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+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1983 and is detained in Sztum. 6.  At the time of the events in question, the applicant was serving a prison sentence in the Barczewo prison. 7.  On 8 January 2011 the applicant\u2019s grandmother died. On 10 January 2011 the applicant lodged a request with the Director of Prison and the Penitentiary judge for leave to attend her funeral which was to take place on 12 January 2011. Together with his application he submitted a statement from his sister E.K. who confirmed that she would personally collect the applicant from prison and bring him back after the funeral. 8.  On 11 January 2011 the Penitentiary judge of the Olsztyn Regional Court (S\u0119dzia Penitencjarny S\u0105du Okr\u0119gowego w Olsztynie) allowed the applicant to attend the funeral under prison officers\u2019 escort. The reasoning of the decision read as follows:\n\u201cIn view of [the applicant\u2019s] multiple convictions and his long term of imprisonment there is no guarantee that he will return to prison\u201d 9.  The applicant refused to attend the funeral, since he believed his appearance under escort of uniformed officers would create a disturbance during the ceremony. 10.  On the same day the applicant lodged an appeal with the Olsztyn Regional Court (S\u0105d Okr\u0119gowy) complaining that the compassionate leave was granted under escort and also that he was only allowed to participate in the funeral (not the preceding church service). 11.  On 3 February 2011 the Olsztyn Regional Court upheld the Penitentiary judge\u2019s decision and dismissed the appeal. The court stressed that the applicant had been allowed to participate in the funeral under prison officers\u2019 escort. It further noted that the applicant was a habitual offender sentenced to a long term of imprisonment therefore there was no positive criminological prognosis and no guarantee that he would have returned to prison after the ceremony.", "references": ["9", "8", "4", "0", "1", "5", "2", "3", "7", "6", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1982 and is currently detained in Cricova. 6.  In 2002 the Prosecutor\u2019s Office initiated a criminal investigation against the applicant on charges of murder and a detention warrant in respect of him was issued by the Buiucani District Court on 14 February 2002. Since the applicant had left the country, an international search order was issued. 7.  In December 2010 the applicant was arrested in the Russian Federation and extradited to Moldova, where he was placed in detention on 29 December 2010 on the basis of the detention warrant of 14 February 2002. The applicant lodged a habeas corpus request in which he complained, inter alia, that he had not been informed about the detention warrant of 14 February 2002 within seventy-two hours, as provided by law, and that there were no relevant and sufficient reasons to deprive him of his liberty. However, the request was rejected on the ground, inter alia, that he had been in hiding and that he could abscond again. Later the detention warrant was renewed several times on similar grounds and the applicant\u2019s appeals were rejected. The last decision in the proceedings concerning his remand in custody dates from 27 May 2011 and it was issued by the Buiucani District Court. By that decision the applicant\u2019s detention on remand was prolonged until 29 June 2011. 8.  During his detention the applicant was jailed in Prison no. 13 in Chi\u015fin\u0103u between 29 December 2010 and 22 March 2012 and after 10 January 2013. The applicant alleges that the cells were overcrowded and dirty; there was no ventilation system; there was no sufficient natural light because the windows were very small; the daily walks lasted for only one hour and the food served was of a very poor quality. In particular he submitted that due to the overcrowding each inmate only had between 1.5 and 2 square metres of available space in the cells. The toilets were separated from the rest of the cells by a wall which was seventy centimetres high or by a curtain and were located at a distance of some 1.5 metres from the table where the inmates served their meals. The inmates were allowed to take showers only once a week and were subjected to passive smoking. 9.  On 14 June 2011 the applicant was convicted and sentenced to eight years\u2019 imprisonment. After this date no more detention warrants were issued and he continued to be detained on the basis of the above sentence. The Court was not informed about subsequent developments in the criminal proceedings against the applicant. 10.  The relevant parts of the report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment compiled following his visit to Moldova from 4 to 11 July 2008 (The United Nations Human Rights Council, document A/HRC/10/44/Add.3, 12 February 2009) read:\n\u201cB.  Conditions in places of detention\nInstitutions under the Ministry of Justice 30.  Undoubtedly, progress has been achieved in improving conditions of detention. However, some of the institutions visited by the Special Rapporteur were heavily overcrowded. The authorities themselves pointed out that Institution No. 13 in Chi\u015fin\u0103u was severely overcrowded - on the day of the visit it held 931 persons with the official capacity being 600 (see also appendix). The Special Rapporteur was informed of Government plans to close down this institution. 31.  Common problems at all pre- and post-trial prisons are the poor hygienic conditions, restricted access to health care and lack of medication as well as risk of contamination with tuberculosis and other diseases. Whereas the Special Rapporteur notes that the minimum norms regarding nutrition of detainees (Government Decision n. 609 of 29 May 2006) are checked on a daily basis and that, according to the financial plan of the Penitentiary Department, the food budget for 2008 had almost doubled in comparison to 2004 and is set to rise further, he also received consistent allegations regarding the poor quality and quantity of food. ...\u201d 11.  In its report for 2009 (page 117, \u201cConditions of detention\u201d), the Centre for Human Rights in Moldova (\u201cthe Human Rights Centre\u201d, which also acts as the Moldovan Ombudsman) found, inter alia, that:\n\u201cRegarding personal hygiene, clothing and bedding, despite [the fact that] Government decision no. 609 (29 May 2006) concerning minimum daily food requirements and the issuing of items of personal hygiene provides for the issuing of soap to detainees for bathing and other sanitary-hygienic needs, this has remained unfulfilled during 2009.\u201d 12.  In its report for 2010 (page 142 et seq. \u201cConditions of detention\u201d) the Human Rights Centre found, inter alia, that:\n\u201cFailure to adhere to the statutory cell size (4 square metres per person) in the living blocks of the institution has become an unpleasant problem which now affects the prison system across the entire country. ...\nThe same situation was confirmed during a visit to Chi\u015fin\u0103u Prison no. 13 on 9 September 2010. In some cells the living space was not proportionate to the number of detainees. During the visit, eight detainees were being held in cell no. 38, which measured 24 square metres. This situation has been seen repeatedly during visits by the Centre\u2019s staff to the Chi\u015fin\u0103u Pre-trial Detention Centre. Similar findings were made during visits to Rusca Prison no. 7 on 19 May 2010, where six detainees were being held in a cell measuring 15.5 square metres and to Cricova Prison no. 4, where (in living block no. 7) over twenty detainees were being held in a cell measuring 65 square metres.\nOvercrowding comes directly within the Ombudsman\u2019s remit as part of the National Mechanism for the Prevention of Torture, which on many occasions has recognised overcrowding in the country\u2019s prisons. ...\n... [T]he Prisons Department informed the Ombudsman that meat and fish products are provided [to detainees] whenever possible. At the same time, the authority stated that, owing to the difficult financial situation, during 2010 the detainees in Rezina Prison no. 17 received only 75% and 80% of their normal quotas of meat and fish products respectively. In this connection, the Minister of Justice provided information to the Ombudsman about the expenditure on prisoners\u2019 food in 2010. The cost amounted to MDL 24.05 million, whereas the budgetary need for the same year was, according to the Ministry of Finance\u2019s draft budget, MDL 29.05 million. The daily cost of feeding a detainee in 2010 was MDL 10.24, whilst the daily budgetary need was MDL 12.35. This statistic was often cited by prison authorities to justify why they were unable to provide detainees with meat and fish.\n...\nAs regards sanitary conditions, lighting and ventilation problems continue to exist in the majority of living blocks in Moldovan prisons, with the exception of Taraclia Prisons no. 1 and Rusca Prison no. 7.\nThe Republic of Moldova inherited old gulag-type prisons in dilapidated buildings, corresponding to former Soviet standards. The prisons do not conform to current national and international standards; however, the budget constraints upon the State do not allow for their reconstruction or renovation.\n In the prisons, with the exception of Taraclia Prison no. 1, detainees are held in large-capacity cells insufficiently equipped for their daily needs, namely areas for sleeping, for everyday living and for sanitary equipment. Detainees are held in extremely overcrowded, dark, damp and unventilated spaces full of cigarette smoke. In certain prisons the bunk beds essentially prevent daylight from reaching the living space.\u201d", "references": ["7", "8", "5", "6", "4", "0", "3", "9", "2", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Naro-Fominsk in the Moscow region. He is currently serving his sentence in IK-4 detention facility in the village of Udarnyy in the Republic of Mordovia. 6.  At 8.20 p.m. on 6 March 2004 Ms E. was robbed in the street and was stabbed through the heart. She died of the wound shortly afterwards. The assailant took a mobile phone and 2,500 Russian roubles (RUB) from the victim\u2019s purse. 7.  The Naro-Fominsk town prosecutor\u2019s office (\u201cthe town prosecutor\u2019s office\u201d) instituted a criminal investigation into E.\u2019s killing. Having obtained from the mobile phone operator the call logs in respect of the victim\u2019s phone, the investigators established that at 9.50 pm on 6 March 2004 a phone call had been made to a number belonging to Ms A. from E.\u2019s phone using the applicant\u2019s SIM card. 8.  At 11 a.m. on 18 March 2004 the police arrived at the applicant\u2019s flat and ordered him to follow them to the police station. 9.  Once at the police station, the applicant explained that on 6 March 2004 he had bought a used mobile phone from a stranger because a friend of his had earlier expressed an interest in purchasing a second-hand phone. In order to test the phone, he had inserted his SIM card and made a call to his then girlfriend, Ms A. He also claimed that on the same day he had played slot machines and won RUB 2,500. Then the officers questioning him showed him a call log from Ms E.\u2019s phone, informed him of the killing and suggested that he confess to mitigate his sentence. The applicant refused to admit to the crime. 10.  The officers proceeded to hit and kick him on his head, chest and flanks. The applicant fainted several times. The beatings went on for twelve hours. Eventually the applicant gave in and agreed to write down a \u201cstatement of surrender and confession\u201d (\u044f\u0432\u043a\u0430 \u0441 \u043f\u043e\u0432\u0438\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0439), as dictated by the officers, admitting to the robbery and murder of Ms E. 11.  An investigator of the town prosecutor\u2019s office, Mr A., questioned the applicant as a suspect and later went to the applicant\u2019s flat to seize a few items including the mobile phone contract for the applicant\u2019s SIM card. 12.  The applicant was not provided with legal assistance on 18 March 2004. 13.  The applicant was brought to the police station at 10 p.m. on 18 March 2004. Upon arrival the police officers asked him how he had obtained Ms E.\u2019s phone and then showed him the call log. The applicant looked at the log and then asked the officers to leave him alone in the room. He then wrote a statement of surrender and confession describing the circumstances of the crime. No physical force was applied to the applicant. 14.  In the Government\u2019s submission, on 18 March 2004 the applicant complained to the town prosecutor\u2019s office; however, he did not raise the issue of ill-treatment. 15.  At 12.30 p.m. on 19 March 2004 an arrest record was drawn up. It contained a handwritten note by the applicant that read as follows: \u201c[I] agree with the arrest, rights are understood, [I have] no statement to make\u201d. 16.  A handwritten statement signed by the applicant and dated 19 March 2004 affirmed that the applicant\u2019s rights had been explained to him; that he did not require legal assistance; that the \u201cbodily injuries visible at [that] moment on [his] face and body [had been] inflicted on 11 March 2004 by [his] roommate Dima\u201d; and that police officers had not used force against him. 17.  Between 12.40 a.m and 2.55 a.m on 19 March 2004 the applicant was questioned without a lawyer present. 18.  In the early morning on 19 March 2004 the applicant was placed in a temporary detention centre (\u0418\u0437\u043e\u043b\u044f\u0442\u043e\u0440 \u0432\u0440\u0435\u043c\u0435\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0441\u043e\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0436\u0430\u043d\u0438\u044f, hereinafter \u201cIVS\u201d). According to the Government, when placed in the IVS, the applicant did not make any health\u2011related complaints. He had a bruise under his right eye. An entry in the IVS logbook was made by an ambulance doctor stating that the applicant was \u201cin a post-epileptic-fit state\u201d. 19.  Between 11.10 a.m. and 12.50 p.m. on 19 March 2004 the applicant was questioned in the presence of Mr B., a legal-aid lawyer. According to the Government, in the course of the interview he described how he had committed the crime. The record of the interview reads that the applicant found the knife used as the murder weapon at a market after a fire. 20.  On 20 or 22 March 2004[1] the investigators carried out an investigative re-enactment. In the applicant\u2019s submission, the re-enactment was limited to bringing him to the crime scene and photographing him there. According to the Government, during the visit the applicant confirmed his statement made in the presence of the lawyer in the course of the second interview of 19 March 2004. He also selected a knife similar to that used to stab Ms E. from a selection of four knives available at a local shop. 21.  On 20 March 2004 a judge of the Naro-Fominsk Town Court (\u201cthe Town Court\u201d) placed the applicant in custody. The applicant complained to the judge about his ill-treatment; she refused to take note of the allegations, however, stating that they could be examined in the course of the trial against the applicant. 22.  On 25 March 2004 the applicant was formally charged with murder and robbery. He retracted his confession. 23.  On 26 March 2004 the police transported the applicant to a remand prison. However, the staff on duty refused to admit the applicant as he had visible injuries. The applicant was returned to the IVS. On 29 March 2004 the police again tried to transfer him to the remand prison and were refused for the second time. 24.  On 30 March 2004 the police brought the applicant to the Naro\u2011Fominsk polyclinic where he underwent an X-ray examination which showed that there were fractures to three ribs with signs that the bones were beginning to heal. The following day the applicant was admitted to the remand prison. 25.  According to the applicant, once in the remand prison, he complained about his ill\u2011treatment to the town prosecutor\u2019s office. 26.  According to the Government, the applicant raised the ill-treatment complaint on 17 June 2004. The town prosecutor\u2019s office carried out a pre\u2011investigation inquiry on the basis of the complaint. 27.  On 18 June 2004 Mr A., an investigator with the town prosecutor\u2019s office, refused to initiate criminal proceedings into the alleged ill-treatment. He observed that upon arrival at the IVS the applicant had had a bruise under his right eye and yet had made no complaints about his state of health, and noted that, according to the IVS logbook, an ambulance had been called for the applicant on account of an epileptic fit. 28.  On an unspecified date the criminal case against the applicant was submitted for trial before the Moscow Regional Court (\u201cthe Regional Court\u201d). 29.  The applicant first took cognisance of the decision of 18 June 2004 on 29 June 2004 while studying the case file in the criminal case against him. 30.  The applicant complained about the town prosecutor\u2019s office\u2019s refusal of 18 June 2004 to the Russian Prosecutor General\u2019s Office, which forwarded it for examination by the Prosecutor\u2019s Office of the Moscow region. The latter forwarded the complaint to the town prosecutor\u2019s office (against which the complaint was directed). The applicant received no reply. 31.  The applicant did not attempt to institute any judicial review proceedings, considering that they would be futile on account of the judge\u2019s reply of 20 March 2004. 32.  On 27 July 2004 the Regional Court scheduled a trial hearing on 9 August 2004. 33.  The applicant raised the matter of ill-treatment before the Regional Court at his trial. 34.  On 20 October 2004 the Regional Court ordered an expert medical examination of the X-ray of 30 March 2004. It can be seen from the trial record of that date that N. informed the judge that he was not an expert in interpreting X\u2011rays and asked for a period of two weeks to consult a colleague; the judge acceded to the request. On 4 November 2004 N. drew up a report stating that the rib fractures had been caused by blunt objects; by 30 March 2004 the knitting together of the fractures had commenced; the fractures had been \u201cconsiderably old\u201d and \u201cno injuries corresponding to [those of] 11 and 18 March 2004 [had been] identified\u201d. The judge rejected the applicant\u2019s request for another expert report. 35.  The Regional Court dismissed the record of the first interview of 19 March 2004 as inadmissible evidence for the reason that the interview had been conducted without a lawyer present. 36.  On 3 December 2004 the Regional Court convicted the applicant of robbery and murder and sentenced him to twenty years\u2019 imprisonment. The court referred to the applicant\u2019s pre-trial confession, the record of his questioning by the investigator, his statements at the investigative re\u2011enactment and other physical evidence. 37.  The trial judge also examined in detail the evidence presented by the parties in relation to the allegation of ill\u2011treatment, including the decision of 18 June 2004 and the expert medical report ordered in respect of the X-ray. The judge also heard evidence from an expert, N., as well as investigator Mr A. and several police officers. The judge refused to examine the IVS logbook which, according to the applicant, would support his assertion that there were injuries. Instead, the judge examined a letter from the deputy director of the IVS, according to which on his arrival there the applicant only had had a black eye which he had explained as having received before the arrest. The deputy director had also noted that the logbook entry concerning the call for an ambulance had been made for another person. The judge dismissed the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment and declared the relevant evidence (the confession statement, the interview record and the investigative re-enactment record) admissible. 38.  On 6 December 2004 the applicant lodged an appeal reiterating the issue of his confession under duress without a lawyer present, as well as the weakness of the prosecution\u2019s case against him. He insisted on his innocence. 39.  On 14 December 2004 the applicant lodged an additional appeal in which he claimed that the Regional Court had wrongly considered his previous conviction as an aggravating factor and yet had chosen to regard the surrender and confession as a mitigating factor. He asked for the first\u2011instance judgment to be quashed on the grounds given in his appeal of 6 December 2004. 40.  On the same date the applicant (through his counsel) lodged an appeal in which he insisted that the statement of surrender and confession had not been genuine as he had been forcibly brought to the police station and detained there for twelve hours with no access to a lawyer. 41.  On 16 March 2005 the Supreme Court of Russia upheld the first\u2011instance judgment in a summary fashion. 42.  The applicant further unsuccessfully sought supervisory review of his conviction. 43.  On 5 April 2005 the applicant sent another complaint to the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office, which was forwarded to the town prosecutor\u2019s office. 44.  On 12 May 2005 the deputy town prosecutor quashed the decision of 18 June 2004 and issued an instruction to carry out an additional pre\u2011investigation inquiry. 45.  On 15 May 2005 S., an investigator with the town prosecutor\u2019s office, refused to institute an investigation into the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment. He found it established that on 12 March 2004 a police officer in Naro-Fominsk had received a report of a violent fight; on 13 March 2004 he had invited the applicant to come in for a \u201cpreventative talk\u201d and had noticed two bruises under the applicant\u2019s eyes. S. concluded that the bruise under the applicant\u2019s right eye had been a result of the injury inflicted long before the arrest. He also pointed out that the Regional Court had \u201ccarefully examined\u201d the applicant\u2019s version of ill-treatment by police officers. The issue of the fractured ribs was not examined.", "references": ["5", "0", "7", "2", "6", "4", "9", "8", "No Label", "1", "3"], "gold": ["1", "3"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1977 and lives in Luton. 7.  The applicant was summoned to attend jury service at the Crown Court on 4 July 2011. 8.  On the morning of the 4 July the jurors were shown a video in relation to their service and were given verbal instruction from the court\u2019s jury officer that they were not permitted to research their cases on the Internet or to research the defendants or any of the individuals involved in the trial. Notices in the jury waiting room contained the following warning:\n\u201cYou may also be in contempt of court if you use the internet to research details about any cases you hear along with any cases listed for trial at the Court ...\u201d 9.  The notices made it clear that contempt of court was punishable by a fine or by imprisonment. 10.  The applicant was selected to serve on a jury in a trial of a defendant charged with grievous bodily harm with intent. The trial commenced that afternoon. When the jury were sworn, the applicant took an oath or affirmation that she would faithfully try the defendant and give a true verdict according to the evidence. 11.  Before the case was opened by the prosecution, the judge gave a number of directions to the jury. These underlined the importance of deciding the case only on the basis of what the jury saw and heard in the courtroom. Two consequences were identified by the judge. The first was that they should not speak about the case to anybody. He continued:\n\u201cThe second consequence is a newer one: that you do not go on the internet. You have probably read in the last few weeks about a juror who did go on the internet; went on Facebook and severe problems followed for that juror. I am sure you will not want any of those. So, the rule is \u2013 and it is told to every jury \u2013 that not only do you not discuss it, but you do not go on the internet; you do not try and do any research of your own; you do not discuss it on Facebook; you do not tweet about it; or anything of that nature. So, simply, once you leave this room you do not talk about it or deal with it in any way with anybody.\nWe ask you to observe what goes on in this room. The evidence has been carefully considered. It is put before you in a carefully considered way. That is why you are not to discuss it with anybody else or do your own research, or discuss it on Facebook \u2013 because it is carefully controlled ...\u201d 12.  The trial continued on 5 and 6 July 2011. On 5 July the trial judge allowed a prosecution application to adduce evidence of the defendant\u2019s bad character. The disclosure gave details of a previous sentence for assault occasioning actual bodily harm. It was not disclosed that the defendant had also been charged with rape in respect of the same offence but had been acquitted. 13.  On 6 July 2011 the jury retired to consider their verdict. At the end of the court day the judge sent the jury home to return on 8 July 2011. 14.  After the court had risen, one of the jurors in the case informed the court usher that a juror, whom she identified as the applicant, had been on the Internet and had found out about the previous conviction and that it involved rape. The trial judge was informed. 15.  On 8 July 2011, after hearing from the juror in court, the judge summoned the jury foreman, who confirmed that there had been some reference to the matter to which the juror had referred. The judge then called the applicant into court. He informed her of what had been said and that she should not say anything at that stage. He gave her the opportunity, which she accepted, of speaking to a barrister in order to take advice on the question of contempt of court. After discussion with the applicant, the barrister informed the court that the applicant\u2019s position was that her behaviour regarding the Internet was not deliberate. She therefore claimed to have a defence to the allegation of contempt of court. The judge explained to her that the matter would be referred to the Attorney General and that there would be a police investigation. 16.  The judge subsequently discharged the jury and the trial was aborted. 17.  The police obtained statements from the eleven other jurors at trial. The statements showed that during the jury deliberations the applicant stated that she had conducted Internet research and that her research had showed that the previous conviction also included an allegation of rape. Most of the other jurors had reacted to this by making it clear that the applicant had introduced extraneous and impermissible facts into their discussion, contrary to the instructions and directions that they had been given. 18.  On 26 July 2011 the police interviewed the applicant under caution. During the interview, the applicant explained what had happened at the commencement of the trial and set out her recollection of what the trial judge had said as follows:\n\u201cThe judge said ... that we should not look, we should not publish anything on Facebook, on Twitter, we should not tell anybody outside the court about the case ...\u201d 19.  She said that did not recall that the judge had instructed jurors not to do Internet research. 20.  She explained that she had seen a newspaper article concerning the defendant on the Internet on the evening of 5 July 2011. When asked what she was doing on the Internet, she replied that, as she was Greek, she had wished to know the exact translation of the charge facing the defendant. She had therefore searched for \u201cgrievous bodily harm\u201d. She had then wished to see how frequent such incidents were in Luton so added \u201cLuton\u201d to the search terms. The article concerning the defendant\u2019s previous conviction had appeared in the list of results. She explained that her recollection was hazy but that she did not remember searching for the defendant by name. She admitted that she had informed the other members of the jury of the information she had found. She said that she was not aware that she had missed any element of the judge\u2019s instructions and that she had had \u201cabsolutely no intention\u201d of going against the instructions or directions of the judge. 21.  The Attorney General subsequently applied to the Divisional Court for permission to make an application for an order of committal under Order 52 of the Rules of the Supreme Court (\u201cSCR\u201d \u2013 see paragraphs 45-46 below). The applicant was informed of the application by letter dated 3 November 2011. 22.  On 29 November 2011 the Divisional Court granted permission to make a committal application. 23.  On 2 December 2011 a claim form was issued by the Attorney General seeking an order of committal against the applicant for:\n\u201ccontempt of court in conducting Internet research on the case she was trying as a juror in the Crown Court and thereafter in disclosing the extraneous information she had obtained to other members of the jury.\u201d 24.  The grounds on which the applicant\u2019s committal was sought were that\n\u201cher acts created a substantial risk of seriously prejudicing and/or impeding the course of justice in the proceedings with which she was concerned.\u201d 25.  Reference was made to further details set out in a sworn affidavit by a legal adviser at the Attorney General\u2019s office. In the affidavit, it was submitted that the evidence in the case demonstrated that the applicant:\n\u201cdeliberately and in breach of instructions given by the jury officer, a warning contained in a written notice, her jury oath or affirmation and directions given by the trial judge, (a) conducted internet research on the case she was trying, and thereby obtained extraneous information about the case, and (b) imparted that extraneous information to other members of the jury whilst the jury were in deliberation.\u201d 26.  In her position statement dated 5 December 2011, the applicant accepted that she had searched on the Internet for the words \u201cgrievous\u201d and \u201cLuton\u201d while the trial was underway and that she had discussed with other jurors a newspaper report concerning the defendant. She did not accept a specific intent to impede or to cause a real risk of prejudice to the due administration of justice. 27.  In a note on behalf of the Attorney General dated 9 January 2012, the test for contempt was set out as follows:\n\u201cAt common law, a contempt of court is an act or omission which creates a real risk of prejudice to the administration of justice, done with the intent of creating such a risk.\u201d 28.  The note went on to claim that the applicant\u2019s Internet research and subsequent conduct in relation to it had created a real risk of prejudice to the administration of justice and had been done with the intent of creating such a risk. 29.  In written submissions on behalf of the applicant dated 10 January 2012, it was submitted that the offence of contempt of court could be stated as follows:\n\u201cWhere a person knowingly does an act which he specifically intends to impede, or create a real risk of prejudicing, the due administration of justice ...\u201d 30.  On 19 January 2012 the application for committal was heard. Counsel for the applicant submitted that the key element that the prosecution had to prove was \u201cspecific intent\u201d, that is intent to impede or create a real risk of prejudicing the due administration of justice. He referred to the Attorney General\u2019s position that intent could be inferred from foresight of the consequences and indicated that, while that might be appropriate in some cases, it did not sit so easily with the kind of intent required in the applicant\u2019s case. An exchange then took place between the court and counsel for the applicant, as follows:\n\u201c[Court]:Can we get this down to the reality of the case. The Crown\u2019s case is that your client deliberately disobeyed the order of the judge. Is that not the same as what you are saying? You disagree with it and you are going to submit to us why the Crown\u2019s case is wrong, but if a juror deliberately disobeys the order if a judge, is that not contempt of court?\n[Counsel]:Certainly, yes.\n[Court]: The \u2018deliberate\u2019 is the point that matters.\n[Counsel]: Yes. Yes.\u201d 31.  The Attorney General was subsequently asked whether he accepted that in the context of the case he had to satisfy the court, to the criminal standard, that the applicant had deliberately disobeyed the order of the judge. He confirmed that he did. 32.  At the conclusion of the evidence and submissions, and after the court had already adjourned, the judges returned to seek further clarification of the correct test for contempt of court. The following test was put to counsel by the bench:\n\u201cIt is a contempt in the context of jury misconduct within the jury room, for a juror deliberately to disobey the direction of the judge and create a risk of prejudice to the due administration of justice.\u201d 33.  The judge added:\n\u201cWhat that removes is a specific intent in relation to the creation of the risk. The intent is directed at the deliberate disobedience.\u201d 34.  The Attorney General expressed himself to be content with the test proposed. Counsel for the applicant requested that the word \u201cthereby\u201d be added following \u201cdisobey the direction of the judge and ...\u201d, in order to create a link between the two elements. The Attorney General fully accepted the proposed modification. Counsel for the applicant was pressed on whether he was content with a definition whereby the intent was the deliberate act of disobeying the order, which then had a causative link in creating the risk. It was noted by the judge that this was a slightly different test from the one counsel had earlier proposed. He replied that he was content with the proposed test, and added:\n\u201cI am reacting as I stand. I hope I can venture to submit that actually, if this is the test, it is perhaps redefining an old law but it is new.\u201d 35.  On 23 January 2012 an order for committal was made. The Divisional Court summarised the applicant\u2019s version of events as follow:\n\u201c36. On her account, effectively, she came across the newspaper reference to [the defendant\u2019s] previous conviction in the local newspaper in Luton by following a route from the word \u2018grievous\u2019 through to \u2018Luton\u2019 and \u2018crime\u2019 and in effect, somehow she stumbled across the newspaper entry.\u201d 36.  However, the court rejected her account, explaining:\n\u201c37. We do not believe that the defendant did not seek information about [the defendant] on the internet. Her inability to remember this particular feature of the case, when she has a detailed recollection of so much else, was not credible. We do not believe that she could have just stumbled across the link to [the defendant\u2019s] previous conviction in the way she described.\u201d 37.  The court concluded:\n\u201c38. We have no doubt that the defendant knew perfectly well, first, that the judge had directed her, and the other members of the jury, in unequivocal terms, that they should not seek information about the case from the internet; second, that the defendant appreciated that this was an order; and, third, that the defendant deliberately disobeyed the order. By doing so, before she made any disclosure to her fellow jurors, she did not merely risk prejudice to the due administration of justice, but she caused prejudice to it. This was because she had sought to arm and had armed herself with information of possible relevance to the trial which, although not adduced in evidence, might have played its part in her verdict. The moment when she disclosed any of that information to her fellow jurors she further prejudiced the administration of justice. In the result, the jury was rightly discharged from returning a verdict and a new trial was ordered. The unfortunate complainant had to give evidence of his ordeal on a second occasion. The time of the other members of the jury was wasted, and the public was put to additional unnecessary expense. The damage to the administration of justice is obvious.\u201d 38.  It found that the contempt had been proved to the criminal standard. On sentence, the court explained that misuse of the Internet by a juror was always \u201ca most serious irregularity\u201d and that an effective custodial sentence was virtually inevitable to ensure that the integrity of the process of trial by jury was sustained. A sentence of imprisonment for six months was imposed. The judge noted that pursuant to rules on early release, the applicant would serve three months in prison. 39.  Following the handing down of the judgment, an exchange took place between the applicant\u2019s counsel and the bench. The applicant\u2019s counsel sought clarity on the test for contempt of court, explaining:\n\u201cI am concerned that the test that I was addressing \u2013 that we were addressing in preparation of this case \u2013 was a different test. We conducted the defence to a different test, and the reasons why it was a different test, I suggest, are threefold. First, the intention is different. Secondly, the risk has been diluted from \u2018real risk\u2019 \u2013 and, after all, \u2018risk\u2019 on the authorities simply means \u2018a possibility of occurrence\u2019 to \u2018risk\u2019. Thirdly, may I make this submission? This is the first occasion \u2013 I do this with some hesitation for I can find no authority \u2013 where there has been a contempt of court flowing from a judicial direction.\n... It has always historically been the order which has attracted contempt, not the direction, and the idea that a judge gives directions to a jury in the summing-up which could attract contempt and imprisonment is, in my submission, a novel one.\nI therefore submit this question rhetorically: whether this reformulation that this court has applied in this case is consistent with the common law of contempt.\u201d 40.  The court retired to consider the matter before confirming that the appropriate test was applied in paragraph 38 of its judgment (see paragraph 37 above), and that it had been understood that applicant\u2019s counsel had agreed to that test. Leave to appeal was refused. 41.  The applicant applied for permission to appeal to the Supreme Court. She argued, inter alia, that the test of contempt of court reformulated by the Divisional Court was not consistent with the common law of contempt of court; and that the reformulation of the offence, after evidence had been led and final submissions concluded, was not compatible with human rights principles and in particular with Articles 6 and 7 of the Convention. 42.  On 26 January 2012 the applicant\u2019s petition to appeal to the Supreme Court was refused because the application did not raise an arguable point of law. In particular, the Supreme Court concluded that a suggested distinction between a \u201cdirection\u201d and an \u201corder\u201d was not tenable since the meaning of each depended on the context and both could mean the same; and that the deliberate disobedience of a specific order of the judge not to use the Internet in connection with the case unquestionably amounted to contempt of court at common law. 43.  From 23 January 2012 to 20 April 2012 the applicant was detained at HMP Holloway.", "references": ["9", "5", "8", "2", "6", "1", "4", "3", "0", "7", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicants were born in 1983 and 2007 respectively and live in Gevgelija, in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. 7.  On 15 October 2006 the first applicant married Mr V. Savik (\u201cthe father\u201d). On 11 February 2007 she gave birth to their daughter, the second applicant. 8.  On 10 May 2007 the Gevgelija Court of First Instance (\u201cthe first-instance court\u201d) dissolved the marriage and gave the first applicant custody of the second applicant. 9.  On 31 May 2007, on an application by the father, the Gevgelija Social Welfare Centre (\u201cthe Centre\u201d) made an order specifying that he could see the second applicant at the first applicant\u2019s house every Friday for two hours. The order was made after the Centre had examined the situation in both families and had discussed the matter with the parents. \u0422he order was served on the first applicant on 2 June 2007. 10.  The first applicant\u2019s refusal to allow the father to have contact with the second applicant at four scheduled meetings between 8 and 29 June 2007 led to her being convicted pursuant to Article 198 of the Criminal Code (judgment K.br.133/07 of 2 July 2007). The court, noting the child\u2019s young age, dismissed the first applicant\u2019s defence (that she had not been consulted and notified about the Centre\u2019s order of 31 May 2007; that the child had not been developing properly at the time; and that the father had not shown any interest for the child) and sentenced her to six months\u2019 imprisonment, suspended for one year. In determining the penalty, the court referred to gravity of the crime and the manner in which it had been committed, as aggravating circumstances, as well as to the first applicant\u2019s age, her admitting to the crime, the fact that she had no previous criminal record, her good behaviour and her family situation, as mitigating factors. According to the court, the suspended prison term would deter her from reoffending and help crime prevention as a whole. The judgment was upheld on appeal on 27 December 2007. 11.  A further refusal by the first applicant to comply with the Centre\u2019s order of 31 May 2007 by not allowing the father to have contact with the second applicant between July and October 2007 resulted in her being convicted a second time and being given a further suspended prison sentence (eight months, suspended for two years, judgment K.br.229/07 of 17 December 2007, upheld on appeal on 14 May 2008). The first applicant was also ordered to allow the father to see the child within 30 days after the judgment would become final. In case of non-compliance, the court specified that the suspension would be revoked and the sentence would be enforced. The court dismissed the first applicant\u2019s defence that the father had failed to observe the scheduled meeting times, that he had turned up instead under the influence of alcohol and drugs and that he had harassed her, her parents and the child. In determining the penalty, the court referred, inter alia, to the first applicant\u2019s age and her standard of living, as mitigating factors. Both judgments (K.br.133/07 and K.br.229/07) were delivered after the court had heard oral evidence from the first applicant, the father and a representative of the Centre. They were given by Judge I.S. of the Gevgelija Court of First Instance. 12.  In the meantime, on 21 November 2007, the Centre set a new venue and time for the meetings between the father and the second applicant. It was decided to increase the time to five hours every Friday and for the meetings to take place at the Centre rather than in the first applicant\u2019s house. According to the order, the father\u2019s right to have contact with the second applicant, as specified in the order of 31 May 2007, had been considerably affected by the strained relationship between him and the first applicant. The new arrangement required the first applicant to take the second applicant to the Centre at a specified time each week. The Centre stated, inter alia, that:\n\u201c... According to the established methodology of work, all efforts have been made for communication to be established between both parents, between the competent body and [the first applicant] and the parents have been alerted to all legal consequences should they fail to enforce their statutory duties as parents that can violate the rights of the minor child.\nAfter actions have been taken and facts have been established ... on a meeting held on 12 November 2007 the expert team found that no communication could yet be established with [the first applicant] and the parents could not agree on [the second applicant\u2019s] right to have regular contacts and meetings with the non-cohabitant parent. Such an attitude infringes the right of the minor S. Therefore, given [the second applicant\u2019s] age, the need for an emotional bond to be created between the minor child and the non-cohabitant parent, the need to protect her rights, as well (the need) to eliminate any possibility for manipulation that would prevent the expert team to supervise the enforcement of the contact arrangements between the minor child and the father, (the Centre) decided the father\u2019s visiting rights in respect of the minor S.S...\u201d. 13.  The first applicant failed to appear at three scheduled meetings in November and December 2007. On two occasions in January and March 2008, the father did not see his daughter because she was ill. 14.  On 29 April 2008, after the Centre had obtained the views of the first applicant and the father and had examined the file, it partially accepted the father\u2019s request for longer and more frequent meetings and issued an order (no. 12-07/33), specifying that his meetings with the second applicant were to take place in the Centre every Monday from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. The order further stated that:\n\u201c... The expert team (notes that) the minor S. is still breast-fed, but (since) it is necessary to further strengthen the [child\u2019s] emotional bond with the non-cohabitant parent and to protect the right of [the second applicant] to have contact with the father, it considers that the visiting rights should remain once a week, but longer, which would enable that (the child) stays overnight after she would no longer be breast-fed.\u201d 15.  The Centre further set two dates on which the father could meet the second applicant, to replace the meetings missed in January and March 2008 (see paragraph 13 above). The first applicant was ordered to comply with the new contact arrangements or risk criminal proceedings being instituted against her and the father being given temporary custody of the second applicant. 16.  As the first applicant failed to comply in full with the order of 29 April 2008, on 28 May 2008 the Centre allowed the order of 29 April 2008 to be enforced by means of a separate order issued under section 14 of the Family Act (see paragraph 46 below). It established that the first applicant had failed to take the child to four of the scheduled meetings, despite being warned of the possible consequences should she fail to comply. The order further stated that:\n\u201c... Such a warning did not, for unknown reasons, enable the minor S.S. to enjoy the statutory right to contact her father and the mother not only ignores the order, but also engages in unreasonable and constant correspondence to describe incomprehensible situations, and makes accusations in a confused manner about matters which are the subject of other proceedings.\nIn view of the above and by virtue of law, the expert team ... decided unanimously that there are statutory grounds for forceful enforcement of the executive order of 29 April 2008 ... and for proceedings to be instituted regarding custody of the child and criminal liability of [the first applicant].\nIn view of the above and the fact that (the case concerns) the forceful prevention by [the first applicant] of contacts between minor S.S. and her father V.S. ...the expert team considers that the forceful enforcement (of the order of 29 April 2008) as specified in (this decision) is in the absolute interest of the minor [second applicant] ...\u201d 17.  The first applicant was ordered to take the second applicant to the Centre on 2 June 2008 or risk being prosecuted for child abduction under Article 198 of the Criminal Code. The order stated that an appeal would not suspend enforcement of the order (\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043e\u0442\u043e \u043d\u0430 \u0436\u0430\u043b\u0431\u0430 \u043d\u0435 \u0433\u043e \u043e\u0434\u043b\u0430\u0433\u0430 \u0438\u0437\u0432\u0440\u0448\u0443\u0432\u0430\u045a\u0435\u0442\u043e). The first applicant confirmed that she had received the enforcement order of 28 May 2008. She appealed against that order, arguing that she had never been served with the Centre\u2019s order of 29 April 2008. Furthermore, she argued that the delivery that she had received by post on 2 May 2008 had not contained the order of 29 April 2008. No decision on the appeal was made. 18.  On 17 June 2008 the first applicant asked the Centre to review the level of contact the father should have with the child. On 24 December 2008, the Centre made an order setting out the level of contact the father should have with the child. It appears that the first applicant complied with this order. 19.  On an unspecified date, the father requested that the Centre review the level of contact with the second applicant. The first applicant failed to appear at the Centre to discuss the father\u2019s request, notwithstanding that the Centre invited her to do so at two occasions. On 3 June 2009 the Centre made an order specifying that the father should meet his daughter every Monday to Tuesday (from 9 a.m. to 9 a.m.). The increased amount of contact was justified by the child\u2019s \u201cspecific age and stage of development ... when a stable relationship (with the father), as well as an emotional bond between them, were necessary for [the child\u2019s] proper mental and physical development\u201d. 20. Subsequent to the two judgments against her of 2 July and 17 December 2007 (see paragraphs 10 and 11 above), on 19 June 2008, the public prosecutor brought criminal charges against the first applicant. She was accused of failing to allow the meeting scheduled for 2 June 2008 to take place, as required by the Centre\u2019s orders of 29 April and 28 May 2008. In submissions of 30 June 2008, the first applicant denied the charge, arguing that she had never been served with the Centre\u2019s order of 29 April 2008. In this connection, she maintained that she had received another order from the Centre dated 30 April 2008. She also expressed concerns about the fairness of the upcoming trial, given her Bulgarian nationality. She further applied for the removal of Judge I.S., should he be assigned to decide the case. On 1 July 2008 her application was dismissed by \u201ca judge replacing the president\u201d of the first-instance court. In submissions of 7 July 2008 to the first-instance court, the first applicant repeated her arguments and explained that she had sought Judge I.S.\u2019s removal because he had convicted her in the previous criminal cases brought against her. She also maintained that he had allegedly solicited sexual favours from her. Her criminal complaint on the latter subject had allegedly been rejected by the same public prosecutor who had indicted her in the impugned proceedings. She also alleged that the judge who had replaced the president of the first-instance court, and who had dismissed her application for the removal of Judge I.S., was a relative of hers who, in discussions with her, had expressed disagreement with a decision she had made to study in Bulgaria. 21.  The first applicant decided not to testify at the hearing held on 10 July 2008. The first-instance court heard the father, who stated that for reasons unknown to him he had not seen his daughter at any of the scheduled meetings since 29 April 2008. A representative of the Centre stated that the first applicant had not complied with its orders of 29 April and 28 May 2008, notwithstanding the fact that she had been informed of the consequences of non-compliance. She confirmed that the first applicant had been served with all the relevant orders the Centre had made. In a judgment of the same date the first-instance court, presided over by Judge I.S., found the first applicant guilty and sentenced her to three months in prison. In doing so, it relied on the oral and documentary evidence admitted at the trial, including the Centre\u2019s orders of 29 April and 28 May 2008, which had provided explicitly for the need of the child to \u201cstrengthen the emotional bond with the [father] and to protect [her] right to have contact with [him]\u201d as being \u201cin [the child\u2019s] absolute interest\u201d. The court established that the first applicant had not complied with these orders notwithstanding that she had been alerted about the consequences for non-compliance. She had not allowed the father to see his daughter on several occasions before and after 2 June 2008, the date specified in the enforcement order of 28 May 2008. The court further stated that it could not assess the first applicant\u2019s defence due to the fact that she had remained silent at the trial and provided no arguments regarding the incident. Lastly, it stated that:\n\u201cIn assessing the severity of the sentence, the court took into consideration all relevant circumstances (aggravating and mitigating factors) ... in particular, the gravity of the charges and concrete consequences, the manner in which the crime had been committed, the fact that [the first applicant] had already been convicted of the same offence on 2 July [judgment K.br.133/07] and 17 December 2007 [judgment K.br.229/07] and [sentenced to an alternative penalty-suspended prison term]. The court found no alleviating circumstances related to the [first applicant].\nThe above stated leads to a conclusion that the suspended prison sentences issued against the [first applicant] had no impact on her, [given that the first applicant] continues committing the same offence. Accordingly, it decided to sentence her to a prison term finding that it would ... deter her from reoffending in the future and would [help crime prevention as a whole]. 22.  The first applicant appealed. On 3 December 2008 the Skopje Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and upheld the lower court\u2019s judgment. It held that the first-instance court had correctly established that she had not complied with the Centre\u2019s orders of 29 April and 28 May 2008. Lastly, it endorsed the reasons of the first-instance court regarding her custodial sentence. 23.  On 18 February 2009 the first applicant applied to the Supreme Court for an extraordinary review of the final judgment, reiterating the arguments she had raised in her appeal. On 5 May 2009 the Supreme Court dismissed her application, finding that the facts, as based on the evidence admitted at the trial, had been correctly established by the lower courts. In this connection, the lower courts had correctly applied the procedural rules and based their judgments on evidence admitted at the trial. Lastly, the court endorsed the reasons given by the lower courts. 24.  The first applicant was ordered to present herself at prison on 10 March 2009. On 13 March 2009 the first-instance court postponed the execution of the sentence because the second applicant was ill and a new date was set for 14 June 2009. The first applicant started serving her sentence on 30 July 2009, and was released on 8 October 2009. 25.  On 9 July 2009 the Centre gave the father custody of the second applicant for fifteen days. 26.  On 30 July 2009, the date when the first applicant started serving the sentence, the Centre gave the father, of its own motion and on the basis of section 87(6) of the Family Act (see paragraph 54 below), temporary custody of the second applicant pending the conclusion of custody proceedings which he had initiated in August 2008 (see paragraph 33 below). According to the order, the first applicant had not allowed the second applicant to have any contact with the father at any of the scheduled meetings since 15 June 2009. After that date, the applicants had gone into hiding, despite the second applicant\u2019s poor health, which required continuous medical supervision. The order further referred to the first applicant\u2019s incarceration. The order did not provide for any contact rights for the first applicant in respect of the second applicant. 27.  On 6 October 2009 the first applicant sought permission from the Centre to see the second applicant. According to the Government, the Centre invited her to an interview upon her release from prison. However, it appears that she did not receive the invitation and, accordingly, failed to appear. 28.  According to the first applicant, on 23 November 2009 a lawyer acting on her behalf contacted the Centre to find out the whereabouts of her daughter and it was allegedly on that occasion that she was given the Centre\u2019s order of 30 July 2009 (see paragraph 26 above). The lawyer allegedly requested the Centre to decide the contact arrangements between the first and second applicants, which the Centre refused to do, as under the law such orders were only made after both parents had been interviewed by the Centre\u2019s welfare officers. 29.  On 4 January 2010 the first applicant again requested that the Centre specify her contact rights. In reply, the Centre twice asked the first applicant to specify a time and place for meeting her daughter. The first applicant refused to be served with these notifications. 30.  According to the Government, on 29 January 2010 the first applicant applied to the first-instance court for a decision on the amount of contact she could have with her daughter. Since she had specified a time and place for her contact with the daughter, the Centre, in an order dated 10 February 2010, specified her contact rights, which were to be every Friday from 10 a.m. to 3 p.m. 31.  On 19 February 2010 the first applicant met her daughter. 32.  On an application lodged by the first applicant, on 5 March 2010, the order of 10 February 2010 was replaced by a new order by the Centre, dated 17 March 2010, according to which the first applicant was allowed to stay with the second applicant every second weekend in the month, from Friday (3 p.m.) to Monday (9 a.m.). 33.  On 26 August 2008 the father initiated custody proceedings, seeking to have the first-instance court amend its judgment of 10 May 2007 (see paragraph 8 above) and give him custody of the second applicant. In a judgment of 11 March 2010, the court granted his application and ordered the first applicant to hand the child over to the father. The first applicant would be allowed to maintain personal and direct contact with her. On 20 May 2010, however, the judgment was set aside by the Skopje Court of Appeal, which remitted the case for a fresh examination. The Court of Appeal ordered the first-instance court to reassess the available evidence and provide convincing reasons why the first applicant was unfit to enjoy custody of the child. 34.  On 15 October 2010 the first-instance court dismissed the father\u2019s application after hearing evidence from him and the first applicant and admitting expert opinions, of 25 August 2009 and 5 February 2010, which confirmed that both parents were mentally fit and had the required capacity to care for the child. It also admitted a report by the Centre, dated 24 September 2009, in which welfare officers confirmed that the first applicant had the necessary capacity to provide basic care for the child, but that she had continuously prevented her from seeing the father. They had not applied to a court to have her parental rights restricted since there were other ways to protect the interests and rights of the child. They further argued that the first applicant\u2019s behaviour had been inappropriate: she had used insulting language towards everyone involved in the case, and had portrayed herself, without any justification, as a victim of the system. According to the experts, this was not a suitable environment for the second applicant. On the basis of all the available information, the Centre\u2019s welfare officers suggested that it would be in the child\u2019s best interests for the father to be given custody. In that way the child could maintain a relationship with both parents, which she had been unable to do when the first applicant had had custody. 35.  Referring to the aforementioned facts, (see paragraphs 7-32 above), the court found that the first applicant had, for a protracted period of time, prevented the father from having contact with his daughter at the scheduled meetings. She had not been cooperative or shown any insight in her dealings with the State authorities, unlike the father, whose behaviour had been of no concern. Her past behaviour had been the result of her lack of trust in the authorities and her strained relationship with the father, but this had not affected her ability to care for the child. In this connection, the court stated:\n\u201cThe court took into consideration the [Centre\u2019s welfare officers\u2019] opinion, but it has found that it would be in the best interests of the child, given the child\u2019s (young) age and current stage of her development, for her to remain in the custody of the mother. The father may maintain a personal relationship and direct contact with the child. The court also took into consideration the fact that, as a consequence of these proceedings, the parties have understood the need for mutual communication in order to ensure the rights of the child. They ... have reached an agreement regarding their right to have contact with the child, which reduces the need for the competent body to determine those relationships ... In this connection, there is always the possibility that the parents reach their own agreement, at any given time, regarding custody of the child, as befits her interests.\u201d 36.  Lastly, the court concluded that the first applicant\u2019s nationality was of no relevance to the case. On 3 February 2011 the Skopje Court of Appeal upheld the judgment. 37.  After the judgment became final, on 7 March 2011 the Centre specified the contact rights of the father and allowed him to meet his daughter on the second and fourth weekend of the month, between Friday (3 p.m.) and Monday (9 a.m.). 38.  On 1 March 2012 the Supreme Court upheld an appeal on points of law (\u0440\u0435\u0432\u0438\u0437\u0438\u0458\u0430) by the father, finding that there had been a \u201cwrongful application of the substantive law given the established facts\u201d (\u043f\u043e\u0433\u0440\u0435\u0448\u043d\u0430 \u043f\u0440\u0438\u043c\u0435\u043d\u0430 \u043d\u0430 \u043c\u0430\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0438\u0458\u0430\u043b\u043d\u043e\u0442\u043e \u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043e, \u0430\u043a\u043e \u0441\u0435 \u0438\u043c\u0430 \u043f\u0440\u0435\u0434\u0432\u0438\u0434 \u0443\u0442\u0432\u0440\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0430\u0442\u0430 \u0444\u0430\u043a\u0442\u0438\u0447\u043a\u0430 \u0441\u043e\u0441\u0442\u043e\u0458\u0431\u0430). The court overturned the lower courts\u2019 judgments and gave custody of the second applicant to the father. The first applicant was further ordered to pay maintenance of 2,000 Macedonian denars (approximately 30 euros) per month. Referring to the first applicant\u2019s non-compliance with the Centre\u2019s orders of 31 May and 21 November 2007, the fact that she had been convicted on three occasions, as well as to the Centre\u2019s expert opinion, as \u201cthe competent and responsible body\u201d (\u043d\u0430\u0434\u043b\u0435\u0436\u0435\u043d \u0438 \u043c\u0435\u0440\u043e\u0434\u0430\u0432\u0435\u043d \u043e\u0440\u0433\u0430\u043d), the court held that there were grounds to amend the first-instance court\u2019s order of 10 May 2007 regarding custody of the child. Relying on sections 8, 45, 47, 76 and 80 of the Family Act (see paragraphs 45-52 below) the Supreme Court stated, inter alia:\n\u201cThis court considers that after [the first-instance court\u2019s] judgment of 10 May 2007, which granted [the first applicant] custody of [the second applicant], the child was deprived of the fundamental right to receive parental care from both parents because of the first applicant alone. That is the fundamental, most important and decisive reason for amending the judgment [of 10 May 2007] (and) granting the [father] custody of the minor [the second applicant]. The court notes that the lower courts disregarded the change in circumstances and the Centre\u2019s expert opinion, without any legally justified and reasonable grounds. This court considers, contrary to the findings of the lower courts, that ... it is in the best interests of the minor, S., with a view to her enjoying the company of both parents, and ensuring her development, that [the father] should be given custody. His past behaviour has shown that he is a constructive and cooperative parent whose main concern is the interests of the minor, S.\nThis court further considers that the reason why the lower courts dismissed the appellant\u2019s claim to have custody of [the second applicant], namely that she was three years and eight months old and that at that age she needed to stay with the mother, with whom she was biologically connected, cannot be regarded as the only relevant legal ground (\u0435\u0434\u0438\u043d\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435\u043d\u043e \u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043d\u043e \u0440\u0435\u0448\u0430\u0432\u0430\u0447\u043a\u0430 \u043f\u0440\u0438\u0447\u0438\u043d\u0430). The child\u2019s age is an important ground, but it is not the only [element] which is decisive for the court. A court order determining which of the parents of a minor child should be given custody is dependent on other factors, such as the parents\u2019 personalities; their views regarding their rights and duties in respect of their child; the rights and interests of the child, including, certainly, [the child\u2019s] right to both parents; and the need for the child to have the best environment for [his or her] healthy mental and physical development. In the present case, and having regard to all the circumstances, not only the [second applicant\u2019s] age, a final conclusion can be drawn that it is in the [child\u2019s] interests, and best for her mental and physical development, that [the father] should have custody rights.\u201d 39.  The applicant was served with the judgment on 18 June 2012. 40.  On an application by the first applicant, on 12 July 2012 the Centre specified how much contact she could have with her daughter. According to the order, which was based on the explicit consent of both parents, the first applicant was to live with the second applicant between Monday and Friday. Both parents were allowed a ten-day summer holiday and a five-day winter holiday with her. The order further specified who would stay with the child on religious and family holidays. 41.  On an unspecified date, the first applicant applied to the first-instance court for custody of the second applicant. The first-instance court accepted the application and granted custody to the first applicant. On 13 March 2014 that judgment was set aside. The custody proceedings are allegedly still pending before the first-instance court. 42.  While the custody proceedings were pending, on 10 June 2013 the father applied to the Centre to change the living arrangements to allow him to live permanently with the second applicant. The mother would have the child two weekends a month. By a decision of 3 July 2013, the Centre suspended the proceedings relating to that application until the custody proceedings launched by the first applicant had been completed. 43.  The parties confirmed that the Centre\u2019s order of 12 July 2012 was being complied with by all involved.", "references": ["7", "5", "6", "0", "8", "2", "9", "4", "3", "1", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in Oleksandrivka, Kirovograd Region. 5.  On 3 February 2007 the applicant was assaulted. According to the subsequent findings of medical experts, she sustained haematomas on her jaw, shoulder and hip, a bruise under her right eye, concussion, and a displaced rib fracture. The applicant alleges that her assailants were Mr and Mrs K., her daughter\u2019s former parents-in-law, whereas the domestic authorities found that it was only Mrs K. who had assaulted the applicant. The incident occurred in front of the applicant\u2019s two-year-old granddaughter. 6.  On 4 February 2007 the applicant lodged a complaint with the police. 7.  On 5 February 2007 a forensic medical expert examined the applicant. He found that she had haematomas which he classified as \u201cminor bodily injuries\u201d. 8.  On 14 February 2007 the Oleksandrivka District Police Department (\u201cthe Oleksandrivka police\u201d) refused to institute criminal proceedings in connection with the incident. 9.  On 22 February 2007 a forensic medical examination of the applicant was carried out. The expert found that in addition to the previously noted haematomas, the applicant had also suffered concussion and a displaced rib fracture. The expert classified the injuries as \u201cbodily harm of medium severity\u201d. 10.  On 20 March 2007 the Oleksandrivka prosecutor overruled the decision of 14 February 2007 as premature and on 21 March 2007 instituted criminal proceedings in connection with the infliction of bodily harm of medium severity on the applicant. 11.  On 20 May 2007 the investigator suspended the investigation for failure to identify the perpetrator. 12.  On 29 August and 3 October 2007 the Oleksandrivka prosecutor\u2019s office issued two decisions in which it overruled the investigator\u2019s decision of 20 May 2007 as premature. 13.  On 6 October 2007 the investigator questioned Mr and Mrs K. 14.  On 1 December 2007 the investigator again suspended the investigation for failure to identify the perpetrator. 15.  On 10 December 2007 the Oleksandrivka prosecutor\u2019s office, in response to the applicant\u2019s complaint about the progress of the investigation, asked the Kirovograd Regional Police Department to have the police officers in charge of the investigation disciplined. 16.  On 21 January 2008 the Kirovograd Regional Police Department instructed the Oleksandrivka police to immediately resume the investigation. 17.  On 7 April 2008 the investigator decided to ask a forensic medical expert to determine the degree of gravity of the applicant\u2019s injuries. On 22 September 2008 the expert drew up a report generally confirming the findings of 22 February 2007. 18.  On 15 May 2008 the Kirovograd Regional Police Department informed the applicant that the police officers in charge of the case had been disciplined for omissions in the investigation. 19.  On 23 October 2008 the Oleksandrivka Court absolved Mrs K. from criminal liability under an amnesty law, on the grounds that she had an elderly mother who was dependent on her. On 24 February 2009 the Kirovograd Regional Court of Appeal (\u201cthe Court of Appeal\u201d) quashed that judgment, finding no evidence that Mrs K.\u2019s mother was dependent on her. 20.  On 1 July 2009 the investigator refused to institute criminal proceedings against Mr K. 21.  On 7 July 2009 the Novomyrgorod prosecutor issued a bill of indictment against Mrs K. 22.  On 24 July 2009 the Oleksandrivka Court remitted the case against Mrs K. for further investigation, holding that the applicant had not been informed about the completion of the investigation until 3 July 2009 and had therefore not been given enough time to study the case file. It also held that the refusal to institute criminal proceedings against Mr K. had contravened the law. 23.  On 13 November 2009 the Novomyrgorod prosecutor quashed the decision of 1 July 2009 not to institute criminal proceedings against Mr K. Subsequently the investigator again refused to institute criminal proceedings against Mr K. 24.  On 21 December 2009 the new round of pre-trial investigation in the case against Mrs K. was completed and another bill of indictment was issued by the Novomyrgorod prosecutor. 25.  On 29 March 2010 the Oleksandrivka Court remitted the case against Mrs K. for further investigation, holding in particular that the decision not to institute criminal proceedings against Mr K. had been premature, since his role in the incident had not been sufficiently clarified. 26.  On 13 July 2010 the Novomyrgorod prosecutor quashed the decision not to institute criminal proceedings against Mr K. On 26 May 2011 the investigator again refused to institute criminal proceedings against Mr K. 27.  On 20 December 2011 the Znamyanka Court convicted Mrs K. of inflicting bodily harm of medium severity on the applicant, sentencing her to restriction of liberty for two years, suspended for a one-year probationary period. The court found that the decision not to institute criminal proceedings against Mr K. in connection with the same incident had been correct. Mrs K., the prosecutor and the applicant appealed. 28.  On 6 March 2012 the Court of Appeal quashed the judgment and discontinued the criminal proceedings against Mrs K. as time-barred.", "references": ["5", "6", "0", "4", "8", "2", "7", "9", "3", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "5.  The first applicant was born in 1965 and lives in Baku. The second and third applicants were born in 1984 and 1975 respectively and live in Sumgait. 6.  At the material time the applicants were members of the main opposition parties or groups in the country: the Popular Front Party of Azerbaijan (\u201cthe PFPA\u201d), the Musavat Party and Ictimai Palata, respectively. The first applicant was a member of the Board of the PFPA. The first and third applicants were candidates in the parliamentary elections of 2010. The first applicant was also a candidate in the parliamentary elections of 2005. 7.  The year 2011 was marked by an increased number of opposition demonstrations in Azerbaijan, mainly in Baku. They were held, inter alia, on 11 and 12 March, 2 and 17 April, 22 May and 19 June 2011. According to the applicants, the relevant authorities were notified about the demonstrations but refused to authorise them. Despite their peaceful character, demonstrations held without authorisation were dispersed by the police. 8.  All three applicants participated in a number of opposition demonstrations. In the course of many of them they were arrested and convicted. In particular, on 12 and 30 April 2010 and 12 March 2011 the second applicant was arrested and convicted of breaching the rules on the organisation and holding of assemblies and failure to obey a lawful order of a police officer. The third applicant was arrested during the demonstration of 12 March 2011 and reprimanded for breaching the rules on the organisation and holding of public assemblies. 9.  According to the applicants, they had intended to attend the demonstration scheduled for 2 April 2011. In addition, the first applicant was involved in the organisation of that demonstration. 10.  Prior notice of the demonstration of 2 April 2011 had been given to the relevant authority, the Baku City Executive Authority (\u201cthe BCEA\u201d), on 18 March 2011. On 31 March 2011 the BCEA refused to allow the demonstration to be held at the place indicated by the organisers, and proposed that it be held at another place on the outskirts of Baku. Nevertheless, the organisers decided to hold the demonstration in central Baku, and information about it was disseminated via Facebook and the press. 11.  The first applicant alleged that between approximately 10 a.m. and 11 a.m. on 31 March 2011, after he had taken his child to kindergarten, police officers had stopped his car and requested that he follow them to a police station. He did not oppose the police officers\u2019 demand and was taken to police station no. 20 of the Nasimi District Police Office. At an unspecified time the applicant was informed that he was being detained in connection with the upcoming demonstration of 2 April 2011. At around 2 p.m. he learned that he would not be released from detention. The applicant was then questioned. He was asked, inter alia, about his intention to participate in the demonstration of 2 April 2011 and generally about the politics in the country. 12.  According to the official records, the applicant was arrested for disobeying a lawful order of a police officer. In particular, police officers F.P., S.A. and R.V. stated the following in a report (raport) submitted to a superior police officer:\n\u201c... at around 10.30 a.m. on 31 March 2011 on 3rd Alatava street [in Baku] we stopped a [person] who was driving by in his car and requested his identity document because he bore a resemblance to a person who was on a wanted list. But he ignored our lawful demand to produce his identity document. We brought [him] to the police station. There we found out that [he] was [the applicant] ...\u201d 13.  At around 1.20 p.m. on the day of the arrest, an \u201cadministrative-offence report\u201d (inzibati x\u0259ta haqq\u0131nda protokol) was issued by police officer T.A. in respect of the applicant. The report stated that the applicant had committed an administrative offence under Article 310.1 (failure to comply with a lawful order of a police officer) of the Code of Administrative Offences (\u201cthe CAO\u201d). 14.  The applicant signed the part of the administrative-offence report acknowledging that he had been familiarised with the report, but left without signature the part with a pre-printed text which stated that \u201cthe rights and obligations under Articles 371, 372, 374, 377, 379 and 410.4 of the CAO of the Republic of Azerbaijan were explained\u201d.  He made a statement that he had not disobeyed any order given by the police. This statement was included in the report. 15.  According to the applicant, he was never provided with a copy of the administrative-offence report or with other documents in his case file. He was not given access to a lawyer after his arrest or while in police custody. 16.  The applicant was brought before the Nasimi District Court on the day of his arrest. 17.  According to the applicant, the hearing, which began at 3 p.m., was very brief. He refused the assistance of a State-funded lawyer and insisted on hiring a lawyer of his own choice, but the judge disregarded his request. His representation by that lawyer was ineffective and of a formalistic nature. 18.  The applicant stated before the court that he had been stopped by the police and had been requested to follow them to a police station, that he had complied with that request, and that he was not guilty of disobeying a police officer. 19.  The only witnesses questioned during the court hearing were police officers T.A., F.P. and S.A. Police officer T.A. testified that he had prepared the administrative-offence report in respect of the applicant. Police officers F.P. and S.A. gave testimonies virtually identical to the above-mentioned report they had submitted to a superior police officer. 20.  According to the record of the hearing, the State-funded lawyer stated that the applicant was not guilty and asked the court to terminate the administrative proceedings against him. 21.  The court found that the applicant had committed an administrative offence under Article 310.1 of the CAO and sentenced him to seven days\u2019 \u201cadministrative\u201d detention. 22.  The applicant lodged an appeal before the Baku Court of Appeal, presenting his version of the facts surrounding the arrest, and arguing that he had been arrested in connection with the demonstration scheduled for 2 April 2011. He also complained that his arrest had been unlawful and that the hearing before the first-instance court had not been fair. He urged the Baku Court of Appeal to quash the first-instance court\u2019s decision. 23.  It appears that the applicant was not represented by a lawyer before the Baku Court of Appeal. 24.  On 5 April 2011 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld the decision of the first-instance court, stating that its findings had been correct. 25.  The second applicant alleged that at around 10.30 a.m. on 31 March 2011, when he was still in bed, three police officers had entered his apartment without an arrest warrant. The applicant\u2019s father had let the police officers in. The police officers took the applicant to police station no. 3 of the Sumgait City Police Office. At an unspecified time the applicant was questioned about his political activities. 26.  According to the official records, the applicant was arrested for minor hooliganism and for disobeying a lawful order of a police officer. In particular, police officer T.R. stated the following in a report submitted to a superior police officer:\n\u201c... at around 12.30 p.m. on 31 March 2011 on the territory of the 9th micro-district of Sumgait, I noticed a person who was making noise ... But although I invited him to respect the discipline, he continued his cursing and improper behaviour ... Therefore I brought him to police station no. 3. There we found out that that [person] was [the applicant] ...\u201d 27.  On the day of the arrest, an administrative-offence report was issued by police officer E.S. in respect of the applicant. The report stated that the applicant had committed an administrative offence under Articles 296 (minor hooliganism) and 310.1 of the CAO. 28.  The applicant refused to sign the report. 29.  According to the applicant, he was never provided with a copy of the administrative-offence report or with other documents in his case file. He was not given access to a lawyer after the arrest or while he was kept in police custody. 30.  According to a statement (\u0259riz\u0259) allegedly signed by the applicant and submitted to the Court by the Government, the applicant had refused legal assistance while in police custody. According to the transcript of the hearing before the Sumgait Court of Appeal, the applicant claimed that he had not signed that statement. 31.  The applicant was brought before the Sumgait City Court on the day of his arrest. 32.  According to the applicant, the hearing, which began at 3.30 p.m., was very brief and he was not given an opportunity to hire a lawyer of his own choice. 33.  According to the transcript of the first-instance court hearing, the applicant refused the assistance of a State-funded lawyer and decided to defend himself in person. 34.  The applicant stated before the court that he had been taken to a police station from his apartment, that it had been his father who had let the police officers in, that at the police station he had been questioned about his political activity, and that he was not guilty of disobeying a police officer or of swearing at the location indicated by the police. According to the transcript of the Sumgait Court of Appeal hearing, the applicant orally requested that the chief of police station no. 3, M.N., be questioned. However, there is no information whether M.N. was questioned. 35.  The only witness questioned during the court hearing was police officer T.R. He testified that the applicant had been swearing without addressing any particular person and had failed to obey his order to stop his illegal behaviour. 36.  The court found that the applicant had committed an administrative offence under Articles 296 and 310.1 of the CAO and sentenced him to seven days\u2019 \u201cadministrative\u201d detention. 37.  The applicant lodged an appeal before the Sumgait Court of Appeal, presenting his version of the facts surrounding the arrest, and arguing that his arrest had been unlawful, that the hearing before the first-instance court had not been fair and that his right to respect for home had been violated by the police. He urged the Sumgait Court of Appeal to quash the first-instance court\u2019s decision. 38.  It appears that the applicant refused legal assistance at the hearing before the Sumgait Court of Appeal. 39.  On 19 April 2011 the Sumgait Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld the decision of the first-instance court, stating that its findings had been correct. 40.  According to the third applicant, at around 11 a.m. on 31 March 2011 he went with his lawyer to the Sumgait City Police Office. After a conversation with the chief of police, they left. The applicant, who did not clearly explain the purpose of that visit, alleged that when he had been outside the police office and no longer accompanied by his lawyer, police officers had arrested him without explaining the reasons for doing so, and had taken him to police station no. 4 of the Sumgait City Police Office. 41.  According to the official records, the applicant was arrested for \u201cminor hooliganism\u201d. In a report submitted to a superior police officer, police officer N.M. stated the following:\n\u201c... at around 12.30 p.m. on 31 March 2011 on Akhundov street [in Sumgait] [we, the police officers,] noticed a person who was swearing loudly without addressing anyone in particular ... We approached him and ... brought him to police station no. 4. There we found out that that [person] was [the applicant] ...\u201d 42.  Police officers R.S. and A.M. submitted explanatory reports (izahat) to a superior police officer. Those reports were virtually identical to the report submitted by police officer N.M. 43.  On the day of the arrest police officer V.J. issued an administrative-offence report in respect of the applicant. The report stated that the applicant had committed an administrative offence under Article 296 of the CAO. 44.  The applicant refused to sign the administrative-offence report. 45.  According to the applicant, he was never provided with a copy of the administrative-offence report or with other documents in his case file. He was not given access to a lawyer after his arrest or while he was kept in police custody. 46.  According to a decision dated 31 March 2011, police officer V.J. decided to invite a lawyer to represent the applicant, without indicating at what stage the lawyer should join the proceedings. 47.  The applicant was brought before the Sumgait City Court on the day of his arrest. 48.  According to the applicant, he was not given an opportunity to hire a lawyer of his own choice to represent him at the hearing, which began at 4 p.m. He asked the judge to postpone the examination of the case for one hour so that his lawyer could arrive at the court. However, the judge decided to adjourn the hearing for only thirty minutes and to recommence the hearing at 4.30 p.m., which was not enough time for the applicant\u2019s lawyer to arrive. 49.  According to the transcript of the court hearing, the applicant refused the assistance of a State-funded lawyer. 50.  The applicant stated before the court that he was not guilty of breaching public order by swearing at the location indicated by the police, and that he believed that the motive for his arrest had been his participation in the demonstration of 12 March 2011. 51.  The only witnesses questioned during the court hearing were police officers M.N., R.S. and A.M. They testified that the applicant had been swearing without addressing anyone in particular and that they had therefore taken him to a police station. 52.  The court found that the applicant had committed an administrative offence under Article 296 of the CAO and sentenced him to seven days\u2019 \u201cadministrative\u201d detention. 53.  The applicant lodged an appeal before the Sumgait Court of Appeal, presenting his version of the facts surrounding the arrest, and arguing that his arrest had been unlawful and that the hearing before the first-instance court had not been fair. He urged the Sumgait Court of Appeal to quash the first-instance court\u2019s decision. 54.  It appears that the applicant prepared his written appeal with the assistance of a lawyer of his own choice. However, he participated in the hearing before the Sumgait Court of Appeal without his lawyer. 55.  On 15 April 2011 the Sumgait Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld the decision of the first-instance court, stating that its findings had been correct.", "references": ["5", "9", "1", "6", "0", "4", "8", "No Label", "7", "2", "3"], "gold": ["7", "2", "3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Kyiv. 6.  On 26 December 2009 the applicant\u2019s twenty-five-year-old son, K., was arrested by the Kyiv Shevchenkivskyy District Police Department on suspicion of robbery. 7.  On 27 December 2009 K. underwent a medical examination, which did not reveal any injuries. 8.  On 29 December 2009 the Shevchenkivskyy District Court (\u201cthe Shevchenkivskyy Court\u201d) remanded him in custody pending trial. 9.  On 30 December 2009 K. was placed in the Kyiv Pre-Trial Detention Centre (\u201cthe SIZO\u201d). 10.  On 22 March 2010 he complained to the court that the investigator had subjected him to physical and psychological pressure in order to make him confess to a crime which he had not committed. His complaint was referred to the Shevchenkivskyy District Prosecutor\u2019s Office (\u201cthe Shevchenkivskyy Prosecutor\u2019s Office\u201d). 11.  At 9.30 a.m. on 10 April 2010 K. was admitted to Kyiv City Emergency Hospital, where he was diagnosed with a closed abdominal injury, rupture of the spleen, retroperitoneal haematoma, a closed chest injury, laceration (tissue rupture) of the right lung, left-sided pneumonia, post-traumatic anaemia, and fourth-degree haemorrhagic shock (the most serious on a scale of one to four, entailing critical blood loss of over 40%). 12.  On 10 and 12 April 2010 K. underwent surgery twice in respect of the above-mentioned injuries and his spleen was removed. 13.  On an unspecified date the applicant complained to the prosecuting authorities that her son had been physically assaulted in the SIZO on 8 April 2010. 14.  On 23 April 2010 the Shevchenkivskyy Prosecutor\u2019s Office refused to institute criminal proceedings against police officers in respect of K.\u2019s ill-treatment for lack of corpus delicti in respect of their actions. 15.  On 28 April 2010 K. was discharged from hospital and placed in the SIZO\u2019s medical unit, where he remained until 18 June 2010. 16.  On 3 June 2010 the Kyiv City Police Department completed the internal investigation in respect of the applicant\u2019s complaint regarding the alleged ill-treatment of her son and found it to be without any basis. 17.  On 8 June 2010 the newspaper \u201cSegodnya\u201d, issued in the Kyiv region, published an article under the headline \u201cA bad [police] station\u201d (\u00ab\u041d\u0435\u0445\u043e\u0440\u043e\u0448\u0438\u0439 \u0443\u0447\u0430\u0441\u0442\u043e\u043a\u00bb) about the alleged ill-treatment of the applicant\u2019s son in the Shevchenkivskyy police station in spring 2010. The author relied, in particular, on the statements of one of K.\u2019s cell-mates. A similar article titled \u201cAnother incident in the Shevchenkivskyy police station\u201d (\u00ab\u041d\u043e\u0432\u043e\u0435 \u0427\u041f \u0432 \u0428\u0435\u0432\u0447\u0435\u043d\u043a\u043e\u0432\u0441\u043a\u043e\u043c \u0420\u0423\u0412\u0414\u00bb) appeared in the internet media outlet \u201cLevyy Bereg\u201d. 18.  On 10 June 2010 the Shevchenkivskyy Prosecutor\u2019s Office overruled its decision of 23 April 2010 and decided that further investigation was required. More specifically, K. had to be questioned as to who exactly had subjected him to ill-treatment in the SIZO in April 2010. 19.  On 10 June 2010 the investigator also questioned the applicant\u2019s son. K. contended that on 26 December 2009, when he was arrested, police officers had hit him in the stomach. He further stated that the investigator dealing with his case had also hit him in the stomach once in March 2010. According to K., these two beatings had necessitated his urgent medical treatment on 10 April 2010. K. said that he did not understand why his mother had stated that he had been subjected to ill-treatment on 8 April 2010 (see paragraph 13 above). 20.  On 21 June 2010 the investigator who was in charge of K.\u2019s criminal case was also questioned. He denied ever having seen K. in March 2010, let alone having physically assaulted him. 21.  On 8 July 2010 the Shevchenkivskyy Prosecutor\u2019s Office once again refused to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers in question, having found no evidence of criminal conduct. The decision not to prosecute noted that K. had not complained of any ill-treatment during his detention, and that his medical examination on 27 December 2009 had not revealed any injuries (see paragraph 7 above). Following his hospitalisation on 10 April 2010, K. had mentioned to a doctor that he had been physically assaulted some three days earlier, and the doctor had then stated to the investigator that K.\u2019s injuries had been sustained no more than two days before his admission to hospital. According to his medical file, K.\u2019s injuries had originated from blows to his back with blunt objects one to twelve hours prior to his admission to hospital (that is, during the night of 9 to 10 April 2010). On the basis of the above information, the Shevchenkivskyy Prosecutor\u2019s Office concluded that the allegation regarding K.\u2019s ill\u2011treatment was unsubstantiated. 22.  On 3 August 2010 an official of the Kyiv City Prosecutor\u2019s Office (\u201cthe Kyiv Prosecutor\u2019s Office\u201d), to which the investigation had been transferred meanwhile for an unknown reason, also questioned K. This time, he stated that he had only been ill-treated on 26 December 2009, but never thereafter. 23.  On 25 August 2010 eleven inmates with whom K. had shared a cell in the SIZO were also questioned. They said that he had felt unwell on the night of 9 to 10 April 2010, and that an ambulance had been called for him on the morning of 10 April 2010. They also submitted that nobody had been violent towards him or had put him under any psychological pressure. 24.  On 9 September 2010 the SIZO\u2019s medical assistant (\u0444\u0435\u043b\u044c\u0434\u0448\u0435\u0440), who had been on duty at the time of the events, was questioned as part of the investigation. He stated that he had been called to cell no. 36, where K. had been held, at 8.45 a.m. on 10 April 2010. K. had complained of weakness, vertigo and blurred vision. He had not alleged any ill-treatment and a visual examination had not revealed any injuries. He had had low blood pressure. The medical assistant said that he had provided K. with the necessary medical assistance and had reported the matter to the doctor on duty. The doctor on duty at the time of the events made a similar statement. 25.  On 22 October 2010 an official from the Kyiv Prosecutor\u2019s Office questioned the ambulance paramedics who had been called to assist K. They did not remember the circumstances. 26.  On 4 November 2010 the Kyiv Prosecutor\u2019s Office questioned K. again. He stated that Shevchenkivskyy police officers had physically assaulted him following his arrest on 26 December 2009. He considered that the sudden deterioration in his health on 10 April 2010 had been the consequence of that ill-treatment. 27.  From 8 November 2010 to 28 January 2011 a forensic medical expert evaluation of K.\u2019s medical file was carried out, with a view to clarifying exactly how and when he had sustained his injuries and how serious those injuries had been. The expert concluded that K. had sustained an insignificant spleen trauma about a month prior to undergoing surgery, on around 10 March 2010. More specifically, he had sustained a splenic parenchyma rupture which had presented no major danger and would have healed normally. However, about twelve hours before surgery (at about 4 a.m. on 10 April 2010) K. had sustained a serious non-penetrating stomach injury resulting from a blow to the left side of his back with a blunt object. As a result, he had sustained a haemoperitoneum, a partial rupture of the diaphragm and trauma of the spleen. 28.  On 29 December 2010 the applicant\u2019s son signed a form of authority, authorising Mr Zarutskyy (the lawyer who represented the applicant before the Court \u2013 see paragraph 2 above) to represent him in proceedings before the Court. He did not, however, lodge an application with the Court on that occasion. According to the applicant, her son did intend to lodge an application regarding both his ill-treatment and the investigation into that allegation. 29.  In February 2011 K.\u2019s lawyer challenged the refusal to institute criminal proceedings of 8 July 2010 (see paragraph 21 above) with the Kyiv Prosecutor\u2019s Office and before the Shevchenkivskyy Court. He submitted, in particular, that the origin of K.\u2019s injuries while he had been under the authorities\u2019 control had never been explained. 30.  On 10 March 2011 the Kyiv Prosecutor\u2019s Office, relying on the findings of the forensic medical expert report of 28 January 2011 (see paragraph 26 above), opened a criminal case in respect of unidentified individuals who had caused K. grievous bodily harm. The investigation was entrusted to the Shevchenkivskyy Police Department. 31.  On 7 July 2011 the Shevchenkivskyy Court quashed the decision of the Shevchenkivskyy Prosecutor\u2019s Office of 8 July 2010 and remitted the case for additional investigation. 32.  Between 31 May and 25 August 2011 another forensic medical expert evaluation was carried out. It confirmed the findings of the earlier expert report of 28 January 2011 (see paragraph 27 above), but added that a fall could not be ruled out as a possible cause of the injuries. 33.  On 26 August 2011 the Shevchenkivskyy Prosecutor\u2019s Office issued another refusal to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers in question for lack of corpus delicti in their actions. 34.  On 30 September 2011 K. was assigned victim status in the criminal investigation launched on 10 March 2011. On the same date the investigator of the Shevchenkivskyy Police Department questioned him. K. maintained his earlier version of events, namely that his ill-treatment had consisted of the following two episodes: Shevchenkivskyy police officers physically assaulting him following his arrest on 26 December 2009, and the investigator in charge hitting him once in the stomach at the end of March 2010. 35.  On 30 September 2011 the SIZO administration sent to the investigator the list of the staff members who had been on duty during the night of 9 to 10 April 2010. As regards the list of K.\u2019s cell-mates at the time, the administration informed the investigator that no records were kept in that regard. 36.  On 7 November 2011 K., who had been transferred from the SIZO to a civilian hospital and who was suffering from HIV, tuberculosis and a number of concomitant diseases, died (see paragraphs 43-51 below). 37.  On an unspecified date in November 2011 the applicant was granted status as K.\u2019s successor in the criminal investigation into his ill-treatment. She was represented by the same lawyer who had earlier represented K. 38.  On 9 December 2011 the Chief of the Shevchenkivskyy Police Department informed the applicant\u2019s lawyer that the investigation, which had been initiated on 10 March 2011 (see paragraph 30 above), was ongoing. 39.  On 30 March 2012 the applicant enquired with the Shevchenkivskyy Police Department about the progress of the investigation. 40.  On 31 July 2012 the Kyiv City Investigation Department informed her that the investigator in charge had been disciplined for his failure to respond to the above inquiry. 41.  It is not clear whether any investigative measures were implemented between 2012 and 2014. 42.  On 7 March 2014 the investigator of the Shevchenkivskyy Police Department made an entry in the Unified Register of Pre-Trial Investigations about the assault on K. causing grievous bodily harm. That constituted a new procedure for initiating a pre-trial investigation under the new Code of Criminal Procedure with effect from 19 November 2012. 43.  Between 14 and 17 May, and 18 and 23 June 2010, when he was a detainee in the SIZO, K. was examined at the Kyiv City AIDS Centre at his request. He tested positive for HIV on both occasions. 44.  According to the information submitted by the Government, between 24 June 2010 and 20 April 2011 K.\u2019s health remained stable and he did not seek medical assistance. 45.  On 20 April 2011 K. had his lungs X-rayed and was diagnosed, for the first time, with tuberculosis of the right lung. It was unclear how advanced the tuberculosis was. According to the Government, he was prescribed preventive treatment for two to three months. 46.  On 23 May 2011 K.\u2019s lawyer enquired with the management of the SIZO about his client\u2019s condition. He asked, in particular, for clarification as to whether K. had been diagnosed with tuberculosis while in detention, and requested copies of the relevant documents. 47.  On 8 June 2011 the SIZO deputy governor and the chief of the medical unit replied that, following a planned X-ray that day, K. had been diagnosed with infiltrative tuberculosis of the right lung and had been transferred to the SIZO\u2019s medical unit for treatment. In another letter (dated 28 November 2011) from the SIZO management to the applicant\u2019s lawyer (see also paragraph 52 below), it was stated that on 8 June 2011 K. was also diagnosed as having HIV, chronic gastritis, hepatitis in remission and a drug addiction. In addition, he was classed as being in recovery following the removal of his spleen. 48.  According to an extract from K.\u2019s medical records, he was examined repeatedly by the SIZO\u2019s doctors between June and October 2011. Each record begins with the statement that K.\u2019s complaints remained the same, without specifying of what he complained. The records of 28 July and 9 September 2011 further note that K. complained of weakness. Furthermore, it was recorded that K. had complained of periodic coughing with purulent sputum during his examinations on 7 July and 15 October 2011. From 18 October 2011 onwards a deterioration in K.\u2019s health was noted. On 20 October 2011 an ambulance was called for him. 49.  As indicated in the letter sent by the SIZO management on 28 November 2011 in reply to the applicant\u2019s lawyer\u2019s inquiry of 13 October 2011, K. had an X-ray which revealed that the treatment of his tuberculosis was evolving positively. A decision was made to continue that treatment. 50.  On 20 October 2011 K. was taken to Kyiv City Hospital no. 5, where the following diagnoses were made: infiltrative tuberculosis of the right lung, HIV in an unclear phase, meningitis caused by HIV, chronic hepatitis and gastritis in remission. K. was also classed as being in recovery following the removal of his spleen. 51.  On 7 November 2011 K. died in the hospital. 52.  In a letter of 28 November 2011 to the applicant\u2019s lawyer the SIZO management noted that they had previously asked the Kyiv City Court of Appeal, which was dealing with the criminal case against K., to either accelerate the examination of that case or release K. on health grounds. However, they had not received any reply. 53.  On 8 November 2011 the investigator of the Svyatoshynskyy District Police Department inspected K.\u2019s body in the hospital. According to the report on \u201cthe inspection of the scene of the incident\u201d, there was no indication of a violent death. 54.  On the same date, the applicant asked the police to transfer the body to a mortuary, with a view to establishing the cause of death. 55.  According to K.\u2019s death certificate, which was issued on 10 November 2011, his death had been caused by acute heart failure, HIV and multiple concomitant illnesses. 56.  The autopsy report, which was also issued on 10 November 2011, specified that the immediate causes of death had been a brain tumour, pulmonary and heart failure resulting from \u201cexpress autointoxication following cryptococcal meningoencephalitis, macrofocal overwhelming subtotal bilateral pneumonia and focal pulmonary tuberculosis of a person suffering from HIV and drug addiction\u201d. The report also noted that K. had had \u201cshock kidneys\u201d, cachexia, oropharyngeal candidiasis, and albuminous degeneration of the tissues of the kidneys, cardiac muscle and liver. 57.  The applicant made a complaint to the prosecuting authorities regarding her son\u2019s premature death and requested an investigation. 58.  On 16 November 2011 the Svyatoshynskyy District Police Department refused to open a criminal investigation into the matter, having concluded that there was no indication of a criminal offence. 59.  On 23 December 2011 the Svyatoshynskyy District Prosecutor\u2019s Office overruled that decision on the grounds that it was based on a superficial investigation. 60.  On 31 December 2011 the investigator once again refused to open a criminal case in relation to K.\u2019s death. Relying on the scene inspection report of 8 November 2011 and the death certificate of 10 November 2011 (see paragraphs 53 and 55 above), he considered that there was no third-party involvement in the death. 61.  On 16 July 2012 the applicant complained to the General Prosecutor\u2019s Office about the ineffectiveness of the investigation. In particular, she submitted that the adequacy and appropriateness of the medical care provided for her son had never been assessed. She noted that there had been no medical monitoring or treatment of K. as regards his HIV. Furthermore, while the HIV diagnosis presupposed a high risk of tuberculosis, K. had not had an X-ray until almost a year after he had tested positive for HIV. The applicant also complained that the intervals between the X-ray sessions had been unreasonably long. Thus, after his X-ray on 6 June 2011 K. had subsequently not had an X-ray until 13 October 2011, whereas a repeat X-ray should have been performed within a two-month time period. Furthermore, although K.\u2019s treatment for tuberculosis had been unsuccessful, it had been continued, and his resistance to the medications prescribed had never been verified. Lastly, the applicant complained that the authorities had not provided her with all the information concerning her son\u2019s health while he had still been alive, despite the numerous inquiries made by her lawyer. In particular, she had only found out about her son\u2019s HIV after his death. 62.  On 20 July 2012 the General Prosecutor\u2019s Office forwarded the above complaint to the Kyiv Prosecutor\u2019s Office. 63.  On 15 August 2012 the Svyatoshynskyy Prosecutor\u2019s Office wrote to the applicant saying that her complaint concerning her son\u2019s death and the allegedly inadequate medical care he had received had already been investigated. As a result, it had been decided on 31 December 2011 that there were no grounds for opening a criminal case (see paragraph 60 above). It remained open to the applicant to challenge that decision. 64.  There is no information in the case file about any subsequent developments.", "references": ["7", "5", "6", "3", "8", "2", "9", "4", "No Label", "0", "1"], "gold": ["0", "1"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1988, 1989 and 1977 respectively. The first and third applicants live in Baku, and the second applicant lives in Khirdalan. 6.  The youth group Committee for Protection of Rights of Young Political Prisoners (\u201cG\u0259nc Siyasi M\u0259hbuslar\u0131n H\u00fcquqlar\u0131n\u0131 M\u00fcdafi\u0259 Komit\u0259si\u201d) decided to hold a demonstration at around 5.30 p.m. on 22 May 2011 at the Seaside Boulevard in Baku. They did not notify their plan to the relevant authority, the Baku City Executive Authority (the BCEA). 7.  According to the applicants, the demonstration was intended to be peaceful and was conducted in a peaceful manner. The participants, a group of ten to twelve persons, were demanding the release of young persons arrested during some previous demonstrations. 8.  The applicants attended the demonstration, but shortly after it had begun the police started to disperse it. According to the applicants, as soon as they noticed the police approaching they attempted to run away and leave the place of the demonstration but police officers followed and caught them. All three applicants were arrested by police officers V.I. and R.G. at around 5.30 p.m. and were taken to police station No. 39 of the Sabail District Police Office. 9.  Police officers V.I. and R.G. stated the following in a report (raport) submitted to a superior police officer:\n\u201c... at around 5.30 p.m. at the Seaside Boulevard ... a group of young persons attempted to hold an unauthorised [demonstration] by shouting out loud, and disturbed people. When we wanted to calm down those persons they ignored us. ... We ... brought them to police station no. 39. ...\u201d 10.  According to the applicants, they were questioned at the police station. 11.  Between 6.15 p.m. and 6.30 p.m. on the day of the arrest, \u201cadministrative-offence reports\u201d (inzibati x\u0259ta haqq\u0131nda protokol) were issued by police officer T.R. in respect of all three applicants. The reports stated that at 5.30 p.m. on 22 May 2011, by deliberately failing to comply with the lawful order of the police, the applicants had committed an administrative offence under Article 310 of the Code of Administrative Offences (\u201cthe CAO\u201d). 12.  All three applicants refused to sign the respective administrative-offence reports, which contained pre-printed texts declaring that \u201c[the arrested person] was familiarised with the report\u201d and \u201cthe rights and obligations under Articles 371, 372, 374, 377, 379 and 410.4 of the CAO of the Republic of Azerbaijan were explained\u201d. 13.  Subsequently, police officer T.R. prepared \u201cadministrative-arrest reports\u201d (inzibati qaydada tutma haqq\u0131nda protokol) with respect to the first and second applicants. 14.  According to those administrative-arrest reports, copies of which were submitted to the Court by the Government, the first and second applicants had been subjected to administrative arrest at 7 p.m. on 22 May 2011. The reports also stated that the applicants had been released on the same date, without specifying the time of the alleged releases, and contained signatures of the first and second applicants. However, all three applicants maintained that they had been kept in police custody overnight. 15.  According to the applicants, they were never served with copies of the administrative-offence reports or with other documents in their case files. They were not given access to a lawyer after the arrest or while they were kept in police custody. 16.  On 23 May 2011, the day after his arrest, the first applicant, Mr Agasif Ibrahimov, was brought before the Sabail District Court. 17.  According to the applicant, the hearing, which began at 12.40 p.m., was very brief and members of the public, including human rights defenders and journalists, were not allowed to attend, even though the court had not taken a formal decision to close the hearing to the public. 18.  The applicant was not represented by any lawyer. According to the applicant, he was not given an opportunity to hire a lawyer of his own choice. 19.  The applicant stated before the court that he was not guilty of disobeying a lawful order of a police officer. 20.  The only witness questioned during the court hearing was police officer R.G., who testified as follows:\n\u201cAt around 5.30 p.m. on 22 May 2011 ... a group of persons attempted to hold an unauthorised [demonstration] by shouting out loud, and disturbed people. When we wanted to calm down those persons, among them [the applicant], they disobeyed a lawful police order. Then we ... brought them to police station no. 39 where administrative-offence reports were issued in their respect. One of them was [the applicant].\u201d. 21.  The court found that the applicant had failed to stop participating in the unauthorised demonstration. The court convicted him under Article 310.1 of the CAO and sentenced him to seven days\u2019 \u201cadministrative\u201d detention. 22.  The applicant lodged an appeal before the Baku Court of Appeal, arguing that his conviction was in violation of his rights because the demonstration in which he had participated had been peaceful. He also complained that his arrest had been unlawful and that the hearing before the first-instance court had not been fair. He requested the Baku Court of Appeal to quash the first-instance court\u2019s decision. 23.  The applicant was represented before the Baku Court of Appeal by a lawyer of his own choice. 24.  On 31 May 2011 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld the decision of the first-instance court, stating that its findings had been correct. 25.  The Court of Appeal also noted that at the first-instance court hearing the applicant had refused the assistance of a State-funded lawyer and had decided to defend himself in person. 26.  On 23 May 2011, the day after his arrest, the second applicant, Mr Emin Farhadi, was brought before the Sabail District Court. 27.  According to the applicant, the hearing, which began at 12.30 p.m., was very brief and members of the public were not allowed to attend, even though the court had not taken a formal decision to close the hearing to the public. 28.  The applicant was not represented by any lawyer. According to the applicant, he was not given an opportunity to hire a lawyer of his own choice. According to the transcript of the court hearing, he refused the assistance of a State-funded lawyer and decided to defend himself in person. 29.  The applicant stated before the court that he was not guilty of disobeying a lawful order of a police officer and that he had participated in the demonstration as an observer. 30.  The only witness questioned during the court hearing was police officer R.G. The statement that he gave against the second applicant, Mr Emin Farhadi, was similar to his statement against the first applicant, Mr Agasif Ibrahimov (see paragraph 20 above). 31.  The court found that the applicant had failed to stop participating in the unauthorised demonstration. The court convicted him under Article 310.1 of the CAO and sentenced him to eight days\u2019 \u201cadministrative\u201d detention. 32.  The applicant lodged an appeal before the Baku Court of Appeal, arguing that his conviction was in violation of his rights because the demonstration in which he had participated had been peaceful. He also complained that his arrest had been unlawful and that the hearing before the first-instance court had not been fair. He requested the Baku Court of Appeal to quash the first-instance court\u2019s decision. 33.  The applicant was represented before the Baku Court of Appeal by a lawyer of his own choice. 34.  On 31 May 2011 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld the decision of the first-instance court, stating that its findings had been correct. 35.  On 23 May 2011, the day after his arrest, the third applicant, Mr Jamil Hajiyev, was brought before the Sabail District Court. 36.  According to the applicant, the hearing, which began at 12.30 p.m., was very brief and members of the public were not allowed to attend, even though the court had not taken a formal decision to close the hearing to the public. 37.  The applicant was not represented by any lawyer. According to the applicant, he was not given an opportunity to hire a lawyer of his own choice and he refused the assistance of a State-funded lawyer because he believed that such assistance would be of a formalistic nature. 38.  The applicant stated before the court that he was not guilty of disobeying a lawful order of a police officer. He further emphasised that he and other participants of the demonstration had protested peacefully, and that they had been holding photos of arrested young persons, without uttering any slogans. The applicant also stated that he had run away as soon as he saw the police approaching and had boarded a taxi, and that police officers had stopped that taxi and had forced him out. 39.  The only witness questioned during the court hearing was police officer R.G. The statement that he gave against the third applicant, Mr Jamil Hajiyev, was similar to his statement against the first applicant, Mr Agasif Ibrahimov (see paragraph 20 above). R.G. also confirmed that Mr Jamil Hajiyev had tried to escape by taxi, and that the police officers had stopped that taxi. 40.  The court found that the applicant had failed to stop participating in the unauthorised demonstration. The court convicted him under Article 310.1 of the CAO and sentenced him to seven days\u2019 \u201cadministrative\u201d detention. 41.  The applicant lodged an appeal before the Baku Court of Appeal, arguing that his conviction was in violation of his rights because the demonstration in which he had participated had been peaceful. He also complained that his arrest had been unlawful and that the hearing before the first-instance court had not been fair. He requested the Baku Court of Appeal to quash the first-instance court\u2019s decision. 42.  The applicant was represented before the Baku Court of Appeal by a lawyer of his own choice. 43.  On 31 May 2011 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld the decision of the first-instance court, stating that its findings had been correct.", "references": ["0", "6", "1", "5", "4", "8", "9", "No Label", "7", "2", "3"], "gold": ["7", "2", "3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1968 and lives in Kharkiv. 6.  At the beginning of November 2008 some equipment was stolen from the enterprise at which the applicant worked. 7.  The Kharkiv Ordzhonikidze District Police Department invited the applicant and one of her colleagues for questioning in respect of the theft. 8.  On 8 November 2008, at 11.15 a.m., the applicant came to the police station. 9.  At about 11.35 a.m. on 8 November 2008 a senior detective officer, T., accompanied the applicant to the fourth floor of the police station. He asked her to wait in the corridor and entered office no. 56. Five minutes later the applicant heard a woman\u2019s scream emanating from that office. T. opened the door and directed an officer passing by to take the applicant to his office. She was made to wait there for about twenty minutes. Then T. took her to office no. 56. He pushed her inside, twisted her arms behind her back and handcuffed her, even though she had offered no resistance. 10.  T. and his colleague, S., who was also in the office, intimidated the applicant with a view to making her confess to the investigated theft. They told her that her colleague, Ms L., had already started to \u201ccrack\u201d. The applicant noticed Ms L.\u2019s belongings on the floor. She concluded that it was her scream that she had heard. 11.  Having failed to obtain a confession from the applicant, T. and S. made her sit on a chair, put a plastic bag over her head and started to strangle her. At the same time they struck her head, face and mouth so that she could not bite through the bag. The applicant fainted several times. When she told the officers she needed to use the toilet, S. hit her in the stomach and the head. She fainted once again and urinated involuntarily. Sometime later the applicant noticed the presence of another officer, P., in the office. 12.  After several hours of ill-treatment, the applicant was taken to another office where she stayed for about twenty minutes. Thereafter she was brought before a female officer, who conducted her formal questioning. 13.  At about 6 p.m. the applicant signed the official report of the questioning. She was then taken to the office of the head of the search unit, who stated that she was the main suspect in the theft case and that all her colleagues had indicated her as the likely thief. The applicant complained about her ill-treatment. Her complaint was ignored. 14.  She was taken again to office no. 56, where the officers threatened her and tried to pressure her into confessing. She repeatedly refused to do so and professed her innocence. The applicant was forced to write a statement that she had no complaints about the way the police had treated her. 15.  At about 8 p.m. on 8 November 2008 she was released. 16.  The applicant submitted to the Court five colour photographs of herself in which extensive bruising on her both arms and forearms is visible. 17.  On 9 November 2008 (the day following her release) the applicant felt unwell and called an ambulance. 18.  From 9 to 27 November 2008 she underwent in-patient hospital treatment for a closed head injury, concussion, soft tissue contusions on the head, upper and lower limbs, bruising of the abdominal wall, lumbar osteochondrosis and asthenia. 19.  On 9 November 2008 the hospital authorities informed the Ordzhonikidze Police Department about the applicant\u2019s injuries allegedly inflicted on her by police officers. 20.  On 10 November 2008 the applicant complained to the Kharkiv Ordzhonikidze District Prosecutor\u2019s Office (\u201cthe Ordzhonikidze Prosecutor\u2019s Office\u201d) about her ill-treatment. Ms L. lodged a similar complaint. 21.  On 18 November 2008 the police department refused to open a criminal case following the information from the hospital administration. 22.  On 12 December 2008 the Ordzhonikidze Prosecutor\u2019s Office opened a criminal case against the police officers on suspicion of their exceeding their powers by engaging in violent and degrading treatment. As a result, on 16 December 2008 the prosecutor also quashed the ruling of 18 November 2008. 23.  After her discharge from hospital, the applicant remained on sick leave until 19 December 2008. 24.  On 15 January 2009 the investigator seized the trousers which the applicant had been wearing on 8 November 2008. A forensic immunological examination discovered traces of her urine on them. 25.  From 27 November 2008 until 26 January 2009 a forensic medical expert evaluation was carried out with a view to establishing the applicant\u2019s injuries and their nature. That evaluation was based on her medical file, as well as a medical examination of her. The expert considered it established that, at the time of her hospitalisation, the applicant had had bruises to both arms that had been inflicted by blunt objects a day to three days previously. The expert stated that it was impossible to establish more precisely the time at which those injuries had been inflicted. As regards the soft tissue contusions, the expert did not find it necessary to take that diagnosis into account as being based merely on a personal opinion of the doctor who had examined the applicant. The same doctor\u2019s diagnoses of a closed head injury and concussion were considered by the expert as not sufficiently supported by \u201cclinical data\u201d. Lastly, the expert report stated that the applicant was suffering from neurotic asthenia, but that it was impossible to establish its origin. 26.  On 9 February 2009 a forensic expert evaluation was carried out of the applicant\u2019s handwritten statement on the official report on the questioning of 8 November 2008. The expert concluded that she had been \u201cin an unusual state\u201d when writing that note. 27.  On the same date officer T. challenged the decision of 12 December 2008 before the Ordzhonikidze District Court (\u201cthe Ordzhonikidze Court\u201d). 28.  On 24 February 2009 the Ordzhonikidze Court rejected his complaint. 29.  On 19 March 2009, however, the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal (\u201cthe Court of Appeal\u201d) quashed that decision and remitted the case to the first-instance court for fresh examination. 30.  Between 3 March and 2 April 2009 another forensic medical expert evaluation of the applicant\u2019s injuries was carried out. It concluded that she had sustained numerous bruises on her arms, shoulders and thighs. These could have been inflicted at the time and in the circumstances described by her. Because of the delay before the first forensic medical examination was undertaken, it appeared impossible to reach more specific findings. 31.  On 22 April 2009 the Ordzhonikidze Court quashed the prosecutor\u2019s decision of 12 December 2008. This ruling was quashed by the Court of Appeal on 7 May 2009. 32.  On 5 June 2009 the Ordzhonikidze Court once again quashed the prosecutor\u2019s decision of 12 December 2008. On 25 June 2009 this ruling too was quashed by the Court of Appeal. 33.  On 18 November 2009 the applicant and Ms L. identified the officers who had ill-treated them from photographs shown to them by the investigator. 34.  On 4 February 2010, however, the investigator closed the criminal case against the police officers, citing a lack of proof of their guilt. 35.  On 30 September 2010 the Ordzhonikidze Court upheld that decision. 36.  On 15 November 2010 the Court of Appeal quashed the ruling of the first-instance court and remitted the case to it for fresh examination. 37.  On 21 December 2010 the Ordzhonikidze Court allowed the applicant\u2019s complaint and quashed the investigator\u2019s decision of 4 February 2010. 38.  On 13 January 2011 the Court of Appeal upheld that ruling. 39.  In March and May 2011 the applicant enquired about the progress of the investigation. Her enquiries received no answer.", "references": ["2", "3", "6", "9", "0", "8", "5", "4", "7", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1989 and is detained in Opole Lubelskie. 6.  On 29 June 2007 the applicant was arrested and remanded in custody in the Bia\u0142a Podlaska Prison on suspicion of having committed a murder. He had a criminal record and had previously been detained. 7.  On 17 December 2009 he was convicted of a murder and sentenced to 25 years\u2019 imprisonment. The applicant appealed. 8.  On 10 November 2010 the Lublin Court of Appeal quashed the challenged judgment and remitted the case. 9.  On 13 May 2014 the Lublin Regional Court convicted the applicant and sentenced him to 13 years\u2019 imprisonment. 10.  On 14 August 2007 the Biala Podlaska Prison Penitentiary Commission classified the applicant as a dangerous detainee. It relied on the applicant\u2019s attempted escape while being transported outside the prison and on the serious nature of the offence he had been charged with. 11.  On an unspecified day in September 2007, the applicant was transferred to the Lublin Remand Centre. On 3 October 2007 the Lublin Remand Centre Penitentiary Commission also imposed the dangerous detainee regime on the applicant. Subsequently, the commission extended the application of the dangerous detainee regime to the applicant on numerous occasions. The applicant submitted copies of the decisions of the commission dated: 6 May 2008, 19 March 2009, 12 August and 23 December 2010, 23 March, 23 June and 14 July 2011 and 15 March 2012. All these decisions were issued on a special form containing space for reasoning. However, these forms only refer to the applicant\u2019s progress in rehabilitation, classifying it as \u201cmoderate\u201d or \u201cnegative\u201d. 12.  On an unspecified date the applicant was transferred to the Kielce Remand Centre. 13.  On 30 March 2010 the Kielce Remand Centre Penitentiary Commission also imposed the dangerous detainee regime on the applicant. The applicant appealed. 14.  On 28 June 2010 the Kielce Regional Court upheld the decision. It first noted that it was capable of examining whether the commission had remained within the limits of reasonableness and the limits of free assessment of circumstances of the case. It further held that the decision had been issued in accordance with the law and that it had been justified taking into account the applicant\u2019s aggressive and vulgar behaviour in the remand centre, his refusing meals and his unrepentent attitude towards the offences of which he had been convicted by the first-instance court. The court also found that the applicant had received disciplinary penalties on 22 occasions for establishing illegal contacts. 15.  On an unspecified date in 2010 the applicant was transferred back to the Lublin Remand Centre. 16.  On 31 August 2010 he complained about the conditions of his detention and the further extension of his classification as a dangerous detainee to the regional inspector of the Prison Service. 17.  On 2 November 2010 the inspector, relying on the applicant\u2019s attempted escape while being transported, found the complaint ill-founded. He also referred to the applicant\u2019s self-mutilation on 17 June 2010 and found that on 18 June 2010 he had been examined by a psychologist who had not found any obstacles to placing the applicant in solitary confinement as a disciplinary penalty. 18.  The applicant appealed against the decisions of 23 December 2010 and 23 March 2011. In his appeal against the former decision the applicant claimed, in particular, that the commission had arbitrarily classified him as \u201cdangerous\u201d, that he had no access to the opinions and the prison authorities\u2019 request leading to this classification, and he had been debased and humiliated by \u201c[being] consciously kept ... in inhuman conditions\u201d. 19.  On 28 February 2011 the Lublin Regional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the applicant\u2019s classification had been justified in view of the fact that on 14 August 2007 he had unlawfully tried to escape while being transported. The court further referred to the fact that the applicant had been charged with murder and held that this alone would be sufficient to justify the dangerous detainee classification even without the attempted escape.\nThe court further held:\n\u201cFurther circumstances such as personal conditions, the applicant\u2019s behaviour in detention and the extent of his lack of moral character are subject to assessment and the decision in this respect cannot be examined from the viewpoint of lawfulness. It could be examined as regards its equity; this however would go beyond the limits of examination laid down by Article 7 \u00a7 1 of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences.\u201d\nAs regards the applicant\u2019s further complaints the court held that they did not have any influence on the commission\u2019s decision and as such \u201cdid not even merit examination.\u201d 20.  On 11 May 2011 the Lublin Regional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal against the decision of 23 March 2011 holding that it had been based on \u201cthe applicant\u2019s attitude and negative behaviour and the assessment of his rehabilitation progress\u201d. 21.  On 22 September 2011 the Lublin Remand Centre Penitentiary Commission lifted the dangerous detainee regime imposed on the applicant. It relied on the applicant\u2019s good behaviour. 22.  In total, the dangerous detainee regime was applied to the applicant for four years, one month and nine days. 23.  The applicant was detained in several detention facilities, specifically Bia\u0142a Podlaska Prison and in Lublin, Mokot\u00f3w, Bia\u0142ystok and Kielce Remand Centres. 24.  In the Kielce Remand Centre the cells were constantly monitored via closed-circuit television. According to the Government, the applicant could publish articles in the prison bulletin and participate in competitions. He had access to a library and cultural and educational activities. 25.  In the Mokot\u00f3w and Bia\u0142ystok Remand Centres the cells and other areas in which the applicant was allowed were under special surveillance. The applicant was subject to a strip search each time he entered and left his cell. He was supervised by two officers each time he was outside of his cell. He had access to a library and daily newspapers, and could listen to the radio. He also had access to a recreation room with sport facilities. Additionally, in the Bia\u0142ystok Remand Centre he could participate in the programme of reintegration into society. 26.  The applicant spent most of the time complained of in the Lublin Remand Centre. The cell there was equipped with a sanitary facility which was not separated from the rest of the cell. The cell, including its sanitary facilities, was constantly monitored via closed-circuit television. 27.  The applicant had to wear a red uniform designated for dangerous detainees, which was not warm enough in winter. He was subjected to a strip search every time he left and entered the cell, which in practice meant that he had to strip naked in front of prison officers and was required to bend over in order to enable the examination of his anus. According to the applicant, whenever he was outside his cell, including his appearances at court hearings, he had to wear joined shackles (kajdanki zespolone) on his hands and feet. Those shackles consisted of handcuffs and fetters joined together with chains. According to the Government\u2019s submissions the applicant had to wear the joined shackles only when being transported. In prison, when outside his cell, he wore handcuffs. 28.  The applicant had a one-hour-long period of outdoor exercise per day. 29.  The cell window was covered with a plastic blind which, according to the applicant, limited access to fresh air and natural light in the cell. The cell was constantly in semi-darkness and for reading, even during the day, the applicant needed to use artificial light. 30.  The applicant could participate in cultural activities and use the library three times a week; he also had access to a recreation room, equipped with a television, games, a laptop and work-out facilities. 31.  Some disciplinary measures had to be applied to the applicant because of his aggressive and vulgar attitude toward prison guards. On 4 August 2009 he attempted to assault a public servant (pr\u00f3ba czynnej napa\u015bci na funkcjonariusza w s\u0142u\u017cbie). On 17 December 2009 the Lublin Regional Court convicted him of attempting to escape while being transported to a psychiatric examination on 14 August 2007. This conviction was upheld by the Lublin Court of Appeal on 10 November 2010. On 10 February 2012 the applicant was convicted by the Lublin Regional Court of having assaulted a public servant on 4 August 2009.", "references": ["9", "5", "6", "4", "3", "8", "2", "7", "0", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1927 and lives in Zagreb. 6.  On 24 May 1961 the applicant\u2019s husband was granted a specially protected tenancy in respect of a flat in Zagreb by the Yugoslav People\u2019s Army (the \u201cYPA\u201d). The applicant, as his spouse, was also a holder of a specially protected tenancy of that flat. 7.  On 3 June 1991 Parliament enacted the Protected Tenancies (Sale to Occupier) Act (Zakon o prodaji stanova na kojima postoji stanarsko pravo \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe Sale to Occupier Act\u201d), which regulated the sale of socially-owned flats previously let under a specially protected tenancy (see paragraph 19 below). However, State-owned flats were excluded. 8. On 3 October 1991 the Government adopted a decree (Uredba o preuzimanju sredstava JNA i SSNO na teritoriju Republike Hrvatske u vlasni\u0161tvo Republike Hrvatske) whereby it took all the YPA\u2019s property in Croatia into State ownership. 9.  In 1995 the Act Amending the Sale to Occupier Act (Zakon o izmjenama i dopunama Zakona o prodaji stanova na kojima postoji stanarsko pravo \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe APTSO\u201d) allowed the sale of State-owned flats as well (see paragraph 22 below). The time-limit for lodging a request to purchase such a flat was set at sixty days. 10.  On 29 January 1997 the Constitutional Court abrogated some of the provisions of the APTSO, including the one stipulating the time-limit for lodging a purchase request (see paragraph 23 below) 11.  The applicant\u2019s husband died on 15 April 2006. 12.  On 7 June 2006 the applicant lodged with the Ministry of Defence a request to purchase the flat she was occupying. The request was denied on the ground that it had been lodged outside the prescribed time-limit, which had expired on 31 December 1995. 13.  On 19 March 2008 the applicant brought a civil action in the Zagreb Municipal Court seeking a judgment in lieu of a sale contract. She relied on several decisions of the Constitutional Court ruling that there was no time-limit in respect of a holder of a specially protected tenancy lodging a request to purchase the respective State-owned flat (see paragraphs 24-26 below). 14.  In its judgment of 24 June 2008 the Zagreb Municipal Court held that there was no dispute between the parties that the applicant, as a former holder of a specially protected tenancy of the flat that she occupied, had the right to purchase that flat under favourable conditions. The only issue to be resolved was whether there was a time-limit that the applicant had to observe when lodging her request to purchase that flat \u2013 and if so, whether she had complied with it. The Municipal Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim on the ground that the applicant had lodged her purchase request outside the accepted time-limit, which had been 31 December 1995. 15.  The applicant lodged an appeal, arguing that the time-limit under the APTSO for lodging a request to purchase a State-owned flat had been abrogated by the Constitutional Court and that no new time-limit had been fixed. The fact that there was no prescribed time-limit in place should not have been interpreted to the detriment of a plaintiff. She also relied on the opinion of the Constitutional Court that the very purpose of the Sale to Occupier Act was to enable holders of specially protected tenancies in respect of socially and State-owned flats to purchase such flats (see paragraph 22 below). 16.  The first-instance judgment was upheld by the Zagreb County Court on 12 October 2010. The relevant part of the second-instance judgment reads:\n\u201cAs regards the decisions of the Constitutional Court relied on in the [plaintiff\u2019s] action, it is to be noted that these decisions exceptionally recognised the right of certain parties to purchase flats [they occupied] in particular circumstances (such as their having had no clearly regulated status of holder of a specially protected tenancy before that date \u2013 for example in decision no. U-3551/02 of 25 May 2005) ... even though a request to purchase a flat had not been lodged before 31 December 1995. In such particular cases the Constitutional Court has adopted decisions based on particular circumstances. The Constitutional Court in all decisions recognising the right to purchase flats [they occupied] of persons who had not lodged a request in that respect before 31 December 1995 has accepted that there were objective circumstances preventing those persons from taking all relevant steps within the prescribed time-limits. In the case at issue the plaintiff did not even argue [that there were any] such circumstances, but insisted that she could bring an action for the purchase of the flat [that she occupies] at any time and that there were no time-limits in that respect.\nThe view of this court is that the holders of specially protected tenancies of State-owned flats were obliged to lodge a request for purchasing these flats before 31 December 1995 (with the exception that in certain circumstances it was possible to claim that a party was prevented from lodging such a request within that time-limit on objective grounds).\u201d 17.  The applicant\u2019s subsequent constitutional complaint was dismissed on 20 February 2013. The relevant part of that decision reads:\n\u201cThe Constitutional Court notes that the competent courts dismissed the applicant\u2019s civil action on the grounds that she had not proved that any objective circumstances had prevented her from lodging a request to purchase the flat in issue within the prescribed time-limit. The Constitutional Court considers that the impugned decisions contain reasons acceptable from the standpoint of the constitutional law and that therefore they cannot be seen as arbitrary or unreasonable.\u201d", "references": ["0", "8", "1", "6", "5", "3", "2", "7", "4", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
+{"input": "5.  The first applicant organisation is the Vienna Chamber of Medical Doctors (\u00c4rztekammer f\u00fcr Wien). The Chamber represents all medical practitioners in Vienna and also has its own website. The second applicant was the Chamber\u2019s president at the time of the events. 6.  On 18 January 2007 the second applicant published a letter on the first applicant organisation\u2019s website, which was addressed to all members of the Chamber in Vienna and was also sent out to all of them via e-mail. The letter was titled \u201cLocust funds want to take over medical practices\u201d (\u201cHeuschreckenfonds wollen Ordinationen \u00fcbernehmen\u201d). The second applicant went on to state that he had been forced to write to his colleagues for a serious reason, namely, because it had been reported in the media that the F. company planned to go into \u201cthe radiology business\u201d. He added that share-bidding companies planned to offer medical services \u2013 initially in the area of radiology, but soon enough in other areas of the profession as well \u2011 and that doctors risked becoming mere employees of such \u201clocust\u201d companies. If they would not act according to the companies\u2019 wishes, they would be dismissed. The second applicant then explained the assumed legal and organisational basis of such a plan: radiology services which were currently being provided by medical practices could, in future, also be offered by limited companies. Shares of those companies could then be bought by the F. company, and the \u201clocusts\u201d would reach their goal, namely control of the medical profession. Giving an example of a risky development, the second applicant stated that in the last 20 years, colleagues had founded laboratories which had reciprocal agreements with certain health insurance boards. Today, almost all of those laboratories were owned by the F. group, which, in turn, was owned by insurance companies, investment funds and foundations, and which employed a large number of doctors. The second applicant ended his letter by stating that he could guarantee one thing: that the doctors\u2019 professional representative body would make use of all legal and political means available to stop such a disastrous development from going ahead, to prevent that the quality of medical treatment being determined by \u201cmanagers and controllers\u201d and to ensure, inter alia, that existing medical practices were protected from the competition from \u201cinternational locust funds\u201d (\u201cinternationale Heuschreckenfonds\u201d). 7.  On 24 January 2007 the F. company lodged an action against the two applicants and an application for an injunction with the Vienna Commercial Court (Handelsgericht Wien). The applicants contested the application. 8.  On 16 February 2007 the Vienna Commercial Court issued an injunction prohibiting the applicants (each of them individually) from repeating the statement that the F. company was ruthless towards third parties, in particular medical professionals. The injunction prevented the applicants from referring to the F. company as a \u201clocust\u201d, \u201clocust company\u201d or \u201clocust fund\u201d. The applicants were further prohibited from stating that the provision of services by the F. company, particularly services in the area of radiology, was a disastrous development. The court found that there was a competitive relationship between the F. company and the applicants, and found the statements made by the applicants to be defamatory under Article 1330 of the Civil Code and unethical under the Unfair Competition Act (Bundesgesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb). 9.  The applicants appealed against the injunction. On 30 October 2007 the Vienna Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht Wien) partly granted the appeal, and prohibited the applicants from alleging that the F. company was ruthless towards third parties and medical practitioners, and from calling it, inter alia, a \u201clocust company\u201d. However, it dismissed the F. company\u2019s application to prohibit the applicants from calling its provision of services a \u201cdisastrous\u201d development. The Court of Appeal found that the first applicant organisation had locus standi in the injunction proceedings. The Chamber of Medical Doctors held official authority status in relation to certain areas of its work (Bereich der Hoheitsverwaltung), in addition to representing the interests of its members; it was therefore considered a legal entity under the Official Liability Act (Amtshaftungsgesetz). However, when acting as a special interest group, it represented its members\u2019 interests from a mainly economic perspective, rather than acting in its capacity as an official authority. According to the Court of Appeal, the letter in issue pursued the interests of the Chamber\u2019s members, outside the Chamber\u2019s official sphere of activity. 10.  The Court of Appeal further established, referring inter alia to Wikipedia, that the term \u201clocust company\u201c (\u201cHeuschreckenunternehmen\u201c) was introduced into the political discussion in German speaking countries in 2005 by Mr Franz M\u00fcntefering, a German politician, and is ever since used in political debates as a pejorative term for private-equity companies or other forms of capital funds with short-term or exaggerated return expectations \u2013 like hedge funds or \u201evulture\u201c funds, which also had negative connotations. The domestic court found that there was a need to balance the interests involved in the present debate, reiterating that extreme opinions were only unlawful if they were excessive. As a result of that balancing exercise, the Court of Appeal found that the \u201clocust\u201d statement had to be considered a lawful criticism in the context of a public debate, and that the F. company could therefore not base its claim on Article 1330 of the Civil Code. However, the Court of Appeal classified the applicants\u2019 actions as competitive in nature. Statements of fact made in violation of the Unfair Competition Act could not be justified by the right to freedom of expression. The Court of Appeal found that Austrian law provided wide\u2011ranging protection for commercial and economic interests. Those who published an opinion in an economically competitive context were obliged to exercise a higher level of diligence with regard to the facts and bases of their allegations than those who acted in the non-competitive context of a public debate of general interest. Therefore, the Court of Appeal upheld the injunction decision with regard to the statements about the \u201clocust company\u201d. 11.  However, as regards the further statement, namely that provision of certain services by the F. company was a \u201cdisastrous development\u201d, the Court of Appeal found that, read in context, the statement indicated a general assessment and did not refer to a particular service of the F. company. It was therefore to be considered a personal opinion, and thus a value judgment that was not defamatory under Article 1330 of the Civil Code. It also did not fall under section 7 of the Unfair Competition Act. 12.  The applicants lodged an extraordinary appeal with the Supreme Court (Oberster Gerichtshof). On 22 January 2008 the Supreme Court dismissed the extraordinary appeal. It acknowledged the applicants\u2019 argument that where a competitor, even for economic purposes, took part in a debate of public interest, freedom of expression had to hold more weight in the balancing test. However, the Supreme Court observed that the applicants had made their statement in the clearly economic context of competition between medical practitioners and companies which provided the same services. The applicants could have warned their members of the possible risks of cooperating with companies without overstepping the margin of acceptable criticism. However, the applicants had exceeded that limit and stated that the F. company was a \u201clocust\u201d. That statement was one of fact, and the applicants had not provided evidence of a factual basis for their allegations, and had therefore exceeded the permissible limitations of freedom of expression. 13.  On 7 July 2008 the Commercial Court gave its judgment in the substantive proceedings and ordered the applicants to refrain from: repeating the statement that the F. company was ruthless towards third parties, in particular medical practitioners and patients; and stating that the F. company was a \u201clocust company\u201d, a \u201clocust fund\u201d or a \u201clocust\u201d. It further ordered the applicants to publish and display the operative part of the judgment on the first applicant organisation\u2019s website for thirty days, and to publish it in the first applicant organisation\u2019s print newsletter. 14.  The Commercial Court made substantial reference to the Court of Appeal\u2019s reasoning in the interim injunction proceedings. It followed the previous finding that the relevant statements did not constitute defamation pursuant to Article 1330 of the Civil Code. Examining the statements in relation to the provisions of the Unfair Competition Act, the Commercial Court found that the letter had been written by the Chamber of Medical Doctors in a commercial and not a political context. It had also had the advancement of independent medical practices as an objective, and had contained a warning regarding capital ventures which allegedly threatened doctors\u2019 independence. The Commercial Court found the relevant comparisons with \u201clocusts\u201d to be statements of fact regarding both the F. company and its conduct in relation to third parties, doctors and patients. The statements were also likely to damage the F. company\u2019s commercial interests, and had not been proved to be true. 15.  The used language could also not be justified with a reference to the right to freedom of expression as the statement was uttered within the framework of a commercial competitive relationship. With reference to the Court\u2019s case-law allowing for a wider margin of appreciation under Article 10 of the Convention with regard to commercial language, the Commercial Court observed that a competitor was required to be more diligent in the context of commercial communication among competitors. The term \u201clocust\u201d was almost exclusively loaded with negative meaning, which led to the unethical general vilification of a competitor. The applicants were therefore prohibited from using that statement in relation to the F. company, pursuant to the Unfair Competition Act. 16.  On 19 September 2008 the applicants lodged an appeal against that judgment. On 12 December 2008 the Vienna Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as unfounded. It referred to the extensive reasoning given in the interim injunction proceedings and added that, according to the case-law of the Supreme Court, the test used to verify whether a statement was covered by the right to freedom of expression required the assessment of whether a factual basis for such a statement existed; if a competitor participated in a public debate of general interest, freedom of expression had more weight with regard to the assessment of the statement than in the context of purely commercial communication. The greater the public interest in being properly informed and the less the statement related to commercial interests, the more the statement would be protected by Article 10 of the Convention. In the present case, there was no doubt that there was an ongoing public debate; however, the commercial interests of the applicants had very much been in the foreground of the communicated statement itself. 17.  The applicants lodged an extraordinary appeal on points of law against that judgment, which was rejected by the Supreme Court on 14 July 2009. The Supreme Court found that the applicants had not only called the F. company a \u201clocust\u201d, but had also reproached this company for negative conduct, such as dominating doctors, dismissing doctors who did not act in accordance with company wishes, and focusing on economic factors rather than the welfare of patients (\u201cHerrschaft \u00fcber den \u00e4rztlichen Berufstand, K\u00fcndigung nicht \u201cspurender\u201d \u00c4rzte, Orientierung an \u00f6konomischen Erw\u00e4gungen und damit nicht am Wohl der Patienten\u201d). Therefore, the expression used had turned into a statement of fact, giving the reader the impression that the F. company had already demonstrated unethical conduct which threatened the interests of doctors and patients. In view of the specific circumstances of the case, the prohibition ruled upon by the lower courts was justified. Even though the applicants had taken part in a debate of general public interest, an untrue and damaging statement of fact was not protected by freedom of expression. Furthermore, the issuing of warnings concerning the potential risks of the provision of medical services by companies was not, as such, prohibited by the decisions of the Austrian courts; the applicants had only been required to refrain from making untrue statements of fact in respect of their competitors. 18.  The decision of the Supreme Court was served on the applicants\u2019 counsel on 27 August 2009.", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "2", "5", "8", "3", "7", "9", "6", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1989 and is currently in detention in Lublin. 6.  On an unspecified date before October 2011 the applicant was convicted of assault and of endangering lives through arson and extortion. 7.  On 14 October 2011, the Lublin Remand Centre Penitentiary Commission (\u201cthe commission\u201d) imposed a special regime for detainees deemed to be dangerous (\u201cthe dangerous detainee regime\u201d) on the applicant. The commission referred to the fact that the applicant had organised a collective protest in Opole Lubelskie Prison, namely, a hunger strike by prisoners, and that he had planned an attack on a prison employee. It also found that the applicant had received disciplinary punishments on many occasions, in particular for the attempted smuggling of psychoactive substances into prison. 8.  The applicant did not appeal against the decision to impose the regime on him. 9.  The decision was reviewed and upheld by the commission every three months. 10.  On 12 January 2012 the commission again reviewed the situation and upheld its decision, considering that the applicant posed a serious danger to the security of the prison. The applicant did not appeal against that decision. 11.  On 11 April 2012 the commission reviewed and upheld its decision, relying on the same grounds as previously. The applicant appealed. 12.  On 16 May 2012 the commission examined the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld its earlier decision. It referred to the applicant\u2019s conduct, finding that he had often behaved aggressively. It also referred to the applicant\u2019s highly deficient moral character (wysoki stopie\u0144 demoralizacji), and the fact that he had been the leader of a collective protest in Opole Lubelskie Prison (the prisoners\u2019 hunger strike) and had planned an attack on a prison employee. The applicant lodged a court appeal against the commission\u2019s decision. 13.  On 13 June 2012 the Lublin Regional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the decision had been lawful. 14.  On 14 July 2012 the Lublin Remand Centre Penitentiary Commission lifted the dangerous detainee regime in respect of the applicant. It based its decision on the applicant\u2019s good behaviour and the fact that he no longer posed a danger to the prison. 15.  The applicant\u2019s cell, including its sanitary facilities, was constantly monitored via closed-circuit television. The window was covered with a plastic blind. The applicant was subjected to a body search every time he left and entered the cell, which in practice meant that he had to strip naked in front of prison officers and was required to bend over to allow his anus to be examined. Whenever he was outside his cell, including at court hearings, the applicant had to wear joined shackles (kajdanki zespolone) on his hands and feet. The shackles consisted of handcuffs and fetters joined together with chains.", "references": ["7", "2", "3", "9", "0", "8", "6", "5", "4", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1933 and lives in Karabulak, Ingushetia. He is the uncle of Mr Apti Dalakov, who was born in 1986. Mr Apti Dalakov\u2019s parents and brother died in a car accident in 1998. 6.  The circumstances of the case are disputed by the parties.\nThe killing of Mr Apti Dalakov and subsequent events 7.  At about 5 p.m. on 2 September 2007 Mr Apti Dalakov and his friend Mr I.D. left a computer club in Karabulak. While they were walking down Oskanova Street, two Gazel minivans with heavily tinted windows and without number plates pulled over and a group of men armed with assault rifles and pistols emerged from the vehicles. Two of the armed men wore plain clothes, while the others were in camouflage uniforms and balaclavas. Without identifying themselves or giving any explanation they pointed their guns at Mr Apti Dalakov and Mr I.D. and opened fire. Mr Apti Dalakov ran away. The armed men pursued him and continued shooting. 8.  In Dzhabagiyeva Street, in the presence of a number of local residents, including Mr I.B.M., Ms A.I.Ts. and Ms F.Kh.Ts., Mr Apti Dalakov was hit by a car and fell to the ground. He got up and limped into the courtyard of the adjacent nursery school. A man from the car which had hit Mr Apti Dalakov ran after him and fired at him several times with his pistol. Mr Apti Dalakov fell to the ground face down. Several other armed men ran towards the scene and one of them fired at Mr Apti Dalakov several times while he was on the ground. After having ascertained that Mr Apti Dalakov was dead, one of the armed men lifted his body and placed an object under it. 9.  Shortly thereafter a group of officers of the local police and the special police force (\u041e\u0442\u0434\u0435\u043b \u043c\u0438\u043b\u0438\u0446\u0438\u0438 \u043e\u0441\u043e\u0431\u043e\u0433\u043e \u043d\u0430\u0437\u043d\u0430\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f (\u041e\u041c\u041e\u041d)) (hereinafter \u201cthe OMON\u201d) arrived at the scene. A number of civilians present on the premises and the adjacent streets alerted the police officers to the fact that Mr Apti Dalakov had not offered any resistance to his pursuers, that he had not been armed and that his pursuers had placed an object under his body; it turned out to be a hand grenade with its pin pulled. The police officers requested the pursuers, who were officers of the Ingushetia Department of the Federal Security Service (\u0424\u0435\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u0430\u044f \u0421\u043b\u0443\u0436\u0431\u0430 \u0411\u0435\u0437\u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438 (\u0424\u0421\u0411)) (hereinafter \u201cthe FSB\u201d) to identify themselves; they refused to do so. In the ensuing scuffle the police officers arrested the FSB officers and took them to the Karabulak town police department. Mr I.D., who had been arrested by FSB officers after the chase, was also arrested by the town police and then released several days later. 10.  After bomb disposal experts had deactivated the grenade, Mr Apti Dalakov\u2019s body was taken for a post-mortem examination and was returned to his relatives for burial at midnight on 2 September 2007. 11.  The above account of the events is based on the information contained in the application form as well as on written statements by Mr I.B.M., dated 26 September 2007, Ms A.I.Ts. and Ms F.Kh.Ts., both dated 2 October 2007, and a written statement by the applicant dated 31 July 2009.\n(b)  The Government\u2019s submission 12.  Referring to the contents of the investigation file in criminal case no. 27520028 the Government stated in their submission of 22 January 2014 that the circumstances of the incident had been as follows.\n\u201c6.  Between 5.30 p.m. and 6 p.m. on 2 September 2007 servicemen of the Ingushetia FSB found presumed members of a bandit group Mr Apti Dalakov and Mr [I.D.] The FSB servicemen got out of the service car and attempted to detain these two men. They ordered the two men to get down on the ground, having identified themselves as FSB agents. 7.  Mr [I.D.] obeyed and lay down on the ground. Mr Apti Dalakov did not comply with the order and started to run away. One of the FSB agents followed him. During the pursuit he warned Mr Apti Dalakov that he would open fire if the latter did not stop. ... Mr Apti Dalakov stopped, took a grenade from his pocket and prepared to pull the pin. Taking into account information in their possession concerning the presumed criminal activity of Mr Apti Dalakov and his refusal to obey law-enforcement agents\u2019 orders, the FSB officer took the decision to open fire, shooting to kill in order to eliminate the threat to his own life and health and that of the other people present at the time in the street.\n... 9.  As regards Mr [I.D.], on 3 September 2007 the record of his arrest was drawn up and he was questioned as a suspect ... arrest as a measure of restraint was chosen for him. He was released ten days later, and on or about 23 September 2007 he left to live permanently in Kazakhstan ...\u201d 13.  On 2 September 2007 the Karabulak investigating department of the Investigating Committee with the Prosecutor\u2019s Office of the Russian Federation in Ingushetia (hereinafter \u201cthe investigating department\u201d) opened criminal case no. 27520028 against Mr Apti Dalakov under Articles 317 and 222 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code (assault on a law-enforcement official and unlawful possession of arms and explosives). 14.  On the same date, 2 September 2007, the investigating department examined the crime scene. According to the crime scene report, forty cartridge cases were collected from the scene and a grenade was found under Mr Apti Dalakov\u2019s body, under the lower part of his stomach. No objects were found in the hands of Mr Apti Dalakov. As a result, forty cartridges and the grenade were collected from the scene for expert examination. 15.  Between 2 and 11 September 2007 a senior operational search officer, Mr A.Kh. of the Internal Investigations Department of the Ingushetia Ministry of the Interior, conducted an internal inquiry in connection with \u201ccollaboration between police officers from the Ingushetia Ministry of the Interior and officers of the Ingushetia Federal Security Service\u201d concerning the circumstances of Mr Apti Dalakov\u2019s killing. Its results were stated in conclusion no. 172 dated 11 September 2007. The document, amongst other things, contained the following information:\n\u201c... at about 5 p.m. on 2 September 2007 the FSB officers conducted a special operation in Karabulak aimed at arresting members of illegal armed groups.\nThe local police department was not informed about it.\nDuring the special operation, the FSB officers eliminated a member of an illegal armed group, Mr Apti Dalakov, who had offered active armed resistance.\nAt about 5.20 p.m. police captain [G.G.], who was on duty, ... had seen two armed men pursuing a young man who was running away; one of the armed men had opened fire on him. The pursuers had been accompanied by a white Gazel vehicle with darkened windows and without number plates.\nCaptain [G.G.] had reported the incident to the duty unit of the Karabulak town police department, and had remained at his post ...\nA group of police officers dispatched to the crime scene from the town police station and a group of Ingushetia OMON which had arrived there after hearing shots from automatic weapons ... found a dead man and a disorderly group of about 100 people, some in camouflage uniforms and others in civilian clothing, who were shouting ... and yelling about why the police were not arresting armed bandits who had killed an unarmed man who had not offered any resistance.\nThe armed men, who were in camouflage uniforms and civilian clothing, who had conducted this special operation, had refused to identify themselves, had not presented any documents, and had warned that they would use firearms against the police officers.\nThe law-enforcement officers of Karabulak had taken those men for terrorists and/or active members of illegal armed groups ...\nUnder these circumstances, to prevent the presumed law-enforcement officers from being lynched by the enraged crowd, the head of the Karabulak town police department, Lieutenant-Colonel [A.M.], had tried to separate the armed men who had killed [the man on the ground] and the civilians from the local residents. However, the police officers had ended up being isolated by the unidentified armed men and had become, in effect, their hostages; the armed men had behaved aggressively and refused to state what organisation they belonged to.\nThe OMON group had arrived at the scene, quickly assessed the situation, and then blocked and disarmed the unidentified individuals using special physical force techniques against those who resisted. After that the armed men were taken to the Karabulak town police department and the premises of the OMON unit (the entire perimeter of the town police station had been surrounded by civilians expressing their indignation at the actions of the unidentified persons who had made several \u201cinsurance\u201d shots to the head of the unarmed wounded young man who had fallen to the ground next to the nursery school and who, according to the nearby residents, then had placed an armed grenade under his body to make it look like the young man had offered resistance).\nThe Ingushetia Minister of the Interior and the head of the Ingushetia FSB had arrived at the scene and taken the decision to immediately release the arrested persons to avoid making their identities known to the public ...\nThe unidentified persons ... had offered resistance to the OMON officers ... as a result [of the scuffle], the police officers [M.O.] and [M.K.] and the head of the operational search unit of the Karabulak town police department, Lieutenant\u2011Colonel [A.Ts.], required medical assistance...\nAll the arrested persons who were law-enforcement officers were released without logging their names in the detention log upon confirmation of their identities by the head of the Ingushetia FSB; their guns were returned to them ...\nTherefore, the above misunderstanding took place due to lack of proper coordination between the law-enforcement agencies who were carrying out a special task in the Republic of Ingushetia ...\u201d 16.  The documents submitted indicate that on various dates in September 2007 the investigators questioned several witnesses who lived near the crime scene. For the most part the witnesses stated that they had not seen the actual events but had seen a young\u2019s man body on the ground surrounded by a large number of police who had cordoned off the area. 17.  On 12 September 2007 the investigators questioned Ms F.Kh.Ts., who stated that at about 5 p.m. on 2 September 2007 she had been at home. She had looked out of the window on to Dzhabagiyeva Street and heard a muffled sound of an impact. Then she had seen a young man limping rapidly past her window into the premises of the nursery school. He had been followed by a masked man in camouflage uniform with a pistol and a man with a camouflage T\u2011shirt pulled over his head. This man was running with an automatic rifle and firing at the young man. Then all three men went round the corner of the building. The witness had immediately run outside and followed the men. She saw the young man on his stomach on the ground, convulsing. The other two men were standing next to him and arguing. Then one of them ordered the witness to go away and she obeyed the order. After that a large number of police officers had arrived at the scene and cordoned off the area. 18.  On 12 September 2007 the Ingushetia Forensic Examinations Bureau (\u201cthe Forensic Bureau\u201d) concluded that the detonating fuse of the grenade recovered from the crime scene was not capable of exploding due to a missing part, but that the grenade itself was capable of exploding provided the fuse was in working condition. 19.  On 19 September 2007 the investigators questioned a police officer of the Ingushetia OMON, Akh.Ya., who stated that at about 5.30 p.m. on 2 September 2007 he had been at work when he and his colleagues had heard sounds of sporadic gunfire coming from the area around Karabulak central market. He and thirteen to fifteen of his colleagues were then dispatched to the scene of the shooting, next to the nursery school. Upon arrival at the scene the witnesses had seen a large crowd of local residents and a group of about twelve to fifteen masked men with automatic firearms. The local residents had been aggressively expressing their indignation, as according to them the armed men had killed an unarmed young man; the body was still on the ground. The armed men had refused to identify themselves or to give reasons for killing the young man. They resisted the police officers: behaved aggressively, swore, fired their weapons into the air several times, and threatened the police with firearms. When the second group of police arrived, owing to the armed men\u2019s behaviour and the threats from the outraged crowd of local residents they disarmed the masked men, forced them into a Ural lorry, and took them to the Karabulak town police department. 20.  Between 20 and 28 September 2007 the investigators questioned the police officers M.K., M.Ku., B.She., M.Ts. and A.-G.M.; their statements concerning the events were similar to that of their colleague Akh.Ya. 21.  On 22 September 2007 the investigators were informed by the Ingushetia FSB that it was impossible to question their officers implicated in the incident, as they were all undergoing medical treatment in hospital in Kislovodsk, Russia. 22.  On 26 September 2007 the investigators questioned police officer Captain G.G., who stated that at about 5.30 p.m. on 2 September 2007 he had been on duty across the road from the nursery school. He had heard the gunshots and immediately called the police station. After that he had run out into the street and seen two men in the sand-coloured camouflage uniforms of special service agents. The men, who had been running ahead, had been firing at someone in front of them. Then the two men went round the corner of a building and out of sight. Then the men following them in a white Gazel minivan without registration numbers had turned and driven off. 23.  On 1 October 2007 the Forensic Bureau informed the investigators of its conclusions concerning the cause of Mr Apti Dalakov\u2019s death. According to their report of 3 September 2007, Mr Apti Dalakov had died from gunshot wounds, including two in the back, one in the back of the lower leg, and one in the back of the head. 24.  On 15 or 16 October 2007 the investigators questioned an FSB officer, V.L., and granted him victim status in the criminal case. In his statement the officer submitted that at about 5 p.m. on 2 September 2007 he and his colleagues had arrived in Karabulak in a service vehicle to identify and detain members of an illegal armed group, Mr I.D. and Mr Apti Dalakov. At about 5.30 p.m. they had received information that both men were heading in their direction. The officers had been given descriptions of Mr I.D. and Mr Apti Dalakov and ordered to detain them. The witness and his colleagues got out of the car, shouted \u201con the ground! FSB!\u201d and ran after the two men. Mr I.D. immediately got down on the ground, whereas Mr Apti Dalakov ran away. The witness thought Mr Apti Dalakov was armed and could offer resistance. The witness and his colleagues put Mr I.D. into their vehicle and then went after Mr Apti Dalakov. When the witness reached Dzhabagiyeva Street he heard \u201cFSB! Stop!\u201d and then \u201cStop or I\u2019ll fire!\u201d and then heard machine-gun shots and ran towards them. He saw his colleagues next to a two-storey building in Dzhabagiyeva Street, standing next to the body of Mr Apti Dalakov and one of the colleagues holding a grenade. He checked Mr Apti Dalakov\u2019s pulse and confirmed that he was dead, then the witness and his colleagues called the mine squad and cordoned off the area. 25.  On 16 and 17 October 2007 the investigators questioned FSB officers A.Ch., I.K., and P.Ch., and granted them victim status in the criminal case. The statements given by the three officers to the investigation were identical to that of their colleague, officer V.L. 26.  On 2 November 2007 the investigating department terminated the proceedings in case no. 27520028. The decision referred to statements by FSB officers V.L., I.K. and P.Ch. They submitted, among other things, that on 2 September 2007 they had gone to Karabulak to arrest members of an illegal armed group, Mr Apti Dalakov and Mr I.D. When the officers had spotted the two men, they got out of their Gazel minivan and shouted: \u201cFSB! Get down!\u201d. Mr I.D. had complied with the order but Mr Apti Dalakov had run away. Officers A.B. and A.Ch. followed Mr Apti Dalakov, while V.L., I.K. and P.Ch. put Mr I.D. securely into their vehicle. After that they heard shooting and went to Dzhabagiyeva Street, where they found FSB officers and Mr Apti Dalakov, face down on the ground with a grenade in his hand. The officers checked his pulse, ascertained that he was dead, called bomb disposal experts and secured the area. The decision further stated that officers A.B. and P.Ch. \u201chad given similar statements\u201d, without providing any further details in that respect. The examination of the grenade seized at the scene by the authorities had established that it was capable of exploding. The decision concluded that there existed sufficient evidence to prove that Mr Apti Dalakov was guilty of assaulting law\u2011enforcement officials and of unlawful possession of ammunition, but in view of his death in the exchange of fire the criminal case against him was to be terminated. The applicant learnt of that decision at some point in February or March 2008 (see paragraph 40 below). 27.  On 3 December 2007 the head of the investigating department overruled the decision of 2 November 2007 to terminate the criminal investigation as unsubstantiated at the request of the Karabulak town prosecutor. The latter stated in his request, among other things, the following:\n\u201c... the decision of 2 November 2007 ... is premature, unlawful and unsubstantiated due to the incompleteness of the investigation ... for instance,\nMr [I.D.], who had complied with the order of the arresting group ... was not questioned about the circumstances of the incident.\nIn addition, the investigators did not examine the legal grounds for the use of firearms against Mr A. Dalakov.\nFrom conclusion no. 172 of the internal inquiry of 11 September 2007 carried out by the Internal Investigations Department of the Ingushetia Ministry of the Interior, residents of the nearby houses had stated that after the liquidation of Mr A. Dalakov, an armed grenade had been placed under his body to make it look like he had offered armed resistance. However, this information was not examined further ...\u201d\nThe applicant was informed of the decision on 6 December 2007. 28.  On 27 December 2007 the investigators separated the part of the evidence concerning the use of the firearms during the incident from criminal case no. 27520028 and forwarded it to another investigator in the Karabulak investigating department for further examination. In the documents submitted it is also stated that on the same date the same material was forwarded to the military investigations department of military unit no. 68799 for examination. 29.  On 3 January 2008 the investigating department again terminated the proceedings in case no. 27520028 because of the death of the suspect. The text of the decision reiterated in identical wording the decision of 2 November 2007 (see paragraph 26 above). 30.  On 22 January 2008 the head of the Ingushetia investigating department overruled the decision of 3 January 2008 to terminate the criminal investigation as premature and unsubstantiated. In particular, he pointed out that the investigators had neither questioned Mr I.D. and the FSB officer who had shot Mr Apti Dalakov nor obtained information on the inquiry concerning the use of the firearms against Mr Apti Dalakov by the FSB servicemen. 31.  On 6 February 2008 the investigation in criminal case no. 27520028 was again terminated, because of the death of the suspect. The text of the decision reiterated verbatim that of 2 November 2007 (see paragraph 26 above) but did not mention that according to the mother of Mr I.D. the latter had moved to Kazakhstan on or about 23 September 2007. The applicant was not informed of that decision. 32.  On 26 February 2008 the investigators requested the head of the military investigations department to inform them of the results of the examination of the materials concerning Mr Apti Dalakov\u2019s killing. 33.  On 28 February 2008 the military investigations department replied to the investigators that on 30 January 2008 they had refused to initiate criminal investigation into the killing owing to the lack of corpus delicti in the actions of the FSB officer A.K. who had opened fire on Mr Apti Dalakov. The copy of the decision enclosed with the letter indicated that the decision had been taken on the basis of the explanation given by officer A.K., which was identical to the statement given by him on 5 March 2008 to the investigators in criminal case no. 27520028 (see the paragraph below). Neither the applicant nor his relatives were informed of that decision. 34.  On 28 February and 5 March 2008 respectively the investigators granted FSB officer A.K. victim status in criminal case no. 27520028 and questioned him. The officer stated that on 2 September 2007, as a member of a special combat group, upon the order of the head of the Ingushetia FSB, he had arrived in Karabulak to carry out a special operation aimed at arresting active members of \u201cthe Karabulak illegal armed group\u201d Mr Apti Dalakov and Mr I.D., who were suspected of involvement in terrorist acts in Ingushetia. Having arrived at the place of the operation next to the nursery school, the officer had got out of the vehicle, run towards Mr I.D. and Mr Apti Dalakov, and shouted: \u201cOn the ground! FSB!\u201d In reply to this warning Mr I.D. had got down on the ground, whereas Mr Apti Dalakov had started running away. The officer had run after him and continued shouting from time to time: \u201cStop! FSB!\u201d Having understood that Mr Apti Dalakov had no intention of stopping, the officer shouted: \u201cFSB! Stop or I\u2019ll fire!\u201d and then fired once into the air when Mr Apti Dalakov was about ten to fifteen metres away from him. At that point Mr Apti Dalakov had stopped, turned round to face the officer, taken a grenade out of the right pocket of his trousers and tried to pull out the fuse. Having assessed the situation as threatening, the officer opened fire, aiming to hit Mr Apti Dalakov. When the shots were fired Mr Apti Dalakov\u2019s body was flung about in various directions and then he fell to the ground face down. After ascertaining that Mr Apti Dalakov was dead, the officer reported the incident to the head of the operation. The latter ordered the officer and his colleagues from the FSB to cordon off the area and wait for the investigators\u2019 arrival. 35.  On 5 September 2007 a relative of Mr Apti Dalakov, Mr M.Kh., complained to the Karabulak town prosecutor about the killing of Mr Apti Dalakov and asked for a criminal investigation to be opened into the matter. 36.  On 20 and 29 September 2007 the applicant complained about the killing to the Ingushetia Prosecutor and the Karabulak town prosecutor. 37.  On 10 October 2007 the town prosecutor replied to the applicant that on 2 September 2007 criminal case no. 27520028 had been opened against Mr Apti Dalakov concerning assault on a law-enforcement official and unlawful possession of arms and explosives. The letter did not specify whether any proceedings had been initiated to investigate Mr Apti Dalakov\u2019s killing. 38.  On 27 November 2007 the applicant complained to the town prosecutor that he had not been informed of any decisions in respect of the complaint concerning his nephew\u2019s killing. 39.  On 6 December 2007 the town prosecutor replied to the applicant that the decision to terminate proceedings in criminal case no. 27520028 had been overruled as unlawful and the proceedings resumed on 6 December 2007. The letter did not specify whether any proceedings had been initiated in respect of an investigation of Mr Apti Dalakov\u2019s killing. 40.  On 6 March 2008 the applicant again complained to the Karabulak investigating committee about Mr Apti Dalakov\u2019s killing, and stressed that according to numerous witnesses his nephew had not been armed and had not offered resistance to FSB officers. However, none of those eyewitnesses had been interviewed and no criminal proceedings had been instituted in connection with his death. The applicant further stated that he had in the meantime been provided with the decision of 2 November 2007 and that the town prosecutor had overruled it as unfounded. The applicant requested the investigating department to institute criminal proceedings in connection with the killing and to question the FSB officers who had participated in the arrest of his nephew, the OMON and police officers and other eyewitnesses. He also asked the investigators to grant him victim status in those proceedings. The applicant\u2019s complaint was received by the investigating department on 19 March 2008 but no reply was given to it. 41.  On 14 August 2008 the applicant complained to the Karabulak District Court under Article 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure about the failure of the investigating department to open a criminal case in connection with Mr Apti Dalakov\u2019s killing and failure to take basic steps to establish the circumstances of the incident. In his complaint the applicant stated, amongst other things, the following:\n\u201c... On 2 September 2007 ... officers of law-enforcement bodies shot and killed my nephew Mr Apti Dalakov, who, according to eye-witnesses, was not armed and did not resist.\nI lodged a request with the Ingushetia Prosecutor asking for a criminal case to be opened in connection with the killing. In reply I received the decision to terminate the investigation in criminal case no. 2750028 opened against Mr Apti Dalakov.\nThe Karabulak Town Prosecutor overruled this decision ... I lodged another complaint with the Karabulak Investigating Department in which I requested that a criminal case be opened in order to investigate the killing of Mr Apti Dalakov; witnesses to the incident, in addition to the police officers from the Karabulak Town Police Department and the Ingushetia OMON who had participated in the detention of the FSB officers who had shot Mr Apti Dalakov, be identified and questioned ... and victim status in the criminal case be granted to me. This complaint was delivered on 19 March 2008.\nAccording to ... the Russian Criminal Procedure Code, my complaint should have served as the reason for opening of a criminal case ... a criminal case is opened when there is sufficient evidence that a crime has been committed... and the decision is taken within ten days from the receipt of the complaint...\nHowever, those regulations were not complied with. The investigating authorities received my complaint, but they neither took any appropriate decisions nor informed me thereof. This procedural violation led to the failure to take the other steps I had requested in my complaint.\nWitnesses to the incident, who could have confirmed Mr Apti Dalakov\u2019s killing and refuted the allegations that he had resisted arrest, have not been identified or questioned. We ourselves have identified such witnesses, including Mr [M.Ku.], Mr [I.Ma.], and others.\nThe police officers from the Karabulak Town Police Department and the Ingushetia OMON who had arrested the individuals, who shot Mr Apti Dalakov were not questioned. I was not granted victim status either.\nThe failure of the investigating authorities to act violates Article 2 of the European Convention of Human Rights...\nI request, on the basis of Article 125 of the Russian Criminal Procedure Code that the court ... 1.  Declare unlawful the failure of the investigating authorities to initiate a criminal investigation in respect of my complaint, to identify and question witnesses to the killing ... and grant me victim status in the proceedings; 2.  Oblige the Karabulak Investigating Committee\n(1)  to remedy the above breaches;\n(2)  to open a criminal case in connection with Mr Apti Dalakov\u2019s killing\n(3)  to grant me victim status in the criminal case\n(4)  to identify and question witnesses to Mr Apti Dalakov\u2019s killing\n(5)  to question officers of the Karabulak Town Police Department and the Ingushetia OMON who arrested those involved in Mr Apti Dalakov\u2019s killing ...\u201d\nAccording to the Government, the applicant lodged this complaint on 18 August 2008. The incoming mail registration stamp on the copy of the document indicates that this complaint was received on 14 August 2008. 42.  On 18 September 2008 the District Court held a hearing in connection with the applicant\u2019s complaint. According to the transcript of the hearing, both parties were present. During the examination the representative of the investigating authorities submitted that they had transferred the evidence concerning the killing of Mr Apti Dalakov to a military prosecutor\u2019s office. The judge requested that the documents reflecting the transfer be provided for the next hearing, scheduled for 23 September 2008. 43.  On 23 September 2008 the District Court examined and rejected the applicant\u2019s complaint as unsubstantiated. The court reasoned as follows:\n\u201c... [the applicant] M. K. Dalakov ... requested that his complaint be allowed and the refusal to initiate a criminal investigation into his nephew\u2019s killing be declared unlawful ... that the police officers ... who had been present at the crime scene be questioned as witnesses, and that more witnesses to the crime, in addition to the FSB officers who had shot Mr A. Dalakov dead, be identified and questioned.\nThe public prosecutor Mr [A. P.] requested the court to reject the complaint as unsubstantiated. In support of his position he stated that the criminal case related to Mr A. Dalakov\u2019s death had been terminated by the Karabulak Investigating Committee, as the actions of the FSB officers who had carried out the operation in respect of Mr A. Dalakov had been declared lawful. The OMON police officers on whose questioning the applicant insists before the court arrived at the scene later and did not witness Mr A. Dalakov\u2019s killing. No other witnesses were identified.\nHaving been duly informed of the date and place of the hearing, and in the absence of requests for the examination of the case in their absence, both parties failed to appear at the hearing; this does not preclude the court from examining the complaint on its merits.\nThe court finds the applicant\u2019s and his lawyer\u2019s allegations unsubstantiated, as they are not properly argued and are not supported by appropriate evidence.\nOn the basis of the above, under paragraph 5 of Article 125 of the Russian Criminal Procedure Code, the court finds that the complaint of Mr Magomed Dalakov under Article 125 of the Russian Criminal Procedure Code concerning alleged failure of the Karabulak Investigating Committee to act should be rejected ...\u201d 44.  According to the Government\u2019s submission, both parties were present during the examination on 18 and 23 September 2008. The applicant, who was represented at the hearing by his lawyer, was provided with a copy of the decision by letter from the court, sent to his address on the same date. The Government provided a copy of that letter without an envelope, bearing the applicant\u2019s address in Karabulak and dated 23 September 2008. 45.  According to the applicant\u2019s submission, on 23 September 2008 no examination of the complaint took place and, therefore, he was not informed of any decisions taken on that date and did not receive the decision by post. The applicant stated that prior to the hearing of 23 September 2008 his lawyer had been informed in person that the hearing had been rescheduled for an unspecified date. Subsequently, the lawyer repeatedly enquired with the court by telephone and in person about the examination of the complaint. In reply to his queries he was assured that he would be apprised of the date and venue of the examination. Neither the applicant nor his lawyer was provided with a copy of the decision of 23 September 2008. 46.  In the applicant\u2019s submission, the court\u2019s decision allegedly taken on 23 September 2008 was backdated, and had in fact been prepared at a later date. In particular, he pointed out that the text of the decision and the transcript of the hearing allegedly held on that date contained inconsistencies. In particular, according to the transcript, both parties, including the applicant\u2019s lawyer, had been present at the hearing and the delivery of the decision by the judge. However, in the text of the decision of 23 September 2008 it was stated, amongst other things, that neither party had appeared at the hearing (see paragraph 42 above). 47.  According to the applicant, on 30 November 2008 his lawyer telephoned the court and was informed that the examination of his complaint had again been rescheduled as the judge had gone on holiday. 48.  On 9 April 2009 the applicant wrote to the military investigating department, asking whether they had returned to the town prosecutor\u2019s office the materials concerning Mr Apti Dalakov\u2019s killing (see paragraph 42 above). No reply was given to that request. 49.  On 16 April 2009 the applicant\u2019s lawyer complained to the Ingushetia Supreme Court. The text of the complaint included the following:\n\u201c... M. Dalakov lodged a complaint with the Karabulak District Court ... of inaction on the part of the Investigating Committee of Karabulak. The complaint was assigned for examination to Federal Judge Ms [B].\nAccording to Article 125 of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure, this complaint should have been examined within five days of its receipt. However, this has not yet been done.\nI request that you take measures to expedite the examination of the complaint.\u201d\nNo reply was given to this complaint. 50.  From the documents submitted it appears that no criminal proceedings against the FSB officers concerning Mr Apti Dalakov\u2019s killing have been initiated to date.", "references": ["6", "8", "9", "5", "7", "3", "2", "4", "1", "No Label", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "4.  At the material time all the applicants were detained in Russian penal facilities. Where relevant, the dates of their detention are listed in Annex I. 5.  While in detention, the applicants Mr Yevdokimov, Mr Rezanov, and Mr Morozov lodged defamation claims against private third parties; the applicants Mr Makhov, Mr Resin, Mr Anikanov, Mr Lebetskiy, Mr Gromovoy, Mr Gordeyev and Mr Vinokhodov brought claims seeking compensation for the allegedly inhuman conditions of their detention; and the applicant Mr Martirosyan lodged a civil claim for compensation, alleging that the criminal proceedings had been instituted unlawfully. 6.  None of the applicants were able to attend the hearings at which their claims were examined. The domestic courts refused them the possibility to be present at the hearing, on the ground that there was no domestic legal provision for bringing detainees to courts. In particular, they quoted Article 77.1 of the Code on the Execution of Sentences (see paragraph 11 below) and the relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the other cases, the issue of the applicants\u2019 presence in court was not addressed. 7.  The applicants appealed, raising the question of their appearance in court in the appeal statement. Some submitted a separate request seeking leave to appear before the appeal court. The appeal courts either dismissed the applicants\u2019 arguments or concluded that their absence from the court was in line with the legislation and did not contravene the principle of fairness. 8.  The applicants\u2019 claims were refused at two levels of jurisdiction. The dates of the final judgments are set out in Annex I.", "references": ["0", "9", "4", "2", "7", "8", "1", "6", "5", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "7.  The applicant was born in 1945 and lives in Konstancin Jeziorna. 8.  On 27 December 2002 the Gazeta Wyborcza \u2013 a major daily newspaper \u2013 published an article with the headline: \u201cA law in exchange for a bribe: when Rywin pops by to see Michnik\u201d (Ustawa za \u0142ap\u00f3wke, czyli przychodzi Rywin do Michnika).\nThe article was about bribery in connection with the legislative procedure for the amendment of the Broadcasting Act. According to the article, in July 2002 Lew Rywin (the applicant), a well-known film producer, had offered a bribe to representatives of the company that published the Gazeta Wyborcza newspaper, Agora S.A. The applicant was said to have been acting on the instructions of a purported \u201cgroup in power\u201d (grupa trzymaj\u0105ca w\u0142adze), which allegedly included certain high-ranking State officials, among them the Prime Minister. More specifically, the applicant had reportedly offered the representatives of Agora his assistance in amending the Broadcasting Act so that the company could buy the private television channel Polsat, and had asked for the following, among other things, in return: payment of 17.5 million United States dollars (USD), his appointment as chairman of the channel Polsat and an undertaking from the newspaper Gazeta Wyborcza to refrain from publishing any criticism of the government. The above-mentioned proposal was said to have been made by the applicant during a meeting with Adam Michnik, editor-in-chief of Gazeta Wyborcza. The meeting had been recorded by the latter and transcriptions from the recording were later included in the article published by his newspaper. 9.  After the case was revealed in the press, the public prosecutor at the Warsaw Court of Appeal brought proceedings against the applicant, on 31 December 2002, on a charge of influence peddling (przest\u0119pstwo p\u0142atnej protekcji), under Article 230 of the Criminal Code. 10.  On 10 January 2003, the Sejm \u2013 lower house of Parliament \u2013 passed a resolution (uchwa\u0142a) setting up a parliamentary commission of inquiry (\u201cthe commission\u201d). Under that resolution the commission was set up with the following aims:\n\u201c(1) To investigate the circumstances surrounding the attempted extortion by Lew Rywin of material and political gains in exchange for his assistance in preventing an amendment of the Broadcasting Act that would be unfavourable to private media and in guaranteeing that the Broadcasting Media Council would decide in favour of such media; and to determine the identity of any persons that may have taken steps to this effect, as revealed by the Gazeta Wyborcza newspaper and other media.\n(2) To examine, in the light of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 above, the parliamentary procedure for the amendment of the Broadcasting Act.\n(3) To examine whether the authorities\u2019 response to the media revelations concerning the affair mentioned under point 1 above was regular.\u201d\nThe resolution stated that the commission\u2019s meetings would be held in public, unless otherwise provided by law or by the Sejm\u2019s rules of procedure. 11.  On 14 January 2003, the commission, consisting of ten MPs, began its work. 12.  On the same day the public prosecutor questioned the applicant and notified him of the charge against him. The applicant was obliged to present security in the form of a registered charge against his property and his passport was seized. 13.  On 23 February 2003 issue number 8 of the weekly magazine Wprost was published with, on the cover, a photomontage showing the applicant with his head emerging from a toilet bowl while three hands of unknown persons were pressing the flush button. The photomontage was accompanied by the following caption: \u201cHow many men in power will Rywin bring down with him?\u201d (Ilu ludzi wladzy pociagnie za soba Rywin ?). Inside the same issue of Wprost was an article headed \u201cRywinotherapy\u201d (Rywinoterapia), on the subject of corruption in Poland. 14.  Following that publication the applicant brought proceedings against Wprost for the protection of his reputation, complaining about a breach of his right to be presumed innocent.\nOn 25 June 2003 Warsaw Regional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim, finding in particular as follows:\n\u201cUntil the final conviction has been handed down, the complainant must be treated as a person presumed innocent. It is nevertheless true that he had been charged with specific offences, that a bill of indictment had been preferred against him, and that the matter is being examined by a parliamentary commission of inquiry. It must be emphasised that the general public have been informed about the \u201cgroup in power\u201d [sic]. In that situation, the journalists had not only the right but also a duty, under the Press Act, to ask questions about any figures in power who may be implicated in this affair ...\nIn the lower court\u2019s opinion, the complainant\u2019s picture was widely known to the public in the context of the \u2018Rywin affair\u2019 even before the article was published. The image of Lew Rywin had appeared on a number of occasions in the media in connection with this matter. The complainant was interviewed by the parliamentary commission of inquiry in the course of hearings that were broadcast on television. Having regard to this context, the publication by the weekly Wprost of the applicant\u2019s picture did not harm his reputation.\n...\nWhat is important in the present case is the fact that the cover does not contain any material that may prejudge the complainant\u2019s guilt in [what is known as] the \u2018Rywin\u2019 affair. According to the court below, the cover may be seen by readers as a [mere] indication that the complainant was involved in the case. His implication in this affair, of which the public were well-informed before the impugned publication, is therefore not attributable to the latter. ...\nThe seriousness of the bribery justified, in the present instance, the use of scathing expressions and very expressive symbols. ... Bribery is so harmful and blameworthy that the fact of representing it using a toilet bowl as a symbol is no exaggeration ... The picture where the complainant\u2019s head is seen emerging from the toilet bowl \u2013 a symbol of corruption \u2013 only means that he may be implicated in the affair and that its elucidation may lead to establishing the identities of others involved ...\u201d 15.  In the meantime, the criminal investigation and the work of the commission were ongoing. The commission sat throughout 2003 and until 5 April 2004, when its last session was convened.\nThe sessions held by the commission between 8 February and 21 November 2003 were devoted to the hearing of witnesses, such as the executives of Agora, high-ranking government officials starting with the Prime Minister, journalists, members of the Warsaw public prosecutor\u2019s office and businessmen representing the media. The applicant, who appeared before the commission on 22 February 2003, refused to answer any of its questions. The commission\u2019s hearings were public and broadcast live on radio and television. Only two of the witness hearings were apparently held in private. The transcripts of the commission\u2019s hearings, consisting of more than 8,000 typed pages, were systematically published on the Parliament\u2019s website. 16.  The commission\u2019s work was widely reported in the media, including comments by its members. 17.  Pursuant to the Parliamentary Commissions of Inquiry Act (see paragraph 83 below), the commission worked in close cooperation with the Warsaw public prosecutor conducting the criminal investigation in respect of the applicant.\nThus in February 2003 the president of the commission asked the public prosecutor\u2019s office to conduct certain investigative acts, and in particular: to obtain the transcripts of the applicant\u2019s telephone conversations; to determine the places where his documents were kept; to seize the hard drives from his computer; and to carry out a search of his private and professional premises.\nOn 6 February 2003 the public prosecutor conducting the investigation authorised the commission to disclose, in the context of the proceedings before it, the material in the criminal investigation file. On 6 March 2003 the national public prosecutor (Prokurator Krajowy) dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal against this measure, observing that the disclosure of such material was authorised provided it was not prejudicial to the outcome of the case.\nOn 24 March 2003 the commission forwarded to the public prosecutor, at his request, the transcripts and recordings of its hearings, including the witness hearings. 18.  Information was exchanged between the commission and the public prosecutor on several occasions. In that connection, members of the commission\u2019s presidium had meetings with the national public prosecutor and the public prosecutor leading the investigation. 19.  In June 2003 the criminal investigation in respect of the applicant was completed and the indictment, together with a case file of eighteen volumes, was presented to Warsaw District Court. Mr Rywin was indicted for attempted influence peddling, an offence under Article 230 of the Criminal Code combined with Article 12 of the same Code. 20.  On 8 August 2003 the Warsaw Court of Appeal ordered the case to be sent to Warsaw Regional Court on the ground of its exceptional nature and its importance (sprawa szczeg\u00f3lnej wagi), having regard to the positions held by the individuals implicated in the case, the media and public interest and the work of the commission. 21.  On 6 October 2003 Warsaw Regional Court declared that the public prosecutor\u2019s decision of 6 February 2003 (see paragraph 17 above) applied to the judicial phase of the criminal proceedings.\nNoting that the commission had been privy to the whole of the investigation case file concerning the applicant, the court pointed out that if the material in the file were used in the proceedings before the commission it would have to be careful not to cause any prejudice to the persons concerned by that investigation, such as the witnesses and the applicant. 22.  On 20 October 2003 the case was assigned to a bench of three professional judges. 23.  On 2 December 2003, when the trial opened, Warsaw Regional Court authorised the broadcasting of the hearings live on radio and television, emphasising that journalists should not impede the smooth running of the proceedings and should abide by the rule that testifying witnesses were not to be apprised of the statements of the other witnesses.\nThe court also authorised the media disclosure of the applicant\u2019s identity and picture, observing that the public interest in following the proceedings prevailed over any contrary interest of the persons on trial. 24.  Warsaw Regional Court heard testimony from a number of witnesses, including those who had already been interviewed by the commission. During these hearings, the court systematically compared the statements before it with those that the same witnesses had given to the commission. 25.  The Regional Court and the commission exchanged, on a number of occasions, information they had gathered in their respective proceedings. 26.  On 31 March 2004, after the closing of the witness hearings, the court made public all the evidence, including that which it had received from the commission.\nThe court informed the parties that there might be a change in the legal classification of the charges against the applicant, which might fall under Article 13 \u00a7 1 combined with Article 286 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code, corresponding to the offence of attempted fraud (usi\u0142owanie doprowadzenia do niekorzystnego rozporzadzenia mieniem).\nIn response to a request by the defence for the adjournment of the proceedings for a maximum of one week, the court postponed the trial until 14 April 2004, fixing 16 April 2014 as the date of the last round of oral argument. 27.  On 14 April 2004 the court rejected a defence request for the admission of new evidence.\nIn response to a request by the defence, the court then adjourned the trial until 20 April, declaring that judgment would be given on 26 April. 28.  On 21 April 2004 the newspaper Gazeta Wyborcza published an article with the heading \u201cBefore the judgment\u201d (\u201cPrzed wyrokiem\u201d), beginning as follows:\n\u201cThe biggest corruption scandal of the Third Republic will certainly end in a failure for the justice system \u2013 regardless of the charges on which Lew Rywin is convicted or the sentence handed down.\n... I think that the judgment will be disappointing in terms of the intention and capacity of the justice system to succeed in discovering the truth \u2013 this indeed being the mission of the courts and the public prosecutor \u2013 beyond the politics. After the Rywin affair, citizens will still be convinced that laws are not enacted but purchased and that even the high-ranking officials of the State \u2013 and I quote the public prosecutor \u2013 \u2018place their personal interests above those of society\u2019; in other words \u2013 to call a spade a space \u2013 [that they] are corrupt.\n...\u201d 29.  In a judgment of 26 April 2004 Warsaw Regional Court found the applicant guilty of attempted fraud, under Article 13 of the Criminal Code combined with Article 286 \u00a7 1, Article 294 \u00a7 1 and Article 12 of the same Code, and sentenced him to two years and six months\u2019 imprisonment and a fine of 100,000 zlotys (PLN). In its reasoning the court found as follows:\n(a) that it was established that between 15 and 22 July 2002, the applicant had attempted to incite Wanda Rapaczy\u0144ska, chair of Agora\u2019s board of directors, and Adam Michnik, editor-in-chief of Gazeta Wyborcza, to dispose of that company\u2019s property with detrimental effect thereto for a value equivalent to USD 17.5 million;\n(b) that it had not been established that the applicant had been instructed by the Prime Minister or any figures in his entourage.\nOne of the judges on the bench submitted a separate opinion, taking the view that the applicant should have been given a suspended sentence with probation, in view of his age, his professional background and his state of health. 30.  After the delivery of the judgment, the president of the trial court of Warsaw Regional Court published a statement. He commended the efforts of his fellow judges to bring the trial to its conclusion in a calm manner, notwithstanding the various comments about the procedure that had been reported in the media. Noting that some of those comments could be regarded as an attempt to influence the court\u2019s work, the president emphasised the following points: that throughout the trial the judges had acted pursuant only to the provisions of criminal law; that the purpose of the trial was different from that of the parliamentary commission of inquiry; and that as professional judges the members of the bench had been able to resist any pressure that might result from the media statements made in connection with the case by various journalists and politicians, or even by certain members of the commission. Pointing out that a statement such as his in the present case was unusual, in view of the judiciary\u2019s duty of discretion, the president explained that he could not refrain from mentioning the remarks made by the author of the article entitled \u201cBefore the judgment\u201d, which had been published in the period when the case was under deliberation and which could be regarded, in his view, as an attempt on the part of the journalist to influence the outcome; such statements were, in his view, inadmissible and blameworthy, even in connection with a case which, like the present one and rightly so, had attracted significant media interest. 31.  On 23 August 2004 the applicant and the public prosecutor\u2019s office each appealed against the judgment of 26 April 2004. In his statement of appeal the applicant alleged, among other things, that on account of the influence of the commission\u2019s work on the judges, exacerbated by the press coverage of the two sets of proceedings, his trial had been devoid of the requisite fairness under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 32. At the end of its last session on 5 April 2004, the commission adopted its final report, concluding that the applicant had acted alone. Several commission members submitted their own draft reports to the Sejm. After examining it at the plenary of 28 May 2004, the Sejm rejected the commission\u2019s report and expressed its preference for that of the MP Zbigniew Ziobro, which was regarded as the most radical. It can be seen from the file that this report was drafted with a view to having the persons concerned held to account before the Tribunal of State. In view of doubts as to the weight of the vote of 28 May, the Sejm endorsed the report by the MP Zbigniew Ziobro by its final vote of 24 September 2004. The position taken in that report was as follows:\n\u201cLeszek Miller, Prime Minister, Aleksandra Jakubowska, junior minister in the Ministry of Culture, Lech Nikolski, the Prime Minister\u2019s chief of staff, Robert Kwiatkowski, chair of the board of directors of the company TVP S.A., and Wlodzimierz Czarzasty, member of the Broadcasting Media Council, committed, by deliberate and concerted action in July 2002, the offence of bribery, within the meaning of Article 228 \u00a7 5 of the Criminal Code taken together with Article 13 \u00a7 1 thereof; in that they, [while] influencing the content of the Broadcasting Act being amended and the parliamentary proceedings related thereto, in July 2002, through the intermediary of Lew Rywin, acting as agent of the \u2018power-holding group\u2019, made a corrupt proposal to the representatives of Agora S.A, namely on 15 July 2002 to Wanda Rapaczy\u0144ska and Piotr Niemczycki and on 22 July 2002 to Adam Michnik, consisting in demanding a financial reward of 17.5 million US dollars (USD), the appointment of Lew Rywin as chairman of the channel Polsat and an undertaking from the company Agora that the newspaper Gazeta Wyborcza would refrain from publishing any criticism of the Prime Minister or government. In return, provisions would be inserted in the Broadcasting Act that would be beneficial for Agora, allowing it to purchase the television channel Polsat.\nThe evidence gathered in this case renders highly plausible (w wysokim stopniu uprawdopodabnia) the above-mentioned account, to the extent of justifying the prosecution of the above-named persons.\u201d 33.  The report, disseminated by the media, was widely discussed and commented on by the various public stakeholders.\n... 36.  On 23 November 2004 the Court of Appeal informed the parties that the charge against the applicant was likely to be reclassified to aiding and abetting influence peddling (pomocnictwo do p\u0142atnej protekcji), an offence under Article 18 \u00a7 3 of the Criminal Code taken together with Article 230 of that Code.\nThe Court of Appeal adjourned the proceedings until 8 December 2004 to allow the defence to adapt its strategy to the intended change of classification. On the scheduled date the defence submitted their observations. 37.  In a judgment of 10 December 2004 the Court of Appeal found Mr Rywin guilty of aiding and abetting influence peddling (pomocnictwo do p\u0142atnej protekcji), an offence under Article 18 \u00a7 3 of the Criminal Code taken together with Articles 230 and 12 of that Code, and sentenced him to two years\u2019 imprisonment and a fine of PLN 100,000.\nIn its reasoning, the Court of Appeal found that the applicant had facilitated the perpetration by other individuals \u2013 whose identity had not been established \u2013 of the offence of bribery. In this connection it found it established that, on 15 and 22 July 2002, the applicant had presented to Wanda Rapaczy\u0144ska and Adam Michnik an offer devised by the above-mentioned individuals who, on the strength of their positions at the level of the State, had proposed their assistance as intermediaries to amend the Broadcasting Act in a manner favourable to Agora, thereby enabling it to purchase the television channel Polsat, in exchange for USD 17.5 million, a sum that was to be paid to the Social Democrat Party (SLD) via the bank account of a company belonging to the applicant. 38.  In response to the applicant\u2019s complaint that the proceedings of the commission and their media coverage had undermined the fairness of his trial, the Court of Appeal found that this complaint was not substantiated by any tangible evidence; the applicant had not explained concretely how the media reports on the commission\u2019s work had influenced the reasoning of the judges in their deliberations or the outcome of the criminal proceedings, or how the commission\u2019s proceedings and report might have had any impact on the impartiality of the judges or on the reliability of the testimony given before the trial court. The Court of Appeal took the view, in sum, that this was tantamount to implying that only an adjournment of the criminal proceedings pending the outcome of the commission\u2019s work could have preserved its fairness. Noting that the courts were frequently confronted with media interest in a given case, the Court of Appeal was of the view that this fact, in itself, did not suffice for the fairness of the criminal proceedings against the applicant to be called into question. 39.  As to the applicant\u2019s complaint that the testimony used in support of his conviction had been vitiated by the fact that the witnesses had been heard by the Regional Court after being questioned on the same circumstances by the commission, in public sittings that had received significant media attention, the Court of Appeal regarded it as ill-founded; testimony was always assessed by judges in accordance with the rules in Article 7 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and in the light of all the evidence. In the present case, the Court of Appeal could not identify any circumstance that would lead it to believe that the witnesses heard by the Regional Court had been influenced by the content of their previous statements to the commission or by those of other witnesses. 40.  With reference to the applicant\u2019s complaint that the reasoning of the Regional Court\u2019s judgment was insufficient, the Court of Appeal acknowledged that in certain respects the reasoning had been succinct. Nevertheless, it endorsed that reasoning to a large extent, noting that the Regional Court had examined the relevant aspects of the case and that its conclusion was justified. 41.  Lastly, the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaint concerning the Regional Court\u2019s refusal to admit in evidence certain items proposed by the defence; the court below had rightly found them superfluous for the outcome of the case. In the view of the Court of Appeal, the exercise of defence rights could not consist in requests made ad infinitum to elucidate the circumstances of the case, and in particular those that were irrelevant for its resolution. 43.  In a decision (postanowienie) of 20 October 2005 the Supreme Court dismissed the two appeals, endorsing the reasoning given by the Court of Appeal. ... 82.  The relevant provisions of the Polish Constitution read as follows:\nArticle 111\n\u201c1. The Sejm may set up a commission of inquiry in order to examine a given matter. 2. The administration of commissions of inquiry shall be governed by statute.\u201d\nArticle 156\n\u201c1. Members of the Cabinet shall be liable to proceedings before the Tribunal of State for any infringement of the Constitution or statutes, or for the commission of any offences in office. 2. On the proposal of the President of the Republic, or at least 115 members of parliament, a resolution to hold a Cabinet member to account before the Tribunal of State shall be passed by the Sejm by a majority of three-fifths of the number of members of parliament provided for by the Constitution.\u201d\nArticle 175\n\u201cThe administration of justice in the Republic of Poland shall be implemented by the Supreme Court, the ordinary courts, the administrative courts the and military courts.\n...\u201d\n...\nArticle 198\n\u201c1. For violations of the Constitution or of a statute committed by them in office, the following persons shall be constitutionally accountable before the Tribunal of State: the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister and members of the Cabinet, the President of the National Bank of Poland, the President of the Supreme Chamber of Audit, members of the National Council of Radio and Television Broadcasting, persons whom the Prime Minister has appointed to head a ministry and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.\n... 83.  The relevant provisions of the Parliamentary Commissions of Inquiry Act read as follows:\nArticle 8\n\u201c1. The existence of proceedings that are pending or terminated before another public authority does not preclude the opening of proceedings before the commission. 3. Subject to the agreement of the Sejm\u2019s President, the commission may suspend its activities until proceedings pending before another authority are fully or partly terminated. 4. Proceedings before the commission may, in particular, be suspended in the event of a well-founded conviction that the evidence gathered in the proceedings before another body or a decision taken thereby could be useful to it for an in-depth examination of the matter.\u201d\nArticle 14\n\u201c1. At the request of the commission, State bodies and decision-making bodies of legal entities or of entities without legal personality shall provide it with written explanations or shall present to it any documents in their possession or the files concerning any matters pending before those bodies.\n... 3. Where the material gathered by the commission is related to pending criminal proceedings, the commission shall authorise any court or public prosecutor that may so request to take cognisance of such material. Subject to the approval of the Sejm\u2019s President, the commission may authorise another authority to take cognisance of the material gathered ... where it considers that this is the interest of the proceedings conducted by that authority.\u201d\nArticle 15\n\u201c1. The commission may request the Principal Public Prosecutor to carry out certain acts. 2. The chair of the commission may participate in the acts referred to in paragraph 1, or appoint a member of the commission for such purpose. 3. The Principal Public Prosecutor\u2019s office shall carry out the acts referred to in paragraph 1 in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Law of 20 June 1985 on the public prosecutor\u2019s office ...\u201d 84.  The relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure read as follows:\nArticle 5\n\u201c\u00a7 1. The defendant shall be presumed innocent until proven guilty in a final judgment.\n...\u201d\nArticle 7\n\u201cThe authorities responsible for the investigation ... shall form their conviction [about the case] on the basis of their unfettered assessment of all the evidence, in accordance with the principles of logic and sound reasoning and based on their own experience.\u201d\nArticle 8\n\u201c\u00a7 1. The court shall, in its discretion, rule on questions of fact and of law and shall not be bound by any decisions of another court or body.\n...\u201d\nArticle 391\n\u201c\u00a7 1. Where a witness refuses without good reason to testify, clearly alters his testimony with respect to that previously given or states that he cannot recall certain particulars, or fails to appear on account of any unavoidable impediment, or where the president of a court decides not to take his testimony pursuant to Article 333 \u00a7 2, and also where a witness has died, [the court] may, in so far as it is deemed necessary, order the record of [the said witness\u2019] previous testimony given in the course of a pre-trial investigation, or in court proceedings concerning the same matter, or in any other proceedings provided for by law, to be read out in open court.\n...\u201d\nArticle 392\n\u201c\u00a7 1. Any records of testimony taken from witnesses or defendants during an investigation, court proceedings or any other proceedings provided for by law may be read out in open court, unless any of the parties present [at the hearing] object thereto or it is indispensible for the court to gather the evidence itself.\n...\u201d\n... 86.  On 11 February 1999 the President of Poland invited the Constitutional Court to state whether section 8(1) of the Parliamentary Commissions of Inquiry Act complied with the Constitution. 87.  In a judgment of 14 April 1999 (K 8/99 OTK 1999/3/41), the Constitutional Court found that section 8(1) of the Parliamentary Commissions of Inquiry Act was not in breach of the Constitution. ...", "references": ["9", "6", "8", "7", "5", "0", "3", "4", "1", "2", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1943 and is currently detained in Riedstadt Psychiatric Hospital. 6.  The applicant has previous convictions for rape dating from 1968 and for indecent assault combined with causing bodily harm by dangerous means dating from 1990. 7.  On 14 January 2002 the Darmstadt Regional Court convicted the applicant of rape combined with the infliction of bodily injury. The judge incorporated a prison term arising from a previous conviction and sentenced him to a total of four years and six months\u2019 imprisonment. Simultaneously, the court ordered the applicant\u2019s placement in a psychiatric hospital pursuant to Article 63 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 31 below). It held that the applicant was suffering from a disturbance in his sexual preference taking the form of sadism and found that the commission of further crimes was to be expected. The verdict of the Regional Court was based mainly on the conclusions of a psychiatric expert opinion but also took into account the applicant\u2019s previous conviction for indecent assault in 1990. It also observed that the applicant had tried to subjugate several prostitutes whom he had been seeing in recent years. The Regional Court found that this indicated an evolution in his behaviour. It noted that the applicant had refused psychiatric therapy so far and shared the expert\u2019s opinion that the applicant would not be able to resist his urge to humiliate and abuse women in order to satisfy his sexual drive. The Regional Court concluded that similar crimes were to be expected and the applicant therefore represented a danger to the public. 8.  The applicant was arrested on the same day and placed in the Haina Clinic for Forensic Psychiatry. 9.  The applicant\u2019s detention in psychiatric hospitals has been reviewed at regular intervals (compare Articles 67d and 67e of the Criminal Code, see paragraphs 32 and 33, below) and has been extended annually. In the course of the respective proceedings, the courts have requested annual forensic\u2011psychiatric expert opinions on the necessity of his detention in hospital. All expert opinions concluded that the applicant was likely to re\u2011offend. 10.  On 2 April 2003 the Haina Clinic for Forensic Psychiatry delivered an initial expert opinion, affirming the diagnosis of antisocial behaviour as an adult and abuse of alcohol. However, the expert opinion did not diagnose sexual sadism. Referring to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders \u2012 which is published by the American Psychiatric Association and offers a common language and standard criteria for the classification of mental disorders \u2012 it found that the necessary criteria were not met. It concluded that this diagnosis seemed rather unlikely but could not be absolutely excluded without an extensive and credible sexual anamnesis. 11.  On 13 May 2004 the applicant was transferred to the Hanau Clinic for Forensic Psychiatry. 12.  On 21 November 2005 the applicant was examined by an external psychological expert who criticised in detail the diagnosis of sexual sadism during the trial, in particular the lack of information about the applicant\u2019s inner experiences during the onset of the disorder, its further development, and the failure to evaluate his previous offences. The expert concluded that it remained doubtful whether a diagnosis of sexual sadism could be made (\u201cEs bleibt also weiterhin fraglich, inwieweit ein sexueller Sadismus wirklich vorliegt\u201d). 13.  On 11 December 2006 the Hanau Clinic for Forensic Psychiatry delivered a further expert opinion. Although it mentioned the presumptive diagnosis of sexual sadism, it found that this presumption was not tenable in view of the history and the personality structure of the applicant. Even assuming that the applicant might have a sadistic sexual disposition, he experienced this without suffering and had no desire to change. According to the verdict of the trial court, the applicant had probably fulfilled his sexual inclinations with prostitutes in order to avoid being charged with an offence. Neither the files nor his statements revealed the development of an addiction or of a pressing perverted imagination or of pathologic impulsiveness. There was no call for therapy as the applicant neither suffered from his behaviour nor desired to change it. The clinic therefore concluded that the applicant\u2019s committal to hospital had been erroneous. 14.  On 3 September 2007, on 20 August 2008 and on 18 August 2009 similar forensic psychiatric expert opinions were delivered by the Hanau Clinic for Forensic Psychiatry. Although all of them also mentioned the presumptive diagnosis of sexual sadism, they confirmed the previous findings. All the expert opinions concluded that there were no indications for the diagnosis of sexual sadism apart from the facts contained in the verdict of the trial court. In each expert opinion the applicant was described as a classic instance of an erroneous hospital treatment order. 15.  On 29 December 2009 the applicant refused to be examined by an external psychiatric expert. 16.  On 26 January 2010 the applicant was transferred to the Haina Forensic-Psychiatric Hospital. 17.  On 30 September 2008 the Frankfurt am Main Court of Appeal allowed the re-opening of the criminal proceedings which had been terminated by the judgment of the Darmstadt Regional Court dated 14 January 2002. 18.  In 2010 the Kassel Regional Court appointed a new external psychiatric expert. The expert concluded that the applicant was suffering from sexual sadism, subject to the reservation that he had not examined the applicant in person but had based his evaluation on the medical files only. The Kassel Regional Court subsequently dismissed the request to reopen the criminal proceedings. The applicant\u2019s appeal against this dismissal was dismissed. 19.  On 17 September 2013 the Federal Constitutional Court declined to consider the applicant\u2019s related constitutional complaint without providing reasons (file no. 2 BvR 1364/12). 20.  On 15 March 2011 the Haina Clinic for Forensic Psychiatry, where the applicant was detained, delivered an expert opinion on the necessity of the applicant\u2019s further detention in hospital. It made the diagnosis of a dissocial personality disorder, alcohol abuse and a presumptive diagnosis of sexual sadism. Although it found a high risk that the applicant would re\u2011offend, it confirmed the prior assessment that the applicant represented a classic instance of an erroneous hospital treatment order. This conclusion was drawn from the fact that the applicant\u2019s behaviour during treatment never gave any grounds for diagnosing a mental disorder such as would have been expected from a person suffering from a psychiatric disorder. 21.  On 24 May 2011 the Darmstadt Regional Court asked the applicant to inform the court whether he agreed to being examined by the external expert Dr. Egg. 22.  On 29 May 2011 the applicant wrote to the Regional Court and refused a medical examination. 23.  On 26 July 2011 the Regional Court heard the applicant and his counsel in person as well as a psychological expert from the Haina Clinic for Forensic Psychiatry. 24.  On 28 July 2011 the Regional Court declined to terminate the applicant\u2019s placement in hospital and refused to release him on probation as the requirements of Article 67 d \u00a7\u00a7 2 and 6 of the Criminal Code were not met (see paragraph 32, below). It explained that detention in a psychiatric hospital could be terminated on the grounds of an erroneous treatment order only if it was established with certainty that the applicant was not suffering from a mental illness warranting his detention under Article 63 of the Criminal Code owing to a diminished criminal responsibility from the very beginning. In this context the Regional Court observed that neither the statement by the psychological expert at the hearing nor the current and prior expert opinions had excluded the possibility that the applicant was suffering from sexual sadism, although this diagnosis had been found to be rather unlikely (see paragraphs 10 to 14, above). Furthermore, the court took into account that the applicant had refused to provide credible and full information about his sexual history and had thus rendered a certain diagnosis impossible. It therefore held that a committal to hospital by mistake had not been established beyond doubt. For this reason alone, therefore, the conditions for application of Article 67 d \u00a7 6 of the Criminal Code were not met. Lastly, the Regional Court noted, but explicitly without basing its decision on this fact, that the expert opinion which had been delivered in the course of the re-opening proceedings of the criminal trial had confirmed the diagnosis of sadism. 25.  In conclusion, the Regional Court found that the applicant could not be released on probation as he had refused investigation of his problems relating to sexuality and violence. The evolution of the applicant\u2019s detention and his lack of awareness regarding his crimes rendered it very probable that he would re-offend. 26.  On 29 September 2011 the Frankfurt am Main Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the Regional Court. It observed that, for exceptional reasons, an examination of the applicant by an external psychiatric expert was not necessary. Such an expert report would have to be based on the files only, since the applicant had announced his refusal of any examination. Under these circumstances the Court of Appeal found that no new conclusions could be expected from such an external expert opinion. Moreover, it found that the applicant\u2019s condition and dangerousness had not changed since his last examination as he had refused to undergo any therapy. The Court of Appeal further rejected the applicant\u2019s allegation that the Regional Court had reproached him for failing to undergo therapy, while the hospital considered him to be an erroneous admission. It held that in any event the root cause of the applicant\u2019s serious sexual crimes should be reappraised through therapy. In its view that would have been a requirement even if the applicant had been sentenced to imprisonment. The applicant himself had to bear the consequences of his refusal to participate in any therapy as the hospital offered therapy in order to reappraise the causes of crime even for patients who had been placed in hospital erroneously. 27.  On 16 August 2012 the Federal Constitutional Court (file no. 2 BvR 2679/11) refused to admit the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint for its consideration without giving any further reasons. 28.  On 23 April 2014 the Darmstadt Regional Court decided not to suspend the order for the applicant\u2019s placement in a psychiatric hospital and not to grant probation after obtaining an external expert opinion dated 22 February 2014 and having heard the expert and the applicant\u2019s counsel. The expert, who had not examined the applicant in person due to his refusal to permit such examination, found that the applicant was suffering from a disturbance of his sexual preference in the form of sadism and that the commission of further crimes was to be expected. The applicant\u2019s appeal in this respect was dismissed by the Court of Appeal. The proceedings before the Federal Constitutional Court are still pending. 29.  On 19 January 2015 the Darmstadt Regional Court again decided not to suspend the order for the applicant\u2019s placement in a psychiatric hospital and not to grant probation after obtaining a written opinion from the Haina Forensic-Psychiatric clinic in which the applicant has been detained and after hearing the applicant. The applicant\u2019s appeal in this respect was dismissed by the Court of Appeal.", "references": ["9", "6", "3", "1", "7", "4", "2", "8", "0", "5", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1970 and lives in St. Gallenkappel, Switzerland. 7.  Since 2004, the applicant and F.H. have been involved in legal disputes against each other concerning the property rights in 75% of the bearer shares in both EMK stock company (hereinafter \u201cEMK\u201d) and EMK Engineering stock company (\u201cEMK Engineering\u201d), companies resident and registered in Liechtenstein. 8.  In September 2006 and April 2007 the Regional Court (F\u00fcrstliches Landgericht) ordered by way of an interim measure that F.H.\u2019s entry in the commercial register as a member of the EMK and the EMK Engineering companies\u2019 respective supervisory boards with power to represent those companies may not be cancelled. 9.  On 10 June 2005 F.H. brought an action against the applicant in the Regional Court. He requested that the court oblige the applicant to hand over a specified number of bearer shares in EMK and in EMK Engineering and establish that the applicant did not hold and had never held any shares in those Liechtenstein companies. The action was served on the applicant\u2019s counsel on 18 June 2005. 10.  In a decision dated 15 July 2005 the Regional Court, following a hearing on 14 July 2005, dismissed the applicant\u2019s objection to the Liechtenstein courts\u2019 jurisdiction (file no. 02 CG.2005.163). It found that it had jurisdiction on grounds of location of assets (Verm\u00f6gensgerichtsstand) to decide upon F.H.\u2019s action. The applicant had assets in Liechtenstein, specifically claims for salary and fees against EMK and EMK Engineering, which both had their seat in Liechtenstein. Furthermore, F.H.\u2019s action for restitution of the bearer shares in these corporations was of a pecuniary nature. 11.  In a decision dated 1 February 2006 the Court of Appeal, in interlocutory proceedings, dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal of 6 September 2005 against the Regional Court\u2019s decision of 15 July 2005. 12.  Following a constitutional complaint of 22 February 2006, on 1 March 2006 the Constitutional Court granted the applicant\u2019s application to have the Court of Appeal\u2019s interlocutory decision be given suspensory effect. It further ordered the Regional Court not to hold any further hearings in the proceedings at issue until the Constitutional Court had taken its decision on the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint. 13.  On 27 March 2007 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint as ill-founded (file no. StGH 2006/16). 14.  Following the termination of the proceedings before the Constitutional Court, the Regional Court resumed the proceedings. It heard evidence from the parties, their counsel and twelve witnesses in person in hearings on 31 May, 28 June and 6 September 2007. It further took note of the written submissions of the parties and of numerous documents as well as of the case files in several related proceedings. 15.  On 22 April 2009 the applicant asked the Regional Court to deliver its judgment, given that the oral proceedings had concluded on 6 September 2007. 16.  On 28 December 2009 the Regional Court, in a judgment running to 66 pages, upheld F.H.\u2019s action (file no. 02 CG.2007.114). It ordered the applicant to hand over a specified number of bearer shares in EMK and in EMK Engineering to F.H. and declared that the applicant did not hold and had never held shares in those companies. 17.  Having regard to the evidence before it, the Regional Court considered that F.H.\u2019s submissions regarding the question of who had been the owner of the shares in dispute had been more credible than that of the applicant. It found that the applicant\u2019s mother, I.K., had never obtained ownership of the shares in question as there had not been a sales contract between her and F.H. She had been in possession of the shares in order to make a minority shareholder think that F.H. was no longer holding shares in the companies. The applicant had known this on conclusion of his contract with I.K. transferring the shares to him as a gift in 2003 at the latest. I.K. had not, therefore, been the owner of or authorised to transfer ownership of the shares to the applicant; the latter had not obtained ownership thereof for lack of good faith. 18.  Following a hearing, on 27 May 2010 the Court of Appeal, endorsing the findings of the Regional Court, dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal dated 3 February 2010. It considered that the Regional Court had taken all evidence necessary for its decision. It further rejected new documentary evidence submitted by the applicant to support his allegations as inadmissible for having been submitted out of time in an attempt to protract the proceedings. The judgment was served on the applicant\u2019s counsel on 30 June 2010. 19.  In a judgment and decision dated 13 January 2011 the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal on points of law lodged by the applicant on 7 September 2010. It found that the lower courts had not made an error of law in the legal classification of the facts they had established, that they had not failed to take necessary evidence and that they had sufficiently reasoned their judgments. The judgment and decision were served on the applicant\u2019s counsel on 25 January 2011. 20.  On 18 February 2011 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint (running to eighty pages plus annexes) with the Constitutional Court against the Supreme Court\u2019s judgment and decision. Relying, inter alia, on Articles 6, 13 and 14 of the Convention and on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, the applicant complained, in particular, about the length of the proceedings. He stressed that the outcome of the proceedings, to the duration of which he had not contributed, was of vital importance to him as it concerned his means of subsistence. He further submitted in that context that he had not had at his disposal an effective remedy, such as an application to speed up the proceedings, in order to enforce his Convention rights. 21.  On 3 March 2011 the President of the Constitutional Court granted the applicant\u2019s application to have his complaint given suspensory effect. The court reserved its decision on the costs arguing that the duty to bear the costs depended on the outcome of the main proceedings. The applicant would have only had to bear the decision fee if his constitutional complaint had been dismissed. 22.  On 24 March 2011 F.H. lodged a submission in reply to the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint. 23.  On 20 April 2012 the President of the Constitutional Court, B., informed the applicant that he, alongside Judges Bu., Sn., S. and W., would decide on his constitutional complaint in a hearing in camera on 15 May 2012. 24.  On 8 May 2012 the applicant lodged a complaint alleging bias (running to twenty-seven pages plus annexes) against the five judges of the Constitutional Court called upon to decide on his complaint. 25.  The applicant argued, in particular, that all of the five challenged judges had taken arbitrary decisions to his disadvantage and in breach of his Convention rights in relation to the previous injunction and other proceedings brought by him, and that the court, which was influenced by the executive, discriminated against foreign nationals such as the applicant. 26.  The applicant further submitted that, for different reasons, the five judges of the Constitutional Court individually had not been impartial. As regards the court\u2019s President, Judge B., the applicant complained that he had delayed the appointment of the judges who were to decide on his complaint. Moreover, he was a close friend of H., the court\u2019s Vice President and brother of F.H., the party opposing the applicant in the proceedings at issue. 27.  According to the applicant\u2019s submission, Judge Bu. was biased because he worked for the Government drawing up expert reports on constitutional questions and giving seminars organised by the Government. He further worked with Judge H. on a regular basis. 28.  Judge Sn., for his part, was not impartial as he was also a professor at the Liechtenstein University and had himself argued in a publication that judges should be appointed for life or for a long single term of office. 29.  The applicant further stressed that Judge S. was a member of the supervisory board of a state-owned company and was therefore not independent and impartial. 30.  Finally, Judge W. was a partner in a law firm with a lawyer against whom the applicant had brought proceedings concerning an inheritance. Another lawyer of that firm had already represented EMK and EMK Engineering. Moreover, Judge W. had previously worked as a lawyer in Judge H.\u2019s law firm. 31.  By a decision of 15 May 2012, the Constitutional Court, with the five judges whom the applicant had challenged for bias comprising the bench, dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaints of bias. 32.  The Constitutional Court stated that, in accordance with the principle that, if possible, a complaint of bias should not be decided upon by the challenged judge, the challenged judges, respectively, had not participated in the deliberations and the decision on the respective complaint alleging bias against them, which had been decided upon by the four remaining judges. 33.  The Constitutional Court considered that the fact alone that several of the challenged judges had already taken part in prior decisions finding against the applicant did not suffice to substantiate that there were objectively justified doubts as to their impartiality for the purposes of Article 6 of the Convention. Moreover, the fact that the judges had been elected for five years did not compromise their impartiality. The applicant further had not substantiated that the executive had influenced the judges of the Constitutional Court in the present proceedings in any way. Nor did the fact that the judges concerned worked together with F.H.\u2019s brother, the Vice President of the Constitutional Court, on a regular basis and were friends of the latter objectively cast doubts on their impartiality. 34.  On the same day, on 15 May 2012, the Constitutional Court delivered its judgment (file no. StGH 2011/32). It granted the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint in part, finding that the applicant\u2019s rights under Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention and under the Liechtenstein Constitution to a decision within a reasonable time had been breached in the proceedings at issue. It ordered that Liechtenstein reimburse the applicant the fee for lodging the constitutional complaint (170 Swiss francs (CHF)) and bear the further court costs, that is to say, the judgment fee (CHF 1,700). It further ordered Liechtenstein to reimburse F.H., who, unlike the applicant, had been represented by counsel in the proceedings before the Constitutional Court, lawyers\u2019 fees of CHF 2,694.40. 35.  The Constitutional Court found that the total duration of the proceedings alone, which lasted almost seven years after the action of 10 June 2005 had been brought, did not justify the finding of a breach of the right to a decision within a reasonable time. It had to be noted in that context that almost two years had been necessary to deal with the interlocutory proceedings on the Liechtenstein courts\u2019 jurisdiction brought by the applicant himself. Moreover, the courts had generally duly furthered the proceedings. There had only been a delay of two years and three months between the last hearing before the court of first instance on 6 September 2007 and the delivery of the judgment on 28 December 2009. Such a period of inactivity could no longer be considered as reasonable despite the complexity of the proceedings. Therefore, there had been a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention. 36.  The Constitutional Court noted that Liechtenstein law did not contain any provisions stipulating which consequences should result from a breach of the right to proceedings within a reasonable time. However, it would be utterly unjust if a breach of this constitutional right did not have any consequences as a result of a lack of legislative provisions. There was therefore a gap in the law which had to be filled by way of judicial interpretation. In the Constitutional Court\u2019s view, it was therefore necessary to impose the costs of the proceedings (court costs and lawyers\u2019 fees) upon the State in order to compensate for and redress the breach of the fundamental right at issue. However, the judgment fee could not be imposed on the State as a measure of compensation as Liechtenstein had to bear that cost anyway. 37.  The Constitutional Court further dismissed the remainder of the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint. It considered that the applicant\u2019s property rights had not been infringed in the proceedings at issue in which the opposing parties had both claimed to be the owner of the shares in question. Moreover, the Liechtenstein courts had been independent tribunals. In particular, F.H.\u2019s brother, the Vice President of the Constitutional Court, had not taken part in the decision-making process of any of the Liechtenstein courts. Moreover, the findings of facts, the assessment of the evidence and the legal reasoning of the lower courts did not disclose any arbitrariness. 38.  The judgment and the decision of 15 May 2012 were served on the applicant on 27 June 2012.", "references": ["9", "6", "7", "2", "0", "8", "4", "5", "1", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "4.  On 16 September 1982 the applicant was sentenced to life imprisonment for murder. The life sentence was mandatory. 5.  On 26 April 1996 the applicant was released on licence by virtue of section 23 of the Prison Act (Northern Ireland) 1953. 6.  On 7 March 1997 the applicant\u2019s licence was revoked by order of the Secretary of State following his arrest for alleged sexual offences, which included acts of indecent assault and gross indecency with two of his nieces, who were aged nine and thirteen at the time. 7.  The applicant was subsequently charged with the offences but the charges were withdrawn by the Director of Public Prosecutions on 13 January 1998 because it was not considered to be in his nieces\u2019 best interests to give evidence. 8.  After considering representations made on behalf of the applicant, the Secretary of State decided that his life licence should not be reinstated and that his case should be considered by the Life Sentence Review Board. The role of the Board, which consisted largely of senior officials from the Northern Ireland Office, was to advise the Secretary of State on when he should release on licence under section 23 of the 1953 Act prisoners serving terms of imprisonment for life. In considering these cases the Board took into account the nature of the prisoner\u2019s offence, his age and background, his response in prison, and all other relevant factors, including the comments made by the trial judge when passing sentence. 9.  The applicant\u2019s case was reviewed by the Board on 12 November 1998, 3 November 1999, 7 December 1999, 26 April 2000 and 30 October 2000. On each occasion the Board declined to direct his release as it believed that he had committed the conduct alleged against him and that there was a risk he would commit further acts of a similar nature if released. 10.  The applicant sought permission to apply for judicial review of the Board\u2019s decisions of 7 December 1999 and 30 October 2000 on the grounds, inter alia, that the decisions were contrary to Articles 5 \u00a7 4 and 6 of the Convention because the proceedings before the Board had not been \u201cfair\u201d and its function was \u201cadministrative rather than quasi-judicial\u201d. 11.  Permission was granted but the application was dismissed on 29 June 2001. Insofar as the applicant had sought to rely on Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention, the court, having regard to Wynne v. the United Kingdom, 18 July 1994, Series A no. 294\u2011A, found that at the relevant time it did not apply to a mandatory life sentence in Northern Ireland. 12.  The applicant did not seek permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal. 13.  Following a review in anticipation of the coming into force, in October 2000, of the Human Rights Act 1998, the Life Sentence Review Commissioners (\u201cthe LSRC\u201d) replaced the Life Sentence Review Board. Unlike the Board, the LSRC was independent of the Executive and could give legally binding decisions in relation to the release of prisoners. 14.  On 29 November 2001 the applicant\u2019s case was referred to a panel of the LSRC. The panel\u2019s role was first, to establish whether, at the date of recall, there had been a significant risk of the applicant committing serious harm; and secondly, to consider whether the risk currently posed by the applicant was capable of being managed safely in the community, and, if not, whether there were steps that might be taken with a view to reducing the current risk to a level that could, in the future, be safely managed in the community. 15.  An initial hearing took place on 17 June 2002. At the hearing the applicant\u2019s solicitor indicated that he had no more factual evidence to adduce concerning the allegations of sexual abuse and asked the panel to conduct a paper review of the credibility of those allegations. The panel agreed and, based on the written material, concluded that on the balance of probabilities the applicant had committed the alleged sexual assaults. It therefore set that issue aside and the remainder of the hearing only addressed the question of risk at that point in time. 16.  In the course of the hearing the applicant dismissed his solicitor. The hearing was then adjourned as the applicant had no legal representative. He instructed new solicitors in late September 2002 but they only obtained a legal aid certificate in April 2003, despite the Chairman of the panel intervening to expedite the process. 17.  The panel requested submission of evidence and representations by 31 July 2003. An extension was granted at the applicant\u2019s request and the representations were filed on 17 September 2003. In those representations, the applicant submitted, inter alia, that in a recall case the panel was required to conduct a merits review of the recall decision. He therefore argued that the decision arrived at on paper on 17 June 2002 \u2013 that on the balance of probabilities he had committed the alleged sexual assaults \u2013 had been unlawfully and unfairly arrived at and the question should be revisited by a fresh panel. 18.  At a hearing on 9 January 2004 the Chairman indicated that he would allow the applicant to reopen the issue of whether or not he had committed the alleged assaults. As a consequence, the panel members recused themselves on 12 January 2004 and a new panel, chaired by Mr Peter Smith QC, was appointed (\u201cthe Smith panel\u201d). 19.  A preliminary hearing date was fixed for 16 March 2004. At the hearing the Secretary of State indicated that he would not be calling the two complainants as witnesses, although he did intend to tender the transcripts of video-recorded interviews with them. The applicant\u2019s representatives asked the Chairman to direct the Secretary of State to call them as witnesses. The Chairman refused this application but made it clear that the applicant could subpoena the complainants and cross-examine them as though they were witnesses for the Secretary of State. He assured the applicant that no adverse inferences would follow if he did not summons the witnesses. 20.  The substantive hearing was fixed for 18 and 19 May 2004. On 12 May 2004 the Prison Service on behalf of the Secretary of State submitted twenty-one witness statements taken by police during the course of the original investigation and sought leave to call one of the complainants as a witness. On 14 May 2004 the Smith panel issued a direction permitting the supplementary material to be appended to the hearing materials and granting the Secretary of State permission to call the complainant. 21.  On 17 May 2004 the applicant\u2019s solicitors wrote to the Smith panel to complain about the late submission of the witness statements and the decision to permit the complainant to be called as a witness. 22.  As a consequence, a further preliminary hearing was held on the morning of 18 May 2004 instead of the substantive hearing originally planned. At the hearing the applicant was told that the complainant would not be attending and it was decided that the Secretary of State should seek to encourage her to attend voluntarily. In the meantime the hearing was adjourned. 23.  On 23 August 2004 the applicant wrote directly to the Smith panel to complain about the delays in his case. 24.  On 21 September 2004 the Smith panel replied to the applicant\u2019s letter, indicating that the Secretary of State was still trying to secure the complainant\u2019s attendance. 25.  On 8 October 2004 the Secretary of State was \u201cforced to conclude that despite our best efforts [the complainant] is reluctant to give evidence voluntarily to the [panel]\u201d. 26.  On 4 November 2004 the Smith panel indicated that it would not direct the Secretary of State to issue a witness summons to secure the complainant\u2019s attendance. 27.  The hearing began on 21 March 2005. Evidence was heard over 21 and 22 March, 23, 24 and 31 May and 1 June 2005, including video recordings of social services\u2019 interviews with the applicant\u2019s nieces. In addition, both parties submitted written representations. In his representations the applicant argued that the evidence of sexual abuse should not have been admitted as he had been unable to cross-examine the complainants. 28.  Having considered the evidence the Smith panel concluded that the Secretary of State had proved on the balance of probabilities that the applicant had committed the alleged sexual assaults against children and that it was not safe to release him on licence at that point. 29.  The Smith panel dealt with the applicant\u2019s submissions on the unfairness of the proceedings by noting that:\n\u201c... [counsel for the applicant\u2019s] approach to the issue of [the complainant] being subpoenaed was a perfectly legitimate tactical manoeuvre by which he sought, on the one hand, to characterise the failure to subpoena [the complainant] as unfair, while on the other hand, he sought to avoid being instrumental in securing her attendance at the hearing and giving evidence with the consequent danger of the case against [the applicant] being strengthened. The panel remains of the opinion... that it would have been unreasonable to have directed [the complainant] to be subpoenaed.\u201d 30.  On 3 November 2005 the applicant applied for permission to seek judicial review of the Smith panel\u2019s decision of 3 August 2005 not to direct his release from prison. He contended first, that the procedure before the LSRC had been unfair and in breach of Articles 5 \u00a7 4 and 6 of the Convention, as the Smith panel had based a finding against him on the statements of witnesses who had not been available to be challenged by cross-examination. Secondly, he submitted that the Smith panel had misdirected itself on the applicable standard of proof. Thirdly, he argued that there had not been a sufficient \u201ccausal connection\u201d between the deprivation of his liberty following his recall and the crime for which he was originally convicted. Finally, the applicant submitted that there had been undue delay by the LSRC in progressing the hearing of the referral and there had accordingly been a breach of Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention. 31.  Permission for judicial review was granted on 9 November 2005. On 23 May 2006 the High Court dismissed the application. With regard to the question of causal connection, it found that the offences of murder and serious sexual assault were both crimes of violence and the applicant had been recalled to prison on the ground that his actions pointed to an actual or potential threat of harm to members of the public. In relation to the issue of procedural fairness, the court found that no unfairness was caused to the applicant by the decision not to call his nieces as witnesses as he had had the option of subpoenaing them himself. Moreover, the court accepted that the panel had applied the correct standard of proof. Finally, in respect of the question of delay, the court found that the Smith panel had not been in breach of its Article 5 \u00a7 4 obligations as the applicant\u2019s side \u201cwas very largely responsible for the long periods in progressing the matter to the point of a hearing\u201d. Even if the Smith panel had been responsible, the applicant\u2019s detention had not been shown to be unlawful and he had not, therefore, suffered any loss of liberty in consequence of any breach of Article 5 \u00a7 4. 32.  On 4 July 2006 the applicant filed a notice of appeal against the judgment of the High Court in which he argued that the Smith panel had misdirected itself as to the standard of proof required to establish the allegations against him; that the procedure before the Smith panel had been unfair and in breach of Articles 5 \u00a7 4 and 6 of the Convention, most notably because the applicant\u2019s nieces should have been required to give evidence; and finally, that there had not been a \u201cspeedy determination\u201d of the lawfulness of his detention. The appeal was heard on 23 April 2007. 33.  On 6 September 2007 the Court of Appeal delivered its judgment. The court dealt summarily with the issue of delay. Although it noted that the Smith panel was \u201cbeset with a number of problems, not the least of which was the obtaining of legal aid for the appellant\u201d, having examined the chronology furnished by the LSRC it was satisfied that it had acted \u201cwith appropriate dispatch\u201d. 34.  On the question of fairness the court observed that the applicant had suffered no disadvantage on account of the decision not to subpoena his nieces. He had had the opportunity to summons them as witnesses and cross\u2011examine them as though they were the Secretary of State\u2019s witnesses. In any case, the court found it inconceivable that evidence of this nature should have been ignored when the safety of the public was at stake. It therefore concluded that there had been no unfairness to the applicant. 35.  However, the Court held that in determining the standard of proof the Smith panel had misdirected itself. The court accordingly quashed the Smith panel\u2019s decision of 3 August 2005 and directed that a fresh decision be taken by a differently constituted panel. 36.  The applicant\u2019s counsel subsequently filed a further written submission with the Court of Appeal, in which he sought a declaration that the applicant\u2019s detention since 2 October 2000 had been in breach of Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention. He also sought damages in respect of that violation and an order for bail. 37.  On 5 December 2007, after hearing oral submissions, the court decided not to consider the applicant\u2019s submissions on Article 5 \u00a7 1. It noted that this issue had not been raised in the course of the appeal proceedings and, although it had been included in the initial Order 53 statement (a statement lodged with the judicial review application setting out the name and description of the applicant, the relief sought and the grounds on which it was sought), it had not been directly in issue before the High Court and the judge had therefore made no findings on it. 38.  The LSRC was granted permission to appeal to the House of Lords on the issue of the standard of proof. The applicant cross-appealed on several grounds: that the procedure adopted before the Smith panel had been unfair; that he had been detained unlawfully in breach of Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention; and that the delay had caused a breach of Article 5 \u00a7 4. 39.  Before the decision of the Court of Appeal the Secretary of State had made a second referral of the applicant\u2019s case to the LSRC as two years had passed since the decision of 3 August 2005. A second panel had been convened to conduct the referral (\u201cthe Garrett panel\u201d). However, following the decision of the Court of Appeal this review could no longer take place. Instead, the initial referral to the LSRC, which took place on 29 November 2001, was revived and a third panel was convened to consider afresh the applicant\u2019s recall (\u201cthe first Rodgers panel\u201d). 40.  The first Rodgers panel first convened for a hearing on 4 January 2008. It had to consider the same two main issues as the Smith panel: whether there had been a significant risk of the applicant committing serious harm at the date of recall; and whether the risk presently posed by the applicant was capable of being safely managed in the community. 41.  At a hearing on 4 January 2008 the Governor of the Life Management Unit and a senior psychologist at HMP Maghaberry gave evidence to the Rodgers panel on the question of present risk. Following the hearing the applicant\u2019s solicitors wrote to the Northern Ireland Prison Service, asserting that on the basis of the evidence of these two witnesses the risk posed by the applicant could be managed safely in the community. They therefore asked the first Rodgers panel to conclude that there was no significant risk and argued that any further delay in the determination of the case would be in breach of Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention. 42.  At a further hearing on 12 March 2008 several witnesses indicated that they no longer believed the applicant would pose a significant risk to the public. Counsel for the applicant therefore contended that a licence should be issued immediately without waiting for a determination of the outstanding factual issue, namely whether or not the applicant had committed the alleged sexual assaults. 43.  However, on 20 March 2008 the first Rodgers panel indicated that it was required to hear all the evidence before taking a decision. 44.  On 1 May 2008 the applicant issued a claim for judicial review challenging this decision of 20 March 2008 by the first Rodger\u2019s panel. He sought an order of mandamus requiring it to come to a decision on the question of his licence; a declaration that his detention since 12 March 2008 had been in breach of Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention; and a declaration that the handling of the referral by the Rodgers panel on 12 March 2008 was unlawful and in breach of Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention. 45.  At an oral hearing on 9 May 2008 the High Court refused permission to apply for judicial review on the ground that the applicant had not demonstrated an arguable case. In particular, it found the application to be premature, as the first Rodgers panel had not been afforded the opportunity to hear all the relevant evidence in the matter and it would be \u201cincomprehensible\u201d for it to complete its statutory task without doing so. With regard to the issue of delay, the court noted that, while circumstances had prevented the case from proceeding with the expedition which normally attends upon such cases, the evidence as a whole demonstrated that the delays had been necessary and purposeful. 46.  The applicant filed a notice of appeal against this decision. 47.  In the interim further hearings before the first Rodgers panel took place on 21 and 27 May 2008. 48.  On 11 June 2008 the House of Lords allowed the LSRC\u2019s appeal, finding that the Smith panel had not failed to adopt and apply the correct standard of proof, and restored its decision of 3 August 2005. At the same time the House of Lords dismissed the applicant\u2019s cross-appeal (see paragraph 38 above). 49.  Their Lordships considered that the procedure adopted in respect of the subpoenaing of the complainant had not been unfair because it had not disadvantaged the applicant. Likewise, they agreed with the High Court that there had been a sufficient causal connection between the deprivation of the applicant\u2019s liberty and his original conviction. Their Lordships therefore found that there had been no breach of Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention. 50.  In respect of the Article 5 \u00a7 4 issue, although their Lordships expressed some \u201cdisquiet\u201d at the \u201cextraordinarily long period which elapsed between recall and final decision\u201d, they found \u201cno single gap in the chronology which points to avoidable delay on the part of the Commissioners\u201d. They therefore considered that from 29 November 2001 \u2013 when the matter was first referred to the LSRC \u2013 until 3 August 2005 \u2013 the date of the Smith panel\u2019s decision \u2013 the LSRC had taken reasonable steps to proceed to a hearing and that any delays had been mostly out of its control. In particular, Lord Carswell stated that\n\u201c[32]  It is necessary to bear in mind, first, that the remedy is being sought by the Respondent against the Commissioners, not against the Secretary of State, and that what has to be considered is whether the Commissioners failed to act with proper expedition, not whether the system required overhaul so as to speed up the process in some way. For this reason one must leave out of consideration the period up to November 2001 \u2013 over half of the overall lapse of time \u2013 when the matter was referred to the Commissioners for consideration. One may observe, however, that a good deal of activity took place between March 1997 and November 2001, involving two determinations by the Life Sentences Review Board and an application for judicial review.\n...\n[35].  I am of the view, on consideration of the foregoing summary [of events between November 2001 and August 2005], that the Commissioners took reasonable steps to proceed to a hearing, and that the delays were mostly outside their control. Some of them were attributable to the respondent\u2019s change of legal representation and to requests from his solicitors to extend time over various steps. Some delays were unavoidable, bearing in mind that the panel consisted of part-time members and dates had to be found when they could all attend and the witnesses were available. I conclude accordingly that the Commissioners did not delay unduly at any stage, notwithstanding the very long time that the proceedings took to reach a determination. I therefore would not favour making any declaration of breach of article 5(4) of the Convention.\u201d 51.  Following the judgment of the House of Lords, the decision of the Smith panel of 3 August 2005 was reinstated and the first Rodgers panel became functus officio. A new panel was appointed; however, in light of the previous involvement of the members of the first Rodgers panel in the applicant\u2019s case those members were appointed to the new panel (the second Rodgers panel). It was not necessary for the second Rodgers panel to re\u2011determine the lawfulness of the applicant\u2019s recall in 1997 as this issue had already been determined by the Smith panel. The sole issue was therefore that of current risk. 52.  A hearing was listed for 7 October 2008. Following the hearing of updated evidence, the second Rodgers panel directed that the applicant be released on licence subject to conditions. 53.  In the meantime, the Court of Appeal had allowed the applicant\u2019s appeal against the High Court\u2019s refusal to grant permission to apply for judicial review of the first Rodgers panel\u2019s decision of 20 March 2008 (see paragraph 46 above). The judicial review application was remitted to the High Court. 54.  On 23 January 2009 the High Court refused the applicant\u2019s application for judicial review. Insofar as the applicant had relied on Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, the court found that the first Rodgers panel had been entitled to refuse to reach a conclusion on risk until they had heard the further evidence as to the basis of the recall. There had therefore remained a causal connection between the original conviction and the risk of harm to the community which justified the detention of the applicant in March 2008. In respect of his Article 5 \u00a7 4 arguments, the court found that there had been no absence of consideration or periodic review of the applicant\u2019s detention. 55.  On 14 June 2011 the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal against this decision. On the Article 5 \u00a7 4 issue \u2013 namely, whether the evidence of risk before the first Rodgers panel in March 2008 must inevitably have led it to the conclusion that the applicant\u2019s detention was no longer necessary for the protection of the public \u2013, the court noted that the evidence of the witnesses with regard to the risk the applicant posed had not been uniform and the panel had therefore been entitled to reach the decision that it did. Consequently the applicant\u2019s continued detention between March and October 2008 had not been arbitrary and was rationally connected to the reason for his recall and sentence. 56.  On the advice of counsel given on 20 June 2011 the applicant did not pursue an appeal to the Supreme Court.", "references": ["0", "6", "5", "1", "3", "7", "8", "4", "9", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1976 and 1975 respectively and live in Moscow. 6.  The first applicant is a political activist, opposition leader, anti\u2011corruption campaigner and popular blogger. He is a lawyer and was, before his criminal conviction, a member of the Moscow bar association. The second applicant, a businessman, was at the material time a director of the limited liability company OOO Vyatskaya Lesnaya Kompaniya (\u041e\u041e\u041e \u00ab\u0412\u041b\u041a\u00bb \u2013 hereinafter \u201cVLK\u201d). 7.  In 2007 the Kirov region\u2019s Property Management Department founded the State unitary enterprise Kirovles (\u041a\u041e\u0413\u0423\u041f \u00ab\u041a\u0438\u0440\u043e\u0432\u043b\u0435\u0441\u00bb). According to its incorporation documents, Kirovles\u2019 commercial activities were woodcutting and timber processing. It owned thirty-six timber mills registered as its operational branches. It appears that by 2009 the company was in substantial debt and continued to make losses. 8.  In January 2009 the Governor of the Kirov region, Mr Belykh, invited the first applicant to be a volunteer consultant on enhancing transparency of the region\u2019s property management. At first, Mr Navalnyy carried out this role de facto, before being officially appointed on 21 May 2009. One of his projects was to help steer the region\u2019s loss-making timber industry out of crisis. 9.  In early 2009 the first applicant discussed Kirovles\u2019 financial and logistical problems with its director, X. He suggested that the company join forces with a timber trading company to bring in customers and, in particular, curtail the Kirovles timber mills\u2019 practice of direct sales for cash bypassing Kirovles\u2019 accounts. X agreed, and the first applicant invited the second applicant, who he knew would be interested in working in the industry, to set up the timber trading company. The second applicant created VLK and registered it in March 2009. 10.  On 15 April 2009 Kirovles, represented by X, concluded a framework contract with VLK, represented by the second applicant. The contract provided for non-exclusive sales by Kirovles to VLK, who would then sell the goods on to the customers at 7% commission. The timber specifications and prices were set out in thirty-six annexes to the contract, which were signed in the period 15 April to 13 July 2009. In accordance with the contract, from 12 May to 31 August 2009 Kirovles supplied VLK with timber worth 16,165,826 Russian roubles ((RUB), the equivalent of approximately 330,000 euros (EUR) at the material time). 11.  On an unidentified date X\u2019s stepdaughter, Ms B., the then director of Kirovles\u2019 commercial department, was employed by VLK part-time as its deputy director general. 12.  Between July and August 2009 the first applicant commissioned Kirovles\u2019 audit. In view of its results, the Governor\u2019s office set up a working group for restructuring Kirovles, to which the first applicant was appointed. 13.  On 17 August 2009 the property management department suspended X as Kirovles\u2019 director, and on 17 October 2009 he was dismissed for mismanagement. 14.  On 1 September 2009 Kirovles terminated the contract with VLK. 15.  In the course of 2010 the first applicant pursued an anti\u2011corruption campaign and published a number of articles and documents exposing high ranking officials\u2019 involvement in large-scale fraud. In particular, on 16 November 2010 he published an article claiming that at least four billion US dollars of State funds had been misappropriated during the construction of the East Siberia-Pacific Ocean oil pipeline. In the article, he referred to a 2007 audit report and suggested that the President, Vladimir Putin, and the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr Igor Sechin, had both been personally implicated. 16.  On 9 December 2010 the Kirov Regional department of the Prosecutor\u2019s Office (later replaced by the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation \u2013 \u201cthe Investigative Committee\u201d) opened an inquiry on suspicion that the applicants had defrauded Kirovles by inducing its director to enter into a loss-making transaction. When questioned, X stated that he had met Mr Ofitserov and Mr Navalnyy at the Governor\u2019s office and had complained to them that Kirovles was making losses because of falling timber prices and a lack of customers, among other reasons. Mr Navalnyy had later returned to him with the idea of setting up a trading intermediary, VLK, to bring customers to Kirovles, and they had concluded the contract. He indicated that although VLK had paid average market prices for the timber, he had later realised that their commission and the terms of supply had cost Kirovles extra, making it unprofitable. He had therefore terminated the contract. X further stated that when concluding the contract he had been under the impression that Mr Navalnyy had been acting in his official capacity at the Governor\u2019s office, and that as a State enterprise director he had to comply with the decisions of regional government. Two other former Kirovles employees were questioned, Ms B. and its deputy director Z. They confirmed that although VLK had paid average market prices, Kirovles could have increased its margins by selling the timber directly and it had therefore made a limited profit on these sales. They also claimed that the contract had been entered into under pressure from both applicants, whom their director had perceived as acting for the Governor. 17.  The Investigative Committee also questioned the second applicant. He stated that he had approached X directly because he knew that Kirovles needed customers and he had offered to act as an intermediary. The other party had not been subjected to pressure or deception, the prices had been fair, and the first applicant had not been involved in the negotiations. The first applicant was not questioned because \u201chis whereabouts could not be established\u201d. 18.  On 11 January 2011 the Investigative Committee decided not to open a criminal investigation against either applicant for lack of corpus delicti. 19.  On 12 January 2011 criminal proceedings were instituted against X for alleged abuse of his official position, unrelated to VLK; he was suspected of preferential treatment of a different private company he was affiliated with through his family. 20.  On an unidentified date the inquiry resumed in respect of the applicants. The investigator questioned X, Ms B., Kirovles\u2019 deputy director Z., the Deputy Head of the Kirov Regional Government, S., and both applicants. The first applicant stated, in particular, that after X had reported to the Governor on Kirovles\u2019 losses and lack of customers, the Governor had made an appeal to businesses interested in a commercial partnership with Kirovles. VLK had responded, along with others; the Governor\u2019s office had not asked Kirovles to show any preference for VLK or taken part in the contract negotiations. The sales to VLK amounted to only 2% of the total volume of Kirovles\u2019 sales. 21.  On 28 January 2011 the Investigative Committee decided not to open a criminal investigation against the first applicant for lack of corpus delicti. As regards the second applicant, they decided to transfer the inquiry file to the Kirov Regional Department of the Interior, which had competence to decide whether there were grounds to open a criminal investigation. 22.  On 2 February 2011 the first applicant gave a radio interview with a strong anti-corruption message, describing the ruling party of United Russia as \u201ca party of crooks and thieves\u201d. 23.  On 7 February 2011 the inquiry resumed. The investigators questioned both applicants, X, two other former Kirovles employees, Ms B., two other former VLK employees and its then director (the second applicant\u2019s brother), as well as five high-ranking officials of the Kirov region, including its Governor. He stated that in 2008 Kirovles had been in a difficult financial situation and had substantial debt. He had therefore assigned the first applicant to study ways of restructuring Kirovles, and the latter had participated in working groups and working meetings concerning this matter. He explained that the first applicant had not been able to put pressure on X or influence the commercial activities of the timber industry, including Kirovles. It was he himself who had ultimately taken the decision to terminate the contract between Kirovles and VLK as a result of a series of working meetings between him, X and both applicants. 24.  On 9 February 2011 the Commercial Court of the Kirov region placed Kirovles in administration. 25.  On 3 March 2011 the Privolzhskiy Federal Circuit Investigative Committee decided not to open a criminal investigation in respect of the applicants for lack of corpus delicti. 26.  On 10 May 2011 the acting Chief of the investigation division of the Investigative Committee decided to open a criminal investigation in respect of both applicants. They were suspected of deception and abuse of trust of Kirovles director, an offence under Article 165 \u00a7 3 (b) of the Criminal Code. 27.  During the investigation, which lasted for eleven months, both applicants were questioned, as well as X, Ms B., two former Kirovles employees and nineteen timber mill directors. Kirovles and VLK\u2019s accounts were examined, and three reports were ordered from experts in accounting, finance and economics. It follows from the parties\u2019 submissions that the following witnesses were also questioned. Witness Mr A., Chief of the Kirov Regional Forestry Department, made a statement about how the contract between VLK and Kirovles had been concluded and how the first applicant and X had been at odds. Witness Mr K., Deputy Chief of the Kirov Regional Forestry Department, stated that the first applicant had insisted on an independent audit of Kirovles and proposed restructuring it to prevent financial manipulation by X. Seven other witnesses, all managers of VLK, gave details about VLK\u2019s work to find customers for Kirovles in accordance with the contract. Based on this evidence, the investigators found that there was no case against the applicants. 28.  On 10 April 2012 the Investigative Committee closed the criminal investigation in respect of both applicants for lack of corpus delicti. 29.  On 25 April 2012 the Investigative Committee reversed that decision. 30.  On 5 July 2012 the Chief of the Investigative Committee, Mr Bastrykin, spoke at its general meeting and condemned, in particular, the decision to close the criminal investigation in respect of the first applicant. In the extract broadcasted on Russia\u2019s main TV channels he stated:\n\u201cYou have got a man there called Mr Navalnyy. The criminal case, why have you terminated it without asking the Investigative Committee superiors? Today the whole country is discussing [this fraud], the talks [between Mr Navalnyy and Mr Belykh] have been published, and we cannot hear anything except grunting. You had a criminal file against this man, and you have quietly closed it. I am warning you, there will be no mercy, no forgiveness if such things happen again. If you have grounds to close it, report it. Feeling weak, afraid, under pressure \u2013 report! We will help, support you, take over the file, but quietly, like that \u2013 no ...\u201d 31.  On 26 July 2012 the first applicant published an article accusing Mr Bastrykin of breaking laws imposing restrictions on high-ranking public servants. The article included copies of documents stating that he held a Czech residence permit and owned a private business during his tenure at the Investigative Committee. 32.  On 30 July 2012 the Investigative Committee\u2019s investigator for high profile cases decided to open a criminal investigation against X on suspicion that he had conspired with unknown individuals to dissipate Kirovles\u2019 assets through VLK, thus committing an offence under Article 160 \u00a7 4 of the Criminal Code. 33.  On the same day the case against X was joined with the criminal case against the applicants. 34.  On 31 July 2012 charges were formulated against the first applicant under Article 160 \u00a7 4 of the Criminal Code. On 3 August 2012 the same charges were formulated in respect of X, and on 6 August 2012 in respect of the second applicant. They were all suspected of conspiring to dissipate Kirovles\u2019 assets. 35.  On 26 September 2012 the Deputy Prosecutor General granted X\u2019s request to conclude a plea-bargaining agreement and to have his criminal case examined in accelerated proceedings. 36.  On 1 October 2012 the plea-bargaining agreement was signed by X and the Deputy Prosecutor General. Among other conditions, X undertook to \u201cactively provide the investigation with information\u201d about \u201cMr Ofitserov and Mr Navalnyy\u2019s involvement in the misappropriation [of assets], their roles in the commission of the crime, the specific steps taken to implement the criminal plan, including at the stages of preparation and conclusion of the sales contract and demonstration of its feasibility and utility.\u201d On 17 October 2012 the criminal case-file against X was disjoined from the applicants\u2019 case. 37.  On 19 October 2012 the first applicant learned of the plea\u2011bargaining agreement from the press and filed a complaint with the Investigative Committee and the Prosecutor General, alleging that it had breached his procedural rights in the criminal case against him. He requested that X\u2019s case, if it had been severed, be joined with their case again. 38.  On 21 November 2012 the prosecutor\u2019s office replied that the plea\u2011bargaining agreement had been concluded lawfully. 39.  On 5 December 2012 the first applicant served the Leninskiy District Court of Kirov (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) with a complaint challenging the decision to sever X\u2019s criminal case and examine it in accelerated proceedings. On the same day he filed another complaint with the Prosecutor General, challenging the decision to disjoin X\u2019s criminal file from his own. 40.  On 10 December 2012 the Investigative Committee dismissed the request to join X\u2019s criminal case with the applicants\u2019 case. 41.  On 18 December 2012 the prosecutor\u2019s office replied that the cases had been disjoined lawfully. 42.  On 24 December 2012 the District Court gave judgment in X\u2019s case, after examining it in accelerated proceedings, without an examination of evidence. The court found X guilty of dissipating Kirovles\u2019 assets (Article 160 \u00a7 4 of the Criminal Code) and handed him a four-year suspended sentence with three years\u2019 parole. The judgment indicated that X had conspired with two others, \u201cN.\u201d and \u201cO.\u201d and contained, in particular, the following findings:\n\u201c... at the end of December 2008 [to the] beginning of January 2009...the Governor of the Kirov region ... met the directors of the big State enterprises, including [X] ... and introduced his volunteer consultants including N., who was officially appointed to this role ... on 21 May 2009.\n...\nIn approximately January to February 2009 N. ... developed a criminal plan to misappropriate Kirovles\u2019 assets in favour of a newly created entity under his control, to be founded and led by O.\n...\nIn approximately February to March 2009 N. continued to implement his criminal intent to dissipate Kirovles\u2019 assets, ordered the commission of the crime ... informed [X] about the forthcoming creation of an intermediary enterprise ... aimed at dissipating the assets in [X\u2019s] charge.\n[X] ... did not take any steps to prevent N.\u2019s unlawful acts [and] agreed with him, thus entering into a criminal conspiracy with N. and O. aimed at large-scale dissipation of the assets ... entrusted to him.\nTo implement N.\u2019s criminal plan, O., acting in agreement with him, created in March 2009 ... the limited liability company \u201cOOO VLK\u201d ... thus facilitating the commission of the crime ...\n...\nLater, [X] ... acting deliberately and in agreement with N. and O., signed a sales contract with VLK ... in full realisation of the damaging consequences ... because of [VLK\u2019s ]lack of adequate collateral ...\n...\nIn doing so, [X], N. and O. had sound knowledge that OOO VLK would pay for the goods under the terms of the contract and its annexes at a price known to be lower than that Kirovles could have received without an intermediary ...\n...\nIn the period 15 April 2009 to 13 July 2009 ... [X] and O., in conspiracy with N., who had organised the crime and ordered its implementation, signed [thirty-six] annexes to the contract ... which stipulated ... a price which was deliberately reduced by all [of the] partners in crime without any economic need compared to the price Kirovles could have sold its products for if it supplied the VLK customers of directly.\n...\nWhile doing so, N. and O. realised that [X] was unlawfully depriving Kirovles of the possibility of independent sales of its timber products at market prices and was thus placing its timber products at VLK\u2019s disposal without a sufficient and equivalent reimbursement of its market value.\nIn the period 15 April 2009 to 30 September 2009 in Kirov, [X], acting in abuse of his official position, and O., in conspiracy with and on the instructions of N., deliberately implemented the terms of the sales contract ... and its annexes ...\n...\n [X], acting in premeditated conspiracy with N. and O., out of acquisitive motives therefore abused his official position, ... unlawfully dissipated the assets he was in charge of ... for the benefit of third parties \u2013 partners in crime and OOO VLK under their control, thus causing significant damage to the assets of their owner, Kirovles.\nThe Deputy Prosecutor General ... proposed [using] accelerated proceedings for the judicial hearing and issuing the judgment ... in respect of [X] ...\nThe accused [X] has pleaded guilty to the entirety of charges, accepted the indictment and the proposal ... of accelerated proceedings on the basis of the concluded plea-bargaining agreement.\n...\nInformation stated by [X] in compliance with the terms of the concluded plea\u2011bargaining agreement, is full and true and corroborated by the evidence gathered in the case. The court therefore concludes that [X] has complied with the obligations set out in the plea-bargaining agreement, and that judgment may therefore be given in respect of the accused without an examination of evidence, in accordance with the procedure set out in Article 316 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as required by Article 317.7 ...\u201d 43.  On 3 January 2013 the first applicant lodged an appeal against the judgment given in X\u2019s case. He challenged, in particular, the use of accelerated proceedings in that case, the fact that it had been disjoined from the case against him and the second applicant and alleged that the judgment had been prejudicial to the outcome of their case. 44.  On 9 January 2013 the judgment against X acquired legal force. 45.  On 17 January 2013 the District Court informed the first applicant that he could not appeal against the judgment in X\u2019s case because he had not been a party to those proceedings. He was denied access to the transcript of the court hearing for the same reason. 46.  On the same day the charges under Article 165 \u00a7 3 (b) of the Criminal Code were lifted in respect of both applicants. The charges under Article 160 \u00a7 4 of the Criminal Code were maintained, although they were reformulated in respect of the second applicant. 47.  On 20 February 2013 the first applicant filed a complaint with the Kirov Regional Court (\u201cthe Regional Court\u201d) about the refusal to consider his appeal. 48.  On 13 March 2013 the Deputy President of the Kirov Regional Court replied, stating that his appeal could not be examined because he had not been a party to the proceedings. Moreover, he indicated that the judgment against X could not be prejudicial to the applicant; his guilt had not been established, he had not participated in those proceedings and his name had not been mentioned in it. 49.  On 20 March 2013 the indictment was issued in respect of both applicants. 50.  On 3 April 2013 the District Court fixed the hearing in the applicants\u2019 case for 13 April 2013. 51.  On 10 June 2013 the applicants filed a request with the District Court to have the judgment given in X\u2019s case excluded from evidence. They argued, in particular, that admitting it would prejudice the outcome of their case. 52.  On 11 June 2013 the court dismissed the request on the grounds that the judgment against X did not predetermine the applicants\u2019 guilt and, moreover, their names had not been mentioned in it. 53.  During the hearing, X was called and examined as a witness. He was first questioned by the public prosecutors, who then asked to read out his statements given during the investigation on the grounds that he could not remember some details and had given contradictory answers to some questions. The applicants objected on the grounds that during the investigation X had made the statements in his capacity as an accused, and an accused had the right to make false statements, not being under oath. Moreover, reading out his previous statements, especially in full, would hinder his cross-examination by the defence as it would remind the witness of the \u201ccorrect\u201d version of events he had accepted during his trial but could not remember at the applicants\u2019 hearing. The court dismissed these objections and allowed the statements made by X during the investigation to be read out. The applicants and their defence team questioned X afterwards. 54.  The court also allowed, despite the applicants\u2019 objections, the statements of Ms B. and six other witnesses to be read out. They were each first questioned by the prosecutor, then their previous testimony and statements were read out in their presence. Only then could the defence question them. 55.  On 10 June and 2 July 2013 a challenge by the applicants to the trial judge was rejected. 56.  On 11 June 2013 the court dismissed the applicants\u2019 request to have material obtained by interception of the applicants\u2019 telephone calls excluded. On 3 July 2013 it admitted this material as evidence. 57.  On 18 June and 2 July 2013 the court rejected the applicants\u2019 requests to have several people called and examined as witnesses, including Mr A., Chief of the Kirov Regional Forestry Department, Mr K., Deputy Chief of the Kirov Regional Forestry Department, and the seven VLK managers who had been questioned during the investigation, as well as three expert witnesses. 58.  On 2 and 3 July 2013 the court rejected the applicants\u2019 request for the following evidence: documents relating to Kirovles\u2019 insolvency proceedings, Kirovles\u2019 financial reports, an approved list of standard minimum prices for timber, complete records of intercepted telephone calls between the applicants, material relating to the criminal proceedings against X instituted on 12 January 2011 and the criminal case file relating to X\u2019s conviction in the Kirovles case. 59.  On 3 July 2013, at the applicants\u2019 request, the court admitted as evidence a report issued by a trade specialist indicating that the prices paid by VLK to Kirovles were above average. On the same day it rejected their request for the court to order expert reports by finance, economics and merchandising experts. 60.  On 17 July 2013 the first applicant was registered as a candidate for the Moscow mayoral elections. 61.  On 18 July 2013 the District Court gave judgment, finding the first applicant guilty of organising, and the second applicant of facilitating, large-scale embezzlement. The court relied on the testimony of X and his statements made during the investigation. It also relied on the testimony of forty-four witnesses and statements made by eight of them during the investigation, material obtained by way of operational-search activities, in particular intercepted email correspondence and telephone calls between the applicants, accounting documents and expert reports. As regards the judgment in respect of X, the court said:\n\u201cIt follows from the judgment of the Leninskiy District Court of Kirov given on 24 December 2012 that [X] was found guilty of dissipation [and] embezzlement, that is stealing Kirovles\u2019 assets entrusted to [X], on an especially large scale, committed by abuse of his official position in conspiracy with N. and O. ... a criminal offence under Article 160 \u00a7 4 of the Criminal Code.\u201d 62.  The court further noted that it found X\u2019s testimony, as well as his statements made during the investigation, truthful and concordant with other evidence; it also found that they were admissible and had been lawfully obtained. 63.  The court dismissed the first applicant\u2019s allegations of political persecution or revenge by individuals who had lost their jobs at Kirovles or were otherwise disconcerted with his role in reforming the timber industry in the Kirov region. It also dismissed the objection to admitting X and Ms B.\u2019s testimony and statements on the grounds that X had a vested interest in the proceedings, finding the objection unfounded and illogical. It explained the discrepancies between the testimony and pre-trial witness statements by the passage of time that had elapsed since the events in question and held that, in any event, the witnesses at the trial had confirmed the validity of their previous statements. 64.  The court noted that X had treated the first applicant as an official from the Governor\u2019s office and that the applicant knew this. However, it stressed that the first applicant had not been accused, or convicted, of any abuse of his official position at the Governor\u2019s office:\n\u201cMr Navalnyy [is not suspected of] committing a crime by abuse of his official position; consequently, the defence\u2019s arguments that the Governor\u2019s volunteer consultant had no powers to give binding instructions to the companies\u2019 management do not refute the accusation [or] prove that it was impossible for Mr Navalnyy to commit the crime and order its execution.\u201d 65.  As regards the legal classification of the applicants\u2019 offences, the court held:\n\u201cThe court finds that the arguments put forward by the defence about the absence of unlawfulness, a necessary element of theft, because a regular civil\u2011law transaction has been concluded by persons with legal capacity, are unfounded.\nThe Kirov region\u2019s Property Management Department, acting on behalf of the owner of Kirovles, has provided in the certificate of incorporation and [X\u2019s] employment contract that [X was under an] obligation to carry out his duties in good faith, reasonably and in accordance with the applicable legislation.\nIn accordance with Article 10 \u00a71 of the Civil Code, it is not permitted to exercise one\u2019s civil rights with the exclusive purpose of causing damage to another person, act in circumvention of the law with unlawful intent, [or any other] intentional exercise of civil rights in bad faith (abuse of rights).\nThe court has established that contrary to the said provisions of the certificate of incorporation, the employment contract and the law, [X], acting on behalf of the company directed by him, has entered into a sales contract ... with OOO VLK represented by Mr Ofitserov to exclusively facilitate stealing Kirovles\u2019 property and transferring [it] for the benefit of OOO VLK ... The conclusion of this sales contract has resulted in material damage [being caused] to Kirovles.\n...\nThe court notes that neither Mr Navalnyy nor Mr Ofitserov is charged with organising and facilitating the conclusion of a legally invalid sales contract. On the contrary, what the [applicants are suspected of] is organising and facilitating the dissipation of Kirovles\u2019 assets by concluding a sales contract with OOO VLK intended exclusively to create the impression that Kirovles had civil-law obligations towards OOO VLK to transfer timber goods to shipment recipients, as if for collateral, whereas in reality the goods would be transferred without OOO VLK [having] equivalent and sufficient collateral.\n...\nAccording to the ruling of the Plenary of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation no. 51 dated 27 December 2007 \u201cOn Court Practice in Cases of Fraud, Misappropriation or Embezzlement\u201d, a perpetrator of misappropriation or embezzlement may only be someone entrusted with the assets of another legal person or individual, based on legal grounds for a specific purpose or for a defined activity. Based on the provisions of Article 34 \u00a7 4 of the Criminal Code, those who do not possess these special subjective characteristics qualifying [them] for misappropriation or embezzlement, but who directly participated in stealing assets in prior agreement with the person entrusted with the assets, must be criminally liable under Article 33 in conjunction with Article 160 of the Criminal Code in their capacity as organisers, inciters or facilitators.\nIt follows from the judgment of the Leninskiy District Court of Kirov given on 24 December 2012, which has acquired legal force, that the perpetrator of the crime Mr Navalnyy and Mr Ofitserov [are suspected of] was found to be [X], who had been entrusted with Kirovles assets as its director general. [X\u2019s] acts were classified by the court as falling under Article 160 \u00a7 4 of the Criminal Code.\u201d 66.  The court estimated that the damage caused to Kirovles amounted to RUB 16,165,826. It concluded that the first applicant was guilty of organising the theft of Kirovles\u2019 assets by X (Article 33 \u00a7 3 in conjunction with Article 160 \u00a7 4 of the Criminal Code), and the second applicant of facilitating that theft (Article 33 \u00a7 4 in conjunction with Article 160 \u00a7 4 of the Criminal Code). They were sentenced to five and four years\u2019 imprisonment respectively, to be served in a correctional colony. In addition, they were both fined RUB 500,000. 67.  The applicants were taken into custody immediately after the hearing. 68.  On the same day the prosecutor\u2019s office of the Kirov region asked the court to release the applicants pending appeal, particularly since the first applicant was a registered candidate in the Moscow mayoral elections. 69.  On 19 July 2013 the Regional Court granted the request and released the applicants on parole. 70.  On 26 July 2012 both applicants lodged an appeal against the judgment of 18 July 2013. They challenged their conviction, insisting that it was unlawful and unfounded and that the first-instance court had relied on the judgment of 24 December 2012 against X in violation of the rules of criminal procedure. They also complained about the court\u2019s assessment of evidence and the manner in which it had examined the witnesses. 71.  On 8 September 2013 the first applicant stood as a candidate in the Moscow mayoral elections. He came second, securing approximately 27% of the votes. 72.  On 13 September 2013 the applicants questioned the accuracy of the transcript of the first-instance hearing. The requested amendments were set out in an eighty-nine page document. 73.  On 27 September 2013 the District Court accepted a small number of amendments but rejected the rest. 74.  On 2 and 3 October 2013 the applicants filed additional grounds of appeal elaborating on those lodged previously. 75.  On 16 October 2013 the Regional Court dismissed the applicants\u2019 appeal and upheld the first-instance judgment in substance. It amended their sentence and gave them both suspended prison terms on an undertaking not to change their place of residence. 76.  On 7 February 2013 the applicants each lodged appeals on points of law. On 1 and 2 April 2014 the Regional Court, sitting in a single judge formation, refused to give them leave to appeal. 77.  On 28 February 2014 the Basmannyy District Court ordered that the first applicant be placed under house arrest pending another, unrelated, criminal case against him. To justify the application of this preventive measure the court referred to, among other factors, the first applicant\u2019s prior criminal conviction in the Kirovles case. The conditions of the house arrest included a number of restrictions, in particular a ban on communicating with anyone other than his immediate family and legal counsel, a ban on using the Internet and a ban on making public statements or comments to the media. The first applicant remained under house arrest for ten months.", "references": ["7", "8", "6", "1", "5", "4", "2", "9", "0", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1987 and lives in S\u0142omczyn. 6.  On 6 April 2009 the applicant was arrested on charges of participation in an organised and armed criminal group involved in extortions and procuring of several violent offences committed while acting in an organised criminal group. 7.  The investigation against the applicant and some other persons was conducted by the Warsaw Prosecutor of Appeal (Prokuratura Apelacyjna). 8.  On 8 April 2009 the Warsaw Wola District Court (S\u0105d Rejonowy) remanded the applicant in custody, relying on the reasonable suspicion that he had committed the offences in question. The court considered that, whereas the statements of a co-accused were the key evidence against the applicant, they were corroborated by the other evidence gathered in the case. It further considered that keeping the applicant in detention was necessary to secure the proper conduct of the proceedings. In the court\u2019s view the risk that the applicant might obstruct the proceedings resulted from the fact that he had been charged with membership in an organised criminal group. The court further noted in this connection that one of the charges against the applicant concerned witness tampering by means of violence. It also stressed the severity of the anticipated sentence which might encourage the accused to interfere with the conduct of the proceedings. 9.  On 5 June 2009 the Warsaw Regional Court (S\u0105d Okr\u0119gowy) dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal against this decision. The court underlined, in particular, that the credibility of the statements of the co-accused was confirmed by evidence given by several witnesses. Consequently, the suspicion against the applicant could indeed be considered as reasonable. The Regional Court also agreed with the District Court that the circumstances of the case justified the suspicion that a severe penalty might be imposed on the applicant. 10.  The applicant\u2019s pre\u2011trial detention was subsequently extended by the Warsaw Regional Court on 2 July, 28 September and 7 December 2009 and on 18 January 2010. The court relied on the same grounds as previously. It also stressed that a possible severe penalty which might be imposed on the applicant might incite him to interfere with the conduct of the proceedings, especially that not all members of the organised group in question had been arrested at that time. It further noted that because of complicated nature of the case the proceedings could not be terminated earlier and that less preventive measures would not be capable of securing the proper conduct of the proceedings. 11.  On 19 March 2010 the bill of indictment against the applicant was lodged with the Warsaw Regional Court. The applicant was indicted as charged. The bill of indictment concerned altogether nine accused charged with thirty six offences. It contained seventy-six pages. The prosecutor requested the trial court to hear twenty-six witnesses. 12.  On 29 March 2010 the Warsaw Regional Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 31 July 2010. The court relied on the reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the offences, the severity of the anticipated penalty and the need to secure the proper conduct of the proceedings due to the organised character of the criminal activities in question. 13.  The applicant\u2019s detention pending trial was subsequently prolonged by further decisions of the Warsaw Regional Court. 14.  The applicant\u2019s appeal against the decision of that court of 23 December 2010 was dismissed by the Warsaw Court of Appeal (S\u0105d Apelacyjny) on 20 January 2011. 15.  Meanwhile, the trial was started on 19 July 2010. The trial court held fourteen hearings. 16.  On 31 March 2011 the Warsaw Regional Court gave judgment. It convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to a cumulative penalty of seven years\u2019 imprisonment. 17.  The applicant and the other defendants appealed. 18.  On 20 December 2011 the Warsaw Court of Appeal quashed the first\u2011instance judgment and remitted the case. 19.  On the same day the Warsaw Court of Appeal extended the applicant\u2019s detention. It considered that the reasons previously given remained valid. In particular, there was still a need to secure the proper conduct of the proceedings, in the light of the judgment of 20 December 2011. 20.  On 10 April 2012 the same court again extended the applicant\u2019s detention. 21.  The applicant\u2019s appeals against the above decisions were dismissed by the Warsaw Court of Appeal on 17 January and on 17 May 2012, respectively. 22.  On 19 October 2012 the Warsaw Regional Court decided to lift the detention on remand referring, in particular, to its length. The court considered that the length of proceedings resulted from reasons unrelated to the defendants (sickness of a judge) and that they should not suffer \u201cnegative consequences\u201d of the fact that the proceedings could not be concluded in time. 23.  The prosecutor appealed. 24.  On 6 December 2012 the Warsaw Court of Appeal quashed the contested decision finding the lower court\u2019s reasoning insufficient. 25.  On 9 January 2013, after reexamination of the case, the Warsaw Regional Court decided to extend the applicant\u2019s detention. The court relied on the reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the offences in question. It considered that there was no risk of absconding; nevertheless, keeping the applicant in detention was justified by severe penalty to which he was liable and by the risk that he might obstruct the proceedings. The court also referred to the fact, relied on by the court which had imposed the detention on the applicant (see paragraph 8 above), that one of the charges against him concerned witness tampering by means of violence. 26.  On 12 February 2013 the Warsaw Court of Appeal quashed that decision for procedural reasons. 27.  On 6 March 2013 the Warsaw Regional Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention for a period of three months. It relied on the severity of the anticipated penalty and the need to secure the proper conduct of the proceedings in finding that keeping the applicant in custody was necessary. It also noted that the length of the proceedings resulted mainly from the complexity of the case. 28.  On 18 April 2013 the Warsaw Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal against the above mentioned decision. 29.  On 5 June 2013 the applicant\u2019s detention on remand was lifted. He remained in detention due to a preventive measure imposed on him in another set of proceedings (see below). 30.  The proceedings are still pending before the Warsaw Regional Court. 31.  On 18 June 2012 the Warsaw Prosecutor of Appeal charged the applicant with participation in an organised and armed criminal group involved in drug trafficking and with several offences of drug trafficking. 32.  On 20 June 2012 the Warsaw \u015ar\u00f3dmie\u015bcie District Court remanded the applicant in custody, relying on the reasonable suspicion that he had committed the offences in question. The court also referred to the severity of the anticipated penalty and the need to secure the proper conduct of the proceedings. It considered that the risk that the applicant might obstruct the proceedings resulted from the gravity of accusations against him. 33.  On 17 July 2012 the Warsaw Regional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal against this decision. 34.  The applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention was subsequently extended by the decisions of the Warsaw Regional Court of 11 September and 11 December 2012 and of 21 February 2013, and of the Warsaw Court of Appeal of 18 June and 22 August 2013. The courts continually justified their decisions by the existence of a reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the offences in question. They also referred to the likelihood of a heavy prison sentence being imposed on him after conviction. They emphasised the need to secure the process of obtaining evidence and the complex character of the case. They also considered that the risk that the applicant might obstruct the proceedings resulted from the fact that he had been charged with offences committed in an organised and armed criminal group. 35.  The applicant appealed against all of the above decisions but to no avail. 36.  Meanwhile, on 28 June 2013 the investigation concerning the charge of membership in an organised criminal group was discontinued as it concerned substantially the same matter as the other set of criminal proceedings against the applicant, at that time pending before the Warsaw Regional Court (see above). 37.  On an unspecified date in 2013 the charges against the applicant and some of the defendants were severed to a separate set of proceedings. 38.  On 5 September 2013 the bill of indictment containing 187 pages was lodged with the Warsaw Regional Court. The applicant was charged with several instances of drug trafficking committed in an organised criminal group. The bill of indictment concerned altogether twenty-six accused charged with 168 offences. The prosecutor requested the trial court to hear fifty-eight witnesses. 39.  The applicant\u2019s detention pending trial was extended by the Warsaw Regional Court on 17 September and 17 December 2013 and on 20 January 2014. The court repeatedly relied on the reasonable suspicion against the applicant, the severity of anticipated penalty and the risk that the applicant might obstruct the proceedings due to the organised character of the offences in question. It also noted that despite the complexity of the case the trial court had conducted the proceedings in a timely and diligent manner. 40.  The applicant\u2019s appeals against the above decisions and, likewise, his applications for release were unsuccessful. 41.  On 25 June 2014 the Warsaw Regional Court ordered that the applicant\u2019s detention on remand be lifted on condition that he paid the bail in the sum of 80,000 Polish zlotys. 42.  The bail was paid and the applicant was released on 2 July 2014. The court also imposed on him police supervision and a ban on leaving the country. 43.  The proceedings are still pending before the Warsaw Regional Court.", "references": ["1", "7", "5", "6", "8", "3", "4", "9", "0", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "8.  The applicant is a Moldovan national belonging to the German ethnic minority. He was born in 1978 and lived in Tiraspol until 2010. Since 2011 he has been an asylum-seeker in Switzerland. 9.  The Moldovan Government submitted that despite all their efforts they had been unable to verify most of the facts of the present case owing to a lack of cooperation on the part of the authorities of the self-proclaimed \u201cMoldavian Republic of Transdniestria\u201d (the \u201cMRT\u201d). They had therefore proceeded, broadly speaking, on the basis of the facts as submitted by the applicant. 10.  The Russian Government did not make any submissions in respect of the facts of the case. 11.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant and as may be determined from the documents in the case file, are summarised below. 12.  The background to the case, including the Transdniestrian armed conflict of 1991-92 and the subsequent events, is set out in Ila\u015fcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia ([GC], no. 48787/99, \u00a7\u00a7 28-185, ECHR 2004\u2011VII) and Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia ([GC], nos. 43370/04 and 2 others, \u00a7\u00a7 8-42, ECHR 2012). 13.  On 24 November 2008 the applicant was detained on suspicion of defrauding the company he worked for and another company belonging to the same group. The companies allegedly claimed initially that the damage had been 40,000 United States dollars (USD) and then increased that amount to USD 85,000. The applicant was asked to confess to the crime, which he claims he did not commit. He signed various confessions, allegedly following threats to him and his relatives. He claimed to have first been detained by his company\u2019s security personnel and subjected to threats if he did not confess to the crime, before being handed over to the investigating authority. 14.  On 26 November 2008 the \u201cTiraspol People\u2019s Court\u201d remanded the applicant in custody for an undetermined period. 15.  On 5 December 2008 the \u201cMRT Supreme Court\u201d rejected an appeal by the applicant\u2019s lawyer as unfounded. Neither the applicant nor his lawyer was present at the hearing. 16.  On 20 March 2009 the \u201cTiraspol People\u2019s Court\u201d extended the applicant\u2019s detention for up to five months from the date of his arrest. 17.  On 21 May 2009 the \u201cTiraspol People\u2019s Court\u201d extended the applicant\u2019s detention for up to eight months from the date of his arrest. That decision was upheld by the \u201cMRT Supreme Court\u201d on 29 May 2009. Neither the applicant nor his lawyer was present at the hearing. 18.  On 22 July 2009 the \u201cTiraspol People\u2019s Court\u201d extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 24 September 2009. 19.  On 22 September 2009 the \u201cTiraspol People\u2019s Court\u201d extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 24 November 2009. That decision was upheld by the \u201cMRT Supreme Court\u201d on 2 October 2009. The applicant\u2019s lawyer was present at the hearing. 20.  On 4 November 2009 the applicant\u2019s criminal case was submitted to the trial court. 21.  On 21 April 2010 the applicant\u2019s detention was extended again until 4 August 2010. 22.  On 1 July 2010 the \u201cTiraspol People\u2019s Court\u201d convicted the applicant under Article 158-1 of the \u201cMRT Criminal Code\u201d of defrauding two companies, and sentenced him to seven years\u2019 imprisonment, suspended for five years. It ordered the confiscation of the money in his and his girlfriend\u2019s bank accounts and of his personal car, which totalled the equivalent of approximately USD 16,000, and additionally ordered him to pay the two companies the equivalent of approximately USD 26,400. It also released him subject to an undertaking not to leave the city. No appeal was lodged against that decision. According to the applicant, in order to pay a part of the damages his parents sold his flat and paid USD 40,000 to the companies. 23.  On an unknown date shortly after 1 July 2010 the applicant left for treatment in Chi\u0219in\u0103u. In 2011 he arrived in Switzerland. 24.  On 25 January 2013 the \u201cTiraspol People\u2019s Court\u201d amended the judgment in the light of certain changes to the \u201cMRT Criminal Code\u201d providing for a more lenient punishment for the crime of which the applicant had been convicted. He was thus sentenced to six years and six months\u2019 imprisonment, suspended for a period of five years. 25.  By a final decision of 15 February 2013, the same court replaced the suspended sentence owing to the applicant\u2019s failure to appear before the probation authorities, and ordered that the prison sentence be served in full. 26.  Following a request from the applicant\u2019s lawyer of 12 October 2012, on 22 January 2013 the Supreme Court of Justice of the Republic of Moldova quashed the judgment of the \u201cTiraspol People\u2019s Court\u201d of 1 July 2010. With reference to Articles 114 and 115 of the Constitution and section 1 of the Law on the status of judges (see paragraphs 69-70 below), the court found that the courts established in the \u201cMRT\u201d had not been created in accordance with the Moldovan legislation and could not therefore lawfully convict the applicant. It ordered the materials in the criminal file to be forwarded to the prosecutor\u2019s office with a view to prosecuting the persons responsible for the applicant\u2019s detention and also to determining whether the applicant had breached the rights of other persons. 27.  On 31 May 2013 the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office of the Republic of Moldova informed the applicant\u2019s lawyer that it had initiated a criminal investigation into his unlawful detention. Within that investigation, \u201call possible procedural measures and actions [were] planned and carried out\u201d. No further progress could be achieved owing to the impossibility of carrying out procedural steps on the territory of the self-proclaimed \u201cMRT\u201d. 28.  The applicant\u2019s medical condition (bronchial asthma, an illness which he has had since childhood) worsened while in prison, and he suffered several asthma attacks. He was often moved from one temporary detention facility (IVS) to another (such as the IVS at Tiraspol police headquarters and the IVS in Slobozia, as well as colony no. 3 in Tiraspol and the IVS in Hlinaia), all of which allegedly provided inadequate conditions of detention. 29.  The applicant described the conditions at Tiraspol police headquarters as follows. There was high humidity, no working ventilation and a lack of access to natural light (since the detention facility was in the basement of the building), while the windows were covered with metal sheets with small holes in them. The cell was overcrowded (he was held in a 15 sq. m cell together with twelve other people). They had to take turns to sleep on the single large wooden platform, which was not covered. The applicant was allowed fifteen minutes of exercise daily, spending the remainder of the time in the cell. Many of the detainees smoked in the cell, which contributed to his asthma attacks. The metal truck he was transported in when being brought before the investigator was suffocating, and he was placed in a cell without a toilet for hours on end (while waiting to be interviewed by the investigator) and suffered numerous asthma attacks. Laundry could only be done in the cells, where wet clothes would also be hung out to dry. The food was scarce and inedible. The cells were full of parasites. There were no hygiene products except for those brought in by detainees\u2019 relatives. For several months the applicant was detained in a cell which became very hot in summer, causing him to suffer more asthma attacks. 30.  The applicant described in a similar manner the conditions of his detention in the Slobozia detention facility, where there were no hygiene products at all, he was transported in a crammed and unventilated truck, and was fully reliant on his parents for any sort of medication. 31.  As for colony no. 3 in Tiraspol, the applicant again noted the insufficient medical treatment, overcrowding (with one hour\u2019s exercise per day, the remaining time being spent in the cell) and a lack of ventilation coupled with the heavy smoking of his cellmates. The food was inedible, full of worms and made from rotten produce. In the winter the heating was on for only a few hours a day and, as at the Tiraspol police headquarters, the detainees were allowed to shower only once a week (all the detainees in his cell had a combined total of twenty minutes in which to take a shower with cold water). 32.  In the IVS in Hlinaia the applicant was again placed in an overcrowded cell and received virtually no medical assistance. 33.  During his detention the applicant often complained about his medical condition and asked for medical assistance. His parents requested on many occasions that their son be seen by a lung specialist. On 12 March 2009 he was eventually seen and various tests were carried out. He was diagnosed with unstable bronchial asthma and prescribed treatment. 34.  In May 2009 the applicant was transferred to the Medical Assistance and Social Rehabilitation Centre of the \u201cMRT Ministry of Justice\u201d (\u201cthe Centre\u201d). Doctors there confirmed his previous diagnosis and the fact that he suffered frequent asthma attacks and had second and third degree respiratory insufficiency, and that his medical condition was continuing to get worse. On 7 May 2009 the Centre informed the applicant\u2019s relatives that it had neither a lung specialist nor the required laboratory equipment to treat the applicant properly. The doctors added that he needed to be transferred to the respiratory medicine department of the Republican Clinical Hospital, but that this would be impossible to arrange because the hospital was short\u2011staffed and had no one to guard the applicant during his stay. 35.  On an unknown date in 2009 the applicant\u2019s mother asked for the applicant to be transferred to a specialist hospital, as bronchial asthma was one of the illnesses listed by the \u201cMRT Ministry of the Interior\u201d as a reason warranting a transfer to hospital. In its reply of 1 June 2009, the \u201cMRT Ministry of the Interior\u201d informed her that only convicted prisoners could be transferred to hospital on those grounds. 36.  On 21 September 2009 the Centre informed the applicant\u2019s parents that since May 2009 their son had continued to be treated on an in-patient basis, but that his medical condition was continuing to get worse, with no visible improvement as a result of treatment. 37.  On 15 February 2010 a medical panel composed of four senior \u201cMRT\u201d doctors established as follows.\n\u201cDespite the repeated treatment given, the respiratory dysfunction continues to increase and treatment is having no noticeable effect. A continuing downward trend is observed, with an increase in the frequency of asthma attacks and difficulty in stopping them.\u201d\n  In addition to the initial diagnosis of bronchial asthma and respiratory insufficiency, the panel found that the applicant had second degree post\u2011traumatic encephalopathy. It concluded that\n\u201c[t]he [applicant\u2019s] life expectancy/prognosis is not favourable. His continued detention in the conditions of [pre-trial detention centres] appears problematic owing to the absence of laboratory equipment and specially qualified medical staff at [the Centre] for the purposes of carrying out the required treatment and its monitoring.\u201d 38.  Despite the panel\u2019s findings, the applicant was transferred on the same day to the IVS in Hlinaia, which, as stated by the applicant and not contradicted by the respondent Governments, was less well equipped than the Centre. On 16 February 2010 the applicant\u2019s mother was allowed to see him. He told her about his poor conditions of detention (lack of ventilation, heavy smoking by detainees, overcrowding) and said that he had already had two asthma attacks that day. The applicant\u2019s mother was told by the prison staff that she had to bring her son the medication he required since there was none available in the prison. 39.  On 18 February 2010 the applicant\u2019s mother asked the \u201cMRT President\u201d for the applicant to be transferred as a matter of urgency to a specialist hospital and for his release from detention pending trial in order to obtain the treatment he required. On 20 February 2010 she received a reply saying that her complaint had not disclosed any breach of the law. 40.  On an unknown date after 18 February 2010, the applicant was transferred to Prison no. 1 in Tiraspol. On 17 March 2010 he was again admitted to the Centre for in-patient treatment. 41.  In a letter to the applicant\u2019s lawyer of 11 June 2010, the Centre\u2019s director stated that, in addition to the applicant\u2019s main diagnosis of asthma, he was also found to have terminal respiratory insufficiency, symptoms of a head injury with localised areas of brain damage, the first signs of hypertonic disease, an allergy in his lungs making treatment and the ability to stop his asthma attacks more difficult, post-traumatic encephalopathy, arterial hypertension, toxoplasmosis, giardiasis (a parasite), chronic gastroduodenitis, pancreatitis and pyelonephritis. His prognosis was worsening. 42.  In a number of replies to complaints by the applicant\u2019s parents, the \u201cMRT\u201d authorities informed them that the applicant was seen regularly by various doctors. After his transfer from the Centre to the IVS in Hlinaia on 15 February 2010, his state of health had deteriorated and on 17 March 2010 he had been immediately transferred to the Centre for treatment. 43.  According to the applicant, his state of health improved after his release and the treatment he received in Chi\u0219in\u0103u. However, because he feared re-arrest by \u201cMRT militia\u201d, he fled to Switzerland and applied for asylum there (see paragraph 23 above). 44.  From November 2008 until May 2009 the applicant was not allowed to see his parents, despite repeated requests (for instance on 5 March and 13, 16 and 30 April 2009). The first authorised visit took place six months after the applicant\u2019s arrest, on 4 May 2009. On 9 December 2009 a judge of the \u201cTiraspol People\u2019s Court\u201d refused to allow a further visit because examination of the case was pending. Another request for a visit was refused on 15 February 2010. On 16 February 2010 a visit was authorised, but the applicant and his mother had to talk to each other in the presence of a prison guard. They were not allowed to speak their own language (German) and were made to speak Russian or risk the guard calling off the visit. 45.  In June and September 2009 pastor Per Bergene Holm from Norway attempted to visit the applicant at the latter\u2019s request in order to provide him with religious services, including \u201clistening to [the applicant\u2019s] confession and giving him the sacraments\u201d. He was denied access to the applicant, a refusal which he subsequently confirmed in a letter to the Court dated 29 September 2010. On 30 September 2009 an \u201cMRT presidential adviser\u201d acknowledged that there was no reason to refuse the pastor access and that such a refusal was incompatible with the \u201cMRT Constitution and laws\u201d. The pastor was finally allowed to see the applicant on 1 February 2010. As stated by the applicant and not disputed by the Governments, a guard remained in the room throughout the visit. 46.  The applicant\u2019s parents made several complaints to the Moldovan authorities and the Russian embassy in Moldova concerning their son\u2019s situation. 47.  On 12 October 2009 the Centre for Human Rights of Moldova (the Moldovan Ombudsman) replied that it had no means of monitoring the applicant\u2019s case. 48.  On 3 November 2009 the Moldovan Prosecutor General\u2019s Office informed the applicant\u2019s parents that it could not intervene owing to the political situation in the Transdniestrian region since 1992. It also referred to Moldova\u2019s reservations in respect of its ability to ensure observance of the Convention in the eastern regions of Moldova. 49.  A complaint made on an unknown date to the Russian embassy in Moldova was forwarded to the \u201cMRT prosecutor\u2019s office\u201d. The latter replied on 1 February 2010, saying that the applicant\u2019s case was pending before the \u201cMRT courts\u201d, which alone were competent to deal with any complaints after the case had been submitted to the trial court. On 10 February 2010 the Russian embassy forwarded that reply to the applicant\u2019s mother. 50.  The applicant also complained to the Joint Control Commission, a trilateral peacekeeping force operating in a demilitarised buffer zone on the border between Moldova and Transdniestria known as the \u201cSecurity Area\u201d. For further details, see Ila\u015fcu and Others (cited above, \u00a7 90). It is unclear whether he obtained any response. 51.  After notice of the present application had been given to the respondent Governments, the Moldovan Deputy Prime Minister wrote on 9 March 2010 to the Russian, Ukrainian and US ambassadors to Moldova, as well as to the Council of Europe, the European Union and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), asking them to assist in securing the applicant\u2019s rights. 52.  On 16 July 2010 the applicant asked the Moldovan Prosecutor General\u2019s Office to provide witness protection to him and his parents, since the \u201cMRT militia\u201d had been looking for him at his home in Tiraspol while he was in hospital in Chi\u0219in\u0103u. On the same day the applicant was officially recognised as a victim. However, on 19 July 2010 the Bender prosecutor\u2019s office refused his request to be provided with witness protection, since it had not been established that his life or health were at risk. 53.  On 6 August 2010, following a complaint by the applicant, the investigating judge of the Bender District Court in Moldova set aside the decision of 19 July 2010 on the grounds that the applicant had been unlawfully arrested and convicted and had had his property taken away from him. He ordered the Bender prosecutor\u2019s office to provide witness protection to the applicant and his family. The parties did not inform the Court of any further developments in this regard. 54.  The applicant submitted reports from various \u201cMRT\u201d media outlets. According to an article dated 13 April 2007 from Regnum, one of the leading Russian online news agencies at the relevant time, the Russian ambassador to Moldova had given a speech in Tiraspol the previous day in which he declared that Russia would continue its support for the \u201cMRT\u201d and would never give up its interests there. The diplomat added that \u201cRussia has been here for more than a century. Our ancestors\u2019 remains are buried here. A major part of our history is situated here\u201d. 55.  On 20 April 2007 the same news agency informed the public of a decision by the Russian Ministry of Finance to give the \u201cMRT\u201d USD 50 million in non-reimbursable aid, as well as USD 150 million in loans secured on \u201cMRT\u201d property. 56.  In a news report dated 23 November 2006, the Regnum news agency reported a statement by the \u201cMRT President\u201d to the effect that each \u201cMRT Ministry\u201d was working on harmonising the legislation of the \u201cMRT\u201d with that of Russia, and that a group of representatives of \u201cMRT Ministries\u201d was to travel to Moscow within the next few days to discuss the matter. 57.  According to the Moldovan Government, \u201cthe last and non-significant\u201d withdrawal of armaments from the \u201cMRT\u201d to Russia took place on 25 March 2004. Almost twenty thousand tonnes of ammunition and military equipment are purportedly still stored on the territory controlled by the \u201cMRT\u201d. On 26 January 2011 Russian and Ukrainian officials were able to visit the Colbasna arms depot, while Moldovan officials were neither informed of nor invited to participate in the visit. 58.  In February 2011 the Russian ambassador to Moldova declared, inter alia, in public speeches that since 2003, when Moldova had refused to sign a settlement agreement with the \u201cMRT\u201d (the so-called \u201cKozak Memorandum\u201d), Russia had no longer been able to withdraw arms from the \u201cMRT\u201d owing to the latter\u2019s resistance. 59.  According to the Moldovan Government, Tiraspol Airport, which was officially closed down by the Russian authorities on 1 December 2005, continues to serve \u201cMRT\u201d military and civilian helicopters and aircraft. Russian military planes and helicopters are still parked there. Between 2004 and 2009, over eighty flights from that airport which were not authorised by the Moldovan authorities were recorded, some of which appear to have been bound for Russia. 60.  According to the Moldovan Government, the \u201cMRT\u201d received a total of USD 20.64 million in Russian aid in 2011, in the form of either the waiving of debts for natural gas consumed or of non-refundable loans. During 2010 the \u201cMRT\u201d consumed natural gas from Russia to a value of USD 505 million. It paid the Russian company Gazprom USD 20 million, about 4% of the price for that gas. At the same time, the local population paid the \u201cMRT\u201d authorities approximately USD 163 million for gas in 2010, a sum which remained largely at the disposal of the \u201cMRT\u201d.\nII.  RELEVANT REPORTS OF INTER-GOVERNMENTAL AND NON\u2011GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS 61.  The relevant parts of the Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, Manfred Nowak, concerning his visit to the Republic of Moldova from 4 to 11 July 2008 (UN Human Rights Council, 12 February 2009, UN Doc. A/HRC/10/44/Add.3), read as follows.\n\u201cTransnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova\n... 29. The Special Rapporteur also received information that in the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova transfers of prisoners are conducted by the police. Prisoners are packed on top of each other in a metal wagon with only one tiny window. In the summer the heat in the wagon becomes unbearable after a few minutes but they have to stay inside for hours. Different categories of prisoners are mixed during these transports (adults, minors, sick, including those with open tuberculosis), which puts the prisoners at risk of contamination with diseases.\n... 45. According to several of his interlocutors, including detainees, progress has been made with improving conditions in the penitentiary system, e.g. functioning heating, food quality improved, HIV treatment in prisons commenced in September 2007. However, complaints about the poor quality and sometimes lack of food were common. The Special Rapporteur also received reports that international programmes are often not extended into the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova, which means less out-reach in terms of health care and problems in particular with regard to tuberculosis treatment and a higher percentage of persons sick with tuberculosis and HIV. 46. The Special Rapporteur is concerned that many human rights violations flow from the legislation in force, which, for instance, requires solitary confinement for persons sentenced to capital punishment and to life imprisonment and which prescribes draconic restrictions on contacts with the outside world. 47. Conditions in custody of the militia headquarters in Tiraspol were clearly in violation of minimum international standards. The Special Rapporteur considers that detention in the overcrowded cells with few sleeping facilities, almost no daylight and ventilation, 24 hours artificial light, restricted access to food and very poor sanitary facilities amounts to inhuman treatment.\u201d 62.  The relevant parts of the \u201cReport on Human Rights in the Transnistrian Region of the Republic of Moldova\u201d (by UN Senior Expert Thomas Hammarberg, 14 February 2013) read as follows.\n\u201c... the de facto authorities in Transnistria have ... pledged unilaterally to respect some of the key international treaties, including the two UN Covenants on human rights, the European Convention on Human Rights and the Convention on the Rights of the Child.\u201d (p. 4)\n\u201cThe changes of the role of the Prosecutor and the creation of the Investigation Committee would have an impact on the functioning of the judiciary as well. If correctly implemented, it would be clear that the Prosecutor would not have an oversight or supervisory role in relation to the functioning of the courts.\u201d (p. 17)\n\u201cThe Expert was confronted with many and fairly consistent complaints against the functioning of the justice system. One was that the accusations in a number of cases were \u2018fabricated\u2019; that procedures were used to intimidate persons; that the defence lawyers were passive; that people with money or contacts had an upper-hand compared to ordinary people; and that witnesses changed their statements because of threats or bribery \u2013 and that such tendencies sabotaged the proceedings.\nIt is very difficult for an outsider to assess the basis for such accusations but some factors made the Expert reluctant to ignore them. They were strikingly frequent and even alluded to by a few high level actors in the system.\u201d (p. 18)\n\u201cComments\nBuilding a competent, non-corrupt and independent judiciary is a huge challenge in any system. However, it is an indispensable human right to have access to independent and impartial tribunals.\nThe Transnistrian Constitution states that judges cannot be members of political parties or take part in political activities. It is as important that the judiciary avoids close relationships with big business or organized partisan interests.\nThe procedures for the recruitment of judges should be impartial and reward professional skills and high moral standards. Corrupt behaviour and other breaches of trust should be investigated and punished through a credible and competent disciplinary mechanism. A reasonable salary level will also counter temptations of accepting bribes.\nThe judge has a crucial role in protecting the principle of \u2018equality of arms\u2019. The Expert heard complaints that the defence in general was disadvantaged in comparison with the prosecution. Such perceptions undermine the credibility of the system and the sense of justice in general.\nThe prestige of judges in society will of course depend largely on their competence, their knowledge of the laws and the case law as well as familiarity with problems in society. Update training is one way of meeting this need.\nSpecial training is needed for those judges involved in juvenile justice matters.\nThe United Nations adopted a set of basic principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, which were unanimously endorsed by the General Assembly in [1985]. These principles, representing universally accepted views on this matter by the UN Member States, set out parameters to ensure independence and impartiality of the judges, condition of service and tenure, freedoms of expression and association and modalities for qualification, selection and trainings. [Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights] and the International Bar Association have jointly developed extensive guidance material on human rights in the administration of justice, which might also be used for the training of legal professionals working in the Transnistrian region.\nThe Expert considers that an evaluation ought to be undertaken on the present situation with regard to minors in detention, including, inter alia, their length of stay, their individual background as well as efforts to assist their reintegration in society.\nSuch survey could serve as a background to a review of the whole approach to juvenile crime. The Expert feels that there is an acute need to develop preventive programmes and alternatives to institutional punishment.\n...\nThe Expert was informed that there were, as of October 1, 2 858 inmates in these institutions, of whom 2 224 were convicted and 634 held on remand. This means that there are approximately 500 prisoners per every 100 000 persons, one of the highest figures in Europe.\nThe number had gone down during 2012 from an even higher figure as a consequence of releases through reduction of sentences and pardons granted to a considerable number of prisoners.\nFurthermore, the Code of Criminal Procedure was amended in the autumn in order to reduce the number of persons kept on remand during investigations. Another amendment opened for alternatives to imprisonment, such as fines or controlled, non\u2011penitentiary community work, for the less serious crimes.\nDetention on remand\nWhen the Expert visited the remand facility in prison no. 3 in Tiraspol, there were 344 detainees kept there. Some were under investigation before trial. Others had been charged and were defendants at court proceedings. Still others had appealed a sentence in the first instance.\nNone of these three categories had an unconditional right to receive visitors. The reason given was that visits might disturb the investigations. However, relatives may on request get permission from the investigator or the judge to pay a visit, though not in private.\n...\nThe Expert talked with inmates who had been kept on remand longer than 18 months. One woman who had appealed an original sentence had been detained for four years. Her two small children had been taken to a children\u2019s home and she had not been able to see them for the entire period of her detention.\nThe Expert was told that the total detention period before and during a trial could be as long as seven years.\n...\nPenitentiary facilities in Tiraspol and Glinnoe\nThe Expert visited the colony in Tiraspol (prison no. 2) in May and the one in Glinnoe (prison no. 1) in September. The former had at the time 1 187 inmates, of whom 170 were under strict special regime. The average sentence was 13 years, the Expert was told. Terms of 22-25 years are being served for murder, repeat offences and trafficking crimes.\nIn Glinnoe, the Expert was told that there were 693 convicted prisoners; the number had gone down as a consequence of the recent revision of the Criminal Code. The Expert was told that the average sentence was 5 years though many prisoners had sentences of between 10 and 15 years.\n...\nThe possibility of visits by relatives was limited. In Tiraspol no. 2, the basic rule was to allow visits four times a year, two short and two longer. Phone calls were allowed for 15 minutes once a month \u2013 with supervision except for discussions with the lawyer.\nBoth visits and phone calls could be reduced as a method of disciplinary sanction. Such measures were taken in cases of infringements such as possessing alcohol or having a mobile telephone. Disciplinary measures could also include solitary confinement of up to 15 days.\n...\nHealth situation in prisons\nHealth service in the penitentiary institutions is also under the authority of the Transnistrian Ministry of Justice; doctors and nurses there are seen as part of the prison staff. The resources are limited and the Expert found the health situation, in particular in the Glinnoe prison, to be alarming and the care services substandard. There is limited communication with the civilian health system which results in low coverage with testing and treatment.\n...\nFew human resources and limited capacities of existing medical personnel create barriers to enjoying access to quality medical services in penitentiaries. The standard of health care in the Glinnoe prison appeared to the Expert to be especially bad on all accounts, including on record keeping and preventive measures such as diet control. There, the complaints about the quality of the food were particularly bitter.\u201d (pp. 19\u201123) 63.  In the report on its visit to Moldova between 21 and 27 July 2010 (CPT/Inf (2011) 8) the CPT stated that, following the refusal of the \u201cMRT\u201d authorities to allow members of the Committee to meet in private with detainees, the CPT had decided to call off its visit because a limitation of this kind ran counter to the fundamental characteristics of the prevention mechanism enshrined in its mandate. 64.  The relevant parts of the report of the CPT on its visit to Moldova between 27 and 30 November 2000 (CPT/Inf (2002) 35) read as follows.\n\u201c40.  At the outset of the visit, the authorities of the Transnistrian region provided the delegation with detailed information on the five penitentiary establishments currently in service in the region.\nIn the time available, the delegation was not in a position to make a thorough examination of the whole of the penitentiary system. However, it was able to make an assessment of the treatment of persons deprived of their liberty in Prison No. 1, at Glinoe, Colony No. 2, at Tiraspol, and the SIZO (i.e. pre-trial) section of Colony No. 3, again at Tiraspol. 41.  As the authorities are certainly already aware, the situation in the establishments visited by the delegation leaves a great deal to be desired, in particular in Prison No. 1. The CPT will examine various specific areas of concern in subsequent sections of this report. However, at the outset, the Committee wishes to highlight what is perhaps the principal obstacle to progress, namely the high number of persons who are imprisoned and the resultant overcrowding. 42.  According to the information provided by the authorities, there are approximately 3,500 prisoners in the region\u2019s penitentiary establishments i.e. an incarceration rate of some 450 persons per 100,000 of the population. The number of inmates in the three establishments visited was within or, in the case of Prison No 1, just slightly over their official capacities. Nevertheless, the delegation found that in fact the establishments were severely overcrowded.\nThe situation was at its most serious in Prison No 1. The cells for pre-trial prisoners offered rarely more \u2013 and sometimes less \u2013 than 1 m\u00b2 of living space per prisoner, and the number of prisoners often exceeded the number of beds. These deplorable conditions were frequently made worse by poor ventilation, insufficient access to natural light and inadequate sanitary facilities. Similar, albeit slightly better, conditions were also observed in the Sizo section of Colony No. 3 and in certain parts of Colony No. 2 (for example, Block 10). 43.  An incarceration rate of the magnitude which presently prevails in the Transnistrian region cannot be convincingly explained away by a high crime rate; the general outlook of members of the law enforcement agencies, prosecutors and judges must, in part, be responsible for the situation. At the same time, it is unrealistic from an economic standpoint to offer decent conditions of detention to such vast numbers of prisoners; to attempt to solve the problem by building more penitentiary establishments would be a ruinous exercise.\nThe CPT has already stressed the need to review current law and practice relating to custody pending trial ... More generally, the Committee recommends that an overall strategy be developed for combating prison overcrowding and reducing the size of the prison population. In this context, the authorities will find useful guidance in the principles and measures set out in Recommendation No R (99) 22 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, concerning prison overcrowding and prison population inflation ...\n... 48.  The CPT recognises that in periods of economic difficulties, sacrifices may have to be made, including in penitentiary establishments. However, regardless of the difficulties faced at any given time, the act of depriving a person of his liberty always entails a duty to ensure that that person has access to certain basic necessities. Those basic necessities include appropriate medication. Compliance with this duty by public authorities is all the more imperative when it is a question of medication required to treat a life-threatening disease such as tuberculosis.\nAt the end of the visit, the CPT\u2019s delegation requested the authorities to take steps without delay to ensure that all penitentiary establishments are supplied on a regular basis with medicines of various types and, in particular, with a suitable range of anti\u2011tuberculosis drugs. The CPT wishes to be informed of the action taken in response to that request.\n ... 49.  Official health-care staffing levels in the penitentiary establishments visited were rather low and, at the time of the visit, this situation was exacerbated by the fact that certain posts were vacant or staff members on long-term leave had not been replaced.  This was particularly the case at Prison No 1 and Colony No 2. The CPT recommends that the authorities strive to fill as soon as possible all vacant posts in the health-care services of those two establishments and to replace staff members who are on leave.\nThe health-care services of all three penitentiary establishments visited had very few medicines at their disposal, and their facilities were modestly equipped. The question of the supply of medicines has already been addressed (cf. paragraph 48). As regards the level of equipment, the CPT appreciates that the existing situation is a reflection of the difficulties facing the region; it would be unrealistic to expect significant improvements at the present time. However, it should be possible to maintain all existing equipment in working order. In this context, the delegation noted that all the radiography machines in the establishments visited were out of use. The CPT recommends that this deficiency be remedied.\nOn a more positive note, the CPT was very interested to learn of the authorities\u2019 plans for a new prison hospital, with a region-wide vocation, at Malaie\u015fti. This is a most welcome development. The Committee would like to receive further details concerning the implementation of those plans.\n... 51.  The CPT has already highlighted the poor material conditions of detention which prevailed in the establishments visited and has made recommendations designed to address the fundamental problem of overcrowding (cf. paragraphs 42 and 43).\nIn addition to overcrowding, the CPT is very concerned by the practice of covering cell windows. This practice appeared to be systematic vis-\u00e0-vis remand prisoners, and was also observed in cells accommodating certain categories of sentenced prisoners. The Committee recognises that specific security measures designed to prevent the risk of collusion and/or criminal activities may well be required in respect of certain prisoners. However, the imposition of such security measures should be the exception rather than the rule. Further, even when specific security measures are required, such measures should never involve depriving the prisoners concerned of natural light and fresh air. The latter are basic elements of life which every prisoner is entitled to enjoy; moreover, the absence of these elements generates conditions favourable to the spread of diseases and in particular tuberculosis.\nIt is also inadmissible for cells to accommodate more prisoners than the number of beds available, thereby compelling prisoners to sleep in shifts.\nConsequently, the CPT recommends that the authorities set the following as short-term objectives:\ni)  all prisoner accommodation to have access to natural light and adequate ventilation;\nii)  every prisoner, whether sentenced or on remand, to have his/her own bed.\nFurther, as measures to tackle overcrowding begin to take effect, the existing standards concerning living space per prisoner should be revised upwards. The CPT recommends that the authorities set, as a medium-term objective, meeting the standard of 4m\u00b2 of floor space per prisoner. 52.  As the delegation pointed out at the end of its visit, material conditions of detention were particularly bad at Prison No 1 in Glinoe. The CPT appreciates that under the present circumstances, the authorities have no choice but to keep this establishment in service. However, the premises of Prison No 1 belong to a previous age; they should cease to be used for penitentiary purposes at the earliest opportunity.\u201d 65.  In its Annual Report for 2005, the OSCE referred to events in Transdniestria as follows.\n\u201cThe Mission concentrated its efforts on restarting the political settlement negotiations, stalled since summer 2004. The mediators from the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and the OSCE held consultations with representatives from Chisinau and Tiraspol in January, May and September. At the May meeting, Ukraine introduced President Victor Yushchenko\u2019s settlement plan, Toward a Settlement through Democratization. This initiative envisages democratization of the Transdniestrian region through internationally conducted elections to the regional legislative body, along with steps to promote demilitarization, transparency and increased confidence.\nIn July, the Moldovan Parliament, citing the Ukrainian Plan, adopted a law On the Basic Principles of a Special Legal Status of Transdniestria. During consultations in September in Odessa, Chisinau and Tiraspol agreed to invite the EU and US to participate as observers in the negotiations. Formal negotiations resumed in an enlarged format in October after a 15-month break and continued in December following the OSCE Ministerial Council in Ljubljana. On 15 December, the Presidents of Ukraine and the Russian Federation, Victor Yushchenko and Vladimir Putin, issued a Joint Statement welcoming the resumption of negotiations on the settlement of the Transdniestrian conflict.\nIn September, Presidents Voronin and Yushchenko jointly requested the OSCE Chairman-in-Office to consider sending an International Assessment Mission (IAM) to analyse democratic conditions in Transdniestria and necessary steps for conducting democratic elections in the region. In parallel, the OSCE Mission conducted technical consultations and analyses on basic requirements for democratic elections in the Transdniestrian region, as proposed in the Yushchenko Plan. At the October negotiating round, the OSCE Chairmanship was asked to continue consultations on the possibility of organizing an IAM to the Transdniestrian region.\nTogether with military experts from the Russian Federation and Ukraine, the OSCE Mission completed development of a package of proposed confidence- and security\u2011building measures, which were presented by the three mediators in July. The Mission subsequently began consultations on the package with representatives of Chisinau and Tiraspol. The October negotiating round welcomed possible progress on enhancing transparency through a mutual exchange of military data, as envisaged in elements of this package.\u201d\nOn the question of Russian military withdrawal, the OSCE observed:\n\u201cThere were no withdrawals of Russian arms and equipment from the Transdniestrian region during 2005. Roughly 20,000 metric tons of ammunition remain to be removed. The commander of the Operative Group of Russian Forces reported in May that surplus stocks of 40,000 small arms and light weapons stored by Russian forces in the Transdniestrian region have been destroyed. The OSCE has not been allowed to verify these claims.\u201d\nIn its Annual Report for 2006 the OSCE reported as follows:\n\u201c... The 17 September \u2018independence\u2019 referendum and the 10 December \u2018presidential\u2019 elections in Transnistria \u2013 neither one recognized nor monitored by the OSCE \u2013 shaped the political environment of this work ...\nTo spur on the settlement talks, the Mission drafted in early 2006 documents that suggested: a possible delimitation of competencies between central and regional authorities; a mechanism for monitoring factories in the Transnistrian military\u2011industrial complex; a plan for the exchange of military data; and an assessment mission to evaluate conditions and make recommendations for democratic elections in Transnistria. The Transnistrian side, however, refused to continue negotiations after the March introduction of new customs rules for Transnistrian exports, and thus no progress could be made including on these projects. Attempts to unblock this stalemate through consultations among the mediators (OSCE, Russian Federation and Ukraine) and the observers (European Union and the United States of America) in April, May and November and consultations of the mediators and observers with each of the sides separately in October were to no avail.\n ...\nOn 13 November, a group of 30 OSCE Heads of Delegations, along with OSCE Mission members, gained access for the first time since March 2004 to the Russian Federation ammunition depot in Colbasna, near the Moldovan-Ukrainian border in northern Transnistria. There were no withdrawals, however, of Russian ammunition or equipment from Transnistria during 2006, and more than 21,000 tons of ammunition remain stored in the region. ...\u201d\nThe Annual Report for 2007 stated:\n\u201cThe mediators in the Transnistrian settlement process, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the OSCE, and the observers, the European Union and the United States, met four times. The mediators and observers met informally with the Moldovan and Transnistrian sides once, in October. All meetings concentrated on finding ways to restart formal settlement negotiations, which have nonetheless failed to resume.\n ...\nThe Mission witnessed that there were no withdrawals of Russian ammunition or equipment during 2007. The Voluntary Fund retains sufficient resources to complete the withdrawal tasks.\u201d\nIn its Annual Report for 2008 the OSCE observed:\n\u201cMoldovan President Vladimir Voronin and Transnistrian leader Igor Smirnov met in April for the first time in seven years and followed up with another meeting on 24 December. Mediators from the OSCE, Russian Federation and Ukraine and observers from the European Union and the United States met five times. Informal meetings of the sides with mediators and observers took place five times. These and additional shuttle diplomacy efforts by the Mission notwithstanding, formal negotiations in the \u20185+2\u2019 format were not resumed.\n ...\nThere were no withdrawals of Russian ammunition or equipment from the Transnistrian region during 2008. The Voluntary Fund retains sufficient resources to complete withdrawal tasks.\u201d\nIn its Annual Report for 2009 the OSCE observed:\n\u201cWithdrawal of Russian ammunition and equipment. The Mission maintained its readiness to assist the Russian Federation to fulfil its commitment to withdraw ammunition and equipment from Transdniestria. No withdrawals took place in 2009. The Voluntary Fund retains sufficient resources to complete withdrawal tasks.\u201d\nSubsequent OSCE reports describe the confidence-building measures taken and note the various meetings between those involved in the negotiations concerning the settlement of the Transdniestrian conflict. They do not contain any reference to the withdrawal of troops from the \u201cMRT\u201d. 66.  In Catan and Others (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 64-73) the Court summarised the content of various reports by intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations concerning the situation in the Transdniestrian region of Moldova and the Russian military personnel and equipment stationed there during 2003 and 2009. It also summarised the relevant provisions of international law (ibid., \u00a7\u00a7 74-76). 67.  In paragraph 18 of Resolution 1896 (2012) on the honouring of obligations and commitments by the Russian Federation, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe noted as follows:\n\u201cThe opening of polling stations in Abkhazia (Georgia), South Ossetia (Georgia) and Transnistria (Republic of Moldova) without the explicit consent of the de jure authorities in Tbilisi and Chi\u015fin\u0103u, as well as the prior \u2018passportisation\u2019 of populations in these territories, violated the territorial integrity of these States, as recognised by the international community, including the Parliamentary Assembly.\u201d 68.  On 10 May 2010 the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) replied to a letter from the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Moldova concerning the applicant\u2019s case, stating that an ICRC delegate and a doctor had seen the applicant on 29 April 2010. During their visit, they had met with the applicant in private and had been told that he had regular contact with his family and could receive parcels from them.", "references": ["3", "7", "0", "8", "9", "6", "No Label", "1", "2", "4", "5"], "gold": ["1", "2", "4", "5"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Kaunas. 6.  In February 1993 the Kaunas Region Municipality (Kauno rajono savivaldyb\u0117) assigned a plot of land measuring 0.15 hectares in the settlement of Noreiki\u0161k\u0117s to the applicant for the construction of a house (hereinafter \u201cthe land\u201d). In May 1995 she signed a land purchase agreement with the municipality and bought the land for 29.70 \u201csingle-use investment vouchers\u201d (investiciniai \u010dekiai). The purchase agreement indicated that the nominal value of the land was 2,976 Lithuanian litai (LTL \uf02d approximately 862 euros (EUR)). The applicant subsequently obtained a building permit and built a storehouse on the land. 7.  On 10 May 2002 the Constitutional Court found that Government regulations which allowed land in Noreiki\u0161k\u0117s to be sold to private individuals were contrary to the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and the Restitution Law (see Padalevi\u010dius v. Lithuania, no. 12278/03, \u00a7 18, 7 July 2009). 8.  In December 2003 the Kaunas County Administration (hereinafter \u201cthe KCA\u201d) brought a claim before the Kaunas District Court (Kauno rajono apylink\u0117s teismas) seeking the annulment of the administrative decisions and the purchase agreements on the basis of which plots of land had been sold to the applicant and to several other individuals. The KCA argued that the land in question had to be returned in natura to its former owners and thus had been sold to the applicant and other individuals unlawfully. 9.  On 4 June 2004 the Kaunas District Court allowed the KCA\u2019s claim. The court annulled the administrative decision of 1993 assigning the land to the applicant and the land purchase agreement of 1995, and ordered the Kaunas Region Municipality to return 29.70 \u201csingle-use investment vouchers\u201d to the applicant. 10.  On 7 February 2005 the Kaunas Regional Court partially quashed the first-instance judgment. It found that the lower court had correctly annulled the administrative decision and purchase agreement, and upheld the judgment in that part. However, it noted that the \u201csingle-use investment vouchers\u201d could no longer be used as a means of payment. Thus, in accordance with the Civil Code, the applicant should have received the monetary equivalent of what she had paid in 1995. The court remitted that part of the case for re-examination in order to assess the monetary equivalent. On 3 October 2005 the Supreme Court upheld the Regional Court\u2019s judgment. 11.  The remitted part of the case was subsequently re-examined by the Kaunas Regional Court sitting as the court of first instance. During those proceedings, the applicant argued that the unlawful allocation and sale of the land had resulted from the State authorities\u2019 negligence. The applicant claimed that she, as a bona fide purchaser, was therefore entitled to receive compensation for the full market value as it was at the time of expropriation, in accordance with Article 6.147 \u00a7 2 of the Civil Code (see paragraph 16 below). 12.  On 6 March 2008 the Kaunas Regional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s request for compensation equating to the full market value of the land. The court found that the authorities could not be held solely responsible for the unlawful sale because the applicant had also had a duty to verify whether she had been buying the land lawfully. Thus, the court held that, for the purposes of Article 6.147 \u00a7 2 of the Civil Code, the applicant could not be considered a bona fide purchaser and was not entitled to compensation for the full market value. The court awarded her the nominal value of the land in 1995, which it assessed to be LTL 29.70 (EUR 8.60). The court also noted that if the applicant considered that she had suffered pecuniary damage, she had the right to institute separate proceedings against the State for damages. 13.  On 19 August 2008 the Court of Appeal partially amended the Regional Court\u2019s judgment. It reiterated that the applicant could not be considered a bona fide purchaser merely because she had bought the land from the State \u2013 she had also had a duty to verify the lawfulness of the sale. However, the Court of Appeal found that the lower court had incorrectly assessed the nominal value of the land in 1995. Referring to the text of the purchase agreement (see paragraph 6 above), the court awarded the applicant LTL 2,976 (EUR 862). 14.  On 27 January 2009 the Supreme Court upheld the judgment of the Court of Appeal; however, it partially amended the reasoning. The Supreme Court stated that the nominal value of the land had been indicated in the purchase agreement, so it had not been necessary to apply Article 6.147 of the Civil Code and assess the monetary equivalent. As a result, the applicant\u2019s good faith had been irrelevant in determining the amount of compensation and should not have been examined. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court considered that that error had not affected the lawfulness of the Court of Appeal\u2019s judgment.", "references": ["5", "3", "8", "2", "7", "1", "0", "4", "6", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
+{"input": "7.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, are similar to those in Association \u201c21 December 1989\u201d and Others v. Romania (nos. 33810/07 and 18817/08, \u00a7\u00a7 12-41, 24 May 2011). They have the same historical context and relate to the same domestic criminal proceedings. They can be summarised as follows: 8.  On 17 December 1989, following demonstrations against the Government and on the orders of President Nicolae Ceau\u015fescu, military operations were conducted in Timi\u0219oara and, over the following days, in other towns, including Bucharest, Re\u0219i\u021ba and Bra\u015fov. These operations caused many civilian deaths and casualties.\nAccording to a document of 5 June 2008, issued by the military prosecutor\u2019s office at the High Court of Cassation and Justice, \u201cmore than 1,200 people died, more than 5,000 people were injured and several thousand people were unlawfully deprived of their liberty and subjected to ill treatment\u201d, in Bucharest, Timi\u015foara, Re\u015fi\u0163a, Buz\u0103u, Constan\u0163a, Craiova, Br\u0103ila, Oradea, Cluj, Bra\u015fov, T\u00e2rgu Mure\u015f, Sibiu and other towns in Romania. In addition, it appears from Ministry of Defence documents, declassified by Government decision no. 94/2010 of 10 February 2010, that thousands of servicemen, equipped with combat tanks and other armed vehicles, were deployed in Bucharest and other cities. During the period of 17 to 30 December 1989 they used considerable quantities of ammunition against the demonstrators. 9.  The applicants are people whose relatives were shot and killed in the events which took place between 17 and 30 December in Bucharest, except for the applicant in application no. 45779/14, whose husband was killed in Re\u0219i\u021ba and the applicant in application no. 24127/14, whose son was killed in Bra\u015fov. 10.  In 1990, military prosecutors in Bucharest, Timi\u015foara, Oradea, Constan\u0163a, Craiova, Bac\u0103u, T\u00e2rgu Mure\u015f and Cluj opened investigations into the use of force and the unlawful deprivation of liberty of the participants in demonstrations in the final days of December 1989. To date, the main criminal investigation into the use of violence, particularly against civilian demonstrators, both prior to and following the overthrow of Nicolae Ceau\u015fescu, has been contained in file no. 97/P/1990 (current number 11/P/2014). The most important procedural steps undertaken between 1990 and 2009 were summarised in Association \u201c21 December 1989\u201d and Others (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 12-41). Subsequent developments are described below. 11.  On 18 October 2010 the military prosecutor\u2019s office at the High Court of Cassation and Justice decided not to institute criminal proceedings with regard to the acts committed by the military, finding that the applicants\u2019 complaints were partly statute-barred and partly ill-founded. The investigation into crimes committed by civilians, members of the Patriotic Guards, militia members and prison staff was severed from the case file and jurisdiction was relinquished in favour of the prosecuting authorities at the High Court of Cassation and Justice. 12.  On 15 April 2011 the chief prosecutor at the military prosecutor\u2019s office set aside the decision of 18 October 2010 on the grounds that the investigation had not yet been finalised and that not all the victims and perpetrators had been identified. 13.  On 18 April 2011 the military prosecutor\u2019s office relinquished jurisdiction in favour of the prosecutor\u2019s office at the High Court of Cassation and Justice on the grounds that the investigation concerned both civilians and military personnel. 14.  On 9 March 2012 \u2013 after classified material in the criminal investigation file had been opened to the public in 2010 \u2013 the case was re-registered with a view to an investigation in the light of the newly available information. 15.  In February 2014, after the entry into force of the new Code of Criminal Procedure, jurisdiction was again relinquished in favour of the military prosecuting authorities and the file was registered under the domestic case file no. 11/P/2014. 16.  By an ordinance of 14 October 2015, the prosecuting authorities at the High Court of Cassation and Justice discontinued the proceedings in relation to case file no. 11/P/2014. The parties have not submitted any information on whether there was an appeal against that decision.", "references": ["4", "8", "7", "2", "9", "3", "5", "6", "1", "No Label", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1989 and lives in Istanbul. 6.  On 15 June 2004 she applied to take part in the entrance competition for the Turkish National Music Academy attached to \u0130stanbul Technical University (\u201cthe Music Academy\u201d) for the 2004-2005 academic year. 7. On 21 and 31 August 2004 she took the practical selection tests performing on the ba\u011flama[1]. 8.  On 7 September 2004 the music section of the Academy administration published a list of successful candidates in the entrance examination, which included the applicant. 9.  The applicant immediately applied to a medical board at B\u00fcy\u00fck\u00e7ekmece Public Hospital for a medical report certifying her fitness to study at the Music Academy. 10.  On 9 September 2004 that medical board drew up a report stating that the applicant had been diagnosed with hypermetropia with nystagmus and severe bilateral amblyopia. The Board concluded that the applicant should be referred to a higher medical authority. 11.  On 16 September 2004 a medical board at the Bak\u026ark\u00f6y Research and Training Hospital (\u201cBak\u026ark\u00f6y Hospital\u201d) prepared a medical report finding that the applicant could receive education and instruction in the sections of the Music Academy where eyesight was unecessary. 12.  On the same day the Director of the Music Academy sent a letter to the applicant stating the following:\n\u201cAs we have explained on several occasions to your mother, your father and yourself, since you have failed to provide a report from a fully equipped public hospital (tam te\u015fekk\u00fcll\u00fc devlet hastanesi[2]) confirming that you can study at the Music Academy ... we have been unable to enrol you ... We look forward to receiving your report from a public hospital mentioning your admission to the Music Academy as a student as soon as possible ...\u201d 13.  On 20 September 2004 the applicant\u2019s father wrote to the Director of the Music Academy to inform him that the medical report had been forwarded to the Music Academy that same day, as requested. 14.  Also on the same day, the Director of the Music Academy wrote to the Chief Medical Officer of Bak\u026ark\u00f6y Hospital. Referring to the report issued by that hospital\u2019s Medical Board on 16 September 2004, he informed the Chief Medical Officer that none of the seven sections of the Music Academy could be deemed not to require eyesight. The letter stated that in order to be able to be educated in any section of the Academy, a student had to submit a medical report stating that he or she was fit for the task. The Director of the Music Academy asked the Chief Medical Officer to prepare a fresh medical report taking account of the fact that no section of the Music Academy could be considered as not necessitating eyesight, and accordingly to specify whether or not the applicant was capable of being educated in the Music Academy. 15.  On an unspecified date the Music Academy rejected the applicant\u2019s request for enrolment. 16.  On 24 September 2004 the applicant\u2019s parents, acting in her name and on her behalf, lodged with Istanbul Administrative Court (\u201cthe Administrative Court\u201d) an action against the administration of Istanbul Technical University to set aside the Music Academy\u2019s decision not to enrol their daughter. That action was accompanied by a request for a stay of execution of the impugned decision. In his pleadings, counsel for the applicant argued that his client had passed the entrance examination to the Music Academy on 21 August 2004, appearing before a panel of eight teachers, and that on 31 August 2004 she had passed the final entrance competition with full marks, appearing before a panel of twenty teachers. Quoting the criteria for admission to the Music Academy, that is to say being under the age of fifteen, holding a certificate of primary education, having the requisite physical abilities for playing the chosen instrument in respect of which enrolment has been requested, not having a physical disability such as to prevent her from receiving an education in the chosen section, and passing the talent and technical standard competition. Counsel for the applicant submitted that she had satisfied all those criteria. Her enrolment in the Music Academy had been refused on the sole ground that she was blind, which was contrary to law and the equality principle. In support of her application, counsel for the applicant relied on Article 42 of the Constitution, Articles 4, 7, 8 and 27 of Basic Law No. 1739 on national education (\u201cAct No. 1739\u201d) and Article 9 of Legislative Decree No. 573 on specialised education. He also cited the names of former blind students who had graduated from the same Music Academy. 17.  In a statement of defence of 12 October 2004 the administration of Istanbul Technical University submitted that when filing her application for enrolment the applicant\u2019s father had provided no document referring to her blindness. It contended that he had concealed that fact, had behaved as if his child were disability-free and had therefore attempted to deceive the enrolment office. It stated that Article 4 of the principles governing admissions and enrolment in the Music Academy set out the \u201cno disability\u201d criterion. Furthermore, the applicant had failed to provide a medical report certifying that she could study at the Music Academy, which requirement applied to all applicants for admission. The statement therefore affirmed that the refusal to enrol the applicant had not been due to her blindness but stemmed from her failure to submit all the requisite documents for her enrolment, within the stipulated time-limit. It added that even though the medical report submitted by the applicant had stated that she could study in the sections of the Academy where eyesight was unnecessary, there were in fact no such sections. Finally, it pointed out that in the absence of appropriate facilities and teaching staff with the requisite expertise, the Music Academy was not in a position to provide education for blind students, or indeed for persons with any kind of disability. In that connection it explained that in 1976, when it had opened, the Music Academy had hoped to introduce facilities for teaching blind students, but the lack of teachers with a command of braille had forced it to abandon those efforts. 18.  On 14 October 2004 the Administrative Court dismissed the request for a stay of execution of the decision on the grounds that the conditions set out in section 27 \u00a7 2 of Act No. 2577 on Administrative Procedure (\u201cAct No. 2577\u201d) as amended by Act No. 4001 had not been met. 19.  On 26 October 2004, acting in her name and on her behalf, the applicant\u2019s parents appealed against that decision to the Istanbul Regional Administrative Court. They argued that pursuant to section 27 \u00a7 2 of Act No. 2577, there had been two preconditions for obtaining a stay of execution: the existence of damage which was irreparable or difficult to repair, and the apparent unlawfulness of the administrative Act in question. The parents stated that under the circumstances of the present case it was obvious that the refusal to enrol their daughter in the Music Academy would cause her damage which would be difficult to repair. They also submitted that such refusal was unlawful. Their memorial pointed out that the applicant held a primary school certificate and, apart from her blindness, had all the requisite physical capacities for playing the ba\u011flama. Furthermore, she had passed the entrance examination for the Music Academy, and a medical report had established that she had no disability such as to prevent her from receiving education in the music department. They submitted that the merits of that medical report could not be contested, that other students had provided medical reports from institutions similar to that which had drawn up the applicant\u2019s report, and that the Music Academy had accepted those reports. In their view, the fact that the report had not specifically mentioned that the applicant could study at the Academy could not invalidate it. Moreover, they argued that the respondent administration\u2019s argument that the medical report had not been submitted in time was fallacious, as that report had been submitted to the Music Academy on Monday 20 September 2004, that is to say on the first working day after receipt of the letter from the Academy requesting the report. The parents further affirmed that the applicant had met all the conditions for enrolment and submitted the requested documents within the stipulated time-limits. The only reason for the refusal of enrolment had been her blindness. In reply to the respondent administration\u2019s plea that the Music Academy had no sections where eyesight was not required, the applicant\u2019s parents provided the names of four blind graduates of the Music Academy. Those former students had asserted that blindness was no obstacle to playing a musical instrument, that there were many blind musicians and that the Music Academy\u2019s argument that none of the teachers knew braille was invalid in the light of advanced technology and computer systems capable of converting braille. Finally, the applicant\u2019s parents submitted that the impugned measure was contrary to the constitutional principle of equality and all the relevant international legal instruments. 20.  On 28 October 2004 the Istanbul Regional Court Administrative dismissed that appeal on the grounds that the conditions for a stay of execution set out in section 27 \u00a7 2 of Act No. 2577 had not been fulfilled since the execution of the impugned decision was not such as to cause damage which was irreparable or difficult to repair and was not unlawful. 21.  On 29 November 2004 the Chief Medical Officer of Bak\u026ark\u00f6y Hospital wrote to the administration of the Music Academy to inform it that the medical report du 16 September 2004 had been revised. The original sentence \u201ccan receive education and instruction in the sections of the Music Academy where eyesight is unnecessary\u201d had been replaced by: \u201ccannot receive education or instruction\u201d. 22.  On 11 March 2005, acting in the applicant\u2019s name and on her behalf, her parents submitted a complaint to the Bak\u026ark\u00f6y State Prosecutor against the Bak\u026ark\u00f6y Research and Training Hospital, its Chief Medical Officer and the other doctors who had amended the medical report of 16 September 2004, accusing them of abuse of office. They argued that the doctors had amended the medical report arbitrarily, without examining their daughter. They affirmed that the purpose of the amendments had been to ensure that the proceedings against the administration of Istanbul University concluded in the latter\u2019s favour. 23.  On the same day they applied to the Istanbul Medical Association for an inquiry into the events in question. 24.  On 23 May 2005 the Health Department attached to the Istanbul Governor\u2019s Office adopted a decision refusing to authorise the prosecution of the Chief Medical Officer in question. That decision mentioned that the findings of the report had been amended at the request of the administration of the Music Academy and that there had been no wrongdoing or abuse of office. 25.  On 4 July 2005 the applicant\u2019s parents, acting in her name and on her behalf, appealed to the Istanbul Regional Administrative Court to set aside that decision and authorise proceedings against the Chief Medical Officer in question. That appeal was unsuccessful. 26.  On 18 July 2005 they lodged an appeal with the Istanbul Court Administrative requesting the setting aside of the decision not to enrol the applicant. They relied on section 15 of Act No. 5378 of 1 July 2005 on persons with disabilities (\u201cAct No. 5378\u201d), which had, in their view, put an end to all forms of discrimination in the educational sphere. 27.  On 14 October 2005 the Administrative Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. The relevant sections of the court\u2019s reasoning read as follows:\n\u201c...\nThe principles governing entrance competitions and enrolments at the Turkish National Music Academy attached to Istanbul University were adopted by the University Senate ... at the request of the section assembly, after having been debated in the Music Academy assembly and deemed lawful by the University\u2019s Educational Board. ... Those principles include the condition that applicants who have passed the competition for enrolment in the Music Academy should not suffer from any physical disability impeding education in the section [to which they have been admitted]. Furthermore, that condition is mentioned on the form distributed to applicants listing the documents required for final enrolment. The submission of a report drawn up by a fully equipped hospital and stating \u2018is capable of studying at the Music Academy\u2019 is mandatory.\nIt transpired from the assessment of the application that [the applicant] passed the entrance examination and secured the right to be enrolled. However, whereas the report prepared by B\u00fcy\u00fck\u00e7ekmece Public Hospital had concluded that a report should be requested from a higher medical board, she requested a report from an equivalent medical board, namely Bak\u026ark\u00f6y Research and Training Hospital. It transpires from the defence of the respondent administration that in the 1970s, when the Music Academy was set up, it had enrolled a number of blind students on a trial basis, but, in the absence of teaching staff conversant with the braille alphabet and having regard to the various difficulties encountered, that experiment was discontinued. No further blind students were admitted. It has been established that the administration wrote to the Chief Medical Officer of Bak\u026ark\u00f6y Hospital requesting information on the interpretation of the medical report which it had issued and that the conclusions of that report had subsequently been amended. The respondent administration\u2019s decision to refuse to enrol the applicant was not unlawful as she had been unable to provide a report drawn up by a fully equipped public hospital and stating that she was capable of studying at the Music Academy. The applicant\u2019s allegations to the contrary are ill-founded ...\u201d 28.  The Administrative Court adopted that decision on a majority vote, contrary to the recommendation of the President of the court, who adopted a dissenting opinion stating, with reference to Article 42 of the Constitution and Act No. 1739, that no one could be deprived of his or her right to education and instruction. In his view, it was beyond doubt that it was incumbent on government departments to put in place an environment conducive to education and instruction and meeting the needs of blind persons. Referring to the defence put forward by the respondent administration, which had attempted to incorporate blind students in 1976, he noted that it had been possible at the time to provide blind persons with musical education. He emphasised that there were many famous blind musicians. To deprive individuals of their right to education was incompatible with a social and democratic State governed by the rule of law. He consequently held that the impugned administrative measure had been unlawful. 29.  On 9 November 2005 the Governing Board of the Istanbul Medical Association wrote a letter to the applicant\u2019s father in reply to his request of 11 March 2005 (see paragraph 23 above). The relevant parts of the letter read as follows:\n\u201c1. The two reports covered by the inquiry are similar in content.\n 2. However, the hospital administration\u2019s failure to defend the initial report and its decision to make the requested amendments, on the instructions of the administration of the Music Academy ... cannot be considered as an appropriate attitude. 3. The letter of 22.10.2004 (no. 5821) sent by the administration of the Music Academy ... to the Chief Medical Officer of the hospital ... states that \u2018inasmuch, moreover, as the teaching administered in those sections is intended for sighted students, we have no suitable educational environment for blind students (in terms of resources, equipment, technical facilities or teachers). For those reasons it is out of the question for sighted and blind students to follow common courses\u2019.\n... Having regard to the relevant international agreements and legislative provisions, the course of action expected of the administration was not to force through amendments to a report drawn up by a hospital, thus impeding a blind citizen\u2019s right to education ... In conclusion, the Chief Medical Officer amended the form of the report, [but] its content remained the same, such that he cannot be accused of negligence. The available administrative and judicial remedies should be used to aasert the right in question ...\u201d 30.  On 18 April 2006 the applicant\u2019s parents, acting in her name and on her behalf, lodged an appeal on points of law with the Council of State against the 14 October 2005 decision of the Administrative Court (see paragraph 27 above). They submitted that that decision was contrary to the Constitution, to Act No. 1739, to Act No. 5378 and to several international instruments and declarations. They submitted that the respondent administration\u2019s defence plea that eyesight was required in all the sections of the Music Academy was fallacious, citing the names of blind former music students who held diplomas from the Academy. They requested the invalidation of the first-instance decision in accordance with the arguments set out in the opinion of the President of the Administrative Court. 31.  On 4 January 2007 the administration of Istanbul Technical University filed its defence. It submitted that the applicant\u2019s medical report had mentioned that she could study in the sections of the Music Academy which did not require eyesight, but that in fact the Academy had no such sections. Lastly, it affirmed that the applicant had not met all the requisite conditions for enrolment. 32.  By judgment of 19 February 2008, served on counsel for the applicant on 28 April 2008, the Council of State dismissed the appeal on points of law and upheld the impugned decision, having found that the latter had fallen within the jurisdiction of the administrative court, had not been unlawful and had complied with the procedural rules. Moreover, it transpired from the judgment of the Council of State that the reporting judge had come down in favour of admitting the appeal on points of law. In his opinion on the appeal on points of law, the State Prosecutor with the Council of State, referring to Article 42 of the Constitution and sections 4, 7 and 8 of Act No. 1739, also stated that educational establishments were required to take into account persons who required specialist teaching and to adopt the necessary measures to guarantee their education. In the circumstances of the present case, he considered that the decision not to enrol the applicant \u2013 who had passed the entrance examination for the Music Academy and met all the legal conditions \u2013 flouted the relevant constitutional and legislative provisions and should therefore be set aside. 33.  According to information transmitted to the Court by the applicant, after the rejection of her application to the Music Academy, she continued her education in an ordinary school before joining the Music Department of the Arts Faculty of Marmara University.\n...", "references": ["9", "0", "3", "7", "6", "4", "2", "5", "1", "No Label", "8"], "gold": ["8"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1987 and lives in Orsk, the Orenburg region. 6.  The applicant received a summons from investigator K. to attend office no. 44 at the Sovetskiy district police department of the town of Orsk (\u043e\u0442\u0434\u0435\u043b \u0432\u043d\u0443\u0442\u0440\u0435\u043d\u043d\u0438\u0445 \u0434\u0435\u043b \u0421\u043e\u0432\u0435\u0442\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0440\u0430\u0439\u043e\u043d\u0430 \u0433. \u041e\u0440\u0441\u043a\u0430) at 11 a.m. on 15 February 2005. The summons contained no further details. At 11 a.m. on 15 February 2005 the applicant, who was 17 years old at the time, arrived at the police station, as requested, together with his father and his friend Ms L. A police officer on duty registered their arrival at the police station. Investigator K. was absent and the applicant was asked to wait. Police officer M. took the applicant to his office. 7.  At some point the applicant\u2019s father was asked to participate in an investigative measure. When this was finished he could not locate the applicant at the police station. He and Ms L. were requested by police officer M. to leave the building. They remained outside near the main entrance waiting for the applicant. At some point they were told that the applicant was no longer in the police station. They left at about 7 p.m. As the applicant did not appear at home his parents enquired about his whereabouts at the Sovetskiy district police department, by telephone and in person. After many unsuccessful attempts they were finally told that the applicant had gone to police station no. 2 together with police officer Sh. and that he had stayed there until 8 p.m. 8.  According to the applicant, police officer Sh. took him to an experts\u2019 room where he was photographed and fingerprinted. Then, shortly after 3 p.m., Sh. led him out of the police station from a back door in the experts\u2019 room and took him to Orsk police department no. 2 in a police car for questioning. According to the police station logbook, the applicant left the Sovetskiy district police station at 3.20 p.m. on 15 February 2005. 9.  The applicant provided the following account of events at police department no. 2. The head of the police department, P., and police officer E. interviewed him about his alleged involvement in thefts from certain shops. The applicant denied involvement in the thefts. E. shackled the applicant\u2019s hands behind his back, told him \u201cto sit on the floor with his legs crossed in front of him\u201d, tied his legs with a rope, \u201cthrew the rope across the neck to the back\u201d, \u201chung it on a chair and pulled it\u201d. The applicant felt severe pain in his back. 10.  At some point operative police officer K. came in and interviewed the applicant. When P. and E. both came out K. untied the applicant\u2019s legs and demanded that the applicant write a statement of \u201csurrender and confession\u201d. The applicant maintained his refusal. K. opened the door and called E. The applicant \u201cunderstood that he would be tortured again\u201d. He ran up and hit his head against the glass door of a bookcase. The glass broke and the applicant received cuts on his face above the left eyebrow and on his head. 11.  Then E. tied the applicant\u2019s hands and legs behind his back, passed a metal bar under the rope and hung him on the bar, the ends of which were put on the table and the back of a chair. The applicant had been hanging in that position for about eight minutes when somebody took the bar off and asked E. to untie the applicant. E. refused. 12.  At some point E. came out and the applicant was untied and the handcuffs were removed from him. K. demanded again that the applicant write a statement of \u201csurrender and confession\u201d. The applicant started writing the statement as requested. P. came in together with lawyer S. who offered his services as counsel for the applicant\u2019s defence. The applicant refused because he wished to be represented by a lawyer of his own choice. 13.  Reluctant to continue writing the confession statement, the applicant was taken by E., who was allegedly drunk, to his office. An ambulance, which had been called after the incident with the broken glass, arrived and the applicant was examined by the ambulance medical assistant, who provided him with first aid and left. 14.  Thereafter the applicant was questioned by two police officers, who were also drunk. One of them hit the applicant several times on both ears simultaneously with the palms of his hands. The other police officer punched him in the head. 15.  Then E. tied the applicant up and hung him on the bar again. The applicant saw blood dripping from his head to the floor. 16.  Police officer B. untied the applicant and demanded that he finish writing the statement of \u201csurrender and confession\u201d. The applicant did so and was allowed by P. to leave. The applicant went home, which was about three kilometres away, on foot. 17.  At about 9.40 p.m. the applicant arrived home. At 11.05 p.m. he was hospitalised. According to the medical records of town hospital no. 2, where he stayed for in-patient treatment until 4 March 2005, at the time of his admission the applicant was complaining of headache, nausea, vomiting and giddiness. He explained that he had been beaten up by police officers three hours previously. He had an abrasion up to 2 cm long over the left eyebrow and bruises on his scalp. He was diagnosed with an abrasion on the left superciliary arch, contusions of the soft tissues of the head and concussion. 18.  The evidence in the case file indicates that police officer E. drew up a record of the applicant\u2019s being \u201cconveyed\u201d (\u0434\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0430\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435) to the police station. According to that record, at 7 p.m. on 15 February 2005 the applicant was brought to the police station \u201cfor examination\u201d (\u0440\u0430\u0437\u0431\u0438\u0440\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e) and searched in the presence of attesting witnesses V. and Sh. It was stated in the record, which was signed by police officer E., the two attesting witnesses and the applicant, that the applicant, a \u201cviolator\u201d, had been informed of the rights and obligations of a person against whom administrative proceedings were initiated. The record contained no further details. 19.  On 15 February 2005 the Orsk police department was alerted by the town hospital that the applicant had been taken to hospital with injuries allegedly inflicted by police officers. 20.  On 17 February 2005 the Orsk Sovetskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office received information about the applicant\u2019s alleged ill-treatment by police officers. 21.  On 21 February 2005 the applicant\u2019s father complained to the Sovetskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office that the applicant had been the victim of police officers\u2019 unlawful actions. On 4 March 2005 he lodged a similar complaint with the Orenburg regional prosecutor\u2019s office. 22.  The Sovetskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office carried out a preliminary inquiry. Its investigator B. received explanations from a number of persons, including the following persons.\n(a)  Explanations received by the investigating authority 23.  On 18 February 2005 lawyer S. stated that on 15 February 2005, some time after 7.20 p.m. [the head of the police department] P. had asked him to be present at an investigative measure as counsel for the defence of the applicant, who was suspected of having committed a crime. S. had seen coagulated blood on the applicant\u2019s eyebrow and on his head. S. had asked the operative officers to leave the office and asked the applicant about the origin of his injuries. The applicant had explained that he himself had hit his head against a bookcase. S. had offered his services as counsel for his defence. The applicant refused, as he wanted lawyer Z. to defend him. 24.  On 22 February 2005 police officer E. stated that he had left work at 6.50 p.m. on 15 February 2005. At a bus stop he had seen the applicant who had been suspected of having committed thefts from two shops. E. had taken the applicant to the police station, where he had invited two attesting witnesses so that a record could be drawn up about the applicant\u2019s being conveyed to the police station and searched. In the presence of the attesting witnesses the applicant had jumped from his chair and hit his head against the glass door of a bookcase. The glass had broken and the applicant had received cuts on his eyebrow and head. E. had provided the applicant with first aid, had drawn up the record of his being conveyed to the police station, and had transferred him to operative officer K. Some twenty minutes later K. had brought the applicant back, as the applicant was complaining of feeling unwell. E. had called an ambulance. The ambulance staff had provided the applicant with first aid. E. denied any use of force or psychological pressure in relation to the applicant. 25.  On 22 February 2005 the head of the police department P. stated that at 7-7.30 p.m. on 15 February 2005 he had been informed that the applicant had been brought to the police station on suspicion of having committed a theft. P. gave statements similar to those by E. about the applicant hitting the bookcase with his head. According to P., the applicant had stayed at the police station for one hour and had left at about 8 p.m. None of his subordinates had committed any unlawful actions in relation to the applicant. 26.  On 24 February 2005 attesting witnesses V. and Sh. stated that at about 7 p.m. they had been invited to be present as attesting witnesses at the applicant\u2019s search. After being searched the applicant had jumped to his feet, run up and hit his head against a bookcase. The glass of the bookcase had broken and the applicant had cut his eyebrow. Two police officers had been present during the incident. 27.  On 3 March 2005 police officer Sh. stated that on 15 February 2005 at the Sovetskiy district police station he had taken the applicant to the experts\u2019 room, where the applicant had been fingerprinted and photographed, and then to the exit. Sh. denied having taken the applicant to police station no. 2. 28.  On 5 March 2005 operative officer K. stated that the police had had information, notably explanations by an eyewitness to a theft at a certain shop, that the applicant could have been involved in the theft. K. had interviewed the applicant, who had been known to the police on account of thefts previously committed by him, at about 7 p.m. on 15 February 2005, after the incident with the broken glass. The applicant had confessed to the theft and had written a statement. After that E. had called the ambulance as the applicant was complaining of a headache. K. denied any use of force in relation to the applicant. 29.  On 11 March 2005 investigator G. stated that she had requested that the applicant be summoned to the police station for an identity parade in a criminal case concerning assault and battery. On 15 February 2005 she had carried out the identity parade with the participation of the applicant\u2019s father. As the applicant\u2019s lawyer had not appeared she had cancelled the identity parade in which the applicant was to have participated. The applicant had left her office together with police officer Sh. 30.  Expert M. stated that in the afternoon of 15 February 2005 police officer Sh. had brought the applicant to the experts\u2019 room. The applicant had been fingerprinted and photographed. M. confirmed that there was another exit from the building through the experts\u2019 room. He stated, however, that Sh. and the applicant had left through another, \u201cnormal\u201d door, through which they had arrived. 31.  The applicant gave a description of his alleged ill-treatment (see paragraphs 9-16 above). He stated that he had hit his head against the bookcase in order to stop the ill-treatment. He also stated that police officer E. had threatened to kill him if he told the ambulance staff about the ill\u2011treatment. When left with lawyer S. in private he had told him about the ill\u2011treatment and forced confession. 32.  The applicant\u2019s father and Ms L. gave statements about their visit to the police station on 15 February 2005 (see paragraphs 6 and 7 above).\n(b)  Forensic medical expert\u2019s opinion 33.  On 14 March 2005 investigator B. ordered a forensic medical examination of the applicant, which was carried out by expert B. on 17 March 2005. The expert was requested to determine the degree of harm to the health of the applicant, who had allegedly been beaten up by police officers on 15 February 2005. The applicant complained of recurring headaches. He had a scar over the left eyebrow. Expert B. also examined his medical records from the town hospital (see paragraph 17 above). In his report no. 892 the expert concluded that the applicant\u2019s injuries, notably the concussion, the wound over the left eyebrow and the bruises on the scalp, had been inflicted by hard blunt objects shortly before he was hospitalised. The injuries were qualified as light damage to health as they had caused short-term health disorder.\n(c)  Decision of 17 March 2005 34.  On 17 March 2005 investigator B. ordered that by virtue of Article 24 \u00a7 1 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (\u201cCCrP\u201d) no criminal proceedings were to be instituted in respect of the applicant\u2019s complaint, in view of the absence of constituent elements of a crime under Article 286 of the Criminal Code (abuse of power) in the acts of police officers Sh. (as well as under Article 301 of the Criminal Code, unlawful arrest or detention), P., K., E. (also under Article 302 of the Criminal Code, coercion to obtain statements), and four others. 35.  On 21 March 2005 a deputy prosecutor of the Sovetskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office overturned the investigator\u2019s decision, as the inquiry on which it was based was considered incomplete, and ordered an additional inquiry.\n(d)  Additional explanations received by the investigating authority 36.  Investigator B. received the following additional explanations. 37.  On 22 March 2005 N., a medical assistant, stated that at 7.30 p.m. an ambulance had been called by police station no. 2. She and G., a junior nurse, had gone to the police station. She had found the applicant in a room with two police officers, who had explained to her that the applicant had hit the glass with his head and broken it. She had examined the applicant, who had cuts over the left eyebrow and on the head. Her examination had not revealed any obvious signs of concussion. The applicant had taken off his clothes. She had not seen any visible injuries on his body. 38.  On 23 March 2005 junior nurse G. gave similar explanations. She noted that the applicant had been in a room with two police officers, one of whom had later come out. Then medical assistant N. had examined the applicant. 39.  On 23 and 24 March 2005 Ya. and V. stated that in February 2005 they had undergone in\u2011patient treatment at the town hospital and had been in the same ward as the applicant, who had told them that he had been ill\u2011treated at the police station. Ya. understood that police officers had handcuffed the applicant and hung him and afterwards hit his head against the wall. According to V., police officers had handcuffed the applicant and hung him, and then either he himself had hit the bookcase with his head or police officers had hit his head against the bookcase. 40.  The applicant\u2019s schoolteacher, I., characterised the applicant as sly, deceitful and shifty. 41.  Forensic medical expert B. stated that he did not consider it possible to establish reliably how the applicant had received concussion. It could have been the result either of the applicant\u2019s hitting the bookcase with his head or of being punched on the head.\n(e)  Decision of 24 March 2005 42.  On 24 March 2005, on the basis of the results of the inquiry, investigator B. again refused to open a criminal case under Article 24 \u00a7 1 (2) of the CCrP, on the grounds that the constituent elements of a crime in the acts of police officers Sh., P., K., E. and four others were absent. As before, the investigator referred to a crime under Article 286 of the Criminal Code (abuse of power), as well as Article 301 of the Criminal Code (unlawful arrest or detention) in relation to Sh., and Article 302 of the Criminal Code (coercion to obtain statements) in relation to P., K. and E.. The investigator found that the applicant had been at the Sovetskiy district police department from 11 a.m. until 3.20 p.m. on 15 February 2005 for an identity parade in a criminal case concerning assault and battery, and that at about 7 p.m. on the same day police officer E. had taken him to police station no. 2 on suspicion of theft. The investigator held that the results of the inquiry had showed that the applicant\u2019s injuries were self-inflicted, as a result of his hitting the bookcase with his head, and that the allegations of ill-treatment by police officers were devoid of any foundation. 43.  The applicant\u2019s father appealed against the investigator\u2019s decision of 24 March 2005. He complained, in particular, that the investigator had never held an identity parade in order to identify the two unknown police officers who had delivered blows to the applicant\u2019s head. 44.  On 20 May 2005 the Orsk Sovetskiy District Court, sitting in a single-judge formation, heard the applicant\u2019s father, his representative and a deputy prosecutor of the Sovetskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office, and examined the evidence of the inquiry carried out by the investigator. It was satisfied that the inquiry had been comprehensive and thorough, and that the investigator\u2019s assessment of its results had been impartial, reasoned and logical. It dismissed the applicant\u2019s father\u2019s appeal. It noted that an identity parade could only be held once a criminal case had been opened, which was not the case in the present proceedings. 45.  The applicant\u2019s father appealed against the District Court\u2019s decision. On 16 June 2005 the Orenburg Regional Court dismissed his appeal and fully endorsed the first-instance court\u2019s findings. It held, inter alia, that the evidence of the inquiry had reliably shown that on 15 February 2005 the applicant had not been arrested as a suspect in a criminal case.", "references": ["7", "4", "3", "8", "5", "9", "0", "6", "No Label", "1", "2"], "gold": ["1", "2"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant first visited Cyprus in 1991. He married a Cypriot national in 1993. As a result of this marriage he obtained Cypriot nationality in September 2000. Two years later the applicant divorced his wife and married his second wife, a Syrian national. He and the Syrian national divorced in 2005. 6.  On 10 March 2006 the Council of Ministers informed the applicant of its intention to deprive him of his Cypriot citizenship. Following a request by the applicant an investigative committee was set up. The applicant was also heard by the committee as part of the investigation. 7.  On 8 July 2007 the applicant married his third wife, a Cypriot national, in Syria. 8.  On 23 July 2007, on the basis of the report of the investigative committee, the Council of Ministers decided to deprive the applicant of his Cypriot nationality on public interest grounds, pursuant to section 113 of the Census Bureau Law of 2002 (see relevant domestic law and practice at paragraph 37 below). The report concluded that the applicant had been involved in cigarette trafficking and in the trafficking of illegal immigrants between Syria and Cyprus. 9.  The applicant filed a recourse with the Supreme Court (revisional jurisdiction) seeking the annulment of the Council of Minister\u2019s decision (recourse no. 1226/07). This recourse was dismissed at first instance on 7 May 2008. On 2 June 2008 the applicant appealed against the Supreme Court\u2019s decision (appeal no. 82/08). The appeal was dismissed by the plenary court on 12 May 2011: see paragraph 18 below. 10.  On 25 August 2010 deportation and detention orders were issued against the applicant. These were served on the applicant on 22 September 2010 while he was in hospital recovering from a road accident. He was detained the same day. The next day, at the applicant\u2019s request, he was transferred to a private hospital and remained under police custody until his discharge from the hospital on 21 October 2010. After that he was detained at a police station in Pera Chorio Nisou (Nicosia District) and was transferred to the hospital on various occasions, where he remained in police custody. 11.  On 24 September 2010 the applicant filed a recourse with the Supreme Court (revisional jurisdiction) against the deportation and detention orders (recourse no. 1303/10). The same day, the applicant filed a request for a provisional order seeking the suspension of his deportation and an order for his release. These recourse proceedings were then adjourned pending the outcome of the appeal concerning the removal of his citizenship (appeal no. 82/08, see paragraph 9 above). 12.  On 30 September 2010, further to a complaint by the applicant\u2019s wife to the Commissioner for Administration (the Ombudsman), the Ombudsman asked the Minister of Interior to suspend the applicant\u2019s deportation because of his poor health and until she had completed an investigation. That investigation was completed on 27 October 2010 when the Ombudsman concluded that she did not have the authority to investigate the matter further as court proceedings were pending. 13.  On 16 December 2010, the applicant withdrew his application for suspension of his deportation because he had decided to leave Cyprus voluntarily. It appears that the applicant took this decision because he had been in detention for too long. 14.  On 20 December 2010, the applicant, whilst in detention, received a letter from the Civil Registry and Migration Department requesting payment, before his deportation, of EUR 30,356 for detention expenses as well as EUR 1,200 for the legal costs incurred in recourse no. 1226/07 (the appeal against removal of citizenship: see paragraph 9 above). The EUR 30,356 was broken down as follows: (i) EUR 20,675 for the salaries of the police officers who guarded him when he was in hospital; EUR 2,650 as expenses for his detention and maintenance at the police detention facilities for fifty-three days; and EUR 5,831 representing 25% of administrative fees. In his submissions to the Court, the applicant alleges that the authorities refused to allow him to leave Cyprus unless he paid the sums requested. He did not and claims that he thus remained in detention. 15.  On 31 December 2010, the applicant applied to the Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus (application no. 155/2010). He argued that after 20 December 2010 his detention had been illegally prolonged as it was made conditional upon payment of the detention expenses. 16.  On 29 January 2011 the applicant was deported to Syria. 17.  On 4 February 2011, in light of the applicant\u2019s deportation, counsel for the applicant withdrew the habeas corpus application which had been made on 31 December 2010 (see paragraph 15 above). 18.  The Supreme Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal against the removal of his citizenship (appeal no. 82/08) on 12 May 2011. The applicant maintains that his representatives were notified of this judgment on 30 May 2011. 19.  On 28 November 2012, the applicant withdrew his recourse against the deportation and detention orders (recourse no. 1303/10). 20.  The applicant returned to Cyprus on 20 March 2012. He then married his third wife (that is, the woman he had already married in Syria in 2007: see paragraph 7 above). 21.  On 21 April 2012 the applicant applied for a residence permit. The Civil Registry and Migration Department refused this application on 11 June 2012, stating that it considered the applicant a threat to public order for the same reasons for which he had been deprived of Cypriot nationality and then deported on 29 January 2011. The applicant was asked to leave the country. The applicant lodged a recourse against this decision, which the Supreme Court rejected on 3 February 2015, finding that refusal of the residence permit was lawful and disclosed no breach of the Convention. 22.  On 24 October 2013, the Civil Registry and Migration Department commenced proceedings in the Nicosia District Court for payment of the detention expenses, which, as it considered, were still owed by the applicant (see paragraph 14 above). That claim was withdrawn on 31 July 2015.", "references": ["8", "3", "5", "0", "4", "1", "7", "9", "6", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1973 and lives in Br\u010dko, Bosnia and Herzegovina. 7.  On 29 December 2011 the applicant lodged a request for a residence permit in Croatia on the grounds of family reunification with her partner, Ms D.B., who was living in Sisak. She submitted that she had been educated in Croatia and that she had lived in Zagreb for seventeen years. She also explained that she wanted to live with D.B., with whom she had been in a relationship for two years, and with whom she wanted to establish a household and start a business. 8.  By a letter dated 28 December 2011 D.B. stated that she owned a house in Sisak where she wanted to live with the applicant. She explained that she had been in a relationship with the applicant for two years and that they wanted to live together so as to avoid constant travelling and the distance between them. 9.  During the proceedings the Sisak Police Department (Policijska uprava Sisa\u010dko-moslova\u010dka) found that the applicant and D.B. had been in a relationship since October 2009 and that in order to maintain their relationship they had been travelling to see each other. It was also established that the applicant had recently stayed with D.B. in the period between 16 September and 4 December 2011. 10.  On 24 February 2012 the Sisak Police Department dismissed the applicant\u2019s request with a summary reasoning indicating that all the relevant requirements under the Aliens Act had not been met. 11.  The applicant appealed against that decision to the Ministry of the Interior (Ministarstvo unutarnjih poslova; hereinafter: the \u201cMinistry\u201d), arguing that it could be inferred from the decision of the Sisak Police Department that her request had been dismissed because the Aliens Act did not allow family reunification for same-sex couples. She considered that there had been no grounds for a difference in treatment based on sexual orientation and that the relevant law should not be construed in a manner that allowed for such a possibility. She relied, inter alia, on the Constitution and the Prohibition of Discrimination Act, arguing that even if she was not to be considered as D.B.\u2019s \u201cimmediate family member\u201d, within the meaning of the Aliens Act, she should in any case be considered as her \u201cother relative\u201d within the meaning of that Act. 12.  On 8 June 2012 the Ministry dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld the decision of the Sisak Police Department. The relevant part of the Ministry\u2019s decision reads:\n\u201cConcerning the family reunification, based on which the request for the regularisation of the status of an alien in Croatia has been submitted in the case at issue, [it is to be noted that] the case file shows that the appellant relies on the existence of a same-sex relationship with the Croatian national D.B., which has allegedly lasted for two years ...\nThe impugned decision shows that the [first-instance body], other than citing the [relevant] provisions of the Aliens Act, also cited section 3 of the Family Act, according to which the effects of an extramarital relationship, that is to say the rights and obligations following from its existence, relate to a union between an unmarried woman and man which has lasted for at least three years, or less if a child was born of [the union]; and section 2 of the Same-Sex Union Act ... which defines a same-sex union as a union between two persons of the same sex (partners) who are not married, or in an extramarital relationship or other same-sex union, which has lasted for at least three years and which is based on the principles of equality of partners, mutual respect and assistance as well as the emotional bonds of partners.\n...\nIt follows that the [Same-Sex Union] Act does not define a same-sex union as a family and the Family Act does not cover same-sex unions. It should also be taken into account that the provisions of the Aliens Act concerning temporary residence for family reunification do not provide for a possibility of regularisation of the status of an alien on the grounds of [the existence of] a same-sex union, nor does such a union fall within the scope of [the term] \u2018immediate family member\u2019 incorporated in that Act, which makes it clear that there is no legal ground for granting the request of the appellant.\nTherefore, the appellant wrongly considers that the first-instance body should have applied section 56 \u00a7 4 of the Aliens Act in her case ... because that provision clearly provides that exceptionally to the provision defining immediate family members, \u2018other relative\u2019 could be so considered if there are specific personal or serious humanitarian reasons for a family reunification in Croatia.\u201d 13.  On 24 July 2012 the applicant lodged an administrative action with the Zagreb Administrative Court (Upravni sud u Zagrebu), arguing that she had been discriminated against in comparison to different-sex couples who had a possibility to seek family reunification under the Aliens Act. She relied on the domestic anti-discrimination legislation, including the Prohibition of Discrimination Act, as well as the Convention and the Court\u2019s case-law. 14.  The Zagreb Administrative Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s action on 30 January 2013. The relevant part of the judgment provides:\n\u201cThe cited section 56 \u00a7 3(1) and (2) of the Aliens Act provides that the immediate family members are spouses or persons who live in an extramarital relationship in accordance with Croatian legislation. The cited sections 3 and 5 of the Family Act show that marriage and extramarital relationship are unions between a man and a woman. Thus, union between two same-sex persons cannot be considered under the relevant legal provisions as marriage or an extramarital relationship.\nUnion between two same-sex persons can be considered under the legal term same-sex union under the conditions provided for in section 2 of the Same-Sex Union Act. However, given the limited legal effects of a same-sex union, the possible existence of such a union does not represent a basis for family reunification. It should be noted that section 56 of the [Aliens] Act explicitly enumerates persons who are to be considered immediate family members or who are to be exceptionally considered [so], which leads to a conclusion that it cannot be extended to cover persons living in a same-sex union.\nAccordingly, the granting of a request for temporary residence of an alien on the grounds of family reunification depends on the satisfaction of the requirements under sections 52 and 56 of the Aliens Act. In the case at issue the plaintiff is neither married nor in an extramarital relationship with the Croatian national D.B., which is not in dispute between the parties. It therefore follows that the plaintiff cannot be considered an immediate family member within the meaning of section 56 \u00a7 1(1) and (2) of the [Aliens] Act and thus she did not justify the purpose (in the concrete case: family reunification) for which a temporary residence of an alien in Croatia can be granted ...\nIn view of the cited legal provisions, and the facts of the case, this court finds that in the concrete case it was not possible to grant the plaintiff\u2019s request.\u201d 15.  On 8 March 2013 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske), contending that she had been discriminated against on the basis of her sexual orientation. She relied on the Convention and the relevant domestic anti-discrimination legislation, and she cited the Court\u2019s case-law on the question of discrimination related to sexual orientation. 16.  On 29 May 2013 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint, endorsing the reasoning of the lower bodies. The relevant part of the decision reads:\n\u201c8.  The Constitutional Court reiterates that discrimination under Article 14 of the Constitution does not have an independent standing for a constitutional complaint but must be submitted in conjunction with another (substantive) constitutional right. Discrimination means difference in the treatment of persons in the same or relevantly similar situations without an objective and reasonable justification. Article 14 of the Constitution contains constitutional guarantee against discrimination on any ground in securing a concrete right.\nAlthough the appellant relied in her constitutional complaint in Article 35 of the Constitution and the related Article 8 of the Convention, the Constitutional Court finds that these provisions are not applicable in the case at issue. 8.1.  In the proceedings before it, the Constitutional Court did not find facts or circumstances which would suggest that in the proceedings before [the lower bodies] the appellant was discriminated against on any ground ... Thus her complaint of a violation of Article 14 \u00a7 1 of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court finds unfounded. 8.2.  The Constitutional Court also notes that the appellant, in the concrete case, did not show that she has used the legal avenue under the Prohibition of Discrimination Act ...\nThere has therefore been no violation of her constitutional right under Article 14 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 2 of the Constitution. 9.  The case-law of the European Court cited in the constitutional complaint is of no relevance for the case at issue since it relates to cases concerning health insurance and inheritance of tenancy rights by same-sex partners living in a stable (de facto) relationship.\u201d", "references": ["7", "2", "5", "9", "0", "3", "6", "1", "No Label", "8", "4"], "gold": ["8", "4"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1966 and lives in St Petersburg. 6.  In April 2003 the applicant gave birth prematurely to twins at a maternity hospital in St Petersburg (\u201cthe maternity hospital\u201d). The first twin died nine hours after her birth. The second twin, who was transferred to a resuscitation and intensive therapy unit at one of the St Petersburg children\u2019s hospitals (\u201cthe children\u2019s hospital\u201d) twenty hours after his birth, survived. The applicant was of the opinion that her daughter would also have survived had she been promptly transferred to a resuscitation and intensive therapy unit at a children\u2019s hospital. 7.  On 25 May 2003 the applicant\u2019s mother, Mrs D., sent the following telegram to the President of the Russian Federation:\n\u201c... newborns are dying because of delays in emergency medical treatment. Resuscitation units lack capacity. [Hospitals] have waiting lists \u2013 a brutal practice. Thus in ... April at ... a.m. in Maternity Hospital no. ... [my] grandchildren, twins, ... were born. They were tenth on the waiting list. [My] granddaughter ... never got to the top of the list and died ten hours later. [My] grandson ... was hospitalised twenty hours after his birth and placed in the resuscitation unit of Children\u2019s Hospital no. ... in a very serious condition ... The death [of my granddaughter] has shocked our family. We could not imagine that it was possible not to provide emergency medical treatment to the newborn child ... Does the waiting list constitute negligence or irresponsibility on a criminal scale? I ask [you] to take action. Children\u2019s Hospital no. ... needs urgent help ...\u201d 8.  On 15 June and 1 August 2003 D. sent two more telegrams to the President of the Russian Federation, stating:\n\u201cI am informing you for the second time that emergency neonatal resuscitation for premature babies in St Petersburg is being provided on the basis of a waiting list. Who is responsible for the deaths of these children? I request that this problem be examined at the meetings of the Government and the State Duma ...\u201d\n\u201cI am wiring you for the third time about the deaths of premature newborns in St Petersburg ... [I] consider the existence of a waiting list for resuscitation treatment a crime ... Waiting for [your] response about the action taken ...\u201d 9.  The Administration of the President of the Russian Federation forwarded the telegrams to the Ministry of Healthcare of the Russian Federation (\u201cthe Ministry\u201d) for examination. The Ministry asked the Committee for Healthcare at the St Petersburg City Administration (\u201cthe Committee\u201d) to examine the allegations and take the necessary action. 10.  The Committee ordered an examination, which was carried out by a panel consisting of the chief neonatologist of the Committee and the head of the paediatrics department at the advanced medical studies faculty of the St Petersburg State Paediatrics Medical Academy. The examination was carried out on the basis of the applicant\u2019s and the twins\u2019 medical records, which were obtained from the maternity hospital and the children\u2019s hospital. The results of the examination were set out in a report (\u0440\u0435\u0446\u0435\u043d\u0437\u0438\u044f), which mainly concerned the development and treatment of the twin who had died. In particular, the report stated that the infant had been born prematurely in the thirty-first week of gestation of an eighth pregnancy and by a first delivery. Her blood test had indicated the possibility of a prenatal viral infection, and she had been clinically diagnosed as premature (at thirty\u2011one weeks), with respiratory distress syndrome and atelectasis. A post\u2011mortem examination had revealed moderate interstitial emphysema of the lungs, which had explained the immediate cause of death. It was concluded that she had been born with severe respiratory distress syndrome complicated by an air leak syndrome, and that she had been provided with treatment which had been entirely appropriate, given the seriousness of the condition and the nature of the disease. Such cases carried a risk of death of not less than 80%, in addition to the risk of serious disabilities, and an early transfer to a children\u2019s hospital did not guarantee survival or a favourable outcome. The report also noted that the second twin had suffered from respiratory distress syndrome as well, but to a much lesser extent. The experts did not make any significant observations about the treatment he had received at the maternity hospital or the children\u2019s hospital. 11.  On 5 September 2003 the acting head of the Committee sent the report to the Ministry with an accompanying letter. 12.  On 12 September 2003, in reply to her telegrams, the Committee informed D. of the results of the experts\u2019 examination of the twins\u2019 medical records by briefly restating the conclusions in the report. The Committee noted that the results of the examination of her allegations had been communicated to the Ministry. 13.  On the same day, the Committee forwarded to the Ministry a copy of its reply to D. and informed the Ministry that, according to the conclusion of a commission formed by the maternity hospital where the twins had been born, the reasons for the applicant\u2019s premature delivery had been her compromised obstetric\u2011gynaecological history \u2013 in particular, seven artificial abortions \u2013 and her urogenital mycoplasmosis infection. The letter of 12 September 2003 was the subject of proceedings brought by the applicant against the Committee, about which no further information is available. 14.  On 3 December 2003 the applicant received a letter from the Committee with similar contents to the letter of 12 September 2003 that it had sent to D., stating, in particular, that her children\u2019s medical records had been examined by the panel of experts. It appears that a request by the applicant for a copy of the report was refused, and that that refusal was the subject of separate proceedings brought by the applicant against the Committee. In the course of those proceedings, on 30 November 2004, the applicant received a copy of the report and the Committee\u2019s letter to the Ministry of 5 September 2003. 15.  On 25 February 2005 she brought new proceedings against the Committee, seeking a declaration that its actions had been unlawful in that it had collected and examined her medical records and those of her children, and had communicated the report containing her personal information to the Ministry without obtaining her consent. She requested that the report and the letter of 5 September 2003 be declared invalid. She stated that she had not asked the Committee to examine the quality of the medical treatment she and her children had received or to establish the cause of her daughter\u2019s death. She claimed that the Committee had interfered with her private life by disclosing \u2013 without her consent \u2013 confidential information to a considerable number of individuals, including staff at the Committee and the Ministry who dealt with correspondence and other employees. She relied on Article 61 of the Basic Principles of Public Health Law, which prohibited the disclosure of confidential medical information without a patient\u2019s consent. She argued that the provisions of Article 61 contained an exhaustive list of exceptions to that general rule, and that the Committee\u2019s impugned acts had not fallen under any of them. 16.  On 14 December 2005 the Kuybyshevskiy District Court of St Petersburg dismissed her application. The chief neonatologist, who was examined as a witness, stated that: he had acted within his powers; he had not been able to verify D.\u2019s allegations without obtaining the medical records in question; he had involved medical specialists in the examination of those records; and no disclosure of the information contained in those medical records had taken place. A representative of the Committee denied the applicant\u2019s allegations. 17.  The District Court found that the Ministry had asked the Committee to examine the allegations set out in D.\u2019s telegrams. The Ministry had had the power to request material from the Committee, which in turn had had a corresponding duty to submit detailed information. The applicant\u2019s medical records had been examined by doctors bound by confidentiality. It was the report prepared as a result of that examination, and not the applicant\u2019s medical records per se, which had been transferred to the Ministry. 18.  On the basis of the above considerations, the District Court held that the applicant\u2019s rights, as guaranteed by Article 61 of the Basic Principles of Public Health Law, had not been violated. 19.  The District Court also noted that the applicant had lodged her application on 25 February 2005, although she had learned that her children\u2019s medical records had been obtained without her consent on 3 December 2003 from the Committee\u2019s letter of that date. The District Court saw no reasonable excuse for her failure to lodge her application within the statutory time\u2011limit. Lastly, it rejected her request for a separate ruling to denounce the Committee\u2019s allegedly common practice of obtaining medical records without patients\u2019 consent. 20.  An application by the applicant for clarification of the judgment \u2013 in particular, for details as to whether her application had been dismissed on the merits or because it had been time-barred \u2013 was dismissed on 20 January 2006 by the District Court, which considered that the judgment had been clearly formulated and did not allow for different interpretations. The applicant did not appeal against that decision. 21.  The applicant appealed against the judgment, relying on Article 61 and, in particular, the exhaustive list of exceptions to the general rule of non-disclosure of confidential medical information without a patient\u2019s consent provided therein. She stated that her own medical records and those of her children had been collected and examined without her consent by Committee officials acting ultra vires, and not by her own doctors, who were bound by confidentiality. The report contained confidential medical information and its communication to the Ministry without her consent had been unlawful. The fact that her own personal medical records had been examined in addition to those of her children had become known to her at a later date than 3 December 2003. The three\u2011month time\u2011limit for lodging her application had started running on 30 November 2004, when she had received a copy of the report. She had therefore complied with that time-limit. 22.  On 14 March 2006 the St Petersburg City Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal against the judgment and fully endorsed the District Court\u2019s findings.", "references": ["7", "0", "9", "5", "1", "8", "6", "2", "3", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1964 and is currently detained in a psychiatric hospital in Lippstadt. 6.  In 1979 the applicant forced two seven-year-old girls, and in 1980 a four-year-old girl, to undress and hit them with a stick. In 1981 the applicant forced a seven-year-old girl to undress and lay on top of the girl on a bench. The criminal proceedings relating to these offences were discontinued because of the applicant\u2019s lack of criminal responsibility as a minor. 7.  On 21 January 1983 the M\u00fcnster Regional Court convicted the applicant of attempted rape together with sexual assault and dangerous assault and of attempted murder and assault. Applying the criminal law relating to young offenders, it sentenced him to five years\u2019 imprisonment and ordered his detention in a psychiatric hospital under Article 63 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 28 below). 8.  The Regional Court found that on 22 June 1982 the applicant, then aged seventeen, had forced a fourteen-year-old girl to follow him into a forest where he had attempted to rape her, sexually assaulted her with a stick and then attempted to kill her by strangling her to cover up his offences. When, on return to the crime scene, he realised that his victim was not dead, he forcefully hit her buttocks with a branch. 9.  In the Regional Court\u2019s finding, it was necessary to order the applicant\u2019s detention in a psychiatric hospital under Article 63 of the Criminal Code. It considered that the applicant had acted with diminished criminal responsibility (Article 21 of the Criminal Code; see paragraph 27 below). Having regard to the findings of expert H., the court was convinced that the applicant had reduced mental capacities which had been caused by infantile brain damage. This damage, combined with failings in his upbringing (he had repeatedly been hit by his father with a stick himself), had caused a consciousness disorder and the sadistic sexual tendencies the applicant had disclosed in his offence. These disorders amounted to an \u201cother serious mental abnormality\u201d for the purposes of Articles 20 and 21 of the Criminal Code (see paragraphs 26-27 below). Moreover, a comprehensive assessment of the applicant\u2019s personality revealed that, as a result of his condition and notably the sadistic tendencies which had manifested themselves in the offence of which he was found guilty, he could be expected to commit further unlawful acts and was therefore dangerous to the general public. 10.  Since 29 January 1983 the applicant has been detained in a psychiatric hospital. 11.  In December 1990, when the applicant was granted leave from detention, he attacked a twenty-six-year-old cyclist, threatened her with a knife and attempted to force her into a forest. He was chased away by a car driver. The criminal proceedings in this respect were discontinued with regard to his previous conviction. 12.  The courts dealing with the execution of sentences reviewed the applicant\u2019s detention at regular intervals. In particular, on 5 February 2010 the Paderborn Regional Court ordered the applicant\u2019s detention in a psychiatric hospital to continue. It had noted, in particular, that the applicant had refused therapeutic discussions. There was stagnation in the applicant\u2019s treatment, the representatives of the psychiatric hospital having explained that they considered substantial changes in the applicant\u2019s personality by sex therapy no longer possible. 13.  On 28 January 2011 the Paderborn Regional Court ordered the continuation of the applicant\u2019s detention in a psychiatric hospital under Articles 67d and 67e of the Criminal Code (see paragraphs 29-31 below). 14.  The Regional Court noted that external psychiatric expert T., in his report dated 28 January 2010, had diagnosed the applicant, whom he had examined in person, with an abnormality of the sex chromosomes (so-called Klinefelter syndrome). The latter had most probably caused an endocrine personality syndrome characterised by retardation and disorders in the development of a person\u2019s personality and by an insufficient internalisation of ethical rules. The applicant had therefore developed a dissocial and schizoid personality. It was unclear whether the applicant still suffered from sadistic paraphilia. The expert considered that the applicant\u2019s retardation had partially been offset by hormonal treatment. Moreover, the applicant\u2019s dissocial conduct and schizoid personality disorder had been alleviated by social therapy and psychotherapy. 15.  In assessing the risk emanating from the applicant, the expert considered that it had to be taken into account that the applicant had already committed a number of sadistic offences against children. Moreover, the seriousness of the offence of which the applicant had been convicted in 1983, and the attack on a woman at a time when he had already been detained in the psychiatric hospital in 1990, had to be taken into consideration. It appeared that it had not been possible to continuously pursue sex therapy with the applicant during his long psychiatric internment. There was a risk that, if the applicant were overstrained or frustrated, he might commit offences as a result of sadistic tendencies. The expert stated, however, that it was impossible for him to assess how far the applicant was still driven by sadistic fantasies. Consequently, the risk that the applicant would reoffend if released was difficult to assess and could only be determined in the course of further therapy. 16.  A representative of the psychiatric hospital, in submissions to the court dated 7 December 2010, confirmed that the applicant had spoken with a psychologist on his request. However, he was still unable to reflect on the motives for his offence. Therefore, it was difficult to assess how dangerous the applicant was; there was a risk that he would reoffend if released. Furthermore, the therapist responsible for the applicant confirmed that it was impossible to make a proper assessment of the danger posed by the applicant. 17.  The Regional Court, having heard the applicant and having regard to the evidence before it, considered that the continuation of the applicant\u2019s detention in a psychiatric hospital had to be ordered. Despite the fact that the applicant had proved reliable during leave from detention during recent years, it could not be expected with sufficient probability that the applicant would not reoffend if released. In particular, it could not be ruled out that his sadistic tendencies persisted. The applicant was currently not undergoing therapy, in the proper sense of the term, and suffered from hospitalism. 18.  The Regional Court further considered that the continuation of the applicant\u2019s detention was proportionate. In support of this view, it referred to the serious offence which had led to the applicant\u2019s placement in a psychiatric hospital, to the fact that he had relapsed during the execution of his detention order and to the potential risk, as confirmed by the expert and the psychiatric hospital staff, that the applicant would reoffend if released. 19.  On 23 February 2011 the applicant lodged an appeal against the Regional Court\u2019s decision. 20.  On 15 March 2011 the Hamm Court of Appeal, endorsing the reasons given by the Regional Court, dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. 21.  By submissions dated 1 April 2011, the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court. He argued that his continued detention in a psychiatric hospital for more than twenty\u2011eight years was disproportionate and had therefore breached his constitutional right to liberty and the constitutional protection of the rule of law. It had been insufficient for the courts to base their assessment that he was currently still dangerous on offences dating back more than twenty\u2011eight years and on an incident during the execution of his detention order dating back more than twenty years. Moreover, the experts and courts had confirmed that he was no longer undergoing any therapy and that it was unclear whether he was still dangerous to the public. 22.  On 27 July 2011 the Federal Constitutional Court declined to consider the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint, without giving reasons (file no. 2 BvR 735/11). 23.  The applicant underwent several courses of therapy, including social therapy and psychotherapy, during his detention in the psychiatric hospital. After the applicant had failed in his attempts to complete a sex therapy course on a number of occasions, the Lippstadt Psychiatric Hospital authorities decided to discontinue attempts at sex therapy for some time. The applicant was transferred to the so-called \u201clong-stay\u201d department of the hospital in 2006, where he was detained during the time covered by the proceedings at issue and where he did not undergo any sex therapy. The purpose of the applicant\u2019s placement in the \u201clong-stay\u201d department was in fact to grant him a break from his failed attempts to complete sex therapy. He was being prepared for another attempt at completing sex therapy in psychotherapeutic one-to-one meetings with a psychologist. However, he had repeatedly declined offers to restart such individual or group therapy. 24.  The applicant has been working in the factory on the premises of the psychiatric hospital. When granted leave under escort several times per year, he has visited members of his family. 25.  On 18 January 2012 the Paderborn Regional Court, endorsing the reasons given in its previous decision, ordered the applicant\u2019s continued detention in a psychiatric hospital. It agreed with the view expressed by the psychiatric hospital representative that sadism could not be cured and considered that there was a high risk that the applicant would again commit further serious offences against the life and sexual self-determination of others. On 20 March 2012 the Hamm Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal.", "references": ["6", "5", "2", "0", "7", "8", "3", "1", "9", "4", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in St Petersburg. 6.  She had a garage and a small storage building (\u2018the construction\u2019) in Yerevan measuring 21 sq. m. in total, that she had apparently built without authorisation. 7.  On 22 July 2005 the Mayor of Yerevan adopted a decision which, inter alia, recognised the applicant\u2019s ownership of the construction and allocated the underlying plot of land to her with the right of lease. 8.  On 26 August 2005 a lease agreement, valid until 22 July 2010, was concluded between the Mayor of Yerevan and the applicant. 9.  On 5 September 2005, based on the Mayor\u2019s decision of 22 July 2005, the applicant received an ownership certificate in respect of the construction. 10.  It appears that on 19 June 2006 the Mayor of Yerevan adopted another decision, which annulled the decision of 22 July 2005 in its part concerning the recognition of the applicant\u2019s ownership in respect of the construction. 11.  On 20 July 2006 the Mayor of Yerevan lodged a claim against the applicant with the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan seeking to invalidate her ownership certificate in respect of the construction and the lease, on the basis of the decision of 19 June 2006. 12.  On 20 October 2006 the applicant issued a power of attorney whereby she authorised advocate G. to represent her in court. This power of attorney was then signed and sealed by G. 13.  The first hearing before the District Court took place on 24 October 2006. The record of this hearing states, inter alia, the following:\n\u201c... [the applicant] has not appeared; advocate G. has appeared on her behalf stating that he represents the defendant and asked to be given time to study the case file and produced a power of attorney signed by the applicant but not certified by a notary.\n...\nThe court decides to adjourn the examination of the case until 12 a.m. on 1 November 2006 in order for [the applicant] to submit a written reply and a proper power of attorney in compliance with the procedure established by the law.\n...\u201d 14.  On 1 November 2006 G. lodged a counter-claim on behalf of the applicant seeking to invalidate the Mayor\u2019s decision of 19 June 2006 as taken in violation of the domestic law. 15.  On the same day the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan decided not to admit the counter-claim and to return it. The relevant parts of the District Court\u2019s decision reads as follows:\n\u201cHaving examined ... the presented power of attorney, the court finds that the counter-claim ... must be returned, taking into account that the power of attorney has been issued in violation of Article 41 \u00a7 1, 2 and 4 of the [the Code of Civil Procedure]. Pursuant to that Article, a representative\u2019s powers must be stipulated in a power of attorney issued and drawn up in accordance with the law, the power of attorney issued by a citizen shall be certified by a competent official, while the powers of an advocate shall be certified in accordance with the law. In the present case, the power of attorney as submitted by advocate [G.] has been issued in violation of the legal requirements.\nIn accordance with ... Article 92 \u00a7 1 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure ... the court decides to return the counter-claim lodged by [G.].\nThe decision to return the counter-claim can be appealed in cassation proceedings within three days from its receipt by the claimant.\u201d 16.  On the same day the District Court also examined the Mayor\u2019s claim and decided to grant it. The relevant parts of its judgment read as follows:\n\u201c...The defendant [the applicant] was duly notified about the date and the place of the court hearing but has failed to appear before the court while the court has not accepted the power of the advocate who has appeared on her behalf as her representative, on the ground that the power of attorney was not duly certified.\n...\nTaking into account that the ground [the Mayor\u2019s decision of 22 July 2005], based on which the lease agreement was concluded and the title registered, no longer exists, the court finds that ... the agreement on lease of land concluded between [the applicant] and the Yerevan Municipality should be terminated and her certificate of ownership/use [and] the right of lease of immovable property be annulled.\u201d 17.  On 8 November 2006 the District Court sent a copy of its judgment to the applicant by post. It appears from the postal envelope that the copy of the judgment was delivered to the applicant\u2019s local post office on 18 November 2006 and was received by the applicant on 20 November 2006. 18.  On 15 November 2006 advocate G. lodged an appeal on points of law with the Court of Cassation against the District Court\u2019s decision not to admit the counter-claim. He claimed that the provisions of the civil legislation did not require that a power of attorney issued to an advocate be certified by a notary. He also added that the imposition of such a requirement restricted the right of access to court since the notary, as a public official, interfered with the relationship between advocate and client and made the possibility to institute court proceedings conditional on his prior approval. 19.  On 28 November 2006 G. lodged an appeal with the Civil Court of Appeal against the District Court\u2019s judgment of 1 November 2006 on behalf of the applicant, together with a request to restore the missed time-limit for appeal, alleging that a copy of the judgment had been served upon the applicant outside the time-limit for lodging an appeal against it. 20.  On 1 December 2006 the Court of Cassation declared G.\u2019s appeal against the decision refusing the admission of the counter-claim inadmissible for lack of merit. The relevant parts of this decision state the following:\n\u201cThe Civil Chamber of the Court of Cassation ... having examined the appeal on points of law against the decision of 1 November 2006 ...lodged by [the applicant\u2019s] representative [G.] ... found that it should be returned for the following reasons:\nAccording to Article 230 \u00a7 1 (4.1) of the Code of Civil Procedure of the Republic of Armenia, an appeal on points of law should contain one of the grounds stated in Article 231.2 \u00a7 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure.\n... the present appeal on points of law only mentions the elements of points 1 and 3 of Article 231.2 \u00a7 1; however the appellant has not submitted proper and sufficient arguments in relation to them; therefore the requirements of Article 230 \u00a7 1 (4.1) of the ... Code of Civil Procedure have not been met.\nIn such circumstances, the violations of the above-mentioned requirements serve as a basis for returning the appeal on points of law.\n...\nIn view of the above reasoning ... the Court of Cassation decides to return the appeal on points of law against the decision of ... of 1 November 2006 lodged by [the applicant\u2019s] representative [G.]...\u201d 21.  On 19 January 2007 the Court of Appeal rejected the request to restore the missed time-limits for lodging an appeal and left the appeal against the judgment of 1 November 2006 unexamined stating the following:\n\u201cHaving examined the appeal lodged by [G.], the representative of the defendant in the present case, and the request seeking to restore the missed time-limit, [the Court of Appeal] found out that on 28 November 2006 an appeal was lodged against the judgment ... of 1 November 2006 by ... [the applicant\u2019s] representative G., who had failed to respect the fifteen-day time-limit prescribed by the law.\nThe appellant has requested ... to restore the missed time-limit for lodging an appeal in view of the fact that the District Court served the copy of the given judgment on the defendant belatedly.\nThe court finds that the request should be rejected and the appeal dismissed since the appellant has failed to submit any documentary proof which would substantiate this allegation; moreover, ... the case file contains a postal receipt ... according to which a copy of the above judgment was sent to [the applicant] on 8 November 2006 with registered mail in accordance with the procedure and within the time-limits prescribed by ... the Code of Civil Procedure.\n...\u201d 22.  On 26 January 2007 G. lodged an appeal on points of law against this decision with the Court of Cassation, on behalf of the applicant. He argued, in particular, that there was no evidence in the case file, such as an acknowledgement of receipt, which would substantiate that the defendant had received the copy of the judgment in a timely manner. In such circumstances, where it was the courts\u2019 duty to serve their decisions in due time, the Court of Appeal should not have placed the responsibility of producing proof of belated receipt of the judgment on the party to the proceedings. 23.  On 15 February 2007 the Court of Cassation declared the appeal on points of law inadmissible for lack of merit. In doing so, it stated, in particular, that:\n\u201cThe Civil Chamber of the Court of Cassation ... having examined the appeal on points of law lodged by [G.] against the decision of the Civil Court of Appeal of 19 January 2007 to return [the applicant\u2019s] appeal, found that it should be returned for the following reasons...\n The Court of Cassation finds that the admissibility criteria set out in Article 231.2 \u00a7 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure are absent in the appeal on points of law lodged in the present case. Besides, the person who has lodged the appeal has failed to submit a power of attorney drafted in compliance with the civil legislation ...\nAt the same time, the Court of Cassation does not find it appropriate to provide a time-limit to rectify the errors and resubmit the appeal on points of law.\n... the Court of Cassation decides to return the appeal on points of law lodged by [G.] against the decision of the Civil Court of Appeal of 19 January 2007 to return [the applicant\u2019s] appeal...\u201d", "references": ["7", "8", "4", "9", "0", "5", "2", "1", "6", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1961 and is currently detained. 6.  On the night of 12 to 13 June 2003 a house was robbed and three individuals were murdered in the Ivanivka District of the Odessa Region. On 13 June 2003 criminal proceedings were instituted in this respect. 7.  According to the applicant, on 27 June 2003 he was arrested in Sumy; the reasons for his arrest were not explained to him, no record of the arrest was drawn up, and there was a delay in charging him. He remained in detention thereafter. On the same day, the applicant was taken to the Sumy Regional Police headquarters, where he was allegedly beaten up by police officers from the Odessa Regional Police. According to the applicant, he had been handcuffed and remained so during the night. 8.  On 28 June 2003 the applicant was interviewed in Sumy by an officer of the Odessa Regional Police concerning the circumstances of his business trip to the Odessa Region from 10 to 18 June 2003. According to a written explanation signed by the applicant, he denied any involvement in the murder. 9.  According to the applicant, on the same day he was transferred to the Ivanivka police station, where he was allegedly subjected to beatings and psychological pressure by police officers with a view to obtaining a confession. 10.  According to the arrest report drawn up by Mr I.G., an investigator from the Odessa regional prosecutor\u2019s office, the applicant was arrested on 30 June 2003 as a suspect in the criminal case. The applicant refused to sign the report. On the same day I.G. apprised the applicant of his right to defence and his right not to incriminate himself. According to a decision issued by I.G. on the same date, the applicant wished to be represented by P., who was formally appointed as his lawyer. Thereafter, the applicant was questioned by I.G. in his lawyer\u2019s presence and confessed to the robbery and murder of three persons. According to the applicant, he was in fact questioned on 3 July 2003 and the record of his questioning was backdated to 30 June 2003. The applicant further maintained that the lawyer had left the interview in protest against the applicant\u2019s poor state of health, but the lawyer\u2019s signature was added to the record of the questioning afterwards. 11.  On 2 July 2003 the applicant made a written confession in the Ivanivka police station; his lawyer was not present. 12.  On 3 July 2003 another arrest report was drawn up by an officer on duty at the Ivanivka police station. It stated that the applicant had been placed under arrest on suspicion of murder. On the same day the Ivanivka District Court ordered the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention. His lawyer was not present. 13.  According to a statement from the applicant\u2019s wife, on 8 July 2003 the lawyer P. informed her by telephone that her husband, who had been arrested in Sumy on 27 June 2003, was in Ivanivka. 14.  On 8 July 2003 the applicant was transferred to the Odessa temporary detention facility (\u0456\u0437\u043e\u043b\u044f\u0442\u043e\u0440 \u0442\u0438\u043c\u0447\u0430\u0441\u043e\u0432\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0442\u0440\u0438\u043c\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044f, \u201cthe ITT\u201d). According to the applicant, the ITT had initially refused to admit him because of his injuries and a medical officer arranged for him to attend the local hospital for a medical examination. At the hospital a general surgeon and a neurosurgeon examined the applicant and issued a medical certificate stating that he had bruising on his shoulders and hips, and extensive bruising on his head and face, but that there was no indication of brain damage. Subsequently, the applicant was taken back to the ITT but the medical officer sent him back to the hospital for an additional examination, as not all the injuries on his body had been recorded. However, the hospital doctors refused to issue a new certificate. 15.  On an unspecified date the applicant was transferred from the ITT to the Odessa pre-trial detention centre (\u0441\u043b\u0456\u0434\u0447\u0438\u0439 \u0456\u0437\u043e\u043b\u044f\u0442\u043e\u0440, \u201cthe SIZO\u201d). 16.  On 9 July 2003 the investigator charged the applicant and a Mr Y.G. with the robbery and murder of three persons. 17.  On the same day, at the applicant\u2019s request, lawyer P. was replaced by lawyer K. 18.  On 5 September 2003 the applicant complained to investigator I.G. that the police officers had beaten him and put psychological pressure on him in order to force him to confess. 19.  In response to a request from the investigator I.G., on 23 October 2003 the ITT informed him about the injuries observed on the applicant on 8 July 2003 and about the disagreement as to their full extent which had occurred on that day. 20.  On 19 December 2003 investigator I.G. refused to institute criminal proceedings into the above complaint for want of proof against the police officers. According to the investigator\u2019s decision, it was impossible to establish the circumstances in which the applicant had sustained his injuries. The investigator relied on a certificate from the SIZO, according to which at the time of the applicant\u2019s admission to the SIZO he had had no injuries, and on the ITT records of 8 July 2003 describing the applicant\u2019s injuries. The investigator stated that despite this information from the ITT, the applicant had not raised any complaints during his questioning at the ITT. The decision was included in the applicant\u2019s criminal case file. 21.  On 30 December 2003 the applicant and his representative studied the criminal case file in its entirety. 22.  On 16 February 2004 the applicant refused to continue to be represented by lawyer K. and was given time to find a new lawyer. 23.  On 18 February 2004 the applicant wrote to the deputy prosecutor of the Odessa Region arguing that the decision of 19 December 2003 had been based on an error and asking that his case be examined impartially and carefully. The applicant alleged that the ITT had originally refused to admit him because of his injuries and had agreed to admit him only after he had presented a written explanation of his injuries to the ITT medical officer. 24.  On 4 May 2004 the applicant concluded a contract with Mr P. Sushko, who represented him in the proceedings thereafter. 25.  Following remittal of the applicant\u2019s criminal case for an additional investigation, on 2 October 2004 it was transferred to the Odessa Regional Court of Appeal for trial. According to the applicant, he had been allowed to study only part of the case file material. 26.  In the course of the trial the applicant and Mr Y.G. retracted all their confessions, which they claimed had been given under duress, and asserted their innocence. The applicant raised the complaint that he had been ill\u2011treated. The Court of Appeal questioned the investigator I.G., who stated that the injuries recorded at the ITT could have been inflicted on the applicant in the course of arrest. 27.  On 1 August 2005 the Court of Appeal found the applicant and his co-defendant Y.G. guilty of murder and sentenced them to life imprisonment with confiscation of their property. The court based their conviction, among other things, on the testimony of Ms V., who had seen the applicant and Y.G. before and after the murder, on fingerprints from Y.G. found at the scene of crime, on the confessions made by the applicant and Y.G. in the presence of their lawyers, and on the applicant\u2019s written confession of 2 July 2003 made in the absence of his lawyer. Commenting on the applicant\u2019s complaint of ill-treatment, the court also took into account the investigator\u2019s decision of 19 December 2003. It thus found that there was no evidence that the applicant\u2019s confession had been obtained under duress and rejected his complaint as unsubstantiated. 28.  The applicant and his lawyer appealed in cassation, complaining, inter alia, of the applicant\u2019s alleged ill-treatment in police custody, as a result of which he had confessed. 29.  On 11 April 2006 the Supreme Court upheld the applicant\u2019s conviction. It noted that his complaint of ill-treatment had been thoroughly examined by the Court of Appeal and had been lawfully rejected as unsubstantiated. It also mentioned that the applicant\u2019s guilt had been proved by his confession, among other things.", "references": ["9", "4", "0", "7", "2", "5", "6", "8", "No Label", "1", "3"], "gold": ["1", "3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1978. He is Polish and lives in Kent, the United Kingdom. He is married to M.J., who is also Polish. In 2005 the couple moved to the United Kingdom. Their daughter was born there in January 2010. Parental responsibility was exercised jointly by both parents. 6.  On 17 July 2012 M.J. and the child went to Poland on holiday, with the applicant\u2019s consent. On 9 September 2012 M.J. informed the applicant that she was not coming back to the United Kingdom with the child. 7.  On 21 September 2012 the applicant applied to the United Kingdom Central Authority for a return order for the child under the Hague Convention. 8.  It appears that in mid-October 2012 the application was registered with the Grudzi\u0105dz District Court. Judge D.K. was assigned to preside over the case. 9.  In response to the applicant\u2019s request, M.J. submitted that in 2011 she and her husband had become distant from each other; the applicant had lost interest in his family and had been spending his spare time playing computer games. For those reasons, and also out of fear that the child would never again be allowed to leave the United Kingdom, M.J. did not agree to her daughter\u2019s returning to the United Kingdom alone and informed the domestic court that she did not wish to go back there with the child. 10.  The first hearing was held on 19 December 2012 before the Grudzi\u0105dz District Court, with Judge D.K. presiding. The applicant and his lawyer attended the hearing. 11.  The second hearing was held on 4 February 2013 before the same judge. The applicant and his lawyer attended the hearing. The domestic court heard two witnesses and ordered a report of experts in psychology from the Family Consultation Centre (Rodzinny O\u015brodek Diagnostyczno Konsultacyjny \u201cRODK\u201d). 12.  On 22 March 2013 the experts examined the applicant, M.J. and the child, who was three years old at the time. The report was issued on 17 April 2013. 13.  The third hearing was held on 8 May 2013 before Judge D.K. At this hearing, the Grudzi\u0105dz District Court decided to dismiss the applicant\u2019s request for the child\u2019s return (III Nsm 999/12). 14.  The first-instance court ruled on the basis of the following evidence: testimony of the applicant, M.J. and the members of both families and the RODK experts\u2019 report. 15.  The RODK experts were ordered to make the following assessment:\n\u201cwhether moving [the child] into her father\u2019s care, linked with her separation from the mother, would disturb [the child\u2019s] sense of security and would affect her emotional state in a negative way; or is it recommended, [with a view to] the adequate psycho-physical development of the child, to [put the child under the father\u2019s care] linked with [giving] an order to surrender the child by the mother.\u201d 16.  The experts concluded that \u201cthe child\u2019s return to the United Kingdom and her separation from the mother\u201d, her primary caregiver, \u201cwould cause more emotional harm to the child than the lack of daily contact with her father.\u201d In particular, the child\u2019s sense of security and stability could be disturbed. To this effect the report read as follows: \u201cConsidering the [young] age and the sex of the child, it must be stated that the mother is currently best suited to satisfy her daughter\u2019s needs.\u201d\nThe experts also noted that the child was emotionally attached to both parents; she was developing well; perceived Poland and the United Kingdom on an equal footing; spoke Polish and had adapted well to her new life in Poland. It was recommended that the child should stay with her mother in Poland and have regular contact with her father. 17.  The first-instance court considered that the RODK\u2019s report was thorough, clear and of a high evidentiary value. 18.  On the merits, the Grudzi\u0105dz District Court considered that it was called to examine \u201cthe relationship between the child and [each of] the parents, her physical and psychological development and also, any [possible] physical or psychological harm [which could occur] in the event of the child\u2019s return to her father without the mother.\u201d 19.  The domestic court attached importance to the young age of the child (who was three years and four months old at the time of the ruling) and the fact that the mother had always been the child\u2019s primary caregiver. The reasons for the mother\u2019s refusal to return to the United Kingdom together with the child were not discussed by the domestic court. The district court held, relying on the experts\u2019 report, that there was a grave risk of psychological harm if she were to return to the United Kingdom without her mother. It was noted that Article 13 (b) of the Hague Convention protected abducted children to such a great extent that it did not allow for their return if that was going to place them in a \u201cdisadvantageous situation\u201d (w niekorzystnej sytuacji). 20.  The applicant appealed, arguing among others the following points of fact and law: the first-instance court ruled in breach of Article 13 (b) of the Hague Convention, firstly in that they concluded that in the circumstances of the case there was a grave risk that the child\u2019s return to the United Kingdom would expose her to intolerable psychological harm and would place her in a disadvantageous situation, and secondly in that they wrongly assumed that the child would have to be separated from the mother even though the latter had not cited any objective obstacles to her returning to the United Kingdom; the first-instance court ruled in breach of Article 3 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and its general directive that the best interest of the child be protected; the facts as established by the domestic court contradicted the evidence produced in the course of the proceedings; the court\u2019s conclusion that the child\u2019s return would expose her to intolerable psychological harm contradicted the findings of the expert report; and the court should not have refused to adjourn the hearing at which the applicant was not represented by a lawyer. 21.  At the appellate hearing, the applicant also argued (6) that the experts in psychology who had drafted the RODK\u2019s report for the first\u2011instance court were incompetent. 22.  On 14 October 2013 the Toru\u0144 Regional Court dismissed the appeal (IV Ca 1865/12). 23.  The appellate court fully relied on the findings of fact made by the first-instance court, and held that the child\u2019s return to the United Kingdom with or without the mother would place her in an intolerable situation (\u201cw sytuacji nie do zniesienia\u201d). Firstly, in view of the child\u2019s very young age and the fact that since the retention the child had been under her mother\u2019s care practically round the clock and that her contact with the applicant had been rare, the child\u2019s separation from her mother would cause negative and irreversible consequences. Secondly, the child\u2019s return with her mother would not have a positive impact on the child\u2019s development either. To this effect, it was noted that M.J. had never adapted to her life in the United Kingdom; she was in conflict with the applicant and her departure from Poland would be against her will and forced by the circumstances. 24.  As to the remaining grounds of the applicant\u2019s appeal, the regional court ruled in the following manner: contrary to the applicant\u2019s impression, the RODK\u2019s report was clear and adamant in its conclusion that the child\u2019s best interest would be better served if she were allowed to stay in Poland with her mother; in view of the fact that the applicant\u2019s lawyer had gone on holiday and the applicant had not agreed to be represented by a substitute lawyer, granting his motion for adjournment was not justified; and the argument about the incompetence of the RODK\u2019s experts was, firstly, belated (the applicant had not raised that issue before the first-instance court or in his appeal) and, secondly, inconsistent with the applicant\u2019s reliance on the impugned report in support of his remaining arguments. 25.  At the first hearing, held on 19 December 2012 by the Grudzi\u0105dz District Court, the applicant\u2019s lawyer applied, expressly citing Article 21 of the Hague Convention, for arrangements for organising and securing the effective exercise of the applicant\u2019s right of contact during the Hague Convention proceedings. 26.  The domestic court did not rule on that application. 27.  On 28 December 2012 the applicant applied to the Grudzi\u0105dz District Court for a contact order in respect of the child. He did not rely on Article 21 of the Hague Convention. He asked, inter alia, for an interim order to be issued obliging M.J. for the duration of the Hague Convention proceedings to allow him to take the child to his house every second and fourth weekend of the month from 3 p.m. on Friday until 8 p.m. on Sunday, and to talk to the child by telephone or Skype every Monday, Wednesday and Friday between 4 p.m. and 7 p.m. 28.   On 28 February 2013 the Grudzi\u0105dz District Court, with D.K. as the presiding judge, decided under Article 445 1 \u00a7 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure to stay the proceedings concerning the applicant\u2019s contact with the child until the end of the couple\u2019s divorce proceedings, which had been instituted before the Toru\u0144 Regional Court on 14 January 2013 (III. R. Nsm 35/13). 29.  On 25 March 2013 the divorce application lodged by M.J. (IC 117/13) was rejected by the Toru\u0144 Regional Court, with S.M. as the presiding judge accompanied by two lay judges. The regional court favoured the jurisdiction of the English courts because the last common place of residence of the couple was in Maidstone, the United Kingdom. On 24 June 2013 the Gda\u0144sk Court of Appeal, with D.K. as the presiding judge, dismissed M.J.\u2019s interlocutory appeal against that decision. 30.  The applicant submitted that when the Hague Convention proceedings had been pending in Poland, he had seen his daughter on several occasions, in the mother\u2019s house and in her presence. 31.  On 28 November 2014 the Grudziadz District Court issued a decision on the applicant\u2019s contact with his daughter. A copy of this decision has not been submitted to the Court. It appears that the applicant was authorised to see his daughter the second and the fourth weekend of every month; during one week of winter holidays; during two weeks of summer holidays and on selected days of Christmas and Easter holidays. It appears that the applicant did not appeal against this decision.\nOn 31 August 2015 the Grudzi\u0105dz District Court, with D.K. as presiding judge, confirmed that the above-mentioned decision was binding and enforceable as of 8 July 2015. 32. Divorce proceedings are currently pending in the United Kingdom. 33.  The Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction which has been ratified by Poland (Dz.U.1995 r. Nr 108, poz. 528, date of entry onto force 1 November 1992) and the United Kingdom provides, in so far as relevant, as follows.\n\u201c... Article 3\nThe removal or the retention of a child is to be considered wrongful where -\na) it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person, an institution or any other body, either jointly or alone, under the law of the State in which the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention; and\nb) at the time of removal or retention those rights were actually exercised, either jointly or alone, or would have been so exercised but for the removal or retention.\nThe rights of custody mentioned in sub-paragraph a) above, may arise in particular by operation of law or by reason of a judicial or administrative decision, or by reason of an agreement having legal effect under the law of that State.\nArticle 4\nThe Convention shall apply to any child who was habitually resident in a Contracting State immediately before any breach of custody or access rights. The Convention shall cease to apply when the child attains the age of 16 years.\n...\nArticle 11\nThe judicial or administrative authorities of Contracting States shall act expeditiously in proceedings for the return of children.\n If the judicial or administrative authority concerned has not reached a decision within six weeks from the date of commencement of the proceedings, the applicant or the Central Authority of the requested State, on its own initiative or if asked by the Central Authority of the requesting State, shall have the right to request a statement of the reasons for the delay. If a reply is received by the Central Authority of the requested State, that Authority shall transmit the reply to the Central Authority of the requesting State, or to the applicant, as the case may be.\nArticle 12\nWhere a child has been wrongfully removed or retained in terms of Article 3 and, at the date of the commencement of the proceedings before the judicial or administrative authority of the Contracting State where the child is, a period of less than one year has elapsed from the date of the wrongful removal or retention, the authority concerned shall order the return of the child forthwith.\nThe judicial or administrative authority, even where the proceedings have been commenced after the expiration of the period of one year referred to in the preceding paragraph, shall also order the return of the child, unless it is demonstrated that the child is now settled in its new environment.\nWhere the judicial or administrative authority in the requested State has reason to believe that the child has been taken to another State, it may stay the proceedings or dismiss the application for the return of the child.\nArticle 13\nNotwithstanding the provisions of the preceding Article, the judicial or administrative authority of the requested State is not bound to order the return of the child if the person, institution or other body which opposes its return establishes that -\na) the person, institution or other body having the care of the person of the child was not actually exercising the custody rights at the time of removal or retention, or had consented to or subsequently acquiesced in the removal or retention; or\nb) there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation.\nThe judicial or administrative authority may also refuse to order the return of the child if it finds that the child objects to being returned and has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of its views.\nIn considering the circumstances referred to in this Article, the judicial and administrative authorities shall take into account the information relating to the social background of the child provided by the Central Authority or other competent authority of the child\u2019s habitual residence.\n...\nArticle 16\nAfter receiving notice of a wrongful removal or retention of a child in the sense of Article 3, the judicial or administrative authorities of the Contracting State to which the child has been removed or in which it has been retained shall not decide on the merits of rights of custody until it has been determined that the child is not to be returned under this Convention or unless an application under this Convention is not lodged within a reasonable time following receipt of the notice.\nArticle 19\nA decision under this Convention concerning the return of the child shall not be taken to be a determination on the merits of any custody issue.\n...\u201d 34.  The Explanatory Report on the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention, prepared by Elisa P\u00e9rez-Vera and published by The Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH) in 1982 ( \u201cthe P\u00e9rez\u2011Vera Report\u201d), provides the following comments on the notion of \u201cthe best interest of the child\u201d:\n\u201c... \u2018the legal standard \u2018the best interest of the child\u2019 is that at first view of such vagueness that it seems to resemble more closely a sociological paradigm than a concrete juridical standard ... the general statement of the standard does not make it clear whether \u2018the interest\u2019 of the child to be served are those of the immediate aftermath of the decision, of the adolescence of the child, of young adulthood, maturity, senescence or old age\u2019 ...\u201d (\u00a721, p. 431)\n\u201c... [the philosophy of the Convention] can be defined as follows: the struggle against the great increase on international child abductions must always be inspired by the desire to protect children and should be based upon an interpretation of their true interests...the right not to be removed or retained in the name of more or less arguable rights concerning its person is one of the most objective examples of what constitutes the interests of the child...\u2019the presumption generally stated is that the true victim of the \u2018childnapping\u2019 is the child himself, who suffers from the sudden upsetting of his stability, the traumatic loss of contact with the parent who has been in charge of his upbringing, the uncertainty and frustration which come with the necessity to adapt to a strange language, unfamiliar cultural conditions and unknown teachers and relatives\u2019 ...\u201d (\u00a724, pp. 431 and 432)\n\u201cIt is thus legitimate to assert that the two objects of the Convention \u2013 one preventive, the other designed to secure the immediate reintegration of the child into his habitual environment \u2013 both correspond to a specific idea of what constitutes the \u2018best interests of the child\u2019 ... However ... it has to be admitted that the removal of the child can sometimes be justified by objective reasons which have to do either with its person, or with the environment with which it is most closely connected ...\u201d (\u00a7 25, p. 432)\u201d 35.  As a consequence, the Hague Convention contains a number of clearly derived from a consideration of the interest of the child, namely that of a serious risk that a child\u2019s return would expose him or her to \u201cphysical or psychological harm\u201d or otherwise place the child in an \u201cintolerable situation\u201d. 36.  The P\u00e9rez-Vera Report contains the following general comments about the exceptions to the principle of the child\u2019s prompt return under Article 13 (b):\n\u201c... [the exceptions] to the rule concerning the return of the child must be applied only as far as they go and no further. This implies above all that they are to be interpreted in a restrictive fashion if the Convention is not to become a dead letter... The practical application of this principle requires that the signatory States be convinced that they belong, despite their differences, to the same legal community within which the authorities of each State acknowledge that the authorities of one of them \u2013 those of the child\u2019s habitual residence \u2013 are in principle best placed to decide upon questions of custody and access. As a result, a systematic invocation of the said exceptions, substituting the forum chosen by the abductor for that of the child\u2019s residence, would lead to the collapse of the whole structure of the Convention by depriving it of the spirit of mutual confidence which is its inspiration...\u201d (\u00a734, pp. 434 and 435)\n\u201c... the exceptions [in Articles 13 and 20] do not apply automatically, in that they do not invariably result in the child\u2019s retention; nevertheless, the very nature of these exceptions gives judges a discretion \u2013 and does not impose upon them a duty \u2013 to refuse to return a child in certain circumstances ...\u201d (\u00a7113 p. 460)\n\u201c... With regard to article 13, the introductory past of the first paragraph highlights the fact that the burden of proving the facts stated in sub-paragraphs a and b is imposed on the person who opposes the return of the child ...\u201d (\u00a7 114, p. 460)\n\u201c... The exceptions contained in [article 13] b deal with situations ... where the return of the child would be contrary to its interests ... Each of the terms used in this provision, is the result of a fragile compromise reached during the deliberations of the Special Commission and has been kept unaltered. Thus it cannot be inferred, a contrario, from the rejection during the Fourteenth Session of proposals favouring the inclusion of an express provision stating that this exception could not be invoked if the return of the child might harm its economic or educational prospects, that the exceptions are to receive a wide interpretation ...\u201d (\u00a7116, p. 461) 37.  With regard to Article 29 the P\u00e9rez-Vera Report states that the aim of the Hague Convention is to provide additional means of helping persons whose custody or contact rights have been breached. Those persons have a choice either to apply directly to the Central Authorities, as provided for in the Hague Convention, or to institute relevant proceedings before the authorities of the State where the child is located. In such a case, where the applicants have recourse to a direct action before the competent authorities, they can choose to submit their application \u201cwhether or not under the provisions\u201d of the Hague Convention. In the latter case, according to the explanatory report, the authorities are not obliged to apply the provisions of the convention unless they have been incorporated in their domestic law. 38.  The relevant provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, signed in New York on 20 November 1989, read as follows:\nPreamble\n\u201cThe States Parties to the present Convention,\n...\nConvinced that the family, as the fundamental group of society and the natural environment for the growth and well-being of all its members and particularly children, should be afforded the necessary protection and assistance so that it can fully assume its responsibilities within the community,\nRecognizing that the child, for the full and harmonious development of his or her personality, should grow up in a family environment, in an atmosphere of happiness, love and understanding, ...\nHave agreed as follows:\n...\nArticle 3 1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration...\nArticle 7 1. The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right from birth... to know and be cared for by his or her parents...\nArticle 9 2. States Parties shall respect the rights and duties of the parents and, when applicable, legal guardians, to provide direction to the child in the exercise of his or her right in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child...\nArticle 18 1. States Parties shall use their best efforts to ensure recognition of the principle that both parents have common responsibilities for the upbringing and development of the child. Parents or, as the case may be, legal guardians, have the primary responsibility for the upbringing and development of the child. The best interests of the child will be their basic concern.\n...\u201d 39.  Council Regulation (EC) No. 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility (known as \u201cBrussels II bis Regulation\u201d) reads, in particular, as follows:\n\u201c...\n(12) The grounds of jurisdiction in matters of parental responsibility established in the present Regulation are shaped in the light of the best interests of the child, in particular on the criterion of proximity. This means that jurisdiction should lie in the first place with the Member State of the child\u2019s habitual residence, except for certain cases of a change in the child\u2019s residence or pursuant to an agreement between the holders of parental responsibility.\n(13) In the interest of the child, this Regulation allows, by way of exception and under certain conditions, that the court having jurisdiction may transfer a case to a court of another Member State if this court is better placed to hear the case. However, in this case the second court should not be allowed to transfer the case to a third court.\n...\n(17) In cases of wrongful removal or retention of a child, the return of the child should be obtained without delay, and to this end the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 would continue to apply as complemented by the provisions of this Regulation, in particular Article 11. The courts of the Member State to or in which the child has been wrongfully removed or retained should be able to oppose his or her return in specific, duly justified cases. However, such a decision could be replaced by a subsequent decision by the court of the Member State of habitual residence of the child prior to the wrongful removal or retention. Should that judgment entail the return of the child, the return should take place without any special procedure being required for recognition and enforcement of that judgment in the Member State to or in which the child has been removed or retained.\n...\nArticle 10\nJurisdiction in cases of child abduction\nIn case of wrongful removal or retention of the child, the courts of the Member State where the child was habitually resident immediately before the wrongful removal or retention shall retain their jurisdiction until the child has acquired a habitual residence in another Member State and:\n(a) each person, institution or other body having rights of custody has acquiesced in the removal or retention;\nor\n(b) the child has resided in that other Member State for a period of at least one year after the person, institution or other body having rights of custody has had or should have had knowledge of the whereabouts of the child and the child is settled in his or her new environment and at least one of the following conditions is met:\n(i) within one year after the holder of rights of custody has had or should have had knowledge of the whereabouts of the child, no request for return has been lodged before the competent authorities of the Member State where the child has been removed or is being retained;\n(ii) a request for return lodged by the holder of rights of custody has been withdrawn and no new request has been lodged within the time limit set in paragraph (i);\n(iii) a case before the court in the Member State where the child was habitually resident immediately before the wrongful removal or retention has been closed pursuant to Article 11(7);\n(iv) a judgment on custody that does not entail the return of the child has been issued by the courts of the Member State where the child was habitually resident immediately before the wrongful removal or retention.\nArticle 11\nReturn of the child 1. Where a person, institution or other body having rights of custody applies to the competent authorities in a Member State to deliver a judgment on the basis of the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (hereinafter \"the 1980 Hague Convention\"), in order to obtain the return of a child that has been wrongfully removed or retained in a Member State other than the Member State where the child was habitually resident immediately before the wrongful removal or retention, paragraphs 2 to 8 shall apply.\n... 3. A court to which an application for return of a child is made as mentioned in paragraph 1 shall act expeditiously in proceedings on the application, using the most expeditious procedures available in national law.\nWithout prejudice to the first subparagraph, the court shall, except where exceptional circumstances make this impossible, issue its judgment no later than six weeks after the application is lodged. 4. A court cannot refuse to return a child on the basis of Article 13b of the 1980 Hague Convention if it is established that adequate arrangements have been made to secure the protection of the child after his or her return. 5. A court cannot refuse to return a child unless the person who requested the return of the child has been given an opportunity to be heard.\n...\u201d 40.  The European Convention of 20 May 1980 on Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions concerning Custody of Children and on Restoration of Custody of Children (known as \u201cLuxembourg Convention\u201d) reads, in so far as relevant, as follows:\n\u201c...\nArticle 1\nFor the purposes of this Convention:\na child means a person of any nationality, so long as he is under 16 years of age and has not the right to decide on his own place of residence under the law of his habitual residence, the law of his nationality or the internal law of the State addressed;\n...\nd improper removal means the removal of a child across an international frontier in breach of a decision relating to his custody which has been given in a Contracting State and which is enforceable in such a State; improper removal also includes:\ni the failure to return a child across an international frontier at the end of a period of the exercise of the right of access to this child or at the end of any other temporary stay in a territory other than that where the custody is exercised;\n...\nArticle 5\n1 The central authority in the State addressed shall take or cause to be taken without delay all steps which it considers to be appropriate, if necessary by instituting proceedings before its competent authorities, in order:\n...\nb to avoid, in particular by any necessary provisional measures, prejudice to the interests of the child or of the applicant;\n...\nArticle 8\n1 In the case of an improper removal, the central authority of the State addressed shall cause steps to be taken forthwith to restore the custody of the child where:\na at the time of the institution of the proceedings in the State where the decision was given or at the time of the improper removal, if earlier, the child and his parents had as their sole nationality the nationality of that State and the child had his habitual residence in the territory of that State, and\nb a request for the restoration was made to a central authority within a period of six months from the date of the improper removal.\n...\nArticle 11\n...\n3 Where no decision on the right of access has been taken or where recognition or enforcement of the decision relating to custody is refused, the central authority of the State addressed may apply to its competent authorities for a decision on the right of access, if the person claiming a right of access so requests.\n...\nArticle 19\nThis Convention shall not exclude the possibility of relying on any other international instrument in force between the State of origin and the State addressed or on any other law of the State addressed not derived from an international agreement for the purpose of obtaining recognition or enforcement of a decision.\nArticle 20\n1 This Convention shall not affect any obligations which a Contracting State may have towards a non-Contracting State under an international instrument dealing with matters governed by this Convention.\n2 When two or more Contracting States have enacted uniform laws in relation to custody of children or created a special system of recognition or enforcement of decisions in this field, or if they should do so in the future, they shall be free to apply, between themselves, those laws or that system in place of this Convention or any part of it. In order to avail themselves of this provision the State shall notify their decision to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe. Any alteration or revocation of this decision must also be notified.", "references": ["2", "7", "5", "6", "1", "0", "9", "3", "8", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "5.  The first applicant was born in 1971 and is serving a prison sentence in the Vologda Region. The second applicant was born in 1975 and is serving a prison sentence in the Kostroma Region. 6.  On 24 October 2005 the first applicant was arrested on suspicion of manslaughter. He remained in custody pending investigation and trial. His defence was carried out by a State-appointed lawyer, M. 7.  On 24 July 2006 the Vologda Town Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to nine and a half years\u2019 imprisonment. The applicant, but not his State-appointed lawyer, appealed. 8.  On 13 and 21 November 2006 the applicant informed the Vologda Regional Court that he did not wish to be represented by M. in view of the perfunctory nature of the services that she had provided. 9.  On 6 December 2006 another lawyer, Ye., was appointed to represent the applicant before the appeal court. On the same date she studied the case file. 10.  On 7 December 2006 the Regional Court examined the applicant\u2019s case on appeal. The applicant was in a special room in a detention facility from which he could participate in the appeal hearing by means of a video link. Ye. was present in the courtroom. She did not submit fresh grounds for appeal and made oral submissions to the court that appeared to be based on the grounds for appeal originally filed by the applicant. The court upheld the applicant\u2019s conviction. 11.  According to the applicant, at the beginning of the hearing he asked the court to provide him with an opportunity to meet with Ye. in private to discuss his line of defence. His request was refused. He was then removed from the room where the video conference equipment was installed and thus was prevented from following the appeal hearing which took place in his absence. 12.  According to the Government, the applicant had had ample opportunity to communicate with Ye. prior to the appeal hearing via video link. He did not argue before the appeal court that he had been unable to discuss his case with Ye. in order to make sure that she had a sufficiently thorough knowledge of the case as to be able to carry out his defence effectively. The applicant stayed in the video-conference room throughout the appeal hearing and was not prevented in any way from participating in it. 13.  On an unspecified date the second applicant was arrested and charged with murder and robbery. He remained in custody pending investigation and trial. 14.  On 26 December 2006 the Kostroma Regional Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to seventeen years\u2019 imprisonment. The applicant appealed, stating that he was not guilty and that the trial court had erred in assessing the evidence before it. 15.  On 12 April 2007 the applicant asked the Supreme Court (acting as the appeal court) in writing to appoint a lawyer to represent him. 16.  On 18 April 2007 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the applicant\u2019s conviction on appeal. The applicant participated in the hearing by means of a video link. According to the applicant, the quality of the sound was very poor. He could not hear or understand the judges. He stated that he reiterated his request to be represented before the appeal court; that request was refused. 17.  On 16 September 2010 the Court gave notice of the application to the Government. 18.  On 16 March 2011 the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation considered a supervisory review appeal lodged by Deputy Prosecutor General. The court acknowledged that the applicant\u2019s right to be provided with legal counsel had been infringed, quashed the appeal judgment of 18 April 2007, and remitted the matter for fresh consideration to the appeal court. The applicant participated in the proceedings by means of a video link. He was represented by a State\u2011appointed lawyer, U. 19.  On an unspecified date another lawyer, M., was appointed to represent the applicant. Prior to the hearing before the appeal court, she studied the material in his case file. 20.  On 19 May 2011 the applicant discussed his case with M. by means of a video link. 21.  On the same date the Supreme Court held the appeal hearing. The applicant participated in the proceedings by means of a video link. According to the transcript of the appeal hearing, the applicant agreed that his defence would be carried out by lawyer M. He further asked the court for additional time in which to meet with M. to discuss his defence. The court adjourned the hearing in order to ensure that the applicant could meet with M. 22.  On 20 May 2011 the Supreme Court resumed the hearing. The applicant informed the court that he had discussed the case with M. by means of a video link. The court heard the applicant, M., and the prosecutor. M. did not submit any grounds for appeal; she only made oral submissions to the court that appeared to be based on the grounds for appeal originally filed by the applicant. The Supreme Court upheld the applicant\u2019s conviction in substance, but reduced his sentence to sixteen and a half years\u2019 imprisonment.", "references": ["6", "4", "8", "7", "1", "0", "2", "5", "9", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Bucharest. 7.  In 2005 a businessman, G.B., lodged a criminal complaint against the applicant and the rector of the University of Agronomy concerning the sale of a 224-hectare plot of land located in B\u0103neasa, near Bucharest. He claimed that the applicant had purchased the plot of land for significantly less money than its actual worth. He also alleged that the plot of land was not the property of the University but of the Romanian State. 8.  On 14 February 2008 the General Prosecutor\u2019s Office decided not to start an investigation, for lack of evidence. However, on 31 July 2008 the Chief Public Prosecutor quashed this decision and relinquished its jurisdiction in favour of the National Anti-Corruption Prosecution Service (\u201cthe NAP\u201d). 9.  On an unspecified date in March 2009 the NAP officer in charge of the inquiry made an accusation that he had been pressured to stop the investigation. According to his statements, two senior directors from the Ministry of the Interior, namely the head of the Ministry\u2019s Internal Protection and Intelligence Department and the head of the Anti-Corruption Department\u2019s Operation Division within the same Ministry, asked him to resolve the case quickly and to provide a favourable response. 10.  On the basis of the NAP officer\u2019s testimony, the initial investigation concerning the applicant and the rector was extended to include the two senior directors from the Ministry of the Interior. 11.  On 12 March 2009 the applicant was invited to NAP headquarters. He gave a statement. 12.  On 20 March 2009 the NAP started a criminal investigation in respect of the applicant on the ground that he was an accomplice to an offence of abuse of position committed by the rector of the University of Agronomy. 13.  On 23 March 2009 the NAP started another criminal investigation in respect of the applicant in connection with the offence of active bribery on account of the influence exercised on the NAP officer in charge of the inquiry. 14.  On the same day the prosecutor issued orders to appear before the investigators against the applicant and five other co-defendants. In the order to appear issued against the applicant it was stated that the order\u2019s objective was to ensure that the applicant was heard in his capacity as a suspect (\u201c\u00eenvinuit\u201d) in connection with the offences of abuse of position and active bribery under Articles 248 and 255 in conjunction with Article 26 of the C.P. 15.  On 24 March 2009, at about 3 p.m., the applicant was taken by police to NAP headquarters in accordance with an order to appear before the investigation body. 16.  When the applicant arrived at NAP headquarters the questioning of one of his co-accused, S.I.C, was in progress and lasted until 7.50 p.m. 17.  Subsequently, another co-accused, P.P.D., was questioned between 8.30 p.m. and 10.05 p.m. 18.  Two lawyers chosen by the applicant were called and invited to NAP headquarters to assist him. 19.  According to the Government\u2019s submissions, one of the applicant\u2019s lawyers arrived at NAP headquarters at 4 p.m. and the other at about 7.45 p.m. 20.  The applicant stayed at the headquarters of the prosecuting authorities without being questioned until 10 p.m. According to his allegations, which have not been contradicted by the Government, he was not free to leave. 21.  The Government did not contend that they had informed the applicant that he had been free to leave; on the contrary, in their written submissions to the Court they maintained that the applicant had remained at their disposal for questioning between 3 p.m. and 11.30 p.m. 22.  Between 10 p.m. and 10.55 p.m. the applicant was informed of the charges against him and was heard by the investigators. 23.  From 11 p.m. to 11.20 p.m. the prosecution authorities questioned another co-accused, A.I.N. 24.  The applicant was kept at NAP headquarters until 11.30 p.m., when he was informed of the decision taken by the NAP on the same day concerning the charges against him and the other defendants. 25.  The NAP charged the rector of the University of Agronomy with abuse of position with aggravated consequences, the applicant with complicity in abuse of position, and the two senior directors of the Ministry of the Interior with favouring the offender. By the same decision all the defendants were remanded in custody for twenty-four hours, the period of detention starting to run at 11.30 p.m. 26.  The next day, on 25 March 2009, at about 6.40 p.m., the NAP asked the Bucharest Court of Appeal to remand the applicant and the other two defendants in custody (the rector was released) for twenty-nine days, from 25 March 2009 until 22 April 2009. 27.  On the same date, the Bucharest Court of Appeal, ruling as a single judge, dismissed the prosecution\u2019s request. 28.  It ruled that keeping the applicant in pre-trial detention was not necessary. In this connection it stressed that the applicant had not evaded criminal proceedings, but had complied with every summons from the prosecution service. It also stated that bringing the accused on the basis of an order to appear before the investigation body was not justified as he had never refused to come when summoned to the NAP. It concluded that there was no evidence that the release of the accused posed any specific threat to public order or would impede the criminal proceedings. 29.  However, the court imposed on all of them a prohibition on leaving the country for thirty days, on the ground that there was reasonable suspicion that they had committed the offences with which they had been charged. 30.  An appeal on points of law lodged by the NAP against this decision was dismissed by the High Court of Cassation and Justice on 1 April 2009. The High Court endorsed the decision of the Bucharest Court of Appeal, noting that the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention appeared excessive, given that the applicant had no criminal record, had been of good standing in society, and there was no evidence in the file that he had evaded criminal proceedings. The court considered that the prohibition on leaving the country ensured the right balance between the general interest of society in the good administration of justice and the applicant\u2019s interest. 31.  By a decision delivered on 22 April 2009 the NAP extended the prohibition on the applicant\u2019s leaving the country for another thirty days, from 23 April to 22 May 2009. The reasons provided by the prosecutor for taking such a measure were that there was reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the offence, and that it was necessary to ensure the proper administration of justice. 32.  The applicant contested the measure before the Bucharest Court of Appeal, arguing that the prosecutor\u2019s decision did not provide sufficient reasons for the extension of the restrictive measure, adding that he had willingly attended each time he had been summoned by the investigators. He stressed that the restriction on leaving the country had been imposed in 2009, but in connection with an offence that he had allegedly committed in 2002. He relied on the fact that he was an important businessman for whom freedom of movement outside the country was vital for conducting his business. 33.  In his oral submissions before the court the prosecutor added that the restriction on the freedom of movement was justified by the necessity to ensure the speediness of the proceedings. The applicant replied that he had not been invited to the NAP to give a statement since 24 March 2009. He added that the speediness of the proceedings was in his own interest too, because as a well-known businessman his reputation and integrity were being harmed as long as there were proceedings pending against him. 34.  The measure was upheld by an interlocutory judgment rendered by the Bucharest Court of Appeal on 27 April 2009, which found that the reasons provided by the prosecutor were sufficient. It held that since there were no new circumstances which could change the applicant\u2019s situation there was no reason to revoke the preventive measure against him. 35.  An appeal on points of law lodged by the applicant was dismissed by the High Court of Cassation and Justice as inadmissible on 8 May 2009. It held that the applicable law did not provide for an appeal on points of law against an interlocutory judgment by which a request for revocation of a preventive measure had been dismissed. 36.  On 19 May 2009 the NAP again ordered the extension of the prohibition on the applicant\u2019s leaving the country for another thirty days. The reasoning of the decision was exactly the same as in the previous decision of 22 April 2009. The applicant challenged the measure before the Bucharest Court of Appeal. He stated that he needed to leave the country as he had been invited to a business meeting abroad. 37.  By an interlocutory judgment of 1 June 2009 the Bucharest Court of Appeal ordered the revocation of the measure. It held that the applicant had not tried in any way to hinder the investigation or to leave the country, and that he was observing all the obligations imposed on him by the judicial authorities. It also stated that there was still reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the offence, but the revocation of the restriction would not impede the proper administration of justice. It concluded that although the imposition of a preventive measure should be justified by the necessity to ensure the proper administration of justice and to protect society by preventing the commission of new offences, in the instant case the NAP had not managed to explain why allowing the applicant to leave the country could have negative repercussions on the administration of justice. At the same time, it stressed that maintaining the restriction would not prevent the applicant from contacting all the parties in the case and influencing them. 38.  The appeal on points of law lodged by the NAP was allowed by the High Court of Cassation and Justice on 9 June 2009. It dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaint, and upheld the NAP\u2019s decision to extend the restriction. It held that the restriction should be maintained because of the negative social impact caused by the offence committed by the applicant and the complexity of the case, which involved multiple procedural acts. 39.  On 18 June 2009 the NAP extended the restriction on the applicant\u2019s right to leave the country for another thirty days. The applicant\u2019s complaint against the measure was allowed by an interlocutory judgment of the Bucharest Court of Appeal. The court held that there were no reasons to justify the maintenance of the preventive measure. It noted in this connection that no procedural act had been carried out in the case since 21 May 2009, and the applicant, a well-known businessman, had been present whenever the investigators summoned him. An appeal on points of law lodged by the NAP was dismissed by the High Court of Cassation and Justice on 3 July 2009. 40.  On 19 May 2009 the applicant was invited to NAP headquarters and informed that he was charged with the offence of active bribery. The applicant refused to give a statement, availing himself of his right to silence. A report was drafted and signed by the applicant, his lawyer and the prosecutor on that occasion. 41.  On 21 December 2012 the file was registered with the Bucharest Court of Appeal. According to the most recent information provided by the applicant, the criminal proceedings against him are still pending.", "references": ["9", "3", "5", "6", "7", "1", "0", "4", "8", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1938 and lives in Sibiu. 6.  At 9.55 a.m. on 21 August 2005 the applicant took his son L.M. to the emergency unit of the Sibiu County Hospital, accompanied by their family doctor. L.M. was immediately examined by the doctor on duty, Mr C.C.R., who recorded an initial diagnosis on the observation sheet of \u201cicteric syndrome\u201d (jaundice). Following subsequent tests the diagnosis was changed to \"hepatic cirrhosis with gastrointestinal haemorrhage\u201d and the patient was treated with drugs. 7.  Dr C.C.R. filled in forms to admit the patient to the gastroenterology unit, as provided for by the hospital\u2019s code of practice for patients with gastrointestinal haemorrhage. However, owing to the fact that the gastroenterology unit was in a separate building and had no elevator, the patient remained in the emergency unit. 8. Despite the treatment he was given, the patient\u2019s condition worsened and at around 1 p.m. he was examined by Dr A.M., a doctor who specialised in intensive care. She recommended that the treatment be continued and ordered blood transfusions. Owing to a lack of beds in the intensive care unit, the patient was not immediately transferred there. 9.  At around 5.40 p.m., L.M. was transferred to the intensive care unit. Dr A.M., on duty that night in the unit, came to see L.M. two times. At some point during the night the blood transfusions were stopped. 10.  After 6 a.m. the next morning L.M.\u2019s condition began to worsen and he was given blood transfusions again. 11.  At around 4.30 p.m., because the patient\u2019s state continued to deteriorate, Dr F.A., the head of the gastroenterology unit, decided to perform an endoscopy of the stomach. The procedure did not succeed because of massive gastrointestinal bleeding. 12.  At 5.50 p.m. on 22 August 2005 L.M. was declared dead owing to cardio-respiratory failure. According to the hospital observation sheet, the direct cause of death was upper gastrointestinal haemorrhage, ruptured oesophageal varices, decompensated hepatic cirrhosis and a haemorrhagic duodenal ulcer. 13.  On 22 August 2005 the applicant and his wife lodged a criminal complaint against C.C.R. and A.M., accusing them of manslaughter. The applicant firstly complained that, despite repeated requests, Dr C.C.R. had refused to allow the patient to be transferred to another, better equipped, hospital. The applicant also complained of the failure to provide blood transfusions, which he said caused the death of his son, and of the generally poor treatment received by his son in the Sibiu County Hospital. 14.  On 19 September 2005 the two doctors were questioned by the Sibiu County Police. Dr C.C.R. explained that the patient\u2019s state of health did not allow him to be transferred to another hospital. He also submitted that a particular medicine, Lactulose, had been missing from the hospital\u2019s pharmacy and that he had asked the applicant to buy it. Concerning the lack of blood for transfusions, the doctor said that that was not his fault and that the hospital had run out of blood that night. In conclusion, the doctor stated that the patient, who was suffering from hepatic cirrhosis, had received the necessary treatment. Dr A.M. said that the patient\u2019s condition had had a poor prognosis, that she had provided the correct treatment and that a transfer to another hospital would not have been possible under the circumstances. 15.  The applicant\u2019s statement was taken on 26 January 2006. He reiterated his previous complaints. In addition, he criticised the delay in the administration of Lactulose to his son. 16.   An autopsy report issued on 17 April 2006 said that L.M. had not died by violent means. The death was caused by upper gastrointestinal haemorrhage due to the rupture of varices in the oesophagus and a duodenal ulcer in a patient already suffering from hepatic cirrhosis. The report concluded that no issues had been found that could raise questions about the medical treatment received by the patient. 17.  On 2 May 2006 the applicant complained to the Sibiu Prosecutor\u2019s Office of excessive delays in the investigation. He also requested a forensic medical expert report to verify whether his son had received the necessary treatment. He included the results of various blood tests made by L.M. between 2000 and 2005, intending to prove that his son had not been ill in the years before his admission to the Sibiu County Hospital. 18.  On 30 May 2006 the Prosecutor\u2019s Office of the Sibiu County Court sent a request for a forensic report to the Sibiu County Forensic Service. On 18 August 2006 the Sibiu County Forensic Service replied that it could not deliver such a report because its chief doctor had already performed the autopsy in the same case. Therefore, on 25 August 2006 the request was sent to the Cluj Napoca Forensic Institute. 19.  On 20 December 2006 the forensic report was added to the case file and on 4 January 2007 it was made available to the applicant. The report noted that hospital practice had not been adhered to as the patient should have been admitted to the gastroenterology section, given the diagnosis. Nevertheless, the conclusion was that the treatment received by L.M. was adequate and correct and there was no indication of medical error. 20.  On 18 January 2007 the applicant submitted objections to the report and requested it to be reanalysed by the Mina Minovici National Forensic Institute in Bucharest. On 24 January 2007 the applicant\u2019s objections to the forensic report were rejected by the prosecutor, who only allowed it to be referred to the Mina Minovici National Forensic Institute for approval. 21.  On 4 April 2007, in a one-page letter, the Mina Minovici National Forensic Institute approved the report drafted by the Cluj Napoca Forensic Institute. 22.  On 11 April 2007, in a briefly-worded decision based on the forensic medical report, the Prosecutor\u2019s Office of the Sibiu County Court decided not to commence criminal proceedings against the two doctors as there had been no finding of medical errors. That decision was upheld on 13 June 2007 by the chief prosecutor of the same prosecutor\u2019s office. 23.  A complaint by the applicant against the two decisions was allowed by the Timi\u015foara District Court on 16 April 2008. The court decided to send the case back to the prosecutor in order to commence criminal proceedings against the two doctors. The court observed that the prosecutors\u2019 decisions had been based only on statements by the two doctors and on the forensic report and held that the investigators in the case needed to clarify whether the patient\u2019s state of health had required his admission to the gastroenterology unit and whether treatment in that unit could have influenced the course of the victim\u2019s illness. The court ordered that such questions should be answered by way of a more thorough investigation, taking statements from doctors specialising in gastroenterology, as well as from other employees of the hospital. In addition, the court requested the prosecutors to clarify, by way of witness statements and confrontations, what was the practice of the hospital in dealing with cases of gastrointestinal bleeding and whether the two doctors had observed that practice. The judgment became final on 10 October 2008 when an appeal on points of law by the two doctors was rejected by the Timi\u015f County Court. 24.  On 20 March 2009 the investigation resumed with the questioning of Dr P.P.J., a gastroenterologist employed at the Sibiu County Hospital, and on 23 March 2009 of Dr F.A., who had performed the endoscopy on L.M. On 25 March 2009, C.C.R. and A.M., the two doctors under investigation, were questioned for a second time. 25.  On 27 March 2009 the Prosecutor\u2019s Office of the Sibiu County Court again found no fault in the actions of the two doctors. That decision was communicated to the applicant on 26 May 2009. On 18 June 2009 a complaint by the applicant against that decision was rejected as ill-founded by the chief prosecutor of the same prosecutor\u2019s office. The applicant took his case against those decisions to court. 26.  On 7 June 2010 the Timisoara District Court allowed the applicant\u2019s complaint and ordered the reopening of criminal proceedings, considering that the questions raised in its judgment of 16 April 2008 had still not been answered. The court held that, bearing in mind the seriousness of the case, which involved the death of a man, the investigation should have been more detailed and the applicant\u2019s allegations should have been more thoroughly checked. More specifically, the court noted that the applicant had maintained, among other things, that L.M. had been healthy and had never previously been admitted to hospital and that there had been delays in the administration of a particular drug and in giving blood transfusions. However, the medical reports had said that the deceased was suffering from an ulcer and cirrhosis. The court also reasoned that, even if it could be accepted that rapid changes could occur in such conditions, it was hard to believe that the victim had had no previous symptoms and had not been under the supervision of medical professionals prior to 22 August 2005. In view of the above, the court further requested that the prosecutors take statements from the family doctor and gather evidence about the victim\u2019s state of health prior to his admission to the Sibiu County Emergency Hospital. 27.  On 24 December 2010 the investigation resumed with a letter being sent to the Sibiu Police in which the prosecutor requested their assistance in obtaining a statement from the victim\u2019s family doctor, as well as copies of any medical documents she might have concerning the victim\u2019s state of health prior to his hospital admission on 21 August 2005. In January 2011 the family doctor, M.L.I., gave a statement to the police. She recalled that, during an examination in December 2004, L.M. had presented with signs of hepatic distress and that she had recommended various tests. The tests had come back showing results that were slightly above the norm, so she had advised him to see a gastroenterologist. 28.  Dr F.A. was again questioned on 27 January 2011. Two doctors who had been on duty when L.M. was admitted were questioned in February 2011. They did not remember any relevant details about the case. 29.  On 25 July 2011 the Prosecutor\u2019s Office of the Sibiu County Court, considering it established that the applicant had been suffering from cirrhosis well before August 2005 and that nothing could have been done to save his life, decided not to press criminal charges against the two suspects on the grounds that they had not committed any criminal act. A complaint by the applicant against that decision was rejected as ill-founded by the chief prosecutor of the same prosecutor\u2019s office on 23 August 2011. 30.  A complaint by the applicant against the prosecutors\u2019 decisions of 25 July and 23 August 2011 was allowed by the Timisoara District Court on 21 December 2011. The court considered that all the facts had still not been clarified by the investigation and again ordered the reopening of criminal proceedings. Specific instructions were again given to the prosecutors. The court noted that, in order to observe the equality of arms and to guarantee a fair trial, the applicant should have been consulted on which witnesses to hear and given the opportunity to call doctors of his own choice as witnesses. The court further reiterated the instructions given in its previous judgments in the case, which it did not consider had been carried out by the prosecutor. Finally, the court ordered the prosecutor to conduct a speedier investigation, bearing in mind that a long time had passed since the lodging of the applicant\u2019s complaint and that the inquiry had been totally ineffective up to that point. 31.  The investigation was reopened on 21 February 2012. On 27 February 2012 a statement from the applicant was taken by the prosecutor. He stated that he did not know the names or addresses of the medical staff on duty at the time of the incident. He further requested a confrontation with the two doctors under investigation. 32.  On 29 February 2012 the prosecutor asked the Sibiu County Emergency Hospital for a list of employees on duty on the two days of L.M.\u2019s stay in hospital. On 21 March 2012 the hospital replied that it no longer had the duty sheets as that type of document was only kept for three years. 33.  On 4 April 2012 two doctors specialising in gastroenterology, called as witnesses by the applicant, testified before the prosecutor that the diagnosis and treatment applied by Drs C.C.R. and A.M. had been correct in the circumstances. They noted that the only drug capable of removing blood from the stomach in order to prepare the patient for an endoscopy under the proper conditions was not available in Romania at that time. 34.  A confrontation between C.C.R., A.M. and the applicant took place on 3 May 2012. 35.  Between 11 and 20 April 2012 the prosecutor took statements from several employees of the Sibiu County Emergency Hospital. They all declared that they did not remember anything about the patient L.M. 36.  By a decision issued on 8 June 2012 the Prosecutor\u2019s Office of the Sibiu County Court ended its criminal investigation, finding no guilt in the actions of the two doctors. The prosecutor noted that according to the hospital\u2019s practice, the patient should have been admitted to the gastroenterology unit but that this had not been possible because the unit did not have an elevator for wheeled beds. However, the prosecutor observed that all the medical reports drafted in the case had concluded that the patient\u2019s diagnosis had been correct and that he had had the appropriate treatment. This conclusion was also confirmed by the two specialists called as witnesses by the applicant. The prosecutor stated that the endoscopy performed before the patient\u2019s death had been rendered more difficult owing to the absence in the country of the drug needed to clear blood from the patient\u2019s stomach. With regard to the applicant\u2019s complaint concerning the doctors\u2019 failure to administer blood transfusions, the prosecutor held that the patient\u2019s death had been caused not only by anaemia but also by hepatic insufficiency. 37.  The prosecutor\u2019s decision was upheld on 16 July 2012 by the head prosecutor of the Prosecutor\u2019s Office of the Sibiu County Court. 38.  A complaint by the applicant against those two decisions was rejected with final effect on 19 November 2012 by the Timi\u015foara District Court. The court, quoting widely from the prosecutor\u2019s decision of 8 June 2012, held that the investigation had correctly led to the conclusion that there was no proof of fault by the two doctors. 39.  On 19 October 2005 the applicant and his wife lodged a disciplinary complaint against Drs C.C.R. and A.M. 40.   The disciplinary committee of the Sibiu County College of Doctors opened an investigation into the patient\u2019s death, collecting documents from the patient\u2019s medical file and taking statements from the doctors who had treated him. It gave its decision on 27 February 2006, ruling that no medical errors had been made. 41.  The applicant objected to the committee\u2019s conclusions and his appeal was examined by the superior disciplinary committee of the National College of Doctors. 42.  On the basis of the evidence presented to it, on 7 December 2006 the National College of Doctors terminated the disciplinary proceedings against Drs C.C.R. and A.M. Relying on the medical documents in the file and on the opinion of a university professor, the authority considered that it had been established that no medical errors had been made. 43.  The applicant and his wife brought an action for the quashing of the decision adopted on 7 December 2006, pointing to the failure by the two doctors to provide appropriate treatment for their son. 44.  On 5 June 2007 the Sibiu County Court dismissed the action as ill\u2011founded and upheld the decision of the National College of Doctors. 45.  An appeal by the applicant against that judgment was allowed by the Bra\u015fov Court of Appeal on 26 February 2008. The case was sent to the Bra\u015fov County Court for rehearing because the lower court had not examined any evidence other than the documents in the file, which had been the sole basis for its decision. 46.  On 13 February 2013 the Bra\u015fov County Court took note of the fact that the applicant and his wife no longer wished to pursue the proceedings and closed the case.", "references": ["1", "5", "6", "4", "7", "9", "8", "3", "2", "No Label", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1970 and lives in Stockholm. He is self-employed and runs a business. 6.  On 22 April 2004 the Swedish commercial television channel TV3 broadcast an episode of a television show entitled \u201cInsider\u201d, in which it was claimed that \u201cshady transactions and shady characters\u201d were revealed. The show was broadcast live with a few recorded features. In the show, the applicant, who was unknown to the broader public, appeared in pictures and was mentioned by name. He was singled out as the central figure of organised crime within media and advertising and as being guilty of several counts of fraud and other economic offences. The programme was re\u2011broadcast on 25 April and 17 September 2004. At this time, no criminal investigation had been initiated against the applicant. 7.  The television programme was produced in Sweden by the Swedish company Strix Television AB. It was sent by satellite link from Sweden to the London-based company Viasat Broadcasting UK Ltd and from there sent unaltered to a satellite which transmitted the programme to the Swedish audience. The encoded programme was viewable via a satellite receiver or a cable connection in Sweden a fraction of a second after it had been sent by satellite link. Even if it was viewable in the United Kingdom, which is doubtful, it would have been watched there by a small audience. It was presented in the Swedish language for a Swedish-speaking audience, and was sponsored by companies competing in the Swedish market. The anchorman of the show, X, a Swedish national, was a celebrity and a well-known television personality in Sweden; he was also the Chief Executive Officer of Strix Television AB. The show had a long run and was watched by many viewers. 8.  In October 2006 the applicant brought a private prosecution against X for gross defamation, claiming damages in the amount of 250,000 Swedish kronor (SEK; approximately 27,000 euros). He maintained that he had been unreservedly pointed out as the central figure of organised crime within media and advertising and as being directly or indirectly responsible for a large number of serious crimes. He further alleged that X was responsible for the content of the programme since he had failed in his duty to appoint a legally responsible editor (ansvarig utgivare) for the programme and because he had been its anchor. 9.  The applicant relied on Chapters 5 and 6 of the Constitutional Law on Freedom of Expression (Yttrandefrihetsgrundlagen, 1991:1469; hereafter \u201cthe Constitutional Law\u201d), regarding freedom of expression offences and liability rules, and Chapter 5 of the Penal Code (Brottsbalken), dealing with defamation, as well as Articles 6 \u00a7 2, 8 and 13 of the Convention. In the latter respect, he argued that his appearance in the show breached his right to privacy as well as his right to be presumed innocent and that a decision to dismiss his claims would constitute a violation of his right to an effective remedy. The applicant submitted a legal opinion stating that it would be impossible, or at least not useful, to bring an action in the United Kingdom in the present case since the damage flowing from the television programme at issue had not occurred in the United Kingdom. 10.  X disputed the claim on the grounds, inter alia, that he was not the responsible editor of the show and that he enjoyed the freedom to communicate information as provided for under Chapter 10, section 2 of the Constitutional Law and as clarified by the Supreme Court (H\u00f6gsta domstolen) in the case NJA 2005 p. 884 (see paragraphs 32 and 33 below). 11.  In a preliminary ruling on 20 May 2008 the Stockholm District Court (Stockholms tingsr\u00e4tt) dismissed the claim in so far as it was based on the Constitutional Law. It referred to the Supreme Court judgment in an almost identical case, NJA 2002 p. 314 (see paragraphs 28-31 below), and held that Chapters 1-9 of the Constitutional Law were not applicable to the television programme since it could not be regarded as emanating from Sweden. This was because the programme had first been sent by satellite link to Viasat Broadcasting UK Ltd, the British company responsible for the programme content, and thereafter uplinked to a satellite, which had in turn transmitted the programme to viewers in Sweden. As Chapters 1-9 of the Constitutional Law were not applicable, X could not be held responsible for the programme content under Chapter 6. The District Court further held that the applicant\u2019s claims under the Penal Code were to be determined following the main hearing in the case. The court finally drew the parties\u2019 attention to the Supreme Court case NJA 2005 p. 884. 12.  The applicant appealed, repeating what he had stated in his earlier submissions. He further argued that all companies involved in the case were Swedish, including the receiving company in London, allegedly named Viasat AB, with its seat in Stockholm. Although Viasat AB had acquired the right to transmit the show from the Swedish company TV3 AB, it had had no impact on or responsibility for the programme selection. Having regard to the above, the offence committed against the applicant through the programme could not be examined by United Kingdom courts. The applicant also submitted that Swedish courts were competent to examine the case under the Brussels I Regulation (see further paragraph 35 below). X contested the arguments and submitted that it was the company Viasat Broadcasting UK Ltd, whose seat was in the United Kingdom, which was responsible for the programme service and decided on the final content of the programmes. 13.  On 20 March 2009 the Court of Appeal (Svea hovr\u00e4tt) upheld the District Court\u2019s decision. It held that the issue for it to determine was whether the general provisions in the Constitutional Law were applicable to the programme in question, that is, whether or not the broadcasting of the programme could be considered to have originated from Sweden within the meaning of Chapter 1, section 6(2) of that law. It further stated that the burden of proof concerning the applicability of the Constitutional Law rested on the applicant and that he had not, in response to X\u2019s refutation, established that the decisions concerning the programme content were taken in Sweden. Consequently, Chapters 1-9 of the Constitutional Law were not applicable in the case. The court further held that the material before it indicated that it was possible for the applicant to bring claims before a British court. 14.  The applicant appealed and referred to his earlier submissions. In addition, he requested that a question concerning the interpretation of the Brussels I Regulation be referred to the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) for a preliminary ruling. According to the applicant, the regulation entitled a person claiming non-contractual damages to bring actions where the harmful event occurred. In the present case, the harmful event had occurred in Sweden and the applicant thus should have had the right to bring his action before the Swedish courts. Consequently, the position hitherto taken by the Swedish courts ran contrary to Community law. 15.  On 21 September 2009 the Supreme Court rejected the applicant\u2019s referral request and refused leave to appeal in the case. It held that, since the District Court had found itself competent to examine the applicant\u2019s claims in so far as they were based on grounds other than the Constitutional Law, there was no reason to request a preliminary ruling from the ECJ. 16.  The applicant subsequently withdrew his remaining claims before the District Court since there was no practical prospect of success in a continued procedure. On 17 November 2009 the District Court struck the case out of the list and ordered the applicant to pay X\u2019s legal costs and expenses. 17.  Criminal proceedings were taken against the applicant in regard, inter alia, to the matters described in the television programme. He was convicted of aggravated fraud as well as tax and bookkeeping offences and sentenced to five years\u2019 imprisonment. The criminal proceedings were finalised by a Supreme Court decision to refuse leave to appeal on 4 October 2010. These proceedings, in particular their compliance with Articles 6 and 7 of the Convention, are the subject of an application lodged with the Court on 4 April 2011 (no. 32814/11).", "references": ["9", "5", "0", "7", "4", "6", "8", "1", "2", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Me\u017eica. 6.  On 22 August 2003 the applicant brought criminal charges (\u201ccriminal action\u201d) for defamation against A.\u0160., thus undertaking criminal prosecution as private prosecutor. Along with the criminal action, the applicant made a motion to be awarded compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary loss arising from the commission of the criminal offence in question. 7.  On 16 November 2006 the Ljubljana District Court handed down its judgment and found A.\u0160. guilty of the criminal offence of defamation, giving him a suspended sentence of one month in prison and ordering him to pay the costs of the proceedings. In respect of the applicant\u2019s claim for compensation, the district court held that the claim was unsubstantiated and directed the applicant to seek compensation in civil proceedings. 8.  Both parties appealed against the judgment before the Ljubljana Higher Court. In particular, the applicant alleged that there had been a violation of the Criminal Code and that the punishment imposed on A.\u0160. had been too lenient. He also complained about the fact that the first-instance court had not ruled on his claim for compensation, despite the fact that there had allegedly been enough material in the case file to enable it to rule on the matter. 9.  On 11 March 2008 the Ljubljana Higher Court granted the applicant\u2019s appeal in respect of the punishment and increased it to three months of suspended sentence. However, it dismissed the complaint concerning the applicant\u2019s unsuccessful claim for compensation, confirming the lower court\u2019s view that it had not been substantiated. 10.  The applicant did not institute separate civil proceedings for compensation. 11.  On 12 May 2008 A.\u0160. lodged with the Supreme Court a request for the protection of legality (an extraordinary legal remedy whereby to challenge the procedural and substantive legality of final decisions), alleging an incorrect application of the Criminal Procedure Act. In particular, he alleged that the applicant\u2019s criminal action had been brought out of time. 12.  On 27 May 2008 the Ljubljana District Court notified the applicant\u2019s representative that on 12 May 2008 A.\u0160. had lodged a request for the protection of legality; however, the notification did not include a copy of the said request for the protection of legality. 13.  On 4 July 2008, pursuant to Section 423 of the Criminal Procedure Act, the request for the protection of legality was sent to the Supreme State Prosecutor for a response. 14.  In that response, the Supreme State Prosecutor agreed that the criminal action had been brought out of time. This response was served on A.\u0160. and his representatives. 15.  However, neither the applicant nor his representative were served with that response; nor were they ever served with the request for the protection of legality. 16.  On 28 August 2008 the Supreme Court, without having informed the parties of the date of the deliberation session, deliberated in private and upheld the request for the protection of legality, dismissing the applicant\u2019s action as having been lodged out of time. Further, it ordered the applicant to pay the costs of proceedings including the costs and attorney\u2019s fees incurred by A.\u0160. and a lump sum covering court fees of 600 euros (EUR). 17.  Not being aware that the request for the protection of legality had already been decided, on 3 September 2008 the applicant\u2019s representative requested the relevant documentation from the Ljubljana District Court. 18.  On 5 September 2008 the Ljubljana District Court informed the applicant\u2019s representative that the case-file documents had been with the Supreme Court since 30 June 2008. Accordingly, on the same day the applicant\u2019s representative requested from the Supreme Court the documentation regarding the request for the protection of legality. 19.  On 12 September 2008 the Supreme Court informed the applicant\u2019s representative that A.\u0160. had lodged a request for the protection of legality which had been upheld on 28 August 2008. 20.  On 22 September 2008 the Supreme Court\u2019s judgment was served on the applicant\u2019s representative. 21.  On 20 November 2008 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint. Citing Articles 14, 22 and 23 of the Constitution, the applicant claimed that he had not been afforded equality before the law and that his right to judicial protection and his right to equal protection had been violated as he had not been given the opportunity to participate in the proceedings before the Supreme Court. He also alleged violations of the Convention, citing Articles 6 and 14 and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the latter in respect of the fact that he had been ordered to pay the opposite party\u2019s costs of the proceedings. 22.  On 5 January 2009 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant\u2019s complaint.", "references": ["1", "6", "8", "9", "0", "2", "7", "5", "4", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1969 and lives in Leskovac. 6.  On 17 October 2006 the Leskovac police informed the local minor-offence judge and the public prosecutor\u2019s office about a violent incident between the applicant and a certain R.C. that had occurred on 12 October 2006 in a neighbourhood of Leskovac. 7.  By a decision of 6 November 2007 the misdemeanour court judge in Leskovac (sudija Op\u0161tinskog organa za prekr\u0161aje u Leskovcu) found that at about 5.30 p.m. on 12 October 2006 in Leskovac R.C. had verbally insulted the applicant\u2019s children, and the applicant had then punched him several times on the head and injured him. The judge concluded that these actions had been in breach of public order and peace and had thus been contrary to Article 6(3) of the Public Order Act 1992 (see paragraph 21 below under Relevant domestic law and practice). The relevant part of the decision reads:\n\u201cDefendant[s] R.C. ... and Mom\u010dilo Milenkovi\u0107 are guilty in that at about 5.30 p.m. on 12 October 2006, in Suboti\u010dka street in Leskovac, [the former first swore and insulted the applicant\u2019s children], while the latter punched R.C. several times on the head and injured him ...\u201d 8.  Each of them was ordered to pay a fine in the amount of 4,000 Serbian dinars (RSD) plus RSD 700 for costs (at that time equivalent to approximately 60 euros (EUR) in total), which in the event of non-compliance would be converted into a prison term of eight days. 9.  After an investigation had been conducted, on 4 April 2007 the Leskovac Public Prosecutor\u2019s Office (\u201cthe LPPO\u201d) charged the applicant with the criminal offence of inflicting grievous bodily harm on R.C. in connection with the above incident, contrary to Article 121 \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Code 1998. The LPPO, as well as the applicant and his family in the capacity of private prosecutors, lodged separate indictments against R.C. for several offences. All the indictments were joined in the same proceedings before the Leskovac Municipal Court. 10.  In a judgment of 13 April 2011 the Leskovac Municipal Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to three months\u2019 imprisonment. R.C. was found guilty and fined for insulting the applicant\u2019s family and causing minor bodily injuries to the applicant\u2019s mother. The court ordered the applicant to pay RSD 14,739 in court costs, while each party was to cover its own costs and expenses.\nThe relevant part of the decision reads:\n\u201cDefendant Milenkovi\u0107 Mom\u010dilo ... is guilty in that\nat about 4.00 and 4.30 p.m on 12 October 2006 in Suboti\u010dka Street ... he punched [R.C.] on the left side of the face and, after knocking R.C. down, he continued punching him in the head, thereby causing him a number of grievous bodily injuries dangerous for life, such as: bruising of both eyelids (black eye), bruising of the left cornea, and nose abrasions ...\u201d 11.  The applicant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that he had already been punished in respect of the same incident by the Leskovac misdemeanour judge, with the result that the principle of ne bis in idem had been violated (see paragraph 18 below). 12.  On 20 March 2012 the Ni\u0161 Appeals Court upheld the judgment in respect of the applicant and dismissed the charges against R.C. as statute-barred. As regards the principle of ne bis in idem, the court held that the applicant had been found guilty of a misdemeanour against public order and peace in the misdemeanour proceedings, whereas he had been convicted of the criminal offence of grievous bodily harm in the criminal proceedings. According to the court, the descriptions of the acts sanctioned therefore clearly differed. 13.  On 19 September 2012, the Leskovac Basic Court converted the prison sentence to house arrest without electronic monitoring. 14.  On 29 November 2012 the Leskovac Basic Court amnestied the applicant at his request, finding that the conditions for a statutory amnesty were applicable (see paragraph 22 below). 15.  In a subsequent constitutional appeal lodged on 25 May 2012 the applicant reiterated that he had been tried and punished twice for the same offence, in breach of Article 34 \u00a7 4 of the Constitution (see paragraph 13 below). 16.  On 20 May 2013 the Constitutional Court, referring to the reasoning of the Ni\u0161 Appeals Court as \u201cfully acceptable from the constitutional point of view\u201d (see paragraph 12 above), dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal as ill-founded. The decision of the Constitutional Court was served on the applicant\u2019s representative on 29 May 2013.", "references": ["9", "8", "3", "2", "0", "7", "5", "1", "6", "4", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Buivydi\u0161k\u0117s, Vilnius Region. 6.  In 1991 the Lithuanian Parliament enacted the Law on Land Reform which provided that residents of rural areas had the right to acquire land for individual farming (asmeninio \u016bkio \u017eem\u0117) from the State, in accordance with the requirements set out in the relevant legal instruments (see \u201cRelevant domestic law\u201d below). 7.  On 2 May 1992 the applicant\u2019s husband submitted a request to the Zuj\u016bnai District Land Council of the Vilnius Region to buy from the State two hectares of land for individual farming in the village of Zuj\u016bnai. 8.  On 29 October 1993 the Government adopted a decision establishing, inter alia, the order of allocation of land for individual farming. The decision instructed regional and municipal authorities to delimit plots of land to be assigned for individual farming and to prepare the necessary documents for their allocation to individual claimants. 9.  On 17 October 1994, in court proceedings instituted by the Government, the Vilnius Region District Court ordered the Buivydi\u0161k\u0117s District Council of the Vilnius Region to implement the aforementioned decision of the Government. 10.  On 16 March 1995 the Buivydi\u0161k\u0117s District Council adopted a decision on the allocation of 1,520 hectares of land for individual farming in the Vilnius Region. The decision provided a list of individuals who were entitled to buy plots of land from the State. It indicated the amount of land to which each listed individual was entitled but did not specify actual plots. The applicant was included in that list and entitled to buy two hectares of land. 11.  On 20 June 1995 the Convention entered into force in respect of Lithuania. 12.  On 25 September 2000 the Vilnius County Administration (hereinafter \u201cthe VCA\u201d) approved the land allocation plan (\u017eem\u0117s reformos \u017eem\u0117tvarkos projektas) for the Buivydi\u0161k\u0117s cadastral area (this area comprised several villages in the Vilnius Region). The VCA approved the delimitation of plots of land in that territory (patvirtino suformuot\u0173 \u017eem\u0117s sklyp\u0173 plotus bei ribas) and instructed Matininkai, a surveyor company, to prepare the necessary documents in order to allocate the plots to individual claimants and to formalise their rights of land ownership or use. 13.  In January 2001 the applicant and her husband submitted a request to the VCA to consider as valid their previous request of 2 May 1992 (see paragraph 7 above) and to allocate a plot of land in the village of Zuj\u016bnai to them, for the nominal price of 1,884 Lithuanian litai (LTL, approximately 546 euros (EUR)). 14.  On 28 January 2002 the VCA approved a list of individuals who were using land for individual farming in the Buivydi\u0161k\u0117s cadastral area. The applicant was included on the list as using two hectares of land in the village of Buivydi\u0161k\u0117s. However, as submitted by the applicant and not disputed by the Government, the applicant had not been using this land since no land had been provided to her at that time. 15.  In June 2002 the VCA decided that it was necessary to amend the land allocation plan of the Buivydi\u0161k\u0117s cadastral area in order to take into account requests for restitution in natura which had been submitted in respect of land there. It ordered Matininkai to amend the delimitation and allocation of plots accordingly and to prepare all the necessary documents by 15 October 2002. 16.  In July 2002, April 2004, April and November 2006 and February 2007 the applicant and her husband petitioned the VCA and the National Land Service (hereinafter \u201cthe NLS\u201d), stating that they had still not received the land to which they were entitled, and requesting that such land be provided to them without further delay. They were informed that the preparation of the land allocation plan in the area was ongoing. 17.  In 2006 the applicant and her husband lodged a claim against the VCA before the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court. They complained that the two hectares of land assigned to them in 1995 had still not been provided, that they had been unable to receive any information from the VCA about the ongoing land reform in the Vilnius Region, and that they had not been given the opportunity to participate in the planning of the reform, unlike other residents of the region. They requested that the court oblige the VCA to enforce the decision of the Buivydi\u0161k\u0117s District Council of 16 March 1995 (see paragraph 10 above) without further delay. 18.  On 13 October 2006 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court dismissed the claim. However, on 5 May 2007 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the applicant\u2019s appeal and annulled the judgment of the first-instance court. The Supreme Administrative Court noted that the applicant had been entitled to buy two hectares of land by the decision of 16 March 1995 and that she had been included on the list of land users in January 2002 (see paragraphs 10 and 14 above), so on these grounds the VCA was obliged to allocate a specific plot of land to the applicant. The court ordered the VCA to carry out the necessary administrative procedures to identify and delimit a plot of land for the applicant (atlikti administracines proced\u016bras, susijusias su \u017eem\u0117s sklypo suprojektavimu bei jo rib\u0173 nustatymu). However, the Supreme Administrative Court denied the applicant\u2019s request to set a precise deadline for the VCA to carry out said actions, noting that no such deadlines were provided in the legislation and that there was no objective possibility to do so due to the complexity of the land reform. 19.  In May and June 2007 the bailiff in charge of the enforcement of the Supreme Administrative Court\u2019s judgment submitted several notices to the VCA, urging it to enforce the judgment immediately. 20.  On 5 June 2007 the VCA approved an amended land allocation plan of the Buivydi\u0161k\u0117s cadastral area. It ordered Arlitanus, a surveyor company, to mark the delimited plots (pa\u017eenklinti vietoje) and to prepare the necessary documents for formalising individual rights of ownership or use. 21.  In June and July 2007 the applicant and her husband submitted several requests to the VCA and the NLS, inquiring about the enforcement of the judgment of 5 May 2007 and requesting information about the implementation of the land reform in the Buivydi\u0161k\u0117s cadastral area. 22.  On 26 July 2007 the VCA informed the applicant that it had instructed Arlitanus to identify a specific plot of two hectares for the applicant from the stock of available State land by 1 August 2007. 23.  In August and October 2007 the applicant submitted complaints to the VCA concerning the continuing non-enforcement of the Supreme Administrative Court\u2019s judgment. She did not receive any response. 24.  In August 2007 the applicant asked the Supreme Administrative Court to clarify its judgment of 5 May 2007 and to set a concrete deadline for the VCA to enforce it. However, the court denied the applicant\u2019s request, noting that it was not authorised to clarify its previous judgments in a way that would alter their content. 25.  In October 2007 the VCA again amended the land allocation plan of the Buivydi\u0161k\u0117s cadastral area and instructed Arlitanus to complete the planning by 1 March 2008. 26.  In November 2007 the applicant submitted two requests to the VCA, asking to be provided with a plot of land by the end of the year and requesting information as to whether she had been included in the amended land allocation plan as a candidate to receive land. The following month the VCA informed the applicant that the planning in the Buivydi\u0161k\u0117s cadastral area had to be completed by 1 March 2008 and that the applicant would be included as a candidate of the seventh priority rank to receive land there. 27.  In December 2007 the NLS urged the VCA to examine why the list of candidates to receive land in the Buivydi\u0161k\u0117s cadastral area had not been compiled in time with a view to ensuring the enforcement of the Supreme Administrative Court\u2019s judgment of 5 May 2007. 28.  In April 2008 the VCA again amended the land allocation plan in the Buivydi\u0161k\u0117s cadastral area. It instructed Arlitanus to complete the list of candidates to receive land in that territory by 30 May 2008 and to complete the planning by 1 December 2008. 29.  That same month the applicant and her husband requested that the Supreme Administrative Court order interim measures against the VCA to prevent it from distributing land in the Buivydi\u0161k\u0117s cadastral area to candidates of the eighth and lower priority ranks. The court dismissed their request, noting that interim measures could only be ordered before the court\u2019s judgment is adopted, while after its adoption the VCA was already under an obligation to enforce the judgment and thus interim measures were unnecessary. 30.  On 30 May 2008 the Supreme Administrative Court granted the applicant\u2019s request and clarified its judgment of 5 May 2007. The court held that the VCA was under the obligation to include the applicant on the list of candidates to be provided with land in the Buivydi\u0161k\u0117s cadastral area by 30 June 2008 and to carry out the remaining administrative procedures necessary for the allocation of a specific plot of land of two hectares to the applicant within three months of the completion of the land allocation plan of the Buivydi\u0161k\u0117s cadastral area. 31.  In August 2008 the applicant asked the VCA to inform her whether the Supreme Administrative Court\u2019s judgment of 30 May 2008 had been enforced. She also requested that they provide her with the list of candidates to receive land in the Buivydi\u0161k\u0117s cadastral area. She did not receive any response. 32.  In October 2008 the VCA approved the amended land allocation plan of the Buivydi\u0161k\u0117s cadastral area and the list of candidates to receive plots of land in that territory. The applicant was not included on that list. 33.  Later that month the VCA approved the list of individuals in the eldership (seni\u016bnija) of Zuj\u016bnai who were not using the land which had been assigned to them for individual farming. The list indicated that the applicant had been assigned two hectares of land and that she had not been using them. As submitted by the Government, the purpose of that list was to determine the location of the plots to be allocated \u2013 those individuals who were not using any specific land would be provided with plots from the State stock of vacant land. 34.  In December 2008 the VCA informed the applicant and her husband that the land allocation plan of the Buivydi\u0161k\u0117s cadastral area was again being amended, and that the list of candidates to receive land in that territory would be compiled after the completion of the planning when the available land has been identified. The VCA noted that the applicant had been included in the preliminary list as a candidate of the seventh priority rank. 35.  In March 2009 the bailiff urged the VCA to immediately enforce the Supreme Administrative Court\u2019s judgment of 30 May 2008. In May 2009 the bailiff concluded that the judgment had not been enforced. In July 2009 the Vilnius City First District Court satisfied the bailiff\u2019s request and ordered the VCA to pay a fine of LTL 400 (EUR 115) for non-enforcement of the court\u2019s judgment, as well as to enforce that judgment within three months. However, in December 2009 the Vilnius Regional Court annulled the first-instance decision, noting that the VCA had already included the applicant on the list of candidates to receive a plot of land (see paragraph 36 below), which meant that the judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court had been partly enforced and thus there were no grounds to order a fine. 36.  On 9 August 2009 the VCA approved the list of candidates to receive land in the eldership of Zuj\u016bnai, in the Buivydi\u0161k\u0117s cadastral area. The applicant was included in this list as a candidate of the seventh priority rank. 37.  The VCA further amended the land allocation plan in the Buivydi\u0161k\u0117s cadastral area several times in May to July 2009 and February to June 2010, setting new deadlines for the surveyor company to complete the planning. 38.  In June 2010 the bailiff asked the VCA to provide information as to whether the land allocation plan had been completed and whether the necessary administrative procedures had been carried out to provide the applicant with a plot of two hectares. In October 2010 the bailiff declared that the Supreme Administrative Court\u2019s judgment had not been enforced and decided to discontinue the enforcement proceedings. The applicant appealed against the bailiff\u2019s decision and in March 2011 the Vilnius City First District Court allowed the appeal and ordered the bailiff to continue the enforcement. That judgment was subsequently upheld by the Vilnius Regional Court. 39.  In July 2010, after an administrative reform, the VCA was abolished and its obligations were transferred to the NLS. 40.  In November 2010, during a meeting between Arlitanus and candidates of the seventh priority rank, the applicant was offered two plots of land, amounting to a total of two hectares. She accepted the offer. 41.  In June 2012 the NLS approved the plan of the Buivydi\u0161k\u0117s cadastral area prepared by Arlitanus, which delimited plots of land to be allocated to candidates of the first-to-fourth priority ranks. 42.  On 20 May 2013 the NLS held a meeting of candidates of the seventh priority rank. The applicant was offered four plots of land (different from the two which had been previously offered to her \u2013 see paragraph 40 above) amounting to a total of two hectares. She confirmed that she was aware of any applicable restrictions on the use of those plots and agreed to the offer. 43.  On the same day the applicant submitted a complaint to the NLS, stating that the four plots offered to her were too far from her home, that they could not be reached by road and that they were swampland (u\u017epelk\u0117j\u0119), and therefore unsuitable for farming. She requested that the NLS give her the plots of land which were offered to her in November 2010 (see paragraph 40 above) or other plots of equivalent quality. However, a few days later the applicant notified the NLS that she would accept the four offered plots. 44.  On 31 December 2014 the NLS approved the land allocation plan of the Buivydi\u0161k\u0117s cadastral area and a list of over twenty individuals who had been allocated specific plots of land. The list indicated that the applicant had been assigned the four plots of land offered to her on 20 May 2013 (see paragraphs 42 and 43 above). 45.  In April 2015 the State Land Fund identified that one of the four plots assigned to the applicant included 0.55 hectares of forestland. As a result, that part of the plot could not be transferred to the applicant and had to be returned to the State. 46.  That same month the State Land Fund assessed the value of the four plots (after excluding the 0.55 hectares of forestland). It calculated that their total nominal value, assessed in accordance with the Rules of Land Valuation adopted by the Government in 1999 (see \u201cRelevant domestic law\u201d below), was EUR 627, whereas their total market value was EUR 20,410. 47.  In May 2015 the NLS informed the applicant that the preliminary market value of the four plots was EUR 26,740, and that she would subsequently be informed of the final price. 48.  In June 2015 the NLS amended the land allocation plan for the eldership of Zuj\u016bnai, indicating that the total area which had been allocated to the applicant amounted to 1.45 hectares. 49.  In September 2015 the NLS informed the applicant that she had to pay a fee of EUR 157 for registering the four plots in the property register, and that that fee would be subsequently refunded to her in the price of the land. 50.  In October 2015 the Government informed the Court that the NLS had identified the remaining vacant State land in the Buivydi\u0161k\u0117s cadastral area and that the applicant would be included as a candidate to receive 0.55 hectares of farmland in a future land plan. In November 2015 the Government further informed the Court that the NLS had prepared draft agreements to enable the applicant to purchase the aforementioned four plots amounting to 1.45 hectares. 51.  In July 2007 the applicant and her husband submitted a complaint against the VCA to the Vilnius Regional Commission of Administrative Disputes (hereinafter \u2013 \u201cthe Commission\u201d). They complained that they had not received any response to their repeated requests for information, sent in June and July 2007 (see paragraph 21 above). The Commission partly upheld the complaint and ordered the VCA to respond within five days to two requests submitted in June 2007. 52.  On 25 September 2007 the applicant and her husband submitted a complaint to the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court, requesting that it order the VCA to comply with the Commission\u2019s decision. They also claimed non-pecuniary damages resulting from the VCA\u2019s deliberate refusal to fulfil its obligations. 53.  On 12 December 2007 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court dismissed the complaint. However, on 20 November 2008 the Supreme Administrative Court quashed the first-instance judgment and ordered the VCA to provide the applicant and her husband with a satisfactory response to their request of June 2007. The court also noted that the applicant and her husband had repeatedly asked the VCA for information about the implementation of the land reform and about the plot assigned to them, that they had petitioned several State institutions (see paragraphs 54-57 below), and that the lengthy non-enforcement of the Supreme Administrative Court\u2019s judgment of 5 May 2007, as well as the VCA\u2019s evasiveness concerning their requests, had caused them inconvenience and negative feelings. Thus, the court awarded the applicant and her husband non-pecuniary damages of LTL 1,500 (EUR 430) each. 54.  In April 2006 the applicant and her husband submitted a complaint to the Parliamentary Ombudsperson, stating that they still had not been given the land assigned to them in 1995. In June 2007 the Ombudsperson concluded that the complaint was well-founded, and recommended the Ministry of Agriculture provide assistance to the VCA in enforcing the decision of the Buivydi\u0161k\u0117s District Council of 16 March 1995. 55.  In November 2007 the applicant\u2019s husband again petitioned the Ombudsperson, stating that her previous recommendation had not been implemented. He noted that the Ministry of Agriculture had passed on the Ombudsperson\u2019s conclusion to the NLS, but the latter institution had stated that it was not allowed to influence the decisions of county administrations. The applicant\u2019s husband also complained that he and the applicant still had not been included on the list of candidates to receive land in the Buivydi\u0161k\u0117s cadastral area and that the land in that territory was being distributed to candidates of lower priority ranks. 56.  That same month a group of residents of Buivydi\u0161k\u0117s, including the applicant\u2019s husband, submitted a complaint to the parliamentary subcommittee on the rule of law, complaining about the actions of the VCA in the implementation of the land reform. The residents claimed that the only individuals who had received land in the Buivydi\u0161k\u0117s cadastral area had been employees of local institutions and that the land was not being distributed in compliance with the approved priority ranks. 57.  Later that month the applicant\u2019s husband also petitioned the Ministry of Agriculture, asking what assistance had been provided to the VCA following the Parliamentary Ombudsperson\u2019s recommendation (see paragraph 54 above). 58.  In August 2007 the applicant and her husband requested that the police of the Vilnius Region launch a criminal investigation into the actions of the VCA. They alleged that the VCA had deliberately refused to enforce the Supreme Administrative Court\u2019s judgment of 5 May 2007 (piktybi\u0161kai nevykd\u0117 teismo sprendimo), in violation of Articles 228, 229 and 294 of the Criminal Code, and that the land in the Buivydi\u0161k\u0117s cadastral area had been distributed to civil servants working at the VCA and its subordinate institutions, contrary to approved land allocation plans. 59.  Subsequently the applicant and her husband requested that the district prosecutor of the Vilnius Region suspend any further actions of the VCA concerning the allocation of land in the Buivydi\u0161k\u0117s cadastral area, but their request was denied. 60.  In December 2007 the district prosecutor of the Vilnius Region decided to discontinue the criminal investigation into the VCA, concluding that no crime had been committed. The applicant and her husband appealed against that decision. The Prosecutor General satisfied their appeal and ordered a different prosecutor in the Vilnius Region to continue the investigation. 61.  In March and April 2008 the applicant and her husband submitted written testimonies to the district prosecutor and were recognised as victims. 62.  In June 2009 the district prosecutor decided to discontinue the criminal investigation against the VCA on the grounds that no crime had been committed. The prosecutor held that the land reform in the Buivydi\u0161k\u0117s cadastral area had been prolonged due to reasons outside the control of the VCA, such as requests of former owners of land to receive restitution in natura. The decision also stated that the preparation of the land plan was ongoing and the applicant had been included in the preliminary list of candidates. Lastly, the prosecutor did not find any evidence that the land had been unlawfully distributed to candidates of lower priority ranks.", "references": ["6", "0", "8", "1", "7", "4", "2", "5", "9", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1967 and lives in Chelyabinsk. 7.  In 2012 the applicant, while serving a prison sentence, was diagnosed with lymphoma. He was admitted to prison hospital no. 3 of the Chelyabinsk Region and underwent two courses of chemotherapy. 8.  In December 2012 a court authorised the applicant\u2019s early release on health grounds. He was then monitored by an oncologist in a civil hospital, having continued with chemotherapy. The Government submitted that in May 2013 the applicant had undergone an in-depth examination in the oncology department of the Chelyabinsk regional hospital, where he was diagnosed with lymphoproliferative disorder affecting the cervical, axillary, mediastinal and retroperitoneal lymph nodes. The applicant did not complete the medical examinations or treatment, including chemotherapy. He was arrested on 10 September 2013. 9.  By judgments of 30 September 2013, 22 November 2013, and 16 December 2013 the applicant was convicted of fraud, robbery and theft respectively. He was sent to serve his sentence in detention facility no. 3. On 3 March 2014 he was transferred to the prison tuberculosis hospital. 10.  On 13 March 2014 a medical panel, comprising the deputy head of the prison tuberculosis hospital and doctors from the same hospital, examined the applicant and diagnosed him with progressive non-Hodgkin lymphoma in acute III B stage, with lesions of the cervical, axillary and abdominal lymph nodes. The panel concluded that the applicant was eligible for early release as he suffered from malignant formations of lymphatic and haematogenous tissues, a disease included in the List of serious illnesses precluding the serving of sentences in correctional institutions, as provided for by Decree no. 54 of the Government of the Russian Federation of 6 February 2004 (hereinafter \u201cthe List\u201d). 11.  On 10 April 2014, with reference to the conclusions of the medical panel, the applicant made an application for early release. On 26 May 2014 the Metallurgicheskiy District Court of Chelyabinsk dismissed the application. Having accepted that the applicant\u2019s illness was included in the List, and describing his condition as \u201cstable [but] serious\u201d, the court, nevertheless, found that the drugs necessary for his treatment were available in the prison tuberculosis hospital, and that the applicant was undergoing the necessary medical procedures. The court further pointed out that it was not clear who would take care of the applicant in the event of his release from prison. The applicant did not appeal against the decision. 12.  On 30 June 2014 the applicant\u2019s sister gave a written undertaking to take care of the applicant should he be released. 13.  According to a certificate issued by the prison tuberculosis hospital at the request of the applicant\u2019s lawyer, the drugs necessary for the applicant\u2019s chemotherapy were unavailable at the hospital. 14.  On 1 July 2014 the medical panel from the prison tuberculosis hospital again examined the applicant. The diagnosis was that the applicant had progressive non-Hodgkin lymphoma in acute IV B stage with lesions of the abdominal lymph nodes. It was once again noted that the applicant was eligible for release on health grounds. 15.  The applicant made another application for release at the end of July 2014. He submitted that his disease had progressed to its final stage and that he had relatives who could take care of him. 16.  On 12 September 2014 the Metallurgicheskiy District Court held a hearing. B., a doctor from the prison tuberculosis hospital, testified that the applicant needed chemotherapy and radiation therapy, but was unable to receive such treatment in detention since the necessary equipment was unavailable at the hospital.  On the same date the District Court dismissed the application for release once again, noting that the applicant had a tendency to reoffend and concluding that he was receiving adequate medical care in detention. 17.  The applicant appealed. 18.  In October 2014 the applicant asked the Court to apply Rule 39 of the Rules of Court and to authorise his immediate release from detention as an interim measure. The applicant claimed that he was not receiving the necessary medical assistance and treatment in detention, despite his suffering from a life-threatening and rapidly progressing illness. He relied on a certificate from the prison hospital confirming the absence of drugs for his chemotherapy (see paragraph 13 above). 19.  On 16 October 2014 the Court decided to indicate to the Russian Government, under Rule 39, that it was desirable in the interests of the proper conduct of the proceedings that the applicant be immediately examined by medical experts, including an oncologist, independent from the prison system with a view to determining: (1) whether the treatment he was receiving in detention was adequate for his condition; (2) whether his current state of health was compatible with detention in the conditions of a correctional colony or prison hospital; and (3) whether his current condition required his placement in a specialised hospital or release. The Russian Government were also asked to ensure the applicant\u2019s immediate transfer to a specialised hospital if the medical experts concluded that the applicant required placement in such a hospital. 20.  On 7 November 2014 the Government responded to the Court\u2019s letter of 17 October 2014, submitting the following documents:\n-  a handwritten copy of the applicant\u2019s medical history drawn up during his detention. The history included a form for consent to treatment, signed by the applicant. It also contained a detailed schedule showing the daily intake of drugs by the applicant. As appears from that document, he received basic analgesic and anti-inflammatory drugs, antihistamines, sleeping pills, antidepressants, antiemetics and neuroleptics.\n-  certificates issued by the acting head of the prison tuberculosis hospital, indicating that the applicant had not been provided with chemotherapy for his lymphoma as he had not consented to that treatment when it had been offered to him, in March and June 2014. According to the acting head of the hospital, the applicant had refused to make a written statement to that effect. The certificate also indicated that an oncologist had examined the applicant four times, once in March and September 2014 and twice in October 2014. At the end of October 2014 the applicant\u2019s condition was considered to be serious: he was suffering severe pain and increasing asthenia, had coughed blood, and his lymph nodes continued to grow. In another certificate, the acting head of the hospital stressed that the applicant was suffering from a life-threatening oncological disease, particularly taking into account the advanced stage of his illness. In addition, in a separate certificate, the acting head of the hospital noted that the prison tuberculosis hospital where the applicant was detained employed an oncologist and had the necessary medicines for the applicant\u2019s treatment.\n-  copies of the applicant\u2019s complaints to various Russian officials, including the Chelyabinsk regional ombudsman, the Prosecutor General\u2019s office, the regional department for the execution of sentences and the acting head of the prison tuberculosis hospital, about the poor quality of his medical care in detention. The complaints also contained a request for a medical examination and for his early release on health grounds. 21.  The Government also answered the three questions which, in its letter of 17 October 2014, the Court had asked them to refer to independent medical experts. In particular, in their answer to the first question concerning the adequacy of the applicant\u2019s treatment, the Government stressed that the applicant had regularly undergone in-patient treatment and examinations in relation to his oncological illness. They noted that the applicant\u2019s condition was considered to be moderately serious and stressed that in March and June 2014 he had failed to consent to the cancer treatment. They further directed the Court to the documents enclosed with their reply (see paragraph 20 above). 22.  In their response to the second question about the compatibility of the applicant\u2019s state of health with the conditions of the correctional colony and prison hospital, the Government emphasised that the applicant\u2019s hospital employed the necessary specialists, and had the necessary equipment and drugs to treat him. They further noted that the applicant was in pain and was weak, that he occasionally coughed blood and that his lymph nodes continued to grow. The Government continued by indicating that he would be provided with chemotherapy as soon as the general blood test results allowed and the applicant consented. 23.  In replying to the third question as to whether the applicant needed to be transferred to a specialised hospital or be released, the Government observed that the applicant\u2019s oncological illness was incurable and could lead to his death. They relied on the two reports issued by the doctors from the prison tuberculosis hospital on 13 March and 1 July 2014, according to which the applicant was suffering from a condition included in the list of serious illnesses precluding the serving of sentences in correctional institutions, as provided for by Decree no. 54 of the Government of the Russian Federation. However, the Russian courts had refused to release the applicant on health grounds. Another examination of the applicant by the hospital medical panel had been scheduled for November 2014. 24.  The applicant informed the Court that on 28 November 2014, acting upon his appeal, the Chelyabinsk Regional Court had quashed the decision of 12 September 2014 and ordered his release. With reference to B.\u2019s testimony, the Regional Court held that the District Court\u2019s findings as to the adequacy of the treatment received by the applicant in the hospital were not in accordance with the established facts. It also pointed to the District Court\u2019s failure to comment on the undertaking by the applicant\u2019s sister to take care of the applicant after his release. 25.  On an unspecified date after 28 November 2014 the applicant was released.", "references": ["2", "5", "6", "9", "3", "4", "8", "0", "7", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Izhevsk. 5.  On 27 August 2008 the police arrested the applicant in the street on suspicion of being drunk. He was taken to the police station where he was held for more than two hours. The police charged the applicant with public drunkenness and told him to pay a fine. 6.  Further to a complaint by the applicant, on 8 December 2008 the Pervomayskiy District Court of Izhevsk quashed the police decision, finding that the charge had not been supported by evidence. 7.  The applicant brought a claim for compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage in connection with his arrest and detention. 8.  By a judgment of 16 November 2009, the Pervomayskiy District Court dismissed his claim. Noting that the claim arising out of administrative detention fell outside the exhaustive list of examples of strict liability under Article 1100 of the Civil Code, the court held that the lawful actions of the police officers could not give rise to liability in tort. It acknowledged that the applicant must have suffered frustration and anxiety as a result of his detention, but determined that his suffering had been \u201cof no legal consequence\u201d. 9.  On 3 March 2010 the Supreme Court of the Udmurtiya Republic upheld the District Court\u2019s decision on appeal.", "references": ["0", "5", "3", "8", "7", "9", "1", "4", "6", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1982 and is currently detained in Gorodyshche prison. 6.  On 30 November 2008 the applicant, Mr A.S. and Mr V.S. broke into the home of Mr N., a local businessman, which was located in the Pustomyty District. The applicant had four prior convictions for theft, burglary, robbery and carjacking. According to the findings of the domestic court that subsequently convicted the applicant, Mr N. had fought with the intruders and, unable to overcome his resistance otherwise, they had stabbed him to death. As a result of the attack Ms P., N.\u2019s wife, sustained injuries of medium severity. Numerous valuables and documents were stolen, including some jewelry, a reserve officer\u2019s card belonging to N. and certificates showing his achievements in sports. 7.  On 1 December 2008 the Pustomyty District police instituted criminal proceedings in connection with the incident. 8.  On 5 December 2008 V.S. was arrested and questioned. He stated that the applicant had stabbed N. in the course of the burglary. V.S. had hit Ms P., who had tried to come to N.\u2019s rescue. 9.  At around 9 p.m. on 5 December 2008 I.Kot., V.Ye., I.G. and R.D., detectives from the Lviv Regional Police, located the applicant in Chervonograd and apprehended him in the street. According to the subsequent submissions of the applicant and the detectives to the domestic authorities, the applicant attempted to flee; in order to stop him from fleeing the detectives tripped him up, he fell on the asphalt pavement and was then handcuffed. According to the applicant, after he had been handcuffed the police officers continued to hit and kick him. 10.  The applicant also claimed that following his arrest he had been ill\u2011treated by the police in order to extract his confession. 11.  At 10.30 a.m. on 6 December 2008 an arrest report was drawn up by the Pustomyty Police. According to a document provided by the Government, at the same time the applicant was admitted to the Lviv temporary detention facility (\u0456\u0437\u043e\u043b\u044f\u0442\u043e\u0440 \u0442\u0438\u043c\u0447\u0430\u0441\u043e\u0432\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0442\u0440\u0438\u043c\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044f, \u201cthe ITT\u201d). 12.  On the same day an investigator, K., asked a forensic medical expert to record any injuries on the applicant\u2019s body and to provide an expert opinion as to when and how they had been inflicted. 13.  On the same day the forensic medical expert, G. (referred to as Mr H. by the Government), issued a report stating that the applicant had the following injuries: a bruise on his forehead and, overlapping it, four long, deep, vertical parallel scratches; bruises on the bridge of his nose, his chin, wrists and neck; nine small bruises on the fingers of his right hand; and swelling of the back of his right hand. The bruises on his wrists were soft and pink in colour. The other bruises were covered in dry scabs. The expert classified the injuries as minor and expressed the opinion that they could have been inflicted on 30 November 2008. According to the report, the applicant explained to the expert that he had injured his face and hands when he fell trying to run away from the police. 14.  At 2.30 p.m. on the same day K., the investigator from the Pustomyty Police, questioned the applicant as a suspect. The applicant stated that on 29 November 2008 he had agreed with V.S.\u2019s proposal to burgle Mr N.\u2019s home. The applicant had not taken a knife with him and had not seen V.S. or A.S. do so. Once they had broken into the house, the applicant switched off the television set N. had been watching, while V.S. and A.S. started punching N. Hearing N.\u2019s screams, P. tried to enter the room, and the applicant hit and kicked her. Afterwards the applicant kicked N. three or four times. While the others continued hitting N., the applicant started looking for money, then took a knife from V.S. and cut some paintings out of their frames. He also took other valuables from the house. 15.  At 9.22 p.m. on the same day, following the applicant\u2019s complaint about his health, an ambulance was called to the ITT for the applicant. The ambulance staff noted that the applicant had bruises on his face and right hand, and was suffering from concussion, hypertension and an oedema. 16.  On 8 December 2008 the applicant was charged with aggravated burglary and infliction of grievous bodily harm resulting in the death of the victim. Questioned on the same day as an accused, the applicant confirmed the account of events he had given on 6 December 2008 and added that he had seen V.S. hitting N. but not stabbing him. The applicant reiterated that he had not stabbed N. and had had no intention of murdering him. He had used the knife to cut paintings out of their frames. Prior to the burglary V.S. had promised that he would take it upon himself to force N. to give up the money. 17.  On 9 December 2008 the applicant was examined by medical staff on his admission to the Lviv pre-trial detention centre (\u0441\u043b\u0456\u0434\u0447\u0438\u0439 \u0456\u0437\u043e\u043b\u044f\u0442\u043e\u0440, hereinafter \u201cthe SIZO\u201d). According to a certificate issued by the SIZO on 20 January 2015, the applicant did not raise any complaints during that examination. 18.  In the period from 5 February to 8 July 2009 the police took the applicant from the SIZO at least eight times in order to carry out investigative measures with him. 19.  On 6 February 2009 Mr Ch. was appointed as the applicant\u2019s defence counsel. On the same day the applicant was questioned in Ch.\u2019s presence. The applicant confirmed the account of events he had given on 6 and 8 December 2008, including the statement that at N.\u2019s house he had used the knife to cut paintings out of their frames, and added that there had been no plan to murder N. but simply to burgle his house. When he and his co-defendants had learned that N. would be home, the plan had been simply to tie him up. 20.  According to the Government, on 6 February 2009 the applicant was familiarised with the medical expert\u2019s report of 6 December 2008 and made no comments or requests. 21.  On 18 March 2009, having examined the applicant as an inpatient, a panel of psychiatric experts issued a report concluding that the applicant was not suffering from a mental illness. In discussing the applicant\u2019s mental health history the experts noted that in October 2008 he had been involved in a fight, suffered a blow to the head and had received outpatient treatment for the injury. On 17 April 2009 the applicant and his lawyer signed a statement confirming that they had examined the report and had no comments or requests to make. 22.  On 7 May 2009 the applicant was questioned again in the presence of his lawyer. He reiterated his earlier statement. In the course of the questioning the investigator asked the applicant why he had not initially joined his co-defendants in attacking N. The applicant refused to answer. 23.  In the course of the pre-trial investigation A.S. stated that it had been the applicant who had stabbed N.  In the course of a confrontation between the applicant and A.S., the latter reaffirmed his statement. The applicant denied A.S.\u2019s allegations but refused to testify. 24.  P. stated that it had been V.S., and not the applicant, who had attacked and hit her. 25.  Ms I.M. stated that on 1 December 2008 the applicant had given her a mobile phone and a silver chain which he had stolen from N. and P. 26.  On 30 July 2009 the case against the applicant and his co-defendants, A.S. and V.S., was sent for trial to the Lviv Regional Court of Appeal (\u201cthe Court of Appeal\u201d), sitting as a trial court. 27.  On 16 November 2009 the trial court informed the applicant that the question of whether an additional psychiatric examination should be ordered would be examined in the course of the trial. 28.  The applicant pleaded guilty to the charge of theft of documents, guilty in part to the charge of aggravated burglary, and not guilty to the charge of murder. He refused to testify at length, but in response to a question stated that he had used a knife to cut the paintings out of their frames at the victims\u2019 house. V.S. pleaded guilty to the charge of aggravated burglary and A.S. pleaded guilty to that charge in part. They largely reiterated the statements they had given during the pre-trial investigation concerning the applicant\u2019s role in the crime, in particular stating that they had not stabbed N. and had seen the applicant, knife in hand and covered in blood, lead N., also covered in blood, to a safe to extract N.\u2019s money. V.K. also stated that the applicant had told him that he had stabbed N. 29.  Ms M.M. and Ms A.V. testified that late on the night of the murder the defendants had left the house where they had been staying together. A.S. had been carrying a knife. The defendants had then returned with various objects, including paintings and documents. M.M. testified that she had seen blood on the applicant\u2019s clothes when he returned that night. A.V. also testified that when the applicant had returned, he had given her his clothes and had instructed her to burn them. However, she had left the clothes in the house. 30.  Two other witnesses testified that on 5 December 2008 they had witnessed the owner of the house in question handing over to the police a bag of clothes which had been left there by the defendants. According to DNA expert reports, the applicant\u2019s hair and blood possibly originating from the victims were found on the clothes in the bag. 31.  On 11 March 2010 the applicant asked the trial court to call G., the medical expert, as a witness, on the grounds that in her report of 6 December 2008 she had failed to specify exactly when the injuries had been inflicted on the applicant. In support of his request he stated that he had been ill-treated in the course of and following his arrest. The applicant also asked for I.Ku., an investigator from the Pustomyty Police to be called as a witness, arguing that his statements during the pre-trial investigation were untrue and had been dictated to him and given under pressure. He also asked for police detectives I.Kot., V.Ye., I.G. and R.M. of the Lviv Regional Police to be called as witnesses, arguing that they had ill-treated him in the course of arrest and in the course of his initial interrogation, causing the injuries recorded in the medical expert\u2019s report of 6 December 2008. The trial court refused those requests. According to the Government, the grounds for the refusal were that the trial court had in its possession the transcripts of the interviews with the police officers in question conducted during the pre-trial investigation. Moreover, the trial court considered that the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment had already been examined within the framework of pre-investigation enquiries, in the course of which no corroboration of the applicant\u2019s allegations had been found. 32.  On 25 March 2010 the trial court convicted all three applicants of murder, of aggravated burglary, and of theft of documents. In respect of the conviction for murder the applicant was sentenced to life imprisonment with confiscation of all of his property, V.S. to thirteen years\u2019 and A.S. to twelve years\u2019 imprisonment. Additional prison sentences were imposed in respect of the other charges but because of the sentencing rules, the overall sentences imposed were the same as the sentences for murder. 33.  The court found it established that the applicant and his two co-defendants, A.S. and V.S., had committed aggravated burglary of Mr N. and Ms P. While it was the applicant who had stabbed N. to death, all the defendants had used violence against N. to overcome his resistance and so were guilty of his murder. As evidence of the applicant\u2019s guilt the court referred to the testimony of the co-defendants, of Ms P., Ms I.M., Ms M.M., Ms A.V. (see paragraphs 24, 25 and 29 above), and of a number of other witnesses who had described how the defendants had disposed of their clothing and of the objects taken from the victims\u2019 house. The court also relied on physical and expert evidence. In reaching its finding that it had been the applicant who had stabbed N., the court referred to the testimony of his co-defendants, noting that it was consistent with P.\u2019s testimony to the extent that all three had testified, contrary to the applicant, that it was V.S., and not the applicant, who had attacked P. The court also referred to the DNA expert evidence which had found blood, possibly originating from N., on the trousers worn by the applicant on the night of the murder and seized by the police at the house where the applicant had left them. The court also referred to the applicant\u2019s admission during the pre-trial investigation that he had used the knife, that is the murder weapon, to cut paintings out of their frames. 34.  On 18 January 2011 the Supreme Court upheld the applicant\u2019s conviction and mitigated his sentence to fifteen years\u2019 imprisonment. 35.  On 12 July 2009 the applicant wrote to the head of the Security Service of Ukraine in the Lviv Region complaining that he had been ill\u2011treated in the course of his arrest and afterwards by the police. In particular, he stated that on the day of his arrest he had been going to a meeting with a certain Ms Z. when he had been approached by a stranger, who had turned out to be a police officer. Thinking that the stranger was trying to steal his phone, the applicant started running away. However, other officers tripped him up. He fell and the officers started kicking and punching him. The police officers continued to kick him once he was in their car and subsequently, in the place to which he was taken after his arrest. 36.  On 24 July 2009 the Chervonograd prosecutor\u2019s office and on 27 August 2009 the Pustomyty prosecutor\u2019s office refused to institute criminal proceedings in connection with the applicant\u2019s complaint. 37.  On 26 February 2010 the Lviv regional prosecutor\u2019s office (\u201cthe LRPO\u201d) quashed the decisions of 24 July and 27 August 2009 and remitted the case to the Chervonograd and Pustomyty prosecutors for further examination. The LRPO concluded that the pre-investigation enquiries had been incomplete. The LRPO indicated that the Chervonograd prosecutor\u2019s office should undertake a number of additional measures to establish the circumstances of the incident, most notably: (i) interview Ms Z. whom the applicant had been going to meet when he had been arrested; (ii) identify the ambulance staff who had visited the applicant on 6 December 2008 and interview them; (iii) interview the forensic medical expert to find out whether the injuries observed by the expert on the applicant on 6 December 2008 were consistent with the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment. 38.  On 26 March 2010 the Chervonograd prosecutor\u2019s office again refused to institute criminal proceedings against detectives I.Kot., V.Ye., I.G., R.M. of the Lviv Regional Police. The decision was based on the statements of the police detectives and the expert report of 6 December 2010. The detectives had stated that they had tripped up the applicant while he had been attempting to escape. The prosecutor\u2019s office concluded that that fall explained the applicant\u2019s injuries. On 28 March 2012 the Chervonograd Court upheld that decision, rejecting as unsubstantiated the applicant\u2019s argument that his injuries had resulted from ill-treatment. 39.  On 31 March 2010 the Pustomyty prosecutor\u2019s office refused to institute criminal proceedings against the investigator I.Ku. and two other officers of the Pustomyty Police. The decision was based on the interviews with the officers. The prosecutor\u2019s office also referred to the ITT records and an unspecified forensic medical expert report, according to which the applicant had had no injuries at the relevant time. The applicant was informed of that decision on 5 May 2011. 40.  On an unspecified date the decision of 31 March 2010 was overruled. 41.  On 18 May 2012 the Pustomyty prosecutor\u2019s office again refused to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers of the Pustomyty Police and of the Lviv Regional Police for lack of corpus delicti in their actions. The decision was based on the statements of the officers, who had denied the applicant\u2019s allegations. 42.  On 20 June 2013 the Pustomyty District Court quashed the decision of 18 May 2012. The court found numerous omissions in the pre-investigation inquiry, in particular that the authorities had failed to explore under what circumstances an ambulance had been called for the applicant while he had been in the ITT; they had also failed to examine the records from the facilities where the applicant had been detained. 43.  On 19 November 2012 a new Code of Criminal Procedure came into force. Under the new Code an investigation is commenced by creating an entry in the Unified Register of Pre-Trial Investigations (\u201cthe Register of Investigations\u201d) (see paragraph 51 below). 44.  On 15 March 2013 the Chervonograd Court granted the applicant\u2019s claim and ordered the Chervonograd prosecutor\u2019s office to create an entry in the Register of Investigations in order to investigate the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment. 45.  On 20 March 2013 the entry was created. 46.  On 21 March 2013 the Chervonograd prosecutor\u2019s office decided to discontinue the investigation. On an unspecified date the Chervonograd Court overruled that decision. 47.  On 2 July 2013 the Chervonograd prosecutor\u2019s office reopened the investigation and the applicant was questioned. He insisted that he had been ill-treated by police detectives I.Kot., V.Ye., I.G. and R.M. in the course of his arrest and on the way to the Pustomyty police station, where his arrest had been recorded. The police detectives were interviewed and denied any ill-treatment, insisting that the applicant had been injured when he had fallen while trying to flee. 48.  On 24 September 2013 the Chervonograd prosecutor\u2019s office decided to discontinue the investigation for lack of corpus delicti in the actions of detectives I.Kot., V.Ye, I.G. and R.M. The decision referred to an earlier decision of July 2009 to refuse to institute criminal proceedings, according to which the applicant had fallen while trying to flee from the police. As a result, he had sustained concussion and bruises. The decision also referred to a number of pieces of evidence supporting that version of events, most notably the statements of the police officers and the medical expert\u2019s report of 6 December 2008. 49.  The decision of 24 September 2013 was upheld by the Chervonograd Court on 7 February 2014 and by the Court of Appeal on 11 March 2014.", "references": ["9", "4", "7", "6", "5", "0", "3", "8", "2", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Hamburg. 6.  The applicant is a civil servant working as a lawyer for the Hamburg tax authorities. In 1995, the applicant was a board member of the local branch of a registered association called \u201cRed Aid\u201d. In this capacity he opened a bank account for the association. He and two other members of the association were authorised to draw on the account. The account was used for the deposit of donations and membership fees. The account data was therefore published, for example in brochures. In 2000 the applicant left the board of the association. 7.  In 2003, a third person reported to the police that he had bought a watch via eBay. The watch had turned out to be a fake. He had tried to rescind the purchase when he found out, but the seller \u2013 of whom he knew only the email address \u201csternschnuppe756@uboot.com\u201d \u2013 refused to cooperate. The police investigations showed that a certain Mr D. was registered with eBay as user of the email address \u201csternschnuppe756\u201d. The bank account registered for the email address \u201csternschnuppe756\u201d was the account of the \u201cRed Aid\u201d association. Investigations further showed that various other users, who were registered with eBay, cited the bank account of the \u201cRed Aid\u201d association as their bank account. The police also found out that the user of \u201csternschnuppe756\u201d had traded computer programmes via eBay. An investigation of the transactions of the \u201cRed Aid\u201d bank account showed that there had only been one transaction connected to eBay: eBay had tried to collect fees (EUR 36.33) on 7 October 2003. The \u201cRed Aid\u201d association had protested against the payment, which had been returned on 27 November 2003. Mr D. was questioned by the police. He explained, convincingly, that he had nothing to do with the email address \u201csternschnuppe756\u201d or the bank account of the \u201cRed Aid\u201d association. 8.  On 21 September 2004, upon a request of the prosecutor\u2019s office of Munich I, the Munich District Court issued a search warrant in respect of the applicant\u2019s home (and the home of three other members of the \u201cRed Aid\u201d association who were authorised to draw on the association\u2019s bank account) on suspicion that they had committed \u201ccopyright piracy\u201d by selling fake goods such as watches and computer programmes. The search warrant authorised the search and seizure of computers and documents containing information about the sale of the fake watch and the computer programmes. 9.  On 8 December 2004 the applicant\u2019s (shared) flat in Hamburg was searched. The police found none of the items they were searching for. Instead, by coincidence, the police found 463.732 grams of hashish, which contained 39.09 grams of pure THC (tetrahydrocannabinol), and two defective weighing scales in the flat. The amount and quality of the hashish was asserted by an expert. The amount was enough for 2606 consumption units. The criminal proceedings regarding the suspected \u201ccopyright piracy\u201d were discontinued. However, new proceedings for possession and trafficking of a substantial amount of drugs were initiated against the applicant. 1.  Proceedings before the Munich District Court and the Munich I Regional Court challenging the lawfulness of the search warrant and the house search 10.  The applicant, represented by counsel, lodged a complaint against the search warrant before the criminal courts arguing that the warrant, and consequently the search, had been unlawful and had infringed his constitutional right to respect for his home under Article 13 of the German Constitution (\u201cthe Basic Law\u201d; see paragraph 22, below). The Munich District Court and the Munich I Regional Court dismissed the complaint. 2.  First proceedings before the Federal Constitutional Court challenging the lawfulness of the search warrant and the house search 11.  The applicant subsequently lodged a constitutional complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court. 12.  On 13 November 2005 the Federal Constitutional Court held that the complaint was manifestly well-founded, found a violation of Article 13 of the Basic Law, declared the house search unlawful and quashed the search warrant and the decisions of the District and the Regional Court. The court left open whether the few indications supporting the initial suspicion that the applicant might have committed \u201ccopyright piracy\u201d justified the ordering of a search warrant. In any event, however, the Federal Constitutional Court ruled that having weighed the few indications supporting a suspicion that the applicant could have committed \u201ccopyright piracy\u201d against the massive impact of a house search on the applicant\u2019s constitutional right to respect for his home, the issuing of a search warrant and hence the house search had not been proportionate. It would have been possible and necessary to take other investigative measures that would have interfered less with the applicant\u2019s right before searching the applicant\u2019s home. 13.  On 29 July 2005 the applicant was indicted by the Hamburg prosecution on charges of possession of and trafficking in a substantial amount of drugs. On 24 January 2006 the Hamburg District Court convicted the applicant of possession of a substantial amount of drugs in less serious circumstances and imposed a ten months\u2019 suspended prison sentence. The judgment was exclusively based on the presence of hashish found during the house search of 8 December 2004. 14.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law before the Hamburg Court of Appeal, arguing that he should have been acquitted as the evidence found during the house search could not be admitted as evidence in the criminal proceedings for drug possession. As the search warrant had been invalidated by the Federal Constitutional Court, the police had never had a right to enter the applicant\u2019s shared flat and would therefore never have had a legal possibility of finding the drugs at the applicant\u2019s flat. Moreover, the seizure of the hashish had not even been covered by the unlawful search warrant. The infringement of the applicant\u2019s right to respect for his home had been so severe that the evidence which had coincidentally been found during the house search could not be admitted as evidence against the applicant. 15.  On 5 September 2006 the Court of Appeal quashed the District Court\u2019s judgment and referred the case back to the District Court because it was of the view that the District Court had not sufficiently examined whether the hashish belonged to the applicant. As he lived in a shared flat, the room, and hence the drugs, could have belonged to any of his flatmates. With regard to the admissibility of the evidence the Court of Appeal found that the hashish found during the search could be used as evidence against the applicant. The infringement of the applicant\u2019s basic rights with regard to the criminal proceedings concerning copyright piracy had not been so serious that the applicant\u2019s interest in respect for his home outweighed the public interest in prosecution. The Court of Appeal referred to the Federal Constitutional Court\u2019s case-law (see paragraph 26 below), according to which unlawfully obtained evidence could be used in criminal proceedings as long as, after a thorough balancing of the different interests at stake, the public interest in prosecution did not have to stand back against the right to respect for his home of the person concerned and as long as that person\u2019s rights had not been violated on purpose. It reiterated the Federal Constitutional Court\u2019s finding that the applicant\u2019s basic rights had been seriously infringed (see paragraph 12 above). Whether or not the search warrant had been sufficiently precise, and whether a sufficient initial suspicion for issuing a search warrant had been present or not, did not have to be determined because, even assuming that this had not been the case, such shortcomings did not render the obtained evidence unlawful. Because of the seriousness of the crime of drug possession, and the substantial amount of hashish found, the public interest in prosecution outweighed the applicant\u2019s interest in respect for his home. Furthermore, the applicant\u2019s rights had not been deliberately infringed, the house search had not been arbitrary and the amount of hashish found would theoretically have justified a house search. The Court of Appeal was hence of the view that the hashish found during the search could be used as evidence against the applicant. 3.  First set of proceedings before the Federal Constitutional Court challenging the admissibility of evidence found during the house search 16.  Considering that it was legally unclear whether or not the Court of Appeal\u2019s findings regarding the admissibility of the evidence found during the house search were binding on the lower courts, the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court. On 27 December 2006 the Federal Constitutional Court rejected the complaint as inadmissible. 17.  In the resumed proceedings before the Hamburg District Court, the applicant made a statement that the room in which the hashish had been found was exclusively used by him. On 18 April 2007 the District Court acquitted the applicant, ruling that the hashish found during the house search could not be used as evidence against him. The court noted that under the well-established case law of the Federal Constitutional Court (see paragraph 26 below) an unlawful house search did not automatically mean that the evidence seized during such a house search could not be used in the trial against the person concerned. Evidence might, however, be precluded if the violation of the applicant\u2019s right to respect for his home had been particularly serious. The court weighed the public interest in prosecuting the crime of possession of drugs against the applicant\u2019s interest in respect for his home. It was of the view that the initial suspicion that the applicant might have committed the offence of copyright piracy had been so vague that the issuing of a search warrant had not been justified at all. Hence, the applicant\u2019s right to respect for his home had been infringed in such a severe way that despite the seriousness of the crime of drug possession and the substantial amount of hashish found, the public interest in prosecution could not outweigh the applicant\u2019s interest in respect for his home. 18.  On 5 October 2007, on appeal by the prosecution, the Regional Court quashed the acquittal, convicted the applicant of possession of a substantial amount of drugs in less serious circumstances and sentenced him to a six months\u2019 suspended prison sentence. As regards the question whether the applicant had been in possession of the drugs the Regional Court relied on a statement of the applicant dated 13 March 2007 according to which the room in which the hashish had been found was solely used by himself. Furthermore, the Regional Court was of the view that the Court of Appeal\u2019s findings in its judgment of 5 September 2006 (see paragraph 15 above) on the admissibility of the hashish as the sole evidence were binding and that hence the hashish found in the applicant\u2019s flat could be used as evidence against him. Moreover, the court made it clear that even if the Court of Appeal\u2019s findings were not binding in this respect it was itself of the view that, weighing the applicant\u2019s interest in respect for his home against the public interest in prosecution, the latter prevailed and that the evidence was thus admissible. 19.  The applicant subsequently lodged a fresh appeal on points of law before the Court of Appeal, arguing that the Regional Court should not have admitted the evidence. On 16 September 2008 the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. The court weighed the public interest in prosecuting the crime of possession of drugs against the applicant\u2019s interest in respect for his home. It took the view that, considering the seriousness of the crime of drug possession and the substantial amount of hashish found, the public interest in prosecution outweighed the applicant\u2019s interest in respect for his home because the applicant\u2019s rights had not been deliberately infringed, the house search had not been arbitrary and the amount of hashish found would theoretically have justified a house search. 7. Second stage of the proceedings before the Federal Constitutional Court challenging the admissibility of the evidence obtained during the house search 20.  The applicant lodged a fresh constitutional complaint, arguing that the admission of the evidence infringed his right to respect for his home under Article 13 of the Basic Law and his right to a fair trial under Article 2 \u00a7 1 read in conjunction with Article 20 \u00a7 3 of the Basic Law (see paragraph 23 below). On 2 July 2009 the Federal Constitutional Court dismissed the complaint (file no. 2 BvR 2225/08). The decision was served on the applicant\u2019s counsel on 3 August 2009. The court assessed the applicant\u2019s arguments mainly under the head of Article 13 of the Basic Law. It held that the Court of Appeal had balanced all the interests at stake in a way that was neither arbitrary nor unreasonable and that the conviction of the applicant, although exclusively based on the evidence found during the house search, did not infringe the applicant\u2019s constitutional rights. With regard to the applicant\u2019s claim that the use of the hashish seized as evidence against him had violated his rights under Article 2 \u00a7 1 read in conjunction with Article 20 \u00a7 3 of the Basic Law, the court held that the principle of a fair trial had been applied in a way that was neither unjustifiable nor arbitrary. Hence the applicant\u2019s constitutional rights had not been violated. 21.   As the applicant was a civil servant, disciplinary proceedings were initiated in view of the criminal charges against him. The disciplinary proceedings were adjourned during the criminal proceedings. Following the conviction of the applicant by the criminal courts, the competent authorities formally noted that the applicant had committed a disciplinary offence and discontinued the proceedings as the offence had not been of a kind or degree demanding disciplinary measures.", "references": ["0", "3", "8", "9", "1", "4", "2", "6", "5", "7", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Suceava. At the relevant time, he was a journalist for a local newspaper Monitorul de Suceava (hereafter \u201cthe newspaper\u201d). 6.  On 26 August 2003 the applicant published an article under the title \u201cAn inhabitant of Verne\u015fti is wanted by police across the country, having been accused of breaking into the headquarters of the local branch of the Social Democratic Party\u201d (\u201cthe PSD\u201d).\nThe article, accompanied by a photograph of S.A., a suspect at the time, read as follows:\n\u201cS.A, aged 35, is accused of having stolen two television sets and approximately 17,000,000 Romanian lei (ROL) from the local headquarters of the PSD. As he has fled in order to avoid criminal investigation for the offence of aggravated theft, a general search has now been launched by the police (a fost dat \u00een urm\u0103rire general\u0103) and his photograph is now on the desk of the policemen of the judicial service [Biroul Judiciar] throughout the country.\nAn inhabitant of Verne\u015fti is wanted by police officers throughout the country, as he is the main suspect in a case of breaking and entering at the headquarters of the PSD in Suceava. S.A., aged 35, is suspected of being one of the organisers of the burglary of the local headquarters of the governing party committed at the end of last year. The night before Christmas Eve 2002 was marked by bad luck for the PSD in Suceava, as thieves visited their headquarters. On the morning of 24 December some of the members of this party arrived at the headquarters located in the centre of Suceava ... [and] noticed that the headquarters had been ravaged. After checking inside, they realised there had been a burglary and that the thieves had stolen two televisions and approximately ROL 17,000,000. While searching for valuables, the thieves vandalised the offices, breaking all the doors, and yanking the televisions from the electric sockets. Following an investigation by the Suceava police, the main suspect was identified as S.A., who has been missing from his place of residence since that date. S.A. (see photo) fled in order to avoid criminal investigation for the offence of aggravated theft and so a general search has been instituted and his photograph has been sent to judicial service police officers throughout the country. In a case where someone tries to avoid \u2018getting nicked\u2019 [p\u00e2rnaie] by fleeing, despite being sought by the police, a countywide search is launched. If the person is not found within ninety days, the police launch a national search. In a case where there is information that the person has left the country, an international arrest warrant is issued, and the arrest of the fugitive is only a matter of time.\u201d 7.  Following the publication of the article, the father of S.A. sent a letter to the newspaper, which read as follows:\n\u201cTo the editor of Monitorul de Suceava,\nThe undersigned A.D. found out from your newspaper that there was a national and local search order for my son, A.S., for the offence of aggravated theft. Regarding the [content of the] article, I can tell you that [at the time] my son was neither in the country nor in Suceava county as he was in Italy. The employees of the Suceava County Police Inspectorate promptly informed me that there had been a mistake and that the general search for my son had been called off. The document confirming this information is available to the public from the Suceava judicial service.\nMy wish would be to have the article retracted.\u201d 8.  This letter was published in the newspaper on 29 August 2003. 9.  On 15 September 2003 S.A. lodged with the Suceava District Court a criminal complaint against the applicant for the offence of defamation, as prescribed at the time by Article 206 of the Romanian Criminal Code. After explaining that at the time of the theft he was in Italy and thus it was impossible for him to have participated in the alleged offence, he mentioned that once his father had found out about the article, he had written to the newspaper, asking that it be retracted. The letter was published unedited, but nothing else was done since then. S.A. considered that the article contained serious allegations which considerably affected his public image, causing him personal suffering.\nHe therefore requested that those responsible be convicted and ordered to pay him non-pecuniary damages in the amount of ROL 100,000,000. 10.  In his defence the applicant submitted that the information concerning the general search for S.A., as well as the photograph of S.A., were given to him on 25 August 2003 by the Suceava judicial service and thus there had been no reason for him to doubt it. He contended that at the time of the publication, the general search order issued in respect of S.A. was valid.\nHe further argued that he did publish a retraction in the newspaper, namely the letter of S.A.\u2019s father. 11.  On 17 October 2003, the head of the Police Department of Suceava informed the first-instance court that:\n\u201cIn response to your letter in which you enquire whether on 25 August 2003 a general search order was outstanding against S.A. ... I wish to inform you that on 31 December 2002 by Order no. 124000 of the General Inspectorate of the Romanian Police a general search order was issued in respect of this person as he was attempting to avoid criminal investigation while under suspicion of theft. The measure was revoked by Order no S/150522 of the General Inspectorate of the Romanian Police on 3 September 2003, after clarification of S.A.\u2019s situation\u201d. 12.  On 19 November 2003 the court acquitted the applicant of the charge of defamation; however it ordered the applicant to pay, jointly with the newspaper, the sum of ROL 10,000,000 to S.A. The relevant excerpts from the judgment read as follows:\n\u201cTaking into account the fact that the applicant obtained information concerning the suspect from the judicial office within the General Police Inspectorate, he cannot be found to have deliberately (mens rea) defamed the plaintiff ...\nUnder the civil limb of the action, defamation concerns public communication of a distorted, negative image of a person, which is likely to cause him or her personal suffering and damage to reputation, leading to changes such as social embarrassment and injury to self-esteem. The first-instance court considers that publishing the article in the newspaper caused damage to the standing of the civil party ...\nMoreover, it must be noted that although the civil party\u2019s father notified the newspaper that the facts published about his son were false, the newspaper did not publish a retraction of the article written by the defendant.\u201d 13.  By a final judgment of 23 January 2004 the Suceava County Court rejected an appeal by the applicant and upheld the first-instance court\u2019s judgment.\nThe court stated in its reasoning the following:\n\u201cEven though there is no mens rea as far as the offence of defamation provided for in Article 206 of the Criminal Code is concerned, given the source of information at the date of the publishing of the article, the defendant\u2019s obligation to pay compensation to the civil party cannot be set aside. This is because following the discovery of the error he did not publish a retraction in order to try to rectify it. The article caused non-pecuniary damage to the civil party which can be repaired only in the manner established by the first-instance court\u201d.", "references": ["1", "2", "7", "0", "9", "5", "4", "6", "3", "8", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicants were employed by HK Komgrap ad Komgrap-Maki\u0161 doo, a company based in Belgrade (hereinafter \u201cthe debtor\u201d). At the relevant time, the company was predominantly socially-owned. 6.  Since the debtor had failed to fulfil its obligations towards its employees, the applicants brought a civil claim seeking payment of salary arrears and various social security contributions. 7.  On 23 June 2003 the Belgrade Second Municipal Court (Drugi op\u0161tinski sud u Beogradu) ordered the debtor to pay to the applicants certain sums in respect of salary arrears and various social security contributions. This judgment became final and enforceable on 25 July 2005. 8.  On 26 September 2005 the applicants applied to the Belgrade Fourth Municipal Court (\u010cetvrti op\u0161tinski sud u Beogradu) for enforcement of the judgment of 23 June 2003. 9.  On 18 January 2006 the said court ordered the enforcement of the judgment and awarded the applicants the costs incurred in the enforcement proceedings. 10.  The Government maintained that the debtor had been sold in 2007 to a private company. 11.  The applicants disagreed and claimed that it was, in fact, a different company that had been privatised in 2007. 12.  The Government submitted that bankruptcy proceedings had been instituted in respect of the debtor on 22 July 2010 and had been terminated on 10 June 2013. 13.  The applicants disagreed and claimed that it was, in fact, a different company that went into bankruptcy in 2013. 14.  In their additional observations the Government submitted that bankruptcy proceedings had been instituted in respect of the debtor on 24 July 2013 and had been terminated on 8 November 2013 when the decision to institute bankruptcy proceedings had been quashed. 15.  On 27 October 2010 the applicants lodged a constitutional appeal, seeking redress for the non-enforcement of the judgment in question. 16.  On 27 November 2013 the Constitutional Court held that the applicants had suffered a breach of the \u201cright to a trial within a reasonable time\u201d with regard to the enforcement proceedings. The court, however, did not award them compensation for non-pecuniary damage, finding that only the period after the applicants had continued the enforcement proceedings following the death of their relatives (on 9 July 2013 and 15 May 2013, respectively) could be taken into account. 17.  On 27 November 2013 the Constitutional Court held that the applicants had suffered a breach of the \u201cright to a trial within a reasonable time\u201d with regard to the enforcement proceedings. The court ordered the acceleration of the proceedings and declared that the applicants were entitled to compensation for the non-pecuniary damage suffered in the amount of EUR 800 each, converted into the national currency at the rate applicable at the date of settlement. 18.  The Constitutional Court held that since the enforcement proceedings in question had not yet been completed, the constitutional appeals were premature in so far as they concerned pecuniary damage, and dismissed the appeals in that regard.", "references": ["2", "8", "1", "0", "4", "5", "7", "6", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1941 and lives in Murmansk. 6.  The applicant sued the local office of the Pension Fund, claiming that her monthly pension had been miscalculated. 7.  On 12 September 2003 the Pervomayskiy District Court of Murmansk granted her claim and ordered that the pension due to the applicant be recalculated and increased. No appeal was lodged against that judgment and on 23 September 2003 it became final and enforceable. 8.  On 11 August 2005 the Pervomayskiy District Court of Murmansk quashed the judgment of 12 September 2003 and reopened the proceedings after an application by the respondent authority on the grounds that new circumstances had come to light. 9.  On 23 August 2005 the same court rejected the applicant\u2019s pension recalculation claim.", "references": ["2", "4", "6", "5", "0", "1", "7", "8", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Chisinau. 6.  In January 2008 the Balti police organised an undercover operation with the purpose of apprehending a criminal group specialised in the production and circulation of forged documents. For that purpose an advertisement was placed in a local newspaper specialised in advertising, stating as follows: \u201cNeed help with obtaining passport (Romanian-Bulgarian)\u201d followed by a telephone number. 7.  According to the applicant, at that time he was interested in leaving Moldova for Romania or another country in the European Union in order to find a job. He was therefore interested in obtaining a Romanian passport which would facilitate his plans. Since he understood the newspaper advertisement as proposing assistance with obtaining Romanian passports, he called the number from it and met a person who introduced himself as E. During their conversation he understood that E. was himself looking for a Romanian passport. Both men agreed to let each other know in the event that one of them found an easy way of obtaining a Romanian passport. 8.  Some time later a friend of the applicant (D.) recommended to him a person called Z. who could help obtain a Romanian passport in a short time. Both D. and Z. confirmed during the subsequent court proceedings that it was D. who had recommended Z. to the applicant in March 2008. The applicant met Z. and found out that his services cost 1,500 euros (EUR), a sum of money which he did not possess at the time. 9.  It appears from the materials of the case-file that approximately three weeks after the applicant\u2019s first meeting with E., the latter called him to find out whether he had progressed in his search for a way of obtaining a Romanian passport. This was submitted by the applicant in the proceedings and not contested by the prosecution. The applicant informed E. that he had found a person, Z., who could help in exchange for EUR 1,500 and proposed to put E. in contact with Z. However, E. refused to get into direct contact with Z. and informed the applicant that he did not have the money at the time. He also told the applicant that he had an acquaintance T. who was also interested in obtaining a Romanian passport and proposed a deal to the applicant. In particular, he proposed to him to act as an intermediary between Z. and T. and tell T. that the price was EUR 2,300. The difference of EUR 800 between the price asked by Z. and the sum paid by T. was to be split between the applicant and E. This information was not contested by the prosecution during the proceedings. The applicant accepted E.\u2019s proposal and agreed to arrange a meeting with T. 10.  The applicant then discussed the matter with Z., who gave him a list of documents necessary for T.\u2019s new Romanian identity card. The applicant submitted during the proceedings that he had been convinced at the time that the identity card was not going to be forged and that Z. would only act as a representative of T. before the Romanian authorities. This information was contested by Z. during proceedings, who stated that he had informed the applicant from the very beginning that T.\u2019s Romanian identity card was going to be false and that he was to avoid travelling to Romania with it. 11.  On 3 April 2008 the applicant met with T. and obtained from him the necessary documents and an advance of EUR 750 for which he had written and submitted to T. a receipt. He then transmitted the money and the documents to Z. The identity card was later produced in the United Kingdom and reached Z. and then the applicant by the middle of April 2008. On 16 April 2008 the applicant met with T. and gave him the identity card in exchange for the rest of the money. He was then arrested by the police. 12.  On 17 April 2008 an official criminal investigation was initiated against the applicant on charges of manufacturing and trading with forged official documents. 13.  In the meantime, Z. signed an agreement with the prosecutors acknowledging his guilt and was convicted on the basis of that agreement and given a suspended sentence of four years. 14.  During the criminal proceedings the applicant argued inter alia that he had been entrapped by E. and T. and requested that they be heard in court. The court of first instance refused to hear E. and T. and referred to the fact that the law governing undercover operations made it possible to hear undercover officers in court only if they consented to that. 15.  On 17 December 2008 the Balti District Court found the applicant guilty of participating in the production of a false Romanian identity card and of selling it to T. The court sentenced him to a criminal fine of some EUR 200. The judgment did not make any mention of the applicant\u2019s assertion concerning incitement. 16.  The applicant lodged an appeal in which he submitted inter alia that the first instance court had not paid attention to the fact that the offence had been committed as a result of police incitement and that the court had refused to hear the persons who had entrapped him. 17.  During the appeal proceedings, the applicant asked again that E. and T. be heard in court. Initially the Court of Appeal agreed to hear them; however, later it decided otherwise. 18.  On 4 March 2009 the Balti Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal and confirmed the judgment of the first instance court. The court examined the applicant\u2019s argument concerning entrapment and dismissed it on the sole ground that it was the applicant who had first telephoned the number indicated in the newspaper advertisement. In so far as the issue concerning the hearing of E. and T. was concerned, the court considered that that was not important as their statements had not been used against the applicant. Moreover, according to the law, they could not be heard unless they agreed to that. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law and submitted the same arguments as in his appeal. 19.  On 8 July 2009 the Supreme Court of Justice dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law and upheld the previous judgments.", "references": ["0", "2", "8", "9", "7", "1", "4", "6", "5", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Shadrinsk. 6.  On 20 August 2003 the Shadrinsk Town Court of the Kurgan Region convicted him of murder and sentenced him to ten years\u2019 imprisonment. On 29 October 2003 the Kurgan Regional Court upheld the conviction on appeal. 7.  The applicant is HIV-positive and at the material time also suffered from tuberculosis and hepatitis. 8.  On 25 December 2008 the applicant was transferred to the LIU OF\u201173/3 medical facility (\u043b\u0435\u0447\u0435\u0431\u043d\u043e-\u0438\u0441\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e\u0435 \u0443\u0447\u0440\u0435\u0436\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435) in the Kurgan Region and was detained in the following wards:\n(a)  quarantine ward 24 from 25 to 30 December 2008 and from 18 to 30 June 2009;\n(b)  ward 25 from 30 December 2008 to 28 May 2009 and from 30 June to 21 September 2009; and\n(c)  ward 26 from 21 September to 3 November 2009. 9.  According to the applicant, the wards were severely overcrowded. For instance, ward 25 measured approximately 80 square metres, was equipped with fifteen two-tier bunk beds and housed twenty-seven inmates. Passages between the beds, lengthwise, were as narrow as fifty centimetres and were used by four inmates. The wards were poorly lit as the windows were covered with louvre shutters blocking access to natural light. 10.  According to the Government, ward 24 measured 61.49 square metres, had sixteen sleeping places and accommodated up to sixteen inmates. Ward 25 measured 67.5 square metres, was equipped with thirteen two-tier bunk beds and housed up to twenty-six inmates. Finally, ward 28 measured 49.4 square metres and accommodated fifteen inmates. The applicant was provided with an individual sleeping place at all times. All wards had access to natural light. 11.  In support of their submissions, the Government provided original floor plans and ward population registers containing information about the exact number of inmates in each ward for the whole period the applicant was in the LIU OF-73/3 facility. They also submitted a prosecutor\u2019s report dated 11 October 2010 regarding the conditions there. It indicated, in particular, that windows in all wards were fitted with metal louvre shutters. 12.  On 9 February 2009 the medical facility authorities issued an order introducing visiting fees for inmates and their families. The calculation table annexed to the order specified that a fee of 320 Russian roubles (approximately 9 euros) per day per person would be payable, covering maintenance charges, prison staff salaries, the depreciation of visiting room equipment, bed linen and cleaning products. 13.  On 14 April 2009 the director of the Federal Service for the Execution of Sentences sent a letter to the heads of Russian penal facilities, reminding them that charging visitors and detainees for family visits was in breach of Article 89 of the Code on the Execution of Sentences (see paragraph 17 below) and that facility administrations must bear the costs of providing rooms for long-term visits. Only additional services are payable by detainees in accordance with the Internal Regulations of Correctional Facilities (see paragraph 20 below). 14.  On 22 April 2009 the applicant was authorised to see his two daughters on a long-term family visit. He calculated that a three-day visit from them would cost RUB 1,920, which was far beyond their means. His daughters did visit him, but stayed only one day instead of the expected three, as they did not have enough money on them to stay any longer. 15.  On 22 August 2009 the applicant\u2019s daughters visited their father again, this time free of charge. 16.  On 29 April 2010 the applicant received a letter from the Court dated 19 March 2010 in the correspondence department of the OF-73/2 correctional facility, to which he had been transferred in February 2010. It was handed over to him in an open envelope and he was told to sign a copy which had been attached to his personal file.", "references": ["7", "8", "3", "9", "6", "2", "0", "5", "No Label", "1", "4"], "gold": ["1", "4"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1970 and lives in Chisinau. 6.  At the time of the events in question, the applicant was a high-ranking police officer. On 26 March 2008 he was arrested on suspicion of being part of a criminal gang specialised in the smuggling of heroin through Moldova to the European Union. His arrest took place as a result of the seizure of a large quantity of heroin in Chi\u015fin\u0103u. He was indicted with the offence of circulating large quantities of narcotics, an offence provided for in Article 217/1 of the Criminal Code and punishable with seven to twenty years of imprisonment. 7.  On 5 September 2008 the criminal investigation into the circumstances of the case was completed and the case was referred to a trial court for determination. 8.  On 21 October 2009 the applicant was found guilty of having committed other offences than that for which he had been put in detention on remand and sentenced to five years and nine months\u2019 imprisonment. The offences of which the applicant was found guilty concerned negligence, abuse of power and aiding and abetting in the commission of an offence. On 21 June 2010 the judgment was set aside by the Chisinau Court of Appeal and the applicant was released from detention. The proceedings are still pending. 9.  Between his arrest and his sentencing the applicant was detained on remand. A detention warrant was issued every month and the reasons given for prolonging his detention were the same throughout the entire period: the applicant had been accused of a serious criminal offence punishable by more than two years\u2019 imprisonment and there was a risk he might abscond or hinder the investigation. All of the applicant\u2019s habeas corpus requests were dismissed. 10.  The applicant was detained in two detention facilities. Between his arrest and 17 November 2008 he was detained in solitary confinement at the detention facility of the Centre for Fighting Economic Crime and Corruption (CFECC) and between 17 November 2008 and 21 June 2010 he was held in Prison no. 13. According to the applicant, the conditions of detention in Prison no. 13 were tantamount to inhuman and degrading treatment. In particular, the cells were dirty and overcrowded. In the cell in which the applicant was detained, each inmate had only 2.5 square metres of available space. The food was of a very poor quality, the inmates smoked, and he was held along with detainees convicted of violent crimes who threatened him with violence on account of his status as a police officer. The inmates were not provided with bed linen and the cell was infected with vermin. 11.  During his detention the applicant\u2019s state of health deteriorated and a panel of doctors diagnosed him with gastritis, duodenitis, pancreatitis, hepatitis and hypertension. They recommended he be hospitalised for in-patient treatment. The applicant was hospitalised between 7 October and 17 November 2008 in a prison hospital belonging to the Ministry of Justice but he refused treatment, asking instead to be treated in a military hospital accredited by the Ministry of Healthcare. His request was rejected on grounds which were not communicated to the Court by the parties.", "references": ["0", "4", "7", "5", "6", "9", "3", "8", "No Label", "1", "2"], "gold": ["1", "2"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1965 and lives in Chi\u0219in\u0103u. 7.  The applicant was serving a sentence of eleven years\u2019 imprisonment in Prison no. 13 in Chi\u0219in\u0103u. On 28 October 2006 he and five other detainees were in cell no. 20, reserved for the medical treatment of detainees with mental problems. Three of them, including the applicant, had a Category 2 disability. The applicant\u2019s diagnosis was, inter alia, personality disorder. 8.  At around 3 p.m. several men entered the cell to search for prohibited items. Some of the men wore dark masks and they were armed with rubber truncheons and metal shields. They ordered everyone out. According to the applicant, the masked men shouted at the detainees and insulted them, while hitting and pushing them. The Government dispute that any force was used or that there was any improper behaviour on the part of the men who had entered the cell. While in the corridor the detainees were ordered to stand with their faces to the wall. The search lasted for approximately half an hour. One prison officer recorded the events on video. 9.  The detainees were then ordered back into the cell. According to the applicant, when he saw their possessions, including food brought to them by their relatives, medication and documents, scattered on the floor and in total disorder, he declared that he would return to the cell only after a prosecutor or a representative of the prison administration had made a report on the search and the disorder caused. He was then hit and thrown to the floor, kicked in the stomach, and the cell door was slammed with force while his foot was between the door and the doorpost, causing him great pain. His reading glasses fell to the ground and were smashed by one of the masked men. The Government submitted that no force had been used and that the cell had been left in good order. 10.  After the search the applicant complained about his swollen foot and was taken by ambulance to a hospital in Chi\u0219in\u0103u at around 7 p.m. The doctor who examined him in that hospital diagnosed him with contusion of the soft tissues of the right ankle and a suspected fracture of the bone. His foot was then put in plaster. 11.  On 31 October 2006 the applicant complained about ill-treatment to the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office, the military prosecutor\u2019s office and other State authorities. Four other detainees who had been held in the same cell made similar complaints. 12.  On 28 November 2006 the applicant was examined by another doctor, who confirmed the diagnosis of a broken bone and found a haematoma on his right foot, corresponding to signs of violence and leading to long-lasting health problems (over twenty-one days). Further forensic examinations were carried out on 1 and 28 December 2006 and 3 May 2007. According to the applicant, these certificates confirmed that he had suffered an injury to his right foot. According to the Government, a further forensic examination carried out on 31 October 2007 contradicted the results of the previous ones, finding no conclusive evidence that the applicant had had a broken bone. The parties did not submit full copies of the last three reports mentioned above. 13.  On 6 December 2006 a prosecutor from the Chi\u0219in\u0103u Military Prosecutor\u2019s Office decided not to start a criminal investigation into the complaints made by the applicant and other detainees. 14.  On 8 December 2006 a prosecutor from the Chi\u0219in\u0103u Prosecutor\u2019s Office started a criminal investigation into the applicant\u2019s allegations. 15.  Between 28 November and 5 December 2007 several individuals, members of the \u201cPantera\u201d special forces battalion who had taken part in the action of 28 October 2006, were charged with exceeding their powers by using excessive force against the applicant. 16.  On 15 February 2008 a prosecutor from the Chi\u0219in\u0103u Prosecutor\u2019s Office discontinued the criminal investigation. He found that on 28 October 2006 the applicant had disobeyed lawful orders of the prison staff during the search of his cell, acted provocatively, and refused to return to his cell. He had had to be taken there by force. Moreover, it could not be ruled out that he had caused injuries to himself in order to subsequently accuse the authorities of ill-treatment. The prosecutor noted that the applicant and four other detainees in cell no. 20 had confirmed, in their complaints and statements made to the investigator during the criminal investigation, that the masked men who had entered the cell on 28 October 2006 had caused great disorder, had insulted the detainees, and had hit them with rubber truncheons. 17.  According to the statement of detainee S.B., on 28 October 2006 the detainees were taken out of cell no. 20 and ordered to stand facing the wall for approximately half an hour while their cell was being searched. They were then moved back to their cell, again by force. S.B. witnessed one of the masked officers slamming the cell door and crushing the applicant\u2019s foot, threatening to break his hands if he continued to write complaints. Having watched the videotape of the search, S.B. submitted that the filming was selective, not showing the acts of violence in order to shield those who had carried them out from responsibility. At the end of the search the leader of the masked men did not identify himself and did not fill in any report about the incident. 18.  Detainees A.G., V.Z. and B.I. made similar statements, each declaring that he had been personally hit and insulted and that the applicant\u2019s foot had been shut in the cell door. The applicant\u2019s statement was similar to those of the other detainees. He added that the video footage shown to him was only about six minutes long, while the entire event had lasted for approximately thirty minutes. Moreover, the various parts of the film were clearly not in chronological order. 19.  One detainee, (V.S.), who had been taking his daily exercise during the search, confirmed seeing upon his return great disorder in the cell, with all the food and personal items broken up and thrown to the ground, and the detainees cleaning up the mess and complaining about being hit during the search. 20.  Another witness, a member of the prison staff (I.V.), stated that he did not see any violence towards the detainees or any disorder being created in cell no. 20 during the search of 28 October 2006. Another member of the prison staff (P.P.), who was the head of the medical unit of Prison no. 13, stated that after the search on 28 October 2006 he saw disorder in cell no. 20, but did not see any food on the ground. The search lasted for approximately thirty minutes. He did not see the detainees re-enter their cell, but heard the conflict between the applicant and the masked men. He did not see any violence being used, but could admit that force had been used. Later on the applicant complained of pain in his foot and was taken to the emergency hospital, from which he returned with his foot in plaster. 21.  According to witness A.P., who worked as a nurse in Prison no. 13, on 28 October 2006 she came to work at 4 p.m. and was called to cell no. 20, where the applicant was complaining of sharp pain in his foot. He was then taken to hospital by ambulance and returned with his foot in plaster. The cell was in disorder; the patients were agitated and were asking for urgent medical assistance for the applicant. During the initial examination A.P. found that the applicant\u2019s foot was seriously swollen. He then told her that he had been hit by the officers during the search. 22.  Witness E.B., a medical assistant in Prison no. 13, stated that she had not seen any of the events and had only heard the noise. She was later told by A.P. that after the search the applicant had asked for medical assistance to treat his foot. 23.  According to witness P.C., a supervisor in Prison no. 13, on 28 October 2006 he was informed that someone was asking for medical assistance in cell no. 20, and sent A.P. there. When he himself entered the cell P.C. saw personal belongings and food scattered on the ground. The applicant then told him that the masked men had caused the disorder and had beaten them up, and that his foot hurt as a result of that beating. He also declared that during that day the applicant had not made any complaints about his state of health, but immediately after the search had complained of sharp pain in the foot. He was limping when he was taken to the ambulance. 24.  According to witness M.M., a feldsher (paramedic) in Prison no. 13, on 28 October 2006 at 5 p.m he saw the applicant, who complained that he had been beaten up earlier, during the search. M.M. did not see any visible injury on the applicant\u2019s body; the applicant could move his feet freely, but his right foot was swollen in the ankle area. The applicant limped when taken to the ambulance. 25.  Three witnesses (A.V., O.H., and V.D.), all members of the prison staff, declared that they did not witness any violence against the detainees, or any disorder in cell no. 20. 26.  (V.N.) stated that he had filmed \u201ccertain parts of the search\u201d on a video recorder, using an 8 mm video cassette. He had not witnessed any disorder or violence towards the detainees. 27.  Witnesses V.B. and I.I., who coordinated the actions of the various groups of prison staff and the Pantera special forces regiment (the masked men), declared that after the search their teams did not report having used force on anyone or having had any exceptional situation to deal with. Only the applicant had been uncooperative, but he was eventually persuaded to return to the cell without using force. 28.  The prosecutor\u2019s decision further analysed several reports in the file, including a report confirming the destruction of the applicant\u2019s reading glasses. A video filmed by V.N. during the event, lasting for six minutes and thirty-six seconds and registered on a compact disk, showed the detainees leaving their cell voluntarily; the presence in the cell of masked men; the applicant\u2019s request to be allowed to take his belongings with him and the refusal of that request; it showed various objects in the cell and the presence in it of detainee V.Z. The cell was in good order. The next scene showed the applicant refusing to comply with I.V.\u2019s order to return to the cell. The next scene showed the applicant sitting on the ground and asking for a prosecutor to be called, affirming that he would not move until the prosecutor saw what had happened to the food and belongings in the cell and a report was made about the event. The last scene showed the cell door being closed. Someone could be heard hitting the door from the inside and the applicant\u2019s voice shouting \u201cI\u2019m going to kill myself, I\u2019m going to cut myself\u201d and \u201cwhere is the map with documents, they took my map with documents\u201d. 29.  The prosecutor found that the video recording did not prove that violence had been used, and that the sound of the cell door being struck, heard at the end of the recording, allowed the supposition that the injury to the applicant\u2019s foot could have been self-inflicted. 30.  On 10 March 2008 the deputy Prosecutor General quashed the decision of 15 February 2008 and ordered a more thorough investigation. 31.  On 17 April 2008 a prosecutor discontinued the criminal investigation, essentially for the same reasons as those mentioned in the decision of 15 February 2008. 32.  By a final decision of 12 August 2008 an investigating judge of the Buiucani District Court upheld the decision of 17 April 2008. The judge found that while the law allowed complaints about violations of fundamental rights and freedoms, the applicant\u2019s complaint concerned the admissibility and evaluation of evidence obtained in criminal proceedings. However, the investigating judge did not have the competence to evaluate evidence in a criminal or civil trial. 33.  The applicant lodged an extraordinary appeal (recurs \u00een anulare) to the Supreme Court of Justice, and asked for the decision of 12 August 2008 to be quashed. 34.  On 1 October 2009 the Supreme Court of Justice rejected his request, finding that the Buiucani District Court had adopted a lawful decision after analysing the evidence in the file.", "references": ["3", "4", "5", "2", "7", "6", "9", "0", "8", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "4.  Mr Gerardo Men\u00e9ndez Garc\u00eda (\u201cthe first applicant\u201d) was born in 1964 and lives in Gargantada (Langreo). Mr Sigifredo \u00c1lvarez Gonz\u00e1lez (\u201cthe second applicant\u201d) was born in 1956 and lives in Sant Jordi de Cercs (Barcelona). 5.  On 2000 the applicants acted as intermediary (purchase agent) in the sale of three cars, sold to a company. As a result of this sale, on 20 November 2000 criminal investigations were instituted by the Gij\u00f3n no. 1 investigating judge against the applicants and other eight suspects for fraud and forgery of documents. 6.  On 16 April 2001 and 18 April 2001, respectively, the applicants were detained, charged with document forgery and informed about the rights they were entitled as detainees. They were subsequently interrogated by the Guardia Civil in the presence of their lawyer. 7.  On 8 November 2004 the Judge issued a decision (auto) ordering the initiation of oral proceedings (apertura de juicio oral) and set the complete file to the Asturias Audiencia Provincial. 8.  On 6 May 2009 the hearings before the Asturias Audiencia Provincial took place. 9.  On 5 June 2009 the Asturias Audiencia Provincial sentenced the first applicant to a three years and six months\u2019 imprisonment, and the second applicant to a five years\u2019 imprisonment for fraud and document forgery. The Asturias Audiencia Provincial refused the applicants\u2019 request to reduce the sentence in view of the undue delay of proceedings, as prescribed in Article 21 of the Criminal Code. The Asturias Audiencia Provincial acknowledged that the proceedings had been \u201cunusually\u201d long, but this was due to the complexity of the case, namely the difficulties in gathering evidences within different jurisdictions, the great number of parties involved, the difficulty faced when trying to notify some of the defendants, as well as the applicants\u2019 conduct, whose lawyers had lacked celerity in presenting their submissions. 10.  The applicants lodged a cassation appeal before the Supreme Court. On 27 May 2010 the Supreme Court partially ruled in favour of the applicants and sentenced them both to three years and eight months\u2019 imprisonment for fraud. However, the Supreme Court rejected the claims of undue delay of proceedings. The Supreme Court considered that even though the proceedings might have appeared excessively long, the Asturias Audiencia Provincial had provided a sounded and detailed justification for the duration of the proceedings. 11.  Both applicants lodged an amparo appeal with the Constitutional Court complaining, inter alia, about the undue length of the proceedings. 12.  By two decisions of 20 May 2011 and 12 September 2011, respectively (served on 25 May 2011 and 23 September 2011), the Constitutional Court declared both appeals inadmissible on the grounds that they lacked the constitutional relevance provided for in Article 50 \u00a7 1 b) of the Organic Law on the Constitutional Court.", "references": ["0", "9", "2", "7", "1", "8", "5", "6", "4", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant is a limited liability company registered under Hungarian law, with its seat in Budapest. 5.  On 24 November 1998 the applicant initiated a civil lawsuit against two companies requesting the court to declare invalid a real estate sale and purchase agreement concluded between these two companies. 6.  The Budapest Regional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim on 26 February 2004. On appeal, the Budapest Court of Appeal quashed the judgment on 5 November 2004. 7.  The first-instance court re-heard the case and dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim on 13 October 2005. On appeal, the second-instance court upheld the judgment on 9 November 2006. The applicant challenged the judgment before the Supreme Court which quashed it on 13 September 2007. 8.  In the resumed proceedings the Budapest Court of Appeal quashed, on 20 March 2008, the first-instance court\u2019s judgment. 9.  On 18 March 2009 the Budapest Regional Court as first\u2011instance court dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim. On appeal, the Budapest Court of Appeal upheld the judgment on 17 December 2009. The applicant challenged the judgment before the Supreme Court but to no avail. The Supreme Court upheld the final and binding judgment on 13 September 2010 (served on 27 October 2010).", "references": ["4", "9", "6", "0", "7", "5", "1", "8", "2", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant, Mr Mikhail Novruk, is a Moldovan national who was born in 1972. He is represented before the Court by Ms I. Khrunova, a lawyer practising in Kazan. 7.  In 2000, Mr Novruk and Ms O., a Russian national, started living together as a couple in Moldova. In 2001, a boy was born to their union; he acquired Russian nationality by birth. Two years later O. and their son moved to the Primorskiy region of Russia, where most of her family lived. In 2005 Mr Novruk joined them in Russia, and in the same year they married. They divorced in 2008. 8.  In 2009, Mr Novruk met Ms S., a Russian national. In March 2010, he travelled to Moldova to renew his passport, where he discovered that he was HIV-positive. Three weeks later Mr Novruk returned to Vladivostok and on 24 April 2010 he and S. married. S. has a daughter from her previous marriage and she is also a foster parent to nine orphaned children, some of whom are HIV-positive. 9.  In June 2010 Mr Novruk applied to the Primorskiy Region Federal Migration Service for a temporary residence permit. By a letter of 8 July 2010 he was informed that his application was refused by reference to section 7 \u00a7 1 (13) of the Foreign Nationals Act, which restricted the issue of residence permits to foreign nationals who could show that they were HIV\u2011negative. 10.  On 4 October 2010 the Sovetskiy District Court of Vladivostok, dismissed a challenge by the applicant to that decision, finding in particular that the Federal Migration Service had been required by law to reject his application for a residence permit. On 16 November 2010 the Primorskiy Regional Court upheld that judgment on appeal. 11.  The applicant Ms Anna Viktorovna Kravchenko is a Ukrainian national who was born in 1982. She is represented before the Court by Ms N. Yermolayeva, a lawyer practising in Moscow. 12.  In 2003, Ms Kravchenko married Mr D., a Russian national. They started living in Moscow. During her pregnancy she was diagnosed as HIV\u2011positive. On 4 April 2003 her son F. was born. He acquired Russian nationality by birth. 13.  In 2009, Ms Kravchenko applied for a temporary residence permit. By a letter of 25 May 2009 the Federal Migration Service refused her application by reference to section 7 \u00a7 1 (13) of the Foreign Nationals Act and ordered her to leave Russia within fifteen days or face deportation. Ms Kravchenko challenged the refusal with the courts. 14.  On 23 September 2009 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court, Moscow, found for Ms Kravchenko, noting in particular that the Migration Service had decided on her application without taking into account that her minor child and husband were both Russian nationals. It directed the Migration Service to reconsider the application. 15.  Further to the District Court\u2019s decision, Ms Kravchenko lodged a new application for a residence permit. On 15 January 2010 the Migration Service rejected it, referring to the same provision of the Foreign Nationals Act. 16.  Ms Kravchenko applied again for a judicial review. By a judgment of 3 September 2010, the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow granted a stay of enforcement of the Migration Service decision and ordered it to reconsider the matter in the light of the Constitutional Court\u2019s decision of 12 May 2006 and the Convention principles. Ms Kravchenko appealed; she submitted that the District Court should have ruled that the Migration Service refusal had been unlawful. 17.  On 8 February 2011 the Moscow City Court dismissed Ms Kravchenko\u2019s appeal against the District Court\u2019s judgment, finding that \u201cthere were no grounds to vary the judgment, because the Moscow division of the Federal Migration Service had actually complied with it\u201d. 18.  The applicant, Mr Roman Khalupa, is a Moldovan national who was born in 1974. He was granted legal aid and is represented before the Court by Mr D. Bartenev, a lawyer practising in St Petersburg. 19.  In 2005, Mr Khalupa married Ms E., a Russian national. Their children, a girl A. and a boy B., were born in 2005 and 2008 respectively. The family were living in St Petersburg. 20.  In early 2008 Mr Khalupa took a blood test with a view to obtaining a health certificate to support his application for a temporary residence permit. He was found to be HIV-positive. The hospital reported the results of his test to the St Petersburg division of the Federal Migration Service, which issued a decision of 4 June 2008 on the undesirability of Mr Khalupa\u2019s stay in Russia because he would pose a \u201creal threat to public health\u201d. On 17 June 2008 the director of the Federal Migration Service ratified that decision. 21.  On 1 August 2008 the decision was notified to Mr Khalupa; he left Russia three days later, in compliance with the law. He took up residence in Dubossary in the \u201cMoldavian Republic of Transdniestria\u201d. 22.  On the day following the pronouncement of the Kiyutin v. Russia judgment (no. 2700/10, ECHR 2011), Ms E., acting on Mr Khalupa\u2019s behalf, applied to the St Petersburg division of the Federal Migration Service, asking it to set aside the decision by which his presence in Russia had been pronounced undesirable. She submitted medical documents showing that Mr Khalupa posed no danger to public health because he was receiving appropriate treatment. Her request was forwarded to the legal department of the Federal Migration Service for review. In a letter of 5 May 2011 addressed to the deputy director of the visas and registration department of the Federal Migration Service, the director of the legal department acknowledged that the decision of 4 June 2008 had not taken fully into account Mr Khalupa\u2019s family ties in Russia. Nevertheless, on 12 September 2011 the deputy director of the St Petersburg division of the Federal Migration Service informed Mr Khalupa and Ms E. that their applications for review of the decision of 4 June 2008 had been refused. His letter did not specify the grounds for refusing the request. 23.  Mr Khalupa complained to court. On 30 January 2012 the Basmannyy District Court of Moscow dismissed his complaint, finding firstly that his rights and freedoms had not been interfered with, and secondly that the director of the Federal Migration Service was not empowered to review or set aside a decision by which an individual\u2019s presence in Russia had been declared undesirable. That judgment was upheld on appeal on 16 May 2012 by the Moscow City Court. On 12 December 2012 the Presidium of the City Court rejected Mr Khalupa\u2019s cassation appeal. 24.  Mr Khalupa also challenged the compatibility of section 25.10 of the Entry and Exit Procedures Act with the Constitution, in that it allowed an executive agency to pronounce his presence undesirable solely because of his HIV-positive status. By decision no. 902-O of 4 June 2013, the Constitutional Court declared his challenge inadmissible, finding that the impugned section was needed for the protection of public health from infectious diseases, including HIV. The Constitutional Court reiterated that its decision of 12 May 2006 (cited in paragraph 60 below) remained valid and applicable, and that the decision pronouncing someone\u2019s presence undesirable must take full account of humanitarian considerations and the factual circumstances of each case, including the family links and state of health of the individual concerned. 25.  On 14 January 2014 Mr Khalupa\u2019s representative asked the Consumer Protection Authority to review the undesirability decision and to allow him to visit his children in Russia. By a letter of 13 February 2014 the deputy head of the CPA replied that it did not have the authority to reverse a decision issued by the Federal Migration Service. 26.  The applicant, Ms Irina Grigoryevna Ostrovskaya, was born in 1953 in the Kurgan Region of the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic of the USSR. She is represented before the Court by Ms O. Leonova, a lawyer practising in Samara. 27.   In 1966 her parents took Ms Ostrovskaya and her sister to live in the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic of the USSR. In 1972 Ms Ostrovskaya got married and gave birth to a boy. Two years later her sister also married and moved back to Russia. Following the collapse of the USSR, Ms Ostrovskaya acquired Uzbek nationality. 28.  After the death of her parents and husband and her son\u2019s move to Russia in 2006, Ms Ostrovskaya remained in Uzbekistan alone. In September 2011 she decided to move to Russia to share the flat occupied by her son\u2019s and her sister\u2019s families. Ms Ostrovksaya\u2019s sister and her husband are Russian nationals; her son and his family are Uzbek nationals with valid Russian residence permits. 29.  In November 2011 Ms Ostrovskaya applied for a temporary residence permit. During a medical examination she tested HIV-positive. 30.  By decision of 17 January 2012, the Samara division of the Federal Migration Service refused her application for residence permit by reference to section 7 \u00a7 1 (13) of the Foreign Nationals Act, and informed her accordingly. On 27 March 2012 a further notification to the same effect was sent by the Federal Migration Service. 31.  By a letter of 9 June 2012 the Samara division of the Consumer Protection Authority notified Ms Ostrovskaya that she should leave Russia by 30 June 2012 or face deportation. The letter indicated that on 30 May 2012 the director of the Federal Consumer Protection Authority determined that her presence on Russian territory was undesirable by virtue of section 25.10 of the Entry and Exit Procedures Act. 32.  On 26 June 2012 Ms Ostrovskaya complained to court, relying on humanitarian grounds in her claim that she should be allowed to stay in Russia. By a judgment of 23 July 2012, upheld on appeal on 17 September 2012, the Samara District and Regional Courts held that the decision to refuse her a residence permit had been lawfully given by the Migration Service within its jurisdiction and in compliance with the Foreign Nationals Act and its internal regulations. The District Court declared that it would not take any humanitarian considerations into account because Ms Ostrovskaya had missed the three-month time-limit for submitting her claim, and she had a receipt of notification as early as 16 February 2012. The undesirability decision had been issued by the Federal Consumer Protection Authority rather than by its Samara division; since Ms Ostrovskaya had designated the latter, but not the former, as the defendant in her claim, the courts refused to review what they described as an \u201cactually non-existent decision\u201d. 33.  On 6 November 2012 the Regional Court refused her leave to appeal to a cassation instance. 34.  The applicant, Mr V.V., is a national of Kazakhstan who was born in 1983 and lives in Yekaterinburg. The Court granted the applicant\u2019s request for his identity not to be disclosed to the public (Rule 47 \u00a7 4). 35.  V.V. came to Russia in 2006 to study at a medical college. Since 23 November 2007 he has been living with his partner Mr X, who also represented him in the present proceedings before the Court. They have maintained a common household, shared expenses and travelled together. They have met each other\u2019s parents. V.V. submitted copies of travel documents and family photographs. 36.  On 11 March 2012 V.V. applied to the Sverdlovsk division of the Federal Migration Service for a temporary residence permit. He committed himself to producing an HIV certificate within thirty days. On 16 April 2012 the Sverdlovsk Regional Centre for Aids Prevention and Treatment certified him to be HIV-positive. 37.  On 28 April 2012 the Federal Migration Service refused his application for a residence permit by reference to section 7 \u00a7 1 (13) of the Foreign Nationals Act. V.V. challenged the refusal before a court. 38.  On 26 July 2012 the Verkh-Isetskiy District Court of Yekaterinburg upheld the refusal, finding in particular that V.V.\u2019s HIV status amounted to an \u201cactual threat to the health of the Russian population\u201d and that V.V.\u2019s living with a same-sex partner was not equivalent to having a family. 39.  On 21 November 2012 the Sverdlovsk Regional Court heard an appeal by V.V. against the District Court\u2019s decision and, referring in particular to the Kiyutin judgment, held that V.V.\u2019s HIV-positive status could not on its own be a ground for a restriction on his rights. Since the Migration Service did not cite any other grounds in its decision, the Regional Court enjoined it to carry out a new assessment of the application for a residence permit. The judgment became final and enforceable. 40.  In the meantime, on 24 April 2012 the Sverdlovsk division of the Consumer Protection Authority forwarded a copy of V.V.\u2019s diagnosis to the Federal Consumer Protection Authority, with a view to pronouncing his presence in Russia undesirable. On 16 November 2012 the federal authority asked the regional division to re-administer the HIV test. On 25 December 2012 V.V. again tested positive for HIV. 41.  On 15 March 2013 the Federal Consumer Protection Authority pronounced V.V.\u2019s presence in Russia undesirable in accordance with section 25.10 of the Entry and Exit Procedures Act. The decision stated that V.V. had been infected with HIV and had avoided treatment. It cited in evidence medical certificates dated 16 April and 25 December 2012. V.V.\u2019s representative challenged the decision before a court. 42.  On 26 April 2013 V.V. travelled from Russia to Kazakhstan. On his way back two days later, he was refused entry into Russia by reference to that decision. 43.  On 30 May 2013 the Verkh-Isetskiy District Court allowed the challenge, finding that the undesirability decision had been unlawful because it did not refer to any grounds other than V.V.\u2019s HIV-positive status. It also granted a stay of enforcement of that decision, enabling V.V. to return to Russia, which he did. 44.  However, on 13 August 2013 the Sverdlovsk Regional Court reversed the District Court\u2019s decision and dismissed the claim. It held that the ban against V.V. had been put in place not only because he was infected with HIV but also because he had refused to give contact details of his former partners during an \u201cepidemiological investigation of the HIV infection\u201d, that is when filling out a questionnaire at the hospital. The Regional Court also examined V.V.\u2019s personal circumstances and found that he was single, that his next of kin lived in Kazakhstan, that he did not have a family relationship with any Russian nationals, that he lived in a student hostel rather than in a rented flat, and that he had no resources to pay for HIV treatment. 45.  On 19 February 2014 the Sverdlovsk Regional Court refused leave to appeal to the cassation instance. It found in particular:\n\u201cThe facts which, in the claimant\u2019s view, are of legal significance but which the appeal court failed to take into account, including ... his voluntary compliance with the obligation to inform his former partners about a possible HIV infection, his being in a steady sexual relationship ... cannot be established on the basis of the claimant\u2019s and his representative\u2019s statements alone.\nThe court did not see any evidence of any social links the claimant has in the Russian Federation. The claimant and his representative merely confirmed that they have a sexual relationship, which does not equate to social links.\nA threat to public health ... could result from the fact that the claimant has a registered place of residence and actually lives in a hostel, which is a public place; this fact alone put the health of the other residents of the dormitory at risk because the claimant may use the same public facilities ...\u201d 46.  On 1 April 2014 a judge of the Supreme Court refused him leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. 47.  After notice of the case had been given to the Government, on 7 July 2014 V.V. informed the Court that the Government Representative\u2019s office had forwarded the case materials to the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office with a request to inquire whether or not V.V. was lawfully present in Russia, whether or not he was continuing his studies, and whether his representative before the Court Mr X could have been his partner. The request contained full personal details of V.V. The Prosecutor General sent the request to the local prosecutor\u2019s office in Yekaterinburg. As it happened, Mr X was a former employee in that prosecutor\u2019s office. A prosecutor summonsed Mr X for an interview and put questions about the nature of his relationship with V.V., whether V.V. was still present in Russia, and where they lived. Law-enforcement officers also visited their neighbours and asked them how long V.V. and Mr X had lived together and whether they had girlfriends. 48.  The Government submitted a copy of a statement from a prosecutor in charge of human rights and federal law compliance, dated 6 August 2014, from which it appears that on 1 June 2014 Mr X had been asked to attend the Sverdlovsk regional prosecutor\u2019s office in his capacity as V.V.\u2019s representative. He was interviewed about \u201cthe exercise by V.V. of his labour, family and migration rights\u201d. The interview was conducted \u201ctactfully\u201d (\u0432 \u043a\u043e\u0440\u0440\u0435\u043a\u0442\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0435), and no pressure was put on him. The police and migration authorities had established that no one lived at the address which V.V. had listed as his registered place of residence. The Government also produced a copy of the statement signed by Mr X on 1 June 2014. Mr X clarified that V. had been living in a stable same-sex relationship since 2007. He refused to name V.\u2019s partner or to say whether he was V.\u2019s partner: in his capacity as V.\u2019s representative he was not required to disclose any information about his own private life. He also briefly described V.\u2019s education, employment and migration status.", "references": ["2", "7", "1", "0", "3", "5", "9", "6", "No Label", "8", "4"], "gold": ["8", "4"]}
+{"input": "5.  From 1996 onwards the applicant, a former police officer discharged for health reasons, enjoyed disability benefits under the Labour Disablement Insurance Act (Wet op de Arbeidsongeschiktheidsverzekering \u2013 \u201cWAO\u201d). He was allowed to earn by his own means a sum not exceeding 60,000 Netherlands guilders (NLG) without losing his entitlement under the WAO. This he did by running a one-man business as a trainer teaching people how to deal with stress. 6.  The applicant states that he entered into an arrangement with an official of the competent social-security authority (at that time called Cadans), one Mr G., which was intended to make possible his transition into independent self-employment without the need for additional social security benefits. He alleges that Mr G. gave him the assurance that he would be permitted for a period of five years to earn income over and above the sum of NLG 60,000, the purpose being to allow him to create cash reserves in case his health should deteriorate further. The agreement had been witnessed by another official, one Mr S. 7.  In February 1999 the applicant announced his intention to continue his business in the form of a limited liability company (besloten vennootschap met beperkte aansprakelijkheid). He wrote to the social-security authority (re-named Social Security Implementing Institution for Government and Education (Uitvoeringsinstelling sociale zekerheid voor overheid en onderwijs; \u201cUSZO\u201d)) asking it to confirm that this change would not affect the arrangements made during the time when he was self-employed. In the ensuing domestic proceedings the social security authorities submitted one or more letters which they stated had been sent in response, including one dated 12 July 1999 denying the applicant the confirmation sought. The applicant states that he never received any reply. 8.  In September 1999 the applicant\u2019s business was transformed into a limited liability company. The shares were held by the applicant\u2019s wife. The applicant was its managing director and its only employee; he entered its employ on 1 October 1999. 9.  On 3 September 2003 Mr D., an official of the social-security authority (by this time re-named Employee Insurances Schemes Implementing Body (Uitvoeringsinstituut werknemersverzekeringen; \u201cUWV\u201d)) submitted an extensive investigation report implicating the applicant and his wife in suspected social-security fraud. According to the report, the applicant had defrauded the social-security system by declaring only his own income as an employee of the limited liability company but not the company\u2019s profits, which were declared as taxable income by his wife. The report included the following passage:\n\u201cIt was arranged in addition that only what Gillissen earned in self-employment after his discharge would be considered his residual earning capacity (resterende verdiencapaciteit). The labour expert (arbeidsdeskundige) Mr G. has stated that he discussed this extensively with Gillissen, who could agree to that position and who indicated during the conversation that in the coming years more growth was to be expected and that it was his intention to make his own living in self-employment with a corresponding gradual reduction to zero (afbouw) of the WAO benefits.\u201d 10.  On 28 January 2004 UWV gave a decision reducing the applicant\u2019s WAO benefits with retroactive effect. On 3 March 2004 UWV gave a second decision ordering the applicant to repay the excess. 11.  The applicant lodged objections (bezwaar) against both decisions. As relevant to the case before the Court, the applicant argued that as from 1999 he had kept the competent authorities informed of developments as they occurred, withholding no information, and invoked the arrangement which he had agreed with Mr G. He named Mr S. as a witness. 12.  Having held a hearing on 11 January 2006, UWV gave a decision on 31 January 2006 dismissing the applicant\u2019s objections. It found that the applicant could reasonably have been aware that the total of his additional income \u2013 the sum of his salary and the profits of the limited liability company \u2013 was too high for him to be entitled to the full amount of his social-security benefits. The alleged arrangement to the contrary was not reflected in the case file, and in any case, whatever statements had been made (assuming that any had been made at all) had been made by a person lacking the requisite competence and could not bind UWV. 13.  The applicant lodged an appeal (beroep) with the Roermond Regional Court (rechtbank). As relevant to the case before the Court, he complained about UWV\u2019s failure to question Mr G. and Mr S., which in his submission reflected a lack of due care affecting the quality of the investigation. He also submitted that Mr G. had acted within his competence in making the agreement alleged. 14.  Having held a hearing on 30 August 2006, the Regional Court gave judgment on 21 November 2006 dismissing the applicant\u2019s appeal. Its reasoning included the following:\n\u201cThe [applicant] has also stated that [UWV] officials had agreed with him that he would be permitted to earn unlimited income in addition to his WAO benefits for a period of five years. The Regional Court has found no evidence of such an agreement in the documents available, nor is there any other reason to consider it plausible. On the contrary, it appears from the labour expert Mr G.\u2019s report of 26 October 1998 that the [applicant\u2019s] income did in fact have to be taken into account. In addition, [UWV] answered the [applicant]\u2019s questions about the possibilities of obtaining income from work (additional income) in a letter of 12 July 1999, which letter incidentally the [applicant] claims not to have received. This letter states in no uncertain terms that [UWV] must always be informed immediately of any taking up of work and generation of income. But even without this letter it ought in reason to have been clear to the [applicant] that income can have an effect on the benefits. This ground of appeal therefore also fails.\u201d 15.  The applicant lodged a further appeal (hoger beroep) with the Central Appeals Tribunal (Centrale Raad van Beroep). As relevant to the case before the Court, he again complained in his written submissions about UWV\u2019s failure to hear Mr G. and Mr S. as witnesses. He asked for them both to be heard as a witness in order to prove the existence of the agreement. He also prayed in aid his acquittal by the \u2018s-Hertogenbosch Court of Appeal, which had been given in the meantime (see paragraph 22 below). He did not, however, himself summon Mr G. and Mr S. as witnesses by registered letter or bailiff\u2019s writ. 16.  The Central Appeals Tribunal held a hearing on 8 August 2008. The applicant did not bring Mr G. and Mr S. along but restated his request to have them heard as witnesses. The Central Appeals Tribunal decided to reopen its examination of the facts of the case in order to put an additional question to UWV. UWV replied to the Central Appeals Tribunal\u2019s question in writing. The applicant and UWV waived the right to a further hearing. 17.  The Central Appeals Tribunal gave judgment on 30 January 2009 dismissing the further appeal without having heard any witnesses. Its reasoning included the following:\n\u201cThe agreement relied on by the [applicant], which is denied by UWV, does not appear from the case file and no other credible case for its existence has been made out by the [applicant].\u201d 18.  In response to a question by the Court, the applicant acknowledged that he had made no attempt to summon Mr G. and Mr S. himself or bring them along to the hearing of either the Regional Court or the Central Appeals Tribunal, as permitted by section 8:60(4) of the General Administrative Law Act (Algemene wet bestuursrecht; see paragraph 25 below). 19.  In parallel with the administrative proceedings outlined above, the applicant was prosecuted for social security fraud and forgery. 20.  On 20 January 2006 the single-judge chamber of the criminal division (politierechter) of the Roermond Regional Court convicted the applicant. 21.  The applicant appealed to the \u2018s-Hertogenbosch Court of Appeal (gerechtshof). 22.  Having held a hearing on 4 May 2007, the Court of Appeal gave judgment on 16 May 2007 acquitting the applicant. Its reasoning included the following:\n\u201cThe suspect states that he drew up a common plan with Mr G. of USZO in 1998 with a view to the gradual reduction to zero of the WAO benefits over five years. The applicant further states that he made arrangements with that Mr G. concerning the amount of additional income he would be allowed to earn in the said five-year period. The suspect understood these arrangements in the sense that he would in principle be allowed to earn unlimited additional income without losing his benefits.\nPrompted by the transformation of the one-man business into one or more limited liability companies the suspect sought confirmation from UWV that it would not matter for the arrangements made whether the provider of the income was the one-man business or the said limited liability companies. To this end he got in touch with USZO on multiple occasions by means of letters. These letters were answered by USZO with automatised standard letters which did not address the specific situation in which the suspect found himself and which the suspect himself had raised with USZO.\nBy the time this question was put by the suspect to USZO Mr G. had been succeeded by Mr M. The latter found no report in the USZO file of the arrangements mentioned by the suspect. It is not apparent from the file that any attempt was made to hear Mr G. about the said arrangements within the framework of this criminal case.\nIn view of the facts outlined above, the Court of Appeal considers it plausible (aannemelijk) that the suspect made arrangements with Mr G. of USZO in one form or another concerning the amount of permitted additional income within the framework of the gradual reduction to zero of his WAO benefits. It makes no difference that no report of any arrangements was found in the USZO file because no attempt has been made to verify the existence of these arrangements with Mr G.\u201d", "references": ["6", "1", "0", "5", "4", "7", "9", "8", "2", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1997 and lives in Deva. 6.  At the time of the events, the eleven-year-old applicant was living with her family in a small village and often used to go to play with two girls from a neighbouring family at their house. The girls, F.C.B. and M.S.B., were about the same age as the applicant. The neighbours\u2019 family (the B. family) had ten children and were also accommodating a relative of theirs, J.V., a fifty-two-year-old man who was unemployed and lived in the family\u2019s vacant cattle stable. 7.  According to the statement made by the applicant later to the police, in August 2008 and then again in December 2008, J.V. had dragged her by force while she was playing with her girlfriends at the neighbours\u2019 house, had taken her to an empty room in the house or into the barn and had raped her while holding her down and keeping his hand over her mouth in order to prevent her from screaming. The applicant also stated to the police that between August 2008 and February 2009 she had been raped in similar circumstances by four of the neighbours\u2019 sons and their friend G.I. 8.  On 10 March 2009 the applicant\u2019s mother noticed that the applicant did not get her monthly period and had a talk with her. She told her mother that she had been sexually abused by J.V. and the other boys. She said that she had been ashamed to talk about what happened and also afraid to tell her parents sooner because J.V. had threatened that he would beat her if she told anyone. 9.  As a result of the sexual abuse, the applicant became pregnant and, with her parents\u2019 approval, she later underwent a surgical termination of the pregnancy. 10.  On 10 March 2009 the applicant\u2019s parents lodged a complaint against the alleged perpetrators with the local police and an investigation was started against J.V. and the four brothers F.B., A.B., G.B. and P.B. No proceedings were opened with respect to G.I., who was under fourteen and hence not criminally liable. 11. On the same day the five suspects were called into the police station for questioning. F.B. declared that on 22 December 2008, when the applicant was visiting her friends, he had asked her to have sex with him and she had accepted. P.B. declared that it had been J.V. who insistently told him to have sex with the applicant. 12.  On 11 March 2009 a forensic report found that no traces of violence had been detected on the applicant\u2019s body. 13. During the investigation J.V. declared that the applicant had provoked him to have sex with her as she was always scantily dressed. He further stated that it was she who had come to him and had asked him to have sex with her the first time, in August or September 2008. He alleged that the applicant had told him that she had had sex before with the boys from the B. family. 14.  The applicant declared before the police that she had been forced by J.V. to have sex with him on several occasions, alleging that he had threatened that he would beat her if she told anyone. The other boys had also forced her to have sex with them, telling her that it was J.V. who had told them what to do. 15.  On 22 April 2009 the Deva Police sent the file to the Prosecutor\u2019s Office of the Hunedoara County Court in order to pursue the investigation into rape. The judiciary police officer making the request held that, even if the perpetrators\u2019 statements were to be accepted as truthful, the victim\u2019s age (eleven at the time of the first sexual act) precluded the existence of legally valid consent as she could not have freely expressed her will. 16.  On 7 July 2009, at the request of the Hunedoara County Police, the Hunedoara County Forensic Institute issued a forensic psychiatric report on the applicant. The report held that the applicant was suffering from post-traumatic stress and stated that:\n\u201cConcerning the specific circumstances in which the criminal acts were committed, the minor speaks with shame about what happened. She has a vivid memory of the events. ... She says that she did not tell anyone about the incidents sooner because she feared for her safety and the safety of her family members.\u201d\nThe report concluded that the applicant had difficulties in foreseeing the consequences of her actions and had insufficient discernment due to her age. 17.  F.B. declared before the prosecutor that he had had sex with the applicant once on 22 December 2008. A.B. declared that he had had sex with the applicant in the autumn of 2008. G.B. declared that he had had sex with the applicant once in April and then again in October 2008. P.B. stated that he had had sex with the applicant on one occasion in the autumn of 2008. The applicant had asked him to have sex with her, and when he had refused - because he had never done this before - it was she who got undressed and climbed onto him. He further mentioned that he had used a condom that he had in his pocket. They all declared that it was the applicant who had taken the initiative each time and that it had happened because she displayed a provocative attitude, being scantily dressed most of the time. Each brother stated that the applicant had told him that she had had sex before, either with one of the other brothers or with J.V. 18.  When questioned during the investigation, F.C.B. and M.S.B. declared that the applicant had told them she had had an intimate relationship with J.V. and that they had never seen him taking the applicant by force while they were playing. They also stated that the applicant often came to their house scantily dressed and that their brothers C.B. and A.B. had told them that the applicant had provoked them and \u201cjumped onto them\u201d. 19.  On 10 December 2009 the Prosecutor\u2019s Office of the Hunedoara County Court issued an indictment decision with respect to J.V. for the crime of sexual intercourse with a minor on repeated occasions. F.B., A.B., G.B. and P.B. were given administrative fines for the same crime. From the statements of the perpetrators and the two sisters, the prosecutor held as proved the fact that the applicant had gone to the neighbours\u2019 house scantily dressed and had had a sexual relationship with J.V. The prosecutor therefore concluded that from the documents in the file it was not proved beyond doubt that the applicant had not given her consent to the sexual acts. 20.  The applicant\u2019s complaint against the prosecutor\u2019s decision concerning the four brothers and G.I. was rejected by the superior prosecutor and subsequently by the courts. 21.  On 20 April 2010 J.V. was found guilty by the Deva District Court of sexual intercourse with a minor and was sentenced to three years\u2019 imprisonment. The applicant was awarded 10,000 Romanian lei (ROL) by way of compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage (approximately 2,000 euros (EUR)). 22.  During the proceedings the applicant\u2019s representative requested the perpetrator\u2019s conviction for rape. She submitted to the file a copy of a judgment issued on 10 November 2009 by the Bac\u0103u Court of Appeal which held that a girl aged ten years and eight months could not understand what a sexual act meant sufficiently well to give her consent to it. 23.  The applicant declared before the court that J.V. had forced her to have sex with him and had threatened to beat her if she told anyone. She was afraid of him because he could become violent when he was drunk. The other boys had also threatened to beat her and once A.B. had threatened her with a knife. 24.  In reaching its decision, after also hearing statements from J.V. and the witnesses F.C.B. and M.S.B., the Deva District Court firstly observed that the forensic certificate stated that no signs of violence had been detected on the victim\u2019s body. The court further noted that it was apparent from the statements of J.V. and the other perpetrators who had not been indicted by the prosecutor that the applicant had always taken the initiative for the sexual acts and she had been in the habit of provoking both J.V. and the other boys to have sex with her. As regards the content of the above-mentioned statements, the court considered \u201crelevant\u201d the fact that the applicant was scantily dressed and that even after she had allegedly been sexually abused she went on playing with her girlfriends. The court considered that:\n\u201cIf sexual intercourse had taken place by force or by taking advantage of the victim\u2019s lack of capacity to defend herself or to express her will, it is certain that [she] would not have continued her previous practice [going to play with the neighbours\u2019 daughters]\u201d. 25.  The applicant, represented by her lawyer, appealed against the judgment of the Deva District Court, requesting that J.V. be convicted of rape and that the amount of compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage be increased to ROL 50,000. The applicant\u2019s representative submitted that the decision of the first instance court had not been impartial since it had been based only on the statement of the accused, together with statements by the other perpetrators and two witnesses \u2013 all related to the accused. Furthermore, since the minimum age of consent to a sexual act was set by law at fifteen, the applicant \u2012 who was only eleven at the time of the incidents \u2012 could not have expressed valid consent and the sexual abuse committed against her could therefore only be classified as rape. In addition, the applicant\u2019s representative complained that the forensic psychiatric report of 7 July 2009, which declared that the victim lacked capacity to express valid consent and was suffering from post-traumatic stress, had not been taken into consideration by the first instance court. 26.  The Hunedoara County Court decided to allow the applicant\u2019s appeal, holding that:\n\u201cAccording to the provisions of Article 197 of the Criminal Code, the crime of rape is \u2018Sexual intercourse of any kind with a person ... taking advantage of the [person\u2019s] lack of capacity to defend herself or to express her will [original emphasis]...\u2019.\nAt the time when the accused had sexual intercourse with the victim, she was eleven years old. In Romanian law, there is an absolute presumption that any person below fourteen completely lacks capacity. Therefore, before the age of fourteen, the minor cannot express a valid consent, being in a position of inability to express [his/her] will in a valid manner...\u201d 27.  Taking these arguments into account, on 4 November 2010 the Hunedoara County Court convicted J.V. of rape and sentenced him to four years\u2019 imprisonment. The court applied a sentence below the minimum provided for by law for the crime of rape against a person under fifteen, finding mitigating circumstances due to the defendant\u2019s good behaviour prior to the commission of the crime on trial. The court also held that it was not necessary to increase the amount of compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage awarded by the first instance court. 28.  The applicant\u2019s representative submitted an appeal on points of law (recurs) against the judgment of 4 November 2010, requesting an increase in the amount of compensation for non-pecuniary damage and that a more severe sentence be imposed on the defendant. J.V. also contested the judgment, requesting a conviction for the crime to which he had confessed, namely sexual intercourse with a minor. 29.  On 21 March 2011 the Alba Iulia Court of Appeal allowed the appeal on points of law submitted by J.V. and upheld with final effect the judgment of the Deva District Court of 20 April 2010. The Alba Iulia Court of Appeal based its verdict on the statements given by J.V., F.C.B. and M.S.B. as well as the account of the events given by the other perpetrators. Based on these testimonies and the fact that the victim had not told her parents about the alleged abuse, the court drew the conclusion that the instances of sexual intercourse had always been initiated by the applicant and dismissed the theory that the victim might have lacked capacity to express her will. The findings of the forensic psychiatric report of 7 July 2009 were not mentioned or discussed in any way by the court.\nThe court of appeal explained as follows:\n\u201cThe court considers that the crime of rape is committed by constraint - physical or moral - or by taking advantage of the victim\u2019s lack of capacity to express his/her will, more specifically rape is a sexual intercourse committed without consent. On the other hand, the crime of sexual intercourse with a minor, as provided by Article 198 of the Criminal Code, means engaging in a sexual intercourse with a minor under 15, but with the minor\u2019s consent. ...\n\u201cThe presumption of lack of capacity applies only to minors who are under fourteen and have committed a crime, but with respect to the crime provided by Article 198 of the Criminal Code, the minor [the applicant] is the victim and not the perpetrator.\u201d", "references": ["7", "3", "5", "8", "2", "0", "9", "6", "No Label", "1", "4"], "gold": ["1", "4"]}
+{"input": "5.  Between 2005 and 2006 the applicants successfully sued the authorities for miscalculating social benefits. The judgments became final. 6.  On various dates the supervisory review courts quashed the judgments delivered in the applicants\u2019 favour after applications by the defendant authorities, considering that the lower courts had misapplied substantive or procedural law (for more details see the Appendix). 7.  On 3 July 1986 the applicant was sentenced to three and a half years\u2019 imprisonment. On 25 February 1997 he was acquitted. 8.  On an unspecified date the applicant lodged an application with the Sovetskiy District Court, claiming 3,973,578 Russian roubles (RUB) in compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage on the grounds of wrongful prosecution. 9.  On 24 May 1999 the Sovetskiy District Court allowed the applicant\u2019s claim in part, awarding him RUB 43,568 in compensation for unpaid salary, the confiscation of his car, and judicial costs and expenses. The judgment was fully enforced. 10.  On an unspecified date the applicant brought a similar set of proceedings against the Ministry of Finance, claiming compensation for wrongful prosecution in 1997. 11.  On 27 July 2006 the Leninskiy District Court granted the applicant\u2019s claim in full and awarded him RUB 761,815 in compensation for unpaid salary; the confiscation of his car and other property; rent for his flat; travel expenses; and judicial costs and expenses. No appeal against the judgment was lodged and it became final. 12.  On 1 February 2007 the Presidium of the Rostov Regional Court quashed that judgment by way of supervisory review on the grounds that the same issue had already been decided by the judgment of 24 May 1999 and that there had been no grounds to examine the complaint a second time.", "references": ["0", "6", "4", "8", "1", "7", "5", "2", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in London. 6.  The applicant married in 1977. He separated from his wife in 2002. On 9 January 2004 he issued an application in the County Court for contact with two of his five children. 7.  The applicant and his wife divorced on 27 August 2004. His legal aid certificate was withdrawn following a financial award made as part of the divorce. 8.  Meanwhile the contact proceedings continued. The applicant\u2019s former wife alleged that he had harassed her and applied to the County Court for protection. On 21 December 2004 the applicant gave an undertaking to Wandsworth County Court:\n\u201cNot to contact, or communicate with, [his former wife], [her] mother or father, nor her solicitors in any way whatsoever ... except through his own solicitors.\u201d 9.  On 23 February 2005 Woolwich County Court granted the applicant\u2019s former wife an injunction which inter alia prevented him from using or threatening violence towards her. 10.  On 6 July 2005 the applicant\u2019s former wife issued an application for him to be committed to prison for breach of the undertaking and injunction. 11.  His Honour Judge Collins, sitting in the Central London Civil Justice Centre, chose to hear the applicant\u2019s application for contact and his former wife\u2019s application for him to be committed for contempt at the same time. He heard the applications on 26 and 27 July 2005. 12.  The applicant was unrepresented during the proceedings before Judge Collins. His position as regards legal aid was due to be reviewed shortly after the hearing. The judge made no inquiries into why the applicant was unrepresented or whether he wanted representation. 13.  On 27 July 2005 the judge made an order for indirect contact. He also committed the applicant to prison for three months because he had breached the undertaking and the order and was therefore in contempt of court. 14.  The applicant contacted lawyers from prison in order to appeal his committal but, having accepted instructions, they failed to assist him. He subsequently lodged a complaint against them and received five hundred pounds sterling (\u201cGBP\u201d) in compensation. 15.  The applicant was released on 9 September 2005, after approximately six and a half weeks\u2019 imprisonment, pursuant to provisions permitting early release. 16.  On around 14 September 2005 the applicant lodged an appeal out of time against the finding that he had been in contempt of court. He subsequently obtained legal aid and legal representation to pursue those proceedings. 17.  On 23 March 2007 the Court of Appeal quashed both the finding of contempt and the sentence imposed. It found that the County Court\u2019s errors of procedure were grave ones. Lord Justice Moses, delivering the first judgment, began by setting out a number of well-established principles relevant to committal hearings. The need to observe the Human Rights Act 1998 (see paragraphs 50 to 55 below) was central to the practice direction on committal proceedings, which had applied to the proceedings before the County Court (see paragraph 41 below). Such proceedings concerned a \u201ccriminal charge\u201d for the purpose of Article 6 of the Convention and the defendant therefore benefited from the right to legal assistance set out in Article 6 \u00a7 3 (c). A defendant to committal proceedings was not obliged to give evidence and enjoyed a right against self\u2011incrimination and, referring to Article 6 \u00a7 2, the burden of proving guilt lay on the person seeking committal. 18.  In the applicant\u2019s case, Moses LJ observed that these matters had not been drawn to the attention of the judge. He continued:\n\u201c11. Untutored and unassisted as the judge was, matters went wrong from the beginning. The judge noted, at the outset, that Mr Hammerton was acting in person. He made no comment about it whatever. In particular, he did not ask anything as to the circumstances in which he was unrepresented. Had he done so, he would have learnt that earlier legal representation had been withdrawn by the Legal Services Commission after he received a sum of money on his divorce ... That was the subject matter of a review panel which was due to sit two weeks later. This emerged at the outset of the cross-examination by counsel for Mrs Hammerton on the second day of the hearing.\u201d 19.  Moses LJ considered that once the judge had learnt that the issue of legal aid was the subject of an imminent review panel, there was no reason why the committal hearing should not have been adjourned until the issue of legal representation had been resolved. He was of the view that the judge had been obliged to ask appropriate questions and to consider, at the very outset of the hearing, whether there should be an adjournment so as to enable the defendant to be represented. In the absence of evidence of intransigence on the part of the applicant, and he noted that there was none, there was no reason why the applicant should not be represented. 20.  Moses LJ further found that the decision to hear the application for committal at the same time as the application for contact led to inescapable errors in procedure. He noted that it was for the applicant to establish his claim for contact, and for his former wife to prove breaches of the undertaking and the court order. The applicant should have been warned that he did not need to give evidence; he received no such warning. 21.  Moses LJ concluded that the decision of the judge to hear both applications at the same time had placed the applicant in an impossible position, noting that there was no hint at any stage in the transcript of the proceedings of anyone advising the applicant of his rights in respect of the committal proceedings, nor of the judge reminding himself of the different burden and standard of proof in the two applications. Further, the judge had given no explanation as to why he considered it essential to deal with both applications at the same time. 22.  Finally, Moses LJ considered that the judge again fell into error at the sentencing stage. He noted that the judge never paused, even at that stage, to consider whether the applicant should have legal representation or to remind himself of the relevant principles. He observed that the judge had paid no heed to the purpose of punishment in contempt proceedings. Since he had not been represented and had never been given an opportunity to mitigate, the sentencing phase of the committal was \u201cfatally flawed\u201d. 23.  Moses LJ then assessed whether it was necessary for the court to consider whether legal representation would have made a difference in the applicant\u2019s case. He commented that it was almost impossible to envisage a case where such representation would not be needed, if only, as this case demonstrated, to remind a judge of the principles which applied. Even in a case where a defendant admitted every breach alleged, representation would be needed so as to assist the judge in considering the appropriate disposal. The case was certainly not one where the court would decline to take action despite a violation of Article 6. There was ample material to suggest that legal representation would have made a difference. Quite apart from the question of the appropriate sentence, there was material relevant to the facts of the breaches to which the judge\u2019s attention ought to have been drawn. 24.  Lord Justice Wall fully agreed with Moses LJ, noting:\n\u201c35. There are, of course, many cases in the books in which this court has upheld committal orders even although they have been made in proceedings which were procedurally flawed ... Provided the contemnor has had a fair trial and the order has been made on valid grounds, the existence of a defect in the committal application or in the order served will not result in it being set aside except in so far as the interests of justice require that to be done ... 36. The instant case, however, is plainly not in that category, and I am in complete agreement with Moses LJ that the defects in the process in the instant case are so serious that the interests of justice plainly require both the committal order and the consequential sentence of imprisonment to be set aside.\u201d 25.  Specifically on the question of access to legal advice, he added:\n\u201c52.  ... Even more important, however, in my view is the proposition that in the absence of exceptional circumstances, it is a breach of a party\u2019s ECHR Article 6 rights to be sent to prison for contempt of court without the benefit of legal representation. No magistrates\u2019 court would impose a custodial sentence on an unrepresented defendant, and in my judgment, no family court should send a litigant in person to prison for contempt without first making arrangements for that litigant to be legally represented.\u201d 26.  On 20 March 2008 the applicant commenced proceedings for damages under common law for the tort of wrongful imprisonment and under the Human Rights Act 1998 (see paragraphs 50-55 below), relying on Articles 5 and 6 of the Convention. He sought an extension of time for lodging his claim. 27.  On 25 February 2009 the High Court dismissed his claim and refused the extension of time. However, Mr Justice Blake made it clear that had he considered there to be merit in the claim, he would have extended time. He had therefore considered the merits of the applicant\u2019s claim. 28.  Blake J noted at the outset that the Court of Appeal had identified three main errors in the applicant\u2019s case: the failure to inquire into why he was not represented and to consider whether to adjourn the committal proceedings to enable him to obtain representation; the joinder of the committal proceedings and the contact order application, which undermined the burden of proof and the applicant\u2019s right not to give evidence in the committal proceedings; and the fact that he was not given the opportunity to mitigate before sentence was passed. Blake J considered it plain from the judgment of the Court of Appeal that although it had granted no formal declaration that the committal hearing had breached the applicant\u2019s human rights, it had been of the view that it had and that had been the tenor of its findings. 29.  As to the false imprisonment claim, Blake J referred to the long\u2011standing recognition in the case-law that there was immunity from suit for a claim based on alleged errors of a circuit judge of competent jurisdiction that resulted in detention, in the absence of malice. The applicant\u2019s claim accordingly failed. 30.  He considered equally hopeless the applicant\u2019s claim that any violation of an Article 6 \u00a7 1 right gave rise to a right to damages under the Human Rights Act 1998. He found that section 9(3) of the Act, which precludes damages in respect of a judicial act done in good faith, with the exception of damages required by Article 5 \u00a7 5 of the Convention (see paragraph 55 below), was inconsistent with the applicant\u2019s claim. He also referred to the fact that just satisfaction under the Convention was a matter of discretion. 31.  As to the claim under Article 5 of the Convention, Blake J referred to this Court\u2019s judgments in the cases of Benham v. the United Kingdom [GC], 10 June 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996\u2011III, Perks and Others v. the United Kingdom, nos. 25277/94 and others, 12 October 1999 and Lloyd and Others v. the United Kingdom, nos. 29798/96 and others, 1 March 2005. He decided that the applicant\u2019s claim that his detention was a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 1 because any hearing in which a violation of Article 6 occurred was not in accordance with law was:\n\u201ca slightly more modest reworking of the article 6 submission that has been already considered and summarily rejected. Again I reject this reworking of the submission for similar reasons to those already given, but more particularly for the principles spelt out in the trio of Community charge cases.\u201d 32.  Blake J concluded that the applicant\u2019s detention pursuant to the order of Judge Collins was not so gross or obvious an irregularity, within the meaning of \u00a7 115 of the Court\u2019s judgment in Lloyd and Others, cited above, as to be not in accordance with the law. In reaching this conclusion, he noted, inter alia, that the County Court was a court of competent jurisdiction; that proper notice of the hearing and of the committal application had been given; that the record of proceedings did not appear to reveal any application by the applicant for an adjournment to seek legal representation; that there was no failure to follow a statutory prerequisite because the general requirement to observe Article 6 imposed by the Human Rights Act 1998 was not the same as a precise rule prohibiting committal unless a condition was complied with; that, similarly, the practice direction (see paragraph 41 below), which set out the need to observe the Human Rights Act, was in general terms and did not amount to a condition precedent; that the Court of Appeal, at the time of the County Court\u2019s decision, had not made an unambiguous finding that a lack of representation at a committal hearing would always violate Article 6, although its finding in the present case meant that Article 6 might be considered a condition precedent in future cases; and that there was no hint of malice or bad faith by the judge. 33.  Blake J also found that the Court of Appeal\u2019s three principal criticisms all suggested that the County Court had erroneously exercised its judgment. Erroneous exercises of judgment did not make decisions not in accordance with law or arbitrary in the sense indicated in the Article 5 \u00a7 1 case-law. 34.  Having thus concluded, Blake J explained that, had he reached the contrary conclusion, it would have been necessary to consider what the causal nexus between the unfairness and the detention resulting from the unfairness was. He accepted that where detention was in violation of Article 5 \u00a7 1 it was necessary and appropriate to visit it with a measure of damages, however modest. He found that, if the family-law applications had been separated correctly and the applicant had been represented, a finding of contempt would nevertheless have been inevitable. However, whilst custody was the more probable outcome, the length of sentence would have been significantly shorter and approximately fourteen days, so the applicant would not have served six weeks in prison. He indicated that, had a violation of Article 5 been established, he would have awarded damages in the sum of GBP 6,000, on an equitable basis. 35.  The applicant sought leave to appeal out of time. On 27 August 2009 leave to appeal was refused on the papers. The judge commented that he might consider extending time if there was a real prospect of success, but in his view the judgment would be upheld.", "references": ["1", "5", "6", "7", "8", "0", "9", "4", "2", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicants were born in 1985 and live in Vanadzor and Gyumri, Armenia. 7.  In May 2003 the applicants were drafted into the Armenian army and assigned to the third infantry battalion of military unit no. 33651, situated near the village of Mataghis in the Martakert Region of the unrecognised Nagorno Karabakh Republic (hereafter, Nagorno Karabakh) (see Chiragov and Others v. Armenia [GC], no. 13216/05, \u00a7 28, 16 June 2015). 8.  On 9 January 2004 the Martakert Garrison Prosecutor\u2019s Office instituted criminal proceedings no. 90800104 on account of the murder of two servicemen of the same military unit, R.Y. and H.M., who had been found dead in a nearby canal on 9 and 10 January 2004. They had been murdered on 24 December 2003. 9.  An investigating team was created by order of the Military Prosecutor of Armenia, which was headed by investigator A.H. of the Military Prosecutor\u2019s Office of Armenia. The investigating team also included the investigator of the Gugark Garrison Military Prosecutor\u2019s Office of Armenia, S.T., the investigator of the Martakert Garrison Military Prosecutor\u2019s Office of Nagorno Karabakh, A.K., the Deputy Chief of the Yerevan Military Police Department, V.K., and the Chief of the Stepanakert Military Police Department of Nagorno Karabakh, A.B. 10.  On 16 January 2004 a number of servicemen were arrested and subsequently charged and detained in connection with the murders. It appears that these charges were later dropped for lack of evidence. 11.  By letter of 6 March 2004 the Military Police Chief of Armenia informed the Military Prosecutor of Armenia that three servicemen had testified and implicated three other servicemen, V.H., S.P. and G.Y., in the crime but later retracted their testimony, alleging that they had made those statements under moral and psychological pressure from one of the officers of the Stepanakert Military Police Department and two officers of their military unit. 12.  On 16 April 2004 the first and second applicants were assigned to keep watch at a military outpost. 13.  On 19 April 2004 the investigative team received from one of the officers of military unit no. 33651 an empty envelope allegedly found at the crime scene on 25 December 2003, on which some names were written. 14.  On 20 April 2004 a former serviceman of the same military unit, K.A., was questioned in this connection in the second applicant\u2019s home town of Gyumri. It appears that it was disclosed during this interview that the envelope in question was linked to the second applicant and had been included in a parcel sent to him by his parents at the end of December 2003. It further appears that this fact was confirmed during the questioning of the second applicant\u2019s younger brother, which took place on 21 April 2004 from 11 a.m. to 1.10 p.m. 15.  The applicants alleged that on 19 April 2004 they were taken, in turns, to the office of their military unit\u2019s commander, M.A., for questioning in connection with the murders. The questioning was carried out by investigators A.H. and S.T. and military police officers V.K. and A.B. Chiefs of the Third and Fourth Battalions, E.M. and I.V. respectively, were also present during part of the questioning. The law enforcement officers started beating, threatening and verbally abusing the applicants, forcing them to confess to the murders. On the same day, following their questioning, they were transported by these law enforcement officers to the Martakert Garrison Military Prosecutor\u2019s Office in Nagorno Karabakh by order of the Military Prosecutor of Armenia, where they continued to be ill\u2011treated and were kept until their transfer to the Stepanakert Military Police Department for further questioning. 16.  The Government contested these allegations and claimed that on 19 and 20 April 2004 the first and second applicants were on watch at a military outpost. It was only on 21 April 2004 that the second applicant was taken to the office of the commander of the military unit, M.A., for questioning as a witness in connection with the murders. Soon thereafter the commander of the military unit ordered the Chief of the Third Battalion, E.M., to bring also the first applicant from the military outpost for questioning as a witness. The third applicant was also taken for questioning. The questioning was carried out in the office of the commander of the military unit by employees of the military prosecutor\u2019s office and the military police. During questioning it was revealed that on 24 December 2003 the applicants had abandoned their military unit without authorisation and had gone to Mataghis village. This was found to be a grave disciplinary offence and the commander of the military unit decided to impose on them a disciplinary penalty of ten days in isolation. On the same day, namely 21 April 2004, the applicants were taken first to the Martakert Garrison Military Prosecutor\u2019s Office and later to the Stepanakert Military Police Department where they were placed in a disciplinary isolation cell in order to serve their disciplinary penalty. 17.  It appears from the materials of the case that the applicants\u2019 first questioning took place at their military unit, in the office of commander M.A., where they were taken in turns. The questioning was carried out by investigators A.H. and S.T. and military police officers V.K. and A.B. It appears that the Chief of the Fourth Battalion, I.V., was also present for part of the questioning. The applicants were asked questions about a parcel that the second applicant had received from his parents on 24 December 2003, which included food, letters and other items, whether they had eaten the food together after fetching the parcel from Mataghis and, if so, where and when. No record was made of this interview. 18.  It further follows from the materials of the case that on 21 April 2004 the commander of the military unit, M.A., issued Order no. 112, according to which the applicants were considered to be isolated by the Stepanakert Military Police Department and were deprived of their daily allowance as of 22 April 2004. This Order was based on three Isolation Notices dated 21 April 2004 and signed by the commander, which stated that the applicants were to be isolated for a period of ten days on the grounds of a \u201cVMR\u201d (violation of military rules) and were to be kept in a common cell. In the section of the Isolation Notices entitled \u201cDoctor\u2019s conclusion\u201d the note \u201cpractically healthy\u201d appeared, followed by the signature of doctor S. The sections of the Isolation Notices which were to include the signature of the chief of the disciplinary isolation cell and his notes regarding the time and date of the applicants\u2019 admission to and release from the disciplinary isolation cell were left blank. 19.  On 21 April 2004 the applicants were questioned as witnesses at the Martakert Garrison Military Prosecutor\u2019s Office. According to the relevant records, the first applicant was questioned by investigator S.T. from 2.50 p.m. to 7.25 p.m., the second applicant was questioned by investigator A.K. from 2.35 p.m. to 7.40 p.m., and the third applicant was questioned by investigator A.H. from 2.05 p.m. to 7.20 p.m. The second applicant admitted during questioning that he and the other two applicants had eaten the food contained in the parcel received from his parents outside the military unit next to the canal on 24 December 2003. The first applicant was asked during questioning to provide an account of what he had done on 24 December 2003. He was then asked whether he was familiar with servicemen R.Y. and H.M. and whether the nearby shop had still been open when he and the other two applicants had eaten the food, as well as two questions regarding the envelope of the letter which had arrived with the parcel. 20.  Later that day at an unspecified hour the applicants were taken to the Stepanakert Military Police Department of Nagorno Karabakh where from 10.35 p.m. to 00.10 a.m. the second applicant was questioned as a witness by investigator A.H. The interview was videotaped by the cameraman of the Media Department of the Nagorno Karabakh Defence Army, A.G. 21.  The applicants were kept at the Stepanakert Military Police Department until 23 April 2004. On that date the Military Prosecutor of Armenia issued a letter addressed to the Defence Minister of Nagorno Karabakh, with a copy to the Chief of Military Police of Armenia, the Chief of the Stepanakert Military Police Department and the commander of military unit no. 33651, having the following content:\n\u201cFor the purposes of criminal case no. 90800104 examined by the investigative unit of the Military Prosecutor\u2019s Office of Armenia, on 21 April 2004 [the applicants], who were performing their military service at military unit no. 33651, were taken to the Martakert Garrison Military Prosecutor\u2019s Office, whereupon they were taken to the Stepanakert Military Police Department.\nIt is necessary to transfer the three above-mentioned servicemen to military unit no. 10724 in Yerevan in order to carry out a number of investigative measures with their participation.\u201d 22.  On the same date the applicants were transferred to Yerevan, the second applicant separately from the first and third applicants. At 10.45 p.m. the officer on duty of the Military Police Department of Armenia drew up a record entitled \u201cReceipt\u201d in which it was stated that he had received the first and third applicants from the employees of the Stepanakert Military Police Department. 23.  The applicants alleged that, during the entire period prior to their transfer to Yerevan, they were questioned on numerous occasions as witnesses, in spite of already being suspected of the crime. They were continually subjected to beatings, threats and verbal abuse by investigators A.H. and S.T., military police officers V.K. and A.B. and another officer of the Stepanakert Military Police Department nicknamed M., with the aim of extorting a confession. They were kept in various rooms and cells at different law enforcement agencies and were neither fed nor allowed to sleep. They were transferred from one law enforcement agency to another, blindfolded and handcuffed. The second applicant also alleged that the officers threatened to rape him with a club and to arrest his mother and younger brother, if he refused to confess. 24.  The applicants further alleged that upon their arrival in Yerevan they remained in custody and at an unspecified point were placed in an arrest facility situated at military unit no. 10724 which was administered by the military police (hereafter, the military police arrest facility \u2013 \u0540\u0540 \u054a\u0561\u0577\u057f\u057a\u0561\u0576\u0578\u0582\u0569\u0575\u0561\u0576 \u0576\u0561\u056d\u0561\u0580\u0561\u0580\u0578\u0582\u0569\u0575\u0561\u0576 \u054c\u0561\u0566\u0574\u0561\u056f\u0561\u0576 \u0578\u057d\u057f\u056b\u056f\u0561\u0576\u0578\u0582\u0569\u0575\u0561\u0576 \u057e\u0561\u0580\u0579\u0578\u0582\u0569\u0575\u0561\u0576 \u0584\u0576\u0576\u0579\u0561\u056f\u0561\u0576 \u0574\u0565\u056f\u0578\u0582\u057d\u0561\u0580\u0561\u0576) upon the instructions of the investigator. 25.  The Government admitted that the applicants had been transferred to Yerevan upon the request of the Military Prosecutor on 23 April 2004, but claimed that this was done as a protective measure under Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP). They further claimed that the applicants were placed in the military police arrest facility only after their arrest on 24 April 2004. 26.  On 24 April 2004 from 10.45 a.m. to 3.10 p.m. the second applicant was questioned as a witness by investigator A.H. at the Military Prosecutor\u2019s Office of Armenia. This interview was videotaped. During the questioning, the second applicant confessed that it was he and the other two applicants who had committed the murders. According to his statement, on 24 December 2003 he and the other two applicants had left their military unit in order to eat in private the food sent by his parents, near the canal. There they had come across the two fellow servicemen. A quarrel had erupted which led to a fight and resulted in fatal injuries. Having realised that the two fellow servicemen were dead, he and the other two applicants had decided to throw their bodies into the canal. 27.  On the same date the applicants were formally arrested and recognised as suspects. The first applicant\u2019s arrest record was drawn up at 6.35 p.m. at the Military Police Department in Yerevan. The record indicated that he was suspected of complicity in the murder of the two servicemen. 28.  It appears that investigator A.H. invited lawyers M.A. and V.Y. to represent the applicants. M.A. was assigned to represent the second applicant, while V.Y. was assigned to the first and third applicants. The first applicant agreed in writing that his interests be represented by lawyer V.Y. 29.  Later that day the applicants were questioned separately as suspects in the presence of their lawyers. Furthermore, two separate confrontations were held between the second applicant and the first and third applicants respectively, both in the presence of the lawyers. During his questioning and the above confrontations, the second applicant confirmed his earlier confession, while the other two applicants denied their guilt and his account of events. 30.  The applicants alleged that the above-mentioned lawyers had been invited to join the case by the investigators of the Military Prosecutor\u2019s Office and their involvement in the case was merely a formality and amounted to the signing of records and other documents in order to create an appearance of lawfulness. The first applicant also alleged that he had never met with his lawyer in private, while the second applicant alleged that his lawyer, M.A., had not been chosen by him and neither he nor his family had given their consent to the lawyer\u2019s participation in the case. 31.  On the same day at an unspecified hour the officer on duty of the military police arrest facility drew up a record of examination of a person\u2019s body (\u0561\u0580\u0571\u0561\u0576\u0561\u0563\u0580\u0578\u0582\u0569\u0575\u0578\u0582\u0576 \u0561\u0576\u0571\u056b\u0576 \u0574\u0561\u0580\u0574\u0576\u056b \u0566\u0576\u0576\u0578\u0582\u0569\u0575\u0561\u0576 \u0565\u0576\u0569\u0561\u0580\u056f\u0565\u056c\u0578\u0582 \u0574\u0561\u057d\u056b\u0576) in respect of each applicant, which noted that he, together with two deputy officers, two attesting witnesses, V.V. and K.A. (male and female respectively), and the medical assistant on duty (\u0570\u0565\u0580\u0569\u0561\u057a\u0561\u0570 \u0562\u0578\u0582\u056a\u0561\u056f), K.G., examined the applicants\u2019 bodies and that \u201cnothing was detected on [them]\u201d. The time of the examinations was indicated as \u201c9.55 p.m.\u201d, \u201c10.05 p.m.\u201d and \u201c10.10 p.m.\u201d for the second, third and first applicants respectively. The respective records were signed by the applicants and everybody else involved. The Government alleged that these examinations had been carried out upon the applicants\u2019 admission to the military police arrest facility. 32.  On 26 April 2004 the applicants were formally charged with murder under Article 104 of the Criminal Code. The applicants were questioned as accused in the presence of lawyers V.Y. and M.A. It appears that later that day the first and third applicants dispensed with the services of lawyer V.Y. 33.  On the same date the third applicant was visited by his father and his cousin\u2019s husband, H.M. It appears that this visit took place in investigator A.H.\u2019s office and lasted a few minutes. 34.  On the same date investigator A.H. took a decision prohibiting the applicants from meeting with their relatives on the ground that it \u201cmight obstruct the interests of the criminal investigation\u201d. 35.  On 27 April 2004 at an unspecified hour the Arabkir and Kanaker\u2011Zeytun District Court of Yerevan examined and granted the investigator\u2019s motions seeking to have the applicants detained on remand. It appears that the motions were presented at the hearings by the investigators dealing with the case, in the first applicant\u2019s case this being investigator A.H. The applicants were present at their respective hearings. It appears that the second applicant, who was represented by lawyer M.A., admitted at the hearing that he and the others had beaten the two fellow servicemen, but had no intention of killing them. It further appears that the first applicant was not represented at his hearing. The record of the hearing stated that lawyer V.Y. had been duly notified but had failed to appear. The applicants\u2019 detention was to be calculated from 24 April 2004 and was valid for a period of two months. 36.  On 29 April 2004 the second applicant was taken to the crime scene in Mataghis for a reconstruction of the crime, which was videotaped. 37.  On 11 May 2004 the second applicant addressed a letter to the Military Prosecutor of Armenia in which he retracted his confession, claiming that he and the other two applicants had nothing to do with the murder. He submitted that he had made his confession because the investigator A.H. had informed him that his mother and younger brother had been arrested and were also held at the Military Prosecutor\u2019s Office of Armenia and had threatened that they would \u201ccome to harm\u201d. The investigator further threatened that his younger brother would be assigned to perform his military service at the same military unit and would \u201ccome to harm\u201d. The second applicant requested that he be questioned again. 38.  On 14 May 2004 a lawyer, Z.P., was hired by the first applicant\u2019s family to represent his interests. 39.  On 18 May 2004 the second applicant was questioned by investigators A.H. and S.T. in the presence of lawyer M.A. He was asked questions about his letter of 11 May 2004, including whether it had been his idea to write that letter, why he had not written it earlier, whether it had been dictated to him, whether he stood by his allegations and why he had not retracted his confession earlier when he had other chances to do so. The second applicant again denied their involvement in the murder and repeated his allegation that he had made his confession since he had been told that his mother and younger brother had been arrested. In reply to the investigator\u2019s question about whether anyone had forced or coerced him into making the confession, the second applicant replied that no one had forced him. In reply to the investigator\u2019s question about why he had made a false confession, he replied that when he had told the truth the investigators refused to believe him. 40.  By letter of 19 May 2004 investigator A.H. informed the chief of the military police arrest facility that the first applicant\u2019s interests were represented by lawyer Z.P. 41.  On 21 May 2004 the applicants were examined by a board of psychiatrists in order to evaluate whether they were competent to stand trial. They were found not to suffer from any mental health issues either at the time of the offence or at present. 42.  On 25 May 2004 the chief of the military police arrest facility instructed the staff of the facility that lawyer Z.P. had been authorised to represent the first applicant. It appears that the lawyer was allowed to visit the first applicant at the facility. The first applicant alleged that, prior to his first meeting with lawyer Z.P., he had been deprived of any contact with the outside world and of any legal assistance. 43.  On the same date the first applicant addressed a complaint to various authorities, including the General Prosecutor, the Military Prosecutor and the Ombudsman, indicating the number of his criminal case and informing them of the following:\n\u201cI, Arayik Zalyan, and my two conscript friends, Razmik Sargsyan and Musa Serobyan, are kept at a military police arrest facility and are falsely accused of a grave crime[, namely] the murder of [servicemen H.M. and R.Y.].\nOn 19 April 2004 I and Razmik Sargsyan were at a military outpost when Razmik received a call from the military unit and was told to come down because his parents had arrived. About an hour later I also received a call and was told that my parents had also arrived and was summoned to the military unit. I went down and was taken to the commander\u2019s office. In the corridor I saw Musa Serobyan who was standing hunched in the corner. There were four unfamiliar persons in the office, two of whom \u2013 as I later found out \u2013 were investigators [A.H. and S.T.] of the Military Prosecutor\u2019s Office of Armenia. Chief of the Third Battalion [E.M.] and Chief of the Fourth Battalion [I.], whose last name I do not remember, were also present. The two investigators, [A.H. and S.T.], assaulted me, calling me a \u201cmurderer\u201d, demanding that I tell with whom I had eaten on 24 December, beating me and demanding that I explain how we murdered servicemen [H.M. and R.Y.]. I was beaten so hard that my nose bled profusely. The Chief of the Fourth Battalion [I.] then helped me and took me to clean my nose. Thereafter I, Musa Serobyan and Razmik Sargsyan were forced to put our T-shirts over our heads, placed in a car and taken away. We arrived in some place, which \u2013 as I later found out \u2013 was Martakert. I was taken to a room where I stayed with my T-shirt pulled over my head for about an hour and from where I could hear Razmik\u2019s and Musa\u2019s terrified voices and how they were beaten continuously for about an hour. Then it was my turn. [Investigator S.T.] came to my room, started questioning me, saying that my friends had confessed that we had committed the murder, told me to write the same thing and intimidated me, saying that I would not last long and that I would get a life sentence. At that moment some Major entered the room and said that the deceased were his friend\u2019s children and if we did not write the truth \u2013 that we had killed them \u2013 he would take me out, kill me, throw me in a pit and say that it was the [Azeris] who had killed me. Thereafter, again with our T-shirts over our heads, we were taken away ... and arrived in some place where I was taken to what appeared to be a police station where I was questioned from 6.00 p.m. to 3.00 a.m. I was questioned, sworn at, beaten, threatened, persuaded and told to write that it was us who had killed [H.M. and R.Y.]. They beat and threatened us for a whole day, not even giving us water to drink. That night at around 3.30 a.m. I was taken down to the Stepanakert Military Police Department\u2019s detention facility, where there were three other persons... I, Musa and Razmik were kept in that facility until the morning of 23 April. Musa and I were taken to Yerevan together by a senior lieutenant of the military police department. I realised that Musa had been severely beaten since his face was covered with red and blue marks of blows. We spent the night of 23 April 2004 in Yerevan on the premises of the military police in \u0430 room of some supervised unit where we stayed for one night. Musa and Razmik were also there and were kept in separate rooms. The next day I was questioned in the same building and then taken to a confrontation with Razmik. When I saw Razmik, I could hardly recognise him since his entire face was swollen. I realised that he had been beaten and was extremely frightened of the investigators, which is why he gave false testimony.\nI ask you to carry out an investigation and to find the real perpetrators ...\u201d 44.  On 8 June 2004 lawyer Z.P. addressed another complaint to the same authorities, submitting that the applicants had been unlawfully arrested between 19 and 24 April 2004 without an arrest warrant and questioned on numerous occasions on suspicion of having committed a murder. The lawyer further complained in detail about the ill-treatment inflicted on the applicants during that period. She also complained that from 23 April 2004 to the present the applicants, in violation of the law, had been kept at a military police arrest facility, despite their pre-trial detention having been ordered by the court decision of 27 April 2004. Thus, they were deprived of the protection offered by the justice system and were kept under the authority of the military police who were, moreover, working in close cooperation with the Military Prosecutor\u2019s Office. She alleged, inter alia, a violation of Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention. 45.  By a letter of 10 June 2004 the Military Prosecutor informed the first applicant and his lawyer, in reply to their complaints, that:\n\u201cThe first investigative measures involving [the applicants] were carried out on 21 April 2004 at the Martakert Garrison Military Prosecutor\u2019s Office where they were questioned as witnesses. Before the questioning they had been informed about the right not to testify against themselves ... guaranteed by Article 42 of the Constitution.\nIn order to clarify a number of discrepancies in their statements, on 21 April 2004 [the applicants] were taken to the Stepanakert Military Police Department of the Ministry of Defence of Armenia for the purpose of conducting confrontations and further questioning.\nOn 22 April [the second applicant], upon my instruction, was transferred to Yerevan as a witness in a criminal case, since I found it inexpedient for him to continue his military service at his military unit. In Yerevan he stayed in the barracks together with the servicemen entrusted with guarding the building of the Military Prosecutor\u2019s Office of Armenia.\n[The first and third applicants] were transferred to Yerevan from Stepanakert on the night of 23-24 April and stayed, without being isolated, in the room envisaged for servicemen on duty of military unit no. 10724...\nOn 24 April [the second applicant] was questioned again as a witness and he was again informed about the requirements of Article 42 of the Constitution, which is confirmed by his signature under the record of the interview.\n[The applicants] were arrested on 24 April 2004 and were immediately provided with lawyers.\nFrom the moment of their arrest all the investigative measures in respect of [the applicants], such as questioning, confrontations, the arraignment, etc., were carried out in the presence of their lawyers.\nIn compliance with [the CCP] the accused took part in the hearings concerning the imposition of detention, during which they did not make any statements about the \u2018ill\u2011treatment inflicted\u2019 on them...\nThe accused are kept in the military police arrest facility in accordance with Annex 14 to the Regulations for the Garrison and Sentry Services.\nA medical examination can be conducted in respect of [the first applicant] and the others if a relevant request is made.\u201d 46.  On 10 June 2004 the second applicant\u2019s lawyer M.A. filed a motion with the Military Prosecutor, challenging the impartiality of investigator A.H. and requesting that he be removed from the case. It appears that attached to this motion was a complaint by the second applicant, in which he alleged that the investigator and others had bullied and beaten him in Martakert and Stepanakert, as a result of which he had made a false confession. The lawyer requested that the persons mentioned in the second applicant\u2019s complaint be questioned. 47.  On 12 June 2004 the Military Prosecutor decided to reject the motion as unsubstantiated, finding that all the investigative measures involving the second applicant had been carried out in compliance with the rules of criminal procedure. From the moment of his arrest his lawyer had participated in all the investigative measures, except the reconstruction of 29 April 2004 in which case the lawyer\u2019s absence had been voluntary. Most of the second applicant\u2019s interviews had been videotaped, which further proved that no ill-treatment had been inflicted on him. Moreover, at the detention hearing of 27 April 2004 he had stated that his statements made at those interviews had been true. Following his complaint of 11 May 2004 he had been additionally questioned upon his request and stated that he had not been forced to make any statements. 48.  On 14 June 2004 the first applicant\u2019s lawyer Z.P. filed a similar motion with the Military Prosecutor, challenging the impartiality of investigators A.H. and S.T. and requesting that they be removed from the case on the ground that they had, inter alia, ill-treated the applicants. 49.  On 16 June 2004 the third applicant\u2019s new lawyer, A.A., filed a similar motion with the Military Prosecutor, challenging the impartiality of investigator A.H. and requesting that he be removed from the case on the ground that the investigator had, inter alia, ill-treated the third applicant in Stepanakert, including by administering blows to his head with the handle of his pistol. 50.  On 17 June 2004 the Arabkir and Kanaker-Zeytun District Court of Yerevan examined and granted the investigator\u2019s motions seeking to extend until 24 August 2004 the period of the applicants\u2019 detention, which was to expire on 24 June 2004. The first applicant submitted at the court hearing that his and the second applicant\u2019s testimony had been given under duress. 51.  On 18 June 2004 the Military Prosecutor decided to reject the motion of 14 June 2004 as unsubstantiated, finding that the first applicant had been questioned on 21 April 2004 in compliance with all the rules of criminal procedure, including being informed about the right not to testify against himself guaranteed by Article 42 of the Constitution. No investigative measures involving the first applicant had been carried out on 19 and 20 April 2004. He was arrested on 24 April 2004 and was immediately provided with a lawyer. Neither he nor the third applicant had complained about ill-treatment prior to a similar complaint made by the second applicant. The foregoing indicated that the allegations of ill\u2011treatment made by the accused and their lawyers were unsubstantiated, concocted and were aimed at justifying the accused, who were employing coordinated common tactics. 52.  On the same date the Military Prosecutor rejected the third applicant\u2019s motion of 16 June 2004 on similar grounds. 53.  On 25 June 2004 the first applicant lodged an appeal against the decision of 17 June 2004. In his appeal he complained in detail, inter alia, that he and the other applicants had been subjected to ill-treatment by investigator A.H. and other law enforcement officers. The first applicant also complained that he and the other applicants were unlawfully kept at a military police arrest facility. 54.  On 29 and 30 June 2004 the second applicant was questioned again. At the outset he was asked questions in connection with the allegations of ill\u2011treatment raised in his complaint of 10 June 2004, namely whether he had suffered any injuries and whether he still had any injuries. The second applicant stated that he had suffered only a swollen jaw, which healed in about three to four days, still being visible at the time of his arrest on 24 April 2004 but not when he had appeared before a judge on 27 April 2004. Currently he had no injuries. The injury to his jaw had been inflicted at the office of the commander of the military unit in Mataghis on 21 April 2004 by S.T., A.H., police officer V.K. and one tall police officer from the Stepanakert Police Department. The same persons had continued to ill\u2011treat him at the Military Prosecutor\u2019s Office in Martakert and the Military Police Department in Stepanakert, which made his kidneys hurt and lasted a few days. He had had no other injuries and nobody had ill-treated him following his transfer to Yerevan. When ill-treated, he was being ordered to tell the truth. He had made up the confession himself, without any outside interference. The second applicant was then asked a number of questions in connection with his allegations, including why he had made his confession in Yerevan if no ill-treatment had been inflicted on him there and why he had not raised his allegations of ill-treatment earlier. Lastly, a number of questions were posed about the events of December 2003 and the murder. 55.  On 5 July 2004 the investigation into the applicants\u2019 criminal case was over. 56.  On 6 July 2004 the Criminal and Military Court of Appeal dismissed the first applicant\u2019s appeal of 25 June 2004. 57.  On the same date the Military Prosecutor addressed a letter to the chief of the military police arrest facility, stating that it was no longer necessary to keep the applicants at the arrest facility and requesting that they be transferred to Nubarashen pre-trial detention facility. 58.  On the same date the applicants were transferred from the military police arrest facility to Nubarashen pre-trial detention facility. 59.  On 7 July 2004 the first applicant was subjected to a medical examination at Nubarashen pre-trial detention facility, with the following conclusion:\n\u201cNo fresh bodily injuries or traces of beatings have been disclosed. Skin and mucous membranes are of a normal colour. Vesicular respiration present in the lungs. Heart sounds [(illegible)] ... The abdomen is soft and pain free. There are no external symptoms of venereal disease.\u201d 60.  Medical file no. 607 was opened. On the front page of the medical file \u201c19 April 2004\u201d was noted as the starting date of the first applicant\u2019s detention. 61.  It appears that the second and third applicants were also subjected to medical examinations and no injuries were recorded. 62.  On 16 July 2004 the General Prosecutor decided to reject another motion filed by the first applicant challenging the impartiality of both the Military Prosecutor and investigators A.H. and S.T., on the ground that, inter alia, the allegations of ill-treatment had not been confirmed. No such allegations had been made by the applicants at the court hearings concerning their detention and they had jointly started raising such complaints only at the end of May 2004. 63.  On 22 July 2004 the Deputy Ombudsman informed the General Prosecutor about the second applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment. The Deputy Ombudsman further stated that the second applicant had been kept from 26 April to 6 July 2004 at a military police arrest facility in violation of the Law on Conditions for Holding Arrestees and Detainees and the Regulations for the Garrison and Sentry Services. The Deputy Ombudsman argued that, according to these legal acts, the second applicant should not have been kept at that facility for more than 72 hours after the court issued its decision to detain. 64.  On 26 July 2004 the Deputy Ombudsman was informed by the General Prosecutor\u2019s Office that the accused had been kept at the military police arrest facility on the basis of Annex 14 to the Regulations for the Garrison and Sentry Services and had been transferred to Nubarashen pre\u2011trial detention facility following the entry into force of the amendments to those Regulations adopted by the Parliament on 28 April 2004 and ratified by the President on 22 May 2004. 65.  On 24 September 2004 the Deputy Ombudsman addressed a letter to the General Prosecutor in connection with the first applicant\u2019s complaint of ill\u2011treatment. The Deputy Ombudsman pointed out that the above complaint had been transmitted to the Military Prosecutor\u2019s Office, the authority whose actions were the subject of the complaint, and the criminal case continued to be dealt with by the same investigator who was alleged to have inflicted ill-treatment on the accused. 66.  On 3 August 2004 the first applicant made a written statement, declaring that he was going on a hunger strike in protest against the unlawful actions of the law enforcement authorities. He alleged that the charges against him and the others were trumped up and based on a coerced confession. Since all his complaints in this respect had remained unanswered, he wished to continue his protest with a hunger strike. 67.  The following record was made in the first applicant\u2019s medical file:\n\u201cSince 11 August 2004 the patient has been on hunger strike and under constant medical observation ...\u201d 68.  On 5 August 2004 the first applicant and his lawyer were granted access to the case file. 69.  By a letter of the same date the investigator informed the chief of Nubarashen pre-trial detention facility about this and added that the first applicant\u2019s detention period was suspended pursuant to Article 138 \u00a7 3 of the CCP. 70.  On 24 August 2004 the first applicant\u2019s detention period, as extended by the decision of 17 June 2004 of the Arabkir and Kanaker\u2011Zeytun District Court of Yerevan, expired. 71.  On 9 September 2004 the first applicant and his lawyer finished familiarising themselves with the materials of the case. 72.  On the same date the first applicant filed a motion with the investigator, arguing that from 24 August 2004 there was no court decision authorising his detention and requesting that he be released. 73.  On 10 September 2004 the investigator decided to dismiss that motion, stating that, pursuant to Article 138 \u00a7 3 of the CCP, the detention period had been suspended on the date when the first applicant was granted access to the case file, namely 4 August 2004. 74.  On 16 September 2004 the first applicant\u2019s mother asked to be allowed to visit him in detention. She was worried about his health, as he was on hunger strike, but she was not allowed to see him. 75.  On 22 September 2004 the case file was transmitted by the Prosecutor to the Syunik Regional Court, which sat in Stepanakert, Nagorno Karabakh. 76.  On an unspecified date Judge M. of the Syunik Regional Court decided to take over the case. 77.  By a letter of 15 October 2004 the chief of Nubarashen pre-trial detention facility informed the first applicant that his detention period had been suspended in accordance with, inter alia, Article 138 of the CCP by the letter of the Military Prosecutor\u2019s Office of 5 August 2004. The chief of the detention facility further stated that, according to the Military Prosecutor\u2019s letter of 22 September 2004, as of that date the detention period had been accounted for by the Syunik Regional Court. 78.  On 19 October 2004 the first applicant was transferred to the Hospital for Prisoners due to his general emaciation as a result of the hunger strike. 79.  On the same date the first applicant\u2019s lawyer addressed a letter to various public authorities, including the prosecutor in charge of the detention facilities and the Chief of the Hospital for Prisoners, complaining that the first applicant was unlawfully detained without a relevant court decision. She further submitted that the first applicant\u2019s state of health was critical and that no requisite medical assistance had been provided for him by the administration of Nubarashen pre-trial detention facility during the entire hunger strike. The lawyer requested that the first applicant be released immediately. 80.  By a letter of 21 October 2004 the Deputy Chief of the Hospital for Prisoners informed the lawyer that no visceral illnesses had been disclosed following the first applicant\u2019s objective inpatient examination, clinical and biochemical analyses of his blood and urine, and a number of instrumental examinations. There was therefore no need to administer medicine. The first applicant was under constant medical supervision due to his hunger strike and the resulting general emaciation of a minor degree. 81.  On 25 October 2004 the lawyer lodged similar requests with the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan and the Syunik Regional Court. 82.  By a letter of 26 October 2004 the General Prosecutor\u2019s Office informed the first applicant\u2019s lawyer that he had not been released from detention by virtue of Article 138 \u00a7 3 of the CCP. 83.  On 27 October and 1 November 2004 the lawyer again requested the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan to release the first applicant. She also submitted that she had visited him on 25 October 2004 at the Hospital for Prisoners. He had been lying in bed motionless and looked frail. She further alleged that the psychologist had told her that, if the first applicant continued to remain isolated on hunger strike, his life could be in serious danger. She lastly complained that he had been ill\u2011treated when questioned as a witness. 84.  By a letter of 27 October 2004 the District Court informed the first applicant\u2019s lawyer that, in order to have the circumstances of the alleged unlawful methods of investigation examined, she had to apply to the authority dealing with the merits of the case. The District Court was not, however, dealing with the merits of the first applicant\u2019s case. 85.  On 1 November 2004 the lawyer requested the administration of the Hospital for Prisoners to provide details of the treatment provided for the first applicant. 86.  By a letter of 2 November 2004 the Deputy Chief of the Hospital for Prisoners informed her that the first applicant had undergone an examination and no visceral illnesses had been found. Due to his general emaciation, since 22 October 2004 the first applicant had been receiving intravenous injections of 5% glucose and vitamins in order to sustain water and vitamin balance. In his current state of health the first applicant was fit to be transferred to a detention facility. 87.  On 2 November 2004 the first applicant was discharged from the Hospital for Prisoners and transported to Stepanakert, Nagorno Karabakh, to participate in the trial. According to the discharge summary:\n\u201c[The first applicant] was taken to the Hospital for Prisoners on 19 October 2004 in order to undergo an inpatient examination.\nThe detainee underwent a clinical and laboratory instrumental examination, as a result of which no symptoms of visceral illnesses were found. He was examined by a psychiatrist who concluded that he had no psychological disorders.\nTaking into account his refusal to eat over a long period of time and the general emaciation of his organism, the detainee was injected with glucose and vitamins through a drip.\nSince inpatient treatment is no longer necessary, the detainee is being discharged to remain under further medical supervision by the medical staff of the detention facility.\u201d 88.  On 4 November 2004 Judge M. of the Syunik Regional Court decided to set the case down for trial and to fix the date of the first court hearing, which was to take place on an unspecified day in November 2004. The judge stated in his decision that the first applicant\u2019s detention was to remain unchanged. 89.  On 5 November 2004 the first applicant ended his hunger strike. 90.  On 26 November 2004 the first applicant\u2019s lawyer applied to the Chief of the Nagorno Karabakh Remand Centre, claiming that the first applicant\u2019s state of health was unsatisfactory following his hunger strike and requesting that he be examined by a doctor. It is not clear whether there was any follow-up to this request. 91.  In November 2004 the court hearings in the applicants\u2019 criminal case commenced at the Syunik Regional Court. 92.  The second applicant submitted before the Regional Court that on 19 April 2004 he had been taken to the office of the military unit commander M.A. The Chief of the Fourth Battalion I.V. had also been present. The commander had started asking him questions about a parcel that he had received from his parents on 24 December 2003, including where and with whom he had eaten the food contained in that parcel. He had answered that he had eaten the food with the other two applicants at the military unit, but the commander did not believe him. Thereafter investigators S.T. and A.H. and military police officers V.K. and A.B. had entered the office and started beating him and forcing him to admit that it was he and the other two applicants who had killed the two servicemen. Then the other two applicants had been brought and subjected to beatings. The ill-treatment had continued at the Martakert Garrison Military Prosecutor\u2019s Office and the Stepanakert Military Police Department. Not being able to stand the ill-treatment, he had had to come up with a false story, admitting his and the others\u2019 guilt. Later on he had realised his mistake and asked to be questioned again, during which he retracted his earlier confession. 93.  The first and third applicants submitted that they had been ill\u2011treated in similar circumstances. 94.  The Regional Court called and examined investigators A.H., S.T. and A.K. and military police officers V.K. and A.B. 95.  Investigator A.H. submitted that he and the other members of the investigating team had arrived at the military unit near Mataghis on 21 April 2004. Upon his instructions the second applicant had been brought from the military outpost to the military unit, since it was necessary to find out where and with whom he had eaten the food contained in the parcel received from his parents. The first and third applicants were also later brought in for questioning. In order to verify the versions of events presented by the applicants, the latter had been transferred to Martakert and then to Stepanakert where further interviews were conducted. Thereafter the applicants had been transferred to Yerevan where the second applicant confessed to the crime. 96.  Investigator S.T. and military police officers V.K. and A.B. made similar submissions. 97.  Investigator A.K. submitted that he had questioned the second applicant at the Martakert Garrison Prosecutor\u2019s Office but did not know about the outcome of that interview since investigator A.H. and military police officer V.K. had taken over and he had left. 98.  The applicants submitted in reply that investigators A.H. and S.T. and military police officers V.K. and A.B. had ill-treated, beaten and threatened them. 99.  The Regional Court also called and examined Chiefs of the Third and Fourth Battalions E.M. and I.V., cameraman A.G. and an officer of military unit no. 33651, M.A., who had been present at the reconstruction of the crime on 29 April 2004. 100.  I.V. submitted that he had been present on and off during the applicants\u2019 questioning on 21 April 2004 but nobody had ill-treated them in his presence. 101.  E.M. submitted that he had personally delivered the first applicant to the office of the military unit commander on 21 April 2004. The second applicant was already there. Thereafter the law enforcement officers had arrived and he had to leave. Nobody had ill-treated the applicants in his presence. 102.  A.G. submitted that he had been present during the second applicant\u2019s questioning at the Stepanakert Military Police Department and no beatings or violence had been inflicted on the second applicant by investigators A.H. and S.T. or military police officer A.B. Nor did he notice any injuries on the second applicant or bloodstains on the floor. 103.  M.A. submitted that he had been present during the reconstruction of the crime by the second applicant in April 2004. The reconstruction had been filmed by investigator A.H. The second applicant had been calm and no ill\u2011treatment or violence had been inflicted on him. 104.  On 18 May 2005 the Syunik Regional Court found the applicants guilty of murder and sentenced them to 15 years\u2019 imprisonment. This judgment was based, inter alia, on the second applicant\u2019s confession statement. As regards the applicants\u2019 allegations of ill-treatment, the Regional Court found them to be unsubstantiated on the following grounds. First, the applicants had not raised any such complaints during their questioning as witnesses on 21 April 2004, during their questioning as suspects and as accused and the two confrontations which were held on 24 and 26 April 2004 in the presence of their lawyers, or during the reconstruction of the crime on 29 April 2004. Second, the second applicant had not raised such allegations even during his additional questioning on 18 May 2004 and did so only in his motion of 10 June 2004, which was followed by similar motions filed by the first and third applicants on 16 June 2004, all of which were dismissed by the Military Prosecutor as unsubstantiated. Third, the fact that no ill-treatment had been inflicted on the applicants was confirmed by the submissions of law enforcement officers A.H., S.T., V.K. A.B. and A.K., Chiefs of the Third and Fourth Battalions E.M. and I.V. and officer M.A. The Regional Court concluded that the motions filed by the applicants and their lawyers, challenging investigator A.H.\u2019s impartiality, and their allegations of ill-treatment, threats and psychological pressure were aimed at helping the applicants to avoid criminal responsibility. 105.  On 1 June 2005 the applicants lodged an appeal against the judgment of the Syunik Regional Court. In their appeal they complained in detail that they had been unlawfully deprived of their liberty from 21 to 24 April 2004 and subjected to ill-treatment during that entire period. They further complained that the authorities had failed to investigate their allegations of ill-treatment in violation of Article 3 of the Convention. Moreover, instead of ordering the institution of criminal proceedings, the Regional Court decided to call and examine the alleged perpetrators as witnesses and to rely on their statements in justifying the conviction. 106.  On an unspecified date, the proceedings commenced in the Criminal and Military Court of Appeal. The applicants repeated in detail their allegations of ill-treatment before the Court of Appeal. They also added that at the time of their admission to the military police arrest facility in Yerevan they had various bodily injuries, including an injured jaw, a bruised eye and a bruised back. They were stripped and examined, but the member of the medical staff who had drawn up the relevant records did not note those injuries. They had signed the records drawn up as a result of these examinations without reading them. 107.  In this connection the Court of Appeal called and questioned medical assistant K.G. who had participated in the examination of the applicants\u2019 bodies at the military police arrest facility. K.G. submitted that the applicants had been admitted to the arrest facility when he was on duty. They had been examined in the presence of witnesses and no bodily injuries had been found. Appropriate records had been drawn up, which were signed also by the applicants. K.G. further submitted that it was impossible for him to fail to record any injuries found, since he would be held personally responsible for such an omission. Nor was it possible for the second applicant to have had an injured jaw, since that was a serious injury which he could not have overlooked. 108.  On 12 December 2005, while their case was still being examined by the Court of Appeal, the applicants lodged another complaint with the General Prosecutor, alleging in detail that they had been deprived of their liberty from 19 to 24 April 2004 and subjected to ill-treatment for the purpose of coercing a confession. They indicated investigators A.H. and S.T. and military police officers V.K., A.B. and M. as the perpetrators and requested that criminal proceedings be instituted against them. The applicants alleged, in particular, that as a result of ill-treatment the second applicant had an injured jaw, the first applicant had a bleeding nose and the third applicant was beaten up and had dirty clothes, having been thrown to the floor and repeatedly kicked. Furthermore, the second applicant was stripped, leaned against the wall and threatened that, if he refused to confess, he would be raped with a club. Thereafter, he was forced to hang on a rod placed on chairs and was threatened with clubs and weapons. When being beaten during his questioning in the office of the chief of Stepanakert Military Police Department A.B., a large amount of blood dripped from the second applicant\u2019s nose onto the floor and he was ordered to lick it off. The applicants finally alleged that they had been kept unlawfully at the military police arrest facility until 6 July 2004 in order to be subjected to further threats and abuse. 109.  By a letter of 26 December 2005 the General Prosecutor\u2019s Office informed the applicants that, during the court examination of the criminal case against them, the Syunik Regional Court, guided by Article 17 \u00a7 4 of the CCP, had taken the necessary measures to verify the statements alleging that they had been subjected by the investigators to coercion during the investigation, and found them to be unsubstantiated in its judgment of 18 May 2005. 110.  On 8 January 2006 the applicants lodged a complaint with the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan under Article 290 of the CCP, complaining that the Prosecutor\u2019s Office, by relying on the examination carried out by the Syunik Regional Court, was refusing to institute criminal proceedings. However, the Syunik Regional Court was not competent to carry out examinations outside the scope of the criminal case before it. The alleged perpetrators were not involved as accused and appeared before the Regional Court only as witnesses. In order to carry out an effective investigation of the allegations of ill-treatment, it was necessary to institute criminal proceedings under Article 181 of the CCP. They requested the District Court to oblige the General Prosecutor to institute such proceedings. 111.  On 1 February 2006 the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan dismissed the complaint, finding that the General Prosecutor\u2019s reply was in conformity with the law and did not violate the applicants\u2019 rights. The District Court stated, in particular, that complaints alleging a violation of lawfulness in the course of criminal proceedings, pursuant to Article 17 \u00a7 4 of the CCP, were to be thoroughly examined by the authority dealing with the merits of the case, while statements about a crime made during a court hearing, pursuant to Article 177 of the CCP, were to be entered into the record of the court hearing. 112.  On 14 February 2006 the applicants lodged an appeal, raising similar arguments to those in their complaint of 8 January 2006. 113.  On 14 March 2006 the Criminal and Military Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the District Court, finding that the applicants\u2019 allegations of ill-treatment had been examined during the proceedings before the Syunik Regional Court and the evidence obtained was evaluated in the ensuing judgment. The case was currently being examined on the merits by the Criminal and Military Court of Appeal, which was not constrained by the appeal and was competent to examine the full scope of the case, including any new evidence. The applicants\u2019 argument that the Regional Court and the Court of Appeal were not competent to conduct proceedings in respect of persons who had not been involved as accused was incorrect, since the courts, in adopting their judgments, were obliged under the criminal procedure law to verify and assess whether the evidence obtained was admissible and relevant and whether or not it had been obtained through violence, threats and other unlawful actions of the police officers as alleged in the applicants\u2019 appeal. Pursuant to Articles 41 \u00a7 2 (4) and 184 \u00a7 1 of the CCP, the courts, based on the materials of a case examined by them, were entitled to request that the prosecutor adopt a decision instituting criminal proceedings against third persons. Since the case was currently pending before the Court of Appeal, the applicants\u2019 appeal was to be dismissed. 114.  On 28 March 2006 the applicants lodged an appeal on points of law, raising similar arguments. They also claimed that their procedural rights had been violated since the authorities refused to comply with the requirements of Articles 180 and 181 of the CCP. 115.  On 30 May 2006 the Criminal and Military Court of Appeal issued its judgment on the merits of the applicants\u2019 criminal case. It found the applicants guilty and increased their sentences to life imprisonment. The Court of Appeal relied, inter alia, on the second applicant\u2019s confession statement. As regards the applicants\u2019 allegations of ill-treatment, the Court of Appeal found them to be unsubstantiated. In doing so, the Court of Appeal first of all referred to the submissions made before the Regional Court by law enforcement officers A.H., S.T., V.K. A.B. and A.K., Chiefs of the Third and Fourth Battalions E.M. and I.V., officer M.A. and cameraman A.G. The Court of Appeal further referred to the video recording of the reconstruction of the crime, which did not reveal any bodily injuries on the second applicant, who moved and talked freely, and the records of examination of a person\u2019s body drawn up at the military police arrest facility on 24 April 2004. 116.  On 1 June 2006 the Court of Cassation decided to leave the appeal of 28 March 2006 unexamined. It found, in particular, that the applicants had brought a complaint under Article 290 of the CCP against the prosecutor\u2019s actions related to the pre-trial proceedings. However, since the Court of Cassation was the supreme judicial instance and was called upon, pursuant to Article 92 of the Constitution, to ensure the uniform application of the law, its constitutional status prevented it from examining appeals against decisions and actions of the prosecutor related to the pre-trial proceedings. Such appeals might be examined by the Court of Cassation in exceptional circumstances, if they raised an issue of high importance for judicial practice. In such circumstances, the appeal was to be left unexamined since it was brought against a decision which was not subject to appeal in cassation. 117.  On 9 June 2006 the applicants lodged an appeal on points of law against the judgment of the Criminal and Military Court of Appeal of 30 May 2006. 118.  On an unspecified date, the father of one of the murdered servicemen, in his capacity of victim, also lodged an appeal on points of law against that judgment. In his appeal he complained that the criminal case had been conducted with procedural violations, as a result of which three innocent servicemen had been found guilty, while the real perpetrators were never brought to justice. 119.  On 7 August 2006 the Court of Cassation returned the applicants\u2019 appeal, requesting them to correct a shortcoming and to re-submit the appeal in accordance with the newly-adopted amendments to the CCP. 120.  On 11 September 2006 the first and second applicants re\u2011submitted their appeals, seeking to have their conviction quashed and to be acquitted. It appears that on an unspecified date the third applicant also followed suit. The applicants complained in detail that they had been unlawfully deprived of their liberty from 19 to 24 April 2004 and subjected to ill\u2011treatment during that period. They further complained that the authorities had failed to investigate their allegations of ill-treatment. 121.  On 9 October 2006 the Court of Cassation decided to admit the applicants\u2019 appeals for examination. On an unspecified date the victim\u2019s appeal was also admitted for examination. 122.  On 22 December 2006 the Court of Cassation decided to dismiss the applicants\u2019 appeals, but to grant that of the victim, quashing the judgments of 18 May 2005 and 30 May 2006 and remitting the case for further investigation. The Court of Cassation found that the investigating authority had failed to take all the necessary measures for an objective evaluation of the circumstances of the case and had failed to verify duly the statements of the defence concerning the applicants\u2019 innocence and the existence of exonerating evidence, as well as their allegations of a violation of lawfulness in the course of the proceedings. In such circumstances, the applicants\u2019 appeals seeking an acquittal could not be granted, since it was necessary to carry out a further investigation into the case. 123.  As regards, in particular, the second applicant\u2019s confession statement, the Court of Cassation found that this statement was not supported by other objective evidence in the case. Furthermore, the second applicant had retracted his statement, alleging that he had given it as a result of fear, violence and torture. It was therefore necessary to verify the credibility of the second applicant\u2019s confession statement. 124.  As regards the question of the applicants\u2019 deprivation of liberty and their allegations of ill-treatment, the Court of Cassation stated:\n\u201cIt follows from the materials of the case that [the applicants] were detained on 24 April 2004. It was indicated in the appeals on points of law that for five days in a row [the applicants], having the status of a witness, had been subjected to violence, torture and inhuman treatment, as a result of which a confession statement was extorted from [the second applicant].\nPursuant to Paragraph 5 of Order no. 112 of 21 April 2004 of the commander of military unit no. 33651, [the third applicant] was \u2018considered to be isolated\u2019 by the Stepanakert Military Police Department and was deprived of his daily allowance on the basis of Isolation Notice N-99.\nPursuant to Paragraph 6 of the same Order, [the second and first applicants], who were on military watch, were considered to be \u2018isolated by the Stepanakert Military Police Department\u2019 and were deprived of their daily allowances on the basis of Isolation Notices N-100 and N-101.\nIn the course of the further investigation it is necessary to clarify what it means \u2018to consider\u2019 the said soldiers \u2018to be isolated by the Stepanakert Military Police Department\u2019 on the basis of isolation notices and what is the substance of such isolation. Has it not led to unlawful restrictions and deprivation of liberty not inherent in measures normally applied in the armed forces?\nIt is also necessary to verify in detail the arguments raised in the appeals lodged by the defence concerning the infliction of violence on [the applicants] and subjecting them to torture during those days.\u201d 125.  The Court of Cassation also decided to annul the preventive measure and to release the applicants from detention. 126.  On 6 February 2007 the investigation into the applicants\u2019 criminal case was assigned to another investigator of the Military Prosecutor\u2019s Office, V.S. An investigator of the Gugark Garrison Military Prosecutor\u2019s Office of Armenia, S.G., was appointed as his assistant. 127.  On 19 February 2007 the applicants appeared for questioning in their capacity of accused but refused to testify, stating that they considered themselves to be victims rather than accused. They stated that they would be willing to testify in connection with their allegations of torture if a separate criminal case was instituted and they were recognised as victims. 128.  On the same date lawyer Z.P., who at that point was representing all three applicants, challenged the impartiality of employees of the Military Prosecutor\u2019s Office, alleging that they were incapable of carrying out an objective investigation, which was evidenced by all the unlawfulness demonstrated earlier in the case, and requesting that they be removed from the investigation. This challenge was dismissed by the Acting Prosecutor General as unfounded. 129.  On 27 February 2007 lawyer Z.P. filed a motion with the General Prosecutor\u2019s Office requesting that a separate criminal case be instituted. She argued that the criminal case in question had been instituted on account of murder and the applicants were involved as accused. It was not possible to carry out an investigation into allegations of torture within the scope of that criminal case. The applicants had consistently complained for three years about the torture that they had undergone, and indicated the names of the perpetrators, but the authorities refused to make a proper assessment of their allegations. 130.  On 28 February 2007 investigator V.S. rejected the motion, finding that not every report of a crime was sufficient in itself to institute criminal proceedings. Sufficient materials had not yet been obtained to adopt such a decision. 131.  In March and April 2007 the investigators questioned a number of persons, including investigators A.H. and S.T. and military police officers V.K., A.B. and M., the commander of the applicants\u2019 military unit, M.A., three military police officers of the Stepanakert Military Police Department and one officer of the Nagorno Karabakh Defence Army who had transported the applicants from Stepanakert to Yerevan, lawyers M.A. and V.Y., and the third applicant\u2019s cousin\u2019s husband, H.M., who had visited him in detention together with his father on 26 April 2004. 132.  Investigators A.H. and S.T. provided their account of the events and denied having ill-treated the applicants. The transcripts of their interviews, including the questions and answers, contained texts which were word-for-word duplicates. Military police officers V.K. and A.B. similarly denied having ill-treated the applicants. Military police officer M. stated that he had been absent from the Stepanakert Military Police Department during the period when the applicants were taken there and he had never encountered them. Commander of the military unit M.A. stated that on 21 April 2004 he had imposed disciplinary detention on the applicants because of their unauthorised absence from the unit and ordered that they serve it at the Stepanakert Military Police Department. He did not know what questions had been posed to the applicants by the investigators in his office because this had been done in private. No violence had been inflicted in his presence. The officers who had transported the applicants stated that the applicants had not been handcuffed and no violence had been inflicted on them during their transfer. They had not noticed any bodily injuries and the applicants had not complained about their health. 133.  Lawyers M.A. and V.Y. stated that on 24 April 2004 they had received telephone calls from investigator A.H. who had invited them to the Military Prosecutor\u2019s Office to take up the applicants\u2019 defence, since a lawyer\u2019s participation was mandatory in cases involving servicemen. They were presented to the second applicant, who was asked to choose between them, so he chose lawyer M.A. Lawyer M.A. stated that, from that moment, he participated in all the interviews and confrontations involving the second applicant. On 27 April 2004 he met with his parents and signed a contract. Lawyer V.Y. stated that he had represented the first and third applicants until 26 April 2004. On that day he met with the first and third applicants\u2019 parents, who did not wish him to continue representing them. Both lawyers stated that they had not noticed any injuries on the applicants, no ill\u2011treatment had been inflicted on the applicants in their presence, no complaints of ill-treatment had been made by the applicants nor any pressure exerted on them by the investigator. Lawyer M.A. added that the second applicant did not raise his allegations of ill-treatment until 15 days later when they met in private at the military police arrest facility. He then advised the second applicant to lodge a complaint with the Military Prosecutor. 134.  H.M. stated that on 24 April 2004 the third applicant\u2019s father had told him that his son had been taken to the Military Prosecutor\u2019s Office. Since he was acquainted with investigator A.H., who lived in his neighbourhood, he promised to find out the reasons for the third applicant\u2019s arrest. On the next day he had bumped into A.H. in the yard and introduced him to the third applicant\u2019s father. They inquired about the reasons for his arrest, to which A.H. had replied that he was investigating a murder case and the third applicant had been arrested in that connection. They had further asked A.H. to give them a possibility to visit the third applicant for a few minutes, to which A.H. replied that on the following day he was going to carry out some investigative measures involving the third applicant at the Military Prosecutor\u2019s Office and he could allow them to see him for a few minutes. On the following day they had gone to the Military Prosecutor\u2019s Office and met with the third applicant for a few minutes in A.H.\u2019s office. In reply to the investigator\u2019s question as to whether he had seen any injuries on the third applicant or received from him any complaints of ill-treatment, H.M. stated that he had not noticed any injuries or received such complaints. Furthermore, since the investigator had left them alone for a few minutes, the third applicant, in his opinion, would at least have told his father about any ill-treatment. 135.  On 2 April 2007 the investigator decided to order a forensic medical examination in respect of the applicants. The experts were requested to answer the following questions: (a) whether there had been or were any injuries on the applicants\u2019 bodies and, if so, what was their origin; (b) if so, whether they could have originated during the period from 19 to 24 April 2004 and not be visible three days later, namely on 27 April 2004; and (c) whether the applicants suffered from any illness and, if so, whether it had been caused by the alleged ill-treatment. 136.  On 10 September 2007 the forensic medical experts produced their conclusions. They found that, according to the applicants\u2019 medical files, they did not have any injuries or suffer from any illnesses at the material time. It was not possible to determine whether the applicants had any injuries or illnesses at present since they had failed to appear for the examination. The experts added that skin, bone and joint injuries, such as wounds, bruises, scratches, fractures and dislocated joints, were usually visible after three days. 137.  On 1 October 2007 the Acting General Prosecutor decided not to institute criminal proceedings against the alleged perpetrators of ill\u2011treatment for lack of a criminal act. This decision referred at the outset to the instructions of the Court of Cassation to investigate the circumstances of the applicants\u2019 alleged deprivation of liberty prior to 24 April 2004 and their ill-treatment. As regards the deprivation of liberty, it was found to have been a lawful disciplinary measure imposed by the commander of the military unit within the scope of authority vested in him. It was further found that the investigating team had the right to interview the applicants as witnesses and they had been transferred for that purpose. At the Stepanakert Police Department they were placed in a disciplinary isolation cell and continued to be questioned, but later it was necessary to transfer them to Yerevan for the purposes of the investigation. There the second applicant had made his confession, after which the applicants were arrested. Lawyers were assigned to them and they were detained by a court decision of 27 April 2004. In such circumstances, the applicants\u2019 allegations of unlawful deprivation of liberty and ill-treatment had been rebutted by the evidence collected in the case. 138.  On 25 October 2007 the applicants lodged an appeal against this decision. They complained in detail that they had been unlawfully deprived of their liberty from 19 to 24 April 2004 in the guise of witnesses, while already being suspected of the crime. This had been done in order to deprive them of the safeguards enjoyed by a suspect under the law, such as the right to have a lawyer and the right not to testify, and to coerce them into making a confession. They had never been summoned to appear as witnesses as required by law but instead were forcibly taken from their military unit and transported miles away from one law enforcement agency to another where they were kept in various rooms and cells and subjected to repeated ill\u2011treatment. There had been no reasonable suspicion to justify depriving them of their liberty and they had been arrested only once the confession had been secured through coercion. They had then been placed in the military police arrest facility where the investigators continued exerting pressure, and in order to hide any traces of ill-treatment. They had not been informed about the reasons for their deprivation of liberty and were brought before a judge with a delay of eight days. The decision of the Acting General Prosecutor had been unlawful and unfounded. He was obliged by law to institute a separate set of criminal proceedings on account of ill\u2011treatment, to recognise them as victims and, after carrying out an investigation, to give a proper assessment to the questions raised by the Court of Cassation in its decision of 22 December 2006. For more than four years they had consistently raised their allegations of ill-treatment and indicated the names of the perpetrators but no effective investigation had ever been carried out. The applicants relied, inter alia, on Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention. 139.  On 23 November 2007 the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan decided to dismiss the appeal. The decision reads as follows:\n\u201cHaving studied the appeal and the materials of the criminal case, the court finds that the contested actions were taken in compliance with the law and there has been no violation of a person\u2019s rights or freedoms.\u201d 140.  No appeal was lodged against this decision. 141.  On 18 January 2008 the Military Prosecutor decided to institute criminal proceedings to investigate whether the fact that the starting date of the first applicant\u2019s detention was indicated in his medical file as \u201c19 April 2004\u201d amounted to falsification of an official document. A number of persons were questioned and it was revealed that the note in question had been made by mistake by the head of the medical service based on the first applicant\u2019s oral statement. For this reason it was decided to terminate the criminal proceedings for lack of a criminal act. 142.  On an unspecified date the applicants\u2019 trial resumed in the Shirak Regional Court. According to the applicants, a number of former servicemen of their military unit and also a few civilians testified during the trial that they had been locked up during various periods at the beginning of 2004 at the Martakert Garrison Military Prosecutor\u2019s Office and the Stepanakert Military Police Department and questioned in connection with the murders. Many of them stated that they had been humiliated and brutally ill\u2011treated during those periods in order to confess to the crime. 143.  On 18 December 2012 the Shirak Regional Court, having heard numerous witnesses and examined the available evidence, found that the applicants\u2019 guilt had not been substantiated and decided to acquit them. It appears that no appeals were lodged against this judgment.", "references": ["4", "8", "3", "0", "9", "6", "7", "5", "No Label", "1", "2"], "gold": ["1", "2"]}
+{"input": "10.  On 11 May 1995 the Fier Commission recognised the applicant\u2019s and other heirs\u2019 inherited property rights over a plot of land measuring 55,200 sq. m of which 8,186 sq. m were restored. It also decided that the Commission would decide on the compensation of the remaining plot at a further moment. On 29 January 1999 the Fier District Court amended the Commission decision of 11 May 1995 and restored the applicant and other heirs a plot measuring 9,107 sq. m. 11.  On an unspecified date the applicant lodged a civil action seeking the vacation of the property, which was occupied by third parties. The third parties lodged a counter-action requesting the annulment of the Commission decision of 11 May 1995. On 27 September 2001 the Supreme Court finally amended the Commission decision in respect of the applicant\u2019s share of property, which corresponded to a plot measuring 930 sq. m. Since the plot of land was occupied, the Supreme Court decided that the applicant would be compensated in one of the ways provided by law. 12.  On 11 April 2011 the Fier District Court granted the applicant\u2019s and other heirs\u2019 leave to appeal out of time against the Commission decision of 11 May 1995 in respect of the remaining plot of land measuring 47,014 sq. m (see paragraph 10 above). The parties failed to provide information about the progress of this set of proceedings. It would appear that the proceedings are pending. 13.  To date, no compensation has been paid in respect of the applicant\u2019s land measuring 930 sq. m. 14.  On 19 January 2000 the Tirana Commission recognised, amongst others, the applicants\u2019 inherited property rights over a plot of land measuring 10,600 sq. m. Since the plot of land was occupied, the applicants would be compensated in one of the ways provided by law. 15.  On 14 April 2008 the applicants requested that unoccupied plots measuring 3,142 sq. m, situated within the plot measuring 10,600 sq. m, be restored to them. On 3 December 2008 the Tirana Commission rejected their application since the plot of land was occupied. 16.  To date, no compensation has been paid in respect of the plot of land measuring 10,600 sq. m. 17.  On 15 January 2008 the Elbasan Commission recognised the applicant\u2019s inherited property rights over two plots of land totalling 16,500 sq. m. Since the plots of land were occupied, the applicant would be compensated in one of the ways provided by law. 18.  To date, no compensation has been paid. 19.  On 19 August 2014 Mr Erol Hasa, a Macedonian national, expressed his wish to pursue the proceedings on his father\u2019s behalf (see paragraph 3 above). He submitted an English translation of a notarised document, which recognised him as the sole testamentary heir in respect of the property situated in Elbasan. The original document, no copy of which was submitted to the Court, appears to have been issued by a notary of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. That document has not been recognised by the Albanian authorities in accordance with the Albanian law. 20.  On 25 October 1995 the Gjirokast\u00ebr Commission recognised the applicants\u2019 inherited property rights over a plot of land measuring 4,527 sq. m of which 920 sq. m. were restored. Since the remaining plot measuring 3,607 sq. m was occupied, the applicants would be compensated in one of the ways provided by law. 21.  To date, no compensation has been paid. 22.  On 23 September 1996 the Tirana Commission recognised, amongst others, the applicants\u2019 inherited property rights over a plot of land measuring 208,696 sq. m of which 7,452 sq. m were restored. Since the remaining plot measuring 201,244 sq. m was occupied, the applicants would be compensated in one of the ways provided by law. 23.  To date, no compensation has been paid. 24.  On 22 October 1994 the Tirana Commission recognised the applicants\u2019 inherited property rights over a plot of land measuring 1,730 sq. m. Since the plot of land was occupied, the applicants would be compensated in one of the ways provided by law. On 22 December 2007 the Agency decided to award financial compensation to the applicants in respect of 200 sq. m. 25.  To date, no compensation has been paid in respect of the remaining plot measuring 1,530 sq. m. 26.  On 24 October 1995 the Saranda Commission recognised the applicants\u2019 inherited property rights over a plot of land measuring 69,186 sq. m, situated within the city boundaries (vij\u00ebs s\u00eb verdh\u00eb t\u00eb qytetit), of which 5,000 sq. m were restored and another 5,000 sq. m were compensated in kind. Since another plot measuring 59,184 sq. m was occupied, the applicants would be compensated in State bonds on the basis of Agricultural Land Act. 27.  To date, no compensation has been paid.", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "6", "8", "5", "1", "7", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1972 and is currently serving a sentence in prison no. 100. 6.  On 1 April 2000 criminal proceedings were instituted in Donetsk in connection with a robbery committed in Dzerzhinsk. 7.  On 2 June 2000 criminal proceedings were instituted in Kharkiv in connection with a robbery committed on the Kharkiv-Dnipropetrovsk-Simferopol road. 8.  On 9 August 2001 criminal proceedings were instituted in Yevpatoriya in connection with a murder and attempted murder committed in the course of an armed robbery (\u201cthe murder proceedings\u201d). 9.  On 30 October 2001 the Chervonodzerzhynskiy District Court (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) granted the prosecutor\u2019s request to put the applicant, a former police officer, on remand as a suspect in the criminal proceedings concerning the robbery on the Kharkiv-Dnipropetrovsk-Simferopol road. The District Court held that, as the applicant was suspected of having committed a serious crime and had absconded during the investigation, his detention was necessary to prevent him from reoffending. The court also noted that the applicant\u2019s personality was to be taken into consideration, without giving any further details. On the same date, the applicant\u2019s name was put on a wanted list. 10.  On 11 November 2001 the applicant was arrested in accordance with the District Court decision of 30 October 2001. He submitted that he had presented himself to the police voluntarily once he had become aware that he was wanted. On the same day, he drafted a \u201cstatement of voluntary surrender\u201d (\u044f\u0432\u043a\u0430 \u0437 \u043f\u043e\u0432\u0438\u043d\u043d\u043e\u044e) in which he confessed to committing, as part of a criminal group, a number of armed robberies on the Kharkiv-Dnipropetrovsk-Simferopol road, as well as one in the town of Yevpatoriya. He stated that, in the course of the latter, he had used a firearm against the victim. The applicant also provided more details in writing about the above crimes and his acquaintance with his accomplices and informed the police about two other armed robberies which he and his accomplices had committed in the town of Dzerzhynsk, as well as about other crimes of which he was aware. 11.  On 12 November 2001 the applicant was charged with armed robbery and questioned. Before being questioned he was informed of his procedural rights but signed a waiver of his right to legal assistance. He made similar statements to those given to the police the day before, including about the shooting incident in Yevpatoriya. On the same day, he familiarised himself with the decision of 30 October 2001, against which he was entitled to appeal. He did not appeal against the decision. 12.  On 13 November 2001, in the absence of a lawyer, the applicant was questioned in the context of the robbery proceedings. The Government submitted \u2013 and this is not contested by the applicant \u2013 that the applicant again waived his right to a lawyer, having once again been informed of his rights. During the questioning, the applicant, apart from giving information on the robberies, reiterated his statements regarding the shooting which had occurred in Yevpatoriya. He was further questioned in that regard. 13.  On 21 November 2001 a lawyer, D., was appointed to represent the applicant. On the same day, in the absence of a lawyer, the applicant was questioned as a suspect in the murder proceedings. He admitted to shooting a victim in the course of the armed robbery but denied that he had done so intentionally. 14.  On 22 November 2001, in the presence of his lawyer, the applicant was charged with murder and attempted murder, and questioned as an accused. He admitted his guilt in respect of the armed robbery but denied the murder charges. A reconstruction of the crime scene was carried out. 15.  On 12 December 2001 the applicant was charged with armed robbery causing grievous bodily harm. He waived his right to a lawyer during questioning. 16.  On 13 December 2001 the applicant was charged with premeditated armed robbery as part of a criminal group. He again waived his right to a lawyer. 17.  On 4 January 2002 the District Court extended the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention to four months. The applicant did not appeal against this decision. 18.  On 8 February 2002 the criminal proceedings concerning robberies on the Kharkiv-Dnipropetrovsk-Simferopol road were joined with the murder proceedings. 19.  On 7 March 2002 the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal, having heard the investigator and the prosecutor, and referring to \u201cthe applicant\u2019s personality\u201d, albeit without assessing it, the seriousness of the charges against him, and the need for additional time to conduct the necessary investigative measures, extended the applicant\u2019s detention to six months. The decision was not amenable to appeal. 20.  On 12 March 2002 B. was appointed as the applicant\u2019s lawyer. 21.  On 4 April 2002 the criminal proceedings regarding the robberies in Dzerzhynsk were joined with the other proceedings against the applicant. 22.  On 8 April 2002 the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal, having heard the investigator and the prosecutor, extended the applicant\u2019s detention to nine months on the same grounds as those in its ruling of 7 March 2002. The decision was not amenable to appeal. 23.  On 10 July 2002 L. replaced B. as the applicant\u2019s lawyer. On the same day, the applicant was charged with a number of crimes, including banditry, several counts of armed robbery, premeditated murder and attempted murder, and questioned. He pleaded not guilty as charged and refused to give further testimonies. 24.  On 18 November 2002 amended charges were brought against the applicant and he was questioned again. 25.  On 28 December 2002 the applicant was granted access to the case file. According to the Government, no investigative measures were conducted that day. 26.  After the investigation had been completed the case was referred to the Donetsk Regional Court of Appeal (\u201cthe Court of Appeal\u201d), acting as a first-instance court, for trial. The decision to do so was not amenable to appeal. 27.  On 12 June 2003 the applicant requested the Court of Appeal to change his preventive measure to a non-custodial one. 28.  On 17 December 2003 the Court of Appeal remitted the case for additional investigation, holding that the applicant\u2019s rights of defence had been breached. It found, inter alia, that the applicant had officially been charged with offences other than those considered by the trial court. It further established that on 10 July, 18 November and 28 December 2002 investigative measures had been carried out in the absence of the applicant\u2019s lawyer, contrary to the requirements of domestic law. The court also decided, without giving reasons or setting a time-limit, that the applicant would remain in detention. The applicant appealed in cassation against that decision and requested, inter alia, that the preventive measure, namely the detention ordered be lifted. 29.  On 29 April 2004 the Supreme Court heard the applicant\u2019s appeal in the presence of the prosecutor. It upheld the decision of the Court of Appeal of 17 December 2003 and stated, without giving any reasons, that there were no grounds for changing or discontinuing the preventive measure imposed on the applicant. 30.  On 2 August 2004 V. was appointed as the applicant\u2019s lawyer. 31.  On 6 August 2004, in the presence of his lawyer, the applicant was charged with a number of criminal offences, including banditry, several counts of armed robbery, premeditated murder and attempted murder, and questioned. He admitted to his acquaintance with the co-accused, but pleaded not guilty on all charges. 32.  On 20 August 2004, in the presence of his lawyer, amended charges were brought against the applicant. The latter refused to sign or receive copies of the relevant papers as he disagreed with the charges. During further questioning he pleaded not guilty and refused to give any testimony. 33.  On 27 August 2004 the applicant and his lawyer were granted access to the case file, and on 3 September 2004 the case was referred for trial. 34.  On an unspecified date, the applicant lodged a request for release with the Court of Appeal. 35.  On 6 October 2005 the Court of Appeal, having acquitted the applicant on four of the eight charges for lack of proof, found him guilty of banditry, several counts of armed robbery, intentional murder and attempted murder. It sentenced him to life imprisonment with confiscation of all his property. The court based its findings to a large extent on the testimonies of the applicant and his co-defendants given during the pre-trial investigation, having found them to be corroborated by a number of other pieces of evidence. In the part of the judgment which concerns the murder charges, the court referred, in particular, to the \u201ctestimonies given by the applicant as a suspect and an accused, including in the presence of a lawyer\u201d. It further dismissed as ill-founded the applicant\u2019s complaints that his rights of defence had been violated and his requests to declare inadmissible his statements obtained in the absence of a lawyer. In this context, when finding the applicant guilty of armed robberies, the court held that, having been informed of his procedural rights, the applicant had voluntarily waived his right to legal representation and that such a waiver had been lawfully accepted by the investigative authorities as robbery charges could not lead to a life sentence. It further held that during questioning on the murder, the applicant had been legally represented and had made his statements in the presence of a lawyer. 36.  In addition, the Court of Appeal gave a separate ruling by which it declared inadmissible a number of pieces of evidence related to different charges against the applicant and his co-defendants, as the evidence had been obtained in violation of the defendants\u2019 rights of defence. In particular, as far as the applicant was concerned, apart from the evidence which had been found inadmissible on 17 December 2003, the court further excluded from the body of evidence some of the testimonies given by the applicant on 8 and 9 January 2002. It held that, even though the applicant had allegedly confessed to murdering five people shortly after his arrest, he had nevertheless been questioned as a witness, in the absence of a lawyer. 37.  The applicant appealed in cassation against the judgment of 6 October 2005. He stated in particular that there had been insufficient evidence to prove his guilt; he had been ill-treated by the police; on a number of occasions during the pre-trial investigation he had been questioned in the absence of a lawyer and that evidence obtained in violation of his rights of defence had nevertheless been used to secure his conviction. 38.  On 19 October 2006 the Supreme Court of Ukraine held a hearing in the presence of the prosecutor, the applicant and his sister \u2013 who acted as his representative. On the same day, it upheld the applicant\u2019s conviction of 6 October 2005. It dismissed as unsubstantiated his complaints that his rights of defence had been violated at the pre-trial stage of the proceedings, holding that those complaints had been duly examined and dismissed by the Court of Appeal. It also dismissed as unsubstantiated the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment by the police. 39.  Between 28 July and 13 October 2004 the applicant was held in the Kharkiv pre-trial detention centre no. 27 (\u201cKharkiv SIZO\u201d), in cell no. 537. He submitted that his cell had been overcrowded: it had measured 16 square metres, contained eight beds for ten people, and detainees had had to take turns to sleep. He also alleged that some of the cellmates had been suffering from tuberculosis. In this context, he submitted written statements made by his cellmates K., G., K.I., P. and O. 40.  The applicant\u2019s sister complained to the Governor of Kharkiv SIZO about the conditions of her brother\u2019s detention. By a letter dated 13 June 2005 the Governor informed her that the cell in question had been designed to accommodate eight people and that no more than eight inmates had been held in that cell during the applicant\u2019s detention. The Governor further informed her that, according to medical documents concerning K., G., K.I., P. and O., none of them had been suffering from an active form of tuberculosis. He stated that the applicant had never been in contact with anyone suffering from such a disease whilst in Kharkiv SIZO. 41.  After his conviction on 6 October 2005, the applicant was transferred to the high-security wing of the Donetsk pre-trial detention centre no. 5 (\u201cDonetsk SIZO\u201d). According to the applicant, he was handcuffed whenever he left his cell, including during daily walks and meetings with his relatives. 42.  In Kharkiv SIZO the applicant was held in cells nos. 27 and 537 measuring 24.2 square metres each, designed to accommodate eight detainees. The cells were equipped with a dining table, a bench, a washstand and a toilet, which was separated from the living area by a brick partition. There was natural ventilation and light through windows; artificial lighting allowed inmates to read and write without damaging their eyesight. The temperature in the cells was between 18oC and 20oC. Running water was constantly available in the cells. All detainees were provided with bed linen and clothes in accordance with domestic standards. 43.  As regards the applicant\u2019s allegations that he had shared his cell with persons suffering from tuberculosis, the Government pointed out that the domestic legislation provided that persons suffering from that disease should be kept separately from healthy detainees. The Government could not provide any information about the applicant\u2019s cellmates and their state of health, however, because the time-limit for keeping the relevant documents had expired and the records had been destroyed. They noted that the applicant had not complained that his state of health had worsened in detention. 44.  Whenever the applicant was taken out of his cell and escorted within the Donetsk SIZO, handcuffs were used pursuant to the relevant domestic legislation. The Government contested the applicant\u2019s statement that he had been handcuffed during his daily walks and meetings with relatives, as the former was prohibited by the relevant domestic regulations.", "references": ["0", "6", "8", "5", "9", "4", "7", "No Label", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["1", "2", "3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1972 and lives in Burgas. 6.  At about 6 a.m. on 11 July 2007 several police officers visited the applicant\u2019s home with a summons for him to report to the police station in the neighbouring town of Pomorie \u201cas a witness\u201d in relation to an investigation. The applicant alleged that he was not at home at the time and that he was alerted by phone by his wife. On the summons, on the other hand, it is noted that he refused to accept receipt. 7.  At about 7 a.m. the applicant arrived at the Pomorie police station. He was notified that he was being detained under section 63(1)(1) of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Act (\u201cthe MIAA\u201d, see paragraph 15 below). The detention order stated that he was being detained on the basis of section 63(1)(1) \u201cin connection with an offence under Article 195 of the Criminal Code\u201d, which refers to theft. 8.  During his detention, the applicant was transported to a police station in Burgas and then back to the police station in Pomorie, where his fingerprints were taken. He was not interviewed, and no further investigative steps involving his participation were taken. 9.  At about 12 a.m. the applicant was allowed to meet with a lawyer retained by his wife, who insisted that the police release him. The applicant was released shortly after that, at 1.30 p.m. on 11 July 2007. 10.  Immediately after his release the applicant applied for judicial review of the detention order. In the framework of the ensuing proceedings the police presented an order dated 10 July 2007 and signed by a police investigator in Pomorie. They stated that the case file concerning the applicant contained no further documents. The order stated that a theft had been committed by an unknown person in a hotel in Pomorie and instructed the police to take the appropriate measures to search for the perpetrator. 11.  The Burgas Administrative Court heard the case on 28 November 2007. It accepted the order mentioned in the preceding paragraph as evidence. 12.  In a judgment of 21 December 2007 it upheld the detention order, holding that the applicant\u2019s detention had been in accordance with the law. It found, in particular, that for the lawful application of section 63(1)(1) of the MIAA it was not necessary that the police should hold evidence showing \u201cin an unqualified manner\u201d that the detainee had committed an offence; data \u201cjustifying a suspicion that there was a probability that the person had committed an offence\u201d was sufficient. The domestic court noted further that the police had operational freedom as to the application of section 63(1)(1) of the MIAA. 13.  On appeal by the applicant, on 17 November 2008 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the judgment of the Burgas Administrative Court, reiterating its reasoning.", "references": ["1", "0", "9", "4", "8", "3", "7", "6", "5", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1984 and lives in Baku. 6.  The applicant is a well-known civil society activist and human rights defender. He is the Chairman and one of the co-founders of Human Rights Club, a non-governmental organisation (NGO) specialising in the protection of human rights. Human Rights Club was established in December 2010 and has made several unsuccessful attempts to obtain State registration by the Ministry of Justice in order to obtain legal entity status under domestic law. The authorities\u2019 refusal to register Human Rights Club is the subject of another application pending before the Court (see application no. 27309/14). The applicant has collaborated with other NGOs in Azerbaijan on various projects. He is also a member of the Board of Directors of the Republican Alternative Civic Movement (REAL). 7.  The applicant has been involved in the preparation of various reports relating to human rights issues in Azerbaijan. He has also been involved in promoting the adoption of a Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) report on political prisoners in Azerbaijan, and has been working on a consolidated list of political prisoners to be presented to the Council of Europe. He has been a speaker at Council of Europe and United Nations (UN) events, and has submitted shadow reports to UN institutions. 8.  The applicant also coordinated the Sing for Democracy campaign (later renamed Art for Democracy) during and after the Eurovision Song Contest 2012 in Baku, which aimed at drawing attention to human rights violations in Azerbaijan. 9.  During the June 2014 session of the PACE the applicant presented a report on human rights violations in Azerbaijan at the Council of Europe. 10.  In recent years a number of human rights activists, lawyers, politicians, journalists and other government critics have been arrested and/or charged with various criminal offences. Those arrests generated wide publicity and were condemned by a number of international organisations, NGOs and prominent individuals (see, for example, paragraphs 83-84 below). 11.  On 22 April 2014 the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office instituted criminal proceedings under Articles 308.1 (abuse of power) and 313 (forgery by an official) of the Criminal Code in connection with alleged irregularities in the financial activities of a number of NGOs. 12.  While the applicant was away in Kyiv from 6 to 11 July 2014 the Sabail District Court ordered a freezing injunction in respect of his bank accounts on 7 July 2014. 13.  On 29 July 2014, while travelling by train from Baku to Tbilisi, the applicant was stopped during checks at the Azerbaijani-Georgian border. He was informed that he could not leave the country because a travel ban had been imposed on him on 25 July 2014. 14.  On 31 July 2014 the applicant was invited to the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office, where he was questioned as a witness in connection with the above-mentioned criminal proceedings (see paragraph 11 above). 15.  On 31 July and 1 August 2014 searches were conducted at Human Rights Club, and a number of documents, mainly related to book-keeping and finance, were seized. 16.  On 2 August 2014 the applicant was again invited to the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office for questioning as a witness. On his arrival at the premises he was arrested and formally charged under Articles 192.2.2 (illegal entrepreneurship), 213.1 (large-scale tax evasion) and 308.2 (abuse of power) of the Criminal Code. The description of charges consisted of a single sentence which was one page long. In particular, it was noted that since June 2010 the applicant, as co-founder and Chairman of Human Rights Club, an \u201corganisation lacking State registration\u201d, and as a project manager in an NGO named International Cooperation of Volunteers, had received a number of grants from the United States of America\u2019s National Endowment for Democracy (NED), various branches of the Open Society Institute Assistance Foundation (OSIAF), Norway\u2019s Stiftelsen Fritt Ord and other donor organisations, pursuant to relevant grant agreements. He was accused of acquiring profit, \u201cby paying money to himself and other people involved in the projects in the guise of salaries and service fees\u201d in the amount of 147,900.85 Azerbaijani new manats (AZN), having acquired that money through, \u201cillegal entrepreneurial activity in respect of grants which, as an official, he had failed to register with the relevant executive authority, even though he had a professional obligation to do so\u201d. He was also accused of avoiding payment of taxes under Articles 218, 219 and 220 of the Tax Code in the amount of AZN 6,162.24, thus causing, \u201csignificant damage to State interests protected by law, bringing about grave consequences\u201d. 17.  On the same day, 2 August 2014, the Nasimi District Court, relying on the official charges brought against the applicant and the prosecutor\u2019s application for the preventive measure of remand in custody, ordered the applicant\u2019s detention for a period of three months. The court justified the decision as follows:\n\u201cTaking into account the gravity of the criminal offences of which the applicant is accused and the possibility of him disrupting the normal course of the investigation by unlawfully influencing people involved in the proceedings or absconding from the investigation if he remains at liberty, the court considers that the preventive measure of remanding him in custody must be applied in his case.\u201d 18.  On 4 August 2014 the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office made a public statement which noted that the applicant had been charged under Articles 192.2.2, 213.1 and 308.2 of the Criminal Code because there was a suspicion that he had committed the criminal offences set out in the above\u2011mentioned Articles. 19.  On 4 August 2014 the applicant appealed against the detention order. He argued that there was no \u201creasonable suspicion\u201d that he had committed a criminal offence, and that his detention was a punishment for carrying out activities which were protected by the Constitution. He further argued that the court had failed to provide any relevant reasons as to the applicability of grounds which could justify his detention. In particular, as to the risk of absconding, the applicant pointed out that the factual circumstances indicated that there was no such risk. He submitted that he had cooperated with the investigating authorities from the very beginning by appearing for questioning and producing documents whenever he had been required to do so, and that he had returned to the country from a trip to Kyiv knowing that he was under investigation. As to the risk of disrupting the investigation, the applicant argued that the existence of such a risk had not been substantiated. He argued that, on the contrary, he had given to the authorities originals of all documents which could be relevant to the investigation, and therefore was not in a position to tamper with the evidence. 20.  On 8 August 2014 the Baku Court of Appeal upheld the detention order of 2 August 2014 without addressing any of the applicant\u2019s arguments. 21.  On 19 August 2014 the applicant applied to the Nasimi District Court, requesting the substitution of remand with either house arrest or release on bail. Among other things, the applicant highlighted the factual circumstances which supported his argument for less restrictive measures, including the fact that he had returned to the country from Kyiv knowing that he was under investigation and had complied with all orders to produce documents and appear for questioning, and that he, as a human rights defender, was a respected public figure with strong ties to the community. 22.  On 20 August 2014 the Nasimi District Court rejected his application, finding that the grounds justifying his detention, as specified in its decision of 2 August 2014, \u201chad not ceased to exist\u201d. 23.  On 22 August 2014 the applicant appealed, reiterating his arguments in detail. On 28 August 2014 the Baku Court of Appeal upheld the Nasimi District Court\u2019s decision of 20 August 2014. 24.  On 23 October 2014 the Nasimi District Court extended the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention by three months (to 2 February 2015), finding that the grounds justifying his continued detention, \u201chad not ceased to exist\u201d. 25.  On 24 October the applicant appealed, reiterating his previous arguments. 26.  On 29 October 2014 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the extension decision of 14 March 2013 and providing the same reasoning as the first-instance court. 27.  On an unspecified date in December 2014 the applicant applied to the Nasimi District Court, requesting the substitution of remand with house arrest. On 10 December 2014 the Nasimi District Court rejected his application, finding that the grounds justifying his detention, as specified in its decisions of 2 August and 23 October 2014, \u201chad not ceased to exist\u201d. 28.  On 12 December 2014 the applicant appealed against the Nasimi District Court\u2019s decision of 10 December 2014, reiterating his arguments in detail. On 19 December 2014 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. 29.  No further decisions extending the applicant\u2019s detention are available in the case file. 30.  On 12 December 2014 the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office charged the applicant under Articles 179.3.2 (high-level embezzlement) and 313 of the Criminal Code, in addition to the original charges under Articles 192.2.2, 213.1 and 308.2 of the Criminal Code. The description of the allegations against him was slightly expanded, but essentially remained the same as that given on 2 August 2014 (see paragraph 16 above), with additional information alleging that the applicant had falsified various pieces of paperwork and minor contracts for services provided by a number of individuals (presumably in connection with various grant projects) and had not paid them in full as stipulated in the contracts. The new description of charges also included changes to the total amount of the alleged illegal profit obtained by the applicant (AZN 150,170.62) and the alleged amount of unpaid taxes (AZN 6,257.11). 31.  The applicant\u2019s criminal trial began in January 2015. On 16 April 2015 the Baku Court of Serious Crimes convicted him of all charges and sentenced him to six and a half years\u2019 imprisonment and deprivation of the right to hold official positions in State and local authorities and the right to engage in entrepreneurial activity for a period of three years. The conviction is not yet final and the appeal is pending. 32.  Enclosed with his submissions to the Court, the applicant included statements by NED dated 22 October 2014, by the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Baku dated 19 November 2014, by the British Embassy in Azerbaijan dated 12 December 2014, by People In Need dated 12 January 2015, by OSIAF dated 20 and 21 January 2015, by International Bridges of Justice dated 22 January 2015 and by the Fritt Ord Foundation dated 5 February 2015. 33.  All of those statements, addressed \u201cTo whom it might concern\u201d, provided details of the relevant grants and donations awarded to the applicant or Human Rights Club, noted that the applicant had regularly provided the relevant donor with necessary accounting information concerning the expenditure of the funds, and specified that the donor organisations and embassies had every confidence that the funds had been used properly for the relevant projects and initiatives for which they had been awarded. 34.  There is no indication in the case file that the above statements have been sought or taken into account by the prosecuting authorities. 35.  Before and after the applicant\u2019s arrest, numerous articles about him were published in the State media and in the media allegedly close to the government. In those articles, he was described as a spy for foreign interests and \u201ca traitor\u201d. Moreover, a number of politicians from the ruling political party made similar comments about recently arrested NGO activists and human rights defenders in Azerbaijan, without specifically naming the applicant. The following are some examples of such comments. 36. In January 2012 Yeni Azerbaijan, the official newspaper of the ruling party, ran a piece entitled \u201cNew Target of National Traitors: Eurovision 2012\u201d, which attacked the Sing for Democracy campaign coordinated by the applicant as a campaign against the interests of the country and stated the following:\n\u201cThe blackmail and slander campaign of the Alliance to Protect Political Freedoms, Institute for Peace and Democracy, Institute for Reporters\u2019 Freedom and Safety, and Human Rights Club is based on ugly intentions which are evident from the names of these organisations. These organisations always orchestrate the ugly plans of several interested circles against Azerbaijan and act as mercenaries. The remote control of those who would do anything for money, who easily betray their country and State by launching a black smear campaign in exchange for foreign donations (donations obviously granted for meeting certain interests) is in the hands of those who give the money.\u201d 37.  Around the time of the applicant\u2019s arrest and thereafter, the same newspaper and online news portals affiliated with the authorities published a number of pejorative articles calling the applicant an \u201cAmerican agent\u201d, with headlines such as \u201cAmerican Agent Rasul Jafarov Detained for Three Months\u201d, \u201cThe Rights of Rasul Jafarov, Another Agent, Limited\u201d, and \u201cSearch of the Flat of American Agent Rasul Jafarov\u201d. 38.  On 14 August 2014 A.H., the Chairman of the Legal Policy and State Building Committee of the National Assembly, gave an interview to APA news agency where he commented on the reactions to the arrests of Ms Leyla Yunus, Mr Intigam Aliyev and other human rights defenders and stated:\n\u201c... it is those [international organisations] which made them \u2018well known\u2019. The organisations which have allocated grants to them in non-transparent ways, directing them into various activities, including those against Azerbaijan. These people, some of whom are traitors and some weak-minded, will finally answer before the law.\u201d 39.  On 15 August 2014 A.H., the Head of the Department of Social and Political Issues of the Presidential Administration, stated the following in an interview with Trend news agency:\n\u201cThe most deplorable thing is that such NGOs and individuals and some journalists, relying on foreign circles funding them, placed themselves above the national law, evaded registering their grant projects, filing financial statements, paying taxes and the government\u2019s other legal requirements.\u201d 40.  In an interview published on 2 September 2014 Y.M., a member of parliament from the ruling party, who was also the Director of the Institute of History at the Academy of Sciences, stated the following in respect of the recently arrested NGO activists and human rights defenders:\n\u201cPeople who betray their motherland cannot be forgiven. ... The death penalty should be imposed on such people. Capital punishment must be the gravest punishment for them. Why should traitors be forgiven? ... Therefore, the activities of a number of non-governmental organisations must be investigated very seriously, and if any illegality is discovered, such organisations must be immediately banned and their leaders punished.\u201d 41.  On 3 December 2014 State-owned news agencies published a sixty\u2011page manifesto written by R.M., the Head of the Presidential Administration, entitled \u201cThe World Order of Double Standards and Modern Azerbaijan\u201d. The article accused human rights NGOs operating in the country of being the \u201cfifth column of imperialism\u201d. It postulated that various, mostly US-sponsored, donor organisations such as NED, as well as other foreign organisations, supported political opposition movements in various countries against national governments. For local human rights NGOs, the purpose of such funding schemes was the formation of a \u201cfifth column\u201d inside a country. US taxpayers\u2019 money was spent on preparing a change of political power or forcing existing governments to comply with US political demands. 42.  According to the applicant, in various speeches given in 2014 the President of the State had stated that foreign criticism of the human rights situation in Azerbaijan had nothing to do with human rights, but was politically motivated, and that within the country there were \u201cnational traitors who had sold their conscience to foreign anti-Azerbaijani circles\u201d. 43.  The applicant\u2019s representative, Mr Bagirov, was an advocate and a member of the Azerbaijani Bar Association (\u201cthe ABA\u201d). He was affiliated with Law Office no. 6 in Baku. 44.  In November 2014 disciplinary proceedings were instituted against Mr Bagirov by the ABA on the basis of a letter dated 25 September 2014 from a judge of the Shaki Court of Appeal. In his letter, the judge informed the ABA that Mr Bagirov had breached the ethical rules of conduct for advocates at court hearings held in September 2014 before the Shaki Court of Appeal during criminal proceedings against I.M. 45.  On 10 December 2014 the Collegium of the ABA held a meeting at which it considered the complaint against Mr Bagirov. Following the meeting, the Collegium of the ABA held that Mr Bagirov had breached the ethical rules of conduct for advocates because at the court hearing he had made the following remark about the judicial system, \u201cLike State, like court ... If there were justice in Azerbaijan, Judge [R.H.] would not deliver unfair and partial judgments, nor would an individual like him be a judge\u201d (\u201cBel\u0259 d\u00f6vl\u0259tin bel\u0259 d\u0259 m\u0259hk\u0259m\u0259si olacaq ... Az\u0259rbaycanda \u0259dal\u0259t olsayd\u0131, hakim [R.H.] \u0259dal\u0259tsiz v\u0259 q\u0259r\u0259zli h\u00f6km \u00e7\u0131xarmaz, n\u0259 d\u0259 onun kimisi hakim i\u015fl\u0259m\u0259zdi\u201d). On the same day the Collegium of the ABA decided to refer Mr Bagirov\u2019s case to a court, with a view to his disbarment. It also decided to suspend his activity as an advocate (v\u0259killik f\u0259aliyy\u0259ti) pending a decision by the court. 46.  It appears from documents submitted to the Court that, following Mr Bagirov\u2019s suspension as an advocate, the domestic authorities stopped allowing him to meet the applicant in prison. 47.  On 29 March 2015 Mr Bagirov sent a letter to the Head of the Prison Service of the Ministry of Justice asking for a meeting with six of his clients who were held in detention, including the applicant. He specified in his letter that he was representing those individuals before the Court, and requested a meeting with them in connection with their pending cases. The relevant part of the letter reads:\n\u201cI am writing to inform you that I represent the following individuals, who are detained in the penal facilities and temporary detention centres under your authority, before the European Court of Human Rights.\nI ask you to allow a meeting with these individuals in connection with the progress of their cases based on their applications lodged with the European Court (the numbers of which are stated below):\n... 6. Jafarov Rasul Agahasan oglu (Baku Detention Facility, application no. 69981/14)\nAttachment: Copies of letters from the European Court and the Azerbaijani government concerning these individuals.\u201d 48.  A copy of the letter was also sent to the Head of the Serious Crimes Department of the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office. 49.  By a letter of 14 April 2015, the Deputy Head of the Prison Service refused to allow Mr Bagirov to meet the applicant in prison. The relevant part of the letter reads:\n\u201cYour request for a meeting in the penal facilities and detention centres with the individuals detained in the penal facilities and with convicted inmates in order to provide them with advocacy services has been considered.\nIn explanation, as your advocacy activity at Law Office no. 6 has been suspended by decision no. 29 of 10 December 2014 of the Bar Association of the Republic of Azerbaijan and you have been disbarred, and [as a result of the fact that] as of that date you can no longer practise as an advocate in court and investigation proceedings, it is impossible to grant you access to the penal establishments as counsel.\u201d", "references": ["0", "8", "3", "9", "5", "7", "6", "1", "4", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1948 and lives in Plovdiv. 6.  In January 2000 the applicant, who had been diagnosed with invasive ductal carcinoma, underwent mastectomy of her left breast. 7.  In the beginning of 2002 the applicant began to experience pain in the left side of her chest, for which in February 2002 she underwent a bone scintigraphy. The scintigraphy found a pathological uptake of radioactive tracer in her sixth left rib. Another bone scintigraphy in May 2002 confirmed that finding. However, a computerised axial tomography scan carried out later in May 2002 showed a suspected metastasis in the area of the eighth and ninth left ribs rather than the sixth one. The doctor who performed the scan recommended a further bone scintigraphy. Two such scintigraphies, in August 2002 and in January 2003, showed the same findings as the previous two. A radiography in February 2003 showed a suspected pathological lesion in the sixth left rib. But a second computerised axial tomography scan later in February 2003 found again that the suspected metastasis was in the area of the eighth and ninth left ribs. 8.  On 26 February 2003 a panel of five medical doctors decided that the suspected metastasis was to be surgically removed. 9.  Worried that the exact location of the suspected metastasis had not been fully established, the applicant asked the surgeon who was to operate on her, Dr K.M., whether further tests were required before the operation. According to the applicant, he told her that the available imaging results were sufficient and that he would be able to identify the metastasis once he had opened up her thorax. The applicant then approached the medical doctor who had performed the mastectomy in January 2000 (see paragraph 6 above). He told her that the suspected metastasis was very small, could not be localised visually, and had to be precisely localised before any surgery. The applicant shared her misgivings in that respect with Dr K.M. and reiterated her request for further tests before the operation. However, he reassured her that the available imaging results were sufficient. 10.  Having assented to the operation by signing an informed consent form, the applicant underwent surgery on 13 March 2003. In the course of that surgery Dr K.M. removed fragments of her fourth and fifth left ribs, rather than her sixth, eighth or ninth left ribs. However, the operation report erroneously said that he had removed fragments of the eighth and ninth ribs. When talking to the applicant the next day, Dr K.M. likewise told her that he had removed fragments of those ribs, and that he had inspected her lungs. 11.  The removed rib fragments were sent for histological testing, the results of which were ready on 25 March 2003 and showed that they did not contain cancerous tissue. 12.  When seeing her hospitalisation report upon her discharge from hospital on 24 March 2003, the applicant was surprised to find that her sixth left rib had been left in place and that, instead, fragments of her fourth and fifth left ribs, where no lesions had been detected by the scans and where no cancerous tissue was present according to the histological tests, had been removed. She approached Dr K.M., who denied having made a mistake but agreed to prescribe a further bone scintigraphy, which was carried out in September 2003 and found an increased uptake of radioactive tracer in the sixth left rib and also in the fourth and fifth left ribs. A computerised axial tomography scan carried out the same month found that parts of the fourth and fifth left ribs had been removed and that the sixth left rib was fractured. 13.  The applicant asked Dr K.M. to explain all that, and he apparently again denied having made any mistake. 14.  For years after the operation, the applicant was undergoing radiotherapy and hormonal therapy. 15.  In late 2003 the applicant complained about the operation to the Ministry of Health. The Ministry ordered the Plovdiv Regional Health Inspectorate to carry out an inquiry and, based on its findings, on 23 January 2004 informed the applicant that in view of the inconclusive results of the medical imaging tests, the operating team had chosen to make a wide opening in the thorax, enabling them to inspect the left side of the thoracic wall from the fourth to the ninth ribs. They had decided to remove parts of the fourth and fifth ribs because they had observed macroscopic changes on them; they had not found pathological changes in the sixth rib. The reference to the eighth and ninth ribs in the operation report had been a clerical mistake. 16.  The results of the inquiry, coupled with a complaint filed by the applicant with the hospital, prompted the hospital\u2019s ethical commission to review the case. It did not find any misconduct on the part of Dr K.M. 17.  On 27 January 2004 the applicant brought a claim for damages against Dr K.M. and the hospital in which he was employed, a State-owned limited liability company. She alleged that he had (a) erroneously removed parts of two healthy ribs, the fourth and the fifth on the left, without having obtained her consent; (b) inspected her lungs, which had been unnecessary and unjustified; (c) fractured her sixth left rib; and (d) failed to remove the metastasis, which had been the very purpose of the operation. 18.  On 14 April 2004 the Plovdiv Regional Court admitted a number of medical documents, including the consent form signed by the applicant before the operation. At the request of the applicant, the court ordered an expert report, to be drawn up by an oncologist, nominated by the applicant, a thoracic surgeon, nominated by Dr K.M., and a radiologist, nominated by the court, on a number of points raised by counsel for the applicant. At the request of Dr K.M., the court ordered a second expert report, to be drawn up by another thoracic surgeon. 19.  On 2 July 2004 the court appointed a new oncologist because the one initially chosen had declined the task, ordered the applicant to present herself for examination by the experts, admitted her medical files, and heard as witnesses a surgeon who had taken part in the operation alongside Dr K.M. and another surgeon who had monitored the applicant in the hospital after the operation. 20.  The two expert reports were filed in October 2004. 21.  The report drawn up by the three experts described the different methods for detecting bone metastases, including bone scintigraphy, emphasising that their results had to be assessed cumulatively; said that when operating on cancer patients it was mandatory to inspect adjoining organs by palpation; described the extent, in their view limited, to which the removal of parts of the fourth and fifth left ribs had affected the applicant\u2019s body movements; said that rib fractures were almost inevitable and very frequent in thoracotomies; said that the main principle when operating on cancer patients was that all decisions were to be made by the entire team; and opined that it would be possible to operate on the applicant again, should the need arise. 22.  The thoracic surgeon\u2019s report said that the operating team had not erred from a medical point of view when carrying out the operation, and that the applicant\u2019s prognosis and quality of life would have been much worse had the operation not taken place. 23.  On 20 October 2004 the court heard the four experts, including their answers to questions put by counsel for the applicant. The experts stood by their conclusions. The court then reserved judgment. However, on 5 January 2005 the court, finding that the applicant had not specified whether her preferred defendant was Dr K.M. or the hospital, reopened the proceedings and instructed her to do so. 24.  On 23 March 2005 the court asked the thoracic surgeon to deal with additional questions. He filed his supplementary report in June 2006. 25.  On 17 June 2005 the court admitted further written evidence and heard two witnesses called by the applicant. At the request of counsel for the applicant, it disqualified the thoracic surgeon on the basis that he was employed by the defendant hospital (see paragraph 51 below). The court then appointed a new expert. 26.  In his report the new expert, a thoracic surgeon from Sofia, said that the operating team had not breached good medical practice by removing parts of the applicant\u2019s fourth and fifth left ribs based on their visual and tactile inspection in the course of the operation, bearing in mind that histological testing of bone tissue required time and therefore no histological conclusion could be obtained during the operation; that they had correctly inspected the applicant\u2019s lungs by palpation; that rib fractures in the course of such operations were almost inevitable; that the removal of the rib fragments had not unduly affected the applicant because they had later partly regenerated; and that it could not be categorically said that the applicant had a metastasis in her sixth rib, especially bearing in mind that no further metastases had been detected for many years after the operation. 27.  On 26 October 2005 the court heard the new expert, including his answers to questions put by counsel for the applicant. He explained in detail why he stood by his conclusions. Counsel for the applicant requested a further expert report on the need for the operation. The court turned down the request on the basis that it went beyond the scope of the case. 28.  In a judgment of 11 January 2006, the Plovdiv Regional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim. It referred to the conclusions of the experts but said that it would not take into account the reports drawn up by the expert who had been disqualified (see paragraphs 22, 24 and 25 above). Based on those conclusions, the court found that the precise location of the suspected metastasis had not been fully established before the operation. It went on to say that the allegation that Dr K.M. had removed parts of the applicant\u2019s fourth and fifth left ribs without her consent was baseless, since the written consent form that she had signed before the operation, following an explanation on the proposed procedure, had not specified the rib to be operated upon. The court further held, with reference to the expert opinions, that Dr K.M. had not erred by removing parts of the fourth and fifth left ribs, as he had observed on them tissue which he had suspected to be cancerous. The fact that the histological test had later showed otherwise had not retrospectively rendered his assessment flawed. Nor had he erred by inspecting the applicant\u2019s lungs by palpation \u2013 that was standard practice in that type of operation. Furthermore, the evidence did not categorically prove that the applicant still had a metastasis in her sixth left rib, especially bearing in mind the lack of other metastases after the operation. In particular, the experts were agreed that the medical imaging results submitted by the applicant could not be conclusive on that point in the absence of a fresh histological test. Lastly, the court found that it had not been proved that the applicant\u2019s sixth rib had been fractured in the course of the operation and that, in any event, such a fracture was a habitual risk in that sort of operation. 29.  The applicant appealed to the Plovdiv Court of Appeal. 30.  On 10 April 2006, at the request of counsel for the applicant, the court instructed the replacement thoracic surgeon who had acted as expert in the proceedings before the lower court (see paragraph 26 above) to draw up a supplementary report in which to address several points raised in the appeal. Counsel for the applicant also requested a fresh expert report, to be drawn up by three thoracic surgical oncologists. They asked that one of those be Dr V.T. Counsel for Dr K.M. opposed the request, arguing that Dr V.T. would be biased in favour of the applicant because he had known her for years. The court did not order the report. 31.  The thoracic surgeon\u2019s supplementary report said that the applicant had correctly been subjected to surgery; that the operating team had not erred by acting on the basis of the visual and tactile findings made in the course of the operation, especially bearing in mind the uncertain results of the prior medical imaging tests; that there was no universally reliable method to establish the presence of bone metastases; that it had been impossible to mark the precise spot of the suspected metastasis before the operation; and that Dr K.M. had had the requisite qualifications to operate on the applicant. 32.  On 29 May 2006 the court admitted the report and heard the thoracic surgeon. The applicant submitted a private expert opinion which said that the removal of parts of her fourth and fifth left ribs had been needless and erroneous. This opinion could not be admitted because it had not been drawn up by court-appointed experts. The applicant however reiterated her earlier request for a fresh expert report (see paragraph 30 above), and the court acceded to it, appointing as experts two thoracic surgeons, one of whom was Dr V.T., and a thoracic surgical oncologist, all from Sofia. 33.  The experts were divided. Dr V.T., who filed a minority report, was of the view that the operation had not been necessary and had been carelessly carried out, with the removal of parts of two healthy ribs. The other two experts expressed the same views as those set out in the thoracic surgeon\u2019s supplementary report (see paragraph 31 above), and came to the conclusion that the operation had been required and that the operating team had not acted out of line with good medical practice. 34.  On 18 September 2006 the court admitted the reports and heard the three experts, who each stood by the views expressed in their respective reports. On 2 October 2006 it admitted further written evidence and heard the parties\u2019 oral argument. 35.  On an unknown later date in 2006 the Plovdiv Court of Appeal upheld the lower court\u2019s judgment. It said that it credited all expert opinions save that of the expert disqualified in the proceedings before the lower court (see paragraphs 22, 24 and 25 above) and that of Dr V.T. (see paragraph 33 above), which went against the remainder of the evidence. It went on to hold, by reference to the other experts\u2019 conclusions, that the operation had been necessary, and that by removing parts of the applicant\u2019s fourth and fifth left ribs on the basis of a visual and tactile examination Dr K.M. had acted in line with established medical practice, even though it had later transpired that they did not contain cancerous tissue. The court came to the same conclusions as the lower court with respect to the inspection of the applicant\u2019s lungs by palpation, the alleged fracture of her sixth rib, and the question whether it had been proved that she had cancer after the operation (see paragraph 28 above). On that basis, the court held that the medical team which had operated on the applicant had not acted negligently and that it had not been categorically established that the applicant had suffered damage as a result of their actions. 36.  The applicant appealed on points of law. 37.  In a judgment of 29 July 2008 (\u0440\u0435\u0448. \u2116 393 \u043e\u0442 29.07.2008 \u0433. \u043f\u043e \u0433\u0440. \u0434. \u2116 2227/2008 \u0433., \u0412\u041a\u0421, I \u0433. \u043e.), the Supreme Court of Cassation quashed the lower court\u2019s judgment and remitted the case. It held that that court had failed duly to elucidate the facts and in particular to take on an active role in the formulation of the questions to the experts. It had thus not fully clarified whether it had been necessary to operate on the applicant, whether her sixth left rib had been fractured in the course of the operation, and why it had been necessary to remove parts of her fourth and fifth left ribs. It had likewise failed to explain fully why it had disregarded Dr V.T.\u2019s opinion; simply saying that it went against the rest of the evidence was not enough. On remittal, the lower court had to re-visit these points by taking into account the history of the applicant\u2019s medical condition, and inquire into the need for the operation, the presence of metastases in her ribs, and the alleged worsening of her health after the operation. In so doing, it had to obtain a fresh medical expert report and enable the parties to take part in the formulation of the questions to the experts. 38.  On remittal, the Plovdiv Court of Appeal ordered a fresh expert report, to be drawn up by two thoracic surgeons from Sofia and a medical imaging specialist from Plovdiv. 39.  The report said that it had been imperative to carry out the operation; that the fracture of the sixth rib had been there before the operation and had been due to the rib\u2019s heightened fragility resulting from previous anti-cancer treatment; that the removal of parts of the fourth and fifth ribs had not been an error in view of the inconclusive prior medical imaging data, which had its limitations, and the visual observation of tissue that could at the time have been suspected to be cancerous; that there was no categorical medical data proving the presence of a metastasis in the sixth rib before or after the operation \u2013 the bone scintigraphies had only showed an increased uptake of radioactive tracer there \u2013 in spite of the medical treatment undergone by the applicant after the operation; that the applicant could be operated upon again, should the need arise; and that the applicant\u2019s medical condition would have been much worse had she indeed had an untreated metastasis in her sixth, eighth or ninth rib for years after the operation. 40.  On 26 November 2008 the court admitted the report and heard the three experts, including their replies to questions posed by counsel for the applicant. The experts stood by their conclusions. The court also admitted other evidence submitted by the applicant. 41.  On 11 May 2009 the Plovdiv Court of Appeal again upheld the lower court\u2019s judgment. It held, by reference to the reports of the three experts that it had appointed, the three experts appointed in the proceedings before the lower court, and three of the experts appointed in the first appeal proceedings (see paragraphs 21, 31, 33 and 39 above), that the operation had been required. It said that it could not follow the opinion of Dr V.T. on this point (see paragraph 33 above) because, even though the question whether it had been advisable to operate in such circumstances could be debated theoretically, the medical team treating the applicant had been faced with an exigently practical situation: the medical imaging tests had showed the presence of a suspected isolated tumour whose exact location was uncertain, and there had been for this reason only one course of action: localise the tumour using the methods of surgical diagnostics and immediately remove it. The court agreed with the experts\u2019 conclusions that the operating team had not erred by removing parts of the applicant\u2019s fourth and fifth ribs on the basis of their suspicion that they contained cancerous tissue, even though that had turned out not to be the case. The mention of the eighth and ninth ribs in the operation report had been a clerical mistake without incidence for the applicant\u2019s health. Again by reference to the experts\u2019 conclusions, the court fully agreed with the lower court\u2019s findings with respect to the inspection of the applicant\u2019s lungs by palpation, and held that it had not been proved that her sixth rib had been fractured in the course of the operation, or that a metastasis in that rib had erroneously not been removed. On that basis, it concluded that Dr K.M. had not acted negligently. 42.  The applicant again attempted to appeal on points of law. 43.  In a decision of 10 November 2009 (\u043e\u043f\u0440. \u2116 1537 \u043e\u0442 10.11.2009 \u0433. \u043f\u043e \u0433\u0440. \u0434. \u2116 1275/2009 \u0433., \u0412\u041a\u0421, IV \u0433. \u043e.), the Supreme Court of Cassation refused to admit the appeal for examination, holding that there was no divergent case-law on the points of law decided by the lower court and that the appeal in effect concerned that court\u2019s findings of fact.", "references": ["1", "3", "9", "0", "8", "6", "4", "7", "2", "5", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1949 in the Khabarovsk Region. He is serving his prison sentence in a correctional colony in the village of Kochubeyevskoe, Stavropol Region. 7.  On 9 March 2006 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of aggravated murder, robbery and firearms possession. He remained in detention throughout the investigation and trial. 8.  On 28 July 2006 the Stavropol Regional Court found him guilty as charged and sentenced him to nineteen years\u2019 imprisonment in a correctional colony. 9.  On 10 February 2010 the applicant was sent to serve his sentence in correctional colony no. IK-17/1 in the village of Kochubeyevskoe, Stavropol Region (\u201cthe correctional colony\u201d). 10.  When the applicant arrived at the colony the resident doctor noted that he had a first-degree disability: he was totally blind as a result of mature cataracts in both eyes. His blindness, which had developed during his detention, meant that he was unable to move around alone. In addition, he was suffering from coronary disease, hypertension, gallstones and chronic pancreatitis. He was included on a list of detainees requiring enhanced medical attention. 11.  The applicant was assigned to colony unit no. 10 for special-needs detainees, which comprised a separate dormitory. It housed forty-six detainees with various disabilities or serious illnesses. The unit had a dormitory measuring 149.6 square metres, a dining room, a toilet, showers, and several offices for administrative and medical personnel. A large part of the dormitory floor area was taken up by furniture such as bunk beds, bedside tables and chairs. According to a certificate issued by the correctional colony on 13 October 2014, each detainee was afforded 2.82 square metres of living space. As is apparent from the documents and photographs submitted by the Government, the premises were not adapted for visually impaired or blind persons. 12.   The authorities assigned another inmate with cardiac problems to assist the applicant with his basic needs. The inmate did not receive any remuneration for the assistance he provided to the applicant. He helped the applicant to move around the dormitory and to take showers, and guided him in the dining room. The applicant had no prison work; he remained in the unit throughout the day. 13.  According to the applicant, he faced particular difficulties in orientating himself in the correctional colony. He regularly stumbled over objects, slipped and fell. Such helplessness induced anguish and despair. In 2011 he was diagnosed as having an emotionally unstable personality disorder. 14.  On 21 February 2011 and 19 November 2012 a medical commission confirmed the applicant\u2019s disability. They recommended that the authorities provide him with a walking stick, a white cane, a player for audiobooks designed for blind people, a vocal clinical thermometer and a vocal tonometer. The recommendations were never enforced. According to two entries in his medical record, on 30 November 2011 and 23 January 2013 officials asked the applicant whether he wished to receive those items. The applicant allegedly refused, but did not agree to make a written note to that effect in the medical record. 15.  In September 2014 the inmate who had been assisting the applicant was released from detention and the applicant was left to fend for himself. According to a certificate issued by the authorities, he refused the assistance of other inmates. 16.  On 8 February 2013 the applicant asked for a medical examination to determine whether his state of health warranted his early release. 17.  On 5 April 2013 a medical commission held that as blindness was one of the diseases listed in Government Decree no. 54 of 6 February 2004 that may warrant release from a correctional institution, the applicant could be relieved from serving his sentence. 18.  Relying on the conclusion of the medical commission, the applicant lodged an application with the Kochubeevskoe District Court, Stavropol Region, for release on health grounds. On 16 April 2013 the District Court dismissed the application. Referring to Ruling no. 21 of the Supreme Court of Russia dated 20 December 2011 (see paragraph 26 below), the court noted that the fact that the applicant\u2019s illness was included in the list provided for by Government Decree no. 54 did not automatically mean that he would be released. The court cited the gravity of the crimes committed by the applicant and the length of the prison term he had yet to serve. Taking those two factors into account, the court concluded that the applicant should remain in the correctional colony. The Stavropol Regional Court upheld that judgment on appeal. 19.  On 10 July 2014 the Supreme Court of Russia rejected a cassation appeal lodged by the applicant without examining it on the merits. It found that the applicant had failed to lodge the appeal within the statutory time\u2011limit.", "references": ["0", "6", "4", "2", "8", "9", "3", "5", "7", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Fontanelas. 7.  He is one of the most well-known television hosts in Portugal and is currently the host of a morning talk show. He has worked in the media for almost forty years. 8.  He publicly declared his homosexuality in 2008. 9.  Between midnight and 1 a.m. on 28 December 2009, a live talk show, Five Minutes to Midnight (5 Para a Meia-Noite) was broadcast on one of the channels of the national television service, RTP2. The programme was presented by F.C. and featured two famous people from the media as guests. 10.  In the course of the talk show, during a quiz, the guests were asked to answer the following question, which was identified as the most important by F.C.: \u201cWho is the best Portuguese female TV host?\u201d The possible answers to the question included the name of three female television hosts and the applicant\u2019s; the latter being the \u201ccorrect\u201d one. The transcript of the quiz reads:\n \n\u201cF.C.: Who is the best female Portuguese TV host? Option A, F.C.; option B, C.V; option C, C.P. or option D, Manuel Lu\u00eds Goucha. J.M.: Oh boy. I will obviously exclude option A, definitely. From the other three, I think they are all gorgeous. I\u2019ll choose... F.C: We know that you are a Manuel Lu\u00eds Goucha fan and [that] this is difficult for you. Goucha in the afternoons, mornings... F.C.: Let\u2019s see the answer. J.M. cannot stand his excitement any longer. Let\u2019s see the answer. Manuel Lu\u00eds Goucha! J.M.: I knew it, I knew it. That\u2019s what I was going to say. She was the one telling me not to say it, that it could be bad.\u201d 11.  On an unspecified date of 2010 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint for defamation and \u201cinsult\u201d (inj\u00faria) with the Lisbon Criminal Department for Investigation and Prosecution against the State-owned television company RTP, the production company, the television presenter F.C. and the directors of programming and content. He complained that they had damaged his reputation and dignity by including his name in the list of possible answers to the question asked during the programme. 12.  On 2 March 2011 a public prosecutor of the Lisbon Criminal Department discontinued the proceedings by adopting a decision which stated that the defendants had not intended to offend the applicant. 13.  On an unspecified date the applicant sought to intervene in the proceedings as an assistant to the public prosecutor (assistente) and lodged private prosecution submissions (acusa\u00e7\u00e3o particular) with the Lisbon Criminal Investigation Court (Tribunal de Instru\u00e7\u00e3o Criminal) against the defendants. They challenged his prosecution submissions by requesting that a judicial investigation be opened (requerimento de abertura de instru\u00e7\u00e3o). 14.  On 24 June 2011 the investigating judge (juiz de instru\u00e7\u00e3o) responsible dismissed the case (despacho de n\u00e3o pron\u00fancia). In relation to the individual defendants, the judge decided that there was insufficient evidence of any defamation and insults by them, thus the case was unable to be brought to trial. The relevant part of the decision reads:\n\u201cGiven the defendants\u2019 statements, it is clear that they did not intend to attack the [assistente\u2019s] honour. Nor did they anticipate this as possible. The subjective element of this criminal offence is therefore unverified.\nThe [assistente] is a public figure and so must be used to having his characteristics captured by comedians in order to promote humour; it being public knowledge that [the applicant\u2019s characteristics] reflect behaviour that is attributed to the female gender, such as his way of expressing himself, his colourful [feminine] clothes, and the fact that he has always lived in a world of women (see, for example, the programmes he has always presented on television).\nThe [assistente] has recently made his homosexuality public, and the defendants never intended to criticise his sexual orientation ...\u201d\nWith regard to the two defendant companies, the proceedings were discontinued pursuant to Article 11 of the Criminal Code, which excludes \u201clegal persons\u201d from liability for defamation and insult. 15.  The applicant appealed against the decision not to indict the natural defendants before the Lisbon Court of Appeal (Tribunal da Rela\u00e7\u00e3o de Lisboa). In particular, he argued that the reason his name had been included in the list of possible answers had been his sexual orientation. On 17 April 2012 the appeal was dismissed. The court upheld the Criminal Investigation Court\u2019s decision. It stated that there was insufficient evidence to enable them to consider that there had been any defamation by the defendants. In its decision, the court cited the above quotation from the investigating judge\u2019s decision of 24 June 2011 and further stated:\n \u201cIt should not be considered offensive to one\u2019s honour anything that the complainant considers as such, but what in the opinion of the majority of reasonable people should be considered an offence to the social and individual values of respect (judgment of the Coimbra Court of Appeal of 16 March 1993).\n...\nAnd as the impugned decision noted, having balanced in a very sensible way the conflict of interests at hand and the context in which it unfolded:\n\u2018It should be taken into account that we have before us a comedy show, and that the moment at which the defendant asked her guest a question, referring to [assistente] Manuel Lu\u00eds Goucha as \u2018one of the best female Portuguese hosts\u2019, was considered to be one of the many jokes said throughout the show, typical of such shows.\nThe [assistente] is a public figure and so must be used to having his characteristics captured by comedians in order to promote humour; it being public knowledge that [the applicant\u2019s characteristics] reflect behaviour that is attributed to the female gender, such as his way of expressing himself, his colourful [feminine] clothes, and the fact that he has always lived in a world of women (see, for example, the programmes he has always presented on television).\nThe [assistente] has recently made his homosexuality public, and the defendants never intended to criticise his sexual orientation. ...\u201d\nIt further considered that:\n\u201c... the expression used in a playful and irreverent context and in the normal style previously adopted by the television show under consideration, even though one may consider it as being in bad taste, does not reach the threshold required by law for the protection of honour and consideration.\u201d", "references": ["7", "3", "6", "2", "4", "0", "8", "9", "5", "1", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1978 and until his arrest lived in Krasnoyarsk. He is currently serving a sentence in a correctional colony in the Krasnoyarsk Region. 7.  On 13 December 2005 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of aggravated kidnapping, murder, fraud and conspiracy. 8.  On 27 December 2007 the Krasnoyarsk Regional Court found him guilty as charged and sentenced him to twenty-four years and eleven months\u2019 imprisonment. The first seven years were to be served in a prison and the remaining term in a high-security correctional colony. 9.  On 24 December 2008 the Supreme Court of Russia upheld his conviction and sentence on appeal. 10.  The parties provided the Court with the applicant\u2019s medical documents, including clinical records, discharge summaries and expert reports. Parts of the clinical records drawn up during his detention and submitted to the Court by the Government are illegible. 11.  On several occasions before his arrest the applicant underwent inpatient and outpatient treatment in civilian hospitals. Between 1999 and 2001 he was treated for cerebral concussion, cerebral contusion, vertebral contusion, knee pain and a duodenal ulcer. 12.  After his arrest on 13 December 2005 the applicant was taken to a police detention facility in Krasnoyarsk. Two days later he was transferred to remand prison no. 24/1 (\u201cthe remand prison\u201d), also in Krasnoyarsk, where resident doctors carried out a general check-up, noting in the medical file that he had sustained a brain injury and suffered from a duodenal ulcer. The doctors found him fit for detention, noting that detention in northerly regions should be avoided. 13.  According to the applicant, in 2005 and in 2006 he complained to the prison doctor about various health problems, including stomach pain, but his complaints remained unnoticed by the authorities. His medical records for the period between 2005 and 2007 did not contain any entries regarding his complaints, medical examinations or treatment in that period. 14.  On 16 June 2007 the prison doctor saw the applicant after he complained of stomach pain and deteriorating eyesight. He diagnosed the applicant with a duodenal ulcer in the acute phase and myopia, but did not prescribe any treatment. He noted that a specific endoscopy was to be performed. 15.  On 19 July and 13 and 16 August 2007 the trial court adjourned its hearings in the applicant\u2019s case as he did not feel well and had complained of severe stomach pain. The court asked the detention authorities to submit detailed information on his actual state of health. 16.  In August 2007 the applicant received injections of drotaverine allegedly provided by his mother, a retired doctor, to relieve his stomach pain. On 21 August 2007, at a court\u2019s request, a deputy head of the prison medical ward examined the applicant and observed that he was receiving treatment for an acute duodenal ulcer. In addition, he noted that the applicant was to be transported to Regional Tuberculosis Hospital no. 1 (\u201cthe prison hospital\u201d) for the fibrogastroduodenoscopy ordered in June 2007. 17.  On 19 October 2007 the applicant was taken to the prison hospital. Multiple tests performed there led to him being diagnosed with first-stage myopia, a duodenal ulcer in remission and duodenitis associated with cicatricial deformation of the duodenum bulb. Omeprazole was prescribed. Insofar as the submitted medical records could be deciphered, the applicant did not receive the prescribed treatment. 18.  In March 2009 the applicant was transported to the prison hospital for the second time. This time the doctors prescribed him medication for his myopia and neurological symptoms resulting from the trauma in 1999. The medical records did not contain any information on the actual intake of drugs by the applicant. 19.  In October 2009 the applicant\u2019s stomach pain came back. A fibrogastroduodenoscopy showed that he suffered from duodenitis with cicatricial deformation of the duodenum bulb and antral gastritis. The resident doctor saw him in October 2009 and January 2010, prescribing him drug treatment and a special diet. The applicant\u2019s medical records do not contain any information indicating that the doctor\u2019s recommendations were followed. 20.  On 19 March 2010 the applicant underwent an in-depth medical examination in the prison hospital. It showed that in addition to his peptic problems, erosive duodenitis and antral gastritis, the applicant had developed first-stage sensorineural hearing loss and his myopia had progressed slightly. A drug programme and special diet were recommended. According to the applicant, the recommendation was not followed by the authorities. His medical documents contain no entries in this regard. 21.  In early April 2010 the court had to adjourn several hearings in the applicant\u2019s criminal case owing to his severe stomach pain. It ordered the detention authorities to provide him with anti-ulcer treatment. At the end of that month the applicant was examined in a civilian hospital, which diagnosed him with an aggravated ulcer and acute gastritis. Inpatient treatment was prescribed. The authorities did not admit him for it. 22.  The next recurrence of the applicant\u2019s ulcer occurred in autumn 2010. According to the medical records, the applicant did not receive any drugs at that time. An examination on 21 December 2010 showed that his ulcer had grown and the duodenitis and gastric disease had progressed further. A civilian doctor who visited him recommended inpatient treatment, but he remained in the remand prison. The resident doctor prescribed drug treatment in December 2010 and January and March 2011. However, the medical records contain no information concerning the actual provision of the prescribed drugs to the applicant. According to him, only one of the drugs was made available to him. His mother sent him the required drugs in June 2011 to enable him to receive at least some relief. 23.  A new acute stomach pain attack occurred in December 2011. The applicant was immediately taken to the prison hospital for an X-ray examination and a surgical consultation. The surgeon concluded that the applicant\u2019s condition did not call for surgery. Over the next few days the applicant was diagnosed with duodenitis and recurring acute gastritis which had passed to the chronic stage. Drug treatment was prescribed, but the Court was not given any records showing that he actually received it. 24.  In the meantime the applicant started complaining of mild knee pain and impeded nasal breathing allegedly caused by a broken nose in 2006 while in detention on remand. He stated that he had received some medication for knee pain, but had not undergone any septal surgery. 25.  In the beginning of 2012 the applicant underwent a magnetic resonance imaging scan of the brain and spine in a civilian hospital. He paid for the scan himself, which revealed the presence of Schmorl\u2019s nodes, protruded discs, spondylarthrosis and a haemangioma in one of the spinal discs. It also indicated moderate changes within local tissue associated with a cerebrospinal fluid cyst in the arachnoid membrane of the brain. These diagnoses were confirmed by the prison doctor, who found that the applicant\u2019s condition did not call for surgical treatment. 26.  The applicant was sent to a prison to serve his sentence. 27.  On 23 October 2012 the applicant arrived at the prison in Minusinsk in the Krasnoyarsk Region (\u201cthe prison\u201d). On admission he was seen by a prison doctor, who considered him to be in satisfactory health. He was included on a list of detainees subject to regular medical check-ups and enhanced medical attention. 28.  The next day he was diagnosed with acute gastritis and degenerative disc disease. He was prescribed a fibrogastroduodenoscopy and several drugs, including nonsteroidal anti\u2011inflammatory medication and medication to treat his gastritis. He refused to comply with the doctors\u2019 recommendations pertaining to the endoscopy and anti-inflammatory drugs, insisting that they would lead to a further deterioration of his ulcer. He nevertheless took the medication prescribed for gastritis treatment. According to the medical records, the ulcer treatment continued for the following few months. 29.  In the meantime, an independent medical specialist and neurologist, Dr M., assessed the applicant\u2019s health and prepared a report on 5 November 2012. It stated that he should be admitted to a neurological or neurosurgical medical facility, where his spinal problems could be treated with nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory medication, neuromuscular blocking agents and painkillers. The doctor gave detailed recommendations concerning the applicant\u2019s treatment. 30.  On 29 November 2012 the prison doctor prescribed the applicant vitamin injections and pain-relief ointment to treat his spinal problems. Several days later the doctor authorised an additional hour\u2019s rest from physical activity and prescribed nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory medication, spasm relief analgesics and omeprazole for his peptic problems. 31.  In the absence of any positive developments, in January 2013 the doctor amended the spinal treatment and introduced a stronger anti\u2011inflammatory drug. 32.  In March 2013 the applicant was transferred to the prison hospital. Tests showed that his conditions had not progressed. The gastritis and duodenal ulcer were in remission. The applicant was prescribed omeprazole and sucralfate-based medication. According to an entry made in his medical history on 26 March 2013, his attending doctor recommended testing for the bacteria \u041delicobacter pylori (\u201cH.pylori\u201d). The test was never performed. 33.  After the applicant\u2019s return to the prison his treatment continued in line with the recommendations of the prison hospital doctors. He received meloxicam and omeprazole. However, in May 2013 his duodenal ulcer again worsened. The acute phase lasted about two months. 34.  On 17 July 2013 the applicant was examined by a number of medical specialists from a mobile prison hospital. He was diagnosed with a duodenal ulcer in remission, chronic gastritis, erosive duodenitis, osteoarthritis of the left knee, Raynaud\u2019s syndrome, degenerative disc disease, acute back pain and second-stage myopia. He was prescribed drug treatment. The records do not indicate that he received all of the prescribed medications. 35.  On 7 August 2013 the prison authorities received a parcel of medication from the applicant\u2019s mother. He was treated with those drugs until 30 August 2013, when he was sent to a correctional colony. 36.  On 11 September 2013 the applicant arrived at correctional colony no. 288/17 in Krasnoyarsk. He complained to the resident doctor of nausea and was diagnosed with an ulcer and degenerative disc disease. He was put on a list of detainees for close medical supervision. The doctor noted that the applicant required anti-recurrence ulcer treatment and in-depth examinations every six months, recording that it was necessary for him to be placed on a special diet when the ulcer recurred. 37.  On 18 September 2013 the applicant was seen by doctors from the mobile prison hospital and underwent a fibrogastroduodenoscopy. It revealed that he had antral gastritis. According to him, his mother bought him medication for the ulcer treatment and sent it to the correctional colony. 38.  In November 2013 the applicant had another severe attack of stomach and back pain. The prison doctor prescribed him drugs, injections of painkillers and vitamins. According to the Government, he refused to take one of the drugs, a nonsteroidal anti\u2011inflammatory. He disputed that allegation. 39.  On 30 August 2013 the applicant filed a complaint against the prison administration, arguing that his treatment fell short of the requirements of Russian law. He stressed that the authorities had failed to properly treat his conditions. 40.  On 16 October 2013 the Minusinsk Town Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaint, finding that the authorities had provided him with adequate treatment. According to the court, he was regularly seen by a doctor and prescribed medication, including anti-inflammatory drugs and painkillers. They were given to the applicant as prescribed. His condition remained stable between 23 October 2012 and 30 August 2013. 41.  On 17 March 2014 the Krasnoyarsk Regional Court upheld the judgment on appeal.", "references": ["2", "9", "0", "8", "4", "6", "3", "5", "7", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "6.  The first applicant, Partners 2000 Kft, is a Hungarian limited liability company with its seat in Ny\u00e1rliget. It is owned and run by the second applicant. The second applicant is a Hungarian national, who was born in 1972 and lives in Sopron. The third applicant is the second applicant\u2019s wife, who was born in 1973 and lives in Sopron. The fourth applicant is the second and third applicants\u2019 minor child, born in 2000. 7.  On 11 September 2012 Parliament enacted Act no. CXXXIV of 2012 on the Repression of Smoking of the Youth and on Tobacco Retail. The Act was published on 24 September 2012. 8.  According to the Act, tobacco retail was to become a State monopoly (exercised through a State-owned company, ND Nemzeti Doh\u00e1nykereskedelmi Nonprofit Zrt), and tobacco retailers would become authorised through a concession tender, advertised on 15 December 2012. The time-limit for applying was 22 February 2013. 9.  Entities or persons previously engaged in tobacco retail had no privileges in the tender. Legal persons were not entitled to apply. 10.  The Act was subsequently amended on several occasions, and the final version was enacted on 6 June 2013, with entry into force on 1 July 2013. Government Decree no. 181/2013. (VI.7.), which contained the detailed rules for the operations of the future concession-holders, was published on 8 June 2013, that is, after the completion of the tendering process, the results of which had become public on 22 April 2013. The decision about the tenders was taken by ND Zrt itself. 11.  The first applicant, Partners 2000 Kft had been active in tobacco retail for several years. Since, however, it was not entitled to apply for a concession under the new law, the second applicant applied personally for one, on several occasions. However, ND Zrt turned down his applications, informing him that he had not obtained a tobacco retail concession. The decisions said that his applications did not fully meet the requirements, without developing the shortcomings. 12.  No compensation is available for ex-tobacco-retailers who, by not being awarded a concession, lost part of their livelihood. The refusals, such as those of Mr Gy\u00f6rk\u00f6s, were not subject to any legal remedy. 13.  The applicants submitted that others in comparable situations \u2013 and in the case of those who had never been doing tobacco retail beforehand, in non-comparable situations \u2013 were granted concessions, which difference in treatment cannot be explained by any circumstance other than political adherence.", "references": ["3", "5", "8", "7", "0", "2", "6", "4", "1", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1964 and, until his arrest, lived in St Petersburg. 7.  On 26 June 2010 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of aggravated kidnapping and extortion committed within an organised criminal group and with the use of firearms. He remained in detention throughout the investigation and trial. 8.  On 22 June 2012 the Leningrad Regional Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to nine years\u2019 imprisonment in a high-security correctional colony. 9.  The Supreme Court of Russia upheld the sentence on appeal on 8 November 2012. 10.  The parties provided the Court with extensive medical evidence, including the applicant\u2019s clinical records, medical certificates, expert reports, and opinions by various medical specialists. 11.  The evidence shows that the applicant had a long history of heart and kidney diseases. In 2007 he suffered a stroke, closed craniocerebral injury and cerebral contusion. The following year he suffered a myocardial infarction and was admitted to a hospital for in-patient treatment. A medical examination carried out by the hospital revealed a deterioration in the functioning of his kidney. He was prescribed a basic drug regimen, which was supervised by a cardiologist and a nephrologist. Upon discharge from the hospital, his state of health was considered satisfactory. 12.  After the applicant\u2019s arrest he was taken to a temporary detention centre in the town of Vsevolzhk, and six days later, on 2 July 2010, to temporary detention facility no. IZ-47/1 in St Petersburg (\u201cfacility no. IZ\u201147/1\u201d). On admission to the detention facility, the applicant underwent a general medical check-up performed by the prison doctor, who concluded that he was \u201csomatically healthy\u201d. Eleven days later he underwent an electrocardiogram, which revealed hypertrophy of the left ventricle of his heart and myocardium insufficiency. The prison doctor recommended in-patient care. 13.  On 16 July 2010 the applicant was transferred from the detention facility to hospital no. 2 of medical ward no. 78 of the Federal Service for the Execution of Sentences (\u201cprison hospital no. 2\u201d). An electrocardiogram and blood and urine tests were performed in the hospital, leading to diagnosis of third-stage hypertension, third-stage arterial hypertension, coronary disease, first\u2011degree angina pectoris, sclerotic kidney, fourth-stage chronic kidney disease, and chronic renal insufficiency of the second degree. He was prescribed drug therapy comprising enalapril, aspirin, spironolactone and other medication. 14.  On the day following his admission to the hospital, the applicant made a written refusal to receive injections of hypotensive medication, arguing that they could lead to a sharp drop in his blood pressure. 15.  The applicant\u2019s clinical records show that he received drug treatment for hypertension in the hospital. His blood pressure and body temperature were regularly monitored. 16.  On 13 August 2010 the applicant was discharged from the hospital and transferred to facility no. IZ-47/1. The discharge certificate indicated that his treatment had not produced the expected results, with the applicant\u2019s arterial blood pressure remaining at a high level. It recommended a consultation with a cardiologist and a nephrologist in order to adjust his treatment. 17.  Two months later, on 13 October 2010, the applicant was taken to hospital no. 1 of medical ward no. 78 of the Federal Service for the Execution of Sentences (\u201cprison hospital no. 1\u201d), where he was examined by several doctors, including a cardiologist and a nephrologist. He underwent several medical examinations, which revealed that his angina pectoris had progressed to the third stage. He was also diagnosed with first\u2011degree encephalopathy of mixed genesis. His antihypertensive drugs regimen was adjusted accordingly. The doctors recommended regular monitoring of his blood pressure, creatinine and urea levels. The applicant was certified as having a third-degree disability on 2 December 2010. 18.  In December 2010, the applicant\u2019s wife, anticipating his discharge from the hospital, complained to the head of the Regional Department of the Federal Service for Execution of Sentences in St Petersburg and Leningrad Region and to the Investigative Committee of the Leningrad Region that the applicant\u2019s medical treatment had been inadequate and about his impending transfer from the hospital to a temporary detention facility. On 18 January 2011 the Investigative Committee dismissed the complaint. The complaint to the Regional Department of the Federal Service for Execution of Sentences was also unsuccessful. 19.  On 3 December 2010 the applicant was sent back to facility no. IZ\u201147/1. He was seen by a therapist. His treatment continued as prescribed in the hospital. 20.  On 14 December 2010 an independent cardiologist, Dr F., chosen by the applicant\u2019s wife, issued a report assessing the quality of the applicant\u2019s treatment in detention. He observed that the applicant\u2019s health, and in particular his heart condition, had deteriorated while in detention. He noted that after the arrest the applicant had not been given medication or appropriate dietary nutrition. Serious emotional conditions aggravated by the incarceration had also contributed to the deterioration of his health and increased the risk of a stroke, fatal heart attack or kidney failure. Dr F. recommended dietary nutrition, basic treatment and regular monitoring of the applicant with a view to adjusting his drug therapy if necessary. These and the subsequent recommendations of Dr F. were submitted to the authorities by the applicant\u2019s lawyer or wife and appear to have been included in his medical file. 21.  On 14 January 2011 a prison doctor ordered the applicant\u2019s medical examination. A week later the applicant underwent a biochemical blood test and a urine test. His diagnosis was re-confirmed and the doctor recommended continuing his treatment with hypotensive drugs. 22.  On 21 February 2011 Dr F. prepared a new report pertaining to the quality of the applicant\u2019s treatment. He suggested that the applicant\u2019s hypertension may have become drug-resistant and that a kidney tomography examination with a contrast agent was necessary in order to choose the correct treatment regimen. 23.  A week later the applicant was taken back to prison hospital no. 2. A number of medical examinations and tests revealed that he was also suffering from renal hypoplasia and chronic latent pyelonephritis. 24.  The applicant subsequently acquired an acute respiratory infection and was prescribed treatment for it. This led to a change in his hypertension therapy, primarily by decreasing the dosage and excluding certain drugs. His angina pectoris attacks became worse, and he was transferred to hospital no. 1 where his condition was brought under control. He was given, among other drugs, high dosages of anticoagulants. He was discharged from the hospital on 22 March 2011 on condition that he remained on the prescribed drug regimen and that his blood pressure and creatinine and urea levels were regularly monitored. 25.  From 22 March to 14 April 2011 the applicant was held in facility no. IZ-47/1. The records submitted to the Court do not indicate what drugs or other treatment the applicant received during this period. 26.  In the meantime, in March 2011 Dr F. studied the applicant\u2019s clinical records and recommended that he undergo a coronary angiography examination, as well as haemodialysis to define the correct treatment and to prevent possible progress of his kidney disease. 27.  On 14 April 2011 the applicant was taken back to hospital no. 2 with a view to adjusting his treatment. 28.  Four days later Dr F., an independent nephrologist, Dr G., and the head of the prison hospital examined the applicant in the hospital. They recorded a further deterioration of his heart and kidney functions and suggested that his treatment with anticoagulants might be incorrect given the high risk of heart failure or internal hemorrhage. The doctors recommended that he undergo a coronary angiography examination and a renal tomography or Doppler ultrasound examination. 29.  Another examination of the applicant by Dr F. and an independent cardiologist, Dr M., on 22 April 2011 led to the following opinion: the applicant had received adequate hypotensive therapy, which had nevertheless resulted in the aggravation of his hypercreatinemia. They observed that the coronary disease had started prevailing over the remaining diseases and suggested that the applicant\u2019s therapy should be based on regular treatment with anti-aggregants, nitrates and statins. The doctors stressed that there was a high risk of the applicant\u2019s condition deteriorating and leading to his death as a result of heart failure, a stroke or myocardial infarction, should prison medical personnel fail to perform a coronary angiography examination or surgery. 30.  On 18 May 2011 the applicant was discharged from the hospital and transferred to temporary detention facility no. IZ-47/4 in St Petersburg (\u201cfacility no. IZ-47/4\u201d). 31.  On the following day the investigative authorities ordered the applicant\u2019s expert examination. A medical commission was to answer several questions, including whether the applicant\u2019s diseases posed a threat to his life and whether his further detention was compatible with his condition. According to expert report no. 200/K of 27 May 2011, the applicant was suffering from third-degree hypertension, third-stage arterial hypertension, chronic heart insufficiency of the second degree, first-degree chronic venous insufficiency, chronic coronary disease, second-degree angina pectoris, sclerotic kidney, second-stage chronic renal insufficiency, the initial stage of cerebral atherosclerosis, and dyscirculatory encephalopathy of the first degree. The commission stated that those illnesses required constant monitoring and adequate drug therapy. Any breach of his treatment regimen could induce life-threatening complications. The commission nevertheless concluded that the applicant\u2019s condition did not warrant his release from detention. 32.  At the end of May 2011 the applicant wrote a note refusing two injections and intravenous therapy and stating that he had lost trust in the attending medical personnel.  On one occasion in June 2011 he refused to take a certain medicine, having noted that he had already taken similar drugs earlier that day. 33.  On 1 July 2011 the applicant was examined by Dr F., who observed that the authorities had failed to give him necessary drugs and that the applicant\u2019s relatives had had to step in and supply the prescribed medication. He nevertheless noted positive changes in his state of health. Dr F. again strongly insisted that the applicant needed to undergo a coronary angiography examination. 34.  The applicant\u2019s wife complained to the Representative of the Russian President in the North-West Federal Circuit of the applicant\u2019s poor treatment in detention. The complaint was to no avail. She also complained to the St Petersburg Ombudsman. On 26 July 2011 the Ombudsman recommended that the applicant\u2019s wife complain before the courts, apply for the applicant\u2019s early release on medical grounds, or complain to the administration of the detention facility. 35.  On 11 and 25 August 2011 Dr F. and a doctor from facility no. IZ\u201147/4 examined the applicant. In their joint report they noted that for a considerable amount of time the applicant had not received even basic vital medication because none had been available in the detention facility. In particular, the applicant did not receive spironolactone, aliskiren, clopidogrel and isosorbide mononitrate. Only the latter drug was substituted with analogous medication. The applicant\u2019s hypertension and coronary disease had deteriorated. The two doctors therefore recommended his admission to hospital. 36.  On 19 September 2011 the applicant was examined by Dr G., who found that his kidney disease had progressed to stage three. The doctor stressed that an angiography examination at that stage of the development of the applicant\u2019s illness posed a risk of irreparable damage to the applicant\u2019s kidneys. However, the risk of heart failure was even higher, and therefore an angiogram was vital. 37.  On 8 October 2011 the applicant was transferred to the Mariinskiy Hospital of St Petersburg for a coronary angiography examination. He underwent a number of tests in the hospital. A coronary angiography examination performed on 8 December 2011 revealed up to 75% arterial stenosis. The discharge certificate of 13 December 2011 prescribed the installation of a coronary stent. The surgery was to be performed in due course. 38.  On 19 December 2011 the applicant was admitted to prison hospital no. 2, where he underwent various medical tests and examinations. 39.   In a report prepared after the applicant\u2019s examination on 20 January 2012, Dr F. and the head of the prison hospital stated that he had not received any statins. The absence of this drug had caused an increase in the applicant\u2019s cholesterol level and deterioration in the lipid metabolism indices. In addition, the doctors observed that the applicant\u2019s renal protective therapy had been insufficient and his blood pressure had not been monitored regularly. As a result, his kidney disease had progressed. 40.  On 26 April 2012 in the course of the criminal proceedings against the applicant, the trial court ordered his expert examination with a view to updating the information about his state of health, particularly in the light of the results of his coronary angiography examination. In a report issued on 29 May 2012 experts confirmed that there was a high risk of heart complications, including lethal ones. They noted that the applicant\u2019s state of health called for vascular surgery, drug treatment and the limitation of stress. 41.  On 16 June 2012 the applicant was discharged from the hospital for a \u201cbreach of regimen\u201d, namely his refusal to be examined by two doctors. He continued his treatment as an outpatient. 42.  On 14 December 2012 the applicant was readmitted to prison hospital no. 1. 43.  In January 2013 Dr G. and Dr F. again assessed the quality of the medical treatment provided to the applicant. They concluded that he had received adequate treatment, that he was in need of endovascular surgery and that his impending transfer to a correctional colony would be incompatible with his state of health. 44.  The applicant spent another month in hospital no. 2. 45.  On 18 March 2013 the applicant was sent to a correctional colony in the Mordoviya Republic to serve his sentence. 46.  Meanwhile, on 1 April 2013 the applicant\u2019s wife complained to the Prosecutor General, the Federal Service for the Execution of Sentences, medical ward no. 78 and other authorities of the continuous failure to properly diagnose and treat her husband. She received no response. 47.  On 12 April 2013, after several weeks on the road, the applicant reached correctional colony no. IK-385/5 (\u201ccolony no. 385/5\u201d). On admission he was seen by a doctor who confirmed his diagnoses and prescribed clinical blood and urine tests, an electrocardiogram, and examinations by a therapist, a cardiologist and a psychiatrist. Five days later, the applicant was prescribed basic drugs for coronary heart disease and hypertension. On 23 April 2013 he was examined by a psychiatrist, who did not find any acute pathology. 48.   The applicant was admitted to prison hospital no. 21, where he spent the first two weeks of June 2013. He was seen by a doctor and again underwent various medical examinations, including blood and urine tests, electrocardiography and ultrasound tests. His diagnoses were confirmed and dietary nutrition and a specific drug regimen were prescribed. 49.  From 13 August to 27 September 2013 the applicant was admitted to medical ward no. 13 of the correctional colony. A doctor monitored his health and adjusted his treatment regimen. 50.  The applicant spent the entire month of October 2013 in transit between several detention facilities. At that time he contracted acute pharyngitis, which was successfully treated. 51.  On 30 October 2013 the applicant\u2019s health significantly deteriorated and he was admitted to the therapeutic department of medical ward no. 13. Tests revealed that he had kidney stones and a benign liver tumour. The applicant\u2019s drug regimen was amended. His condition was considered to have been stabilised. 52.  The discharge report issued to the applicant upon his discharge from the medical ward on 22 November 2013 indicated that he was to consult a heart surgeon and a nephrologist. 53.  According to the applicant, following his discharge from the ward he was immediately sent to Saransk for the recommended examinations. The journey took over two weeks. 54.  On 6 December 2013 a nephrologist and a heart surgeon examined the applicant and diagnosed him with second-degree chronic renal insufficiency, coronary disease, third-degree angina pectoris and atherosclerosis of the arterial vessels. Symptomatic treatment was prescribed for his kidney disease. A coronary angiography examination was also to be performed. In addition, the neurologist noted that the applicant\u2019s state of health did not require haemodialysis. 55.  On 24 January 2014 the applicant underwent a coronary angiography examination in Saransk Town hospital. It revealed up to 75% arterial stenosis with an unstable atherosclerosis plaque. Doctors authorised and immediately performed an urgent coronary angioplasty and a coronary stent was installed. The surgery was successful.", "references": ["7", "6", "5", "3", "4", "9", "1", "2", "8", "0", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1969 and lives in Samobor. 7.  The applicant owned a flat in Zagreb situated on the third floor of a residential building, where he lived with his wife and two children. 8.  In 2003, three years after he had bought the flat, the applicant\u2019s wife gave birth to their third child. The child was born with multiple physical and mental disabilities. 9.  After the birth the child underwent a number of medical treatments and his condition was under the constant supervision of the competent social care services. In April 2008 an expert commission diagnosed him with incurable cerebral palsy, grave mental retardation and epilepsy. In September 2008 the social services declared the child 100% disabled. 10.  In the meantime, in September 2006, the applicant bought a house in Samobor, and in October 2008 he sold his flat. According to the applicant, the reason for buying a house was the fact that the building in which his flat was situated had no lift and for that reason did not meet the needs of his disabled child and his family. In particular, it was very difficult to take his son out of the flat to see a doctor, or to take him for physiotherapy and to kindergarten or school, and to meet his other social needs. 11.  On 19 October 2006, after he had bought the house in Samobor, the applicant submitted a tax exemption request to the tax authorities. He relied on section 11(9) of the Real Property Transfer Tax Act, which provided for the possibility of tax exemption for a person who was buying a flat or a house in order to solve his or her housing needs, if he or she, or his or her family members, did not have another flat or house meeting their housing needs (see paragraph 24 below). In his request the applicant argued that the flat which he owned did not meet the housing needs of his family since it was very difficult, and in fact becoming impossible, to take his disabled child out of the flat from the third floor without a lift, given that he was in a wheelchair. The applicant therefore submitted that he had bought the house in order to cater for his son\u2019s needs. 12.  On 6 May 2009 the Samobor Tax Office (Ministarstvo Financija \u2013 Porezna uprava, Podru\u010dni ured Zagreb, Ispostava Samobor) dismissed the applicant\u2019s request, giving the following reasons:\n\u201cSection 11(9) of the Real Property Transfer Tax Act ... provides for tax exemption for citizens who are buying their first real property in order to meet their housing needs, under conditions which must be cumulatively satisfied, including the requirement that the taxpayer in question, or his or her family members, do not have another flat or a house meeting their housing needs. During the proceedings it was established that the taxpayer Jo\u0161ko Guberina had owned a flat measuring 114,49 square metres, in Zagreb ..., which he had sold on 25 November 2008 to ... Given that the surface of that real property, and in view of the number of the taxpayer\u2019s immediate family members (five), satisfied the housing needs of the taxpayer and his immediate family, within the meaning of section 11(9.3) of the Real Property Transfer Tax Act, and given that it satisfied all housing needs in terms of hygiene and technical requirements as well as the basic infrastructure (electricity, water and [access to] other public utilities), under section 11(9.5) of the Real Property Transfer Tax Act, the taxpayer does not meet the cumulative conditions provided under section 11(9) of the Real Property Transfer Tax Act. It was therefore decided as noted in the operative part [of the decision].\u201d 13.  The Samobor Tax Office ordered the applicant to pay 83,594.25 Croatian kunas (HRK; approximately EUR 11,250) in tax. 14.  The applicant appealed against the above decision to the Finance Ministry (Ministarstvo Financija, Samostalna slu\u017eba za drugostupanjski upravni postupak; hereafter, \u201cthe Ministry\u201d), and on 6 July 2009 the Ministry dismissed his appeal as ill-founded, endorsing the reasoning of the Samobor Tax Office. The relevant part of the decision reads:\n\u201cSection 11(9) of the Real Property Transfer Tax Act (Official Gazette, nos. 69/07-153/02) provides for tax exemption for citizens who are buying their first real property in order to meet their housing needs. It further lays down conditions which the citizen must meet in order to demonstrate that he or she is buying his or her first real property in order to meet his or her housing needs. In this connection, one of the conditions laid down under indent 9.5 is that the citizen and the members of his or her immediate family must not have another real property (flat or house) meeting their housing needs; and indent 9.6 also provides that the citizen and the members of his or her immediate family must not own a flat, a holiday house, or property of a significant value (other property of a significant value can include a piece of land where construction is allowed) or a business premises where the citizen or his or her immediate family members do not exercise a registered [business] activity, whereby the value of the real property is similar to that of the real property (flat or house) which the citizen is purchasing.\nGiven the rationale of the cited provisions and the facts of the case as established beyond doubt during the proceedings, [the Ministry] considers that the first-instance authority was justified in rejecting the appellant\u2019s request for tax exemption ... The right to tax exemption exists if the citizen, or his or her immediate family members, at the time of purchase [of the real property], do not own, or did not own, another real property meeting their housing needs or a flat, a holiday house or other real property of a significant value. As this is not the situation in the present case, given that the appellant, at the time of purchase [of the house], owned a flat in Zagreb ... larger than the real property he was buying and in respect of which he sought tax exemption, it cannot be said that by buying the house the appellant was purchasing his first real property in order to meet his housing needs.\u201d 15.  On 7 September 2009 the applicant lodged an administrative action with the High Administrative Court (Visoki upravni sud Republike Hrvatske), arguing that in their decisions the lower bodies had ignored his specific family situation and, in particular, his child\u2019s disability and therefore the housing needs of his family. In the applicant\u2019s view, it was necessary to recognise that in his particular case the availability of a lift in the building was an infrastructural requirement on the same level as access to water and electricity in general. He also emphasised that the house was the first real property in respect of which he had sought a real property transfer tax exemption. 16.  On 21 March 2012 the High Administrative Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s administrative action as ill-founded, endorsing the reasoning of the lower administrative bodies. The relevant part of the judgment reads:\n\u201cGiven that the surface area of the flat [which the applicant owned] satisfied the needs of five members of the plaintiff\u2019s family (provision 9.3) and that the flat at issue was equipped with the basic infrastructure and hygiene and technical requirements, the defendant correctly concluded that the plaintiff, in the given case, did not meet the conditions for a tax exemption set out in section 11(9) of the Real Property Transfer Tax Act.\nThe arguments regarding the administrative action are ineffective in changing the decision in this administrative matter, and therefore the court considers that the impugned decision did not breach the law to the plaintiff\u2019s detriment.\u201d 17.  On 25 May 2012 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) relying on Article 14 of the Constitution, contending, inter alia, that, given the specific accommodation needs of his family due to his child\u2019s disability, he had been discriminated against by unfair application of the relevant tax legislation. He argued, in particular, that the competent administrative authorities had failed to correct the factual inequality inherent in his particular situation with regard to the ordinary meaning of the term basic infrastructural requirements meeting the housing needs of his family. 18.  On 26 September 2012 the Constitutional Court, endorsing the reasoning of the lower bodies, dismissed the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint as ill-founded on the grounds that there was no violation of his constitutional rights. In particular, having examined his complaints from the angle of the right to a fair trial, the Constitutional Court held that no issue arose with regard to the other complaints relied upon by the applicant. 19.  The decision of the Constitutional Court was served on the applicant\u2019s representative on 11 October 2012. 20.  The Government provided a report by the Ministry of Social Policy and Youth (Ministarstvo socijalne politike i mladih) of 6 November 2013, according to which the applicant\u2019s child had been in receipt of monthly monetary allowances of HRK 1,000 (approximately EUR 130) in the period between 19 January 2006 and 10 September 2012, and allowances of HRK 625 (approximately EUR 80) from 11 September 2012 onwards. In addition, he had been involved in various therapeutic and social assistance activities, and for the period between 29 June 2010 and 2 October 2011 the applicant\u2019s wife had been granted special status related to her child\u2019s disability and had received inter alia, monthly payments of HRK 2,500 (approximately EUR 300). 21.  According to the applicant, the annual expenses relating to his son\u2019s special needs amounted to some HRK 80,000 (approximately EUR 10,400). This included HRK 28,800 for physiotherapy, HRK 4,500 for speech therapy, HRK 900 for a child neurologist, HRK 7,200 for drugs, HRK 21,175 for a wheelchair (with additional State support of HRK 8,900); HRK 7,200 for swimming therapy; and HRK 9,150 for daily transport to the day-care centre for ten months.", "references": ["0", "3", "6", "1", "5", "4", "7", "2", "No Label", "8", "9"], "gold": ["8", "9"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Roman. 6.  The applicant\u2019s daughter was monitored during her pregnancy by Dr I.M., a gynaecologist working at the Suceava County Hospital. She was examined on a monthly basis and her pregnancy developed normally. 7.  On 8 October 2001, Dr I.M. performed a routine check-up on the applicant\u2019s daughter when she was eight months pregnant. According to the applicant, on that occasion Dr I.M. informed her daughter that she needed to be hospitalised for further investigations because an imminent premature birth was suspected. 8.  On the same date the applicant\u2019s daughter was admitted to hospital with the diagnosis of imminent premature birth and sub icterus of unknown aetiology. 9.  On 9 October 2001 the applicant\u2019s daughter was examined and blood samples were collected because it was suspected that she was suffering from viral hepatitis and an internal condition. She was also suffering from pain in the lumbar region and food poisoning was suspected because she had stated that she had eaten mushrooms picked from the forest. She was treated with Duvadilan (a vasodilator, prescribed for peripheral vascular disease associated with cerebrovascular insufficiency and premature labour) and other medication. According to the applicant, as a result of this treatment large ecchymoses caused by the rupture of blood vessels appeared on her daughter\u2019s legs and abdomen. 10.  On the night of 9 to 10 October 2001 the medical condition of the applicant\u2019s daughter worsened. 11.  On 10 October 2001 the applicant\u2019s daughter was transferred to the intensive care unit and her condition continued to deteriorate. 12.  According to the applicant, after repeated requests from her and her son-in-law, Dr I.M. agreed to contact Dr D.D. from the Cuza-Vod\u0103 Clinic located in Ia\u015fi. Dr D.D. was a university professor. When he received information about the patient\u2019s condition and treatment, Dr D.D. diagnosed the applicant\u2019s daughter with Hellp syndrome (an exceptionally serious pre\u2011natal condition) and asked Dr I.M. to perform an emergency C-section in order to save the mother\u2019s life. 13.  According to the applicant, Dr I.M. refused to perform the emergency C-section, but eventually agreed that the applicant\u2019s daughter could be transferred to the Cuza-Vod\u0103 Clinic in Ia\u015fi. 14.  The applicant\u2019s daughter was transferred by ambulance to Ia\u015fi, 150 kilometres away from Suceava, unaccompanied by a doctor. Her condition worsened during the transport. 15.  She was admitted to the Cuza-Vod\u0103 Clinic in a coma, with the diagnosis of Hellp syndrome. An emergency C-section was performed thirty minutes after she arrived at the hospital. She died ten minutes after the surgery from cardiac arrest, despite resuscitation manoeuvres. The applicant\u2019s granddaughter died on 12 October 2001 from cardiac arrest, despite resuscitation manoeuvres. 16.  On 10 October 2001 the Ia\u015fi Police Department initiated of its own motion a criminal investigation into the death of the applicant\u2019s daughter. They carried out an examination of the body, took photographic evidence and they interviewed Dr C.N., who had assisted Dr D.D. during the surgery, as well as the applicant\u2019s son-in-law. 17.  On 12 October 2001 a post-mortem report was produced in respect of the applicant\u2019s daughter\u2019s and granddaughter\u2019s deaths at the Ia\u015fi Police Department\u2019s request. It concluded that the cause of the applicant\u2019s daughter\u2019s death had been cardio-respiratory and hepatic-renal insufficiency with brain hypoxia. In addition, the applicant\u2019s granddaughter\u2019s death had been caused by lung and brain hypoxia. 18.  On 27 March 2002, the Ia\u015fi Forensics Institute produced a forensic necropsy report. It noted amongst other things that according to the serology examination report no spores of poisonous mushrooms were found. It concluded that the death of the applicant\u2019s daughter was pathological and was caused by hepatic-nephritis and generalised haemorrhagic vasculopathy, with cardio-respiratory and circulatory insufficiency. In addition, the assessment of the medical assistance provided to the victim during pregnancy and upon giving birth had to be made, after medical documents were adduced, by a review commission (comisia de avizare) composed of obstetrics and gynaecology experts. 19.  On 30 May 2002, the Ia\u015fi Forensics Institute, sitting as a review commission, informed the Ia\u015fi Police Department that they approved the conclusions of the forensic necropsy report of 27 March 2002 as scientifically grounded and based on the medical data included in the report. In addition, it found that there had been no omissions in the techno-medical treatment of the victim (\u00een atitudinea tehnic-medical\u0103 fa\u021b\u0103 de victim\u0103 nu se constat\u0103 omisiuni). 20.  On 6 February 2002, the applicant\u2019s son-in-law lodged a criminal complaint, with no civil claims, with the Ia\u015fi Prosecutor\u2019s Office, requesting an investigation into his wife\u2019s and daughter\u2019s deaths following his wife\u2019s admission to the Cuza-Vod\u0103 Clinic in Ia\u015fi. His complaint was registered on 12 February 2002 with the Ia\u015fi Prosecutor\u2019s Office under criminal file no. 670/P/2002. 21.  On 27 March 2002, the applicant\u2019s son-in-law lodged a second criminal complaint, with no civil claims, with the General Prosecutor\u2019s Office attached to the Court of Cassation (\u201cthe General Prosecutor\u2019s Office\u201d) against the medical personnel of the Suceava County Hospital and the Cuza-Vod\u0103 Clinic in Ia\u015fi. He relied on Article 178 (2) of the Romanian Criminal Code, and argued that the medical personnel had been medically negligent. In addition, he contended amongst other things that the criminal investigation lacked the required speediness. The complaint was registered on 23 April 2002 with the Ia\u015fi Prosecutor\u2019s Office under criminal file no. 2294/P/2002. 22.  By an order of 26 July 2002 the Ia\u015fi Prosecutor\u2019s Office decided to join the criminal files nos. 670/P/2002 and 2294/P/2002 and not to open criminal proceedings (ne\u00eenceperea urm\u0103ririi penale) in the case. It held, on the basis of the medical evidence, the forensic necropsy report and the approval of the review commission of 30 May 2002, that the death of the victim had had natural causes and had not been induced by any medical error. Subsequently, the order was notified to the applicant\u2019s son-in-law and he challenged the order before the superior prosecutor. 23.  On 31 July 2002, the applicant\u2019s son-in-law challenged the order before the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office. His complaint was subsequently referred to the Ia\u015fi Prosecutor\u2019s Office. 24.  On 30 September 2002, the superior prosecutor dismissed the applicant\u2019s son-in-law\u2019s challenge to the order of 26 July 2002. 25.  On an unspecified date in 2002, the applicant\u2019s son-in-law lodged a criminal complaint against Dr I.M. with the Suceava Prosecutor\u2019s Office for involuntary manslaughter following the deaths of his wife and daughter. The complaint was registered under criminal file no. 735/P/2002. 26.  On 8 January 2003 the Suceava Prosecutor\u2019s Office informed the applicant\u2019s son-in-law that the criminal investigation concerning Dr I.M. was pending; that he would be heard after the medical authorities had submitted the relevant medical and forensic documents; and that once the investigation had ended he would be notified of the outcome. 27.  On 22 January 2003 the applicant\u2019s son-in-law was heard in respect of the circumstances of his wife\u2019s death. 28.  On 16 May 2003 the Suceava Police Department asked the Ia\u015fi Forensics Institute to help them clarify certain aspects of the case and to explain: (a) if Dr I.M. had acted correctly by hospitalising the patient and by giving her the treatment he did; (b) if the treatment with Duvadilan was appropriate for the patient\u2019s condition and if the treatment had influenced the deterioration of her condition; (c) what were the possible causes of the patient\u2019s death occurring soon afterwards; (d) what would have been the patient\u2019s chances of survival, given her diagnosis, if the surgery had been performed as soon as her condition had deteriorated. 29.  On 16 May and 21 August 2003, Dr I.M. was heard in respect of the circumstances of his patient\u2019s death. 30.  On 10 June 2003 the Ia\u015fi Forensics Institute informed the Suceava Police Department that given his patient\u2019s diagnosis Dr I.M. had had a duty to carry out haemolysis and other blood tests in order to identify a state of pre-eclampsia, given that the patient had been hospitalised with sub icterus. In addition, the prompt treatment recommended in case of suspicion of Hellp syndrome would have been the immediate evacuation of the pregnancy in order to avoid aggravation of the hepatic and vascular lesions. Furthermore, with careful monitoring of the mother and of the foetus as well as prompt treatment, the deaths might have been avoided. The fact that the patient reached the Cuza-Vod\u0103 Clinic in Ia\u015fi in a serious condition suggested inadequate monitoring. The absence of a diagnosis for three days aggravated the patient\u2019s condition. Given the doctor\u2019s aforementioned duties, he should have been aware of the evolution of a state of pre\u2011eclampsia, and he was obliged to exhaust all the available remedies to avoid it and treat it. The extremely low level of thrombocytes in the patient\u2019s blood in Suceava was an important aid to a suspicion of this type of complication and an indication that prompt intervention was necessary. 31.  On 25 August 2003, following Dr I.M.\u2019s objections, the Suceava Police Department reiterated before the Higher Forensics Commission attached to the National Forensics Institute in Bucharest (\u201cthe Higher Forensics Commission\u201d) the same questions raised before the Ia\u015fi Forensics Institute on 16 May 2003, and asked it to help them clarify those aspects of the case and to provide explanations. 32.  On 12 January and 8 March 2004, the Suceava Police Department asked the Higher Forensics Commission to provide its conclusions in respect of their request from 25 August 2003. It emphasised that the conclusions were necessary to solve the case, and that the victim\u2019s family had complained repeatedly before the domestic authorities about the lack of promptness of the criminal investigation. 33.  On 29 January 2004 the applicant complained before the superior prosecutor attached to the Suceava Prosecutor\u2019s Office that the criminal investigation lacked promptness and had failed to clarify the circumstances of the victims\u2019 deaths. She stated that the last written notification received concerning the case had been the information note of 8 January 2003. She also requested to be informed of the outcome of the investigation. 34.  On 6 February 2004 the Suceava Police Department informed the applicant that the Higher Forensics Commission had been asked to produce a forensic expert report in the case. The applicant was also informed that as soon as the Higher Forensics Commission\u2019s report was available a lawful solution would be issued in respect of the case and that she would be notified about it. 35.  On 23 April 2004 the Higher Forensics Commission approved the note (avizul) produced by the Ia\u015fi Forensics Institute on 10 June 2003 with additional explanations. In particular, it noted amongst other things that while she was in hospital the applicant\u2019s daughter stated that she had eaten forest mushrooms. At the time there was another patient in the hospital suffering from mushroom poisoning. This caused her medical condition to be blamed on the mushrooms, which delayed the Hellp syndrome diagnosis. It also noted that during the applicant\u2019s hospitalisation on the intensive therapy unit the applicant\u2019s daughter condition worsened. Dr D.D. was contacted by phone and he suggested that the pregnancy should be evacuated. Given the patient\u2019s serious condition and the local intensive therapy possibilities (posibilit\u0103\u021bile locale de terapie intensiv\u0103), in order to solve the case, Dr D.D. was contacted and he accepted that the patient be transferred to Ia\u015fi. It further noted that according to the post-mortem report the patient had displayed symptoms of hepatic-nephritis and generalised haemorrhagic vasculopathy and subsequent cardio-respiratory insufficiency. It concluded that the actions of the Suceava Hospital\u2019s staff could be explained from a medical standpoint, in the context of the patient\u2019s anamnesis and given that according to the information available and on the basis of the patient\u2019s symptoms they could have also concluded that the patient\u2019s condition had been caused by mushroom poisoning, and not by Hellp syndrome as turned out to be the case. There were similarities in the symptoms of the two medical conditions. 36.  By an order of 4 May 2004 the Suceava Prosecutor\u2019s Office decided not to open criminal proceedings against Dr I.M. for involuntary manslaughter, on the ground that such an unlawful act had not taken place. 37.  On 13 December 2007 the applicant requested information from the General Prosecutor\u2019s Office about the status of the criminal investigation and the measures taken in the case. She also accused the authorities investigating the case of procrastination and of waiting for Dr I.M.\u2019s criminal liability to become time-barred. 38.  On 13 August 2008, the Suceava Prosecutor\u2019s Office informed the applicant that the criminal investigation against Dr I.M. had been terminated by the order of 4 May 2004, and that the aforementioned order had been communicated to her son-in-law. Also, it noted that the same information had been communicated to the applicant on 6 February 2008. 39.  On an unspecified date, the applicant challenged the order of 4 May 2004 before the superior prosecutor attached to the Suceava Prosecutor\u2019s Office. 40.  On 1 September 2008, the superior prosecutor attached to the Suceava Prosecutor\u2019s Office dismissed the applicant\u2019s challenge. 41.  On 26 September 2008, the applicant challenged the orders of 26 July and 30 September 2002 as well as those of 4 May 2004 and 1 September 2008 before the Suceava County Court. 42.  On 12 November 2008 the Suceava County Court declined jurisdiction to examine the case in favour of the Suceava District Court, on account of the nature of the offence under investigation. 43.  On 25 November 2008, the applicant lodged a request with the Court of Cassation seeking the transfer of the file to a different district court. 44.  On 4 February 2009, the Court of Cassation allowed the applicant\u2019s request and ordered the transfer of the file for examination to the Ia\u015fi District Court. 45.  On 22 May 2009 the file was registered with the Ia\u015fi District Court. 46.  By a judgment of 20 November 2009, the Ia\u015fi District Court allowed the applicant\u2019s and her son-in-law\u2019s challenge against the order of 4 May 2004, cancelled the order, and referred the file back to the prosecutor\u2019s office for criminal proceedings to be opened against Dr I.M. for involuntary manslaughter. The challenge to the order of 26 July 2002 rendered by the Ia\u015fi Prosecutor\u2019s Office was dismissed as lodged out of time. 47.  The court considered that the criminal investigation had not been complete, and that additional evidence was needed. It held that the decision not to open criminal proceedings had been based on the two forensic expert reports, but forensic expert reports had in fact not been asked for by the investigating authorities and had not been produced in the case. The document produced on 10 June 2003 was in fact a note of the Ia\u015fi Forensic Service in response to the investigating authorities\u2019 request for clarification of some aspects of the case. The aforementioned documents did not have the content of a forensic expert report produced according to law. The same considerations applied to the document issued by the Higher Forensic Commission on 23 April 2004. 48.  According to the court, a forensic expert report was essential evidence in cases of suspected involuntary manslaughter and it was required when medical negligence had supposedly been the cause of death. Also, the content of the Ia\u015fi Forensic Service\u2019s note of 10 June 2003 which indicated a possible medical error by Dr I.M. made a forensic expert report even more necessary. 49.  The court considered that essential aspects of the case needed to be clarified, namely to establish the cause of death and to examine whether Dr I.M. had administered medical treatment in accordance with his professional obligations, and, if such treatment had been inappropriate, whether this had had any causal link with the deaths of the applicant\u2019s daughter and grand-daughter. In addition, the question of whether the applicant\u2019s daughter had eaten forest mushrooms had not been entirely clarified. Dr I.M.\u2019s statement that the applicant\u2019s daughter had eaten the aforementioned mushrooms had not been confirmed or rebutted by any other evidence. The information concerning the consumption of mushrooms found in the clinical observation chart was also added there by Dr I.M. Furthermore, the reasons why the applicant\u2019s daughter was not accompanied by a doctor during her transfer by ambulance remained unclear. Consequently, the court ordered a forensic expert report to be produced which would establish whether: (a) the doctor had been diligent enough to correctly establish the diagnosis; (b) the actual diagnosis had been established on the basis of the symptoms and the investigations made in the case; (c) the correct diagnosis could have been established on the basis of supplementary tests and examinations which should have been performed; (d) the medical treatment had been appropriate; (e) the medical intervention should have been performed at the Suceava County Hospital; (f) the applicant\u2019s daughter\u2019s health had deteriorated during her transfer to the clinic in Ia\u015fi because she was not assisted by a doctor throughout the transportation; (g) any of the aspects above, or others, had any causal link with the death of the applicant\u2019s daughter and her new born granddaughter. If the expert report established a causal link between the death and the fact that the transfer by ambulance had not been done with a doctor present, the reason why the patient had not been accompanied by a doctor and the identity of those responsible should be established. Consequently, the medical staff responsible for the transfer by ambulance should be heard. The court also ordered that the notes on the clinical observation chart should be checked for accuracy against the doctor\u2019s statements regarding the consumption of forest mushrooms, and accordingly the victim\u2019s mother and husband should be heard. 50.  The Ia\u015fi Prosecutor\u2019s Office lodged an appeal on points of law (recurs) against the judgment. 51.  On 30 March 2010, the Ia\u015fi County Court dismissed the Ia\u015fi Prosecutor\u2019s Office\u2019s appeal on points of law and upheld the judgment of the district court. 52.  By an order of 21 December 2010, the Suceava Prosecutor\u2019s Office decided not to open criminal proceedings against Dr I.M., on the ground that his criminal liability had become time-barred. 53.  The applicant challenged the order before the superior prosecutor. She argued amongst other things, that the investigating authorities had delayed the investigation of the case, although she had repeatedly asked for a speedy investigation. Also, she had not been notified without undue delay of the outcome of the criminal investigation, although on 6 February 2004 the Suceava Police Department had informed her that she would be notified about the outcome of the investigation. 54.  On 1 February 2011, the superior prosecutor attached to the Suceava Prosecutor\u2019s Office dismissed the applicant\u2019s challenge and upheld the order of 21 December 2010. It held amongst other things that the proceedings had not been abandoned by the authorities, since they had finished the investigation on 4 May 2004. The length of proceedings had been affected by the forensic expert reports, the last one being produced on 23 April 2004. 55.  The applicant challenged the order before the Ia\u015fi District Court. 56.  On 22 April 2011, the Ia\u015fi District Court declined jurisdiction in the case in favour of the Suceava District Court. 57.  On 21 July 2011, the file was registered with the Suceava District Court. 58.  On 21 September 2011, the Suceava District Court considered that only the Ia\u015fi District Court was competent ratione loci to examine the case. Consequently, it referred the case to the Court of Cassation to examine and decide on the conflict of competence between the two district courts. 59.  On 25 January 2012, the Court of Cassation decided that the Suceava District Court was competent to examine the case. 60.  On 5 April 2012, the file was registered once again with the Suceava District Court. 61.  By a final judgment of 6 June 2012 the Suceava District Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s action as ill-founded and upheld the prosecutor\u2019s office\u2019s order. It held that according to the relevant criminal law provisions and given the nature of the offence he had been suspected of, Dr I.M.\u2019s criminal liability had become time-barred eight years after the unfortunate event. The statute of limitations had not been suspended or interrupted by any act carried out in the case that had to be communicated to the accused (\u020bnvinuitului) or to the defendant (inculpatului). Criminal proceedings against Dr I.M. had not been opened and therefore he had not been considered either an accused or a defendant, as the investigation against him had been carried out at the preliminary investigation (acte premerg\u0103toare) stage of the proceedings. 62.  The court considered that the applicant\u2019s argument that an expert medical report could be requested only after a criminal investigation had been opened was not supported by any legal provision. Also, it could not be accepted that the running of the statutory limit had been stopped or suspended, either by the request for a medical expert report to be produced or by the judgment of 20 November 2009. The judgment of a court quashing an order of the prosecutor\u2019s office to discontinue a criminal investigation was not one of the lawfully permissible reasons to suspend the running of the statutory limit. 63.  The court also held that the Suceava Prosecutor\u2019s Office had been competent to investigate the case. The fact that the Court of Cassation had transferred the case for examination to a different district court would not have justified an investigation of the case by a different prosecutor\u2019s office from the one which had initially investigated the case, once the examining court had referred the case back to the prosecutor. Furthermore, the prosecutor was legally bound to open criminal proceedings only if, after the evidence indicated by the court was adduced to the file, it did not appear that there were circumstances that would impede it. Also, even if the prosecutor\u2019s office had taken into account the applicant\u2019s granddaughter\u2019s death and had requalified Dr I.M.\u2019s acts from involuntary manslaughter to aggravated involuntary manslaughter and the maximum penalty had been increased by three years, the offence would still have been time-barred. 64.  The applicant appealed on points of law against the judgment. 65.  On 26 September 2012 the Suceava Court of Appeal dismissed as inadmissible the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law, on the ground that the domestic legislation did not allow a second level of jurisdiction in respect of court proceedings initiated against the prosecutor\u2019s office\u2019s orders or decisions. 66.  On 16 May 2002, following Dr I.M.\u2019s request, the Professional Jurisdiction Commission attached to the Suceava County College of Doctors (Comisia de Jursidic\u0163ie Profesional\u0103 a Colegiului Jude\u0163ean al Medicilor Suceava) established that there were no elements to suggest medical error or other deficiencies in the medical treatment and investigations provided to the applicant\u2019s daughter at the Suceava County Hospital. Her illness had been identified promptly once she was hospitalised, and she had been transferred to intensive care and afterwards to Ia\u015fi. However, the seriousness of her illness led to her death. In addition, there had been no other case before the Romanian College of Doctors in which Dr I.M. had been accused of medical error or breaches of the code of medical ethics. 67.  On 30 May 2002, the Suceava County College of Doctors validated the Professional Jurisdiction Commission\u2019s decision.", "references": ["7", "8", "2", "6", "9", "1", "4", "3", "5", "No Label", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Szeged. 5.  The applicant had a car accident in 1993, sustained serious injuries and, as a consequence, her loss of capacity to work was assessed to be 67 per cent. 6.  An insurance company was obliged to pay a monthly allowance to the applicant. In order to redeem the monthly allowance, the insurance company offered 4,400,000 Hungarian forints (17,600 euros) to the applicant as compensation for all damages she has suffered. The applicant and the insurance company concluded an agreement on the lump sum on 25 February 1999. 7. Subsequently, the applicant realised that the lump sum paid by the insurance company did not cover all her damages, believing that the calculation method applied by the insurance company was mistaken. Consequently, on 7 August 2003 the applicant initiated a civil lawsuit against the insurance company requesting the court to declare the agreement invalid and to oblige the insurance company to pay compensation for damages. 8.  The Budapest Regional Court delivered a partial judgment on 18 April 2006 in which dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim on the alleged invalidity of the parties\u2019 agreement. On appeal, the Budapest Court of Appeal upheld the partial judgment on 21 February 2007. The applicant challenged the partial judgment before the Supreme Court which upheld it on 17 October 2007. 9.  As to the remainder, the Budapest Regional Court in its judgment delivered on 11 June 2007 partly found for the applicant in respect of the damage claim. On appeal, the Budapest Court of Appeal reversed the judgment and dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim on 23 April 2008. The applicant challenged the judgment before the Supreme Court but to no avail. The Supreme Court upheld the final and binding judgment on 11 February 2009.", "references": ["7", "4", "0", "2", "9", "5", "8", "1", "6", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "10.  The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Sweden. 11.  He entered Sweden on 16 November 2009 and applied for political asylum. 12.  On 19 February 2010, counsel appointed the applicant made written submissions to the Migration Board (Migrationsverket) in which he developed the grounds for the applicant\u2019s request for political asylum. 13.  On 24 March 2010 the Migration Board held an oral interview with the applicant in the presence of his counsel and an interpreter. The applicant handed over a declaration of 15 March 2010 from a pastor in Sweden certifying that the applicant had been a member of his congregation since December 2009 and had been baptised. The Migration Board official therefore started the interview by asking about that matter. The applicant replied that it was a private matter \u201cin [his] heart\u201d, adding: \u201cIt has nothing to do with this but if you want to ask questions you may. All problems in my home country are caused by Islam entering Iran ...\u201d. The Migration Board official explained that the reason why he was asking questions about it was that he had interpreted the certificate as though the applicant had relied on his conversion as a ground for asylum. The applicant stated: \u201cno, it is not something I want to rely on. It is something private\u201d. The Migration Board official then suggested a break in the interview in order for the applicant and his counsel to confer. After a ten-minute break, counsel stated: \u201cthe applicant wants to underline that he has not changed religion in order to enhance his chances of getting a residence permit but out of personal conviction\u201d. When asked when he had converted, the applicant replied that this had happened after he had arrived in the Swedish town of X, where there were not many Iranians. He had got to know a person who went to church four times a week. This person knew that the applicant hated Islam. The applicant continued: \u201cI do not regard Christianity as a religion\u201d. When asked why that was so, the applicant replied: \u201cif regarded as a religion it would be like Islam, but Christianity is about a kind of love you have for God\u201d. He explained that he had been going to the congregation\u2019s gatherings two to four times per week and that he read the Bible. The applicant gave examples of miracles and prophecies from the Bible which had attracted him to Christianity. The Migration Board official asked why, if the applicant did not wish to rely on his conversion as a ground for asylum, he had nevertheless handed in the certificate from the pastor, to which the applicant replied: \u201cI don\u2019t know. I never asked for it and I had not even considered handing it in, but you wanted it. They gave all converts a certificate like that\u201d. 14.  The rest of the interview dealt with the applicant\u2019s political past. The applicant explained that in Iran he had worked with persons connected to different universities who were known to oppose the regime. He had mainly worked on creating and publishing web pages. He and one of the other persons had been arrested in April 2007. He had been released after 24 hours and then hospitalised for ten days due to high blood pressure. 15.  Before the elections on 12 June 2009, the applicant had worked with the Green Movement, who had supported Mousavi for the presidential position, by spreading their message via the Internet. The day before the elections, he and his friends had been arrested, questioned and detained in the polling station overnight. 16.  After the elections, the applicant had participated in demonstrations and other activities. He had been arrested once again in September 2009 and imprisoned for twenty days. He had been ill-treated in prison. In October 2009 he had been taken before the Revolutionary Court, which had released him after a day on condition that he cooperate with the authorities and spy on his friends. He had agreed to the demands and given his business premises as a guarantee. He had also assured them that he would not participate in any demonstrations and that he would respond to their summons. Following his release in a park, he had found that his business premises had been searched. He had kept politically sensitive material there, which the authorities must have noticed, and his passport and other documents were missing. 17.  Subsequently, the applicant was summoned to appear on 2 November 2009 before the Revolutionary Court. He had contacted a friend who, in turn, had obtained the help of a smuggler to enable him to leave the country. The applicant submitted a summons from the Revolutionary Court dated 21 October 2009 stating that he should present himself at Evin prison in Teheran on 2 November 2009. 18.  The interview before the Migration Board lasted approximately two hours and the record was subsequently sent to the applicant and his counsel for comment. Counsel commented that the applicant had not read the certificate from the congregation\u2019s pastor before the interview as it had not been translated and that the applicant intended to submit the formal baptism certificate. 19.  On 29 April 2010 the Migration Board rejected the applicant\u2019s request for asylum. By way of introduction, it stated that while the applicant had not proven his identity or citizenship he had established the probability thereof. 20.  As regards the request for political asylum, the Migration Board held that participation in demonstrations or affiliation with the Green Movement could not, of itself, give rise to a risk of persecution, ill-treatment or punishment on his return to Iran. The Migration Board noted that the applicant had changed his story in some parts during the proceedings, and in particular, he had changed his statements concerning the number of times he had been arrested. Furthermore, he had not been able to name the park where he had been released in October 2009. Thus, the Migration Board found reason to question whether he had been arrested at all. The Migration Board further considered that the applicant\u2019s political activities had been limited. After the questioning in 2007 and until the elections in 2009, he had been able to continue working with the web pages that contained the critical material, even though, according to the applicant, already at that time the authorities had been aware of his activities. For these reasons, the Migration Board found that the applicant could not have been of interest to the authorities on account of his activities or the material he had in his possession. 21.  As to the applicant\u2019s conversion to Christianity, the Migration Board noted that the conversion and baptism had not taken place in the Church of Sweden and that the applicant had not handed in any proof of his baptism. The certificate from the congregation\u2019s pastor could be regarded only as a plea to the Migration Board that the applicant should be granted asylum. The applicant had not initially wished to invoke his conversion as a ground for asylum and had stated that his new faith was a private matter. To pursue his faith in private was not found to be a plausible reason for believing that he would risk persecution upon return. In conclusion, the Migration Board found that the applicant had not shown that he was in need of protection in Sweden. 22.  The applicant appealed to the Migration Court (Migrationsdomstolen), maintaining his claims and relying on both political and religious grounds for asylum. As regards the latter he handed in a baptism certificate of 31 January 2010. He reacted against the decision by the Migration Board, which in his view implied that a conversion within a \u201cfree church\u201d was of less relevance than if it had been within the Church of Sweden. He explained that the reason why he had not initially wished to rely on his conversion was that he did not want to trivialise the seriousness of his beliefs. 23.  On 16 February 2011 the Migration Court held an oral hearing in the presence of the applicant, his counsel, an interpreter and a representative of the Migration Board. 24. The Migration Board did not question the fact that the applicant, at the time, professed the Christian faith, but found that this, by itself, was not enough to consider him in need of protection. It referred to the British Home Office\u2019s operational guidance note of January 2009. 25.  The applicant stated that he did not wish to rely on his conversion as a reason for asylum but considered it something personal. He added that \u201cit would, however, obviously cause [him] problems upon return\u201d. 26.  In respect of his political past he explained, inter alia, that he had had contact with the student movement and quite a lot of students and had helped them with their home pages. His computer had been taken from his business premises while he was in prison. Material that was critical of the regime was stored on his computer. While he had not personally criticised the regime, or President Ahmadinejad, or the highest leaders, the applicant had visited some websites and had received cartoons via e\u2011mail. Therefore, in his view, there was enough evidence to prove that he was an opponent of the system. It was much the same as the material he had had on his computer in 2007. 27.  The summons to appear before the Revolutionary Court on 2 November 2009 was also submitted to the Migration Court. The applicant explained that the summons had been served at his home and that his sister had brought it to him. He had left the summons with a friend when he left Iran. Subsequently, the said friend had sent it to another friend, who was going to Ukraine, and who had made sure that the summons was sent to the applicant in Sweden. He had not been summoned again and his family had not been targeted. Something might have happened, though, that his family did not wish to burden him with. 28.  On 9 March 2011 the Migration Court rejected the appeal. It observed that the applicant was no longer relying on his religious views as a ground for persecution and it did not refer further to this issue in its conclusions. 29.  The Migration Court found that the applicant\u2019s story in support of his request for political asylum had been coherent and trustworthy on the most essential points. It found that the uncertainties that had been pointed out by the Migration Board had been satisfactorily explained. However, as regards the summons to appear before the Revolutionary Court, the Migration Court found, regardless of the authenticity of the document, that it could not by itself substantiate a need for protection. The Migration Court pointed out in this respect that the document was merely a summons and that no reason had been given as to why the applicant should present himself at Evin prison. Moreover, the information concerning the applicant\u2019s political activities had generally been vague and lacking in detail. The applicant had only stated that he had participated in the campaign for the opposition before the elections in 2009 by joining demonstrations and having contact with the student movement and students in order to help them with their web pages. Furthermore, the applicant had stated that the material he had had in his possession when he was questioned in 2007 had not differed from the material he had in 2009. These circumstances, together with the fact that he had not been summoned again to appear before the Revolutionary Court after November 2009 and that his family had not been targeted, made the Migration Court doubt that his political activities had been of such a nature and extent as to have resulted in the consequences alleged. The Migration Court found that the applicant had exaggerated the importance of his political activities and their consequences and therefore also the authorities\u2019 interest in him. For these reasons, it considered that the applicant had not made out that the Iranian authorities had a special interest in him and that therefore he was in need of protection. 30.  On 30 March and 19 April 2011 the applicant requested leave to appeal to the Migration Court of Appeal (Migrations\u00f6verdomstolen). He maintained his need for political asylum. He also alleged that before the Migration Court he had relied on his conversion. He submitted that the latter issue had been sensitive for him, that he had considered it a private matter and that had not wanted to tarnish the seriousness of his belief. This was the reason why he, in response to a direct question by the Migration Court, had stated that he was no longer relying on his conversion as a ground for asylum. After the oral hearing before the Migration Court he had become a member of another Christian congregation and had taken part in an initiation ceremony broadcast on the Internet. His fear that his conversion had become known to the Iranian authorities had therefore increased. He enclosed a letter of 13 April 2011 from his new congregation which supported his explanation. In particular, it stated that the applicant had converted shortly after his arrival in Sweden, that he had shown with honest intent and interest that he was willing to learn more about Christianity, and that he took part in church services, prayer meetings and social activities. It also stated that he became a member of the congregation in February 2011 and that his Christian beliefs were no longer private as the services he attended were broadcast on the Internet. 31. On 8 June 2011 the Migration Court of Appeal refused the applicant\u2019s request for leave to appeal. The removal order thus became enforceable. 32.  On 6 July 2011 the applicant requested the Migration Board to stay the enforcement of his expulsion and to reconsider its previous decision in the light of new circumstances. He stated, inter alia, that the act of conversion from Islam to another religion was a taboo and punishable by death in Iran. The applicant submitted the above-mentioned letter of 13 April 2011 from his new congregation. 33.  On 13 September 2011 the Migration Board refused to re-examine the applicant\u2019s request for asylum based on his conversion. The Migration Board noted that in the original asylum proceedings the applicant had stated that he had been baptised and had converted to Christianity. He had also stated that his conversion was a personal matter which he did not wish to rely on as a ground for asylum. The Migration Board found it noteworthy that the applicant now raised the question of conversion, when he had been given the chance to elaborate on it during the oral hearing before the Migration Court but had declined to do so. It thus concluded that the applicant\u2019s conversion could not be regarded as a new circumstance, which was a precondition for the Migration Board to re-examine the request. 34.  The applicant appealed against the decision to the Migration Court, maintaining his claims. He submitted that since he had not previously relied on his conversion, it should be regarded as a new circumstance. 35.  On 6 October 2011 the Migration Court rejected the appeal. It observed that the authorities had already been aware of the applicant\u2019s conversion in the original proceeding leading to the decision to expel him. Therefore, the conversion could not be considered as a \u201cnew circumstance\u201d. The fact that the applicant had previously chosen not to rely on his conversion as a ground for asylum did not change the court\u2019s assessment in this regard. 36.  The applicant\u2019s request for leave to appeal was refused by the Migration Court of Appeal on 22 November 2011. 37.  Since under Chapter 12, section 22 of the Aliens Act, the validity of a deportation order expires four years after the date on which it acquired legal force, in the present case the deportation at issue expired on 8 June 2015.", "references": ["2", "9", "6", "4", "5", "8", "7", "3", "No Label", "0", "1"], "gold": ["0", "1"]}
+{"input": "9.  The applicant was born in 1992 and lives in Novosibirsk. 10.  At some point before September 2004, the applicant\u2019s parents were deprived of their parental responsibility and the applicant was placed in a local orphanage until his grandfather was assigned as his guardian in October 2004 and the applicant was placed with him. On 28 February 2005 the grandfather\u2019s guardianship was revoked but he was reinstated as guardian at the beginning of 2006. 11.  From 2002 to 2005, the applicant allegedly committed offences prohibited by the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, including disorderly acts, aggravated robbery and extortion, alone or in a group of minors. Since he was under the age of criminal responsibility, no criminal proceedings were instituted against him but he was the subject of five pre-investigation inquiries and placed under the supervision of the Juveniles Inspectorate within the Department of the Interior of the Sovetskiy District of Novosibirsk (hereafter \u201cthe Juveniles Inspectorate\u201d). Moreover, following the fourth inquiry, he was placed in a temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders on 21 September 2004 for thirty days. 12.  According to the applicant\u2019s medical records, he suffered from an attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (a mental and neurobehavioural disorder characterised by either substantial attention difficulties, or hyperactivity and impulsiveness, or a combination of the two; hereafter \u201cADHD\u201d) and a neurogenic bladder causing enuresis (a disorder involving urinary incontinence). 13.  On 27 December 2004 and 19 January 2005 he was examined by a neurologist and a psychiatrist. He was prescribed medication, regular supervision by a neurologist and a psychiatrist and regular psychological counselling. 14.  On 3 January 2005 the applicant, who at that time was twelve years old, was at the home of his nine-year old neighbour S. when his mother, Ms S., called the police, who came and took the applicant to the police station of the Sovetskiy District of Novosibirsk. He was not informed of the reasons for his arrest. 15.  According to the applicant, he was put in a cell that had no windows and the lights in the cell were turned off. After he had spent about an hour in the dark, he was questioned by a police officer. The police officer told him that S. had accused him of extortion. He urged the applicant to confess, saying that if he did so he would be immediately released, whereas if he refused he would be placed in custody. The applicant signed a confession statement. The police officer then immediately telephoned the applicant\u2019s grandfather to tell him that the applicant was at the police station and could be taken home. When his grandfather arrived at the police station, the applicant retracted his confession and protested his innocence. 16.  The Government disputed the applicant\u2019s account of the events at the police station. They submitted that the applicant had been asked to give an \u201cexplanation\u201d rather than being formally questioned, that he had been interviewed by a police officer who had pedagogical training, and that he had been apprised of his right to remain silent. He had not been subjected to any pressure or intimidation. His grandfather had been present during the interview. 17.  On the same day the applicant\u2019s grandfather signed a written statement describing the applicant\u2019s character and way of life. He stated that two days earlier he had seen the applicant in possession of some money. When asked where the money had come from, the applicant had said that he had got it from his father. 18.  S. and his mother were also heard by the police about the incident and they claimed that on two occasions, on 27 December 2004 and 3 January 2005, the applicant had extorted 1,000 roubles (RUB) from S., threatening him with violence if he did not hand over the money. 19.  On 12 January 2005 the Juveniles Inspectorate refused to institute criminal proceedings against the applicant. Relying on the applicant\u2019s confession and the statements of S. and S.\u2019s mother, it found it to be established that on 27 December 2004 and 3 January 2005 the applicant had extorted money from S. His actions therefore contained elements of the criminal offence of extortion, punishable under Article 163 of the Criminal Code. However, given that the applicant was below the statutory age of criminal responsibility he could not be prosecuted for his actions. 20.  On 3 February 2005 the applicant\u2019s grandfather complained to the Prosecutor\u2019s Office of the Sovetskiy District of Novosibirsk that the applicant, a minor suffering from a psychological disorder, had been intimidated and then questioned in the absence of his guardian and that his confession had been obtained under duress. The grandfather requested that the confession statement be declared inadmissible as evidence and that the pre-investigation inquiry be closed on account of lack of evidence of an offence, rather than the applicant\u2019s age. 21.  On 8 June 2005 the Prosecutor\u2019s Office of the Sovetskiy District of Novosibirsk quashed the decision of 12 January 2005, finding that the pre\u2011investigation inquiry had been incomplete. It ordered a further pre-investigation inquiry. 22.  On 6 July 2005 the Juveniles Inspectorate again refused to institute criminal proceedings against the applicant, for the same reasons as before. 23.  During the following months the applicant\u2019s grandfather lodged several complaints with prosecutors\u2019 offices of various levels, asking for a fresh examination of the case against the applicant. He complained that the applicant\u2019s confession had been obtained as a result of intimidation by the police; in particular, he had been placed in a dark cell for an hour and he had then been questioned by a police officer in the absence of a guardian, psychologist or teacher. The police officer had coerced the applicant into signing the confession statement without the benefit of legal advice. He had then issued a decision refusing to institute criminal proceedings on the ground that the applicant had not reached the statutory age of criminal responsibility, while stating at the same time that the applicant\u2019s involvement in extortion had been established. 24.  By letters of 4 August, 9 November and 16 December 2005 the Prosecutor\u2019s Office of the Sovetskiy District of Novosibirsk and the Prosecutor\u2019s Office of the Novosibirsk Region replied that no criminal proceedings had been instituted against the applicant on grounds of his age. He therefore did not have the status of a suspect or a defendant. On 3 January 2005 he had been asked to give an \u201cexplanation\u201d rather than questioned by the police. In those circumstances the participation of a lawyer, psychologist or teacher had not been mandatory. There was no evidence that the applicant had been held in a dark cell before the interview and he had had to wait no more than ten minutes for an officer from the Juveniles Inspectorate to arrive and interview him. That the applicant had committed extortion had been established on the basis of the statements of S. and S.\u2019s mother and the applicant\u2019s admission of guilt during the interview of 3 January 2005. 25.  On 10 February 2005 the Head of the Sovetskiy District Police Department of Novosibirsk asked the Sovetskiy District Court of Novosibirsk to order the applicant\u2019s placement in a temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders. 26.  On 21 February 2005 the Sovetskiy District Court held a hearing at which the applicant and his grandfather attended and submitted medical certificates confirming that the applicant suffered from a psychological disorder and enuresis. 27.  On the same day the court delivered its judgment in which it ordered the applicant\u2019s placement in the temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders for thirty days. It held as follows:\n\u201cThe Head of the Sovetskiy District Police Department of Novosibirsk has applied to the court with a request to place [the applicant], who has been registered with the [Juveniles] Inspectorate as a delinquent minor since 4 January 2002, in the temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders for thirty days.\nOn 14 May 2003 [the applicant] committed an offence proscribed by Article 161 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. A criminal case was not opened because he had not reached the age of criminal responsibility.\nOn 24 July 2003 [the applicant] again committed an offence proscribed by Article 213 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. A criminal case was not opened because he had not reached the age of criminal responsibility.\nOn 27 August 2004 [the applicant] again committed a criminal offence under Article 161 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. A criminal case was not opened because he had not reached the age of criminal responsibility. [The applicant] was placed in the temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders for thirty days.\nThe minor lives in unfavourable family conditions in which his grandfather is responsible for his upbringing in so far as possible; [the applicant\u2019s] parents are alcoholics and have a negative influence on their son. Before [the grandfather] was given guardianship status, [the applicant] had lived in an orphanage and studied in school no. 61. At the material time he studied in school no. 163, often played truant from school, and stopped attending school entirely from December onwards. Given that the requisite control over him is absent, the minor spends the major part of his day on the streets, committing socially dangerous offences.\nOn 27 December 2004 [the applicant] committed another offence proscribed by Article 163 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation; a criminal case was not opened because he had not reached the age of criminal responsibility.\nTaking the above-mentioned circumstances into account, [the Head of the Police Department] considers it necessary to place [the applicant] in the temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders for a period of thirty days to prevent his further unlawful actions.\nThe representative of the Juveniles Inspectorate supported the request made by the Head of the Police Department and explained that [the applicant\u2019s] guardian had requested in writing that his guardianship rights be lifted and the [Inspectorate] had accepted that request.\n[The applicant] refused to provide any explanations.\nThe [applicant\u2019s] representative [the grandfather] objected to [the applicant\u2019s] placement in the temporary detention centre, having noted that [the applicant] had not committed a criminal offence on 27 December 2004 as he had been with [the grandfather] at a doctor\u2019s surgery for an examination at that time.\nThe lawyer, Ms [R.], asked the court to dismiss the request of the Head of the Police Department.\nThe prosecutor asked the court to accept the request and to place [the applicant] in the temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders, taking into account that the documents presented by [the applicant\u2019s] guardian did not confirm that [the applicant] had been at a doctor\u2019s surgery on 27 December 2004 at 1 p.m. or that he had been unable to commit the criminal offence, particularly taking into account the [applicant\u2019s] personality and the fact that he had already committed a number of offences.\nHaving heard the parties to the proceedings and having examined the materials submitted by them, the court considers that the request must be allowed for the following reasons: [the applicant] is registered in the database of [the Juvenile Department of the police]; he was previously placed in the [temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders] for behaviour correction but did not draw the proper conclusions and committed further delinquent acts; the preventive measures put in place by the [Juveniles] Inspectorate and by the guardian have not produced results, which shows that [the applicant] has not learnt his lesson. [The applicant] must be placed in the [temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders] for thirty days for behaviour correction.\nThe case-file materials examined by the court confirm that [the applicant] committed a socially dangerous offence: a complaint by Ms [S.] shows that on 27 December 2004, at approximately 1 p.m., [the applicant] extorted 1,000 roubles from her son [S.] in a yard; he accompanied those actions with threats of violence. On 3 January 2005 [the applicant] again came to their house and again extorted 1,000 roubles from her son, having again threatened the son with violence. Explanations by [S.] indicate that on 27 December 2004, at approximately 1 p.m., [the applicant] told [S.] to give him 1,000 roubles in a yard; he accompanied those actions with threats of violence and [S.] gave him the money. On 3 January 2005 [the applicant] again came to their house and requested 1,000 roubles from [S.], having again threatened him with violence. [S.] complained to his mother, who called the police.\nThe court takes into account that those circumstances are corroborated by the statement made by [the applicant], who did not deny that he had received money from [S.] on 27 December 2004 as the latter had been afraid of the applicant. [The applicant] also did not deny that he had come to [S.\u2019s] house on 3 January 2005. A criminal case in respect of the events on 27 December 2004 and 3 January 2005 was not opened as the applicant had not reached the age of criminal responsibility.\nHaving taken these circumstances into account, the court finds unsubstantiated and far-fetched the explanations by the applicant\u2019s guardian that [the applicant] did not commit the offences on 27 December 2004 and 3 January 2005.\nHaving regard to the above-mentioned facts and ruling under section 22(2)(4) of the Minors Act, the court grants the request of the Head of the Police Department and decides to place the applicant in the temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders for thirty days.\u201d 28.  On 21 February 2005 the applicant was placed in the Novosibirsk temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders, where he remained until 23 March 2005. 29.  According to the applicant, he had shared his bedroom in the centre with seven other inmates. The lights were kept on all night. 30.  During the day inmates were forbidden to lie on their beds or to enter the bedroom. They had to spend the whole day in a large empty room which had no furniture or sports equipment. On a few occasions they were given a chess set and other board games. They were allowed to go out into the yard only twice during the applicant\u2019s thirty-day stay in the centre. 31.  Inmates had classes twice a week for about three hours. They had mathematics and Russian grammar classes only. They were not taught any other courses from the officially approved secondary school curriculum. About twenty children of different ages and school levels were taught together in one class. 32.  The supervisors applied collective punishment to the inmates. If one of them committed a breach of the centre\u2019s strict regime, all inmates were forced to stand in line against the wall without moving, talking or being allowed to sit down. Given that many inmates were psychologically unstable and unruly, because of their socially disadvantaged background, such punishment was applied every day and often lasted for hours. 33.  Inmates were not allowed to leave the room where they were assembled. They had to ask for the supervisor\u2019s permission to go to the toilet and were accompanied there in groups of three. They therefore had to wait until such a group was formed before being able to go to the toilet. Given that the applicant suffered from enuresis, the fact that he could not go to the toilet as often as he needed caused him bladder pain and psychological suffering. If his requests for permission to go to the toilet became too frequent, the supervisors punished him by making him do particularly arduous cleaning work. 34.  Although the applicant\u2019s grandfather had informed the staff of the centre about the applicant\u2019s enuresis and his attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, the applicant did not receive any treatment. 35.  According to the Government, each bedroom in the temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders measured seventeen square metres and was equipped with four beds. Access to the bathrooms and toilets situated on each floor was not limited. 36.  The centre had a dining room where meals were served five times a day. There was also a games room and a sports room. Audio and video equipment, educational games and fictional works were available. 37.  The supervisors carried out \u201cpreventive work\u201d with each inmate of the centre and could apply incentive measures or punitive measures in the form of oral reprimands. Corporal punishment was not used; nor were juvenile inmates ever required to do hard or dirty work. 38.  The centre\u2019s medical unit had all the necessary equipment and medicine. It could be seen from the staff list of the centre submitted by the Government that the medical unit was staffed by a paediatrician, two nurses and a psychologist. According to the Government, each child was examined by the paediatrician on his admission and every day thereafter. Treatment was prescribed when necessary. It could be seen from the temporary detention centre\u2019s \u201caccounting and statistical record\u201d concerning the applicant that he had not informed the doctor about his enuresis. 39.  The applicant\u2019s personal file, containing, in particular, the information about his medical condition on admission, the preventive work carried out and the punishment applied to him, had been destroyed on 17 January 2008 after the expiry of the statutory time-limit on storage, in accordance with Order no. 215 of the Ministry of the Interior of 2 April 2004 (see paragraph 73 below). However, the Government stated that the applicant\u2019s \u201caccounting and statistical record\u201d, referred to above, had been retained since its storage period was unlimited in accordance with Order no. 215 (see paragraph 74 below). 40.  According to the Government, the applicant\u2019s other medical records and logbooks at the temporary detention centre had been destroyed as soon as they had become unnecessary, without any records being compiled in this respect. This had been possible because there had been no regulations on storing such documents until Order no. 340 of the Ministry of the Interior had entered into force on 12 May 2006 (which provided that medical records were to be stored for three years). 41.  However, the Government submitted a written statement by a supervisor at the detention centre dated 23 December 2010. She confirmed the Government\u2019s description of the conditions of detention in the centre. She also stated that one of the supervisors was always present in the room where the inmates were gathered, which ensured continuity of the educational process. Teachers from the neighbouring school regularly came to the centre so that the inmates could follow the secondary-school curriculum. After their release from the centre, they received an education progress record. She stated that she did not remember the applicant but asserted that she had not received any requests or complaints from him or from any other inmate. 42.  The Government also submitted a copy of an agreement of 1 September 2004 between the detention centre and secondary school no. 15 according to which the school undertook to organise secondary-school courses in the centre in accordance with a curriculum developed by the centre. A copy of an undated two-week curriculum was produced by the Government. It included four classes per day on Tuesdays, Thursdays and Fridays. 43.  On 23 March 2005 the applicant was released from the detention centre. On the following day he was taken to hospital, where he received treatment for neurosis and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. He remained at the hospital until at least 21 April 2005. 44.  On 31 August 2005 the applicant was placed in an orphanage and, according to an extract from the applicant\u2019s medical record drawn up at the orphanage, he was on the run between 14 September and 11 October 2005 and again between 13 and 23 October 2005. 45.  On 1 November 2005 he was transferred to a children\u2019s psychiatric hospital, where he remained until 27 December 2005. At some point after this, he was returned to his grandfather who had been reinstated as his guardian. 46.  On 4 October 2005 the applicant\u2019s grandfather complained to the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office that the applicant, who suffered from a mental disorder, had not received any medical treatment in the temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders, which had caused a deterioration in his condition; nor had he been provided with any educational courses. He reiterated his complaints to the prosecution authorities in a letter dated 30 November 2005. While the Prosecutor\u2019s Office of the Sovetskiy District of Novosibirsk sent a reply to the applicant\u2019s grandfather on 9 November 2005 and the Prosecutor\u2019s Office of the Novosibirsk Region sent a reply on 16 December 2005, both of these dealt exclusively with the procedural issues related to the applicant\u2019s case (see paragraph 24 above) and did not contain any answer to the grandfather\u2019s complaints in so far as they related to the applicant\u2019s health and the conditions of detention. 47.  Meanwhile, on 2 March 2005, the applicant\u2019s grandfather appealed against the detention order of 21 February 2005. He submitted, firstly, that the detention was unlawful because the Minors Act did not permit detention for \u201cbehaviour correction\u201d. Secondly, he complained that he had not been informed of the decision of 12 January 2005 refusing to institute criminal proceedings against the applicant and had therefore been deprived of an opportunity to appeal against it. He further submitted that the court\u2019s finding that the applicant had committed an offence had been based on the statements of S. and his mother and the applicant\u2019s confession statement. However, the applicant had made his confession statement in the absence of his guardian. Nor had a teacher been present. No teacher had been present during the questioning of S. either. Their statements were therefore inadmissible as evidence. Moreover, S. and his mother had not attended the court hearing and had not been heard by the court. Nor had the court verified the applicant\u2019s alibi. Lastly, the applicant\u2019s grandfather complained that the court had not taken into account the applicant\u2019s frail health and had not verified whether his medical condition was compatible with detention. 48.  On 21 March 2005 the Novosibirsk Regional Court quashed the detention order of 21 February 2005 on appeal. It found that behaviour correction was not among the grounds listed in section 22(2)(4) of the Minors Act for placing a minor in a temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders. Detention for behaviour correction therefore had no basis in domestic law. Moreover, the District Court had not stated reasons why it considered it necessary to detain the applicant. The mere fact that the applicant had committed an offence for which he was not liable to prosecution because of his age could not justify his detention. Such detention would be permissible only if one of the additional conditions listed in section 22(2)(4) of the Minors Act (see paragraph 66 below) was met. The Regional Court remitted the case to the District Court for fresh examination. 49.  On 11 April 2005 the Sovetskiy District Court discontinued the proceedings because the Head of the Sovetskiy District Police Department of Novosibirsk had withdrawn his request for the placement of the applicant in the temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders. The applicant and his grandfather were not informed of the date of the hearing. 50.  On 22 March 2006 the applicant\u2019s grandfather lodged an application for supervisory review of the decision of 11 April 2005. He complained that as a result of the discontinuation of the proceedings the applicant had been deprived of an opportunity to prove his innocence in respect of the offence for which he had already unlawfully served a term of detention in the temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders. 51.  On 3 April 2006 the President of the Novosibirsk Regional Court quashed the decision of 11 April 2005. He found, firstly, that, in accordance with section 31.2(3) of the Minors Act, a judge examining a request for the placement of a minor in a temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders had the power either to grant or to reject the request. He had no power to discontinue the proceedings. Secondly, the applicant and his guardian had not been informed of the date of the hearing and had therefore been deprived of an opportunity to make submissions on the issue of the discontinuation of the proceedings. 52.  On 17 April 2006 the Prosecutor of the Novosibirsk Region lodged an application for supervisory review of the Regional Court\u2019s decision of 21 March 2005. 53.  On 12 May 2006 the Presidium of the Novosibirsk Regional Court quashed the decision of 21 March 2005, finding that it had been adopted by an unlawful composition of judges. It remitted the case for a fresh examination on appeal. 54.  On 29 May 2006 the President of the Novosibirsk Regional Court held a fresh appeal hearing and upheld the decision of 21 February 2005 ordering the applicant\u2019s placement in the temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders. He found that the applicant had committed a delinquent act punishable under Article 163 of the Criminal Code but that no criminal proceedings had been instituted against him because he had not reached the statutory age of criminal responsibility. He belonged to a \u201cproblem family\u201d; his parents had been deprived of parental responsibility and he was cared for by his grandfather. He played truant from school and spent most of the time on the streets or in a computer club. In those circumstances, it had been necessary, in accordance with section 22(2)(4) of the Minors Act, to place him in the temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders for thirty days to prevent him from committing further delinquent acts. The fact that the District Court had referred to \u201cbehaviour correction\u201d as a ground for detention had not made the detention order of 21 February 2005 unlawful. The applicant\u2019s detention had been justified by other grounds. Nor could the detention order of 21 February 2005 be quashed on account of the applicant\u2019s frail health, given that it had already been enforced in March 2005.", "references": ["4", "0", "7", "8", "5", "6", "9", "No Label", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["1", "2", "3"]}
+{"input": "7.  The applicants are a mother and child born in 1990 and 2012 respectively. 8.  On 16 January 2012 the first applicant, who was in the fifth month of pregnancy, was detained by the police on suspicion of robbery. 9.  On 26 January 2012 the Dzerzhynskyy District Court of Kharkiv (\u201cthe Dzerzhynskyy Court\u201d) ordered her pre-trial detention as a preventive measure pending trial. 10.  On the same date she was placed in the Kharkiv SIZO. 11.  On 22 May 2012 the first applicant was taken to Kharkiv Maternity Hospital no. 7 (\u201cthe maternity hospital\u201d). 12.  On the same date she gave birth to the second applicant. He measured 49 cm and weighed 2.9 kg. 13.  Three female security officers guarded the first applicant in the hospital. According to her, they stayed on the ward at all times. The Government submitted that they had left the ward during the delivery. 14.  The first applicant alleged she had been continuously shackled to her hospital bed or to a gynaecological examination chair, the only exception being during the delivery when the shackles had been removed. It is not clear from her submissions exactly how she had been shackled; on one occasion, she submitted that after the delivery she had had her foot shackled to the bed. At the same time, she submitted that the guards had only removed the shackles from her wrists for breastfeeding. 15.  According to the Government, the first applicant was never handcuffed or shackled in the maternity hospital. 16.  On 25 May 2012 the applicants were discharged. 17.  On 12 November 2012 the first applicant wrote in a statement for the SIZO administration (see paragraphs 41 and 76) that the maternity hospital staff had treated her well, that she had not been handcuffed or shackled, and that the two female security officers who had been on her ward had been helping her take care of the baby. 18.  In December 2012 and January 2013 the prosecution authorities questioned some maternity hospital staff and the security officers who had guarded the first applicant with a view to verifying her allegations, particularly as regards her shackling (see also paragraphs 76-82 below). 19.  On 21 December 2012 the chief doctor of the maternity hospital wrote to the governor of the Kharkiv SIZO, in reply to an enquiry by the latter, to say that during her stay in the maternity hospital the first applicant had been guarded by SIZO officers at all times, that the officers in question had not been on the delivery ward, and that the first applicant had not been handcuffed or shackled during the delivery. 20.  On 24 December 2012 the chief obstetrician, Ms Ti., gave a written statement to the prosecution authorities. She submitted that the first applicant had been shackled by the wrists to the gynaecological examination chair during her examinations both in the admissions unit and later in the obstetric unit, and that it was usual practice for detainees to be shackled and guarded by three guards. 21.  Two other obstetricians, Ms F. and Ms S., and a nurse, Ms To., made similar statements. Ms F. submitted that she could not remember any details regarding the second applicant\u2019s delivery. Ms To. specified that the first applicant had not been shackled during the delivery or subsequently during breastfeeding. 22.  The chief doctor of the neonatal unit Ms Vl. also submitted that the first applicant had been shackled to a gynaecological examination chair. Furthermore, she indicated that two guards had been staying on the ward near the applicants, with a third near the door. 23.  The security officers who had guarded the first applicant denied that she had been handcuffed or shackled in hospital. 24.  The applicant\u2019s lawyer enquired with a former nurse, Ms P., about the conditions faced by women in detention during delivery, with reference to her related work experience. On 7 February 2013 Ms P. wrote to him indicating that she had indeed worked as a nurse at Donetsk Regional Childcare and Maternal Health Centre from 1996 to 2005, and that in 2004 or 2005 a detained woman had been shackled to her bed during her baby\u2019s delivery there. 25.  While the first applicant was held in several different cells in the SIZO, her application form referred only to the conditions of her detention with her baby in cell no. 408, in which she had been held from 14 March to 8 November 2012. The summary of facts below therefore only concerns that cell.\n(a)  The first applicant\u2019s account 26.  The cell, situated in a semi-basement, was cold and damp. There was no hot water and only an irregular supply of cold water. The first applicant therefore rarely had the opportunity to take a shower and bath her new-born son. She also had to store cold water in plastic bottles for her own use. She boiled water on a defective electric cooker in a kettle, which she had to borrow from the administration and which was provided to her for no longer than fifteen minutes each time. The toilet and shower were in a niche not separated from the living area. The toilet was often blocked. There was no baby changing table or cot in the cell. 27.  The first applicant was not provided with any baby hygiene products. Nor did she receive nutrition suitable to her needs. On the days of court hearings her only meal was breakfast, which consisted of bread and tea. No packed lunches were provided to her. 28.  The applicants were able to have outdoor walks of about ten minutes per day, but not every day, in a communal walking area. 29.  Lastly, one of the inmates she shared with was HIV positive.\n(b)  The Government\u2019s account 30.  Cell no. 408 was a high-comfort cell designed for pregnant women and women with children. It was located on the ground floor, measured fifty-two square metres and could accommodate up to six people. The first applicant shared it with two or sometimes three inmates. 31.  The cell had three windows measuring over eight square metres in total. There was hot and cold water, as well as a drinking water cooler with a capacity of ten litres. 32.  Furthermore, there were all the necessary furniture and facilities such as air conditioning, a refrigerator, an electric stove, a baby cot and a pram. There was also a supply of nappies and hygiene products. The toilet and shower were separated from the living area. 33.  The first applicant was provided with adequate nutrition in accordance with the applicable standards (the total energy value of her daily meals being 3,284 kilocalories). She received three hot meals per day with the exception of hearing days, when she missed lunch. She breastfed her son and refused the baby food provided by the SIZO. There were no restrictions on food or other parcels she received from her relatives. 34.  The applicants had a daily two-hour walk in a specially designated area. 35.  They never shared a cell with inmates with HIV. 36.  The Government provided four colour photographs of cell no. 408, showing a spacious and light room in a visually good state of repair. There were three large windows with sheer curtains. The cell had a washbasin. There was also a lavatory with a bidet and a shower cubicle, both separated from the living area by opaque glass doors. Also on the photographs were a wardrobe, two beds with bedside cabinets, a cot, a table with two stools, a baby stool, a shelf with some tableware, a microwave, a television and a baby changing table. 37.  Another photograph showed a walking area for detained mothers with babies, with a flowerbed and a wall with a nature mural. The first applicant and her baby were on the photograph, as well as another woman with a pram.\n(c)  Other detainees\u2019 accounts and relevant information 38.  On 1 and 2 February 2012 the local sanitary and epidemiological service inspected the SIZO in the context of an unspecified investigation. It observed that there was a special cell for women with babies, with all the essential amenities. It was noted in the report that there had been no pregnant inmates or inmates with babies in the SIZO at the time of the inspection. 39.  On 24 May 2012 the sanitary and epidemiological service also inspected the drinking water in the SIZO to check that it complied with the relevant standards. No irregularities were found. 40.  On 22 October 2012 the Kharkiv Regional Prosecutor\u2019s Office informed the Agent of the Government that there had been no complaints from the first applicant regarding the conditions of detention or the second applicant\u2019s medical care in the SIZO. 41.  On 12 November 2012 the first applicant wrote a statement giving a detailed description of her cell in the SIZO similar to that submitted by the Government (see paragraphs 30-37 above). The last paragraph also concerned her stay in the maternity hospital (see paragraph 17 above). 42.  On 13 November 2012 one of the SIZO staff wrote to the State Prisons Service to say that the first applicant\u2019s statement had been made freely. 43.  During her detention in the Kharkiv SIZO the first applicant received about thirty food parcels from her mother, often with basic foodstuffs such as bread, butter, tea, sugar and milk. 44.  The first applicant lodged numerous requests for release with the trial court dealing with her criminal case, subject to an undertaking not to abscond (dated 6 July, 6, 26 and 31 August, 3 September and 9 October 2012). She alleged, in particular, that the conditions in the SIZO were not adequate for her baby. The court rejected those requests. 45.  The applicants\u2019 case received some media coverage. For example, in November 2012 the article \u201cBaby as a victim of inhuman treatment\u201d was published online by the Kharkiv Human Rights Group. In December 2012 a television programme was broadcast, in which the first applicant and the State authorities gave accounts, particularly as regards the conditions of the applicants\u2019 detention in the SIZO. The parties did not submit to the Court a copy of the relevant article or video footage or a transcript of the television programme. 46.  On 12 December 2012 one of the detainees, Ms B., wrote a statement addressed to the head of the local department of the State Prisons Service. She submitted that in November 2012 she had been held in the same cell as the first applicant and had been satisfied with the conditions of detention there. It was noted in the statement that there had been large windows in the cell, a shower cubicle with hot and cold water and all the necessary furniture and appliances, including a refrigerator and a television. 47.  On 19 December 2012 the Kharkiv Regional Department of the State Prisons Service issued a memorandum stating that the first applicant had not submitted any complaints during her detention in the Kharkiv SIZO. 48.  The case file contains three statements by detainee Ms M. concerning the conditions of detention in the SIZO. She wrote two of them while detained there (on an unspecified date and on 25 December 2012), and a third on 30 January 2013 when she had already begun serving her prison sentence elsewhere. In the first two statements Ms M. described the conditions of her detention in cell no. 408 as quite satisfactory and comfortable. Her account was similar to that given by the Government (see paragraphs 30-32 above). The first two statements also contained critical remarks regarding the first applicant claiming, in particular, that she had displayed a careless attitude towards her baby and had acted in bad faith in applying to the Court. In her third statement, Ms M. stated that the food in the SIZO had been poor. More specifically, the bread had been stale and the meat had been tinged blue. She also submitted that there had been no hot water in cell no. 408. Lastly, she submitted that on two occasions she had witnessed the first applicant requesting medical care for her baby when he had had stomachache, but her requests had been ignored. 49.  On 28 December 2012 a former detainee, Ms Sa., wrote a statement for the first applicant\u2019s lawyer and had it certified by a notary. She stated that she had shared cell no. 408 with the first applicant from an unspecified date in March to 19 April 2012. Ms Sa. had been pregnant at the time. She described the conditions of their detention as follows. The cell was located in a semi-basement and inmates saw practically no daylight. The windows were so high that they could not be opened without the assistance of a guard. There were about seven inmates in the cell, some of them with HIV and some suffering from other illnesses. The toilet was separated from the living area by a waist-high wall and leaked. As a result, there was always a bad smell. The shower also leaked and the cubicle door was broken. It was so humid in the cell that the plaster had fallen off the ceiling and the walls were covered in mould. The cell was infested with mice and lice. There were no household appliances like a kettle or microwave. Nor were there any beds or bedside cabinets as shown by the State Prisons Service on television (see paragraph 45 above). Ms Sa. specified that in fact none of the detainees had ever been held in the cell presented by the authorities on television. There was no hot water and the pressure in the cold water taps was so low that inmates had to store water for their own use. Furthermore, the SIZO administration did not provide them with any tableware. Their daily walk lasted only twenty minutes and took place in a small walking area covered with bars. Furthermore, according to Ms Sa., the food in the SIZO was neither fresh nor tasty. Lastly, she stated that she had been shackled to her bed when undergoing some treatment in the maternity hospital in Kharkiv while pregnant. 50.  On an unspecified date Ms Ve., who had also shared cell no. 408 with the first applicant (the exact period is unknown), wrote a statement about the conditions of detention there. Her description was similar to that given by Ms Sa. as regards the leaking toilet, high humidity levels, lack of hot water and irregular supply of cold water, as well as the duration and conditions of the daily outdoor walks and poor nutrition. 51.  On 25 May 2012 the applicants were discharged from the maternity hospital. The second applicant was found to be in good health. 52.  According to a letter from its chief doctor to the first applicant\u2019s lawyer dated 12 December 2012, on 25 May 2012 the second applicant was transferred to Children\u2019s Hospital no. 19 (\u201cthe children\u2019s hospital\u201d). All the other relevant documents in the case file indicate that on 25 May 2012 both applicants were taken to the Kharkiv SIZO. 53.  As submitted by the first applicant and noted in a letter by the chief doctor of the children\u2019s hospital to the first applicant\u2019s lawyer dated 6 September 2012, a paediatrician from that hospital had examined the second applicant on 28 May 2012. The baby was found to be in good health but to have phimosis (a condition of the penis where the foreskin cannot be fully retracted). 54.  However, according to the second applicant\u2019s medical file kept by the SIZO, the first time a paediatrician of the children\u2019s hospital examined him was on 31 May 2012. He was found to be in an adaptation period and the first applicant received advice regarding childcare. 55.  According to the second applicant\u2019s medical file, on 12 June 2012 he was examined again by a paediatrician, who diagnosed him with intestinal colic and recommended Espumisan, massage, feeding on demand and outdoor walks. The doctor also suspected that the boy had a patent (open) foramen ovale (PFO; the foramen ovale allows blood circulation in the fetal heart and closes in most individuals at birth). 56.  The second applicant\u2019s next medical examination appears to have taken place on 20 July 2012. It was noted in his medical file that the paediatrician had given advice to the first applicant regarding feeding and care. 57.  The first applicant denied that any of the examinations following that on 28 May 2012 had taken place. She alleged that her baby had not been examined by a paediatrician until 10 September 2012. She submitted that the records of her son\u2019s earlier examinations in the medical file had been forged. According to her, the first page of that book referred to an examination on 10 September 2012, whereas the records of his earlier examinations had been written on separate pages and subsequently glued into the file. The case file as it stands before the Court contains a separate copy of each page of the file, which makes it impossible to verify the first applicant\u2019s allegation. 58.  On 28 August 2012 the first applicant\u2019s lawyer asked the Kharkiv SIZO administration to provide him with details of when the second applicant had been examined by a paediatrician and whether the conditions of detention had been appropriate for such a small baby. He also requested copies of the relevant documents. 59.  On 4 September 2012 the SIZO administration replied that it would be able to provide comprehensive information on the second applicant\u2019s health after a complete medical examination in the children\u2019s hospital, which was due to take place. 60.  On 31 August 2012 the first applicant asked the judge dealing with her case to order a medical examination of her son \u201cgiven that the SIZO administration [was] ignoring her requests to that effect\u201d. It appears that her request was rejected. 61.  On 6 September 2012 the chief doctor of the children\u2019s hospital wrote to the first applicant\u2019s lawyer in reply to an enquiry by him dated 5 September 2012. He said that with no paediatrician at the Kharkiv SIZO, a paediatrician from that hospital monitored babies born there. He also indicated that the second applicant had been examined by the hospital paediatrician on 28 May 2012 (see also paragraph 53 above). In so far as the lawyer enquired about the baby\u2019s medical condition at the material time, the chief doctor stated that it was impossible to provide him with such information because the first applicant had not requested any medical care for him until then. 62.  On 10 September 2012 a dermatologist, cardiologist, ear, nose and throat specialist, neurologist and paediatrician all examined the second applicant. He was found to have allergic dermatitis, dysplastic cardiomyopathy and phimosis. Furthermore, the patent foramen ovale diagnosis had been called into question (see paragraph 55 above). The doctors concluded that the second applicant did not require any medical treatment, but recommended that the mother follow a hypoallergenic diet. 63.  According to the first applicant, the examination was carried out in the context of custody proceedings initiated by the second applicant\u2019s stepfather. She specified that it had been done with her consent so that the second applicant could be taken from the SIZO, where he was not receiving adequate care. 64.  On 14 September 2012 the SIZO sent a copy of the second applicant\u2019s medical file to the applicants\u2019 representative, further to a request made by him on 28 August 2012 (see paragraph 58 above). 65.  On 18 October 2012 the chief doctor of the children\u2019s hospital wrote to the first applicant\u2019s lawyer, in reply to an enquiry made on 10 October 2012, to say that hospital was in charge of the medical supervision of children in the Kharkiv SIZO where needed, subject to the SIZO administration making the relevant application. It was also noted that the second applicant required an additional examination in the regional cardiology centre, and that the children\u2019s hospital had already requested the SIZO administration\u2019s cooperation in that regard. 66.  On 19 October 2012 a paediatrician and a cardiologist examined the second applicant again. He was diagnosed with a patent foramen ovale (a heart condition, see paragraph 55 above for further details) and an additional examination was recommended. 67.  On the same date the second applicant underwent an echocardiogram and was found to be healthy. 68.  On 14 November 2012 the first applicant refused to allow her son to undergo a paediatrician examination, which she had been offered. 69.  The following day the first applicant was released (see also paragraph 75 below). 70.  On 30 November 2012 the first applicant\u2019s lawyer enquired with the children\u2019s hospital whether it had kept a medical file in respect of the second applicant and whether he had been vaccinated during his stay with the first applicant in the SIZO. 71.  On 4 December 2012 the chief doctor replied that the children\u2019s hospital provided medical care to children residing permanently in its catchment area. As regards children residing there temporarily, a written application by one of the parents was required. The first applicant had never submitted such an application. Accordingly, the hospital had not opened a medical file in respect of the second applicant. At the same time, its doctors had examined him when requested by the SIZO administration. The results of each examination had been reflected in the medical file provided by the SIZO. In so far as the second applicant\u2019s vaccinations were concerned, it was noted that he had always been brought for examinations without his mother, and without her consent no vaccinations had been given. 72.  On 12 April, 17 May, 15 June, 2 and 31 August and 15 November 2012 the first applicant participated in court hearings, during which she was held in a metal cage. Her requests not to be placed in a cage were rejected. 73.  On 14 March 2013 the judge of the Dzerzhynskyy Court, who had been in charge of the first applicant\u2019s case, wrote to the Agent of the Government, in reply to the latter\u2019s request, to say that the first applicant had indeed been held in a metal cage in the courtroom during hearings. The judge emphasised that it was a legal requirement to place criminal defendants in a metal cage and there were no exceptions to this rule. Furthermore, he considered that allowing the first applicant to remain outside the cage in the courtroom would have been equal to her temporary release, contrary to the custodial preventive measure applied. 74.  On 15 March 2013 the Ministry of the Interior confirmed once again to the Agent of the Government that the first applicant had been held in a metal cage in the courtroom during hearings. It further specified that the second applicant had remained with the SIZO medical specialist outside the cage and had been passed to her for breastfeeding when requested. 75.  On 15 November 2012 the first applicant was released on an undertaking not to abscond. 76.  On 25 December 2012 she complained to the Kharkiv Regional Prosecutor\u2019s Office that she had been shackled to her bed in the maternity hospital at all times, including during the delivery. She also complained that the conditions of detention and nutrition in the SIZO had been inadequate. Lastly, the first applicant alleged that the statement she had written on 12 November 2012 expressing her satisfaction with the conditions of detention had been made under psychological pressure (see paragraphs 17 and 41 above). 77.  On 27 December 2012 the State Prisons Service completed the internal investigation it had undertaken following the media coverage of the applicants\u2019 case (see paragraph 45 above). The first applicant\u2019s allegations were dismissed as unsubstantiated. 78.  On 2 January 2013 the first applicant complained to the Kharkiv Zhovtnevyy District Prosecutor\u2019s Office (\u201cthe Zhovtnevyy Prosecutor\u2019s Office\u201d) that she had not been provided with adequate medical care during her pregnancy and the delivery; that she had been shackled by her wrists and feet to a gynaecological examination chair or her bed in the maternity hospital at all times, including during the delivery; that the conditions of her detention in the Kharkiv SIZO had been poor; and that neither she nor her baby had received adequate medical care there. On the same date her complaint was registered in the Integrated Register of Pre-trial Investigations and the investigation was started. 79.  On 18 January 2013 the Zhovtnevyy Prosecutor\u2019s Office ordered a forensic medical examination of the case material with a view to establishing: (i) whether the first applicant had any injuries and, if so, how they had been caused; (ii) whether there was any forensic medical evidence that the first applicant had been handcuffed or shackled between 26 January and 15 November 2012; (iii) whether there was any forensic medical evidence that the applicants had not been provided with adequate or sufficient medical care in the Kharkiv SIZO; (iv) whether there was any forensic medical evidence that the applicants had not been provided with adequate or sufficient medical care in the maternity hospital; and (v) if the applicants had not received adequate or sufficient medical care, whether this had had any negative impact on their health. 80.  The aforementioned examination continued from 18 January to 26 March 2013. The answers in the report to all five questions were negative. 81.  On 1 April 2013 the Zhovtnevyy Prosecutor\u2019s Office discontinued the criminal investigation for lack of evidence of a criminal offence. 82.  Also in April 2013 the State Prisons Service, following an enquiry by the Government\u2019s Agent, undertook an internal investigation as regards the lawfulness of the second applicant\u2019s detention in the SIZO. On 22 April 2013 it was completed, with the conclusion that there had been no violation. It was noted in the report that, although in August 2012 the first applicant had verbally expressed her intention to transfer the custody of her baby to her mother, she had later changed her mind as she had been breastfeeding.", "references": ["3", "8", "9", "4", "2", "5", "0", "6", "7", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1973 and lives in New Delhi, India. 6.  The applicant arrived in Latvia in May 1999 [in his observations, he mentions 1989 or 1992 and studies at Riga Aviation University]. He married a Latvian national on 2 July 1999. They have two daughters, born in Latvia on 19 January 1999 and 18 April 2000 respectively. 7.  In August 1999 and August 2000 the applicant was issued a temporary residence permit for one year and four years respectively on the grounds of his marriage to a Latvian national. Under the domestic law which was applicable at the material time, following the expiry of the four\u2011year period the applicant was entitled to a permanent residence permit. 8.  On 21 June 2004 the applicant\u2019s documents for the permanent residence permit were accepted. 9.  On 11 August 2004 the applicant\u2019s wife asked the Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs (Pilson\u012bbas un migr\u0101cijas lietu p\u0101rvaldes \u0100rzemnieku apkalpo\u0161anas departaments) to check the information submitted by the applicant for the permanent residence permit in relation to his employment in Latvia. 10.  On 21 September 2004 the Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs refused to grant the permanent residence permit to the applicant on the grounds that he had submitted false information and did not have sufficient financial means to stay in Latvia. 11.  According to the Government, on 30 September 2004 the applicant\u2019s wife wrote the Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs a short letter stating that \u201cmy husband ... was refused a permanent residence permit; I would like to object to this.\u201d This objection was accompanied by another letter requesting to ignore the former, as it had been drawn up under threat by the applicant. She asked for help and for the applicant to be refused leave to remain in Latvia.\nThe applicant disagreed with the allegations contained in this letter. 12.  On 13 November 2004 the Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs overturned the decision of 21 September 2004 (see above). It was concluded that the applicant had sufficient financial means and that no false information had been submitted by him. A permanent residence permit, valid until 9 July 2010, was then issued for the applicant. 13.  On 6 December 2004 the applicant\u2019s wife reported a domestic conflict to the police. According to her, on 4 and 5 December, when she had attempted to talk to the applicant about a divorce, he had allegedly tried to suffocate her and had inflicted bodily injuries on her. The applicant disagreed with his wife\u2019s version of events; he submitted to the police that he had not inflicted any bodily injuries on his wife. The cause of their conflicts had been the fact that his wife had taken their children to live in another city in Latvia. 14.  Following a forensic examination, unspecified minor injuries were found on the applicant wife\u2019s body. On 29 December 2004 the police refused to open criminal proceedings, on the ground that no offence had been committed. No appeal was lodged against that decision. 15.  Meanwhile, on 9 December 2004, the applicant\u2019s wife applied to the Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs with a view to withdrawing the applicant\u2019s permanent residence permit and expelling him from Latvia on the grounds that he presented threats to her life and health and those of their children. She mentioned her previous letters to the Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs. When the applicant had found out about them, he had asked for them to be recalled and had promised to stop the abuse he had been engaging in. She had done so. Nevertheless, when the permanent residence permit had been issued \u201cit had started all over again\u201d. The applicant had allegedly threatened to cripple her if he had to leave Latvia, and also to kill her, the children and himself.\nThe applicant denied the allegations contained in this letter. 16.  On 15 December 2004 her letter was forwarded to the Security Police (Dro\u0161\u012bbas policija) for an assessment of the applicant\u2019s character and to determine if he presented threats to national security or public order. 17.  On 10 January 2005 the Security Police informed the Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs that the applicant constituted a threat to public order and safety. 18.  On 20 January 2005 the Minister of Interior decided to include the applicant in the blacklist for an indefinite period of time, on the ground that he constituted a threat to public order and safety, and decided to refuse him entry to Latvia. This decision was not amenable to judicial review at the time. Following legislative changes (see paragraph 45 below) the persistence of the grounds for the inclusion in the blacklist could be re-examined by the Minister of Interior; the applicant attempted to avail himself of this remedy (see paragraph 21 below). 19.  On 24 March 2005 the Minister of Interior replied to the applicant\u2019s enquiry of 22 February 2005 and, having reviewed the applicant\u2019s case, concluded that the applicant could not be removed from the blacklist. 20.  On 14 April 2005 the applicant\u2019s wife applied to the Ministry of the Interior claiming that notwithstanding her previous letters expressing her wish for the applicant to leave the country their relations had improved and she wished to maintain her family and not to separate the applicant from their children. If he had to leave she and their children would probably follow him. In reply, the Minister explained that her subjective feelings towards the applicant did not imply a change in the circumstances on the basis of which the applicant had been included in the blacklist. 21.  On 25 May 2005 the applicant applied to the Minister of Interior with a view to removing the prohibition on entering Latvia. He submitted that the relationship with his spouse had improved and that she and their children did not wish him to leave Latvia. 22.  On 27 May 2005 the Security Police wrote to the Ministry of the Interior informing them that the applicant constituted a threat to public order and safety. On 31 May 2005 the Security Police informed the Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs that the applicant had been included in the list of persons prohibited from entering in Latvia, confirming their view that the applicant constituted a threat to public order and safety; there had been no change in those circumstances. In view of this, they asked the State Border Guard Service to detain and expel the applicant in accordance with section 51, paragraph 1, part 2 of the Immigration Law. 23.  On 13 June 2005 the Minister of Interior adopted decision no. 121 and refused to remove the applicant from the blacklist. The decision was sent to the applicant\u2019s address in J\u0113kabpils. In the decision, the Minister relied on the letter of 27 May 2005 informing him that the circumstances on the basis of which the applicant had been included in the blacklist had not changed. Thus the Minister could not remove the prohibition on entering Latvia. The applicant\u2019s submissions could not serve as the basis for his removal from the blacklist, since a person could not choose his country of residence under either domestic or international law. States were not obliged to respect couples\u2019 choices concerning their country of residence. Nor were there any reasons detected why the applicant\u2019s family could not join the applicant in India and enjoy their family life there. The Minister concluded that the restrictions on the applicant\u2019s right to respect for his family life were justified in the interests of public order and safety and were proportionate. As regards the procedure for appeal, a reference was made to section 76, paragraph 2 and section 188, paragraph 2 of the Administrative Procedure Law which provided for an appeal to the administrative court. 24.  The applicant did not appeal. 25.  On 1 February 2005 the Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs adopted decision no. 823 by which the applicant\u2019s permanent residence permit was withdrawn on the grounds that he had been included in the blacklist (section 36, paragraph 1, part 2 of the Immigration Law). The decision was based on the decision of 20 January 2005 (see paragraph 18 above). It was drawn up on the basis of information and documents received from the Ministry of the Interior. The decision indicated that pursuant to section 70 of the Administrative Procedure Law (see paragraph 50 below) it was to take effect upon notification to the applicant. The decision also stated that the applicant was obliged to leave the country within forty-five days. On 14 February 2005 the applicant was informed of the decision and of the fact that he was to leave the country by 26 March 2005. The applicant lodged an appeal against this decision with the Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs. 26.  On 15 March 2005 the Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal against the withdrawal of the residence permit. It found that the applicant had been lawfully included in the list of persons prohibited from entering in Latvia. Taking into account that the decision to include the applicant in the blacklist was in force and had not been declared unlawful, it was impossible for the applicant to stay in Latvia. It further considered that the contested decision complied with the rule of law, and that it was taken in the interests of national security, public order and safety and for protection of the rights of others, namely the spouse and children. It was proportionate because the protection of the interests of society in assuring national security and public order and safety in the State outweighed the individual interests of the applicant. The applicant was not heard because his views could not change the circumstances of the case, which were evidenced with proof and would not change. References were also made to the Court\u2019s case-law on immigration control, to Article 8 of the Convention under which the interference with the applicant\u2019s family life could be justified, and to the 2004 report of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) concerning Latvia. 27.  On 23 March 2005 the applicant\u2019s appeal against the decision to withdraw his permanent residence permit was allowed by the Administrative District Court. 28.  On 12 April 2005 the Administrative District Court forwarded to the applicant\u2019s address in J\u0113kabpils the written submissions of the Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs in his case. The applicant was asked to indicate by 2 May 2005 if he would agree for the court to examine his case in written proceedings (rakstveida proced\u016bra). Since he did not reply, the court could not examine the case without a hearing. 29.  Following four hearings (on 19 December 2006, 16 January and 12 June 2007, and 5 August 2008), the case was left without determination on the grounds that the applicant had failed to appear before the court. This decision took effect on 16 August 2008. All the court correspondence was sent to the applicant\u2019s address in India. His wife was invited as a third party to the proceedings. 30.  Meanwhile, on 7 June 2005 the applicant was detained by State Border Guard Service officials under section 51, paragraph 1, part 2 of the Immigration Law on the ground that he constituted a threat to national security or public order and safety. The detention record also stated that by a decision of the Minister of Interior the applicant had been included in the blacklist, and that on 14 February 2005 his permanent residence permit had been withdrawn. The applicant signed the detention record and he was placed in a short-term detention facility in J\u0113kabpils, where he stayed until 17 June 2005. 31.  The applicant lodged a complaint with a prosecutor, arguing that he had been unlawfully detained on the grounds of lack of a valid residence permit. On 14 June 2005 a prosecutor replied that the applicant\u2019s detention was lawful and had been ordered on national security or public safety and order grounds. He could be detained for ten days on these grounds, following which a court order was necessary for continued detention. It was noted that on 31 May 2005 the Security Police had informed the State Border Guard Service that the applicant had been included in the blacklist. Finally, it was noted that the applicant\u2019s detention as such did not automatically entail his expulsion. An expulsion order should be issued within ten days of the applicant\u2019s detention. The applicant was informed that he could lodge an appeal against this reply with a superior prosecutor. 32.  On 13 June 2005 the J\u0113kabpils branch of the Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs adopted an expulsion order, no. 23-7 (l\u0113mums par \u0101rzemnieka piespiedu izraid\u012b\u0161anu) under section 47, paragraph 1, part 2 of the Immigration Law, on the grounds that the applicant had been detained by the State Border Guard Service in Latvian territory. He was informed that he would be excluded from Latvian territory for a five-year period. The decision took effect the same day, when it was notified to the applicant. On 14 June 2005 the applicant lodged an appeal against the expulsion order with the Head of the Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs. 33.  On 16 June 2005, following a closed hearing, a judge of the J\u0113kabpils District Court authorised the applicant\u2019s detention for two more months. The judge heard the applicant and decided that he was to be transferred to an accommodation centre for foreign detainees in Olaine. He could not yet be expelled because he had lodged an appeal against order no. 23-7, and thus the judge considered that it was necessary to extend his detention. No appeal against the decision was lodged. 34.  On 17 June 2005 the applicant was transferred to an accommodation centre for foreign detainees in Olaine. 35.  On 30 June 2005 the Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs adopted a decision under section 61, paragraph 4, part 3 of the Immigration Law (see paragraph 46 below), including the applicant in the list of persons prohibited from entering in Latvia until 13 June 2010. The applicant did not lodge an appeal against this decision with the administrative courts. 36.  On 11 July 2005 the Head of the Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal against the expulsion order (see paragraph 32 above). The decision stated that it came into effect pursuant to section 70 of the Administrative Procedure Law and could be amenable to judicial review by the administrative court within one month of its coming into effect. 37.  On 13 July 2005 this decision was sent to the accommodation centre for foreign detainees in Olaine. It was not served on the applicant because meanwhile, on 12 July 2005, the applicant had been expelled from Latvia to India. 38.  Upon the applicant\u2019s request, on 30 March 2011 the Minister of Interior adopted decision no. 26 entitled \u201cRemoval of prohibition on entering the Republic of Latvia\u201d. On the basis of information received from the State Police and the Security Police and section 64, paragraph 1, part 1 of the Immigration Law the Minister decided to remove the applicant from the blacklist. The decision took effect immediately. 39.  On 29 April 2011, in response to an email from the applicant, the Ministry of the Interior explained that he had been included in the blacklist on the basis of decision no. 72 of 20 January 2005 and that he could not appeal against the decision, but he could ask the competent authority to review that decision (reference was made to paragraph 7 of the transitional provisions of the Immigration Law). They also informed him that according to the Immigration Law the reasons for the applicant\u2019s inclusion in the list could not be disclosed. Having received the applicant\u2019s request for a review of the decision, the Ministry of the Interior had made enquiries with the State Police and the Security Police. They had received answers that threats under section 61, paragraph 1 of the Immigration Law were not present. Accordingly, the above decision was adopted. Lastly, in response to the applicant\u2019s question whether he could now enter Latvia or receive a permanent residence permit, reference was made to the Immigration Law and the procedure established therein.", "references": ["5", "3", "9", "4", "7", "1", "6", "0", "8", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1983 and lives in Tula. 5.  On 9 March 2009 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of a flagrant breach of public peace and order, committed in concert by an organised group. The events in question took place in December 2008. 6.  On 10 March 2009 the Taganskiy District Court of Moscow remanded the applicant in custody during the investigation. In particular, the court noted as follows:\n\u201cWhen deciding whether a preventive measure should be imposed, the court takes into consideration whether [the applicant] has been charged with a serious offence which entails a custodial sentence of up to seven years\u2019 imprisonment. [The offence in question] was committed against public peace and public order.\nFurther, the court takes into consideration the fact that, at the time of the arrest, [the applicant] did not reside in Moscow, did not reside at his registered address and, according to him, was staying at his friend\u2019s place in the Moscow Region; and that he had applied for two years\u2019 leave of absence from his studies at university. During that period he did not have a permanent place of residence and did not reside at his registered address. [The applicant] is not employed. The source of his income or means of subsistence for his family are not known. Earlier [the applicant] was found liable for administrative offences against public order and public safety.\nThe court also takes into consideration the motive for and the specific circumstances of the offence with which [the applicant] has been charged. The perpetrators used improvised weapons and acted in an organised group during the late hours of the day.\nRegard being had to the circumstances described above, the court concludes that, if at large, [the applicant] may abscond or otherwise interfere with the administration of justice by, inter alia, putting pressure on [witnesses].\u201d 7.  On an unspecified date the applicant lodged an appeal against the decision of 10 March 2009. He argued that the District Court had failed to justify its decision to remand him in custody and had not considered the possibility of using a less restrictive preventive measure in his case. He further noted that there was no evidence that he had ever tried to put pressure on witnesses, to interfere with the administration of justice or to abscond. Lastly, he pointed out that he was residing at the address known to the authorities together with his wife, who was pregnant. 8.  On 30 March 2009 the Moscow City Court found the decision of 10 March 2009 justified and upheld it on appeal. 9.  On 27 April 2009 the District Court extended the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention until 15 June 2009. The court reasoned as follows:\n\u201cAs can be seen from the materials submitted to the court, [the applicant] is charged with a serious offence which carries a custodial sentence of up to seven years. The crime was committed in concert with other persons. Some of them have not been identified by the investigating authorities to date. The others have been arrested. [The applicant] was not residing at his registered address. He does not have a registered address in the Moscow Region. He is unemployed.\nUnder Article 97 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a preventive measure can be imposed if there is evidence that a defendant might abscond or interfere with the administration of justice in his case. Neither [the applicant] nor his lawyer presented evidence to show that the existence of such a risk could not be justified. Furthermore, it can be seen from the documents submitted to the court that there is a risk that [the applicant] might engage in unlawful acts as defined in the above-mentioned provision of the law, regard being had to the nature and seriousness of the offence with which he is charged, to the circumstances of the case and of his arrest, and to his character\n...\nAccordingly, the court concludes that the circumstances justifying the [applicant\u2019s] remand in custody have not changed. There is no reason to change or lift the preventive measure imposed earlier. The statements of guarantee submitted by the [applicant\u2019s] lawyer cannot be taken into consideration by the court because they were not submitted to the investigator or presented by the signatories in person. ... Some of the statements are not duly authorised and the court has doubts as to their authenticity.\u201d 10.  On 18 May 2009 the City Court upheld the decision of 27 April 2009 on appeal. 11.  On 29 May 2009 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow scheduled the trial for 10 June 2009. The applicant argued against the extension of his pre-trial detention. He submitted that he was a student, that he was married and that his wife was pregnant. He further pointed out that the investigation in the case had already been completed and that he could not interfere with the administration of justice or put pressure on witnesses. He had no intention of doing so or of absconding. The court ruled that the applicant should remain in custody pending trial. In particular, the court stated as follows:\n\u201cHaving examined the prosecutor\u2019s request to detain [the applicant and two other defendants] pending trial, the court grants it. It discerns no grounds on which to change the preventive measure imposed on the defendants, regard being had to the seriousness of the charges, the factual circumstances and the defendants\u2019 character. In particular, G. and [the applicant] do not have a registered address in Moscow or the Moscow Region. They were not living at their registered address. They are unemployed. The circumstances underlying their remand in custody have not ceased to exist or changed. The fact that the investigation in the criminal case has been completed has no effect to the contrary.\nRegard being had to the foregoing, the court discerns no grounds on which to change the preventive measure imposed earlier on the defendants and apply a less restrictive measure, including the [applicant\u2019s] release upon a statement of guarantee signed by a surety.\u201d 12.  On 24 June 2009 the applicant asked the District Court for release. He submitted that on 16 June 2009 his wife had given birth to their child. He also relied on the statements of guarantee submitted by his sureties. The court dismissed the applicant\u2019s request noting as follows:\n\u201c... the court considers that the request cannot be granted. The court discerns no circumstances that would allow it to change the preventive measure imposed on [the applicant], regard being had to the seriousness of the charges, the factual circumstances and his character. In particular, [the applicant] does not have a registered address in Moscow or the Moscow Region. He is unemployed. Nor was [he] residing at his registered address. The reasons justifying the [applicant\u2019s] remand in custody have not ceased to exist or changed. ... the birth of his child has no effect to the contrary and cannot justify the decision to replace [pre-trial detention] with a less restrictive measure, including the [applicant\u2019s] release upon a statement of guarantee signed by a surety.\u201d 13.  On 22 July 2009 the City Court upheld the decision of 29 May 2009 on appeal. 14.  On 28 October 2009 the District Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to four years\u2019 imprisonment. 15.  On 22 December 2009 the City Court upheld, in substance, the applicant\u2019s conviction on appeal.", "references": ["9", "7", "3", "8", "1", "5", "4", "0", "6", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "8.  The applicant is a journalist by profession. On 15 October 2003 he published an article in the weekly magazine L\u2019Illustr\u00e9 entitled \u201cTragedy on the Lausanne Bridge \u2013 the reckless driver\u2019s version \u2013 Questioning of the mad driver\u201d (\u201cDrame du Grand-Pont \u00e0 Lausanne \u2013 la version du chauffard \u2013 l\u2019interrogatoire du conducteur fou\u201d). The article in question concerned a set of criminal proceedings against M.B., a motorist who had been remanded in custody after an incident on 8 July 2003 in which he had rammed his car into pedestrians, before throwing himself off the Lausanne Bridge (Grand-Pont). The incident, in which three people had died and eight others had been injured, had caused much emotion and controversy in Switzerland. The article began as follows:\n\u201cSurname: B. First name: M. Born on 1 January 1966 in Tamanrasset (Algeria), son of B.B. and F.I., resident in Lausanne, holder of a category C licence, spouse of M.B. Profession: nursing assistant ... It is 8.15 p.m. on Tuesday 8 July 2003, in the austere premises of the Lausanne criminal investigation department. Six hours after his tragic headlong race along the Lausanne Bridge, resulting in three deaths and eight casualties, this reckless driver is alone for the first time, facing three investigators. Will he own up? In fact he doesn\u2019t actually seem to realise what is happening, as if oblivious to the events and all the hubbub around him. The man who upset the whole of Lausanne this fine summer day is not very talkative. This Algerian citizen is withdrawn, introverted, inscrutable, indeed completely impenetrable. And yet the questions are flying from all sides. What were the reasons for this \u2018accident\u2019, one of the policemen rather clumsily writes, as if he had already formed his opinion. Four words in reply: \u2018I do not know\u2019.\u201d 9.  The article continued with a summary of the questions put by the police officers and the investigating judge and M.B.\u2019s replies. It also mentioned that M.B. had been \u201ccharged with premeditated murder (assassinat) and, in the alternative, with murder (meurtre), grievous bodily harm, endangering life and serious traffic offences\u201d, and that he \u201cappear[ed] to show no remorse\u201d. The article was accompanied by several photographs of letters which M.B. had sent to the investigating judge. It ended with the following paragraph:\n\u201cFrom his prison cell, M.B. now spends his time sending letters to the investigating judge ...: on being taken into custody he asked for his watch to be returned and requested a cup for his coffee, some dried fruit and chocolate. On 11 July, three days after the events, he even asked to be temporarily released for \u2018a few days\u2019. \u2018I would like to phone my big brother in Algeria\u2019, he subsequently begged. He finally announced on 11 August that he had come to a \u2018final decision\u2019: he dismissed his lawyer, Mr M.B., on grounds of \u2018lack of trust\u2019. Two days later, another letter: could the judge send him \u2018the directory of the Bar Association of the Canton of Vaud\u2019 to help him find a different defence lawyer? However, with all the recurrent lies and omissions, the mixture of naivety and arrogance, amnesia and sheer madness characterising all these statements, surely M.B. is doing everything in his power to make himself impossible to defend?\u201d 10.  The article also included a brief summary entitled \u201cHe lost his marbles...\u201d (\u201cIl a perdu la boule...\u201d), and statements from M.B.\u2019s wife and from his doctor. 11.  It appears from the file that the applicant\u2019s article was not the only piece to have been published on the Lausanne Bridge tragedy. The authorities responsible for the criminal investigation had themselves decided to inform the press about certain aspects of the investigation, which had led to the publication of an article in the Tribune de Gen\u00e8ve on 14 August 2003. 12.  M.B. did not lodge a complaint against the applicant. However, criminal proceedings were brought against the applicant on the initiative of the public prosecutor for having published secret documents. It emerged from the investigation that one of the parties claiming damages in the proceedings against M.B. had photocopied the case file and lost one of the copies in a shopping centre. An unknown person had then brought the copy to the offices of the magazine which had published the impugned article. 13.  By an order of 23 June 2004 the Lausanne investigating judge sentenced the applicant to one month\u2019s imprisonment, suspended for one year. 14.  Following an application by the applicant to have the decision set aside, the Lausanne Police Court, by a judgment of 22 September 2005, replaced the prison sentence with a fine of 4,000 Swiss francs (CHF) (approximately 2,667 euros (EUR)). At the hearing on 13 May 2015, in reply to a question from the Court, the applicant\u2019s representative stated that the sum of CHF 4,000 had been advanced by his client\u2019s employer and that his client was intending to refund it after the proceedings before the Court. He also confirmed that the amount set by the criminal court had taken account of the applicant\u2019s previous record. 15.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. His appeal was dismissed on 30 January 2006 by the Criminal Court of Cassation of the Canton of Vaud. 16.  The applicant lodged a public-law appeal and an appeal on grounds of nullity with the Federal Court, which on 29 April 2008 dismissed the appeals. Its decision was served on the applicant on 9 May 2008. The relevant passages from the decision are as follows:\n\u201c7.  In short, the appellant submits that his conviction for a breach of Article 293 of the Criminal Code is contrary to federal law. He does not challenge the fact that the information which he published falls within the ambit of Article 293 of the Criminal Code. He does, on the other hand, submit, under an interpretation of Articles 293 and 32 of the Criminal Code in the light of the principles inferred from Article 10 ECHR by the European Court of Human Rights, that having received that information in good faith without obtaining it unlawfully, he had the duty as a professional journalist, under Article 32 of the Criminal Code, to publish it owing to what he sees as the obvious interest of the so-called \u2018Lausanne Bridge\u2019 case to the general public in French-speaking Switzerland. 7.1.  In accordance with Article 293 of the Criminal Code (Publication of secret official deliberations), anyone who, without being entitled to do so, makes public all or part of the documents, investigations or deliberations of an authority which are secret by law or by virtue of a decision taken by that authority, acting within its powers, will be punished by a fine (paragraph 1). Complicity in such acts is also punishable (see paragraph 2). The court may decide not to impose any penalties if the secret thus made public is of minor importance (see paragraph 3).\nAccording to case-law, this provision proceeds from a formal conception of secrecy. It is sufficient that the documents, deliberations or investigations in question have been declared secret by law or by virtue of a decision taken by the authority, or in other words that there has been an intention to keep them from becoming public, regardless of the type of classification selected (for example, top secret or confidential). On the other hand, strict secrecy presupposes that the holder of the specific information wishes to keep it secret, that there is a legitimate interest at stake, and that the information is known or accessible only to a select group of persons (see ATF [Judgments of the Swiss Federal Court] 126 IV 236, point 2a, p. 242, and 2c/aa, p. 244). This state of affairs was not altered by the entry into force of paragraph 3 of this Article on 1 April 1998 (RO [Recueil officiel \u2013 Official Collection of Federal Statutes] 1998 852 856; FF [Feuille f\u00e9d\u00e9rale] 1996 IV 533). That rule concerns not secrets in the substantive sense but rather instances of futile, petty or excessive concealment (see ATF 126 IV 236, point 2c/bb, p. 246). In order to exclude the application of paragraph 3, the court must therefore first of all examine the reasons for classifying the information as secret. It must, however, do so with restraint, without interfering with the discretionary power wielded by the authority which declared the information secret. It is sufficient that this declaration should nonetheless appear tenable vis-\u00e0-vis the content of the documents, investigations or deliberations in issue. Moreover, the journalists\u2019 viewpoint on the interest in publishing the information is irrelevant (see ATF 126 IV 236, point 2d, p. 246). In its Stoll v. Switzerland judgment of 10 December 2007, the European Court of Human Rights confirmed that this formal conception of secrecy was not contrary to Article 10 ECHR inasmuch as it did not prevent the Federal Court from determining whether the interference in issue was compatible with Article 10 ECHR, by assessing, in the context of its examination of Article 293, paragraph 3, of the Criminal Code, the justification for classifying a given piece of information as secret, on the one hand, and weighing up the interests at stake, on the other (see Stoll v. Switzerland, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 138 and 139). 7.2.  In the present case the offence with which the appellant is charged concerned the publication of records of interviews and correspondence contained in the case file of a live criminal investigation.\nIn pursuance of Article 184 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Canton of Vaud (CPP/VD), all investigations must remain secret until their final conclusion (see paragraph 1). The secrecy requirement relates to all the evidence uncovered by the investigation itself as well as all non-public decisions and investigative measures (see paragraph 2). The law also specifies that the following are bound by secrecy vis-\u00e0-vis anyone who does not have access to the case file: the judges and judicial staff (save in cases where disclosure would facilitate the investigation or is justified on public-order, administrative or judicial grounds; see Article 185 CPP/VD), and also the parties, their friends and relatives, their lawyers, the latter\u2019s associates, consultants and staff, and any experts and witnesses. However, disclosure to friends or relatives by the parties or their lawyer is not punishable (see Article 185a CPP/VD). Lastly, the law provides for a range of exceptions. As an exception to Article 185, the cantonal investigating judge and, with the latter\u2019s agreement, the judge responsible for the preliminary inquiry or senior police officers specially appointed by the cantonal government [Conseil d\u2019Etat] (see Article 168, paragraph 3) may inform the press, radio or television about a pending investigation if so required by the public interest or considerations of fairness, particularly where public cooperation is required to shed light on an offence, in cases which are particularly serious or are already known to the general public, or where erroneous information must be corrected or the general public reassured (see Article 185b, paragraph 1, CPP/VD).\nThe present case therefore concerns secrecy imposed by the law rather than by an official decision. 7.3.  As a general rule, the reason for the confidentiality of judicial investigations, which applies to most sets of cantonal criminal proceedings, is the need to protect the interests of the criminal proceedings by anticipating risks of collusion and the danger of evidence being tampered with or destroyed. Nevertheless, the interests of the accused must not be disregarded either, particularly vis-\u00e0-vis the presumption of innocence and, more broadly, the accused\u2019s personal relations and interests (see Hauser, Schweri and Hartmann, Schweizerisches Strafprozessrecht, 6th ed., 2005, \u00a7 52, no. 6, p. 235; G\u00e9rard Piquerez, op. cit., \u00a7 134, no. 1066, p. 678; G\u00e9rard Piquerez, Proc\u00e9dure p\u00e9nale suisse: manuel, 2nd ed., 2007, no. 849, pp. 559 et seq.), as well as the need to protect the opinion-forming process and the decision-making process within a State authority, as protected, precisely, by Article 293 of the Criminal Code (see ATF 126 IV 236, point 2c/aa, p. 245). The European Court of Human Rights has already had occasion to deem such a purpose legitimate in itself. The aim is to maintain the authority and impartiality of the judiciary in accordance with the wording of Article 10 (2) ECHR, which also mentions the protection of the reputation or rights of others (see Weber v. Switzerland, judgment of 22 May 1990, \u00a7 45, and Dupuis and Others v. France, judgment of 7 June 2007, \u00a7 32).\nFurthermore, in so far as the impugned publication concerned excerpts from records of interviews of the accused and reproduced certain letters sent by the latter to the investigating judge, this evidence can validly be classified secret, by prohibiting public access to it, as provided by the legislation of the Canton of Vaud. This is the inescapable conclusion as regards the records of interviews of the accused, as it would be inadmissible to allow such documents to be analysed in the public sphere, before the conclusion of the investigation, before the trial and out of context, in a manner liable to influence the decisions taken by the investigating judge and the trial court. It is also the only possible conclusion as regards the letters sent by the accused to the investigating judge, which focused on practical problems and criticisms of his lawyer (see Police Court judgment, point 4, p. 7). We might point out here that it appears from the impugned publication \u2013 which the cantonal authorities did not reproduce in full in their decisions, although they did refer to it and its content is not disputed \u2013 that the aforementioned practical problems concerned requests for temporary release and for access to personal effects (letters of 11 July 2003), for a change of cell (letter of 7 August 2003) and for authorisation to use the telephone (letter of 6 August 2003). Regardless of the guarantee of the presumption of innocence and the inferences concerning the detainee\u2019s character which might be drawn during the criminal proceedings from such correspondence, the detainee, whose liberty is considerably restricted, even in respect of everyday acts relating to his private life, or indeed intimate sphere, can expect the authority restricting his liberty to protect him from public exposure of the practical details of his life as a remand prisoner and as a person facing charges (see Article 13 of the Constitution).\nIt follows that in the instant case the information published by the appellant, in so far as it concerned the content of the records of his interviews and his correspondence with the investigating judge, cannot be described as a secret of minor importance for the purposes of Article 293, paragraph 3, of the Criminal Code. That being so, the impugned publication constituted the factual elements of the offence provided for in Article 293, paragraph 1, of the Criminal Code. 7.4.  Moreover, the information in question may be described as being secret in substantive terms because it was only accessible to a restricted number of persons (the investigating judge and the parties to the proceedings). Furthermore, the investigating authority was desirous to keep them secret, with not only a legitimate interest in doing so but an obligation under the Cantonal Code of Criminal Procedure, the justification for which was mentioned above (see point 7.3 above). 8.  In short, the appellant submits that he had the professional duty (under former Article 32 of the Criminal Code) as a journalist to publish the information in question because of what he describes as the obvious interest in the \u2018Lausanne Bridge\u2019 case for the population of French-speaking Switzerland. He considers that in the light of European case-law, the basic assumption should be that publication is justified in principle unless there is a pressing social need to maintain secrecy. From the standpoint of good faith, he submits that Article 32 should apply to journalists who are not responsible for the indiscretion committed by a third party and who receive information without committing any offence themselves other than the breach of secrecy stemming from the publication. Lastly, he contends that the mode of publication is not a relevant criterion. 8.1.  As regards the former point, the cantonal court found that while the accident of 8 July 2003, the circumstances of which were undoubtedly unusual, had triggered a great deal of public emotion, it had nevertheless, in legal terms, been simply a road accident with fatal consequences, and did not in itself entail any obvious public interest. It was not a case of collective trauma on the part of the Lausanne population, which would have justified reassuring the citizens and keeping them informed of the progress of the investigation (see judgment appealed against, point 2, p. 9).\nIt is true that the \u2018Lausanne Bridge case\u2019 attracted extensive media coverage (see Police Court judgment, point 4, p. 8, to which the cantonal judgment refers (judgment appealed against, point B, p. 2)). However, this circumstance alone, alongside the unusual nature of the accident, is insufficient to substantiate a major public interest in publishing the confidential information in question. Unless it can be justified per se, the interest aroused among the public by media coverage of events cannot constitute a public interest in the disclosure of classified information, because that would mean that it would be sufficient to spark the public\u2019s interest in a certain event in order to justify the subsequent publication of confidential information likely to maintain that interest. Furthermore, such a public interest is manifestly lacking as regards the letters that were published. As we have seen above (see point 7.3 above), these letters virtually exclusively concerned criticisms levelled by the accused against his lawyer and such practical problems as requests for temporary release, for access to personal effects, to change cells and to use the telephone. This type of information provides no relevant insights into the accident or the circumstances surrounding it. It relates to the private life, or indeed intimate sphere, of the person in custody, and it is difficult to see any interest which its publication could satisfy other than a certain kind of voyeurism. The same applies to the appellant\u2019s requests to the investigating judge in relation to his choice of defence lawyer. Nor is it clear, as regards the records of his interviews, what political question or matter of public interest would have arisen or been worth debating in the public sphere, and the cantonal authorities explicitly ruled out the existence of any collective trauma which might have justified reassuring or informing the population. This finding of fact, which the appellant has not disputed in his public-law appeal, is binding on this court (see section 277 bis of the Federal Criminal Procedure Act). That being the case, the appellant fails to demonstrate the \u2018obvious\u2019 interest to the general public of the information published, and the cantonal court cannot be criticised for having concluded that at the very most, such an interest involved satisfying an unhealthy curiosity. 8.2.  The other two factors relied upon by the appellant concern his behaviour (good faith in access to information and mode of publication). 8.2.1.  It should first of all be noted that Article 293 of the Criminal Code punishes only the disclosure of information, irrespective of how the perpetrator obtained it. Moreover, even under Article 10 ECHR, the European Court does not attach decisive importance to this fact when considering whether applicants have fulfilled their duties and responsibilities. The determining fact is rather that they could not claim in good faith to be unaware that disclosure of the information was punishable by law (see Stoll v. Switzerland, cited above, \u00a7 144, and Fressoz and Roire v. France [GC], no. 29183/95, ECHR 1999\u2011I). This point is well-established in the present case (see section B above). 8.2.2.  On the other hand, the mode of publication can play a more important role in the context of safeguarding freedom of expression. While the European Court of Human Rights reiterates that neither it, nor the domestic courts for that matter, should substitute their own views for those of the press as to what technique of reporting should be adopted by journalists, in weighing up the interests at stake it nevertheless takes account of the content, vocabulary and format of the publication, and of the headings and sub-headings (whether chosen by the journalist or the editors), and the accuracy of the information (see Stoll v. Switzerland, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 146 et seq., especially 146, 147 and 149).\nIn the instant case the cantonal court ruled that the tone adopted by the appellant in his article showed that his main concern was not, as he claims, to inform the general public about the State\u2019s conduct of the criminal investigation. The headline of the article (\u2018Questioning of the mad driver\u2019, \u2018the reckless driver\u2019s version\u2019) already lacked objectivity. It suggested that the case had already been tried in the author\u2019s view, in the sense that the fatalities on the Lausanne Bridge had been caused not by an ordinary motorist but by a \u2018mad driver\u2019, a man \u2018oblivious to the events and all the hubbub around him\u2019; The journalist concluded by wondering whether the driver was in fact doing his best to \u2018make himself impossible to defend\u2019. The manner in which he quoted the excerpts from the records of interviews and reproduced the letters sent by the defendant to the judge pointed to the motives of the author of the impugned article: he confined himself to sensationalism, his modus operandi being exclusively geared to satisfying the relatively unhealthy curiosity which anyone is liable to feel about this type of case. Readers of this highly biased publication would have formed an opinion and subjectively prejudged the future action to be taken by the courts regarding this case, without the least respect for the principle of presumption of innocence (see judgment appealed against, point 2, pp. 9 et seq.). The cantonal court concluded that this factor did not indicate that the public interest in receiving information prevailed. That court cannot be criticised on that account. 8.3.  The appellant also submitted that the records of interviews and the letters would in any case be mentioned in subsequent public hearings. He inferred from this that preserving the confidentiality of this information could therefore not be justified by any \u2018pressing social need\u2019.\nHowever, the mere possibility that the secrecy of criminal investigations might be lifted during a subsequent phase of proceedings, particularly during the trial, which is generally subject to the publicity principle, does not undermine the justification for keeping judicial investigations confidential, because the primary aim is to protect the opinion-forming and decision-making processes on the part not only of the trial court but also of the investigating authority, until the completion of this secret phase of proceedings. Moreover, far from being neutral and comprehensive, the publication in issue included comments and assessments which presented the information in issue in a particular light, without providing the opportunities for adversarial argument which are the very essence of proceedings in trial courts. 8.4.  Lastly, the appellant did not explicitly criticise the amount of the fine imposed on him. Nor did he challenge the refusal to grant him a probationary period after which the fine would be struck out (former Article 49, point 4, in conjunction with former Article 106, paragraph 3, of the Criminal Code) under Swiss law. From the angle of weighing up the interest in the interference, we might simply note that the fine imposed, the amount of which took into account a previous conviction dating back to 1998 (imposition of a CHF 2,000 fine, which could be struck out after a two-year probationary period, for coercion and defamation), does not exceed half the amount of the appellant\u2019s monthly income at the material time (see Police Court judgment, point 1, p. 5), and there is nothing to suggest that his freelance status at the time of the first-instance judgment led to any significant drop in his earnings. It should also be pointed out that at CHF 4,000 the amount of the fine is below the statutory maximum set out in former Article 106, paragraph 1, of the Criminal Code (as in force until 31 December 2006), and that this maximum amount, set by the legislature more than thirty years ago, was not revised until the entry into force of the new general section of the Criminal Code, which now sets a figure of CHF 10,000 (see Article 106, paragraph 1, of the Criminal Code as in force since 1 January 2007). Furthermore, the sanction for the offence with which the appellant is charged did not prevent him from expressing his views, since it was imposed after the article had been published (see Stoll v. Switzerland, cited above, \u00a7 156). That being the case, it is unclear, in view of the nature of the offence charged (the least serious in the classification set out in the Swiss Criminal Code), the amount of the fine and the time of its imposition, how the sanction imposed on the applicant could be regarded as a form of censorship. 8.5.  It follows from the foregoing that the appellant disclosed a secret within the meaning of Article 293, paragraph 1, of the Criminal Code and that he cannot rely on any justifying factor in his favour. The decision appealed against does not violate federal law as interpreted in the light of the Convention provisions relied upon by the appellant.\u201d", "references": ["7", "6", "2", "8", "1", "9", "4", "5", "3", "0", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in \u0160ibenik. 6.  On 26 August 2005 the \u0160ibenik Municipal State Attorney\u2019s Office opened an investigation against the applicant on suspicion of the theft of a mobile telephone from E.R., who had come to Croatia as a tourist from the Czech Republic. 7.  On 20 September 2005 an investigating judge of the \u0160ibenik County Court heard the applicant, who denied the charges against him. He explained that on the occasion in question some children from a house in Betina had thrown water-filled balloons at him. He had approached the house the children had come from and had knocked at the door, but no one had answered. He had then walked away. When he was back at home, two young women had come to ask for the mobile telephone belonging to one of them, but he told them he had not taken it. 8.  In response to a request for international legal assistance from the Croatian prosecuting authorities, on 9 June 2006 the Chomutovo County Court in the Czech Republic heard evidence from E.R. She said that on 12 July 2005 in Betina, Croatia, her children had thrown water-filled balloons at the applicant. He had then approached the house they were staying in and through a window she had seen him steal her mobile telephone from a table on the terrace of that house. Together with her step-daughter she had followed the applicant to his house and asked him to return her telephone. However, he had denied taking it. 9.  On 9 November 2006 the \u0160ibenik Municipal State Attorney\u2019s Office indicted the applicant in the \u0160ibenik Municipal Court (Op\u0107inski sud u \u0160ibeniku) on the charge of stealing a mobile telephone from E.R. 10.  During his trial before the \u0160ibenik Municipal Court the applicant gave oral evidence on 18 May 2010. He reiterated the statement he had given before the investigating judge. Throughout these proceedings the applicant challenged the allegation against him, contending that, although there had been a dispute between him and E.R. over the behaviour of her children, he had not stolen her mobile telephone. The applicant\u2019s account was confirmed in essence by his former wife, who was also questioned as a witness during the proceedings. 11.  At a hearing held on 27 October 2010 the \u0160ibenik Municipal Court decided to admit the record of E.R.\u2019s questioning as evidence without examining her directly. The applicant objected to the reading out of E.R.\u2019s statement. 12.  On 28 October 2010 the \u0160ibenik Municipal Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to four months\u2019 imprisonment suspended for one year. The finding of the applicant\u2019s guilt was based solely on the evidence given by E.R. The trial court held that it was clear that the applicant had been the person who had approached the house where E.R. and her family were staying. The evidence given by E.R. conclusively showed that the applicant had committed the offence at issue and that E.R. had no reason \u201cto blame the accused without basis\u201d. The relevant part of the first-instance judgment reads:\n\u201cUnder Article 331 \u00a7 1(12) of the Code of Criminal Procedure this court read out the statement given by E.R. before the Chomutovo County Court, the Czech Republic, on 9 June 2009 without the parties\u2019 consent because there were sound reasons for doing so, namely that the victim gave her evidence more than four years ago and this court considers that, owing to the passage of time, it would not learn any new facts or circumstances relevant for assessing the circumstances of the event [at issue], and was also mindful of the fact that the [charges against the accused] will become time-barred in July 2011 and ... summoning the victim would protract the criminal proceedings unnecessarily.\n...\n... considering the evidence given by witness and victim E.R. as being credible and truthful, this court has established the criminal responsibility of the accused because it has not found in the victim\u2019s statement any reason for which she would blame the accused without basis. ...\u201d 13.  In his appeal of 28 January 2011 the applicant argued, inter alia, that E.R. had never been summoned to a hearing during his trial before the \u0160ibenik Municipal Court and that he had had no opportunity to question her. He also argued that E.R.\u2019s mobile telephone had not been found in his possession. On 3 March 2011 the \u0160ibenik County Court (\u017dupanijski sud u \u0160ibeniku) dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal as ill-founded, upholding the first-instance judgment. The relevant part of the appeal judgment reads as follows:\n\u201cIn the reasoning of its judgment, the [first-instance] court stated the reasons why it had decided ... to read out the statement of the witness-victim E.R., stating that the victim had given her evidence more than four years previously, at which time her recollection of the event [at issue] would have been fresher than later, that the prosecution would become time-barred in July 2011 and since [the victim] was a foreign citizen ... summoning her [to a hearing] would protract the criminal proceedings unnecessarily.\n... This decision of the first-instance court did not violate the defence rights of the accused ...\n...\n... it should also be said that the mobile telephone could not have been found in the accused\u2019s possession because nobody looked for it. The documents in the case-file show that the accused\u2019s home was not searched, which was a mistake on the part of the police. However, even without it, the [first-instance] court undoubtedly established that the accused had stolen the mobile telephone from the victim ...\u201d\n... \u201d 14.  On 13 May 2011 the applicant lodged a complaint before the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske), arguing that he had not had a fair trial as he had not been given an opportunity to question E.R. 15.  On 8 December 2011 the Constitutional Court declared the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded. This decision was served on the applicant\u2019s counsel on 12 January 2012.", "references": ["4", "8", "0", "5", "2", "9", "6", "7", "1", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicants were born in 1966 and 2007 respectively and live in St Petersburg. The first applicant is the second applicant\u2019s father. 7.  The first applicant has a mild mental disability. Between 1983 and January 2012 he lived in St Petersburg Neuropsychological Care Home no. 1 (\u201cthe care home\u201d). 8.  In 2007 the first applicant married Ms N.S., a resident of the same care home, who had been deprived of her legal capacity on account of her mental disability. 9.  On 30 May 2007 Ms N.S. gave birth to the second applicant. At the time, the first applicant was not recognised as the child\u2019s father. One week later the second applicant was admitted to hospital because of an infection she had contracted during the delivery. 10.  On 12 July 2007 the second applicant was placed in St Petersburg Children\u2019s Home no. 3 (\u201cthe children\u2019s home\u201d) as a child without parental care. 11.  On 7 August 2007 the first applicant obtained a new birth certificate for the second applicant and was registered as her father. He subsequently gave his consent for her to stay at the children\u2019s home until it became possible for him to take care of her. Throughout the second applicant\u2019s stay there, the first applicant maintained regular contact with her. He would visit her regularly, spend time with her, take her for walks and buy her books, toys and clothes. 12.  By a judgment of 31 March 2008 the Dzerzhinskiy District Court of St Petersburg refused to restore Ms N.S.\u2019s legal capacity, relying in particular on a psychiatric examination report. It stated that, inter alia, there were conflicting, aggressive and emotionally inadequate tendencies in her behaviour. 13.  On 24 September 2008 the marriage between the first applicant and Ms N.S. was declared void at the request of a public prosecutor because of Ms N.S.\u2019s legal incapacity. 14.  Following a claim by the first applicant acting on his own behalf and on behalf of the second applicant, on 6 June 2011 the Smolninskiy District Court of St Petersburg ordered the St Petersburg City Council to provide the applicants with housing under a social tenancy agreement. In November 2011 they were provided with a flat in St Petersburg. 15.  In February 2012, on the basis of a medical assessment, the first applicant was discharged from the care home and moved into his flat. He has been living there ever since. 16.  In November 2011 the first applicant informed the children\u2019s home of his intention to take the second applicant into his care once he was discharged from the care home and had moved into his flat. 17.  On an unspecified date the children\u2019s home applied to the Frunzenskiy District Court of St Petersburg (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) to have the first applicant\u2019s parental authority over the second applicant restricted. The children\u2019s home indicated that \u201cthe first applicant [had] never yet taken the girl from the children\u2019s home to raise her in his family but was planning to raise the girl by himself\u201d. In the children\u2019s home\u2019s view, it was not advisable to let the girl be placed in her parents\u2019 care as her mother was legally incapacitated and thus posed a danger to the girl\u2019s life and health, while her father could not fully exercise his parental responsibilities owing to his mental disability. In addition, the children\u2019s home submitted, referring to information provided by its staff (see paragraph 18 below), that at the time it would be very stressful for the second applicant to be transferred to her parents\u2019 family.\n(a)  Written evidence 18.  In the proceedings before the District Court, the children\u2019s home produced undated reports by its staff. They stated that the second applicant had difficulties in communicating with her parents and that she felt fear, anxiety and emotional stress in their presence. 19.  The first applicant relied on the following pieces of written evidence. 20.  In a certificate dated 24 December 2009 the children\u2019s home stated that the second applicant was in their care and that the first applicant and Ms N.S. regularly visited her. 21.  In a certificate dated 26 May 2011 a municipal custody and guardianship agency confirmed that the second applicant was living temporarily at the children\u2019s home at the first applicant\u2019s request pending the allocation of social housing to him, and that he visited her there. 22.  A report dated 10 October 2011 by a panel of experts contained the results of a medical psychiatric examination of the first applicant that had been carried out with a view to determining whether he could be discharged from the care home and bring up his child. The report described him as a fully focused, sociable person with reduced intelligence. According to the report, the first applicant was well presented, readily engaged himself in conversation and could read, write and do arithmetic. He was able to cook and kept his room in the care home clean and orderly. The report also mentioned that he talked about his daughter with tenderness and love, proudly demonstrated her \u201cachievements\u201d, showed clothes and toys bought for her, and regularly visited her. He was planning to take her home as soon as he was provided with social housing. The report also stated that throughout his stay at the care home the first applicant had worked there and saved money over several years; he would therefore be able to support his daughter financially. The report concluded that he could be discharged from the care home and that his state of health enabled him to fully exercise his parental authority. 23.  A report dated 8 February 2012 by the custody and guardianship authority described the living conditions in the first applicant\u2019s flat as appropriate for his daughter. It stated, in particular, that the flat had recently been renovated, was clean and light, had all the necessary furniture and home appliances, and that there was a sleeping place for the child with clean bed linen. There were toys and books suitable for her age, and clothes appropriate for the season. There was also a separate desk equipped for the child. 24.  A letter dated 14 February 2012 issued by the care home to the District Court again confirmed that the first applicant regularly visited the second applicant at the children\u2019s home, that he bought clothes for her and that he discussed with the management of the care home the steps he could take on his own to ensure the girl received a good upbringing, financial support, health care and an education. When concluding the social tenancy agreement for the flat allocated to him, the first applicant had himself found out which documents he would need to register the girl at kindergarten, had collected those documents and had put her on a waiting list for a place. The letter also stated that the first applicant\u2019s medical examination had not revealed any contradictions to his upbringing of the second applicant; he was a well-organised and reliable person who had realistic life plans and a responsible attitude towards his work and obligations. His psychiatric state was stable; he did not show any signs of aggression towards others or emotional instability and did not need any medical treatment.\n(b)  Oral submissions and witness statements 25.  At the hearing before the District Court, the first applicant\u2019s representative contested the children\u2019s home\u2019s application as groundless and discriminatory as being based on the fact that the first applicant had an intellectual disability. He argued, with reference to the adduced evidence (see paragraphs 20-24 above), that the first applicant was fully able to exercise his parental authority and take care of his daughter. He pointed out that the first applicant had recently been discharged from the care home and lived in a separate flat, where the conditions were adequate and suitable for the second applicant to live in. The first applicant\u2019s lawyer thus insisted that the second applicant should be transferred into his care. He argued that the transfer could be performed gradually, to enable the girl to get used to the changes in her life, while the competent social care agencies could assist the first applicant in exercising his parental authority and monitor the family and, in particular, the second applicant\u2019s life and upbringing. 26.  Representatives of the children\u2019s home (its director and the doctor in charge of the second applicant\u2019s treatment) maintained the claim, arguing that it was premature to transfer the girl into the first applicant\u2019s care. They stated, in particular, that the first applicant had a mental disability and had lived for all his life in a closed specialist institution; he would therefore be unable to ensure proper hygienic care of the girl or her adequate development, while it was impossible to entrust any such care to the second applicant\u2019s mother as she was legally incapacitated. The representatives of the children\u2019s home also stated that the first applicant\u2019s attempts to communicate with the second applicant clearly showed that there was no contact between them. They added that when the second applicant had been told for the first time that she might be transferred into her father\u2019s care, she had been stressed, scared and afraid of approaching him; later, when she had realised that she would be staying at the children\u2019s home, her fears had disappeared. They also stated that at the time the second applicant\u2019s fear of her parents had passed, and that she ceased fearing living with her family. 27.  A representative of the municipal custody and guardianship authority and a public prosecutor both maintained the children\u2019s home\u2019s application, arguing that in view of the first applicant\u2019s diagnosis, and the fact that his partner Ms N.S. had no legal capacity, it was not safe to transfer the second applicant into their care, and that two parents with mental disabilities would be unable to ensure the girl\u2019s harmonious development. 28.  The District Court also heard evidence from Ms O., a care home employee, who stated that whilst at the home the first applicant had lived independently in a separate room, which he had kept in order. He had bought food and cooked for himself and had been able to take prescribed medicines unsupervised if given clear instructions. He had worked part-time at the home, helping to take care of its patients, and had always been able to establish good contact with the patients and their relatives. He had been allowed to leave the care home freely and had also worked part-time outside, and at some point he and Ms N.S. had lived together at her relatives\u2019 place for a while, and had then returned to the care home. Ms O. expressed her certainty that the first applicant would be fully able to fulfil his parental obligations and take good care of the second applicant.\n(c)  Judgment of 20 March 2012 29.  On 20 March 2012 the District Court examined the children\u2019s home\u2019s claim. It observed, in particular, that the first applicant and Ms N.S. regularly visited the second applicant at the children\u2019s home and attempted to communicate with her in the presence of the social workers, and that the first applicant had obtained a compulsory medical insurance certificate for her. The court also referred to the report of 8 February 2012 regarding the first applicant\u2019s living conditions and noted, more specifically, that the first applicant had carried out repairs at the flat allocated to him, had equipped a room for a child, and had registered the second applicant at the address. 30.  The District Court went on to note that if the children\u2019s home\u2019s application to restrict the first applicant\u2019s parental authority were to be dismissed, the first applicant would be entitled to take his daughter into his care. However, the court considered that at the time it would be \u201cundesirable\u201d as it would not be in the child\u2019s best interests. It noted, with reference to the reports by staff members of the children\u2019s home (see paragraph 18 above) and similar statements by the representatives of the children\u2019s home made at the hearing (see paragraph 26 above) that at present the girl felt anxious in the presence of her parents and had difficulties in communicating with them. The court therefore considered that \u201cit would be stressful for the child to be placed with the family of her parents, who she had never lived with and had so far had no chance to get used to\u201d. 31.  The District Court further observed that since childhood, the first applicant had lived in specialist State institutions for people with mental disabilities and had no skills and experience in rearing children and taking care of them. In view of the fact that he had only left an institution and started living on his own in 2012, it considered that his intention to raise his daughter by himself was premature. 32.  The court also observed that the girl\u2019s biological mother had free access to the first applicant\u2019s flat and noted that at present she had no legal capacity. It then noted that it \u201c[had] no sufficient and reliable evidence that it would be safe for the child to remain with her parents, including her legally incapacitated mother\u201d. 33.  The District Court also referred to the first applicant\u2019s mental disability and noted that \u201cat present there was no reliable evidence showing that it would be safe for the girl to live with him\u201d. In this connection, it noted that his medical diagnosis and category of disability would make him ineligible for applying to adopt a child. 34.  Lastly, the District Court observed that the first applicant\u2019s monthly income was 15,000 Russian roubles (RUB), while the monthly living wage was RUB 6,910.90 for an adult and RUB 5,461.39 for a child. As the first applicant would have to pay utility bills and, from time to time, medicine, some of which could be costly, the court considered that at the time he would be unable to provide adequate financial support for his daughter. 35.  The District Court then referred to Article 73 of the Family Code and allowed the children\u2019s home\u2019s claim. It restricted, for the time being, the first applicant\u2019s parental authority over the second applicant. The court added that by virtue of Article 76 of the same Code the first applicant would be able to apply to court to have the restriction of his parental authority lifted, if the reasons for the restriction being imposed ceased to exist. 36.  The first applicant appealed against the judgment of 20 March 2012 to the St Petersburg City Court (\u201cthe City Court\u201d). 37.  With regard to the District Court\u2019s first argument (see paragraph 30 above), the first applicant submitted that it would in any case be stressful for the child, who had spent four years at the children\u2019s home, to start living anywhere else, for instance with an adoptive family. As for the children\u2019s home\u2019s reference to the girl\u2019s anxiety in her parents\u2019 presence, the first applicant argued that the reports to that end by its staff (see paragraph 18 above) were out of date and could not serve as a basis for the court\u2019s finding, as at the hearing before the first-instance court the children\u2019s home representatives had confirmed that the second applicant was no longer afraid of her parents or of being placed in the first applicant\u2019s care (see paragraph 26 above). 38.  The first applicant also argued that, in so far as the District Court had relied on the fact that he had lived at the care home for a prolonged period, a parent\u2019s past or present residence in a specialist institution, there was no such ground for restricting parental authority in the Russian Family Code. Moreover, the law did not require biological parents to prove their ability to raise children or their housekeeping skills as a prerequisite for exercising their parental authority. 39.  The first applicant further insisted, with reference to the District Court\u2019s argument to that end, that the fact the girl\u2019s mother was legally incapacitated was of no relevance to his case. Legal incapacity was a formal status and did not mean that the person was dangerous to others. In any case, the mental health of the child\u2019s mother could not serve as a basis for restricting his own parental authority over his daughter. The first applicant also claimed that during the second applicant\u2019s stay at the children\u2019s home, her mother had been allowed to visit her. 40.  The first applicant went on to argue that there had been no evidence at the District Court\u2019s disposal proving that he posed any danger to his daughter. On the contrary, the relevant medical report by the experts of the care home, who had observed the first applicant for many years, revealed that his mental condition had not impaired his ability to fulfil his parental responsibilities (see paragraph 22 above). 41.  Lastly, the first applicant alleged that the District Court had erred in establishing his income, which in fact exceeded the living wage in St Petersburg. Referring to the Court\u2019s judgment in the case of Saviny v. Ukraine (no. 39948/06, 18 December 2008) and the relevant provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, he also submitted that his income could not be a decisive element in the decision to restrict his parental authority. 42.  In his oral submissions before the City Court, the first applicant argued that if the children\u2019s home\u2019s claim was rejected, the transfer of the second applicant into his care could be gradual to enable her to adapt psychologically to her new life in the family. 43.  On 17 July 2012 the City Court upheld the judgment of 20 March 2012 on appeal. It repeated the reasoning and conclusions of the District Court, stating that they were correct and accurately reflected the factual circumstances of the case. The appellate court considered that the first applicant \u201chad not adduced convincing evidence proving the absence of a real risk to the second applicant\u2019s life, health and adequate upbringing\u201d if she was transferred into her father\u2019s care. It also noted that the first applicant was not precluded from seeking an annulment of the restriction of his parental authority in the future, should the relevant circumstances change. 44.  On 31 January 2013 a St Petersburg City Court judge returned without examination a cassation appeal by the first applicant against the court decisions of 20 March and 17 July 2012, as he had failed to enclose a duly certified copy of the judgment of 20 March 2012. He did not attempt to pursue the cassation proceedings any further. 45.  After the present application was communicated to the respondent Government, they submitted information on factual developments in the case. 46.  In particular, by a judgment of 20 September 2012, the Zelenogorskiy District Court of St Petersburg restored, with reference to a psychiatric report, Ms N.S.\u2019s legal capacity. The judgment entered into force on 25 October 2012. 47.  On 15 November 2012 the first applicant remarried Ms N.S. 48.  By an order of 9 January 2013 the children\u2019s home established rules concerning the admission of visitors. According to the Government, on the basis of that order the first applicant regularly and without any limitations visited the second applicant there. 49.  On an unspecified date the first applicant brought civil proceedings against the children\u2019s home in the District Court of St Petersburg, seeking to have the restriction of his parental authority over the second applicant lifted. He argued, in particular, that one of the grounds for imposing that restriction had been the second applicant\u2019s anxiety and fear she had felt in his presence and her unwillingness to live with him. He pointed out that at present the second applicant had no fear of her parents, that she had developed an affective attitude towards him, considered him as her father and was ready to live with him. He also pointed out that since February 2012 he had been living on his own and maintaining a household and that he was employed and had a stable income. He also submitted that the legal capacity of the second applicant\u2019s mother, Ms N.S., had recently been restored. In the first applicant\u2019s view, therefore, there was no reason to continue to restrict his parental authority over the second applicant which prevented him from taking her from the children\u2019s home. 50.  A representative of the children\u2019s home confirmed in court that the first applicant regularly visited the second applicant, that close emotional ties had formed between them and that the girl missed her father when he left. He was therefore of the opinion that it would be in the second applicant\u2019s interests to lift the restriction on the first applicant\u2019s parental authority and transfer her into his care. Representatives of two district custody and guardianship agencies and a public prosecutor supported the first applicant\u2019s application. 51.  On 8 April 2013 the District Court gave its judgment. It took into account the parties\u2019 arguments and observed, as had been submitted by a representative of the children\u2019s home, that the first and second applicants had developed close emotional ties, that at present the girl felt comfortable and calm in her father\u2019s presence and that she missed him whenever he left the children\u2019s home. It also observed that from February 2012 onwards the first applicant had been living independently in a separate flat, where the second applicant was also registered. The court noted that the conditions were good and suitable for the second applicant to live in. It also had regard to the fact that the first applicant was employed and had received positive references from his place of work and place of residence. 52.  The District Court further noted that the first applicant had a stable monthly income of approximately RUB 19,000. The living wage being RUB 7,352 for a working adult and RUB 5,802.50 for a child, the court considered that he was fully able to ensure the second applicant had adequate financial support. The court went on to note that the legal capacity of Ms N.S., who freely visited the first applicant\u2019s flat, had by that time been restored and that the first applicant had himself submitted a medical report dated 5 March 2013 which confirmed that he was fully able to take care of his child. 53.  The District Court therefore concluded that the restriction of the first applicant\u2019s parental authority was no longer justified, as the reasons it had relied on in its previous judgment of 12 March 2012 were no longer valid. With reference to Article 76 of the Russian Family Code, the court thus allowed the first applicant\u2019s application and ordered that the restriction of his parental authority over the second applicant be lifted and that she be transferred into his care. The judgment was not appealed against and entered into force on 17 May 2013. 54.  On 20 May 2013 the first applicant took the second applicant from the children\u2019s home to his home address, where she has been living ever since.", "references": ["1", "7", "9", "3", "8", "5", "2", "6", "0", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1967 and lives in Plasencia. 6.  On 3 January 2011 following a trial, the Plasencia criminal judge (juez de lo penal) no. 1 sentenced the applicant to six months\u2019 imprisonment for serious disobedience to public authority (desobediencia grave a la autoridad). The applicant was acquitted of other charges against him, namely false accusation of a crime (calumnias), defamation (injurias) and concealment (encubrimiento). 7.  The judge established that the applicant was the webmaster of an Internet forum on which defamatory messages against the complainants in the proceedings had been published, and that he had deliberately disregarded the request made to him by a police officer within the framework of the criminal investigation not to alter the messages in question. In fact, the applicant had proceeded to have the forum webpage removed altogether, despite the police officer\u2019s request to leave it unchanged. As regards the charges for defamation and false accusation of a crime, the judge held that there were reasonable doubts as to whether the applicant had been aware of the messages in question before his police interview and that he should therefore be acquitted in that regard. It was also alleged that he had protected the individuals who had made the defamatory statements; however, the judge considered that he could not be found guilty of concealment as it had not been proved that he had been aware at the time of his police interview that it had been possible for him to have access to the Internet Protocol (IP) numbers of the participants on the forum. 8.  Both the prosecution and defence appealed against the judgment before the C\u00e1ceres Audiencia Provincial. The applicant did not request a hearing, nor did the Audiencia Provincial order one. Instead, the court watched a video-recording of the trial. 9.  On 16 May 2011 the Audiencia Provincial upheld the applicant\u2019s conviction for serious disobedience to public authority and, unlike the first-instance judge, found him guilty of continuous and false accusation of a crime (delito continuado de calumnias). His punishment was a daily fine of 15 euros (EUR) for a period of eighteen months. He was also required to pay damages. In finding the applicant guilty, the appellate court stated that it had relied on the facts established by the first-instance judge and on the testimony given by the complainants, the applicant and the witnesses in the earlier trial. The court stated:\n\u201cFourth. The facts declared proved in the first-instance judgment constitute continuous and false accusation of a crime and defamation regulated and punished by section 205 and seq. of the Criminal Code in relation to section 74 of the same Code for which the defendant Jorge G\u00f3mez Olmeda should be declared guilty as a principal pursuant to sections 28 and 30 of the Code with the mitigating factor of undue delays pursuant to section 21 paragraph six of the Code.\n...\nIt is undisputed that documentary evidence does not require judicial immediacy for its assessment because it is written down and can be read and interpreted in the light of the circumstances of the case, which had been perfectly outlined in the complainants\u2019 brief and proved in the hearing, both with respect to what was written on the forum and the people against whom those expressions were directed. Those expressions imputed the commission of crimes to the complainants (sexual assault, sexual slavery of a person) and were detrimental to their fame and reputation to the extent that it is obvious that the imputations were serious in themselves and related to public understanding, which is an open-ended concept of which interpretation depends on the particular facts of the case. It is worth remembering that we are speaking here of a small town where everybody knows each other, where everybody runs into each other, where everybody attends the same places, where everyday life is routine and there is little room for novelties, where anything breaking the monotony is something which attracts public attention, where the genealogy of every inhabitant is known to the rest. For these reasons we find the applicant guilty of the crime of continuous and false accusation of a crime ...which he had been acquitted of at first instance.\nThe applicant states that he was the administrator of the forum; that he did not log onto it very often; that he lacked computer skills and that he had removed some phrases and messages which in his view might be considered insulting for the purposes of the case now before us. We disagree with the accused when he states that he was unaware of what was written on the forum, the argument on which the first-instance judge relied to acquit him of false accusation of a crime and defamation. And we disagree for the following two reasons. Firstly, because it was part of his duties as the administrator of the forum to be aware of what was written on it, to the extent that he was its \u2018censor\u2019, so to speak, on account of the fact that he had created it; and secondly, because it is untrue that he was unaware of what was written on it, since he had removed some phrases and messages which were insulting to the complainants, thus proving that he had read what was written on the forum in question and demonstrating that he had regarded what was written there as insulting to a specific individual or individuals, which led him to the decision to remove what he regarded as defamatory or insulting.\u201d 10.  The applicant applied to the Audiencia Provincial to have the previous proceedings before it declared void. His application was dismissed on 29 September 2011 on the grounds that no legal provision had been infringed and none of his rights had been breached in those proceedings. 11.  The applicant lodged an amparo appeal with the Constitutional Court. He cited Article 24 of the Constitution (right to a fair hearing), complaining that the Audiencia Provincial had convicted him on appeal without giving him the opportunity to plead his case in open court. 12.  By a decision served on 13 March 2012 the Constitutional Court declared the applicant\u2019s amparo appeal inadmissible as it had no special constitutional significance.", "references": ["4", "0", "8", "2", "9", "5", "7", "1", "6", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Wiener Neustadt, Austria. 7.  On 15 September 2010 he was arrested in Hungary and on 17 January 2011 he was extradited to Moldova on suspicion of defrauding C., a company registered in Moldova. 8.  The applicant describes in the following way the conditions of his detention in Prison no. 13, where he was detained between 21 January and 23 August 2011. For the first month he was held in cell no. 13, designed for prisoners with medical problems, since he had complained upon his arrival of pain due to his prostate cancer, as well as hypertension. As fifteen other inmates with various illnesses were all crammed into this cell, he was afraid of getting other illnesses and avoided asking for detention in this \u201ctreatment cell\u201d thereafter. 9.  After approximately one month he was transferred to cell no. 123. The cell was in the basement and had no access to natural light. A window opened on to another room which had an opening in its roof, thus giving a glimpse of daylight. The cell was damp and cold; clothes rotted as a result. It was full of parasitic insects and rats. The water was yellow because the pipes were rusted, but he had to drink it in the absence of an alternative. Even that water was not always available, so the detainees collected it in plastic bottles. There was no toilet and detainees had to use a bucket, which caused a horrible smell. Most of the detainees smoked in the cell, which caused the applicant to suffer. The food served sometimes consisted of warm water and stale bread, and at other times of inedible cereals full of insects. 10.  According to the applicant, he did not receive the medical treatment required to treat his illness. The prison did not have a doctor who specialised in treating cancer, nor did it have the sophisticated equipment with which he had been treated in Austria before his arrest. He received basic medication for his hypertension. As a result of the lack of specialised medical assistance the applicant\u2019s state of health worsened to such an extent that he could no longer control the process of urination, wetting himself as a result and thus having to endure additional humiliation. In the absence of changes of clothes or incontinence pads, he had to wait for the next day for bathing, which happened only once a week. He claims that only the intervention of his cellmates prevented his suicide on several occasions, as confirmed by the signatures of five cellmates under his description of the conditions addressed to his lawyer. Moreover, after the change of the preventive measure from detention to house arrest on 23 August 2011 he continued to need specialised treatment, but was unable to secure it since he had no money to pay for a hospital. 11.  According to the Government, during his detention in Prison no. 13 the applicant was held in cell no. 13, designed for twelve detainees and measuring 30 square metres, cell no. 123, designed for six detainees and measuring 13.68 square metres, and cell no. 80, designed for six detainees and measuring 15 square meters. Each cell was lit by three 100-W bulbs and had a window and artificial ventilation, as well as a washbasin and a toilet separated from the rest of the cell by a partition. The cells were regularly disinfected, and tap water was always available except for during repair periods, when water was brought in in special receptacles. 12.  Hot food three times a day was ensured in accordance with Government Decision no. 609 concerning the minimal norms of food for detainees. The budget for food, medication and other expenses grew steadily each year (the total prison budget rose from 3,453,000 Moldovan lei (MDL) in 2007 to MDL 4,813,300 in 2011). 13.  In an appeal to the Chi\u0219in\u0103u Court of Appeal on 18 February 2011 the applicant referred to his poor state of health as a reason for his release; he was ill with prostate cancer. 14.  On 19 April 2011 the applicant asked to be released, relying, inter alia, on a letter from his doctor in Austria concerning his untreated cancer and recommendations after delayed surgery for cancer in 2008. That request was refused on 20 April 2011 by the Buiucani District Court. 15.  In an appeal of 16 May 2011 against a further extension of his detention, the applicant noted, inter alia, the lack in Prison no. 13 of medical personnel who specialised in treating his kind of illness, as well as the lack of equipment required to treat him, and the worsening of his health resulting in severe pain and in his inability to control the urination process, causing him to wet himself. He relied on Article 3 of the Convention. On 24 May 2011 the Chi\u0219in\u0103u Court of Appeal dismissed that appeal, finding that there was no medical evidence in the file to suggest that the applicant could not be treated while in detention. 16.  On 29 June 2011 the applicant asked to have his detention replaced with house arrest, relying, inter alia, on Article 3 of the Convention. He relied on a reply by the medical service of Prison no. 13 as to the specific treatment given to him. According to that reply of 1 June 2011 he was being treated with hypertension pills and his blood pressure was monitored daily. The applicant claimed that this proved that he had no treatment whatever for his prostate cancer. This request was refused on 29 June 2011 by the Buiucani District Court. 17.  In an appeal of 1 July 2011 the applicant repeated his submissions made before the Buiucani District Court. 18.  On 23 August 2011 the Chi\u0219in\u0103u Court of Appeal replaced the applicant\u2019s detention with house arrest. On 23 January 2012 the Buiucani District Court replaced that preventive measure with an undertaking not to leave the country. 19.  The Court refers to the findings made by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, as cited in its previous case-law concerning the Republic of Moldova (see, for instance, Shishanov v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 11353/06, \u00a7\u00a7 57-60, 15 September 2015). 20.  In its report for 2010 (page 142 et seq., \u201cConditions of detention\u201d) the Human Rights Centre (the Moldovan Ombudsman institution) found, inter alia, that:\n\u201c... [T]he Prisons Department informed the Ombudsman that meat and fish products are provided [to detainees] whenever possible. At the same time, that authority stated that, owing to the difficult financial situation, during 2010 the detainees in Prison no. 17 in Rezina received 75% and 80% of their normal quotas of meat and fish products respectively. In this connection, the Minister of Justice submitted information concerning the expenditure on prisoners\u2019 food in 2010. The cost amounted to MDL 24,500,000, whereas the budgetary need for the same year was, according to the Ministry of Finance\u2019s draft budget, MDL 29,500,000. The daily cost of feeding a detainee in 2010 was MDL 10.24 [approximately EUR 0.6], while the daily budgetary need was MDL 12.35. This statistic was often cited by prison authorities to justify why they were unable to provide detainees with meat and fish ...\u201d 21.  In its report for 2011 (page 71 et seq., \u201cConditions of detention\u201d) the Human Rights Centre found, inter alia, that during 2011 it had addressed a total of seventeen recommendations to the authorities after making 238 visits to various prisons in Moldova. All of them noted problems concerning conditions of detention, and a significant proportion also noted problems with medical assistance. The report noted that in most cases prisons were overcrowded, each detainee having less than four square metres of personal space.\nIn respect of Prison no. 13 the report stated that:\n\u201c... the situation in respect of conditions of detention ... is of real concern. ... The Moldovan Minister of Justice confirmed that the conditions in prisons are akin to those in medieval times, noting that the conditions in prisons constitute a systemic problem.\u201d\nThe report noted the continuing problem of insufficient access to daylight in the cells, in which the windows are covered with layers of metal bars, the lack of ventilation, increased humidity in the cells, very worn-out bed linen, the separation of the toilet from the rest of the cell by a cellophane sheet, or the lack of any type of separation.\nThe Human Rights Centre recommended that Prison no. 13 be closed down in order to avoid new findings of violations by the Court.\nThe report also found that there was a lack of medical staff in prisons, with only 245 posts out of 321 filled. 22.  In December 2015 the Human Rights Centre repeated its recommendation of closing down Prison no. 13 and, if that was impossible, the urgent improvement of conditions of detention there.", "references": ["8", "2", "7", "0", "6", "4", "5", "9", "3", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1989 and lives in Kresttsy, Novgorod Region. 5.  On an unspecified date the applicant was charged with theft. On 16 December 2003 the case was settled and the criminal proceedings were discontinued. 6.  On 28 July 2004 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of having committed a murder. The applicant was 15 years old at the time of the arrest. 7.  On 29 July 2004 the Krestetskiy Federal Court of the Novgorod Region authorised the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention noting as follows:\n\u201cHaving heard the parties to the proceedings and examined the materials, [the court] has established that there is reasonable suspicion that [the applicant] has committed the crime. The other participants in the crime confessed and incriminated [the applicant].\nGiven that [the applicant] has been previously charged with criminal offences, that he is suspected of having committed a serious crime, it is impossible to apply a more lenient preventive measure.\u201d 8.  On an unspecified date the applicant was charged with conspiracy to commit robbery. 9.  On 27 September 2004 the Novgorod Town Court extended the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention until 8 November 2004 noting as follows:\n\u201cRegard being had to the [applicant\u2019s] character and the seriousness of the charges against him, the court considers that it is not possible to lift or replace the earlier imposed preventive measure because [the applicant] may interfere with the establishment of the truth or abscond.\u201d 10.  On 4 November 2004 the Town Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 8 January 2005. It reiterated verbatim its earlier reasoning. 11.  On 7 December 2004 the investigator dropped the murder charges against the applicant for lack of corpus delicti. He further re-classified the charge against the applicant as robbery committed by a group of persons. 12.  On 30 December 2004 the Town Court extended the applicant\u2019s pre\u2011trial detention until 28 January 2005. The court noted as follows:\n\u201cRegard being had to the seriousness of the charges, the [applicant\u2019s] character and the negative references, the court does not discern grounds to change the earlier imposed preventive measure or to release [the applicant].\u201d 13.  On 25 January 2005 the Novgorod Regional Court upheld the decision of 30 December 2004 on appeal noting that, in view of the seriousness of the charges, the applicant might interfere with the establishment of the truth, abscond or re-offend. 14.  On 14 February 2005 the Regional Court fixed the preliminary hearing of the applicant\u2019s case for 24 February 2005. The court also ruled that the applicant should be detained pending trial. On 28 April 2005 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the said decision on appeal. 15.  On 20 July 2005 the Regional Court rescheduled the preliminary hearing in the applicant\u2019s case for 4 August 2005. The applicant and his lawyer were present. The lawyer asked for the applicant\u2019s release into his mother\u2019s care pending trial. The court dismissed the request and extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 27 October 2005 noting that \u201cthe preventive measure earlier imposed on [the applicant] should remain unchanged\u201d. Both the applicant and his lawyer appealed. 16.  On 21 September 2005 the Supreme Court upheld the decision of 20 July 2015 on appeal. The court decided to consider the matter in the applicant\u2019s absence noting that the applicant had attended the hearing on 20 July 2005 and had been provided with an opportunity to be heard. The applicant\u2019s lawyer and the prosecutor were present and made submissions to the court. As regards the extension of the applicant\u2019s detention, the court ruled that the circumstances underlying the applicant\u2019s remand in custody continued to exist. In this connection the court noted as follows:\n\u201cIt follows from the materials of the case that [the applicant] has earlier committed another crime, that he had been absent from classes in school and had demonstrated anti-social behavior. He had not spent nights at home and had not lived with his mother for extended periods of time. His mother could not control his behavior; she did not pay due attention to his upbringing and had no influence over him. The [applicant\u2019s] release into his mother\u2019s care ... would not ensure his due behavior pending trial.\u201d 17.  On 17 October 2005 the Regional Court extended the applicant\u2019s and two other defendants\u2019 detention until 27 January 2006. The court noted:\n\u201cThe defendants are charged with particularly serious offences; the circumstances of their remand in custody have not changed. The court does not discern circumstances that would allow it to apply a more lenient preventive measure, including the [applicant\u2019s] release into his mother\u2019s care.\u201d 18.  On 15 December 2005 the Supreme Court upheld the decision of 17 October 2005 on appeal. 19.  On 24 January 2006 the Regional Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention and two other defendants\u2019 detention until 27 April 2006. The court reiterated verbatim its reasoning of 17 October 2005. 20.  On 13 February 2006 the Regional Court found the applicant guilty of robbery and sentenced him to four and a half years\u2019 imprisonment. On 27 September 2006 the Supreme Court of Russia upheld, in substance, the applicant\u2019s conviction on appeal. 21.  On 2 August 2007 the Nevelskiy District Court of the Pskov Region released the applicant on parole.", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "6", "7", "8", "3", "5", "9", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "12.  The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in London. She is the cousin of Jean Charles de Menezes, who was shot dead by police officers on 22 July 2005. 13.  On 7 July 2005 four suicide bombers detonated explosions on the London transport network. Three of the suicide bombers were on underground trains and one was on a bus. Fifty-six people, including the four suicide bombers, were killed in the attack and many more were injured. 14.  The Metropolitan Police Service (\u201cMPS\u201d) initiated a major police investigation to establish the identities of persons involved in or otherwise connected with the explosions. Available intelligence indicated that terrorists were actively planning a further attack within a matter of days and the threat level posed to the United Kingdom from international terrorism was raised from Level 3 to Level 1. 15.  On 21 July 2005, precisely two weeks after the first bombings, four explosive devices were discovered in rucksacks left on three underground trains and on one bus. As it was feared that the failed bombers would regroup the following morning and attempt to detonate further explosions, the MPS immediately launched an operation to find them (Operation THESEUS 2). This operation was led, as Gold Commander, by Police Commander John McDowall. 16.  At 4.20 a.m. on 22 July 2005 Commander McDowall was informed that intelligence had identified Hussain Osman as a suspect in the failed bombings of 21 July. Both Mr Osman and another suspect were thought to be living in an apartment at 21 Scotia Road, London. 17.  At 4.38 a.m. on 22 July 2005 Commander McDowall decided to mount surveillance operations at both Scotia Road and another London address. The overall aim of the operation at 21 Scotia Road was to establish whether the suspects were present in the apartment and to arrest them safely if they came out. Commander McDowall\u2019s strategy for this operation was not recorded; however, it would appear to have been to control the premises at Scotia Road through covert surveillance, to follow persons leaving the premises until it was felt safe to challenge them, and then to stop them. In order to implement this strategy his plan was that a surveillance team from SO12 (Special Branch) should be in attendance at Scotia Road. They were to be supported by a unit from SO19, a Specialist Crime & Operations branch of the MPS. The unit from SO19 consisted of highly trained Special Firearms Officers (\u201cSFOs\u201d) who were usually deployed on pre-planned operations. Although some surveillance officers were armed for their own protection and that of the public, their training did not enable them to be used as a resource to arrest armed suspects. SO19 would normally undertake this task, although armed officers from SO12 could be used for this purpose as a last resort. 18.  The Crown Prosecution Service (\u201cCPS\u201d) Review Note later found that if Commander McDowall\u2019s strategy had been followed (notably, had the team from SO19 been deployed in time to support the surveillance teams at Scotia Road), events would not have unfolded as they did. 19.  Commander McDowall appointed Commander Cressida Dick as the Designated Senior Officer (\u201cDSO\u201d) in charge who was to be responsible for achieving the THESEUS 2 strategy safely. As such, she had responsibility for the operation at 21 Scotia Road on 22 July 2005. She was based in Control Room 1600, where she was supported by Trojan 80, an experienced SFO from SO19 who was acting as her tactical adviser. 20.  Detective Chief Inspector C (\u201cDCI C\u201d) was appointed as Silver Commander for the operation at Scotia Road. Although a Silver Commander would normally have ultimate responsibility for the management of an incident and deployment of firearms resources, on this occasion the DSO retained this responsibility and DCI C operated as the DSO\u2019s ground commander. DCI C was supported by and accompanied on the ground by Trojan 84, who, like Trojan 80, was an experienced SFO from SO19 who was acting as a tactical adviser. Trojan 84 was in charge of the SFO team to be deployed and he was in direct contact with Trojan 80. 21.  Detective Superintendent Jon Boutcher (\u201cDS Boutcher\u201d), the Senior Investigating Officer for the investigation into the identity of the persons responsible for the bombings on 7 July 2005, was also appointed as a Silver Commander. 22.  At 5.00 a.m. on 22 July 2005 a surveillance team from SO12 was called out. No request was made at this stage for a unit from SO19. 23.  By 6.04 a.m. two surveillance teams from SO12 had been deployed to the Scotia Road address to control the premises and to follow anyone coming out of the apartments. 21 Scotia Road was accessed by the same doorway as 17 Scotia Road and the surveillance teams were stationed in an observation van which had a view of that doorway. 24.  The Anti-Terrorist Branch of the MPS (\u201cSO13\u201d) deployed four officers to assist with any arrest and to gain intelligence. DS Boutcher was the link between the Control Room and SO13. 25.  At 6.50 a.m. Commander McDowall held a briefing during which the firearms strategy was outlined. Trojan 80 was present at the briefing together with the Silver Commanders for the surveillance operations at Scotia Road and the second London address. The DSO arrived at 7.15 a.m.; however, Commander McDowall spoke to her after the briefing to ensure she had all the information and assistance she needed. 26.  As they had not been called out earlier (see paragraph 22 above), SFOs from SO19 were allocated to the operation when they reported for duty. At 7.45 a.m. Trojan 84 briefed the SFOs. The briefing was not recorded but he appears to have told the team that they \u201cmay be required to use unusual tactics because of the environment they were in and that they should think about this\u201d. When asked for clarification Trojan 84 added that, in relation to a critical shot, the instruction would come directly from the DSO. However, if they were deployed to intercept a subject and there was an opportunity to challenge but the subject was non-compliant, a critical shot could be taken. The CPS later found that this briefing \u201cstoked the [SFOs] fears that they would meet suicide bombers and that they may have to shoot such people\u201d. 27.  Following the briefing the unit from SO19 travelled to a police station at Nightingale Lane, which was about two miles from Scotia Road. They stopped off for petrol on the way. Upon arrival they received a further briefing from DCI C, which commenced at 8.50 a.m. The briefing was not recorded but it appears that DCI C confirmed the terrorists had the capacity to attach a device to themselves that would be difficult to detect. He described the individuals involved in the bombings as being \u201cdeadly and determined\u201d and \u201cup for it\u201d. The CPS later criticised this briefing as unbalanced as DCI C had failed to caution the SFOs that not everyone they would stop leaving Scotia Road would be a suicide bomber and that they should not overreact in the heat of the moment. 28.  The team from SO19 was not deployed on the ground until after 9.30 a.m. 29.  Jean Charles de Menezes was a Brazilian national who lived at 17 Scotia Road. At 9.33 a.m. he left his apartment building through the common doorway in order to go to work. An officer in the surveillance van saw Mr de Menezes, described him and suggested \u201cit would be worth someone else having a look\u201d. However, as the unit from SO19 had not yet reached Scotia Road it was not possible to stop Mr de Menezes at this stage (as per the strategy outlined at paragraph 17 above). Instead, he was followed by the surveillance officers. 30.  On leaving Scotia Road Mr de Menezes walked a short distance to a bus stop and got on a bus heading towards Brixton. The CCTV on the bus did not capture the entire journey due to vibrations but Mr de Menezes was recorded as being on the bus by 9.39 a.m. At this point the surveillance team described him as \u201ca good possible likeness\u201d to Hussain Osman. By 9.46 a.m. the description had changed to \u201cnot identical\u201d. 31.  At 9.47 a.m. Mr de Menezes got off the bus. He was then seen using his mobile phone before running back to the bus and reboarding. 32.  There are conflicting accounts of whether a positive identification was made of Mr de Menezes as the suspect at this stage. It appears from the Stockwell One Report of the Independent Police Complaints Commission (the \u201cIPCC\u201d \u2013 see paragraphs 45-71 below) that those on the ground had not been able to identify Mr de Menezes as Hussein Osman. The fact that the Surveillance Running Log refers to him at each entry as being an \u201cU/I [unidentified] male\u201d lends some support to this position. Nevertheless, those in Control Room 1600 appear to have believed that a positive identification of Hussein Osman had been made. 33.  At around the time that Mr de Menezes reboarded the bus the unit from SO19 began to make its way towards Brixton. The SFO team leader later told the IPCC that he heard over the radio that \u201cit was definitely our man and that he was nervous and twitchy\u201d. 34.  At 9.59 a.m. the surveillance teams were asked to give a percentage indication of the likelihood that Mr de Menezes was the suspect and they replied that it was \u201cimpossible [to do so] but thought that it was [the] suspect\u201d. 35.  Mr de Menezes got off the bus at Stockwell and walked towards Stockwell underground station. There were several surveillance officers in the vicinity and their leader offered to stop Mr de Menezes before he entered the station. The DSO initially ordered that they perform the stop, having been informed that the unit from SO19 was not yet in a position to intervene. However, almost immediately thereafter she was informed that the unit was on hand. As a consequence, she countermanded her original order and instructed the SFOs to stop Mr de Menezes. By this time Mr de Menezes was already in the underground station. Trojan 84 relayed the order to the SFOs, informing them that \u201cthey want us to stop the subject getting on the tube\u201d. The SFOs were told that they were going to Code Red, which meant that they were to have ultimate control of the situation and that an armed interception was imminent. 36.  The CCTV at the station shows Mr de Menezes entering the station at 10.03 a.m. wearing a thin denim jacket, a T-shirt and denim jeans, walking calmly and not carrying anything. He went down an escalator and onto a platform. There is no CCTV recording of the lower end of the escalator or of the platform: the relevant tapes, when seized by the MPS, were blank. The IPCC Stockwell One Report and the CPS later found that this was because a cable had been damaged during recent refurbishment works. 37.  At 10.05 a.m. a number of SFOs entered Stockwell underground station and ran down the escalators. At 10.06 a.m. they followed Mr de Menezes onto the platform. Eyewitness accounts as to what exactly happened next are conflicting and some of the witnesses gave accounts which it is now known could not have been accurate. However, it would appear from the accounts quoted in the IPCC Stockwell One Report that: Mr de Menezes went into the third coach of a stationary train and sat down; one of the surveillance officers shouted to the SFOs that Mr de Menezes was there; Mr de Menezes stood up, arms down; he was pushed back onto his seat and pinned down by two police officers; according to one witness his hand may have moved towards the left hand side of his trouser waistband; and two SFOs (Charlie 2 and Charlie 12) shot Mr de Menezes several times and killed him. 38.  Within days of the shooting, after it had become apparent that Mr de Menezes had not been involved in the attempted terror attacks on 21 July, the Commissioner of the Police of the Metropolis, the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs expressed their profound regret at his death. A representative of the MPS travelled to meet his family in Brazil and apologised directly to them on behalf of the police. An ex gratia payment was agreed upon to ensure that the family\u2019s financial needs were met. They were encouraged to take independent legal advice from a solicitor in the United Kingdom and they were advised that their legal costs in doing so would be met. 39.  The Police Reform Act 2002 and the Police (Complaints and Misconduct) Regulations 2004 required a police shooting to be referred to the IPCC. However, following the shooting of Mr de Menezes the Commissioner of the Police of the Metropolis wrote to the Home Office to inform it that he had decided not to refer the matter to the IPCC at that time. 40.  As it was not immediately clear that Mr de Menezes had not been connected to the attempted bombings, the Anti-Terrorist Branch initially retained primary control of the scene of the shooting. During this time the Department of Professional Standards (\u201cDPS\u201d), an independent section of the MPS which had been notified of the shooting at 10.38 a.m. on 22 July 2005, ensured the integrity of the scene, interviewed witnesses, and completed forensic retrieval. 41.  After the shooting Charlie 2 and Charlie 12 had been taken to a police station. At 2.30 p.m., having taken legal advice, they indicated that they would not be making statements at that time. Instead, they made their statements together at approximately 2.00 p.m. the next day, after they had been told that Mr de Menezes was not connected to the attempted bombings. Some of the details they initially provided have since been either proved false or called into doubt. For example, they initially indicated that Mr de Menezes had been wearing a bulky jacket (CCTV footage showed him wearing a light denim jacket) and that the officers from SO19 had shouted \u201carmed police\u201d when they boarded the train (the IPCC considered such an action to be \u201cillogical\u201d when confronting a possible suicide bomber). 42.  An officer from SO12 had seized the surveillance log at 12.35 p.m. on 22 July 2005. However, at 8.40 p.m. the same day it was handed back to the officers from the unit. Around this time an amendment appears to have been made to an entry; the words \u201ca split second view of his face. I believe it was [the suspect]\u201d appear to have been altered to read \u201cI believe it was NOT [the suspect]\u201d. 43.  At 9.45 p.m. on 22 July 2005 the Anti-Terrorist Branch formally handed over control of the scene to the DPS as they were satisfied that Mr de Menezes was not connected to the attempted bombings. 44.  On 23 July 2005 a post-mortem examination took place and recorded the cause of death as \u201cmultiple gunshot wounds to the head. The cause of death is severe disruption to the brain\u201d. 45.  On 25 July 2005 the DPS formally referred the investigation to the IPCC, whose investigation began on 27 July 2005 when the DPS provided it with the relevant material in its possession. Because of the seriousness of \u2013 and the public interest in \u2013 the matter, the IPCC determined that it would use its own staff to carry out the investigation. It was overseen by the Chair of the IPCC personally and the investigating team possessed all the powers and privileges of a police constable carrying out an investigation. 46.  The purpose of the investigation was to advise the CPS of any criminal offence that might have been committed; to provide it with the evidence necessary to come to a decision about any prosecution; to enable the \u201cresponsible authorities\u201d of the officers concerned (the MPS and Metropolitan Police Authority, or \u201cMPA\u201d) to consider what disciplinary or other action they might need to take; to inform the Secretary of State for the Home Department of the circumstances of Mr de Menezes\u2019 death; and to assist the coroner in relation to any inquest. 47.  In particular, the investigation by the IPCC was to examine:\na)  the information that led to the surveillance of the apartments at Scotia Road;\nb)  the command structure of the operation, including details of the numbers and types of specialist officers deployed and the tactics available to them;\nc)  the qualification and training of those involved and their suitability to carry out their role;\nd)  details of the briefing given to the officers involved and any description or photograph of any suspect made available;\ne)  whether or not the operation was designated as a \u201cKRATOS\u201d operation (the national strategy for dealing with suspected suicide bombers which permitted the use of lethal force if absolutely necessary) and the policy, operational tactics and authority levels of \u201cKRATOS\u201d;\nf)  the details of the mobile surveillance operation from Scotia Road to Stockwell underground station;\ng)  the details of police action once Mr de Menezes had reached Stockwell underground station;\nh)  whether or not the policy and operational authorities of \u201cKRATOS\u201d were followed and were effective; and\ni)  whether \u201cKRATOS\u201d was compliant with Article 2 of the Convention. 48.  The IPCC was also to report on the actions and statements of the DPS from the time of the incident to the formal handover of the investigation to the IPCC to ensure that the IPCC investigation met its obligations under Article 2 of the Convention. 49.  During the course of the investigation nearly 890 witness statements were taken from police, forensic experts and civilian witnesses and more than 800 exhibits were collected. The family of Mr de Menezes, together with their legal representatives, were given regular detailed verbal briefings on the progress of the investigation and eventually on its conclusions. 50.  On 30 September 2005 the IPCC investigating team submitted a report to the IPCC indicating, inter alia, that certain officers might have committed criminal or disciplinary offences. The IPCC therefore wrote to the MPS and to the MPA about the officers concerned. 51.  On 19 January 2006 the IPCC Stockwell One Report was completed and submitted to the CPS. On 6 and 22 March 2006 the legal representatives of Mr de Menezes were briefed on the IPCC investigation and report. IPCC personnel also offered to travel to Brazil to brief any member of his family residing there. On 14 March 2006 the IPCC submitted its recommendations to the MPS, MPA, Her Majesty\u2019s Inspector of Constabulary and to the Home Office.\n(a)  Summary of the Stockwell One Report\u2019s conclusions 52.  The report considered all the witness statements and outlined in detail the events of 22 July 2005 and the investigative steps which followed the shooting. In particular, it examined the actions and responsibility of the Commanders, their advisers and all the frontline SFOs and surveillance officers. While it accepted that the death of Mr de Menezes was not the result of any deliberate act designed to endanger the life of any innocent third party, it nevertheless concluded that:\n\u201c20.01 There can be no doubt that on the morning of 22 July 2005 a combination of circumstances between 0500 and 1006 led to the killing of an entirely innocent man.\u201d 53.  With regard to this \u201ccombination of circumstances\u201d, it identified a number of failings. 54.  First, it criticised the briefings given by DCI C and Trojan 84:\n\u201c20.8 There is no doubt that the briefings provided by [DCI C and Trojan 84] included a comprehensive update on the intelligence including the links between 7 July and 21 July and the possibility that the firearms officers may have to confront one of the terrorists who had survived the suicide bombings the previous day. What the briefing for [SO19], and indeed the other teams, did not include was any rider about the circumstances in which the Operation KRATOS policy could be used. That policy was only one option available to the Metropolitan Police for dealing with suspected terrorists and suicide bombers. The [SO19] officers were not told that it should only be used as a matter of last resort when they were sure of the identity of the person in relation to whom the policy was to be applied. That should have been included in the briefing.\u201d 55.  Secondly, it criticised the failure to implement Commander McDowall\u2019s strategy by deploying the unit from SO19 to Scotia Road earlier:\n\u201c20.15 The management of the operation between 07:15hrs and 09:30hrs should have involved giving practical effect to the strategy devised by Commander MCDOWALL so that appropriate resources were in place at SCOTIA ROAD from the earliest possible time. Commander DICK was in charge of the operation following her briefing from Commander MCDOWALL. The policy, which is described at paragraphs 6.3 and 6.4, was, in essence, one of containment, stop and arrest. What occurred between 07:15hrs and 10:06hrs was a failure of that policy. Between 07:15hrs and 09:33hrs there was no adequate effort to put in place police resources at SCOTIA ROAD that would have enabled the Metropolitan Police to give effect to the policy. During those hours there was a series of briefings. None of the eight people who left the flats before Mr DE MENEZES left were stopped in accordance with the strategy and when he left he was simply followed while ineffective attempts were made during the course of half an hour to determine whether he was [the suspect]. If appropriate resources had been in place there would have been the opportunity to stop Mr DE MENEZES during the course of his five minute walk from SCOTIA ROAD before catching the bus in TULSE HILL.\n... ... ... 20.32 Detective Chief Inspector C, the Silver Commander, was effectively the ground commander with responsibility for SO12, SO13 and [SO19] officers. However owing to the fact that he was still with SO13 and [SO19] at NIGHTINGALE LANE when Mr DE MENEZES left SCOTIA ROAD, and stationary at the T.A. Centre when DE MENEZES was identified as the suspect at BRIXTON, DCI C was always playing \u2018Catch up\u2019 in respect of the operation.\n... ... ... 20.49 ... evidence from the CCTV at STOCKWELL underground station reveals that the [SO19] officers did not enter the station until two minutes after MR DE MENEZES had passed though the ticket barriers. 20.50 While two minutes is a very short time period, the delay in [SO19] getting to the scene and the failure to get a positive identification had enabled a person, believed to be a possible suspect for attempting to detonate a bomb on the underground system the day before, to get on the same bus twice and enter an underground station.\u201d 56.  Thirdly, the report was critical of the delay in handing the investigation to the IPCC:\n\u201c17.22 The pressures under which the Metropolitan Police were operating following the events of 7 July and 21 July are self-evident. However, the fact that the independent body established by an Act of Parliament to investigate complaints and serious incidents involving the police, and which has independently investigated every fatal police shooting since 1 April 2004, was now to be excluded from the scene, is a major concern for an independent investigation, and should never occur again. 17.23 The fact that there was such concern over the problems with the CCTV tapes at STOCKWELL and the fact that the hard drives on the train were missing highlights the problem. This issue could have been resolved a lot earlier had they been under the control of the IPCC.\n... ... ... 17.25 The failure to allow the IPCC access has also been highlighted by the fact that the surveillance log 165330 has been altered.\n... ... ... 17.33 Had the IPCC been involved at the commencement of the investigation, the surveillance log would not have been released for amendments to be made.\u201d 57.  Nevertheless, the IPCC found that high vibrations had interfered with the recording of most of the bus journey, the hard drive on the train had not been replaced on the relevant day, and the recording equipment in the station had been broken during prior refurbishments. Consequently, it concluded that there was \u201cno evidence of a cover-up to withhold this evidence from the investigation\u201d. 58.  Likewise, two expert witnesses who examined the surveillance log could not agree either that it had been altered or, if it had been, who might have altered it.\n(b)  Prosecutions 59.  The report also identified a number of individuals whom the CPS might consider prosecuting.\n(i)  Charlie 2 and Charlie 12 60.  As to the shooting of Mr de Menezes after he had been tackled on the train, the IPCC noted:\n\u201c20.71 The actions of Charlie 2 and Charlie 12 should be considered in light of the day\u2019s events and those of the previous two weeks. At the briefing, they were supplied with a full briefing on the capabilities of the terror suspects. During the operation they had heard the man being followed was being identified as one of the suspects from the previous day\u2019s attempted bombings. On arrival at STOCKWELL, [SO19] went to State Red, authorising a firearms intervention, following an order from the DSO to stop the man from entering the station and tube train. 20.72 They had seen \u2018Ivor\u2019 [a surveillance officer from SO12] point at the suspect, who they saw get off his seat. \u2018Ivor\u2019 then grabbed the man and forced him back to the seats. Both officers state they believed they had to act immediately to prevent loss of life to the people on the train.\n... ... ... 20.74 Charlies 2 and 12 clearly believed they were acting in self-defence, and had the right in law to use the force they did. The [CPS] may wish to consider whether the actions of Charlie 2 and Charlie 12 amount to murder in the context of their justification for the shooting of Mr DE MENEZES and having regard to the fact that there were explanations given for the shooting at that time which did not accord with the accounts given 36 hours later.\n... ... ... 20.94 ... [The CPS] ... may also wish to consider whether they were grossly negligent to come to the conclusion that they were confronting a suicide bomber.\u201d\n(ii)  The DSO 61.  With regard to the role of the DSO, the IPCC stated:\n\u201c20.77 The order given by Commander DICK was to stop the suspect getting onto the underground station and subsequently the underground train. When interviewed she was asked to explain the word \u2018Stop\u2019 and her response was that \u2018Stop\u2019 is a common word in policing terms and it was meant as \u2018stop and detain\u2019. This opinion is supported by DCI C and Trojan 80 and 84. 20.78 However, the way the order was received by [SO19] must be considered. Following a full briefing, many of the [SO19] officers have described that they believed that they would have to confront a suicide bomber. The [SO19] officers have stated that they believed the man being followed on the bus had been identified as one of the suspects for the failed bombings on 21 July 2005. They had been in a situation of trying to \u2018Catch up\u2019 with the surveillance team since their briefing had finished. And as they approached STOCKWELL underground station they hear that the suspect had entered the underground station and they received an order to stop him getting on the underground train. I do not believe that the use of the word \u2018Stop\u2019 can be related to normal policing duties. With the mind-set of the [SO19] officers believing that a suicide bomber had entered the underground station, to receive such an order to stop him from DSO cannot be related to normal duties. They had not had the benefit of a rider to their briefing of the sort to which I refer at paragraph 20.8. If they had received such a briefing they might have been more cautious in the way they approached and dealt with Mr DE MENEZES.\n... ... ... 20.82 I [Senior Investigator J.D. Cummins] comment at paragraph 20.47 on the consequences of the surveillance team having failed to adequately identify the person they were following. However, that team had spent thirty minutes following and staying with Mr DE MENEZES and attempting to identify him. That provided Commander DICK with a thirty minute opportunity to act in accordance with the operation strategy. There was no attempt to do so. 20.83 The SO12 officers who were following Mr DE MENEZES had been authorised to carry firearms for their personal protection and the protection of the public. In the context of the events of 7 July and 21 July when, respectively, there had been a successful detonation and an attempted detonation of bombs on buses it was a failure of the management of the operation to permit Mr DE MENEZES to get on the bus at TULSE HILL. If he had been a suicide bomber that event could have been catastrophic. Therefore the failure to use SO12 to stop him getting back on the bus in BRIXTON is an even more inexplicable failure to apply the strategy.\n... ... ... 20.87 [The DSO] has endorsed that she was the person in command.\nThe [CPS] may wish to consider whether the manner in which this operation was commanded, the failures to have resources properly deployed and the absence of any other tactical options could be considered to be grossly negligent.\u201d\n(iii)  \u201cJames\u201d 62.  With regard to the \u201cidentification\u201d of Mr de Menezes as the suspect, the IPCC noted:\n\u201c20.53 ... James [the head of the surveillance teams] did not communicate that some of his team thought that the subject was not [the suspect]. This information should have been fully communicated to [the DSO] as it may have influenced her decision-making. The [CPS] may wish to consider whether this negligence by \u2018James\u2019 ... satisfies the test for gross negligence.\u201d\n(iv)  The other officers on the train 63.  As to any potential offence on the part of the eight officers on board the train:\n\u201c20.91 Given that they believed they were confronting a suicide bomber it is perhaps illogical that they would have challenged him prior to trying to detain him. The [CPS] may wish to consider whether any of the eight officers on the train who state they shouted or heard the words \u2018armed police\u2019 have conspired to ... pervert the course of justice. ...\u201d\n(v)  Trojan 80, Trojan 84 and DCI C 64.  As the IPCC did not consider that Trojan 80, Trojan 84 and DCI C had been in a position to influence the outcome of events, it was of the opinion that they could not be held responsible.\n(vi)  The surveillance log 65.  In respect of the possible alteration of the surveillance log (see paragraphs 42 and 56 above), the IPCC did not find sufficient evidence against any individual to suggest that criminal proceedings might be appropriate.\n(c)  Operational recommendations 66.  The IPCC noted that in the course of its investigation grave concerns had been raised about the effectiveness of the police response on 22 July 2005. These concerns were not only that an entirely innocent member of the public had been killed in error but also that the police response might not have been adequate to stop a terrorist who was intent on causing harm. It therefore made a number of detailed operational recommendations. 67.  The IPCC underlined two operational concerns about the use of firearms: the substantial delay between the time the unit from SO19 was requested and when it was deployed, and the lack of clarity about the command to \u201cstop\u201d the suspect given the likely mind-set of the SFOs. It also made detailed recommendations on command and control issues in firearms operations, including the need to clarify the roles and responsibilities within the chain of command; to establish a clear and common understanding of the circumstances surrounding future operations; and, given the failure to implement Commander McDowall\u2019s strategy to ensure the deployment of the unit from SO19 in time, to put in place better communications channels. 68.  In respect of the surveillance operations, the IPCC expressed concern that the surveillance team, the SFOs, and those in command were not used to working together and were not sufficiently familiar with each other\u2019s working practices; that two surveillance officers believed the person being followed was not the suspect and that this was not communicated to the DSO; and that the surveillance log had been altered. 69.  In relation to the post-incident management, the IPCC repeated its concern about the delay in handing the scene and the investigation to it, and about the fact that Charlie 2 and Charlie 12 had been allowed to return to their own base, refresh themselves, confer and write up their notes together. 70.  As regards the communications infrastructure, the IPCC was concerned that key briefings and strategic and tactical decisions were not recorded and furthermore that the command and control of the incident was inevitably lost when the unit from SO19 entered the underground. Concerns were also expressed that the existing Firearms Manual and the \u201cKRATOS\u201d policy were patently insufficient to deal with the current terrorist threat.\n(d)  Publication 71.  The IPCC Stockwell One Report was not made public until 8 November 2007 as publication was delayed pending the criminal trial of the Office of the Commissioner of the Police of the Metropolis (\u201cOCPM\u201d) (see paragraphs 100-101 below). 72.  On 14 October 2005 the MPA referred a complaint to the IPCC about the MPS\u2019s handling of public statements following the shooting of Mr de Menezes. The IPCC carried out a second investigation and the IPCC Stockwell Two Report was published on 2 August 2007. The contents of that report are not directly relevant to the complaint currently before the Court. 73.  The IPCC had the power to recommend or direct the MPS to bring disciplinary proceedings against individuals. During the IPCC investigation fifteen officers were served with notices under Regulation 9 of the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2004, informing them that they were being investigated and warning them that the investigation might result in disciplinary proceedings being brought against them. 74.  However, on 11 May 2007 the IPCC decided that no disciplinary action should be pursued against any of the eleven frontline and surveillance officers involved in the operation since there was no realistic prospect of any disciplinary charges being upheld. One surveillance officer received \u201cwords of advice\u201d in connection with the alteration of the surveillance log. 75.  A decision concerning disciplinary charges against the two Commanders and their tactical advisers was postponed until after the prosecution of the OCPM (see paragraphs 100-101 below). 76.  On receiving the IPCC Stockwell One Report, the CPS considered whether to bring prosecutions against any individual officers for murder, involuntary manslaughter by way of gross negligence (\u201cgross negligence manslaughter\u201d), misconduct in public office, forgery or attempting to pervert the course of justice. It also considered whether to prosecute the OCPM or any individual for offences under the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 (\u201cthe 1974 Act\u201d). In deciding whether or not to prosecute, it first had to apply a threshold evidential test, namely, whether or not there was a realistic prospect of conviction, before asking whether or not prosecution would be in the public interest (see paragraph 163 below).\n(a)  The first decision letter 77.  By letter dated 17 July 2006 the CPS notified the deceased\u2019s family that the Director of Public Prosecutions (\u201cDPP\u201d) had decided to prosecute the OCPM, not in his individual capacity but as an employer of police officers, for failing to provide for the health, safety and welfare of Mr de Menezes contrary to sections 3 and 33 of the 1974 Act (see paragraphs 157-158 below). No individual was to be prosecuted in relation to the death as there was \u201cinsufficient evidence to provide a realistic prospect of conviction against any individual police officer\u201d; that is, it was more likely than not that a jury would not convict. 78.  The decision letter, in so far as relevant, provided as follows:\n\u201cIn the circumstances of this case, if the prosecution could prove that [the SFOs] were not acting in self defence (either of themselves or others) then they would be charged with murder. The order was given that Jean Charles was to be stopped from getting on the train. Although officers in the control room intended that Jean Charles should be arrested outside the station, the [SFO team] were not in place to make such an arrest, nor was this intention made explicit to the [SFOs] who were being sent down to the train. All the available evidence suggests that they believed that Jean Charles had been identified as a suicide bomber, that they had been directed to stop him from blowing up the train and that they had to shoot him to prevent that ....\nThe burden would be on the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that these two officers did not honestly and genuinely believe that they were facing a lethal threat and so I looked to see if there was sufficient evidence to disprove that they had such an honest and genuine belief. Both officers stated that Jean Charles was wearing a \u2018bulky\u2019 jacket when they saw him but in fact Jean Charles was wearing a simple denim jacket. I therefore took this into account as it could indicate that the officers had lied. However even if I could prove that the officers had lied, rather than simply being mistaken, this alone would not be enough to commence a prosecution for murder as there could be other reasons for an officer to lie. I also considered their explanations of Jean Charles\u2019s movements when they approached him, to see if there was evidence that they had fabricated those accounts to justify their actions. Both refer to Jean Charles getting up and advancing towards them with his hands down by his side before he was tackled by a surveillance officer and forced back into the seat. The [SFOs] then shot Jean Charles. I had to consider whether the prosecution could argue that the restraint meant that no bomb could be detonated and that the firearms officers\u2019 actions were unlawful. However I must bear in mind that this happened in a matter of seconds and there is some independent evidence that supports the officers\u2019 accounts that they feared Jean Charles might detonate a bomb. A witness sitting opposite Jean Charles said \u2018I got the impression that he was reaching to the left hand side of his trouser waistband.\u2019 ...\nAs I cannot prove the officers did not act in genuine self-defence, I cannot charge them with murder or any other offence of assault, including manslaughter.\nThere is some disagreement between officers and the members of the public as to whether any warning was given that armed police were approaching the train. In a situation such as this, where a warning to a suspected bomber could be fatal for officers and the public, no warning should be given. However some police officers say that they did hear a call of \u2018armed police\u2019 before the shooting and although passengers did hear officers shouting as they ran down the stairs, none of them heard the words \u2018armed police.\u2019 Both of the [SFOs] say that they shouted \u2018armed police\u2019 immediately before they fired but whether they did, and if so, whether it was intended as a warning to Jean Charles or to others in the carriage is unclear. There is no doubt that some police officers did shout something before any shots were fired .... Unless I could prove that officers had lied ... to mislead any investigation, I could not prosecute them for attempting to pervert the course of justice.\nNext I carefully examined the roles of those police officers concerned in planning the surveillance and stop and those who carried it out. ... there were a number of people involved and there is no doubt that messages were misinterpreted with tragic consequences. I have considered whether any errors or other conduct by individuals could be categorised as criminal. In this I have applied the law on gross negligence manslaughter, misconduct in public office and the [1974] Act. Even where I found that individuals had made mistakes, I found insufficient evidence that those mistakes were so bad that they could be described as criminal. As criminal proceedings are to be brought against the [OCPM], I cannot provide you with a detailed account of the conduct of those individuals, as that conduct will form part of the prosecution case.\u201d\n(b)  The Review Notes 79.  More detailed reasons were provided in a fifty-page Review Note dated 9 March 2006 as well as in a Final Review Note of 9 July 2006.\n(i)  The IPCC investigation 80.  In respect of the investigation by the IPCC, the Review Note stated that:\n\u201cI am satisfied that the investigation has complied with Article 2 and the procedural requirements that flow from it. The IPCC is clearly independent of the Metropolitan Police and the investigation has not been limited to the actual shooting on the train but has examined the whole of the operation. I have had a number of discussions with senior investigators at the IPCC who have assisted me with any queries I have raised. I am therefore satisfied that I have sufficient material before me to reach a decision on the criminal liability of those officers involved in the operation that led to the death of Mr de Menezes and the Commissioner as corporation sole.\u201d 81.  However, the Review Note drew attention to one particular evidential difficulty:\n\u201cPerhaps the most significant problem in understanding what occurred is that there is an almost complete absence of any worthwhile contemporaneous records and the accounts from the participants vary significantly on all the crucial aspects. It is at times impossible to say with any certainty what was said, by whom, to whom and when. There is also the issue that some accounts were made in the knowledge that something terrible had gone wrong.\u201d 82.  With regard to the witness statements taken from the passengers on the train, the Review Note indicated that there were inevitable inconsistencies in their recollections of events with the consequence that \u201cthe accounts do not match either among themselves or with those of the police\u201d. For example, some of the witnesses confused Mr de Menezes with \u201cIvor\u201d, one of the surveillance officers.\n(ii)  Charlie 2 and Charlie 12 83.  With regard to Charlie 2 and Charlie 12, the Review Note reiterated that there was insufficient evidence to persuade a jury that they did not genuinely believe they were acting in self-defence. It noted that, if they did hold a genuine belief, then the actions they took in shooting dead a \u201csuicide bomber\u201d would be reasonable and would not be unlawful.\n(iii)  The DSO 84.  As for Commander Cressida Dick, the Review Note stated that there was no evidence against her to sustain a charge of murder as she did not order any officer to open fire. The prosecutor was, however, satisfied that there was evidence her actions and direction and failure to plan fell below the standard of a reasonable officer in her position and, as such, a breach of the duty of care and causation could be shown. Nevertheless, he considered that there was \u201cnowhere near enough\u201d evidence to persuade a jury that her conduct was so bad as to justify a charge of gross negligence manslaughter. He also considered the possibility of prosecuting Commander Dick for offences under sections 7 and 33 of the 1974 Act, but, having applied the relevant criteria, found that the prosecution of her or of any of the other individual officers under these provisions would not be in accordance with Health and Safety Executive Policy.\n(iv)  Trojan 84 85.  In the Review Note the prosecutor identified Trojan 84 as the officer most closely connected with the death of Mr de Menezes. In particular, he had failed to dispatch firearms cover to Scotia Road, he gave the briefing that stoked the SFOs fears that they would meet suicide bombers and that they might have to shoot them, and, finally, he should have known that once the SFOs were away from the armed response vehicle and were to engage with a potential suicide bomber the overwhelming likelihood was that they would shoot. However, he could not be prosecuted for murder as he did not direct the officers to fire and his actions were not \u201cbad\u201d enough to satisfy the test for gross negligence manslaughter.\n(v)  Trojan 80 and DCI C 86.  Likewise, the prosecutor considered that there was insufficient evidence to prosecute Trojan 80, DCI C or the surveillance teams for gross negligence manslaughter.\n(vi)  Alteration of the surveillance log 87.  The Review Note considered the alleged alteration of the log (see paragraph 56 above), but found that it had been examined by two experts who did not agree to the required standard either that there had been alterations or, if there had been, who might have made them. Therefore, as it could not be proved that the relevant entry was a forgery, let alone who might have forged it, there was no basis for a prosecution for conspiracy to pervert the course of justice.\n(vii)  Missing recordings 88.  It also indicated that there was no evidence the police or anyone else had tampered with the recording equipment on the bus, at the station or on the train. Although there were gaps in the recordings at all three locations, the IPCC investigation had revealed that high vibrations had interfered with the recording of most of the bus journey, the hard drive on the train had not been replaced on the relevant day, and the recording equipment in the station had been broken during prior refurbishments.\n(viii)  The decision to prosecute the OCPM 89.  The Review Note explained in greater detail the decision to prosecute the OCPM. The prosecutor indicated that:\n\u201cIn my view, this operation was badly handled from the moment it passed from Commander [McDowall]. It resulted in an innocent man being shot dead in the most horrific manner. The Metropolitan Police were under tremendous pressure and were doing their best to protect the public from suicide bombers. These are factors that I take into account but these do not detract from the failure to carry out [Commander McDowall\u2019s] strategy which would have best protected Mr de Menezes.\u201d 90.  He continued:\n\u201cIn my view, the lack of planning led to the death of de Menezes and, as such, constituted an offence under section 3 of the [1974 Act]. I believe that if such a charge is preferred, we can prove the case on the evidence already available but a decision not to prosecute individuals will enable the IPCC to seek further evidence to strengthen the case, from those individuals who are at present declining to.\u201d 91.  The only defence open would be one of \u201creasonable practicability\u201d and it was\n\u201cdifficult to see how the police could argue the lack of reasonable practicability in ensuring the safety of [Mr de Menezes]. If this came to a contested trial, the police would probably have to call a number of officers ... who were interviewed as suspects. Their failures in the planning would then be highlighted\u201d. 92.  On 16 October 2006 the applicant sought leave to apply for judicial review of the decision not to prosecute any individual police officer for criminal offences, which she argued was incompatible with Article 2 of the Convention. 93.  In particular, the applicant argued that the threshold evidential test in the Crown Prosecutors\u2019 Code (\u201cthe Code\u201d), which prevented a prosecution unless a jury properly directed was likely to convict (see paragraph 163 below), was not compatible with Article 2. She also submitted that Article 2 required the courts to undertake a more intensive review of a prosecutor\u2019s decision than that provided for in R v. Director of Public Prosecutions, ex parte Manning [2001] 1 QB 330, in which the Divisional Court stated that it would accord great weight to the judgment of experienced prosecutors and, as such, a prosecutorial decision would be lawful if it was taken in accordance with the Code and was a decision reasonably open to the prosecutor on the material before him (see paragraph 165 below). 94.  On 14 December 2006 a Divisional Court of the High Court granted permission to apply for judicial review but dismissed the substantive application. 95.  In relation to the compatibility of the Code with Article 2, the court found that this Court\u2019s jurisprudence did not determine any particular evidential test to be applied when deciding whether or not there should be a prosecution. The test set out in the Code was therefore compatible with the obligation under Article 2 to put in place effective criminal law provisions to deter the commission of offences against the person, backed up by law enforcement machinery for the prevention, suppression and punishment of breaches of such provisions. Bringing prosecutions which were likely to fail, even if they could survive a dismissal application and a submission of no case to answer, would have profound consequences for all parties concerned. Furthermore, if the threshold was lowered in cases where lethal force was employed by State agents, it was likely that a significant proportion of prosecutions would fail because the evidence was lacking. If this were to happen, public confidence in both law enforcement agencies and in the CPS would be undermined. 96.  The court also held that Article 2 did not require a change to the established position regarding judicial review of a decision not to prosecute. The \u201ccareful scrutiny\u201d review required in \u00d6nery\u0131ld\u0131z v. Turkey [GC], no. 48939/99, \u00a7 96, ECHR 2004\u2011XII was compatible both with the test outlined in the Manning case (see paragraph 165 below) and with the domestic courts\u2019 general approach to cases involving fundamental human rights. 97.  Thirdly, applying the Manning test, the court found that the decision of the CPS was in accordance with the Code and was one which was reasonably open to it. The decision was taken by a very senior and highly experienced prosecutor and it was reviewed by the head of the CPS and by independent counsel. It was lengthy, careful, thorough, clear and detailed and the CPS had applied the correct test to each individual considered; namely, \u201cwhether there was sufficient evidence to provide a realistic prospect of conviction, or, in other words, whether a jury was more likely to convict than not to convict\u201d. 98.  Although it was not necessary for the court to go so far, it also indicated that it saw \u201cno reason to disagree with the decision\u201d. Consequently, it concluded that the DPP\u2019s decision was lawful and dismissed the applicant\u2019s challenge to it. Leave to appeal to the House of Lords was refused by the court and, on 26 July 2007, by the House of Lords itself. 99.  On 22 January 2007 the court also rejected an application by the OCPM to have the charges under the 1974 Act dismissed. 100.  On 1 October 2007 the criminal trial of the OCPM commenced. A total of forty-seven witnesses were called to give evidence during the course of the trial, including Commander McDowall and Commander Dick. The prosecution argued that the OCPM was guilty of the following:\na)  Commander McDowall\u2019s strategy had not been communicated adequately to the officers who took over the running of the operations on 22 July 2005, the surveillance officers or the SFOs;\nb)  Commander McDowall\u2019s strategy for controlling the premises was not adequately planned for or carried out;\nc)  the Control Room officers, the SFOs and the surveillance officers had a confused and inconsistent understanding of the strategy for Scotia Road;\nd)  officers had not been deployed to stop and question persons emerging from the Scotia Road premises, including Mr de Menezes;\ne)  the SFOs were not in attendance at Scotia Road when Mr de Menezes emerged from the common doorway;\nf)  there was no contingency plan for dealing with persons who emerged from the apartment building before the firearms officers arrived;\ng)  persons emerging from Scotia Road had not been stopped and questioned;\nh)  a safe and appropriate area where those leaving Scotia Road could be stopped and questioned had not been identified;\ni)  the briefings given to the SFOs were inaccurate, unbalanced, and provided the SFOs with inadequate and inaccurate information about the operation, including the operation at Scotia Road;\nj)  the information concerning the identification of Mr de Menezes, his clothing, demeanour and likely level of threat, was not properly or accurately assessed or disseminated to officers and, in particular, to the SFOs;\nk)  doubts about the correctness of the identification of Mr de Menezes as the suspect were not communicated to the control room;\nl)  the control room officers failed to satisfy themselves that a positive identification of Mr de Menezes as the suspect had been made by the surveillance officers;\nm)  the SFOs had not been deployed at relevant locations in time to prevent Mr de Menezes from getting on the bus and entering Stockwell underground station;\nn)  the SFOs failed to satisfy themselves that a positive identification of Mr de Menezes as the suspect had been made by the surveillance officers;\no)  effective steps were not taken to stop underground trains or buses so as to minimise the risk to the travelling public;\np)  Mr de Menezes was permitted to get on a bus twice and to enter Stockwell underground station despite being suspected of being a suicide bomber and despite having emerged from an address linked to a suspected suicide bomber;\nq)  a clear and timely order that Mr de Menezes be stopped or arrested before he entered Stockwell underground station had not been given;\nr)  accurate information had not been given to the DSO about the location of the SFOs when she was deciding whether the SFOs or officers from the Anti-Terrorist Branch should stop Mr de Menezes; and\ns)  the risk inherent in effecting the arrest of Mr de Menezes by armed officers had not been minimised, whether in relation to the location, timing or manner of his arrest. 101.  On 1 November 2007 the jury returned a verdict, finding the OCPM guilty of breaching sections 3 and 33 of the 1974 Act (see paragraphs 157 and 158 below). The jury also attached a rider to its verdict to the effect that Commander Dick bore no \u201cpersonal culpability\u201d for the impugned events. This rider was endorsed by the trial judge. The OCPM was fined GBP 175,000 and ordered to pay costs of GBP 385,000. 102.  After the trial, the IPCC decided not to issue a recommendation for the senior officers to face disciplinary proceedings. In particular, it had regard to the jury\u2019s rider that no blame should attach to Commander Dick, who was the most senior officer. 103.  The inquest, which had been adjourned pending the trial of the OCPM, commenced on 22 October 2008. In the course of the inquest seventy-one witnesses were called, including Commander McDowall, Commander Dick, Trojan 80, Trojan 84, Charlie 2 and Charlie 12. The family of Mr de Menezes were represented at the hearing at the State\u2019s expense and were able to cross-examine witnesses and make submissions. 104.  On 24 November 2008 the coroner delivered a written Ruling on what, if any, verdicts should be left to the jury. The options available to him were lawful killing, unlawful killing and an open verdict. However, the coroner was not permitted to leave a verdict to a jury if it fell foul of the test used to determine a submission of \u201cno case to answer\u201d; namely, if there was no evidence to support it or the evidence was so weak, vague or inconsistent with other evidence that, taken at its highest, a jury properly directed could not properly return that verdict (see paragraph 166 below). 105.  The coroner therefore considered the verdicts to be left to the jury separately as regards certain police officers. 106.  The coroner found that:\n\u201c16. ... There is no doubt that the officers intended to kill Mr de Menezes when they fired. Therefore, if their contention that [they] were acting lawfully in defence of themselves or others could be disproved, they would have committed ... the offence of murder. 17. There is agreement between all Interested Persons as to what test I should apply in determining whether the officers acted lawfully in defence of themselves and others:\n(i) Did the officer honestly and genuinely believe that it was necessary for him to use force in defence of himself and/or others? This is a question of subjective belief. Even if the belief was mistaken, and even if the mistake was unreasonable, the defence can still run. The reasonableness of the belief is only relevant in helping the jury to decide whether the belief was honestly held.\n(ii) If the officer did hold the belief, did he use no more force than was reasonably necessary in the circumstances as he believed existed at the time? This is an objective test, but it is applied realistically. Where a person faces a threat, the Courts will not judge with too precise a measure the degree of force he uses... It is also significant for present purposes that a person under threat is not required to wait passively for the blow to fall. A pre-emptive strike can be justified by the circumstances.\n... ... ... 18. The legal test is no different when the person facing the threat is a police officer or a soldier. However, as Waller LJ said in Bennett at paragraph 15, the tribunal is entitled to take account of the person\u2019s training when applying the two limbs of the test to the facts of the given case. The same must apply to specific briefings as well as general training.\u201d 107.  It was accepted by the parties that the SFOs honestly believed that the man in front of them in the carriage was Hussain Osman, the person who was strongly suspected of having attempted to explode a bomb on the underground the day before. However, the coroner rejected the submission on behalf of the de Menezes\u2019 family that the officers did not honestly believe that Mr de Menezes represented an imminent threat. He therefore found that the jury could not properly conclude to the criminal standard of proof that the two officers did not honestly believe that Mr de Menezes represented a mortal threat to those around them. In reaching that conclusion, he stated that:\n\u201c27. If the officers honestly believed that Mr de Menezes represented a mortal threat to themselves and those around them, it could not be said that they used more force than was reasonably necessary... An argument was made... to the effect that [one of the officers] used excessive force because he fired too many times ... In my judgment, it has no merit. The events took place in a few seconds, and one cannot fairly say that some of the shots to the head constituted reasonable force and some did not. In any event, the officers had been trained to fire until the threat was neutralised.\u201d 108.  The coroner therefore declined to leave to the jury the option of returning a verdict of unlawful killing in relation to the actions of Charlie 2 and Charlie 12. 109.  The coroner then considered whether the senior officers could safely be found to have committed manslaughter by reason of having caused death by gross negligence. It was accepted by all parties that this offence had to be proved against a particular officer; the failings of a number of persons could not be aggregated. Four elements had to be proved in order to establish that the offence had been committed: the defendant must have owed a duty of care to the victim, the defendant must have breached that duty, the breach must have caused the death (namely, made a more than minimal causal contribution to the death), and the breach must be characterised as \u201cgross\u201d. 110.  In relation to the duty of care, the coroner concluded that\n\u201c35. ... a police officer can owe a duty of care in directing other police officers to perform an armed interception. The content of the duty here would be to take reasonable care to ensure that such an interception took place in such a location and at such a time as to minimise, so far as reasonably practicable, the risk of unnecessary injury to the subject of the intervention, to the officers concerned and to others in the immediate vicinity. In this case the duty would not arise before the point at which firearms officers were ordered to move through with a view to performing an interception.\u201d\n(a)  Commander McDowall 111.  In relation to Commander McDowall, there were three alleged breaches of a duty of care: that he should have set a strategic plan to ensure that suspects were stopped between leaving the premises and reaching the public transport system; that he did not ensure that the unit from SO19 was deployed sooner; and that he had failed to keep himself informed and to ensure that his orders were being followed. In respect of each of these allegations the coroner did not accept that Commander McDowall had owed any duty of care to Mr de Menezes. However, even if a breach of duty could be established, the coroner did not accept that it had led to Mr de Menezes\u2019 death.\n(b)  the DSO 112.  There were three allegations against Commander Dick:\n\u201c54. ... First, ... that [she] failed to ensure that the block on Scotia Road was kept under careful surveillance control and that tactics were employed to ensure that all suspects could be identified and stopped before reaching a bus stop. As it happens, the nearest bus stop was on Upper Tulse Hill, only a few minutes\u2019 walk from the block. The first obstacle [to this] argument is the difficulty of constructing a positive duty of care at that stage to stop Mr de Menezes close to his home. In my judgment, no such duty could exist. Even if it could, I consider that it would not have been practicable to implement this as a fixed and inflexible tactical plan... In any event, the surveillance control was good: Mr de Menezes was kept continually under surveillance but the covert status of the operation near Scotia Road was maintained. The failure to stop him at an earlier stage was based on an inability of officers to say whether he was identifiable with the suspect. Therefore, his death was not caused by any failure of surveillance control at Scotia Road. 55. Secondly, it is alleged that [the DSO] failed to keep herself informed of where surveillance and firearms officers were as Mr de Menezes was travelling from Tulse Hill towards Stockwell. Again, I do not think that a police officer owes a duty to a person under surveillance to ensure that he is informed of the movements of other officers, at least before any intervention is immediately in prospect. If there were such a duty, it would only be to keep oneself reasonably well-informed, since it would not be practicable to keep note of the precise position of every officer and car. The thrust of the evidence is that [the DSO] did keep herself reasonably well-informed. She was aware, through the surveillance monitor in the control room, that surveillance officers were following Mr de Menezes and of what they were saying. In any event, as [counsel for the family of Mr de Menezes] accepts, nothing could have been done to stop Mr de Menezes between his getting on the bus at Tulse Hill and his alighting at Stockwell. [The DSO] had [the SFOs] at the proper holding point at the time she wanted to deploy them. In the minutes before she ordered the intervention, she was relying upon information from [her tactical adviser] as to the position and readiness of the [SFOs]. In my judgment, she was entitled to rely upon that information. In all those circumstances, any failure on her part to keep herself informed was not causative of the fatal events in the carriage. 56. Thirdly, it is submitted ... that [the DSO] failed to exercise proper judgment in her decisions in the last critical minutes, after Mr de Menezes left the bus at Stockwell. In my judgment, she probably did owe a duty of care to him at this stage in making decisions and giving directions for an armed stop. However, she cannot fairly be said to have breached that duty. When she became aware that the subject of surveillance had left the bus, she ordered the [SFOs] to perform an armed stop. Upon hearing that they were not in a position to make the stop, she instructed the surveillance officers to do so. That order cannot be characterised as negligent. If there were any slight delay in giving the order, that can probably be explained by the need to take thought before ordering a suspected suicide bomber to be stopped by officers who were not trained for such situations. Once she was told that the [SFOs] were in position, she countermanded the earlier order. It might be possible to say that she made the wrong decision at that point, given where Mr de Menezes was known to be, but these were fast-moving events and her decision cannot be described as negligent. [It was submitted] that using [SFOs] gave rise to a particular risk that lethal force would be used. However, there were obvious advantages to using officers who had the training and experience to perform armed interventions in a public place.\u201d\n(c)  Trojan 80 (the DSO\u2019s firearms tactical adviser) 113.  As to this officer, the coroner stated as follows:\n\u201c58. The first charge against [Trojan 80] is that, upon arriving at New Scotland Yard at around 6.00 a.m., he failed to take steps to expedite the despatch of [the unit from SO19] to the Scotia Road area. For the reasons already given, I do not consider that he would have owed a duty of care to Mr de Menezes in this regard. In any event, when he started work, all the critical decisions had been taken in relation to the [SFOs] deployments. It would probably not have been safe or sensible to try to expedite the deployments at that stage. As explained in paragraph 52 above, I do not think it can be established to the necessary standard of proof that any delay in deploying firearms teams was causally relevant to the death of Mr de Menezes. 59. The second allegation is that he failed to devise a tactical plan to ensure that any suspect coming out of the block was stopped before reaching a bus stop. This is, in essence, the same as one of the allegations made against [the DSO]. For the reasons I have given in paragraph 54, this argument fails at every stage. 60. The third point made in criticism of [Trojan 80] is that he failed to pass on to [the DSO] accurate information about the position of the [SFOs] in the minutes after it became apparent that Mr de Menezes was leaving the bus. However, [Trojan 80] was reliant for his information on the tactical adviser who was with the team on the ground, \u2018Trojan 84\u2019. That officer initially told [Trojan 80] that his team were \u2018not in contention\u2019 because they were behind the wrong bus. [Trojan 80] duly passed on that information. Even if it were incorrect, it is difficult to criticise him for passing it on.\u201d 114.  If, contrary to all of the above, any of the allegations were made out, the coroner concluded that none approached the level of gross or criminal negligence.\n(d)  Conclusion 115.  In light of the above, the coroner decided not to leave the potential short-form verdict of unlawful killing to the jury in respect of the senior officers and instead left them to decide between a verdict of lawful killing and an open verdict. 116.  The coroner also included in his Ruling a list of proposed questions which would be left to the jury and which required responses of \u201cyes\u201d, \u201dno\u201d, or \u201dcannot decide\u201d. Having heard the parties\u2019 submissions, on 1 December 2008 he finalised the list of questions to include questions of fact concerning the events in the train carriage and questions concerning the factors which had contributed to Mr de Menezes\u2019 death. However, he refused to leave \u201copen questions\u201d to the jury inviting them to add any other factors which they regarded as causally relevant. 117.  On 2 December 2008 Mr de Menezes\u2019 mother had sought leave to apply for judicial review of the coroner\u2019s decision to exclude both the verdict of unlawful killing and certain narrative verdict questions. At the hearing, she pursued the second point only because by that date the coroner had started summing up and had already indicated the verdicts which were to be left to the jury. 118.  The claimant argued that the coroner had been obliged to ensure that the jury members were permitted to resolve the disputed factual issues at the heart of the case and were able properly to determine by what means and in what circumstances Mr de Menezes had come by his death. The question of how he came by his death went far beyond determining whether to return a verdict of lawful killing or an open verdict. The coroner\u2019s approach had precluded the jury from commenting on whether or not they regarded any particular failings by the police as serious and, if so, how serious \u2013 and how important in terms of accountability \u2013 these failings were. As such, the jury\u2019s findings were at best likely to beg more questions and at worst be confusing or meaningless. The claimant therefore wished to put additional narrative verdict questions to the jury once the coroner\u2019s summing up was finished. 119.  On 3 December 2008 Silber J refused leave to apply for judicial review. 120.  First, he found that the existing verdicts and questions satisfied the statutory obligation under section 11 of the Coroners Act and Rule 36(1)(b) of the Coroners Rules (see paragraphs 167 and 168 below) to enable the jury members to ascertain by what means and in what circumstances Mr de Menezes had come by his death. Furthermore, the inquiry required by the coroner of the jury in this case was significantly more demanding than that sought from, and given by, the jury in both Bubbins v. the United Kingdom no. 50196/99, ECHR 2005\u2011II and McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom 27 September 1995, Series A no. 324, and in those cases this Court had found that the procedural obligations under Article 2 of the Convention had been met. 121.  Secondly, the judge observed that the claimant had not pointed to any case decided domestically or in this Court which held that specific questions were required to be asked of a jury over and above asking \u201cby what means and in what circumstances\u201d the deceased had died. 122.  Thirdly, as the coroner had a discretion \u201cto decide how best in the particular case to elicit the jury\u2019s conclusion on the central issue or issues\u201d, the judge considered that the only grounds for interfering with it would probably be Wednesbury grounds; namely, that the coroner\u2019s decision was so unreasonable that no reasonable coroner would have done the same. 123.  Fourthly, the judge found that there was a risk that if the jury members were required to answer the additional questions proposed by the claimant they would be acting in contravention of Rule 36(2) of the Coroners Rules 1984 by expressing opinions on matters other than those on which they were entitled to comment and, in particular, by appearing to determine questions of criminal or civil liability. 124.  Fifthly, he considered that the proposed questions would expose the jury to a risk of making contradictory and conflicting findings. 125.  Sixthly, the judge found that the claimant had failed to show, even arguably, that there were strong grounds for disturbing the decision of the coroner. 126.  The claimant\u2019s grounds relating to the short-form verdicts were adjourned generally with liberty to both parties to apply to restore. The claimant subsequently agreed that no further action would be taken in relation to these grounds because, inter alia, even if the judicial review was successful the only remedy for the family would be for the court to order a fresh inquest and the claimant did not \u201csee any great benefit in re-hearing all the evidence to enable a different jury to come to a verdict, particularly bearing in mind the very high cost of holding such an inquest\u201d. 127.  On 12 December 2008 the jury returned an \u201copen verdict\u201d. In answering the questions left to them the jury found as follows:\na)  that Charlie 12 did not shout \u201carmed police\u201d;\nb)  that while Mr de Menezes did stand up before being grabbed in a bear hug by one of the surveillance officers, he did not move towards the SFOs;\nc)  that the general difficulty in identifying the man under surveillance in the time available and the innocent behaviour of Mr de Menezes (which may have increased suspicion) were not contributory factors to his death;\nd)  that the following were contributory factors to his death: the failure to obtain and provide to surveillance officers better photographic images of the failed bomber Hussain Osman; the fact that the views of the surveillance officers regarding the identification of the suspect were not accurately communicated to the command team and the SFOs; the failure by police to ensure that Mr de Menezes was stopped before he reached public transport; the fact that the position of the cars containing the SFOs was not accurately known by the command team as the SFO teams were approaching Stockwell underground station; the shortcomings in the communications system between various police teams on the ground; and a failure to conclude at the time that surveillance officers could have been used to carry out the stop on Mr Menezes at Stockwell underground station; and\ne)  it was not clear whether the pressure on police after the suicide attacks in July 2005 was a contributory factor to Mr de Menezes\u2019 death. 128.  After the verdict the coroner delivered a report as he was required to do under Rule 43 of the Coroners Rules 1984. In the report he identified MPS systems and practices which gave rise to concern and the risk that other deaths might arise in the future. He further identified action which should be taken to prevent the occurrence or continuance of such circumstances or to eliminate or reduce the risk of death created by such circumstances. The coroner also reviewed material indicating which remedial steps had already been taken to develop police practice since the events of July 2005. 129.  In the report the coroner expressed concerns about the command structure employed by the police on 22 July 2005 and observed that the Association of Chief Police Officers (\u201cACPO\u201d) manual on the police use of firearms and the command structure should be reviewed. He also made specific recommendations about the role of the DSO, who was responsible for ordering any intentional shot that might be required in anti-terrorist operations. 130.  The coroner also reported on the communication problems that the jury found had contributed to the death of Mr de Menezes. He recommended that changes should be made to the systems and methods of communication to ensure that there was better information available to enable accurate identification to be made and communicated and to ensure that appropriately trained police officers were available to deal with possible terrorist threats on the basis of as much up-to-date information as possible. 131.  Finally, the coroner made recommendations about the recording of briefing and control room activity and recommended that the practice of police witnesses conferring before recording their accounts of events should cease. 132.  Following the inquest, further meetings and exchanges of correspondence took place between the CPS and Mr de Menezes\u2019 family. On 26 March 2009 the family asked the DPP to review the decision not to prosecute in light of new evidence which had emerged at the inquest. 133.  On 8 April 2009 the DPP confirmed by letter that there remained insufficient evidence to prosecute any individual. 134.  Mr de Menezes\u2019 family did not apply for leave to seek judicial review of this decision, considering that there would be no prospect of success in light of the previous judicial review action. The factual matrix had not significantly changed: the claim would have been on similar grounds to the previous claim for review and was therefore bound to fail. 135.  By letter dated 2 October 2009 the Chairman of the IPCC rejected the family\u2019s request to review its decision not to initiate disciplinary proceedings as no new evidence had emerged during the inquest to justify bringing disciplinary charges against any individual officer. 136.  He noted that the trial of the OCPM and the inquest had confirmed the conclusion of the IPCC that Mr de Menezes was killed because of mistakes that could and should have been avoided. Indeed, the trial of the OCPM, the coroner\u2019s report, the IPCC recommendations, Her Majesty\u2019s Inspectorate of Constabulary, the MPA and the MPS had all recognised the organisational failings that led to his death. Major efforts had been made to rectify these organisational failings and it was necessary to take them into account when judging the individual culpability of the officers concerned. Every independent judicial, prosecuting and disciplinary authority which had considered the conduct of the officers had concluded that individual criminal or disciplinary charges were not merited. 137.  In respect of Charlie 2 and Charlie 12, there was insufficient evidence to undermine their claim that they honestly believed they were dealing with a suicide bomber or to warrant proceedings based on the disciplinary offences of using excessive force or abusing authority. The officers had had at best five to ten seconds to assess whether to shoot to kill and given the overall scene of confusion, coupled with the stress of the circumstances, it was not possible to conclude that the mistakes which were made were deliberate or negligent. 138.  With regard to Commander McDowall, the IPCC concluded that it was not likely that any tribunal would find that failings which occurred after he set his strategy were due to negligence on his part. 139.  As for Commander Dick, the IPCC had regard to the criminal jury\u2019s unambiguous conclusion that she had no personal culpability, especially as no evidence had emerged at the inquest which would cause a disciplinary tribunal to ignore this finding. 140.  The IPCC considered that there was no evidence that might cause a tribunal to accept the jury\u2019s rider in respect of Commander Dick but not in respect of Trojan 80 or DCI C. 141.  In respect of \u201cJames\u201d, the IPCC accepted that the degree of doubt as to the identity of Mr de Menezes was not communicated sufficiently clearly by the surveillance team. However, the IPCC concluded that this was the result of technical as well as personal shortcomings, the speed and stress of the circumstances and the lack of an unambiguous communications process. 142.  A civil action in damages was brought by the family of Mr de Menezes (including the applicant) against the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis. This was settled by way of mediation during the week of 16 November 2009. The settlement was on a confidential basis. 143.  Following the death of Mr de Menezes the MPS took a number of steps to improve its methods of command and control in counter-terrorism operations. In particular, a common command model was introduced for planned firearms operations, a smaller team, or \u201ccadre\u201d of firearms commanders was formed, a new cadre of ACPO officers was created to deal with high-risk counter-terrorism operations and a new ACPO Firearms Manual was published. 144.  In addition, a Surveillance Command was formed to provide consistency of training, procedure and professional practice and to create a platform for increased inter-operability (that is, how different units and personnel work together operationally) with other departments and national units. There has been a structured rotation of teams between counter-terrorism and crime operations to familiarise personnel in both types of operation. 145.  Furthermore, a new counter-terrorism control room came into operation and steps were taken to clarify the roles and responsibilities of control room staff and to provide them with high quality training. Operational delivery of a new secure photo-imaging system for transmitting images of suspects and other data has also taken place. Audio recording is now available in the control room, which is activated when dealing with any suicide bombing threat, and a new and evolving covert airwave communication system has been introduced to ensure effective radio communications are available throughout the London underground system as well as above ground. 146.  Pursuant to ACPO guidance issued in October 2008, the practice of officers writing up their notes together after an incident has ceased in cases where police officers have discharged firearms. Internal instructions drawn up in consultation with the IPCC and DPS have since extended this change of practice to officers involved in other (non-shooting) death and serious injury cases.", "references": ["1", "6", "8", "3", "4", "7", "9", "5", "0", "2", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1960 and 1956 respectively and live in Riga. 6.  On an unspecified date the Bureau for the Prevention and Combating of Corruption (\u201cthe KNAB\u201d) received information concerning allegedly unlawful activities of officials of the State Pharmacy Inspectorate. Aiming to verify that information, the KNAB launched operational proceedings (operat\u012bv\u0101 izstr\u0101de). In the context of those proceedings the second applicant, who at that time was the owner of a chain of pharmacies in Latvia, was summoned to the KNAB to give statements about the activities of certain State officials supervising pharmaceutical matters in Latvia. 7.  According to the document (uzzi\u0146a) prepared by the Supreme Court on 27 July 2012 and addressed to the Government, on 10 March 2005 an operational measure \u2013 the interception of the second applicant\u2019s telephone conversations \u2013 had been authorised until 12 May 2005. The document was based on \u201cthe Supreme Court\u2019s register of special proceedings (lietved\u012bba) relating to classified State secrets for the year 2005, Volume 13, entry no 2\u20111264s of 19 March 2005\u201d. 8.  Upon being summoned by the KNAB, on 12 April 2005 the second applicant went to its offices, where he was questioned by two investigators, H. and J. Initially, he refused to cooperate and instead asked J. questions about his duties. 9.  On 13 April 2005 the second applicant arranged a meeting with J. away from the KNAB\u2019s offices. On the KNAB\u2019s behalf, the meeting was organised as an undercover operation under section 15(3) of the Law on Operational Activities, and prior authorisation from a specially authorised prosecutor of the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office was obtained. 10.  On 13 and 14 April 2005 three meetings took place between the second applicant and J. During the second meeting, which was video and audio recorded by J., the second applicant offered J. a bribe in the amount of 50,000 Latvian lati (LVL) and monthly payments of LVL 1,000 in return for the cessation of any investigative activities concerning his business and the State officials connected with it. During the meeting the second applicant paid J. LVL 18,000 as a first instalment. 11.  Meanwhile, the second applicant called the first applicant, who was a board member of the company he owned. He asked her to withdraw cash from the company\u2019s account. He explained that the money would be spent on \u201cprotection\u201d. Their phone conversations were intercepted and recorded. 12.  The next day, the second applicant arranged another meeting, during which he gave the investigator LVL 27,000. On the same day he was arrested by KNAB officers. 13.  After the second applicant\u2019s meeting with J., on 13 April 2005 the KNAB instituted criminal proceedings for bribery. The second applicant was charged as a suspect. The charging decision was sent to the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office so that the prosecution could commence. 14.  On 22 April 2005 a prosecutor of the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office questioned the second applicant. The second applicant pleaded guilty and stated that the payments had been intended to prevent further investigation into his business activities. 15.  In a letter of 31 May 2005 the KNAB informed the supervising prosecutor at the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office that the second applicant\u2019s phone had been tapped in accordance with section 17(3) of the Law on Operational Activities \u201cupon the authorisation of a judge of the Supreme Court\u201d. The KNAB asked for the recordings to be included in the criminal case file. 16.  On 2 June 2005 the Office of the Prosecutor brought a charge of aiding and abetting against the first applicant, and a charge of bribery against the second applicant. 17.  On 30 June 2005 both applicants were questioned by a prosecutor of the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office. The first applicant pleaded guilty. 18.  On 12 July 2005, having studied the material in the criminal case file, the representative of the first applicant asked the prosecutor to disclose a document attesting to the lawfulness of the interception of the telephone conversations between both applicants. On the same day the supervising prosecutor dismissed that request, arguing that the decision to authorise interception of the telephone conversations of the applicant and other persons had been adopted under 17(3) of the Law on Operational Activities, and therefore was not a procedural document. Moreover, the document had been classified as a State secret. The prosecutor also argued that the existence of such authorisation had been confirmed by the KNAB, and that there were no grounds to question the validity of that confirmation. The first applicant did not appeal against that reply to a more senior prosecutor. 19.  On 15 July 2005 the criminal case concerning both applicants was referred to a court. 20.  It appears that on 18 October 2005 the representative of the first applicant sent a complaint about the activities of KNAB officials in relation to the phone tapping to the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office. The prosecutor in charge replied that the phone tapping had been authorised by a judge of the Supreme Court, and that the KNAB had not infringed any provisions of the Law on Operational Activities. The prosecutor also stated that the information obtained as a result of the operational activities was open to assessment in the course of the criminal proceedings. The first applicant did not appeal against that reply to the Prosecutor General. 21.  On 2 November 2005 the Riga City Vidzeme District Court, acting as a first-instance court and presided over by Judge B.T., acquitted the first applicant. The court found the second applicant guilty and gave him a suspended sentence of two years\u2019 imprisonment. He pleaded guilty during the hearing, therefore the court proceeded without assessing the evidence. 22.  On 8 November 2005 the prosecutor submitted an appeal contesting the acquittal of the first applicant, and asked for an immediate custodial sentence to be imposed in relation to the second applicant. He asked the appellate court to give a new judgment in respect of the parts of the original judgment which were contested. The second applicant submitted an appeal concerning the severity of his sentence. 23.  Between 24 and 27 October 2006 the Riga Regional Court, acting as an appellate court, held several hearings during which the second applicant pleaded guilty. The representative of the first applicant submitted that the case file did not contain any information pertaining to the authorisation of the interception of phone conversations, which had been the main evidence against her. During the hearing, the prosecutor confirmed orally that judicial authorisation had been obtained. 24.  On 31 October 2006 the appellate court adopted a judgment which upheld the prosecutor\u2019s appeal and quashed the disputed parts of the lower court\u2019s judgment. The appellate court found the first applicant guilty, giving her a suspended sentence of one year\u2019s imprisonment. It also revoked the suspension of the second applicant\u2019s prison sentence and he was taken directly to prison from the courtroom. The appellate court stated, inter alia, \u201cthe court recognises all the evidence in the criminal case as admissible, on the grounds that the factual information has been obtained and established (nostiprin\u0101tas) in line with procedure and in accordance with the order set out by law ...\u201d. 25.  In an appeal on points of law the first applicant argued that the tapped phone conversations should not have been admitted as evidence, as they had been obtained without proper authorisation. The second applicant submitted, inter alia, that the appellate court had not assessed the lawfulness of the phone tapping and had ignored the fact that the criminal case had contained no reference to any authorisation to carry out the above activity as prescribed by Article 176\u00b9 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In this regard, he also submitted that the appellate court had consequently failed to observe that interference in a person\u2019s private life should be in accordance with the law, as required by Article 8 of the Convention. 26.  On 19 January 2007 the Senate of the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on points of law in open court. In response to the Article 8 complaint, the Senate stated that the phone had been tapped \u201cin accordance with section 17 of the Law on Operational Activities, and not as a special investigative measure under Article 176\u00b9 of the Code of Criminal Procedure\u201d. 27.  Meanwhile, during a judges\u2019 conference on 4 November 2005, the Minister of Justice stated in her opening speech:\n\u201cToday I would say that I, like the majority of you sitting in this hall, am powerless against the actions of our colleagues, which neither society nor I personally understand\u201d. 28.  A daily news report on 4 November 2005 mentioned that the minister had admitted to journalists that she had been referring to the judgment adopted by Judge B.T. in her speech (see paragraph 21 above):\n\u201cYes, I am not authorised to comment on particular cases where the adjudication is still pending, but I consider that I have the right to express an opinion on behalf of other judges who carry out their work honestly.\u201d", "references": ["5", "0", "8", "9", "6", "1", "3", "7", "2", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1969 and lives in Yerevan. 6.  In 1991 the applicant, without permission, constructed a building consisting of a shop/storage and an unfinished construction and measuring in total 500 sq. m., on a 1000 sq. m. plot of land situated in a suburb of Yerevan. The applicant alleged that this land was not being used by anyone so he had cleaned it and constructed the building using his own means. It appears that the applicant used this property for the following ten years. 7.  In 2001 the applicant instituted special (non-contentious) proceedings in the Shengavit District Court of Yerevan seeking recognition of his ownership right in respect of that building by virtue of acquisitive prescription under Article 187 of the Civil Code (CC), as well as his right of use in respect of the plot of land. 8.  On 8 June 2001 the Shengavit District Court decided to recognise the applicant\u2019s ownership right in respect of the building and to leave the plot of land under his use. The District Court found that the building in question had no registered owners and the applicant had openly and in good faith had it in his possession and used it without interruption for over ten years, which entitled him to become its owner under Article 187 of the CC. 9.  No appeal was lodged within the prescribed 15-day time-limit, so this judgment became final. 10.  On 9 April 2002 a certificate was issued by the local branch of the State Real Estate Registry on the basis of this judgment, confirming the applicant\u2019s ownership in respect of the building. The certificate further stated that, by virtue of Article 118 \u00a7 4 of the Land Code (LC), the applicant enjoyed a right of lease in respect of the plot of land for a period of 99 years. 11.  On 20 May 2003 the applicant, pursuant to Article 118 \u00a7 7 of the LC, paid the cadastral value of the plot of land which amounted to AMD 1,465,500 Armenian drams (AMD). 12.  On 22 May 2003 the applicant\u2019s right of ownership was registered in respect of the plot of land and a relevant ownership certificate was issued. 13.  The applicant regularly paid property tax on both the building and the plot of land in the following years. 14.  On 27 July 2008 \u0430 topographic examination of the land was carried out by a representative of \u201cTownplanning\u201d State Closed Joint-Stock Company founded by, and acting on behalf of, the Yerevan Mayor\u2019s Office. The relevant diagram mentioned the applicant as the owner of the land in question. 15.  On 11 November 2008, a third person addressed a letter to the Yerevan Mayor\u2019s Office, stating that she had bought a plot of land at an auction held on 16 June 2008. When she later applied to the local branch of the State Real Estate Registry to have her ownership right registered, she was informed that the plot of land in question overlapped with the neighbouring plot of land. She requested that the auction be cancelled in its part concerning the overlapping part of the plot, the money paid for that part be returned and a new sale contract be concluded in respect of the remaining part of her plot. 16.  The Government alleged that the neighbouring plot of land was the applicant\u2019s and that following this letter there was an exchange of correspondence between the Yerevan Mayor\u2019s Office and the local branch of the Real Estate Registry. 17.  On 24 February 2009 the local branch of the State Real Estate Registry addressed a letter to the Mayor\u2019s Office stating, in reply to an inquiry by the Mayor dated 17 February 2009, that the registration of the applicant\u2019s ownership and lease rights had been performed on 9 April 2002 on the basis of the judgment of the Shengavit District Court of Yerevan of 8 June 2001. This letter was received by the Mayor\u2019s Office on 18 March 2009 and attached to it was a copy of the judgment of 8 June 2001. 18.  On 7 May 2009 the Deputy Prosecutor General lodged an appeal against the judgment of 8 June 2001 seeking to quash it and to dismiss the applicant\u2019s acquisitive prescription claim, arguing that the District Court had erred in its interpretation and application of the relevant provisions of the substantive law. The land had belonged to the State and hence had not been ownerless at the material time, so the District Court should not have applied the acquisitive prescription rules to the case. As a result, the judgment had damaged the State\u2019s pecuniary interests. The Deputy Prosecutor General further argued that the District Court had been obliged to involve, as parties to the proceedings, the local branch of the Real Estate Registry, as well as the Yerevan Mayor\u2019s Office as the authority vested with management of land. By failing to do so, and adopting a judgment affecting their rights in their absence, the District Court had also violated the procedural law. The Deputy Prosecutor General requested the Court of Appeal to restore the expired time-limit for appeal, arguing that the Yerevan Mayor\u2019s Office had not been aware of the judgment of 8 June 2001 and therefore had been deprived of the possibility of lodging an appeal, while the Prosecutor\u2019s Office had been informed about that judgment by the Mayor\u2019s letter of 24 February 2009. 19.  On 18 May 2009 the Yerevan Mayor\u2019s Office also lodged an appeal against the judgment of 8 June 2001, raising similar substantive and procedural arguments. As regards the procedural issues, it claimed that the Shengavit District Court had violated the relevant provisions by examining the case through special proceedings and not involving it as a party, despite the fact that the Mayor\u2019s Office was the authority vested with management of public land in Yerevan and therefore the judgment affected its rights. The Mayor\u2019s Office further claimed that it had become aware of the contested judgment by a letter from the local branch of the State Real Estate Registry dated 24 February 2009, which had been received by the Mayor\u2019s Office on 18 March 2009. It finally added that the letter of the Judicial Department of Armenia of 6 February 2009 had been accompanied by a copy of another judgment of the Shengavit District Court, dated 26 June 2001, which was unrelated to the present case. 20.  On an unspecified date, the applicant lodged a reply to the appeals. He argued, inter alia, that on 20 May 2003 he had paid the cadastral value of the plot of land and bought it through direct sale. Furthermore, the fact that the Yerevan Mayor\u2019s Office had been aware of his becoming the new owner of the plot of land was confirmed by the compulsory payments he had to make for that property. Thus, on the one hand, by virtue of Article 61 of the LC, the Yerevan Mayor\u2019s office had alienated the plot of land to him, received a sum of money and since then had continued to levy property tax and, on the other hand, it now claimed to be unaware of that transaction. Moreover, the Yerevan Mayor\u2019s Office had been notified of his becoming the new owner of the plot of land by virtue of the Law on the State Registration of Rights in Respect of Property. Hence, the Mayor\u2019s Office had been aware of the registration of his property rights on the basis of the court judgment of 8 June 2001 and of the direct sale of the plot of land, and had not \u2013 as it claimed \u2013 become aware of that judgment from a letter of 24 February 2009. 21.  On 12 June 2009 the Civil Court of Appeal decided, with reference to Article 207 \u00a7 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CCP), to admit the appeals, stating:\n\u201cThe Yerevan Mayor\u2019s Office and the General Prosecutor have missed the time\u2011limit for appeal prescribed by law and they submitted motions seeking to find this to be valid, arguing that the Mayor\u2019s Office found out about the judgment [of 8 June 2001] from a copy of the judgment attached to the letter of the Judicial Department of Armenia of 6 February 2009, while the General Prosecutor\u2019s Office from the letter of the Yerevan Mayor\u2019s Office of 24 February 2009.\n...\nThe court finds that the motions of the Yerevan Mayor\u2019s Office and the General Prosecutor\u2019s Office are substantiated and must be granted.\u201d 22.  On 18 July 2009 the Civil Court of Appeal decided to grant the appeals, to quash the judgment of 8 June 2001 and to dismiss the applicant\u2019s acquisitive prescription claim. The Court of Appeal found, in particular, that the Shengavit District Court had applied Articles 178 and 187 of the CC, which were not applicable to the case, and failed to apply Articles 168 and 188 of the CC, thereby reaching incorrect findings. The building in question was an unauthorised construction built on a plot of land belonging to the State. Hence, only the State could have acquired ownership rights in respect of that building. 23.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. 24.  On 9 September 2009 the Court of Cassation decided to return the appeal as inadmissible for lack of merit. 25.  Following these decisions, the authorities instituted proceedings against the applicant seeking annulment of registration of his ownership rights in respect of the building and the plot of land, which was granted by the courts.", "references": ["5", "2", "7", "1", "4", "6", "0", "8", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
+{"input": "8.  The first applicant was born in 1992, the second applicant in 1995, and the third applicant in 1993. They are female and reside in Latvia. 9.  The relevant facts of the case as submitted by the parties and emerging from the documents furnished to the Court may be summarised as follows. 10.  From a young age the applicants trained in modern pentathlon. In 2007 they enrolled in a State sports school in Riga. 11.  According to their submission, the first and third applicants commenced training with the sports school\u2019s coach O.B. in summer 2008 and the second applicant was coached by him during the summer of 2009. 12.  In addition to the above-mentioned training, O.B. organised sports summer camps on the school\u2019s campus, which the first and third applicants attended in 2008 and all the applicants attended in 2009. 13.  At the time of the events in issue, the applicants were under eighteen years of age. 14.  On 4 January 2010 the mother of the first and second applicants submitted a complaint to the State police alleging that the coach, O.B., had sexually abused her daughters. 15.  The same day the police opened a criminal investigation under section 162 of the Criminal Law (Krimin\u0101llikums) (sexual abuse (pave\u0161ana netikl\u012bb\u0101)) with respect to the period between summer 2008 and September 2009. 16.  In the course of investigation the police took statements from various individuals, including the applicants and their parents, and O.B.\u2019s former students and their parents. 17.  On 4 January 2010 the mother stated that she had learnt from her daughters that O.B. had requested that after training they attend the sauna fully undressed. The coach had explained that wearing clothes was unhealthy. The second applicant had refused. However, other girls between thirteen and sixteen years of age, including the first applicant, had attended the sauna naked. The mother named the girls who had attended the sauna naked. 18.  On one occasion when the second applicant had been in the sauna half-undressed, O.B. had entered the sauna and had told her that she was still little, thereby embarrassing her. 19.  On another occasion, after the sauna O.B. had massaged the first applicant while touching her intimate body parts. 20.  He had furthermore watched the girls changing and had touched their intimate body parts. 21.  The first and second applicants\u2019 mother submitted with regard to the third applicant that she had travelled with O.B. to a competition in Lithuania, where he had pressurised her to share the same bed. The third applicant however had refused.\n(b)  The applicants\u2019 statements 22.  On 5 and 14 January 2010 the police took statements from the three applicants, who were granted the status of injured parties in the proceedings. The police took an additional statement from the third applicant on 1 April 2010 and from the second applicant on 6 April 2010.\n(i)  Sauna and massages 23.  The applicants stated that the sauna sessions took place after training around twice a week. The second applicant had attended the sauna only twice. 24.  Having arrived for the sauna, the first and second applicants had seen the other girls undressing fully. The other girls had told that it had been O.B.\u2019s request that the sauna be attended naked. O.B. had said that it was very healthy to attend the sauna in that way. 25.  At the beginning, the first applicant had felt shy. Yet, as she had seen the other girls attending the sauna naked, she had started doing so. For the same reason, the third applicant had also started going to the sauna naked. 26.  The second applicant had removed only the top part of her swimsuit and had entered the sauna. Suddenly O.B., wearing shorts and a cap, had entered, which had startled the second applicant. She therefore had covered herself with her hands, to which O.B. had reacted by telling the other girls to look at how little she still was and saying that the other girls were already grown up and therefore naked. The second time, she had attended the sauna wrapped in a towel. 27.  According to the applicants\u2019 account, even though girls had been in the sauna naked, O.B. \u2013 dressed in shorts \u2013 had come in and massaged them using a special bath brush (a birch \u201cbesom\u201d for a steam bath, used to swat or massage the body during a steam-bath procedure). Although the second applicant had refused that massage, she had witnessed O.B. asking the other girls to lie on their back and then massaging them. The second applicant had seen O.B. telling the third applicant to go to the sauna, and that he would come to massage her. The third applicant had listened to him. The second applicant stated as follows:\n\u201c... when [O.B.] was massaging [the girls] in the sauna, he did not touch [their] intimate body parts, [he] touched [their] bodies only with the bath brush, [he] did not touch [them] with [his] hands.\u201d 28.  The second applicant had told the other girls that the above\u2011mentioned practice was not normal. However, they had responded that, as it had been requested by the coach, it had to be complied with. The first and third applicants stated that O.B. had been their trainer and teacher, whom they had to obey. The second applicant, however, considered that there had been a possibility to refuse. To her mind the other girls had attended the sauna as they had not wished to disobey O.B. They had practically worshipped him, and had listened to everything he said. 29.  From the documents furnished to the Court it appears that the applicants gave the police the names of the other girls who had attended the sauna, A.F., A.B. \u2013 who appears to have been a relative of O.B. \u2013 and V.A. The third applicant indicated that V.A. had rarely been to the sauna. According to the second applicant\u2019s account, there had been another girl, K.D. 30.  The first applicant also recounted an occasion when she had experienced pain in her leg. O.B. had told her that he would give a massage and after the sauna had laid her on a bed and massaged her while she had been wearing only underpants. O.B. had touched the lower part of her stomach.\n(ii)  Changing room 31.  The applicants stated that there had been times when O.B. had entered the girls\u2019 changing room as if looking for someone. When passing by them he had \u2013 as if accidently \u2013 touched the girls\u2019 intimate body parts. The second applicant stated that he had also tried to touch her, which she had prevented.\n(iii)  Trip to Lithuania 32.  The first applicant stated that she had heard that in November 2009 the third applicant and some boys had travelled with O.B. to a competition in Lithuania. There he had told the third applicant that she would sleep with him in the same bed. The third applicant had gone to a separate bed to sleep and O.B., while drunk, had entered the room and had pulled at the children\u2019s legs, including those of the third applicant. 33.  The third applicant also gave evidence regarding the trip to Lithuania with O.B. and the other two boys, whose names she provided. 34.  At a hotel O.B. had told her that she would sleep with him in the same bed. She had spoken to one of the boys and had taken one of the single beds. At around 10 p.m. O.B. had returned to the hotel room drunk. After some time he had gone to sleep. The third applicant had felt afraid that O.B. might do something bad to her. 35.  During all three days of the competition, O.B. had consumed alcohol, even though he had also been driving a vehicle.\n(c)  Psychologist\u2019s report 36.  In April and May 2010 the police ordered a psychologist\u2019s report regarding the applicants. 37.  During the psychologist\u2019s examination the first applicant commented that she had been surprised that the sauna had to be attended and that girls had attended it naked and that O.B. would enter and massage them with a besom, which had not seemed normal and had been unpleasant. However, the first applicant had felt afraid to tell her parents. O.B. had often touched her body, putting his arm around her waist, sitting her on his lap and hugging her, and also during massages. On one occasion during a massage he had touched her between her legs. The first applicant had been confused as to whether the coach\u2019s behaviour had been normal or bad. She had not wished to tell O.B. anything bad as he had helped her a lot. However, at the workplace he had almost always been under the influence of alcohol. When any of the girls had not wished to sit on his lap, he would use force to pull them down. 38.  The second applicant likewise told the psychologist that she had been very surprised about all the girls attending the sauna naked and O.B. entering and massaging them with a besom. She had tried to persuade the girls that it was not normal and had gone to the sauna dressed in a swimsuit. O.B. had ridiculed her about it in front of the other girls, saying that she was so shy because she was little. Also, the coach had always been trying to touch her, and to put his arm around her waist. It had been unpleasant and she had tried to avoid him. The second applicant had gone to the sauna twice. She had gradually started telling her parents about O.B.\u2019s behaviour. 39.  The third applicant did not wish to speak about the events in issue. Thoughts about O.B.\u2019s behaviour caused negative emotions in her and she was trying to forget it. She confirmed her earlier testimonies. The psychologist noted her statements to the police of 14 January and 1 April 2010. Concerning the sauna sessions, the third applicant had not found it normal that the sauna needed to be attended naked. However, she had started doing the same as the other students. The report referred to the applicant\u2019s character report from her previous school, which stated that on 1 September 2009 the applicant had been observed in a tense condition, unwilling to participate in extracurricular activities, in low spirits and suffering from loss of concentration. Suddenly in the mid-December 2009 she had decided to change school. 40.  According to the psychologist\u2019s report, the three applicants had been able to understand the nature and meaning of actions directed towards them. 41.  However, the first applicant\u2019s ability to object could have been diminished due to personality traits such as a difficulty in saying \u201cno\u201d and in objecting, especially to older persons, and the wish to avoid conflict situations and to maintain a friendly relationship with everyone. The third applicant\u2019s ability to resist could have been diminished by personality traits such as a difficulty in expressing her own opinion where it contradicted the expectations of others, in assessing her own attitude and feelings with regard to events, judging what is right and what is not, an insecurity in communication, and the wish to avoid conflict situations and to maintain a friendly relationship with everyone. With regard to the second applicant, the psychologist\u2019s report stated that she had been able to exhibit resistance appropriate to the situation. 42.  The report noted that the events in issue had caused the first applicant unpleasant feelings, insecurity, and anger and had made her distrustful in her communication with other coaches and with older men. With regard to the second applicant the report stated that she had retained anger, and had felt offended and guilty. The third applicant had been in low spirits, unable to concentrate, tense, and unwilling to participate in extracurricular activities, but this had lessened over time. She had felt offended. She still retained shame, anger, unpleasant thoughts and memories about the coach\u2019s conduct. 43.  The report concluded that the alleged conduct of the coach had not caused the applicants to suffer psychological trauma. Owing to their psychological condition, however, the applicants\u2019 participation in a trial or confrontation was not recommended.\n(d)  The coach, O.B. 44.  On 27 January 2010 the police apprehended and questioned O.B. as a suspect. 45.  According to O.B., girls had entered the sauna either wrapped in towels or wearing swimsuits. He had not entered the sauna with naked girls. They had exited the sauna dressed. O.B. would ask a particular child whether they required a massage. If the child responded in affirmative he would enter the sauna and massage the child with a besom. 46.  In the sauna O.B. had massaged the first and third applicants at their request. He continued that during the massage they had been fully naked. No complaints however had been made. He had massaged by first lifting up one or both legs and massaging them and had then moved on to massage their arms. He had not touched the girls\u2019 intimate body parts. He had known that touching breasts during massage was unhealthy. He had not known how it had come about that girls had been in the sauna naked. He had not told them that they needed to attend the sauna in that way. 47.  O.B. stated that in summer 2009 he had massaged the first applicant on her hip muscle. It had been hurting and she had asked him to massage it. 48.  On 29 January 2010 the police released O.B. subject to his not changing his place of residence and complying with a prohibition on approaching the applicants or the sports school.\n(e)  Third applicant\u2019s mother 49.  On 21 January 2010 the mother of the third applicant gave evidence. In September 2009 her daughter had told her that girls attended the sauna naked together with O.B., who himself had been dressed in shorts. She had also mentioned a trip to Lithuania during which O.B. had touched her leg and she had run into the bathroom.\n(f)  O.B.\u2019s students and their parents 50.  Of the other students mentioned by the applicants, it appears that the police interviewed V.A. on 14 January 2010 and her mother on 19 January 2010. Also, K.D.\u2019s statement was taken on 13 August 2010 and her mother\u2019s had been taken on 1 February 2010. 51.  In particular, V.A. stated that she did not like the sauna. She had attended it only twice. Girls had attended the sauna naked and O.B. had massaged them. She had had good relations with O.B. According to V.A.\u2019s mother, V.A. did not like the sauna in principle and it was unlikely that she had often attended it. 52.  According to K.D.\u2019s account of events, she had trained with O.B. until 2008. He had been a good coach (the copy of K.D.\u2019s statement furnished to the Court by the Government in some parts was illegible). At a sports camp in summer 2005 her mother had gone into the sauna together with the girls. K.D. had told her that, as a sports doctor, O.B. would usually massage them. The mother had asked her: \u201c...but how, naked?\u201d Her daughter had replied that they would cover their bodies up with towels. Therefore the mother had understood that O.B. had not massaged them naked. 53.  With regard to the other students referred to by the applicants, the police interviewed the mother of A.F. on 15 January 2010. The latter stated that her daughter had not paid any attention to attending the sauna naked as she had trained with O.B. from a young age. She had seen the other girls undressing for the sauna and had followed their example. A.F. had stated that the coach had not harassed them. In the view of A.F.\u2019s mother, O.B. should not have allowed the girls to attend the sauna undressed and should have informed the parents. She stated that she would allow A.F. to be questioned only on a prosecutor\u2019s authorisation. 54.  On 25 January 2010, the police questioned D.B. \u2013 who had been referred to by the first and second applicants\u2019 mother \u2013 and D.B.\u2019s mother. D.B. had trained with O.B. between 2005 and 2008. From a copy of D.B.\u2019s statement furnished to the Court by the Government it appears that she stated:\n\u201c... at the beginning [students] were going to the sauna in swimsuits, but [O.B.] said that [they] should not be shy and should attend the sauna without swimsuits in order for the body to relax fully. [D.B.] had started to take massages naked, as had the other girls.\u201d D.B. had not found it inappropriate, because the coach had entered the sauna only in order to demonstrate how to massage using a besom. Neither D.B. nor her mother had any complaints to lodge against him. 55.  Between January and August 2010 the police also took other statements. 56.  It emerges that the police interviewed a parent of one of O.B.\u2019s students at the time of the investigation; specifically, on 3 February 2010 they questioned A.K., whose son, V.K., trained with O.B. He did not have any complaints concerning the coach and did not know any details about the situation in issue. 57.  The police also questioned numerous former students of the coach. On 28 January 2010 J.R. gave evidence that she had been coached by O.B. until 2004. She described him positively. With regard to O.B.\u2019s massaging naked girls in the sauna, she believed that he had done it through ignorance or a lack of understanding about the situation. But at the same time, he had done it in order to prepare aspiring athletes. She did not believe that he had had a sexual purpose. Parents of O.B.\u2019s former students, J.P., J.A., and I.S.H., and also N.I. \u2013 who had herself trained with O.B. between 1991 and 1992 \u2013 described O.B. as a very good coach. I.S.H. had learnt from her son that boys had taken sauna massages wearing swimming trunks. Two other former students of O.B., A.D. \u2013 coached between 1994 and 2001 \u2013 and J.M., described O.B. as a very good coach.\n(g)  Other witnesses 58.  On 1 February 2010 the doctor L.G. submitted evidence that the sauna was one of the most important renewal procedures after training. However, if a male was present in the sauna together with girls, it was recommended that they all wear swimwear. 59.  On 18 October 2010 the investigator, T.M., terminated the investigation. 60.  In her decision T.M. cited the evidence collected. She concluded that the investigation had revealed that the sauna sessions had been voluntary. Girls had attended the sauna fully undressed, either on their own initiative or because that had been the practice by others. As explained by O.B., sauna sessions were healthy and necessary after training. He had massaged students at their request. During massages they had been undressed but O.B. had had no interest in the girls. He had merely assisted with the massages. 61.  T.M. could not establish that O.B. had acted with a sexual purpose, an element required under section 162 of the Criminal Law (sexual abuse). For that reason and referring to the principle of in dubio pro reo T.M. closed the investigation against O.B. for the lack of elements of crime. 62.  On 29 October 2010 the applicants\u2019 parents appealed to the prosecutor\u2019s office against the termination decision. In November 2010 they supplemented the appeal. 63.  They claimed that the applicants\u2019 allegations had been ignored. The first applicant had indicated that O.B. had touched her intimate body parts; according to the second applicant, O.B. had ridiculed her in front of the other girls with regard to undressing in sauna; and the third applicant had recounted her experience in Lithuania. The allegation that O.B. had entered the changing rooms had not been addressed. 64.  Contrary to the parents\u2019 request, the students who had travelled to Lithuania together with O.B. and the third applicant had not been questioned. The statements of children present in the sauna had not been taken. 65.  The parents contended that their reference to a recognised trainer who maintained that sauna sessions harmed the health of athletes under the age of eighteen had been neglected. They named a witness in that regard and asked that a statement be taken from him. They also requested that the first applicant\u2019s current coach and the school psychologist be interviewed. 66.  They furnished the report by the psychologist, K.V., to the effect that the first and second applicants had suffered psychological trauma. The appeal therefore sought the commissioning of another expert report.\n(b)  Appeal decision 67.  On 1 December 2010 the prosecutor I.G. dismissed the appeal. 68.  She reasoned that the applicants had been questioned thoroughly. Sixteen of O.B.\u2019s former students, and their parents had been interviewed, as had two further witnesses as regards the usefulness of sauna. 69.  Endorsing the investigator\u2019s conclusion, I.G. stated that the investigation had not shown that O.B. had acted with a sexual purpose. All the witnesses had stated that O.B. had never touched students\u2019 naked body parts other than with a besom and when massaging parts causing pain. Accordingly, the elements of crime under section 162 of the Criminal Law (sexual abuse) were not present. Nor could the elements under section 174 of the Law (cruelty and violence against a minor) be identified. None of O.B.\u2019s students had stated that O.B. had treated his students in a cruel or violent way. The phrase he had used [with regard to the second applicant] had not reached that threshold. 70.  I.G. dismissed the parents\u2019 requests that further evidence be collected. Likewise, the report of the psychologist, K.V. concerning the first and second applicants could not be included in the investigation file as it had already been closed. 71.  On 13 December 2010 the applicants\u2019 parents appealed against the aforementioned decision to a higher prosecutor. In January 2011 they supplemented the appeal. 72.  They disputed the conclusion that the element of a sexual purpose had not been present. In particular, they noted that according to the first applicant O.B. had touched the lower part of her stomach, the area between her legs, and her breasts during massages. The second applicant had told of O.B. ridiculing her in front of the other girls regarding undressing for the sauna. The third applicant\u2019s account regarding the events in Lithuania had been ignored and other students who had been present on the trip to Lithuania had not been interviewed. No consideration had been given to the allegation of O.B. entering changing rooms and, as if by accident, touching girls\u2019 breasts. 73.  The appeal referred to the report by the psychologist, K.V., stating that the first applicant exhibited symptoms associated with violence or serious psychological trauma.\n(b)  Higher prosecutor\u2019s decision 74.  On 14 January 2011 the higher prosecutor, E.B., dismissed the appeal. 75.  He endorsed the findings of the lower prosecutor, including the view that O.B. had regarded sauna sessions as beneficial to athletes\u2019 health and had offered them to his students for this reason. Attendance of the sauna had been voluntary. Students had been naked because that had been the practice of the other students. Sometimes O.B. had entered the sauna but in order to perform massages only. 76.  With regard to the episode in Lithuania, E.B. deemed that the third applicant\u2019s allegation had not in itself revealed that a crime had been committed and statements from students present were therefore unnecessary. The investigation had been thorough and no further investigative actions were required. 77.  On 26 January 2011 the applicants\u2019 parents lodged an appeal against the aforementioned decision to the chief prosecutor, V.O. 78.  They maintained their previous requests and arguments, including the contention that the girls had attended the sauna naked because O.B., using his coach\u2019s authority, had convinced them that wearing swimsuits was harmful to health. Initially all the applicants had been wearing swimsuits but the other girls had told them that O.B. had insisted on their being undressed. 79.  No regard therefore had been given to the claim that the first and third applicants had undressed due to pressure from O.B. 80.  That aspect and the reasons which had led children to undress for the sauna had not been investigated. Even though the testimonies of other parents stated that their children had also attended the sauna naked, these children had not been interviewed. 81.  Furthermore, according to boys coached by O.B. they had not been asked to attend the sauna undressed, which, in the parents\u2019 submission, signalled that O.B. had been interested in naked girls. None of the other coaches at the sports school had massaged their students in the sauna, especially not naked. Moreover, O.B. had been in the habit of entering the sauna without the applicants\u2019 permission. 82.  The parents further argued that the lower prosecutor had referred to the allegation that during a massage O.B. had touched the first applicant between her legs without specifying further detail, even though the first applicant had specifically stated that the coach had touched her intimate body parts. The first applicant had spoken about it to the psychologist, who had affirmed that she had been speaking the truth.\n(b)  Final appeal decision 83.  On 28 February 2011 the chief prosecutor, V.O., dismissed the appeal and affirmed the closure of investigation. 84.  V.O. endorsed the lower prosecutor\u2019s findings. With regard to the parents\u2019 request for the hearing of further witnesses, V.O. stated as follows:\n\u201c[A]fter having assessed [the applicants\u2019] testimonies in that part, no grounds exist to conclude that a crime has been committed. Moreover, in these testimonies [the applicants] gave no evidence on the circumstances mentioned in the appeal in question.\u201d 85.  No appeal lay against the aforementioned decision. 86.  On 17 June 2011 the mother of the first and second applicants, arguing that the report by the psychologist, K.V., constituted newly discovered facts, asked the State police to reopen the investigation. She stated that K.V. had concluded that the first applicant had suffered psychological trauma. 87.  By a final decision of 1 September 2011 that request was dismissed. 88.  On 22 November 2011 the mother of the third applicant, arguing that the report of the psychologist, K.V., constituted newly discovered facts, asked the police to reopen the investigation. According to K.V.\u2019s report, the third applicant exhibited possible post-traumatic stress symptoms. 89.  By a final decision of 6 February 2012 that request was dismissed. 90.  In the meantime, on 20 April 2011 a compensation claim against O.B. was lodged on behalf of the applicants before the Riga City Vidzeme District Court (R\u012bgas pils\u0113tas Vidzemes priek\u0161pils\u0113tas tiesa). 91.  Relying on Article 92 of the Constitution (Satversme) (right to compensation) and section 1635 of the Civil Law (Civillikums) (right to compensation), it was requested that O.B. pay compensation of 3,000 Latvian lati (LVL) (roughly corresponding to 4,286 euros (EUR)) with regard to the first and the third applicants and LVL 1,000 (roughly corresponding to EUR 1,428) with regard to the second applicant. 92.  On 30 October 2013 the District Court delivered its judgment. 93.  According to the District Court, it was not disputed that the first and third applicants had started to train with O.B. in June 2009 and the second applicant in August 2009 (sic). The first and second applicants had trained with him until September 2009 and the third applicant until November 2009. 94.  It was established that O.B. had recommended sauna sessions to his students. It was not, however, established that O.B. had psychologically influenced the applicants with regard to attending the sauna. At the same time, the District Court continued, it was not proved that the sauna sessions had been necessary in order to achieve good results in sports without harming health. They had not been included in the training programme. It was not proved that either the applicants or their parents had consented to the coach\u2019s presence in the sauna together with naked girls. The applicants had been minors and therefore unable to fully understand or assess the situation. They had trusted and obeyed a person of the age of majority and could not have fully protected themselves against interference with their privacy. 95.  According to generally accepted ethical norms, it was not a tradition in the society of the region to appear naked \u2013 even in the sauna \u2013 in front of the opposite sex. Massaging naked girls with a besom had been unethical and in contravention of general moral principles, as had been the suggestion to a girl under the age of eighteen to sleep with the coach in the same bed. The District Court found that these actions on part of O.B. had violated the applicants\u2019 right to privacy. 96.  Noting, inter alia, that none of the applicants had been caused grievous or irreversible consequences, the District Court ordered that O.B. pay LVL 300 (roughly corresponding to EUR 428) each to the first and third applicants and LVL 100 (roughly corresponding to EUR 143) to the second applicant. 97.  As submitted by the Government and not disputed by the applicants, on 2 December 2013 O.B. lodged an appeal against the aforementioned judgment before the Riga Regional Court (R\u012bgas apgabaltiesa). No appeal, however, was lodged by the applicants. 98.  On 12 March 2014 O.B. withdrew his appeal. On 19 March 2014 the appeal proceedings were discontinued and the judgment of the District Court became final on 1 April 2014.", "references": ["5", "6", "7", "2", "4", "8", "3", "1", "9", "0", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "6.  Mr Dzhabarov was born in 1975 and lives in Burgas. 7.  Mr Petkov was born in 1981 and lived in Burgas. He died on 31 May 2014. On 4 September 2014 his mother, who is his only heir, expressed the wish to pursue the application on his behalf. 8.  Ms Nikolova was born in 1962 and lives in Sandanski. 9.  On 20 December 2007 Mr Dzhabarov, Mr Petkov and a friend of theirs were travelling in a car in Stara Zagora. At about 3 a.m. they were stopped by a police patrol, arrested, and, at approximately 3.10 a.m., taken to a local police station. 10.  The police issued an order for Mr Dzhabarov\u2019s detention for twenty-four hours at 12 noon. The order said that he was being detained under section 63(1)(1) of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Act 2006 (\u201cthe MIAA\u201d \u2013 see paragraph 41 below) in conjunction with Article 195 \u00a7 1 (3) and (4) of the Criminal Code 1968, which criminalise burglary and theft committed by using a motor vehicle, technical means or a special technique. 11.  The police issued an order for Mr Petkov\u2019s detention for twenty-four hours at 1.30 p.m. That order likewise said that he was being detained under section 63(1)(1) of the MIAA, but in his case in conjunction with 198 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code 1968, which criminalises robbery. 12.  Neither of the two orders mentioned the factual grounds on which they had been issued. 13.  The applicants were released at 12 noon on 21 December 2007. 14.  In the beginning of 2008 Mr Dzhabarov sought judicial review of the order for his detention. 15.  On 16 April 2008 the Stara Zagora Administrative Court quashed the order. It noted that Mr Dzhabarov had been detained under section 63(1)(1) of the MIAA. However, the order had not specified the offence of which he was suspected. That was both a breach of the rules of procedure and an indication that there did not exist a reasonable suspicion that Mr Dzhabarov had committed an offence. The lack of such suspicion was also demonstrated by the absence of any evidence in the police file. Two police reports, drawn up later and suggesting that Mr Dzhabarov had been detained with a view to elucidating whether he was implicated in the robbery of a petrol station and a number of burglaries, could not ex post facto justify his detention; they moreover contained discrepancies and were based on investigative steps carried out after Mr Dzhabarov\u2019s arrest. The court went on to say that the order had been issued more than nine hours after Mr Dzhabarov\u2019s de facto arrest, which was out of line with the object and purpose of the law. The court partly allowed Mr Dzhabarov\u2019s claim for costs, awarding him 200 Bulgarian levs (BGN) (102 euros (EUR)) in lawyers\u2019 fees and BGN 10 (EUR 5) in court fees. 16.  The police appealed on points of law. Mr Dzhabarov did not ask the Stara Zagora Administrative Court to vary its ruling in relation to costs, as was possible under the applicable rules of procedure. He did however ask the Supreme Administrative Court to award him the costs incurred in the appeal proceedings. 17.  In a judgment of 2 December 2008 (\u0440\u0435\u0448. \u2116 13157 \u043e\u0442 02.12.2008 \u0433. \u043f\u043e \u0430\u0434\u043c. \u0434. \u2116 7441/2008 \u0433., \u0412\u0410\u0421, \u0406\u0406\u0406 \u043e.), the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the lower court\u2019s judgment. It held that the detention order, which had been issued at 12 noon on 20 December 2007, was chiefly tainted by the undisputed lack of contemporaneous evidence that Mr Dzhabarov might have been implicated in an offence. The court did not mention Mr Dzhabarov\u2019s claim in respect of the costs incurred in the appeal proceedings. Mr Dzhabarov did not ask it to supplement its judgment by doing so, as provided under the applicable rules of procedure.\n(b)  The claim for damages 18.  In January 2009 Mr Dzhabarov brought a claim under section 1(1) of the State and Municipalities Liability for Damage Act 1988 (see paragraph 47 below) against the Stara Zagora Regional Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. He alleged, inter alia, that his detention had been unlawful and had caused him psychological trauma. He sought BGN 2,000 (EUR 1,023) in non-pecuniary damages and, under the head of pecuniary damages, reimbursement of the remainder of the costs that he had allegedly incurred in the judicial review proceedings: BGN 206 (EUR 105). 19.  On 27 November 2009 the Burgas Administrative Court dismissed the claim. It held that Mr Dzhabarov had failed to prove that he had suffered non-pecuniary damage \u2013 such as negative emotions, stress or discomfort \u2013 as a result of his detention. He had not provided any evidence, in particular medical expert reports, on that point. The statement of Mr Petkov, who had been called by Mr Dzhabarov to testify, only contained information about the events surrounding their arrest and detention. The court went on to say that it was not possible to seek costs incurred in proceedings for judicial review of a detention order by way of a claim for damages under section 1(1) of the 1988 Act. 20.  Mr Dzhabarov appealed on points of law. He argued, inter alia, that it was logical to presume that a person who had been unlawfully detained had endured mental suffering on account of that, and that he was entitled to compensation because his detention had been in breach of his fundamental rights. 21.  In a judgment of 15 June 2010 (\u0440\u0435\u0448. \u2116 7954 \u043e\u0442 15.06.2010 \u0433. \u043f\u043e \u0430\u0434\u043c. \u0434. \u2116 753/2010 \u0433., \u0412\u0410\u0421, III \u043e.), the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the lower court\u2019s judgment. It held that claimants in proceedings under section 1(1) of the 1988 Act bore the burden of making out all elements of the tort, including the existence of damage, and that the only evidence that could be used to prove non-pecuniary damage in the form of mental suffering was medical expert evidence, not witness evidence. The court went on to agree fully with the lower court\u2019s ruling in relation to the claim for costs in the judicial review proceedings. 22.  In January 2008 Mr Petkov sought judicial review of the order for his detention. 23.  On 10 March 2008 the Stara Zagora Administrative Court quashed the order. It noted that Mr Petkov had been detained under section 63(1)(1) of the MIAA. However, the order for his detention, while formally valid, was out of line with the object and purpose of the law. The police were given the power to detain persons suspected of offences with a view to being able to investigate those offences. That is why the law did not require conclusive evidence of an offence but simply information enabling the police to form a reasonable suspicion in that regard. The police detention log showed that Mr Petkov had been brought to the police station at 3.10 a.m. on 20 December 2007, whereas the three witness statements submitted by the police in the judicial review proceedings in support of their contention that Mr Petkov was suspected of an offence spoke of a robbery of a petrol station committed at 4.50 a.m. This showed that, at the time of Mr Petkov\u2019s arrest, the police did not have a reasonable suspicion of him committing an offence. It was also striking that although Mr Petkov had in fact been arrested at 3.10 a.m. on 20 December 2007, the order for his detention said that his detention had started at 1.30 p.m. that day. The court partly allowed Mr Petkov\u2019s claim for costs, awarding him BGN 200 (EUR 102) in lawyers\u2019 fees and BGN 10 (EUR 5) in court fees. 24.  On 30 September 2008 the police appealed on points of law against that judgment. Mr Petkov did not ask the Stara Zagora Administrative Court to vary its ruling in relation to costs, as was possible under the applicable rules of procedure. He did however ask the Supreme Administrative Court to award him the costs incurred in the appeal proceedings. 25.  In a bench ruling of 18 November 2009 (\u043e\u043f\u0440. \u043e\u0442 18.11.2009 \u0433. \u043f\u043e \u0430\u0434\u043c. \u0434. \u2116 14761/2008 \u0433., \u0412\u0410\u0421, \u0406\u0406\u0406 \u043e.), the Supreme Administrative Court declared the appeal inadmissible, finding that the time-limit for the police to lodge an appeal had expired as early as 25 March 2008. The court did not mention Mr Petkov\u2019s claim in respect of the costs incurred in the appeal proceedings. On 3 December 2009 Mr Petkov asked the court to supplement its decision by doing so. In a decision of 7 January 2010 (\u043e\u043f\u0440. \u2116 162 \u043e\u0442 07.01.2010 \u0433. \u043f\u043e \u0430\u0434\u043c. \u0434. \u2116 14761/2008 \u0433., \u0412\u0410\u0421, \u0406\u0406\u0406 \u043e.), the Supreme Administrative Court refused the request, finding that it had been made out of the applicable seven-day time-limit, which had started to run on 18 November 2009. Mr Petkov appealed, but a five-member panel of the court dismissed the appeal in a decision of 3 February 2010 (\u043e\u043f\u0440. \u2116 1399 \u043e\u0442 03.02.2010 \u0433. \u043f\u043e \u0430\u0434\u043c. \u0434. \u2116 1511/2010 \u0433., \u0412\u0410\u0421, \u043f\u0435\u0442\u0447\u043b. \u0441-\u0432).\n(b)  The claim for damages 26.  In July 2008 Mr Petkov brought a claim under section 1(1) of the State and Municipalities Liability for Damage Act 1988 (see paragraph 47 below) against the Stara Zagora Regional Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. He alleged, inter alia, that his detention had been unlawful and had caused him psychological trauma. He sought BGN 2,000 (EUR 1,023) in non-pecuniary damages and, under the head of pecuniary damages, reimbursement of the remainder of the costs that he had allegedly incurred in the judicial review proceedings: BGN 206 (EUR 105). 27.  On 6 October 2008 the proceedings were stayed pending the determination of the appeal against the Stara Zagora Administrative Court\u2019s judgment of 10 March 2008 (see paragraph 25 above). On 12 April 2010 the proceedings were resumed. 28.  On 29 September 2010 the Burgas Administrative Court dismissed the claim. It held that Mr Petkov, who bore the burden of proof in that respect, had failed to show that he had suffered non-pecuniary damage \u2013 such as negative emotions, stress or discomfort \u2013 as a result of his detention. He had not provided any evidence, in particular medical expert evidence, on that point. The evidence of Mr Dzhabarov and the other person with whom Mr Petkov had been detained, who had been called by Mr Petkov to testify, and the expert evidence on the lawfulness of those conditions adduced in the course of the proceedings, gave information about the material conditions in the detention facility but not about Mr Petkov\u2019s state of mind or subjective perceptions. These could only be established on the basis of medical expert evidence, which had not been provided. The court went on to say that it was not possible to seek costs incurred in proceedings for judicial review of a detention order by way of a claim for damages under section 1(1) of the 1988 Act. 29.  Mr Petkov appealed on points of law. He argued, inter alia, that it was absurd to hold that the mental suffering flowing from unlawful detention could only be established on the basis of medical expert evidence. It was natural to presume that a person unlawfully deprived of his liberty for more than thirty hours would endure such suffering. 30.  In a judgment of 11 April 2011 (\u0440\u0435\u0448. \u2116 5046 \u043e\u0442 11.04.2011 \u0433. \u043f\u043e \u0430\u0434\u043c. \u0434. \u2116 13852/2010 \u0433., \u0412\u0410\u0421, III \u043e.), the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the lower court\u2019s judgment. It held that claimants in proceedings under section 1 of the 1988 Act bore the burden of proving all elements of the tort, including the existence of damage, and that the only evidence that could be used to prove non-pecuniary damage in the form of mental suffering was medical expert evidence, not witness evidence. The statements of the witnesses called by Mr Petkov had established the conditions in the detention facility and the attitude of the police officers towards him, but could not serve as proof of negative changes in his physical, psychological or neurological status. 31.  In 2006 Ms Nikolova was working as head of the audit unit of the Blagoevgrad division of the National Revenue Agency. She was in charge of, among others, the towns of Petrich and Sandanski. 32.  At about 11 a.m. on Saturday 9 September 2006, Ms Nikolova went to the Sandanski office of the National Revenue Agency, according to her to practise filling in tests on the ethical duties of tax officials. She said that, on her way there, she ran into an acquaintance of hers, Mr B.T., who asked her whether she could run a check on the identities of certain persons that he needed for court papers that he was about to file in connection with the registration of the United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden-PIRIN as a political party. Ms Nikolova decided that there was no legal impediment to that and together with Mr B.T. went inside the Agency\u2019s office. However, their entry set off the alarm and shortly after that three police officers came to the office and found Ms Nikolova and Mr B.T. inside, checking the personal data of certain individuals in the Agency\u2019s computer database. The officers asked the two of them to produce their identification papers and to accompany them to the local police station. 33.  Ms Nikolova and Mr B.T., under police escort, arrived at the police station at about 11.15 a.m. Ms Nikolova was asked to draw up a written explanation of her presence in the Agency\u2019s office. In the meantime, two plain-clothes officers arrived at the station; it later transpired that they were officers of the National Security Agency. They interviewed Ms Nikolova without identifying themselves and without explaining the reasons why she was detained. Ms Nikolova was released at about 3.40 p.m. It appears that, in the meantime, at about 1.50 p.m., she was briefly taken by the police back to the office of National Revenue Agency to be present while the police drew up a record, and then returned to the police station. 34.  Following this incident, the prosecuting authorities opened criminal proceedings against Ms Nikolova on charges that she had knowingly divulged confidential information to which she had access by virtue of her position as a tax administration official, contrary to Article 248 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code 1968. However, on 22 May 2007 the Sandanski District Prosecutor\u2019s Office decided to discontinue those proceedings. It noted that while Ms Nikolova had indeed misused her office to divulge confidential information \u2013 the personal data of two persons \u2013 to which she had access by virtue of her position, Article 248 \u00a7 1 required, in addition, that this divulgation give rise to prejudice for the State or a private person. There was no evidence, however, that the applicant\u2019s act had prejudiced the State or those two persons, both of whom, when interviewed, had stated that they had not suffered any negative consequences as a result of the applicant\u2019s divulging their personal data to Mr B.T. 35.  Shortly after the incident, Ms Nikolova and Mr B.T. complained to the military prosecuting authorities about the actions of the police officers who had detained them. On 29 November 2007 the Sofia Military Prosecutor\u2019s Office refused to open criminal proceedings pursuant to those complaints. Its decision was upheld by the Appellate Military Prosecutor\u2019s Office on 19 February 2008 and by the Supreme Cassation Prosecutor\u2019s Office on 4 June 2008. 36.  In January 2010 Ms Nikolova brought a claim under section 1(1) of the State and Municipalities Liability for Damage Act 1988 (see paragraph 47 below) against the Blagoevgrad Regional Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the National Security Agency. She alleged that her detention had been unlawful because it had not been based on a written order as required under section 65(1) of the MIAA. She also alleged that the deprivation of liberty and the pressure to which she had been subjected by the police had caused her stress and humiliation and had aggravated her health, and sought BGN 10,000 (EUR 5,113) in non\u2011pecuniary damages. 37.  On 29 July 2010 the Blagoevgrad Administrative Court dismissed the claim. It noted that it was not disputed that between about 11 a.m. and about 3.30 p.m. on 9 September 2006 Ms Nikolova had been detained by officers of the Sandanski police. That was further proved by the register of detainees kept by the Sandanski police station and the statements of the officers concerned. However, a claimant in proceedings under section 1(1) of the 1988 Act (see paragraph 47 below) had to make out all elements of the tort under that provision: a wrongful act or omission by officials, damage, and a sufficient causal link between the two. The claimant bore the full burden of proof in relation to each of those, and the lack of any element meant that the claim should fail. However, Ms Nikolova had not categorically shown that she had suffered non-pecuniary damage as a result of her arrest and detention. There was no evidence that the officers concerned had done anything to hurt her dignity. Their testimony, which was internally consistent and matched the rest of the evidence, showed that Ms Nikolova had not been subjected to any physical or psychological abuse. Ms Nikolova\u2019s evidence that one of the officers had acted rudely was contradicted by the evidence of all officers and was vague; it could not therefore be credited. It was not supported by the statement of Mr B.T. either. Ms Nikolova\u2019s assertions in respect of the damage that she had allegedly suffered were in addition very general and could not be upheld. The police had been apprised of a possible offence and had detained her for less than twenty-four hours to elucidate the case, as possible under section 64 of the MIAA (see paragraph 42 below). Had the detention lasted more than twenty-four hours, the outcome of the case would probably have been different. 38.  Ms Nikolova appealed on points of law. She argued, inter alia, that the court had not clarified under which point of section 63(1) of the MIAA she had been detained, or commented on the fact that her detention had not been sanctioned by a written order. She also argued, by reference to Article 5 \u00a7 5 of the Convention, that the mere fact of unlawful detention gave rise to non-pecuniary damage because it was an infringement of the fundamental right to liberty, guaranteed by, inter alia, Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention. Since she had been detained unlawfully, she was entitled to non-pecuniary damages in relation to that. 39.  In a judgment of 19 May 2011 (\u0440\u0435\u0448. \u2116 7036 \u043e\u0442 19.05.2011 \u0433. \u043f\u043e \u0430\u0434\u043c. \u0434. \u2116 245/2011 \u0433., \u0412\u0410\u0421, \u0406\u0406\u0406 \u043e.), the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the appeal. It fully agreed with all of the lower court\u2019s findings, including that Ms Nikolova had been placed under police detention within the meaning of section 63 of the MIAA, but did not mention Article 5 \u00a7\u00a7 1 or 5 of the Convention.", "references": ["8", "6", "9", "0", "3", "5", "1", "4", "7", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "3.  The present case concerns the applicant\u2019s trial and conviction before a judge and jury at the Central Criminal Court for the murder of a Mr Jon Bartlett. A co-defendant, Mr Lee Osborne, was tried and acquitted of assisting an offender. 4.  The facts of the case may be summarised as follows. 5.  Mr Bartlett was shot dead at about 7.40 pm on 31 March 2006. According to witnesses the gunman was wearing a baseball cap and drove off in a silver Vauxhall Vectra. In the early hours of 1 April 2006 a silver Vauxhall Vectra was set alight a short distance from the scene of the shooting. 6.  Shortly after the murder the applicant fled to the Netherlands. He was subsequently extradited from the Netherlands to the United Kingdom to stand trial for Mr Bartlett\u2019s murder. 7.  On 1 April 2008 the applicant formally served a Defence Statement in which he alleged that Mr Bartlett had been murdered by Mr Pearman, a man who had previously been convicted of serious drug and firearms offences and who was at that time serving a prison sentence for murder. 8.  The applicant\u2019s case was that he had been involved in a drug deal with Mr Pearman and Mr Bartlett. On the morning of 31 March 2006 Mr Pearman and Mr Bartlett had asked him to provide a car so they could collect a shipment of drugs. Later that day he purchased the Vectra in the presence of Mr Osborne and Mr Pearman, but Mr Pearman had driven off in it. 9.  The applicant met Mr Pearman again at 7.30 p.m. to give him his share of money for the drugs. Mr Pearman was driving the Vectra. The applicant left the meeting with Mr Osborne, who was driving a white van. 10.  After this meeting the applicant went to his parents\u2019 home. During the night he went to a petrol station and while he was there he called a friend whose mother lived near the road where the burning Vectra was discovered. 11.  On 4 July 2008 the police interviewed Mr Pearman about the applicant\u2019s allegations. He answered \u201cno comment\u201d to the questions asked. That evening he telephoned his son and told him he had never heard of the applicant and knew nothing of the murder. On 17 July 2008 he telephoned his wife and again denied any involvement in the murder. Both of these conversations were recorded as Mr Pearman, a category A prisoner, would have known. 12.  The applicant\u2019s trial for the murder of Mr Bartlett started on 11 August 2008. At the trial it was accepted by the applicant that the real issue for the jury was whether he or Mr Pearman was the murderer. Mr Pearman was asked to make a statement or give evidence at the trial but refused to do so. This was made known to the court through a statement from an officer at the prison where he was being detained. 13.  To disprove the applicant\u2019s defence the prosecution sought to adduce the recordings of Mr Pearman\u2019s telephone calls pursuant to section 114(1)(d) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (see paragraph 40 below). The defence objected to their admission in evidence but the judge ruled that they should be admitted. In his ruling, the judge stated that Mr Pearman had indicated, in the clearest terms, that he was not prepared to make a statement to the police or give evidence at the trial. 14.  In determining whether the recordings should be admitted, the judge considered the matters listed in section 114(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (see paragraph 40 below). 15.  First, he stated that he was satisfied the evidence had extremely strong probative value as Mr Pearman \u201cappeared to be expressing genuine outrage at being implicated in a murder in which he was in no way involved\u201d. 16.  Secondly, he indicated that Mr Pearman could not be called because he refused to give evidence, but noted that all the enquiries carried out by the police to date had confirmed his lack of involvement in the killing. 17.  Thirdly, he said that he was satisfied the evidence in question was \u201cextremely important\u201d. 18.  Fourthly, the judge referred to the submissions of counsel for the applicant and for his co-defendant, who submitted that Mr Pearman would have known that his calls were being recorded by the prison authorities, and argued that his statements were self-serving. The judge said that these were all valid comments which the jury should consider in assessing the weight to be attached to Mr Pearman\u2019s denials, but were not, in his view, grounds for excluding evidence. 19.  Fifthly, he pointed out that as the conversations were taped the evidence was clearly reliable. 20.  Sixthly, the trial judge said that the defence had already cross\u2011examined the officer in the case as to Mr Pearman\u2019s previous convictions and the details of the murder for which he was serving his sentence of life imprisonment. Moreover, he had already noted that the jury should consider the fact that Mr Pearman\u2019s comments were self-serving and that he would have known that his telephone conversations were being recorded. 21.  Finally, he said that he did not consider that there would be any real prejudice to the applicant from the tapes being played. 22.  At trial, in addition to playing the tapes, the prosecution led evidence that the applicant and victim were known to each other and were both involved in drug dealing on a substantial scale. Items connected to drug dealing were recovered from Mr Bartlett\u2019s home, one of which was a list of debts. The applicant\u2019s name appeared on this list and he was shown as owing the victim GBP 24,000. 23.  The prosecution also relied on the applicant\u2019s previous arrest when he was found to be in possession of a firearm. In his evidence the applicant admitted that when arrested on that occasion he had been dealing in drugs, but denied possession of the firearm. 24.  Mr Bartlett\u2019s mobile telephone records were also introduced to show that he had been in contact with the applicant on the day of the murder. The last telephone call between them was recorded at 7.22 p.m., shortly before the murder. There had also been significant telephone contact between the applicant and Mr Bartlett in the ten days prior to the murder. 25.  The seller of the silver Vectra gave evidence that on the afternoon of the murder he had been contacted by the applicant, who had arranged to meet at his house at 6 p.m. The seller\u2019s mother testified that one of the two men who collected the car was named John and was wearing a baseball cap. The men came for the car in a white van that had been hired by the father of Mr Osborne that day from AVA, a hire company, and passed to Mr Osborne at 6 p.m. that evening. The van had distinctive orange writing on the side. 26.  Witnesses also saw a white van in the vicinity of the shooting at the relevant time. The van had orange writing on the side, and was similar, if not identical, to the van that had been hired from AVA on the same date. 27.  Mobile telephone cell site evidence was led by the prosecution with the intention of showing that the applicant\u2019s mobile telephone was in the vicinity of the murder at the relevant time, although it was switched off between 7.28 p.m. and 7.50 p.m. Cell site evidence also demonstrated that the applicant and his co-accused were in the vicinity of the road where the Vectra was found between 8.01 p.m. and 8.17 p.m. 28.  Residents of the streets near the shooting gave evidence. One stated that she had heard two bangs and a man running to a car and driving off very quickly. Another, Ms Rita Willott, gave a description of the gunman as being between twenty and thirty years\u2019 old, of average build and height and wearing a baseball cap. She saw a car matching the Vectra\u2019s description leaving the scene. Ms Willott\u2019s evidence was not challenged and was read to the jury. A third eye-witness, a ten-year old boy, also gave evidence that the gunman had been in his mid-thirties and had been wearing a baseball cap. A fourth eye-witness, Mr Gordon Raggett, also gave a description matching the applicant. A fifth witness, Ms Kate Botwright, gave evidence that she had seen both the car and the van near the shooting. The driver of the car was in his late teens or early twenties, had short brown hair and wore a baseball cap. Several other witnesses gave descriptions to the effect that the man driving the Vectra was white and was wearing a baseball cap. 29.  CCTV footage from a petrol station showed the applicant arriving in the white AVA van, wearing a baseball cap and making telephone calls to an associate at 1.47 a.m. The number dialled by the applicant was in the vicinity of the cell site covering the road where the Vectra was found and the inference sought by the prosecution was that the applicant was in discussions about the destruction of the car. 30.  A police superintendent also gave evidence of the enquiries into Mr Pearman. The police had found no connection between Mr Pearman and either Mr Bartlett or the applicant (there was, for instance, no reference to Mr Pearman in Mr Bartlett\u2019s telephones) and it was the superintendent\u2019s conclusion that there was absolutely no evidence that he had been involved in Mr Bartlett\u2019s murder. 31.  A photograph of Mr Pearman was also adduced in evidence. The prosecution\u2019s case was that Mr Pearman, a man in his fifties, did not match the description of the gunman given by the eye-witnesses. 32.  Mr Pearman\u2019s previous convictions for drug offences, firearm offences, and murder committed on 2 May 2006 were also adduced. 33.  On Mr Pearman\u2019s telephone calls, the trial judge directed the jury as follows:\n\u201cIt is for you to decide what weight, if any, you attach to this evidence; but it does have certain limitations which I must draw to your attention: (a) you had not had the opportunity of seeing and hearing the witnesses in the witness box and sometimes when you do see and hear a witness you get a much clearer idea of whether his evidence is honest and accurate; (b) their evidence has not been tested under cross\u2011examination and you have not had the opportunity of seeing how their evidence survived this form of challenge; (c) in the case of Pearman these were self-serving statements, that is he was saying he was not involved in the murder of Jon Bartlett. In addition calls made by high risk category A prisoners, such as Pearman, from prison would be known by him to be recorded and he was speaking in those calls to members of his own family.\u201d 34.  On Mr Pearman\u2019s previous convictions, the trial judge directed the jury:\n\u201cYou have heard this evidence because it may help you to resolve two issues in the case, namely: (a) whether the convictions show that on 31st May 2006 he had a tendency to be a drug dealer, carry a firearm and commit murder, and whether this makes it more likely that he was the gunman in this case; and (b) whether he was being truthful and reliable in denying his involvement in the present case in his telephone calls to his son and wife. A person of bad character may be less likely to tell the truth, but it does not follow that he is incapable of doing so.\nYou may use the evidence of his bad character for the particular purposes I have just indicated, if you find it helpful to do so. It is for you to decide the extent to which the evidence of bad character helps you, if at all. The prosecution submit that the only reason Seton chose to name Pearman as the murderer in his defence statement on 1st April 2008 was because he knew he had an extremely bad character for drugs offences, firearm offences and murder, and therefore was an ideal person for him to blame for the murder in this case. The defendant Seton says he named him because he believed Pearman killed Jon Bartlett.\u201d 35.  In the course of their deliberations, the jury asked and were allowed to hear the tapes of Mr Pearman\u2019s telephone calls again. On 26 August 2008, by a majority, the jury convicted the applicant of murder. He was sentenced to life imprisonment with a minimum term of thirty years. He appealed against conviction to the Court of Appeal. 36.  The application for leave to appeal was initially considered and rejected by a single judge in February 2009. The application was renewed before the full court on 14 November 2009 and leave to appeal was granted. In doing so, the court found it to be arguable that the trial judge did not make sufficient investigations with regard to the production of Mr Pearman. The court also observed:\n\u201cIt seems to us that it is a long standing principle that unless there are compelling reasons to the contrary, the best available evidence should be put before the jury. In this instance, rather than the jury hearing from Mr Pearman himself, they heard the recording of his two conversations. It is also of note that shortly after the jury had retired they asked if they might hear the recordings again and, after some discussion, the recordings were played to them. It is perhaps pertinent to observe that had Pearman himself given evidence, what would have happened if there had been a request by the jury to be reminded of his evidence is that the judge would have summarised it to them from his notebook. Playing the recordings a second time to the jury, that, submits Miss Wass [counsel for the applicant], is something that elevates the importance of the hearsay evidence there contained. There is no doubt that the recordings were important evidence in the context of the case as a whole (at least so far as we are thus persuaded) and we have come to the conclusion that permission to appeal should be granted on all grounds advanced and the hearing will proceed in due course accordingly.\u201d 37.  On 4 March 2010 the full court heard the case and dismissed the appeal, reserving its judgment. The judgment was delivered on 12 March 2010. In relation to the tapes of Mr Pearman\u2019s telephone calls, the court observed:\n\u201cIt is contended on behalf of the Appellant [the present applicant] that the tapes of the calls should not have been admitted without calling, or trying to call, Pearman to give evidence.\n...\nThe difficulty with this submission is the judge\u2019s finding of fact that Pearman would not give evidence. It is true that he could have been compelled to come to Court. However, on the basis of the judge\u2019s finding, the grounds for which have not been impugned, that would have been a fruitless exercise. Moreover, he would have had to be warned of the right to exercise the privilege against self-incrimination. The prospect of any sensible evidence being given by him was, on any realistic view, nil. All that the defence could have obtained was the advantage of having him brought up before the jury, who would presumably have seen his obduracy.\nThe judge considered this evidence to be important and to have strong probative value. We do not know whether the jury shared this view. The defence were able to say, as they did, that the statements were self-serving, made by a serious criminal who knew that they were being recorded. What is central to this appeal is that the judge addressed the matters required to be addressed by section 114(2) [of the Criminal Justice Act 2003]. The allegation against Pearman had been made late, and given that on the Appellant\u2019s case he had known of Pearman\u2019s responsibility for the murder within days of its being committed, it is to be inferred that it was deliberately made late so as to make it more difficult for the Crown to investigate it. As it was, because of the lateness of the allegation, the telephone records for telephones used in the murder for which Pearman had been convicted only went back to 23 April 2006.\nIn Z this Court said:\n\u201825. The Court of Appeal will not readily interfere with a trial judge\u2019s decision to admit evidence under section 114(1)(d) [of the Criminal Justice Act 2003]. It will do so, in general, only if his decision is marred by legal error, or by a failure to take relevant matters into account or it is such that the judge could not sensibly have made.\u2019\nThe judge\u2019s decision was not marred by legal error; he took all relevant matters into account; and the decision to admit the recordings in evidence was not one that no judge could sensibly have made.\n...\nFor these reasons, we reject this ground of appeal.\u201d 38.  The Court of Appeal then added:\n\u201cThe safety of the conviction\nHowever, we would in any event have upheld the safety of the conviction. The evidence against the Appellant may have been circumstantial, but it was overwhelming. In summary:\n(i) The only evidence of Pearman\u2019s involvement was that of the Appellant.\n(ii) Seton and Bartlett were involved in drugs together; there was evidence that Seton was in debt to Bartlett and that Bartlett was pressing for payment. Seton had a motive to kill Bartlett.\n(iii) There was no good reason for the allegation of Pearman\u2019s involvement to have been made so late.\n(iv) It is difficult to see why the Appellant fled the country if he was innocent.\n(v) The police uncovered no evidence of any link between Pearman and either the Appellant or Bartlett, despite exhaustive enquiries. Miss Wass contends that those enquiries were imperfect. The fact remains that there was no such evidence.\n(vi) The Appellant himself accepted that he made no direct calls to Pearman; contact was, he said, made via Bartlett. If all three were involved in a drugs deal, it is curious indeed that the Appellant did not have Pearman\u2019s telephone number and could not and did not telephone him direct.\n(vii) There was no evidence of Bartlett\u2019s telephones having been used to telephone any telephone number associated with Pearman.\n(viii) Pearman was born in 1952. He was 54 at the date of Bartlett\u2019s murder. The evidence of Rita Willott (described by the judge as an extremely important witness) was not challenged and was read at the trial. She said that the man who fired the gun was aged between 20 and 30, of average build and height, and he was wearing a baseball cap. Jack Doyle, a boy aged 10, said that the gunman was wearing a baseball cap and was in his mid-30s. Gordon Raggett described the gunman as white, in his 20s, athletic and about 5 feet 10 inches, of slim build. All these descriptions fitted the Appellant and not Pearman. Against these, one witness described the gunman as not appearing to be young. Miss Wass suggested that the evidence of the age of the gunman should be discounted because of the uncertainties of ascribing an age to a man wearing a baseball cap. However, the weight of the evidence points clearly to a young man such as the Appellant rather than Pearman. If the Appellant seriously wished to challenge Miss Willott\u2019s evidence, she should have been required to give evidence orally and should have been cross examined.\n(ix) Similarly, Kate Botwright described the driver of the Vectra car, seen by her together with the AVA van, as in his late teens or early 20s, with short brown hair and wearing a baseball cap. Her account of what she saw was inconsistent with the Appellant\u2019s.\n(x) The evidence relating to the purchase of the Vectra and the hire of the AVA van on the day of the murder supports the prosecution case.\n(xi) The cell phone evidence showed Seton to be in the vicinity of the murder when it was committed; the timing of his last telephone connection with Bartlett, just before the murder, and the switching off of his telephone at the time of the murder, and his call to a telephone in the vicinity of the location where the Vectra was set on fire, all powerfully supported his guilt.\n(xii) Lastly, evidence was given that on a previous occasion Seton had had a connection with a firearm.\nThus, quite apart from the evidence of Pearman\u2019s telephone calls, we had no doubt as to the safety of the conviction of the Appellant.\u201d 39.  On 6 March 2010 the applicant was informed that the Court of Appeal had refused to certify questions of general public importance for the consideration of the Supreme Court.", "references": ["0", "8", "4", "9", "6", "3", "7", "5", "1", "2", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1936 and lives in Sofia. 6.  In 1997 the Compensation for Owners of Nationalised Real Property Act (\u201cthe 1997 Compensation Law\u201d) entered into force. It regulated the granting of compensation for property taken under several laws of a punitive or redistributive nature and which could not be returned physically. 7.  On 27 November 1997 the applicant requested from the regional governor of Sofia region compensation for an apartment which had belonged to his ancestor at the time of its nationalisation in 1949. As he received no reply, at some point in 1998 the applicant challenged the governor\u2019s silence in court. The Sofia City Court quashed the governor\u2019s tacit refusal on 18 June 1999, finding that the applicant had to be compensated with \u201chousing compensation bonds\u201d (\u0436\u0438\u043b\u0438\u0449\u043d\u0438 \u043a\u043e\u043c\u043f\u0435\u043d\u0441\u0430\u0442\u043e\u0440\u043d\u0438 \u0437\u0430\u043f\u0438\u0441\u0438) as restitution was not possible. The applicant appealed, challenging the type of compensation awarded to him. On 9 April 2001 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the lower court\u2019s judgment and returned the case to it for the compensation amount to be determined. 8.  Instead of ruling on the compensation, the Sofia City Court archived the case; it was only put back on the case roll on 5 July 2002 when the applicant complained. 9.  The Sofia City Court, sitting in its administrative bench, delivered a decision on 19 July 2005. It determined that the amount of total compensation due in respect of the property in question was BGN 23,604, and that the regional governor was liable for costs. The court also ruled that the applicant was to receive compensation in the form of \u201chousing compensation bonds\u201d, in accordance with his share as an heir. The court went on to state that, as evidenced by the heirs certificate issued in 1994 and presented during the proceedings, the applicant and his brother were the two heirs of the owner of the confiscated property. Consequently, the applicant\u2019s share of the inheritance stemmed directly from the law, which provided that the children of the deceased inherited in equal parts. The decision became enforceable on 6 September 2005. 10.  On 26 June 2006 the applicant transmitted to the regional governor a copy of the final court decision of 19 July 2005, asking that it be enforced. He sent another request to that effect on 8 August 2006. 11.  The deputy regional governor replied in writing on 14 February 2007 that the applicant needed to submit a certified copy of the court decision, as well as a certificate attesting to his status as heir and a declaration certified by a notary. 12.  On 19 February 2007 the applicant submitted a certified copy of the court decision of 19 July 2005. He signalled that enforcement continued to be outstanding and emphasised that he had already submitted a certificate attesting to his status as heir to the regional governor, together with his initial request for compensation of 27 November 1997 (see paragraph 7 above). He also pointed out that it was clear from the judicial decision that the heirs in question were two \u2013 himself and a sibling of his; pursuant to section 5(1) of the Inheritance Act 1949 he was eligible to receive half of the inheritance and, therefore, half of the compensation awarded by the court. He sought clarification in respect of the declaration requested by the governor. 13.  The deputy governor replied on 5 March 2007 that the declaration was necessary pursuant to section 5 of Ordinance No. 9 of 1998; the latter governed the conditions and order for the payment of experts included in the list under \u00a7 4 of the 1997 Compensation Law. 14.  In the meantime, on 19 January 2007, the applicant requested to be issued with a writ of execution on the basis of the 19 July 2005 judgment and, more specifically, in respect of its part concerning the amount of compensation and his consequent share of it. 15.  On 16 March 2007 he was issued with a writ of execution in respect of the compensation owed to him. On 30 March 2007 he asked the bailiff to start forced enforcement proceedings and to collect the related costs and expenses. 16.  On 3 April 2007 the bailiff sent an invitation for voluntary compliance to the governor, signalling that a failure to act upon the 19 July 2005 decision attracted a pecuniary sanction. 17.  The deputy regional governor replied on 20 April 2007 that the compensation proceedings had not been completed because of the applicant\u2019s failure to submit the requested declaration certified by a notary (see paragraphs 11 and 13 above). He also indicated that an original writ of execution was needed in order for his office to pay costs and expenses. 18.  On 25 April 2007 the applicant wrote to the regional governor that the ordinance in question did not apply to his case, as it only concerned situations in which the administrative body itself was called upon to determine the compensation amount. In the applicant\u2019s case that amount had been determined in court, which had also ruled that the applicant and his sibling were the only heirs, and the property had to be evenly split between the two of them. 19.  The bailiff sent another letter to the regional governor on 27 April 2007, inviting him to enforce the court decision. He reiterated that the writ of execution had been issued following a final judicial decision which was binding in respect of the parties and in which the court had established all relevant facts as well as the compensation due to the applicant. The bailiff specified that the costs and expenses which the governor was requested to pay related to the enforcement proceedings, that a writ of execution was not necessary in order to claim or collect those expenses, and that they had increased with the passage of time. Finally, the bailiff reiterated that a weekly fine in the amount of BGN 200 would be imposed on the governor in the event of failure to enforce the court decision. 20.  On 10 May 2007 the regional governor challenged in court the bailiff\u2019s acts. He claimed that the lack of enforcement was caused entirely by the applicant\u2019s refusal to submit the notary declaration. On 2 July 2007 the Sofia City Administrative Court held that the governor\u2019s application for judicial review was inadmissible. The court found in particular that the bailiff\u2019s invitations to the governor for voluntary compliance were not acts of forced enforcement and were not therefore subject to judicial review. This decision was confirmed by the Supreme Administrative Court on 21 December 2007 in a final decision. 21.  As no further action by the regional governor followed, in March 2009 the applicant once again asked the bailiff to enforce the court decision of 19 July 2005. The bailiff wrote to the governor on 31 March 2009, requesting enforcement and with a reminder that failure to enforce could result in weekly fines of BGN 1,200 and in prosecution. 22.  The deputy regional governor replied on 27 April 2009 that the compensation proceedings had not been completed because of the applicant\u2019s failure to submit the requested declaration about his share of the inheritance in accordance with the Inheritance Act 1949. Two days later the regional governor himself fined the applicant BGN 1,000, to be applied weekly. 23.  On 11 May 2009 the applicant challenged the fine in court. The Sofia City Administrative Court quashed the fine on 8 January 2010, finding that in this case the regional governor was not competent to impose fines as he was not an enforcement body but a debtor, and Mr Yanakiev was not a debtor but a creditor. 24.  By a letter of 19 August 2013 the applicant\u2019s lawyer informed the Court that the final court decision of 19 July 2005 remained unenforced.", "references": ["1", "6", "5", "0", "7", "2", "8", "4", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1965 and lives in Budapest. 6.  The applicant intended to organise a demonstration protesting against \u201cthe persecution of national radicalism\u201d. It was planned to take place between 4 p.m. and 7 p.m. on 15 August 2009. The venue was Venyige Street in Budapest Xth District, in front of Budapest Penitentiary. 7.  Venyige Street is of a width of five metres in the Government\u2019s submissions and of eight in the applicant\u2019s. Parallel to the main driveway, there is a service lane, of a width equivalent to that of two cars; this area is normally used as a car park. In the applicant\u2019s submissions, this latter section could have accommodated largely all the participants, without them creating any major traffic incident. 8.  The applicant, in the notification addressed to Budapest Police Department under Act no. III of 1989 on the Right of Assembly, indicated that a maximum of 200 participants were to be expected. This notification was made at 5.40 p.m. on 12 August 2009. 9.  On 14 August 2009 Budapest Police Department banned the demonstration, in pursuit of its prerogatives under section 8(1) of Act no. III of 1989. It was of the view that there was no alternative route for the traffic in the neighbourhood, and consequently the demonstration would impede traffic inordinately. The applicant was reproached with the fact that the notification did not contain the agenda for the gathering. 10.  Because of this prohibition, the demonstration did not take place. 11.  On 17 August 2009 the applicant requested judicial review of the police decision. He explained inter alia that he had not specified the agenda because the meeting had been intended as a rather small one and that therefore the actual course of events, such as speeches or discussion, was hard to predict. 12.  On 19 August 2009 the Budapest Regional Court rejected the applicant\u2019s complaint. It observed that the question of previous notification of the agenda was immaterial, since the only valid reason in the case was the disproportionate difficulties which would be caused to traffic by the demonstration. 13.  The court relied on the expert opinion provided by the Traffic Division of Budapest Police Department, in whose view the demonstration would have significantly impeded the traffic heading to the shops located in Venyige Street, a dead end, to the local waste disposal site and to the suppliers\u2019 entrance of Budapest Prison; and the disruption caused by the crowd might have extended to Magl\u00f3di Road, a major thoroughfare in the vicinity with lines of city transport involved. Relying on that reasoning, the court endorsed the police decision.", "references": ["5", "0", "2", "8", "4", "1", "9", "6", "3", "No Label", "7"], "gold": ["7"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1967 and lives in Porto. 5.  On 28 April 2009 the applicant lodged a request to be granted permanent disability with respect to work before the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s Office of the Porto Labour Court as a consequence of a labour accident that she had suffered and with regard to which she was claiming damages and compensation. 6.  On 27 May 2009 the applicant supplied statements to the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s Office in which she confirmed she was receiving medical care. On the same day the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s Office request the applicant to provide her medical reports, which she submitted on 28 and 29 July 2009. 7.  Meanwhile, the applicant\u2019s employee was notified to provide information on the applicant\u2019s work accident, which was done on 16 June 2009. 8.  On 16 September the applicant supplied second statements, informing the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s Office that she remained under medical treatment. 9.  Between 16 September 2009 and 20 September 2010 the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s Office requested information regarding the evolution of the applicant\u2019s medical treatment. Between these dates, the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s Office stayed the proceedings twice for thirty days, on 5 March and on 4 May 2010, until the applicant was medically fit. 10.  On an unknown date the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s Office was informed that the applicant was no longer being treated in the same clinic and on 7 October 2010 requested the applicant to inform whether she was still being treated and in which clinic. The State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s Office was informed that the applicant had changed her address and on 25 October 2010 requested the police to provide information on the applicant\u2019s new address. 11.  On 4 November 2010 the applicant informed the Porto Labour Court of her new address and that she had not been certified as medically fit yet. 12.  On 5 January 2011 the court requested the Forensic Institute (Instituto de Medicina Legal) to make a medical examination of the applicant, which was made on 27 February 2011. The medical report was submitted by the Forensic Institute on 3 March 2011 in which it referred that further clinical data and an additional examination were still needed. 13.  On 9 March 2011 the Porto Labour Court the collection of those data and the realisation of the additional examination, which were submitted on 26 May and 15 June 2011, respectively. On 12 October 2011 the Forensic Institute submitted its final report. 14.  On 24 October 2011 the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s Office scheduled a conciliatory hearing between the parties on 23 November 2011. 15.  The conciliatory hearing was adjourned to 24 January 2012 due to the lack of notification of the applicant\u2019s employer. On 24 January 2012 the hearing was again adjourned to 14 March 2012 at the request of the applicant. On this date the conciliatory stage ended without an agreement between the parties. 16.  On 2 April 2012 the applicant requested the Porto Labour Court to continue with the judicial stage of the proceedings against her employer and the insurance company. 17.  Between 8 June 2012 and 21 November 2012 several procedural steps took place, mostly notifications, provision of information from the parties to the Porto Labour Court and a medical examination at the request of the applicant. 18.  The hearing started on 20 February and continued on 28 February 2013. 19.  On 8 March 2013 the Porto Labour Court delivered its decision in which it ruled against the applicant.", "references": ["8", "1", "9", "0", "4", "5", "6", "7", "2", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1978 and lives in Kaliningrad. 6.  On unspecified date the applicant bought a house in Kaliningrad. A third person, M., was her authorised representative for the conclusion of the purchase contract. 7.  On 18 August 2003 her ownership of the house was registered in the Consolidated State Register of Real Estate Titles and Transactions (\u0415\u0434\u0438\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u0433\u043e\u0441\u0443\u0434\u0430\u0440\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u0440\u0435\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0440 \u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432 \u043d\u0430 \u043d\u0435\u0434\u0432\u0438\u0436\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0435 \u0438\u043c\u0443\u0449\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e \u0438 \u0441\u0434\u0435\u043b\u043e\u043a \u0441 \u043d\u0438\u043c, \u201cthe Land Register\u201d) and it remains there to date. 8.  On an unspecified date M. was charged with fraud against the Savings Bank of Russia (\u0421\u0431\u0435\u0440\u0431\u0430\u043d\u043a) (hereafter \u2013 \u201cthe Bank\u201d) and a private person. 9.  On 20 April 2005 a judge of the Lomonosovskiy District Court of Arkhangelsk issued an interlocutory injunction prohibiting the applicant from selling the house. 10.  On 15 March 2006 the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Arkhangelsk found M. guilty of fraud. The court found, inter alia, that M. was also the de facto owner of the house as she had paid for it and resided in it since 2003. The court ordered the seizure and sale of the house in order to pay M.\u2019s debt to the victims of the crime. 11.  On 9 June 2006 the Arkhangelsk Regional Court partly quashed M.\u2019s conviction on appeal, notably as regards the District Court\u2019s finding that she was the real owner of the house. It considered that this finding was not based on any legal provision and failed to take into account the purchase contract concerning the house. The Regional Court thus remitted that specific issue for fresh consideration in civil proceedings. 12.  On an unspecified date the Bank sued M. for additional damages and sought reimbursement by means of the sale of the house. The applicant was also summoned to the proceedings as a defendant. 13.  On 17 September 2007 the Tsentralnyy District Court of Kaliningrad rejected the Bank\u2019s civil claims and declared that the house was the applicant\u2019s property. It held that the applicant had always demonstrated her intention to be the owner of the disputed house, notably by systematically paying all charges and taxes relating to the house, and that her mother was living in it. As regards the Bank\u2019s request for annulment of the powers of attorney given by the applicant to M. for the purchase of the house and of the purchase contract itself, the District Court found that this claim was time-barred and consequently rejected it. 14.  On unspecified date the Bank lodged an appeal against that judgment, notably arguing that the purchase contract should be declared null and void because the applicant had never intended to become the real owner of the house but was merely helping M. to cover up for her crimes. 15.  On 19 December 2007 the Kaliningrad Regional Court upheld on appeal the judgment of 17 September 2007, which became final. 16.  On 16 April 2008 the applicant applied to the Tsentralnyy District Court of Kaliningrad for the revocation of the interlocutory decision of 20 April 2005 by the Lomonosovskiy District Court of Arkhangelsk to seize the house. 17.  On 28 April 2008 the Tsentralnyy District Court of Kaliningrad rejected the application on the grounds that it lacked jurisdiction to decide on a measure imposed by another court in the framework of criminal proceedings. 18.  On 4 May 2008 the Bank lodged an application for supervisory review. 19.  On 18 August 2008 the Presidium of the Kaliningrad Regional Court quashed the judgment of 17 September 2007, as upheld on 19 December 2007, and ordered the seizure of the house from the applicant in order to pay M.\u2019s debt to the Bank. The Presidium relied on the finding made by the Oktyabrskiy District Court in its judgment of 15 March 2006 that although the applicant was registered as the official owner of the house, it had been bought with funds belonging to M. 20.  On 16 October 2008 and 10 March 2009 the applicant and M. challenged the judgment of the Presidium of the Kaliningrad Regional Court by way of supervisory review applications, which were rejected by the Supreme Court and the Deputy President of the Supreme Court, respectively. 21.  On 8 June 2009 the bailiff decided to seize the house in accordance with the judgment of the Presidium of the Kaliningrad Regional Court. 22.  On 2 April 2010 at the bailiff\u2019s request the Tsentralnyy District Court stayed the enforcement proceedings pending examination of the applicant\u2019s case by the Court.", "references": ["3", "7", "8", "6", "1", "2", "0", "4", "5", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in Krasnodar. 5.  On 24 March 2009 the Military Court of Novorossiysk Garrison (\u041d\u043e\u0432\u043e\u0440\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0439\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0439 \u0433\u0430\u0440\u043d\u0438\u0437\u043e\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u0432\u043e\u0435\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u0441\u0443\u0434) convicted the applicant of laundering of the proceeds of crime and sentenced him to a fine. 6.  On 21 May 2009 the Military Court of the North-Caucasian Command (\u0421\u0435\u0432\u0435\u0440\u043e-\u041a\u0430\u0432\u043a\u0430\u0437\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0439 \u043e\u043a\u0440\u0443\u0436\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u0432\u043e\u0435\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u0441\u0443\u0434) acquitted the applicant on appeal. 7.  On 21 July 2009 the Presidium of the Military Court of the North\u2011Caucasian Command, on a public prosecutor\u2019s initiative, annulled the judgment of 21 May 2009 by way of supervisory review and remitted the case for fresh consideration to the appeal court. The annulment was reasoned by two main arguments: (1) unresolved contradictions between witnesses\u2019 statements pertaining to the applicant\u2019s criminal intent, and (2) absence in the appeal judgment of a summary of the arguments presented by the prosecution during the appeal proceedings. 8.  On 6 August 2009 the Military Court of the North-Caucasian Command, acting on appeal, reversed the judgment of 24 March 2009 and remitted the case for fresh consideration to the trial court. 9.  In 2010 the criminal proceedings against the applicant were terminated due to decriminalization of his actions under the domestic law.", "references": ["2", "0", "8", "4", "5", "7", "1", "9", "6", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicants were claimants in civil proceedings. 6.  In the applications Trapeznikov v. Russia and Bychkov and Others v. Russia, the applicants were former participants of the Chernobyl clean-up operation who sued the relevant authorities for an inflation adjustment to their social benefits. 7.  In the application Markova v. Russia, the applicant sought the eviction of her late son\u2019s wife and her granddaughter from the flat she was living in, alleging that she was the sole owner because her son had renounced his share in the flat in her favour. 8.  In the application Ryabchikov v. Russia, the applicant inherited a house in accordance with a will drawn up by his late mother. Later he discovered that she had two plots of land which she transferred back in 1994 to an agricultural company to which she was a member. The applicant sought to recover the property of these two plots of land alleging that the transfer had not been duly formalised and that consequently the land formed part of his inheritance. 9.  In all of the applications, the first-instance courts found for the applicants, the judgments were upheld on appeal and they became enforceable. Subsequently, at the defendants\u2019 requests, the presidia of the relevant regional courts quashed the judgments by way of supervisory review. In the applications Trapeznikov and Bychkov and Others, the presidia found that the lower courts failed to take into account the specific method of calculation of indexation established by the Government for this particular category of social benefits. In the applications Markova and Ryabchikov, they concluded that the findings of the lower courts favorable to the applicants were based on the retrospective application of the law (see Appendix).", "references": ["6", "1", "5", "4", "0", "3", "8", "9", "2", "7", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  On 8 April 1998 the applicant requested the Bucharest Commission for Implementing Law no. 9/1998 (the County Commission) to award compensation for a property owned by his ancestors and taken over by the Bulgarian State. On 15 December 2000 the Commission issued a decision proposing payment of compensation in the amount of ROL 2,013,957,441 (approximately EUR 88,000 at the time). 6.  That decision, according to the law, had to be validated by a central commission within sixty days. As the Central Commission did not issue any decision, the applicant brought a court action aimed at obliging the Central Commission to act in accordance with the law. The applicant also asked for the amounts granted by the County Commission to be adjusted for inflation when payment was made.\nThe applicant\u2019s action was dismissed on 17 February 2002 by the Bucharest County Court, which held that the sixty-day deadline was not compulsory, but rather advisory. The court also held that the adjustment of the amounts granted was indeed prescribed by Article 8 \u00a7 3 of the law, but any adjustment was to be made at the time payment was actually made, once the Central Commission had ratified or otherwise the County Commission decision. 7.  On 23 June 2003 the Bucharest Court of Appeal allowed the applicant\u2019s claim, and ordered that the Central Commission issue a decision ratifying or otherwise the proposal made by the County Commission on 15 December 2000. The court held that the claim concerning the adjustment of the amounts granted as compensation was to be dealt with during the enforcement stage. 8.  On 29 August 2003 the Central Commission ratified the County Commission decision of 15 December 2000. 9.  The compensation, representing at that time approximately EUR 54,000, was paid to the applicant on 22 November 2003. 10.  Dissatisfied with the decision of the Central Commission, on 13 December 2003 the applicant lodged a court action aimed at obtaining an adjustment of the initial amount to take into account inflation from the date on which it was established by the County Commission to the date of actual payment. 11.  By a decision of 16 April 2004, the Bucharest County Court ruled in the applicant\u2019s favour. The County Court established that in accordance with Article 8 \u00a7 2 of Law no. 9/1998, the amounts set by the County Commission had to be adjusted for inflation if they were not paid in the year they were awarded. 12.  On 21 February 2005 the Bucharest Court of Appeal reversed the decision, and ruled that the applicant was not entitled to an adjustment for inflation. 13.  The appellate court concluded that the County Court had interpreted the applicable law incorrectly, as the entitlement to adjustment for inflation had to be determined on the basis of the date when the Central Commission had ratified the decision of the County Commission. As the payment had been made uno ictu, and not in instalments, during the same year as the Central Commission took its decision, the applicant was not entitled to an adjustment for inflation. 14.  It also concluded that the failure of the Central Commission to ratify the decision of the County Commission within sixty days could not represent a legal basis for the adjustment of the amount in question.", "references": ["7", "3", "5", "8", "4", "2", "6", "0", "1", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1936 and lives in Skokie, USA. 6.  On 31 August 1998 the applicant lodged a request with the Bucharest Commission for Implementing Law no. 9/1998 (the County Commission) seeking compensation for assets owned by her ancestors and transferred to the Bulgarian State. On 29 April 2004 the County Commission issued a decision whereby the applicant was entitled to compensation of ROL 4,991,284,506 (approximately EUR 123,500 at the time). 7.  Between 2005 and 2008 the applicant lodged several applications with the National Authority for Property Restitution (hereinafter \u201cthe National Authority\u201d) and the President of Romania for payment of the compensation. On each occasion, the applicant was informed that her file was subject to ratification by the responsible authority for implementing Law no. 9/1998. 8.  On 20 February 2009 the National Authority issued the ratification decision, confirming the applicant\u2019s entitlement to RON 499,128.43 (approximately EUR 117,000 at the time). The decision mentioned that the payment would be made in two annual instalments, as provided for by the methodological rules for the implementation of the law, in force since 30 November 1998 and amended on 26 October 2007. 9.  To date, the applicant has not received the compensation or any indication as to when such compensation would be paid.", "references": ["4", "1", "7", "2", "6", "8", "9", "5", "3", "0", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Linz. He has been a lawyer since 1986 and he practises in Linz. 7.  In 2006 criminal investigation proceedings were pending before the Linz Regional Court against O.G., a regional politician from Upper Austria, and a Moldovan citizen, T.S., who was in detention pending trial. Both were suspected of human trafficking. O.G. was also suspected of fraud. During the investigation proceedings, T.S. accused O.G. of having accepted money for facilitating the illegal entry or transit of nineteen nationals from Moldova to Austria or through Austria to Italy. 8.   E.W., an association of which O.G. was president, commissioned the applicant to represent T.S. in the criminal proceedings. The applicant\u2019s fees were covered by this association. Having accepted the mandate the applicant remained in close contact with O.G. and transmitted to him information concerning the criminal investigation proceedings against T.S. He did not represent O.G. in the proceedings. 9.  On 17 August 2006 the applicant visited T.S. in prison in order to prepare for the trial on that day. During this visit an affidavit (Eidesst\u00e4ttige Erkl\u00e4rung), prepared in advance by the applicant, was signed by T.S. in which she submitted that her former allegations against O.G. had been untrue. 10.  On the same day, the Linz Regional Court convicted T.S. of the crimes as charged and sentenced her to fifteen months\u2019 imprisonment. T.S. did not retract the statements she had made to the investigating authorities, nor was the affidavit submitted to the court. Instead, the applicant transferred it to the lawyers of O.G. 11.  On 21 August 2006 the lawyers of O.G. transferred T.S.\u2019s affidavit to the public prosecutor to be taken into consideration in the proceedings against O.G. 12.  On 31 October 2006 and 4 December 2006, in the course of the criminal proceedings against O.G., the judge of the Linz Regional Court reported to the Upper Austrian Bar Association (Rechtsanwaltskammer, hereinafter \u201cthe Bar Association\u201d) that he suspected the applicant of double representation. The judge stated that the applicant had kept close contact with O.G. and had transferred to him information concerning the investigation proceedings regarding T.S. The judge further stated that the applicant had asked T.S. to submit the affidavit, whose contents were untrue but in favour of O.G., to the court. 13.  On 11 July 2007, upon a request by the Linz public prosecutor, the Linz Regional Court instituted a preliminary investigation into allegations of attempting to aid the perpetrator (versuchte Beg\u00fcnstigung), false testimony (Falsche Beweisaussage) and falsifying evidence (F\u00e4lschung eines Beweismittels) against the applicant, and informed the Bar Association. 14.  On 17 July 2007, 17 August 2007 and 6 September 2007 the Linz public prosecutor requested that the court conduct further preliminary investigations in the case, in particular the questioning of several witnesses and to put the applicant on the stand. The Linz Regional Court took the requested evidence and heard evidence from the applicant. 15.  On 24 September 2007, the Linz public prosecutor requested the inclusion of a further file regarding the falsification of evidence in a case not related to that of O.G. The file was included in the preliminary investigation against the applicant and the requested evidence was gathered. 16.  Because of the reform of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which entered into force on 1 January 2008, the investigating judge transmitted the file to the Linz public prosecutor, who took charge of the case. 17.  On an unspecified date the Linz public prosecutor decided not to file a formal indictment (Anklageschrift, Strafantrag) against the applicant until a final court decision in the case against O.G. had been taken. There is no indication that a formal decision on the postponement was taken on this matter or sent to the applicant. 18.  On 4 February 2009 the Linz public prosecutor ordered the suspension of the criminal proceedings against the applicant since the criminal proceedings against O.G. were still pending. Again, it appears that no formal decision was sent to the applicant in this regard. 19.  On 5 May 2009 the applicant lodged a request with the Linz public prosecutor for the discontinuation of the investigation proceedings. 20.  On 6 July 2009 the criminal proceedings against the applicant were resumed and he was charged with the offence of attempted aiding of the perpetrator and falsifying evidence. 21.  The Linz Regional Court summoned the applicant on 17 July 2009 for trial on 22 September 2009. The applicant lodged a request to have more witnesses questioned on 10 September 2009 and submitted a statement. 22.  On 22 September 2009 the first hearing in the criminal proceedings against the applicant was held before the Linz Regional Court. 23.  The next hearing was held on 24 November 2009. The hearing was adjourned until the final decision in the case of O.G. had been taken. 24.  As the criminal proceedings against O.G. were still pending, the Linz Regional Court continued criminal proceedings against the applicant and a further hearing was held on 27 April 2011, with a new judge presiding. 25.  On 17 June 2011 the Linz Regional Court acquitted the applicant on all counts. 26.  On 8 November 2011 the Linz Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal by the public prosecutor. This judgment was served on the applicant on 30 November 2011. 27.  Following the notice of the investigating judge of 31 October 2006 the Disciplinary Prosecutor (Disziplinaranwalt) on 13 December 2006 applied to introduce disciplinary proceedings against the applicant on charges of double representation and falsification of evidence. 28.  Accordingly, on an unspecified date, the Disciplinary Council of the Bar Association (Disziplinarrat der Ober\u00f6sterreichischen Rechtsanwaltskammer, hereinafter \u201cthe Disciplinary Council\u201d) initiated disciplinary proceedings against the applicant. 29.  On 24 September 2007 the Disciplinary Council held an oral hearing and adjourned the disciplinary proceedings until the criminal proceedings at the Linz Regional Court had become final. 30.  On 25 September 2007 the Disciplinary Prosecutor applied for the withdrawal of the applicant\u2019s right to represent clients before the Linz courts in criminal cases as an interim measure. 31.  The applicant was informed of this application and submitted his written comments on 4 October 2007 and 30 October 2007 in which he opposed the measure. 32.  On 17 December 2007 the Disciplinary Council, without holding a hearing, withdrew the applicant\u2019s right to represent before the Linz District Court, the Linz Regional Court and the Linz Court of Appeal in criminal law cases as an interim measure by virtue of section 19 of the Disciplinary Act (Disziplinarstatut f\u00fcr Rechtsanw\u00e4lte und Rechtsanwaltsanw\u00e4rter). It held that because of the accusations against the applicant the imposed interim measure was proportionate. 33.  The applicant appealed on 5 February 2008 against this interim measure and complained that the preconditions for it had not been met, that the Disciplinary Council had failed to hear evidence and that it had not held an oral hearing. Furthermore the measure had not been proportionate to the accusations. 34.  On 28 August 2008 the Appeals Board (Oberste Berufungs- und Disziplinarkommission) dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal without having held an oral hearing. It found that it was the task of the criminal courts to hear evidence. The applicant had submitted his comments and had therefore been able to sufficiently present his arguments. Moreover, the measure imposed upon the applicant had been proportionate. 35.  On 28 October 2008 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Constitutional Court (Verfassungsgerichtshof) and again complained about the lack of an oral hearing and that the measure was disproportionate. 36.  On 25 November 2008 the applicant lodged a request for information (Auskunftsbegehren) with the Disciplinary Board and asked if the interim measure of 17 December 2007 would automatically expire after six months. If not, he asked to have the interim measure withdrawn as the criminal proceedings were still pending. He claimed that it was disproportionate to sustain the interim measure over such a long period of time. 37.  On 2 December 2008 the Disciplinary Board replied to the request of 25 November 2008 and informed the applicant, that the interim measure would not expire automatically but would remain in force. 38.  On 1 December 2009 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaint and held that the reasoning of the authorities had been sufficient and therefore the imposed measure was not arbitrary. Furthermore it found that the proceedings had overall been fair. As the preliminary measure imposed on the applicant had not been a \u201ccriminal charge\u201d in the sense of Article 6 of the Convention, an oral hearing had not been compulsory. 39.  On 9 December 2010 the Bar Association asked for information about the state of the criminal proceedings. A written reply was sent on 14 January 2011. 40.  On 17 June 2011, after the applicant had been acquitted on all counts by the Linz Regional Court, he lodged another request with the Bar Association to have the interim measure withdrawn referring to the court\u2019s decision. 41.  This request was dismissed by the Bar Association as the public prosecutor had appealed against the decision of the Linz Regional Court. 42.  The applicant appealed on 18 July 2011 against this decision and complained about the length of time the imposed measure had already been in force. 43.  On 14 November 2011 the interim measure imposed on the applicant, prohibiting him from representing clients before the Linz courts in criminal cases was lifted by the Bar Association. 44.  On 30 January 2012 he was summoned to a hearing by the Disciplinary Council on 27 February 2012. 45.  The applicant filed statements in preparation of the hearing on 8 and 22 February 2012 denying that there was a case of double representation and referring to the decision of the Linz Court of Appeal of 8 November 2011. 46.  On 11 March 2013 the Disciplinary Council of the Bar Association found that the applicant had not knowingly organised for T.S. to submit an affidavit that was untrue. However, he had acted in double representation within the meaning of section 10 of the Lawyers Act (Rechtanwaltsordnung) in criminal proceedings, as he had acted in the interests of O.G. and the association E.W. as well as in those of T.S., whom he had represented. The Disciplinary Council stated that the fact that the disciplinary proceedings had lasted almost seven years and the fact that the right of the applicant to represent before certain courts in criminal cases had been withdrawn for about four years had to be taken into account. Therefore it found it reasonable to impose a fine of 1,000 euros (EUR) in addition to another disciplinary fine he already had been ordered to pay for another case of violation of the Lawyers Act. 47.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law and an appeal against the fine. 48.  The Supreme Court, acting as the highest court in disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, held a hearing on 20 May 2014 and dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law, but reduced the additional disciplinary fine to EUR 500. It explicitly mentioned the length of disciplinary proceedings as a violation of the applicant\u2019s rights under Article 6 of the Convention and took account of the fact that the applicant\u2019s right to represent before the Linz Courts in criminal cases had been withdrawn for four years. The Supreme Court found that a different set of disciplinary proceedings had been already pending when the present incident occurred. Therefore, the applicant should have acted with special caution. A total waiver of the fine would not be adequate in this situation. 49.  The Supreme Court\u2019s judgment was served on 11 August 2014 on the applicant.", "references": ["2", "1", "8", "4", "9", "7", "0", "6", "5", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Yerevan. He owned a house measuring 223.9 sq. m. and a plot of land measuring 770.3 sq. m. jointly with his mother. 6.  On an unspecified date the applicant lodged a civil claim against several individuals, who were apparently his relatives residing in the house (hereafter, the respondents), seeking to terminate their right of use of accommodation in respect of a part of the house by paying compensation and to evict them. The applicant\u2019s mother also lodged a similar claim. 7.  On 24 August 2006 the respondents lodged a counter-claim seeking to invalidate the ownership certificate and to have their ownership recognised in respect of the part of the house and of the plot of land used by them by virtue of acquisitive prescription. 8.  On 14 September 2006 the Shengavit District Court of Yerevan dismissed the applicant\u2019s and his mother\u2019s claims and granted the respondents\u2019 counter-claim. 9.  On an unspecified date the applicant lodged an appeal against the judgment of the District Court. 10.  On 19 January 2007 the Civil Court of Appeal examined the appeal and granted the applicant\u2019s claim in its part concerning the termination of the respondents\u2019 right of use of accommodation through payment of compensation. At the same time it dismissed the respondents\u2019 counter\u2011claim. 11.  This judgment became immediately effective and was subject to appeal on points of law within six months from the date of its delivery. 12.  On 24 April 2007 the respondents lodged an appeal on points of law with the Court of Cassation against this judgment, claiming that it had been adopted in violation of substantive law. As a ground for admitting their appeal, the respondents submitted, pursuant to Article 231.2 \u00a7 1 (1) and (3) of the Code of Civil Procedure (the CCP), that the judicial act to be adopted by the Court of Cassation might have a significant impact on the uniform application of the law and that the violation of the substantive law might cause grave consequences. 13.  On 2 May 2007 the Court of Cassation decided to return the respondents\u2019 appeal as inadmissible for lack of merit. The reasons provided were as follows:\n\u201cThe Civil Chamber of the Court of Cassation ... having examined the question of admitting [the respondents\u2019 appeal lodged against the judgment of the Civil Court of Appeal of 19 January 2007], found that it must be returned for the following reasons:\nPursuant to Article 230 \u00a7 1 (4.1) of [the CCP] an appeal on points of law must contain a ground [required by] Article 231.2 \u00a7 1 of [the CCP].\nThe Court of Cassation finds that the admissibility grounds raised in the appeal on points of law[, as required by] Article 231.2 \u00a7 1 of [the CCP], are absent. In particular, the Court of Cassation considers the arguments raised in the appeal on points of law concerning a possible judicial error and its consequences, in the circumstances of the case, to be unfounded.\u201d 14.  This decision became final from the moment of its pronouncement and was not subject to appeal. 15.  On 19 July 2007 the respondents lodged another appeal on points of law with the Court of Cassation against the judgment of the Court of Appeal of 19 January 2007, alleging violations of substantive and procedural law. As a ground for admitting their appeal the respondents indicated, besides the grounds mentioned in their first appeal on points of law, that the contested judicial act contradicted a judicial act previously adopted by the Court of Cassation. 16.  On 2 August 2007 the Court of Cassation decided to admit the appeal for examination, finding that it complied with the requirements of Articles 230 and 231.2 \u00a7 1 of the CCP. 17.  On 10 October 2007 the Court of Cassation examined the appeal on the merits and decided to grant it by quashing the judgment of the Civil Court of Appeal of 19 January 2007 and validating the judgment of the Shengavit District Court of 14 September 2006. 18.  On 15 November 2007 an ownership certificate was issued in the name of the respondents in respect of 115.4 sq. m. of the house and 387 sq. m. of the plot of land.", "references": ["1", "8", "7", "4", "0", "2", "6", "5", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
+{"input": "5.  On 30 May 2003 the Gjirokastra Commission recognised, amongst others, the applicants\u2019 inherited property rights over an agricultural land measuring 655,400 sq. m. The applicants and other heirs would be awarded compensation in the sum of 2,297,398 Albanian leks (\u201cALL\u201d) in respect of the entire land. 6.  To date, no compensation has been paid. 7.  On 15 September 1995 the Kor\u00e7a Commission recognised, amongst others, the applicant\u2019s inherited property rights over some land measuring 2,800 sq. m of which 300 sq. m were restored. Since the remaining plot measuring 2,500 sq. m, which was situated within the village boundaries and used to be arable land, was occupied, the applicant and other heirs would be compensated in State bonds in the event the buildings located on the land were not privatised (\u201cu kompensohet me obligacion shtet\u00ebror sip\u00ebrfaqja 2,500 m2 ish tok\u00eb ar\u00eb, brenda vijave kufizuese t\u00eb Zvarishtit, n\u00eb rast se objektet (...) nuk do t\u00eb privatizohen\u201d). The Commission stated that the applicant owned one sixths of the land.\n 8.  On 21 December 1998 the Kor\u00e7a Commission recognised, amongst others, the applicant\u2019s inherited property rights over another plot of arable land and meadow measuring 19,796 sq. m. Since the arable land and meadow were occupied, the applicant would be compensated in State bonds equivalent to a financial amount of ALL 36,890. 12.  On 28 August 2000 the Kavaja Commission recognised, amongst others, the applicant\u2019s inherited property rights over two plots of land totalling 17,500 sq. m. Since the plots of land were occupied, the applicant and other heirs would be compensated in kind in respect of a plot measuring 10,000 sq. m and in State bonds in respect of another plot measuring 750 sq. m. No decision was taken in respect of any right to compensation as regards the remaining plot measuring 6,750 sq. m. 14.  On 13 December 1996 the Devoll Commission recognised the applicants\u2019 inherited property rights over an agricultural land measuring 27,200 sq. m. The applicants would be awarded compensation by way of State bonds in the sum of ALL 367,000. 16. On 23 June 1995 the Tirana Commission recognised the applicant\u2019s inherited property rights over a plot of land measuring 836 sq. m of which 513 sq. m were restored. Since the remaining plot was occupied, the applicant would be compensated in one of the ways provided by law. 17.  On 17 March 2008 the Agency on Restitution and Compensation of Properties amended in part the Commission decision and decided that the applicant would be compensated in one of the ways provided by law even in respect of the plot of land measuring 513 sq. m.", "references": ["4", "0", "5", "7", "1", "8", "6", "2", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
+{"input": "5.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants, are similar to those in Association \u201c21 December 1989\u201d and Others v. Romania (nos. 33810/07 and 18817/08, \u00a7\u00a7 12-41, 24 May 2011). They have the same historical context and relate to the same domestic criminal proceedings. 6.  Between 17 and 28 December 1989, many people, including the applicants and the close relatives involved in this case, took part in anti\u2011communist demonstrations in Bucharest, Timi\u0219oara, Slobozia, Vi\u0219ina and \u021a\u0103nd\u0103rei, which led to the fall of the communist regime. They were injured or killed by gunfire during the demonstrations, which took place on 17 December 1989 in Timi\u0219oara, and in Bucharest and other cities across the country from 21 to 28 December 1989. 7.  In 1990, following the overthrow of the communist regime, the military prosecutor\u2019s office opened a criminal investigation into the December 1989 armed crackdown on the anti-communist demonstrations in Bucharest and the other cities. 8.  In a number of cases concerning the events in Timi\u0219oara, the investigations culminated in referral to the courts and the conviction of senior military officers (see \u015eandru and Others v. Romania, no. 22465/03, \u00a7\u00a7 6-47, 8 December 2009). 9.  As regards the events in other cities, the criminal investigation is still pending before the prosecuting authorities. The most important procedural steps were summarised in Association \u201c21 December 1989\u201d and Others (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 12-41). Subsequent developments in the investigation are as follows. 10.  On 18 October 2010, the military prosecutor\u2019s office at the High Court of Cassation and Justice decided not to institute criminal proceedings with regard to the acts committed by the military, finding that the applicants\u2019 complaints were partly statute-barred and partly ill-founded. The investigation into crimes committed by civilians, members of Patriotic Guards, members of militia and prison staff was severed from the case file and jurisdiction was relinquished in favour of the prosecuting authorities at the High Court of Cassation and Justice. 11.  On 15 April 2011 the chief prosecutor at the military prosecutor\u2019s office set aside the decision of 18 October 2010 on the grounds that the investigation had not yet been finalised and that not all the victims and perpetrators had been identified. 12.  On 18 April 2011 the military prosecutor\u2019s office relinquished jurisdiction in favour of the prosecutor\u2019s office at the High Court of Cassation and Justice on the grounds that the investigation concerned both civilians and military personnel. 13.  On 9 March 2012 - following the opening of the classified information in the criminal investigation file to the public in 2010 - the case was re-registered with a view to an investigation in the light of the newly available data. 14.  Following the entry into force of the new Code of Criminal Procedure in February 2014, jurisdiction over the case was relinquished in favour of the military prosecutor\u2019s office. 15.  On 14 October 2015, the prosecutor\u2019s office closed the investigation, finding that the applicants\u2019 complaints were partly statute-barred, partly subject to an amnesty and partly ill-founded. It also found that some of the facts which had been investigated could not be classified as criminal offences; and that some of the facts were res judicata. The parties have not submitted any information on whether there was an appeal against that decision.", "references": ["5", "1", "4", "9", "8", "3", "7", "6", "2", "No Label", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicants were born in 1978 and 1986 respectively and live in Bucharest and Curtea de Arge\u015f respectively. 7.  On 3 June 2006 the applicants participated in the annual gay march in Bucharest. It was organised by ACCEPT, a non-governmental organisation whose goal is to provide information and to assist the LGBTI community. The march was given police protection. Several individuals who had actively expressed their disapproval over the gay march were stopped by the police, their pictures taken and their identity papers checked and noted. 8.  At around 7 pm, at the end of the march, the applicants and four other participants left the area using the routes and means of transport recommended by the authorities in the guidelines prepared by the organisers for march participants. As recommended in the same leaflet, they wore no distinctive clothing or badges that would identify them as having participated in the march. 9.  After boarding a metro train, they were attacked by a group of six young men and a woman wearing hooded sweatshirts. The attackers approached the victims directly and started punching them and kicking their heads and faces. They also swung from the metal bars above their heads, kicking their victims. During the attack they kept on shouting: \u201cYou poofs go to the Netherlands!\u201d (Poponarilor, duce\u0163i-v\u0103 \u00een Olanda!) 10.  The victims were pushed into a corner of the carriage. One of them tried to protect the others with his body, but the second applicant remained exposed and suffered several blows. 11.  The attack lasted for about two minutes. On their way out of the carriage, the attackers punched the first applicant again in the face. 12.  The other passengers withdrew to the opposite side of the carriage during the attack. Among them was a photographer, Z.E., who had also been at the march. The victims asked him to take pictures of the incident, which he did. As a consequence, the attackers hit him as well. 13.  The same evening, accompanied by a representative of ACCEPT, the victims went to the Mina Minovici National Forensic Institute and to Bagdasar Emergency Hospital for medical consultations. 14.  The forensic medical certificate stated that the first applicant had bruises which could have been produced by blows from a hard object; they did not require \u201cdays of medical care\u201d. 15.  The second applicant was diagnosed with multiple contusions (related to the incidents), minor cranio-cerebral trauma, contusion on the left shoulder and the left side of his face, and bruises. No bone damage was found. The forensic medical certificate concluded that the applicant needed one to two days of medical care. 16.  Later that night of 3 to 4 June 2006 the victims, including the applicants, and a representative of ACCEPT went to Bucharest Police Station no. 25. They filed a criminal complaint against the attackers and stated that the assault was based on the victims\u2019 sexual orientation. They reiterated not having worn any visible signs that could have given away the fact that they were returning from the gay march. They argued that the attackers had identified them at the march (as they had not worn masks) and followed them afterwards, with the intention of harming them. They informed the police about the offensive remarks made during the attack. 17.  According to the applicants, the police agents were surprised when they realised that the applicants and the other victims, although gay, were affluent individuals with regular jobs and positions of responsibility. They tried to dissuade them from pursuing their complaint, warning them that they would have to confront their aggressors in court. 18.  On 5 June 2006 the applicants\u2019 representative submitted to the police several pictures of the attack taken by Z.E. In some of the pictures the attackers\u2019 faces were visible, as their hoods were down. The photographer gave statements and was able to identify one of the perpetrators. 19.  The first applicant was also shown pictures taken by the police during the march. She was able to identify two of the individuals from their photos. The police had the suspects\u2019 names and addresses on record. 20.  The victims gave statements to the police. 21.  On 8 June 2006 the police received copies of fifteen police reports drawn up on the day of the march concerning administrative fines imposed on counter-demonstrators. 22.  Due to a reorganisation within the police force, the case file was moved from one police station to another, and on 4 April 2007 it was registered at the Metro Police Station. 23.  As it appeared that nothing was happening in the case, the applicants sought information on the progress of the investigation by means of letters sent by ACCEPT on 25 September 2006, 28 March 2007 and 20 July 2011. On 19 March 2007 they also complained to the Ministry of Internal Affairs about the lack of an effective investigation in the case, but to no avail. 24.  On 27 April 2007 they were informed that, following the reorganisation within the police force, their file had finally been logged by the Metro Police Station. The letter also informed the applicants that the investigation was ongoing and steps were being taken to identify the culprits. 25.  On the same day, the police submitted a request to the Romanian Intelligence Service (the \u201cSRI\u201d) to confirm whether R.S.A. \u2013 an intelligence officer who had been identified among the attackers \u2013 had been on an official mission that night. On 24 May 2007 the Intelligence Service asked for clarification concerning the nature of the request. It was not until September 2007 that the police were able to obtain a statement from R.S.A., who declared that he had been off duty that day and offered information on one other person in the group of attackers. The actions undertaken by the police to identify the other individuals remained without success. 26.  The Metro Police received, on 12 June 2007, a list of forty five names and identification numbers of persons who had been fined by the police during the gay march. 27.  As one of the suspects was believed to be a Steaua football club supporter, the investigators attended twenty-nine football matches between 16 September 2007 and 13 December 2009 in an attempt to identify him. On 12 February, 14 May, 4 August and 7 December 2010 and 10 March 2011 the investigators tried to identify the suspects at metro stations. On eight occasions between 12 June 2007 and 6 July 2011, the investigators successfully asked the prosecutor to extend the deadline for completing the investigation. 28.  On 10 June 2011 the police stated their view that the investigation should come to an end and asked the prosecutor\u2019s office not to institute criminal proceedings in the case. The police gave the following explanation for their request:\n\u201c... the investigation was rendered difficult by the fact that the file arrived at the Metro Police Station ... almost one year after the incidents, and the police agents ... who had been in charge of the case until September 2006 could not continue the investigation as the Intelligence Service had refused to cooperate and allow their agent \u2012 who was the only identified eye-witness to the events \u2012 to be interviewed; it is to be noted that the police lost their motivation to use the information for the purposes of finding the truth in this case, of identifying and bringing to justice those responsible. In addition, to a certain extent the victims lost their interest in how their complaint was being dealt with (they did not ... adduce the medical certificates ... which had been obtained at the request of the police ... on 27 October 2009 when it was noted that none of the victims had needed more than two days of medical care). It is observed that all the evidence-gathering methods for this type of crime have been exhausted and, given the lapse of time from the date when the complaints were lodged, the validity and relevance of the evidence gathered ... [have decreased], leaving the investigation into the identity of the culprits without an outcome. At the same time, it is observed that ... the criminal acts had become time-barred, removing criminal responsibility from the culprits. 29.  On 9 August 2011, in response to a request from the applicants for information, the Metro Police informed them that their intention was to not institute a criminal prosecution (ne\u00eenceperea urm\u0103ririi penale) as the alleged crimes had become statute-barred (s-a \u00eemplinit prescrip\u0163ia special\u0103). The police explained that the investigation had been rendered more difficult by the fact that the file had not arrived at the Metro Police office until a year after the events. Moreover, all the actions undertaken by police in order to identify the alleged culprits had failed. 30.  On 4 October 2011 the prosecutor\u2019s office attached to the Bucharest District Court of the Fourth Precinct endorsed the police proposal and decided to terminate the investigation. The decision was sent to the first applicant\u2019s home on 27 February 2012. 31.  On 19 March 2012 the applicants lodged a complaint with the Prosecutor\u2011in\u2011Chief against the decision of 4 October 2011. They argued that the prosecutor should have investigated the more serious crime of organising a criminal group (asocierea pentru sav\u00e2r\u015firea de infrac\u0163iuni), which had not yet become time-barred. They also complained that the investigators had failed to pursue their allegation that the attack had been motivated by their sexual orientation.\nThe prosecutor-in-chief dismissed their objections on 18 June 2012. 32.  The applicants reiterated their objections against both the decisions delivered by the prosecutors in two separate complaints lodged with the Bucharest District Court. 33.  On 9 August 2012 the District Court dismissed the complaint lodged by the applicants against the prosecutor\u2019s decision of 4 October 2011. The court made the following observation:\n\u201cIt is true that the authorities were apparently not sufficiently diligent in carrying out within a reasonable time an effective investigation capable of identifying and punishing those responsible for the criminal acts (the long periods of police inactivity, the transfer of files, the lack of cooperation from some authorities are all duly noted). On the other hand, this situation \u2013 although not imputable to the [applicants] \u2013 cannot prevent the application of the statute of limitation of criminal responsibility.\u201d 34.  On 12 November 2012 the District Court dismissed the complaint lodged against the prosecutor\u2019s decision of 18 June 2012 as a mere reiteration of that already dealt with by the court in its decision of 9 August 2012. 35.  Throughout the proceedings the applicants repeatedly sought access to the prosecution file. It was partially granted on 9 May 2012 and the applicants gained full access to the file once their objections had been lodged with the courts.", "references": ["9", "6", "7", "0", "2", "5", "4", "3", "No Label", "8", "1"], "gold": ["8", "1"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant, who is of Roma origin, was born in 1988 and lives in Gy\u00f6ngy\u00f6spata, a village of 2,800 people, about 450 of whom are of Roma origin. 7.  On 6 March 2011 the Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik Magyarorsz\u00e1g\u00e9rt Mozgalom), a right-wing political party, held a demonstration in Gy\u00f6ngy\u00f6spata. Between 1 and 16 March 2011, in connection with the demonstration, the Civil Guard Association for a Better Future (Szebb J\u00f6v\u0151\u00e9rt Polg\u00e1r\u0151r Egyes\u00fclet) and two right-wing paramilitary groups (Bety\u00e1rsereg and V\u00e9der\u0151) organised marches in the Roma neighbourhood of the village. 8.  On 6, 9, and 10 March 2011, during the demonstration and the marches, there was a considerable police presence in Gy\u00f6ngy\u00f6spata. 9.  At around 11 a.m. on 10 March 2011 Mr J.F., the president of the local Roma minority self-governing body, informed the police that he and the mayor of the municipality had been threatened by people they did not know. The mayor reported on the same events to the police, explaining that earlier that day some fifty members of the Roma minority had confronted approximately fifteen members of the Civil Guard Association, who were joined by four or five unknown persons, one of whom had an axe and another a whip. 10.  As it appears from the case file, at around the same time four men passed by the applicant\u2019s house, yelling \u201cGo inside, you damned dirty gypsies!\u201d At this time the applicant was outside the house in her garden together with her daughter and some acquaintances. In response to the four men, the applicant and her acquaintances told them to leave, saying that it was their village. One of the men continued threatening them by yelling that he would build a house in the Roma neighbourhood \u201cout of their blood\u201d. He stepped towards the fence swinging an axe towards the applicant, but was held back by one of his companions. 11.  At around 2 p.m. on the same day police officers K.K. and A.B. stopped and searched four individuals, Mr S.T., Mr F.W., Mr Cs.F., and Mr G.M. The mayor of Gy\u00f6ngy\u00f6spata identified two of them, Mr S.T. and Mr  F.W., as having participated in the incident that morning. The men were members of Bety\u00e1rsereg. Mr S.T. informed the police that he was the leader of one of the \u201cclans\u201d within the organisation. He said that because some members of his group, about 200 people, intended to come to Gy\u00f6ngy\u00f6spata \u201cto put the Roma situation in order\u201d, he was there to \u201cscout\u201d the village. Later the same day, Mr S.T., who by then was extremely drunk, was again spotted by the police being dragged away from the Roma settlement by a female acquaintance. When questioned by the police, he said he only wanted to play football with the Roma children. 12.  On 7 April 2011 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint against \u201cunknown perpetrators\u201d with the Heves County Regional Police Department, alleging offences of violence against a member of an ethnic group, harassment and attempted grievous bodily assault. The police opened an investigation on charges of violent harassment under section 176/A (2) of the Criminal Code. 13.  In parallel, the Gy\u00f6ngy\u00f6s District Public Prosecutor\u2019s Office opened an investigation on suspicion of harassment based on the report of a third person, Mr J.F., the president of the local Roma minority self-governing body. 14.  On 12 April 2011 the applicant was heard as a witness concerning the events. She testified that three men and a woman had passed by her house and one of them, brandishing a whip, had threatened to build a house out of her blood. 15.  At the request of her lawyer, the Gy\u00f6ngy\u00f6s Police Department informed the applicant that criminal proceedings had been instituted on charges of harassment on the basis of the criminal complaint lodged by Mr J.F. Subsequently, the applicant was informed that her complaint had been joined to that of Mr J.F. 16.  On 14 July 2011 the Gy\u00f6ngy\u00f6s Police Department discontinued these proceedings on the grounds that harassment was punishable only if directed against a well-defined person, and that criminal liability could not be established on the basis of threats uttered \u201cin general\u201d. 17.  The police also instituted minor offence proceedings on the ground that the impugned conduct was \u201cantisocial\u201d. 18.  On 14 September 2011 a hearing was held in the ensuing minor offence proceedings in which Mr S.T. and five other persons, Mr C.S.F., Mr F.W., Mr G.M., Mrs A.B.I., and Mr I.N.I. appeared before the Gy\u00f6ngy\u00f6s District Court on charges of disorderly conduct.\nAll six persons subject to the proceedings denied having threatened any members of the Roma community.\nMr J.F., questioned as a witness, maintained that two of the persons subject to the proceedings had been wielding an axe and a whip and had threatened the inhabitants of the Roma settlement that they would kill them and paint the houses with their blood.\nMr L.T., the mayor of Gy\u00f6ngy\u00f6spata, identified one of the persons as having been present in Gy\u00f6ngy\u00f6spata on 10 March 2011, but could not confirm that the threats had been directed at the Roma.\nAnother witness, P.F., identified three of the persons as having participated in the incident and maintained that it was Mr I.N.I. who had threatened the inhabitants of the Roma settlement.\nThe applicant, who was also heard as a witness, identified Mr S.T. and Mr F.W. as having been armed and Mr S.T. as having said that he would \u201cpaint the houses with [the applicant\u2019s] blood.\u201d 19.  On an unspecified date the applicant attached to the criminal file extracts from comments posted on a right-wing Internet portal in which Mr S.T. had been referred to as the man who had \u201cenforced order among the Roma of Gy\u00f6ngy\u00f6spata with a single whip\u201d. 20.  At a further court hearing on 5 October 2011 the applicant\u2019s legal representative requested that the minor offence proceedings be stayed because criminal proceedings against unknown perpetrators were pending. 21.  On 7 October 2011, following a complaint that procedural errors had been committed by the Heves County Regional Police Department in the investigation of Mr J.F.\u2019s complaint, the Gy\u00f6ngy\u00f6s District Public Prosecutor\u2019s Office informed the applicant that it had opened a separate investigation into the allegations of harassment on the basis of the applicant\u2019s complaint. 22.  On 20 October 2011, in the criminal proceedings on charges of harassment, the applicant\u2019s lawyer requested the Gy\u00f6ngy\u00f6s District Prosecutor\u2019s Office to open an investigation into \u201cviolence against a member of an ethnic group\u201d under article 174/B (1) of the Criminal Code. He maintained that the motive of the threats uttered against the applicant was her Roma origin. His allegation was supported by the fact that at the material time various paramilitary groups were \u201cinspecting\u201d the Roma settlement with the aim of \u201chindering Gypsy criminality\u201d. 23.  On 3 November 2011 the prosecutor\u2019s office refused the request, finding that the use of force, the objective element of the criminal offence of \u201cviolence against a member of a group\u201d under article 174/B (1) of the Criminal Code as in force at the material time could not be established at that stage of the proceedings.\nOn 28 November 2011 the applicant reiterated her request, apparently without success. 24.  The identities of the persons who had passed by the applicant\u2019s house and that of the alleged perpetrator, Mr S.T., were established by the investigating authorities. Moreover, the Police Department questioned a number of witnesses, including the applicant\u2019s acquaintances present during the incident, but only two of them provided statements relevant for the case. Mr S.T. refused to testify. 25.  On 2 February 2012 the Gy\u00f6ngy\u00f6s Police Department discontinued the investigation into harassment on the grounds that none of the witnesses heard had substantiated the applicant\u2019s allegation that she had been threatened. The Police Department noted that Mr S.T. had refused to testify and the witness testimony of Mrs I.B. had confirmed only that threats had been made, but not that they had been directed against a certain person. 26.  The applicant challenged that decision, arguing that the witness testimonies had clearly stated that Mr S.T. had uttered degrading threats and that from the circumstances of the case it was clear that they had been directed against her. She also submitted that the investigating authorities had failed to hear Mr S.T. and two other individuals suspected of the offences. 27.  On 21 March 2012 the Gy\u00f6ngy\u00f6s District Public Prosecutor\u2019s Office upheld the first-instance decision. The Prosecutor\u2019s Office found that it could not be established on the basis of the witness testimonies whether Mr S.T. had been armed and whether the threats and insults he had uttered had been directed at the applicant. Thus neither the criminal offence of harassment, nor \u201cviolence against a member of a group\u201d could be established.\nThis decision was served on the applicant on 2 April 2012, informing the applicant of the possibility to pursue substitute private prosecution proceedings. 28.  On 1 June 2012 the applicant, acting as substitute private prosecutor, lodged an application with the Gy\u00f6ngy\u00f6s District Court, which was declared admissible on 13 June 2012. 29.  On 6 November 2012 the criminal proceedings were discontinued since the applicant had withdrawn the charges, in her submission, because of for fear of reprisals.", "references": ["5", "3", "2", "6", "7", "8", "0", "1", "9", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1944 and lives in Bucharest. 6.  In 1984, the applicant, a professional photographer, took a number of photographs of landscapes in C\u0103l\u0103ra\u015fi County that had been commissioned for commercial publication in an album. The album was not, in the event, published, but the photographs were retained by F.G., who was in charge of the album project. 7.  In 2004, the applicant discovered by chance that an album named \u201cC\u0103l\u0103ra\u015fi County\u201d had been published by a company run by F.G. in 1999. He noticed that of the 143 photographs of landscapes from C\u0103l\u0103ra\u015fi County contained in the album, 135 were photographs taken by him and left in the possession of F.G. in 1984. However, F.G. was credited as the photographer, and not the applicant. 8.  The applicant lodged a criminal complaint against F.G. with the Romanian Copyright Office (\u201cthe RCO\u201d) on 25 February 2004, claiming that F.G. had committed one of the offences provided for by Articles 140\u2011142 of Law 8/1996 on copyright and neighbouring rights (\u201cLaw 8/1996\u201d). He joined a civil action to the criminal complaint, seeking compensation amounting to EUR 50,000 for pecuniary and non\u2011pecuniary damage. 9.  On 29 June 2004, a report was drawn up by the RCO following an investigation carried out at the headquarters of the company that had published the album. 10.  After finalising its investigation and concluding that the provisions of Article 140 \u00a7 1 let. a) of Law 8/1996 had been infringed, the RCO forwarded the applicant\u2019s complaint, together with the accompanying documents, to the C\u0103l\u0103ra\u015fi Police Department on 5 November 2004. 11.  On 8 November 2004, an expert report was ordered by the C\u0103l\u0103ra\u015fi Police Department. The report, dated 24 December 2004, confirmed that the photographs had been taken by the applicant. 12.  On 21 April 2005, the prosecutor\u2019s office attached to C\u0103l\u0103ra\u015fi County Court decided not to open a criminal investigation on the ground that the limitation period for the punishment of F.G. had expired. 13.  The applicant lodged a complaint against that decision with the Chief Prosecutor. The latter confirmed the decision not to open an investigation. 14.  A complaint lodged by the applicant with the C\u0103l\u0103ra\u015fi County Court was allowed on 24 November 2005. The court held that the period between 27 April 1999 (the date of publication of the album) and 25 February 2004 (the date on which the applicant lodged his complaint with the RCO) was less than five years \u2013 the term of limitation provided by law. It added that the procedure stipulated by Law 8/1996 was a special procedure for the punishment of offences related to copyright, which was justified by the complexity and exceptional nature of such cases. Therefore, the court held that in the light of the special provisions applicable to the file, the date from which the term of limitation of five years should have been calculated was not the date on which the RCO forwarded the file to the police (5 November 2004) but the date on which the applicant lodged his complaint with the RCO (25 February 2004). 15.  Accordingly, the C\u0103l\u0103ra\u015fi County Court remitted the file to the prosecutor\u2019s office in order for it to initiate criminal proceedings. 16.  On 17 February 2006, the Bucharest Court of Appeal allowed an appeal by the prosecutor against the judgment of 24 November 2005 and held that the case had become time-barred, given that the police had received the criminal complaint only on 5 November 2004 \u2013 more than five years after the offence had been committed. No reference was made to the civil complaint lodged by the applicant.", "references": ["8", "7", "6", "2", "5", "9", "0", "1", "4", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1976 and lives in Cluj\u2011Napoca. 6.  The applicant is the son and heir of Mr C. Ple\u015f. He replaced his father in the domestic proceedings after his death. 7.  The applicant\u2019s father was shot on 21 December 1989 while participating in a demonstration organised in Cluj against N. Ceau\u015fescu. He was immediately hospitalised and diagnosed with \u201ca gunshot wound in the right side of the chest, rupture of the right lung and fracture of ribs seven and eight, plus a gunshot wound in the right arm\u201d. Following surgery, two lobes of his right lung were removed. He was left with a breathing deficit of over 30%, paresis of his right arm, and a permanent disability that prevented him from continuing to work to support his family. Furthermore, in subsequent years he was hospitalised many times because of serious breathing problems. 8.  Criminal proceedings were instituted against the army commanders who had ordered the shooting of demonstrators during the events of December 1989 in Cluj. Many victims of the repression joined civil complaints to the proceedings, requesting compensation for pecuniary and non\u2011pecuniary damage. The applicant\u2019s father lodged one such civil complaint, requesting 150,000,000 Romanian lei (ROL) (approximately 4,100 euros (EUR)) in respect of pecuniary damage, ROL 500,000,000 (approximately EUR 14,000) in respect of non-pecuniary damage, and ROL 50,000,000 (about 1,400 euros) for costs and expenses incurred during the trial. 9.  On 17 May 2004 the applicant\u2019s father died. He was replaced as a civil party in the proceedings by the applicant. 10.  By a judgment of 23 May 2005 the High Court of Cassation and Justice, acting as a first-instance court, convicted five of the officers involved in the events of December 1989 in Cluj. They were ordered to pay compensation jointly with the Ministry of National Defence to all eighty\u2011four civil parties in the case. The court granted the applicant ROL 150,000,000 in respect of pecuniary damage and ROL 50,000,000 for costs and expenses. It omitted to grant the claim for ROL 500,000,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, without providing any reason. 11.  Eighteen civil parties to the criminal proceedings, including the applicant, lodged an appeal on points of law, complaining about the way in which the first-instance court had examined their claims for damages. The grounds of appeal of the civil parties were not identical. In most of the cases they concerned the amount of damages awarded. The applicant complained that the first-instance court had not granted him the requested compensation for non-pecuniary damage. 12.  By a decision of 20 March 2006, a panel of nine judges of the High Court of Cassation and Justice dismissed all the appeals lodged by the civil parties. The court of last resort referred to the general provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Civil Code concerning compensation for damages in the context of civil actions joined to criminal proceedings (see paragraph 13 below) and without examining in particular any of the civil parties\u2019 appeals, it dismissed all the appeals as ill\u2011founded.", "references": ["4", "9", "0", "5", "8", "7", "1", "2", "6", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1978 and lives in Kaunas. 6.  On 6 February 2004 the applicant was notified by the Financial Crime Investigation Service that a criminal investigation had been opened against him on suspicion of fraud committed in an organised group (Articles 25 \u00a7 3 and 182 \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Code of 2000). It was suspected that from October 2001 until May 2002 the applicant and his accomplices, using companies founded or acquired for the purpose, had bought large amounts of fish from unspecified persons without paying value added tax (VAT), forged payment documents to show that the applicable VAT had been paid, and then sold the fish to another company for a price that included the applicable VAT \u2013 thus appropriating an amount equal to the said applicable VAT. It was suspected that in this manner the applicant and his accomplices had appropriated 261,854.65 Lithuanian litai (LTL, approximately 75,838 euros (EUR)), which should have been paid into the State budget as VAT. 7.  On the same day the applicant was prohibited from going abroad or leaving his home without the approval of the investigating authorities (kardomoji priemon\u0117 \u2013 ra\u0161ytinis pasi\u017ead\u0117jimas nei\u0161vykti). 8.  On 6 May 2004 the prosecutor issued an indictment against the applicant and his accomplices. The applicant was charged with several counts of fraud and forgery of documents committed in an organised group (under Articles 25 \u00a7 3, 182 \u00a7 2 and 300 \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Code of 2000). The indictment noted that the applicant had admitted his guilt and cooperated with the investigative authorities. 9.  On 3 February 2005 the Kaunas Regional Court found the applicant guilty of all charges and ordered him to pay a fine of LTL 18,750 (EUR 5,430). 10.  On 3 February 2006 the Court of Appeal partly amended the judgment of the regional court. It acquitted the applicant of fraud but upheld his conviction for forgery of documents and sentenced him to two years of imprisonment. The sentence was suspended for two years, during which time an injunction (\u012fpareigojimas) was imposed on the applicant: he was prohibited from leaving his home for more than seven days in a row without the approval of the supervising institution (hereinafter, \u201cthe sentence for forgery\u201d). 11.  The applicant began complying with the injunction imposed on him by the Court of Appeal (see paragraph 17 below). 12.  On 5 December 2006 the Supreme Court partly amended the judgment of the Court of Appeal. It quashed the applicant\u2019s acquittal of fraud and returned that part of the case for re-examination by the Court of Appeal. The remaining of the appellate court\u2019s judgment was upheld. 13.  On 4 July 2007 the Court of Appeal, after re-examining the above-mentioned part of the case, convicted the applicant of fraud. When determining the sentence, the court took into account various aggravating circumstances (the crime had been well organised, the applicant had played a leading role in its commission, and the value of the appropriated property had been high), as well as mitigating circumstances (the applicant had admitted his guilt, he had a family and a job, and he had been complying with the injunction previously imposed on him). As a result, the Court of Appeal sentenced the applicant to imprisonment for two years and three months \u2013 a sentence which was close to the minimum sentence stipulated in the Criminal Code (see paragraphs 28-29 below). The court combined this sentence with the one previously imposed on the applicant for forgery of documents (see paragraph 10 above) and ordered a consolidated sentence (subendrinta bausm\u0117) for the two crimes \u2013 imprisonment of two years and three months. The Court of Appeal stated that because the crime of fraud was serious (sunkus nusikaltimas), the consolidated sentence could not be suspended (see paragraph 32 below). 14.  The applicant submitted a cassation appeal to the Supreme Court. He asked the court to quash the sentence of imprisonment for the crime of fraud ordered by the Court of Appeal and instead restore the fine imposed by the Kaunas Regional Court in its judgment of 3 February 2005 (see paragraph 9 above). 15.  On 31 July 2007 the Supreme Court delayed the execution of the Court of Appeal\u2019s judgment of 4 July 2007 until the applicant\u2019s cassation appeal was examined. The Supreme Court\u2019s decision did not explicitly indicate whether the applicant had to continue complying with the injunction imposed on him during the term of suspension of the sentence for forgery (see paragraph 17 below). Nonetheless, during the period of the delay the applicant continued complying with the injunction. 16.  On 8 January 2008 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s cassation appeal. It found that when determining the sentence the Court of Appeal had correctly assessed the gravity of the crime, the applicant\u2019s personality, and all relevant mitigating and aggravating circumstances. It also reiterated that the Criminal Code excluded the possibility of suspending the sentence in the event that the individual concerned had been convicted of a serious crime, such as fraud. However, the Supreme Court partly amended the Court of Appeal\u2019s judgment of 4 July 2007 by applying the terms of a 2002 law on amnesty and reducing the applicant\u2019s sentence of imprisonment by one fifth. Thus, the applicant\u2019s final consolidated sentence was one year and nine months of imprisonment (hereinafter, \u201cthe consolidated sentence\u201d). 17.  After the Court of Appeal\u2019s judgment of 3 February 2006 (see paragraph 10 above), the applicant began complying with the injunction imposed on him during the term of suspension of the sentence for forgery. The applicant was not allowed to leave his home for more than seven days without the approval of the supervising institution. He was also obliged to report to the local prison department every two months, which he did from March 2006 until January 2008. At the applicant\u2019s request, on 1 February 2008 the local prison department issued a certificate stating that he had been complying with the injunction and that the term of suspension of his sentence for forgery would end on 3 February 2008.\n(b)  The applicant\u2019s request to be released from serving the consolidated sentence 18.  In January 2008 the applicant submitted a request to the Kaunas Regional Court to be released from serving the consolidated sentence. The applicant stated that he had nearly completed serving the term of suspension of the sentence for forgery by complying with the injunction imposed by the Court of Appeal. According to the applicant, given that the sentence for forgery (two years of imprisonment) was longer than the consolidated sentence (one year and nine months of imprisonment) and given that he had served the former, he should be released from serving the latter; otherwise he would have to serve two sentences for one crime. 19.  On 28 January 2008 the Kaunas Regional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s request. The court reiterated that the applicant had been convicted of two crimes \u2013 one of which (fraud) was serious and the other (forgery of documents) less serious (apysunkis) \u2013 and the Criminal Code did not permit the suspension of a sentence for a serious crime. 20.  On 28 February 2008 the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal against the regional court\u2019s judgment. The court firstly found that the applicant had not yet finished serving the term of suspension of the sentence for forgery: the completion of the term had to be confirmed by a decision of the relevant district court, but no such decision had been adopted as at that date (see paragraph 33 below). The Court of Appeal further held that the imposition of an injunction during the term of suspension of a sentence (\u012fpareigojimai, paskirti nuosprend\u017eio vykdymo atid\u0117jimo metu) did not amount to the serving of that sentence (bausm\u0117s atlikimas); therefore, the applicant had not actually served his sentence for forgery, so the question of \u201cdouble punishment\u201d did not arise. The fact that he had been complying with the injunction was relevant only during the determination of the final consolidated sentence, and that had been done by the Supreme Court.\nThe judgment was final and not subject to appeal.\n(c)  The applicant\u2019s request for the completion of the term of suspension of the sentence for forgery to be confirmed 21.  Subsequently the applicant submitted a request to the Kaunas District Court, asking it to confirm that he had completed the term of suspension of the sentence for forgery. On 18 March 2008 the court refused to examine the applicant\u2019s request because, under domestic law, a request for the term of suspension of a sentence to be declared completed could only be submitted by the supervising institution and not by the convicted person (see paragraph 33 below). 22.  On 15 April 2008 the Kaunas Regional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. The court stated that that the applicant had been prohibited from leaving his home since 6 February 2004 (see paragraph 7 above), so during the entire time he had been complying with that restrictive measure and not with the injunction relating to the suspended sentence. The court further held that the Court of Appeal\u2019s judgment of 4 July 2007 had annulled the suspension of the sentence for forgery, but that the domestic law did not provide for the possibility to release a convicted person from the obligation to serve a sentence due to the fact that he or she had been complying with an injunction which had subsequently been annulled.\nThe judgment was final and not subject to appeal. 23.  Around the same time the applicant submitted a request to the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court, asking it to order the local prison department to request a district court to affirm that the applicant had completed the term of suspension of the sentence for forgery (see paragraph 21 above). On 9 April 2008 the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court held that it did not have the competence to examine the applicant\u2019s request because that request only related to matters of criminal sentencing and not acts of public administration. On 13 May 2008 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the decision of the lower court on the same grounds.\n(d)  The applicant\u2019s imprisonment 24.  On 16 April 2008 the applicant began serving the consolidated sentence in the Pravieni\u0161k\u0117s Correctional Facility. After serving one-third of the sentence, on 26 January 2009 he was released on probation.", "references": ["9", "2", "6", "4", "3", "8", "5", "1", "7", "0", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Novi Pazar. 6.  She was employed by DP \u201cRa\u0161ka Holding Kompanija\u201d AD, a socially-owned company based in Novi Pazar (hereinafter \u201cthe debtor\u201d). 7.  On 30 June 2004, 25 September 2009 and 21 December 2009 respectively, the Novi Pazar Municipal Court ordered the debtor to pay the applicant certain amounts on account of salary arrears and social insurance contributions, plus the costs of the civil proceedings. These judgments became final on 15 September 2004, 20 October 2009 and 5 October 2010 respectively. 8.  On 5 October 2004 and 11 July 2011 respectively, upon the applicant\u2019s request to that effect, the Novi Pazar Municipal Court ordered the enforcement of the said judgments; it further ordered the debtor to pay the applicant the enforcement costs. 9.  On 11 September 2013 the Kraljevo Commercial Court opened preliminary insolvency proceedings against the debtor. 10.  On 25 October 2013 the same court opened insolvency proceedings against the debtor. 11.  The insolvency proceedings are still ongoing.", "references": ["2", "1", "7", "4", "8", "5", "6", "0", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1964. He is currently serving a prison sentence in the Pravieni\u0161k\u0117s Correctional Home (Pravieni\u0161ki\u0173 pataisos namai \u2013 atviroji kolonija). 6.  In March 2009 the applicant was arrested and placed in pre-trial detention on suspicion of several instances of trafficking drugs in very large amounts as part of an organised group. 7.  Between 30 March 2009 and 14 June 2010 the applicant was held at Luki\u0161k\u0117s Remand Prison (Luki\u0161ki\u0173 tardymo izoliatorius - kal\u0117jimas) in cells which measured approximately eight square metres and which housed between two to four detainees. 8.  On 14 June 2010 the applicant was transferred to Kaunas Remand Prison (Kauno tardymo izoliatorius). According to a document issued by that prison, the average space per prisoner in the cells where the applicant was held varied, but was sometimes less than three square metres per inmate. 9.  On 2 September 2011 the applicant complained to the Prisons\u2019 Department (Kal\u0117jim\u0173 departamentas), a body that oversees Lithuanian prisons, about the conditions in which he had been held (d\u0117l buvusi\u0173 prast\u0173 kalinimo s\u0105lyg\u0173) in Luki\u0161k\u0117s Remand Prison. In its reply of 15 September 2011, the department admitted that the applicant\u2019s allegations that he had been held in overcrowded cells in Luki\u0161k\u0117s had been partly proved. 10.  After visiting Kaunas Remand Prison on 28 November 2011, the Public Health Centre (Visuomen\u0117s sveikatos centras) found that the prison complied with general health and hygiene requirements. 11.  On 5 August 2013 the applicant started court proceedings for damages, arguing that the conditions of his detention in Luki\u0161k\u0117s Remand Prison had been abysmal. 12.  By a decision of 19 November 2013, the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court held that the applicant had missed the three years\u2019 statutory deadline to lodge a claim for damages, because he had been released from Luki\u0161k\u0117s Remand Prison on 14 June 2010. 13.  The applicant appealed, arguing that he had only learned in July 2012 that his rights had been breached, when he had started communicating with his current representative before the Court, Mr S. Tomas. 14.  By a final decision of 30 October 2014, the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the appeal, noting that the applicant could have asked for legal aid to start court proceedings for damages in a timely fashion if he had been without sufficient means to employ a lawyer. 15.  On 22 September 2011, while he was being held at Kaunas Remand Prison, the applicant had his first myocardial infarction. He was taken that day to a public hospital \u2013 the cardiology unit of the Hospital of the Lithuanian University of Health Sciences\u2019 Kaunas Clinics (Lietuvos sveikatos moksl\u0173 universiteto ligonin\u0117 \u2013 Kauno klinikos, hereinafter \u2013 \u201cthe Kaunas Clinics\u201d), where he underwent a surgical intervention. The doctors noted in the applicant\u2019s medical file that he was a heart attack risk because he had smoked 10-15 cigarettes a day for twenty-five years. Another risk factor was hereditary, because the applicant\u2019s father had had myocardial infarction. 16.  On 28 October 2011 the Kaunas Clinics\u2019 doctors concluded that the applicant\u2019s condition had stabilised (b\u016bkl\u0117 stabilizavosi). The applicant was prescribed medications for his condition (medikamentinis gydymas), explained what kind of diet and health regime to follow and transferred to the Prison Department Hospital (Laisv\u0117s at\u0117mimo viet\u0173 ligonin\u0117). 17.  As can be seen in the documents submitted by the parties, and as was later confirmed by the Ombudsperson (see paragraph 30 below), the doctors at the Prison Department Hospital, on the instructions of the doctors at the Kaunas Clinics, performed a number of tests on the applicant (including urine, blood, and an ECG). They also prescribed a diet that was low on salt and fat. Given that the applicant\u2019s state of health was stable and improving, on 3 November 2011 the applicant was sent back to Kaunas Remand Prison. The doctors recommended that he continue to take the medications he had been prescribed. 18.  On 6 December 2011 the applicant was again placed in the Prison Department Hospital for an earlier scheduled consultation. He had some diagnostic tests and was treated with medications. 19.  On 14 December 2011, while at the Prison Department Hospital, the applicant had a second myocardial infarction and was immediately transferred to a public hospital \u2013 the Cardiology and Angiology Centre of Vilnius University Hospital\u2019s Santari\u0161k\u0117s Clinics (Vilniaus Universiteto Ligonin\u0117s Santari\u0161ki\u0173 klinikos, hereinafter \u2013 \u201cthe Santari\u0161k\u0117s Clinics\u201d), where he was examined and tests were performed. Two days later, on 16 December 2011, the doctors in Santari\u0161k\u0117s held that the applicant\u2019s state of health was stable, and on that day he was returned to the Prison Department Hospital. 20.  While being held at the Prison Department Hospital, on 6 March 2012 the applicant was taken back to the Santari\u0161k\u0117s Clinics for a consultation. The doctors recommended the applicant be treated with medications and also prescribed a diet which was low on salt and fat. The doctors also recommended that the applicant engage in physical activity for 45 to 50 minutes a day. They also recommended that the applicant be \u201cbrought back to the Santari\u0161k\u0117s Clinics\u2019 Cardiology and Angiology Centre after six months (po 6 m\u0117nesi\u0173) for a consultation, having registered in advance\u201d. 21.  On 15 March 2012 the Prison Department Hospital released the applicant back to Kaunas Remand Prison. The applicant\u2019s medical record indicates that he was released because his state of health \u201chad improved (pager\u0117jo)\u201d. It also states that the applicant \u201ccould walk (gali eiti)\u201d. Among the risk factors, the doctors noted that the applicant smoked. It was recommended that the applicant have further outpatient treatment with medications (medikamentinis ambulatorinis gydymas), follow a diet that was low on fat and salt and be physically active by taking exercise (fizinis aktyvumas). 22.  On 31 December 2011 the applicant was issued with a certificate that he had lost 60% of his capacity for work. The document stated that he could not perform any work where he needed to lift more than 15 kilograms. However, the applicant could do work that involved walking, sitting or bending. 23.  In reply to a complaint by the applicant\u2019s lawyer, on 14 May 2012 the Prison Department Hospital noted that it had rigorously adhered to the instructions from cardiologists of category III medical care institutions (see paragraph 65 below). 24.  The applicant was again admitted to the Prison Department Hospital, staying there from 27 to 29 March 2012 with digestion-related issues (haemorrhoids). The doctors noted that the applicant had got haemorrhoids three years previously. After examining the applicant, they prescribed outpatient treatment with medications, and noted that he was fit enough to be taken to a court hearing. 25.  In April 2012 the Kaunas Remand Prison\u2019s administration told the applicant in reply to a request that as of that month he would be provided the same menu of food as women (Jums bus tiekiamas maitinimas pagal moter\u0173 valgiara\u0161t\u012f). 26.  After visiting the Prison Department Hospital between 7-22 May 2012, the Public Health Centre concluded that the hospital complied with general health-care and hygiene requirements. 27.  The applicant was admitted to the Prison Department Hospital from 21 to 28 June 2012 for a scheduled follow-up (planine tvarka) of his heart condition. The applicant\u2019s medical record shows that a number of tests had been performed on him, the doctors concluded that his state of health was \u201cunchanged (be pakitim\u0173)\u201d and \u201csatisfactory (patenkinama)\u201d. The medical certificate issued at the time of the applicant\u2019s discharge from the hospital on 28 June 2012 also indicated that he smoked, which was a risk factor. 28.  In March 2012 the applicant also wrote to the Ombudsperson, complaining that he had been held at Luki\u0161k\u0117s Remand Prison, Kaunas Remand Prison and at the Prison Department Hospital, where he had suffered great psychological stress. He argued that in those facilities his health had worsened and as a consequence he had suffered two myocardial infarctions. He also claimed that in Kaunas Remand Prison he had not been provided with the right diet, going against the doctors\u2019 recommendations. The applicant was also dissatisfied with the fact that he had not been provided rehabilitation therapy. In April 2012 the applicant withdrew, in writing, the part of his complaint concerning Kaunas Remand Prison, stating that he had no complaints about that facility. 29.  On 6 June 2012 the Ombudsperson accepted the applicant\u2019s withdrawal of his complaint as regards Kaunas Remand Prison. The Ombudsperson, however, established that the conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention at Luki\u0161k\u0117s Remand Prison, where he had been held between March 2009 and June 2010, as well as at the Prison Department Hospital, where he had been held between 16 December 2011 and 15 March 2012, had been in breach of domestic legislation on overcrowding. In particular, the applicant had been held in the Prison Department Hospital in a room where he had had 4.42 square metres of personal space. 30.  The Ombudsperson nevertheless dismissed the complaint about a lack of proper medical care. After examining the documents related to the applicant\u2019s treatment in hospitals, the Ombudsperson noted that, contrary to the applicant\u2019s submissions, neither the Kaunas Clinics nor the Santari\u0161k\u0117s Clinics had prescribed him a course of rehabilitation therapy after the applicant\u2019s first and second heart attacks respectively. On the contrary, both Clinics had made recommendations for further treatment, such as the medications, tests and dietary requirements which were required, and which the Prison Department Hospital had followed. 31.  According to three documents provided by the applicant\u2019s representative, Mr. S. Tomas, in September and December 2012 and in April 2013 the outpatient polyclinic in Upninkai (Upnink\u0173 ambulatorija, hereinafter \u2013 Upninkai Polyclinic), a village in Jonava district in Lithuania, gave \u201cthe applicant\u2019s authorised person\u201d three written statements by the polyclinic\u2019s head doctor. They noted that the applicant had suffered from myocardial infarction and summarised his medical history. One of those documents also stated that because of his state of health, as seen in the light of certain legal acts issued by the Minister of Health, the applicant should be released from serving his sentence. 32.  In November 2012 the applicant was taken to the Prison Department Hospital for a planned consultation with a cardiologist. The applicant spent about a month there. During that time, on 15 November 2012, he was also taken to the Santari\u0161k\u0117s Clinics, where the doctors performed a cardiopulmonary exercise test (veloergometrija) and an ultrasound examination of the heart (ultragarsinis \u0161irdies tyrimas). The applicant\u2019s heart was rhythmical, with no decompensation. The cardiologists prescribed medications to treat the applicant, said he should limit his intake of fat and salt (as concerned his diet) and have 45-50 minutes of physical activity a day. He was to return for a further consultation, although the exact date was not indicated.\nThe doctors in the Prison Department Hospital also performed a number of tests. When they released the applicant back to Kaunas Remand Prison on 5 December 2012 they concluded that \u201chis illness was without complications (ligos eiga: be komplikacij\u0173)\u201d. The applicant\u2019s state of health was \u201csatisfactory (patenkinama)\u201d. 33.  As can be seen from the applicant\u2019s medical records, on 12 February 2013 Kaunas Remand Prison sent him to the Prison Department Hospital for \u201ca full examination, follow-up and treatment\u201d of his heart condition. The doctor\u2019s examined the applicant, including an ECG and blood tests, and concluded that his state of health was \u201csatisfactory\u201d. It was noted that the applicant smoked. 34.  After the applicant\u2019s arrest on 25 March 2009, a court sanctioned his pre-trial detention for an initial duration of three months. The detention was then prolonged a number of times. 35.  On 28 November 2011 the Kaunas Regional Court extended the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention for three months on the grounds that the applicant was suspected of being the organiser of a criminal group which committed drug-related crimes, that he had connections abroad, did not work and faced a heavy sentence. Moreover, there was evidence in the file that the applicant had attempted to influence other suspects, thus impeding the criminal investigation. 36.  The applicant\u2019s lawyer appealed, arguing that her client had suffered a double myocardial infarction, had been operated on and treated at the Prison Department Hospital. In addition, he had another illness, connected to the digestive system. The lawyer argued that her client would not receive proper medical assistance, as regarded his regime and diet, in the Prison Department Hospital. She asked that a milder remand measure than pre-trial detention be ordered. 37.  On 29 December 2011 the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that milder remand measures would hinder the course of justice. It held that there was no information in the file preventing the holding of the applicant in pre-trial detention because of his state of health. The court noted that the applicant was being held at the time at the Prison Department Hospital and was receiving 24-hour medical assistance. 38.  In March 2012 the applicant\u2019s lawyer submitted several new requests asking to replace detention with a less severe remand measure owing to the deterioration of the applicant\u2019s health while in detention. She also relied on the Santari\u0161k\u0117s Clinics\u2019 record of 6 March 2012, where it was stated that the applicant needed a low-salt diet, a special regime for his meals and physical activity. The lawyer maintained that such assistance could not be provided at Kaunas Remand Prison or at the Prison Department Hospital, thus preventing the applicant from having satisfactory medical care. 39.  On the basis of the request by the applicant\u2019s lawyer, on 23 March 2012 the Kaunas Regional Court ordered a comprehensive forensic examination to be performed by a doctors\u2019 commission, comprising a cardiologist, to answer the question whether the applicant was ill with a serious, incurable illness (sunki nepagydoma liga), and, if so, whether for that reason he could be released from serving a sentence. In the meantime, the court extended the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention. 40.  On 20 April 2012 the Court of Appeal upheld the decision to extend the applicant\u2019s detention. The court observed that although the applicant had serious health problems, he had always been provided with adequate treatment at the Prison Department Hospital or, if necessary, in a public hospital. 41.  After examining the applicant\u2019s medical records from the Kaunas Clinics and the Santari\u0161k\u0117s Clinics, as well as from the Prison Department Hospital, on 11 June 2012 experts from the State Forensic Medicine Service (Valstybin\u0117 teismo medicinos tarnyba) produced report no. EKG 24/12 (02). It read that the applicant had an ischaemic heart illness, having suffered a myocardial infarction; he also had hypertension and ischaemic cardiomyopathy. Those ailments should be classified as serious and incurable illnesses. However, the experts concluded that the applicant\u2019s state of health at the time did not meet the criteria which allowed a convicted person to be exempted from serving a sentence, according to the rules set by the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of the Interior (see paragraph 49 below). One of the doctors on the commission was a cardiologist, a professor and habilitated doctor of sciences at the Kaunas Clinics. Another doctor was a surgeon with 35 years of experience. 42.  The applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention was then prolonged by court rulings on 13 June, 24 July and 25 September 2012. 43.  The last pre-trial detention order was upheld on 19 October 2012 by the Court of Appeal. The applicant\u2019s lawyer referred to the reports from the Upninkai Polyclinic and claimed that neither Kaunas Remand Prison nor the Prison Department Hospital could guarantee the necessary medical care for the applicant. The Court of Appeal however noted absence of any new documents showing that the applicant\u2019s state of health had worsened. The Court of Appeal also had regard to the practice of the Court to the effect that the State should protect inmates\u2019 physical health (it relied on Kud\u0142a v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, ECHR 2000\u2011XI, and Peers v. Greece, no. 28524/95, ECHR 2001\u2011III). However, in the applicant\u2019s case there was no evidence that there would be a lack of medical assistance. Furthermore, the comprehensive medical examination (see paragraph 41 above) had not ruled out keeping the applicant detained, and, in the court\u2019s view, its conclusions prevailed over those of the Upninkai Polyclinic. There was no reason to hold that keeping the applicant detained, and, if necessary, treating him at the Prison Department Hospital or in another hospital, could be considered as inhuman or degrading. 44.  By a judgment of 13 December 2012, the Kaunas Regional Court found the applicant guilty of a number of drug-related crimes and sentenced him to sixteen years and six months imprisonment in a correctional home. The applicant was to remain detained until the judgment became final. 45.  The applicant\u2019s conviction was upheld by the Court of Appeal on 31 March 2014, but the sentence was changed to fourteen years of deprivation of liberty in a correctional home. 46.  By a final judgment of 16 December 2014, the Supreme Court upheld the appellate court\u2019s verdict. The Supreme Court also relied on expert report no. EKG 24/12 (02) (see paragraph 41 above), and held that the lower courts had been correct in finding that the applicant\u2019s state of health did not prevent him from serving a prison sentence.", "references": ["4", "6", "1", "7", "2", "3", "8", "9", "5", "0", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Barnaul. 5.  In 2001 he became a suspect and then an accused in a criminal case concerning fraud. During the investigation of the criminal case the applicant was under a written undertaking not to leave his place of residence. 6.  In March 2003 the prosecutor referred the criminal case to the Industrialnyy District Court of Barnaul (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) for trial. 7.  On 19 September 2003 the District Court ordered the applicant\u2019s detention pending trial following the complaints by one of the victims and a witness about threats expressed by the applicant in their respect. 8.  On 22 September 2003 the applicant\u2019s representatives lodged a cassation appeal against the detention order of 19 September 2003 with the Regional Court via the District Court. 9.  On 6 October 2003 the District Court forwarded that appeal to the Regional Court and set its examination on 27 November 2003. 10.  On 8 October 2003 the District Court forwarded a copy of the applicant\u2019s appeal to other participants of the criminal proceedings and informed them that they had until 22 October 2003 to submit their comments, if any. 11.  On 22 October 2003 victim Shch. submitted her comments on the applicant\u2019s grounds of appeal. 12.  On 19 November 2003 the Regional Court received all materials related to the applicant\u2019s appeal against the detention order of 19 September 2003. 13.  On 27 November 2003 the Regional Court examined and rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal. 14.  The District Court subsequently extended the applicant\u2019s detention on several occasions. 15.  On 30 September 2004 the applicant was released under a written undertaking. 16.  On 13 December 2005 the District Court found the applicant guilty of fraud and sentenced him to two years\u2019 imprisonment. 17.  On 18 May 2006 the Regional Court upheld the applicant\u2019s conviction.", "references": ["7", "8", "6", "0", "3", "5", "9", "4", "1", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1952 and lives in Rostov region. He took part in the clean-up operation at the Chernobyl nuclear disaster site. He was subsequently registered disabled, and became entitled to various social benefits. 6.  In February 2003 the applicant brought proceedings claiming that his benefits should be increased in accordance with a particular method. The adjustment method suggested by the applicant was approved by the domestic courts, which in addition increased the social benefits to which he was entitled to in 2002 in accordance with this same method (judgment of 25 February 2003). 7.  In June 2003 the applicant brought a similar set of proceedings in respect of social benefits to which he was entitled to during the first six months of 2003. Relying on their previous judgment by which they approved the adjustment method suggested by the applicant, the domestic courts increased his social benefits for the new period accordingly (judgment of 18 June 2003). 8.  In October 2003 the judgment of 25 February 2003 approving the adjustment method suggested by the applicant was quashed by a supervisory review court. 9.  In March 2004 the domestic courts quashed on the basis of newly discovered circumstances the judgment delivered on 18 June 2003 on the ground that it was based on the judgment delivered in February 2003 but quashed since then by way of supervisory review. 10.  Both judgments, of February and June 2003, remained unenforced prior to their quashing. 11.  In 2006 the applicant brought proceedings against welfare authorities claiming arrears for various benefits as well as indexation of those benefits. The Zernogradskiy District Court of the Rostov Region granted the applicant\u2019s claims (judgment of 19 June 2006, upheld on 18 July 2006). This judgment remained unenforced for fourteen months.", "references": ["1", "8", "7", "4", "0", "2", "6", "5", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
+{"input": "4.  The municipal unitary enterprise Sysolskoye proizvodstvennoye obyedineniye \u201cZhilkomkhoz\u201d (\u041c\u0423\u041f \u0421\u044b\u0441\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0435 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0438\u0437\u0432\u043e\u0434\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0435 \u043e\u0431\u044a\u0435\u0434\u0438\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u00ab\u0416\u0438\u043b\u043a\u043e\u043c\u0445\u043e\u0437\u00bb, hereinafter \u201cthe company\u201d) was set up by a decision of the administration of the Sysolskiy District. It provided maintenance services in respect of municipal housing, including heating and water supply, maintenance of the sewage systems and renovation and maintenance of the municipal housing stock. 5.  The Company had \u201cthe right of economic control\u201d (\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043e \u0445\u043e\u0437\u044f\u0439\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0432\u0435\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f) over the assets allocated to it in order to carry out its statutory activities. According to its statutory articles all of the company\u2019s property as well as obtained profits belonged to the municipal estate. 6.  On 3 March 2006 the Commercial Court of the Komi Republic commenced insolvency proceedings and appointed an external administrator to oversee the company\u2019s administration. 7.  On 29 September 2006 the Commercial Court of the Komi Republic ordered the insolvency proceedings in respect of the company. 8.  On 28 August 2008 the Commercial Court of the Komi Republic discontinued the insolvency proceedings and ordered the respondent company\u2019s liquidation. The creditors\u2019 claims, which had not been satisfied during the liquidation procedure, including the applicants\u2019 claims, were considered as settled. 10.  On an unspecified date in 2006 the applicants brought proceedings against the debtor company seeking salary arrears and other work-related payments. 11.  On 9 August 2006 and 30 October 2006 the Justice of the Peace of the Sysolskiy Court Circuit of the Komi Republic awarded the applicants salary arrears (the amounts are specified in the Appendix, column no. 2) and compensation for non-pecuniary damage against their employer. On 10 October 2006 and 10 November 2006 respectively the Sysolskiy District Court upheld those judgments on appeal and they became final.", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "7", "6", "8", "1", "5", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
+{"input": "7.  The applicants were born in 1957, 1961, 1966, 1970 and 1946 respectively and lived until their arrest in St Petersburg. 8.  At the end of the 1990-s a criminal gang was operating in St Petersburg. It was named after one of the applicants as \u201cShutov\u2019s Gang\u201d. Its members were involved in multiple serious and violent crimes including aggravated murders, kidnappings, armed robberies and extortion. At the time, Mr Shutov was serving as a member of the St Petersburg Legislative Assembly. He was later accused and convicted of orchestrating the gang\u2019s activities. 9. On 20 January 1999 a criminal investigation into the gang\u2019s activities was opened. 10.  The applicants were arrested on the following dates:\n-  Mr Gimranov and Mr Dodonov on 26 January 1999;\n-  Mr Denisov on 13 February 1999;\n-  Mr Shutov on 16 February 1999; and\n-  Mr Filimonov on 7 March 2001. 11.  They were placed in pre-trial detention on suspicion of participating in a number of serious crimes as members of a criminal group allegedly led by Mr Shutov. 12.  The St Petersburg City Court (hereinafter \u201cthe City Court\u201d) extended the period of the applicants\u2019 pre-trial detention several times. 13.  It transpires from the wording of the decisions that the City Court relied solely on the seriousness of the charges as grounds for the continuing detention and rejected a complaint made by the applicants concerning the composition of the bench. The City Court did not examine in detail the need or grounds for continuing detention and extended the applicants\u2019 pre-trial detention by repeating the contents of earlier orders. In the last extension order, made on 6 December 2005, the City Court relied in addition on the need \u201cto secure execution of a conviction\u201d. All of the extensions were upheld on appeal. 14.  On 26 January 2001 the preliminary investigation was completed. Mr Denisov, Mr Gimranov, Mr Dodonov, Mr Shutov and twelve other individuals implicated in the gang\u2019s activities were charged with multiple counts of aggravated murder, kidnapping, armed robbery and extortion. The bill of indictment and material from the applicants\u2019 case (no. 7806) were transmitted to the City Court, where it reached on 29 January 2001. 15.  On 13 April 2001 Mr Filimonov was indicted in separate proceedings for similar offences and his criminal case was transmitted to the City Court and consolidated with case no. 7806. 16.  The first hearing was scheduled for 1 October 2001, but the City Court adjourned it at least eighty-eight times between that date and 27 September 2004 for the reasons summarised as follows: (i) some lawyers failed to appear for no reason; (ii) some of the lawyers excused their absence for health, professional or personal reasons; (iii) the applicants were not escorted to the court on the days they were ill; or (iv) the applicants and/or their lawyers were removed from the courtroom for interrupting the presiding judge and court clerk, addressing the City Court using obscene language and engaging in other unruly behaviour. 17.  On 28 September 2004 the City Court began to examine the case on the merits by inviting the prosecution to read out the bill of indictment. The trial continued, with few interruptions, until 15 February 2006. 18.  The City Court was composed of a professional judge and two lay judges, Ms I. and Ms M., who in 1990 and 1991 respectively had been elected by St Petersburg (then Leningrad) City Council of People\u2019s Deputies (City Council) to serve as lay judges at the City Court. Their terms of service were extended by three presidential Decrees. 19.  On 15 May 2002 and 27 March 2003 the defence unsuccessfully challenged the professional judge, alleging that he was biased against the applicants. 20.  On 12 February 2004 the applicants applied to have their case examined by a jury. Their request was not considered by the court because Mr Shutov was not present in court. 21.  On 27 May and 23 August 2004 the defence unsuccessfully challenged the lay judges Ms I. and Ms M., on the grounds that they lacked the requisite credentials. In particular, they submitted that Ms I. had never been selected as a lay judge, and that Ms M.\u2019s term of office had expired in 1996. They further alleged that subsequent extensions of Ms M.\u2019s term of office by Presidential Decree had been unlawful, and that in any event she could no longer serve in her office following the adoption in January 2000 of a law governing the selection and service of lay judges and the entry into force in July 2002 of the new Code of Criminal Procedure, which had abolished lay judges in the Russian judicial system. In support of their argument, they submitted a letter from the president of the St Petersburg Legislative Assembly stating that their archives contained no decisions by City Council dated 22 June 1990, the date Ms I. had allegedly been selected. 22.  On 24 September 2004 the applicants unsuccessfully challenged the professional judge and applied for an examination of their case by a jury. 23.  The applicants challenged the bench up to forty-seven times in total during the proceedings. 24.  Mr Denisov was excluded from the courtroom for misconduct from 17 September 2003 to 17 March 2004, 16 April to 24 September 2004, 27 September 2004 to 19 July 2005 and 21 July to 9 December 2005 after repeatedly challenging the bench and requesting to be tried by jury and engaging in unruly behaviour. 25.  On 27 September 2004 the other four applicants were removed from the courtroom prior to the start of examination of the case on the merits until the end of the submissions, on the same grounds as Mr Denisov. 26.  Mr Gimranov submitted that after the prosecution had finished presenting its evidence, he had been called to the courtroom and invited to testify. He had been removed again after asking about the witnesses\u2019 testimonies or for access to the hearing transcript and an interpreter. 27.  On 26 August 2004 the prosecutor requested the City Court to have the trial moved from the City Court to Kresty remand prison IZ-47/1 in St Petersburg (\u201cIZ-47/1\u201d). The prosecutor explained to the court that Mr Shutov suffered from different health ailments and constantly required medical supervision which was not possible in the courtroom as there was no on-site medical stuff present in the court building, unlike in the remand prison which had a permanent medical post. The prosecutor further submitted that the removal of the trial to IZ-47/1 was also aimed at ensuring the safety of the presiding judge, lay judges and three co-defendants of the applicants who started receiving physical threats in connection with the proceedings and asked for state protection. 28.  On the same day the City Court granted the prosecutor\u2019s request despite protests by the defence, who complained that there would be no access to the public. 29.  According to the documents in the case-file, the members of the general public could attend the hearings in IZ-47/1 after they presented their identity document to the security personnel and obtained a security pass. Between 27 August 2004 and 17 February 2006 thirty-seven individuals were admitted to attend the hearings taking place in IZ-47/1. The City Court allowed video and audio recording during the trial in the remand prison. The journalists were allowed to observe the trial on a television screen in the press-room organised specifically for them in IZ-47/1. 30.  On 28 September 2004 and 2 November 2005 the defence applied to have the trial moved back to the City Court, alleging poor working conditions. Both requests were rejected. 31.  On 16 and 17 February 2006 the representatives of four television channels and six newspapers were present during the trial. 32.  On 15 June 2000 Mr Denisov and G., the lawyer representing him at the time, signed a form acknowledging that they had received sixty-five files of the criminal case for review. 33.  On 16 August 2000 the head of the criminal investigation unit gave Mr Denisov a formal warning for delaying the review of the case documents for no valid reason and notified him that the time allocated to him for studying the case material might be reduced. Mr Denisov signed the warning and explained in writing that he had regularly reviewed the case documents and had done so as quickly as he could. 34.  On 6 September 2000 the head of the criminal investigation unit reported that because Mr Denisov had intentionally delayed the review of the case documents and had refused to review them on several occasions, he and his lawyer had been given eighty days to finish the review, and by 15 January 2001 at the latest. 35.  According to the trial transcript of 28 September 2004, the City Court refused a request by Mr Denisov\u2019s new lawyer, K., to adjourn the hearing in order to review the case documents. The court explained that since Mr Denisov\u2019s lawyer G. remained on the case and was familiar with the material, K.\u2019s request for adjournment was not justified. 36.  On 29 September 2004 the City Court informed the applicants\u2019 lawyers, including K., that they could study the case documents every afternoon after the hearings and during working hours on Fridays. 37.  On 10 November 2004 the City Court ruled that Mr Denisov would be allowed to review the transcript of the hearings from which he had been removed at the end of the deliberations. 38.  On 2 December 2004 Mr Denisov\u2019s lawyer K. informed the City Court that he had reviewed the case documents and had digital copies of them. 39.  From 24 February 1999 to 17 March 2006 Mr Denisov was detained in IZ-47/1. 40.  On 21 May 2007 he complained to the Court that the conditions of his detention there had been inadequate. In particular, he stated that each detainee in his cell had only been allocated 1.5 square metres of space. The cell had not been heated in winter or properly ventilated in summer, and there had been no privacy in the toilet area. 41.  The applicant submitted that on 4 March 2002 and 20 July 2003 the court had refused his request to study certain case material even though he had only studied thirty-two of the sixty-eight files produced by the end of the preliminary investigation. 42.  On 28 September 2004 the City Court had refused to allow his second legal counsel K., who had entered the proceedings that day, time to study the case file. 43.  On 30 September 2004 his counsel had requested that he be allowed time to study the case material and the trial transcript. The City Court had refused, noting that he had had ample opportunity to study the case in advance, and that the trial transcript would be distributed at the end of the proceedings. 44.  On 2 December 2004 and 27 June 2005 his remaining legal counsel K. had requested access to certain evidence and procedural documents. The request had been granted only in part. 45.  On 20 July 2005 his counsel had unsuccessfully asked to be allowed time to study the statements certain witnesses, victims and co-accused had made during the preliminary investigation, and to familiarise himself with transcripts of the hearings held while the applicant had been excluded from the courtroom. 46.  The applicant submitted that even though his native language was Tatar and he was not completely fluent in Russian, he had not been provided with an interpreter despite his requests both during the pre-trial and trial stages of the proceedings. On several occasions the City Court had refused his requests for translations and to allow his partner, Ms. Ch., to act as his non-legal representative in the proceedings, on the grounds that she was not fluent in Tatar. He had also been unable to lodge an appeal against his conviction, as the appellate court had refused to consider his statement of appeal written in Tatar. 47.  The applicant submitted that on 3 November 2005 he had terminated his agreement for legal assistance with his two counsels Z. and Sh. He had informed the City Court that he wished to retain new counsel, but it had refused his request on the grounds that he had not given sufficient reasons why he no longer wished to be represented by Z. and Sh. They had continued to represent him, but according to the applicant, they had not effectively participated in the defence. 48.  On 15 February 2006 the City Court convicted the applicants and twelve other defendants of multiple counts of organising a criminal group, murder and assault, preparing explosive devices and unlawfully storing and carrying firearms. Mr Denisov, Mr Gimranov and Mr Shutov were sentenced to life imprisonment, while Mr Filimonov and Mr Dodonov received sentences of nine and eighteen years respectively. 49.  According to the judgment, the applicants could request to participate in person in the appeal hearing of their case. The applicants appealed.\n(a)  Mr Shutov\u2019s request to participate in appeal proceedings 50.  On 27 February 2006 Mr Shutov filed a statement of appeal against his conviction. He did not request to be present during the hearing. On 30 August 2006 he was informed that the hearing of his case on appeal would start on 16 November 2006 in the Supreme Court of Russia (hereinafter \u201cthe appellate court\u201d). On the day of the hearing Mr Shutov\u2019s lawyer, S., lodged a request for him to personally participate in the hearing but it was refused. In addition to S., Mr Shutov was represented by two other lawyers at the hearing.\n(b)  Mr Dodonov\u2019s request to participate in appeal proceedings 51. On 29 June 2006 the appellate court granted Mr Dodonov\u2019s request to participate in the appeal hearing of his case.\n(c)  Appeal judgment 52.  On 21 November 2006 the Supreme Court of Russia upheld the applicants\u2019 conviction on appeal. Mr Denisov, Mr Dodonov, Mr Gimranov and their lawyers participated in the hearing, as did Mr Shutov\u2019s three lawyers and Mr Filimonov\u2019s lawyer.", "references": ["4", "0", "5", "3", "7", "6", "9", "8", "1", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1971 and is currently in detention in Warsaw. 6.  On 17 January 2006 the applicant was arrested and detained on remand. He was suspected of the murder of two people and of inciting the murder of another person who had intended to testify against him in a separate set of proceedings. 7.  He was subsequently convicted several times for various offences. In particular, on 27 February 2013 the Warsaw Regional Court convicted him of murder. 8.  On 19 January 2006 the Warsaw Remand Centre Penitentiary Commission (\u201cthe commission\u201d) classified the applicant as a dangerous detainee. The decision stated as follows:\n\u201cThe commission hereby decides that [the applicant] is to be placed in a designated wing or cell in a remand centre in conditions which provide increased protection for society and for the security of the remand centre.\nThe commission approves the proposals of the directors of the protection and prison wings.\nThe detainee has been informed of his right to appeal against the commission\u2019s decision within seven days to the Warsaw Regional Court, XI Penitentiary Division.\u201d\nThe last sentence of the decision contained information about who was to be informed about the applicant\u2019s placement in a cell for dangerous detainees. 9.  The applicant did not appeal against that decision. 10.  The commission reviewed and upheld its decision to classify the applicant as a dangerous detainee on several occasions. In total, there were over thirty decisions to extend the period of imposition of the regime in respect of the applicant. All the decisions were based on the same pattern of wording, which read as follows:\n\u201cThe commission has decided to extend [the applicant\u2019s categorisation as a dangerous detainee] as the reasons for his placement in a cell in conditions which provide increased protection for society and for the security of the remand centre have not ceased to exist.\u201d 11.  In particular, a decision of 3 January 2013 to extend the imposition of the dangerous detainee regime on the applicant referred to the seriousness of the charges against him and his highly deficient moral character. 12.  An appeal by the applicant against the latter decision was the only one he made against the series of decisions to impose and extend the dangerous detainee regime on him. 13.  On 30 January 2013 the Warsaw Regional Court dismissed the appeal. The court held that the decision had been lawful. 14.  On 21 November 2013 the commission lifted the dangerous detainee regime applied to the applicant. 15.  The applicant was kept in a cell which was constantly monitored via closed\u2011circuit television. He was subjected to a body search every time he left or entered the cell, which meant in practice that he had to strip naked in front of prison officers.", "references": ["8", "5", "4", "0", "3", "7", "2", "9", "6", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "7.  The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in the United States of America. 8.  On 21 December 1995 the Tirana District Court (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) acknowledged the inherited property rights of some landowners over a plot of land measuring 24 hectares (vendim p\u00ebr v\u00ebrtetim fakti). On 13 February 1996 the District Court acknowledged that the landowners also had inherited property rights over installations and fuel tanks of a petrol station located on the land (vendim p\u00ebr v\u00ebrtetim fakti). 9.  In the meantime, on the assumption that the landowners\u2019 properties would be restored in natura by the Commission on Property Restitution and Compensation, in January and February 1996, the applicant concluded two agreements with one of the landowners, who was acting on his own and the remaining heirs\u2019 behalf, whereby the applicant would assist the landowners in the process of the privatisation of installations and fuel tanks on the land (see paragraphs 21-22 below). In May 1996 he concluded a sales contract (see paragraph 23 below). Following the conclusion of these contracts, the validity of which became the object of a dispute (see section B below), all landowners appointed the applicant to act on their behalf in proceedings related to the protection of their property rights. 10.  On the strength of the District Court\u2019s decisions, on an unspecified date the landowners lodged a request with the Tirana Commission on Property Restitution and Compensation (\u201cthe Commission\u201d) seeking restitution of the above-mentioned property by the domestic authorities. On 7 March 1996 the Commission dismissed the landowners\u2019 request on the grounds that the land was not subject to the Property Act as it was located outside the legal city boundaries (ndodhen jasht\u00eb vijave kufizuese). The landowners appealed to the District Court. 11.  On 24 April 1996 the District Court quashed the Commission\u2019s decision and allocated the landowners a plot of land measuring 56,500 sq. m. Relying on an expert\u2019s report, the court held that the value of the respective installations and fuel tanks constructed thereon did not exceed 20% of the land\u2019s total value. It therefore ordered that these objects be restored at no cost. The petrol station was situated on the main road between the cities of Tirana and Durr\u00ebs and it was used and administered by two State-owned oil companies. The judgment became final on 7 May 1996, no appeal having been lodged against it. 12.  Subsequent to the above judgment, on 30 May 1996 the Mortgage Office issued a property certificate (v\u00ebrtetim pron\u00ebsie \u2013 Ipoteka), according to which the landowners had registered title to the plot of land measuring 56,500 sq. m. on which the fuel tanks and installations had been erected (mortgage register entry no. 3350 of 8 May 1996). The petrol station and fuel tanks were subsequently expropriated in the public interest. 13.  Between 1996 and 1998 the landowners\u2019 property rights were unsuccessfully challenged by various State institutions. On one occasion the domestic courts dismissed the claim, whereas on four other occasions they discontinued the proceedings on various grounds. The applicant joined the proceedings as a third party. 14.  On 25 March 1998 the Ministry of Economy challenged the lawfulness of the District Court\u2019s judgment of 24 April 1996 (see paragraph 11 above) recognising the landowners\u2019 property rights. The action was dismissed by the Supreme Court with final effect on 22 December 1999. 15.  On 28 December 1999 and 7 January 2000 the Ministry of Economy and the State-owned oil companies lodged two separate applications for supervisory review of the domestic judgments upholding the landowners\u2019 property rights, namely the District Court\u2019s judgment of 24 April 1996 and the Supreme Court\u2019s judgment of 22 December 1999. 16.  On 12 May 2000 the Supreme Court Joint Benches gave two separate decisions by accepting both applications for supervisory review and the reopening of the proceedings. A constitutional appeal lodged by the applicant on 1 August 2000 was declared inadmissible by the Constitutional Court on 7 December 2000. As a result of the remittal of the cases to the District Court, on an unspecified date the court decided to join the proceedings. The applicant took part in them as a third party. 17.  In the first set of rehearing proceedings, the case was heard by the District Court, the Tirana Court of Appeal (\u201cthe Court of Appeal\u201d) and the Supreme Court, which on 18 March 2003 decided to remit the case to the Court of Appeal for a further rehearing. 18.  In the second set of rehearing proceedings, the case was heard by the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, which on 27 October 2005 decided to remit the case to the Court of Appeal for fresh consideration. 19.  In the third set of rehearing proceedings, the case was heard by the Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court, which gave its final decision on 20 September 2009. The domestic courts ruled in favour of the landowners. 20.  In the meantime, on 19 June 2007 the Tirana Agency for the Restitution and Compensation of Property, which had replaced the Commission, recognised the landowners\u2019 inherited property rights over the plot of land measuring 24 hectares (240,000 sq. m) and ordered that they be compensated in respect of 183,500 sq. m in one of the forms prescribed by law, the remaining 56,500 sq. m having already been decided upon by the authorities. The authorities\u2019 failure to pay compensation in respect of the 183,500 sq. m is the subject of application no. 5915/14, of which notice was given to the Government as a follow-up to the Court\u2019s pilot judgment in the case of Manushaqe Puto and Others v. Albania (nos. 604/07, 43628/07, 46684/07 and 34770/09, 31 July 2012). 21.  On 18 January 1996 one of the landowners, acting on his own and the remaining heirs\u2019 behalf, concluded an agreement (akt marr\u00ebveshje) with the applicant\u2019s company, according to which the latter would secure finance for the privatisation of fuel tanks and installations located on the landowners\u2019 plot of land, in respect of which they would exercise their right of first refusal (e drejta e parablerjes) at the time of privatisation. In return, the landowners would transfer ownership rights to the applicant\u2019s company upon privatisation. Subsequent to this transaction, the parties would form a joint company, whose registered capital would be made up of the applicant\u2019s company\u2019s ownership of the fuel tanks and other installations, as well as the landowners\u2019 ownership of the plot of land. 22.  On 29 February 1996 the same landowner, again acting on his own and the remaining heirs\u2019 behalf, concluded a similar agreement (akt marr\u00ebveshje) with the applicant\u2019s company for the privatisation of the fuel tanks and installations, the difference being that some objects would remain the landowners\u2019 property. 23.  On 23 May 1996 the same landowner, again acting on his own and the remaining heirs\u2019 behalf, concluded a notarised sales contract with the applicant for the sale of almost all of the fuel tanks and installations for 100,000 United States dollars (USD), which, according to the contract, was paid by the applicant to the landowners. On the same date the Mortgage Office issued a property certificate (v\u00ebrtetim pron\u00ebsie \u2013 Ipoteka), according to which the applicant had registered title to the petrol station fuel tanks and installations (mortgage register entry no. 4135 of 23 May 1996). 24.  On 23 and 25 May 1996 the same landowner, acting on his own behalf, concluded two loan agreements with the applicant to lend the latter a total of USD 200,000. The agreements contained no details as to the purpose of the loan. 25.  On 10 October 2002 the landowners instituted proceedings against the applicant seeking the annulment of the agreements and contract concluded between February and May 1996 (see paragraphs 21-24 above). They requested the court to declare the agreements and contract null and void (pavlefshm\u00ebri absolute) without any legal consequences for the parties whatsoever. The claim was signed by their lawyer, to whom they had given power of attorney. 26.  Following remittals of the case, on 31 March 2005 the District Court decided to discontinue the proceedings (pushimin e \u00e7\u00ebshtjes) as the landowners had failed to attend court without good reason. 2.  Second set of proceeding concerning the nullity of the contract and agreements concluded in 1996\n(a)  Proceedings before the District Court 27.  On 17 April 2005 the landowners instituted a fresh set of proceedings against the applicant seeking the annulment of the agreements and contract concluded between February and May 1996. The claim was signed by only their lawyer. 28.  On an unspecified date the landowners requested the District Court to obtain and process all documents from the case-file concerning the first set of proceedings, including the powers of attorney. The court accepted this request. 29.  On 27 July 2005 the applicant requested the court to stay the proceedings pending the outcome of a criminal complaint he had lodged with the district prosecutor\u2019s office against the landowners alleging forgery of documents. 30.  On 20 October, 11 and 18 November 2005 and 27 February 2006 the applicant, having regard to the number of previous requests that had been rejected, challenged the bench. 31.  On 15 November 2005 the presiding judge of the bench withdrew from the case, given the applicant\u2019s repeated requests for withdrawal. On 9 December 2005 the President of the District Court set aside the withdrawal, finding that it did not contain any of the grounds stipulated in Article 72 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 32.  On 17 February 2006 the applicant lodged a counterclaim requesting the court to decide the requests he had already submitted for the withdrawal of the bench. According to the counterclaim, the landowners had not authorised their lawyer to represent them in the proceedings and their claim was time-barred. Furthermore, the loan agreements were fictitious and their conclusion with only one of the landowners could not have a bearing on the sales contract of the fuel tanks and installations. The applicant argued that a number of factors pointed to his having lawful property rights over the fuel tanks and installations, such as the fact that all the agreements and contracts were lawful and valid, the property had been registered in his name, he had represented the landowners in the domestic proceedings and he had taken legal action to defend their interests. 33.  On 18 April 2006 the District Court declared the agreements and contracts null and void (absolute nullity). It found them to be fictitious on the grounds that they had been concluded at a time when the said property in question was being administered by the State, no property rights having been transferred to the landowners. In accordance with the law, the installations had been privatised at no cost, because their value was less than 20% of the land\u2019s value. Furthermore, no joint company had been set up by the applicant and landowners and no money had been lent to the applicant in accordance with the loan agreements. They had been concluded with a view to having an assurance for the execution of the sales contract, in which the sale price was the same. Despite the property certificate (no. 4135 of 23 May 1996), the fact that no actions had been effected pursuant to the agreements and contracts and that no legal consequences had resulted for the parties, the District Court concluded that the agreements were fictitious in accordance with Article 92(\u00e7) of the Civil Code. It further ordered that the entry of 23 May 1996 (see paragraph 23 above) in the immovable property register be erased.\n(b)  Proceedings before the Court of Appeal 34.  The applicant appealed, arguing that the District Court bench was biased because disciplinary proceedings had been instituted for the dismissal of the presiding judge of the bench for breaches of law. In this connection, the withdrawal of the presiding judge of the bench had not been accepted by the President of the District Court and his four requests for the withdrawal of the bench were rejected, no such mention having been made in the hearing records. The applicant further submitted that the claim had been brought outside the statutory time-limit, and had been signed by only the lawyer and not the landowners, the power of attorney dating back to 2002 and being limited in time and scope, and that the facts of the claim were unrelated. He also objected to the fact that his counterclaims of 28 June 2005 and 17 February 2006 had not been admitted to the case-file. Moreover, he contended that the District Court had not accepted any of the twenty-four requests for pieces of evidence he had produced, and had made findings in excess of the requests contained in the object of the claim. He argued that four hearings had been held between 6 April and 4 July 2005, without the landowners providing any good reason for their non-appearance to supplement the claim. In his view, his spouse, who was a co-owner, should have been invited to attend the hearings. Finally, he claimed that the contracts had been concluded in complete conformity with the domestic law and that there had been no need to summon witnesses. In this connection, the landowners had confirmed the applicant\u2019s ownership of the plot of land by way of specific powers of attorney, while the applicant had lodged numerous procedural requests, applications and appeals and had attended hearings to defend his and their property rights. 35.  On 30 November 2006 the applicant challenged the bench in the light of the previous decisions given against him. On the same date he requested that thirty-nine items of evidence and twenty procedural requests absent from the case-file before the District Court be readmitted. 36.  On 4 December 2006 the applicant requested that eight additional items of evidence be admitted to the case-file. 37.  On 19 February 2007 the Deputy President of the Court of Appeal requested the Minister of Justice to appoint three judges from other appellate courts to hear the case, since all of its judges had sat in the proceedings. 38.  On 15 March 2007 the Minister of Justice, following a decision taken by the High Council of Justice (\u201cHCJ\u201d), informed the Court of Appeal that three judges of the Military Court of Appeal would hear the case. 39.  On 29 March 2007 the applicant challenged the new composition of the bench, submitting that the HCJ should appoint judges from other ordinary appellate courts instead of the Military Court of Appeal. 40.  On 25 May 2007 the Court of Appeal, composed of three judges, upheld the District Court\u2019s judgment of 18 April 2006 (see paragraph 33 above). It transpires that the applicant had withdrawn the request for the exemption of the bench from hearing the case, and that the court had partially reopened the judicial examination and accepted new items of evidence as produced by him. The Court of Appeal held that the objects mentioned in the agreements and contracts of 1996 were, at the time of the judgment, being administered by the State and that their ownership had not yet been transferred to the landowners. Consequently, those contracts and agreements were fictitious under Article 92 (\u00e7) of the Civil Code and were of no legal effect. It rejected all of the applicant\u2019s arguments as unfounded and held that he had failed to adduce evidence to object to or challenge the landowners\u2019 claim, which was supported by the documents contained in the case-file. According to the Court of Appeal, a claim requesting absolute nullity was not subject to a statutory limitation period. 41.  The presiding judge of the bench, judge Y.M, dissented. In a separate opinion, he stated that the claim had not been signed by the landowners. The evidence in the case-file was not capable of demonstrating that the agreements were fictitious, since the parties\u2019 intentions had been real and lawful. As a result, the landowners did not have legal standing to bring the claim as they could not prove that there had been a breach of a substantial right (e drejta materiale). Their claim was time-barred and the courts had failed to take into account the statutory limitation period. The evidence produced by the applicant showed that the landowners, by virtue of powers of attorney or other documents issued between 1997 and 2005, had appointed the applicant to act as their representative. This pointed to the fact that the parties had wished their transactions to have legal effect and this, in itself, contradicted the fictitious nature of the agreements and contracts. In his view, the court had rejected all of the applicant\u2019s requests without giving any reasons in the decision.\n(c)  Proceedings before the Supreme Court 42.  On 9 July 2007 the applicant appealed, raising seventy-two grounds of appeal. In addition to maintaining the same complaints he had raised before the Court of Appeal, he alleged that the composition of the District Court had not been drawn by lots and that the Court of Appeal had not been a \u201ctribunal established by law\u201d as it had been composed of military judges. He claimed that his requests for the withdrawal of the Court of Appeal judges had not been examined and that his requests for the admission of numerous items of evidence had not been processed by the Court of Appeal. He further objected to the lower courts\u2019 application and interpretation of the domestic law since, in his view, he had been authorised by the landowners to act as their representative, had lodged various appeals and other procedural requests and followed the judicial proceedings with the landowners, had requested the enforcement of final decisions on his and the landowners\u2019 behalf and had sought the criminal prosecution of third parties. 43.  On 23 November 2007 the Supreme Court decided to stay execution of the Court of Appeal\u2019s judgment of 25 May 2007 pending the outcome of the applicant\u2019s appeal. 44.  On 25 January 2010 the Supreme Court declared the applicant\u2019s appeal inadmissible in accordance with Article 472 of the Code of Civil Procedure (no valid grounds of appeal).\n(d)  Proceedings before the Constitutional Court 45.  On 18 March 2010 the applicant lodged an eighty-three page constitutional appeal. On 15 September 2010 he supplemented it with a fifteen-page memorandum. In addition to maintaining the same grounds of appeal he had raised before the lower courts, the applicant also complained of a lack of reasoning in the Supreme Court\u2019s decision and about the length of the proceedings. 46.  On 17 September 2010 the applicant requested that judges X.Z, S.B and F.A withdraw from the appeal on the grounds that they had rejected a previous constitutional appeal lodged by him on 20 September 2009 in relation to another unrelated set of proceedings. On 27 September 2010 he requested that judge V.T withdraw from the appeal on the grounds that she had been on the bench that had decided against him in another appeal in 2000. 47.  On 17 January 2011 the applicant was informed of the Constitutional Court\u2019s decision of 22 November 2010 rejecting his appeal. It found nothing to suggest a lack of impartiality on the part of the Supreme Court bench and that, even though some of the judges had heard previous appeals lodged by the applicant with the Supreme Court, those appeals concerned different facts, parties and sets of proceedings. It dismissed the remaining complaints, finding that they related to the assessment of facts and the outcome of the proceedings, which was within the lower courts\u2019 jurisdiction.", "references": ["7", "6", "4", "8", "0", "9", "2", "1", "5", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1959 and 1947 respectively and live in the village of Sinemorets, on the southern Black Sea coast. 6.  The two of them have lived as a family since 1989. At that time, they resided in the town of Burgas, where the first applicant owned a flat, which in 2013 she donated to her daughter, who had lived in it with her family for a number of years. 7.  The first applicant\u2019s father and mother owned a plot of 625 square metres in Sinemorets. Following the death of the first applicant\u2019s father in 1986 and ensuing division-of-property proceedings between his surviving wife and seven children, the first applicant\u2019s mother was allotted 250 out of the 625 shares in the plot. In 1999 she transferred those shares, together with the nine sixteenths of the plot to which she was otherwise entitled as a heir of her late husband, to the first applicant. Combining the shares that she obtained as a result of this transfer and the one sixteenth of the plot that she had inherited from her father, the first applicant became the owner of 484.43 shares, or 77.5%, of the plot. On the plot, there existed a dilapidated one-storey cabin. 8.  In 2004 the second applicant, who had been employed as a driver, suffered a myocardial infraction and was no longer able to work. In 2005 he was recognised as a disabled person and has since then been in receipt of a disability pension. At about that time, the two applicants moved from Burgas to Sinemorets, allegedly because they were no longer able to afford living in Burgas. They submitted that they put all their savings into the reconstruction of the cabin, converting it into a solid one-storey brick house. They did not apply for a building permit. The reconstruction took place in 2004-05. Since that time, the two applicants have lived in that house. In 2006 two of the other co-owners of the plot formally notified the first applicant that they did not agree with the reconstruction. According to the Government, there was evidence that the construction had not been finalised before 2009. 9.  In 2006 the other ten heirs of the first applicant\u2019s father and mother brought a claim against the first applicant, seeking a judicial declaration that they were the owners of 140.57 of the 625 shares of the plot and of the house built on it. The Tsarevo District Court dismissed the claim. On an appeal by the claimants, on 7 June 2009 the Burgas Regional Court quashed that judgment and made a declaration in the terms sought by the claimants, finding that they were the owners of 140.57 out of the total of 625 shares of the plot and the house built in the place of the old cabin. It also held that the first applicant was the owner of the remaining 484.43 shares of the plot and the house. The first applicant attempted to appeal on points of law, but in a decision of 22 June 2009 (\u043e\u043f\u0440. \u2116 566 \u043e\u0442 22.06.2009 \u0433. \u043f\u043e \u0433\u0440. \u0434. \u2116 1974/2009 \u0433., \u0412\u041a\u0421, I \u0433. \u043e.), the Supreme Court of Cassation refused to admit the appeal for examination. In so doing, it held, inter alia, that by including the house in the declaration, the lower court had not erred because it was settled case-law that illegal buildings could be the objects of the right to property. 10.  For most of the year, the first applicant is unemployed. Her only source of income comes from servicing vacation houses in Sinemorets during the late spring and summer. The second applicant inherited shares of several plots of land in another village, which he sold for a total of 1,200 Bulgarian levs (614 euros) in 2012-14. The applicants used the money to buy a second-hand car. 11.  In September 2011, prompted by some of the other co-owners of the plot, municipal officers inspected the house and found that it had been constructed illegally. They notified their findings to the first applicant in October 2011. In July 2012 the municipality brought the matter to the attention of the regional office of the National Building Control Directorate. In October 2012 that office advised the first applicant that it had opened proceedings for the demolition of the house. In November 2012 officers of the Directorate inspected it and likewise found that it was illegal as it had been constructed without a building permit. 12.  On 30 September 2013 the head of the regional office of the Directorate noted that the house had been constructed in 2004-05 without a building permit, in breach of section 148(1) of the Territorial Organisation Act 2001, and was as such subject to demolition under section 225(2)(2) of that Act (see paragraphs 25 and 26 below). The first applicant had not put forward any arguments or evidence to show otherwise. The house was therefore to be demolished. Once the decision had become final, the first applicant was to be invited to comply with it voluntarily. If she failed to do so in good time, the authorities would enforce it at her expense. 13.  The first applicant sought judicial review of that decision. 14.  On 10 December 2014 the Burgas Administrative Court dismissed the claim. It held that the decision was lawful. The evidence clearly showed that the applicants had constructed the house in 2004-05 without obtaining a building permit, which under section 225(2)(2) of the 2001 Act (see paragraph 26 below) was grounds for its demolition. The house could not be exempted from demolition under paragraph 16 of the transitional provisions of the 2001 Act or paragraph 127 of the transitional and concluding provisions of a 2012 Act for the amendment of the 2001 Act (see paragraphs 28 and 29 below). 15.  The first applicant appealed. She submitted, inter alia, that the house was her only home and that its demolition would cause her considerable difficulties as she would be unable to secure another place to live. 16.  In a final judgment of 17 March 2015 (\u0440\u0435\u0448. \u2116 2900 \u043e\u0442 17.03.2015 \u0433. \u043f\u043e \u0430\u0434\u043c. \u0434. \u2116 1381/2015 \u0433., \u0412\u0410\u0421, II \u043e.), the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the lower court\u2019s judgment. It agreed that the house was illegal as it had been constructed without a building permit, that it was as such subject to demolition, and that, having been constructed in 2004-05, it could not be legalised under the transitional amnesty provisions of the 2001 Act or the 2012 Act. 17.  On 15 April 2015 the regional office of the National Building Control Directorate invited the first applicant to comply with the demolition order within fourteen days of receiving notice to do so, and advised her that failure to do so would prompt it to enforce the order at her expense. 18.  As the first applicant did not do so, on 6 August 2015 that office made a call for tenders from private companies willing to carry out the demolition; the deadline for submitting such offers was 15 September 2015. 19.  On 18 August 2015 the Burgas Municipal Ombudsman urged the Minister of Regional Development to halt the demolition on the basis that, although formally lawful, it would have a disproportionate impact on the applicants. In response, on 25 September 2015 the Directorate\u2019s regional office reiterated its intention to proceed with the demolition. 20.  After the Government were given notice of the application (see paragraph 4 above), on 15 October 2015 the Directorate\u2019s regional office asked the municipal authorities to explore whether, if necessary, they could provide alternative accommodation for the first applicant. Until 27 October 2015, date of the latest information from the parties on that point, the municipal authorities had not replied to that query, and the Directorate\u2019s regional office had for that reason not proceeded with the demolition. 21.  On an unspecified date in the second half of October 2015, again after notice of the application had been given to the Government, a social worker interviewed the first applicant and explained to her the possibilities to request social services. The first applicant stated that she was not interested in that because she preferred to remain in the house. 22.  According to a register available on the website of the National Building Control Directorate (link), on 10 March 2016 the demolition had not yet been carried out.", "references": ["9", "0", "3", "2", "1", "8", "5", "6", "7", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicants were born in 1950, 1979, 1988, 1958, 1947, 1927 and 1932 respectively. They live in Plovdiv, apart from Ms Asthig Hampartsum Bedrosyan, who lives in New York, United States of America. Before her death in 2014, Ms Anaiys Hampartsum Shirin lived in Burgas. 7.  Ancestors of the applicants owned a plot of land measuring 246 square metres in the old part of Plovdiv, which had a two-storey house built on 160 square metres of it. In 1949 the building was declared a cultural monument. In 1966 the property was expropriated and the applicants\u2019 ancestors received compensation. After that, the building was the subject of substantial renovation work, in particular after a fire destroyed part of it in 1978. 8.  After the adoption of the Restitution of Property Expropriated under Building Planning Legislation Act (\u201cthe Restitution Act\u201d) in 1992 (see paragraph 15 below), some of the applicants and other heirs of the original owners (from whom the remaining applicants succeeded in the course of the domestic proceedings) applied for the revocation of the expropriation. On 28 June 1993 they were informed that their application had been refused by the mayor of Plovdiv municipality, and on 7 July 1993 they applied for judicial review of that refusal. In a judgment of 9 October 1997 the Plovdiv Regional Court upheld the administrative decision. 9.  However, in a final judgment of 2 October 1998 the Supreme Administrative Court reversed. It found that the applicants\u2019 property had been taken under legislation regulating expropriations made with a view to carrying out public works, namely expropriations intended to be followed by the construction of new buildings or infrastructure. The property in issue, however, had been declared a cultural monument, and had been expropriated to be used as such, thus the expropriation had been in breach of the law. The fact that no construction work had ever been envisaged had to be assimilated to a situation where no public works within the meaning of the Restitution Act had ever been commenced. In addition, the renovation work carried out after the expropriation did not represent \u201cpublic works\u201d either, as it had only aimed to preserve the building. Lastly, it was noted that the property still existed. All of those factors meant that the preconditions for restitution had been fulfilled. On this basis, the Supreme Administrative Court revoked the expropriation, quashing the mayor\u2019s refusal in that regard. 10.  Following the above judgment, in order to make the restitution effective (see paragraph 16 below), on 21 May 1999 the applicants paid back to the municipality the monetary compensation received by their ancestors at the time of the expropriation. The parties disagreed as to whether the applicants had also received compensation in the form of other property at the time of the expropriation, and whether they had to return that as well. 11.  In 2001 the applicants obtained a notarial deed, which named them as the property\u2019s owners. 12.  Despite the events described above, the applicants could not take possession of the property, because it was being held and used by the Plovdiv municipality, which in 1997 had declared it a public municipal property and had rented a room in the building to an organisation called \u201c13 Centuries Bulgaria\u201d National Endowment Fund (\u201cthe Fund\u201d, see paragraphs 19-20 below). 13.  After unsuccessfully attempting to negotiate an agreement, in December 2003 the applicants brought rei vindicatio proceedings against the Plovdiv municipality and the Fund. The action was dismissed by a final judgment of the Supreme Court of Cassation of 8 June 2007. In the first place, the domestic courts found that they were competent to examine the action. According to the second-instance Plovdiv Regional Court, the judgment of 2 October 1998 was open to indirect judicial review, because it was replacing the mayor\u2019s administrative decision on the applicants\u2019 request for restitution, and did not have a res judicata effect in proceedings specifically concerning the right to property. According to the Supreme Court of Cassation, the defendants to the rei vindicatio action, namely the Plovdiv municipality and the Fund, had not participated in the earlier judicial proceedings and therefore were not bound by the judgment of 2 October 1998. 14.  Next, the domestic courts found that the reparation work carried out on the building which the applicants were claiming had been so substantial (the building\u2019s appearance had been preserved, but the internal construction had been largely modified \u2013 the roof, some windows and other elements had also been replaced) that, within the meaning of the Restitution Act, it could not be said that the building still existed. In addition, the property was being used for the purpose for which it had been expropriated, namely as \u201ca cultural monument\u201d, which, in the courts\u2019 view, constituted \u201cpublic works\u201d within the meaning of the same Act. Accordingly, none of the preconditions for restitution had been satisfied.", "references": ["0", "6", "2", "4", "7", "5", "1", "8", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1987 and lives in Tallinn. 6.  He was charged with causing serious health damage. According to the charges, at 4.30 a.m. on 22 April 2006, he, together with I.J., had repeatedly hit L. on the head outside a nightclub on Harju Street. L. had fallen to the ground and had then been kicked several times. He had sustained serious head injuries which had been life-threatening and caused him permanent health damage. 7.  Criminal proceedings in respect of I.J. were discontinued after his death in a car accident on 25 February 2007. 8.  The Harju County Court (\u201cthe County Court\u201d) heard evidence from the applicant and nine witnesses and examined certain other evidence such as a written forensic expert opinion on L.\u2019s injuries, a telephone activity report concerning the time and location of the applicant\u2019s communications, identification reports based on photographs and a video-recording from a closed circuit television camera near the scene. It also examined I.J.\u2019s statements given during the preliminary investigation. 9.  The County Court found that the witness statements were incoherent and that some were contradictory. The witnesses had given different accounts of the events, regarding the number of persons who had been at the scene and attacked L., as well as the attackers\u2019 actions during the scuffle and after L. had fallen to the ground. The court noted that according to I.J.\u2019s statements given during the preliminary investigation, he had hit L. twice, L. had fallen to the ground, and the applicant had arrived afterwards. The court had no reason to doubt what I.J. had said. It also noted that it could not give less credit to the statements of S.G. \u2013 according to whom the fight had been between L. and I.J. \u2013 merely because he was a friend of the applicant. 10.  The court rejected witness statements from K.A., K.S. and K.M. as evidence, as well as identification reports drawn up during the pre-trial investigation identifying the applicant as one of the (probable) attackers of the victim, as their statements in the identification reports did not match their statements before the court. It also pointed to the lack of credibility of some of the witness statements, such as K.M.\u2019s statement, which said that she had recognised the applicant\u2019s eye colour and the look in his eyes, but that she had not seen the colour of his jacket. 11.  The County Court considered that there was only indirect evidence against the applicant and concluded that it could not be established beyond doubt that he had committed the offence he was charged with. By a judgment of 30 April 2007 the County Court acquitted him. 12.  The prosecutor appealed to the Tallinn Court of Appeal (\u201cthe Court of Appeal\u201d). He mainly challenged the County Court\u2019s assessment of the evidence. He did not request a re-examination of the witnesses. He requested that the Court of Appeal quash the County Court judgment and adopt a new judgment convicting the applicant. A copy of the prosecutor\u2019s appeal was sent to the applicant and his lawyer. 13.  The Court of Appeal summoned the applicant, his counsel and the prosecutor to a hearing. However, the applicant informed the court in writing that he did not wish to take part and asked for the case to be examined in his absence. 14.  At the Court of Appeal hearing, which took place on 4 September 2007, the applicant\u2019s counsel confirmed that he was aware that the applicant did not wish to take part. The prosecutor did not object to examination of the case in the applicant\u2019s absence. The Court of Appeal disclosed the records of the County Court hearings at the prosecutor\u2019s request, to which the applicant\u2019s counsel did not object. Subsequently, the court heard the parties\u2019 arguments. No requests to summon witnesses were made and no witnesses were examined. 15.  The Court of Appeal assessed the evidence differently, based on the material in the case file, and found that the applicant\u2019s guilt was established. It considered that it was incorrect to describe the witness statements as contradictory; rather, the witnesses\u2019 attention had been focused on different details and the scope and precision of the information contained in their statements varied. The court provided a comprehensive analysis of the evidence in its judgment, delivered on 18 September 2007, and explained in detail why, and to what extent, it assessed the statements given in the County Court differently from the lower court. 16.  Notably, the Court of Appeal considered that the County Court had not been justified in rejecting K.A.\u2019s, K.S.\u2019s and K.M\u2019s statements and identification reports as evidence. In respect of K.S., it noted that at the identification procedure she had recognised the applicant by his eyes and eyebrows. The fact that she could not describe his clothing did not discredit her evidence. The court found that it could not be required of a witness to note everything necessary for criminal proceedings. A person could only focus on a single detail rather than on the full picture. Nor was her evidence discredited by her failure to recognise the applicant at the court hearing, as at court hearings witnesses were in a particularly stressful situation. Similar considerations were applied to K.M., who, moreover, had recognised the applicant at the County Court hearing. The fact that K.M. and T.S. (another witness) \u2013 who had been together at the time of the events \u2013 had taken note of different aspects of the events did not render those statements unreliable; rather, it reflected the fact that the perception and memory of different people differed. Nor did the different expressions used by K.M. at the identification procedure and in court render her statements unreliable. Furthermore, the Court of Appeal found no radical differences between K.A.\u2019s statements in the identification report and in court, and therefore considered that the rejection of his statements as evidence had been not justified either. In conclusion, the Court of Appeal considered that K.A.\u2019s, K.S.\u2019s and K.M.\u2019s statements, as well as their identification reports, had to be taken into account and assessed together with the other evidence. 17.  The Court of Appeal also disagreed with the County Court\u2019s position concerning the reliability of S.G.\u2019s statements. It pointed to the fact that his statements, according to which the applicant had arrived at the scene after L. had already fallen to the ground, did not match any of the other witness statements. It also noted that the applicant, S.G. and I.J. had been friends, whereas the other witnesses had had no connection with them. Considering a number of statements by independent witnesses, the court found that I.J. had not been credible in assuming full responsibility and noted that there was no way of finding out why he had done so. It also noted that the applicant\u2019s statements had been inconsistent. He had said during the preliminary investigation that he had seen I.J. hitting L., whereas in court he had said that he had been further away from the scene and denied having seen anything. The court also referred in that connection to the words heard by witnesses from a person whose appearance corresponded to that of the applicant: \u201cWhy then did he come to start a quarrel?\u201d If the applicant had arrived at the scene after L. had been knocked down, he would have known nothing about the reasons and initial stages of the conflict and would have had no reason to express himself in such a way. 18.  The Court of Appeal noted that since the applicant had acted jointly with another person, it was legally irrelevant which of them had struck L., causing him to fall, although it also referred to K.S.\u2019s statements according to which the last blow had been given by the applicant. The court further analysed at length the subjective element of the offence and concluded that the applicant had acted with the indirect intent of causing serious health damage. Both the intellectual and volitional aspects of intent required under the pertinent case-law had been present in the applicant\u2019s behaviour. 19.  The Court of Appeal convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to five years\u2019 imprisonment, of which he immediately had to serve two months, the remainder of the sentence being suspended. In sentencing, the court had regard to the fact that the applicant had no previous convictions and that he was a young person in his formative years. A short immediate prison sentence gave him a serious warning for the future. 20.  The applicant appealed to the Supreme Court. He challenged the Court of Appeal\u2019s assessment of the evidence and argued that it had not convincingly substantiated its different conclusion from that of the County Court. He pointed out that the Court of Appeal had not directly verified the evidence; he referred in that respect to the conduct of the witnesses, which was of paramount importance in assessing their credibility but which was not reflected in the record of the court hearing. In particular, he referred to K.M.\u2019s hesitant behaviour at the hearing. He considered that the Court of Appeal had assessed the evidence in a selective and arbitrary manner and had given the benefit of the doubt to the prosecution. 21.  On 14 November 2007 the Supreme Court decided not to examine the applicant\u2019s appeal.", "references": ["8", "1", "7", "3", "5", "2", "4", "9", "0", "6", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "8.  The applicant was born in 1953 on the island of Aruba. In 2013, while serving a sentence of life imprisonment in a prison in Aruba, he was diagnosed with terminal cancer. In September 2013 he was transferred from the prison to a nursing home in Cura\u00e7ao. On 31 March 2014 he was granted a pardon (gratie) entailing his immediate release. He returned to Aruba, where he passed away on 26 November 2014. 9.  At the time the applicant was convicted and sentenced, the Kingdom of the Netherlands consisted of the Netherlands (the Realm in Europe) and the Netherlands Antilles (consisting of the islands Aruba, Bonaire, Cura\u00e7ao, Sint Maarten, Sint Eustatius and Saba). On the Netherlands Antilles, the Head of State of the Kingdom (the Queen, at that time) was represented by a Governor. In 1986 Aruba became an autonomous \u201ccountry\u201d (land) within the Kingdom, having its own Governor. From 10 October 2010 the Netherlands Antilles ceased to exist other than as a collective name for the six islands in the Caribbean Sea belonging to the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The Kingdom currently consists of four autonomous countries: the Netherlands (i.e. the Realm in Europe), Aruba, Cura\u00e7ao and Sint Maarten, whereas Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba are special municipalities of the Netherlands. Each of the three island countries (Aruba, Cura\u00e7ao and Sint Maarten) has a Governor. 10.  The countries of the Kingdom have their own legal systems, which may differ from each other. 11.  The Joint Court of Justice of the Netherlands Antilles, which imposed the life sentence on the applicant in 1980, became the Joint Court of Justice of the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba in 1986, and is currently called the Joint Court of Justice of Aruba, Cura\u00e7ao, Sint Maarten and of Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba. For ease of reference it will hereafter generally be referred to as \u201cthe Joint Court of Justice\u201d. 12.  On 31 October 1979 the First Instance Court (Gerecht in Eerste Aanleg) of the Netherlands Antilles found the applicant guilty of the murder of a six-year-old girl on the island of Cura\u00e7ao. The judgment of the First Instance Court included a summary of a psychiatric report that had been drawn up at the request of the public prosecutor (Officier van Justitie). The conclusion reached by the psychiatrist was summarised as follows in the judgment (the conclusion and advice contained in the psychiatrist\u2019s report are set out in full in paragraph 33 below):\n\u201c... That the defendant suffers from a pathological disturbance, in particular a very limited development of his mental faculties ... Considering this, the defendant should be regarded as having diminished criminal responsibility (verminderd toerekeningsvatbaar), but nevertheless should mainly be held criminally liable for his actions. It is noted in particular that the defendant cannot be considered to have been mentally insane before, during or after the commission of the crime ... Even though the defendant is capable of committing a similar offence in the future, it is not necessary to commit him to a regular mental hospital (krankzinnigengesticht), but instead he should be placed in a custodial clinic for psychopaths (psychopatenasiel) to undergo a rather lengthy treatment under very strict surveillance. In Cura\u00e7ao there is a choice only between prison and the national (regular) mental hospital (Landspsychiatrisch Ziekenhuis). Taking into consideration that the risk of recidivism is for the time being very high, even if treatment would possibly start immediately, and that, consequently, intensive surveillance is of primordial importance (such surveillance being impossible in the national mental hospital), and the fact that the defendant is not to be considered criminally insane within the meaning of the law, admission to the national mental hospital is wholly contra-indicated. The sole option remaining is for him to undergo his punishment in prison (transfer to a custodial clinic in the Netherlands is impossible on account of the defendant\u2019s limited intelligence and insufficient ability to express himself verbally). It is strongly advised that, where possible in the prison setting, an attempt should be made to attain a stronger personality structure in the defendant in order to avoid recidivism in the future.\u201d 13.  The First Instance Court considered that a life sentence, the imposition of which had been sought by the Public Prosecutor, would only be condign punishment if it was established from the outset that the applicant\u2019s condition was not amenable to improvement. As the court found that this could not be deduced from the psychiatrist\u2019s report, it sentenced the applicant to twenty years\u2019 imprisonment. 14.  Both the applicant and the Public Prosecution Service (Openbaar Ministerie) submitted an appeal against the judgment of the First Instance Court. 15.  On 11 March 1980 the Joint Court of Justice of the Netherlands Antilles quashed the judgment of the First Instance Court. It convicted the applicant of murder, finding it proven that he had deliberately and with premeditation taken the life of the six-year-old girl. It held that he had conceived the intention and taken the decision to kill her after calm consideration and quiet deliberation, and in order to execute that intention, had stabbed her repeatedly with a knife, as a result of which she had died. The applicant had killed the child, who was the niece of an ex-girlfriend, in revenge for the latter\u2019s ending of their relationship. The Joint Court of Justice sentenced the applicant to life imprisonment. In this connection it cited part of the psychiatrist\u2019s report as summarised in the judgment of the First Instance Court (see paragraph 12 above) and furthermore held, inter alia, as follows:\n\u201cConsidering that in view of the findings of the psychiatrist, which the court accepts and adopts as its own, and in particular the fact that the risk of recidivism is very significant, the interest of society in being protected against any such recidivism should, in the opinion of the court, carry the most weight, having regard to the personality of the accused;\nConsidering that \u2212 however regrettable \u2212 there is no possibility in the Netherlands Antilles for the imposition of a TBS order (terbeschikkingstelling met bevel tot verpleging van overheidswege) for confinement in a custodial clinic, which would be the most appropriate measure in this case; that placement in a custodial clinic in the Netherlands in similar cases has in the past proved impracticable \u2013 as is known to the court ex officio \u2013 and is in the present case moreover considered impossible by the psychiatrist due to the accused\u2019s limited intelligence and insufficient ability to express himself verbally;\nConsidering that in the present case there is no way in which the aforementioned preponderant interest can adequately be protected in these lands other than through the imposition of a penalty which will prevent the accused\u2019s return to society, and thus that only a sentence of life imprisonment qualifies as suitable;\nConsidering that the court is aware that this sentence does not \u2013 in principle \u2013 provide the accused with any prospect of one day returning to society as a free man, a fact which will presumably make this sentence heavier to bear for the accused than a temporary sentence of imprisonment, but which in the court\u2019s opinion should not lead to the aforementioned interests, which, as set out above, should carry the most weight, being sacrificed;\n...\n... sentences the accused to imprisonment for life;\n...\u201d 16.  On 25 November 1980 the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal in cassation against the judgment of the Joint Court of Justice. 17.  On 24 November 1981 the applicant filed a request for revision with the Joint Court of Justice which was rejected on 6 April 1982. 18.  The applicant served the first nineteen years of his sentence in the Koraal Specht prison (which was subsequently renamed Bon Futuro and is currently called Sentro di Dentenshon e Korrekshon Korsou or SDKK) in Cura\u00e7ao. This prison has, since 1990, accommodated a special unit for prisoners showing signs of mental illness or serious behavioural disorders, the so-called Forensic Observations and Counselling Unit (Forensische Observatie en Begeleidings Afdeling \u2013 \u201cFOBA\u201d). The FOBA comprises two separate sections, one for observation and one for treatment. Although the applicant submitted that he had spent some time in the observation section, the Government stated during the hearing before the Grand Chamber on 14 January 2015 that while he was detained in Cura\u00e7ao the applicant had not been placed in either unit. 19.  The applicant\u2019s first thirteen years in prison were marked by incidents: fights, extortion, drug abuse, etc., some of which led to periods spent in solitary confinement. 20.  On 1 December 1999 the applicant was transferred to the Korrektie Instituut Aruba (\u201cKIA\u201d \u2013 also referred to as the Instituto Coreccional Nacional or \u201cICN\u201d) in Aruba, having repeatedly requested such a transfer from 1985 onwards, in order to be closer to his family. At the same time the responsibility for the execution of the applicant\u2019s sentence was transferred from the authorities of the Netherlands Antilles to those of Aruba. By agreement of 1 December 1999 the Minister of Justice of Cura\u00e7ao, however, made the transfer conditional, stipulating that any measure (e.g. pardon, reduction of sentence, temporary leave) involving the applicant\u2019s release from prison would be subject to the consent of the Cura\u00e7ao Public Prosecution Service. 21.  In the course of his incarceration the applicant unsuccessfully petitioned for a pardon on a considerable number of occasions; the exact number cannot be ascertained since the files are no longer complete owing to the lapse of time. From the information and documents contained in the Court\u2019s case file, the following events can be established. 22.  In a letter of 26 April 1982 the applicant requested that the Minister of Justice of Cura\u00e7ao review his life sentence and give him some kind of relief. He submitted that the prison where he was being detained offered no educational or vocational programme capable of benefitting his personal and mental development, whereas the frustration and disappointment of being isolated and neglected was creating mental anguish that would surely drive him to the brink of mental illness. This request was rejected by the Governor of the Netherlands Antilles on 9 August 1982 for the reason that there were no grounds on which to grant it. 23.  A request lodged on an unknown date was rejected on 29 November 1983. It appears that the applicant also lodged requests on 6 June 1990, 11 April 1994 and 17 May 1996 but no further information has been provided about them. 24.  The case file contains a number of documents (hereinafter called \u201cconsultation sheets\u201d) on which each of the three judges, who were consulted before the Joint Court of Justice issued its advice to the Governor on a particular application for pardon, could write their opinion about that application. One of the judges consulted about the applicant\u2019s request for a pardon of 31 July 1997 wrote as follows in October 1997:\n\u201c... It can be deduced from the psychiatric report in the file that the risk of recidivism was deemed great. The psychiatrist considered that treatment of the petitioner in prison was indicated, but nothing has of course come of this. I still find that it would be irresponsible to grant a pardon to the petitioner, who has in the meantime reached the age of 44. ...\u201d\nA second judge wrote on the consultation sheet that he agreed with his colleague, and that a new psychiatric report might be requested, which could also be important for the future in order to be able to monitor the applicant\u2019s development and in due course perhaps advise positively on a request for a pardon.\nIn a letter of 22 October 1997 the Joint Court of Justice advised the Governor not to grant a pardon, writing, in so far as relevant, as follows:\n\u201c... It appears from the psychiatric report in the file that the petitioner has very inadequately developed mental faculties ... In said psychiatric report it is concluded that the petitioner is certainly capable of committing the same offence or of disrupting public order in a different way. The court notes that the petitioner has not undergone any (psychiatric) treatment in prison aimed at strengthening his personality structure in order to prevent him reoffending in the future.\nAs the crime committed by the petitioner shocked the legal order so profoundly, the granting of a pardon would not be understood by the community, not even after such a long time.\nHaving regard to the foregoing the court is of the view that for the time being it would be irresponsible to pardon the now 44-year-old petitioner.\nThe Public Prosecutor Service has attempted, so far in vain, to bring about the petitioner\u2019s transfer to the KIA in Aruba, in accordance with his wishes, in view of the fact that he has relatives living there. This wish of the petitioner ought now to be acted upon. The court therefore supports this reasonable desire of the petitioner.\u201d\nThe request for a pardon was refused on 20 November 1997. 25.  On 30 January 2002 the Acting Governor of the Netherlands Antilles rejected the applicant\u2019s request of (probably) 14 August 2001 to reduce his sentence by means of a pardon, considering that no facts or circumstances justifying such a course of action had either been adduced or become apparent. 26.  On 26 January 2004 the Advocate General of the Netherlands Antilles wrote, in so far as relevant, as follows to the Joint Court of Justice in relation to the applicant\u2019s request for a pardon lodged on 27 October 2003:\n\u201c... The opinion of the Public Prosecution Service is unchanged. Prior to committing the offence at issue the suspect [sic] had been convicted of raping a young girl and sentenced to imprisonment. That sentence did not have a preventative effect on the petitioner. The petitioner was extensively examined in relation to the offence at issue and the extensive report explicitly mentions the risk of recidivism. It does not appear that the circumstances have changed.\n... The granting of a pardon on humanitarian grounds will, even if such reasons can be said to exist (quod non), not be understood by society nor, in my view, be accepted. Humanitarian grounds may be said to have been the basis for the transfer to the KIA. As far as I am concerned that is sufficient.\u201d\nOne of the judges of the Joint Court of Justice, while subscribing to the negative advice given by the Advocate General, wrote on the consultation sheet:\n\u201cAt some point in time a moment will however arrive when mercy comes before law. That moment has not been reached yet, but it may do in ten or twenty years.\u201d\nThe Joint Court of Justice advised that the applicant\u2019s request be refused on the grounds indicated in the advice of the Advocate General of 26 January 2004. 27.  The Procurator General, in a letter to the Joint Court of Justice of 5 August 2004, recommended that that court issue negative advice on the application for a pardon lodged by the applicant on 17 June 2004. He wrote, in so far as relevant, as follows:\n\u201c... Having regard to the content of his request for a pardon together with the interview with him that was recently broadcast on television, the petitioner obviously still does not, in my opinion, realise the gravity of the diabolical act committed by him on 23 May 1979. ...\nIn the interview ... Murray also had the nerve to play down his heinous crime by saying that others who had already been released had committed more serious offences. ...\nThe petitioner has never \u2013 either at the trial, on the delivery of the verdict, or in the aforementioned interview \u2013 shown remorse. ...\nMurray claims that he has behaved like a model prisoner in the course of the past twenty-two years. Nothing could be further from the truth; in any event, not as regards the period of detention spent in prison here [i.e. in Cura\u00e7ao]. During those years the petitioner has misbehaved numerous times, inter alia by issuing threats, committing thefts, fighting with fellow inmates, committing indecent acts with third parties, and attempting to poison a fellow inmate. ...\nAlthough he may lately have displayed good behaviour, this does not detract from the fact that the consequences of his demonic deed can never be redressed, while it has appeared, also in view of the recent reactions in our community, that society remains deeply shocked. Our society cannot afford to take any risks with such a murderous psychopath. In order for our community\u2019s interests to be adequately protected, the return of the petitioner to that community is to be prevented. In my opinion it cannot be excluded that this solidly built 51-year-old man, with his serious criminal behaviour ..., and currently in the prime of his life, will once again reoffend.\nThe above-mentioned interview as well as the fact that he (even though he is entitled to do so) has once again seen fit to lodge a request for a pardon for the umpteenth time has caused great commotion in our society. Anxious civilians, also including relatives of the victim, have fiercely protested in the media against a possible pardon. ...\nThe opinion, voiced occasionally, that a life sentence in practice boils down to a sentence of between twenty and twenty-five years is not based on the Criminal Code and does not find support in law either. The Antillean legislator has also never intended for this to be the case. ...\u201d\nThe request for a pardon was rejected by the Governor on 1 March 2006 for the reason that no facts or circumstances justifying a pardon had either been adduced or become apparent. 28.  In a letter of 28 September 2007 the Joint Court of Justice advised the Governor to reject a request for a pardon lodged by the applicant as there was no appearance of any circumstance which the trial court had failed or had been unable to take (sufficiently) into account at the time of its decision and which, had the court been sufficiently aware of it, would have caused it to impose a different sentence or to refrain from imposing any sentence. Neither had it become plausible that the execution of the trial court\u2019s decision or its continuation did not reasonably serve any of the aims pursued through the application of the criminal law.\nThe petition for pardon to which this advice of the Joint Court of Justice related was rejected by the Governor, on the grounds set out in that advice, on 16 January 2008. 29.  In January 2011 the three judges consulted about a request for a pardon submitted by the applicant on 31 August 2010 wrote on the consultation sheet, respectively, \u201cno grounds present\u201d, \u201creject\u201d and \u201creject\u201d. 30.  On 29 August 2013 the applicant requested a pardon in view of his deteriorating health. The head of the social work department of the prison in Aruba advised that a pardon be granted, as this would allow the applicant to die in a dignified manner in the presence of his family. By a decision of 31 March 2014 the Governor of Cura\u00e7ao acceded to this request and granted the applicant a pardon (see also paragraph 8 above), entailing the remission of his prison sentence, as in the circumstances the further execution of that sentence was no longer deemed to serve a useful purpose. 31.  On 21 September 2012 the Joint Court of Justice, having submitted the applicant\u2019s life sentence to the periodic review prescribed by Article 1:30 of the Cura\u00e7ao Criminal Code, which had entered into force on 15 November 2011 (see paragraphs 55-56 below), decided that the applicant\u2019s custodial sentence still served a reasonable purpose after thirty-three years. 32.  The decision of the Joint Court of Justice firstly sets out the proceedings which took place before that court: hearings had taken place on 10 May and 6 September 2012, at which the applicant, who was represented by counsel, was heard. A member of staff of the prison in Aruba was also heard, as were the psychologist M.V., the psychiatrist G.E.M. and relatives of the victim and their representative. The decision cites relevant parts of the sentencing court\u2019s judgment of 11 March 1980 and summarises the findings contained in the reports drawn up about the applicant for the purpose of the periodic review (see paragraphs 36-42 below). A section entitled \u201cThe position of the relatives of the victim\u201d reads as follows:\n\u201cThe relatives indicated at the hearing that they did not agree with a possible release of the convicted person. They stated that news of a possible release had reopened old wounds, that they were experiencing the psychological consequences of this, and that they were afraid of the convicted person. He has threatened them in the past and they have not observed any feelings of remorse or regret in him.\nThe relatives\u2019 representative submitted that the risk of recidivism was unacceptable for them.\nIn a report drawn up by the Cura\u00e7ao Foundation for Probation and Social Rehabilitation of 10 May 2012 the Rapporteur addresses the position of the relatives. The Rapporteur notes in the first place that the relatives have so far barely been provided with psychological help or with support in coming to terms with their bereavement. He concludes that the victim\u2019s mother still appears to struggle with issues she has not dealt with and about which she barely speaks, and that the father requires professional help in order to cope with his feelings. The relatives have told the Rapporteur that they feel insecure at the mere thought of the convicted person being released. They have further indicated that ever since the arrest of the convicted person and until the present time they have been \u2018living in a prison\u2019 and that this has also had adverse repercussions on their other children. The Foundation for Probation and Social Rehabilitation concludes that a possible conditional release of the convicted person would at this stage have far-reaching psychological consequences for the relatives.\u201d\nThe decision goes on to observe that, in the acting Procurator General\u2019s submission, there was not a single objective indication from which it could be inferred that the risk of the applicant\u2019s committing an offence had disappeared or diminished, that an early release would seriously shock the surviving relatives, and that it would also shock society to such an extent that this would hinder the applicant\u2019s possible reintegration. After describing the position put forward on behalf of the applicant, the Joint Court then came to its assessment, which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:\n\u201c... 8.2  The convicted person\u2019s deprivation of liberty has at present lasted considerably more than twenty years, namely over thirty-three years. The court must therefore assess whether the further unconditional execution of the life sentence no longer serves a reasonable purpose. 8.3  It follows from the reasons given by the [sentencing] court for the imposition of the life sentence ... that the aim of this sentence was to protect society against recidivism by the convicted person. The risk of recidivism was deemed by the [sentencing] court to be particularly high, while treatment was not considered possible. 8.4  The court will therefore first and foremost have to assess to what extent the risk of recidivism existing at the time is still present today. In this connection it is firstly to be noted that at the time that risk was deemed to be particularly high in view of the personality of the convicted person, and that since then no treatment in any shape or form has taken place. 8.5  After the court had commissioned two experts at its hearing of 10 May 2012, psychologist M.V. and psychiatrist G.E.M. reported on the convicted person\u2019s personality and the risk of recidivism. Unlike the defence, the court is of the view that both the examination carried out and the report drawn up by the psychologist are of adequate quality and expertise. ... 8.6  It appears from the ... findings of both experts that the convicted person is still suffering from a disorder, namely an antisocial personality disorder. The court deduces from the findings that this disorder has a negative bearing on the risk of recidivism and hampers possible reintegration into society. The court further considers that the nature of the offence committed by the convicted person \u2013 the killing of a six-year-old girl for the sole purpose of hurting her aunt, his former girlfriend \u2013 is bizarre and, as was concluded at the time, must be attributed to the psychopathically disturbed personality of the convicted person. The court notes that important aspects of that disturbed personality, such as the antisocial personality, the limited development of his conscience and the lack of empathy, are currently still present. No treatment has taken place during the period of detention. It is furthermore not the case, as would be customary within the framework of treatment, that the circumstances which led him to his deed have been discussed with him so that he might subsequently have acquired an insight into how to avoid or defy such circumstances. In the case of the convicted person it would have been expected that in the course of such discussions his relationship with women and the question of dealing with rejection would have been addressed. As already mentioned, no such discussions or treatment have taken place. Also, at the hearing the convicted person did not demonstrate that he was capable of holding himself to account for the seriousness and absurdity of the murder or of understanding how he was able to commit it. 8.7  The foregoing leads the court to conclude that the risk of the convicted person\u2019s reoffending if he were released is such that the protection of society should prevail. This is not altered by the fact that the convicted person has been functioning well and without problems in prison in recent years. After all, and just as the experts have pointed out, prison life is very structured and circumstances such as those under which the convicted person committed his crime are absent there. Such circumstances may occur outside the prison and \u2013 having regard to the aforementioned personality and the fact that no treatment has taken place \u2013 the court considers the risk of the convicted person\u2019s reoffending if confronted with such circumstances to be too great. 8.8  The court further takes the position of the victim\u2019s relatives into account. It has been sufficiently established that conditional release would at the present time entail adverse psychological consequences for them. The court observes in this connection that over the years the relatives have also not been provided with adequate support to help them come to terms with their grief or, if necessary, with treatment for their psychological problems. It is therefore easily understandable that they are very shocked now that the possibility of the convicted person\u2019s conditional release is being considered for the first time. In this context the court attaches relevance to the fact that after he committed his crime the convicted person threatened to harm the relatives and in this way contributed to their sense of insecurity. The convicted person has not demonstrated that he has any insight into the consequences of his deed or his subsequent actions. 8.9  On the basis of the foregoing, the court is of the opinion that the continued execution of the life sentence still serves a reasonable purpose. The court will accordingly not proceed to order the conditional release of the convicted person. 8.10  Having regard to the foregoing the court also perceives no cause to adjourn its examination pending further investigations, as requested by the defence as an alternative course of action. 8.11  The court adds that it is aware of the fact that its considerations as set out under points 8.6 and 8.7 would appear to offer little prospect of release in the future, as this would imperatively require that in the coming period some form of treatment should take place in which, in any event, aspects such as crime analysis, relationships and rejection would need to be addressed. Perhaps such treatment can be organised in some way in the [prison in Aruba]. The court further considers that the position of the relatives may also be different at the time of a subsequent review if they continue to receive the necessary support in dealing with their feelings of mourning, anger and fear. 8.12  The court finally notes that it has also had regard to the commotion which the possibility of a conditional release has caused in society and which has appeared from the submitted newspaper articles and the considerable public interest. A large part of the community perhaps thinks that the perpetrator of a crime such as the murder of [the victim] should never be allowed to regain his liberty. In the court\u2019s examination this has not, however, played a decisive role. After all, society\u2019s need for retribution should be considered to have been sufficiently assuaged after a period of detention of more than thirty-three years. As noted above, the aim of the continuation of that sentence is currently no longer retribution but the protection of society against possible recidivism. 33.  In the course of the criminal proceedings against him and at the request of the public prosecutor, the applicant was examined by psychiatrist J.N.S. in order to assess whether he could be held criminally responsible for the offence with which he was charged. The psychiatrist produced a 27\u2011page report on 11 October 1979. The First Instance Court\u2019s judgment of 31 October 1979 includes a summary of the conclusion and advice contained in that report (see paragraph 12 above). The conclusion and advice as set out in the psychiatrist\u2019s report, reads, in so far as relevant, as follows:\n\u201cConclusion: In view of the above the Rapporteur reaches the following structure diagnosis: Serious criminal behaviour in the shape of a murder committed as a result of a primitive and primary outburst of emotions, by a retarded, infantile and narcissistic young man whose character structure has a serious disturbance of a psychopathiform nature.\nAdvice: The Rapporteur should wish to present his advice on the basis of the following questions: 1.  Is the accused suffering from a pathological disturbance and/or an inadequate development of his mental faculties?\nReply: Yes, he certainly is, and in particular from a very inadequate development of his mental faculties. 2.  Was this disturbance and/or inadequacy already present at the time of the offences with which he is charged?\nReply: The inadequate development in particular has been present all his life, and therefore also at the time of the offences with which he is charged, although it may be said that everything had accelerated rapidly at that time. 3.  If so, was this the case to such an extent that the accused, were he to be found guilty of the offences, should generally be considered, in the current state of Netherlands Antillean society, as not responsible for them or only to a greater or lesser extent?\nReply: The Rapporteur would wish to conclude that the accused, having regard to the replies under 1. and 2., should be considered as having diminished criminal responsibility, but he nevertheless still considers that the accused is for the most part responsible for the acts, if they are found proven, which he has committed. The Rapporteur should especially wish to conclude that he would not call the accused insane, either before, during or after the offence; ... the accused has never withdrawn into a bizarre and mad world of his own but has always lived in a primitive, primary sensory world and he has succeeded, whenever his existence was not under stress, to participate in society to a reasonable extent. 4.  At the time of the offences, did he have the insight to realise that committing them was morally reprehensible and would not be tolerated by society?\nReply:  According to the Rapporteur he must have had such insight, but he subsequently completely suppressed and replaced it by a fantasy in view of the threat of destruction of his own personality structure. 5.  If he did have such insight, would he have been capable of determining his will and his actions accordingly?\nReply:  See the reply to question 4. Also partly because of that, the Rapporteur has reached a conclusion of diminished criminal responsibility. 6.  Can it be expected that the accused might commit the same offence again or disrupt public order in a different manner?\nReply:  Having regard to what has been written and concluded above, the accused is certainly capable of committing a similar act or of causing a different disruption of public order. 7.  Does his mental state require that the accused be committed to a lunatic asylum?\nReply: In view of the reply to question 3 it may be said that this is not necessary. 8.  What practical guidelines can you give and/or what proposals that are feasible in present-day society can you make in order to improve or bring about a recovery and/or a better development of the accused?\nReply:  In view of the replies under 1, 2, 3, 6 and 7 my advice would be that the accused should be committed to a mental asylum where, certainly, during a fairly long period institutional treatment under very strict surveillance ought to take place. On Cura\u00e7ao we have the choice only between prison and the national psychiatric hospital. Taking into consideration that for the time being the risk of recidivism is very great, even if treatment were to be commenced immediately, and that intensive surveillance is consequently of primordial importance (such surveillance being impossible in the national psychiatric hospital!) as well as the fact that the accused is not to be considered insane within the meaning of the law, admission to the national psychiatric hospital is wholly contra-indicated. The sole option remaining is for the accused, should he be found guilty of the offences with which he has been charged, to undergo his sentence in prison (a transfer to, for example, a mental asylum in the Netherlands is in my opinion not possible because of the accused\u2019s limited intelligence and insufficient ability to express himself verbally). The Rapporteur strongly advises that, if possible, attempts should be made in the prison setting to attain a stronger personality structure in order to avoid recidivism in the future.\u201d 34.  On 6 September 1991 psychiatrist Dr M. de O. wrote to the Cura\u00e7ao Procurator General in relation to the applicant\u2019s wish to be transferred to Aruba. She stated that the applicant had been placed under psychiatric observation upon his arrival in the remand centre in Cura\u00e7ao and that good contact of a therapeutic nature had been established with a view to his rehabilitation. The psychiatrist expressed her opinion that from a psychological point of view a transfer to Aruba would benefit the applicant\u2019s rehabilitation. 35.  This psychiatric report was drawn up by P.N. van H. at the request of the Advocate General of Cura\u00e7ao in relation to the applicant\u2019s request to be transferred to Aruba. The psychiatrist found that the applicant was not suffering from any psychosis, depression or anxiety, but that he did have a serious narcissistic personality disorder. He concluded that there was no psychiatric reason why the applicant could not be transferred to Aruba, and that, psychologically, such a transfer would probably be favourable for the applicant as his family was living there. 36.  In anticipation of the periodic review of life sentences to be introduced in the Cura\u00e7ao Criminal Code, the Procurator General, in a letter of 9 September 2011, requested a psychiatric examination of the applicant. 37.  On 7 October 2011 psychologist J.S.M. stated as follows:\n\u201c... the results of the test show that [the applicant] is suffering from symptoms of depression. He pents up his emotions and anger and hides them from those around him. ... [The applicant] has little trust in other people. In his opinion people use and abuse each other in order to achieve their goals. That is why he is very distrustful of the people he encounters and displays antisocial behaviour. ... He is extremely sensitive to criticism and rejection.\n...\n[The applicant] has been detained for a very long time, and as a result his feeling of well-being has deteriorated. His social skills have similarly deteriorated and he has given up hope of his situation undergoing any change, which has resulted in [the applicant] having to cope with very negative and depressive feelings about himself and others.\n[The applicant] requires support as regards his bottled-up negative and depressive feelings and in order to improve his general well-being.\nMy advice as regards a pardon is not to give [the applicant] false hope and to be clear about the aspects of his case.\nIf a pardon is applicable, it is recommended that [the applicant] follow a rehabilitation and social skills programme and that he be provided with support both inside and outside the KIA in order to promote his independence and functioning in society.\u201d 38.  On 26 March 2012 the Aruban Foundation for Probation, Social Rehabilitation and the Protection of Juveniles (Stichting Reclassering en Jeugdbescherming) issued a report, in which it was noted that the applicant could live with his mother on Aruba and could work in an upholstery shop. The person who drew up the report found it difficult to estimate the risk of recidivism, but considered that with appropriate support following release his prospects of successfully integrating in society were good. 39.  At the request of the Joint Court of Justice three reports were issued. 40.  The first of these reports, which was issued by the KIA on 25 May 2012, included the following:\n\u201c[The applicant] is a calm, quiet man of 59 who has never been given a disciplinary punishment during his detention. ... He carries out his duties adequately and to the satisfaction of prison staff. In principle he works alone, but is occasionally willing to train other inmates in upholstery work. ... He is always polite and respectful towards prison staff; none of them have complaints about him. He rarely has any contact with the social worker and if he does, he always asks the same questions. It is as if he forgets matters which have already been discussed.\u201d 41.  The second report was drawn up on 21 July 2012 by psychiatrist M.V., who concluded as follows:\n\u201cThe personality test showed that the subject has an antisocial personality disorder with mild psychopathic features. There are also signs of narcissistic features. The character structure is rigid, but is not strongly displayed, perhaps because of his age. The risk that he will reoffend or get into trouble in some other way upon return to society is considered to be present (moderate risk in comparison with the forensic population). ... In general the subject can be described as having an antisocial personality whose more unpleasant manifestations have been mitigated. ... It is reasonably certain that his personality will not change. Personality is formed up to age 35, after which only small changes take place. The examination shows that the subject\u2019s personality profile is fairly rigid. He will therefore always be a fairly unpleasant person in his relations with others and will always have difficulty in establishing and maintaining social contacts. Given his personality, I estimate the chances of successful integration in society to be small.\u201d 42.  The third report requested by the Joint Court of Justice was compiled by psychiatrist G.E.M. on 17 August 2012, in which the following was concluded:\n\u201cThe subject is, however, suffering from a severe antisocial personality disorder, characterised by a highly undifferentiated, fairly primitive emotional awareness, an underdeveloped conscience, rudimentary social skills, a lack of empathy. ... Although the subject displayed problematic and aggressive behaviour during the first few years of his detention, even including an attempt at poisoning, he has practically been a model prisoner over the last few years. ... This change in behaviour is largely attributable to the structure provided by the prison setting and the fact that he is much older now (almost 60) and is likely to become more and more moderate as the years go by. ... [A]s to the risk of recidivism: I am in two minds. Whereas the subject is almost a model prisoner, his character traits have not in essence changed. He continues to be a person with a serious disability. It remains in doubt how he will react and to what extent he can survive once the structure offered by the prison is no longer in place.\u201d 43.  Following up the decision of 21 September 2012 given by the Joint Court of Justice, the Public Prosecution Service in Cura\u00e7ao concluded that more structured contact with a psychiatrist would be desirable. For this reason, the Procurator General of Cura\u00e7ao asked his counterpart in Aruba to ensure that the applicant received regular visits from a psychiatrist who would counsel him on the basis of a treatment plan, in so far as this could be done within the constraints of the enforcement of his life sentence. 44.  A document entitled \u201cPsychological Report\u201d was drawn up by the Aruba prison\u2019s psychologist J.S.M. (who had reported on the applicant for the purposes of the periodic review; see paragraph 37 above) on 24 July 2014, apparently at the request of the applicant\u2019s representative. The psychologist stated that she had conducted a psychological test and an interview with the applicant, at a time (2011) when she had only been working at the prison for a few months. She had no knowledge of what had been offered to the applicant prior to that. The short time during which she had had experience of the applicant was insufficient for her to produce a support plan or to execute such a plan. 45.  A second document entitled \u201cPsychological Report\u201d was drawn up by the same psychologist on 1 September 2014, at the request of the Government. Apart from one sentence, this report is identical to the report of 24 July 2014. The sentence in question states that, after consulting the applicant\u2019s medical file, the psychologist declared that no psychological or psychiatric treatment of the applicant had taken place. 46.  In an email of 29 July 2014 to the applicant\u2019s representative, the senior social worker in the Aruba prison stated that there was nothing in the prison\u2019s medical file on the applicant, who had been transferred to Aruba in 1999, to suggest that he had undergone any treatment by a psychiatrist or a psychologist. The KIA had employed a psychologist in 2011 but she had not treated or supported the applicant. The applicant had visited the social work department of the prison with some regularity in order to talk or to organise practical matters.", "references": ["7", "4", "6", "3", "9", "2", "5", "0", "8", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant party is a Turkish political party based in Ankara. 5.  Supervision of the finances of political parties in Turkey is entrusted to the Turkish Constitutional Court (\u201cthe Constitutional Court\u201d) under Article 69 of the Constitution. Accordingly, all political parties are obliged to submit their consolidated final accounts annually to the Constitutional Court, which reviews the compliance of the political parties\u2019 incomes and expenditure with the principles set out in Article 69 of the Constitution and sections 70-77 of Law no. 2820 on Political Parties (\u201cthe Political Parties Act\u201d). Failure to comply with the relevant laws is subject to sanctions set out in the Political Parties Act. The decisions delivered by the Constitutional Court in this regard are final. 6.  In keeping with the requirement under Article 69 of the Constitution and sections 74 and 75 of the Political Parties Act, the applicant party submitted the consolidated final accounts of its headquarters and local branches for the years 2007, 2008 and 2009 to the Constitutional Court for inspection. While the exact dates are unknown, it appears that the accounts were submitted within six months of the end of each respective fiscal year (that is, before 30 June) in accordance with section 74(2) of the Political Parties Act. 7.  The Constitutional Court carried out a preliminary inspection on 1 July 2010 for the 2007 accounts and on 6 April 2011 for the 2008 and 2009 accounts. At the end of each preliminary inspection, it found the information submitted by the applicant party to be complete and decided to proceed with an examination on the merits. 8.  On 7 October 2011, 29 November 2011 and 15 February 2012 the Constitutional Court sent the applicant party \u201cquestionnaires\u201d in relation to its accounts for the years 2007, 2008 and 2009 respectively, whereby it requested the party to provide further information and documents regarding some of the expenses that it deemed problematic. It also requested the applicant party to provide the original invoices or other supporting documentation as required under Law no. 213 on Tax Procedure (\u201cthe Tax Procedure Act\u201d) for all items of expenditure that had not been submitted previously. 9.  It appears that the applicant party responded to the Constitutional Court\u2019s requests within fifteen to thirty days of their receipt; its responses are summarised in the appendix below. It was, however, unable to provide original invoices or the like for all the items of expenditure as requested. 10.  On 7 March 2012 the Constitutional Court delivered its decision regarding the final accounts of the applicant party for the year 2007, which was followed by decisions pertaining to the 2008 and 2009 accounts, both delivered on 11 July 2012. The decision concerning the 2007 accounts was published in the Official Gazette on 5 April 2012 and the decisions for the 2008 and 2009 accounts were published on 20 September 2012. 11.  In all three decisions the Constitutional Court found at the outset that the income and expenses presented in the final accounts were financially accurate. It also held that the income obtained in the period under review had been mostly in compliance with the rules on funding as set out in the Political Parties Act. As for the expenses, the Constitutional Court made the following preliminary remarks to explain the basis for its examination:\n\u201cOne of the main tenets of accounting is the principle of \u2018documentation\u2019. Section 229 of the Tax Procedure Act explains that \u2018an invoice is a commercial certificate given to a customer by a vendor or a merchant to indicate the amount owed by the customer in return for the goods sold or service provided\u2019, and section 232, entitled \u2018Obligation to use an invoice\u2019, specifies under what circumstances and by whom an invoice must be received and provided. In this connection, it has been made obligatory to document purchases of goods and services with invoices and to use invoices as supporting documents in bookkeeping.\nSection 236 of the same Act, entitled \u2018Obligation of receipt\u2019, states that \u2018self-employed persons are under an obligation to issue a freelance receipt in duplicate for all payments received in relation to their professional activities and to give one copy to the customer; and the customer is under an obligation to request and receive such receipt\u2019. The contents of a receipt have been set out in section 237.\nSection 234 of the same Act, entitled \u2018Expense note\u2019, states that ... those [tradespersons exempt from taxation] who are under no obligation to furnish an invoice should issue expense notes.\nSince section 70(3) of Law no. 2820 [the Political Parties Act] provides that expenses below five thousand liras[1] do not need to be substantiated with documents such as a receipt or an invoice, any expenses exceeding that amount must be based on a relevant supporting document.\nUnder section 70 of the Political Parties Act, \u2018all expenses of a political party shall be incurred on behalf of the legal personality of that political party\u2019 and pursuant to section 75 of the same Act, \u2018at the end of its inspection, the Constitutional Court shall determine the accuracy and the lawfulness of the political party\u2019s income and expenses, and shall order the registration of unlawful income and expenses as revenue with the State Treasury\u2019.\nLaw no. 6111 ..., which was published in the Official Gazette dated 25 February 2011 [and which introduced some amendments to section 74 of the Political Parties Act], came into force on the date of its publication and it does not envisage ... the [retroactive] application of the amended provisions ...; therefore, the unamended provisions are to be applied to inspections and proceedings predating the amendments.\u201d 12.  On the basis of the principles outlined above, the Constitutional Court found that certain expenses incurred in the respective periods under review had been in violation of the Political Parties Act. The violations in question fell under two heads: the first head consisted of expenses that could not be considered to have been made \u201cin pursuance of the objectives of the political party\u201d and \u201cin the name of the party\u2019s legal personality\u201d on the basis of a decision of the competent party organ, in accordance with section 70 of the Political Parties Act; and the second head concerned the expenses that had not been substantiated with the necessary documents as required under section 76, regardless of whether they were otherwise lawful. The Constitutional Court accordingly ordered the \u201cconfiscation of the party\u2019s assets\u201d[2] in the amounts corresponding to its unlawful expenditure for each respective year under review, as per sections 75 and 76 of the Act. 13.  The details of the Constitutional Court\u2019s findings are presented in the table below (the amounts indicated are in Turkish liras (TRY)):\n \nYear\nTotal income\n \nTotal expenditure\nExpenditure confiscated by the State for infringement of the Political Parties Act\nState funding\nOther sources\nUndocumented expenses\nOther unlawful expenses (not incurred in pursuance of the party\u2019s purposes and/or in the party\u2019s name) \n \n2007\n \n79,859,379\n \n53,675,876\n \n \n127,470,011\n \n691,636\n \n2,679,610\n \n2008\n \n \n20,471,032\n \n50,088,000\n \n49,227,118.86\n \n82,952.66\n \n1,349,304.64\n \n2009\n \n \n49,860,840\n \n78,385,330\n \n125,443,105\n \n314,000\n \n943,030.83 14.  Further details regarding the individual expenses that were deemed unlawful by the Constitutional Court may be found in the appendix below. 15.  The Constitutional Court treated all expenses that were not supported by original invoices, freelance receipts or expense notes as \u201cundocumented\u201d, referring to the strict requirements of documentation set out under the Tax Procedure Act as referred to in paragraph 11 above. The applicant party informed the Constitutional Court that in view of the sheer volume of documents circulating in the party, the originals of some invoices had been lost and submitted other documents as proof of payment. However, where the expense concerned an invoiceable transaction, the Constitutional Court did not accept as proof of payment vouchers, receipts, payment orders or even duplicates or notary\u2011certified copies of invoices, and ordered the confiscation of the applicant party\u2019s assets in the amounts corresponding to the undocumented expenses. 16.  The expenses that were found not to have been incurred \u201cin pursuance of the party\u2019s objectives\u201d and \u201cin the name of the legal personality of the party\u201d following a decision of the competent party organ, and those that were considered to \u201cfall outside the party\u2019s political activities\u201d, covered a wide array of financial activities. 17.  They included food, pharmaceutical and accommodation expenses, including those incurred by members of the party and employees of the party headquarters or its youth branches. Although the applicant party argued that the expenses in question had been incurred by the relevant individuals while on official duty, the Constitutional Court did not accept them as lawful expenses since the invoices had been drawn up in the individual members\u2019 or employees\u2019 names, rather than in the name of the party. Moreover, the applicant party had not submitted any other tangible evidence to demonstrate the professional nature of those expenses. In this connection, the Constitutional Court refused to accept that the food expenses of the driver assigned to the party leader and of other drivers working for the party could be lawfully met by the applicant party, in spite of the latter\u2019s explanation that the relevant expenses had been incurred while the drivers were on duty. 18.  Among the food expenses declared unlawful were expenses incurred by the head of the applicant party\u2019s youth branch, F.P., who appears to have hosted six dinners in 2008 in connection with election work. The Constitutional Court accepted two of those meals as lawful expenses in relation to party work, but rejected the remaining four without any explanation. 19.  Reimbursement of food and commuting expenses of persons not on the applicant party\u2019s payroll and not party to the collective labour agreement between the applicant party and its salaried employees, such as freelance consultants, was not considered to be in keeping with the \u201cparty\u2019s objectives\u201d. Similarly, meals offered to persons who provided various services to the applicant party, but who were legally employed by other public or private bodies, such as police officers, municipality employees, journalists or gardeners, could not qualify as legitimate expenses under the Political Parties Act because any meal costs had to be met by the relevant person\u2019s respective employers and not by the applicant party. Some dinners hosted for the applicant party\u2019s guests, volunteers or personnel for special occasions were also considered to constitute personal expenditure not related to the party\u2019s legal personality, whereas some other dinners were accepted as relevant to party work. In this connection, the Constitutional Court found that the expenses borne for the meals hosted for the Alevi-Bekta\u015fi Federation and the Pir Sultan Abdal Association, as well as the meals organised for party personnel on the occasion of Bayram[3] and following the death of an employee\u2019s father, should not have been paid from the party\u2019s budget, whereas it deemed legitimate the expenses in relation to food offered to Tekel[4] workers during their industrial action. 20.  The Constitutional Court also refused to accept a great number of travel expenses as lawful, because the bus and plane tickets in question had been prepared in the name of the individuals travelling rather than in the party\u2019s name, and the official decisions of the relevant party organs authorising travel had not been submitted. In addition, reimbursement of passport fees to various employees was not considered relevant to the party\u2019s objectives, even when the passports had been obtained for travel in connection with party business, as passports could be used for personal travel as well. The Constitutional Court also deemed costs for printing of business cards for employees to be unlawful, considering them to be personal expenses. 21.  Payments made to employees apart from the entitlements specifically indicated in the collective labour agreement, including New Year bonuses (approximately 35 euros (EUR) per person in 2008) or bonuses to reward extra work during the general election period, were also deemed to fall outside the scope of the lawful expenditure provided for in the Political Parties Act. Moreover, chocolates distributed to party personnel for Eid al\u2011Fitr (Ramazan Bayram\u0131) in 2009 were found to be unlawful expenses, whereas no such finding was made in relation to the chocolates distributed during another religious holiday, Eid al-Adha (Kurban Bayram\u0131). Blankets, umbrellas and raincoats purchased for use at the party headquarters were also found to be personal expenses, whereas no such finding was made for clothes and dishwashers purchased for the use of personnel. 22.  In addition, payments made to security and cleaning personnel in excess of the amounts specifically indicated in the service agreements, where such excess amounts \u2013 no matter how meagre \u2013 could not be explained by increases in social security contributions or taxes, were considered unjustified and thus unlawful. 23.  The Constitutional Court also found that the severance packages given to employees whose contracts had been terminated, which included basic severance pay, unused vacation time and benefits corresponding to unused leave, were not in compliance with the Labour Act and were therefore unlawful, as benefits corresponding to unused leave should not have been included in the severance packages. 24.  The review of the financial accounts for the years 2007 to 2009 also revealed that the applicant party had paid court fees in various legal proceedings in which members of the party\u2019s senior management and/or its members of parliament, including its leader at the relevant time, had been involved. Although the applicant party stated that the legal proceedings in question had concerned the party\u2019s political activities, and not personal disputes, the Constitutional Court nevertheless decided that the litigation expenses had to be met by the persons in question, regardless of their role or status in the party, as the political party itself was not a party to any of the relevant proceedings. In the decision of 11 July 2012 concerning the review of the 2009 accounts (see paragraph 10 above), one of the judges dissented from the majority\u2019s approach to this matter, and argued that demanding that such costs be met by the individual members of the party involved directly in the litigation, regardless of the effects of that litigation on the political party, would unduly curtail the scope of the party\u2019s political activities in an unconstitutional manner. 25.  Another payment that was considered unlawful by the Constitutional Court was made to Halk TV, a nationwide television channel, for the live broadcasting of political rallies and activities attended by the applicant party\u2019s leader and coverage of the party\u2019s parliamentary group meetings, press conferences, and important statements made by the party\u2019s senior management, as well as the distribution of that material to other media outlets. The Constitutional Court found that while the applicant party could lawfully pay for the live broadcast of the relevant events, additional payments to cover the costs of production and for the allocation of link bandwidth were unacceptable, as such costs had to be met by Halk TV itself. In addition, payments made in 2009 for the lease of vehicles for broadcasting rallies organised by the party in various provinces were considered unlawful unless accompanied by the relevant lease agreements and detailed information on the exact nature of the services acquired. The Constitutional Court also noted that an agreement had already been made with Halk TV for coverage of the applicant party\u2019s political rallies and other events. 26.  Fuel and other expenses (such as installation of sound systems, speakers and microphones) for the vehicles owned or leased by the party and its local branches were accepted as having been made in the party\u2019s name and for its purposes only where the vehicle registration certificates or lease agreements had been submitted to the Constitutional Court along with the invoices. As for fuel and other expenses for vehicles made available to the party by volunteers during the election campaigns, they were deemed entirely unlawful in the absence of any contracts with the volunteers for the use of the relevant vehicles. 27.  The Constitutional Court held that gold coins given as wedding gifts at wedding ceremonies attended by the applicant party\u2019s leader on behalf of the party could not be considered to have been made in the name of the party or in pursuance of its objectives. Similarly, the costs of flowers sent by the applicant party\u2019s treasurer for special events could not be classified as lawful expenses where the invoice had been drawn up not in the party\u2019s name but in the name of the treasurer. 28.  The Constitutional Court also held that fines for traffic violations by the party\u2019s drivers, as well as fines or interest on late payment of various financial obligations, such as social security contributions, court orders, rents or motor vehicle taxes for the party\u2019s vehicles, could not be lawfully covered from the party\u2019s budget, and had to be met by the individuals who had been responsible for defaulting on such payments. 29.  Moreover, the Constitutional Court found that advance payments made to fifty-two employees in 2009 had only been partially repaid. In the light of the prohibition in section 72 of the Political Parties Act against lending money, the advance payments in question were unlawful and were thus confiscated in full (including the amounts that had been repaid by the relevant employees). 30.  The Constitutional Court also issued a number of warnings in relation to certain expenditure in 2008 and 2009. 31.  One of those warnings concerned the payment of employees\u2019 salaries. Although the applicant party had submitted the relevant payment orders, it had not provided bank statements demonstrating that the amounts ordered had actually been paid. The Constitutional Court warned the applicant party to submit such bank statements with its consolidated accounts to demonstrate that the payments in question had indeed been made. 32.  Another warning was issued in relation to a payment made to a private company in return for installing a sound system for an election bus. The Constitutional Court requested the applicant party to submit a technical report indicating when the work had been completed and a record stating that the bus had been duly delivered. The applicant party responded that there was no legal obligation to prepare such documents. The Constitutional Court held that in the absence of such information, it could not know whether the service had been delivered on time and, if not, whether the service provider had paid the penalty envisaged in the service agreement for defaulting on its obligation. 33.  Yet another warning was issued about the incompatibility between the party\u2019s expenses and its inventory, in that a number of items allegedly purchased for the party (three televisions and one computer) had not been registered in the inventory. 34.  The Constitutional Court also issued a warning in connection with advance payments made to some employees in 2009, in addition to ordering the confiscation of the applicant party\u2019s assets in the full amount of the advance payments in question (see paragraph 29 above). 35.  On 11 May 2012 the applicant party received a letter from the Ankara governor\u2019s office ordering it to pay the amounts indicated in the Constitutional Court decision concerning the review of the 2007 final accounts, which totalled TRY 3,372,446 (approximately EUR 1,435,000 on 7 March 2012, the date of the delivery of the decision), within thirty days of the receipt of the letter. 36.  On 23 May 2012 the applicant party sent a letter to the Ankara governor\u2019s office requesting postponement of the payment until January 2013, in view of the financial difficulties it would suffer for the rest of 2012 in the event of immediate payment of the amounts concerned. 37.  On 12 March 2013 the Ministry of Finance informed the applicant party that the payments due in relation to the 2007 final accounts had been deducted from the State funding allocated to it on 10 January 2013 for that year, together with interest of TRY 176,211 running from the date on which the payment had become due (namely 12 June 2012). The amount deducted thus totalled approximately TRY 3,549,000 (approximately EUR 1,527,000 on 10 January 2013). 38.  On 31 October 2012 the applicant party received a letter from the Ankara governor\u2019s office ordering it to pay the amounts indicated in the Constitutional Court decisions concerning the review of the 2008 and 2009 final accounts, plus interest, which totalled approximately TRY 3,738,700 (approximately EUR 1,604,000 as at 31 October 2012), within ten days of the receipt of the letter. 39.  On 6 November 2012 the applicant party sent a letter to the Ankara governor\u2019s office, once again requesting the postponement of the payments due in relation to its 2008 and 2009 accounts until January 2013. 40.  On 15 January 2013 the applicant party paid TRY 1,432,257.30 (approximately EUR 605,212 at the material time) to the State Treasury for its unlawful expenses, in compliance with the Constitutional Court\u2019s review decision for the year 2008, and TRY 1,257,030.83 (approximately EUR 531,168 at the material time) for the decision regarding the accounts for the year 2009. It refused to pay the interest, which it contested before the relevant authorities. 41.  On 7 June 2013 the applicant party paid the State Treasury the sum of TRY 45,920 (approximately EUR 18,460) as default interest on the amounts confiscated in relation to its 2008 and 2009 accounts. 42.  On 30 March 2014 local elections were held in Turkey.", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "2", "6", "9", "8", "1", "5", "No Label", "7"], "gold": ["7"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicants\u2019 seventeen close relatives were members of an outlawed organisation in Turkey, namely the Maoist Communist Party (hereinafter \u201cthe MKP\u201d). On various dates since the 1970s criminal proceedings had been brought against the relatives for membership of a number of outlawed organisations and for carrying out activities on behalf of those organisations. They had spent various periods of time in prisons, and after their release some of them had left Turkey and settled in different countries in Europe. 6.  In early June 2005 the seventeen relatives began arriving in a rural area within the administrative jurisdiction of the town of Ovac\u0131k, near the city of Tunceli, in order to hold a meeting of their organisation. They were all killed in that area by members of the security forces on 17 and 18 June 2005. 7.  The names of the seventeen relatives and the applicants\u2019 relationship to them are as follows:\ni.  Cafer Cang\u00f6z was the first applicant Mr Mustafa Cang\u00f6z\u2019s son;\nii.  Ayd\u0131n Hanbayat was the second applicant Ms Fatma Hanbayat\u2019s son;\niii.  Okan \u00dcnsal was the third applicant Ms Bahriye \u00dcnsal\u2019s son;\niv.  Berna Sayg\u0131l\u0131-\u00dcnsal was the fourth applicant Mr Tevfik Fikret Sayg\u0131l\u0131\u2019s daughter;\nv.  Ali R\u0131za Sabur was the fifth applicant Mr H\u0131d\u0131r Sabur\u2019s brother;\nvi.  Alattin Ata\u015f was the sixth applicant Ms Nari Ata\u015f\u2019s son;\nvii.  Cemal \u00c7akmak was the seventh applicant Ms Zekiye \u00c7akmak\u2019s son;\nviii.  \u00d6kke\u015f Karao\u011flu was the eighth applicant Ms Hatice Karao\u011flu\u2019s son;\nix.  Taylan Y\u0131ld\u0131z was the ninth applicant Ms \u0130mi\u015f Y\u0131ld\u0131z\u2019s son;\nx.  Dursun Turgut was the tenth applicant Mr \u0130brahim Turgut\u2019s son;\nxi.  Binali G\u00fcler was the eleventh applicant Ms Elif G\u00fcler\u2019s husband;\nxii.  \u0130brahim Akdeniz was the twelfth applicant Mr Mehmet Akdeniz\u2019s son;\nxiii.  Ahmet Perkta\u015f was the thirteenth applicant Ms G\u00fcls\u00fcm Perkta\u015f\u2019s son;\nxiv.  \u00c7a\u011fda\u015f Can was the fourteenth applicant Ms \u015e\u00fckran Can\u2019s son;\nxv.  G\u00fclnaz Y\u0131ld\u0131z was the fifteenth applicant Mr Teslim Y\u0131ld\u0131z\u2019s daughter;\nxvi.  Ersin Kantar was the sixteenth applicant Mr Erdal Kantar\u2019s brother; and,\nxvii.  Kenan \u00c7ak\u0131c\u0131 was the seventeenth applicant Ms Dilek \u00c7ak\u0131c\u0131\u2019s husband. 8.  The events which took place on 17 and 18 June 2005 are disputed between the parties. Thus, the parties\u2019 submissions will be set out separately. The facts as presented by the applicants are set out in Section B below (paragraphs 9-13). The Government\u2019s submissions concerning the facts are summarised in Section C below (paragraphs 14-20). The documentary evidence submitted by the parties is summarised in Section D below (paragraphs 21-76). 9.  At around 9 p.m. on 17 June 2005 some of the applicants heard on the television news that nine MKP members had been killed by soldiers in Ovac\u0131k and that armed clashes were continuing. 10.  The following day a number of family members, suspecting that their relatives might be among those who had been killed, went to the Ovac\u0131k District Gendarmerie Command to seek more information. When they failed to obtain any information there a lawyer representing one of the families went to see the local prosecutor. The prosecutor told the lawyer that seventeen people had been killed. 11.  The families were then taken to a nearby military base to identify the seventeen bodies, which had been placed in the car park of the military base. The families noted that most of the bodies were naked. As the faces and bodies of the deceased had been destroyed beyond recognition, it was not possible to complete the identification process that day. 12.  When all the bodies had been identified and autopsies carried out on them they were handed over to the families for burial. 13.  The photographs and video footage taken by the families while the bodies were being prepared for burial were submitted to the Court. Very extensive injuries on the bodies of the seventeen can be seen in the footage. 14.  In their observations the Government summarised a number of the steps taken by the national authorities (which are also summarised below between paragraphs 21-76), and added the following. 15.  The applicants\u2019 relatives were members of the MKP terrorist organisation and some of them had entered Turkey illegally in order to participate in a meeting of that organisation in Tunceli. After receiving intelligence reports, a patrolling helicopter found the terrorist group in an area near Tunceli on 17 June 2005. The terrorist group opened fire on the helicopter. After determining the location of the group the security forces arrived in the area to arrest them. At 5 p.m. the security forces encountered the group. Despite warnings to surrender issued by the security forces, the terrorists opened fire and injured a soldier. 16.  At 9 a.m. on 18 June 2005 the armed clash between the security forces and the terrorists ended. Alongside the bodies of the terrorists the security forces found, amongst other things, a number of automatic rifles and ammunition. Three terrorists were apprehended alive and arrested. 17.  On the same day, just after the armed clash ended, the prosecutor arrived at the incident area, conducted an on-site inspection, prepared an incident report, and opened an investigation concerning the deaths of the seventeen terrorists. The prosecutor then ordered the destruction of the material which had no evidential or economic value. 18.  On 18 June 2005 between 9.30 a.m. and 2.30 p.m. the bodies and everything else found were photographed. 19.  On 29 June 2005, at the request of the relatives of the deceased, the prosecutor asked the Forensic Medicine Institute to examine the clothes and bodies of the deceased with a view to establishing whether the security forces had opened fire from a distance without issuing any warning to surrender. 20.  On 1 July 2005 the Forensic Laboratories of the Police in Diyarbak\u0131r released the ballistic report, which stated that sixteen of the seventeen terrorists had actively fired at the security forces during the armed clashes. 21.  The following information appears from the documents submitted by the parties. 22.  According to a report prepared by three non-commissioned officers from the Ovac\u0131k District Gendarmerie Command on 18 June 2005 (hereafter \u201cthe Ovac\u0131k report\u201d), intelligence obtained by the security forces suggested that members of the MKP were planning to have a meeting in mid-June in an area in the vicinity of the Mercan Mountains, near the border between Tunceli and Erzincan provinces. Security forces from Erzincan and Tunceli subsequently started a military operation in the area on 15 June 2005. The operation was also supported from the air. At around 5 p.m. on 17 June 2005 the security forces conducting the operation came across a group of \u201carmed members of the organisation\u201d and asked them to surrender. However, \u201cthe members of the organisation\u201d responded with fire and an armed clash ensued. During the first fire opened by \u201cthe terrorists\u201d a soldier was injured on the upper leg and airlifted to hospital by helicopter. As the area was mountainous with many caves and in some places covered with snow, and as the \u201cmembers of the illegal organisation\u201d refused to surrender and opened intense fire, the clashes continued until the following day. At around 10 a.m. the following day the fire directed at the security forces stopped and then a search was conducted by members of the security forces. The bodies of fifteen male and two female \u201cterrorists\u201d were recovered. \u201cAs instructed by the public prosecutor\u201d, the bodies and weapons recovered in the area were then taken by helicopter to the Ovac\u0131k District Gendarmerie Command. 23.  According to the above-mentioned report, 13 automatic rifles (one M16, four G3s, seven Kalashnikov AK47s and one PKM), 23 spent cartridges discharged from G3 rifles, and 45 spent cartridges discharged from Kalashnikov rifles, 44 bullets for PKM-type rifles, 19 bullets for G3\u2011type rifles, 76 bullets for M16-type rifles and 77 bullets for Kalashnikov-type rifles, 11 Kalashnikov magazines, 7 M16 magazines and 12 G3 magazines were recovered together with the bodies. \u201cItems which did not have evidential value\u201d, including four rucksacks, fifteen items of male and two pieces of female clothing and shoes were destroyed in accordance with \u201cthe instructions given by the prosecutor\u201d. 24.  The report summarised in the preceding paragraphs, together with the weapons and ammunition mentioned therein, were handed over to the Ovac\u0131k prosecutor\u2019s office on 20 June 2005 together with a number of other documents. According to one of those documents which, in effect, is a list of the documents forwarded to the prosecutor by the military, two of the documents handed over to the prosecutor were a twelve-page military order, drawn up on 15 June 2005, for the carrying out of the operation and a sketch of the operation area. Those two documents were not made available to the Court. 25.  Another military report was drawn up on 18 June 2005 by the officer in charge of the District Gendarmerie Command of the neighbouring town of Kemah, and eleven gendarmes who had taken an active part in the operation (hereafter the \u201cKemah report\u201d). The report states that \u201coutlawed terrorist organisations had set up camp\u201d in the area and that its members had been travelling between Erzincan city centre and Sar\u0131yaz\u0131 village. There was evidence and information showing that members of the terrorist organisation were in contact with three men from Sar\u0131yaz\u0131 village who were providing them with assistance. At 8 a.m. on 17 June 2005 two of the three men in question were apprehended and questioned by the soldiers. When they denied the allegations against them, the soldiers told them that the mobile telephone belonging to Ali R\u0131za Sabur \u2013 one of the applicants\u2019 deceased relatives \u2013 was being intercepted and that the security forces were therefore aware that they had been in contact with members of the illegal organisation who had arrived in the area recently. One of the two men then told the soldiers that he had seen a number of armed men in the area and that he had subsequently helped them by supplying them with food and transport and by providing guidance about the local area. The man informed the gendarmes that the last time he had seen the armed men had been that very morning and that, given that three of the armed men were \u201climping\u201d and thus walking slowly, they were probably at a location at approximately one hour\u2019s walking distance away. 26.  According to the above-mentioned Kemah report, the soldiers then asked for a military helicopter and went to that area with the man to look for the applicants\u2019 relatives. The armed men were spotted in a river bed from armed Cobra-type military helicopters at 11 a.m. When one of the armed men noticed the helicopter, he opened fire and an armed clash ensued during which nine of the armed men were killed. At 4.30 p.m. the same day a number of soldiers taking security measures in the area came under intense fire as a result of which another armed clash ensued and continued until 9 a.m. the following morning, that is 18 June 2005. After the operations ended the bodies of eight more people \u2013 two of whom were female \u2013 were recovered together with their weapons. One of the three men, who had been apprehended the previous morning and had assisted the soldiers in locating the applicants\u2019 relatives, was with the soldiers at that time and identified the bodies as the persons whom he and his two friends had helped after their arrival in the area. The report further states that the incident took place on the border between the Ovac\u0131k and Kemah districts. The Ovac\u0131k prosecutor was then informed about the operation and instructed the soldiers to take the bodies of the seventeen and their belongings to the town of Ovac\u0131k. 27.  On 18 June 2005 a press release was issued by the Gendarmerie Headquarters in Ankara, stating that \u201cseventeen terrorists were recovered dead and three terrorists were apprehended alive\u201d during the operations. 28.  Also on 18 June 2005, the applicants\u2019 legal representative Ms Meral Hanbayat submitted a petition to the prosecutor\u2019s office in Malatya and asked the prosecutor to order the carrying out of necessary forensic examinations on the body and clothes of the second applicant\u2019s son, Ayd\u0131n Hanbayat, with a view to establishing the distance from which he had been shot. The legal representative also asked the prosecutor to examine Ayd\u0131n Hanbayat\u2019s hands for gunpowder residue in order to establish whether or not he had opened fire. 29.  According to a report drawn up by the Ovac\u0131k prosecutor on 18 June 2005, the area where the applicants\u2019 relatives had been killed was not safe and therefore it was not possible for the prosecutor to go there to examine the bodies. Thus, a decision was taken to bring the bodies to the town of Ovac\u0131k in a military helicopter. When they were brought to the Ovac\u0131k District Gendarmerie Command the bodies were placed in the car park reserved for military vehicles. As their identities had not yet been established, each body was given a number. 30.  The Ovac\u0131k prosecutor, assisted by two doctors, arrived at the car park and examined the bodies. The prosecutor noted that all seventeen were clothed and instructed that the clothes be removed for the examinations to be carried out. The bodies were also photographed, both with their clothes on and after they were taken off. The prosecutor and the doctors noted in their report the extensive injuries they observed on the bodies. A search was carried out of the clothes, in which sixteen identity documents were found. The prosecutor decided to keep the number tags on the bodies in place as he suspected that some of the identity papers might be forged. It was later established that ten of the identity papers belonged to the deceased and the remaining six identity documents were in the names of other people. 31.  The two doctors concluded that all seventeen had died as a result of injuries caused by bullets and shrapnel, but considered it necessary to have detailed autopsies carried out. The bodies were then handed over to a gendarme non-commissioned officer, who took them to the Forensic Medicine Institute\u2019s nearest branch in the city of Malatya at around 8 p.m. the same day. No mention is made in the document whether the clothes removed from the bodies of the seventeen were also handed over to that non-commissioned officer. 32.  The same evening three people who claimed to know some of the deceased arrived at the Forensic Medicine Institute\u2019s Malatya Branch and identified the bodies of Cafer Cang\u00f6z, Ayd\u0131n Hanbayat, \u00d6kke\u015f Karao\u011flu, Okan \u00dcnsal, \u0130brahim Akdeniz and G\u00fclnaz Y\u0131ld\u0131z. 33.  The same evening forensic pathologists started carrying out the autopsies; they completed their examinations at 6.30 the following morning. A detailed verbatim report of the actions taken during the autopsies was prepared in the presence of the Malatya prosecutor. Blood and urine samples taken from the bodies were sent for further analysis to verify whether the deceased had consumed alcohol or used drugs. Swabs were taken from their hands and sent for ballistic examinations with a view to establishing whether they had any gunpowder residue on their hands. Bullets and shrapnel found in the bodies were also sent for further analysis. Fingerprints were taken for identification purposes. 34.  According to the findings of the forensic pathologists which are set out in the autopsy report, eight of the deceased had been killed by explosives, three of them by bullets, and the remaining six by both explosives and bullets. The forensic pathologists considered that to establish the distances from which the seventeen persons had been shot, further examinations had to be conducted on their clothes. They noted, however, that with one exception all the deceased had been stripped of their clothes and that the clothes belonging to thirteen of the remaining sixteen had not been provided. 35.  After the autopsies were concluded the Malatya prosecutor ordered the return of the bodies and the clothes to the Ovac\u0131k prosecutor\u2019s office. 36.  On 21 June 2005 the Ovac\u0131k prosecutor wrote to his opposite number in Kemah and requested a copy of the investigation documents relating to the arrest of the three men (see paragraphs 25-26 above). According to the documents submitted to the Court, the Kemah prosecutor complied with that request and forwarded a copy of his investigation file to the Ovac\u0131k prosecutor. 37.  It appears from the Kemah prosecutor\u2019s file that on 9 June 2005 the security forces had obtained authorisation from a judge to intercept the applicants\u2019 relatives\u2019 mobile telephones, and telephone conversations some of the applicants\u2019 relatives had had with a number of local people, including the men who were subsequently arrested for providing them with logistical support, were intercepted by the authorities between 9 and 17 June 2005. According to the transcripts of the intercepted telephone conversations drawn up on 11 June 2005, the applicants\u2019 relatives had discussed over the telephone issues such as renting vehicles and facilitating their movements in the area. 38.  On 21 June 2005 the Ovac\u0131k prosecutor also asked the Ovac\u0131k District Gendarmerie Command to send the weapons and the ammunition recovered together with the bodies of the applicants\u2019 relatives to the Regional Forensic Laboratories with a view to establishing whether the rifles had been used in any other previous incident and whether the 23 G3 spent cartridges and the 45 Kalashnikov spent cartridges had been discharged from the G3 and the Kalashnikov rifles found together with the bodies and whether they had thus been used in the armed clash. 39.  On 19 and 20 June 2005 most of the bodies were formally identified by their family members and burial certificates were issued. 40.  On 22 June 2005 three of the deceased, namely Cafer Cang\u00f6z, Berna Sayg\u0131l\u0131-\u00dcnsal and \u00d6kke\u015f Karao\u011flu, were formally identified after an examination of their fingerprints was conducted at the Malatya Police Headquarters. 41.  The same day the Ovac\u0131k prosecutor was provided with the report pertaining to the medical examination of the soldier who had been injured during the operation and airlifted to hospital (see paragraph 22 above). According to the report, the soldier in question had been kept in a military hospital in Elaz\u0131\u011f between 18 and 30 June 2005 for the \u201cinjury to the skin of and a foreign object on the left femur, which is not life-threatening and which can be treated with a simple medical intervention\u201d. 42.  On 27 June 2005 three of the applicants, namely Ms Fatma Hanbayat, Mr Mustafa Cang\u00f6z and Ms \u0130mi\u015f Y\u0131ld\u0131z, assisted by their legal representatives, submitted an official complaint to the Ovac\u0131k prosecutor\u2019s office. The three applicants alleged in their complaint that the bodies of their three deceased relatives had been stripped of their clothes and displayed at the military base in Ovac\u0131k before they were taken to Malatya for autopsies. The three applicants added that they had not seen the clothes since the autopsies. They submitted that the way in which their relatives had been killed must be established before the investigation could proceed. They maintained that a forensic examination on the clothes was crucial and requested the prosecutor to ensure that it was done. 43.  In their complaint the three applicants also informed the prosecutor that there were \u201cstrong indications\u201d that their relatives had been killed by being bombed from a distance, without any prior warning and without any attempts being made to ask for their surrender. They asked the prosecutor to promptly carry out an impartial investigation and visit the area where the operation had been conducted. They also requested the prosecutor to carry out the necessary investigation into the removal of their relatives\u2019 clothes and the exhibiting of their bodies, which, they argued, constituted an offence. Finally, the three applicants asked the prosecutor to give them a copy of the documents from the investigation file. 44.  When the Ovac\u0131k prosecutor received the applicants\u2019 complaint he wrote to the Ovac\u0131k Magistrates\u2019 Court the same day and informed that court of his opinion that \u201cwhen taken into account that [the three applicants] are related to the deceased members of the terrorist organisation, handing over to them documents from the investigation file would endanger the investigation\u201d. The prosecutor asked the Magistrates\u2019 Court to issue a decision classifying the investigation file as confidential so that neither the three applicants, their legal representatives, or anyone else would be able to examine the investigation file or obtain any documents from it, with the exception of the autopsy reports. 45.  The prosecutor\u2019s request was granted on the same day by the Ovac\u0131k Magistrates\u2019 Court. The same day the prosecutor forwarded the Magistrates\u2019 Court\u2019s decision to the three applicants and informed them that in the light of the Magistrates\u2019 Court\u2019s decision it was not possible to accede to their request and that he was therefore unable to give them any of the documents from the file, with the exception of the autopsy reports. The three applicants\u2019 legal representatives were handed a copy of the autopsy reports the same day. 46.  On 29 June 2005 the Ovac\u0131k prosecutor wrote to the Forensic Medicine Institute\u2019s headquarters in Istanbul, stating that although autopsies had been carried out on the bodies of the seventeen at the Malatya Branch of the Forensic Institute, clothes belonging to some of the deceased had been returned to his office without examination, because there was no expert in Malatya able to carry out that task. The prosecutor also informed the Institute about the allegation made by the three applicants that their relatives might have been killed without a warning and added that the applicants had requested that their relatives\u2019 clothes be forensically examined. With his letter the prosecutor sent the clothes removed from the bodies of Cemal \u00c7akmak, Ca\u011fda\u015f Can, Okan \u00dcnsal and \u0130brahim Akdeniz, and asked the Institute to carry out the necessary examinations on them. 47.  On 1 July 2005 the three applicants mentioned above (see paragraph 42) lodged an objection to the Ovac\u0131k Magistrates\u2019 Court\u2019s decision to restrict their access to the investigation file and asked for that decision to be set aside. In their submission the three applicants added that they had spoken to the prosecutor and had repeated their request to have their deceased relatives\u2019 clothes forensically examined. However, the prosecutor had told them that the clothes had been \u201cdestroyed after the operation because [the authorities] had deemed it necessary to do so\u201d. The three applicants also stated in their submission that all they needed were the documents recording the actions taken during the investigation, and not any of the documents pertaining to the organisation of the military operation. They argued that they needed those documents to exercise their statutory right to effectively participate in the investigation. Furthermore, when the facts were known by the perpetrators and by the prosecutors, hiding those same facts from the complainants was not compatible with the principle of equality of arms. It was thus evident that an investigation conducted solely on the basis of the documents prepared by the perpetrators, the contents of which were not known to them and could thus not be challenged, would not lead to a fair conclusion. 48.  The applicants also challenged the logic behind the decision to restrict their access to the investigation file, and questioned how their involvement in the investigation, the aim of which was to establish the facts, would endanger it. They submitted that some of the evidence, such as the clothes worn by their relatives, had already been destroyed on the orders of the prosecutor. The applicants considered it telling that the clothes of those killed by explosives had been sent for forensic examinations whereas the clothes worn by those killed by bullets had been destroyed. They argued that those destroyed clothes could have been instrumental in establishing the distance from which the deceased had been shot. They complained, moreover, that the prosecutor had still not visited the place where the operation had been conducted; thus, there were serious questions about the way the evidence from that place had been collected. Lastly, the applicants referred to Articles 2 and 13 of the Convention and Paragraph 16 of the Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions (adopted by Economic and Social Council Resolution 1989/65 on 24 May 1989) and argued that their exclusion from the investigation was in breach of those provisions. 49.  The objection was rejected by the Tunceli Criminal Court of First Instance on 20 July 2005. 50.  Also on 1 July 2005, the Forensic Laboratories of the Police in Diyarbak\u0131r published their reports on the swabs taken from the hands of the seventeen deceased. According to the report, there was gunpowder residue on the palms and the backs of the hands of the sixteen of the seventeen relatives. It was stated in the report that the presence of gunpowder residue on the backs of the hands meant that the person had either fired a weapon or been in close proximity to a weapon when it was fired. The presence of gunpowder residue on the palm of the hand meant that the person had either been holding a weapon or had had contact with objects on which there was gunpowder residue, or that he or she had been standing close to a weapon when it was fired. It was stated in the same report that gunpowder residue could be found on the hand of a person who had not fired a weapon but whose hand had been in contact with objects such as a weapon, a bullet entry wound, or the hands of another person who had fired a weapon. 51.  On 6 July 2005 sixteen relatives, including fourteen of the applicants, submitted a complaint to the Ovac\u0131k prosecutor with the assistance of their legal representatives. 52.  The relatives began by stating that the arguments they were making in their complaint were inevitably based only on the autopsy reports and the things they had heard or witnessed personally; as they had been denied access to the investigation they had not had the opportunity to see any of the evidence or the information in the prosecutor\u2019s file. In their submission they complained about the killings of their relatives and about the public displaying of the bodies by the security forces. The relatives also submitted that the fact that the bodies of some of their relatives had been destroyed beyond recognition by bombs had led them to form the opinion that there had not been an armed clash as alleged and that their relatives had been killed by unlawful fire from military helicopters. In any event, on account of their ages and the various physical disabilities of five of them, their relatives had not been in a position to actively participate in an armed clash with soldiers in a mountainous area. Furthermore, although it had been alleged that firearms had been found next to the bodies of their relatives, those firearms would not have been effective against military helicopters. Thus, it was obvious that they had been killed as a result of the use of disproportionate force. 53.  The relatives also repeated the criticism, which had already been voiced by three of them on a number of previous occasions (see paragraphs 42-43 and 47-48 above), of the fact that they had been denied access to the investigation file and the investigating authorities\u2019 failures to take certain steps in the investigation. In that connection they highlighted, in particular, the destruction of their relatives\u2019 clothes by the authorities. They also complained that crucial evidence had been collected without any judicial supervision and by members of the security forces who themselves had been implicated in the killings and were therefore under investigation. 54.  The relatives argued that the killing of their relatives had been unlawful and in breach of Turkey\u2019s obligations under various international treaties, including the Convention. Contrary to the requirements of those international obligations, no attempts had been made to apprehend their relatives in a non-life-threatening fashion. Moreover, members of the security forces had committed another offence by publicly exhibiting their relatives\u2019 naked bodies. They invited the prosecutor to carry out an independent and effective investigation that was proportionate to the seriousness of the killings. 55.  The applicant Tevfik Fikret Sayg\u0131l\u0131, together with his wife Necla Sayg\u0131l\u0131, submitted another complaint to the Ovac\u0131k prosecutor in addition to the one he had already submitted on 6 July 2005 together with the other applicants. In their complaint the couple complained about the killing of their daughter, Berna Sayg\u0131l\u0131-\u00dcnsal, and alleged, in particular, that their daughter and her sixteen friends had been unarmed at the time and there had therefore not been an armed clash between them and the soldiers. They further complained that necessary precautions in the area where their daughter was killed had not been taken by the prosecutor, and the evidence in the area had thus been allowed to disappear. They also complained that their daughter\u2019s body had been exhibited by the soldiers. 56.  On various dates the Ovac\u0131k prosecutor asked his colleagues in various towns and cities to take statements from the applicants living within their jurisdictions. According to the documents submitted by the parties, the prosecutors complied with that request and took statements from twelve of the applicants and four other close relatives of the seventeen deceased. In their statements the relatives repeated their allegations and maintained their complaints. The relatives also stated that, although they had not personally seen the bodies of their deceased relatives being exhibited, they had heard about it from others. 57.  On 19 August 2005 the Regional Forensic Laboratories of the Gendarmerie concluded their examinations in respect of the weapons and the spent cartridges found in the operation area (see paragraphs 23 and 38 above). It was stated in the report that 43 of the 45 spent Kalashnikov cartridges had been discharged from the seven Kalashnikov rifles found in the area. The remaining two had been discharged from two other Kalashnikov rifles, which were not among those recovered in the area. It was also established that 22 of the 23 spent G3 cartridges had been discharged from the four G3 rifles found in the area. As the remaining G3 spent cartridge had no markings on it, no examination could be carried out on it. 58.  On 23 September 2005 the Forensic Medicine Institute prepared its report in response to the Ovac\u0131k prosecutor\u2019s request of 29 June 2005 for the clothes worn by four of the deceased at the time they were killed to be examined. It was noted in the report that the holes observed on three of the four sets of clothes were not bullet holes. The holes observed on the fourth set of clothes which belonged to Cemal \u00c7akmak did not have any gunpowder residue and it was not therefore possible to establish the distance from which he had been shot. 59.  On 23 November 2005 the applicants asked the Ovac\u0131k prosecutor to give them a copy of the autopsy report and a copy of the document pertaining to the examination of the clothes removed from the bodies of their relatives. The prosecutor complied with that request on 8 December 2005. 60.  Between September 2005 and June 2006 a number of ballistic examinations were conducted; the Ovac\u0131k prosecutor was informed at the end of those examinations that the rifles and the spent cartridges found next to the bodies had not been used in any other incident. 61.  On 20 June 2006 the Ovac\u0131k prosecutor closed the investigation. After summarising some of the documents which are also set out in the preceding paragraphs, the prosecutor stated the following in his decision:\n\u201cSections 86 and 87 of the Code of Criminal Procedure set out how post mortem examinations should be conducted. As stated in the autopsy reports, there was no one to identify the members of the terrorist organisation MKP/HKO who had been recovered dead. That was why they could not be formally identified in Ovac\u0131k. Moreover, their clothes were removed on the instruction of the prosecutor so that their bodies could be examined. Thus, the bodies were not stripped of their clothes by members of the security forces so that they could be publicly displayed. Removing the clothes was a necessity and did not constitute an offence.\nAs for the complaint concerning the killings, the terrorist organisation MKP/HKO issued press releases on 19 and 23 June 2005 in which it was made clear that the deceased had indeed been members of that terrorist organisation and in which the Turkish Republic was expressly referred to as the enemy. It was stated in the press releases, for example, \u2018during the armed clashes that took place between the fascist Turkish State and the forces from the People\u2019s Liberation Army (HKO) [acting] under the leadership of our Maoist-Communist Party, seventeen of our communist warrior comrades became martyrs\u2019. Thus, those press releases not only confirm that the deceased were members of the terrorist organisation, but also that they died in armed clashes with the security forces.\nThe aim and strategy of the terrorist organisation MKP/HKO is to destroy the constitutional order of the Turkish Republic through armed struggle and to replace it with a different regime. The deceased were members of the MKP/HKO and were carrying out armed and unlawful activities on behalf of that organisation in order to change the constitutional order by force. The investigation documents, the nature of the weapons recovered, the other documents and information [in the file] and the fact that the deceased did not obey the security forces\u2019 warning to surrender show conclusively that they were members of the MKP/HKO and were acting in accordance with that organisation\u2019s aims to change the constitutional order through armed struggle.\nIn addition, it was openly stated in the press release issued by the terrorist organisation MKP/HKO that all the deceased were members of the MKP/HKO terrorist organisation.\nAs explained above, the deceased were members of the illegal MKP/HKO terrorist organisation, which carries out activities aimed at changing the constitutional order by force of arms; they were carrying out armed and unlawful activities on behalf of that organisation. A report showing that they were members of the unlawful MKP/HKO terrorist organisation and that they had carried out armed activities on behalf of that organisation and thus had committed the offence of attempting to change the Turkish republic\u2019s constitutional order, was prepared [by me] and sent to the Malatya prosecutor.\nThe [deceased] had been wandering and hanging around as a group. Their aim was to inflict casualties on members of the security forces. It was the terrorists who fired first, despite an order to surrender issued by members of the security forces. When they first opened fire they injured a member of the security forces. Then, despite a warning to surrender, the terrorist group continued to open fire. Faced with an all-out armed attack, the security forces had no alternative but to open fire. Thus, the \u2018absolute necessity\u2019 and \u2018reasonableness\u2019 criteria were satisfied, which renders the killings lawful.\nIn order to realise their so-called ideals, terrorists make plans and act in accordance with those plans. Even when they are dying they think of killing. They prepare traps with explosives and hand grenades and set them to explode when members of the security forces approach them when they are seriously injured or after their death to lift their bodies. The response of the security forces to prevent the terrorists\u2019 so-called last mission (the traps) which caused severe damage to the terrorists\u2019 bodies must be regarded as a lawful action carried out within the ambit of \u2018self-defence\u2019 and \u2018necessity\u2019, because they acted with the aim of protecting their own physical integrity and lives.\nAccording to the decision of the Grand Chamber of the Court of Cassation for Criminal Law Matters (10 October 1995, decision no. 1213/271), the existence of an attack must be interpreted widely; if it is definite that an attack is going to begin, it can be regarded as an attack already begun; if it has already come to an end but there is a fear that it might begin again, then it must be regarded as not yet ended.\nIn the present incident, it is established that members of the security forces had persistently warned the deceased, who were members of the MKP/HKO terrorist organisation, and asked them to stop and surrender. The deceased, who were members of the MKP/HKO terrorist organisation and who opened fire and injured a gendarme soldier, were then recovered dead together with their weapons.\nIn the course of anti-terrorism measures, members of the security forces have the power to use weapons pursuant to s. 1-3 of Law No. 1481 and s. 39-40 of the Regulations on the Establishment and Powers of the Gendarmerie: the latter was drafted in accordance with s. 24 of Law No. 280, and additional section 6 \u00a7 2 of Law No. 2559.\nAccording to Article 2 \u00a7 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights, members of the security forces can use weapons if it has become absolutely necessary to do so.\nIn recovering dead the members of the MKP/HKO terrorist organisation, members of the security forces used their weapons in accordance with s. 24-25 of the Turkish Criminal Code, Article 2 \u00a7 2 of the ECHR and s. 17 \u00a7 4 of the Turkish Constitution, and they did so within the limits of their powers and duties. It is clearly established that their actions were lawful within the context of self-defence. Thus, no offence was committed by the members of the security forces who killed the deceased or by members of the security forces and the administrative officials who planned the operation and ordered it ... The decision is hereby taken not to continue with the investigation...\u201d 62.  The applicants lodged objections to the prosecutor\u2019s decision on 14 and 22 July 2006. In their submissions the applicants also referred to the Kemah report and drew attention to the discrepancies between that report and the Ovac\u0131k report. They argued, in particular, that in the Kemah report there was no mention of any warnings having been issued to their seventeen relatives to surrender. In the Ovac\u0131k report it was stated, however, that their relatives had been given warnings to surrender. The applicants pointed out in this connection that, instead of trying to assess which version had represented the truth, when closing the investigation the prosecutor had completely ignored the Kemah report, in which no mention was made of surrender warnings, and relied solely on the Ovac\u0131k report. 63.  The applicants further argued that no investigation had been conducted into the roles played by and the actions of members of the security forces during the operation. In fact, they had not even been named or questioned. Furthermore, no attempts had been made to find out what types of weapons had been used by the security forces in the operation. 64.  The applicants also referred to the documents in the Kemah prosecutor\u2019s investigation file concerning the actions of the three men who had been arrested on suspicion of helping their relatives. They submitted that those documents showed that members of the security forces had not simply \u201ccome across\u201d their relatives on 17 June 2005 as alleged in the Ovac\u0131k report (see paragraph 22 above). Instead, those documents showed that the operation had in fact started on 2 June 2005 and had been meticulously carried out. For example, twelve of their relatives had been under close observation by the security forces from the time of their arrival in Erzincan on 2 June 2005, and their telephone conversations with the three men who were under investigation for helping them had been intercepted and their meetings photographed. According to the applicants, this background information showed that, instead of arresting their relatives at a much earlier stage, members of the security forces had chosen to wait until their relatives went to the countryside where the conditions were suitable for an operation to kill them. Nevertheless, despite their importance and relevance, none of the above factors had been taken into account by the prosecutor in the investigation. 65.   The applicants argued that if the prosecutor had taken notice of the contents of the Kemah report he would have seen that no warnings had been issued by the soldiers before they opened fire on their relatives. Indeed, given that the first contact had been with their relative who had been on lookout duty and the members of the security forces who had been in the helicopter, it was improbable that such a warning had been issued first. Thus, the prosecutor\u2019s reliance on the alleged warnings to surrender when concluding that the killings had been in self-defence was without basis. 66.  The applicants also criticised the justification proffered by the prosecutor for the use of heavy weaponry by alleging that their relatives could have set up booby-traps. They argued that there was no evidence in the file to support the prosecutor\u2019s conclusion. In particular, it was impossible to reach such a conclusion without first questioning the soldiers who, in any event, had not made any allegations that there were booby traps. The applicants argued that by doing so the prosecutor had replaced the lack of any evidence with his subjective assumptions and that the conclusion reached by him could not, therefore, have any legal significance and could not prove that the force used had not been excessive. 67.  The applicants alleged that the prosecutor had failed to establish with any clarity the way in which their relatives had been killed. They submitted that, according to the news coverage of the incident in the media on 17 June 2005, initially nine of their relatives had been killed by bombs, and that those media reports were compatible with the Kemah military report. The remaining eight relatives had been killed mostly by bullets, because after the initial heavy bombing the soldiers on the ground had formed a circle around the eight relatives and shot them. 68.  The applicants also criticised the fact that the swabs taken from the hands of their relatives were examined at the Forensic Laboratories of the Police in Diyarbak\u0131r rather than at the independent Forensic Medicine Institute. Moreover, when taking into account that their relatives had been killed in the course of a military operation during which heavy weapons had been used and that their bodies had been carried by soldiers who had taken part in the operation, the prosecutor\u2019s conclusion, which was based on the forensic reports showing that they had gunpowder residue on their hands, that their relatives had taken part in the armed clash was not compatible with the other information in the file. 69.  Furthermore, no fingerprint analysis had been conducted on the rifles with a view to establishing whether they had their relatives\u2019 fingerprints on them. Similarly, although the fact that only spent cartridges belonging to Kalashnikov and G3 rifles had been found after the operation could lead to the assumption that only G3 and Kalashnikov rifles had been used in the operation, the failure to specify exactly where those spent cartridges had been found and the added failure to collect the spent cartridges discharged from the rifles used by the soldiers discredited that assumption. 70.  In addition to the above, in their complaint the applicants also criticised the prosecutor\u2019s failure to identify the names of the soldiers who had killed their relatives, to establish the exact locations and movements of both their relatives and the soldiers, to visit the scene, to identify the weapons used by members of the security forces, and to safeguard the clothes removed from the bodies of their relatives. 71.  The applicants argued that, in the light of the serious failures it could not be said that an effective investigation had been conducted. Indeed, when looking at the investigation as a whole, one could see that both the security forces who had prepared the military reports after the operation, and subsequently the prosecutor, had been convinced that their relatives had deserved to die and that that had been the real reason behind their failure to take even the most basic investigative steps. In that connection they also criticised the fact that evidence had been collected by the soldiers who were supposed to be under investigation. 72.  The applicants concluded their complaint by arguing that, in the light of the shortcomings in the investigation, the prosecutor had not been in a position to decide whether or not the use of force was justified under the national legislation set out in his decision. 73.  The objection lodged by the applicants against the prosecutor\u2019s decision was rejected by the Erzincan Assize Court on 24 August 2006. The Assize Court\u2019s decision is as follows:\n\u201cThe complainants submitted through their legal representatives that, although their relatives who were killed on 17 May 2005 (sic) could have been apprehended alive, members of the security forces had acted with the intention to kill and that they had stripped the clothes off their relatives and displayed their bodies publicly. Their complaint was therefore against the military and administrative authorities who had ordered the operation, planned it, and carried it out.\nAt the end of the investigation carried out by the Ovac\u0131k prosecutor a decision was taken not to bring criminal proceedings against the military or administrative authorities who had ordered the operation, who had overseen it and who had executed it, for the killings of the deceased persons and for displaying their bodies. It was considered that no offence had been committed.\nHaving examined the file, a decision is hereby given to reject the objection lodged by the complainants because the Ovac\u0131k prosecutor\u2019s decision is in accordance with the procedure and the legislation\u201d. 74.  In the meantime, on the same date as he closed the investigation \u2011 that is on 20 June 2006 \u2013 the Ovac\u0131k prosecutor also prepared a report and sent it to the Malatya prosecutor\u2019s office. In his report the Ovac\u0131k prosecutor asked his colleague in Malatya to take the necessary action against the applicants\u2019 deceased relatives who, according to the evidence in his possession, had committed the offences of membership of a terrorist organisation and had attempted to destroy the constitutional order through armed struggle, and had injured a soldier. 75.  On 18 August 2006 the Malatya prosecutor decided not to bring criminal proceedings against the applicants\u2019 relatives, because they were dead. 76.  According to a document which was made available to the Court by the respondent Government and which was prepared by the Ministry of Justice on 12 May 2009 and sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs apparently in order to advise the latter when preparing its observations to be submitted to the Court, the applicants\u2019 relatives\u2019 clothes and a number of other items found on their persons were destroyed on the orders of the Ovac\u0131k prosecutor, on the ground that they had no evidential value.", "references": ["8", "7", "2", "3", "5", "6", "9", "1", "4", "No Label", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1952 and lives in Zagreb. 6.  On 10 December 2010 the Zagreb Police Department (Policijska Uprava Zagreba\u010dka; hereinafter \u201cthe police\u201d) lodged a criminal complaint with the Zagreb County State Attorney\u2019s Office (\u017dupanijsko dr\u017eavno odvjetni\u0161tvo u Zagrebu) against the applicant, alleging that in 1991, as commander of a police unit, he had committed war crimes against the civilian population. They relied on extensive material obtained in the course of a preliminary investigation. An investigating judge of the Zagreb County Court (\u017dupanijski sud u Zagrebu) was also informed of the case. The case immediately attracted wide media interest and coverage. 7.  On the same day, based on the criminal complaint lodged by the police, the investigating judge questioned the applicant. The applicant contested the allegations of the police and decided not to give further evidence, stressing that he was suffering from health problems. He submitted extensive medical documentation showing that he had suffered a stroke in 2007. 8.  Later on the same day, the Zagreb County State Attorney\u2019s Office requested the investigating judge to open an investigation in respect of the applicant on suspicion of war crimes against the civilian population, as alleged in the criminal complaint lodged by the police. It relied in particular on the material provided to the Croatian authorities by the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (hereinafter \u201cthe ICTY\u201d) concerning the crimes allegedly committed by a unit under the applicant\u2019s command. 9.  Following the request of the Zagreb County State Attorney\u2019s Office, on 13 December 2010 the investigating judge questioned the applicant. The applicant decided to remain silent and refused to give any evidence. 10.  On the same day the investigating judge opened an investigation in respect of the applicant on suspicion of war crimes against the civilian population. The investigating judge found, on the basis of the available material, that there was a reasonable suspicion that in the period between October and December 1991, in his capacity as commander of a police unit, the applicant had ordered arbitrary arrests, ill-treatment and the killing of a number of civilians, and that, by not taking the necessary measures to prevent and punish those responsible, he had consented to a number of other arbitrary arrests, the unlawful confiscation of property, ill-treatment and the killing of civilians by his subordinates. 11.  During the investigation the investigating judge heard evidence from thirty-one witnesses and requested international legal assistance from the Serbian authorities in obtaining evidence from the witnesses. He also obtained a number of relevant reports on the DNA analyses of the victims\u2019 remains, as well as exhumation and autopsy reports, and various documents concerning the actions of the unit under the applicant\u2019s command. 12.  On the basis of the evidence obtained during the investigation, on 9 June 2011 the Zagreb County State Attorney\u2019s Office indicted the applicant in the Zagreb County Court on charges of war crimes against the civilian population. The indictment listed twenty-two counts of arbitrary arrest, unlawful confiscation of property, ill-treatment and the killing of civilians. The relevant part of the indictment concerning the applicant\u2019s participation in those acts reads:\n\u201cIn the period between 8 October and mid-December 1991, in Zagreb and Pakra\u010dka Poljana, during an international armed conflict between the forces of the Republic of Croatia and the former [Yugoslav People\u2019s Army] and the paramilitary Serb forces, assisted by volunteer fighters from other parts of the former Yugoslavia, contrary to Articles 2, 3 \u00a7 1 (a) and (c), 13 and 32 of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949 and Articles 4 \u00a7\u00a7 4 and 2 (a), 51 \u00a7\u00a7 2 and 6, 86 and 87 of the Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I), as an official in the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Croatia and the commander of the reserve unit of the Ministry of the Interior stationed in Pakra\u010dka Poljana and partially in Zagreb, where it had its compound, and thereby authorised to command his subordinates and responsible for the application of rules of international humanitarian law concerning the protection of civilians, ordered the unlawful deprivation of liberty, torture and killing of certain civilians, and when he was not present in the field, although aware that his subordinates were acting unlawfully by arbitrarily depriving civilians of their liberty, robbing, ill-treatment, torture, causing physical harm and killing civilians, did not take the necessary measures to prevent or suppress such unlawful actions, thereby accepting that his subordinates continue with such acts and condoning their consequences ...\u201d 13.  On 28 June 2011 the applicant lodged an objection against the indictment, arguing that it was not supported by any relevant evidence. 14.  On 12 September 2011 a three-judge panel of the Zagreb County Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s objection against the indictment as ill-founded on the grounds that there was sufficient evidence supporting the conclusion that there was a reasonable suspicion that he had committed the offences for which he had been charged. 15.  On 4 October 2011 the Zagreb County Court commissioned an expert report concerning the possibility of the applicant following the trial. 16.  In a report of 14 December 2011 a court expert found that with the appropriate accommodation arrangements and medical supervision, the applicant could follow the trial. 17.  In the further course of the proceedings a number of hearings were held before the Zagreb County Court. A hearing held on 29 March 2012 was adjourned to 2 April 2012 due to deterioration in the applicant\u2019s health during the questioning of a witness. A hearing held on 15 June 2012 was also adjourned due to the applicant\u2019s state of health. 18.  The criminal proceedings against the applicant are still pending. 19.  The applicant was arrested on 10 December 2010 in connection with the criminal complaint lodged against him by the police (see paragraph 6 above). 20.  On the same day, having questioned the applicant (see paragraph 7 above), the investigating judge of the Zagreb County Court ordered his remand in custody for a further forty-eight hours on the grounds that he might try to influence the witnesses and on account of the gravity of the charges. The investigating judge noted in particular that some forty-three witnesses needed to be questioned and that the allegations of war crimes against the civilian population imputed to the applicant were of a particularly serious nature, involving killings and severe ill-treatment. 21.  On the order of the investigating judge and because of the applicant\u2019s medical condition (see paragraph 7 above), he was placed in a prison hospital. Later during his confinement he was also treated in a special rehabilitation hospital in Krapinske Toplice. 22.  On 12 December 2010 the investigating judge ordered that the applicant be remanded in custody for a further day. 23.  On 13 December 2010 the investigating judge ordered the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention for one month under Article 102 \u00a7 1 (2) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (risk of collusion and gravity of charges), reiterating his previous arguments. 24.  The applicant appealed against the decision of the investigating judge before a three-judge panel of the Zagreb County Court, invoking his state of health and arguing that twenty years had passed since the alleged crimes had taken place. 25.  On 17 December 2010 a three-judge panel of the Zagreb County Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal as unfounded. The relevant part of the decision reads:\n\u201cIt is firstly to be noted that in connection with the offences imputed to the defendant, in particular concerning the acts of the reserve [police] forces under his command, the questioning of a number of victims and witnesses, who have the relevant knowledge about the events from the period at issue, has been requested. Irrespective of the time that has passed since the period at issue, the defendant, who has only recently been informed of the facts of the offences forming the charges against him, if at large is likely to try to contact the [following] witnesses ... [These witnesses] still feel distress and fear and [the defendant could], in order to minimise his criminal responsibility, directly or indirectly influence their statements and thereby hinder the proper course of the investigation. Therefore, in order to avert the collusion, the investigating judge properly ordered the defendant\u2019s pre-trial detention under Article 102 \u00a7 1 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.\nFurthermore, in view of the manner in which the war crimes against the civilian population under Article 120 of the Criminal Code were allegedly committed by the defendant, and which are punishable by twenty years\u2019 imprisonment, the investigating judge correctly found that the circumstances of the offences were particularly grave, warranting pre-trial detention under Article 102 \u00a7 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. These particularly grave circumstances of the offences concern, in the view of this panel, the manner in which the civilians ... were unlawfully and arbitrarily deprived of their liberty, how their property was confiscated without any legal basis, how they were physically and mentally ill-treated (often by the use of electric shocks) and eventually killed; and the fact that some of these unlawful acts were committed on the basis of the defendant\u2019s orders, while the others he did not prevent although he was aware of them ...\u201d 26.  On 5 January 2011 the investigating judge extended the applicant\u2019s detention for a further two months under Article 102 \u00a7 1 (2) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (risk of collusion and gravity of charges). He found that some more witnesses needed to be questioned and reiterated his previous findings concerning the gravity of the charges against the applicant. 27.  The applicant appealed against that decision and on 14 January 2011 a three-judge panel of the Zagreb County Court dismissed his appeal as ill-founded, reiterating its previous arguments. 28.  The investigating judge extended the applicant\u2019s detention on 9 March 2011 for a further two months, relying on Article 102 \u00a7 1 (2) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (risk of collusion and gravity of charges). He found that eight witnesses still needed to be questioned and that the arguments concerning the gravity of the charges were still valid. 29.  The applicant appealed against that decision, reiterating his previous arguments, and on 18 March 2011 a three-judge panel of the Zagreb County Court dismissed his appeal as ill-founded, relying on the same grounds as those in its previous decisions. 30.  On 9 May 2011 the investigating judge extended the applicant\u2019s detention for a further month under Article 102 \u00a7 1 (2) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (risk of collusion and gravity of charges), reiterating his previous arguments concerning the gravity of the charges and finding that five more witnesses needed to be questioned. 31.  The applicant appealed against that decision and on 27 May 2011 a three-judge panel of the Zagreb County Court dismissed his appeal as ill-founded, noting in particular that, in view of the gravity of the charges imputed to the applicant and given that he had been detained for some six months, there was still a predominant interest in keeping him in detention. It also considered that he should be remanded in custody until all the witnesses had been questioned. 32.  Following the submission of the indictment against the applicant to the Zagreb County Court (see paragraph 12 above), on 10 June 2011 a three-judge panel of that court extended the applicant\u2019s detention pending trial under Article 102 \u00a7 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (gravity of charges). The relevant part of the decision reads:\n\u201cWhen assessing whether further extension of the detention is needed under Article 102 \u00a7 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the panel looked into the facts of the indictment and found that there was a reasonable suspicion that the accused Tomislav Mer\u010dep, in the period between 8 October 1991 and mid-December 1991, as an official and the commander of the reserve unit of the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Croatia, authorised to command his subordinates, ordered the unlawful deprivation of liberty, torture and killing of certain civilians. When he was not present in the field, although aware that his subordinates were acting unlawfully by arbitrarily depriving civilians of their liberty, robbing, ill-treatment, torture, causing physical harm and killing civilians, he did not take the necessary measures to prevent and suppress such unlawful actions, therefore accepting that his subordinates continue with such acts and condoning their consequences.\n...\nFurthermore, the perpetrators \u2013 members of the accused\u2019s unit \u2013 took money and valuables from their victims (cars, jewellery, household appliances etc.) and subsequently exposed them to brutal torture, such as electric shocks through an induction telephone, cutting open muscles and wiring open wounds, severe beatings, physical ill-treatment, degrading treatment and locking them in rooms without beds or toilets. In addition, the charges against the accused also concern an incident in which members of the unit under his command killed a twelve year-old girl A.Z. by firing six bullets into her head, together with her mother M., both of whom had been taken away after her father, M.Z., had been killed in their doorway in Z.\nConsequently, and bearing in mind the extent of the unlawful actions which there is a reasonable suspicion that the accused committed and in particular the number of victims, which was, according to the facts of the indictment, more than twenty, all of them civilians, who were brutally tortured, robbed and killed or who have disappeared, the panel finds that the perpetrator acted with extreme cruelty, brutality, persistence and an extraordinary degree of criminal intent.\nAll of the above-mentioned circumstances, in the opinion of this panel, represent particularly grave circumstances that overcome the usually grave circumstances pertinent to such offences. Therefore, the detention is necessary under Article 102 \u00a7 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure ...\u201d 33.  The applicant appealed against that decision to the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske), challenging the necessity of his detention and alleging a number of substantive and procedural flaws. 34.  On 6 July 2011 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal, upholding the decision of the Zagreb County Court. The Supreme Court in particular noted:\n\u201c... the finding of the first-instance court that the grounds for further detention of the accused under Article 102 \u00a7 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure still exist is correct.\nThe indictment shows a relevant degree of reasonable suspicion that the accused committed the criminal offence under Article 120 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code, by which the general statutory condition under Article 102 \u00a7 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has been fulfilled.\n...\nAccording to the indictment ... the behaviour of the accused, in the view of this second-instance court, significantly surpasses the ordinary circumstances and consequences of such offences, and represents particularly grave circumstances of the offence allegedly committed by the accused which warrant detention under Article 102 \u00a7 1(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.\nIn his appeal, the accused alleged that there had been a serious breach of criminal procedure, without specifying his argument. In this regard, the second-instance court was unable to find breaches that should have been examined ex officio.\nThe appeal argument of errors of facts is also unfounded, since the first-instance court fully determined the facts and gave detailed, valid and clear reasons for its findings, which this second-instance court fully accepts.\nThe accused also relied on the case-law of the Constitutional Court in its decision U-III-1683/2008 of 7 May 2008 and Article 5 \u00a7 1 [of the Convention], arguing that deprivation of liberty before a final judgment is a particularly sensitive issue, and that such detention should not turn into a prison sentence. Thus, [according to the accused] it can be ordered only when there is a high probability that guilt will be established and a sentence imposed, in cases where there is a reasonable suspicion that the accused has committed a criminal offence and only for the purposes of the proper conduct of the proceedings, conditions which had not been met in the case at issue.\nContrary to the appeal arguments, the extension of detention under Article 102 \u00a7 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not contrary to the Constitution or Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Detention under Article 102 \u00a7 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure has a preventive purpose, namely the deprivation of liberty of the perpetrators of such serious crimes that, if they would be at large, the reputation of the judiciary and the public\u2019s faith in it would be diminished; its purpose is not to avert the risk of the proceedings being hindered.\n...\nThe poor state of health of the accused does not call into question the reasonableness of his detention, since adequate medical care, bearing in mind that he suffers from a chronic disease, can be offered to him in detention, that is to say in the prison hospital.\u201d 35.  The applicant challenged the decision of the Supreme Court before the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske), arguing that the Supreme Court had failed to provide relevant and sufficient reasons for his prolonged pre-trial detention. 36.  On 30 August 2011 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint as ill-founded, endorsing the decisions of the Zagreb County Court and the Supreme Court. The relevant part of the decision reads:\n\u201cIn view of the competence of the Supreme Court as the highest court ensuring the coherent application of the law and the equality of everyone in its application (Article 116 \u00a7 1 of the Constitution), the likelihood of a prison sentence within the given term and the particularly grave circumstances of the offence, the Constitutional Court finds that the Supreme Court and the Zagreb County Court satisfied the relevant opinions and requirements when extending the pre-trial detention under Article 102 \u00a7 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure ...\u201d 37.  On 6 September 2011 a three-judge panel of the Zagreb County Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention under Article 102 \u00a7 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (gravity of charges), reiterating its previous arguments. 38.  The applicant appealed against that decision to the Supreme Court and on 28 September 2011 the Supreme Court dismissed his appeal as ill-founded on the grounds that, in the particular circumstances of the case, his detention was still justified. 39.  On 28 November 2011 a three-judge panel of the Zagreb County Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention under Article 102 \u00a7 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (gravity of charges) on the grounds that the reasons warranting his detention still persisted. 40.  The applicant appealed against that decision and on 14 December 2011 the Supreme Court dismissed his appeal as ill-founded, endorsing the reasoning of the Zagreb County Court. 41.  The applicant\u2019s detention was further extended on 14 February 2012 by a decision of a three-judge panel of the Zagreb County Court, relying on Article 102 \u00a7 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (gravity of charges) and reiterating its previous arguments. 42.  The applicant challenged that decision before the Supreme Court and on 29 February 2012 the Supreme Court dismissed his appeal as ill-founded on the grounds that no doubts had been raised as to the findings of the Zagreb County Court. 43.  The applicant then lodged a constitutional complaint before the Constitutional Court, arguing that his detention was no longer justified and proportionate. 44.  On 18 April 2012 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint, endorsing the extension of his pre-trial detention. However, the Constitutional Court indicated that the lower courts were obliged to thoroughly assess all the relevant circumstances of the case, and in particular the applicant\u2019s state of health, when deciding whether his pre-trial detention should be extended. 45.  On 27 April 2012 a three-judge panel of the Zagreb County Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention under Article 102 \u00a7 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (gravity of charges), finding that the circumstances warranting his detention still persisted. With regard to the applicant\u2019s state of health, it indicated that so far, nothing suggested that he could not receive appropriate medical treatment in detention. 46.  The applicant appealed to the Supreme Court alleging lack of appropriate reasoning in the decision of the Zagreb County Court to extend his pre-trial detention. 47.  On 21 May 2012 the Supreme Court accepted the applicant\u2019s appeal and remitted the case to the Zagreb County Court on the grounds that it had not established all the relevant facts concerning the health care provided to the applicant in detention. 48.  In compliance with the order of the Supreme Court, a three-judge panel of the Zagreb County Court re-examined the case. On 29 May 2012 it extended the applicant\u2019s detention under Article 102 \u00a7 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (gravity of charges). With regard to the applicant\u2019s state of health, it noted that he was receiving appropriate medical treatment in detention. 49.  The applicant challenged that decision before the Supreme Court. On 29 June 2012 the Supreme Court accepted his appeal and remitted the case for re-examination on the grounds that the decision of the Zagreb County Court lacked relevant reasoning. 50.  On 5 July 2012 a three-judge panel of the Zagreb County Court revoked the decision on the applicant\u2019s detention and ordered his immediate release on the grounds that, although the circumstances of the case warranted his detention, the quality of the medical treatment which he was receiving in detention was not adequate. Since that could raise an issue under Article 3 of the Convention, the Zagreb County Court considered that he should be released pending trial. It stressed in particular:\n\u201cThus, in the concrete case priority should be given to the values protected by Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights because the public interest is reflected not only in the grounds for detention under Article 102 \u00a7 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure but also in the protection and application of the values provided for under the cited provision of the European Convention on Human Rights. In this respect, the time that has elapsed since according to the indictment the offence was committed should be noted, and in particular the period which the accused has spent in detention, as well as the likely duration of the criminal proceedings.\u201d", "references": ["3", "2", "6", "1", "0", "5", "7", "9", "4", "8", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1953 and 1950 respectively and live in Ankara. They are the parents of Mr H\u00fcseyin Ba\u015fbilen, who was an engineer working for Aselsan, a defence contractor that produces technology for the Turkish Armed Forces. 6.  On 4 August 2006, at around noon, Mr H\u00fcseyin Ba\u015fbilen\u2019s wife informed the police that her husband had been missing since the morning of the same day. 7.  On 5 August 2006, at around 9 p.m., the mayor of Ayd\u0131nc\u0131k village, in the district of Alt\u0131nda\u011f, in Ankara, informed the gendarmerie that there was a car in the vicinity of the cemetery of the village. When the gendarmerie arrived at the scene at 9.30 p.m., they found H\u00fcseyin Ba\u015fbilen\u2019s dead body in his car. 8.  A crime scene report was drafted and signed by two crime scene gendarmerie officers on 6 August 2006. The report stated that a public prosecutor together with a doctor and the crime scene officers had arrived on the scene at 9.30 p.m. on 5 August 2006 and had conducted an on-site inspection of the area. According to the report, Mr H\u00fcseyin Ba\u015fbilen\u2019s car was locked when the officers found it. His head was under the glove compartment on the passenger side and his feet were on the driver\u2019s seat. A doctor examined the deceased\u2019s body and observed that there was a cut of 15-20 cm on the left side of his throat and another cut of 10 cm on his left wrist. A number of personal objects, a briefcase and a box cutter covered with traces of blood were found in the car. The deceased\u2019s personal objects and the briefcase were given to officers from the Alt\u0131nda\u011f gendarmerie command. The crime scene officers noted bloodstains on various parts of the interior of the car. 9.  A suicide note entitled \u201cFAREWELL\u201d, typed on a computer and signed, was also found in the car. The note stated that the applicant had no problems with his wife, his family or at work, but he wished to put an end to his life as he was in emotional pain. In the note, details of Mr H\u00fcseyin Ba\u015fbilen\u2019s bank accounts and an explanation as to how he wished his property to be managed following his death were included. 10.  The crime scene officers took fingerprints of the deceased and collected fingerprints both from the interior and the exterior of the car. The officers also obtained blood and hair samples from the car, prepared two sketch maps of the scene of crime and took approximately one hundred photos. Mr H\u00fcseyin Ba\u015fbilen\u2019s body was then sent to the Forensic Medicine Institute for autopsy. The fingerprints collected at the crime scene and the suicide note were sent to the Gendarmerie General Command for examination by experts. The deceased\u2019s clothes as well as hair and blood samples were sent to the police crime laboratory. 11.  Meanwhile, on 6 August 2006 a gendarmerie officer, \u015e.K., from the Alt\u0131nda\u011f gendarmerie command, went to Mr H\u00fcseyin Ba\u015fbilen\u2019s workplace in order to verify whether the suicide note found at the scene of the crime had been written using his office computer. According to a confiscation report drafted at 1.40 p.m. on that day and signed by \u015e.K. and two employees of Aselsan, a document entitled \u201cFor those who love me\u201d was found in the \u201cDocuments\u201d file on the deceased\u2019s computer. This document had the same content as the suicide note found in the car. The copy of the suicide note submitted to the Court also contains a brief note on the back of it which states that a document entitled \u201cFor those who love me\u201d was in a USB flash drive in one of the drawers of Mr H\u00fcseyin Ba\u015fbilen\u2019s desk at work. 12.  On the same day an autopsy was carried out on the deceased\u2019s body. The doctors noted that the body was in an advanced state of decomposition and that there were two cuts on it: one cut of 8 cm on the left wrist; another one between the left thyroid cartilage and the left ear. The doctors concluded that the cut on the deceased\u2019s left wrist was the fatal wound and that the cause of death was excessive bleeding. They also noted that the cut on Mr H\u00fcseyin Ba\u015fbilen\u2019s throat was superficial. 13.  On the same day the applicants, Mr H\u00fcseyin Ba\u015fbilen\u2019s sister and his wife made statements to the gendarmerie. While the applicants and Mr H\u00fcseyin Ba\u015fbilen\u2019s sister denied the possibility that he had committed suicide, his wife stated that he had been suffering from depression and had been undergoing psychiatric treatment. She believed that her husband had committed suicide. 14.  On 22 August 2006 a report was drawn up by experts from the Gendarmerie General Command stating that the signature at the bottom of the suicide note was considered to belong to the deceased. The experts compared the signature on the suicide note with two documents taken from Aselsan. On the same day a further fingerprint analysis report was also issued. According to this report, most of the fingerprints collected from the crime scene were not suitable for analysis. The experts noted that only four fingerprints could be analysed and that two of them belonged to Mr H\u00fcseyin Ba\u015fbilen. The remaining two fingerprints did not belong to the deceased and did not match any of those in the fingerprint database. 15.  On 29 August 2006, following examination of the hair and blood samples collected at the crime scene, the Ankara police crime laboratory issued a report. According to the report, the blood and hair found in the car belonged to the deceased. 16.  On 7 September 2006 the applicants lodged a complaint with the Ankara public prosecutor\u2019s office, asking for the scope of the investigation to be expanded. They requested, in particular, that the transcripts of the deceased\u2019s telephone conversations, his emails, messages and all information on his computers be examined; that the date of creation of the file containing the suicide note be determined and that an examination of the deceased\u2019s computer be carried out by experts. The lawyer also stated that the psychiatrist who had been treating Mr H\u00fcseyin Ba\u015fbilen had told Mrs Ba\u015fbilen that her son had not had suicidal tendencies. 17.  On 12 October 2006, upon a request by the public prosecutor, Turkcell, a mobile network operator, submitted a list of communications made from the deceased\u2019s mobile phone between 10 July and 5 August 2006 to the Ankara public prosecutor\u2019s office. 18.  On 28 November 2006 the Ankara public prosecutor decided to close the investigation into Mr H\u00fcseyin Ba\u015fbilen\u2019s death. In his decision, the public prosecutor noted that the signature on the suicide note belonged to the deceased and that the letter had been found on his work computer. He further noted that the fingerprints and the blood and hair samples collected at the crime scene belonged to Mr H\u00fcseyin Ba\u015fbilen and that according to the autopsy report the fatal wound on his body had been the cut on his left wrist, which had caused bleeding. The public prosecutor considered that Mr H\u00fcseyin Ba\u015fbilen had committed suicide using a sharp object and thus decided to close the investigation. 19.  On 25 December 2006 the applicants lodged an objection with the Sincan Assize Court against the decision of 28 November 2006. They referred to a number of shortcomings in the investigation conducted by the Ankara public prosecutor. They complained, in particular, about the failure of the public prosecutor to take statements from their son\u2019s wife, the psychiatrist who had been treating Mr H\u00fcseyin Ba\u015fbilen, and other possible witnesses, to have the deceased\u2019s computer, his emails and the transcripts of his telephone conversations examined and to determine the date the suicide note file had been created on his computer. They also noted that the briefcase found in the deceased\u2019s car had not been subject to an examination and was not listed in the crime scene inventory. The applicants considered that their son had been murdered as he had been working on important projects for Aselsan. 20.  On 12 April 2007 the Sincan Assize Court asked the Forensic Medicine Institute to clarify whether in suicide cases it was possible to have two separate cuts, that is to say one on the throat and another on the wrist, like in the present case. 21.  On 28 September 2007 the first section of expertise of the Forensic Medicine Institute held, by a majority, that the cut on Mr H\u00fcseyin Ba\u015fbilen\u2019s throat was superficial and that the fatal cut, which had caused extensive bleeding, was the one on his wrist. The report concluded by saying that it was possible that both cuts had been inflicted by Mr Ba\u015fbilen himself. A minority expressed a dissenting opinion. Taking into account the circumstances of the case, in particular the fact that the deceased had not been in a suicidal state of mind, the position of the deceased\u2019s body in the car and the nature of his injuries, they considered that Mr H\u00fcseyin Ba\u015fbilen had not committed suicide. 22.  On 13 December 2007 the Sincan Assize Court dismissed an objection lodged by the applicants and upheld the public prosecutor\u2019s decision. The court based its decision on the conclusions of the Forensic Medicine Institute\u2019s report, according to which it was possible that the deceased himself had inflicted the two cuts on his body. This decision was served on the applicants on 18 January 2008.\nII.  Investigation no. 2010/142387 23.  On 8 November 2010 Mr Hasan Ba\u015fbilen, Mr H\u00fcseyin Ba\u015fbilen\u2019s twin brother, lodged a complaint with the Ankara public prosecutor\u2019s office. In his complaint, Hasan Ba\u015fbilen noted that according to a number of news articles published, an investigation had been initiated against a number of officials attached to the Naval Forces suspected of forming a criminal organisation and espionage. According to the transcripts of telephone conversations between the suspected members of the organisation, they had stolen important weapons technology from Aselsan and similar establishments, sold it abroad, killed those who had not wished to collaborate with them and made those murders look like suicides. Hasan Ba\u015fbilen asked the public prosecutor\u2019s office to re-open the investigation and to remedy the previous investigation\u2019s shortcomings. 24.  Upon the receipt of Hasan Ba\u015fbilen\u2019s complaint, the Ankara public prosecutor initiated a new investigation into the death of H\u00fcseyin Ba\u015fbilen. 25.  On 29 December 2010 the public prosecutor took a statement from the first applicant, who contended that he believed that his son had been murdered. The first applicant stated that he had received phone calls after his son\u2019s death during which he had been informed that his son had been killed by foreign intelligence services who had stolen a project his son was working on. He further stated that he did not believe that the suicide note found in his son\u2019s car had been drafted by him given that he had not gone to his workplace on the day of his death. The first applicant also contended that his son\u2019s briefcase found in his car was missing. He asked the public prosecutor to take statements from the deceased\u2019s colleagues and wife and to extend the scope of the investigation. 26.  On 31 December 2010 the Ankara Magistrates\u2019 Court authorised the Ankara public prosecutor to conduct a search of H\u00fcseyin Ba\u015fbilen\u2019s computer in Aselsan, to obtain copies of the computer files thereon, to have those files converted to text formats and to seize any evidence that could help the investigation. 27.  On 4 January 2011 the Ankara public prosecutor, three police technical specialists and a computer engineer went to Aselsan\u2019s office. According to the search report, the engineer who acted as an expert stated that he was unable to copy the files on the computer on the spot and that therefore the computer case and the hard disk should be confiscated for further examination in a laboratory. The company officials also handed over a number of documents to the public prosecutor. These documents had been in the briefcase found in the deceased\u2019s car and had been given to his wife, who had in turn given them to Aselsan. 28.   On 5 January 2011 the Ankara public prosecutor asked the Alt\u0131nda\u011f gendarmerie command to submit the USB flash drive found in the deceased\u2019s workplace and confiscated on 6 August 2006, and the report concerning the date of creation of the suicide note document found on the deceased\u2019s computer on the same date, if such a report had been drawn up. The public prosecutor asked the gendarmerie command to explain the reasons for not determining the date the letter was written on, if such an investigative step had not been carried out. He lastly asked that \u015e.K., the gendarmerie officer who had conducted the examination of the deceased\u2019s computer, be referred to the public prosecutor\u2019s office to make a statement. 29.  On 16 March 2011 the Alt\u0131nda\u011f gendarmerie commander sent a letter to the Ankara public prosecutor in which he stated that the gendarmerie forces did not have any information as to the whereabouts of the USB flash drive and that it had not been possible to ascertain whether an examination of the suicide note document to ascertain its date of creation had been carried out. He further stated that the USB flash drive had not been found on the gendarmerie command premises and that he had no information as to whether such an object had been found at the scene of the crime or whether the public prosecutor had an order for its confiscation. He noted that when \u015e.K. had been asked to give information regarding the public prosecutor\u2019s inquiry, he had contended that he had not confiscated such an object. The gendarmerie commander lastly stated that \u015e.K. had retired. 30.  Meanwhile, on 12 January 2011 fingerprints collected from various parts of Mr H\u00fcseyin Ba\u015fbilen\u2019s car were once again subjected to an analysis by experts from the Ankara police headquarters, who noted that ten of the fingerprints taken were not suitable for an analysis. They further noted that one fingerprint belonged to the deceased and that three fingerprints which were suitable for an analysis did not belong to Mr H\u00fcseyin Ba\u015fbilen. 31.  On 27 January 2011 S.A., a relative of the deceased who had gone to the crime scene together with the deceased\u2019s father, made a statement to the Ankara public prosecutor. He noted a number of peculiarities that he had observed there, such as the fact that there had been little blood in the car, and that the driver seat had been pushed back even though the deceased had been a short man. He also noted that there had been three plain clothed men at the crime scene whose access to the crime scene had been prevented by the gendarmerie officers. 32.  On 31 January 2011 Hasan Ba\u015fbilen made a statement to the Ankara public prosecutor, in which he reiterated his suspicions regarding his brother\u2019s death. 33.  In February and March 2011, upon the Ankara public prosecutor\u2019s instructions, the computer files were examined by police officers attached to the technical bureau at the anti-terror department of the Ankara police headquarters, who prepared two reports. 34.  On 14 February 2011 \u015e.K. made a statement to the Ankara public prosecutor. He submitted that when he had gone to the premises of Aselsan on 6 August 2006, he had examined the deceased\u2019s computer together with an Aselsan manager. They could not find the suicide note on the computer but found it on the USB flash drive. He printed the letter out using a printer there and sent it to the crime laboratory. He also maintained that he had confiscated the USB flash drive and given it to E.\u015e., the then Alt\u0131nda\u011f gendarmerie commander. He had then assumed that the USB flash drive would be sent to the public prosecutor\u2019s office to be included in the investigation file. \u015e.K. stated that he had not looked into when the suicide note document had been created as he had limited knowledge of information technology and as he had not received an order to carry out such an analysis. He considered that fingerprinting the suicide note would be sufficient for a comparison between the copies of the letter found at the deceased\u2019s workplace and in his car. \u015e.K. lastly noted that he did not have any knowledge as to the briefcase and the documents therein found in Mr H\u00fcseyin Ba\u015fbilen\u2019s car. 35.  On 21 February 2011 an expert from the Ankara police crime laboratory examined the photographs of the crime scene and the other evidence in order to determine whether Mr H\u00fcseyin Ba\u015fbilen\u2019s death had been homicide or suicide. The expert opined that the cuts had been inflicted when the deceased had been in the driver\u2019s seat; that he had touched the left door handle at least once; that later on he had crawled to reach the door on the passenger side for an unknown reason; that he had lost consciousness and his head had fallen under the glove department on the passenger side; and that he had then died. The expert also noted a number of dubious issues. In particular, having regard to the position of the briefcase and the absence of blood on it, he considered that the briefcase had been put in the place where it had been found after the death had occurred and the blood clots had dried. The expert lastly noted that the source of the bloodstains observed in front of the left rear seat could not be determined. 36.  On 22 February 2011 H.A., the psychiatrist who had been treating Mr H\u00fcseyin Ba\u015fbilen for depression, made a statement to the Ankara public prosecutor. He contended that he had diagnosed the deceased with serious depression and had prescribed medication for his health issues. The psychiatrist considered that the deceased had not had suicidal tendencies. He noted that had he considered H\u00fcseyin Ba\u015fbilen at risk of killing himself, he would have informed his family members and confined him to a hospital for psychiatric treatment. However, he considered it possible that an event might have triggered his suicide given that he had suffered from depression. 37.  On various dates between February and April 2011 the Ankara public prosecutor obtained witness statements from six persons who had been H\u00fcseyin Ba\u015fbilen\u2019s friends or colleagues. They all maintained that he had been an intelligent and hardworking engineer who had had good social relations and that they had not been aware that he had had health issues. His colleagues also noted that the project on which he had been working had not been a critically important project and that his death had not had an impact on its running. 38.  Following an instruction received from the Ankara public prosecutor, the anti-terror branch of the Ankara police headquarters sent a list of names and email addresses found on H\u00fcseyin Ba\u015fbilen\u2019s computer to the Istanbul police headquarters. They asked the latter to carry out an examination of the files of the military espionage and Ergenekon[1] investigations with a view to determining whether those names and the deceased\u2019s name appeared therein. On 14 April 2011 the deputy director of the Istanbul police headquarters sent a report prepared by three police officers according to which some of those names, including H\u00fcseyin Ba\u015fbilen, had been found in some of the documents seized from two suspects in the military espionage and Ergenekon investigations. 39.  On 20 June 2011 E.\u015e. made a statement to the Ankara public prosecutor. He submitted that a team from the gendarmerie command had gone to Aselsan and found the suicide note on a USB flash drive which they had confiscated. E.\u015e. stated that he had not been given the USB flash drive, which should have been sent to the gendarmerie crime laboratory. He also did not have any knowledge of the whereabouts of the documents in the briefcase found at the crime scene. He had seen the briefcase when the deceased\u2019s car had been brought to the gendarmerie command. The crime scene gendarmerie officers had showed the documents to Aselsan officials and had asked whether they were important and should be returned to Aselsan. The officials had not considered the documents important. He however did not know to whom those documents had been handed over. 40.  On 19 August 2011 the Ankara public prosecutor sent a letter to the Air Force Command requesting information as to whether the Air Force had asked Aselsan to develop software for Turkish military aeroplanes. 41.  On 21 September 2011 the deputy legal advisor at the Air Force Command informed the Ankara public prosecutor that the Air Force had not asked Aselsan to develop software. He sent to a list of military projects in which Aselsan had been involved to the public prosecutor\u2019s office in support of his reply. 42.  On 3 November 2011 the box cutter found at the crime scene was analysed at the Ankara criminal police laboratory. The experts did not note any fingerprints on it. 43.  On 12 December 2011 the Ankara public prosecutor asked the Forensic Medicine Institute to prepare a new report regarding H\u00fcseyin Ba\u015fbilen\u2019s death. On 4 January 2012 the first section of expertise of the Forensic Medicine Institute issued a report in which it concluded, by a majority, that the injuries found on the deceased\u2019s body had been self\u2011inflicted. 44.  On various dates in 2011 the Ankara public prosecutor collected information on Mr H\u00fcseyin Ba\u015fbilen\u2019s financial status. In particular, he requested and received documents concerning his bank accounts from several banks. Similarly, in 2011 the public prosecutor collected medical records of Mr Ba\u015fbilen as well as two other engineers who had worked for Aselsan and who had passed away. 45.  On 6 April 2012 the Ankara public prosecutor asked Aselsan to provide a list of persons who had had access to H\u00fcseyin Ba\u015fbilen\u2019s office and computer and a list of persons who had worked for Aselsan in 2006 as well as their mobile phone numbers. 46.  On 8 June 2012 the legal director and the legal expert of Aselsan informed the Ankara public prosecutor that all staff members at Aselsan had had access to H\u00fcseyin Ba\u015fbilen\u2019s office. They further noted that H\u00fcseyin Ba\u015fbilen had had two computers and that other employees could use H\u00fcseyin Ba\u015fbilen\u2019s computers if they logged onto the system with their usernames and passwords. In such a case, if H\u00fcseyin Ba\u015fbilen had not limited access to the hard disk of his computers as an administrator, other users could have accessed the hard disk. Lastly, Aselsan sent a list of persons who had shared H\u00fcseyin Ba\u015fbilen\u2019s office and another list containing the names of those who had worked for Aselsan in 2006 with their mobile phone numbers. 47.  Meanwhile, on 21 May 2012 the first applicant made a further statement to the Ankara public prosecutor reiterating that his son\u2019s death raised suspicions and asking the public prosecutor to continue to investigate. 48.  On 5 July 2012 S.D. and M.K., the residents of Ayd\u0131nc\u0131k village who had found the deceased\u2019s car, were interviewed by the public prosecutor. S.D. stated that he had heard from somebody that three cars had arrived in the village a day before H\u00fcseyin Ba\u015fbilen\u2019s car had been found and that the deceased\u2019s car had been one of them. He had learned that the persons in the cars had got out in the village\u2019s main square and that there had been a quarrel. They had then left the village and driven towards the cemetery. S.D. contended that he did not recall who had talked to him about this incident. 49.  On 5 Mart 2013 a graphology expert conducted an examination of the signature found on the suicide note and prepared a report. According to the report, the expert compared the signature on the suicide note with the deceased\u2019s signature found on four documents, namely a document taken from Aselsan, two documents taken from the deceased\u2019s bank and a document taken from another company. The report concluded that the signature belonged to the deceased. 50.  On 26 October 2013 the Ankara public prosecutor once again asked the Forensic Medicine Institute to prepare a report regarding H\u00fcseyin Ba\u015fbilen\u2019s death. 51.  On 13 February 2014, the plenary assembly of the Forensic Medicine Institute concluded, by a majority (seventeen votes), that it was possible that the injuries on H\u00fcseyin Ba\u015fbilen\u2019s body had been inflicted by himself; however, seven members considered that Mr H\u00fcseyin Ba\u015fbilen had not committed suicide and fourteen members opined that it could not be determined whether the deceased had been killed or had committed suicide. 52.  On 16 July 2014 a public prosecutor from the office for investigating offences allegedly committed by civil servants (Memur Su\u00e7lar\u0131 Soru\u015fturma B\u00fcrosu), attached to the Ankara public prosecutor\u2019s office, asked the Ankara provincial gendarmerie command to form a task force and to reinvestigate the deaths of H\u00fcseyin Ba\u015fbilen and four other engineers who had also worked for Aselsan. The public prosecutor\u2019s office also requested that a number of steps be taken in the investigations into these deaths. As to the investigation into H\u00fcseyin Ba\u015fbilen\u2019s death, the public prosecutor noted four issues and ordered further enquiries regarding these points. The prosecutor, firstly, ordered a further report on the dubious issues noted in the report dated 21 February 2011 (see paragraph 35 above). Secondly, he considered suspicious the fact that the deceased\u2019s briefcase had not been forensically examined but had been given to his wife, and requested that the officer who had given the order to deliver the briefcase to his wife be identified. Noting that the USB flash drive found in H\u00fcseyin Ba\u015fbilen\u2019s office had disappeared and criminal proceedings had been brought against \u015e.K. and E.\u015e., the public prosecutor asked for information as to whether disciplinary proceedings had been brought against the relevant officers. Lastly, the public prosecutor noted that on the basis of H\u00fcseyin Ba\u015fbilen\u2019s credit card statements it had been found out that he had bought petrol in a filling station at 6.56 a.m. on 4 August 2006. He ordered that enquiries be carried out into whether the video surveillance recordings had been requested from the filling station and that, if so, that they be sent to the public prosecutor\u2019s office. He also ordered the gendarmerie to find out whether the recordings were extant if they had not already been secured. 53.  On 7 August 2014 the deputy commander of the Ankara gendarmerie command sent a list of gendarmerie officers to be included in the task force, and a table containing the instructions given by the Ankara public prosecutor, to the Ankara public prosecutor\u2019s office. 54.  On 29 September 2014 the Ankara public prosecutor asked the gendarmerie command to instruct the officers in the task force to conduct a thorough investigation, to be in constant contact with the public prosecutor\u2019s office and to provide information on the outcome, especially in view of the public interest in the investigation. 55.  According to the information in the case file, the investigation is ongoing.", "references": ["2", "7", "5", "6", "4", "3", "1", "9", "8", "No Label", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1962 and 1958 respectively and live in Sisak. 6.  On 20 June 2011 the Sisak-Moslavina Police Department (Policijska Uprava Sisa\u010dko-moslava\u010dka; hereinafter: the \u201cpolice\u201d) lodged a criminal complaint against the applicants and one other person, alleging that in 1991 and 1992 they had committed war crimes against the civilian population in the area of Sisak and Banovina. 7.  Having collected extensive evidence in the course of the preliminary investigation, on 22 June 2011 the Osijek County State Attorney\u2019s Office (\u017dupanijsko dr\u017eavno odvjetni\u0161tvo u Osijeku) requested an investigating judge of the Osijek County Court (\u017dupanijski sud u Osijeku) to open an investigation in respect of the applicants on suspicion of war crimes against the civilian population, as alleged in the criminal complaint lodged by the police. 8.  The investigating judge questioned the applicants in connection with the request of the Osijek County State Attorney\u2019s Office. Both applicants denied the allegations against them. 9.  On 22 June 2011 the investigating judge opened an investigation in respect of the applicants on suspicion of war crimes against the civilian population. The investigating judge found, on the basis of the available material, that there was a reasonable suspicion that the first applicant, acting in his capacity as commander of police combat units in the area of Sisak, had ordered and carried out arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment of civilians, and that he had failed to prevent, supress and punish arbitrary arrests and searches and seizures, as well as ill-treatment and killings perpetrated by his subordinates. With regard to the second applicant, the investigating judge found that there was a reasonable suspicion that, as a member of a special police unit of the Sisak police, he had organised a group which had carried out arbitrary arrests, ill-treatment and killings. 10.  During the investigation the investigating judge heard evidence from the applicants and questioned numerous witnesses. He also obtained a number of relevant forensic reports on the crime-scene examinations, autopsies and ballistic expertise, and voluminous evidence and documentation concerning the actions of the police units in Sisak at the relevant time. 11.  On the basis of the evidence obtained during the investigation, on 16 December 2011 the Osijek County State Attorney\u2019s Office indicted the applicants in the Osijek County Court on charges of war crimes against the civilian population. The first applicant was charged with twenty-four counts of arbitrary arrests, ill-treatment and the killing of civilians, and the second applicant with four counts of ill-treatment and the killing of civilians. The relevant part of the indictment concerning the applicants\u2019 participation in those events reads:\n\u201cI. Defendant Vladimir Milankovi\u0107\nin the period between July 1991 and June 1992, while defending the wider area of Sisak and Banovina from armed attacks carried out by paramilitary formations of a part of the local Serbian population and the Yugoslav People\u2019s Army in the conflict on the Constitutional and territorial integrity of the Republic of Croatia, ... as a commander of the police units in the wider area of Sisak and Banovina ...\nauthorised thereby to give orders to all police units and responsible for [securing] compliance with and application of the laws of war and international humanitarian law relative to the protection of civilian persons on that territory and for the humane treatment of prisoners of war,\naware that, due to the conflict and occupation of an important part of Banovina and the terrorising and expulsion of the non-Serbian population from the occupied territories, intolerance towards the Serbian citizens of Sisak was growing, that the security situation in the city was ... extremely complex, that inter-ethnic relations were very tense, that there was a perception amongst the Croatian and other non-Serbian citizens of Sisak that all Serbs were collectively responsible for the war, ...\nat the same time aware that the police units under his command were mostly composed of members of the local population affected by the suffering, that amongst the members of his subordinate police units there were some individuals who had been previously in conflict with the law, while the members of the reserve police units had not been instructed about or trained on all the obligations arising from the norms of international laws of war and humanitarian law,\naware that in the Sisak area members of his subordinate units frequently and without any legal basis carried out searches [and seizures] in the houses and flats of persons of Serbian origin, ... who were, in the course of these unlawful actions, often arrested ...\nalthough aware that the arrested persons were subjected to unlawful actions, that during questioning they were accused of collaboration with the enemy, offended, humiliated and coerced, that some of them were physically and psychologically ill-treated and that grave bodily injuries were inflicted on them, and that already on 4 August 1991, during one such intervention ... V.B. [was arrested and subsequently] brutally beaten by a number of unknown members of the reserve police unit ..., and that the numerous injuries he had sustained led to his death the same evening in the Sisak hospital,\nalthough aware that in the above-noted circumstances, if he failed to take timely and adequate measures, the members of his subordinate units would continue their unlawful actions against the citizens of Sisak of Serbian origin and their inhumane treatment of prisoners of war,\nalthough under the commonly recognised rules of international laws of war and humanitarian customary law relative to the protection of civilian persons, and the command responsibility for the acts of subordinates in times of armed conflict, contrary to Articles 3 \u00a7 1 (a) and (c), 13, 27, 31 and 32 of the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949, Article 4 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 2 (a) and Article 13 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts of 8 June 1977 (Protocol II), Articles 75, 86 and 87 of the Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I) and Article 3 \u00a7 1 (a) and (c) and Article 13 of the Third Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949, he was required to take measures to prevent, supress and punish such unlawful actions, he failed to do so. On the contrary, by using his authority as commander of the police units, he prevented the taking of necessary measures to identify the direct perpetrators and thereby condoned the unlawful actions of his subordinates and encouraged them to take such actions, accepting that they would continue with their actions and condoning their consequences. Meanwhile he also personally participated in ill-treatment and attacks on certain civilians and ordered the unlawful detention of a number of civilians of Serbian origin ...\nII. Defendant Drago Bo\u0161njak\nin the second half of August 1991, ..., as a member of the special police unit V. of the Sisak Police Department, together with, at present, unknown members of that unit, ..., in order to carry out coercion and revenge on citizens of Serbian origin, contrary to Articles 3 \u00a7 1 (a) and (c), 13, 27 and 32 of the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949, Article 4 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 2 (a) and Article 13 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts of 8 June 1977 (Protocol II), organised and led a group of unknown members of the said unit with whom he carried out unlawful arrests, ill-treatment and the killing of persons of Serbian origin ...\u201d 12.  The applicants objected to the indictment. On 27 January 2012 a three-judge panel of the Osijek County Court confirmed the existence of a reasonable suspicion that they had committed the offences listed in the indictment, and sent the case to trial. 13.  At a hearing held on 21 May 2012 before the Osijek County Court the applicants pleaded not guilty to the charges. 14.  In the further course of the proceedings a number of hearings were held before the Osijek County Court, notably on 11-13 June; 2-4 and 9-11 July; 4-5 and 17-19 September; 9-10 and 15-17 October; 5, 7, 19, 20-21 November, 11-12 December 2012; as well as on 4-5 and 18-20 February; 18-20 March; 29 April; 14 and 28 June; 26 August; 29 September; and 14-16 October 2013. Several witnesses were questioned and voluminous evidence was examined. 15.  The closing hearing was held on 2 December 2013. By a judgment of 9 December 2013 the Osijek County Court found the first applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to eight years\u2019 imprisonment. It acquitted the second applicant on the grounds of lack of evidence. 16.  The first applicant challenged the first-instance judgment before the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske), alleging a number of substantive and procedural flaws. The Osijek County State Attorney\u2019s Office also lodged an appeal before the Supreme Court, challenging the acquittal of the second applicant and complaining that the sentence given to the first applicant was lenient. 17.  On 10 June 2014 the Supreme Court upheld the acquittal of the second applicant and increased the first applicant\u2019s sentence to ten years\u2019 imprisonment. The judgment of the Osijek County Court thereby became final. 18.  On 20 June 2011 the applicants were arrested in connection with the criminal complaint lodged against them by the police (see paragraph 6 above). 19.  On 22 June 2011 the investigating judge ordered the applicants\u2019 pre-trial detention for one month under Article 102 \u00a7 1 (2) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (risk of collusion and gravity of charges). The relevant part of the decision reads:\n\u201cAs an investigation has been opened in respect of the defendants concerning the offences at issue, the general condition [related to the existence of reasonable suspicion] for ordering detention against ... the second defendant Vladimir Milankovi\u0107 and the third defendant Drago Bo\u0161njak has been met.\n...\nA request for the questioning of 232 witnesses has been made. Most of these witnesses live in the Sisak area and most of them still work or have worked as police officers ... who were subordinate to the second defendant Vladimir Milankovi\u0107. Specifically, in the period at issue the second defendant Vladimir Milankovi\u0107 was a deputy to the Chief of the Sisak Police Department ... and the real commander of the entire police force [in the Sisak area]. The records of the police interviews show that several witnesses who should be questioned [during the investigation] are in fear of the second defendant because they gave statements concerning the impugned actions ... and the second defendant was their superior in the period at issue. Furthermore, amongst the witnesses \u2013 including victims who have been ill-treated or are family members of the victims, there is a fear of the defendant and the available material in the case file shows that the witnesses have been threatened ... There is therefore a risk of collusion, [that is to say a risk] that the defendant could, if at large, hinder the investigation by influencing the witnesses. Thus detention under Article 102 \u00a7 1 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is justified.\nFurthermore, since the defendant ... has been charged with individual and command responsibility for the unlawful deprivation of liberty and ill-treatment of thirty-eight civilians of Serbian origin and the killing of thirty-one persons of Serbian origin from the Sisak area, all of which was perpetrated in a particularly brutal manner, including entire families irrespective of the sex or age [of the victims], and in view of the fact that the criminal offence at issue carries a sentence of more than twelve years\u2019 imprisonment, and also the circumstances described in [the decision on opening of the investigation], ... it follows that detention under Article 102 \u00a7 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is justified.\nDetention under Article 102 \u00a7 1 (2) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is also justified in respect of the third defendant Drago Bo\u0161njak. ... A number of witnesses who should be questioned during the investigation, and who were members of unit V., have given different statements about the [relevant] events from those given by the defendant ... which suggests that there is a risk that if at large he could hinder the conduct of the investigation by influencing these witnesses ...\nThe same circumstances which have been stated above concerning the first and the second defendants accordingly apply to the third defendant with regard to the existence of a risk that if at large they could continue with threats to the mentioned witnesses, who have already been threatened several times concerning their statements against the defendants in the proceedings at issue. Thus the detention under Article 102 \u00a7 1 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is justified.\nIn respect of the third defendant, reasons for detention under Article 102 \u00a7 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure also exist.\nIn particular, he is suspected of individual responsibility in the commission of war crimes against the civilian population and arbitrary arrests, ill-treatment and the killing of two families Vi. and T. in a highly brutal manner. The description of the offences [referred to in the decision on opening of the investigation] suggests that the circumstances of the offences were particularly serious. The offences were motivated by revenge and ethnic discrimination and were committed in a highly brutal manner against civilians and entire families ... Detention under Article 102 \u00a7 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is therefore justified.\u201d 20.  The applicants appealed against the decision of the investigating judge before a three-judge panel of the Osijek County Court, arguing that it lacked the relevant reasoning. 21.  On 5 July 2011 a three-judge panel of the Osijek County Court dismissed the applicants\u2019 appeals as unfounded, endorsing the reasoning of the investigating judge. In particular it noted the following:\n \u201cThere is therefore a reasonable suspicion that the defendants committed the offences alleged [in the decision on opening of the investigation] and thus the general condition for ordering pre-trial detention under Article 102 \u00a7 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has been met. The impugned decision contains sufficient reasoning as to the existence of a reasonable suspicion, and the appeal arguments, concerning the manner in which the offences were committed or the extent of the criminal wrongdoing relate to something which will be examined during the proceedings. At this stage of the proceedings the existence of a reasonable suspicion is a sufficient condition for ordering pre-trial detention ... and when examining an appeal against the decision ordering detention, the second-instance court is not authorised to examine the facts with regard to the actual existence of the offences at issue or the criminal responsibility of the perpetrator.\nThe justification for pre-trial detention under Article 102 \u00a7 1 (2) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure in respect of the defendants follows from the material in the case file. In this respect the impugned decision provided relevant and detailed reasons, which this second-instance panel accepts.\n...\nFurthermore, the appeal arguments that in the case at issue the same purpose of the detention could be achieved by one of the alternative measures under Article 90 of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be accepted ...\nIn view of all the circumstances of the case, this panel finds that detention under Article 102 \u00a7 1 (2) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is necessary and the only appropriate measure for the prevention of collusion, especially given the particular gravity of the offences at issue.\u201d 22.  On 19 July 2011 the investigating judge extended the applicants\u2019 detention for a further two months under Article 102 \u00a7 1 (2) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (risk of collusion and gravity of charges). He found that some more witnesses needed to be questioned and that some of them had been threatened with regard to their statements in the criminal proceedings at issue. The investigating judge also reiterated the previous findings concerning the gravity of the charges against the applicants. 23.  The applicants appealed against that decision and on 1 August 2011 a three-judge panel of the Osijek County Court dismissed their appeals as ill-founded, reiterating its previous arguments. 24.  On 19 September 2011 the investigating judge extended the applicants\u2019 detention for a further three months under Article 102 \u00a7 1 (2) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (risk of collusion and gravity of charges). He held that thus far, out of 232 witnesses, sixty-one had been questioned and that the remainder should be questioned within a period of three months. The investigating judge also reiterated the specific circumstances of the case justifying detention on the grounds of gravity of the charges. 25.  The applicants challenged that decision, arguing that their continued detention was not justified. On 30 September 2011 a three-judge panel of the Osijek County Court dismissed their appeals as ill-founded, endorsing the findings of the investigating judge. 26.  On 28 October 2011 the first applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske), contending that his pre-trial detention was not based on relevant and sufficient reasons. 27.  On 11 November 2011 the Constitutional Court dismissed the first applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint, endorsing the reasoning of the Osijek County Court. The Constitutional Court in particular stressed:\n\u201cThe Constitutional Court reiterates its opinion, on which the appellant relies in his constitutional complaint, that the mere existence of a \u2018reasonable suspicion\u2019 is not sufficient after a certain lapse of time to justify pre-trial detention. It is necessary in such instances, (even under) the case-law of the European Court [of Human Rights], to ascertain the conditions for a possibility [of detention]: a) the existence of \u2018relevant and sufficient\u2019 reasons justifying [the detention], and b) whether the competent criminal justice authorities displayed the necessary diligence in the conduct of the proceedings. ...\nSince Article 102 \u00a7 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not explicitly provide for a legitimate aim of detention, as provided for in the other relevant provisions on detention, it is particularly important that the competent criminal justice authorities correctly establish the necessity of applying Article 102 \u00a7 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure ...\nIn view of the findings of the Osijek County Court, and taking into account the sentence of imprisonment which can be imposed in this specific case, as well as the gravity of the charges, the Constitutional Court finds that the decisions of the investigating judge and the three-judge panel of the Osijek County Court comply with the relevant opinions and requirements when extending the pre-trial detention under Article 102 \u00a7 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure ...\u201d 28.  Following the filing of the indictment against the applicants in the Osijek County Court (see paragraph 11 above), on 19 December 2011 a three-judge panel of that court extended the first applicant\u2019s detention pending trial under Article 102 \u00a7 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (gravity of charges). The relevant part of the decision reads:\n\u201cThere is a reasonable suspicion (and therefore the existence of the general condition for pre-trial detention) that the accused Vladimir Milankovi\u0107 and Drago Bo\u0161njak committed the [war crimes against the civilian population]. ...\nThe second condition [for detention] under Article 102 \u00a7 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure has also been met. This follows from the indictment against the accused Vladimir Milankovi\u0107 and Drago Bo\u0161njak, which describes the physical and mental ill-treatment of the detained civilians, who were beaten until they lost consciousness, subjected to such brutality as to cause bodily harm, arbitrary arrests and beatings. [The accused are suspected of] shooting and bombing family houses, locking civilians in basements without windows or light, taking civilians to unknown locations and shooting them or killing them with hard or sharp objects, and the killing of the entire V. family and part of the T. family out of revenge and ethnic discrimination ... Therefore both defendants are suspected of particular cruelty and mercilessness ..., which, in view of the number of [victims] and the consequences of such conduct, the impugned offences in their entirety significantly surpass the usual circumstances pertinent to such grave offences. This justifies detention under Article 102 \u00a7 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure in respect of the accused Vladimir Milankovi\u0107 and Drago Bo\u0161njak ...\n The preventive measures [under the Code of Criminal Procedure], in view of the specific circumstances of the offences at issue, could not achieve the purpose of detention ...\u201d 29.  The first applicant appealed against that decision to the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske), challenging the necessity of and the lack of relevant and sufficient reasons for his continued detention. 30.  On 13 January 2012 the Supreme Court dismissed the first applicant\u2019s appeal, upholding the decision of the Osijek County Court. The relevant part of the decision reads:\n\u201cThe impugned conduct of both accused, which includes ill-treatment and other extreme forms of inhumane treatment of civilians, and in the case of the accused Vladimir Milankovi\u0107 also of prisoners of war, some of whom were killed, as well as the failure to prevent such conduct by [Vladimir Milankovi\u0107\u2019s subordinates] ... suggests a particularly high level of brutality, mercilessness and unimaginable cruelty. Taking also into account that the seriousness of the impugned conduct of both accused on account of its intensity, recurrence and modality, as well as the period in which it took place, significantly surpasses the usual circumstances and consequences of such offences, which are in themselves particularly grave, [the Supreme Court finds] that the circumstances of the offence are particularly grave [justifying detention] under Article 102 \u00a7 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.\nThe appellate arguments of both accused that the purpose of detention could be achieved by alternative preventive measures cannot be accepted ... as there is public interest justifying the restriction of the accused\u2019s right to personal liberty, guaranteed under the Constitution and the European Convention on Human Rights. The fact that the impugned offences took place twenty years ago does not diminish their gravity and their moral public condemnation ... In particular, the conclusion as to the existence of particularly grave circumstances [of the offences] follows from the specific facts and the conduct with which the accused are charged, and they significantly surpass the usual circumstances related to the commission of such offences.\nThe appellate arguments challenging the existence of a reasonable suspicion, and the assessment of evidence, are not relevant for the decision on detention, as at this stage of the proceedings the existence of a reasonable suspicion follows from the indictment. The second-instance panel, when examining an appeal against a decision on detention, cannot examine the factual findings or the criminal responsibility of the accused.\u201d 31.  The first applicant challenged the decision of the Supreme Court by lodging a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court. He argued that his continued detention had been arbitrary and contrary to the Constitution and the Convention. 32.  On 2 March 2012 the Constitutional Court dismissed the first applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint as unfounded. It reiterated the necessity of examining in detail all the relevant circumstances of the case when ordering and extending pre-trial detention under Article 102 \u00a7 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 27 above), noting in particular:\n\u201cThe Constitutional Court accepts the findings of the Supreme Court ... that detention is justified by the public interest in the case. The Supreme Court correctly stated that the fact that the impugned offences took place twenty years ago does not diminish their gravity or their moral public condemnation ...\u201d 33.  On 9 March 2012 a three-judge panel of the Osijek County Court extended the first applicant\u2019s detention under Article 102 \u00a7 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (gravity of charges), reiterating its previous arguments. 34.  The first applicant appealed against that decision to the Supreme Court. On 4 April 2012 the Supreme Court dismissed his appeal as ill-founded on the grounds that, in the particular circumstances of the case, his detention had not been disproportionate or unjustified. 35.  On 4 June 2012 a three-judge panel of the Osijek County Court extended the first applicant\u2019s detention under Article 102 \u00a7 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (gravity of charges), relying on the seriousness of the specific charges against him and finding that the overall duration of his detention had not been excessive. 36.  The first applicant challenged that decision before the Supreme Court, reiterating his previous arguments. On 29 June 2012 the Supreme Court dismissed his appeal as ill-founded on the grounds that the public interest related to his remand in custody prevailed over his right to liberty. 37.  The first applicant lodged a constitutional complaint before the Constitutional Court against the decision of the Supreme Court, arguing in particular that his continued detention was not based on relevant and sufficient reasons. 38.  On 26 July 2012 the Constitutional Court dismissed the first applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint, endorsing the reasoning of the Supreme Court. 39.  On 27 August 2012 a three-judge panel of the Osijek County Court extended the first applicant\u2019s detention under Article 102 \u00a7 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (gravity of charges), relying on its previous findings as to the gravity of the charges against him. 40.  The first applicant appealed against that decision to the Supreme Court, invoking his state of health related to an injury to his right hip and challenging his continued pre-trial detention. 41.  On the basis of medical documentation submitted by the first applicant, on 26 September 2012 the Supreme Court found that the relevant information concerning his health had not been known to the first-instance court when extending his detention; it thus remitted the case and ordered the first-instance court to examine the matter. 42.  On 17 October 2012 a three-judge panel of the Osijek County Court, relying on an expert report which indicated that there was no imminent risk to the first applicant\u2019s health or necessity for urgent surgery, extended the first applicant\u2019s detention. 43.  The first applicant appealed against that decision before the Supreme Court. On 15 November 2012 the Supreme Court dismissed his appeal as ill-founded on the grounds that the Osijek County Court had correctly established all the relevant circumstances of the case warranting the extension of his detention. 44.  The first applicant challenged the decision of the Supreme Court before the Constitutional Court, arguing that his continued detention was no longer reasonable or justified. On 8 January 2013 the Constitutional Court dismissed his complaint as ill-founded, upholding the decision of the Supreme Court. 45.  On 14 January 2013 a three-judge panel of the Osijek County Court extended the first applicant\u2019s detention under Article 102 \u00a7 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (gravity of charges) on the grounds that, in the particular circumstances of the case at hand, there was nothing calling into question the necessity of his continued detention. 46.  The first applicant appealed against that decision to the Supreme Court and on 30 January 2013 the Supreme Court dismissed his appeal as ill-founded. The Supreme Court held as follows:\n\u201cIt is therefore, in the view of this court, justified to remand the accused Vladimir Milankovi\u0107 in custody under Article 102 \u00a7 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure ... In view of the fact that the purpose of detention under the cited provision is to prevent persons whose actions provoke particular moral condemnation from being at large, the appeal arguments, according to which the decision of the first-instance court with regard to the necessity of detention lacks the relevant reasoning, cannot be accepted.\u201d 47.  The first applicant challenged that decision before the Constitutional Court. On 15 March 2013 the Constitutional Court dismissed his complaint, endorsing the findings of the Supreme Court. 48.  On 28 March 2013 a three-judge panel of the Osijek County Court extended the first applicant\u2019s detention under Article 102 \u00a7 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (gravity of charges), reiterating its previous arguments. 49.  The first applicant challenged that decision before the Supreme Court. On 17 April 2013 the Supreme Court dismissed his appeal on the grounds that there was a persisting public interest warranting his detention. 50.  On 14 June 2013 a three-judge panel of the Osijek County Court extended the first applicant\u2019s detention under Article 102 \u00a7 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (gravity of charges), reiterating its findings as to the particular gravity of the charges against him. 51.  The first applicant appealed against that decision to the Supreme Court and on 5 July 2013 the Supreme Court dismissed his appeal as ill-founded, endorsing the findings of the Osijek County Court. 52.  The first applicant then lodged another constitutional complaint before the Constitutional Court, challenging his continued detention. On 26 August 2013 the Constitutional Court accepted his complaint and remitted the case to the Osijek County Court on the grounds that it had failed to indicate in sufficient detail the specific reasons warranting the first applicant\u2019s continued detention. The Constitutional Court explained the relevant principles in the following manner:\n \u201cUnder Article 102 \u00a7 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure on the purpose and aim of detention, and bearing in mind the [Court\u2019s] case-law, which the Constitutional Court accepts, detention on the grounds of \u2018particularly grave circumstances\u2019 of an offence ... cannot by itself serve as a purpose.\nThe consequences of the fact that a criminal offence is particularly grave and that its social dangerousness and the \u2018extent\u2019 of society\u2019s condemnation are expressed through the possibility of imposing a (long) sentence, are reflected both subjectively and objectively. A defendant facing serious charges and a possibility of incurring a long sentence inevitably has a subjective [incentive] to escape and/or to hinder the proper conduct of the proceedings and/or to reoffend. However, objectively ... there is a possibility of \u2018disturbance of the public\u2019, which requires additional care and protection of the public interest. ...\n...\nAccordingly, the extension of detention under Article 102 \u00a7 2 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be grounded on a simple repetition of the description of the offence imputed [to a defendant] ... but requires an analysis and a detailed reasoning of all the facts and circumstances, particularly those related to the personality of the defendant, the public interest in his or her remand in custody, as well as the conduct and the results of the proceedings.\u201d 53.  On 2 September 2013 a three-judge panel of the Osijek County Court examined the specific circumstances of the case and extended the first applicant\u2019s detention under Article 102 \u00a7 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (gravity of charges). The relevant part of the decision reads:\n\u201cThe release of the accused Vladimir Milankovi\u0107 in respect of whom there is a reasonable suspicion that he has committed the offences at issue, would create public disturbance, particularly amongst members of the Serbian minority, specifically those who were the victims of these offences in the area of Sisak. It should be borne in mind that this concerns not only Sisak, as a small community, but also the surrounding rural areas where the consequences of the war are still present and where the process of normalisation of mutual relations and peaceful coexistence of the citizens, irrespective of their ethnic background, is still ongoing. Thus, the release of the accused from detention would not only disturb the population [of this area] but would also diminish [citizens\u2019] confidence in the judiciary and the social [order] as such. This is especially so given that the mission of the judiciary is not only prosecution, establishing of guilt and punishment of the perpetrators of criminal offences, but also the [creation of a sense] of justice and rule of law from the perspective of citizens.\u201d 54.  The first applicant appealed against that decision to the Supreme Court, challenging the extension of his detention. On 27 September 2013 the Supreme Court dismissed his appeal as ill-founded, endorsing the reasoning of the Osijek County Court. 55.  The first applicant challenged the decision of the Supreme Court by lodging a constitutional complaint before the Constitutional Court. On 7 November 2013 the Constitutional Court dismissed the complaint as ill-founded. The relevant part of the decision reads:\n\u201c... the Constitutional Court accepts the fact that the Supreme Court, in compliance with the decision ... of 26 August 2013, in the impugned decision provided reasons justifying the necessity of detention under Article 102 \u00a7 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the circumstances of the present case. In particular, the Supreme Court provided reasons showing that in view of the local circumstances in Sisak and the [Court\u2019s] case-law relevant to the prevention of disturbance to public order (in the terminology of the Supreme Court: public disturbance), the appellant\u2019s detention under Article 102 \u00a7 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure was justified. ...\n...\nFor these reasons the Constitutional Court finds that the competent courts provided sufficient reasons for their decisions, as required by the decision of the Constitutional Court ... of 26 August 2013. ...\u201d 56.  On 26 November 2013 a three-judge panel of the Osijek County Court extended the first applicant\u2019s detention under Article 102 \u00a7 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (gravity of charges), reiterating its previous arguments. 57.  Following the first applicant\u2019s conviction at first-instance on 9 December 2013 (see paragraph 15 above), he was remanded in custody pending a final judgment. 58.  On 19 December 2011, following the filing of the indictment against the applicants in the Osijek County Court (see paragraph 11 above), a three-judge panel of that court extended the second applicant\u2019s detention pending trial under Article 102 \u00a7 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure on the grounds of gravity of the charges (see paragraph 28 above). 59.  The second applicant appealed against that decision to the Supreme Court, challenging the necessity of his detention and complaining of a lack of relevant and sufficient reasons for ordering it. On 13 January 2012 the Supreme Court dismissed his appeal, upholding the decision of the Osijek County Court (see paragraph 30 above). 60.  On 9 March 2012 a three-judge panel of the Osijek County Court extended the second applicant\u2019s detention under Article 102 \u00a7 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (gravity of charges), reiterating its previous arguments (see paragraph 33 above). 61.  The second applicant challenged that decision before the Supreme Court. On 4 April 2012 the Supreme Court dismissed his appeal as ill-founded on the grounds that, in the particular circumstances of the case, his detention was not disproportionate or unjustified (see paragraph 34 above). 62.  The second applicant lodged a constitutional complaint before the Constitutional Court against the decision of the Supreme Court, arguing that his continued detention was not justified. On 31 May 2012 the Constitutional Court dismissed his constitutional complaint as ill-founded on the grounds that the Osijek County Court and the Supreme Court had provided relevant and sufficient reasons for his continued detention. 63.  On 4 June 2012 a three-judge panel of the Osijek County Court extended the second applicant\u2019s detention under Article 102 \u00a7 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (gravity of charges). They relied on the particularly grave circumstances of the specific charges against him and found that the overall duration of his detention had not been excessive (see paragraph 35 above). 64.  The second applicant challenged that decision before the Supreme Court. On 29 June 2012 the Supreme Court dismissed his appeal as ill-founded on the grounds that the public interest in his being remanded in custody prevailed over his right to liberty (see paragraph 36 above). 65.  On 27 August 2012 a three-judge panel of the Osijek County Court extended the second applicant\u2019s detention under Article 102 \u00a7 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (gravity of charges), relying on its previous findings as to the gravity of the charges against him (see paragraph 39 above). 66.  The second applicant challenged that decision before the Supreme Court. On 26 September 2012 the Supreme Court dismissed his appeal as ill-founded, endorsing the decision of the Osijek County Court. 67.  On 21 November 2012 a three-judge panel of the Osijek County Court extended the second applicant\u2019s detention under Article 102 \u00a7 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (gravity of charges). The relevant part of the decision reads:\n\u201cIt is alleged in the confirmed indictment that there is a reasonable suspicion that the accused Drago Bo\u0161njak, in the second half of August 1991, while defending the wider area of Sisak and Banovina from armed attacks carried out by paramilitary formations of part of the local Serbian population and the Yugoslav People\u2019s Army, as a member of special police unit V. of the Sisak Police Department, together with several unidentified members of that unit, organised and led a group of unidentified members of the said unit with whom he carried out unlawful arrests, ill-treatment and the killing of persons of Serbian origin. Five members of the Vi. family as well as [a certain] N.T. were killed, while [N.T.\u2019s] sons Z. and B. were taken to an improvised detention camp and beaten up, after which they disappeared.\nThe alleged conduct of the accused, especially given the intensity and recurrence of the acts as well as the period in which they took place, was in itself particularly merciless and cruel. In the view of this court, the particularly grave circumstances of the offence surpass the usual circumstances and consequences of such offences and thus justify the detention under Article 102 \u00a7 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.\u201d 68.  The second applicant appealed against that decision to the Supreme Court, arguing that his detention was not justified. On 7 December 2012 the Supreme Court dismissed his appeal as ill-founded. The relevant part of the decision reads:\n\u201c... the finding of the first-instance court that the grounds for the continued detention of the accused Drago Bo\u0161njak under Article 102 \u00a7 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure still apply is correct.\nThe confirmed indictment shows a relevant degree of reasonable suspicion that the accused committed the offence under Article 120 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code. Thus the general statutory condition under Article 102 \u00a7 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has been met.\nThere is a reasonable suspicion that the accused, in the second half of August 1991, while defending the wider area of Sisak and Banovina from armed attacks carried out by paramilitary formations of part of the local Serbian population and the Yugoslav People\u2019s Army, as a member of special police unit V. of the Sisak Police Department, together with several unidentified members of that unit, organised and led a group of unidentified members of the said unit with whom he carried out unlawful arrests, ill-treatment and the killing of persons of Serbian origin. Five members of the Vi. family as well as [a certain] N.T. were killed, while [N.T.\u2019s] sons Z. and B. were taken to an improvised detention camp and beaten up, after which they disappeared.\nContrary to the appeal arguments, the behaviour of the accused described above, particularly given the intensity and number of impugned acts and the period in which they took place, was in itself particularly merciless and cruel. In the view of this second-instance court, the particularly grave circumstances of the offence surpass the usual circumstances and consequences of such offences and thus justify the detention under Article 102 \u00a7 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.\nThe remaining appeal arguments concern the assessment of evidence and the proceedings and are not decisive for the decision on detention. They are a subject of discussion before the first-instance court. In addition, the detention of the accused Drago Bo\u0161njak does not raise an issue under the principle of proportionality with regards to the gravity of the offence, the sentence which could be expected and the necessity of detention.\u201d 69.  The second applicant lodged a constitutional complaint against the decision of the Supreme Court, challenging the necessity of his detention. On 31 January 2013 the Constitutional Court dismissed it as ill-founded. The relevant part of the decision reads:\n\u201cBearing in mind all the circumstances of the present case enumerated in the impugned decisions, the fact that there is a reasonable suspicion that the appellant (in detention since 20 June 2011) \u2018committed an offence under Article 120 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code by which a general statutory condition under Article 102 \u00a7 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure\u2019 has been satisfied, and \u2018in particular the intensity and recurrence of the impugned acts\u2019, the Constitutional Court finds that, notwithstanding the presumption of the appellant\u2019s innocence (and the fact that he has been in detention for nineteen months) the compelling public interest outweighs the accused\u2019s right to liberty.\nTherefore, the Constitutional Court finds that the detention \u2018with regard to the gravity of the offence and the sentence which could be expected\u2019 is entirely proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued, and that the impugned decision does not limit the rights or freedoms of the appellant contrary to [the Constitution].\u201d 70.  On 5 February 2013 a three-judge panel of the Osijek County Court extended the second applicant\u2019s detention under Article 102 \u00a7 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (gravity of charges), reiterating its previous arguments. 71.  The second applicant appealed to the Supreme Court, challenging the existence of relevant and sufficient reasons for his detention. On 27 February 2013 the Supreme Court dismissed his appeal as ill-founded, endorsing the reasoning of the Osijek County Court. 72.  The second applicant challenged the decision of the Supreme Court by lodging a constitutional complaint before the Constitutional Court. On 18 April 2013 the Constitutional Court dismissed his complaint as ill-founded on the grounds that the lower courts, when extending his detention, had provided relevant and sufficient reasons. 73.  On 26 April 2013 a three-judge panel of the Osijek County Court extended the second applicant\u2019s detention under Article 102 \u00a7 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (gravity of charges), relying on its previous reasoning. 74.  The second applicant appealed against that decision before the Supreme Court. On 17 May 2013 the Supreme Court dismissed his appeal as ill-founded, endorsing the reasoning of the Osijek County Court. 75.  The second applicant challenged that decision before the Constitutional Court, arguing that his continued detention had been excessive and disproportionate. 76.  On 11 July 2013 the Constitutional Court, having examined the second applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint, remitted the case to the Osijek County Court on the grounds that the impugned decisions on detention lacked the relevant reasoning. The Constitutional Court reiterated its case-law relevant to the requirements for ordering and extending pre-trial detention on the grounds of gravity of the charges under Article 102 \u00a7 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 52 above). 77.  On 17 July 2013 a three-judge panel of the Osijek County Court extended the second applicant\u2019s detention under Article 102 \u00a7 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (gravity of charges), reiterating its previous findings concerning the specific circumstances of the offences with which the second applicant was charged. 78.  The second applicant appealed against that decision to the Supreme Court. On 31 July 2013 the Supreme Court dismissed his appeal as ill-founded, pointing out the following:\n\u201cIt goes without saying that the release of a person, in respect of whom there is a reasonable suspicion that he has committed the impugned acts, would consequently create a public disturbance, in particular by the national minorities, amongst whom there are also family members of the victims of the conduct at issue, which took place during the war in the Sisak area. This is all the more so since [Sisak] is a small community which has been seriously affected by the war and where the long and difficult process of normalisation of mutual relations and peaceful coexistence is ongoing.\u201d 79.  The second applicant lodged a constitutional complaint before the Constitutional Court against the decision of the Supreme Court, challenging the reasonableness of his continued detention. 80.  On 27 September 2013 the Constitutional Court dismissed the second applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint, finding that his detention so far had been based on relevant and sufficient reasons. However, the Constitutional Court stressed:\n\u201cIn view of the findings [with regard to the possibility of ordering detention on the grounds of the gravity of the charges] and the length of the appellant\u2019s continued detention, as well as the length of the criminal proceedings and the expected termination of the main hearing, and in view of the fact that the detention was ordered twenty years after the alleged commission of the offences with which the appellant has been charged, the Constitutional Court finds that the validity of the findings of the Supreme Court [with regard to the avoidance of public disturbance] has reached its temporal limits.\nIn particular, every further reliance on the risk of public disturbance as a ground for extending the appellant\u2019s detention could turn that ground for detention into a strong basis [for detention], which would mean in practice a constitutionally unacceptable and prohibited obligatory deprivation of liberty ...\nIt therefore follows from the circumstances of the present case that a further extension of detention on the grounds of a risk of public disturbance could lead to a violation of the appellant\u2019s constitutional right to liberty. It is time therefore for the competent court to [re]examine the justification for the appellant\u2019s continued detention in view of this new fact.\u201d 81.  On 30 September 2013 a three-judge panel of the Osijek County Court extended the second applicant\u2019s detention under Article 102 \u00a7 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (gravity of charges), reiterating that in view of the specific charges held against him, his release from detention could create a public disturbance. 82.  The applicant appealed against that decision to the Supreme Court, arguing that his detention was no longer justified. On 25 October 2013 the Supreme Court dismissed his appeal as ill-founded, endorsing the reasoning of the Osijek County Court. 83.  On 2 December 2013 a three-judge panel of the Osijek County Court, anticipating the pronouncement of the first-instance judgment acquitting the second applicant (see paragraph 15 above), ordered his immediate release from detention. The second applicant was released on 9 December 2013. 84.  Meanwhile, the second applicant lodged a constitutional complaint before the Constitutional Court challenging the extension of his detention by the Osijek County Court on 30 September 2013, which had been upheld by the decision of the Supreme Court on 25 October 2013 (see paragraphs 81-82 above). 85.  On 13 January 2014 the Constitutional Court found that the extension of the applicant\u2019s detention from 30 September to 9 December 2013 (see paragraphs 81-82 above) had violated his right to liberty under Article 22 of the Constitution. The relevant part of the decision reads:\n\u201c... in the impugned decisions [the Osijek County Court and the Supreme Court] failed to cite any new reason satisfying the Constitutional Court that the temporal limits [for detention based on the necessity to prevent public disturbance] had not been attained, but they nevertheless extended the appellants detention.\nMoreover, seventy days after the first-instance court had extended the appellant\u2019s detention by means of the impugned decision, and forty-five days following the confirmation of the lawfulness of such decision by the Supreme Court, the competent criminal court terminated the criminal proceedings against the appellant at first instance, acquitting him. Thus in the appellant\u2019s case what the Constitutional Court indicated in its decision ... of 27 September 2013 was confirmed: that \u2018every further reliance on the risk of public disturbance as a ground for extending the appellant\u2019s detention could ... turn that ground for detention into a strong basis [for detention], which would mean in practice a constitutionally unacceptable and prohibited obligatory deprivation of liberty\u2019.\nThe Constitutional Court does not find such conduct by the competent courts acceptable since the liberty of a person is an essential value protected by the Constitution. ...\nIt follows that for the period of validity of the impugned decisions of the Osijek County Court and the Supreme Court (between 30 September 2013 and 9 December 2013) the appellant\u2019s right to liberty, guaranteed under Article 22 of the Constitution, has been violated.\nLastly, the Constitutional Court should also point out that there has been a flagrant violation of the appellant\u2019s constitutional right to liberty in the period between 2 December 2013 and 9 December 2013.\n...\nThe Constitutional Court finds that from the perspective of the appellant\u2019s constitutional right to liberty it is irrelevant that the [Osijek County Court] in its decision of 2 December 2013 to terminate the detention referred to the (forthcoming) judgment of 9 December 2013 by which the appellant was acquitted. From the perspective of the appellant\u2019s right to liberty, it is exclusively relevant that in the operative part of the decision of 2 December 2013 [the Osijek County Court] ordered that the appellant should be \u2018immediately released\u2019, but that the court order was not executed until seven days later.\n...\nIn these circumstances the seven days of the appellant\u2019s detention (between 2 and 9 December 2013) should a priori be considered as a flagrant violation of his right to liberty, guaranteed under Article 22 of the Constitution.\u201d 86.  In October 2014, after he had been finally acquitted, the applicant instituted the friendly settlement procedure with the State concerning the compensation for his unjustified detention. Following an unsuccessful arrangement with the Ministry of Justice (Ministarstvo pravosu\u0111a) over the amount of compensation, the applicant lodged a civil action for damages in the Osijek Municipal Court (Op\u0107inski sud u Osijeku). On 15 October 2015, on the basis of the State\u2019s partial admission of the claim, the Osijek Municipal Court adopted a partial judgment and awarded him 108,900 Croatian kunas (HRK; approximately 14,300 euros) in non-pecuniary damage plus the applicable statutory interest. This partial judgment became final on 5 November 2015, and the Osijek Municipal Court commissioned an expert report in order to determine the possible extent of the State\u2019s responsibility for the applicant\u2019s suffering in detention. These proceedings are still pending.", "references": ["4", "9", "3", "1", "5", "7", "0", "6", "8", "2", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1975 and lives in Chi\u015fin\u0103u. 6.  In 2001 the Comrat Prosecutor\u2019s Office initiated a criminal investigation against the applicant on charges of murder and an arrest warrant was issued by the Comrat District Court. Since the applicant had left the country, an international search order was issued. 7.  On 21 January 2011, upon his return to Moldova, the applicant was arrested and placed in detention. On 4 February 2011, when the applicant was about to be transferred from Comrat to Chisinau, he cut open his abdomen as a sign of protest. He was taken to a hospital where his wound was taken care of. The applicant lodged a habeas corpus request, however it was rejected on the ground, inter alia, that he had been in hiding for more than ten years and that, consequently, he could abscond again. Later the detention warrant was renewed several times on similar grounds and the applicant\u2019s appeals were rejected. The last judgment in the proceedings complained of by the applicant is dated 18 October 2011 and was issued by the Comrat Court of Appeal. 8.  During all this time the applicant was detained in Prison no. 13 in Chisinau (between 4 March and 17 April 2011 and between 9 October 2012 and 12 June 2013) and in Prison no. 5 in Cahul (between 18 April 2011 and 8 October 2012). The applicant gave a detailed description of the conditions of detention in Prison no. 13 where, according to him, the cells were overcrowded and dirty. Each inmate only had between 1.5 and 3 square metres of available space in the cells in which the applicant was detained. The toilets were separated from the rest of the cells by a wall which was not very high and were located at a distance of some 1.5 metres from the table where the inmates served their meals. There was no ventilation system and the air was impregnated with a sewage smell and with cigarette smoke; there was no sufficient natural light because the windows were very small; the daily walks lasted for only one hour and the food served was of a very bad quality. The applicant submitted that according to information available on the web page of the Ministry of Justice, each inmate was allocated only 10 Moldovan Lei per day, i.e. the equivalent of 0.8 Euros (EUR) at the time. Moreover, the applicant alleged that after his arrest, he needed urgent medical care for the wound on his abdomen and for an ear infection and that no medical care was provided for him for one month. He provided medical documents to support his claims concerning his health problems. The Government provided documents according to which the applicant was seen by doctors and medication was prescribed for him. 9.  In so far as Prison no. 5 is concerned, the applicant submitted that he was detained in two cells in which each inmate had between 2.4 and 3 square metres. The Government contested that information and presented a document according to which in the applicant\u2019s cells each inmate had between 4.4 and 6.6 square metres. 10.  The applicant was released from detention on 12 June 2013. The Court was not informed about subsequent developments in the criminal proceedings against the applicant. 11.  The relevant parts of the report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment compiled following his visit to Moldova from 4 to 11 July 2008 (The United Nations Human Rights Council, document A/HRC/10/44/Add.3, 12 February 2009) read:\n\u201cB. Conditions in places of detention\nInstitutions under the Ministry of Justice 30. Undoubtedly, progress has been achieved in improving conditions of detention. However, some of the institutions visited by the Special Rapporteur were heavily overcrowded. The authorities themselves pointed out that Institution No. 13 in Chi\u015fin\u0103u was severely overcrowded - on the day of the visit it held 931 persons with the official capacity being 600 (see also appendix). The Special Rapporteur was informed of Government plans to close down this institution. 31. Common problems at all pre- and post-trial prisons are the poor hygienic conditions, restricted access to health care and lack of medication as well as risk of contamination with tuberculosis and other diseases. Whereas the Special Rapporteur notes that the minimum norms regarding nutrition of detainees (Government Decision n. 609 of 29 May 2006) are checked on a daily basis and that, according to the financial plan of the Penitentiary Department, the food budget for 2008 had almost doubled in comparison to 2004 and is set to rise further, he also received consistent allegations regarding the poor quality and quantity of food. ...\u201d 12.  In its report for 2009 (page 117, \u201cConditions of detention\u201d), the Centre for Human Rights in Moldova (\u201cthe Human Rights Centre\u201d, which also acts as the Moldovan Ombudsman) found, inter alia, that:\n\u201cRegarding personal hygiene, clothing and bedding, despite [the fact that] Government decision no. 609 (29 May 2006) concerning minimum daily food requirements and the issuing of items of personal hygiene provides for the issuing of soap to detainees for bathing and other sanitary-hygienic needs, this has remained unfulfilled during 2009.\u201d 13.  In its report for 2010 (page 142 et seq. \u201cConditions of detention\u201d) the Human Rights Centre found, inter alia, that:\n\u201cFailure to adhere to the statutory cell size (4 square metres per person) in the living blocks of the institution has become an unpleasant problem which now affects the prison system across the entire country. ...\nThe same situation was confirmed during a visit to Chi\u015fin\u0103u Prison no. 13 on 9 September 2010. In some cells the living space was not proportionate to the number of detainees. During the visit, eight detainees were being held in cell no. 38, which measured 24 square metres. This situation has been seen repeatedly during visits by the Centre\u2019s staff to the Chi\u015fin\u0103u Pre-trial Detention Centre. Similar findings were made during visits to Rusca Prison no. 7 on 19 May 2010, where six detainees were being held in a cell measuring 15.5 square metres and to Cricova Prison no. 4, where (in living block no. 7) over twenty detainees were being held in a cell measuring 65 square metres.\nOvercrowding comes directly within the Ombudsman\u2019s remit as part of the National Mechanism for the Prevention of Torture, which on many occasions has recognised overcrowding in the country\u2019s prisons. ...\n... [T]he Prisons Department informed the Ombudsman that meat and fish products are provided [to detainees] whenever possible. At the same time, the authority stated that, owing to the difficult financial situation, during 2010 the detainees in Rezina Prison no. 17 received only 75% and 80% of their normal quotas of meat and fish products respectively. In this connection, the Minister of Justice provided information to the Ombudsman about the expenditure on prisoners\u2019 food in 2010. The cost amounted to MDL 24.05 million, whereas the budgetary need for the same year was, according to the Ministry of Finance\u2019s draft budget, MDL 29.05 million. The daily cost of feeding a detainee in 2010 was MDL 10.24, whilst the daily budgetary need was MDL 12.35. This statistic was often cited by prison authorities to justify why they were unable to provide detainees with meat and fish.\n...\nAs regards sanitary conditions, lighting and ventilation problems continue to exist in the majority of living blocks in Moldovan prisons, with the exception of Taraclia Prison no. 1 and Rusca Prison no. 7.\nThe Republic of Moldova inherited old gulag-type prisons in dilapidated buildings, corresponding to former Soviet standards. The prisons do not conform to current national and international standards; however, the budget constraints upon the State do not allow for their reconstruction or renovation.\n In the prisons, with the exception of Taraclia Prison no. 1, detainees are held in large-capacity cells insufficiently equipped for their daily needs, namely areas for sleeping, for everyday living and for sanitary equipment. Detainees are held in extremely overcrowded, dark, damp and unventilated spaces full of cigarette smoke. In certain prisons the bunk beds essentially prevent daylight from reaching the living space.\u201d", "references": ["9", "4", "3", "6", "7", "8", "5", "0", "2", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1977 and lives in Bucharest. 6.  On 11 October 2009 the EcoPolis association, founded by the applicant and four other associates, opened proceedings before the Bucharest District Court to seek registration in the Register of Associations and Foundations kept by that court. It also asked the court to grant it legal personality. 7.  The association\u2019s goal, as declared in its memorandum of association (act constitutiv) and in Article 2 of its articles of association (statutul asocia\u021biei), was that of promoting the principles of sustainable development at the public policy level in Romania (promovarea principiilor dezvolt\u0103rii durabile la nivelul politicilor publice din Rom\u00e2nia). The association\u2019s objectives, as declared in Article 7 of its articles of association, were: to increase expertise in the development of sustainable public policies in Romania (cre\u015fterea expertizei \u020bn elaborarea politicilor publice durabile din Rom\u00e2nia); to improve the process of the development of sustainable public policies by facilitating public participation in and access to relevant information about the environment; to increase the accountability of the relevant official bodies by scrutinising the implementation of public policies with an impact on the environment; to facilitate the access of official bodies to best practices by examining the Government\u2019s environmental initiatives in a European context; to ensure transparency in the work of public institutions and increase their responsibility for their actions in relation to other citizens; to review whether public institutions worked on the basis of principles of sustainability; and to defend the right to a clean environment, as provided by international treaties. The activities envisaged by the association in order to achieve its objectives, as declared in Article 8 of its articles of association, were: research and analysis; public debates and conferences; monitoring the implementation of European Union directives; public communication campaigns; opinion polls; reviewing the development and implementation of public policies in the environmental field; training; raising citizens\u2019 awareness; informing people of matters of public concern; raising the awareness of the community and of public authorities about the need to protect the environment; organising meetings between citizens and representatives of public authorities; organising debates and opinion polls on issues impacting the environment; developing programmes in partnership with public authorities; active involvement of citizens in the development of public policies and the decision-making process; improving the legal framework; setting up annual prizes for environmental activities; awarding scholarships for promoting sustainable development; networking with similar national and international organisations; supporting and defending the association\u2019s members and volunteers; and other lawful activities. 8.  By an interlocutory judgment of 24 October 2009, delivered in private, the Bucharest District Court granted the association legal personality and ordered its registration in the Register of Associations and Foundations. The court held that the organisation had attached all the lawfully required documents to the application for registration and that the documents had complied both in form and content with the requirements set out by Government Ordinance no. 26/2000. Moreover, the goal set by the association complied with the provisions of Articles 1 and 4 of that Ordinance. 9.  The Bucharest Public Prosecutor\u2019s Office lodged an appeal on points of law (recurs) against the interlocutory judgment of 24 October 2009. It argued that it interpreted the association\u2019s declared goal as belonging to the field of activities of a political party. That interpretation was supported by the association\u2019s objectives and by the activities it planned, as set out in Articles 7 and 8 of the articles of association. However, a political party could not be registered under the provisions of Government Ordinance no. 26/2000. 10.  By a final judgment of 10 February 2010 the Bucharest County Court allowed the appeal on points of law by the Public Prosecutor\u2019s Office and rejected the organisation\u2019s request for registration. It held that the goal of the association, as declared in its memorandum and articles of association, was that of promoting the principles of sustainable development at the public policy level in Romania. Also, according to Article 7 of its articles of association, one of the association\u2019s objectives was to increase expertise in the development of sustainable public policies in Romania. The court considered that the concepts used by the organisation had been very general and had run the risk of being understood as belonging to the field of activities of political parties. The association\u2019s objectives could likewise have been interpreted as belonging to the realm of activity of a political party, although Government Ordinance no. 26/2000 expressly prohibited the use of the ordinance for the registration of political parties.", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "2", "5", "6", "9", "0", "8", "No Label", "7"], "gold": ["7"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Zagreb. 6.  The applicant was a co-owner of a block of flats on the island of Vir. 7.  On 2 and 23 March 2006 building inspectors of the Inspectorate of the Ministry of the Environment, Spatial Development and Construction (Ministarstvo za\u0161tite okoli\u0161a, prostornog ure\u0111enja i graditeljstva, Uprava za inspekcijske poslove) carried out an on-site inspection of the block of flats in question. 8.  On 31 March 2006 one of the building inspectors ordered that the block of flats be demolished within three days from the date of service of the decision. 9.  The applicant lodged an appeal against the demolition order, submitting that the time-limit for compliance was too short and that the block of flats was not within the protected coastal area. 10.  On 15 May 2006 the appeal section of the Legal Department at the Inspectorate (Odsjek za postupak u drugom stupnju \u2013 \u201cthe second-instance body\u201d) dismissed the appeal, finding that the block of flats had been built without a building permit. 11.  Meanwhile, on 4 May 2006 the building inspector issued an administrative enforcement order (zaklju\u010dak o dozvoli izvr\u0161enja), stating that the demolition order of 31 March 2006 had become enforceable on 6 April 2006 and that the co-owners had not complied with it within the given time-limit. He therefore ordered that the demolition be carried out by a third party after 11 May 2006, at the expense of the co-owners. 12.  The applicant lodged an appeal against the administrative enforcement order, submitting that it was not sufficiently reasoned and that the construction of the block of flats could be retrospectively approved. 13.  On 23 May 2006 the second-instance body dismissed the appeal as ill-founded. 14.  On 27 June 2006 the co-owners had the block of flats demolished. 15.  Meanwhile, on 26 June 2006 the applicant lodged an administrative complaint with the Administrative Court, repeating the arguments made in her appeal and seeking damages for the demolition. Since it was not clear whether the applicant was complaining about the second-instance decision concerning the demolition order or the administrative enforcement, on 11 July 2006 the Administrative Court requested her to specify which she wished to contest. 16.  On 30 August 2006 the applicant replied that she was seeking annulment of the second-instance decision of 15 May 2006 concerning the demolition order. 17.  On 22 April 2010 the Administrative Court dismissed her complaint as ill-founded, but addressed it as if it had been about the second-instance decision of 23 May 2006 concerning the administrative enforcement. 18.  On 13 July 2010 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint, alleging, inter alia, a violation of her right of access to court, on the ground that the Administrative Court had erroneously decided a matter which had not been the subject of her administrative complaint. 19.  On 13 December 2010 the Constitutional Court declared the constitutional complaint inadmissible, on the grounds that the contested decision had not concerned the merits of the case and as such was not amenable to constitutional review. This decision was served on the applicant\u2019s representative on 7 January 2011.", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "8", "7", "6", "2", "5", "9", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "4.  This application was lodged on 27 April 2007 by Marina Viktorovna Novikova, who was born in 1972 and lives in Moscow. The applicant is represented by Yuriy Yershov, a lawyer practising in Moscow. 5.  On 10 November 2006 the applicant staged a demonstration in front of the State Duma in Moscow, holding a poster that read \u201cPsychiatry kills our children on our taxes\u201d. According to her, it was a solo static demonstration (\u043e\u0434\u0438\u043d\u043e\u0447\u043d\u043e\u0435 \u043f\u0438\u043a\u0435\u0442\u0438\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435) (see \u201cRelevant domestic law and practice\u201d below) and, as such, fell outside the statutory requirement to give prior notification to the competent public authority. Moreover, she took care to position herself at a distance from other people who were also present in front of the State Duma. 6.  After about ten minutes, the applicant was approached by police officers, who then took her to the district police station. An arrest record was compiled; the reasons for her arrest are unclear. 7.  According to the applicant, she spent some three hours in the police station and was then allowed to leave. 8.  The Government submitted to the Court a report issued on 11 November 2006 by the senior officer on-duty, Su. The report stated that the applicant and five other people (including A., M. and S.) had been present at 8.30 a.m. in front of the State Duma, holding posters that read \u201cAttention! Psychiatry kills. 7.5 million roubles of public funds spent on the destruction of lives\u201d, \u201cDo not force taxpayers to pay for psychiatrists\u2019 systematic extermination of Russians\u201d, \u201cPsychiatrists need walls to hide their crimes\u201d and other such statements. The Government also submitted to the Court copies of documents relating to administrative offence proceedings against A., M. and S. 9.  As for the applicant, the administrative offence record states that she was accused of \u201ctaking part, together with other citizens, in a demonstration in respect of which no prior notification had been provided to the public authorities\u201d. Her actions were classified under Article 20.2 of the Code of Administrative Offences of the Russian Federation (hereinafter \u201cthe CAO\u201d), which regulates the penalties applied to violations of the regulations on public events set out in, inter alia, the Public Assemblies Act. 10.  Officer G. submitted a written report to his hierarchical superior indicating that the applicant \u201chad been arrested and taken to the police station for violating the regulations on public gatherings, namely Article 20.2 of the CAO\u201d. 11.  According to the Government, on 14 November 2006 the case against the applicant was received by the justice of the peace of the Tverskoy District, who on the same day scheduled a hearing for 15 November 2006. According to the applicant, she was not informed of the hearing date until it was too late. Thus, she made no written or oral submissions to the court. 12.  Having examined the file, on 15 November 2006 the judge considered that the applicant had been apprised of the hearing but had refused to sign the summons. The court decided to proceed with the case in her absence and held that she had been afforded but had not used an adequate opportunity to make written or oral submissions. On the same day, the judge found the applicant guilty under Article 20.2 \u00a7 2 of the CAO and imposed a fine of 1,000 Russian roubles (RUB), which was at the time equivalent to 29 euros (EUR). 13.  Referring to the arrest record, the offence record and G.\u2019s report (see above), the court considered that the applicant had participated in a demonstration after which some five people and the applicant had been arrested. In the court\u2019s view, the applicant\u2019s behaviour amounted to participation in a public event requiring prior notification. The justice of the peace then held as follows:\n\u201c[The applicant\u2019s] actions constitute a violation of the regulations on static demonstrations in that no notification had been made [to the competent authority] about the possibility of staging a demonstration ... Thus, this demonstration was held without legal grounds. The court takes into account that the applicant\u2019s presence next to the object being picketed, together with other people, directly discloses the expression of opinions and attitudes, and thus takes the form of a group public event, namely a static demonstration.\u201d 14.  The applicant sought re-examination of the case on appeal by the Tverskoy District Court of Moscow. On 5 December 2006 the court heard the applicant and upheld the judgment of the justice of the peace, concluding that the applicant had taken part in a public event held without prior notification to the competent authority; on 10 November 2006 she had been apprised of the hearing to be held before the justice of the peace but had failed to sign the summons. 15.  On 23 January 2007 the Deputy President of the Moscow City Court upheld the District Court\u2019s decision on supervisory review. 16.  This application was lodged on 26 August 2011 by Yuriy Ignatyevich Matsnev, who was born in 1937 and lives in Kaliningrad. He was represented by Aleksandr Koss, a lawyer practising in Kaliningrad. 17.  On 30 July 2010 the applicant staged a solo demonstration in front of the Kaliningrad Regional Administration building. He was holding a poster showing people (apparently, officials he suspected of corruption) behind bars, and saying \u201cThey should be found accountable!\u201d and \u201cMr Boos! Kaliningrad\u2019s residents are waiting for you to solicit the President!\u201d. Mr S., a journalist, was passing by and filmed the demonstration and the arrival of the police. 18.  The applicant was arrested by the police and taken to the police station. He remained there for two hours and was then allowed to leave. No administrative offence proceedings were instituted against him. 19.  According to reports subsequently made by the arresting officers, the applicant had not had an identity document on him and had agreed to accompany them to the police station in order to have his identity verified and to have an administrative record compiled. 20.  The applicant brought civil proceedings seeking RUB 500,000 as compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage caused by the authorities\u2019 actions. The applicant referred to Article 10 of the Convention. 21.  By a judgment of 14 March 2010, the Tsentralnyy District Court of Kaliningrad acknowledged that the taking of the applicant to the police station and his retention there had been unlawful. The court held as follows:\n\u201cFollowing the escorting of [the applicant] to the police station no administrative offence case was opened ... [Mr S.] testified that the defendant had shown his identity document and had not expressed his consent to go with the police to the police station ... The police officers acted unlawfully when escorting the applicant to the police station ...\u201d\nThe court awarded the applicant RUB 6,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage (approximately EUR 149 at the time). It dismissed his claim concerning the alleged destruction of the poster by the police and made no separate findings relating to his freedom of expression. 22.  On 25 May 2011 the Kaliningrad Regional Court upheld the judgment. 23.  This application was lodged on 10 November 2012 by Viktor Mikhaylovich Savchenko, who was born in 1967 and lives in the village of Platonovo-Petrovka in the Rostov Region. 24.  On 23 June 2011, when Mr Putin was visiting the village of Peshkovo, the applicant staged a demonstration, standing at some distance from a road close to the village and holding a poster reading \u201cMr Putin! In the Rostov region they disregard your Decree on social assistance to families. The Russian Government disregards its obligations to issue housing certificates!\u201d 25.  According to the applicant, police officers approached him and ordered him to go to another place where journalists were filming. He arrived there and displayed his poster. He was approached by people in plain clothes who ordered the police to take him to the police station. The police complied. After some three hours in the police station, the applicant was free to leave. 26.  The police drew up a record of the administrative escorting in respect of the applicant. 27.  The applicant was accused of disorderly behaviour on account of using foul language in a public place on 23 June 2011. On 24 June 2011 a senior police officer found him guilty under Article 20.1 of the CAO (see paragraph 74 below) and imposed a fine of RUB 500 on him. On 21 December 2011 the Azov Town Court overruled the conviction because the senior police officer had not heard evidence from the applicant. The court then discontinued the case owing to the expiry of the time-limit for prosecution. On 7 February 2012 the Rostov Regional Court upheld the judgment on appeal. 28.  The applicant brought civil proceedings challenging the actions of the police in respect of him. On 4 April 2012 the Town Court dismissed his claims. On 14 June 2012 the Regional Court upheld the judgment on appeal. The appeal court noted that the courts dealing with the administrative offence case had not determined whether the applicant had committed the impugned action (using foul language) and whether he had committed an offence, but had simply discontinued the case on procedural grounds. The appeal court concluded that the above \u201cdid not disclose any unlawfulness\u201d on the part of the law-enforcement officers, while the applicant had not substantiated, in the current case, that their actions had violated or otherwise impeded the exercise of his protected rights or freedoms. 29.  This application was lodged on 30 November 2012 by Aleksandr Mikhaylovich Kirpichev, who was born in 1984 and lives in Astrakhan. He is represented by Konstantin Ilyich Terekhov, a lawyer practising in Moscow. 30.  At 7.15 p.m. on 3 July 2012 the applicant staged a solo demonstration at a bus stop. He was holding a poster which read \u201cThe Kremlin is not for sale \u2013 it is a piece of architecture!\u201d. After several minutes some five passers-by stopped and looked at him and his poster. 31.  It appears that soon thereafter five police officers approached and warned those present that a meeting required prior notification to the authorities. The passers-by went away. 32.  It appears from a video recording submitted by the applicant that one of the police officers refused to listen to the applicant\u2019s explanations and told him that he would be taken to the police station. The applicant was then placed in a police car and taken to the police station. He was accused of holding a public event without giving prior notice. 33.  According to the Government, the applicant had staged a public meeting first on the road and then on the pavement near a bus stop. The police officers\u2019 written reports indicated that the applicant had called passers-by to approach and discuss with him the topic of the event. The police decided to apply the escort procedure (\u0434\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0430\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435) to the applicant because it was necessary to put an end to the administrative offence and because an administrative offence record could not be compiled on the spot since the applicant had no identity document on him. The applicant agreed to go with the police to the police station. 34.  On 20 July 2012 a justice of the peace convicted the applicant under Article 20.2 \u00a7 2 of the CAO. The court considered that the applicant had held a public event in the form of a meeting (\u043c\u0438\u0442\u0438\u043d\u0433); some five people had gathered but then dispersed after a warning from a police officer. The justice of the peace sentenced the applicant to a fine of RUB 20,000 (approximately EUR 505 at the time), noting that the applicant had committed an offence that was similar to another one for which he had already been convicted earlier the same year. The justice of the peace warned the applicant that his failure to pay the fine would constitute an administrative offence under Article 20.25 of the CAO, which was punishable by a fine of double the amount or up to fifteen days\u2019 detention. 35.  The applicant appealed, arguing that the court had failed to take into account his financial situation when imposing a high fine. 36.  On 21 August 2012 the Kirovskiy District Court of Astrakhan upheld the judgment on appeal. The appeal court dismissed the argument concerning the amount of the fine by stating that it was the minimum statutory amount prescribed by Article 20.2 \u00a7 2 of the CAO. 37.  In September 2012 the justice of the peace allowed the applicant to pay the fine in three monthly instalments. 38.  This application was lodged on 20 May 2013 by Valeriy Leonidovich Romakhin, who was born in 1965 and lives in Astrakhan. He is represented by Konstantin Ilyich Terekhov, a lawyer practising in Moscow. 39.  At 1.30 p.m. on 10 November 2012 the applicant held a solo demonstration in front of the Maritime University in Astrakhan, to express his disagreement with the recent decision to close the university. The applicant was holding a poster that read \u201cTo close the university is to commit a crime\u201d. 40.  Mr A. was holding a demonstration on the other side of the road, making similar claims. He was holding a poster saying \u201cAnnul order no. 101 of 27 September 2012 and find its authors liable\u201d. According to the applicant, he was standing some 50 metres away. The Government submitted that the applicant and A. were at \u201cvisual distance from each other\u201d. 41.  Shortly after starting his demonstration, the applicant was approached by a police officer who warned him that he was in breach of Article 20.2 of the CAO. He then escorted the applicant to the police station. It appears that A. was also taken to the police station. According to the Government, it was not possible to draw up an administrative offence record on the spot because the applicant had no identity document on him. 42.  The applicant was allowed to leave the police station after several hours. 43.  In the Astrakhan Region, Law no. 80/2012-FZ of 27 November 2012 set the minimum distance between solo demonstrators at twenty metres. 44.  On 6 December 2012 a justice of the peace held a hearing. A. stated that he knew the applicant; without any concerted plan, they had both gone to the university to stage solo demonstrations; the applicant had not prepared his own poster and so had taken one of A.\u2019s posters; they had placed themselves at a distance of some fifty metres from each other. 45.  On the same day, the justice of the peace convicted the applicant under Article 20.2 \u00a7 2 of the CAO (organisation and holding of a public event without prior notification) and imposed a fine of RUB 20,000 on him. On 5 February 2013 the Sovetskiy District Court of Astrakhan upheld the judgment. The courts considered that the applicant and A. had held a public static demonstration (common logistical organisation, timing and claims disclosing a common goal), which by law required them to notify the local authorities in advance. The courts concluded that the offence impinged upon public order and public security, \u201chaving a significant adverse impact on protected public relations\u201d. According to the Government, the applicant was a \u201cparticipant\u201d in a demonstration with A. 46.  It appears that on 26 April 2013 the Astrakhan Regional Court reviewed the case and reduced the fine to RUB 1,000.", "references": ["4", "8", "9", "0", "1", "7", "3", "5", "2", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant submitted that he was born in 1978 in Marseille. He is currently living in Cyprus. 6.  The applicant had carried out some renovation work for the owners of a building in Paphos for which they had not paid him. On 22 January 2010 they called the police to have him arrested. The police came and the applicant told them about the work he had carried out and the money he was owed. 7.  On 26 January 2010, after the owners of the building in question reported him to the police with false claims concerning drugs, he was assaulted by the police and arrested without a warrant. He was then taken by force to Paphos Police Station. He was interrogated the next day by the Police Drug Squad in the presence of an interpreter and was then released. He was advised to file a complaint in respect of the money owed to him. 8.  On 28 January 2010 he was once again assaulted by police officers who came to his flat. He was then taken to Paphos Police station for about an hour. 9. On 17 June 2010 the applicant was assaulted by persons sent by the people he had carried out the work for and he was taken to hospital by the police. 10.  On 15 December 2010 he was informed by a judge of the Paphos District Court that he had to pay 500 euros (EUR). He enclosed a receipt in this respect. He was then released. 11.  On 10 April 2013 five police officers came to his home, searched his apartment and possessions, seized his World Service Authority passport (see paragraph 19 below) and other documents, and proceeded to arrest him; all this without a court order. 12.  They then forced him to go to the Paphos District Court where he was questioned about his passport and documents. He was arrested and the next day he was taken to the Nicosia Central Prisons. 13.  On 17 April 2013 he was taken back to the Paphos District Court. 14.  On 12 June 2013 he wrote to the Prison Director requesting contact with a lawyer but he was informed that he was not allowed to do so. 15.  On 21 June 2013, when he had finished serving his sentence (see paragraph 42 below), the prison guards asked him to sign the \u201crelease register\u201d but he did not do so as he wanted to leave with copies of his medical reports. They refused to give them to him. 16.  The applicant eventually obtained copies of his records and x-rays upon payment of a fee. 17.  The applicant was then detained in Menoyia Detention Centre. 18.  Following an incident on 27 August 2014 he was charged with assaulting a police officer during the performance of his duties contrary to section 244(b) of the Criminal Code. Criminal proceedings are pending against him before the Larnaca District Court (case no. 15785/14). 19.  The applicant complained to the authorities through the World Service Authority which is based in Washington, in the United States of America (\u201cWSA\u201d). On 17 September 2013 the WSA sent letters to the President of the Republic of Cyprus in which a complaint was made about the applicant\u2019s arrest, detention and search carried out in his flat. 20.  By a letter dated 14 August 2013 the applicant sent a complaint to the Commissioner for Administration of the Republic of Cyprus (hereafter \u201cthe Ombudsman\u201d). A copy of the letter has not been submitted. The Ombudsman replied by a letter dated 4 September 2013 that she would contact him with the outcome of her investigation into his complaint when this was concluded. 21.  On 20 September 2013 the Office of the President replied that the conclusion of the investigation of the matter by the competent authority was awaited. 22.  On 4 November 2013 the WSA sent another letter to the Office of the President asking for information on developments in the case of the applicant. It appears that no reply was received. 23.  On 7 July 2014 the applicant complained to the Ombudsman about not having access to his medical records and x-rays at the Nicosia General Hospital. The Ombudsman replied by a letter dated 15 July 2014 that she would contact him about the outcome of her investigation into his complaint when this was concluded. 24.  On 26 January 2010 members of the police entered and searched the applicant\u2019s flat in Paphos after obtaining a search warrant. They confiscated the applicant\u2019s WSA passport and arrested him for the flagrant criminal offences of assaulting a police officer, resisting lawful arrest, obstructing a police officer in the execution of his duty and threatening violence (sections 244 (a) and (b) and 91(c) of the Criminal Code, Cap. 154). The arresting police officer cautioned the applicant and informed him of the reasons for his arrest. The applicant then replied in English \u201cSo what?\u201d 25.   The applicant was then taken to Paphos Police Station where he was detained. 26.  At the station the applicant was informed in writing of his rights under the Rights of Persons Arrested and Detained Law 2005 (Law no. 163(I)/of 2005) (see paragraph 99 below) and, in particular, of his right to contact by phone any relative or other person of his choice, a lawyer of his own choosing and the right to communicate with the consular or diplomatic mission of the state of which he was a national. The applicant signed the relevant document. 27.  On 27 January 2010, at 3.15 pm, a police officer, with the assistance of an interpreter, charged the applicant with the above criminal offences. He was then released. 28.  Following a police investigation, on 1 February 2010, the District Court of Paphos issued an arrest warrant on the ground that there was reasonable suspicion based on evidence that the applicant had been involved in forgery and in circulating a forged document. 29.  The applicant was arrested on the next day on the basis of the above arrest warrant. The arresting officer drew the applicant\u2019s attention to the law and informed him in English of the reasons for his arrest. The applicant then replied in English: \u201cMy passport is not false, it\u2019s real.\u201d The applicant was then taken to Paphos Police Station where he was informed in writing of his rights pursuant to Law no. 163(I)/2005 (see paragraphs 26 above and 99 below). The applicant signed the relevant form. 30.  On 3 February 2010 a police officer, with the assistance of an interpreter, charged the applicant with the criminal offences of forgery, circulating forged documents, unlawful entry and unlawful residence in the Republic. 31.  Criminal proceedings were brought against him before the Paphos District Court (case no. 7512/2010). The applicant was charged with a number of offences: (a) circulating forged documents contrary to sections 331, 332, 333, 335 and 339 of the Criminal Code; (b) unlawful entry into the Republic contrary to section 12 (1, (2) (5) of the Aliens and Immigration Law; (c) unlawful residence in the Republic contrary to sections 6(1)(k) and 19 (l) of the Aliens and Immigration Law; (d) resisting lawful arrest contrary to section 244(a) of the Criminal Code; (e) assaulting a police officer and deliberately obstructing a police officer during the performance of his duties contrary to section 244(b) of the Criminal Code; and lastly, (f) threatening violence (section 91(c) of the Criminal Code). 32.  The Government submitted that the applicant was released on 3 February 2010, twenty-four hours after his arrest. 33.  They also submitted a bail document dated 26 August 2010. 34.  The applicant represented himself in the proceedings. 35.  On 10 April 2013 he appeared before the Paphos District Court. Judgment was given in the case on that day. The applicant was found guilty of the offences of circulating forged documents, resisting lawful arrest and assaulting and deliberately obstructing a police officer during the performance of his duties (see paragraph 31 above). The court held, inter alia, that it had not been established that the applicant had entered Cyprus unlawfully and that, on the basis of the evidence before it, the Aliens and Immigration Law did not apply to the applicant who was a European Union citizen. 36.  The case was then adjourned until 17 April 2013 for sentencing. 37.  When adjourning, the court ordered the applicant\u2019s detention and requested that a socio-economic report be prepared by the Department of Social Welfare Services. 38.  The applicant was taken to Paphos Police Detention Centre and the next day he was transferred to the Nicosia Central Prisons where he remained until 17 April 2013. 39.  In the meantime, on 15 April 2013, the applicant was examined by the prison doctor. The record appears to refer to a facial cranial injury the applicant had two years ago stating it was \u201cnow ok\u201d and that he was \u201csuitable\u201d. A viral test was recommended. 40.  On 17 April 2013 the court imposed concurrent sentences of three months\u2019 imprisonment for the first offence and one month\u2019s imprisonment for the remaining offences, running from 10 April 2013. The applicant was taken back to the Nicosia Central Prisons to serve his sentence. 41.  On 19 April 2013 the applicant was re-examined by the prison doctor. The record indicated that the results of the viral test had not been received (see paragraph 39 above) and that the applicant was suitable for work but not in the kitchen. 42.  On 21 June 2013 the applicant was released following suspension of his sentence by virtue of a decree of the President of the Republic concerning a number of prisoners. To the extent that the decree concerned foreign convicts, suspension of their sentence came with a number of conditions, including that measures would be taken to ensure their departure from Cyprus. 43.  On the same day, the Director of the Department of Civil Registry and Immigration issued deportation and detention orders against the applicant pursuant to section 14 of the Aliens and Immigration Law on the ground that he was an illegal immigrant under section 6(1)(d) of that Law. The applicant was re-arrested immediately upon his release and placed in the immigration detention facilities in the Nicosia Central Prisons. It appears that the applicant never left the prisons but was arrested by the same officers who released him. 44.  A letter was also prepared by the Ministry of Interior informing him of the decision to detain and deport him following his conviction and imprisonment pursuant to section 6(1) of the Aliens and Immigration Law and Article 35 of the Right of Union Citizens and their Family Members to Move and Reside Freely within the Territory of the Republic of Cyprus (see paragraphs 90 and 94 below). In the letter it was stated that the applicant\u2019s personal conduct represented a \u201cgenuine, present and sufficiently serious threat\u201d to the public and legal order of the Republic and that following his deportation to France he would be prohibited from entering Cyprus for ten years. The letter, along with a form setting out his communication rights pursuant to Law 163(1)/2005 were served on him on 21 June 2013. On the copies of both documents there was a handwritten signed note by a police officer stating that they were served on the applicant on 21 June 2013 but that he refused to sign for them and give reasons. 45.  On 9 July 2013 the applicant was transferred to Menoyia Detention Centre where he was once again informed of his rights under the above Law. The applicant signed a form which stated that he had received the list of rights and obligations of the detainees in a language that he understood and which also informed him of the right to undergo medical tests, treatment and follow-up. 46.  The applicant did not have a valid passport or any other valid travel document. His \u201cWorld Passport\u201d was not recognised. 47.  On 28 November 2013 the applicant was interviewed by members of the Aliens and Immigration office. The applicant claimed that he was born in France but refused to present a birth certificate. He also stated that he wished to remain in custody. 48.  The Aliens and Immigration Office contacted the French Embassy in Cyprus for the purpose of establishing whether the applicant was a French citizen. The Embassy informed them that they would first talk to him on the phone and then, if he was indeed a French citizen, proceed to issue a travel document. They suspected, however, that he was from the Comoro Islands as their citizens often held \u201cWorld Passports\u201d which were not recognised by the French Government. 49.  On 11 December 2013 the applicant was interviewed again by members of the Aliens and Immigration Office but refused to co-operate. He also refused contact with the French Embassy and stated that he wished to remain in detention. 50.  On 20 December 2013 and, subsequently, on 4 February 2014, the applicant was interviewed by a staff member of the French Embassy who concluded that the applicant was not a French citizen. He had no French document and it was understood that the applicant\u2019s father was from the Ivory Coast. 51.  On 4 February 2014 the applicant was interviewed by an officer of the Aliens and Immigration Office but refused to give any information or give any documents proving his real identity. He stated that he wished to be released and to be able to travel freely. 52.  On 27 February 2014 the applicant filled in a document with his biographical information. 53.  On 13 March 2014 the applicant was interviewed by members of the Aliens and Immigration Office but refused to co-operate. He claimed that his detention was unlawful. 54.  On 28 March 2014 members of the Aliens and Immigration Office sought instructions from the Director of the Department of Civil Registry and Immigration concerning the applicant\u2019s detention. 55. On 9 April 2014 a letter was also sent by them to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs setting out the applicant\u2019s history, his claims that he was a French citizen and attaching a letter by the WSA (see paragraph 19 above) which issued \u201cWorld Passports\u201d. It was also requested that the French Embassy investigate whether the applicant was a French citizen. 56.   The Aliens and Immigration Office also contacted the Consulate of the Ivory Coast in Cyprus. 57.  On 8 May 2014 the Ivory Coast Consulate informed the Aliens and Immigration Office that the personal details documented in the applicant\u2019s \u201cWorld Passport\u201d were not real. It was not therefore in a position to issue a travel document. The Consul also informed them that he had met with the applicant in March 2013, before his arrest, and the applicant had refused to co-operate. It was therefore up to the Aliens and Immigration Office to persuade the applicant to disclose his identity. The Consulate would only then be able to issue a travel document. 58.  Interviews with the Aliens and Immigration Office took place on 26 June 2014, 8 August 2014, 16 September 2014, 7 October 2014 and 15 October 2014. The applicant, however, refused to co-operate and provide any information as to his real identity. 59.  On 22 September 2014 a reminder was sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about steps taken towards the French Embassy and Ivory Coast to determine the applicant\u2019s identity. 60.  The applicant was released on 24 October 2014. The conditions attached to his release were set out in a letter given to him on his release. In particular, the applicant was requested to take steps to obtain a valid passport and to hand it over, once obtained, to the Aliens and Immigration police. He would be given a certified copy of the passport which would allow the issuance of a residence permit or any other permit. A special residence/employment permit would be issued to the applicant for a period of three months from the date of his release. The applicant was also obliged to inform the Aliens and Immigration Police of a residence address within fifteen days from his release, and also to report to the nearest police station once a month. 61.   On 22 April 2013, while detained in the Nicosia Central Prisons, a prison warder told the applicant, along with two other foreign detainees, to go to another wing. When they got there, the Cypriot prisoners told them to clean their (the Cypriot prisoners\u2019) cells. The applicant and the other two detainees refused and returned to their wing. 62.  The prison warder took them back in order to clean the cells. When they refused, five prisoners attacked them. The applicant stated that he fell down on the floor, his nose bled and he was hit on the chest and backbone. He remained on the floor for five minutes and three of the prison guards stood by while the other prisoners beat him up. The guards then took him back to his wing where they beat him up. 63.  The applicant stated that he sustained injuries to his face, ear and back and had broken chest bones. 64.  He did not receive any medical treatment for twenty-four hours. 65.  On 23 April 2013, the prison guard who was responsible for giving medical treatment to prisoners came to examine him and then sent him to the Nicosia General Hospital because of blood on his face, 66.  On 20 May 2013 he was taken to hospital as he could not hear anything because of pain and blood in his ear. He also had pain in the chest and back. 67.  On 7 May 2013, 28 May 2013 and 14 June 2013 the applicant applied to the prison authorities for access to his medical records and x-rays. 68.  The applicant submitted that the prison guards had informed him that there was no reason to contact a lawyer or his family and to bring him before a court. 69.   On 22 April 2013, at 9.50 a.m, the applicant and two other detainees were taken to the television room in another wing. They were accompanied by the head guard and two other guards. When the prison staff informed them of their duties, the applicant reacted by stating that he did not wish to work or clean and did not co-operate, and incited the other prisoners to refuse. The head guard informed the chief officer of the wing who instructed that the applicant be taken to his office by one of the guards so he could talk to him. The applicant then reacted and attempted to hit the guard who was meant to escort him but was prevented from doing so by two prisoners and one of the other guards. 70.  The Government submitted statements given on that day by the two guards and the head guard. The head guard stated that he had been in the office of the particular wing at the time of the incident and two of the prisoners and one of the guards had intervened and pushed the applicant back. According to the other two statements the applicant was immobilised. The Government also submitted a copy of a letter dated 16 October 2014 sent by the prison administrator to the Ministry of Justice concerning the present case describing the incident, in which it was stated that following the applicant\u2019s attempt to hit the escorting guard, two of the prisoners and the other guard on duty pushed him aside and immobilised him. 71.  According to the applicant\u2019s prison file, the applicant was charged under the Prison Regulations with assaulting a member of staff and failure to comply with a lawful order. 72.  On the same day the applicant was examined by the prison doctor. The entry in the applicant\u2019s medical file, dated 22 April 2013, indicated as follows: \u201cInvolved in a fight. Complains of pain in the right thorax without obvious bruising. Abrasions on the lips. Blood in the ear canal. Without general symptoms. Respiratory murmur without rattle. Soft abdomen. Neurologically without focal points. Blood pressure normal. Pulse normal.\u201d The applicant was prescribed medication and directions were given for re-examination. 73.  The next day the applicant was re-examined by the prison doctor who noted that the applicant did not want to be examined and refused medication but insisted on having an x-ray of his chest taken as he considered he needed it. The prison doctor, however, noted that there appeared to be no problem. He certified that the applicant had fresh blood in the left ear canal and that his eardrum was ruptured. The doctor then referred the applicant to the Accident and Emergency Department of the Nicosia General Hospital. He was taken there on the same day and was examined by an ear and throat specialist who noted that his ear was bleeding. 74.  The Government also submitted a medical record taken by a doctor at the Accident and Emergency Department of the above hospital certifying that the applicant had a perforated eardrum and referring the applicant to an ear and throat specialist. The record is undated. 75.  On 26 April 2013 the prison doctor\u2019s record noted that the applicant had a ruptured eardrum and that he had not been taking his medication up to that date. 76.  On 2 May 2013, the prison doctor\u2019s record, in so far as legible, indicated: \u201cduring night hours right side; normal respiration, murmur without additional sounds\u201d. 77.  On 7 May 2013 the prison doctor noted that the applicant had asked to change wing. The applicant also wrote to the prison doctor requesting his medical records and x-rays. 78.  On 20 May 2013 the prison doctor noted that the applicant complained about his left ear and earache. He referred him a second time to an ear and throat specialist at the Nicosia General Hospital. He was examined on 22 May 2013 and the specialist noted that his eardrum was ruptured and recommended medication. 79.  On 28 May 2013 the applicant repeated his written request to the prison doctor for his medical records and x-rays. 80.  On 3 June 2013 the doctor stated that the applicant complained about pain in the right side of the chest but the clinical examinations did not reveal anything. 81.  According to a chart in his prisoner\u2019s file, antibiotics were administered to the applicant daily from 22 April 2014 until 4 May 2014. 82. On 16 June 2013 the applicant wrote again to the prison doctor and requested his medical records and x-ray reports. 83.  On 18 June 2013 the prison doctor noted that the applicant should apply directly to the Nicosia General Hospital as prison doctors did not have in their possession x-rays and other reports issued by doctors there. 84.  On 21 June 2013, the date on which the applicant was released following the suspension of his sentence (see paragraph 42 above), he was informed by the prison guard in charge of his release that if he wished to have his x-rays he should apply directly to Nicosia General Hospital. A copy of the record to this effect from the applicant\u2019s prison file was submitted. 85.  On or around 16 September 2014, the applicant went on hunger strike seeking his release. 86.  On 19 September 2014 the prison doctor referred the applicant to a psychiatrist and the District Court of Larnaca issued an order for temporary hospitalization at the Athalassa Psychiatric Hospital. The applicant was transferred there and a recommendation was made by the administration of the Menoyia Detention Centre for the deportation orders to be annulled. 87.  On 30 September 2014 the applicant was discharged from hospital and was transferred back to Menoyia. 88.   On 1 October 2014 the applicant went on hunger strike again which he continued until his release on 24 October 2014. He was under constant medical supervision throughout this period.", "references": ["5", "6", "3", "4", "9", "8", "0", "7", "No Label", "1", "2"], "gold": ["1", "2"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Kavadarci. 6.  In April 2000, while criminal proceedings were pending against a certain Mr I.A., the latter sold a lorry (\u201cthe lorry\u201d) to a company, M. 7.  On 13 June 2000 the Skopje Court of First Instance (\u201cthe Trial Court\u201d) convicted Mr I.A. of smuggling nearly 9 tonnes of sugar, which he had transported in the lorry in November 1997. According to the Government, the court dismissed the prosecutor\u2019s application to have the lorry confiscated, given that Mr I.A. had stated that he had already sold it. The court considered that the conditions for confiscation of the lorry under Article 68 (2) of the Criminal Code 1996 (see paragraph 21 below) had not been fulfilled: specifically it had not been established that the lorry could be used again to commit an offence; that the confiscation had been necessary for the protection of safety or for reasons of ethics; and that the lorry had been specially adjusted for the commission of specific type of offences. On 20 November 2001, following separate appeals by Mr I.A. and the public prosecutor, the Skopje Court of Appeal found the public prosecutor\u2019s application immaterial (\u0431\u0435\u0441\u043f\u0440\u0435\u0434\u043c\u0435\u0442\u043d\u0430) and quashed all aspects of this judgment. 8.  On 17 September 2003 the Trial Court convicted Mr I.A. in absentia. It fined him and ordered, under Article 278 (3) of the Criminal Code 1996, the confiscation of the lorry and the sugar (\u201cthe confiscation order\u201d). In the absence of an appeal, the judgment became final on 29 October 2003. 9.  On 6 September 2004 the company M. sold the lorry to the applicant, who later registered the lorry in his name. 10.  On 12 June 2006 the Kavadarci Court of First Instance (\u201cthe first-instance court\u201d) enforced the confiscation order of 17 September 2003 against the applicant and issued a record of enforcement (\u0437\u0430\u043f\u0438\u0441\u043d\u0438\u043a \u0437\u0430 \u0438\u0437\u0432\u0440\u0448\u0443\u0432\u0430\u045a\u0435). 11.  On 15 November 2006 the applicant objected to the enforcement of the confiscation order, arguing that Mr I.A. had died on 21 March 2005 and that the confiscation order accordingly could not be enforced. There had been no injunction restricting the sale of the lorry. He had been the lawful owner and he had been making his living using the lorry. Lastly, he stated that he had sought, in separate civil proceedings, return of the lorry (see paragraph 14 below). 12.  On 20 November 2006 the execution-of-sanctions judge of the Trial Court rejected the objection as inadmissible, finding that the applicant had no procedural standing. It found that the confiscation order had been enforced in accordance with section 355 of the Enforcement of Sanctions Act (see paragraph 26 below). It further found that the applicant, as the third person from whom the lorry had been confiscated, could assume his rights under section 129(5) of the Criminal Proceedings Act (see paragraph 25 below). 13.  The applicant appealed. On 6 December 2006 a three-judge panel of the Trial Court dismissed his appeal reiterating that he had no right to object to the enforcement of the confiscation order. However, he had been entitled to claim, in civil proceedings, return of the lorry. Civil courts had jurisdiction, under section 129(5) of the Criminal Proceedings Act, to reverse a final confiscation order issued in criminal proceedings and order the return of the confiscated item. 14.  On 19 June 2006 the applicant submitted a civil claim seeking that the first-instance court declare him to be the owner of the lorry and to order the State to restore it to his possession. In the case of failure of his first claim, he sought that the State would reimburse him for the upgrades made to the lorry. In this latter context, he identified the upgrades that he had installed in the lorry. He further maintained that he was the bona fide and lawful owner of the lorry. He argued that the authorities had failed to seize the lorry immediately after the offence had been committed (\u043d\u0430 \u043b\u0438\u0446\u0435 \u043c\u0435\u0441\u0442\u043e) and to note a ban on the sale of the lorry on its registration certificate. As he was making his living off the lorry, he requested an injunction restricting the State from selling or otherwise disposing of the lorry until the final resolution of the dispute. 15.  By decisions of 29 June and 16 November 2006 respectively, the first-instance court and the Skopje Court of Appeal (\u201cthe second-instance court\u201d) dismissed the applicant\u2019s application for an injunction finding no evidence that in the absence of such a measure his claim would be considerably affected or that he would sustain irreparable damage. 16.  On 2 March 2007 the applicant informed the first-instance court that Mr I.A. had died in Austria in 2005. 17.  On 10 May 2007 the first-instance court dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim. It established that Mr I.A., who knew that the lorry could have been confiscated, had sold it to the company M. At the relevant time, neither the manager of M. nor the applicant had known that the lorry had been used in the commission of the offence and that it had been subject to a confiscation order. Relying on Articles 68 and 278 (3) of the Criminal Code (see paragraphs 21 and 22 below), the court stated that:\n\u201cConfiscation is a safety measure, the typical aim of which is to remove conditions which are convenient for the commission of offences, and it is a condition for ordering such a measure that the offender has been sentenced, as in the present case. The court considers that it is mandatory to confiscate the [lorry] under the afore-mentioned provisions, because this safety measure has a wider influence [in the sense of] general deterrence of all future offenders of this type of offences, and otherwise the offenders would be encouraged, after the offence has been committed, to dispose of the means with which they committed the offence and, thus, to even acquire pecuniary benefit; furthermore that would have a negative influence on the ethics of the wider public, [that is to say] on general deterrence ...\n... Given that from the evidence and the above-mentioned statutory provisions it has been established that the [lorry] in question was confiscated in favour of [the respondent State] in lawful proceedings, the court finds that the [respondent State] has therein obtained ownership of the [lorry] in question on the basis of a final and enforceable judgment ... in accordance with sections 112(2) and 154 of the [Property Act.]\nFor these reasons, the court dismisses the [applicant\u2019s] main claim and also the alternative claim, because it concerns upgrades made to the [lorry].\nOn the other hand, the court considers that the [applicant], as the bona fide owner, can be indemnified for the value of the entire [lorry], including the upgrades, but solely from the offender, [Mr I.A.], in accordance with Article 68 (3) of the [Criminal Code], and not from the [respondent State] ...\nThe court dismisses as groundless the argument that at the moment of confiscation of the [lorry] in question it was not owned by [Mr I.A.] but by the [applicant] as the bona fide possessor (\u0441\u043e\u0432\u0435\u0441\u0435\u043d \u0432\u043b\u0430\u0434\u0435\u0442\u0435\u043b), given that from the evidence it was established that when the offence was committed the [lorry] was owned by [Mr I.A.] and the safety measure confiscation of the [lorry] was issued on those grounds. The court also considers groundless the [applicant\u2019s] representative\u2019s arguments that under section 129(5) of the Criminal Proceedings Act the final decision for confiscation of the [lorry] could be amended with a decision in civil proceedings if there were a dispute concerning the ownership of the confiscated items, given that this provision would have been applied if the [lorry] had been sold to the [applicant] before the offence was committed and had, under any legal basis, remained in the factual possession of the convicted [Mr I.A.] and he, after having sold it, committed the crime; but in the present case it is vice versa; firstly the offence was committed and then the [lorry] was sold.\u201d 18.  The court also established that the applicant had upgraded the lorry to the value of 69,150 Macedonian denars (MKD). Furthermore, on the basis of the applicant\u2019s and two witnesses\u2019 statements, the court established that the applicant had bought the lorry for 4,300 euros (EUR). 19.  The applicant appealed. He stated that he had previously requested that the first-instance court obtain evidence from the Ministry of the Interior which would confirm that Mr I.A. had died in Austria in 2005. He argued that the domestic authorities had failed to ban Mr I.A. from disposing of the lorry or to seize the lorry at the time the offence had been discovered. He also argued that he was the bona fide owner and that he had obtained title to the lorry by adverse possession (\u043e\u0434\u0440\u0448\u043a\u0430). The first-instance court had incorrectly applied section 129(5) of the Criminal Proceedings Act. The lorry had been confiscated nine years after the offence had been committed. The State had been unlawfully enriched by the value of the upgrades installed by the applicant. 20.  On 19 October 2007 Skopje Court of Appeal (\u201cthe second-instance court\u201d) dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal finding no grounds to depart from the established facts and reasons given by the lower court. On 13 November 2007 this judgment was served on the applicant.", "references": ["3", "2", "7", "0", "1", "4", "8", "5", "6", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1970 and 1956 respectively and live in Daugavpils. 6.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7.  In October 2011 the Bureau for the Prevention and Combating of Corruption (Korupcijas nov\u0113r\u0161anas un apkaro\u0161anas birojs \u2013 \u201cthe KNAB\u201d) conducted an inquiry into suspected bribery. It obtained information giving rise to a suspicion that the bribery involved the trade of contraband tobacco and alcohol. The goods were stored on the premises of company M., which was owned by V.K. In November 2011 the KNAB transmitted this information to the State Revenue Service (Valsts ie\u0146\u0113mumu dienests \u2013 \u201cthe VID\u201d). 8.  On 16 November 2011 the VID dispatched officers to company M. in order to verify the information received with an inspection (apskate), under Article 2561 of the Code of Administrative Violations (Administrat\u012bvo p\u0101rk\u0101pumu kodekss). According to the Government, V.K. was not present at the site himself, but was informed by telephone when the officers arrived. 9.  At 3.40 p.m. they commenced the inspection of the commercial site used by company M. It covered an area of 7,000 square metres, which was surrounded by a concrete fence and consisted of seven large buildings and numerous containers. It was interrupted as the employees present refused to open a suspicious container, acting on orders given by V.K. over the telephone. The officers then obtained a prosecutor\u2019s authorisation and resumed the inspection. 10.  According to the second applicant, who was an accountant at company M., the officers arrived at about 4 p.m. on 16 November 2011. Although she was informed that she was not under arrest, officer J.L. asked her not to leave the site. The second applicant stayed, but subsequently contacted the company\u2019s lawyer, V.G., who advised her that she had a right to leave. She did so at about 7.30 p.m. At about 10 p.m. V.G. telephoned the second applicant, asking her to return to the site to find his power of attorney to act on behalf of company M. She arrived at about 10.30 p.m. 11.  According to the Government, at 1.16 a.m. on 17 November 2011 V.K. telephoned the first applicant, a guard at company M., to find out how the inspection was progressing. V.K. telephoned him again at 2.37 a.m., this time asking him to follow his instructions. The first applicant was to go to the outbuilding of a furnace facility and open and press certain taps, valves, and buttons. The KNAB intercepted this conversation and informed the VID officers. 12.  At 2.50 a.m. an investigator opened criminal proceedings and decided to conduct an inspection (apskate) of the crime scene. By the same decision, the administrative proceedings were discontinued. According to the Government, shortly thereafter officers arrived at the outbuilding, which smelled of spirits and was filled with large plastic tanks. They discovered the first applicant inside operating various taps and valves and asked him to stop what he was doing. As he refused, the officers handcuffed and removed him from the outbuilding. They placed him in the office building and seized his telephone, given his regular telephone contact with V.K. 13.  According to the first applicant, however, at about 2.30 a.m. on 17 November 2011 he went to the outbuilding to switch on the heating. There was no smell of spirits or large plastic tanks. Shortly thereafter he was handcuffed by officers and his mobile telephone was taken off him. From that moment on, he was under the constant watch of the officers and was not permitted to use the telephone. No reasons were given for their actions. 14.  According to the Government, officers found approximately ten tons of illegal alcohol in the furnace facility. They also discovered a secret passage leading to a nearby forest. In order to preserve the crime scene, they asked the employees present, including the first and second applicants, not to leave. As the second applicant had been observing their activities and contacting someone on a mobile telephone, the officers seized it from her. The first applicant was kept handcuffed until the furnace facility was sealed off and the commercial site secured. The first applicant submitted that he had remained handcuffed until about 8 a.m. 15.  According to the second applicant, because it was so late, she was resting at the site. At about 3 a.m. on 17 November 2011 she was approached by an investigator, I.R. From that moment onwards, she was kept under guard by the officers and forbidden from using the telephone. She was prevented from leaving and ordered to participate in the inspection. 16.  At 10 and 11 a.m. the first and second applicants were both questioned as witnesses. 17.  At 12.10 p.m. the second applicant made a written request to I.R., stating that she was not feeling well and wanted permission to rest. At 12.23 p.m. I.R. allowed her to rest in the office premises. 18.  At 7 p.m., according to the Government, the first applicant left the site. He stated that he had been given permission to leave. 19.  According to the Government, at 7.15 p.m. the officers resumed the inspection. As the second applicant was present, the officers invited her to attend it with V.G. She did not refuse this invitation, nor made any remarks or complaints about it in the relevant record. 20.  According to the Government, at 4.30 a.m. on 18 November 2011 the officers completed the second part of the inspection. It was then, according to the second applicant, that she was allowed to leave the site. 21.  Subsequently, on 18 November 2011 the first applicant was arrested at his home and questioned as a suspect. He was released the same day. 22.  By a decision dated 19 November 2011 the first applicant was declared a suspect. He was subsequently charged with failing to report a serious crime and attempting to conceal evidence of a crime. On 16 January 2013 the criminal proceedings against him were terminated for lack of corpus delicti in his actions. He had followed V.K.\u2019s instructions, without being aware of the consequences of his actions. 23.  On 26 July 2013 the VID completed the investigation and transferred the case to the prosecution service. 24.  At the time the parties exchanged their observations, the criminal proceedings were still pending. 25.  On 14 and 29 December 2011 the applicants lodged complaints with the prosecution service regarding the events of 16 to 18 November 2011. They alleged that the officers had breached Article 5 of the Convention and had also restricted their freedom of movement. 26.  The first applicant stated that at about 2.30 a.m. on 17 November 2011 he had gone to the outbuilding to switch on the heating. The officers had entered shortly afterwards. They had handcuffed him and taken his mobile telephone. From that moment on, he had been under their constant watch and had not been permitted to use the telephone. At about 3 a.m. he had been ordered to participate in the inspection. He had remained handcuffed until about 8 a.m. At about 10 a.m. an investigator, V.V., had invited him to one of the offices for questioning. The first applicant had asked whether lawyer, V.G., could be present, to which he had received a negative reply. The first applicant had been allowed to leave the site at about 7 p.m. on 17 November 2011.\nAs regards his handcuffing, the first applicant submitted that when the officers had handcuffed him a criminal investigation had not yet been opened. Therefore, the VID officers could not have exercised their powers under sections 16(3) and 161 of the Law on the State Revenue Service (likums \u201cPar Valsts ie\u0146\u0113mumu dienestu\u201d). Furthermore, there had been no grounds under section 161(1) of the Law for his handcuffing and at no point had he actually been formally detained. 27.  The second applicant stated that the VID officers had arrived at about 4 p.m. on 16 November 2011. Although she had been informed that she had not been placed under arrest, officer J.L. had asked her not to leave the site. The second applicant had stayed, but about 7.30 p.m. she had contacted V.G., who had advised her that unless she had been detained she had a right to leave. The second applicant had left, despite the officers\u2019 threats. Another employee, T.K., had also left. At about 10 p.m. V.G. telephoned the second applicant, asking her to return to the site to find his power of attorney to act on behalf of company M. She had arrived at about 10.30 p.m. Later, the second applicant had gone to a lounge area to rest. At about 3 a.m. she had been approached by the VID officers, who had told her that V.G. had left and that the first applicant had been handcuffed. I.R. had seized her telephone and had ordered her to participate in the inspection, without informing her that she had a right not to participate. The second applicant had asked I.R. several times to allow her to stay on the office premises as she had been tired. I.R. had refused several times and had eventually told her that if she continued to make such requests I.R. would detain her for forty-eight hours and place her in isolation cell. She had therefore been compelled to participate in the inspection. Furthermore, she had been under the constant watch of the officers. At about 11 a.m. she had been questioned by V.V., who had not given her an opportunity to contact a lawyer. Although the second applicant had not been under arrest, she had not been allowed to leave the site and her brother had been prevented from seeing her. He had meanwhile contacted a lawyer, I.B., who had arrived at the site at about 9.30 p.m. The second applicant had been allowed to leave the site at about 4.30 a.m. the following morning, when the inspection had been completed.\n(b)  Decisions 28.  On 30 December 2011 and 9 January 2012 prosecutor O.R. dismissed the applicants\u2019 complaints. 29.  He reasoned that between 2.50 and 9 a.m. on 17 November 2011 a VID investigator, I.R., had conducted an inspection, which had been resumed at 7.15 p.m. and completed at 4.23 a.m. the following morning. According to the inspection record the applicants and V.G., acting as a representative of company M., had all been present. They had signed the record, but none of them had noted in it that they had been compelled to participate or that they had not been informed of their rights. 30.  There was therefore no reason to consider that the applicants\u2019 presence at the inspection had been unlawful. 31.  In so far as the applicants alleged that the VID officers had restricted their rights, their complaints were transmitted to the VID for disciplinary proceedings (see paragraphs 44-48 below).\n(c)  Appeals 32.  On 12 and 18 January 2012 the applicants lodged appeals against the aforementioned decisions, arguing that they had not been informed of their right not to participate in the inspection. Furthermore, they had not been assisted by V.G. From about 9.30 p.m. on 17 November 2011 the second applicant had been assisted by I.B. 33.  The fact that the first applicant had not made any remarks in the inspection record did not prove that there had been no violations. The second applicant had noted in the record that she had not known what her role in the inspection had been.\n(d)  Decisions on appeals 34.  On 1 and 3 February 2012 prosecutor V.\u0160. dismissed the applicants\u2019 appeals. 35.  She reasoned that the inspection had been conducted in accordance with section 162 of the Criminal Procedure Law (Krimin\u0101lprocesa likums). 36.  The applicants had been present at the site at the start of the inspection at 2.50 a.m. on 17 November 2011. I.R. had invited them to participate in it. There was no evidence suggesting that they had refused. As the applicants had not been involved in the criminal proceedings, there had been no obligation to inform them of their rights. 37.  Furthermore, once the inspection had resumed at 7.15 p.m., the second applicant had had an opportunity to invite her lawyer, I.B. Neither I.B. nor the second applicant had noted in the inspection record that she had participated against her will.\n(e)  Further appeals 38.  On 14 and 17 February 2012 the applicants appealed against the aforementioned decisions. 39.  They maintained that I.R. had ordered them to participate in the inspection. The fact that they had not made notes in the record was irrelevant. They had had no information about their status in the proceedings until they had been questioned as witnesses. 40.  In addition, the second applicant had had no opportunity to seek legal assistance, as her mobile telephone had been taken off her. Her relatives had invited I.B., who had arrived at about 9.30 p.m. on 17 November 2011, eighteen hours after the start of the inspection, when it had been nearing its end. The second applicant had been unaware that her rights had been violated and had not known what information to provide to I.B.\n(f)  Final decision 41.  On 13 and 14 March 2012 chief prosecutor A.S. dismissed the applicants\u2019 appeals and upheld the lower prosecutors\u2019 decisions. 42.  Between 2.50 and 9 a.m. on 17 November 2011 I.R. had conducted an inspection. The first and second applicants and V.G. had attended. The applicants had familiarised themselves with the inspection record and had signed it. While the first and second applicants had made some remarks in the record, they had not noted that they had participated against their will. The second applicant had also attended the second part of the inspection between 7.15 p.m. on 17 November 2011 and 4.23 a.m. on 18 November 2011. From 8.45 p.m. on 17 November 2011 she had been assisted by I.B. Neither I.B. nor she had noted in the inspection record that she had participated against her will or that she had not known her rights in the criminal proceedings. 43.  There was no reason to conclude that the applicants had not known their rights, including the right to be present at the inspection, to familiarise themselves with and write remarks in the inspection record and to make complaints. 44.  On 16 and 17 January 2012 the VID concluded that there were no grounds for opening disciplinary proceedings against its officers. 45.  Between 17 and 18 November 2011 I.R. had conducted an inspection in accordance with sections 139(1), 159, 160 and 162 of the Criminal Procedure Law. Under section 9(1) of that legislation everyone had a duty to comply with the requests of an official authorised to conduct criminal proceedings and with the procedure provided by law. 46.  During the inspection on 17 November 2011 the first applicant had opened taps so that spirits could start flowing into the pipes. There had been a suspicion that he had tried to conceal evidence of a crime and therefore had attempted to commit a criminal offence. He had been handcuffed to protect the crime scene and to prevent him from committing further criminal acts, namely, to stop him failing to comply with lawful requests. Immediately after completion of the inspection, the applicant\u2019s handcuffs had been removed. Their use had therefore been lawful. 47.  Referring to section 12 of the Criminal Procedure Law, the VID stated that the restrictions on the first and second applicants\u2019 freedom of movement between 17 and 18 November 2011 had been proportionate to the public interest in crime prevention. 48.  Furthermore, during the inspection the first and second applicants had been assisted by two lawyers. None of them had noted down in the relevant record any objections as regards the course of the inspection, thereby confirming its lawfulness. 49.  On 13 March 2013 the Ombudsperson issued conclusions on the first applicant\u2019s complaint. 50.  At 3.40 p.m. on 16 November 2011 VID officers had commenced a \u201ccontrol\u201d (p\u0101rbaude) in administrative proceedings. 51.  At quarter past midnight on 17 November 2011 they had commenced an \u201cinspection of an area inaccessible to the public\u201d (publiski nepieejamas teritorijas apskate) under Article 2561 of the Code of Administrative Violations, based on a prosecutor\u2019s authorisation. 52.  At about 2.30 a.m. the first applicant had gone to the furnace facility. The officers had asked him to stop what he was doing and handcuffed him. 53.  At about 2.50 a.m. a decision had been made to open criminal proceedings and conduct an inspection under sections 162 and 163 of the Criminal Procedure Law. 54.  Between 9.57 and 10.56 a.m. the first applicant had been informed of his rights and questioned as a witness. 55.  At 10.10 a.m. on 18 November 2011 he had been detained and later the same day questioned as a suspect. 56.  There was no dispute that under the Law on the State Revenue Service, officers could use restraint measures in the circumstances provided for by law. In view of the information received from the VID, the first applicant had been handcuffed under section 161(1)3) and 4) of that legislation on the grounds that he had failed to comply with lawful requests made by the VID officers and to protect an object under guard from unlawful threat. 57.  At the same time, there was no information in the case material regarding lawful requests made by the VID officers which the first applicant had failed to fulfil. Similarly, there was no information that the VID officers had guarded the furnace facility. Accordingly, there had been no legal or factual obstacles preventing him from entering it. 58.  Also, there was no objective reason why less restrictive measures could not have been used to prevent obstruction of the criminal investigation. In view of this, the use of handcuffs had not been necessary. 59.  As a result of the handcuffing, the first applicant\u2019s freedom of movement and right to liberty had been restricted. At the same time, during an inspection under section 163 of the Criminal Procedure Law the rights of those present could not be restricted. The procedure for arrest was laid down in the Code of Administrative Violations and the Criminal Procedure Law, which provided that a record of arrest had to be drawn up. The first applicant had not been detained under Article 253 of the Code of Administrative Violations, and in the criminal proceedings he had only been detained at 10.10 a.m. on 18 November 2011. A record of his arrest had not been drawn up with regard to the restriction on his right to liberty during the inspection on 17 November 2011. This had therefore not been in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. There had been a violation of Article 5 of the Convention. 60.  There was no dispute that VID officers could invite anyone to participate in the inspection. However, in accordance with section 163(3) of the Criminal Procedure Law, such persons were not under an obligation to participate. At the same time, in its judgment of 14 November 2006 (in case no. SKA-454/2006) the Administrative Cases Division of the Senate of the Supreme Court (Augst\u0101k\u0101s tiesas Sen\u0101ta Administrat\u012bvo lietu departaments) stated that a request made by a police officer in the performance of his or her official duties was regarded as binding on the person concerned. The Ombudsperson was therefore of the view that the person concerned was prevented from refusing to comply with a request made by an investigating authority, unless informed of the right to do so. In the present case, the first applicant had not been informed of the right to refuse to participate in the inspection. This had not been examined by the prosecution service.", "references": ["5", "7", "9", "0", "8", "4", "3", "1", "6", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1965 and lives in Rastatt. 6.  He has a daughter, H., born on 29 June 2003. He and the child\u2019s mother, who were not married, separated shortly after the birth. The child lives with her mother, who has sole parental authority. 7.  Since the end of 2003, the parents have argued about contact. In April 2004, the applicant lodged his first request for contact with the Neustadt/Weinstra\u03b2e Family Court. During a hearing in June 2004 the parents agreed to him having supervised contact, which took place until October 2004. On 8 December 2004 the parents reached a further agreement for supervised contact, which was approved by the Family Court. 8.  On 21 February 2005 the applicant requested that the supervising Youth Office, which had refused to continue to be involved due to the parties\u2019 behaviour, be replaced by another child protection association. On 11 July 2005 the Family Court granted this request. By a letter of 21 October 2005, the appointed child protection association refused to act upon the Family Court\u2019s instructions because of the mother\u2019s behaviour. 9.  On 28 October 2005 the applicant requested the Family Court to impose a coercive fine on the mother in order to enforce contact rights. On 17 May 2006 the parents agreed on a court-approved contact arrangement. On 18 September 2006 the Family Court, upon the applicant\u2019s request, appointed an access facilitator (Umgangspfleger). The order was subject to a time-limit expiring on 31 December 2006. Subsequently, the contact\u2011arrangement was implemented in a more or less regular way. 10.  On 8 May 2007 the applicant asked the court to extend contact, reappoint a custodian ad litem (Verfahrenspfleger) and impose a coercive fine on the mother. In reply, the mother requested that contact be suspended for two years. On 22 December 2008, after having again heard an expert, the Family Court suspended contact until 31 December 2009. The applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint (no. 2084/09) was to no avail. 11.  On 22 January 2010 the applicant requested an extension of contact following the end of the suspension period. After hearing the child in person, on 12 April 2010 the Family Court granted the applicant contact on a fortnightly basis. At the same time it gave specific directions about the contact and set out sanctions to be applied if the parents did not comply with the order. Contact did not take place. 12.  On 2 September 2010, after having heard the child again, the Family Court, at the mother\u2019s request, suspended the applicant\u2019s contact until the conclusion of the main proceedings and rejected his requests for a coercive fine. 13.  On 15 April 2011 the Family Court heard both parents, the child and the child\u2019s custodian ad litem. Relying on the opinion of a psychiatrist, Dr B., submitted both in writing and explained orally, it granted the applicant contact of two hours every fortnight. It appointed a guardian, who was given specific directions as to how the child should be prepared for contact and how the meetings should be organised. 14.  The mother appealed against this decision. The applicant pursued his request for contact and furthermore requested that the Zweibr\u00fccken Court of Appeal order the mother to supply regular information on the child\u2019s development. 15.  The Court of Appeal obtained further written submissions from Dr B., who, with regard to the development, was now of the opinion that a suspension of the applicant\u2019s contact was, at the moment, the less damaging approach and therefore in the child\u2019s best interest. Contact with the applicant as such was not found to be damaging, but the circumstances of the conflict rendered a different solution at the moment impossible. As regards the parents\u2019 conflict, the expert pointed out that the applicant had agreed on mediation, but the mother refused such a procedure. He declined any possibility for the applicant to positively and actively arrange any contact at the moment. In her written submission to the Court of Appeal, the child\u2019s guardian expressed her view according to which, to prevent long\u2011time damages of the child, a minimum contact with the applicant should be guaranteed in any event by allowing him to send letters and presents to the child. 16.  On 19 October 2012 the Court of Appeal heard from the parents, the child\u2019s guardian, the child and Dr B., it rejected the applicant\u2019s request and suspended all contact between him and his daughter indefinitely, pursuant to Articles 1696 and 1684 \u00a7 4 of the Civil Code (see paragraphs 23 and 24 below). 17.  The Court of Appeal observed at the outset that the court-approved contact agreement of 17 May 2006 was still valid. It considered, however, that contact had to be permanently suspended because ordering contact would affect the child\u2019s welfare. The court noted that the child had not had any contact with her father for four years, and that he had become a stranger to her. This had been confirmed, in particular, by the court\u2011appointed expert. When heard in court, the child had clearly stated that she did not want to see her father. She only had limited, bad memories of him. The child, who appeared to have developed properly in relation to her age, had given the impression that she knew what was at stake and what she wanted. In spite of her young age, she had clearly and firmly expressed the desire to have her own wishes respected, suggesting that she would not accept being forced into doing something she did not want. The guardian submitted that he had not succeeded in breaking the child\u2019s aversion to her father. According to him, the child had cried and left the room when he had started talking about her father. 18.  The Court of Appeal considered that the child\u2019s attitude had been influenced by the loyalty she felt towards her mother, who continuously talked negatively about the father. The child felt obliged to feel the same way as her mother. She longed for the dispute between her parents to come to an end so that she would no longer be exposed to a conflict of loyalties. She saw rejecting her father as the only way to preserve at least her mother\u2019s love. Relying on the expert\u2019s findings, the Court of Appeal observed that the child was mature enough to make a conscious decision and be aware of its consequences. She found herself in a psychological dilemma caused by the communication troubles between her parents, without yet having developed post-traumatic stress disorder. On the one hand, the loss of contact with a parent generally led to a disturbance of psychological development which affected a child\u2019s welfare, but on the other, forced contact in the context of a continuing dispute between parents could also seriously affect the child. 19.  The Court of Appeal noted that the expert, in his opinion submitted to the Family Court, had explained that contact with the father did not in itself jeopardise the child\u2019s welfare. However, the expert considered it necessary to prepare the parents by improving their communication before reinstating contact. The Family Court\u2019s decision had failed to take this \u201cprerequisite\u201d into account. The parents had not undertaken any steps in this direction. When heard in the Court of Appeal on 6 September 2012, the expert had clarified that if the parents did not change their way of communicating, which would necessitate at least some form of professional help such as mediation, it would cause more harm to attempt to reinstate contact than to exclude it altogether. 20.  The Court of Appeal continued:\n\u201cAgainst the background of the parents\u2019 previous conduct both in and outside the courtroom, the [Court of Appeal\u2019s] chamber rules out the possibility that the parents will be able successfully to have recourse to mediation in the foreseeable future. As a mandatory result, the father cannot be granted access to H. at present (derzeit) and the only available option is to exclude [him] from contact. It is not possible to solve the child\u2019s dilemma by specifying the arrangements for contact ... or by appointing a custodian.\nIt is up to the mother to overcome her aversion to the father, and up to the father to learn that contact can only be reinstated through patience, restraint and understanding of both the mother\u2019s and child\u2019s feelings. It is furthermore not ruled out that the child, with advancing age and maturity, will be able to detach herself from her parents\u2019 dispute and seek contact with her father herself. The present decision does not exclude these options.\u201d 21.  By a judgment given on 6 February 2013 (no. 1 BvR 4/13), the Federal Constitutional Court refused to entertain a constitutional complaint lodged by the applicant regarding the decisions taken in the main proceedings, without providing reasons. 22.  After the applicant lodged his application with the Court and the application had been communicated to the Government, the family case file was sent to the Ministry of Justice and then back to the Family Court. On 18 July 2014, after its return from the Ministry, the case file was presented to a judge, who ruled: \u201c1. Seen. Nothing to be done. 2. To be stored\u201d (1. Gesehen. Nichts zu veranlassen. 2. Weglegen\u201d).", "references": ["4", "6", "1", "0", "2", "3", "5", "7", "9", "8", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1966 and is currently in detention in Daugavpils. 6.  On 8 May 2006 the applicant was transferred from the Central Prison (Centr\u0101lcietums) to Riga Regional Court, where he was placed in a holding cell. 7.  At 11.25 a.m. the applicant asked the detainee escort officers from the State Police to call an ambulance. He had pain around the waist area and was nauseous. The ambulance arrived at 11.35 a.m. It was established that the applicant was suffering from kidney stones and renal colic. He was given painkillers. 8.  The Government submitted that the pain in the area of the applicant\u2019s waist had later returned, and that at approximately 1 p.m. he had once again asked his escort officers to call an ambulance, shouting and cursing whilst so doing. One of the escort officers, M.P., had entered the cell in order to calm him down. The applicant had attempted to hit M.P. In order to prevent the attack, M.P. had forced the applicant onto the floor, using physical force and a restraint technique in accordance with section 13(1)5) and 6) of the Law on Police (likums \u201cPar Policiju\u201d). 9.  The applicant submitted that at approximately 1.30 p.m. he had asked the officers to call an ambulance. They had refused to do so. As he had been in pain, he had continued to ask for medical assistance. At some point, one of the officers had entered the holding cell and had kicked him in the chest, as a result of which the applicant had fallen to the floor. Whilst the applicant was trying to stand up, he had received several more kicks. The applicant\u2019s screaming was heard by two other escort officers, who had rushed to the cell. One of the officers had forced him onto the floor and had kicked him several times in the back in order to keep him quiet. Then the officers had left. 10.  At 1.48 p.m. the escort officers called the ambulance for the second time. The ambulance arrived at 2.04 p.m. The applicant informed the ambulance staff that the officers had hit him on his left side. He also told them that following an injury in 2005 he had suffered a right kidney rupture. In the ambulance log it was noted that he had no visible injuries. The applicant was taken to the prison hospital in Olaine, where he was diagnosed with a fracture to the third lumbar vertebra and contusion of the left kidney. 11.  On the same day the escort officers M.P. and A.P. submitted reports to their superior regarding the incident. 12.  On 19 May 2006 the applicant was discharged from the hospital. 13.  The Government referred to an extract from the applicant\u2019s medical file at the prison hospital in Olaine. It stated that on 6 May 2006 (two days prior to the incident at issue) the applicant underwent an X-ray examination which revealed a fracture to his lumbar vertebrae. His condition was described as \u201csimilar\u201d following an X-ray on 9 May 2006 (sic) (the day after the incident at issue). 14.  According to a letter from the prison in Olaine the applicant was treated at the prison hospital in Olaine between 8 and 19 May 2006. He was diagnosed with a transverse process fracture and a left kidney contusion. There were no injuries such as bruises or scratches on the applicant\u2019s body. The prison was unable to provide information as regards the applicant\u2019s medical care prior to 8 May 2006. 15.  On 17 May 2006 the applicant\u2019s complaint of 10 May 2006 regarding the incident was received by the Internal Security Office of the State Police (Valsts policijas Iek\u0161\u0113j\u0101s dro\u0161\u012bbas birojs). The applicant alleged that he had been beaten by the escort officers. 16.  On 2 June 2006 the Internal Security Office of the State Police commenced criminal proceedings for the offence of exceeding official authority. 17.  On 30 June 2006 the Internal Security Office of the State Police requested an expert medical report in respect of the applicant\u2019s injuries.\nOn 10 July 2006 an expert from the State Forensic Centre (Valsts tiesu medic\u012bnas ekspert\u012bzes centrs) examined the applicant\u2019s medical records. The expert noted his medical history, including the fact that he had been treated for polycystic kidney disease and a urinary tract infection between 1 and 10 March 2006. She requested the applicant\u2019s X-ray from the prison hospital in Olaine. On 19 September 2006 the expert concluded that the applicant had sustained a fracture of the third lumbar vertebra which was classified as a moderately severe injury. The injury could have been caused by a blunt solid object on 8 May 2006. However, the possibility that the injury had been caused by the applicant\u2019s falling against a solid object could not be excluded. 18.  In the meantime, a senior inspector questioned the applicant on 5 July 2006. During the interview he had been unable to identify, from numerous photographs, the officers who had allegedly used excessive force against him. 19.  On 22 and 23 August 2006 the senior inspector questioned detainee escort officers M.P., R.T. and A.P., who denied that excessive force had been used against the applicant. 20.  The applicant referred to the evidence of S.\u0160., who stated that the applicant and two other individuals had been placed in the same cell as him. After the applicant\u2019s condition deteriorated, the officers had placed him in another cell opposite their cell. S.\u0160. could see what was happening in the corridor by looking through the peephole in the door. He had seen two or three officers entering the applicant\u2019s cell and then kicking \u201csomething\u201d. He had heard the applicant groan. 21.  On 26 October 2006 the senior inspector closed the investigation. 22.  She found that at approximately 1.30 p.m. on 8 May 2006 the applicant had been swearing and banging on the door of the holding cell while asking the escort officers to call an ambulance for the second time. One of the officers, M.P., had entered the cell in order to calm him down and the applicant had attempted to hit him. In order to prevent the attack, M.P. had forced the applicant onto the floor, using physical force and a restraint technique in accordance with section 13(1)5) and 6) of the Law on Police. 23.  The senior inspector also noted that the applicant had at first been placed in the holding cell together with the witness S.\u0160. and two other individuals. According to S.\u0160. the applicant had been taken to another cell and S.\u0160. had heard the applicant groan. Thereafter the ambulance had arrived. 24.  While the expert report of 19 September 2006 indicated that the applicant had been diagnosed with a moderately severe injury in the form of a fracture of a lumbar vertebra, the possibility could not be excluded that this injury had been caused by the applicant\u2019s falling against a hard object, which corresponded to the escort officers\u2019 account of the incident. 25.  The senior inspector concluded that the constituent elements of an offence under section 317(2) of the Criminal Law (Krimin\u0101llikums) (exceeding official authority) were lacking in the officers\u2019 actions.\n(ii)  Prosecution service 26.  The applicant lodged an appeal against the aforementioned decision with two levels of the prosecution service. On 22 December 2006 a prosecutor upheld the impugned decision. 27.  On 29 January 2007 the deputy chief prosecutor quashed that decision. She found that the investigation had been superficial and that the decision concerned had lacked \u201csufficient justification\u201d. 28.  There was no evidence that the applicant had fallen against a hard object. According to witness statements, he had fallen to the floor. It was therefore necessary to inspect the holding cell in which force had been used against the applicant and to verify the statements of both the applicant and of M.P. and A.P. at the scene to establish how the applicant had fallen and whether there had been any object against which he could have fallen. It was also necessary to obtain an expert report to find out whether or not the applicant could have sustained the injury prior to 8 May 2006. 29.  The deputy chief prosecutor referred the case back to the Internal Security Office of the State Police.\n(b)  Second round of investigation\n(i)  The Internal Security Office of the State Police 30.  On 28 February 2007 the Internal Security Office of the State Police ordered a further expert report. 31.  Between 21 and 26 March 2007 the senior inspector questioned A.P. and M.P. and verified the applicant\u2019s evidence at the scene. A.P. and M.P. stated that they could not recall in which holding cell the applicant had been placed. Neither could they recall or demonstrate how force had been used against him. 32.  On 26 March 2007 the senior inspector closed the investigation. 33.  She noted that the ambulance had arrived for the second time at 2.06 p.m. on 8 May 2006. The applicant had complained of a pain in the area of his left kidney, alleging that the officers had kicked him there. During the investigation, however, he had alleged that the officers had kicked him on the right side of his body. Furthermore, he had stated that the officers had kicked him in the chest, as well as hitting him with a truncheon. At the same time, he had had no visible injuries. 34.  According to the expert report dated 12 March 2007, the applicant could have remained mobile even after sustaining a lumbar vertebral fracture, and the possibility could not be excluded that the applicant had sustained this injury prior to 8 May 2006. 35.  It could not therefore be established when the applicant had sustained the injuries. The senior inspector concluded that the constituent elements of an offence under section 317(2) of the Criminal Law (exceeding official authority) were lacking in the officers\u2019 actions.\n(ii)  Prosecution service 36.  The applicant lodged an appeal against the aforementioned decision with two levels of the prosecution service. On 11 May 2007 the prosecutor upheld that decision. 37.  On 12 June 2007 the chief prosecutor quashed the impugned decision. He found that the investigation had not been thorough and that the decision had been made without assessing all the evidence in the case. 38.  The senior inspector had not verified the evidence of A.P. and M.P. at the scene. Their questioning had been merely formal. The escort officers had previously stated that they had used force against the applicant. It was therefore necessary to establish whether or not the applicant had sustained injuries as a result thereof. In addition, the evidence of S.\u0160. had not been considered. According to S.\u0160. there had been two other individuals in the holding cell but these individuals had not been questioned. 39.  The chief prosecutor referred the case back to the Internal Security Office of the State Police for the second time.\n(c)  Third round of investigation\n(i)  The Internal Security Office of the State Police 40.  On 28 June 2007 the senior inspector visited the scene together with M.P. and A.P. to verify their evidence. The latter could no longer recall in which cells the various detainees, including the applicant, had been held, nor were they able to show how force had been used against him. They maintained their previous statements. 41.  The senior inspector obtained an additional statement from S.\u0160. and questioned fourteen detainees who had been escorted by the officers on the day in question. Some of them had heard noise and shouted requests for a beating to be stopped. The whereabouts of other four detainees could not be established. The applicant referred to the evidence of M.R., who stated that S.\u0160. had been placed in the same cell as him. M.R. had not seen the incident but had heard some noise and a man shouting. He did not know the applicant. 42.  On 24 April 2009 the senior inspector closed the investigation. 43.  She noted that the applicant had given different accounts as to how force had been used against him. There were several other discrepancies. The applicant had stated that an officer had beaten him in his cell, whereas S.\u0160. had stated that three to four officers had beaten him in the corridor. Another detainee, V.J., had given evidence that the applicant had told him that he had been kicked once on the leg. 44.  Furthermore, the applicant\u2019s allegation that he had been kicked in the chest and hit on the head with a truncheon was not corroborated by the expert report, which had not recorded injuries to those areas of his body. 45.  As regards the lumbar vertebral fracture, according to the expert report, this injury could have been caused by the applicant\u2019s falling against a hard object. This corresponded to the accounts given by M.P. and A.P. 46.  The senior inspector concluded that the applicant had not sustained the injuries as a result of unlawful conduct by the escort officers. It could not be established that the use of force had been unjustified.\n(ii)  Prosecution service 47.  On 29 May 2009 the prosecutor, in response to a complaint from the applicant, upheld the aforementioned decision. 48.  He noted that force had been used against the applicant in compliance with section 13(1)6) of the Law on Police. It was impossible to determine when the applicant\u2019s injuries had been caused. The constituent elements of an offence under section 317(2) of the Criminal Law (exceeding official authority) were lacking in the officers\u2019 actions. 49.  Lastly, the prosecutor found that the senior inspector had taken all the investigative steps requested by the prosecution service. The duration of the investigation had been lengthy because many of the individuals who had been escorted on the day in question had been released and their whereabouts were unknown. 50.  An appeal lay to a higher prosecutor against the aforementioned decision. According to information from the prosecution service dated 11 and 19 February 2015, furnished by the Government, the applicant did not appeal. 51.  On 20 November 2013 the applicant wrote to the prosecution service asking for a final decision in the criminal proceedings. On 28 November 2013 the prosecution service replied that an appeal against the prosecutor\u2019s decision should have been lodged within ten days. Although the applicant had been notified of the decision, he had not appealed against it within the statutory time-limit. The prosecution service could therefore not exercise its powers in respect of the criminal proceedings. 52.  In the meantime, on 16 June 2006 the State Police instigated an internal inquiry into the events of 8 May 2006. 53.  The applicant alleged that he had been kicked on various parts of his body, including his head, chest and spine, as well as in the kidney area. He said he had also been hit with a truncheon. 54.  Between 26 and 29 June 2006 the escort officers gave their explanations (paskaidrojumi). M.P. and A.P. stated that M.P. had used force against the applicant as the latter had attempted to hit him. A.P. had helped to restrain the applicant. 55.  On 30 June 2006 the State Police found that without carrying out procedural acts it was impossible to establish the circumstances in which the applicant had sustained the injuries and whether the force used against him by M.P. or A.P. had been in compliance with section 13 of the Law on Police.", "references": ["0", "4", "5", "3", "6", "7", "2", "9", "8", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1958 and lives in Tetovo. 6.  On 12 April 2006, the applicant concluded a sales contract (\u043a\u0443\u043f\u043e\u043f\u0440\u043e\u0434\u0430\u0436\u0435\u043d \u0434\u043e\u0433\u043e\u0432\u043e\u0440) with a Sh.A., for the purchase of a concrete mixing and transport lorry (\u201cthe vehicle\u201d) for the equivalent of 5,000 euros (EUR) in Macedonian denars (MKD). On 15 May 2007 the applicant lent the vehicle to his company. 7.  On 6 October 2008 the Ministry of the Interior temporarily seized the vehicle and its registration certificate (\u0441\u043e\u043e\u0431\u0440\u0430\u045c\u0430\u0458\u043d\u0430 \u0434\u043e\u0437\u0432\u043e\u043b\u0430) from the applicant in order to examine the vehicle\u2019s chassis (\u043f\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0435\u0440\u043a\u0430 \u043d\u0430 \u0448\u0430\u0441\u0438\u0458\u0430). A record of temporarily seized objects (\u043f\u043e\u0442\u0432\u0440\u0434\u0430 \u0437\u0430 \u043f\u0440\u0438\u0432\u0440\u0435\u043c\u0435\u043d\u043e \u043e\u0434\u0437\u0435\u043c\u0435\u043d\u0438 \u043f\u0440\u0435\u0434\u043c\u0435\u0442\u0438) was issued. 8.  On 1 February 2010 the Struga Court of First Instance (\u201cthe first-instance court\u201d) acquitted Sh.A. of charges of forgery of a document (\u201c\u0444\u0430\u043b\u0441\u0438\u0444\u0438\u043a\u0443\u0432\u0430\u045a\u0435 \u0438\u0441\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u0430\u201c) concerning the vehicle\u2019s chassis number and rejected an indictment brought by a public prosecutor against a certain I.S. The court found that during the trial it had not been established that Sh.A. had altered the vehicle\u2019s chassis. In accordance with section 102(3) of the Criminal Proceedings Act (see paragraph 18 below), the court further advised the applicant, who had claimed compensation in the criminal proceedings, to pursue the claim by means of a separate civil action before the civil courts. On 21 July 2010 the judgment became final. 9.  On 16 November 2010 the applicant requested that the first-instance court return the vehicle in his possession. 10.  On 3 December 2010 the first-instance court heard evidence from the applicant, who stated that he had bought the vehicle from Sh.A. for EUR 25,000. He further stated that he could not have been aware at the time that the chassis number of the vehicle had been forged. 11.  On 6 December 2010 the first-instance court, relying on Article 100\u2011a (3) of the Criminal Code (\u201cthe Code\u201d, see paragraph 17 below), found that there were no grounds for confiscation of the applicant\u2019s vehicle. The applicant had not known nor could he have known that the vehicle had been used to commit a crime. The court also ordered that the registration certificate be returned to the applicant. 12.  Upon the public prosecutor\u2019s appeal, on 24 January 2011 the Bitola Court of Appeal (\u201cthe appellate court\u201d) quashed that decision. Relying on Article 100-a (2) of the Code, the appellate court found that the vehicle\u2019s chassis had been forged and that the vehicle, in the interest of public safety, could not be declared roadworthy. It further referred to section 100-a (3) of the Code and instructed the first-instance court to assess whether the continued use of the vehicle would constitute a \u201cuse of a forged document\u201d offence under the Code (\u0443\u043f\u043e\u0442\u0440\u0435\u0431\u0430 \u043d\u0430 \u0444\u0430\u043b\u0441\u0438\u0444\u0438\u043a\u0443\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0430 \u0458\u0430\u0432\u043d\u0430 \u0438\u0441\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u0430, see paragraph 17 below). 13.  On 22 February 2011 the first-instance court dismissed the applicant\u2019s application and ordered the confiscation (\u0441\u0435 \u043e\u0434\u0437\u0435\u043c\u0430\u0430\u0442) of the vehicle and its registration certificate. It referred to Article 100-a (2) and (3) of the Code and found that the vehicle\u2019s chassis number had been forged and that the vehicle could be used for committing an offence. For that reason and for the reasons of road safety, it was necessary to confiscate the vehicle and the registration certificate. It also referred to section 532(1) of the Criminal Proceedings Act (see paragraph 18 below) and found that, irrespective of the fact that there had been no proceedings against the applicant and that he was not an offender, it was necessary to confiscate the vehicle for general safety reasons. 14.  On 11 March 2011 the applicant appealed arguing that the first-instance court had wrongly applied Article 100-a (2) and (3) of the Code and that he had not known that the vehicle had been used to commit a crime. 15.  On 19 May 2011 the appellate court dismissed the appeal and upheld the first-instance court\u2019s decision. The relevant part of the decision states as follows:\n\u201c[The arguments] raised in the appeals, [namely] that the first-instance court had not established the decisive facts concerning [the certitude] that the [applicant] had not known that the vehicle\u2019s chassis had been forged, which was decisive, are groundless. Specifically, it is true that [the applicant] did not know that the vehicle\u2019s chassis had been forged, as a result of which [he] registered the vehicle as its last buyer, [he was] issued a driving licence and [he] paid a large amount. However, [what is] primary under Article 100-a (2) of the [Criminal Code] is that the objects which were intended to [commit] an offence or were used to commit an offence shall be confiscated notwithstanding that they are not in the ownership of the offender or that they are in the ownership of a third person, if general safety, public health or ethics require so ...\nThe fact that [the applicant] did not know that the vehicle\u2019s chassis had been forged does not signify that the conditions of Article 100-a(3) are met, but the first-instance court correctly found that the use of the vehicle with thus forged identification numbers would affect the safety of the road users in the State [\u0431\u0435\u0437\u0431\u0435\u0434\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0430 \u043d\u0430 \u0458\u0430\u0432\u043d\u0438\u043e\u0442 \u0441\u043e\u043e\u0431\u0440\u0430\u045c\u0430\u0458], and therefore also the general safety [\u0438\u043d\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0435\u0441\u0438\u0442\u0435 \u043d\u0430 \u043e\u043f\u0448\u0442\u0430\u0442\u0430 \u0431\u0435\u0437\u0431\u0435\u0434\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442].\u201d 16.  It appears that the latter decision was served on the applicant on 2 June 2011.", "references": ["0", "5", "8", "7", "4", "2", "6", "1", "3", "9", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1958. She divorced her husband, B., in 1992. At the time of the events, she was living with her daughter, who was a minor, in a flat in Kyiv. 6.   On 7 March 2005 police officers arrested B. for an administrative offence at Kyiv Pasazhyrskyy railway station. Following the arrest, the police officers found that a driving licence he had shown them did not bear all the requisite information and had a series number linked to another person in the police database. 7.  On 8 March 2005 criminal proceedings were instituted against B. for document forgery committed in conspiracy with others. On that day the police recorded telephone conversations between B. and the applicant which suggested that certain documents relating to his driving licence and his study in the driving school had been kept in her flat. The recorded conversations were later documented in a report on 31 October 2005. 8.  On 10 March 2005 an investigator with the Pivdenno-Zakhidna railway police department, who was dealing with the criminal case against B., applied to the Shevchenkivskyy District Court in Kyiv for search warrants for two flats, including the one belonging to the applicant, where, according to the investigator, B. permanently resided. 9.  On 11 March 2005 the Shevchenkivskyy District Court of Kyiv issued the search warrants. Only the investigator was present at the hearing. With regard to the applicant\u2019s flat, the court found that it was necessary to carry out a search of the flat where B. permanently resided and where the forged documents, as well as the means of and instruments for forging the documents, might be kept. 10.  On the same day the investigator decided to carry out the search of the applicant\u2019s flat. Upon their arrival, the investigator and the other police officers present found that the flat was locked and that nobody responded when they rang the bell. According to the statements of the police officers, as submitted to the investigative authorities, they had contacted the applicant to inform her about the search. According to the applicant, on that day she and her daughter had left for their cottage outside the city; she had had her mobile phone with her and had not been contacted by the police. 11.  The police officers called a task force to open the door to the flat. Once the door had been opened, the investigator and three police officers carried out the search, with two attesting witnesses and a representative of the building maintenance organisation in attendance. In the course of the search the police officers seized items of property, which they listed in a report. The list included, among other things: floppy disks, compact discs, vehicle registration certificates, keys, a box containing cash, certificates issued in B.\u2019s name, a painting and an icon. 12.  On 14 March 2005 the applicant returned home and found the door to her flat damaged and sealed. With the investigator\u2019s permission, she entered the flat and found that it was in a state of disarray. She also found that some items of property not included in the list of seized items were missing: four mobile phones, top-up cards for mobile phones, jewels and a bottle of whisky. 13.  The applicant made a complaint to the law-enforcement authorities regarding the actions of the police officers carrying out the search. She claimed that requirements of domestic law had been breached in the course of the search and that some items of property had disappeared. 14.  On 19 April 2005 the Kyiv transport prosecutor\u2019s office commenced a criminal investigation with regard to the possible theft of the applicant\u2019s property. 15.  On 5 July 2005 the applicant was granted victim status and her civil claim was admitted to the file. On the same day the investigation was suspended, as it was not possible to identify the possible perpetrators of the crime. 16.  On 1 October 2005 the Kyiv city prosecutor\u2019s office reversed the decision of 5 July 2005 as regards the suspension of the proceedings, finding that the investigation had not been carried out comprehensively: the people participating in the search of the applicant\u2019s flat had not been questioned properly, the mobile phones and the top-up cards had not been found, and the investigative measures implemented had not been properly documented. 17.  On 30 November and 26 December 2005 certain seized items, including the painting, the icon and the missing mobile phones, were returned to the applicant. 18.  On 28 December 2005 the transport prosecutor\u2019s office of Kyiv refused to investigate the possible neglect of official duties by the police officers as regards the failure to fully document the items seized. It considered that the mobile phones had not been included in the list of seized items owing to a technical mistake. The phones had been given back to the applicant and, consequently, she had sustained no damage. It was concluded in the end that there had been no objective evidence to suggest that the police officers had neglected their duties. 19.  On 9 June 2006 the Kyiv city prosecutor\u2019s office found that the investigation into the alleged theft had not been carried out thoroughly, and had been delayed. It requested the Kyiv city prosecutor\u2019s office to organise a proper investigation of the case. 20.  On 30 June 2006 an investigator with the Kyiv transport prosecutor\u2019s office terminated the investigation, stating that there had been no evidence to suggest that any item had been stolen from the applicant\u2019s flat during the search. 21.  The applicant challenged that decision in court. 22.  On 7 August 2006 the Holosiyivskyy District Court of Kyiv dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaint, considering that the investigator had taken the necessary measures and had lawfully closed the case. 23.  The applicant appealed. 24.  On 16 November 2006 the Kyiv City Court of Appeal quashed the first-instance court\u2019s decision of 7 August 2006 and the investigator\u2019s decision of 30 June 2006 as unsubstantiated, and remitted the case for further investigation. 25.  As of 22 July 2011 the investigation was ongoing. No further information was provided to the Court. 26.  On 16 June 2005 the Kyiv transport prosecutor, having conducted a pre-investigation inquiry, refused to commence criminal proceedings in relation to the possible abuse of power or ultra vires actions by the police officers during the search of the applicant\u2019s flat. In his decision, the prosecutor referred to the statement of a police officer that the applicant had been contacted on her mobile phone and informed that the search would be carried out, and the door to the flat had only been broken down after her refusal to appear. The prosecutor also stated that the search had been carried out in accordance with established procedure; it had been observed by two attesting witnesses and the representative of the building maintenance organisation, as required by the domestic law. 27.  On 21 June 2005 the applicant challenged the decision of 16 June 2005 in court. 28.  On 7 July 2005 the Holosiyivskyy District Court of Kyiv found that the decision of 16 June 2005 was well-founded. The court stated that the prosecutor had adopted the decision after interviewing the police officers, two attesting witnesses, and a representative of the building maintenance organisation who had been involved in the search, in addition to the applicant and her former husband. The court further stated that the prosecutor had examined the search warrant, search report and other relevant documents, and had come to the correct conclusions when refusing to open an investigation. 29.  The applicant appealed. 30.  On 8 September 2005 the Kyiv Court of Appeal upheld the decision of 7 July 2005, finding that the prosecutor had lawfully refused to open an investigation. The applicant\u2019s contentions were dismissed as groundless. 31.  The applicant appealed on points of law. 32.  On 25 November 2005 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal, noting that the impugned court decisions were not open to review.", "references": ["2", "5", "7", "8", "3", "0", "6", "1", "9", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1946 and lives in Adana. As some of the facts are disputed by the parties, their submissions will be summarised separately. 6.  The applicant\u2019s husband, Mr Sefer Cerf, was the district leader and administrative board member of the People\u2019s Democracy Party (Halk\u0131n Demokrasi Partisi, hereinafter referred to as \u201cHADEP\u201d), a political party which was dissolved by the Constitutional Court in 2003 (see HADEP and Demir v. Turkey, no. 28003/03, 14 December 2010), in the town of Y\u00fcre\u011fir, within the administrative jurisdiction of the province of Adana. In the four to five years prior to 1994 he and his family were often harassed, intimidated and threatened by plainclothes police officers on account of his political activities. On 1 October 1994 a man fired a shot at the applicant\u2019s 11-year-old son outside their house, narrowly missing him. 7.  At around 8 a.m. on 3 October 1994, the applicant\u2019s husband Sefer Cerf left home to go to a caf\u00e9 in the town centre. According to a number of eyewitnesses, Sefer Cerf arrived at the caf\u00e9 and sat outside on the terrace next to his friend, R.\u00c7., who was also an administrative board member of HADEP. 8.  The witnesses then heard six gunshots and immediately afterwards saw two men with pistols in their hands running away from the caf\u00e9. The applicant\u2019s husband Sefer Cerf and his friend R.\u00c7. were shot and Sefer Cerf died at the scene. R.\u00c7. was injured and died while being taken to a hospital by a friend, Mr Ahmet Dizman. A third person, Mr S.S., was also hit by a ricocheting bullet and wounded in the foot. 9.  On the day of the killing there were no police or anti-terrorism officers\u2019 vehicles in the area. This was unusual as ordinarily they would have been patrolling the neighbourhood. Furthermore, it took a considerable amount of time before the authorities attended the scene. When people tried to call an ambulance, they found that the telephone lines had been cut. 10.  Police officers who arrived at the caf\u00e9 questioned eyewitnesses and collected six spent bullet cases and two deformed bullets from the scene and sent them for forensic examination. An incident scene investigation was concluded by the prosecutor the same day. 11.  Mr Sait Macir, also a board member of HADEP, was inside the caf\u00e9 at the time and went outside to help the two victims. He told the authorities that he had seen the two assailants running away from the scene. Mr Macir was taken to a police station on the pretext of giving a statement but was instead questioned about his relationship with the applicant\u2019s husband. His caf\u00e9 was closed by the police for no reason and he was subjected to continuous harassment after the incident. On 30 December 1994 Mr Macir was himself shot and killed outside the same caf\u00e9 (see Macir v. Turkey (friendly settlement), no. 28516/95, 22 April 2003). After his death, Mr Macir\u2019s wife was taken to a police station where she was threatened and questioned about her husband\u2019s connections to the applicant\u2019s husband and to Mr R.\u00c7. 12.  A couple of days after the incident, Ahmet Dizman, who had tried to take R.\u00c7. to hospital, was detained by the police. The police officers beat him up and told him that they had seen him at the funeral of Sefer Cerf and R.\u00c7. the day before. They threatened him and told him that if he continued to be involved in such activities, his end would be like those of the dead HADEP members. As a result of that ill-treatment Mr Dizman\u2019s jaw was broken (see Dizman v. Turkey, no. 27309/95, \u00a7\u00a7 12 and 15, 20 September 2005). 13.  Threats against the applicant also continued after the killing of her husband. Plainclothes police officers continuously observed their family home, questioned their visitors and, on a number of occasions, threw notes into the garden with messages such as \u201clike your father, your end has come\u201d, addressed to the applicant\u2019s daughter. On one occasion in 1995 the applicant\u2019s daughter was detained at a checkpoint on her return from work and made to wait in a police vehicle before being taken to a police station. When her family sought to locate her, the police denied that she was in their custody. While she was detained, the police questioned her about the death of her father. On her release, the police threatened her and she was followed by the police over the following days. 14.  On 20 October 1994 the Adana prosecutor\u2019s office issued a standing search order in relation to the killing of Sefer Cerf and R.\u00c7., requesting that the perpetrators be sought as long as prosecution was not time-barred, and that information be given to the office on a regular basis, every three months. 15.  On 4 August 1995 a number of individuals were remanded under an indictment alleging offences including membership of Hizbullah, an illegal organisation which was involved in the assassination of individuals with pro-Kurdish sympathies in south-east Turkey in the early 1990s. On 25 July 1996 the Konya State Security Court acquitted the individuals previously indicted for offences including membership of Hizbullah. That decision was upheld by the Court of Cassation. 16.  On 19 January 2000 a Mr M.D. was arrested. In his statement of 23 January 2000 M.D. admitted membership of Hizbullah, and told the authorities that he had taken part in the killing of the applicant\u2019s husband and his friend R.\u00c7. He gave a detailed account of the assassination and described the role played by his co-assassins. 17.  Following M.D.\u2019s confession, a \u201cscene report\u201d was drawn up on 30 January 2000. He was taken by helicopter to Adana, where he was taken to the scene of the killing of the applicant\u2019s husband for further questioning. 18.  On 10 February 2000 Mr H.T., one of the persons implicated by M.D. in the killing, and seven of his companions were arrested and detained in custody. H.T. refused to answer any questions put to him regarding the killing of Sefer Cerf and R.\u00c7. 19.  Subsequently A.Y., A.A. and a number of other persons were also arrested. During his questioning A.A. described the role played in the killing by K.G., who had been their leader and had given them their orders. 20.  The information obtained by the police during the investigations was forwarded to the Adana State Security Court, which subsequently decided that it had no jurisdiction, and sent the investigation file to the State Security Court in Diyarbak\u0131r. 21.  On 10 February 2005 the applicant applied to the Adana prosecutor\u2019s office, seeking information and copies of the documents from the investigation file. The prosecutor replied and informed the applicant in his letter that the investigation in question not only concerned the killing of her husband and R.\u00c7., but the killings of seven other persons in 1994 and 1995. The prosecutor informed the applicant in his letter of 11 February 2005 that on account of the confidential nature of the investigation he could not give her a copy of the entire investigation file. The prosecutor did, however, give the applicant copies of certain documents from the file and informed her that five persons had been identified as possible suspects in the killing of her husband and that criminal proceedings had been initiated against one of those individuals before the Diyarbak\u0131r State Security Court. When the applicant insisted on obtaining copies of all the investigation documents so that she could make an application to the European Court of Human Rights, the prosecutor told her that he could not give her those documents because they would be used against Turkey. 22.  In December 2006 the applicant again contacted the Diyarbak\u0131r prosecutor\u2019s office, but was told that it would not provide her with information concerning the prosecution because she had no case file number. 23.  On 5 March 2007 the applicant made a detailed submission to the office of the Diyarbak\u0131r prosecutor and informed that prosecutor about the actions taken by her in having her husband\u2019s killing investigated. She also shared with the prosecutor the evidence in her possession and informed him of her allegations. She asked the prosecutor to reply to a number of questions set out by her in her submission concerning the investigation. In reply, the prosecutor informed the applicant about the actions taken in the criminal proceedings against the suspects K.G. and A.A. 24.  On 27 August 2012 the applicant\u2019s daughter applied to the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court, to which the proceedings had been transferred in the meantime, and asked for information on the proceedings against K.G., M.D. and A.A. She was provided with a copy of the judgment of 30 December 2009 in which K.G. and M.D. had been found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment. The court did not provide any information on A.A.\u2019s case. On 10 September 2012 the applicant asked the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court for information about the whereabouts of K.G., M.D. and A.A. However, she was not provided with any information in response. According to news reports obtained by the applicant, K.G. and M.D. had been released from prison on 4 January 2011, and on 26 January 2011 the Court of Appeal had upheld their convictions. Following their release they had left Turkey and fled to Syria. 25.  It appears from the documents submitted by the Government that during the criminal proceedings against them M.D., K.G., A.A. and M.A.O. retracted their earlier statements, which they alleged had been extracted from them under torture, and denied any involvement in the killing of the applicant\u2019s husband. 26.  The applicant\u2019s husband Sefer Cerf died as a result of an armed attack carried out on 3 October 1994. Neither Sefer Cerf nor the applicant had lodged any complaints with the Adana prosecutor on or after 3 October 1994 or made any allegations that they had been harassed or threatened by plainclothes police officers. 27.  Immediately after the killing of her husband the prosecutor visited the scene and prepared an incident report. The prosecutor also secured the evidence such as the bullets, spent cartridges and the clothes worn by the applicant\u2019s husband on the day in question, and sent them for forensic examination. A search of the area was also carried out. The prosecutor and the investigating police officers took statements from witnesses and prepared a sketch of the scene of the incident. 28.  A post mortem examination was conducted on the body of the applicant\u2019s husband the same day, and a bullet recovered from his body was also sent for forensic examination. 29.  On 20 October 1994 the prosecutor issued a standing search order and instructed law-enforcement officials to investigate the killing until expiry of the limitation period. 30.  Starting in 2000, a number of operations were carried out against Hizbullah. On 19 January 2000 M.D. was arrested in the course of one of those operations. 31.  On 30 January 2000 prosecutors at the Ankara and Adana State Security Courts took M.D. to the place where the applicant\u2019s husband had been killed. M.D. provided a detailed description of the killing of the applicant\u2019s husband. 32.  On 14 July 2000 one of M.D.\u2019s co-assassins, A.A., was arrested and confessed to the killings. 33.  Subsequently, the following criminal proceedings were brought against the suspects. 34.  On 9 August 2000 criminal proceedings were brought against A.A. before the Diyarbak\u0131r State Security Court for membership of Hizbullah and for carrying out armed attacks on behalf of that organisation, including the killing of the applicant\u2019s husband. In 2004 the State Security Courts were abolished and the criminal proceedings against A.A. were taken over by the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court. 35.  On 12 May 2009 A.A. was found guilty and sentenced to fourteen years\u2019 imprisonment. His conviction was quashed by the Court of Cassation on 1 April 2010 on the ground that at the time the offences were committed he had been under the age of 18 and that fact had not been taken into account by the first-instance court. 36.  Criminal proceedings restarted before the Batman Assize Court in 2010 and on 9 May 2013 A.A. was sentenced to a total of five years, six months and twenty days\u2019 imprisonment. A.A. did not appeal against his conviction. 37.  A.A. was detained in a prison between 17 July 2000 and 23 March 2006 and between 8 and 22 January 2013. 38.  On 24 May 2000 M.D. was charged with the offence of attempting to undermine the constitutional order. 39.  On 6 September 2000 K.G. was charged with the offence of \u201cattempting to overthrow the constitutional order by arms and to replace it with a system based on Sharia rules\u201d. 40.  In the indictments the killing of the applicant\u2019s husband was also included as one of the acts imputable to M.D. and K.G. 41.  On 30 December 2009 the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court handed down its 1,153-page judgment. It appears from this judgment that separate criminal proceedings instigated against thirty-one defendants for the killing of a total of 181 people, including the applicant\u2019s husband and his friend R.\u00c7., had been joined in this case. The Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court found M.D. and K.G. guilty and sentenced them to life imprisonment. Their convictions and sentences were upheld by the Court of Cassation on 26 January 2011. 42.  M.D. and K.G. were remanded in custody on 31 January 2000 and kept there until their conditional release was ordered on 3 January 2011 by the Court of Cassation, which noted that they had been in custody for longer than the ten-year period allowed by statute. 43.  Following the upholding of their conviction, arrest warrants were issued on 29 March 2011 and on 17 May 2011 for M.D. and K.G. with a view to executing the remainder of their sentences. 44.  M.A.O. was indicted on 11 June 2001 and charged with the offence of membership of an outlawed organisation, namely Hizbullah, and for carrying out illegal acts on behalf of that organisation, including the killing of the applicant\u2019s husband. 45.  On 13 February 2008 the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court found him guilty and sentenced him to life imprisonment. The conviction and the sentence were upheld by the Court of Cassation on 29 September 2009. 46.  M.A.O. who had been remanded in custody on 23 April 2001, is still in prison serving his sentence. 47.  On 26 July 2000 criminal proceedings were brought against A.Y. for membership of Hizbullah and for carrying out abductions and killings on behalf of that organisation, including the killing of the applicant\u2019s husband. 48.  On 20 December 2012 the Adana State Security Court found him guilty and sentenced him to twelve years and six months\u2019 imprisonment. On 2 June 2013 the Court of Cassation upheld that judgment. 49.  While the above-mentioned criminal proceedings were pending, on 11 February 2005 the Adana prosecutor communicated to the applicant, in response to a request made by her, copies of the documents concerning the investigation into the killing of her husband. As the investigation did not concern only the killing of her husband but also those of a number of other individuals, the applicant was only provided with copies of those documents which concerned the killing of her husband. In this connection a decision to classify the investigation files as confidential constituted an obstacle to the applicant\u2019s access to the documents in question. 50.  On 5 March 2007 the applicant made representations to the Diyarbak\u0131r prosecutor. On 21 and 27 March 2007 the applicant was provided with replies in respect of those representations.", "references": ["3", "8", "4", "1", "9", "6", "5", "2", "7", "No Label", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1988 and lives in Zagreb. 6.  In 1993 the applicant\u2019s father, \u017d.L., who was a war veteran, killed the applicant\u2019s mother and her parents and then committed suicide. 7.  In 1996 the applicant, represented by his grandmother, sought family disability benefit in connection with the suicide of his father, arguing that the suicide was a consequence of mental derangement caused by his participation in the war. 8.  On 19 June 1996 his request was dismissed by the competent Zagreb Office of the Ministry of Defence (Ministarstvo obrane) in charge of war veterans\u2019 affairs on the grounds that the war veteran status of his father had not been established. In July 1996 the applicant challenged that decision before the Ministry of Defence, which accepted his appeal and on 12 December 1997 quashed the first-instance decision and remitted the case for re-examination on the grounds that the nature of the applicant\u2019s request had not been adequately established. 9.  Following several procedural decisions of the Zagreb Municipality Office with responsibility for war veterans\u2019 affairs (hereinafter: the \u201cZagreb Office\u201d) and the Ministry in charge of war veterans\u2019 affairs (Ministarstvo branitelja i me\u0111ugeneracijske solidarnosti; hereinafter: the \u201cMinistry\u201d), on 3 June 2004 the Administrative Court (Upravni sud Republike Hrvatske) ordered the Zagreb Office and the Ministry to examine the applicant\u2019s request for family disability benefit on the merits, which the applicant should have a possibility to challenge if he was not be satisfied with the outcome. 10.  On 8 November 2005 the Zagreb Office dismissed the applicant\u2019s request on the grounds that nothing from the materials available in the case file suggested that the death of his father was a result of his participation in the war. 11.  The applicant challenged this decision before the Ministry, and on 15 January 2006 the Ministry found that the facts of the case connecting the suicide of the applicant\u2019s father to his participation in the war had never been clearly established. It thus ordered the Zagreb Office to clarify the matter by commissioning an expert report from the competent medical institution and to obtain the relevant witness statements concerning the applicant\u2019s father\u2019s wartime service. 12.  On the basis of the Ministry\u2019s instructions, the Zagreb Office commissioned an expert report concerning the question whether the suicide of the applicant\u2019s father was related to his participation in the war from the Psychiatric Clinic of the Clinical Hospital Dubrava, Reference Centre of the Ministry of Health and Social Care for Stress-Induced Disorders, Regional Centre for Psychotrauma in Zagreb (Klini\u010dka bolnica Dubrava, Klinika za psihijatriju, Referentni centar Ministarstva zdravstva i socijalne skrbi za poreme\u0107aje uzrokovane stresom, Regionalni centar za psihotraumu Zagreb; hereinafter: the \u201cCentre\u201d), a public health care institution authorised by law to give expert opinions on matters related to war veterans\u2019 psychiatric disorders (see paragraph 28 below). It also questioned two witnesses concerning the applicant\u2019s father\u2019s wartime service. 13.  In an expert report dated 10 June 2007 addressed to the Zagreb Office, the Centre concluded, on the basis of the available medical reports and the statements of witnesses, that the applicant\u2019s father had not developed any symptoms resulting in a psychiatric diagnosis linked to his participation in the war and that his suicide could not be attributed to his wartime service. This expert report was not forwarded to the applicant. 14.  On 26 September 2007 the Zagreb Office dismissed the applicant\u2019s request for the family disability benefit referring to the Centre\u2019s expert report, which had not established any link between his father\u2019s suicide and his participation in the war. 15.  The applicant challenged the above decision before the Ministry, seeking remittal of the case to the Zagreb Office for further examination. He alleged that the Centre\u2019s report was superficial, since it had not been commissioned with regard to all aspects of the events, such as the triple murder committed by his father. The applicant also considered the report to be illogical, given that before the war his father had had no psychiatric problems whereas after his wartime activities he had committed a triple murder and suicide, which made it difficult to accept that he had not developed some mental condition. The applicant further contended that another expert report should be commissioned from one of the permanent court experts in psychiatry, since the report produced by the Centre raised the issue of its independence. He also stressed that any expert opinion on the matter should necessarily be forwarded to him for comments before the adoption of a decision. 16.  On 2 April 2008 the Ministry dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal on the grounds that the Centre\u2019s report was conclusive that the suicide of his father had not been related to his participation in the war. 17.  The applicant lodged an administrative action in the Administrative Court against the above decision, asking the Administrative Court to decide the case on the merits instead of remitting it to the administrative bodies. He pointed out that the proceedings had already lasted excessively long and that the administrative bodies had failed to comply effectively with the previous instructions of the Administrative Court. He therefore considered that the Administrative Court should itself decide the case on the merits, as provided under section 63 of the Administrative Disputes Act (see paragraph 25 below). The applicant also contended that, if the Administrative Court did not decide the case on the merits, it should quash the Ministry\u2019s decision and remit the case for re-examination. 18.  In his administrative action the applicant in particular pointed out that the Ministry had failed to reply to the specific arguments set out in his appeal against the first-instance decision of the Zagreb Office and had merely reiterated the findings of the first-instance decision. He also reiterated his appeal arguments that the Centre\u2019s expert report was superficial and illogical, since it had not been commissioned with regard to all aspects of the events, such as the triple murder committed by his father, and that it had failed to take into account that before the war his father had had no psychiatric problems whereas after his wartime activities he had committed a triple murder and suicide. In these circumstances, the applicant stressed that under section 191 of the Administrative Disputes Act another expert report ought to be commissioned from the permanent court experts in psychiatry. 19.  On 4 December 2008 the Administrative Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s action as ill-founded. In particular, it stressed:\n\u201cDuring the proceedings an expert report was commissioned, under section 123 \u00a7 1 (8) of the [Veterans Act], from the [Centre] and the report was produced on 10 June 2007. The report concluded that based on the relevant documents from the case file it did not find that \u017d.L. had developed any symptoms resulting in a psychiatric diagnosis linked to his participation in the war ...\nHaving these facts in mind, this court is of the opinion that the defendant acted lawfully when dismissing the appellant\u2019s appeal against the first-instance decision ... It should also be noted that this court already held that the formation of an expert team [competent to determine] a possible link [between death and participation in the war], which [provides for] a decisive evidence within the meaning of section 123 \u00a7 1 (8) of the [Veterans Act], is a precondition for any further proceedings concerning the status of the family member of a deceased war veteran.\nThe defendant therefore correctly dismissed the appeal against the first-instance decision and thereby it did not act contrary to the relevant law. This court did not find it necessary to act under section 63 of the Administrative Disputes Act given that, as already noted above, the administrative body complied with the instruction from the judgement no. Us-2377/00 [see paragraph 9 above] concerning the appellant\u2019s request for family disability benefit, which is the subject matter of the proceedings at issue. Although the defendant did not expressly reply to the appeal arguments concerning the necessity to request a report with regard to [\u017d.L.\u2019s] act of triple murder, [the court finds] that it could not be a decisive factor for a decision in the proceedings at hand. This is because such a criminal act cannot be a basis for the establishment of a link between the death of the war veteran and his participation in [the war]...\u201d 20.  On 18 February 2009 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) arguing that his right to a fair trial in the proceedings had been violated. He contended in particular that the administrative bodies and the Administrative Court had ignored his request for an expert report to be commissioned from the permanent court experts and that he had been offered neither the possibility of participating in the choice of experts nor the opportunity to take cognisance of and comment on the expert opinion before the adoption of a decision during the proceedings. 21.  On 27 May 2010 the Constitutional Court declared the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded, noting that:\n\u201cIn his constitutional complaint, the complainant was unable to show that the Administrative Court had acted contrary to the constitutional provisions concerning human rights and fundamental freedoms or had arbitrarily interpreted the relevant statutory provisions. The Constitutional Court therefore finds that the present case does not raise an issue of the complainant\u2019s constitutional rights. Thus, there is no constitutional law issue in the case for the Constitutional Court to decide on. ...\u201d 22.  The decision of the Constitutional Court was served on the applicant\u2019s representative on 14 June 2010.", "references": ["2", "7", "4", "5", "6", "0", "1", "9", "8", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1992, and at the time of the introduction of the application was detained in Lyster Barracks Detention Centre, in \u0126al Far. 6.  The applicant entered Malta in an irregular manner by boat on 6 May 2012. On arrival she was registered by the immigration police, given an identification number (12D-001) and presented with a Return Decision and a Removal Order. The applicant was immediately detained in Lyster Barracks; her detention was based on Article 14 (2) of the Immigration Act (see Relevant domestic law below). 7.  The Return Decision stated that she was a prohibited immigrant by virtue of Article 5 of the Immigration Act (Chapter 217 of the Laws of Malta) because she was in Malta \u201cwithout means of subsistence and liable to become a charge on public funds\u201d. The Return Decision also informed the applicant that her stay was being terminated and that she had the possibility to apply for a period of voluntary departure. The Removal Order was based on the consideration that the applicant\u2019s request for a period of voluntary departure had been rejected. It informed the applicant that she would remain in custody until removal was effected, and that an entry ban would be issued against her. The two documents further informed the applicant of her right to appeal against the Decision and Order before the Immigration Appeals Board (\u201cthe IAB\u201d) within three working days. 8.  On 9 May 2012 the applicant was assisted to submit a Preliminary Questionnaire (PQ), thereby registering her wish to apply for asylum under Article 8 of the Refugees Act, Chapter 420 of the Laws of Malta. On 21 May 2012 the applicant was called for an interview by the Office of the Refugee Commissioner (ORC). 9.  On 30 June 2012 the ORC rejected her application on the basis, inter alia, that she had failed to support her claim that she was from central/southern Somalia with convincing evidence (in particular, she had shown insufficient knowledge about Mogadishu and her speech displayed phonological, grammatical and lexical features not typical of those spoken in Mogadishu). Her appeal was also rejected by the Refugee Appeals Board (the \u201cRAB\u201d) on 18 December 2012. The appeal decision reads as follows:\n\u201cThe Refugee Appeals Board refers to a fill-in-the-blanks form received in its Office on 18 July 2012 and to a legal submission on your behalf received in its Office on 8 October 2012.\nThe Board notes that you travelled to Libya in December 2011, first via Kenya and then via Sudan. In none of these countries did you consider applying for refugee status. During the popular insurrection against the Gaddafi regime in Libya you disembarked on the island of Malta, illegally and undocumented on 6 May 2012, claiming that you were looking for peace, although seven of your siblings still live in Somalia. You also claim that your brother had been killed by a terrorist Islamic organization, Al Shabab, because they thought he worked for the Government. However, you also claim that if there was peace back home, you would be prepared to return. Since you left, as you may know, Al Shabab has been driven out of Mogadishu and Presidential elections have been successfully held and several Somalis are repatriating.\nYour appeal for the grant of refugee status by Malta cannot be upheld according to law.\u201d 10.  Up to the date of the lodging of her application with the Court on 19 August 2013 the applicant had heard no news about any steps being taken in connection with her removal. In practice Malta effected no removals to Somalia or Somaliland. 11.  Ever since her arrival in Malta the applicant suffered from several medical problems, such as headaches, earaches and fainting, and was frequently hospitalised (see paragraphs 16-19 below). She showed signs of severe anxiety and depression which got worse following the refusal of her asylum request. In consequence, on 1 October 2012, she was referred to the Agency for the Welfare of Asylum Seekers (AWAS) by the Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS). This referral was made with a view to obtaining her release from detention in terms of government policy on the grounds of vulnerability due to physical and psychological ill-health. According to the referral form, filled in by an official of the JRS:\n\u201cSagal has been complaining of several medical problems ever since she arrived in Malta. She had several appointments in hospital was also taken to emergency by ambulance after collapsing in detention. Sagal was also rejected by the Office of the Refugee Commission, causing her to be very depressed. Every time we visit she is in her bed crying and showing signs of severe anxiety.\u201d 12.  In December 2012 the applicant was interviewed (for a few minutes) by the Vulnerable Adults Assessment Team of AWAS, with a view to determine whether she should be released on the grounds of vulnerability. The interview was held in English and the applicant was assisted by another detainee who was not fluent in the language. Her impression is that she was verbally informed that she would be released. On 10 August 2013, that is just under one year after the referral, the interviewers verbally informed her that she would be released. The Government also confirmed that eventually the applicant\u2019s request for release on the ground of vulnerability was acceded to by AWAS. 13.  Nevertheless, up to the date of the lodging of her application with the Court on 19 August 2013 the applicant was still in detention. She hoped to be released in November 2013 after the lapse of an eighteen month detention as per domestic practice at the time. 14.  The applicant submitted that the Vulnerable Adult Assessment Procedure operated by AWAS was developed by the said organisation in order to give effect to a government policy introduced in January 2005 which stated that vulnerable individuals should not be detained. The applicant submitted that although AWAS was not formally charged with the responsibility of this procedure by the law which set it up, in practice the agency had full responsibility for the procedure. However, in spite of the fact that this procedure can have a determining impact on the continued detention of individuals detained in terms of the Immigration Act, it was not adequately regulated by law or by publicly available rules or procedures. The determining authority does not give written reasons for its decision and there is no possibility of appeal, although it may be possible to request a review if more evidence is available or there is a degeneration of the individual\u2019s condition. 15.  According to the Government the Vulnerable Adult Assessment Procedure, which was operated to assess vulnerability, was widely known within the migration sector and a policy document had been issued about it. Forms were distributed to individuals working in the sector such as NGOs. The Government submitted that the Vulnerable Adult Assessment Procedure was a quick process in straightforward cases (such as pregnant women and families with very young children) which were usually determined within two weeks. However, less straightforward cases such as assessments on the grounds of mental health, psychological problems or chronic illness, required a more complex assessment procedure which was therefore lengthier. 16. A certificate issued by a doctor in May 2012 confirmed that the applicant had been hospitalised on 7 and 8 May 2012 (upon her arrival in Malta) for dehydration, she was seen again on 15 May and 15 June of the same year. She suffered \u201cfits\u201d and was waiting for an appointment. 17.   According to the documents provided by the applicant, after her initial hospitalisation, and apart from the two visits mentioned above, she was seen by a doctor at the state hospital around sixteen times between May and September 2012, and each time was prescribed medication. On these occasions she suffered from, inter alia, epigastric pain and nausea (repeatedly), bilateral conjunctivitis, inflammation, bleeding gums, insomnia, otalgia/earaches (also repeatedly) causing reduced hearing, as well as headaches and toothaches, and dizziness. In none of these occasions was she kept under observation overnight, or hospitalised. In June 2012 following claims by the applicant that she had been falling repeatedly, and that she was having episodes of jerking and tongue biting (which had left evident marks), the doctor requested her referral to a specified department to run the relevant tests to exclude epilepsy \u2013 the result of these tests, if undertaken, are unknown to the Court. 18.  A medical certificate issued in March 2013 states that at the time the applicant was suffering from \u201clow mood and insomnia\u201d and had been \u201ccomplaining of somatic symptoms such as chest pain\u201d. The doctor noted \u201cevident deterioration of her mental state\u201d and suggested she be considered as vulnerable. 19.  An attestation issued by a doctor in May 2013 states that according to available records \u201cshe has stayed unwell and been treated or referred to Mater Dei Hospital [the State hospital] more than usual\u201d and that \u201cher health has posed challenges in keeping her at the \u0126al Far detention centre and any assistance will be appreciated\u201d. 20.  The applicant was detained in Hermes Block in Lyster Barracks, in conditions which she considered prison-like and basic. She explained that the Block is divided into five zones alike in terms of layout and facilities. The applicant was detained in Zone C for the first seven to eight months and was afterwards transferred to Zone D for a number of months until she moved to Zone A. 21.  She noted that in Zone C there were over eighty (sic) single women and at one point the detention centre was so crowded that there were not enough beds and people had to sleep on metal tables in the television room. She noted that Zone D was less crowded but that it still lacked privacy and sanitation. 22.  She complained about the lack of constructive activities to occupy detainees, overcrowding (particularly during the summer months), lack of privacy, limited access to open air, difficulties in communication with staff, other detainees and with the outside world, lack of information about their own situations, and the lack of proper arrangements for heating and cooling, leading to extreme cold in winter and extreme heat in summer. The applicant highlighted the lack of female staff - in particular she noted that every morning male soldiers barged into her dormitory while the inmates were still asleep to make a head count, during which they removed the sheets to check for their presence. This meant that the applicant had to sleep fully dressed every night, including her headscarf, to avoid embarrassing moments. 23.  The applicant also complained of limited access to medical care, also because of a lack of interpreters to enable communication with medical staff. 24.  The applicant was informed of the AWAS decision to accede to her request and was released from detention on 12 September 2013.", "references": ["6", "7", "0", "3", "4", "9", "8", "5", "No Label", "1", "2"], "gold": ["1", "2"]}
+{"input": "10.  The applicant was born in 1975 and lives in Turkey. 11.  In 1999 the applicant fled from Uzbekistan to Tajikistan because of pressure from the police, who suspected him of anti-constitutional activities in connection with his alleged Islamic religious beliefs and practices. He feared, in particular, that if he stayed in Uzbekistan, he would face persecution from the State authorities, and would eventually be imprisoned and tortured like some of his fellow Muslim friends. In support of his allegation of the risk of ill-treatment in Uzbekistan, the applicant submitted a copy of a list of persons who had been charged with offences against the State. The list had been prepared by the Human Rights Centre \u201cMemorial\u201d, a non-governmental organisation based in Moscow, and included the applicant\u2019s name. According to this document, the applicant was charged under Article 159 \u00a7 4 of the Uzbekistan Criminal Code (attempting to violently overthrow the State\u2019s constitutional order). At the top of the document, it was explained that the list had been compiled on the basis of the \u201cBulletin on the Search for Criminals\u201d prepared by the criminal investigation and counter-terrorism department of the Ministry of the Interior of Uzbekistan and published in Tashkent in May 2003. 12.  From Tajikistan, the applicant went on to Afghanistan and Pakistan. In 2005 he arrived in Iran, where he settled in Zahedan. The applicant applied to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (\u201cthe UNHCR\u201d) in Zahedan for recognition as a refugee. He lived in Zahedan for two years without experiencing any major problems. In 2007, however, together with some other Uzbek asylum seekers who had left their country for the same reasons, the applicant decided to flee from Iran following deportation threats. He claimed that the threats had been a response to certain disagreements with the Iranian authorities over their living conditions. 13.  On 18 November 2007 the applicant entered Turkey illegally through Van and went to Ankara to apply for refugee status at the UNHCR. Following a preliminary interview, the applicant was referred to the UNHCR office in Van. The Van office issued him with an asylum seeker certificate. Subsequently, he registered with the Van police headquarters and started the domestic temporary asylum procedure. Thereafter he was given a temporary residence permit until 24 September 2008 and was ordered to report to the police three times a week for signature. It appears that the other Uzbek asylum seekers who had fled Iran together with the applicant were granted similar certificates and permits after following the same procedural steps. 14.  On an unspecified date the Van police sent a notice to a number of Uzbek families requiring them to appear at the police station on 12 September 2008. The notice stated that their attendance was required for the distribution of food rations and school stationery. 15.  Although the applicant did not receive such a notice, at 2 p.m. on 12 September 2008 he went to the police station for signature, as part of his weekly routine. Once at the police station, some twenty-nine asylum seekers, including the applicant, were placed in detention. Their personal items, including identity documents, money and telephones, were confiscated. They were driven to the border at around 9 p.m. the same evening and forcibly deported to Iran. The applicant was allegedly ill\u2011treated and threatened by the police during deportation. 16.  After crossing the border to Iran on foot, the Uzbek asylum seekers, including the applicant, were captured and held hostage by people smugglers, who demanded 5,000 United States dollars to spare their lives and to release them. The asylum seekers contacted some other Uzbeks who had managed to escape deportation from Turkey and obtained the ransom fee. The smugglers made them walk for three days to Y\u00fcksekova, a town close to the Iranian border of Turkey, where they were released. 17.  After re-entering Turkey illegally, the applicant went back to Van together with the other Uzbek asylum seekers. They requested legal advice from the Van Bar Association, which, along with two Turkish non-governmental organisations, published a report on 28 September 2008 regarding the Uzbek asylum seekers\u2019 collective expulsion. It was argued in the report, inter alia, that the expulsion of the Uzbeks by the Turkish State authorities, despite their valid residence permits, had had no legal basis. It was also alleged that the expulsion had been motivated by political considerations to improve relations with Uzbekistan, which had been strained following the acceptance by Turkey of members of Uzbek opposition groups, such as the applicant, as asylum seekers in recent years. 18.  On 11 October 2008 a number of Uzbek asylum seekers, who had previously been deported to Iran on 12 September 2008, were collected from their homes by police officers from the Van police headquarters. The same evening, they were deported to Iran once again. The applicant, however, escaped this deportation by pure chance, as the police did not have his correct home address. 19.  The deportation of the applicant and the other Uzbek nationals was brought to the attention of the national and international public through press releases from various NGOs and the UNHCR. In particular, seven human rights and refugee rights organisations, including Amnesty International, issued a press release in which they condemned the forced illegal deportation of the applicant and the other Uzbek nationals to Iran. Likewise, a Turkish parliamentarian issued a press release within the Parliament and criticised the removal as well as the existing refugee protection system in Turkey. 20.  On an unspecified date the applicant\u2019s representative sent letters to, inter alia, the Human Rights Commission of the Parliament of Turkey, the Human Rights Commission of the Van Governor\u2019s office and the Ministry of the Interior. 21.  On 26 November 2008 the head of the Human Rights Commission of the Parliament of Turkey replied to the applicant\u2019s representative that the Ministry of the Interior had informed the Parliament, in a letter dated 11 November 2008, that the applicant had been deported to Iran, a safe third country, in compliance with the legislation in force. 22.  In his reply dated 22 April 2009, in his capacity as head of the Human Rights Commission of the Van Governor\u2019s office, the Deputy Governor of Van informed the applicant\u2019s representative that the applicant and the other deportees had been removed to Iran in compliance with the legislation in force and that Iran was a safe third country where the applicant had lived before he had arrived in Turkey in 2007. 23.  On 16 March 2010 the UNHCR Ankara Office sent a letter to the applicant\u2019s representative, informing him that the UNHCR had learned that the applicant, along with a number of other Uzbek nationals, had been illegally deported to Iran and that the applicant\u2019s asylum claim was under review. The UNHCR also informed the applicant\u2019s representative that on 26 September 2008 they had sent a letter to the Turkish authorities requesting the latter to take the necessary measures to grant the applicant and other Uzbek nationals who had been deported on 12 September 2008 residence permits with a view to legalizing their status in Turkey pending the completion of the procedures with regard to their cases. 24.  Since 2008, the applicant has been living in Turkey in hiding and his application for refugee status under the mandate of the UNHCR is still under consideration. On 4 December 2013 and 28 March 2014 he was interviewed by officers from the UNHCR\u2019s Ankara office regarding his application for refugee status. He has not received any information from the Turkish authorities as to his request for asylum. The applicant cannot approach the Turkish authorities to apply for asylum or to obtain a temporary residence permit for fear of being deported to Iran, like the other Uzbek asylum seekers who were deported once again to Iran in October 2008. Moreover, he cannot appoint a lawyer to undertake the necessary legal and procedural actions on his behalf before the domestic authorities as he does not possess the necessary identity documents required to issue a power of attorney before a notary public. 25.  When the applicant applied for asylum in Turkey in December 2007, he informed the authorities that he had been granted refugee status in Iran by the UNHCR. His application was registered and he was asked not to leave the city of Van. 26.  On 14 February 2008 the applicant left Van and returned there on 26 August 2008. He subsequently repeated his asylum request. 27.  On an unspecified date the applicant\u2019s asylum request was assessed in the light of Article 33 of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, the European Convention on Human Rights, the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and the national legislation. He was subsequently deported to Iran, a safe third country, where he was recognised as a refugee by the UNHCR. According to a document signed by two police officers and one military officer, submitted by the Government, twenty-nine Uzbek and Afghan nationals, including the applicant, were deported on 12 September 2008. 28.  According to the Government, the applicant was not deprived of his liberty. Moreover, his identity documents were not confiscated.", "references": ["5", "3", "6", "8", "4", "9", "0", "7", "No Label", "1", "2"], "gold": ["1", "2"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1982 and until his arrest lived in Moscow. 7.  On 27 February 2012 the police opened a criminal investigation into large-scale fraud. According to investigators, an unknown person had convinced a businessman to hand over 10,000,000 Russian roubles (approximately EUR 248,000) on the pretext of selling some equipment. However, the person had had no intention of selling the equipment or returning the money. 8.  On 24 January 2013 the applicant was accused of aggravated fraud. The police ordered him not to leave his place of residence, but he fled and was put on a wanted list by the police. 9.  On 16 July 2013 he was arrested and taken to a police custody facility. The next day the Tverskoy District Court of Moscow (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) authorised his pre-trial detention until 16 September 2013, having regard to the seriousness of the charges against him and the risk of his absconding, reoffending and interfering with justice. 10.  The applicant appealed. He referred to, among other things, his poor health. 11.  On 19 August 2013 the Moscow City Court (\u201cthe City Court\u201d) upheld the detention order on appeal after examining his recent medical documents, stating that his health did not preclude his detention on remand. 12.  On 13 September 2013 the District Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 16 November 2013, citing the risk of his absconding given his previous attempt to evade prosecution and the seriousness of the charges against him. The District Court also linked that risk to the applicant\u2019s lack of stable income or work. In the court\u2019s view, no alternative measure, such as house arrest or bail, could have ensured that the criminal proceedings ran smoothly. Lastly, the court noted the complexity of the case and several steps in the investigation which had yet to be performed, including some which required the applicant\u2019s presence and participation. 13.  The applicant appealed. He applied to the City Court to be released on bail because of his worsening health. He insisted that he could no longer move without assistance. In the meantime, in October 2013 he was served with the final version of the bill of indictment and was committed to stand trial before the District Court. 14.  On 13 November 2013 the City Court upheld the detention order of 13 September 2013, endorsing the District Court\u2019s reasoning. After examining medical evidence pertaining to the applicant\u2019s health, it found that the illnesses he suffered from were not severe enough to warrant his release. 15.  On an unspecified date the police searched the applicant\u2019s flat and found a passport with his photograph but under another name. 16.  On 14 November 2013 the District Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 30 March 2014. It again cited his unemployment status and ability to abscond, in view of the seriousness of the charges and his having been on the run from January to July 2013. Noting that his state of health was compatible with the detention conditions, the court concluded that the extension of his detention was justified. 17.  On 13 January 2014 the District Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s request for release on bail or under a written undertaking not to leave Moscow. It reiterated the arguments contained in the preceding detention orders and noted the discovery of the forged passport in his flat during the police search, which for the court was a clear sign of his intention to flee. It also addressed his arguments that he had become paraplegic and thus no longer posed a flight risk. It noted that according to a recent conclusion of a medical panel (see paragraph 32 below), his health did not call for his release. 18.  On the same day the District Court convicted the applicant of aggravated fraud and sentenced him to six years\u2019 imprisonment in a correctional colony. 19.  On 20 February 2014 the City Court upheld the conviction, but reduced the sentence to four years. 20.  For about a week after his arrest on 16 July 2013 the applicant was kept in a Moscow police ward. 21.  His cell measured 12 square metres, had three sleeping places and usually housed two or three inmates. He did not complain about his health and was not seen by a doctor, save for a general check-up on admission. 22.  On 24 July 2013 the applicant was taken to remand prison no. IZ\u201177/2 in Moscow. He underwent the usual general medical check-up on arrival. Informing the resident doctor about serious back injuries he had sustained in 2008 and 2010, he did not make any specific complaints, except about his hypertension. He was considered to be in good health. 23.  According to the Government, he was placed in a cell which measured 26.96 square metres and housed four other inmates. Subsequently he was transferred between less spacious cells, which he shared with two or three inmates. The living space afforded to him varied between 3.8 and 5.7 square metres. Throughout his detention he slept on an individual prison bunk. The applicant did not dispute the above information submitted by the Government. 24.  According to the applicant, in August 2013 he fell and hurt his back. Severe back pain was accompanied by numbness in the legs and resulted in him being unable to walk unaided. He spent the major part of his day in bed being assisted by his cellmates. They took him for walks in the prison yard, carried him to the toilet and washed him with wet towels, which was their way of showing that they were annoyed with his helplessness. 25.  The applicant\u2019s medical records show that on 8 October 2013 he complained to the resident doctor that he was suffering from a headache and back and abdomen pain. The doctor prescribed him drugs and a consultation with a neurologist. 26.  On 19 October 2013 he was taken to a medical unit in the same remand prison for inpatient treatment. The attending doctor noted that, owing to a pain syndrome, he had been unable to move unaided. After blood tests and a CAT (computerized axial tomography) scan, he was injected with painkillers, muscle relaxants, nootropics and vitamins. 27.  The applicant submitted that on 24 October 2013 during his transfer to a court hearing in a standard prison van, he had again severely hurt his back and head. 28.  On 13 November 2013 the applicant was discharged from the medical ward to be transferred to the hospital in remand prison no. IZ-77/1 in Moscow for more comprehensive treatment. 29.  The transfer occurred a week later. On admission to hospital the applicant complained of head and back pain and numbness in his legs. The hospital performed a number of medical tests, including blood and urine tests, a CAT scan and a cerebrospinal fluid analysis. As a result he was diagnosed with paraplegia of unknown origin, headaches and chronic inflammatory demyelinating polyneuropathy. He received antibiotics, muscle relaxants, vitamins and other medication. His health improved, but not significantly. The paraplegia remained unchanged. He was discharged from hospital on 9 December 2013 to undergo treatment in a civilian hospital and to check whether his state of health called for his early release. 30.  From 9 to 13 December 2013 the applicant stayed in Moscow City Hospital no. 20, where he underwent a medical expert examination and received treatment. He had an MRI (magnetic resonance imaging) scan of his spinal column and spinal cord, a scintigraphy and an X-ray of his pelvis. According to a medical report dated 13 December 2013, he suffered the consequences of a reduced blood supply to the Adamkiewicz artery, including lower limb spasticity, dysfunction of the pelvic organs and bedsores developed outside the hospital. In addition, he was diagnosed with hypertension, a small hydrothorax on the right side and some residual effects of pneumonia that did not call for any treatment. The conditions did not fall within the established list of illnesses warranting early release. 31.  The applicant was taken to the intensive care unit of remand prison no. IZ-77/1, where he continued his drug regimen in line with the hospital\u2019s recommendations. The doctors were, however, unable to ensure any improvement in his conditions. A week later he was sent back to Moscow City Hospital no. 20. 32.  A report drawn up on 31 December 2013 by a medical panel from the hospital stated that, in addition to the previous diagnosis, the applicant suffered from neurogenic bladder and bowel dysfunction. However, his conditions still did not reach the level of severity to warrant his release. 33.  The stay in hospital was followed by two weeks of detention in remand prison no. 77/1. There is nothing to suggest that his treatment was interrupted during that period. 34.  On 15 January 2014 the applicant was again taken to Moscow City Hospital no. 20 for a month of treatment. The hospital staff changed his drug regimen, completing it with antioxidant and neutrophil treatment, muscle relaxants, painkillers, and introducing physiotherapy, which resulted in \u201ccertain positive changes in [his] state of health\u201d. 35.  Meanwhile, the applicant\u2019s lawyer asked an independent medical specialist to provide an opinion on the quality of medical care afforded to the applicant in the remand prison. In a report dated 11 February 2014 the specialist stated that the applicant\u2019s conditions required enhanced medical attention and inpatient treatment that could only be performed in a neurological medical facility. Remand prison no. 77/1 was not licensed to provide neurological treatment or perform neurosurgery. His bedsores were a sign of insufficient medical attention. The report ended with a recommendation that he be classified as disabled. 36.  On 14 February 2014 the applicant was taken to remand prison no. 77/1, where he was detained until 1 March 2014. According to the Government, he shared his cell measuring around 11.4 square metres with another inmate. As he was unable to care for himself, medical staff and inmates assisted him with his daily needs. It is apparent from the case file that he continued to receive treatment as prescribed. 37.  On 1 March 2014 he was sent to serve his sentence in a correctional colony in Kostroma, over 300 kilometres away. 38.  In the early hours of 1 March 2014 the applicant was taken in a Gazel minivan designed to transfer the seriously ill, to a Moscow train station. The trip took two hours. 39.  At the train station he was placed on board a standard train carriage, where he had to stay for four hours awaiting departure. The journey to the destination, the town of Yaroslavl, took approximately five hours. The Government only stated that the applicant had shared his carriage with other detainees and had been accompanied by escort officers ready to assist him if necessary. 40.  In Yaroslavl the applicant was taken from the train to a prison van. According to the written statements by escort officers submitted by the Government, he was put on a thin blanket on the floor of the van. In the next half hour he was taken to a remand prison, so that new escort officers could join the transfer team. The applicant had to wait for another hour, lying on the floor of the van, while the official procedure involving the escort officers was under way. He was then taken back to the train station in Yaroslavl. 41.  At the station the applicant was taken to a prison train carriage, which he shared with other inmates. After another two hours the train departed for Kostroma. The trip took three hours. At around midnight the train arrived at the Kostroma train station. The Government did not provide any description of the conditions in which the applicant travelled. 42.  Within the next hour a prison van took the applicant to a nearby remand prison, where he was detained from 2 to 6 March 2014. 43.  On the morning of 6 March 2014 the applicant was taken in the same prison van to correctional colony no. IK-15/1 (\u201cthe correctional colony\u201d). The trip took around an hour. 44.  The parties disagreed whether the vehicles used to transfer the applicant, with the exception of the Gazel minivan, were equipped to accommodate ill inmates. While the Government argued that all vehicles could transport bedridden patients, the applicant stated that they had had no special equipment on board. He had been forced to lie on the floor of the prison vans on a thin blanket used as a stretcher. During the entire journey he had been in severe pain, but had not received any painkillers. 45.  The applicant was placed in the medical unit of the colony. He continued receiving various drugs and injections, including nootropic drugs, muscle relaxants and antioxidants and vitamins, to improve the function of the central and peripheral nervous systems. He was regularly seen by doctors. His condition remained stable. 46.  The applicant spent all his time in bed. Personal care workers provided him with bedside care, including basic nursing procedures. 47.  The applicant was examined by a panel of doctors to check whether he should be released early on health grounds. In their report dated 15 April 2014 they concluded that his conditions, in particular his lower limb spasticity and bladder and bowel dysfunction called for his early release. 48.  On the panel\u2019s recommendation, the colony administration asked the court to authorise the applicant\u2019s early release on health grounds. 49.  The Sverdlovskiy District Court of Kostroma granted the request and on 3 July 2014 ordered his release. On 26 August 2014 the Kostroma Regional Court upheld the order on appeal. Two days later the applicant was released.", "references": ["9", "4", "3", "5", "8", "7", "0", "6", "No Label", "1", "2"], "gold": ["1", "2"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1968 and 1973 and live in Belgrade (the first applicant) and Skopje (the second applicant). 6.  As established in the criminal proceedings described below, on 7 January 2007, during a search carried out by the Macedonian Customs at the Blace border crossing (between the respondent State and Kosovo[1]) 434.555 kg of cocaine were found hidden in rectangular packs submerged in hermetically sealed cans of acrylic paint. The cargo, which had been loaded onto a truck driven by the second applicant in Bar (Montenegro), was destined for Greece. 7.  On 7 January 2007 the Criminal Investigations Bureau at the Ministry of the Interior (\u201cthe Bureau\u201d, \u041e\u0434\u0434\u0435\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0437\u0430 \u043a\u0440\u0438\u043c\u0438\u043d\u0430\u043b\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0438\u0447\u043a\u0430 \u0442\u0435\u0445\u043d\u0438\u043a\u0430) carried out an expert examination in order to determine the quantity and quality of the substance found in the truck. On 11 January 2007 the Bureau carried out a further examination. Both reports (TD no. 1/2007 and TD no. 8/2007) established the gross weight of the substance, which was pure cocaine. 8.  On 8 January 2007 the public prosecutor requested that an investigating judge from the Skopje Court of First Instance (\u201cthe trial court\u201d) open an investigation against the applicants on account of reasonable suspicion of trafficking 438.170 kg of cocaine. In the request it was stated that the drugs had been packed in 389 packages and stored in 68 cans containing acrylic paint. 9.  On the same date, the investigating judge heard the second applicant (the first applicant could not be traced) in the presence of Mr D. Dangov, a lawyer of his own choosing (after 11 May 2007 the second applicant was represented by a different lawyer). On this occasion, the second applicant confirmed that he had known the first applicant for many years and that on 29 December 2006 she had contacted him regarding the transportation of acrylic paint from Bar to Greece. She had given him the telephone number of a certain N. (a forwarding agent) in Montenegro regarding the shipment. He had spoken to N. by telephone, but he had not met her. His truck had been searched at Kula border crossing (between Kosovo and Montenegro) and in the city of Pec, Kosovo, after which he had been escorted by police and customs to the border crossing with the respondent State. At around 5 pm. on 6 January 2007 he had arrived at Blace border crossing. The Macedonian customs officials had instructed him to leave the truck overnight and to return the next morning. He had complied with that instruction. On 7 January 2007 the truck had been searched and drugs had been found. The second applicant denied knowing that he had been transporting drugs. 10.  Later that day, the investigating judge opened an investigation and issued detention orders for a period of thirty days in respect of the applicants. 11.  On 9 January 2007 the first applicant appointed Mr D. Dangov to represent her in the proceedings. On 11 January 2007 the investigating judge issued an international arrest warrant in respect of the first applicant. On 13 January 2007 she was arrested in Serbia and detained pending extradition in the respondent State. 12.  On 9 May 2007 the first applicant\u2019s lawyer requested permission to inspect the case file. A handwritten note on his application indicated that \u201cinspection of the case file (wa)s allowed\u201d. On 10 May 2007 the first applicant was incarcerated in Skopje detention facility. An official note drawn up by the investigating judge indicated that on that occasion she had been aware of the public prosecutor\u2019s application and the decision of the investigating judge to open an investigation. 13.  On 11 May 2007 the investigating judge heard the first applicant in the presence of her lawyer. She stated that she would make a statement once she was able to consult the available evidence. On 16 May 2007 she was heard for the second time. In the presence of her representative, she confirmed that she had contacted the second applicant, who had agreed to transport the paint from Bar to Greece for 1,100 euros (EUR). She had also given him the contact details of N., the Montenegrin forwarding agent. The first applicant denied that she was aware that drugs had been planted in the cans. 14.  On 28 May and 4 June 2007 the first applicant\u2019s lawyer requested permission to consult the case file, arguing that his previous requests had remained unanswered. On each application there was a handwritten note indicating that the requests had been granted. 15.  On 21 June 2007 the public prosecutor lodged an indictment against the applicants on account of trafficking 486.705 kg of cocaine (\u043d\u0435\u043e\u0432\u043b\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0435\u043d \u043f\u0440\u043e\u043c\u0435\u0442 \u043d\u0430 \u043d\u0430\u0440\u043a\u043e\u0442\u0438\u0447\u043d\u0430 \u0434\u0440\u043e\u0433\u0430-\u043a\u043e\u043a\u0430\u0438\u043d) packed in 432 packages found in 76 cans. The indictment relied on considerable verbal and material evidence, including the Bureau\u2019s expert reports (see paragraph 7 above). 16.  On 26 June 2007 the first applicant\u2019s lawyer requested access to the case file. According to a note, which he duly signed, on 27 and 28 June 2007 he inspected the file for five hours. 17.  On 2 July 2007 the first applicant objected to the indictment arguing, inter alia, that she had not been given the opportunity to consult the case file and prepare her defence. On 9 July 2007 a three-judge panel of the trial court dismissed the objection, holding that on 27 and 28 June 2007 the first applicant had inspected the case file. 18.  On 10 July 2007 the first applicant\u2019s lawyer requested permission to copy some documents from the case file. According to a handwritten note on the application, his request had been allowed upon payment of the court fees. On 18 July 2007 the court allowed Mr Lj.M., a lawyer whom the first applicant\u2019s mother had in the meantime appointed to represent the first applicant, to consult the case file. 19.  At a hearing held on 7 August 2007, the trial court heard the first applicant, who reaffirmed the deposition she had made before the investigating judge (see paragraph 13 above). In addition, she stated that a certain J. (a Greek forename), from Athens, whose surname, residence and all other contact details were unknown to her, had owed her money and had offered to provide her instead with paint from Venezuela. In the second half of 2006 she had imported two containers of paint from Venezuela, the first being shipped to Rieka (Croatia) and the second to Thessaloniki, Greece. She denied having had any contract with the paint producer and exporter in Venezuela or with J. The latter had told her that a certain Sandrina, who allegedly worked with him, could assist her in her dealings with the exporter in Venezuela. J. also had given her the contact details of a buyer in Greece regarding paint from a third container (the subject of the proceedings) and the telephone numbers of N.V. and L.S. in Montenegro, whom she had called regarding the cargo concerned. (When contacting L.S., the first applicant had introduced herself by name as the owner of company M., saying that she was calling upon instructions from a certain Sandra). She reiterated that she had hired the second applicant to transport the paint from Bar to Greece, had handed over the necessary documentation to him, and had provided him with the contact details of N.V. and L.S. in Montenegro. She also confirmed that around that time she had talked with the second applicant many times on the telephone. Lastly, she denied that she had discussed any drugs-related matter with him or any other person. 20.  On 8 August 2007 Mr Lj.M. requested a copy of certain material evidence, which was allowed on 9 August 2007. 21.  At a hearing on 8 August 2007, the second applicant stated that at the meeting with the first applicant on 29 December 2006, they had agreed that he would transport the paint from Bar to Greece, for which he had been paid EUR 1,100. On 3 January 2007 he had arrived in Bar and had contacted N.V., the Montenegrin forwarding agent, and after the cargo had been loaded onto the truck, he had left for Pec, where the truck had been searched twice using police dogs. The truck had remained at the Pec customs terminal for two nights (the first night the second applicant had remained in the truck; the second night, he had stayed in a nearby hotel). The second applicant had arrived at Blace border crossing at 5 pm. on 6 January 2007 and the truck had remained at customs terminal overnight; the second applicant had spent that night at home and had returned to the terminal at 9 am. next morning. On 7 January 2007 the truck had been searched and the cans had been examined in a special X-ray van. 22.  At hearings on 13 and 14 September 2007 held in the presence of the applicants and their representatives, the trial court decided to hear oral evidence from O.B. and N.N., the experts employed in the Bureau who had drawn up the reports of 7 and 11 January 2007 (see paragraph 7 above). It also accepted a request from the public prosecutor that witnesses N.V. and L.S. (who worked at Bar Harbour) from Montenegro produce oral evidence at the next hearing fixed for 16 October 2007 or, if prevented, give evidence before a competent court in Bar (in the latter case, transcripts of their depositions would be read out at the trial). The applicants did not object. The trial court requested that the Ministry of Justice deliver a court summons to N.V. and L.S. for the hearing scheduled for 16 October 2007. It also attached a letter (\u0437\u0430\u043c\u043e\u043b\u043d\u0438\u0446\u0430) requesting the competent court in Bar, Montenegro to examine the witnesses should they be prevented from attending the hearing of 16 October 2007. The letter contained 14 questions formulated by the trial judge which the court in Bar was asked to put to the witnesses. When there was no reply, the trial court reiterated its request in letters dated 2 and 10 October 2007 and sent to the Ministry of Justice. 23.  On 10 October 2007 an investigating judge from the Podgorica District Court examined N.V. The relevant parts of the court record of her examination read as follows:\n\u201c... I remember that around New Year\u2019s Eve 2007, L.S \u2012 who works at Bar Harbour \u2012 called in order to ask me to send a container to Belgrade for a friend of hers ... L.S. gave my telephone number to certain Sandra. Sandra called me and introduced herself as working for (the first applicant\u2019s) company. She asked me to prepare documentation so that the container would be transported to Greece, to Thessaloniki instead of to Belgrade ... I do not know [the applicants]. I did not see [the second applicant] when he arrived in Bar. I just sat in the office and spoke by telephone and I knew about him because he called to tell me that he would come to the office to provide some documentation for the goods, which he did not give to me, but to my colleague N.K. ...\u201d 24.  On 12 October 2007 the Montenegrin Ministry of Justice forwarded the transcript of N.V.\u2019s statement to the Ministry of Justice of the respondent State. 25.  On 15 October 2007 the investigating judge of Podgorica District Court examined L.S. The relevant parts of her statement (which was sent on the same day to the Ministry of Justice of the respondent State) read as follows:\n\u201c... on 22 December 2006 I received a telephone call from N.P. (from Greece) ... in order to give him the contact details of a person working for a company, M.S., that handled containers ... I called N.[V.] and told her that a friend had asked me for information regarding this matter ... Half an hour after this discussion with N.[V.], I received a telephone call from certain Sandrina ... who told me that the container belonged to her and that it should not go to Belgrade, but to Greece, so she needed a forwarding agent ... on 26 December 2006 I travelled to Bologna, Italy ... While I was in Bologna, I received a telephone call from a man who spoke English and who introduced himself as P. (a Greek name) ... telling me that the container which needed to be taken to Bar belonged to him ... on 3 January 2007 a man who introduced himself as Alija called me and said that he was a driver and that he had come in order to collect the goods in that container ... I called N.V. and told her that the driver had arrived. N.[V.] told me that the driver should go to the car park at Bar Harbour. When Alija called me, I told him what N.V. had said and gave him her number ... on 6 or 7 January 2006 P. called again and told me that the driver needed some documents ... I stress that I had nothing to do with the transportation or contents of that container, nor I could envisage what was inside. Later, I heard on the media that it concerned a shipment of paint and the documents that I saw referred to some paint ... I did not see or speak with [the applicants] ... I do not know if (the man called) Alija whom I mentioned as a driver in this story is [the second applicant] about whom you ask me ...\u201d 26.  Both witnesses gave their evidence under oath and were warned of the consequences of false testimony. 27.  On 16 October 2007, in the presence of the applicants and their representatives, the court heard evidence from the experts O.B. and S.K., a superior expert in the Bureau who had also been involved in drawing up the expert reports (TD no. 1/07 and TD no. 8/07). The expert N.N. could not attend the hearing since she had gone on a business trip to France. Both experts were warned about legal consequences of false testimony. S.K. stated, inter alia, that:\n\u201c... the cocaine examined is pure cocaine ... the net weight ... was not established. ... after cocaine had been discovered, I went with my colleague O.B. to the Blace border crossing in order to carry out an initial examination so as to determine what was involved. The drugs were brought to our laboratory ... At Blace border crossing, (we) cut open the packages and took a small quantity ... which was sufficient to determine the nature of the substance ... that happened at the border crossing, where several packages were opened; that is a standard procedure ... In the laboratory, the packages were brought in, as far as I remember, in paper bags, but I\u2019m not sure.\nOn 7 January 2007 ... the drugs were brought (into the laboratory) ... It was about 1 pm. ... On 8 January 2007 43 packages were brought into the laboratory. For a larger quantity of drugs, in principle, (we apply) the UNDCP recommendations ... In the present case, we examined the square root of the total number (of packages) which was in compliance with these recommendations. Of the additional 43 packages, we examined every third package because it concerned a smaller quantity compared to packages received on 7 January 2007 ... The laboratory is accredited by UNDP for drug analysis and is regarded as reliable. The laboratory is not accredited for ISSO standards. [The latter] is a formal issue and it concerns a long and expensive procedure, but [that] does not mean that in terms of technique, equipment and means of work, there are any shortcomings ...\nThe cocaine we analysed is the biggest quantity so far examined ... As provided for in the UNDCP recommendations, if (there are no more than) 10 packages, then all (the packages) are examined; if (there are) up to 100 packages, then every tenth package is examined; if (there are) more than 100 packages, the quantity to be analysed is the number calculated to be a square root of all the packages ...\u201d 28.  The expert O.B. stated, inter alia, that:\n\u201c... When preparing the expert report, all packages had been analysed using colour tests; 20 packages, which were randomly selected from the total of 389 packages in accordance with the UNDCP recommendations, were analysed by means of ... (methods of analysis) ... The packages were brought into the laboratory for examination in 39 black plastic bags ... When we arrived at Blace border crossing, the packages were lined up at the roadside; they were covered with polycolor; we took samples for analysis from several packages ...\u201d 29.  The applicants objected to both the experts\u2019 statements and the expert reports, arguing that they had been drawn up by the Ministry of the Interior, the same body that had instituted the proceedings against them. 30.  The hearing continued on 17 October 2007 when \u201can employee from the court archives department entered (the court room)\u201d and handed the trial judge the transcripts of the statements N.V. and L.S. had given before the Podgorica District Court (see paragraphs 23 and 25 above), translated into Macedonian. The trial judge noted that N.V. and L.S. had been prevented from attending the scheduled hearing due to \u201cother obligations\u201d and \u201ca trip to Italy\u201d respectively. Therefore, she proceeded to read out the witnesses\u2019 statements. She also ordered that the Bureau supplement the expert reports TD 1/2007 and TD 8/2007 with information regarding the drug\u2019s net weight (\u0434\u043e\u043f\u043e\u043b\u043d\u0443\u0432\u0430\u045a\u0435 \u043d\u0430 \u0432\u0435\u0448\u0442\u0430\u0447\u0435\u045a\u0435\u0442\u043e). 31.  On 2 November 2007, outside the hearing (\u0432\u043e\u043d \u0440\u043e\u0447\u0438\u0448\u0442\u0435), the trial court ordered the Bureau to draw up a fresh expert report regarding the quality and quantity of the substance found in the cans. The order was communicated to the parties. 32.  On 9 November 2007 S.K. and O.B., the experts employed by the Bureau, drew up a fresh expert report (no. 1399/07), the relevant parts of which read as follows:\n\u201cIn order to determine the nature of the substance and in accordance with the recommendations of ENFSI (European Network of Forensic Sciences Institutes) and UNDCP (United Nations Drug Control Program) regarding the analysis of multiple samples, 27 randomly-chosen packages ... were analysed ... out of the total number of packages (432) ...\nThe net weight of the material taken from the analysed packages was 27.30 kilos ...\nOn the basis of the analysis made, it is confirmed that the analysed material taken from the packages was cocaine. This confirms the earlier findings ... specified in the expert reports nos.1/07 and 8/07 of 7 and 11 January 2007, respectively.\nThe total net weight of seized packages (432) was established (on the basis of ENFSI recommendations) by means of a mathematical and statistical methodology ... On the basis of the calculations done, it is concluded that the total net weight of the substance (found) in the packages was 436.879 kg \u00b1 2.324 kg.\u201d 33.  Expert report no. 1399/07 was presented at a hearing dated 15 November 2007 in the presence of the applicants and their representatives. Evidence from the experts S.K. and O.B. was also heard. S.K. stated, inter alia, that:\n\u201c... [the Bureau] is the only accredited and reliable laboratory in the Republic of Macedonia competent to analyse seized drugs. We are authorised by UNDCP and we apply its recommendations ... Since 1997, when we started work, the central laboratory in Vienna has never voiced any complaints about our analyses ...\nIn the present case, which concerned more than 100 packages, namely 432, after we had determined the square root of 432, which is 20.78, we analysed 21 packages, which were chosen at random. I stress that these 21 packages were analysed fully using all the methods specified in the recommendations. That does not mean that some of the packages were not analysed at all. Regarding expert reports nos.1/07 and 8/07, all 432 packages were analysed using so-called speedy methods in order to determine the substance. Then, certain packages that were randomly chosen and were fully analysed using all methods ...\nAsked by the judge whether in the preparation of the expert report commissioned by the court the expert had received any instructions from anyone, including their superior, she replied:\n\u2018I drew up the expert report commissioned by the court, as well as the earlier reports, in good faith and according to my best knowledge. [The Bureau] operates within the Ministry of the Interior, but it is independent in its work. In my career, no superior has ever influenced any expert examination nor would I accept anything of that kind ...\u2019\u201d 34.  O.B. concurred with S.K. The applicants did not object to the expert report and the experts\u2019 statements but they complained that a prosecuting body, such as the Ministry of the Interior was in this case, could not carry out an expert examination of the substance, which anyway should have been examined in its entirety (the results could not be based on an analysis carried out on randomly chosen samples). The applicants contested S.K.\u2019s argument that the Bureau was independent and was the only accredited laboratory for such an examination. In this connection they requested that the court commission an alternative expert report by an independent expert body, national or foreign. 35.  As to the applicants\u2019 objections regarding the expert evidence, the trial court stated:\n\u201c... [The applicants\u2019] request for an alternative expert examination of the quality and quantity of seized packages by an independent institution is not allowed since the expert evidence adduced by the court was produced by the Ministry of the Interior; in accordance with the Criminal Proceedings Act, an expert report may be drawn up by a State body; in more complex cases, such as the present one, such expert examination is entrusted, in principle, to a State body. Expert report no. 1399/07 of 9 November 2007 was drawn up by [the Bureau] on the basis of a prior court order.\nThe request ... for a complete analysis of all seized packages is refused since ... some of the packages had been handed over to the experts (for examination), as provided for in the UNDCP and ENFSI recommendations ...\u201d 36.  On 16 November 2007 the trial court accepted the applicants\u2019 request for an on-site inspection of the (27) packages (kept in a special department of the trial court) examined by the Bureau\u2019s experts and the subject matter of expert report no. 1399/07. The inspection was carried out in the presence of the applicants and their representatives. As indicated in the court record of that date, there were three paper bags. In each bag there were nine packages containing white powder (\u0431\u0435\u043b\u0430 \u043f\u0440\u0430\u0448\u043a\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0430 \u043c\u0430\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0438\u0458\u0430). Since \u201csome packages ... were of dimmer and (others) of brighter white colour (\u0441\u043e \u043d\u0438\u0458\u0430\u043d\u0441\u0438 \u043d\u0430 \u043f\u043e\u0442\u0435\u043c\u043d\u0430 \u0438 \u043f\u043e\u0441\u0432\u0435\u0442\u043b\u0430 \u0431\u043e\u0458\u0430)\u201d, the applicants\u2019 representatives argued that \u201cthe drugs were not of the same quality, that is to say of the same pureness.\u201d\n 37.  At a hearing dated 27 November 2007, the parties presented their concluding remarks. The public prosecutor specified the indicted offence, accusing the applicants of having participated, as a group, in the unauthorised transportation of 434.555 kg of cocaine. The applicants\u2019 lawyers reiterated that the expert evidence had been produced by the Bureau, which had operated within the Ministry of the Interior, as a prosecuting body and that the third expert report that had been commissioned by the court had been of no relevance since it had been produced by the same experts who had been involved in the earlier expert examinations. They also complained that the expert evidence admitted had been inconsistent regarding the quantity of drugs seized (see paragraphs 8 and 15 above) and the type of paint in which the packages had been submerged (see paragraph 28 above). Furthermore, according to this evidence, the substance found had been pure cocaine, which, according to them, was impossible. They also contested that the statements of the witnesses (N.V. and L.S.) examined in Montenegro had been obtained in violation of their defence rights. 38.  On 30 November 2007 the trial court delivered a judgment in which it found the applicants guilty of drug trafficking, an offence punishable under Article 215(2) in conjunction with sub-paragraph 1 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 53 below) and sentenced them to 14 years and six months\u2019 imprisonment. The operative part of the judgment read as follows:\n\u201c... on an unspecified date before the end of December 2006, [the applicants] (acting) as a group (\u043a\u0430\u043a\u043e \u043f\u043e\u0432\u0435\u045c\u0435 \u043b\u0438\u0446\u0430), were participants in the unauthorised transportation of a shipment of narcotic drugs \u2013 cocaine (\u043d\u0435\u043e\u0432\u043b\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0435\u043d\u043e \u043f\u0440\u0435\u043d\u0435\u0441\u0443\u0432\u0430\u045a\u0435 \u043d\u0430 \u043d\u0430\u0440\u043a\u043e\u0442\u0438\u0447\u043d\u0430 \u0434\u0440\u043e\u0433\u0430-\u043a\u043e\u043a\u0430\u0438\u043d). After [the first applicant] had contacted persons of unknown identity who intended to transport drugs from Venezuela, (she) had agreed with them to transfer the drugs to the Republic of Greece ... on 29 December 2006 (she) contacted [the second applicant] in order to arrange with him the transport of the drugs from [Montenegro] to [Greece] ... paid him EUR 1,100 [and provided him with the necessary supporting documentation]. On 2 January 2007 [the second applicant] drove a truck ... to [Montenegro]. On 4 January 2007, 882 plastic cans of acrylic paint were loaded onto [the truck]. Cocaine was planted in some of them ... [He] drove through Kosovo towards the Republic of Macedonia and the Republic of Greece ... At around 5 p.m. on 6 January 2007 he arrived at the Blace border crossing (on the Macedonia-Kosovo border). On the morning of 7 January 2007, during a routine inspection by Customs, which continued on 8 January 2007, 432 packages of cocaine were discovered in 76 cans containing acrylic paint. The total weight of the drugs was 434.555 kg.\u201d 39.  The judgment, which runs to fifty-five pages, was based on the following evidence: the applicants\u2019 statements; statements from four witnesses for the second applicant (including his wife and father, who confirmed that he had spent the night 6 January 2007 at home and had returned the next morning to Blace customs terminal); statements from three customs officials who searched the truck at the customs terminal; the statements given by the experts S.K. and O.B.; the statements of witnesses L.S. and N.V. who were questioned by the investigating judge of the Podgorica District Court; and a considerable amount of material evidence, including expert reports nos. 1/07, 8/07 and 1399/07, and a detailed list of calls made from the applicants\u2019 mobile phones. 40.  In addition to the facts indicated above (see paragraph 6 above), the trial court also established that the second applicant had arrived in Bar on 3 January 2007; that he had called N.V. regarding the shipment; that on 4 January 2007 the cans had been loaded onto his truck and he had left for Kosovo; that he had spent the night of 4 January in the truck at Pec customs terminal; that on 5 January 2007 the truck had been searched (using police dogs) at that terminal; that on the night of 5 January the truck had remained at the terminal and the second applicant had spent the night in a hotel; that he had returned to the terminal on 6 January; and that at 2 pm. that day he had left, escorted by Kosovo customs, for the Blace border crossing, where he had arrived at around 5 pm. on 6 January 2007. The truck had remained at the customs terminal overnight and the second applicant had spent the night at home. At 8.45 am. on 7 January 2007 he had come back to the terminal, where the truck had been searched and drugs had been found with the assistance of an X-ray van. On the basis of a detailed list of telephone calls, the court established that there had been intense communication between the applicants between 20 December 2006 and 10 January 2007 (the first applicant had called the second applicant 124 times, and he had called her 28 times), and that they had telephoned N.V. and L.S. Furthermore, the Greek company specified in the freight documentation as the recipient of the paint did not exist according to Greek official records. 41.  The court referred to the expert reports and considered the experts\u2019 statements (see paragraphs 33 and 34 above) on the basis of which it established the relevant facts regarding the quality and quantity of the drugs found. It further reiterated the reasons for which it had refused the applicants\u2019 requests for an alternative expert examination (see paragraph 35 above). 42.  The trial court presented an outline of the statements made by L.S. and N.V. and stated, inter alia, that:\n\u201c... The court fully accepts the statements of witnesses N.V. and L.S.... The statements of these witnesses were obtained on the basis of a request (addressed to the Montenegro\u2019s authorities) (\u043f\u043e \u043f\u0430\u0442 \u043d\u0430 \u0437\u0430\u043c\u043e\u043b\u043d\u0438\u0446\u0430) issued after a prior decision made on record at the trial. The parties and [the applicants\u2019] representatives had no comment (about that decision) [nor] had they voiced any objection when these statements were read at the trial. They did not make any suggestions regarding these statements ...\u201d 43.  As to the second applicant, the trial court stated, inter alia, that:\n\u201c... The court assessed [the second applicant\u2019s] defence that he had not entered into an agreement with [the first applicant] to transport drugs ..., but rather that the agreement concerned the transportation of acrylic paint ... that drugs had never been mentioned in their discussions, that the freight documents referred only to acrylic paint ... that during the transport, he had spoken about 5 times by telephone with [the first applicant]. The court did not accept the defence of the accused since it was contrary to his actions and the admitted evidence in support of the indictment ... [The second applicant] does not deny that by having transported the paint, he also transported the cocaine ... The court cannot accept [his] defence that he did not know that there was cocaine in the cans because it is not supported by any evidence and it is contrary to his actions \u2012 he transported the drugs from Bar to the Macedonian border and (contrary) to admitted evidence \u2013 cocaine found in the cans, which was noted in the certificate of temporary seized objects ... signed by [the second applicant] who did not contest the signature and the confiscation of the cocaine at any stage of the proceedings ...\u201d 44.  The applicants appealed against the trial court\u2019s judgment. They reiterated that the experts had not been independent (given that the Bureau had operated within the Central Police Forces Unit) and in this respect they referred to the Court\u2019s judgment in the Stoimenov case (see Stoimenov v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, no. 17995/02, 5 April 2007). The first applicant further alleged that the trial court had refused her request for an alternative expert examination, notwithstanding that the Forensic Institute (\u0418\u043d\u0441\u0442\u0438\u0442\u0443\u0442 \u0437\u0430 \u0421\u0443\u0434\u0441\u043a\u0430 \u041c\u0435\u0434\u0438\u0446\u0438\u043d\u0430 was also authorised to conduct such an analysis, that the trial court had not explained the discrepancy between the gross and net weight of the drugs found, and that the court had accepted that the packages containing the drugs had been submerged in acrylic paint, which contradicted the experts\u2019 findings regarding the type of the paint involved (see paragraph 28 above). She also complained that she had not been allowed to consult the case file during the investigation, which had affected her ability effectively to prepare her defence. Furthermore, her defence rights had been unjustifiably restricted since she had not been given the opportunity to attend the examination of witnesses L.S. and N.V. before Podgorica District Court. In this respect she alleged that she had not been informed of the questions put to these witnesses by the trial court. The second applicant complained that there had been no evidence that he had concluded an agreement (with the first applicant) and, in particular, that he had known that he was transporting drugs. In the absence of any evidence confirming his intention to transport drugs, no criminal liability could be attributed to him. 45.  On 18 April 2008 the Skopje Court of Appeal held a public session at which, in presence of the applicants and their representatives, it dismissed the appeals and upheld the trial court\u2019s judgment. As to the first applicant\u2019s complaint concerning the requests she had made in the pre-trial proceedings to consult the case file, the court stated:\n\u201c... On 11 May 2007 [the first applicant], in the presence of her lawyer, was informed about the charges against her ... (and) that she was not obliged to answer the questions and present her defence, but she stated that she would give a statement in any case after the available evidence had been presented to her ... On 16 May 2007 she gave a statement in the presence of her representative; the questioning continued on 18 May 2007. [On both the occasions] on which she gave a statement before the investigating judge, she had had the time and the facilities to prepare her defence and the possibility of communicating with her legal representative ...\nUnder section 126 of the Criminal Proceedings Act, the accused is entitled to consult the case file and ... the evidence after being questioned. In the present case ... it is clear that the trial court did not violate the accused\u2019s right of defence ...\n... regarding the alleged violation of section 126 of the Criminal Proceedings Act ... it is evident that after the investigating judge had questioned [the first applicant] ... [she] gave a detailed statement which was duly noted in the court record and which she had read and signed ...\n... The lawyer requested and was given access to the file before he objected to the indictment ... Moreover, the trial court established all the relevant facts at the trial ... \u201d 46.  As regards the expert evidence, the court established that all the expert reports admitted as evidence had confirmed that the substance found in the cans had been cocaine; in the statement of 15 November 2007, S.K. had confirmed that all 432 packages had been examined using so-called \u201cspeedy methods\u201d and randomly-chosen packages had then been fully analysed; the quantity of the drugs had been established on the basis of ENFSI recommendations. The court further dismissed the applicants\u2019 complaints about the alleged lack of independence of the experts, finding that the expert examination (no. 1399/07) had been ordered by the court, that the expert findings had not been called into doubt, and that they had been confirmed at the hearing by the experts, who had been warned about the consequences of false testimony. Lastly, the court held that a copy of expert report no. 1399/07 had been served on the applicants and they had been provided with a reasonable opportunity to challenge it. 47.  As regards the witness evidence produced by L.S. and N.V. in Montenegro, the court held that they had been heard in response to the request by the trial court made at the hearing dated 14 September 2007; the applicants and their representatives, who had attended that hearing, had not objected, nor had they sought to attend the questioning of these witnesses; the witnesses\u2019 statements had been read out at the trial and the applicants had not objected to them. The court concluded that this evidence had therefore been accordingly lawfully obtained. 48.  As to the second applicant\u2019s complaint that he had not known that he was transporting drugs, the court stated:\n\u201c... such an allegation is contrary to the established facts based on admitted evidence concerning the actions taken by [the second applicant] and his criminal liability ... the court does not accept [his] allegations because on the basis of all evidence admitted at the trial, [the trial] court correctly established the relevant facts concerning the actions taken by [the second applicant] ... (these) allegations were assessed by [the trial] court ... (which) gave reasonable grounds why it did not give credence to them ... it was established beyond any doubt that drugs \u2012 cocaine \u2012 had been found in some paint-cans transported by the vehicle driven by [the second applicant].\u201d 49.  The court further noted that:\n\u201c... the large quantity of drugs, the way they were procured and transported, and the actions taken by the accused, suggest that the cocaine was transported for the purpose of selling it and not for any other purpose ...\nOn the basis of the admitted evidence, the analysis and assessment thereof, (and) the accused\u2019s behaviour before they reached agreement concerning the shipment, the fact that they communicated between themselves, during the shipment, that is to say before, during and after the crime ... it can be concluded that the accused knew and were aware of their actions, including the crime that they had committed ... In this connection, according to this court, there is no logical economic reason to import acrylic paint from Venezuela, given the fact that transport costs from Venezuela to the (final) destination ... would be higher than its value. It can be inferred from this that the accused knew that it was about the transportation of drugs and not of acrylic paint. Having also in mind the intensity of contacts between the accused, and the contacts with the witnesses L.S. and N.V. in Bar, ... together with the fact that [the first applicant] provided [the second applicant] with written documentation ... issued by her company M., stipulating that the cargo should be transported to the Republic of Greece to company S. \u2012 which, on the basis of the available evidence, does not exist \u2012 it becomes clear that [the applicants] knew and were aware of their unlawful actions and the crime committed ...\u201d 50.  The applicants lodged requests before the Supreme Court for extraordinary review of the final judgment (\u0431\u0430\u0440\u0430\u045a\u0435 \u0437\u0430 \u0432\u043e\u043d\u0440\u0435\u0434\u043d\u043e \u043f\u0440\u0435\u0438\u0441\u043f\u0438\u0442\u0443\u0432\u0430\u045a\u0435 \u043d\u0430 \u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043e\u0441\u0438\u043b\u043d\u0430 \u043f\u0440\u0435\u0441\u0443\u0434\u0430). They reiterated the allegations of violation of their defence rights, in particular, concerning the expert evidence, examination of witnesses L.S. and N.V. and lack of reasoning. In this latter context the second applicant reiterated that there had been no evidence showing that he had known that he was transporting drugs hidden in hermetically closed cans. His telephone contacts with the first applicant and N.V. and the court\u2019s conclusion regarding the economic rationale for importing paint from Venezuela were not conclusive given the fact that he was the driver whom the first applicant had engaged to transport the paint from Bar to Greece. The first applicant complained that it had not been established (or indicated in the operative part of the trial court\u2019s judgment) that the drugs had been transported for the purpose of selling them. She also complained that her defence rights had been violated in the investigation. 51.  On 20 October 2009 the Supreme Court upheld the established facts and dismissed the applicants\u2019 requests for the same reasons given by the Skopje Court of Appeal. In this connection it stated, inter alia, that:\n\u201cOn the basis of all admitted evidence, the intensity of telephone contacts between the accused, as well as contacts with witnesses L.S. and N.V., the accused\u2019s behaviour before they reached agreement concerning the shipment, the intensive and multiple contacts between themselves during the shipment, when the crime had been committed and after it had been discovered, the trial court correctly concluded that the accused knew and were aware of their actions regarding the unlawful transport of drugs.\u201d 52.  The Supreme Court further added:\n\u201c... As to the allegations raised in the requests that the expression \u201cfor the purpose of selling (\u0437\u0430\u0440\u0430\u0434\u0438 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0434\u0430\u0436\u0431\u0430)\u201d is missing from the operative part of the trial court\u2019s judgment, the court considers that (this omission) does not render it defective, since that can be presumed (\u043f\u0440\u043e\u0438\u0437\u043b\u0435\u0433\u0443\u0432\u0430) in view of the actions undertaken by [the applicants] when committing the criminal offence ... From the description of [the applicants\u2019] actions there is no doubt that drugs were transported for the purpose of selling and that such a large quantity of drugs, namely pure cocaine, cannot be for [the applicants\u2019] personal use. Even more, it endangers the life and health of millions of people on the planet.\u201d", "references": ["1", "8", "5", "0", "6", "9", "4", "3", "2", "7", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1946 and lives in Nazran, the Republic of Ingushetia. She is the mother of Ms Zarema Gaysanova, who was born in 1969. 7.  The applicant\u2019s property at 7 Second Darvina Lane in Kalinin, a village in the Leninskiy district of Grozny in the Chechen Republic, comprised a house, shed and courtyard. At the material time, it was under reconstruction after being heavily damaged during one of the Chechen military campaigns. Her daughter Zarema, who worked for the Grozny office of the Refugees\u2019 Council, a Dutch NGO, regularly stayed at the property for various periods. 8.  The applicant did not witness her daughter\u2019s abduction. Her account of the events is based on information obtained from her neighbours in Kalinin. 9.  On 31 October 2009, while Ms Zarema Gaysanova was at the applicant\u2019s property on Second Darvina Lane, the law-enforcement authorities launched a special operation in the village, aimed at eliminating members of illegal armed groups. During the operation a man hid in the applicant\u2019s property, which was blocked and shelled until it caught fire. As the house was burning down, Ms Gaysanova was pushed into a UAZ vehicle and taken away. After the house burnt to the ground, law-enforcement officers recovered a man\u2019s body. Shortly thereafter the Chechen President, Mr Ramzan Kadyrov, and the Chechen Minister of the Interior, Mr Ruslan Alkhanov, arrived at the property. Mr Kadyrov, among other things, gave an interview to the local media, saying that a member of illegal armed groups had been \u201cliquidated\u201d in the applicant\u2019s house. 10.  The applicant has had no news of her daughter since her disappearance.\n(b)  Information submitted by the Government 11.  In reply to the Court\u2019s request for information of 27 November 2009, the Government stated that the criminal case file concerning Ms Zarema Gaysanova\u2019s disappearance (see paragraph 19 et seq. below) contained information suggesting that on 31 October 2009 a special operation had been conducted in Kalinin. However, there was no indication that the applicant\u2019s daughter had been arrested in the course of that operation. 12.  In observations of 16 September 2010, the Government also submitted that the operation carried out on 31 October 2009 by the law\u2011enforcement authorities was also called \u201coperational-search activities\u201d (\u043e\u043f\u0435\u0440\u0430\u0442\u0438\u0432\u043d\u043e-\u0440\u043e\u0437\u044b\u0441\u043a\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u043c\u0435\u0440\u043e\u043f\u0440\u0438\u044f\u0442\u0438\u044f). In conducting them, they had blocked Mr A.Kh., a member of illegal armed groups, into 7 Second Darvina Lane and had \u201celiminated\u201d him. Ms Zarema Gaysanova had not been seen or arrested during these events and her body had never been found. 13.  On 31 October 2009 the press office of the Ministry of the Interior of the Chechen Republic (\u041c\u0438\u043d\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e \u0432\u043d\u0443\u0442\u0440\u0435\u043d\u043d\u0438\u0445 \u0434\u0435\u043b \u0427\u0435\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u0440\u0435\u0441\u043f\u0443\u0431\u043b\u0438\u043a\u0438) (hereinafter \u201cthe Chechen MVD\u201d) published information on its official website concerning the special operation conducted in Kalinin. The relevant part of the press release reads as follows:\n\u201cToday, in the course of a special operation in a house in the Leninskiy district of Grozny, [MVD] officers located and liquidated a member of illegal armed groups. [In response to] the officers\u2019 request to surrender his weapons the criminal offered armed resistance. The criminal was hiding in a house which, in the ensuing fight, was set on fire ... The criminal was liquidated.\nAccording to the Minister of the Interior, Ruslan Alkhanov, the fighting continued for fifteen minutes ...\n...\nThe special operation aimed at liquidating the member of illegal armed groups was conducted under the command of the President of the Chechen Republic, Ramzan Kadyrov ... At the moment a group of investigators is working at the crime scene ...\u201d 14.  The online press release was accompanied by a video. It showed, from different angles, a redbrick house under reconstruction burning down with several dozen armed men wearing khaki green and black and blue camouflage uniforms surrounding it, pointing their guns and moving around. It also showed some firemen extinguishing the fire, a fire engine and several other vehicles parked nearby and a number of armed men in camouflage uniforms and plain-clothed men gathered in the vicinity. The applicant furnished the Court with a recording of the video. She identified the burning building as her house at 7 Second Darvina Lane in Kalinin. 15.  On 31 October 2009 an investigator from the Leninskiy inter-district investigation department of the investigation committee at the prosecutor\u2019s office of the Russian Federation in the Chechen Republic (\u041b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u043d\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0439 \u043c\u0435\u0436\u0440\u0430\u0439\u043e\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u043e\u0442\u0434\u0435\u043b \u0441\u043b\u0435\u0434\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u043a\u043e\u043c\u0438\u0442\u0435\u0442\u0430 \u043f\u043e \u0427\u0435\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u0420\u0435\u0441\u043f\u0443\u0431\u043b\u0438\u043a\u0435) (hereinafter \u201cthe Leninskiy investigation department\u201d or \u201cthe investigation department\u201d) reported to his superiors that at 3.30 p.m. he had been informed about the \u201cliquidation\u201d of Mr A.Kh., a member of illegal armed groups, at 7 Second Darvina Lane in the Leninskiy district of Grozny. Mr A.Kh. had been surrounded at the address at about 3 p.m. 16.  Between 4 p.m. and 6.45 p.m. the investigator, with the assistance of an expert and in the presence of three attesting witnesses, examined the crime scene. 17.  On 7 November 2009 the investigation department informed the Minister of the Interior that at about 3 p.m. on 31 October 2009 the law\u2011enforcement authorities had surrounded Mr A.Kh. at 7 Second Darvina Lane in the Leninskiy district of Grozny. He had offered armed resistance to the law-enforcement officers and had been \u201cliquidated\u201d as a result of the ensuing fight. The Minister was asked to examine the circumstances of Mr A.Kh.\u2019s \u201cliquidation\u201d and to inform the investigators of any decisions taken. 18.  On 10 November 2009 the investigation department refused to institute criminal proceedings into Mr A.Kh.\u2019s death, on the grounds that he had resisted arrest and the law-enforcement officers had acted in self\u2011defence. The decision referred to statements by five residents of Second Darvina Lane, including the applicant. They stated, among other things, that Ms Zarema Gaysanova and her brother Ibragim had lived at 7 Second Darvina Lane and that the house had been under reconstruction. At about 3 p.m. on 31 October 2009 police officers had sealed off the area, including the applicant\u2019s house. They had opened fire and the house had burnt down. The applicant submitted that at about 6 p.m. that evening she had received a call from her neighbour, Mr R.M. He had told her that a special operation had been carried out in the village, during which a man had entered her property. Her house had been burnt down and her daughter had been pushed into a UAZ vehicle and taken to an unknown destination. The decision did not specify which law-enforcement agencies had carried out the operation. 19.  At the Court\u2019s request, on 10 and 21 December 2009 the Government submitted information and 160 pages of documents from case file no. 66094 opened into Ms Zarema Gaysanova\u2019s disappearance and containing details of the proceedings between 1 November and 5 December 2009. 20.  Following the Court\u2019s subsequent request to submit an entire copy of case file no. 66094 at the communication stage, the Government furnished a further 608 pages of documents containing details of the proceedings between 1 November 2009 and 11 May 2010. The documents were unnumbered and contained new documents relating to the period 1 November to 5 December 2009, which had not been submitted in December 2009. A significant number of documents, including witness statements such as those by the applicant\u2019s neighbours from Second Darvina Lane, were only partially submitted, in that only the pages containing their names and addresses were provided. Some of the documents were illegible. 21.  On 17 December 2013 the Government submitted additional observations on the merits of the case along with an 1872-page \u201c... copy of the criminal case-file not including the questioning records of several [police] servicemen containing classified personal data. However, these servicemen did not provide any information of importance to the investigation ...\u201d\n(a)  Opening of the investigation 22.  On 1 November 2009 the applicant provided a statement to police captain Mr A.D. at the Leninskiy district department of the interior (\u041b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u043d\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0439 \u0440\u0430\u0439\u043e\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u043e\u0442\u0434\u0435\u043b \u0432\u043d\u0443\u0442\u0440\u0435\u043d\u043d\u0438\u0445 \u0434\u0435\u043b) (hereinafter \u201cthe Leninskiy ROVD\u201d). She stated that on 31 October 2009 she had received a telephone call from her neighbour Mr R.M., who had told her that as a result of a special operation conducted on Second Darvina Lane, her house had been burnt down and her daughter had been taken away in a UAZ vehicle. There had been no news of her daughter since. 23.  On 3 November 2009 the acting Leninskiy district prosecutor forwarded the applicant\u2019s abduction complaint of 1 November 2009 to the investigation department, instructing it to examine it. 24.  In observations of 17 December 2013 the Government stated that \u201cthe authorities became aware of Ms Zarema Gaysanova\u2019s disappearance on 5 November 2009\u201d. 25.  On 8 November 2009 the Leninskiy investigation department extended the time-limit for examining the applicant\u2019s complaint to 15 November 2009. The decision stated that the investigators had interviewed the applicant and sent various queries to the Leninskiy ROVD, and that further steps were to be taken such as a crime scene examination and witness identification and questioning, including of the applicant\u2019s neighbour Mr R.M. and the officers who had conducted the special operation on 31 October 2009. 26.  On 10 November 2009 the Leninskiy ROVD forwarded the applicant\u2019s abduction complaint to the Leninskiy investigation department. According to the applicant, in the complaint to the ROVD and explanatory letter, both of which were dated 1 November 2009, the date had been subsequently changed to 9 November 2009. 27.  On 16 November 2009 the Leninskiy investigation department opened a criminal investigation into Ms Zarema Gaysanova\u2019s abduction under Article 126 \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Code (aggravated abduction). The case file was given the number 66094. The decision stated that from the applicant\u2019s complaint lodged on 5 November 2009 it appeared that at about 5.30 p.m. on 31 October 2009 unidentified persons in camouflage uniforms driving a UAZ vehicle had abducted Ms Zarema Gaysanova from 7 Second Darvina Lane in the Leninskiy district of Grozny and had taken her to an unknown destination. Later that day (in the documents submitted the date was also referred to as 10 December 2010) the applicant was granted victim status in the proceedings.\n(b)  Main witness statements taken by the authorities 28.  The authorities questioned a significant number of witnesses after the investigation was opened. These included the applicant\u2019s neighbours, the workers who had carried out the reconstruction work on the applicant\u2019s house, several police officers from the Argun department of the interior (\u0410\u0440\u0433\u0443\u043d\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0439 \u043e\u0442\u0434\u0435\u043b \u0432\u043d\u0443\u0442\u0440\u0435\u043d\u043d\u0438\u0445 \u0434\u0435\u043b) (hereinafter \u201cthe Argun OVD\u201d), who had participated in the special operation, the firemen who had put out the house fire, Ms Gaysanova\u2019s colleagues and the applicant\u2019s relatives in Nazran. 29.  On 9 November 2009 the investigators questioned the applicant, who stated that before being abducted her daughter had lived at 7 Second Darvina Lane, which had been under reconstruction. She had worked for the Grozny office of the Dutch Refugees\u2019 Council. The applicant\u2019s son Ibragim had stayed with Zarema on several occasions. Between 6 p.m. and 7 p.m. on 31 October 2009 the applicant\u2019 neighbour, Mr R.M., had told her over the telephone that at about 3.30 p.m. that day the law-enforcement authorities had conducted a special operation in the village. In the course of the operation a man had rushed into the applicant\u2019s courtyard, her house had been burnt to the ground and her daughter had been forced into a UAZ vehicle and taken to an unknown destination. 30.  On 10 December 2009 the investigators again questioned the applicant, who stated, among other things, that between 10 p.m. and 11 a.m. on 31 October 2009 she had spoken to her daughter on the telephone about the reroofing of the house, which was being done by workers that day. She had tried to call her after lunch, but there had been no answer. At about 6.40 p.m. her neighbour Mr R.M. had told her over the telephone that officers of the police or the military forces had carried out a special operation in the village, during which her house had been burnt down and a man\u2019s body had been recovered from the ruins. During the operation the officers had stopped residents from leaving their houses. Mr R.M. had seen through a window several officers in camouflage uniforms armed with assault rifles pushing a woman wearing a well-worn pink dressing gown into a UAZ vehicle and driving away. He had recognised the woman as Ms Zarema Gaysanova by what she had been wearing. The applicant said that another neighbour, Ms Z.S., had told her that one of the men in camouflage uniform who had been in her house during the operation had asked over his portable radio \u201cwhether the others had shown the body to the woman\u201d. At that very moment she had heard a woman scream. The man had asked his colleagues if they had put the woman into the car, which they had confirmed. After that, the man had told Ms Z.S. that \u201cthey had killed the devil\u201d, that she could now relax and that they were leaving. While at Ms Z.S.\u2019 house, the man in camouflage had asked her numerous questions about the Gaysanov family and their connections and occupations. The applicant also submitted that Mr R.M. lived in Moscow and on 31 October 2009 he had come to Kalinin to visit his brother, Mr A.M. 31.  Between February and May 2010 the investigators also questioned construction workers Mr A.Yu.Zh., Mr A.A.D., Mr A.V.L., Mr B.I.B and Mr A.Yu.A., all of whom confirmed that since the end of 2009 they had been doing repair work on the applicant\u2019s house where Ms Zarema Gaysanova, and occasionally her brother Ibragim, had lived. All of the workers stated that the last time they had seen Ms Gaysanova was on 31 October 2009 and that they had learnt of the special operation that evening. When they had arrived at the applicant\u2019s house at about 11 a.m. on 1 November 2009, there had been a large group of law-enforcement officers inspecting the property and the surrounding area. The officers had asked them questions about the owners of the house and whether they knew anything about their connections and habits. According to the workers, they had learnt of Ms Zarema Gaysanova\u2019s abduction from the police officers. When questioned again by the investigators, some of the workers changed their initial statements and told them that they had learnt of the abduction from the applicant. 32.  Between February and May 2010 the investigators also questioned seven police officers from the Argun OVD, all of whom stated that at about 4.30 p.m. on 31 October 2009 ten officers from their police station had been sent to 7 Second Darvina Lane following a tip-off that Mr A.Kh., a member of illegal armed groups, had been hiding there. On arrival, some of them had surrounded the house while others had waited in a neighbouring courtyard. Officers of other law-enforcement agencies had also participated in the operation. Mr A.Kh. had been asked to surrender; in response he had opened fire. A grenade had exploded in the yard and there had then been intensive gunfire and the house had been stormed. The building had caught fire and firemen had subsequently put it out. The burnt remains of a man had been found among the ruins. All of the police officers denied having seen Ms Zarema Gaysanova or having any knowledge of her abduction. 33.  On 27 April 2010 the investigators questioned taxi driver Mr Yu.A.B. He stated that at about 12 noon on 31 October 2009 he had picked up Ms Zarema Gaysanova to take her shopping and had seen some workers, including Mr A.M.D., repairing the roof. He had taken her back home at around 1 p.m. That evening he had met Mr A.M.B., who had told him about the special operation on Second Darvina Lane. At about 8.30 p.m. Mr Yu.A.B. had called Ms Zarema Gaysanova, but her mobile telephone had been switched off. 34.  On 28 April 2010 the investigators questioned another construction worker, Mr A.M.B., who stated that after lunch on 31 October 2009 Ms Zarema Gaysanova had returned home with a taxi driver, Mr Yu.A.B. After he had left, they had talked in the shed over a cup of tea, and at about 3.10 p.m. she had gone in the house and he had carried on working. About ten minutes later he had heard heavy footsteps in the courtyard and had seen seven unmasked men in camouflage uniforms, all armed with assault rifles. One of them had asked him in Chechen \u201cWhere has he gone?\u201d to which the witness had replied \u201cWho are you talking about? I am working here\u201d. Shortly thereafter something had exploded inside the house and there had then been intensive gunfire. The witness had heard someone shout in Chechen \u201cThrow grenades, protect our men!\u201d The officers had been shooting at the house and the witness had shouted \u201cWhy are you shooting at the house? There is a woman inside!\u201d, but no one had paid any attention. After the shooting had stopped, the witness had managed to make his way outside the courtyard, where he had seen officers sealing off the area, ready for a further shootout. An officer at the gate had ordered him to leave. Several moments later the witness had called Ms Gaysanova on her mobile telephone, but there had been no answer. 35.  On various dates between November 2009 and May 2010 the investigators questioned a number of the applicant\u2019s neighbours. Most of them confirmed that a special operation had taken place on Second Darvina Lane on 31 October 2009 and that the area had been sealed off by the security forces, but denied having seen Ms Zarema Gaysanova being taken away. Ms T.Kh.A., who lived at 12 Second Darvina Lane, was questioned on 11 May 2010. She stated that at about 3.30 p.m. on 31 October 2009 she had seen a large group of men on the street armed with assault rifles and wearing camouflage uniforms, and a UAZ vehicle. One of the officers had ordered her to get back inside the house and close the door. Shortly thereafter she had heard intensive gunfire and had seen number 7 burning down. Sometime later, police officers had come to her house to ask, among other things, whether she had known Ms Gaysanova. 36.  On 1 December 2010 (the date on the document appears to be incorrect, see paragraphs 59, 64 and 94) the investigators questioned the Chechen President Mr Kadyrov, who stated that \u201cmany\u201d special operations had been conducted in the Chechen Republic around that time and that the heads of the law-enforcement agencies reported the results to him. As to the special operation conducted on 31 October 2009 to eliminate a member of illegal armed groups, Mr A.Kh., he had arrived at the scene at the end of the operation and had seen a burning house and firemen trying to put out the fire. The Minister of the Interior Mr Alkhanov had reported the results of the operation to him. Mr Kadyrov said he had not seen anyone at the scene and had no information about Ms Zarema Gaysanova being detained or abducted. 37.  On various dates in February 2011 the investigators questioned four of the applicant\u2019s neighbours, whose statements did not provide any new information. 38.  On 28 February 2011 the investigators questioned forensic expert Mr Ma.Ma., who stated that he had participated in the crime scene examination shortly after the special operation on 31 October 2009 but had not seen any senior law-enforcement officials or Ms Gaysanova there, and was unable to name any of the other people who had participated in the crime scene examination that day. 39.  On 6 March 2011 the investigators again questioned the applicant, who reiterated her previous statements (see paragraphs 29 and 30 above). She added that on 9 November 2009 at the premises of the Chechen investigation department she had spoken to investigator Mr Tam., who had been in charge of the investigation into her daughter\u2019s disappearance and had told her \u201cyour daughter Ms Zarema Gaysanova is alive but we have no access to her\u201d. 40.  On various dates in March 2011 the investigators questioned three ambulance workers who had arrived at the scene on 31 October 2009. Their statements did not provide any new information. 41.  On 23 and 28 April 2011 the investigators questioned the deputy chief of the Argun OVD, Mr M.Dzh. and one of his officers, Mr L.Ba. They both stated that Special Task Unit \u201cTerek\u201d of the Argun OVD (\u043e\u0442\u0440\u044f\u0434 \u043c\u0438\u043b\u0438\u0446\u0438\u0438 \u0441\u043f\u0435\u0446\u0438\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u043d\u0430\u0437\u043d\u0430\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f) had participated in the operation on 31 October 2009. 42.  On 13 June 2011 the investigators again questioned the applicant, who stated that her daughter had been unmarried at the time of her abduction and that at some point in 1986 she had married someone called Mr Yandiyev but had divorced him six months later. 43.  On 14 June 2011 the investigators again questioned Mr A.M.B., who reiterated his previous statement (see paragraph 34 above). 44.  On 14 June 2011 the investigators questioned the investigator Mr Tam., who stated that in November 2009 he had told the applicant that her daughter had been alive just to calm her down (see paragraph 39 above). 45.  On 3 August 2011 the investigators again questioned the applicant, who stated that her daughter had not fallen out with anyone or received any threats and had not been in involved in a blood feud. 46.  On 29 June 2012 the investigators questioned the head of the Argun town administration, Mr I.T., who stated that he had not participated in the special operation on 31 October 2009 and nor had his security service or guards. 47.  On 28 June 2013 the investigators again questioned the Chechen President Mr Kadyrov, who reiterated his previous statement (see paragraph 36 above).\n(c)  Main investigative steps taken by the authorities 48.  In the course of the investigation, the authorities primarily took the following steps. They (i) carried out an examination of the crime scene on several occasions, (ii) made requests for information to various law-enforcement agencies and detention centres concerning Ms Zarema Gaysanova\u2019s possible arrest or detention in the Chechen Republic and neighbouring regions, and the existence of pending criminal proceedings against her or her possible involvement with members of illegal armed groups, (iii) verified whether she had left the Chechen Republic by plane or train, (iv) published a search announcement in the regional media, and (v) traced the location of her mobile telephone between 21 and 31 October 2009. 49.  On 4 December 2009 the deputy head of the Chechen investigation department issued orders for the investigators in criminal case no. 66094 instructing them to, amongst other things, verify the law-enforcement agencies\u2019 conduct of the special operation on 31 October 2009 and question its participants concerning the details. 50.  On 5 December 2009 the investigators wrote to the chief of the Leninskiy ROVD, asking him to take disciplinary measures against the officers who had failed to comply with the investigators\u2019 instructions and take the steps requested in criminal case no. 66094. 51.  On 11 December 2009 the investigators obtained a joint operational report (\u043e\u043f\u0435\u0440\u0430\u0442\u0438\u0432\u043d\u0430\u044f \u0441\u0432\u043e\u0434\u043a\u0430) from the Chechen MVD concerning the events of 31 October 2009. The relevant part of the document reads as follows:\n\u201c...\nLeninskiy District. Military clash.\nAt 6.15 p.m. on 31 October 2009 the [MVD] front desk was informed ... that at 3.30 p.m. on 31 October 2009 in a deserted half-ruined house at 7 Second Darvina Lane, Grozny ... officers from the Argun [OVD], Leninskiy [ROVD], 8th company of the 2nd regiment of the [MVD] traffic police and the head of the Argun town administration\u2019s security service had blocked a member of illegal armed groups, who had offered armed resistance during his apprehension and had been liquidated ...\nPresent [during the operation were]: Minister of the Interior Mr R. Alkhanov and deputy Minister of the Interior Mr R.L.E, chief of Grozny criminal police Mr Sh., chief of the department of the interior Mr Ir., chief of criminal police at the department of the interior Mr Is., chief of public security police at the department of the interior Mr Ba. and his deputy Mr Bu., acting chief of the criminal investigation directorate at the department of the interior Mr M.,. an investigator from the Leninskiy investigation department Mr A.,. the [entire] operational investigation group of the [MVD], the operational investigation group of the department of the interior, the Leninskiy district [of Grozny] operational investigation group of the Temporary Alignment of Departments at the Ministry of the Interior of the Russian Federation in the North Caucasus Region ...\u201d 52.  On 11 January 2010 the applicant\u2019s lawyer requested that the investigators take a number of steps. These included obtaining copies of the video footage of the special operation and questioning the officials who had been in charge and its participants, the applicant\u2019s neighbours Mr R.M., Ms Z.G and Ms Zh.S, and the construction workers who had carried out the work on the applicant\u2019s house on Second Darvina Lane. On 12 January 2010 the investigators granted the request. 53.  On 27 January 2010 the head of the Chechen investigation department wrote to the Chechen Minister of the Interior stating, amongst other things:\n\u201c... [within the framework of the investigation of criminal case no. 66094], on 24 December 2009 the Chechen prosecutor organised a meeting on officers from the Leninskiy ROVD in Grozny and servicemen from operational-search unit no. 2 of the Ministry of the Interior in the Southern Federal Circuit (the ORB-2) collaborating with the investigation to solve the crime and prosecute the perpetrators.\nHowever, officers from the Leninskiy ROVD in Grozny have not been providing operational support ... repeated requests for information to the chief of the Leninskiy ROVD [have met with] formal and incomplete replies ... [even though] in reply to the repeated request of 6 December 2009 it was stated that the police officers had examined the crime scene again and had found burnt passports, one for use in Russia (internal) and another (foreign) one for use abroad. However, at the time of writing this evidence and the relevant documents have not been provided to the investigators of the criminal case ...\n[As] to our request of 9 December 2009 concerning the identities of the servicemen who participated in the special operation and the conclusions of the internal inquiry, on 18 December 2009 a formal reply was given ... which did not contain any meaningful information; the information and documents requested were not submitted.\nOn 23 December 2009 we sent another request for information concerning the officers who participated in the special operation and the conclusions of the internal inquiry. To the present date no reply has been given.\n[As] to our repeated requests of 11 and 28 December 2009 concerning the identities of the officers who participated in the special operation ... no reply has been given. Officers from the Argun OVD Mr M.B., Mr D.V., Mr I.G and Mr R.Akh, who participated in the operation and whose identities were established by the investigators, refused to give statements to the investigation ...\nThus, at the time of writing the investigation either does not have information concerning the persons who participated in the special operation (their names, service positions and ranks) or documents confirming its lawfulness.\nIn connection with the above, you are requested to personally supervise execution of the requests in the criminal case and provide full and timely replies to the requests for information and operational steps. You are also requested to order an internal inquiry in connection with the violations of criminal procedure law by your subordinates in the [relevant] police departments ...\u201d 54.  On 28 January 2010 the investigators requested the chief of the Argun OVD to provide, amongst other things, the following information:\n\u201c... according to the reply received by the investigation in criminal case no. 66094 to its request for information of 15 December 2009, the following [eleven] officers from the criminal search division of the Argun OVD participated in the special operation on 31 October 2009: Mr Sh.Ya., Mr K.S., Mr M.B., Mr A.P., Mr D.V., Mr Dz.M., Mr E.A., Mr R.A., Mr R.Akh., Mr Kh.O. and Mr A.Ma.\nBased on this information, you are requested to ensure these officers [attend] the Chechen investigation committee at 9 Garazhnaya Street, Grozny to be questioned as witnesses. You are also requested to forward me documents confirming the lawfulness of the special operation ... the order to conduct the operation and a copy of the results of the internal inquiry carried out into the matter ...\u201d 55.  On 2 February 2010 the acting chief of the Argun OVD replied to the investigators that they had no information concerning Ms Zarema Gaysanova\u2019s abduction and that the officers mentioned in the request of 28 January 2010 had been instructed to give statements to the investigators. In an additional letter of the same date, the Argun OVD informed the investigators that no internal inquiries had been carried out in connection with the special operation conducted on 31 October 2009 as \u201cthere were no violations of the law and no officers from the Argun OVD had been injured\u201d. 56.  On 14 February 2010 the applicant repeated the request for the officials in charge of the special operation on 31 October 2009 to be questioned. On 18 February 2010 the investigators replied that they would question them as soon as they had established their identities. 57.  On 24 February 2010 the applicant requested that the investigators question, amongst others, Chechen President Mr Kadyrov, as he had information on the special operation. On 26 February 2010 the investigators granted the request. 58.  On 5 April 2010 the investigators reported to their superiors that they had been unable to interview Mr Kadyrov, who had been in charge of the special operation on 31 October 2009. 59.  On 22 April 2010 the applicant complained to the Chechen investigation department that Mr Kadyrov had not been questioned and that the investigators had failed to take the procedural steps ordered on 26 February 2010. On 26 April 2010 the investigators refused to allow the complaint stating, amongst other things, that according to fourteen other witnesses who had been present during the special operation, Mr Kadyrov had not been there. 60.  On 22 April 2010 the applicant\u2019s lawyer reiterated his request for the investigators to take a number of steps such as obtaining copies of the video footage of the special operation, identifying and questioning all of the participants, asking the drivers of the UAZ vehicles whether they had seen Ms Zarema Gaysanova being forced into one of them, and questioning the Chechen Minister of the Interior Mr Alkhanov concerning the law-enforcement agencies who had participated in the operation and the firemen who had put out the house fire afterwards. On 26 April 2010 the investigators granted the request. 61.  On an unspecified date in April 2010 senior operational-search officer Mr P.G. provided the investigators with an information statement on the operational-search measures taken in the criminal case. The relevant part reads as follows:\n\u201c... It has been established by operational-search measures that at about 3.30 p.m. on 31 October 2009 servicemen from the Argun OVD, the 8th company of the 2nd regiment of the traffic police and the head of the Argun town administration security service conducted a special operation, as a result of which an active member of illegal armed groups Mr A.Kh. was found. He resisted arrest and ... was eliminated as a result ... It has also been established that in this household Mr A.Kh. had lived with his wife, Zarema Gaysanova, whose whereabouts after the special operation remain unknown ...\u201d 62.  On 9 July 2010 the Chechen deputy prosecutor criticised the investigation into Ms Zarema Gaysanova\u2019s disappearance and ordered the investigators to take a number of remedial measures:\n\u201c... On 16 June 2010 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators ... An examination of the case file has demonstrated that this decision was unfounded and premature; it was taken prior to all the investigative steps being taken...\n... the criminal case has been investigated by several investigators for seven months, however, an effective investigation has not been carried out, the whereabouts of the abducted Ms Z. Gaysanova have not been established, and sufficiently effective steps to identify the culprits have not been taken ...\nUp to the present date the servicemen of the law-enforcement agencies who took part in the special operation ... have not all been identified and questioned.\nFrom the operational statement of the Chechnya MVD of 31 October 2009 it appears that servicemen of the 8th company of the 2nd regiment of the traffic police and the head of the Argun town administration security service participated in the liquidation of Mr A.Kh., but [they] have not been identified and questioned.\nThe requests of the applicant, Ms L. Gaysanova, for access to the investigation file have been granted, but her representatives have not been provided [it] ...\nIn addition, the applicant\u2019s representative requested that the investigators take certain investigative steps such as seizure and examination of the video footage posted on the Chechen Ministry of the Interior\u2019s website concerning the special operation... identifying the person who filmed the operation ... those steps have not been taken.\nIn violation of Article 21 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, no measures have been taken to identify the perpetrators for a long time ...\n... In addition, the investigation has not taken sufficient steps to identify key witness Mr R.M. who, according to the applicant, called her to say that Z. Gaysanova had been taken away by the unidentified servicemen who had participated in the special operation against A.Kh. Mr R.M. has not been questioned about those circumstances. In addition, the brother of the abducted Ms Gaysanova, Mr I. Gaysanov, has not been identified and questioned.\nBased on the above, the decision to suspend the investigation in criminal case no. 66094 is unlawful and should therefore be overruled ...\u201d 63.  On 23 August 2010 the Chechen deputy prosecutor again criticised the investigation into Ms Zarema Gaysanova\u2019s disappearance and pointed out that the steps ordered on 9 July 2010 had not been taken and the orders given had not been complied with. He ordered that the decision to suspend the investigation of 16 June 2010 be overruled as unlawful and the proceedings be resumed. 64.  On 10 December 2010 the investigators granted the applicant\u2019s request of 22 April 2010 to have Mr Kadyrov questioned (see paragraph 36 above). The applicant was informed on 13 December 2010. 65.  On 28 March 2011 the investigators collected blood samples from the applicant for genetic testing with the samples in the regional DNA database. On 4 April 2011 the experts reported that there had been no matches. 66.  On 7 April 2011 the applicant\u2019s lawyer requested the investigators to join the investigation into Ms Zarema Gaysanova\u2019s disappearance with the investigation into the disappearance of Mr Rizvan Aziyev (see Khava Aziyeva and Others v. Russia, no. 30237/10, 23 April 2015) for the following reasons:\n\u201c... your department investigating criminal case no. 66094 ... initiated in connection with [Ms Zarema Gaysanova\u2019s] abduction during a special operation on Second Darvina Lane in Grozny ... presumably by representatives of the law-enforcement agencies.\nOn the same date, 31 October 2009, at about 5.50 p.m. by his house at 23 Mumayeva Street in the village of Staraya Sunzha, unidentified armed persons in camouflage uniforms abducted Mr Rizvan Aziyev, who was born in 1979.\nIn connection with this, the Leninskiy investigation department ... opened criminal case no. 66093, which is also being investigated by your department.\nOne of the investigation\u2019s theories in criminal case no. 66094 is that Mr A.Kh. had lived with Zarema Gaysanova, and this served as the reason for [her] abduction and questioning by unidentified representatives of the law-enforcement agencies in order to obtain information about him and his activities.\nMr Rizvan Aziyev, who was abducted the same day, is the brother of Ms Khava Aziyeva, Mr A.Kh\u2019s official wife.\nBoth abductions therefore took place on the date of the special operation on 31 October 2009 to eliminate Mr A.Kh., and both of the people abducted had obvious connections with him. Ms Gaysanova, in whose house Mr A.Kh. had been killed, was presumably his cohabitee, and Rizvan Aziyev was the brother of Mr A.Kh.\u2019s wife.\nIn connection with this, there are grounds to presume that the abductions of Ms Gaysanova and Mr Aziyev, who had been connected to Mr A.Kh., had been perpetrated by the same people ...\u201d 67.  On 8 April 2011 the investigators refused the above request as groundless. 68.  On 21 and 22 April 2011 the investigators checked the detainee registration log of the Leninskiy ROVD temporary detention ward. There was no indication that Ms Zarema Gaysanova had been detained on the premises. 69.  On 14 June 2011 the investigators obtained two DVDs from the Chechen MVD information centre containing the video footage of the special operation on 31 October 2009 and incorporated them into the investigation file as evidence. 70.  On 3 July 2012 the investigators in charge of criminal case no. 66094 informed the head of the Chechen investigation department that they needed to question the Chechen President Mr Kadyrov again, but were unable to do so as he was too busy. They eventually questioned him on 28 June 2013 (see paragraph 47 above). 71.  On 22 July 2013 an operational-search officer from the criminal search division of Grozny OVD, Mr R.D., provided the investigators with an information statement on the operational-search steps taken in the criminal case. The relevant part reads as follows:\n\u201c... It has been established by operational-search measures that at about 3.30 p.m. on 31 October 2009 servicemen from the Argun OVD, the 8th company of the 2nd regiment of the traffic police and the head of the Argun town administration security service conducted a special operation, as a result of which an active member of illegal armed groups, Mr A.Kh., was found. He resisted arrest and [was] therefore eliminated ... It has also been established that in that household Mr A.Kh. had lived with his wife, Zarema Gaysanova, whose whereabouts after the special operation remain unknown ...\nMs Zarema Gaysanova was not officially married ...\nTwo theories were proposed within the framework of the operational-search activities:\n\uf02d Zarema Gaysanova was detained by servicemen of the law-enforcement agencies owing to her possible involvement in illegal armed groups;\n\uf02d Zarema Gaysanova was hiding from the police to avoid prosecution for being a member of illegal armed groups ...\u201d 72.  On an unspecified date in 2011 the investigators established that on 31 October 2009 Ms Zarema Gaysanova had had various telephone conversations, one of which had been with Mr A.Kh., who had subsequently been killed during the special operation.\n(d)  Information concerning the pace of the investigation 73.  On 5 December 2009 the Leninskiy investigation department issued a formal warning (\u043f\u0440\u0435\u0434\u0441\u0442\u0430\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435) to the chief of the Leninskiy ROVD. It stated that the police department had not carried out any of the investigative steps ordered by the investigators, and had thereby hampered the investigation and precluded it from establishing the circumstances of Ms Zarema Gaysanova\u2019s abduction. The chief was instructed to take the necessary steps to remedy the shortcomings and to consider taking disciplinary action against those responsible for the inactivity. On 9 December 2009 the investigators issued a further order to the police department, stressing that their earlier instructions had not been complied with and urging the chief of the Leninskiy ROVD to oversee the matter. 74.  On 7 December 2009 the investigation in case no. 66094 was transferred to investigation department no. 2 (Serious Crimes) of the investigation committee at the prosecutor\u2019s office of the Russian Federation in the Chechen Republic (\u0441\u043b\u0435\u0434\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u043a\u043e\u043c\u0438\u0442\u0435\u0442 \u043f\u043e \u0427\u0435\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u0420\u0435\u0441\u043f\u0443\u0431\u043b\u0438\u043a\u0435) (hereinafter \u201cinvestigation department no. 2\u201d). 75.  On 9 December 2009 it was decided that the investigation was to be conducted by a group of investigators because there was evidence to suggest that members of the security forces had been involved in Ms Zarema Gaysanova\u2019s abduction. The group was to consist of investigators from the Leninskiy investigation department, investigation department no. 2 and officers from the Leninskiy ROVD. 76.  On 11 January 2010 the investigators requested that the time-limit for the investigation in case no. 66094 be extended owing to the number of investigative steps to be taken. The document stated that the investigation had been severely hampered by the persistent refusal of the law\u2011enforcement authorities involved in the operation on 31 October 2009 to provide information about the officers who had participated. 77.  On 27 January 2010 the investigators requested the Minister of the Interior to personally oversee execution of the requests they had addressed to his subordinates in connection with the investigation in case no. 66094. The letter stressed that the Leninskiy ROVD, the Argun OVD, the 8th company of the 2nd regiment of the MVD traffic police and the Minister himself had persistently disregarded the investigators\u2019 repeated requests for information concerning the officers who had participated in the special operation on 31 October 2009. Moreover, officers Mr M.A.B, Mr D.R.V, Mr I.D.G. and Mr R.Z.A. from the Argun OVD, who it had been established had taken part in the operation, had blatantly refused to be questioned. The Minister was asked to look into the matter and take disciplinary action in connection with this. 78.  On 16 June 2010 the investigation was suspended. It was resumed on 31 August 2010 then suspended again on 30 September 2010. The proceedings were resumed each time following criticism from the supervising prosecutor (see paragraphs 62 and 63 above). 79.  On 11 August 2010 the applicant requested access to the investigation file. On 13 August 2010 the investigators refused her request as she was not entitled to familiarise herself with the contents of the file until completion of the investigation. The applicant appealed (see paragraph 93 below). 80.  On 1 December 2010 the investigation was resumed but suspended the next day. The applicant\u2019s lawyer appealed and on 26 January 2011 the proceedings were resumed. 81.  On 31 March 2011 the investigation was again suspended. It was resumed on 14 April 2011 for failure to take a number of steps. 82.  On 15 July 2011 the investigation was again resumed but suspended on 15 August 2011. 83.  On 31 May 2012 the investigation was again resumed owing to the need to take a number of steps such as questioning the head of the Argun town administration on his security guards\u2019 participation in the special operation on 31 October 2009 (see paragraph 45 above). On an unspecified date in June 2012 the proceedings were suspended. 84.  On 20 June 2012 the investigation was resumed then suspended again on 4 July 2012. 85.  On 26 June 2013 the investigation was resumed owing to the need to take a number of steps such as questioning the Chechen President Mr Kadyrov and the applicant\u2019s neighbour Mr R.M. and verifying whether Ms Zarema Gaysanova had left Russia. 86.  On 10 July 2013 the investigation was suspended again. It appears from the documents submitted that it is pending. 87.  On 6 November 2009 the applicant provided a statement to local human rights lawyers from the United Mobile Group (\u041e\u0431\u044a\u0435\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0435\u043d\u043d\u0430\u044f \u041c\u043e\u0431\u0438\u043b\u044c\u043d\u0430\u044f \u0413\u0440\u0443\u043f\u043f\u0430) (hereinafter \u201cthe UMG\u201d). She stated that at about 6.30 p.m. on 31 October 2009 she had received a call from her neighbour Mr R.M. who had informed her, amongst other things, that a special operation had taken place in their neighbourhood and her house had been burnt down as a result, that the armed men who had carried out the operation had taken away her daughter and that a man\u2019s body had been found among the ruins by the firemen. At about 9 p.m. that evening the applicant had gone to the Leninskiy ROVD, where investigator Mr Timur G. had taken a statement from her about the abduction. The chief of the Leninskiy ROVD, who had introduced himself as Mr Imran, had then told her that the man\u2019s body found among the ruins had belonged to Ms Zarema Gaysanova\u2019s husband and that he had no information about who had carried out the special operation. On 1 November 2009 the applicant had lodged an official written abduction complaint with the Leninskiy ROVD. On the same date she had spoken to several of her neighbours, including Ms Z.S., all of whom had told her that on 31 October 2009 a large group of armed men had carried out a special operation in the vicinity of her house, there had been a shooting and her house had been burnt down. Afterwards, a man\u2019s body had been discovered. The Chechen President Mr Kadyrov and Minister of the Interior Mr Alkhanov had arrived at the scene and had given interviews that an illegal armed fighter had been eliminated in the applicant\u2019s house. 88.  On 20 January 2010 the applicant provided another statement to the UMG lawyers. She reiterated her previous statement and added that on the morning of 1 November 2009 she had been told by two men in dark\u2011coloured VAZ-2109 cars with blacked out windows that they had been guarding the ruins of her house for the crime scene examination. More representatives of law-enforcement agencies had then arrived at the scene. The applicant provided the lawyers with the names and telephone numbers of the workers who had worked on her house prior to the events of 31 October 2009, Mr A. Y. Zh., Mr A.Dzh, Mr I.Dzh, Mr B.B. and brothers Mr Al.A. and Mr Ar.A. 89.  On 27 March 2010 the applicant provided another statement to the UMG lawyers. She stressed that on the evening of 31 October 2009 she had complained about her daughter\u2019s abduction in person at the Leninskiy ROVD and on 1 November 2009 had lodged a written complaint with the police department, having gone there with three of her relatives, Mr N.G., Ms Zh.G and Mr A.G. The following day she had lodged abduction complaints with the Leninskiy district and Chechen investigation departments, as well as the Leninskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office and Chechen prosecutor\u2019s office. On 9 November 2009 she had given a statement concerning the abduction to Mr Magomed T., an investigator from the Leninskiy district investigation department. 90.  On 26 May 2010 the UMG lawyers took a statement from one of Ms Gaysanova\u2019s colleagues from the Dutch Refugee Council, Mr D.K., who stated that on 31 October 2009, after the events at the applicant\u2019s house, he had taken the applicant to the Leninskiy ROVD in Grozny. She had been crying, saying that her daughter had gone missing and her house had been burnt down. 91.  On 25 May 2010 the UMG lawyers took a statement from the applicant\u2019s relatives, Ms Zh.G., Mr N.G. and Mr T.G., whose accounts of the events of 31 October 2009 were similar to that of the applicant. In addition, the witnesses stated that on 1 November 2009 a crime scene examination group consisting of several forensic experts had gone through the ruins of the applicant\u2019s burnt house. All of the witnesses confirmed that on 1 November 2009 they and the applicant had gone to the Leninskiy ROVD, where the applicant had given a written statement concerning her daughter\u2019s abduction to the policeman on duty. 92.  On 29 April 2010 the applicant requested the Leninskiy district investigation department in Grozny to initiate a criminal investigation into possible forgery, claiming that the date of her abduction complaint (see paragraph 22 above) had been unlawfully changed from 1 to 9 November 2009 (see paragraph 26 above). In reply to her request, on 7 June 2010 the department refused her request, as it was impossible to establish when the correction had been made to the document. The refusal was subsequently overruled but adopted again on four occasions. The last refusal to initiate criminal proceedings into the matter was taken on 12 December 2011. 93.  On two occasions, 30 April and 30 August 2010, the applicant complained to the Leninskiy District Court of Grozny that the investigators had refused to grant her access to the case file concerning the investigation into her daughter\u2019s disappearance. On 11 May and 5 October 2010 the court allowed her complaints. 94.  On 10 December 2010 the Staropromyslovskiy District Court of Grozny rejected a complaint by the applicant made on 19 November 2010 concerning the investigators\u2019 refusal to question Mr Kadyrov due to his absence from the crime scene, in spite of widespread media coverage to the contrary (see paragraph 13 above). The court held that on 9 December 2010 the refusal had already been overruled by the deputy head of the Chechen investigation department. 95.  On 17 January 2011 the applicant\u2019s lawyers complained to the head of the Chechen investigation department that the investigation into Ms Zarema Gaysanova\u2019s abduction had been suspended unlawfully, requesting that the proceedings be resumed and a number of steps be taken. In particular, they pointed out the following:\n\u201c... according to the criminal case file, the investigators have been verifying the theory that representatives of power structures were involved in Zarema Gaysanova\u2019s abduction. The investigation established that the following servicemen had participated in the special operation (according to the operational information note of 31 October 2009, volume 2, page 49 of the case file):\n\uf02d the Argun department of the interior (OVD)\n\uf02d the Leninskiy district department of the interior in Grozny (ROVD)\n\uf02d the 8th regiment of the 2nd Regiment of the Chechen traffic police\n\uf02d the head of the Argun town administration security service\nAlso, from the same document it follows that the crime scene had been visited by senior officials of the Chechen law-enforcement agencies and operational investigation groups:\n\uf02d Chechen Minister of the Interior, Mr A.;\n\uf02d Chechen deputy Minister of the Interior, Mr E;\n\uf02d chief of the Grozny department of the interior (the Grozny OVD), Mr T.;\n\uf02d chief of the criminal search division of the Grozny OVD, Mr Sh.;\n\uf02d ...\n\uf02d [the entire] operational investigation group of the Chechen Ministry of the Interior;\n\uf02d operational investigation group of the Grozny OVD; and\n\uf02d operational investigation group of the Leninskiy ROVD.\nFrom the video footage made by the press office of the Chechen MVD, which has been incorporated into the case file, it is noticeable that a large number of representatives of the law-enforcement agencies participated in the special operation. However, as at today\u2019s date, not all of the servicemen from the Argun OVD who participated in the special operation have been identified and questioned. At the same time, the statements given by the servicemen who had been questioned by the investigation, are very alike, almost copies of, the reports given by these servicemen to the chief of the Argun OVD. In addition, the servicemen from the other regiments have not been identified and questioned by the investigation. The persons in charge of the operation have not been questioned either, even though from the video of the special operation it appears that next to the applicant\u2019s house were the Minister of the Interior and a group of officers from the Chechen MVD.\n...\nIn addition, the supervising prosecutor\u2019s orders (of 9 July and 23 August 2010) have not been complied with ...\n... according to the evidence examination report of 28 September 2010 (pages 248 and 249 of the file) ... the video footage of the special operation on 31 October 2009 cannot be found on the Chechen MVD website. However, the investigators could examine the video footage presented by the applicant\u2019s lawyers (see ... request of 22 April 2010, volume 5, pages 40-41) which was made from the video posted on the MVD website. This examination has not been carried out. It is necessary to examine this footage with the assistance of the police in order to identify the participants of the special operation on 31 October 2009 ...\u201d 96.  On 24 January 2011 the investigators refused to grant the request, but on 26 January 2011 the deputy head of the Chechen investigation department overruled that refusal and ordered that the request be granted. 97.  On 19 April 2011 the applicant\u2019s lawyers requested that the investigators take a number of steps including questioning the head of the Argun town administration, an examination of the video footage of the special operation of 31 October 2009, establishing which vehicles had been used during the operation and questioning the senior police officials and other officers who had participated. The applicant\u2019s request also contained the following:\n\u201c... from the replies of the acting head of the Chechen MVD headquarters to the investigators\u2019 requests it appears that ... the applicant\u2019s complaint concerning her daughter\u2019s abduction, which was received by the police department on 9 November 2009 at 7.10 p.m., stated that Zarema Gaysanova had left herself in an unknown destination and that the police had not received any complaints about her being abducted by unidentified persons in camouflage uniforms driving around in UAZ vehicles. At the same time, in [the actual] complaint lodged by the applicant with the police department stated that Zarema Gaysanova had been abducted by unidentified men in camouflage uniforms right after the special operation conducted on 31 October 2009 (see volume 1, page 26 of the investigation file). In connection with this it is necessary to question the acting head of the Chechen MVD headquarters to find out why he had provided false information to the investigators and what information they have concerning Zarema Gaysanova\u2019s departure on her own to an unknown destination...\n... It is also necessary to find out ... whether Zarema Gaysanova was the wife of [the man eliminated during the special operation] Mr A.Kh. and to question officer G., who had prepared a report to this end (no. 4912) concerning the sources of that information ...\u201d\nOn 25 April 2011 the investigators granted the request in part, but did not specify which steps would be taken. 98.  On 23 May 2011 the applicant\u2019s lawyers requested that the investigators examine the video footage of the special operation which could be found in the archives section of the Chechen MVD official website and question the persons who had filmed the events. The lawyers provided the link to the footage and stated that the video contained clear images of the participants in the special operation. On 26 May 2011 the investigators informed the applicant that they would grant this request but did not specify when and to what extent. 99.  On 25 May 2011 the applicant\u2019s lawyers requested that the investigators question the Chechen Minister of the Interior Mr Alkhanov, as video footage of the special operation attested to his presence during the events, and ask him about the other participants in the operation. On 3 June 2011 the applicant was informed that the request had been granted. 100.  On 24 August 2011 the applicant\u2019s lawyers wrote to the investigators to say that Ms Zarema Gaysanova had been a user of an online social networking site, Odnoklassniki (\u00ab\u041e\u0434\u043d\u043e\u043a\u043b\u0430\u0441\u0441\u043d\u0438\u043a\u0438\u00bb). The last visit to her account had been on 3 November 2009, after her abduction. In this connection, the lawyers requested that the investigators find out, amongst other things, the account activity since 31 October 2009. On 26 August 2011 the investigators informed the applicant that they had granted her request. It appears from the documents submited that the requested action was not taken. 101.  On 29 July 2011 the investigators refused to grant the applicant\u2019s request of 28 July 2011 for access to the case file, stating that it had been lodged by her lawyer and not by the applicant herself. 102.  On 27 April 2012 the applicant\u2019s lawyer again requested the investigators to grant him permission to access the investigation file, stressing that he had been representing the applicant in accordance with the criminal procedure law and forms of authority. His request was granted the same day.", "references": ["5", "7", "4", "6", "9", "8", "3", "No Label", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["0", "1", "2"]}
+{"input": "5.  On 31 October 2002 the Bucharest Commission for the Enforcement of Law no. 18/1991 on Land Return acknowledged the applicant\u2019s property rights in respect of 350 square metres of land that had been nationalised under the communist regime, issued a property title, and granted him possession of the said land. The land was located on V. Street, in Bucharest. 6.  According to the applicant, on an unspecified date the unidentified owner of a plot of land located across the street from his property built a fence, which encroached onto V. Street. 7.  On an unspecified date in 2007 the applicant asked the Department of Discipline in Constructions (Serviciul de Disciplin\u0103 \u020bn Construc\u1e6dii hereinafter \u201cthe SDC\u201d) attached to the office of the Mayor of Bucharest District No. 5 to remove the part of the fence that was encroaching onto V. Street. He argued that he had intended to build on his property, but had noticed that the width of V. Street (and therefore the access to his land) had been significantly reduced because the owner of the property located opposite to his had unlawfully closed off a large part of the street by building the fence in question. 8.  On 23 November 2007 the applicant asked the Mayor of Bucharest, as well as the Bucharest General and Local Councils, to take the necessary measures to remove the fence. The applicant informed those authorities that on 17 September 2007 the SDC had, by letter, dismissed his request for the removal of the fence built by his neighbour. The SDC had done so on the ground that his request related to a fence \u2013 for which a building permit had been issued \u2013 erected by a certain C.M. The applicant stated that after the fence had been built he could no longer access his land by car, but only on foot. He asked the authorities to verify his claims because, as confirmed by the land expert who had prepared the documents needed for the registration of the applicant\u2019s property rights, they had been \u201cwrongfully established\u201d in the letter that the applicant received from the SDC on 17 September 2007. 9.  On 22 April 2008 the applicant brought an action against the Mayor of Bucharest and the Bucharest General Council and the Bucharest District No. 5 Local Council seeking a court order requiring the Mayor to give the owner of the fence notice to remove it. Moreover, he asked the court to require the Mayor to arrange for the removal of the fence without the owner\u2019s consent if the fence\u2019s owner ignored such removal notice. In the alternative, he asked the court to order the Bucharest General and Local Councils to start expropriation proceedings with a view to enlarging the road and thus restoring full car access. He stated inter alia that in its letter to him of 17 September 2007 the SDC had indicated that the neighbour who was the target of his complaint had had a building permit for the fence. However, the applicant also stated that those responsible for investigating his claim had failed to notice that C.M. was not the owner of the property located opposite his land, which was owned by an unidentified neighbour, but the owner of the property adjoining his. Consequently, their findings had had no bearing on his claim. Moreover, his requests of 23 November 2007 had not received any answers. 10.  On 9 May 2008, at the first-instance court\u2019s instruction, the applicant specified his court action. By relying on the relevant domestic legislation (see paragraph 24, below) he argued that the proceedings had concerned the refusal by the public authorities to issue an act or to carry out the administrative formalities needed for the removal of the fence built on V. Street and for the reopening of access to the street. He also argued that the administrative authorities had failed to examine his demands \u2013 probably because they had been confused as to which neighbour was the subject of his concerns. The authorities\u2019 confusion had been caused by an identical complaint against C.M. having been lodged by a third party living on the same street. 11.  On 17 June 2008 the Bucharest County Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s action. It held that the applicant had not specified which of his neighbours had closed off part of the street by building the fence, either in his applications to the administrative authorities or in his application to that court. Moreover, the neighbour in question could not be identified because the applicant had not specified that neighbour\u2019s address. Consequently, the Mayor of Bucharest\u2019s Office had informed the applicant that the owner of the land at no. 30 V. Street \u2013 namely C.M. \u2013 had had a lawful building permit. Because the applicant had referred only in general terms to the person whose fence had closed off part of the street, the Bucharest General Council had merely replied to him in general terms about the future development plans for the area in question and the size of the street in question. In such circumstances, the court could not accept that the authorities had refused to address the applicant\u2019s request. 12.  The court further considered that the Mayor of Bucharest would have had to be informed of a person\u2019s identity and his actions before he could have issued an order or notice to such person. Given that the street in question had been used by several other property owners, the applicant would have had to identify the person unlawfully occupying part of the street before the authorities could have acted. The administrative authorities could not have been considered to have been inactive as long as the applicant had failed to specify which of the owners of the neighbouring plots of land had diminished the width of the road. 13.  The court also dismissed \u2013 on the grounds that they were unnecessary and would not further the resolution of the case \u2013 the applicant\u2019s request for additional testimonial evidence, an onsite investigation and an expert report that would (according to the applicant) have demonstrated that the road had been obstructed by the construction of the fence. 14.  The court lastly dismissed the administrative authorities\u2019 claim that the applicant\u2019s action had been inadmissible on the ground that the applicant had claimed a breach of his rights as a result of the restricted use of a public road which ensured his access to his property. Moreover, it dismissed the aforementioned authorities\u2019 claim that they lacked legal standing (capacitate procesual\u0103 pasiv\u0103) on the ground that the street ensuring access to the applicant\u2019s property was on the public domain which was managed by them. 15.  The applicant appealed on points of law (recurs) against the judgment. He argued, inter alia, that the evidence that had been requested by him before the first-instance court would have clarified the circumstances of the case and the identity of the owner of the fence; however, the court had wrongfully dismissed that request. Moreover, during a meeting with the administrative authorities, the applicant\u2019s representative had informed them that in his opinion it had not been C.M. but the neighbour whose property had been located opposite his who had blocked the street by building the fence. The applicant had himself been unable to establish the identity of the owner of the fence, because that owner\u2019s property had been empty and no visible postal number had been attached to the entrance gate. The fence had diminished the width of V. Street, preventing vehicular access to the applicant\u2019s property. Consequently, he had been unable to use that property for its practical purpose \u2013 namely, to build a home. The authorities had not asked him to provide the name of the owner of the fence; indeed, it was the duty of the public servants \u2013 not the applicant \u2013 to inform the Mayor of Bucharest of the impugned person\u2019s identity. 16.  On 15 August 2008 the applicant informed in writing the Public Domain Administration (attached to the office of the Mayor of Bucharest District No. 5) that, inter alia, his complaint concerning the occupation of part of V. Street had concerned not C.M. but the unidentified neighbour whose property was located across the street from C.M.\u2019s property. 17.  On 19 September 2008 the Public Domain Administration attached to the office of the Mayor of Bucharest District No. 5 informed the applicant by letter that, inter alia, they had contacted the local tax and land register office in order to identify the owner of the fence. There is no information in the file about the final outcome of the aforementioned measures taken by the authorities or whether they had yielded any results for the applicant. 18.  By a final judgment of 3 November 2008 the Bucharest Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law against the judgment of 17 June 2008. It noted that no further evidence had been added to the file and that the local authorities had not submitted any observations (\u020bnt\u00e2mpinare) even though they had been lawfully summoned. 19.  The court held that the applicant\u2019s claims had been ill-founded. Moreover, according to the SDC\u2019s letter of 17 September 2007, C.M. had been the owner of the land to which the applicant had been referring. It followed that the administrative authorities had not unjustifiably refused to address the applicant\u2019s complaints, as those authorities had not been competent to issue orders in respect of a third party\u2019s private property. The applicant had argued before the judicial authorities that the administrative authorities had been mistaken as to the identity of the owner of the fence; however, he had failed to inform them of the alleged mistake in order that they might clarify the situation. As to a request by the applicant concerning the initiation of eviction proceedings, the court considered that only the relevant administrative authorities could have assessed whether such a measure would have been appropriate. Therefore, it could not conclude that the applicant had been unjustifiably denied an answer in that regard. 20.  On 22 January 2009 the office of the Mayor of Bucharest District No. 5 issued the urban planning certificate (certificat de urbanism) requested by the applicant in respect of his land; this document attested that construction may have been authorised (autorizat) on the land in question. 21.  On 30 October 2015 the applicant\u2019s son, who had inherited the land following his father\u2019s death, had sold the land to a third party. The sale contract had expressly mentioned that the applicant\u2019s son had reserved all the rights resulting from the present application before the Court. 22.  On 11 November 2015 the applicant\u2019s son informed the Court that he had incurred additional damage following the sale of the land and had asked it to examine his loss. He stated that the notary public who had drafted the sale contract had calculated the taxes for the transfer of the land\u2019s ownership based on a guideline for property prices used by notary public offices and not based on the price actually received by him for the land. As a result the applicant had to pay an additional 414 Euros (EUR) in tax. Also given the state of the land, in particular no road access and no utilities (f\u0103r\u0103 utilit\u0103\u021bi), he had been unable to ask the buyer to pay the price per square meter mentioned by the aforementioned guideline. Consequently, he had lost EUR 20,725 as a result of the lower sale price.", "references": ["7", "8", "1", "0", "4", "5", "2", "9", "6", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1952. He is a businessman living in \u017dupanja. 6.  On 11 August 2000 the Vukovar County State Attorney\u2019s Office (\u017dupanijsko dr\u017eavno odvjetni\u0161tvo u Vukovaru) asked an investigating judge of the Vukovar County Court (\u017dupanijski sud u Vukovaru) to open an investigation in respect of the applicant, in his capacity of the director of company M., in connection with suspicion of several charges of economic crime. It also requested that several items of the applicant\u2019s real property be restrained so as to secure effective enforcement of a probable confiscation order in the amount of 3,573,747.24 Croatian kunas (HRK) (approximately 469,475 Euros (EUR)). 7.  The investigation was opened on 21 August 2000, and on 6 March 2001 the investigating judge declared the request for seizure of the applicant\u2019s property inadmissible on the ground that under the Code of Criminal Procedure applicable at the time the State Attorney\u2019s Office had not been authorised to make such a request. 8.  After the completion of the investigation, on 10 May 2002 the applicant was indicted, together with three other persons, in the Vukovar County Court on several charges of economic crime, concerning in particular misappropriation of company shares, and misuse of the company M.\u2019s assets and facilities. 9.  On 28 May 2007 the Vukovar County State Attorney\u2019s Office amended the indictment, dropping the charges on six counts against the applicant and charging him on one count of misappropriation of company shares, and several counts of misuse of the company M.\u2019s assets and facilities. The total value of the pecuniary gain which the applicant had allegedly obtained by the commission of these offences was set out at approximately EUR 1,060,000. 10.  On the basis of the amended indictment, on 8 April 2008 the Vukovar County Court found the applicant guilty of charges of misappropriation of company shares and acquitted him of all other charges. The applicant was sentenced to three years and six months\u2019 imprisonment and confiscation of the pecuniary gain in the amount of HRK 6,169,977.35 (approximately EUR 850,000) allegedly obtained by the commission of the offence of which he was found guilty. 11.  Upon appeal by the applicant and the Vukovar County State Attorney\u2019s Office against this judgment, on 18 October 2011 the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske) quashed it and ordered a retrial. 12.  In the resumed proceedings, and after the 2010 Confiscation of the Proceeds of Crime Act (see paragraph 36 below) had entered into force, on 27 June 2012 the Vukovar County State Attorney\u2019s Office requested the Vukovar County Court that several items of the applicant\u2019s real property be seized (ten plots of land, two houses and a commercial building) so as to secure effective enforcement of a probable confiscation order in the amount of approximately EUR 1,060,000. 13.  In support of its request the Vukovar County State Attorney\u2019s Office submitted records from the land registry attesting to the applicant\u2019s ownership of the real properties in respect of which the request for a seizure order was made. It did not submit an assessment of the value of the property nor did it make any reference to its possible value. However, according to the information submitted by the Government, the assessment of the value of several items of the real property, which were the subject matter of the proceedings, had been made on the basis of the material available from the investigation case file and their estimated value at the moment of purchase in 1997 (in total estimated at approximately EUR 440,000), whereas the assessment of the value of the remainder of the real property had been made by the Vukovar County State Attorney\u2019s Office with regard to the information available in the land registry, although the records in the land registry did not contain information on the value of the property itself. 14.  On 27 June 2012 a single judge of the Vukovar County Court ordered seizure of the applicant\u2019s real property listed in the request of the Vukovar County State Attorney\u2019s Office so as to secure effective enforcement of a possible confiscation order in the amount of approximately EUR 1,060,000. No reasoning was provided with regard to the proportionality of the alleged pecuniary gain obtained and the value of the restrained real property. 15.  On the basis of an order of the Vukovar County Court, the seizure of the applicant\u2019s real property was registered in the land registry. 16.  The applicant challenged the decision of the Vukovar County Court before the Supreme Court and on 5 September 2012 the Supreme Court quashed it and remitted the matter for re-examination on the grounds that the decision on seizure of the real property was not within the competence of a single judge but a panel of three judges. 17.  On 17 October 2012 the applicant requested the Vukovar County Court that the quashed seizure order be removed from the land registry. He contended that he had taken a bank loan which was secured by a mortgage on his real property and that the loan would not be extended due to the seizure of his property, which could lead to his total bankruptcy and destruction of his business. In support of his request, the applicant submitted email correspondence with the bank asking him to clarify when the seizure order would be lifted, as it affected the management of his loan. 18.  On 18 October 2012 the applicant\u2019s representative received a summons by the Vukovar County Court to appear before a three-judge panel of that court on 30 October 2012, without specifying the exact reason for the summons. It was also indicated that the court session could be held in the absence of the defence. 19.  On 30 October 2012 a three-judge panel of the Vukovar County Court examined the request of the Vukovar County State Attorney\u2019s Office for the seizure of the applicant\u2019s real property. On the same day it accepted the request in full and ordered restraint of the applicant\u2019s real property listed in the request of the Vukovar County State Attorney\u2019s Office (see paragraph 12 above) by prohibiting its alienation or encumbrance. The relevant part of the decision reads:\n\u201cThe records from the land registry ... show that the accused Antun D\u017eini\u0107 is the owner of the above listed items of real property.\nUnder section 11 \u00a7 1(A) in conjunction with section 31 \u00a7 2 of the Confiscation of the Proceeds of Crime Act (Official Gazette no. 145/2010), and also in view of section 12 of the Confiscation of the Proceeds of Crime Act, this panel finds that it is presumed that there is a danger that the claim of the Republic of Croatia with regard to confiscation of the proceeds of crime would not be enforceable or that its enforcement would be difficult without ordering of a restraint measure.\nUnder Article 82 of the Criminal Code no one can retain the proceeds of crime.\nBy the indictment of the Vukovar County State Attorney\u2019s Office ... the accused Antun D\u017eini\u0107 is charged, under count 4 (a), (b) and (c), of having procured for himself a pecuniary gain in the amount of HRK 1,800,857.74.\n...\n[T]he proceedings at issue concern ... the confiscation of the proceeds of crime under section 11 \u00a7 1(A) in conjunction with section 31 \u00a7 2 of the Confiscation of the Proceeds of Crime Act. In view of the above, it is ordered to the land registry of the \u017dupanja Municipal Court to register the restraint of the listed property in the land registry.\u201d 20.  The restraint of the applicant\u2019s real property was registered in the land registry on the basis of an order of the Vukovar County Court. 21.  On 12 November 2012 the applicant lodged an appeal before the Supreme Court challenging the decision of the Vukovar County Court ordering the seizure of his property. He contended in particular that the value of the restrained property was according to his provisional estimate more than HRK 20,000,000 (approximately EUR 2,600,000), which significantly surpassed the pecuniary gain allegedly obtained by the commission of the offences which were the subject matter of the proceedings. He also stressed that it was reasonably expected from the Vukovar County Court to conduct at least a general assessment of the value of the property restrained and the pecuniary gain allegedly obtained by the commission of the offences in question. The applicant therefore submitted that by failing to make any such assessment, the Vukovar County Court had imposed an excessive individual burden on his property rights. 22.  The Supreme Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal on 27 December 2012. With regard to the applicant\u2019s specific complaint concerning the lack of proportionality of the measure imposed, the Supreme Court noted:\n\u201cThe Supreme Court finds that the principle of proportionality has not been breached since Antun D\u017eini\u0107 is charged with having obtained a pecuniary gain in the amount of HRK 1,800,857.74, and the value of the restrained property does not justify [his] argument that the value of the restrained property listed in the operative part of the impugned decision significantly surpasses the [possible confiscation] claim.\u201d 23.  On 18 February 2013 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint before the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) challenging the decisions of the lower courts on the seizure of his property. He relied on the Convention and the Court\u2019s case-law, contending that the decision on the seizure of his property had been disproportionate. 24.  On 20 February 2013 the applicant requested the Vukovar County Court that the seizure order be lifted or reassessed. He argued that there were other less restrictive means of securing the enforcement of a possible confiscation order, and contended that it had not been alleged that the seized property had been obtained by a criminal activity. He also urged the Vukovar County Court to make an assessment of the value of the seized property so as to limit the scope of the restraint to the value of the pecuniary gain allegedly obtained. He also contended that the value of the seized property significantly surpassed the alleged pecuniary gain obtained, which had endangered the normal functioning of his business. 25.  On 25 April 2013 the Constitutional Court declared the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint of 18 February 2013 (see paragraph 23 above) inadmissible on the ground that the decisions of the lower courts did not concern a decision on the merits of any of the applicant\u2019s rights or obligations or any criminal charge against him. 26.  On 9 July 2013 a three-judge panel of the Vukovar County Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s request that the seizure order be lifted or reassessed (see paragraph 24 above). The relevant part of the decision reads:\n\u201cThe request for the lifting of the restraint and the request for its modification are unfounded.\nIt follows from the final indictment of the Vukovar County State Attorney\u2019s Office ... that there is a reasonable suspicion that the accused Antun D\u017eini\u0107, by the offences listed in count 4 (a), (b) and (c) [of the indictment], obtained pecuniary gain in the total amount of HRK 1,800,857.\nSince the [seizure order] is based, under section 12 \u00a7 1 of the Confiscation of the Proceeds of Crime Act, on the presumption that there is a danger that the confiscation of the proceeds from crime would not be enforceable or that its enforcement would be difficult without ordering of a restraint measure, it was decided as noted in the operative part of this decision.\u201d 27.  On 12 July 2013 the applicant challenged this decision by lodging an appeal before the Supreme Court. He complained that he had not had an effective opportunity to challenge the seizure order in a hearing before the Vukovar County Court and that the seizure of his property had been disproportionate and thus contrary to Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. The applicant further stressed that it was unclear for which amount of the alleged pecuniary gain the seizure order had been made given that the Vukovar County Court had only referred to one count of the indictment, alleging that he had obtained pecuniary gain in the amount of HRK 1,800,857, whereas it had ignored the other count of the indictment according to which he had obtained a pecuniary gain in the amount of HRK 6,169,977.35. The applicant, therefore, assuming that the overall amount of the pecuniary gain for which the seizure order had been made corresponded to the sum of the two amounts noted (approximately EUR 1,060,000), submitted a detailed estimate value of each item of the restrained property based on the information from a publicly available Internet portal on the market values of real properties in Croatia. According to this estimate, the total value of the seized property corresponded to some EUR 9,887,084. The applicant thus contended that there was a gross disproportionality between the alleged pecuniary gain obtained by the commission of the offences referred to in the indictment and the value of the seized property, which imposed on him an excessive individual burden. 28.  On 17 October 2013 the Supreme Court, acting as the appeal court, dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal by noting the following:\n\u201cThe same complaints had been made against the decision of 30 October 2012 ... and then it was answered to the appellant that the principle of proportionality had not been breached ... By a speculative assessment of the value of the real properties listed in the appeal, the appellant did not manage to put into doubt the findings of the first-instance court.\nThe appellant\u2019s argument that it is not clear from the impugned decision which amount of the pecuniary gain he has allegedly obtained is unfounded.\nThe first-instance court stated in the impugned decision that the accused had obtained a pecuniary gain in the amount of HRK 1,800,857, as referred to in count 4 of the indictment, but it failed to cite the amount referred to in count 1 of the indictment of HRK 6,169,977.35, which is as such, in view of the status of the case, uncontested. There is therefore no doubt that the [seizure order] was made in respect of the overall amount of the possible pecuniary gain, as it was explained in the first decision by which the measure was ordered.\u201d 29.  The applicant challenged this decision before the Constitutional Court and on 7 February 2014 the Constitutional Court declared it inadmissible, reiterating its previous reasoning (see paragraph 25 above). 30.  At a closing hearing in the criminal proceedings before the Vukovar County Court on 8 July 2014, the applicant again requested that the seizure order be lifted. 31.  On 11 July 2014 the Vukovar County Court found the applicant guilty on the charges of misuse of the company M.\u2019s assets and facilities by which he had allegedly obtained a pecuniary gain in the amount of HRK 1,800,857.74 (approximately EUR 240,000), and acquitted him on charges of misappropriation of company shares and one alleged event of misuse of the company M.\u2019s assets and facilities. The applicant was sentenced to two years\u2019 imprisonment and confiscation of the amount of HRK 1,800,857.74. The case is pending on appeal before the Supreme Court. 32.  On the same day the Vukovar County Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s request for lifting of the seizure order made at the hearing on 8 July 2014 (see paragraph 30 above) as ill-founded on the ground that the seizure of the property could be maintained for sixty days following the relevant procedures related to the finality of the judgment. As the judgment had not become final, the Vukovar County Court considered that there was no ground for lifting of the seizure order.", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "4", "6", "7", "8", "3", "5", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant, Mr Micha\u0142 Ojczyk, is a Polish national who was born in 1977 and is currently in detention in \u0141\u00f3d\u017a Remand Centre in Poland. 6.  The parties\u2019 statements relating to the conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention from 17 July 2008 to 8 January 2010 are to a large extent contradictory. 7.  The applicant submitted that he had been detained in \u0141\u00f3d\u017a Remand Centre from 17 August 2005 to 26 April 2010. 8.  In their observations, the Government submitted that the applicant had been detained in the remand centre from 17 August 2005 to 17 July 2008 and that from 17 July 2008 to 13 August 2009 he had been detained in \u0141\u00f3d\u017a Prison. From 13 August 2009 to 8 January 2010 the applicant had been at liberty on a temporary release, while from 8 January to 26 April 2010 he had again been detained in \u0141\u00f3d\u017a Remand Centre. 9.  From 17 August 2005 to 17 July 2008 and from 8 January to 26 April 2010 the applicant was detained in \u0141\u00f3d\u017a Remand Centre. 10.  The applicant submitted that for seven months during his detention between 17 August 2005 and 26 April 2010 he had been held in overcrowded cells, where the space per person had been below the Polish statutory minimum of 3 sq. m. 11.  Official statistics published by the Prison Service (S\u0142u\u017cba Wi\u0119zienna) show that during the applicant\u2019s detention from 17 August 2005 to 7 August 2007, overcrowding at \u0141\u00f3d\u017a Remand Centre ranged from 20.1% to 35.3%. The figure shows the degree by which the number of prisoners exceeds the maximum allowed capacity of a particular detention facility, which, in turn, is calculated on the basis of the standard of 3 sq. m of cell space per prisoner provided for in Polish law. Overall capacity at \u0141\u00f3d\u017a Remand Centre was exceeded on average by 26.8% in that period. 12.  From 8 August 2007 to 7 July 2008 the size of the applicant\u2019s cells varied between 4.76 and 11.69 sq. m and the occupancy rate fluctuated between two and six people. 13.  Official statistics published by the Prison Service show that during the applicant\u2019s detention in \u0141\u00f3d\u017a Remand Centre from 8 January to 26 April 2010 there was no overcrowding. 14.  The applicant was detained with a person infected with the hepatitis C virus for three weeks in August 2005. 15.  From January to April 2007 the applicant was held in a cell with an HIV-positive person. 16.  He alleged that the cells had been badly ventilated. The applicant made no other submissions as to the conditions of his detention in the subsequent period. 17.  It appears that the applicant had one hot shower per week and one hour of outdoor exercise per day.\n(b)  Facts in dispute\n(i)  The Government\u2019s submissions 18.  The Government submitted that the applicant had failed to inform the Court that from 17 July 2008 to 13 August 2009 he had been detained in \u0141\u00f3d\u017a Prison, not in \u0141\u00f3d\u017a Remand Centre, and that from 13 August 2009 to 8 January 2010 he had been at liberty.\n(ii)  The applicant\u2019s submissions 19.  The applicant submitted that he had been detained in \u0141\u00f3d\u017a Remand Centre from 17 August 2005 to 26 April 2010. He argued that that was confirmed by the \u0141\u00f3d\u017a Court of Appeal (S\u0105d Apelacyjny) in the written grounds of its judgment of 17 September 2010 (see paragraph 24 below). 20.  Official statistics published by the Prison Service show that during the applicant\u2019s second period of detention, overcrowding at \u0141\u00f3d\u017a Prison had ranged from highs of 18.5% in July 2008 and 19.4% in August 2008 to a low of 2.5% in June and August 2009. The overall capacity of \u0141\u00f3d\u017a Prison from 17 July 2008 to 13 August 2009 was exceeded on average by 10.4%. 21.  The Government did not contest the fact that the applicant had been held in overcrowded cells in \u0141\u00f3d\u017a Prison. 22.  On 25 May 2008 the applicant brought a civil action for infringement of his personal rights on account of the inadequate living conditions in \u0141\u00f3d\u017a Remand Centre (between November 2004 and June 2011). The applicant argued that he had been detained in overcrowded cells with space that was below the minimum statutory standard. He claimed 290,000 Polish zlotys (PLN \u2013 37,500 euros (EUR)) in compensation. 23.  On 28 April 2010 the \u0141\u00f3d\u017a Regional Court (S\u0105d Okr\u0119gowy) dismissed the applicant\u2019s action. The court found that the applicant had been detained in overcrowded cells from 17 August 2005 to 26 April 2010. Nevertheless, the applicant had failed to prove that those conditions of detention had had any adverse effects on his health. The applicant appealed. The State Treasury, represented during the proceedings by a professional lawyer, did not submit any objections neither to the period nor to the indications of the prison facilities in which the applicant had been held. 24.  On 17 September 2010 the \u0141\u00f3d\u017a Court of Appeal (S\u0105d Apelacyjny) amended the above judgment, granted the applicant PLN 6,000 (EUR 1,500) in compensation and dismissed the remainder of his appeal. The court held that the award was adequate redress for the period in which the applicant had been detained in permanently overcrowded cells. The court found that the applicant had been held in overcrowded cells for most of the time of his detention. The domestic court exempted the applicant from paying the costs of the proceedings but ordered him to reimburse part of the legal fees paid by the respondent, a sum of PLN 1,000 (EUR 250). 25.  In a letter dated 15 February 2011, the applicant\u2019s legal aid lawyer issued an opinion that there were no legal grounds to lodge a cassation appeal. 26.  The Government submitted that the applicant had been served with the opinion by his legal aid lawyer on 15 February 2011 and again by the \u0141\u00f3d\u017a Court of Appeal on 27 September 2012. The Government attached to their observations a postal slip confirming the February date for the posting of the opinion to the applicant at \u0141\u00f3d\u017a Remand Centre.\n(b)  The applicant\u2019s submissions 27.  The applicant submitted that the legal opinion dated 15 February 2011 had not been served on him as he had been on a temporary release between 8 February 2011 and 22 February 2012. The applicant submitted a certificate to the Court issued by \u0141\u00f3d\u017a Remand Centre confirming the above dates.", "references": ["5", "0", "7", "9", "6", "3", "2", "4", "8", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "10.  The applicants, Mr Gergely Kar\u00e1csony, Mr P\u00e9ter Szil\u00e1gyi, Mr D\u00e1vid Dorosz and Ms Rebeka Katalin Szab\u00f3, were born in 1975, 1981, 1985 and 1977 respectively and live in Budapest. 11.  At the material time the applicants were members of parliament and of the opposition party P\u00e1rbesz\u00e9d Magyarorsz\u00e1g\u00e9rt (Dialogue for Hungary). Mr Szil\u00e1gyi was also one of the notaries to Parliament. 12.  At a plenary session on 30 April 2013, during a pre-agenda speech, an opposition member of parliament from the Hungarian Socialist Party criticised the Government and accused it of corruption with regard to, inter alia, the reorganisation of the tobacco market. Mr Zolt\u00e1n Cs\u00e9falvay, the Secretary of State for the National Economy, was replying on behalf of the Government when the applicants Mr Kar\u00e1csony and Mr Szil\u00e1gyi carried into the centre of the Chamber a large placard displaying the words \u201cFIDESZ [the party in Government] You steal, you cheat, and you lie.\u201d Subsequently, they placed it next to the Secretary of State\u2019s seat. 13.  The minutes of the session read as follows:\n\u201cDr Zolt\u00e1n Cs\u00e9falvay, the Secretary of State for the National Economy: ...\nTell them that the increase of commodity wages particularly affects those with a minimum income, since the minimum income has been increased by 5.4 %, which is impossible to keep up with inflation lower than 3.5%. And tell them also ... (Gergely Kar\u00e1csony and P\u00e9ter Szil\u00e1gyi show a placard displaying the words \u201cFIDESZ You steal, you cheat, and you lie.\". \u2013 Interventions from the government MPs: - Rules of procedure! Doctor! The Speaker rings the bell.)\nSpeaker: Honourable Parliament! (Constant interventions from the government MPs. Gergely Kar\u00e1csony and P\u00e9ter Szil\u00e1gyi place the placard next to the speaker\u2019s pulpit.) I request Mr Gergely Kar\u00e1csony to remove the placard in the same way as they brought it in. (Gergely Kar\u00e1csony and P\u00e9ter Szil\u00e1gyi leave the placard next to the speaker\u2019s pulpit. \u2013 Constant interventions from the government MPs. \u2013 The Speaker rings the bell.) I request the ushers to remove the placard. (Interventions from the government MPs, amongst others: That\u2019s all you can do.). I request the ushers to remove the placard. (The placard is removed.)\nThank you very much. Please continue Mr Secretary of State! (Interventions from the government MPs: How could they get that in? \u2013 [The Speaker] rings the bell.)\u201d 14.  On 6 May 2013 the Speaker presented a proposal to fine Mr Kar\u00e1csony 50,000 Hungarian forints ((HUF); equivalent to EUR 170) and Mr Szil\u00e1gyi HUF 185,520 (EUR 600) for their conduct, as recorded in the minutes and considered to be gravely offensive to parliamentary order, in application of sections 49(4) and 49(7) of the Parliament Act. The Speaker proposed that as regards Mr Szil\u00e1gyi the maximum fine (a third of his monthly remuneration) be applied, since he had been elected an official of Parliament and was not just an ordinary MP. No other reasons were given in the proposal. A decision approving the Speaker\u2019s proposal was adopted by the plenary on 13 May 2013, without debate. 15.  On 21 May 2013 during the final vote on Bill no. T/10881 amending certain tobacco-related Acts the applicants Mr Dorosz and Ms Szab\u00f3 carried into the centre of the Chamber and displayed there a large banner displaying the words \u201cHere Operates the National Tobacco Mafia\u201d. 16.  The minutes of the session read as follows:\n\u201cSpeaker: ... I ask the Honourable Parliament whether it adopts Bill T/10881 in accordance with the consolidated proposal as amended just now. Please vote! (Voting)\nI proclaim the decision: Parliament has (Mr D\u00e1vid Dorosz and Ms Rebeka Szab\u00f3 display a banner with the words \u201cHere Operates the National Tobacco Mafia\u201d) adopted the Bill with 222 votes in favour, 81 against and 1 abstention. (Applause from FIDESZ MPs).\nI call the attention of the two Members of Parliament to the fact that their conduct constitutes a grave disruption of the plenary proceedings. I inform you accordingly that the Rules of Procedure and section 49(4) of the Parliament Act (continuous applause from members of the Hungarian Socialist Party) sanction such conduct. (Dr Istv\u00e1n J\u00f3zsa. \u2013 We want legislation against the Mafia!) I ask my colleagues to untie and remove the banner. (D\u00e1vid Dorosz and Rebeka Szab\u00f3 do not hand over the banner to the usher. \u2013 Short break. \u2013 Loud noise from the opposition MPs.) Please help the lady and gentleman, Members of Parliament, to remove the draperies. (D\u00e1vid Dorosz and Rebeka Szab\u00f3 leave the session). Thank you very much.\u201d 17.  On 24 May 2013 the Speaker submitted a proposal to fine Mr Dorosz and Ms Szab\u00f3 HUF 70,000 (EUR 240) each for their conduct, as recorded in the minutes and considered to be gravely offensive to parliamentary order, in application of sections 49(4) and 49(7) of the Parliament Act. The proposal stated that an increased fine was necessary since similar seriously disruptive conduct had occurred before. No other reasons were specified in the proposal. The plenary adopted the proposal on 27 May 2013 without debate. 18.  The applicants, Ms Bernadett Sz\u00e9l, Ms \u00c1gnes Osztolyk\u00e1n and Ms Szilvia Lengyel, were born in 1977, 1974 and 1971 and live in Budakeszi, Budapest and G\u00f6d\u00f6ll\u0151 respectively. 19.  At the material time the applicants were members of parliament and of the opposition party LMP (Politics Can Be Different). 20.  On 21 June 2013 Parliament held a final vote on a new law, Bill no. T/7979 on the Transfer of Agricultural and Forestry Land. The legislative proposal was quite controversial and generated heated reactions among opposition members. In protest during the final vote on the bill, Ms Lengyel placed a small, golden wheelbarrow filled with soil on the table in front of the Prime Minister, while Ms Sz\u00e9l and Ms Osztolyk\u00e1n unfurled a banner displaying the words \u201cLand distribution instead of land robbery!\u201d in front of the Speaker\u2019s pulpit; meanwhile, Ms Lengyel used a megaphone to speak. She had previously delivered two speeches during the detailed debate and one speech during the final debate on the bill, filing three amending motions, and introduced two amending proposals just before the final vote. 21.  The minutes of the session read as follows:\n\u201cSpeaker: The next point on the agenda is the vote on the amendments submitted prior to the final vote on the Transfer of Agricultural and Forestry Land Bill and the final vote. Members of Parliament have received the Bill under number T/7979 and the consolidated text of the Bill under number T/9797/2610.\nFirst we shall vote on the amendments. Their adoption requires a qualified majority.\n(continuous disruption of the session) ...\nSpeaker: Because the members of Jobbik [opposition party] do not allow me to take my position at the Speaker\u2019s pulpit, I will continue presiding over the session from here. (Strong applause from the ruling parliamentary group). Because members of Jobbik are not allowing the left-wing, opposition party member and notary to sit at [the Speaker\u2019s pulpit] during the vote by roll call and conduct the vote and proclaim the results (Continuous noise). I request Members of Parliament to take their seats and listen to me! I request Parliament to confirm that since the members of Jobbik are not allowing the vote by roll call to take place, we shall cast our vote electronically. (Strong applause from the ruling parliamentary group. Interventions from the same side: Hurray!).\nHonourable Members of Parliament! I request all of you who agree, given the unusual circumstances, to cast your votes by electronic voting instead of vote by roll call. (Members of the parliamentary group Jobbik occupy the Speaker\u2019s seat, chanting \u201cTraitors, traitors\u201d for several minutes. Szilvia Lengyel places a small golden wheelbarrow filled with soil on the table in front of the Prime Minister. Dr Bernadett Sz\u00e9l and \u00c1gnes Osztolyk\u00e1n [the applicants] unfurl a banner containing the words \u2018Land distribution instead of land robbery!\u2019 in front of the Speaker\u2019s pulpit).\nI request technical assistance to enable the vote to take place. (Short break. Members of the Jobbik group keep chanting: \u2018Traitors\u2019. Szilvia Lengyel uses a megaphone to speak. Dr. Andr\u00e1s Schiffer applauds. Intervention from the FIDESZ group: - Where are the parliamentary guards? Laughter.)\nMs Member of Parliament! I have to warn you as well that your methods are unacceptable under the rules of procedure. I therefore request you to terminate your speech using the megaphone. Again, I request technical assistance to overcome this problem so that the Members of Parliament can exercise their right to vote, since I am hindered in accessing my own voting card. ...\u201d 22.  On 25 June 2013 the Speaker presented a proposal to fine Ms Sz\u00e9l and Ms Lengyel HUF 131,400 (EUR 430) each and Ms Osztolyk\u00e1n HUF 154,000 (EUR 510) for their conduct, as recorded in the minutes and considered to be gravely offensive to parliamentary order, in application of sections 49(4) and 49(7) of the Parliament Act. 23.  The Speaker proposed that the maximum fine be applied, given the extraordinary situation that had developed during the voting process and that the MPs had engaged in conduct gravely offensive to parliamentary order by displaying their banner and using a megaphone. A decision approving the proposal of the Speaker was adopted by the plenary on 26 June 2013, without debate.", "references": ["2", "9", "5", "7", "3", "4", "1", "0", "8", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1968 and lives in Moscow. 6.  On 14 June 2001 charges of fraud were brought against the applicant, and he signed a written undertaking not to leave his place of residence. Some of the applicant\u2019s assets, specifically his flat, parking spaces and three cars, were frozen. 7.  On 21 June 2001 the investigation of the criminal case against the applicant was terminated and he began examining the case file. 8.  However, on 26 September 2001 the investigation resumed. 9.  On 26 September 2001 the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office of Russia decided that in view of the seriousness of the charges faced by the applicant, the risk of his absconding, as well as the necessity to \u201csecure the enforcement of the conviction\u201d the applicant should be placed in pre-trial detention. 10.  On 28 September 2001 the applicant was remanded in custody and placed in a specialised detention facility at the Moscow Clinical Hospital no. 20 owing to a provisional diagnosis of acute myocardial infarction, arterial hypertension and an exacerbating duodenal ulcer. He stayed there until 20 November 2001, following which he was transferred to a remand prison. The attending doctor found the applicant fit to participate in the investigative actions. 11.  In the meantime, on 8 October 2001 the investigation was completed and the applicant was informed that he could start to examine the case file. 12.  On the same date the applicant brought an application for release. He argued that there was no indication that he would abscond or otherwise obstruct the administration of justice: the applicant had no criminal record; he had a family, a permanent job and a permanent place of residence, and he suffered from a number of chronic cardiovascular and surgical diseases; the choice of a custodial measure had thus not been justified. 13.  On 24 October 2001 the Moscow Babushkinskiy District Court examined the applicant\u2019s arguments with references to his medical documents, documents attesting to his family situation, his positive references from work, and the arguments by the investigator to the effect that the applicant had ignored the investigator\u2019s summonses to appear on 22 and 25 July, 13 and 14 August and 24 September 2001 without giving reasons, that he had often been several hours late to appear before the investigator, that he could appear for fifteen minutes and then leave saying that nobody could tell him when to come and when to leave, and that throughout the summer, in the eyes of the investigator, the applicant had been out of contact. Having considered the reasons which prompted the choice of preventive measure, in particular, the seriousness of the charges against the applicant and his conduct during the pre-trial investigation, the District Court held that there were no grounds for releasing the applicant. 14.  On 20 November 2001 the Moscow City Court upheld the above decision on appeal. 15.  On 22 November 2001, 21 January and 9 April 2002 the Deputy Prosecutor General extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 28 January, 28 April and 28 June 2002 respectively. 16.  Meanwhile, on 15 January 2002 the forensic medical expert did not confirm the applicant\u2019s medical diagnosis. 17.  On 20 June 2002 the criminal case against the applicant was submitted to the Moscow Presnenskiy District Court for trial. 18.  The Moscow Presnenskiy District Court repeatedly extended the applicant\u2019s detention pending trial. Such extensions were granted upon the prosecutor\u2019s request on 16 December 2002, 19 March, 23 June, 24 September, 23 December 2003 and 24 March 2004. On each occasion the District Court referred to the seriousness of the charges against the applicant and the risk of his absconding or otherwise obstructing justice, and the absence of grounds for changing the preventive measure imposed. Those decisions were upheld on appeal by the Moscow City Court on 21 January, 27 May, an unknown date and 3 December 2003, 23 March and 29 April 2004 respectively. 19.  On 26 May 2004 the Moscow Presnenskiy District Court sitting in a bench composed of Judge F. (presiding judge), Ms Kh. and Ms Shch. (lay judges) convicted the applicant of fraud and sentenced him to seven years and six months\u2019 imprisonment. The court further held that the civil claim against the applicant, as well as the question of lifting the restriction imposed on the applicant\u2019s property, should be referred for consideration within the framework of the civil procedure. 20.  The applicant appealed. He complained that, inter alia, the judgment had been given by a court whose composition had not been in accordance with law. In particular, he referred to the fact that the lay judges who participated in the examination of his case had at the same time been examining a criminal case against a certain Mr Tver. He also complained that the trial court had read out the testimonies of the majority of the witnesses for the prosecution, including testimonies by key prosecution witnesses, and had thus deprived him of the possibility of cross-examining them. This was despite the absence of any exceptional circumstances which had prevented the court from securing their attendance at the court hearing. 21.  On 17 August 2004 the Moscow City Court reduced the sentence to six years and upheld the rest of the judgment on appeal. In reply to the applicant\u2019s argument regarding the alleged unlawfulness of the composition of the trial court, the City Court held that the composition of the court had remained unchanged throughout the trial in accordance with Article 242 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and that the participation of lay judges, who had also been involved in the examination of another case, had had no legal consequences and had not amounted to a violation of the law. The City Court further held that the reading out of the testimonies of certain witnesses had been carried out by the trial court on the request of the prosecutor and in compliance with the requirements of Article 281 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 22.  On 30 December 2004 the Presidium of the Moscow City Court, by way of supervisory review, modified the charges the applicant had been convicted on and reduced his sentence to five years six months\u2019 imprisonment. 23.  On 9 March 2005 the Sukhinichskiy District Court, Kaluga Region, ordered the applicant\u2019s conditional early release.", "references": ["1", "8", "7", "9", "4", "0", "6", "5", "No Label", "2", "3"], "gold": ["2", "3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1967 and is currently serving a sentence of imprisonment in a correctional colony in the Republic of Bashkortostan. 6.  On 17 November 2004 the applicant was abducted, allegedly by the police. According to him, he was first taken to the premises of the Tyumen police Organised Crime Department (\u201cthe Organised Crime Department\u201d) and subsequently to a private cottage, where he was allegedly subjected to various forms of ill-treatment until 23 November 2004. The applicant was forced to do the splits, he was suffocated with a plastic bag, a book was held on top of his head and hit with a mallet, causing him to suffer head injuries, he had his arms twisted and stretched out and was given nothing to eat. 7.  On 23 November 2004 the applicant was arrested and taken to the Organised Crime Department\u2019s premises to be interrogated and was subsequently put in a temporary detention facility. He was examined by a medical assistant and discovered to have large bruises on both thighs, abrasions in the area of the nasal septum and limitation of movement in the left hand and both legs. An X-ray examination performed on the same date showed no clear indications of structural, anatomic or traumatic changes in the applicant\u2019s bones. 8.  On 25 November 2004 the applicant was admitted to detention facility SIZO-72/2 in Zavodoukovsk, the Tyumen Region. Upon admission the applicant was discovered to have a bruise on the upper third of the left inner shoulder up to 3 cm in diameter, large bruises on the surface of his inner thighs and a large bruise on the upper third of the right inner shin. He was treated with antibiotics, vitamins, and analgesic and vascular medications. 9.  On 29 November 2004 charges were brought against the applicant. He alleged that he had been beaten up by officers of the Organised Crime Department for his refusal to make self-incriminating statements. 10.  On the same date the applicant made a request for a forensic medical examination to confirm the injuries sustained by him between 17 November and 23 November 2004. The investigator ordered a review of the applicant\u2019s medical file by a forensic medical expert. 11.  From 30 November to 7 December 2004 the applicant was again held in the temporary detention facility. Upon his admission he could not walk unassisted, explaining that his legs hurt. No physical injuries were discovered on him. The applicant made no requests for medical assistance. 12.  In the meantime, on 1 December 2004 the forensic medical expert concluded that it was impossible to carry out a review in the absence of the relevant documents (report no. 9900). 13.  On 3 December 2004 a lawyer was appointed to represent the applicant. 14.  On 9 December and 14 December 2004 the applicant\u2019s lawyer complained to the prosecutor for the Leninskiy District of Tyumen (\u201cthe district prosecutor\u201d) and the Tyumen regional prosecutor (\u201cthe regional prosecutor\u201d) respectively about the beatings administered to the applicant between 17 November and 23 November 2004 by unidentified people. Outlining the circumstances of the beatings and their consequences on the applicant\u2019s health, the lawyer requested the institution of criminal proceedings against the perpetrators and that the applicant be admitted to hospital as a matter of urgency. 15.  From 12 December to 23 December 2004 the applicant underwent hospital treatment for his injuries. An extract from his medical records indicates that he was referred to the hospital with a diagnosis of post\u2011traumatic femoral and paroneal nerve damage, and that he was released following a diagnosis of simulating the symptoms of a number of neurological conditions. 16.  On 27 January 2005 the investigator again ordered a review of the applicant\u2019s medical file by a forensic medical expert. 17.  On 28 January 2005 the forensic medical expert reported that the abrasions on the bridge of the applicant\u2019s nose, in the region of his left elbow, left forearm, right shin and left thigh would not cause harm to the applicant\u2019s health and had been inflicted by the impact of blunt objects, which had not left traces suitable for identification, between eight to thirteen days prior to the applicant\u2019s examination (apparently, the report referred to the applicant\u2019s examinations on 23 November and 25 November 2004) (report no. 691). 18.  From 20 February to 7 April, from 16 May to 28 June, from 22 October to 7 November and from 29 November to 5 December 2005, from 27 January 2006 to an unspecified date and from 28 February to 21 March 2006 the applicant underwent hospital treatment for a variety of neurological conditions (neuropathy of the sciatic nerve, neuritis of the left radial and left paroneal nerves, osteochondrosis of the lumbosacral spine, polyneuropathy and distal paresis of the lower limbs). 19.  In the meantime, on 27 April 2005 the investigator appointed a panel to conduct a forensic medical examination of the applicant. 20.  On 11 May 2005 the applicant\u2019s lawyer applied to the regional prosecutor, claiming, inter alia, that the applicant had not been receiving adequate medical assistance and seeking the alteration of the applicant\u2019s custodial measure. 21.  On 24 May 2005 the applicant was examined by forensic medical experts, who on 26 May 2005 issued report no. 80 containing the following conclusions:\n\u201c... Complaints of inability to walk, absence of movement [and] numbness in the left hand, pain in the left forearm at rest and in movement, periodic enuresis. The above symptoms appeared several weeks after [the applicant] had been handcuffed for seven days by his left hand to a radiator, had received multiple blows to his arms and his legs and had been stretched out. Suffers ... from osteochondrosis of the lumbar region. Demonstrates immobility while walking, sharply [reduced mobility] in the left hand, especially the wrist. Moves with the assistance of two persons carrying him by the shoulders. Neurological status. Cranial nerves without irregularities. Diffuse hypotension in the left hand muscles. Not possible to state objectively the capacity of active movement due to manifestly [feigned] behaviour. Full extent of passive movement in all articulations. The left wrist position is typical for radial nerve lesion \u2013 \u201cwrist drop\u201d. The left foot position is typical for peroneal nerve lesion \u2013 \u201cfoot drop\u201d. Sensory damage impossible to reveal due to manifestly [feigned] behaviour.\u201d 22.  In the period between 27 April and 5 May 2006 the applicant underwent a medical examination, resulting in the following conclusion: \u201clumbar spinal osteochondrosis, herniated disk, radiculopathy, simulation of neurological conditions\u201d. 23.  Between 30 December 2004 and 19 July 2007 an investigator of the Tsentralnyy district prosecutor\u2019s office of Tyumen issued at least seven decisions refusing the institution of criminal proceedings against police officers or any other people for allegedly ill-treating the applicant between 17 November and 23 November 2004. All of the above decisions, except for the most recent decision of 19 July 2007, were subsequently set aside by the deputy prosecutor of the Tsentralnyy district prosecutor\u2019s office of Tyumen as unfounded, and additional pre-investigation inquiries were ordered. The above decisions were based on the following evidence:\n-  explanations by the applicant that on 17 November 2004 he and [one of his co-defendants] Yam. had been forced into a green VAZ 2110 car by three unidentified men. They had been taken blindfolded to a yellow brick building. Unidentified people had started stretching the applicant out, asking him about money and firearms. The applicant had replied that he had no money or guns. In the evening, the applicant had been taken by car to a cottage said to have been situated in the village of Patrushevo and to have belonged to the Bor. family. The applicant had seen people from the Bor. family in the cottage. He had spent seven days in the cottage, during which time he had been repeatedly subjected to torture. The unidentified men had threatened to kill the applicant\u2019s son. On 23 November 2004 the applicant and Yam., blindfolded and handcuffed to one another, had been taken to a car and left on their own. Yam. had shouted out, asking that the handcuffs be taken off, but the unidentified people had already left. A police officer had then approached the car and had taken the applicant and Yam to the police station. After an hour, the applicant and Yam. had been taken to the Organised Crime Department. There, the applicant had recognised two men who had tortured him, who turned out to be police officers. After physical and mental coercion, the applicant had confessed to having abducted M. Bor;\n-  explanations by the applicant\u2019s co-defendant, Yam., similar to that of the applicant above;\n-  a report by chief police officer S., who submitted that on 23 November 2004 police officer D. had contacted him and asked him to assist him in the arrest of the applicant and Yam.;\n-  explanations by police officer D., who submitted that on 23 November 2004 he had seen a VAZ 21213 car with two people inside. He had previously received information that the above car was being searched for, having been used in the commission of several particularly serious crimes and that those responsible for the crimes might be inside the car. D. took the decision to arrest the two people in the car;\n-  explanations by the head of the Organised Crime Department, Sh., who submitted that in September 2004 M. Bor. had been abducted and that criminal proceedings had been instituted in that connection. The investigation had been entrusted to the Organised Crime Department. In the course of operational proceedings it had become apparent that the applicant, Yam., and [another person, who had been identified later as L.] had been involved in the crime under investigation. On 19 November 2004 L. had been arrested. He had confessed to his involvement in the abduction of M. Bor. On 20 November 2004 B. had been arrested and given self\u2011incriminating statements. On the same day, the applicant\u2019s and Yam.\u2019s flats and garages had been searched, but that had not yielded anything. On the following day, information had been sent to all police stations to search for the applicant and Yam. On 23 November 2004 the Organised Crime Department had been informed that the applicant and Yam. had been arrested. The latter were taken to the Organised Crime Department. Sh. further submitted that he had not known about the abduction of the applicant and Yam. No physical force had been applied to them and they had not been subjected to any pressure;\n-  explanations by M. Bor. and B. Bor., who submitted that they did not know the applicant and Yam. They further submitted that they owned an incompletely built cottage that had no heating or lighting;\n-  the record of the applicant\u2019s arrest of 23 November 2004 from which it could be seen that the applicant had made no allegations regarding ill\u2011treatment by the police;\n-  expert report no. 9900 (see paragraph 12 above);\n-  expert report no. 691 (see paragraph 17 above);\n-  the report of a service inquiry by the IZ-72/2 remand prison in connection with the delayed recording of Yam.\u2019s physical injuries;\n-  an expert report on Yam.\u2019s physical injuries;\n-  explanations by Yam.\u2019s ex-wife;\n-  explanations by the applicant\u2019s wife to the effect that on 17 November 2004 the applicant had not come home, and that on 20 November 2004 the police had carried out a search of their flat and seized the applicant\u2019s personal belongings, video and audio equipment, and the applicant\u2019s hunting rifles. On 23 November 2004 a lawyer, Yar., called to inform her that the applicant had been arrested and was at the premises of the Organised Crime Department. The applicant\u2019s wife further asked that medical assistance be provided to the applicant who had been in a very bad state of health;\n-  the reply from the prison hospital where the applicant had been examined in the neurological unit and given the following diagnosis: \u201cMentally healthy, simulation of neurological condition. Inclined to feigned behaviour, fit for work without limitations.\u201d;\n-  a similar document concerning Yam.;\n-  the questioning of Yam.\u2019s ex-wife as part of the criminal proceedings against him and the applicant to the effect that Yam. had been \u201cmad\u201d about guns and hunting, that he had often been absent for several days, that he had been friends with the applicant and that they used to go hunting together;\n-  the questioning of Yam.\u2019s son to the effect that his father and the applicant had been friends and had often gone hunting together; that on 17 November 2004 Yam. had left and he had not known his whereabouts;\n-  the questioning of the applicant\u2019s step-daughter, Z., to the effect that the applicant had been friends with Yam. and that they had often hunted together, that sometimes the applicant had been absent for several hours during the day, and that sometimes he did not leave the house for several days;\n-  the questioning of Z.\u2019s husband to the effect that the applicant had often gone hunting with his friend Yam. 24.  Having regard to the above evidence, the decisions refusing the institution of the criminal proceedings in respect of the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment concluded that:\n-  the abrasions on the bridge of the applicant\u2019s nose, in the region of his left elbow, left forearm, right shin and left thigh had not caused harm to the applicant\u2019s health;\n-  the presence of abrasions on the applicant\u2019s body, which had not caused harm to the applicant\u2019s health and could have appeared in the course of everyday life, had not been indicative of alleged torture;\n-  the applicant was inclined to lie and deceive;\n-  between 17 November and 23 November 2004 measures had been taken by the domestic authorities to identify and arrest those involved in the commission of crimes with which the applicant and his co-defendants had been charged, however the applicant could not be located;\n-  the applicant had often gone away from home hunting, therefore his allegation of abduction should be regarded with a critical eye as being a means to avoid criminal responsibility; the applicant\u2019s allegations had contradicted the statements by the police officers, and the Bor. family, who did not know the applicant. 25.  On 20 July 2005 the applicant was brought to the Leninskiy District Court in Tyumen (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) in order to participate in a hearing concerning the extension of his custody. As the applicant could not walk, he was assisted by two officers from the Organised Crime Department. After the hearing, the officers dragged the applicant out of the courthouse to the prison van, where they allegedly subjected him to severe beatings on the way to remand prison IZ-72/1 in Tyumen where the applicant was being detained at the material time. 26.  The applicant\u2019s lawyers complained on 1 August 2005 about the above incident to the Tyumen regional prosecutor. 27.  On 10 August 2005 the district prosecutor refused to institute criminal proceedings against the alleged perpetrators. 28.  On 20 November 2004 a search was carried out in the applicant\u2019s flat. The investigator seized a camera belonging to the applicant and his wife and the applicant\u2019s hunting rifles as material evidence. 29.  On 1 June 2005 the District Court granted the investigator\u2019s request for the impounding of a VAZ 21213 car and the attachment of a garage belonging to the applicant. 30.  On 2 June 2005 the investigator drew up a record of the impounding of the applicant\u2019s car and the attachment of his garage. 31.  Following the applicant\u2019s conviction, the rifles were destroyed and the car and the garage were confiscated to cover the damage sustained by the victims. 32.  It appears that the applicant\u2019s wife brought proceedings seeking to get the camera back. The outcome of those proceedings has not been disclosed to the Court. 33.  On 25 November 2004 the District Court remanded the applicant in custody, referring to the particular gravity of the charges against him and the risk of his absconding and obstructing justice. 34.  On 17 January, 15 March and 20 July 2005 the District Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 23 March, 25 July and 23 November 2005 respectively. On each occasion the court took into consideration the particular gravity of the charges against the applicant, his being suspected of having committed several other crimes and his being unemployed, which created the risk of his absconding, resuming criminal activity and obstructing the administration of justice in the case. The court further held that the material in the case file contained no evidence to the effect that the applicant\u2019s state of health prevented him from being detained in a remand prison. 35.  On 2 August 2005 the Tyumen Regional Court (\u201cthe Regional Court\u201d) quashed the extension order of 15 March 2005 on appeal (considered in the applicant\u2019s absence) and remitted the matter for fresh examination by a different bench. 36.  On 19 August 2005 the District Court ex post facto authorised the applicant\u2019s detention until 25 July 2005. 37.  On 17 November 2005 the Regional Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 23 February 2006. In addition to the reasoning previously applied, the court mentioned the risk of the applicant\u2019s hiding and destroying evidence. 38.  On 20 February 2006 the Regional Court further extended the applicant\u2019s detention pending trial for a total of eighteen months, until 23 May 2006. The court further mentioned the risk of the applicant\u2019s exerting pressure on victims and witnesses. 39.  On 25 May 2006 the Supreme Court of Russia (\u201cthe Supreme Court\u201d) upheld the above decision on appeal. 40.  On 17 May 2006 the Regional Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention on remand until he and his lawyer had finished studying the case file and the case was submitted to the trial court. 41.  The applicant appealed, claiming, inter alia, that the Regional Court had not indicated the end date of his detention period, thereby rendering it impossible to seek further judicial review of the issue. 42.  On 10 August 2006 the Supreme Court upheld the extension order of 17 May 2006 on appeal. The Supreme Court found as follows:\n\u201c... [P]ursuant to Article 109 \u00a7 8 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the court correctly extended the [applicant\u2019s] detention until such time as [he] and [his] lawyer have finished studying the case file materials ...\nThe statement in the appeal to the effect that the court was required to indicate a specific date when extending [the applicant\u2019s] detention in such circumstances was not based on [domestic] law. ...\u201d 43.  On 8 November 2006 the Regional Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention for thirty days, to be counted from the date on which the prosecutor had approved the indictment in respect of the applicant and sent the case to the trial court. 44.  The applicant appealed, claiming, inter alia, that the above decision had failed to indicate a specific end date for the extension of his period in detention. 45.  On 19 January 2007 the Supreme Court upheld the above decision on appeal. In reply to the applicant\u2019s argument, the court noted as follows:\n\u201c... As is clear from the decision [of 8 November 2006], when the issue of extending [the applicant\u2019s] detention [was being decided] the indictment had already been prepared. The time-limits for submitting the indictment to the prosecutor are determined by [domestic] law; therefore, the calculation of the time-limit for [the applicant\u2019s] detention depended on the submission of the criminal case to the prosecutor. ...\u201d 46.  In the meantime, on 15 November 2006 the supervising prosecutor approved the indictment and the case against the applicant was sent to the Regional Court for trial. 47.  On 14 December 2006 the Regional Court set the opening date of the trial and extended the detention of the applicant and four co-defendants until 15 June 2007. 48.  On 6 June, 2 August and 2 November 2007, and 22 January 2008 the Regional Court extended the detention of the applicant and his co\u2011defendants until 15 August and 15 November 2007, and 15 February and 15 May 2008 respectively. The court referred to the particular gravity of the charges against the defendants, the risk of their absconding, resuming their criminal activity, threatening witnesses and other participants in the proceedings, destroying evidence and otherwise obstructing the administration of justice. The court found no reasons to alter the custodial measure in respect of the defendants and, in so far as the applicant\u2019s health was concerned, mentioned that the forensic medical report contained in the case file indicated that the applicant was simulating the symptoms of neurological conditions and that there was nothing to prevent him from participating in the proceedings. 49.  On 13 September 2007, and 10 January, 11 March and 28 April 2008 respectively the Supreme Court upheld the above decisions on appeal. 50.  On 2 December 2006, in the course of a preliminary hearing in the applicant\u2019s case, the investigator gave an interview to the local newspaper The Tyumen Courier (\u0422\u044e\u043c\u0435\u043d\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0439 \u043a\u0443\u0440\u044c\u0435\u0440) in which she referred to the applicant and his co-defendants as a criminal gang and expressed her opinion on the issue of their guilt. 51.  On 14 September 2007 another local newspaper Aloud about the Most Important Things (\u0412\u0441\u043b\u0443\u0445 \u043e \u0433\u043b\u0430\u0432\u043d\u043e\u043c) published an article, giving an update about the ongoing trial against Yam.\u2019s criminal gang. 52.  On 4 April 2006 the applicant and his lawyer were notified that the investigation had come to an end. On the same day they expressed their wish to study the case file, both together and separately. 53.  On 12 April 2006 the applicant and his lawyer started going through the case file, which comprised forty-nine volumes, fifteen audio and video tapes and physical evidence. 54.  Between 12 April 2006 and 1 September 2006 the applicant looked through thirty volumes of the case file, while his lawyer examined five volumes. 55.  On 6 September 2006 the District Court set a deadline of 30 September 2006 for the applicant and his lawyer to finish going through the case file. The applicant appealed. 56.  On 2 October 2006 the investigator took a decision to terminate the studying of the case file by the applicant and his lawyer. 57.  Numerous requests by the applicant to be granted additional time to examine the case file were refused. 58.  On 14 November 2006 the Regional Court held on appeal that the applicant and his lawyer should be allowed to study all the case file material, including audio and video tapes and physical evidence, until the expiry of the deadline for the conclusion of the pre-trial investigation (extended by then until 27 November 2006). 59.  However, as mentioned above, on 15 November 2006 the case file was sent to the Regional Court for trial without the applicant and his lawyer having been able to finish examining it (see paragraph 46 above). 60.  Following an application by the applicant and his lawyer in the course of the trial, the latter was afforded an opportunity to study the case file between 4 December and 28 December 2006. 61.  On 11 January 2007 the applicant applied to the Regional Court for more time to study the case file in full, including the audio and video tapes and the material evidence. 62.  However, that application was dismissed on the same day by the Regional Court. It noted that the applicant had been given additional time to complete his studying of the case file (see paragraph 60 above), and that although it had been open to him to study the case file each day until 6 p.m., he had only done so until 3 p.m. The Regional Court therefore concluded that the applicant had been afforded sufficient time to finish studying the case file and that he had familiarised himself with it as much as he had considered necessary. As to studying the audio and video tapes and physical evidence, the Regional Court held that those items would be examined during the trial to the extent considered necessary by the prosecution and defence. 63.  On 5 March 2007 the applicant and his lawyer were afforded additional time to study the case file. 64.  On 6 May 2008 the Regional Court, in a jury trial, convicted the applicant of involvement in an organised armed gang, theft, robbery, illegal deprivation of liberty, the stealing of firearms, hijacking, murder, kidnapping and extortion, and sentenced him to twenty-five years\u2019 imprisonment. 65.  The presiding judge had previously sat on the bench examining the appeal against the decision of 6 September 2006 limiting the time which the applicant had been allowed to study the case file. 66.  It appears that some members of the public wishing to attend the trial were not let in, as the presiding judge made an order in respect of those arriving late to court. 67.  The defence asked to tape record the hearing, but their request was dismissed so that the jury would not feel intimidated. 68.  On 12 May 2009 the Supreme Court modified the qualification of the crimes committed by the applicant and upheld the rest of the judgment on appeal.", "references": ["0", "6", "4", "9", "8", "7", "5", "3", "No Label", "1", "2"], "gold": ["1", "2"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant, Ms Gabriele F\u00fcrst-Pfeifer, is an Austrian national who was born in 1964 and lives in M\u00f6dling. She is a psychiatrist and has been registered since the year 2000 as a psychological expert for court proceedings in custody and contact-rights-related disputes and decisions on public care as well as child abuse. Specialised in the psychological examination of children and adolescents, her focus is mainly on custody and contact-rights-related disputes. 6.  The online publication \u201cmeinbezirk.at\u201d was published and edited by the \u201cPrint\u201d Multimedia Company GmbH, a private company which had its registered office in St. P\u00f6lten. 7.  The regional weekly print publication Bezirksblatt, which was sent to every household of the district free, was published and edited by the \u201cPrint\u201d Zeitungsverlag GmbH, a private company which had its registered office in Innsbruck. 8.  On 23 December 2008 an article was published in \u201cmeinbezirk.at\u201d as well as in the print version of Bezirksblatt, which stated as follows:\n\u201cThe quality of experts in the spotlight (Gutachterqualit\u00e4t im Visier)\nDisclosed: Court Expert for custody proceedings a case for therapy\n(Aufgedeckt: N\u00d6 Sorgerechts-Sachverst\u00e4ndige selbst ein Therapie-Fall)\nSuffering from up-and-down mood swings, panic attacks, suicidal thoughts and hallucinations, together with paranoid ideas \u2013 but working as a court-appointed expert. In the last 12 years she has examined over 3.000 married couples in custody\u2011related disputes. Now it seems, it gets rough for [the applicant] as an expert report about her psychological condition has been disclosed ...\nA psychological expert report by Dr. M. was commissioned in 1993 in the course of civil proceedings (action because of an alleged breach of promise of marriage) which unearthed the deficiencies of [the applicant] described above. Moreover, Dr. M. came to the conclusion that the applicant\u2019s impairments were hereditary, as the history of her family showed an accumulation of these impairments. Three years later, the applicant was introduced to the \u201cexpert community\u201d at the Wiener Neustadt Regional Court, and her integrity was beyond reproach for a decade \u2013 until now.\u201d 9.  The passage was followed by comments by a member of the Green Party, who had made a criminal complaint against the applicant with the Public Prosecutor\u2019s office, the Youth Advocate at the Regional Government of Lower Austria, and the Vice-President of the Wiener Neustadt Regional Court, who was responsible for managing the list of experts at the court. At the end of the article it was mentioned that the applicant was no longer answering her phone and had withdrawn from all her cases. 10.  As a result of the article the applicant was confronted with questions related to it from colleagues and patients, and proceedings were initiated at the Wiener Neustadt Regional Court to clarify whether she was still fit to work as a court-appointed expert. In the course of those proceedings the applicant\u2019s mental status was also set to be examined. 11.  On 14 January 2009 the applicant lodged an action with the St. P\u00f6lten Regional Court. She sought damages under section 8a of the Media Act (Mediengesetz) and the publication of the judgment claiming that the article and in particular the passages dealing with the psychological expert report on the applicant had violated her intimate personal sphere and compromised her publicly. However, she did not argue that the expert report had been obtained unlawfully. 12.  On 3 April 2009 the St. P\u00f6lten Regional Court (Landesgericht St. P\u00f6lten) allowed the applicant\u2019s action, ordered the publisher to pay damages in the amount of 5,000 euros (EUR) and the operative part of the judgment to be published. Furthermore, the publisher was to bear the costs of the proceedings. The court found that an average reader would understand the article as putting the expert opinion from 1993 in direct relation to the applicant\u2019s work as an expert now, thus questioning the quality of her work. The article, that also featured the applicant\u2019s full name and the description of her psychological impairment, touched her intimate personal sphere, since it created a link between her mental state and the quality of her work. However, the information itself did not allow for such a link, especially since the expert opinion dated from 1993 and dealt only with a very specific question in the context of civil proceedings at the time. The incomplete and manipulative content of the article was not able to meet the standards of reporting on matters of fact. Furthermore, the court did not consider that there was a direct link between the contents of the article and the applicant\u2019s public position, given that she mainly worked as an expert in custody cases, which were not usually heard in public. Furthermore, it could be assumed that the applicant, a psychiatrist herself and a medical doctor, was managing her illness well and was able to do her work without any impairments. 13.  The publisher appealed on points of law and fact, as well as against the sentence (Berufung wegen Nichtigkeit, Schuld und Strafe). 14.  Thereupon, on 30 November 2009, the Vienna Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht Wien) heard the appeal, set aside the judgment of the lower court, and dismissed the applicant\u2019s action. The Court of Appeal confirmed that the article and the impugned passages giving opinions on the applicant\u2019s mental state affected her intimate personal sphere and were capable of compromising her. However, the content of the article was true, as it only repeated true information that had not been disputed by the applicant. Furthermore, the court did not find the article to be incomplete or manipulative, but sufficiently well-balanced and faithful to the different sides of the story in that it also referred to the fact that the applicant\u2019s integrity had never been questioned in ten years; the court also asked for statements from the Vice-President of the Wiener Neustadt Regional Court, a member of the Green Party, and the Youth Advocate of the Regional Government of Lower Austria. 15.  The Court of Appeal further found that the publication in issue was directly linked to the applicant\u2019s public status. She had been included in the list of experts to be appointed by the courts since the year 2000 and had been appointed in several cases. This regular work as an expert in court proceedings belongs beyond doubt to the public sphere (\u201c...ist zweifellos dem \u00f6ffentlichen Leben zuzuordnen...\u201d) as she took part in association with the State-organised judiciary and held an important position in connection with the decision-making process of judges. Even though the impugned expert opinion dated from 1993 and concerned a period in the applicant\u2019s life prior even to that date, the reporting in question touched sufficiently upon the present public activities of the applicant. Considering the importance and sensitivity of the area of custody proceedings and the dominant role of experts in the field, the psychological integrity of an expert assigned to those cases had to be beyond doubt. Any reservation in relation to the mental health of experts \u2013 if based on sufficient reasons \u2013 had to be met with a thorough investigation in the interest of good conduct of the administration of justice, which was what had happened as the next step in the present case. According to the Court of Appeal, the article took up doubts arising from the neurologist opinion in 1993 without denying the applicant\u2019s abilities as an expert in the area. The truthful information in the article and the public interest in the subject matter justified the article\u2019s critical questioning of exactly those abilities. 16.  That judgment was served on the applicant\u2019s representative on 17 December 2009. 17.  In the meantime the applicant lodged an action with the Innsbruck Regional Court on 7 April 2009. She sought damages under section 8a of the Media Act (Mediengesetz) and publication of the judgment claiming that the article, and in particular the passages dealing with the psychological expert report on her, violated her intimate personal sphere and compromised her publicly. 18.  On 2 October 2009 the Innsbruck Regional Court (Landesgericht Innsbruck) granted the applicant\u2019s action, ordered the publisher to pay damages in the amount of 5,000 euros (EUR) and the publication of the operative part of the judgment. Furthermore, costs were awarded against the publisher. The court found that the average reader would understand the article as stating that the applicant was incapable of being an expert in custody proceedings because of her own mental health impairments in 1993 and that this placed in question the quality of the applicant\u2019s work so far. That the applicant\u2019s psychological illness was directly linked to the intimate personal sphere was beyond doubt. The present article not only mentioned the applicant\u2019s mental health status, but also grossly exaggerated individual symptoms, which was also capable of compromising her. The article was so incomplete and distorted that it could not be considered a report of matters of fact. The Regional Court in particular noted that the article did not mention that the period of examination was even earlier than 1993 and that only certain aspects of the expert opinion had been published, while others had not. Scandalously the article created the impression that the applicant had rendered decisive opinions in custody proceedings for over a decade while herself suffering from the symptoms described above. Furthermore, the publication was not linked in any way to the applicant\u2019s public status (\u201c...steht [...] in keinem unmittelbaren Zusammenhang mit dem \u00f6ffentlichen Leben der Antragstellerin\u201d). There was no connection between the applicant\u2019s work at present and her mental health status years ago. Her work in the context of custody proceedings was also not conducted in public. 19.  The publisher appealed on points of law and fact, as well as against the sentence (Berufung wegen Nichtigkeit, Schuld und Strafe). 20.  Thereupon, on 11 February 2010, the Innsbruck Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht Innsbruck) granted the appeal, set aside the judgment of the lower court, and dismissed the applicant\u2019s action. In contrast to the Regional Court it found that the average reader would understand from the article at issue that in 1993 an expert opinion was rendered in respect of the applicant that showed the above-mentioned psychological impairments. However, the article also stated that the applicant\u2019s integrity had not been questioned for over a decade. The article, while focusing on the applicant\u2019s work in custody proceedings, gave space to comments from the Youth Advocate of the Regional Government of Lower Austria, a member of the Green Party, and the Vice-President of the Wiener Neustadt Regional Court. The article did not indicate however that the applicant was not competent to exercise her profession as a psychological expert. Furthermore, the published information was true. The fact that only parts of the expert opinion were repeated in the article did not render the article distortive, nor the relevant information untrue. 21.  As regards the connection to the public sphere and public interest, the Court of Appeal found that the State administration, together with the administration of justice, belonged to the public sphere. The applicant had been included in the list of court-commissioned experts since the year 2000, and her repeated work as an expert in court proceedings must be considered as belonging to the public sphere. The activity was closely linked to the administration of justice, and had a considerable influence on judges\u2019 decision-making processes. The impugned article concerned the applicant\u2019s activity as an expert in custody proceedings. Considering the importance and sensitivity of the area of custody proceedings and the dominant role of experts in the field, the psychological integrity of an expert assigned to those cases had to be beyond doubt. Any reservation in relation to the mental health of experts \u2013 if based on sufficient reasons \u2013 had to be met with a thorough investigation in the interest of the proper administration of justice, which had happened as a next step in the present case. Insofar, a truthful report linked to a person\u2019s public status, which also contained information belonging to the intimate personal sphere must be permitted to be published. The Court of Appeal concluded that the article, by way of an appropriate commentary, critically examined a matter of public interest and therefore exercised its role as a \u201cpublic watchdog\u201d. 22.  That judgment was served on the applicant\u2019s representative on 11 March 2010.", "references": ["9", "0", "4", "5", "7", "1", "3", "2", "8", "6", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1978 and lives in Kazan. 5.  On 24 November 2006 the Novo-Savinovskiy District Court of Kazan (\u041d\u043e\u0432\u043e-\u0421\u0430\u0432\u0438\u043d\u043e\u0432\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0439 \u0440\u0430\u0439\u043e\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u0441\u0443\u0434\u0430 \u0433\u043e\u0440\u043e\u0434\u0430 \u041a\u0430\u0437\u0430\u043d\u0438) acquitted the applicant on four counts of drug-dealing, convicted her on one count and sentenced her to eight years\u2019 imprisonment and a fine. 6.  On 13 February 2007 the Supreme Court of Republic of Tatarstan (\u0412\u0435\u0440\u0445\u043e\u0432\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u0441\u0443\u0434 \u0420\u0435\u0441\u043f\u0443\u0431\u043b\u0438\u043a\u0438 \u0422\u0430\u0442\u0430\u0440\u0441\u0442\u0430\u043d) upheld the judgment on appeal with minor changes. 7.  On 2 July 2008 the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Tatarstan in supervisory review proceedings annulled the judgment on the applicant\u2019s request, because she was formally indicted outside the prescribed statutory time-limits. 8.  On 15 October 2008 the Novo-Savinovskiy District Court of Kazan acquitted the applicant on the same grounds after re-calculation of the applicable time-limits for investigative actions. 9.  On 18 November 2008 the Supreme Court of the Republic of Tatarstan upheld the judgment on appeal. 10.  On 18 February 2009 the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Tatarstan in supervisory review proceedings annulled the judgments on the prosecutor\u2019s request. The annulment was reasoned by three main arguments: 1) in the opinion of the supervisory court all of the evidence was collected within the statutory time-limits, 2) the lower courts having examining all the evidence during the hearings did not mention them in the judgments and only gave reasons for dismissing them, and 3) formal indictment of the applicant outside of the statutory time-limits should not have led to acquittal in any event. The case was sent for reconsideration. 11.  On 9 October 2009 the applicant was convicted, sentenced to five years\u2019 imprisonment, suspended for five years, and fined.", "references": ["0", "7", "1", "6", "8", "9", "4", "2", "5", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "4.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 5.  Before his arrest the applicant lived in Odessa region with his mother. 6.  In April 2004 the applicant sustained a serious knee injury. 7.  On 16 August 2004 a medical commission found that as a result of the knee injury, the applicant\u2019s knee and thigh joints had become deformed. He was certified as third-degree disabled, the lowest category. 8.  On 21 April 2005 the police arrested the applicant on suspicion of having raped a seven-year-old boy, P. They took him to a police station where, according to the applicant, he was beaten. In his initial application to the Court the applicant stated that a police officer \u201chit him once in the right side of his body\u201d and after that several police officers started beating him. In his written observations submitted to the Court on 23 February 2012 in reply to those of the Government, the applicant\u2019s lawyer stated that police officers had \u201cwrung the [applicant\u2019s] hands and feet and hit him on the body, including the areas of his liver and kidneys, and on [his] arms and legs\u201d. The lawyer further stated that the applicant \u201cwas beaten in turn by two pairs of police officers until about midnight on 21 April 2005\u201d. On 22 April 2005 the applicant was taken to the Kominternivskyy Police Temporary Detention Centre (\u201cthe ITT\u201d) where he was held for the following twenty-eight days. According to the applicant, the conditions of detention in that facility were inhuman. 9.  On 22 April 2005 the police questioned the applicant who said that he knew P. but had not raped him. 10.  On 23 April 2005 P. told the police that the applicant had raped him on several occasions in the applicant\u2019s apartment and near a pond. Once P. had come to a bank of the pond and had seen A. fishing there. The applicant had been fishing on the opposite bank of the pond. P. had approached the applicant who had taken him to some bushes and raped. During the rape P. had seen A. and E. passing by the bushes. 11.  On 25 April 2005 the police questioned A. who said that on 10 April 2005 in the afternoon he and his brother E. had been fishing from the bank of the pond. The applicant had been fishing from the opposite bank of the pond. A. had seen that P. had approached the applicant and they had gone into some bushes. Later on A. and E. had been passing by the bushes and had seen the applicant raping P. 12.  In April 2005 charges under paragraph 3 of Article 153 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 45 below) were brought against the applicant. 13.  On 12 and 18 May 2005, respectively, the applicant was examined by a doctor and a TB specialist. Both doctors noted that the applicant was fit for detention in the ITT. No injuries were discovered on his body and the applicant did not raise any complaints about his state of health. 14.  On 19 May 2005 the applicant was transferred to a SIZO (a pre-trial detention facility). On the same date and the following day he was medically examined and did not raise any complaints of ill-treatment or health problems. The doctors established that he was suffering from the consequences of a knee injury sustained before his arrest. 15.  In June 2005 the applicant studied the indictment which indicated that he had been accused of having raped P. on 10 April 2005 and on unspecified dates between September 2004 and April 2005. 16.  The applicant\u2019s case was referred to the Kominternovskyy District Court of Odessa for trial. In July 2005 that court held the first hearing. 17.  On 26 July 2005 the applicant asked the authorities to appoint him a lawyer. On 30 August 2005 he was assigned a lawyer under legal aid scheme. 18.  On 15 August 2005 the applicant asked the Kominternovskyy District Court of Odessa to appoint his mother as his representative in the proceedings. This request was granted on an unspecified date still in August 2005. 19.  During one of the hearings the trial court questioned the victim, P., who stated, without indicating the exact dates, that the applicant had raped him several times between September 2004 and April 2005. P. provided very detailed information about the circumstances of the rapes and about the events which had taken place before and after them. P. said that the applicant had raped him in his bedroom while the applicant\u2019s mother and sister were in the adjacent room. He said that he had been raped only by the applicant and not by other persons. 20.  The court questioned M., the applicant\u2019s friend, who stated that on 9 and 10 April 2005 from 10 a.m. to 4 or 5 p.m. he and the applicant had sawn wood together. 21.  Witness A. told the court that he had seen the applicant raping P. on 10 April 2005 in some bushes near the pond. 22.  P.\u2019s friends stated before the court that P. had talked to them about the rapes. The applicant\u2019s mother was questioned during the trial and said that P. had never come to the apartment where she and the applicant lived. 23.  P.\u2019s mother and teacher stated that P.\u2019s moods and behavior had changed since autumn 2004. P.\u2019s mother also said that on 8 April 2005 P. had told her that on the same date the applicant had raped him near the pond. P.\u2019s mother also said that the applicant\u2019s mother had told her that P. had come to the apartment where the applicant lived and the applicant\u2019s grandmother had ousted him. P.\u2019s teacher said that P. had told her that the applicant had raped him. 24.  All of those witnesses were questioned by the trial court in the presence of the applicant and his lawyer. The lawyer and the applicant were allowed to question the witnesses and ask for explanations regarding the facts of the case. During the trial the applicant did not complain of ill-treatment by the police. 25.  Before the court the applicant pleaded not guilty. 26.  On 3 January 2006 a surgeon examined the applicant\u2019s knee and prescribed treatment for the knee joint deformation. 27.  On 25 January 2006 the Kominternivskyy Court, in the presence of the applicant\u2019s lawyer and mother, convicted the applicant of several counts of rape (gratification of unnatural sexual desires in respect of a person under fourteen years of age), committed on unspecified dates between autumn 2004 and April 2005 and notably on 10 April 2005. It sentenced him to ten years\u2019 imprisonment under paragraph 3 of Article 153 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 45 below). The applicant was absent from that hearing. The court based his conviction mainly on the victim\u2019s statements but also on the statements of P.\u2019s friends, mother, teacher, and witness A. and on a report drawn up by a psychiatrist who had examined P. and concluded that he could not have made up his account of the rapes. 28.  In February 2006 the applicant and his lawyer, B. appealed, arguing that the conviction was not based on sufficient evidence. In particular, the P., trial court had failed to establish on which dates P. had been raped, and the medical examination of the victim had revealed no injuries on the child\u2019s body. The applicant also argued, without providing further details, that the police had beaten him on 21 April 2005. He stated that he could not rape P. on 10 April 2005 because on that day he had sawn wood with M. He also stated that A. had given false statements during the trial because he himself had raped P. The statements of P.\u2019s mother were also false, the applicant had refused to give her money and she had wanted to take revenge. P. had made false statements during the trial because his mother had taught him to do so. The applicant submitted that A.\u2019s statements concerning the date of the alleged rape near the pond contradicted the statements of P.\u2019s mother (see paragraphs 21 and 23 above). He added that the trial court\u2019s judgment had been unlawful because it contained excessive descriptions of the rape scenes. 29.  Between May 2006 and March 2007 the applicant and his mother, acting on the applicant\u2019s behalf, lodged ten complaints with the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office which forwarded them to the Odessa Prosecutor\u2019 Office. It remains unknown whether the complaints were examined. The copies of the complaints were not made available to the Court. In his application form the applicant stated, without elaborating further, that they concerned various \u201cprocedural violations\u201d during the criminal proceedings. 30.  On 9 October 2006 the applicant sent his first letter to the Court. 31.  In November 2006 the Odessa Regional Court of Appeal (\u201cCourt of Appeal\u201d) informed the applicant that it would hold a hearing in his case on 12 December 2006. 32.  On 16 November 2006 the applicant requested the Court of Appeal to ensure his presence at that hearing. The court granted the request and ordered the bailiffs to bring the applicant to the court hearing. 33.  On 12 December 2006 the applicant was taken to the court-house and kept there in a cell the entire day. In the evening he was taken back to the SIZO. It remains unknown why he was not brought to the court-room for the hearing. 34.  In the meantime, on the same date the Court of Appeal, in the presence of the applicant\u2019s lawyer, upheld the judgment of the first-instance court. On the basis of the findings made by the trial court, the Court of Appeal held that the arguments raised in the appeal by the applicant and his lawyer\u2019s arguments were ill-founded because they had been refuted by evidential material in the applicant\u2019s criminal case file. The trial court had fully and objectively assessed that material. The conclusions reached by the first-instance court had been supported by sufficient evidence, in particular the statements of P. and other persons questioned during the trial. The Court of Appeal did not question any witnesses; nor did it administer or assess any new evidence. 35.  On 16 January 2007 the applicant and his lawyer, B., lodged two separate appeals in cassation with the Supreme Court, raising the same arguments as those raised before the Court of Appeal. They also complained that the applicant had not been taken to the appeal court hearing, despite his request. However, they did not specify how the applicant\u2019s absence from the Court of Appeal had prejudiced his defence or the overall fairness of the proceedings. 36.  According to the applicant, on the same date, after the cassation appeals had been sent to the Supreme Court, lawyer B. stopped representing him. The reason was not notified to the Court. The applicant did not seek the assistance of any other lawyer. 37.  On 19 February 2007 the applicant lodged his application with the Court. He stated, in particular, that he had appealed in cassation, however did not provide a copy of his and his lawyer\u2019s appeals in cassation. 38.  On 2 April 2007 the Court requested the applicant to provide: (i) documentary evidence supporting his allegations of ill-treatment; (ii) copies of the complaints of ill-treatment lodged with the domestic authorities; (iii) copies of the applicant\u2019s and his lawyer\u2019s appeals in cassation, stamped by the Supreme Court to prove their receipt; and (iv) a copy of the Supreme Court\u2019s decision as soon as it would be available. 39.  On 25 June 2007 the applicant sent to the Supreme Court a supplement to his appeal in cassation together with a request for the said copies of documents without, however, indicating why he needed them. The Supreme Court received the request but did not reply to it for unknown reasons. The applicant did not follow up on the request. 40.  On 6 September 2007 the applicant informed the Court that the Supreme Court had left his request for copies of documents unanswered. 41.  On 15 November 2007 the Supreme Court dismissed the cassation appeals lodged by the applicant and his lawyer. Without referring separately to each argument raised in those appeals, the Supreme Court noted that the criminal proceedings against the applicant were not plagued by procedural violations which would justify quashing of the lower courts\u2019 decisions. The conclusion concerning the applicant\u2019s guilt had been sufficiently supported by evidence to which the trial court had referred in its judgment. The Supreme Court noted, in particular, that the applicant\u2019s request to take part in the appeal hearing had been made after that hearing had been held. The applicant did not attend the hearing before the Supreme Court and had not asked for permission to do so. 42.  On 27 November 2007 the Court asked the applicant to send to the Supreme Court a repeated request for copies of the same documents (see paragraphs 38 and 40 above), indicating that he needed them to support his application before the Court. The Court also asked the applicant to provide a copy of such request and a copy of the Supreme Court\u2019s reply to it. The applicant did not follow the Court\u2019s instructions and did not make any further attempts to obtain the copies. 43.  In December 2007 the applicant received a copy of the Supreme Court\u2019s decision and submitted it to the Court on 27 April 2008.", "references": ["3", "2", "9", "1", "7", "8", "4", "5", "6", "0", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1971 and lives in Barking. 5.  The applicant arrived in the United Kingdom on 7 January 2003. He claimed asylum on 15 January 2003 but his claim was refused by the Secretary of State for the Home Department on 15 March 2003 and his appeal against that decision was refused on 1 October 2003. 6.  On 13 February 2004 the applicant was convicted of indecent assault in relation to an incident involving two fifteen-year old girls and was sentenced to twelve months\u2019 imprisonment. He was released on licence on 7 September 2004 but his licence was revoked on 24 September that year because he failed to comply with the terms of the licence. 7.  The applicant was re-arrested on 16 January 2005. 8.  On 31 March 2005 the applicant was served with the decision to make a deportation order. On the same day he was detained pursuant to the Secretary of State\u2019s powers under paragraph 2(3) of Schedule 2 to the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004. The deportation order was signed on 4 August 2005 and served on him on 12 August 2005. 9.  On 5 September 2005 the applicant indicated that he wished to return to Iran. One month later an application was submitted to the Iranian authorities for an emergency travel document to enable him to travel there. However, the application was rejected by the Iranian authorities on 22 November 2005. 10.  The applicant was subsequently interviewed at the Iranian Embassy on 15 September 2006. However, two days later the Embassy informed his solicitors that they could not issue a travel document as no formal identification of the applicant had been provided. On 17 October 2006 the Home Office was informed that the Iranian Embassy required a birth certificate before any travel documents could be issued. It appears that the Home Office thereafter proposed to submit copy documents. The Iranian Embassy initially agreed to this proposal, but later refused. 11.  On 13 September 2007 the applicant commenced judicial review proceedings challenging his continued detention. 12.  On 6 November 2007 the Iranian Embassy agreed to issue a travel document provided that the applicant was prepared to sign a \u201cdisclaimer\u201d consenting to his return. 13.  On 11 December 2007 the Administrative Court ordered the applicant\u2019s release from detention subject to a number of conditions, including that he be subject to a curfew; that he remain at a fixed address; that he report on a weekly basis to the nearest Border and Immigration Agency office; and that he take the steps necessary to obtain travel documents. 14.  The applicant refused to sign a \u201cdisclaimer\u201d on 14 December 2007. Although he was released on 17 December 2007, four days later the matter was brought back to the Administrative Court and a different judge discharged the previous order on account of his failure to comply with the conditions for release (namely, that he take the steps necessary to obtain travel documents). As a consequence, the applicant was once again liable to detention. 15.  On 27 December 2007 Group 4 Securicor reported that they had on two occasions attempted to visit the applicant at his nominated address to install the equipment required for electronic tagging. Both visits took place during the hours of curfew. Very shortly afterwards the applicant reported a different address to the immigration authorities so that they could continue to communicate with him. 16.  On 8 January 2008 an authority was issued for the applicant\u2019s detention and on 14 January he was detained while reporting to the immigration authorities. 17.  By February 2008 the authorities had been alerted to the fact that the applicant was showing some signs of psychological disturbance, had been diagnosed with \u201creactive depression\u201d and was receiving medication for his psychological symptoms. 18.  On 26 February 2008 the claim for judicial review launched on 13 September 2007 was dismissed. 19.  The applicant attended at the Iranian Embassy on 7 April 2008 but no travel document was issued. On 4 June 2008 he again refused to sign a disclaimer. 20.  On 25 July 2008 the applicant was alleged to have displayed \u201cinappropriate behaviour\u201d to a female member of immigration staff at a detention centre. His behaviour was also alleged to have been disruptive. 21.  In or around September 2008 the immigration authorities discussed the possibility of prosecuting the applicant under section 35 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc) Act 2004 for failing without reasonable excuse to comply with the Secretary of State\u2019s requirement to take specified action to enable a travel document to be obtained. However, no prosecution was ever mounted. 22.  On 13 October 2008 the applicant wrote to the United Kingdom Border Agency, indicating that he would be willing to return to Iran if he were to be compensated for the periods of detention which he had undergone. However, the Border and Immigration Agency refused to agree to any such request. 23.  On 6 January 2009, 6 February 2009, March 2009, May 2009, June 2009 and September 2009 the authorities made further attempts to engage the applicant in a voluntary return. However, on each occasion he indicated that he was not willing to co-operate or sign a disclaimer. 24.  On 17 March 2009, 9 June 2009 and 7 October 2009 the applicant made three applications for bail to the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal. On each occasion the application was dismissed. The reasons given for the dismissal of the applications included the fact that the applicant could end his own detention by signing the disclaimer. 25.  The applicant\u2019s solicitors wrote a letter before action on 21 October 2009 and proceedings were issued on 6 November. On 4 December 2009 the High Court granted the applicant permission to apply for judicial review and the Home Office was ordered to release him on bail within forty-eight hours. 26.  At the hearing counsel for the applicant argued that both periods of the applicant\u2019s detention could properly be looked at as being unlawful, although he focused his attention on the second period. Counsel for the Secretary of State for the Home Department argued \u2013 and the court appears to have accepted \u2013 that the first period could not be in question legally, since the applicant had been released for one month pursuant to a court order and the order enforcing release had been discharged. However, he conceded that when considering the lawfulness of the second period of detention, the first period of detention would have to be taken into account. 27.  In considering the lawfulness of the second period of detention, the Administrative Court judge recalled that the authorities should be free to make strenuous efforts to obtain the assent of a person they proposed to deport. If they were unsuccessful, they could and should seek any way around his consent, for example by persuading the country of origin to issue a travel document without a disclaimer. However, the judge noted that the law did not permit the indefinite detention of someone who was never going to consent to deportation. 28.  Bearing that in mind, the judge considered the history of the applicant\u2019s second period of detention. He observed that during this period there had been no change in approach to the applicant, no prosecution had been brought under section 35 of the 2004 Act, and there had been no further approach to the Iranian authorities to see if they would change their position. 29.  The judge then had regard to the relevant principles of domestic law set out in R v. The Governor of Durham Prison, ex parte Hardial Singh [1984] 1 WLR 704 and in the guidance given by the Court of Appeal in both R (A) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] EWCA Civ 804 and WL (Congo) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] EWCA Civ 111 (see paragraphs 35-36 below). Applying those principles and the relevant guidance, the judge noted that the most important factor justifying detention was the applicant\u2019s refusal to sign the relevant disclaimer. He further noted that lengthy detention could be justified by the applicant\u2019s offending, by the realistic fear that he would further offend and by the genuine and reasonable concern that he might abscond. However, even given those factors, the judge found that there had to come a time when such a sterile tactic as merely sitting and waiting while repeatedly urging the applicant to change his mind, in full expectation that he would not, ceased to be detention genuinely for the purpose of deportation. The judge therefore concluded that \u201cthe woeful lack of energy and impetus\u201d applied to this case from at least the middle of 2008 meant that it could not possibly be said that the Secretary of State on this occasion had complied with the obligation in Hardial Singh to act with \u201creasonable diligence and expedition\u201d. He therefore held that the applicant\u2019s detention had been unlawful from 14 September 2009. 30.  With regard to the question of whether there should be guidance on how long it might be appropriate to detain an individual, the judge made the following observations:\n\u201cIt cannot be right for the Secretary of State to be led to believe, by looking at a digest of the range of decisions that have been taken, that it is safe to detain for X months or X years.\nEqually, it cannot be right for those who are in the positon of being detained for considerable periods, stubbornly refusing to comply with the authority\u2019s requests to facilitate voluntary repatriation, to be put in a position of saying, \u2018If I hold on another year, or two years, or three years, then I am all right\u2019. A tariff is repugnant and wrong, and it seems to me that it would be wise for those preparing legally for such cases to abandon the attempt to ask the courts to set such a tariff by a review of the different periods established in different cases.\u201d 31.  In a decision dated 13 May 2011 the applicant was awarded GBP 6,150 in damages. 32.  The applicant sought permission to appeal. On 31 October 2011 permission to appeal was refused. However, on 7 November 2012 the applicant renewed his application for permission to appeal and on 10 February 2012 he was granted permission to appeal only in respect of the quantum of damages awarded. The outcome of that appeal is unknown.", "references": ["8", "5", "7", "3", "0", "6", "9", "4", "1", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1999 and lives in Pleven. 6.  On 2 August 2012 the applicant, aged 13, was admitted to the Open Door children\u2019s crisis centre in Pleven. Her placement was ordered as a protective measure under the Child Protection Act by the Pleven municipal director of social assistance, at the request of the applicant\u2019s mother, who had claimed to be unable to look after her daughter. 7.  In a decision of 1 October 2012 a criminal bench of the Pleven District Court (\u0420\u0430\u0439\u043e\u043d\u0435\u043d \u0441\u044a\u0434) confirmed the applicant\u2019s placement and extended its validity for a further three months. In its reasoning the court found that the conditions for the placement of a minor in a specialist institution were satisfied, namely that the child\u2019s parents were unable to provide her with adequate care and that she was living in a dangerous social environment, as she associated with \u201cmen identified as delinquents\u201d. Lastly, it stated that no member of the applicant\u2019s family was able to take on responsibility for her upbringing. 8.  On 16 January 2013, finding that the conditions for the applicant\u2019s return to her family environment were not satisfied, the municipal director of social assistance ordered the extension of her placement in the centre. On 1 April 2013 a civil bench of the District Court in turn confirmed the measure and extended it for a further six months. 9.  On 3 April 2013 the local committee for combating juvenile antisocial behaviour (\u201cthe local committee\u201d) asked the District Court to order the applicant\u2019s placement in a correctional boarding school. On 19 April 2013 a criminal bench of the District Court held a hearing, following which it gave a decision imposing a less severe educational measure on the applicant, namely \u201ca ban on meeting and making contact with certain individuals\u201d. In its reasoning the court specified that placement in a correctional boarding school was liable to have a negative impact on the child\u2019s psychological and social development, given the \u201cunfavourable environment offered by that type of institution\u201d. It added that following the expiry of her placement in the Open Door centre, it would be appropriate to admit the applicant to another institution regulated by the Child Protection Act in order to keep her away from the people who had forced her into prostitution. 10.  On 17 May 2013 the local committee sent the District Court a new proposal for the applicant\u2019s admission to a correctional boarding school under the Juvenile Antisocial Behaviour Prevention Act. It argued that the applicant did not have a favourable family environment and that, in particular, her father was serving a prison sentence and her mother had trouble assuming her parental responsibilities. This had caused the applicant to run away from home and develop a circle of friends including both adults and juveniles who were identified as \u201cdelinquents\u201d and had allegedly incited her to engage in immoral conduct, such as the provision of \u201csexual services\u201d. Lastly, the local committee noted that the applicant had also run away twice from the children\u2019s crisis centre and had behaved aggressively towards the staff. 11.  On 10 June 2013 a criminal bench of the District Court held a hearing. The applicant\u2019s mother was present, having been summoned to appear at the hearings, and asked to have a lawyer officially appointed to represent her daughter in the proceedings. The applicant also asked to have a lawyer appointed. The court granted their request. It heard evidence from the applicant, her officially appointed lawyer, a representative of the local committee, an inspector from the child protection team (\u0414\u0435\u0442\u0441\u043a\u0430 \u043f\u0435\u0434\u0430\u0433\u043e\u0433\u0438\u0447\u0435\u0441\u043a\u0430 \u0441\u0442\u0430\u044f), a representative of the district prosecutor\u2019s office, a representative of the municipal child protection department and two social workers from the children\u2019s crisis centre where the applicant was living. The inspector from the child protection team stated that the applicant engaged in prostitution and had been found offering prostitution services on a motorway near Devnia, some 270 km from her home town. The two social workers from the children\u2019s crisis centre pointed out that that factor had served as a ground for placing her in the centre as a protective measure for a child at risk. They added that after her admission to the centre, the child had remained in contact with the people who had incited her to engage in prostitution despite the steps that had been taken to protect her. In the social workers\u2019 opinion, the applicant\u2019s family environment was unsuitable for her. She came from a large family where the mother did not exert any parental control. The mother did not have a job and her partner drank and was violent towards her and her children. The mother had also stayed at the children\u2019s crisis centre with two of her other children. After intensive psychological and social counselling, a positive development had been noted in the applicant and there were plans to find different accommodation arrangements for her. However, the social workers added that by the time of the hearing the applicant\u2019s situation had worsened as she did not follow the rules in place, came back late from school or was brought back by the police when she failed to return, and continued to associate with individuals known to the police, to engage in sexual relations and to behave aggressively towards the staff. She had attended a series of talks on prevention of \u201clover boy\u201d-type human trafficking but had not been receptive to the protective measures recommended. The social workers expressed the opinion that the applicant faced a strong risk of being driven into prostitution and that the arrangements in place at the crisis centre did not afford her the necessary protection. In their view, such protection would only be provided in a secure centre with a restrictive regime. Lastly, the representative of the local committee stated that four educational measures had already been imposed on the applicant, including strict monitoring by a supervisor, the ban on associating with certain individuals and the warning recommending placement in a correctional boarding school. He viewed those measures as insufficient. 12.  The court also obtained welfare reports. The applicant stated that she did not wish to be admitted to a correctional boarding school and preferred to remain in the children\u2019s crisis centre. The officially appointed lawyer called for the adoption of less severe educational measures. The representatives of the district prosecutor\u2019s office and of the municipal child protection department supported the proposal by the local committee. The representative of the municipal child protection department stated that during the hearing all the safeguards laid down in the Child Protection Act had been observed. In his opinion, the possibilities for the child\u2019s upbringing in the crisis centre had been exhausted, the risk of her renewed involvement in human trafficking was very high and she was unaware of this. Accordingly, the measure of placement in a correctional boarding school was in fact in her interests. 13.  Later on 10 June 2013 the District Court gave a judgment ordering the applicant\u2019s placement in the correctional boarding school in Podem (\u201cthe Podem school\u201d), a village 20 kilometres away from Pleven. In its reasoning the court held that despite the judicial decision of 1 April 2013 in which a compromise solution had been adopted for the applicant, namely the confirmation and extension of her placement in the children\u2019s crisis centre, she was still failing to abide by the institution\u2019s internal rules, was not returning to the centre by the designated time after school, was in contact with individuals identified as \u201cdelinquents\u201d and was still behaving rudely and aggressively towards the social workers at the centre. It noted that, in the absence of adequate parental control, the applicant had developed serious antisocial habits and that her placement in a children\u2019s crisis centre no longer had the intended educational and preventive effect on her behaviour. In the court\u2019s view, the applicant no longer displayed any willingness to abide by the rules of society, or even those of the institution in which she was living, and it was therefore advisable to remove her from her circle of acquaintances who were harming her personal development, and to provide her with enhanced educational support in order to eradicate her negative behavioural traits. The court noted that educational measures had already been imposed on her, but they had not produced a positive result. It concluded that the measure of admission to a correctional boarding school was necessary not only for her own benefit but in the interests of society. 14.  The applicant, represented by her lawyer, appealed against that judgment. She challenged the measure imposed on her, arguing in particular that the court had not specified its duration, that her mother had not been given a hearing by the first-instance court and that she herself had not committed any criminal acts. 15.  In a final judgment of 16 July 2013 a criminal bench of the Pleven Regional Court upheld the first-instance court\u2019s decision. In its reasoning it held that the law did not oblige the court to hear evidence from the parents \u00ad\u2013 in this instance the applicant\u2019s mother \u00ad\u2013 and that the applicant\u2019s other complaints were unsubstantiated and ill-founded. 16.  On 13 September 2013 the applicant attempted to commit suicide and was admitted to the toxicology department of Pleven Hospital. According to a medical certificate dated 15 September 2013, she had taken ten 500 mg paracetamol tablets and ten Remotiv tablets and was in a fragile state. After her stomach was pumped, the effects of the intoxication were brought under control. 17.  On 15 September 2013 the applicant was taken to the Podem school. She was still there at the time of the most recent information submitted to the Court, on 11 June 2015. 18.  Regarding life at the school, the applicant submitted in her application that the level of teaching was much lower than at her previous institution. In the four years prior to her application, only six pupils had obtained the secondary-school leaving certificate, and none at all in 2011 or 2012. Three pupils had been awarded the certificate in 2013 with an overall average mark of 3.67 out of 6, the minimum pass mark being 3. The applicant added that in 2012 and 2013 the pedagogical council had not given any positive assessments of pupils\u2019 behaviour or school results, meaning that no proposals for the end of a placement had been submitted to the District Court. 19.  The applicant also asserted that she had continued to be threatened with forced prostitution by her former contacts after being admitted to the Podem school. On 19 November 2013 she had attempted suicide for the second time, as part of a group with four other girls, by ingesting chemical substances. She had then been taken to hospital for three days. There had been other suicide attempts at the school. 20.  The applicant further submitted that her telephone conversations were monitored by a supervisor. For that purpose, a loudspeaker had been attached to the telephone and switched on during each conversation. 21.  In addition, because of the significant number of violent incidents at correctional boarding schools, the prosecutor\u2019s office on 7 November 2013 ordered an inspection of all secure educational institutions, including the Podem school. The results of the inspection are not known. 22.  When submitting their observations on the admissibility and merits of the application, the Government included a report dated 30 January 2015 by the head of the Podem school about the applicant\u2019s situation. According to the report, during her previous placement in the Open Door centre, the applicant had been aggressive towards the staff, had encouraged other girls to engage in prostitution and had run away on two occasions (4 and 27 February 2013). The report also stated that she had unashamedly admitted to having been sexually active since the age of 12 and that she provided \u201csexual services\u201d in return for payment. 23.  The report mentioned, in addition, that the applicant did not have a favourable family background and that she was left unsupervised, which explained why she had previously run away and led a vagrant lifestyle. 24.  According to the report, the Podem school offered an educational environment with experts qualified to work as teachers or supervisors in accordance with the requirements of the Ministry of Education and Science. The school curriculum and the courses followed in all specific subjects had been developed and approved in line with the Ministry\u2019s standard procedures. The applicant had been deficient in many areas and the teachers had worked with her on a one-to-one basis as well as during lessons. 25.  The file does not include a copy of the individual development plan that was supposed to have been drawn up at the time of the applicant\u2019s admission to the school and updated every six months. However, according to the report, the plan indicated that she was unaware of the risks she ran on account of her \u201cerratic sexual relations\u201d, that she did not question the consequences of such acts and that she was not ready to live independently. It added that she was na\u00efve, easy to manipulate, impulsive, emotionally fragile and prone to dishonesty. 26.  The report went on to state that the individual plan as updated on 29 September 2014 noted a positive change in the child\u2019s behaviour. Although she did not apply herself consistently, she had nevertheless shown some interest in schoolwork. The individual plan had recommended that she step up her efforts to acquire knowledge on an ongoing, in-depth basis. 27.  The report also noted that at the end of the 2013/14 school year, the applicant had achieved an average mark of 3.69 out of 6 and had therefore moved up to the next class, that she had also been awarded a certificate as a qualified seamstress and that she would be receiving a similar mark for the first semester of the 2014/15 school year. 28.  With regard to the applicant\u2019s telephone conversations, the report explained the applicable rules and stated that she had not been \u201cdeprived of telephone contact with her mother\u201d or subjected to any restrictions on visits from her family, even though these had often taken place outside the times specified in the school\u2019s internal rules. In addition, the applicant had never received any letters or parcels from her family. She had gone on home leave five times during the school holidays, from 21 December 2013 to 5 January 2014, from 30 January to 4 February 2014, from 28 March to 6 April 2014, from 4 July to 15 September 2014, and from 19 December 2014 to 4 January 2015. Each time, the applicant had returned late to the Podem school. 29.  The report also stated that according to information from the police, the child had been suspected of stealing a mobile phone and jewels from a house on 4 January 2014. On being questioned by the police, she had handed over the items in question of her own accord. 30.  Lastly, the report noted that the school\u2019s committee on preventing the risks of assault and harassment of juveniles had not received any information to suggest that the applicant had been \u201csexually exploited\u201d within the school itself. 31.  Two reports issued in 2009 and 2013 by the State Agency for Child Protection include a summary of the findings of an assessment of the operation of the four correctional boarding schools in Bulgaria, including the one in Podem. They indicate that these schools had a total capacity of 405 places and that in 2013 there were 166 children attending them. There were 44 girls at the Podem school, all of whom had been admitted under the Juvenile Antisocial Behaviour Act. 32.  The reports also note that there is a high pupil turnover rate during the school year because of the admission of juveniles on the basis of a placement order and because of their departure, in most cases on reaching the age of majority (18 years of age) or on the expiry of the statutory maximum duration of the placement. During 2009, twenty children ran away from the schools and eight left them following a positive annual assessment by the pedagogical council. During 2012/13, fewer than four children had a positive assessment and were therefore able to leave the correctional boarding schools. During the 2013/14 school year, there were no instances of children leaving the schools following a positive assessment. As regards the results achieved across all secure educational institutions in Bulgaria, the reports indicate that in 2009, 10% of pupils were awarded a vocational qualification, 35% successfully completed their secondary education up to the age of 14 and 3% successfully completed their secondary education up to the age of 18. The remaining 52% of pupils failed to complete their education. The 2013 report mentions a low success rate among pupils, with average marks of between 3 and 4 out of 6. According to the reports, these figures point to a problem as to the effectiveness of educational and rehabilitative measures, and even raise questions as to whether \u201csuch measures exist in practice\u201d. 33.  The reports further state that, in accordance with the applicable legislation, each correctional boarding school has a team responsible for educational and psychological assessment of pupils and a team of supervisors responsible for educational and rehabilitative support. The teams draw up annual individual plans for pupils, which in most cases are set out in a standardised form. Objectives relating to learning, education and development are general in nature and do not include any specific activities tailored to the individual needs, abilities, age and interests of the children concerned. The 2013 report is particularly critical of the prevalence of serious incidents involving suicide attempts or assaults on other pupils, and deplores the fact that no provision is made for follow-up action in the individual plans of the pupils concerned so that consideration can be given to the reasons for their actions and to their psychological state. 34.  In addition, the reports note that the staff of the institutions concerned have undergone training covering matters such as alternative education methods for children in difficulty, development of their potential for autonomy and catering for individual needs. With regard to the Podem school in particular, the teaching and support staff are subject to external educational supervision. The reports nevertheless conclude that the number of people employed to run extracurricular activities is insufficient, although the children\u2019s wide-ranging needs and their vulnerability suggest that educational activities should be arranged in small groups. They also criticise the lack of any programme to foster closer relations between children and their families. 35.  Two types of problems are highlighted. The first type concerns the school curriculum and the second concerns the programme for social integration and rehabilitation. 36.  Regarding schoolwork, the reports note, among other things, that illiteracy levels are a cause for concern, particularly as children of a wide range of ages and abilities are grouped together in the same class. A large number of pupils are unable to read or write on their arrival at the schools, and the curricula taught do not allow them to redress their shortcomings and make progress. Furthermore, many children with behavioural difficulties also encounter problems at school and the development of their ability for effective learning and independent work is impaired. These children often run away, do not attend lessons regularly and have insufficient contact with adults. 37.  As far as the programme for social integration and rehabilitation is concerned, the reports state that, in addition to staff shortages, the existing groups of more than seven or eight children in difficulty cannot be effectively supervised, the activities on offer do not follow an appropriate methodology for vulnerable children, and no arrangements are made at the institutions to encourage contact between the children and their families, a shortcoming identified as a cause of aggressive behaviour. 38.  Lastly, the 2009 report recommends in particular: (a) a general reform of the status of the institutions in question and of their operation, through the inclusion of alternative educational and preventive methods; (b) the introduction and development of units for preventing deviant behaviour, and their involvement as soon as children display the first signs of such behaviour; (c) shorter placements, with more emphasis on social rehabilitation and psychological support for children than on teaching; (d) returning the children in question to the ordinary school system, including in schools in their home area, rather than keeping them apart in specialist institutions, through an intensive individual integration scheme managed by teams of educational experts; (e) the introduction of programmes allowing young people to acquire vocational skills; (f) instilling an atmosphere of cooperation with families; (g) a reform whereby local committees for combating juvenile antisocial behaviour would no longer have a decisive role in taking educational measures and such decisions would be taken by a specialist judge alone; (h) abolition of punishments for juvenile antisocial behaviour; (i) abolition of criminal penalties for children under 14 years of age and their replacement by exclusively social and protective measures, applicable only in exceptional cases; (j) admitting children under 14 years of age to specialist institutions only where there is a social need or a need for protection; and (k) closure of the institutions in question, subject to the introduction of alternative protective and judicial measures in legislation and practice. 39.  It appears that, following the 2009 report by the State Agency for Child Protection, the Ministry of Education and Science undertook to reform the secure institutions for juveniles in order to ensure that the system was entirely focused on the child and offered an individually tailored approach. Measures were subsequently put forward in an action plan for the implementation of the national policy strategy on juvenile justice for 2013-2020. Among the measures envisaged were: the repeal of the Juvenile Antisocial Behaviour Act and the introduction of a new Juvenile Justice Act for children in conflict with the law, with the aim of offering a wide range of social, educational and learning services to children in difficulty.\n...", "references": ["0", "7", "8", "9", "3", "6", "5", "1", "No Label", "2", "4"], "gold": ["2", "4"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1975 and lives in Shostka. 6.  On 13 November 2003 the applicant\u2019s wife died as a result of a traffic accident caused by Mr V. whose car collided with a horse-drawn carriage in which the applicant\u2019s wife was travelling. The police examined the scene of the accident immediately. The medical examination of Mr V. was also conducted. 7.  On 17 November 2003 the Shostka District Police Department instituted a criminal investigation into the road traffic accident. 8.  On 27 December 2003, after a number of forensic medical examinations and on the basis of witnesses\u2019 testimonies, the investigative officer terminated the criminal proceedings on the ground that it was impossible to establish who was responsible for the accident. On 4 February 2004 the investigative officer of the Shostka District Police Department decided to resume the investigation on account of its incompleteness and the necessity to conduct further investigative actions. 9.  Between February 2004 and April 2005 six more decisions to discontinue the criminal proceedings for lack of corpus delicti in the driver\u2019s actions were taken (on 5 February, 5 March, 15 April, 17 August, 7 October, 23 December 2004). All of them were subsequently quashed and the criminal proceedings have accordingly been reopened by decisions of the Police Officer of the Shostka District Police Department (on 3 March and 1 April, 11 June, 6 October, 10 November 2004, 1 March 2005) with reference to the incompleteness of the investigation. The latter authority referred, in particular, to the failure of the inquiring officers to question additional witnesses and to reconcile factual discrepancies between the experts\u2019 conclusions and the accounts of some witnesses, the completion of technical examinations, including reconstruction of the events. 10.  On 11 July 2004 the applicant was recognised as being a victim and a civil plaintiff in the criminal case and on 5 January 2005 he lodged a civil claim, seeking compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage within the context of the criminal proceedings. 11.  On 27 April 2005 the Police Officer of the Shostka District Police Department instituted criminal proceedings against the car driver Mr V. On 1 July 2005 the indictment against Mr V. was prepared by the Shostka District Prosecutor\u2019s Office. On 5 July 2005 the criminal case was referred to the Shostka Local Court for consideration on the merits. On 29 August 2005 the Shostka Local Court allowed the prosecutor\u2019s request and decided that the case should be remitted for additional investigation to Shostka District Prosecutor\u2019s Office on account of the incompleteness of the investigation. 12.  On 18 March 2006 the Shostka District Police Department terminated the proceedings against Mr V. for lack of evidence of his involvement in the crime. On 20 March 2007 the prosecutor quashed the resolution regarding the termination of the proceedings in the case, having found that additional investigation was required. 13.  On 19 April 2007 the investigator of the Shostka Prosecutor\u2019s Office terminated criminal proceedings against Mr V. for lack of evidence against him. On 1 July 2008 this resolution was quashed and the case was remitted for additional investigation. 14.  On 24 July 2008 the Shostka Prosecutor\u2019s Office instituted criminal proceedings against Mr V. On 11 August 2008 the criminal case was referred to the Shostka Local Court for consideration on the merits. 15.  On 12 March 2011 the Shostka Local Court sentenced Mr V. to five years\u2019 imprisonment combined with a driving ban for three years and awarded pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage to the applicant and other victims (two more persons were injured in the traffic accident). 16.  On 28 July 2011 the Sumy Court of Appeal quashed the judgment of 12 March 2011, terminated the criminal proceedings and amnestied Mr V. It also left civil claims without examination, indicating that they could be examined in the context of civil proceedings. 17.  On 29 August 2011 the applicant instituted separate civil proceedings against Mr V. 18.  On 29 March 2012 the Higher Specialised Civil and Criminal Court upheld the decision of the appellate court in the criminal case against Mr V. 19.  On 8 January 2013 the Higher Specialised Civil and Criminal Court of Ukraine upheld the decision of the Sumy Court of Appeal of 15 August 2012 allowing the applicant\u2019s civil claim and ordering payment of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages relating to his wife\u2019s death in the amount of UAH 10,774.32. It appears that the decision of the Court of Appeal has not been fully enforced due to lack of funds of Mr V. and the impossibility of selling his property. On 28 November 2014 the decision was partly enforced and the applicant was paid pecuniary and non\u2011pecuniary damages in the amount of UAH 1,942.", "references": ["6", "5", "2", "7", "1", "9", "4", "8", "No Label", "0", "3"], "gold": ["0", "3"]}
+{"input": "13.  The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Garkalne (Riga district). At the time of the events which are the subject of the present application he was an investment consultant. 14.  On 4 May 1999 the applicant and F.H. Ltd., a commercial company incorporated under Cypriot law, signed an acknowledgment of debt deed before a notary. Under the terms of the deed the applicant declared that he had borrowed 100,000 United States dollars (USD) from F.H. Ltd. and undertook to repay that sum with interest by 30 June 1999. The deed also contained choice of law and jurisdiction clauses according to which it was governed \u201cin all respects\u201d by Cypriot law and the Cypriot courts had non\u2011exclusive jurisdiction to hear any disputes arising out of it. The applicant\u2019s address was given as G. Street in Riga and was indicated as follows:\n\u201c[FOR] GOOD AND VALUABLE CONSIDERATION, I, P\u0112TERIS AVOTI\u0145\u0160, of [no.], G. [street], 3rd floor, Riga, Latvia, [postcode] LV-..., (\u2018the Borrower\u2019) ...\u201d 15.  In 2003 F.H. Ltd. brought proceedings against the applicant in the Limassol District Court (\u0395\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03c7\u03b9\u03b1\u03ba\u03cc \u0394\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf \u039b\u03b5\u03bc\u03b5\u03c3\u03bf\u03cd, Cyprus), alleging that he had not repaid the above-mentioned debt and requesting that he be ordered to pay the principal debt together with interest. In the Strasbourg proceedings the applicant submitted that he had in fact already repaid the debt before the proceedings were instituted in the Cypriot court, not by paying the sum of money in question to F.H. Ltd. but by other means linked to the capital of F.H. Ltd.\u2019s parent company. However, he acknowledged that there was no documentary evidence of this. The respondent Government contested the applicant\u2019s submission. 16.  In an order dated 27 June 2003 the District Court authorised the \u201csealing and filing of the writ of summons\u201d. On 24 July 2003 a \u201cspecially endorsed writ\u201d was drawn up, describing the facts of the case in detail. It gave the applicant\u2019s address as G. Street in Riga, the address indicated on the acknowledgment of debt deed. 17.  Since the applicant was not resident in Cyprus, F.H. Ltd. made an ex parte application to the same District Court on 11 September 2003 seeking a fresh order enabling a summons to be served on the applicant outside the country and requiring him to appear within thirty days from the date of issuing of the summons. The claimant company\u2019s lawyer produced an affidavit declaring that the defendant was habitually resident at an address in G. Street in Riga and could actually receive judicial documents at that address. The applicant, for his part, contended that it would have been physically impossible for him to receive the summons at the address in question, which was simply the address at which he had signed the loan contract and the acknowledgment of debt deed in 1999 and was not his home or business premises. 18.  On 7 October 2003 the Limassol District Court ordered that notice of the proceedings be served on the applicant at the address provided by the claimant company. The applicant was summoned to appear or to come forward within thirty days of receiving the summons. If he did not do so the court would make no further attempt to contact him and would instead post all future announcements concerning the case on the court noticeboard. 19.  An affidavit produced by an employee of the firm of lawyers representing F.H. Ltd. showed that, in accordance with the court order, the summons had been sent by recorded delivery to the address in G. Street in Riga on 16 November 2003. However, the copy of the summons furnished by the Latvian Government indicated that it had been drawn up on 17 November 2003. The slip produced by the Cypriot postal service stated that the summons had been sent on 18 November 2003 to the address in G. Street, and had been delivered and signed for on 27 November 2003. However, the signature on the slip did not appear to correspond to the applicant\u2019s name. The applicant claimed never to have received the summons. 20.  As the applicant did not appear, the Limassol District Court ruled in his absence on 24 May 2004. It ordered him to pay the claimant USD 100,000 or the equivalent in Cypriot pounds (CYP), plus interest at an annual rate of 10% of the aforementioned amount from 30 June 1999 until payment of the debt. The applicant was also ordered to pay costs and expenses in a gross amount of CYP 699.50, plus interest at an annual rate of 8%. According to the judgment, the final version of which was drawn up on 3 June 2004, the applicant had been duly informed of the hearing but had not attended. The judgment did not state whether the decision was final or indicate possible judicial remedies. 21.  On 22 February 2005 F.H. Ltd. applied to the Riga City Latgale District Court (R\u012bgas pils\u0113tas Latgales priek\u0161pils\u0113tas tiesa, Latvia) seeking recognition and enforcement of the judgment of 24 May 2004. In its request the company also sought to have a temporary precautionary measure applied. It stated that the applicant was the owner of real property in Garkalne (Riga district) which according to the land register was already mortgaged to a bank. Accordingly, fearing that the applicant might seek to evade enforcement of the judgment, it asked the District Court to place a charge on the property in question and record the charge in the land register. Lastly, it requested that the applicant be ordered to pay the costs. In its request the company gave as the applicant\u2019s place of residence an address in \u010c. Street in Riga which differed from the address previously notified to the Cypriot court. 22.  On 28 April 2005 the Latgale District Court adjourned examination of F.H. Ltd.\u2019s request, informing the company that the request contained a number of defects which it had one month to correct. In particular, F.H. Ltd. had not explained why it had given an address in \u010c. Street when the applicant was supposedly resident in G. Street. 23.  On 26 May 2005 F.H. Ltd. submitted a corrigendum in which it explained, among other points, that according to the information contained in the register of residents (Iedz\u012bvot\u0101ju re\u0123istrs), the address in \u010c. Street was the applicant\u2019s officially declared home address. As to the address in G. Street, the company\u2019s representatives had assumed it to be the applicant\u2019s actual residence. In that connection the Latvian Government provided the Court with a copy of a letter from the authority responsible for the register of residents according to which, prior to 19 June 2006, the applicant\u2019s officially declared address had been in \u010c Street. 24.  In an order of 31 May 2005 the Latgale District Court ruled that the corrigendum submitted by F.H. Ltd. was insufficient to remedy all the defects in its request. The court therefore declined to examine the request and sent it back to the company. The latter lodged an appeal with the Riga Regional Court (R\u012bgas apgabaltiesa), which on 23 January 2006 set aside the order of 31 May 2005 and remitted the case to the District Court in order for the latter to examine the request for recognition and enforcement as rectified by the corrigendum of 26 May 2005. 25.  In an order of 27 February 2006 issued without the parties being present, the Latgale District Court granted F.H. Ltd.\u2019s request in full. It ordered the recognition and enforcement of the Limassol District Court\u2019s judgment of 24 May 2004 and the entry in the Garkalne municipal land register of a charge on the property owned by the applicant in that municipality. The applicant was also ordered to pay the costs. 26.  According to the applicant, it was not until 15 June 2006 that he learned, from the bailiff responsible for enforcement of the Cypriot judgment, of the existence of that judgment and of the Latgale District Court order for its enforcement. On the following day (16 June 2006) he went to the District Court, where he acquainted himself with the judgment and the order. The respondent Government did not dispute these facts. 27.  The applicant did not attempt to appeal against the Cypriot judgment in the Cypriot courts. However, he lodged an interlocutory appeal (blakus s\u016bdz\u012bba) against the order of 27 February 2006 with the Riga Regional Court, while asking the Latgale District Court to extend the time allowed for lodging the appeal. Arguing that there was nothing in the case file to confirm that he had been given notice of the hearing of 27 February 2006 or of the order issued following the hearing, he submitted that the thirty-day period laid down by the Civil Procedure Law should start running on 16 June 2006, the date on which he had taken cognisance of the order in question. 28.  In an order of 13 July 2006 the Latgale District Court granted the applicant\u2019s request and extended the time-limit for lodging an appeal. It noted, inter alia, as follows:\n\u201c... It is clear from the order of 27 February 2006 that the issue of recognition and enforcement of the foreign judgment was determined in the absence of the parties, on the basis of the documents furnished by the claimant, [F.H. Ltd.]. The order further states that the defendant may appeal against it within thirty days from the date of receipt of the copy [of that order], in accordance with section 641(2) of the Civil Procedure Law.\nThe court considers the arguments advanced by the applicant, P. Avoti\u0146\u0161, to be well\u2011founded, to the effect that he did not receive the order ... of 27 February 2006 until 16 June 2006, this being attested to by the reference in the list of consultations [appended to the case file] and by the fact that the order, served [on the applicant] by the court, was returned on 10 April 2006 ... It is apparent from the documents appended to the appeal that the applicant has not lived at the declared address in [\u010c.] Street since 1 May 2004; this confirms ... the statement made by his representative at the hearing, according to which the applicant no longer lives at the above-mentioned address.\nAccordingly, the thirty-day period should ... run from the date on which the applicant received the order in question ...\nFurther, the court does not share the view of the representative of [F.H. Ltd.] that the applicant himself is responsible for his failure to receive the correspondence because he did not declare his change of address promptly, and that the time allowed [for lodging an appeal] should not therefore be extended. The fact that the applicant did not take the necessary legal steps concerning registration of residence is not sufficient to justify a refusal by the court to allow him to exercise the fundamental rights guaranteed by the State as regards access to the courts and judicial protection, including the right to appeal against a decision, with the consequences this is likely to entail. ...\u201d 29.  In his grounds of appeal before the Riga Regional Court the applicant contended that the recognition and enforcement of the Cypriot judgment in Latvia breached Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (\u201cthe Brussels I Regulation\u201d) and several provisions of the Latvian Civil Procedure Law. He submitted two arguments in that regard. 30.  Firstly, the applicant argued that in accordance with Article 34(2) of the Brussels I Regulation (corresponding in substance to section 637(2), third sub\u2011paragraph, of the Latvian Civil Procedure Law), a judgment given in default in another Member State could not be recognised if the defendant had not been served with the document instituting the proceedings in sufficient time and in such a way as to enable him to arrange for his defence. He maintained that he had not been duly informed of the proceedings in Cyprus, although both the Cypriot lawyers who had represented the claimant company in the Limassol District Court and the Latvian lawyers who had represented it in the Latvian courts had been perfectly aware of his business address in Riga. In support of that allegation he submitted that he had had professional dealings with the Cypriot lawyers, who had telephoned him and sent faxes to his office, and had met the Latvian lawyers in person. Hence, they must all have been aware of his business address. He added that he could also have been reached at his home address in Garkalne, as he had a residence there that was officially declared in accordance with the law and the lawyers could have consulted the municipal land register, where the property he owned was registered under his name. However, instead of serving notice of the proceedings on him at one of those addresses, which had been known and accessible, the lawyers had given the courts an address which they should have realised could not be used. 31.  Secondly, the applicant argued that, under the terms of Article 38(1) of the Brussels I Regulation and section 637(2), second sub\u2011paragraph, of the Civil Procedure Law, a judgment had to be enforceable in the State of origin in order to be enforceable in the Member State addressed. In the instant case, there had been a threefold breach of those requirements. First, the claimant had only submitted the text of the Cypriot court judgment to the Latvian court and not the certificate required by Annex V to the Brussels I Regulation. In that connection the applicant acknowledged that under Article 55(1) of the Brussels I Regulation the court in which enforcement was sought could, in some circumstances, exempt the claimant from the obligation to produce a certificate. However, in the present case the Latgale District Court had not made clear whether it considered that the claimant could be exempted from that obligation and, if so, for what reason. Second, the Cypriot judgment had contained no reference to the fact that it was enforceable or to possible judicial remedies. Third, although a judgment had to be enforceable in the country of origin in order to be enforced in accordance with the Brussels I Regulation, the claimant company had not produced any documentary evidence demonstrating that the judgment of 24 May 2004 was enforceable in Cyprus. In view of all these circumstances, the applicant contended that the judgment could on no account be recognised and enforced in Latvia. 32.  In a judgment of 2 October 2006 the Regional Court allowed the applicant\u2019s appeal on the merits, quashed the impugned order and rejected the request for recognition and enforcement of the Cypriot judgment. 33.  F.H. Ltd. lodged an appeal against that judgment with the Senate of the Supreme Court, which examined it on 31 January 2007. At the start of the hearing F.H. Ltd. submitted copies of several documents to the Senate, including the certificate referred to in Article 54 of the Brussels I Regulation and Annex V thereto. The certificate was dated 18 January 2007 and had been signed by an acting judge of the Limassol District Court. It stated that the document instituting the proceedings had been served on the applicant on 27 November 2003. The last part of the certificate, intended for the name of the person against whom the judgment was enforceable, had been left blank. When asked to comment on these documents the applicant\u2019s lawyer contended that they were clearly insufficient to render the judgment enforceable. 34.  In a final judgment of 31 January 2007 the Supreme Court quashed and annulled the Regional Court judgment of 2 October 2006. It granted F.H. Ltd.\u2019s request and ordered the recognition and enforcement of the Cypriot judgment and the entry in the land register of a charge on the applicant\u2019s property in Garkalne. The relevant extracts from the judgment read as follows:\n\u201c ... It is clear from the evidence in the case file that the Limassol District Court judgment became final. This is confirmed by the explanations provided by both parties at the Regional Court hearing on 2 October 2006, according to which no appeal had been lodged against the judgment, and by the certificate issued on 18 January 2007... As [the applicant] did not appeal against the judgment, his lawyer\u2019s submissions to the effect that he was not duly notified of the examination of the case by a foreign court lack relevance [nav b\u016btiskas noz\u012bmes].\nHaving regard to the foregoing, the Senate finds that the judgment of the Limassol District Court (Cyprus) of 24 May 2004 must be recognised and enforced in Latvia.\nArticle 36 of the [Brussels I] Regulation provides that a foreign judgment may under no circumstances be reviewed as to its substance; in accordance with section 644(1) of the Civil Procedure Law, once such judgments have been recognised they are to be enforced in accordance with the conditions laid down by that Law. ...\u201d 35.  On 14 February 2007 the Latgale District Court, basing its decision on the Supreme Court judgment, issued a payment order (izpildu raksts). The applicant complied immediately with the terms of the order and paid the bailiff employed by the claimant company a total of 90,244.62 Latvian lati (LVL, approximately 129,000 euros (EUR)), comprising LVL 84,366.04 for the principal debt and LVL 5,878.58 in enforcement costs. He then requested that the charge on his property in Garkalne be lifted. In two orders dated 24 January 2008 the judge with responsibility for land registers (Zemesgr\u0101matu noda\u013cas tiesnesis) refused the request. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with the Senate of the Supreme Court, which, in an order of 14 May 2008, lifted the charge on his property. 36.  At the material time the relevant parts of Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) read as follows:\n\u201c1.  The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States. 2.  The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of Community law.\n...\u201d 37.  Following the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on 1 December 2009, Article 6 of the TEU reads as follows:\n\u201c1.  The Union recognises the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 7 December 2000, as adapted at Strasbourg, on 12 December 2007, which shall have the same legal value as the Treaties.\nThe provisions of the Charter shall not extend in any way the competences of the Union as defined in the Treaties.\nThe rights, freedoms and principles in the Charter shall be interpreted in accordance with the general provisions in Title VII of the Charter governing its interpretation and application and with due regard to the explanations referred to in the Charter, that set out the sources of those provisions. 2.  The Union shall accede to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Such accession shall not affect the Union\u2019s competences as defined in the Treaties. 3.  Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, shall constitute general principles of the Union\u2019s law.\u201d 38.  Furthermore, since 1 December 2009 the relevant provisions of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) provide:\nArticle 67\n\u201c1.  The Union shall constitute an area of freedom, security and justice with respect for fundamental rights and the different legal systems and traditions of the Member States.\n... 4.  The Union shall facilitate access to justice, in particular through the principle of mutual recognition of judicial and extrajudicial decisions in civil matters.\u201d\nArticle 81(1)\n\u201cThe Union shall develop judicial cooperation in civil matters having cross-border implications, based on the principle of mutual recognition of judgments and of decisions in extrajudicial cases. Such cooperation may include the adoption of measures for the approximation of the laws and regulations of the Member States.\u201d\nArticle 82(1)\n\u201cJudicial cooperation in criminal matters in the Union shall be based on the principle of mutual recognition of judgments and judicial decisions and shall include the approximation of the laws and regulations of the Member States in the areas referred to in paragraph 2 and in Article 83.\u201d 39.  Lastly, the second paragraph of Article 249 of the Treaty establishing the European Community (applicable at the material time and identical to Article 288, second paragraph, of the TFEU) provided:\n\u201cA regulation shall have general application. It shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.\u201d 40.  The relevant provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (which had not yet acquired binding force at the material time) provide:\nArticle 47 \u2013 Right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial\n\u201cEveryone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance with the conditions laid down in this Article.\nEveryone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law. Everyone shall have the possibility of being advised, defended and represented.\n...\u201d\nArticle 51 \u2013 Field of application\n\u201c1.  The provisions of this Charter are addressed to the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity and to the Member States only when they are implementing Union law...\n...\u201d\nArticle 52 \u2013 Scope and interpretation of rights and principles\n\u201c1.  Any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by this Charter must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms. Subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others.\n... 3.  In so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said Convention. This provision shall not prevent Union law providing more extensive protection. 4.  In so far as this Charter recognises fundamental rights as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, those rights shall be interpreted in harmony with those traditions.\n...\u201d\nArticle 53 \u2013 Level of protection\n\u201cNothing in this Charter shall be interpreted as restricting or adversely affecting human rights and fundamental freedoms as recognised, in their respective fields of application, by Union law and international law and by international agreements to which the Union or all the Member States are party, including the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and by the Member States\u2019 constitutions.\u201d 41.  In the case of Krombach v Bamberski (Case C-7/98, judgment of 28 March 2000, ECR I-1935), the Court of Justice of the European Union (known as the \u201cCourt of Justice of the European Communities\u201d prior to the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on 1 December 2009 \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe CJEU\u201d), held as follows:\n\u201c25.  The Court has consistently held that fundamental rights form an integral part of the general principles of law whose observance the Court ensures (see, in particular, Opinion 2/94 [1996] ECR I-1759, paragraph 33). For that purpose, the Court draws inspiration from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States and from the guidelines supplied by international treaties for the protection of human rights on which the Member States have collaborated or of which they are signatories. In that regard, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter \u2018the ECHR\u2019) has particular significance (see, inter alia, Case 222/84 Johnston v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [1986] ECR 1651, paragraph 18). 26.  The Court has thus expressly recognised the general principle of Community law that everyone is entitled to fair legal process, which is inspired by those fundamental rights (Case C-185/95 P Baustahlgewebe v Commission [1998] ECR I\u20118417, paragraphs 20 and 21, and judgment of 11 January 2000 in Joined Cases C\u2011174/98 P and C-189/98 P Netherlands and Van der Wal v Commission [2000] ECR I-0000, paragraph 17). 27.  Article F(2) of the Treaty on European Union (now, after amendment, Article 6(2) EU) embodies that case-law. It provides: \u2018The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November1950 and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of Community law\u2019.\u201d 42.  In its judgment in ASML Netherlands BV v Semiconductor Industry Services GmbH (SEMIS) (Case C-283/05, judgment of 14 December 2006, ECR I-12041), the CJEU reiterated the following:\n\u201c26.  According to settled case-law, fundamental rights form an integral part of the general principles of law whose observance the Court ensures... For that purpose, the Court draws inspiration from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States and from the guidelines supplied by international treaties for the protection of human rights on which the Member States have collaborated or to which they are signatories. In that regard, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (\u2018ECHR\u2019) has special significance... 27.  It follows from the ECHR, as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights, that the rights of the defence, which derive from the right to a fair legal process enshrined in Article 6 of that convention, require specific protection intended to guarantee effective exercise of the defendant\u2019s rights (see Eur. Court H.R., Artico v Italy judgment of 13 May 1980, Series A No 37, \u00a7 33, and Eur. Court H.R., T v Italy judgment of 12 October 1992, Series A No 245 C, \u00a7 28).\u201d 43.  In its judgment in DEB Deutsche Energiehandels- und Beratungsgesellschaft mbH v Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Case C-279/09, judgment of 22 December 2010, ECR I-13849), delivered after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon and hence after the Charter of Fundamental Rights had acquired the same legal value as the Treaties, the CJEU held:\n\u201c29.  The question referred thus concerns the right of a legal person to effective access to justice and, accordingly, in the context of EU law, it concerns the principle of effective judicial protection. That principle is a general principle of EU law stemming from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, which has been enshrined in Articles 6 and 13 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 (\u2018the ECHR\u2019) ... 30.  As regards fundamental rights, it is important, since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, to take account of the Charter, which has \u2018the same legal value as the Treaties\u2019 pursuant to the first subparagraph of Article 6(1) TEU. Article 51(1) of the Charter states that the provisions thereof are addressed to the Member States when they are implementing EU law. 31.  In that connection, the first paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter provides that everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by EU law are violated has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance with the conditions laid down in that article. Under the second paragraph of Article 47, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law. Everyone is to have the possibility of being advised, defended and represented. The third paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter provides specifically that legal aid is to be made available to those who lack sufficient resources in so far as such aid is necessary to ensure effective access to justice. 32.  According to the explanations relating to that article, which, in accordance with the third subparagraph of Article 6(1) TEU and Article 52(7) of the Charter, have to be taken into consideration for the interpretation of the Charter, the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter corresponds to Article 6(1) of the ECHR.\u201d 44.  In Gascogne Sack Deutschland GmbH v Commission (Case C\u201140/12 P, judgment of 26 November 2013), the CJEU stressed the continuity of the legal system before and after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, finding as follows:\n\u201c28.  As to the question of whether the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty ought to have been regarded, as the appellant submits, as a matter which came to light in the course of the proceedings and, on that basis, gave good grounds, in accordance with the first subparagraph of Article 48(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, for introducing new pleas in law, the Court of Justice has held that the entry into force of that treaty, incorporating the Charter into European Union primary law, cannot be considered a new matter of law within the meaning of the first subparagraph of Article 42(2) of its Rules of Procedure. In that context, the Court has noted that, even before that treaty entered into force, it had found on several occasions that the right to a fair trial, which derives inter alia from Article 6 ECHR, constitutes a fundamental right which the European Union respects as a general principle under Article 6(2) EU (see, in particular, Case C-289/11 P Legris Industries v Commission, paragraph 36).\u201d 45.  Lastly, with regard to the scope of the rights guaranteed by the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the CJEU held in J. McB. v L.E. (Case C\u2011400/10 PPU, judgment of 5 October 2010):\n\u201c53.  Moreover, it follows from Article 52(3) of the Charter that, in so far as the Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the ECHR, their meaning and scope are to be the same as those laid down by the ECHR. However, that provision does not preclude the grant of wider protection by European Union law. Under Article 7 of the Charter, \u2018[e]veryone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, home and communications\u2019. The wording of Article 8(1) of the ECHR is identical to that of the said Article 7, except that it uses the expression \u2018correspondence\u2019 instead of \u2018communications\u2019. That being so, it is clear that the said Article 7 contains rights corresponding to those guaranteed by Article 8(1) of the ECHR. Article 7 of the Charter must therefore be given the same meaning and the same scope as Article 8(1) of the ECHR, as interpreted by the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (see, by analogy, Case C\u2011450/06 Varec [2008] ECR I\u2011581, paragraph 48).\u201d 46.  In its judgment in N.S. v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10, judgment of 21 December 2011, ECR I-13905), given in the context of the application of Regulation No 343/2003 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national (\u201cthe Dublin Regulation\u201d), the CJEU held:\n\u201c77.  According to settled case-law, the Member States must not only interpret their national law in a manner consistent with European Union law but also make sure they do not rely on an interpretation of an instrument of secondary legislation which would be in conflict with the fundamental rights protected by the European Union legal order or with the other general principles of European Union law (see, to that effect, Case C\u2011101/01 Lindqvist [2003] ECR I\u201112971, paragraph 87, and Case C\u2011305/05 Ordre des barreaux francophones et germanophone and Others [2007] ECR I\u20115305, paragraph 28). 78.  Consideration of the texts which constitute the Common European Asylum System shows that it was conceived in a context making it possible to assume that all the participating States, whether Member States or third States, observe fundamental rights, including the rights based on the Geneva Convention and the 1967 Protocol, and on the ECHR, and that the Member States can have confidence in each other in that regard.\n... 80.  In those circumstances, it must be assumed that the treatment of asylum seekers in all Member States complies with the requirements of the Charter, the Geneva Convention and the ECHR. 81.  It is not however inconceivable that that system may, in practice, experience major operational problems in a given Member State, meaning that there is a substantial risk that asylum seekers may, when transferred to that Member State, be treated in a manner incompatible with their fundamental rights.\n... 83.  At issue here is the raison d\u2019\u00eatre of the European Union and the creation of an area of freedom, security and justice and, in particular, the Common European Asylum System, based on mutual confidence and a presumption of compliance, by other Member States, with European Union law and, in particular, fundamental rights.\n... 94.  It follows from the foregoing that in situations such as that at issue in the cases in the main proceedings, to ensure compliance by the European Union and its Member States with their obligations concerning the protection of the fundamental rights of asylum seekers, the Member States, including the national courts, may not transfer an asylum seeker to the \u2018Member State responsible\u2019 within the meaning of Regulation No 343/2003 where they cannot be unaware that systemic deficiencies in the asylum procedure and in the reception conditions of asylum seekers in that Member State amount to substantial grounds for believing that the asylum seeker would face a real risk of being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 4 of the Charter.\n... 98.  The Member State in which the asylum seeker is present must, however, ensure that it does not worsen a situation where the fundamental rights of that applicant have been infringed by using a procedure for determining the Member State responsible which takes an unreasonable length of time. If necessary, that Member State must itself examine the application in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 3(2) of Regulation No 343/2003. 99.  It follows from all of the foregoing considerations that, as stated by the Advocate General in paragraph 131 of her Opinion, an application of Regulation No 343/2003 on the basis of the conclusive presumption that the asylum seeker\u2019s fundamental rights will be observed in the Member State primarily responsible for his application is incompatible with the duty of the Member States to interpret and apply Regulation No 343/2003 in a manner consistent with fundamental rights. 100.  In addition, as stated by N.S., were Regulation No 343/2003 to require a conclusive presumption of compliance with fundamental rights, it could itself be regarded as undermining the safeguards which are intended to ensure compliance with fundamental rights by the European Union and its Member States. 101.  That would be the case, inter alia, with regard to a provision which laid down that certain States are \u2018safe countries\u2019 with regard to compliance with fundamental rights, if that provision had to be interpreted as constituting a conclusive presumption, not admitting of any evidence to the contrary.\n... 104.  In those circumstances, the presumption underlying the relevant legislation, stated in paragraph 80 above, that asylum seekers will be treated in a way which complies with fundamental rights, must be regarded as rebuttable. 105.  In the light of those factors, the answer to the questions referred is that European Union law precludes the application of a conclusive presumption that the Member State which Article 3(1) of Regulation No 343/2003 indicates as responsible observes the fundamental rights of the European Union.\u201d 47.  In the case of Melloni v Ministerio Fiscal (Case C-399/11, judgment of 26 February 2013), concerning in particular the issue whether a European Union Member State could refuse to execute a European arrest warrant on the basis of Article 53 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights on grounds of infringement of the fundamental rights of the person concerned guaranteed by the national Constitution, the CJEU found as follows:\n\u201c60.  It is true that Article 53 of the Charter confirms that, where an EU legal act calls for national implementing measures, national authorities and courts remain free to apply national standards of protection of fundamental rights, provided that the level of protection provided for by the Charter, as interpreted by the Court, and the primacy, unity and effectiveness of EU law are not thereby compromised. 61.  However, [the] Framework Decision [governing the European arrest warrant] does not allow Member States to refuse to execute a European arrest warrant when the person concerned is in one of the situations provided for ... 62.  It should also be borne in mind that the adoption of Framework Decision 2009/299, which inserted that provision into Framework Decision 2002/584, is intended to remedy the difficulties associated with the mutual recognition of decisions rendered in the absence of the person concerned at his trial arising from the differences as among the Member States in the protection of fundamental rights. That framework decision effects a harmonisation of the conditions of execution of a European arrest warrant in the event of a conviction rendered in absentia, which reflects the consensus reached by all the Member States regarding the scope to be given under EU law to the procedural rights enjoyed by persons convicted in absentia who are the subject of a European arrest warrant. 63.  Consequently, allowing a Member State to avail itself of Article 53 of the Charter to make the surrender of a person convicted in absentia conditional upon the conviction being open to review in the issuing Member State, a possibility not provided for under [the] Framework Decision ..., in order to avoid an adverse effect on the right to a fair trial and the rights of the defence guaranteed by the constitution of the executing Member State, by casting doubt on the uniformity of the standard of protection of fundamental rights as defined in that framework decision, would undermine the principles of mutual trust and recognition which that decision purports to uphold and would, therefore, compromise the efficacy of that framework decision. 64.  In the light of the foregoing considerations, the answer to the third question is that Article 53 of the Charter must be interpreted as not allowing a Member State to make the surrender of a person convicted in absentia conditional upon the conviction being open to review in the issuing Member State, in order to avoid an adverse effect on the right to a fair trial and the rights of the defence guaranteed by its constitution.\u201d 48.  In the case of Alpha Bank Cyprus Ltd v Dau Si Senh and Others (Case C-519/13, judgment of 16 September 2015), concerning the application of Regulation (EC) No 1393/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2007 on the service in the Member States of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters, the CJEU held:\n\u201c30.  Therefore, with the aim of improving the efficiency and speed of judicial procedures and ensuring proper administration of justice, that regulation establishes the principle of direct transmission of judicial and extrajudicial documents between the Member States (see judgment in Leffler, C\u2011443/03, EU:C:2005:665, paragraph 3), which has the effect of simplifying and accelerating the procedures. Those objectives are noted in recitals 6 to 8 in the preamble to that regulation. 31.  However, as the Court has already held on numerous occasions, those objectives cannot be attained by undermining in any way the rights of the defence of the addressees, which derive from the right to a fair hearing, enshrined in the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Article 6(1) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 (see, inter alia, judgment in Alder, C\u2011325/11, EU:C:2012:824, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).\u201d 49.  In Opinion 2/13 of 18 December 2014 on the draft agreement providing for the accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights, the CJEU found that the draft agreement was not compatible with the Treaty on European Union. The relevant parts of the Opinion provide:\n\u201c187.  In that regard, it must be borne in mind, in the first place, that Article 53 of the Charter provides that nothing therein is to be interpreted as restricting or adversely affecting fundamental rights as recognised, in their respective fields of application, by EU law and international law and by international agreements to which the EU or all the Member States are party, including the ECHR, and by the Member States\u2019 constitutions. 188.  The Court of Justice has interpreted that provision as meaning that the application of national standards of protection of fundamental rights must not compromise the level of protection provided for by the Charter or the primacy, unity and effectiveness of EU law (judgment in Melloni, EU:C:2013:107, paragraph 60). 189.  In so far as Article 53 of the ECHR essentially reserves the power of the Contracting Parties to lay down higher standards of protection of fundamental rights than those guaranteed by the ECHR, that provision should be coordinated with Article 53 of the Charter, as interpreted by the Court of Justice, so that the power granted to Member States by Article 53 of the ECHR is limited \u2013 with respect to the rights recognised by the Charter that correspond to those guaranteed by the ECHR \u2013 to that which is necessary to ensure that the level of protection provided for by the Charter and the primacy, unity and effectiveness of EU law are not compromised.\n... 191.  In the second place, it should be noted that the principle of mutual trust between the Member States is of fundamental importance in EU law, given that it allows an area without internal borders to be created and maintained. That principle requires, particularly with regard to the area of freedom, security and justice, each of those States, save in exceptional circumstances, to consider all the other Member States to be complying with EU law and particularly with the fundamental rights recognised by EU law (see, to that effect, judgments in N. S. and Others, C\u2011411/10 and C\u2011493/10, EU:C:2011:865, paragraphs 78 to 80, and Melloni, EU:C:2013:107, paragraphs 37 and 63). 192.  Thus, when implementing EU law, the Member States may, under EU law, be required to presume that fundamental rights have been observed by the other Member States, so that not only may they not demand a higher level of national protection of fundamental rights from another Member State than that provided by EU law, but, save in exceptional cases, they may not check whether that other Member State has actually, in a specific case, observed the fundamental rights guaranteed by the EU. 193.  The approach adopted in the agreement envisaged, which is to treat the EU as a State and to give it a role identical in every respect to that of any other Contracting Party, specifically disregards the intrinsic nature of the EU and, in particular, fails to take into consideration the fact that the Member States have, by reason of their membership of the EU, accepted that relations between them as regards the matters covered by the transfer of powers from the Member States to the EU are governed by EU law to the exclusion, if EU law so requires, of any other law. 194.  In so far as the ECHR would, in requiring the EU and the Member States to be considered Contracting Parties not only in their relations with Contracting Parties which are not Member States of the EU but also in their relations with each other, including where such relations are governed by EU law, require a Member State to check that another Member State has observed fundamental rights, even though EU law imposes an obligation of mutual trust between those Member States, accession is liable to upset the underlying balance of the EU and undermine the autonomy of EU law.\u201d 50.  Article 234 of the Treaty establishing the European Community (applicable at the relevant time and replaced by Article 267 of the TFEU) read as follows:\n\u201cThe Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning:\n...\n(b)  the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the Community and of the ECB;\n...\nWhere such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Member State, that court or tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give judgment, request the Court of Justice to give a ruling thereon.\nWhere any such question is raised in a case pending before a court or tribunal of a Member State against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, that court or tribunal shall bring the matter before the Court of Justice.\u201d 51.  In the case of Srl CILFIT and Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v Ministry of Health (Case 283/81, judgment of 6 October 1982, ECR 3415), the CJEU spelled out the extent of the obligation imposed by the former Article 177(3) of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (equivalent to the third paragraph of Article 234 of the Treaty establishing the European Community). It held as follows:\n\u201cThe third paragraph of Article 177 ... is to be interpreted as meaning that a court or tribunal against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law is required, where a question of Community law is raised before it, to comply with its obligation to bring the matter before the Court of Justice, unless it has established that the correct application of Community law is so obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt. The existence of such a possibility must be assessed in the light of the specific characteristics of Community law, the particular difficulties to which its interpretation gives rise and the risk of divergences in judicial decisions within the Community.\u201d 52.  The scope of that case-law was further defined in the case of Ferreira da Silva e Brito and Others v Estado portugu\u00eas (Case C-160/14, judgment of 9 September 2015), in which the CJEU held as follows:\n\u201c36.  By its second question, the referring court seeks to ascertain whether, in circumstances such as those at issue in the main proceedings and, in particular, because of the fact that lower courts have given conflicting decisions concerning the interpretation of the concept of a \u2018transfer of a business\u2019 within the meaning of Article 1(1) of Directive 2001/23, the third paragraph of Article 267 TFEU must be construed as meaning that a court or tribunal against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law is in principle obliged to refer the matter to the Court of Justice in order to obtain an interpretation of that concept. 37.  In that regard, although it is true that the procedure laid down in Article 267 TFEU is an instrument for cooperation between the Court of Justice and the national courts, by means of which the Court provides the national courts with the points of interpretation of EU law which they need in order to decide the disputes before them, the fact remains that when there is no judicial remedy under national law against the decision of a court or tribunal of a Member State, that court or tribunal is, in principle, obliged to bring the matter before the Court of Justice under the third paragraph of Article 267 TFEU where a question relating to the interpretation of EU law is raised before it (see judgment in Consiglio nazionale dei geologi and Autorit\u00e0 garante della concorrenza e del mercato, C\u2011136/12, EU:C:2013:489, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited). 38.  As regards the extent of that obligation, it follows from settled case-law, beginning with the judgment in Cilfit and Others (283/81, EU:C:1982:335), that a court or tribunal against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law is obliged, where a question of EU law is raised before it, to comply with its obligation to bring the matter before the Court of Justice, unless it has established that the question raised is irrelevant or that the provision of EU law concerned has already been interpreted by the Court or that the correct application of EU law is so obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt. 39.  The Court has also made clear that the existence of such a possibility must be assessed in the light of the specific characteristics of EU law, the particular difficulties to which the interpretation of the latter gives rise and the risk of divergences in judicial decisions within the European Union (judgment in Intermodal Transports, C\u2011495/03, EU:C:2005:552, paragraph 33). 40.  It is true that the national court or tribunal has sole responsibility for determining whether the correct application of EU law is so obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt and for deciding, as a result, to refrain from referring to the Court a question concerning the interpretation of EU law which has been raised before it (see judgment in Intermodal Transports, C\u2011495/03, EU:C:2005:552, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited). 41.  In itself, the fact that other national courts or tribunals have given contradictory decisions is not a conclusive factor capable of triggering the obligation set out in the third paragraph of Article 267 TFEU. 42.  A court or tribunal adjudicating at last instance may take the view that, although the lower courts have interpreted a provision of EU law in a particular way, the interpretation that it proposes to give of that provision, which is different from the interpretation espoused by the lower courts, is so obvious that there is no reasonable doubt. 43.  However, so far as the area under consideration in the present case is concerned and as is clear from paragraphs 24 to 27 of this judgment, the question as to how the concept of a \u2018transfer of a business\u2019 should be interpreted has given rise to a great deal of uncertainty on the part of many national courts and tribunals which, as a consequence, have found it necessary to make a reference to the Court of Justice. That uncertainty shows not only that there are difficulties of interpretation, but also that there is a risk of divergences in judicial decisions within the European Union. 44.  It follows that, in circumstances such as those of the case before the referring court, which are characterised both by conflicting lines of case-law at national level regarding the concept of a \u2018transfer of a business\u2019 within the meaning of Directive 2001/23 and by the fact that that concept frequently gives rise to difficulties of interpretation in the various Member States, a national court or tribunal against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law must comply with its obligation to make a reference to the Court, in order to avert the risk of an incorrect interpretation of EU law. 45.  Accordingly, the answer to the second question is that, in circumstances such as those of the case in the main proceedings, which are characterised both by the fact that there are conflicting decisions of lower courts or tribunals regarding the interpretation of the concept of a \u2018transfer of a business\u2019 within the meaning of Article 1(1) of Directive 2001/23 and by the fact that that concept frequently gives rise to difficulties of interpretation in the various Member States, the third paragraph of Article 267 TFEU must be construed as meaning that a court or tribunal against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law is obliged to make a reference to the Court for a preliminary ruling concerning the interpretation of that concept.\u201d 53.  Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (\u201cthe Brussels I Regulation\u201d) entered into force on 1 March 2002. It replaced the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters of 27 September 1968 and was binding on all the European Union Member States with the exception of Denmark. The provisions cited below, which were applicable in the present case, remained in force until 10 January 2015, the date of entry into force of the new recast version, known as \u201cBrussels I bis\u201d. 54.  Recitals 16 to 18 of the Preamble to Regulation No 44/2001 read as follows:\n\u201c(16)  Mutual trust in the administration of justice in the Community justifies judgments given in a Member State being recognised automatically without the need for any procedure except in cases of dispute.\n(17)  By virtue of the same principle of mutual trust, the procedure for making enforceable in one Member State a judgment given in another must be efficient and rapid. To that end, the declaration that a judgment is enforceable should be issued virtually automatically after purely formal checks of the documents supplied, without there being any possibility for the court to raise of its own motion any of the grounds for non-enforcement provided for by this Regulation.\n(18)  However, respect for the rights of the defence means that the defendant should be able to appeal in an adversarial procedure, against the declaration of enforceability, if he considers one of the grounds for non-enforcement to be present. Redress procedures should also be available to the claimant where his application for a declaration of enforceability has been rejected.\u201d 55.  The relevant Articles of the Regulation read as follows:\nArticle 26\n\u201c1.  Where a defendant domiciled in one Member State is sued in a court of another Member State and does not enter an appearance, the court shall declare of its own motion that it has no jurisdiction unless its jurisdiction is derived from the provisions of this Regulation. 2.  The court shall stay the proceedings so long as it is not shown that the defendant has been able to receive the document instituting the proceedings or an equivalent document in sufficient time to enable him to arrange for his defence, or that all necessary steps have been taken to this end.\n...\u201d\nArticle 33\n\u201c1.  A judgment given in a Member State shall be recognised in the other Member States without any special procedure being required. 2.  Any interested party who raises the recognition of a judgment as the principal issue in a dispute may, in accordance with the procedures provided for in Sections 2 and 3 of this Chapter, apply for a decision that the judgment be recognised.\n...\u201d\nArticle 34\n\u201cA judgment shall not be recognised: 2.  where it was given in default of appearance, if the defendant was not served with the document which instituted the proceedings or with an equivalent document in sufficient time and in such a way as to enable him to arrange for his defence, unless the defendant failed to commence proceedings to challenge the judgment when it was possible for him to do so;\n...\u201d\nArticle 35\n\u201c1.  Moreover, a judgment shall not be recognised if it conflicts with Sections 3, 4 or 6 of Chapter II, or in a case provided for in Article 72. 2.  In its examination of the grounds of jurisdiction referred to in the foregoing paragraph, the court or authority applied to shall be bound by the findings of fact on which the court of the Member State of origin based its jurisdiction. 3.  Subject to the paragraph 1, the jurisdiction of the court of the Member State of origin may not be reviewed. ...\u201d\nArticle 36\n\u201cUnder no circumstances may a foreign judgment be reviewed as to its substance.\u201d\nArticle 37(1)\n\u201cA court of a Member State in which recognition is sought of a judgment given in another Member State may stay the proceedings if an ordinary appeal against the judgment has been lodged.\u201d\nArticle 38(1)\n\u201cA judgment given in a Member State and enforceable in that State shall be enforced in another Member State when, on the application of any interested party, it has been declared enforceable there.\u201d\nArticle 41\n\u201cThe judgment shall be declared enforceable ... without any review under Articles 34 and 35. The party against whom enforcement is sought shall not at this stage of the proceedings be entitled to make any submissions on the application.\u201d\nArticle 43\n\u201c1.  The decision on the application for a declaration of enforceability may be appealed against by either party.\n... 3.  The appeal shall be dealt with in accordance with the rules governing procedure in contradictory matters.\u201d\nArticle 45\n\u201c1.  The court with which an appeal is lodged under Article 43 ... shall refuse or revoke a declaration of enforceability only on one of the grounds specified in Articles 34 and 35. It shall give its decision without delay. 2.  Under no circumstances may the foreign judgment be reviewed as to its substance.\u201d\nArticle 46(1)\n\u201cThe court with which an appeal is lodged under Article 43 ... may, on the application of the party against whom enforcement is sought, stay the proceedings if an ordinary appeal has been lodged against the judgment in the Member State of origin or if the time for such an appeal has not yet expired; in the latter case, the court may specify the time within which such an appeal is to be lodged.\u201d\nArticle 54\n\u201cThe court or competent authority of a Member State where a judgment was given shall issue, at the request of any interested party, a certificate using the standard form in Annex V to this Regulation.\u201d\n(b)  Explanatory memorandum concerning the proposal for a Regulation 56.  In so far as relevant to the present case, the explanatory memorandum concerning the proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters presented by the Commission (document COM/99/0348 final, published in the Official Journal of the European Communities C 376 E of 28 December 1999, pp. 1-17) stated as follows:\n\u201c2.2. Legal basis\nThe subject-matter covered by the [Brussels] Convention is now within the ambit of Article 65 of the Treaty; the legal basis for this proposal is Article 61(c) of that Treaty.\nThe form chosen for the instrument \u2013 a regulation \u2013 is warranted by a number of considerations. The Member States cannot be left with the discretion not only to determine rules of jurisdiction, the purpose of which is to achieve certainty in the law for the benefit of individuals and economic operators, but also the procedures for the recognition and enforcement of judgments, which must be clear and uniform in all Member States.\n...\nSection 2 - Enforcement\nThis Section describes the procedure to be followed either for formal recognition ... or for a declaration of enforceability in a Member State other than the State of origin of the judgment. The purpose of this procedure, of course, is to declare a judgment that is enforceable in the State of origin enforceable; there is no effect on actual enforcement of the judgment in the Member State addressed. The procedure is directed towards obtaining a rapid decision. Considerable changes have accordingly been made to the Brussels Convention mechanism. For one thing, the court or authority responsible for declaring the judgment enforceable in the Member State addressed has no power to proceed of its own motion to review the grounds for non-enforcement of the judgment provided for by Articles 41 and 42. These may be reviewed, if at all, only in the course of an appeal from the party against whom enforcement has been authorised. The court or competent authority is limited to making formal checks on the documents presented in support of the application; they are determined by the Regulation. Moreover, the grounds for non-recognition or non\u2011enforcement have been narrowed down quite considerably.\n...\nArticle 41 [corresponding to Article 34 of the EC Regulation]\nThis Article determines the sole grounds on which a court seised of an appeal may refuse or revoke a declaration of enforceability. These grounds have been reframed in a restrictive manner to improve the free movement of judgments.\nFor one thing, adding the adverb \u2018manifestly\u2019 in point 1 underscores the exceptional nature of the public policy ground. For another, the ground most commonly relied on by debtors to oppose enforcement has been modified to avoid abuses of procedure. To prevent enforcement being excluded, it will be enough for the defaulting defendant in the State of origin to have been served with notice in sufficient time and in such a way as to enable him to arrange for his defence. A mere formal irregularity in the service procedure will not debar recognition or enforcement if it has not prevented the debtor from arranging for his defence. Moreover, if the debtor was in a position to appeal in the State of origin on grounds of a procedural irregularity and has not done so, he is not entitled to invoke that procedural irregularity as a ground for refusing or revoking a declaration in the State addressed. ...\u201d\n(c)  The CJEU\u2019s case-law 57.  In the case of Klomps v Michel (Case C-166/80, judgment of 16 June 1981, ECR 1593), the CJEU further defined the scope of the guarantees contained in Article 27(2) of the Brussels Convention (corresponding in part to Article 34(2) of the Brussels I Regulation). It held that the provision in question remained applicable where the defendant had lodged an objection against a judgment given in default and a court of the State in which the judgment was given had held the objection to be inadmissible on the ground that the time for lodging an objection had expired. Furthermore, even where a court in the State of origin had held, in separate adversarial proceedings, that service had been duly effected, Article 27(2) still required the court in which enforcement was sought to examine whether service had been effected in sufficient time to enable the defendant to arrange for his defence. 58.  In its judgment in ASML Netherlands BV v Semiconductor Industry Services GmbH (SEMIS), cited above, the CJUE was called on to give a ruling as to whether the condition that it must have been \u201cpossible\u201d, within the meaning of Article 34(2) in fine of the Brussels I Regulation, to commence proceedings to challenge the default judgment, required the judgment to have been duly served on the defendant or whether it was sufficient for the latter to have become aware of its existence at the stage of the enforcement proceedings in the State in which enforcement was sought. The CJEU adopted the following reasoning:\n\u201c20. ... Article 34(2) of Regulation No 44/2001 does not necessarily require the document which instituted the proceedings to be duly served, but does require that the rights of defence are effectively respected. 21.  Finally, Article 34(2) provides an exception to ground for refusal of recognition or enforcement of a judgment, that is to say, in the case where the defendant has failed to commence proceedings to challenge the judgment when it was possible for him to do so. 22.  Therefore, Article 34(2) of Regulation No 44/2001 must be interpreted in the light of the objectives and the scheme of that regulation. 23.  First, as regards the objectives of that regulation, it is clear from the 2nd, 6th, 16th and 17th recitals in the preamble that it seeks to ensure the free movement of judgments from Member States in civil and commercial matters by simplifying the formalities with a view to their rapid and simple recognition and enforcement. 25.  The same requirement appears in the 18th recital in the preamble to Regulation No 44/2001, pursuant to which respect for the rights of defence means that the defendant should be able to appeal in an adversarial procedure, against the declaration of enforceability of a decision, if he considers one of the grounds for non-enforcement to be present.\n... 29.  Second, in relation to the scheme established by Regulation No 44/2001 as regards recognition and enforcement, it must be observed ... that the observance of the rights of defence of a defendant in default of appearance is ensured by a double review. 30.  In the original proceedings in the State in which the judgment was given, it follows from the combined application of Articles 26(2) of Regulation No 44/2001 and Article 19(1) of Regulation No 1348/2000, that the court hearing the case must stay the proceedings so long as it is not shown that the defendant has been able to receive the document which instituted the proceedings or an equivalent document in sufficient time to enable him to arrange for his defence, or that all necessary steps have been taken to this end. 31.  If, during recognition and enforcement proceedings in the State in which enforcement is sought, the defendant commences proceedings against a declaration of enforceability issued in the State in which the judgment was given, the court hearing the action may find it necessary to examine a ground for non\u2011recognition or enforcement, such as that referred to in Article 34(2) of Regulation No 44/2001. 32.  It is in light of those considerations that it must be established whether, where the default judgment has not been served, the mere fact that the person against whom enforcement of the judgment is sought was aware of its existence at the stage of enforcement is sufficient to justify the conclusion that it was possible for him, within the meaning of Article 34(2) of Regulation No 44/2001, to commence proceedings to challenge that judgment. 33.  It is common ground that, in the case in the main proceedings, the default judgment was not served on the defendant, so that the latter was unaware of its contents. 34.  As the Austrian, German, Netherlands and Polish Government and the Commission of the European Communities have rightly argued in their observations submitted to the Court, the commencement of proceedings against a judgment is possible only if the person bringing those proceedings was able to familiarise himself with its contents, the mere fact that the person concerned is aware of the existence of that judgment being insufficient in that regard. 35.  In order for the defendant to have the opportunity to bring proceedings enabling him to assert his rights, as provided for in the case-law set out in paragraphs 27 and 28 of this judgment, he should be able to acquaint himself with the grounds of the default judgment in order to challenge them effectively. 36.  It follows that only knowledge by the defendant of the contents of the default judgment guarantees, in accordance with the requirements of respect for the rights of defence and the effective exercise of those rights, that it is possible for the defendant, within the meaning of Article 34(2) of Regulation No 44/2001, to commence proceedings to challenge that judgment before the courts of the State in which the judgment was given.\n... 39.  Article 34(2) of Regulation No 44/2001 does not mean, however, that the defendant is required to take additional steps going beyond normal diligence in the defence of his rights, such as those consisting in becoming acquainted with the contents of a judgment delivered in another Member State. 40.  Consequently, in order to justify the conclusion that it was possible for a defendant to commence proceedings to challenge a default judgment against him, within the meaning of Article 34(2) of Regulation No 44/2001, he must have been aware of the contents of that decision, which presupposes that it was served on him.\n... 49.  In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the answer to the questions referred must be that Article 34(2) of Regulation No 44/2001 is to be interpreted as meaning that it is \u2018possible\u2019 for a defendant to bring proceedings to challenge a default judgment against him only if he was in fact acquainted with its contents, because it was served on him in sufficient time to enable him to arrange for his defence before the courts of the State in which the judgment was given.\u201d 59.  In the case of Bernardus Hendrikman and Maria Feyen v Magenta Druck & Verlag GmbH (Case C-78/95, judgment of 10 October 1996, ECR I-4943), the CJEU found that where proceedings had been initiated against a person without his knowledge and a lawyer had appeared on his behalf but without his authority, the defendant was still to be regarded as being \u201cin default of appearance\u201d within the meaning of Article 27(2) of the Brussels Convention, even if the proceedings before the court first seised had become proceedings inter partes. 60.  In Trade Agency Ltd v Seramico Investments Ltd (Case C-619/10, judgment of 6 September 2012), the CJEU was called on to give a ruling as to whether, where the judgment given in default of appearance in the Member State of origin was accompanied by the certificate referred to in Annex V to the Brussels I Regulation, the court of the Member State in which enforcement was sought could nevertheless check whether the information in the certificate was consistent with the evidence. The CJEU found as follows:\n\u201c32.  Specifically as regards the ground mentioned in Article 34(2) of Regulation No 44/2001, to which Article 45(1) thereof refers, it must be held that it aims to ensure that the rights of defence of a defendant in default of appearance delivered in the Member State of origin are observed by a double review ... Under that system, where an appeal is lodged, the court of the Member State in which enforcement is sought must refuse or revoke the enforcement of a foreign judgment given in default of appearance if the defendant was not served with the document which instituted the proceedings or with an equivalent document in sufficient time and in such a way as to enable him to arrange for his defence, unless the defendant failed to commence proceedings to challenge the judgment whereas it was possible for him to do so. 33.  In that context, it is common ground that whether the defendant was served with the document which instituted the proceedings is a relevant aspect of the overall assessment of a factual nature ..., which must be conducted by the court of the Member State in which enforcement is sought in order to ascertain whether that defendant has the time necessary in order to prepare his defence or to take the steps necessary to prevent a decision delivered in default of appearance. 34.  That being the case, it must be observed that the fact that the foreign judgment is accompanied by the certificate cannot limit the scope of the assessment to be made pursuant to the double control, by the court of the Member State in which enforcement is sought, once it examines the ground for challenge mentioned in Article 34(2) of Regulation No 44/2001.\n... 36.  Next, ... since the court or authority competent to issue that certificate is not necessarily the same as that which gave the judgment whose enforcement is sought, that information can only have prima facie value. That follows also from the fact that production of the certificate is not obligatory, since in its absence in accordance with Article 55 of Regulation No 44/2001, the court in the Member State in which enforcement is sought which has jurisdiction to issue the declaration of enforceability may accept an equivalent document or, if it considers that it has sufficient information, dispense with requesting its production. 37.  Finally, ... it must be stated that, as is clear from the wording of Annex V to the regulation, the information contained in the certificate is limited to \u2018[d]ate of service of the document instituting the proceedings where judgment was given in default of appearance\u2019, without mentioning any other information which helps to ascertain whether the defendant was in a position to defend himself such as, in particular, the means of service or the address where service was effected. 38.  It follows that, when examining the ground for challenge set out in Article 34(2) of Regulation No 44/2001, to which Article 45(1) thereof refers, the court of the Member State in which enforcement is sought has jurisdiction to carry out an independent assessment of all the evidence and thereby ascertain, where necessary, whether that evidence is consistent with the information in the certificate, for the purpose of establishing, first, whether the defendant in default of appearance was served with the document instituting proceedings and, second, if service was effected in sufficient time and in such a way as to enable him to arrange for his defence.\n... 43.  In that connection, the Court has already held that it is apparent from recitals 16 to 18 in the preamble to Regulation No 44/2001 that the system of appeals for which it provides against the recognition or enforcement of a judgment aims to establish a fair balance between, on the one hand, mutual trust in the administration of justice in the Union, and, on the other, respect for the rights of the defence, which means that the defendant should, where necessary, be able to appeal in an adversarial procedure against the declaration of enforceability if he considers one of the grounds for non\u2011enforcement to be present (see, to that effect, Case C\u2011420/07 Apostolides [2009] ECR I\u20113571, paragraph 73).\n... 46.  Having regard to all of the foregoing considerations, the answer to the first question is that Article 34(2) of Regulation No 44/2001, to which Article 45(1) thereof refers, read in conjunction with recitals 16 and 17 in the preamble, must be interpreted as meaning that, where the defendant brings an action against the declaration of enforceability of a judgment given in default of appearance in the Member State of origin which is accompanied by the certificate, claiming that he has not been served with the document instituting the proceedings, the court of the Member State in which enforcement is sought hearing the action has jurisdiction to verify that the information in that certificate is consistent with the evidence.\u201d 61.  In the case of Apostolides v Orams (Case C-420/07, judgment of 28 April 2009, ECR I-3571), meanwhile, the CJEU stated:\n\u201c55.  As a preliminary point, it should be recalled that Article 34 of Regulation No 44/2001 must be interpreted strictly inasmuch as it constitutes an obstacle to the attainment of one of the fundamental objectives of that regulation... With regard, more specifically, to the public-policy clause in Article 34(1) of the regulation, it may be relied on only in exceptional cases ...\n... 73.  ... [I]t is apparent from recitals 16 to 18 in the preamble to Regulation No 44/2001 that the system of appeals for which it provides against the recognition or enforcement of a judgment aims to establish a fair balance between, on the one hand, mutual trust in the administration of justice in the Union, which justifies judgments given in a Member State being, as a rule, recognised and declared enforceable automatically in another Member State and, on the other hand, respect for the rights of the defence, which means that the defendant should, where necessary, be able to appeal in an adversarial procedure against the declaration of enforceability if he considers one of the grounds for non-enforcement to be present. 74.  The Court has had occasion, in Case C-283/05 ASML [2006] ECR I-12041, to make clear the differences between Article 34(2) of Regulation No 44/2001 and Article 27(2) of the Convention of 27 September 1968 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters ... 75.  Article 34(2) of Regulation No 44/2001, unlike Article 27(2) of the Convention, does not necessarily require the document which instituted the proceedings to be duly served, but does require that the rights of the defence are effectively respected ... 76.  Under Articles 34(2) and 45(1) of Regulation No 44/2001, the recognition or enforcement of a default judgment must be refused, if there is an appeal, if the defendant was not served with the document which instituted the proceedings or with an equivalent document in sufficient time and in such a way as to enable him to arrange for his defence, unless the defendant failed to commence proceedings to challenge that judgment before the courts of the Member State of origin when it was possible for him to do so. 77.  It is clear from the wording of those provisions that a default judgment given on the basis of a document instituting proceedings which was not served on the defendant in sufficient time and in such a way as to enable him to arrange for his defence must be recognised if he did not take the initiative to appeal against that judgment when it was possible for him to do so.\n... 80.  In the light of the foregoing, the answer to the ... question [referred for a preliminary ruling] is that the recognition or enforcement of a default judgment cannot be refused under Article 34(2) of Regulation No 44/2001 where the defendant was able to commence proceedings to challenge the default judgment and those proceedings enabled him to argue that he had not been served with the document which instituted the proceedings or with the equivalent document in sufficient time and in such a way as to enable him to arrange for his defence.\u201d 62.  The recast version of the Brussels I Regulation (known as \u201cBrussels I bis\u201d), introduced by Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast), entered into force on 10 January 2015. 63.  Article 39 of the new version abolished the declaration of enforceability (exequatur) procedure and established the principle of automatic enforceability of judgments given in another Member State. It provides as follows:\n\u201cA judgment given in a Member State which is enforceable in that Member State shall be enforceable in the other Member States without any declaration of enforceability being required.\u201d 64.  However, Article 45(1) of the new version reiterates the terms of Article 34(2) of the Brussels I Regulation:\n\u201cOn the application of any interested party, the recognition of a judgment shall be refused:\n(a)  if such recognition is manifestly contrary to public policy (ordre public) in the Member State addressed;\n(b)  where the judgment was given in default of appearance, if the defendant was not served with the document which instituted the proceedings or with an equivalent document in sufficient time and in such a way as to enable him to arrange for his defence, unless the defendant failed to commence proceedings to challenge the judgment when it was possible for him to do so;\n...\u201d 65.  Prior to 1 May 2004, the date of accession of Cyprus and Latvia to the European Union, the service of judicial documents between the two countries was governed by the Hague Convention of 15 November 1965 on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, which was ratified both by Cyprus (where it entered into force on 1 June 1983) and by Latvia (where it entered into force on 1 November 1995). This Convention applies in all cases where a judicial or extrajudicial document is to be transmitted for service abroad, except where the address of the person to be served with the document is not known. 66.  Since the accession of Cyprus and Latvia to the European Union on 1 May 2004, the service of judicial documents has been governed by the EC Regulation on the service in the Member States of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters. The first version of this Regulation (Council Regulation (EC) No 1348/2000 of 29 May 2000) was repealed and replaced on 30 December 2007 by a new version (Regulation (EC) No 1393/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2007). 67.  At the material time the relevant sections of the Latvian Civil Procedure Law (Civilprocesa likums) read as follows:\nSection 8(1)\n\u201cThe court shall establish the circumstances of the case by assessing evidence obtained in accordance with the law.\u201d\nSection 9\n\u201c1.  The parties shall have equal procedural rights. 2.  The court shall ensure that the parties are able to exercise on an equal footing the rights conferred on them for the defence of their interests.\u201d\nSection 230(1)\n\u201cIn the decision [l\u0113mums; not ruling on the merits] the court or judge shall indicate:\n...\n(7) the detailed arrangements and time-limits for lodging an appeal against the decision.\u201d\nSection 637(2)\n\u201cRecognition of a foreign judgment shall be refused only if one of the following grounds for non-recognition exists:\n ...\n(2) the foreign judgment has not become enforceable in accordance with the law;\n(3) the defendant has been unable to defend his or her rights, particularly where judgment was given in default and the defendant was not duly and promptly summoned to appear before the court, unless he or she had the opportunity to appeal against the judgment and did not do so;\n...\n(6) such recognition would be contrary to Latvian public policy [sabiedrisk\u0101 iek\u0101rta];\n...\u201d\nSection 644\n\u201c1.  After it has been recognised, a foreign judgment which is enforceable in the State in which it was given shall be enforced in accordance with the present Law. 2.  With regard to the rules on the enforcement of judgments laid down by Council Regulation No 44/2001 ..., the provisions of [this] Chapter ... concerning recognition of judgments given by foreign courts shall apply in so far as [Regulation No 44/2001] so provides.\u201d 68.  In accordance with the relevant provisions of Cypriot law furnished by the Cypriot Government (see paragraph 10 above), a defendant against whom judgment has been given in default may apply to have the judgment set aside (Order 17, Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Rules). The lodging of such an application is not subject to any time-limit; however, the defendant must provide a reasonable explanation for his or her failure to appear. Hence, according to the case-law of the Cypriot courts, a defendant may lodge an application to set aside in two sets of circumstances:\n(a)  where the defendant was not duly summoned to appear before the court which gave judgment. In such cases the judge is required to set aside the judgment given in default; he or she has no discretion to decide otherwise;\n(b)  where the defendant was duly summoned but produces an affidavit putting forward an arguable case and explaining why he did not appear (for example, because he did not know about the proceedings, he had instructed a lawyer to appear on his behalf but the lawyer failed to do so, or he made an honest and reasonable mistake as to the deadline for appearing before the court). In such cases the court may grant the application to set aside but is not required to do so (Supreme Court judgment in the case of Phylactou v. Michael (1982, 1 A.A.D., 204).", "references": ["8", "3", "1", "7", "5", "9", "6", "0", "4", "2", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "4.  All applicants were former employees of \u201cLETEKS\u201d u ste\u010daju (the debtor), which was, at the relevant time, a company predominantly comprised of socially-owned capital. 5.  Since the debtor failed to fulfil its contractual obligations towards its employees, on an unspecified date, the applicants instituted civil proceedings against it. 6.  On 18 April 2008 the Leskovac Municipal Court ordered the debtor to pay the applicants specified amounts on account of salary arrears, plus the costs and expenses of the civil proceedings. 7.  On 3 October 2010 the above judgment became final. 8.  Between 20 November 2008 and 30 November 2009 all applicants filed separate requests for the enforcement of the above judgment. 9.  The Leskovac Municipal Court ultimately accepted the applicants\u2019 requests and issued the enforcement orders, respectively. The essential information as to the enforcement proceedings in respect of each application is outlined in the Annex to this judgment. 10.  On 25 January 2011 the Leskovac Commercial Court opened insolvency proceedings in respect of the debtor (St. 47/2010). 11.  The applicants duly submitted their respective claims. 12.  On an unspecified date the applicants\u2019 claims based on the judgment of 18 April 2008 were formally recognised. 13.  The insolvency proceedings against the debtor are still ongoing. 14.  On 31 March 2010, the applicants lodged a constitutional appeal. 15.  On 8 July 2013 the Constitutional Court dismissed the appeal in respect of all applicants except the applicants Ms Jagoda Jan\u010di\u0107 (application no. 62499/10), Mr Predrag Stamenkovi\u0107 (application no. 63100/10) and Ms Stana Stankovi\u0107 (application no. 63137/10). 16.  On 18 September 2013 the Constitutional Court also found a violation of the right to a hearing within a reasonable time, in respect of Ms Jan\u010di\u0107, Mr Stamenkovi\u0107 and Ms Stankovi\u0107. It further awarded each of them 500 euros (EUR) as just satisfaction for non-pecuniary damage and ordered the court in Leskovac to expedite the proceedings.", "references": ["5", "8", "0", "2", "7", "6", "4", "1", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1968 and, prior to his conviction, lived in Yaroslavl. 5.  On 15 April 2008 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of fraud. Subsequently, he was charged with fraud, attempted fraud, embezzlement, tax evasion and a breach of duties in his work as a tax agent. 6.  On 16 April 2008 the Kirovskiy District Court of Yaroslavl remanded the applicant in custody pending investigation. The judge found that (1) the applicant was suspected of serious crimes, (2) he might abscond, (3) he might put pressure on witnesses, or (4) he might interfere with the investigation. 7.  On 25 April 2008 the Yaroslavl Regional Court upheld the detention order of 16 April 2008 on appeal. 8.  The applicant remained in detention pending investigation and trial. The courts extended his detention, using the same stereotyped formula as described above. 9.  On 16 March 2009 he was committed for trial before the Kirovskiy District Court of Yaroslavl. 10.  On 27 October 2009 he was convicted of the charges and sentenced to seven years\u2019 imprisonment. 11.  On 29 December 2009 the Yaroslavl Regional Court quashed the judgment on appeal and remitted the case to the first-instance court for a fresh examination. 12.  On 25 January 2010 the trial court ordered his release on bail. 13.  On 27 January 2010 the bail was paid and the applicant was released. 14.  On 20 July 2010 the applicant was convicted of fraud and attempted fraud and sentenced to five years and six months\u2019 imprisonment. 15.  On 19 October 2010 the Yaroslavl Regional Court upheld the judgment on appeal. 16.  On 2 December 2014 the Government submitted a unilateral declaration. They acknowledged that the applicant had been detained \u201cbetween 15 April 2008 and 27 October 2009 ... without relevant and sufficient grounds\u201d, in breach of the requirements of Article 5 \u00a7 3 of the Convention. They offered to pay him a sum of 1,850 euros (EUR) as just satisfaction and invited the Court to strike the case out of its list of cases. 17.  On 2 February 2015 the applicant replied that he had taken note of the Government\u2019s acknowledgment of the violation, but that the amount of compensation was not acceptable to him.", "references": ["5", "7", "3", "4", "6", "1", "8", "9", "0", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1955 and is currently detained in Ia\u0219i Prison. 6.  By a final decision of 2013 the applicant was convicted of fraud and sentenced to a term of imprisonment. He had been detained in several prisons since 18 October 2011. 7.  In respect of the establishments in which he had been detained, the applicant alleged that he had been kept in overcrowded cells with poor conditions of hygiene. The food he had received had been of poor quality and had not been adapted to his medical condition. He also claimed that despite the fact that he was a non-smoker, he had had to share the cells with smokers. He also claimed that the cells in which he was detained in Ia\u0219i Prison were infested with bugs, and the mattresses were old and dirty. 8.  The Government submitted that in all the cells occupied by him, the applicant had had his own bed. The cells had natural and artificial light and were ventilated through windows. The detention cells were disinfected daily with chlorine. The detainees were provided with cleaning materials and they were responsible for cleaning the cells. At least every trimester the prison authorities or specialised contractors carried out work to eradicate rodents and insects. The detainees were entitled to two showers per week. 9.  The applicant received a special diet for his diabetes. 10.  The Government made specific submissions in respect of the following detention facilities in which the applicant had been detained. 11.  The applicant was detained in Gherla Prison between 18 October and 22 November 2011. He occupied the following cells: (i) cell EG 1.7, which measured 43.25 square metres and which he shared with nine co\u2011detainees between 18 October and 11 November 2011; (ii) cell EG 3.25, which measured 55.20 square metres and which he shared with twenty\u2011five co\u2011detainees between 11 and 16 November 2011; (iii) cell EG 1.15, which measured 43.25 square metres and which he shared with nine co\u2011detainees between 16 and 18 November 2011; and (iv) cell E 1.8, which measured 43.25 square metres and which he shared with eleven co-detainees between 18 and 22 November 2011. 12.  The applicant was detained in Bistri\u021ba Prison between 22 November 2011 and 18 January 2012. He occupied cell no. 4, which measured 20.03 square metres and which he shared with eight co-detainees. 13.  The applicant was detained in Jilava Prison between 4 and 23 February 2012. He occupied the following cells: (i) cell no. 4.21, which measured 44.81 square metres and which he shared with twenty\u2011three co\u2011detainees from 4 to 16 February 2012; and (ii) cell no. 6.24, which measured 43.90 square metres and which he shared with between twenty\u2011two and twenty-six co-detainees from 17 to 23 February 2012. 14.  The applicant was detained in Foc\u0219ani Prison on several occasions: between 2 and 9 March 2012, 11 and 18 January, 5 and 19 February, and 2 and 5 April 2013. He occupied the following cells: (i) cell no. E 1.8, which measured 21.22 square metres and which he shared with ten co\u2011detainees for seven days; (ii) cell no. E 3.28, which measured 25.28 square metres and which he shared with thirteen co\u2011detainees for another seven days; and (iii) cell no E 3.30, which measured 25.28 square metres and which he shared with fourteen co-detainees for five days. 15.  For the rest of the period of detention until the present, the applicant has been detained in Ia\u0219i Prison, in cells E 4.4., E 3.3, E 5.12, E 6.6, E 6.9, which each measured 33.30 square metres and which he shared with twenty\u2011five co-detainees.", "references": ["4", "9", "7", "6", "0", "2", "3", "8", "5", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1978 and until his arrest lived in Sarapul, the Republic of Udmurtiya. 6.  He was arrested on 18 October 2006. On 28 May 2007 the Sarapul Town Court convicted him of several criminal offences, including aggravated robbery committed by a criminal group, and sentenced him to six years and ten months\u2019 imprisonment. 7.  After the arrest on 18 October 2006 the applicant was taken to a police station in Sarapul and shortly thereafter to remand prison no. IZ-18/1 in Izhevsk. Twenty days later he was admitted to prison hospital no. 4 (\u201cthe prison hospital\u201d). 8.  The parties provided conflicting descriptions of the conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention in the prison hospital between March and October 2007. 9.  From March to May 2007 he was detained with nine other sick inmates in cell no. 4, which measured 36 sq. m. Accordingly, each detainee was afforded around 3.6 sq. m of personal space. The living space was further diminished by six bunk beds and a table. The cell had a window measuring 150 by 150 cm and two lamps, only one of which was functional. Inmates were allowed to smoke in the cell. The ventilation system, which was switched on in the mornings and evenings, and a small ventilation window measuring 25 by 30 cm, was unable to ensure sufficient inflow of fresh air. The cell had a squat toilet separated by a metal screen from the sink, but not from the table or the door. 10.  In May 2007 the applicant was transferred to cell no. 1 which was not different in any aspect from cell no. 4, save for the facts that the cell had two windows and was located in the semi-basement and was therefore excessively humid. 11.  In late June 2007 the applicant was placed in cell no. 20. The conditions of detention there were satisfactory. It was designed for ten detainees but only accommodated five. 12.  Shortly after the applicant was returned to cell no. 4. He did not describe his further transfers between the cells, only claiming that the conditions of his detention had been deplorable. 13.  As to the general conditions of detention, the applicant argued that daily outdoor exercises were dispiriting, as the prison yard, secured by high walls, was gloomy and small, and the outdoor activities did not last longer than an hour, or were sometimes even shorter. 14.  The applicant used communal shower facilities which were in an appalling unsanitary condition. The floor was covered by a mixture of mud and detergent. Each detainee was afforded fifteen minutes to take a shower. 15.  The quality of food served in the prison hospital was poor and scarce. Dishes largely comprised of cabbage, potatoes and barley grit. Meat or fish was only served on public holidays. 16.  The applicant supported his claims with photos of the prison hospital and a dish served there. 17.  Relying on certificates issued by the prison hospital administration on 22, 23 and 24 April 2013, extracts from records of inmates\u2019 transfers on 7 and 28 February, 27 March, 5 and 23 April, 7 August, 7 and 11 September, 1 October 2007, and a detailed plan of the prison hospital, the Government claimed that the facility had not been overcrowded. Their submissions may be summarised as follows:\nPeriod of detention\nCell no.\nCell surface area (sq. m)\nNumber of detainees\n28 February to 21 March 2007\n4\n37\n7\n21 to 27 March 2007\n6 18.  Relying on photos of the prison hospital, written statements about the conditions of detention in 2007 made by three inmates in 2013, and on certificates issued by the prison hospital administration on 22 and 24 April 2013, the Government argued that the cell windows had allowed sufficient daylight so that inmates had been able to read and write. The cells had been equipped with four 40\u2011watt fluorescent tubes which had been lit from 6 a.m. to 10 p.m. At night the cells had been lit by security lights. 19.  A ventilation system had been installed in every cell. The natural ventilation had also been ensured through the windows. The heating system had properly functioned. 20.  Toilets in the cells had been separated from the main area by a partition for privacy. Due to the security considerations involved, punishment cells designed for solitary confinement had no such partition, but were equipped with a curtain. The applicant had been able take a shower once a week for at least fifteen minutes. 21.  The premises of the prison hospital had been in good sanitary condition, as it had been checked daily by staff members. The cells had been cleaned and disinfected every day. 22.  In addition to a daily hour-long walk in the prison hospital\u2019s yard, the applicant had been able to walk freely during the daytime within sanitary block. 23.  The applicant had been provided with three hot meals per day and an extra allowance for ill inmates comprising bread, vegetables, meat, milk, cheese and fruit juice. 24.  Despite the Court\u2019s request to produce the applicant\u2019s complete medical record, the Government only submitted several illegible pages apparently belonging to his medical file. They further produced extracts from his medical history. The extracts contained fragments of information concerning the drugs prescribed. The following information on the applicant\u2019s treatment may be deduced from the submitted documents. 25.  The applicant did not suffer from tuberculosis prior to his arrest. 26.  On the day of his arrest, 18 October 2006, the applicant was seen by a prison paramedic, who performed a general check-up, noting, inter alia, that the applicant\u2019s lungs were clear. The next day a prison doctor confirmed that he was in good health. In late October a periodic chest X-ray showed traces of tuberculosis. The prison doctor studied the X-ray record and recommended the applicant\u2019s transfer to the prison hospital. 27.  Five days later the applicant was admitted to the prison hospital. A sputum smear test performed on admission led to his being diagnosed with infiltrative tuberculosis at the stage of lung tissue destruction, with inactive Mycobacterium tuberculosis (\u201cMBT\u201d). Two days later a new X-ray test confirmed the diagnosis. 28.  Between 16 November 2006 and 11 January 2007 the applicant underwent inpatient anti-tuberculosis treatment in the prison hospital. There is no information describing the nature of the treatment. For unknown reasons it was unsuccessful. 29.  According to the medical records, in the following year the applicant \u201creceived standard anti-tuberculosis treatment\u201d. However, he stated that between March 2007 and March 2008 he had only been given basic febrifuges and painkillers. During that period he was seen by the prison doctor on three occasions. No significant changes were registered. The size of the lung cavities remained the same. 30.  In the beginning of 2008, when a chest X-ray and tomography examinations registered a new focal point of infiltration in the right lung, the applicant\u2019s doctor confirmed the extent of the deterioration of the applicant\u2019s health. 31.  In early March 2008 the applicant was examined by a commission of doctors and certified as having a second-degree disability. A three-month drug regimen based on pyrazinamide, ethambutol, capreomycin and other medication was prescribed. According to the applicant, one of the drugs was out of stock. 32.  On 18 March and 1 April 2008 the applicant failed to see the attending doctor. 33.  In May 2008 the treatment regimen was amended with capreomycin removed and new drugs (rifampicin, cycloserine and others) added into the applicant\u2019s daily drug intake. 34.  In the following two months the applicant interrupted his treatment for a period of two or three weeks, having refused to take some drugs and having gone on hunger strike. In the late June 2008 his tuberculosis transformed into MBT-positive form. 35.  Between July 2008 and March 2009 the applicant received inpatient treatment which had no effect on his medical condition. The deterioration of his health continued in the summer and autumn of 2009. 36.  An X-ray and a tomography examination performed in September 2009 indicated that the applicant\u2019s lungs were filled with caseation. The applicant was taken for a month-long inpatient treatment in the hospital with his condition had been brought under control. By September 2010 his health had improved and the lung cavities had disappeared. 37.  According to his medical records, in December 2010 the applicant refused to take a few of the anti-tuberculosis drugs. In April, September and November 2011 he did not consult the attending doctor. 38.  In September 2011 tuberculomas replaced the lung cavities. In 2012\u201113 calcifications and pulmonary fibrosis scars were only registered in the applicant\u2019s lungs. The most recent sputum smear test in February 2013 did not indicate whether the applicant remained MBT\u2011positive. 39.  The parties did not submit information on the applicant\u2019s further treatment. 40.  In the end of 2006 the applicant complained about the poor quality of medical care to the Ministry of Health of the Republic of Udmurtiya. By a letter of 17 January 2007 his claim was rejected. 41.  In the early 2007 he lodged a similar claim with the Service for the Execution of Sentences in the Republic of Udmurtiya. It was dismissed on 23 April 2007. 42.  In 2008 the applicant unsuccessfully complained to the Federal Ombudsman about his alleged lack of access to information about his health and diagnoses. His claim was not examined on the merits. 43.  He further complained of the lack of medical assistance to the prosecutor\u2019s office of the Republic of Udmurtiya. On 21 August 2008 his complaint was dismissed. 44.  In 2010 the applicant lodged two claims with the Industrialnyy District Court of the Republic of Udmurtiya arguing that he had not benefitted from adequate medical care in detention. The claims were dismissed. According to the Government, the applicant did not appeal. The parties did not submit copies of the judgments.", "references": ["4", "2", "6", "8", "5", "3", "0", "9", "7", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Voronezh. 6.  On 7 March 2008 the applicant was arrested and brought to the Tsentralniy district police station, Voronezh (\u041e\u0442\u0434\u0435\u043b \u0432\u043d\u0443\u0442\u0440\u0435\u043d\u043d\u0438\u0445 \u0434\u0435\u043b \u0426\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0440\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0440\u0430\u0439\u043e\u043d\u0430 \u0433. \u0412\u043e\u0440\u043e\u043d\u0435\u0436\u0430, \u201cthe Tsentralniy OVD\u201d) for having employed offensive language in public. He submitted that after the interview the policemen had ill-treated him. In particular, they had handcuffed his hands behind his back, lifted the handcuffs so that he could only stand on his toes, attached the handcuffs to metal bars and administered several blows to the applicant\u2019s face and chest. A few hours later, the applicant was released. 7.  On 8 March 2008 the applicant paid a visit to Voronezh Town Clinical Hospital no. 2 (\u201cthe town hospital\u201d). A bruise on the left side of his chest was noted during the examination carried out by a doctor there. 8.  On 10 March 2008 the applicant was examined by the Voronezh regional forensic bureau which in addition detected bruises on the applicant\u2019s right eye and right wrist, and scratches on the left of his forehead and both wrists, inflicted by a blunt hard object. The report reflected the timing of these injuries as \u201cone to three days prior\u201d, \u201cpossibly 7 March 2008, as argued by [the applicant]\u201d. It further concluded that the injuries in question did not entail any permanent damage to health or disability. 9.  On 11 March 2008 the applicant visited local polyclinic no. 4, which diagnosed him as having developed periarthritis as a result of trauma of the wrist joints. 10.  On 19 March 2008 the applicant lodged an application with the Tsentralniy district investigation department of the investigative committee at the Voronezh regional prosecutor\u2019s office (\u0421\u043b\u0435\u0434\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u043e\u0442\u0434\u0435\u043b \u043f\u043e \u0426\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0440\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e\u043c\u0443 \u0440\u0430\u0439\u043e\u043d\u0443 \u0433. \u0412\u043e\u0440\u043e\u043d\u0435\u0436\u0430 C\u043b\u0435\u0434\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0443\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u0421\u043b\u0435\u0434\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u043a\u043e\u043c\u0438\u0442\u0435\u0442\u0430 \u043f\u0440\u0438 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u043a\u0443\u0440\u0430\u0442\u0443\u0440\u0435 \u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0439\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u0424\u0435\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438 \u043f\u043e \u0412\u043e\u0440\u043e\u043d\u0435\u0436\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u043e\u0431\u043b\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0438, \u201cthe district investigation department\u201d) requesting that criminal proceedings be instituted against the police officers who had ill-treated him at the Tsentralniy OVD on 7 March 2008. 11.  On 23 March 2008 an investigator of the district investigation department rejected the applicant\u2019s request as unfounded for lack evidence of a crime. 12.  On 24 April 2008 the above decision was set aside by the deputy head of the district investigation department as unfounded, and the case file material was referred for an additional pre-investigation inquiry. 13.  Thereafter the applicant\u2019s request was repeatedly rejected and re\u2011examined. The respective decisions to reject the request were taken by the investigator of the district investigation department on 1 October, 5 November, 11 December 2008 and 13 August 2009 on the basis of:\n-  the applicant\u2019s statements;\n-  the forensic medical report of 10 March 2008 (see paragraph 8 above) and the additional forensic medical report of 1 October 2008, which confirmed the conclusions of the initial report;\n-  the statements of Mr P.M., the applicant\u2019s father, who submitted that on 7 March 2008 at about 9.30 p.m. the applicant\u2019s friends had brought his son from the Tsentralniy OVD, that the applicant had had bruises and had been in shock and had told him that he had been subjected to ill-treatment by the police;\n-  the statements of Ms T.D., a friend of the applicant, who submitted that she had picked the applicant up from the Tsentralniy OVD on 7 March 2008 at about 10 p.m., that the applicant had had no visible injuries and told her that the police officers had ill-treated him by forcing him into a stress position known as \u201cthe swallow\u201d (\u043b\u0430\u0441\u0442\u043e\u0447\u043a\u0430);\n-  the statements of Ms A.M., the applicant\u2019s wife, who submitted that the applicant had arrived home on 7 March 2008 at approximately 11.55 p.m., that he had had abrasions on his wrists and a black eye, and that he had told her that the police had beaten him up, handcuffed his hands behind his back and suspended him from a metal bar by handcuffs;\n-  the statements of Ms Z.K, the applicant\u2019s mother-in-law, who submitted that she had picked up the applicant\u2019s belongings at the Tsentralniy OVD on 7 March 2008 and had not seen the applicant committing any unlawful acts or police officers applying physical force to the applicant;\n-  the report by police officer V.V., who submitted that on 7 March 2008 at about 6.10 p.m. he and police officer S.S. had apprehended the applicant for having employed offensive language in public;\n-  the statements of officers V.V. and S.S. who denied having applied physical force to the applicant;\n-  the statements of police officer P.A., who submitted that on 7 March 2008 at about 7.00 p.m. the applicant was brought to the Tsentralniy OVD; he had had no visible injuries and had been behaving calmly, and no physical force or measures of restraint had been applied to him;\n-  the statements of police officers S.Sh. and M.V., who had been on duty on 7 March 2008, who submitted that they had had no information about the applicant\u2019s arrest, and that they had not seen physical force or measures of restraint being applied to any of the persons brought to the Tsentralniy OVD on that date;\n-  the statements of several persons who had been detained at the Tsentralniy OVD at the same time as the applicant, who submitted that they had not seen or heard that any unlawful measures had been applied to the applicant by the police officers. 14.  All of the above decisions refusing the institution of criminal proceedings against the police officers were subsequently set aside by the deputy head of the district investigation department as unfounded, and an additional pre-investigation inquiry was ordered. 15.  On 19 May and 28 October 2008, and 10 August 2009 the Tsentralniy District Court, Voronezh, discontinued the proceedings by which the applicant sought to challenge the lawfulness of the decisions of 23 March, 1 October and 11 December 2008 respectively, refusing to open a criminal case against the police officers as in the meantime the above decisions had been set aside. 16.  After the application was communicated to the Russian Government, on 23 March 2011 the district investigation department instituted criminal proceedings under Article 286 \u00a7 3 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. 17.  On an unspecified date in the end of March 2011 the applicant was questioned as a victim. 18.  On an unspecified date in April 2011 the investigator appointed a doctor to carry out a forensic medical examination. 19.  On 6 June 2011 the applicant participated in an onsite verification of his statements and in an identity parade of the police officers. Police officers V.V. and S.P. of the Tsentralniy OVD were presented for identification; however, none were recognised by the applicant. 20.  On 25 July 2011 the investigation was suspended on the grounds that it was impossible to identify the alleged perpetrators.", "references": ["4", "6", "3", "8", "5", "2", "9", "0", "7", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicants, Mr Goran Paunovi\u0107 (\u201cthe first applicant\u201d) and Ms Ksenija Milivojevi\u0107 (\u201cthe second applicant\u201d), are Serbian nationals who were born in 1965 and 1975 and currently live in Novi Sad and Belgrade, respectively. 6.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7.  Parliamentary elections in Serbia are held on the basis of a proportional representation system in which candidates for Parliament are included on lists put forward by political parties or coalitions. Voters choose between these lists, without voting directly for individual candidates. 8.  In 2003 the applicants were elected as members of parliament (MPs) for a political party called G17PLUS. 9.  Before the elections, however, all candidates, including the applicants, had been required by their party to sign undated letters of resignation and hand them in to the party. The documents also authorised the party to appoint other candidates in their place if necessary. 10.  Following political differences between the applicants and their party, on 5 May 2006 the first applicant signed a separate, officially certified statement, in which he declared his prior resignation letter to be null and void. The first applicant informed G17PLUS and the President of Parliament of this statement and made it public. 11.  The second applicant also subsequently told Parliament, the party and the public that she considered her earlier resignation letter to be null and void. 12.  On 15 May 2006 the head of the G17PLUS party group in Parliament dated the applicants\u2019 resignation letters and submitted them to the President of the Parliament. 13.  On the same day, the first applicant addressed the Parliamentary Committee on Administrative Affairs, explaining that he did not intend to resign and that he wished to keep his seat as an independent MP. He provided the committee with his certified statement of 5 May 2006. However, the committee concluded that both applicants had resigned and held that their parliamentary mandates were deemed to be terminated. 14.  On 16 May 2006 a plenary session of Parliament confirmed that decision and accepted two other candidates proposed by G17PLUS as MPs in place of the applicants. 15.  On 25 May 2006 the applicants filed two separate complaints with the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court, seeking the annulment of Parliament\u2019s decisions to terminate their mandates and replace them with other candidates. 16.  On 29 May 2006 the complaint made to the Supreme Court was dismissed on procedural grounds. The court stated that the impugned parliamentary decisions had not been \u201cadministrative acts\u201d and could not, as such, be subject to judicial review. 17.  On 29 May 2008 the Constitutional Court also ruled against the applicants, without considering the merits of their case. It stated that new parliamentary elections had been held in January 2007, which was why the applicants\u2019 complaint had effectively become moot. It noted that their complaint could not have been treated as a constitutional appeal, as envisaged under the Constitution adopted in November 2006, since the parliamentary decisions at issue had been made several months before the new Constitution had been adopted (see B.4 below).", "references": ["4", "6", "7", "5", "2", "1", "3", "9", "8", "0", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "10.  The applicants were born, respectively, in 1971 in Togo and in 1979 in Ghana. They live in Malm\u00f6, Sweden. 11.  The first applicant lived in Togo until the age of 6 and again briefly from the age of 21 to 22. From the age of 6 to 21 he lived in Ghana with his uncle. He attended school there for ten years and speaks the local language. On 18 July 1993, when he was 22 years old, he entered Denmark and requested asylum, which was refused by a final decision of 8 March 1995. 12.  In the meantime, on 7 November 1994, he had married a Danish national. Having regard to his marriage, on 1 March 1996, by virtue of the former section 9, subsection 1(ii), of the Aliens Act (Udl\u00e6ndingeloven) he was granted a residence permit, which became permanent on 23 September 1997. 13.  On 25 September 1998 the first applicant and his Danish wife got divorced. 14.  On 22 April 2002 the first applicant acquired Danish citizenship. At the relevant time he met the requirements set out in the relevant circular relating to the length of his period of residence (at least nine years), age, general conduct, arrears owed to public funds and language proficiency. 15.  On 22 February 2003 the first applicant married the second applicant in Ghana. He had met her during one of four visits to Ghana made in the five years prior to their marriage. 16.  On 28 February 2003, at the Danish Embassy in Accra, Ghana, the second applicant requested a residence permit for Denmark with reference to her marriage to the first applicant. At that time she was 24 years old. She stated that she had never visited Denmark. Her parents lived in Ghana. On the application form, the first applicant submitted that he had not received any education in Denmark, but had participated in various language courses and short-term courses concerning service, customer care, industrial cleaning, hygiene and working methods. He had been working in a slaughterhouse since 15 February 1999. He had no close family in Denmark. He spoke and wrote Danish. The spouses had come to know each other in Ghana and they communicated between themselves in the Hausa and Twi languages. 17.  At the relevant time, under section 9, subsection 7, of the Aliens Act family reunion could be granted only if both spouses were over 24 years old and their aggregate ties to Denmark were stronger than the spouses\u2019 attachment to any other country (the so-called attachment requirement). 18.  On 1 July 2003 the Aliens Authority (Udl\u00e6ndingestyrelsen) refused the residence permit request because it found that it could not be established that the spouses\u2019 aggregate ties to Denmark were stronger than their aggregate ties to Ghana. 19.  In July or August 2003 the second applicant entered Denmark on a tourist visa. 20.  On 28 August 2003 she appealed against the Aliens Authority\u2019s decision of 1 July 2003, to the then Ministry for Refugees, Immigration and Integration (Ministeriet for Flygtninge, Indvandrere og Integration). The appeal did not have suspensive effect. 21.  On 15 November 2003 the applicants moved to Malm\u00f6, Sweden, which since 1 July 2000 has been connected to Copenhagen in Denmark by a 16 km bridge (\u00d8resundsforbindelsen). 22.  By Act no. 1204 of 27 December 2003, section 9, subsection 7, of the Aliens Act was amended so that the attachment requirement was lifted for persons who had held Danish citizenship for at least 28 years (the so\u2011called 28-year rule \u2013 28-\u00e5rs reglen). Persons born or having arrived in Denmark as small children could also be exempted from the attachment requirement, provided they had resided lawfully there for 28 years. 23.  On 6 May 2004 the applicants had a son. He was born in Sweden but is a Danish national by virtue of his father\u2019s nationality. 24.  On 27 August 2004 the Ministry for Refugees, Immigration and Integration upheld the decision by the Aliens Authority of 1 July 2003 to refuse to grant the second applicant a residence permit. It pointed out that in practice, the residing person was required to have stayed in Denmark for approximately twelve years, provided that an effort had been made to integrate. In the case before it, it found that the applicants\u2019 aggregate ties to Denmark were not stronger than their ties to Ghana and that the family could settle in Ghana, as that would only require that the first applicant obtain employment there. In its assessment, it noted that the first applicant had entered Denmark in July 1993 and had been a Danish national since 22 April 2002. He had ties with Ghana, where he had been raised and had attended school. He had visited the country four times in the past six years. The second applicant had always lived in Ghana and had family there. 25.  On 18 July 2006, before the High Court of Eastern Denmark (\u00d8stre Landsret), the applicants instituted proceedings against the Ministry for Refugees, Immigration and Integration and relied on Article 8 of the Convention, alone and in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention, together with Article 5 (2) of the European Convention on Nationality. They submitted, among other things, that it amounted to indirect discrimination against them when applying for family reunion, that persons who were born Danish citizens were exempt from the attachment requirement altogether, whereas persons who had acquired Danish citizenship at a later point in life had to comply with the 28-year rule before being exempted from the attachment requirement. In the present case that would entail that the first applicant could not be exempted from the attachment requirement until 2030, thus after 28 years of Danish citizenship, and after reaching the age of 59. 26.  In a judgment of 25 September 2007 the High Court of Eastern Denmark unanimously found that the refusal to grant the applicants family reunion with reference to the 28-year rule and the attachment requirement did not contravene the Articles of the Convention or of the European Convention on Nationality relied upon. It stated as follows:\n\u201c...the facts given in the decisions of the immigration authorities in the case are found not to be in dispute.\nAccordingly, [the second applicant] who is a Ghanaian national, was thus 24 years old when she applied for a residence permit on 28 February 2003, and she had no ties with Denmark other than her recent marriage to [the first applicant]. [The second applicant] had always lived in Ghana and had family there. [The first applicant] had some ties with Ghana, where he had lived with his uncle while attending school in Ghana for ten years. He entered Denmark in 1993 at the age of 22 and became a Danish national on 22 April 2002. [The applicants] married in Ghana on 22 February 2003 and have lived in Sweden since 15 November 2003 with their child, born on 6 May 2004. [The first applicant] has told the High Court that the family can settle lawfully in Ghana if he obtains paid employment in that country.\nIt appears from a Supreme Court judgment of 13 April 2005, reproduced on page 2086 in the Danish Weekly Law Reports (Ugeskrift for Retsv\u00e6sen) for 2005, that Article 8 of the Convention does not impose on the Contracting States any general obligation to respect immigrants\u2019 choices as to the country of their residence in connection with marriage, or otherwise to authorise family reunion.\nIn view of the information on [the applicants\u2019] situation and their ties with Ghana, the High Court accordingly finds no basis for setting aside the Respondent\u2019s decision establishing that [the applicants\u2019] aggregate ties with Ghana were stronger than their aggregate ties with Denmark and that [the applicants] therefore did not meet the attachment requirement set out in section 9, subsection 7, of the Aliens Act. In this connection, the High Court finds that the refusal did not bar [the applicants] from exercising their right to family life in Ghana or in a country other than Denmark. The fact that [the first applicant] is able to reside in Ghana only if he obtains paid employment there is found not to lead to any other assessment. Accordingly, the High Court holds that the decision of the Ministry did not constitute a breach of Article 8 of the Convention.\nAlthough the High Court has held that Article 8 of the Convention has not been breached in this case, the High Court has to consider [the applicants\u2019] claim that, within the substantive area otherwise protected by Article 8, the decision of the Ministry constituted a breach of Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention.\nThe High Court initially observes that [the first applicant] had been residing in Denmark for 11 years when the Ministry issued its decision. Although he acquired Danish nationality in 2002, nine years after entering Denmark, he did not meet the 28\u2011year nationality requirement applicable to all Danish nationals pursuant to section 9, subsection 7 of the Aliens Act, irrespective of whether they are of foreign or Danish extraction. Nor did he have the comparable attachment to Denmark throughout 28 years which will generally lead to an exemption from the attachment requirement according to the preparatory work of the 2003 statutory amendment.\nThe 28-year rule is a generally-worded relaxation of the attachment requirement based on an objective criterion. In practice, however, the rule may imply that a Danish national of foreign extraction will only meet the 28-year rule later in life than would be the case for a Danish national of Danish extraction. When applied, the rule may therefore imply an indirect discrimination.\nAccording to the relevant explanatory report, Article 5 of the European Convention on Nationality must be taken to mean that Article 5 \u00a7 1 concerns the conditions for acquiring nationality while Article 5 \u00a7 2 concerns the principle of non-discrimination. According to the report, it is not a mandatory rule that the Contracting States are obliged to observe in all situations. Against that background, Article 5 is considered to offer protection against discrimination to an extent that goes no further than the protection against discrimination offered by Article 14 of the Convention.\nThe assessment of whether the refusal of the Ministry implied discrimination amounting to a breach of Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention is accordingly considered to depend on whether the difference in treatment which occurred as a consequence of the attachment requirement in spite of nationality can be considered objectively justified and proportionate.\nAccording to the preparatory work of the Act, the overall aim of the attachment requirement, which is a requirement of lasting and strong links to Denmark, is to regulate spousal reunion in Denmark in such a manner as to ensure the best possible integration of immigrants in Denmark, an aim which must in itself be considered objective. In the view of the High Court, any difference in treatment between Danish nationals of Danish extraction and Danish nationals of foreign extraction can therefore be justified by this aim as regards the right to spousal reunion if a Danish national of foreign extraction has no such lasting and strong attachment to Denmark.\nThe balancing of this overall consideration relating to the specific circumstances in the case requires a detailed assessment. The High Court finds that the assessment and decision of the Ministry were made in accordance with section 9(7) of the Aliens Act and the preparatory work describing the application of the provision. Accordingly, and in view of the specific information on [the first applicant\u2019s] situation, the High Court finds no sufficient basis for holding that the refusal by the Ministry to grant a residence permit to [the second applicant] with reference to the attachment requirement of the Aliens Act implies a disproportionate infringement of [the first applicant\u2019s] rights as a Danish national and his right to family life. The High Court therefore finds that the decision of the Ministry was not invalid, and that it was not contrary to Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention.\u201d 27.  The applicants appealed against the judgment to the Supreme Court (H\u00f8jesteret), which delivered its judgment on 13 January 2010 upholding the High Court judgment. 28.  The Supreme Court, composed of seven judges, found, unanimously, that it was not in breach of Article 8 of the Convention to refuse the second applicant a residence permit in Denmark. It stated as follows:\n\u201cIn its decision of 27 August 2004, the Ministry of Integration refused the application from [the second applicant] for a residence permit on the grounds that the aggregate ties of herself and her spouse [the first applicant] with Denmark were not stronger than their aggregate ties with Ghana (see section 9, subsection 7, of the Aliens Act).\n[The applicants] first submitted that the refusal was unlawful because it was contrary to Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. If the refusal was not contrary to Article 8, they submitted as their alternative claim that it was contrary to the prohibition against discrimination enshrined in Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 8, for which reason they were eligible for family reunion in Denmark without satisfying the attachment requirement set out in section 9(7) of the Act.\nFor the reasons given by the High Court, the Supreme Court upholds the decision made by the Ministry of Integration that it is not contrary to Article 8 to refuse [the second applicant\u2019s] application for a residence permit.\u201d 29.  Moreover, the majority in the Supreme Court (four judges) found that the 28-year rule was in compliance with Article 8 of the Convention read in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention. They stated as follows:\n\u201cPursuant to section 9, subsection 7, as worded by Act No. 1204 of 27 December 2003, the requirement that the spouses\u2019 or cohabitants\u2019 aggregate ties with Denmark must be stronger than their aggregate ties with another country (the attachment requirement) does not apply when the resident has been a Danish national for 28 years (the 28-year rule).\nUntil 2002, Danish nationals had had a general exemption from the attachment requirement. Act No. 365 of 6 June 2002 tightened the conditions of family reunion, one of the consequences being that the attachment requirement would subsequently also apply to family reunion where one of the partners was a Danish national. One of the reasons for extending the attachment requirement to include Danish nationals also given in the preparatory work (on page 3982 of Schedule A to the Official Gazette for 2001 to 2002 (2nd session)) is that there are Danish nationals who are not particularly well integrated in Danish society and for this reason the integration of a spouse newly arrived in Denmark may entail major problems.\nIt quickly turned out that this tightening had some unintended consequences for persons such as Danish nationals who had opted to live abroad for a lengthy period and who had started a family while away from Denmark. For that reason, the rules were relaxed with effect from 1 January 2004 so that family reunion in cases where one of the partners had been a Danish national for at least 28 years was no longer subject to satisfaction of the requirement of stronger aggregate ties with Denmark.\nAccording to the preparatory work in respect of the relaxation, the Government found that the fundamental aim of tightening the attachment requirement in 2002 was not forfeited by refraining from demanding that the attachment requirement be met in cases where the resident had been a Danish national for 28 years (see page 49 of Schedule A to the Official Gazette for 2003 to 2004). It is mentioned in this connection that Danish expatriates planning to return to Denmark one day with their families will often have maintained strong ties with Denmark, which have also been communicated to their spouse or cohabitant and any children. This is so when they speak Danish at home, take holidays in Denmark, read Danish newspapers regularly, and so on. Thus, there will normally be a basis for successful integration of Danish expatriates\u2019 family members into Danish society.\nPersons who have not been Danish nationals for 28 years, but were born and raised in Denmark, or came to Denmark as small children and were raised here, are normally also exempt from the attachment requirement when they have stayed lawfully in Denmark for 28 years.\nA consequence of this current state of the law is that different groups of Danish nationals are subject to differences in treatment in relation to their possibility of being reunited with family members in Denmark, as persons who have been Danish nationals for 28 years are in a better position than persons who have been Danish nationals for fewer than 28 years.\nAccording to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, nationals of a country do not have an unconditional right to family reunion with a foreigner in their home country, as factors of attachment may also be taken into account in the case of nationals of that country. It is not in itself contrary to the Convention if different groups of nationals are subject to statutory differences in treatment as regards the possibility of obtaining family reunion with a foreigner in the country of their nationality.\nIn this respect, reference is made to paragraph 88 of the judgment delivered by the European Court of Human Rights on 28 May 1985 in the case of Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom. In this case the Court found that it was not contrary to the Convention that a person born in Egypt who had later moved to the United Kingdom and become a national of the United Kingdom and Colonies was treated less favourably as regards the right to family reunion with a foreigner than a national born in the United Kingdom or whose parent(s) were born in the United Kingdom. The Court said in that respect: \u2018It is true that a person who, like Mrs Balkandali, has been settled in a country for several years may also have formed close ties with it, even if he or she was not born there. Nevertheless, there are in general persuasive social reasons for giving special treatment to those whose links with a country stem from birth within it. The difference of treatment must therefore be regarded as having had an objective and reasonable justification and, in particular, its results have not been shown to transgress the principle of proportionality.\u2019 The Court then held that Mrs Balkandali was not a victim of discrimination on the ground of birth.\nAs regards Mrs Balkandali, who was a national of the United Kingdom and Colonies, it was not contrary to the Convention to make it an additional requirement for family reunion that she must have been born in the United Kingdom. A different additional requirement is made under Danish law: a requirement of Danish nationality for 28 years. The question is whether [the first applicant] is subjected to discrimination contrary to the Convention owing to this criterion.\nWe find that the criterion of 28 years of Danish nationality has the same aim as the requirement of birth in the United Kingdom, which was accepted by the Court in the 1985 judgment as not being contrary to the Convention: to distinguish a group of nationals who, seen from a general perspective, had lasting and strong ties with the country.\nIn general, a person of 28 years who has held Danish nationality since birth will have stronger real ties with Denmark and greater insight into Danish society than a 28-year-old person who \u2013 like [the first applicant] \u2013 only established links with Danish society as a young person or an adult. This also applies to Danish nationals who have stayed abroad for a shorter or longer period, for example in connection with education or work. We find that the 28-year-rule is based on an objective criterion, as it must be considered objectively justified to select a group of nationals with such strong ties with Denmark when assessed from a general perspective that it will be unproblematic to grant family reunion with a foreign spouse or cohabitant in Denmark as it will normally be possible for such spouse or cohabitant to be successfully integrated into Danish society.\nEven though it is conceivable that a national who has had Danish nationality for 28 years may in fact have weaker ties with Denmark than a national who has had Danish nationality for a shorter period, this does not imply that the 28-year rule should be set aside pursuant to the Convention. Reference is made to the case, relative to the then applicable additional British requirement of place of birth considered by the European Court of Human Rights, of a national who was not born in the United Kingdom, but who had in reality stronger ties with the United Kingdom than other nationals who satisfied the requirement of place of birth, but had moved abroad with their parents at a tender age or maybe had even been born abroad. It is noted in this respect that it was sufficient to satisfy the then British requirement of place of birth for only one of the relevant person\u2019s parents to have been born in the United Kingdom.\nWe also find that the consequences of the 28-year rule cannot be considered disproportionate relative to [the first applicant]. [He] was born in Togo in 1971 and came to Denmark in 1993. After nine years\u2019 residence, he became a Danish national in 2002. In 2003 he married [the second applicant] and applied for reunion with his spouse in Denmark. The application was finally refused in 2004. The factual circumstances of this case are thus in most material aspects identical to Mrs Balkandali\u2019s situation assessed by the Court in its judgment in 1985, when the Court found that the principle of proportionality had not been violated. She was born in Egypt in 1946 or 1948. She first went to the United Kingdom in 1973 and obtained nationality of the United Kingdom and Colonies in 1979. She married a Turkish national Bekir Balkandali in 1981, and their application for spousal reunion in the United Kingdom for the husband of a British national was refused later in 1981. A comparison of the two cases reveals that both [the first applicant] and Mrs Balkandali only came to Denmark and the United Kingdom, respectively, as adults. In [the first applicant\u2019s] case, the application was refused when he had resided in Denmark for 11 years, two of which as a Danish national. In Mrs Balkandali\u2019s case, the application was refused after she had resided in the United Kingdom for eight years, two of which as a British national.\nOn these grounds we find no basis in case-law to find that the 28-year rule implied discrimination against [the first applicant] contrary to the Convention.\nAs regards the significance of the European Convention on Nationality of 6 November 1997, we find for the reasons stated by the High Court that it cannot be a consequence of Article 5 \u00a7 2 of this Convention that the scope of the prohibition against discrimination based on Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights should be extended further than justified by the 1985 judgment.\nWe hold on this basis that the refusal of residence for [the second applicant] given by the Ministry of Integration cannot be set aside as being invalid because it is contrary to Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights.\nFor this reason we vote in favour of upholding the High Court judgment.\u201d 30.  A minority of three judges were of the view that the 28-year rule implied indirect discrimination between persons who were born Danish citizens and persons who had acquired Danish citizenship later in life. Since persons who were born Danish citizens would usually be of Danish ethnic origin, whereas persons who acquired Danish citizenship at a later point in their life would generally be of foreign ethnic origin, the 28-year rule also entailed indirect discrimination between ethnic Danish citizens and Danish citizens with a foreign ethnic background. More specifically, they stated as follows:\n\u201cAs stated by the majority, the requirement of section 9, subsection 7, of the Aliens Act that the spouses\u2019 or cohabitants\u2019 aggregate ties with Denmark must be stronger than their aggregate ties with another country (the attachment requirement) does not apply when the resident person has been a Danish national for 28 years (the 28\u2011year rule).\nThe 28-year rule applies both to persons born Danish nationals and to persons acquiring Danish nationality later in life, but in reality the significance of the rule differs greatly for the two groups of Danish nationals. For persons born Danish nationals, the rule only implies that the attachment requirement applies until they are 28 years old. For persons not raised in Denmark who acquire Danish nationality later in life, the rule implies that the attachment requirement applies until 28 years have passed after the date when any such person became a Danish national. As an example, [the first applicant] who became a Danish national at the age of 31, will be subject to the attachment requirement until he is 59 years old. The 28-year rule therefore implies that the major restriction of the right to spousal reunion resulting from the attachment requirement will affect persons who only acquire Danish nationality later in life far more often and with a far greater impact than persons born with Danish nationality. Hence, the 28-year rule results in obvious indirect difference in treatment between the two groups of Danish nationals.\nThe vast majority of persons born Danish nationals will be of Danish ethnic origin, while persons acquiring Danish nationality later in life will generally be of other ethnic origin. At the same time, the 28-year rule therefore implies obvious indirect difference in treatment between Danish nationals of Danish ethnic origin and Danish nationals of other ethnic origin regarding the right to spousal reunion.\nPursuant to section 9, subsection 7, of the Aliens Act, the attachment requirement may be disregarded if exceptional reasons make this appropriate. According to the preparatory work of the 2003 Act, this possibility of exemption is to be administered in such a manner that aliens who were born and raised in Denmark or who came to Denmark as small children and were raised here must be treated comparably to Danish nationals, which means that they will be exempt from the attachment requirement when they have lawfully resided in Denmark for 28 years. However, relative to persons who were not raised in Denmark, but acquire Danish nationality later in life, this does not alter the situation described above concerning the indirect difference in treatment implied by the 28-year rule.\nWhen the attachment requirement was introduced by Act No. 424 of 31 May 2000, all Danish nationals were exempt from the requirement. Act No. 365 of 6 June 2002 made the attachment requirement generally applicable also to Danish nationals. Concerning the reason for this, the preparatory work in respect of the Act states, inter alia: \u2018With resident aliens and Danish nationals of foreign extraction it is a widespread marriage pattern to marry a person from their country of origin, among other reasons due to parental pressure ... The Government find that the attachment requirement, as it is worded today, does not take sufficient account of the existence of this marriage pattern among both resident foreigners and resident Danish nationals of foreign extraction. There are thus also Danish nationals who are not well integrated into Danish society and where integration of a spouse newly arrived in Denmark may therefore entail major problems.\u2019 By Act No. 1204 of 27 December 2003, the application of the attachment requirement to Danish nationals was restricted through the 28-year rule, and the preparatory work in respect of the Act stated that the purpose was, inter alia, \u2018to ensure that Danish expatriates with strong and lasting ties to Denmark in the form of at least 28 years of Danish nationality will be able to obtain spousal reunion in Denmark\u2019. In the light of these notes, it is considered a fact that the indirect difference in treatment between Danish nationals of Danish ethnic extraction and Danish nationals of other ethnic extraction following from the 28-year rule is an intended consequence.\nUnder Article 14 of the Convention, the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms recognised by the Convention, including the individual\u2019s right under Article 8 to respect for his or her family life, must be \u2018secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status\u2019. As mentioned above, the 28-year rule implies both indirect difference in treatment between persons born Danish nationals and persons only acquiring Danish nationality later in life and, in the same connection, indirect difference in treatment between Danish nationals of Danish ethnic extraction and Danish nationals of other ethnic extraction. Both these types of indirect difference in treatment must be considered to fall within Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention. The two types of indirect difference in treatment implied by the 28\u2011year rule are therefore contrary to Article 14 unless the difference in treatment can be considered objectively justified and proportionate.\nThe European Convention on Nationality of 6 November 1997, which has been ratified by Denmark, provides in Article 5 \u00a7 2: \u2018Each State Party shall be guided by the principle of non-discrimination between its nationals, whether they are nationals by birth or have acquired its nationality subsequently\u2019. The memorandum of 14 January 2005 made by the Ministry of Integration and the memorandum of November 2006 made by the working group composed of representatives of the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Integration state that the provision solely concerns issues on the revocation and loss of nationality. In our opinion it is dubious whether there is any basis for such a restrictive interpretation as the provision, according to its wording, comprises any difference in treatment exercised as a consequence of how and when nationality was acquired. As is apparent from the explanatory report, the provision is not a prohibition from which no derogation may be made, and the provision must be taken to mean that it may be derogated from if the difference in treatment is objectively justified and proportionate. However, when assessing the 28-year rule relative to Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention, we consider it necessary to include the fact that, at least according to its wording, Article 5 \u00a7 2 of the European Convention on Nationality comprises a general provision stating that any difference in treatment between different groups of a State Party\u2019s own nationals is basically prohibited.\nIn an assessment made under Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention, another factor to be taken into consideration is the crucial importance of being entitled to settle with one\u2019s spouse in the country of one\u2019s nationality.\nAs mentioned, Danish nationals were originally generally exempt from the attachment requirement. The Supreme Court established in a judgment reproduced on p. 2086 in the Danish Weekly Law Reports for 2005 that discrimination relative to the right to spousal reunion based on whether the resident spouse is a Danish or foreign national is not contrary to the prohibition of discrimination laid down in Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention. In this respect, the Supreme Court referred to paragraphs 84 to 86 of the judgment delivered by the European Court of Human Rights on 28 May 1985 in Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom. Difference in treatment based on nationality must be seen, inter alia, in the light of the right of Danish nationals to settle in Denmark, and no significance can be attributed to the fact that such discrimination is not considered contrary to Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 8 when assessing whether it is permissible to implement a scheme implying a difference in treatment between different groups of Danish nationals. In our opinion, no crucial significance can be attributed to paragraphs 87 to 89 of the Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali judgment either in this assessment, among other reasons because difference in treatment based on the length of a person\u2019s period of nationality is not comparable to a difference in treatment based on place of birth.\nIn the cases in which the attachment requirement applies, some of the factors emphasised are whether the resident spouse has strong links to Denmark by virtue of his or her childhood and schooling in Denmark. Such strong attachment to Denmark will exist in most cases where a person has held Danish nationality for 28 years. However, when assessing whether the difference in treatment implied by the 28\u2011year rule can be considered objectively justified, it is not sufficient to compare persons not raised in Denmark who acquire Danish nationality later in life with the large group of persons who were born Danish nationals and were also raised in Denmark. If exemption from the attachment requirement was justified only by regard for the latter group of Danish nationals, the exemption should have been delimited differently. The crucial element must therefore be a comparison with persons who were born Danish nationals and have been Danish nationals for 28 years, but who were not raised in Denmark and may perhaps not at any time have had their residence in Denmark. In our opinion, it cannot be considered a fact that, from a general perspective, this group of Danish nationals has stronger ties with Denmark than persons who have acquired Danish nationality after entering and residing in Denmark for a number of years. It should be taken into consideration in that connection that one of the general conditions for acquiring Danish nationality by naturalisation is that the relevant person has resided in Denmark for at least nine years, has proved his or her proficiency in the Danish language and knowledge of Danish society and meets the requirement of self-support.\nAgainst that background, it is our opinion that the indirect difference in treatment implied by the 28-year rule cannot be considered objectively justified, and that it is therefore contrary to Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention.\nThe consequence of this must be that, when applying section 9, subsection 7, of the Aliens Act to Danish nationals, the authorities must limit the 28-year rule to being solely an age requirement, meaning that the attachment requirement does not apply in cases where the resident spouse is a Danish national and is at least 28 years old.\nAccordingly, we vote for ruling in favour of the [applicants\u2019] claim to the effect that the Ministry of Integration must declare invalid the decision of 27 August 2004, thereby remitting the case for renewed consideration.\nIn view of the outcome of the voting on this claim we see no reason to consider the claim for compensation.\u201d 31.  The applicants remained in Sweden and did not subsequently apply for family reunion in Denmark, which they could have done under section 9, subsection 7 of the Aliens Act, had the first applicant decided to reside in Denmark anew. He maintained a job in Copenhagen and therefore commuted every day from Malm\u00f6 in Sweden to Copenhagen in Denmark.", "references": ["2", "9", "7", "3", "5", "0", "1", "6", "No Label", "8", "4"], "gold": ["8", "4"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1992 and lives in Cotiglet, Romania. At the time of the events complained of, she was aged fourteen years and four months. 6.  On 13 January 2007 the applicant was attending a funeral wake in her village. At around 8 p.m. she went with two girlfriends, P.A. (ten years old) and Z.F.D. (fourteen years old) to fetch some drinking water at a neighbour\u2019s house. On their way, three boys, M.I.C. (fifteen years old), M.S. (fifteen years old) and M.C.S. (sixteen years old), approached the girls. M.I.C. pulled the applicant\u2019s arm behind her back, grabbed her head and told her to go with him. The boys took her into the garden of a nearby deserted building, where a man, M.C. (twenty-two years old), was waiting. 7.  The three boys left and M.C. pushed the applicant to the ground, partially undressed her and had sexual intercourse with her. In the meantime, another man, A.C.L. (twenty-six years old), arrived at the scene and tried to have sex with the applicant, but was physiologically incapable. A third man, V.F. (thirty years old) was also there. He had also intended to have sexual intercourse with the applicant but finally decided to help her get up, clean and dress herself, and accompanied her back to the house where the funeral wake was being held. Twenty minutes later the applicant\u2019s father came looking for her and she told him that she had been raped. He immediately alerted the police. 8.  The applicant underwent a forensic examination by a doctor on 14 January 2007. According to the subsequent forensic medical report, there were no signs of traumatic lesions on the applicant\u2019s body and no sperm could be found either. The forensic doctor found signs of pathology which could have resulted from sexual intercourse. Lastly, the doctor mentioned that the applicant was in a state of anxiety and fear, and he recommended psychological counselling and possibly a neuropsychiatric examination. 9.  On 15 February 2007 the applicant was admitted to the Oradea Psychiatric Hospital. The hospital observation sheet stated that the applicant had sought treatment because she had been raped. She was diagnosed with stress-related anxiety, irritability, a sleep disorder, slight intellectual disability (an IQ of 68) and lice infestation. She was prescribed treatment with anxiolytics and anti-depressives, and was discharged from hospital in a slightly improved condition on 20 February 2007. 10.  On 5 March 2007 an additional forensic medical report was issued at the request of the applicant\u2019s father. It stated that the applicant presented a psychological disorder caused by a physical and psychological trauma to which she had been exposed on 13 January 2007. The doctor held that, according to the documents presented by the Oradea Psychiatric Hospital, the applicant\u2019s condition had required fourteen days of medical care. No signs of pregnancy had been detected. 11.  On 24 April 2007 the applicant was readmitted to the Oradea Psychiatric Hospital. According to the hospital observation sheet, her state of health was slightly improving but she had started to have headaches. She was discharged from hospital the following day, having been told to continue the initial treatment and to return for further tests at the end of May. 12.  In July 2007 the applicant was again hospitalised in the Oradea Psychiatric Hospital for fourteen days with symptoms including frontal headaches, depression, tearfulness and feelings of social isolation. She was diagnosed with an emotional disorder, a sleep disorder and anaemia, among other conditions. She received treatment with neurotropic drugs, anxiolytics and vitamins. The doctors prescribed further treatment with neurotropic drugs and anxiolytics until a follow-up examination scheduled for September. 13.  On 14 January 2007 the applicant, accompanied by her father, lodged a formal complaint with the police. On the same day she made a written statement about the events of the previous day, accusing the three adult men involved in the incident of rape. She also mentioned that, all the way to the deserted house, M.I.C. and M.S. had held her by her arms and neck, not allowing her to leave, and had threatened to beat her if she screamed for help. The police accompanied the applicant and her father to the scene of the incident and took photographs. No objects or other evidence were found. 14.  Later the same day, written statements were given to the police by M.C. and M.I.C. M.C. stated that he had not forced the applicant in any way and he had not been aware that she was under fifteen. He alleged that he had seen the applicant during the wake and had invited her to go with him to the deserted house, which she had done voluntarily. After he had had consensual sex with the applicant, he had left her in the company of M.C.S. and had returned to the wake. M.I.C. denied any involvement in the events, stating that he had not left the house where the wake had been held. 15. On 15 January 2007 A.C.L., V.F. and M.C.S. gave statements to the police. 16.  A.C.L. stated that on the evening of 13 January 2007 he had been passing by the deserted house when he had heard noises coming from the garden. He decided to go inside to see what was happening. There he met V.F., who told him that M.C. was there with a girl. He saw M.C. on top of the applicant, having sex. After he had finished, M.C. called him to do the same thing. He tried, but was physiologically incapable of having sex so he stood up and put his clothes back on. He left together with M.C., who was waiting for him nearby. 17.  M.C.S. stated that he had seen how M.I.C. had grabbed and twisted the applicant\u2019s arm and had left with her from the wake. He had followed them together with M.S., but received a phone call and continued on a separate road. 18.  In his statement, V.F. claimed that he had been at the wake when the applicant\u2019s brothers had asked him to help them look for their sister. He left alone and went to the deserted house where he found the applicant with M.C. A.C.L. was also there. At that moment his phone rang so he did not pay attention to the three people. When he finished on the phone he heard the applicant calling him and went to her. She was alone, lying on the ground, undressed from the waist down. He asked her what had happened but she did not say anything. When she asked him to come closer, he started kissing her and wanted to have sex with her, but felt uneasy about it, so he helped her get dressed and clean up the mud on her coat, and accompanied her back to the wake. 19.  On 17 January 2007 the applicant\u2019s two girlfriends made statements to the police. They mentioned that M.I.C., M.S. and M.C.S. had approached the applicant, twisted her arm to her back and taken her with them. When she returned to the wake, the applicant did not tell them where she had been. P.A. also stated that she had heard the applicant shouting at the three boys to leave her alone. Z.F. had also seen the three boys surround the applicant and take her with them. 20.  The applicant gave another detailed account of the facts in a statement drafted on 18 January 2007. She repeated that the three boys had forced her to go with them without saying where they were taking her, so she had not known what was going on. Once they arrived at the deserted house, there was M.C. who threatened to beat her if she would not accept to have sex with him. She further clarified that M.C.S. had kept her there by force until M.C. had raped her a second time. Then A.C.L. and V.F. came around and tried to rape her but failed and it was V.F. who had finally helped her leave the scene of the incident. Lastly, she mentioned that she had never had sex before the incident of 13 January and that M.C., A.C.L. and V.F. had known her and had been aware of her age. 21. M.S. stated to the police on 22 January 2007 that he had heard M.C. asking M.I.C. to take the applicant to the deserted house without telling her why. When the girls came out of the house where the wake was being held, he saw M.I.C. going after them and grabbing the applicant\u2019s head, twisting her arm to her back and taking her in the direction of the deserted house. He denied having touched or spoken to the applicant. He had just walked behind her and continued on his way past the deserted house. M.C.S. gave the same account of the facts. 22.  M.I.C. was questioned again on 22 January 2007, when he re\u2011considered his initial statement and told the police that M.C. had asked him, M.S. and M.C.S. to \u201cgrab\u201d the applicant and take her to the deserted house. He then admitted having grabbed her by the arms, but claimed that afterwards she had walked along with him voluntarily. 23.  On 6 February 2007 the police took another round of statements from those involved in the events, who reiterated their previous statements. In addition, all the men questioned stated that they knew for a fact that the applicant had had sex before with other men and that they had been unaware of her age at the time. 24.  On 2 March 2007 the case was transmitted to the prosecutor\u2019s office attached to the Bihor County Court in order for it to pursue the investigation into the crime of sexual intercourse with a minor. 25.  On 26 April 2007 the applicant gave a statement before the prosecutor and requested that M.C., A.C.L., M.I.C., M.C.S. and M.S. be investigated for rape and complicity to rape. 26.  M.C. and A.C.L. also gave brief statements before the prosecutor. M.C. claimed on this occasion that the applicant was the one who had sent word through M.I.C. that she wished to meet with him. A.C.L. stated that he knew the applicant had already had sex before and she had poor school results. 27.  On 23 May 2007 the prosecutor indicted M.C. for the crime of sexual intercourse with a minor and A.C.L. for attempt to commit the same crime. The prosecutor based the decision on the following facts: the two men declared that they had not forced the applicant in any way; the forensic medical certificate attested to no signs of violence on the applicant\u2019s body; and after returning to the wake she had not told her girlfriends what had happened to her. In view of those elements it was considered that the applicant had consented to have sex with M.C. and A.C.L. The witnesses, M.I.C., M.C.S. and M.S., did not know about M.C.\u2019s intentions and therefore it was considered that they had no criminal responsibility in the case. The criminal proceedings were discontinued with respect to V.F. because he had not had sexual intercourse with the applicant. 28.  The Beiu\u015f District Court scheduled a first hearing in the case on 15 June 2007. The applicant stressed before the court that M.C. had twice had sexual intercourse with her without her consent. In support of her allegations, she submitted copies of the medical reports referred to in paragraphs 8-11 above. She also claimed civil damages for the suffering caused by the actions of the two defendants. 29.  M.C. testified before the court that, once he had arrived at the funeral wake, M.I.C. had told him that the applicant was waiting for him at the deserted house. When he reached the meeting point, the applicant started kissing him and asked him to go with her to the back of the garden, away from the road. They then lay down on his coat and the applicant started undressing herself. They had sexual intercourse once, which was consensual. He did it because V.F. had told him once that he had had sex with the applicant in the past. Lastly, M.C. mentioned that he had done this before with other girls at other funeral wakes. 30.  A.C.L. reiterated the statements he had given during the investigation. He concluded his testimony before the court with the remark:\n\u201c... I was asked by someone in the village whether it was true what happened and whether I was not ashamed of what I had done, but I replied that it was not safe to leave girls alone on the streets.\u201d 31.  On 31 August and 28 September 2007 the court heard statements from the applicant\u2019s two girlfriends, as well as from M.I.C. and M.C.S. In her testimony Z.F. claimed that the applicant had been scared when she had returned to the wake. She also mentioned that the applicant was a well\u2011behaved girl who did not go out with boys or go to bars. M.C.S. stated that he had heard the applicant asking M.I.C. to let go of her hand, but the latter had refused. 32.  In his testimony M.I.C. also stated as follows:\n\u201cThe next morning we went to the police to give statements and afterwards I asked M.C. what had really happened. He then told me that he had raped her [the applicant]. He did not seem too happy about his actions. We have played this game before at another wake: you must take the girl to a secluded place where she must be kissed by the boy she chooses. When the defendant [M.C.] told me he had raped the victim, he also mentioned that he had kissed her.\u201d 33.  On 12 October 2007 the Beiu\u015f District Court convicted M.C. of sexual intercourse with a minor and gave him a suspended sentence of one year and four months. A.C.L. was convicted of attempted sexual intercourse with a minor and given a suspended sentence of one year. 34.  In reaching its decision the court firstly observed that the forensic medical report indicated that no signs of violence had been detected on the victim\u2019s body. The court further established the course of the events on the evening of 13 January 2007 as described by M.I.C., M.C.S. and M.S. It cited the parts of the statements given by the applicant\u2019s two girlfriends in which they had mentioned that the applicant had not cried for help. Lastly, the court concluded that the two defendants ought to have known that the injured party was under the age of fifteen. The court did not address the applicant\u2019s statement, the medical reports attesting to her medical condition or her requests for the incident to be examined as rape. It rejected her claim for civil damages, considering that the medical conditions described in the forensic reports had no connection with the incident at issue. In addition, it had come to light from witness statements that the applicant had had sex before the impugned incident. 35. All parties to the trial, including the applicant represented by her lawyer, appealed against the decision of the Beiu\u015f District Court. In her reasons for appeal the applicant claimed that the sexual abuse committed against her could only be classified as rape. She asked the court to extend the examination of the case to M.I.C., M.C.S. and M.S., whom she considered accomplices to rape. Lastly, the applicant considered that the medical reports submitted clearly attested to the suffering she had endured and therefore the court had erred in rejecting her claim for damages. 36.  On 27 February 2008 the Bihor County Court decided to increase the sentences imposed on the two defendants to three years\u2019 imprisonment for M.C. and eighteen months\u2019 imprisonment for A.C.L. The decision of the Beiu\u015f District Court concerning the classification of the crime and the suspension of the execution of the sentences was upheld. The County Court also decided to award the applicant 2,000 Romanian lei (RON) (approximately 600 euros (EUR)) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. In reply to the applicant\u2019s reasons for appeal, the court reasoned:\n\u201cIt must be mentioned that the victim tried to convince the court that, in fact, she had not agreed to have sexual intercourse with the two defendants and that she had been the victim of a rape, but these allegations had not been proved in any way. Hence, the witnesses Z.F. and P.A. ... stated that ... the injured party had not cried for help ... and had not told them what had happened. ...\nIt must also be noted that from the forensic medical report ... it does not appear that the injured party was the victim of a rape, since she displayed no signs of post\u2011traumatic injury on her body.\u201d 37.  An appeal on points of law (recurs) lodged by the applicant against that judgment was rejected as ill-founded on 8 May 2008 by the Oradea Court of Appeal. The court declared briefly that by corroborating the victim\u2019s statement with the forensic medical report of 14 January 2007, the existence of a crime of rape had been excluded in the case.", "references": ["9", "0", "2", "6", "4", "5", "8", "7", "3", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1969 and lived until his arrest in Moscow, having worked as a notary. 6.  On 22 November 2003 the Khamovnicheskiy district prosecutor in Moscow opened a criminal investigation into the attempted murder of a certain Mr P. Police officers questioned the applicant. Two months later the case was closed in view of the finding that there was no actus reus. 7.  On 15 April 2005 the criminal case was reopened and joined to the criminal proceedings instituted in respect of the killings of Mr Paul Khlebnikov, the founding editor of the Russian edition of Forbes magazine, and Mr Yan Sergunin, a former Deputy Prime Minister of Chechnya. Only two weeks separated the two murders, which were believed to have been connected in light of the fact that Mr Khlebnikov had been in contact with Mr Sergunin not long before his death. 8.  On 24 May 2005 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of having organised the murders. Two days later the Basmannyy District Court, Moscow, (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) authorised his detention during the investigation, having assessed the gravity of the charges and the risk of the applicant absconding, reoffending and interference with witness. 9.  On 21 July 2005 the District Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 9 October 2005, citing the gravity of the charges and the particular complexity of the case, and having looked into the state of the applicant\u2019s health and not considering it to be serious enough to justify his release. The District Court found that other measures of restraint could not be applied because the circumstances which had prompted the applicant\u2019s arrest had not changed. 10.  The pre-trial investigation was completed on 31 August 2005, and a week later the applicant and his lawyers commenced reading the thirty\u2011seven-volume case file. 11.  In September 2005 an investigator lodged an application with the District Court, seeking a further extension of the applicant\u2019s detention, in particular because the defence had not yet completed its study of the case file. 12.  On 27 September 2005 the court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 9 December 2005, having noted, inter alia, that the applicant had only read three, and his lawyer nine, volumes and that they therefore needed additional time. The court also reiterated its previous reasoning invoking the gravity of the charges against the applicant and his ability to hamper the proceedings if released. In addition it noted that the applicant\u2019s personal and family situation, as well as his state of health, did not outweigh the reasons for his continued detention. 13.  Having finished studying the file, on 22 November 2005 the applicant was committed to stand trial before the Moscow City Court (\u201cthe City Court\u201d). 14.  On 1 December 2005 the City Court scheduled a preliminary hearing and collectively extended the applicant\u2019s and his co-defendants\u2019 detention for an unspecified period. In so doing, the court merely referred to the absence of any change in the circumstances which had initially prompted the accuseds\u2019 detention. 15.  After the preliminary hearing the City Court authorised a trial by jury, fixed the first trial hearing for 29 December 2005 and once more collectively extended the detention of the defendants, including the applicant, for an unspecified period of time, again citing exclusively the gravity of the charges. 16.  During a hearing of 15 February 2006 the applicant\u2019s lawyer asked the City Court to release the applicant, arguing that his detention pending trial was not based on sufficient and valid reasons and was therefore in breach of Article 5 \u00a7 3 of the Convention. The court refused to release the applicant because the grounds which had been cited in the previous orders extending his detention had not ceased to exist. 17.  The applicant appealed against the decision of 15 February 2006. His statement of appeal bears the stamp of the City Court and indicates that it was lodged on 21 February 2006. Seventeen days later his lawyer received a letter from the presiding judge, stating that the appeal could not be accepted because Russian procedural law did not provide for the possibility to appeal against intermediate decisions issued by a trial court. 18.  In a hearing on 4 April 2006 the applicant\u2019s lawyers again asked the City Court to release him, stating that his health had seriously deteriorated. The court refused the request, using wording identical to that of its decision of 15 February 2006. 19.  The applicant\u2019s lawyers appealed. A stamp on the appeal statement indicates that it reached the City Court on 12 April 2006. Five days later the court returned the statement to the lawyers, noting that the decision of 4 April 2006 was not amenable to appeal. 20.  A similar request for release was lodged by the applicant\u2019s lawyers on 19 April 2006. That request was also refused by the City Court, which ruled that the detention had been lawfully authorised on 6 December 2005 and that there were no grounds for changing the measure of restraint. 21.  On 6 May 2006 the City Court acquitted the applicant and his co\u2011defendants of all charges and ordered their immediate release. 22.  After the arrest the applicant was placed in remand prison no. IZ\u201177/5 in Moscow (\u201cthe remand prison\u201d). He argued that the conditions of his detention between 31 January and 7 February 2006 had been appalling. The facility had been overcrowded and his cell had been dirty and in a deplorable state. 23.  The applicant also complained about the conditions surrounding his transport to and from the courthouse. According to a certificate issued by the detention authorities on 30 July 2010, as well as the daily transport schedule submitted by the Government, on court hearing dates the applicant had risen at 6 a.m. At around 8 a.m. he had been put in a prison van and had been taken to the court house. He had come back to the remand prison at 10 p.m. Given his late return to the remand prison and subsequent body search, the applicant had allegedly only been able to go to bed at around midnight. 24.  On 21 March 2006 the lawyer complained to the escorting service about the late return of the applicant to the remand prison. The complaint was left unanswered. Six days later the lawyer requested the District Court not to hold hearings on Wednesdays in order to provide the applicant with the possibility to rest. The court agreed that at least one working day per week should be left free for the applicant to recover and prepare for forthcoming hearings. 25.  Between 15 February and 6 May 2006 the applicant took part in thirty-six hearings, with the hearings taking place on no more than four days per week. 26.  In 1998 the applicant suffered a craniocerebral injury; in 1999 he was treated in the S.P. Botkin Clinical Hospital in Moscow, where he was diagnosed with post-traumatic encephalopathy accompanied by hypertension-hydrocephalus syndrome, disorder of cerebrospinal fluid dynamics, vestibular coordination disorders, and symptomatic epilepsy characterised by frequent systemic convulsive attacks. The following year he was certified as having a second-degree disability. 27.  The parties provided differing descriptions of the applicant\u2019s health problems and his treatment in the remand prison.\n(a)  The Government\u2019s version 28.  According to the Government, the applicant had not had any particular health problems in detention, save for his having lost consciousness once while being transported in a prison van. He had also attempted to commit suicide. The Government stressed that he had not suffered any epileptic fits and had been regularly seen by prison doctors. 29.  The medical file submitted by the Government shows that on admission to the remand prison on 8 June 2005 the applicant had undergone a basic medical check-up comprising blood tests, a chest X-ray and a consultation with a prison paramedic. Having interviewed the applicant, the paramedic had noted that he had a second-degree disability. According to the medical entry, the applicant had denied having epileptic seizures. A recommendation to request the applicant\u2019s full medical history had been made. 30.  In February 2006 the applicant had attempted to commit suicide by cutting his wrist. The prison paramedic had treated the cut. 31.  A prison paramedic had visited the applicant several times, mostly before and after his transport to the courthouse, each time noting that he was healthy. 32.  Once, on 12 April 2006, the applicant had been seen by a prison doctor after he had lost consciousness in a prison van. The doctor had diagnosed him with neurocirculatory dystonia and given him Corvalol. 33.  During the second set of the criminal proceedings (see paragraph 43 below) the applicant had been placed in remand prison no. 77/1 in Moscow, where his epilepsy had received medical attention.\n(b)  The applicant\u2019s version 34.  According to the applicant, the medical records had not reflected his actual state of health in detention. His frequent epilepsy seizures had been disregarded by the authorities. 35.  On 30 October 2005 nine of the applicant\u2019s cellmates had lodged a complaint with the detention authorities, noting the applicant\u2019s poor health and their (that is to say, the cellmates\u2019) inability to cope with the applicant\u2019s health problems. According to the detainees, the applicant had had frequent epileptic seizures. Once he had fallen from the upper tier of his bunk, injuring himself and a cellmate. As a result of another seizure, he had inadvertently poured hot water over himself. The inmates had also submitted that he often talked to himself or with an imaginary interlocutor. Fearing that they might be held responsible for the applicant\u2019s injuries sustained during the seizures, his cellmates had asked the authorities to provide him with adequate medical care and, if necessary, to admit him to a medical institution. 36.  Medical certificates issued by emergency medical teams called to see the applicant on 14 October 2005 and 30 March 2006 on account of his epileptic seizures had indicated that the applicant had been found by the paramedics in a post-seizure condition and provided with medication. 37.  The applicant had further alleged that the authorities had not provided him with the required medical attention or drugs necessary to treat his epilepsy or at least to decrease the frequency of seizures, of which they had been fully aware. Certain drugs had been sent to him by his family or friends. 38.  The applicant\u2019s lawyer had interviewed three inmates who had shared a cell with the applicant between June 2005 and May 2006. They had consistently stated that the applicant\u2019s epilepsy had been known to the detention authorities, including the resident doctor. The applicant had been initially assigned the upper-tier bunk, but on the doctor\u2019s recommendation, he had been allowed to move to the lower tier to reduce the risk of injuries during seizures. The inmates testified to either having seen the applicant suffering a seizure or having heard about them. They also confirmed that the applicant\u2019s family had sent him parcels with medication, which he had taken under the supervision of the resident doctor.\n(c)  Requests for medical examination 39.  On 12 October 2005 the applicant\u2019s lawyer sent a letter to the Prosecutor General\u2019s office asking it to authorise a complex psychological and psychiatric examination of the applicant. The lawyer insisted that the applicant\u2019s health had seriously deteriorated during his detention, that his convulsive episodes had become too frequent, that the applicant had started suffering from occasional visual and auditory hallucinations, that he had difficulty concentrating and had experienced memory loss, and so on. Two days later the request was refused as unsubstantiated. The applicant appealed. On 4 April 2006 the District Court rejected that appeal on the merits. 40.  In the meantime, on 24 October 2005, in view of the deterioration of the applicant\u2019s health, his lawyer requested the head of the remand prison and the Prosecutor General\u2019s office to authorise a complex medical examination of the applicant by doctors from the S.P. Botkin Clinical Hospital and experts from the Main State Centre of Forensic Medical and Criminological Examinations. The head of the remand prison replied that the applicant was under the supervision of a prison doctor and that he was afforded any necessary out-patient treatment. His state of health was stable and did not require admission to a hospital. In addition, it was noted that a request for a medical examination of an inmate by civil medical specialists could only be authorised by the investigating authorities. According to the response of the Prosecutor General\u2019s office there was no necessity to authorise a medical examination as there was no evidence that the applicant\u2019s health had deteriorated. 41.  On 31 March 2006 the applicant\u2019s lawyer unsuccessfully asked the City Court to authorise a complex medical examination of the applicant. 42.  On 6 May 2006 an investigator from the Moscow City prosecutor\u2019s office instituted criminal proceedings against the applicant. The investigating authorities alleged that between June 2002 and February 2003 the applicant, acting in his official capacity as a notary, together with two other individuals, had forged a will and had fraudulently acquired a flat belonging to the deceased. 43.  On 11 May 2006 the applicant was arrested and on the following day the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court authorised his detention on remand, which was further extended on a number of occasions. 44.  On 31 January 2007 the Preobrazhenksiy District Court found the applicant guilty of aggravated fraud, abuse of position and property laundering and sentenced him to nine years\u2019 imprisonment. On 12 November 2007 the City Court upheld the judgment on appeal, amending the legal classification of the offences and reducing the sentence to eight years\u2019 imprisonment.", "references": ["3", "7", "0", "5", "8", "4", "9", "6", "No Label", "1", "2"], "gold": ["1", "2"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1943 and 1942 respectively and live in Odessa. 6.  On 30 April 2002 the applicants\u2019 daughter was struck by a car driven by P. as she was crossing the street. She died in hospital following the accident. 7.  Between April 2002 and October 2010 the prosecution authorities delivered at least ten decisions refusing to institute or discontinuing criminal proceedings in respect of P. owing to a lack of corpus delicti in his actions. All those decisions were quashed by the supervising authorities as unsubstantiated and further investigations were ordered. 8.  On 9 July 2009 the first applicant lodged a civil claim against P. within the criminal proceedings. On 15 July 2009 he was attributed the status of an aggrieved party in those proceedings. 9.  On 26 October 2010 the Odessa Suvorivskyy District Court discontinued the criminal proceedings against P. as time-barred. On 21 December 2010 and 20 November 2012 the Odessa Regional Court of Appeal (\u201cthe Court of Appeal\u201d) and the Higher Specialised Court for Civil and Criminal Matters (\u201cthe Higher Specialised Court\u201d), respectively, upheld that decision. 10.  On 20 November 2012 the Higher Specialised Court also issued a separate ruling, by which it brought to the attention of the Court of Appeal and the Odessa regional prosecutor\u2019s office a number of shortcomings in the proceedings. It stated, in particular, that the pre-trial investigation had been perfunctory and lengthy. Since 2002, there had been hardly any investigative measures. The numerous refusals by the investigating authorities to institute criminal proceedings in respect of the accident had been unfounded and had eventually been quashed. Guidelines as regards remedying shortcomings in the investigation had been ignored. The overall duration of the investigation, over ten years, had been unjustified. In summary, the Higher Specialised Court held that the criminal investigation in question had not complied with domestic legislation or the Convention. It therefore instructed the aforementioned authorities to take measures to prevent similar violations in the future.", "references": ["4", "7", "2", "9", "3", "5", "8", "1", "6", "No Label", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1946 and lives in Zagreb. 6.  In 1965 the Sisak Ironworks (\u017deljezara Sisak), a socially-owned company, granted a specially protected tenancy to its employee S.K. and his family of a flat in Sisak. During 1991 and 1992 Serbian paramilitary forces gained control of about one third of the territory of Croatia and proclaimed the so-called \u201cSerbian Autonomous Region of Krajina\u201d (Srpska autonomna oblast Krajina, hereinafter \u201cKrajina\u201d). The town of Sisak was close to the border of Krajina. There were targeted killings of Serbian civilians by members of the Croatian police and army in the Sisak area during a prolonged period in 1991 and 1992 (see Jeli\u0107 v. Croatia, no. 57856/11, \u00a7 78, 12 June 2014). Owing to this situation, S.K. and his wife Z.K., both being of Serbian national origin, left the town of Sisak and went to live with their relatives in Rijeka. They left their belongings, such as furniture and household appliances, in the flat in Sisak. 7.  In May 1991 the socially-owned company Sisak Ironworks was transformed into a joint-stock company and became Sisak Ironworks Holding (\u017deljezara Sisak Holding). It remained State-owned and State-controlled. It owned several companies, one of them being Sisak Ironworks Flat company (\u017deljezara Sisak \u201cStan\u201d) which since May 1991 managed all the flats having been previously owned by the former Sisak Ironworks company. Another company was Sisak Ironworks Fortis, which was privatised in July 1995. From 1997 the State ceased to have any share in the ownership of Sisak Ironworks Holding. 8.  On 3 June 1991 Parliament enacted the Specially Protected Tenancies (Sale to Occupier) Act (Zakon o prodaji stanova na kojima postoji stanarsko pravo, hereinafter \u201cthe Sale to Occupier Act\u201d) with regulations on the sale of socially-owned flats previously let under a specially protected tenancy. In general, the Act entitled the holder of a specially protected tenancy of a socially-owned flat to purchase it under favourable conditions. 9.  The applicant and his family lived in the town of Petrinja in their house. Petrinja was occupied by Serbian paramilitary forces in September 1991. The applicant and his family moved to Sisak as displaced persons. The applicant found employment with Sisak Ironworks Fortis. 10.  In 1992 the applicant and his family moved into the flat where S.K. and Z.K. had a specially protected tenancy. According to the applicant the flat was allocated to him and his family by his employer. According to the Government, during the proceedings before the domestic courts the applicant did not produce any document which showed the flat as having been allocated to him. S.K. and the applicant communicated on several occasions by telephone and S.K. agreed that the applicant and his family, as displaced persons, could temporarily occupy the flat. 11.  On 13 July 1992 the Sisak Ironworks Flat company brought a civil action in the Sisak Municipal Court against S.K. and Z.K., seeking the termination of their specially protected tenancy of the flat at issue. The applicant gave oral evidence as a witness in those proceedings. He stated that he did not know where S.K. was. S.K. and Z.K., having been adjudged to be persons whose whereabouts were unknown, had a special guardian ad litem appointed to represent them in the proceedings. On 20 October 1992 the Sisak Municipal Court terminated S.K. and Z.K.\u2019s specially protected tenancy on the grounds that they had abandoned the flat in question. That judgment was upheld by the Sisak County Court on 24 March 1992 and thus became final. 12.  On 23 December 1993 S.K. and Z.K. lodged an application for the reopening of civil proceedings which had been completed with final effect. A copy of that application was served on the Sisak Ironworks Flat company. The application was granted on 12 April 1994 and the proceedings were reopened. The applicant participated in the reopened proceedings as an intervener on the side of the plaintiff. 13.  On the same day, Sisak Ironworks Holding and the Fortis company concluded an agreement to sell the flat at issue to the applicant, under the Sale to Occupier Act. A copy of the contract was submitted to the State Attorney\u2019s Office for approval, which was given on 12 April 1994. 14.  On 22 May 1996 the Sisak County Court dismissed the action by the Sisak Ironworks Flat company to terminate the specially protected tenancy held by S.K. and Z.K. That judgment was upheld by the Sisak County Court on 30 June 1997 and thus became final. 15.  After the Croatian authorities had gained control over Petrinja in 1995, the applicant and his family sought reconstruction assistance for their house in Petrinja to be repaired, under the Reconstruction Act (see paragraph 28 below). 16.  On 12 December 1996 the Office for Reconstruction and Development of Sisak-Moslavina County accepted the applicant\u2019s request and granted him and his family the sum of 29,900 Croatian kunas (HRK) to repair their house in Petrinja. 17.  The applicant and his family confirmed to the administrative authorities that they had returned to Petrinja on 16 January 1998. They had their registered residence in Petrinja between 5 February 1993 and 28 December 1999. 18.  In 2003 S.K. and Z.K. brought a civil action in the Sisak Municipal Court (Op\u0107inski sud u Sisku) against the parties to the 1994 contract of sale, seeking the annulment of that contract. During the proceedings S.K. died. The claim was dismissed by the Sisak Municipal Court on the grounds that the contract of sale had been concluded in accordance with the law, since at that time the applicant had had a specially protected tenancy of the flat in question. 19.  The Municipal Court\u2019s judgment was reversed on 22 November 2007 by the Sisak County Court (\u017dupanijski sud u Sisku). It established that Z.K. had not lost her specially protected tenancy since it had been restored to her and therefore the contract of sale had been concluded in breach of the mandatory rules of the Sale to Occupier Act. It also held that the applicant had known the circumstances in which the former holders of the specially protected tenancy had left the flat at issue as well as that they had lodged a request for the re-opening of the proceedings in which their specially protected tenancy had been terminated. Therefore, the impugned contract of sale was contrary to morals and constitutional principles and therefore null and void under section 103(1) of the Obligations Act. The judgment was upheld by the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske) on 20 January 2010. 20.  On 26 March 2008 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint. He relied on Article 3 and Articles 14 \u00a7 1 and 29 \u00a7 1 of the Constitution (see paragraph 22 below). In essence he complained about the annulment of his title to the flat by the Sisak County Court. In particular, in his constitutional complaint he wrote, inter alia:\n\u201cThe complainant\u2019s right to inviolability of ownership guaranteed by Article 3 of the Croatian Constitution was violated by the decisions of the Sisak County Court and the Sisak Municipal Court because the unconstitutional decision of the Sisak County Court interferes with the complainant\u2019s ownership ...\u201d 21.  The Constitutional Court declared the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint inadmissible on 9 June 2011 holding that the case did not raise any constitutional issues. 22.  The applicant is still living in the flat at issue.", "references": ["9", "2", "8", "1", "7", "3", "0", "5", "6", "4", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1971 and lives in Naujoji Akmen\u0117. 6.  In November 1989 he started military service in the armed forces of the Soviet Union. Medical records dated 20 June 1990 drafted by a panel of doctors in his military unit in Riazan (Russia), stipulated that at that time he had problems communicating with others and was autistic, though he had a normal memory and level of intelligence. He was diagnosed with sluggish schizophrenia, which he had developed during military service. On those grounds, he was released from military service. 7.  Having returned from the army to Lithuania, by 2005 he had been treated in psychiatric institutions no less than fifteen times. In 2004 he was diagnosed with residual and then paranoid schizophrenia. 8.  In February 2006 the applicant attempted suicide by setting himself on fire. He was admitted to the trauma unit of a hospital. 9.  In reply to a prosecutor\u2019s request for information, on 14 November 2006 the Akmen\u0117 District Psychiatric Health Centre (Akmen\u0117s rajono psichikos sveikatos centras) confirmed that the applicant had been attending there since 1999, and continued to be treated there for schizophrenia. In 2004 episodes of the applicant\u2019s illness became more frequent. That year the applicant attempted to commit suicide; he did not accept that he was ill. He was admitted to the \u0160iauliai Psychiatric Hospital (\u0160iauli\u0173 psichiatrijos ligonin\u0117), where he spent about a month before being released for outpatient care at his own request. Since July 2005 the applicant stopped attending the Akmen\u0117 District Psychiatric Health Centre and taking his medication, because he firmly refused any consultations with the psychiatrists. He would also submit numerous complaints to various authorities. 10.  On 24 November 2006 the applicant\u2019s mother asked a prosecutor to initiate proceedings with a view to her son being declared legally incapacitated. According to her, his mental illness started when he was in the Soviet army. She and her husband lived in a house separate from him in neighbouring Akmen\u0117. By 2006 the applicant\u2019s condition reached such a stage that he was afraid to leave his apartment or let his parents in, and he did not take care of himself. He even attempted to take his own life by setting himself on fire. 11.  On the same day, the prosecutor sent the request by the applicant\u2019s mother to the Akmen\u0117 District Court, together with an extract from the applicant\u2019s medical records. It was noted that his schizophrenia had worsened and that he had become a danger to himself. He was thus in need of help from others. It was indispensable to ascertain whether there was a basis for declaring him legally incapable, if psychiatrists established that he could not understand or control his actions. The prosecutor relied on Articles 2.10, 3.242 \u00a7 1 and 3 of the Civil Code, Articles 135, 462-465, 491\u2011493 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and Article 19 of the Law on Prosecution Service. 12.  By a ruling of 29 November 2006 the Akmen\u0117 District Court ordered an expert examination to ascertain (i) whether the applicant was suffering from mental illness, (ii) whether he could understand his actions and (iii) whether he could take part in court proceedings. His mother was to be informed of that decision. 13.  Having examined the applicant in person and scrutinised his medical records, on 8 January 2007 a psychiatrist concluded that he suffered from paranoid schizophrenia. He was also very mistrusting and had strong feelings of persecution. Psychiatrists took into account the letters by his mother to the Akmen\u0117 District Psychiatric Health Centre and the prosecutor to the effect that the applicant did not take care of his daily needs, and had social and health issues and suicidal thoughts. The psychiatrist thus established that the applicant could not correctly understand or control his actions, and noted that he \u201ccould not take part in court proceedings, could not be questioned, and court documents could not be served on him\u201d. 14.  In a one page form sent to the Akmen\u0117 District Court on 29 January 2007, Akmen\u0117 District social services ticked a box to say that they \u201cagreed\u201d with the prosecutor\u2019s request for the applicant to be declared incapacitated. They also indicated that they would not take part in the court hearing, which was scheduled for 31 January 2007. 15.  On 23, 24, 25 and 30 January 2007 attempts were made by the Akmen\u0117 District Court to personally serve the applicant with the summons concerning the forthcoming hearing for his legal incapacitation and care. The copy of the summons indicated that it had not been served because, according to his next door neighbour, the applicant was mentally ill and opened the door to no one. 16.  At a public hearing on 31 January 2007 the Akmen\u0117 District Court, relying on Articles 465-468 of the Code of Civil Procedure, granted the prosecutor\u2019s request for the applicant to be declared incapacitated, on the grounds that he could not understand or control his actions. The prosecutor and the applicant\u2019s mother were in attendance. The applicant\u2019s mother testified about her son\u2019s history of mental illness. She also stated that he had recently been living away from his parents, but could not take care of himself, did not pay maintenance fees for his apartment, and would not go out or take his medication.\nThe ruling stipulated that it could be appealed against within thirty days. 17.  The Government submitted that, given the fact that it had not actually been possible to serve the summons on the applicant, the decision of 31 January 2007 had only been sent to the interested parties in the case, that is to say the applicant\u2019s mother, the prosecutor and social services. 18.  On 5 February 2007 the applicant drafted what appears to be a response to the prosecutor\u2019s request of 24 November 2006 to incapacitate him. Therein he mentions that he received a copy of the prosecutor\u2019s request on 30 January 2007. The letter appears essentially to be a complaint about his treatment in psychiatric hospitals and diagnosis with schizophrenia. He concludes by stating that because of obvious forgery of his medical examination results and clear bias on the part of the prosecutor, the applicant refused to undergo medical examination in Lithuania. A stamp on the letter indicates that it was received by the Akmen\u0117 District Court on 5 February 2007. 19.  Having established that the applicant was legally incapacitated, by a ruling of 6 March 2007 the Akmen\u0117 District Court appointed the applicant\u2019s mother as his guardian and the administrator of his property. The decision was taken at a public hearing in which she, a prosecutor and a representative from social services took part. The ruling stipulated that the applicant had not taken part because of ill-health. 20.  The applicant was forcibly admitted to the \u0160iauliai Psychiatric Hospital on 9 March 2007, after showing signs of agitation and behaving aggressively towards his parents. The police and some firemen had to break down the door of his apartment to get to him. On 11 March 2007 he consented to treatment until 13 March 2007, when he refused any further treatment in writing. 21.  On 13 March 2007 the \u0160iauliai Psychiatric Hospital asked the State Guaranteed Legal Aid Service (\u201cthe Legal Aid Service\u201d) to provide legal aid to the applicant, who was to be forcibly hospitalised. It was granted the same day, and a lawyer was appointed to represent him.\nLater that day, in the presence of a psychiatrist and the appointed lawyer, the \u0160iauliai District Court granted a request by the psychiatric hospital for the applicant to be forcibly hospitalised. The court noted that the applicant was absolutely uncritical of his own behaviour, and that his state of mind at that time meant that he posed a danger to himself and others. The ruling was final and not appealable. It indicated that on 31 January 2007 the applicant had been declared legally incapacitated, and that on 6 March 2007 his mother had been appointed as his guardian. 22.  The Government submitted to the court an extract from the applicant\u2019s medical records, which indicated that he had been at the \u0160iauliai Psychiatric Hospital from 9 March until 22 June 2007. The doctor indicated in that record that a copy of the court ruling of 13 March 2007 had been given to the applicant. It is not clear when that was done.\nThe Government submitted that the court decision of 13 March 2007 had been handed to the applicant by his treating doctor on 15 March 2007. 23.  On 6 April 2007 the applicant signed a document certifying that his treatment plan from the \u0160iauliai Psychiatric Hospital had been explained to him and that he agreed to follow it. 24.  Having been released from the psychiatric hospital, on 26 November 2008 the applicant approached the Legal Aid Service. In his application he wrote that by a ruling of 31 January 2007 he had been declared legally incapacitated, and that he would need the time-limit for appealing against it to be renewed. He also indicated that in March 2007 his mother had been appointed his guardian and the administrator of his property. He noted that he had not known about the two decisions until 9 March 2007, upon his admission to the \u0160iauliai Psychiatric Hospital. He also expressed a wish to appeal against them. 25.  On 31 December 2008 the Legal Aid Service refused the request as having no prospect of success. It noted that the applicant fell into the category of people entitled to legal aid; however, given that the proceedings for his incapacitation had been terminated, his request for legal aid was clearly irrelevant. 26.  The Legal Aid Service noted that the decisions the applicant wished to challenge had been taken in January and March 2007. Given that he had not requested legal aid until 28 November 2008, he had missed the deadline for appeal against those decisions. Representing him in such proceedings would have had no prospect of success. 27.  As to the appointment of the applicant\u2019s mother as his legal guardian, the Legal Aid Service indicated that he had given no grounds for doubting her ability to perform her duties as guardian and the administrator of his property. Lastly, it observed that guardianship could be revoked at the request of a prosecutor or social services. Given that the applicant himself could not apply to the court with such a request, there was no legal basis for providing him legal assistance. 28.  On 15 December 2008 the applicant requested that the Akmen\u0117 District Court give him a copy of the court rulings regarding his incapacitation and the appointment of his legal guardian. 29.  On 16 December 2008 a judge of the Akmen\u0117 District Court wrote to the applicant informing him that those court rulings would not be given to him, because his mother had been appointed as his legal guardian and the administrator of his property. 30.  In their observations on the admissibility and merits of the case, sent to the Court on 2 May 2012, the Government noted that at that time the applicant had lived separately in his own apartment. He had been unemployed but had received disability pension. His guardian had helped him with daily chores. He had also received regular outpatient treatment at the Akmen\u0117 District Psychiatric Health Centre. 31.  On 13 August 2014 the applicant complained to the \u0160iauliai prosecutor\u2019s office that in 2004 he had been forcibly admitted to the \u0160iauliai Psychiatric Hospital and made to undergo medical treatment. The applicant asked that a pre-trial investigation be opened regarding his allegations. 32.  By a final ruling of 11 November 2014, the \u0160iauliai Regional Court held that the applicant\u2019s complaints about events in 2004 were unfounded.", "references": ["5", "1", "8", "2", "6", "7", "0", "9", "No Label", "3", "4"], "gold": ["3", "4"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Klaip\u0117da. 6.  The applicant\u2019s husband, V.B., born in 1953, worked as a mechanic in cargo ships. On the morning of 24 October 2007, while on a work voyage to Brazil on the private ship Vega, he was found dead in his cabin. He was lying on his back in bed, with the blanket drawn up to his chest, his right hand bent and pressing his chest. On the same day, the ship\u2019s captain assembled a commission to investigate the death. Having inspected V.B.\u2019s cabin, the captain sent a report about the death to his superiors in Klaip\u0117da, the Limarko shipping company. 7.  The following day, 25 October 2007, a Brazilian doctor, P.C.J., gave acute heart attack (\u016bmus miokardo infarktas) as V.B.\u2019s cause of death. The Brazilian authorities also issued an authorisation to preserve V.B.\u2019s body (\u017emogaus palaik\u0173 konservavimo aktas). The authorisation noted that there were no indications against preserving the body, and therefore V.B.\u2019s remains were set to be embalmed with the help of chemicals (phenol, formalin and others) at 8 a.m. that day. Afterwards, the body of the applicant\u2019s husband\u2019s was put in a zinc coffin and shipped to Lithuania, which it reached on 1 December 2007.\nOn 25 October 2007 the ship\u2019s captain and chief engineer were questioned by the Brazilian police authorities. The police also inspected the cabin where V.B. had been found dead. Considering that no crime had taken place and that V.B. had died of a heart attack, the Brazilian police sent the investigation material to a local court. 8.  The death certificate issued by the Brazilian authorities on 5 November 2007 gave heart attack as V.B.\u2019s cause of death. 9.  On 25 October 2007 a Lithuanian prosecutor opened a criminal investigation on the basis of Article 176 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 51 below), after receiving notification of V.B.\u2019s death from Limarko. The prosecutor ordered the Klaip\u0117da Seaport Police to conduct the investigation. 10.  On 9 November 2007 Limarko provided the investigators with the following documents: the captain\u2019s service report; an extract from the ship\u2019s logbook of 24 October 2007; a report on the circumstances of V.B.\u2019s death, signed by the captain and two assistant captains; two reports (one by the captain and one by the chief engineer) to the Brazilian authorities; statements by twelve members of the crew; the death certificate issued on 5 November 2007 in Brazil; documents about the work instructions given to V.B.; his qualifications and photographs from his cabin. 11.  On 21 November 2007 the applicant requested that the prosecutor and the State Labour Inspectorate (Valstybin\u0117 darbo inspekcija, a State body responsible for safety at work, hereinafter \u2013 \u201cthe SLI\u201d) examine her husband\u2019s body and investigate the cause of his death and his working conditions on the ship. She submitted that conditions on the Vega were dangerous, and could have led to her husband\u2019s death. 12.  In the meantime, on 16 November 2007 the applicant was granted victim status in the criminal proceedings. 13.  On 29 December 2007 the prosecutor refused to continue the criminal investigation, finding that there had been no signs of a crime or anything to disprove a finding that the victim had died because of a heart illness. In particular, the forensic report from Brazil had shown no sign of poisonous chemicals in V.B.\u2019s body fluids; there had also been no traces of alcohol, and V.B.\u2019s body had been embalmed because there had been no indications against such a procedure. Preservation of the body by chemical means irreparably altered the chemical composition of the blood, and therefore there had been no reason to carry out a further examination of the body. The prosecutor noted that in April 2007 V.B. had passed medical check, which showed that he had been fit to serve at sea. The Vega\u2019s logbook had had no entry about V.B. ever complaining about his health. 14.  After a complaint by the applicant, that decision, however, was quashed by the Klaip\u0117da Regional Court on 13 February 2008. The court held that the prosecutor had failed properly to investigate the applicant\u2019s submission that her husband had died because of dangerous conditions on the Vega. The pre-trial investigation resumed. 15.  Between January and April 2008, the Klaip\u0117da Seaport Police questioned as witnesses the sailors who had worked on the Vega with V.B. The sailors testified that V.B., who was a refrigerator mechanic, worked in the machinery section of the ship, where the refrigerators were placed. There had been frequent fires in the machinery section of the ship during the voyage by the Vega. When fires broke out, there was a strong smell of fumes. When there was a fire in the machinery section, the air conditioning in the ship\u2019s cabins did not work, and the temperature would rise as high as 50\u02daC. In the run up to 24 October 2007, the ship had been preparing to have goods loaded. For that reason, V.B. had worked for about a week prior to his death in the machinery section preparing refrigerators for the shipment. The applicant\u2019s husband was seen working in the machinery section both with and without a gas mask. In the week before his death, V.B. had worked intensively and rested little. No repairs in the machinery section had been carried out until V.B.\u2019s death. After the death, the ship had been repaired in a Brazilian port, after which there had been no smell of gas in the machinery section. The witnesses also stated that V.B. had not complained about his health or stated that he had any heart problems. 16.  The applicant was also questioned. Citing conversations with her late husband, the applicant said that in reality the conditions of work on the Vega had been very difficult as the ship had been in a bad technical state and its mechanics had had to deal permanently with fires and leaks of gas, without any adequate protection. 17.  The SLI\u2019s report of 27 March 2008, no. SD-5662, stated that the SLI had examined the possible cause of V.B.\u2019s death. The SLI held that the reasons for V.B.\u2019s death were not connected to his work. The SLI discontinued its investigation, on the grounds that V.B.\u2019s death certificate had indicated that he had died of a heart attack, and that the authorisation to preserve his body had read that there had been no indication against such an action. When examining the applicant\u2019s complaint, the SLI had obtained internal correspondence between Limarko and the Vega, which showed that the working conditions on the ship had been hard \u2013 the ship\u2019s machinery, including the main engine, would often break down, and the engine emitted combustion gases into the ship; there had also been frequent fires. However, according to the SLI, V.B.\u2019s duties did not include repairs to the main engine or extinguishing fires, and he had not done such jobs. The SLI did not have any other proof that the working conditions on the Vega had been harmful. The SLI also observed that they had not performed any readings on the ship, because they had not been able to check it when it was at sea. 18.  On 7 April 2008 Limarko stated that it had been informed about a breakdown of the main engine, which could have led to a worsening of the working conditions on the Vega. Repairs had taken place in the summer of 2007, and the problems had finally been solved in November 2007. 19.  On 31 December 2008 the pre-trial investigation was discontinued by the prosecutor for a second time. The prosecutor held that no crime had taken place and that the applicant\u2019s husband had died of a heart attack, when \u2018the ship was on a voyage in the Atlantic Ocean near the Brazilian port of Imbituba\u2019. The prosecutor also relied on the testimony given by an expert, V.A. during the hearing in April 2008 before the Klaip\u0117da Regional Administrative Court (see paragraph 49 below). On the basis of V.B.\u2019s medical record of 15 June 2001 that expert had testified that V.B. had a partial blockage of the nerve in the heart which makes the heart contract. If the nerve did not work properly, heart arrhythmia could occur, which could in turn cause a heart attack. The position of V.B.\u2019s body was typical of someone who had died of a heart attack. According to that expert, fire could cause a heart attack if a person had been in a smoky environment or a closed space, and there had been a lack of oxygen. However, a heart attack would happen at a slower pace than a person would die of suffocation. Death from a heart attack caused by a fire could not take a day or week to happen.\nThe prosecutor noted that, according to the Brazilian authorities who had considered that the cause of death was a heart attack, no poisons or other toxic materials had been found in the applicant\u2019s body fluids. The prosecutor also pointed out that V.B.\u2019s health had been checked on 24 April 2007, and it had been concluded that he had been \u201cfit to work in the fleet\u201d. 20.  Following a request by the applicant, on 8 January 2009 she was allowed access to the entire criminal case file, which by then comprised 279 pages. 21.  On 16 January 2009 the applicant appealed against the prosecutor\u2019s decision to discontinue the criminal investigation. She argued that there had been many flaws in the investigation and that the conclusions as to her husband\u2019s death had been unclear. In particular, the applicant submitted that the SLI\u2019s decision not to treat the death as an accident at work had been hasty. The applicant was also dissatisfied that the SLI had not inspected the Vega itself, nor had it questioned the crew members, who could have confirmed the unsafe working conditions on board. There had also been no autopsy, nor any test for toxins in her husband\u2019s skin or hair. The body had been embalmed too quickly, without such examinations. The applicant further submitted that Lithuanian diplomats had not been present when the body had been embalmed. The applicant also pointed out that her husband had been healthy: he had been examined by a doctors\u2019 commission in April 2007 and that that conclusion was valid for one year; moreover, her husband had not complained about any heart issue. The applicant also maintained that even local journalists in the town in Brazil where V.B.\u2019s death had been given as a heart attack had not been able to find contact data for doctor P.C.J., thus raising doubts about his credentials. 22.  On 21 February 2009 the Klaip\u0117da City District Court granted the applicant\u2019s appeal. The court observed that on 10 September 2008 the applicant had asked the prosecutor to order an expert examination to establish whether the constant breathing of combustion gases could cause a heart attack, and to ask the Brazilian authorities to provide the report on her husband\u2019s autopsy and the results of blood tests, as those documents had not been present among those brought back with V.B.\u2019s body. She had also asked for documents confirming whether it had been verified that V.B. could have died of poisoning by combustion gases; for the questioning of doctor V.G., who had signed the conclusion of the doctors\u2019 commission (of April 2007) as to V.B.\u2019s health; and for other investigative actions. Given that the applicant had had the status of a victim, the prosecutor had been under an obligation to take a decision on those requests. However, he had ignored the applicant\u2019s requests for three months, until he had taken the decision to discontinue the criminal investigation, which had been in breach of Article 178 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 52 below). 23.  On 20 March 2009 the Klaip\u0117da Regional Court upheld the lower court\u2019s decision. It emphasised that what was at issue was a criminal investigation into charges of a violation of requirements to protect health and safety at work. Having examined the pre-trial investigation material, the regional court concluded that the kind of breaches alleged by the applicant had not been properly examined during the criminal investigation. Furthermore, as could be seen from the SLI\u2019s report of 27 March 2008, the inquiry performed by that body had not been sufficiently comprehensive either (see paragraph 17 above). Accordingly, it could not be stated that the pre-trial investigation into the circumstances of V.B.\u2019s death had been performed thoroughly. In the opinion of the Klaip\u0117da Regional Court, it was therefore vital to continue the pre-trial investigation and to eliminate the doubts raised by the applicant as to the reliability of the results of the medical examination of V.B.\u2019s body, and to establish whether V.B. had indeed worked in harmful conditions during the voyage, including whether regulations on hours of work had been observed. Should breaches of working conditions be established, it was also necessary to order a forensic expert to perform an objective investigation and to establish whether such breaches had had any impact on V.B.\u2019s death. Without a comprehensive examination of those aspects, it had not been reasonable or lawful to discontinue the pre-trial investigation. 24.  On 24 March 2009 the prosecutor ordered the Klaip\u0117da Seaport Police to establish the whereabouts of the Vega and whether it was possible to inspect the ship; to question everyone who worked on it, including about working conditions, as noted in the applicant\u2019s complaint; to obtain documents from Limarko related to safety at work; and to ask the SLI whether they had examined the actual working conditions on the ship. The prosecutor also asked the Klaip\u0117da Seaport Police to prepare a request to the Brazilian authorities for legal assistance. 25.  On 31 March 2009 the Klaip\u0117da Seaport Police asked Limarko for documents about the technical state of the ship on 24 October 2007, information about the ship\u2019s whereabouts, and whether it was possible to inspect it.\nOn 10 April 2009 the shipping company Limarko replied that the ship usually worked in the region of south west Africa; currently it was near the coast of Namibia. The ship had passed its yearly check by authorised certification company Det Norske Veritas on 21 August 2007 in Walvis Bay port in Namibia, and the inspector of that company had had no remarks as to the technical state of the ship\u2019s machinery. That report was given to investigators. 26.  On 9 June 2009 the prosecutor again asked the Klaip\u0117da Seaport Police to \u201ctake active measures\u201d to question everyone who had been working on the ship at the relevant time. It was also necessary to obtain V.B.\u2019s medical records and question the doctor who on 15 June 2001 had diagnosed V.B. with a heart problem, and to obtain documents from Limarko related to repairs in the machinery section of the ship, to fires on board and to issues of safety at work. 27.  In reply to the investigators\u2019 inquiry of 26 May 2009, on 16 June 2009 the SLI wrote that its inspectors had not examined the working conditions on the Vega because, as far as they knew, the ship had not returned to Lithuanian ports after V.B.\u2019s death. It had not been technically possible to examine the ship in the ports of other countries. The SLI noted that the circumstances of V.B.\u2019s death had been examined on the basis of the documents provided by Limarko and on the experts\u2019 conclusions. 28.  On 22 July 2009 the applicant wrote to the prosecutor, questioning why Limarko had not requested that the Brazilian authorities perform a test for toxic substances in the body as such an examination could have been performed within four to six weeks. She stated that she had not been asked whether any other reports by experts should have been done, yet V.B.\u2019s body had been taken straight away to a funeral parlour on 24 October and embalmed at 8 a.m. the following day. The applicant emphasised that the ship at that time had been put up for sale. She asked that the ship\u2019s documents up to the time of the sale be examined to establish whether there were any toxic gases in the machinery room or other factors that made for unsafe working conditions. She mentioned the records in the logs of the machinery room; the service reports to Limarko by the captain and chief mechanic; the description of repairs to the main engine; and the work which her husband performed on the ship. Lastly, the applicant asked the prosecutor to inform her whether and when Limarko had been ordered to keep copies of its communications with the ship during its voyage. 29.  Between April 2009 and August 2010 investigators questioned crew from the Vega, some of them repeatedly. 30.  In addition, on 7 July 2009 doctor V.G. stated that from February 2001 he had worked as chief doctor at the sailors\u2019 health-care centre (J\u016brinink\u0173 sveikatos prie\u017ei\u016bros centras) in Klaip\u0117da. On 15 June 2001 V.B. had passed a medical board exam as being fit to serve at sea. The conclusion of the medical board examination had been signed by doctor V.G. himself, and it meant that the applicant\u2019s husband was healthy enough to work at sea. The partial blockage of the nerve on the right side of his heart, as seen in the cardiogram, had no effect on V.B.\u2019s health, nor on his ability to work at sea. In the doctor\u2019s opinion, inhalation of combustion gases could lead to poisoning, but not to an acute heart attack. 31.  On 9 September 2009 another witness, V.S., stated that he had been a chief mechanic on the Vega in June 2007, but had later refused to work on the ship because of poor working conditions. Failures of the main engine meant that fires on the ship had been frequent, happening almost daily. All the fires and repairs had been registered in the machinery logbook. Limarko had been notified of those facts. The crew had worked in the machinery room wearing respirator masks, but no gas masks had been provided. V.B. would spend about four hours (per day) in the machinery room. 32.  On 13 October 2009 the Klaip\u0117da Seaport Police transferred the criminal file to the applicant so that she could acquaint herself with it. By then, the file comprised 418 pages. 33.  On 7 January 2010, in reply to a request made the same day by the prosecutor, the Lithuanian Maritime Safety Administration (Lietuvos saugios laivybos administracija) noted that the Vega had been taken off the register of Lithuanian ships, because a foreign company, Pantex Trading Limited (Nevis), had bought the ship. 34.  In reply to a question from the Klaip\u0117da Seaport Police of 18 January 2010, Limarko confirmed that it had sold the Vega to a third party. It noted that the records from the ship\u2019s machinery room, which the investigators had been seeking, had been destroyed before the ship had been transferred to the new buyers, and thus could not be provided. 35.  On 25 February 2010 the investigators again provided the case file to the applicant. It by then comprised three volumes and 565 pages. 36.  On 26 May 2009 the Klaip\u0117da Seaport Police sent documents to Klaip\u0117da prosecutors concerning a request for legal assistance to be sent to the Brazilian authorities. The police stated that in order to establish whether V.B.\u2019s death had been caused by dangerous conditions on the Vega, it was important to establish whether an autopsy of V.B. had been performed and his blood tested (and, if so, to provide the results of the autopsy and the tests), and whether the Brazilian authorities had inspected the Vega after the death to examine the working conditions on board. 37.  On 13 October 2010 the Klaip\u0117da Seaport Police submitted a fresh request to the Klaip\u0117da prosecutors for legal assistance from the Brazilian authorities, this time adding a request that doctor P.C.J. be questioned. The prosecutor then returned the documents, because they had not met the right requirements. On 1 February 2011 the General Prosecutor\u2019s Office sent a request for legal assistance to the Brazilian authorities. 38.  On 3 December 2010 a response to the request for legal assistance was received from the Brazilian authorities. However, according to the Lithuanian investigators, the documents contained only internal correspondence between the Brazilian authorities about the fact that V.B. had died. As a result, there had been no new information relevant for the investigation. 39.  On 24 August 2010 the Klaip\u0117da Seaport police asked experts from the State Forensic Medicine Service (Valstybin\u0117s teismo medicinos tarnyba) to answer the following questions: 1) what is characteristic evidence that a person has died from an acute heart attack and is it possible to conclude that a person has died from a heart attack without an autopsy; 2) could a dangerous working environment in a non-ventilated ship machinery room (where emission gases were present) have had an impact on V.B.\u2019s death, that is, could such conditions have caused an acute heart attack; 3) how long must a person work in a harmful working environment, where there is an elevated level of emission gases, before getting a heart attack. 40.  On 7 December 2010 the forensic experts J.R. and R.S. prepared a report stating that they had not been provided with any medical documents about V.B.\u2019s autopsy (if one had ever been performed), any blood results or other medical records. Neither were they provided with documents, confirmed by special diagnostic methods, about the exact level of combustion gases on the ship. Therefore, they could rely only on the testimony of the crew who had worked on the ship with V.B. 41.  Proceeding on that basis, the experts stated that, in medical practice, death certificates without an autopsy were delivered only when there was documented medical data that the person had been ill with a long-term disease (sirgo l\u0117tine liga), that the circumstances of death were clear, and that there was no evidence that the cause of death could have been due to physical injuries or other external factors. 42.  For the experts, it was known from the criminal case file that V.B. had been found dead in a cabin. Without examining the body, and in the absence of any data about V.B.\u2019s state of health, or information about any physical injuries or external factors (for example, acute gas poisoning), which could have caused his death, it was possible only to state (galima tik teigti) that the cause of V.B.\u2019s death was that his heart had stopped for unknown reasons. In that case, it was impossible to either confirm or deny that an acute heart attack had been the cause of V.B.\u2019s death. Accordingly, it was not possible to establish a possible link between V.B.\u2019s working in harmful conditions and his death. 43.  The experts also stated that the main reason for an acute heart attack was a failure of arterial blood vessels. That happened when physical exhaustion or nervous tension caused the heart muscle suddenly to need a lot of oxygen. Long working hours, in an environment where there were elevated levels of emission gases, was not a risk factor for a heart attack. 44.  The prosecutor then discontinued the investigation on 14 December 2010, concluding that no crime had been committed \u2018on the ship, which sailed under a Lithuanian flag\u2019. According to him, although the existence of harmful working conditions and leaks of gases in the engine room of the ship had been confirmed, they could not have caused the victim\u2019s heart failure. 45.  That decision was upheld by a higher prosecutor, and then by the Klaip\u0117da City District Court on 11 August 2011. The first instance court noted, inter alia, that the cause of V.B.\u2019s death had already been established by final decisions in administrative courts. 46.  The applicant appealed against the decision to discontinue the criminal investigation, arguing that the report by the specialist, J. R., had not definitely confirmed that her husband had died of a heart attack, given that no autopsy had been carried out. She pointed to shortcomings in the investigation, such as the absence of blood test results and toxicology tests, and the lack of documents concerning safety at work on the ship. The applicant also pointed out that the ship\u2019s logbooks had not been obtained, and that the ship had not been inspected. 47.  By a final ruling of 12 September 2011, the Klaip\u0117da Regional Court dismissed the appeal. The court noted that the cause of death had already been established by the final and binding decision of 5 February 2009 by the Supreme Administrative Court in the administrative case (see paragraph 50 below). In addition, the criminal court held that the investigation had been wide-ranging, that numerous witnesses and experts had been questioned and that the necessary forensic examinations had been carried out. As concerned the applicant\u2019s argument about the collection of additional evidence, it was considered as serving no purpose given the amount of time which had elapsed. The criminal court also noted that at certain stage the expert, V.A., had been questioned by the first-instance court of criminal jurisdiction, and had testified that V.B. could have died from his heart condition. 48.  In parallel to the ongoing criminal investigation, the applicant also started administrative court proceedings, asking that her husband\u2019s death be recognised as a work accident. 49.  By a decision of 7 April 2008, the Klaip\u0117da Regional Administrative Court acknowledged, on the basis of the SLI report of 18 December 2007, that work conditions on Vega were bad, and the main engine would often break down, causing leaks of dangerous gases. For that reason many mechanics had left the ship. However, the administrative court also took into account the conclusion by a forensic expert V.A. about V.B.\u2019s earlier heart condition and that fire or smoke on the ship, even if they had been present, could not have caused V.B.\u2019s heart attack (see paragraph 19 above). As a result, the applicant\u2019s claim before the administrative courts for her husband\u2019s death to be recognised as a work accident was dismissed. 50.  On 5 February 2009 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the lower court\u2019s decision.", "references": ["3", "9", "7", "6", "4", "5", "1", "8", "2", "No Label", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Nova Gorica. 6.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows. 7.  On 29 October 2002 the applicant lodged a civil action against company X, her former employer, seeking payment of 3,285.89 euros (EUR) and statutory default interest in respect of contributions made by her into the employee share scheme (trajne vloge delavca). On 24 May 2011 the Nova Gorica Local Court (\u201cthe Local Court\u201d) dismissed her claim and on 13 June 2011 the judgment was served on her lawyer. 8.  The time-limit for appealing against the judgment expired at midnight on 28 June 2011. At 6.54 p.m. on that day the applicant\u2019s lawyer sent a document of six pages by fax to the Local Court. The next day, after the expiry of the time-limit, the applicant\u2019s lawyer sent the appeal against the first-instance judgment, consisting of six pages, by registered mail. On 12 July 2011 the Local Court rejected the appeal as out of time. It held that the applicant had lodged her appeal on 29 June 2011, which was after the time-limit. 9.  On 30 July 2011 the applicant appealed against this decision, arguing that she had lodged her appeal by fax within the prescribed period. In this connection, she submitted a fax confirmation page according to which on 28 June 2011 at 6.54 p.m. her lawyer had sent a six-page document to the Local Court\u2019s fax number. 10.  On 12 August 2011, at the request of the Koper Higher Court (\u201cthe Higher Court\u201d), the competent judge of the Local Court enquired about the faxes received by the registry of that court on 28 June 2011 from 6 to 7 p.m. The confirmation page showed that the Local Court had received a document of six pages from the applicant\u2019s lawyer at 6.59 p.m. On 24 August 2011 the competent judge was informed that the fax from the applicant\u2019s lawyer had been saved in the fax machine\u2019s memory, but had not been printed out. Subsequently, this information was sent to the Higher Court. 11.  On 14 November 2011 the Higher Court dismissed the appeal, noting that the Local Court had received the documentation that had been lodged by mail only on 29 June 2011. It held that the appeal allegedly lodged on 28 June 2011 by fax would have been regarded as within the prescribed time-limit only if it had been delivered to the court before its expiry. The burden of proof that the appeal had been lodged in due time was on the applicant. The Higher Court acknowledged that the confirmation page submitted by the applicant indeed showed that on 28 June 2011 the applicant had sent a document of six pages by fax. However, the confirmation page made no reference to the type of document sent, its content and to which case it referred. 12.  On 5 June 2012 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. She pointed out that section 112 of the Civil Procedure Act allowed the submission of an application by fax and that according to the existing case-law of the Supreme Court an application was deemed to be submitted in due time if delivered to the competent court before the expiry of the time-limit regardless of how it was subsequently handled by the court, which was a matter of the court\u2019s internal organisation. The applicant submitted that the Local Court had received her appeal by fax in due time but then most probably failed to print it out and the document had automatically been deleted from the fax machine\u2019s memory. Hence, she argued that the date when the fax had been sent should be considered as the date the appeal had been lodged and that she should not be made to bear the burden of proof in a case where the document had not been printed out by the court. She further emphasised that a timely delivery should not have any negative consequences for the parties to the proceedings. Furthermore, as regards her failure to prove the content of the fax that had been sent to the Local Court on 28 June 2011, the applicant submitted: firstly, that the confirmation page from her lawyer\u2019s fax machine had showed the date of the transmission, the number of pages sent and the time it had taken to deliver the document to the receiving machine; secondly, on the following day, 29 June 2011, the applicant had lodged the relevant document by registered mail which, according to her, proved that the document in question was in fact the appeal against the judgment of 24 May 2011. The applicant added that, according to information given to her by a telecommunications company and a fax-machine manufacturer, it was not possible to prove the content of a document sent by fax as those transmissions were encrypted. 13.  On 20 June 2013 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law. It referred to its decision of 4 April 2013 (II Ips 603/2009 and II Ips 718/2009) in which it had held that proof that a fax was sent did not necessarily mean proof of receipt of the document. In the Supreme Court\u2019s opinion, there was a possibility that the court would not receive the relevant document in due time because of faults in the telecommunications network or similar technical reasons (lack of paper, an empty ink cartridge, the machine shutting down, and so on). Such a risk was borne by the applicant in the same manner as if the document were sent by regular \u2013 as opposed to registered \u2013 mail, whereby the risk of late receipt of a motion was borne by the sender. Since the applicant had failed to prove the content of the document sent by fax on 28 June 2011, the Supreme Court confirmed that the Higher Court had correctly taken into consideration only the appeal sent by registered post the next day. 14.  On 18 October 2013 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint in which she reiterated the arguments raised before the Supreme Court. 15.  On 11 November 2013 the Constitutional Court dismissed the constitutional complaint for lack of significant disadvantage and for not raising an important constitutional question. On 15 November 2013 this decision was served on the applicant. 16.   Meanwhile, on an unspecified date, the applicant requested that the Local Court reinstate her case. On 7 February 2012 the Local Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s request. The applicant lodged an appeal which she subsequently withdrew.", "references": ["5", "2", "0", "1", "8", "6", "7", "4", "9", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant, Mr Vladislav Andreyevich Gankin, was born in 1954 and lives in Volzhskiy, the Volgograd Region. 5.  In May 2006 the applicant lodged a civil claim seeking to recover excess service fees paid. On 3 October 2007 the Volzhskiy Town Court of the Volgograd Region heard the case in the applicant\u2019s presence and rejected his claim. The applicant appealed to the Volgograd Regional Court. The Government stated that on 9 November 2007 a judicial summons was sent to the applicant by mail. The applicant did not receive it. 6.  On 29 November 2007 the Volgograd Regional Court upheld the judgment of the Town Court in the applicant\u2019s absence, without addressing the issue of whether he had been notified. 7.  The applicant, Ms Olga Ivanovna Shevchenok, was born in 1958 and lives in Tyumen. 8.  In January 2007 the applicant brought a defamation action against a third party. On 6 March 2007 the Tsentralnyy District Court of Tyumen dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim. The applicant was present and pleaded her case in person. On 18 March 2007 she lodged a statement of appeal, in which she indicated her post-office box number. The Government stated that on 12 April 2007 a judicial summons was sent to the applicant\u2019s post\u2011office box. She claimed she had not received it. 9.  On 2 May 2007 the Tyumen Regional Court examined and dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal in her absence, without examining the issue of whether she had been notified. 10.  The applicant, Mr Aleksey Dmitriyevich Belkin, was born in 1952 and lives in Neya, the Kostroma Region. 11.  In April 2009 he lodged a civil claim against traffic police, seeking to obtain a copy of a vehicle registration certificate. On 19 May 2009 the Neyskiy District Court of the Kostroma Region examined the case in the applicant\u2019s presence and satisfied his claim in part. Both parties appealed against the judgment. The Government stated that on 10 August 2009 the Kostroma Regional Court had sent a judicial summons to the applicant by regular mail and had also called the telephone number listed in his statement of claim. He claimed he had not received the summons or the telephone call. 12.  On 19 August 2009 the Kostroma Regional Court quashed the District Court\u2019s judgment and dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim in his absence, without examining the issue of whether he had been notified. 13.  The applicant, Mr Mikhail Viktorovich Kiryushkin, was born in 1975 and lives in Yekaterinburg. 14.  The applicant brought a civil action against his employer for wrongful dismissal. On 1 September 2011 the Kirovskiy District Court of Yekaterinburg heard the case in the applicant\u2019s presence and refused his claim. On 15 September 2011 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Sverdlovsk Regional Court. The Government stated that on 12 October 2011 the Regional Court sent a judicial summons to the applicant by registered mail. Three postal notices were then sent to the applicant inviting him to pick up the letter from the post office: on 18 and 24 October and 7 November 2011. According to the applicant he received the postal notice only on 11 November 2011. 15.  On 1 November 2011 the Sverdlovsk Regional Court rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal claim in his absence and did not examine the issue of whether he had been notified.", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "9", "2", "6", "8", "5", "7", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in Strumica. 7.  At the time when the criminal proceedings (see paragraphs 11-32 below) were initiated, there were four judges working in the criminal section of the Strumica Court of First Instance (\u201cthe trial court\u201d): Judges M.A., C.K., T.D. and G.M. In addition, Judge B.B. was an investigating judge in the trial court, Judge V.D. worked on cases concerning minor offences, and Judge S.D. was on sick leave. 8.  From 2002 Judge C.K. was a clerk (\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0443\u0447\u0435\u043d \u0441\u043e\u0440\u0430\u0431\u043e\u0442\u043d\u0438\u043a) at the trial court. From 2004 she worked with Judge M.A. and two other judges. She was appointed as a judge in February 2005. 9.  In 2004 Judge M.A. became president of the criminal section of the trial court. 10.  On 26 November 2006 the applicant was involved, as the driver of a car, in a traffic accident in which the eighteen-year-old daughter of Judge M.A. was killed. 11.  On 19 January 2007, after examining the applicant in the presence of his lawyer, Judge B.B. opened an investigation against him. 12.  Between 25 January and 7 February 2007 Judge B.B. heard evidence from five eyewitnesses, two experts and the victims\u2019 representative. The applicant\u2019s representative was only present when two of the eyewitnesses gave their statements. 13.  On 8 February 2007, Judge B.B. commissioned an expert report, to be prepared by the Forensic Bureau (\u0411\u0438\u0440\u043e \u0437\u0430 \u0441\u0443\u0434\u0441\u043a\u0438 \u0432\u0435\u0448\u0442\u0430\u0447\u0435\u045a\u0430) (\u201cthe Bureau\u201d), regarding the reasons for the accident, the speed at which the applicant had been driving at the relevant time, whether the accident could have been avoided, and other relevant matters. 14.  On 14 March 2007 a mechanical engineer from the Bureau drew up an expert report (\u201cthe first expert report\u201d), relying partly on the statements given by the witnesses before Judge B.B. 15.  On 20 April 2007 the public prosecutor charged the applicant with \u201csevere crimes against the safety of people and property in traffic\u201d (\u0442\u0435\u0448\u043a\u0438 \u0434\u0435\u043b\u0430 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0442\u0438\u0432 \u0431\u0435\u0437\u0431\u0435\u0434\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0430 \u043d\u0430 \u043b\u0443\u0453\u0435\u0442\u043e \u0438 \u0438\u043c\u043e\u0442\u043e\u0442 \u0432\u043e \u0441\u043e\u043e\u0431\u0440\u0430\u045c\u0430\u0458\u043e\u0442). On 15 May 2007 a three-judge panel of the trial court, presided over by Judge T.D., dismissed an objection (\u043f\u0440\u0438\u0433\u043e\u0432\u043e\u0440) by the applicant to the indictment. 16.  In June 2007 an alternative expert report was drawn up, at the applicant\u2019s request, by a private expert agency (\u201cthe second expert report\u201d). 17.  On 12 July 2007 the applicant asked the president of the trial court to exclude the trial court judges who acted in the criminal proceedings, namely Judge C.K. and the other judge on the trial court panel which were acting in the applicant\u2019s case, as well as Judges G.M., S.D. and T.D., given that the case concerned a traffic accident in which the daughter of a judge in the criminal section of the court had been killed. He further complained that the investigation had been unfair, and alleged that Judge B.B. had been partial. Finally, he stated that he hoped that the president of the trial court would ask the President of the \u0160tip Court of Appeal (\u201cthe appellate court\u201d) to assign the case to another first-instance court. 18.  On the same day Judges C.K. and T.D., who had been appointed as members of the panel in the applicant\u2019s case, gave written statements that the fact that their colleague\u2019s daughter had died in the accident would not influence their adjudication. The president of the trial court referred to those statements, and dismissed the application for exclusion in respect of Judges C.K. and T.D., finding that the conditions of section 36(2) of the Criminal Proceedings Act (see paragraph 33 below) had not been fulfilled. The president of the trial court further rejected as inadmissible the application concerning Judges G.M. and S.D., given that under section 38(4) of the Criminal Proceedings Act an application for exclusion could only be lodged in respect of an individual judge who was acting in a particular case (see paragraph 33 below). 19.  The trial continued, and on the same day the applicant lodged a fresh application for exclusion of Judge T.D., given that he had presided over the three-judge panel which had dismissed the applicant\u2019s objection to the indictment (see paragraph 15 above). 20.  On 13 July 2007 the president of the trial court upheld the latest application for the exclusion of Judge T.D. 21.  At a hearing held on 26 September 2007 the trial court (Judge C.K. presiding, and including Judge S.D. and three lay judges) admitted in evidence the second expert report (see paragraph 16 above) submitted by the applicant. The applicant asked the trial court to examine the experts who had prepared both reports, in order to clarify their findings, which he described as contradictory. 22.  At a hearing held on 19 October 2007 the composition of the trial court panel was changed to Judge C.K. (as president of the panel), Judge V.D., and three lay judges. At that hearing the trial court commissioned a fresh expert report (\u0432\u0435\u0448\u0442\u0430\u0447\u0435\u045a\u0435\u0442\u043e \u0434\u0430 \u0441\u0435 \u043e\u0431\u043d\u043e\u0432\u0438 \u0441\u043e \u0434\u0440\u0443\u0433\u0438 \u0432\u0435\u0448\u0442\u0430\u0446\u0438) to be prepared by three experts from the Bureau, not those who had drawn up the report of 14 March 2007 (see paragraph 14 above). 23.  On 31 January 2008 a fresh expert report was issued by the Bureau (\u201cthe third expert report\u201d). 24.  On 4 March 2008 one of the experts who had drawn up the third expert report was examined at the trial. 25.  On 5 March 2008 the applicant\u2019s lawyer, in his closing remarks, submitted that the trial court was adjudicating a case concerning an incident in which their colleague\u2019s daughter had died. He argued that the practice in similar cases was that the judges withdrew in order not to cast doubt on the court\u2019s impartiality. 26.  On the same day the trial court convicted the applicant and sentenced him to four years and six months\u2019 imprisonment. It found that the applicant had been driving at excessive speed and under the influence of alcohol. It dismissed the applicant\u2019s arguments that the victim in the accident had ignored a \u201cStop\u201d sign and was not wearing a seat belt. It based its findings on the third expert report and the oral evidence. It did not give any weight to the second expert report. Finally, the trial court upheld the compensation claim lodged by Judge M.A., her husband and her other daughter against the applicant\u2019s insurance company, which had acknowledged the claim (\u0433\u043e \u043f\u0440\u0438\u0437\u043d\u0430 \u0431\u0430\u0440\u0430\u045a\u0435\u0442\u043e). 27.  On 4 April 2008 the applicant appealed against the judgment, arguing, inter alia, that the case should have been assigned to another court, and that Judge C.K. had previously worked as a court clerk delegated to Judge M.A. for several years. In this connection he submitted that there had already been such transfers in cases concerning criminal proceedings against a public prosecutor and a president of a court. There had been grounds for exclusion under section 36(2) of the Criminal Proceedings Act. The trial court had not provided any reasoning in respect of the second expert report, and had not admitted evidence proposed by the applicant. The third expert report was identical to the first and contradictory to the second, as regards the speed at which the applicant had been driving at the time of the accident. The applicant further requested that the case be remitted and heard either before a different panel of the trial court or before a different court. 28.  On 24 September 2008 the appellate court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal, upheld the prosecutor\u2019s appeal, and increased the sentence to six years\u2019 imprisonment. The part of its judgment concerning the alleged lack of impartiality reads as follows:\n\u201cThe complaints about a violation of section 36(2) of the [Criminal Proceedings Act] are groundless ... [the applicant\u2019s] defence lawyer applied for exclusion of [Judges C.K, G.M., S.D. and T.D.]. According to the statements given by the Judges, the President of the Court of First Instance took a decision ... by which he dismissed the application for exclusion, for reasons stated in the decision.\u201d 29.  The appellate court further held that the second expert report had not been ordered by the court, that the experts had not been warned of their duties and had not taken an oath, that the court had not established which matters should have been addressed by the report, and that it was for the trial court to decide whether it would accept the report. As regards the applicant\u2019s complaint that evidence proposed by him had not been admitted at the trial, the appellate court held that this did not amount to a violation of the applicant\u2019s right to defence, as the trial court was not obliged to accept all proposed evidence. 30.  On 11 November 2008 the applicant lodged a request for extraordinary review of a final judgment (\u0431\u0430\u0440\u0430\u045a\u0435 \u0437\u0430 \u0432\u043e\u043d\u0440\u0435\u0434\u043d\u043e \u043f\u0440\u0435\u0438\u0441\u043f\u0438\u0442\u0443\u0432\u0430\u045a\u0435 \u043d\u0430 \u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043e\u0441\u0438\u043b\u043d\u0430 \u043f\u0440\u0435\u0441\u0443\u0434\u0430), arguing that the trial court had refused his request for an additional expert report (\u0441\u0443\u043f\u0435\u0440\u0432\u0435\u0448\u0442\u0430\u0447\u0435\u045a\u0435) to be commissioned from an independent institution. Citing Articles 6 and 8 of the Convention, the applicant complained that Judge C.K., the clerk of the victim\u2019s mother (Judge M.A.), had adjudicated the case, and that Judge M.A. was the president of the criminal section of the trial court. He further complained about the refusal to assign the case to another competent court. 31.  On 13 January 2009 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s request and confirmed the lower courts\u2019 judgments. It endorsed the lower courts\u2019 findings and reasoning, without providing further reasoning in respect of the applicant\u2019s complaint concerning the judges\u2019 alleged bias. 32.  On 21 September 2010 and 29 March 2011 the Supreme Court dismissed two requests by the applicant for extraordinary mitigation of his sentence (\u0431\u0430\u0440\u0430\u045a\u0435 \u0437\u0430 \u0432\u043e\u043d\u0440\u0435\u0434\u043d\u043e \u0443\u0431\u043b\u0430\u0436\u0443\u0432\u0430\u045a\u0435 \u043d\u0430 \u043a\u0430\u0437\u043d\u0430\u0442\u0430).", "references": ["8", "7", "5", "0", "2", "6", "1", "9", "4", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicants were born in 1971 and 1975 respectively and live in the city of Komsomolsk. 5.  On 27 May 2006 Mr S., driving a bus, hit the applicants\u2019 minor son who was later that day brought to hospital with severe injuries. On the same day police examined the scene of the accident, questioned S. and several other witnesses. 6.  On 1 June 2006 the applicants\u2019 son died of numerous serious injuries caused by the above traffic accident. 7.  On 9 June 2006 the Komsomolsk Prosecutor\u2019s Office refused to institute criminal proceedings against S. This refusal was quashed on 14 June 2006 by the same office and instructions were given as to further investigative actions. In particular, the police were instructed to find and examine the direct witness of the accident who was an employee of the Komsomolsk Department of State Postal Service (later it turned out to be B.). The case was transferred to the police for further inquiries. 8.  On 6 July 2006 the Poltava Regional Police Department instituted criminal proceedings into the traffic accident which led to the child\u2019s death. 9.  On 13 July 2006 the applicants were officially recognised as aggrieved parties in the criminal proceedings. 10.  Between May 2006 and April 2007 the police conducted two technical and two medical forensic expert examinations, on-site traffic accident reconstructions, questioned S., the applicants and several other witnesses. 11.  From April 2007 until October 2009 the investigation was terminated on numerous occasions for lack of corpus delicti in the actions of S. Subsequently it was resumed by the investigator (in November 2007) or the above decisions were quashed by higher Prosecutor\u2019s Office, due to various omissions in the investigation and with instructions to carry out further actions with a view to collecting evidence. 12.  On several occasions the criminal investigation was suspended because it was not possible to establish a person liable for the traffic accident. 13.  During the above period the police investigator examined several witnesses (including B. on 7 September 2009) and conducted one reconstruction. 14.  Between September 2010 and March 2012 the police conducted three additional technical forensic expert examinations, several on-site traffic accident reconstructions and questioned several witnesses. On several occasions the criminal investigation was suspended because of S.\u2019s illness. 15.  On 5 October 2010 S. was for the first time officially recognised as a suspect in the criminal proceedings. 16.  On 26 March 2012 the case was referred to the Komsomolsk Court. 17.  On 4 April 2013 the Komsomolsk Court, having established that S. had committed the crime of negligence, amnestied him and left unexamined the applicants\u2019 civil claim. 18.  On 25 June and 31 October 2013 the Poltava Regional Court of Appeal and the Higher Specialised Civil and Criminal Court upheld the judgment of 4 April 2013.", "references": ["3", "7", "9", "6", "2", "1", "8", "5", "4", "No Label", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant company, Instytut Ekonomichnykh Reform (a limited liability company), is the editorial body of the Evening News newspaper (\u0412\u0435\u0447\u0435\u0440\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0412\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0438), registered in Ukraine. According to the applicant company, at the material time the newspaper was one of the top nationwide dailies in Ukraine by circulation and was closely associated with Ms Yuliya Tymoshenko, a political leader. 6.  In the 1990s Ms Ganna German worked as a newspaper journalist in Lviv. In the early 2000s she headed the Kyiv bureau of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. In 2004 she became a spokesperson for the then-Prime Minister, Victor Yanukovych, a move which was widely perceived as constituting a significant change of sides in the political debate on Ms German\u2019s part. In May 2006 she was elected as a member of parliament on the list of the Party of Regions, led by Mr Yanukovych. At the material time she frequently presented her party\u2019s and Mr Yanukovych\u2019s views on various television and radio programmes and debates. 7.  On 2 April 2007 the President of Ukraine issued a decree dissolving Parliament. This decree led to an acute constitutional crisis, with the parliamentary majority, grouped around the Party of Regions, initially refusing to comply with the decree. Fresh parliamentary elections were originally scheduled for 27 May 2007 but were postponed; they eventually took place on 30 September 2007. Political parties led by Mr Yanukovych and Ms Tymoshenko won the largest numbers of votes. 8.  On 21 May 2007 Evening News published an article entitled \u201cHow I became a victim of demagogues\u201d (\u041a\u0430\u043a \u044f \u0441\u0442\u0430\u043b \u0436\u0435\u0440\u0442\u0432\u043e\u0439 \u0434\u0435\u043c\u0430\u0433\u043e\u0433\u043e\u0432) written by Mr I. Tkalenko (\u201cthe author\u201d). 9.  The relevant extracts from the article read as follows:\n\u201cOn Friday evening Yuliya Tymoshenko almost lost one of her fans ... I am embarrassed to admit that I almost went over to Yanukovych\u2019s side ...\nAnd it\u2019s Ganna German\u2019s fault. She was talking live on BBC radio and she almost persuaded me. She said that they had eleven million supporters in Ukraine and that the party numbered one million members. I was dumbfounded!\nAnd of course I was impressed by her eloquence. How beautifully she speaks, what a well-trained voice and proper intonation she has. She uses not only words but intonation, communicating non-verbally as well ... Of course, she is such a professional ...\nI thought that after her speech another five hundred thousand would join the Party of Regions. I used to think that one could easily debate with Ganna German. I put myself in Ganna German\u2019s position and it seemed that she must be feeling very uncomfortable.\nI thoughtlessly believed that the question \u201cMs Ganna, what are you doing in this gang?\u201d should make her blush and lower her gaze. She, a nationalist, should be ashamed to belong to this group of Ukraine haters (\u0443\u043a\u0440\u0430\u0438\u043d\u043e\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0430\u0432\u0438\u0441\u0442\u043d\u0438\u0447\u0435\u0441\u043a\u0443\u044e \u043a\u043e\u043c\u043f\u0430\u043d\u0438\u044e).\nMs Ganna dropped hints about not being a rich person, which means that money was evidently not the least motivation for her decision to work for Yanukovych. And although she does it for money, she does it with such devoted artistry that it made me want to cry out, contrary to Stanislavsky: \u201cI believe you! Ms Ganna, I believe you!\u201d\nI did almost believe her.\nAs a journalist and someone who knows Ganna personally, and someone who has even learned from her (I learned from her how not to write), I have constantly tried to put myself in her position.\nI certainly understand, Ms Ganna, that it\u2019s about the money ...\nBut it can\u2019t be that kind of money! A thousand, really? A thousand bucks? Or more?\nI think any Ukrainian journalist would sell himself to Yanukovych for that much money \u2013 for a thousand bucks. I don\u2019t even know if I myself would be able to resist. What would I say to my wife, to my friends? I would say: \u201cYou don\u2019t know Yanukovych. I know Victor Fyodorovich personally. I have talked with him a lot. He is a great guy ...\u201d\nWhat if I were given more than a thousand bucks a month? And [if I had an offer] to become a member of parliament, as in Ganna German\u2019s case? That is, for a flat in Kyiv? I believe that all journalists dream of selling themselves for a flat in Kyiv, even those who already have one. One does not have to do anything complicated for this. One just has to say, with beautiful diction and intonation, that Yanukovych is a lost sheep that has finally found the right path and constantly thanks God for it ...\n...\nI could also say those things. For a flat in Kyiv. And many other simple country guys could say those things for a flat in Kyiv. The problem is, however, that Yanukovich wouldn\u2019t give just anyone a flat in Kyiv. We don\u2019t have many stars, like Ganna German, [whose worth is] that of a flat in Kyiv (\u041c\u0430\u043b\u043e \u0443 \u043d\u0430\u0441 \u0442\u0430\u043a\u0438\u0445 \u0437\u0432\u0435\u0437\u0434, \u043a\u0430\u043a \u0410\u043d\u043d\u0430 \u0413\u0435\u0440\u043c\u0430\u043d, \u043a\u043e\u0442\u043e\u0440\u044b\u0435 \u0441\u0442\u043e\u044f\u0442, \u043a\u0430\u043a \u043a\u0432\u0430\u0440\u0442\u0438\u0440\u0430 \u0432 \u041a\u0438\u0435\u0432\u0435). By the way, for the cost of an MP\u2019s flat one could maintain the editorial staff of a daily newspaper for five to ten years (depending on what kind of flat it is). And each and every one of them would write about what criminals and falsifiers the members of the Orange Party are and what a wise, honest and principled man our Victor Fyodorovich is.\n...\nI listened to Ganna German and I wish I were as lucky as she is. I wish I could sell myself like that! That is of course the highest point in a journalist\u2019s career. Not even for a flat. At least ten thousand bucks, but all in one go. Alright, for five thousand. Even three. Or for a monthly salary of eight hundred dollars. And I am wholly yours. Or at least six hundred ... But no less than five hundred.\n...\nAll of this is a joke. Pardon me for ... the irony. This is irony, although somebody may consider it sarcasm. No, it isn\u2019t sarcasm.\nAccording to [the] Ozhegov [dictionary], \u201cdemagoguery\u201d is \u201cinfluencing the feelings and instincts of those with low-level awareness on the basis of the deliberate distortion of facts\u201d. For a long time I suffered from not being able to argue with such demagogues as Ganna German, Taras Chornovil, Kinakh, and all the [members of the Party of Regions] and communists. It is not possible to argue logically with them. An intelligent man can hardly stay emotionally composed listening to them.\nWhen I was on Shuster\u2019s [television programme], [fellow guest] Zhvaniya gave me a tip. It\u2019s irony. The thing is that demagoguery requires artistry. An intelligent man can feel the falsity but cannot put his finger on it. At this point you need irony to make the demagogue\u2019s statements sound absurd ...\u201d 10.  On 18 July 2007 Ms German lodged a defamation claim with the Kyiv Pecherskyy District Court against the applicant company and the article\u2019s author. She sought a retraction \u2013 in the form of the publication of a court judgment in her favour \u2013 of the allegedly false statements made in the article concerning her alleged acquisition of a flat,. She also sought compensation for non-pecuniary damage. The applicant company maintained that the statements in question had constituted a value judgment in respect of the legal provision entitling members of parliament to housing support. 11.  On 18 December 2007 the District Court allowed the plaintiff\u2019s claims in part. It found that the following extracts constituted an untrue statement:\n\u201cAnd [if I had an offer] to become a member of parliament, as in Ganna German\u2019s case? That is, for a flat in Kyiv? ...\nThe problem is, however, that Yanukovych wouldn\u2019t give anyone a flat in Kyiv. We don\u2019t have many stars, like Ganna German, [whose worth is] that of a flat in Kyiv.\u201d 12.  The court found that the plaintiff had not requested or received a flat in her capacity as a member of parliament; she had bought her own flat in 2001, before she had been elected. The court considered that the above statements suggested that the plaintiff had become a member of parliament for the sole purpose of obtaining a flat in Kyiv. In the court\u2019s view this was not a value judgment because only concrete information as to whether Ms German had exercised her entitlement to housing support could serve as the basis for such statements. Rather, the statements in question constituted statements of fact which had not been verified or proved by either of the defendants, and were negative and insulting to the plaintiff. 13.  Relying in particular on the provisions of the Civil Code and of the Information Act and referring to the constitutional provision guaranteeing respect for private life (see paragraphs 20 and 21 below), the court ordered the applicant company to retract this information by publishing the operative part of its judgment and to pay the plaintiff 1,700 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH, approximately 300 euros (EUR) at the time) in compensation for non-pecuniary damage. 14.  The court also found that the following extract constituted a value judgment on the author\u2019s part and rejected the claim in this respect:\n\u201cWhat if I were given more than a thousand bucks a month? ... I believe that all journalists dream of selling themselves for a flat in Kyiv, even those who already have one ... I listened to Ganna German and I wish I were as lucky as she is. I wish I could sell myself like that!\u201d 15.  The applicant company appealed, arguing, in particular, that the statement in question had been an expression of the author\u2019s opinion. In particular, he had wondered what could have induced Ms German, \u201ca former nationalist\u201d, to change her political sympathies. Being aware that the Member of Parliament\u2019s Status Act provided for housing support, the author speculated that he might be willing to change his views in exchange for a flat in Kyiv. For the applicant company, the lack of coherence in the plaintiff\u2019s demand that a subjective opinion be retracted was illustrated by the fact that the plaintiff and the first-instance court had been unable to formulate a specific statement of retraction and had resorted to the requirement to publish the text of the judgment itself. For the applicant company, the plaintiff\u2019s failure to formulate a specific retraction illustrated the rationale behind section 47-1 of the Information Act, under which value judgments were not subject to retraction. The applicant company argued that the requirement to retract the statement by publishing the text of the court judgment contradicted section 37 of the Press Act. The applicant company also argued that the author had not had the requisite intent to disseminate untrue information. In support of its arguments it invoked the constitutional provision guaranteeing the freedom of expression. 16.  On 28 February 2008 the Kyiv City Court of Appeal upheld the judgment of 18 December 2007, finding the applicant company\u2019s arguments unsubstantiated and the District Court\u2019s conclusions correct. 17.  The applicant company appealed on points of law. In addition to reiterating the arguments it had raised on appeal, it referred to the Court\u2019s judgments in Ukrainian Media Group v. Ukraine (no. 72713/01, 29 March 2005), and De Haes and Gijsels v. Belgium (24 February 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997\u2011I), arguing that according to the Court\u2019s case-law the limits of acceptable criticism were wider with regard to a politician than in relation to a private individual and that such criticism could include recourse to a degree of exaggeration, or even provocation. 18.  On 23 May 2008 the Supreme Court found no grounds to review the case on points of law, finding that there were no reasons to believe that the lower courts\u2019 decisions had breached any provisions of substantive or procedural law.", "references": ["4", "8", "5", "0", "9", "2", "1", "7", "3", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1952. At the time of lodging his application, he had been placed in a supervised residential facility in Springe (Germany). He was subsequently released. 6.  Following five convictions for offences including burglary and dangerous assault, in 1977 the Hildesheim Regional Court convicted the applicant of committing offences while in a drunken state. It sentenced him to one year\u2019s imprisonment and ordered his detention in a psychiatric hospital under Article 63 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 35 below). The court found that the applicant\u2019s criminal responsibility had been diminished at the time of the acts, owing to infantile brain damage combined with drunkenness. He was detained in psychiatric hospitals in G\u00f6ttingen and Moringen from December 1977 to October 1980. 7.  In 1981 the G\u00f6ttingen Regional Court quashed the judgment of the Hildesheim Regional Court of 1977. It convicted the applicant of intentionally committing offences while in a drunken state and sentenced him to one year and eight months\u2019 imprisonment, without ordering his detention in a psychiatric hospital. The court, having regard to the findings of a psychiatric expert and the results of a re-examination of the applicant\u2019s brain by new technical means, found that he did not suffer and had never suffered from a pathological mental disorder. He had therefore not acted with diminished criminal responsibility. The court considered that the applicant did not have infantile brain damage, and although he had an abnormal personality, he was neither a psychopath nor an alcoholic. 8.  On 11 December 1984 the Hildesheim Regional Court convicted the applicant of seven counts of dangerous assault, four counts of assault, coercion and two counts of attempted coercion. All these offences had been committed between 6 December 1982 and 1 May 1984. The court sentenced him to six years\u2019 imprisonment and ordered his preventive detention under Article 66 \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Code (see paragraphs 28-29 below). 9.  The Hildesheim Regional Court found that the applicant had attacked his victims in a violent manner. The victims had been almost exclusively male and had included schoolchildren. Some had been acquaintances, but others had not been known to the applicant \u2013 people in bars or those who had been randomly chosen on the street. He had either punched his victims in the face, kicked them in the face when they had fallen to the ground or set an Alsatian dog on them, which had significantly injured the victims by biting them, sometimes on the stomach and neck. He had attacked two homeless people whom he did not know with a knife. They had been sleeping in an abandoned building. He had injured the hand, lip, chest and thigh of one and the back and finger of another. Objectively, his victims had not provoked any conflict. 10.  The Hildesheim Regional Court, having consulted a psychiatric expert and a psychological expert, found that the applicant had acted with full criminal responsibility at the time most of his offences had been committed, despite his prior consumption of alcohol. Only in relation to two of his offences could diminished criminal responsibility as a result of alcohol intoxication not be excluded as a relevant consideration (Article 21 of the Criminal Code, see paragraph 34 below). However, the consumption of alcohol had not been the cause of his offences. He did not suffer from any other pathological mental disorder within the meaning of Article 21 of the Criminal Code. His personality differed from that of the majority of the population in that he lacked empathy and saw himself as a strong and dominating man, without that difference being of a pathological nature. He had a propensity to commit serious violent offences against others, where the victims were significantly injured. 11.  On 7 May 1990, having fully served his term of imprisonment, the applicant was placed in preventive detention for the first time, initially mainly in Salinenmoor Prison. In view of another prison sentence he had served, by 7 August 2000 he had spent ten years in preventive detention. On the same day, the L\u00fcneburg Regional Court ordered that his preventive detention should continue. 12.  On 2 May 2001 the Hildesheim District Court convicted the applicant of assault, finding that he had slapped his daughter in the face while under the influence of alcohol while on home leave from detention, and sentenced him to four months\u2019 imprisonment. The applicant served that sentence in 2002. 13.  On 25 August 2003 the applicant was transferred to the detoxification department of Moringen Hospital. By a decision of 18 April 2005 the G\u00f6ttingen Regional Court then ordered further preventive detention in a psychiatric hospital (Article 63 of the Criminal Code) rather than in a detoxification facility, as his rehabilitation could be better promoted there. The applicant was then transferred to the psychiatric department of Moringen Hospital. 14.  The order for the applicant\u2019s continued preventive detention in a psychiatric hospital was subsequently extended. In March 2011 he was authorised to reside provisionally (Probewohnen) in Friedland Castle in Northeim, a supervised residential facility. 15.  On 19 July 2011 the G\u00f6ttingen Regional Court again ordered the applicant\u2019s continued preventive detention in a psychiatric hospital, under Article 67d \u00a7 3 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 31 below). 16.  The Regional Court considered that the stricter criteria set out by the Federal Constitutional Court in its judgment of 4 May 2011 regarding preventive detention beyond the former ten-year time-limit during the transitional period lasting until 31 May 2013 (see paragraph 39 below) were met in the applicant\u2019s case. 17.  The Regional Court found that the applicant suffered from a mental disorder for the purposes of section 1(1) of the Therapy Detention Act (see paragraph 36 below), which was the cause of his previous offences. Following its own critical review, it endorsed the conclusions about the applicant\u2019s mental condition which S., an experienced and reliable expert in the field of forensic psychiatry, had drawn in his report dated 26 May 2010 and supplemented on 24 April 2011. The expert had completed his report on the basis of case files, as the applicant had refused an examination. S. had stated that, just as at the time of his offences, the applicant still suffered from a dissocial personality disorder with marked psychopathic elements, as defined by the relevant tool for the classification of diseases, the ICD-10 (International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems in its current, revised version). This diagnosis had further been confirmed by the applicant\u2019s treating doctors at Moringen Hospital. 18.  Furthermore, the Regional Court considered that there was a high risk that the applicant, owing to specific circumstances relating to his character and conduct, would commit the most serious violent crimes if released from preventive detention. As had been confirmed by S., there was a danger that he would again threaten the lives of others by attacking them, for instance by kicking his victims in the head or setting a dog on them and inciting it to bite them on the neck and face. That risk was particularly high when the applicant \u2013 whom the expert had concluded abused alcohol without being addicted, as defined by the ICD-10 \u2013 was drunk. Owing to his dissocial personality disorder, the applicant had hardly any inhibitions with regard to injuring others, as he lacked empathy. As he did not question his own perception of a situation, a misinterpreted situation could lead to his using unlimited force against randomly chosen victims who objectively had not provoked any conflict by their conduct. 19.  The Regional Court further considered that the applicant\u2019s preventive detention was still proportionate. At that time, there was no residential accommodation outside of preventive detention where his conduct could be closely monitored. In view of his conduct, it was already unclear whether he would be permitted to continue residing in his current residential facility in Friedland Castle. Having regard to the high risk that the applicant would commit the most serious violent offences upon his release, his preventive detention for a period of more than twenty years was not unreasonable. 20.  The Regional Court confirmed that the applicant\u2019s rehabilitation could still be better promoted by detention in a psychiatric hospital than by placement in a preventive detention facility (Article 67a \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 2 of the Criminal Code, see paragraph 32 below). Even though there had been no substantial change in his disorder, there had been some positive development in that he had started residing provisionally in a supervised residential facility. 21.  On 19 September 2011 the Braunschweig Court of Appeal, endorsing the reasons given by the G\u00f6ttingen Regional Court, dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal as ill-founded. 22.  On 24 October 2011 the applicant, represented by counsel, lodged a constitutional complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court. He claimed that his continued preventive detention in a psychiatric hospital breached his constitutional right to liberty. He argued that the strict criteria for continued preventive detention set out by the Federal Constitutional Court in its leading judgment of 4 May 2011 were not met. Having regard to the fact that his offences \u2013 committed under the influence of alcohol \u2013 dated back twenty-seven years, that he had not drunk alcohol since then, and that the conditions of his detention had been extensively relaxed, the experts and the courts had not convincingly shown that there was a risk that he would commit a serious violent offence again if released. Moreover, it had not been found by the experts or the domestic courts that his alleged mental disorder had caused the offences in question, nor that he was or had ever been an alcoholic. 23.  On 18 July 2012, without giving reasons, the Federal Constitutional Court declined to consider the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint (file no. 2 BvR 2270/11). The decision was served on the applicant\u2019s counsel on 26 July 2012. 24.  From March 2011 to August 2012 the applicant was authorised to reside provisionally in Friedland Castle in Northeim, a supervised residential facility. He received regular visits from staff members from Moringen Hospital. Three times a week he was allowed to go shopping in Moringen for two hours, and once a week he was allowed to go to Northeim for half a day under escort. The applicant continued his work therapy in Moringen Hospital. He no longer received any specific treatment for his mental condition or the alcohol abuse with which he had been diagnosed. The aim of his stay in the supervised residential facility was to enable him to cope with the requirements of everyday life by drawing on his own resources. 25.  In August 2012 the applicant had to return to Moringen Hospital following conflict with the staff at Friedland Castle. From October 2012 onwards he resided provisionally in Gestorf Castle, a supervised residential facility in Springe, with conditions of detention comparable to those in Friedland Castle. 26.  In accordance with the G\u00f6ttingen Regional Court\u2019s decision of 10 July 2014 to terminate his preventive detention, the applicant was released on 15 September 2014.", "references": ["5", "1", "6", "8", "7", "4", "2", "0", "9", "3", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicants were born in 1955 and live in Baku. 7.  The first applicant is a well-known human rights defender and civil society activist. She is the director of the Institute for Peace and Democracy (\u201cthe Institute\u201d), a non-governmental organisation specialising in human rights protection and conflict resolution. 8.  The second applicant, the first applicant\u2019s husband, is a researcher and the head of the Conflict Resolution Department of the Institute. 9.  On 30 July 2014 the first applicant was arrested by the police and was taken to the Serious Crimes Department (\u201cthe SCD\u201d) of the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office. On the same day she was charged under Articles 178.3.2 (large-scale fraud), 192.2.2 (illegal entrepreneurship), 213.2.2 (large-scale tax evasion), 274 (high treason), 320.1 and 320.2 (falsification of official documents) of the Criminal Code. 10.  On 30 July 2014 the Nasimi District Court, relying on the official charges brought against the first applicant and the prosecutor\u2019s request for application of the preventive measure of remand in custody (h\u0259bs q\u0259timkan t\u0259dbiri), ordered her detention pending trial for a period of three months. The court justified its application of the preventive measure by the gravity of the charges and the likelihood that if released, she might abscond from the investigation. 11.  On 1 August 2014 the first applicant appealed against this decision, claiming that her detention was unlawful. She submitted, in particular, that there was no reasonable suspicion that she had committed a criminal offence, and that there was no justification for the application of the preventive measure of remand in custody. She pointed out in this connection that her detention was related to her activities as a human rights defender and that she had been punished for her activities. She further complained that the court had failed to take into account her personal circumstances, such as her state of health and age, when it had ordered her detention pending trial. 12.  On 6 August 2014 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the first-instance court\u2019s decision was lawful. 13.  On 24 October 2014 the Nasimi District Court extended the first applicant\u2019s detention pending trial by four months, until 28 February 2015. The court substantiated its decision by the fact that more time was needed to complete the investigation and that the grounds for the detention had not changed. 14.  On the same day the Nasimi District Court also dismissed the first applicant\u2019s request to be released on bail or placed under house arrest instead of in pre-trial detention. 15.  On 27 October 2014 she appealed against these decisions, reiterating her previous complaints. 16.  On 30 October 2014 the Baku Court of Appeal, in two separate decisions, upheld the Nasimi District Court\u2019s decisions of 24 October 2014. 17.  No further extension decisions were included in the case file. 18.  On 30 July 2014 the second applicant was questioned by an investigator at the SCD. Following the interrogation, he was charged under Articles 178.3.2 (large-scale fraud) and 274 (high treason) of the Criminal Code. 19.  On the same day the investigator decided to apply the preventive measure of placement under police supervision (polisin n\u0259zar\u0259ti alt\u0131na verm\u0259 q\u0259timkan t\u0259dbiri), taking into account his state of health, in particular the fact that he suffered from chronic hypertension. The relevant part of the decision reads as follows:\n\u201cTaking into consideration the state of health of the accused, Arif Yunusov, who was diagnosed with grade 3 hypertension and hypertensive crisis, and given medical treatment in the Central Oil Workers\u2019 Hospital and Baku City Clinical Hospital No. 1 ... it was appropriate to choose the preventive measure of placement under police supervision.\u201d 20.  It appears from the documents submitted by the Government that on 30 July 2014 the second applicant was examined by two experts, who issued forensic medical report no. 185/KES dated 31 July 2014. The report confirmed that the second applicant suffered from chronic hypertension. The report also indicated that \u201cconsidering A. Yunusov\u2019s current state of health, it is possible to carry out investigative actions with him\u201d (\u201cA. Yunusovun hal-haz\u0131rk\u0131 sa\u011flaml\u0131q durumu il\u0259 \u0259laq\u0259dar onunla istintaq h\u0259r\u0259k\u0259tl\u0259rinin apar\u0131lmas\u0131 m\u00fcmk\u00fcnd\u00fcr\u201d). 21.  On 5 August 2014 the second applicant was arrested by the police. On the same day the prosecutor lodged a request with the Nasimi District Court asking it to replace the second applicant\u2019s placement under police supervision with detention pending trial. The prosecutor justified his request by the second applicant\u2019s failure to comply with the requirements of the preventive measure of placement under police supervision. The request also indicated that forensic medical report no. 185/KES dated 31 July 2014 did not reveal anything that would prevent the second applicant from participating in the investigation. 22.  On 5 August 2014 the Nasimi District Court ordered the second applicant\u2019s detention pending trial for a period of three months. The court justified the detention by the gravity of the charges and the likelihood that if released he might abscond from the investigation. 23.  On 8 August 2014 the second applicant appealed against this decision. He submitted, in particular, that there was no reasonable suspicion that he had committed a criminal offence and that there was no justification for replacing the preventive measure of placement under police supervision with detention pending trial. He also pointed out that his detention was related to his and his wife\u2019s activities as a civil society activist and human rights defender and that the court had failed to take into account his personal circumstances, such as his state of health and age, when it had ordered his detention pending trial. 24.  On 11 August 2014 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the detention order was justified. 25.  On 29 October 2014 the Nasimi District Court extended the second applicant\u2019s detention pending trial by four months, until 5 March 2015. The court substantiated its decision by the fact that more time was needed to complete the investigation and that the grounds for the detention had not changed. 26.  On 30 October 2014 the Nasimi District Court also dismissed the second applicant\u2019s request to be released on bail or placed under house arrest instead of in pre-trial detention. 27.  On 3 November 2014 the second applicant appealed against these decisions, reiterating his previous complaints and arguing that the first\u2011instance court had failed to justify his continued detention. 28.  On 6 November 2014 the Baku Court of Appeal, in two separate decisions, upheld the Nasimi District Court\u2019s decisions of 29 and 30 October 2014. 29.  No further extension decisions were included in the case file. 30.  The medical documentation submitted by the parties shows that the first applicant suffers from a number of illnesses. In particular, she has suffered from chronic hepatitis (hepatitis C) since 1997. People with hepatitis C usually suffer from constant exhaustion, joint, muscle and abdominal pain, general sickness and weakness, and often depression. A low-fat diet is required to reduce liver damage. The disease is potentially fatal. The first applicant regularly underwent medical treatment in Germany before her arrest. 31.  Since 2009 she has also had type 2 diabetes, which is non-insulin dependent and requires sufferers to follow a special diabetic diet and take regular exercise. In addition, she suffers from myogelosis (muscle stiffness), arterial hypertension and a single cyst in the left kidney. 32.  It also appears from the medical documents in the case file that she underwent surgery on both eyes in Germany before her arrest and needs specialist medical care as a follow-up, to avoid any risk of damage to her eyesight. The relevant part of a letter dated 5 September 2014 from the head of the Department of Ophthalmology at the Asklepios Clinic in Hamburg reads as follows:\n\u201cMrs Yunusova\u2019s right and left eyes were both myopic with cataracts.\nIt is absolutely necessary that she undergoes a repeat consultation and examination for the development of capsular fibrosis, which can lead to visual impairment and needs surgical laser treatment.\nIt is also absolutely necessary that she undergoes a complete bilateral examination of her retina since she has had myopia and her risk of retinal detachment is substantially higher than in normal eyes and is further increased by the previous surgery. Any signs of retinal tears must be treated early with a laser retinopexy to prevent further damage and minimise the risk of permanent visual impairment.\u201d 33.  The medical documentation submitted by the parties shows that the second applicant suffers from grade 3 chronic hypertension and hypertensive crisis, with an increased risk of cardiovascular complications. He regularly underwent medical treatment in Germany before his arrest. He was also hospitalised from 25 to 28 April 2014 in the Central Oil Workers\u2019 Hospital and from 29 April to 6 May 2014 in Baku City Clinical Hospital No. 1. 34.  The first applicant was detained in a cell with four other detainees, two of whom were extremely noisy. Heating was available but inadequate. The electricity was cut off from 2 to 3 p.m. and from 1 to 8 a.m., which made it impossible to use a heater. The temperature inside the cell and in the walking area was very low in winter. There was no proper ventilation inside the cell and the temperature was very high in summer. There was a problem with hot water distribution in the cell. In particular, she was not informed of the distribution time for the hot water and could not obtain more when necessary. Moreover, there was only one refrigerator for all the detainees on her floor which was not sufficient. 35.  According to the first applicant, upon her arrival at the detention facility, she was examined by a doctor who confirmed that she had type 2 diabetes and chronic hepatitis C. 36.  From 31 July to 5 August 2014 she was provided with the necessary diabetic food and medicine by the second applicant who, as a close family member, was entitled to deliver her parcels. However, following his arrest on 5 August 2014, she was deprived of the necessary diabetic food and medicine. In particular, the detention facility administration did not allow her lawyer or friends to deliver her parcels until 23 August 2014, arguing that only the family members of a detainee could send in parcels. 37.  In this connection, it appears from the documents submitted by the first applicant that on 6 August 2014 her lawyer asked the investigator in charge of the case to allow her friends, A.I. and S.A., to deliver her a parcel. He pointed out that, taking into consideration that on 5 August 2014 her husband had been arrested and that her only daughter lived abroad, the first applicant did not have any other family member to do this. On 22 August 2014 the lawyer also lodged a request with the administration of the detention facility (\u201cthe administration\u201d), complaining that on 21 August 2014 employees had refused to receive a parcel for the first applicant on the grounds that it had not been sent in by a family member. 38.  On 22 August 2014 the first applicant lodged a request with the administration and the investigator in charge of the case, asking for a medical examination at her own expense by a doctor of her own choosing, A.G. She specified in her request that she suffered from diabetes and other serious illnesses, and that under domestic law detainees could be examined by a doctor of their own choosing. 39.  By a letter of 4 September 2014, the deputy governor of the detention facility replied to her request, noting that there was no need for a medical examination by A.G. In this connection, he pointed out that the first applicant\u2019s state of health was stable and being monitored by the detention facility doctors. The letter also indicated that on 19 August 2014 she had been examined by an endocrinologist from the Ministry of Health, who had recommended that she continue her previous treatment. 40.  By a decision of 9 September 2014, the investigator dismissed her request, finding that all the necessary measures had been taken for her medical treatment in the detention facility. 41.  On 23 September 2014 the first applicant\u2019s cell was searched. On the same day she was deprived of her right to make phone calls for one month. She was also obliged to take a cold shower because the shower room had no hot water. 42.  On 26 September 2014 the first applicant\u2019s lawyer asked the administration to provide him with a copy of the administrative decision depriving the first applicant of her right to make phone calls. He did not receive any response to his request. 43.  On 14 October 2014 the first applicant\u2019s lawyer asked the administration to provide him with a list of medication prescribed to the first applicant during her detention. He did not receive any response to his request. 44.  By a letter of 21 October 2014 the deputy governor of the detention facility responded to the first applicant\u2019s complaint of being unable to receive parcels following her husband\u2019s arrest. He noted that she had received a parcel sent in by A.I. on 23 August 2014. The letter was however silent as to the delivery of any parcels between 5 and 23 August 2014. 45.  In a statement dated 4 May 2015 submitted by the first applicant to the Court with the applicants\u2019 reply to the Government\u2019s observations, she stated that she had not been provided with any documents concerning her state of health. As regards her medical treatment in detention, she stated that she had been examined on 29 December 2014 and 12 March 2015 at the Baku Diagnostic Centre by C.W., a German doctor from Charit\u00e9, a university hospital in Berlin. During the examination on 29 December 2014, she had been insulted and humiliated by a doctor named R.A when C.W. had been out of the room. In March 2015 the eyesight in her left eye had drastically deteriorated. The ophthalmologist who had examined her on 31 March 2015 stated that the same process would soon begin to happen to her right eye. She further stated that in detention her weight had dropped dramatically because of her illnesses and conditions of detention.\n(b)  The Government\u2019s account 46.  On 31 July 2014 the first applicant was admitted to the Baku Pre\u2011trial Detention Facility of the Ministry of Justice. 47.  She was held with four other detainees in a cell measuring 26.32 sq. m designed to hold six detainees. The cell was adequately lit. It had two windows measuring 1.2 x 1.4 metres. The sanitary facilities were separate from the rest of the cell and were adequately ventilated. She was provided with food, water, bedding, clothing and other essentials. 48.  Upon her arrival at the detention facility on 31 July 2014, she underwent a series of medical examinations. Fluorography and electrocardiography examinations did not reveal any changes to her pathological condition. Her neuropsychological status was evaluated as satisfactory. An ultrasound examination of her abdomen and external examination of her body confirmed that she had previously undergone surgery. General and biochemical blood tests concluded that her blood sugar level was a little higher than average. Following these examinations, she was diagnosed with chronic hepatitis C, type 2 diabetes, gallstones, a single cyst in the left kidney (measuring 0.91 cm) and pseudophakia (replacement of the natural lenses of the eyes with intraocular lenses). The Government provided the Court with copies of the results of the medical tests and examinations carried out that day. 49.  It further appears from the extracts of the first applicant\u2019s detention facility medical records (m\u0259hkumun tibbi kitab\u00e7as\u0131) submitted by the Government that on 31 July 2014 the doctor recommended that the first applicant continue the medical treatment for diabetes prescribed by her previous doctor, the drug Galvus. She also had the rules of a diabetic diet explained to her and was provided with a blood glucose meter to monitor the level of sugar in her blood. 50.  On 2 August 2014 the first applicant was provided with medication brought in by her relatives, including 20 Galvus Met capsules, 90 Glifer capsules, 308 Galvus tablets, 30 Beloc tablets and 17 Spasmalgon tablets. The next delivery of medication, comprising 20 Spasmalgon tablets, took place on 29 August 2014. The first applicant\u2019s need for medication during this period was fully covered by the medication delivered on 2 August 2014. As to the provision of diabetic food from 5 to 23 August 2014, upon her arrival at the detention facility, the first applicant was registered on a list of diabetic detainees and was consequently provided with diabetic food during this period. 51.  On 19 August 2014 she was examined by an endocrinologist in the detention facility, who recommended that she continue her previous treatment. On the same day she also underwent a blood test to determine her sugar level and the state of the hepatitis C. The Government provided the Court with copies of the results of the medical tests and examinations conducted that day. 52.  On 23 September 2014 she was examined by a detention facility doctor. She complained of general sickness without raising any particular complaints. 53.  On 8 and 10 October 2014 she was examined by a neurologist and a therapist. No pathological conditions were revealed. 54.  On 19 November 2014 the first applicant refused to be examined by an ophthalmologist at the National Ophthalmology Centre in order to establish the impact of the diabetes on her eyesight. According to the Government, on 25 and 26 November and 2 and 3 December 2014 she again refused to be examined by the detention facility doctors. They submitted various records compiled by the doctors to support this claim. 55.  On 11 December 2014 she was examined by an endocrinologist who assessed her state of health as stable. The Government did not submit any documents concerning this medical examination. 56.  On the same day she refused to undergo various medical examinations by a virologist, endocrinologist and physician from the Ministry of Health in the presence of the members of the joint working group on human rights and members of the public committee under the Ministry of Justice. However, she refused to sign anything to say that she had refused to be examined. 57.  On 12 December 2014 the first applicant\u2019s lawyer lodged a request with the prosecution authorities, complaining of the deterioration of her state of health in detention and asking for a forensic medical examination. The lawyer submitted that her hepatitis C and diabetes were serious and that since her detention her weight had dropped dramatically from 61 to 47 or 48 kg. The lawyer also pointed out that, as the first applicant had not been provided with adequate medical care in detention, she refused to be examined by the detention facility doctors. 58.  On the same day the investigator in charge of the case ordered a forensic medical examination of the first applicant. The experts could only examine her on 8 January 2015 in the presence of her lawyer due to her initial refusal. They issued forensic medical report no. 424/KES, which indicated that the examination had begun on 18 December 2014 and ended on 28 January 2015. The report confirmed that the first applicant suffered from a number of illnesses, including hepatitis C and diabetes. However, the experts concluded that the illnesses were not life-threatening and could be treated in detention. The relevant part of the conclusion of the report reads as follows:\n\u201c4. The illnesses revealed in L.Yunusova, being chronic in nature, do not pose any danger to her life and she does not currently need immediate and specialist treatment. 5. If necessary, L. Yunusova can receive outpatient treatment in her conditions of detention in respect of the hepatitis C and diabetes which were diagnosed. 59.  In the meantime, on 29 December 2014 the first applicant underwent a number of medical tests and examinations in the presence of C.W from Charit\u00e9. In particular, she underwent a general and biochemical blood test, an ultrasound examination of the abdominal cavity, a chest computed tomography (CT) scan, and electrocardiography and echocardiography examinations. The Government submitted copies of the results of these medical tests and examinations to the Court with their observations. However, none of the documents submitted contained any information regarding medical recommendations or prescriptions made by the doctors following the examinations dated 29 December 2014. 60.  On 26 January 2015 the first applicant again underwent various medical tests and examinations. She was examined by a group of doctors, including international doctors C.W., L.U. (a professor from the Budapest Metropolitan Cancer Centre) and A.B. (a gynaecologist). The Government submitted copies of the results of these medical tests and examinations to the Court with their observations. However, none of the documents submitted contained any medical recommendations or prescriptions concerning the first applicant\u2019s medical treatment. 61.  On 12 March 2015 she was examined in the presence of C.W. and Z.R. (the director of ExaMed Medical Centre in Budapest). On the same day, she underwent a blood test and gynaecological ultrasound examination. The Government submitted copies of the results of these medical tests and examinations to the Court with their observations. However, none of the documents submitted contained any medical recommendations or prescriptions concerning the first applicant\u2019s medical treatment. 62.  The extracts of the first applicant\u2019s detention facility medical records contained further information concerning her state of health from 31 July 2014 to 12 March 2015:\n-  On 19 and 20 September 2014 she was provided with the relevant medication brought in by her lawyer and friends.\n-  On 22 September 2014 she complained of constant exhaustion, general sickness and weakness.\n-  On 23 September 2014 she again complained of general sickness and stayed in bed. That day and the next she was examined by a prison doctor who assessed her state of health as satisfactory. In particular, it was established that her blood pressure, temperature and sugar level were within the permitted range.\n-  On 30 September 2014 she was provided with medication for diabetes brought in by her friends.\n-  On 3 October 2014 she underwent a prophylactic medical examination and was provided with medication brought in by her friends.\n-  On 8 and 10 October 2014 she was examined by a neurologist and a therapist. During the examination, she complained only of frequent urination.\n-  On 17 October 2014 she underwent a prophylactic medical examination and was provided with medication brought in by her friends.\n-  On 25, 28 and 31 October 2014 she was provided with medication brought in by her friends.\n-  On 15, 21, 25 and 26 November she refused to be examined.\n-  On 12 December 2014 she was provided with medication brought in by her friends.\n-  On 3, 13 and 16 December 2014 she refused to be examined.\n-  On 19 December 2014 she complained of a migraine and stress, but refused to be examined by a doctor.\n-  On 23 December 2014 she was provided with medication brought in by her friends.\n-  On 29 December 2014 she was examined in compliance with international standards by a group of doctors, including an international doctor.\n-  On 6, 7 and 10 January 2015 she did not complain about her state of health.\n(Illegible)\n-  On 23 January 2015 she complained of headaches, but refused to be examined by a doctor.\n-  On 26 January 2015 she was again examined by a group of international doctors.\n-  (date illegible) January 2015 she again refused to be examined by a doctor and was provided with medication brought in by her friends.\n-  On 6 and 17 February 2015 she again refused to be examined.\n-  On 19 February 2015 she complained of headaches.\n-  On 12 March 2015 she was again examined by a group of doctors, including international doctors. 63.  The second applicant was detained alone in a cell at the Pre-trial Detention Facility of the Ministry of National Security. 64.  According to his lawyer, his state of health significantly deteriorated after his arrest. In particular, the domestic authorities had failed to provide him with adequate medical care in detention. He further submitted that in the absence of any information concerning the second applicant\u2019s conditions of detention and medical care, it was impossible for him to give an account about either.\n(b)  The Government\u2019s account 65.  On 6 August 2014 the second applicant was admitted to the Pre-trial Detention Facility of the Ministry of National Security. 66.  He was held in a cell measuring 8 sq. m designed to hold two inmates. He was placed alone in the cell at his own request. The cell had two beds and was adequately lit and ventilated. He was provided with hot and cold water, bedding, clothing and other essentials. 67.  According to a letter by the governor of the detention facility dated 13 March 2015, heating was available and functioned well. The sanitary conditions were acceptable and the food served was of good quality. The second applicant also had the right to listen to the radio for five hours a day and to use the detention facility library. He was also entitled to receive one food parcel a week (weighing up to 31.5 kg) from his relatives. 68.  Upon his arrival at the detention facility, the second applicant underwent a medical examination, during which he stated that he had suffered from arterial hypertension since 2006. However, he did not make any particular complaint about his state of health which was assessed as satisfactory. 69.  On 7 August 2014 the second applicant underwent an electrocardiography examination which did not reveal any problems. 70.  It further appears from a medical certificate dated 29 September 2014 from the head of the medical service of the detention facility that the second applicant\u2019s state of health was satisfactory and that he had not sought medical attention during his pre-trial detention. 71.  On 7 August 2014 a repeat offender, N.H., was transferred to the applicant\u2019s cell. After being transferred, N.H. frequently subjected the first applicant to verbal and physical violence. She complained to the administration, but no action was taken. 72.  On 19 September 2014 she lodged a request with the administration, complaining about N.H.\u2019s unlawful behaviour. In particular, she complained that she had been subjected to physical violence and that the placement of a repeat offender in her cell was not in compliance with domestic law. 73.  On 23 September 2014 the first applicant was subjected to verbal and physical violence by Major Y., a prison guard. 74.  By a letter of 21 October 2014, the governor of the detention facility responded to the first applicant\u2019s request of 19 September 2014. He claimed that she had not been subjected to violence by N.H. and that her conditions of detention complied with the established standards. 75.  Following publication in the media of information concerning the first applicant\u2019s alleged beating in the detention facility, on 25 September 2014 an investigator from the Sabunchu District Prosecutor\u2019s Office ordered a forensic medical examination. He asked experts to establish whether there were any signs of ill-treatment on the first applicant\u2019s body. 76.  Following examinations on 29 September and 10 October 2014, the experts issued forensic medical report no. 285 dated 13 October 2014. They concluded that there were no signs of injury on the first applicant\u2019s body. 77.  On 22 October 2014 the investigator in charge of the case refused to institute criminal proceedings, finding that there was no evidence that the first applicant had been subjected to violence in the detention facility. The decision relied on the conclusions of the forensic medical report of 13 October 2014, statements by the first applicant\u2019s cellmates and video footage from the detention facility. 78.  No appeal was lodged against this decision. 79.  Following the indication of the interim measure under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court by the Acting President of the Section on 30 September 2014, the Government responded by a letter dated 3 November 2014 submitting that the relevant domestic authorities had been immediately informed of the interim measure indicated by the Court under Rule 39. They further submitted that the applicants\u2019 state of health was stable and did not require their transfer to an appropriate medical facility. The letter also contained an overview of the medical examinations that the applicants had undergone in October 2014, although no medical documents were attached to the letter. 80.  The Government subsequently provided the Court with monthly information reports concerning the applicants\u2019 state of health and medical treatment in detention. All the monthly reports submitted were one or two pages long. They began in a standard format and said that \u201cthe applicants\u2019 state of health is stable and does not require [their] transfer to a specialist medical facility\u201d. They were not accompanied by any medical documents. 81.  The reports sent by the Government from November 2014 to June 2015 contained the same information in respect of the first applicant\u2019s state of health and medical treatment as they submitted in their observations of 27 May 2015. As regards the second applicant\u2019s state of health and medical treatment, all the reports contained the two following sentences:\n\u201cOver the past month, the second applicant\u2019s state of health was under constant medical supervision, and it was assessed as satisfactory; no deterioration in his health has been noted.\n(date), the second applicant passed [his] latest general medical examination, which did not reveal any deterioration in his health.\u201d 82.  As regards the subsequent reports, the two-page report dated 30 July 2015 indicated that on 13 July 2015 the first applicant had been examined by C.W. in the presence of local doctors. The results of the examination showed that her state of health was stable and did not reveal any pathological conditions or signs of deterioration. C.W. recommended that the first applicant take Harvoni and she started treatment with this drug on 14 July 2015. As regards the second applicant, the report contained the above-mentioned two sentences. No medical documents were attached to the information report. 83.  The two-page report dated 7 September 2015 indicated that on 14 August 2015 the first applicant had again been examined by C.W. in the presence of local doctors. The results of the examination showed that her state of health was stable and did not reveal any pathological conditions or signs of deterioration. C.W. prescribed the drug Velmetia for the regulation of her blood sugar level. As regards the second applicant, in addition to the above-mentioned two sentences, the report indicated that on 3 August 2015 at a court hearing, the second applicant had asked for medical help. His blood pressure had been 210/110 mm Hg and could be stabilised following the intervention of the emergency services. The hearing had been postponed upon a doctor\u2019s advice. No medical documents were attached to the information report. 84.  The one-page report dated 6 October 2015 indicated that the first applicant had finished her medical treatment with Harvoni. The report also contained information relating to her blood pressure and sugar level. As regards the second applicant, the report contained the above-mentioned two sentences. No medical documents were attached. 85.  The reports dated 19 November and 2 December 2015 contained information relating to the first applicant\u2019s blood pressure and sugar level and indicated that on 3 and 7 October 2015 the first applicant had refused to be examined by the doctors. On 30 October 2015 she had been examined by C.W, at whose request she had been transferred to the medical department of the Prison Service. As regards the second applicant, he had been examined by C.W on 30 October 2015. His blood pressure had been 224/122 mm Hg and he had been prescribed with the relevant medical treatment. On 2 November 2015 he had been transferred to the medical department of the Prison Service, where he had received the necessary medical treatment. Following this treatment, his blood pressure had lowered to 160/110 mm Hg. No medical documents were attached to the information report. 86.  On an unspecified date the criminal investigation was completed and the applicants\u2019 case was referred to the Baku Assize Court for trial. 87.  On 13 August 2015 it convicted and sentenced the applicants to eight and a half and seven years\u2019 imprisonment respectively. 88.  On an unspecified date the applicants appealed against this judgment to the Baku Court of Appeal. 89.  It appears from the information submitted by the Government that on an unspecified date the medical department of the Prison Service requested the Baku Court of Appeal to change the second applicant\u2019s detention pending trial due to his emotional state and the possible repeat of hypertensive crisis. The Government did not provide the Court with a copy of this request. 90.  On 12 November 2015 the Baku Court of Appeal granted the request and ordered the second applicant\u2019s release. The Court was not provided with a copy of this decision. 91. On 9 December 2015 the Baku Court of Appeal quashed the Baku Assize Court\u2019s judgment of 13 August 2015 and gave the applicants a conditional sentence of five years\u2019 imprisonment. The first applicant was released from the court.", "references": ["2", "6", "7", "8", "4", "9", "0", "5", "3", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Kremenchuk. 5.  On 19 June 1998 the applicant\u2019s 17-year-old daughter, M., was found dead in a field in the Kharkiv region. Her body was naked and had numerous injuries. 6.  According to the information submitted by the Government, on 20 June 1998 a post mortem was carried out. It established that M. had been strangled and that her body had been dragged to the place where it had been discovered. There was no indication that she had been raped. She had not been pregnant. Nor had she been under the influence of alcohol or drugs. 7.  On 22 June 1998 the Kharkiv inter-district prosecutor\u2019s office opened a criminal case in respect of the murder. 8.  On 24 June 1998 the applicant was admitted to the proceedings as an aggrieved party. 9.  On 28 June 1998 the police inspected the scene of the crime. They discovered the remnants of a fire and two plastic bags not far from the place where M.\u2019s body had been found. Samples of the coal and the bags were collected as material evidence. 10.  On 30 June 1998 another examination of the crime scene was carried out and the following objects were found: some matches, two cigarette ends, two plastic bags, a burnt notepad with some notes written by M. (her parents identified her handwriting later). Furthermore, the police discovered the burnt remains of a calendar, some tampons, a student ID with a stamp containing the word \u201cLaw\u201d (M. was a student at the Kharkiv Law Academy), and a lighter. 11.  On 24 August 1998 a forensic cytological examination established that it was not M. who had smoked the cigarettes. 12.  On 1 October 1998 the police seized one of M.\u2019s shoes, which had been discovered by a villager at some distance from the crime scene. 13.  On 18 January 1999 a witness stated that on the evening of 18 June 1998 she had twice seen a beige car belonging to a certain B., with two male passengers and a girl resembling M., near the crime scene. The witness also submitted that B. had apparently had the car seat covers changed shortly thereafter. 14.  On 14 April 1999 the investigator in the case instructed the police to verify whether B. and his two passengers of 18 June 1998 could have been involved in the murder and to identify the girl who had been seen with them. The police questioned those seen in the car and concluded that sufficient grounds did not exist to treat them as suspects. As regards an inspection of the car and the covers of the seats, it appears that none was carried out at the time as the investigator had to order one again on 22 February 2010. That belated inspection produced no tangible results. 15.  The investigation of M.\u2019s murder has been unsuccessful. Between 1998 and 2010 it was suspended at least thirteen times for failure to establish who had committed the murder. At least five of those decisions were quashed as premature and as not based on a comprehensive investigation. In the remaining instances the investigation was resumed without any further details being given in the respective decisions. At least four times (in particular, in 1998, 2001 and 2009) the investigator complained to his supervisors that his instructions to the police had not been complied with. In particular, on 20 January 2009 the investigator, when instructing the police to undertake certain investigative measures, noted that earlier instructions to that effect, given in 2000, had not been followed up. Overall, throughout the period in question, the investigator\u2019s instructions to the police remained the same: to identify all the possible witnesses to the murder and to verify whether any of M.\u2019s acquaintances, or any people with a criminal record living nearby, could have been involved in it. 16.  The applicant submitted numerous complaints to the prosecution authorities about the length and ineffectiveness of the investigation. He also put forward his own version of events and mentioned the names of several people whom he suspected of being involved in the crime. He was informed on at least four occasions that there had indeed been omissions in the investigation and that the police officers responsible had been disciplined. As regards the applicant\u2019s requests for access to the case file, they were rejected on the grounds that under the applicable procedural legislation, an aggrieved party could only have such access after the pre-trial investigation had been completed. 17.  The applicant also brought a civil claim against the prosecution authorities, but courts at three levels of jurisdiction found against him. 18.  There is no information in the case file about any developments in the investigation after 2010.", "references": ["9", "5", "7", "3", "8", "6", "4", "1", "2", "No Label", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant company specialises in taking soil samples by way of drilling for geological examination, inter alia, for the purpose of assessing suitability for building sites and for the construction of wells. 7.  In the building industry in Germany, a number of collective agreements operated, which contained regulations related to the social welfare of employees working in that sector (see relevant domestic law and practice paragraphs 21-28). The employers\u2019 associations in the building industry (Hauptverband der Deutschen Bauindustrie and Zentralverband des Deutschen Baugewerbes) and the trade union (IG Bauen-Agrar-Umwelt) concluded the Collective Agreement on Social Welfare Proceedings in the Building Trade (Tarifvertrag \u00fcber das Sozialkassenverfahren im Baugewerbe, \u201cVTV\u201d). The VTV contained rules about contributions and entitlements in relation to both the ZVK and the Holiday and Wage Equalisation Fund of the Construction Industry (Urlaubs- und Lohnausgleichskasse der Bauwirtschaft, \u201cULAK\u201d), which jointly comprised the Social Welfare Fund in the building industry which went by the common name \u201cSOKA-BAU\u201d. 8.  As the Federal Ministry for Labour and Social Affairs declared the VTV generally binding (allgemeinverbindlich) pursuant to Section 5 \u00a7 1 of the Law on Collective Agreements (Tarifvertragsgesetz), it was binding on all employers in the building industry, even if they did not belong to the employers\u2019 association (Section 5 \u00a7 4 of the Law on Collective Agreements, see relevant domestic law and practice paragraph 20). As a consequence, all employers in the building industry were obliged to contribute to the Social Welfare Fund an additional sum amounting to 19.8% of the gross wages paid to their employees. 9.  The applicant company was not a member of an employers\u2019 association that was party to the relevant collective agreements. It was thus not directly bound by any collective agreements by virtue of such membership. 10.  On 10 August 2004 the Social Welfare Fund sent a letter to the applicant company with key information about the supplementary welfare schemes, including with regard to contributions to be paid and possible benefits it might receive. The applicant company did not react to this letter. 11.  On 12 April 2005, following enquiries made in order to establish whether the applicant was obliged to pay contributions, the Social Welfare Fund sent a letter to the applicant company, informing it about its duty to pay contributions and that an account had been opened into which benefits would be paid. 12.  On 28 April 2005 the applicant company\u2019s lawyer sent a letter to the Social Welfare Fund, objecting to being registered with the Fund. 13.  On 11 October 2007 the Wiesbaden Labour Court ordered the applicant company to pay 63,625.58 euros (EUR) in welfare fund arrears for the period between September 2002 and March 2004 to the ZVK. The applicant company was further ordered to submit copies of the wage slips issued to its employees between January 2006 and June 2007. The Labour Court considered that the applicant company was bound by the VTV, which was binding on all employers in the building industry even if they did not belong to one of the employers\u2019 associations. The activities of the applicant company fell within the scope of the VTV which, in its Article 1 \u00a7 2 (v) no. 6, listed drilling as an activity within its scope. 14.  The applicant company lodged an appeal submitting, in particular, that the generally binding effect of the VTV violated the negative aspects of its right to freedom of association. It argued that it was obliged to contribute to a fund jointly set up by the employers\u2019 association and the trade union, even though it did not belong to either of these associations. The applicant company further complained that it was prevented from founding its own association, due to a lack of funds. 15.  On 27 June 2008 the Hesse Labour Court of Appeal rejected the applicant company\u2019s appeal and did not grant leave for an appeal on points of law. As well as confirming the Labour Court\u2019s reasoning, the Court of Appeal held that the generally binding effect of the VTV did not violate the applicant company\u2019s right to freedom of association. It observed that the generally binding effect did not entail an obligation to adhere either to one of the employers\u2019 associations or to the Social Welfare Fund. Referring to the case-law of the Federal Constitutional Court (decision of 15 July 1980, 1 BvR 24/74, see relevant domestic law and practice paragraph 27), the Labour Court of Appeal conceded that the applicant company, which was not a member of one of the employers\u2019 associations, had the disadvantage of not being able to assert its interests by exercising control over the activities of the Social Welfare Fund via these associations. The right to participate in the decision-making process within these associations was reserved to members of the respective association. In so far as this fact exerted a certain pressure to become a member of one of the employers\u2019 associations, this was, however, not sufficient to amount to a violation of the negative aspect of its right to freedom of association. 16.  The Court of Appeal further considered that the obligation to contribute to the Social Welfare Fund did not prevent the applicant company from founding its own association. It observed that the major parts of the contributions due would be reimbursed to the applicant if properly declared. 17.  The Court of Appeal finally considered that the obligatory contribution to the Social Welfare Fund took account of the high fluctuation of employees in the building industry and served the public interest of allowing for management of the employee\u2019s claims by the Social Welfare Fund, thus preventing a distortion of competition. 18.  On 10 December 2008 the Federal Labour Court rejected the applicant company\u2019s complaint against the refusal to grant leave to appeal. 19.  On 5 February 2009 the Federal Constitutional Court refused to accept the applicant company\u2019s constitutional complaint for adjudication without providing reasons (1 BvR 243/09).", "references": ["2", "0", "9", "7", "4", "8", "5", "3", "1", "6", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in Bad D\u00fcrkheim, Germany. Through the German stock market, he purchased 81,529 Turkish and 737 German share certificates in Demirbank, which at the time was identified as the fifth largest private bank in Turkey. 6.  By a decision dated 6 December 2000 (no. 123), the Banking Regulation and Supervision Board (Bankalar D\u00fczenleme ve Denetleme Kurulu, hereinafter referred to as \u201cthe Board\u201d) transferred the management and control of Demirbank to the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (Tasarruf Mevduat\u0131 Sigorta Fonu \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe Fund\u201d), pursuant to section 14(3) of the Banking Activities Act (Law No. 4389). In its decision the Board held that the assets of Demirbank were insufficient to cover its liabilities and that the continuation of its activities would threaten the security and stability of the financial system. Accordingly, Demirbank\u2019s management and control, and the privileges of its shareholders except for dividends, were transferred to the Fund. The Fund also confiscated all properties belonging to Demirbank. 7.  On 31 January 2001 all of the bank\u2019s equities were removed from its account at the Istanbul Stock Exchange (Istanbul Menkul K\u0131ymetler Borsas\u0131 \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe Stock Exchange\u201d) and transferred to the account of the Fund. Subsequently, on 20 September 2001 the Fund entered into an agreement with the HSBC bank and sold Demirbank to the latter for 350,000,000 United States dollars (USD). As a result, on 14 December 2001 Demirbank\u2019s legal personality was extinguished and it was struck off the commercial register. 8.  On 2 February 2001, the main shareholder of Demirbank, namely C\u0131ng\u0131ll\u0131 Holding A.\u015e., brought administrative proceedings against the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (Bankalar D\u00fczenleme ve Denetleme Kurumu \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe Agency\u201d) before the Ankara Administrative Court, seeking a ruling setting aside the decision of 6 December 2000 to transfer Demirbank to the Fund. 9.  The Ankara Administrative Court found that it lacked jurisdiction, and transferred the case to the Supreme Administrative Court. 10.  In its submissions before the Supreme Administrative Court, the plaintiff claimed that its property rights had been violated. It also raised a plea of unconstitutionality under section 14 of the Banking Activities Act. The company further stated that prior to November 2000 Demirbank had never encountered major financial problems. It was pointed out that pursuant to section 14(2) of the Act, a bank with financial difficulties should first be given a warning to strengthen its financial structure and be allowed time to take specific measures. However, no such warning had been given in the instant case. Secondly, the Board had not claimed that Demirbank\u2019s financial situation was so weak that it could not be strengthened even if specific measures were taken. Lastly, the company stated that following the transfer of the bank to the Fund, a General Assembly composed of the Fund\u2019s officials had exonerated the former managers of Demirbank, holding that they had not been at fault in the incident leading to the bank\u2019s transfer. 11.  After examining the case file, on 3 June 2003 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the case. It held that the takeover of the bank by the Fund had been in accordance with section 14(3) of the Banking Activities Act. 12.  On 18 December 2003 the Joint Administrative Chambers of the Supreme Administrative Court decided to quash the decision of 3 June 2003. In its judgment, the court held that prior to ordering the transfer of Demirbank to the Fund, the Board should have carried out an objective evaluation of the bank\u2019s financial situation. The court also concluded that the Board should first have ordered Demirbank to take specific measures in accordance with section 14(2) of the Banking Activities Act before applying section 14(3) of the Act. 13.  On 29 April 2004 a request for rectification lodged by the Agency was refused. 14.  The case was remitted to the Supreme Administrative Court, which delivered its decision on 5 November 2004 applying the decision of the Joint Administrative Chambers of the Supreme Administrative Court. It accordingly set aside the Board\u2019s decision of 6 December 2000 ordering the transfer of Demirbank to the Fund, holding that the takeover had been illegal. A further appeal and a request for rectification lodged by the Agency were rejected on 14 April 2005 and 15 December 2005 respectively. 15.  On 20 September 2001 Ms S. C\u0131ng\u0131ll\u0131o\u011flu, the main shareholder of C\u0131ng\u0131ll\u0131 Holding A.\u015e., brought administrative proceedings against the Fund before the Ankara Administrative Court, seeking the annulment of the agreement to sell Demirbank to HSBC. 16.  Given that the transfer of Demirbank to the Fund had been found to be illegal by the Joint Administrative Chambers of the Supreme Administrative Court, on 21 April 2004 the Ankara Administrative Court annulled the agreement entered into by the Fund and HSBC on 20 September 2001. An appeal and a request for rectification lodged by the Fund were rejected on 3 June 2005 and 24 February 2006 respectively. 17.  Following the transfer of Demirbank to the Fund, the applicant applied to the Board claiming compensation. He did not receive any reply. 18.  Subsequently, on an unspecified date in 2002, the applicant brought compensation proceedings against the Agency before the Supreme Administrative Court. He argued that he had lost his shares in Demirbank as a result of its transfer to the Fund and requested that the Board\u2019s implied rejection of his compensation claim be reversed. 19.  On 26 June 2003 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s case. On the basis of a previous judgment it had rendered on 3 June 2003 (see paragraph 11 above), the court found that the takeover of the bank by the Fund had been in accordance with section 14(3) of the Banking Act. 20.  The applicant lodged an appeal. 21.  On 21 October 2004 the Joint Administrative Chambers of the Supreme Administrative Court decided to quash the judgment. It indicated that the previous judgment dated 3 June 2003, which had constituted the basis of the latter, had been quashed on 18 December 2003 (see paragraph 12 above). 22.  A rectification request lodged by the Agency was rejected on 26 May 2005. 23.  On 19 September 2005 the Supreme Administrative Court held that it lacked jurisdiction ratione materiae, as the applicant\u2019s case merely concerned an implied rejection by the Board, which should be assessed by the Ankara Administrative Court. 24.  On 29 December 2005 the Ankara Administrative Court dismissed the case as out of time. The court held that the applicant should have initiated proceedings within sixty days of the date on which Demirbank\u2019s equities had been transferred to the Fund\u2019s account at the Stock Exchange, namely 31 January 2001 (see paragraph 7 above). 25.  The Supreme Administrative Court upheld the first-instance court\u2019s judgment on 12 March 2007. 26.  Following the two judgments in respect of the main shareholders (see paragraphs 8-16 above), on 10 and 11 May 2006 the applicant applied to the Agency and the Fund respectively, requesting the restitution of his rights as a shareholder. Relying on the restitutio in integrum principle, he claimed that the above-mentioned judgments of the Supreme Administrative Court should be enforced and his rights as a shareholder of Demirbank reinstated. 27.  The Agency did not respond to the applicant\u2019s request within the statutory time-limit. 28.  On 15 June 2006 the Fund refused the applicant\u2019s request, stating that restitution was legally and practically impossible. 29.  Subsequently, the applicant initiated another set of proceedings before the Ankara Administrative Court, claiming that the Agency should enforce the above-mentioned judgments and that his rights as a shareholder of Demirbank should be reinstated. He argued that the bank still owned a certain amount of assets following its sale to HSBC and that restitution was therefore possible to a certain extent. He further claimed that in the event that his rights were not reinstated, he ought to be awarded compensation for the loss of his shares. 30.  On 30 November 2007, the Ankara Administrative Court dismissed the case. It pointed out that under Articles 12 and 28 of the Code of Administrative Procedure only \u201cthose concerned\u201d had the right to bring proceedings seeking to remedy the situation in full (tam yarg\u0131 davas\u0131). It found that the applicant could not be considered as \u201cconcerned\u201d as he had not been a party to the annulment proceedings (iptal davas\u0131) brought by the main shareholders. The court held that if the annulled administrative act had been regulatory (d\u00fczenleyici i\u015flem), the concept of \u201cconcerned persons\u201d would have applied to anyone who had been affected by it, whereas in the case of an individual act (bireysel i\u015flem), it applied only to those who had been parties to the annulment proceedings. Holding that the annulled administrative acts were individual acts, the court considered that the applicant had not been \u201cconcerned\u201d by the annulment. Lastly, it indicated that the decisions of the Agency and the Fund to reject the applicant\u2019s requests had been lawful and that restitution would not be possible. 31.  On 23 October 2008 the Ankara Regional Administrative Court upheld that judgment and on 26 February 2009 it rejected the applicant\u2019s request for rectification.", "references": ["1", "3", "5", "4", "2", "0", "7", "8", "6", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicants are a married couple, Mrs R.B.A.B. and Mr H.S., their two daughters, X and Y, and their son Z. The children were born in 1991, 1993 and 1996, respectively. The applicants have been in the Netherlands since 2001. 6.  On 28 April 2001 the applicants entered the Netherlands, where the first and second applicants filed separate asylum applications, and Mrs R.B.A.B. also filed applications on behalf of the other three applicants (the children, who were all minors). The immigration authorities conducted interviews with the first and second applicants on 8 May 2001 (eerste gehoor) and 9 August 2001 (nader gehoor). An additional interview (aanvullend gehoor) was conducted with the second applicant on 2 November 2001. 7.  The first and second applicants stated that they had previously lived in Dilling in Sudan\u2019s South Kordofan province and that they had fled Sudan after Mr H.S. had attracted the attention of the Sudanese authorities on account of his activities for the opposition movement M. 8.  On 7 December 2001 the Deputy Minister of Justice (Staatssecretaris van Justitie, the \u201cDeputy Minister\u201d) notified the first and second applicants of her intention (voornemen) to reject their asylum requests. In the light of various contradictions in the statements given by the first and second applicants, their inability to answer basic questions about the respective tribes they claimed to belong to, and the second applicant\u2019s inability to provide simple topographic details of the city and the surroundings of the place where he claimed he had grown up and/or to provide any details about the M. opposition movement (goal, members, structure, leader) for which he claimed to have been active, the Deputy Minister concluded that no credence could be attached to the applicants\u2019 asylum statement. 9.  In two separate decisions of 17 January 2002, after the applicants\u2019 lawyer had filed written comments (zienswijze) concerning the intended refusals, the Deputy Minister rejected the first and second applicants\u2019 asylum requests, finding that the written comments had not dispelled her doubts concerning the credibility of their asylum statement. 10.  The first and second applicants\u2019 appeal against this decision were declared inadmissible on procedural grounds by the Regional Court (rechtbank) of The Hague sitting in Zwolle in a joint ruling, the first and second applicants having failed to submit the requisite grounds for their appeals, even though they had been given extra time to remedy this shortcoming. The applicants\u2019 objection (verzet) was dismissed on 10 September 2002 by the Regional Court. No further appeal lies against this ruling. 11.  On 12 April 2003 the first and second applicants \u2013 and Mrs R.B.A.B. also on behalf of the other applicants \u2013 filed a second asylum request, which was based on essentially the same grounds as their initial request. They submitted various documents in support of their declaration. On 13 April 2003, the Minister for Immigration and Integration (Minister voor Vreemdelingenzaken en Integratie) notified the first and second applicants of her intention to reject their fresh asylum request, holding that their repeat requests were not based on newly emerged facts or altered circumstances as required by section 4:6 of the General Administrative Law Act (Algemene Wet Bestuursrecht). The new documents submitted by the first and second applicants only served to increase the already existing doubts as to the credibility of their asylum statement. In two separate decisions of 14 April 2003, having received the applicants\u2019 written comments on the intended decision, the Minister rejected the applicants\u2019 second asylum request on the grounds given in his notice of intention. The first and second applicants did not lodge an appeal against this decision before the Regional Court of The Hague even though it would have been possible to do so. 12.  On 14 June 2005 the first and second applicants, and Mrs R.B.A.B. also on behalf of the other applicants, filed a third asylum request based on the claim that, if they were to be sent back to Sudan, their daughters X and Y would be subjected to female genital mutilation (\u201cFGM\u201d), contrary to Article 3 of the Convention, due to tribal and social pressure. In interviews with the immigration authorities held on 16 June 2005, the first and second applicants stated that they opposed FGM but would be unable to protect their daughters against it. They further submitted a document issued by the Sudanese Embassy in the Netherlands on 26 April 2005 stating that the applicants \u201care all Sudanese citizens although they do not possess the requisite documents to enable them to obtain a Sudanese laissez-passer\u201d. 13.  On 17 June 2005, the Minister for Immigration and Integration notified the first and second applicants separately of her intention to reject their third asylum request. The Minister doubted the sincerity of the applicants\u2019 purported fear that their daughter would be subjected to FGM because they had not raised this argument in their previous asylum requests. The Minister also took into consideration the order amending the Aliens Act 2000 Implementation Guidelines 2004/36 (Wijzigingsbesluit Vreemdelingencirculaire 2000, \u201cWBV 2004/36\u201d), which was based on an official report on Sudan drawn up by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken) on 3 February 2004 (DPV/AM\u2011823666), according to which women who had had the benefit of a higher education (namely a university or higher professional level education) and who were living in the larger cities in Sudan did not experience any social stigma for not subjecting their daughters to FGM, whereas women in the rural areas who had received little or no schooling had little choice but to subject their daughters to this practice. As the first and second applicants had still not substantiated their personal identities or given a credible statement concerning their place of residence in Sudan, the Minister considered that they had not established that they did not belong to the group of more highly educated people able to reject the practice of female circumcision. The Minister also considered that the second applicant constituted a danger to public order, having accepted a negotiated penalty (transactieaanbod) in order to settle out of court a criminal charge for shoplifting. 14.  On 20 June 2005 the applicants filed their written comments concerning the intended refusal of their third asylum request. They argued that the Minister had failed to present a proper reasoning for her finding that it had not been demonstrated that the first applicant did not belong to the group of highly educated women who would be able to resist the social pressure to circumcise their daughters, especially as the first applicant had stated in her first request for asylum that she had only had a primary school level education. The first applicant therefore offered to take an IQ test to prove her level of education. 15.  In two separate decisions of 20 June 2005 the Minister rejected the first and second applicants\u2019 asylum request on the grounds detailed in her notice of intention. The Minister added that it was not for her to examine the first applicant\u2019s level of education through an IQ test but rather for the applicants to prove their identities and background in their asylum application. 16.  In a joint ruling given on 12 June 2005 the provisional-measures judge (voorzieningenrechter) of the Regional Court of The Hague sitting in Zwolle granted the first and second applicants\u2019 appeals, quashed the impugned decisions and remitted the case to the Minister for a fresh decision. The provisional-measures judge held:\n\u201cThe judge notes that it is no longer in dispute that the petitioners are Sudanese nationals. Nor is it in dispute that both daughters of the petitioners, currently 14 and 11 years old, have not been circumcised.\nAccording to the policy guidelines set out in C1/4.3.3 Vc 2000, a girl can \u2013 if return would entail a real risk of genital mutilation \u2013 qualify for an asylum-based residence permit ... The following conditions apply:\n- there exists a risk of genital mutilation;\n- the authorities of the country of origin are unwilling or unable to provide protection to persons exposed to an imminent risk of genital mutilation; and\n- no internal relocation possibility is deemed to exist in the country of origin.\nAccording to chapter A8 Vc 2000 \u201cCountry-specific part, the asylum policy in respect of Sudan\u201d under 5.5 Vc, genital mutilation is widespread in Sudan. Although there is a Health Act forbidding genital mutilation, the Sudanese authorities hardly ensure compliance with that act. The parental freedom of choice (as the court understands, whether or not to have their daughters circumcised) is connected to the cultural attitudes of the family and surroundings. Women with a higher education in larger towns will generally not have their daughters circumcised. This will generally not give rise to problems from their social environment. The term \u2018women with a higher education\u2019 is to be understood to mean women who have had an academic or higher vocational education. According to the official report of 3 February 2004, women with a low level of education living in rural areas have little choice. According to the same chapter it cannot be deduced from the official report whether it is possible to avoid circumcision by settling elsewhere in Sudan, meaning that for the assessment of the question whether there is an internal relocation alternative, each individual\u2019s declaration is of decisive importance.\nThe defendant\u2019s refusal to grant the requested residence permit is based to a large extent on the fact that the identity and origin of, in particular, [the first applicant] has not been demonstrated, but also because in the proceedings concerning the first asylum request, it was found that statements lacking credence had been given. For that reason, it is not possible to assess whether the conditions set out in the policy guidelines are met.\nThe refusal thus reasoned cannot be upheld.\nThe policy guidelines are aimed at protecting girls and women against circumcision, an act which according to the policy is to be seen as a violation of Article 3 [of the Convention]. ...\nThe assertion that [the first applicant] based her first asylum request on an asylum statement subsequently found to be implausible is correct. However, it is unclear what the relevance of that conclusion is in the context of the present [asylum] application, which is concerned with the protection of the daughters and not of [the parents].\u201d 17.  On 19 July 2005 the Minister filed a further appeal against this judgment with the Administrative Jurisdiction Division (Afdeling bestuursrechtspraak) of the Council of State. 18.  On 25 August 2005, the Administrative Jurisdiction Division granted the Minister\u2019s further appeal, quashed the judgment of the Regional Court and rejected the first and second applicants\u2019 appeal against the Minister\u2019s decision of 20 June 2005. It considered that, pursuant to section 31 \u00a7 1 of the Aliens Act 2000 (Vreemdelingenwet 2000), it was for the applicants to demonstrate as plausible those facts and circumstances which could lead to the conclusion that they were eligible for admission pursuant to the policy in force, and not for the Minister to demonstrate the opposite. As not only the applicants\u2019 statements about their identity and origin but also their asylum statement had been found to lack credibility in a decision of 17 January 2002 which had obtained the force of res iudicata, the Minister could reasonably have found that the applicants had not made out a persuasive case to show that they complied with the conditions for admission under the policy concerned, that the authorities could not provide them with protection, and that there was no internal relocation alternative for them. No further appeal lay against this ruling. 19.  The third applicant, Ms X., gave birth to a daughter on 11 June 2011 and to a son on 15 March 2013.  On 1 September 2015 Ms X. was granted a Netherlands residence permit for the purpose of remaining with her partner. On 15 September 2015 she informed the Court that she did not wish to maintain the application in so far as it concerned her. 20.  In the meantime, on 7 November 2012, the Minister for Immigration, Integration and Asylum Policy (Minister voor Vreemdelingenzaken en Integratie) rejected a request for a residence permit filed by the fourth applicant, Ms Y., who had come of age in the meantime. On the same day Ms Y. filed an objection (bezwaar) against this refusal and, on 30 November 2015, she attended a hearing on that objection before an official commission during which she stated that in 2012, as a volunteer for two non-governmental organisations, she had disseminated information about FGM, for which purpose she had attended a training course. 21.  On 29 December 2015 the Minister rejected the fourth applicant\u2019s objection. In so far as the fourth applicant would allegedly be exposed to the risk of being subjected to circumcision in Sudan, the Minister noted that her parents opposed this practice and therefore found it likely that they would not force Ms Y. to be circumcised. As regards pressure from the social environment, the Minister noted that Ms Y had still not submitted any documents substantiating her identity or alleged Dilling origin. In this situation, the Minister found that it was not necessary to address the question of whether internal relocation would be a possibility. No further information about these proceedings has been submitted. 22.  On 11 April 2013 the fifth applicant, Mr Z., applied for a residence permit under the Transitional Regulation on Children Residing Long-Term in the Netherlands (overgangsregeling langdurig in Nederland verblijvende kinderen), which provided that minors without a residence permit who had been residing in the Netherlands for over five years could obtain a residence permit if they met certain criteria. These criteria included that the minor in question must have applied for asylum at least five years before reaching the age of 18 and must not have evaded monitoring by the Netherlands authorities for more than three months. The close family members of such minors could also qualify for accompanying family-member residence permits for close relatives (that is to say parents and siblings). The fifth applicant also sought accompanying family-member residence permits for his parents, his sisters Y. and X., and for the latter\u2019s two children, who are minors. 23.  On 30 July 2013 this request was rejected by the Deputy Minister of Security and Justice (Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie), who held that the applicants had not been in touch with the designated immigration authorities for over three months. On 1 September 2015, after remittal of the case by the Administrative Jurisdiction Division on 22 July 2015, the petitioners\u2019 objection was again rejected by the Deputy Minister. No further information about these proceedings has been submitted. 24.  In a letter of 24 September 2014, the Deputy Minister informed the Mayor of Amsterdam that he would not avail himself of his discretionary powers to admit the applicants to the Netherlands. The applicants\u2019 objection was declared inadmissible by the Deputy Minister, who held that the content of the letter of 24 September 2014 was not a decision within the meaning of section 1:3 of the General Administrative Law Act which could be challenged in administrative appeal proceedings. Although the applicants\u2019 appeal against this decision was granted on 1 September 2015 by the Regional Court of The Hague sitting in Amsterdam, it nevertheless held that the legal effects of the impugned decision were to remain intact. No further information about these proceedings has been submitted. 25.  The official report (ambtsbericht) on Sudan released by the Netherlands Minister of Foreign Affairs in April 2010 states the following in respect of the situation of women in Sudan:\n\u201cAfter the regime change in 1989, the position of women deteriorated. Women were forced into the background of public life. Many highly educated women lost both their jobs and their freedom of movement. Strict dress codes and codes of behaviour were imposed on women employed by educational and (semi-)governmental institutions.\nGenital mutilation\nThere is no specific statutory provision rendering genital mutilation of women (FGM) a criminal offence. The Criminal Code merely mentions a prohibition of damaging acts against girls and women. The interpretation of this legislative provision is left to the judge. In practice, perpetrators of genital mutilation are not prosecuted. In 2008 Sudan pledged to eradicate FGM within 10 years. However, the Sudanese authorities have not been consistent in the implementation of this policy. Whilst the National Council of Child Welfare is active in combatting FGM, inter alia in collaboration with UNICEF, the Council of Ministers, on the other hand, deleted in February 2009 a. provision prohibiting FGM from the draft bill for the Children\u2019s Act. The Children\u2019s Act was adopted on December 2009 and contains no provision prohibiting FGM.\nFGM is widespread in Sudan. The percentage of women in North-Sudan having undergone FGM is estimated at about 90%. In so far as known, FGM is practiced by all North-Sudanese population groups (Arab and non-Arab). However, other population groups residing in the north, including the southern Sudanese, have also adopted the practice. Nothing is known about the extent to which pressure in exerted on communities in northern Sudan that do not traditionally practise FGM. ...\nGenital mutilation takes place in childhood, generally between the ages of four and ten. It may occur that women who have not undergone FGM are forced to undergo this when they get married. It is not possible to say anything about the specific circumstances in which circumcision takes place at a later age, such as the place of residence or the level of education of the woman concerned.\nBecause genital mutilation is a parental choice, the question does not arise whether and to what extend girls can avoid it. The parents\u2019 decision is closely connected with the cultural attitudes of the family and the surrounding community. In practice it does not occur that people move home in order to avoid genital mutilation. There are no shelters in Sudan for women or girls seeking to avoid FGM.\nAn increasing number of urban, educated families are refusing to have their daughters circumcised. Generally these families do not experience any problems. The lesser educated and people living in rural areas are often unable or unwilling to make the choice not to have their daughters circumcised due to great pressure emanating from the community.\u201d 26.  The country assessment report on Sudan drawn up by the Netherlands Minister of Foreign Affairs in July 2015 reads in its relevant part:\n\u201cThere is no specific statutory provision rendering genital mutilation of women (FGM) a criminal offence. The Criminal Code merely mentions in general terms the ban on \u2018female circumcision\u2019 without any further definition. The interpretation of this legislative provision is left to the judge. In practice, those who commit FGM are not prosecuted.\nFGM in Sudan is still being carried out at a large scale. Girls are circumcised traditionally to prepare them for marriage, for religious reasons and \u2013 based on superstition \u2013 for \u2018health reasons\u2019. The most recent estimate of the percentage of circumcised women between 15-49 years old in Sudan is 89%. ... UNICEF and UNFPA [United Nations Population Fund] conduct large-scale campaigns to stop FGM. These campaigns have rendered circumcision a topic of debate. Discussions are being held within families and in the press and on social media even photographs are being shown. There is, however, also a strong influence of the pro-FGM lobby which presents it as the traditional values and norms being affected by the West. Sheikh Abdel-Hay Yusuf is voicing this. It appears from UNICEF figures that the percentage of girls having been circumcised between the ages of 5 to 9 has reduced from 41 percent in 2006 to 35.5 percent in 2010.\nBecause genital mutilation is a parental choice, the question does not arise whether and to what extend girls can avoid it. The parents\u2019 decision is closely connected with the cultural attitudes of the family and the surrounding community. In so far as known, in practice it does not happen that people move home for the purpose of avoiding genital mutilation. The local NGO SEEMA refers victims for medical help.\u201d 27.  FGM comprises all procedures that involve partial or total removal of the external female genitalia or other injury to the female genital organs for non-medical reasons. The World Health Organisation (\u201cthe WHO\u201d) noted the following key facts in its Fact Sheet on FGM (as updated in February 2016): more than 200 million girls and women alive today have been cut in 30 countries in Africa, the Middle East and Asia where FGM is concentrated and is mostly carried out on young girls between infancy and 15 years of age. 28.  There are different forms of FGM (see \u201cEliminating Female Genital Mutilation: An Interagency Statement\u201d, 2008, authored by various international organisations including the WHO, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN Children\u2019s Fund (UNICEF) and the UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM)). These include clitoridectomy, excision and infibulation. The same Interagency Statement described FGM as a violation of the right to freedom from torture, inhuman and degrading treatment, meaning that protection from FGM was provided for by various international treaties (the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women), by regional treaties (the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People\u2019s Rights Relating to the Rights of Women in Africa, the \u201cMaputo Protocol\u201d) as well as by consensus documents published by several international organisations. The UN Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment considers that FGM amounts to torture even if it is legal and/or medicalised (Report to the UN General Assembly, 14 January 2008. See also the \u201cGlobal strategy to stop health-care providers from performing female genital mutilation\u201d, 2010, published jointly by the WHO, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNIFEM and others). Sudan signed the Maputo Protocol on 30 June 2008 but has not yet ratified it. 29.  The United Kingdom Home Office Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan of 16 April 2010 includes the following observations on the subject of FMG:\n\u201c25.40 The USSD [United States Department of State] Report 2008 recorded that: \u2018...The law does not prohibit FGM. While a growing number of urban, educated families no longer practiced FGM, there were reports that the prevalence of FGM in Darfur had increased as persons moved to cities. The government actively campaigned against it. Several NGOs worked to eradicate FGM.\u2019 The UNICEF Sudan country page, accessed 15 January 2010, reported that \u2018[FGM] and cutting affects 68 per cent of women and girls \u2013 mostly in the north of Sudan.\u2019 25.41 UNICEF reported on 6 February 2009 that the organisation commended the efforts made by the Sudanese government, civil society and local communities to bring an end to the practice of FGM in the country.\n\u2018The dangers that female genital mutilation and cutting create for girls and women have been recognized by the government, religious leaders, health professionals, community elders and individual families in Sudan, and we applaud the collective efforts now being taken to eradicate the practice entirely. It is unacceptable that any girl should face this dangerous and unnecessary violation of her rights,\u2019 noted UNICEF Acting Representative Dr. Iyabode Olusanmi. 25.42 However, The Sudan Tribune reported on 8 February 2009 that Sudanese activists had slammed a decision by the Sudanese cabinet to drop an article banning the practice of female genital cutting in the country. The report stated that the government took its decision in accordance with an Islamic fatwa on the issue:\n\u2018The Council of Ministers on February 5 dropped the article (13) of the draft Children\u2019s Act of 2009, which provides for the ban of female genital mutilation as part of other customs and traditions harmful to the health of the child, and after approval of the draft Children\u2019s Act 2009. The cabinet decided to drop the article, which deals with female circumcision, taking into account the advisory opinion of the Islamic Fiqh Academy, which distinguish between harmful circumcision or infibulation (Pharaonic circumcision) and the circumcision of Sunna, a less extensive procedure. 25.43 A press statement issued by UNICEF on 7 January 2010 however stated that the \u2018article dealing with female genital mutilation/cutting which was taken out of this bill [The Child Act] will be included in the revision of the Criminal Act in the near future\u2019.\u201d 30.  As regards FGM in Sudan, the Operational Guidance Note on Sudan released in August 2012 by the United Kingdom Home Office cites the following extracts from a country guidance determination issued by the United Kingdom Immigration and Asylum Tribunal (FM (FGM) Sudan CG [2007] UKAIT00060) on 27 June 2007:\n\u201c\u2018Significant action is being taken in Sudan, both within government and by NGOs, to combat the practice of female genital mutilation in all its forms. Legal sanctions are, however, unlikely to be applied where a woman has been subjected by her family to FGM\u2019.\n...\n\u2018There is in general no real risk of a woman being subjected to FGM at the instigation of persons who are not family members. As a general matter, the risk of FGM being inflicted on an unmarried woman will depend on the attitude of her family, most particularly her parents but including her extended family. A woman who comes from an educated family and/or a family of high social status is as such less likely to experience family pressure to submit to FGM. It is, however, not possible to say that such a background will automatically lead to a finding that she is not at real risk.\u2019\n...\n\u2018The risk of FGM from extended family members will depend on a variety of factors, including the age and vulnerability of the woman concerned, the attitude and whereabouts of her parents and the location and \u201creach\u201d of the extended family.\u2019\n...\n\u2018If a woman\u2019s parents are opposed to FGM, they will normally be in a position to ensure that she does not marry a man who (or whose family) is in favour of it, regardless of the attitude of other relatives of the woman concerned.\u2019\u201d 31.  The \u201cJoint Evaluation of the UNFPA-UNICEF Joint Programme on FGM/C: Accelerating Change 2008\u20132012\u201d in respect of Sudan, published in July 2013, includes the following:\n\u201cIn 1983, when Sharia law was introduced, the article prohibiting FGM/C was removed from the penal code.\nSince then there have been several attempts to criminalise all forms of FGM/C but none have been successful. The most significant recent setback occurred in 2009, when the Council of Ministers decided to remove Article 13 of the 2009 Child Act, which would have prohibited FGM/C as a harmful practice and tradition affecting the health of children.\nDespite limited progress made at the national level, several states in Sudan have managed to pass laws prohibiting all forms of FGM/C. An anti-FGM/C law was passed in the state of South Kordofan in 2008 and is now being used as a model for other states.\u201d 32.  The United States Department of State\u2019s \u201cCountry Reports on Human Rights Practices 2014\u201d, published on 25 June 2015, reads:\n\u201cFemale Genital Mutilation and Cutting (FGM/C): There is no national law prohibiting FGM/C. The states of South Darfur and Red Sea passed laws prohibiting FGM/C as a harmful practice affecting the health of children.\nFGM/C is traditionally practiced in the country. According to UNICEF and the UN Population Fund (UNFPA), the national prevalence of FGM/C among girls and women 15-49 years old was 88 percent. Within the country prevalence varies geographically and depends on the custom of local ethnic groups. The 2010 Sudan Household Health Survey indicated considerable variations in the practice of FGM/C from one region to another, from 99.4 per cent in the Northern State compared with a rate of 68.4 per cent in Western Darfur.\nGirls are generally cut when they are five to 11 years old. Comprehensive figures were not available for the year. The government and UNICEF reported a shift in attitudes towards FGM/C and observed downward trends in the prevalence of FGM/C between the household health surveys in 2006 and 2010. The 2010 survey concluded 34.5 percent of girls ages five to nine were cut, as compared with 41 percent in 2006. Of girls and women ages 15-19, 37 percent favored FGM/C in 2010, compared with 73 percent in 2006.\nThe government attempted to curb the prevalence of FGM/C and made public awareness campaigns on the subject a top priority. In 2008 the National Council on Child Welfare, with support from UNICEF, launched the National Strategy to Abolish FGM/C in Sudan (2008-18). Under the strategy the government introduced \u2018Saleema\u2019, a public awareness campaign to counter FGM/C, which received significant attention through local media.\nThe government agreed to a three-year program with UNICEF, the UNFPA, and the WHO to seek to end FGM/C in the country. In October the government hosted a conference in Khartoum to promote the \u2018Saleema\u2019 campaign and anti-FGM/C initiatives.\u201d", "references": ["6", "5", "3", "9", "0", "2", "4", "7", "1", "8", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1975 and lives in Tbilisi. 7.  At 3.50 p.m. on 19 February 2005 the applicant was arrested as a suspect in a criminal case. On 21 February 2005 he was charged with multiple episodes of fraud. 8.  On 22 February 2005 the First-Instance Panel of the Supreme Court of Georgia, rejecting the prosecutor\u2019s request to place the applicant in pre-trial detention, ordered the applicant\u2019s release under police supervision. The applicant was released at 4.00 p.m. on the same day. 9.  On 25 February 2005 the Appeals Chamber of the Supreme Court of Georgia, reversing the lower-instance decision, placed the applicant in pre-trial detention for three months. It justified its decision solely by noting that the applicant had been charged with a serious crime carrying a possible penalty of more than five years\u2019 imprisonment. This fact in itself, in the Supreme Court\u2019s view, substantiated the risk of the applicant absconding, given that Article 151 \u00a7 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (\u201cthe CCP\u201d), as in force at the material time, provided that the seriousness of an offence could constitute grounds for the imposition of pre-trial detention. 10. On 25 March 2005 amendments were introduced to Article 151 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 4 of the CCP; those amendments, inter alia, provided that, subject to assessment by the national courts, pre-trial detention should in principle only be the last resort in cases where it is demonstrated that a more lenient measure of restraint would not suffice in view of the profile of the accused and the concrete circumstances of the case in question. 11.  On 18 May 2005 the Investigative Panel of the Tbilisi District Court, having heard the prosecutor\u2019s argument that more time was needed to finalise the investigation, extended the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention for another two months, until 22 July 2005. The court did not address the question of whether the required investigative actions could be conducted without the applicant\u2019s continued detention. The applicant\u2019s reasons for his objection to any prolongation (his good reputation and family situation; the absence of previous convictions; and formal assurances from several public persons, including a member of parliament) were dismissed by the court. The court also refused an offer made by the Georgian Labour Union to post bail for the applicant in the form of bonds with an approximate value of 680,000 Georgian laris (GEL, approximately 248,300 euros (EUR)), reasoning that, under Article 168 \u00a7 3 of the CCP, persons being charged with serious offences were not subject to release on bail. 12.  On 23 May 2005 the Appeals Chamber of the Tbilisi District Court upheld the order of 18 May 2005. Like the lower-instance court, the appellate court did not address the possibility of imposing a more lenient measure of restraint in order to ensure the aims of the investigation. 13.  On 15 June 2005 the applicant requested that his pre-trial detention be replaced by a more lenient measure of restraint. The prosecutor agreed to the applicant\u2019s request. 14.  On 9 July 2005 the Tbilisi District Court released the applicant on bail on payment of a security of GEL 5,000 (approximately EUR 1,800). When ordering his release, the court took into consideration the applicant\u2019s good references and the fact that he had fully compensated the injured party for the damage caused by his allegedly fraudulent activities. 15. At the time of submission of the present application, while the applicant contended that he was unable to have certain unspecified witnesses examined and to obtain expert opinions pertinent to his case, the criminal proceedings against him were still pending.", "references": ["9", "5", "8", "3", "1", "0", "6", "7", "4", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1968 and lives in Komsomolskoye village in the Kharkiv Region. 6.  In May 1999 the Pavlograd Police placed the applicant on the wanted list in connection with their criminal investigation into a violent burglary in Pavlograd and the infliction of grave bodily injuries on B.\u2019s daughter P., who was a minor. 7.  On 28 January 2000 the applicant was arrested in Russia on suspicion of having committed an unrelated crime in that country, for which he was subsequently convicted by a Russian court to a term of imprisonment that was due to end on 27 July 2004. 8.  On 1 June 2004 a Russian court ordered the applicant\u2019s retention in custody pending his extradition to Ukraine. 9.  On 1 December 2004 the applicant was extradited to Ukraine and placed in a pre-trial detention facility. 10.  At 5.20 p.m. on 16 January 2005 the applicant was presented with an arrest report stating that he had been arrested on suspicion of having committed aggravated burglary. He was informed of his right to have access to a lawyer as from the first interrogation. The applicant signed this report, stating that he generally disagreed with its content and that he wished to have a lawyer as from the first interrogation. 11.  At the same time on the same day the applicant also signed a record confirming that he had been informed about his rights as a suspect, in particular the right to remain silent and to consult a lawyer. The applicant signed the report and added by hand in the relevant field provided on the pre-printed form that he had \u201crefused the assistance of a defence counsel and would defend himself, not for financial reasons\u201d (\u0441\u0432\u043e\u0438 \u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u0430 \u0431\u0443\u0434\u0443 \u0437\u0430\u0449\u0438\u0449\u0430\u0442\u044c \u0441\u0430\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u043e\u044f\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e, \u043d\u0435 \u043f\u043e \u043c\u0430\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0438\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u044b\u043c \u043f\u0440\u0438\u0447\u0438\u043d\u0430\u043c). The applicant alleged that he had been compelled to sign this and subsequent waivers because the police had told him that they would not provide him with a lawyer, as he had initially requested. 12.  On 17 January 2005 the applicant signed another record confirming that he had been informed about his rights as a suspect and stating \u2012 using the same wording \u2012 that he would defend himself. 13.  On the same day he was questioned twice. He denied any involvement in the alleged offence. 14.  On 25 January 2005 the applicant was formally charged with aggravated burglary. On the same day he signed a record confirming that he had been informed about his rights as an accused person and stated \u2012 using the same wording \u2012 that he would defend himself. 15.  On 27 January 2005 he signed another such record using the same wording. On the same day the investigator announced to the applicant that the pre-trial investigation was complete and gave him the criminal case file to study. 16.  On 29 January 2005 the Pavlograd Prosecutor signed the final bill of indictment, charging the applicant with aggravated burglary. The indictment contained a request that the victims, B. and P., and two other witnesses be called at the trial. 17.  On 1 March 2005 the applicant stood trial before the Pavlograd Court sitting in a single judge formation, assisted by a clerk. According to the trial record, the trial unfolded as follows:\n(a)  Only the applicant and B. were present at the opening of the trial, the prosecutor, P. and the witnesses being absent. The judge asked the applicant and B. whether they objected to proceeding in the others\u2019 absence. None having objected, the judge ruled to proceed.\n(b)  The judge explained to the applicant his rights as a defendant, including the right to have a defence counsel or to defend oneself, and to testify or to remain silent.\n(c)  Responding that he understood those rights, the applicant asked to be allowed to represent himself. The judge granted the request.\n(d)  The judge read out the indictment and asked the applicant whether he understood the charges and how he wished to plead.\n(e)  The applicant responded that he understood the charges, pleaded guilty and refused to testify.\n(f)  B. asked the court to question her first and then allow her to leave and proceed with the trial in her absence. The applicant expressed no objection, and the court granted the victim\u2019s request.\n(g)  B. was questioned and left.\n(h)  A prosecutor arrived.\n(i)  The judge explained to the applicant that he had the right to challenge the prosecutor. The applicant responded that he did not wish to challenge the prosecutor. He again pleaded guilty and stated that he did not wish to testify. He stated that the evidence of his guilt was \u201cadmissible and sufficient,\u201d asked the court not to call the absent witnesses since he was ashamed of his actions, and asked the court to dispense with the examination of evidence, pursuant to Article 299 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 30 below).\n(j)  The court ruled that the examination of the evidence be dispensed with and proceeded to read out some of the written evidence in the case file.\n(k)  The prosecutor asked the court to sentence the applicant to six and a half years\u2019 imprisonment. 18. According to the applicant, this record of the trial was inaccurate. In particular, the applicant did not initially plead guilty. It was only after B. had departed that the judge persuaded him to plead guilty and to agree to abbreviated proceedings in exchange for a lenient sentence. 19.  At the close of the trial on the same day, the court delivered its judgment. It convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to six and a half years\u2019 imprisonment, to be counted from 28 January 2000, the date of his arrest in Russia, with one year and about five months therefore remaining to be served. The court relied on his guilty plea in the course of the trial and his consent to dispensing with the examination of evidence. It also stated that the applicant\u2019s guilt was proven by a number of documents in the file. In particular it referred to the identification reports, according to which P. and another eyewitness had identified the applicant as the person who had attacked P. 20.  On 4 March 2005 B. appealed, maintaining that the sentence was too lenient. She argued that the term of imprisonment should be calculated from the date of the applicant\u2019s arrest in Ukraine rather than from the date of his arrest in Russia for an unrelated crime. She also maintained that the prosecutor had not been present at the trial and that the applicant had never repented or admitted his guilt and had behaved defiantly at the trial. 21.  The applicant replied to the appeal, submitting that his guilty plea and remorse for the crime had been genuine and that the sentence imposed by the trial court had been correct and justified. 22.  On 20 May 2005 the Dnipropetrovsk Regional Court of Appeal (\u201cthe Court of Appeal\u201d) held a hearing in the presence of a prosecutor, B. and the applicant. At the hearing the applicant reaffirmed his initial submissions, said that he regretted the offence he had committed, and requested that the trial court\u2019s verdict be left in force. According to the applicant, he had requested the presence of a lawyer at this hearing but his request had not been granted. 23.  On the same date the Court of Appeal quashed the sentence of the Pavlograd Court as unduly lenient, taking into account the seriousness of the offence and the applicant\u2019s personality. It also found that the trial court had misinterpreted the law regulating the calculation of sentences with regard to the time served in prison in Russia. In particular, it had failed to take into account the fact that Ukraine had made a reservation to the Protocol to the Minsk Convention on Legal Assistance and Legal Relations in Civil, Family and Criminal Matters 1993 concerning the effect given to sentences rendered in other States Parties to the Protocol. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal sentenced the applicant to twelve years\u2019 imprisonment to be calculated from 16 January 2005, the date of his arrest in Ukraine. 24.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, arguing that he was in fact innocent. He alleged that at the trial he had initially denied his guilt and pointed out what he believed to be gaps and inconsistencies in the prosecution\u2019s case. However, he had then pleaded guilty because of pressure from the trial judge and because he had wished to be released sooner and had no funds to pay for a lawyer. No prosecutor had been present at his trial and in these circumstances he had not been convinced of the judge\u2019s impartiality or that there had been a fair examination of evidence. When the judge had assured him that he would receive a lenient sentence if he pleaded guilty, he had followed the judge\u2019s instructions. The applicant also alleged that the Court of Appeal had erred in failing to take into account the time he had served in prison in Russia. 25.  On 30 August 2005 the Supreme Court rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal and found that, taking due account of the adequacy of the written evidence collected by the prosecution, the applicant\u2019s conviction had a sufficient factual and evidentiary basis. It furthermore found that the Court of Appeal had been correct in its calculation of the applicant\u2019s prison term from 16 January 2005, but reduced the sentence to nine years. 26.  On 10 March 2009, at the request of the prosecutors\u2019 office, the Court of Appeal ordered that the term of the applicant\u2019s imprisonment be calculated from 1 June 2004 (the date of the decision to remand him in custody pending consideration of the extradition request). 27.  On 30 September 2011 the applicant was released.", "references": ["9", "1", "4", "8", "6", "5", "0", "7", "2", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1947 and lives in Plovdiv. 6.  Between 1992 and 2000 the applicant was involved in proceedings regarding the restitution of a flat which she and her family had been occupying. The flat, purchased from the State by the applicant\u2019s parents in 1968, had become State property after having been nationalised in the period following 1947, and denationalisation legislation adopted in the beginning of the 1990s provided that under certain circumstances even properties which had in the meantime been sold to private parties could be subject to restitution. At the end of the proceedings at issue the courts found that the pre-nationalisation owners were the true owners of the flat by virtue of restitution. Those proceedings were the subject of the applicant\u2019s first application before the Court, in which the Court found a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, and also a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention due to the length of the court proceedings (see Gyuleva and Others v. Bulgaria, no. 76963/01, 25 June 2009). 7.  On 1 February 2002 the persons recognised as owners of the flat at issue (the pre-nationalisation owners) sold it to a Mr and Mrs P. Soon after that, Mr and Mrs P. brought rei vindicatio proceedings against the applicant, who was still living in the property. Their claim was allowed at first instance by the Plovdiv District Court on 24 October 2002. Even though the rei vindicatio proceedings after that remained the subject of appeals, the applicant vacated the property on 10 January 2003. She moved to a house she owned in the village of Hrabrino, where she registered her address on 4 February 2003. 8.  On 4 May 2005 Mr and Mrs P. brought another action against the applicant, for unjust enrichment, alleging that she had had no valid legal grounds to live in their flat between 1 February 2002 and 10 January 2003, and seeking compensation. 9.  On 16 May 2005 the Plovdiv District Court issued a summons, notifying the applicant of the action brought against her and the date of the first court hearing. The summons was sent to the mayor of Hrabrino for delivery to the applicant. However, in a letter to the District Court dated 16 June 2005, the mayor sent the summons back, stating that \u201cno such person has been registered\u201d as living in the village. 10.  On 8 July 2005, upon a request by Mr and Mrs P., the Plovdiv Regional Directorate of the Interior issued a certificate confirming that the applicant\u2019s last declared address was in the village of Hrabrino. 11.  Without making any further attempts to find the applicant, on 26 August 2005 the Plovdiv District Court, after concluding that the applicant was of \u201cunknown address\u201d, published a notification concerning the unjust enrichment proceedings in the State Gazette (Article 50 \u00a7 1 of the 1952 Code of Civil Procedure, see paragraph 18 below in fine). 12.  The District Court appointed ex officio a lawyer to represent the applicant, to whom all subsequent papers and notifications were served. According to the applicant, the lawyer did not adequately defend her interests in the proceedings, because she failed to seek to contact the applicant, to appeal against the Plovdiv District Court\u2019s judgment, which would have been standard practice, to make any evidentiary requests, or to contest in any meaningful manner the claimants\u2019 arguments, including by raising what the applicant considered a valid objection that the claims against her were partially time-barred. 13.  On 6 April 2006 the Plovdiv District Court gave judgment, allowing the claim against the applicant and ordering her to pay 3,573 Bulgarian levs (BGN), plus interest, to Mr and Mrs P. 14.  Upon an appeal by Mr and Mrs P., in a judgment of 10 July 2006 which was final, the Plovdiv Regional Court ordered the applicant to pay the claimants an additional BGN 1,006.21. 15.  The applicant became aware of the proceedings and the judgments against her on 22 February 2008, when she received a notice from a bailiff to pay the sums due. 16.  The applicant points to several additional facts. In 2004, she was appointed as a juror at the Plovdiv District Court for the period between 2005 and 2009 and she received notifications of the court hearings she needed to attend at another address she had provided to the authorities (the address of her brother in Plovdiv). At that same address, in 2007 and 2008, she received two summonses related to other unspecified proceedings brought against her by Mr and Mrs P. At that same address, in February 2008, she received the bailiff\u2019s notice mentioned in the previous paragraph. The applicant is a well-known piano teacher at the Academy of Music, Dance and Fine Arts in Plovdiv whose place of work could have been known to the authorities. 17.  In the months after February 2008 the applicant paid the sums owed by her in full. The overall amount paid, comprising the damages awarded to Mr and Mrs P., accrued interest and the relevant fees and expenses, totalled BGN 8,767.07 (equivalent to approximately 4,473 euros (EUR)).", "references": ["5", "2", "4", "0", "9", "8", "7", "6", "1", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "7.  The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Srebrenica, a town in the Republika Srpska (one of the two constituent Entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina[1]). 8.  The applicant declares himself as Bosniac[2] (one of the country\u2019s \u201cconstituent peoples\u201d). He actively participates in the social and political life of the country. The applicant is a member of the Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina (Stranka za BiH; \u201cthe BH Party\u201d) and a founding member of the Srebrenica Intellectuals\u2019 Club (Klub Intelektualaca Srebrenice). 9.  He has held several elected and appointed political positions in the Republika Srpska. At the time of lodging his application to the Court, the applicant was a member of the National Assembly of the Republika Srpska. 10.  In 2006, as a candidate of the BH Party, the applicant submitted his candidacy for the 2006 elections to the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 11.  On 24 July 2006 the Central Election Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina (\u201cCentralna izborna Komisija Bosne i Hercegovine\u201d; \u201cthe CEC\u201d) rejected his candidacy. It explained that the applicant could not be elected to the Presidency from the territory of the Republika Srpska considering that he declared affiliation with Bosniacs. Pursuant to Article V of the Constitution and Article 8.1 \u00a7 2 of the Election Act 2001 the presidential candidate from that Entity must be a Serb. 12.  On 1 August 2006 the CEC rejected the applicant\u2019s request for the reconsideration of that decision. 13.  On 10 August 2006 the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina rejected the applicant\u2019s further appeal. It held that the applicant\u2019s candidacy was in contravention of the Constitution and the Election Act 2001. 14.  On 20 September 2006 the BH Party and the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal relying on Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 to the Convention. On 29 September 2006 the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina held that there had been no violation of that provision (decision no. AP 2678/06). The relevant part of the majority opinion reads as follows (the translation has been provided by the Constitutional Court):\n\u201c...Therefore, the provision of Article 8 of the Election Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including Article V of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, should be viewed in the light of the discretionary right of the State to impose certain restrictions when it comes to the exercise of individual rights. The said restrictions are justified by the specific nature of the internal order of Bosnia and Herzegovina that was agreed upon by Dayton Agreement and whose ultimate goal was the establishment of peace and dialogue between the opposing parties given that the said provision was intentionally incorporated into the Constitution so that the members of the Presidency come from amongst Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs.\nThere is no dispute that the provision of Article V of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the provision of Article 8 of the Election Act 2001, have a restrictive character in that they restrict the rights of citizens, namely the candidacy of Bosniacs and Croats from the territory of the Republika Srpska and the Serbs from the territory of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to stand for election as members of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina.\nHowever, the purpose of those provisions is to strengthen the position of the constituent peoples in order to ensure that the Presidency is composed of the representatives from these three constituent peoples. Taking into account the current situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the restriction imposed ... is justified at this moment since there is a reasonable justification for such reasoning.\nTherefore, given the current situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and specific nature of its constitutional order as well as the current constitutional and statutory arrangements, the challenged decisions of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Central Election Commission did not violate the appellants\u2019 rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 to the European Convention and Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights since the above-mentioned decisions are not arbitrary and are based on law. It means that they serve a legitimate aim, that they are reasonably justified and that they do not place an excessive burden on the appellants given that the restrictions imposed on the appellants\u2019 rights are proportionate to the objectives of the general community in terms of preservation of the established peace, continuation of dialogue, and consequently the creation of conditions for amending the above-mentioned provisions of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Election Act 2001.\u201d\nThe relevant part of the concurring opinion of Judge Feldman reads as follows:\n\u201cI agree that the special circumstances in which the Dayton Agreement was drafted and the needs of the time are capable of providing a rational and objective justification for treatment which would otherwise be discriminatory...Like Judge Grewe in her separate dissenting opinions....I regard the justification as being temporary rather than permanent, but I respectfully differ from Judge Grewe in thinking that the time has not yet arrived when the State will have completed its transition away from the special needs which dictated the unusual architecture of the State under the Dayton Agreement and the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina.\nHowever, I have another reason for joining the majority of the Constitutional Court in this case. Until the time (if it ever arrives) when Article V of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina is amended to remove the differential treatment of potential candidates for the Presidency, it seems to me that Article V leaves the drafters of the Election Law, the Central Election Commission and the courts no choice. It is not constitutionally permissible for a Law or the interpretation or implementation of a Law to be directly incompatible with the express and unambiguous requirements of Article V of the Constitution. Had the appellants succeeded in their appeal, it would have left Article V of the Constitution with no effect whatever. It would have been otiose, reduced to empty words. In my view, the Constitutional Court, required by Article VI of the Constitution to \u2018uphold this Constitution\u2019, cannot properly make a decision which makes an important part of the Constitution wholly ineffective. I accept that there different parts of the Constitution appear to have conflicting values and objectives, but constitutions are never entirely coherent. They are always shaped by, and are a compromise between, conflicting values and objectives. The task of the Constitutional Court under Article VI is to give effect to the Constitution, with all its inconsistencies, and make it as effective as possible in all the circumstances.\nFor this reason, I would have dismissed this appeal as ill-founded even had I disagreed with the conclusion of the majority of the Constitutional Court that there is an objective and rational justification for the difference of treatment. Whether justified or not, the difference is required by Article V of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina. An international tribunal such as the European Court of Human Rights might perhaps decide that the constitutional arrangements for electing members of the Presidency violate rights under the European Convention (and nothing I write here should be taken to lend support to that suggestion under present conditions). Such a tribunal has no duty to uphold the Constitution. The Constitutional Court has an express constitutional obligation to uphold the Constitution, and in my opinion has no power to set aside parts of it, or make them ineffective, by relying on rights arising in an international instrument in preference to the express and unambiguous terms of the Constitution itself.\u201d\nThe relevant part of the dissenting opinion of Judge Grewe, joined by Judge Palavri\u0107, reads as follows:\n\u201c...I respectfully differ from the conclusion that there is no violation of the appellant\u2019s rights guaranteed by the European Convention, its Protocols and Additional Human Rights Agreements because of an \u2018objective and reasonable justification for differential treatment\u2019.\n...I consider the exclusion of the candidate Mr. Ilijaz Pilav on the Party\u2019s candidate list for the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina inconsistent with Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 and with Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which guarantees equal right to stand for election and to be elected without unreasonable restrictions. Contrary to the statements of the majority (\u00a7 22), it seems to me that the current situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina does not justify at this moment the differential treatment of the appellant\u2019s candidacy in relation to the candidacy of other candidates who are the Serbs and are directly elected from the territory of the Republika Srpska, nor it serves a legitimate aim, such as preservation of peace, continuation of dialogue or creation of conditions for amending the provisions of the Constitution of BiH and Election Law. Although I think like judge Feldman in his separate concurring opinion under this decision that the State of BiH has not yet completed its transition, that it is still in a special situation requiring specific measures, I however consider that the Dayton Agreement architecture is evolving and has to adapt to the different stages of evolution in BiH. The constitutional specificity of BiH consists of the multi-ethnic character of State and public institutions. The multi-ethnicity established by the Dayton Agreement has been precised by the Constitutional Court in case U 5/98 (Official Gazette of BiH, No. 36/00), stressing the equality of all constituent peoples in both entities and excluding in consequence the minority status of any constituent people in any entity.\nThe coherence of this decision implies a multi-ethnic composition of the Presidency without territorial interference since the three constituent peoples are precisely equal in the whole State territory of BiH...It is the particular combination of ethnic and territorial structures which leads to unjustified discriminations since the territorial interference in presidential elections result to an ethnic separation materialized by the exclusion of the right to stand for election for all Serbs living in the Federation and for all Croats and Bosniacs living in Republika Srpska. This combination is inconsistent with the Dayton Agreement\u2019s goal of a multi-ethnic State and with the principle of equality of constituent peoples in both entities which only justifies that the Serbs living in Federation and that the Bosniacs and the Croats living in Republika Srpska do not benefit of the status of a minority.\nTherefore the only legitimate aim appropriated in the current situation in BiH consists of excluding the territorial criterion in presidential elections. Only such a solution could be a reasonable justification of differential treatment and would be consistent with the requirements of Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 that any right set forth by law shall be secured without discrimination on any ground and of Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. In other terms, the differential treatment challenged by the appeal is not justified in an objective or in a proportionate manner.\nI also differ from the opinion expressed by judge Feldman in his point 4. Indeed, the European Convention and its Additional Protocols have at least the same rank as the Constitution of BiH. The Constitutional Court stated that the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina was adopted as the Annex 4 to the Peace Agreement. It follows that there cannot be a conflict and possibility of dispute between that Agreement and the Constitution of BiH which form a legal unity. This implies that the Constitutional Court grants the same importance to the Peace Agreement and its annexes and thus that in case of conflict of norms, the case may only be resolved through a method of systematic interpretation. Furthermore the provisions of Articles II.2, II.3 and X.2 of Constitution place the compliance with the human rights and the European Convention among the basic pillars of the constitutional order in Bosnia and Herzegovina which have priority over any other law and cannot be restricted even by a constitutional revision.\nThe Constitutional Court in its role of upholding the Constitution has to take account of all these elements as well as of legal evolutions in order to guarantee concrete and effective rights. Therefore Article V.1 has to be read in light of Articles II and X of the Constitution and of Article 1 of Protocol No. 12. The Constitutional Court cannot, of course, replace or modify the present Constitution but it can request the Parliament to harmonize the text with the requirements of BiH\u2019s international obligations.\u201d 15.  On 5 July 2010 the applicant again submitted his candidacy to the CEC. On 29 July 2010 it was rejected for the same reasons as before.", "references": ["2", "6", "5", "0", "1", "7", "4", "8", "3", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1924 and lives in Cologne. His father was a pharmaceutical entrepreneur who had owned property in the Soviet Occupied Zone of Germany which was subject to expropriation measures in 1946 and 1947, after an administrative body classified him as a \u201cNazi activist\u201d, \u201cNazi criminal\u201d and \u201cperson profiting from the war\u201d. After Germany\u2019s reunification, the applicant\u2019s application for restitution of the property under the Property Act (Verm\u00f6gensgesetz) proved unsuccessful. 6.  In 2006 the applicant initiated proceedings under the Criminal Rehabilitation Act (Strafrechtliches Rehabilitierungsgesetz) on behalf of his late father. He claimed that the expropriation and other measures had a penal character, although his father\u2019s guilt had been determined not by a court but by an administrative body. He submitted a vast number of documents, claiming that the historical background of the measures taken under the Soviet occupation command had to be evaluated anew. In particular, the 1946 and 1947 provisions on which the measures against his father had been taken could now be qualified as criminal prosecution. New research had shown that their objective was to punish individual Germans for alleged wrongdoing. The applicant requested, inter alia, that the 1946 decisions to find his father guilty of being a Nazi and the subsequent decisions to expropriate him and confiscate his personal property and the property belonging to his company be declared contrary to the rule of law and hence void. According to the applicant, the value of his restitution claims amounted to about ninety million euros. 7.  On 26 June 2008 the Dresden Regional Court fixed a public hearing for 19 August 2008, as requested by the applicant. 8.  On 21 July 2008 the applicant\u2019s lawyers published a press release under the following title:\n\u201cTurnaround in the assessment of the Communist industrial reform? For the first time the Dresden Regional Court discusses a criminal rehabilitation application at an oral hearing.\u201d\nIn the press release the lawyers explained, in particular, that until that time the domestic courts had seen the objective of the measures in question as motivated by economic policy, that is, having the purpose of modifying the prevailing ownership structure. They presented the fact that the Regional Court had fixed an oral hearing as a potential turning point in domestic case-law and announced that they would explain orally and in detail at the hearing what the so-called \u201ceconomic reform\u201d had really been about. At the same time they communicated the date, time and place of the hearing. 9.  On 8 August 2008 the Regional Court cancelled the hearing foreseen for 19 August and set a time-limit for written procedure ending on 15 September 2008. It found that, according to section 11 \u00a7 3, first sentence, of the Criminal Rehabilitation Act, a decision should generally be taken without holding an oral discussion. The date for a hearing, according to section 11 \u00a7 3, second sentence, of the Criminal Rehabilitation Act (see paragraph 13 below) had been set to give the applicant the opportunity to illustrate (erl\u00e4utern) his legal opinion, which conflicted with that of the Regional Court and the Dresden Court of Appeal and was supported by particularly extensive factual submissions. Making use of its margin of appreciation, the Regional Court refrained from holding a hearing since, contrary to its prior opinion, there was no longer any additional benefit to be gained for dealing with the case. In fact, the scheduling of the hearing had been used to create the impression in a press release, also published on the internet, that by calling a hearing the Regional Court had indicated that it was abandoning its settled case-law. Furthermore, the press release had announced that the applicant would use the hearing to \u201creveal an important part of contemporary history\u201d. This indicated that the hearing was to be used as a public forum. Against this background, the court refrained from holding a hearing. 10.  On 24 August 2009, following unsuccessful claims by the applicant that the judges were biased, the Regional Court rejected the applicant\u2019s request. It held that the measures taken against the applicant\u2019s father were not of a penal character. The expropriation measures did not result in further consequences to his detriment. Contrary to the applicant\u2019s submission, nothing indicated that an arrest warrant had been issued in 1947. The applicant\u2019s father\u2019s loss of his electoral rights, his business licence and his personal assets had been a necessary consequence of the expropriation. 11.  On 26 November 2010 the Dresden Court of Appeal, without holding an oral hearing, dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal, fully endorsing the Regional Court\u2019s reasons. It added that the documents submitted proved neither the penal character of the measures in question nor that there had been an arrest warrant. An oral hearing was not necessary as the documents presented were sufficient for the case to be assessed. 12.  By decision of 19 November 2013 the Federal Constitutional Court, without providing reasons, declined to consider the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint, in which he had alleged violations of his right to an effective remedy, his right to be heard and his personality rights (file no. 2 BvR 1511/11).", "references": ["9", "7", "2", "8", "5", "1", "6", "4", "0", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1969 and lives in Astrakhan. 6.  At approximately 8 p.m. on 15 June 2004 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of attempted fraud. On the same day at 11.37 p.m. criminal proceedings were instituted against him. 7.  On 16 June 2004 at 12.58 a.m. a record of the applicant\u2019s arrest was drawn up by the investigator. The record indicated that the applicant\u2019s arrest took place at 11.05 p.m. on 15 June 2004. 8.  On 17 June 2004 the Leninskiy District Court of Astrakhan (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) authorised the applicant\u2019s detention pending investigation. The court noted as follows:\n\u201c[The applicant] is charged with a serious offence representing an increased danger to society; the material submitted contains sufficient data about [his] involvement in the crime, including the testimony of the victim ... [The applicant] is an acting police officer, and under such circumstances the court finds that the Prosecutor has made a well-founded argument about the necessity to isolate [the applicant] in view of the risk of [his] absconding and obstructing the establishment of the truth in the early stage of the investigation by putting pressure on witnesses using his [status].\u201d 9.  On 25 June 2004 the Astrakhan Regional Court (\u201cthe Regional Court\u201d) upheld the above decision on appeal. The appeal hearing was held in the applicant\u2019s absence. The applicant\u2019s lawyer was present. 10.  On 13 August 2004 the applicant was informed that the investigation had been completed and that the case file had been submitted to the District Court for trial. 11.  In the meantime, on 15 August 2004, the two-month time-limit for the applicant\u2019s detention pending investigation expired. The applicant, however, remained in detention. 12.  On 25 August 2004 the District Court scheduled a preliminary hearing and ordered that the preventive measure applied to the applicant should remain unchanged until a date for the opening of the trial had been set. 13.  The applicant challenged the above decision in a supervisory review procedure. He argued that since there had been no valid court order authorising his detention from 15 August to 25 August 2004, the decision to retain the custodial measure unchanged had been unlawful. 14.  On 9 September 2004 the District Court scheduled the opening of the trial and ordered that the preventive measure remain unaltered. 15.  On 16 February 2005 the District Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention pending trial for two months, until 16 April 2005, noting as follows:\n\u201c[The applicant] is charged with a serious crime, representing an increased danger to society. The crime, according to the charges brought, was committed in abuse of office. So far [the applicant] has not been suspended from [his post]. Under these circumstances, if released, [the applicant] may put pressure on the victim and the witnesses. The sanction for the offence with which [the applicant] is charged varies from 5 to 10 years\u2019 imprisonment; therefore the arguments of the prosecution that [the applicant] may abscond from justice and render the examination of the case on the merits impossible are well-founded.\u201d 16.  On 7 April 2005 the District Court dismissed the application for release and extended the applicant\u2019s detention pending trial for another two months, until 16 June 2005. The decision mentioned that an appeal could be lodged within three days to the Regional Court and the applicant appealed. However, on 20 May 2005 the Regional Court discontinued the examination of the applicant\u2019s appeal. Referring to Article 355 \u00a7 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Court held that rulings rendered by a court in the course of the trial were not amenable to separate appeal. 17.  On 15 June 2005 the District Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention for three months, until 15 September 2005. The court applied the same reasoning as in its decision of 16 February 2005. On 21 July 2005 the Regional Court upheld the above decision on appeal. 18.  On the same day, the Regional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s application to quash the decision of 25 August 2004 by means of supervisory review. The court held, inter alia, that the applicant\u2019s detention from 16 August to 25 August 2004 had been lawful and that the decision of 25 August 2004 should stand. 19.  On 14 September 2005 the District Court, applying the same arguments as in its previous decisions, extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 15 December 2005. During the hearing, the applicant requested that the court let his sister represent him. However, in view of the fact that the applicant was already represented by two professional advocates, the court dismissed the request. On 27 October 2005 the Regional Court upheld the above decision on appeal. 20.  On 15 December 2005 the District Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 15 March 2006. The court again relied on the gravity of the charges against the applicant, his position and the risk of his putting pressure on the victim and witnesses, and of absconding and obstructing justice. One of the applicant\u2019s lawyers was absent from the hearing. On 26 January 2006 the Regional Court upheld the above decisions on appeal. 21.  On 13 March 2006 the District Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 15 June 2006, noting that the grounds for detention had not changed. 22.  The applicant lodged another application for release, relying on a deterioration of his health and the unavailability of adequate medical assistance in the remand prison. However, on 11 April 2006 the District Court dismissed the application. 23.  The applicant appealed, but on 25 May 2006 the Regional Court, relying on Article 355 \u00a7 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, discontinued the appeal proceedings. 24.  On 9 June 2006 the District Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 15 July 2006. 25.  On 29 June 2006 the District Court convicted the applicant of attempted large-scale fraud in abuse of office and sentenced him to six years and six months\u2019 imprisonment and a fine. During the hearing the applicant was kept in a metal cage. 26.  On 11 January 2007 the Regional Court upheld the judgment on appeal. 27.  On 27 January 2009 the applicant obtained a conditional early release. 28.  From 17 June 2004 to 22 January 2007 and from 5 May 2007 to 25 February 2008 the applicant was held in remand prison IZ-30/1 in the Astrakhan Region. He claimed that the facility had been severely overcrowded and that the cells had been in a poor sanitary condition. 29.  In the above periods, the applicant was transported between the remand prison and the District Court on no less than one hundred occasions. He claimed that the conditions of his transport to and from the courthouse had been appalling. 30.  Upon the applicant\u2019s arrival at IZ-30/1 remand prison in June 2004 he underwent a mandatory medical examination, including clinical laboratory tests and an examination by medical specialists. No abnormalities were found. The applicant subsequently underwent scheduled health examinations. 31.  On 16 April 2006 the applicant sought medical assistance. In connection with this application, on 21 April 2006 he was referred to the prison hospital in IK-2 correctional colony for examination and treatment. The examination showed that the applicant was suffering from the initial stages of a cardiovascular disease. He was prescribed and provided with the necessary treatment and his condition improved. The applicant was discharged on 10 May 2006 in a satisfactory condition with a recommendation to continue outpatient supervision. Upon return to IZ-30/1 the applicant was put under outpatient supervision and given the recommended treatment. 32.  From 30 August to 27 September 2006, from 30 May to 29 June 2007 and from 20 July to 27 August 2007 the applicant underwent subsequent scheduled courses of inpatient treatment in IK-2 correctional colony\u2019s prison hospital. The applicant\u2019s health condition remained satisfactory and no complications were noted. 33.  Despite the Court\u2019s request to submit a copy of the applicant\u2019s medical file, the Government\u2019s account was not supported by any relevant documents. 34.  Several times during his detention in IZ-30/1 the applicant applied for treatment for acute toothache. However, he was informed on each occasion that there was no dentist on the medical staff of the remand prison. In October 2005 a dentist was recruited by the remand prison. The only treatment available was extraction and there was a three-week waiting list. 35.  A medical certificate issued by the applicant\u2019s dentist (who had provided dental care to the applicant since 2001, up to his detention) confirmed in January 2009 that there were no traces of dental care having been provided to the applicant in the period between June 2004 and January 2009 and noted a serious worsening of the state of the latter\u2019s teeth. It also stated that the applicant needed treatment for tooth decay (nine teeth) and a dental prosthesis. 36.  The applicant also complained on numerous occasions about hypertension. He was given unidentified pills and a prescription for a more effective and costly medicine, with reference to the facility\u2019s lack of finance. The applicant could not afford to buy the medication prescribed. 37.  The applicant developed chronic gastritis while in remand prison. 38.  At the request of the applicant\u2019s lawyer, on 14 December 2005 the doctor at IZ-30/1 remand prison issued a medical certificate reading as follows:\n\u201cDuring his detention in IZ-30/1 [the applicant] repeatedly turned to the medical unit of the [remand prison] for medical assistance. He was examined by a physician and diagnosed with neurocirculatory dystonia of a hypertonic type, and chronic gastritis of type B at the stage of unstable remission.\nAppropriate treatment was prescribed with the medicine available at the remand prison. Furthermore, a prescription was given to the applicant to purchase more efficient medication.\nAt the present moment [the applicant\u2019s] state of health is relatively satisfactory.\nIn the event of a worsening of his state of health the applicant can be transferred to the regional prison hospital for inpatient treatment.\u201d 39.  An ambulance was called for the applicant at the court hearings on several occasions and he was given treatment for high blood pressure. The applicant submitted a medical certificate dated 14 December 2005, which shows that the ambulance was called for him on that date during the court hearing and that he was provided with the necessary medical assistance for a hypertensive crisis. 40.  Following numerous complaints about inadequate medical assistance in the remand prison, the applicant was transferred on several occasions to the hospital in the IK-2 correctional colony in the Astrakhan Region. However, no effective treatment was available in the hospital either, because the applicant was not transferred there when his health required, that is following his hypertensive crises, but in accordance with an unclear schedule fixed by the administration of the remand prison. 41.  As is apparent from the documents submitted by the applicant in support of his allegations, on 19 September 2006 an inspection of IZ-30/1 was carried out by the prosecutor\u2019s office of the Astrakhan Region. The inspection revealed, inter alia, that there was a problem of deficient health care in the remand prison. 42.  The applicant brought the issue of inadequate medical assistance before various domestic authorities, including the head of the remand prison, the Astrakhan regional prosecutor\u2019s office, the Ombudsman and a judge of the District Court, but all to no avail.", "references": ["0", "5", "8", "7", "9", "4", "6", "No Label", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["1", "2", "3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1966 and is detained in the Suwa\u0142ki Prison. 6.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows. 7.  On 30 April 2003 the Suwa\u0142ki Regional Prosecutor\u2019s Office issued an arrest warrant against the applicant on suspicion of his being the leader of an international organised criminal group and six counts of kidnapping for ransom committed by members of that group. On the same day the Suwa\u0142ki District Court issued a decision ordering the applicant\u2019s detention on remand, relying on the reasonable suspicion that he had committed the offences in question. It attached great weight to the possibility that the applicant might attempt to obstruct the proceedings by bringing pressure to bear on witnesses and other suspects. 8.  On 22 April 2003 the applicant was arrested in the Netherlands. 9.  The extradition request, arrest warrant and detention order were sent to the Netherlands. The applicant was transferred to Poland on 20 October 2003. 10.  On 8 April 2004 the Suwa\u0142ki Regional Prosecutor indicted the applicant before the August\u00f3w District Court. The case was later transferred to the Lublin Regional Court. 11.  The applicant\u2019s appeal against the detention order, his further appeals against subsequent decisions extending his detention, and all his subsequent applications for release and appeals against refusals to release him, were unsuccessful. 12.  In the meantime, in another set of criminal proceedings, on 1 April 2005, the Suwa\u0142ki Regional Court convicted the applicant of armed robbery and sentenced him to four years and six months\u2019 imprisonment (II K 96/04). The judgment was upheld on appeal. He served this sentence from 21 January 2006 until 20 July 2010. 13.  The bill of indictment was first lodged with the August\u00f3w District Court, which declared itself not competent to deal with the case on 14 April 2004. The case was then transferred to the Lublin District Court, where the trial commenced on 21 September 2004. The court held many hearings and heard witnesses. On 26 January 2006 the prosecutor submitted a request for the case to be transferred to the Lublin Regional Court. Following various appeals and challenges, on 26 September 2006 the Warsaw Court of Appeal finally decided that the Lublin Regional Court was competent to deal with the applicant\u2019s trial. The trial commenced before the Lublin Regional Court in December 2006. The court held at least sixty-five public hearings lasting up to four hours. 14.  At the hearings before the Lublin District Court and Lublin Regional Court the applicant had the services of a Lithuanian interpreter. On a few occasions a Russian interpreter was provided as the applicant agreed that he spoke Russian well enough. On 4 January 2007 the applicant expressed his preference for a Lithuanian interpreter and one was provided until the end of the trial. 15.  On numerous occasions the applicant, assisted by an interpreter, examined the file. According to the Government, the file was examined on 14 November and 2 December 2007, 3 January, 7, 17 and 31 March and 5 May 2008 at the very least. At the applicant\u2019s request the trial court provided him with translations of documents. In addition, at four hearings in 2005 the applicant requested copies of the relevant documents in Polish. 16.  On 5 October 2007 the applicant asked the trial court to allocate another legal aid lawyer to him. He contended that he had argued with the incumbent lawyer and could not communicate with him. It appears that at the hearing the lawyer endorsed the request made by the applicant, but the court dismissed it. 17.  At the hearing of 7 January 2009 the applicant challenged the presiding judge. However his challenge was dismissed. 18.  On 27 January 2010 the Lublin Regional Court (IV Ka 338/06) convicted the applicant as charged. In particular he was convicted on six counts of kidnapping for ransom and leading an organised criminal gang. The applicant was sentenced to twelve years\u2019 imprisonment. The period of the applicant\u2019s detention from 22 April 2003 until 20 January 2006 was credited towards the sentence. 19.  During the trial before the Lublin District and Regional Courts the applicant was represented by Mr M.C. a lawyer from Bia\u0142ystok, appointed for him by the court. The lawyer prepared an appeal on his behalf. In his appeal he raised, inter alia, a breach of the applicant\u2019s defence rights under Article 6 of the Convention and argued that the applicant had not had access to his lawyer in the presence of an interpreter and full access to the case file in his own language. 20.  On 7 December 2010 the Lublin Court of Appeal (II AKa 235/10) upheld the conviction. The court dismissed the allegations regarding the impossibility of communicating with his lawyer, who spoke only Polish, as manifestly ill-founded. The court established that the applicant had had access to a sworn interpreter during the entire trial, including meetings with the lawyer. The appellate court also found that the applicant had not been hindered in his right of access to the case file, which he consulted on many occasions in the presence of his interpreter. The court stated:\n\u201cDuring the entire proceedings the accused benefited from free counsel with whom he could communicate in the presence of an interpreter. The regional court even organised recesses during the hearing in order to enable the applicant to contact his lawyer in the presence of a sworn interpreter. Consequently, one cannot share the accused\u2019s allegation of a breach of Article 6 of the Convention or other provisions. Moreover, throughout the proceedings the first-instance court provided him with copies of the requested documents...\u201d 21.  A new lawyer allocated to the applicant at this stage of the proceedings, Mr A.D., lodged a cassation appeal against the judgment. He argued that the contact with the lawyer during recesses in the trial had occurred in the presence of police officers and sometimes lay judges or judges\u2019 assistants. That rendered respect for the applicant\u2019s defence rights illusory. The requests for unsupervised meetings with the lawyer in the presence of the interpreter had been dismissed by both the trial court and the court of appeal. In the cassation appeal he further argued that the trial court never actually provided the applicant with copies of the translated documents although it had agreed to do it. Moreover, the court had asked the applicant to pay for them although he did not have any financial means. 22.  On 4 April 2012 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s cassation appeal. The translation into Lithuanian of this judgment had been received by the applicant on 7 July 2012. As regards the arguments put forward in the cassation appeal, the court stated that the applicant had been detained on remand and had therefore had to be accompanied by guards during the meetings with the lawyer which had taken place during recesses in the trial court hearing. The court further noted that the requirements of Article 6 of the Convention had been fulfilled as the applicant had had translations of the most important documents necessary for his comprehension of the case, even if not the entire file. 23.  On 21 October 2003 the Suwa\u0142ki Remand Centre requested to classify the applicant as a so-called \u201cdangerous detainee\u201d. In their request the authorities pointed out that the applicant had been charged with having committed several counts of kidnapping for ransom, robberies and attempted murder and of being a leader of an international, armed, criminal group. The applicant was searched by an arrest warrant and apprehended in Amsterdam. The remand centre authorities stated: \u201chis personal situation, character and behaviour pose a serious danger to society or to the security of a remand centre\u201d. They further indicated that the security of all transfers of the applicant be strengthen \u201cgiven the character and the manner in which the offences had been committed and the fact that [the applicant] had previously practiced box and combat techniques\u201d. The request ends: \u201cHe is a person of high degree of depravity\u201d.\nOn the same day the Lublin Remand Centre Penitentiary Commission decided to classify the applicant as a \u201cdangerous detainee\u201d. The commission stated that the main reason for the classification was the suspicion that the applicant had committed offences within an organised criminal group (Article 212a \u00a7 3 and \u00a74 (c) of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences). 24.  On an unspecified date the applicant lodged a complaint with the Lublin Regional Prison Service Inspectorate concerning the constant monitoring of his cell, repeated body searches and the lack of unsupervised visits. On 15 February 2010 the complaint was declared manifestly ill\u2011founded. 25.  Every three months the Lublin Remand Centre Penitentiary Commission reviewed and reaffirmed its decision to classify the applicant as a \u201cdangerous detainee\u201d. The relevant decisions were limited to short descriptions of the nature of the charges laid against him, and later offences of which he had been convicted which, together with his \u201cpersonal situation\u201d, justified the maintaining of the previous decisions. In the requests for extension of the regime issued prior to each decision of the commission, the director of the remand centre emphasised the violent nature of the crimes which the applicant had allegedly committed. In the requests of 19 October 2004 and 9 January 2005 the authorities referred to the applicant\u2019s \u201cpersonal circumstances (ruthless and cruel manner in which the crimes were committed taken together with the knowledge of box and combat techniques)\u201d. In the more recent requests the remand centre authorities pointed out that the applicant had not taken any active part in the \u201csocial rehabilitation process\u201d and had been of low moral character. All the commission\u2019s decisions and the requests by the remand centre issued between April 2005 and 2012 had similar wording. 26.  The applicant appealed against some of those decisions. In particular, he appealed against the decision of 2 April 2009, but this was dismissed by the Lublin Regional Court on 8 June 2009. The applicant also appealed against the commission\u2019s decision of 29 April 2011 and on 6 September 2011 the Bia\u0142ystok Regional Court upheld it. In addition to that, the applicant submitted that he had appealed against the decision of 4 August 2011 which was dismissed on 11 October 2011. On 26 March 2012 the Bia\u0142ystok Regional Court dismissed his appeal against the decision of the commission issued on 27 January 2012. The domestic courts examined the legality of the impugned decisions and found that they had been given in accordance with the law and after a thorough analysis of the case. In particular due consideration had to be given to the nature of the offences allegedly committed by the applicant and of which he had been later found guilty. The courts also found that the authorities based their decisions on an exhaustive assessment of the applicant\u2019s behaviour. 27.  On 25 July 2012 the Bia\u0142ystok Remand Centre Penitentiary Commission decided to lift the measure. The commission considered that the applicant no longer posed a threat to the security of the remand centre. 28.  On 11 October 2007 the Lublin Regional Court granted the applicant\u2019s request to be allowed to make phone calls from the detention centre. During his subsequent detention in the Lublin and Suwa\u0142ki Remand Centres the applicant was authorised to make two telephone calls per week, each lasting ten minutes. For a short period of time in 2010 the use of telephone was limited to once a week but the call duration extended to 15 minutes. 29.  In addition to that, the applicant was often granted additional telephone conversations with his family, daughter, lawyer, or diplomatic representatives. In 2010 these took place on eight occasions and in 2011 on seven occasions. At his request, on seven occasions in 2010 the authorities extended the allotted time to fifteen minutes. 30.  The visits by the applicant\u2019s family, his common-law wife and daughter, were subject to restrictions, but he had been able to receive them regularly. The first visit from his common law wife took place in August 2004, followed by two other in the same year. From the list of visits submitted by the Government and not contested by the applicant, it appears that between 2004 and 2009 he had had between two and four visits every year at least. In 2010 he had in total eight visits mostly from his wife and daughter. Each visit lasted between thirty minutes and two hours. 31.  The applicant was not restricted in receiving correspondence from his family. 32.  The Government acknowledged that during the hearings before the Lublin Regional Court the applicant had been held in a metal cage separating him from the judges and the public, and whilst in the cage, his hands had remained handcuffed. 33.  The parties failed to provide a detailed description of the cage, in particular its dimensions. It is also not clear whether the guards were positioned inside the cage with the applicant or next to it. 34.  The parties disagreed as to the number of hearings during which the applicant remained in the cage. The applicant stated that he was placed in the metal cage, with his hands and legs shackled, during all the hearings before the trial court, approximately 104 of them. The Government submitted that he was placed in the cage, handcuffed, during some hearings before the Lublin Regional Court but not all of them. 35.  The Government also submitted that on 7 October 2010 the applicant received disciplinary punishment for having verbally threatened a prison guard.", "references": ["4", "7", "8", "3", "6", "9", "0", "2", "5", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1946 and lives in Bucharest. 6.  On 24 April 2002 she was hit by a car while crossing the street. The driver left the scene of the accident and took the applicant to hospital, where she was diagnosed with a fractured spine. She underwent surgery five days later and was released from hospital on 14 May 2002. 7.  The police opened an investigation to clarify the circumstances of the accident. 8.  On 19 June 2002 the police took a statement from the applicant, in which she complained that the driver had caused her bodily harm. She also requested 20,000 US dollars (USD) from him in civil damages. 9.  On 5 July 2002 the police officer in charge of the investigation ordered a technical expert report. 10.  On 8 July 2002 an eyewitness was interviewed by the police. 11.  On 23 August 2002 a forensic medical report was attached to the investigation file. It stated that the applicant had suffered injuries which required forty to forty five days of medical care. 12.  According to reports drafted by the investigating police officers, on 30 November 2002 and 16 January 2003 the applicant failed to attend the police station to take note of the objectives set for the expert report. On 5 June 2003 the applicant went to the police station, where she submitted additional questions to be answered by the expert. 13.  On 18 February 2004 the police requested the assistance of an expert to prepare the technical expert report in the case. 14.  On 29 March 2004 the expert examined the scene of the accident in the presence of the driver and the applicant. The driver declared that he agreed with the expert\u2019s findings. 15.  The technical expert report was finalised on 25 August 2004. It stated that the applicant was to blame for the accident because she had crossed the street in an unmarked place without paying attention. The driver, who had been turning his vehicle at the time, had not breached any traffic regulations. The expert appointed by the driver agreed with the report, while the expert appointed by the applicant drafted a dissenting opinion concluding that the fault lay entirely with the driver, who had turned his car without paying attention. 16.  The applicant took note of the expert opinions on 23 November 2004. On 17 January 2005 she submitted objections, to which she received a reply on 25 January 2005. 17.  On 31 January 2005 the Prosecutor\u2019s Office attached to the Bucharest District Court decided not to prosecute the driver, since the fault of the accident lay entirely with the applicant. The applicant lodged a complaint against that decision, but it was rejected as ill-founded by a hierarchically superior prosecutor on 4 April 2005. 18.  A complaint by the applicant against the two decisions was declared inadmissible by the Bucharest District Court on 2 June 2005. She lodged an appeal on points of law (recurs) against that judgment. On 4 August 2005 her appeal was allowed by the Bucharest County Court, which decided to send the case back to the prosecutor for a more thorough investigation since numerous facts had not been clarified. 19. On 29 December 2005 the applicant made enquiries with the prosecutor\u2019s office about the status of the investigation.[1] 20.  On 26 April 2006 the same eyewitness was interviewed again. 21.  A new expert report was requested by the prosecutor on 7 July 2006, and on 19 July 2006 the applicant informed the authorities that she would need additional time, until 9 September 2006, to decide whether to instruct a counter expert on her behalf. 22.  On 10 August 2006 a first written statement was taken from the driver. 23.  In statements given to the police on 11 May and 19 October 2006, the applicant mentioned that a new expert report would not be necessary in the case. 24. According to three reports drafted between 2 October and 29 November 2006 by the police officer in charge of the investigation, the applicant could not be contacted, or had failed to come to the police station to give the name of her counter expert. 25.  On 23 January 2007, holding that a new expert report was not necessary, the prosecutor decided again not to prosecute the driver since the fault for the accident lay entirely with the applicant. The decision was upheld by a hierarchically superior prosecutor on 21 February 2007. 26.  The applicant\u2019s complaint against the prosecutors\u2019 decisions was allowed by the Bucharest District Court on 8 May 2007. The court held that the investigative authorities had failed to follow the instructions given in the previous judgment of 4 August 2005. The judgment became final on 26 September 2007 when an appeal on points of law by the prosecutor was dismissed by the Bucharest County Court. 27.  On 9 June 2008 the Prosecutor\u2019s Office attached to the Bucharest District Court noted that the limitation period for the crime under investigation had expired on 24 April 2007 and decided to close the case. 28.  The applicant appealed against that decision before the courts. She claimed 25,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage from the driver and the Prosecutor\u2019s Office. She considered that the prosecutor was liable for the excessive delays in the investigation which had triggered the expiry of the limitation period for the crime committed against her. 29.  On 27 August 2008 the Bucharest District Court rejected the applicant\u2019s claim. The court held that because the limitation period for criminal responsibility in the case had expired it could not rule on the applicant\u2019s claim for compensation. It further held that the applicant could bring such a claim before the civil courts. The judgment became final on 15 October 2008 when an appeal by the applicant was dismissed by the Bucharest County Court.", "references": ["7", "9", "4", "6", "5", "2", "1", "8", "0", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Pozuelo de Alarc\u00f3n (Madrid). 7.  The applicant cohabited with another man in a homosexual relationship from 1990 until the latter\u2019s death on 2 July 2002. During that period they lived together in an apartment belonging to the applicant\u2019s partner. When his partner died, the sister and only heir of the applicant\u2019s partner gave the applicant, because of the relationship he had had with her brother, an apartment that had belonged to the applicant\u2019s late partner and in which the couple had spent their holidays together since 1990. 8.  On 19 September 2003 the applicant claimed social security allowances as a surviving spouse, under section 174 (1) of the General Social Security Act, arguing that he had cohabited with his deceased partner for many years. 9.  On 22 September 2003 the National Institute of Social Security (Instituto Nacional de la Seguridad Social, hereafter referred to as \u201cINSS\u201d) refused to grant the applicant a survivor\u2019s pension on the ground that since he had not been married to the deceased person, he could not legally be considered as his surviving spouse for the purposes of section 174 (1) of the General Social Security Act. That decision was formally served on 13 June 2005. 10.   On 1 July 2005 Law no. 13/2005 amending the provisions of the Civil Code with respect to the right to enter into marriage was passed. Two days later it entered into force. This law legalised same-sex marriage in Spain. In accordance with its first additional provision all legal and regulatory provisions making reference to marriage should be understood thereafter as applicable to all marriages irrespective of the sex of its members (see paragraph 35 below). 11.  On 5 July 2005 the applicant filed an administrative complaint against the decision of 22 September 2003. This complaint was dismissed by the INSS on 11 August 2005. The INSS noted that there was no provision in the legislation in force that allowed, for the purposes of social security rights, the person who had been cohabiting with the deceased to gain the status of a widower. 12.  On 26 September 2005 the applicant challenged that decision before the Madrid Social Tribunal no. 33 (\u201cthe Social Tribunal\u201d). 13.  In a judgment of 14 November 2005 the Social Tribunal ruled for the applicant. The Social Tribunal firstly outlined that the facts of the case had to be assessed in the light of the newly enacted Law no. 13/2005, which was already in force and deemed constitutional by the tribunal. As to the merits, the Social Tribunal observed that the issue at stake was whether the applicant, as the surviving partner of a same-sex relationship that ended (following his partner\u2019s death) before the entry into force of Law no. 13/2005, had the right to a survivor\u2019s pension. The Social Tribunal then reiterated that, according to the well-established domestic case-law, surviving partners of unmarried couples were not entitled to a survivor\u2019s pension under section 174 of the General Social Security Act, marriage being a constitutive element to access any such social-security benefit; that the applicant had been prevented from marrying his partner because same-sex marriage had not been recognised in domestic law at the time his partner died; that the social security administration had relied on the fact that the couple had not married to refuse the applicant a survivor\u2019s pension; and that it was evident that after the entry into force of Law no. 13/2005, surviving spouses of same-sex marriages were entitled to survivors\u2019 pensions on the same footing as survivors of different-sex marriages. 14.  The Social Tribunal was of the view that the solution to the legal issue raised by the applicant\u2019s case depended on whether it could be inferred from Law no. 13/2005 that Parliament\u2019s intention had been that surviving partners of same-sex couples who had been prevented from marrying under the former legislation could access a survivor\u2019s pension on a similar footing to same-sex couples who could marry after the entering into force of that Act. The Social Tribunal drew attention in this regard to the provisions and the explanatory memorandum of Law no. 13/2005 to contend that this new legislation had a very strong egalitarian purpose, and that from the date it entered into force, that is to say 3 July 2005, all legal provisions concerning marriage should be interpreted on the basis of the first additional provision of Law no. 13/2005 as applying fully to same-sex marriage (see paragraph 35 below). The Social Tribunal held in this regard that:\n\u201cThis is a wide-ranging provision which affects all the other provisions of the legal system making reference to marriage. From now onwards all references to marriage established in the law shall be understood as applying also to marriage celebrated between two persons of the same sex. Accordingly, whoever shall be called to interpret or apply any marriage-related provision should do so in egalitarian terms without taking into consideration whether the spouses are of the same or different sex\u201d. 15.  The Social Tribunal further recalled that additional provision no. 10 (2) of Law no. 30/1981 of 7 July 1981 amending the provisions of the Civil Code pertaining to marriage and the procedure to be followed for cases of annulment, judicial separation and divorce, recognised the right to obtain a survivor\u2019s pension for individuals who had been prevented from marrying a person who later died by the legislation in force until then, provided that he or she had cohabited in a relationship similar to marriage with the deceased person and that the deceased had died before Law no. 30/1981 entered into force. 16.  The Social Tribunal stressed that such a provision was included in order to provide a solution for those cohabiting couples consisting of a man and a woman who could not have married under the legislation in force until that time, and thus did not qualify for a survivor\u2019s pension, because one or even both of them had still been married to another person whom they had been prevented from divorcing, divorce having been legally impossible in Spain until the passing of Law no. 30/1981. The Social Tribunal considered that the applicant\u2019s circumstances were \u201cfully comparable\u201d to those outlined in additional provision no. 10 (2) of Law no. 30/1981 in so far as:\n\u201c- the claimant could not marry his partner because the legislation then in force prevented him from doing so;\n- the claimant had shared a marital life with his partner until the latter\u2019s death;\n- the latter\u2019s death had taken place before the entry into force of Law no. 13/2005\u201d 17.  The Social Tribunal acknowledged, however, that whereas Law no. 30/1981 was aimed at protecting the rights of those cohabiting heterosexual couples who were prevented from marrying because divorce was prohibited at the time, Law no. 13/2005 was aimed at protecting the rights of those who could not marry on account of their sexual orientation, and that this distinction was the main impediment to the recognition of the applicant\u2019s right to a survivor\u2019s pension. 18.  The Social Tribunal considered nonetheless that treating these two groups differently would not be in harmony with the strong egalitarian intention expressed by Parliament with the passing of Law no. 13/2005 and that, accordingly, additional provision no. 10 (2) of Law no. 30/1981 was applicable to the applicant by force of additional provision no. 1 of Law no. 13/2005. The Social Tribunal stated as follows:\n\u201cTherefore, the interpretation that in my opinion better fits the legislature\u2019s intention is the following:\n- If the first additional provision of Law no. 13/2005 sets out that provisions making reference to marriage shall apply irrespective of the sex of the spouses,\n- And one of [these provisions], currently in force to provide access to a survivor\u2019s pension, is additional provision no. 10 (2) of Law no. 30/1981.\n- The only method to apply it in a way which is consistent with the egalitarian intention of the legislature is to do so irrespective of the sexual orientation of the members of the cohabiting couple.\n- In order to ensure that sexual orientation does not constitute discriminatory grounds in the application of additional provision no. 10 (2) of Law no. 30/1981, the right thereby recognised shall currently be interpreted as providing a solution to factual situations such as the one in the instant case in which the impediment to access to a survivor\u2019s pension is no other than the sexual orientation [of the claimant].\u201d 19.  As regards the administration\u2019s submission that in the area of social security benefits the governing principle was that of non-retroactivity of laws and that according to the law in force at the time the applicant\u2019s partner died the former did not qualify for a survivor\u2019s pension because they were not married, the Social Tribunal was of the view that this general principle was not absolute and that it did not apply where there was a specific rule giving retroactive effect to laws more favourable to the citizens, as is true of the instant case. Thus, additional provision no. 10 (2) of Law no. 30/1981 should be read in the light of the first additional provision of Law no. 13/2005. 20.  As to the degree of retroactivity that should be given to additional provision 10 (2) of Law no. 30/1981 in the applicant\u2019s case, the Social Tribunal relied on the constitutive effects of Law no. 13/2005 which created new rights and was effective only from the date it entered into force. Accordingly, the Social Tribunal recognised the applicant\u2019s right to be awarded a survivor\u2019s pension with effect from 3 July 2005. 21.  The INSS and the Treasury General of Social Security appealed (recurso de suplicaci\u00f3n) against that judgment to the Madrid High Court of Justice (Tribunal Superior de Justicia). 22.  On 18 September 2006 the Madrid High Court of Justice upheld the appeal and reversed the first-instance judgment. The court found that the legislature had not intended Law no. 13/2005 to cover same-sex partnerships which had been ended by the death of one of the partners before said law had entered into force and that the lack of protection of these unions could not be considered discriminatory in the light of Article 14 of the Spanish Constitution. 23.  For the court, it was only as from the entry into force of Law no. 13/2005 that marriage between same-sex couples was recognised and that this law affected other rights for those persons who would wish to marry thereafter. Hence, the court was of the view that Law no. 13/2005 had no retroactive effects, except as otherwise expressly provided, which was not the case at hand. 24.  The court further stated that even though Law no. 13/2005 had been inspired by the constitutional principle of equality, prior legislation preventing same-sex marriage could not be deemed unconstitutional as contrary to either any constitutional principle or to the right not to be discriminated against. The court referred to constitutional case-law dating from 1994 according to which the requisite of heterosexuality for the purposes of marriage was fully constitutional and that it was within the margin of appreciation of the public authorities to treat heterosexual marriages more favourably than homosexual partnerships. In this connection, the court maintained that despite the reference in the preamble of Law no. 13/2005 (see paragraph 35 below) to the discriminatory treatment to which homosexuals had traditionally been subjected on account of their sexual orientation, the aim of Parliament in passing that law was merely to respond to a new social reality and award homosexuals the right to marry, but not to protect same-sex partnerships which had already ended before its enactment. 25.  The court referred to constitutional case-law according to which a difference in legal treatment of individuals due to subsequent changes in the law does not necessarily entail discrimination, even if those persons could be said to be in similar circumstances. Given the complexity that a change in legislation might involve, it was for Parliament to establish the characteristics of the legal transition, either by introducing retroactivity clauses or by restricting the application of the new legislation to circumstances arising after its entry into force. 26.  The court noted in this regard that Law no. 13/2005 had not included any provision concerning same-sex partnerships which had already ended at the time of its entry into force and that it strictly concerned same-sex couples still in existence at that time and who would be willing to enter into marriage. The court considered that the difference between the situations before and after the passing of Law no. 13/2005 was essentially an expression of the principle of succession of laws without constitutional implications as regards the right not to be discriminated against. 27.  As regards the applicability to the present case of additional provision no. 10 (2) of Law no. 30/1981, the Madrid High Court of Justice found that this provision was not applicable to the applicant\u2019s case for two main reasons. Firstly, that provision could not be considered as among the provisions to which the first additional provision of Law no. 13/2005 referred. Additional provision no. 10 (2) was, as the Constitutional Court had established, of a provisional or transitory nature and had been envisaged for those specific cases in which one of the partners had died before the entry into force of Law no. 30/1981. It had not been intended to govern future situations. Secondly, that provision had been envisaged for a totally different situation from that of the applicant. Additional provision no. 10 (2) of Law no. 30/1981 was aimed at guaranteeing a survivor\u2019s pension to those heterosexuals who had been prevented from marrying their out-of wedlock partner because divorce had not been legal at the time of the latter\u2019s death. The inability to remarry for those affected by additional provision no. 10 (2) of Law no. 30/1981 was based on the fact that divorce was not permitted at the time. The institution of marriage was open to them in their capacity as heterosexuals. On the contrary, same-sex couples were absolutely prevented from marrying before Law no. 13/2005 since the institution of marriage was until then restricted to heterosexual couples. 28.  Furthermore, the court contended that the applicant could never have fulfilled the more uxorio marital cohabitation requirement established by additional provision no. 10 (2) of Law no. 30/ 1981 of, because only those who were in principle eligible for marriage but had been prevented from marrying for whatever reason could qualify for de facto marital cohabitation. The applicant and his partner could have never cohabited \u201cas if married\u201d before the entry into force of Law no. 13/2005, because before then they were ineligible for marriage as they were both male. 29.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law seeking harmonisation of the case-law (recurso de casaci\u00f3n para la unificaci\u00f3n de doctrina). In a decision of 27 June 2007, the Supreme Court (Social Chamber) declared the appeal inadmissible on the ground that the decision produced for purposes of comparison, specifically a judgment of the High Court of Justice of the Canary Islands of 7 November 2003, was not relevant. That decision was served on 26 July 2007. 30.  Relying on Articles 14 (principle of equality and prohibition of discrimination) and 24 \u00a7 1 (right to effective judicial protection), the applicant lodged an amparo appeal with the Constitutional Court. In a decision of 11 February 2009, served on 17 February 2009, the Constitutional Court declared the appeal inadmissible on the grounds that the applicant had failed to substantiate the special constitutional relevance of his complaints.", "references": ["1", "5", "9", "0", "8", "4", "2", "6", "7", "3", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1976 and lives in Warsaw. 6.  The applicant is a journalist working for The World of Cars (Auto \u015awiat) a weekly motoring magazine. 7.  In August 2006 the Competition and Consumer Rights Office (Urz\u0105d Kontroli Konkurencji i Konsument\u00f3w) published a report on its official website, summarising the results of a countrywide survey concerning the quality of motor fuel sold by petrol stations. It listed, inter alia, a number of petrol stations, including their names, addresses and owners, where samples of diesel and petrol taken during that survey did not meet the quality requirements imposed by the applicable regulations. 8.  On 14 August 2006 the magazine published a series of articles. It presented the most drastic cases of fraud and described the impact that use of adulterated fuel had on the vehicles. It also summarized the results of the survey. It was divided into five parts: \u201cYou can make an official complaint\u201d (Tu mo\u017cna z\u0142o\u017cyc skarg\u0119), \u201cBrand names take care of the quality of fuel\u201d (Firmowe stacje dbaj\u0105 o jako\u015b\u0107), \u201cCostly repairs\u201d (Kosztowne naprawy) and \u201cWe go public with the names of fuel crooks\u201d (Ujawniamy oszust\u00f3w paliw). The latter article referred to the results of the survey and had the applicant\u2019s name in the byline. The article also included a table entitled \u201cStations selling counterfeit fuel\u201d (Stacje fa\u0142szuj\u0105ce paliwa). 9.  The table shown was based on the Competition and Consumer Rights Office report and consisted of four columns listing the town, the name of the company running the station and information on the quality of the diesel and petrol sold there. The fuels were rated as either \u201cgood quality\u201d or \u201cbad quality\u201d; at least one fuel in all the listed stations was rated as \u201cbad quality\u201d. No mention was made of the degree to which standards had been breached or of the kind of standards concerned in each case. The station owned by the complainant in the subsequent criminal proceedings (see paragraphs 12\u201126 below) was included into the list with the following information: \u201cDiesel \u2013 good quality, gasoline \u2013 bad quality\u201d. 10.  The front page of the magazine bore the title \u201cReport: stations selling adulterated fuel. Troubling results of survey. The World of Cars publishes addresses of petrol stations where you should not buy fuel.\u201d (Raport: kt\u00f3re stacje sprzedaj\u0105 fa\u0142szywe paliwo. Niepokoj\u0105ce wyniki kontroli. Auto-\u015awiat podaje adresy, gdzie nie nale\u017cy tankowa\u0107). 11.  On 30 August 2006 B.J., the owner of one of the stations listed in the table referred to above, asked the magazine\u2019s editor to publish a retraction of the statement concerning his business. In a reply of 7 September 2006 the publisher replied that their article had been based on the report of the Competition and Consumer Rights Office. 12.  On 2 December 2006 B.J. brought a private prosecution against the applicant with the Hrubiesz\u00f3w District Court. He submitted that the press report had damaged his reputation and good name; that he sold fuel bought from renowned suppliers; that he did not adulterate it; and that the data published by the Office had not indicated that he had done so. He relied on Article 212 of the Criminal Code (defamation (znies\u0142awienie)). 13.  The case was subsequently transferred to the Warsaw\u2011Mokot\u00f3w District Court. 14.  On 10 September 2008 that court, without holding a hearing discontinued the criminal proceedings, finding that the applicant had no case to answer. It noted that civil proceedings against the applicant had been instituted by B.J. and were at that time pending before the civil courts (see paragraphs 28-29 below). The facts of the case which the court had established on the basis of the case file of the civil proceedings were not in dispute between the parties. The applicant had not committed a criminal offence as information published in the impugned article had been based on official data publicly available via the Internet. He had therefore had good grounds to assume that it had been true. The editors of the magazine and the applicant had acted to protect the legitimate interests of car owners. As selling adulterated motor fuel had been known to be very common and as it had been causing serious damage to car engines, the issue had been hotly debated and had caused considerable public concern and anger. 15.  The court lastly noted that a civil forum was more appropriate for the purposes of dealing with similar cases. 16.  B.J. appealed against the decision.\nOn 18 June 2009 the Warsaw Regional Court allowed the appeal. It noted that the contested decision had been taken with the court referring to a civil case which had previously been lodged by the garage owner and which had been pending at that time. However, this decision had been premature as a hearing should have been held in order to establish all the relevant facts. The court acknowledged that the applicant had relied on the official report, but noted that phrases such as \u201cfuel crooks\u201d had not been included therein. Consequently, it could not have been determined at that point in time whether these statements had been true. The court remitted the case for reconsideration to the Warszawa-Mokot\u00f3w District Court. 17.  On 10 November 2009 the Warszawa-Mokot\u00f3w District Court found the applicant guilty of the offence of defamation under Article 212 of the Criminal Code. It imposed on him a fine of 2,000 Polish zlotys (PLN, approx. 500 euros (EUR)), ordered him to pay PLN 500 (approx. EUR 125) to a charity and to reimburse B.J.\u2019s legal costs in the aggregate amount of PLN 2,760 (approx. EUR 690). 18.  The court noted concordant testimony from a number of witnesses that the problem of selling adulterated motor fuel had been a serious one and that it had given rise to an ongoing discussion and to measures being taken by the State authorities in order to prevent and penalise it. It accepted that it had been an issue of public interest.\nIt noted that J.K., a witness in the case, had testified that after the article many clients in the town had stopped buying fuel at the station owned by B.J. 19.  It had regard to an expert opinion which confirmed that the petrol sold by B.J. had not corresponded to the official standards. The expert had indicated a number of possible causes. Adulteration of the petrol by the addition of heating oil had been one of them. He stated that the non\u2011compliance of the fuel sold by B.J. at the time of the survey had not been significant and that it could not have damaged car engines. 20.  The court was of the view that it had not been demonstrated to its satisfaction that B.J. had adulterated the petrol he had sold. The applicant had not shown that this had indeed been the case. The deterioration of its quality could have been caused by other factors over which the owner of the station had had no control. The applicant had failed to show proper diligence by publishing the results of the survey made by the Competition and Consumer Rights Office and by referring, in the title of the table referred to above, to \u201c[s]tations selling adulterated fuel\u201d. The title of that table was a simplification which clearly ascribed negative intentions and conduct to the owners of the stations concerned. 21.  While it was true that an administrative fine had been imposed on B.J., the prosecuting authorities had decided not to institute criminal proceedings against him because the applicable standards had been breached only minimally at his station. Hence, in the court\u2019s view it had been inappropriate to include the name of his company in the table entitled \u201cFuel crooks\u201d. Prior to the publishing of the impugned information, the applicant should have checked how exactly B.J. had breached the official standards and whether these shortcomings could indeed have caused damage to car engines. Instead, he had uncritically published the information from the Competition and Consumer Rights Office report, putting B.J. on a par with those who pursued the dangerous practice of adulterating petrol by adding heating oil to it and breaching the quality standards a hundred- or a thousand-fold. 22.  The court acknowledged that the applicant\u2019s intentions had been legitimate, but the use of words such as \u201ccrook\u201d or \u201cforger\u201d to describe B.J.\u2019s conduct had not been justified. The newspaper should have used more appropriate and precise language. 23.  The applicant appealed. He argued, inter alia, that his conviction had been incompatible with Article 10 of the Convention in so far as the court had failed to address substantive issues arising under this provision in the case, including the case-law of the Court; that the issues raised by him had been the subject of an ongoing public debate, a fact which had not been sufficiently taken into consideration by the court; that the information contained in the article had consisted merely of data relayed from an official document prepared by the State; that it had not been for the applicant to assess the veracity of this information; that he had therefore had a right to assume that it had been true and had therefore not been obliged to contact the owner of the station prior to the article\u2019s publication. He lastly argued that the court had failed to make a distinction between untrue information and information which the applicant had been justified in thinking had been true. He concluded that the interference had been excessive and not necessary in a democratic society. 24.  By a judgment of 21 April 2011, served on the applicant\u2019s lawyer on 7 June 2011, the Warsaw Regional Court essentially upheld the contested judgment (save for a part amended for a technicality). It further increased the legal costs to be paid to a total of PLN 4,244. It shared the conclusions of the lower court as to the legal assessment of the facts of the case. 25.  In so far as the applicant relied on Article 10 of the Convention and referred to the Court\u2019s case-law, the court noted that both this provision and the provisions of the Constitution guaranteed a right to freedom of expression, but this freedom was not unlimited. It could be restricted for the purposes of, inter alia, the protection of the rights of others. In the present case the impugned article contained offensive terms and had thereby breached B.J.\u2019s rights. It could not therefore be accepted that it had served any legitimate public aim. In particular, it could not be accepted that the article had amounted to a mere retransmission of the information contained in the report of the Competition and Consumer Rights Office. 26.  In so far as the applicant relied on the case-law of the Court, the Regional Court observed that the Polish courts, as in any other continental jurisdiction, were not bound by the judgments of the Court as the Polish legal system was not based on precedent. It had not been necessary for the lower court to rely on the Court\u2019s case law. According to the appellate court, although it shared the applicant\u2019s views based on the Court\u2019s case law on the freedom of expression presented in his appeal, those views were not relevant for the adjudication of the case (nie maj\u0105 one znaczenia dla rozstrzygni\u0119cia niniejszej sprawy) The applicant\u2019s point in this matter had therefore been wholly erroneous (ca\u0142kowicie chybiony). The appellate court was well aware of the role of the media in a pluralist and democratic society, but the press was obliged to present truthful or at least carefully verified information to the public and to show diligence and thoroughness. The applicant had failed to do so and the information he had published had seriously damaged B.J.\u2019s reputation. 27.  On 31 January 2008 the Warsaw Regional Court gave a judgment in the civil case for the protection of personal rights brought by B.J. against the applicant, the editor-in-chief of the magazine and its owner. 28.  On 25 March 2009 the Warsaw Court of Appeal partly amended this judgment. The defendants were obliged, jointly, to pay PLN 10,000 (approx. EUR 2,500) to the plaintiff and to apologise to the plaintiff.", "references": ["3", "9", "8", "1", "7", "2", "5", "4", "0", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
+{"input": "1.  The case originated in an application (no. 71256/11) against Hungary lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (\u201cthe Convention\u201d) by six Hungarian nationals, Mr L\u00e1szl\u00f3 Haraszthy, Mr Gy\u00f6rgy L\u00e1szl\u00f3 M\u00e1rton, Mr G\u00e1bor Horn, Ms N\u00f3ra Siska, Mr Zolt\u00e1n Pint\u00e9r and Ms  M\u00e1ria  Ter\u00e9zia  Oszter (\u201cthe applicants\u201d), on 11 November 2011. 2.  The applicants were represented by Mr I. P. Horv\u00e1th, a lawyer practising in Budapest. The Hungarian Government (\u201cthe Government\u201d) were represented by Mr Z. Tall\u00f3di, Agent, Ministry of Justice. 3.  On 31 August 2015 the applicants\u2019 complaints under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention concerning the imposition of 98% tax on their severance payment were communicated to the Government. 4.  On 9 November 2015 and 4 January 2016 the Court received friendly settlement declarations signed by the Government and by five applicants under which these five applicants agreed to waive any further claims against Hungary in respect of the facts giving rise to their complaints against an undertaking by the Government to pay Mr L\u00e1szl\u00f3 Haraszthy EUR 12,800 (twelve thousand eight hundred euros), Mr G\u00f6rgy L\u00e1szl\u00f3 M\u00e1rton EUR 3,200 (three thousand two hundred euros), Mr G\u00e1bor Horn EUR 1,000 (one thousand euros), Ms N\u00f3ra Siska EUR 5,300 (five thousand three hundred euros) and Mr Zolt\u00e1n Pint\u00e9r EUR 7,100 (seven thousand one hundred euros) to cover any pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage as well as costs and expenses, which will be converted into Hungarian forints at the rate applicable on the date of payment, and will be free of any taxes that may be applicable. It will be payable within three months from the date of notification of the decision taken by the Court. In the event of failure to pay this sum within the said three-month period, the Government undertook to pay simple interest on it, from the expiry of that period until settlement, at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points. The payment will constitute the final resolution of the case in respect of these five applicants. 5.  The sixth applicant, Ms M\u00e1ria Ter\u00e9zia Oszter was born in 1949 and lives in Budakeszi. From 1 July 1997 she was employed at the State-owned National Asset Management Ltd. Her employment was terminated on 30 May 2011. A certain part of her severance payment was subject to special tax at a 98% rate. Accordingly, special tax was levied on her severance payment in the amount of HUF 2,195,835 (approximately EUR 7,300).", "references": ["7", "3", "0", "1", "6", "4", "2", "8", "5", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born on 30 August 1949 and lives in Nicosia. 6.  The applicant was employed at the Department of Lands and Surveys on 1 December 1971. On 1 January 1996 he was promoted to the position of assistant officer and on 2 February 1998 he was authorised by the director of the department to sign payment orders as authorising officer. On 13 May 2002 a complaint was made by the director following an irregularity in a compulsory acquisition case. It emerged from the investigation that a series of cheques had been issued as alleged compensation to owners of land that had been compulsorily acquired, but that the cheques had never reached the payees named on them. 7.  A number of criminal proceedings were brought against the applicant and an accomplice. It also appears that a third person was charged but those proceedings were terminated following the filing of a nolle prosequi by the Attorney\u2011General. The proceedings against the applicant involved a total of 223 criminal charges. 8.  On 18 January 2005 the applicant received concurrent sentences ranging from two to five years\u2019 imprisonment from the Nicosia Assize Court (no. 18115/02) on a plea of guilty, following a plea bargain to twenty-\nfour charges concerning a number of offences. These included, inter alia, obtaining the amount of 225,643.67 Cyprus pounds (CYP) (approximately 390,000 euros) by false pretences, issuing false documents, forging cheques, abuse of office, and concealment. Part of the agreement reached between the parties was that the applicant would repay the sum of CYP 150,000 (approximately 255,000 euros), and a confiscation order for that sum was issued in respect of his property. In imposing the sentences the Assize Court also took into consideration another eight cases pending against the applicant before it as well as the District Court of Nicosia. 9.  The applicant lodged an appeal with the Supreme Court against his sentence (criminal appeal no. 22/05). 10.  Following the applicant\u2019s conviction, and having received the Attorney-General\u2019s advisory opinion that the offences committed involved dishonesty or moral turpitude, the PSC instituted disciplinary proceedings against the applicant. Similar proceedings were also instituted against his accomplice, on whom the PSC imposed compulsory retirement pursuant to section 79(1)(i) of the Public Service Law of 1990 (Law 1/1990; hereinafter \u201cthe Public Service Law\u201d; see paragraph 43 below). 11.  By a letter dated 13 April 2005 the PSC informed the applicant of the Attorney-General\u2019s opinion and invited him to appear before it on 17 May 2005 and to make representations before proceeding with the imposition of a disciplinary penalty. 12.  The PSC convened on 17 May 2005. The applicant\u2019s lawyer requested a month to prepare his pleadings, as he had only recently been appointed and in view of the special nature of the case. The PSC granted the request. 13.  On 13 June 2005, the applicant, who was represented by a lawyer, was heard by the PSC. He put forward a number of mitigating factors, which included his dire financial situation following suspension from his duties, the fact that he had paid off most of the sum agreed upon with the authorities, the conviction and sentence he had received from the Assize Court, his significant years of service, and the less severe punishment imposed on his accomplice. He also submitted a socio-economic report by the Department of Social Welfare Services. 14.  On 13 June 2005 the PSC decided to dismiss the applicant. In its decision the PSC observed that this case had been one of the most serious cases it had been faced with. The conception and planning of the crimes committed showed a well-set-up fraud which had dealt a blow to the prestige and credibility of the procedures of the Department of Lands and Surveys and also to the image of the Public Service in general. The PSC noted that the offences of which the applicant had been convicted included some of the most serious offences against property, as well as abuse of office and concealment. The gravity of the offences was evident from the severity of the sentences applicable under the law, the substantial sum the applicant had secured through his unlawful actions, and the fact that eight more cases pending against him concerning similar offences had been taken into account by the Nicosia Assize Court when imposing sentence. The PSC also pointed out that the applicant had faced 223 charges in total, which was unprecedented for Cyprus and which disclosed the seriousness and the magnitude of the case. 15.  In reaching its decision the PSC observed that it had taken into account the circumstances and conditions under which the applicant had committed the offences. He had been authorised to sign payment orders and had been entrusted by the Republic with the important post of promoting cases concerning compulsory acquisition and serving citizens involved in these cases. The applicant, however, did not live up to his responsibilities, exploited his position, and developed his criminal activities with unprecedented effrontery and recklessness. He had been the mastermind, instigator and main executor of the criminal activities. 16.  The PSC also noted that it had taken into consideration what had been said by the applicant\u2019s counsel in mitigation, in particular, the applicant\u2019s personal and family circumstances, as well as the fact that he had undertaken to compensate for the damage and/or part of the damage suffered by the Republic as a consequence of his criminal acts. Further, the PSC pointed out that he had been the main protagonist and this had been stressed by the Assize Court when distinguishing the sentence passed on him from that passed on his co-accused. 17.  Pursuant to section 79(7) of the Public Service Law (see paragraph 43 below), the disciplinary penalty of dismissal resulted in the forfeiture of the entire applicant\u2019s public service retirement benefits (hereinafter \u201cretirement benefits\u201d). This entailed the loss of a retirement lump sum and a monthly pension. 18.  Lastly, the PSC decided that the part of the applicant\u2019s salary that had been withheld during the period of his suspension from service would not be returned to him. 19.  Up to the date of his dismissal the applicant had worked for thirty-three years in the public service. 20.  On 23 March 2006 the applicant withdrew his appeal. 21.  Pursuant to section 79(7) of the Public Service Law (see paragraph 43 below), his wife received a widow\u2019s pension. This amounted to 15,600 euros (EUR) per year. 22.  On 26 August 2005 the applicant brought a recourse before the Supreme Court (revisional jurisdiction) under Article 146 of the Constitution, seeking the annulment of the PSC\u2019s decision to dismiss him from the Public Service and of the consequent forfeiture of his pension rights (recourse no. 994/2005). 23.  The applicant claimed that the forfeiture of his retirement benefits had been in breach of Article 23 of the Constitution and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. In this respect the applicant argued that his pension rights constituted a \u201cpossession\u201d, and that their automatic forfeiture consequent to his dismissal was disproportionate. 24.  On 2 April 2007 the Supreme Court, in an ex tempore decision, held that the recourse was admissible. The court observed that the case concerned the discretion of the PSC in deciding on the dismissal, taking into account all relevant parameters and, in particular, the consequences dismissal would have for the applicant. Therefore, the decision on the penalty and the consequences were very closely linked, bringing to the forefront the principle of proportionality as the main aspect of the PSC\u2019s discretion. It was obvious from the PSC\u2019s decision that in exercising its discretion when choosing the penalty to be imposed it had taken into account the automatic, as it considered, by law, loss of retirement benefits. As a result the court concluded that the extreme severity of the case justified, despite its grave repercussions on the applicant\u2019s retirement rights, the penalty of dismissal. If in the end the court were to accept the applicant\u2019s claims, the setting aside of the penalty of dismissal could not be excluded. The Supreme Court therefore concluded that it could continue to examine the merits of the recourse. 25.  On 7 May 2007 the Supreme Court dismissed the recourse, but did not award costs against the applicant in view of the nature of the legal issues raised. 26.  The Supreme Court, after having ruled that the retirement benefits of a public servant in Cyprus constituted a possession under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, went on to examine whether or not there had been a violation of the applicant\u2019s rights under this provision. Drawing guidance from the Court\u2019s case-law, and in particular the judgments in the case of Azinas v. Cyprus (no. 56679/00, 20 June 2002, and [GC], no. 56679/00, ECHR 2004\u2011III), and the decision in the case of Banfield v. the United Kingdom ((dec.), no. 6223/04, ECHR 2005\u2011XI), the Supreme Court first pointed to those factors which justified the deprivation of the right to property in this case. One such main factor in the court\u2019s view was the gravity of the offences committed. It considered in this respect that the characterisation of the case by the PSC as one of the most serious in its history did not appear to be an exaggeration. The impression given by the offences was such that not only did they entail a well-organised fraud but they also, most importantly, as the PSC asserted, dealt a blow to the prestige and trustworthiness of the administration. The court considered that sentencing the applicant to five years\u2019 imprisonment, as well as dismissing him, did not necessarily exhaust the limits of the discretion of the State to put things right. Besides, as in Azinas, the non-deprivation of pension benefits in the case of a pension plan to which the employee did not make contributions would amount to rewarding the applicant. 27.  At the same time, the serious consequences of the applicant\u2019s punishment - a sentence of five years\u2019 imprisonment and dismissal - had also to be considered, particularly the financial difficulties arising from the deprivation of the said rights as an additional \u201cpunishment\u201d for the applicant and his family. The court observed that this was an important factor to be taken into account, according to the circumstances of each case. If the deprivation had not been automatic but discretionary within the framework of enacted procedures, as in England, it would have been possible to examine whether there should be a deprivation and to what extent. The court noted in this respect that it would indeed be good for the State to consider seriously the prospect of an amendment to the law so as to make the system more flexible and fairer in each case. Moreover, there was also the fact that the applicant had to a great extent returned the money he had embezzled, a fact which, although the PSC had said that it had taken it into account, did not appear to have affected its decision, since the punishment imposed on the applicant was, of the ten forms provided for, the extreme one of dismissal instead of choosing the second most serious form of punishment, that of compulsory retirement, which would not have entailed the loss of retirement rights. 28.  In the end, however, the Supreme Court considered that the fact that the case in question arose and was heard on the basis of a different statutory regime from that in Azinas as regards the consequences of dismissal entailing the loss of pension rights, tilted the scales, albeit slightly, in favour of the Republic. The proviso in section 79(7) that the applicant\u2019s pension from the day of his dismissal would be paid to his wife and dependent children as if he had died on that date reduced for the family the hardship resulting from the dismissal. Despite this, the court observed that it was likely that there would be cases with even more dire consequences for the dismissed employee, such as when there was no wife or dependent children, or their relationship was such that the dismissed employee could not reasonably expect to benefit through them. Nothing, however, had been said to include the present case among those cases, except for the theoretical possibility that his wife could die before the applicant. The court stated that, if matters were otherwise, it was likely that it would have ruled differently. 29.  Finally, the Supreme Court stressed that the competent bodies should seriously study the possibility of amending the statutory framework on the basis of the law in force in England, so that deprivation of retirement rights was not automatic but could be looked at with the help of enacted procedures and with the exercise of discretion in order that the PSC might determine, by means of a reasoned decision, the extent to which it was just to forfeit, if at all, in any particular case, according to the individual\u2019s special circumstances and needs. The Supreme Court considered that both the rule of law and the modern conception of individual justice demanded this. 30.  On 5 June 2007 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Supreme Court (appellate revisional jurisdiction; appeal no. 78/2007). He first challenged the first-instance finding concerning section 79(7) of the Public Service Law. He submitted that this section was contrary to Article 23 of the Cyprus Constitution and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, as the forfeiture of his retirement benefits had been automatic, without the exercise of any discretionary power. In this respect he argued that the first-instance court had applied the proportionality principle incorrectly during the examination of the penalty imposed by the PSC, and therefore had been wrong when it decided that the measure was proportionate and in line with the Convention. Secondly, the applicant claimed that the finding of the first-instance court that the consequences of this decision were reduced because he was married and thus his wife and dependent children would receive a pension, was discriminatory on the ground of marital status and thus in violation of Article 28 of the Constitution. 31.  On 12 June 2007 the respondent Government also appealed (appeal no. 81/2007) challenging the first-instance findings (a) that in the present case the retirement benefits could be considered a \u201cpossession\u201d; (b) that in the disciplinary dismissal of a public servant there was no enacted framework providing for the exercise of discretion as to whether the retirement benefits would be granted; and (c) that the payment of the pension to the applicant\u2019s wife was the only essential factor which tilted the scales in favour of the Republic. 32.  On 18 May 2010 the Supreme Court dismissed both appeals without awarding costs, in view of the importance of the matter raised. It agreed with the first-instance court\u2019s finding that the right to a pension and its conditions constituted a possession of the employee. This right was created by the appointment of the employee. The fact that a pension was given to the wife and dependent children suggested that pension benefits were considered as \u201cproperty\u201d which could be transferred. In this respect the court referred to its judgment in the case of Pavlou v. the Republic (revisional appeal no. 161/2006, (2009) 3 CLR 1402; see paragraph 46 below) and the Court\u2019s judgment in the case of Apostolakis v. Greece (no. 39574/07, 22 October 2009). 33.  The court went on to find, however, that the deprivation of the applicant\u2019s retirement benefits had been justified. In this respect, the court noted that the PSC had chosen the penalty of dismissal under section 79(7) of the Public Service Law, after exercising its discretion and after considering the consequences and the fact that such a penalty was in the public interest. The first-instance court had examined whether the imposition of the penalty of dismissal, which brought about the automatic forfeiture of retirement benefits, was disproportionate. It had examined whether the PSC, when exercising its discretion, had applied the principle of proportionality in deciding on the penalty of dismissal, which itself resulted in the automatic deprivation of retirement rights. In this respect it held that the PSC had exercised its discretion when deciding to impose the penalty of dismissal. The PSC had had a variety of available penalties at its disposal, such as compulsory retirement, which did not bring about the forfeiture of the pension. It decided, however, in view of the offences committed by the applicant, that such deprivation was justified. 34.  The Supreme Court pointed out that the European Court of Human Rights had acknowledged that the administration had wide discretion in deciding on such matters. 35.  It went on to agree with the first-instance court that the deprivation of the applicant\u2019s retirement benefits had been justified in view of the seriousness of the offences, which had dealt a blow to the trustworthiness and credibility of the administration. The relevant domestic law provision was aimed at discouraging public servants from committing serious offences and at protecting the smooth running of the administration. Section 79(7) of the Public Service Law was not contrary to Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, since the deprivation of retirement benefits was not a punishment on its own, but a consequence of the imposition of the penalty of dismissal. 36.  The court went on to distinguish the applicant\u2019s case from that of Apostolakis, in which the forfeiture had been automatic following a criminal conviction and had entailed deprivation of both pension and social security rights and therefore of all means of subsistence. In the present case, although the applicant had been deprived of his retirement benefits as a public servant, he had been entitled to receive benefits from the Social Insurance Fund, which were calculated on the basis of contributions made by the employer and the employee. Referring to the Court\u2019s judgment in the case of Wieczorek v. Poland (no. 18176/05, 8 December 2009), it found that the applicant had not been deprived of all means of subsistence. 37.  As to the question of discrimination due to marital status, raised by the applicant, the Supreme Court held that the first-instance court\u2019s comments on the matter did not support the applicant\u2019s claim of discrimination. The comments in question had been made on a hypothetical basis and did not apply to the present case. 38.  Lastly, the Supreme Court dealt with the remaining grounds of appeal put forward by the Government. It observed that the first-instance decision was to the effect that in the event of dismissal the law did not provide for a procedure concerning the exercise of discretion for forfeiting retirement rights, but it did not say that it was not possible to exercise discretion on the matter, since it recognised that there was a choice between dismissal entailing forfeiture of rights and compulsory retirement, which did not. Finally, it pointed out that the first-instance court had set out in its decision all the facts which it had taken into account in deciding on the proportionality of the forfeiture, and had rightly concluded that the payment of the pension to the wife meant that the deprivation was not disproportionate. The court did not award costs in view of the important issues raised. 39.  The applicant has been receiving a social security pension from the Social Insurance Fund since 31 August 2012, when he reached the age of sixty-three. The pension therefore received by his wife pursuant to section 79(7) of the Public Service Law was then reduced by the complementary sum received by him from the Social Insurance Fund. According to a letter dated 28 November 2012 sent to her by State\u2019s Treasury, her pension was reduced by EUR 854,94 per month.", "references": ["0", "2", "5", "8", "6", "3", "7", "9", "4", "1", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The first applicant was born in 1978 and lives in Tsentrelnye Koryaki in the Kamchatka Region. 6.  On 20 June 2005 at approximately 3.30 a.m. he was arrested by traffic police while driving a vehicle which had been declared stolen earlier in the evening, and was taken to the local police station. 7.  On the same day at 3.00 p.m. he gave a confession statement. 8.  Later on at approximately 6.00 p.m. a record of his arrest was drawn up. This document indicated that he had been apprehended at 6.00 p.m. by an investigator, Mr S. 9.  On 22 June 2005 the Yelizovskiy District Court (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) authorised the first applicant\u2019s detention. The court found that there were grounds to believe that he would abscond, because he was suspected of having committed an offence punishable by more than two years\u2019 imprisonment, was unemployed and without any source of income, and did not reside at his official address. It further referred to the risk that the first applicant might continue his criminal activities on the grounds that, having been released on parole on 17 June 2005, he had been apprehended three days later on suspicion of an offence similar to that for which he already had a conviction. 10.  On 29 June 2005 the first applicant was charged with theft. 11.  On 19 July 2005 the detention order of 22 June 2005 was upheld on appeal. 12.  By a judgment of 1 March 2006, upheld on appeal on 2 May 2006, the District Court convicted the first applicant as charged and sentenced him to ten years\u2019 imprisonment. 13.  The second applicant was born in 1976 and lives in Vladimir. 14.  On 10 April 2005 Ms F. complained of having been raped by three unidentified individuals. 15.  A criminal investigation into the rape was opened at 12 noon on 11 April 2005 and the second applicant was apprehended on the same day. He and the Government provided differing versions of how he was arrested. 16.  According to the second applicant, at around 12 noon he was stopped in the street by police and escorted to the local police station. Between 12.25 p.m and 12.33 p.m. he took part in an identification parade, as a result of which he was identified by the victim as one of the individuals who had raped her. Between 3.10 p.m. and 4.20 p.m. he was questioned by an investigator. A record of his arrest was not drawn up until 11.35 p.m. 17.  According to the Government, the second applicant was taken to the police station as a witness. They have provided no indications as to when he was taken there or why he was considered to be a witness for the purposes of the investigation. The Government further claimed that the second applicant was interviewed as a witness between 3.10 p.m. and 4.20 p.m., and that the identification parade during which he was identified by the victim took place between 10.25 p.m. and 10.33 p.m. At 11.25 p.m. he was arrested as a criminal suspect and ten minutes later an arrest record was drawn up. 18.  During the above procedures, the second applicant waited in different offices of the police station. Had he tried to leave, he would have been stopped by the police officers who were standing guard at the doors of the offices. As soon as the record of arrest was compiled, he was incarcerated. 19.  At 6.25 p.m. on 13 April 2005 the Gus-Khrustalnyy Town Court of the Vladimir Region (hereinafter \u201cthe Town Court\u201d) remanded the second applicant in custody on the basis of Article 108 of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter \u201cthe CCrP\u201d) (see paragraph 34 below). It found that he was suspected of having committed a serious criminal offence, had been identified by the victim, had escaped from the scene of the crime, did not work and had a recent criminal record, and that for those reasons he might abscond, reoffend, influence the victim and the other parties to the proceedings, destroy evidence, or otherwise obstruct the proper administration of justice. The Town Court did not address the second applicant\u2019s allegation that he had been unlawfully detained for more than forty-eight hours without judicial authorisation. 20.  On 15 April 2005 the second applicant appealed. Among other things, he complained that his detention was unlawful, on the grounds that he had been brought before a judge more than forty-eight hours after his actual arrest and the Town Court had not established any \u201cexceptional circumstances\u201d, as required by the CCrP in order to place a suspect in detention (see paragraph 33 below). 21.  On 16 May 2005 the Vladimir Regional Court (\u201cthe Regional Court\u201d) upheld the order of 13 April 2005. It considered that the second applicant had been apprehended as indicated in the arrest record. It further found that the Town Court had based its decision on sufficient grounds. Lastly, as regards his argument concerning the absence of \u201cexceptional circumstances\u201d, the Regional Court held as follows:\n\u201cThe exceptional nature of remanding a criminal suspect in custody implies that he must be charged not later than ten days from the time of his arrest. Otherwise, he should be immediately released.\u201d 22.  In the meantime, on 19 April 2005 the second applicant was charged with aggravated rape. 23.  On 20 December 2005 the Town Court found him guilty as charged and gave him a custodial sentence. 24.  On 3 March 2006 the Regional Court upheld the judgment on appeal. 25.  Between 20 April 2005 and 22 March 2006 the second applicant was held in Vladimir Prison T-2 in connection with the criminal proceedings against him. He submitted that the facility had been severely overcrowded and in an appalling sanitary condition. The detainees did not have access to fresh air, sunlight or drinking water.", "references": ["4", "6", "3", "5", "1", "0", "8", "7", "9", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in the village of Patilt\u0117 (Utena Region). 6.  On 20 November 2006 the applicant began serving a prison sentence at the Marijampol\u0117 Correctional Facility. The prison regulations were explained to him, which included a prohibition on prisoners growing beards (see paragraph 17 below). The applicant signed to confirm that he had read and understood the rules. 7.  On 4 October 2007 the applicant submitted a request to the Prison Department to allow him to grow a beard for health reasons. He stated that he had been diagnosed with tongue cancer and had undergone radiation treatment, and therefore shaving irritated his skin. 8.  On 17 October 2007 the applicant was examined by the correctional facility\u2019s medical personnel. The subsequent medical report stated that no traces of irritation had been found on the applicant\u2019s skin and that, according to the applicant himself, the main reason why he wanted to grow a beard was that his electric razor was almost broken and he could not afford to buy a new one. On 23 October 2007 the Prison Department denied the applicant\u2019s request, based on the results of the examination. 9.  The applicant later submitted another request to grow a beard to the Prison Department, and on 19 November 2007 it was denied on the same grounds. 10.  On 5 December 2007 the applicant submitted a complaint to the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court. He argued that there was no law prohibiting beards in prison, so the Marijampol\u0117 Correctional Facility did not have the right to establish such a prohibition in its internal regulations. He also contended that the prohibition, which had been applied to him regardless of his health problems, had caused him great mental suffering and had breached his rights. 11.  On 21 April 2008 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court upheld the applicant\u2019s complaint. The court acknowledged that prisons were in principle justified in having rules on prisoners\u2019 beards in so far as it was necessary for hygiene-related reasons. However, it dismissed the Prison Department\u2019s argument that the prohibition on beards was necessary for the purpose of the swift identification of prisoners, and held that such a restriction was contrary to the requirement to reintegrate prisoners into society. Accordingly, the court concluded that the prohibition on the applicant having a beard was against the law and was neither necessary nor proportionate. 12.  However, on 24 March 2009 the Supreme Administrative Court overturned the first-instance judgment. Firstly, the court noted that the applicant had not proven that he had been unable to shave regularly because of health reasons (see paragraph 8 above). The court also noted that although prisoners\u2019 human rights and fundamental freedoms could only be restricted by laws and not by legal acts of a lower order, the desire to grow a beard could not be considered as such a right or freedom. Therefore, unless it was related to other rights, such as, for example, religious freedom, the growing of a beard could be restricted by internal prison rules. Lastly, the Supreme Administrative Court considered that a prohibition on growing beards could be justified by the prison authorities\u2019 need to swiftly identify prisoners, and thus it was necessary and proportionate. 13.  On 15 December 2009 the applicant was released from the Marijampol\u0117 Correctional Facility on probation.", "references": ["6", "7", "5", "1", "8", "9", "2", "0", "3", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicants\u2019 dates of birth and places of residence are given in the Appendix. 5.  The applicants stood as candidates in the parliamentary elections of 7 November 2010 and applied for registration as candidates in various single\u2013mandate electoral constituencies (see Appendix). They were either self-nominated or nominated by various political parties (see Appendix). 6.  As the Electoral Code required that each nomination as a candidate for parliamentary elections be supported by a minimum of 450 voters, the applicants on various dates submitted sheets containing the signature of more than 450 voters collected in support of their candidacy to their respective Constituency Electoral Commissions (\u201cConECs\u201d). 7.  Before a decision by a ConEC on registering an applicant as a candidate, the signature sheets and the other registration documents submitted by the applicants had first to be verified by special working groups (i\u015f\u00e7i qrupu) established by the ConECs. None of the applicants were invited to participate in the examination of their sheets of signatures by the ConEC working groups. 8.  The ConECs on various dates (see Appendix) issued decisions to refuse the applicants\u2019 requests for registration as a candidate after the ConEC working groups had found that some of the voter signatures were invalid and that the remaining valid signatures had numbered fewer than 450. Signatures were found to be invalid on several grounds in each case, including: (a) falsified or repeat signatures (\u201csignatures made repeatedly by the same individuals who had already signed sheets in the name of other individuals\u201d); (b) incorrect personal information on voters (birth date, identity card number, and so on); (c) signatures by persons whose identity cards had expired; (d) signatures belonging to voters registered outside the constituency; (e) uncertified corrections in signature sheets; (f) signatures claimed to have been obtained \u201cby deceptive means\u201d; and (g) unspecified \u201cother grounds\u201d. 9.  None of the applicants were invited to the ConEC meetings where decisions to refuse their requests for registration were taken. In each case, despite the requirements of the law, all the relevant working group documents (expert opinions, minutes of the meeting, records and tables of the results of the examination), as well as the ConEC decision itself, were only made available to the applicants after the decision to refuse their registration had been taken. In many cases, some of the documents were never made available to the applicants or were only made available to them as late as during the subsequent judicial proceedings in the Baku Court of Appeal. 10.  Each applicant lodged a complaint with the Central Electoral Commission (\u201cthe CEC\u201d) against the ConEC decisions. They made some or all of the following complaints:\n(a)  the findings of the ConEC working groups that such large numbers of signatures were invalid had been factually wrong, unsubstantiated, and arbitrary. Some of those findings of fact could easily have been rebutted by simply contacting the voter in question and confirming the authenticity of his or her signature. However, the ConECs had not taken any steps to corroborate their findings with any reliable evidence, such as contacting and questioning a number of voters randomly selected from the group whose signatures were suspected of being false. There were no specialist handwriting experts among the members of the ConEC working groups and therefore their findings on the authenticity of some signatures had been highly subjective and arbitrary;\n(b)  the ConEC decisions to declare the signatures invalid had been arbitrary and in breach of the substantive and procedural requirements of the law. Relying on various provisions of the Electoral Code, the applicants argued that unintentional and rectifiable errors in the signature sheets could not serve as a reason to declare a voter signature invalid. If the errors found could be rectified by making the necessary corrections, the Electoral Code required the ConEC to notify the particular candidate of this within twenty\u2011four hours and to provide him or her with an opportunity to make corrections in the documents before deciding on his or her registration as a candidate. The ConECs had, however, declared large numbers of signatures invalid in the case of each applicant on the basis of easily rectifiable errors, without informing the candidates in advance and giving them an opportunity to make the necessary corrections;\n(c)  the procedure followed by the ConECs had also breached other requirements of the Electoral Code. Contrary to the requirements of Article 59.3, the applicants had not been informed in advance of the time and place of the examination of the signature sheets and their presence had not been ensured. Contrary to Article 59.13 of the Electoral Code, the applicants had also not been provided with a copy of the minutes of the examination of the validity of the signature sheets at least twenty-four hours prior to the ConEC meeting dealing with their respective requests for registration. Subsequently, none of the applicants had been invited to the ConEC meetings, which had deprived them of the opportunity to argue for their position;\n(d)  some of the grounds for invalidation were not provided by law and therefore to declare signatures invalid on those grounds had been unlawful. For example, the Electoral Code did not allow the invalidation of a signature merely because the voter\u2019s identity document had recently expired. Likewise, it had been unlawful to invalidate signatures on unspecified and unexplained \u201cother grounds\u201d, because the Electoral Code provided for an exhaustive list of clear grounds for declaring signatures invalid and did not give electoral commissions any discretionary power to introduce any other grounds for that purpose;\n(e)  in some cases, various local public officials and police officers had applied undue pressure on voters or signature collectors to \u201cwithdraw\u201d their signatures on the grounds that they had been tricked to sign in the candidate\u2019s favour \u201cby deceptive means\u201d. 11.  Enclosed with their complaints to the CEC, some of the applicants submitted statements by a number of voters affirming the authenticity of their signatures. However, those statements were not taken into consideration by the CEC. 12.  The CEC arranged for another examination of the signature sheets by members of its own working group. None of the applicants was invited to participate in that examination process. The CEC working group found in each case that large numbers of signatures were invalid and that the remaining valid signatures were below the minimum required by law. 13.  In each case, the number of signatures found to be invalid by the CEC working group differed from the number given by the particular ConEC working group, with the differences often being significant. Furthermore, in almost every case, the grounds for declaring signatures invalid given by the CEC had been different from the grounds given for the same signature sheets by the ConEC. In most cases a certain number of the total signatures were also declared invalid on the grounds that they had \u201cappeared\u201d to have been falsified, that is, \u201cmade by the same person in the name of other people\u201d (\u201cehtimal ki, eyni \u015f\u0259xs t\u0259r\u0259find\u0259n icra olunmu\u015fdur\u201d). 14.  On various dates, the CEC also rejected the applicants\u2019 complaints (see Appendix). None of the applicants were invited to attend the CEC meeting dealing with their complaint. Moreover, in each case, all the relevant CEC documents (including the working group documents) were only made available to the applicants after the CEC decision had been taken, while in some cases such documents were never given to them at all, or were given as late as at the stage of judicial appeal proceedings. 15.  On various dates, each of the applicants lodged an appeal with the Baku Court of Appeal against the decisions of the electoral commissions. They reiterated the complaints they had made before the CEC concerning the ConEC decisions and procedures. They also raised some or all of the following complaints concerning the CEC\u2019s decisions and procedures:\n(a)  contrary to the requirements of electoral law, the CEC had failed to notify them of its meetings and ensure their presence during the examination of the signature sheets and their complaints;\n(b)  contrary to the requirements of electoral law, some or all of the relevant CEC documents had not been made available to them, depriving them of the opportunity to mount an effective challenge to the CEC decisions;\n(c)  the decisions of the electoral commissions had been based on expert opinions that had contained nothing more than conjecture and speculation (for example, that the signatures had \u201cappeared\u201d (\u201cehtimal ki\u201d) to have been falsified), instead of properly established facts;\n(d)  in those cases where the applicants had submitted additional documents in support of their complaints, the CEC had ignored those submissions and failed to take them into account. 16.  Relying on a number of provisions of domestic law, and directly on Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, the applicants claimed that their right to stand for election had been infringed. 17.  On various dates (see Appendix), the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed appeals by the applicants, finding that their arguments were irrelevant or unsubstantiated and that there were no grounds for quashing the decisions of the CEC. 18.  The applicants lodged cassation appeals with the Supreme Court, reiterating their previous complaints and arguing that the Baku Court of Appeal had not carried out a fair examination of the cases and had delivered unreasoned judgments. 19.  On various dates (see Appendix), the Supreme Court dismissed the applicants\u2019 appeals as unsubstantiated, without examining their arguments in detail, and found no grounds to doubt the findings of the electoral commissions or of the Baku Court of Appeal. 20.  In addition to the applicants in applications nos. 30362/11, 30581/11, 30728/11 and 30799/11, at the material time their representative Mr Intigam Aliyev was representing twenty\u2011seven other applicants in cases concerning the 2010 parliamentary elections and a number of applicants in other cases before the Court. Mr Aliyev himself is the applicant in application no. 66684/12. 21.  In August 2014 the prosecution authorities launched an investigation into the activities of a number of NGOs, including the Legal Education Society, an NGO headed by Mr Aliyev. 22.  On 7 August 2014 the Nasimi District Court issued a search warrant authorising the search of Mr Aliyev\u2019s office in the Legal Education Society and seizure of \u201clegal, financial, accounting and banking documents, letters and contracts, reports on execution of grant contracts and tax documents relating to [the organisation\u2019s] establishment, structure, functioning, membership registration, receipt of grants and other financial aid, and allocation of granted funds, as well as computers, disks, USB keys and other electronic devices storing relevant information ...\u201d 23.  On 8 August 2014 Mr Intigam Aliyev was arrested after questioning by an investigator of the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office in connection with the criminal proceedings instituted against him under Articles 192.2.2 (illegal entrepreneurship), 213.1 (large-scale tax evasion) and 308.2 (abuse of power) of the Criminal Code. On the same day, the Nasimi District Court ordered his detention pending trial. He remains in detention while the criminal proceedings against him are pending. The circumstances relating to Mr Aliyev\u2019s arrest and detention are the subject of a separate application brought by him before the Court (application no. 68762/14). 24.  On 8 and 9 August 2014 the investigation authorities conducted a search of Mr Aliyev\u2019s home and office pursuant to the Nasimi District Court\u2019s search warrant of 7 August 2014, seizing, inter alia, a large number of documents from his office, including all the case files relating to the pending proceedings before the Court, which were in Mr Aliyev\u2019s possession and which concerned over 100 applications in total. The files relating to the present cases, which, it appears, included copies of all the documents and correspondence between the Court and the parties, were also seized in their entirety. No adequate inventory of the seized document files relating to the Court proceedings was made in the search and seizure records of 8 and 9 August 2014. 25.  On an unspecified date Mr Aliyev lodged a complaint with the Nasimi District Court, claiming that the search had been unlawful. He complained that the investigator had failed to register each seized document as required by the relevant law and had taken the documents without making an inventory. He further complained about the seizure of the documents and files relating to the ongoing court proceedings before the Court and the domestic courts. 26.  On 12 September 2014 the Nasimi District Court dismissed Mr Aliyev\u2019s claim. It held that the searches had been conducted in accordance with the relevant law. As to the seizure of the documents relating to the cases pending before the Court and the domestic court, it found that they could not be returned to the applicants at this stage of the proceedings. Following an appeal, on 23 September 2014 the Baku Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance court\u2019s decision of 12 September 2014. 27.  On 25 October 2014 the investigation authorities returned a number of the case files concerning the applications lodged before the Court, including the file relating to the present case, to Mr Aliyev\u2019s lawyer. The investigator\u2019s relevant decision specified that \u201csince it has been established that among documents seized on 8 and 9 August 2014 there were files concerning applications by a number of individuals and organisations lodged with the European Court of Human Rights, which have no relation to the substance of the criminal proceedings [against Mr Intigam Aliyev], [those files] have been delivered to [Mr Aliyev\u2019s lawyer] Mr Javad Javadov\u201d.", "references": ["5", "0", "2", "4", "8", "6", "9", "7", "3", "1", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1961 and lives in Kyiv. 5.  On 30 June 2004 the Darnytskyy District Court of Kyiv found that the applicant had committed the following crimes: appropriation of private property by means of fraud or abuse of trust, theft of property and theft of official documents. The court sentenced her to five years\u2019 imprisonment suspended for three years with probation. 6.  On 23 December 2004 the applicant\u2019s conviction was upheld by the Kyiv Court of Appeal. She appealed on points of law to the Supreme Court. 7.  On 31 May 2005 a three-judge panel of the Supreme Court considered the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law in accordance with Article 394 \u00a7 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (by virtue of which it could either dismiss the appeal or assign the case for further consideration with the participation of all the parties). The Supreme Court did not notify the applicant or her lawyer of that hearing. The prosecutor was present and made oral representations during the hearing. Having regard to his opinion and the material in the case file, the panel dismissed the appeal as unsubstantiated. 8.  In a letter dated 12 September 2005 the Supreme Court notified the applicant, enclosing a copy of its decision. She received the letter on 16 September 2005.", "references": ["5", "7", "4", "8", "1", "0", "6", "2", "9", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1982 and lives in Baku. At the material time he was deputy chairman of the Youth Committee of an opposition party, Musavat. 5.  Demonstrations were planned to be held on 2 April 2011 and 20 October 2012 in Baku. Prior to the assemblies, on 18 March 2011 and 15 October 2012 respectively the organisers, members of the opposition, gave notice to the relevant authority, the Baku City Executive Authority (\u201cthe BCEA\u201d). 6.  The BCEA refused to authorise the demonstrations at the places indicated by the organisers and proposed a different location on the outskirts of Baku \u2013 the yard of a driving school situated in the 20th habitable area of the Sabail District. 7.  The organisers nevertheless decided to hold the demonstrations in the centre of Baku. 8.  According to the applicant, the demonstrations were intended to be peaceful and were conducted in a peaceful manner. The participants were demanding free and fair elections and democratic reforms in the country. 9.  The applicant attended both demonstrations, but shortly after they had begun the police started to disperse those who had gathered. In both cases the applicant was arrested during the dispersal operation and was taken to a police station, where he was questioned. According to him, at the second demonstration he was arrested by people in plain clothes. 10.  In both cases on the day of the applicant\u2019s arrest, an administrative offence report (inzibati x\u0259ta haqq\u0131nda protokol) was issued on him. The reports stated that by deliberately failing to comply with a lawful order of the police, the applicant had committed an administrative offence under Article 310.1 of the Code of Administrative Offences (\u201cthe CAO\u201d). 11.  In the first case the applicant refused to sign the administrative offence report. 12.  According to the applicant, he has never been served with copies of the administrative offence reports or with other documents from his case files. In both cases he was not given access to a lawyer after the arrest or while he was in police custody. 13.  On the day of his arrest, namely 2 April 2011 in the first case and 20 October 2012 in the second case, the applicant was brought before a first-instance court, the Nasimi District Court and the Binagadi District Court respectively. 14.  According to him, the hearing before the court in both cases was very brief. Members of the public, including human rights defenders and journalists, were not allowed inside the courtroom, even though the court had not taken a formal decision to close the hearing to the public. 15.  According to the applicant, in both cases he was not given an opportunity to appoint a lawyer of his own choosing. 16.  At the hearing in the first case the applicant was not represented by a lawyer. According to documents submitted by the Government, he refused the assistance of a State-funded lawyer and decided to defend himself in person. 17.  At the hearing in the second case a State-funded lawyer was invited to assist the applicant. 18.  According to the transcript of the court hearing in the second case, in his oral submissions the State-funded lawyer briefly asked the court to impose on the applicant a light punishment in view of his young age. 19.  The only witness questioned during the court hearing in the first case was a police officer who, according to official records, had arrested the applicant. He testified that the applicant had staged an unauthorised demonstration. At the hearing in the second case the court did not question any witnesses. 20.  In both cases the first-instance court found that the applicant had failed to stop participating in an unauthorised demonstration. 21.  By decisions of 2 April 2011 and 20 October 2012, the courts convicted the applicant under Article 310.1 of the CAO and sentenced him to seven and ten days\u2019 administrative detention respectively. 22.  On unspecified dates the applicant lodged appeals with the Baku Court of Appeal, arguing that his convictions were in violation of his rights because the demonstrations in which he had participated or attempted to participate had been peaceful. The applicant also complained that his arrests had been unlawful and that the hearings before the respective first-instance courts had not been fair. 23.  In both cases the applicant was represented before the Baku Court of Appeal by a lawyer of his own choosing. 24.  On 11 April 2011 and 29 October 2012 respectively, the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeals and upheld the decision of the first-instance court.", "references": ["9", "4", "5", "6", "0", "1", "8", "No Label", "7", "2", "3"], "gold": ["7", "2", "3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Sevastopol. 6.  At about 5 a.m. on 26 January 2002 the applicant had a fight in a local bar during which injuries were sustained by bar staff and damage was caused to property in the bar. The police arrived to handle the matter. They took the applicant and his companion, I., to the police station. The applicant was arrested for an administrative offence of \u201cminor disorderly acts\u201d provided for in Article 173 of the Code of Administrative Offences. 7.  On 28 January 2002 the Nakhimovskyy District Court of Sevastopol (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) found the applicant guilty of the above offence and sentenced him to five days\u2019 administrative detention. The court set out the following grounds for the conviction:\n\u201c... At about 5 a.m. on 26 January 2002 Tarasov, being drunk in the [L.N.] bar located at ... used obscene language about the bar staff, grabbed and swung a wooden chair leg, threatened physical violence, ignored the remarks addressed to him, and thereby breached the public order and peace of the citizens. In other words, he engaged in minor disorderly acts. ...\u201d 8.  The judgment was not open to appeal and became final. 9.  On 29 January 2002 the investigator of Nakhimosvkyy District Police Department of Sevastopol instituted criminal proceedings against the applicant and I. for disorderly acts in the bar on 26 January 2002. At a certain point an additional charge against the applicant was included in the case in relation to the injuries which he had allegedly caused to his wife in a separate incident. 10.  On 14 October 2003 the District Court adopted the judgment in the criminal case. It also resolved a civil dispute lodged by the victims within the criminal proceedings. With respect to the applicant, the District Court convicted him of two offences: the offence provided for in Article 122 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code (\u201cintentional infliction of medium-severity bodily injuries\u201d) and the offence provided for in Article 296 \u00a7 4 of the Criminal Code (\u201cdisorderly acts\u201d with aggravating circumstances). 11.  As regards the first crime the District Court found it established that on 13 August 2001 the applicant had beaten his wife, intentionally causing injuries of medium severity. 12.  As to the second crime, the District Court established that at about 4.30 a.m. on 26 January 2002 the applicant and his accomplice I., both drunk and armed with wooden chair legs, entered the L.N. bar where they committed a serious breach of public order. In describing the applicant\u2019s conduct, the court stated that the latter, using obscene language, approached a table occupied by N., B., and K. (bar employees) and, using the wooden chair leg, inflicted minor bodily injuries on N. and K. The applicant also hit N. on the head with a bottle. Further, the applicant hit a table, which was covered with dishes, using the wooden chair leg, he then broke a mop and threw a beer bottle at the wall, thus causing damage to property. The applicant then went up to a waitress, M., kicked her in the hip and slapped her in the face. 13.  In its judgment the District Court cited statements of the victims and some indirect evidence to support these factual findings. In particular, it referred to the statements of N., B., K., and M., who had submitted that the applicant had shouted obscenities, threatened physical violence, inflicted the above-mentioned injuries and caused damage to property, and that B. had tried to calm him down. 14.  The District Court classified the applicant\u2019s acts under Article 296 \u00a7 4 of the Criminal Code as the offence of \u201cdisorderly acts\u201d committed with the use of an instrument constructed beforehand to inflict bodily injuries (the wooden chair leg). It sentenced the applicant to three years\u2019 imprisonment for the two crimes taken together, combined with mandatory medical treatment in prison. The District Court also considered the applicant\u2019s objection that he had earlier been convicted of an administrative offence as regards the same events of 26 January 2002. That argument was dismissed by the court on the ground that the applicant had previously been convicted under the Code of Administrative Offences and had received an administrative penalty, which was a different type of legal responsibility; accordingly, the administrative case did not constitute any obstacle to the criminal proceedings. 15.  On 20 July 2004 the Sevastopol Court of Appeal upheld the applicant\u2019s conviction, having amended the judgment of the District Court as regards the medical treatment of the applicant and his civil liability. On 27 January 2005 the Supreme Court dismissed, in the absence of the applicant, his appeal on points of law. The applicant was informed of the Supreme Court decision by the letter sent to him on 21 May 2005. The applicant\u2019s allegation that he had been tried and punished twice for the same offence was dismissed by both courts as unfounded.", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "7", "9", "6", "5", "3", "0", "8", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicants\u2019 dates of birth and places of residence are given in the Appendix. 5.  The applicants stood as candidates in the parliamentary elections of 7 November 2010 and applied for registration as candidates in various single\u2013mandate electoral constituencies (see Appendix). They were either self-nominated or nominated by various political parties (see Appendix). 6.  As the Electoral Code required that each nomination as a candidate for parliamentary elections be supported by a minimum of 450 voters, the applicants on various dates submitted sheets containing the signature of more than 450 voters collected in support of their candidacy to their respective Constituency Electoral Commissions (\u201cConECs\u201d). 7.  Before a decision by a ConEC on registering an applicant as a candidate, the signature sheets and the other registration documents submitted by the applicants had first to be verified by special working groups (i\u015f\u00e7i qrupu) established by the ConECs. None of the applicants were invited to participate in the examination of their sheets of signatures by the ConEC working groups. 8.  The ConECs on various dates (see Appendix) issued decisions to refuse the applicants\u2019 requests for registration as a candidate after the ConEC working groups had found that some of the voter signatures were invalid and that the remaining valid signatures had numbered fewer than 450. Signatures were found to be invalid on several grounds in each case, including:\n(a)  falsified or repeat signatures (\u201csignatures made repeatedly by the same individuals who had already signed sheets in the name of other individuals\u201d);\n(b)  incorrect personal information on voters (birth date, identity card number, and so on);\n(c)  signatures by persons whose identity cards had expired;\n(d)  signatures belonging to voters registered outside the constituency;\n(e)  uncertified corrections in signature sheets;\n(f)  signatures claimed to have been obtained \u201cby deceptive means\u201d; and\n(g)  unspecified \u201cother grounds\u201d. 9.  None of the applicants, except the applicant in application no. 29808/11, were invited to the ConEC meetings where decisions to refuse their requests for registration were taken. In each case, despite the requirements of the law, all the relevant working group documents (expert opinions, minutes of the meeting, records and tables of the results of the examination), as well as the ConEC decision itself, were only made available to the applicants after the decision to refuse their registration had been taken. In many cases, some of the documents were never made available to the applicants or were only made available to them as late as during the subsequent judicial proceedings in the Baku Court of Appeal. 10.  Each applicant lodged a complaint with the Central Electoral Commission (\u201cthe CEC\u201d) against the ConEC decisions. They made some or all of the following complaints:\n(a)  the findings of the ConEC working groups that such large numbers of signatures were invalid had been factually wrong, unsubstantiated, and arbitrary. Some of those findings of fact could easily have been rebutted by simply contacting the voter in question and confirming the authenticity of his or her signature. However, the ConECs had not taken any steps to corroborate their findings with any reliable evidence, such as contacting and questioning a number of voters randomly selected from the group whose signatures were suspected of being false. There were no specialist handwriting experts among the members of the ConEC working groups and therefore their findings on the authenticity of some signatures had been highly subjective and arbitrary;\n(b)  the ConEC decisions to declare the signatures invalid had been arbitrary and in breach of the substantive and procedural requirements of the law. Relying on various provisions of the Electoral Code, the applicants argued that unintentional and rectifiable errors in the signature sheets could not serve as a reason to declare a voter signature invalid. If the errors found could be rectified by making the necessary corrections, the Electoral Code required the ConEC to notify the particular candidate of this within twenty\u2011four hours and to provide him or her with an opportunity to make corrections in the documents before deciding on his or her registration as a candidate. The ConECs had, however, declared large numbers of signatures invalid in the case of each applicant on the basis of easily rectifiable errors, without informing the candidates in advance and giving them an opportunity to make the necessary corrections;\n(c)  the procedure followed by the ConECs had also breached other requirements of the Electoral Code. Contrary to the requirements of Article 59.3, the applicants had not been informed in advance of the time and place of the examination of the signature sheets and their presence had not been ensured. Contrary to Article 59.13 of the Electoral Code, the applicants had also not been provided with a copy of the minutes of the examination of the validity of the signature sheets at least twenty-four hours prior to the ConEC meeting dealing with their respective requests for registration. Subsequently, none of the applicants had been invited to the ConEC meetings, which had deprived them of the opportunity to argue for their position;\n(d)  some of the grounds for invalidation were not provided by law and therefore to declare signatures invalid on those grounds had been unlawful. For example, the Electoral Code did not allow the invalidation of a signature merely because the voter\u2019s identity document had recently expired. Likewise, it had been unlawful to invalidate signatures on unspecified and unexplained \u201cother grounds\u201d, because the Electoral Code provided for an exhaustive list of clear grounds for declaring signatures invalid and did not give electoral commissions any discretionary power to introduce any other grounds for that purpose;\n(e)  in some cases, various local public officials and police officers had applied undue pressure on voters or signature collectors to \u201cwithdraw\u201d their signatures on the grounds that they had been tricked to sign in the candidate\u2019s favour \u201cby deceptive means\u201d. 11.  Enclosed with their complaints to the CEC, some of the applicants submitted statements by a number of voters affirming the authenticity of their signatures. However, those statements were not taken into consideration by the CEC. 12.  The CEC arranged for another examination of the signature sheets by members of its own working group. None of the applicants was invited to participate in that examination process. The CEC working group found in each case that large numbers of signatures were invalid and that the remaining valid signatures were below the minimum required by law. 13.  In each case, the number of signatures found to be invalid by the CEC working group differed from the number given by the particular ConEC working group, with the differences often being significant. Furthermore, in almost every case, the grounds for declaring signatures invalid given by the CEC had been different from the grounds given for the same signature sheets by the ConEC. In most cases a certain number of the total signatures were also declared invalid on the grounds that they had \u201cappeared\u201d to have been falsified, that is, \u201cmade by the same person in the name of other people\u201d (\u201cehtimal ki, eyni \u015f\u0259xs t\u0259r\u0259find\u0259n icra olunmu\u015fdur\u201d). 14.  On various dates, the CEC also rejected the applicants\u2019 complaints (see Appendix). None of the applicants were invited to attend the CEC meeting dealing with their complaint. Moreover, in each case, all the relevant CEC documents (including the working group documents) were only made available to the applicants after the CEC decision had been taken, while in some cases such documents were never given to them at all, or were given as late as at the stage of judicial appeal proceedings. 15.  On various dates, each of the applicants lodged an appeal with the Baku Court of Appeal against the decisions of the electoral commissions. They reiterated the complaints they had made before the CEC concerning the ConEC decisions and procedures. They also raised some or all of the following complaints concerning the CEC\u2019s decisions and procedures:\n(a)  contrary to the requirements of electoral law, the CEC had failed to notify them of its meetings and ensure their presence during the examination of the signature sheets and their complaints;\n(b)  contrary to the requirements of electoral law, some or all of the relevant CEC documents had not been made available to them, depriving them of the opportunity to mount an effective challenge to the CEC decisions;\n(c)  the decisions of the electoral commissions had been based on expert opinions that had contained nothing more than conjecture and speculation (for example, that the signatures had \u201cappeared\u201d (\u201cehtimal ki\u201d) to have been falsified), instead of properly established facts;\n(d)  in those cases where the applicants had submitted additional documents in support of their complaints, the CEC had ignored those submissions and failed to take them into account. 16.  Relying on a number of provisions of domestic law, and directly on Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, the applicants claimed that their right to stand for election had been infringed. 17.  On various dates (see Appendix), the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed appeals by the applicants, finding that their arguments were irrelevant or unsubstantiated and that there were no grounds for quashing the decisions of the CEC. 18.  The applicants lodged cassation appeals with the Supreme Court, reiterating their previous complaints and arguing that the Baku Court of Appeal had not carried out a fair examination of the cases and had delivered unreasoned judgments. 19.  On various dates (see Appendix), the Supreme Court dismissed the applicants\u2019 appeals as unsubstantiated, without examining their arguments in detail, and found no grounds to doubt the findings of the electoral commissions or of the Baku Court of Appeal. 20.  In addition to the applicants in the present cases, at the material time the applicants\u2019 representative Mr Intigam Aliyev was representing twenty\u2011seven other applicants in cases concerning the 2010 parliamentary elections and a number of applicants in other cases before the Court. Mr Aliyev has also lodged an application on his own behalf in a case relating to the 2010 elections (application no. 66684/12). 21.  In August 2014 the prosecution authorities launched an investigation into the activities of a number of NGOs, including the Legal Education Society, an NGO headed by Mr Aliyev. 22.  On 7 August 2014 the Nasimi District Court issued a search warrant authorising the search of Mr Aliyev\u2019s office in the Legal Education Society and seizure of \u201clegal, financial, accounting and banking documents, letters and contracts, reports on execution of grant contracts and tax documents relating to [the organisation\u2019s] establishment, structure, functioning, membership registration, receipt of grants and other financial aid, and allocation of granted funds, as well as computers, disks, USB keys and other electronic devices storing relevant information ...\u201d 23.  On 8 August 2014 Mr Intigam Aliyev was arrested after questioning by an investigator of the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office in connection with the criminal proceedings instituted against him under Articles 192.2.2 (illegal entrepreneurship), 213.1 (large-scale tax evasion) and 308.2 (abuse of power) of the Criminal Code. On the same day, the Nasimi District Court ordered his detention pending trial. He remains in detention while the criminal proceedings against him are pending. The circumstances relating to Mr Aliyev\u2019s arrest and detention are the subject of a separate application brought by him before the Court (application no. 68762/14). 24.  On 8 and 9 August 2014 the investigation authorities conducted a search of Mr Aliyev\u2019s home and office pursuant to the Nasimi District Court\u2019s search warrant of 7 August 2014, seizing, inter alia, a large number of documents from his office, including all the case files relating to the pending proceedings before the Court, which were in Mr Aliyev\u2019s possession and which concerned over 100 applications in total. The files relating to the present cases, which, it appears, included copies of all the documents and correspondence between the Court and the parties, were also seized in their entirety. No adequate inventory of the seized document files relating to the Court proceedings was made in the search and seizure records of 8 and 9 August 2014. 25.  On an unspecified date Mr Aliyev lodged a complaint with the Nasimi District Court, claiming that the search had been unlawful. He complained that the investigator had failed to register each seized document as required by the relevant law and had taken the documents without making an inventory. He further complained about the seizure of the documents and files relating to the ongoing court proceedings before the Court and the domestic courts. 26.  On 12 September 2014 the Nasimi District Court dismissed Mr Aliyev\u2019s claim. It held that the searches had been conducted in accordance with the relevant law. As to the seizure of the documents relating to the cases pending before the Court and the domestic courts, it found that they could not be returned to the applicants at this stage of the proceedings. Following an appeal, on 23 September 2014 the Baku Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance court\u2019s decision of 12 September 2014. 27.  On 25 October 2014 the investigation authorities returned a number of the case files concerning the applications lodged before the Court, including the file relating to the present case, to Mr Aliyev\u2019s lawyer. The investigator\u2019s relevant decision specified that \u201csince it has been established that among documents seized on 8 and 9 August 2014 there were files concerning applications by a number of individuals and organisations lodged with the European Court of Human Rights, which have no relation to the substance of the criminal proceedings [against Mr Intigam Aliyev], [those files] have been delivered to [Mr Aliyev\u2019s lawyer] Mr Javad Javadov\u201d.", "references": ["8", "6", "2", "1", "7", "5", "4", "0", "9", "3", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicants, who are husband and wife, were born in 1932 and 1926, respectively, and live in Bat-Yam, Israel. 6.  In 1990s the applicants emigrated from the USSR to Israel and obtained Israeli nationality. Before emigrating, they were receiving old-age pensions from the Soviet authorities. Once the applicants left the USSR, the payments were discontinued in accordance with the USSR pension law in force at the material time. 7.  On 4 August 2006 the applicants brought civil proceedings against the competent regional department of the Pension Fund of the Russian Federation (\u041f\u0435\u043d\u0441\u0438\u043e\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u0424\u043e\u043d\u0434 \u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0439\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u0424\u0435\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438) (hereinafter \u201cthe Pension Fund\u201d) seeking reinstatement of their right to the pension payments. 8.  On 4 December 2006 the Kirovskiy District Court of Astrakhan found in the applicants\u2019 favour and ordered the Pension Fund to set up monthly pension payments backdated to 15 June 1998. 9.  On 12 January 2007 the Astrakhan Regional Court upheld the judgment on appeal and it became binding and enforceable. 10.  On 10 July 2007 the Pension Fund lodged an application for supervisory review, seeking to have the judgments quashed. The application was addressed to the President of the Supreme Court. 11.  On 27 July 2007 a judge of the Supreme Court requested the case file from the District Court and subsequently suspended enforcement of the judgment of 4 December 2006. 12.  On 4 December 2007 another judge of the Supreme Court sent the case for supervisory review to the Astrakhan Regional Court. 13.  On 22 January 2008 the Astrakhan Regional Court dismissed the supervisory review application and endorsed the judgment of 4 December 2006, as upheld on 12 January 2007. 14.  On 8 April 2008 the Pension Fund lodged another application for supervisory review, again addressed to the President of the Supreme Court. 15.  On 24 June 2008 a judge of the Supreme Court sent the case for supervisory review by the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court. 16.  On 1 August 2008 the Civil Chamber of Supreme Court quashed the judgment of 4 December 2006, as upheld on 12 January 2007, and rejected the applicants\u2019 claims.", "references": ["5", "4", "2", "6", "1", "0", "8", "7", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Petrozavodsk, in the Republic of Kareliya. She was a municipal unitary enterprise employee in Petrozavodsk, working for Auto Transport Column 1126 (\u201cAvtokolonna 1126\u201d, hereafter \u201cthe company\u201d). 5.  Avtokolonna 1126 was set up in accordance with a decision of the administration of the town of Petrozavodsk (\u201cthe town administration\u201d), and provided public transport services in the town on a commercial basis. In order to carry out its statutory activities, the company had \u201cthe right of economic control\u201d (\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043e \u0445\u043e\u0437\u044f\u0439\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0432\u0435\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f) over the assets allocated to it by the town administration (see Liseytseva and Maslov v. Russia, nos. 39483/05 and 40527/10, \u00a7\u00a7 55-75, 9 October 2014 for further details on the company\u2019s status). In accordance with several agreements between the company and the town administration, the company undertook to provide certain sections of the population with transport services free of charge, and the town administration was to reimburse it for the expenses incurred out of the budget allocated for that purpose by the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Kareliya or the federal budget. A letter from the town administration to the applicant dated 19 March 2003 shows that at some point, owing to the relevant budgets lacking funds, the company was owed a significant amount of money. Consequently, it was unable to pay its employees on time. In 2004 the town administration asked the legislative body of the Republic of Kareliya to consider allocating additional funds to cover the company\u2019s debt, but to no avail. 6.  On an unspecified date the town administration ordered the restructuring of the company in the form of a spin-off as a new entity, and transferred the assets mentioned in paragraph 5 above to the newly created municipal unitary enterprise \u201cAvtokolonna 1126 Plus\u201d. The debt which had accumulated in respect of the unpaid salaries was not transferred, and remained with the applicant\u2019s employer. On 6 July 2003 the Commercial Court of the Republic of Kareliya declared the debtor company \u201cAvtokolonna 1126\u201d insolvent, and liquidation proceedings were commenced. 7.  On 18 May 2004 the Petrozavodsk Town Court awarded the applicant 21,830 Russian roubles (RUB) in respect of salary arrears, default interest and non-pecuniary damage. The judgment became final ten days later. According to a payment note on a writ of execution of 20 July 2006, at some point the company paid the applicant RUB 9,206. The remainder of the judgment debt has remained unpaid. 8.  On 10 April 2006 a justice of the peace of the 11th Court Circuit of Petrozavodsk ordered the company to pay the applicant RUB 614 in compensation for non-pecuniary damage. The award became final ten days later, but was not paid to the applicant. 9.  On 4 October 2006 the Commercial Court of the Republic of Kareliya ordered the company\u2019s liquidation. Creditors\u2019 claims which had not been satisfied during the liquidation proceedings, including the applicant\u2019s remaining claims, were considered settled. On 15 October 2006 the liquidation was recorded in the Register of Legal Entities, and the company ceased to exist. 10.  On 16 March 2005, in subsidiary liability proceedings, the Petrozavodsk Town Court refused to hold the town administration liable for the company\u2019s debts. The court found that the applicant had failed to adduce evidence to demonstrate that it had caused the company\u2019s insolvency. It appears that the judgment was not appealed against.", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "0", "5", "8", "6", "7", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
+{"input": "10.  The first applicant was born in 1941 and lives in Amman (Jordan). According to the Security Council of the United Nations (UN), he was head of finance for the Iraqi secret services under the regime of Saddam Hussein. The second applicant is a company incorporated under the laws of Panama and having its registered office in Panama, the first applicant being its managing director. 11.  After Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990 and Resolution 670 (1990) of 25 September 1990, calling upon UN member States and non\u2011member States to apply a general embargo against Iraq and on any Kuwaiti resources confiscated by the occupier, together with an embargo on air transport. 12.  On 7 August 1990 the Swiss Federal Council adopted an ordinance providing for economic measures against the Republic of Iraq (the \u201cIraq Ordinance\u201d; see paragraph 36 below). The applicants alleged that since that date their assets in Switzerland had remained frozen. 13.  On 10 September 2002 Switzerland became a member of the United Nations. 14.  On 22 May 2003 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1483 (2003), superseding Resolution 661 (1990), among others (see paragraph 46 below). Paragraph 23 of Resolution 1483 (2003) reads as follows:\n\u201cThe Security Council\n...\nDecides that all Member States in which there are:\n(a)  funds or other financial assets or economic resources of the previous Government of Iraq or its state bodies, corporations, or agencies, located outside Iraq as of the date of this resolution, or\n(b)  funds or other financial assets or economic resources that have been removed from Iraq, or acquired, by Saddam Hussein or other senior officials of the former Iraqi regime and their immediate family members, including entities owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by them or by persons acting on their behalf or at their direction,\nshall freeze without delay those funds or other financial assets or economic resources and, unless these funds or other financial assets or economic resources are themselves the subject of a prior judicial, administrative, or arbitral lien or judgement, immediately shall cause their transfer to the Development Fund for Iraq, it being understood that, unless otherwise addressed, claims made by private individuals or non-government entities on those transferred funds or other financial assets may be presented to the internationally recognized, representative government of Iraq; and decides further that all such funds or other financial assets or economic resources shall enjoy the same privileges, immunities, and protections as provided under paragraph 22.\u201d[1] 15.  The Iraq Ordinance of 7 August 1990 underwent numerous amendments, in particular on 30 October 2002, following the entry into force of the Federal Law of 22 March 2002 on the application of international sanctions (the Embargo Act, in force since 1 January 2003), and on 28 May 2003, to take account of Resolution 1483 (2003). Article 2 of the Iraq Ordinance provided in substance for the freezing of assets and economic resources belonging to the former Iraqi Government, to senior officials thereof and to companies or bodies under the control or management of that Government or its officials. Pursuant to the Ordinance, any person or organisation holding or managing assets covered by the freezing measure must immediately declare them to the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (the \u201cSECO\u201d) (see Article 2a \u00a7 1 of the Iraq Ordinance, paragraph 36 below). 16.  On 24 November 2003 a sanctions committee created by Security Council Resolution 1518 (2003) (\u201cthe 1518 Sanctions Committee\u201d), and consisting of representatives of all members of the Council, was given the task of listing the individuals and entities concerned by paragraph 23 of Resolution 1483 (2003) (see paragraph 46 below). For that purpose, the Committee was to keep up to date the lists of individuals and entities already compiled by the former sanctions committee, created under Resolution 661 (1990), which had been adopted during the armed conflict between Iraq and Kuwait. 17.  On 26 April 2004 the 1518 Sanctions Committee added to the list of individuals and entities, respectively, the second applicant, which had its registered office in Geneva, and the first applicant, who was the managing director of the latter. 18.  On 12 May 2004 the applicants\u2019 names were added to the list of individuals, legal entities, groups and organisations concerned by the national measures under Article 2 of the Iraq Ordinance. On 18 May 2004 the Federal Council also adopted, under Article 184, paragraph 3, of the Federal Constitution, an ordinance on the confiscation of the frozen Iraqi assets and economic resources and their transfer to the Development Fund for Iraq (\u201cthe Confiscation Ordinance\u201d; see paragraph 37 below). That Ordinance was initially valid until 30 June 2010 and was then extended until 30 June 2013. 19.  The applicants indicated that a confiscation procedure had been initiated in respect of their assets in Switzerland, which had been frozen since 7 August 1990, by the Federal Department for Economic Affairs, when the Confiscation Ordinance had entered into force on 18 May 2004. 20.  The first applicant, wishing to apply directly to the 1518 Sanctions Committee for the removal of his name from the list, called upon the Federal Department for Economic Affairs, in a letter of 25 August 2004, to suspend the confiscation procedure in respect of his assets. In a letter of 5 November 2004 to the Chair of the Committee, the Swiss Government, through their Permanent Representative to the United Nations, supported that application. In a letter of 3 December 2004 the Chair informed the applicants that the Sanctions Committee had received their application and that it was under consideration. He asked them to send supporting documents and any additional information that might substantiate the application. 21.  The first applicant replied in a letter of 21 January 2005 that he wished to give oral evidence to the Sanctions Committee. As no action was taken on the request, the applicants, in a letter of 1 September 2005, sought the continuation of the confiscation procedure in Switzerland. 22.  On 22 May 2006 the Federal Department for Economic Affairs sent the applicants a draft decision on the confiscation and transfer of the funds that were deposited in their names in Geneva. In observations of 22 June 2006 the applicants challenged that decision. 23.  In three decisions of 16 November 2006 the Federal Department for Economic Affairs ordered the confiscation of the following assets:\n(a)  the sum of 86,276.85 Swiss francs (CHF) belonging to the first applicant, representing the liquidation dividend of a company (not the second applicant) of which he had been the sole shareholder, and deposited in the \u201cclient\u201d account of a Swiss law firm which represented him;\n(b)  a total of CHF 164,731,213 deposited in the applicant company\u2019s name with bank X;\n(c)  a total of CHF 104,739,882.57 deposited in the applicant company\u2019s name with bank Y. 24.  The Federal Department for Economic Affairs stated the conditions in which the sums would be transferred, within ninety days from the entry into force of the decisions, to the bank account of the Development Fund for Iraq. In support of its decisions, it observed that the applicants\u2019 names appeared on the lists of individuals and entities drawn up by the Sanctions Committee, that Switzerland was bound by the resolutions of the Security Council and that it could only delete a name from the annex to the Iraq Ordinance where the relevant decision had been taken by the Sanctions Committee. The Federal Department further observed that the applicants had discontinued their discussions with the Sanctions Committee. It indicated that an administrative-law appeal could be lodged with the Federal Court against its decisions. 25.  On 19 December 2006 the Security Council, being committed to ensuring that fair and clear procedures existed for placing individuals and entities on sanctions lists, including those of the 1518 Sanctions Committee, and for removing their names, as well as for granting humanitarian exemptions, adopted Resolution 1730 (2006), which created a delisting procedure (see paragraph 48 below). 26.  The applicants lodged separate administrative-law appeals with the Federal Court against each of the Federal Department\u2019s three decisions of 16 November 2006, seeking their annulment. In support of their submissions, they argued that the confiscation of their assets breached the property right guaranteed by Article 26 of the Federal Constitution and that the procedure leading to the addition of their names to the lists provided for by Resolution 1483 (2003) and annexed to the Iraq Ordinance had breached the basic procedural safeguards enshrined in Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) of 16 December 1966, in Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention and in Articles 29 to 32 of the Federal Constitution. The applicants took the view that the Federal Court, and before that the Federal Department for Economic Affairs, had jurisdiction to review the legality and the conformity with the Convention and the ICCPR of the 1518 Sanctions Committee\u2019s decision to add their names to the list provided for in paragraph 23 (b) of Resolution 1483 (2003). They submitted that there was no incompatibility or conflict between the obligations under the Charter and the rights guaranteed by the Convention or the ICCPR. 27.  On 10 December 2007 the applicants filed additional observations limited to an assessment of the impact of a judgment of the Federal Court dated 14 November 2007 (in the case which ultimately led to the Nada v. Switzerland judgment ([GC], no. 10593/08, ECHR 2012)) on the merits of their own appeals. They further sought the opportunity to present oral argument on that point. A copy of these observations was sent to the Federal Department for Economic Affairs for information purposes. 28.  On 18 January 2008 the applicants wrote to the Federal Court drawing its attention to the opinion delivered on 16 January 2008 by the Advocate General in the case of Yassin Abdullah Kadi, then pending before the Court of Justice of the European Communities (\u201cthe CJEC\u201d, which on 1 December 2009 became known as the Court of Justice of the European Union, \u201cthe CJEU\u201d), and reiterating their request of 10 December 2007 to present oral argument. 29.  In three almost identical judgments, the Federal Court dismissed the appeals, confining itself to verifying that the applicants\u2019 names actually appeared on the lists drawn up by the Sanctions Committee and that the assets concerned belonged to them. The relevant parts of those judgments read as follows (unless otherwise stated, this is the text of the judgment concerning the first applicant):\n\u201c5.1  On 10 September 2002 Switzerland became a member of the United Nations and ratified the United Nations Charter of 26 June 1945 (the Charter; RS 0.120). Article 24, paragraph 1, of the Charter provides that, in order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf. Under Article 25 of the Charter, the members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the Charter. The binding nature of Security Council decisions concerning measures taken in accordance with Articles 39, 41 and 42 to maintain or restore international peace and security also stems from Article 48, paragraph 2, of the Charter, which provides that such decisions must be carried out by the members of the United Nations directly and through their action in the appropriate international agencies of which they are members. The mandatory effect of Security Council decisions is the basis for the similar effect of decisions taken by subsidiary organs such as the sanctions committees (see Eric Suy and Nicolas Angelet in Jean-Pierre Cot, Alain Pellet and Mathias Forteau, La Charte des Nations Unies, commentaire article par article, 3rd edition, Economica 2005, Article 25, pp. 915 et seq.). 5.2  It was under Chapter VII (Articles 39 to 51) of the Charter that the Security Council adopted Resolution 1483 (2003): having regard to the situation in Iraq, the Security Council considered that it had to take measures \u2018to maintain or restore international peace and security\u2019. Those measures included, in particular, the decisions stated in paragraphs 19 and 23 of the Resolution: in particular, the Security Council decided that member States were required to freeze and transfer to the Development Fund for Iraq the assets described in paragraph 23 of the Resolution. It also decided that the 1518 Sanctions Committee would have the task of identifying the individuals and entities referred to in paragraph 23. 5.3  At the outset, the 1518 Sanctions Committee published a set of guidelines for the application of paragraphs 19 and 23 of Resolution 1483 (2003) (see http://www.un.org/french/sc/committees/1518/indexshtml); they described the manner in which the lists of individuals and entities would be drawn up and disseminated. In that document the Committee requests as follows: \u2018The names of individuals and entities proposed for identification should be accompanied by, to the extent possible, a narrative description of the information that forms the basis or justification for taking action pursuant to resolution 1483 (2003)\u2019. The procedure is then described in the following terms. The Committee will reach decisions by consensus. If consensus cannot be reached, the Chairman should undertake such further consultations as may facilitate agreement. If after these consultations, consensus still cannot be reached, the matter may be submitted to the Security Council. Given the specific nature of the information, the Chairman may encourage bilateral exchanges between interested member States in order to clarify the issue prior to a decision. Where the Committee agrees, decisions may be taken by a written procedure. In such cases, the Chairman will circulate to all members of the Committee the proposed decision of the Committee, under the \u2018no-objection\u2019 procedure within three working days. If no objection is received within such a period, the decision will be deemed adopted. 5.4  Company S. SA and [the first applicant] appear on the lists of entities and individuals drawn up by the 1518 Sanctions Committee under number ... for the company and ... for the latter, on the ground that its managing director is [the first applicant], the head of finance, at the time, of the Iraqi secret services, who also controls the companies H., K. SA and M. [the second applicant], three entities entrusted with the management of the assets of the former regime and its high-ranking members. The decision taken on 16 November 2006 by the Federal Department for Economic Affairs to confiscate the appellant\u2019s assets pursuant to the Iraq Ordinance and the Confiscation Ordinance is thus based on Resolution 1483 (2003).\u201d\nThe two judgments concerning the second applicant:\n\u201c5.4  The [second applicant] appears on the lists of entities and individuals drawn up by the 1518 Sanctions Committee under number ..., on the ground that its managing director is [the first applicant], who also controls H. and K. SA, two entities entrusted with the management of the assets of the former regime and its high-ranking members. The decision taken on 16 November 2006 by the Federal Department for Economic Affairs to confiscate the appellant\u2019s assets pursuant to the Iraq Ordinance and the Confiscation Ordinance is thus based on Resolution 1483 (2003).\u201d\nThe judgment concerning the first applicant (continued):\n\u201c6.1  Since 28 November 1974 Switzerland has been a Contracting Party to the European Convention on Human Rights. However, even though it signed, on 19 May 1976, the additional Protocol No. 1 of 20 March 1952, which guarantees in particular the protection of property (Article 1), it has not ratified it to date. That Protocol has not therefore entered into force in respect of Switzerland. Consequently, in Switzerland, the protection of property is guaranteed by the Federal Constitution alone (Article 26).\nUnder Article 1 ECHR, the High Contracting Parties undertake to secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of the Convention (Articles 2 to 18 ECHR). Article 6 \u00a7 1 ECHR, in particular, grants everyone the right to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law, in the determination of an individual\u2019s civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him or her. Under Article 13 ECHR, everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in the Convention are violated is entitled to an effective remedy before a national authority.\n... 6.4  Even though he relies on the guarantee of the protection of property and points out that restrictions on property are possible only under the conditions laid down in Article 36 of the Constitution, the appellant is in reality only complaining of a breach of procedural safeguards and not of a violation of Articles 26 and 36 of the Constitution. He observes that restrictions on the enjoyment of his possessions, such as the confiscation of his property, can be ordered only after due process under domestic law, including a substantive examination of the legal conditions for such restriction, while ensuring the observance of fundamental rights, basic procedural safeguards, and defence rights, or the right to be heard, and in compliance with the requirement to state reasons, the prohibition of any denial of justice, and the equality of arms and adversarial principles (see appellant\u2019s observations, ch. 76-80). He complains that the reasons for his inclusion on the list of the 1518 Sanctions Committee were never brought to his knowledge and that he was not able to comment on them or defend himself in adversarial proceedings before an independent and impartial judicial body, this not being disputed \u2013 quite rightly \u2013 by the Department for Economic Affairs in the light of the listing procedure (see above, point 4.3).\nIn this connection, the appellant is of the opinion that Switzerland is required to apply Resolution 1483 (2003), but also the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights and those of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights concerning procedural safeguards; he argues that there is no contradiction between those various obligations, and that for this reason the decision appealed against should be quashed and the matter referred back for fresh confiscation proceedings before the Swiss courts, which would examine the merits of the measure in compliance with basic procedural safeguards.\nIt is therefore appropriate to examine the procedural safeguards that Switzerland is required to comply with, having regard to its obligations under the Charter and Resolution 1483 (2003), in the proceedings initiated by the Federal Department for Economic Affairs leading to the confiscation of the appellant\u2019s assets. 7.1  Pursuant to Article 5 paragraph 4, of the Constitution, the Confederation and the Cantons comply with international law. Under Article 190 of the Constitution, the Federal Court and the other authorities are required to apply federal laws and international law. International law, within the meaning of Article 190 of the Constitution, is defined by jurisprudence as the entire body of international law that is binding on Switzerland, comprising international agreements, customary international law, the general rules of the law of nations and the decisions of international organisations that have mandatory effect in Switzerland. Accordingly, the Federal Court is in principle required to comply with the provisions of the Charter, United Nations Security Council resolutions, the European Convention on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 7.2  Article 190 of the Constitution does not, however, provide for any rule of conflict between the various norms of international law that are equally binding on Switzerland. However, under Article 103 of the Charter, in the event of a conflict between the obligations of the members of the United Nations under the Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their Charter obligations prevail. This primacy is also enshrined in Article 30 \u00a7 1 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 23 May 1969 (\u2018VCLT\u2019; RS 0.111; entered into force in respect of Switzerland on 6 June 1990).\nAccording to legal opinion and case-law, this is an absolute and general primacy which applies regardless of the nature of the treaty which is in conflict with the Charter, whether it is bilateral or multilateral, or whether the treaty entered into force before or after the entry into force of the Charter. The primacy is granted not only to the obligations expressly laid down in the Charter, but also, according to the International Court of Justice, to those that stem from binding decisions of United Nations organs, in particular the binding decisions taken by the Security Council pursuant to Article 25 of the Charter (see the case concerning Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie, ICJ Reports 1992, p. 15, paragraph 39; see also Felipe Paolillo in Les conventions de Vienne sur le droit des trait\u00e9s, commentaire article par article, Olivier Corten and Pierre Klein (eds.), Bruylant, Brussels 2006, no. 33 on Article 30 VCLT and the numerous references cited). This primacy does not render null and void the treaty which is in conflict with the Charter obligations, but merely suspends the treaty for as long as the conflict remains (see Eric Suy in Les conventions de Vienne sur le droit des trait\u00e9s, op. cit., no. 15 on Article 53 VCLT and the references cited).\nMoreover, neither the European Convention on Human Rights nor the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights contains clauses which would, in themselves or by virtue of another treaty, prevail over the conflict clause that is enshrined in both Article 103 of the Charter and Article 30 \u00a7 1 VCLT.\nArticle 46 ICCPR certainly provides that \u2018[n]othing in the present Covenant shall be interpreted as impairing the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and of the constitutions of the specialized agencies which define the respective responsibilities of the various organs of the United Nations and of the specialized agencies in regard to the matters dealt with in the present Covenant\u2019. However, according to legal opinion, this provision simply means that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights cannot hinder the task of the political organs and specialised agencies which have been entrusted under the Charter with duties relating to human rights (see Manfred Nowak, U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, CCPR Commentary, Kehl 2005, no. 3, on Article 46 ICCPR, p. 798). It does not therefore establish any hierarchy between the decisions of the Security Council and the rights guaranteed by the ICCPR \u2013 the United Nations as such is not a party to the latter in any event. It cannot be concluded that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights prevails over Charter obligations. 7.3  Consequently, in the event of any conflict between Switzerland\u2019s obligations under the Charter and those deriving from the European Convention on Human Rights or the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Charter obligations in principle prevail over the latter, as the appellant has not in fact denied. He takes the view, however, that this principle is not absolute. In his opinion, the obligations arising from the Charter, in particular those imposed by Resolution 1483 (2003), lose their binding character if they contravene the rules of jus cogens. 8.  The appellant argues that the procedural safeguards under Article 14 ICCPR and Article 6 ECHR constitute jus cogens norms. He submits that, in breaching those safeguards, Resolution 1483 (2003) should lose its binding effect. 8.1  Under the heading \u2018Treaties conflicting with a peremptory norm of general international law (jus cogens)\u2019, Article 53 VCLT provides that a treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law, that is, a norm accepted and recognised by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character. Moreover, Article 64 VCLT provides that, if a new peremptory norm of general international law emerges, any existing treaty which is in conflict with that norm becomes void and terminates. Article 71 VCLT governs the consequences of the invalidity of a treaty in such cases. 8.2  Article 53 VCLT does not contain any examples of peremptory norms of general international law (Report of the International Law Commission, Commentary on Art. 50, ILC Yearbook 1966 II, pp. 269 et seq.). The words \u2018by the international community of States as a whole\u2019 do not mean that a norm must be accepted and recognised as peremptory by States unanimously. A significant majority is sufficient. By way of example, the norms concerning the prohibition of the use of force, slavery, genocide, piracy, unequal treaties and racial discrimination are generally cited (see Eric Suy, op. cit., no. 12 on Article 53 VCLT, p. 1912; Nguyen Quoc Dinh, Patrick Daillier, Alain Pellet, Droit international public, 7th edition, LGDJ 2002, no. 127, pp. 205 et seq.; and Joe Verhoeven, Droit international public, Larcier 2000, pp. 341 et seq.).\nThis list of examples does not include the rights deriving from Article 14 ICCPR and Article 6 ECHR, which are relied upon by the appellant. Their mere recognition by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights does not go so far as making them peremptory norms of general international law. It transpires, moreover, from the preparatory work in respect of Article 53 VCLT and the wording of that provision that in principle there can be no regional jus cogens norms (see Eric Suy, op. cit., no. 9 on Article 53 VCLT, p. 1910; this is a controversial matter in legal opinion, see inter alia: Eva Kornicker, Ius cogens und Umweltv\u00f6lkerrecht, Thesis Basle 1997, pp. 62 et seq. and the numerous references cited therein). 8.3  It is true that, in the event of a public emergency which threatens the life of the nation, Article 4, paragraphs 1 and 2, ICCPR authorises, under certain conditions, measures that derogate from the obligations under the Covenant, except for those deriving from Articles 6, 7, 8 (paragraphs 1 and 2), 11, 15, 16 and 18 (right to life, prohibition of torture, prohibition of slavery, prohibition of imprisonment on the ground of inability to fulfil a contractual obligation, prohibition of retrospective criminal legislation, recognition of legal personality, freedom of thought, conscience and religion). Article 15, paragraphs 1 and 2, ECHR also contain a public emergency clause permitting derogation from Convention obligations, similarly excluding any derogation from Articles 2, 3, 4 (paragraph 1) and 7 (right to life, prohibition of torture, prohibition of slavery, no punishment without law). Some authors take the view that the rights and prohibitions listed in Article 4, paragraph 2, ICCPR and Article 15, paragraph 2, ECHR correspond to the core human rights and could therefore be regarded as peremptory norms of general international law (see Stefan Oeter, \u2018Ius cogens und der Schutz der Menschenrechte\u2019, in Liber amicorum Luzius Wildhaber 2007, pp. 499 et seq. and pp. 507 et seq.); for other authors the provisions merely point in that direction (see Eva Kornicker, op. cit., pp. 58 et seq.). The latter opinion seems to correspond to that of the (former) Commission on Human Rights [recte: Human Rights Committee], which found that the list of non-derogable rights in Article 4, paragraph 2, ICCPR might admittedly be related to, but not identical with, the question whether certain human rights corresponded to peremptory norms of general international law (General Comments 29/72 of 24 July 2001 under Article 40, paragraph 4, ICCPR, ch. 11, in Manfred Nowak, U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, CCPR Commentary, Kehl 2005, pp. 1145 et seq. at 1149). In the present case it is not necessary to settle this question in so far as Article 14 ICCPR and Article 6 ECHR do not, in any event, appear in the lists given in Article 4, paragraph 2, ICCPR and Article 15, paragraph 2, ECHR. 8.4  Consequently, contrary to what the appellant has claimed, neither the fundamental procedural safeguards, nor the right to an effective remedy, under Articles 6 and 13 ECHR and Article 14 ICCPR, have per se the nature of peremptory norms of general international law (jus cogens), in particular in the context of the confiscation procedure affecting the appellant\u2019s property (see, to the same effect, the judgment of the Swiss Federal Court no. 1A.45/2007 of 14 November 2007 in the case of Nada v. DFE, point 7.3; judgment of the Court of First Instance of the European Communities, 21 September 2005, Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council and Commission, T-306/01 Reports 2005 II, p. 3533, paragraphs 307 and 341; judgment of the Court of First Instance of the European Communities, 21 September 2005, Kadi v. Council and Commission, T-315/01 Reports 2005 II p. 3649, paragraphs 268 and 286; judgment of the Court of First Instance of the European Communities, 12 July 2006, Ayadi v. Council, T-253/02 Reports 2006 II p. 2139, paragraph 116; judgment of the Court of First Instance of the European Communities, 12 July 2006, Hassan v. Council and Commission, T-49/04 Reports 2006 II p. 52, paragraph 92).\nAs to the rights guaranteed by Articles 29 et seq. of the Constitution, this is a matter of domestic law which cannot constitute jus cogens or hinder the implementation by Switzerland of Resolution 1483 (2003). 9.  According to the appellant, Switzerland should have sufficient latitude, even in the light of its obligations vis-\u00e0-vis the Security Council, to fulfil its duties under Article 14 ICCPR and Article 6 ECHR. In his view it is necessary to distinguish between the question of the deletion of his name from the list of the 1518 Sanctions Committee and that of the confiscation of the frozen assets: the question of confiscation could be dealt with in fair proceedings without contravening the Charter obligations. 9.1  That opinion cannot be upheld. The description of the measures (freezing of funds or other financial assets, immediate transfer thereof to the Development Fund for Iraq), of the individuals and entities concerned (previous Iraqi government, Saddam Hussein or other senior officials of the former Iraqi regime and their immediate family members, including entities owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by them or by persons acting on their behalf or at their direction), and of the mandate given to the 1518 Sanctions Committee (to enumerate the individuals and entities mentioned in paragraph 23), is detailed and leaves no room for interpretation. Similarly, the list of individuals and entities drawn up by the 1518 Sanctions Committee is not indicative in nature. It is not a matter of deciding whether the appellant\u2019s name should be, or is legitimately, included on that list; it is simply a question of observing that his name does appear on the list in question, which must be transposed into Swiss domestic law. In asserting that it should be possible to deal separately with the question of the confiscation of his assets, the appellant overlooks the fact that the measures imposed on member States include the immediate transfer of the frozen assets to the Development Fund for Iraq. This order does not call for any interpretation, nor does it grant any latitude in the result that it requires of member States as to the treatment of the frozen assets of persons who, like the appellant, are included in particular on the list of the 1518 Sanctions Committee. Being clearly ascertained, those assets must be transferred to the Development Fund for Iraq. From that perspective, the present case differs from a case examined by the Court of First Instance of the European Communities, Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d\u2019Iran v. Council of the European Union. It concerned Resolution 1373 (2001) of 28 September 2001 laying down strategies to combat terrorism, which required the member States of the United Nations \u2013 in that case the European Community \u2013 to identify individuals, groups and entities whose funds had to be frozen, because the Resolution itself did not provide any list of the latter. The Court of First Instance found that procedural safeguards had to be observed in the keeping of such a list (judgment of the Court of First Instance of the European Communities, 12 December 2006, Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d\u2019Iran v. Council, T-228/02, not yet reported). 9.2  In those circumstances, contrary to what the appellant has claimed, the implementation of Resolution 1483 (2003) requires Switzerland to adhere strictly to the measures introduced and to the decisions of the 1518 Sanctions Committee, which, unless found by the Security Council to be in breach of jus cogens norms, does not leave any room, even on the grounds of ensuring the procedural safeguards provided for in the European Convention on Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights or the Swiss Constitution, for an examination of the procedure by which the appellant\u2019s name was added to the list issued by the 1518 Sanctions Committee, or for verification of the justification for such addition. 10.  The appellant further argued that Article 4 of the Confiscation Ordinance granted the Federal Court full jurisdiction to deal with the various aspects of the matter, enabling it to find that the authority below had failed to ascertain the merits of the confiscation of his assets or, in other words, that the authority had wrongly accepted their confiscation solely on the basis that his name appeared on the list annexed to Resolution 1483 (2003), without remedying the breach of his procedural rights under, inter alia, Articles 29 et seq. of the Constitution. 10.1  According to the foregoing considerations, Article 4 of the Confiscation Ordinance cannot authorise the Federal Court, any more than the authority below, to verify whether the appellant\u2019s inclusion on the list issued by the 1518 Sanctions Committee complied with the procedural safeguards of Article 14 ICCPR, Article 6 ECHR and Article 29 et seq. of the Constitution. With the exception of an examination of a possible breach of jus cogens norms, as shown above, Switzerland is thus not authorised to scrutinise the validity of Security Council decisions, and in particular that of Resolution 1483 (2003), not even in terms of compliance with procedural safeguards, or to provide redress for any defects in such decisions. For that could have the effect of depriving Article 25 of the Charter of any effectiveness, as would be the case if the appellant\u2019s frozen assets were not confiscated and transferred to the Development Fund for Iraq (see Eric Suy and Nicolas Angelet in La Charte des Nations Unies, Commentaire article par article, Jean-Pierre Cot, Alain Pellet and Mathias Forteau (eds.), 3rd edition, Economica 2003, Art. 25, p. 917). 10.2.  However, with that reservation, Switzerland is free to choose how it transposes into domestic law the obligations arising from Resolution 1483 (2003) and the arrangements for transferring the frozen assets. The Federal Council has made use of this discretion in distinguishing between the measures introduced for the freezing of the assets and those governing the transfer of frozen assets. The Federal Department, for its part, suspended the confiscation procedure at the request of the appellant, who sought to have the matter examined by the Sanctions Committee, and resumed it only upon his express application. With the same reservation, the Federal Council was entitled to guarantee the right of the frozen asset-holders to be heard before the confiscation decision was taken. It was also entitled to make available an administrative-law appeal against such decisions.\nIn the present case, the appellant made full use of his right to be heard because he obtained access to the file of the Federal Department for Economic Affairs, or at least to the relevant bank documents, and had the opportunity to express himself before that authority. He also fully availed himself of the right provided for in Article 4 of the Confiscation Ordinance by lodging the present administrative appeal. As to that matter, falling as it does within the jurisdiction of Switzerland, it should be noted that the applicant has not submitted any complaint of a violation of Articles 26 and 36 of the Constitution in respect of the confiscation procedure (see point 5.4).\nIn a further complaint, lastly, the appellant contended that the refusal to annul the decision of the Federal Department for Economic Affairs of 16 November 2006 for a breach of procedural safeguards ran counter to the position defended on many occasions by Switzerland, the Federal Council or the Federal Department for Foreign Affairs, asserting an intangible principle of respect for human rights. He argued that this was an \u2018indivisible\u2019 position in relation to other Nations which had been disregarded by the decision of the Federal Department for Economic Affairs of 16 November 2006. 10.3  The appellant seems to be unaware of the meaning that should be given to indivisibility (in the area) of human rights. According to legal opinion, the principle of indivisibility of human rights means that States cannot choose between human rights in order to give priority to some over others. The aim of this principle is to prevent governments from claiming to defend human rights by choosing from the list, as they see fit, those they accept and those they ignore (see Fran\u00e7oise Bouchet-Saulnier, Droits de l\u2019homme, droit humanitaire et justice internationale, Actes Sud 2002, pp. 23 and 27 et seq.). 10.4  In the present case, to the extent that his position can be understood, the appellant is complaining more about Switzerland\u2019s attitude, which he regards as contradictory. This opinion disregards the fact that the positive legal order, as set out above, is mandatory under Article 190 of the Constitution for reasons of legal certainty. Switzerland cannot, by itself, delete the appellant\u2019s name from the list drawn up by the Sanctions Committee, which has sole competence for that purpose, even if the procedure for that purpose is not fully satisfactory (see judgment 1A.45/2007 of 14 November 2007, point 8.3). Moreover, it is not contradictory for the federal authorities to find the system deficient and yet, as in the present case, to advocate and act on a political level in favour of intangible respect for human rights, especially in relation to the listing and delisting procedures applied by the 1518 Sanctions Committee. Switzerland\u2019s conduct does not therefore breach Articles 26 and 29 et seq. of the Constitution, Articles 6 and 13 ECHR or Article 14 ICCPR, under that head either. 11.  The appeal must accordingly be dismissed. The Federal Court finds, however, that, in the context of Switzerland\u2019s power and freedom of implementation (see point 10.2), the authority below should grant the appellant a brief and final period of time, before implementing the decision of 16 November 2006 \u2013 which enters into force with the dismissal of the present appeal \u2013 to allow him to apply, should he so wish, to the 1518 Sanctions Committee for a new delisting procedure in accordance with the improved arrangements of Resolution 1730 (2006) of 19 December 2006, the appellant not having had the opportunity to make use of the latter because he wrongly placed all his hopes in the present administrative-law appeal. 30.  On 13 June 2008 the applicants lodged a delisting application in accordance with the procedure introduced by Resolution 1730 (2006). The application was rejected on 6 January 2009. 31.  In a favourable opinion issued by the SECO on 26 September 2008, the applicants were informed that they would be authorised to make use of the assets frozen in Switzerland to pay the fees charged by a lawyer in the United States, that lawyer\u2019s activities being confined to their defence in connection with the Swiss confiscation procedure and the delisting procedure. Since 2007, on four occasions (the last being on 26 February 2009), the SECO, on the basis of Article 2, paragraph 3, of the Iraq Ordinance, granted the applicants\u2019 requests and authorised the release of certain sums for the payment of lawyer\u2019s fees in respect of the confiscation decisions. According to the information provided by the Swiss Government and not denied by the applicants, the SECO has released about CHF 850,000 in respect of lawyers\u2019 fees and over CHF 200,000 in respect of court costs. 32.  On 6 March 2009 the Swiss authorities stayed the execution of the confiscation decisions pending the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights, and that of the Federal Court on an application to reopen the domestic proceedings if the Court were to find a violation of the Convention. 33.  In its Resolution 1956 (2010) of 15 December 2010 the Security Council decided to terminate the Development Fund for Iraq no later than 30 June 2011 and to transfer the proceeds from that Fund to the Government of Iraq\u2019s \u201csuccessor arrangements account or accounts\u201d. The Sanctions Committee set up under Resolution 1518 (2003) continued to operate. 34.  On 20 December 2013 the Federal Department for Economic Affairs issued two other confiscation decisions in respect of assets in the name of the first applicant that were frozen in two banks, to be paid into the successor funds of the Iraqi Government. Referring to the Federal Council\u2019s decision of 6 March 2009 (paragraph 32 above), the Department decided that the assets concerned would remain frozen and would be transferred to the funds in question only if and when the present application was rejected by the European Court of Human Rights, \u201cor when the confiscation decisions of 16 November 2006 ... were confirmed by the Federal Court in the event of review\u201d. An appeal was lodged against those decisions before the Federal Administrative Court which, on 7 May 2014, suspended the proceedings pending the judgment of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights.", "references": ["7", "6", "0", "8", "9", "2", "1", "4", "5", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Podgorica, but is currently detained at the Institute for Execution of Criminal Sanctions (Zavod za izvr\u0161enje krivi\u010dnih sankcija; \u201cIECS\u201d hereinafter) in Spu\u017e. 6.  On 19 February 2011 the applicant was detained on suspicion that he had committed a murder. 7.  On 21 February 2011 the High Court (Vi\u0161i sud) in Podgorica issued a detention order against the applicant. It is clear from the case file that the applicant\u2019s detention was extended on 16 March 2011, 17 May 2011 and 18 July 2011. The decisions of 17 May and 18 July 2011 are in the case file. The decision of 17 May 2011 specified that the detention would last \u201cuntil a further decision of the court\u201d (ima trajati do dalje odluke suda). The decision of 18 July 2011 specified nothing in this regard. 8.  On 16 May 2011 the applicant was indicted for murder. 9.  On 23 September 2011 the applicant approached the prison authorities requesting that he be released in the absence of any decision extending his detention after 18 September 2011. 10.  The same day the applicant was served with a copy of a decision of 22 September 2011, sent by fax. The copy was neither signed nor stamped. The decision, in its reasoning part, specified as follows:\n\u201cOn 16 May 2011 the High State Prosecutor in Podgorica lodged an indictment Kt.br. 29/11 against [the applicant] for the criminal offence of aggravated murder under Article 144 \u00a7 1 (1) and (4) of the Criminal Code.\n[The applicant] was detained pursuant to decision Kri.br. 151/11 issued by the investigating judge of this court on 21 February 2011, which detention was extended by decisions of this court\u2019s panel, Kv. Br. 268/11 of 16 March 2011 and Kv. Br. 472/11 of 17 May 2011.\nThe three-judge panel (krivi\u010dno vije\u0107e) has, on its own motion, within the meaning of Article 179 \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Procedure Code, examined further detention of [the applicant] and found as follows:\n- the detention [of the applicant] should be extended pursuant to Article 175 \u00a7 1 (1) and (4) of the Criminal Procedure Code.\nNotably, given that [the applicant] is indicted for an aggravated murder pursuant to Article 144 \u00a7 1 (a) and (4) of the Criminal Code, and in view of the seriousness of the criminal offence for which he could be sentenced to between 10 and 40 years of imprisonment, and especially in view of the fact that the accused committed the said criminal offence on 17 February 2011 at around 21.30, after which he fled the crime scene, and that the authorised police officers of the Police Directorate \u2013 Podgorica Unit deprived him of liberty on 19 February 2011 at 13.00, these are the reasons, in view of the panel, justifying the extension of detention pursuant to Article 175 \u00a7 1 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code.\nIn the opinion of this panel [the applicant\u2019s] detention should be extended also pursuant to the detention basis as provided in Article 175 \u00a7 1 (4) of the Criminal Procedure Code, given that [the applicant] is charged with aggravated murder under Article 144 \u00a7 1 (1) and (4) of the Criminal Code, and having in mind that the provided sentence is between 10 and 40 years of imprisonment, the first condition for the extension of detention under Article 175 \u00a7 1 (4) of the Criminal Procedure Code is fulfilled, that is that the provided sentence for the criminal offence is 10 years or more. Furthermore, in this particular case there are particularly qualifying circumstances of the criminal offence at issue due to the manner in which it was committed or its consequences, which are reflected in the fact that [the applicant], as it transpires from the case-file, [...] in an insidious manner and for material gain, deprived X of his life [...] by shooting him at close range in the chest and in the back with an automatic gun several times, inflicting on him numerous injuries and causing his immediate death, after which he fled, and according to this panel the aforementioned established facts and circumstances, in their entirety, represent extraordinary circumstances indicating that the [applicant\u2019s] release would threaten public order and peace, which reasons justify the extension of detention.\u201d 11.  On 26 September 2011 the applicant appealed, complaining about the manner in which the decision had been served on him and claiming that his detention had ended on 17 September 2011, that is two months as of the last extension of detention. The same day the applicant was served with the stamped and signed decision of 22 September 2011. 12.  On 29 September the applicant filed another appeal. 13.  On 4 October 2011 the Court of Appeals (Apelacioni sud) in Podgorica dismissed both appeals. It established that the decision delivered by fax was identical to the original which was signed and stamped. It further considered that the applicant had been served with a decision bearing no signature or stamp by an obvious mistake, which did not make the decision unlawful or cause a violation of his human rights guaranteed by the Constitution and the Convention. One of the judges involved in the ruling was S.V. 14.  By 4 November 2011 the applicant filed a constitutional appeal, submitting a number of complaints, one of them being that S.V. should have been excluded from the bench given that she was related to the representative of the injured party. 15.  On 12 January 2012 the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud) in Podgorica quashed the decision of the Court of Appeals and ordered that the case be re-examined. The Constitutional Court quashed the said decision on the ground that S.V. had indeed to be excluded from ruling on the applicant\u2019s appeals as she was the sister of the injured party\u2019s representative. In view of this, the court did not consider it necessary to examine the other complaints. 16.  On 25 January 2012 the Court of Appeals, upon the remittal by the Constitutional Court, dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeals. This decision was not submitted to the case-file. From the subsequent decision of the Constitutional Court (see paragraph 18 below), however, it transpires that the Court of Appeals held, in particular, that: (a) the applicant\u2019s detention had not ended on 17 September 2011, as the previous detention order had not specified how long the detention would last and the statutory time-limit of two months was not mandatory (see paragraphs 33 and 34 below); and (b) the absence of the stamp and signature on the detention order did not make it unlawful. 17.  On 22 March 2012 the applicant filed a constitutional appeal complaining that his detention had not been extended within the statutory time-limit of two months, that the copy of the relevant decision had not been signed and stamped, and that the presumption of innocence had been violated by the High Court\u2019s decision. He relied, inter alia, on Articles 5 and 6 of the Convention. 18.  On 20 April 2012 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s constitutional appeal. It considered in particular that the relevant legislation limited the duration of the detention to three years after the indictment, and that there was no other limitation in that regard. The courts had a duty to examine every two months if reasons for detention persisted and, depending on the circumstances, extend it or revoke it. There was no obligation on the courts to specify how long the detention would last, given their obligation to control the duration of the detention every two months. However, these statutory time-limits were not mandatory and the fact that the decision had been issued after two months and four days could not therefore be decisive for concluding that the applicant\u2019s right to liberty was violated. The court also held that the High Court and the Court of Appeals had not stated that the applicant was guilty but that it transpired from the case-file and the disputed decisions that the applicant had been charged with the relevant criminal offence. The court did not address the complaint about the lack of a stamp and signature on the copy of the decision extending the detention on 22 September 2011. 19.  It is clear from the case-file that the above decision of the Constitutional Court was not dispatched before 18 May 2012. 20.  On 22 March 2013, as submitted by the Government, the High Court issued a first-instance decision on the charges against the applicant. They did not provide a copy thereof. There is also no information in the case-file as to whether the criminal proceedings against the applicant have ended in the meantime and if so what the outcome was.", "references": ["5", "4", "1", "0", "8", "9", "6", "7", "No Label", "2", "3"], "gold": ["2", "3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1973 in Perm. He is currently detained in Kostroma Region. 6.  In 2002 a court found that the applicant, who suffered from schizophrenia, had committed a number of criminal offences, including possession of drugs and aggravated robbery, and ordered his admission to a psychiatric hospital. The applicant was placed in a mental institution in Leningrad Region, where he remained until 30 January 2005, when he escaped. 7.  On 21 September 2005 he was arrested by the Ukrainian border police for an unlawful attempt to cross the border. On the same day the Lychakivsky District Court of Lviv sentenced him to fifteen days administrative detention. According to a certificate issued by the Ukrainian Border Service in Lvov, the applicant was detained from 21 September to 6 October 2005. 8.  In 2005 the police opened a criminal investigation into the arson of vehicles belonging to a private company. 9.  According to the applicant, on 28 November 2005 he was arrested by the police in Belgorod, a town near the Ukrainian border, during a random identity search operation. He was taken to a police station and allegedly beaten up to force him to confess to the criminal offences. The following day the applicant confessed to having set a vehicle on fire on 9 August 2005. 10.  A report indicated that the applicant was arrested on 29 November 2005. On the same day he wrote a statement, confessing to having burnt out a car together with an accomplice. The investigator assigned a legal-aid lawyer and questioned the applicant in his presence. The applicant again confessed to the arson attack. He also mentioned that several months earlier he had escaped from a psychiatric hospital, where he underwent treatment under a court\u2019s order. 11.  On 30 November 2005 the investigator asked the Belgorod District Court of the Belgorod Region to order the applicant\u2019s placement in custody. 12.  On 1 December 2005 the request was granted. The District Court held that the applicant was charged with a serious criminal offence punishable by up to five years\u2019 imprisonment. His escape from a mental hospital and his lack of a permanent place of residence demonstrated his liability to abscond. Furthermore, relying on statements by a witness who had testified to having been approached by the applicant with a view to \u201cdiscussing charges against him\u201d, the court found that the applicant was prone to influencing witnesses and obstructing justice. It concluded that only detention could ensure the interests of justice. 13.  The applicant was admitted to temporary detention facility no. IZ\u201131/1 in Belgorod. He shared a cell with other detainees. There is no evidence suggesting that the detention authorities had made an effort to accommodate the applicant\u2019s mental disorder. 14. The applicant submitted that after his admission to the detention facility the police officers who had allegedly beaten him up after the arrest had again driven him to the police station for questioning, had handcuffed him to a heating unit and had left him in that position until late evening. He had not been given food for the entire day and had only twice been allowed to use a toilet. 15.  On 2 December 2005 the applicant confessed to having blown up a car with an accomplice on 5 October 2005. He later repeated the confession at the crime scene. 16.  In January 2006 the investigating authorities charged the applicant with a robbery committed on 25 November 2005. They also asked the District Court to extend the applicant\u2019s detention pending investigation, claiming that the case was complex and that more time was necessary to complete the investigation. The defence argued that the applicant was in need of psychiatric treatment and that he therefore should be released and admitted to a mental institution. On 26 January 2006 the court extended his detention until 16 February 2006, having considered that that there were no circumstances warranting the applicant\u2019s release. 17.  Another extension, based on the same reasoning, followed on 9 February 2006. The applicant was to be detained until 16 April 2006. 18.  In the meantime, the investigators authorised a psychiatric expert examination of the applicant. In a report issued on 15 February 2006, psychiatrists indicated that the applicant suffered from paranoid continuous progressive schizophrenia and the initial stage of paraphrenia. The doctors also noted that that serious emotional disorder made the applicant particularly dangerous and thus called for his detention under constant psychiatric supervision. 19.  Acting in response to the psychiatrists\u2019 findings, the authorities appointed, on 16 March 2006, a legal guardian to assist the applicant in the proceedings. 20.  On 30 March 2006 the pre-trial investigation was closed and the applicant was committed for trial before the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Belgorod. Referring to his diagnosis, the prosecution sought his admission to a psychiatric hospital. 21.  On 7 April 2006 the applicant lodged an application with the Oktyabrskiy District Court asking for a preliminary hearing to be held in his case. He disputed the charges and declared his innocence. Without submitting documentary evidence the applicant argued that he had been detained in Ukraine between 22 September and 6 October 2005 and thus he had not committed any crime during that period. He also disagreed with the expert report of 15 February 2006, stating that a psychiatric hospital with a lighter security regime would be more appropriate for his condition. Lastly, he asked that his presence at the trial be ensured, as he doubted the efficiency of the legal aid. He noted that he had never met with his legal guardian. 22.  On 13 April 2006 the court held the preliminary hearing. The applicant was present. The court was to decide on the applicant\u2019s continued detention and the need for his personal presence at trial. 23.  The applicant and his legal-aid counsel expressed different opinions on several matters. While the applicant insisted on his transfer from the ordinary detention facility to a psychiatric hospital, his legal guardian and legal-aid lawyer agreed to the extension of his detention. As regards the necessity of his presence, the applicant\u2019s counsel argued that it was desirable, but not necessary. The legal guardian submitted that the issue could be discussed at a later stage. The applicant strongly insisted on his personal participation, as he was afraid that otherwise he could be convicted of crimes which he had not committed. 24.  Having heard the parties, the court ordered the applicant\u2019s detention pending trial and stated that the trial was to be held in his absence, as the personal participation of persons suffering from a mental disorder was not provided for by the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure for cases such as the one to be decided. 25.  The applicant challenged the decision of 13 April 2006, but ten days later his claim was returned without examination on the merits. The court held that his lawyer or legal representative only had a right, under Russian law, to lodge an appeal in such category of cases. 26.  On 25 April 2006 the court held a trial hearing in the presence of a prosecutor, the victims, their lawyers, the applicant\u2019s counsel and legal guardian. The applicant himself was not brought to the court-house. The court read out records of the statements made by the victims at the pre-trial stage and heard testimony from one of the victims. It further read out statements by seven witnesses and studied the applicant\u2019s written confessions made on 29 November and 2 December 2005. It examined other documents and material evidence. Neither the legal-aid counsel nor the legal guardian made any applications or objections. They did not ask any questions during the victim\u2019s cross-examination and did not challenge the admissibility of any item of evidence, including the applicant\u2019s confession. During their closing arguments the lawyer and the guardian acknowledged that the applicant had committed the impugned offences. They stated that owing to his mental disorder he should not bear criminal or civil responsibility and should be admitted to a high-security psychiatric hospital under intensive supervision. 27.  On 3 May 2006 the District Court delivered its judgment. It established that on 9 August 2005 the applicant and his accomplice had set fire to a car; that on 5 October 2005 they had blown up another car and that on 25 November 2005 they had committed a robbery. Relying on the psychiatric report of 15 February 2006 the court ordered the applicant\u2019s treatment in a high-security psychiatric institution under intensive supervision. It held that the preventive measure in the form of the applicant\u2019s detention should remain unchanged until his admission to a psychiatric hospital. 28.  On 12 May 2006 the applicant appealed. He also asked the court to provide him with the trial records from the first-instance court proceedings. The applicant argued that he had been unlawfully convicted of crimes he had not committed, that his confession had been given under pressure and that his defence team, comprising the legal-aid counsel and the legal guardian assigned against his will, had been manifestly ineffective. The applicant submitted that on 5 October 2005 he had still been in detention in Ukraine and therefore he could not have blown up a car in Russia on the same day. 29.  A similar complaint was filed with the Belgorod regional prosecutor\u2019s office. 30.  Neither the applicant\u2019s counsel, nor his guardian lodged an appeal against the judgment of 3 May 2006. It became final on 13 May 2006. 31.  On 15 May 2006 the court dismissed the applicant\u2019s application for access to the trial records as such a request could only be lodged by his defence counsel or legal guardian. Two days later the Oktyabrskiy District Court returned the applicant\u2019s appeal against the judgment of 3 May 2006, informing him that his lawyer or legal guardian were the only ones with the authority to appeal. A similar response arrived from the prosecutor\u2019s office on 26 May 2006. 32.   On 11 June 2006 the judgment of 3 May 2006 was enforced and the applicant was admitted to Oryol Psychiatric Hospital. 33.  In 2012 the Belgorod regional prosecutor\u2019s office applied to the Presidium of the Belgorod Regional Court for supervisory review of the case referring to the breach of the applicant\u2019s right to defence. 34.  On 27 September 2012 the request was granted. Invoking Article 6 \u00a7 3 (c) of the Convention, the court held that the trial court\u2019s decision to hold the hearings in the applicant\u2019s absence had been unjustified. 35.  On 11 October 2012 the Presidium of the Belgorod Regional Court acknowledged a violation of the applicant\u2019s right to defence, quashed the judgment of 3 May 2006 and remitted the case to the Oktyabrskiy Regional Court for a fresh examination on the merits. 36.  The first hearing in the case was to be held on 19 November 2012, but the court was unable to summon the applicant. The summons was returned with a note that the applicant could not be found at the indicated address. On 26 November and 6 December 2012 the District Court repeatedly attempted to inform the applicant of the hearing by registered post and telegram. The summons was not served on the applicant as he had left the place of his residence. 37.  On 6 December 2012 the District Court held that it could not proceed with the examination of the criminal case in view of the lack of any knowledge of his whereabouts. It returned the case to the investigating authorities with an order to find the applicant. 38.  The parties did not inform the Court of the outcome of the proceedings. 39.  On 10 December 2005 the applicant complained to the Belgorod town prosecutor\u2019s office about his arrest and subsequent ill-treatment. The complaint contained no references to bodily injuries or possible witnesses to the beatings. It was not supported by any other evidence. 40.  Having questioned the alleged perpetrators, who denied any instance of ill-treatment, the prosecutor\u2019s office refused to open a criminal case on 20 January 2006. 41.  On 27 February 2006 a higher-ranking prosecutor overturned the decision of 20 January 2006 with an order to verify whether the applicant had had any injuries on his admission to the detention facility. 42.  On 10 March 2006 the prosecutor\u2019s office again refused to open a criminal case, mainly referring to the applicant\u2019s mental disorder. On 14 April 2006 the Oktyabrskiy District Court upheld the refusal. 43.  The applicant was detained in the following institutions: from 2 December 2005 to 11 June 2006 in the temporary detention facility; from 11 June 2006 to 4 December 2007 in Oryol Psychiatric Hospital; from 4 December 2007 to 24 February 2009 in St Petersburg High-Security Psychiatric Hospital; and from 24 February to 31 August 2009 in Kashchenko Psychiatric Hospital in St Petersburg. The applicant was then discharged for outpatient treatment. 44.  Shortly after his admission to the temporary detention facility the applicant was seen by a resident doctor, whom he informed that he had been suffering from schizophrenia since 2001. 45.  In the end of December 2005 he was examined by a psychiatrist. According to the doctor\u2019s report of 21 December 2005, the applicant had maniacal schizophrenia. Having noted that his condition did not call for any drug regimen, the doctor recommended his further examination and treatment in a mental institution. 46.  A report prepared by the detention authorities for the applicant\u2019s examination by a psychiatric commission indicated that there were no peculiarities in his general behaviour. He had good relations with inmates and was respectful of the authorities. He never violated prison regulations. 47.  On 15 February 2006 the applicant was examined by a commission of doctors from Belgorod Regional Clinical Psychoneurological Hospital. The experts confirmed that the applicant suffered from paranoid continuous progressive schizophrenia and paraphrenia in the initial stage. They recommended treatment in a high-security medical institution with intensive supervision, given the danger the applicant posed to those around him. 48.  During his stay in the temporary detention facility he received no antipsychotic drugs. No aggressive outbursts or other incidents were recorded. 49.  On admission to Oryol Psychiatric Hospital in June 2006 the applicant behaved aggressively. He was given antipsychotic medication. In the beginning of February 2007 his mental condition improved. By the end of 2007 his behaviour was satisfactory. 50.  During his stay in St Petersburg High-Security Psychiatric Hospital and in Kashenko Psychiatric Hospital, St Petersburg the applicant received standard psychiatric treatment with antipsychotic medication. His mental condition significantly ameliorated, he was no longer in need of inpatient treatment and he was therefore released. 51.  A chest X-ray examination performed several days after his admission to the temporary detention facility disclosed that the applicant had been infected with focal tuberculosis at the infiltration stage. The applicant was seen by a doctor. A standard treatment regimen with first-line antibacterial drugs was ordered. 52.  Daily entries in his medical records show that between 13 January and 20 April 2006 the applicant received the prescribed anti-tuberculosis drug regimen. A scheduled break in his treatment followed. 53.  In Oryol Psychiatric Hospital his treatment continued. A chest X-ray in February 2007 showed that the tuberculosis had been \u201cclinically cured\u201d, with only insignificant traces of the disease remaining in the left lung. On 10 November 2008 doctors confirmed his complete recovery. 54.  The submitted documents indicate that during his treatment the applicant was subjected to regular X-ray examinations, and blood and sputum tests. 55.  A blood test carried out by Oryol Psychiatric Hospital on 16 June 2006 showed that the applicant had hepatitis C. On 29 June 2006 he was seen by an infectious diseases specialist. Treatment with a regimen of drugs was prescribed. It resulted in the remission of the hepatitis in June 2007. In December 2007 the doctor confirmed the full remission. When asked by the doctor about the possible causes of the infection, the applicant stated that he had shared his safety razor with inmates in the temporary detention facility. 56.  Subsequent medical tests and check-ups did not show any deterioration in the applicant\u2019s health. It appears from the submitted documents that the illness has remained dormant ever since. 57.  On 11 June 2012 the applicant was arrested in Ivanovo for drug trafficking. The Leninskiy District Court of Ivanovo authorised his detention. He was placed in a temporary detention facility. In 2013 he was transferred to a psychiatric hospital in Kostroma Region.", "references": ["8", "4", "1", "0", "5", "6", "7", "9", "No Label", "2", "3"], "gold": ["2", "3"]}
+{"input": "7.  The applicant was born in 1955 in the village of Z., the Omsk Region. Until his arrest he lived in the village of O. in the same region. 8.  The applicant suffers from various illnesses, including rectal cancer. He has twice had colorectal surgery, in 1994 and 1995, and has been certified as having a second-degree disability. 9.  On 1 November 2006 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of committing, with accomplices, large\u2013scale bank fraud by abuse of position. After being questioned by the police the applicant was released. 10.  Two days later, the Kuybishevskiy District Court of Omsk authorised his detention pending investigation. The court concluded that he could abscond or hamper the investigation if released and that he had attempted to influence witnesses after they had been interviewed by the police. The applicant was taken to remand prison no. IZ-55/1 in Omsk. 11.  The defence appealed, stating that the applicant had serious health problems and was therefore not fit enough to exert pressure on witnesses. The defence also referred to the non-violent nature of the offence and the fact that it was not a particularly serious crime. 12.  On 13 November 2006 the Omsk Regional Court rejected the appeal, endorsing the reasoning of the District Court. 13.  On 27 December 2006 the District Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 14 March 2007. Despite arguments by the defence that his health was fragile and that he was unable to receive the necessary care in the detention facility, which did not employ a proctologist, the court, after examining medical evidence submitted by the prosecution, found that his health condition did not call for his release. Having cited the risks of the applicant absconding and obstructing justice, the court also noted that the case was complex and that the investigating authorities were proceeding with it with due promptness. The applicant\u2019s continued detention was therefore warranted. 14.  The defence challenged the detention order, referring mainly to the applicant\u2019s deteriorating condition and a lack of adequate medical care in detention. They stated that the applicant was in need of constant medical assistance, supervision and treatment in a surgical department of a hospital. 15.  On 29 December 2006 the Regional Court, without addressing the defence\u2019s arguments, found the detention order to be lawful and well\u2011founded. 16.  On 9 March 2007 the District Court concluded that the circumstances which had called for the applicant\u2019s arrest and detention had not changed. His further detention was necessary so that the authorities could complete the investigation. The detention was extended until 14 June 2007. 17.  On 14 March 2007 the Regional Court upheld the detention order, stressing that the accused\u2019s health was not the decisive factor in the assessment of the need for detention. The court also noted that Russian law guaranteed medical treatment to every detainee. 18.  On 9 June 2007 the applicant\u2019s detention was extended until 14 September 2007. The court endorsed its previous reasoning, namely the risks of absconding and influencing witnesses and the necessity to complete the investigation. 19.  In appeal statements, the defence disagreed that there was a risk of influencing witnesses, and cited the applicant\u2019s serious health condition and the detention facility\u2019s continued failure to ensure his transfer to a hospital. The lawyers also argued that the investigative authorities had been idle in the previous three months. 20.  On 18 June 2007 the Regional Court upheld the detention order without going into the defence arguments. 21.  On 31 August 2007 the Tsentralniy District Court of Omsk extended the detention until 1 November 2007, given that the bill of indictment had not yet been drafted or served on the applicant. 22.  The detention order was upheld on appeal on 10 September 2007, including a specific reference to the detention authorities\u2019 consent to ensure the applicant\u2019s prompt admission to a civilian hospital if necessary. 23.  Another extension followed on 29 October 2007 when the Regional Court ordered that the applicant had to remain in custody until 1 December 2007 because one of his alleged accomplices had not yet finished studying the case file. The court noted that there were no grounds for concern about the applicant\u2019s access to medical aid since the authorities had made assurances about his transfer to an adequate medical facility if needed. 24.  On 6 February 2008 the Supreme Court of Russia upheld the detention order of 29 October 2007, finding it to be well-reasoned. 25.  In the meantime, the pre-trial investigation was closed and the applicant was committed to stand trial before the Russkaya Polyana District Court of the Omsk Region. 26.  On 30 November 2007 the Russkaya Polyana District Court held a preliminary hearing in the case in which it extended the applicant\u2019s detention in view of the continued presence of the factors which had initially warranted his arrest. 27.  On 13 December 2007 the Regional Court dismissed an appeal against the extension order, noting the lawfulness and reasonableness of the District Court\u2019s findings. 28.  In early 2008 the applicant sought release from detention on medical grounds. He cited colorectal surgery, which he had undergone in December, and his inability to take part in court hearings for three or four months given his need for bed rest. 29.  On 8 February 2008 the District Court found that the circumstances justifying the applicant\u2019s continuous detention had ceased to exist. His health condition had become serious. Against that background the gravity of the charges no longer sufficed to justify continued detention. The court ordered the applicant\u2019s release against a written undertaking not to leave his home town. The criminal proceedings against the applicant were stayed. Three days later the applicant was released from detention. The release order became final. 30.  The parties have not provided any information on subsequent progress in the case. 31.  Following admission to remand prison no. IZ-55/1 on 3 November 2006, the applicant was examined by the prison doctor, who noted that he had twice undergone colorectal surgery and that he was suffering from various illnesses, including coronary disease, angina pectoris, mild hypertension, moderate obesity, chronic gastritis and chronic enterocolitis. 32.  In December 2006 a large part of the applicant\u2019s sigmoid colon prolapsed and fell out of the rectum, resulting in the development of faecal incontinence. On 21 December 2006 a generalist surgeon from Omsk Regional Penitentiary Hospital no. 11 (\u201cthe Penitentiary Hospital\u201d) examined the applicant and prescribed the use of adult absorbent briefs and the washing of his intimate areas twice a day. A consultation by a proctologist was recommended. 33.  The authorities did not provide the applicant with adult absorbent briefs. It is apparent from a certificate signed by the detention authorities that the applicant received a small number of absorbent briefs from his relatives. 34.  According to a written statement by Mr. P., a detainee who claimed to have shared a cell with the applicant between November 2006 and January 2007, the applicant complained of acute pain which intensified during the night. On a number of occasions the applicant lost consciousness owing to unbearable pain. A doctor called by inmates only gave painkillers to him. The applicant could only walk by taking small steps as walking caused a great deal of pain. He had to endure the pain each time he wanted to go to the prison shower room, which was located in the basement area of the prison. The authorities did not give him any hygiene products. Even toilet paper was supplied by his relatives. 35.  On 6 January 2007 the applicant was admitted to the medical unit in the remand prison. Six days later, at the request of the applicant\u2019s lawyer, the head of the colorectal department of the State Regional Civilian Hospital, Dr N., examined the applicant in the remand prison and found his condition to be moderately serious. The applicant was diagnosed with a serious dysfunction of the anal sphincter and the presence of rectal strictures. An inpatient in-depth examination in a civilian hospital, as well as rectal surgery, was prescribed. Dr N. noted that the detention authorities were unable to ensure that the applicant receive the necessary examinations or provide him with treatment owing to a lack of equipment and medical specialists. Dr N. stressed that any delay in treatment could lead to complications and even death. 36.  At the end of January 2007 the applicant was seen by a prison surgeon. Considering the applicant\u2019s condition to be satisfactory, the doctor concluded that there was no urgent need to perform surgery or admit the applicant to hospital. The applicant was, however, relieved from morning physical exercises, marching drills and lifting weights. 37.  On 2 February 2007, again at the initiative of the applicant\u2019s lawyer, a senior doctor from the State Regional Civilian Hospital, Dr Z., visited him and recorded a further deterioration of his health in the form of an inflammation of the prolapsed part of his bowels. The doctor interpreted the inflammation as a serious complication which could result in the patient\u2019s death if urgent medical examinations and treatment did not take place. He stated that the penitentiary institutions were unable to perform a fibre endoscopic examination of the colon and a multislice computed tomography, the tests required for the correct diagnosis and treatment of the applicant\u2019s condition. The doctor endorsed the recommendations made on 12 January 2007 and added that bed rest was required. 38.  On 22 March 2007 the applicant was admitted to the Penitentiary Hospital where, by means of an endoscopy, he was diagnosed with dysfunction of the sphincter, and prolapse and inflammation of the sigmoid colon. Treatment with drugs was prescribed. The treatment was meant to reduce the applicant\u2019s pain and help cure his secondary illness. 39.  On 2 April 2007 Dr Z. visited the applicant and confirmed the diagnosis. The doctor established that the inflammation had progressed, the patient\u2019s health had deteriorated and that the overall state of his health had become serious. He was in need of urgent colorectal surgery. 40.  On 10 May 2007 the applicant was sent back to the medical unit in the remand prison, where he stayed for eleven days. Treatment with painkillers in that period was unsuccessful and the applicant was re\u2011admitted to hospital, apparently with a complication of his heart conditions. 41.  At the end of May 2007 Dr N. examined the applicant and noted further progression of the inflammatory process and the aggravation of other illnesses. He insisted on an in-depth medical examination and surgery, noting that surgery could only be performed after bringing the applicant\u2019s heart-related problems under control. 42.  The applicant was taken back to the prison medical unit at the beginning of June 2007. However, re-admission to the Penitentiary Hospital followed after just seven days. The applicant was again sent back and forth between the two institutions in August 2007. In that period he received painkillers and antispasmodic drugs. His condition deteriorated further. The attending doctors recorded enlargement of the prolapsed segment of the bowel and that the surrounding skin was macerated and oedematous. 43.  On 20 and 27 June 2007 the applicant\u2019s lawyer arranged for an ultrasound examination by an independent doctor, who recorded pathologic changes in the liver and suggested that they could, in fact, be a sign of metastasis caused by the developing colorectal cancer. A liver puncture test was required for the correct diagnosis. 44.  On 9 August 2007 the applicant was released from the Penitentiary Hospital and sent to the remand prison, where he stayed for a month. 45.  On 16 August 2007 the applicant was examined by a surgeon from the Penitentiary Hospital who confirmed the necessity for colorectal surgery on the patient \u201cin due course in the very near future\u201d. 46.  Eight days later Dr N. stated that owing to the deterioration of the applicant\u2019s condition he was in need of urgent colorectal surgery. Any postponement, in his view, could lead to irreparable damage, including the applicant\u2019s death. 47.  According to a written statement by Mr S., who shared a cell with the applicant at the beginning of autumn 2007, at the time in question the applicant looked very sick. He had a sallow complexion, was thin and exhausted. The applicant could only take small steps when walking and supported the lower part of his abdomen. A pungent smell surrounded him. Mr S. helped the applicant to bathe. The applicant\u2019s perineum was inflamed. A bleeding segment of bowel the size of a fist prolapsed through his rectum. The applicant was not provided with incontinence wear and had to wash himself in a sink with cold water. 48.  After another stay in the Penitentiary Hospital, from 6 September to 3 October 2007, the applicant was taken back to the prison medical unit. In the notes accompanying his discharge the doctors noted that the applicant was suffering from stage 2 colorectal cancer. They recommended colorectal surgery after the applicant\u2019s release from detention. 49.  On the following day the applicant was taken back to the Regional Hospital as an urgent case as his condition had become worse. 50.  In the meantime, on 1 October 2007 he had lodged an application with the Court and had also asked for the application of an interim measure under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. He wanted an indication to the Russian Government that he should be allowed to have colorectal surgery, an X-ray computer tomography and a paracentesis of a space-occupying lesion of the liver. 51.  On 3 October 2007 the applicant had a new ultrasound examination. It was unable to give a definite answer as to whether the changes in the applicant\u2019s liver were indeed caused by metastasis. 52.  According to a medical certificate issued in the Penitentiary Hospital on 29 October 2007, the applicant\u2019s health condition was considered to be satisfactorily and stable with no signs of negative trends. The detention authorities repeatedly insisted that there was no need for urgent surgery. 53.  On 23 November 2007, following receipt from the Government of information on the applicant\u2019s state of health, the Court decided to apply Rule 39 and to draw the Russian Government\u2019s attention to the urgent necessity of the applicant having the following medical procedures: colorectal surgery in a specialist hospital, an X-ray computed tomography, as well as a surgical puncture of the space-occupying lesion of the liver. 54.  Between 21 and 26 November diagnostic tests indicated by the Court were performed. They revealed no signs of liver metastasis or space\u2011occupying lesions. 55.  On 26 November 2007 Dr N. examined the applicant. He observed a tumor-like stained mass measuring 10 cm in diameter with an opening measuring 1.3 cm, surrounded by coarse cicatrix. The doctor again urged the authorities to perform colorectal surgery. 56.  The applicant\u2019s fellow inmate, Mr R., in a statement submitted to the Court, wrote that in November and December 2007 the applicant\u2019s state of health was serious. The applicant was stained with faeces, being unable to control his defecation function. He had to defecate in a standing position, supporting the prolapsed bowel, otherwise his rectum began bleeding. The faeces were liquid and flowed down his legs. He had to wash himself with cold water as no hot water was available in the cell. 57.  On 24 December 2007 the applicant was admitted to Omsk Regional Hospital where a colostomy was performed. After a month-long stay, the applicant was discharged from the hospital back to the prison medical unit. Seventeen days later he was released from detention. 58.  On 14 October 2008 the Court decided to lift the interim measure indicated under Rule 39. 59.  According to the applicant, he underwent inpatient and outpatient treatment in various hospitals after his release. 60.  The parties provided conflicting descriptions of the conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention in the remand prison. 61.  On the applicant\u2019s admission to the remand prison, on 3 November 2006, the administration found him unfit for detention in a cell for common occupation and ordered his confinement in a cell for single occupation. An order to that effect was issued and the applicant signed it. 62.  Relying on certificates issued by the administration of the remand prison in December 2011 the Government claimed that the facility had not been overcrowded. The applicant had been detained in ten different cells which fully complied with regulatory standards. Lavatory pans in the cells had been separated from the living area by a partition. The Government\u2019s submissions may be summarised as follows:\n \nPeriod of detention\nCell\nno.\nCell surface area (sq.m.)\nDesign capacity (pers.)\nHeight of the partition\n(m.)\n3 November 2006 to 4 January 2007\n143\n21\n6 1.1\n8 to 16 June 2007\n232\n40\n10\nceiling height\n10 August 2007\n39\n-\n-\n-\n10 August to 6 September 2007\n249 63.  According to the Government, there was hot and cold water in the cells. The facility had had separate shower rooms. The applicant had been given a bucket for his daily washing needs. 64.  The applicant disputed the idea that he had been put in a cell for single occupation and stated that no such order had ever been issued by the detention authorities. He stressed that he had always shared a cell with other detainees in the remand prison. To support that statement, the applicant submitted a certificate issued by a remand prison official on an unspecified date, apparently between 2006 and 2007. 65.  In 2012 the applicant\u2019s lawyer questioned three inmates, Mr P., Mr. S. and Mr R., who stated that they had been detained with the applicant in overcrowded cells. One cell had measured 41 square metres and housed between eighteen and twenty detainees, while two of the cells had measured between 18 and 20 square metres and had accommodated at least eight detainees. Each inmate, including the applicant, had thus been afforded between 2.05 and 2.5 square metres of living space. 66.  The applicant submitted that during his detention in the remand prison he had only been able to take a shower once a week. However, acute pain while walking had sometimes prevented him from using the shower even on those occasions. After each instance of uncontrolled defecation he had had to wash himself while standing over the lavatory pan, exposed to the view of his cellmates. The partitions were low and therefore could not provide any privacy. No special arrangements had been made for him by the authorities. 67.  In their statements, Mr P., Mr. S. and Mr R. also confirmed the applicant\u2019s submissions about the lack of any possibility for him to take regular showers and about the conditions in which he had had to perform the daily washes caused by his illness. The inmates described the insults that the applicant had had to endure as a result of the need to wash himself in front of his cellmates. The three former detainees stressed that the applicant had had to make amends for the inconvenience he had caused to his fellow detainees by, for instance, giving them cigarettes, tea, or other valued products supplied by his relatives.", "references": ["7", "5", "8", "4", "3", "0", "6", "9", "No Label", "1", "2"], "gold": ["1", "2"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1981 and is currently detained in Giurgiu Prison. 6.  On 30 December 2010 the applicant was detained pending trial, on suspicion of drug-trafficking offences. Subsequently, he was sentenced to thirteen years\u2019 imprisonment. 7.  The applicant was detained in Rahova Prison from: 17 July 2012 to 23 July 2013; 25 July to 17 October 2013; 31 October 2013 to 12 May 2014; and 14 May to 28 July 2014. 8.  The applicant was in Rahova Prison Hospital for medical tests and treatment from: 23 to 25 July 2013; 17 to 31 October 2013; and 12 to 14 May 2014. 9.  On 28 July 2014 the applicant was transferred to Giurgiu Prison, where he remains to date. 10.  In his letters to the Court the applicant stated that he had been detained in overcrowded cells in Rahova Prison. He had had to share a cell measuring twenty-four square metres with nine other detainees. The furniture and the ten beds in the cell had taken up part of the available living space. Consequently, each detainee had been limited to only half a square metre of living space. 11.  The applicant stated that, even though he was a non-smoker and had been assigned to a non-smoking cell, the prison authorities had also detained inmates who smoked all the time in that cell. He had complained to the prison authorities about it, but they had ignored his complaints. According to him, this problem had lasted until 30 April 2013. 12. The applicant also stated that some of the detainees who had occasionally shared the cell with him had had contagious diseases, such as hepatitis and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), or had been drug addicts. Also, some of them had suffered from psychological problems and the prison authorities had been aware of their medical conditions. These detainees had either represented a hazard for the other inmates in the cell, or had not allowed them to rest properly. 13.  The applicant further stated that warm water in the shower had only been available two days a week for ninety minutes for all ten detainees in the cell. Also, during the summer, running water had only been available six hours a day and not at all during the night, even if the detainees had needed to use the toilet. 14. The National Prisons Agency informed the Government that the applicant had been detained in cells 2.31, 3.9, 3.10, 3.34, 3.44, 3.48, 5.36 and 6.9 during his incarceration in Rahova Prison. The cells measured between 18.8 and 24.6 square metres, excluding the bathroom and toilet areas. He had shared these cells with nine other detainees at most. The applicant had had his own bed and at no time during his detention had the number of detainees exceeded the number of beds available in the cells. 15.  Each cell had a window measuring 1.44 square metres. The food storage area within the cells also had a window measuring 0.72 square metres. All the aforementioned windows were fitted with bars and metal nets, but allowed for sufficient natural light and ventilation in order to comply with the relevant international standards. 16.  The cells had bathrooms with two sinks and a shower. The toilets had natural ventilation, namely windows measuring 0.72 square metres, and were separated from the rest of the bathroom by a door. 17.  Detainees had permanent access to sanitary facilities. Running water was always available, while warm water was available twice a week for one and a half hours, between 12 p.m. and 1.30 p.m. and between 5 p.m. and 6.30 p.m. Also, detainees were provided with protection against sexually transmitted diseases. 18.  The cells and the sanitary facilities also had artificial light and were fitted with radiators. Heating was available intermittently, depending on the outdoor temperature. During the cold season, the temperature in the cells would be 19\u02daC. 19.  Cells had furniture, in particular, bunk beds, small tables, small benches and television stands. 20.  The prison authorities issued inmates with cleaning materials, and detainees cleaned the cells themselves. Upon their incarceration, and thereafter on a monthly basis, inmates were issued with personal hygiene products and disinfectants. They were also allowed to buy these products from the prison shop if necessary. Detainees were allowed to wash their underwear and bedlinen in the prison laundry room weekly. 21.  In accordance with domestic regulations, each year the applicant had received two toothbrushes, twelve tubes of toothpaste, twelve rolls of toilet paper, twelve bars of soap and twelve disposable razors. 22.  Different products and methods were used to disinfect cells and remove pests, and such work was carried out by either the prison or specialist firms. Disinfection was carried out daily, according to the characteristics of each area of the prison. The operations carried out to disinfect and remove pests from the applicant\u2019s cell were preventive, and neither he nor the other inmates sharing his cell had requested them. However, no rats or mice had ever been found in the detention cells in Rahova Prison. 23.  Detainees\u2019 diets were determined according to several criteria, including, inter alia, their health and religion. Ingredients had to meet the quality criteria set out by law and had to have quality certificates provided by suppliers. Food was cooked hygienically in the prison kitchen, and stainless steel cooking utensils and equipment were used. Food quality and quantity was also checked by a detainee representative before it was distributed. 24.  The National Prisons Agency finally informed the Government that, during his detention, the applicant had not raised complaints in respect of the conditions of detention. 25.  In his letters to the Court the applicant stated that, as a Muslim, the prison authorities had not offered him an appropriate diet, namely food which did not contain pork. Moreover, when his visitors had brought him food from home, the prison authorities had only allowed him to receive canned food, fruits and vegetables. Although he had complained to the prison authorities about the inappropriate diet, his complaints had been ignored. 26.  The National Prisons Agency informed the Government that, during his detention in Rahova Prison, the applicant had been provided with a diet appropriate for Muslims, and any pork had been replaced with beef. 27.  In Rahova Prison, a detainee of a particular faith could ask the prison administration to allow him to buy the food he wanted from the prison shop. 28.  During his detention the applicant had been visited on several occasions, but had only received one parcel. 29.  The applicant had been allowed to practise his religion in his cell, and had taken part in various religious activities organised by the prison\u2019s orthodox chaplain. He had never asked to receive religious objects, even though he had a lawful right to ask for them.", "references": ["0", "8", "6", "4", "3", "7", "2", "9", "5", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1970. 5.  On 13 February 2009 the applicant was arrested and taken into custody on suspicion of using drugs and providing drugs to third persons. 6.  On 16 February 2009 the applicant\u2019s statement was taken by the Istanbul Assize Court and she was released on the same day. On 19 February 2009 the public prosecutor lodged an objection to this decision and on 23 February 2009 the Istanbul Assize Court issued an arrest warrant against the applicant. 7.  On 24 February 2009 the applicant was placed in detention on remand. 8.  On 4 April 2009 the public prosecutor filed a bill of indictment, charging the applicant with using drugs and providing drugs to third persons under Articles 188 \u00a7 3, 188 \u00a7 4 and 191 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code. 9.  On 15 May 2009 and 24 June 2009 respectively the Istanbul Assize Court on the basis of the case file dismissed release requests lodged by the applicant. On 9 June 2009 and 21 July 2009 respectively the Istanbul Assize Court further dismissed the objections lodged by the applicant against the above-mentioned decisions, without holding oral hearings. 10.  On 1 October 2009 the Istanbul Assize Court held its first hearing and the applicant appeared before the court. On the same day the trial court released the applicant.", "references": ["7", "5", "8", "1", "9", "4", "6", "3", "0", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in G\u00f3is. 6.  At the relevant time, the applicant was a chief corporal in the National Republican Guard (Guarda Nacional Republicana), working at the G\u00f3is territorial post. 7.  On 7 November 2009 the applicant sent an email to the General Inspectorate of Internal Administration (Inspec\u00e7\u00e3o-Geral da Administra\u00e7\u00e3o Interna) on the subject \u201cSuspected misuse of money\u201d, in which he made reference to an alleged misuse of money by Commander M.C. of the Arganil territorial post in accordance with what he had heard in a conversation with colleagues at the Arganil territorial post. He asked the General Inspectorate to investigate the alleged facts, stating as follows:\n\u201cIn the month of December 2008 the Coimbra [National Republican Guard] Territorial Group distributed money to the territorial posts of its area of command ... for the Christmas dinner ...\nThe only members of the military [in Arganil] who attended the dinner were the Commander of the post and Corporal M.; the total amount of money that had been given to the military from the [territorial] post [to pay for the dinner] was paid to the restaurant\u2019s manager in exchange for a receipt ... it seems that the Commander has since then been going with his family to the mentioned restaurant, where the cost of his meals is deducted from the money that was not spent [on the above dinner] ... Note: I have just become aware of this matter through rumours within the military of the mentioned post, who claim that they have not reported the situation for fear of reprisals, and because of that [fear of reprisals] I ask you for secrecy during the investigation because I am also a member of the military ...\u201d 8.  On an unknown date the General Inspectorate of Internal Administration forwarded the email to the General Command of the National Republican Guard (Comando Geral da Guarda Nacional Republicana) and to the Lous\u00e3 public prosecutor\u2019s office (Minist\u00e9rio P\u00fablico). 9.  On an unknown date the Lous\u00e3 public prosecutor\u2019s office opened an investigation into the applicant\u2019s allegations. On 28 February 2010 the Lous\u00e3 public prosecutor\u2019s office discontinued the proceedings on the grounds that, following investigations by the criminal investigation police (Polic\u00eda Judici\u00e1ria), it had found no evidence of the criminal offence denounced by the applicant. 10.  The General Inspectorate of Internal Administration also conducted an inquiry into the applicant\u2019s allegations. On 21 June 2010 the inquiry was discontinued. 11.  The General Command of the National Republican Guard also started an internal inquiry into the allegations on 4 December 2009. On 23 December 2009 Commander M.C. was heard in that respect. He then became aware of the email of 7 November 2009 and its content. On 9 February 2010 the inquiry was converted into disciplinary proceedings against Commander M.C. at the request of the official in charge of the inquiry on the grounds that the management of the cafeteria of the Arganil territorial post showed signs of lack of transparency which required further investigation. 12.  On 30 July 2010 the disciplinary proceedings against Commander M.C. were discontinued on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence to take disciplinary action. The decision to discontinue the disciplinary proceedings also took into account the decision of the Lous\u00e3 public prosecutor\u2019s office to discontinue the criminal proceedings against Commander M.C. 13.  On 22 April 2010 Commander M.C. lodged a criminal complaint before the Lous\u00e3 public prosecutor\u2019s office, accusing the applicant of defamation. He alleged that the applicant\u2019s email had disseminated injurious statements about him. 14.  On 7 July 2011 the public prosecutor brought charges (acusa\u00e7\u00e3o) against the applicant for aggravated defamation on the grounds that the statements made in his email called into question Commander M.C.\u2019s honesty, honour and professional reputation, which the applicant had intentionally attacked. 15.  On 21 September 2011 Commander M.C. lodged a claim for damages against the applicant in the amount of 5,000 euros (EUR). 16.  In a judgment of 17 January 2012 the Lous\u00e3 Criminal Court convicted the applicant of aggravated defamation and sentenced him to eighty day-fines, totalling EUR 720 euros. The applicant was also ordered to pay EUR 1,000 in damages to Commander M.C. The Court described its findings of fact and the manner in which it had assessed the evidence, and held as follows:\n\u201c... since the existence of such a rumor has not been proved in any way, the court is fully convinced that the defendant\u2019s intention was to undermine the honour of the offended party, once he knew that this was just a rumour and that therefore he was making an allegation that was not true.\n...\nThe allegation made in the defendant\u2019s complaint, by its content, put into question the offended party\u2019s honesty, honour and professional reputation as commander of a territorial post of the National Republican Guard \u2013 which was well known to the defendant.\nThe defendant has therefore acted in a free, voluntary and conscious way, with the achieved aim of attacking the offended party\u2019s honour and personal and professional reputation.\n...\nThe disclosure of irregular situations has to be seen as a duty (as the performance of an obligation) when it falls within the competence and responsibilities of the whistle-blower and when it does not go beyond the facts which were effectively observed. [Whistle-blowing] cannot be used as a basis to cast suspicion which cannot be supported by any factual element.\nIn the instant case, the defendant accuses the offended party of facts which are objectively dishonorable without having any evidence to substantiate them. Indeed, by submitting that the offended party and his family were using the existing credit to have dinner at the mentioned restaurant, the defendant knew that he was accusing the offended party of a dishonorable deed, all the more because he knew that the offended party was in charge of the National Republican Guard\u2019s Arganil territorial post. He further knew that the allegation was inconsistent with the truth and that he could easily have clarified its authenticity with the restaurant owner.\nThrough such conduct, the defendant acted of his own free will and in the knowledge that ... [his actions] were not allowed.\u201d 17.  On an unknown date the applicant appealed against the judgment to the Coimbra Court of Appeal. In particular, he contested the established facts as, in his opinion, he had not acted with the intention of attacking Commander M.C.\u2019s honour and reputation. 18.  On 19 September 2012 the Coimbra Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance court\u2019s decision. It considered that there were no reasons to change the facts established by the first-instance court and, as such, no reasons to reach a different conclusion with regard to the applicant\u2019s guilt and conviction. 19.  On 3 August 2011 the General Command of the National Republican Guard instituted disciplinary proceedings against the applicant. 20.  On 20 February 2013 the official in charge of the inquiry within the disciplinary proceedings against the applicant submitted a final report in which he concluded that the applicant had breached his duties. The relevant passage of the report reads as follows:\n\u201c... the defendant breached the duty of loyalty... as being on duty and being part of the G\u00f3is Territorial Post in the quality of Deputy Commander of the Post, he did not inform his hierarchical superiors, in clear disregard of the functional hierarchy principles, of the acts allegedly committed ...\u201d 21.  In the report it was also taken into account that the applicant\u2019s allegations had been investigated by different authorities, all of which had discontinued their investigations. Additionally, it had regard to the fact that the applicant had been convicted by the domestic courts in the criminal proceedings against him. The report further analysed the existence of a fine which Commander M.C. had imposed on the applicant before the latter had sent the impugned email. However, the official responsible for the report considered that fact to be innocuous and irrelevant. 22.  On 27 March 2013, at the request of the official responsible for the disciplinary proceedings, the General Command imposed on the applicant a disciplinary sanction consisting of suspension from duty for six days, its enforcement being suspended for a period of twelve months. 23.  According to the material submitted in the case file, it seems that the applicant did not lodge an appeal against the disciplinary sanction with the Minister of Home Affairs.", "references": ["9", "8", "3", "0", "2", "6", "1", "4", "5", "7", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicants were born in 1947, 1976, 1973, 1983 and 1987 respectively. At the time of the application they were being held in detention in Buca F\u2011Type prison in \u0130zmir. 5. On 23 July 2007 the \u0130zmir Assize Court decided to restrict access to the investigation file, under Article 153 \u00a7 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (the \u201cCCP\u201d), Law no. 5271. 6.  On 24 July 2007 the applicants were arrested and taken into custody on suspicion of being members of a criminal organisation. 7.  On 27 July 2007 the applicants were questioned by the investigating judge, in the presence of their lawyer. According to their statements to the judge, the applicants denied being involved with the criminal organisation. They did not deny that they had had telephone conversations that had been intercepted, or that they had accepted the transfer of parcels and had possessed firearms, all of which were deemed to be evidence of making threats, of fraud and of smuggling, the offences that they were suspected of having committed. 8.  On 1 August 2007 the applicants\u2019 representative objected to the order for the pre\u2011trial detention in respect of the first four applicants. The representative also applied for their release pending trial on 3 February 2008, 11 February 2008 and 13 February 2008 respectively. Those applications were dismissed by the \u0130zmir Assize Court on 4 February 2008, 11 February 2008 and 14 February 2008 respectively based the nature of the criminal charges and the state of the evidence. No hearing was held. 9.  On 13 March 2008 the public prosecutor at the \u0130zmir Assize Court filed an indictment, charging the first applicant with establishing a criminal organisation and the other applicants with being members of a criminal organisation. The applicants were further charged with committing fraud, making threats, and carrying out raids and smuggling, under Article 220 and other related articles of the Criminal Code. 10.  On 17 March 2008 the trial court held an interlocutory session and, in the absence of the applicants, decided to extend their pre-trial detention. The first hearing was scheduled for 24 June 2008. 11.  On 2 May 2008 the applicants\u2019 representative objected to that decision in respect of the first four applicants and applied for them to be released. On 7 May 2008 the \u0130zmir Assize Court dismissed the objection. The applicants\u2019 representative appealed. On 9 May 2008 the appeal court dismissed the appeal without holding an oral hearing. 12.  On 24 June 2008 \u0130zmir Assize Court held the first hearing as planned and the applicants appeared before the court. The trial court decided to release the applicants from pre-trial detention on the same day.", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "1", "6", "9", "5", "7", "8", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1964 in Egypt and currently lives in Hamrun, Malta. 7.   The applicant had a Maltese tourist visa, which had been issued in 1991 and had been valid for three months. Having overstayed this visa, he remained in Malta illegally. 8.  In 1993, when the applicant was twenty-nine years of age and still living in Malta illegally, he met MP, a Maltese citizen, who at the time was seventeen years of age. Three months later, on 13 October 1993, they married in a civil ceremony. On 26 February 1994 they also married in accordance with the Catholic rite. 9.  On 18 November 1993 the applicant enquired about his \u201cexempt person status\u201d (see paragraph 34 below) and on 23 November 1993 started the process to obtain Maltese citizenship on the basis of his marriage to a Maltese national. 10.  The applicant\u2019s exempt person status was confirmed on 2 March 1994. On 19 April 1994, following the processing of his application and consequent to the marriage, he was registered as a Maltese citizen. On 12 September 1994, he therefore lodged an application to renounce his Egyptian nationality (a copy of the relevant application form has not been submitted to the Court). It transpires from a letter issued by the Consul of the Embassy of the Arab Republic of Egypt in Malta that on 29 September 1994 the applicant\u2019s request was approved and his Egyptian passport withdrawn. At the relevant time, dual nationality was not possible under either Egyptian or Maltese law. 11.  According to the Government, in 1994 the applicant and MP had various marital problems, which led the applicant to leave the matrimonial home on two occasions. The applicant had behaved aggressively, and specifically on 5 June 1994 he had physically assaulted his pregnant wife, causing her a permanent disability. MP left the matrimonial home thereafter. 12.  The applicant was charged, remanded in custody, and eventually tried and found guilty in respect of the act of assault. He was given a suspended sentence. 13.  In the meantime, on 13 December 1994 a child, LR, was born of the marriage. LR is a Maltese citizen. The various family disputes continued between the couple. 14.  On 8 February 1995 MP instituted court proceedings to annul the marriage. Following adversarial proceedings where both parties were represented by a lawyer, the applicant\u2019s marriage was annulled by a judgment of 19 January 1998. The court delivering the judgment was satisfied (to the degree necessary in civil proceedings, namely on a balance of probabilities) that the applicant\u2019s only reason for marrying had been to remain in Malta and acquire citizenship; thus he was positively excluding marriage itself, and there had been a simulation of marriage. Since no appeal was lodged against the judgment, it became final. 15.  The applicant did not inform the authorities of the judgment concerning the annulment of his marriage and he remained resident in Malta and retained his Maltese citizenship. 16.  On 30 June 2003 the applicant married VA, a Russian citizen, four months after their first encounter. The applicant enquired about the exempt person status of his Russian wife and was asked to produce a copy of the judgment of annulment. On 4 July 2003 the applicant produced a copy of the judgment and it was only at that time that the authorities became aware of the reason for the annulment of his first marriage. 17.  Following an application to that effect, on 27 September 2004, VA was granted exempt person status and thus had full freedom of movement (see \u201cRelevant domestic law\u201d below). According to the Government, although this was contested by the applicant, attention was drawn to the fact that the benefit of such status would cease if the applicant lost his citizenship. Two sons were born of this marriage, VR and VL, in 2004 and 2005 respectively. They are both Maltese citizens. 18.  On 8 May 2006 the applicant was informed that an order was to be made to deprive him of his Maltese citizenship (under Article 14(1) of the Citizenship Act (\u201cthe Act\u201d) \u2013 see \u201cRelevant domestic law\u201d below), which, according to the judgment of 19 January 1998, appeared to have been obtained by fraud. He was informed of his right to an inquiry. 19.  The applicant challenged that decision, claiming that it was not true that he had obtained his marriage by fraud and stressing that he had three Maltese children. 20.  In consequence, proceedings were instituted to investigate the applicant\u2019s situation and if necessary divest him of his Maltese citizenship. A committee was set up for this purpose in accordance with Article 14(4) of the Act. A number of hearings were held before the committee where the applicant was assisted by a lawyer. He was allowed to make oral and written submissions and submit evidence, including witness testimony. It appears from the documents available that the applicant contested the basis of the annulment decision and claimed that he had not been aware that he could have appealed against it. He also contested the findings of a court of criminal jurisdiction that had found him guilty of injuring his wife and causing her a permanent disability. 21.  The applicant\u2019s ex-wife, a citizenship department official and a priest also gave testimony. 22.  The committee\u2019s final recommendation to the Minister of Justice and Internal Affairs was not made available to the applicant. Requests by the applicant\u2019s lawyer for a copy of the acts of those proceedings remained unsatisfied. 23.  On 31 July 2007 the Minister ordered that the applicant be deprived of his citizenship with immediate effect, in accordance with Article 14(1) of the Act. 24.  By a letter dated 2 August 2007 from the Director of the Department of Citizenship and Expatriate Affairs, the applicant was informed that the Minister of Justice and Internal Affairs had concluded that the applicant had obtained citizenship by fraudulent means and that therefore on 31 July 2007, in accordance with Article 14(1) of the Act, the Minister had ordered that he be immediately divested of his citizenship. He was required to return his certificate of registration as a Maltese citizen and his passport. 25.  The applicant instituted constitutional redress proceedings, complaining under Articles 6, 8 and 14 of the Convention. He claimed that he had not had a fair trial and appropriate access to court for the determination on his right to citizenship. Moreover, the revocation of his citizenship had not been in accordance with the law. The prerequisites for such action had not existed as his first marriage had not been one of convenience. 26.  By a judgment of 12 July 2011 the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional jurisdiction rejected the applicant\u2019s complaint under Article 6, finding that the committee set up for that purpose had not been a tribunal, but solely an investigative body capable of giving recommendations but not making final decisions. The court, however, found that the applicant\u2019s Article 8 rights would be breached if, as a result of his being divested of his citizenship, he became an alien. His de jure family (in respect of the second marriage) would suffer irremediable upset if, as a father (of the two Maltese children of that marriage), he were required to move to another country. Thus, the revocation of citizenship in the present case was in breach of Article 8. Consequently, the court annulled the order of 31 July 2007 and considered that it was not necessary to rule on any further complaints. 27.  On appeal, by a judgment of 25 May 2012 the Constitutional Court overturned the first-instance judgment in part. It rejected the Article 6 complaint on the basis that the provision was not applicable in the absence of a civil right. In that connection, it rejected the applicant\u2019s contention that the revocation of citizenship affected his right to a family life and therefore was civil in nature, as citizenship was a matter of public law and fell under the prerogatives of the State. It also reversed the part of the judgment in respect of Article 8, commenting that it had not been established that the applicant had a family life in Malta, and, even if this were so, the revocation of his citizenship would not necessarily result in his having to leave Malta. Indeed, it had not transpired that the applicant would be denied Maltese residence or that he had applied for it and had been refused, nor had a removal order been issued. 28.  Following the lodging of the application with the Court, on 16 November 2012 the applicant\u2019s lawyer wrote to the relevant authorities informing them that the case was pending before the Court and that therefore no action should be taken on the basis of the order of 31 July 2007. No feedback, apart from an acknowledgment of receipt, was received concerning that letter. However, although the order to deprive the applicant of his citizenship with immediate effect remains in force, no action has been taken to date in pursuit of the order and no removal order has been issued. 29.  Although the applicant considers that the implementation of the order is only a matter of time, he is currently still residing and carrying out his business in Malta. He has a trading licence, which is periodically renewed. He continued using a Maltese passport to travel until 2014, when it expired, as he had failed to return it to the authorities despite their request. 30.  The applicant does not appear to have any contact with his first son, but claims to be in a family environment with his second wife and their children. Following the revocation of his citizenship, the applicant\u2019s second wife lost her exempt person status and the attached freedom-of-movement rights.", "references": ["6", "0", "8", "7", "2", "3", "4", "5", "1", "9", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1966 and lives in Ia\u0219i. 6.  On an unspecified date in 2006 the applicant brought proceedings against a third party, seeking the annulment of two sale/purchase agreements concerning an apartment. 7.  By a judgment of 25 January 2007 the Ia\u015fi District Court, acting as a court of first instance, allowed the applicant\u2019s action on the merits and declared the two contracts null and void. The third party appealed against the judgment. 8.  By a decision of 21 November 2007 the Ia\u015fi County Court, sitting as a bench of two judges, allowed the third party\u2019s appeal on the merits, quashed the judgment of 25 January 2007 and dismissed the applicant\u2019s action. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law (recurs) against that decision. 9.  By a final decision of 2 June 2008 the Ia\u015fi Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law as inadmissible, without commenting on the merits of the case. It held that, under Article 2811 of the Romanian Code of Civil Procedure, judgments delivered by first-instance courts in respect of disputes where the subject matter of the litigation had been valued at less than one billion Romanian lei (RON) (approximately EUR 27,000) were not subject to an ordinary appeal. The applicant had estimated the value of the disputed property to be RON 9,000. Therefore, the judgment delivered by the District Court could only be challenged by way of an appeal on points of law. Moreover, the decision of the Ia\u015fi County Court was final, even if the County Court had erred and examined the applicant\u2019s case in a composition of two rather than three judges.", "references": ["8", "4", "6", "9", "2", "1", "7", "0", "5", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1980 and 1971 respectively and live in Zubutli-Miatli, Kizilyurt district, Dagestan, Russia. They are the wife and the sister of Mr Kamil Mutayev who was born in 1976. 6.  Between 2010 and 2012 the applicants\u2019 relative Mr Kamil Mutayev had been detained on at least three occasions by representatives of law\u2011enforcement agencies on suspicion of illegal activities and subsequently released. In particular, in 2010 he had been detained pending trial for about six months on suspicion of illegal possession of firearms and assault of a representative of the State and had then been subsequently sentenced to two years\u2019 imprisonment. The sentence was suspended.\n(b)  The abduction of the applicants\u2019 relative 7.  At about 1 p.m. on 2 May 2012 Mr Kamil Mutayev and his twelve\u2011year old son Muradis were driving in their VAZ-21099 car in Shamil Street in the centre of the town of Kizilyurt, Dagestan, when they were blocked by two silver-coloured VAZ Priora cars with heavily tinted windows, one of which had an official registration number containing the digits \u201c78\u201d. Eight masked men in black uniforms and armed with pistols and machine guns got out of the Priora cars, knocked Mr Kamil Mutayev off his feet and forced him into one of their vehicles. They threatened his son with firearms and ordered him to stay in the car. The abduction took place approximately two hundred metres from the district police station (the department of the interior) and the public prosecutor\u2019s office. After the abduction the perpetrators drove away through the local traffic police checkpoint. 8.  The applicants submitted to the Court the witness statements of Ms Ya.R. dated 7 February 2013 and of Ms As.I. dated 25 February 2013. According to both women, they did not see the abduction but both saw two Priora cars speeding away from the vicinity of where the incident took place around the time of the abduction. It does not appear that either of the witnesses provided a statement to the investigation. 9.  The Government did not dispute the facts as presented by the applicants. At the same time they denied any involvement of State agents in the abduction. 10.  In reply to the Court\u2019s first request for a copy of the contents of the investigation file, the Government provided documents from the file, amounting to 43 pages, which showed the steps taken by the investigators from 14 May to 27 June 2012. 11.  In reply to the Court\u2019s second and third requests for a copy of the contents of the investigation file, the Government submitted copies of its contents, some 688 pages long, which showed the steps taken by the investigators from the beginning of the proceedings to 15 August 2015. From the documents submitted, the investigation can be summarised as follows. 12.  Immediately after the abduction, on 2 May 2012 the applicants complained to the Kizilyurt police station (\u041e\u0442\u0434\u0435\u043b \u0432\u043d\u0443\u0442\u0440\u0435\u043d\u043d\u0438\u0445 \u0434\u0435\u043b \u043f\u043e \u0433 .\u041a\u0438\u0437\u0438\u043b\u044e\u0440\u0442) (hereinafter \u201cthe OVD\u201d). 13.  On 2 May 2012 the police questioned the second applicant who provided a detailed account of the events similar to the one submitted to the Court and stated that she had learnt of Mr Kamil Mutayev\u2019s abduction from her nephew Muradis. 14.  On 2 May 2012 the police examined the crime scene. No evidence was collected. 15.  On 2 and then on 10 May 2012 the police questioned Mr Kamil Mutayev\u2019s son Muradis, whose account of the events was similar to that submitted by the applicants to the Court. In addition, the witness stated that the abductors had scared him by threatening to shoot him if he disobeyed their orders not to move. 16.  On 2 or 3 May 2012 the police examined Mr Kamil Mutayev\u2019s VAZ\u201121099 car. Fingerprints taken from the vehicle on that date were submitted for expert examination on 18 May 2012. 17.  On 14 May 2012 the applicants lodged an abduction complaint with the Kizilyurt town prosecutor\u2019s office. 18.  On 14 May 2012 the investigations department of the Kizilyurt town prosecutor\u2019s office opened criminal case no. 207127. The applicants were informed thereof on 24 May 2012. 19.  On 19 May 2012 the investigators questioned Mr Kamil Mutayev\u2019s son Muradis who reiterated his previous statements and added that he would not be able to identify any of the abductors as he had been scared. 20.  On 19 May 2012 the investigators questioned the first applicant whose statement was similar to the applicants\u2019 account submitted to the Court. In particular, the applicant pointed out that when driving away the abductors\u2019 vehicle had gone through the traffic police checkpoint. 21.  On 21 May 2012 the first applicant was granted victim status in the criminal case and questioned again. She reiterated her previous statements. 22.  On 23 May 2012 the Dagestan Forensic Expert Examinations Bureau informed the investigators that they did not have matches in their database for the fingerprints found on Mr Kamil Mutayev\u2019s car. 23.  On 24 May 2012 the investigators again questioned the second applicant whose statement was similar to the applicants\u2019 account submitted to the Court. 24.  On 6 June 2012 the investigators again examined the crime scene. 25.  On 7 June 2012 the investigators again questioned the first applicant who stated that her husband Mr Kamil Mutayev did not have financial debts or enemies. At the same time she stated that on several occasions he had received threats from unidentified persons on account of his religious beliefs. Those persons had visited their house and had thrown hand-written threats inside. The applicant did not specify whether she had had any suspisions or theories concerning the identities of those persons. 26.  On 15 June 2012 the local police informed the investigators that Mr Kamil Mutayev was a member of an illegal armed group, belonged to an extremist religious movement and had, therefore, most probably, staged his own abduction. 27.  On 29 June 2012 the investigators questioned five local residents, all of whom stated that they had not witnessed the abduction and found out about it from others. 28.  On 6 August 2012 the investigators examined the registration log of detainees of the OVD. No records concerning Mr Kamil Mutayev were found therein. 29.  On 6, 7 and 12 August 2012 the investigators questioned police officers from the OVD: Mr M.M., Mr Z.S., Mr R.A., Mr A.M. and Mr D.D. All of them stated that on the date of the abduction they had been on duty at the police station and neither Mr Kamil Mutayev nor his car had been brought in. 30.  On various dates between June and November 2012 the investigators received the list of calls made from and to Mr Kamil Mutayev\u2019s mobile telephone as well as replies to their numerous information requests concerning Mr Kamil Mutayev from hospitals, morgues, retirement homes, mosques and detention centres in various regions of Russia. No information pertatining to his whereabouts or the perpetrators\u2019 identities was obtained. 31.  On 14 September 2012 the investigation was suspended. It is unclear whether the applicants were informed thereof. 32.  On 9 November 2012 the investigation was resumed in order to take further steps. 33.  On 30 November 2012 the investigators questioned the head of the OVD officer R.S. who stated that according to their information Mr Kamil Mutayev was an avid follower of the extremist religious movement Wahhabi and that he had staged his abduction to join an illegal armed group. 34.  On an unspecified date in 2013 the investigation was resumed. 35.  Between March 2013 and February 2014 the investigators questioned a number of Mr Kamil Mutayev\u2019s relatives and neighbours, whose statements did not provide new information. They also questioned again his son Muradis and the first applicant who reiterated their earlier statements. 36.  From the documents submitted it follows that between November 2012 and August 2015 the investigation was suspended and resumed on several occasions. The last resumption of the investigation took place on 10 September 2015. The proceedings are still pending.", "references": ["9", "1", "3", "2", "5", "7", "8", "4", "6", "No Label", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1970 and 1965 respectively and live in Moscow. 6.  On 13 June 2000 the prosecutor\u2019s office opened a criminal investigation against the applicants on suspicion of fraud and tobacco smuggling. 7.  On 24 November 2000 the applicants were arrested. On 27 November 2000 the prosecutor authorised their pre-trial detention. They remained in custody during the investigation and study of the case file. 8.  On 12 January 2004 the City Court set a trial date of 19 January 2004. The court ordered that the applicants remain in custody pending trial. The applicant\u2019s detention was subsequently extended on several occasions. 9.  On 3 February 2005 the jury delivered a verdict of not guilty in the applicants\u2019 case. On 4 February 2005 the City Court pronounced the judgment and ordered the applicants\u2019 release. 10.  On 22 July 2005 the Supreme Court quashed the judgment of 4 February 2005 on appeal and remitted the matter for fresh consideration. 11.  On 29 July 2005 the City Court ordered the applicants to be remanded in custody pending a new trial. The court reasoned as follows:\n\u201cIt can be seen in [the judgment of the Supreme Court] that the verdict was quashed in view of breaches of the rules of criminal procedure by both defendants, which influenced the opinion of the jury. Therefore, the court considers that, if released, [the applicants] might interfere with the establishment of the truth and the administration of justice by putting pressure on witnesses.\nRegard being had to the above, to the gravity of the charges and in order to ensure compliance with the objectives of the criminal proceedings, the court grants the prosecutor\u2019s request to remand [the applicants] in custody.\u201d 12.  On 20 September 2005 the Supreme Court upheld the decision of 29 July 2005 on appeal. 13.  On 13 February 2006 the jury delivered a verdict of not guilty in the applicants\u2019 case. On 16 February 2006 the City Court pronounced the judgment and ordered the applicants\u2019 release. In the operative part of the judgment, the court noted that the applicants had a right to rehabilitation and could apply for compensation in respect of pecuniary damage by bringing a claim to the court which delivered the judgment in their criminal case. They could also bring a civil action seeking compensation in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage resulting from the criminal prosecution against them. 14.  On 21 September 2006 the Supreme Court upheld the judgment on appeal. 15.  According to the official version of events, on 22 August 2002 the first applicant destroyed certain documents which had been admitted as evidence in the criminal case against him, and on 28 August 2002 he assaulted a trainee investigator. 16.  On an unspecified date a criminal case was opened against the first applicant on multiple charges, including the use of violence against a law\u2011enforcement officer and the destruction of official documents. 17.  On 30 July 2003 the Tverskoy District Court of Moscow found the first applicant guilty and sentenced him to two years\u2019 imprisonment. 18.  On 19 November 2003 the City Court upheld the first applicant\u2019s conviction on appeal. 19.  It appears that the first applicant finished serving his prison sentence on 29 July 2005.", "references": ["9", "5", "0", "8", "6", "3", "1", "4", "7", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1983 and lives in Ordzhenikidzevskaya, Ingushetia. He is the brother of Mr Abubakar (also spelt as Abu-Bakar) Tsechoyev, who was born in 1978. 6.  At the material time the applicant\u2019s brother Mr Abubakar Tsechoyev worked at the water-pumping station in Ordzhenikidzevskaya, Ingushetia. 7.  In the evening of 22 March 2012 Mr Abubakar Tsechoyev was at work at the pumping station with his colleagues Mr A.A., Mr K.Kh and Mr I.G. At about 10 p.m. a group of about ten men in camouflage uniforms and balaclavas armed with automatic weapons broke into the pumping station, quickly and noiselessly tied up the employees, blindfolded them and dragged them into separate rooms where they were subjected to beatings. Approximately forty minutes later they took Mr Abubakar Tsechoyev, who was unconscious, outside, placed him in one of their UAZ\u2011brand vehicles and drove away in the direction of Chechnya. They had been due to pass through a checkpoint located on the border between Ingushetia and Chechnya, on the Ordzhenikidzevskaya to Sernovodsk motorway. Later that night, at about 2 a.m. or 3 a.m., one of the colleagues of the abducted man, Mr I.G., managed to free himself; he untied the two others, went to the applicant\u2019s house and informed him of his brother\u2019s abduction. 8.  According to the applicant, as soon as he learnt of the abduction, he went to the Sunzhenskiy district police station and informed the duty officer of the abduction of his brother from the water-pumping station. The officer didn\u2019t believe him. The applicant, therefore, left and returned with Mr I.G. who bore the marks of the beatings and whose clothing was torn. Then an investigator questioned Mr I.G. and at about 6 a.m. on 23 March 2012 a group of police officers went to the crime scene to inspect it. 9.  The applicant arrived at the pumping station with the police and walked around the grounds. He examined the ground, which was wet, as it had rained at night. A couple of hundred metres from the pumping station, the applicant found the tyre marks of a Lada Niva car. The only road leading to the pumping station passed by the building of school no. 6 in Ordzhenikidzevskaya, which was equipped with CCTV cameras. 10.  The Government did not dispute the circumstances of the abduction as presented by the applicant. At the same time, they pointed out the following: the applicant had not witnessed the incident and had learnt of its circumstances from third persons; the eyewitnesses\u2019 statements were incomplete and imprecise, as the perpetrators had blindfolded them. The Government further submitted that the events had taken place in 2012, in Ingushetia, and not in the Chechen Republic, and that there had been no counterterrorist operations going on and no limitations on free movement of vehicles in the area. In addition, the domestic authorities had found \u201cnot far from the water-pumping station [the crime scene] traces of the whereabouts of illegal armed groups.\u201d In sum, the Government submitted that was no evidence of State agents\u2019 involvement in the abduction of the applicant\u2019s brother. 11.  In reply to the Court\u2019s requests for a copy of the contents of the investigation file, the Government submitted partial copies of its contents, some 639 pages in total, which showed the steps taken by the investigators from March 2012 to October 2015. From the documents submitted, the investigation can be summarised as follows. 12.  Early in the morning of 23 March 2012 the applicant lodged an abduction complaint with the Sunzhenskiy district department of the interior (\u0421\u0443\u043d\u0436\u0435\u043d\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0439 \u0440\u0430\u0439\u043e\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u043e\u0442\u0434\u0435\u043b \u0432\u043d\u0443\u0442\u0440\u0435\u043d\u043d\u0438\u0445 \u0434\u0435\u043b (\u0420\u041e\u0412\u0414)) (hereinafter \u201cthe Sunzhenskiy ROVD\u201d) and the Sunzhenskiy district prosecutor. In his complaint the applicant stated the following:\n\u201c... Yesterday, on 22 March 2012, at about 9 p.m. my brother Abubakar Tsechoyev, who was born in 1978, was abducted from his place of work (he worked as the operator of the Vodokanal water-pumping station). The abductors were a group of ten persons, all armed with automatic weapons, dressed in camouflage uniforms and with balaclavas covering their faces. Three more men who were at work at the pumping station with my brother (an electrician, a machinist and a guard), were tied up and prohibited from moving under threat of being shot. One of them was beaten using the butt of a sub-machine gun. At least three persons attacked Abubakar; they beat him with their guns, hands and kicked him; they handcuffed him and dragged him from the pumping station. Then they drove away in a vehicle, presumably, a UAZ. Overall, the abductors spent about an hour at the pumping station. According to our information, the abductors drove through a checkpoint situated on the road between Ordzhenikidzevskaya and Sernovodsk.\nMy brother is not a criminal, he has not been charged with any administrative or criminal offences, he had never had any problems with the law ... on the date of his abduction he was at work.\nOn the basis of the above I ask for your assistance in the search for my brother Abubakar Tsechoyev and the persons who abducted him ...\u201d 13.  On 23 March 2012 investigators examined the crime scene. Several pieces of evidence, including adhesive tape, pieces of fabric used by the abductors to tie-up the employees and a cut-off piece of the barbed wire from the pumping station\u2019s fence were collected from the scene. 14.  On 23 March 2012 the applicant requested that the investigators obtain the CCTV footage from the building of school no. 6 in Ordzhenikidzevskaya which was located in the vicinity of the water\u2011pumping station. He informed the investigators that the footage would be available for seven days as after that subsequent recording would automatically overwrite it. On 30 March 2012 the investigators collected the CCTV footage. However, the video recorded between 20 and 23 March 2012 had already been overwritten by the footage of subsequent dates. 15.  On 24 March 2012 the Investigative Department in Sunzhenskiy district (\u0421\u043b\u0435\u0434\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u043e\u0442\u0434\u0435\u043b \u043f\u043e \u0421\u0443\u043d\u0436\u0435\u043d\u0441\u043a\u043e\u043c\u0443 \u0440\u0430\u0439\u043e\u043d\u0443) (hereinafter \u201cthe investigations department\u201d) initiated a criminal investigation into the abduction under Articles 126 \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Code (aggravated abduction) and the case file was given the number 12600026. 16.  On the same date, 24 March 2012, the applicant was granted victim status in the criminal proceedings and questioned (see paragraph 36 below). 17.  On 24 March 2012 the investigators took the applicant\u2019s fingerprints to exclude them from the future expert examination of the adhesive tape collected at the crime scene. 18.  On 26 March 2012 the investigators granted Mr I.G. victim status in the criminal case (see paragraph \n37 below) and ordered a forensic medical examination of the bruises received during the abduction. On 4 April 2012 the expert concluded that Mr I.G. could have obtained the injuries under the circumstances described in his statements to the investigation. 19.  On various dates in March and April 2012 the investigators forwarded information requests to a number of State agencies, hospitals, morgues and detention centres in the North Caucasus and the neighbouring regions asking whether they had any information on Mr Abubakar Tsechoyev. The replies received were in the negative. 20.  On 6 April 2012 the Sunzhenskiy District Court granted the investigators permission to obtain the phone records for the period between 1st and 30 March 2012 of the mobile telephones of the four employees of the water-pumping station, Mr Abubakar Tsechoyev, Mr A.A., Mr K.Kh and Mr I.G. 21.  On 10 April 2012 the investigators informed their supervisor that on that date they had wanted to \u201cinspect\u201d the applicant\u2019s house but the applicant had refused to let them in. From the document submitted it is unclear whether the judicial authorisation for it had been obtained. 22.  On 19 April 2012 the applicant refused, for unspecified reasons, to familiarise himself with the decisions to order an expert examination of the evidence and the examination\u2019s conclusions in the criminal case opened in connection with his brother\u2019s abduction. 23.  On 27 April 2012 the investigators ordered a forensic expert examination of the piece of fabric which had been used to tie-up Mr K.Kh. during the abduction to establish whether any DNA or smells could be derived from the evidence (see paragraph 13 above). 24.  On 3 May 2012 the investigators examined the phone records and the calls made on and around the time of the abduction. 25.  On 10 or 11 May 2012 the investigators granted Ms R.Ts., the mother of Mr Abubakar Tsechoyev, victim status in the criminal case and questioned her (see paragraph 41 below). 26.  On 20 May 2012 the investigators obtained blood samples from Ms R.Ts. and on 21 May 2012 ordered that they be forensically examined to determine her blood type and to add them to the DNA database. 27.  On 21 May 2012 the investigators obtained permission from Ms R.Ts. to search her house; this was carried out on the same date. As a result, Mr Abubakar Tsechoyev\u2019s passport and a black sweatshirt were collected as evidence and a forensic examination of these items was ordered. 28.  On an unspecified date between 24 March and 19 May 2012 the Sunzhenskiy ROVD informed the investigators that not far from the pumping station they had found a concealed bunker belonging to members of illegal armed groups. 29.  On 24 August 2012 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. The decision stated that the investigation had four theories concerning the reasons for the abduction: the abduction had been perpetrated due to the hostile relationship between the perpetrators and Mr Abubakar Tsechoyev; he had been arrested by State agents; he had become a member of an illegal armed group; his alleged abduction had been staged by his accomplices in that illegal armed group. 30.  On 25 September 2012 the investigators\u2019 supervisor overruled the decision to suspend the investigation as premature and unlawful and ordered that the proceedings be resumed. The applicant was informed thereof. 31.  On 25 December 2012 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. The applicant was informed thereof. 32.  On 13 October 2015 the investigation was resumed in order to take a number of steps, such as questioning several police officers who had manned checkpoints Angara-120 and Kavkaz-1 in the vicinity of Ordzhenikidzevskaya on the night of the abduction, and further questioning Mr Abubakar Tsechoyev\u2019s relatives. 33.  From the documents submitted it appears that the investigation is still pending. 34.  On 23 March 2012 the investigators questioned the applicant and two employees of the water-pumping station, Mr I.G. and Mr K.Kh., whose scrappy statements were furnished to the Court. From the copies submitted, the contents of the documents were unclear. 35.  On the same date, 23 March, and then on 24 March 2012 the investigators questioned another employee of the pumping station, Mr A.A., who stated that in the evening of 22 of March 2012 he had been on-duty at work with three other colleagues, including Mr Abubakar Tsechoyev. At about 9.40 p.m. the lights in the pumping station had gone out. The witness had gone to see what had happened to the electric wires when he had heard Mr Tsechoyev screaming while being beaten by three men in camouflage uniforms, black balaclavas and armed with sub-machine guns; two more men in similar uniforms and balaclavas had been guarding the window and the door. Then the man at the door had grabbed the witness and pointed his gun at his chest and ordered him in Russian not to move. The witness had understood that as a result of the beating Mr Abubakar Tsechoyev had passed out. Then the men had bound the witness\u2019 hands, blindfolded him with a piece of a blanket and adhesive tape and dragged him over to the control room, and then to the prayer room where the intruders had wrapped him in a rug and thrown him to the floor. The witness had remained in the room until about 2 a.m. when his colleagues Mr I.G. and Mr K.Kh. had untied his hands. Then the three of them had seen that the intruders had taken Mr Abubakar Tsechoyev along with their two-way radios, their mobile telephones and the battery from Mr Abubakar Tsechoyev\u2019s VAZ\u201121099 car which had been parked in the courtyard. The witness stated that he would not be able to identify the perpetrators but that he was sure that the abduction had been perpetrated by professionals who had spoken unaccented Russian and had acted quickly and had been able to incapacitate the employees within a few minutes without making any noise. 36.  On 24 March 2012 the investigators questioned the applicant who stated that at about 3 a.m. on the night between 22 and 23 March 2012 Mr I.G. had arrived at his house, informed him of the abduction of Mr Abubakar Tsechoyev by armed masked men in camouflage uniforms and described the circumstances of the incident. The applicant had immediately gone to the Sunzhenskiy ROVD but the duty officer had refused to register the complaint; the applicant had returned to the police station with Mr I.G. who had described the events and shown the bruises received as a result of the abductors\u2019 beating. The applicant further stated that his relatives had previously been detained by the authorities \u2013 his elder brother Mr Islam Tsechoyev had been detained and tortured by State agents on the suspicion of membership of an illegal armed group and subsequently had successfully complained of those events to the European Court of Human Rights (see Khadisov and Tsechoyev v. Russia, no. 21519/02, \u00a7\u00a7 123 and 133, 5 February 2009) \u2013 and that his cousin Mr Aslan Tsechoyev had been killed in 2011 during a special operation carried out by the authorities against members of illegal armed groups. 37.  On 24 and then on 26 March 2012 the investigators questioned an employee of the water-pumping station Mr I.G. whose statements were similar to the ones given by his colleague Mr A.A. on 23 and 24 March (see paragraph 35 above). In addition, he stated that the perpetrators had used physical force during the abduction, that they had beaten him and that they had been in camouflage uniforms, including special military boots and armed with sub-machine guns. When he had been taken to the control room, the abductors had pulled a plastic bag over his head leaving just a small opening for the air. Several minutes later he had managed to free himself and gone to the other rooms to find his colleagues. The lights had been off in the entire station. The witness had found Mr K.Kh. and unbound his hands. Then the two of them had found Mr A.A., who had been wrapped in a rug in the prayer room. Then all of them had searched for Mr Abubakar Tsechoyev but they had not been able to find him as he had been taken by the abductors along with their mobile telephones. Then the witness had gone to the applicant\u2019s house and informed him of the incident. 38.  On unspecified dates in 2012 (the pages with the dates and the names of the persons questioned were not furnished to the Court) the investigators questioned twelve police officers who had been manning checkpoint Assa situated between the settlement of Nesterovskaya in Ingushetia and the settlement of Assinovskaya in Chechnya between 11 p.m. on 22 March and 11 p.m. on 23 March 2012. All of the officers stated that they had checked each vehicle passing through and that on the night of the abduction they had not seen any vehicles of State agencies going through and had no information pertaining to the incident. 39.  On 23 April 2012 the investigators questioned the former director of the water-pumping station Mr B.K. who stated that he had learnt of the incident from Mr I.G. and that he had quit his job after the abduction. 40.  On 1 May 2012 the investigators again questioned the applicant\u2019s brother Mr Is.Ts. who stated that he had learnt of the abduction from Mr Abubakar Tsechoyev\u2019s colleague Mr I.G. His statement was similar to that of the applicant (see paragraph 36 above). The witness stated that his family members had been detained and ill-treated by State agents. He referred to his brother, Mr Islam Tsechoyev, who had been detained and tortured by State agents, and that his cousin, Mr Aslan Tsechoyev, had been killed in 2011 during a special operation carried out by the authorities against members of illegal armed groups. 41.  On 11 May 2012 the investigators questioned the mother of Mr Abubakar Tsechoyev, Ms R.Ts., who stated that she had learnt of the abduction from Mr I.G. and that her relatives had been detained and ill\u2011treated by State agents. Similarly to her sons, the applicant and Mr Is.Ts. (see paragraphs 36 and 40 above), she referred to the detention and torture of her son Mr Islam Tsechoyev and the killing of Mr Aslan Tsechoyev as a result of a special operation against members of illegal armed groups. 42.  On 28 May 2012 the investigators questioned the former head of the security service of the water-pumping station, Mr Ya.G., who stated that he had learnt of the incident from Mr I.G. and that he had quit his job after the abduction. 43.  On 12 April 2013 the applicant complained to the Sunzhenskiy District Court (hereinafter \u201cthe District Court\u201d) that the investigation of his brother\u2019s abduction had been ineffective. He stated, in particular, the following:\n\u201c... on 25 December 2012 the investigation was suspended for failure to establish the perpetrators.\nAbubakar did not have hostile relationships with anybody; he was not involved in a feud nor had he any debts. In 2001 our elder brother Islam Tsechoyev was abducted and taken to the military base in Khankala where he was subjected to severe beatings. In 2007 the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg delivered a judgement in Islam\u2019s favour. I do not know that the reasons were for Abubakar\u2019s abduction but I am sure that it was perpetrated by servicemen from within the power structure [of the State].\nThe investigation failed to take the full range of operational investigative steps. The case file contains the witness statement of a shepherd who had seen a suspicious four-door Niva car with heavily tinted windows next to the water-pumping station. Such vehicles are usually used by special forces ...That car was seen at the pumping station on the day of the abduction and two days prior to it. The investigators also ignored the statement of the guard of the husbandry team who had seen that car at 5 p.m. on the day of the abduction ... I personally inspected the area and found the place where the car had pulled over leaving clear tyre tracks. During that inspection I was with the district police officer [Dz.] from Ordzhenikidzevskaya. I informed the investigator [G.] about my findings but the investigation took no steps to identify the vehicle. No expert examination of the tyre tracks was carried out. The investigation failed to establish which State agency possessed such vehicles and in what quantity. From the very beginning of the investigation, it had been necessary to examine vehicles from the operational search units of State agencies; this has not been done.\nIn addition, despite my repeated requests, the information from the CCTV cameras situated next to the school was not obtained in time ... On 23 March [2012] I requested that the footage be examined as every seven days the video recorded was automatically destroyed and, therefore, it could be lost. I asked the investigator [G.], amongst other persons, about it, but the investigation obtained the disks only on 30 March [2012], when everything had already been erased.\nBased on the above ... I request that ...\n-  the decision to suspend the investigation of 25 December 2012 be found unsubstantiated; ...\n-  servicemen of the bodies responsible for my brother\u2019s abduction be identified and prosecuted ...\u201d 44.  On 22 April 2013 the District Court rejected the applicant\u2019s complaint as unsubstantiated having found that the impugned decision had been taken lawfully and on sufficient grounds. The court did not examine the applicant\u2019s allegations concerning the possible involvement of State officers in the abduction and the alleged lack of investigative steps to verify that theory. 45.  The applicant appealed against that decision to the Ingushetia Supreme Court stating, amongst other things, the following:\n\u201c... on 24 March 2012 criminal case no. 12600026 was opened in connection with my brother\u2019s abduction ...\nWe [the relatives of Abubakar Tsechoyev] do not know the reasons for the abduction, but I am sure that this crime was perpetrated by servicemen of State agencies.\nThe investigators failed to take all the operational-search meaures such as ... steps to identify the vehicle [seen at the crime scene]. An expert examination of the tyre tracks was never ordered ...; the investigation\u2019s first step should have been to check the vehicles used by the operational units [of law-enforcement agencies] which was never done.\nIn addition, in spite of my requests, the information from the CCTV cameras ... was not retrieved on time. On 23 March 2012 I asked for it to be done as every seven days the footage got erased. I personally asked the investigators, including investigator G., about it, but they obtained the footage only on 30 March [2012], when everything had been already erased ...\u201d\nOn 11 June 2013 the Ingushetia Supreme Court upheld the decision of the District Court on appeal in a summary fashion.", "references": ["7", "9", "1", "6", "4", "5", "3", "8", "2", "No Label", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "5.  On 31 January 2006 the applicant submitted a traffic accident report to an insurance company. According to that report she had been involved in a traffic accident in her car on 26 January 2006. On 3 March 2006 the applicant submitted additional explanations to the insurance company. She stated that she had not known the other persons involved in the accident, that she had completed the accident report in her vehicle after the accident and that her friend P. had come to pick her up at the scene of the accident. The insurance company suspected fraud and informed the police. On 6 April 2006 criminal proceedings were opened. The applicant was charged with insurance fraud and inciting P. knowingly to give false testimony. The other accused were P., K., T. and V. 6.  On 16 May 2008 a prosecutor drew up a bill of indictment against the applicant, P., K., T. and V. According to the bill of indictment, it had been established in the criminal investigation that the applicant, contrary to her allegations, had not been at the scene of the alleged accident. This was confirmed by the positioning of her mobile phone at the time of the accident, her phone call records and P.\u2019s statement. It was established that the applicant together with the other accused had submitted false information to the insurance company concerning the occurrence of an insured event, the persons who had been involved in the traffic accident, and the circumstances of the accident. The applicant was therefore charged with insurance fraud. In addition, it was established that the applicant had incited P. to give false testimony concerning the fact that she had gone to pick the applicant up at the scene of the accident. This had been confirmed by P.\u2019s statement. The applicant was therefore charged with inciting another person knowingly to give false testimony. It was noted in the statement of charges that no pecuniary damage had been caused by the offences because the insurance company had declined to make the corresponding payout when the suspicion of an offence arose. On the basis of this statement of charges the applicant was committed for trial. 7.  On 2 and 3 December 2008 the Tartu County Court held a hearing in the criminal proceedings against the applicant, P., K., T. and V. At this hearing the prosecutor asked the court to discontinue the criminal proceedings against the applicant and P. under Article 202 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Kriminaalmenetluse seadustik). According to the minutes of the hearing, the prosecutor stated that the applicant had committed offences of a less serious nature (\u201cin the second degree\u201d), that she had been involved in the commission of those offences at the instigation of the co-accused, thereby demonstrating that her guilt was less, and that she had no previous convictions. In requesting the imposition of certain public law obligations, the prosecutor had also taken into account the fact that the applicant had been raising a small child on her own. The applicant and her counsel explicitly accepted this reasoning put forward by the prosecutor in support of discontinuance of the criminal proceedings. They also consented to the prosecutor\u2019s request that the applicant be ordered to pay the procedural costs and perform community service. 8.  By a ruling of 3 December 2008 the Tartu County Court discontinued the criminal proceedings in respect of the applicant and P. on the basis of Article 202 (1) and (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (the \u201cCCrP\u201d). The applicant was ordered to pay 1,178 kroons (EEK) (75 euros (EUR)) to the public purse and perform eighty hours of community service. In the event of the applicant\u2019s failure to perform these obligations, the court would \u2012 at the request of the Public Prosecutor\u2019s Office \u2012 resume the criminal proceedings. 9.  The County Court\u2019s ruling contained a detailed description of the charges against the applicant and P. It further noted that the prosecutor had requested the discontinuance of the criminal proceedings in respect of the applicant and P. on the basis of Article 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure since the offence in question had been an offence in the second degree, both the applicant and P. had been involved in it at the instigation of other persons, and neither of them had had a previous criminal record. Their guilt had been negligible and there had been no public interest in the continuation of the criminal proceedings. The prosecutor had requested the imposition on the applicant of the obligations indicated above. The court also noted that both the applicant and P. \u2012 as well as their lawyers \u2012 had agreed to the discontinuance of the proceedings and the imposition of the obligations requested by the prosecutor. The part of the ruling setting out the County Court\u2019s conclusion read as follows:\n\u201cThe criminal proceedings in respect of the charges against [the applicant] ... have to be discontinued on the basis of Article 202 (1) and (2) of the [Code of Criminal Procedure] as all the legal requirements have been fulfilled. This is an offence in the second degree, the guilt of the accused is negligible, no proprietary damage has been caused and there is no public interest in the continuation of the proceedings.\nOn the basis of Article 202 (2) points 1 and 2 of the [Code of Criminal Procedure] the obligations requested by the prosecutor have to be imposed on the applicant ... \u201d 10.  By a judgment of 3 December 2008, in settlement proceedings concerning the same criminal case, the Tartu County Court convicted K., T. and V. of insurance fraud. It was noted in the judgment that V. and the applicant \u2012 whose name was replaced with initials in the judgment \u2012 had not been present at the scene of the alleged accident. It was also stated that the applicant and K. had drafted and that the applicant, T. and V. had signed and submitted to the insurance company documents containing false information about the traffic accident. It was further stated that by these acts K., the applicant, T. and V. had jointly created the illusion of the occurrence of an insured event with the aim of claiming an insurance payout. 11.  On 4 March 2009 the applicant claimed EEK 190,282.71 (EUR 12,161) from the insurance company by way of compensation related to the traffic accident that had given rise to the above criminal proceedings. The insurance company rejected the claim, arguing that it had been established by the Tartu County Court\u2019s judgment of 3 December 2008 that the traffic accident had been staged. 12.  By 23 May 2009 the applicant had performed the obligations imposed on her in the ruling of 3 December 2008. 13.  On 2 June 2009 the applicant brought a civil suit against the insurance company. In support of her insurance claim, the applicant submitted as evidence to the court the claims sent to the insurance company after the event in 2006, a copy of the 3 December 2008 ruling ordering discontinuance of the criminal proceedings, and documents proving the extent of the damage. The insurance company, for its part, submitted to the court the 3 December 2008 judgment in the criminal case (see paragraph 10 above). The defendant argued that the judgment, together with the ruling ordering discontinuance of the proceedings, was sufficient to negate the applicant\u2019s claim that a genuine traffic accident had taken place as she alleged. 14.  The applicant\u2019s claim was dismissed by a judgment of Tartu County Court on 23 December 2009. The court held as follows:\n\u201cTartu County Court established by a final judgment in the criminal case ... that the traffic accident which, according to the [applicant\u2019s] allegations, had taken place on 26 January 2006, had been staged. According to the judgment ... three individuals were found guilty of having staged a collision between an Opel Ascona, an Audi A6 and a Volvo S60 allegedly driven by the [applicant] at around 9 p.m. on 26 January 2006. The [applicant] made a claim to the [insurance company] for compensation for the damage caused to the vehicle by the alleged traffic accident ... . According to the claim the [applicant] had been driving the car that was involved in the accident. It was established by the Tartu County Court\u2019s ruling of 3 December 2008 ... that the [applicant] had not been at the scene of the traffic accident and that it had been staged. Nevertheless, ... the [applicant] submitted to the [insurance company] a statement containing false information and a claim for compensation for damage caused by an alleged insurance event. The [applicant] was charged with an offence under Article 212 \u00a7 1 of the [Penal Code], namely intentionally causing an insured event to happen and creating the illusion of the occurrence of an insured event with the intention of obtaining compensation from the insurer. The prosecutor requested ... the discontinuance of the criminal proceedings on the basis of Article 202 of the [Code of Criminal Procedure] since it was an offence in the second degree, the guilt of the accused was negligible, and there was no public interest in the continuation of the proceedings. The [applicant] erroneously concluded that, because of the [prosecutor\u2019s] request and the discontinuance of the criminal proceedings, [she] had a right to claim the insurance payout. An insurance payout is made by an insurer only if an insured event has occurred. In the present case it had been established by a judgment and a ruling of a court that no insured event had occurred and that the traffic accident had been staged. The [applicant] therefore had no grounds for claiming the payout ... from the [insurance company]. ... In the present case, no accident took place.\nThe [applicant] is wrong in her understanding that she is not guilty because of the discontinuance of the criminal proceedings against her [on the basis of] Article 202 \u00a7 2 (1) and (2) [of the Code of Criminal Procedure]. Article 202 \u00a7 1 [of the Code of Criminal Procedure] provides that if the object of criminal proceedings is a criminal offence in the second degree and the guilt of the person suspected or accused of the offence is negligible, and he or she has remedied or has begun to remedy the damage caused by the criminal offence or has paid the expenses relating to the criminal proceedings, or has assumed the obligation to pay such expenses, and there is no public interest in the continuation of the criminal proceedings, the Public Prosecutor\u2019s Office may request discontinuance of the criminal proceedings by a court with the consent of the suspect or accused. It follows from this provision that the person\u2019s guilt exists but it is negligible and that he or she has begun to remedy it or has assumed the obligation to pay the expenses relating to the criminal proceedings.\u201d 15.  The applicant appealed, complaining, inter alia, about the breach of her right to the presumption of innocence by the County Court. Although there had been no judgment finding her guilty in connection with the traffic accident of 26 January 2006, the County Court in its judgment of 23 December 2009 in a civil case had regarded her as being guilty of the offence. She argued that her consent to pay the expenses relating to the criminal proceedings did not mean that she had committed the offence. By its judgment of 3 December 2008 in a criminal case the Tartu County Court had convicted K., T. and V. but not the applicant. 16.  On 3 May 2010 the Tartu Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and upheld the County Court\u2019s judgment, holding as follows:\n\u201c7. The [applicant] is mistaken in arguing that the County Court had wrongly interpreted the legal nature and the evidentiary value, in respect of the person\u2019s admission of guilt, of the ruling ordering discontinuance of the criminal proceedings.\nThe County Court has correctly found, relying on what was established by the Tartu County Court\u2019s ruling and judgment of 3 December 2008, that the [applicant] took part ... in the staging of a traffic accident the aim of which was to cause an insured event to happen and to create the illusion of the occurrence of that insured event with the intention to obtain compensation from the insurer.\nAccording to Article 272 \u00a7 2 of the [Civil Code] court decisions in other cases are deemed to be documentary evidence.\n... 8.  ...\nDiscontinuance of criminal proceedings under Article 202 \u00a7 1 of the [Code of Criminal Procedure] does not prove that the suspect or the accused has not committed the act he or she is accused of. The premise of the discontinuance of the criminal proceedings according to the provision referred to is that the object of the criminal proceedings is a criminal offence in the second degree and the guilt of the person suspected or accused of the offence is negligible, and that he or she has remedied or has begun to remedy the damage caused by the criminal offence or has paid the expenses relating to the criminal proceedings, or has assumed the obligation to pay such expenses, and that there is no public interest in the continuation of the criminal proceedings, but that the act as such was nevertheless committed.\nThe Court of Appeal finds that the fact that the applicant committed the act consisting of causing the insured event to happen and creating the illusion of the occurrence of an insured event with the intention of obtaining compensation from the insurer was established by the Tartu County Court\u2019s ruling of 3 December 2008. If the [applicant\u2019s] position was that she did not commit the act, she would have submitted evidence to prove her argument, but she has not done so. The mere assertion by the [applicant] that she did not commit the act referred to in the Tartu County Court\u2019s ruling of 3 December 2008 does not imply the conclusion that the applicant did not participate in an insurance fraud aimed at obtaining compensation. 9. ...\nIn the present case it is established that the [applicant] as the policyholder intentionally caused the insured event and the [insurance company] is therefore exempted from the obligation to satisfy the claim.\u201d 17.  The applicant appealed to the Supreme Court repeating, inter alia, her complaint about a breach of her right to the presumption of innocence. 18.  On 22 June 2010 the Supreme Court decided not to examine the appeal.", "references": ["3", "1", "5", "0", "7", "9", "2", "8", "6", "4", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Vienna. 5.  The applicant was a public official working for the Vienna municipality (Magistrat der Stadt Wien). On 2 February 1996 the personnel office (Personalamt) of the Vienna municipality accepted the applicant\u2019s resignation (Entsagung), and held that she was entitled to severance pay (Abfindung) amounting to three monthly salaries. On 18 March 1996 the same authority amended the aforementioned decision, stating that the applicant was not eligible for severance pay. 6.  The applicant appealed on 1 April 1996. On 3 September 1996 the Appeal Panel of the Vienna municipality (Berufungssenat der Stadt Wien) dismissed her appeal as unfounded. 7.  On 9 October 1996 the applicant lodged a complaint against the appeal decision with the Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgerichtshof). On 17 October 2001 the Administrative Court set aside the appeal decision of 3 September 1996 due to lack of jurisdiction of the personnel office of the Vienna municipality. 8.  On 13 June 2002 the applicant filed a request for transfer of jurisdiction (Devolutionsantrag), since the Appeal Panel had not rendered a fresh decision by then. However, on 7 August 2002, the Appeal Panel set aside the decision of 18 March 1996 and at the same time decided on the merits of the subject matter and stated that the applicant was not eligible for severance pay. 9.  On 19 September 2002 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Constitutional Court (Verfassungsgerichtshof). On 30 November 2004 the Constitutional Court set aside the Appeal Panel\u2019s decision on the merits due to lack of jurisdiction of the panel with regard to the subject matter. 10.  On 1 April 2005 the Vienna Municipal Council (Gemeinderat der Stadt Wien) rendered a decision declaring that the applicant was not eligible for severance pay. 11.  The applicant lodged a complaint against that decision with the Constitutional Court on 17 May 2005. On 12 October 2005 the Constitutional Court declared that the applicant\u2019s constitutionally guaranteed right to have proceedings determining her civil rights conducted within a reasonable time had been violated. However, it dismissed her request to set aside the decision of the Municipal Council and refused to deal with the remainder of the complaint. The Constitutional Court conceded that the proceedings had already had an overall duration of approximately nine years, which resulted entirely from the conduct of the authorities and courts involved. Furthermore, the subject matter of the proceedings was not particularly complex. However, setting aside the decision (preliminarily) concluding those overly long proceedings would not be capable of remedying the violation of the applicant\u2019s rights; on the contrary, it would again delay the termination of the proceedings. 12.  On 16 December 2005 the applicant amended her complaint for the proceedings before the Administrative Court. On 13 March 2009 the Administrative Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaint as unfounded. That judgment was served on the applicant\u2019s counsel on 3 April 2009.", "references": ["9", "2", "5", "6", "7", "4", "0", "1", "8", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1966 and is currently detained in Arad. 6.  By a final decision of 21 March 2001 the Arad District Court convicted the applicant of rape of a minor and sentenced him to thirteen years\u2019 imprisonment. The applicant\u2019s detention started on 21 January 2001 and lasted until 24 May 2011, when he was released from prison on probation. On 11 July 2013 the applicant was again detained, following a new conviction for the rape of two girls who were minors, and was incarcerated in Coliba\u015fi Prison. 7.  In his letters to the Court, the applicant contended that in Arad and Timi\u015foara Prisons he had been kept in overcrowded cells. 8.  Despite the fact that he was a non-smoker, he had had to share a cell with smokers. He lodged several complaints with the domestic authorities in this respect, claiming that he had health problems because of the smoke he had inhaled from his inmates\u2019 cigarettes. By a final decision of 12 April 2005, the Arad County Court allowed one of the applicant\u2019s complaints and ordered the placement of the applicant in a non-smoking cell. From the information submitted by the applicant it is not clear whether that decision was enforced, but based on his written observations it could be inferred that he had been placed in a non-smoking cell. 9.  Moreover, the applicant alleged that he had been transferred from one prison to another or from prison to court in vans with detainees who smoked. 10.  The applicant was mostly detained in Arad Prison, where he spent more than eight years. The prison authorities took into account the fact that the applicant had been convicted of the rape of a minor and for most of his stay he had therefore been placed alone in an individual cell of 10.40 square metres. 11.  The applicant was detained in Timi\u015foara Prison on several occasions, for five hundred and sixty days in total. On these occasions he was detained in the medical unit of the prison or in cells used for transit.\nAccording to the information provided by the National Prison Administration and forwarded to the Court by the Government, the applicant was held in the following cells:\n- cell no. 1 measuring 19.69 square metres, containing eight beds (that is 2.46 square metres per bed);\n- cell no. 6 measuring 19.78 square metres, containing three beds (that is 6.59 square metres per bed);\n- cell no. 7 measuring 17.71 square metres containing three beds (that is 5.90 square metres per bed);\n- cell no. 12 measuring 7.60 square metres containing three beds (that is 2.53 square metres per bed);\n- cell no 35 neasuring 20.84 square metres containing ten beds (that is 2.08 square metres per bed);\n- cell no. 45 measuring 46. 22 square metres containing nineteen beds (that is 2.43 square metres per bed);\n- and cell no. 66 measuring 21.16 square metres containing nine beds (that is 2.35 square metres per bed). 12.  The Government did not provide any information concerning either the number of the detainees who had occupied the cells or the time spent by the applicant in each of the above-mentioned cells. 13.  The Government submitted that both prisons mentioned by the applicant had adequate natural and electric lighting and ventilation. Both prisons had a central heating system providing adequate heating in the winter. All of the cells in which the applicant had been held had had the requisite furniture. 14.  Cold water had always been available and hot water was available daily according to a schedule approved by the prison authorities. 15.  Concerning the hygiene in the cell, the Government submitted that prisoners had been responsible for cleaning the cells and were provided with cleaning products by the prison administration. 16.  The applicant had been transferred between the prison facilities in vehicles fitted with windows, lights, heating and sunroofs. These vehicles had had between sixteen and thirty-eight seats. Smoking was strictly prohibited during transfers, and the applicant had anyway been transported separately from smokers.", "references": ["8", "9", "4", "3", "6", "7", "2", "0", "5", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "7.  The applicant was born in 1952 and lives in Tbilisi. 8.  The applicant was chairperson of the Civil Aviation Agency of Georgia (\u201cthe CAA\u201d) between 12 March 2002 and 13 March 2004, when he resigned. The CAA has legal personality under public law. 9.  By a judgment dated 10 January 2003, delivered in the case of Airzena Georgian Airlines Ltd. v. Parliament and the Ministry for Transport and Communications, the Constitutional Court declared that it was unconstitutional to use the legal term \u201cannual regulation fee for transport activities\u201d (\u10e0\u10d4\u10d2\u10e3\u10da\u10d8\u10e0\u10d4\u10d1\u10d8\u10e1 \u10e1\u10d0\u10e4\u10d0\u10e1\u10e3\u10e0\u10d8), which appeared in various relevant legal acts \u2013 the Act of 20 July 2001 on the Rules of State Management and Regulation of Transport and Communications (\u201cthe Regulation Act\u201d), and the Orders of 28 December 2001, nos. 109 and 110, of the Minister for Transport and Communications (see paragraphs 59\u201180 below). 10.  The Constitutional Court considered that the aforementioned \u201cannual regulation fee for transport activities\u201d, which was a compulsory payment provided for in section 9(5) of the Regulation Act, was strictly speaking neither a tax nor a levy. However, Article 94 of the Constitution only recognised the latter two kinds of compulsory payment to the State. Furthermore, unlike taxes and levies, the regulation fee was not paid into the State\u2019s coffers or to a local authority, but directly to the CAA. The Constitutional Court considered that in those circumstances the fee amounted to a special form of tax, which was a compulsory payment and which had the features of both a traditional levy (payable in exchange for a service or the granting of a right) and of a tax (payable on the annual income of the body concerned). 11.  The defendant authorities \u2013 Parliament and the Ministry for Transport and Communications \u2013 argued before the Constitutional Court that there was a need for some kind of compulsory regulation fee for transport activities because it was not possible for the CAA to sign contracts with civil aviation companies. The Constitutional Court dismissed that argument, pointing out that the regulation of transport activities meant the provision of a service by a public authority in exchange for the payment of a fee for that service. Such relationships could only arise within the framework of a mutual contract, freely entered into by the parties concerned. A fee received by a public authority for a service should therefore take the form of income received for work carried out on a contractual basis, in accordance with section 13(d) of the Public-Law Entities Act. 12.  The Constitutional Court further observed that the claimant, a private airline, would obviously never be able to carry out its business without the transport service provided by the CAA. However, regard being had to the principle of the freedom to choose services, even an undeniably necessary service should be the subject of a free agreement between the parties. The Constitutional Court thus concluded that if the matter at issue were settled in that way, then future situations in which the payment of considerable amounts imposed unilaterally by a public authority, in total disregard of the opinions of the companies concerned, would be avoided. The Constitutional Court emphasised that not even constitutional provisions could prevent a public authority in charge of the regulation of civil aviation from signing a contract with a private entity which included conditions and rules for services to be provided under that contract. 13.  The Constitutional Court ruled that its judgment of 10 January 2003 would become effective on 1 April 2003. 14.  On 13 February 2004 criminal proceedings were instituted for abuse of power against unnamed officers of the Ministry of Transport and Communications, the CAA and two State-owned civil aviation companies. That decision was taken on the basis of information provided by \u201can investigative journalism organisation carrying out research into corruption\u201d. 15.  On 16 March 2004 a charge of repeated abuse of power was brought against the applicant himself, under Article 332 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3 (a) of the Criminal Code, by the General Public Prosecutor\u2019s Office (\u201cthe GPPO\u201d). He was accused in particular of having entered into civil contracts in his capacity as chairperson of the CAA on 28 March and 13 August 2003 with three civil aviation companies \u2013 Sakaeronavigatsia, Tbilisi International Airport and Air-GP-Georgia \u2013 which undertook to pay the CAA on a monthly basis a \u201cfee for services rendered in relation to the regulation of activities\u201d (\u10db\u10dd\u10db\u10e1\u10d0\u10ee\u10e3\u10e0\u10d4\u10d1\u10d8\u10e1 \u10e1\u10d0\u10e4\u10d0\u10e1\u10e3\u10e0\u10d8). Accordingly, between April and September 2003 the CAA received 600,000 Georgian laris (GEL) (about 280,000 euros (EUR)). According to the investigator, the applicant\u2019s actions in using the words \u201cfee for services rendered in relation to the regulation of activities\u201d (hereinafter \u201cfee for services\u201d) had concealed what had actually in fact amounted to the old \u201cannual regulation fee for transport activities\u201d, a legal term and obligation which had become unconstitutional after 1 April 2003, when the Constitutional Court judgment of 10 January 2003 had entered into force (see paragraph 13 above). 16.  The applicant was further accused of having issued Order no. 1 of 25 November 2003, and of applying it retroactively, again in breach of the Constitutional Court\u2019s judgment of 10 January 2003 (see paragraph 81 below). The order had allowed the CAA to charge Sakaeronavigatsia and Tbilisi International Airport the sum of GEL 134,609 (about EUR 64,000) between 1 October and 5 December 2003 in respect of the regulation fee. 17.  Thus, by having wilfully circumvented the legal effects of the Constitutional Court\u2019s judgment of 10 January 2003, the applicant \u201chad acted unlawfully and had therefore committed an abuse of power\u201d. 18.  The applicant was arrested on 16 March 2004. He was charged on 17 March 2004 but pleaded not guilty. 19.  On 19 March 2004 the Krtsanisi-Mtatsminda District Court of First Instance in Tbilisi (\u201cthe Krtsanisi-Mtatsminda Court\u201d), allowing an application by the GPPO, ordered the applicant\u2019s detention for three months, pending investigation and trial. 20.  By a final decision of 25 March 2004, the Tbilisi Regional Court dismissed an appeal by the applicant as inadmissible and upheld the detention order of 19 March 2004. 21.  On 14 June 2004 the Tbilisi Regional Court, after hearing both parties\u2019 arguments, allowed an application by the GPPO to extend the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention until 16 September 2004. No appeal lay against that decision, and it was therefore final. 22.  On 20 July 2004 an accountancy expert from the crime detection department of the Ministry of the Interior, whose services had been solicited by the GPPO as part of the investigation of the applicant\u2019s case, drew up an audit of the CAA\u2019s regulatory activities (\u201cthe audit report of 20 July 2004\u201d). Firstly, the expert listed the acts which constituted the legal basis for the activities of the CAA and which were in force before and after 1 April 2003, when the Constitutional Court\u2019s judgment of 10 January 2003 had entered into force. He then distinguished three periods of activity: (i) the period between 1 January 2002 and 1 April 2003, corresponding to the imposition of \u201cthe annual regulation fee for transport activities\u201d by the CAA on the civil aviation companies concerned; (ii) the period between 1 April and 1 October 2003, corresponding to the regulation by the CAA of the activities of the companies in question in accordance with conditions negotiated as part of the contracts it entered into; and (iii) the period between 1 October 2003 and 13 March 2004, when the CAA had collected regulation fees on the basis of Order no. 1, which had been issued by its chairperson, the applicant, on 25 November 2003. 23.  The expert noted that the adoption of the Constitutional Court\u2019s judgment of 10 January 2003 had led to \u201cthe suppression of the imposition by the CAA, in the form of an order, of the \u2018annual regulation fee for transport activities\u2019 on companies operating within civil aviation and the removal of the compulsory nature of the payment of that fee\u201d. However, \u201cthe judgment in question had not declared that it was unlawful for the CAA to provide its services to the companies concerned on the basis of negotiated contracts\u201d. According to the expert, the judgment indicated, on the contrary, that there was a \u201cneed for such contracts and a legal settlement of the issue in this way\u201d. The expert assumed that the applicant had taken the latter route, \u201cwhich had been suggested to him by the Constitutional Court\u201d. That had brought him to sign the impugned contracts with Sakaeronavigatsia and Tbilisi International Airport on 28 March 2003, that is to say, three days before the entry into force of the judgment in question. On 13 August 2003 the applicant had signed the same kind of contract with Air-GP-Georgia. In each case, the CAA\u2019s remuneration had been calculated on a monthly basis and was referred to as a fee for services provided in the field of regulation. The three contracts had been terminated on 1 October 2003. 24.  As regarded Order no. 1, which had been issued by the applicant on 25 November 2003, the expert noted that the order, approved for entry into force by the Ministry of Justice on 27 November 2003, had been able to be applied retrospectively, that is as of 1 October 2003, which was the date of the termination of the three above-mentioned contracts. He said the order showed good conduct in the financial activities relating to the functioning of civil aviation in the country which, by its very nature, had to be a continuous process. 25.  After examining the available evidence, the expert concluded that the CAA\u2019s charging of the fees for the three above-mentioned periods of activity \u201cwas based on the relevant laws and regulatory acts\u201d. He established, moreover, that the regulation fee at that time constituted the sole source of revenue for the CAA, a public-law entity not financed by the State. Had it not charged those amounts, the CAA would have been obliged to continue functioning without, though, paying its employees\u2019 salaries. The expert reiterated that the regulation fee paid to the CAA by the companies concerned was included in the price for the service that those companies offered to individuals (air travel tickets) or other companies (carriage of goods). Payment of the fee to the CAA did not therefore cause them any financial damage and, even if there had nevertheless been a loss, it would in the end have been passed on to the consumer. 26.  Generally, the expert established that the CAA had received, between 1 April 2003 and 13 March 2004, GEL 630,000 (some 310,000 euros (EUR)) in fees for the regulatory services provided under the three impugned contracts with Tbilisi International Airport, Air-BP-Georgia and Sakaeronavigatsia, and GEL 774,376 (some EUR 380,000) by way of the fee collected on the basis of Order no. 1. In any event, the expert emphasised that the charging of those sums by the CAA to the various private companies had been continuous in time and had been based on valid legal acts (either statutes or other legal instruments). Out of all the above\u2011mentioned amounts received by the CAA between 1 April 2003 and 13 March 2004, the applicant had made a personal profit of GEL 15,618 and 17,090 (some EUR 7,500 and 8,200) by way of, respectively, the salary and business trips allowances he had received over the same period of time. A further GEL 490,473.40 (some EUR 225,000) had been paid to the State Budget in income tax and social security charges, while the remaining funds had been spent on the salaries of other CAA employees and various business trips and management expenses. 27.  On 31 August 2004 the preliminary investigation was terminated and a bill of indictment was served on the applicant. According to the bill, between 1 April and 1 October 2003 the CAA had carried out three unlawful activities: (i) firstly, it had received, in breach of the judgment of the Constitutional Court of 10 January 2003, a regulation fee from eight civil aviation companies; (ii) secondly, twenty-two companies had paid the CAA the same regulation fee on the basis of Order no. 1, issued by the applicant; (iii) and, thirdly, the three companies \u2013 Sakaeronavigatsia (a government-owned undertaking), Tbilisi International Airport and Air\u2011BP\u2011Georgia \u2013 had paid the fee for services to the CAA on the basis of contracts concluded by the applicant. The pecuniary damage thus incurred by the companies concerned amounted to GEL one million, of which GEL 517,341.51 (some EUR 250,000) was caused to Sakaeronavigatsia. The applicant had used the amounts received to pay salaries and expenses for the management and business trips. 28.  On 15 September 2004 the applicant challenged the indictment before the investigator of the Chief Prosecutor\u2019s Office handling the case, arguing that the evidence that had been gathered did not support the charges. In particular, the investigation authorities had not explained how, within the meaning of Article 332 of the Criminal Code, the acts committed had damaged the \u201cinterests of the civil service\u201d; what unlawful \u201cpersonal profit\u201d he had derived; what unlawful personal profit had been derived by third parties and who those people actually were; which of the rights of the companies concerned had been breached by his action; what legal interests of the State had been disregarded; and in what way that \u201cdisregard\u201d had been \u201csubstantial\u201d (see Article 332 of the Criminal Code, at paragraph 58 below). He again pointed out that the judgment of the Constitutional Court at issue authorised the CAA to continue to charge the fee for services, provided that the payment was based on negotiated contracts and not imposed, as hitherto. Contrary to the argument put forward by the investigator, the companies concerned could not be deemed to have incurred any substantial losses simply by having fulfilled contractual obligations which had been freely negotiated with the CAA. Moreover, those companies had never complained of the unlawfulness of the contracts in question. Lastly, the applicant argued that \u201cnone of the State\u2019s legal interests\u201d had been disregarded, given that the State could not claim to be a victim of contractual relationships between two entities which were independent of it. 29.  On 16 September 2004 the investigator rejected that complaint as ill\u2011founded. He pointed out that the indictment of 31 August 2004 had been based on evidence gathered during the investigation, and that such evidence was sufficient to dispel any doubts that the applicant had committed the offence provided for in Article 332 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3 (a) of the Criminal Code. In particular, the investigator pointed out that everyone had to comply with the judgment of the Constitutional Court of 10 January 2003, which had the force of law, but which the applicant had failed to do. After 1 April 2003, the date of entry into force of that judgment, the applicant had continued to charge the regulation fee, referring to it as a \u201cfee for services provided in the field of the regulation of activities\u201d in order to conceal the nature of the activity. The Constitutional Court had considered, however, that revenues gained by the CAA in the form of a regulation fee were unconstitutional. The applicant and his employees had derived a personal profit from the amounts at issue in the form of salaries, and management and business trip fees. For example, the applicant had received total salary of GEL 15,618 (some EUR 7,500). According to the investigator, even if most of the companies concerned had declared that they had not incurred any loss from the applicant\u2019s activities, the charging by the CAA of the disguised regulation fee in breach of the judgment of the Constitutional Court had damaged the legal interests of the State. Furthermore, by giving retrospective effect to Order no. 1, registered by the Ministry of Justice on 27 November 2003, the applicant had jeopardised the well-being of the companies concerned. 30.  On 18 September 2004 the applicant lodged an appeal against that decision with the Chief Prosecutor. He stated that the investigator had failed properly to assess the circumstances of the case. He reiterated the arguments made in his complaint of 15 September 2004 (see paragraph 28 above). 31.  On 18 September 2004 a prosecutor from the Chief Prosecutor\u2019s Office replied to the applicant, stating that his appeal had been rejected because the decision of 16 September 2004 had properly and exhaustively addressed all his claims. 32.  On 20 September 2004 the indictment was approved by a deputy chief prosecutor and the case sent for trial before the Vake-Saburtalo District Court of First Instance in Tbilisi (\u201cthe Vake-Saburtalo Court\u201d). 33.  On 1 February 2005 the applicant applied to the Vake-Saburtalo Court, claiming that he had been unlawfully detained since 16 September 2004. In particular, the period of his pre-trial detention had expired on that date and had not been extended. He asked that he be released immediately. 34.  On 16 March 2005 the Vake-Saburtalo Court held a pre-trial conference hearing in the case, ruling to commit the applicant for trial as a defendant (Article 417 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3 of the CCP). Without replying to the applicant\u2019s complaint of 1 February 2005 of the unlawfulness of his pre-trial detention, the court upheld the restraint measure on the basis of the \u201cnature of the charges\u201d and the inability to conduct a comprehensive judicial assessment of his arguments for release at the admissibility stage. 35.  On an unspecified date, subsequent to a reform of the judicial system and the associated liquidation of the Vake-Saburtalo District Court, the applicant\u2019s case was assigned for trial to the newly created Tbilisi City Court. 36.   When questioned by the Tbilisi City Court during the trial, the acting director and the chief accountant of Sakaeronavigatsia confirmed that their company had paid the relevant fee to the CAA even after the Constitutional Court\u2019s judgment of 10 January 2003, either on the basis of a contract or on the basis of Order no. 1. They did not know at the time that they were exempted from paying the fee by the Constitutional Court\u2019s ruling. 37.  The managers of Tbilisi International Airport and Air-BP-Georgia, which specialised in fuel distribution, confirmed to the trial court that their companies had paid the amounts at issue pursuant to contracts that they had freely entered into with the CAA. They specified that in exchange for the fee the CAA licensed their companies\u2019 activities, and that without such certification it would have been impossible for Tbilisi International Airport to host international flights. 38.  When questioned by the trial court, Mr Dj.K., the first deputy chairperson of the CAA, explained that at the material time, a new law, which should have been passed following the judgment of the Constitutional Court of 10 January 2003, had been delayed and that, if the applicant had not decided to enter into contracts with companies whose activities were subject to regulation, the CAA, which received no funding from the State, would have had to cease operations. That would have meant that employees of Georgian airports would no longer have been certified, that no aircraft would have been able to land at those airports and that no country would have allowed aircraft that had taken off from those airports onto its territory. By way of an example, Airzena, the airline behind the request which had resulted in the judgment of the Constitutional Court of 10 January 2003, leased its aircraft in Germany on the condition that the CAA, under an agreement entered into with the German civil aviation authority, assumed responsibility for supervising those aircraft and regulating the corresponding activities. If the CAA were to cease operations, Germany would no longer lease its aircraft to Airzena. It was to prevent any such blockages in the field of civil aviation in Georgia that the applicant had entered into the contracts, in accordance with the Public-Law Entities Act and the judgment of the Constitutional Court at issue. 39.  The second deputy chairperson of the CAA told the court that he had personally worked on drafting contracts which were subsequently entered into with the three civil aviation companies. He maintained that those contracts, which had become the only source of funding for the CAA, had become necessary after the Constitutional Court had invalidated the relevant legal provisions by declaring them unconstitutional. 40.  The CAA\u2019s accountant explained before the trial court that on 1 January 2002 the CAA had been split from the Ministry of Transport, on the recommendation of the World Bank, and that it had become legally fully independent. The exercise of public duties had been delegated to it, including the supervision of flight safety. Since that date, the CAA had not been funded from the State budget, and had therefore been obliged to collect duties from the various private companies working in civil aviation. However, since the relevant legal provisions regulating the collection of \u201cthe annual collection fee for transport activities\u201d had been declared invalid by the Constitutional Court, the CAA, pending the passing by Parliament of new legislation on the matter, had been forced to make contracts with civil aviation companies. Subsequently, after the amendment of the Regulation Act on 14 August 2003 (see paragraphs 77\u201180 below), the chairperson of the CAA, the applicant, had become entitled to issue orders setting the amount of fees payable by the companies. 41.  When questioned by the trial court, the representatives of various other private companies working in civil aviation, who were contractors of the CAA, stated that prior to 1 April 2003, they had paid the regulation fee in accordance with the law. Following the judgment of the Constitutional Court of 10 January 2003, they had stopped doing so and had only resumed payments on 1 October 2003, as a result of Order no. 1, issued by the applicant. 42.  When questioned by the trial court, the accountancy expert from the Ministry of the Interior who had authored the audit report on the CAA\u2019s activities confirmed the conclusions in the report relating to the legality of the CAA\u2019s transactions between 1 April 2003 and 13 March 2004. 43.  In his submissions before the court, the applicant first reiterated the arguments he had made during the investigation, notably in his complaint of 15 September 2004 (see paragraph 28 above). The applicant then argued that of the amounts which he had been unjustifiably accused of charging unlawfully, he had paid GEL 490,473 (some EUR 225,000) to the State, while the remainder had been used to fund the CAA\u2019s operations (see the aforementioned expert report cited at paragraphs 22-26 above). Consequently, neither he nor anyone else had derived any personal profit from the amounts in question. The applicant argued that the accountancy expert\u2019s report confirmed the legality of his actions. He explained that the reason the Constitutional Court had delayed the entry into force of its judgment of 10 January 2003 had been to grant Parliament sufficient time to legislate and fill the gap arising from its judgment. In order not to leave the CAA without funds, which would have meant flight safety might have been compromised, the Constitutional Court had clearly indicated in its judgment that the CAA could enter into contractual relationships with the aviation companies concerned, which would thus be able to negotiate conditions freely. 44.  It was for the very same reasons as those espoused by the Constitutional Court in its judgment that the Georgian President had issued Decree no. 364 on 25 July 2003 (see paragraph 82 below). That decree, as well as section 13(d) of the Public-Law Entities Act, gave a direct right to the applicant, as chairperson of the CAA, to collect duties by entering into contractual relations with companies working in civil aviation. Furthermore, the new law, required as a result of the judgment of the Constitutional Court of 10 January 2003, had been passed on 14 August 2003 and had entered into force on 15 September 2003. The applicant had issued Order no. 1 in compliance with that law and had subsequently submitted it to the Ministry of Justice for registration. The Ministry of Justice had registered it on 27 November 2003, approving its retrospective application as of 1 October 2003 under sections 33(4) and 54 of the Law on Normative Legal Acts, on the grounds that all the companies covered by the Order had the necessary legal identification numbers and codes. The applicant pointed out that if it had been unlawful to apply the order at issue retrospectively, the Ministry of Justice would have informed the CAA and instructed it to make the necessary amendments, in accordance with the law. The applicant concluded that the actions he had taken in the exercise of his official duties had not been contrary to the judgment of the Constitutional Court in question, or to any other legal provisions applicable at the material time, and thus could not qualify as abuse of power. 45.  On 8 August 2005 the Tbilisi City Court found the applicant guilty of two of the three episodes of abuse of power which the GPO had accused him of (see paragraph 27 above), but acquitted him of one. The one he was acquitted of was with respect to the CAA collecting \u201can annual registration fee for transport activities\u201d from eight private companies working in civil aviation, including Sakaeronavigatsia and Tbilisi International Airport, between 1 April and 1 October 2003. The court established that the relevant amounts corresponded to debts owed to the CAA by those companies for the period prior to 1 April 2003. 46.  As for the other two episodes, the Tbilisi City Court considered that the applicant had unlawfully entered into the contracts of 28 March and 13 August 2003 with Sakaeronavigatsia, Tbilisi International Airport and Air\u2011BP\u2011Georgia, in breach of the Constitutional Court\u2019s judgment of 10 January 2003. Thus, between 1 April and 1 October 2003, the CAA had unlawfully received the sums of GEL 425,000 (some EUR 208,000), 180,000 (around EUR 83,000) and 25,000 (some EUR 11,000) respectively, from which the applicant had unlawfully paid his own salary and the salaries of his employees, and had financed the CAA\u2019s business trip and management expenses. Furthermore, the applicant was found guilty of unlawfully issuing Order no. 1, to which the applicant had moreover given retrospective effect, which served as the basis for collecting levies between 1 October 2003 and 13 March 2004 from twenty-two companies, amounting to GEL 281,344.23 (some EUR 133,000) which had been spent in the same, unlawful way. 47.  The Tbilisi City Court stated that it disagreed with the applicant\u2019s argument that the Constitutional Court judgment of 10 January 2003 had given him the right to enter into contracts with the companies concerned and that the CAA would have been unable to continue to operate if those contracts not been entered into. However, the court did not give any reasons to explain its position. 48.  As to the audit report prepared by the accountancy expert on the CAA\u2019s activities, the Tbilisi City Court restricted itself to noting that the expert in question was from the Ministry of the Interior and that he had confirmed his conclusions when he had been questioned during the trial. The court gave no explanation for why it did not take the expert\u2019s statements into consideration. 49.  The judgment of 8 August 2005 found the applicant guilty of the crime provided for in Article 332 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3 (a) of the Criminal Code and sentenced him to five years\u2019 imprisonment. He was also banned from holding public office for two years. 50.  The applicant appealed, stating that the Tbilisi City Court had not established which of the impugned actions had breached the notion of public service requirements, within the meaning of Article 332 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code, what exactly the criminal offence had consisted of, what had been the reasons for it, and what its objectives and consequences had been. Furthermore, the Tbilisi City Court had not explained how his actions had damaged the interests of twenty-two companies, when none of those companies had expressed any interest in joining the criminal proceedings as civil parties or had ever initiated any separate civil proceedings against the CAA. 51.  When questioned by the Tbilisi Court of Appeal, representatives of fourteen of the companies concerned stated that they had incurred no financial damage as a result of having paid the fees for the services provided by the CAA, either on the basis of the relevant contracts or Order no. 1. Moreover, the cost of the amounts paid had not been borne by the companies, since it had been included in the price of airplane tickets sold to the end consumer, who was airline passengers (see also the accountancy expert\u2019s report cited at paragraphs 22-26 above). By a judgment of 30 December 2005 the Tbilisi Court of Appeal acquitted the applicant in respect of the charge relating to the aforementioned fourteen companies. It upheld the judgment of the lower court as to the remaining charges, notably the collection by the CAA of fees for services from the remaining eight companies on the basis of either contracts or Order no. 1. The applicant\u2019s prison sentence was amended and set at four years. 52.  The applicant appealed on points of law, arguing that his case had been examined superficially and that, amongst other things, the accountancy expert\u2019s report of 20 July 2004 (see paragraphs 22-26 above) had not been taken into consideration. The applicant complained that in examining the question of the existence of a loss to the aforementioned eight companies, the Court of Appeal had failed to consider the case from the same point of view concerning the other companies, especially Sakaeronavigatsia, which had allegedly incurred the biggest loss. In fact, according to the applicant, the Court of Appeal had completely failed to consider that part of the case or the accountancy expert\u2019s view that Sakaeronavigatsia could not have incurred a loss. The applicant concluded that the reasoning given by the lower court to prove his guilt had been manifestly insufficient and arbitrary. 53.  On 14 September 2006 the Supreme Court of Georgia dismissed the appeal on points of law by the applicant, stating that by continuing to charge the fees to the various private companies after 1 April 2003 the applicant had misapplied the judgment of the Constitutional Court of 10 January 2003 and had thus committed an abuse of power, infringing the rights of various legal entities and the general legal interests of the State. 54.  After serving his sentence in full, the applicant was released on 14 March 2008. 55.  In December 2003, well before the applicant had been placed under investigation and arrested, and shortly after the Rose Revolution that led to the resignation of President Shevardnadze (see Georgian Labour Party v. Georgia, no. 9103/04, \u00a7\u00a7 11-13, ECHR 2008), Mr M. Saakashvili, who did not hold any State office at the time but was campaigning as a candidate to be elected president, addressed representatives of Georgian companies in Tbilisi\u2019s sports stadium. He stated that the objectives of the abolition of the old, corrupt and unfair regime had not involved simply replacing one political clan with another. In particular, he promised that nepotism, irrespective of where it came from, whether from representatives of the old or the new regime, would no longer be the rule. Amongst other things, he stated in that regard:\n\u201cI heard more news on the television yesterday: it would appear that Zurab Ts ..., the chairman of a committee of the former parliament, took his son and had him appointed deputy chairman of the Civil Aviation Authority! It is now 3.35. I will give [the applicant]: either he gets rid of Ts ..., or [the applicant] himself goes to jail! ... It is said that we are instructing the prosecution authorities to arrest officials of the old regime but that this seems like a breach of their human rights! Yes, I confirm, all those who should be arrested will be jailed. They only began to remember human rights when their own interests were threatened ... Where does the money come from [for a former governor] to hire lawyers to defend himself and ... live in a five\u2011star hotel in Moscow, when one night there costs the same as your pensions several times over...? Is not your money, Georgia\u2019s money, being taken from your pockets? ... \u201c 56.  According to the applicant, the events which came after the speech of Mr Saakashvili, who was elected President of Georgia in January 2004, were as follows: the son of Zurab Ts. immediately resigned as deputy chairman of the CAA, the applicant was placed under investigation in March 2004 on the aforementioned charges and the same Zurab Ts. was re\u2011elected to parliament from Mr Saakashvili\u2019s presidential party list during the parliamentary elections of March 2004.", "references": ["8", "9", "1", "7", "6", "4", "5", "0", "No Label", "2", "3"], "gold": ["2", "3"]}
+{"input": "5.  On 27 June 2006 a nineteen-year old woman, K., went to a party in Novy Sanzhary, a small town, and never returned home. 6.  On 4 July 2006 her relatives reported her disappearance to the police. 7.  Having questioned a number of witnesses, the police established that K. had left the party with her cousin R. and the applicant, one of his friends. At about 6 a.m. on 28 June 2006 K., R. and the applicant were seen drinking beer in a caf\u00e9. Several witnesses stated that while the applicant had been in the caf\u00e9 he had carried a certain \u201cpennant\u201d of a mobile operator company. Shortly afterwards, a witness saw the applicant walking down a road with his arms around K. After that nobody saw K. 8.  R. told the police that in the morning on 28 June 2006 he had left K. with the applicant and had gone to work. 9.  On an unspecified date between 4 and 8 July 2006 the police questioned the applicant as a witness in connection with K.\u2019s disappearance. During that questioning the applicant said that in the morning on 28 June 2006 he had left K. with two unknown men, had taken a taxi at a taxi stand and had gone home. Police officer I. brought the applicant to the taxi stand and asked the taxi drivers whether they had seen him on 28 June 2006. The taxi drivers did not recognise the applicant and the applicant could not indicate the car and the driver who had allegedly driven him on 28 June 2006. He also could not provide any details about the appearances of the car or the driver. 10.  After the applicant\u2019s questioning as a witness and the visit to the taxi stand (see paragraph 9 above), on 8 July 2006 the police detained the applicant for an \u201coffence of minor public disorder\u201d and placed him in a cell at the Novy Sanzhary Police Station. Before the Court and the trial court the applicant submitted that he had not committed any such offence and had been placed in the cell without any reasons. No further information about the nature of the offence in question was made available to the Court. 11.  Before the Court the applicant stated that on 8 and 9 July 2006, while he had been kept in the cell, police officers had beaten him and threatened him urging him to \u201ctell the truth\u201d about K.\u2019s disappearance. The material in the case file (namely, a copy of the applicant\u2019s indictment) contains reference to the statements of police officers I. and F. saying that on 8 or 9 July 2006, while the applicant was in the cell at the Novy Sanzhary Police Station, they questioned him without a lawyer in connection with K\u2019.s disappearance. On 10 July 2006 they questioned him again on the same issue without a lawyer and he confessed to K.\u2019s murder, robbery and rape. 12.  On 10 July 2006 during the questioning by I. and F. the applicant made a written statement saying that in the morning on 28 June 2006, after R. had left, he had decided to walk K. home. As he and K. had been walking down a road, he had tried to hug her but she had struck him in the groin. He had reacted by suddenly grabbing her by the neck with his two hands and holding her for several seconds. K. had fainted so he had let her go. After that he had dragged her body into some bushes, pulled down her knickers, bra and t-shirt and had raped her. After that he had taken 20 Ukrainian hryvnias (approximately 3 euros) from her wallet and had left. As he had been leaving, K. had been unconscious, but he had not known whether she had been dead or alive, he had had no intention to kill K. when he had grabbed her neck but he had realized that such actions could theoretically result in her death. I. and F. passed the applicant\u2019s written confessions to investigator G. from the local prosecutor\u2019s office. 13.  Still on 10 July 2006 investigator G. opened a criminal case against the applicant for the rape, robbery and murder of K. and read him his procedural rights as a suspect, including his rights of defence. The applicant confirmed in writing that he understood his rights. G. also arrested the applicant on suspicion of murder, robbery and rape. 14.  Some forty minutes later investigator G. carried out a reconstruction of events in the presence of the applicant, attesting witnesses B. and L., and a forensic medical expert, B. The applicant showed them the place where he had grabbed K. by the neck and her body lying in the bushes. The experts and the investigator inspected the crime scene and collected physical evidence. Investigator G. kept written minutes of the inspection of the crime scene. He noted that the corpse was heavily damaged from decay, worms and insects, it was lying face up with legs spread apart. K.\u2019s bra, t-shirt and knickers were pulled down. Near the corpse the police found a pennant of a mobile operator company and K.\u2019s open wallet. 15.  On the same day after the reconstruction of events, investigator G. questioned the applicant in his capacity as a suspect without a lawyer being present. The applicant confirmed his previous statements. 16.  In his application form the applicant stated that for the first time he had been allowed to see a lawyer on 22 August 2006. However, from the material in the case file, the authenticity of which the applicant did not dispute before the Court, it follows that on 11 July 2006 the investigator G. appointed lawyer V. to represent the applicant under the legal aid scheme and questioned the applicant in his presence. The applicant confirmed that he had strangled K. with both hands, taken 20 hryvnias from her wallet, put her body in the bushes, pulled down her clothes and raped her. 17.  On 12 July 2006 S. was appointed as the applicant\u2019s lawyer instead of V. at the request of the applicant\u2019s father. The applicant confirmed in writing that he wished to have S. as his lawyer. 18.  Later that day the police conducted a further reconstruction of events which the applicant, lawyer S., two attesting witnesses and two forensic medical experts took part in. The applicant confirmed that he had strangled K. with both hands, and that after she had fainted he had put her body in the bushes, taken 20 hryvnias from her wallet, pulled down her clothes and raped her. During the reconstruction, he told the medical experts that he had not been ill-treated by the investigative authorities. 19.  On 14 July 2006 the applicant was questioned again without a lawyer. Before the questioning he noted in writing that he did not object to being questioned without a lawyer. He described the clothes he had worn on the day of the murder and said that after the murder the clothes had been washed. The police seized the clothes in question from the house of the applicant\u2019s parents. 20.  On 18 July 2006 the applicant was examined by a forensic medical expert, who observed no injuries and reported no complaints. 21.  On the same date the investigator read the applicant his procedural rights as an accused, including his rights of defence. The applicant indicated that he wanted to have S. as his lawyer. 22.  Later that day the applicant was charged with rape, robbery and murder. He was questioned in lawyer S.\u2019s presence and confirmed having strangled K. with both hands, taken 20 hryvnias from her, put her body in the bushes, pulled down her clothes and raped her. 23.  Forensic examinations conducted in July and August 2006 revealed that K. had died because she had been strangled by the neck on both sides. The forensic experts did not find on the corpse any forensic evidence (fingerprints, body fluids, genetic material, and the like) originating from the applicant. No such evidence was discovered on the crime scene either. The experts also found no forensic evidence of rape on the body because its soft tissues had been destroyed by decay and worms. However, in their report the forensic medical experts noted that the corpse\u2019s position and the fact that the clothes on it had been displaced proved that K. had been raped. 24.  On 9 September 2006 the applicant confirmed that he wished to have S. as his lawyer. Later that day he was questioned in S.\u2019s presence and said that he had not intended to kill or rape K. He had only decided to rape her after she had fainted. He said that he had not taken 20 hryvnias from K.\u2019s wallet. In fact, he had seen 20 hryvnias on the ground near her body, decided that they had fallen from his own pocket and had taken them. He also said that he had given his earlier statements voluntarily without being physically or psychologically coerced into doing so. 25.  Witnesses questioned during the pre-trial investigation stated that the pennant found on the crime scene looked exactly as the one which they had seen on the applicant in the morning on 28 June 2006 (see paragraph 7 above). The applicant did not deny that it was the same pennant. 26.  On 19 September 2006 the investigator granted the applicant\u2019s request to have his mother appointed as his representative. 27.  On the same day the applicant was informed that the pre-trial investigation was completed and the indictment was drafted. The applicant was allowed to study the case file with S. and his mother. 28.  On 28 September 2006 the case was sent for trial to the Poltava Regional Court of Appeal. 29.  On 16 November 2006, during a court hearing at which lawyer S. was present, the applicant stated that after K. had kicked him in the groin he had suddenly struck her on the neck with one hand. She had fainted and he had put her body in the bushes and left. He denied having strangled K. with his two hands, robbed her, pulled down K.\u2019s clothes, and raped her. He submitted that the police had detained him several days before 10 July 2006, kept him in a cell and ill-treated him until he agreed to confess to the murder, robbery, and rape. 30.  The court ordered the prosecution authorities to conduct a pre\u2011investigation inquiry into the applicant\u2019s allegation of ill-treatment. 31.  On 5 February 2007 the Novi Sanzhary prosecutor\u2019s office refused to institute a criminal investigation into the applicant\u2019s complaint of ill\u2011treatment after questioning F. and I., who denied that they had subjected him to any pressure. Copies of the written minutes of the questioning of F. and I. are not available to the Court. 32.  The applicant requested the Poltava Regional Court of Appeal to send his case for additional investigation on the ground that his right to defence had been restricted on 10 July 2006 when he had been questioned without a lawyer. On 23 October 2007 the Poltava Regional Court of Appeal rejected that request noting that although the applicant\u2019s right to legal assistance had indeed been restricted on 10 July 2006, the situation had been remedied because starting from 11 July 2006 the applicant had been represented by a lawyer and confirmed his self-incriminating statements in his presence. 33.  The court questioned F. and I. and the attesting witnesses present during the reconstruction of events on 10 July 2006. They all denied that the applicant had been coerced. The forensic experts who had examined K.\u2019s body were questioned by the court; they refuted the applicant\u2019s claim that he had struck the victim once on the neck. They said that her injuries proved that she had died because she had been strangled by the neck on both sides, in the exact same way the applicant had described during the pre-trial investigation. 34.  Being questioned at a court hearing in the presence of a lawyer the applicant stated that he had involuntarily killed K. by striking her with one hand, he had not strangled, robbed or raped her. According to him, the police had pulled down K.\u2019s clothes, put her body face up and spread her legs because they wanted to accuse the applicant of her rape. 35.  On 20 November 2007 the Poltava Regional Court of Appeal convicted the applicant of robbery, rape, and murder of K. and sentenced him to fourteen and a half years\u2019 imprisonment. The court found that the applicant had wanted to rob and rape K. and had strangled her in order to supress her resistance. The court referred to the statement which the applicant had made in the presence of his lawyer, the minutes of the inspection of the crime scene on 10 July 2006, the results of the forensic examination of K.\u2019s body and other material evidence found on the crime scene, forensic expert\u2019s statements made before the court, and statements of witnesses who on 28 June 2006 had first seen the applicant with R. and K. and then later with K. alone walking down the road. The court also noted that the pennant which the applicant had with him when he had been in the caf\u00e9 (see paragraph 7 above) had been later found on the crime scene. The court also referred to the statements of witnesses who had seen that on 27 June 2006 K. had with her a note of 20 hryvnias. The conclusion that K. had been raped was made having regard to the position of K.\u2019s body when it had been discovered by the police and the fact that her clothes had been pulled down. In its reasoning the court did not refer to the clothes which the applicant described on 14 July 2006 (see paragraph 19 above) as an evidence of his guilt. However, in the operative part of the judgment the court ordered the police to return the clothes to the applicant\u2019s mother. As to the applicant\u2019s allegation of ill-treatment, the court dismissed this as unsubstantiated referring to the prosecutor\u2019s decision of 5 February 2007. 36.  The applicant appealed to the Supreme Court. He complained, in particular, that the trial court had relied on his confessions extracted under duress and without a lawyer. 37.  On 27 March 2008 the Supreme Court upheld the judgment of 20 November 2007. It noted, in particular, that when convicting the applicant the trial court had mainly relied on the statements which he had made in the presence of the lawyer S. on 9 September 2006. 38.  In a letter to the Court in September 2009, the applicant described the conditions of his detention in Poltava SIZO. He stated that he had been held there since 27 August 2006 in a cell measuring approximately 15 square metres with three other inmates. The window had been covered by a plastic sheet making it impossible to open. Because of this no fresh air had entered the cell and in summer, the temperature would sometimes reach 45oC. He had never been allowed to leave the cell. The food had been inadequate. 39.  The applicant submitted photos of a building which he claimed was Poltava SIZO. The windows appear to have bottom-hinged shutters made of transparent plastic. On the photographs the shutters are open, and there are several tens of centimetres of space between the window and shutter and the shutter and wall. 40.  The Government submitted that during his detention in the SIZO, the applicant had been held in various cells and it was unclear which of them he had been referring to in his letter to the Court. From 29 December 2008 to 26 January 2009 he had been detained with three other detainees in cell no. 135, which measured 10.34 square metres. He had therefore enjoyed 2.6 square metres of personal space. From 26 January 2009 to 12 March 2010 he had been detained with three other inmates in cell no. 24, which measured 12.42 square metres. The space allocation for one person had therefore been 3.1 square metres. Both cells were equipped with four beds. The SIZO windows could be opened and had not been blocked with plastic sheets. The food the applicant had received met the standard set by domestic law. The Government did not deny that the applicant had been unable to leave the cells he had been held in.", "references": ["5", "2", "7", "0", "9", "6", "8", "4", "No Label", "1", "3"], "gold": ["1", "3"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in the town of Severodonetsk, Ukraine. 7.  According to the applicant, in 1996 he brought criminal proceedings for libel before the Severodonetskyy Town Court, complaining that it had been noted in his employment record that he had been dismissed because he had committed theft. The applicant alleged that, following his numerous complaints to a prosecutor\u2019s office about the failure to investigate the above case, in 2000 the prosecutor\u2019s office had requested his placement in a psychiatric facility. 8.  According to case-file materials, on 18 March 2000 the principal of the Severodonetsk Territorial Medical Association (\u0421\u0435\u0432\u0435\u0440\u043e\u0434\u043e\u043d\u0435\u0446\u044c\u043a\u0435 \u0442\u0435\u0440\u0438\u0442\u043e\u0440\u0456\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u0435 \u043c\u0435\u0434\u0438\u0447\u043d\u0435 \u043e\u0431\u2019\u0454\u0434\u043d\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044f, hereinafter the \u201cSeverodonetsk Hospital\u201d) received a letter from the Severodonetsk Town Prosecutor\u2019s Office asking for an opinion on the state of the applicant\u2019s mental health. The parties did not submit a copy of that letter to the Court. 9.  Psychiatrists Ma. and K. studied the applicant\u2019s letters at the prosecutor\u2019s office and decided that the applicant should be examined, since the letters contained evidence of a \u201chigh probability of socially dangerous behaviour\u201d. The parties did not submit copies of those letters to the Court either. 10.  On 19 March 2000, Ma., assisted by a team of paramedics and two police officers, visited the applicant at home. The applicant stated that he had been visited by seven persons in total. 11.  The parties differed on the circumstances of this visit. According to the applicant\u2019s testimonies given before the court in civil proceedings (see paragraph 29 below), he opened the door only after the police had threatened to break it. Once the applicant had opened the door, Ma. said that they should go to a hospital to examine the applicant there. A police officer, P., was shouting at the applicant and threatening him with criminal prosecution for resisting the police. The applicant replied that he would \u201csubmit to force\u201d. He was subsequently taken by his arms and put in an ambulance. 12.  The Government submitted that there was no evidence that any pressure had been applied to the applicant. According to Ma.\u2019s testimonies given in the same court proceedings, the applicant opened the door and let Ma. and the police officers in. Ma. introduced himself and had a conversation with the applicant. It was then proposed that the applicant accompany them to a hospital for further examination. The applicant agreed, collected his belongings, closed the door and got into the ambulance. Upon arrival in the Severodonetsk Hospital it was decided that the applicant needed hospitalisation. 13.  On 20 March 2000 the applicant was examined by a panel of four doctors, including Ma. and K., which confirmed the necessity of his urgent hospitalisation. On the next day the applicant was examined by an assistant of the psychiatric medicine department of the Lugansk State University Hospital in the presence of Ma., and was offered hospital treatment. Since he refused, he was further examined by three doctors of the Lugansk Regional Psychoneurological Hospital (\u041b\u0443\u0433\u0430\u043d\u0441\u044c\u043a\u0430 \u043e\u0431\u043b\u0430\u0441\u043d\u0430 \u043a\u043b\u0456\u043d\u0456\u0447\u043d\u0430 \u043f\u0441\u0438\u0445\u043e\u043d\u0435\u0432\u0440\u043e\u043b\u043e\u0433\u0456\u0447\u043d\u0430 \u043b\u0456\u043a\u0430\u0440\u043d\u044f, hereinafter the \u201cLugansk Hospital\u201d), who concluded that he should be urgently admitted for treatment because he had written threatening letters to various authorities. 14.  Between 21 March and 7 September 2000 the applicant was a patient in the Lugansk Hospital. He was allegedly examined on 21 April, 22 May, 23 June and 22 August 2000 by a panel of three psychiatrists. Each time it was decided that his treatment had to be continued. On 26 July 2000 the applicant was examined by a regional medico-social expert commission, which established that he had a second-degree disability. 15.  On 7 September 2000 the applicant was transferred to the Svatove Regional Psychiatric Hospital (\u0421\u0432\u0430\u0442\u0456\u0432\u0441\u044c\u043a\u0430 \u043e\u0431\u043b\u0430\u0441\u043d\u0430 \u043f\u0441\u0438\u0445\u0456\u0430\u0442\u0440\u0438\u0447\u043d\u0430 \u043b\u0456\u043a\u0430\u0440\u043d\u044f, the \u201cSvatove Hospital\u201d) to continue his treatment there. He was discharged from the hospital on 4 December 2000. 16.  The applicant also stayed in a hospital between 31 May and 26 June 2001. 17.  In July and August 2001 the applicant requested that the medical establishments where he had stayed in 2000 allow him to study his medical file and inform him on what legal basis he had been subjected to psychiatric treatment. According to the applicant, he received an answer only from the Lugansk Hospital but the answer was not satisfactory. 18.  On 26 September 2001 the applicant brought proceedings before the Severodonetskyy Town Court against the Severodonetsk Hospital, complaining of its failure to reply to his request. The case file contains a copy of the applicant\u2019s complaint dated 26 September 2001. There are two handwritten notes on it: \u201creceived on 28 September 2001\u201d and \u201creceived on 2 October 2001\u201d. The Severodonetskyy District Court issued a note on the progress of the applicant\u2019s case stating that the applicant had instituted the proceedings on 2 October 2001. In October 2001 the applicant lodged a similar complaint against the Lugansk Hospital. 19.  On 15 November 2001 the court stayed the proceedings in the case pending examination of the issue of the applicant\u2019s legal capacity. On 26 December 2001 the request to recognise the applicant as legally incapacitated was left without consideration, so the proceedings were resumed on 1 February 2002. 20.  On 29 April 2002 the court rejected the applicant\u2019s claims as unsubstantiated. On 21 November 2002 the Lugansk Regional Court of Appeal quashed that decision and remitted the case for fresh consideration. 21.  On 6 February 2003 the applicant modified his claims. In addition to his initial claims, he complained, inter alia, that his committal to the psychoneurological department of the Severodonetsk Hospital on 19 March 2000 and his confinement there until 21 March 2000 had been unlawful. He also complained that he had been unlawfully transferred to the Lugansk Hospital and the Svatove Hospital, where he had been confined until 4 December 2000. The applicant also claimed damages. 22.  Between 23 February 2003 and 23 March 2004 ten court hearings took place and three hearings were postponed. In particular, on two occasions the defendants and/or their representatives failed to appear in court, and one hearing did not take place because the court recording equipment was not available. 23.  Following a request by one of the defendants, on 23 March 2004 the court ordered a forensic psychiatric examination of the applicant. On 14 July 2004 the Lugansk Regional Court of Appeal quashed that decision and remitted the case for examination on the merits. 24.  In their observations the Government provided a list of scheduled court hearings which had taken place in the applicant\u2019s case. The case file also contains a note on the progress of the applicant\u2019s case issued by the Severodonetskyy District Court. Those two descriptions of the progress of the proceedings in the applicant\u2019s case contain some contradictory information. 25.  According to the Government\u2019s submissions, between 3 September 2004 and 14 June 2005 eleven court hearings were scheduled but only five took place because either the defendants, the applicant or their representatives failed to appear. According to the domestic court record, seven hearings took place. 26.  On 14 June 2005 the term of office of the judge in the applicant\u2019s case expired. The next hearing scheduled for September 2005 allegedly with a new judge did not take place because the court recording equipment was not available. 27.  Between 3 November 2005 and 13 August 2007 forty-eight court hearings were scheduled. According to the Government, all of them took place; according to the domestic court record, ten of them did not take place because the defendants, the applicant or their representatives failed to appear. The number of such failures to appear was almost equal for both parties. 28.  On 13 August 2007 the court partially allowed the applicant\u2019s claims. It summarised his submissions as follows. On 19 March 2000 Ma., with the assistance of the police, had the applicant unlawfully committed to a psychoneurological department, where he stayed for two days. On 21 March 2000 the applicant was transferred to the Lugansk Hospital without his consent; he stayed there until 7 September 2000. He was then transferred to the Svatove Hospital, where he stayed until 4 December 2000. The applicant claimed that Ma. had acted unlawfully, had breached the applicant\u2019s right to respect for his home, had examined the applicant against his will and had deprived him of his liberty. The applicant further complained that he had been unlawfully confined in all three hospitals, and that the principals of those institutions had failed to respond to his requests for information. The applicant claimed 100,000 Ukrainian hryvnas (UAH) in compensation for non-pecuniary damage. 29.  The court further noted that in a court hearing the applicant had submitted that he had not challenged his diagnosis but considered that the doctors\u2019 actions had been unlawful. He gave his version of the events of 19 March 2000 (see paragraph 11 above). The applicant also submitted that force had been used against him in the Severodonetsk Hospital; he had been administered with injections and had been kept behind bars in a locked room. He had been transferred to the Lugansk and Svatove Hospitals without his consent. Information about his state of health had been provided to his employers and to the relevant prosecutor\u2019s office. He had been discharged from the Svatove Hospital having been advised not to lodge any official complaints, otherwise he would be hospitalised again. He had not lodged any complaints since he had been \u201cafraid for his future\u201d. The applicant stated that he had sustained non-pecuniary damage caused by his involuntary hospitalisation, the administering of unknown medication by means of injection, poor nutrition, fear for his life, unsanitary conditions and a breach of his right to respect for his home. 30.  In court hearings Ma., and police officers Sh. and G. testified that no pressure had been brought to bear on the applicant at the time of the visit to his home. Witness Mb. testified that he did not remember the circumstances of that visit and witness Z. testified that she had seen \u201ca doctor entering [the applicant\u2019s house?] alone, followed several minutes later by a police officer\u201d. She had then seen the applicant getting into an ambulance. Ma. also submitted that the applicant\u2019s hospitalisation had been in compliance with temporary instructions nos. 16 and 17 \u201cOn procedure for the conduct of preliminary psychiatric examination of citizens\u201d and \u201cOn procedure for urgent hospitalisation of mentally ill persons\u201d (\u201cInstructions nos. 16 and 17\u201d) appended to Order no. 225 of the Ministry of Health of the USSR of 25 March 1988 \u201cOn actions for further improvement of psychiatric assistance\u201d (\u201cOrder no. 225\u201d), in particular, paragraphs 1, 2, and 10 to 13 of Instruction no. 16 and paragraphs 1, 2, 5 and 6 of the Instruction no. 17 (see relevant domestic law below). 31.  The court found that the visit to the applicant\u2019s home on 19 March 2000 when the applicant had been examined and later taken to the Severodonetsk Hospital had been performed in compliance with paragraphs 1, 2, and 10 to 13 of Instruction no. 16 and paragraphs 1, 2 (b), 5 and 6 of Instruction no. 17. Referring to the \u201ctestimonies of Ma., Mb. and G.\u201d, the court held that the applicant had failed to prove that any force had been used against him. The decision of 19 March 2000 on the applicant\u2019s admission to hospital had also been adopted in compliance with paragraphs 1 and 2 of Instruction no. 17. The subsequent decision of 21 March 2000 to hospitalise the applicant had also been taken in compliance with paragraph 2 (b) of Instruction no. 17. However, the applicant\u2019s transfer to the Svatove Hospital on 7 September 2000 had been in breach of section 16 of the Psychiatric Medical Assistance Act, which was in force as of 4 April 2000. The applicant\u2019s requests for access to information had been rejected as a result of a decision to limit his access to his medical file, which he had not challenged. Such information could have been provided to the applicant\u2019s relatives if he so wished. The court awarded the applicant UAH 2,000 to be paid by the Svatove Hospital (approximately 286 euros (EUR) at the material time) in compensation for non-pecuniary damage. 32.  The applicant appealed, stating, in particular, that by Order no. 81 of 18 April 1996 of the Ministry of Health of Ukraine (\u201cOrder no. 81\u201d), Order no. 225 had been declared \u201cnot applicable on the territory of Ukraine\u201d. 33.  On 29 November 2007 the Lugansk Regional Court of Appeal upheld the decision of 13 August 2007. The court held that the first-instance court had correctly applied the law in force at the material time. The court rejected the applicant\u2019s arguments about the invalidity of Order no. 225 as unsubstantiated without giving any further details. It did not comment on the validity and/or legal effect of Order no. 81. 34.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, reiterating his arguments. 35.  On 12 February 2008 the Supreme Court of Ukraine dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law as unsubstantiated. 36.  On 23 November 2010 the applicant complained to the Severodonetskyy Town Court that he had not received a writ of enforcement. In reply, the court informed him that he could receive the writ of enforcement from the court\u2019s secretariat upon a written request. 37.  It is unclear whether the applicant received the compensation awarded to him.", "references": ["9", "8", "7", "4", "0", "5", "1", "6", "No Label", "2", "3"], "gold": ["2", "3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1954, 1976 and 1971 respectively and live in Lecco. 6.  The first applicant is the editor of a local online newspaper in the province of Lecco. The other two applicants are journalists working for the newspaper. 7.  In the course of their activities, the applicants used radio equipment to access frequencies used by the police or the carabinieri. This enabled them to learn of any communications transmitted in that way, so that they could arrive quickly on the scene when wishing to report on specific incidents. 8.  On 1 August 2002 the applicants listened in on a conversation during which the Merate carabinieri operations centre decided to send a patrol to a location where, according to anonymous sources, weapons had been stored illegally. 9.  The carabinieri accordingly went to the location mentioned, and the second and third applicants arrived on the scene immediately afterwards. 10.  Having obtained a search warrant, the carabinieri searched the applicants\u2019 car, finding two frequency-modulation transmitter/receivers that were capable of intercepting police radio communications. 11.  The carabinieri then went to the two journalists\u2019 editorial office and seized two fixed radio receivers, which were tuned to the frequencies used by the carabinieri. Other frequencies used by police operations centres were stored in the devices\u2019 memory. 12.  Criminal proceedings were instituted against the first and second applicants for illegally installing equipment designed to intercept communications between law-enforcement agencies\u2019 operations centres and patrols (Articles 617, 617 bis and 623 bis of the Criminal Code). The third applicant was charged with accessing the aforementioned communications (Articles 617 and 623 bis of the Criminal Code). 13.  On 9 November 2004 the Lecco District Court acquitted the applicants. It held that the relevant Articles of the Criminal Code were to be interpreted in the light of Article 15 of the Constitution, which only protected communications of a confidential nature. 14.  The District Court observed that the radio device used by the law-enforcement agencies was unable to ensure the confidentiality of the information it transmitted. Accordingly, the interception of the communications in question did not constitute an offence. Moreover, the possession and use of radio receivers were not prohibited as such. 15.  The Milan principal public prosecutor and the Lecco public prosecutor appealed. They argued that the Lecco District Court\u2019s interpretation was inconsistent with the Court of Cassation\u2019s case-law in such matters (citing in particular judgment no. 12655 of 23 January 2001) and that the communications in issue were clearly confidential, bearing in mind the aims of ensuring public safety and protecting public order. In addition, the communications concerned the initial investigations following the commission of an offence. They were therefore subject to a confidentiality requirement pursuant to Article 329 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 16.  The confidential nature of the communications was also obvious from the fact that the carabinieri used coded language for communications concerning the location and the type of intervention, clearly seeking to ensure that no third parties had knowledge of the information being exchanged. In addition, the radiofrequencies involved had been exclusively assigned to operations centres by the Ministry of Defence. 17.  Furthermore, in order to listen in on the conversations, the applicants had had to purchase special radio equipment, as ordinary equipment could not be used for this purpose. On the other hand, the fact that such devices were freely available on the market did not justify their use for intercepting conversations between law-enforcement officers. 18.  In addition, in accordance with Presidential Decree no. 447/2001, as in force at the material time, devices of this kind were intended to be purchased by amateur radio operators but could not be used to intercept police radiofrequencies. Lastly, the Ministry of Communications\u2019 decree of 11 February 2003 had expressly prohibited amateur radio operators from intercepting communications which they were not entitled to receive. 19.  In a judgment of 15 May 2007 the Milan Court of Appeal found the first and second applicants guilty and sentenced them to one year and three months\u2019 imprisonment. The third applicant was sentenced to six months\u2019 imprisonment. The Court of Appeal suspended the applicants\u2019 sentences. 20.  It observed that Article 623 bis of the Criminal Code, as amended by Law no. 547 of 23 November 1993, had extended the scope of criminal responsibility to cover all remote data transmission, thus including the interception of conversations between the law-enforcement agencies\u2019 operations centres and patrols. 21.  Such communications were, moreover, clearly confidential. Reiterating all the arguments put forward by the Milan and Lecco public prosecutors, particularly regarding the aims of ensuring public safety and protecting public order, the Court of Appeal held that Article 329 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was also at issue in the present case. 22.  The applicants appealed to the Court of Cassation. They contended that the communications in question had been transmitted on unencrypted frequencies and thus could not be treated as confidential. Furthermore, they had been acting in a professional capacity as journalists, and their actions were therefore justified under Article 51 of the Criminal Code and in terms of freedom of the press. 23.  In a judgment of 28 October 2008 the Court of Cassation found against the applicants, upholding the Court of Appeal\u2019s position as to the confidential nature of the communications and reiterating that this interpretation was consistent with its own approach in similar cases, particularly in judgments no. 25488 of 6 May 2004 and no. 5299 of 15 January 2008. 24.  Addressing the applicants\u2019 argument concerning freedom of the press, the Court of Cassation stated that the right to impart information, which they had relied on, might have prevailed over the public interests protected by criminal law in a case of alleged defamation. However, that right could not take precedence in a case concerning the illegal interception of communications between law-enforcement officers.\n...", "references": ["5", "9", "7", "2", "3", "0", "4", "1", "6", "8", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1966 and is currently serving a prison sentence. 6.  In August and September 2001 a number of separate criminal proceedings were instituted in connection with stealing grain, farm animals and other items from different farms. These proceedings were eventually joined into a single criminal case (\u201cthe theft proceedings\u201d). 7.  On 15 August 2001 the applicant \u2013 together with several other individuals including V.Z. \u2013 was arrested as a suspect in these proceedings. 8.  On 17 August 2001 the Magdalynivsky District Court (hereafter \u201cthe District Court\u201d) remanded the applicant in custody pending pre-trial investigation of the above charges. 9.  On 23 August 2001 criminal proceedings were instituted in connection with the premeditated murder of a man whose body had allegedly been found by a villager in the forest near the applicant\u2019s village (\u201cthe murder proceedings\u201d). 10.  On the same day, whilst being interrogated in the theft proceedings, V.Z. allegedly told the police that on 1 August 2001 the applicant had fatally injured a woman, L.G., in a traffic accident and had killed her husband, A.G., in V.Z.\u2019s presence in order to cover this crime. He also stated that they had hidden the bodies in the forest. According to the Government, criminal proceedings in connection with L.G.\u2019s death in a traffic accident were also launched that day. 11.  Later the same day, the applicant and V.Z., unaccompanied by lawyers, were taken to the centre of the village where they lived and were asked by the police to give video-recorded testimonies about the circumstances of the deaths of L.G. and A.G. V.Z. repeated the statement he had made earlier that day. According to the record of the crime reconstruction, which referred to the applicant as the \u201csuspect\u201d, the latter \u2013having been informed of his rights to defence and his right not to incriminate himself \u2013 agreed to give testimony and acknowledged that he had fatally hit L.G. with his car and had helped V.Z. to cover the victims\u2019 bodies, but stated that it was V.Z. who had killed A.G. 12.  On the same day, in the absence of the applicant\u2019s lawyer, a site inspection and a road examination were carried out. The investigation team and forensic experts also examined the applicant\u2019s car in his absence. 13.  On 24 August 2001 criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant in connection with the traffic accident which had resulted in L.G.\u2019s death. The applicant\u2019s wife was questioned by the police. 14.  On 31 August 2001 the applicant was informed in writing of his right to defence and was questioned, in the presence of his defense counsel, as a suspect in the premeditated murder of A.G. He repeated the statement he had made on 23 August 2001. 15.  On 26 September 2001 the applicant was charged with ten counts of theft and with causing a traffic accident which resulted in L.G.\u2019s death. 16.  On 10 October 2001 the investigation into the premeditated murder of A.G. was suspended because it had been impossible to establish the offender. It was resumed on 10 February 2002. 17.  On an unspecified date the applicant was committed for trial on the charges of theft and causing a fatal traffic accident. 18.  On 11 February 2002 the District Court found the applicant guilty on several counts of theft and sentenced him to ten years\u2019 imprisonment. No verdict was reached on the other charge (see paragraph 21 below). By the same judgment, eleven other individuals, including V.Z., were convicted on various counts of theft in collaboration with the applicant and were sentenced to various penalties. 19.  On the same day, the applicant was charged with the premeditated murder of A.G. He was questioned in the presence of his defence counsel but made no statement. 20.  On 12 February 2002 the murder proceedings were stayed owing to the applicant\u2019s unspecified illness. According to the applicant, his \u201cillness\u201d was invented by the authorities in order to protract the proceedings. 21.  On 25 July 2002 the Dnipropetrovsk Regional Court of Appeal (hereafter \u201cthe Court of Appeal\u201d) upheld the conviction of 11 February 2002 with respect to the applicant\u2019s co-defendants, quashed the conviction with respect to the applicant and remitted his case to the District Court for retrial. The Court of Appeal noted, in particular, that the District Court, having admitted the case for trial on both the charges of theft and causing a fatal traffic accident, had reached a verdict only on the theft charge. 22.  On 13 February 2003 the District Court disjoined the charge concerning the traffic incident and remitted it to the investigating authorities for further investigation together with the murder charge. 23.  On 19 February 2003 the District Court found the applicant guilty on several counts of theft and sentenced him to ten years\u2019 imprisonment. 24.  On 24 February 2003 the murder proceedings were resumed and joined to the criminal proceedings concerning the traffic accident. 25.  On 6 June 2003 the Court of Appeal quashed the judgment of 19 February 2003 and remitted the case for retrial. It noted, in particular, that the investigation was littered with deficiencies and procedural violations. 26.  On 7 July 2003, following a request by the applicant and his lawyer, the District Court remitted the theft case to the Magdalynivsky District Prosecutors\u2019 Office, instructing it to join the proceedings to those concerning the traffic accident and the murder. 27.  On 24 September 2003 the investigator reclassified the applicant\u2019s charges from premeditated to aggravated murder. On the same date, these proceedings were joined to the criminal proceedings concerning the theft and the traffic accident. 28.  On 25 September 2003 the investigator from the Magdalynivsky District Prosecutors\u2019 Office ordered the applicant\u2019s release from custody pending trial in connection with the theft charges. On the same date, without being released, the applicant was re-arrested on suspicion of the premeditated murder of A.G. 29.  On 26 September 2003 the prosecutor\u2019s office asked the District Court to remand the applicant in custody in connection with the murder proceedings. 30.  On 27 September 2003, in the presence of his defense counsel, the applicant was questioned as a suspect in the murder proceedings. He maintained his innocence. 31.  On 29 September 2003 the District Court refused the prosecutor\u2019s request to remand the applicant in custody in the murder proceedings, having found that the prosecutor\u2019s decision to cancel the applicant\u2019s detention on remand of 25 September 2003 had been unlawful. It noted, in particular, that the investigation of the murder case had featured artificial suspensions and other delays and that by joining and disjoining the various charges against the applicant, the investigation had been sidestepping the proper procedure for extending the term for the pre-trial investigation. Moreover, this tactic had allowed them to conduct various investigative activities in the absence of the applicant\u2019s defence counsel. The court further found that the applicant should be considered as having been in detention since 15 August 2001 for the theft charges. 32.  On 7 October 2003, in the presence of his defense counsel, the applicant was charged with theft, causing a traffic accident and premeditated murder and was questioned as an accused. He admitted that he had fatally hit L.G. but denied killing A.G. 33.  On 8 October 2003 the Court of Appeal quashed the decision of 29 September 2003 and remitted the matter to the District Court for fresh consideration. 34.  On 10 October 2003 the applicant was charged with the aggravated murder of A.G. and causing a traffic accident. 35.  On 13 October 2003 the applicant had a face-to-face confrontation with V.Z. 36.  On 14 October 2003 the District Court granted the prosecution\u2019s request to remand the applicant in custody in the context of the murder proceedings. 37.  On 20 November 2003 the applicant was charged, within the criminal proceedings as joined on 24 September 2003, with aggravated murder, theft and causing a traffic accident. 38.  On 2 December 2003 the applicant and his defense counsel were granted access to the case-file. 39.  On 9 December 2003 a bill of indictment was drafted by the investigator. 40.  On 14 January 2004 the criminal case was sent to the Court of Appeal, acting as the first-instance court, for trial. 41.  On 30 January 2004, upon requests from the prosecutor and the applicant, the court remitted the case for additional investigation as it had been littered with procedural violations which could not be rectified during the trial. The court noted, in particular, that after 23 August 2001 a number of investigative actions had been carried out in respect of the applicant without his procedural rights having been explained to him. It further noted that all the investigative actions taken after 23 October 2001 had violated the applicant\u2019s procedural rights because the term for the pre-trial investigation of the murder had expired. 42.  On 9 March 2004 the theft charges were disjoined into separate proceedings. The murder charges of 11 February 2002 were dropped. 43.  On 16 March 2004 the applicant was charged with aggravated murder and was questioned in the presence of his defence counsel. He maintained his innocence and confirmed the statements made earlier in this respect. 44.  On 19 April 2004 the applicant was committed for trial before the Court of Appeal, acting as a first-instance court, on charges of having caused the traffic accident which resulted in L.G.\u2019s death and of the aggravated murder of A.G. 45.  During the trial the applicant acknowledged that he had fatally hit L.G. with his car but denied killing A.G., who, according to him, had been murdered by V.Z. 46.  On 27 April 2004 the criminal proceedings concerning the theft charges were suspended. 47.  On 21 May 2004 the Court of Appeal found the applicant guilty of causing the traffic accident which resulted in L.G.\u2019s death and of the aggravated murder of A.G. The conviction for murder was based on the testimony of V.Z., which the trial court found to be corroborated by the statements made by the applicant\u2019s wife, the results of the crime-scene inspection and the forensic expert\u2019s examination of the victim\u2019s body. The Court of Appeal found reasonable V.Z\u2019s argument that he had no reason to murder A.G. as it was not him who had killed A.G.\u2019s wife. The applicant\u2019s testimony with respect to V.Z. was found by the court to be inconsistent in its details and therefore not truthful. 48.  The applicant was sentenced to life imprisonment in combination with a three-year driving ban. The Court of Appeal stated that the term of imprisonment was to be calculated from 10 October 2003. 49.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, having noted, inter alia, that he had not been provided with legal advice during the questioning of 23 August 2001. 50.  On 5 October 2004 the Supreme Court upheld the conviction but reduced the sentence to fifteen years\u2019 imprisonment. It found that the applicant\u2019s guilt was proved by V.Z.\u2019s testimony which was consistent and corroborated by other evidence and concluded that the lower court had correctly found the applicant\u2019s accusation against V.Z. inconsistent in its details. Without particularly mentioning the applicant\u2019s argument regarding the lack of legal assistance, the Supreme Court found no procedural violations serious enough to necessitate quashing the judgment. 51.  On numerous occasions the applicant complained to the Court of Appeal and other State authorities that his term of imprisonment had been calculated incorrectly in the judgment of 21 May 2004, and that the starting point should have been the date of his first arrest in connection with the theft charges, i.e. 15 August 2001, rather than 10 October 2003. In reply, the applicant was informed that the term of imprisonment had been properly calculated, because prior to October 2003 the applicant had been detained in relation to charges that were not linked to the murder charge for which he was convicted. 52.  On 4 April 2005 the criminal proceedings concerning the theft charge were renewed and on an unspecified date the case was referred for trial. 53.  On 10 June 2005 the District Court remitted the case for further investigation. 54.  On 17 June 2011 the criminal case was referred to the trial court for examination. 55.  On 24 May 2012 the District Court found the applicant guilty on several counts of theft and sentenced him to eight years\u2019 imprisonment combined with the confiscation of all his property. Given the applicant\u2019s conviction under the judgment of 21 May 2004, the trial court applied the rule of absorption of sentences, as provided by domestic legislation, and defined the final sentence for all his crimes as fifteen years\u2019 imprisonment combined with the confiscation of his property and the three-year driving ban. The District Court included the length of the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention in the overall term of imprisonment and ruled that the latter had started running on 15 August 2001, when the applicant had been detained for the first time in the context of the theft proceedings. The parties did not appeal against this decision and it became final on 8 June 2012.", "references": ["9", "0", "2", "7", "1", "5", "4", "8", "6", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in the town of Shargorod, Ukraine. 6.  According to the applicant, at around 1.30 p.m. on 30 December 2002, while working in the backyard of his home, he saw three young men on the premises of the nearby Shargorodskiy Food Products Factory (\u201cthe factory\u201d). Since there had previously been thefts at the factory premises, during which scrap metal had been thrown over the fence into the applicant\u2019s yard, the latter decided to enter the factory yard to chase after the young men. However, having climbed over the fence and realising the young men were no longer there, the applicant went to look inside the building, entering \u201cthrough an opening in the wall\u201d. The factory premises were empty but the applicant claimed to have heard adult voices. He did not want to meet anybody and so he crawled out through the same opening and quickly returned home. 7.  Five to ten minutes later a police officer, L., arrived at the applicant\u2019s house. According to the applicant, he had a gun in his hand, swore at the applicant, grabbed him by his collar and hit him on the head with the gun handle. The applicant fell to the ground and the police officer started kicking him. The applicant\u2019s mother-in-law appeared and asked the police officer not to beat the applicant, whereupon he grabbed the applicant by the sleeve and took him to the police station. The applicant was accused of stealing aluminium sheets from the factory. 8. The applicant also submitted that, at the police station, L., in the presence of two other police officers, had kicked him in the kidneys, at which point the applicant fell to the ground. After he got up, one of the police officers gave him some water. L. then took the applicant into one of the offices, where he and another police officer, P., beat the applicant about the head and kicked him on various parts of his body for 15-20 minutes. Another police officer, G., arrived and L. and P. continued to beat the applicant, wanting him to confess to theft. After a while the applicant was placed in a cell. 9.  That night the applicant complained of a headache and general sickness. He was told by the duty police officer that a doctor would come. After some time a man wearing a white coat arrived, emptied two ampules labelled \u201cAnalgin\u201d and \u201cDimedrol\u201d (diphenylhydamine) into a plastic water bottle and gave it to the applicant. 10.  On the morning of 31 December 2002 the applicant was taken to court, where he was fined in administrative proceedings for disobeying a police officer\u2019s order to stop. According to the applicant, he had wanted to show the judge his injuries but the latter refused, advising the applicant to go to a hospital and file a complaint. 11.  The applicant was brought back to the police station, where he signed a paper stating that nobody had ill-treated him and that his personal belongings had been returned to him. The material in the case-file includes a note, allegedly signed by the applicant and dated 31 December 2002, stating that he had no complaints about the police officers and that no physical force had been used against him. 12.  On the same day a decision not to institute criminal proceedings against the applicant for stealing aluminium was adopted. It was noted that the applicant had not had any intention of stealing the aluminium sheets and that he had entered the factory premises out of curiosity. 13.  The applicant came home and told his family what had happened. The applicant\u2019s sister-in-law, who is a nurse, gave him an injection but the applicant did not feel any better. He was suffering from headache, nausea and fever which he claimed continued for eight months. 14.  The Government did not provide a detailed description of the events of 30-31 December 2002 but it appears from their observations that they agreed with the findings of the national investigation authorities (see paragraphs 48-50 below). 15.  On 2 January 2003 the applicant was examined at a hospital and was hospitalised the next day. The applicant stayed in hospital until 11 February 2003. According to the applicant\u2019s medical records, upon arrival at the hospital, his condition was of \u201cmedium seriousness\u201d. He had bruises mostly on the left side of his body and some scratches on his back. On his left thigh there was a large bruise measuring 12 by 6 centimetres. The applicant was suffering from headache and nausea. He told the doctors that he had been beaten by police officer L. 16.  In a medical certificate dated 11 February 2003, issued by the hospital, the applicant was diagnosed with multitrauma, closed brain injury, brain contusion of medium severity causing numerous neurological problems, two broken ribs, post-traumatic pneumonia and injuries to his kidneys, face and body. 17.  On 10 February 2003 the applicant requested the Vinnytsya Regional Prosecutor that criminal proceedings be instituted against the police officers. In support of his complaint the applicant outlined his version of the events which took place on 30-31 December 2002 (see paragraphs 6\u201113 above). 18.  On 18 February and 3 March 2003 several factory employees (F., S., Lo. \u2013 the wife of police officer L. \u2013, V. and A.) testified before the investigation authorities that a noise had been heard in one of the factory buildings. V. had asked a police officer, L., to check the origin of this noise. All of the above persons had approached the building and had seen footprints in the snow leading to a conveyor belt opening in the wall. Two of them had stayed outside while the others, accompanied by L., had entered the building and had seen aluminium sheets from the ceiling piled on the floor and a man trying to escape through the conveyor belt opening. V., who had stayed outside, had tried to catch the man, but the latter had broken free. When jumping from the conveyor belt, the man had slipped and fallen onto the asphalt and had then run away. The police officer had chased after the man. The latter had climbed over the 2.5 metre high fence but had lost his balance and fallen onto the other side. The witnesses had heard a thud and a shriek. 19.  L. gave similar testimony. He added that the applicant had also fallen when jumping over the fence of his house. L. had found the applicant in a coal bunker in the backyard of the applicant\u2019s house and said that he had taken him to a police station. 20.  On 3 March 2003 the applicant\u2019s mother-in-law, M., testified that L. had arrived at her house and had said that he was looking for a criminal. Later she had heard a noise behind the barn and had seen L. aiming a blow with the handle of his gun at the applicant, who was lying on the ground. M. had begged L. not to beat the applicant. After that L. had taken the applicant to a police station. 21.  On the same day the Vinnytsya Regional Police Department (\u0423\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043b\u0456\u043d\u043d\u044f \u041c\u0412\u0421 \u0423\u043a\u0440\u0430\u0457\u043d\u0438 \u0443 \u0412\u0456\u043d\u043d\u0438\u0446\u044c\u043a\u0456\u0439 \u043e\u0431\u043b\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0456) approved the results of an internal investigation in response to the applicant\u2019s complaint. The investigation found that on 30 December 2002 around 2 p.m. the factory employees had asked L. to check the origin of a suspicious noise that had been coming out of one of the factory\u2019s abandoned halls. L., accompanied by five factory employees, checked the hall and found aluminium sheets, which had been torn from the ceiling and piled up on the floor. He also saw the applicant, who tried to escape. While running away, the applicant fell twice \u2013 once when climbing through a conveyor belt opening in the wall and a second time when climbing over the fence. He fell for a third time when jumping over the fence of his house. In the yard of his house the applicant hid in a coal bunker, where he was found and taken to a police station. The police officers testified that they had not ill-treated the applicant. The applicant\u2019s mother-in-law testified that a police officer L. had aimed a blow at the applicant as he was lying on the ground but she had not seen the applicant being beaten. Although summoned by a prosecutor, the applicant did not appear for questioning and neighbours \u2012 who did not want their names to be cited \u2012 described him as an alcoholic inclined to involvement in scandalous conduct, theft and fraud. The internal police investigation concluded that since the submissions of the applicant, the police officers and the witnesses were contradictory, the case-file of material should be sent to a prosecutor\u2019s office. 22.  On 7 March 2003 the deputy prosecutor of the Shargorodskiy District (\u0437\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0443\u043f\u043d\u0438\u043a \u043f\u0440\u043e\u043a\u0443\u0440\u043e\u0440\u0430 \u0428\u0430\u0440\u0433\u043e\u0440\u043e\u0434\u0441\u044c\u043a\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0440\u0430\u0439\u043e\u043d\u0443) refused to institute criminal proceedings following the applicant\u2019s complaint. The deputy prosecutor noted that the applicant had stated that he had not intended to steal aluminium but had entered the factory premises out of curiosity and had run away out of fear of being accused of theft, that L. and P. had denied using physical force on the applicant and that the factory employees said that they had not seen L. beat the applicant. It was also noted that the applicant had not appeared for the forensic medical examination. The deputy prosecutor concluded that the applicant had sustained his injuries when trying to run away from L. 23.  On 10 April 2003 this decision was quashed by a higher prosecutor since it had not been established how the applicant\u2019s injuries had been inflicted. 24.  According to a forensic medical conclusion of 12 May 2003, the applicant had sustained the following injuries: closed concussion, two broken ribs on the left and one on the right, post-traumatic pneumonia and a kidney injury. He had numerous bruises: on the chest (20x15 cm), left shoulder (3x3 cm and 4x3 cm), left hip (12x6 cm), under the right knee (2x2 cm), left shoulder blade (5x4 cm) and scratches on the back. Those injuries were of medium severity and had been inflicted by a blunt, hard object possibly on 30 December 2002. 25.  Between 15 June 2003 and 27 October 2004 the Shargorodskyy District Prosecutor\u2019s Office (\u043f\u0440\u043e\u043a\u0443\u0440\u0430\u0442\u0443\u0440\u0430 \u0428\u0430\u0440\u0433\u043e\u0440\u043e\u0434\u0441\u044c\u043a\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0440\u0430\u0439\u043e\u043d\u0443) twice refused to institute criminal proceedings in response to the complaint from the applicant. Those decisions were quashed by higher prosecutors for reasons similar to those mentioned in the decision of 10 April 2003 and the case was referred for additional investigation. 26.  Between 15 June 2003 and 27 October 2004 the following investigative steps were taken:\n\uf02d on 30 August 2004 the applicant\u2019s mother-in-law testified that she had seen L. kicking the applicant whilst he was lying on the ground;\n\uf02d on 30 August-1 September 2004 the applicant, his wife and the factory employees were questioned;\n\uf02d on 30 August 2004 a forensic expert concluded that the applicant had sustained bodily injuries of medium seriousness and that those injuries could have been inflicted by blunt objects or by several falls from different heights;\n\uf02d on 6-8 September 2004 police officers P. and L. were questioned;\n\uf02d on 27 September 2004 the factory premises were examined;\n\uf02d according to a forensic medical report dated 6 October 2004, the applicant could have sustained his injuries between 30 December 2002 and 2 January 2003 by being beaten or by falling from a height. 27.  On 27 October 2004 the Vinnytsya Regional Prosecutor\u2019s Office (\u043f\u0440\u043e\u043a\u0443\u0440\u0430\u0442\u0443\u0440\u0430 \u0412\u0456\u043d\u043d\u0438\u0446\u044c\u043a\u043e\u0457 \u043e\u0431\u043b\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0456) instituted criminal proceedings on suspicion of abuse of power. 28.  On 30 November 2004 the applicant was questioned and he reiterated his version of events (see paragraphs 6-10 above), submitting, in particular, that in the police station \u2012 in the presence of two police officers \u2012 L. had struck him on the chest; P. had hit him several times on the head; P. and L. had kicked him on various parts of his body and P. had struck him on the chest and on the abdomen and had then beaten him in the presence of a police officer. 29.  On 10 January 2005 the forensic medical commission confirmed the previous expert conclusions and added that the applicant had been able to move after the injuries had been inflicted. 30.  Between February and June 2005 the applicant, his family members, factory employees and police officers were again questioned and a reconstruction of events was staged in the police station. The applicant\u2019s mother-in-law testified that she had seen L. kicking the applicant as he lay on the ground. She also stated that L. had hit the applicant on the head with his gun handle. The factory employees F. and A. testified that they had seen the applicant running away and falling over on his way to the fence and again when climbing over the fence. Face-to-face confrontations between the applicant and police officers P., L. and G., and between the applicant and the factory employees were conducted. 31.  On 19 April 2005 the police officers P. and L. were charged with abuse of power accompanied by violence. 32.  By a letter of 5 May 2005 the Vinnytsya Regional Prosecutor\u2019s Office informed the applicant that investigating officers K. and T. had been disciplined for delaying the investigation. 33.  On 18 May 2005 P. and L. were questioned as witnesses. 34.  On 26 May 2005 the Vinnytsya Regional Prosecutor\u2019s Office asked the Head of the Internal Security Department of the Vinnytsya Region, which is part of the Ministry of the Internal Affairs of Ukraine (\u043d\u0430\u0447\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u0438\u043a \u0423\u0412\u0411 \u0443 \u0412\u0456\u043d\u043d\u0438\u0446\u044c\u043a\u0456\u0439 \u043e\u0431\u043b\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0456 \u0414\u0412\u0411 \u0413\u0423\u0411\u041e\u0417 \u041c\u0412\u0421 \u0423\u043a\u0440\u0430\u0457\u043d\u0438), to identify and question witnesses who had seen or talked to the applicant at the time of the events in question. On an unspecified date the police stated that it had not been possible to find any witnesses. Similar requests were also submitted on 16 May 2006 and 11 January 2007. The answers to those requests were also negative. 35.  On 2 June 2005 the Shargorod Territorial Medical Unit (\u0428\u0430\u0440\u0433\u043e\u0440\u043e\u0434\u0441\u044c\u043a\u0435 \u0442\u0435\u0440\u0438\u0442\u043e\u0440\u0456\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u0435 \u043c\u0435\u0434\u0438\u0447\u043d\u0435 \u043e\u0431\u2019\u0454\u0434\u043d\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044f), in reply to a request from Vinnytsya Regional Prosecutor\u2019s Office, submitted that on 30 and 31 December 2002 the applicant had not received any medical assistance from an ambulance team. 36.  On the same day, judge Tr. was questioned. He submitted that when he had seen the applicant in court on 31 December 2002 the applicant had had no injuries to his head or hands, nor had he complained about any health problems. The applicant also did not complain that he had been beaten. 37.  On 10 June 2005 the investigating officer from the Vinnytsya Regional Prosecutor\u2019s Office terminated the proceedings against the police officers for absence of corpus delicti. On 16 August 2005 this decision was upheld by the Leninskyy District Court of Vinnytsya. On 22 September 2005 the Vinnytsya Regional Court of Appeal quashed these decisions and remitted the case for a fresh investigation. The court found that the investigating officer had failed to check whether an ambulance had been called for the applicant when he had been at the police station, and had failed to question the witnesses to the applicant\u2019s arrest. It was also unclear whether the applicant\u2019s injuries could have occurred as a result of his falls. 38.  On 28 October 2005 the Shargorod Territorial Medical Unit again submitted that on 30 and 31 December 2002 the applicant had not received any medical assistance from an ambulance team while at the police station. 39.  In November 2005 L., A. and S. were again questioned. 40.  On 22 December 2005 the forensic experts concluded that the applicant\u2019s injuries could have occurred as a result of several falls. 41.  On 28 December 2005 the investigating officer of the Vinnytsya Regional Prosecutor\u2019s Office again terminated the proceedings for absence of corpus delicti. 42.  On 20 February 2006 the Leninskyy District Court of Vinnytsya quashed that decision because witnesses to the applicant\u2019s arrest had not been sought and the hospital doctors had not been questioned. The applicant\u2019s family members and some factory employees were to be additionally questioned and the evidential material from the administrative case-file against the applicant was to be included in the file. The case was remitted for further investigation. 43.  On 13 April 2006 the Vinnytsya Regional Court of Appeal rejected the prosecutor\u2019s appeal against the decision of 20 February 2006. 44.  Between 13 April 2006 and 19 October 2008 the proceedings were terminated three times for absence of corpus delicti and re-opened, in particular, in the light of the failure to obtain the applicant\u2019s medical file from the hospital or to conduct a reconstruction of events with the participation of L., witnesses and a forensic medical expert in order to establish where the applicant had fallen and the circumstances in which the applicant had suffered his injuries. 45.  By letters of 7 July 2006 and 7 February 2007 the Shargorodskyy District Prosecutor\u2019s Office informed the Vinnytsya Regional Prosecutor\u2019s Office, inter alia, that the applicant\u2019s mother-in-law, wife and sister-in-law had refused to testify, that a factory guard who had been on duty on 30 December 2002 had moved to Russia, and that \u201cit had been impossible to question doctors at Shargorod Hospital since there was no information about any medical assistance that might have been provided to the applicant\u201d. 46.  On 14 October 2008 a reconstruction of events at the factory had been conducted with the participation of L. and a forensic medical expert. The expert had also been asked additional questions on the same day. 47.  On 19 October 2008 an investigating officer of the Tomashpilskyy District Prosecutor\u2019s Office terminated the criminal proceedings against the police officers for absence of evidence of a crime. 48.  It was found that on 30 December 2002 at around 1 p.m. employees of the Shargorodskiy Food Products Factory had asked a police officer L., who had been present at that time on the factory premises, to check the origin of noises coming from inside one of the locked factory buildings. L. together with V., F., A., Lo. and S. went to the premises in question. Inside the building, L. and the factory employees found aluminium sheets torn from the ceiling and piled up against a wall. They also saw the applicant, who ran away after tripping up several times. The applicant was later apprehended at his home and taken to a police station. 49.  After being questioned on 30 August and 30 November 2004 (see paragraphs 26 and 28 above), the applicant admitted that whilst running away he had heard people shouting behind him but had not paid any attention to them. The applicant also submitted that he had climbed over the fence having stepped on a manure pile on another side. However, the applicant\u2019s neighbours testified that the manure pile was located 1.5 metres away from the wall. The prosecutor also referred to the testimonies given by the police officer L., factory workers, other police officers and a judge Tr. during the investigation. Numerous forensic medical experts concluded that the applicant\u2019s injuries could have been caused by having fallen onto hard objects several times. The forensic medical expert who participated in the reconstruction of events testified that the applicant\u2019s injuries had most probably been caused as a result of his having fallen down several times, bearing in mind the frozen ground, the height of the conveyor belt and the fence, and the body\u2019s acceleration when running. 50.  In view of the above the Tomashpilskyy District Prosecutor\u2019s Office concluded that there was no evidence of any crime and, since the events in question had taken place six years earlier, that there was no possibility of finding such evidence. 51.  On 22 September 2010 the Leninskyy District Court authorised a search of premises at K. Street 54/1. This search was the result of criminal proceedings instituted the previous day following the placement of pornographic material on an Internet page which allegedly belonged to the applicant\u2019s representative. 52.  On 15 October 2010 Ya., who was using the premises at K. Street 54/3, allowed the police to inspect those premises after receiving authorisation from the owner. She confirmed that the items of property in the room at that address belonged to the applicant\u2019s representative. 53.  On the same day the police officers inspected the premises at K. Street 54/3 and seized, inter alia, three computers. According to the applicant\u2019s representative, the office of a human rights organisation was located at that address, which was where he worked. 54.  The applicant\u2019s representative complained about the seizure to a prosecutor indicating that one of the seized computers contained part of confidential correspondence with the Court in the present case. 55.  On 5 November 2010, in response to complaints by the applicant\u2019s representative about alleged breaches of the law in the course of the search and seizure, the Vinnytsya City Prosecutor\u2019s Office issued a decision refusing to institute criminal proceedings. According to the applicant\u2019s representative, he appealed against that decision but to no avail. 56.  According to reports in the media, in August 2013 the applicant\u2019s representative was acquitted.", "references": ["2", "3", "9", "4", "5", "8", "6", "0", "7", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "11.  The applicant was born in 1952 and lives in Budapest. 12.  On 22 June 2009, after seventeen years of service (1991-2008) as a judge at the European Court of Human Rights and, subsequently, more than one year\u2019s service as a member of the Budapest Court of Appeal, the applicant was elected by the Parliament of Hungary, by decision no. 55/2009 (VI.24) OGY, as President of the Supreme Court for a six-year term, until 22 June 2015. 13.  In that capacity, the applicant carried out managerial tasks and also had a judicial role, presiding over deliberations which resulted in uniformity resolutions (on case-law consistency) and in guiding resolutions. He was also President of the National Council of Justice. This second function had been added to the tasks of the President of the Supreme Court in 1997 by the Organisation and Administration of the Courts Act (Act LXVI of 1997). As the head of the National Council of Justice, the applicant was under an explicit statutory obligation to express an opinion on parliamentary bills that affected the judiciary, after having gathered and summarised the opinions of different courts via the Office of the National Council of Justice (see paragraph 44 below). 14.  On 13 October 2011 the General Assembly of the Network of the Presidents of the Supreme Judicial Courts of the European Union elected the applicant President of the Network for a two-year term (2011 to 2013). 15.  In April 2010 the alliance of Fidesz\u2013Magyar Polg\u00e1ri Sz\u00f6vets\u00e9g (Fidesz\u2013Hungarian Civic Union, hereinafter \u201cFidesz\u201d) and the Christian Democratic People\u2019s Party (\u201cthe KDNP\u201d) obtained a two-thirds parliamentary majority and undertook a programme of comprehensive constitutional and legislative reforms. In his professional capacity as President of the Supreme Court and the National Council of Justice, the applicant expressed his views on different aspects of the legislative reforms affecting the judiciary, notably the Nullification Bill, the retirement age of judges, the amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the new Organisation and Administration of the Courts Bill. 16.  On 12 February 2011, in relation to the Nullification Bill (subsequently Act XVI of 2011, ordering the annulment of final convictions relating to the dispersal of crowds in the autumn of 2006), the applicant\u2019s spokesman explained to the N\u00e9pszabads\u00e1g newspaper that, in the applicant\u2019s view,\n \n\u201cthe Bill ordering the annulment of certain judicial decisions delivered in relation to the 2006 riots gives cause for concern, because it violates the right of judges to assess evidence freely. This is a serious constitutional problem. ... the judiciary is examining the Bill only from a professional point of view and distances itself from any kind of political debate. Andr\u00e1s Baka [the applicant], President of the National Council of Justice, hopes that Parliament will choose a legal technique that eliminates the problem of unconstitutionality\u201d. 17.  On 8 March 2011, the day after the Bill\u2019s enactment, Istv\u00e1n Balsai (Fidesz MP, Chairman of the Constitutional, Judicial and Standing Orders Committee of Parliament at the relevant time), responded at a press conference to the criticisms made by the judiciary, and declared: \u201cThe adopted legal solution was said to be unfortunate. Now, I myself find it unfortunate if a member of the judiciary, in any position whatsoever, tries to exert influence over the legislative process in such a way\u201d. 18.  On 24 March 2011, in a speech delivered to Parliament in the course of the debate on the Bill on the Fundamental Law of Hungary (the new Constitution), the applicant expressed his opinion on certain aspects of the proposed constitutional reform which concerned the judiciary, notably the new name given to the Supreme Court \u2013 K\u00faria \u2013, the new powers attributed to the K\u00faria in the field of ensuring consistency in the case-law, the management of the judiciary and the functioning of the National Council of Justice, as well as the introduction of a constitutional appeal against judicial decisions. 19.  On 7 April 2011, in relation to the proposal to reduce the mandatory retirement age of judges (from seventy years to the general retirement age of sixty-two) in Article 26 (2) of the Fundamental Law of Hungary, the applicant, together with other court presidents, addressed a letter to various actors in the constitutional process (the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, the Speaker of Parliament) in which they pointed out the possible risks to the judiciary posed by the given proposal. Their concern was that, by abolishing the possibility for judges to remain in office until the age of seventy, the proposed rule would force one-tenth of Hungarian judges (274 persons) to end their careers in 2012, earlier than planned, with all the attendant consequences for the functioning of the judiciary and the length of pending proceedings. 20.  On the morning of 11 April 2011 (the day of the vote on the proposals to amend the retirement age of judges), the applicant addressed a letter to the Prime Minister, in which he stressed that the proposal was humiliating and professionally unjustifiable; it infringed the fundamental principles of the independence, status and irremovability of judges; and it was also discriminatory, since only the judiciary was concerned. He refuted accusations of bias in favour of any political ideology within the judiciary, and continued:\n\u201cIt is, however, unacceptable if a political party or the majority of Parliament makes political demands on the judiciary and evaluates judges by political standards.\u201d\nIn his letter the applicant asked the Prime Minister to use his influence to prevent Parliament from adopting the proposal. On the same day, however, Parliament adopted the proposal (see Relevant Domestic Law below). 21.  On 14 April 2011, a joint communiqu\u00e9 was addressed to the Hungarian and European-Union public by the plenary session of the Supreme Court, by the applicant in his capacity as President of the National Council of Justice, and by the presidents of regional and county courts. It argued for the autonomy and independence of the judiciary and criticised the new mandatory retirement age for judges and the proposal to modify the model of judicial self-governance embodied in the National Council of Justice. The relevant extracts from the communiqu\u00e9 read as follows:\n\u201cAccording to the proposal, the mandatory retirement age of judges will be reduced by eight years as of 1 January 2012. As a result, the tenure of 228 judges (among them 121 judges responsible for court administration and professional supervision) will be terminated on that same date, without any transition period, since they will have turned 62. By 31 December 2012 a further 46 judges will have to terminate their careers. As a consequence of this decision, the rapidity of judicial proceedings will significantly deteriorate (nearly 40,000 cases will have to be reassigned, which may even result in several years\u2019 delay in judicial proceedings, concerning tens of thousands of persons). The administration of the courts will be seriously hindered, since it is extremely difficult to replace dozens of retiring judges.\nThe multiple effect of the forced pensioning-off, with no real justification, of highly qualified judges who have several years of experience and practice, most of whom are at the apex of the hierarchy, will fundamentally shatter the functioning of the court system \u2013 leaving aside other unforeseeable consequences. Moreover, the proposal is unfair and humiliating with respect to the persons concerned, who took an oath to serve the Republic of Hungary and to administer justice, and who have devoted their lives to the judicial vocation.\nIt is incomprehensible why the issue of the retirement age of judges is worth regulation in the Fundamental Law. There is only one answer: by including it in the Fundamental Law, there will be no possibility of contesting this legal rule, which violates the fundamental principles of a democratic state governed by the rule of law, before the Constitutional Court.\nSuch an unjustified step implies political motivation.\u201d 22.  On 14 June 2011 Bill no. T/3522 on the amendment of certain legislative acts concerning judicial procedure and the judicial system (including the Code of Criminal Procedure) was submitted to Parliament. At the applicant\u2019s request, the Criminal Law Division of the Supreme Court prepared an analysis of the Bill, which was communicated to Members of Parliament. On 4 August 2011, as no substantive changes had been made to the Bill prior to its enactment on 4 July 2011 as Act LXXXIX of 2011, the applicant challenged the Act before the Constitutional Court, on the grounds of unconstitutionality and violation of the obligations enshrined in international treaties, making use of that power for the first time in Hungarian history. The Constitutional Court, in its judgment no. 166/2011. (XII. 20.) AB of 19 December 2011, established the unconstitutionality of the impugned provisions and quashed them (notably, the provision concerning the Attorney General\u2019s right to establish court competence by derogation from the default statutory rules). 23.  Lastly, on 26 October 2011 the applicant addressed to Parliament a detailed analysis of two new Cardinal Bills: the Organisation and Administration of the Courts Bill (no. T/4743) and the Legal Status and Remuneration of Judges Bill (no. T/4744). According to the explanatory memorandum to the Bills, it was proposed that the National Council of Justice be abolished and replaced by a National Judicial Office and a National Judicial Council. The purpose of those proposals was to separate judicial and managerial functions, which had been \u201cunified\u201d in the person of the President of the Supreme Court, who was at the same time president of the National Council of Justice. The proposed reform sought to concentrate the tasks of judicial management in the hands of the president of the new National Judicial Office, while leaving the responsibility for overseeing the uniform administration of justice with the president of the Supreme Court (renamed with the historical appellation \u201cK\u00faria\u201d).\nThe applicant also decided to express his opinion directly before Parliament, as permitted by Article 45 \u00a7 1 of Parliamentary Decision 46/1994 (IX.30) OGY on the Rules of Parliament. In his speech, delivered on 3 November 2011, the applicant raised his concerns about the draft legislation. He said that it did not address the structural problems of the judiciary, but left them to \u201cthe discretion of the executive of an external administration (the President of the proposed National Judicial Office, which would replace the National Council of Justice in managing the courts), who [would be] assigned excessive and, in Europe, unprecedented powers, with no adequate accountability\u201d. The applicant referred to those new powers (to appoint judges and court executives, to issue normative orders and to designate the court in a given case) as \u201cunconstitutional\u201d. In this regard, he stated:\n\u201cThis unrestricted, non-transparent and uncontrollable power is unparalleled in contemporary Europe ... The extent and uncontrollability of such centralised authority is without precedent, even in countries where the administration of the judiciary lies with the ministry of justice and even if we think of the socialist dictatorship, in the last years of which K\u00e1lm\u00e1n Kulcs\u00e1r, member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and Minister of Justice responsible for the administration of the judiciary, declared that he would appoint only persons recommended by the professional organs of the judiciary.\u201d\nFinally, the applicant again raised in his speech the issue of the new retirement age for judges, saying that it would have a severe effect on the Supreme Court and that the need to have enough judges at the K\u00faria had not yet been addressed. In this connection, he maintained that the K\u00faria\u2019s main responsibility, that of ensuring consistency in the judicial application of laws, could be met only if that court were able to deliver judgments in an appropriate number and type of cases. 24.  The Fundamental Law of 25 April 2011 established that the highest judicial body would be the K\u00faria (the historical Hungarian name for the Supreme Court). The date of entry into force of the Fundamental Law was scheduled for 1 January 2012. 25.  On 14 April 2011, during a debate on the Fundamental Law, a Fidesz politician, Gergely Guly\u00e1s, MP, declared on the Infor\u00e1di\u00f3 radio station that the President of the Supreme Court would remain the same and that only the name of the institution would change. On 19 October 2011, in an interview on the ATV channel, the State Secretary of Justice, R\u00f3bert R\u00e9p\u00e1ssy, MP, declared that under the Organisation and Administration of the Courts Bill (no. T/4743), the new K\u00faria would have the same function as the current Supreme Court and that only the Supreme Court\u2019s name would change. He said that the legislation \u201cwill certainly not provide any legal ground for a change in the person of the Chief Justice\u201d. 26.  On 6 July 2011, in the \u201cPosition of the Government of Hungary on the Opinion on the Fundamental Law of Hungary adopted by the Venice Commission at its 87th Plenary Session (Venice, 17-18 June 2011, CDL\u2011AD(2011)016)\u201d, transmitted by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Hungary, the Government assured the Venice Commission that the drafting of the transitional provisions of the Fundamental Law would not be used to unduly put an end to the terms of office of persons elected under the previous legal regime. 27.  In the period between 19 and 23 November 2011, members of Parliament submitted several amendments proposing that the applicant\u2019s mandate as President of the Supreme Court be terminated. 28.  On 19 November 2011 Gergely Guly\u00e1s submitted a Bill (no.  T/4996) to Parliament, proposing an amendment to the 1949 Constitution (then in force). The amendment provided that Parliament would elect the President of the K\u00faria by 31 December 2011 at the latest. The reasoning of the Bill reads as follows:\n \u201cIn view of the Fundamental Law of Hungary and of the modifications to the court system resulting from that Law, in compliance with the Bill on the Transitional Provisions of the Fundamental Law of Hungary, and with a view to ensuring a smooth transition and continuity in the fulfilment of the tasks of the K\u00faria as from 1 January 2012, this Bill provides that Parliament must elect, by 31 December 2011 and according to the rules laid down in the Fundamental Law, the President of the K\u00faria who is to take office on 1 January 2012.\u201d 29.  On 20 November 2011 two members of the parliamentary majority submitted a Bill (no. T/5005) to Parliament on the Transitional Provisions of the Fundamental Law. Under section 11 of the Transitional Provisions of the Fundamental Law of Hungary Bill, the legal successors of the Supreme Court and the National Council of Justice would be the K\u00faria, for the administration of justice, and the President of the National Judicial Office, for the administration of the courts. Pursuant to section 11(2), the mandates of the President of the Supreme Court and of the President and members of the National Council of Justice would be terminated upon the entry into force of the Fundamental Law. The reasoning of the Bill stated as follows:\n\u201cThe Bill regulates in a comprehensive manner the succession of the Supreme Court and the National Council of Justice and its president, in that the successor body or person shall be different for the respective duties. Having regard to the modifications to the court system, the Bill provides that the term of office of the President of the Supreme Court currently in office, and that of the President and the members of the National Council of Justice, shall be terminated upon the entry into force of the Fundamental Law.\u201d 30.  On 23 November 2011 another Member of Parliament submitted a proposal for an amendment to sections 185 and 187 of the Organisation and Administration of the Courts Bill. While the previous versions of the Bill submitted by the Government (on 21 October and 17 November 2011) provided that the term of office of the court executives appointed before 1 January 2012 would last until the date fixed at the time of their appointment, this last mentioned amendment provided for an exception. It sought to terminate ex lege the mandate of the President and Vice-President of the Supreme Court. The reasoning of the proposal read as follows:\n\u201cThe aim of this proposal for an amendment, submitted before the final vote, is to ensure the compliance of consolidated Bill no. T/4743/116, by amending its transitional provisions, with the Fundamental Law, having regard to Bill no. T/4996 on the Amendment of the Act XX of 1949 on the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary and also to Bill no. T/5005 on the Transitional Provisions of the Fundamental Law of Hungary, both submitted to Parliament.\u201d 31.  On 28 November 2011 Parliament adopted both the Organisation and Administration of the Courts Bill (as Act CLXI) and the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary (Amendment) Bill (as Act CLIX), with the content described above. 32.  On 30 December 2011 the Transitional Provisions of the Fundamental Law Bill was adopted without amendment[1]. The Transitional Provisions were published in the Official Gazette on 31 December 2011. 33.  As a consequence of the entry into force of all these constitutional and legislative amendments, the applicant\u2019s mandate as President of the Supreme Court terminated on 1 January 2012, three and a half years before its expected date of expiry. 34.  The applicant remained in office as president of a civil-law division of the K\u00faria. 35.  In order for a new president to be elected to the K\u00faria in due time, the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary (Amendment) Act (Act CLIX of 2011, adopted on 28 November 2011, see paragraph 31 above) entered into force on 2 December 2011. On 9 November 2011 the Organisation and Administration of the Courts Bill was amended, and an additional criterion for the election of the new president of the K\u00faria was introduced. This provided that he or she would be elected by Parliament from among the judges appointed for an indeterminate term and having served at least five years as a judge (section 114(1) of Act CLXI of 2011 \u2013 see Relevant Domestic Law below). On 9 December 2011 the President of the Republic proposed that Parliament elect P\u00e9ter Dar\u00e1k as President of the K\u00faria and T\u00fcnde Hand\u00f3 as President of the National Judicial Office. On 13 December 2011 Parliament elected those candidates, in line with the proposal by the President of the Republic. 36.   Firstly, the applicant lost the remuneration and other benefits (social security, presidential residence, personal protection) to which a president of the Supreme Court was entitled throughout the period of the fixed presidential term. 37.  Secondly, the legislation dealing with certain post-term benefits for outgoing presidents of the Supreme Court (Remuneration and Allowances Act 2000) was repealed as from 1 January 2012. Section 227(1) of the Legal Status and Remuneration of Judges Act 2011 (as amended on 28 November 2011, in force from 1 January 2012) supplemented this abrogation, and stipulated that the repealed legislation would be applied to any former president of the Supreme Court only to the extent that he or she was entitled to the allowance specified in sections 26(1) and 22(1) (pension supplement for life), had reached retirement age at the time of the entry of force of the Act and had requested the allowance. Since the applicant had not attained retirement age by 1 January 2012, he could not claim payment of that post-function benefit.", "references": ["8", "7", "1", "0", "5", "2", "9", "4", "No Label", "6", "3"], "gold": ["6", "3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1938 and 1939 respectively and live in the city of Kherson, Ukraine. 6.  On 14 January 2000 a police training exercise was conducted in accordance with an operational plan entitled \u201cSirena\u201d (\u043e\u043f\u0435\u0440\u0430\u0442\u0438\u0432\u043d\u0438\u0439 \u043f\u043b\u0430\u043d \u00ab\u0421\u0438\u0440\u0435\u043d\u0430\u00bb) (hereinafter \u201cOperation Sirena\u201d). During the exercise the applicants\u2019 son, a police officer at the material time, played the role of a criminal for the purposes of the exercise and was accidentally shot dead by another police officer. 7.  Operation Sirena for the Kherson Region was approved in 1999 by the police, civil and military authorities of that region on the basis of order No. 230 (classified) of 24 April 1998 of the Ministry of the Interior (see paragraph 66 below). The plan set out the steps to be taken and the procedure to be followed in the event of a search for and the arrest of armed or other dangerous criminals, including those who had escaped from detention. 8.  A senior traffic police inspector, L., following instruction no. 20/10-33 of 9 January 2000 issued by the Kherson Regional Department of the Ministry of the Interior (\u0423\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043b\u0456\u043d\u043d\u044f \u041c\u0456\u043d\u0456\u0441\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0430 \u0432\u043d\u0443\u0442\u0440\u0456\u0448\u043d\u0456\u0445 \u0441\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432 \u0432 \u0425\u0435\u0440\u0441\u043e\u043d\u0441\u044c\u043a\u0456\u0439 \u043e\u0431\u043b\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0456) (\u201cthe Kherson Regional Department\u201d) and pursuant to an order from a senior traffic police officer, Kos., drafted a training exercise for traffic police officers in the city of Kherson and the village of Antonivka in the context of Operation Sirena. 9.  The one-page training scenario stipulated that the training was to take place on 14 January 2000 between 10 a.m. and 5 p.m. At 10 a.m. a police office on duty was to circulate information that armed criminals had hijacked a car and that Operation Sirena had been launched. The scenario stipulated that, in addition to the police officer who would drive the car, there should also be in the car a second police officer, O., who would observe the actions of police patrol officers. The hijacked car would be followed by a second car containing a police officer, Ts., who would film the exercise. The scenario was approved on 13 January 2000 by a deputy head of the Kherson Regional Department, S. 10.  Senior traffic police officer Kos., who on 14 January 2000 was the acting head of the Traffic Police Department, later stated in the course of the criminal investigation that traffic police officers had been given prior notice of the training exercise on the day that it was held. 11.  At 10.30 a.m. on 14 January 2000 a senior traffic police officer, So., briefed traffic police officers O., Ts., Ku., Sh. and the applicants\u2019 son about the training. At 10.50 a.m. L. instructed a traffic police officer on duty to give the police unit on duty (\u00ab\u0447\u0435\u0440\u0433\u043e\u0432\u0430 \u0447\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0438\u043d\u0430\u00bb) prior notice of the training exercise and to issue a \u201clookout alert\u201d. 12.  At 10.56 a.m. a police officer on duty, P., was informed by a traffic police unit that two unknown armed criminals had hijacked a car and were moving in the direction of Tavriyskyy, a Kherson residential neighbourhood. He communicated this information to the patrol cars, to the city\u2019s district police stations and to the head of the Kherson Regional Department. Two or three minutes later P. received additional information that the above-mentioned alert was part of a training exercise being conducted under Operation Sirena. According to the findings of the subsequent internal police investigation (see paragraph 19 below), P. forwarded that additional information to the head of the Kherson Regional Department, who instructed P. to pass it on to the city\u2019s district police stations. It was established by the police internal investigation that P. failed to do so. 13.  Having been informed of the alleged hijacking, Os., the First Deputy of the Dniprovskyy district police office, issued appropriate instructions to four police officers and placed them at various posts. In particular, police officer K. was placed, together with a traffic police officer, Ko., in the vicinity of the Antonovskyy Bridge over the River Dnipro. 14.  The car containing the \u201ccriminals\u201d (played by the applicants\u2019 son and police officer Ku.) passed the aforementioned post without being stopped. According to Ko., his radio transmitter had not been working properly and he had left his post in order to inform the traffic police office in charge that the hijacked car had passed their post. Later Ko. testified that he had given K. prior notice of the training exercise. After Ko. had left, police officer Ts., who was in the second car and was filming the exercise, switched off his camera (see paragraph 26 below). 15.  Traffic police officer O., who was an observer in the \u201chijacked\u201d car, instructed the applicants\u2019 son, who was driving, to drive by the post again. This time, police officer K. stopped the car, released his gun\u2019s safety catch, and ordered the applicants\u2019 son and police officer Ku. to get out of the car. While searching the applicants\u2019 son, K. pulled the trigger since the applicants\u2019 son had allegedly made a sudden movement. The applicants\u2019 son was fatally wounded and died on the way to hospital. 16.  The applicants submitted a copy of the video recording of the training exercise. However, the part containing the shooting incident involving the applicants\u2019 son was missing. The original video recording has been lost (see paragraph 46 below). 17.  On 15 January 2000 the Kherson Regional Board of the Ministry of the Interior adopted a decision by which it was concluded that the \u201cextraordinary event\u201d (\u00ab\u043d\u0430\u0434\u0437\u0432\u0438\u0447\u0430\u0439\u043d\u0430 \u043f\u043e\u0434\u0456\u044f\u00bb) of 14 January 2000 had taken place because of low professional standards on the part of the police; K.\u2019s failure to assess properly the \u201cextraordinary circumstances\u201d (\u00ab\u0435\u043a\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0435\u043c\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u0456 \u0443\u043c\u043e\u0432\u0438\u00bb), ignorance of the steps to be taken when arresting a suspect and failure to properly handle his weapon; and the irresponsible attitude of senior police officers towards the organisation of the training exercise. It was decided, inter alia, to dismiss K., O., P., Os. and A. 18.  On 16 January 2000 the head of the Kherson Regional Department, I., approved the findings of an internal investigation conducted following the death of the applicants\u2019 son. 19.  The conclusion of that investigation provides, in so far as relevant, as follows:\n\u201cThe inspection established that:\nIn accordance with instruction no. 20/10-33 of 9 January 2000 issued by the Kherson Regional Department of the Ministry of Interior ..., L. ... drafted a training scenario for traffic police personnel ... When doing so he did not take into consideration the provisions of Operation Sirena ... [It] is pointless and not efficient to conduct training only for the traffic police officers of Kherson and Antonivka.\nThe procedure for the conduct of the training was not comprehensively set out; [failures included]:\n- the failure to stipulate an itinerary for the car containing the \u201ccriminals\u201d;\n- the failure to provide for the necessary number of observers ...\nIn their turn, the senior officers of the Kherson Regional Traffic Police ... acted in a perfunctory and irresponsible manner ..., did not properly study the scenario and did not correct its shortcomings...\nMoreover, no training instructor was appointed and the heads of services and subdivisions involved in the training were not informed of the details of the scenario.\nThe deputy head of the Department ..., S. \u2013 approved the above-mentioned scenario on 13 January 2000 without correcting its shortcomings...\nSo., a lieutenant-colonel, ... briefed those police officers who were due to participate in the training but failed to notify the head of the Department of the time of the training and did not personally supervise the progress of the training ... 20.  As a result, it was concluded that police officers K., O., P., Os. and A. should be dismissed and that the dismissal of police officer S. should be initiated before the Ministry of the Interior. It was further proposed to discipline a number of the other police officers involved. The investigation concluded that the senior police officers involved had failed to properly train their personnel to act in emergency circumstances. 21.  On 17 January 2000 the Ministry of the Interior issued an order which noted that even though safety and the prevention of death and injury in respect of police officers were priorities in police activities, there had been a number of serious shortcomings in the organisation and conduct of the training exercise, which had led to the incident in question. It was noted, inter alia, that since the beginning of his service with the Dniprovskyy District Police Office in November 1999 K. had not attended the relevant theoretical instruction classes. The Ministry also concluded that the police officers involved had failed to properly organise the training. 22.  It was further noted that by order No. 17 of 16 January 2000, issued by I., the head of the Kherson Regional Department, Os., A., P., O., and K. had been dismissed and other police officers disciplined. For the most part, that decision was approved by the Ministry of the Interior. However, it was decided not to dismiss but rather to demote Os. and A. and to reprimand I. 23.  On 14 January 2000 the Dniprovskyy District Prosecutor\u2019s Office of Kherson (\u201cthe District Prosecutor\u2019s Office\u201d) instituted criminal proceedings in respect of the incident. On the same day it was decided to assign the case to three investigating officers and to conduct a forensic medical examination of the body of the applicants\u2019 son. In particular, the expert was asked to determine what injuries were on the corpse. 24.  On 15 January 2000 a forensic medical expert concluded that the applicants\u2019 son had a gunshot wound to the chest and scratches on the left side of the face, possibly sustained when he fell down. 25.  In the course of the investigation K. pleaded guilty. His testimonies regarding the events of 14 January 2000 coincided with the facts as described in paragraphs 13-15 above. 26.  The testimony of different police officers involved in the organisation and conduct of the training exercise included, inter alia, the following:\n- P. testified that the \u201corders in force\u201d had not required that information about the training be circulated;\n- the head of the police unit on duty at the Kherson Regional Department (\u043d\u0430\u0447\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u0438\u043a \u0447\u0435\u0440\u0433\u043e\u0432\u043e\u0457 \u0447\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0438\u043d\u0438 \u0448\u0442\u0430\u0431\u0443 \u0423\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043b\u0456\u043d\u043d\u044f \u041c\u0412\u0421), G., testified that he had instructed P. to \u201ccomply with the Sirena plan, in accordance with the existing instructions\u201d. G. also submitted that the police unit on duty had only received the training scenario on 15 January 2000 that is the day after the training exercise. It had been impossible to involve only the traffic police in the training since Operation Sirena had required joint action, involving both the police and the traffic police;\n- S., a deputy head of the Kherson Regional Department, testified that there had been no legal instruments governing the conduct of police training under Operation Sirena. S. stated that the police officer who had ordered the implementation of the training had been supposed to instruct police officers on duty as to what information should be given to the district police stations. S. stated that the training scenario had been discussed with Kos., who had told S. that the scenario had been approved by the head of the Kherson Regional Department;\n- police officer O. testified that the district police stations must have been aware of the training exercise. This information should have been circulated, together with a \u201clookout alert\u201d;\n- police officer A. testified that nobody in the Dniprovskyy District Police Office had been aware of the training exercise;\n- police officer Ku. testified that he and the applicants\u2019 son had been \u201caware that the police officers [would] have guns with live rounds\u201d;\n- traffic police officer Ko. testified that he had told K. about the training;\n- police officer Ts. testified that he had stopped filming after traffic police officer Ko. had left (see paragraph 14 above), since he had \u201cnot known that the car would make a second attempt to pass this post\u201d. 27.  During a confrontation held between K. and traffic police office Ko., the latter insisted that he had informed K. about the training. 28.  In the course of the investigation a number of other investigating measures were conducted, including a forensic ballistics examination and a reconstruction of events. 29.  On 13 July 2000 the Dniprovskyy District Court (\u201cthe Dniprovskyy Court\u201d), in the absence of the applicants, terminated the criminal proceedings against K. under the Amnesty Act, since he was the father of a minor and should thus not be liable to serve a punishment. It was noted that this decision was not subject to appeal. 30.  On 3 April 2009 the Dniprovskyy Court rejected as unsubstantiated an application lodged by the second applicant on March 2009 for the renewal of the time-limit in respect of an appeal against the decision of 13 July 2000. On 19 May 2009 the Kherson Regional Court of Appeal upheld this decision. The court noted that although the second applicant had been absent from the court hearing on 13 July 2000, she had been aware of that decision since at least 2004 and had received a copy of it on 23 January 2008 at the latest. 31.  In June 2000 the District Prosecutor\u2019s Office refused to institute criminal proceedings against other police officers involved in the organisation and conduct of the training exercise. In particular, on 7 and 8 June 2000 the District Prosecutor\u2019s Office refused to institute criminal proceedings against L., O., Kos., So., S., A., Ost. and G. in the absence of any evidence of a crime, given that there had been no causal link between their actions and the death of the applicants\u2019 son. 32.  On 27 and 28 June 2000, citing the same reasons, the District Prosecutor\u2019s Office refused to institute criminal proceedings against P. and O.  On 18 August 2000 those decisions were quashed by the Kherson Regional Prosecutor\u2019s Office and the case was remitted for additional investigation. 33.  On 1 September 2000 the District Prosecutor\u2019s Office instituted criminal proceedings in respect of the alleged negligence on the part of the Kherson Regional Department police officers involved in the organisation and conduct of the training exercise. 34.  On 30 October 2000 the District Prosecutor\u2019s Office terminated the proceedings. It noted that, according to a Kherson Regional Department senior police officer, the legal instruments of the Ministry of the Interior had not stipulated that police officers should have been informed about the training. Such training was to be conducted under realistic conditions. It was further noted that no obligation to inform colleagues about the training exercise had been part of the duties of any police officer on duty. 35.  On 28 November 2000 the Kherson Regional Prosecutor\u2019s Office quashed that decision and remitted the case for additional investigation. It noted that the investigation had not been thorough and that the decision taken had been unsubstantiated. In particular, it had not been established whether there had been a causal link between the shortcomings on the part of the police officers and the death of the applicants\u2019 son. It had also not been established which legal instruments regulated police training exercises. 36.  By a letter of 29 December 2000 the Kherson Regional Department informed the District Prosecutor\u2019s Office that, under (classified) order No.  230 of the Ministry of the Interior (see paragraph 66 below), the relevant skills were \u201cto be mastered during training [conducted] under realistic conditions\u201d. At the same time the relevant legal instruments did not specify any procedure for the conduct of training exercises. 37.  On the same day the District Prosecutor\u2019s Office terminated the criminal proceedings. 38.  On 12 February 2001 the Kherson Regional Prosecutor\u2019s Office quashed that decision, citing the failure to fully comply with the decision of 28 November 2000. The recommenced proceedings were again terminated on 29 March 2001. It was noted in the latter decision that the constituent elements of a crime (\u201cnegligence\u201d) under Article 167 of the Criminal Code included failure to perform properly or at all certain duties. However, in the absence of any regulations governing procedure for the conduct of training exercises under Operation Sirena, the duties of the police officers involved in such training had not been defined. Moreover, there had been no causal link between the actions of the Kherson Regional Department police officers and the death of the applicants\u2019 son, since the latter had died following K.\u2019s mishandling of firearms. It was concluded that there was no indication of any crime in the actions of the police officers. 39.  On 1 April 2004 the General Prosecutor\u2019s Office quashed the decision of 29 March 2001. It was noted that the decision to terminate the criminal proceedings had been \u201cpremature and unlawful\u201d. In particular, during the investigation it had not been clarified whether there had been a possibility to equip the police officers with blank cartridges and why O. had not intervened to prevent K. firing his gun after seeing that its safety catch had been released. 40.  On 25 April 2004 the District Prosecutor\u2019s Office again terminated the proceedings. When questioned again, O. stated that he had not known that K.\u2019s gun had been loaded. Moreover, K. should have been aware that a training exercise was in progress. The tragic incident had happened within seconds, so O. had not had the possibility of preventing it. P. testified that, \u201cunder the Department\u2019s instructions regarding the \u2018Sirena\u2019 training plan\u201d, it had not been his responsibility to circulate the information that the announcement about the car hijacking was part of a training exercise. As to whether blank cartridges could have been used for the training exercise, the head of the Kherson Regional Department staff, D., testified that the regional police senior officers had decided to use live rounds for the training. The investigation concluded that the applicants\u2019 son had died as a result of the mishandling of firearms on the part of K. 41.  On 21 September 2004 the Kherson Regional Prosecutor\u2019s Office quashed this decision and remitted the case for additional investigation. It was noted that a number of investigative actions had yet to be undertaken and a number of issues had yet to be clarified. In particular, the plans for the training exercise and Operation Sirena had to be seized and it had to be clarified who had briefed K. and why K. had been alone at his post. It was also noted that order No. 230 was not classified and should therefore be added to the case materials. 42.  In January 2005 the applicants\u2019 relatives testified that at the funeral of the applicants\u2019 son they had noted that make-up had been applied to the applicants\u2019 son\u2019s face to cover a hole in his head. An ambulance doctor testified that he had not examined the body in detail since it had been evident that the applicants\u2019 son had died after being shot. 43.  On 20 January 2005 the investigating authorities decided to exhume the body. 44.  On 24 March 2005 a forensic medical examination of the body of the applicants\u2019 son was ordered because the applicants insisted that their son had not been accidentally shot but rather killed by either being hit on the head with a gun or shot in the head because he had possessed information regarding unlawful activity on the part of other police officers. They stated that the body had had a large haematoma on the head and there had been a crack in the skull. 45.  After the forensic medical examination of the body of the applicants\u2019 son, a forensic expert concluded that the crack in the skull of the applicants\u2019 son had appeared during the initial forensic medical examination. 46.  On 25 January 2006 the Deputy Prosecutor of the Kherson Regional Prosecutor\u2019s Office upheld the conclusions of an internal investigation into the loss of the original video recording of the training exercise. It was proposed to discipline the investigating officer, I., who, between April 2004 and April 2005, had lost the video. 47.  On 10 February 2006 it was again decided to terminate the criminal proceedings in the absence of any evidence of a crime. A deputy head of the Kherson Regional Department, T., submitted that the police officers had not been informed about the training exercise since, under (classified) order No. 230 of the Ministry of the Interior, police training should be conducted under conditions as realistic as possible. There were no legal instruments of the Ministry of the Interior stipulating the procedure for the conduct of training exercises and there was no obligation to inform police officers when any such training was being conducted. Consequently, the scope of duties of those involved in the training conducted under Operation Sirena had not been defined. 48.  On 8 September 2006 the Suvorovskyy District Court (\u201cthe Suvorovskyy Court\u201d) quashed this decision and remitted the case for additional investigation, since the prosecutor\u2019s office had failed to take into account the fact that some police officers had been disciplined. The court also observed that \u201call necessary and possible investigative actions had not been undertaken\u201d. 49.  On 14 November 2006 the Kherson Regional Court of Appeal quashed the decision of 8 September 2006 and upheld the decision of 10 February 2006. The court concluded that the circumstances of the case had been investigated comprehensively and that the Suvorovskyy District Court had, in particular, failed to specify which facts had not been examined by an investigating officer. 50.  The second applicant appealed against the decision of 14 November 2006 in cassation. She stated that the court of appeal had failed to examine the factual circumstances of the case and that many aspects of the case remained unclear (whether there had been an obligation to inform the police officers about the training, what did the \u201cnear-reality\u201d conditions mean etc.), therefore, the first instance court decision had been well-grounded and should not had been quashed. On 31 January 2008 the Supreme Court of Ukraine dismissed the second applicant\u2019s appeal. It found that the applicant\u2019s arguments about unlawfulness and lack of reasoning of the second instance court decision had been unsubstantiated. In particular, the court of appeal correctly concluded that the investigation had been comprehensive while the first instance court had failed to give reasons for the need for additional investigation. 51.  On 16 October 2000 a lump-sum insurance payment in the amount of 18,270 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH) (at the material time around 3,894.68 euros (EUR)) was paid jointly to the applicants and to their son\u2019s widow and daughter pursuant to section 23 of the Police Act (see Lovygina v. Ukraine (dec.), no. 16074/03, 22 September 2009). 52.  According to the Government, between 2002 and 2013 a total of UAH 21,320 (around EUR 2,558) was paid to the applicants in financial aid and the first applicant was furnished with a washing machine, construction materials for a house renovation and a table for a computer. 53.  The applicants instituted proceedings against the Kherson Regional Department claiming compensation for damage inflicted by their son\u2019s death. On 13 October 2000 the Suvorovskyy District Court awarded them UAH 23,600 (around EUR 5,000) as compensation for non-pecuniary damage. This decision was quashed and the case remitted for fresh consideration. 54.  On 26 September 2001 the same court awarded the applicants UAH 20,000 (around EUR 4,000). On 15 January 2002 the Kherson Regional Court of Appeal upheld that decision. However, on 21 October 2002 the Supreme Court of Ukraine quashed it and dismissed the applicants\u2019 claim, finding that, after having accepted a full insurance payment, the applicants no longer had a valid compensation claim. The parties did not submit copies of the applicants\u2019 claim and the domestic courts\u2019 decisions. 55.  In March 2006 the applicants instituted proceedings against the prosecutor\u2019s offices at various levels. The applicants complained that the investigation into their son\u2019s death had been ineffective and claimed compensation for non-pecuniary damage. 56.  On 8 September 2006 the Suvorovskyy District Court, examining the case under administrative procedure, found for the applicants. The court found that the investigation had lasted for six years and that on four occasions the Kherson Regional Prosecutor\u2019s Office had quashed the decisions of the District Prosecutor\u2019s Office terminating those proceedings. The court concluded that the case had been investigated improperly, with numerous breaches of the law, and awarded the applicants compensation. 57.  On 23 January 2007 the Kherson Regional Court of Appeal quashed that decision and remitted the case for fresh consideration by the first-instance court. 58.  After declining several times to consider the applicants\u2019 case because of their failure to comply with procedural requirements, on 6 February 2008 the Komsomolskyy District Court (\u201cthe Komsomolskyy Court\u201d) decided to terminate the proceedings, ruling that the applicants\u2019 claim for damages should have been lodged under a civil procedure. On 24 December 2008 the Odessa Administrative Court of Appeal upheld this decision. The applicants appealed in cassation. 59.  On 10 March 2011 the Higher Administrative Court upheld the above decisions and held that the applicants should have complained to a higher prosecutor about the allegedly unlawful actions of the lower prosecutor. 60.  In April 2009 the applicants lodged a claim under civil procedure with the Komsomolskyy Court against the Kherson Prosecutor\u2019s Office, claiming compensation for damage resulting from an ineffective investigation. On 22 April 2009 the court dismissed that claim on the ground that the applicants should have lodged their claim under administrative procedure. On 20 July 2009 the Kherson Regional Court of Appeal upheld that ruling. The applicants did not appeal against those rulings. 61.  In February 2009 the second applicant instituted administrative proceedings in the Kherson Regional Administrative Court against the Ministry of the Interior and the Kherson Regional Department, complaining that their conduct relating to the organisation of the police training of 14 January 2000 had been unlawful. It is not clear whether she claimed any compensation in this respect. 62.  On 26 June 2009 the Kherson Regional Administrative Court found against the second applicant. The court noted that the death of the second applicant\u2019s son had been investigated several times; K. had been found guilty but amnestied, criminal proceedings against other police officers had been terminated in the absence of evidence of any crime, and police officers S. and I. had been disciplined. Moreover, the second applicant\u2019s son had died in 2000, but the second applicant had only lodged her claim against the Ministry and the Kherson Regional Department in 2009. 63.  On 4 January 2010 the Odessa Administrative Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal lodged by the second applicant, ruling that it had been lodged out of time. On 16 November 2010 the Higher Administrative Court of Ukraine upheld that ruling. 64.  On 1 April 2003 the applicants lodged an application before this Court complaining that termination of the proceedings against K. had been in breach of the State\u2019s positive obligation under Article 2 of the Convention to conduct an effective independent investigation into their son\u2019s death. They also invoked Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention complaining about the outcome of the proceedings in respect of their claim for compensation (see paragraph 54 above). 65.  On 18 October 2005 the Court by a Committee decision declared their complaints inadmissible (application no. 15439/03).", "references": ["6", "1", "8", "9", "2", "3", "4", "7", "5", "No Label", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Odesa. 6.  On 22 January 2004, on the basis of a pre-investigation inquiry, criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant and two other persons in connection with a robbery committed the night before. 7.  On the same day, the investigator arrested the applicant and drew up an arrest report, the relevant parts of which read as follows:\n\u201cOn 22 January 2004 at 1.40 p.m., investigator Ya., in accordance with Article 115 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine detained Kleutin Denis Vasyliyovych ... on suspicion of commission of the crime provided for by Article 186 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine. ...\u201d 8.  On 23 January 2004 the investigator applied to the Prymorsky District Court of Odesa (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) with a request to place the applicant in pre-trial detention. He noted that the applicant had been suspected in having committed a serious crime and, if released, might abscond in order to avoid the investigation and prevent the establishment of the truth in the case. 9.  On 24 January 2004, in the presence of the prosecutor and in the absence of the applicant, the District Court remanded the applicant in custody without setting its maximum duration. The court\u2019s order referred to the investigator\u2019s statements as to the gravity of charges, the applicant\u2019s previous convictions, and the risk of his committing another crime, absconding, impairing the establishment of truth and obstructing the course of justice. The applicant did not appeal against this decision. 10.  On 18 March 2004, in the presence of the prosecutor and in the absence of the applicant, the District Court allowed the investigator\u2019s request and extended the applicant\u2019s detention for one month in view of the need to carry out certain investigative steps to complete the investigation. The court found that the arguments of the investigator in this respect were reasonable. 11.  On 8 April 2004 the investigation was completed and the criminal case was sent for trial. 12.  On 5 May 2004, in the committal hearings, the District Court made no ruling in respect of the applicant\u2019s further detention. It noted that no applications had been lodged by the parties to the proceedings and found \u201cno violations of the requirements of Article 237 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of Ukraine (\u201cthe CCP\u201d) in the course of the preliminary investigation of the case\u201d. 13.  On 18 June 2004 the District Court remitted the criminal case for additional investigation, without addressing the issue of applicant\u2019s extended detention. 14.  On 18 April 2005 the District Court again remitted the criminal case for additional investigation. It made no ruling in respect of the applicant\u2019s extended detention. 15.  On 13 August 2005 the additional investigation was completed and the case was sent to the District Court for trial. 16.  On 18 August 2005 the applicant requested that the District Court change the preventive measure to an obligation not to abscond. 17.  On 15 September 2005, in the committal hearings, the District Court maintained the applicant\u2019s detention without giving any reason or setting any time-limits. 18.  On 7 November 2005, in June, July and on 16 October 2006 and again on 6 March 2007, the applicant applied to the District Court in writing to change the preventive measure into a non-custodial one. In his request of July 2006, he argued, inter alia, that he did not represent a danger to society, had a registered place of residence and was about to start a new job at the time when he was arrested. In reply to the applicant\u2019s request of 7 November 2005, the court informed the applicant that all petitions should be \u201clodged and examined at a hearing\u201d. 19.  On 8 June 2007 the applicant was found guilty of premeditated robbery as part of a group and of involving of minors in a crime and was sentenced to five years\u2019 imprisonment. 20.  On 15 November 2007 the Odesa Regional Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal lodged by the applicant. 21.  On 2 June 2008 the Supreme Court of Ukraine rejected the applicant\u2019s request for leave to appeal on points of law. 22.  On 22 January 2009 the applicant finished serving his sentence and was released. 23.  On 22 January 2004, the applicant was apprehended at his apartment and taken to the police station where he was subsequently arrested. The parties provided different accounts of the events. 24.  According to the applicant, he had been beaten by the police at the apprehension. He raised this complaint before the Court for the first time on 11 November 2005, having stated, inter alia, that on 9 August 2004 he had requested that the prosecutor\u2019s office institute criminal proceedings against three police officers who had threatened him with firearms and fractured two of his ribs when trying to make him admit guilt for a crime. No copy of the complaint has been provided to the Court. On 5 June 2008 the applicant submitted that on 22 January 2004, K. \u2012 who was the brother of the applicant\u2019s alleged accomplice in the said crime \u2012 and his colleagues had unlawfully broken into his apartment and had severely beaten him while trying to make him confess. In his comments on the Government\u2019s observations, the applicant stated that on 22 January 2004 three police officers, including K., had come to his place of residence, had threatened him and hit him on his head and body with their firearms, fracturing two of his ribs. Thereafter, he had been forced to go to the police station. In view of the beating he had been given, he had been unable to resist and had had to go with the officers. 25.  The Government submitted that no pressure or physical force had been used on the applicant whilst being apprehended and that the latter had voluntarily agreed to go with the officers to the police station. 26.  The documents submitted by the Government suggest that during the trial in his criminal case, the applicant repeated his complaint of ill\u2011treatment. Thus, according to the District Court\u2019s ruling of 29 March 2005, the applicant submitted that on 22 January 2004, K. and three other police officers had come to his apartment and had asked him to go with them to the police station. They were armed and used physical coercion, hitting him on his head several times with their firearms. His sister had also been present in the apartment. The ruling further suggests that, when questioned as a witness, K. had stated that on 22 January 2004 whilst on duty as a security service officer, he had witnessed his brother being apprehended by the police. A police officer had approached K. and asked him to assist in the apprehension of the applicant, with whom K. was acquainted. The police officer, K. and his two subordinates then went to the applicant\u2019s address. With the exception of one security service officer who had remained in the car, they had all gone to the applicant\u2019s apartment. When the applicant opened the door, they had checked his documents, had apprehended him and had escorted him to the police station. K. submitted that the applicant\u2019s sister had also been present in the apartment. 27.  By the aforementioned ruling of 29 March 2005, the District Court ordered the prosecutor\u2019s office to identify, by 11 April 2005, the persons who had apprehended the applicant and to question them and the applicant\u2019s sister in relation to the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment. The ruling also instructed the prosecutor\u2019s office to identify other individuals who could give evidence concerning the applicant\u2019s complaint and to question them in this respect. Lastly, the prosecutor was ordered to issue a procedural decision following the results of the inquiry. 28.  On 18 April 2005 the District Court noted the prosecutor\u2019s failure to comply with the above ruling and sent the case for additional investigation. 29.  On 21 July 2005 the applicant\u2019s sister was questioned and testified that on 22 January 2004 at about 10 a.m. she had opened the door to K. and two other individuals, who had identified themselves as police officers. Thereafter, she had woken the applicant, and the police officers had asked him to proceed to the police station, having informed him that two other individuals had committed a crime and he needed to present himself with a view to further inquiry. The applicant had got dressed and had gone with the police officers. The applicant\u2019s sister further submitted she had not witnessed any ill-treatment as she had not been present in the applicant\u2019s room. She stated, however, that she had heard raised voices during the conversation between the applicant and the police officers. 30.  On 23 November 2005 the applicant lodged a complaint about his ill-treatment with the prosecutor\u2019s office. He claimed that K. and his three colleagues had come to his apartment. They had been armed and had tried to force him to assume K.\u2019s brother\u2019s guilt for the crime. When the applicant refused, K. and one of his colleagues, who identified himself as K.\u2019s cousin, started beating him and fractured two of his ribs. As they were demanding that the applicant go to the police station, the applicant\u2019s sister \u2012 who had been sleeping in another room \u2013 had come in. The applicant further submitted that the police officers had left the apartment after he had stated, in his sister\u2019s presence, that those officers had no authority to take him to the police station. An hour later they had come back, accompanied by the police officer who afterwards questioned the applicant at the police station. Lastly, the applicant alleged that K. had forced his sister to give false evidence. 31.  On 17 May 2007 the District Court issued a separate order to the investigating authorities to verify, by 29 May 2007, the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment, having noted in this respect that its order of 18 April 2005 had not been complied with. 32.  On 4 June 2007 the prosecutor questioned the police officer who had been identified as the one who had apprehended the applicant. The officer submitted that it had been necessary to question the applicant as there was evidence about his possible involvement in a crime. K., who knew the applicant and his home address, happened to be in the vicinity of the police station at the time and volunteered to show them the applicant\u2019s place of residence. They had arrived at the applicant\u2019s apartment around lunch time. The police officer stated that he had not been armed that day and K. would only have had a pneumatic weapon, if he had one at all. After entering the apartment, the officer had identified himself and had informed the applicant that there had been testimony against him. He therefore asked the applicant to go with him to the police station and the latter agreed. The conversation had taken place in the applicant\u2019s room but the police officer did not remember if K. had also entered the room. He further alleged that no recourse to physical force had been needed as the applicant had not resisted and had complied with his request voluntarily. He finally stated that a girl had also been present in the apartment. 33.  On the same day, on the basis of the above-mentioned statements by the police officer, the prosecutor refused to institute criminal proceedings against the police officer, having found that no physical force had been applied to the applicant and that he had voluntarily agreed to go to the police station. This decision has not been challenged by the applicant and was referred to by the District Court in its judgment of 8 June 2007. 34.  The documents before the Court indicate that on 26 January 2004 the applicant was admitted to Odesa SIZO. According to the authorities, he underwent a medical examination upon his admission \u2012 including an X-ray \u2012 was found to be healthy, and did not complain about any injury. His medical file contained an X-ray taken at the city hospital of 25 January 2004, on whose basis, as alleged by the applicant, Odessa SIZO medical staff concluded that the applicant \u201clacked part of his third left rib\u201d (see paragraph 50 below). 35.  The case file suggests that in 2006 the applicant\u2019s lawyer had made inquiries to the SIZO authorities and the city hospital about the applicant\u2019s possible injuries following the alleged ill-treatment. The SIZO administration had provided the lawyer with a record of the applicant\u2019s state of health upon his admission to the SIZO and the medical treatment provided to him in detention. The X-ray of 25 January 2004 was mentioned as one of the documents in the applicant\u2019s file upon his admission to the SIZO. According to the city hospital\u2019s reply, no in-patient treatment was provided to the applicant in January 2004. 36.  From 26 January 2004 to 23 November 2007 the applicant was detained in Odesa SIZO. Without specifying in which cells he had been held or for how long, the applicant initially submitted that his conditions of detention had been unbearable. In his reply to the Government\u2019s observations, the applicant specified that the cells had not afforded enough living space, that the sanitary conditions had been poor, and that he had been detained in those conditions for the most of the day, with no outdoor activity allowed. 37.  According to the information provided by the Government, the applicant was held in the following cells:\n- cell no. 209, measuring 7.07 sq. m (intended for 4 detainees);\n- cell no. 219, measuring 6.83 sq. m (intended for 4 detainees);\n- cell no. 223, measuring 6.99 sq. m (intended for 4 detainees);\n- cell no. 255, measuring 7.58 sq. m (intended for 4 detainees);\n- cell no. 257, measuring 7.39 sq. m (intended for 4 detainees);\n- cell no. 255, measuring 7.85 sq. m (intended for 4 detainees);\n- cell no. 285, measuring 7.44 sq. m (intended for 4 detainees);\n- cell no. 119, measuring 33.42 sq. m (intended for 12 detainees);\n- cell no. 129, measuring 77.45 sq. m (intended for 42 detainees);\n- cell no. 131, measuring 35.22 sq. m (intended for 14 detainees);\n- cell no. 326, measuring 6.73 sq. m (intended for 4 detainees);\n- cell no. 357, measuring 7.31 sq. m (intended for 4 detainees). 38.  According to the Government, the conditions in those cells had been adequate and they were equipped with the requisite furnishings and facilities and a partitioned toilet. The windows and the ventilation system allowed fresh air and natural light to circulate and running water and mains drainage had been available.", "references": ["3", "5", "8", "6", "7", "4", "0", "9", "No Label", "1", "2"], "gold": ["1", "2"]}
+{"input": "4.  On 16 February 1998 R.M. reported his ex-wife, A.M, missing. 5.  On 24 February 1998 police carried out an initial forensic investigation of an apartment which A.M. and her son had shared with the applicants in June 1997, the date she had last been seen. 6.  An Interim Missing Persons report was prepared by police and submitted to the Procurator Fiscal on 1 May 1998, with later reports following on 31 August 1998 and 8 September 1998. 7.  On 30 June 1998 police obtained a search warrant in respect of the apartment A.M. had shared with the applicants. However, a full forensic examination of the property does not appear to have disclosed any relevant evidence. 8.  On 18 August 1998 the applicants were sentenced to periods of imprisonment of eight years\u2019 and six years\u2019 respectively following their conviction for various sexual offences. The complainer in relation to some of those offences was A.M.\u2019s son. Following conviction, both applicants were placed on the Sexual Offenders\u2019 Register. 9.  By September 1998 A.M.\u2019s disappearance was being referred to by the Procurator Fiscal at Kilmarnock as \u201csuspicious\u201d and Crown Counsel described the police inquiry into her disappearance as a \u201cmurder inquiry\u201d. On 14 September 1998 the police sought authorisation for the release of the applicants from HMP Peterhead into their custody so that they could be interviewed with regard to the disappearance and suspected murder of A.M. 10.  On 17 September 1998, while serving their sentence at HMP Peterhead, the applicants were detained by the police under section 14 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 and removed to Queen Street Police Office in Aberdeen. On the same day the applicants were interviewed separately by police officers for over five hours. During these interviews they were directly accused of the murder of A.M. Both applicants asked police officers if they were going to be charged with the murder, but received indications to the contrary. Following the interviews, neither applicant was arrested or charged with any offence owing to insufficient evidence. They were therefore returned to prison to continue serving their respective sentences. 11.  By November 1998 no progress had been made in finding A.M. and the police inquiry was scaled down. A full Missing Person Report was submitted to the National Missing Persons Bureau at New Scotland Yard (London). The case was continued as a live enquiry and periodic reviews were conducted by police. 12.  The applicants were released from custody on licence on 22 May 2003 and 18 January 2002 respectively. They both travelled to Spain without notification, thereby breaching the terms of their parole licence in contravention of the Sex Offenders Act 1997. The Scottish Executive subsequently revoked their licences. 13. In April 2004 the applicants were arrested in Spain in connection with the apparent abduction of a fourteen year old boy. They were returned to the United Kingdom, where they were recalled to prison to serve the unexpired portion of their licence periods. 14.  On 10 November 2004 both applicants appeared on indictment in respect of offences contrary to the Sex Offenders Act 1997. They pled guilty and on 4 April 2005 they were sentenced to a further three years\u2019 imprisonment, which was reduced on appeal to eighteen months. 15.  Between 1 and 4 April 2005 a decision was made by the Procurator Fiscal, following consultation with Crown Counsel, to place both applicants on petition in relation to the murder of A.M. The Crown\u2019s position was that A.M. had threatened to report the applicants to the police after discovering that they were sexually abusing her son. The applicants\u2019 had subsequently killed her and disposed of her body. 16.  On 5 April 2005 the applicants were charged with the murder of A.M. and with concealing and disposing of her body in an attempt to pervert the course of justice. They appeared on petition at Kilmarnock Sheriff Court were they were committed for further examination and remanded in custody. 17.  The police continued to pursue their investigation and enquiries. 18.  On 6 June 2005 the Crown Office provisionally fixed a preliminary hearing date for 12 September 2005. That hearing date was set aside as the first applicant lodged a \u201cdevolution minute\u201d (see paragraphs 51-52 below) relating to a potential violation of the reasonable time guarantee contained within Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention. On 14 October 2005 the Sheriff Court held that the devolution minute had been raised prematurely as no indictment had been served. On 7 December 2005 the High Court dismissed the first applicant\u2019s appeal against that decision and refused him leave to appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. 19.  Meanwhile, a Proof of Life report was produced on 18 November 2005 (supplemented on 5 January 2006), which concluded that A.M. had been dead since approximately June 1997. 20.  In late 2005 Crown Counsel had concerns regarding the sufficiency of evidence against the second applicant. Although the evidence against the first applicant was stronger, the understanding that the applicants had acted together would have made a trial against the first applicant only very difficult. Therefore, on 19 December 2005 the Crown decided to take \u201cno proceedings meantime\u201d (see paragraph 49 below) with regard to the 2005 petition. 21.  Following reviews of the case in February and March 2006, Crown Counsel instructed that no new additional material had come to light which would justify reconsideration of that decision. However, the decision would remain under periodic review. 22.  Pursuant to sections 65(1)(a) and (1A) of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, a trial had to take place within twelve months of the accused\u2019s first appearance on petition in respect of the offence, although this period could be extended either within the twelve-month period or retrospectively (see paragraph 48 below). The twelve-month period for bringing proceedings expired on 4 April 2006 and the Lord Advocate did not seek an extension of time. On 26 April 2006 the applicants were informed that there would be \u201cno proceedings meantime\u201d. 23.  By November 2006 both applicants had served the custodial element of their earlier criminal sentences and were released from prison. They both travelled to live in Spain for a period before returning to the United Kingdom in November 2007. 24.  The police continued to conduct periodic reviews of the decision to take \u201cno proceedings meantime\u201d in respect of the 2005 petition. Furthermore, Central Scotland Police formed \u201cOperation Aspen\u201d, the objective of which was to look for evidence both of further sexual offending by the applicants, and of their involvement in the disappearance of A.M. 25.  As a result of Operation Aspen, new evidence came to light concerning the circumstances of A.M.\u2019s disappearance and the applicants\u2019 sexual offending. Consequently, on 9 September 2008 Crown Counsel concluded that there had been a material change in the prospects of securing a conviction against both applicants on the murder charges contained in the earlier 2005 petition. 26.  On 10 September 2008 the applicants were served with an indictment which contained the same charges as the 2005 petition. It also contained a number of additional charges relating to various sexual offences. 27.  The second applicant lodged a devolution minute on 15 September 2008 in which he argued that certain missing evidence would have a prejudicial impact on the fairness of his trial. 28.  The following day the first applicant lodged a devolution minute, arguing that he could not receive a fair trial within the meaning of Article 6 owing to the significant delay which had occurred in his case. 29.  On 10 October 2008 a preliminary hearing was held at the High Court in Glasgow where further preliminary notices and devolution minutes were served on behalf of both applicants. The Crown also made an application under section 65(3)(a) of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 for a retrospective extension of the twelve-month time-limit contained within section 65(1) of that Act (see paragraph 48 below). 30.  Between 4 November 2008 and 20 February 2009 there were a number of preliminary hearings in respect of the Crown\u2019s application for an extension. Following the hearing on 20 February 2009 the application was granted. The High Court found that the Crown had acted properly in investigating and reviewing the evidence between 1997 and 2008; that the expiry of the section 65 time-limit had come about through a positive decision rather than through inadvertence; and that new evidence had since come to light so as to allow the Crown to proceed against both applicants. Although the applicants were granted permission to appeal, their appeal was refused on 5 June 2009. 31.  At a preliminary hearing on 29 June 2009 the High Court allowed motions by the applicants to separate the murder charges from the sexual offences charges. The first applicant also argued that the murder charge against him should be dismissed for reason of delay. However, the court refused to dismiss the charge, finding, inter alia, that proceedings had begun on 5 April 2005; that the \u201creasonable time\u201d permitted by Article 6 had not been exceeded; that the fairness of the upcoming trial had not been jeopardised; and that there was no other compelling reason why it would be unfair to proceed to trial. 32.  The first applicant appealed against the decision not to dismiss the charge against him. The Lord Advocate brought a cross-appeal against the decision to separate the charges. 33.  Both appeals were dismissed on 26 November 2009. In dismissing the first applicant\u2019s appeal, the Appeal Court accepted that the police had interrogated him \u201crobustly\u201d in 1998, but agreed with the High Court that he was not \u201ccharged\u201d until 5 April 2005. The court considered that the Crown had acted without fault since that time, and, in the particular circumstances of the case, it could not be said that the matter would not be determined within a reasonable time. 34.  The Appeal Court and the Supreme Court refused the first applicant leave to appeal on 26 November 2009 and 22 February 2010 respectively. 35.  Further preliminary hearings took place between January 2010 and May 2010 in respect of various petitions and minutes lodged by the applicants. 36.  The applicants\u2019 trial for the sexual offences took place between 19 April 2010 and 13 May 2010. On 12 May 2010 the applicants were convicted on numerous counts and sentenced to periods of imprisonment ranging from eight to ten years to run concurrently. Both applicants unsuccessfully sought to appeal against conviction and sentence. 37.  The murder trial began at the High Court in Glasgow on 17 May 2010 with the Crown leading evidence from over fifty witnesses. 38.  On 4 June 2010 the second applicant addressed the Court on his devolution minute dated 15 September 2008 (see paragraph 27 above). The High Court dismissed the minute as the arguments advanced by the second applicant related to unreasonable delay and not to missing evidence (which was the argument raised in the original minute). The second applicant did not appeal the decision. 39.  On 10 June 2010 a jury convicted the applicants of murder and attempting to pervert the course of justice. They were sentenced to life imprisonment for murder, with a tariff of thirty years for the first applicant and twenty-six years for the second applicant. They were also sentenced to concurrent sentences of eight years imprisonment for attempting to pervert the course of justice. 40.  The applicants appealed against conviction and sentence. The first applicant lodged a Note of Appeal on 2 September 2010, containing numerous grounds and sub-grounds on a wide range of issues regarding all the charges. The sifting judges granted him leave to appeal against his sentence for murder, but not against his conviction. The second applicant lodged a Note of Appeal on 27 August 2010. On 3 February 2011 leave to appeal was refused by the judge at first sift. On 4 July 2011, following the second sift, leave to appeal against conviction was granted though restricted to two grounds relating to alleged errors by the trial judge. The second applicant was also granted leave to appeal against sentence. 41.  The applicants subsequently applied under section 107(8) of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 (\u201cthe 1995 Act\u201d) for leave to reinstate grounds which the sifting judges had found to be unarguable, including those relating to the length of proceedings. 42.  An oral hearing took place on 8 November 2011. On 8 February 2012 the Appeal Court granted the first applicant leave to appeal against his conviction on one ground only, which alleged an error by the trial judge. The second applicant was refused leave to appeal on the grounds raised. 43.  The applicants sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against the Appeal Court\u2019s refusal to grant leave to appeal on the additional grounds. 44.  On 19 April 2012 the Appeal Court granted both applicants leave to appeal on the issue of undue delay. The court also granted the first applicant permission to appeal against his conviction on another ground alleging apparent bias on the part of the trial judge. 45.  A hearing took place on 29 and 30 April 2013 before the Supreme Court, which gave judgment on 13 June 2013. The main issue before the Supreme Court was whether the applicants could be said to have been \u201ccharged\u201d on 17 September 1998 or whether the appropriate \u201cstarting point\u201d for the purposes of Article 6 \u00a7 1 was 5 April 2005. The court assessed the evidence in light of the relevant case-law of the domestic courts and of this Court. In doing so, it distinguished the applicants\u2019 case from that of Ambrose v. Harris [2011] UKSC 43, in which the Supreme Court accepted that an appellant, who was complaining that there had been a breach of his right to legal advice under Article 6 \u00a7 1, had been \u201ccharged\u201d following his caution by police in connection with the alleged offence. The Supreme Court observed that as the \u201cfair trial\u201d guarantee under Article 6 was distinct from the \u201creasonable-time\u201d guarantee it had to be approached separately. Therefore, the fact that the applicants had been subjected to questioning on 17 September 1998 that might have affected their right to a fair trial did not mean that this was the relevant \u201cstarting point\u201d for determining whether proceedings had been conducted within a \u201creasonable time\u201d. The court concluded that the correct \u201cstarting point\u201d in the applicants\u2019 proceedings was 5 April 2005 and the case was remitted to the Appeal Court. 46.  The Appeal Court dismissed the first applicant\u2019s appeal against conviction and sentence on 27 March 2014, and the second applicant\u2019s appeal on 19 June 2014.", "references": ["6", "8", "5", "0", "7", "2", "1", "9", "4", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1948 and lives in Belgrade. 6.  The applicant was employed by \u201cPIM \u2013 bagerovanje i vodni transport\u201d, a socially-owned company based in Belgrade (\u201cthe debtor\u201d). 7.  On 30 March 2005 the Belgrade Second Municipal Court (Drugi op\u0161tinski sud u Beogradu) ordered the debtor to pay the applicant specified sums in respect of salary arrears, social security contributions and procedural costs. This judgment became final on the same date. 8.  On 22 June 2005 the Belgrade Fourth Municipal Court (\u010cetvrti op\u0161tinski sud u Beogradu) issued an enforcement order with regard to the said judgement. 9.  On 29 March 2012, acting upon the applicant\u2019s constitutional appeal, the Constitutional Court held that the applicant had suffered a breach of the \u201cright to a trial within a reasonable time\u201d with regard to the enforcement proceedings. The court ordered the acceleration of the proceedings and declared that the applicant was entitled to compensation for the non-pecuniary damage suffered in the amount of EUR 700, converted into the national currency at the rate applicable at the date of settlement. 10.  The enforcement proceedings instituted on the basis of the judgment rendered by the Belgrade Second Municipal Court on 30 March 2005 continued and are still pending.", "references": ["1", "0", "7", "4", "5", "2", "6", "8", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1966 and lives in W\u0119gl\u00f3wka. 6.  At about 5 p.m. on 26 January 2009 the applicant and his wife went by car from their home to another village. The applicant\u2019s wife was driving. The car had been borrowed from the applicant\u2019s friend. On a narrow section of the road they saw a police car trying to stop another car. The applicant\u2019s wife, who apparently considered it an unsafe place to stop other cars, overtook the police vehicle and sounded the horn, though she claims to have done this by accident. 7.  While being overtaken, the police officers noticed that the car driven by the applicant\u2019s wife had no left rear light and that its rear registration plate was not lit. They decided to stop the car to inspect it. 8.  They overtook the applicant and his wife, stopped the car and requested the relevant documents. They considered that the registration document of the car was partly illegible. According to the applicant, he read the contents of the registration document aloud to the officers. They tried to contact the Nowy Targ police station to confirm the identity of the driver but to no avail. The applicant and his wife spent about half an hour in the car at the side of the road. He then requested that they all drive to the police station because he wanted to speak to the officers\u2019 supervisor. They all drove to the police station in Jab\u0142onka, but there was no one there, so the police officers continued the inspection on the street outside. 9.  They found that, apart from the light that did not work, the fire extinguisher in the car was too small. They wanted to fine the applicant\u2019s wife 200 Polish zlotys (PLN). The applicant then told her: \u201cdo not sign anything for those beggars\u201d (\u201cNie podpisuj nic tym dziadom\u201d). The officers felt offended and one of them told the applicant that he would be arrested for insulting police officers. 10.  According to the applicant, by that time the \u201croutine\u201d inspection had already lasted for about two hours, and he and his wife were getting nervous. His wife began to cry because the officers wanted to take her to the police station for questioning. The policemen repeated \u201cthis will cost a lot\u201d each time they found a fault with the car. He therefore considered that they wanted him to bribe them and referred to them as \u201cbeggars\u201d. According to the applicant, he was trying to defend his wife who, after two hours of intervention, was very anxious and upset. The officers claimed that the applicant had been disturbing their routine activities. As established by the domestic courts in the set of proceedings against the police officers, when one of the police officers had told the applicant that he would be arrested, the applicant pushed the police officer and started to run away. 11.  As established by the domestic courts in the set of proceedings against the applicant, on the basis of the testimony of the policemen, after the comment made by the applicant the police officers tried to apprehend him, however he resisted arrest and moved a few steps back. Officer J.B. then forcefully put the applicant onto the ground and pressed down on him with his knee. The applicant continued to resist and try to get away and then kicked J.B. several times in his left leg. The other officer, D.B., then used pepper spray against him. When the applicant calmed down he was handcuffed. 12.  The applicant was subsequently taken to the police station. His wife informed the policemen that her husband had heart problems, so they called an ambulance. The doctor who came to the police station considered that the applicant needed to be examined in a hospital so he was taken to Nowy Targ. After examination he was placed in police custody (Policyjna Izba Zatrzyma\u0144). He was released the following day. Apparently after his release he was examined again in a hospital in My\u015blenice. 13.  The relevant notes from the hospitals, in so far as they were legible, contained the following information. 14.  Notes by the Nowy Targ Hospital on 26 January 2009 read:\n\u201cSkin bruising on the right hand. Chemical burn to the right eye.\u201d 15.  A document dated 27 January 2009 confirming the applicant\u2019s release from the My\u015blenice Hospital read:\n\u201cHe claims that yesterday he was beaten up by the police officers who used pepper spray on him. Skin bruising on the right hand, chemical burn to the right eye, reddish conjunctivitis in the right eye.\u201d 16.  The applicant also submitted a copy of a medical certificate requesting that he be examined by an ophthalmologist, because of \u201cburns from pepper spray\u201d. The note was marked \u201curgent\u201d but bore no date. 17.  On 28 January 2009 the applicant lodged a complaint about his arrest with the Nowy Targ District Court (\u201cthe District Court\u201d). He submitted that he had been apprehended by force and put onto the ground, that the police had used a whole container of pepper spray and that he had many scratches and bruises. He had been released from the police custody facility at about midday and let out by the back door without a jacket or any money. He had had to walk until he had found a taxi driver who had agreed to give him a lift and call his wife, who had apparently been waiting at the police station since 10 a.m. and had had no idea that he had been released and let out by the back door. 18.  On 4 February 2009 the District Court refused to allow the applicant\u2019s complaint. It found that in his complaint he had presented \u201chis own version of events\u201d and that his arrest had been lawful because \u201calthough there was no fear that he might go into hiding there was a reasonable suspicion that he might influence the testimony of a witness to the events in question\u201d. The court also considered that at the moment of the arrest there were grounds to suspect the applicant of having committed the offence referred to in Article 226 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code and there were grounds to bring proceedings against him in an expedited manner.\nHaving examined the grounds, legality and appropriateness of the applicant\u2019s arrest, the court found no shortcomings. It appears that the court did not hear evidence from any witnesses; it based its findings on a note made by the police and the arrest and examination records.\nThe court did not refer to the applicant\u2019s allegations as regards the use of excessive force by the police. 19.  On 22 February 2009 the police lodged an indictment against the applicant with the District Court. He was charged with offending police officers on duty and breaching the personal inviolability of a police officer by kicking him. On 8 April 2009 in his reply to the bill of indictment, when describing the \u201ckicking\u201d he stated that these could have been involuntary movements as he had been pushed to the ground and pressed down on with a police officer\u2019s knee and pepper spray had been directed into his face. He submitted that he had not intended to hit anybody. 20.  On 28 May 2009 the District Court found the applicant guilty as charged and conditionally discontinued the proceedings against him. The court held that in his statements the applicant had not actually denied kicking the police officer J.B. as he could not rule out that he had made the movements with his legs involuntarily, without the intention of hitting anybody. He was also ordered to pay PLN 200 to charity and the costs of the proceedings. 21.  On 24 July 2009 the applicant appealed. He submitted that he did not feel guilty; on the contrary, he had been a victim. He also considered that he could not have violated anybody\u2019s personal inviolability because he had been pressed against the ground and two officers had been sitting on his back trying to handcuff him. 22.  On 8 September 2009 the Nowy S\u0105cz Regional Court quashed the first-instance judgment and discontinued the proceedings, finding that the prohibited acts committed by the applicant had not constituted offences because the resulting harm to the public was insignificant (znikoma szkodliwo\u015b\u0107 spo\u0142eczna czynu). 23.  On 28 January 2009 the applicant reported the two police officers who had arrested him on 26 January 2009 to the Nowy Targ District Prosecutor for abuse of power. 24.  On 25 February 2009 the District Prosecutor opened an investigation into their alleged abuse of power. 25.  On 11 March 2009 the applicant and his wife were questioned. On 9 April 2009 the prosecutor questioned officers D.B. and J.B. 26.  On 16 April 2009 the District Prosecutor discontinued the investigation, finding that no offence of abuse of power had been committed. Referring to the relevant provisions of domestic law, in particular the 1990 Police Act, the prosecutor found that the police had had the right to use force because \u201cthe applicant had not obeyed their orders, had behaved nervously and had tried to run away\u201d. 27.  The applicant appealed. He argued, among other things, that the prosecutor had not properly examined the circumstances of the case; the officers had apprehended him for no legal reason. The applicant admitted that he had been nervous because of the inspection which had lasted for about two hours, but considered that this could not have been the basis for his arrest. He further submitted that the officers had used excessive force, inappropriate in the circumstances; they had put him onto the ground with his face down and had sat on his back and used pepper spray to incapacitate him. He had had injuries afterwards and had to take over a month\u2019s sick leave. He also referred to the circumstances of his release from the police station and the fact that his wife, who had been waiting there for him, had not been informed that he had left by the back door. 28.  On 12 August 2009 the District Court upheld the challenged decision discontinuing the investigation. It found that the applicant had again repeated his version of events which the prosecutor had found not to be credible. The court did not refer in any way to his submissions as regards his injuries. It found that the \u201ccircumstances of the applicant\u2019s arrest [had already been] examined because the applicant had complained about his arrest and his complaint [had been] dismissed\u201d. The court further held that \u201cit had been reprehensible not to have informed the applicant\u2019s wife of the applicant\u2019s release but this had not constituted any offence\u201d.", "references": ["4", "6", "3", "0", "2", "7", "9", "5", "8", "1", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Warsaw. 6.  The applicant was detained from 15 June 2007 until 21 January 2009 after a conviction. It appears that he was at first committed to a semi\u2011open facility, Dobrowo Remand Centre, and following his reclassification as a habitual offender, to a closed-type facility, Koszalin Remand Centre. 7.  The following findings were made by the domestic courts in the course of the civil proceedings described below (see paragraphs 24\u201133 below). Neither the applicant nor the Government contested them. 8.  For 309 days of his total period of detention in Koszalin Remand Centre, the applicant was held in cells which did not conform with the statutory minimum size of 3 sq. m per person. More particularly, the applicant had between 1.9 to 2.6 sq. m of personal floor space in his cells. 9.  Initially, the toilet facilities in Koszalin Remand Centre were not separated from the living area of the cells in question. In 2008 or 2009, however, construction work started and the toilets were gradually enclosed by concrete walls with a door. 10.  All of the applicant\u2019s cells were well-lit, ventilated and, when necessary, heated. They were equipped with enough bunk beds for each detainee to have a separate place to sleep, as well as a table, stools and cupboards. 11.  In 2009 the Koszalin Remand Centre\u2019s day-room was turned into cells. However, detainees continued to have access to a library and various forms of leisure and cultural activities. 12.  It appears that in Koszalin Remand Centre the applicant had one hour of outdoor exercise per day. Initially, the applicant had one hot shower per week. From 18 October 2007 that number was increased to five per month. 13.  The applicant was assigned a top bed. He submitted that that was contrary to medical recommendations because he had health problems (see paragraphs 17-20 below). He did not submit any documents to that effect. 14.  The applicant submitted that for the whole of 2008 he had not been able to attend Sunday Mass at the remand centre. 15.  As established by the domestic courts (see paragraphs 24-33 below), at the material time, three Catholic services had been organised on Sundays and one on religious holidays. Prisoners wishing to attend had to sign up with their supervisors (wychowawca). Subsequently, a list of persons approved for a particular Mass had been prepared by remand centre staff, with the help of a special computer program. The system had been designed to select prisoners on a rotation basis, according to their classification groups and in a way so as not to mix prisoners classed as dangerous detainees with those who did not require any special security measures. At times, however, individual prisoners were rejected because they did not belong to the group authorised to attend Mass on a particular day. 16.  The remand centre register showed that the applicant had been authorised to attend Sunday Mass four times, twice in September and twice in November 2008. 17.  The domestic courts established that three years before his detention the applicant had been admitted to hospital because of inflammation of the testicles, prostatic hyperplasia, pneumonia and an unspecified skin condition, for which he had received treatment similar to that usually prescribed for dermatitis (zapalenie sk\u00f3ry). 18.  During his detention in Koszalin Remand Centre, the applicant often made appointments with the in-house doctor because of colds, back ache and prostate problems. On 15 November 2007 a drug called Prostamol was prescribed for the applicant, in compliance with his wish. Another medicine which the applicant had previously taken for his prostate condition, Doxar, was not in the remand centre\u2019s stock. A generic medicine was offered to the applicant instead. Eventually, Doxar was sent to the prison by the applicant\u2019s relatives. 19.  The applicant also received treatment for a scalp condition, tinea versicolor (\u0142upie\u017c pstry). In addition to that treatment, from 18 October 2007 onwards, he was entitled to an additional monthly shower. On 20 June 2008 the applicant was examined by a dermatologist and his skin condition was diagnosed as seborrhoeic dermatitis (\u0142ojotokowe zapalenie sk\u00f3ry), a chronic inflammatory scalp disorder. Consequently, the applicant\u2019s treatment was changed slightly. It was also established that the first symptoms of that disorder had appeared prior to the applicant\u2019s detention, in 2004. An expert in dermatology, appointed by the domestic court, excluded the possibility that the applicant had developed the illness because of contact with an allegedly dirty and mouldy mattress. The expert also concluded that the applicant had received the treatment which was usually prescribed in such cases by dermatologists. In the 18 months following diagnosis of the illness, the applicant was seen by a doctor on thirty occasions. Subsequently, throughout 2008, he made twelve medical appointments. 20.  In 2008 the applicant also obtained dentures. 21.  In 2007 and 2009 the applicant lodged a number of complaints with the Ombudsman, the Ministry of Justice and the relevant penitentiary court, informing them of the allegedly deplorable conditions of his detention, his inadequate medical care and of unreasonable restrictions on the practice of his religion during his detention in Koszalin Remand Centre. 22.  On an unspecified date the Central Inspectorate of the Prison Service (Centralny Inspektorat S\u0142u\u017cby Wi\u0119ziennej) informed the applicant that his complaints had been considered ill-founded. It was established that the applicant had received adequate medical care. In particular, the remand centre had administered Prostamol and the other drug, Doxar, had been obtained with the authorities\u2019 permission from the applicant\u2019s relatives. The remand facility in Dobrowo had not registered any overcrowding. The applicant\u2019s cells had been adequately furnished and there had been place for each detainee at the cell\u2019s communal table. 23.  In letters of 11 May and 15 June 2009, the authorities informed the applicant that he had had unrestricted access to religious services in Koszalin Remand Centre, in accordance with the special schedule. Moreover, the applicant\u2019s placement in overcrowded cells had been in compliance with the law, namely Article 248 of the Code of the Execution of Criminal Sentences. 24.  The applicant, who was represented by a lawyer, also brought a civil action for infringement of his personal rights on account of overcrowding, inadequate medical care and unreasonable restrictions on the practice of his religion in Koszalin Remand Centre by means of attendance of Sunday Mass. He claimed 50,000 Polish zlotys (PLN) (approximately 12,000 euros (EUR)) in compensation. The domestic courts examined the claim under Articles 23, 24, 417 and 448 of the Civil Code (Kodeks Cywilny). 25.  On 14 December 2010 the Koszalin District Court (S\u0105d Rejonowy) held that the applicant\u2019s placement in overcrowded cells for a period of 309 days during his detention constituted degrading and inhuman treatment within the meaning of domestic law and the Convention. 26.  The rest of the applicant\u2019s complaints were considered ill-founded. 27.  The evidence which was obtained by the civil court, inter alia, the applicant\u2019s medical history, witness testimony and the report of an expert in dermatology, had disproved the applicant\u2019s allegations that he had contracted his skin condition in the remand centre because his mattress had been dirty and damp and that his illness had been inadequately treated. 28.  The domestic court considered that in view of the fact that the applicant had been authorised to attend Sunday Mass a total of four times in September and November 2008 and in the light of the testimony of the prison chaplain that the applicant had been free to request attendance in Sunday Mass, it could not be said that his access to religious services had been unreasonably restricted. It was also noted that detainees had been free to make individual appointments with the remand centre\u2019s priest. The applicant had not wished to do so at the material time. 29.  Lastly, the applicant\u2019s submission that he had obtained a doctor\u2019s recommendation to have a bottom bunk had not been supported by any documents. 30.  In view of the above, the Koszalin District Court awarded the applicant PLN 5,000 (approximately EUR 1,200) in non-pecuniary compensation on account of the suffering caused by his detention in overcrowded cells. The domestic court also ordered the applicant to pay PLN 1,200 (EUR 300) towards the costs of the proceedings. 31.  The applicant submitted a hand-written appeal against the above-mentioned judgment, dated 24 January 2011. The document does not bear any stamps but is accompanied by an official note, confirming that on 24 January 2011 the applicant wished to send his appeal to the Koszalin District Court from \u017bytkowice Prison. 32.  On 5 April 2011 the Koszalin Regional Court (S\u0105d Okr\u0119gowy) dismissed an appeal brought by the respondent and, apparently, the applicant\u2019s appeal. The first-instance judgment was upheld. 33.  An appeal by the applicant against the judgment of the appellate court was rejected as no such appeal was available under the applicable law.", "references": ["4", "9", "7", "6", "5", "3", "8", "0", "2", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Enschede. 6.  On 21 May 2010 the applicant was convicted of shoplifting. The Almelo Regional Court (rechtbank) imposed the measure of placement in a Persistent Offenders Institution (inrichting voor stelselmatige daders) for the duration of two years on him. It took into account the statements of different police officers and probation officers who had had direct contact with the applicant. From these statements it appeared that the applicant was a drug addict who would not voluntarily cooperate with treatment plans. The Regional Court further decided that the measure would be reviewed six months from the date the judgment became final (5 June 2010). 7.  On 1 December 2010 the Regional Court reviewed the measure and decided not to terminate it, because it was deemed that there was still a high risk of the applicant reoffending. The applicant appealed against this decision on 6 December 2010, but on 19 April 2011 the Arnhem Court of Appeal (gerechtshof) dismissed the appeal. 8.  On 19 May 2011 G.D., the applicant\u2019s personal case officer, issued a progress report about the applicant, containing, amongst other things, the following:\n\u201c[The applicant] is currently residing in FPA De Cederborg. The placement is progressing reasonably well. (...)\nIf the measure should be terminated, [the applicant] will immediately find himself in a situation where he has no income, housing or daily activities. The risk of reoffending is consequently high. To lower the risk of reoffending the measure should be continued.\u201d 9.  On 9 June 2011 the Regional Court decided to prolong the measure further, holding that there was a considerable likelihood that the applicant would reoffend after his release. 10.  The applicant lodged an appeal against that decision on 15 June 2011. On 8 November 2011 counsel for the applicant made inquiries with the Court of Appeal about the progress of the appeal and requested that its examination be given priority. Prior to the hearing before the Court of Appeal, counsel for the applicant requested in a letter of 18 November 2011 that, for the benefit of the applicant, an interpreter be present who spoke Aramaic or Assyrian, and he gave the name of an interpreter who spoke the correct language. 11.  On 12 December 2011 a hearing took place before the Court of Appeal. It appeared that the applicant was unable to understand the interpreter who spoke Assyrian. With the applicant\u2019s agreement, the case was adjourned for a maximum period of three months to allow counsel for the applicant to put written questions to certain of the applicant\u2019s counsellors. It was also determined that case officer G.D. should be heard as an expert witness and that an interpreter speaking Aramaic should be present at the next hearing. 12.  After a period of three months had elapsed, counsel for the applicant inquired with the Court of Appeal into the progress of the proceedings on 13 March and again on 2 April 2012. The proceedings were resumed on 10 May 2012, when a hearing took place. On that occasion case officer G.D. declared the following:\n\u201c[The applicant] is no longer addicted to substances. The risk of reoffending is maximally reduced at this moment. The parole board has made several attempts to include [the applicant] in a treatment plan, but unfortunately this has not been sufficiently achieved. The clinical features of [the applicant] play an important role in this, but Cederborg [the institution] could have signalled earlier that there were no further possibilities to treat [the applicant]. The measure has contributed to the protection of society since [the applicant] is no longer addicted, thus reducing the risk of him reoffending. [The applicant] is now residing in a halfway house and has been placed on the waiting list for sheltered accommodation.\u201d 13.  It would appear that sheltered accommodation became available for the applicant on 11 May 2012. 14.  On 16 May 2012 the Court of Appeal delivered its decision, holding, amongst other things, the following:\n\u201cNo violation of Article 6 ECHR\nThe Court of Appeal considers that in the present case it cannot be said that the appeal was dealt with speedily within the meaning of Article 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. It took more than ten months after the appeal was lodged before it was dealt with on the merits. Unlike counsel [for the applicant], the court is of the opinion that the decision to accept that a violation of the Convention has occurred in itself constitutes sufficient satisfaction for the outrage to his sense of justice.\nTermination\nThe Court of Appeal has held that the execution of the measure has not been sufficiently expeditious in all stages. The Court of Appeal deems that the difficult progress of the measure cannot only be attributed to [the applicant] and finds that FPA De Cederborg could have signalled the difficult progress of the measure earlier.\nHaving regard to the fact that [the applicant] currently has accommodation where he can stay as well as a prospect of placement in appropriate sheltered accommodation where he can also stay if the measure is terminated, and the fact that partly due to this the risk that the termination of the measure will lead to endangerment, nuisance and degradation of society is small, the Court of Appeal considers that continuation of the measure is no longer necessary.\u201d", "references": ["5", "7", "8", "9", "6", "0", "1", "3", "4", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicants all live in \u017dilina, except for Mr Ky\u0161ka, Mr P. Lalinsk\u00fd and Ms Vestf\u00e1lov\u00e1, who live in Turie, Byt\u010da and Nemeck\u00e1 nad Hronom respectively. 6.  The facts of the case are structurally similar to those obtaining in the cases against Slovakia of Urb\u00e1rska Obec Tren\u010dianske Biskupice (no. 74258/01, 27 November 2007 (merits) and 27 January 2009 (just satisfaction)), Jenisov\u00e1 (no. 58764/00, 3 November 2009), \u0160ef\u010d\u00edkov\u00e1 (no. 6284/02, 3 November 2009), and Salus (no. 28697/03, 3 November 2009). 7.  The applicants are the owners of land situated in the cadastral area of Z\u00e1vodie on the territory of the municipality of \u017dilina. They acquired title to this land by way of inheritance from their predecessors. 8.  In 1948 the State put the land in question at the disposal of an agricultural cooperative called Mier \u017dilina-B\u00e1nov\u00e1. In 1987 the cooperative designated part of the land as an \u201callotment colony\u201d, consisting of individual allotments which were put at the disposal of private third parties (\u201cthe gardeners\u201d). 9.  The applicants\u2019 \u2012 or, at the relevant time, their predecessors\u2019 \u2012 formal title to the land has remained unaffected but in practice, they have not been able to make use of it at all. The size of each of the applicants\u2019 individual parcels of land thereby affected is listed in column C of the appendix. 10.  In the context of the political changes in the former Czechoslovakia, the Land Ownership Act (Law 229/1991 Coll.) was enacted in 1991. Under section 22(2) thereof, in the absence of any agreement to the contrary with the applicants, the gardeners acquired a tenancy right in respect of the land in question with effect from the date of the Act\u2019s entry into force. 11.  The rent payable for such tenancy was regulated under section 22(3) of the Land Ownership Act until this provision was replaced by the Allotments Act, which entered into force on 26 March 1997. 12.  The Allotments Act likewise imposed a compulsory tenancy arrangement in favour of the gardeners, the rent being regulated by its section 4, which applied by operation of law unless the parties had agreed otherwise. This provision, as applicable at that time, referred to other pieces of legislation which set the annual rent at ten per cent of the value of the property \u2012 calculated on the basis of the then applicable price regulations \u2012 the minimum being equivalent to 0.01 Euro (EUR) per square metre and per year. 13.  In the applicants\u2019 case, with the exception mentioned below, no such separate agreement had been reached between the parties, and the annual rent payable by the gardeners to the applicants was thus determined under the statutory rules at the lowest limit of the applicable scale, that is to say at a rate of EUR 0.01 per square metre. In the case of the applicant Ms L. Kothajov\u00e1, an agreement was reached that, as from 2004, she would be paid rent equivalent to EUR 0.01168 per square metre and per year. 14.  The applicable statutory regime was amended \u2012 after the Court\u2019s above-mentioned judgments had become final \u2012 with effect from 1 April 2011 by Law no. 57/2011 Coll., which adjusted the rent payable to owners in a situation such as the applicants\u2019 to a level commensurate with the market rent.\nBy virtue of the statutory amendment, the amount of the rent was to be determined under the Regulation of the Ministry of Justice on Determination of the General Value of Property (no. 492/2004 Coll.). This regulation uses the term \u201cgeneral value\u201d \u2012 which is understood to mean the expert assessment of the most likely price at a given place and time on the market in conditions of free competition and honest sale \u2012 and lays down formulae for the determination thereof in relation to land and the rent payable for that land, the latter being linked to the former. These formulae take into account what is known as the \u201cgeneral situation index\u201d (\u201cthe GSI\u201d), ranging originally from 0.70 to 2.00, normally depending on the geographical location of the property.\nHowever, prior to the entry into force of the amendments introduced by Law no. 57/2011, Regulation 492/2004 had been amended by Regulation no. 254/2010 Coll., which took effect from 1 July 2010. The latter Regulation introduced a special GSI ranging from 0.50 to 0.70 to be applied when determining the \u201cgeneral value\u201d of land and the \u201cgeneral value\u201d of the rent for the land in allotment colonies. 15.  These amendments left the compulsory tenancy introduced by the Allotments Act unaffected. Such a tenancy arrangement remains in place until the completion of what are known as land consolidation proceedings in a given area. Such proceedings are also provided for under the Act, their aim being to have the ownership and use of the land in the allotment area consolidated, principally by transferring title to the land to the gardeners and having the former owners compensated by means regulated under the Act, the details of such consolidation being defined in what is known as a \u201cland consolidation project\u201d. 16.  In the applicants\u2019 case, the gardeners initiated the requisite land consolidation proceedings on 7 December 1998. Within the framework thereof, the order had been given for implementation of a \u201cland consolidation project\u201d, but the proceedings changed course on 7 August 2013 when the Constitutional Court held that the applicants\u2019 inability to have that order reviewed by the courts violated their right of access to a court and their property rights.\nThe land consolidation proceedings are currently pending, at a stage where the general value of the applicants\u2019 land remains to be determined. 17.  The compulsory tenancy of the applicants\u2019 land persists. 18.  The parties disagreed as to the amount of rent payable for the applicants\u2019 property. Their positions and the documents submitted in their support may be summarised as follows. 19.  The applicants relied on report no. 05/2010 dated 29 March 2010, in which a sworn expert, A, estimated the general value of the rent in question by reference to the criteria laid down in Regulation no. 492/2004, and applied a GSI of 1.30. On that basis, the applicants considered that the market value of the annual rent amounted to EUR 2.66 per square metre.\nLater, the applicants also submitted report no. 169/13 dated 5 November 2013 by another sworn expert, B, according to which the general value of monthly rent for a plot in the stated area belonging to the applicant Mr Le\u0161\u010dinsk\u00fd was EUR 0.773 in 2013, EUR 0.782 in 2012, EUR 0.789 in 2011 and EUR 0.752 in 2010. These figures had been estimated on the basis of Regulation no. 492/2004, taking into account the GSI resulting from the amendments introduced by Regulation no. 254/2010. 20.  The Government for their part submitted the following documents:\n\u2012 A letter from the Forensic Engineering Institute in \u017dilina dated 17 December 2012, in which the Institute pointed out what they considered to be methodological flaws in the calculations of expert A. On the basis of their pro forma recalculation of the available data, the value of the annual general rent would be EUR 0.239 per square metre. However, the letter points out that this recalculation was done without a separate in situ investigation and without the examination of further documents that the Institute considered essential.\n\u2012 A letter from the Slovak Real Estate Fund dated 24 April 2013 stating that, at that time, expert valuations of the general value of the land had been obtained for fourteen allotment colonies in the district of \u017dilina. On the basis of the general value of the land as established in these valuations, which took into account legislative amendment no. 57/2011, the Government contended that the average general value of the annual rent payable for land comparable to the applicants\u2019 was EUR 0.38.\n\u2012 A full expert report drawn up by the Institute in 2014, numbered 86/2014, which had been preceded by the Institute\u2019s own investigations. In this report, drawn up on the basis of amended Regulation no. 492/2004, the Institute calculated the general value of the annual rent payable for the property in question as of 31 March 2014 as EUR 0.718 per square metre.\nThe method provided by Regulation no. 492/2004 could not be used in relation to the preceding periods. In these cases, the Institute assessed the general value of the annual rent for previous years \u2012 on the basis of the results for the year 2014, but taking into account the general development of real estate prices in the given region and other economic criteria during those years \u2012 as follows: in 2013 EUR 0.716, in 2012 EUR 0.746, in 2011 EUR 0.732, in 2010 EUR 0.745, in 2009 EUR 0.790, in 2008 EUR 1.084, and in 2007 EUR 0.804.\nLastly, the Institute reiterated the objections concerning the methodology used in the valuation produced by expert A and expressed the view that he had lacked the requisite qualifications for conducting the particular type of valuation obtaining in the present case, since his qualifications pertained only to agricultural land, and did not extend to include the type of land concerned in the present case.", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "2", "6", "5", "4", "8", "7", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1980 and 1964, respectively, and live in Hajdukovo. 6.  On 12 February 2007 the applicants and their friend S.K. were indicted for allegedly having stolen a wine press (presu za gro\u017e\u0111e). 7.  On 25 January 2008 the Subotica Municipal Court acquitted all three defendants of these charges. In so doing, it explained that while there was evidence that they had been in possession of a press, there was nothing to suggest that they had obtained it through any criminal activity. The applicants themselves maintained that they had found the press abandoned, while S.K. denied the charge and thereafter exercised his right to remain silent. No material evidence was introduced during the trial and, apart from the statement by the alleged victim \u2012 who maintained that the press worked and had been kept in a locked yard \u2012 the statements of two witnesses supported the applicants\u2019 defence. 8.  On 8 April 2008 the prosecution lodged an appeal against this judgment, emphasising, in particular, that the first-instance court had failed to take into account a statement given to the police by S.K. on 26 January 2006 (albeit in the absence of the applicants and their counsel, who had not been invited to attend). 9.  On 12 May 2008 the Subotica District Court quashed the impugned judgment and ordered a retrial. The court explained that the statement referred to by the prosecution was particularly important because on this occasion S.K. had confessed \u2012 in the presence of his counsel \u2012 that he had stolen the press together with the applicants. S.K. had subsequently revoked this confession claiming that it had been given under the influence of alcohol and then refused to answer any further questions, and all of these circumstances needed to be reconsidered by the Municipal Court, even though the prosecution itself had initially failed to request that S.K.\u2019s statement of 26 January 2006 be admitted as evidence. The court found this failure by the Municipal Court to be \u201cunclear and inexplicable\u201d. 10.  On 12 October 2008 S.K. died and on 29 December 2008 the Municipal Court discontinued the proceedings against him. 11.  On 19 February 2009 the Municipal Court, having held a hearing and read out S.K.\u2019s statement of 26 January 2006 before the parties, found the applicants guilty. The first applicant was sentenced to an effective prison term of six months while the second applicant was sentenced to six months\u2019 imprisonment, suspended for a period of two years. In its reasoning the court primarily relied on S.K.\u2019s statement of 26 January 2006. No evidence different from that admitted during the first trial was introduced during the retrial. 12.  On 29 July 2009 the District Court upheld this judgment on appeal, and on 7 October 2010 the Supreme Court rejected the applicants\u2019 further appeal on points of law (zahtev za ispitivanje zakonitosti pravosna\u017ene presude). 13.  In the meantime, on 11 September 2009, the applicants lodged a constitutional appeal with the Constitutional Court, alleging that their conviction had been based on the testimony of a person whom they had never had a chance to cross-examine and who had, in any event, revoked it subsequently. 14.  On 14 October 2010 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicants\u2019 appeal as manifestly ill-founded, adding that \u2012 as a consequence of the death of S.K. \u2012 the lower courts had had no choice but to accept his prior statement given to the police and, clearly, could no longer accommodate the applicants\u2019 objection regarding his cross-examination.", "references": ["5", "4", "8", "9", "1", "2", "7", "6", "0", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Zagreb. 6.  He is an advocate. In that capacity, he represented the plaintiff in civil proceedings instituted on 5 February 2009 before the Vukovar Municipal Court (Op\u0107inski sud u Vukovaru), in which his client sought payment of a certain amount of money from the defendant. 7.  On 16 November 2009 the Municipal Court held a hearing, which the applicant attended. At the end of the hearing, the court scheduled the next one for 17 December 2009. 8.  The applicant did not attend the hearing of 17 December 2009, at which the court made a decision to suspend the proceedings (mirovanje postupka) in accordance with section 216(1) of the Civil Procedure Act (see paragraph 18 below). 9.  On 31 December 2009 the applicant, on behalf of the plaintiff, lodged an appeal against that decision. 10.  He explained that he had been unable to attend the hearing owing to a vehicle malfunction, and that he had tried to contact the court and the defendant\u2019s representative, with a view to informing them of the reason for his absence. He further stated that, after the hearing, he had spoken by telephone with the defendant\u2019s representative, who had told him that, despite his (the representative\u2019s) suggestion to proceed and hear the defendant\u2019s testimony, the court had decided to adjourn the hearing and suspend the proceedings. The applicant argued that, if that was true, the court\u2019s decision to suspend the proceedings had had no legal basis. He explained that suspending proceedings was an instrument for maintaining procedural discipline, the effect of which was to delay proceedings and thereby penalise the parties for their inaction. Yet, in his case, he and his client had been penalised by a delay even though it was through no fault of his own that he had failed to attend the hearing. He then stated:\n\u201cWith a view to highlighting the unacceptable conduct of the judge, the following circumstances have to be mentioned.\nThe parties\u2019 representatives and the defendant attended the hearing held on 16 November 2009.\nThe plaintiff did not attend because no testimonies from the parties were scheduled, he is of low income, and he resides in Pula.\nThe hearing in question was characterised by the fact that the party present at court did not give evidence and the judge attempted to adjourn the hearing without scheduling another one.\nThe judge [eventually] adjourned the hearing, and only at the insistence of the plaintiff\u2019s representative scheduled another one for 17 December 2009.\nSuch conduct from the judge is absolutely unacceptable. In behaving in this way, he seeks to give the impression that he is proceeding with the case [i.e. that the case is being dealt with], whereas, essentially, hearings are being held which are devoid of substance.[1]\nSince the plaintiff\u2019s representative has no reason to doubt the defendant\u2019s representative\u2019s statement that he had suggested hearing the defendant\u2019s testimony at the hearing in question [the hearing of 17 December 2009], that statement indicates that the court could not have issued the contested decision.\n...\nThe contested decision should therefore be quashed.\u201d 11.  By a decision of 13 January 2010, Judge M.R. \u2013 who was the first-instance single judge in the above case \u2013 fined the applicant 1,500 Croatian kunas (HRK)[2] for contempt of court. The relevant part of that decision reads:\n\u201c... the advocate in the appeal ... first admitted not having attended the hearing scheduled for 17 December 2009 ... owing to a vehicle malfunction ...\nInstead of asking for the proceedings to be restored to the status quo ante [restitutio in integrum ob terminem elapsum, povrat u prija\u0161nje stanje] as a result of objective reasons and force majeure, the advocate in question, for no reason whatsoever, states on the second page of the appeal, \u2018Such conduct from the judge is absolutely unacceptable. In behaving in this way, he seeks to give the impression that he is proceeding with the case [i.e. that the case is being dealt with], whereas, essentially, hearings are being held which are devoid of substance.\u2019 [T]hat statement is certainly offensive to the court and the judge [concerned], and as such constitutes unacceptable communication between the court and the advocate representing one of the parties.\nBy making that offensive statement, the advocate in question implies that the judge hearing the case proceeds pointlessly, and most likely proceeds pointlessly with all other cases, which represents a serious insult to both the court and the judge.\nFor that insult, the court fined the advocate HRK 1,500. Such a fine will most likely [discourage] the advocate from insulting the court and judge hearing the case in future, in his appeals and [other] submissions, and encourage him to pay them due respect in all circumstances.\u201d 12.  The applicant appealed against that decision, arguing that his statement had not been offensive or demeaning. Rather, by making that statement, he had criticised the first-instance court\u2019s inefficiency in conducting the proceedings. In particular, in his appeal, the applicant wrote, inter alia, the following:\n\u201cThe operative provisions [of the contested decision] indicate that the fine was imposed for offending the court in the appeal of 31 December 2009 by stating, \u2018Such conduct from the judge is absolutely unacceptable. In behaving in this way, he seeks to give the impression that he is proceeding with the case [i.e. that the case is being dealt with], whereas, essentially, hearings are being held which are devoid of substance\u2019.\nI consider the contested decision to be without basis.\nThe quoted statement does not represent an insult. [Rather,] it is an assessment of how usefully the proceedings in the present case were conducted.\nThe statements quoted in the contested decision ... cannot in themselves, and especially having regard to the behaviour of the judge hearing the case, [be regarded as] disrespectful, which would justify the need to issue a decision on the fine.\n...\nIn addition to the plaintiff\u2019s representative, the defendant and [her] representative attended the hearing scheduled for 16 November 2009. The record [of that hearing] states that [the plaintiff] reaffirmed his action and the submissions of 30 March 2009, and that the defendant maintained the arguments expressed in [her] response ... of 11 March 2009. Beside this, nothing else happened at that hearing.\n...\nApart from acknowledging the facts as stated above, the judge hearing the case did not carry out any action intended to bring the proceedings to an end, except for scheduling the next hearing.\nAt that hearing, he did not even oblige the defendant to provide evidence for the claims expressed in [her] response.\nAt that hearing, not even a decision to hear testimonies from the parties was adopted. Only at the request of the plaintiff\u2019s representative did the judge decide to schedule the next hearing.\n...\nIn the circumstances, it is evident that the hearing scheduled for 17 December 2009 would have been identical ... to the previous hearing.\nThe plaintiff\u2019s representative considers such conduct to be at odds with the purpose of law.\n...\nGiven that the purpose of a hearing is concentrated deliberation, that purpose is frustrated when such concentrated deliberation is lacking. One should also bear in mind that such conduct increases the costs of proceedings ... [without] rational justification.\n...\nNo intention to offend was expressed in the submissions in question [that is, the appeal of 31 December 2009]. The quoted statement represents a view assessing how usefully the proceedings were being conducted.\nIn the reasoning [of the contested decision], it is stated that the representative implies that the judge hearing the case \u2018most likely proceeds pointlessly with all other cases\u2019. That view is not supported by any argument and has no basis [in what was written in the appeal].\u201d 13.  By a decision of 7 July 2010 the Vukovar County Court (\u017dupanijski sud u Vukovaru) dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld the first-instance decision. The relevant part of that decision, which was served on the applicant on 16 July 2010, reads:\n\u201cWhen deciding to fine the representative for contempt of court ... the first-instance court correctly held \u2013 and gave valid reasons for its view \u2013 that such statements constituted unacceptable communication between the court and an advocate ..., the assessment of which is within the discretion of the court before which the proceedings are pending.\nThose statements ... go beyond the limits of an advocate\u2019s role in the proceedings ... and may be legally characterised as abuse of process on account of inappropriate communication.\u201d 14.  On 17 August 2010 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint against the decisions of the ordinary courts. In so doing, he complained that those decisions were in breach of his freedom of expression. He explicitly relied on Article 38 of the Croatian Constitution (see paragraph 16 below) and Article 10 of the Convention. 15.  By a decision of 27 January 2011 the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) declared the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint inadmissible on the grounds that the contested decision was not open to constitutional review. That decision was served on the applicant on 11 February 2011.", "references": ["2", "5", "0", "8", "9", "4", "3", "7", "1", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Sebedra\u017eie. 6.  The present case concerns real property situated in the cadastral area of Sebedra\u017eie. Land in this area has been subject to land consolidation proceedings under the Land Consolidation Act (Law no. 330/1991 Coll.). The aim of such proceedings is to reorganise the ownership and use of land in the given area so as to correspond to the requirements of protection of the environment and rational agriculture. 7.  On 29 December 1992 the Prievidza Land Authority issued a decision under section 15(2) of the Act approving accelerated interim arrangements in relation to the land in question, in accordance with a simplified allotment plan, attached to the decision. 8.  Those interim arrangements assigned to the applicant\u2019s father, free of charge, temporary use of land divided by and situated on both sides of a railway line. This land partly neighbours a road and is partly separated from that road by another plot belonging to the applicant. 9.  The title of the applicant\u2019s father to this land was later transferred to the applicant. The Government submitted that that transfer had occurred as a result of the applicant\u2019s purchase of his father\u2019s title; by contrast, the applicant submitted (without offering any details) that his link to the land stemmed directly from his grandfather\u2019s previous ownership. 10.  Under similar terms, other individuals were assigned plots situated further down the railway line that had no or only limited contact with the road in question. 11.  The interim arrangements provided that those concerned were entitled to make use of the existing road network. Such arrangements were to stay in place until the completion of the land consolidation proceedings in the area. The completion of those proceedings was scheduled for 2014. However, no information has been submitted to the Court concerning the current state and outcome of those proceedings, if any. 12.  The bone of contention in the present case is whether or not the existing road network comprised a three-metre-wide makeshift field track (nespevnen\u00e1 po\u013en\u00e1 cesta), running parallel to the railway, across the land assigned to the applicant\u2019s father, connecting the plots assigned to the other individuals with the road passing around the applicant\u2019s property.\nIt is the applicant\u2019s contention that in point of fact no such track has ever existed in practice or on paper and that the area is covered by vegetation (in particular, fruit trees).\nAs would later be established by courts, although the track was not recorded on official maps or other documentation, it existed in practice until the applicant blocked it in 2000 by building a fence and erecting a gate. 13.  On 13 March 2001 a court ordered \u2013 by way of an interim measure \u2013 the applicant to remove the fence and gate and to enable access to the other plots concerned. 14.  On 20 April 2001 a person to whom land neighbouring the applicant\u2019s had been assigned lodged a civil action against the applicant. The exact formulation of the relief sought evolved in the course of the proceedings; the action ultimately sought to obtain an injunction ordering the applicant to (i) remove the fence, gate, vegetation and anything else obstructing passage over the property in question; (ii) re-establish the original track; and (iii) allow and not hinder the claimants\u2019 passage by that track. 15.  On the merits, the action was examined twice by both the District Court as the first-instance court and the Regional Court as the court of appeal. 16.  The first judgment (of 27 August 2004) granting the action was quashed (on 4 April 2005) following an appeal by the applicant. The second judgment (of 11 February 2009) again granting the action was upheld (on 27 January 2010) following his appeal. 17.  The courts had regard to witness, expert and documentary evidence examined at seven hearings before the first-instance court and to the findings of three in situ examinations conducted by the first-instance judge. 18.  The courts\u2019 reasoning may be summarised as follows. As mentioned above, it was established that the disputed track had never been officially documented, but what was ultimately decisive was that it had existed in point of fact. The latter finding was primarily based on a written representation made by the Land Authority, evidence from three witnesses, and written statements from four other persons. In so far as the applicant had argued to the contrary, relying on his own witnesses, the courts considered to be conclusive photo documentation submitted by the claimant and the in situ findings of the first-instance judge.\nThe courts observed that the interim arrangements relating to the area concerned, including the disputed track, constituted sui generis restrictions equivalent to easements on the ownership of the land concerned. If the ownership of any plot of land in that area were to be transferred to another person, then any attendant \u201cquasi-easements\u201d would encumber the new owner. The applicant should have known this when he acquired the title to the land from his father.\nAccordingly, the applicant was to enable and not to obstruct passage across the land. 19.  No further appeal was available. The matter became resolved by force of a final and binding judgment on 9 March 2010, after the judgment of the court of appeal had been served on the parties. Upon the expiry of the grace period accorded to the applicant for compliance with the judgment on the merits, the respective ruling became enforceable on 10 April 2010. 20.  Together with the above rulings, the applicant was ordered to pay the claimant the amount that the latter had previously paid to the court as an advance on the fees of the court-appointed expert. This ruling became enforceable on 13 March 2010. 21.  On 24 October 2008 the District Court determined the expert\u2019s remuneration. In part, it was to be paid from the advance previously paid by the claimant (some 230 euros (EUR)); the rest (some EUR 480) was paid from the budget of the court. 22.  The applicant appealed, submitting that the expert\u2019s report had been belated and flawed by errors. It should therefore have been disregarded and the expert should be paid either no or reduced remuneration. 23.  On 27 January 2010 the Regional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld the decision of 24 October 2008. 24.  On 4 February 2010 the District Court ordered the applicant to pay some EUR 475 as costs of the in situ inspections and for the remainder of the expert\u2019s fees previously paid by the court. The applicant appealed against this order. 25.  On 16 April 2010 the Regional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld the contested order. 26.  No further appeal against the ruling of 16 April 2010 was available. After that ruling was served on the parties, the costs order against the applicant became final and binding on 31 May 2010. On the expiry of the grace period accorded for compliance with the costs order, it became enforceable on 4 June 2010. 27.  The decisions of 24 October 2008 and 4 February 2010 were issued with reference to the same file number of the District Court as in the proceedings on the merits. 28.  The enforcement of the above rulings appears to be still pending. In the meantime, the applicant has paid EUR 87.40 in respect of the enforcement officer\u2019s fees. Despite being ordered to remove vegetation from the track in question, he has yet to do so. 29.  On 3 May 2010 the applicant lodged a complaint under Article 127 of the Constitution with the Constitutional Court. The complaint was against the District Court and the Regional Court and challenged specifically their judgments and decisions on the merits of his neighbour\u2019s action (11 February 2009 and 27 January 2010) and on the fees of the expert (24 October 2008 and 27 January 2010).\nThe applicant alleged, inter alia, a violation of his rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention and Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention.\nIn that regard, he argued that there had been a restriction of his ownership rights and that that restriction had been neither lawful nor necessary, had not been in the public interest, and had been subject to no compensation.\nIn addition, the length of the proceedings had been excessive and they had been unfair in that the courts had disregarded his arguments, had accepted expert and other evidence which was not reliable, and had rendered arbitrary decisions. 30.  As can be seen from the Constitutional Court\u2019s decision (see the following paragraph), it had obtained observations in reply to the applicant\u2019s complaint from the Presidents of the District Court and the Regional Court. In the Constitutional Court\u2019s decision, those observations were reflected as follows:\nThe President of the District Court observed that the claimant and others involved had long been using the disputed track and that the state of affairs had been accepted by the applicant and his father until the applicant had arbitrarily barred the track in 2000, apparently guided by the mistaken belief that his title to the property concerned was absolute. The applicant\u2019s assertions had been properly examined, the court had heard extensive evidence, and the complaint about the length of the proceedings had been belated.\nThe President of the Regional Court (i) recapitulated the course of the proceedings, (ii) summarised the applicant\u2019s complaint, and (iii) submitted that no position could be taken as regards some of the applicant\u2019s claims relating to the first-instance court, that there had been no undue delays in the proceedings before the court of appeal, and that one of the applicant\u2019s submissions before that court could not have been taken into account because it had been belated. 31.  On 14 April 2011 the Constitutional Court declared the complaint inadmissible.\nIt found no unfairness in the proceedings and held, in particular with reference to the reasons for the Regional Court\u2019s decision, that the lower courts\u2019 conclusions had been sufficiently reasoned and not arbitrary. For similar reasons, the Constitutional Court dismissed as being manifestly ill\u2011founded the complaint about the decision on the expert\u2019s remuneration.\nAs to the complaint about the length of the proceedings, the Constitutional Court held, referring to its established practice, that it had been lodged belatedly. Specifically, the complaint had been lodged after the ordinary courts\u2019 judgments on the merits had become final.\nLastly, referring to its established practice to that effect, the Constitutional Court held that, in view of the conclusion reached under Article 6 of the Convention, the ordinary courts could not be held liable for any breach of the applicant\u2019s rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. 32.  On 16 July 2010 the applicant lodged a fresh constitutional complaint against the District Court and the Regional Court, challenging the costs order against him (4 February and 16 April 2010), and alleging a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention on the grounds that the courts had disregarded his arguments and had decided arbitrarily. 33.  On 15 April 2011 the Constitutional Court ruled the complaint inadmissible, having found no appearance of any unfairness or arbitrariness in the contested decisions and the underlying proceedings.", "references": ["9", "2", "1", "6", "8", "7", "0", "5", "4", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1973 and lives in Bibice. 6.  In 1997 the applicant married E. In 2004 their daughter, N., was born. In 2008 the applicant and E. separated. In May 2008 the applicant moved out of the family home. 7.  After the separation, the applicant and E. agreed on access arrangements (every second weekend, one day during the week, and the winter and summer holidays). 8.  On 16 January 2009 the applicant lodged a divorce petition with the Krak\u00f3w Regional Court (S\u0105d Okr\u0119gowy) together with an application for an interim contact order. 9.  On 26 February 2009 the Regional Court ordered a local assessment (wywiad \u015brodowiskowy) to be conducted at the mother\u2019s home by a court\u2011appointed guardian with a view to establishing N.\u2019s situation and the parenting skills of the mother and father. The guardian submitted her report on 21 July 2009. The guardian established that N. loved both parents but was more attached to the mother. The applicant had frequent contact with his daughter. However, the parents were in conflict with each other and had negative feelings about each other. The applicant had authorised M.T., his new partner, to collect N. from the nursery, which was a source of great conflict between the parents. The guardian concluded that the access arrangements should be speedily determined by the court in order to minimise the negative consequences of the divorce on N. The child should stay with the mother and the father should be allowed frequent visits. He should, however, inform the mother of the child\u2019s whereabouts as he had taken N. abroad without the mother\u2019s knowledge. 10.  A hearing scheduled for 17 February 2010 did not take place as the case file had not been returned from the Court of Appeal (where maintenance proceedings had taken place) and because the applicant had been in pre-trial detention in connection with a corruption case against him. 11.  On 2 June 2009 and 14 October 2010 the applicant again applied for interim contact orders, specifying different arrangements. On 18 November 2010 the mother replied, setting out her own request for contact arrangements. 12.  In summer 2010 the applicant moved in with M.T. and in September 2010 a son was born. 13.  On 22 November 2010 the Krak\u00f3w Regional Court issued an interim contact order. It decided that the applicant was allowed to see his daughter every second weekend between 3 p.m. on Friday and 5 p.m. on Sunday, and also between 3 p.m. on Tuesday and 3 p.m. on Wednesday. In addition, he could spend every second Christmas Eve, every Christmas Day and every Easter Sunday with her. The applicant was allowed to take N. for the first week of the winter school holidays and between 1 and 21 July of the summer holidays. 14.  On 21 January 2011 the Krak\u00f3w Regional Court issued a writ of execution in respect of that decision. 15.  On 17 May 2011 E. asked the court to restrict contact between the applicant and N. owing to the child\u2019s fragile emotional condition. N. had therapy with a psychologist between April 2011 and February 2012. 16.  A hearing scheduled for 22 March 2011 was adjourned after the applicant lodged an application for the judge to step down. That application was dismissed on 29 March 2011. A further appeal by the applicant was dismissed on 7 September 2011. 17.  On 20 May 2011 the psychologist treating N. suggested a change in the contact order so that N. would not have to stay overnight at the applicant\u2019s house, as that was apparently causing her a lot of stress. 18.  On 13 July 2011 the Krak\u00f3w Regional Court ordered another local assessment. The guardian submitted her report on 16 December 2011. She established that contact visits with N. had taken place as agreed by the parents after their separation, with the exception of the period between January-May 2010 (when the applicant had been detained on remand on corruption charges). Contact meetings had resumed in May 2010 and had continued regularly until November 2010. Subsequently, after the court had begun supervising the contact visits, the conflict between the parents had escalated. The mother had been of the opinion that the applicant had wanted the contact meetings to take place regardless of the child\u2019s needs and her after-school activities (ice skating practice). On the other hand, the father was convinced that the practice schedule had been manipulated by the mother so that it took place during his contact visits. As of 17 December 2011, the contact visits had not taken place according to the interim contact order. The applicant saw his daughter on her birthday and on a few occasions after school. 19.  On 2 January 2012 the guardian submitted a supplementary report to the court. She noted that N. did not enjoy the way the contact with the applicant was taking place. She did not mind seeing him more often than scheduled, but she did not want to stay overnight at his house. 20.  On 11 January 2012 a hearing took place during which the applicant and E. agreed on access arrangements. On the same day, the Krak\u00f3w Regional Court issued a divorce decree. The court ordered that in the period up to 30 June 2012 the applicant could see his daughter every Thursday between 3 p.m. and 7 p.m.; every second Saturday and Sunday between 11 a.m. and 7 p.m.; as well as on Easter Sunday between 11 a.m. and 7 p.m. From 1 July 2012, the applicant could see his daughter every second weekend from 3 p.m. on Friday until 5 p.m. on Sunday; every Wednesday from 3 p.m. until Thursday 3 p.m.; for the whole of the period between 1 and 21 July; the first week of the winter holidays; the first day of Easter; and on Christmas Day. 21.  On 5 March 2012 the applicant appealed. On 31 July 2012 the Krak\u00f3w Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance judgment. 22.  On 14 and 20 December 2010 and on 17 January 2011 the applicant complained to the court that the mother had refused to comply with the access arrangements. 23.  On 7 March 2011 the applicant lodged two applications for the court to impose a fine on the mother for failing to comply with the interim contact order of 22 November 2010. 24.  The applicant subsequently lodged three applications on 15 April 2011, three on 28 April 2011 and four on 18 May 2011. 25.  The court scheduled a hearing for 27 May 2011. However, E. failed to appear on that date (she was on leave to take care of her sick child). 26.  The applicant lodged numerous further applications for the court to impose fines on E. In particular, he lodged two applications on 1 June 2011, two on 7 June 2011, four on 24 June 2011, three on 25 July 2011, three on 8 August 2011 and one on 23 August 2011. 27.  The next hearing took place on 31 August 2011. 28.  At a further hearing held on 28 October 2011, with reference to the applicant\u2019s motion of 7 March 2011, the Krak\u00f3w-Krowodrza District Court ordered the mother to comply with the interim contact order within two weeks on pain of a fine of 1,000 Polish zlotys (PLN). On 30 December 2011 the Krak\u00f3w Regional Court dismissed an appeal by E. against that decision. 29.  The applicant made further requests to the court to impose fines on E.: on 1 February 2012, 20 February 2012, 20 March 2012, 3 April 2012 (six motions); 24 April 2012 (two motions); and on 21 May 2012 (three motions). 30.  On 8 March 2012 the Krak\u00f3w-Krowodrza District Court severed to a separate set of proceedings the applicant\u2019s application of 23 August 2011 (see paragraph 26 above). It was subsequently dismissed on 18 April 2012. Upon further appeal, the Krak\u00f3w Regional Court quashed that decision on 30 July 2012. On 3 September 2012 the proceedings were further severed and the part concerning the applicant\u2019s application of 23 August 2011 was assigned a new case number. It was subsequently transferred to Krak\u00f3w\u2011Nowa Huta District Court on account of a change of address by E. The proceedings were eventually discontinued on 24 April 2013. 31.  On 15 March 2012, in reply to the applicant\u2019s claim of 7 March 2011, the District Court imposed a fine of PLN 1,000 on E. (which she subsequently paid). It further ordered her to comply with the interim contact order within two weeks, on pain of another fine of PLN 1,000. 32.  On 24 April 2012 a court-appointed guardian submitted a report to the court on arrangements for the applicant\u2019s contact with his daughter. She observed that contact visits were not taking place in accordance with the contact order. N. sometimes met the applicant on Tuesdays after school, staying with him until about 3-4 p.m. She further noted that while N. did not want to stay overnight at the applicant\u2019s home, she did not mind seeing him more often after school during the week. The guardian suggested that the parents and the child undergo an assessment at the Regional Family Consultation Centre (Rodzinny o\u015brodek diagnostyczno-konsultacyjny) (\u201cthe RODK\u201d). 33.  On 8 August 2012 the court imposed another fine of 1,000 PLN on E. However, on 22 November 2012 the Krak\u00f3w District Court discontinued the proceedings on the grounds that the interim contact order of 22 November 2010 was no longer in force. 34.  The court-appointed guardian submitted two reports to the Krak\u00f3w District Court, dated 20 and 29 October 2012. She noted in the reports that the contact arrangements set out in the latest interim contact order were not being enforced. From May 2012 the father had only been able to see his daughter for a few minutes at occasional meetings. In the guardian\u2019s opinion, the father was ready and able to take care of his daughter and organise interesting activities for their meetings. However, when questioned by the guardian, N. had been unenthusiastic about seeing her father and had said only negative things about him. The guardian concluded that a family assessment at the RODK was required. 35.  Meanwhile, the applicant lodged numerous applications for a forcible removal of N. for various visits (in May, July and August 2012, and in February 2013). The Krak\u00f3w District Court issued orders for a forcible removal of the child by the guardian on 15 May 2012 (for 1 July 2012), on 13 December 2012 (for 23 December 2012) and on 6 March 2013. In the latter decision, the court stressed that under no circumstances should physical force be used when collecting N. as that would be against her best interests. 36.  On the first occasion, the guardian found that E. was not living at the address she had submitted to the court and he was therefore unable to collect the applicant\u2019s daughter. On the two later occasions, the guardian tried to mediate between the parents and talk to the child in order to make her change her mind, but the child refused to go with the father. 37.  During the divorce proceedings, both the applicant and E. asked the police to intervene on several occasions. In particular, on 3 September 2011 the applicant arrived at E.\u2019s home to collect N. However, N. was crying and refused to go with him. E. called the police because the applicant was allegedly behaving in an aggressive manner. On 25 October 2011 the police again intervened at E.\u2019s home. On that occasion, E. refused to allow the applicant to take N. for a court-scheduled contact visit as the child was allegedly afraid of him. 38.  On 20 February 2012 the applicant complained to the Krak\u00f3w-Nowa Huta District Court that the mother had failed to comply with the interim contact order and asked the court to order her to give an undertaking related to her behaviour (odebranie przyrzeczenia okre\u015blonego zachowania). 39.  A hearing planned for 25 April 2012 was adjourned owing to the absence of both parents. The following hearings took place on 20 July 2012 and 23 August 2012. 40.  On 23 August 2012 the Krak\u00f3w-Nowa Huta District Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s application because the interim contact order was no longer in force. That decision was quashed on appeal on 30 January 2013. The Krak\u00f3w Regional Court held that the District Court had focused on the application to fine E. and had failed to consider the applicant\u2019s other requests. 41.  On 28 February 2013 the Krak\u00f3w-Nowa Huta District Court again discontinued the proceedings relating to the applicant\u2019s application to impose a fine on the mother because the interim contact order was no longer in force after the divorce judgment had become final. As of the date of the submission of the Government\u2019s observations to the Court, the remainder of the applicant\u2019s request (proceedings for the mother to give an undertaking) was still pending. 42.  On 9 August 2012 E. applied for a change of the access arrangements which were specified in the divorce judgment. She submitted that N. did not want to stay overnight at the applicant\u2019s house. 43.  On 1 October 2012 the Krak\u00f3w-Nowa Huta District Court issued an interim contact order and allowed E.\u2019s request. The court ruled that the applicant could meet his daughter every other Sunday between 2 p.m. and 6 p.m. The court held that the modification of the access arrangements was in the best interests of the child at that moment and that it was essential to rebuild the emotional ties between N. and the applicant. 44.  On 2 October 2012 the court ordered another local assessment and an examination of the parents and the child by the RODK experts. 45.  On 3 December 2012 a psychologist submitted his opinion to the court. The expert stated that the weakening of the emotional bond between the applicant and N. had been caused by a series of events. Those were, in particular, the applicant\u2019s arrest in N.\u2019s presence and his subsequent detention on remand; the applicant\u2019s new relationship and new child; the applicant\u2019s attempt to enforce the contact order, without any regard to N.\u2019s needs; and the escalation in the conflict between E. and the applicant. The expert concluded that family therapy was needed in order for family ties to be re-established. In addition, changes to contact arrangements, such as an increased frequency of visits, were not in the child\u2019s best interests at that time. 46.  At a hearing held on 10 December 2012, the applicant informed the court that the day before, when he had arrived to see his daughter, she had not wanted to go with him. Apparently, N. had gone outside to talk to the applicant but when she had seen M.T. (his new partner) she had returned home crying and had refused to go with her father. In reply to a question from the court whether he would participate in family therapy, the applicant stated that he would have to think about it, as in his view the problems with enforcing the contact arrangements were the mother\u2019s fault. 47.  On 11 January 2013 the Krak\u00f3w Regional Court allowed the applicant\u2019s appeal against the interim order of 1 October 2012. It considered that the access arrangements specified in the District Court\u2019s contact order had gone beyond what the mother had requested in her application. 48.  On 1 March 2013 the RODK submitted its opinion to the court. Firstly, the experts observed that both parents loved N. and were able to attend to her needs. The father was determined to have a place in her life and play an important role. The mother had not been right to cut off contact between N. and her father. While she claimed that she had not obstructed the contact arrangements, she was not aware that her passive approach and clear animosity towards her ex-husband had impeded father-daughter contact. The experts stressed that N. had a strong emotional bond with the mother and remained under her influence. She did not feel loved by her father and was afraid of having contact with him. The experts concluded that N. was not able to cope with the emotional consequences of the conflict between her parents and that family therapy was indispensable. Furthermore, despite her negative reaction to the applicant, she should have contact with him. However, contact visits should not take place in the mother\u2019s presence as that would increase N.\u2019s negative attitude towards her father and prevent her from re-establishing a bond with him. Contact meetings should take place on neutral ground in the presence of a neutral person. 49.  On 24 April 2013 the Krak\u00f3w District Court issued a contact order. According to that decision, the applicant could meet N. every second Sunday between 3 p.m. and 6 p.m., with the exception of the first week of the winter school holidays and the period between 15 July and 15 August. In addition, he could see N. on the first day of Easter between 3 p.m. and 6 p.m., and on 24 December every even year and on 26 December every odd year. The court held that contact meetings should take place in the presence of a court-appointed guardian.", "references": ["2", "6", "3", "1", "7", "9", "0", "5", "8", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "7.  Mr Tadeucci (\u201cthe first applicant\u201d) was born in 1965. Mr McCall (\u201cthe second applicant\u201d) was born in 1958. They live in Amsterdam. 8.  The applicants have formed a same-sex couple since 1999. They lived in New Zealand, with the status of unmarried couple, until December 2003, when they decided to settle in Italy on grounds of the first applicant\u2019s poor health. 9.  During their first period of residence in Italy the second applicant had a student\u2019s temporary residence permit. He subsequently applied for a residence permit for family reasons, under Legislative Decree no. 286 of 1998 ... . 10.  On 18 October 2004 the chief of the Livorno police rejected his application on the ground that the statutory criteria were not satisfied. 11.  On 27 January 2005 the applicants appealed on the basis of Legislative Decree no. 286 of 1998, requesting that the second applicant be issued with a residence permit for family reasons. 12.  In a judgment of 4 July 2005 the Florence Civil Court allowed the applicants\u2019 appeal. 13.  The court observed that the applicants were recognised as a couple in New Zealand, the first applicant having been issued with a residence permit in that country for family reasons in his capacity as an unmarried partner. The court found that the applicants\u2019 status as an unmarried couple was not contrary to Italian public policy, as de facto couples received social and legal recognition in the Italian system. In the court\u2019s view, Article 30 of Legislative Decree no. 286 of 1998 ... had to be interpreted in conformity with the principles established by the Constitution, which meant that a same-sex cohabiting partner should be regarded as a \u201cmember of the family\u201d of the Italian national and thus entitled to obtain a residence permit. 14.  The court found that the right asserted by the second applicant also derived from Articles 3 and 10 of Directive 2004/38/EC of 29 May 2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council ..., which recognised the right of the partner of a citizen of the European Union (EU) to obtain a residence permit where the existence of a durable relationship was duly attested. 15.  The Minister of Foreign Affairs appealed against the judgment of the Florence Civil Court. 16.  In a judgment of 12 May 2006 the Florence Court of Appeal allowed the appeal. It observed that the New Zealand authorities had recognised that the applicants had the status of \u201cunmarried cohabiting partners\u201d and not that of \u201cmembers of the same family\u201d. 17.  The Court of Appeal found, first, that the lower court\u2019s recommended interpretation of Legislative Decree no. 286 of 1998, according to which the \u201ccohabiting partner\u201d was regarded as a \u201cmember of the family\u201d, was not compatible with the Italian legal system, which, according to the court, ascribed a different scope and meaning to those two legal concepts. Secondly, the Court of Appeal pointed out that the Constitutional Court had repeatedly held that a relationship based on cohabitation alone, and lacking stability and legal certainty, could not in any circumstances be regarded as a legitimate family based on marriage. 18.  The Court of Appeal found that New Zealand law was not compatible with Italian public policy on the grounds, firstly, that it regarded persons of the same sex as \u201ccohabiting partners\u201d and, furthermore, that it could be construed as conferring the status of \u201cfamily members\u201d on them for the purposes of granting them a residence permit. Lastly, it added that neither European law, particularly Directive No 2004/38/EC ..., nor the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights, obliged the States to recognise same-sex relationships. 19.  The applicants appealed on points of law. 20.  In a judgment of 30 September 2008, the text of which was deposited with the registry on 17 March 2009, the Court of Cassation dismissed the applicants\u2019 appeal. 21.  The Court of Cassation observed first that, according to the terms of Article 29 of Legislative Decree no. 286 of 1998 ..., the concept of \u201cfamily member\u201d extended only to spouses, minor children, adult children who were not self-supporting for health reasons, and dependent relatives who lacked adequate support in their country of origin. It pointed out that as the Constitutional Court had, moreover, ruled out the possibility of extending to cohabiting partners the protection granted to members of a legitimate family, the Constitution did not require an extensive interpretation of Article 29 cited above. 22.  The Court of Cassation also considered that Articles 8 and 12 of the Convention did not require such an interpretation either. In its view, those provisions left a wide margin of appreciation to the States regarding the choice of means of exercising the rights they guaranteed, particularly in the area of immigration control. The Court of Cassation added that there had been no discrimination on grounds of the applicants\u2019 sexual orientation in the present case. It observed in that connection that the non-eligibility of unmarried partners for a residence permit for family reasons applied to opposite-sex couples as well as same-sex partners. 23.  Lastly, it held that European Directive 2004/38/EC ..., which concerned the right of EU citizens to move freely within the territory of the Member States other than their State of origin, did not apply to the present case, which concerned family reunification with an Italian national resident in his own country. 24.  After being notified of the Court of Cassation\u2019s judgment, the applicants left Italy in July 2009. They moved to the Netherlands, where the second applicant was issued with a five-year residence permit on 25 August 2009 as a de facto partner in a long-term relationship with an EU national. 25.  On 8 May 2010 the applicants married in Amsterdam. They stated that they had chosen to marry for personal reasons and not in order to obtain a residence permit, as the Netherlands authorities had already issued one to the second applicant. They added that the marriage contracted in the Netherlands did not allow them to live together in Italy. On 22 August 2014 the second applicant obtained a second five-year residence permit in the Netherlands, valid until 22 August 2019.\n...", "references": ["2", "3", "5", "1", "0", "9", "7", "6", "No Label", "8", "4"], "gold": ["8", "4"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Mingachevir. 5.  The applicant worked as the executive director at the \u201cMingachevir Technical Rubber\u201d Joint Stock Company, which was an enterprise under the control of the Department for Privatization and Management of State Property (\u201cthe DPMSP\u201d) of the Ministry of the Economic Development. On 15 March 2005 the applicant was dismissed from his job by an order of the DPMSP of the Ministry of the Economic Development. 6.  The applicant lodged an action against the DPMSP, seeking reinstatement in his previous job and payment of his unpaid salaries. 7.  On 25 August 2005 the Sabayil District Court granted the applicant\u2019s claim, ordering his reinstatement in his previous job. The court also ordered the DPMSP to pay the applicant his unpaid salary for the period from 15 March 2005 (date of dismissal) until the date of his reinstatement, without specifying the due amount. 8.  On 25 November 2005 the Court of Appeal upheld the judgment of 25 August 2005, dismissing the DPMSP\u2019s appeal. The judgment became enforceable immediately after its delivery. On 13 December 2005 a writ of execution was issued and sent to the DPMSP. 9.  On 12 April 2006 the Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeal\u2019s judgment and dismissed the cassation appeal lodged by the State Committee for Management of State Property (\u201cthe SCMSP\u201d), which was the legal successor of the former DPMSP. 10.  It appears from the documents in the case file that in spite of the issuance of the writ of execution and numerous letters of the enforcement officers requesting the execution of the judgment, the SCMSP took no action to comply with the judgment in question. 11.  Following the SCMSP\u2019s continuous failure to comply with the judgment, on 14 July 2006 the Sabayil District Court decided to refer the case to the Sabayil District Prosecutor\u2019s Office for institution of criminal proceedings against the SCMSP\u2019s responsible official for non-execution of an enforceable judgment. However, it transpires from the case file that on an unspecified date the prosecuting authorities returned the case to the enforcement officers without taking any formal decision as regards the institution of criminal proceedings. 12.  At the time of the latest communication with the parties in June 2011, the judgment delivered in the applicant\u2019s favour remained unenforced.", "references": ["0", "8", "4", "1", "7", "5", "6", "2", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1939 and lives in Dnipro. 6.  He was formerly a shareholder in two private companies, O. and L., which were liquidated on the basis of decisions by other shareholders. Accordingly, the local authorities struck the companies out of the list of legal entities. The applicant instituted several sets of court proceedings in that regard. 7.  On 21 April 2003 the applicant instituted proceedings in the Zhovtnevyy District Court of Dnipro (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) against the local council and three private persons, challenging the company\u2019s liquidation, claiming back his shares and seeking compensation. The applicant made changes to his claims on a number of occasions. 8.  In the course of the proceedings, about twenty of the approximately fifty hearings were adjourned at the request of one or more of the parties, or owing to their failure to appear. Between July 2005 and February 2007 no hearings were held pending the outcome of appeals in cassation against a procedural decision by one or other of the defendant parties. Between May 2007 and July 2008 courts at three levels of jurisdiction examined the question of whether the case should be considered within the framework of civil or commercial proceedings. Eventually, it was decided that the case should be examined under the rules of civil procedure and examination on the merits resumed in August 2008. 9.  Overall, the proceedings lasted for over seven years and eight months, the final decision being taken by the Supreme Court on 29 December 2010. That court upheld decisions of the District Court of 30 June 2010 and of the Dnipro Regional Court of Appeal (\u201cthe Court of Appeal\u201d) of 16 September 2010 rejecting the applicant\u2019s claims as unsubstantiated. The courts found that there had been no violation of the applicant\u2019s rights as a shareholder of O. 10.  In January 2005 the applicant brought a civil claim with the District Court against the local council and a number of private persons, challenging the liquidation of company L. and the authorities\u2019 decisions in that regard. He also sought the restoration of the company as a legal entity, recovery of his shareholding and an order to declare the minutes of the shareholders\u2019 general assembly invalid. 11.  On 2 June 2006, the court decided, in the applicant\u2019s presence, to leave his claim without examination, finding that it concerned essentially the same issue as one which it had examined in proceedings concerning the applicant\u2019s administrative claim (see paragraph 15 and 16 below). 12.  On 7 June 2006 the applicant lodged a statement of intent with the Court of Appeal to appeal against the decision of 2 June 2006. On 16 June 2006 he lodged an appeal, stating, inter alia, that that decision had been incorrect, as his administrative claim had concerned only a part of the issues raised in the civil claim. 13.  On 25 July 2006 the Court of Appeal left the applicant\u2019s appeal without examination, finding that the statement of intent to appeal had been lodged outside the five-day time-limit envisaged by Article 294 \u00a7 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure of 2004 (see paragraph 20 below). According to the appeal decision, the time-limit in question had started to run from the date of the pronouncement of the contested decision. 14.  On 9 October 2006 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal in cassation, finding no fault on the part of the lower courts. 15.  In November 2005 the applicant brought an administrative claim in the District Court against the head of the local council, seeking the annulment of the decision striking L. out of the list of legal entities. 16.  On 17 April 2006 the court, having examined the case pursuant to the Code of Administrative Justice of 2005, rejected the applicant\u2019s claim as unsubstantiated, finding that the contested decision had been lawful. The court further noted that the applicant had made allegations of the unlawfulness of the shareholders\u2019 decision to liquidate the company, which could not be examined in the framework of administrative proceedings. It also noted that the applicant\u2019s claim had been brought out of time, though it did not consider it necessary to reject it on that ground. 17.  On 20 September 2006 the Court of Appeal upheld the decision of 17 April 2006. 18.  On 28 October 2008 the Higher Administrative Court quashed the decisions of the lower courts and terminated the proceedings. It found that the claim should not have been examined within the framework of administrative proceedings, as it essentially concerned a property dispute. The Higher Administrative Court noted that the applicant\u2019s claim could be heard under the Code of Civil Procedure of 2004.", "references": ["6", "7", "0", "9", "2", "8", "1", "5", "4", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicants\u2019 dates of birth and places of residence are given in the Appendix. At the material time many of them were members of opposition political parties or groups. 5.  Demonstrations were planned to be held on 20 October and 17 November 2012 in Baku. Prior to the assemblies, on 15 October and 12 November 2012 respectively the organisers, members of the opposition, gave notice to the relevant authority, the Baku City Executive Authority (\u201cthe BCEA\u201d). 6.  The BCEA refused to authorise the demonstration of 20 October 2012 at the place indicated by the organisers and proposed another location on the outskirts of Baku \uf02d the yard of a driving school situated in the 20th habitable area of the Sabail District. 7.  The BCEA also refused to authorise the demonstration of 17 November 2012. It noted in general terms that that assembly would not be in accordance with the Law on Freedom of Assembly. The BCEA further noted that the square where the organisers proposed to hold the assembly was a designated public leisure area and that the assembly itself would be impractical. 8.  The organisers nevertheless decided to hold the demonstrations as planned. 9.  According to the applicants, the demonstrations were intended to be peaceful and were conducted in a peaceful manner. The participants were demanding democratic reforms in the country and protesting against impediments on freedom of assembly. 10.  Each applicant attended one of the two demonstrations (see Appendix), but shortly after they had begun the police started to disperse those who had gathered. All applicants were arrested during the dispersal operations and were taken to various police stations. According to most of the applicants, they were arrested by people in plain clothes. 11.  The applicants were questioned at the respective police stations. 12.  On the day of each applicant\u2019s arrest administrative offence reports (inzibati x\u0259ta haqq\u0131nda protokol) were issued on them, which stated that by deliberately failing to comply with a lawful order of the police, the applicants had committed an administrative offence under Article 310.1 of the Code of Administrative Offences (\u201cthe CAO\u201d). The applicants in application nos. 8204/13, 8468/13, 31201/13 and 51930/13 were also charged under Article 298 of the CAO (violation of the rules on holding public assemblies). 13.  Some of the applicants refused to sign the administrative offence reports. 14.  According to the applicants, they were never served with copies of the administrative offence reports or with other documents from their case files. They were not given access to a lawyer after their arrest or while they were in police custody. 15.  Each applicant was brought before a first-instance court on the day of their arrest. 16.  According to most of them, the hearing before the court in each case was very brief. Members of the public were not allowed inside the courtroom, even though the court had not taken a formal decision to close the hearing to the public. 17.  According to all applicants, they were not given an opportunity to appoint lawyers of their own choosing. State-funded lawyers were invited to represent most of them. The applicants in application nos. 8204/13, 31201/13 and 51930/13 were not represented by a lawyer. According to the transcripts of the respective court hearings, the applicants in application nos. 8204/13 and 51930/13 refused the assistance of a State-funded lawyer and decided to defend themselves in person. 18.  The applicants stated in the respective courts that they had participated or attempted to participate in the demonstrations of 20 October 2012 or 17 October 2012, exercising their right to freedom of assembly and/or that they were not guilty of failing to comply with a lawful order of the police. 19.  According to the transcripts of the hearings, in their oral submissions the State-funded lawyers stated in general terms that the applicants were not guilty or briefly asked the respective courts to adopt a fair decision. With respect to the applicants in application nos. 8468/13, 17569/13 and 45211/13 the State-funded lawyers did not make any oral or written submissions. 20.  The only witnesses questioned during the respective court hearings were police officers who, according to official records, had arrested the applicants or issued administrative offence reports on them. They testified that the applicants had staged unauthorised demonstrations and/or had been shouting loudly on the street. 21.  In application nos. 8204/13, 8468/13, 14226/13, 17569/13, 31201/13, 45211/13 and 51930/13 the respective courts did not question any witnesses. 22.  In most of the cases the respective first-instance courts found that the applicants had failed to stop participating in an unauthorised demonstration. With respect to the applicant in application no. 5231/13, the first-instance court found that he had attempted \u201cto make noise by shouting\u201d on a street. With respect to the applicant in application no. 17575/13, the first-instance court stated in general terms that he had deliberately failed to comply with a lawful order of the police. 23.  The courts convicted the applicants under Article 310.1 of the CAO and sentenced them to a period of administrative detention, varying from five to thirteen days (see Appendix). The applicant in application no. 8468/13 was additionally convicted under Article 298 of the CAO. 24.  On various dates the applicants lodged appeals with the Baku Court of Appeal, arguing that their convictions were in violation of their rights because the demonstrations in which they had participated or attempted to participate had been peaceful. The applicants also complained that their arrests had been unlawful and that the hearings before the respective first\u2011instance courts had not been fair. They asked the Baku Court of Appeal to quash the first-instance courts\u2019 decisions in their respective cases. 25.  The applicants were represented before the Baku Court of Appeal by lawyers of their own choosing. 26.  On various dates the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the applicants\u2019 appeals and upheld the decisions of the respective first-instance courts (see Appendix).", "references": ["1", "6", "4", "9", "0", "8", "5", "No Label", "7", "2", "3"], "gold": ["7", "2", "3"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicants\u2019 dates of birth and places of residence are given in the Appendix. 5.  The circumstances of the case are similar to those in Tahirov v. Azerbaijan (no. 31953/11, \u00a7\u00a7 6-22, 11 June 2015) and Annagi Hajibeyli v. Azerbaijan (no. 2204/11, \u00a7\u00a7 6-20, 22 October 2015). 6.  The applicants stood as candidates in the parliamentary elections of 7 November 2010 and applied for registration as candidates in various single\u2013mandate electoral constituencies (see Appendix). 7.  The respective Constituency Electoral Commissions (\u201cConECs\u201d) on various dates (see Appendix) refused the applicants\u2019 requests for registration as a candidate after the ConEC working groups had found that some of the supporting voter signatures submitted by the applicants were invalid and that the remaining valid signatures had numbered fewer than 450, a minimum required by law. Signatures were found to be invalid on several grounds in each case. 8.  None of the applicants, except the applicant in application no. 30750/11, were invited to the ConEC meetings where decisions to refuse their requests for registration were taken. In each case, despite the requirements of the law, all the relevant working group documents and the ConEC decision itself were made available to the applicants belatedly or never made available to them. 9.  Each applicant lodged a complaint with the Central Electoral Commission (\u201cthe CEC\u201d) against the ConEC decisions. The points raised in their complaints were similar to those made by the applicants in Tahirov (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 13-14) and Annagi Hajibeyli (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 11-12). 10.  On various dates, the CEC also rejected the applicants\u2019 complaints (see Appendix), after another examination of the signature sheets by members of its own working group, which had found in each case that large numbers of signatures were invalid and that the remaining valid signatures were below the minimum required by law. 11.  None of the applicants were invited to attend the relevant CEC or working group meetings. Moreover, in each case, all the relevant CEC documents were only made available to the applicants after the CEC decision had been taken. 12.  On various dates, each of the applicants lodged an appeal with the Baku Court of Appeal against the decisions of the electoral commissions. They reiterated the complaints they had made before the CEC concerning the ConEC decisions and procedures. They also raised a number of other points similar to those raised by the applicants in Tahirov (cited above, \u00a7 19) and Annagi Hajibeyli (cited above, \u00a7 17). 13.  On various dates (see Appendix), the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed appeals by the applicants, finding that their arguments were irrelevant or unsubstantiated and that there were no grounds for quashing the decisions of the CEC. 14.  The applicants lodged cassation appeals with the Supreme Court, reiterating their previous complaints and arguing that the Baku Court of Appeal had not carried out a fair examination of the cases and had delivered unreasoned judgments. 15.  On various dates (see Appendix), the Supreme Court dismissed the applicants\u2019 appeals as unsubstantiated, without examining their arguments in detail, and found no grounds to doubt the findings of the electoral commissions or of the Baku Court of Appeal. 16.  In addition to the applicants in the present cases, at the material time Mr Intigam Aliyev, the applicants\u2019 representative in applications nos. 2326/11, 8055/11 and 30750/11, was representing a total of twenty\u2011seven applicants in cases concerning the 2010 parliamentary elections and a number of applicants in other cases before the Court. 17.  On 8 August 2014 criminal proceedings were instituted against Mr I. Aliyev, which are the subject of a separate application brought by him before the Court (application no. 68762/14). On 8 and 9 August 2014 the investigation authorities seized a large number of documents from Mr I. Aliyev\u2019s office including all the case files relating to the pending proceedings before the Court, which were in Mr Aliyev\u2019s possession and which concerned over 100 applications in total. The files relating to applications nos. 2326/11, 8055/11 and 30750/11 were also seized in their entirety. The facts relating to the seizure and the relevant proceedings are described in more detail in Annagi Hajibeyli (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 21-28). 18.  On 25 October 2014 the investigation authorities returned a number of the case files concerning the applications lodged before the Court, including the file relating to applications nos. 2326/11, 8055/11 and30750/11, to Mr Aliyev\u2019s lawyer.", "references": ["9", "0", "6", "8", "2", "3", "1", "7", "4", "5", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1965 and lives in Riga. 6.  On 18 February 2008, in the course of a first set of criminal proceedings against the applicant for fraud in relation to means of payment, the Riga Regional Court decided to relieve him of criminal liability, and imposed on him a compulsory measure: outpatient medical treatment. 7.  On 7 May 2009 the applicant signed an information sheet \u2013 drawn up and certified by the Riga psychiatric hospital (VSIA \u201cR\u012bgas psihiatrijas un narkolo\u0123ijas centrs\u201d, hereafter \u201cthe psychiatric hospital\u201d) \u2013 regarding the rights and obligations of people receiving compulsory outpatient medical treatment. Among other things, this information sheet stated that a patient had to visit a doctor once a month and attend a panel meeting of doctors every six months, on the date indicated by the relevant doctor. It also stated that if a patient missed more than three doctor\u2019s appointments in a row, that patient would be reported to the police so that he could be taken to the doctor. 8.  The necessity of continuing the applicant\u2019s compulsory treatment was reviewed on several occasions, and on 8 April 2013 the Vidzeme District Court, having examined the medical panel\u2019s conclusion of 25 February 2013 in relation to his state of health, decided to continue the treatment. The applicant was summoned, but did not attend the hearing, and on 10 April 2013 the decision was sent to him. 9.  On 21 April and 24 June 2013 the applicant sent letters to the Vidzeme District Court, asking it to revoke the compulsory measure. On 2 July 2013 the court informed him that, following his requests, it had asked the medical experts concerned to report on his medical condition. 10.  On 20 August 2008, in the course of a second set of criminal proceedings against the applicant for social benefit fraud, the Riga Regional Court decided to relieve him of criminal liability, and imposed on him a compulsory measure: inpatient psychiatric treatment in a psychiatric hospital, which on 13 April 2010 was changed to compulsory outpatient medical treatment. 11.  On 28 May 2012 the Riga Regional Court decided to continue the applicant\u2019s outpatient medical treatment. It relied on a medical report filed on 28 March 2012, which, among other things, noted that he was regularly attending appointments with a doctor, was not showing stable improvement, did not accept that he had health issues and had no remorse regarding the offence he had committed. The applicant was represented by a State\u2011appointed defence lawyer, and on 10 April 2013 the decision was sent to the applicant. 12.  On 10 May 2013 the Riga Regional Court, relying on section 607(4) of the Criminal Procedure Law (see paragraph 22 below), asked the psychiatric hospital to send a report on the applicant\u2019s state of health, so that the court could decide whether it was necessary to continue the compulsory medical treatment. 13.  According to the information the Riga psychiatric hospital submitted to the Government, since 2005 the applicant had been admitted to the psychiatric hospital for inpatient treatment on eight occasions, including on an emergency basis. Since 2010 he had visited doctors every two to three months. In 2013 he had voluntarily visited his doctor on 24 January and 15 April, and had missed an appointment on 24 April. On 28 May 2013 the applicant\u2019s doctor at the psychiatric hospital had telephoned him to ask the applicant to comply with the compulsory treatment measure, and had warned him that police assistance would be sought. Observing that the applicant had not attended a doctor\u2019s appointment, and considering that a longer period without treatment could cause his health to deteriorate, on 10 June 2013 the Head of Unit at the psychiatric hospital asked the police to bring the applicant to the outpatient section of the hospital, relying on section 11 of the Law on Police. That request referred to the court\u2019s decision of 18 February 2008 in the first set of criminal proceedings. 14.  On 17 June 2013 several police officers arrived at the applicant\u2019s home and took him to the outpatient section of the Riga psychiatric hospital. 15.  According to information submitted by the Riga psychiatric hospital, on 17 June 2013, in the outpatient section of the Riga psychiatric hospital the applicant declared that he would only visit a doctor if given a written summons. In line with a doctor\u2019s decision, the applicant was put under observation as an inpatient (nov\u0113ro\u0161ana stacion\u0101r\u0101). The applicant, accompanied by police officers, was taken to the inpatient section of the hospital, where he displayed dissatisfaction and anger and refused to admit himself to hospital voluntarily. On the same day he was involuntarily admitted for inpatient treatment, as provided for by section 68(1) of the Medical Treatment Law (see paragraph 25 below), where he received medication and on 18 June 2013 asked a doctor to be released. He was informed that he would be examined by a medical commission, as provided for by section 68(3) of the Medical Treatment Law (see paragraph 26 below). 16.  On 19 June 2013 the medical commission drew up a report, which stated that the applicant did not display any psychotic symptoms, therefore there was no need for inpatient treatment. In the afternoon he was discharged from hospital. 17.  On 19 June 2013 the medical commission informed the relevant court that the applicant was not completely well, but his condition was stable and he was not socially dangerous, therefore it was recommended that the court revoke the compulsory outpatient treatment measure which had been imposed on him. 18.  Having examined the above report, on 20 August 2013 the Riga Regional Court and, at a later date the Vidzeme District Court, revoked the compulsory outpatient treatment measures which had been imposed on the applicant in both sets of criminal proceedings. 19.  On 19 July 2013 the Internal Security Office of the State Police (Valsts policijas Iek\u0161\u0113j\u0101s dro\u0161\u012bbas birojs) dismissed a complaint by the applicant that police officers had taken him to the psychiatric hospital unlawfully. In its decision, it stated that the police officers in question had acted in accordance with section 11 of the Law on Police following the request received from the psychiatric hospital. 20.  The applicant appealed that decision to the Office of the Prosecutor General, which on 16 August 2013 upheld it, stating that on 28 May 2012 the Riga Regional Court had decided to continue the applicant\u2019s compulsory medical treatment. As the applicant had failed to comply with the measure, representatives of the psychiatric hospital had had grounds to ask for police assistance in executing it.", "references": ["7", "0", "9", "6", "3", "4", "1", "8", "5", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Kassel. He is a lawyer and was appointed insolvency administrator of the German limited partnership M.K. KG (hereafter \u201cthe company\u201d) in 1999. 6.  On 12 July 2002 the applicant, in his position of insolvency administrator of the company, took legal action against Ms B., a former limited partner (Kommanditist) of the KG, to seek the reimbursement of close to 56,000 euros (EUR), which had been paid to her as advance payment on profits (Vorauszahlungen auf Gewinne) by the KG. 7.  In his statement of claim, the applicant indicated that he might introduce an additional action concerning approximately EUR 1.7 million, to seek the reimbursement of payments received by Ms B. as compensation for her participation as a limited partner (Abfindung f\u00fcr Kommanditbeteiligung) and as advance payments for profit. The applicant declared that he had refrained from introducing an action concerning these claims at that point in time because of the costs involved. 8.  Ms B. was notified of the legal action on 17 July 2002. 9.  On 30 December 2004 the applicant requested legal aid for his initial action and with a view to introducing an action concerning the supplementary claims, amounting to approximately EUR 1.7 million. The statutory time\u2011limit for those latter claims was 31 December 2004. This request for legal aid was placed in the case file. It was neither examined by a judge nor was notice given to Ms B. 10.  On 24 March 2005 the applicant sent a letter to the Regional Court to enquire whether he had been granted legal aid. He did not receive a response. On 29 August 2005, he sent another letter, to which he received no response. The applicant claimed that, in addition, he had also made telephone calls to the Regional Court on 10 June 2005 and on 14 November 2005 to find out whether he had been granted legal aid and that, both times, he had been informed by the Registry that the file was at the judge\u2019s office and that, therefore, no information could be given. 11.  On 11 May 2007 the Regional Court granted the applicant\u2019s request for legal aid, following another written inquiry of that same day. The decision to grant legal aid was served on Ms B. on 16 May 2007. On 5 July 2007 the Regional Court issued a decision, clarifying that the grant of legal aid covered the supplementary claims brought on 30 December 2004. 12.  On 20 July 2007 the applicant introduced the additional action concerning the said claims. Ms B. was notified on 25 July 2007. On 1 October 2008 a hearing was held. 13.  In its judgment on 19 November 2008 the Regional Court ordered Ms  B. to pay EUR 15,338.76 to the applicant and dismissed the remainder of the applicant\u2019s initial action. That court likewise dismissed the applicant\u2019s additional action for reimbursement of approximately EUR 1.7 million in its entirety, finding that the claims were time-barred. It stated that the statutory time-limit for these claims was 31 December 2004 and that submitting the request for legal aid on 30 December 2004 had not been sufficient to suspend the running of time for purposes of limitation, because domestic law also required that the court arrange for notice to be given to the defendant (see relevant domestic law and practice paragraphs 25 to 27 below). 14. The Regional Court noted that Ms B. was notified of the request for legal aid only in mid-2007, hence more than two and a half years after the expiry of the limitation period. It considered that the exception foreseen by domestic law allowing for the retroactive effect of arranging for notice to be given was not applicable in the instant case. According to that exception, the running of time for the purposes of limitation was suspended with effect from the day a request for legal aid was lodged, if the notification of that request was arranged \u201cshortly after\u201d (demn\u00e4chst). The Regional Court noted that, according to the constant case-law of the domestic courts, the term \u201cshortly after\u201d was interpreted in a way that required the litigant to act with the necessary diligence to effect the immediate notice or service. It found that the applicant \u2013 who, as a lawyer, must have known that arranging for notice to be given to the defendant of his request for legal aid \u201cshortly after\u201d its submission was required to prevent his claim from becoming time\u2011barred \u2013 had in a reproachable manner contributed to the delay and thus not acted with the necessary diligence required. The Regional Court observed that the applicant had not asked the Regional Court to notify immediately the defendant of his request for legal aid, irrespective of its prospects of success, which he could have done without additional costs and without suffering any procedural disadvantages. Also, rather than enquiring whether the notification of the request had been arranged, the applicant limited himself to enquiring whether his request for legal aid had been successful. In relation to the alleged telephone calls in June 2005 and November 2005, it found that, given that the Regional Court had not responded to his written request of 24 March 2005, the applicant should not have relied on the registry\u2019s alleged statement. The court found it incomprehensible that the applicant had waited until 29 August 2005, and 11 May 2007, to enquire again in writing about the success of his request for legal aid. 15.  The Regional Court added that, in any event, the claim concerning the reimbursement of approximately EUR 1.7 million was ill-founded and thoroughly reasoned this finding. 16.  On an unspecified date the applicant requested legal aid in order to lodge an appeal. 17.  On 22 June 2009 the Frankfurt/Main Court of Appeal dismissed his request, finding that the appeal lacked prospects of success as the Regional Court had rightly considered the applicant\u2019s claims to be time-barred. It observed that the Regional Court had arranged for notice to be given to Ms B. of the applicant\u2019s request for legal aid at the earliest in 2007 and argued that notice two and a half years after the request\u2019s introduction could not be considered as having taken place \u201cshortly after\u201d that introduction. The interests of the defendant, who had no knowledge of the submission of the request for legal aid, in the protection of her legal positions and the clarification of the legal situation, had to be taken into account. 18.  The Court of Appeal pointed out that it was constant case-law of the domestic courts that the term \u201cshortly after\u201d was to be interpreted in such a way that the risk of a delayed notification was distributed fairly between both parties to the dispute and, therefore, the litigant concerned must have acted with the necessary diligence to effect the immediate notification. Furthermore, there must not be legitimate interests of the defendant that conflicted with such retroactive effect (see relevant domestic law and practice paragraph 26 below). It confirmed the Regional Court\u2019s finding that the applicant had not acted with the necessary diligence. It underlined that the applicant would have had to alert the Regional Court about the imminent expiry of the limitation period and to ask to arrange for the immediate notification of the defendant in order to suspend the running of time for the purposes of limitation. In fact the applicant had to take into account that the Regional Court also had the possibility to refuse his request for legal aid without hearing, and hence without notifying, the defendant if it considered the claim to be ill\u2011founded or the applicant to have the necessary means (decision a limine). The Court of Appeal likewise considered that the subsequent steps taken by the applicant were not sufficient, because he had not asked for the notification to be effected immediately. The Court of Appeal based its decision to refuse legal aid exclusively on the finding that the claims were time-barred. 19.  On an unspecified date the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court, alleging that the refusal to grant him legal aid violated his right of access to a court and that he had been discriminated against as an impecunious person compared to a litigant with sufficient financial means. 20.  On 19 July 2010 the Federal Constitutional Court, sitting as a formation of three judges, declined to accept the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint for adjudication (1 BvR 1873/09). It found that the period of processing the request for legal aid and the delay in arranging for notice to be given to the defendant constituted gross negligence (grob fehlerhaft) by the Regional Court. Nonetheless, it considered that the decision of the Court of Appeal was in conformity with the case-law of the Federal Court of Justice, according to which a notification could only be \u201cshortly after\u201d the submission of a request for legal aid if the applicant concerned acted with the necessary diligence to effect the immediate notification, and if there were no legitimate interests of the defendant that conflicted with such retroactive effect (see relevant domestic law and practice paragraph 26 below). The Federal Constitutional Court found that the Court of Appeal\u2019s finding that the applicant had not acted with the necessary diligence did not raise concerns. The applicant failed to ask the Regional Court to notify immediately the defendant about the request for legal aid. Neither in his initial lawsuit nor in his subsequent enquiries did the applicant indicate the particular urgency of the matter, namely, the imminent limitation of the claims. 21.  In relation to the alleged discrimination, the Federal Constitutional Court found that impecunious litigants and litigants with sufficient financial means were in a comparable situation as regards the possibilities and obligations in order to suspend the running of time for purposes of limitation. Referring to the case-law of the Federal Court of Justice (see relevant domestic law and practice paragraph 28 below), it considered that a litigant with sufficient financial means must not limit himself to submitting a lawsuit, but rather had to remind the court to ask him to pay the necessary court fees or even to pay the fees on his own initiative, if the court had failed to ask him, in order to effect the service of the legal action. The Federal Constitutional Court found that such obligations on the part of a litigant with sufficient financial means were comparable to those of the applicant, namely his obligation to ask the court concerned to notify immediately the defendant of the request for legal aid, and to remind the court to arrange for notice to be given.", "references": ["2", "6", "5", "4", "9", "7", "3", "0", "8", "1", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1966 and lives in Gda\u0144sk. 6.  At the relevant time, the applicant was a member of the Polish Parliament and a member of the Law and Justice party. 7.  On 8 May 2006 the applicant and several other politicians, experts and journalists, participated in a live television programme, Warto rozmawia\u0107 (\u201cIt\u2019s good to talk\u201d), shown on TVP2. The programme was also broadcast on TVP Polonia on two consecutive days. 8.  During the programme the applicant took out a copy of Gazeta Wyborcza, a Polish daily newspaper and, pointing to particular pages, said:\n\u201cI would like to show you the nature of the relationship between this media agreement (\u201cuklad\u201d) ... and the attacks on Law and Justice. I will show you Gazeta Wyborcza, which for the first seven pages, for example today, is a frenzied attack on Law and Justice. Out of modesty I will not mention that a horrible piece about me, full of lies, is on the first page. On the second page, a frenzied attack on Kaczy\u0144ski and the Polish Families League. Here, \u201cStudents fear flogging\u201d, etc. etc., \u201cRadio Maryja miracles\u201d. This is just obsessive propaganda. But let\u2019s go further, to page thirty-five. And what do we see? We see an advertisement entitled \u201cWe have built one of the world\u2019s biggest stock markets with the participation of Polish shareholders. We are proud of that.\u201d This is an advertisement for the company J&S S.A....\nSo the paradox is that usually in newspapers they advertise washing powders, cosmetics, beers, or cars, that is, widely available consumer goods (powszechnego nabycia). This [company] is a monopolist. It does not need any advertising. This company imports most of the crude oil into Poland and drives billions of euros away from Poland to another company, which is registered somewhere in Cyprus. This is not about an advertisement. This is [about] financing mass propaganda against Law and Justice through an agreement which has been threatened by Law and Justice, so that such dubious deals (geszefty) ...\nThe point is that Law and Justice has interfered with extremely serious connections, which have been draining ...\nJust one sentence ... but the jokes are over, and this structure (uk\u0142ad) understood that there will be no early elections, there will be no minority government, this is a chance for an institutional construction ...\u201d 9.  During the applicant\u2019s statement one of the journalists interrupted him by saying: \u201cBut this would be more appropriate if someone from Gazeta Wyborcza was here.\u201d However, the applicant continued with his statement. 10.  On 16 May 2006, Agora S.A., the publisher of Gazeta Wyborcza, brought a civil claim against the applicant for the protection of its rights. It claimed that the applicant\u2019s statements during the television programme on 8 May 2006 had harmed its good name and credibility and asked that the applicant be made to have an apology published in Gazeta Wyborcza and broadcast on TVP2 and to pay 25,000 Polish zlotys (PLN) to a charity. 11.  On 12 June 2007 the Warsaw Regional Court granted the claim and ordered the applicant to issue an apology via Gazeta Wyborcza and TVP2 for the statements he had made. It further ordered the applicant to pay PLN 10,000 (approximately 2,500 euros (EUR) to a charity and PLN 2,410 (approximately EUR 600) in court fees. 12.  The text of the apology to be published by the applicant was as follows:\n\u201cI declare that the public statement I made during the programme Warto rozmawia\u0107, broadcast on 8 May 2006 on TVP2, included untrue, defamatory allegations and suspicions about AGORA S.A., a company registered in Warsaw, and about its publishing activity regarding Gazeta Wyborcza. I confirm that those allegations caused negative consequences for AGORA S.A in conducting their business activities, in particular a loss of indispensable credibility and trust.\nConsequently, I apologise to the Warsaw-registered company AGORA S.A. (the publisher of Gazeta Wyborcza) for having publicly disseminated untrue, defamatory statements which could have harmed its good name, credibility and reputation.\nThe above statement is made as a consequence of losing a civil case. \u201d 13.  During the proceedings the applicant submitted that it had not been his intention to offend the plaintiff. In the television programme he had merely expressed a value judgment relating to aggressive and clearly one-sided articles published in Gazeta Wyborcza. He further noted that as his statements had been value judgments he had not had to prove their veracity. 14.  The court considered that the applicant had breached the plaintiff\u2019s rights, in particular in respect of its good name, credibility and reputation. It could be seen from the applicant\u2019s statement that he had wished to point out to the audience that the plaintiff and Gazeta Wyborcza had had some kind of media/business agreement, whereby articles against Law and Justice had been published in Gazeta Wyborcza and financed via advertisements. 15.  The court observed that the applicant\u2019s statement had contained both facts and conclusions drawn from those facts. 16.  The court further observed that an accusation that a newspaper had published articles ordered by a sponsor was clearly offensive to the publisher. Likewise, it was offensive to the publisher to be associated with a company that allegedly conducted morally doubtful activities. The defendant had not submitted any evidence in support of his allegations. He had failed to explain on what basis he had drawn the conclusion that the income obtained from a particular advertisement had resulted in articles being published in Gazeta Wyborcza. Furthermore, there had been no reason to believe that the income obtained from the J&S S.A. advertisement had been connected with any particular articles in Gazeta Wyborcza, particularly the ones that the applicant had referred to as \u201ca frenzied attack on Law and Justice\u201d. 17.  The court stressed that J&S S.A. had at the relevant time placed advertisements in several newspapers and magazines. However, the applicant had not alleged that those other newspapers or magazines had been involved in the alleged agreement (uk\u0142ad). The court pointed out that a publisher could not refuse to publish an advertisement unless one of the grounds set out in the press law existed, which had not been the situation in the present case. Moreover, as a rule, a publisher was not responsible for the content of advertisements. 18.  The court did not agree with the applicant that he had not wished to infringe the plaintiff\u2019s rights. It noted that the applicant had prepared in advance to make the statement in question. He had already had a copy of Gazeta Wyborcza when he had entered the television studio and he had had it in his hand while making the statement. In the court\u2019s opinion, the declaration had not been made spontaneously. 19.  Lastly, the court observed that the applicant\u2019s statement could not have been explained on the grounds that it had been in the public interest. On the contrary, it was in the public interest that public figures such as the applicant, a member of parliament, should base the opinions they expressed in the media on verified facts and did not breach the rights of others. 20.  The applicant lodged an appeal against the judgment. He argued, amongst other things, that the Regional Court had wrongly classified his statements as facts and not as value judgments. 21.  On 25 June 2008 the Warsaw Court of Appeal upheld the first\u2011instance judgment and ordered the applicant to pay 270 PLN (about EUR 67) in court fees for the proceedings at second instance. 22.  The Court of Appeal considered that the first-instance judgment had not related to the part of the applicant\u2019s statement concerning articles about himself and Law and Justice, even though he had called them \u201cfrenzied attacks\u201d, because it was well known that Gazeta Wyborcza was critical of Law and Justice and that was not something which needed to be proved. However, the applicant\u2019s allegations that J&S S.A. had conducted unclear or even suspicious dealings under the cover of placing advertisements in Gazeta Wyborcza, and had in fact financed them only to destroy Law and Justice, which, for its part, had been fighting against the \u201cagreement\u201d between the company in question and Gazeta Wyborcza, had been statements of fact. Nevertheless, the applicant had not proved the truthfulness of his statements about the connections between the plaintiff and the J&S S.A. company. 23.  The court agreed with the Regional Court that the applicant had prepared in advance to make the statement in question. The programme had concerned different issues and the statement had not been a response or reaction to the discussion between the participants. During the programme the applicant had kept a copy of Gazeta Wyborcza under his chair, which he had shown to the cameras at the relevant moment. 24.  As regards the PLN 10,000 (about EUR 2,500) to be paid to a charity, the court considered that to be a modest sum and the costs of publishing an apology a normal consequence of the applicant\u2019s wrongdoing. 25.  The applicant lodged a cassation appeal against the judgment. He argued that the Court of Appeal had wrongly applied the standards of Article 10 of the Convention and had thus considered his statement to be one of fact rather than a value judgment. In his opinion, he had expressed value judgments during a public debate and had therefore not undermined the plaintiff\u2019s good name. 26.  The applicant\u2019s cassation appeal was dismissed by the Supreme Court on 5 November 2009. 27.  The court considered that the statement in question, in so far as it had concerned relations between J&S S.A. and Gazeta Wyborcza, had been a statement of fact. The applicant had spoken of suspicious links between Gazeta Wyborcza and the publisher of the advertisement and the creation of fictional reasons for receiving funds from that publisher, which was all aimed at allowing Gazeta Wyborcza to oppose Law and Justice. Such a statement, according to the court, had gone further than being a simple opinion about an advertisement in the press. Adding more information had put J&S S.A.\u2019s advertisement in a completely different, negative light. Asking the applicant to prove such a statement had not been excessive and had not interfered with the freedom of political debate, but had been necessary for the accuracy and pertinence of such a debate. 28.  The court further referred to Article 10 of the Convention and stressed that freedom of expression was not absolute. Noting the case of Feldek v. Slovakia (no. 29032/95, ECHR 2001\u2011VIII), it further reiterated that where a statement amounted to a value judgment, the proportionality of the interference may depend on whether there existed a sufficient factual basis for the impugned statement, since even a value judgment without any factual basis to support it may be excessive. In the present case, the defendant had not even attempted to prove the accuracy of his statements about the alleged connections of which he had accused the plaintiff. 29.  On 29 August 2008 Agora S.A. instituted enforcement proceedings in order to summon the applicant to comply with the obligations imposed by the Warsaw Regional Court\u2019s judgment of 12 June 2007. 30.  On 12 January 2010 the Warsaw District Court ordered the applicant to publish the apology in question in Gazeta Wyborcza (in a smaller size than originally indicated). Since the applicant failed to comply with that order, on 26 February 2010 the Warsaw District Court allowed Agora S.A. to publish the apology in Gazeta Wyborcza in the applicant\u2019s name and ordered him to cover the costs of publication of PLN 34,897.36 (about EUR 8,700).", "references": ["4", "3", "7", "2", "0", "9", "5", "1", "8", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant, Mr Rahmi \u015eahin, was born in 1985 and lives in Hakkari. 6.  On 12 December 2009 the applicant was taken into police custody on suspicion of involvement in a demonstration and subsequent clashes between some of the demonstrators and the police in Hakkari. According to the arrest report, drafted at 4.30 p.m. and signed by two police officers, the latter officers arrested the applicant at around 4 p.m. after he had attempted to escape. The report said he had also fallen over. The police officers noted that the applicant had resisted arrest and that they had used proportionate force to apprehend him. The applicant refused to sign the arrest report. 7.  At 11.30 p.m. on the same day, an incident report was drafted and signed by thirty-seven police officers. According to that report, the F\u0131rat News Agency, a website controlled by the PKK (Kurdish Workers\u2019 Party, an armed illegal organisation), had published a declaration by the KCK (Koma Civak\u00ean Kurdistan \u2013 the Union of Communities in Kurdistan), containing instructions to hold meetings and marches, to start Serhildan (rebellion), and carry out acts of civil disobedience to show support for Abdullah \u00d6calan. As a result, on 11 December 2009, a press conference was held and around 500-550 people, including mayors and local politicians from the DTP (Party for a Democratic Society), a pro-Kurdish political party, as well as members of a number of non-governmental organisations, gathered in front of the DTP\u2019s Hakkari office. During the press conference, the crowd chanted slogans and carried banners praising Abdullah \u00d6calan and the PKK. That same day, the DTP\u2019s dissolution was ordered by the Constitutional Court and thirty-seven of its members were banned from carrying out political activities. As a result, the F\u0131rat News Agency published another article containing instructions for further Serhildan acts and for demonstrations. According to the police report, on 11 and 12 December 2009 the security forces had intervened in several areas in the city where demonstrators had blocked the traffic, chanted slogans in favour of the PKK and its leader, and burned tyres or attacked cars, shops and administrative buildings. The report further stated that when the security forces had intervened, some demonstrators had responded by throwing stones and Molotov cocktails at the police officers. According to the report on the applicant\u2019s arrest, he had been apprehended after the police had moved against a group of 50-60 people who had been chanting slogans in favour of the PKK and its leader in the cemetery of the Bi\u00e7er neighbourhood. 8.  At 6.15 p.m. and 8.20 p.m. that day, two police officers made identical statements to two other officers. They both stated that the applicant had been with a group of people who had been chanting slogans in favour of the PKK and its leader and who had burned tyres. The group had attacked the police with stones when the police had moved against the gathering. According to their statements, the applicant had tried to flee and they had arrested him when he had fallen down, using proportionate force. 9.  The arresting officers later identified the applicant. They submitted that the applicant had been in a group of people who had burned tyres and chanted slogans in favour of the PKK and its leader. The officers stated that they had arrested the applicant after he had attempted to avoid arrest. 10.  At 6.33 p.m., the applicant was taken to the Hakkari state hospital for a medical examination. The doctor who examined the applicant noted the following information on a medical form:\n\u201cThere is a haematoma on the left eye. [The injury] occurred three hours ago. There is no nausea or vomiting. The patient is conscious and co-operating. There is a slight swelling between the upper lip and the teeth (He stated/It was stated[1] that it was due to a fall). There is a bruised lesion with abrasions on the lumbar area at the level of the second vertebra. A dental examination is recommended.\u201d 11.  On 13 December 2009 the applicant was examined by the same doctor. The findings were the same as those in the report of 12 December 2009. 12.  On the same day, the Hakkari Magistrates\u2019 Court decided to restrict access to the investigation file concerning the applicant and two other people. 13.  On 14 December 2009 a lawyer from the Hakkari Bar Association was asked to assist the applicant during questioning, which took place at the anti-terrorist branch of the Hakkari police headquarters. The applicant was asked to respond to a number of questions in the presence of his lawyer, Mr F. Timur. The applicant, however, exercised his right to remain silent and did not reply to any of the questions. 14.  On the same day, the applicant\u2019s legal representative applied to the Hakkari Magistrate\u2019s Court and requested that the decision to restrict his and his client\u2019s access to the investigation file be annulled and his client be released from police custody. On 15 December 2009 the Hakkari Magistrates\u2019 Court dismissed the request. On 16 December 2009 the Hakkari Assize Court upheld the decision of 15 December 2009. 15.  Meanwhile, on 14 December 2009 the applicant had made a statement to the Hakkari public prosecutor. He denied any involvement in the demonstration. He stated that the disturbances in the city had meant that he and his wife had been unable to go out of their house and that on 12 December 2009 he had left home in order to buy bread. He contended that he had seen police officers approaching him and had continued to walk towards them. One of the officers had insulted him and taken him to a hill close to their neighbourhood. They had then pushed him down the hill. An officer had hit him on his right ear with a plastic tube. The applicant had then started running down the hill, where there were other officers who had thrown him to the ground, with him landing on his back, and had arrested him. He stated that he still had pain in several parts of his body, particularly around the heart. He complained to the public prosecutor that after he had been arrested, he had been put in a police vehicle and had been hit on the back, close to his armpit, with the butt of a gun. He asked the public prosecutor to find and punish the officers who had been responsible for his ill-treatment. 16.  After the questioning, the public prosecutor ordered a medical examination of the applicant. A forensic doctor, mentioning the findings of the previous medical reports, noted an old yellow-green ecchymosis in the right (sic) periorbital area and a mucosal tear of 0.5 cm and oedema on the right side of the upper lip. The report also stated that the applicant had described pain on the left side of his chest and in the left femoral and lumbar regions. According to the report, the applicant was sensitive upon palpation in those regions. The doctor concluded that the injuries were not life-threatening and required only simple medical care. 17.  Later that day, the applicant was brought before the Hakkari Magistrates\u2019 Court, where he pleaded innocent and asked to be released. The applicant\u2019s legal representative noted that his client had been beaten during his arrest and that he had not sustained the injuries noted in the medical reports as the result of a fall. The applicant was subsequently detained on remand on suspicion of membership of the PKK on account of his alleged involvement in the events of 12 December 2009. 18.  On 16 December 2009 the applicant\u2019s legal representative lodged an application with the Hakkari Magistrates\u2019 Court for his client\u2019s release. In the application, the lawyer noted that the applicant had not sustained the injuries noted in the medical reports as the result a fall, but had been beaten by police officers. The court dismissed the application the same day. 19.  Also on that day, the applicant\u2019s legal representative requested that the Hakkari public prosecutor provide him with copies of the documents in the investigation file, which he was authorised to receive despite the restriction order. He further requested the medical reports issued in respect of the applicant. According to the applicant\u2019s submissions, his lawyer was only provided with the medical reports of 12 and 13 December 2009; the public prosecutor\u2019s office failed to provide him with the report of 14 December 2009, which had been issued at the end of the applicant\u2019s detention in police custody. 20.  On 17 December 2009 the applicant applied to the Hakkari Magistrates\u2019 Court for release from detention. In his application, the applicant also stated that the police officers had beaten him when they had arrested him. He contended that the officers had held him by the arms and hit him. His eyes and his mouth had been covered with blood as a result. 21.  On 18 December 2009 the Hakkari Magistrates\u2019 Court dismissed the application for release. In its decision, the court did not refer to the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment. 22.  On 28 December 2009 the applicant\u2019s lawyer filed a complaint against the police officers who had taken part in the applicant\u2019s arrest. He claimed that the applicant had been beaten by the police officers and that he had been taken to a hill and ordered to run towards the police officers, who had stood further down the hill and had then thrown him to the ground. He also claimed that the medical reports that had been issued were not appropriate or in compliance with internal regulations or the \u201cIstanbul Protocol\u201d. It was further alleged in the complaint that during their consultation in police custody, the lawyer had observed bruises around the applicant\u2019s left eye and damage to his gums, which could have been the result of being hit on the face. The applicant\u2019s legal representative further stated that the applicant was suffering from constant pain around the heart and chest. The lawyer requested that his client be examined by medical practitioners at the Human Rights Foundation of Turkey, a non\u2011governmental organisation specialised in reporting torture and other types of ill-treatment. He further requested that the public prosecutor initiate an official investigation into the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment and identify the officers who had ill-treated his client. Finally, the lawyer requested that the public prosecutor take a statement from his client in person and communicate to him the date and the time for taking such a statement. 23.  On 17 March 2010 the Hakkari public prosecutor decided not to bring any charges in relation to the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment. In his decision, the public prosecutor first summarised the content of the incident report dated 12 December 2009 (see paragraph 7 above). Secondly, he noted that the applicant had acted with a group of people who had chanted slogans in favour of the PKK and that he had been arrested after he had attempted to escape and had fallen. The public prosecutor noted in that respect that two police officers had identified the applicant. The public prosecutor then noted that the applicant had acted with groups of people who had blocked traffic, burned tyres, chanted slogans praising the PKK, carried out attacks with stones and Molotov cocktails, and that he had resisted the police by throwing stones when they tried to arrest him, and that he had fallen. The public prosecutor observed that although the applicant had sustained minor injuries on his face and body, he had failed to substantiate his claims that he had been beaten and insulted by the police officers. According to the public prosecutor, acts of \u201csocial terrorism\u201d led supporters of terrorism to resist or attack the security forces, in some cases with weapons, and so members of the security forces were obliged to use force within the limits of the law. The Hakkari public prosecutor considered that the applicant had acted upon the instructions of the PKK and that it was to be expected that such people would make claims of ill-treatment. Noting that, according to section 16 of Law no. 2559 on the Duties and Powers of the Police, the police officers had the authority to use force against PKK supporters, the public prosecutor considered that the police had used proportionate force against the applicant. He also noted that there was no evidence in the case file indicating any deficiency in the medical reports drafted by the doctors. The public prosecutor concluded that the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment were unsubstantiated. 24.  On 31 March 2010 the applicant\u2019s legal representative lodged an appeal against the decision of 17 March 2010. He noted, in particular, that the Hakkari public prosecutor\u2019s assessment had been based on incorrect facts such as the \u201cminor nature\u201d of the applicant\u2019s injuries and his involvement in violent acts during the events of 12 December 2009. The lawyer also noted that the public prosecutor had failed to take a statement from the applicant, to collect evidence in relation to his allegations or to identify and question the arresting police officers and potential witnesses. The lawyer also noted that the medical reports had complied with neither domestic legislation nor the \u201cIstanbul Protocol\u201d since they lacked details such as the applicant\u2019s medical history, the applicant\u2019s own account of how the injuries had been caused and an assessment regarding the cause of the injuries. He also claimed that the applicant\u2019s medical examination had taken place in the presence of police officers. 25.  On 13 April 2010 the Van Assize Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. Noting that there was no evidence showing that the applicant had been subjected to ill-treatment, the assize court held that the decision of 17 March 2010 had been lawful. 26.  The Government submitted two sets of photographs taken by the security forces with regard to the demonstrations and disturbances of 11 and 12 December 2009 in Hakkari. The first set of 374 photographs concerned the demonstrations held in Hakkari city centre, of which 14 show young men and adolescents throwing stones. The remaining photographs show people demonstrating in different parts of the city centre. 27.  The second set of 444 photographs concerned the gatherings and disturbances in the outlying neighbourhoods of Medrese and Bi\u00e7er in Hakkari. The photographs show that children, adolescents and a few young men gathered in various places in the neighbourhoods. In some photographs, the demonstrators are seen burning tyres and blocking streets. In most of the photographs, children and adolescents, mostly boys, are seen standing or walking. Four of the photographs show children standing close to soldiers, probably talking to them, while another ten show adolescents and young men standing in front of police officers. In around twenty-five of the photographs, children, adolescents and young men, some of whom have their faces covered, are seen throwing stones at an armoured police vehicle. Five pictures show police vehicles spraying demonstrators with a water cannon and tear gas.", "references": ["9", "0", "6", "7", "5", "2", "8", "4", "3", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicants were born in 1952, 1947, 1973 and 1980 respectively and live in Bratislava. 7.  They are co-owners of a residential house located in the Bratislava-Star\u00e9 Mesto municipality. The house was built in 1929 by their familial predecessors, who during the previous regime donated it to the State under circumstances that would later be accepted as constituting duress. The ownership of the house was restored to the first and second applicants on 10 December 1991 under special legislation on restitution. Consequently, each of them acquired a 4/12 share of the ownership of the house. The third and fourth applicants each acquired a 2/12 share of the ownership of the house on 25 January 1995 and 29 March 1999 respectively. 8.  At the time the applicants acquired the ownership of the house five flats were inhabited by tenants with regulated rent. Under the relevant legislation this meant that (i) the applicants had to accept that their flats were occupied by these tenants, (ii) they could charge them no more than the maximum amount of rent fixed by the State, (iii) they could not unilaterally terminate the leases, and (iv) they could not sell the flats other than to the tenants (\u201cthe rent-control scheme\u201d). 9.  The rent-control scheme applies, or has applied, to the flats in question, as follows: a four-room flat with a surface area of 129 sq. m which had been subject to rent control until January 2006 (\u201cthe first flat\u201d); a four-room flat with a surface area of 130 sq. m which had been subject to rent control until September 2008 (\u201cthe second flat\u201d); a two-room flat with a surface area of 87 sq. m and two four-room flats measuring 126 sq. m each (\u201cthe third, fourth and fifth flats\u201d), to which rent control still applies. 10.  The monthly rent chargeable for the flats under the applicable legislation was equivalent to some 10 to 17.5 euros (EUR) between 1992 and 1999. After several increases in the regulated rent, in June 2007 the applicants were able to charge some EUR 73.5 monthly in respect of the two-room flat and approximately EUR 125 monthly in respect of the four\u2011room flats. According to the Government\u2019s calculations the regulated rent reached EUR 236 and EUR 400 respectively in 2014. 11.  The parties provided differing figures as to the market rent.\nThe applicants relied on data from the National Association of Real Estate Agencies (\u201cthe NAREA\u201d) and claimed that the monthly market rent for comparable two\u2011room flats in the area reached around EUR 662 and for comparable four\u2011room flats some EUR 1,296 between 2004 and 2007.\nThe Government submitted an expert valuation according to which the monthly market rent for the applicants\u2019 flats in 2010 amounted to EUR 561 and EUR 772 to EUR 797 respectively.", "references": ["7", "8", "0", "3", "6", "5", "2", "1", "4", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1959 and is currently detained in Chi\u0219in\u0103u. 5.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 6.  On 23 December 2013 the applicant was arrested and charged with embezzlement and organising the attempted murder of two businessmen. Since that date he has been detained in Prison no. 13. 7.  According to the applicant, he has been detained in a cell measuring 6 square metres with five other inmates, which left very little space for each detainee. Due to overcrowding, detainees had to share beds. He was not provided with bedding or a pillow. There was no sink or running water in the cell. The food was of poor quality and inedible. The squat toilet was not separated from the rest of the cell and gave off a foul odour. There was also a lack of daylight and poor ventilation. 8.  The applicant asserted that he had been detained with inmates diagnosed with tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases. As a result of being held in inhuman conditions of detention, he had been ill with mycosis, gastritis and a respiratory infection. He was not provided with any medical assistance and was forbidden from receiving herbal medicine from his wife. 9.  The applicant complained of inhuman conditions of detention to the Chi\u0219in\u0103u prosecutor\u2019s office and Court of Appeal. On 14 April 2014 the Prisons Department replied that after examining his allegations, it had not found any violation of domestic law. 10.  The Government submitted that the applicant\u2019s cell (no. 130) measured 10 square metres and was designed to accommodate four people. All detainees had their own beds. The cell was equipped with a sink and running water. The applicant was provided with bedding, hygiene products tailored to his needs and hot food three times a day, in accordance with Government Decision no. 609 concerning the minimum daily food requirements for detainees. The Government contended that the cell in question had not accommodated people with infectious diseases. They added that the applicant had been provided with medical assistance and submitted evidence of various medical check-ups. 11.  The Court refers to the relevant material cited in its previous case\u2011law concerning the Republic of Moldova (see, for instance, Shishanov v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 11353/06, \u00a7\u00a7 50-61, 15 September 2015). 12.  In its reports for 2013, 2014 and 2015 on conditions of detention following several visits undertaken in Chi\u0219in\u0103u Prison no. 13, the Centre for Human Rights in Moldova (\u201cthe Human Rights Centre\u201d, which also acts as the Moldovan Ombudsman) found serious problems, notably concerning overcrowding, food quality, ventilation and access to daylight. In view of its findings, it recommended in its reports for 2014 and 2015 that Prison no. 13 be closed or if that was not possible, that the conditions of detention there be urgently improved.", "references": ["8", "0", "4", "3", "6", "9", "2", "5", "7", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "8.  The applicant was born in 1947 and lives in Comrat, Republic of Moldova. 9.  The applicant was a minority shareholder in and the CEO of a liquefied gas supply company from southern Moldova in which the State owned 82% of the shares. In July 2006 a criminal investigation was initiated in respect of an alleged unsuccessful attempt by the applicant to commit a fraud in connection with his activity at the company. In particular, he was accused of having, between 2000 and 2006, devised a scheme involving the importation of liquefied gas from Kazakhstan and Ukraine, as a result of which the company had sustained major financial losses. According to the accusation, instead of purchasing gas directly from the producers, he had called on the services of intermediary companies, resulting in a significant increase in the price of the gas. Those intermediary companies also had ties with his sons. Later, when his company was faced with a court claim from the intermediary companies amounting to 594,067 United States dollars plus penalties, he had acknowledged that debt in court proceedings. 10.  In this connection, in July 2006 the investigating authorities summoned the applicant to appear before them and to make a statement. In his defence the applicant argued that his company could not purchase gas directly from the producers, because the minimum quantity which the producers agreed to sell exceeded his company\u2019s needs for a period of five years. Therefore, it was impossible for his company to purchase the amounts of gas needed directly from the producers. Moreover, the producers only accepted 100% pre-payment and his company did not have the available funds. He submitted that all national gas importers used the same method of importing gas and that the price of the gas purchased by his company was lower than that on the free national market. He further argued that the difference in price between that of the producers and that paid by his company was explained by transportation costs, certification, handling, insurance and other factors. He also denied that his sons were in any way involved in the intermediary companies. 11.  The applicant was summoned on several occasions and in each case appeared before the investigating authorities and cooperated with them. In October 2006 the applicant\u2019s house was searched, his personal computer was seized and various documents were extracted from it. It does not transpire from the case file that there were any instances when the applicant did not comply with the instructions of the investigators and/or that he was ever accused of obstructing the investigation. 12.  The applicant\u2019s sons, who were also suspects in the criminal proceedings and were subsequently charged, were summoned to appear before the investigating authorities without being arrested. Later, fourteen different investigations were initiated in respect of the applicant and all of them were joined in a single procedure. 13.  On 2 May 2007 the applicant was arrested and on 5 May 2007 he was formally charged with the attempted large-scale misappropriation of goods belonging to the company where he worked, namely with the facts described in paragraph 9 above. On the same date, the prosecutor in charge of the case applied to the Buiucani District Court for a thirty-day detention warrant on the following grounds: the seriousness of the offence, the risk of influencing witnesses and the risk of reoffending. 14.  The applicant objected and argued that there was no reasonable suspicion that he had committed an offence. In particular, he submitted that the criminal proceedings against him were nothing but a means of influencing the outcome of pending civil proceedings concerning the debt owned by the State-owned company and the intermediary companies. In any event, the grounds relied upon by the prosecutor were stereotyped and the prosecutor had failed to explain the reasons for his belief that the applicant would attempt to influence witnesses and reoffend. He submitted that he was a well-known person in the region and that he had worked at his company for over thirty years. He had a permanent residence, had been cooperating with the investigation since July 2006 and had never attempted to abscond or hinder the investigation. Moreover, he relied on his age and on his poor state of health, submitting that he had suffered a heart attack and a stroke. 15.  On 5 May 2007 the Buiucani District Court partly upheld the prosecutor\u2019s application and ordered the applicant\u2019s detention pending trial for a period of fifteen days. The court found that:\n\u201c... the deed with which [the applicant] is charged is considered to be an exceptionally serious offence, which allows for detention pending trial. [The court] takes into account the nature and seriousness of the offence and the complexity of the case, and considers that at this incipient stage of the investigation there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accused could collude with others (his sons, who have not been questioned) in order to take a common position.\nThe other reasons relied upon by the prosecutor, namely the risk of absconding and influencing witnesses or that of destroying evidence, are not substantiated and are not very probable.\u201d 16.  The applicant appealed, contending that there was no reasonable suspicion that he had committed an offence. He reiterated his previous statement to the effect that the criminal proceedings pursued the ulterior motive of influencing the outcome of pending civil proceedings between the company at which he worked and a third company. He further argued that the ground relied upon by the court to order his detention on remand, namely the risk of his colluding with his sons, had not been invoked by the prosecutor. Moreover, his two sons had not been formally charged and, in any case, all of them had had plenty of time to collude between July 2006, when they first learned of the investigation, and May 2007 had they been so inclined. The applicant also relied on his serious medical condition and submitted that he was a well-known individual with a family, a residence and a job in Moldova, who had appeared before the investigating authorities whenever he had been summoned during the period from July 2006 to May 2007. 17.  On 8 May 2007 the Chi\u015fin\u0103u Court of Appeal upheld the decision of 5 May 2007, essentially repeating the grounds given by the lower court without giving any reasons for dismissing the arguments put forward by the applicant. 18.  On 11 May 2007 the prosecutor in charge of the case applied to the court for the prolongation of the applicant\u2019s detention on remand by thirty days. He relied on such reasons as the gravity of the offence, the risk of influencing witnesses, the risk of reoffending and the risk of absconding. 19.  The applicant objected, submitting that there was no reasonable suspicion that he had committed an offence and no reason to believe that he would influence witnesses who had already been questioned. He also emphasised that he had cooperated irreproachably with the investigation before his arrest and that he had a permanent residence. He therefore asked the court to order the replacement of the measure of detention with another less severe measure. One of his lawyers asked the court to order a less severe measure such as, for instance, house arrest, in place of the detention. 20.  On 16 May 2007 the Buiucani District Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention on remand by twenty days. After recapitulating the parties\u2019 positions and citing the applicable provisions of the law, the court found that:\n\u201c... the grounds relied on when applying the preventive measure [of detention] remain valid, the majority of the investigative actions have been carried out, but a number of additional measures requiring [the applicant\u2019s] participation are still necessary in order to send the case to the trial court. The court considers that the application on the part of the defence to replace the preventive measure is premature, taking into account the seriousness and complexity of the case and the need to protect public order and the public interest, as well as to ensure the smooth and objective course of the investigation.\u201d 21.  The applicant appealed, relying on essentially the same arguments as he had done previously. 22.  On 22 May 2007 the Chi\u015fin\u0103u Court of Appeal upheld the decision of 16 May 2007. The court gave essentially the same reasons as it had done in its decision of 8 May 2007, namely the gravity and the complexity of the case, the risk of absconding or influencing witnesses and the risk of destroying documentary evidence which have not yet been collected by the prosecutors. 23.  On 1 June 2007 the prosecutor in charge of the case applied for a further prolongation of the applicant\u2019s detention on remand of another thirty days. He argued that the case was complex and that new charges had been brought against the applicant in the context of the same proceedings: he had now been charged also with abusing his position and overstepping his duties. As on previous occasions, the prosecutor argued that the extension of the detention was necessary in order to avoid the risk of the applicant\u2019s influencing witnesses and reoffending. 24.  The applicant objected and asked the court to replace the measure of detention with another measure. He submitted the same reasons as before and added that his health had considerably deteriorated during detention and that he needed medical care. 25.  On 5 June 2007 the Buiucani District Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention on remand by another twenty days, stating that the reasons for his continued detention remained valid. 26.  The applicant appealed, submitting inter alia that the complexity of the case invoked by the prosecutor had been deliberately generated by the latter\u2019s refusal to conduct an audit of the company or to question the witnesses cited by the applicant. He also challenged the allegation concerning the gravity of the offence imputed to him, pointing out that he was only being accused of attempting to commit an offence, not of committing it. He claimed that no actual loss had been caused to the company and that the court had failed to take into consideration the accused\u2019s individual circumstances. 27.  On 11 June 2007 the Chi\u015fin\u0103u Court of Appeal upheld the lower court\u2019s decision, finding that it had been adopted in compliance with the law. The court also noted that the applicant was accused of a particularly serious offence punishable by imprisonment from ten to twenty-five years and that the investigation was still ongoing. The court held that if released the applicant might be able to abscond or to influence witnesses. 28.  On 21 June 2007 the prosecutor in charge of the case applied again for a further thirty-day extension of the applicant\u2019s detention. 29.  The applicant objected on the basis that there were no reasons to believe that he would abscond or influence witnesses. He stressed that the prosecutor had not conducted any investigative measures for a long time and that the investigation was virtually completed. He reiterated that he had a permanent residence and that he had agreed to appear before the investigators whenever necessary. He presented a medical report dated 18 June 2007, according to which it was established inter alia that he had arterial hypertension and a slight paralysis of his right leg as a result of a stroke. The doctor recommended treatment in a neurological clinic. The applicant asked the court to dismiss the prosecutor\u2019s application and to apply a less severe measure such as conditional release or house arrest. 30.  On 26 June 2007 the Buiucani District Court rejected the prosecutor\u2019s application and accepted the applicant\u2019s request, ordering that he be placed under house arrest for thirty days. The court found that:\n\u201c... the applicant has been detained for fifty-five days and has participated in all the necessary investigative actions; ... Article 5 \u00a7 3 of the Convention imposes a presumption that an accused be freed while he awaits his trial; ... certain evidence, which may have been sufficient earlier to justify [detention] or to render alternative preventive measures inadequate, could become less convincing with the passage of time; ... it is for the prosecutor to prove the existence of a risk of absconding, and such a risk cannot be proved only by reference to the severity of the potential punishment; [the court referred to the applicant\u2019s medical problems and his age, the lack of a criminal record, his permanent residence and married status]; the [European Court\u2019s] case-law provides that detention pending trial should be exceptional, always objectively reasoned and must correspond to the public interest; the court finds that it is implausible that [the applicant] will abscond, influence witnesses or destroy evidence, and that the normal course of the criminal investigation is possible while the accused is under house arrest.\u201d\nThe court set the following conditions for the applicant\u2019s house arrest: prohibition from leaving his house; prohibition of using the telephone; prohibition from discussing his case with any other person. 31.  The applicant was immediately taken home, where he remained for three days. However, the prosecutor lodged an appeal against the above-mentioned decision and invoked as one of the reasons for the applicant\u2019s continued detention in custody the fact that the applicant refused to confess to having committed the offence imputed to him. 32.  On 29 June 2007 the Chi\u015fin\u0103u Court of Appeal quashed the decision of 26 June 2007 and adopted a new one, ordering the applicant\u2019s detention pending trial for twenty days. The court found that:\n\u201c... the lower court did not take into account the complexity of the case and the seriousness of the offence with which [the applicant] is charged; the court considers that while under house arrest [the applicant] could communicate with the other accomplices, who are not under arrest and who are, moreover, his sons; he could abscond by fleeing to the [self-proclaimed and unrecognised \u201cMoldovan Republic of Transdniestria\u201d], which is not under the control of the Moldovan authorities; he could influence witnesses, in order to make them change their statements; the applicant has received visits from doctors and can obtain medical assistance in prison.\u201d 33.  On 11 July 2007 the prosecutor in charge of the case applied again to the court for an extension of the applicant\u2019s detention on remand. He relied on the same reasons as before. 34.  On 16 July 2007 the Buiucani District Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention pending trial by another twenty days. It argued again that the applicant was accused of a serious offence and that he could abscond or hinder the investigation. 35.  The applicant appealed, advancing essentially the same arguments as he had done earlier. 36.  On 20 July 2007 the Chi\u015fin\u0103u Court of Appeal quashed the lower court\u2019s decision and adopted a new one, changing the preventive measure to house arrest. The court found that:\n\u201cthe prosecutor did not provide any evidence confirming the continued need to detain [the applicant], did not submit additional materials confirming the probability that he could exert influence on witnesses who have already been heard; [the applicant] promises to appear before the investigating authorities whenever summoned; there is no specific information concerning any risk of absconding\u201d.\nThe court also prohibited the applicant from communicating with persons who had any link with the criminal case against him and from leaving his house, and obliged him to phone the prosecutor\u2019s office every day. 37.  On 14 September 2007 the Comrat District Court examined the prosecutor\u2019s application to prolong the applicant\u2019s house arrest by ninety days. The applicant did not object to the prolongation of the house arrest provided that the measures concerning the limitation on his communication with relatives were discontinued. The court upheld the prosecutor\u2019s request and ordered the prolongation of the house arrest for ninety days. It also upheld the applicant\u2019s request and discontinued the limitation on his communication with his relatives. The only reason invoked by the court was the seriousness of the offence imputed to the applicant. 38.  On 14 December 2007 the Comrat District Court again prolonged the applicant\u2019s house arrest for ninety days. The only reason given by the court was the seriousness of the offence imputed to the applicant. The applicant did not object provided that he was allowed to visit the hospital and the court in order to study the case file. 39.  On an unspecified date the applicant lodged a habeas corpus request with the Comrat District Court asking for the measure of house arrest to be changed for that of provisional release or release on bail. He argued that he had never breached the rules of the house arrest and that he undertook to further comply with all the instructions issued by the investigation organs. 40.  On 12 March 2008 the Comrat District Court decided to release the applicant on bail, observing that he had been detained for over ten months and had never breached any of the restrictions imposed on him. 41.  On 9 June 2011 the applicant was acquitted of the charges for which he had been detained between 2 May 2007 and 12 March 2008. The court found that no offence had taken place in regard to the facts imputed to him. At the same time he was acquitted of thirteen other charges brought against him and was found guilty on one count, namely that of having illegally sold liquefied gas which had been seized by a bailiff, for which he was sentenced to a fine of 20,000 Moldovan lei (approximately 1,000 euros). Neither the applicant nor the prosecutor appealed against that judgment, which became final. The applicant\u2019s sons were acquitted.", "references": ["0", "3", "9", "6", "8", "5", "1", "4", "7", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1966 and has been in the Netherlands since 2003. 7.  On 25 July 2003 the applicant entered the Netherlands where on 19 August 2003 he applied for asylum, fearing persecution within the meaning of the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (\u201cthe Refugee Convention\u201d) and/or treatment in breach of Article 3 of the Convention. On 20 August 2003, he was interviewed about his identity, nationality and travel itinerary (eerste gehoor). He stated, inter alia, that he was an Afghan national of Hazara origin, that he came from Kabul and that he had travelled to the Netherlands via Pakistan, Iran and Germany. 8.  On 21 August 2003 the applicant was interviewed about his reasons for seeking asylum (nader gehoor). He stated that he feared persecution and ill-treatment on account of his communist past as a former member of the communist People\u2019s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (\u201cthe PDPA\u201d) and for having served as a volunteer in the Revolutionary Guard (Sepah Enghelab). He further claimed that he risked ill-treatment at the hands of mujahideen party Jamiat-e Islami for having been involved between 1992 and 1994 with the rival Hazara-dominated, Hezb-e Wahdat party and, additionally, at the hands of a Mr S., whom he had captured and ill-treated during an interrogation conducted in the context of his work for Hezb-e Wahdat. He also feared problems from the side of Hezb-e Wahdat for having stopped working for them. 9.  The applicant stated that he had joined the youth branch of the PDPA in 1978 and that in 1981 he had served as a volunteer for twenty days in the Revolutionary Guard. He had been discharged after he had stepped on a mine during combat. He further stated that in 1984 he had started to work for the Ministry of Trade in Kabul, at the department for government stores, and that in 1989 he had given a television interview in which he had criticised the then Minister of Trade. This interview had not been broadcast in 1989 but only in mid-May 1992, after the mujahideen had seized power in Afghanistan. The day after it had been broadcast, the applicant had been arrested by the mujahideen faction Ittehad-al-Islami (Islamic Union) then led by Abdul Rasul Sayyaf. In his opinion they had been under the impression, given that he had dared to criticise the Minister of Trade, that he was an important member of the Communist Party. He had been released after ten days in a prisoner exchange operation mediated, at the request of the applicant\u2019s parents, by Mr M., an influential person of Hazara origin. 10.  In return, the applicant had had to work for Hezb-e Wahdat. He had worked as a representative of the (military) Division 95 of Hezb-e Wahdat at the West Kabul peace commission in which Jamiat-e Islami, Ittehad\u2011al-Islami and Harakat-e-Islami had also been represented. His tasks had included trading prisoners and seized goods, and mediating between parties. He had also been responsible for preventing members of Hezb-e Wahdat\u2019s Central Committee from defecting and for preventing members of other factions from infiltrating Hezb-e Wahdat. In the course of carrying out these duties and if circumstances so warranted, he had been under orders to take people secretly into custody. One of the persons taken in custody, Mr S., had been interrogated by the applicant himself, who had ill-treated Mr S. during interrogation. After Burhanuddin Rabbani and Ahmad Shah Massoud had taken over control of the Afshar district in West Kabul, the applicant had been arrested and detained again by Ittehad\u2011al-Islami in December 1992/January 1993. He had been released in a prisoner exchange organised by Hezb-e Wahdat. 11.  The applicant had continued his work for the peace committee of Hezb-e Wahdat until December 1994, when this party had been defeated and retreated to Bamyan. The applicant had stayed behind in Kabul and had not been persecuted by \u201cKhalili\u201d (see paragraph 39 below). However, fearing Jamiat-e Islami and the Taliban, the applicant had then gone into hiding \u2013 moving around between Kabul and the villages of Siah Khak and Sar Shesmeh in the province of Wardak \u2013 until December 2001, when American troops had arrived. He had been arrested on 20 or 21 March 2002 by Jamiat-e Islami, then under the leadership of General Fahim. The applicant had been tortured several times during his incarceration. Mr S. had been present on one of those occasions. The applicant had been told by interrogators that he had been detained because he was a communist or a convert. He also thought that his arrest had something to do with Mr S. The applicant had managed to escape from prison after 45 days with the help of a guard \u2013 who like the applicant was a former communist \u2013 to whom the applicant had paid three thousand United States dollars. This guard had set up a mock execution outside the prison, which had enabled the applicant to escape. This guard had told the applicant that he should leave Afghanistan forever. After his escape, the applicant had first hidden in his house in Kabul for about 15 days and had subsequently stayed with a distant relative until he had left Afghanistan for Pakistan in May 2002. 12.  On 18 September 2003, the Minister for Immigration and Integration (Minister voor Vreemdelingenzaken en Integratie) informed the applicant that his case had been transmitted to the 1F Unit (see A.A.Q. v. the Netherlands (dec.), no. 42331/05, \u00a7\u00a7 47-49, 30 June 2015) in order for it to examine whether Article 1F of the 1951 Refugee Convention should be applied to the applicant\u2019s asylum request. 13.  On 5 February 2004 the 1F Unit conducted a supplementary interview (aanvullend gehoor) with the applicant. During this interview, he declared, inter alia, that in 1981, as a member of the Revolutionary Guard, he had participated in a purge action \u2013 ordered by the PDPA Central Committee and the Ministry of Defence \u2013 aimed against persons active on behalf of Hezb-e Islami and Jamiat in a specific area and that prisoners of war had been handed over to the former Afghan communist security service, KhAD/WAD (Khadimat-e Atal\u2019at-e Dowlati/Wezarat-e Amniyat-e Dowlati). He had become disabled when the tank on which he had been standing had hit a mine. The applicant also stated that, during the wars, Hezb-e Wahdat had plundered houses, seized privately owned cars and physically tortured persons. It was correct that Hezb-e Wahdat had committed many crimes and had shed much blood. He further related how he had interrogated and hit Mr S. at the Hezb-e Wahdat headquarters in Kabul. He also stated that, at present, he had no proof that he was being searched for but that it was clear to him, having been released upon payment of a bribe, that he could not show himself in Afghanistan. 14.  On 21 April 2005 the Minister for Immigration and Integration issued notice of her intention (voornemen) to reject the first applicant\u2019s asylum application and to apply Article 1F of the 1951 Refugee Convention. The Minister found it established, given his consistent and detailed statements, that the applicant had worked for the Revolutionary Guard and Hezb-e Wahdat but also found that, in his account to the Netherlands authorities, he had in part misrepresented the facts, had sought to trivialise his activities for Hezb-e Wahdat and had withheld important information. 15.  The nature of the applicant\u2019s work, and the contents of an official report (ambtsbericht), drawn up on 29 February 2000 by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, entitled \u201cSecurity Services in Communist Afghanistan (1978-1992), AGSA, KAM, KhAD and WAD\u201d (\u201cVeiligheidsdiensten in communistisch Afghanistan (1978-1992), AGSA, KAM, KhAD en WAD\u201d; DPC/AM 663896) and an official report, drawn up on 23 June 2000 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on Hezb-e Wahdat (DPC/AM-681499), had given cause to consider whether Article 1F of the 1951 Convention was applicable to the applicant\u2019s asylum claim. 16.  In her notice of intention, the Minister analysed, on the basis of elaborate argumentation based on various international materials and on the prescribed and so-called \u201cknowing and personal participation\u201d test, the nature of the acts imputed to the applicant in the framework of Article 1F of the 1951 Refugee Convention, as well as his individual responsibility under that Convention. The Minister noted, inter alia, that the applicant had worked for a part of the PDPA Government, the Revolutionary Guard, which had collaborated with the KhAD and found that it was justified to conclude that the applicant had known or should have known about the criminal character of the KhAD and that its crimes had formed part of a widespread or targeted attack aimed against the civilian population. Having regard to the official report of 29 February 2000 (see paragraph 15 above), the Minister further found that the cruel character of the KhAD had been commonly known. The Minister further did not believe that the applicant had been ignorant of the criminal character of Hezb-e Wahdat when he had started to work for it as this had been widely known at the material time. Relying on the official report of 23 June 2000 (see paragraph 15 above), the Minister underlined that Hezb-e Wahdat had been considered during the Afghan civil war to be one of the most violent groups, not only because of its militia\u2019s actions on the battle field and merciless liquidation of its political opponents, but in particular because of its militia\u2019s crimes against the civil population of Afghanistan and for having instilled a true climate of terror in the country. The Minister lastly found it established that the applicant himself had committed acts of torture on the person of Mr S. 17.  As regards Article 3 of the Convention, the Minister did not find it established that the applicant, if returned to Afghanistan, would be exposed to a real risk of being subjected to treatment prohibited by this provision. In reaching this finding, the Minister took into account, inter alia, that the applicant had stayed for about three months in Pakistan and about eight months in Iran without having sought assistance in these countries from, for instance, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (\u201cUNHCR\u201d), that he had not applied for asylum when he had been apprehended by the police in Germany, and that he had not reported immediately to the immigration authorities after his arrival in the Netherlands. 18.  On 17 June 2005 the applicant submitted written comments (zienswijze) on the Minister\u2019s intended decision. On 19 October 2005 the Minister rejected the applicant\u2019s asylum application, confirming the reasoning set out in her notice of intention of 21 April 2005 and rebutting the applicant\u2019s written comments. 19.  The applicant\u2019s appeal against this decision was rejected on 25 January 2007 by the Regional Court (rechtbank) of The Hague, sitting in Roermond. It held in respect of the applicant\u2019s activities as a fifteen-year\u2011old adolescent volunteer for the Revolutionary Guard that, according to the applicable policy in respect of child soldiers, the Minister had not adequately reasoned her decision finding \u201cknowing participation\u201d in respect of this part of the applicant\u2019s account. However, on the basis of the other elements of the account, it accepted the decision of the Minister to deny the applicant asylum by applying Article 1F of the Refugee Convention against him. It further held that it had not been established that the applicant \u2013 if expelled to Afghanistan \u2013 would be exposed to a risk of being subjected to treatment proscribed by Article 3 of the Convention from the side of Jamiat-e Islami on the basis of the general security situation in Afghanistan, or on the basis of his Hazara ethnic origin. 20.  The applicant, who from his first interview was assisted by a lawyer in these asylum proceedings, could have filed a further appeal with the Administrative Jurisdiction Division (Afdeling Bestuursrechtspraak) of the Council of State (Raad van State), but did not do so. Consequently, the ruling of 25 January 2007 became final when the four week time-limit for filing an appeal with the Administrative Jurisdiction Division expired. 21.  On 25 May 2007 the applicant was informed by the Deputy Minister of Justice (Staatssecretaris van Justitie) of the intention (voornemen) to declare him an undesirable alien entailing the imposition of an exclusion order (ongewenstverklaring) in accordance with section 67 \u00a7 1 (e) of the Aliens Act 2000 (Vreemdelingenwet 2000), following the decision to hold Article 1F of the Refugee Convention against him in the asylum procedure. 22.  The actual decision to impose this exclusion order on the applicant was taken on 24 September 2007 by the Deputy Minister of Justice. As regards Article 3, the Deputy Minister did not find it established that the applicant would be at risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to this provision in Afghanistan or that there were any obstacles of a medical nature to his removal to Afghanistan. Further noting that the applicant did not have any relatives or other persons in the Netherlands with whom he had a family life within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention, the Deputy Minister further found that the exclusion order did not constitute an interference with the rights guaranteed by this provision. 23.  The applicant challenged this decision in administrative law proceedings. The last (for the applicant negative) decision in these proceedings was taken on 10 February 2009 by the Regional Court of The Hague, sitting in Maastricht. It noted that, in its ruling of 25 January 2007, which had obtained the force of res iudicata, the Regional Court of The Hague, sitting in Roermond, had concluded that there existed serious reasons for assuming that the applicant had been involved in acts referred to in Article 1F of the Refugee Convention. As the Deputy Minister had enjoyed a discretionary power in deciding whether or not to impose an exclusion order, it had to be assessed whether in deciding to impose that order, the competing interests involved had been carefully balanced. In view of the reasons given in the impugned decision and the applicant\u2019s submissions, the Regional Court of The Hague, sitting in Maastricht, accepted the Deputy Minister\u2019s decision that the applicant\u2019s personal interests were outweighed by the general public\u2019s interests pursued by the exclusion order. 24.  In so far as the applicant had invoked Article 3 of the Convention, the Regional Court noted that in its ruling of 25 January 2007 it had already found that the applicant had not demonstrated that his expulsion to Afghanistan would expose him to a risk of a violation of his rights under that provision. It found that also in the proceedings at hand the applicant had not submitted facts or referred to circumstances on the grounds of which it should be accepted as plausible that he would risk a violation of his rights under Article 3 of the Convention if he were to be expelled to Afghanistan. As regards Article 8, the Regional Court noted that it appeared from the applicant\u2019s notice of appeal (beroepschrift) that it was not in dispute between the parties that the applicant could not claim a right of residence on the basis of Article 8 of the Convention and that it was thus not necessary to consider this point any further. 25.  The applicant, who was represented by a lawyer throughout these proceedings, could have filed a further appeal with the Administrative Jurisdiction Division, but he did not do so. Consequently, the ruling of 10 February 2009 became final after the expiry of the four-week time-limit for filing an appeal with the Administrative Jurisdiction Division.", "references": ["3", "7", "5", "1", "2", "6", "0", "9", "8", "4", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "10.  The applicant was born in 1962 and is detained in Daugavpils Prison. 11.  On 25 April 1998 the applicant and another individual, A. Vovru\u0161ko, were arrested by the police on suspicion of having committed, inter alia, aggravated assault against P.M. 12.  Criminal proceedings were initiated in that connection, throughout which the applicant and his co-defendant pleaded their innocence. 13.  On 27 September 2000 the applicant and his co-defendant were found guilty of the charges and were sentenced to nine and twelve years\u2019 imprisonment respectively by the Riga Regional Court. 14.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law and unsuccessfully sought leave to attend the hearing on his appeal before the Supreme Court. 15.  Following his questioning at the police station after his arrest, the applicant complained to the public prosecutor\u2019s office that he had been ill-treated by police officers who had tried to obtain a confession from him (for details concerning similar allegations of ill-treatment made by the applicant\u2019s co-defendant, see Vovru\u0161ko v. Latvia, no. 11065/02, 11 December 2012). 16.  As a result, criminal proceedings (case no. 50207598) were initiated against the police officers for abuse of official power. On 19 March 2001 those criminal proceedings were discontinued by the Riga police station investigator (R\u012bgas rajona policijas p\u0101rvalde) on grounds of insufficient evidence. The investigator found, inter alia, that the applicant\u2019s allegations were incoherent, and concluded that the \u201clight\u201d injuries he had sustained could have been caused during his arrest. 17.  On 8 October 2001 the applicant lodged an application (no. 547/02) with the Court. He alleged a breach of Article 3 of the Convention, complaining of having been subjected to ill-treatment during the pre-trial investigation and of the lack of an effective investigation into those allegations. He also alleged breaches of Article 3 (conditions of detention following his conviction), Article 5 \u00a7 3 (duration of pre-trial detention), Article 5 \u00a7 5 (lack of compensation), Article 6 \u00a7 1 (refusal to grant him leave to attend the Supreme Court hearing and overall duration of the criminal proceedings), and Article 6 \u00a7 1 taken in conjunction with Articles 13 and 14 of the Convention (lack of legal assistance). He lodged a further complaint under Article 6 \u00a7 1 alleging that the criminal proceedings which had resulted in his conviction had been unfair as his confession had been obtained from him as a result of ill-treatment in breach of Article 3. 18.  On 22 February 2007 the Government were given notice of the applicant\u2019s complaints concerning, inter alia, his ill-treatment and the lack of an effective investigation into his allegations in that regard. 19.  On 30 April 2008 the Government submitted the following unilateral declaration:\n\u201cThe Government of the Republic of Latvia (hereinafter \u2013 the Government) represented by [their] Agent Inga Reine admit that the physical treatment of Viktors Jeronovi\u010ds (hereinafter \u2013 the applicant) by the police officers, as well as the effectiveness of the investigation of the respective applicant\u2019s complaints, the access to legal aid and effective remedies to apply for the compensation of damages, the length of criminal proceedings [against the applicant], as well as the lack of effective remedy did not meet the standards enshrined in Article 3, Article [5 \u00a7 5], Article [6 \u00a7 1], Article 13 and Article 14 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter \u2013 the Convention). Being aware of that, the Government undertake to adopt all necessary measures in order to avoid similar infringements in future, as well as to provide an effective remedy.\nTaking into account that the parties have failed to reach a friendly settlement in this case, the Government declare that they offer to pay ex gratia to the applicant compensation in the amount of 4,500 EUR ([approximately] 3,163 LVL]), this amount being the global sum and covering any pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage together with any costs and expenses incurred, free of any taxes that may be applicable, with a view to terminat[ing] the proceedings pending before the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter \u2013 the Court) in the case [of] Jeronovi\u010ds v. Latvia (application no. 547/02).\n...\nThis payment will constitute the final resolution of the case.\u201d 20.  On 10 February 2009 the Chamber of the Court\u2019s Third Section to which the case had been allocated adopted a decision in which, inter alia, it took note of the terms of the Government\u2019s declaration and, by virtue of Article 37 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, struck out the complaints mentioned in the unilateral declaration. The relevant paragraphs of the decision read as follows:\n\u201c48. The Court observes at the outset that the parties have not reached agreement on the terms of a friendly settlement of the case. It reiterates however that a distinction must be drawn between, on the one hand, declarations made in the context of strictly confidential friendly-settlement negotiations and, on the other, unilateral declarations \u2013 such as the one at issue \u2013 made by a respondent Government in public and adversarial proceedings before the Court. In accordance with Article 38 \u00a7 2 of the Convention and Rule 62 \u00a7 2 of the Rules of Court, the Court will proceed on the basis of the Government\u2019s unilateral declaration and the parties\u2019 observations submitted outside the framework of the friendly-settlement negotiations, and will disregard the parties\u2019 statements made in the context of exploring the possibilities for a friendly settlement of the case and the reasons why the parties were unable to agree on the terms of a friendly settlement (see Tahsin Acar v. Turkey (preliminary objection) [GC], no. 26307/95, \u00a7 74, ECHR 2003\u2011VI). 49.  The Court further refers to Article 37 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, the relevant parts of which provide:\n\u20181.  The Court may at any stage of the proceedings decide to strike an application out of its list of cases where the circumstances lead to the conclusion that\n...\n(c)  for any other reason established by the Court, it is no longer justified to continue the examination of the application.\nHowever, the Court shall continue the examination of the application if respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto so requires.\u2019 50.  The Court reiterates that in certain circumstances it may be appropriate to strike an application out of the list under Article 37 \u00a7 1 (c) of the Convention on the basis of a unilateral declaration by the respondent Government even though the applicant wishes the examination of the case to be continued. In each instance, it is the specific circumstances of the case which will determine whether the unilateral declaration offers a sufficient basis for finding that respect for human rights as defined in the Convention does not require the Court to continue its examination of the case (see Tahsin Acar, cited above, \u00a7 75; see also, for example, Van Houten v. the Netherlands (striking out), no. 25149/03, \u00a7 33, ECHR 2005\u2011IX; Swedish Transport Workers\u2019 Union v. Sweden (striking out), no. 53507/99, \u00a7 24, 18 July 2006; Kalanyos and Others v. Romania, no. 57884/00, \u00a7 25, 26 April 2007; Kladiv\u00edk and Ka\u0161iar v. Slovakia (dec.) (striking out), no. 41484/04, 28 August 2007; Sulwi\u0144ska v. Poland (dec.) (striking out), no. 28953/03, 18 September 2007; Stark and Others v. Finland (striking out), no. 39559/02, \u00a7 23, 9 October 2007; Feldhaus v. Germany (dec.) (striking out), no. 10583/02, 13 May 2008; and Kapitonovs v. Latvia (dec.) (striking out), no. 16999/02, 24 June 2008).\n... 52.  As to the ill-treatment to which the applicant was allegedly subjected in police custody and the effectiveness of the investigations carried out, although the Court has not to date found a violation of Article 3 by the Latvian police in that specific context, it nevertheless points to its clear and very extensive case-law in this regard (see, among many other authorities, Selmouni v. France [GC], no. 25803/94, \u00a7\u00a7 95-106, ECHR 1999\u2011V; Dikme v. Turkey, no. 20869/92, \u00a7\u00a7 73-104, ECHR 2000\u2011VIII; and Karaduman and Others v. Turkey, no. 8810/03, \u00a7\u00a7 64-82, 17 June 2008). The same is true as regards the principles governing the granting of legal aid as a component of the right of access to a court (see, for example, Aerts v. Belgium, 30 July 1998, \u00a7\u00a7 59-60, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998\u2011V; P., C. and S. v. the United Kingdom, no. 56547/00, \u00a7\u00a7 88-91, ECHR 2002\u2011VI; Bertuzzi v. France, no. 36378/97, \u00a7\u00a7 23-32, ECHR 2003\u2011III; and Staroszczyk v. Poland, no. 59519/00, \u00a7\u00a7 127-129, 22 March 2007). 53.  In their declaration in the present case the Government have recognised that the treatment to which the applicant was subjected by the police officers while in police custody, the manner in which the investigations were carried out in that regard, the handling of the applicant\u2019s claims for compensation and in particular the refusal of his applications for legal aid in order to gain access to the compensation procedure, as well as the length of the criminal proceedings against him, infringed Articles 3, 5 \u00a7 5, 6 \u00a7 1, 13 and 14 of the Convention. They have offered to pay the applicant EUR 4,500 in compensation and undertake to take all necessary measures to prevent similar violations in the future. 54.  In view of the nature of the undertakings contained in the Government\u2019s declaration, the Court considers that it is no longer justified to continue the examination of the complaints in question. That decision is without prejudice to the possibility for the applicant to exercise any other available remedies in order to obtain redress. The same applies to the complaint under Article 2 of Protocol No. 7, which is identical in substance to the complaint under Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention concerning the length of the criminal proceedings in question (paragraph 38 in fine). The Court is further satisfied that respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto does not require it to continue its examination of this part of the application (Article 37 \u00a7 1 in fine). 55.  Accordingly, the case should be struck out of the list in so far as it concerns the complaints referred to in paragraphs 28, 37 and 38 of this decision.\u201d 21.  In the same decision, the Court declared admissible the complaints concerning the applicant\u2019s conditions of detention (Article 3) and the refusal to grant him leave to attend the Supreme Court hearing (Article 6), and dismissed all the other complaints, including the complaint that the criminal proceedings had been unfair owing to the admission of evidence obtained under duress (Article 6). On the latter point the Court found as follows:\n\u201c39.  Relying on Articles 6 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 2, 7 and 14 of the Convention, the applicant complained of the overall unfairness of his conviction for the armed robbery allegedly committed in April 1998. He maintained in that connection that a confession had been obtained from him under duress and that the courts had refused several requests made by him for a confrontation. Lastly, the applicant contended that he had been convicted solely on account of his ethnic and social origin and his previous convictions.\n... 84.  The Court, having regard to all the evidence in its possession and in so far as it has jurisdiction to examine the allegations made, finds no appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the provisions on which the applicant relies. In particular, it reiterates that it is not its function to deal with errors of fact or of law allegedly committed by a national court unless and in so far as they may have infringed rights and freedoms protected by the Convention, which is not the case here (see, among many other authorities, Khan v. the United Kingdom, no. 35394/97, \u00a7 34, ECHR 2000\u2011V). 85.  It follows that these complaints are manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 and 4 of the Convention.\u201d 22.  On 1 December 2009 the Court adopted a judgment \u2013 Jeronovi\u010ds v. Latvia (no. 547/02) \u2013 finding a violation of Article 3 of the Convention (conditions of detention) and Article 6 \u00a7 1 (refusal to grant leave to attend the Supreme Court hearing) and awarding 5,000 euros [EUR] in compensation for the non-pecuniary damage suffered on account of the Article 3 violation. 23.  On 11 October 2010 the applicant requested the public prosecutor\u2019s office to reopen the criminal proceedings in which he had been convicted (see paragraph 13 above) as well as the proceedings concerning his alleged ill-treatment by police officers (see paragraph 16 above). He relied on the terms of the Government\u2019s unilateral declaration of 30 April 2008 and on sections 655(3), 656(3) and 657 of the Criminal Procedure Law (see paragraphs 28 to 31 below). 24.  On 17 November 2010 a prosecutor attached to the Riga Regional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s request, finding that none of the grounds for the reopening of criminal proceedings set out in section 655(2) of the Criminal Procedure Law applied. The prosecutor also found as follows:\n\u201c...The case of Jeronovi\u010ds v. Latvia (no. 547/02) contains the Government\u2019s unilateral declaration, the conclusions of which are applicable only to the circumstances and the events examined within the scope of that case. It cannot be concluded from the judgment of 1 December 2009 adopted by the European Court of Human Rights that the Court examined and assessed any activities carried out by the law-enforcement officers during the pre-trial investigation in the criminal proceedings ... Accordingly, the conclusions reached in [the Court\u2019s] judgment of 1 December 2009 and the Government\u2019s unilateral declaration of 30 April 2008 cannot be applied or connected to the criminal proceedings...\u201d 25.  In an appeal lodged on 9 December 2010 the applicant reiterated that there was a legal basis for reopening the criminal proceedings concerning his ill-treatment, on account of the fact that the Government\u2019s unilateral declaration had expressly recognised the violation of Article 3 of the Convention, a circumstance which had led the Court to strike out that complaint. He further argued that at the time his criminal case was examined by the domestic courts, the judicial authorities had been unaware that the investigation into his allegations of ill-treatment was in breach of Article 3. 26.  In a final decision of 20 December 2010 a higher-ranking prosecutor upheld the decision of 17 November 2010. The prosecutor noted that, under section 655(2) of the Criminal Procedure Law, only criminal proceedings that had ended with a valid court judgment or decision could be reopened, and only provided that the ground for requesting such reopening was among those listed in that provision. The prosecutor further found as follows:\n\u201cHaving examined the foregoing, I find that the conclusion of the prosecutor in her decision of 17 November 2010 is valid and well-founded, to the effect that your application dated 11 October 2010 requesting the reopening of the criminal proceedings in cases nos. 06725198 and 50207598 on the basis of new circumstances does not comply with any of the conditions prescribed by section 655(2) of the Criminal Procedure Law which could serve as grounds for reopening the above-mentioned criminal proceedings. The prosecutor did not establish the existence of any such conditions during the examination of your application, which is why I regard as reasonable her decision to refuse the reopening of the criminal proceedings in cases nos. 06725198 and 50207598 on the basis of newly disclosed circumstances.\nAs already mentioned, the Criminal Procedure Law prescribes in detail all the circumstances which shall be recognised as newly disclosed and on the basis of which criminal proceedings ending in a valid court judgment or decision may be reopened. The Criminal Procedure Law does not make any provision for these circumstances to be expanded. In examining your complaint I did not find established any of the newly disclosed circumstances prescribed by section 655(2) of the Criminal Procedure Law. Likewise, I did not find any opinion by an international judicial authority relating to the decision of the Latvian court in case no. 50207598 and finding that the judgment of the Criminal Division of the Riga Regional Court which came into force on 27 September 2000 did not comply with international law and regulations binding on Latvia. The European Court of Human Rights did not express such an opinion in its judgment of 1 December 2009 or in the decision of 10 February 2009 in which that international court examined your application. I would also like to point out that, contrary to your allegations, the European Court of Human Rights in its decision of 10 February 2009 stated that in the adoption of its decision concerning inhuman treatment by police officers during the criminal investigation it did not find any violation of international laws or regulations.\nIn your application you emphasised that the criminal proceedings in cases nos. 06725198 and 50207598 should be reopened in connection with the unilateral declaration of the Government of the Republic of Latvia mentioned by the Latvian Republic Government Agent on 30 April 2008, in which the Government of the Republic of Latvia recognised that the physical treatment of Viktors Jeronovi\u010ds by police officers, the effectiveness of the investigation into the applicant\u2019s complaints, his access to legal aid and to effective remedies by which to apply for compensation for damage, the length of the criminal proceedings, and the lack of an effective remedy, did not meet the standards enshrined in Articles 3, 5 \u00a7 5, 6 \u00a7 1, 13 and 14 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. I would like to make clear that, according to section 655(2) of the Criminal Procedure Law, the above-mentioned unilateral declaration by the Government of the Republic of Latvia is not recognised as a newly disclosed circumstance and cannot therefore be regarded as a basis for reopening the criminal proceedings in cases nos. 06725198 and 50207598.\nIn view of the above-mentioned considerations, there is no reason to quash the decision [...] dated 17 November 2010 concerning the refusal to reopen the criminal proceedings in the light of newly disclosed circumstances...\u201d", "references": ["9", "2", "3", "5", "0", "7", "4", "6", "8", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1982 and currently lives in Budapest. 7.  The applicant crossed the Hungarian border from Serbia clandestinely in the evening of 24 June 2014. Apprehended by a border guard patrol, he was taken into custody, since he was unable to show documentary evidence of his identity or right to stay in the country.\nThe applicant then claimed asylum. 8.  At the hearing held on 25 June 2014 by the Immigration Office, the applicant declared that he had fled from his country of origin, Iran, because of his homosexuality. He stated that he had been forced to leave Iran and, with the help of a human trafficker, he had entered Hungary without documents, because he had had no other way of doing so. At the hearing, he again applied for recognition as a refugee. 9.  In view of his request, on 25 June 2014 the Csongr\u00e1d County Police Department suspended the alien administration procedure. On the same day the Office of Immigration and Nationality commenced asylum proceedings. At the ensuing hearing the applicant said that he had intended to go to the United Kingdom, but since Hungary seemed to be a safe country he had requested asylum there. He stated again that he had had to leave Iran because he was homosexual and that criminal proceedings had been instituted against him for this reason, attracting very severe penalties. 10.  After the hearing, the asylum authority, a department of the Office of Immigration and Nationality, ordered that the applicant be detained (menek\u00fclt\u00fcgyi \u0151rizet), with effect from 7 p.m. on 25 June 2014, in Debrecen, relying on section 31/A (1) a) and c) of Act no. LXXX of 2007 on Asylum (the \u201cAsylum Act\u201d). In its decision the asylum authority observed that the applicant\u2019s identity and nationality had not been clarified. It held that there were grounds for the presumption that if left at large, he would delay or frustrate the asylum proceedings and would present a risk of absconding, given that he had arrived unlawfully in Hungary and had no connections in the country or resources to subsist on. According to section 31/A (6) of the Asylum Act, the maximum length of asylum detention when ordered by the asylum authority is 72 hours. On the basis of section 31/C (3) of the Asylum Act and section 36/C (1) of the relevant Government Decree (see in paragraph 22 below), the applicant could have submitted an objection to the ordering of his asylum detention. 11.  On 26 June 2014 the asylum authority applied to the Debrecen District Court for an extension of the asylum detention for a maximum of 60 days. The asylum authority pointed out in its application that Iranian asylum seekers tended to frustrate the procedure and leave for unknown places. To justify its application, it referred to the fact that the applicant\u2019s stay in Hungary was unlawful, that he had no connection to the country, and that he lacked any resources to subsist on. 12.  On 27 June 2014 the court appointed a legal representative for the applicant; on the same date \u2013 that is, before the expiry of the 72-hour period referred to in paragraph 10 above \u2013 it held a hearing. The hearing lasted from 9.40 to 9.45 a.m. In its ensuing decision the court dismissed the applicant\u2019s application to be released and extended the asylum detention by a maximum of 60 days. It noted that the applicant\u2019s identity was unclear, that he had arrived in Hungary unlawfully, and that he had no connections in the country or any means to subsist on. Without referring to other individual circumstances or the applicant\u2019s sexual orientation, the court held that less stringent measures \u2013 such as an obligation to check in regularly with the authorities, to stay at a designated place of residence, or to pay asylum bail (menek\u00fclt\u00fcgyi \u00f3vad\u00e9k) \u2013 were not suitable in the case to secure the applicant\u2019s availability to the authorities. 13.  On 8 and 11 July 2014 the applicant applied to the asylum authority to be released from detention or transferred to an open facility. In its reply, the asylum authority informed the applicant that an asylum hearing would be held in a few days: he would have the opportunity to prove his citizenship there. Because of this consideration, the asylum authority did not forward these requests to any other authority. 14.  At the asylum hearing held on 18 July 2014 the applicant made the same statements as before. Referring to his sexual orientation, he explained that it was difficult for him to cope with the asylum detention for fear of harassment. At the hearing he provided the asylum authority with relevant and up-to-date information relating to his country of origin. 15.  On 25 July 2014 the asylum authority stated that the applicant\u2019s asylum request was neither inadmissible nor manifestly ill-founded and thus it ordered the examination of the case on the merits. 16.  On 11 August 2014 the asylum authority again sought extension of the asylum detention by another maximum of 60 days, relying on section 31/A (1) a) and c) of the Asylum Act. In its application, the asylum authority did not give any detailed explanation as to why no other, less stringent measures could be applied in the case. 17.  In her submission of 12 August 2014 to the asylum authority, the applicant\u2019s legal-aid lawyer requested the termination of the asylum detention and the designation of a place of residence for the applicant with measures securing his availability during the proceedings. In her submission of the same day to the Debrecen District Court, the lawyer asked the court to hear the applicant and not to extend the asylum detention. 18.  On 13 August 2014 the court appointed another legal representative for the applicant. On 19 August 2014 the court heard the applicant and dismissed the application for extension of the asylum detention. Relying on section 31/A (1) a) of the Asylum Act, the District Court stated that the delay caused by the acts of the authority for which the asylum seeker could not be held responsible did not provide grounds for the extension of the detention. Referring to section 31/A (1) c), the court further stated that the asylum authority had not given any specific reasoning for the view it had taken, namely that the applicant would abscond and frustrate the asylum proceedings. 19.  On 22 August 2014 the asylum authority terminated the asylum detention and ordered a designated place of residence for the applicant in Debrecen with measures securing his availability during the proceedings. 20.  On 31 October 2014 the applicant was recognised as a refugee. His asylum detention lasted from 25 June 2014 to 22 August 2014.", "references": ["8", "0", "3", "1", "5", "4", "6", "9", "7", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Leonding. 5.  On 10 July 2001 the applicant applied to the Regional Governor (Landeshauptmann) of Upper Austria (Ober\u00f6sterreich) for the granting of a licence to run a pharmacy in Leonding. On 25 September 2002 the Governor dismissed the application. 6.  On 14 June 2002 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Federal Minister for Health and Women (Bundesministerin f\u00fcr Gesundheit und Frauen, \u201cthe Minister\u201d). On 14 June 2004 he filed a complaint with the Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgerichtshof) against the Minister\u2019s failure to give a decision (S\u00e4umnisbeschwerde). On 30 September 2004 the Administrative Court set a time-limit of 31 March 2005 for the Minister to make a decision. 7.  On 24 March 2005 the Minister dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. 8.  On 11 May 2005 the applicant filed a complaint with the Constitutional Court (Verfassungsgerichtshof) against that decision. On 12 October 2005 the Constitutional Court refused to deal with the complaint and, upon the applicant\u2019s request, referred the case to the Administrative Court. 9.  Already on 22 April 2005 the applicant lodged a request for re\u2011opening of the proceedings with the Minister, who allowed the request on 10 May 2005. 10.  Thereupon, a number of owners of other pharmacies in the area, who had been parties to the administrative proceedings, lodged a complaint with the Administrative Court challenging the Minister\u2019s decision. While the complaints against the Minister\u2019s decision of 24 March 2005 and concerning the re-opening decision of 10 May 2005 were still pending before the Administrative Court, the Minister granted the applicant a licence to run a pharmacy on 5 December 2005. 11.  The applicant challenged parts of the Minister\u2019s decision before the Constitutional Court, which dismissed his complaint on 27 February 2007. A request to transfer his complaint to the Administrative Court was dismissed. 12.  On 16 July 2009 the Administrative Court, dealing with the complaints of the first and the second sets of proceedings at the same time, decided that neither of the Minister\u2019s decisions of 24 March and 10 May 2005 had been lawful, and quashed them. As a consequence, the Administrative Court also had to quash the Minister\u2019s decision of 5 December 2005. The proceedings were thus referred back to the Minister. 13.  On 19 March 2010 the Minister granted the applicant\u2019s appeal against the decision of the Regional Governor of Upper Austria of 25 September 2002. The applicant was granted a licence to establish and run a new public pharmacy in Leonding. 14.  The complaint against that decision raised by the owners of an existing pharmacy was dismissed by the Administrative Court on 28 May 2013 and the applicant was awarded compensation for costs in the amount of 1,106.40 euros (EUR).", "references": ["1", "5", "2", "7", "0", "6", "9", "4", "8", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1945 and lives in Zvolen. 7.  In 1929 the applicant\u2019s grandfather built a house in Pie\u0161\u0165any. His predecessors retained ownership under the communist regime. Ownership was transferred to the applicant from his mother on 21 December 1998. 8.  The house comprises four flats. Two have a surface area of 108 sq. m each in size, while the other two measure 123 sq. m each. 9.  At the time the application was lodged, the flats were inhabited by tenants with a regulated rent. Their or their predecessors\u2019 right to use the flats had been established by decisions taken by the municipal authorities between 1953 and 1986. After 1 January 1992 their right of use had been transformed into tenancies with regulated rent for an indefinite period. 10.  Under the relevant legislation, the applicant had to accept that his flats were occupied by those tenants and that he could charge them no more than the maximum amount of rent fixed by the State (\u201cthe rent-control scheme\u201d). The applicant had no possibility of unilaterally terminating the leases on his flats. 11.  Under the applicable legislation, the maximum monthly rent chargeable for the flats in 1999 was the equivalent of some 13 to 33 euros (EUR). After several increases in the regulated rent, in 2004 the applicant was able to charge EUR 115 monthly in respect of each of the smaller flats and EUR 124 monthly in respect of the larger ones. 12.  The applicant contended that he, in fact, received from the tenants less than the maximum amount of rent set by the applicable legislation. To this end he led several property disputes with them and the local municipality. 13.  The parties provided differing figures as to the market rent.\nThe applicant relied on data from the National Association of Real Estate Agencies (\u201cthe NAREA\u201d) and claimed that the monthly market rent for similar flats reached EUR 600 to 800 between 2004 and 2007.\nThe Government submitted an expert valuation according to which the monthly market rent for the applicant\u2019s flats in 2010 amounted to EUR 265.50 and EUR 325 respectively. 14.  In submissions made on 16 June 2014 the applicant informed the Court that the rent control in respect of his four flats had been terminated. The first flat had been subject to rent control until May 2007, the second and third flats until August 2007, and the fourth flat until April 2008.", "references": ["4", "5", "8", "1", "3", "0", "6", "2", "7", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1946 and lives in Bratislava. 7.  The applicant\u2019s parents built a house in Bratislava-Ru\u017einov in 1937. In the second half of the 1950s they were compelled to donate the house to the State. On 31 July 1992 it was restored to the applicant\u2019s mother (a three-quarters share) and the applicant (a one-quarter share) under the special legislation on restitution. Since 30 September 1996 the applicant has been its sole owner. 8.  At the time of its restitution to the applicant and his mother, the house comprised nine flats subject to rent control. One flat has a surface area of 30 sq. m and the remaining eight measure 70 sq. m each. Under the relevant legislation (i) the applicant had to accept that his flats were occupied by the tenants, (ii) he could charge them no more than the maximum amount of rent fixed by the State, (iii) he could not unilaterally terminate the leases, and (iv) he could not sell the flats to anyone other than the tenants (\u201cthe rent-control scheme\u201d). 9.  In 1996 and 2000 two of the bigger flats became vacant, as a result of which the rent\u2011control scheme ceased to apply to them. The rent control ceased to apply in respect of another two 70 sq. m flats in January 2008 and November 2012 respectively. Currently, five flats are under the rent control regime. 10.  Under the applicable legislation, between 1992 and 1999 the maximum permissible monthly rent chargeable for the flats was equivalent of some 3 to 8 euros (EUR). After several increases in the regulated rent, in 2007 the applicant could charge some EUR 35 for the smaller flat and EUR 65 for each of the larger ones. 11.  The parties provided differing figures as to the market rent:\nThe applicant relied on data from the National Association of Real Estate Agencies (\u201cNAREA\u201d) and claimed that in 2007 the monthly market rent for similar flats with a surface area of 70 sq. m reached EUR 553 and for flats measuring 30 sq. m some EUR 375.\nThe Government submitted an expert valuation according to which the monthly market rent for the applicant\u2019s flats in 2010 amounted to EUR 330 and EUR 160.50 respectively.", "references": ["2", "4", "5", "3", "7", "6", "0", "1", "8", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Chi\u0219in\u0103u. At the time of the events, he was a bank armoured vehicle driver. 6.  At around 10.55 a.m. on 12 August 2005 the applicant went around an illegally parked bus while driving an armoured vehicle. While he was completing the manoeuvre, the bus started moving and to prevent having an accident with the armoured vehicle it stopped abruptly. As a result of the sudden stop a bus passenger, C., fell from her seat and suffered moderately severe injuries. 7.  On 1 September 2005 a criminal investigation was initiated. The prosecutor heard the applicant, the victim C., the bus driver D., a witness who had been sitting in the applicant\u2019s vehicle and another two witnesses who had been passengers on the bus (S. and V.). 8.  On 7 October 2005 D. was charged with violating traffic rules, resulting in C.\u2019s injuries. 9.  On 10 October 2005 the applicant and D. were interviewed face-to-face. According to the applicant, he had completed the manoeuvre around the stationary bus and taken the lane in front of it after making sure the bus was still stationary. He had then signalled to turn right and used the horn to alert the driver of his intentions. According to D., the applicant\u2019s car had turned right without any warning and he had been forced to stop abruptly to prevent an accident. 10.  The same day the prosecutor discontinued the criminal proceedings against D. for lack of evidence and instead interviewed him as a witness. 11.  On 21 October 2005 the applicant was charged with violating traffic rules, resulting in C.\u2019s injuries. 12.  During the course of the proceedings the Botanica District Court heard the same witnesses as the prosecutor. The court also examined a site investigation report and a sketch map of the scene of the incident, both drawn up on 12 August 2005 at 12.20 p.m. in only D.\u2019s presence. 13.  The court considered the testimony of C. and the two bus passengers unreliable. They claimed that the applicant had performed a sudden manoeuvre which had obliged D. to suddenly stop the bus. The court considered that none of them had seen any of the events themselves and that their impression that the applicant was guilty was because the bus driver blamed him. The court also considered D.\u2019s testimony unreliable because the same charges had been previously brought against him. The court noted that charges had been brought against the applicant based on statements by D. made shortly after the criminal proceedings against him had been discontinued, without re-interviewing the other witnesses. The court also noted that the site investigation report and the sketch map had not been drawn up immediately after the incident, that the police had gone to the scene several hours later and had been joined only by D., that the applicant\u2019s objections had not been reflected in the documents, and that the sketch map did not correspond to the statements given by all the witnesses shortly after the incident. 14.  In a judgment of 27 March 2006 the Botanica District Court acquitted the applicant for the reasons given above. It concluded that the prosecution had failed to provide reliable evidence in support of the contention that the applicant\u2019s actions had obliged D. to suddenly stop the bus. The prosecutor appealed. 15.  On 23 May 2006 the Chi\u0219in\u0103u Court of Appeal dismissed the prosecutor\u2019s appeal and upheld the first-instance judgment. It noted that the first-instance court had correctly scrutinised all the evidence and had provided reasons supporting the findings about the unreliability of the witness statements, referring to the testimony of the two passengers. The prosecutor appealed on points of law. 16.  On 17 October 2006 the Supreme Court of Justice held a hearing at which the applicant, his representative and the prosecutor were present. The court upheld the prosecutor\u2019s appeal on points of law, quashed the appellate judgment and ordered a rehearing of the case in accordance with the provisions of Article 436 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, namely that any examination had to be in accordance with the rules applicable in proceedings before the first-instance court. The court found that the appellate court had not thoroughly stated its position on the assessment of the statements made by C., D. and the two passengers, but had merely relied on evidence in the applicant\u2019s favour. 17.  After rehearing the case, on 28 December 2006 the Chi\u0219in\u0103u Court of Appeal dismissed the prosecutor\u2019s appeal and upheld the first-instance judgment. The court analysed the witness testimony and the site investigation report and the sketch map, providing reasons why the evidence was unreliable. The prosecutor appealed on points of law. 18.  On 26 June 2007 the Supreme Court of Justice held a hearing at which the applicant, his representative and the prosecutor were present. The court upheld the prosecutor\u2019s appeal on points of law and ordered a rehearing of the case. The court provided reasoning similar to that in its judgment of 17 October 2006. 19.  Pursuant to the verbatim record of the appellate hearing of 25 October 2007 the applicant and his lawyer did not object to the court continuing to examine the case without recalling the victim and did not request the recalling of witnesses. On the same day, the Chi\u0219in\u0103u Court of Appeal upheld the prosecutor\u2019s appeal, quashed the judgment of the Botanica District Court of 27 March 2006, found the applicant guilty and ordered him to pay an administrative fine of 3,000 Moldovan lei (MDL \u2013 approximately 194 euros (EUR)) and damages to C. in the amount of MDL 2,500 (approximately EUR 162). The court referred to a list of evidence, including the disputed statements of C., D. and the two witnesses, without providing any additional reasons. 20.  The applicant appealed and outlined, inter alia, the discrepancies in the witness statements, which had been identified by the first-instance court after hearing them and which had not been clarified by the appellate court. On 13 February 2008 the Supreme Court of Justice examined the applicant\u2019s appeal in the absence of the parties and declared it inadmissible. 21.  The applicant was served with this judgment on 24 May 2008.", "references": ["7", "8", "6", "1", "2", "5", "9", "4", "0", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Buda\u00f6rs. 6.  On 29 August 2011 the representative of a limited liability company lodged a criminal complaint against unknown persons for having allegedly stolen goods belonging to the company worth 11,000,000 Hungarian forints (HUF) (approximately 34,400 euros (EUR)). 7.  In connection with the criminal complaint, investigations were opened in respect of two individuals on suspicion of forgery of public documents and aggravated fraud. 8.  On 1 June 2012 the Tatab\u00e1nya Police Department issued a warrant for the arrest of the applicant in connection with the ongoing criminal proceedings, since the applicant was unreachable at his permanent address.\nApparently, at the time the arrest warrant was issued the applicant had a lawyer appointed for him, as required by Article 527 \u00a7 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 9.  On 8 June 2012 the applicant voluntarily appeared at J\u00e1szf\u00e9nyszaru police station, where he was questioned as a suspect on charges of aggravated fraud. He was suspected of having been hired as a part-time truck driver by a transport company, and instead of transferring the goods to their assigned destination, he had left them at an unidentified location. The applicant gave a detailed account of events, substantiated by information from his mobile telephone. His lawyer also submitted that although the applicant had gone abroad several times for short periods that had been solely because of his work as a truck driver. He had had no intention to circumvent the investigations and had resided at the same address for years. 10.  The applicant was placed in police custody on the same day on the grounds that a warrant had been issued for his arrest. He complained against the measure, arguing that he had not been present at his permanent address as he worked as a truck driver abroad. He also stated that he had steady employment and a permanent address, that the alleged offence of which he was suspected was of a minor nature, that he had voluntarily appeared before the investigation authorities, and that he had given a detailed account of events. Therefore, there were no grounds to believe that he would abscond or commit any other crime. He also maintained that the only evidence against him was that his personal details had allegedly been registered erroneously by the company where he had been employed as a driver.\nThe complaint was dismissed by the Tatab\u00e1nya district prosecutor\u2019s office on 14 June 2012.\nIn those and the ensuing proceedings the applicant was represented by a lawyer of his choice. 11.  On 8 June 2012 the Tatab\u00e1nya Police department filed an application with the head of the Tatab\u00e1nya District Prosecutor\u2019s Office seeking the applicant\u2019s placement in pre-trial detention. The application specified that the applicant had submitted false personal information (name and ID card number) when receiving the goods, which were supposed to be transported by the applicant to a specific place but had gone missing following their hand-over. 12.  The Kom\u00e1rom-Esztergom County public prosecutor\u2019s office applied for the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention on the same day. It argued that the applicant was suspected of committing aggravated fraud as he had been the driver of the truck containing the missing goods and had used false information to identify himself when the goods in question had been handed over to him. Furthermore, he had been arrested under a warrant because he had been unreachable at his domicile. Further investigative steps were also necessary and there was a risk that he would obstruct the gathering of evidence by influencing witnesses or that he would abscond. 13.  On 9 June 2012 the Tatab\u00e1nya District Court held a detention hearing. The application of the public prosecutor\u2019s office was presented to the applicant\u2019s lawyer orally during the hearing. The court ordered the applicant\u2019s detention on remand until 9 July 2012 under Article 129 \u00a7 2 (b) and (c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. According to the court\u2019s reasoning, the applicant, in cooperation with another suspect, had transferred the missing goods to an unidentified location and had submitted false information about his identity. Referring to the arrest warrant, the court also held that there were grounds to believe that the applicant would abscond, obstruct the investigations or commit further offences. It further stated, without any additional reasoning, that less restrictive measures could not be applied. 14.  The applicant appealed, arguing that the conditions for pre-trial detention had not been fulfilled because there was neither a well-founded suspicion that he had committed a criminal act nor any risk of his absconding or colluding with others. He reiterated that he had voluntarily cooperated with the police, both as regards his arrest and the giving of evidence. Furthermore, his personal circumstances, that is, the fact that his mother and brother were ill, his permanent employment and residence, which had been the same for forty years, also excluded the risk of his absconding. He further submitted that he had not been informed of any evidence justifying his detention on remand. Alternatively, the applicant requested his release and that he be placed under house arrest or under an obligation not to leave a certain area. 15.  The first-instance decision was upheld on appeal, without further reasoning, by the Tatab\u00e1nya High Court on 14 June 2012. 16.  On 3 July 2012, on the application of the public prosecutor\u2019s office, the applicant\u2019s detention was extended until 9 September 2012 by the District Court. The court found that there remained a well-founded suspicion that the applicant had committed aggravated fraud. Furthermore, the risk of his absconding remained since the applicant had been arrested under a warrant. Finally, there was a risk of collusion given the ongoing investigations and the need to question further witnesses, and the applicant\u2019s denial of the offence. The application of the prosecutor\u2019s office for a prolongation of the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention, dated 2 July 2012, was served on the applicant following the first-instance decision. 17.  The first-instance decision was upheld on appeal on 20 July 2012 by the Tatab\u00e1nya High Court, without further reasoning. 18.  In parallel, on 2 July 2012 the applicant applied for release from pre-trial detention or, alternatively, to be placed under house arrest or under an obligation not to leave a certain area. He reiterated that he had no criminal record, gave financial assistance to his elderly parents and his brother, who had Down syndrome and with whom he also shared a house, had a permanent job and that his residence had not changed for forty years. He also submitted that he had voluntarily cooperated with the police giving a detailed account of the events and handling over documentary evidence in his possession. He further pointed out that the evidence obtained by the police supported his version of the events, thus there were no grounds to believe that he would have obstructed the investigations.\nA request by the prosecutor\u2019s office, dated 5 July 2012, seeking the maintenance of the coercive measure was not served on the applicant at all. 19.  The applicant\u2019s application for release was dismissed by the District Court on 9 July 2012. It reiterated in essence the same reasoning as in its decision of 3 July 2012 without any consideration for the application of a less restrictive measure. On appeal, on 9 August 2012, the Tatab\u00e1nya High Court partly upheld the applicant\u2019s appeal, finding that there was no risk of his absconding owing to his personal circumstances, namely his mother\u2019s fragile health and his brother\u2019s illness, and the fact that he had voluntarily appeared before the police following the issuing of the arrest warrant. Nonetheless, the High Court upheld the first-instance decision to prolong the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention owing to a risk of collusion, adding that there were no grounds for choosing another, less restrictive, preventive measure. 20.  On 28 August 2012 the investigation was closed and the case file was presented to the defence. 21.  On 7 September 2012 the prosecutor\u2019s office released the applicant from pre-trial detention on the grounds that no specific reason (such as a risk of collusion) existed for his further detention. 22.  On 25 June 2015 the Tatab\u00e1nya District Court acquitted the applicant. 23.  The applicant was detained in Sz\u00e9kesfeh\u00e9rv\u00e1r Prison from 9 June to 7 September 2012. During that time he was held in a cell measuring 41.09 sq. m with eighteen sleeping places. On 31 July 2012 there were eight inmates (5.1 sq. m per person); on 9 June, between 26 June and 2 July, 1 and 10 August and 26 August and 7 September 2012 there were nine inmates (4.5 sq. m per person); between 10 and 11 June and 3 and 6 July 2012 there were ten inmates (4.1 sq. m per person); between 12 and 21 June, 20 and 30 July and 11 and 25 August 2012 there were eleven inmates (3.7 sq. m per person); between 22 and 25 June and between 7 and 15 July 2012 there were twelve inmates (3.4 sq. m per person); and between 15 and 20 July 2012 there were thirteen inmates (3.1 sq. m per person). During the summer, the temperature in the prison cell rose to 30\u02daC during the day time, occasionally reaching 35\u02daC. The cell was equipped with a separate toilet. The applicant could only leave the cell for one hour of outdoor exercise every day. Inmates were able to take a shower once a week for about five to ten minutes.", "references": ["0", "9", "3", "4", "7", "5", "8", "6", "No Label", "1", "2"], "gold": ["1", "2"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1944 and lives in K\u0142omnice. 6.  The applicant is proprietor and editor-in-chief of the local weekly newspaper \u201cKomu i Czemu\u201d, published in the Radomsko and Be\u0142chat\u00f3w Districts. 7.  In issue no. 33 of 18 August 2004 the applicant published an article entitled \u201cElegantly wrapped dung\u201d (\u201c\u0141ajno \u2013 elegancko opakowane\u201d). It read, in so far as relevant:\n\u201cA poser is someone who does everything to produce external effects by his conduct, speech and, in particular, with the populism he preaches. He is a numbskull posing as the people\u2019s tribune. The only panacea, or universal cure, for such a person is to recognise his intentions and take up a bloodless fight using arguments. An argument against any kind of tricks by a poser or populist will be always a counter\u2011argument based on reality, logic and the opportunity to put one\u2019s intentions into practice.\nI remember when, not so long ago, the author of the proposal to develop a quail farm as a panacea against rural unemployment had a go at me in an accommodating local newspaper, accusing me of malice, a willingness to discredit every good idea, and mindlessness leading to nasty mental disease and many other irreversible disorders of the mind. At the same time he declared that he would continue doing his job, that is, condemning farmers to breeding nice little birds in order to collect their eggs. His boss considered the quail business very important, because it would eliminate the need for viagra. There has not been a sideshow like it in the Radomsko District for a long time. So the time is approaching when pilgrimages of men from all over Poland, and maybe even the European Union, will come to Radomsko to taste quail eggs and later begin procreating.\nI wonder who has gone mad in the district, and why mad ideas, supported by even madder arguments, can be accepted by our officials. But no matter. Every dull boss can be convinced by any rubbish. Once more I want to authoritatively and responsibly declare that neither quail breeding, nor mushroom growing, nor Eternit [a registered trademark for fibre cement], which suddenly seems to have dropped out of the picture, will solve the unemployment problem in the villages of our region. And I will continue calling the actions of dim-witted officials and their dull bosses pretentious and populist, and no numbskull will convince me that I am wrong. ...\u201d 8.  The applicant went on to describe in general terms a local economic development programme, which had been presented to him by a businessman. He finished his article with the following paragraph:\n\u201cThis is not a venture of the quail variety by some smart poser or populist who is able to sell his dull bosses dung nicely wrapped in words. And he actually sells it.\u201d 9.  On 8 March 2005 M.D., the mayor of the Radomsko District (starosta), G.D., the head and spokesperson of the district\u2019s marketing department, and K.H., an employee of that department, lodged a private bill of indictment against the applicant with the Radomsko District Court. In respect of the impugned article, they accused him of defamation committed through the mass media under Article 212 \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Code. In particular, they alleged that the copious use of words such as \u201cnumbskull\u201d, \u201cdull boss\u201d, \u201cdim-witted official\u201d, \u201cposer\u201d and \u201cpopulist\u201d (\u201cpalant\u201d, \u201cnierozgarni\u0119ty szef\u201d, \u201cprzyg\u0142upawy urz\u0119dnik\u201d, \u201cpozer\u201d, \u201cpopulista\u201d) had defamed them as local government officials. The statements had lowered them in public opinion and undermined the public confidence necessary for the discharge of their duties. 10.  The private prosecutors sought an order requiring the applicant to publish an apology in the weekly newspaper. They further sought reimbursement of their legal costs and payment by the applicant of 5,000 Polish zlotys (PLN) to a charity. 11.  The Radomsko District Court ruled that it did not have jurisdiction in the case, and transmitted the private bill of indictment to the Piotrk\u00f3w Trybunalski District Court. The trial court held two hearings. 12.  On 8 February 2006 the Piotrk\u00f3w Trybunalski District Court gave its judgment. It held that the use of the words \u201cnumbskull\u201d, \u201cposer\u201d and \u201cdim\u2011witted official\u201d in respect of K.H., and the use of the words \u201cdull bosses\u201d in respect of M.D. and G.D., had amounted to insult (zniewaga) committed through the mass media, within the meaning of Article 216 \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Code. The court convicted the applicant under that provision and ordered him to pay a fine of PLN 10,000 (approximately 2,630 euros (EUR)). It also ordered him to reimburse the private prosecutors\u2019 costs (PLN 900, approximately EUR 236) and the costs of the State Treasury (PLN 1,000, approximately EUR 263). 13.  As to the facts, the court observed that, since March 2004, the applicant\u2019s newspaper had been publishing articles which were critical of M.D., the mayor of the Radomsko District, and his officials. The newspaper was particularly critical of K.H.\u2019s initiative to develop quail farming in order to tackle the impoverishment of the local population. K.H. was an official in the district\u2019s marketing department. G.D., the head of the marketing department, was also involved in the implementation of this project. In April 2004 the applicant had published an article in which he had made ironic remarks about K.H.\u2019s initiative. In June 2004 a journalist at the same newspaper had published a detailed article on the same subject. The conflict between the applicant and the private prosecutors had intensified with each successively published article. 14.  The court further noted that, in his article entitled \u201cElegantly wrapped dung\u201d, the applicant had again written about the quail farming. Being aware of the publicity which the initiative promoted by K.H. and G.D. had received, the applicant had decided once again to mock the two officials, as well as their superior, M.D. He had referred to K.H., the author of the initiative, as a \u201cposer\u201d, \u201cnumbskull\u201d and \u201cdim-witted official\u201d, while the idea of quail farming had been referred to as \u201cnicely wrapped dung\u201d. According to the applicant, this kind of \u201cproduct\u201d had been sold to \u201cdull bosses\u201d, that is, first G.D. and then M.D., the mayor of the district. 15.  The trial court rejected the applicant\u2019s argument that the impugned article had been a simple weekly column in which any similarity to actual persons had been purely coincidental. It found that the article in issue had been part of a campaign carried out by the newspaper against the private prosecutors. They had not been mentioned by name, but they had been easily identifiable on account of the publicity generated by the quail farming project and the earlier articles published by the applicant\u2019s newspaper. The court established that there was no doubt that the words \u201cnumbskull\u201d, \u201cdim\u2011witted official\u201d and \u201cposer\u201d had referred to K.H., and the term \u201cdull bosses\u201d to M.D. and G.D. 16.  With regard to the applicant\u2019s criminal responsibility, the trial court noted that a journalist had the right to criticise the actions of public officials, but was not entitled to use media in a manipulative way to wage private wars. The latter behaviour was not only unethical and unprofessional, but also incompatible with the role of the media, which was to serve the State and society. The trial court further held:\n\u201cThe fair criticism and objective coverage, free from personal emotions, which is desired in journalism, gave way to the private interest of the defendant, pursued through expressions which, in common understanding, remain offensive and disrespectful. It is difficult not to agree with the position that the word \u201cnumbskull\u201d (\u201cpalant\u201d) in the analysed context, although its literal meaning is legally irrelevant, fulfils all the criteria of insult within the meaning of Article 216 of the Criminal Code. Of an equally offensive character are the terms \u201cposer\u201d, \u201cdim-witted official\u201d and \u201cdull boss\u201d. It would be hard to find a person who would not feel offended by similar epithets, especially if formulated in the press.\nIncidentally, it should also be noted that the word \u201cdung\u201d used in the title of the article has a cruder equivalent, and undoubtedly that equivalent was meant to describe K.H.\u2019s contribution to the development of local entrepreneurship, which was accepted without reservation by his \u201cdull bosses\u201d. \u201cDull\u201d meaning not sharp, unintelligent, intellectually retarded.\nHowever, the court found no grounds to hold that the impugned words had the effect of lowering the private prosecutors in public esteem, or undermining the public confidence necessary for the discharge of their duties as local government officials. Accordingly, it would not be justified to classify the applicant\u2019s acts as coming under Article 212 \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Code. The quoted statements were rather harmful to the private prosecutors\u2019 perception of their dignity, and such, in the court\u2019s view, was the defendant\u2019s intention. By using insulting words in respect of the district officials, Maciej Ziembi\u0144ski intended to derive satisfaction from doing them moral harm. By doing so in a newspaper, he fell within the scope of Article 216 \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Code, acting unlawfully, reprehensibly, and, in the absence of circumstances capable of precluding or mitigating his guilt, also culpably.\u201d 17.  The trial court noted that the present case involved a conflict between constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech and the right of each citizen to have his reputation protected. However, it found that the applicant\u2019s acts had constituted a blatant abuse of freedom of speech and professional ethics. The court observed that his acts and motivation had been reprehensible, since he had been settling a private conflict with the officials and transgressing basic professional standards. 18.  As regards sentence, the court found that, having regard to the circumstances of the case, it would be disproportionate to impose a prison sentence, and that a fine would be the most appropriate penalty. It imposed a fine of PLN 10,000, which it considered proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of the applicant\u2019s guilt. 19.  The applicant appealed. He contested the factual findings of the first\u2011instance court, in particular that his article had concerned the private prosecutors personally. He argued that the impugned article had presented in a sarcastic light people who achieved personal gain by pretending to work, and their dull bosses who accepted such practices. The applicant emphasised that criticism of the quail farm project as a solution to a decline in agriculture in the region had been entirely legitimate. Lastly, he submitted that public figures such as M.D., the district mayor, and other officials had to accept harsh criticism of their activities. 20.  On 18 April 2006 the Piotrk\u00f3w Trybunalski Regional Court (\u201cthe Regional Court\u201d) upheld the first-instance judgment. It ordered the applicant to pay PLN 1,000 (approx. EUR 256) in respect of the costs of the appeal proceedings. 21.  The Regional Court held that the lower court had correctly established the facts of the case. It endorsed the trial court\u2019s findings that the words used in the article had been insulting and harmful to the private prosecutors\u2019 dignity. It further held that, although fair criticism of public authorities and officials was socially desirable and legally accepted, the protection afforded by law did not extend to the use of insulting words which offended human dignity. 22.  The judgment was served on the applicant on 29 May 2006.", "references": ["0", "8", "2", "4", "1", "9", "5", "3", "7", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
+{"input": "5.  In 1996 the applicant and his wife started a family business which involved, among other things, the replication of digital data and the sale of blank data storage devices. They used a flat on P. Street in Kyiv owned by the applicant\u2019s mother as their office, in which they had copying equipment set up. 6.  On 20 August 2002 several police officers from the Kyiv Economic Crime Unit (\u201cKECU\u201d) inspected the applicant\u2019s office at P. Street in his and his wife\u2019s presence. 7.  On the same date the KECU officers also inspected the applicant\u2019s garage and his car. 8.  After the inspection the police seized seven computers, sixty-six optical disc recording devices, a printer, a modem, over three thousand optical discs with recordings, some thirty thousand blank optical discs and some seven thousand printed disc covers. The seizure was documented on three standardised forms (one for each site inspected), which included the following pre-filled printed text:\nDeed of inspection and seizure\n\u201cBeginning of the inspection: _______ [time, date]\nEnd of the inspection: _________ [time, date]\nI (we), ______ of the KECU on the premises of ______ [site] ... inspected and seized from _________ [name, address, place of work of the person whose possessions were subject to seizure] the following ________ [list of seized items].\nThe seized items will be stored with the KECU pending resolution of the matter on the merits.\nThis Deed has been completed in duplicate and read out. ...\u201d 9.  It appears from the forms that the inspection of the office started at 7.30 p.m. and ended at 7.30 a.m. the following morning, 21 August 2002. Other sites were inspected at the same time \u2013 the car from 7.30 p.m. until 1.34 a.m. and the garage between10.25 and 11.45 p.m. 10.  According to the applicant, for the whole night the police officers questioned him, his wife and the members of their extended family who were on the premises. The questions related to the applicant\u2019s family business and the observance of copyright law in the business\u2019s use of software and in its replicating activities. 11.  On 22 August 2002 a report was published on the Ministry of Interior\u2019s website, which stated that the Kyiv Police had:\n\u201c... identified a criminal group of two [individuals]. These two [individuals] organised an entire underground production [facility] in their office. With the help of computer equipment they replicated CD-ROMs containing various programs and games ...\u201d 12.  The report also featured a photograph of the applicant\u2019s wife without a caption and listed the seized items, declaring their estimated value as 117,000 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH). 13.  On 15 November 2002 investigator O.K. from the Investigative Department of the Kyiv Police instituted criminal proceedings concerning \u201cthe suspected breach of copyright\u201d under Article 176 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, without naming any suspected offenders. In his decision, he referred to the search of the office of the applicant and his wife and the seizure of their belongings on 20 August 2002. He further noted that they had been found not to have a license agreement with the law firm S., the official representative of the Microsoft Corporation, whose software they had used in their business, thereby causing damage to the software copyright owner. 14.  On 20 November 2002 O.K. declared the property seized from the applicant and his wife as physical evidence to be stored by the police pending the investigation of the case. 15.  On 21 November 2002 the Shevchenkivsky District Court of Kyiv (hereinafter \u201cthe District Court\u201d) issued search warrants in respect of the applicant\u2019s and his wife\u2019s flats, noting that they were suspected of breaching criminal legislation concerning copyright protection. 16.  On 23 November 2002 these flats were searched pursuant to the warrants. It appears from the case file that no items were seized. 17.  As follows from the applicant\u2019s submissions, after these searches and several interviews, the proceedings stagnated, with the police never pressing any charges against the applicant or any other person. 18.  On numerous occasions the applicant asked the police and the prosecutor\u2019s office to order the return of his seized property. On various dates (in particular 24 February 2003, 11 August 2003 and 13 May 2005) the respective authorities rejected his requests, notifying him that his seized property constituted physical evidence in a criminal case, that keeping it in the possession of the authorities was justified by the need to carry out expert assessments and that, more generally, in accordance with Article 81 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1960 (\u201cthe CCP\u201d), the fate of the items had to be determined upon the final resolution of the case. 19.  On 27 September 2004 the Kyiv prosecutor\u2019s office rejected a request by the applicant to have the criminal case in which his possessions had been seized transferred to court with a view to having the proceedings closed as time-barred. They noted, in particular, that proceedings could only be terminated on such grounds in cases in which a particular person had been indicted. 20.  On 25 February 2005 the police rejected a request by the applicant to have the criminal proceedings discontinued for lack of corpus delicti, noting that discontinuing proceedings on such grounds also presupposed the identification of a particular defendant. 21.  On 4 April 2004 the police informed the applicant in response to his complaint about being denied any status in the criminal proceedings \u2013 which, in his view, concerned him as a de facto suspect \u2013 that there were no grounds for instituting a criminal case against him personally. There was insufficient evidence that he had unlawfully replicated copyrighted materials or distributed counterfeit products. 22.  In March 2006 the criminal proceedings were still pending. No investigative measures concerning the applicant had been ordered. His property remained in the control of the police as physical evidence in the case. 23.  In their subsequent submissions \u2013 the last correspondence from the applicant\u2019s lawyer and the Government was received in March and June 2013 respectively \u2013 the parties did not provide any further information concerning the outcome or status of the aforementioned criminal proceedings and the fate of the seized items. 24.  On an unspecified date the applicant and his wife instituted defamation proceedings against the police authorities for publishing an inaccurate crime report on their website (see paragraph 11 above), seeking the retraction of the information contained therein. 25.  On 27 October 2003 the District Court allowed the claim. 26.  It follows from the case file that this judgment was not appealed against and became final. 27.  On 22 August 2003 the prosecutor\u2019s office rejected the applicant\u2019s request for criminal proceedings to be instituted against three KECU officers who had taken part in the search of his office, car and garage and had seized his property. It was noted in the relevant decision, in particular, that the police officers had not \u201csearched\u201d but \u201cinspected\u201d the applicant\u2019s office and other sites. The inspection had been lawful, as it had been carried out in the police officers\u2019 competence to carry out investigative and operational activities for the purpose of crime detection within the meaning of the Law of Ukraine \u201cOn operational and investigative activities\u201d and with the applicant\u2019s and his wife\u2019s consent. 28.  On 13 October and 4 December 2003 respectively the Pecherskyy District Court and Kyiv City Court of Appeal (\u201cthe Court of Appeal\u201d) rejected appeals by the applicant against that decision. 29.  On an unspecified date the applicant instituted civil proceedings in the Shevchenkivskyy District Court in Kyiv to reclaim his computer equipment, optical discs and other property seized by the police. 30.  On 10 October 2003 the court suspended these proceedings pending resolution of the criminal case in which the property had been retained by the police (see paragraphs 13-23 above). 31.  In April 2003 the applicant lodged a complaint against the Investigative Department of the Kyiv Police with the District Court. Initially referring to Article 248 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1963 in force at the material time, he alleged, in particular, that the inspection of his office and search and seizure of his property in August 2002, as well as the institution of criminal proceedings on 15 November 2002 had been unlawful. 32.  In court the applicant reformulated his claims. Referring to Article 234 of the CCP (see paragraph 46 below) he contended that there had been no lawful grounds for instituting the criminal proceedings concerning the suspected breach of copyright. He requested that the investigator\u2019s decision of 15 November 2002 (see paragraph 13 above) be set aside. In this respect the applicant submitted, in particular, that on 20 and 21 August 2002 KECU officers had conducted an arbitrary search and seizure of his property without a court warrant or any other lawful grounds for taking such actions. The applicant argued that there was no reason to suspect that a crime had been committed justifying the search and seizure of his belongings; that, in breach of the applicable law, the measures had been taken at night-time; that the same people had been appointed as lay witnesses for all three sites, which had been inspected all at the same time; and that following the institution of the criminal proceedings he had not been summoned to participate in any investigative activities. The proceedings at issue had been instituted in bad faith, to prevent him from recovering his seized property and to cover up the unlawful conduct of the KECU. 33.  On 26 June 2003 the District Court found that Article 234 of the CCP (not Article 248 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1963) was the appropriate provision for examining the applicant\u2019s allegations. It rejected them, finding that the applicant lacked standing to bring the proceedings. In particular, the disputed criminal case had been instituted \u201cinto the matter\u201d rather than \u201cagainst the applicant\u201d (see paragraph 46 below quoting Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure), who had neither been a formal suspect nor a defendant in the proceedings at issue. He could not therefore claim that his rights had been breached by the institution of the proceedings. As regards his complaints concerning the allegedly unlawful actions of the police, in accordance with Article 234 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, these complaints could be brought only within the framework of the above-mentioned criminal case and fell to be examined by the court which would try that case, during either the preliminary hearing or trial. 34.  The applicant appealed, stating in particular that he had been a de facto suspect in the proceedings at issue. As he had been denied formal status as a suspect, he could not defend himself properly. In addition, as the proceedings had been artificially protracted, he had been deprived of the opportunity to reclaim his seized property pending resolution of the case. 35.  On 17 September 2003 the Court of Appeal quashed the District Court\u2019s decision and decided to discontinue the proceedings. Like the lower court, it considered that the applicant had no standing to bring the proceedings at issue and, more generally, that the actions of the police authority complained of could only be challenged before the court examining the criminal case, after the relevant investigation had been completed and the case transferred to the court for examination. In these circumstances, rather than rejecting the applicant\u2019s complaints on the merits, the proceedings had to be discontinued. 36.  The applicant appealed on points of law. 37.  On 13 July 2004 the Supreme Court of Ukraine quashed the previous decisions and remitted the case to the lower courts for fresh consideration. It noted, in particular, that on 30 January 2003 the Constitutional Court of Ukraine had found that the provisions of Article 234 of the CCP, which had made it impossible to appeal separately against decisions of investigative authorities concerning the institution of criminal proceedings, were unconstitutional (see paragraph 47 below). The foregoing ruling also meant that courts should likewise admit for consideration complaints about other procedural actions, decisions or inaction on the part of investigative authorities, which could result in irreparable or grave damage to an individual\u2019s constitutional rights if their judicial review were to be delayed. The Supreme Court further noted that there was sufficient evidence to suggest that the applicant had been substantially affected by the criminal proceedings at issue \u2013 in particular, with regard to the search of his premises and the seizure and retention of his belongings. It stated that the proceedings appeared to be protracted without any justification and instructed the lower courts to verify whether the conduct of the investigative authorities could indicate ulterior motives aimed at concealing unlawful actions on their part. 38.  On 14 October 2004 the District Court allowed the applicant\u2019s complaint and revoked the decision of 15 November 2002. Regard being had to the grounds for taking that decision, the proceedings should have been instituted against the applicant, who had been a de facto suspect in relation to breach of copyright. Institution of the proceedings \u201cinto the matter\u201d without indicating a specific defendant had been artificial and had restricted the applicant\u2019s procedural rights. The police officers\u2019 actions which had led to the institution of the proceedings had been tainted by procedural breaches, regard being had, in particular, to the unjustified inspection of the premises at night-time in the absence of the flat owner (the applicant\u2019s mother ), as well as various other procedural violations. 39.  On 3 November 2004 the Kyiv prosecutor\u2019s office appealed against that decision. 40.  On 24 December 2004 the Court of Appeal quashed the District Court\u2019s decision and remitted the criminal case concerning the suspected breach of copyright to it for further investigation. By assessing the lawfulness of the investigative actions, the District Court had in fact touched upon the admissibility of evidence, a matter which could only be examined in the course of a criminal trial. It further found that by instituting the criminal proceedings \u201cinto the matter\u201d rather than \u201cagainst the applicant\u201d, the police had not caused irreparable damage to the applicant\u2019s constitutional rights such as would necessitate the setting aside of their decision by way of judicial proceedings. Any irregularities in the formulation of the decision to institute criminal proceedings could be more appropriately addressed by the prosecution authorities. 41.  The applicant appealed on points of law, alleging in particular that the Court of Appeal had breached procedural rules in admitting the appeal of the prosecutor\u2019s office. 42.  On 25 July 2005 Justice V.P. of the Supreme Court refused to consider the applicant\u2019s request for leave to appeal on points of law, stating that the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction over the decisions taken by the Court of Appeal in the relevant matters, unless they concerned the termination of proceedings.", "references": ["8", "1", "6", "5", "3", "7", "2", "0", "No Label", "4", "9"], "gold": ["4", "9"]}
+{"input": "5.  Mrs Marinova was born in 1972 and lives in Tervel. 6.  In February 2006 she complained to the Child Protection Agency that the school teacher of her son, then aged fourteen, had on several occasions ill-treated and humiliated him. In particular, she alleged that the teacher had hit the child three years earlier and had since then often insulted him, had made remarks about his parents in front of other pupils, and had belittled his performance at school. Mrs Marinova argued that this had amounted to harassment, and said that her son had become demotivated. The Agency examined the complaint, heard the teacher, Mrs Marinova\u2019s son and other witnesses, and concluded that the allegation of ill-treatment had not been made out. It found that relations between Mrs Marinova and the teacher had been strained since 2003, when the father of her son had threatened the teacher in front of other pupils. The teacher had brought a private criminal prosecution against the father in relation to that, and the proceedings were pending. 7.  In April 2006 Mrs Marinova complained to the school\u2019s headmaster and the police that the teacher had taken her son\u2019s mobile telephone in class and had later refused to give it back. 8.  The prosecuting authorities opened criminal proceedings against an unknown perpetrator in connection with this allegation and in August 2006 suspended them on the ground that the perpetrator had not been identified. 9.  In July 2006 the teacher brought a private criminal prosecution against Mrs Marinova in connection with these three complaints. She submitted that she had not read them because the authorities dealing with them had not shown them to her. However, she had been asked to give explanations and from the questions put to her she had inferred that Mrs Marinova had accused her of having stolen a mobile telephone and described her as a biased and incompetent teacher using inappropriate disciplinary methods. At the first hearing of the case in September 2006, the teacher brought a civil claim against Mrs Marinova, seeking 5,000 Bulgarian levs (BGN) (2,556 euros (EUR)), plus interest, in non-pecuniary damages. 10.  On 29 November 2006 the Tervel District Court found Mrs Marinova guilty of defaming a public official, contrary to Articles 147 and 148 \u00a7\u00a7 1 (3) and 2 of the Criminal Code (see paragraphs 49 and 50 below). The court replaced Mr Marinova\u2019s criminal liability with an administrative fine of BGN 500 (EUR 256). It partly allowed the teacher\u2019s claim for damages, ordering Mrs Marinova to pay her BGN 1,000 (EUR 511), plus interest. It also ordered Mrs Marinova to pay the teacher\u2019s costs, amounting to BGN 164 (EUR 84), and part of the court fee paid by the teacher, amounting to BGN 40 (EUR 20). The court noted that relations between the teacher and Mrs Marinova had for a long time been bad. Having examined the findings of the Child Protection Agency and the prosecuting authorities in relation to Mrs Marinova\u2019s complaints, the court concluded that her allegations, the first of which had become known to the school\u2019s headmaster and a pedagogical counsellor in the school, had been false and therefore defamatory. The court also held, without specifying the basis for its conclusion on this point, that Mrs Marinova had acted with direct intent. In fixing the amount of the fine, the court noted, inter alia, her poor financial situation. 11.  Mrs Marinova appealed, arguing, inter alia, that complaining about a public official to the authorities did not amount to \u201cdissemination\u201d within the meaning of Article 147 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 49 below). Such complaints could, in some cases, be seen as false accusation contrary to Article 286 of the Code (see paragraph 54 below). Mrs Marinova also emphasised that she had not made her allegations publicly. 12.  In a final judgment of 18 April 2007, the Dobrich Regional Court upheld the lower court\u2019s judgment. It found that Mrs Marinova\u2019s allegations that the teacher had ill-treated her son were not supported by the findings of the Child Protection Agency or her son\u2019s or the headmaster\u2019s testimony, and held that information was \u201cdisseminated\u201d within the meaning of Article 147 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code even if only one person had become privy to it. The court found that the allegations in relation to the mobile telephone were false as well. It agreed that the statements in this respect in Mrs Marinova\u2019s complaint to the police had amounted to a false accusation, and that the lower court had been wrong to characterise them as defamation. However, it stated that in the absence of an appeal by the teacher, it could not quash this part of the lower court\u2019s judgment. It upheld, without giving any details, the lower court\u2019s finding that Mrs Marinova had acted with direct intent. 13.  To obtain payment of the award of damages and costs, the teacher brought enforcement proceedings against Mrs Marinova. It is unclear how these ended. 14.  Mr Zlatanov was born in 1963 and lives in Sofia. 15.  On 28 July 2008 he was stopped by two road traffic police officers. One of them recorded that Mr Zlatanov had failed to obey a stop sign. Mr Zlatanov objected, noting down in the record that the officer had refused to present himself, smelled of alcohol and staggered. In written explanations which he filed with the Shabla District Police Department on 5 August 2008, Mr Zlatanov reiterated his allegations and said that the officer had behaved aggressively. 16.  Mr Zlatanov\u2019s allegations triggered an internal inquiry which exonerated the officer of any wrongdoing. 17.  In December 2008 the officer brought a private criminal prosecution against Mr Zlatanov in relation to these allegations. He also claimed BGN 5,000 (EUR 2,556) in non-pecuniary damages. 18.  In a judgment of 6 March 2009, the Kavarna District Court found Mr Zlatanov guilty of defaming a public official, contrary to Articles 147 and 148 \u00a7\u00a7 1 (3) and 2 of the Criminal Code (see paragraphs 49 and 50 below). The court replaced his criminal liability with an administrative fine of BGN 500 (EUR 256). It partly allowed the officer\u2019s claim for damages, ordering Mr Zlatanov to pay him BGN 1,500 (EUR 767), plus interest. It also ordered Mr Zlatanov to pay BGN 60 (EUR 30) in court fees. The court examined in detail the results of the internal inquiry carried out pursuant to Mr Zlatanov\u2019s allegations, tests carried out several hours after the incident on 28 July 2008 and showing that the officer had not consumed alcohol, and the oral evidence of the other officer present at the scene and the officers\u2019 superior. It concluded that Mr Zlatanov\u2019s allegations did not correspond to the truth. It went on to find that Mr Zlatanov had not been certain of the truthfulness of his allegations, but had nevertheless chosen to make them, both in the record drawn up by the officer in the course of the incident on 28 July 2008 and in his subsequent written explanations. 19.  Mr Zlatanov appealed. He argued, inter alia, that his statements, made in the exercise of his constitutional rights and only addressed to the officer\u2019s superior, had not amounted to \u201cdissemination\u201d within the meaning of the Article 147 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 49 below). He also relied, inter alia, on Article 10 of the Convention and this Court\u2019s case\u2011law under this provision. 20.  In a final judgment of 20 November 2009, the Dobrich Regional Court upheld the lower court\u2019s judgment. It found it established that the officer had not displayed any signs of inebriation, which in the court\u2019s view meant that Mr Zlatanov had been fully aware that the officer had not been drunk but had nevertheless chosen to make his allegations, thus acting with a direct intent to discredit the officer. Those allegations, whose purpose had been to smear the officer and at the same time exonerate Mr Zlatanov from liability for the road traffic offence recorded by the officer, could not be justified by the right to defend oneself against administrative-penal charges or the right to freedom of expression. The court ordered Mr Zlatanov to pay the officer\u2019s costs for the appellate proceedings, amounting to BGN 512 (EUR 262). 21.  Mr Findulov was born in 1955 and lives in Burgas. 22.  On 12 July 2009 Mr Findulov, who was driving his lorry, was stopped by two road traffic police officers. One of them allegedly requested a bribe. Mr Findulov promised to bring him the money in ten minutes and left his identity card and the vehicle\u2019s documents with the officers. He then called the police and informed the officer on duty of the incident. 23.  On 23 July and 3 and 14 August 2009 Mr Findulov made complaints to the Inspectorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ombudsman of the Republic and the Minister of Internal Affairs, alleging that one of the officers who had stopped him, whose identity was not known to him, had requested a bribe and had withheld his documents. 24.  On 13 August 2009 the Burgas Regional Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs replied to Mr Findulov that his complaint was ill\u2011founded. 25.  According to Mr Findulov, on 14 September 2009 he found his identity card in his mail box. The vehicle\u2019s documents were never recovered. 26.  In a decision of 12 August 2009, the Road Traffic Police Department of the Burgas Regional Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs found, on the basis of a report by the two traffic police officers issued in Mr Findulov\u2019s absence, that he had not used a seatbelt, that one of the tyres of his lorry had been worn out, that he had refused a breathalyser test, and that he had driven away in an unknown direction. It gave Mr Findulov two administrative fines of BGN 50 and one administrative fine of BGN 500, stripped him of twenty-five control points from his driving licence, and barred him from driving a motor vehicle for twelve months. 27.  Mr Findulov sought judicial review of that decision. On 30 November 2009 the Burgas District Court found that no appeal lay against the BGN 50 fines and discontinued the proceedings in that part. It quashed the remainder of the decision of 12 August 2009, finding that the report of the traffic police officers had not been communicated to Mr Findulov. In a final judgment of 25 March 2010 the Burgas Administrative Court upheld that judgment. 28.  On an unspecified date in 2009, the officer accused by Mr Findulov of soliciting a bribe brought a private criminal prosecution against him in relation to that allegation. He also sought BGN 10,000 (EUR 5,113) in non\u2011pecuniary damages. 29.  In a judgment of 11 May 2010, the Burgas District Court found Mr Findulov guilty of defaming a public official, contrary to Articles 147 and 148 \u00a7\u00a7 1 (3) and 2 of the Criminal Code (see paragraphs 49 and 50 below). It sentenced him to a fine of BGN 5,000 (EUR 2,556) and a public reprimand. It partly allowed the officer\u2019s claim for damages, ordering Mr Findulov to pay him BGN 3,000 (EUR 1,534). It also ordered Mr Findulov to pay BGN 120 (EUR 61) in court fees. The court noted that in his complaints Mr Findulov had not named the officer, but found that he had been identifiable from the complaints, which clearly alleged that he had requested a bribe, thus accusing him of an offence before third parties. The offence of defamation did not require that those third parties \u2013 the officer\u2019s hierarchy \u2013 had actually believed the allegations or taken any action in relation to them. Mr Findulov, who under Article 147 \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 49 above) bore the burden of proof in this respect, had failed to establish that the officer had in fact solicited a bribe. The court went on to say, without explaining the reasons for this conclusion, that Mr Findulov had acted with direct intent. When fixing the sentence, the court noted that it could not replace Mr Findulov\u2019s criminal liability with an administrative punishment as this was a one-off possibility and Mr Findulov had previously benefited from a waiver of his criminal liability in relation to a road traffic offence. In fixing the award of non-pecuniary damages to the officer, the court noted that Mr Findulov\u2019s allegations had been particularly damning. 30.  Mr Findulov appealed. 31.  In a final judgment of 14 July 2010, the Burgas Regional Court upheld the lower court\u2019s judgment. It entirely agreed with the reasons given by that court, adding that Mr Findulov had been fully aware that his allegations against the officer were false but had nevertheless chosen to defame him. The court also ordered Mr Findulov to pay BGN 250 (EUR 128) incurred by the officer in costs for the appeal proceedings. 32.  The public reprimand was executed, as ordered by the court, by announcing Mr Findulov\u2019s conviction and sentence on the local radio station. To obtain payment of the award of damages and costs, the officer brought enforcement proceedings against Mr Findulov. It is unclear how these ended. 33.  Mr Dinchev was born in 1943. Mrs Dincheva was born in 1947. Both of them live in Lovech. 34.  The two of them had a long-running conflict with neighbours of theirs. On 14 November 2009 tensions escalated and Mr and Mrs Dinchevi called the police, complaining that they had been assaulted by the neighbours. Two officers came and warned one of the neighbours not to harass the applicants. 35.  On 17 November 2009 Mr and Mrs Dinchevi complained to the head of the Lovech District Police Directorate against the officers, alleging that they had shown no interest in the incident and had failed to protect them, instead inviting the aggressors in the patrol car and \u201cmuttering with them\u201d. Mr and Mrs Dinchevi sent copies of the complaint to the Lovech District Prosecutor\u2019s Office, the head of the Lovech Fire Brigade, and the Minister of Internal Affairs. On 4 December 2009 the head of the Lovech District Police Directorate informed Mr and Mrs Dinchevi that an internal inquiry had established that their complaint was ill-founded. 36.  On an unspecified date in 2010 the officers brought a private criminal prosecution and claims for damages against Mr and Mrs Dinchevi. 37.  In a judgment of 20 October 2010, the Lovech District Court found Mr and Mrs Dinchevi guilty of defaming public officials, contrary to Articles 147 and 148 \u00a7\u00a7 1 (3) and 2 of the Criminal Code (see paragraphs 49 and 50 below). It sentenced each of them to a fine of BGN 2,500 (EUR 1,278) and a public reprimand. The reprimand was to be executed by announcing the conviction and sentence on the local radio station. The court also partly allowed the officers\u2019 claims for damages, ordering the applicants to pay each of them BGN 400 (EUR 205). 38.  On appeal, in a final judgment of 18 April 2011 the Lovech Regional Court upheld the conviction with similar reasoning but reduced the fine imposed on each applicant to BGN 1,500 (EUR 764). 39.  After the Government were given notice of the application (see paragraph 4 above), they brought Mr and Mrs Dinchevi\u2019s case to the attention of the Chief Prosecutor. In December 2012 the Chief Prosecutor ad interim asked the Supreme Court of Cassation to reopen the proceedings, set aside the judgments against Mr and Mrs Dinchevi, and acquit them. He submitted that the statements in their complaint against the officers had not been defamatory but simply an expression of their disapproval of the way in which the officers had carried out their duties. Under the case-law of this Court and the case-law of the Supreme Court of Cassation, public officials could legitimately be subjected to heightened criticism. Accepting, as the Lovech courts had, that critical statements in complaints against such officials were defamatory would mean that the vast majority of claims and complaints filed with the courts and the prosecuting authorities by non\u2011lawyers could lead to penal sanctions. 40.  In a final judgment of 7 March 2013 (\u0440\u0435\u0448. \u2116 104 \u043e\u0442 07.03.2013 \u0433. \u043f\u043e \u043d. \u0434. \u2116 178/2013 \u0433., \u0412\u041a\u0421, III \u043d. \u043e.), the Supreme Court of Cassation allowed the request, reopened the proceedings, set the two judgments aside, acquitted Mr and Mrs Dinchevi, and dismissed the claims for damages against them. It held that their actions had not amounted to an offence. The statements in their complaints had been an expression of their disapproval of the way in which the officers had carried out their duties, and an exercise of their constitutional rights to make complaints to the authorities, express their opinion, and defend their rights. The statements had been value judgments which could not be proved or disproved, and could not be regarded as defamatory. Defamation could only consist in the imputation of concrete negative facts. The statements did not give rise to liability in damages either.", "references": ["8", "3", "1", "5", "4", "2", "7", "0", "9", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicants were born in 1978, 1980 and 2007 respectively. 7.  They fled Armenia on account of fears of persecution related to the first applicant\u2019s activity as a journalist and his political activism. 8.  After arriving in France on 4 October 2009 they filed applications for asylum, which were rejected by the French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons (Office fran\u00e7ais de protection des r\u00e9fugi\u00e9s et apatrides \u2013 OFPRA), on 21 December 2009, then by the National Asylum Court (Cour nationale du droit d\u2019asile \u2013 CNDA), on 28 February 2011. Their subsequent requests for re-examination were also rejected. 9.  On 3 May 2011 the prefect of Loiret issued orders rejecting the applicants\u2019 requests for leave to remain and obliging them to leave French territory. On 18 October 2011 the Orleans Administrative Court, on an appeal from the applicants, refused to overturn those orders. 10.  The first applicant was arrested by the police in connection with a theft on the evening of 16 February 2012 and was taken into police custody that same day. The second and third applicants were arrested the next day at the reception centre for asylum seekers (Centre d\u2019accueil des demandeurs d\u2019asile \u2013 CADA) at Chaingy, where the family had been living. The applicants were taken that same day to the administrative detention centre (Centre de r\u00e9tention administrative \u2013 CRA) of Toulouse-Cornebarrieu. The detention orders in respect of the first two applicants read as follows:\n\u201cWhereas the immediate enforcement of the [order to leave France] is not possible on account of the organisation of [their] departure for [their] country of origin.\nWhereas [the applicants] [have] not presented sufficient guarantees that [they] will not abscond, not having a valid passport, [having] neither a fixed abode nor sufficient resources, not [having] complied with the previous removal directions issued to [them] and [having] formally opposed, when interviewed, [their] return to [their] country of origin.\u201d 11.  The first two applicants challenged their detention orders and in parallel lodged an urgent application for a stay of execution. They claimed that they had a fixed addressed at the reception centre (CADA), that a friend was prepared to accommodate them and that, in any event, their detention would be incompatible with the best interests of their child. In this connection they indicated that their child, who was too young to be left on his own, was obliged to accompany them in all their administrative formalities and therefore to come into contact with armed police officers in uniform. 12.  On 21 February 2012 the President of the Toulouse Administrative Court dismissed the urgent application without a hearing, finding as follows:\n\u201cUnder the [domestic statutory] provisions, the legality of decisions ordering administrative detention in connection with removal measures can be challenged fully through a specific procedure, which itself has the nature of an urgent procedure, separately from the remit of the urgent applications judge ...; it follows therefrom that the applicants\u2019 request for that judge to order ... the stay of execution of the detention orders made for the purpose of enforcing the removal directions, a stay which would in fact have an equivalent effect to that of the annulment of the same decision on the merits, is inadmissible.\u201d 13.  On the same day, the Toulouse Administrative Court dismissed the application lodged by the first two applicants for the annulment of the administrative detention order, on the following grounds:\n\u201cIt is not in dispute that [the applicants] cannot present any valid identity or travel document; although [they claim] that [they] have a fixed address in an asylum-seekers\u2019 reception centre, it can be seen from the evidence in the file that this centre asked [them] to vacate the premises, where [they have] unduly remained since June 2011; nor [have] the [applicants] adduced evidence of lawful income; lastly, since the notification of the judgment of the Orl\u00e9ans Administrative Court of 18 October 2011 dismissing [their] application against the order of the prefect of Loiret of 2 May 2011, [the applicants] [have] avoided the said removal measure; under those circumstances, the choice of the administrative authority to place [them] in administrative detention instead of ordering a measure of restricted residence ... is not vitiated by a manifest error of judgment.\u201d\nResponding more specifically to the argument raised by the applicants concerning the child\u2019s best interests, the Administrative Court found it to be inapplicable, as the decisions appealed against pertained only to the parents\u2019 personal situation. 14.  The prefect asked the Liberties and Detention Judge of the Toulouse tribunal de grande instance to extend the detention, after which the first two applicants tried to obtain the third applicant\u2019s voluntary intervention in the proceedings. On 22 February 2012 that judge authorised the extension of the applicants\u2019 detention for a period of twenty days, after finding inadmissible the request for voluntary intervention on behalf of the child, and having dismissed the argument that the conditions of detention were incompatible with the presence of a minor child, on the following grounds:\n\u201cIt is not for the judicial authority to interfere in the running of an administrative detention centre\u201d. 15.  That decision was upheld on 24 February 2012 by the President of the Toulouse Court of Appeal, who found in particular as follows:\n\u201c... the administrative detention centre of Cornebarrieu, where the child is held, has been authorised to receive families and contains all the necessary facilities to ensure the comfort of a family with children.\nThus the whole family is together and they have, in an autonomous area and separated from the rest of the detainees, rooms for them alone and for their exclusive use.\nIn addition, there is a playground on the site, like those to be found in town squares.\nLastly, a doctor and a nurse are available every day in the Toulouse administrative detention centre and Mr and Mrs A.B. have not shown that they met with a refusal when they asked to present their child \u2013 a request of which the existence has not been established.\nThe Convention provisions, especially Article 8, do not therefore appear to have been breached.\u201d 16.  On 24 February 2012 the applicants submitted to the Court, under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a request for the suspension of the detention orders concerning them. On 29 February 2012 the Court decided not to indicate the requested interim measure. 17.  On 5 March 2012 the applicants were released, after expressing their wish to return to Armenia, and after seeking voluntary return assistance for that purpose. However, they did not leave France, on account of the third applicant\u2019s state of health. On 13 July 2012 the first applicant was granted leave to remain as the parent of a sick child. 18.  In two judgments of 15 November 2012, the Bordeaux Administrative Court of Appeal annulled the administrative detention orders of 17 February 2012 in respect of the first two applicants. Its judgments contained the same wording for each spouse:\n\u201c4.  Article L. 561-2 of the Entry and Residence of Aliens and Right of Asylum Code provides, by way of exception to the cases where a foreign national may be placed in detention, the possibility of ordering a measure of restricted residence (assignation \u00e0 r\u00e9sidence) if the alien can present guarantees to allay the risk of non-compliance with his or her obligation to leave France. Under provision 3o of part II of Article L. 511-1 of the same Code, such risk must in particular be regarded as established, save in specific circumstances, in cases where the alien has already evaded the execution of a removal measure. The finding by the administrative authority of facts falling within provision 3o of part II of Article L. 511-1, while it is such as to create a presumption of a risk that the alien might fail to comply with his or her obligation to leave France, does not dispense that authority, before any decision to place him or her in detention, from specifically examining the circumstances of the case. As regards aliens who are the parents of minor children and who do not have sufficient guarantees of compliance, such aliens being provided for by Article L. 562-1 of the said Code, and in accordance with the aims of Article 17 of Directive 2008/115/EC, recourse to placement in detention can only constitute an exceptional measure in cases where the alien does not have a stable place of abode at the time when the prefectoral authority takes the necessary measures to prepare for the removal. 5.  For the purposes of transposition of the above-mentioned Directive, Article L. 562-1 of the Entry and Residence of Aliens and Right of Asylum Code, as inserted by Law no. 2011\u2011672 of 16 June 2011, provides: \u2018In the cases provided for in Article L. 551\u20111, where the alien is the parent of a minor child residing in France and has effectively contributed to the raising and education of that child in the conditions prescribed in Article 371-2 of the Civil Code since the birth of the child or at least for the past two years, and where the conditions for a restricted residence measure under Article L. 561-2 of the present Code are not fulfilled, the administrative authority can decide on a measure of curfew with electronic tagging, with the agreement of the alien concerned.\nThe measure of curfew with electronic tagging is decided by the administrative authority for a period of five days. The measure may be extended by the Liberties and Detention Judge under the same conditions as the extension of the administrative detention provided for in chapter II of title V of the present book.\u2019 6.  It can be seen from the evidence in the file that on the date of the decision appealed against, Mr [A.B.], accompanied by his wife and four-year-old son [A.B.], had been accommodated for several years in the hostel of the asylum-seekers\u2019 reception centre in Chaingy, and that the child had been going to school. Mrs [A.A.B.] was apprehended on 16 February 2012 in that hostel, where the family had remained unlawfully, even though they had been requested to leave the premises by the centre\u2019s administration, following the rejection of their requests for a review of their asylum situation by a decision of 28 July 2011 of the French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless persons. In deciding on their placement in detention the prefect of Loiret merely stated that Mr [A.B.] did not present sufficient guarantees against the risk of non-compliance, as he did not have a valid passport, had no stable place of abode or sufficient income, and had not complied with the previous directions for his removal. It does not appear from the decision appealed against that the prefect had considered, having regard to the presence of a child, whether a less coercive measure than detention was possible for the necessarily short duration of the removal procedure. In those conditions, his decision was vitiated by an error of law and had for that reason to be declared null and void. 7.  It transpires from the foregoing that, without there being any need to examine the other arguments in the application, Mr [A.B.] is justified in submitting that the judge appointed by the President of the Toulouse Administrative Court, in the judgment appealed against, had been wrong to reject his request for the annulment of the decision of 17 February 2012 placing him in administrative detention.\u201d\n...", "references": ["8", "9", "6", "7", "0", "3", "5", "No Label", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["1", "2", "4"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1940 and lives in Gelgaudi\u0161kis, \u0160akiai Region. 6.  On 17 February 2010 the \u0160akiai police arrested the applicant\u2019s son, V.\u017d., on suspicion of unlawful possession of narcotic substances with the purpose of distributing them under Article 260 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code. 7.  On that same day the police searched the applicant\u2019s apartment where she lived together with V.\u017d., and found some small plastic bags. The following day a search was conducted in the applicant\u2019s daughter V.B.\u2019s apartment. As V.B. was living abroad, the applicant provided the police officers with the keys to V.B.\u2019s apartment and was present during the search. The officers found some plastic bags, a digital weighing scales, and remnants of \u201cherbal substances\u201d (augalin\u0117s kilm\u0117s med\u017eiagos). 8.  On 19 February 2010 the \u0160akiai District Court authorised V.\u017d.\u2019s detention for fourteen days. 9.  On 2 March 2010 an officer informed the head of the \u0160akiai Police that V.\u017d. had unlawfully carried a mobile phone into detention. Most of the information on that phone, including any text messages sent by V.\u017d., had been deleted but police officers found several text messages which V.\u017d. had received from his fianc\u00e9e on 19 and 20 February 2010, including the following:\n\u201cWill not risk transfer now, [it\u2019s been] said.\u201d\n\u201cDon\u2019t use that phone at all, don\u2019t you understand.\u201d\n\u201cShe is telling me something else.\u201d\n\u201cThrow that phone away, don\u2019t you understand, mother already knows what to do.\u201d\n\u201cGive me their number, I\u2019ll arrange for us to give it later. We can\u2019t give it now. Your mother was questioned today and almost got arrested, don\u2019t you understand? It\u2019s all hidden now.\u201d\n\u201cMother doesn\u2019t give anything, I\u2019m telling you the customs office is watching everything.\u201d 10.  In the afternoon of 3 March 2010 the applicant arrived at \u0160akiai Police station, where V.\u017d. was detained, to bring him food and clean clothes. 11.  At 4 p.m. that day the applicant was informed by a senior investigator that she was being placed under provisional arrest (laikinas sulaikymas), on the basis of Article 140 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see \u201cRelevant domestic law\u201d below). The decision to arrest the applicant indicated that she was suspected of unlawful possession of narcotic substances with the purpose of distribution (see paragraph 27 below). Provisional arrest had been deemed necessary in order to prevent her from fleeing, interfering with the investigation or committing further crimes because it was suspected that she had previously hidden drugs from the investigators (see paragraph 9 above). The record of the provisional arrest, drawn up at the time of the arrest, stated that the applicant had been explained her rights, including the right to a lawyer, and that she had refused to sign the record. The applicant was placed in the \u0160akiai police station in a nearby cell to her son. Her husband was informed of her arrest. At that time the applicant was sixty-nine years old. 12.  On 4 March 2010 the applicant was served with the official notice that she was a suspect (prane\u0161imas apie \u012ftarim\u0105). The notice stated that in February 2010 she had allegedly acquired drugs from unidentified persons, kept them in her daughter V.B.\u2019s apartment with the purpose of distribution, and subsequently distributed them, thereby committing the act proscribed in Article 260 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code. The applicant signed the notice that she was an official suspect, to indicate that she had received it and that her rights had been explained to her. 13.  From 11.30 a.m until midday that day the applicant was questioned as a suspect in the case, in the presence of a lawyer. She denied having committed any crimes and refused to answer any further questions. 14.  At some point during the day the applicant started feeling weak, and felt a headache and a pain in her chest. An ambulance was called to the police station and the applicant was given first aid. 15.  On the same day the applicant\u2019s lawyer submitted a request to the \u0160akiai district prosecutor to release the applicant from provisional arrest. The lawyer argued that the applicant had not committed any crime and that she had only been arrested to pressurise her to testify against her son. 16.  At 3.50 p.m. that day the \u0160akiai police released the applicant. The decision to release her stated that all the necessary investigative actions concerning the applicant had been conducted, and that there were no grounds to believe that she would interfere with the investigation upon her release. 17.  On 5 March 2010 the \u0160akiai district prosecutor rejected the applicant\u2019s lawyer\u2019s request to release the applicant (see paragraph 15 above) as based on \u201csubjective and declaratory statements\u201d and thus unfounded. According to the applicant, she did not appeal against that decision because she had already been released. 18.  On 30 September 2010 the \u0160akiai district prosecutor discontinued the pre-trial investigation against the applicant on the grounds of insufficient evidence that she had committed the crime outlined in Article 260 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code. 19.  The \u0160akiai police continued the pre-trial investigation concerning the applicant\u2019s son V.\u017d. The police obtained his call records and questioned several witnesses who admitted to having bought cannabis from V.\u017d. 20.  On 4 November 2011 the \u0160akiai District Court convicted V.\u017d. of unlawful possession of narcotic substances with the purpose of distribution under Article 260 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code. On 2 March 2012 the Kaunas Regional Court dismissed V.\u017d.\u2019s appeal, and on 23 October 2012 the Supreme Court dismissed his appeal on points of law. 21.  On 25 February 2013 the applicant lodged a civil claim for damages against the State under Article 6.272 of the Civil Code. She claimed that her provisional arrest had been unfounded because she had not committed any crimes, as proven by the subsequent discontinuation of the pre-trial investigation. The applicant also argued that her arrest had been unnecessary because at the time she had been almost seventy years old, ailing and had had difficulties walking; she had had no prior convictions, had been retired and had had a place of residence with her husband. Thus, she claimed that it had been unlikely that she would have attempted to flee or hide from the investigation. The applicant noted that the investigation against her son had been instituted on 17 February 2010, and there had been no indication from that day until her arrest that the police suspected that she had committed any crimes or attempted to interfere with the investigation \u2011 on the contrary, she had voluntarily come to the police station to see her son. The applicant argued that the real purpose of arresting her had been to force her to testify against her son. 22.  The applicant further submitted that she had suffered pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage because of the provisional arrest: her blood pressure had risen and as a result she had had to seek medical help and take medication; she had become irritable, had started having nightmares and was scared of police officers; she felt humiliated in front of her son who had been detained in a nearby cell, as well as other inhabitants of her village, who subsequently thought of her as a criminal. The applicant claimed 2,300 Lithuanian litai (LTL, approximately 666 euros (EUR)) in respect of pecuniary damage resulting from her legal expenses, as well as LTL 10,000 (EUR 2,896) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 23.  At the hearing before the \u0160akiai District Court the applicant also submitted that, after arresting her, the police officers had searched her purse and tried to strip search her, but she had resisted. She stated that the cell in which she had been detained had been damp and dilapidated and that there had been smells emanating from the toilet which had made her nauseous. 24.  On 27 May 2013 the \u0160akiai District Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim. The court noted that the termination of the pre-trial investigation against the applicant did not make the investigation unlawful ab initio, and found that there had been sufficient grounds for suspicions against her: plastic bags had been found in the apartment where she lived together with her son V.\u017d., and remnants of drugs had been found in the applicant\u2019s daughter V.B.\u2019s apartment. Furthermore, while detained, V.\u017d. had unlawfully been in possession of a mobile phone, and the police officers had had grounds to believe that he had warned the applicant to hide the drugs which had been stored in V.B.\u2019s apartment. Accordingly, the court found that the applicant\u2019s provisional arrest had been well-founded. The court also noted that the applicant had not appealed against the district prosecutor\u2019s decision of 5 March 2010 to refuse her release (see paragraph 17 above), which meant that the decision to arrest her had not been declared unlawful. Lastly, the court held that the medical documents submitted by the applicant did not prove that the deterioration of her health had been caused by the provisional arrest. The court did not address the applicant\u2019s complaints concerning the conditions of her detention. 25.  On 29 October 2013 the Kaunas Regional Court rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal. It upheld the findings of the first-instance court that at the time of the arrest there had been sufficient evidence to suspect the applicant of having committed a crime, and that the subsequent discontinuation of the pre-trial investigation did not make the arrest unlawful. The Kaunas Regional Court also noted that Article 140 of the Code of Criminal Procedure permitted the provisional arrest not only of a suspect but also any other person in respect of whom it was necessary to conduct certain investigative actions. Having found that the applicant\u2019s arrest had been lawful, the court held that there were no grounds to award the applicant any damages. It did not address the applicant\u2019s complaints concerning the conditions of her detention. 26.  On 18 December 2013, following an appeal on points of law by the applicant, the Supreme Court refused to examine the case as raising no important legal questions.", "references": ["6", "1", "8", "2", "0", "7", "5", "9", "4", "3", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Sevojno. 6.  On 30 May 2001 the U\u017eice department of the Central Employment Office (Republicki zavod za tr\u017eiste rada \u2013 Nacionalna slu\u017eba za zapo\u0161ljavanje \u2013 Organizaciona jedinica U\u017eice, hereinafter \u201cthe Employment Office\u201d) granted unemployment benefits to the applicant until he found a new job or became eligible for retirement (nov\u010dana naknada do zaposlenja ili ispunjavanja uslova za starosnu penziju). 7.  On 1 June 2001 the Law on Changes and Amendments to the Law on Employment and Rights of Unemployed Persons (\u201cthe 2001 Law\u201d) came into force. The law provided for different coefficients and a different methodology for calculating such benefits. It also provided, in Article 20, that any administrative proceedings which had not been concluded by the date on which the new law came into force were to be finalised in accordance with the new law (Article 17 of the 2001 Law provided that Article 20 was applicable as of 1 September 2001). 8.  The applicant was receiving the full amount of the benefits he was entitled to until October 2001. From that date the benefits were decreased to 70-80% of the amount he had initially been awarded, although the decision of 30 May 2001 had not been amended or superseded by a new decision. 9.  Consequently, on 12 November 2007 the applicant brought a civil claim against the Employment Office in the U\u017eice Municipal Court (Op\u0161tinski sud u U\u017eicu), seeking payment of the difference between the benefits he had received and those he had been granted by the Employment Office and which had been due from 1 November 2004 (a claim for any earlier sum was statute-barred), plus statutory interest and legal costs. 10.  On 26 December 2007 the Municipal Court rejected the applicant\u2019s claim. It found that his benefits had been correctly calculated, in accordance with the 2001 Law, as the Employment Office\u2019s decision in his case had not yet been final on the date on which the relevant law had come into force. 11.  On 18 March 2008 the U\u017eice District Court (Okru\u017eni sud u U\u017eicu) upheld that judgment following an appeal by the applicant. 12.  The applicant\u2019s lawyer brought separate claims on behalf of numerous individuals (hereinafter \u201cthe plaintiffs\u201d), seeking outstanding benefits. 13.  On 22 November 2007 the same Municipal Court ruled in favour of M.\u00d0., one of the plaintiffs, whose claim was factually and legally identical to that of the applicant (M.\u00d0.\u2019s administrative decision had also been delivered on 30 May 2001). That judgment became final on 19 December 2007. 14.  The Municipal Court ruled in favour of several of the plaintiffs in nine judgments delivered between 24 August 2007 and 17 April 2008, although it appears that the dates on which the respective administrative decisions had come into force differed. 15.  On 26 February 2008 and 19 May 2008 the Arilje Municipal Court delivered two judgments in which it ruled against plaintiffs whose claims were identical to the applicant\u2019s. The U\u017eice District Court upheld those two judgments on 20 March 2008 and 15 September 2008 respectively. 16.  A number of plaintiffs who were in an identical situation to that of the applicant lodged constitutional appeals with the Constitutional Court of Serbia. Between 4 November 2010 and 1 March 2012 the Constitutional Court adopted a number of decisions in those cases, finding a violation of the right to a fair trial. It quashed the civil judgments and ordered the reopening of the civil proceedings. 17.  Acting upon the decisions of the Constitutional Court, the Kragujevac Court of Appeal (which became the competent court of second instance for the applicant\u2019s case after a reorganisation of courts in Serbia in 2010, instead of the U\u017eice District Court) and the Belgrade Court of Appeal reopened proceedings in cases in which the Constitutional Court had made such an order and ruled in favour of the plaintiffs. 18.  On 1 April 2014 the Supreme Court of Cassation adopted a detailed action plan aimed at ensuring the general harmonisation of case-law throughout the Serbian judicial system. The plan contained a series of measures to be taken at various levels of jurisdiction, and, inter alia, included the following: (i) the adoption of guiding legal opinions based on the principles developed in the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights; (ii) the dissemination of such opinions; (iii) regular information sharing between the courts; (iv) an increased number of thematic discussions and training programmes; (v) the adoption of specific action plans by the courts at various levels; and (vi) the development of various IT tools and related intranet databases.", "references": ["2", "4", "5", "9", "1", "7", "6", "0", "8", "3", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1981 and lives in Veshenskaya, a village in the Rostov Region. 6.  According to the applicant, on an unspecified date at the end of June 2002 he was sitting in a cafe. He saw P. there, a police officer and former schoolmate who was drunk and making indecent suggestions to a girl. The applicant, in his words, reprimanded P. for his behaviour, to which he replied with a vague threat. 7.  Between about 10.30 and 11 p.m. on 9 July 2002 the applicant was hit by a car while on the pavement. The driver was P., who was accompanied by a passenger, Ms S.K. The accident took place in a recreational area in the centre of the village. As a result, the applicant suffered severe head and spinal injuries. P.\u2019s car was also damaged. With the help of a passer\u2011by, G., P. loaded the semi\u2011conscious applicant into his car and drove him away from the scene of the accident. 8.  At about 11 p.m. P. arrived with the applicant at a local hospital. The applicant was able to walk but was suffering from memory loss, was disoriented and did not understand what had just happened. His condition started to worsen; at about midnight he was transferred to the hospital\u2019s intensive care unit. 9.  According to the applicant, having seen what he had done, P. called his father, the chief of the local tax police and former chief of the local traffic police. P.\u2019s father called his acquaintances, A., a traffic police officer, and M., the head of the laboratory of the local hospital. He explained to them what had happened and asked if they would help protect his son. The Government did not comment on this allegation. 10.  Shortly after the applicant\u2019s admission to the hospital A. arrived and spoke to the applicant. At 12.15 a.m. on 10 July 2002 he drew up a report stating that the applicant had fallen down the stairs of a nearby cafe and had injured himself. He made the applicant sign the report. No mention of the car accident was made. The report contained a handwritten entry, apparently in the applicant\u2019s own handwriting, which read: \u201cRecorded from my words, I have read it\u201d. The report was then submitted to Sholokhovskiy police station, where the accident was logged in the daily accident record as \u201cno. 2\u201d. 11.  At 12.20 a.m. on 10 July 2002, M. arrived at the hospital in P.\u2019s father\u2019s car and took samples of the applicant\u2019s blood. After testing them she concluded that his blood contained a high level of alcohol (1.9 per mille), which meant he had been drunk at the time of the accident. The applicant was unconscious when M. took the samples. She also took blood from P. The tests showed the presence of 0.4 per mille of alcohol in his blood (the then acceptable legal limit for driving a car). The applicant alleged that the results of the tests had been falsified by M. He referred to the testimony of two staff members of the hospital, who later testified that he had not been drunk. The applicant also pointed to inconsistencies in the report by A. and the results of subsequent tests of the samples of his blood, which had revealed different levels of alcohol. 12.  At about 1.15 a.m. the applicant\u2019s parents arrived at the hospital. According to the applicant, they did not smell any alcohol on him. Furthermore, the entries made by the hospital personnel about his condition and the nature of his injuries were incomplete. No mention of his spinal injury had thus been made, since the existence of such an injury would have gone against the story that he had fallen down the stairs. Furthermore, the hospital authorities had washed his t-shirt, which contained traces of his blood and could have confirmed his version of events. 13.  In the meantime P. left the hospital and returned to the scene of the accident. According to the official examination report, the police examined the scene between 1 and 2 a.m. on 10 July 2002. P. took part in the examination, together with police officers from Sholokhovskiy police station. He signed the report, as did the attesting witnesses present. The applicant claimed that the examination had taken place much later in the day, during the afternoon. 14.  According to the applicant, later that day P. drove his car to a garage, where it was quickly repaired and the broken windscreen replaced. 15.  At 1.45 a.m. on 10 July 2002 the applicant\u2019s father arrived at Sholokhovskiy police station and tried to formally report the car accident. However, the officer on duty refused to accept it, referring to the earlier report by A. stating that the applicant had fallen down the stairs. 16.  Between 2 and 3 a.m. doctors at the hospital made an encephalogram of the applicant\u2019s head and took samples of his spinal fluid. 17.  At 10 a.m. a second test of the applicant\u2019s blood was carried out, which showed the presence of 0.2 per mille of alcohol. A further test of the same sample showed the presence of 0.1 per mille of alcohol. 18.  The applicant\u2019s first operation took place at about 1.30 p.m. on 10 July 2002 and was carried out by Dr Zh, a surgeon from the hospital. His condition, however, remained very unstable and continued to worsen. His relatives suspected that when they had left the hospital, someone had tried to strangle him to death, because upon their return they had discovered marks on his neck. They also blamed the hospital authorities for their inaction in dealing with the applicant\u2019s case. 19.  That day the police examined P.\u2019s car. It appears from the report of the examination that the car had dents on the right side of the bonnet and on the front right windscreen support. The police did not mention the windscreen in their report. It is unclear whether the car was examined before or after it had been repaired. 20.  At 9 a.m. on 13 July 2002 the local hospital requested the help of the Rostov City Hospital at the insistence of the applicant\u2019s relatives. A neurosurgeon arrived at about 3.30 p.m. and performed further surgery, which was more successful. The applicant started to recover. A few days later he was transferred to the Rostov City Hospital for further treatment. In the years that followed he had to undergo a further two neurosurgical operations, but he never recovered completely; he lost the ability to work and started to suffer from repeated epileptic fits. He was registered as Category 2 disabled (where Category 1 corresponds to a severe disability preventing a person from working, and Category 3 corresponds to a less severe disability). 21.  According to the applicant, on 12 July 2002 the Sholokhovskiy district police informed the District Prosecutor about the incident on 9 July 2002. The Government did not comment. 22.  On 16 July 2002 the Sholokhovskiy District Prosecutor\u2019s Office opened a criminal investigation into the accident (registered as case no. 2707168). The applicant alleged that the investigator in charge of the case, M., had been a schoolmate and close friend of P. He also alleged that the date the decision was taken to open an investigation was incorrect, as the case had in fact been opened on 18 July 2002. 23.  On 17 July 2002 the investigator started questioning witnesses. G., who had been with the applicant on the night of 9 July and helped take him to the hospital, testified that the applicant had not been drinking that evening. He also testified that the applicant had been walking parallel to the road when the car had hit him. His account was confirmed by the testimony of several other witnesses. In contrast, some other witnesses testified that the applicant had suddenly moved in the direction of the car a second before the collision. Several witnesses had also noticed that the windscreen of the car of P. had been broken after the incident. It appears that the investigator identified and questioned more than twelve witnesses who had seen the accident or observed the events immediately afterwards. The investigator also questioned paramedics from the local hospital, some of whom testified that P. had probably been drunk. Others had not noticed anything of that kind. 24.  On 19 July 2002 the investigator examined the car again. His report suggests that the car did not have any visible dents, but evidence of repair work was discovered on the front right windscreen support. 25.  On 23 July 2002 the investigator questioned P. again. It appears that he was questioned as a witness. He claimed that the applicant had made a dangerous unexpected move in the direction of the car. He also denied that the car had sustained any damage to the windscreen or the front right windscreen support. 26.  On 29 July 2002 the investigator examined the scene of the accident. It was established, amongst other things, that it had taken place in an area marked as a pedestrian zone. There was a road sign prohibiting cars from access, although it was unclear whether it had been there on the night of the accident and had been visible. 27.  On 29 July 2002 a forensic expert tested a sample of P.\u2019s blood, obtained from him on 10 July 2002. The expert did not find any traces of alcohol. A similar test of a sample of the applicant\u2019s blood revealed the presence of 2.9 per mille of alcohol. 28.  On 31 July 2002 the investigator conducted a reconstruction of the accident, in the presence of P. Neither the applicant nor his parents were notified or participated. 29.  On 1 August 2002 a forensic expert drew up a report examining the nature of the applicant\u2019s injuries and making conclusions as to the speed and direction P.\u2019s car had been travelling, the position of the applicant\u2019s body at the time of the accident, and other relevant factors. 30.  On 2 August 2002 the investigator questioned P.\u2019s father who explained, among other things, that the dent on the bonnet of the car was not related to the accident involving the applicant. P. testified that he had arranged for the car to be repaired a few days before the accident. 31.  On 6 August 2002 the applicant\u2019s father complained to the Regional Prosecutor that the investigator M. had been leaking information about the investigation to P.\u2019s father. He asked that the case be transferred to another investigator from a neighbouring district. 32.  On 12 August 2002 the applicant\u2019s father submitted to the investigator in charge of the case a list of over a dozen witnesses who had seen the accident. He asked the investigator to summon and question them. 33.  On 5 September 2002 the applicant was granted victim status in the investigation. On 6 and 25 September 2002 the investigator questioned him. The applicant testified, among other things, that he had not been drinking on the day of the accident. He also claimed that he had been walking straight when the car had hit him from behind. 34.  On 9 September 2002 the investigator organised a reconstruction of the accident in the presence of the applicant, P. and G. 35.  On 17 September 2002 the investigator questioned M. She denied falsifying the results of the blood test. The difference between the original and second blood tests could, in her words, be explained by a different testing method and the acceptable margin of error. 36.  On an unspecified date experts examined the applicant\u2019s clothes in order to establish the mechanics of the injuries. 37.  On 25 September 2002 P. was questioned again, this time as a suspect in the criminal case. He refused to give evidence. 38.  On 27 September 2002 the investigator questioned an expert, who explained the difference between the results of the two tests of the blood samples taken from the applicant and P. 39.  On 2 October 2002 the investigator questioned the applicant\u2019s father. 40.  On 4 December 2002 a team of experts produced a report analysing the applicant\u2019s injuries and the mechanics of the accident. They answered twenty\u2011two questions which had been formulated by the investigator. 41.  On 10 January 2003 the applicant lodged a civil claim against P. in connection with the health problems he had suffered as a result of the accident. 42.  On 19 January 2003 P. was ordered by the investigator not to leave the village without his consent. 43.  On 14 February 2003 P. was formally charged under Article 264 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code for causing serious bodily harm by negligently breaching traffic regulations. He was questioned but denied his guilt. 44.  On 24 March 2003 the investigator questioned the deputy head of Sholokhovskiy police station, Ch., who had been an eyewitness to the accident. 45.  On 26 April 2003 a further reconstruction of the accident was carried out. 46.  On 14 May 2003 the applicant obtained an expert report from the Volgograd Forensics Bureau, in which the events of 9 July 2002 were reconstructed on the basis of the material of the case file. 47.  On 20 March 2003 the applicant was examined by medical experts. 48.  On 15 April 2003 doctors examined X-ray images of the applicant\u2019s neck and drew up a report. 49.  On 27 August 2003 P. started working at Sholokhovskiy police station as a district police officer. On 7 July 2003 two witnesses to the accident, S. and B., complained to the district prosecutor that pressure had been put on them by P. in connection with his criminal case. 50.  On 22 November 2003 the investigator obtained another expert examination of the applicant\u2019s injuries and the mechanics of the accident. 51.  On 24 December 2003 the prosecutor approved the indictment against P. By the end of the investigation, the case file was nine volumes and over three thousand pages long. The applicant was given access to the case material. 52.  On 26 December 2003 the applicant brought proceedings to challenge the investigator\u2019s decision, as he was dissatisfied with the accident being classified as an Article 264 \u00a7 1 offence. He applied for an injunction requiring the investigator to instead charge P. under Article 111 \u00a7 2 (intent to cause serious bodily harm). On 29 January 2004 the Sholokhovskiy District Court dismissed his complaint; it held that the courts had no jurisdiction to review the decisions of the investigator in so far as they concerned the legal classification of a criminal charge, since such a decision did not interfere with the applicant\u2019s constitutional rights and freedoms. 53.  On an unspecified date in early 2004 the investigation was completed, and the parties were given access to the case material. The investigator\u2019s decision of 27 April 2004 stated that the applicant\u2019s father had studied it. According to him, he only had five-and-a-half hours to study the material, which consisted of four files, each three hundred pages long. During that time he was only able to read part of the material and copy one hundred and thirty pages. The last volume of the case file was incomplete and did not contain an index of documents. As a result, the applicant had to request additional time to examine the case file during the court proceedings. A handwritten inscription he had written indicating that he had not read all the material allegedly disappeared from the case file. 54.  On 5 January 2004 the criminal case and indictment were forwarded to the Sholokhovskiy District Court for examination on the merits. 55.  On 12 February 2004 the Sholokhovskiy District Court ruled that the first hearing in the case would be held on 26 February 2004, and that there was no need to hold a preliminary hearing. The applicant objected, claiming that one was necessary. 56.  The hearings in the case were held on 26 February, 11 June and 5 July 2004. 57.  On 13 September 2004 the Sholokhovskiy District Court found P. guilty under Article 264 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code and sentenced him to eighteen months\u2019 imprisonment, although he was not required to serve his sentence owing to the expiry of the statutory limitation period for crimes of that category. As to the civil claim lodged by the applicant within the criminal proceedings, the court awarded him 50,000 Russian roubles (RUB) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. It also acknowledged that he had a right to compensation in respect of pecuniary damage but decided to transfer the matter to a civil court for examination because it was impossible to make a precise calculation within the criminal proceedings. 58.  On 26 November 2004 P. was dismissed from service in the police at his own request. 59.  On 28 December 2004 the Rostov Regional Court quashed the judgment of 13 September 2004 and remitted the case for fresh examination. In particular, it ordered the lower court to clarify whether the road sign could have been visible to P. on the night of the accident. 60.  In the course of the second round of the trial the court examined documentary evidence in the case file and heard over twenty witnesses, including the applicant, P., M., the applicant\u2019s parents, several people who had seen the accident, police officers who had been involved in the initial inquiry, two expert witnesses, attesting witnesses and a number of hearsay witnesses. 61.  On 8 April 2005 the Sholokhovskiy District Court found P. guilty under Article 264 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Its findings of fact can be summarised as follows. The court found that P.\u2019s car had been moving at 30 to 40 km/h. The car had entered the pedestrian zone, which had been marked by a road sign, and had hit the applicant from behind. He had been walking straight and had not contributed in any manner to the accident. P. had been able to avoid collision by manoeuvring or stopping his car, but for whatever reason he had not done so. He had applied the brakes a while after the collision. As a result of the collision, the applicant had received life\u2011threatening injuries. No mention was made of P. or the applicant being drunk during the accident. The court was also unable to make any conclusive findings as to when the dents on P.\u2019s car had been repaired, or whether or not the windscreen had been broken. It concluded that the injuries had been caused to the applicant by P.\u2019s carelessness, but not deliberately. The court sentenced P. to eighteen months\u2019 imprisonment, although again he was not required to serve his sentence owing to the expiry of the statutory limitation period for crimes of a less serious nature. The court awarded the applicant RUB 50,000 in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage. As to compensation for pecuniary damage, the court referred the case to a civil court. The Sholokhovskiy District Court specified that although the applicant had produced contracts, receipts and other documents to support his claim for pecuniary damages, he had failed to explain the amounts claimed and the court was therefore unable to make a precise calculation. 62.  Both parties appealed. 63.  On 31 May 2005 the Rostov Regional Court amended the decision of the first-instance court. Confirming its conclusions as to the facts of the case and their legal classification, the court decided that P. could not be held guilty, owing to the expiry of the statutory limitation period. As a result, the judgment of the first-instance court was quashed in its entirety and the proceedings discontinued. The Rostov Regional Court\u2019s judgment did not make reference to the civil award made by the first-instance court. 64.  On an unspecified date the applicant brought civil proceedings against P. claiming compensation for health damage, moral suffering, loss of earning capacity and the inability to live a normal life. The applicant\u2019s relatives also lodged separate claims within the same proceedings. The applicant claimed compensation of RUB 1,118,307 for past medical expenses, 6,000 United States dollars (USD) for a year\u2019s loss of earnings, 100,000 euros (EUR) for future surgery and medical expenses, and EUR 2,000 a month for health damage. In addition, he claimed USD 100,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 65.  On 8 August 2005 the Sholokhovskiy District Court, at the applicant\u2019s request, ordered that the car belonging to P. be temporarily seized. 66.  On 10 August 2005 the Sholokhovskiy District Court allowed the applicant\u2019s claims in part. 67.  On 10 October 2005 the Rostov Regional Court quashed that decision and remitted the case for fresh examination. 68.  Since all the judges working in the Sholokhovskiy District Court had participated in the earlier proceedings, the case was transferred to a court in an adjacent district, the Verkhnedonskoy District Court, situated 50 kilometres from the applicant\u2019s village. The applicant, who was a wheelchair user at the time, objected without success. 69.  In those proceedings the plaintiffs (the applicant and his relatives) amended their claims. In particular, they claimed that damages should be paid by the State, because P. had been a police officer at the time of the events. 70.  The applicant formulated his claims in respect of pecuniary damage as follows. The accident and resulting injuries had deprived him of the ability to work. Although the applicant, who was a qualified naval operator mechanic, had had no actual work at the time, he had been promised an offer of employment overseas on a cargo ship, and had been on a waiting list for a job. If he had accepted that job, his salary would have amounted to USD 2,500 per month. Consequently, he asked to be compensated the three years\u2019 salary he would have earned but for the accident (USD 82,500)[1]. Further, he asked for reimbursement of various medical expenses, including several operations and consultations in Rostov and Moscow, and legal costs related to his participation in the proceedings against P. (RUB 1,031,120). He also claimed reimbursement of his expenses related to a special diet he had to follow, and the personal assistance he had required during his periods of complete disability. Lastly, the applicant claimed that he still needed further surgery, which could only be done at a clinic in Germany because he had developed several brain cysts as a result of the previous operations (EUR 200,000). Lastly, he claimed compensation for his expenses for having to retrain in another field, which would enable him to work again (RUB 970,000). 71.  As to non-pecuniary damages, the applicant claimed RUB 4,320,000 under this head, referring mostly to the same facts and the suffering caused by the accident, the subsequent surgery, his participation in the proceedings, and lost opportunities related to his disability. 72.  The representative of the State claimed that the State could not be held responsible for the accident. In their words, liability would arise when two conditions were met: if the damage was caused in the course of realisation of the State\u2019s public functions, and if the State\u2019s acts were unlawful. Where damage was caused in the context of an economic activity, it should be compensated in the ordinary way, by the immediate wrongdoer. P. had injured the applicant while driving his own car, and had not been on duty at the time. He had therefore had to be the defendant in the civil proceedings, not the State. 73.  On an unspecified date the court obtained (through the applicant or otherwise) a letter from an employment assistance agency, Panigo, dated 28 March 2003. It said that the agency had an opening for the applicant on an overseas voyage on a six-month contract basis, with a salary of USD 2,500. A letter from another shipping company, Valmars Ltd, which had the applicant\u2019s name on a waiting list for an offer of employment at the time of the accident, said that he could have earned USD 550 working as an operator mechanic on a ship in 2003. It also indicated that on overseas voyages on foreign ships, the pay of operator mechanics varied between USD 700 and 2,300. 74.  On 5 June 2006 the Verkhnedonskoy District Court gave judgment in the civil case. The court\u2019s findings of fact were almost identical to the findings of the criminal court. It concluded that P. had been fully responsible for the injuries caused to the applicant. As to the amount of pecuniary damages, the court noted that the applicant had only been on a waiting list for future employment and had not received an actual job offer. At the time of the accident he had been unemployed. Moreover, it could be seen from the material in the case file that he could not have obtained a job as a naval operator mechanic on overseas voyages in 2002 owing to a lack of previous work experience and his poor English. Furthermore, the applicant had a chronic kidney problem, which would have prevented him from going overseas. As a result, the court calculated the applicant\u2019s loss of earnings as five times the minimum wage and took into consideration the \u201cminimum subsistence level\u201d which existed at the relevant time in the area where the applicant lived. The resulting amount for loss of earnings for the period under consideration was RUB 117,645 (approximately EUR 3,415). The court also ordered that the defendant pay him RUB 2,690 (approximately EUR 80) every month until the next expert examination of his health. The court also partially satisfied the applicant\u2019s claims concerning the reimbursement of his medical expenses (RUB 5,321) and his and his father\u2019s travel expenses connected to consultations in Moscow clinics (RUB 4,070) and the cost of those consultations (RUB 23,265). The part of the applicant\u2019s claim related to his special diet, treatments, legal and postal expenses and so forth were dismissed by the court as unnecessary, unsubstantiated, or not actually incurred. In particular, the court held that further treatment in Germany had not been proven necessary by the plaintiff. 75.  The court ordered P. to pay non-pecuniary damages, dismissing the claims against the State. The court fixed the amount of compensation referring to, inter alia, the defendant\u2019s financial situation, at RUB 50,000 (approximately EUR 1,460). The overall amount to be recovered from P. was RUB 200,301 (approximately EUR 5,850). The court dismissed the claims of the applicant\u2019s relatives as unsubstantiated. 76.  The applicant lodged an appeal, but it appears to have been dismissed by the Rostov Regional Court on 12[2] July 2006. 77.  The amount of compensation awarded by the Verkhnedonskoy District Court was paid in full by 2008. 78.  According to the applicant, during the trial P. made repeated death threats towards him and other members of his family. As a result of that stressful situation, the health of some his relatives worsened and they have since died. The applicant asked the prosecutor to initiate criminal proceedings against P. in respect of the death threats but his request was refused for lack of evidence. The applicant tried to challenge the refusals in the courts but to no avail. 79.  The applicant also sought to initiate a criminal investigation into the alleged falsification of the results of the blood tests by M. However, the prosecutor decided not to open a case, a decision which was upheld by the courts. 80.  The applicant tried to initiate a criminal investigation into the actions of the surgeon Dr Zh., but the investigator did not find any grounds on which to prosecute him.", "references": ["6", "2", "9", "4", "8", "1", "7", "5", "3", "No Label", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1955 and live in Pore\u010d. 6.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7.  On 5 February 2009 the applicants and their company, M.N., entered into an agreement with M.G. and his company, E. By virtue of that agreement the applicants acknowledged their debt of 580,000 Croatian kunas (HRK) to M.G. and their company\u2019s debt of HRK 180,000 to company E. In order to secure the overall loan, the applicants used their house as collateral, allowing M.G. to register a charge on it. It was stipulated that unless the applicants and their company paid their outstanding debts by 1 May 2009, the creditors were entitled to institute enforcement proceedings for payment of the debt through the sale of the applicants\u2019 house. 8.  On 20 October 2009 M.G. and his company E. instituted enforcement proceedings against the applicants before the Pore\u010d Municipal Court (Op\u0107inski sud u Pore\u010du), seeking the judicial sale of the house. They argued that the applicants had failed to pay their debt to M.G., while the company M.N. had managed to pay only part of its debt to the company E. The applicants\u2019 outstanding debt amounted to HRK 703,643.05. 9.  On 17 November 2009 the Pore\u010d Municipal Court granted that request and issued an enforcement order against the applicants. The applicants did not appeal and the enforcement order became final on 17 December 2009. 10.  On 11 December 2009 the Pore\u010d Municipal Court registered the enforcement order on the applicants\u2019 house in the land register. 11.  A hearing to assess the value of the property was held before the Pore\u010d Municipal Court on 4 May 2010. Both applicants were properly summoned, but only the first applicant appeared. He undertook to submit an expert valuation of the house within two days. The creditor asked the Municipal Court to commission an expert for that purpose. The first applicant did not comply with his undertaking. 12.  On 16 June 2010 the valuation of the house was carried out on site by a civil engineer and a surveyor, in the presence of the first applicant. 13.  The civil engineer submitted his report on 20 August 2010, stating that the value of the house was HRK 2,463,092.48 (approximately 323,860 euros). The applicants made no objections to the valuation. 14.  On 7 October 2010 another set of enforcement proceedings against the applicants was joined to the proceedings at issue. In the former proceedings an enforcement order had been issued against the applicants at the request of the Pore\u010d Municipality on 12 May 2010, in respect of a claim of HRK 24,352.94 (approximately 3,200 euros). Since the applicants had not lodged an appeal, the enforcement order had become final on 12 June 2010. 15.  On 25 October 2010 the Municipal Court set the value of the applicants\u2019 house at HRK 2,463,092.48. 16.  On 25 January 2011 a first public auction was held. However, there were no interested buyers. The applicants, though properly summoned, did not appear. 17.  A further set of enforcement proceedings against the applicants was joined to the proceedings at issue on 13 May 2011. In those proceedings, an enforcement order had been issued against the applicants at the request of Bank P. on 24 January 2011, in respect of an unpaid loan of 14 February 2006 in the amount of 159,688.87 Swiss Francs. Since the applicants had not lodged an appeal, the enforcement order had become final on 31 March 2011. 18.  A second public auction for the sale of the applicants\u2019 house was postponed several times at the request of the creditors. 19.  The second public auction was eventually held on 30 March 2012 and the applicants\u2019 house was sold to M.G. for HRK 821,040 (approximately 109,000 euros). The applicants, though properly summoned, did not appear. 20.  On 2 April 2012 the Pore\u010d Municipal Court granted M.G. title to the applicants\u2019 house, on condition that he paid HRK 821,040 as the purchase price. 21.  On 23 April 2012 the applicants lodged an appeal against that decision, arguing that the judicial sale had been disproportionate since the true value of their house had been about 700,000 euros (EUR). They also argued that the Municipal Court had failed to comply with the provisions of the Enforcement Act, which stated that courts should respect the dignity of debtors subject to enforcement and should make the enforcement process as humane as possible. 22.  On 8 May 2012 the applicants submitted a statement that the value of their house was EUR 640,000. 23.  On 28 December 2012 the Pula County Court (\u017dupanijski sud u Puli) dismissed the applicants\u2019 appeal. It found that the applicants\u2019 house had been sold at a second public auction for more than one-third of its value, that the first public auction had been unsuccessful, and that M.G. had been the only bidder. Furthermore, the value of the house had been set by the Pore\u010d Municipal Court on 25 October 2010 and the applicants had not objected to it. In the County Court\u2019s view, the sale of the applicants\u2019 house was in accordance with the Enforcement Act. 24.  On 31 January 2013 the Pore\u010d Municipal Court entered M.G.\u2019s title to the applicants\u2019 house in the land register. 25.  On 20 February 2013 the applicants lodged an appeal on points of law against the decision of the Pula County Court, relying on section 382(2) of the Civil Procedure Act. They argued that the actual value of their house was around EUR 700,000, and that their house should have been exempted from enforcement as it was \u201cmeeting their basic human needs\u201d. 26.  On the same day, the applicants applied to the Pore\u010d Municipal Court for a stay of enforcement. 27.  On 22 February 2013 the Pore\u010d Municipal Court declared the applicants\u2019 appeal on points of law inadmissible on the grounds that such an appeal was allowed in enforcement proceedings only if based on section 382(2) of the Civil Procedure Act, which was not the case. The applicants lodged an appeal. 28.  On the same day the Pore\u010d Municipal Court declared the applicants\u2019 request for a stay of enforcement inadmissible, finding that they had failed to meet the statutory conditions for such a request. The applicants lodged an appeal. 29.  On 8 March 2013 the Croatian Electricity Company (Hrvatska Elektroprivreda, hereinafter \u201cHEP\u201d) cut off the applicants\u2019 electricity at M.G.\u2019s request. The applicants immediately applied to the Pore\u010d Municipal Court for an interim measure prohibiting M.G. from having the electricity and water cut off and from making alterations to the house, ordering HEP to reconnect the electricity, and authorising them to keep the house until the enforcement proceedings were complete. On the same day the Pore\u010d Municipal Court issued the interim measure, prohibited M.G. from having the electricity and water cut off and ordered HEP to reconnect the electricity. That decision was quashed by the Pula County Court on 21 May 2013 and the applicants\u2019 request for an interim measure was denied. 30.  On 19 June 2013 the Municipal Court decided to transfer ownership of the house at issue to M.G. The applicants lodged an appeal, which was declared inadmissible by the Municipal Court on 10 July 2013. 31.  On 26 July 2013 the Pore\u010d Municipal Court held a hearing on the division of the proceeds (dioba kupovnine) from the sale of the house. The applicants, though properly summoned, did not appear. 32.  On 17 September 2013 the Pore\u010d Municipal Court ordered the eviction of the applicants. The applicants lodged an appeal, arguing that enforcement should not have been carried out by the sale of their house, which served to \u201csatisfy their basic needs\u201d: they lived there with their family and it also served as their business premises. 33.  On 21 October 2013 the Municipal Court scheduled the eviction of the applicants for 13 December 2013, ordering the court bailiff to carry out the eviction. However, the eviction was postponed for three months. 34.  On 19 November 2013 the applicants applied for an interim measure prohibiting the sale of their house and their eviction. 35.  On 20 December 2013 the Pore\u010d Municipal Court decided to conclude the enforcement proceedings for the payment of monetary debts. 36.  On 20 January 2014 the Pula County Court dismissed the applicants\u2019 appeal against the decision of 17 September 2013 (see paragraph 32 above), finding that the Municipal Court had acted in accordance with the law, namely the provisions of the Enforcement Act. The enforcement proceedings were about to be concluded since the sale of the applicants\u2019 house had been completed. 37.  On 23 January 2014 the Pula County Court accepted the applicants\u2019 appeal against the decision of 22 February 2013 (see paragraph 27 above) and remitted the applicants\u2019 appeal on points of law to the Municipal Court. 38.  On the same day the Pula County Court, in a different decision, dismissed the applicants\u2019 appeal against the decision of 22 February 2013 by which their request for a stay of the enforcement proceedings had been dismissed (see paragraph 28 above). 39.  On 12 March 2014 the applicants withdrew their appeal on points of law referred to in paragraphs 25 and 37 above. 40.  On 13 March and 28 April 2014 M.G. sought the applicants\u2019 eviction. 41.  The applicants have not yet been evicted.", "references": ["0", "8", "6", "1", "2", "9", "4", "3", "7", "5", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant organisation, SIA AKKA/LAA (SIA \u201cAutorties\u012bbu un komunic\u0113\u0161an\u0101s konsult\u0101ciju a\u0123ent\u016bra/Latvijas Autoru apvien\u012bba\u201d \u2013Copyright and Communication Consulting Agency ltd./Latvian Authors Association) is a non-profit organisation founded in Riga by a separate non\u2011profit organisation, the Latvian Authors Association, whose members are various Latvian artists. 6.  At the end of the 1990s the applicant organisation, acting as a representative of approximately 2000 domestic and two million international authors who had entrusted the applicant organisation to manage the copyright of their musical works, was concluding licence agreements with several broadcasters in Latvia. From 1998 to 1999, after the expiry of the previous licence agreements, the applicant organisation and certain broadcasting organisations in Latvia could not reach an agreement on the terms of the future licence agreements, especially with regard to the remuneration to be paid for the broadcasting of music. As a result some broadcasting organisations continued to use the protected musical works without a written agreement, either without paying any remuneration or paying the amount the broadcasting organisations unilaterally considered equitable. In 2002 the applicant organisation instituted civil proceedings against several broadcasters operating in Latvia. 7.  In July 2002 the applicant organisation lodged a claim against a private radio station, Radio SWH, and requested that the Riga Regional Court, acting as a first-instance court, recognise that by broadcasting protected musical works without a valid licence agreement between 1 January 1999 and 31 December 2001, the defendant had violated economic interests of the authors represented by the applicant organisation. The applicant organisation further asked that the court award compensation for unauthorised use of musical works. By relying on the authors\u2019 exclusive rights to control the use of their musical works, the applicant organisation asked the court to apply an injunction precluding the defendant from using the authors\u2019 works before a valid licence agreement between the parties had come into effect. 8.  The defendant lodged a counterclaim arguing that the applicant organisation had abused its dominant position and had fixed an unreasonably high royalty rate, which was six times the rate which had been applicable for the period from 1995 to 1998. They asked the court to order the applicant organisation to conclude a licence agreement with the defendant organisation and to lay down an equitable royalty rate. 9.  During the first-instance court\u2019s hearing, the applicant organisation admitted that the parties had a dispute over the royalty rate in the draft licence agreement negotiated by the parties, but that the court was precluded under section 41 of the Copyright Law from setting the rate as long as there was no licence agreement concluded between the parties (see paragraph 26 below). 10.  On 16 January 2003 the first-instance court partly upheld the claim and fully upheld the counterclaim. It established that between 1 January 1999 and 31 December 2001 the defendant had infringed the authors\u2019 rights by broadcasting the protected works without authorisation, contrary to the provisions of the Copyright Law. The first-instance court ordered the defendant to pay to the applicant organisation compensation for the above period in the amount of 78,000 Latvian lats (LVL, equivalent to 111,500 euros (EUR)), which was 1.5% of the defendant\u2019s net turnover over this period. 11.  Furthermore, the first-instance court ordered the applicant organisation to conclude a licence agreement with the defendant for the next three-year period with a royalty rate set at 2% of the defendant\u2019s monthly net turnover (ikm\u0113ne\u0161a neto apgroz\u012bjums). 12.  Lastly, by relying on the preamble of the WIPO Copyright Treaty and Articles 11 and 11bis of the Berne Convention (see paragraph 37 below), the first-instance court dismissed the applicant organisation\u2019s application to have an injunction granted to prohibit the defendant from broadcasting works of the rightsholders represented by the applicant organisation. By referring to the testimonies of two authors represented by the applicant organisation, the first-instance court concluded that the authors themselves were interested in their musical works being publicly broadcasted. An interdiction on broadcasting of the musical works would infringe the authors\u2019 exclusive rights to have their work reproduced, as well as it would negatively affect the interests of the society to listen to music. 13.  On 23 October 2003 the Civil Cases Chamber of the Supreme Court, acting as an appellate court, upheld the part of the first-instance judgment concerning the compensation for copyright infringement and the injunction. 14.  On the issue of ordering the conclusion of a licence agreement, the appellate court observed that both parties had expressed their intention to enter into a such an agreement, as attested by a draft licence agreement of 7 October 2003 in which the parties had agreed on certain terms and conditions such as the duration of the licence and the income from which royalties should be calculated. The appellate court noted that it was partly due to the applicant organisation\u2019s inconsistent negotiating that a licence agreement could not be concluded. The appellate court accordingly recognised that the licence agreement was to be considered concluded in the wording as agreed by the parties on 7 October 2003. On the question of remuneration, the appellate court established that in the negotiation process the applicant organisation had changed the royalty rate from 6% to 4% and then to 3.5%, whereas the defendant had insisted on 1.6% of the income from which royalties should be calculated. The appellate court took note of the characteristics of the defendant\u2019s activities and concluded that an equitable remuneration would be 2% of the income from which, as agreed by the parties, the royalties should be calculated. 15.  On 11 February 2004, following an appeal on points of law, the Senate of the Supreme Court upheld the appellate court\u2019s findings that after the expiry of the earlier licence agreement on 31 December 1998 the de facto contractual relationship between the parties had continued mainly owing to the fact that the applicant organisation had failed to reach an agreement with the defendant on the terms of the licence agreement. The Senate of the Supreme Court further observed that the parties did not contest that the authors had a right to receive equitable remuneration, but that to that day the parties had not reached an agreement on the rate of the royalty payments. Given that there was no other authority responsible to decide on this matter, the Senate of the Supreme Court concluded that pursuant to Article 11bis of the Berne Convention and section 5 of the Civil Law, it was within the court\u2019s competence to set the royalty rate. The Senate of the Supreme Court also dismissed the allegations that the appellate court\u2019s judgment had infringed the intellectual property rights protected under the Constitution of the Republic of Latvia. 16.  In their claim against Latvijas Radio, a state-owned limited liability company, the applicant organisation asked the Riga Regional Court, acting as a first-instance court, to find that by broadcasting the rightsholders\u2019 musical works without a valid licence agreement between 1 January 2000 and 31 December 2001, the defendant had violated economic interests of the authors represented by the applicant organisation. The applicant organisation further asked that the court award compensation for unauthorised use of musical works. By relying on the authors\u2019 exclusive rights to control the use of their musical works, the applicant organisation asked the court to apply an injunction precluding the defendant from using the authors\u2019 works before a valid licence agreement between the parties had come into effect. 17.   By lodging a counterclaim the defendant in essence asked the court to recognise that in the disputed period the parties had a de facto contractual relationship. 18.  On 2 April 2003 the Riga Regional Court dismissed the applicant organisation\u2019s claim and upheld the counterclaim. The court established that even though the licence agreement concluded between the parties with the royalty rate set at 3.2% of the defendant\u2019s annual income had expired in 1999, the applicant organisation had continued receiving royalty payments from the defendant, which continued to pay at a lower rate. Given that the applicant organisation had not referred to objections to the broadcasting of the musical works, the existence of a de facto contractual relationship between the parties had been proven. Relying on section 41 of the Copyright Law the court set the royalty rate from 2000 to 2001 at 1.57% of the defendant\u2019s annual income. 19.  On 26 November 2003 the Civil Cases Chamber of the Supreme Court, acting as an appellate court, diverted from the first-instance court\u2019s findings and recognised that the defendant had infringed copyright by broadcasting the musical works over a prolonged period of time without a valid written licence agreement. It awarded the applicant organisation compensation in the amount of LVL 100,000 (EUR 143,000), which exceeded the amount the defendant had paid under the expired licence agreement. It considered that it would be fruitless to issue an injunction prohibiting the defendant from broadcasting the works. The appellate court observed that in principle the parties had expressed their interest in concluding a licence agreement but that before and during the court proceedings the parties had not agreed on the equitable royalty rate. It also pointed to the applicant organisation\u2019s responsibility in failing to reach an agreement in the negotiation of a new licence. As a result, over a prolonged period of time the authors\u2019 rights had been unprotected. As the parties had not asked the court to decide on the exact terms and conditions of a licence agreement, the appellate court decided to impose on the parties a general obligation to conclude a licence agreement by 1 March 2004. Given that the parties had been unable to agree on a royalty rate, the appellate court set the rate at 3% of the defendant\u2019s net turnover. In reaching this conclusion the appellate court took into consideration such elements as, inter alia, the royalty rate set in other court proceedings and the existing practice in certain other EU member States. 20.  The applicant organisation appealed on points of law arguing that by, inter alia, ordering the parties to conclude a licence agreement and setting its terms, the court had overstepped its powers and acted in breach of section 11bis of the Berne Convention and section 15 of the Copyright Law. 21.  On 17 March 2004 the Senate partly upheld the lower court\u2019s judgment with similar reasoning as in the first set of proceedings.", "references": ["7", "4", "9", "6", "3", "0", "8", "2", "1", "5", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Sofia. 6.  On 29 March 2006 the Kazanlak District Court convicted the applicant of wilfully using a forged document and falsely accusing another person of criminal conduct, and sentenced him to two years\u2019 imprisonment. The court ordered that the applicant be detained pending any appeal against his conviction and sentence. 7.  After his detention, the applicant appealed against his conviction and sentence to the Stara Zagora Regional Court. In his appeal, he included the following statement:\n\u201cThe [judge-rapporteur] is a pupil of mine and is seeking revenge, using his functional immunity. Everything is being decided on the basis of power and connections, not on the basis of laws.\u201d 8.  The judge\u2011rapporteur at the Kazanlak District Court became aware of that statement when processing the appeal, which, in accordance with the applicable rules of procedure, had been filed with that court with a view to being sent to the higher court for examination. 9.  In the course of the appeal hearing before the Stara Zagora Regional Court the applicant said, inter alia, the following:\n\u201cThe [judgment against me] was given by a judge who is a former pupil of mine. When I asked him which subject I had taught him, the reply was that it had been \u2018electrical materials\u2019 and that I had given him an average grade ... I believe that there exist grounds for the recusal of the judge-rapporteur ... I have personal relations with [him]. My request was however turned down and my fate was left in the hands of the court.\u201d 10.  On 16 May 2007 the Stara Zagora Regional Court quashed the lower court\u2019s judgment and remitted the case for re-examination, citing a number of breaches of the rules of procedure. In particular, it found that the lower court had not given reasons why it had accepted that the applicant had committed the offences and had in effect reversed the burden of proof, placing it on the applicant. Concerning the grounds for recusal of the judge\u2011rapporteur, the court noted as follows:\n\u201cIn relation to the arguments that there existed grounds for the [judge\u2011rapporteur] to recuse himself, it is well-established case-law that the refusal of the court to accede to a recusal request is reviewable on appeal. In this case, the request was based on personal relations between the [applicant] and the [judge-rapporteur] that pre-dated the opening of the criminal proceedings against the [applicant].\nBearing in mind the effective sentence \u2013 which corresponds neither to the gravity of the offence nor to the dangerousness of the offender \u2013, the reasons given for its imposition \u2013 to protect other members of society and the judicial authorities from future civil claims brought by the [applicant] \u2013, and the unwarranted emotionality of the [lower court\u2019s] reasoning, this court finds that the judgment under appeal does not demonstrate the requisite subjective or objective impartiality. The bias displayed by the judge\u2011rapporteur constituted grounds for him to recuse himself.\u201d 11.  On 4 June 2007 the judge-rapporteur in the criminal case against the applicant brought a private criminal prosecution against him in relation to the written and the oral statements made by the applicant in the appeal proceedings (see paragraphs 7 and 9 above). He submitted that those statements were untrue and defamatory: the first amounted to an allegation that he was vindictive and was using his office to settle personal scores, and the second amounted to an allegation that he had deliberately failed to comply with the rules on recusal, which was not true. He did not have any personal bias against the applicant, and had never been asked to recuse himself from the case. 12.  In a judgment of 14 December 2007, the Stara Zagora District Court convicted the applicant of defaming a public official, contrary to Articles 147 and 148 \u00a7\u00a7 1 (3) and 2 of the Criminal Code (see paragraphs 20 and 21 below), in relation to both statements. It sentenced him to a fine of 5,000 Bulgarian levs (BGN) (2,556 euros (EUR)) and a public reprimand, and ordered him to pay BGN 150 (EUR 77) in court costs. Without seeking to verify whether the applicant\u2019s allegations could be borne out, it held that he had wilfully defamed the judge by making disparaging allegations in respect of him. The court did not accept the applicant\u2019s argument that he had not acted with intent. It noted that he had repeated the allegations twice and that, as evident from a psychiatric expert report obtained in the course of the defamation proceedings, he had been fully aware of the meaning of the statements and capable of controlling himself in spite of his emotional state. The form of mens rea had been oblique intent (recklessness): the applicant had been aware that his allegations might not be true but had nonetheless chosen to make them. Taking into account that the applicant had no previous convictions, that he had expressed regret for making the statements, and that no pecuniary damage had ensued from them, the court opted for the minimum sentence: a fine of BGN 5,000 and public reprimand. 13.  The applicant appealed to the Stara Zagora Regional Court. In his brief, he submitted that his first statement had been read out of context; that the lower court had not taken due account of his perturbed emotional state, resulting from his having to spend time in custody pursuant to an unlawful conviction and sentence; that his statements had only been addressed to the appellate court and not intended for publication; and that he had not acted wilfully or recklessly. In an additional brief, the applicant\u2019s counsel submitted, inter alia, that the lower court had failed to explain why it had found that the applicant\u2019s statements had been \u201cdisseminated\u201d, given that the appellate judges to whom they had been addressed had been under the duty not to disclose professional secrets and that no third parties had access to the file containing the statements. Nor had the lower court given reasons as to why it had found the statements disparaging. Moreover, the statements were truthful \u2013 the judge had been a pupil of the applicant, and his bias against the applicant had been acknowledged in the appellate judgment. The applicant had not acted recklessly. He had made the statements while conducting his defence in a criminal case against him, and it was wrong to read them out of context. Lastly, his sentence, although set at the statutory minimum, was still unduly harsh. 14.  In a final judgment of 17 March 2008, the Stara Zagora Regional Court upheld the applicant\u2019s conviction in relation to the first statement (see paragraph 7 above), but acquitted him with respect to the second statement (see paragraph 9 above), and accordingly reduced the fine to BGN 2,500 (EUR 1,278). It held that the applicant had \u201cdisseminated\u201d the first statement by including it in his appeal. The fact that he had been in a fragile emotional state when doing so was irrelevant. As evident from the psychiatric expert report obtained in the course of the defamation proceedings, he had been able to understand the nature of his actions, appreciate their consequences, and control them. Without attempting to verify whether the first statement had a factual basis, the court found that it had amounted to an allegation that the judge was vindictive and had used his office to seek revenge, had been disparaging for the judge in his professional capacity, and had impinged on his office. By contrast, the court went on to hold that the second statement was not disparaging and did not amount to the imputation of an offence. There was nothing discrediting in the fact that the judge had been a pupil of the applicant, and the applicant\u2019s view that the judge should have therefore recused himself was a personal opinion, which could not give rise to criminal liability because it could not be proved. In view of the court\u2019s ruling in relation to the second statement, it was necessary to reduce the applicant\u2019s sentence. Bearing in mind the applicant\u2019s clean criminal record and the fact that he was experiencing financial difficulties because he was unemployed, the court found that it had to opt for a sentence below the statutory minimum and reduce the applicant\u2019s fine to BGN 2,500.", "references": ["5", "7", "4", "1", "8", "3", "2", "0", "9", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Jonava. 6.  On 23 April 2008, around 2.45 a.m., two officers of the Jonava Police Department, V.B. and J.D., received an alert that there had been a break-in and robbery in a jewellery store. They called a dog handler, N.B., from the Kaunas Police Department who, with the help of a police dog, followed traces from the store to a garage complex on a nearby street and informed V.B. and J.D., who then went to the garage complex. 7.  The applicant worked as a guard in that garage complex and on the night of 23 April 2008 he was on duty. It appears that no other employees were present in the garage complex at that time. 8.  The officers V.B. and J.D. arrested the applicant and took him to Jonava police station. According to the official police record, the applicant was placed in detention at 4.55 a.m. on 23 April 2008 and released at 7.40 a.m. the same day. 9.  Subsequently the applicant and the police officers presented different accounts of the circumstances surrounding the applicant\u2019s arrest. 10.  On 23 April 2008 the officer V.B. submitted the following report to his superior:\n\u201cOn 23 April 2008 I was on duty in Jonava together with officer J.D. At 4.25 a.m. we arrived at the entrance to the garage complex ... where an officer of the Kaunas Police Department, N.B., was waiting for us. He said that a police dog had followed traces to [a car] ... the car was identified as belonging to [the applicant]. We called the guard of the garage and asked him whose car it was, and he said that the car was his. When he was asked to state his name, surname and place of residence, the guard refused and began shouting and jostling (prad\u0117jo r\u0117kti ir stumdytis). He said that he did not have to tell us anything about himself. We explained that a crime had been committed and that he was under an obligation to comply with our lawful orders. The guard refused to comply and kept shouting and jostling. A restrictive measure \u2011 handcuffs \u2013 was used against him. After the man was taken to the Jonava police station, it was identified that he was [the applicant].\u201d\nThe officer J.D. submitted an identically worded report the same day. 11.  That same day the applicant submitted the following statement to the Jonava District Prosecutor (hereinafter \u201cthe prosecutor\u201d):\n\u201cOn the night of 22-23 April 2008 I was on duty at the garage complex ... Around 4.30 a.m. three police officers came onto the premises. One of them asked me why I had driven drunk and fled. I explained that I was at my workplace, that I had not been drinking and had not gone anywhere (I had arrived at work at 9 p.m.). They checked the car and again began accusing me of being drunk and driving drunk. I told them that I was not drunk and that I had a medium-level disability (antros grup\u0117s ne\u012fgalumas). Then they dragged me into the administrative area, handcuffed me, pushed me to the floor and held me down, and twisted my arms behind my back (lau\u017e\u0117 rankas), it hurt a lot (my hands were handcuffed behind my back); one of them kicked me in the stomach four or five times, and they kept telling me to confess. Since I kept denying it, they took me to the police station and gave me an alcohol test, which gave a reading of zero ...\u201d 12.  That same day the applicant was examined by a doctor at a local hospital. The doctor found that the applicant\u2019s entire abdominal area was sensitive when touched, although there were no external signs of contusion, and that there was limited and painful movement in the applicant\u2019s shoulder joints. The final diagnosis read: \u201ca contusion of the abdomen and a sprain of the shoulder joints\u201d (pilvo sumu\u0161imas, pe\u010di\u0173 s\u0105nari\u0173 rai\u0161\u010di\u0173 patempimas). 13.  On 23 April 2008 the prosecutor opened a pre-trial investigation concerning the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment by the police officers. The prosecutor requested an additional medical examination of the applicant in order to determine whether there were any injuries on his body, and if so their nature, gravity and possible causes. 14.  On 24 April 2008 the applicant was examined by a court medical expert. The report on the results of that examination, issued in June 2008, found a contusion on the applicant\u2019s abdomen and indicated that it could have been caused by one blow from a hard blunt object (vienu trauminiu poveikiu). It also detected bruised skin on the applicant\u2019s left wrist and a sprain of his shoulder joints, noting that they could have resulted from the circumstances described by the applicant, namely from being handcuffed and having his arms twisted behind his back, thus two separate traumas (dviem trauminiais poveikiais). The report concluded that the applicant\u2019s injuries constituted negligible health impairment (ne\u017eymus sveikatos sutrikdymas). It also indicated that the applicant\u2019s injuries were unlikely to have been caused by deliberate self-harming actions (neb\u016bdingi ty\u010diniam sav\u0119s \u017ealojimui) and that they could have resulted from fighting or self\u2011defence. 15.  On 30 April 2008 police officer V.B. was questioned as a witness in the investigation. The written record of his interview was almost identical to his initial report (see paragraph 10 above), and added:\n\u201c[The applicant] approached us and said that the car was his. After we asked him to state his name, surname and place of residence, he refused and began shouting and jostling ... After a while [the applicant] said that his documents were in the car and he went to the guard booth to get the car keys. After taking the keys, he turned to me and tried to punch me in the face. At that moment I was standing near the door. The punch missed because I managed to step back. Since he was resisting, I took him by one arm, the officer J.D. took him by the other, and we both handcuffed him. Physical force was used only when putting the handcuffs on him, other forcible actions were not used against him. We called the senior investigating officer L.B. to the scene of the event. He examined [the applicant\u2019s car] and did not find any suspicious objects ...\u201d 16.  On 2 June 2008 police officer J.D. was questioned as a witness in the investigation; the written record of his interview was almost identical to that of V.B. (see paragraph 15 above). 17.  On 17 July 2008 the police dog handler N.B. was questioned as a witness. He stated:\n\u201cOn the night of 23 April 2008 ... I went to the jewellery shop in Jonava ... A police dog followed traces to [the garage complex] and lost them by the car ... The car was examined by officers of the Jonava Police Department. It was identified as belonging to [the applicant] who, it emerged later, was a security guard at the garage complex ... He refused to give any statements and refused to go to the police station, so the officers asked him to identify himself, which he also refused to do, and therefore the officers tried to take him into custody and put him into the police car ... [The applicant] resisted the officers, punched one of them in the face, pushed and jostled them to try to avoid being apprehended, used various Russian swear words ... and threatened the officers ... He mentioned that he had friends in high-level positions. The police officers used combat wrestling methods (kovini\u0173 imtyni\u0173 veiksmus) and [the applicant] was apprehended, handcuffed and taken to the Jonava police station to clarify the circumstances of the incident.\u201d 18.  On 30 July 2008 the applicant was granted victim status in the investigation and questioned. He stated:\n\u201cOn the night of 22-23 April 2008 ... [soon after 4 a.m.] two police officers entered the premises; they were wearing uniforms; one of them was taller than the other. They asked me if I was the guard. I told them I was. Then they told me to go outside ... The officers pointed to my car and asked me whose it was. I told them it was mine. Then both the officers came closer to me, one from the right and the other from the left, and without saying anything they twisted my arms behind my back (u\u017elau\u017e\u0117 rankas) ... Then they asked me why I had tried to escape from them and had not obeyed their order to stop. I told them that I had been at my workplace, that I had not gone anywhere and had not tried to escape from anyone. Then the officers started pulling my twisted arms upwards (u\u017elau\u017etas rankas k\u0117l\u0117 \u012f vir\u0161\u0173) and telling me to confess that I had fled. My arms were hurting ... I told the officers that I could go to the administrative area and get my car keys, so that they could check if my car\u2019s engine was hot. The officers stopped twisting my arms, but did not release them and led me inside the premises. The car keys were on the table and the officers picked them up, I told them that my documents were in the car and they could check them ... When we were leaving the premises, I felt the officers handcuff me behind my back. Once I was handcuffed, the shorter officer walked in front of me and the taller officer behind me; and he was pulling up my handcuffed arms. I crouched down because of that and the shorter officer kneed me in the stomach about four times. I started feeling weak and dizzy. I kept asking the officers to release me and to stop torturing me. Then the shorter officer said that they would take me to the police station ... I told them that my documents were in the car, that my identity was known to them, and that I could not leave my workplace. Then the taller officer, who was behind me, took me outside while repeatedly twisting and pulling up my arms ... In about five minutes another officer in a uniform arrived, took my car keys, and tried to open the boot of my car ... The officers examined my car ... Then the shorter and the taller officers put me into their car, still twisting my arms. At the police station I was searched and given an alcohol test ...\n[W]hen the officers arrived at my workplace they did not identify themselves; I knew they were police officers only from their uniforms. They did not tell me why they were there, and did not ask me to identify myself; they only asked me if I worked there and if I was the guard. Before being handcuffed I did not jostle. I did not intend to punch the officers ...\u201d 19.  On 5 September 2008 the prosecutor arranged a confrontation between the applicant and police officer J.D. They both essentially reiterated their previous statements (see paragraphs 10, 11, 16 and 18 above). In addition, J.D. stated that the applicant had sworn at the officers when he had been asked to identify himself. J.D. also stated that after the applicant had gone to the guard booth to get his car keys he had attempted to lock himself inside the booth, but the officers had prevented the door from closing and had entered the booth as well. In the booth V.B. had been standing on the applicant\u2019s right side and J.D. on his left. The door was on J.D.\u2019s other side. After taking the car keys, the applicant had attempted to punch V.B. After that J.D. had taken the applicant by one arm and V.B. by the other, and they had cuffed his hands behind his back.\nThe applicant disagreed with J.D.\u2019s statements. He insisted that the officers had not asked him to identify himself, and that he had answered all their questions. The applicant also stated that J.D. and V.B. had been the only officers present at the scene and that there had not been a third officer with a dog. He denied swearing at the officers. J.D. replied that the dog handler, whose name he did not know, had been present during the entire incident, that he had also asked the applicant some questions, and that it was impossible for the applicant not to have noticed him. 20.  On 15 September 2008 senior investigating officer L.B. was questioned as a witness. He stated:\n\u201cI don\u2019t remember the exact date but it could have been 23 April 2008 ... I was called to the garage complex ... When I arrived, there were two police officers, a dog handler with a dog, and another man \u2013 as I later found out, it was [the applicant]. The officers told me that the dog had followed traces to one of the cars, so I examined that car. I don\u2019t remember if [the applicant] was handcuffed at the time when I examined the car, I wasn\u2019t paying attention. I don\u2019t remember if [the applicant] was swearing at or insulting the police officers, I didn\u2019t notice whether he was actively resisting. After examining the car I didn\u2019t find anything suspicious. Then I immediately left, whereas the officers, the dog handler and [the applicant] stayed there ... I can confirm that the handler with the dog was present when I arrived, it was impossible for [the applicant] not to have seen him. When I was examining the car, [the applicant] was nearby, I don\u2019t remember if he was saying or doing anything. The officers were also standing nearby, I don\u2019t remember what exactly they were doing.\u201d 21.  On 30 September 2008 the prosecutor arranged a confrontation between the applicant and the dog handler N.B. The applicant stated that he had never seen N.B. before and that neither N.B. nor any dog had been present at the time of his arrest. Meanwhile N.B. insisted that he had been present:\n\u201cI was at the scene of the incident, I was with a dog, I saw [the applicant\u2019s] arrest and I helped two police officers to twist [the applicant\u2019s] arms (pad\u0117jau u\u017elau\u017eti rankas) ...\nI went to the guard booth with the officers. The applicant opened the door of the booth and stepped outside. We explained to him why we were there \u2013 that a crime had been committed and that the dog had led us to the cars which were parked nearby. We asked the applicant to identify himself and to tell us whose cars were parked there. The applicant refused, began swearing and insulting us, and said that it was none of our business. Then we explained to him that if he didn\u2019t identify himself he would be forcibly taken to the police station. At some point the applicant raised his hand against one of the officers, I don\u2019t remember which one, and I didn\u2019t see if he hit him or not. Then the officers and I took him by the arms; I don\u2019t remember if we twisted them (su\u0117m\u0117me jam u\u017e rank\u0173, ar u\u017elau\u017e\u0117m, neatsimenu). Then my dog ran towards us; it had been fifteen metres away by the fence or the wall of the garage, I don\u2019t remember exactly. I caught the dog and tied it up, possibly to the fence, and then I returned to the officers and the applicant. I helped the officers to hold the applicant\u2019s hands and one of them put on handcuffs. I don\u2019t remember what time we went to the guard booth. Nothing happened inside the booth.\u201d N.B. further specified that \u201cprobably not more than a minute\u201d had passed from the moment the applicant was handcuffed until the moment he was put into the police car. He also stated that he had not seen whether the applicant had been beaten or kicked by the officers. He stated that although the incident had happened during the night, everything was clearly visible. 22.  On 30 September 2008 the prosecutor arranged a confrontation between the applicant and police officer V.B. The applicant stated that V.B. and J.D. had twisted his arms outside, next to the guard booth, that they had handcuffed him inside the booth, and that J.D. had then forcibly pulled up his arms, while V.B. had kneed him in the stomach three or four times. V.B. disagreed with the applicant\u2019s statements and denied kneeing him. He stated:\n\u201cWhen we arrived at the garage complex, the dog handler told us that the dog had followed the traces of the possible criminal to the car. Then I identified whose car it was. Afterwards the applicant came towards me: I didn\u2019t see how he got there because at that time I was talking on the portable radio ... After being told that a crime had been committed, the applicant said that he \u201cdidn\u2019t give a damn\u201d and that he \u201cdidn\u2019t have to explain anything\u201d. When we told the applicant that if he refused to identify himself he would be taken to the police station, he started jostling me and J.D. Then I grabbed him by the wrist and bent it back, and once again told him to identify himself. When a wrist is bent, it doesn\u2019t hurt if the person himself doesn\u2019t move. Besides, before grabbing the applicant I warned him that if he kept jostling us physical force would be used against him. Then the applicant identified himself to us. Then he said that he would go to the guard booth to get the car keys and documents. He walked to the booth and I, J.D. and the dog handler followed, I don\u2019t remember in which order. In the booth the applicant went to the table and I stood by the door. He picked up the documents and then turned round and punched me in the face. His fist barely touched my mouth but didn\u2019t cut it (jo kum\u0161tis vos paliet\u0117 mano l\u016bp\u0105, jos neprakirto) because I managed to step back. Then I grabbed his arm and twisted it behind his back. J.D. twisted the other arm and the dog handler also helped. Then either I or J.D. handcuffed the applicant. Then I led him outside the booth ... During the arrest the applicant was swearing; he did not insult me personally and I did not pay attention to the swear words he used.\u201d V.B. further specified that when they went into the guard booth, he was standing closest to the applicant inside the booth, near the door, while J.D. and N.B. were standing behind V.B.\u2019s back. 23.  On 4 November 2008 the prosecutor discontinued the pre-trial investigation. The prosecutor held that the applicant had obstructed the police officers in the performance of their duties, had refused to comply with their lawful orders, had jostled and used swear words, had actively resisted the officers, and had attempted to punch V.B. The prosecutor found no grounds to doubt the statements of the officers V.B., J.D. and N.B., because those statements had been \u201cconsistent and logical\u201d; the applicant\u2019s statements could not however be considered reliable, because he had claimed that he had not seen the dog handler N.B. at the scene of the incident, although it had been established that N.B. was there. The prosecutor further held that the injury to the applicant\u2019s abdomen was not sufficient to find that V.B. had kneed him in the stomach, because such an injury could have occurred while the applicant was resisting the officers, as seen from the statements of V.B., J.D. and N.B. In such circumstances, the prosecutor considered that the officers had been justified in using physical force against the applicant, and that they had acted in line with the applicable domestic law. 24.  The applicant appealed against the prosecutor\u2019s decision. He submitted that V.B. had admitted to having bent his wrist back (see paragraph 22 above) but that that detail had been disregarded during the investigation. He also submitted that the results of the medical examination had clearly indicated injuries on his abdomen which could not have been caused by the officers\u2019 lawful actions. The applicant noted that the Police Activity Act allowed the use of physical force in order to prevent crime, arrest individuals who had committed crimes, or in other situations when justified by the public interest (see paragraph 49 below), but not in order to establish a person\u2019s identity. He submitted that he was of advanced age (fifty-eight years old at the time of the incident) and had a medium-level disability, so it was illogical that he could have violently resisted two police officers.\nThe applicant also pointed out several discrepancies between the officers\u2019 statements:\n(a)  V.B. had stated that the applicant had attempted to punch him inside the guard booth (see paragraph 15 above), whereas N.B. had said that nothing had happened inside the booth (see paragraph 21 above).\n(b)  J.D. had stated that he and V.B. had approached the guard booth and the applicant had stepped outside, and that physical force had been used against the applicant only when handcuffing him and only inside the booth (see paragraph 19 above). However, V.B. had stated that he had been examining the applicant\u2019s car when the applicant had approached him, and that the applicant\u2019s arms had been twisted when he was outside in order to make him identify himself (see paragraph 22 above). Meanwhile N.B. had presented yet another version of events: that the applicant had attempted to punch one of the officers outside, then he had been handcuffed, and only then had everybody gone inside the guard booth, where nothing had happened (see paragraph 21 above). Lastly, the senior investigator L.B. had not noticed any active resistance by the applicant (see paragraph 20 above).\n(c)  J.D. had stated that the applicant had attempted to lock himself inside the booth (see paragraph 19 above), but the booth did not have any mechanism which would allow it to be locked from the inside.\nAccordingly, the applicant complained that the pre-trial investigation had not been thorough and had not objectively established the circumstances of his arrest and injury. 25.  On 20 March 2009 a senior prosecutor upheld the applicant\u2019s appeal and reopened the investigation. 26.  In April 2009, at the prosecutor\u2019s request, a court medical expert carried out an additional examination of the applicant\u2019s medical file. The report on the results of that examination confirmed the findings of the previous medical examination (see paragraph 14 above). The report also specified that the bruises on the applicant\u2019s left wrist and the sprain of his shoulder joints could have been caused during a fight (grumtyni\u0173 metu) or by handcuffing or twisting of his arms, and that the contusion on the abdomen could have resulted from a direct blow (suduodant tiesiogin\u012f sm\u016bg\u012f). The report concluded that the applicant\u2019s injuries constituted negligible health impairment, and that even though he had subsequently required medical treatment, this had been caused by his defective heart valve and not by the injuries. 27.  In April 2009 the prosecutor questioned two other witnesses as requested by the applicant \u2013 his acquaintances A. and V. They both stated that they had seen the applicant soon after his arrest and that they had noticed his injuries. 28.  On 16 April 2009, at the applicant\u2019s request, the Jonava District Court changed the prosecutor in charge of the pre-trial investigation. The court upheld the applicant\u2019s arguments that the previous prosecutor, who had decided to discontinue the investigation, could not be seen as impartial, and ordered the Jonava District Prosecutor\u2019s office to appoint a different prosecutor. 29.  In April and May 2009 the new prosecutor inspected the location of the incident. 30.  On 4 May 2009 another witness requested by the applicant, his acquaintance V.V., was questioned. V.V. stated:\n\u201cAround 23 April 2008, I don\u2019t remember the exact date, around 4 a.m. I went to [the applicant\u2019s] workplace ... to ask him to give me a lift home. At that time it was still dark. Then I saw two officers approach [the applicant] from both sides and twist his arms. I heard [the applicant] scream and ask who they were and why they were twisting his arms. After twisting his arms the officers led him to [the guard booth]. I heard [the applicant] screaming inside the booth and asking why they were hitting him. Then I saw the two officers lead him outside handcuffed and with twisted arms. Before [the applicant] was taken inside the booth, his hands had not been handcuffed. I didn\u2019t see whether [the applicant] had been hit, I only heard him ask why they were hitting him. Then I went to [the applicant\u2019s son\u2019s house] to inform him about what had happened but nobody answered the door, so I came back alone [to the garage complex] but I didn\u2019t find anyone there. I didn\u2019t see what happened afterwards. I spoke to [the applicant] a few months later, around January-February 2009, and he mentioned the incident with the officers ...\u201d 31.  On 21 May 2009 the prosecutor arranged a confrontation between the officers V.B. and N.B. They were both asked about the place where the applicant had allegedly attempted to punch V.B., and gave the following responses:\n\u201cV.B.: [The applicant] punched me inside the premises, that is in the guard booth. N.B.: I didn\u2019t see if [the applicant] had attempted to punch the officer in the booth ... When I was outside, I saw jostling between the officers and [the applicant] (\u012fvyko susistumdymas). [The applicant] was jostling the officers, but I can\u2019t say exactly if he punched an officer. It was dark, I could have been mistaken.\u201d 32.  On 1 June 2009 the prosecutor discontinued the pre-trial investigation, relying on essentially the same grounds as the previous prosecutor in his decision (see paragraph 23 above), and a senior prosecutor upheld that decision. However, on 28 August 2009 the Jonava District Court upheld the applicant\u2019s appeal and reopened the investigation. The court held that the investigation had not been thorough because it had not determined whether the use of force by the police officers had been within the limits provided by the Police Activity Act (see paragraph 49 below), and it had not established the circumstances surrounding the injury to the applicant\u2019s abdomen. 33.  In September 2009, at the prosecutor\u2019s request, a court medical expert carried out an additional assessment of the applicant\u2019s medical file. The report on the results of that assessment confirmed the findings of the previous medical reports (see paragraphs 14 and 26 above). In addition, the report specified that the contusion on the applicant\u2019s abdomen could have been caused either by a blow from an object or by bumping into an object (tiek suduodant, tiek atsimu\u0161ant), and that the injuries to the applicant\u2019s left wrist and shoulder joints could have resulted from his offering resistance while being apprehended. The report also concluded that the injuries to the applicant\u2019s wrist, shoulder joints and abdominal area were not likely to have been caused by falling down (neb\u016bdingi su\u017ealojimams, padarytiems nugriuvus). The examination could not determine the exact sequence of the injuries, but noted that they could have all been caused at the same time and that at that time the applicant could have been in various positions. 34.  On 28 October 2009 L.B. was questioned again. He confirmed his earlier statements (see paragraph 20 above), and added that on 23 April 2008 he had arrived at the garage complex alone and that he had not been wearing a police uniform at the time. He also stated that at the time of his arrival the handler with a dog had been present at the scene and that it would have been impossible for the applicant not to see them. 35.  On 12 November 2009 the prosecutor discontinued the pre\u2011trial investigation. The prosecutor held that officers V.B., J.D. and N.B. had given consistent statements about the incident and there were no grounds to doubt them. On the other hand, the prosecutor considered that the applicant\u2019s statements had been inconsistent: during one questioning he had said that the officers had hit him inside the guard booth and during another he had said that they had hit him outside; he had also stated that officer L.B., who had arrived on the scene later, had been wearing a uniform, but L.B. had denied this; lastly, the applicant had claimed that neither N.B. nor a police dog had been present during the incident, but the contrary had been proven by N.B.\u2019s official report and consistent statements of all the officers. The prosecutor also noted that the witness V.V. had not seen the officers hit the applicant. Lastly, the prosecutor held that the injury to the applicant\u2019s abdomen was not sufficient to find that he had been kneed by the officers, because the medical examination had shown that such an injury could have been caused either by being hit with an object or by bumping into an object. Accordingly, the prosecutor concluded that the use of physical force by the police officers had been a lawful and proportionate response to the applicant\u2019s violent resistance, and to his refusal to comply with their lawful orders. 36.  The applicant appealed against the prosecutor\u2019s decision. He submitted that the investigation had still not clarified the contradictions between the officers\u2019 statements (see paragraph 24 above). He further submitted that V.B.\u2019s and J.D.\u2019s first reports had not mentioned that the applicant had been swearing at the officers or had attempted to punch one of them, and that those allegations had been made only much later, well after the incident. The applicant also noted that, contrary to N.B.\u2019s statements (see paragraph 21 above), he could not have tied his dog to a fence because there was no fence at the garage complex, nor was it possible to tie the dog to the brick wall of the garage. 37.  On 2 December 2009 a senior prosecutor dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal, but on 24 December 2009 the Jonava District Court quashed the prosecutor\u2019s decision and reopened the investigation. 38.  On 28 January 2010 witness V.V. was questioned again. He stated:\n\u201c[W]hen I was on my way to the garage complex, fifteen to twenty metres from the guard booth, I saw a police car and stopped by the corner of the garage wall ... Next to [the applicant\u2019s] car there were two officers in police uniforms and [the applicant] ... I heard one of the officers ask [the applicant] to whom the car belonged ... [The applicant] said that the car was his and that he would get the keys so that the officers could examine the car ... I saw [the applicant] turn round to go to the guard booth and then the larger police officer with a moustache grabbed him by the shoulder ... twisted his arm ... and the other officer twisted his other arm. Everything happened right next to [the car]. The two officers led the applicant, with his arms twisted, to the guard booth. Outside, the officers still held his arms twisted behind his back, but didn\u2019t handcuff him ... [the applicant] was not saying anything offensive and was not resisting. When [the applicant\u2019s] arms were twisted, he started shouting, \u201cGuys, why are you twisting my arms?\u201d. But the officers, without any explanation, led him to the booth with his arms twisted behind his back. At that moment another man got out of the same police car, but I don\u2019t know if he was an officer or not because he was in plain clothes. He also went to the booth and was standing in the doorway because the door was open. I heard [the applicant] scream inside the booth, \u201cGuys, why are you hitting me?\u201d. The third man did not enter the booth; he stood in the doorway the whole time. I think [the applicant] and the officers were inside the booth about ten or fifteen minutes. Then I saw the man who had been standing in the doorway step aside and the same two officers lead [the applicant] from the booth with his hands handcuffed and twisted behind his back. I think both the officers were pulling up his handcuffed arms. Outside [the applicant] asked the officers, \u201cGuys, why did you hit me in the stomach?\u201d... I didn\u2019t see the officers hit [the applicant], I only heard him scream inside the booth ... I saw everything well because the area around the booth was lit. It was still before dawn then. I didn\u2019t see a dog near the booth ...\u201d 39.  On 8 March 2010 the prosecutor discontinued the pre-trial investigation, relying on essentially the same grounds as in the previous decisions (see paragraphs 23 and 35 above). The applicant appealed against that decision, and on 6 April 2010 a senior prosecutor reopened the investigation. 40.  On 21 April 2010 V.B. was questioned again. He essentially repeated his previous statements (see paragraphs 10, 15 and 22 above), but did not mention bending back the applicant\u2019s wrist outside. V.B. also stated that when he and J.D. had followed the applicant to the guard booth, N.B. had probably followed them, but V.B. could not remember the exact order in which they had walked. J.D. was also questioned the same day and the written record of his testimony was almost identical to that of V.B. 41.  On 6 May 2010 N.B. was questioned again. He essentially repeated his previous statements (see paragraphs 17 and 21 above), and added:\n\u201cI didn\u2019t go inside the guard booth, I stayed near the door, and that\u2019s why during previous questioning I said that nothing happened inside the booth and that I didn\u2019t see if there had been an attempt to punch an officer in the booth, because I couldn\u2019t see it from the outside. When [the applicant] was led out of the booth, he was handcuffed ...\nMy dog was further away the whole time, tied to the garage wall ...\nAs for the punch ... I can only say that it appeared to me that [the applicant] had attempted to punch an officer. During the first questioning I said that he had punched an officer, but I may have been wrong because I didn\u2019t consider this an important circumstance; also, during that questioning I wasn\u2019t asked exactly whether there had been a punch or just an attempt to punch \u2013 as I said before, [the applicant] was jostling the officers, so it seemed to me that he had punched an officer.\u201d 42.  On 7 June 2010 the prosecutor discontinued the pre\u2011trial investigation, relying on essentially the same grounds as in the previous decisions (see paragraphs 23, 35 and 39 above), and a senior prosecutor dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. However, on 29 July 2010 the Jonava District Court reopened the investigation. The court held that although the investigation concerned criminal activity allegedly committed by V.B. and J.D., these two officers had been questioned as regular witnesses, in violation of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 50 below). The court considered that there had been a grave breach of V.B. and J.D.\u2019s defence rights, as they had been denied the special rights of persons who may testify about their own possibly criminal activity \u2013 such as the right to have a representative, the right to request to be granted the status of a suspect, and exemption from responsibility for refusing to testify or providing wrongful testimony. As a result, all the procedural actions carried out in their respect \u2013 such as interviews and confrontations \u2013 had to be declared void. Accordingly, the court concluded that essential investigative actions had not been carried out.\nOn 6 September 2010 the Kaunas Regional Court upheld that judgment. 43.  On 2 November 2010, at the applicant\u2019s request, the pre-trial investigation was transferred to the Kaunas District Prosecutor. 44.  In May 2011 V.B. and J.D. were questioned as special witnesses who were testifying about their own alleged criminal activity (see paragraph 50 below). They both essentially repeated their earlier statements (see paragraphs 10, 15, 16, 19, 22 and 40 above), emphasising that they could no longer exactly remember all the details, because of the passage of time. 45.  On 30 June 2011 the Kaunas District Prosecutor discontinued the investigation. The prosecutor relied on essentially the same grounds as the Jonava District Prosecutor in its earlier decisions (see paragraphs 23, 35, 39 and 42 above), and concluded that the applicant\u2019s statements had been inconsistent, whereas the consistent statements of all the police officers had shown that the use of force had been a lawful and proportionate response to the applicant\u2019s resistance and his refusal to comply with the officers\u2019 lawful orders. On 29 July 2011 a senior prosecutor upheld that decision. 46.  On 7 September 2011 the Kaunas District Court and on 25 October 2011 the Kaunas Regional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeals. Both courts concluded that the pre-trial investigation had been thorough and its discontinuation had been justified. 47.  On 23 April 2008 the Jonava Police Department charged the applicant with the administrative offence of refusing to comply with lawful orders of police officers and resisting them (Article 187 \u00a7 1 of the Code of Administrative Offences). On 9 May 2008 the administrative proceedings against the applicant were adjourned, pending the results of the pre\u2011trial investigation into his allegations of ill-treatment by the police, and were subsequently discontinued as time-barred. 48.  According to the material submitted to the Court, the applicant was never suspected or accused, nor did he hold any other status in the proceedings, in the criminal case concerning the robbery of the jewellery shop (see paragraph 6 above). A report by the Jonava Police Department of 8 July 2008 indicated that the applicant\u2019s sons E. and A. were being investigated in connection with the robbery, but it appears that neither of them was charged. In 2009 the investigation was suspended without identifying those responsible for the robbery.", "references": ["4", "7", "3", "9", "2", "0", "6", "8", "5", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Chita. 5.  On 2 September 2004 the applicant was arrested on the charges of fraud and forgery of official documents. On 4 September 2004 the Tsentralnyy District Court of Chita authorised the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention. The court reasoned as follows:\n\u201cThe evidence collected ... incriminated [the applicant] ... in a serious crime which entails a custodial sentence exceeding ten years. ... The court takes note of the [applicant\u2019s] character. However, ... it considers that, if at large, [the applicant] might put pressure on victims and witnesses or otherwise interfere with administration of justice or continue criminal activities, Accordingly, ... the court considers it necessary to remand [the applicant] in custody.\u201d 6.  On 11 November 2004 the Chita Regional Court upheld the decision of 2 September 2004 on appeal. 7.  The applicant remained in custody pending investigation and trial. The court extended his pre-trial detention on several occasions reiterating, in substance, the reasoning employed by the District Court on 2 September 2004. 8.  On 4 June 2007 the District Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to eight years\u2019 imprisonment.", "references": ["7", "3", "1", "6", "0", "5", "8", "9", "4", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1926 and lives in Novi Sad. His son, Mr Vojislav Mu\u010dibabi\u0107, was born in 1951 and died on 23 June 1995. The present case concerns the investigation into the death of the applicant\u2019s son. 6.  On 23 June 1995 a powerful explosion occurred at the facilities of Grme\u010d, a company with headquarters in Belgrade. 7.  It transpires from the judicial decisions and the case file that the explosion was caused by the covert production of composite solid rocket fuel under the auspices of the State Intelligence Service. 8.  The general information the Court has been able to procure as to the production of rocket fuel and the risk of an explosion at production sites may be summarised as follows. 9.  Composite fuel, also known as composite propellant, is a broad class of solid chemical fuels that are used as propellants in rockets. The rocket-fuel sheets resemble PVC folia but are less stable and require a specialised location with a high level of preventive measures and safety precautions. They are composed of fuel and oxidiser. An example of a fuel is phenol formaldehyde and of an oxidiser, ammonium perchlorate (\u201cAP\u201d). AP is a powerful oxidiser, which explains why it is used mainly in solid propellant rocket boosters, including space shuttles and military missiles. 10.  AP is a white, granular, crystalline solid or powder. Its explosive characteristics depend on particle size and granulometric composition. It is a class 4 oxidiser (it can cause an explosive reaction) when particles measure over 15 micrometres. It is classified as an explosive when particles measure less than 15 micrometres. It has been apparently involved in a number of accidents. AP is stable when properly stored, transported and handled at temperatures below 150 degrees Celsius (oC). The amount put in any pile must be limited and storage sites must be designed with blast walls. The risks of explosion and fire associated with AP arise mainly when there is a large proportion of AP in a premix or when it is exposed to intensive heat or an organic compound. When heated to 300oC, AP degrades organic adhesive, breaking cemented joints. Complete reactions leave no residue. 11.  At a series of meetings, an Intelligence Service executive had apparently agreed to the production of rocket fuel with a private company, JPL Systems (hereinafter \u201cJPL\u201d). The latter\u2019s experts were supposed to provide the formula and certain components, including oxidisers. Certain Grme\u010d managers had allegedly been requested to make available a mill with two counter-rotating rollers in its facilities for the production of polyvinyl chloride sheets, as well as other substances and its experts. 12.  On 23 June 1995, most of the components were blended together in a batch mixer in another company, transported in aluminium bins to Grme\u010d in a private car by JPL experts and stored next to the mill. When the mixture was put on the mill and extraction of the sheets of rocket fuel started, an explosion occurred in the presence of more than twenty workers from the two commissioned companies. As a consequence, the applicant\u2019s son and ten other people died, while ten others were seriously injured. 13.  It appears from the Serbian Business Register and the expert reports that neither Grme\u010d nor JPL was licensed and adequately equipped for the production of rocket fuel at the material time. 14.  At about 9 p.m. on 23 June 1995 the investigating judge on duty, M.A., arrived at Grme\u010d to inspect the scene of the incident. V.V., the Deputy District Public Prosecutor Office (hereinafter \u201cthe prosecutor\u201d), Z.L., a crime inspector, and V.M., a crime-scene technician, were also present. 15.  According to the investigating judge\u2019s two-page report of his inspection of the incident scene (zapisnik o uvi\u0111aju), at about 6.30 p.m. on 23 June 1995 a massive explosion occurred during the production of a new product \u2013 polyvinyl chloride sheets. The explosion greatly damaged the production room and killed a number of people who had been involved in the production process.\nWhen the investigating judge arrived at the scene, unspecified members of the factory\u2019s security staff and the Belgrade police prevented him and the prosecutor from entering the production room. They were requested to examine the scene two to three steps away from the entrance door for security reasons, given that the damaged roof could have collapsed. The judge noticed that it had been a powerful explosion, and that the production room had been covered in dust and pieces of the roof, which also prevented a good overview of the room.\nAs the judge could not inspect the incident scene, in order to gather evidence he talked to the director, R.U. He had to wait thirty minutes for the director to be found and to finish his telephone call with the Belgrade mayor, N.\u010c. The director stated that the explosion had occurred when the factory\u2019s experts with a team of additional experts (part of the statement is illegible) had apparently tested a new product-manufacturing process with which he was not familiar. However, he clarified that the manufacturing process required special security measures and teams, and named all of the factory\u2019s experts involved, including the applicant\u2019s son as a chief engineer. The technical director, S.K., stated that his team of between seventeen and twenty employees had been testing a new product and that experts from other companies and faculties \u201cmight have been involved\u201d in the manufacturing process that afternoon. Presuming that ten people had died, he anticipated that the cause of the explosion may have been \u201can unwanted, unexpected and unknown chemical reaction which had \u2018broken out\u2019 during the process\u201d.\nThe investigating judge instructed (a) the Belgrade police\u2019s expert team and the factory experts to continue looking for those involved who had died or survived; (b) the crime-scene technician to collect and register all traces, objects and details which might help to elucidate the account of the events and to make an appropriate file in that respect; (c) the removal of all the corpses to the Institute for Forensic Medicine for post-mortem examinations to determine the cause of death; and (d) the transfer of all the survivors to the appropriate medical centres. All those activities and the relevant documentation were to form an integral part of the incident report. 16.  In his two-page report on the forensic inspection of the incident scene (izve\u0161taj o kriminalisti\u010dko-tehni\u010dkom pregledu lica mesta), the crime inspector, Z.L., noted that there had been traces of the destruction caused by a massive explosion which had occurred at about 6 p.m. on 23 June 1995 at the Vinfleks factory (production room) where bituminous materials were produced. He reported that nine corpses had been found and gave the names of several injured people who had been transported to hospital (one of them had died there) as well as a short statement by one of the workers who had been nearby. The inspector reported that the police firemen had already started extinguishing the fire, that the crime-scene technicians, M.P. and M.\u0160, had taken photographs, and that the criminal police (Kriminalisti\u010dka slu\u017eba (UZSK)) had taken on the case. The identification of the casualties and the cause of the explosion should have been determined the following day by specialised teams of criminal police. No other documents, photographs, scheme of the scene or results of any chemical or toxicological analysis, if any, have been submitted to the Court with the case file; nor apparently were they made available to the applicant. 17.  On 24 June 1995 an additional forensic report was drawn up after the fingerprinting and photographing of the bodies. The bodies were transferred for post-mortem examination, together with additional body parts which had been found in the meantime, while the clothing was sent to the prosecutor\u2019s office. 18.  The post-mortem examination of victims\u2019 bodies was carried out between 24 and 26 June 1995 by the Institute for Forensic Medicine of the Faculty of Medicine in Belgrade. The autopsy reports stated that the victims\u2019 deaths had been violent and caused by the destruction of or damage to some vital organs and/or third and fourth-degree burns from the explosion, or complications thereafter. 19.  On 24 June 1995 the Belgrade police ex officio set up a commission to examine the cause of the explosion. The commission was comprised of several officers from the Security Institute (Institut bezbednosti MUP-a Srbije)[1], as well as two professors from the Mechanical Engineering Faculty in Belgrade, B.J. and \u00d0.B., who were also the co-owners of JPL (see paragraph 11 above). 20.  Following site inspections between 23 and 26 June 1995 and computer simulations of the explosions, two experts from the Security Institute, B.G. and P.P., submitted their report to the DDPO on 9 August 1995. As regards the cause and origin of the accident, the experts stated (a) that the explosion appeared to have been initially caused by the heat generated by the mill\u2019s rollers during the production of composite fuel; (b) that static electricity could not have ignited the composite fuel, premix or fuel sheet; (c) that the primary blast of the premix or the composite fuel sheet on the mill\u2019s two counter-rotating rollers had most probably been caused by the presence of a mechanical object in the premix, which had ended up between the rollers; and (d) that the initial blast had led to two secondary explosions of the premix, which was stored in two aluminum bins next to the mill. 21.  On 30 August 1995 the Labour Ministry inspectorate lodged a criminal complaint against the Director of Grme\u010d, R.U., for breaching health-and-safety regulations (see paragraphs 76-77 below). Previously, on 3 July 1995 the Ministry had informed the prosecutor that on 24 and 26 June 1995 they had been refused access to the factory and to documentation for inspection, and that Grme\u010d had not informed them to that date about the fatal incident, as required by the relevant law. 22.  It would appear that the prosecutor lodged a request for a formal preliminary judicial investigation against unknown persons from Grme\u010d in respect of the explosion (zahtev za sprovo\u0111enje pojedinih istra\u017enih radnji). On 13 September 1995 the applicant sought to be granted victim status. 23.  On 8 March 1996 the applicant and two other victims\u2019 relatives lodged a criminal complaint against a number of senior executives of Grme\u010d and JPL (R.U., D.M., S.K., D.Z., Lj.R., Z.O., B.I. and V.B.), on the grounds that there was a reasonable suspicion that they had committed grave breaches of public safety regulations (see paragraph 76 below, Article 194 \u00a7 2 in conjunction with Article 187 \u00a7 4 of the Criminal Code). 24.  The experts\u2019 report of 9 August 1995 was served on the applicant on 15 April 1996. Two weeks later, the applicant submitted numerous objections and posed questions. He questioned, inter alia, the expert commission\u2019s authorisation to investigate the case, the fact that it had focussed on the cause of the explosion without establishing whether the appropriate safety precautions had been taken, and the experts\u2019 conclusions, which were pure presumption. 25.  On 5 June 1996 the prosecutor lodged a request with the Belgrade District Court that the police experts be heard. 26.  At a hearing scheduled for 4 December 1996, however, the investigating judge did not take statements from the experts. The applicant again objected to the experts\u2019 report. The investigating judge endorsed the experts\u2019 request to be provided with all questions in writing and to be given another month to answer. In their reply of 15 April 1997, the experts clarified that (a) on 23 June 1995 at the scene of the incident, where they had gone ex officio, the investigating judge had instructed them orally to establish the cause of the explosion; (b) they had not made any plan or programme for the expert report; (c) they had not had sufficient information (for example, on the original premix or the final product) to examine and determine the cause of the blast, but they had found traces of AP at the accident scene and had been provided with the formulae of the premix by JPL; (d) they could not say whether the fire had started on the rollers, the fuel or the rocket-fuel sheet; (e) they had not found any documentation about the planning or technology programme of the production of rocket fuel which had led to the blast; and that (f) their task had been to establish the cause of, and not the responsibility for, the explosion. 27.  On 14 May 1997 the applicant amended his criminal complaint, relying on Article 194 \u00a7 2 in conjunction with Article 187 \u00a7 4 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 76 below). 28.  Following the prosecutor\u2019s proposal of 10 June 1997, a month later the court appointed the Military Institute to determine and submit a report on whether the cause of the explosion had been of a technical nature or a human mistake. On 18 July 1997 the Institute informed the investigating judge that it did not have the capacity to do so. 29.  On 28 November 1997 the Belgrade Chemistry Faculty was appointed to determine the cause of the explosion, whether it could have been avoided and the possible liability in that respect. 30.  Following two unsuccessful attempts to receive additional relevant data, on 12 May 1998 the Professor of the Belgrade Chemistry Faculty, I.J., submitted his report. He claimed that it was based on reliable data collected by the Security Institute, given that, owing to the lapse of time, it was impossible to analyse any samples found on the site. He clarified further that he had not used most of the Institute\u2019s documentation, as it concerned computer-generated and simulated experiments of assumed events which could only indirectly hint at the possible answers. The expert stated that the collected data were incomplete and did not contain quantitative figures of the samples examined to allow any deeper analysis of the collected evidence or its compliance with the account of the events that had allegedly led to the explosion. While not excluding the possibility that the cause of the explosion might have been the one suggested by the police experts, the expert observed that the possible exposure of AP to humidity could have made it sensitive to an organic compound and the explosion could have been caused by a piece of paper, wood or engine oil, especially in the presence of unwanted metal or soot particles. 31.  The expert also noted the following issues as relevant: (a) although explosive, carcinogenic and other dangerous substances were used during the production process, no technical-technological documentation and certificates for them had been found; (b) the purity of the components, especially of AP, was questionable (it was described as light pink powder, whereas it was a white, crystalline substance); (c) the samples revealed, unusually, included the presence of phosphates, which were not components of composite fuel, or equipment for the maintenance of the mill or the building itself; (d) the production process and technology did not seem to have been accurately specified and followed, as certain components had been added and mixed on the mill in the course of the production process; and (e) an unacceptably high number of individuals present had indicated that they did not know what had been produced and that other safety measures had probably not been taken. 32.  Following the prosecutor\u2019s proposal of 13 June 1998, the investigating judge heard evidence from a number of witnesses to and surviving victims of the accident (eighteen out of the nineteen were from Belgrade) on ten occasions between 10 November 1998 and 15 October 1999[2]. They were asked who had allowed V.B. to bring the premix to Grme\u010d, and whether they had known what it contained and what safety measures had been taken. On 27 July 1999 and 18 February 2000 respectively the investigating judge also interviewed Mr Radosav Luki\u0107 and Mr Jovica Stani\u0161i\u0107, Deputy Head and Head of the State Intelligence Service. 33.  On 1 March 2000 the investigating judge returned the case file with the collected evidence to the prosecutor. 34.  On 9 June 2000 the investigating judge, on the prosecutor\u2019s initiative, withdrew the case file and sealed the statements of the State Intelligence Service executives, classifying them as State secret. 35.  On 12 June 2000 the public prosecutor decided not to prosecute, relying on secret evidence and information. He stated that a detailed analysis of the facts had been provided in an official note of 15 March 2000, which had been classified as confidential. He summarily dismissed the applicant\u2019s criminal complaint on the grounds that there were no elements of crimes prosecuted ex officio (da se prijavljeno delo ne goni ex officio), invoking Articles 184 to 187 of the Criminal Code. By a letter of the same date, the applicant was informed about the prosecutor\u2019s decision and notified that he could pursue a subsidiary criminal prosecution within eight days of the date the letter had been served on him by lodging a request for an investigation (zahtev za sprovo\u0111enje istrage). 36.  The applicant alleged that despite his request, he had not had access to the case file until 10 June 2000. In the meantime, he commissioned an expert report by the court\u2019s permanent specialist on explosives and blasts, M.A.L. In her report of 11 May 2000, the specialist stated that most of the police experts\u2019 work had been incomplete or irrelevant, and gave the reasons for her assertions. She found that neither Grme\u010d nor JLP had been registered and properly equipped for working with explosive materials, and that their employees had lacked the necessary skills and competences. She confirmed in principle, and further elaborated on, the findings of the Chemistry Faculty\u2019s expert and itemised the numerous failures of the two companies to comply with the relevant provisions of the Explosive Substances, Flammable Liquids and Gases Act concerning transporting and working with explosive materials (see paragraphs 84-86 below). 37.  On 20 June 2000 the applicant instituted subsidiary prosecution against R.U., S.K., R.\u010c., V.B., J.T. and R.L. by lodging a request with the Belgrade District Court that a criminal investigation be opened into breaches of safety regulations, referring to Articles 194 \u00a7 2 and 187 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 76 below). 38.  On 27 September 2000 the investigating judge of the Belgrade District Court refused to open the investigation sought by the applicant (izrazio neslaganje sa zahtevom), and referred the case to a three-judge criminal panel (see paragraph 81 below). 39.  On 3 October 2000 the three-judge panel of the District Court upheld the investigating judge\u2019s decision, having established that rocket fuel had been produced on the orders of the then Serbian President, Mr Milo\u0161evi\u0107, and Mr Stani\u0161i\u0107 (see paragraphs 7 and 32 above). The applicant appealed on 21 October 2000. 40.  On 28 December 2000 the Supreme Court of Serbia quashed that decision. On 25 January 2001 it referred the case back to the Belgrade District Court for additional investigation, holding that the prosecuting authorities had failed to assess the evidence properly. 41.  A month after the prosecutor\u2019s request of 19 March 2001, the investigating judge commissioned the Military Technical Academy (Vojno-tehni\u010dka akademija-Katedra za raketna goriva) to draw up a fresh expert report in respect of the explosion. The Academy refused, claiming that it did not have the power to do so. 42.  On 10 May 2001 the investigating judge appointed the Security Institute to draw up the report, but that institute also refused, referring to its report of 9 August 1995 (see paragraph 28 above). 43.  On 12 June 2001 the investigating judge informed the applicant that there was no other available institution to carry out a fresh expert report and that, instead, he could file an indictment directly if he so wished. 44.  In June and August 2001 the applicant filed an indictment and requested further investigative measures. 45.  On 25 March 2002 the criminal chamber of the District Court sent the case file back to the investigating judge, referring to the Supreme Court\u2019s decision of 28 December 2000 (see paragraph 40 above). The chamber instructed the investigating judge to open an investigation and interview the suspects. It stated that the three-judge panel of the District Court would again decide on his refusal to open an investigation once the suspects had been heard. It explained that it would be inappropriate to proceed with a subsidiary indictment without first carrying out an investigation, even with the investigating judge\u2019s permission to file a direct indictment, if the suspects had never been questioned. 46.  On the same date, the investigating judge opened an investigation. Between 16 September and 10 October 2002 he questioned all five suspects and gave individual decisions on investigation in respect of each of them. 47.  On 29 October 2002 the investigating judge again appointed the Military Technical Academy to draw up a report establishing in a clear and conclusive manner the cause of the explosion and which irregularities in the production process had led to the blast. In a short report drawn up in December 2002, the Academy stated this time that their task was apparently to examine the cause of the explosion, not the possible failure of any of the suspects to protect those involved from the risk of explosion. 48.  On 8 April 2003 the investigating judge closed the investigation. The applicant was informed and instructed that he could file an indictment as a subsidiary prosecutor within fifteen days if he so wished. 49.  On 22 April 2003 the applicant and two others filed an indictment, laying blame on four former senior executives of Grme\u010d and JPL, R.U., S.K., R.\u010c. and V.B., as well as on Mr R.L., former Deputy Head of the Intelligence Service, for failing to take measures that had been required of them to prevent the lives of the applicant\u2019s son and others from being avoidably put at risk or to mitigate casualties. By 3 July 2003, the District Court rejected all of the objections raised by the defence that the indictment was defective, and upheld the indictment. 50.  The beginning of the trial was scheduled for 12 December 2003 and then for 22 March 2004, but was adjourned on both occasions by the court because it had been unable to secure the proper composition of its bench and/or some of the defendants had not been properly summoned. 51.  The trial before the Belgrade District Court eventually started on 14 May 2004, when the court heard two defendants and adjourned the hearing because the scheduled time had lapsed. The three scheduled hearings (14 June 2004, 16-17 September 2004 and 18 January 2005) were adjourned because of the presiding judge\u2019s other commitments and/or because one or more of the defendants had failed to appear in court. 52.  At a hearing held on 15-16 March 2005, the court heard four defendants (S.K., R.U., V.B. and R.\u010c.) and adjourned to decide on further objections to the indictment. Between 23 March 2005 and 7 December 2005, the competent courts dismissed the indictment in respect of R.L. and R.\u010c., because the applicant had failed to name them as suspects in his earlier criminal complaint for the crimes at issue (see paragraph 23 above), which were, in principle, supposed to be prosecuted firstly ex officio. The hearing scheduled for 24 October 2005 was adjourned to allow the court to decide on R.\u010c.\u2019s objection, and the next hearing scheduled for eleven months later, on 13 September 2006, was cancelled as the case file had been at the Supreme Court to decide on appeals on points of law lodged by other suspects (R.U, S.K. and V.B.) against the courts\u2019 decisions on their objections. 53.  On 25 September 2006 the indictment was slightly amended with regard to the facts. 54.  On 20 November 2006, the trial recommenced before a new chamber, and also owing to the lapse of time since the previous hearing. The court heard the defendants and two witnesses. 55.  On 6 February 2007 the applicant requested the District Court to re-examine whether the classification of the testimonies of two Intelligence Service executives as State secret had been in accordance with the law, and to add them to the case file if appropriate. No decision in respect of his request has been submitted to the Court. 56.  The trial recommenced once again before a new trial chamber on 12 February 2007, when the court heard two defendants and three witnesses. On 14 and 15 May 2007, the court heard four new witnesses, as well as R.L. and R.\u010c. The three hearings set for 13 February, 5 September and 12 November 2007 were adjourned or cancelled owing to a strike by court clerks (zapisni\u010dara) and/or as the witnesses had not been summoned properly or had failed to appear. The court imposed fines on four witnesses for failure to appear in court. 57.  The trial recommenced before yet another trial chamber on 11 February 2008, as well as again because of the lapse of time. The court heard one witness and adjourned the hearing because it had been unable to maintain the proper composition of its bench. Two further scheduled hearings (15 April and 8 September 2008) were cancelled at the request of the defendants or their lawyers for private or professional reasons and/or because of the inadequate summoning of witnesses. 58.  On 17 July 2008 the applicant lodged a new bill of indictment against R.L. and R.\u010c. 59.  The trial started anew because of the lapse of time on 24 November 2008, when the court again heard defendants and four witnesses. On 28 November 2008 the present proceedings were joined with the criminal proceedings against R.L. and R.\u010c. The two hearings scheduled for 25\u201126 February and 23 April 2009 were cancelled due to the failure of the defendants\u2019 lawyers to appear in court and/or the difficulties of successfully tracing certain experts after so many years. 60.  On 24 June 2009 the trial re-started again because of the lapse of time, but could not proceed as the competent experts failed to appear in court. The judge fined one of the experts. On 16 September 2009 the court heard one police expert (B.G.). The hearing scheduled for 15 December 2009 was adjourned because of the absence of two forensic experts (P.P. and I.J.) and the defendants\u2019 attorneys. 61.  Following judicial reforms, on 1 January 2010 the case was assigned to another judge of the newly competent Belgrade High Court and the proceedings had to begin anew. The hearing fixed for 21 May 2010 was cancelled because the court had been informed that R.L. had been found dead on 19 February 2010, as well as because one of the defendants\u2019 lawyers had not been properly summoned. 62.  On 6 July 2010, the court discontinued the proceedings against R.L. In order to speed up the trial, the applicant amended the indictment, accusing the defendants of being co-accomplices in serious breaches of safety regulations (see paragraph 77 below, Article 288.2 in conjunction with Article 278.3 of the Criminal Code). The hearing was adjourned until 19 October 2010 to allow the defendants to readjust their defence to the slightly amended indictment. The latter hearing was also not held due to a judiciary strike. 63.  By September 2011, the District Court had held one hearing and adjourned another four hearings. Specifically, during a very short hearing on 11 February 2011 one defendant and a number of witnesses had been re-heard, whilst the hearings of 8 December 2010 and 24 March 2011 had been adjourned because the defendants\u2019 lawyers had not appeared. The hearing scheduled for September 2011 was cancelled by the court itself because it had, apparently, been unable to secure the proper composition of its bench. When one of the parties to the proceedings complained about the delay, the Belgrade High Court informed him that the case had been classified as \u201cbacklog\u201d and would be dealt with shortly. 64.  On 24 April 2013 the court rendered the first-instance decision. It acquitted the defendants, finding that there was insufficient evidence to declare them guilty of the offences with which they had been charged. The judgment was served on the applicant on 8 September 2013. 65.  According to the information made available by the parties, the case is still pending before the Belgrade Court of Appeal. 66.  On 10 September 2010 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud), complaining about the length of the criminal proceedings described above. He complained, in particular, of obstacles and obstructions within the criminal proceedings, of not being involved in the investigative activities and of having had no access to the case file. 67.  On 14 July 2011 the Constitutional Court held that the applicant had suffered a breach of his \u201cright to a trial within a reasonable time\u201d in respect of the ineffective, inadequate and lengthy criminal proceedings before the first-instance court, and ordered the latter to bring the impugned proceedings to a conclusion as soon as possible. In order to establish its jurisdiction ratione materiae, the court held that the criminal proceedings concerned the right to life, which was a civil right. The Constitutional Court also declared that the applicant was entitled to non-pecuniary damages, in accordance with Article 90 of the Constitutional Court Act. The applicant does not seem to have been served with that decision until October 2011. 68.  On 31 October 2011 the applicant\u2019s lawyer lodged a request with the Commission for Compensation. In so doing, he relied on the Constitutional Court\u2019s decision, and sought 10,000,000 dinars (RSD) in compensation on account of the pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage suffered. 69.  On 27 December 2011 the Commission for Compensation offered to pay the applicant the sum of RSD 100,000 (at the time approximately 840 euros (EUR)) for the non-pecuniary damage referred to in the Constitutional Court\u2019s decision. According to the information contained in the case file, the applicant refused to accept that amount, deeming it insufficient. 70.  Instead, on 17 July 2012 the applicant lodged a claim with the Belgrade Court of First Instance (Osnovni sud), noting that he had not received an appropriate offer from the Commission for Compensation, which was why he was entitled to bring a separate civil suit in this respect (Article 90 of the Constitutional Court Act, see paragraph 63 above). The applicant sought RSD 10,000,000 (at the time approximately EUR 85,000) for the non-pecuniary damage sustained. 71.  On 12 December 2013 the Belgrade Court of First Instance accepted the applicant\u2019s claim in part and awarded him RSD 500,000 (approximately EUR 4,330). The applicant was exempted from paying court stamp duty on account of his age and indigence. 72.  On 14 May 2014 the Belgrade Court of Appeal (Apelacioni sud), decreased the award to RSD 300,000 (approximately EUR 2,580). The court stated that the payment of the original award would be contrary to the purpose of compensation and that the State could not be responsible for the omissions of third parties. According to information made available by the parties, the awarded amount has not yet been paid. 73.  It would appear that on an unspecified date the applicant lodged another constitutional appeal with the Constitutional Court in respect of the compensation. The Court has not been informed by the parties about the outcome of the proceedings before the Constitutional Court. 74.  Despite the Court\u2019s request to the Government to provide it with the information indicating the ownership structure of Grme\u010d and JPL as of June 1995, the documents provided by the Government concerned only the legal status of Grme\u010d as of 1997, when it was incorporated as a limited liability company (dru\u0161tvo sa ograni\u010denom odgovorno\u0161\u0107u). Nevertheless, documents in the Court\u2019s possession show that in 1995 it was a well-established \u201csocially-owned\u201d holding company (dru\u0161tveno preduze\u0107e/poslovni sistem)[3] licenced for the production of homogeneous flooring and other products made of PVC masses. Its Vinfleks factory was apparently registered for the production of bituminous materials. 75.  JPL was registered as a privately-owned company in 1995 for other services than the production of rocket fuel. It would appear that soon after the explosion the company was re-registered as Brunner, and that some of its co-founders, including R.\u010c. and B.J., further re-registered the company or established new companies called Infinity and/or EdePRO. According to media reports, a new explosion occurred on the EdePRO premises in November 2008. One person died and three were injured.", "references": ["9", "4", "8", "6", "5", "2", "3", "7", "1", "No Label", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant, Mr Vladimir Nikolayevich Ruban, is a Ukrainian national, who was born in 1972 and is currently serving a life sentence. 6.  On 13 August 1996 the Voznesensk local prosecutor\u2019s office in the Mykolayiv region started an investigation into the murder of four persons on 12 August 1996. 7.  On 18 October 1999 the Donetsk Regional Prosecutor\u2019s Office started investigating the murder of A. 8.  On 10 November 1999 the Slavyansk Police Department of the Donetsk region started an investigation into hooliganism concerning R. 9.  On 22 November 1999 the above three investigations were joined. Several persons were suspected of committing the above crimes as a group, one of them being the applicant. 10.  On 14 December 1999 the Donetsk Regional Prosecutor\u2019s Office formally charged the applicant in absentia with the above crimes. He was also placed on the list of wanted persons. The same day the investigation in respect of the applicant was suspended until he was apprehended; the criminal proceedings continued in respect of the other suspects. 11.  On 23 December 2002, the Donetsk Regional Court of Appeal convicted and sentenced G., P. and F. for the above mentioned crimes. 12.  On 2 February 2004 the Slavyansk Local Court ordered the applicant\u2019s detention. 13.  On 28 June 2007 the applicant was apprehended by the Yartsevo Prosecutor\u2019s Office in the Smolensk region, Russia. 14.  On 31 March 2008 the investigation was resumed after the applicant had been extradited to Ukraine. The same day the applicant was formally charged with participation in an organised criminal group together with G., P., F. and two other persons, who had died in the intervening time. The applicant was accused of strangling A., of killing four persons together with G. in 1996 and inflicting grievous bodily harm on R. in a murder attempt, the latter crime in the context of the extortion of R\u2019s brother. All these crimes had been committed as a group. 15.  On 22 May 2008 the investigation was completed and on 26 June 2008 the case was transferred to the Donetsk Regional Court of Appeal. 16.  On 10 July 2009 the Court of Appeal, acting as a first-instance court, found the applicant guilty of aggravated murder and banditry and sentenced him to life imprisonment. 17.  The applicant and his lawyer appealed, considering that the applicant\u2019s guilt had not been proved. 18.  On 15 July 2010 the Supreme Court of Ukraine upheld the judgment of 10 July 2009. On that day the applicant\u2019s lawyer submitted an additional appeal claiming that the Court of Appeal had to apply the most favourable wording of the relevant provisions of the Criminal Code, which was that between 29 December 1999 and 29 March 2000 when the death penalty had already been abolished and life imprisonment had not yet been introduced. The Supreme Court in its decision noted that the applicant had been sentenced correctly.", "references": ["6", "2", "7", "1", "4", "8", "3", "0", "9", "5", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Perm. 6.  The applicant\u2019s son N. was born on 23 August 2005. 7.  On 15 February 2009 the applicant killed his wife by stabbing her several times with a knife. She died on the same day. The applicant\u2019s son, three years old at the time, witnessed the murder. 8.  On 17 February 2009 the applicant was arrested. 9.  On 3 April 2009 N.\u2019s maternal grandmother V. was appointed N.\u2019s guardian. 10.  On 25 May 2010 the Dzerzhinskiy District Court of Perm found that the applicant could not be held responsible for the murder of his wife which had been committed owing to a temporary psychiatric disorder in the form of an acute reaction to stress. It ordered compulsory psychiatric treatment for the applicant in a psychiatric hospital. 11.  On 3 August 2010 the Perm Regional Court (\u201cthe Regional Court\u201d) upheld the above decision on appeal. 12.  On 25 February 2011 the Ordzhonikidzevskiy District Court of Perm found that psychiatric treatment was no longer necessary and ordered the applicant\u2019s release from the psychiatric hospital. 13.  According to the certificate issued by the Perm Regional Clinical Psychiatric Hospital, the applicant remained under psychiatric supervision until March 2014. 14.  On 10 March 2011 the applicant applied to the Ministry of Social Development for the Perm Region (\u201cthe childcare authority\u201d) in order to have the child returned to him. 15.  On 11 May 2011 the childcare authority rejected the applicant\u2019s request. 16.  The childcare authority and V. instituted court proceedings seeking to deprive the applicant of his parental responsibility over N. The applicant brought a counterclaim, challenging the childcare authority\u2019s refusal to return the child to him and seeking the termination of V.\u2019s guardianship over N. 17.  On 16 August 2012 the Dzerzhinskiy District Court dismissed the application by the childcare authority and V. to deprive the applicant of his parental responsibility over N. It also dismissed the applicant\u2019s counterclaim to end V.\u2019s guardianship over N. and to return N. to him. In taking that decision the Dzerzhinskiy District Court relied on the report of a psychological examination of the child carried out on 6 July 2010 by a municipal centre for children\u2019s psychological, medical and social adaptation. The report stated, in particular, that N. was in the process of developing the basis of his mental and psychological health, for which he needed stability, to be provided first and foremost by constant caregiver figures and a permanent place of residence. Based on the report the court found that N. had been living with and had been brought up by V. from the age of three, that he had not seen his father for over a year, since summer 2011, that the applicant had been working on shifts and was out of town every two months out of four, that N. was going to start primary school and that V. had already chosen a school near the boy\u2019s place of residence. The court concluded that, in view of the age of the child and his attachment to V., a change of his place of residence could be traumatic and was therefore undesirable. The court noted, however, that the applicant still had the possibility to communicate with N. and meet him. 18.  On 27 March 2013 the Regional Court upheld the above judgment on appeal. 19.  On 22 May 2012 the Justice of the Peace of the 5th Court Circuit of the Dzerzhinskiy District of Perm ordered the applicant to pay child maintenance to V. in an amount that was equal to a quarter of his income, starting from 28 April 2012 until the child\u2019s coming of age. The judgment became final on 18 September 2012. The applicant makes regular payments. 20.  On 28 May 2012 the applicant applied to the Motovilikhinskiy District Court of Perm (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) for contact rights. He submitted that V. was preventing him from seeing N. and asked to be granted visiting rights every Saturday or Sunday for three hours in V.\u2019s presence. 21.  During the hearing the applicant stated that it was very important for him to resume contact with his son. He was aware that his son, who had not seen him for a long time, needed time to get used to him again. He was ready to change his place of work to be able to adapt better to his son\u2019s schedule. He also stressed that he paid child maintenance and supported him financially. He was under psychiatric supervision and his mental health had improved. 22.  V. stated that the applicant had intentionally and cruelly killed N.\u2019s mother. He had committed the murder in front of N. and had thereby caused him profound psychological trauma. The applicant should not be allowed to see N. as it would undermine his health and psychological development. It would therefore be against N.\u2019s interests to resume contact with his father. 23.  On 5 September 2012 the District Court ordered a psychological examination of N. to establish whether it was possible to resume contact between N. and his father, and if so what form that should take, and the frequency and duration of contact. The experts were also asked to establish whether contact between N. and his father could damage N.\u2019s health or psychological development. 24.  On 11 April 2013 the applicant informed the District Court that he would be on a business trip from 4 May to 6 June 2013 and asked that no hearings be scheduled during that period. 25.  On 29 April 2013 the District Court scheduled a hearing in the case for 14 May 2013. 26.  According to the Government, on the same day a court clerk notified the applicant of the hearing of 14 May 2013 by calling him on his mobile telephone, and on 7 May 2013 by sending him a letter by registered mail, which was, however, returned undelivered on 23 May 2013. 27.  According to the applicant, he was never informed about the hearing of 14 May 2013. He submitted a list of telephone calls, provided by his mobile operator, showing that he had received no calls from the court. 28.  On 14 May 2013 the District Court held a hearing. The applicant and his counsel were absent. V. did not attend either. The record of the hearing reads as follows:\n\u201cThe secretary reported on the appearance [of the parties at the hearing].\nFailed to appear: plaintiff, defendant, notified. [Defendant] informed that impossible to participate at hearing owing to visit to a sanatorium with the child.\n...\nThe possibility of examination of the case in the absence of the parties is considered.\n[Representative of childcare authority]: [I] consider it possible.\nThe court ... held: continue examination of the case ...\u201d 29.  On the same day the District Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s application. The District Court took the following factual elements into consideration:\n-  the applicant was the father of N., a minor, aged seven years old at the time;\n-  the child\u2019s mother had died on 15 February 2009 from multiple stab and cut wounds inflicted on her by the child\u2019s father, the applicant;\n-  pursuant to the decision of 25 May 2010 the applicant had been exempted from criminal responsibility for the murder of his wife and ordered to have compulsory psychiatric treatment in a psychiatric hospital;\n-  the murder had been committed in the presence of the child;\n-  on 25 February 2011 the compulsory psychiatric measures in respect of the applicant had been lifted;\n-  on 3 April 2009 the child\u2019s maternal grandmother V. had been appointed the child\u2019s guardian;\n-  the child resided with V., his housing conditions were adequate and he had been provided with the necessary clothing, a place for play and rest, as well as toys and books;\n-  the applicant wished to see the child on a weekly basis, on Saturdays or Sundays, by taking him out to the cinema, theatre and other places for children and by being afforded an opportunity to stay with the child at his paternal grandparents\u2019 house;\n-  on 16 August 2012 the Dzerzhinskiy District Court had dismissed the claims of the childcare authority and V. to deprive the applicant of his parental responsibility over N. and had dismissed the applicant\u2019s counterclaim to end V.\u2019s guardianship over N. and to return N. to him;\n-  the applicant\u2019s housing conditions were adequate;\n-  the childcare authority had expressed a view that the applicant\u2019s claim should be dismissed as being contrary to the child\u2019s interests;\n-  that according to the report of 2 May 2009 issued by the municipal centre for children\u2019s psychological, medical and social adaptation, presented by V.:\n\u201cDuring the examination N. behaved restlessly, he wandered from room to room and performed chaotic movements with the keys. It can be assumed that the child is in a state of stress ... Only after a certain time ... the boy relaxed and started talking calmly, and agreed to draw a family. N. appeared stressed when drawing. On the drawing the boy depicted his mum, dad and himself. However, it is unclear why the whole family was drawn by the boy. This could reflect the child\u2019s wish to have a full family, or it could mean that the murder of his mother has been erased from the child\u2019s memory, which could be a defensive mechanism.\nHaving compared N.\u2019s references from the nursery school dated November 2008 and the above observations of 2 May 2009, it can be noted that the child\u2019s behaviour has changed, showing signs of acute psychological and traumatic distress. This is confirmed by the child\u2019s grandmother, who submitted that the child is agitated ... has difficulty falling asleep, cries in his sleep and has started to show aggression ... In the [psychological centre] N. also displayed verbal aggression to other children. [The psychologist] therefore came to the conclusion that N. needed timely psychological or psychotherapeutic assistance to overcome the consequences of a psychological trauma.\u201d\n-  reports from N.\u2019s nursery school, dated November 2008, and from his current kindergarten;\n-  the carrying out of a psychological examination of the child, as ordered by the court on 5 September 2012, had been impossible owing to V.\u2019s refusal to allow the experts to have access to the boy, meaning the case material was returned to the court by the expert without enforcement.\nIn the light of the foregoing, the District Court concluded that it was not in N.\u2019s interests to resume contact with his father. The District Court noted, in particular, that the applicant had not submitted any information about the current state of his mental health, and he had not shown that his mental health had improved or that he did not present a danger to N. Furthermore, the District Court took into account the fact that N. had been brought up by his grandparents from the age of three, that he had an established way of life and that he had not seen his father for a long time. The applicant often left on long business trips, which would prevent weekly meetings. Lastly, both grandparents had refused to see the applicant because of their hostility towards him, which made it impossible to organise meetings between N. and the applicant. 30.  In his appeal submissions the applicant complained, in particular, that a psychological examination of N. had never been performed. The finding that it was not in N.\u2019s interest to resume contact with his father had therefore not been based on the assessment of an expert. He also complained that neither he nor his counsel had been informed of the date of the hearing of 14 May 2013. Lastly, he enclosed an expert opinion of 17 May 2013, which read as follows:\n\u201cConclusions: 1.  In view of the incompleteness of the data [failure to examine N. in view of V.\u2019s refusal to give the experts access to N.], the experts consider that at the present time only short meetings between [the applicant] and the child are possible (not more than two hours 2-3 times per month) in public places on condition that the child has a positive or neutral attitude towards the father. 2.  An assessment of whether contact between the child and his father could damage the child\u2019s health or psychological development is impossible given the absence of any data on the child\u2019s psychological stability, his attitude to his father at the present time, or the influence of relatives on the child\u2019s attitude to his father.\u201d 31.  On 26 June 2013 the applicant complained to the Perm Regional Judicial Department that the judge had included a false statement in the case file that he had been informed of the date of the hearing by mobile telephone. He enclosed a list of telephone calls provided by his mobile operator showing that he had not received any calls from the court. He also complained that a letter notifying his counsel of the date of the hearing of 14 May 2013 had only been dispatched on 20 May 2013. 32.  On 23 July 2013 the Perm Regional Judicial Department replied that the fact of the belated notification of the applicant\u2019s counsel had been confirmed. Given that an appeal against the judgment of 14 May 2013 was pending, that issue would be examined during the appeal proceedings. 33.  On 18 September 2013 the Regional Court held an appeal hearing. The applicant and his counsel were both present. The Regional Court upheld the judgment of 14 May 2013, finding that it had been lawful, sufficiently reasoned and justified. It noted that an expert opinion could not be obtained because V. had avoided the experts. It was impossible to take into account the expert opinion of 17 May 2013 because it had been made after the first\u2011instance judgment. The District Court also found that a notification letter about the hearing of 14 May 2013 had been sent to the applicant\u2019s address but had been returned to the court as undelivered. The failure to collect the notification letter from the post office had amounted to a waiver of the right to attend the hearing. 34.  On 24 December 2013 a judge of the Regional Court refused to refer the applicant\u2019s cassation appeal to the Presidium of the Regional Court for examination, finding that the judgment of 14 May 2013 had been lawful, sufficiently reasoned and justified. She noted, in particular, that the expert opinion of 17 May 2013 could not lead the court to change its findings because the experts had not been able to examine N. 35.  On 13 February 2014 a judge of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation also refused to refer the applicant\u2019s cassation appeal to the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court for examination, finding that no significant violations of substantive or procedural law had influenced the outcome of the proceedings. 36.  Despite the court\u2019s decisions, the applicant resumed contact with N. over time, meeting the boy at school, and having telephone and Skype conversations with him. 37.  On 23 December 2014 the applicant brought new proceedings against V., seeking to have her guardianship of N. terminated and for N. to be returned to him. V. brought a counterclaim to have the applicant\u2019s parental responsibility restricted and to prevent the applicant\u2019s contact with the child. 38.  On 23 April 2015 the District Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s application, having regard to the evidence below. 39.  The District Court noted that N. lived with his maternal grandmother and guardian V. and that his housing conditions were adequate. During an inspection of the child\u2019s living conditions, he had explained that he was comfortable living with V., and that they had a trusting and warm relationship. He also explained that he wished to continue living with his grandmother, but maintain contact with his father by meeting him from time-to-time and communicating with him by telephone. 40.  The applicant\u2019s housing conditions were also adequate. 41.  The District Court noted the applicant\u2019s submission to the effect that during his absences for work the child would live with his paternal grandparents. It further noted that the conditions at the paternal grandparents\u2019 house were also suitable and that they were ready to look after N. in the applicant\u2019s absence. 42.  The District Court questioned N., who explained that he lived with his maternal grandparents and that he liked living with them. The boy also submitted that he communicated with his father, who visited him at school and had regular telephone and Skype conversations with him. His father took an interest in his health and his school results. N. expressed a wish to remain living with his grandmother because he had got used to it. 43.  The District Court further found that it was clear from school reports that N. was showing good results at school, that his mental capacity was above average and that he was interested in studying. N. was being brought up by his grandmother V., who was actively engaged in N.\u2019s school life. The applicant regularly visited N. at school. After such meetings N. only talked about computers and computer games, was less interested in studying, and became more sensitive and reserved. 44.  Having therefore taken into consideration N.\u2019s age, the fact that he had been living with V. from the age of three, was attached to her, loved her and had expressed a wish to continue living with her, and that the applicant\u2019s working schedule required long absences, the District Court held that the child\u2019s interests required that he continue to live with his grandmother, which would be more favourable to his development. 45.  The District Court dismissed V.\u2019s counterclaims. It held that there were no grounds to restrict the applicant\u2019s parental responsibility or to ban his communicating with N. The applicant had positive references from work, the compulsory medical measures he had been undergoing had been lifted and he was no longer under psychiatric supervision. The applicant also cared about his son\u2019s life and health, sought communication with him, maintained contact with him over the telephone and Internet, visited him at school, and made regular child maintenance payments. There had furthermore been no evidence that the applicant had any harmful influence on the child. The District Court emphasised that domestic law provided that a child had a right to communicate with his parents and that a guardian had no right to prevent such communication, except if it was contrary to the child\u2019s interests. 46.  On 2 September 2015 the Regional Court upheld the above judgment on appeal. 47.  On 30 September 2015 the childcare authority carried out a monitoring visit at the child\u2019s place of residence. It was established that V. did not prevent N.\u2019s communicating with the applicant. N. submitted that he saw the applicant during breaks between classes at school and communicated with him over the telephone and by Skype.", "references": ["6", "9", "3", "4", "7", "1", "5", "2", "8", "0", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicants, Mr Nizamudin Aliyev (\u201cthe first applicant\u201d) and Ms Madina Gadzhiyeva (\u201cthe second applicant\u201d), live in Makhachkala, Dagestan. They were born in 1960 and 1987 respectively. The first applicant is the father of Mr Sirazhudin Aliyev, who was born in 1988, and the second applicant is the wife of Mr Gazimagomed Abdullayev, who was born in 1988. 6.  At about 2.30 p.m. on 21 January 2012 Sirazhudin Aliyev and Gazimagomed Abdullayev were driving on an errand in the latter\u2019s VAZ car (the Lada Kalina model) with the registration number E261KP 05 RUS in the centre of Makhachkala, Dagestan, when they were stopped by a group of several armed men in the uniforms of the State Traffic Police (\u0413\u043e\u0441\u0443\u0434\u0430\u0440\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435\u043d\u043d\u0430\u044f \u0418\u043d\u0441\u043f\u0435\u043a\u0446\u0438\u044f \u0411\u0435\u0437\u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438 \u0414\u043e\u0440\u043e\u0436\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0414\u0432\u0438\u0436\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u041c\u0438\u043d\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0430 \u0432\u043d\u0443\u0442\u0440\u0435\u043d\u043d\u0438\u0445 \u0434\u0435\u043b \u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0439\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u0424\u0435\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438) (hereinafter \u201cthe traffic police\u201d), who were driving in a white Toyota and a black VAZ car (the Lada Priora model). The armed men discharged one gunshot, hit Abdullayev\u2019s car with their truncheons, forced Aliyev and Abdullayev out of their car, handcuffed them and placed them separately into their two vehicles and drove away. Shortly thereafter Abdullayev\u2019s car was driven away by the abductors. The abduction took place in the presence of numerous witnesses. 7.  According to the applicants, their relatives were taken to the premises of the Dagestan Centre for Terrorism Counteraction (\u0426\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0440 \u041f\u0440\u043e\u0442\u0438\u0432\u043e\u0434\u0435\u0439\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0438\u044f \u042d\u043a\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0435\u043c\u0438\u0437\u043c\u0443 \u041c\u0438\u043d\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0430 \u0412\u043d\u0443\u0442\u0440\u0435\u043d\u043d\u0438\u0445 \u0414\u0435\u043b \u0414\u0430\u0433\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0430\u043d\u0430) (hereinafter \u201cthe CTC\u201d) in Makhachkala. 8.  On 28 January 2012 the flat of the sister of Gazimagomed Abdullayev was searched by police officers from the CTC. 9.  According to the applicants, on 2 February 2012 they learned from sources whose identity they did not disclose that their relatives had been allegedly initially detained on the premises of the CTC in Makhachkala, Dagestan, and then \u2013 about two days later \u2013 taken to the CTC headquarters in the Stavropol Region. 10.  The Government did not dispute the circumstances of the abduction, as presented by the applicants. However, they denied any involvement of State agents in the incident and pointed out that the applicants had not witnessed the abduction; they also stated that the witness statements concerning the incident were unreliable, and that the allegations of State agents\u2019 involvement had been completely unsubstantiated. 11.  The Court made two requests for copies of the contents of the investigations file. In reply to the Court\u2019s first request, the Government furnished it with copies of documents (numbering 378 pages) reflecting the proceedings between January and August 2012; in reply to the Court\u2019s second request the Government supplied copies of documents (numbering 261 pages) reflecting the proceedings between September 2012 and July 2015. Their contents can be summarised as follows. 12.  On 21 January 2012 the applicants and their relatives complained about the abduction to a number of local law-enforcement agencies, including the Dagestan Public Prosecutor and the investigations department of the Leninskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office in Makhachkala. In their complaints they stated, amongst other things, the following:\n\u201cToday, that is to say 21 January [2012], at about lunch time, Sirazhudin Aliyev, who was born in 1988, and Gazimagomed Abdullayev, who was born in 1988, left home in a Lada Kalina automobile with the registration numbers E261KP 05 RUS and drove in the direction of the Eastern Market [in Makahchkala] ...\nHowever, when they were in their car in the vicinity of the Eastern Market, seven or eight unidentified persons carrying firearms and wearing masks and camouflage uniforms forced them out of their car and took them away in two [one white, one black] Lada Priora cars.\nThe Lada Kalina car of Gazimagomed Abdullayev was also taken away by those persons ...\nIn the light of the above, we are seriously concerned that our children could have been unlawfully deprived of their liberty by officials of law-enforcement agencies, [or] special services and subjected to torture or ill-treatment.\nOn the basis of the above, we request that this complaint be examined ... and that a criminal case be opened ... [and that] the perpetrators be identified and prosecuted ...\u201d 13.  On 21 January 2012 an operational search officer from the Leninskiy district police station reported to the head of the station that the duty officers had received a telephone call concerning an abduction. Upon arrival at the crime scene he had spoken on the telephone to the woman who had called about the incident. The woman had told him that she had called the police by mistake and asked to be left alone. The operational search officer further stated that after talking to local residents, he had been unable to find any witnesses to the abduction. 14.  On 21 January 2012 the investigators questioned the first applicant\u2019s wife, Ms T.A., who stated that she had a son, Sirazhudin Aliyev, and a daughter, Ms Zaira Aliyeva. In 2011 her daughter had been arrested by the Dagestan Federal Security Service (\u0423\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0424\u0435\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u0421\u043b\u0443\u0436\u0431\u044b \u0411\u0435\u0437\u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438 \u043f\u043e \u0420\u0435\u0441\u043f\u0443\u0431\u043b\u0438\u043a\u0435 \u0414\u0430\u0433\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0430\u043d (\u0424\u0421\u0411)) (hereinafter \u201cthe FSS\u201d) on suspicion of involvement with illegal armed groups but released ten days later without being charged. At about 5 p.m. on 21 January 2012 a young man had arrived at the store where T.A. had been working and asked her to dial Mr Sirazhudin Aliyev\u2019s mobile number. She had tried, but he had not got through to him. Then the man had told her that her son had been abducted by men in special uniforms and masks. After that the young man had left. According to T.A., her son had not had any enemies or unpaid debts. 15.  On 21 January 2012 the investigators questioned the mother of Gazimagomed Abdullayev, Ms P.A., who stated that she had not witnessed the abduction and had learned of it from her relatives. 16.  On 21 January 2012 the investigators questioned Gazimagomed Abdullayev\u2019s brother, Mr G.A., who stated that he had not witnessed the abduction but had learned of it from his relatives. 17.  On 22 January 2012 the investigators examined the crime scene. No evidence was collected. 18.  On 22 January 2012 the investigators questioned six local residents who owned black Lada Priora VAZ cars about their possible involvement in the abduction. No information indicating such involvement was obtained. 19.  Between 22 and 24 January 2012 the investigators questioned several salespersons and taxi drivers who had been working in the vicinity of the crime scene on the date of the abduction. All of them stated that they had not witnessed the incident. 20.  On 25 January 2012 a local religious association complained to the President of Dagestan on behalf of the applicants. In its letter it stated that Sirazhudin Aliyev and Gazimagomed Abdullayev had been abducted at the Eastern Market on 21 January 2012 and that the abductors, who had fired one gunshot, had been, \u201cjudging by all indications, from law\u2011enforcement agencies\u201d. In the end of January 2012 this complaint was forwarded to the investigators for examination and included in the investigation file. 21.  On 29 January 2012 the investigators questioned the first applicant, who provided them with a detailed account of the abduction, as related to him by a female witness named Fatima (in the documents submitted also referred to as \u201cFatimakhanum\u201d), according to whom his son, Sirazhudin Aliyev, and his son\u2019s friend, Gazimagomed Abdullayev, had been abducted by officers from the traffic police. The abductors had been in black masks and had fired one gunshot. The two young men had been forced by them into two separate (one black, one white) Lada Priora VAZ cars with registration numbers indicating that they were from the Stavropol region. According to the Government\u2019s submission of 12 September 2012, on an unspecified date between January and August 2012 the investigators had tried to question the witness, but to no avail, as she had left her place of permanent residence and moved elsewhere. 22.  On 31 January 2012 the Investigations Department initiated a criminal investigation into the abduction under Articles 126 and 162 of the Criminal Code (kidnapping and highway robbery) and the case file was given the number 20150. 23.  On 2 February 2012 the investigators questioned Ms M.A., who stated that on 21 January 2012 she had been a passenger on local minivan bus no. 4 (together with other passengers); after the minibus had pulled up next to the market she had seen two young men on the ground being handcuffed. She had immediately called the police and reported the incident, adding that a tall man of athletic build in a black face mask had been standing next to the two young men, but that she had not managed to clearly note the features of the other men who had participated in the incident. 24.  On 4 February 2012 the investigators questioned the second applicant, who stated that she had learned from her relatives of her husband\u2019s abduction. On 28 January 2012 she had arrived at the house of the parents of her abducted husband; after her arrival, men in face masks had told her to go with them to the Kirovskiy district police station in Makhachkala. She had agreed to go with them, accompanied by her brother, Mr G.G.; however, instead of the police station, they had been taken to the CTC, where she had been questioned about telephone numbers that had been called by her abducted husband. After that she had been photographed, samples of her hair and nails had been taken and then she and her brother had been released. 25.  On 9 and 10 February 2012 the applicants lodged complaints in respect of their relatives\u2019 abduction with the Dagestan Minister of the Interior (\u041c\u0438\u043d\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e \u0412\u043d\u0443\u0442\u0440\u0435\u043d\u043d\u0438\u0445 \u0414\u0435\u043b \u0420\u0435\u0441\u043f\u0443\u0431\u043b\u0438\u043a\u0438 \u0414\u0430\u0433\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0430\u043d) and the FSS. They described the circumstances of the abduction and asked to be told whether the police and FSS officers had participated in it. 26.  On 15 February 2012 the first applicant was granted victim status in the criminal case and questioned. He provided a detailed account of the abduction that was similar to that submitted to the Court. In particular, he stated that he had not been present during the incident but had learned of it from his wife. According to her, the abductors had been in the uniforms of the traffic police in VAZ cars (the Lada Priora model \u2013 one white and one black) with registration numbers containing the digits 177 or 777, indicating that they were from the Stavropol region. The group of seven or eight abductors had stopped a car containing Sirazhudin Aliyev and Gazimagomed Abdullayev, forced them out, put them into their own vehicles and driven off. A few minutes later someone had driven the abducted men\u2019s car away. From an unidentified source the first applicant learned that certain lawyers were assisting in the release of the abducted men. He had been told by those lawyers to meet with someone at 7 p.m. on 3 February 2012 in a VAZ car (the Lada Priora model) in order to receive information about his son. When the first applicant had gone to the meeting, he had spoken with an unidentified man who had told him that for two days after the abduction Sirazhudin Aliyev and Gazimagomed Abdullayev had been detained at the CTC and that then they had been transferred to the North Caucasus Headquarters of the CTC in the Stavropol region under the command of General Chenchik. According to the applicant, neither he nor his wife had found that information credible; the abductors had most probably not been traffic police officers but could have belonged to other law-enforcement agencies and had simply dressed in traffic police uniforms. 27.  On 17 February 2012 the second applicant was granted victim status in the criminal case. She stated that she had learned of the abduction from her relatives. On 28 January 2012 she had gone to the parents of her husband and discovered that at least six law-enforcement officers had been conducting a search of their house and that the head of the group had been a certain Mr A.G. The latter had then told the second applicant that she had to go with them to the police station to provide a statement concerning someone who had allegedly been hiding in her flat, as he was wanted by the authorities for the murder of an FSS officer. The second applicant, her child and her brother, Mr G.G., had been taken to the CTC headquarters, where she had been questioned about telephone numbers that had been dialed by her husband. She had then been fingerprinted and samples of her nails and hair had been taken; then she had gone home. 28.  On 26 February 2012 the investigators questioned the second applicant\u2019s mother, Ms B.M., who stated that she had not witnessed the abduction and had learned of it from her relatives. She further stated that on 28 or 29 January 2012 her house had been searched by representatives of a law-enforcement agency looking for a man suspected of killing the above\u2011mentioned FSS officer. 29.  On 8 and 17 April 2012 the investigators questioned salespersons Ms Z.G., Ms S.B., Ms I.S., Ms A.G. and Ms Z.R., all of whom stated that they had not witnessed the abduction. 30.  Between 29 April and 15 May 2012 the investigators questioned three other salespersons and three taxi drivers, all of whom stated that they had not witnessed the abduction. 31.  On 18 May 2012 the investigators questioned operational search officer Mr A.G. of the CTC, who stated that the Abdullayev family had been known to them as adherents of illegal armed groups. At the end of January 2012 he had participated in a search of their house conducted together with police officers from the Kirovskiy district police station in Makhachkala (see paragraph 27 above). The search had been conducted in connection with an investigation into the murder of an FSS officer. After the search, the second applicant and her mother had been taken to the CTC headquarters to provide statements to the investigators. The witness had learned of the abduction of Gazimagomed Abdullayev during the conduct of the search. 32.  On 31 May 2012 the criminal investigation was suspended; on 31 August 2012 it was resumed following criticism voiced by the supervisory authorities. Explaining the decision to overrule the suspension of the investigation the deputy head of the Dagestan Investigations Department stated, inter alia, the following:\n\u201c... the decision to suspend the investigation was taken in violation of Article 208 \u00a7 5 of the Criminal Procedure Code \u2013 that is to say prematurely, \u2013 given that all possible steps had not been taken ...\nIn connection with the above, the decision should be overruled as unlawful and the investigation should be resumed.\nIt is necessary that the investigators take the following steps:\n-  take additional measures to establish the whereabouts and question [the applicants] and the persons with whom on 3 February 2012 [the first applicant] had a meeting concerning the abduction of Sirazhudin Aliyev and Gazimagomed Abdullayev;\n-  question Sirazhudin Aliyev\u2019s friends, Mr T., Mr S. and Mr D.;\n-  [(after obtaining court authorisation),] examine the list of mobile telephone calls made by Sirazhudin Aliyev and Gazimagomed Abdullayev ...\u201d 33.  On 30 September 2012 the investigation was suspended again. None of the witnesses specified in the above decision to resume the proceedings were questioned. The applicants were informed of the suspension. 34.  On 1 October 2012 the investigation was resumed again after criticism from the deputy head of the Dagestan Investigations Department, who stated, inter alia, the following:\n\u201c... in violation of part 5 of Article 208 of the Criminal Procedure Code the investigation failed to take all the investigative steps possible to establish the [identity of the perpetrators]; therefore, the decision to suspend the proceedings should be overruled as unlawful.\nIt is necessary that the investigation take the following steps: 1. Question Sirazhudin Aliyev and Gazimagomed Abdullayev\u2019s close relatives to find out whether ... they received any [conditions to be met in respect of] their return;\n... 4. Ask the Russian Federal Service for the Execution of Sentences whether the abducted men are being detained in their facilities;\n... 35.  On 5 November 2012 the investigation was again suspended without any of the supervisory authorities\u2019 orders given on 1 October 2012 being carried out, except for the forwarding of requests for information to various State authorities. The applicants were informed of the suspension. 36.  On 28 January 2013 the investigation was again resumed following criticism from the supervisory authorities (this time the Leninskiy district prosecutor in Makhachkala), who pointed out the following:\n\u201c... the investigation of the criminal case has been suspended on three occasions for failure to establish the identity of the perpetrators. On each occasion, the decision was similar to the previous ones, without the [requested] steps having been taken.\nSuch circumstances demonstrate that the investigators violated Article 61 of the Criminal Procedure Code concerning the time-limit for investigation and demonstrate a lack of oversight on the part of the supervisors from the Investigation Committee.\nThe last decision to suspend ... taken on 5 November 2012 ... should be overruled as unlawful for the following reasons.\nAn examination of the case file showed that the investigation of the criminal case had been conducted with violations of the criminal procedure regulations. For instance, prior to the suspension of the proceedings, the investigator should have taken all the steps possible in the absence of the suspect or accused and taken all the steps necessary to establish the identity of the perpetrator.\nHowever, the investigation [in the present case] failed to question close relatives of Sirazhudin Aliyev and Gazimagomed Abdullayev ...\nThe list of mobile telephone calls [made by the abducted men] has not been examined;\nReplies to ten requests for information forwarded to the law-enforcement agencies and State bodies have not been received ...\u201d 37.  On 4 February 2013 the investigators were ordered to comply with the above instructions within one month and the investigation of the criminal case was forwarded to the investigations department of the Leninskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office in Makhachkala. 38.  On 7 February 2013 the investigators examined a list of mobile telephone calls made by the abducted men. 39.  On 14 February 2013 the second applicant asked the investigators to provide her with copies of documents from the investigation file concerning the disappearance of her husband stating that she needed them in order to initiate civil proceedings to recognise him a missing person and to obtain compensation for the loss of her family\u2019s breadwinner. On 15 February 2013 her request was granted. 40.  On 18 February 2013 the investigators again questioned the second applicant\u2019s mother and Gazimagomed Abdullayev\u2019s mother-in-law, Ms B.M., who confirmed her earlier statement (see paragraph 28 above) and stated that she and her relatives had not heard from Gazimagomed Abdullayev since his abduction. 41.  On 4 March 2013 the investigation was suspended again. The applicants were informed thereof. 42.  On 12 August 2013 the investigation was again resumed after criticism voiced by the supervisory authorities. The decision overruling the suspension again enumerated the steps not taken by the investigators, in violation of the previously given orders, and stressed that the proceedings were to be resumed, having been adjourned unlawfully. The investigators were instructed to take eighteen steps listed in a special order issued on the same date. 43.  On 3 September 2013 the investigators again questioned Gazimagomed Abdullayev\u2019s brother, Mr G.A. (see paragraph 16 above), who stated that at about 4.30 p.m. on 21 February 2012 he had learned of the abduction from his uncle Mr R.A. The two of them, together with the mother of Sirazhudin Aliyev, had gone to see a lawyer named Shamil. According to G.A., Mr R.A. had had information about the names of the eyewitnesses to the abduction. 44.  On 3 September 2013 the investigators questioned Gazimagomed Abdullayev\u2019s uncle, Mr R.A., who stated that on 21 January 2012 he had been in his store when two young men had told him that Gazimagomed Abdullayev and Sirazhudin Aliyev had been forced into VAZ cars (one the Lada Priora model and one the 2110 model) and taken away. Gazimagomed Abdullayev\u2019s mobile telephone had been switched off. His car had been taken away by the abductors. After that Mr G.A. and the mothers of the abducted men had gone to a lawyer named Shamil, who had contacts with human rights organisations. 45.  On 27 August 2013 the investigators requested court authorisation to obtain a list of mobile telephone calls made by the first applicant between 20 January and 20 February 2012. 46.  On 13 September 2013 the investigators obtained and examined the list of the first applicant\u2019s mobile telephone calls. 47.  On 14 September 2013 the investigators again questioned the first applicant, who confirmed his earlier statements (see paragraph 21 and 26 above). In addition, he provided a detailed description of his son\u2019s appearance. 48.  On 17 September 2013 the investigators again questioned Ms M.A., who confirmed her earlier statement (see paragraph 23 above) and added that the abduction had been witnessed not only by her, but also by the other passengers of minivan bus no. 4; however, she had been the only one who had called the police about the incident. 49.  On 18 September 2013 the investigators questioned Ms T.A. (the first applicant\u2019s wife and the mother of Sirazhudin Aliyev), who stated that her daughter, the sister of Sirazhudin Aliyev, had been detained by the FSS on suspicion of involvement in illegal armed groups and an extremist religious movement. In the evening on that date, she had learned of her son\u2019s abduction. From the very beginning, she had suspected that officers of law\u2011enforcement agencies had perpetrated it. 50.  On 19 September 2013 the investigators again suspended the proceedings for failure to establish the identity of the perpetrators. The applicants were informed of the suspension. 51.  On 28 October 2013 the investigation was resumed again. The relevant decision stated that the proceedings were to be resumed because of \u201cthe need to verify the involvement of traffic police officers in the abduction, given that witnesses to the incident stated that the perpetrators looked like policemen\u201d. The applicants were informed of that decision. 52.  On 8, 18 and 24 November 2013 the investigators questioned traffic police officers G.O., Z.G. and K.K., all of whom stated that in January 2012 they and their colleagues had not conducted any special operations and that they had not heard of the abducted men before. 53.  On 28 November 2013 the investigators again suspended the proceedings and informed the applicants of the suspension. 54.  On 20 December 2013 the investigation was again resumed after criticism voiced by the supervisory authorities. The decision stated, amongst other things, the following:\n\u201c... the decision to suspend the investigation is premature and unsubstantiated for the following reasons:\nThe investigators failed to carry out in full the [supervisory authorities\u2019] orders of 12 August 2013 ...\n[They] failed to question Ms Z.A., who organised the [first applicant\u2019s] meeting with the persons who had pointed out that the abduction had been perpetrated by officers of law-enforcement agencies ...\nThe witness statement of Ms M.A. was not re-enacted at the crime scene in order to establish the circumstances of the incident in detail ...\nOther numerous deficiencies in the investigation have not been remedied ...\u201d 55.  On 1 February 2014 the investigators again questioned the first applicant, who confirmed his earlier statements (see paragraphs 21, 26 and 47 above). He also stated that the perpetrators of the abduction of Sirazhudin Aliyev had most probably been officers of law-enforcement agencies and that his daughter, Ms Zaira Aliyeva, had been killed by law\u2011enforcement agents on 18 January 2014 during a special operation in Makhachkala. 56.  On 2 February 2014 the investigators again questioned Gazimagomed Abdullayev\u2019s brother, Mr G.A., who confirmed his earlier statements (see paragraphs 16 and 43 above). 57.  On 4 and 8 February 2014 the investigators again questioned Ms B.M. and Ms M.A., both of whom confirmed their earlier statements (see paragraphs 28 and 48 above). 58.  On 8 February 2014 the investigators again examined the crime scene (see paragraph 17 above). No evidence was collected. 59.  On various dates in February 2014 the investigators obtained samples of blood and saliva from the abducted men\u2019s relatives for expert genetic evaluation and inclusion in the regional DNA database. 60.  On 8 February 2014 the investigators examined the first applicant\u2019s house. No evidence was collected. 61.  On 9 February 2014 the investigation was again suspended. 62.  On 15 February 2014 the investigation was resumed following criticism by the supervisory authorities. The relevant decision stated that the suspension was premature and unlawful and that the investigators had failed to take a number of necessary steps; moreover, they had \u201cfailed to correct numerous shortcomings in the investigation.\u201d 63.  On various dates in March 2014 the investigators questioned the abducted men\u2019s neighbours, Mr O.G., Mr M.M., Mr S.G. and Mr B. Kh., whose statements did not yield any new information. 64.  On 15 April 2014 the investigation was suspended again. 65.  On 23 April 2014 the investigation was again resumed following criticism by the supervisory authorities. The reasoning for the decision to order the resumption of the investigation decision stated that the suspension had been premature and unlawful and that the investigators had failed to re\u2011qualify the crime from that of abduction under Article 126 of the Criminal Code to that of murder under Article 105 of the Criminal Code. (The investigators should have done this, given that the abducted men had been missing for more than two years.) 66.  On 28 April 2014 the investigators questioned the abducted men\u2019s acquaintance, Mr Z. Sh., whose statement did not yield any new information. 67.  On 11 May 2014 the investigators complied with the supervisory authorities\u2019 orders of 23 April 2014 and re-qualified the crime committed in respect of Sirazhudin Aliyev and Gazimagomed Abdullayev from that of abduction to that of murder. 68.  On 12 May 2014 the investigators again questioned the second applicant, who confirmed her earlier statements (see paragraphs 24 and 27 above). 69.  On 17 February 2014 the samples of blood and saliva obtained from Sirazhudin Aliyev and Gazimagomed Abdullayev\u2019s relatives were examined (see paragraph 59 above). 70.  On 24 May 2014 the investigation of the criminal case was suspended again. The applicants were informed of the suspension. 71.  On 25 June 2014 the Leninskiy district prosecutor in Makhachkala examined the criminal case file and concluded that the suspension of the proceedings had been lawful. 72.  As can be seen from the documents submitted the proceedings are still pending. 73.   According to the applicants, the investigators failed to inform them of the course of the criminal proceedings in a timely manner.", "references": ["4", "3", "6", "8", "9", "7", "1", "5", "No Label", "0", "2"], "gold": ["0", "2"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1980 and lives in Kushchevskaya, Krasnodar Region. 5.  On 9 December 2010 the applicant was charged in absentia with accessory to murder and his name was put on the wanted list. 6.  On 16 December 2010 the Kushchevskiy District Court of the Krasnodar Region issued a detention order against the applicant in absentia. 7.  On 21 January 2011 the applicant reported to the police station where he was arrested. 8.  On 29 March 2011 the District Court remanded the applicant in custody. In particular the court held, as follows:\n\u201c... [the applicant] is suspected of having committed an extremely serious offence entailing 8 to 20 years\u2019 custodial sentence or life imprisonment. As it has been established that during investigation [the applicant] stated that he intended to leave Russia and talked on the phone with a person living in Geneva ..., if released, [the applicant] might abscond, commit another offence, and threaten witnesses or other parties to criminal proceedings, destroy evidence or in any other way interfere with the investigation...\u201d. 9.  On 19 April 2011 the District Court extended the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention on the following grounds:\n\u201c[The applicant] is accused of an extremely serious offence entailing 10 years\u2019 imprisonment. The case materials contain evidence confirming his involvement in crimes. Moreover, ... he may abscond or, if released, commit other crimes. These circumstances existed as of the date of [the applicant\u2019s] placement into custody and have not changed at the present time. ... Taking into account that it is necessary to conduct numerous investigative activities, the court shall grant the investigator\u2019s request [to extend the applicant\u2019s detention]\u201d. 10.  The applicant remained in detention pending investigation and trial. The courts extended his detention, using the above formula. The courts referred also to the applicant\u2019s family status, personality, state of health, possibility to put pressure on witnesses and interfere with the investigation, absence of job. In particular, on 25 January 2012 the court held as follows:\n\u201c... taking into account the personality of the accused, his family status, state of health and other circumstances, the court shall grant the investigator\u2019s request and extend [the applicant\u2019s] detention\u201d. 11.  The applicant lodged appeals against some detention orders but the courts rejected them. 12.  On 2 November 2011 the applicant was additionally charged with membership in a criminal gang, six counts of unlawful transportation of fire arms and ammunition, attempted murder and murder. 13.  In October 2012 the applicant, along with two co-defendants, was committed to stand trial before the Krasnodar Regional Court. 14.  On 7 June 2013 the applicant was released. 15.  On 19 June 2013 the Krasnodar Regional Court acquitted the applicant of all charges and held that the applicant be informed of the right to rehabilitation. 16.  On 30 September 2013 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the judgment of 19 June 2013 on appeal. 17.  The applicant brought a claim against the Federal Treasury seeking compensation for pecuniary damage (legal expenses). 18.  On 3 June 2014, the Regional Court awarded the applicant 680,600 Russian roubles as reimbursement of legal fees.", "references": ["5", "9", "4", "1", "7", "3", "0", "8", "6", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicants, whose years of birth are summarised in the Appendix, live in Troitsko-Pechorsk of the Komi Republic. 5.  They were municipal unitary enterprise employees working for \u201cTroitsko-Pechorskoye ZhKKh\u201d (\u00ab\u041c\u0423\u041f \u00ab\u0422\u0440\u043e\u0438\u0446\u043a\u043e-\u041f\u0435\u0447\u0435\u0440\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0435 \u0416\u041a\u0425\u00bb, \u201cthe company\u201d) in the Komi Republic. 6.  The company was set up in 2003 in accordance with a decision of Head of the Troitsko-Pechorskiy District (\u201cthe district administration\u201d) as a commercial organisation performing the following activities, among others: renovation and maintenance of the municipal housing stock; heating and water supply to the district population and enterprises; maintenance of the sewage systems; maintenance services in respect of municipal housing and adjacent territories; and providing real estate registration services in the Troitsko-Pechorskiy District. In order to carry out its statutory activities, the company had \u201cthe right of economic control\u201d (\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043e \u0445\u043e\u0437\u044f\u0439\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0432\u0435\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f) over the assets allocated to it by the town administration (see Liseytseva and Maslov v. Russia, nos. 39483/05 and 40527/10, \u00a7\u00a7 55-75, 9 October 2014 for further details on the company\u2019s status). 7.  In 2004-2006 the district administration withdrew the company\u2019s several assets, including \u201chousing and objects of the engineering infrastructure\u201d and transferred them to the municipal district treasury. 8.  On the dates tabulated in the Appendix below the Justice of the Peace of the Troitsko\u2011Pechorskiy Court Circuit of the Komi Republic by separate judgments and court writs ordered the company to pay the applicants salary arrears. On the dates listed in the Appendix the awards became enforceable. 9.  It appears from the parties\u2019 observations of 2011 that Ms Lyubas (application no. 10742/09) obtained at least two other judgments in her favour which had been issued on 22 June and 2 November 2007 against the debtor enterprise. 10.  Between April 2007 and September 2008 some applicants received the amounts specified in the \u201cenforcement status\u201d column of the Appendix. The Government submitted, without further details, that Ms Lyubas was paid 56,021 Russian roubles pursuant to unspecified domestic judicial decisions in her favour. Ms Lyubas, interviewed in the domestic proceedings, maintained that the award of 21 December 2006 had not been paid to her. 11.  On 11 December 2006 the supervision procedure was put in place in respect of the company. On 14 May 2007 the Commercial Court of the Komi Republic declared the company insolvent and the liquidation proceedings commenced. 12.  At some point before 9 November 2007 the prosecutor\u2019s office conducted an inquiry and, having analysed the manner of the assets\u2019 withdrawal and transfer by the owner, concluded that the owner\u2019s actions contained elements of deliberate bankruptcy. It appears that at some point the prosecutor\u2019s office refused to open criminal proceedings on account of the alleged deliberate bankruptcy of the company. In November 2007 the prosecutor\u2019s office also held an inquiry into the liquidator\u2019s actions, found that she had acted in compliance with the domestic law and refused to bring administrative proceedings against her. 13.  During the insolvency proceedings the liquidator lodged numerous actions on the company\u2019s behalf claiming, inter alia, unpaid communal charges from local population. The amount recovered proved insufficient to settle all creditors\u2019 claims. 14.  At some point the liquidator lodged an action on the company\u2019s behalf against the district administration under Article 56 \u00a7 3 (subsidiary liability) of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation. He argued that the insolvency of the company had been caused by the administration. He submitted that, as a result of a series of the asset transfers in 2004-2006, the company had become unable to meet the creditors\u2019 claims and to continue to carry out its statutory goals. 15.  On 3 March 2010 the Federal Commercial Court of the Volgo\u2011Vyatskiy Circuit rejected the claim in the cassation instance, and on 12 July 2010 the Supreme Commercial Court refused to accept for examination a request for supervisory review of that judgment. The domestic courts at all instances accepted that the assets had indeed been transferred from the company\u2019s economic control to the district treasury. However, they found no evidence that the insolvency had been caused by the owner\u2019s actions. In particular, after the withdrawal of assets the company still had been able to meet the creditors\u2019 claims. The housing and objects of the engineering infrastructure on 30 January 2006 had been withdrawn \u201cin order to apply the housing policy\u201d and to \u201creduce the company\u2019s expenses for the maintenance of the infrastructure objects\u201d. In particular, the Ministry of Architecture and Communal Services of the Komi Republic had recommended the municipalities to withdraw objects of housing and engineering infrastructure from unitary enterprises in order to optimise taxes of housing and communal services providers. Finally, even though at the insolvency stage the company proved unable to meet the creditors\u2019 claims, the claimant had failed to demonstrate that the owner \u201cknew or ought to have known that [the transfer of the assets] would have led to the company\u2019s insolvency\u201d. 16.   On 28 December 2011 the Commercial Court of the Komi Republic ordered the respondent company\u2019s liquidation. Creditors\u2019 claims which had not been satisfied during the liquidation procedure due to the debtor\u2019s shortage of funds, including the applicant\u2019s claims, were considered as settled. On the same date the liquidation was recorded in the Register of Legal Entities, and the company ceased to exist. The judgments in the applicants\u2019 favour have remained unenforced either in full or in part, as indicated in a relevant part of the Appendix below.", "references": ["5", "6", "1", "8", "2", "4", "7", "0", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in Vinkovci. 6.  By a judgment of 1 June 2006 the Vinkovci Municipal Court (Op\u0107inski sud u Vinkovcima) ordered the applicant\u2019s former employer, the company MD Profil d.o.o. (hereinafter \u201cthe debtor company\u201d), to pay him 20,921.18 Croatian kunas (HRK)[1] as remuneration for overtime work, together with accrued statutory default interest, and HRK 19,495.90[2] in costs. On 10 March 2008 the Vukovar County Court (\u017dupanijski sud u Vukovaru) upheld the first-instance court\u2019s judgment, which thereby became final. 7.  By a judgment of 17 January 2008 the \u017dupanja Municipal Court (Op\u0107inski sud u \u017dupanji) found the applicant guilty of the criminal offence of embezzlement committed against his former employer, the debtor company. It sentenced him to ten months\u2019 imprisonment, suspended for a period of two years provided that in that period he did not commit a further offence. The court also ordered the applicant to pay the debtor company HRK 20,311.78[3] in compensation for pecuniary damage caused by his offence. 8.  On 14 April 2008 the applicant applied to the \u0110akovo Municipal Court (Op\u0107inski sud u \u0110akovu) for enforcement of the above judgment of 1 June 2006 (see paragraph 6 above). 9.  The next day, on 15 April 2008, that court issued a writ of execution (rje\u0161enje o ovrsi) whereby it ordered the seizure of funds in the debtor company\u2019s bank account in order to satisfy the applicant\u2019s claim. 10.  The debtor company lodged an appeal, and on 28 August 2008 the Osijek County Court (\u017dupanijski sud u Osijeku) quashed the writ of execution and remitted the case to the first-instance court. It found that the judgment sought to be enforced had not been stamped with a certificate of enforceability and that a grace period for voluntary compliance (paricijski rok) had not been set. 11.  In the new proceedings before the \u0110akovo Municipal Court the applicant submitted on 25 September 2008 a copy of the judgment that he was seeking to enforce stamped with a certificate of enforceability. At the same time, he asked the court to set a grace period for voluntary compliance, pursuant to the law. 12.  On 7 November 2008 the court issued a new writ of execution. It ordered the debtor company to pay the applicant, within a grace period of eight days (a) the sums it had been ordered to pay under the judgment of 1 June 2006 (that is to say the main debt, together with accrued statutory default interest, and the costs of the civil proceedings, see paragraph 6 above), (b) the statutory default interest accrued on the costs of the civil proceedings from the date of delivery of that judgment, and (c) the costs of enforcement proceedings, together with the statutory default interest accrued on those costs from the date of issuance of the writ of execution. 13.  By a decision of 19 February 2009 the Osijek County Court dismissed the debtor company\u2019s appeal and upheld the writ of execution. 14.  Upon receiving, on 27 February 2009, the final judgment of the criminal court of 17 January 2008 (see paragraph 7 above), the debtor company on 9 March 2009 sent a letter containing a set-off statement to the applicant\u2019s legal representative whereby it set off (prijeboj) its claim for compensation against the applicant stemming from that judgment with his claim for payment of overtime work against the debtor company stemming from the judgment he was seeking to enforce. 15.  On the same day, 9 March 2009, the debtor company informed the court that it had received the above-mentioned final judgment of the criminal court and that it had executed the set-off described above (see the preceding paragraph). The debtor company at the same time lodged an extraordinary appeal against the writ of execution of 7 November 2008 (see paragraph 12 above) and lodged an application to postpone the enforcement. 16.  By a decision of 27 March 2009 the \u0110akovo Municipal Court decided on the debtor company\u2019s motion for postponement, instructing the debtor company to institute separate civil proceedings for the enforcement to be declared inadmissible (in full or in part). At the same time it postponed the enforcement pending the final outcome of those proceedings. 17.  The debtor company instituted those civil proceedings on 14 April 2009. They ended on 31 March 2011, when the Osijek County Court upheld the first-instance judgment of the \u0110akovo Municipal Court of 21 October 2010, whereby the enforcement of up to HRK 20,095.30[4] was declared inadmissible. The second-instance judgment was served on the debtor company on 11 May 2011 and on the applicant a day later. 18.  Following an appeal lodged by the applicant, on 21 January 2010 the Osijek County Court quashed the first-instance decision of 27 March 2009 (see paragraph 16 above) in so far as it allowed the postponement of the enforcement and in this respect remitted the case. It dismissed the remainder of the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld the first-instance decision in the remaining part. 19.  In the resumed proceedings, by a decision of 17 June 2010 the \u0110akovo Municipal Court again postponed the enforcement. 20.  On 3 February 2011 the Osijek County Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal against that decision and upheld it. 21.  On 24 May 2011 the applicant informed the \u0110akovo Municipal Court that the judgment declaring the enforcement inadmissible in part had become final (see paragraph 17 above) and asked it to continue with the enforcement in the remaining part. 22.  By a decision of 2 June 2011 that court decided to resume the enforcement in the remaining part. By another decision of the same date that court ordered the debtor company to pay the applicant: (a) HRK 599.40[5] for unpaid overtime work, together with statutory default interest accrued since 11 March 2009, (b) HRK 19,495.90[6] in costs of civil proceedings, together with statutory default interest accrued since 1 June 2006, and (c) HRK 2,606.25[7] in costs of enforcement proceedings, together with statutory default interest accrued since 7 November 2008. This decision became final on 17 June 2011. 23.  On 20 June 2011 the court informed the Domestic Payments Agency (Financijska agencija \u2013 FINA) of its second decision of 2 June 2011 (see the preceding paragraph). In the execution of that decision the agency on 21 July 2011 transferred HRK 38,306.87[8] from the debtor company\u2019s bank account to those of the applicant and his legal representative. 24.  Meanwhile, on 9 October 2009 the applicant lodged a request for protection of the right to a hearing within a reasonable time (zahtjev za za\u0161titu prava na su\u0111enje u razumnom roku) with the Osijek County Court, complaining about the length of the above enforcement proceedings. 25.  By a decision of 9 November 2010 the Osijek County Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s request. It held that, while the case was indeed important for the applicant, the proceedings complained of were complex and he had contributed to their length in that he had not initially submitted a copy of the judgment he was seeking to enforce stamped with a certificate of enforceability (see paragraphs 8-11 above). 26.  On 25 November 2010 the applicant appealed against that decision. 27.  By a decision of 6 June 2011 the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske) dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal and served its decision on his representative on 26 August 2011. 28.  On 23 September 2011 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint against the second-instance decision. 29.  By a decision of 12 December 2012 the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) declared inadmissible the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint and served that decision on his representative on 31 December 2012. It held that the contested second-instance decision was not open to constitutional review.", "references": ["6", "5", "4", "0", "8", "7", "9", "2", "1", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Ko\u0161ice. 6.  The applicant, the father of a child, has been involved in domestic litigation concerning numerous claims on upbringing and maintenance of the child since 1993. 7.  The present application concerns three interrelated claims brought before the \u010cadca District Court on 12 March 2003 and subsequently on 3 July and 16 December 2003. These claims were all registered under the same case file no. P 170/93 and concerned the applicant\u2019s rights of contact with his child and his request for custody of the child. The action of 3 July 2003 related to child maintenance and had been brought by the national authority, acting as a guardian ad litem for the child. 8.  In the course of the proceedings, the District Court examined extensive evidence. This included the assessment of several reports from the appointed guardian ad litem, an opinion from a psychology expert seeking to establish the circumstances of the relationship between the applicant and the child, personal and financial circumstances of the applicant, his medical condition as well as the medical reports of the child.\nThe District Court held nine hearings on the merits, out of which the applicant attended two. It also decided on an interim measure in relation to the contact between the applicant and the child, which was challenged and quashed on appeal twice.\nDuring the course of the proceeding, the applicant asked for a court fee exemption. He also lodged seven motions, by which he had challenged the judges of the District Court as well as the Regional Court for bias. When he had challenged the judges of the latter court on ground of bias, the Supreme Court dealt with those motions. 9.  The District Court twice ruled on the merits of the case, on 20 August 2008 and 31 March 2011 respectively. This was due to the fact that the judgment was partly upheld and party quashed on appeal on the first occasion. It also stayed the proceedings in respect of the applicant\u2019s right to contact with his child because the child had reached the age of majority in the meantime. 10.  The applicant lodged a constitutional complaint relying on several Convention as well as Constitution Articles. He challenged among others the length of proceedings held before the District Court. 11.  On 6 October 2011 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint in respect of the length of the proceedings on the ground that the matter at stake was complicated due to the three aforesaid interrelated claims.\nThe Constitutional Court took into account the sensitive nature of the case and the District Court\u2019s repeated requests for an expert opinion in order to assess the best interest of the child. It also considered the applicant\u2019s behaviour during the proceedings, his seven absences during the nine scheduled hearings, as well as his seven challenges of the domestic courts\u2019 judges for bias, which protracted the proceedings by three years and eight months.\nIn the light of the above, the Constitutional Court found no unreasonable delays in the District Court\u2019s procedure. 12.  Subsequently, on 21 March 2012, the \u017dilina Regional Court dealt with the applicant\u2019s second appeal and delivered the judgment on the merits of the case, which became final on 2 April 2012. It partly upheld the District Court\u2019s judgment and partly amended it. 13.  The applicant then lodged an application for reimbursement of a court fee he had paid for one of his challenges of the judge for bias. This motion was dismissed by two levels of jurisdiction and the decision became final on 8 February 2013.", "references": ["4", "2", "9", "5", "1", "7", "8", "0", "6", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicants were prosecuted in Russia for various crimes. They were arrested and detained while the crimes were investigated and pending trial. Their detention was ordered and extended by the courts. The detention orders were essentially based on the gravity of the charges, the primary grounds being the risk of the applicants\u2019 absconding and interfering with the course of justice. The detention and extension orders used stereotypical formulae, without addressing specific facts or considering alternative preventive measures. 6.  The first applicant was born in 1982 and was detained in Irkutsk. 7.  On 23 December 2008 the first applicant, a police officer at the material time, was arrested and placed in pre-trial detention. On an unspecified date he was formally charged with banditry, kidnapping, abuse of power, robbery (four counts), preparing to commit robbery, intentionally damaging another\u2019s property, and stealing and damaging official documents. On 19 April 2010 he, along with thirteen co-defendants, was committed for trial before the Irkutsk Regional Court. On 7 November 2011 the Irkutsk Regional Court convicted him of abuse of power, and sentenced him to three years\u2019 imprisonment and disqualification from holding public office for one year. He was released on parole. 8.  The second applicant was born in 1967 and was detained in Penza. 9.  On 14 February 2009 a criminal case was opened into an incident of fraud involving an apartment, which had caused damage in the amount of 440,000 Russian roubles (RUB). On 24 June 2009 the second applicant was arrested. On 8 June 2010 the Leninskiy District Court of Penza found him guilty as charged and sentenced him to eleven months\u2019 imprisonment.", "references": ["0", "4", "9", "7", "6", "5", "8", "1", "3", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1981 and lives in Hotarele, V\u00e2lcea County. 6.  On 12 November 2004, in Spain, the applicant gave birth to a girl. The father was R.E.N., a Bulgarian national. In 2008 the couple split up. 7.  The child lived with her parents in Spain until January 2007, when she was sent to her paternal grandparents in Bulgaria. She remained there until March 2008. From March until June 2008 the couple again lived together with their daughter in Spain; then, with the father\u2019s consent, the applicant returned with her daughter to Romania for what was meant to be a short stay with the child\u2019s maternal grandmother. The applicant remained with her daughter in Romania until September 2008 and subsequently returned to Spain to work, leaving the child in Romania with her maternal grandmother. 8.  On 4 November 2008 the child\u2019s paternal grandparents visited the child in Romania. With the maternal grandmother\u2019s consent, they took the child to town for ice-cream, accompanied by her aunt (the wife of the applicant\u2019s brother). They stopped the car on the side of the road, expelled the aunt from the car and then returned to Bulgaria, taking the child with them without the knowledge or consent of the applicant or her family. The child has been living in Bulgaria with her paternal grandparents ever since. 9.  On 29 July 2008 the applicant, represented by counsel, lodged a request for full custody of the child with the R\u00e2mnicu V\u00e2lcea District Court (\u201cthe District Court\u201d). She initially indicated that R.E.N. was living in Romania with her family. However, during the proceedings the applicant told the court that R.E.N. no longer lived in Romania and that she did not know his whereabouts. As a summons could therefore not be served on him, it was posted at the court\u2019s premises and published in a newspaper. Later on the applicant provided an address in Spain, which turned out to be incomplete. 10.  The court postponed four times the examination of the case, mainly on account of attempts made by the applicant and her lawyer to establish R.E.N.\u2019s whereabouts and to secure his presence in court. On 21 November 2008 the District Court heard two witnesses for the applicant. On the same date, the applicant informed the court that her daughter had been kidnapped by the paternal grandparents. 11.  On 30 January 2009 the District Court awarded custody of the child to the applicant, on the basis of the evidence in the case file, including the witness evidence and a report made by the Child Protection Agency following a visit in the applicant\u2019s home. The parties had fifteen days to appeal. 12.  In September 2009 R.E.N. sought leave to appeal outside the time limit (cerere de repunere \u00een termenul de apel), submitting that he had been living in Bulgaria with his parents throughout the period of the proceedings and that the applicant had known of that fact. On 11 December 2009 the V\u00e2lcea County Court (\u201cthe County Court\u201d) quashed the decision of 30 January 2009 (see paragraph 11 above) on the ground that R.E.N. had not been legally summoned to appear. It sent the case back to the District Court. 13.  On 12 February 2010 the case file was again registered with the District Court. Eleven hearings were held and the applicant and/or her counsel were present at all of them. The court heard evidence from the two parents and from four witnesses (two for each party \u2013 R.E.N. summoned his neighbours from Bulgaria) and ordered the child protection agencies in Romania and Bulgaria to investigate the living conditions both in the applicant\u2019s mother\u2019s home and in the paternal grandparents\u2019 home in Bulgaria. The latter investigation was ordered by the court on 18 March 2010; the court order arrived at R.E.N.\u2019s counsel\u2019s office on 17 May 2010 and the latter added to the case file the final report of that investigation in both Bulgarian and Romanian on 2 September 2010. 14.  In a decision of 11 November 2010 the District Court again awarded custody to the applicant. The court also noted that on 22 December 2008 R.E.N. had instituted similar proceedings in Bulgaria. Given that he had lodged his application for full custody of the child with the Bulgarian courts only after the applicant had lodged her request with the Romanian courts, the District Court considered that it had jurisdiction to deal with the matter. On the merits, the court considered that while the living conditions offered by the father and paternal grandparents were superior to the ones available in the applicant\u2019s home, the father and the paternal grandparents did not set the child a satisfactory moral example. Regarding this point, the court referred to R.E.N.\u2019s criminal past and to the manner in which the paternal grandparents had kidnapped the child. 15.  The father lodged an appeal and the case was heard by the County Court. Five hearings took place before the County Court and both the applicant and her counsel were present at all of them. He (that is to say the father) asked the court to interview the child, who was aged seven at that time. On 10 June 2011 the court granted that request. On 14 June 2011 the applicant gave notarised consent for her daughter to obtain travel documents and to cross the border into Romania. On 29 August 2011 R.E.N. informed the applicant that the said notarised consent was not sufficient for the Bulgarian authorities. The applicant offered to travel to Bulgaria to assist in the formalities necessary to obtain a passport. On 9 September 2011 the County Court acknowledged the situation and ordered the applicant to travel to Bulgaria. It also ordered R.E.N. to allow contact between the mother and the child for the purposes of making travel arrangements. After the applicant\u2019s visit to Bulgaria, the child was brought before the court on 17 October 2011. The child told the court in a private hearing, with the help of a Bulgarian translator, that she would prefer to stay with her father and paternal grandparents in Bulgaria; that she spoke on the phone with her mother occasionally; that she could not remember her maternal grandmother; and that she did not like being in Romania. 16.  On 21 October 2011 the County Court granted custody of the child to the father on the grounds that the child was already integrated into her environment in Bulgaria, where she had lived for the past four years, and that she did not speak Romanian. 17.  The applicant appealed on points of law. The Pite\u015fti Court of Appeal held one hearing, at which the parties and their respective counsel were present. The Court of Appeal re-examined the facts and concluded that the County Court had interpreted the situation erroneously and had disregarded the child\u2019s \u201cbest interests\u201d. It therefore quashed the County Court\u2019s decision and upheld the decision rendered by the District Court. The Court of Appeal delivered its final ruling in the case on 9 January 2012. 18.  On 29 June 2011 the applicant, seeking temporary custody of her daughter pending the outcome of the custody proceedings, lodged a request for interim measures. On 26 July 2011 her application was rejected by the District Court on the ground that as at that time the child had already been living with her paternal grandparents in Bulgaria for over three years, it would not be in her interests to temporarily remove her from her usual environment and place her with her mother until the end of the custody proceedings. 19.  The applicant appealed; on 16 September 2011 the County Court dismissed her appeal, upholding the District Court\u2019s decision. 20.  The applicant sought recognition in Bulgaria of the 30 January 2009 judgment of the first-instance Romanian court that had given custody of the child to her (see paragraph 11 above). The Pazardzhik Regional Court granted her request on 14 May 2009, finding that the Romanian judgment had become final in the absence of an appeal within the statutory time-limit (as indicated in paragraph 12, the judgment was appealed later, outside the statutory limits). On 16 April 2010 the Sofia Court of Appeal upheld this decision, which \u2013 as it was not appealed against \u2013 became final on an unspecified date. The applicant was issued with a writ of enforcement on 20 July 2010. 21.  On 30 August 2010 the applicant applied to a Bulgarian enforcement officer, who brought enforcement proceedings immediately. The authorities unsuccessfully attempted on several occasions to personally serve an invitation for voluntary compliance on R.E.N. Having noted that he was working abroad for an indefinite period, the summons was posted twice \u2013 on 13 and 28 October 2010 \u2013 on the entrance gate at R.E.N.\u2019s address. On 20 January 2011 the enforcement officer appointed a lawyer to represent R.E.N. as he had not been located. 22.  On 28 January 2011 the enforcement officer scheduled the handover of the child to the applicant for 9 February 2011 and asked the police and the social services to assist him on that day. Notice of the handover was personally served on R.E.N. on 4 February 2011. On 8 February 2011 two lawyers acting on behalf of R.E.N. brought judicial review proceedings in respect of the enforcement officer\u2019s actions; those proceedings were dismissed by the Pazardzhik Regional Court on 22 March 2011. 23.  Following the unsuccessful attempt on 9 February 2011 to locate the child at the address of her paternal grandparents with whom she lived, the enforcement officer fined R.E.N. 200 euros (EUR) for failure to cooperate and scheduled 16 March 2011 as the new date for the child\u2019s transfer to the applicant. The enforcement officer also directed the social services to help to ensure for the child a smooth transition to life with the applicant by, inter alia, arranging a meeting with a psychologist. On 15 March 2011 the social services drew up a report on the child, which concluded that abruptly removing the child from her usual environment \u2013 and thus separating her from the adults who provided her with emotional and physical security \u2013 would be detrimental to her development. The report noted that the child needed to be assisted in the process of re-establishing a relationship with her mother. 24.  Upon a request of R.E.N., on 2 June 2011 the Supreme Court of Cassation suspended the enforcement proceedings brought by the applicant. It did so following R.E.N.\u2019s request for the reopening of the proceedings for the recognition of the Romanian judgment on custody. 25.  Following the suspension of the enforcement proceedings brought by the applicant in Bulgaria (see the preceding paragraph), on 12 January 2012, within the context of the reopening of the proceedings for recognition of the Romanian judgment, the Supreme Court of Cassation quashed the decision of the Sofia Court Appeal of 16 April 2010 (see paragraph 20 above). The Supreme Court of Cassation found that R.E.N. had not been summoned in accordance with the applicable procedural rules and as a result had been unable to take part in the proceedings for the recognition and enforcement of the Romanian judgment which had determined custody of his daughter. More specifically, he had only learned of those proceedings on 4 February 2011, when he had received notice to hand the child over. In the same decision of 12 January 2012 the Supreme Court of Cassation remitted the case to the Pazardzhik Regional Court for a new examination and decision. 26.  On 10 May 2012, in response to the applicant\u2019s request for the recognition and enforcement of the Romanian judgment of 11 November 2010 granting custody to her (see paragraph 14 above), which had become final and enforceable on 9 January 2012 (see paragraph 17 above), the Pazardzhik Regional Court recognised that judgment and authorised its execution in Bulgaria. Upon an appeal by R.E.N., the Sofia Court of Appeal upheld that decision on 10 April 2013. On 15 May 2014 the Supreme Court of Cassation rejected R.E.N.\u2019s cassation appeal; the decision therefore became final on that date. 27.  Thereafter, on an unspecified date, the applicant brought new enforcement proceedings in Bulgaria seeking implementation of the final Romanian judgment granting custody to her. 28.  On 9 July 2014, upon R.E.N.\u2019s request (see paragraph 43 below), the Pazardzhik District Court suspended the enforcement. The court observed that R.E.N. had in the meantime brought proceedings in Bulgaria for a change of custody in respect of the child. It then noted that the child had settled well in Bulgaria, both in terms of emotional and material comfort, having been living there uninterruptedly since November 2008. The child only spoke Bulgarian, had adapted to and quite enjoyed her schooling environment, and showed interest in the extra-curricular activities she attended. Also, she enjoyed a particularly close and warm relationship with her paternal grandparents, who were caring remarkably well for her. The court found that, in view of the above and the fact that proceedings for a change of custody were pending before the Bulgarian courts, a sudden change in the child\u2019s environment would not be in her interests. The court then granted R.E.N.\u2019s request and suspended the enforcement. 29.  Following a telephone conversation between the applicant and an employee of the Romanian Ministry of Justice, the applicant was invited to lodge a request for the return of her daughter under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction of 25 October 1980 (\u201cthe Hague Convention\u201d; see paragraph 43 below). Accordingly, on 1 July 2011 the applicant lodged a request for the return of the child with the Romanian Ministry of Justice, the Central Authority for the purpose of the Hague Convention. 30.  On 12 July 2011 the Romanian Ministry of Justice requested further clarification from the applicant, in particular asking her to explain why she had waited for such a long time before lodging her request. They informed her that any application lodged more than one year after the abduction could be rejected. On 26 July the Ministry of Justice further informed the applicant that she could request the return of her child either under the terms of the Hague Convention or under the terms of the Brussels II bis Regulation (see paragraph 46 below). They advised her to lodge her request either directly with the competent Bulgarian authority or through the Romanian Ministry of Justice. 31.  On 17 August 2011 the applicant\u2019s initial request was transmitted by the Romanian Ministry of Justice to the Bulgarian Ministry of Justice, the Central Authority for the purpose of the Hague Convention. 32.  On 24 August 2011 the Bulgarian Ministry of Justice informed the applicant that the request had been refused as the Hague Convention had not entered into force between Romania and Bulgaria (see paragraph 43 below). 33.  On 26 October 2011 the Romanian Ministry of Justice also informed the applicant and her counsel about the outcome of the proceedings before the Bulgarian Central Authority. They advised the applicant to apply directly to the Bulgarian courts (under Article 29 of the Hague Convention) or to the Bulgarian Ministry of Justice (either directly or through the Romanian Ministry of Justice, under the provisions of the European Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions Concerning Custody of Children and on Restoration of Custody of Children \u2013 \u201cthe Luxembourg Convention\u201d \u2013 see paragraph 45 below). 34.  On 12 December 2011 the Romanian Ministry of Justice transmitted to the Bulgarian Ministry of Justice a request lodged by the applicant under the Brussels II bis Regulation, which in its view took precedence over the Hague Convention. In the absence of any response to that request, on 9 February 2012 the Romanian Ministry of Justice repeated the request to the Bulgarian Ministry of Justice. 35.  On 7 February 2012 the Bulgarian Ministry of Justice informed its Romanian counterpart that it had refused the request. In its view the Hague Convention did not apply, as the child had entered Bulgarian territory before the entry into force of that Convention between Romania and Bulgaria. Consequently, the Brussels II bis Regulation did not apply either, as it was not meant to be applicable outside the scope of the Hague Convention. 36.  On 22 December 2008 R.E.N. unsuccessfully brought proceedings in Bulgaria seeking custody of the child. Those proceedings were terminated on 25 October 2010 by the Pazardzhik District Court; the decision became final on 11 November 2010. 37.  At the beginning of 2011 R.E.N. brought a second set of proceedings in Bulgaria before the Pazardzhik District Court in which he sought custody of the child. His request for interim measures, namely for the child to live with his parents in Bulgaria and for him to have custody of her, as well as for the suspension of the enforcement proceedings brought in 2010 in Bulgaria by the applicant, was refused by the same court in April 2011. The court suspended the proceedings on 2 December 2011 as it had determined that another set of proceedings \u2013 between the same parties concerning the same issue \u2013 was pending in Romania (see paragraphs 9 to 17 above). 38.  Following the 9 January 2012 final judgment of the Romanian courts granting custody of the child to the applicant (see paragraph 17 above), on 23 October 2012 R.E.N. brought a third set of proceedings before the Pazardzhik District Court, seeking a change of custody due to a change in circumstances. The Pazardzhik District Court terminated these proceedings on 22 November 2012 as it found that the second set of proceedings R.E.N. had brought before it (see the preceding paragraph) concerning the same issue and involving the same parties was still pending, as those proceedings had only been suspended on 2 December 2011 and not terminated. 39.  Subsequently R.E.N. asked the court to terminate the second set of proceedings he had brought, and the court did so on 28 November 2012. On 10 December 2012 R.E.N. appealed against the termination of the third set of proceedings he had brought. In a final decision of 25 March 2013 the Pazardzhik Regional Court granted his request, quashed the termination of those proceedings and remitted the case to the first-instance court for examination. Within the context of those proceedings, in 2014 R.E.N. sought as a protective measure (\u043e\u0431\u0435\u0437\u043f\u0435\u0447\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b\u043d\u0430 \u043c\u044f\u0440\u043a\u0430) the suspension of the enforcement proceedings of the Romanian judgment granting custody to the applicant. His request was granted on 9 July 2014 (see paragraph 28 above). No information is available regarding developments in those proceedings.", "references": ["7", "0", "5", "6", "3", "8", "2", "1", "9", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1975 and lives in Novokuznetsk, the Kemerovo Region. 5.  In the morning of 14 June 2007 policemen came to the applicant\u2019s flat and took him to the police station in Pospelikha village in the Altay Region (\u201cthe police station\u201d) for an interview. He was questioned about the circumstances of a theft which had occurred the day before and made self\u2011incriminating statements. 6.  During the questioning the investigator had to answer a telephone call and stepped out of the office. Left alone, the applicant attempted to walk out but was stopped at the door by a policeman who told him to stay inside and wait. He spent around four hours in the investigator\u2019s office before he was allowed to leave. According to the Government, the applicant came to the police station voluntarily and stayed there for no longer than forty minutes. 7.  On 18 June 2007 the investigators charged the applicant with theft but dropped the charges one month later. 8.  In 2009 the applicant brought a civil claim for compensation for unlawful criminal prosecution and deprivation of liberty. 9.  On 20 October 2009 the Pospelikhinskiy District Court of the Altay Region examined the case in the applicant\u2019s absence. The court noted that the applicant had been informed about the date and place of the hearing but, as he was serving a term of imprisonment, his presence in person could not be ensured. On the merits, the court held that the applicant was entitled to compensation for the unlawful criminal prosecution. It also considered that the questioning of 14 June 2007 had not amounted to a deprivation of liberty and could not give rise to any form of compensation. The applicant was awarded 1,000 Russian roubles (RUB) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 10.  The applicant appealed against the judgment, arguing that the court award was too low and that it did not take into account the deprivation of liberty. He also requested leave to appear before the appeal court. On 10 February 2009 the Altay Regional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal in his absence, endorsing the District Court\u2019s reasoning. 11.  The judgment of 20 October 2009 was enforced on 5 March 2011. 12.  In 2007 Ms I. brought a civil action against the applicant, seeking to recover a contractual debt. On 5 July 2007 the Justice of the Peace of the Pospelikhinskiy District of the Altay Region examined the case in the applicant\u2019s absence. The judgment indicated that the applicant was serving a term of imprisonment and that he had been informed in a timely way about the date and place of the hearing. The Justice of the Peace granted the claim and ordered the applicant to pay RUB 11,311 to Ms I. 13.  The applicant appealed to the Pospelikhinskiy District Court and sought leave to appear before the appeal court. By an interim decision of 12 September 2007, the District Court refused the applicant leave to appear, finding that the Code of Civil Procedure did not provide for escorting detained litigants to courts hearing civil cases. On 10 October 2007 the Pospelikhinskiy District Court upheld the judgment on appeal, endorsing the findings of the Justice of the Peace. The applicant received a copy of the appeal judgement in November 2007.", "references": ["7", "6", "5", "4", "0", "8", "1", "No Label", "2", "3", "9"], "gold": ["2", "3", "9"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1943 and lives in Ni\u0161. 6.  On 28 April 2010 the applicant brought an enforcement action before the Smederevo Court of First Instance (Osnovni sud u Smederevu) against a socially/State-owned company \u201cF\u017dV \u017delvoz a.d. Smederevo\u201d (the debtor). 7.  On 15 December 2010 that court ordered direct enforcement of the outstanding invoice (izvr\u0161enje na osnovu verodostojne isprave). 8.  On 15 June 2011 the Privatisation Agency ordered the restructuring of the debtor as part of privatisation process. 9.  On 25 October 2011 the enforcement proceedings were stayed because the debtor was undergoing restructuring. 10.  On 3 November 2011 the applicant appealed the decision to stay the enforcement proceedings. 11.  On 10 February 2012 the applicant\u2019s appeal was rejected by the enforcement court. 12.  On 21 March 2013 the applicant urged the court to continue the enforcement proceedings. 13.  On 7 June 2013 the court informed the applicant that the debtor was still undergoing restructuring and that therefore the enforcement proceedings could not be continued. 14.  It would appear that the applicant did not appeal against this decision. 15.  On 11 January 2010 the applicant brought an enforcement action before the Ni\u0161 Commercial Court (Privredni sud u Ni\u0161u) against a socially/State-owned company \u201cVagonka a.d. Ni\u0161\u201d (the debtor). 16.  On 29 January 2010 that court ordered direct enforcement of the outstanding invoice. 17.  On 4 November 2009 the Privatisation Agency ordered the restructuring of the debtor as part of privatisation process. 18.  On 4 February 2010 the enforcement proceedings were stayed because the debtor was undergoing restructuring. 19.  The applicant did not appeal against this decision which became final on 17 February 2010. 20.  On 20 March 2013 the applicant urged the court to continue the enforcement proceedings. 21.  On 22 March 2013 the court informed the applicant that the debtor was still undergoing restructuring and that therefore the enforcement proceedings could not be continued.", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "5", "6", "0", "8", "7", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1961 and lives in Mississauga, Canada. 6.  In 2009 the applicant got married in Canada to E.N., a Polish national. They continued living in Canada and their son was born there in September 2010. The child obtained Canadian nationality at birth. It is unknown to the Court whether he also holds Polish nationality. The family lived in the applicant\u2019s apartment. The applicant worked full time and was the sole financial provider for the family. In February 2011 he took thirty-three weeks\u2019 parental leave. 7.  In April 2011 the family went to Poland on holiday. They agreed to return to Canada in July 2011 and aeroplane tickets were purchased to this end.\nThe couple split up in May 2011 and E.N. refused to return to Canada with the child. Soon afterwards the applicant went back to Canada alone. He briefly returned to Poland in July 2011 when his son underwent emergency surgery. 8.  On 31 October 2011 the applicant lodged an application to have his child returned under the Hague Convention. This application was registered with the Kielce District Court on 23 January 2012. 9. On 27 November 2012 the Kielce District Court decided to obtain an expert report from the Family Consultation Centre (Rodzinny O\u015brodek Diagnostyczno-Konsultacyjny \u201cthe RODK\u201d). The experts were ordered to assess whether there was a grave risk that the boy\u2019s return abroad would expose him to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place him in an intolerable situation. A copy of this decision has not been submitted to the Court. 10.  The applicant and E.N. were invited to appear at an interview at the RODK which was scheduled for 30 November 2012. It appears that the domestic court\u2019s decision to order the RODK report contained an instruction that the examination should go ahead whether or not the applicant was present. The applicant did not come to the appointment at the RODK. As a result, the report was based only on the statements of the child and his mother and on four volumes of the domestic court\u2019s case file. It was prepared by two experts in psychology and was issued on 7 December 2012. 11.  In their report, the RODK experts took notice of the fact that for the past year and a half the child (who was two years old at the time of the psychological examination) had lived away from and almost without any contact with his father. They also observed that the child had a strong emotional bond with his mother; he was developing well and spoke Polish; and that E.N. had ensured the child\u2019s security, well-being and development. 12.  The experts concluded that \u201cthe child\u2019s separation from his mother would disturb his sense of security, belonging and stability, and [that] it would be adverse to his development \u2013 in particular, psychological [development] \u2013 [and] it would be against his best interests. In view of the above, moving the child to his father\u2019s care [posed] a grave risk to his emotional [and] social development, [and] could cause a situation [which] for a two-year-old child [would be] difficult to bear.\u201d 13.  Apart from the RODK report, the domestic court obtained the following evidence: testimony from the applicant, E.N. and the members of both families and medical reports. 14.  On 2 January 2013 the Kielce District Court, with Judge I.G. presiding, dismissed the applicant\u2019s Hague Convention application (IIRNsm 87/12). 15.  The first-instance court held that the child had been wrongfully retained in Poland by his mother within the meaning of the Hague Convention. It also considered that, in line with Article 17 of the Hague Convention, the interim orders concerning the issues of custody over the child and his residence which had been granted by the Canadian and Polish family courts (see paragraphs 33, 34 and 36 below) were viewed as irrelevant to the case at hand. 16.  The district court also considered that the RODK report was thorough, clear and of a high evidentiary value. Relying on the report and the remaining evidence, the family court established that since his birth the child had been under the constant good care of his mother (who had not worked in Canada). The child had a strong emotional bond with the mother, did not remember the applicant and did not perceive him as a parent. The applicant did not show any interest in the child. Since July 2011, he had seen his son only once, in March 2012, despite the fact that he had been in Poland for a month. He had also stopped paying child support and had not shown any interest in him. The domestic court also made an additional observation that the applicant had sold his apartment in Canada and it was unknown if his new living conditions were adequate for his two-year-old child to move into. 17.  In view of the above it was ultimately held that separating the two-year-old boy from the mother and returning him to his father in Canada would be traumatic and hard to bear for the child. This, in turn, would pose a threat to the child\u2019s emotional and social development and would perturb his sense of security and stability. 18.  The applicant appealed, arguing that the first-instance court had erred in that, inter alia, it had given a broad and not restrictive interpretation of Article 13 (b) of the Hague Convention and had dismissed his application even though it had not been established that the child was at a grave risk of physical or psychological harm if returned to Canada. The applicant also challenged the RODK experts\u2019 report, arguing that it was unconvincing and inconsistent with the evidence obtained. 19.  On 9 July 2013 the Kielce Regional Court (II Ca 551/13) dismissed the appeal in the relevant part. 20.  The appellate court observed that international and domestic practice required that Article 13 (b) be given a restrictive reading to the effect that, in principle, any unfavourable consequences of the child\u2019s separation stemming from the order to surrender the child by the abducting parent did not give rise to a grave risk of physical or psychological harm within the meaning of that provision. It also noted that the aim of the Hague Convention would be achieved if the abducting parent returned with the child. If no objective obstacles to the abducting parent\u2019s return were present, it could be inferred that the parent was refusing to return and was acting in his or her own interest and not the interest of the child. 21.  The appellate court reasoned that the application of the above\u2011mentioned principles was more complex in cases concerning very young children. The Hague Convention stipulated only a maximum age requirement for children whose return could be sought under its provisions (the age of 16). It also protected (under Article 12) very young children from possible harmful effects of the return if it was shown that the parent seeking the return had not taken care of the child before the abduction or that the child had already adapted to the new environment. Following this approach, separating an abducted child from the parent who had a dominant role in the child\u2019s life would not fall within the Article 13 (b) exceptions unless objective obstacles to the parent\u2019s return could be shown to be present. This approach however, was difficult to accept in cases concerning abductions of infants by mothers because of the special relationship between them. This was true even in the absence of any objective obstacles to the mother\u2019s own return because any separation of an infant from his or her mother would inevitably be contrary to the child\u2019s best interests. 22.  The appellate court held that the utmost importance had to be attached to the child\u2019s contact with his mother and his separation from her would place the boy in an intolerable situation. The domestic court relied on the following elements of the case: the applicant\u2019s son had arrived in Poland with both parents at the age of six and a half months, in April 2011; since then the child had been taken care of solely by his mother; the most important element in his life was his contact with the mother; he did not have any memories of his life in Canada; and the applicant had not considered the child\u2019s remaining in Poland illegal prior to October 2011. The appellate court also observed that by not appearing at the RODK interview, the applicant had waived his right to demonstrate that he could establish adequate contact with his young child and that the applicant had only seen his child once since the latter\u2019s departure from Canada. 23. Since July 2011, the applicant has visited his son once, in March 2012 during a month-long stay in Poland. 24.  In the applicant\u2019s submission, he had made countless attempts to see his son. In particular, he had applied to the courts to have a meeting with his child away from E.N.\u2019s house on 23 November 2011 and on an unspecified date in February 2012. Copies of these applications have not been submitted to the Court.\nIn the Government\u2019s submission, the applicant had not enquired about or sought contact with the child. 25.  On 23 February 2012 the applicant lodged an application with the competent domestic court for arrangements to be made to secure the effective exercise of his right of contact during the Hague Convention proceedings. He wished to meet with his son away from E.N.\u2019s house one day before and on the day of the court hearing. He submitted that he had not seen his child since August 2011 and that the child\u2019s mother and grandparents had been very hostile towards the applicant when he had tried to visit his son at home. The applicant submitted that the application had been made under Article 21 of the Hague Convention. A copy of this application has not been submitted to the Court. 26.  On 2 March 2012 the Kielce District Court, with I.G. as the presiding judge, decided to return the application for an interim order on the right of contact as unsubstantiated. It was considered that the applicant had not demonstrated that the child\u2019s mother, apart from her allegedly hostile attitude, had obstructed his contact with the child. The domestic court relied on the applicable provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and did not make any reference to Article 21 of the Hague Convention. 27.  The applicant stated without submitting a copy of the relevant document that on 1 July 2013 the domestic court had decided to grant him a right to a supervised visit with his son for two hours daily in E.N.\u2019s house. The applicant had been in Canada at that time and thus had not exercised his right. 28.  The applicant also submitted that on 9 July 2013 the appellate court had dismissed his request, presumably for a different schedule of his visits. A copy of this decision is not in the case file. 29.  On an unspecified date, the Polish family court granted the applicant a right to contact with his child. The details of this decision are unknown to the Court. 30.  On 3 June 2014 the Kielce Regional Court issued a decision, presumably concerning the applicant\u2019s right of contact with his son (IC 2240/11). A copy of this decision has not been submitted by the Court. 31.  The applicant lodged an interlocutory appeal against this decision. On 10 September 2014 the applicant\u2019s lawyer completed this appeal by submitting that E.N. had been hindering the father\u2019s right of contact which he had tried to enforce in line with the court\u2019s order. The outcome of these proceedings is unknown. 32.  On 1 September 2011 E.N. petitioned for divorce in Poland. Divorce proceedings are currently pending before the Kielce Regional Court. 33.  On 22 November 2011 the Kielce Regional Court gave an interim order, establishing the child\u2019s residence as being with the mother. It appears that the applicant participated in the court hearing via a live video link. He refused to answer any questions. 34.  On 27 October 2011 the Ontario Superior Court of Justice in Canada held that the child\u2019s retention in Poland was wrongful and issued an interim order granting full custody of the child to the applicant, authorising him and the law-enforcement authorities to apprehend the child and ordering E.N. to surrender the child without delay. To this effect, a wanted notice for E.N. was issued by Interpol for the offence of kidnapping. 35.  On 21 August 2012 the Ontario Superior Court of Justice found E.N. to be in contempt of court for, inter alia, failing to comply with the interim order described above. No sentence was pronounced on that occasion. 36.  On 11 September 2012 the Ontario Superior Court of Justice confirmed the interim decision of 27 October 2011, granting a final order of the applicant\u2019s exclusive custody of the child. The Canadian court also requested the assistance of the Polish courts in securing the immediate apprehension and return of the child pursuant to the Hague Convention. 37.  On 22 May 2013 the Ontario Superior Court of Justice allowed the divorce between the applicant and E.N. 38.  The relevant international and domestic law is set out in the Court\u2019s judgment of K.J. v. Poland, no. 30813/14, \u00a7\u00a7 33-38 and 41-41, 1 March 2016.", "references": ["6", "1", "5", "9", "8", "7", "0", "2", "3", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "4.  At the material time all the applicants were detained in Russian penal facilities. 5.  While in detention, the applicants Mr Baban, Mr Barkov and Mr Bogatyrev sought compensation for inadequate conditions of their detention and substandard medical care; the applicants Mr Davydov, Mr Pflyaum and Mr Yakovlev were involved in contract disputes; Mr Fedchenko was the respondent in a divorce claim; Mr Starodubtsev challenged the decision by which he had lost the status of a disabled person; and Mr Shavayev was the defendant in an action for damages brought by the Federal Customs Service. 6.  None of the applicants, apart from Mr Yakovlev, were able to attend the hearings before the courts of first instance. The domestic courts refused the applicants leave to be present at the hearings, on the ground that there was no domestic legal provision for bringing detainees to courts. In some of the cases they quoted Article 77.1 of the Code on the Execution of Sentences (see paragraph 10 below) and the relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the other cases the issue of the applicants\u2019 presence was left unaddressed. In the first-instance proceedings Mr Shavayev and Mr Starodubtsev were represented by their relatives. Mr Barkov and Mr Davydov were interviewed at courts located near the places of their detention. 7.  The applicants appealed, raising the question of their appearance in court in their appeal statements. Some submitted separate requests seeking leave to appear before the appeal court. The appeal courts either dismissed their arguments and endorsed the findings of the first-instance courts or concluded that their absence from court was in line with the legislation and did not contravene the principle of fairness. None of the applicants were present or represented at the appellate hearings. 8.  The dates of the final judgments are set out in Appendix I.", "references": ["4", "5", "0", "6", "8", "9", "7", "1", "2", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Sofia. 6.  The applicant had been employed by the National Security Service as a system operator since 1981. She submitted that, on account of the nature of her duties, she had held a security clearance permitting her access to classified information constituting State secrets. According to the applicant\u2019s job description, being in a possession of such a security clearance had been a prerequisite to her holding her post. 7.  On 30 April 2002 the Classified Information Protection Act (hereinafter \u201cthe Act\u201d) was promulgated in the State Gazette. Under the Classified Information Protection Act, permits granting access to classified information that had been issued under the legal provisions existing before the entry into force of the Act were to remain valid until their replacement by security clearance allowing access to classified information. The heads of organisational units employing persons who possessed an access permit and whose positions required that they have access to classified information were to request the issuance of security clearance, in accordance with the requirements of the Act. Non-compliance with that provision would result in the invalidation of the respective existing access permits. 8.  On 3 June 2003, in compliance with that obligation, the Director of the National Security Service issued a decision refusing the applicant security clearance allowing access to classified information. The applicant submitted that that decision had been based on a psychological test. The decision did not contain any reasoning in respect of the refusal, apart from a reference to Section 57 of the Classified Information Protection Act. 9.  The applicant lodged an appeal against the refusal with the State Commission for Information Security. The latter, by a decision of 5 February 2004, upheld the refusal. That decision was final and not amenable to judicial review. 10.  On 27 April 2004, the Director of the National Security Service ordered that the applicant be dismissed. The reason given for the termination of her employment was the refusal to grant her security clearance, possession of which was an indispensable condition of her being able to perform her duties. 11.  The applicant challenged her dismissal at three levels of jurisdiction. She contested the objectivity and the lawfulness of the dismissal procedure, arguing that she had fulfilled all conditions for the issuance of security clearance and that she had been dismissed on account of the negative personal relationship between her and her direct supervisor. In the applicant\u2019s view, the clearance had probably been refused because she had suffered from depressive neurosis in 1995, a condition which according to her was no longer relevant. The applicant\u2019s request that a report by a psychiatric expert be commissioned was refused by the Sofia District Court. 12.  By its judgment of 11 May 2005 the Sofia District Court rejected the applicant\u2019s claims, reasoning that the refusal of the Director of the National Security Service to grant security clearance to the applicant was a final and valid administrative act, and it rendered the applicant\u2019s dismissal inevitable because she was no longer able to perform her duties. The court added that the refusal was not amenable to any judicial review; therefore, the court was not competent to examine, within the framework of the dismissal proceedings, any substantial or procedural questions related to its lawfulness. 13.  On appeal, the Sofia City Court, by a ruling of 6 April 2006 upheld the lower court\u2019s decision, endorsing its reasoning. 14.  On 19 June 2008, the Supreme Court of Cassation upheld those rulings.", "references": ["2", "6", "9", "4", "0", "7", "5", "8", "1", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicants were born in 1950 and 1957 respectively and live in Sofia. 7.  On 19 February 1993 the applicants, at the time a married couple, bought a plot of land of 1,000 square metres in the village of Kranevo, on the Black Sea coast. The seller, Mr O., had acquired the property in 1967 from the agricultural co-operative that existed at the time, in exchange for another plot of land of his. 8.  The applicants\u2019 possession of the land remained undisturbed until 2003, when other persons took possession of it. The applicants discovered then that the land had been collectivised after 1945 and that in 1991 the heirs of the pre-collectivisation owner, Mr K., had instituted restitution proceedings under the relevant provisions of the Agricultural Land Act (\u201cthe ALA\u201d, see paragraph 13 below). Their restitution request had been allowed in a court judgment of 7 December 1995 and in a decision issued by the competent administrative body \u2012 the local agricultural land commission \u2012 on 4 April 1996. Thereafter, the heirs of Mr K. had transferred the land to the persons who had later taken possession of the plot. 9.  On an unspecified date in 2003 the applicants brought a rei vindicatio action against these individuals. 10.  In a judgment of 25 May 2005 the Balchik District Court dismissed their claim. It relied on the provision of section 10(13) of the ALA (see paragraph 15 below), holding on its basis that of the two rival claims to the same land the law gave priority to the one based on restitution. 11.  Upon appeal, on 25 January 2007 the Dobrich Regional Court reversed that decision and allowed the applicants\u2019 action. It considered in particular that section 10(13) of the ALA was not applicable to the case as it had only been introduced in 1997, that is to say after the restitution decision in favour of Mr K.\u2019s heirs and after the applicants had bought the plot of land. 12.  Upon further appeal, in a final judgment of 12 December 2008, the Supreme Court of Cassation quashed the Regional Court\u2019s judgment and dismissed the applicants\u2019 rei vindicatio claim. It took the view that section 10(13) of the ALA, introduced in 1997, had to be considered to be applicable with effect from the ALA\u2019s entry into force in 1991 because it was merely clarifying its general restitution provisions. As to the exception contained in section 18z(3) of the Regulations for the ALA\u2019s implementation, also introduced in 1997 (see paragraph 16 below), the Supreme Court considered it inapplicable to the case; in its view, section 18z(3) only precluded the restitution of properties which had been the subject of transactions prior to the ALA\u2019s entry into force in 1991, whereas the applicants had bought their plot in 1993.", "references": ["3", "2", "7", "6", "8", "5", "4", "1", "0", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
+{"input": "6.  Mr Shahanov, who was born in 1977, is serving a life sentence in Plovdiv Prison. 7.  Mr Palfreeman, who was born in 1986, is serving a sentence of twenty years\u2019 imprisonment in Sofia Prison. 8.  In 2011, when serving his sentence in Plovdiv Prison, Mr Shahanov was sharing a cell with eight other inmates. On 24 October 2011 he made two complaints to the Minister of Justice: one written by him personally and one written on his behalf by his wife. In the complaints he stated, inter alia, that another inmate in his ward, X, was bragging that two prison officers, Y and Z, were relatives of his; was threatening and intimidating the other inmates and fomenting intrigues and tension among them; was often making unwarranted complaints to get special attention and treatment; and was planning to escape from prison with the help of his relatives. Mr Shahanov requested that steps be taken to move X to a prison where he did not have relatives. 9.  An inquiry was opened pursuant to Mr Shahanov\u2019s complaints, and written statements were taken from X, other inmates, Y, Z, and other prison officers. 10.  In a letter of 28 November 2011, the head of the Chief Directorate for the Execution of Sentences informed the governor of Plovdiv Prison that the inquiry had not found familial relationships or improper contacts between X and any of the prison officers, or a risk for Mr Shahanov. The letter went on to say that the governor should advise all inmates that making defamatory statements about, or false allegations against, prison officers was a disciplinary offence under section 100(2)(7) of the Execution of Sentences and Pre-Trial Detention Act 2009 (see paragraph 27 below). 11.  The next day, 29 November 2011, the governor of Plovdiv Prison ordered that Mr Shahanov be placed in solitary confinement for ten days for making defamatory statements and false allegations against prison officers, contrary to the above-mentioned provision. 12.  On 30 November 2011 Mr Shahanov sought judicial review of the order. 13.  The Plovdiv District Court heard Mr Shahanov\u2019s claim on 2 December 2011 and, in a final decision of the same date (\u043e\u043f\u0440. o\u0442 02.12.2011 \u0433. \u043f\u043e \u0447. \u043d. \u0434. \u2116 8203/2011 \u0433., \u0420\u0421-\u041f\u043b\u043e\u0432\u0434\u0438\u0432), upheld the order. It held that it was lawful and that, in view of the results of the inquiry carried out pursuant to Mr Shahanov\u2019s complaints and the evidence gathered in the proceedings before it, the prison governor had been correct to find that Mr Shahanov had made defamatory statements and false allegations against prison officers. The court went on to say that the punishment matched the seriousness of the offence. 14.  Mr Shahanov asserted that his correspondence was routinely opened and read by the prison authorities. In support of his assertion, he submitted seven letters sent in 2012, six of which were addressed to his counsel, whose envelopes bore the stamp \u201cchecked\u201d on their backs. For their part, the Government submitted a letter from the administration of Plovdiv Prison according to which Mr Shahanov\u2019s correspondence was being controlled in the manner envisaged in the applicable regulations, which meant that the prison authorities only checked the physical content of the letters, not their text. All letters were sealed and opened by a prison officer in front of the prisoner. The stamp \u201cchecked\u201d affixed on the back of an envelope only meant that the letter had been physically inspected for the presence of prohibited items. 15.  On 23 May 2012 Mr Palfreeman was visited by two journalists. At the same time, a fellow inmate of Israeli nationality also had a visitor. After the visits, Mr Palfreeman learned that his visitors had been treated rudely, and that his fellow inmate\u2019s visitor had had personal items stolen from lockers in the prison where he had left them during the visit. 16.  The next day, 24 May 2012, with the help of another inmate who knew Bulgarian, Mr Palfreeman wrote the following complaint to the governor of Sofia Prison:\n\u201cOn 23 May 2012, during the midday visit, personal items of visitors were stolen from the visitors\u2019 lockers, which are only accessible to the guards. The stolen items are a mobile telephone case, MP3 headphones, a mobile telephone battery, and a sum of money. Also, the guards behaved very rudely and coarsely with the visitors, yelling at them and insulting them for no reason. Could you please carry out an inquiry into the conduct of that shift, and take measures to ensure that the guards work in a disciplined way and with respect towards inmates and others.\u201d 17.  Disciplinary proceedings were opened against Mr Palfreeman in relation to that complaint. On 11 June 2012 a hearing took place before the prison\u2019s disciplinary commission. 18.  In an order of 12 June 2012, the governor of Sofia Prison noted that an inquiry carried out pursuant to Mr Palfreeman\u2019s complaint had shown that the two persons who had visited him had not left any items in the visitors\u2019 lockers, and had not made any complaints about missing items on their way out of the prison. There was no evidence that they had been treated rudely by prison staff either. By making allegations to that effect, Mr Palfreeman had therefore acted contrary to section 100(2)(7) of the Execution of Sentences and Pre-Trial Detention Act 2009 (see paragraph 27 below). The nature and the gravity of the offence, Mr Palfreeman\u2019s attitude towards his act, and his overall conduct and state of health militated in favour of punishing him with three months\u2019 deprivation of the right to receive food parcels from outside prison. 19.  Mr Palfreeman appealed to the head of the Chief Directorate for the Execution of Sentences and sought judicial review. He argued, inter alia, that his disciplinary punishment was in breach of section 90(5) of the 2009 Act (see paragraph 25 below) and this Court\u2019s case-law, that deprivation of the right to receive food parcels was a serious sanction in view of the insufficient quantity of food provided by the prison, and that it was an attempt to cow him into not making complaints against the prison administration. 20.  On 14 August 2012 the head of the Chief Directorate for the Execution of Sentences dismissed the appeal. Noting that the inquiry into Mr Palfreeman\u2019s allegations had not confirmed any of them, he found that, by deliberately making false allegations, the applicant had committed the disciplinary offence under section 100(2)(7) of the 2009 Act. The sanction fully corresponded to the nature and the gravity of his act, his attitude towards it, and his previous conduct. 21.  In a final decision of 19 July 2012 (\u043e\u043f\u0440. \u043e\u0442 19.07.2012 \u0433. \u043f\u043e \u043d. \u0447. \u0434. \u2116 13436/2012 \u0433., \u0421\u0420\u0421), the Sofia District Court held that it could not deal with Mr Palfreeman\u2019s claim for judicial review, as only orders imposing solitary confinement were amenable to such review. All other types of disciplinary punishments were only subject to appeal before the head of the Chief Directorate for the Execution of Sentences (see paragraphs 30-32 below).", "references": ["2", "8", "4", "0", "5", "9", "7", "1", "3", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Skopje. 6.  The applicant was employed by the State Intelligence Agency (\u0410\u0433\u0435\u043d\u0446\u0438\u0458\u0430 \u0437\u0430 \u0440\u0430\u0437\u0443\u0437\u043d\u0430\u0432\u0430\u045a\u0435, \u201cthe employer\u201d). 7.  On 28 February 2001 she was dismissed from work as redundant given that internal regulations (\u041f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u0438\u043b\u043d\u0438\u043a \u0437\u0430 \u0441\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0435\u043c\u0430\u0442\u0438\u0437\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0458\u0430 \u043d\u0430 \u0440\u0430\u0431\u043e\u0442\u043d\u0438\u0442\u0435 \u043c\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0430, \u201cthe Regulations\u201d) of 27 February 2001 provided for reduced number of employees for posts such as the post held by the applicant. 8.  On 9 April 2001 the applicant challenged her dismissal before the Skopje Court of First Instance (\u201cthe first-instance court\u201d). 9.  After three remittal orders, on 29 November 2005 the first-instance court dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim, finding that she had been dismissed on 28 February 2001 on the basis of the Regulations, which had been adopted by the employer and approved by the Government on 27 February 2001. It further found that the Government\u2019s approval had been received by the employer on 2 March 2001, but that had been irrelevant given that it was only the date when approval had been given by the Government that was important for the entry into force of the Regulations. 10.  On 14 December 2005 the applicant appealed, arguing inter alia that the Regulations could not have applied to her case, as it could only be adopted after the employer had received the Government\u2019s approval. The applicant relied on another final judgment of the Skopje Court of Appeal (\u201cthe appellate court\u201d) in a similar case concerning a former colleague of the applicant, in which it had been established that the Regulations had not entered into force at the time of the dismissal (see paragraph 17 below). She contended that under the relevant law (see paragraph 16 below) the Regulations could only be adopted after the Government\u2019s approval had been obtained. 11.  On 23 February 2006 the appellate court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. It found that the Government had approved the Regulations on 27 February 2001, that they had entered into force the same day, and that the applicant\u2019s dismissal of 28 February 2001 was therefore lawful. 12.  On 7 April 2006 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court. In it she argued, inter alia, that the Regulations could only be adopted after the Government\u2019s approval had been obtained, and that they had thus not entered into force at the time of her dismissal. She referred to the earlier judgment of the appellate court (see paragraph 17 below), and argued that it had deviated from its established practice on the matter without providing any reasons. She further contended that the dismissal of her former colleagues, which had been based on the same grounds, had been quashed and they had been reinstated to their posts. 13.  On 25 October 2007 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law. It found that on 27 February 2001 the Government had approved the Regulations, which had thus entered into force the same day. On 15 January 2008 the applicant was served with the Supreme Court\u2019s judgment.", "references": ["7", "4", "8", "9", "5", "6", "2", "0", "1", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicants were born in 1983, 1966, 1961 and 1969 respectively. 7.  On 13 October 2003 the first applicant was arrested by the police. On 25 March 2005 the Primorskyy District Court convicted him of robbery and sentenced him to five years\u2019 imprisonment with confiscation of all his property. He lodged two appeals, which were dismissed by the Odesa Regional Court of Appeal on 12 July 2005 and by the Supreme Court on 14 March 2006. 8.  During the pre-trial investigation and the trial the first applicant was detained at a detention facility in Odesa. In 2006 he was transferred first to the Pivdenna Correctional Colony and then to the Shyryayevskyy Correctional Centre to serve his sentence. In March 2007 the applicant was released from detention. 9.  In 2005, after the first applicant had introduced his application, the Court invited him to submit copies of various documents from his domestic case file, including court decisions and his appeals. The first applicant, while still detained, made a number of unsuccessful attempts to obtain copies of the required documents. In December 2007 and February 2008, when he was at liberty, the first applicant obtained some of the documents, except his cassation appeal, and submitted copies of them to the Court. 10.  According to the Government, after his release from detention in March 2007, the first applicant had been informed that he could come to the court holding the case file in order to obtain copies of the documents he had wished to obtain. The first applicant had not done so.\nII.  Facts relating to the SECOND applicant 11.  On 6 July 2004 the second applicant was arrested by the police on suspicion of murder. He remained in detention for the entire duration of the criminal proceedings against him. Subsequently, he served his prison sentence at the Simferopolska Correctional Colony. 12.  The second applicant was tried by the Simferopol Court, which on 7 October 2004 found him guilty of murder and sentenced him to fifteen years\u2019 imprisonment. 13.  By decisions of 23 November 2004 and 1 December 2005 the Crimea Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, respectively, rejected appeals lodged by the second applicant. 14.  In order to substantiate his application the second applicant submitted a number of requests to the authorities, including the Simferopol Court, for him to be given access to his criminal case file and be provided with the possibility to obtain copies of various procedural documents. His requests were refused as having no legal basis. Eventually, copies of some of the requested documents, principally court decisions, were given to the second applicant.\nIII.  Facts relating to the THIRD applicant 15.  On 11 March 2008 the third applicant was arrested by the police. He remained in detention for the entire duration of the criminal proceedings against him. Subsequently, he served his prison sentence at the Berdychivska Correctional Colony. 16.  On 25 November 2008 the Bila Tserkva Court found the third applicant guilty of murder and inflicting bodily injuries and sentenced him to fifteen years\u2019 imprisonment. 17.  On 10 June and 18 November 2009, respectively, the Kyiv Regional Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court rejected appeals lodged by the third applicant. 18.  In 2010 the Court invited the third applicant to submit copies of several documents from his criminal case file, including his appeals. Between June 2010 and April 2011 the third applicant submitted to the Bila Tserkva Court several requests for such copies. In November 2011 the Bila Tserkva Court sent him a copy of his appeal. It also informed him that the case file did not contain his cassation appeal.\nIV.  Facts relating to the FOURTH applicant 19.  In 2009 the fourth applicant was prosecuted for illegal possession of arms and drug dealing and eventually sentenced to five years\u2019 imprisonment with confiscation of all his property. The final decision in his criminal case was given by the Supreme Court, of which he was informed on an unspecified date in November or December 2009. The fourth applicant was not allowed to keep a copy of that decision. 20.  On 11 March 2011 he was released from detention. 21.  In 2010 and 2011, prior to and after the fourth applicant\u2019s release from detention, the Court invited him to submit copies of various documents from his criminal case file. He was not able to provide copies of any of the required documents, as the Amur Nyzhnyodnirpovskyy District Court in Dnipropetrovsk, which held his case file, had refused to give him access to it.", "references": ["7", "3", "2", "9", "0", "8", "1", "6", "5", "4", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1994 and lives in Bidovce. He is of Romani origin. 6.  At about 7 p.m. on 18 December 2010 a twelve-year old boy was mugged and his mobile phone taken from him while he was walking along a road between two villages in south\u2011eastern Slovakia. The perpetrators of the mugging were not known to him.\nThe boy and his parents subsequently reported the incident to the local county police. 7.  In response, a police unit consisting of three officers searched the area surrounding the crime scene with the boy and his father.\nAt around 8 p.m. they spotted the applicant, who was then aged sixteen, another minor and a third person, all of whom the boy identified as his assailants. 8.  The applicant and his two associates, both of whom were also of Romani origin, were arrested. The parties dispute the circumstances of the arrest.\nThe Government relied on entries in the county police logbook for the relevant night and on a note on the record drawn up by the county police dated 18 December 2010 indicating that the suspects had resisted arrest and attempted to flee. They had consequently had to be subdued, no injuries had been sustained, and the use of force by the arresting officers had been found lawful. That material referred to the measures of restraint used against the applicant and the other two suspects as \u201cself-defence mechanisms for holding and grabbing\u201d. The applicant, for his part, denied that he had shown any resistance or that the police had used any measures of restraint. 9.  The applicant and his companions were then taken to the county police station. According to the results of a breathalyser test carried out there, all three detainees had consumed alcohol and the applicant was in a state of slight inebriation. 10.  The three suspects were kept at the police station and preliminarily questioned (vy\u0165a\u017een\u00ed) by officers from the county police. As to the rooms in which they were kept, these were used as offices, were fitted out with the usual office equipment and were not furnished as detention cells. 11.  The applicant\u2019s and the Government\u2019s accounts in relation to further details vary as follows.\nAccording to the applicant, during the probing, the officers subjected him to psychological pressure and physical violence with a view to obtaining his confession. In particular, he was slapped and punched in the head, was not allowed to sit or lie down or to rest during the entire length of his detention, and was not provided any food or drink.\nIn the Government\u2019s submission, there had been no ill-treatment, the three suspects were kept in separate rooms and were checked on at fifteen\u2011minute intervals. The applicant was allowed to use the toilet, which was equipped with a washbasin with drinkable tap water. 12.  The Public Prosecution Service (\u201cthe PPS\u201d) was informed of the arrest and, at 11.10 p.m. the case file, along with the responsibility for the detention of the young men, was passed on to an investigator from the local district police. 13.  Meanwhile or in parallel, the victim was examined by a doctor, his mother orally submitted a criminal complaint, and the crime scene was inspected. 14.  In the early hours of 19 December 2010 the applicant and his two co-detainees were charged with robbery and the investigator decided to place them in a facility for provisional detention. However, the decision was not implemented as no room was available in such a facility within a reasonable distance.\nSubsequently, a legal-aid lawyer was appointed for the applicant and a copy of the document containing the charges was sent to, inter alia, the child protection services. 15.  Between 12 noon and 1 p.m. on 19 December 2010 the applicant was brought before the investigator, who interviewed him in the presence of his mother and the lawyer. No mention was made of any ill\u2011treatment. 16.  At 1.50 p.m. the applicant was placed in a provisional detention cell as documented by a protocol, which cites him as submitting in response to a pre-printed question that had not been subjected to any violence. The relevant documentation further contains a hand-written note with the applicant\u2019s signature indicating that \u201c[he] ha[d] received dinner\u201d. According to the Government, the cell was equipped with, inter alia, a washbasin and drinkable water from the tap. 17.  At 6.05 p.m. the applicant and his co-detainees were released, and the police took them home. 18.  When the applicant\u2019s mother appeared before the investigator on 20 December 2010 she decided to avail herself of her right not to give evidence, making no mention of any ill-treatment. 19.  On 21 December 2010, acting through the intermediary of his lawyer, the applicant lodged an interlocutory appeal against the charge, arguing that he himself had not been involved in the mugging, which had been perpetrated by his minor associate alone and to which the latter had confessed. There was no mention of any ill-treatment. 20.  On 12 January 2010 the charge against the applicant was withdrawn. 21.  In the applicant\u2019s submission, meanwhile, in the days that followed his release, his mother presented herself at the county police station and contacted the Ministry of the Interior by telephone to complain about the treatment to which her son had been subjected while detained. According to the applicant, her complaint was not registered and she was orally advised to submit it in written form.\nAccording to the Government, however, the heads of the county police and the district police, who were the only persons entitled to receive complaints in matters such as those obtaining in the present case, did not receive any complaint from the applicant\u2019s mother. Similarly, there was no mention of a visit or any communication from her in the records of visits and telephone calls received by the county police or in the operational logbook of the district police. 22.  On 5 January 2011 the applicant and his associates lodged a written criminal complaint with the Ministry of the Interior.\nThey directed it against the officers of the county police who had been on duty between 7 p.m. on 18 December 2010 and 10 a.m. on 19 December 2010, suggesting that the offence of abuse of authority of a public official could have been committed.\nIn particular, they submitted that, while in police custody, each of them separately had been pressured to confess on the pretext that the others had already confessed. The applicant also submitted that he had been subjected to slapping in the face and on the head until he had confessed. The persons inflicting that treatment had worn uniforms. Although the applicant did not know their identity, he would certainly recognise them. Another person had been present, not wearing a uniform, presumably a relative of the boy who had been robbed.\nThroughout the entire time in police custody, the applicant had had to stand, without being allowed to sit or lie down, and he had not been given any food or water.\nMoreover, in the applicant\u2019s submission, his legal guardians had not been notified of his custody, let alone been present. 23.  The applicant submitted a medical report dated 19 December 2010. The doctor who issued the report observed that the applicant had \u201callege[d] that he had been beaten by police officers the day before\u201d and \u201chad received a slap on the right half of a cheek\u201d. In reply to a printed question about whether the injury could have been sustained as alleged, the reply \u201cyes\u201d was given. The doctor further observed that there was no haematoma and that the cheek was sensitive and slightly swollen. He diagnosed \u201ca bruised cheek on the left\u201d and classified the injury as slight, with recovery time below seven days. 24.  The criminal complaint was sent to the local Control and Inspection Section (\u201cthe CIS\u201d) of the Ministry of the Interior for examination. Subsequently, the part of the complaint concerning the failure to notify the applicant\u2019s legal guardians of his arrest and detention, to provide him with food and water during his detention, and to hear him immediately after his arrest was sent to the district police (see paragraph 29 below). 25.  In examining the complaint concerning the alleged physical mistreatment, the CIS interviewed the applicant and his associates, as well as the investigator and two officers under suspicion. In addition, it examined the case file concerning the investigation into the alleged robbery and other documentary material. 26.  On 9 March 2011 the CIS dismissed the complaint. In doing so it observed that the applicant had not raised any complaint of ill-treatment during his interview with the investigator on 19 December 2010, and held that this could not be explained by his proclaimed fear of the officers involved since, in that interview, the applicant had been assisted by his mother and lawyer (see paragraph 15 above).\nThe CIS observed that in his oral depositions, the applicant had claimed that he had been beaten at the county police station for about three hours and that he had sustained bruises and a swollen cheek. However, those allegations of sustained beating and its consequences did not correspond to the findings in the doctor\u2019s report of 19 December 2010, which only attest to an allegation of having received a slap on the right cheek and to having a swollen cheek, but no haematoma.\nThe CIS also noted that in the investigation file concerning the alleged robbery there was no indication of any ill-treatment. It observed that the applicant\u2019s injury could have been inflicted in the course of his arrest, which he had resisted and which accordingly had had to be carried out forcefully.\nIn addition, the CIS observed that the police officers in question had not been involved in the investigation of the alleged robbery, but had merely been guarding the applicant. Consequently, they had had no reason to pressure him into confessing. 27.  The applicant challenged the decision of 9 March 2011 by lodging an interlocutory appeal with the PPS. He requested twice that a decision by the PPS to dismiss the appeal be reviewed.\nThe applicant argued in particular that he had not resisted his arrest and that, accordingly, no physical force had been used in the course of it. His injury could therefore not be explained as the CIS had done. He had not complained of the ill-treatment before the investigator because nobody had asked him about it and because he had been concerned about possible repercussions.\nThe applicant further argued that the fact that there was no mention of the ill-treatment in the investigation file was irrelevant. In fact, it was logical, because the officers involved would naturally not mention their misconduct and would deny it. That incongruity and contradiction of the arguments had not been examined.\nAccording to the applicant, a \u201cracial motive was not excluded\u201d and the treatment to which he had been subjected had been contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. 28.  The interlocutory appeal and the requests for review were eventually dismissed by the Office of the Prosecutor General (\u201cthe OPG\u201d), which communicated its decision to the applicant in a letter of 29 September 2011.\nThe PPS fully endorsed the findings of CIS, considering as crucial the fact that before the doctor on 19 December 2010 the applicant had only alleged slapping, that the doctor\u2019s observations on the applicant\u2019s injury did not correspond to the applicant\u2019s subsequent allegation of sustained beating, and that the applicant had not raised any ill-treatment allegation with the investigator on 19 December 2010.\nWithout any explanation, the PPS also concluded that there was no indication of any racial motive behind the treatment complained of by the applicant. 29.  As to the part of the applicant\u2019s criminal complaint concerning the alleged failure to notify his legal guardians of his arrest and detention, to provide him with food and water during his detention, and to hear him immediately after his arrest (see paragraph 24 above), the district police informed the applicant in a letter of 8 June 2011, without any explanation at all, that \u201cin the investigation of the given matter, no error had been committed by the investigative organs\u201d. 30.  On 2 December 2011 the applicant lodged a complaint, under Article 127 of the Constitution, with the Constitutional Court against the OPG and the Regional Office of the PPS involved in his case.\nHe emphasised that at the time of his arrest he had been a minor, that he had been kept at the police station the whole night without being able to sit or lie down, and without being given any food or water, and that he had been subjected to psychological pressure and physical violence with a view to forcing him to confess. He considered that such treatment had been in breach of his rights under Article 3 of the Convention, as was the ensuing investigation into his complaints on account of its lack of efficiency and independence, as well as the authorities\u2019 failure to act on their own initiative.\nThe applicant also alleged that the lack of a proper investigation had been aggravated by the lack of an effective remedy and discrimination, contrary to his rights under Articles 13 and 14 of the Convention.\nOn the last point, the applicant argued that there had been many known incidents of police violence against the Roma in the course of arrest and detention in Slovakia, and that his treatment by the police had been influenced by his Romani origin. 31.  On 10 April 2012 the Constitutional Court rejected the complaint as manifestly ill-founded. It observed that the applicant had no legal right to have a third person criminally prosecuted, that his right to lodge a criminal complaint merely implied that he had the right \u201cto have the complaint dealt with by a body authorised to do so\u201d, and that it had thus been dealt with. It further observed that the applicant had not complained of his alleged ill-treatment before the investigator on 19 December 2010 or in his interlocutory appeal against the charge (see paragraphs 15 and 19 above). The fact that he had had those means of asserting his rights at his disposal excluded the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court. It concluded without further explanation that, in the circumstances, neither the proceedings before the PPS nor their decisions could have violated the applicant\u2019s rights as identified in his constitutional complaint.\nThe decision was served on the applicant on 25 April 2012. 32.  Various international material concerning the Situation of Roma in Slovakia at the relevant time has been summarised for example in the Court\u2019s judgments in the cases of Mi\u017eig\u00e1rov\u00e1 v. Slovakia (no. 74832/01, \u00a7\u00a7 57-63, 14 December 2010); V.C. v. Slovakia (no. 18968/07, \u00a7\u00a7 78-84 and 146-49, 8 November 2011); and Koky and Others v. Slovakia (no. 13624/03, \u00a7 239, 12 June 2012).\nFurther relevant material 1.  The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI): Report (Fifth Monitoring Cycle) of 19 June 2014 on Slovakia (CRI[2014]37) 33.  The report contains the following passages:\n\u201c... 69.  Police ill-treatment (and generally speaking abusive behaviour) towards Roma have also been reported by the media, civil society and international organisations (IOs)...\n...\n- Authorities\u2019 response\n... 77.  ... The most famous example with extensive media coverage concerns a group of Roma boys who were allegedly subjected to degrading treatment while detained by police officers in Ko\u0161ice in March 2009. Although the racist motivation of the crime was included in the indictment of 10 policemen in spring 2010 to date the case is still pending. More recently, in June 2013, NGOs and the media reported repressive police action in a village in the Kosice region, Moldava nad Bodvou, which allegedly resulted in injuries to over 30 individuals, including children. Only six months after the incident did the General Prosecutor\u2019s office order an investigation into the police action which is still pending.\n... 79.  ECRI reiterates its recommendation that... the Slovak authorities provide for a body which is independent of the police and prosecution authorities, entrusted with the investigation of alleged cases of racial discrimination and misconduct by the police. 80.  ECRI also strongly reiterates its recommendation that the Slovak authorities ensure effective investigations into allegations of racial discrimination or misconduct by the police and ensure as necessary that the perpetrators of these types of acts are adequately punished.\n...\u201d 2.  European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment: Report of 25 November 2014 on its visit to Slovakia in 2013 (CPT/Inf [2014] 29) 34.  The report contains, inter alia, the following:\n\u201c11.  ... the [CPT] delegation did receive a number of consistent and credible allegations of physical ill\u2011treatment by police officers (including from several detained juveniles). Most of the allegations concerned the time period immediately after apprehension (even when the person concerned allegedly was not resisting apprehension or after he/she had been brought under control) and the period before and during police questioning. The alleged ill-treatment mostly consisted of slaps, punches and kicks to various parts of the body. In one case, the head of a detained juvenile was allegedly repeatedly banged against a wall by a police officer during questioning, apparently in an attempt to extract a confession.\nAnother person met by the delegation stated that during his apprehension on the street, after having been brought under control by the police, he had been slapped in the face and kicked by a uniformed police officer...\n... 16.  ...According to the information available, on 19 June 2013, some 60 police officers entered the settlement and individual houses, officially in an attempt to search for wanted individuals and stolen goods. [...] Following the operation, 15 persons were apprehended and escorted to the Moldava nad Bodvou sub-district police department where they spent several hours. Allegedly, in the course of the actual apprehension and subsequent detention, several individuals were ill-treated by the police.... 17.  In its report on the 2009 visit, the CPT referred to the incident of 21 March 2009, concerning the case of six Roma juveniles who had allegedly been forced, under threat of physical assault by police officers, to strip naked in a police station in Ko\u0161ice and to slap each other. Furthermore, they had allegedly been subjected to intimidation by police dogs. The Committee is concerned to note that, according to the information provided by the Slovak authorities during the 2013 visit, i.e. four-and\u2011a-half years after the alleged incident, the criminal case was still pending before the first instance court....\n...\u201d 3.  UN Committee against Torture (CAT): Concluding Observations on the Third Periodic Report of Slovakia (2007-2013) of 8 September 2015 (CAT/C/SVK/CO/3) 35.  In paragraph 11 of its report, the Committee expressed its concern:\n\u201c...\n(d) That no charges were brought against police officers who participated in the raid on 19 June 2013 on the Roma settlement of Moldava nad Bodvou in eastern Slovakia, which resulted in the apprehension of 15 persons, a number of whom reportedly were seriously ill-treated by the police during their apprehension and subsequent detention;\n(e) That all 10 policemen who physically abused and inflicted degrading treatment on six Roma juveniles in the city of Ko\u0161ice on 21 March 2009 were acquitted in the first instance judgement by the Ko\u0161ice II District Court on 27 February 2015, since the court refused to admit the video recording of the incriminating act as a legally obtained piece of evidence.\n...\u201d", "references": ["6", "0", "5", "7", "9", "4", "2", "8", "3", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1991 and lives in Vladivostok. 7.  The applicant is an ethnic Uzbek. He lived in the town of Osh in Kyrgyzstan. After the mass disorders and inter-ethnic clashes in the region in June 2010, he left Kyrgyzstan for Russia. 8.  On 4 July 2010 the applicant arrived in Russia. 9.  On 9 July 2010 the Kyrgyz authorities charged the applicant in absentia with violent crimes related to these clashes, including the kidnapping and murder of two law-enforcement officers. 10.  On 10 July 2010 they ordered the applicant\u2019s arrest. 11.  On 12 July 2010 the applicant\u2019s name was put on a national wanted list, and on 16 September 2010 on an international wanted list. 12.  On 23 January 2014 the applicant was apprehended in Vladivostok, Primorsk Region, and placed in detention. 13.  Shortly after his arrest, the applicant gave an explanation (\u043e\u0431\u044a\u044f\u0441\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435) in which he admitted having participated in the beating of one of the law-enforcement officers in June 2010 but denied his involvement in other crimes for which he was to be prosecuted in Kyrgyzstan. He also indicated that although he had not been directly informed about the charges being brought against him in Kyrgyzstan, he knew that his father had been sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder of the same law-enforcement officers and suspected that he was himself also wanted by the Kyrgyz authorities. 14.  On 24 January 2014 the Frunzenskiy District Court of Vladivostok decided to remand the applicant in custody. His detention was subsequently extended several times. 15.  On 29 January 2014 the Russian Prosecutor\u2019s Office informed the Kyrgyz authorities about the applicant\u2019s arrest. 16.  On 16 January 2015 a judge of the Primorsk Regional Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 23 July 2015. The applicant\u2019s lawyer appealed, arguing that the applicant would be deprived of judicial review of his detention for a long period of time. 17.  On 11 February 2015 the Primorsk Regional Court upheld the extension order on appeal. It did not address the applicant\u2019s argument that he would be deprived of judicial review of his detention for a long period of time. 18.  On 27 July 2015 the applicant was released. It appears that the applicant is currently at large. 19.  On 11 February 2014 the Kyrgyz General Prosecutor\u2019s Office requested the applicant\u2019s extradition. The request was accompanied by assurances that the applicant would not be subjected to torture or inhuman treatment and that Russian diplomats would be granted the opportunity to visit him. 20.  On 17 October 2014 the Deputy Prosecutor General granted the extradition request submitted by the Kyrgyz authorities. 21.  On 6 November 2014 the applicant appealed, arguing that as an ethnic Uzbek charged with serious crimes in relation to the mass disorders of June 2010 he would face a serious risk of torture and ill-treatment if extradited. He also referred to the principle of non\u2011refoulement of asylum seekers pending the examination of his application for refugee status. 22.  On 12 December 2014 the Primorsk Regional Court rejected his appeal in the light of the diplomatic assurances given by the Kyrgyz authorities and the improvement of the situation in Kyrgyzstan. As to the non\u2011refoulement principle, the Regional Court noted that the applicant\u2019s application for refugee status had been refused by the migration authority. 23.  On 25 March 2015 the Supreme Court rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal and the extradition order became final. It noted in particular that in addition to the diplomatic assurances provided in writing by the Kyrgyz authorities, the representatives of the General Consulate of the Russian Federation in this country were able to monitor the situation of persons already extradited to Kyrgyzstan, including those held in relation to the mass disorders. For instance, on 30 and 31 July 2014 Russian diplomats had visited some such detainees, who had made no complaints in relation to their transfer, detention, prosecution or treatment. In the Supreme Court\u2019s view, such a monitoring mechanism was effective in observing compliance by the Kyrgyz authorities with their obligations to ensure the rights of the extradited persons, including the right not to be subjected to torture and inhuman treatment. 24.  The Supreme Court noted that the applicant belonged to a vulnerable group whose members were at risk of being subjected to torture by the law\u2011enforcement agencies, according to international reports. It considered, however, that in the absence of specific evidence submitted by the applicant that he would personally be subjected to torture or inhuman and degrading treatment, these circumstances were not in themselves enough to reject an extradition request, since he had been charged with ordinary criminal offences to some of which he had confessed on 23 January 2014. 25.  On 7 February 2014 the applicant applied to the Primorsk Region Department of the Federal Migration Service (\u0423\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0424\u0435\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u043c\u0438\u0433\u0440\u0430\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u0441\u043b\u0443\u0436\u0431\u044b \u043f\u043e \u041f\u0440\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0440\u0441\u043a\u043e\u043c\u0443 \u043a\u0440\u0430\u044e) (hereinafter the \u201cPrimorsk Region FMS\u201d) seeking refugee status. 26.  On 23 April 2014 the Primorsk Region FMS refused the applicant\u2019s application for refugee status. Although it referred in its decision to inter\u2011ethnic conflicts existing in Kyrgyzstan, it considered that the applicant\u2019s arrival in Russia had rather been motivated by the unemployment situation existing in his country of origin and his wish to escape from criminal prosecution. 27.  The applicant appealed to the Federal Migration Authority, (\u0424\u0435\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u0430\u044f \u043c\u0438\u0433\u0440\u0430\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u043d\u0430\u044f \u0441\u043b\u0443\u0436\u0431\u0430 (\u0424\u041c\u0421)) (hereinafter the \u201cFMS\u201d). He claimed that he was being persecuted on the grounds of his ethnic origin and, if extradited, would be subjected to torture. 28.  On 18 July 2014 the FMS dismissed his appeal on account of his prolonged failure to apply for refugee status and in view of the opportunity offered to the Russian diplomats to monitor the compliance by the Kyrgyz authorities with international standards as regards persons extradited from Russia. 29.  On 13 November 2014 the Basmannyy District Court of Moscow upheld the refusal of the FMS to grant the applicant refugee status, referring in particular to his protracted failure to apply for refugee status. It also indicated that the applicant was not a member of any political, religious, military or public organisation, had neither served in the army nor taken part in any military activities, had never been prosecuted or threatened by the authorities, and had not been involved in any violent incidents. 30.  On 8 April 2015 the Moscow City Court upheld this judgment on appeal. The City Court endorsed the reasoning of the District Court, referring in addition to several international sources demonstrating positive developments in the human rights situation in Kyrgyzstan during the period 2011-2012.", "references": ["5", "6", "7", "0", "8", "4", "3", "9", "No Label", "1", "2"], "gold": ["1", "2"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1969 and lives in Kovel. 5.  At about 1.30 p.m. on 27 August 2003 the applicant\u2019s daughter (two years old at that time) was admitted in a critical condition to the infectious diseases ward of the Kovel City Hospital. She was diagnosed with acute enterocolitis with concomitant illnesses. At 3.45 p.m. her condition aggravated, and acrocyanosis of the lips and nose were noted. At 4 p.m. the resuscitation specialists performed artificial pulmonary ventilation and cardiac massage. At 5.40 p.m. the doctors stated that the applicant\u2019s daughter had died. 6.  On 9 September 2003 the applicant complained to the Kovel inter\u2011district prosecutor\u2019s office (\u201cthe prosecutor\u2019s office\u201d) about the death of his daughter in hospital. 7.  On 19 September 2003 the prosecutor\u2019s office, having conducted a pre-investigation inquiry, decided not to institute criminal proceedings against the doctors of the hospital for lack of corpus delicti. The next day that decision was quashed by the supervising prosecutor and further inquiry was ordered. 8.  On 10 October 2003 the prosecutor\u2019s office instituted criminal proceedings to investigate the allegations of medical negligence and failure to ensure the right of the applicant\u2019s daughter to free medical aid. 9.  On 16 June 2004 a panel of forensic medical experts found, inter alia, that the resuscitation measures had been delayed; however, there was no guarantee that the outcome would have been positive had those measures been taken in a timely fashion. The experts considered that the principal cause of death was the nature and seriousness of the illnesses, which had caused the patient\u2019s brain to swell. 10.  On 24 June 2005 the Volyn regional prosecutor\u2019s office informed the applicant that the investigation had been delayed and that instructions had been given to investigate the case properly. 11.  On 16 September 2006 the forensic medical experts issued an additional report stating, inter alia, that the applicant\u2019s daughter had been admitted to hospital five days after the first symptoms of the pathological process. If her family had sought medical aid in due time, her life and health prognosis could have been more favourable. 12.  On 3 December 2007 the investigators in charge of the criminal case were disciplined for causing delays and for failure to take all the necessary measures during the investigations. 13.  On 24 July 2008 Dr G. was charged with the offences of failure to provide medical aid to a patient by a medical practitioner and violation of the right to free medical aid. 14.  On 7 August 2008 the investigation was completed. The case was referred to the court for trial. 15.  On 5 November 2008 the Turiysk District Court returned the case to the prosecutor\u2019s office stating that the prosecutor had not complied with procedural requirements when submitting the case file to the court. 16.  On 8 January 2009 the prosecutor\u2019s office decided that additional investigative steps should be carried out in the case. 17.  On 30 March 2009 the Turiysk District Court committed Dr G. for trial. 18.  On 26 October 2009 the Turiysk District Court found that on 27 August 2003 Dr G. had committed the offence of failing to provide the applicant\u2019s daughter with medical aid. It also released her from any punishment due to the expiry of the time-limit for criminal responsibility. The court then acquitted Dr G. of a violation of the right to free medical aid, finding that that charge had been unsubstantiated. The applicant and the prosecutor appealed against that judgment. 19.  On 23 February 2010 the Volyn Regional Court of Appeal upheld the judgment of 26 October 2009 as regards Dr G.\u2019s partial acquittal. As regards her conviction, it stated that the trial court had failed to specify the punishment from which she had been released. The Court of Appeal therefore quashed the judgment in that part and remitted the case to the trial court for fresh consideration. 20.  On 30 June 2010 the Turiysk District Court held that Dr G. was guilty of failing to provide medical aid to the applicant\u2019s daughter. It found that between 3.45 p.m. and 4 p.m. on 27 August 2003 she had failed to carry out artificial respiration and cardiac massage and that those failures had reduced the chances of success of the resuscitation measures carried out subsequently by the other doctors. The court sentenced Dr G. to a fine and a three-year ban on medical practice. It nevertheless released her from that punishment due to the expiry of the time-limit for criminal responsibility. 21.  On 24 September 2010 the Volyn Regional Court of Appeal upheld that judgment. 22.  On 23 September 2011 the applicant initiated civil proceedings seeking compensation for the non-pecuniary damage caused by the hospital\u2019s failure to ensure appropriate medical treatment for his daughter. Dr G. was admitted to the proceedings as a third party. 23.  On 7 March 2012 the Starovyzhivskyy District Court found that the applicant had sustained non-pecuniary damage on account of the professional misconduct of Dr G. The court awarded the applicant 20,000[1] Ukrainian hryvnias in respect of non-pecuniary damage. In its reasons the court referred to the findings of the domestic court dealing with the criminal case against Dr G. The court further found that, in accordance with the statutory documents of the Kovel Inter-District Territorial Medical Association, that legal entity was obliged to pay the amount awarded. 24.  On 18 April 2012 the Volyn Regional Court of Appeal upheld the decision of 7 March 2012. 25.  On 25 May 2012 the Higher Specialised Court for Criminal and Civil Matters refused the applicant leave to appeal in cassation against these decisions.", "references": ["5", "3", "2", "1", "9", "8", "4", "6", "7", "No Label", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "8.  The applicants, a married couple and their son, were born in 1964, 1965 and 2000 respectively. 9.   The applicants were brought up in Baghdad. Since the 1990s the husband (the first applicant) had run his own construction and transport business with exclusively American clients and had had his office at the United States military base \u201cVictoria camp\u201d (seemingly referring to Camp Victory). Several of his employees had on occasion been warned not to cooperate with the Americans. 10.  On 26 October 2004 the first applicant was the target of a murder attempt carried out by al-Qaeda. He had to stay in hospital for three months. There, unknown men asked for him, after which he was treated in three different hospitals. 11.  In 2005 his brother was kidnapped by al-Qaeda members, who claimed that they would kill him because of the first applicant\u2019s collaboration with the Americans. His brother was released through bribery a few days later and immediately fled from Iraq. The applicants fled to Jordan and stayed there until December 2006, before returning to Iraq. 12.  Soon afterwards, al-Qaeda members placed a bomb next to the applicants\u2019 house. However, it was detected by the first applicant\u2019s wife (the second applicant), and the American forces arrested the perpetrator. During interrogation, the perpetrator confessed that he had been paid by al-Qaeda to kill the first applicant and disclosed the names of sixteen people who had been designated to watch the applicants. Thereafter, the applicants moved to Syria, although the first applicant continued his business in Iraq. During this time, al-Qaeda destroyed their home and the first applicant\u2019s business stocks. 13.  In January 2008 the applicants returned to Baghdad. In October 2008 the first applicant and his daughter were shot at when driving. The daughter was taken to hospital, where she died. The first applicant then stopped working and the family moved to a series of different locations in Baghdad. The first applicant\u2019s business stocks were attacked four or five times by al-Qaeda members, who had threatened the guards. The first applicant stated that he had not received any personal threats since 2008 as the family had repeatedly moved around. The son (the third applicant) had spent most of his time indoors for fear of attacks and had only attended school for his final examinations. The applicants had never asked the domestic authorities for protection, fearing that the authorities lacked the ability to protect them and might disclose their address, on account of al\u2011Qaeda\u2019s collaboration with the authorities. The applicants maintained that, in the event of their return to Iraq, they risked persecution by al-Qaeda and that the first applicant appeared on al-Qaeda\u2019s death list. 14.  On 14 December 2010 the first applicant applied for asylum and a residence permit in Sweden. On 11 July 2011 his application was rejected since he was registered as having left the country. 15.  On 25 August 2011 the first applicant applied anew for asylum and a residence permit in Sweden, as did the other applicants on 19 September 2011. As to their state of health, the first applicant still had an open and infected wound on his stomach where he had been shot in 2004. They submitted several documents, including identity papers, a death certificate for the first and second applicants\u2019 daughter and a medical certificate for the first applicant\u2019s injury. 16.  All three applicants were given an introductory interview by the Migration Agency (Migrationsverket) on 26 September 2011. Subsequently, the first and second applicants were given a further interview on 11 October 2011, which lasted almost three and a half hours. The third applicant was interviewed briefly for a second time and the first applicant was interviewed a third time. The applicants were assisted by State-appointed counsel. 17.  On 22 November 2011 the Migration Agency rejected the applicants\u2019 asylum application. In respect of the Iraqi authorities\u2019 ability to provide protection against persecution by non-State actors, the Agency stated:\n\u201c...\nEvery citizen should have access to police authorities within a reasonable visiting distance. During the past few years the police authorities have taken numerous measures to fight against corruption, clan and militia connections and pure criminality within the police.\nThe current country information, however, shows that there are serious shortcomings in the police\u2019s work on crime-scene investigations and inquests. One of the reasons is probably that many police officers are relatively new and lack experience, and that it takes time to introduce a new method of investigation based on technical evidence. This problem is naturally accentuated by the fact that many individual police officers live under a threat emanating from different terrorist groups, which is likely to diminish their effectiveness. Nevertheless, the current country information shows that the number of suspects who have been prosecuted during the past few years has increased significantly. Even if fewer than half of all suspects are eventually prosecuted, this is still an improvement.\nThe Iraqi security forces have been reinforced significantly and no longer have any shortcomings in human terms. Instances of police infiltration, which were previously widespread, have decreased significantly. The leading representatives of the police authority have expressed both their willingness and their ambition to maintain general security in Iraq. The current country information also shows that it has become more difficult for al-Qaeda Iraq to operate freely in Iraq and that there has been a significant decline in sectarian violence. Today violence is mainly aimed at individual targets, especially civil servants, police, security forces and some minorities.\n...\u201d\nRegarding the assessment of the applicants\u2019 refugee status, as well as their need for alternative protection, the Agency held as follows:\n\u201c...\nThe Migration Agency notes that [the first applicant] had a contract with the Americans until 2008. For this reason [the first applicant] has been exposed to two murder attempts, his brother has been kidnapped and [the first and second applicant]\u2019s daughter has been killed. Furthermore, on several occasions, [the first applicant] has suffered physical damage to his house and stock. [The first and second applicants] are convinced that al-Qaeda is behind these abuses. The family are also afraid of al-Qaeda in the event of their return.\nThe Migration Agency notes that [the first applicant] stopped working for the Americans in 2008 after his and [the second applicant]\u2019s daughter was killed. The Migration Agency further notes that [the first applicant] stayed in Baghdad until December 2010 and that [the second and third applicants] lived in Baghdad until September 2011. During this period they were not exposed to any direct abuses. [The first applicant] has, however, been indirectly threatened on four or five occasions by the people who guard his stock. Also, his stock has been attacked. [The first and second applicants] explained that they had managed to escape from abuses because they were in hiding and living in different places in Baghdad. The Migration Agency notes that [the first and second applicants] have two daughters who live with their grandmother in Baghdad and a daughter who is married and lives with her family in Baghdad. These family members have not been exposed to any threats or abuses.\nThe Migration Agency notes that the abuses which the family claim to be at risk of being exposed to are criminal acts which their home country\u2019s authorities have a duty to prosecute. In order to decide whether the family can enjoy protection against the abuses they fear, the Migration Agency notes the following.\nIn accordance with the principle that it is for an asylum-seeker to justify his or her need for protection and that it is primarily for the applicant to provide relevant information for the assessment in the case, the onus must be on the applicant to plead that he or she cannot or, owing to a severe fear of the consequences, for example, will not avail himself or herself of the protection of the authorities available in Iraq. In addition, the applicant must justify this. The shortcomings which still exist in the Iraqi legal system are then to be noted and evaluated in the context of the individual assessment of each asylum case. The circumstances on which an applicant relies in arguing that protection by the authorities is deficient are first of all examined in the usual way. In those cases in which the alleged risk of persecution or other abuses does not emanate from the authorities, which as a rule is the case in Iraq, the applicant must show what efforts he or she has made to be afforded protection by the authorities. The applicant can do this either by relying on evidence or by giving a credible account of events which appear plausible. When assessing the authorities\u2019 ability to protect against threats of violence emanating from terrorist groups or unknown perpetrators in a specific case, the individual\u2019s situation, as well as the severity of the violence or threats, their nature and their local reach, must be assessed individually (see Migration Agency, Legal opinion on protection by the authorities in Iraq, 5 April 2011, Lifos 24948).\nThe Migration Agency considers that the family have been exposed to the most serious forms of abuses (ytterst allvarliga \u00f6vergrepp) by al-Qaeda from 2004 until 2008. Such abuses, however, took place three years ago and nowadays it is more difficult for al-Qaeda to operate freely in Iraq. [The first and second applicants] never turned to the Iraqi authorities for protection. [The first applicant] has stated that the Iraqi authorities lack the capacity to protect the family. Further, he has stated that he did not dare to turn to the authorities because he would then have been forced to disclose his address, which could have resulted in al-Qaeda being able to find him. [The second applicant] has stated that al-Qaeda works together with the authorities. As stated earlier, the Migration Agency finds that there has been a significant decline in instances of police infiltration, which previously were widespread. Against the background of the fact that [the first and second applicants] have not even tried to seek the protection of the Iraqi authorities, the Migration Agency considers that they have not made a plausible case that they would not have access to protection by the authorities in the event of potential threats from al-Qaeda upon returning to Iraq.\nAgainst this background, the Migration Agency finds that [the first and second applicants] have not made a plausible case that the Iraqi authorities lack the capacity and the will to protect the family from being exposed to persecution within the meaning of Chapter 4, section 1, of the Aliens Act or to abuses within the meaning of Chapter 4, section 2, first subsection, first point, first line, of the Aliens Act. The Migration Agency notes in this context that there is no armed conflict in Iraq. The Migration Agency therefore finds that the family are not to be regarded as refugees or as being in need of alternative or other protection, for which reason the family do not have the right to refugee status or alternative protection status.\nThe Migration Agency notes that fierce tensions between opposing factions are prevalent in Baghdad. Nevertheless, against the background of the above reasoning, the Migration Agency finds that the family also cannot be regarded as being otherwise in need of protection, within the meaning of Chapter 4, section 2a, first subsection, of the Aliens Act. The family do not therefore have any right to a status falling under any other need of protection.\n...\u201d\nIn conclusion, the Migration Agency found that there were no grounds to grant the family residence permits. Against this background, the Migration Agency rejected the family\u2019s application and ordered their deportation from Sweden on the strength of Chapter 8, section 1, of the Aliens Act. 18.  The applicants appealed to the Migration Court (Migrationsdomstolen), maintaining that the Iraqi authorities had been and would be unable to protect them. They had contacted the police following the fire to their home and the first applicant\u2019s business stock in 2006 and 2008 and the murder of the first and second applicants\u2019 daughter in 2008, but thereafter they had not dared to contact the authorities owing to the risk of disclosing their residence. Together with their written submissions, they enclosed a translated written statement allegedly from a neighbour in Baghdad, who stated that a masked terrorist group had come looking for the first applicant on 10 September 2011 at 10 p.m. and that the neighbour had told them that the applicants had moved to an unknown place. The neighbour also stated that, just after the incident, the first applicant had called him and been told about the incident. The applicants also submitted a translated residence certificate/police report allegedly certifying that their house had been burned down by a terrorist group on 12 November 2011. Furthermore, the applicants submitted a DVD containing an audiovisual recording of a public debate on television concerning corruption and the infiltration of al-Qaeda members within the Iraqi administration. The applicants mentioned in that connection that the first applicant had participated in the public debate, which had been broadcast on the Alhurra channel in Iraq on 12 February 2008, that is to say, four years earlier. Finally, submitting various medical certificates, the applicants contended that the first applicant\u2019s health had deteriorated and that he could not obtain adequate hospital care in Iraq.\nThe Migration Agency made submissions before the Migration Court. It stated, among other things, that the documents submitted concerning the alleged incidents on 10 September and 12 November 2011 were of a simple nature and of little value as evidence. 19.  On 23 April 2012 the Migration Court upheld the Migration Agency\u2019s decision. Concerning the need for protection, the court held:\n\u201cIt is undisputed in the present case that the applicants\u2019 grounds for protection must be examined in relation to Iraq. The general situation in Iraq is not such that as to confer the automatic right to a residence permit. Therefore, an individual assessment of the grounds for protection invoked by the applicants must be made.\nThe applicants have alleged that they are in need of protection upon returning to Iraq as they risk being exposed to ill-treatment by al-Qaeda because [the first applicant]\u2019s company did contract-based work for the Americans in Iraq until 2008.\nThe Migration Court considers that the alleged events took place in the distant past, that it is difficult to see why there would still be a threat as [the first applicant] no longer performs such work, and that, in the event that some threats should still exist, it appears likely [framst\u00e5r som troligt] that the Iraqi law-enforcement authorities are both willing and able to offer the applicants the necessary protection. In such circumstances, there are no grounds to grant the applicants any residence permit on the basis of a need for protection.\n...\u201d 20.  The applicants appealed to the Migration Court of Appeal (Migrations\u00f6verdomstolen). Their request for leave to appeal was refused on 9 August 2012. 21.  On 29 August 2012 the applicants submitted an application to the Migration Agency for a re-examination of their case. They maintained that the first applicant was under threat from al-Qaeda because he had been politically active. They enclosed a video showing the first applicant being interviewed in English, a video showing a demonstration, and a video showing a television debate. 22.  On 26 September 2012 the Migration Agency refused the applicants\u2019 application. The applicants did not appeal to the Migration Court against that decision.", "references": ["9", "0", "7", "6", "8", "5", "4", "3", "2", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1976 and lives in Narva, Estonia. 6.  On 29 April 2009, some time before 6 p.m., the police emergency call centre received a call about two young men who were at the junction of Kreenholmi and Kerese streets in Narva, Estonia. The caller reported that one of the men was carrying a knife and that the other was obviously drunk and had difficulty walking. He considered the men to be dangerous to passers-by. At 5.55 p.m. Officers S.B. and E.V., who were on patrol duty, were given instructions to respond to the call. At around 6 p.m. they found the men \u2013 the applicant and M.Z. \u2013 at a public playground. 7.  The applicant\u2019s version of events relating to his encounter with the police, as it appears from his application and the documents submitted to the Court, is the following. At around 6 p.m. on 29 April 2009, he and M.Z. were waiting for an acquaintance, Y.B., at a playground. Both the applicant and M.Z. were drunk. Two policemen approached him. He did not behave aggressively or swear at them. The applicant spoke with the officers. He did not remember exactly what they talked about, except that it concerned a knife and that the applicant said that he did not have one. He also recalled that the name of one of the policemen was Andrei (this later turned out to be S.B.). He was then punched on the jaw by S.B. and fell to the ground, his face landing in a hole in the pavement. He momentarily lost consciousness, and when he attempted to get up he received another blow on the back, close to the bottom of his neck. One of the police officers put his knee on his neck and pushed him to the ground. He was handcuffed and then the officers started punching and kicking him all over his body and head. He lost consciousness after the beating and only regained it at the police station. 8.  According to the Government, the criminal investigation carried out by the domestic authorities showed that the applicant\u2019s arrest had taken place in the following manner. The police officers who found the applicant and M.Z. at the playground had been given information about two men, one of whom was possibly carrying a knife, while the other one was reportedly drunk and walking with difficulty. At the playground, the applicant behaved aggressively and used obscene language. Officer E.V. tried to talk to the applicant, but the applicant acted in an erratic manner, and started waving his hands around and shouting at the officers. Officer E.V. decided to force him to the ground and keep him there until a police patrol vehicle arrived. He handcuffed the applicant with the help of two police officers, S.J. and N.S., who had arrived by car. While he was being kept on the ground, the applicant attempted to get up, kicked out and continued to utter obscenities at the officers. The police officers did not use excessive force against him and did not beat him. The applicant continued to resist the police while he was being put into a police van, which was last to arrive and was carrying Officers S.T. and J.S. Some force therefore had to be used to get the applicant in the van. In the course of that process, the applicant hit his left temple against the door of the van. The applicant also remained aggressive during his transportation. The officers on the front seats of the van heard what sounded like something being pounded against another object from the back compartment. 9.  The applicant\u2019s account of the events during his detention, as it appears from his application and the documents submitted to the Court, is the following. When he woke up in a room next to the detention cells in the police station, he saw the two police officers who had been present at the playground in front of him. He was lying on the floor with his hands cuffed. When he attempted to stand up, S.B. kneed him in the area of his left ear. When the applicant tried to sit on a chair, he was knocked off his feet and ordered to sit on the floor. After E.V. left the room, S.B., who had on black leather gloves, started systematically punching and kicking the applicant. The applicant stood up and fell over several times. At one point, he was taken to the toilet, the sink tap was turned on and his head was put under the water. He was then taken back to the detention room. While passing the detention cells, he asked those inside whether they would confirm anything they had seen or heard. In the detention room, the applicant sat on the chair and S.B. punched him again several times. When E.V. returned, the applicant was knocked off the chair and beaten again on every part of his body. S.B. continued beating him after E.V. left the room. The applicant lost consciousness for a while and when he came around he had blood on his face and was eventually put on the chair. His handcuffs were removed and he was allowed to go to the toilet, where he washed himself. He returned to the detention room and was then placed in a cell to sober up. After a while, an ambulance came and he was taken to a hospital in the company of different policemen. He had blood on his clothes, but he threw away the T-shirt, while his mother washed his trousers. 10.  According to the Government, the facts as they were established in the subsequent criminal investigation showed the following. The applicant, who was still handcuffed, continued to behave aggressively at the police station. He ran up to detainees in other cells, shouting that he was being beaten by the police. As he did not obey orders to calm down and stay still, physical force had to be used to make him sit or to place him on the floor. When he began to calm down, he was placed on a chair with his hands cuffed. He suddenly lost his balance and fell off the chair face down. The police officers lifted him up and put him back on the chair. Shortly after, the applicant again fell on the floor. In the interests of the applicant\u2019s safety, the officers left him sitting on the floor. The police removed the applicant\u2019s handcuffs as soon as he calmed down. He was then taken to a cell to sober up. A test showed that the applicant was in a moderate state of alcoholic intoxication. 11.  At 7.45 p.m. Officers S.B. and J.S. drafted a report that the applicant had been taken from 10 Kreenholmi Street to recover from alcoholic intoxication. The report stated that the applicant had been in a state of alcoholic intoxication, had walked with difficulty, had fallen over and had been aggressive. It also stated that the applicant\u2019s face had been dirty and that he had had abrasions on his head. 12.  At 1.42 a.m. on 30 April 2009 Officer P.S. called an ambulance to the police station at the request of the applicant. According to ambulance registration card no. 1419, the applicant complained of pain in the left part of his head and the right wrist, as well as nausea, vomiting and loss of hearing in the left ear. The findings on examination were that he had haematomas on the left part of the cranium and a swollen right wrist and was in a state of alcoholic intoxication. He was diagnosed with an intracranial injury and a fracture of the right hand and wrist. The applicant was taken to hospital. 13.  Later at the hospital, according to patient registration card no. 4460, dated 30 April 2009, the applicant complained about losing consciousness and vomiting. The findings on examination were that he had haematomas and an oedema in the area of the left ear and eye. He was diagnosed with concussion and being in a state of alcoholic intoxication. 14.  At 2.15 a.m. on 30 April 2009 other police officers, not those who had allegedly beaten the applicant at the police station, took a statement from him at the hospital. At 2.40 a.m. those officers drafted a misdemeanour report where they stated that the applicant had been drunk in a public place, Kreenholmi Street, and had been brawling, shouting and using obscene language, actions which amounted to a breach of the peace and a disturbance to others. 15.  At 6.26 a.m. on 30 April 2009 a computer tomography scan was performed on the applicant. The results showed \u201ctemporal extracranial swelling on the left side, no haemorrhage, no intracranial pathology or haemorrhage, ventricular system symmetric, no midline shift, cranial bones intact and paranasal sinuses, middle ear spaces aerated\u201d. He was then released from hospital. 16.  On 1 May 2009 the applicant, when close to home, called an ambulance. Ambulance registration card no. 1454 shows that he complained of severe headaches, dizziness, nausea, vomiting and pain in the neck. The findings on examination were that he had a haematoma around the left ear, an oedema in the area of the left eye, and was in a state of alcoholic intoxication. He was diagnosed with concussion and taken to hospital. He was examined at the hospital by a traumatology doctor who found paraorbital haematoma and swelling around the left eye, bruises on the neck and upper limbs, a smell of alcohol from the mouth, dysarthria, and that he staggered. He was diagnosed with concussion and being in a state of alcoholic intoxication. The applicant did not wish to stay in hospital. 17.  On 30 April 2009 the applicant complained to the police of his ill-treatment. He alleged that police officers had beaten him while arresting him, and that this had also happened later, while he was in detention at the police station. The police officer on duty refused to deal with the complaint and said it had to be submitted to a prosecutor\u2019s office. The prosecutor also refused to deal with the complaint and said it had to be submitted to the police. When the applicant returned to the police station, a police investigator allowed him to file his complaint. 18.  On 5 May 2009 the applicant sent a letter to the prosecutor\u2019s office related to the same circumstances. On the same day the police decided to open a criminal investigation based on his complaint. According to the Government, the next day, on 6 May, the police investigator asked the hospital for the applicant\u2019s medical records. 19.  On 13 May 2009 the applicant made a statement to the police investigator and gave his account of events (see paragraphs 7 and 9 above). 20.  On the same day, the investigator took a statement from A.P., who had been held in the police station\u2019s sobering-up cell until 9 p.m. on 29 April 2009. He explained that he had looked through the eyehole of his cell door and had seen that a young man, with his hands cuffed behind his back, had been taken to the room in front of the sobering-up cells. Officer S.B., whose name he saw on his nametag, knocked the young man off his feet. He attempted to stand up, but the officer stopped him and ordered him to stay on the floor. Each time the young man attempted to stand up he was again knocked off his feet. Both men used foul language. He also heard someone being slapped on his body and saw how the police officer swung his hands towards the detainee. He understood from these gestures that the young man was being hit. The young man was then taken to a neighbouring room. After that, A.P. heard the man shouting and begging for his beating to stop. According to A.P. there was certainly some kind of fight between the young man and the officers. Subsequently, the man was put in a cell, where he continued to shout and requested a doctor, but he went quiet after a while. 21.  On 15 May 2009 the applicant\u2019s legal representative sent a letter to the police requesting, among other measures, that the two police officers who had arrested the applicant, taken him to the police department and used force against him at the police station be shown to the applicant for identification. He also wanted the applicant to be taken to the police station so that his statements could be compared with the actual layout of the premises and so he could relate on the spot what happened. He further requested that the applicant\u2019s mother to be questioned about the applicant\u2019s state of health when he had left home on 29 April and when he had returned on 30 April; that the ambulance doctor and nurse be questioned as witnesses; and that a forensic medical examination of the applicant\u2019s injuries be ordered. 22.  On 15 May 2009 the police investigator took a statement from M.S., who had been held at the police station\u2019s sobering-up cell on 29 April 2009. He said that while he had heard that somebody in the neighbouring room had at one point shouted for help and that the police officers had shouted back at him, he had not seen police officers beating anybody when he had from time to time looked through the eyehole. 23.  On 15 May 2009 the police investigator also took statements from Police Officer S.J., who had arrived in a police car with Officer N.S. at the scene of the applicant\u2019s arrest. While still in the police car, they had seen Officer E.V. talking to the applicant and that there had then been a scuffle between the applicant and the officer. S.J. and N.S. ran out of the car, but by the time they reached the scene the applicant had already been placed on the ground. He was aggressive and uttered obscenities at E.V. Officer S.J. kept him on the ground by using his knee to restrict the applicant\u2019s movement. Together with N.S., he helped E.V. to cuff the applicant\u2019s hands behind his back as the applicant was still putting up physical resistance. The applicant attempted to get up, continued to use indecent language and did not obey orders. The officers therefore kept the applicant on the ground until the police van arrived to transport him to the police station. No other force was used against him. S.J. added that at some point an elderly man had approached them and attempted to give them some money which allegedly belonged to the applicant. He was told that it was not necessary at that time to hand over the money. S.J. further stated that at the time of the events in question Officer S.B. had been in the vicinity talking to another young man who had a knife. 24.  On 18 May 2009 the police investigator took a statement from R.L., who had been detained in the police station\u2019s sobering-up cell on 29 April 2009. He told the investigator that he had heard through the door how officers had dragged somebody into the room facing the cells. He had heard how the officers provoked that person into using rude language, shouted at him, themselves using foul language, and then started to beat him. R.L. did not remember exactly in what way the officers had hit the person, but thought that it involved punches and kicks. The person had attempted to stand up, but had not been allowed to do so as he had been knocked off his feet. He had then been taken to another room. 25.  On 18 May 2009 the police investigator took a statement from M.Z. As to the arrest, he explained that before the events that happened at around 6 p.m. on 29 April 2009, he had had several beers with the applicant. They had just sat down at the playground behind some buildings when three police officers arrived in a police car. One of the officers came to talk to him and two went to the applicant and pushed him over. One of the policemen put his leg on the applicant\u2019s neck, while the other attempted to stand on the applicant\u2019s legs. M.Z. was taken to where the applicant had been beaten. The applicant was lying on the asphalt with his face down in some sand as there was a hole in the asphalt. After a while a police van arrived with two police officers. The applicant\u2019s hands were put behind his back and he was handcuffed, lifted onto his feet and moved towards the van. In the course of that process, one of the police officers slapped the applicant on the head. He was put in the van and taken to the police station. 26.  Regarding the events at the police station, M.Z. explained that the applicant had been taken to a room where the cells were located. M.Z. himself had been left in the corridor which was situated immediately after the detention section. He could see through the open doors how the applicant was put on the floor right in front of the doors and two policemen started to beat him. They hit the applicant with their elbows and kicked him on the back of the head and elsewhere. No other police officers entered the room. The doors were open, as was the door to the duty room, but no one came out of that room. After some time, one of the police officers who had been beating the applicant came to M.Z. and took him to an office to make a statement. He gave a statement against the applicant because he was afraid as he had seen how the police officer had beaten his friend. 27.  On 18 May 2009 the police investigator also took a statement from P.S., a police officer on duty at the police station at the time of the applicant\u2019s detention. He explained that when he had arrived at work at 8 p.m. on 29 April 2009 Officer E.V. had told him that the person who had been put in a temporary detention cell, that is, the applicant, might request that an ambulance be called and that he should be checked from time to time. During the night, the applicant went by himself to the toilet, complained of pain but declined an offer for an ambulance to be called. When during the night he was about to be released he requested an ambulance and P.S. called it for him. P.S. overheard the applicant telling the doctor and nurse that he had been beaten by police officers. When P.S. asked who had beaten the applicant, he replied that it had been the police officers who had taken him to the police station. When P.S. asked where the applicant had been beaten, he replied that it had happened on the street during his arrest. The ambulance then took him to the hospital. 28.  On 27 May 2009 the police investigator took a statement from K.I., who had been on duty at the police station\u2019s command centre at the time of the events in question. He said that when he had passed the detention room on his way out, he had seen the applicant sitting on the floor of the detention room with his hands cuffed. He was using offensive language, behaving aggressively and was intoxicated. K.I. said that the applicant had not been beaten in his presence. The applicant had not complained of being beaten or requested an ambulance. 29.  On 2 June 2009 the police investigator took a statement from one of the suspects, Police Officer S.B. According to him, when he arrived with Officer E.V. on foot at the playground between the buildings at 10 Kreenholmi Street and 18 Kerese Street, the applicant was very drunk and was having an argument over some money with another man. As he had gone further on to talk to M.Z., he had not seen what had happened between the applicant and Officer E.V. or how E.V. had forced the applicant to the ground. M.Z. did not have a knife on him, but was wearing a large sheath on his belt. S.B. had no contact with the applicant. However, he saw that the applicant continued to be aggressive after E.V. had put him on the ground, while Officers S.J. and N.S had helped E.V. to handcuff him and kept him on the ground. He also saw what happened when Officers S.T. and J.S. helped to place the applicant in the police van. The applicant was not kicked or punched. On the way to the police station thumps and bangs could be heard from the back compartment of the police van. 30.  S.B. also stated that at the police station officers had put the applicant in the room facing the detention cells. The door of the room had stayed open. He was alone in the room with the applicant for about 40 minutes, but did not beat him. The applicant did not obey orders to calm down and stay on the floor. S.B. could not therefore remove his handcuffs and had to use force against the applicant to make him stay on the floor and to calm him down. At one point E.V. had helped him. When the applicant calmed down a little, he was taken to another room to take his statement and was put on a chair with his hands still handcuffed behind his back. While sitting on the chair in the detention room, the applicant suddenly fell face down off the chair. Together with E.V., who had entered the interrogation room at that moment, S.B. put the applicant back on the chair, but he fell off again and was again helped back up onto the chair. When the paperwork had been done, the applicant was taken to a cell to sober up. He did not have any bodily injuries, except for some old scratches on the head, and did not request medical assistance. 31.  On 3 June 2009 the police investigator took statements from four children who had seen the applicant\u2019s arrest (A.N., D.K., D.B. and E.G.). Three of the children (A.N., D.K., and D.B.) had seen the applicant when he was drunk and having an argument with an elderly man over some money. According to the statements of A.N. and D.K., two police officers arrived and first went to speak with the applicant and the older man. A.N., D.K., and D.B. said one of the officers had then gone further away to deal with the applicant\u2019s companion, who was carrying a knife sheath. According to A.N. the applicant started to shout obscenities at the police officer who had stayed with him. A.N., D.K. and D.B. stated that following an exchange with the applicant the police officer forced him to the ground. A.N. and D.K. said that the officer pushed the applicant over. D.K. added that the applicant was put on the ground with his right cheek facing down. Two other officers, who had arrived by car, helped the first police officer to cuff the applicant\u2019s hands behind his back. All of the children, including E.G., who had arrived after the applicant was put on the ground, confirmed that the officers kept the applicant on the ground by force. According to A.N. and E.G. that was done by standing on his legs, while D.K. and D.B said one officer knelt on the applicant\u2019s neck to keep his head down, while the other stood on his legs, close to his heels. All the children said the officers had neither punched nor kicked the applicant. The applicant had attempted to get up off the ground, had continued to swear and said that the officers were hurting him. All of the children confirmed that the applicant resisted being walked over to the police van. The police used force to put the applicant in the van and he had hit his head (the left side of his head, according to D.B. and E.G.) against the door of the van. 32.  On 4 June 2009 the police investigator took statements from the ambulance nurse, L.G., and the ambulance doctor, V.K. They had received a call about a man with a head trauma at the police station. The applicant, who was drunk, said that police officers had beaten him at the police station. He did not have any blood on his clothes, and he did not vomit. However, given the nature of his injuries, the doctor decided to take him to the hospital for a further examination. 33.  On 8 June 2009 the other suspect, Police Officer E.V., gave a statement. He explained that he had received an order to respond to a call that a man in a state of heavy alcoholic intoxication, possibly carrying a knife, was walking along Kreenholmi Street. He had then immediately gone with his partner, Officer S.B., to where the man was presumed to be. On reaching the building at 10 Kreenholmi Street he saw the applicant was not behaving appropriately as he was waving his hands and staggering. When he approached the men, M.Z. led the applicant by the hand behind the building at 10 Kreenholmi Street. The police officers followed them and found the applicant sitting on a kerbstone with M.Z. and an elderly man, who was standing next to him. When E.V. and S.B. approached, the applicant stood up and staggered towards them. M.Z. went in a different direction. When the applicant reached the officers, E.V. asked him politely to stop. As the applicant did not react and walked past him, E.V. stopped him by taking his elbow and spoke to him again. The applicant reacted quite violently, and started arguing and waving his hands around. E.V. therefore used the radio to call for assistance to have the applicant removed so he could sober up. Meanwhile, the elderly man had approached and told the applicant to calm down because he was dealing with police officers. The applicant replied that he did not care and started throwing money on the ground, telling the man to keep it. The man picked the money up, said he did not need it and put it back in the applicant\u2019s pockets. By that time, S.B. had gone after M.Z. E.V. attempted to calm the applicant down, but he continued to walk back and forth, waving his hands around and uttering obscenities. E.V. decided to handcuff the applicant because there were a lot of children around. The applicant was also clearly being aggressive and might have hurt other people, particularly given the possible presence of a knife. As the applicant did not let E.V. handcuff him, he forced the applicant to the ground, but did not hit him. Officers N.S. and S.J. arrived and helped in handcuffing the applicant and then took him to the police car, which was 10 metres away. The applicant did not have a knife. E.V. had no further contact with the applicant at the playground. While in the police van on the way back to the station the applicant continued his aggressive behaviour and E.V. heard what sounded like the applicant hitting himself against something. 34.  E.V. further stated that at the police station the applicant shouted that the police were beating him, while S.B. tried to calm him down and conduct a search. E.V. left the room to interview M.Z. as a witness to the applicant\u2019s breach of the peace. When E.V. returned he saw that the applicant had fallen face down off his chair and he helped S.B. to lift him back onto the chair. The applicant fell to the ground for a second time and was then left on the floor. According to E.V., the applicant intentionally tried to injure himself in order to later accuse the police. When he started to behave calmly, the handcuffs were removed. The applicant walked unaided to the sobering-up cell. He did not have any injuries that required immediate medical attention. He had haematomas in the area of his face, but he could have received those during his transportation or when he fell off the chair. The applicant\u2019s clothes were dirty but did not have any bloodstains. E.V. informed the applicant that an ambulance would be called for him if he had any complaints about his health. 35.  On the same day, 8 June 2009, the investigator took a statement from Officer N.S., who had arrived by police car with Officer S.J. at the scene of the applicant\u2019s arrest. When N.S. arrived, Officer E.V. was already holding the applicant down on the ground. When he and S.J. reached them they saw the applicant behaving aggressively and using foul language. N.S. helped E.V. to cuff the applicant\u2019s hands behind his back. The applicant was then lifted onto his feet and taken to the police car, but he refused to obey orders to keep still and calm down and started to kick the police car. The officers therefore removed him from the car and put him on the ground. N.S. held his feet and hands, while another officer knelt on the applicant to keep his head down. The applicant constantly resisted the officers, used bad language and behaved aggressively. He was kept down to prevent him from hurting himself and others. The officers did not beat him. The applicant continued to resist the police officers while he was being put in the police van and continued to be aggressive in the van. N.S. added that at some point an elderly man came to them offering to hand over some money which had allegedly belonged to the applicant. He was, however, informed that it was not necessary to hand over the money at that moment. 36.  On the same day, 8 June 2009, the police investigator took statements from Officers S.T. and J.S., who had arrived in the police van at the scene of the applicant\u2019s arrest. When J.S. got out of the van, he saw that Officers S.J. and N.S. were holding the applicant down on the ground. The applicant was aggressive, was shouting and swearing and attempting to break free. N.S. and S.J. took the applicant to the police van. J.S. opened the door for them. He did not see the applicant banging into anything, but while he was being transported sounds could be heard from the back compartment which sounded like something being hit. S.T. stated that he did not get out of the van. He did not hear the applicant banging against anything while he was being put in the van. At the police station he and J.S. carried the applicant to the detention room and left him in front of the cells. He did not see any blood on the applicant or his clothes. Nor did he notice any visible injuries on the applicant. 37.  That day, 8 June 2009, the police investigator ordered a forensic medical assessment of the injuries on the basis of the available documentary evidence (the ambulance cards, patient registration card and the statements of the applicant, the suspects in the case and two other police officers as witnesses). 38.  On 9 June 2009 the police investigator took a statement from D.R., a police officer who had been on duty at the police station on 29 April 2009. He stated that he had arrived at work at 8 p.m. At around 2 a.m. he started to work on the applicant\u2019s documents. The applicant told D.R. that he had a bad headache and that his hands were hurting because of the handcuffs. He requested an ambulance. He also said that his head injury had been caused by other police officers. He had no blood on his clothes and did not vomit. When the applicant was taken to hospital, D.R. accompanied him. 39.  On 15 June 2009 the applicant\u2019s legal representative lodged a complaint against the police with the prosecutor\u2019s office. He stated that the police had not taken the investigative measures he had requested on 15 May 2009 (including the presentation of the police officers for identification; a formal confrontation between the applicant and M.Z., who had allegedly witnessed him committing a breach of the peace; a comparison of the applicant\u2019s statements with the circumstances at the scene of the alleged offence; a forensic medical examination of the applicant\u2019s injuries; and interviews with the children that the applicant\u2019s representative had identified and about whom he had informed the police investigator on 27 May 2009). He requested that the prosecutor take measures to secure the collection of evidence. The prosecutor rejected the complaint on 1 July 2009, stating that the applicant had not challenged any acts or orders of an investigative authority. 40.  On 17 June 2009 the police investigator showed the applicant photos to identify the possible suspects. According to the record of the meeting, the applicant was shown four lists with an unspecified number of photos of police officers who were similar in appearance. The applicant identified S.B. as the police officer who had beaten him at the police station. He did not remember whether that police officer had also beaten him during his arrest. The applicant was unsure in his idenfication of E.V. from the photos. Nevertheless, he added that he would be able to identify the other officer on the basis of his features and height if he saw him in person. 41.  On 6 July 2009 the police investigator took a statement from V.Z., who was the person who had called the police on 29 April 2009 about the applicant\u2019s alleged breach of the peace. He explained that from his car on the crossroads of Kreenholmi and Kerese Street he had seen two young men crossing the street. One of them was carrying a knife. Another young man who was very drunk was walking in front of him, but was having trouble walking. He had called the police after seeing the young men and the knife as he considered them to be clearly dangerous and was worried about the safety of passers-by. 42.  On 13 August 2009 the forensic medical expert delivered his opinion about the applicant\u2019s injuries. He concluded that the injuries found on the applicant on 30 April and 1 May had been caused by blows with a blunt object or objects. The exact cause of those injuries could not be established as their description in the documents was not sufficiently detailed. Nevertheless, the expert concluded that they had been inflicted shortly before the applicant had seen a doctor, possibly on 29 April 2009. He also noted that as there were no detailed descriptions of the injuries to the upper limbs, it was not possible to conclude whether those injuries had been received in self-defence. None of the documents disclosed any information about the ethanol content in the applicant\u2019s blood, but stated simply that the applicant had been in a state of alcoholic intoxication. 43.  On 2 September 2009 the forensic expert gave an oral statement to the police investigator about his written opinion. In reply to a question about whether the applicant had had a haematoma in the area of the left eye on both 30 April and 1 May, the expert replied that there was no information about that in the documents of 30 April. He explained that it could not be excluded that the haematoma had been inflicted on 29 April, but it could also have been inflicted on 30 April or 1 May. He also stated in relation to a question about the cause of the injuries that since the documents had not contained detailed descriptions of the injuries, it was not possible to establish the exact nature of the object which had caused the traumas. 44.  On 14 September 2009 the police investigator presented photos of officers to M.Z. for him to identify. According to the report of the meeting, M.Z. was shown four lists with an unspecified number of photos of police officers who were similar in appearance. M.Z. identified one of the police officers (E.V.) as the officer who, together with the other officer (S.B.), had beaten the applicant at the police station and had used force against the applicant at the playground. He was not certain in his recognition of S.B. on the photos, but pointed out another officer who, in his words, was very similar to S.B. He also stated that there had been no beating at the playground, but that the applicant\u2019s hands had simply been twisted behind his back and that he had been forced to the ground. 45.  On 8 January 2010 the applicant complained to the prosecutor that he had still not been informed of a decision to carry out a forensic medical examination, despite repeated requests. He added that he had still not been examined by an expert, even though he had complained about headaches and a loss of vision after the beating. He requested that he be sent a copy of any expert reports if one had been carried out without his knowledge. He also complained that he had not had a formal confrontation with M.Z. and the suspects in order to eliminate any contradictions in their statements. The prosecutor rejected the complaint on 14 January 2010, stating again that the applicant had not challenged any acts or orders of an investigative authority. 46.  On 20 January 2010 the police investigator decided to discontinue the investigation, concluding that there was no evidence that the police officers had committed the criminal offence of abuse of authority. Their use of force had not violated the Police Act, it had been lawful, justified and not excessive. The decision of the police investigator was approved by the prosecutor on 15 February 2010. 47.  Regarding the applicant\u2019s arrest, the police investigator was of the view that the applicant\u2019s allegations about his beating were completely groundless. She concluded in substance that the use of force against the applicant during his arrest had been justified by the applicant\u2019s breach of the peace while being in a state of alcoholic intoxication; his refusal to obey the officers\u2019 lawful orders; and his attempt to leave the scene without the officers\u2019 consent. The physical force used to put the applicant on the ground, put on handcuffs and keep him on the ground had not been excessive. 48.  In the decision, it was considered as established that the applicant\u2019s arrest had taken place in the following manner. While at the playground in the vicinity of 18 Kerese Street, the applicant had not behaved appropriately, had waved his hands around, used foul language and had been staggering a lot. He had not reacted to the orders given by the police officers. Police Officer E.V. had decided to put handcuffs on the applicant given that children were standing around, that the applicant was clearly of an aggressive state of mind, that he might have injured others and that there was a certain context to the call (the suspicion of carrying a knife). At that moment Officers N.S. and S.J. had arrived and helped to put the handcuffs on. The applicant had not complied with the officers\u2019 orders to stay still and calm down, but had started kicking the police vehicle. N.S. and S.J. had kept the applicant on the ground to restrain him. The applicant had continued to resist, use foul language and behave aggressively. Because of his aggressive behaviour, E.V. had been forced to call for a police van to transport the applicant to the police station. The applicant had resisted being put in the police van and had continued to behave aggressively and use foul language while being transported. Sounds from the transportation compartment made it seem like the applicant had hit himself against something. 49.  In arriving at the conclusion that the applicant had not been beaten and that only lawful force had been used, the police investigator relied concretely on the statements of the children, Police Officers N.S., S.J., J.S., S.T., the suspected police officers, S.B. and E.V., and on the statements of M.Z., who had said during the presentation of the identification photos that there had been no beating at the playground, that the applicant\u2019s hands had simply been forced behind his back and that he had been forced to the ground. 50.  Regarding the events at the police department, the police investigator rejected the statements of M.Z. as unreliable as he could not have seen what was happening to the applicant in the detention room. Though the door of that room had been open, M.Z. had been standing further away. As to the people detained at the police station, the investigator concluded that their statements had not directly confirmed that the applicant had been beaten. The statements of the detainees A.P. and R.L., who had stated that the applicant had been beaten, were dismissed as they contradicted the statements of the third detainee \u2013 M.S. \u2013 and other evidence. Four other police officers involved in the arrest and the transportation of the applicant, as well as one police officer who had been present at the police station during the applicant\u2019s detention, had also stated that the applicant had not been beaten. 51.  As to the applicant\u2019s injuries, the police investigator cited observations in the report from when the applicant was taken to sober up, and from the ambulance and patient registration cards. Regarding the haematoma around the left eye, first documented at the hospital on 1 May 2009, the investigator referred to the forensic expert\u2019s opinion that it could have been caused on 29 April, 30 April or 1 May 2009 and that on the basis of the documents it was impossible to establish its cause. On the basis of that information the investigator concluded that the applicant\u2019s allegation that the haematoma around the left eye had been caused during his beating at the police department was unfounded and untrue. Turning to the applicant\u2019s allegations that he had vomited and that there had been blood on his clothing, the investigator viewed them as being disproven by the statements of the police officers as well as those of the ambulance doctor and the nurse who had not seen any blood on the applicant\u2019s clothes or witnessed any vomiting. 52.  The police investigator found in conclusion that while at the police station the applicant had been aggressive, continued to use foul language and ignored orders to keep still. The force that S.B. and E.V. had used against him had been justified and lawful, and had not been excessive. 53.  On 15 March 2010 the applicant lodged an appeal against the decision to discontinue the criminal investigation. He submitted among other things that the investigation had not been objective, that the statements of witnesses had been selectively cited and distorted, that some of the witnesses (such as Y.B., who had seen the applicant\u2019s arrest, and A.D., who had been detained in the police station at the same time as the applicant) had not been questioned, that he himself had not had a forensic medical examination; and that formal confrontations to eliminate any contradictions in statements in the case had not been arranged. 54.  On 23 March 2010 the State Prosecutor\u2019s Office rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal against the decision to discontinue the investigation as having been lodged out of time. The decision to discontinue the criminal proceedings had stated that the applicant had to lodge an appeal to the State Prosecutor\u2019s Office within ten days of the receipt of the relevant decision. The decision had been sent to the applicant\u2019s address by ordinary mail on 26 February 2010. Estonian Post had indicated that a standard letter was sent to an addressee on the next working day of the post office. The letter should therefore have reached the applicant on 1 March 2010, so the final day for lodging an appeal had been 11 March 2010. The applicant had lodged his appeal on 15 March 2010. The applicant stated that he had only received the letter on 5 March 2010 after returning home from his job in another city. Though the applicant had not requested the restoration of the time-limit for his appeal, the State Prosecutor\u2019s Office stated that in any event there had been no grounds for such a procedure. The State Prosecutor\u2019s Office was of the view that the applicant had a duty of diligence regarding his mail because he knew that there were proceedings pending where decisions concerning his situation might be made. The applicant had had several options available to him to avoid exceeding the time-limit. 55.  On 30 April 2010 the Tartu Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the State Prosecutor\u2019s Office. The court agreed with the applicant\u2019s counsel that the time-limit for an appeal started to run from the date of actual receipt of the decision and not from the date it should have been received according to calculations based on mail delivery deadlines. It nevertheless considered that the decision to discontinue the criminal proceedings had reached the applicant\u2019s mailbox on 1 March 2010, without however explaining on the basis of what evidence this conclusion was reached. The court also stated that there was no need to express an opinion with regard to the restoration of the deadline for the appeal, because the applicant had not believed that he had breached the deadline and had not sought its restoration. 56.  On 25 May 2009 the East Police Prefecture found the applicant guilty of the misdemeanour of committing a breach of the peace at Kreenholmi Street and ordered him to pay a fine. The applicant lodged an appeal against that decision with the Viru County Court. 57.  On 17 November 2010 the Viru County Court, having held a public hearing on 4 November, acquitted the applicant of the charges. The court considered that there was no evidence to prove that his behaviour had constituted a misdemeanour. 58.  The court, pointing to the fact that it was unlawfully obtained evidence, set aside the applicant\u2019s statements given on 30 April 2009 at 2.15 a.m. in the hospital, and which had been contained in the misdemeanour report drafted the same night at 2.40 a.m. It noted that the evidence had been gathered more than eight hours after the offence had allegedly been committed and after the person had in the meantime been taken to sober up, at 7.45 p.m. 59.  The court considered that the witness M.Z. had given reliable testimony at the court hearing on 4 November 2010 when he had said that the police had unduly influenced him to give evidence against the applicant by letting him hear the applicant being beaten. The court considered that statement to be corroborated by the fact that the applicant had been taken to the hospital and had been interrogated there. 60.  The court concluded that the evidence in the misdemeanour proceedings had been collected in an unlawful manner which infringed the applicant\u2019s honour and dignity and endangered his health. That conclusion was based on the statements of the applicant, M.Z., information from the hospital and the place and time of the drafting of the misdemeanour report. 61.  The court further stated that there had been a material violation of the provisions governing misdemeanour proceedings because the applicant had been arrested at 5.40 p.m. and transported immediately to the police station, but had not been taken to sober up until 7.45 p.m.; also, his statement had only been taken at the hospital at 2.15 a.m. and the misdemeanour report not drafted at the hospital until 2.40 a.m. 62.  The East Police Prefecture did not appeal against that judgment.", "references": ["6", "9", "7", "8", "5", "3", "0", "4", "2", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in \u0130zmir. 5.  At the time of the events giving rise to this application, the applicant was working as a watchman on a construction site located in the vicinity of a military compound housing the 7th Gendarmerie Commando Regiment in Fo\u00e7a, \u0130zmir. 6.  On 14 October 2008, sometime between 8 p.m. and 9 p.m., the applicant left the construction site to meet three friends, M.K., N.V., and F.T., who worked on nearby farms. While walking towards his friends, the applicant suddenly collapsed for an unknown reason; his friends immediately took him to hospital. The applicant\u2019s initial medical examination at the Fo\u00e7a State Hospital did not reveal any findings other than a cut measuring 0.5 cm on his back between the tenth and eleventh ribs. However, a lung X-ray taken subsequently showed that a foreign object, which appeared to be a bullet, was lodged between his eleventh and twelfth ribs. The applicant was transferred to the Kar\u015f\u0131yaka State Hospital to receive further treatment for serious injuries sustained to his lungs and liver. After undergoing various operations, on 23 October 2008 he was discharged from the hospital. According to a medical report issued on 30 December 2008 by the Kar\u015f\u0131yaka State Hospital, it had been decided for medical reasons to leave the bullet inside the applicant\u2019s body, to be extracted only in the event of deterioration in the applicant\u2019s condition. The report also noted that the injuries sustained by the applicant had been life-threatening. 7.  At 2.30 a.m. on 15 October 2008 two gendarme officers from the crime scene investigation unit of the Menemen Provincial Gendarmerie Command arrived at the site of the incident, which was located by a farm by the name of \u201cD\u00fcr\u00fcs\u201d (\u201cthe D\u00fcr\u00fcs farm\u201d), to carry out a preliminary investigation and to prepare a scene-of-incident report (on the instructions of the Fo\u00e7a public prosecutor). After photographing the site of the incident, they talked to the witnesses and the gendarmerie patrol unit on duty. According to the information they obtained, the applicant had collapsed abruptly while he was walking to meet his friends. No gunshots had been heard at the site of the incident, but a firing practice had been underway at the relevant time at the nearby military compound housing the 7th Gendarmerie Commando Regiment. The gendarme officers indicated in their report that there were two shooting ranges within the said military compound: one located 1,780 metres to the north of the D\u00fcr\u00fcs farm, at an altitude of fifty metres (\u201cthe first shooting range\u201d); and the other 1,050 metres to the east, at an altitude of ninety metres (\u201cthe second shooting range\u201d). The altitude of the D\u00fcr\u00fcs farm was forty metres. There were three hills between the D\u00fcr\u00fcs farm and the first shooting range; the first two hills had an altitude of fifty-five metres, and the third hill had an altitude of ninety metres. No information was provided regarding the terrain between the farm and the second shooting range. Firing practice was carried out with G3 rifles at the first shooting range and with 5.56 mm rifles at the second shooting range. According to a sketch map prepared by the gendarme officers, the site of the incident was approximately 15 degrees to the east of the assumed trajectory of bullets fired from the first shooting range. In the gendarme officers\u2019 opinion, the applicant had been hit by a stray bullet that had ricocheted during firing practice, particularly in view of the fact that no evidence of criminal conduct had been found at the site of the incident. The only evidence collected by the gendarme officers was the jacket that the applicant had been wearing at the time of his shooting, which was handed to the \u0130zmir G\u00fcr\u00e7e\u015fme Criminal Police Laboratory for examination. 8.  The gendarme officers visited the site of the incident once again at approximately 9.45 a.m. on the morning of 15 October 2008 to make further investigations, but did not discover any new evidence. It appears that on the same morning they also went \u2013 on the instructions of the Fo\u00e7a public prosecutor \u2013 to the military compound to photograph the shooting ranges. 9.  At approximately 10.15 a.m. on 15 October 2008 the Fo\u00e7a public prosecutor visited the site of the incident together with a police expert, H.\u00d6. The public prosecutor noted that the investigation had not thus far revealed any spent cartridges, bullet shells, arms or any other such material on or around the site of the incident, nor had any suspects who might have shot at the applicant been identified. According to the information provided by the applicant\u2019s three friends to the public prosecutor, the applicant had collapsed right before their eyes and there had been no one else present at the relevant time. They also told the public prosecutor that they often heard gunfire coming from the military compound during shooting practice and that gunfire had also been audible at the time of the incident, although they had not heard gun shots emanating from anywhere nearby. 10.  According to the information in the case file, the applicant was still in a critical condition on the morning of 15 October 2008. Nevertheless, at 3 p.m. on that day, he was interviewed by two gendarme officers in the office of the security team commander (Asayi\u015f Tim Komutan\u0131) of the local gendarmerie. It is not clear whether this office was located inside the hospital or outside. Prior to the commencement of the interview, the applicant was informed of his right to request the appointment of a lawyer from the local bar association to assist him, but it appears that he did not exercise that right. The applicant told the gendarme officers that at approximately 8.45 p.m. on 14 October 2008, he had left his house to check up on the construction site where he worked as a watchman. As he had been walking towards the site, he had heard whizzing sounds above his head. He had continued to hear the same sounds on his way out of the construction site, along with the sound of gunfire from the military compound located nearby. Then, all of a sudden, he had felt a sharp pain in his back and had collapsed to the ground. He had not known what had happened until he had been told in the hospital that he had been shot in the back with a firearm. When the gendarme officers asked the applicant whether he had been in ongoing conflict with anyone and whether he had heard any gunshots at the time of the incident, he replied that he had not been in any conflict and that the only shots he had heard had been those coming from the military compound, which he had been hearing for the past week. The applicant also stated that he did not wish to press charges against anyone regarding the incident. 11.  On 16 October 2008 H.\u00d6., the police expert who had accompanied the Fo\u00e7a public prosecutor during his examination of the site of the incident, issued a report of his findings. He indicated in his report that the distance between the site of the incident and the military shooting ranges, which were spread over hilly terrain, was approximately one and a half kilometres. Having regard to the witness statements, and to the absence of any other factors that might explain the applicant\u2019s injury, the police expert opined that the injury had probably been caused by a bullet that had ricocheted during the firing practice at the military compound. He submitted a simple sketch map of the site of the incident along with his report. 12.  On 23 October 2008 the applicant was discharged from the hospital. 13.  On 12 November 2008 two gendarme officers visited the applicant at his home on the instructions of the Fo\u00e7a public prosecutor to enquire about the bullet that had wounded him. The applicant informed the gendarme officers that the bullet had still not been extracted from his body and that the doctors would re-evaluate the situation once he had fully recovered from the earlier operations. The applicant was requested to inform the authorities in the event that the doctors decided to remove the bullet. 14.  On 13 November 2008 the \u0130zmir Criminal Police Laboratory issued a report on the analysis carried out on the applicant\u2019s jacket. According to the report, a hole measuring 0.5 cm in diameter was found in the back of the jacket, but no gunshot residue was found around that hole. Having regard to the shape and other characteristics of the hole, it was decided that it had been caused by a firearm and that the shot had been fired from a long distance. 15.  On 14 November 2008 the Fo\u00e7a public prosecutor took the applicant\u2019s statement for the first time. The applicant was reminded of his right to request the assistance of a lawyer, which he once again declined to do. The applicant largely reiterated the statement he had made to the gendarme officers earlier. He also repeated that he did not want to press charges against any particular person, as he did not believe that he had been shot intentionally. He did, however, reserve his right to claim compensation. 16.  On 24 November 2008 the Fo\u00e7a public prosecutor delivered a decision not to prosecute. The public prosecutor found firstly that, in view of the statements of the applicant and of the witnesses and the manner in which the incident had occurred, the applicant had not been shot intentionally. He noted secondly that the forensic examination conducted on the applicant\u2019s jacket had revealed that the shot had been fired from a long distance; however, the source of the shot had not been identified, as the bullet had for medical reasons not yet been extracted from the applicant\u2019s body. Nevertheless, having regard to all the information in the case file and to the fact that a military firing practice had been underway a few kilometres away at the time of the incident, the public prosecutor found that the applicant had probably been hit by a stray bullet that had ricocheted during the firing practice. According to the public prosecutor, this offence was to be classified as one of causing bodily harm through negligence (taksir), as opposed to recklessness (bilin\u00e7li taksir), in view of the significant distance of the shooting range from the site of the incident. Since the prosecution of the offence of causing bodily harm through negligence required a formal complaint to be made by the victim (which was lacking in the instant case), the Fo\u00e7a public prosecutor decided to close the investigation. 17.  On 12 January 2009, after medical complications had arisen, the bullet was extracted from the applicant\u2019s body and handed over to the hospital police. On 6 February 2009 it was registered in the custody of the Fo\u00e7a public prosecutor\u2019s office. 18.  In the meantime, on 16 January 2009 the applicant lodged an objection against the decision of the Fo\u00e7a public prosecutor, with the assistance of his lawyer. The applicant\u2019s lawyer stated that the decision to close the investigation had been taken prematurely, before the investigation process had been completed and the gun from which the bullet had been fired and the identity of the shooter had been identified. There had also not been an attempt to establish whether the bodily harm had been caused through negligence, recklessness, lack of experience or breach of duty or with intent. Moreover, requesting the victim to indicate whether he wanted to press charges without first having established the perpetrator and the nature of the offence did not comply with due procedure. 19.  The applicant\u2019s objection was rejected by the \u0130zmir Assize Court on 24 April 2009. The assize court did not provide any justification for its decision, apart from stating that the Fo\u00e7a public prosecutor\u2019s decision had been in compliance with the law. This decision was served on the applicant on 20 May 2009. 20.  On 3 March 2009 the applicant lodged a request with the Ministry of the Interior (\u201cthe Ministry\u201d) for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages in respect of his wounding. The Ministry refused the request; the applicant then brought an action for compensation before the \u0130zmir Administrative Court. 21.  On 22 February 2012 the \u0130zmir Administrative Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s action. It held that while it was not disputed that the applicant had been wounded by a bullet, there was no tangible evidence to prove that the bullet in question had in any way been connected to the firing practice held by the 7th Gendarmerie Commando Regiment in Fo\u00e7a on the date in question. The criminal investigation into the incident had been closed on account of the applicant\u2019s decision not to bring an official complaint, and the bullet extracted from his body after the closing of the investigation had therefore not been subjected to a ballistic examination. In these circumstances, by not pursuing his complaints the applicant had hindered the collecting of evidence that could have proved a causal link between the administrative act (idari eylem) and the damage sustained. In the administrative court\u2019s opinion, the applicant had thus not proved his allegations. 22.  On 22 October 2015 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the judgment of the \u0130zmir Administrative Court. 23.  An internal administrative inquiry was also conducted by the military authorities into the applicant\u2019s shooting. During the course of that inquiry thirteen gendarme officers of various ranks who had attended the firing practice in question were interviewed on 15 October 2008 by a lieutenant-colonel. The officers stated, in virtually identical words, that a firing practice had been held on 14 October 2008 between 7 p.m. and 10 p.m. with G3 rifles, that all necessary security measures had been taken at the shooting range prior to the commencement of the practice, in line with the applicable laws and instructions, that all rifles had been fired under the supervision of senior officers, that no firing had been permitted outside the designated shooting areas, and that, in view of the security measures in place and the distance of the applicant from the shooting range, the applicant should not have been affected by bullets fired during the practice. 24.  On 22 October 2008 a report was issued on the findings of the administrative inquiry. According to this report, all requisite safety measures had been implemented at the shooting range on the date in question, in compliance with the relevant security regulations, and no fault or negligence had been found on the part of the military officers who had participated in the firing practice. The report indicated that additional security precautions had nevertheless been taken on the shooting range in the aftermath of the incident, such as adding to the sand bags and barrels behind the target boards, and building barriers in order to reduce the incidence of ricochets, and surrounding the gun-target line with additional barrels.", "references": ["1", "5", "8", "3", "2", "7", "6", "9", "4", "No Label", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1983 and lives in Chisinau. 6.  The applicant is a bus driver. On 14 August 2009 he was involved in an accident with a car in which no one was injured. According to the findings of the police, the driver of the other vehicle involved in the accident, P.C., had changed lanes without paying attention to the applicant\u2019s bus, which had been overtaking it in the other lane. The applicant had not had enough time to brake and had hit P.C.\u2019s car on the rear left side. On the same date the chief inspector of the traffic police issued a decision finding P.C. responsible for the accident under Article 242 \u00a7 1 of the Traffic Code (see paragraph 12 below), fined him 800 Moldovan lei (MDL) (the equivalent of 50 euros (EUR)) and gave him five penalty points. 7.  On an unspecified date P.C. contested that decision. 8.  By a judgment of 29 September 2009 the Anenii Noi District Court dismissed P.C.\u2019s objection and upheld the decision of the chief inspector of the traffic police. The applicant was not involved in the proceedings. Only P.C. and the police officer who had been present at the site of the accident were present and the latter opposed P.C.\u2019s objection. P.C. challenged the District Court\u2019s decision. 9.  On 19 November 2009, the Bender Court of Appeal reversed the decision of the first-instance court, finding the applicant guilty of causing the accident. The court found that the applicant had not kept a safe distance between his bus and the vehicle in front of him and stated as follows:\n\u201c... according to article 49 of the Route Code, the driver of a vehicle shall keep a safe distance between his vehicle and the vehicle in front of him, in such a manner as to avoid collision in case of sudden braking by the foregoing vehicle.\nThese rules were not observed by the driver of the vehicle which was behind, namely by the driver of the bus [...], Mr Igor Pascani, and by no means by Mr P.C.\u201d\nThe applicant was again not involved in the proceedings and only found out about them at a later date. Under domestic law he was not able to challenge the Court of Appeal\u2019s decision. 10.  As a result of the above judgment and based on its conclusions, on 22 January 2010 the chief inspector of the traffic police issued a new decision by which he found the applicant guilty of the breach of Article 49 of the Traffic Code causing the accident of 14 August 2009. The operative part of the decision stated as follows:\n\u201c...Pascari Igor is declared guilty of having committed the offence provided by Article 242 \u00a7 1 of the Code of Administrative Offences (CAO), however, according to Article 30 \u00a7 3 of the CAO no sanction shall be applied in view of the statutory limitation period.\u201d 11.  It appears from the documents submitted by the parties that following the accident the owner of the bus recovered the cost of its repairs from P.C.\u2019s insurance company. After the judicial proceedings in which the applicant was found responsible, P.C. attempted to recover the cost of the repairs of his car from the other party\u2019s insurance company. However, it appears from the case file that the company suspended payment until the case has been finally determined by the Court.", "references": ["5", "7", "2", "4", "9", "1", "6", "8", "0", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant is a company limited by shares registered under Hungarian law. It has its seat in Budapest. 5.  On 31 May 2000 a property claim was brought against the applicant requesting it to pay mandate fees in the amount of 275 million Hungarian forints (HUF) (approximately 1,057,000 euros (EUR) at the time). 6.  On 6 June 2000 the Budapest Regional Court ordered the applicant, under section 187(1) of Act no. LIII of 1994 on Court Execution, to deposit on the bailiff\u2019s trust account a security in the amount of HUF 275 million. The applicant appealed against the decision but this was to no avail. The money was deposited on the bailiff\u2019s trust account on 27 March 2001. 7.  Under the law, such deposits yield no interest. 8.  The applicant requested to have the money released arguing that its financial situation was satisfactory, there was no need for such a deposit and that this measure contradicted the principle of economic rationality. 9.  The applicant\u2019s request was dismissed on 8 May 2001. The Supreme Court as second-instance court upheld the decision on 8 November 2001. The applicant\u2019s subsequent requests to have the money released, in exchange for other securities offered, were also turned down. 10.  After remittals on 27 November 2002 and 8 June 2007, on 16 October 2008 the Regional Court adopted a judgment, partly found for the plaintiff and ordered the applicant to pay HUF 137,280,000 (EUR 514,000 at the actual rate) plus interest accrued as of 6 January 2000. On 16 October 2009 and 29 April 2010, respectively, the Budapest Court of Appeal and the K\u00faria upheld this judgment. 11.  Although the plaintiff succeeded only partly in the litigation, the amount actually payable by the applicant exceeded the amount of the entire deposit. This outcome was the consequence of the fact that whilst the applicant was ordered to pay accrued interest on the money due to the plaintiff in the amount of approximately HUF 189,500,000 (EUR 700,000 at the actual rate), its own money deposited on the bailiff\u2019s trust account had yielded no interest. Ultimately, the applicant had to surrender the whole deposit and pay about another HUF 90 million (EUR 330,000). 12.  The applicant challenged the impugned provisions of Act no. LIII of 1994 on Court Execution before the Constitutional Court; but its constitutional complaint was dismissed on 7 June 2011. This court held that \u2018interest\u2019 as such was consideration for the \u2018use\u2019 of another person\u2019s money; however, the authorities had not in any way \u2018used\u2019 the deposited amount. Furthermore, the Constitution did not provide any safeguards against the depreciation of an asset, including a deposit of money subject to inflation, and that such depreciation for economical or other reasons did not amount to a deprivation of property.", "references": ["6", "2", "7", "1", "0", "4", "5", "8", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1962 and 1951 respectively and live in Lunga and Corjova, in the Transdniestrian region of Moldova. 6.  The background to the case, including the Transdniestrian armed conflict of 1991-1992 and the subsequent events, is set out in Ila\u015fcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia ([GC], no. 48787/99, \u00a7\u00a7 28-185, ECHR 2004\u2011VII), and in Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia ([GC], nos. 43370/04, 8252/05 and 18454/06, \u00a7\u00a7 8-42, ECHR 2012). 7.  The present case concerns the confiscation and/or fining of the applicants for their failure to observe customs rules imposed by the authorities of the self-proclaimed \u201cMoldavian Republic of Transdniestria\u201d (the \u201cMRT\u201d). 8.  Both applicants used cars registered with the authorities of the Republic of Moldova and had Moldovan registration plates. Like many other inhabitants of the \u201cMRT\u201d, the applicants refused to use registration plates issued by the \u201cMRT\u201d authorities, which are not recognised by any country and which means that cars registered with them cannot leave the territory of Moldova. In November 2004, the \u201cMRT\u201d authorities adopted new rules, according to which any car with non-MRT registration plates could only enter the territory of the \u201cMRT\u201d after the payment of customs duties for temporary entry into the \u201cMRT\u201d. Failure to observe the new rules was punished with a fine which could be as high as the full value of the car. 9.  On 27 January 2005 the applicant was driving a car (the first car) from his village to the right bank of the Dniester river when he was stopped by a customs officer of the \u201cMRT\u201d, who seized his car on the grounds that such a car with Moldovan plates had not been registered with the \u201cMRT\u201d customs authorities and no customs duties had been paid for its temporary use on the territory of the \u201cMRT\u201d. By a decision of 9 February 2005 by the chief of the Dubasari (\u201cMRT\u201d) customs office, the applicant was ordered to pay a fine of 2,725 Transdniestrian roubles, equal to twenty percent of the value of the car, in order to be able to recover it. 10.  On an unspecified date, the applicant borrowed a car from a friend (the second car), which also had Moldovan number plates, and registered it with the \u201cMRT\u201d customs authorities by paying customs duties. The registration was due to expire on 30 August 2005. On the day of the expiry, since the applicant was ill, he sent his son to prolong the car\u2019s registration period with the \u201cMRT\u201d customs authorities. However, registration of the car was refused on the grounds that the applicant had to be present in person. The applicant went the next day, only to have his car seized for failure to register it within the allocated time-limit. By a decision of 12 October 2005 of the Dubasari customs office the applicant was ordered to pay 4,275 Transdniestrian roubles, an amount which was equal to fifty percent of the value of the car, in order to be able to recover it. 11.  The applicant challenged the decision of 9 February 2005 before the courts of the \u201cMRT\u201d and argued, inter alia, that he had been going through the customs check-point since 2002 and that nobody had informed him about the need to pay any customs duties. Moreover, the last time he had crossed the customs check-point had only been two days prior to the confiscation of his car. 12.  By a decision of 8 December 2005 the Dubasari district court rejected the first applicant\u2019s challenge to the decision of the Dubasari customs office of 9 February 2005 concerning his first car. As a result, the applicant decided not to challenge the decision of 12 October 2005 in the \u201cMRT\u201d courts. 13.  The applicant also complained to the Moldovan authorities, which initiated criminal proceedings in respect of the unlawful seizure of his car. According to the materials submitted by the Moldovan Government, the criminal investigation was suspended on 14 December 2009 because the perpetrators could not be identified. 14.  It appears from the case file that the applicant never recovered his cars from the \u201cMRT\u201d authorities. 15.  The applicant had his car seized on 28 February 2007 on the grounds that he had failed to leave the territory of Transdniestria before the registration with the \u201cMRT\u201d customs authorities had expired. He was obliged to pay the equivalent of some 30 euros (EUR) in order to be able to recover his car. The applicant paid the money and had his car returned on 30 March 2007. He did not contest the decision of the \u201cMRT\u201d customs authorities before the \u201cMRT\u201d courts. 16.  The applicant also complained to the authorities of Moldova. It appears that on 6 March 2007 the Dubasari chief police officer addressed a letter to the co-chair of the Joint Control Commission (\u201cthe JCC\u201d) (see paragraph 18 below), informing him about the incident of 28 February 2007, and that the Moldovan initiative to examine the matter of the second applicant\u2019s car had been ignored by the other members of the JCC, including the Russian representative. 17.  In a letter dated 13 March 2007, the Reintegration Minister of the Republic of Moldova informed the second applicant about the refusal of the Transdniestrian and Russian members of the JCC, to examine the incident relating to the seizure of his car. The second applicant was also informed that the Ministry of Reintegration had brought the applicant\u2019s case to the attention of the United States, European Union and Ukrainian ambassadors to Chisinau. A general issue concerning respect for human rights in Transdniestria was raised by the Moldovan representative to the OSCE on 8 March 2007. 18.  In a letter dated 7 March 2007, the applicant was informed by the Prosecutor\u2019s Office of the Republic of Moldova that it did not have the necessary means to solve the problem of the seizure of his car by the \u201cMRT\u201d authorities. 19.  On 21 July 1992 the Presidents of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Moldova signed an agreement in Moscow to put an end to the military conflict in the Transdniestrian region of Moldova. Under the agreement, a security zone was created between the conflicting parties and a Joint Control Commission was set up to monitor the implementation of the agreement in the security zone. The JCC is composed of representatives of Russia, the Republic of Moldova and the self-proclaimed Republic of Transdniestria. Any decisions made by the JCC must have the consent of all the parties (for more details, see Ila\u015fcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], no. 48787/99, \u00a7\u00a7 87-91, ECHR 2004\u2011VII). 20.  In Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia ([GC], nos. 43370/04, 8252/05 and 18454/06, \u00a7\u00a7 64-73, ECHR 2012 (extracts)) the Court summarised the content of various reports by intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations concerning the situation in the Transdniestrian region of Moldova and the Russian military personnel and equipment stationed there between 2003 and 2009. It also summarised the relevant provisions of international law (ibid., \u00a7\u00a7 74-76).", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "7", "6", "0", "8", "5", "2", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1944 and lives in Sliema. 6.  The applicant is the owner of a property named \u201cLondon\u201d at 1 Moroni Street, Gzira, Malta (a two-storey house, with stairs allowing access to the second floor, each floor having two main rooms and a smaller room, as well as a terrace; and with further rooms on the roof (hereinafter \u201cthe property\u201d)). Following the death of the applicant\u2019s uncle on 16 July 1975, the applicant and another five heirs inherited his uncle\u2019s estate, including the property. By a deed of partition of 30 April 1980 the property was assigned to the applicant as sole owner. 7.  In 1976 the property was requisitioned and allocated to P.S. In 1987 the applicant became aware that on an unspecified date P.S. had left the property and given the keys back to the authorities, and that the property had then become occupied by a certain C.C., who had no title to it (since it had not been allocated to him by the authorities). 8.  The applicant complained to the Housing Authority, which, instead of condemning the illegal occupation, on 23 May 1988 issued a new requisition order, assigning the property to C.C. Subsequently, C.C. obtained a development permit to carry out alteration work to the property. The work was carried out without the consent of the applicant, as owner. 9.  Throughout the years while the requisition order was in force, the applicant was meant to receive an annual rent of 40 Maltese Liras (MTL) (approximately 93 euros (EUR)) from the Housing Authority. That amount was increased to MTL 80 (approximately EUR 185) in 2010 or thereabouts. However, the Housing Authority has not been paying the applicant since 2003, nor does it transpire that the rent has been deposited in court. According to the Government, the applicant has never requested such payment from the authorities. 10.  The applicant considered that those amounts were far below the rental value of the property. 11.  After having written to the Housing Authority several times to no avail, on 20 October 2009 the applicant instituted constitutional redress proceedings against the Housing Authority and the Attorney General. He requested the court to find that the requisition orders had breached his rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. Consequently, he sought to annul the order, and requested the release of the property in his favour with free and vacant possession. He also sought an award of compensation for the occupation of the premises, as well as any other relevant redress. In so far as relevant, paragraph three of his application concerning the facts of the case reads as follows:\n\u201cIn 1987, after the applicant had inherited the property, he discovered that a certain PS had left the property ...\u201d.\nIt then specified in paragraph four that \u201con 23 May 1988 the same authority again requisitioned the same property by means of requisition order no. 16830\u201d. In paragraph ten the applicant noted that his rights were being breached as a result of \u201cthe requisition order mentioned above\u201d. Lastly, his first request to the court was to the effect that the court should \u201cdeclare the abovementioned requisition ... as being in breach ...\u201d and his second request read \u201cto annul all requisition order issued against the applicants\u201d (tannulla l-ordni ta\u2019 rekwizzjoni kollha rilevanti ma\u0127rugin kontra tag\u0127hom). 12.  According to the Government, when giving evidence in court on 30 November 2009, the applicant mentioned the deed of partition of 30 April 1980. At the same time he acknowledged that he did not contest the requisition order issued in 1976 (no record of this has been provided). 13.  Pending the outcome of the proceedings, the court appointed an expert to make a valuation of the property. According to a report of 21 January 2010 the expert considered that the annual rental value of the property on the market in 1987 was MTL 249 (approximately EUR 580), and that in 2010 it was MTL 1,223.50 (approximately EUR 2,850). Its sale market value was estimated at EUR 95,000. 14.  By a judgment of 14 July 2011 the Civil Court (First Hall), in its constitutional jurisdiction, found in favour of the applicant. It held that although the measure was lawful and pursued a legitimate aim, the applicant had suffered a breach of his property rights on account of the lack of proportionality of the measure, in so far as it made the applicant bear a disproportionate burden, given the low amount of rent applicable compared to the market rental value of the property. It held, however, that the measure was not abusive in so far as C.C. suffered from a physical disability and lived on social benefits. He thus required lodging compatible with his needs to avoid hardship and the property at issue was adequate for such purpose. 15.  The court further held that the Attorney General should not have been summoned as a defendant in the case (m\u2019huwiex le\u0121ittimu kontradittur). The applicant was therefore ordered to pay his own costs of the proceedings as well as those of the Attorney General (in total approximately EUR 2,950). 16.  The court held that given that the violation had arisen solely from a lack of fair balance, it was not necessary to annul the requisition order and release the property. Referring to domestic case-law, it held:\n\u201c... while this [constitutional] court has a wide latitude in giving any order it may consider relevant in order for it to safeguard Articles 33 to 45 of the Constitution and human rights and fundamental freedoms as defined in the Convention, such latitude was not unlimited and was circumscribed by the judicial system of the country, which did not allow this court [of constitutional jurisdiction] to amend national laws, nor could it make mandatory an action which according to domestic law was discretionary, nor could it order the Housing Authority to pay rent or compensation of a higher value than that provided for by the relevant law. Compensation, if any, which may be paid by this court [of constitutional jurisdiction] is that for the violation found.\u201d 17.  The court awarded the applicant EUR 21,000. It considered the compensation fair and just in the circumstances of the case and on the basis of the evidence produced, having taken account in particular of the following factors: that the property had been subject to a requisition order since 1976 but it had affected the applicant since 1988 when he had inherited the property (sic.); for a number of years C.C. had paid the Housing Authority MTL 40 per year and it was only recently (sic.) that the rent had been increased to MTL 80; that the applicant had only received payment up until 2003; that the rental value of the property on the market in 1987 was MTL 249 (approximately EUR 580), and in 2010 it was MTL 1,223.50 (approximately EUR 2,850); and lastly, that the requisition order had been issued in the public interest to procure accommodation for those in need, and thus the compensation payable could be less than the full market value. 18.  The applicant appealed, complaining that the court had failed to annul the requisition order and return the property to him despite finding in his favour. He had thus remained a victim of the situation as the court had not given him an appropriate remedy for the violation. He also complained that the compensation was far too low and had not been determined in accordance with the applicable market value. He further argued that the Attorney General had been the correct defendant given that the amount of rent depended on the law, which in consequence was also an issue in the case. It does not transpire from the written pleadings that the applicant explicitly raised the issue of compensation in relation to the years before 1988, during which he had already been an owner of the property. 19.  The Housing Authority and the Attorney General also appealed. They agreed with the merits of the first-instance decision, but requested the court to reduce the award of compensation which had been awarded arbitrio boni viri and not on proper calculations, and this especially since the applicant had waited twenty years before instituting proceedings. 20.  A hearing was held on 14 November 2011. 21.  By a judgment of 24 February 2012 the Constitutional Court reduced the amount of compensation to EUR 16,000. It, too, considered that the applicant should be penalised for the delay (of twenty years since coming into possession of the property) in instituting proceedings, as had been done in other domestic cases. It noted that, according to European Court of Human Rights case-law, State control over levels of rent may often cause significant reductions in the amount of rent chargeable; in the circumstances of the present case it was therefore not appropriate to make awards in accordance with market values. It considered that the first\u2011instance court had been free to make an award equitably, and correct to make no award for the time prior to 1988, the date when the applicant had become the owner of the property (sic.) and before which he had had no ties with it. The Constitutional Court also refused to annul the order, given that it had been issued lawfully and had pursued a legitimate aim. It considered that in such circumstances it was not appropriate (mhux indikat) to release the property and to evict the tenant (as also held in previous cases, namely Carmen Cassar vs Director of Social Accommodation, Constitutional Court judgment of 12 July 2011 and Gatt vs Attorney General, Constitutional Court judgment of 5 July 2011), nor could it impose a higher rent for the future, when such rent was not provided for by law (as also held in Cassar, cited above). It reiterated that its role was limited to awarding compensation for the violation found. The same had also been held by the European Court of Human Rights. Compensation in cases of a constitutional nature was not equivalent to civil damage, which could be pursued before the courts of ordinary jurisdiction. 22.  The Constitutional Court further confirmed that the proper defendant was solely the Housing Authority, and not the Attorney General, as the applicant was not contesting the constitutional validity of the law itself, but solely the requisition order issued in respect of his property. The Constitutional Court upheld the first-instance court\u2019s order for the payment of costs and ordered the applicant to pay the costs of all the parties related to the appeal. 23.  As a result of this judgment, the applicant had to pay his share of the costs of the proceedings as well as those of the Attorney General at first instance, and those of all the parties on appeal.", "references": ["5", "0", "8", "2", "4", "3", "7", "6", "1", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicants are owners of a house at 4, Wagon Street, Rabat, Malta, which they inherited from their late father in 1997. It is a corner house with an area of around 82 square metres. 6.  The applicants alleged that on an unspecified date in 1987 a certain C.C. broke into the house and started to live there, with his family, without legal title. Their allegation was not proved before the domestic courts. 7.  The applicants\u2019 late father had instituted judicial proceedings to have C.C. evicted. According to the applicants, C.C. attempted to validate his position by soliciting the authorities to take action. 8.  A few days before the general elections, on 14 April 1987, the Maltese Government issued a requisition order (no. 1031) under the Housing Act, Chapter 125 of the Laws of Malta, in respect of the property. The authorities assigned the property to C.C. Thus, as from 30 April 1987 C.C. had legal title to the house. 9.  Following various complaints by the former owner, on 2 June 1987 the property was derequisitioned. 10.  The applicants\u2019 late father again instituted judicial proceedings for the eviction of C.C., who no longer had title to the property. 11.  That case was withdrawn due to a clerical mistake in the name of the complainant. Once the mistake had been corrected, the proceedings were recommenced in September 1987. Meanwhile, a request for an injunction (mandat ta\u2019 inibizzjoni) to prohibit C.C. from making structural changes to the property and from entering the property was upheld in part, namely in relation to the works. 12.  On 8 June 1988, pending a judgment by the ordinary court concerning the eviction, the Maltese Government again requisitioned the property, under an order carrying the same reference as the first requisition (no. 1031), and assigned it to C.C. 13.  In consequence, following the State\u2019s action, the Court of Magistrates (in its civil jurisdiction), by means of a judgment of 18 January 1991, dismissed the claim lodged by the applicant\u2019s predecessor. It held that since the property had again been requisitioned and thus was now administered by the Housing Authority which had assigned it to C.C., it could no longer take cognisance of the claims put forward by the complainant. However, it ordered the successful defendant to pay the costs of the proceedings. 14.  The rent fixed by the authorities amounted to approximately 35 euros (EUR) annually. Amendments introduced by means of Act X of 2009 increased the rent payable on requisitioned property to a maximum of EUR 185 annually, which may be increased every three years. 15.  The applicants refused to receive such rent or to recognise C.C. as a tenant, in order to avoid prejudicing their case. According to the Government, the tenant deposited the rent in court; however, according to the applicants, from a search of the relevant court registry, no such schedules of deposit had ever been filed. 16.  According to a valuation of January 2011 by the applicants\u2019 ex parte expert, the sale value of the property was EUR 230,000 and given its location it had commercial potential. The estimate was, however, based on the premise that the expert had only seen the property from the outside and had relied on the applicants\u2019 descriptions. A Government expert (who acceded to the property) valued it at a sale price of EUR 153,000. 17.  The impugned restrictions did not apply to leases entered into after 1 June 1995. 18.  On 15 September 2008 the applicants instituted constitutional redress proceedings. They lodged an action against the Director of Social Housing. The Housing Authority and C.C. were later joined to the proceedings. The applicants complained that the requisition order had breached their rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. They asked the court to award them adequate compensation reflecting a reasonable rent from 8 June 1988 to the date of judgment and any losses incurred as a result of their inability to develop the property. They further asked the court to order the release of the property free and unencumbered or, if that were not possible, to establish fair conditions in respect of the property and a fair rent for the future. Lastly, they asked the court to give any other orders or directions to ensure that their fundamental rights were respected. 19.  By a judgment of 9 December 2010 the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional jurisdiction found in favour of the applicants. With reference to the preliminary pleas raised, it considered that it had not been necessary also to notify the Attorney General \u2013 such a requirement had been intended to ensure that a representative of a Government department would not fail to appear, a risk eliminated if the Attorney General, who had to provide lawyers for the department\u2019s defence, was notified. In the present case there had been no such risk and therefore the failure to notify him had not brought about the nullity of the claim. The applicants had been suffering a continuing violation from 1988 since they remained dispossessed of their property and therefore had a legal interest in bringing the action. Furthermore, the applicants had no other remedies available to them. Indeed, their action to have C.C. evicted had been dismissed because of their inability to pursue such an action once the property had been requisitioned and no other remedy could have offered the applicants compensation for the breach of their property rights. 20.  On the merits of the case, the Civil Court (First Hall) found a violation of the applicants\u2019 rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention in so far as the applicants had been affected by the measure for numerous years during which they had been owed only EUR 35 annually. The court also expressed doubts as to the public interest of the measure. This was in line with the findings of the European Court of Human Rights in similar circumstances, in the cases of Ghigo v. Malta (no. 31122/05, 26 September 2006) and Fleri Soler and Camilleri v. Malta (no. 35349/05, ECHR 2006\u2011X). It awarded the applicants the sum of EUR 8,000 in compensation based on equity (arbitrio boni viri) and ordered the return of the property free and unencumbered to the applicants within three months. The court considered that it had the power and the duty to take such action under Article 4 (2) of the European Convention Act (see relevant domestic law), in order to bring an end to the consequences of the violation suffered by the applicants. The situation would persist in the absence of legislative intervention. Costs were to be paid by the defendants. 21.  The defendants appealed both in respect of the preliminary pleas and on the merits. The Attorney General also appealed on the same lines, thus joining the proceedings at the appeal stage as a third party on the basis of his interest in the case (appell ta\u2019 terz). The applicants appealed only in respect of the award of compensation, which they considered to be too little given the value of the property at issue. 22.  According to the applicants, before the Constitutional Court they orally invited the President of the Constitutional Court to withdraw from hearing the case (on the basis of Article 734 of the Code of Organisation and Civil Procedure). At the time when the proceedings were instituted, he had been the Attorney General and therefore the senior legal officer responsible for the defence of the two co-defendants in the applicants\u2019 case. He had also been the legal officer advising the Government on the drafting and introduction of Act X of 2009. However, according to the applicants, the President of the Constitutional Court refused to withdraw. The Government noted that this was not mentioned in the court record. 23.  By a judgment of 25 November 2011 the Constitutional Court upheld the first-instance judgment in relation to the preliminary pleas and merits, but varied the redress awarded. 24.  The Constitutional Court noted, inter alia, that any available ordinary remedies such as judicial review proceedings or proceedings before the Rent Regulation Board were not appropriate in such circumstances. As to the merits, it considered that the measure of control of use had been lawful and pursued a legitimate aim in the public interest, namely social accommodation for C.C. who, as it transpired, had obtained legal title to the property by means of the requisition and, thus, could not be considered a squatter. Despite the lack of a rental valuation of the property, it was clear that even for a small house, a rent of EUR 3 a month (EUR 35 annually until 2010) was extremely low and could not be considered as fair. This situation had lasted for more than twenty-two years. In consequence, the applicants had suffered a disproportionate burden as the proportionality requirement had not been fulfilled. 25.  As to redress, the Constitutional Court increased the compensation to EUR 14,000, but revoked the part of the judgment ordering the release of the property. It considered that since the requisition had been lawful and in the public interest, it was for the court to redress the lack of a fair balance but it was not required to annul the requisition order. Referring to domestic case-law, it held as follows:\n \u201c... while this [constitutional] court has a wide latitude in giving any order it may consider relevant in order for it to safeguard Articles 33 to 45 of the Constitution and human rights and fundamental freedoms as defined in the Convention, such latitude was not unlimited and was circumscribed by the judicial system of the country which did not allow this court [of constitutional jurisdiction] to amend national laws, nor could it make mandatory an action which according to domestic law was discretionary, nor could it order the Housing Authority to pay rent or compensation of a higher value than that provided for by the relevant law. Compensation, if any, which may be paid by this court [of constitutional jurisdiction] is that for the violation found.\u201d\nAs to the amount of compensation, the Constitutional Court noted that in such cases, given the legitimate aim, it was not required to follow market values. In the present case the court bore in mind the sums usually awarded by the European Court of Human Rights, the low amount of rent due, the relevant period from 1988 to date, the unavailability of an expert valuation of the rental value of the property, the fact that the applicants had brought proceedings in 2008 and that the more favourable order of the first-instance court was being revoked. 26.  Each party was to pay his own share of the costs of the proceedings. 27.  According to the applicants, on an unspecified date, C.C. passed away and his daughter, L.B., took possession of the property and became its occupant. Subsequently, the Department of Social Housing provided L.B. with alternative housing, which she moved into. Despite the vacation of the property, the authorities did not derequisition it. On an unspecified date L.B. returned to the property. 28.  The applicants claimed that the above information had come to their attention in January 2014. Their requests to the authorities (copies submitted to the Court) for official documents explaining in detail the above course of events had remained unanswered. They had therefore filed a judicial protest objecting to the conduct of the authorities and L.B.\u2019s unlawful occupation of their property. 29.  The Government submitted that the above allegations were unsubstantiated.", "references": ["0", "2", "7", "4", "8", "3", "6", "5", "1", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1932 and lives in Domitrovec. 6.  On 12 February and 29 August 2003 the daily newspaper Ve\u010dernji list published two articles in which the applicant accused his neighbour, a certain Mr I.M., of \u201cstealing\u201d his house and orchard. 7.  In the ensuing two sets of criminal proceedings instituted by I.M. by way of private prosecution, the applicant was found guilty of two counts of defamation (kleveta). By a judgment of 17 December 2004 the Vara\u017edin Municipal Court (Op\u0107inski sud u Vara\u017edinu \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe Municipal Court\u201d) fined the applicant 3,475 Croatian kunas (HRK)[1] and ordered him to pay I.M. HRK 2,660[2] for the costs of the proceedings. By a judgment of 12 January 2005, amended by the Vara\u017edin County Court (\u017dupanijski sud u Vara\u017edinu \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe County Court\u201d) on 15 November 2005, the Municipal Court judicially admonished (sudska opomena) the applicant and ordered him to pay I.M. HRK 2,208[3] in costs. 8.  In subsequent civil defamation proceedings which I.M. instituted against the applicant, the civil courts also found in favour of the plaintiff and awarded him damages. By a judgment of 31 May 2006, amended by the County Court on 4 September 2007, the Municipal Court ordered the applicant to pay I.M. HRK 20,000[4] as compensation for non-pecuniary damage, together with statutory default interest and HRK 6,942[5] in costs. 9.  Meanwhile, another set of civil proceedings between the same parties had also ended unfavourably for the applicant. By a judgment of 2 May 2005 the Municipal Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s action to declare an in-court settlement between him and I.M. of 15 January 1997 null and void, and ordered him to pay the defendant HRK 2,318[6] in costs. 10.  Since the applicant did not pay the sums stipulated above (hereinafter \u201cthe debt\u201d) on time, on 7 September and 31 October 2007 I.M. instituted two sets of enforcement proceedings in the Municipal Court, seeking enforcement against the applicant\u2019s immovable property, specifically his share in the house and surrounding land he owned with his wife. The property in question consisted of the house, a yard and arable land (fields) measuring 150, 500 and 204 square meters respectively (hereinafter \u201cthe property\u201d). 11.  On 5 November 2007 and 4 January 2008 respectively the court issued two writs of execution (rje\u0161enja o ovrsi) ordering the seizure and sale of the applicant\u2019s share in the property. 12.  On 10 March 2008 and 2 June 2009 the Vara\u017edin County Court dismissed appeals lodged by the applicant and upheld the writs. 13.  By a decision of 18 March 2010 the Municipal Court joined the two sets of enforcement proceedings. 14.  At a hearing on 8 April 2010 the court, on the basis of information provided by the tax authorities, determined that the value of the applicant\u2019s share in the property was HRK 131,200[7]. The applicant did not attend the hearing even though he had been duly notified. 15.  By a ruling of 27 July 2010 the court ordered the sale of the applicant\u2019s share in the property (zaklju\u010dak o prodaji, see paragraph 48 below) and scheduled a public auction for 14 October 2010 at which, in accordance with the law, the property (or share of it) could not be sold for less than two-thirds of its value (see paragraph 50 below). 16.  The auction was not attended by any interested buyers. The applicant, however, submitted a certificate confirming that on 8 September 2010 he had paid HRK 14,400[8] of the debt, and promised to pay the rest by New Year. 17.  Since he did not do so, on 12 January 2011 I.M. asked the court to schedule a second public auction. 18.  On 17 January 2011 the applicant submitted another certificate confirming that on 14 January 2011 he had paid HRK 7,340[9] of the debt, and asked the court not to schedule a second auction because he would gradually pay the rest of the debt. 19.  On 1 February 2011 I.M. reiterated his request for a second auction and stated that, by repeatedly promising to gradually pay the debt within self-imposed deadlines he did not observe, the applicant was merely protracting the enforcement proceedings which had thus far lasted three and a half years. 20.  By a decision of 3 February 2011 the court scheduled the second public auction for 17 March 2011 at which, in accordance with the law, the property (or share of it) could not be sold for less than one-third of its value (see paragraph 50 below). 21.  At the second auction only I.M. offered to buy the applicant\u2019s share in the property, for HRK 43,734[10]. This was the minimum price allowed by law and corresponded to one-third of its value. The applicant\u2019s representative asked the court to postpone the auction and promised that the applicant would pay the rest of the debt within three months. The court refused this request and issued a decision declaring that I.M. had \u201csatisfied the conditions to be awarded [the share in] the property\u201d. It also specified that the decision actually awarding him the share in the property (rje\u0161enje o dosudi, see paragraphs 25 and 50 below) would be delivered at a later date. 22.  On 21 March 2011 the applicant paid HRK 21,450[11] of the debt. 23.  On 2 May 2011 he informed the court that earlier that day he had paid a further HRK 15,225.75[12], and had thereby settled the debt of HRK 58,415.75[13] in full (consisting of the principal amount of HRK 34,128.43 and HRK 24,287.32 of statutory default interest). What remained to be paid were the costs of the enforcement proceedings. He therefore asked the court to discontinue the enforcement and issue a decision specifying those costs, which he promised to pay immediately. 24.  At a hearing on 26 October 2011 I.M. confirmed that on 2 May 2011 the applicant had paid the debt in full, but had not covered the costs of the enforcement proceedings. He thus asked the court to issue a decision on costs, and the award decision. 25.  On 18 November 2011 the court delivered its award decision (rje\u0161enje o dosudi, see paragraph 21 above and paragraph 50 below). It specified that the property would be surrendered (transferred) to I.M. after he deposited the purchase price, within three months of the decision becoming final. The court found the fact that the applicant had paid the debt in full on 2 May 2011 irrelevant, since the decision on the sale of the applicant\u2019s share in the property to I.M. had been adopted earlier, on 17 March 2011 (see paragraph 21 above). It noted however that the fact that the applicant had paid off the debt would be taken into account when distributing the proceeds of sale (see paragraph 32 below). In particular, the court held as follows:\n\u201cGiven that the property was sold on 17 March 2011 at the second public auction when it was established that the bidder I.M. had made the best bid and had offered [to pay] HRK 43,734, and thereby met the conditions to be awarded the property, the court adopted [the present] award decision ... regardless of the fact that the enforcement debtor on 2 May 2011 settled the debt in respect of the principal amount and the interest. When settling the enforcement creditor\u2019s claim, the court will deliver a distribution decision whereby it will take into account the fact that the enforcement debtor had settled the debt in respect of the principal amount and the interest.\u201d 26.  On 5 December 2011 the applicant appealed against that decision. He argued that he had settled the debt in full several months before the court had issued the contested award decision. In that sense I.M. \u201chad got it both ways\u201d as he had both been paid the debt and acquired the share in the property. There had been no reason to sell his share in the property to pay the same debt. He further stated that he would also have covered the costs of the enforcement proceedings that remained due if the court had issued a decision specifying the amount, which it had not done. 27.  On 16 January 2012 the County Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld the contested decision, which thereby became final. It held that the necessary conditions for selling the applicant\u2019s share in the property to I.M. had already been met on 17 March 2011. The fact that he had later paid off the debt had no bearing on the validity of the sale. In particular, that court held as follows:\n\u201cHaving regard to the fact that on 17 March 2011 the second public auction was held at which the enforcement creditor appeared as a bidder and made the best (the only) bid, and given that after the auction the court established that the enforcement creditor had offered the highest price and had met the conditions to be awarded the property in accordance with section 98(3) of the Enforcement Act, the first-instance court was, pursuant to section 98(4) of [that] Act, entitled (and obliged to) adopt the contested [award] decision ...\nThe fact that the enforcement debtor after the [second public] auction, on 2 May 2011 settled the creditor\u2019s claim in full is of no relevance for the validity of the contested decision, regardless of the unjustified (time) gap between the auction and the adoption of the impugned decision. [That is because] at the auction of 17 March 2011, which was held in line with the [relevant] provisions of the Enforcement Act, it was established that the enforcement creditor offered the highest price and that he met the conditions to be awarded the property. [Therefore] the events that occurred subsequently cannot call into question the award of the property, nor can the said event constitute grounds for discontinuation of enforcement under the Enforcement Act.\u201d 28.  On 27 February 2012 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint against the County Court\u2019s decision, alleging a violation of his constitutional right to fair procedure. 29.  On 7 March 2012 I.M. informed the court that he had deposited the purchase price, and submitted proof thereof. 30.  By a ruling of 24 April 2012 (zaklju\u010dak o predaji, see paragraph 51 below) the Municipal Court surrendered (transferred) the applicant\u2019s share in the property to I.M. On 29 June 2012 the court\u2019s land registry department recorded him in the land register as co-owner of the property instead of the applicant. 31.  By a decision of 24 May 2012 the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) declared the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint of 27 February 2012 inadmissible (see paragraph 28 above). It held that the contested decision was not open to constitutional review. 32.  On 17 September 2012 the Municipal Court issued a distribution decision (rje\u0161enje o namirenju, see paragraph 54 below), distributing the HRK 43,734[14] deposited with the court by I.M. for the applicant\u2019s share in the property. The court specified the costs of the enforcement proceedings, which were incumbent on the applicant, as HRK 10,703.12[15], and returned that amount to I.M. The remaining HRK 33,030.88[16] was paid to the applicant. 33.  On 14 December 2012 the County Court dismissed an appeal by the applicant against that decision. On 27 February 2013 lodged a constitutional complaint against the decision of the County Court. 34.  By a decision of 25 April 2013 the Constitutional Court declared that constitutional complaint inadmissible, holding that the contested decision was not open to constitutional review. 35.  By a decision of 20 January 2013 the Municipal Court declared the enforcement completed. An appeal by the applicant against that decision was dismissed by the County Court on 26 March 2013. 36.  On 23 May 2013 I.M. instituted non-contentious proceedings in the Municipal Court against the applicant\u2019s wife by lodging a petition for partition of co-ownership. Since the property could not be physically divided, he sought a partition by sale, whereby the proceeds would be distributed to the co-owners. 37.  As the applicant\u2019s wife opposed the partition, by a decision of 2 July 2013 the court discontinued the non-contentious proceedings and instructed I.M. to institute separate civil proceedings against her to that end. 38.  On 17 July 2013 I.M. brought a civil action against the applicant\u2019s wife as instructed, in the same municipal court. He sought a partition of co-ownership in the same way as in his petition of 23 May 2013. 39.  By a judgment of 6 November 2014 the Municipal Court ruled for the plaintiff and ordered a partition by sale and distribution of the proceeds to the co-owners. It also ordered the applicant\u2019s wife to pay the plaintiff HRK 4,050[17] in costs. 40.  She appealed and the proceedings are currently pending before the second-instance court. 41.  Meanwhile, on 3 July 2013 I.M., had also instituted another set of civil proceedings before the Municipal Court against the applicant, seeking payment of rent for the use of the property. He explained that the applicant had remained living in the house even after he acquired the applicant\u2019s share. As a co-owner he was thus entitled to seek from the applicant half of the rent under which the house could be rented out. These proceedings are still pending before the first-instance court.", "references": ["6", "2", "7", "5", "3", "0", "4", "1", "8", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
+{"input": "5.  The first applicant was born in 1940. She is the paternal grandmother of the second applicant, who was born in 1997. As of the time when the application was lodged, the first applicant was also the second applicant\u2019s legal guardian. The applicants live in Lviv. 6.  On 27 July 2002 the Air Force of Ukraine organised a military aviation show in the \u201cSknyliv\u201d aerodrome in Lviv (\u201cthe Sknyliv air show\u201d) to commemorate the sixtieth anniversary of the 14th Air Force Corps. The celebration agenda included a static display of military aircraft and other equipment, and a live aerobatics show by military pilots. 7.  The event was attended by several thousand individuals, including the second applicant, aged five at the time, accompanied by Sergiy Mikhno, her father and the first applicant\u2019s son, and Tetiana Mikhno, her mother and the first applicant\u2019s daughter-in-law. 8.  During the aerobatics performance, an SU-27 military aircraft piloted by Colonels V.T. and Y.Y. crashed into the static aircraft display site where there were numerous spectators, where it exploded. Both pilots had successfully ejected before the explosion. As a result of the crash, seventy\u2011seven people died and over 290 sustained injuries. 9.  Both Sergiy and Tetiana Mikhno, who were in the epicentre of the accident, died at the scene from numerous fractures and severe cerebral trauma. 10.  At the moment of the crash the second applicant was in the cabin of an IL-76 airplane on static display, posing for a photograph and waving her hand to her parents. She witnessed her parents being crushed by the aircraft, but did not sustain any physical injuries herself. Subsequently, she underwent psychological rehabilitation programmes intended to help her recover from her emotional trauma. 11.  On various dates several concurrent investigations were opened to establish the circumstances of the accident, including investigation by a special Government Commission set up for this purpose, the Ministry of Defence, the Lviv City Council, the Prosecutor\u2019s Office, and Sknyliv Tragedy, a non-governmental organisation founded by survivors of the accident and those who had lost relatives at the air show. 12.  On 27 July 2002 the President of Ukraine set up a special Commission (the Government Commission for the investigation of the causes of the catastrophe of the military aircraft of the Air Force of Ukraine; \u201cthe Special Commission\u201d) with a specific mandate to investigate the circumstances of the accident and coordinate assistance to its victims. The Commission was chaired by the President of the National Security and Defence Council. Other members of the Commission included senior officials from the Ministries of Emergencies, Transport, Finances, Health, Interior and Social Protection, officers of the Security Service of Ukraine, the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces, the State Aviation Transport Department, and the Lviv Regional State Administration. The Commission also engaged several experts from the \u201cSukhoy\u201d construction bureau (the SU-27 aircraft manufacturer, Russia) and two test pilots from the Russian Federation as aviation experts. 13.  Following the investigation, which included inspecting the accident site, interviewing individuals involved in the organisation of the air show and examining the relevant documents, as well as deciphering data from the flight data recorders, on an unspecified date in 2002 the Special Commission reported on the facts as follows. 14.  In June 2002 Colonel-General V.S. (the Air Force Commander\u2011in\u2011Chief) authorised the aerobatics show at the request of Lieutenant-General S.O. (the 14th Corps Commander). The Air Force Headquarters appointed a mixed team of officers from different units, including Colonel V.T., from Kirovske, Crimea as the first pilot; Colonel Y.Y., of the Air Force Headquarters, stationed in Vinnytsia, as the second pilot; and Lieutenant-Colonel Y.Ya., stationed in Mirgorod, as the aerobatic performance director. Lieutenant-General A.T. and Major-General A.L., both stationed locally in Lviv with the 14th Corps Command, were also designated to join the mission, one as \u201cair show flights director\u201d and the other as \u201cchief safety officer\u201d. 15.  On 24 July 2002 V.T., Y.Y. and Y.Ya. carried out their only training flight as a team. On the orders of the Air Force Headquarters, the flight took place at a military aerodrome in Ozerne, near Zhitomir. According to the Special Commission, that flight could not qualify as a rehearsal for the performance at the air show, as it included a different sequence of manoeuvres; its purpose was rather to improve and practise piloting techniques. The Commission also established that V.T. had requested an additional training flight in Ozerne and that his request had been turned down by the command, citing a shortage of fuel. Although the air show preparation programme included an on-site rehearsal flight on 26 July 2002, the 14th Corps Commander decided to cancel it for the same reason. The pilots were not formally apprised of the boundaries of the aerobatics zone or the placement of spectators. 16.  Before the show, the pilots were provided with a different aircraft from the one in which they had carried out their training flight. There was a certain asynchronism in the performance of the right and left engines of this aircraft. Overall, however, it was in an acceptable technical condition and remained fully operational until it crashed. The aircraft had been supplied with extra fuel in order to enable the pilots to return to Ozerne without landing at the site of the air show. The fact that the pilots had trained in a different aircraft and with less fuel had a negative impact on their readiness for performing aerobatic displays. For unspecified reasons, the pilots decided to take off without the mandatory anti-gravitation suits (\u201cg-suits\u201d). On arrival at the Sknyliv aerodrome, the pilots immediately started the performance, without taking any time to familiarise themselves with the site, which was new to them. During the performance, the aircraft exited the designated aerobatics zone, the boundary of which was some 150 metres from the spectators\u2019 area. Neither A.T. nor Y.Ya., directing the flight from the ground, warned them of that fact or directed them to return to the designated zone. Still outside of the zone, V.T. decided to perform a certain aerobatic display (called \u201cthe trunk\u201d), which he had never practised before and which was not included in his mission order. He made a technical mistake in its performance and, as the second pilot did not intervene when appropriate, the pilots lost control of the aircraft and it started falling. Subsequent efforts by the crew to regain altitude were futile. Accordingly, the Special Commission concluded that the principal cause of the accident was a technical mistake on the part of the first pilot in performing a manoeuvre which he had not been commissioned to perform. It also noted that the prompt and appropriate intervention of the second pilot could have saved the situation and that loss of life and damage to health could have been avoided had the ground crew properly guided the pilots to stay within the aerobatics zone. 17.  The Special Commission also noted serious shortcomings in the organisation of the air show, including poor coordination between various officers and authorities involved in its preparation; unsatisfactory crew training, and lack of appropriate emergency and spectator-safety planning, which contributed to the disaster. The Commission noted, in particular, as follows:\n\u201cThe serious consequences of the aviation catastrophe ... were the result of irresponsibility, negligence, lack of discipline, official neglect and breach of applicable regulations ... on the part of many leading officers of the Armed Forces, in particular, the generals and officers of the Air Force Headquarters.\nThe tragedy was also the result of the absence of a system of effective supervision of the execution of orders ... by the respective air force officials \u2013 from its Commander-in-Chief to the members of the crew of the SU-27. As a result, the generals and officers involved in the preparation and staging of [the air show] were not apprised of the real state of affairs concerning the necessary measures to be carried out, while the immediate participants in the aerobatic performance proved to be ill-prepared for it.\u201d 18.  The Special Commission criticised, in particular, V.S. (the Air Force Commander-in-Chief) and his colleagues from the Air Force Headquarters responsible for the military training \u2013 Lieutenant-General O.V. and Major\u2011General V.A. \u2013 for not having developed appropriate specific normative guidelines for the aerobatic performances. In the Commission\u2019s view, these were much needed given the lack of general regulations on the relevant matters. The Special Commission also criticised V.S. and his colleagues for not having ensured a proper distribution of tasks between their subordinates engaged in the show and their direct supervision on behalf of the Air Force Headquarters. In the Special Commission\u2019s opinion, such supervision was particularly important in view of the involvement in the show of officers from different military units that were not subordinate to each other and not accustomed to performing any tasks together. It also noted that Lieutenant-General S.O. (the 14th Corps Commander) and his subordinates, in particular Major-General A.T. and Colonel A.L. (the 14th Corps chief flight safety officer), had failed to put in place any meaningful land-and-air safety precautions plan. In addition, the Special Commission regretted S.O.\u2019s decision to cancel the on-site rehearsal flight and concluded that the officers designated to direct the flight as ground crew (A.T. and Y.Ya.) had had no relevant experience or clearance for such a mission. 19.  The Special Commission also reported on numerous procedural breaches on the part of the local administration and municipal authorities in authorising the air show. In particular, K., deputy mayor of Lviv with responsibility for humanitarian issues, had exceeded his authority in authorising it instead of the mayor himself. The mayor, having learned of the military authorities\u2019 initiative to organise the air show, took little action to coordinate the relevant preparatory activities. The show was authorised without the involvement of the competent officers and services legally responsible for carrying out assessments of the relevant safety risks and for taking the necessary prevention and response measures. The local authorities also failed to set up a necessary air show coordination committee and to organise a safety inspection of the aerodrome site before the show. 20.  In September 2002 the Ministry of Defence produced a Report on the internal investigation, largely reiterating the findings of the Special Commission. In particular, it concurred that the immediate cause of the accident was the first pilot\u2019s unforeseen misconduct, whose grave consequences could have been avoided or mitigated, were it not for the second pilot\u2019s and the ground crew\u2019s failure to intervene in good time. It also recognised that the organisation of the air show had been marked by significant shortcomings, including an unsatisfactory land and air safety precautions plan; refusal to arrange at least one training flight for the crew over the Sknyliv aerodrome; and poor supervision by the Air Force Headquarters and the 14th Corps Command of the preparatory activities. In addition, it was noted that the necessary regulatory framework was missing, and the organisers had drawn guidelines from the regulations on ordinary military training, which were not adapted for staging air shows for civilian spectators. 21.  Referring to the conclusions of the investigation, on 6 September 2002 the Minister of Defence issued order no. 305 (On the unsatisfactory organisation of the demonstration flight and the SU-27 aircraft disaster at the Sknyliv aerodrome), whereby a number of officers engaged in the organisation of the show were subjected to disciplinary sanctions. In particular, Lieutenant-General S.O. (the 14th Corps Commander) was demoted; Lieutenant-General O.V., (Deputy Air Force Commander-in-Chief on military training) was dismissed from the military \u201cfor unsatisfactory performance of service duties in respect of the preparation for and supervision of the air show at the Sknyliv aerodrome, and for personal irresponsibility\u201d; Major-General V.A. was dismissed from the military \u201cfor a negligent attitude to the performance of service duties and low personal executive discipline\u201d; and four other high-ranking Air Force officers received warnings and were subjected to other sanctions. In addition, Colonel\u2011General V.S., the Air Force Commander-in-Chief, was also dismissed from the military service on disciplinary grounds, and the new Air Force Commander-in-Chief was instructed to impose disciplinary sanctions on \u201cother officers guilty of breaches of duty during the preparation and staging of the air show\u201d. The issue of disciplinary responsibility for the pilots of the crashed aircraft and the ground crew which had operated their flight, was reserved pending a criminal investigation of the accident. 22.  On 22 October 2002 the Lviv City Council Special Temporary Investigation Commission delivered its report. It stated that numerous authorities shared, to various extents, common responsibility for the poor organisation of the show. It noted, in particular, that:\n\u201c2.2.  ... in the course of the preparation and staging of the demonstration flights ... the military establishments, the specialised central State aviation facilities and departments, the municipal authorities and their particular officers failed to comply with a number of provisions of the current law, governing the procedure of preparation and staging the events of such a scale, which failures, to various extents, resulted in the catastrophe and such a major loss of human life ...\u201d 23.  The Commission concluded that the local authorities had played an ancillary role in the organisation of the air show. However, they had acted negligently in authorising it in breach of formal procedures and without soliciting all relevant information from the military authorities. They had also failed to develop an appropriate emergency prevention and response plan for the air show. According to the Commission, the municipal authority had been completely disengaged from any safety-related decision-making and its overall performance had been marked by \u201c...a certain confusion and lack of clear understanding by the higher officers of the scope of their responsibilities.\u201d In view of this, the Commission recommended that the City Council evaluate the performance of the Mayor and other municipal officers and clarify its policy concerning the distribution of functions between them. It also invited the Mayor to impose disciplinary sanctions on his staff members who were at fault for breach of duty. 24.  The Commission next concluded that the negligence of the city authority had not been a direct cause of the accident, and attributed the primary responsibility for it to the military authorities, having provided the following overall political assessment of the accident:\n\u201c[the accident is] ... a consequence of the generally irresponsible policy of the National Government, which has neglected reformation of the Army and the Navy, leading to a loss unprecedented for a civilised country... of military efficiency and patriotic spirit, criminally negligent performance of their official duties by the military command at all levels, loss of pride in the military service and marginalisation of the material and technical procurement of the armed forces and military servicemen ...\n\u201c... [the accident] ... demonstrated the inadequacy of the current legal framework, the inadequacy of the State control system in respect of flight safety; irresponsible and negligent performance by officers at all levels of their duties under the law in force; the need to establish civilian control over the activities of the army; and the need to modernise and effectively reform the armed forces of Ukraine ...\u201d 25.  On 1 October 2003 the Sknyliv Tragedy Lviv-based NGO founded by the relatives of the accident victims and its survivors published its own investigation report based on interviews and other information collected from public and private sources. In addition, the report featured an assessment of V.T.\u2019s piloting techniques by S., a civil aviation pilot, who had lost family members at the Sknyliv air show. 26.  Similarly to the reports produced by the governmental authorities, the authors of this report concluded that the immediate cause of the crash was error by the first pilot in performing a manoeuvre, which had been neither envisaged by his mission order nor practised by him before the show, while the second pilot and ground crew did not take the opportunity to intervene in respect of the first pilot\u2019s conduct. In addition to that, in the opinion of the authors of the report, the Air Force Commander-in-Chief and the 14th Corps Commander, who had been watching the performance from the VIP lounge, had also failed to act to prevent the accident, as they had had direct radio connection with the ground crew and could have intervened at any moment. 27.  Notwithstanding the aforementioned findings, in the opinion of the authours of the report, the accident had largely resulted from a structural problem. The responsibility for it had to be borne by numerous entities, including the Ministry of Defence, the Air Force Headquarters, the authorities of the 14th Air Force Corps, the Lviv city and regional authorities, and the civil aviation authorities (the Ukraviatrans State Aviation Transport Department and the Ukraerorukh State Company), which had given permission for the aerobatic performance without checking its terms of reference. 28.  In particular, the authors of the report considered that the pilots\u2019 mission had been poorly developed and had not been properly communicated to all parties involved. The mission order approved on 12 July 2002 by Lieutenant-General O.V. of the Air Force Headquarters was at variance with the aircraft specifications. A subsequent explanatory document to the mission order approved by Colonel O.K., the first pilot\u2019s direct supervisor, was inconsistent with these specifications and with the aforementioned mission order. None of these documents specified such important parameters of the mission as engine performance mode, attack angles and acceleration coefficient to be observed during particular manoeuvres. Marginal flight parameters, such as minimum speed and height and maximal attack angle, which had been developed by the 14th Air Force Corps officers, were unsuitable for the performance of most of the manoeuvres which formed part of the event programme. 29.  The authors of the report also criticised the 14th Corps Command for designating too small an aerobatics zone, (2,500x1,600 metres, when 3,514 x2,000 metres would have been required). They noted that it was technically impossible for the pilots to perform their programme within the boundaries of this zone and not to find themselves above the spectators\u2019 heads. 30.  Finally, the report also attributed part of the responsibility for the accident to the local municipal and regional authorities, which had disengaged themselves from any safety-related and emergency-prevention planning as well as to the civil aviation authorities (the Ukraviatrans and Ukraviarukh State agencies) for giving authorisations for the air space to be used in breach of the relevant procedural rules. 31.  On 27 July 2002 the Western Region Military Prosecutor\u2019s Office instituted criminal proceedings to investigate the circumstances of the accident. 32.  On 28 July 2002 the case was transferred for investigation to the General Prosecutor\u2019s Office and assigned to the Deputy Chairman of the Investigation Division of the Chief Department for Military Prosecutors\u2019 Offices. The team of some twenty investigators and other officers from the military prosecutor\u2019s office dedicated to the case was supplemented by nineteen civilian investigative officers from the Lviv Regional Prosecutor\u2019s Office, department of the interior and the State Security Service. The composition of the team was modified on several occasions, each time consisting of both military and civilian officers. 33.  On 4 February 2003 the prosecution commissioned an aviation expert assessment, which was carried out by a group of four Air Force officers in active service, a retired Air Force flight safety specialist and a civilian aviation expert. 34.  On 15 April 2003 the group produced its report, in which it concurred with the earlier findings made by the Special Commission and other entities concerning the principal causes of the accident. As regards the quality of the organisation of the show, the experts found that the pilots\u2019 mission as such had not been incompatible with the SU-27 specifications, and that the size and location of the aerobatics zone had been acceptable. At the same time, in the experts\u2019 view, the organisational flaws had included, among others, a failure on the part of the superior officers to draw up comprehensive documents and guidelines in order for the crew to understand the scope of their mission, and to supervise more closely the execution of orders. 35.  On 30 May 2003 the civilian expert engaged in the above assessment issued a separate opinion in which he stated, inter alia, that in his view the aerobatics zone had been too small; its location had been inherently dangerous and the pilots\u2019 mission order had been incompatible with the SU\u201127 specifications. 36.  On 2 June 2003 the prosecutor\u2019s office solicited an opinion from two other experts, both retired USSR Air Force officers, who at the material time had been on the staff of the Air Force scientific centre for combat application, to clarify the matters in dispute and other questions. 37.  On 11 June 2003 the investigation obtained a conclusion by these two experts, in which they reported of numerous shortcomings in the air show organisation. In addition to the shortcomings pointed in the earlier Special Commission\u2019s report, they concluded that the aerobatics zone was too small; the boundaries of the zone were not clearly marked on site so as to be visible from the aircraft, which factor impaired the pilots\u2019 ability to orient themselves; the location of the aerobatics zone was potentially dangerous in case of any unforeseen situation; the airfield\u2019s preparation for the show was carried out without any account being taken of the possibility of pilot error or any other emergency; the crew did not receive a single mission order defining its mission according to all applicable standards; various documents defining its flight parameters were not comprehensive and not fully consistent with each other; the officers of the flight safety service failed to reveal the above shortcomings; the pilots were allowed to take off without g-suits and their preparedness being checked by any competent authority; the position of \u201cair show flights director\u201d assigned to Major-General A.T., which did not feature in any military training documents, appeared to be redundant; it paralleled that of the ordinary aerodrome flights director, with a lack of clarity as to the distribution of authority between the two officers; neither Major-General A.T. nor Colonel Y.Ya., who directed the flight, had the proper clearance, experience, and qualifications; and there was no assessment of the quality of the first pilot\u2019s piloting technique during the training flight in Ozerne on 24 July 2002. In practice, the pilots\u2019 training was coordinated and supervised only by Colonel O.D., stationed at the Ozerne aerodrome, who had neither the authority nor the qualifications to assess their preparedness. The experts also noted that, regard being had to the army hierarchy, it was for the Air Force Commander-in-Chief to issue an appropriate formal order clearly designating the officers responsible for the mission and determining their personal responsibilities, as well as to bear responsibility for their proper training, since the programme envisaged the involvement of crew members and the use of equipment from various military units. 38.  According to the experts, these and other shortcomings constituted breaches of numerous provisions contained in the relevant regulatory framework, including special military aviation guidelines, in particular: Guidelines for execution of flights for the Ukrainian Air Force, enacted by order no. 249 of the Deputy Minister of Defence on 25 December 1998 (\u041d\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0430\u043d\u043e\u0432\u0430 \u043f\u043e \u0432\u0438\u043a\u043e\u043d\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044e \u043f\u043e\u043b\u044c\u043e\u0442\u0456\u0432 \u0432 \u0430\u0432\u0456\u0430\u0446\u0456\u0457 \u0417\u0431\u0440\u043e\u0439\u043d\u0438\u0445 \u0421\u0438\u043b \u0423\u043a\u0440\u0430\u0457\u043d\u0438, \u041d\u0412\u041f-99); Air Force Navigation Service Guidelines of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, enacted by order no. 54 of the Air Force Commander of Ukraine on 9 November 1992 (\u041d\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0430\u043d\u043e\u0432\u0430 \u043f\u043e \u0448\u0442\u0443\u0440\u043c\u0430\u043d\u0441\u044c\u043a\u0456\u0439 \u0441\u043b\u0443\u0436\u0431\u0456 \u0430\u0432\u0456\u0430\u0446\u0456\u0457 \u0417\u0431\u0440\u043e\u0439\u043d\u0438\u0445 \u0421\u0438\u043b \u0423\u043a\u0440\u0430\u0457\u043d\u0438, \u041d\u0428\u0421-93); General Rules on Flights in Ukrainian Air Space, enacted by order no. 62 of the Air Force Commander of Ukraine on 10 December 1992 (\u041e\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0432\u043d\u0456 \u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u0438\u043b\u0430 \u043f\u043e\u043b\u044c\u043e\u0442\u0456\u0432 \u0443 \u043f\u043e\u0432\u0456\u0442\u0440\u044f\u043d\u043e\u043c\u0443 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0441\u0442\u043e\u0440\u0456 \u0423\u043a\u0440\u0430\u0457\u043d\u0438, \u041e\u041f\u041f-93); Regulation on Prevention of Aviation Incidents in the Ukrainian Air Force, enacted by order no. 210 of the Air Force Commander on 29 October 1999 (\u041f\u043e\u043b\u043e\u0436\u0435\u043d\u043d\u044f \u043f\u0440\u043e \u0437\u0430\u043f\u043e\u0431\u0456\u0433\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044f \u0430\u0432\u0456\u0430\u0446\u0456\u0439\u043d\u0438\u0445 \u043f\u043e\u0434\u0456\u0439 \u0443 \u0412\u0456\u0439\u0441\u044c\u043a\u043e\u0432\u043e-\u041f\u043e\u0432\u0456\u0442\u0440\u044f\u043d\u0438\u0445 \u0421\u0438\u043b\u0430\u0445 \u0423\u043a\u0440\u0430\u0457\u043d\u0438, \u041f\u0417\u0410\u041f-2000), and several others. Similarly to the findings contained in other reports, the experts concluded, in particular, as follows:\n\u201c... One of the reasons for the emergence of the ... incident ... was the existence of significant shortcomings in the ... preparation and staging of the ... air show and lack of clear distribution of duties between the officers ... which, in turn, led to lack of coordination between ... the persons engaged in the preparation, as well as to the absence of effective control over their activity.\u201d\nIf the foregoing normative acts had been unconditionally complied with, the breaches in the organisation of the demonstration flight could have been detected and remedied, and the grave consequences avoided ...\u201d 39.  The investigation ended on 10 August 2004. Ten officers, including both pilots and their ground support crew; the Air Force Commander-in-Chief (O.S.); O.V. and V.A. of the Air Force Headquarters; the Commander of the 14th Corps (S.O.); the 14th corps chief safety officer (A.L.) and the commander of the Air Force unit based in Ozerne (O.D.) were committed for trial. 40.  On an unspecified date in 2004 S.O., previously demoted from his post as 14th Corps Commander, was appointed first deputy Air Force Commander-in-Chief. 41.  On 27 August 2004 the Deputy Prosecutor General disjoined the criminal proceedings against V.S., O.V., V.A. and S.O. and referred their case (hereafter referred to as \u201cthe organisers\u2019 case\u201d) for additional investigation. He found, in particular, that it was necessary to clarify whether there was a causal link between the omissions imputed to those officers and the aircraft crash. 42.  For that purpose, on 24 September 2004 two civilian experts were commissioned to carry out an additional assessment. The four defendants challenged that appointment, alleging that the experts concerned were not competent to evaluate their performance. S.O. proposed six other candidates in their stead. The prosecutor\u2019s office dismissed the challenge to the civilian experts, but agreed to include three of the candidates proposed by S.O. in the group, having found that they were sufficiently independent. It rejected the other three candidates, citing possible conflict of interest in view of their current or former employment with the Air Force Headquarters. Subsequently, two more retired military officers were included in the group, which finally consisted of two civilian experts and five retired military officers. Four of the military officers (including the three candidates proposed by S.O.) were serving at the material time in the faculty of the National Military Academy and the fifth expert was deputy director for flight safety at a military aircraft repair company belonging to the Ministry of Defence. 43.  On 8 February 2005 the five military experts produced a report in which they concluded that all four defendants had duly fulfilled their responsibilities in respect of the organisation of the air show and that none of them had breached any service duty or other applicable provisions. The group also concluded that the applicable legal framework governing the staging of military air shows and the organisation of aerobatic performances had been adequate and sufficient and that there had been no need for the defendants to develop any additional rules or guidelines before the air show. In the group\u2019s view, the misconduct by the first pilot was the sole cause of the accident. Their conclusion, insofar as relevant, read as follows:\n\u201cThe only reason for the crash of the SU-27 aircraft was the execution by the pilot of an unplanned piloting manoeuvre, in the course of which he committed grave errors in piloting technique, which caused the falling of the aircraft and the catastrophic consequences.\u201d 44.  On 11 May 2005 the two civilian experts also produced a report, which largely replicated the findings and the language of the report issued by their military counterparts. 45.  In the meantime, on an unspecified date, the case in respect of the pilots, the ground crew and two other officers of the lower rank (hereafter the \u201cperformers\u2019 case\u201d) was transferred to the court for trial. 46.  During the trial, the defendants pleaded innocent of any wrongdoing. In particular, Major-General A.T. noted that there had been no normative document defining the responsibilities of an \u201cair show flights director\u201d. Having been appointed to this position created by order of the 14th Corps Commander, he had developed his own reference document listing his duties for the Commander\u2019s approval and had done his best in performing them. In his opinion, the appointment could not have made him responsible for direct supervision of the pilots\u2019 training at a different airfield and ensuring their readiness, as neither of them had belonged to the 14th Corps or been placed under his command. He considered that regard being had to their position in the military hierarchy, the pilots had to report directly to the Air Force Commander-in-Chief. 47.  Colonel A.L. of the 14th Corps flight safety service likewise asserted that he had properly performed his service duties and had prepared sufficient documentation concerning flight safety during the air show. He had submitted the relevant documents for review by 14th Corps Command as well as by the relevant sectors in the Air Force Headquarters, and had not received any negative feedback. Colonel A.L. further admitted that he had never personally instructed the pilots on the safety measures and had never checked on their readiness for the flight. In his view, such responsibilities fell outside his authority and had to be carried out by the pilots\u2019 direct superiors, who did not belong to the 14th Corps. 48.  Lieutenant-Colonel Y.Ya., the aerobatic performance director, asserted that, having been informed of the size and boundaries of the aerobatics zone on 24 July 2002, he had warned Major-General A.T. and the pilots of his doubts concerning its safety. However, having been told that the relevant parameters had been approved by the higher command and it was too late to change anything, he had executed the orders of his superiors and directed the flight as best he could. 49.  Colonel V.T. (the first pilot) alleged, in particular, that during the flight the aircraft had become uncontrollable due to forces beyond his control. He denied an accusation that he had deviated from his mission order, and submitted that in his view the way to perform the disputed manoeuvre was a matter for the pilot\u2019s discretion, particularly as his mission order had no specific instructions to this end. Moreover, prior to the flight, he had discussed the disputed manoeuvre with Colonel Y.Y. (the second pilot), who he had considered to be the crew captain, as he was higher in the military hierarchy, and the latter had no objections to his choice. Colonel V.T. also noted that the documents defining his mission had not defined the boundaries of the aerobatics zone. He had been taken by surprise when he saw on arrival on site that the spectators were to the left of the runway, as according to his orders, his manoeuvres were also to be carried out to the left. In any event, he considered himself obliged to carry out his orders without arguing. 50.  Colonel Y.Y. (the second pilot) submitted that he had considered the first pilot to be the crew captain and that he himself was obliged to refrain from interfering with his actions. He concurred with the first pilot that the way to execute the disputed manoeuvre, which was not specified in the mission order, was a matter for the pilot\u2019s discretion. 51.  On 23 June 2005 the Central Region Military Court of Appeal, sitting in a panel consisting of three military judges and acting as a first\u2011instance court, found both pilots, the air show flights director and the aerobatic performance director guilty of breaches of flight regulations within the meaning of Article 416 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (\u201cthe CCU\u201d) and sentenced them to fourteen, eight, six and five years\u2019 imprisonment respectively. It further found the chief of the 14th Corps flight safety service guilty of having a negligent attitude towards military service within the meaning of Article 425 paragraph 2 of the CCU, and sentenced him to four years\u2019 imprisonment, suspended, with probation. By way of reasoning, the court referred extensively to the relevant findings of the Special Commission and the aviation experts\u2019 assessment of 11 June 2003 (see paragraphs 16-18 and 37-38 above) in so far as they related to the actions of the above officers, as well as described the overall shortcomings in organising the show. 52.  The sixth defendant, Colonel O.D., who had coordinated V.T.\u2019s and Y.Y.\u2019s training programme in Ozerne and supplied the aircraft for the show, was found to have performed his duties in good faith and acquitted. 53.  On 2 March 2006 the Military Panel of the Supreme Court of Ukraine upheld this judgment on appeal and it became final. 54.  In the meantime, on an unspecified date the General Prosecutor\u2019s Office decided to continue with the \u201corganisers\u2019 case\u201d, having disagreed with the expert conclusions of 8 February and 11 May 2005, and on 25 January 2006 suspended S.O.\u2019s authority as the Deputy Air Force Commander. 55.  On 11 January 2008 the defendants in this case were committed for trial on charges of having a negligent attitude towards military service within the meaning of Article 425 paragraph 2 of the CCU. O.V. and V.A. were additionally charged with breaches of flight regulations within the meaning of Article 416 of the CCU. Finally, V.S. and S.O. were additionally charged with exceeding their authority within the meaning of Article 424 paragraph 3 of the CCU by inappropriately using State funds for a celebration of a bogus memorial date and staging aerobatic performances in the absence of an appropriate regulatory framework. 56.  On 11 June 2008 the Central Region Military Court of Appeal, sitting in a panel of three military judges and acting as a first-instance court, acquitted all four defendants of the above charges, largely relying on the expert conclusions of 8 February and 11 May 2005. It found that the provisions of Article 416 of the CCU did not apply to O.V. and V.A., as they had not operated the flight and had not been directly involved in its preparation. Other charges were dismissed as unsubstantiated. In particular, all the defendants were found to have carried out their service duties properly. The court noted that they had taken numerous measures to ensure proper organisation of the show and had produced a large volume of documents correctly delegating tasks to different officers. They had also reasonably trusted the pilots, the supporting crew and other officers to carry out the tasks assigned to them. No legal act could be interpreted as conferring on the defendants a different range of duties or imposing an obligation to act in a different manner. The relevant allegations of the prosecution, as well as the conclusions of the Special Commission and the expert findings dated 11 June 2003 in respect of the defendants were incorrect, being based partly on an overly broad interpretation of the applicable legal provisions and partly on references to provisions that were wrongly applied in the context. The court did not refer to the internal investigation of the Ministry of Defence in its judgment. The relevant excerpts of the court judgment read as follows:\n\u201c... the members of the [Special Commission] concluded that the immediate cause of the catastrophe ... derived from mistakes in the piloting technique ... outside the designated aerobatics zone ... The same conclusion was adopted by the court, which examined the criminal case concerning [V.T.] and others. All other circumstances connected to the organisation of the show in the court\u2019s view did not in any way affect the wrongdoings by [the first pilot] and, moreover, they could not have been foreseen or taken into account by the organisers of the show ...\n... As far as the size of the aerobatics zone was concerned, which, according to the experts, was insufficient for the performance of the mission ... this breach was not the cause of the catastrophic situation, since the SU-27 aircraft was practically never within its boundaries ...\nReports on the crew\u2019s readiness for the flight were produced properly, and it was following their receipt that [V.S.] as well as [S.O.] gave permission for the flight to go ahead;\nThe decision to hold the show was taken by the 14th Air Force Corps Commander [S.O.]: this decision was coordinated by him with the Air Force Commander-in-Chief [V.S.], and they acted within the scope of their authority. With a view to preparation of the festivities and organisation of the flight by SU-27, the 14th Corps Command jointly with the Air Force Headquarters took a number of relevant measures: orders were issued; show plans were drafted; agendas were put in place; and air and static display schemes were developed ... The 14th Corps Commander performed his duties with respect to the preparation of the show in accordance with the applicable law, having properly distributed duties among his subordinates ... Issues concerning preparation of the show and supervision over the performance of the delegated tasks were discussed at meetings organised by [S.O.] ...\nThe court\u2019s conclusions ... are also not affected by the cancellation of the [on-site] ... rehearsal flight ... In the court\u2019s view, this fact did not affect the cause of the disaster, which was deviation by [V.T.] from his mission ...\u201d 57.  The Prosecutor\u2019s Office and numerous injured parties appealed against this verdict before the Military Panel of the Supreme Court. In its appeal, the prosecution asserted, in particular, that the preparation for the show was based exclusively on the military training documents, which took no account of the specifics of an aerobatic performance involving civilian spectators. Lacking a body of relevant legislation and regulations, the Air Force Command had been obliged to develop specific documents adapting the military training rules for this purpose before planning the show. As an aerobatics performance could not be equated to an ordinary military training flight, a special training programme had to be set up, and the crew had to have special clearance. However, the reports by the Special Commission, the Ministry of Defence and the aviation experts indicated that not only did the defendants fail to act in developing relevant rules and regulations, but they also failed to supervise compliance with the existing general rules. The court\u2019s findings were at odds with the findings by these authorities, and no justification was provided for them. Moreover, they were inconsistent with the court\u2019s own position adopted in the judgment of 23 June 2005, where it heavily relied on the conclusions of the Special Commission and the aviation expert assessment in examining various aspects of the case and had referred to the relevant findings concerning poor organisation of the show in its reasoning. 58.  On 22 October 2008 the Military Panel of the Supreme Court of Ukraine rejected the appeals and upheld the acquittals. 59.  On 24 December 2002 and 12 February 2003 the first and second applicants lodged civil actions within the aforementioned criminal proceedings. They claimed 50,000 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH) and UAH 200,000 respectively for non-pecuniary damage inflicted by the deaths of Sergiy and Tetiana Mikhno. Subsequently they increased their claims, seeking UAH 500,000 and UAH 2,000,000 in non-pecuniary damages respectively. No claim for damage on account of the second applicant\u2019s presence at the scene of the accident was submitted. 60.  On 23 June 2005, contemporaneously with the verdict in the \u201cperformers\u2019 case\u201d, the court awarded each applicant UAH 50,000 in non\u2011pecuniary damage, to be paid by the Ministry of Defence. It also awarded UAH 40,000 each to the father, mother and sister of Tetiana Mikhno. 61.  On 2 March 2006 the Military Panel of the Supreme Court rejected the applicants\u2019 appeals, in which they claimed higher compensation. 62.  On 14 December 2006 the second applicant received the judgment award due to her. 63.  In March 2008 the first applicant received UAH 46,134.68 of the judgment debt due to her. 64.  According to the Government, the remaining UAH 3,865.32 were paid to the first applicant on 28 December 2012. They presented a copy of the decision of the Bailiffs\u2019 Service dated 28 December 2012 terminating the enforcement proceedings, in view of the fact that the judgment had been duly enforced.\n(b)  Other civil claims 65.  When submitting their observations on the case in response to those of the Government, the applicants additionally submitted copies of the judgments of the Lviv Sykhivskyy and Zaliznychnyy District Courts dated 19 April and 7 December 2006, awarding the second applicant monthly allowances of UAH 830 and UAH 400 in connection with the loss of the financial support of her mother and father respectively. These allowances were to be paid by the Ministry of Defence until the second applicant\u2019s eighteenth birthday. The Ministry was also obliged to pay lump sums of UAH 19,920 and UAH 10,167 in back payments under the first and second judgments respectively. These judgments were not appealed against and became final. 66.  Enforcement proceedings were initiated with respect to both judgments, however, according to the applicants, only the second of them was being enforced. They submitted that the debt under the first judgment amounted to the hryvnia equivalent of 7,786.27 euros (EUR) at the time of the exchange of observations between the parties. 67.  On 27 July 2002 the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine allocated 10,000,000[1] Ukrainian hryvnias from the State reserve fund to the Lviv Regional State Administration towards liquidating the consequences of the accident (Decree no. 1085). 68.  On 29 July 2002 the Regional Administration created a commission to deal with distribution of the above funds, and determined the categories of expenses to be covered (Decree no. 718). According to the Administration\u2019s decision, UAH 5,485,000 was to be distributed to the families of the deceased. The sums were to be disbursed to spouses, children, parents and dependents of the deceased victims, in amounts ranging from UAH 20,000 to UAH 40,000 depending on the family circumstances. The decree further allocated a total of UAH 2,075,000 to the surviving victims; UAH 500,000 to help the families with arranging funerals and providing gravestones; UAH 180,000 towards medical and rehabilitation costs; UAH 553,000 towards prosthetic care and relevant rehabilitation expenses, and the remaining funds to other categories of expenses. According to the Government, the relevant funds were disbursed to the addressees before the end of 2002. 69.  On 3 September 2002 the Parliament of Ukraine decided to transfer one day\u2019s salary of each Member of Parliament, with their consent, to the benefit of the Sknyliv accident victims. 70.  On 27 November 2002 the Lviv City Council\u2019s Executive Committee decided how to distribute the UAH 849,475 received by the municipality in charitable donations (Decree no. 522). According to this decision, UAH 202,475 of these funds were to be distributed to the families of the deceased; UAH 405,000 to those with serious irreversible health damage; UAH 121,492 to those with serious injuries and who were receiving in-patient treatment; UAH 80,520 to those with injuries of medium seriousness and who were receiving in-patient treatment, and UAH 39,970 to those receiving outpatient treatment. 71.  On various other occasions the authorities took additional decisions allocating financial and other assistance to various categories of the victims (such as decrees no. 730 of 15 August 2003, no. 1078 of 5 December 2003, and no. 221 of 5 March 2004 by Lviv City Council, Decree no. 328 of 19 July 2012 by the Lviv Mayor, and others). Pursuant to these decisions, further funds were allocated for medical check-ups and rehabilitation procedures, to cover the costs of holidays in recreational facilities for children, and for lump-sum payments to victims of the accident. 72.  The first applicant and Mr I.M., her husband (the third member of the applicants\u2019 household) received UAH 50,000 each from the State budget in connection with the deaths of their son and daughter-in-law, and about UAH 6,200 in funeral and other assistance. 73.  The second applicant received a global amount of UAH 130,000 from State funds. 74.  The applicants were also provided with holiday vouchers to go to Crimea in 2002 and exempted from payment of the second applicant\u2019s kindergarten fees. A further cumulative amount of UAH 180,000 was made available to the applicants\u2019 household from charitable funds collected by the State authorities for the Sknyliv air show accident victims. 75.  The parents of Tetiana Mikhno received a total of UAH 68,000 in State aid and around UAH 55,000 in charitable donations.", "references": ["7", "8", "1", "0", "5", "4", "6", "2", "9", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1945 and lives in Riga. 6.  In the summer of 2007 a book called \u201cKitchen of Litigation\u201d (Ties\u0101\u0161an\u0101s k\u0101 \u0137\u0113\u0137is) was published, which contained transcripts of allegedly authentic telephone conversations between the lawyers of a well\u2011known law office in Latvia and judges working in various courts, including the Senate of the Supreme Court. The judiciary\u2019s allegedly unlawful and unethical behaviour provoked considerable public debate and attracted wide media coverage. The Supreme Court and the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office launched an inquiry (p\u0101rbaude). 7.  On 17 September 2007 the Supreme Court established a working group consisting of five judges. The working group was tasked with carrying out an assessment of whether \u201cthe judges of the Supreme Court who were purportedly involved in the telephone tapping scandal, which raises doubts about the independence of the judiciary and the honesty of judges\u201d had violated the Code of Ethics of Judges. On 8 October 2007 the working group received transcripts of the alleged telephone conversations from the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office. 8.  On 7 November 2007, during the annual conference of judges, the chairman of the Supreme Court made a speech about the effects of the book and the public debate which followed. He stated:\n\u201cMore than two months have passed since information emerged about alleged telephone conversations between judges and a particular lawyer. That event further confirmed the conviction of at least some people in society that doubts about the impartiality and the independence of courts, and therefore the lawfulness of their judgments, are justified.\nSociety sees the information that was published as credible, irrespective of whether it was obtained lawfully or unlawfully and no matter what the result of the investigation carried out by the Prosecutor\u2019s Office will be, and it undermines trust in the judiciary. ...\n... I think that the information about the alleged conversations between judges and the lawyer [...] should be treated as a signal or a call to look at the problems in the judiciary in a wider context ...\n... In relation to this particular situation, I think it was caused by the attitude to the rule of law and the code of ethics which regulate judges\u2019 behaviour. The superficial, irresponsible and perhaps even the unlawful behaviour of certain judges has fundamentally affected trust in the judiciary ...\nTherefore [we] should also talk about the responsibility of judges, [we] should be conscious of the fact that a lack of self-criticism and an inability to apply ethical standards properly pose a threat to the independence of the judiciary ....\u201d 9.  On an unknown date the inquiry carried out by the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office concluded that the alleged telephone conversations had taken place between November 1998 and April 2000. As there were no audio records of the conversations, the authenticity of the content of the transcripts could not be established. In the course of the inquiry the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office questioned several judges mentioned in the book. 10.  With regard to Judge O.D.J., a judge of the Senate of the Supreme Court, the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office observed that the book had referred to a brief telephone conversation of 24 November 1999 in which the lawyer A.G. had arranged a meeting in the Judge O.D.J.\u2019s office. The impugned conversation had not referred to any specific civil case so the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office concluded that there were insufficient grounds to investigate Judge O.D.J.\u2019s activities. 11.  On 30 November 2007 the working group established by the Supreme Court published a report on their inquiry into alleged ethical wrongdoing by judges. The working group identified that two of the fifteen judges, whose conduct had been assessed, had violated the Code of Ethics of Judges, but that Judge O.D.J., whose conversation with the lawyer had been published in the book, had not. It stated:\n\u201c... [12.5] In his submissions [5.5] O.D.J. did not deny that he might have had conversations [with the lawyer] but that they had only concerned German compensation claims, however in those cases [the lawyer] had not been representing any of the parties, and therefore the working group concluded that O.D.J. had not violated the Code of Ethics.\u201d 12.  In 2004 the applicant and another person brought a civil claim against a third party. On 25 January 2005 the Riga Regional court, as a first\u2011instance court, dismissed the claim and on 21 November 2006 the Supreme Court, acting as an appellate court, dismissed an appeal by the applicant. 13.  In June 2007 the Senate of the Supreme Court granted leave to the applicant to appeal on points of law. The hearing before the cassation court was held on 29 August 2007. The Senate sat as a panel of three judges, including O.D.J. The applicant\u2019s representative raised objections to O.D.J., arguing that the applicant had reasonable doubts as to his impartiality on the grounds that the judge was under several inquiries at the time for allegedly unethical or unlawful behavior. The applicant also alleged that the defendant\u2019s representative was a former employee of the Supreme Court. 14.  On 29 August 2007 the other two judges, referring to Article 19(1)(4) of the Civil Procedure Law (see paragraph 16 below), dismissed the objections. They noted that the applicant\u2019s doubts were based only on an assumption and that the objection did not contain evidence allowing to conclude that the applicant\u2019s doubts about the impartiality of Judge O.D.J. in the particular case were reasonable in the terms of the above provision. On the same day the Senate of the Supreme Court upheld the appellate court\u2019s judgment on the merits by which the applicant\u2019s claim was dismissed and it became final in that part, but referred the case back for reconsideration in part on the implementation of the judgment.", "references": ["7", "8", "1", "9", "3", "4", "2", "6", "5", "0", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1978 and lives in Rheine. 6.  On 26 June 2012 the applicant was arrested on the spot for having damaged with a hammer a number of vehicles parked in the Bocholt courthouse\u2019s car park, and resisting a court\u2019s clerk. As a preliminary measure he was confined to a psychiatric hospital. The court appointed defence counsel to the applicant, who had a previous history of psychiatric treatment going back as far as 1999. 7.  On Tuesday 18 December 2012, the M\u00fcnster Regional Court delivered its judgment and ordered the applicant\u2019s confinement to a psychiatric hospital. It held that the applicant could not be held criminally responsible and was mentally ill. According to the court\u2019s psychiatric expert, he was psychotic and aggressive, did not show any awareness of his illness and it was likely that he would commit further, even more serious crimes. 8.  When the judgment was delivered in the presence of the applicant, his court\u2011appointed defence counsel and the applicant\u2019s custodian (gesetzlicher Betreuer), the applicant became agitated. He told the court\u2011appointed lawyer that he wished for a change in representation and declared that he wanted to appeal against the decision himself. He was informed that this was not possible on the spot. The presiding judge instructed him about the time and form for lodging an appeal on points of law. He was then returned to the forensic hospital where, when in contact with others, he showed no more signs of agitation. 9.  On Friday 21 December 2012 the applicant received a letter from the court\u2011appointed lawyer, dated 19 December 2012, who advised him as follows:\n\u201c... You already announced immediately after the hearing that you wanted to appeal against the court\u2019s decision and also to mandate new defence counsel. We respect your wish for new counsel and hereby terminate the mandate.\nRegarding the remedy you wished for, we give the following advice: You may appeal on points of law against the decision of the M\u00fcnster Regional Court (Bocholt Chamber) within one week after the judgment was delivered, thus until\n27 December 2012\nat the latest.\nAppeal on points of law may be lodged either with the record of the registry or in writing. Since you are not at liberty, the special provision of Article 299 of the CCP applies to you. This means that you can make statements relating to appellate remedies to the record of the registry of the District Court in whose district the institution is located.\nThus, the Rheine District Court would be competent.\nAccording to Article 299 \u00a7 2 of the CCP, in order to meet the time-limit it suffices if the record is taken within the time-limit.\nIn your own interest you should take care that the appeal is lodged in time.\nFor the sake of completeness we refer to Article 345 of the CCP which prescribes that the specific grounds of the appeal shall be submitted to the court whose judgment is being contested no later than one month after expiry of the time\u2011limit for seeking the appellate remedy. If the judgment has not been served by the expiry of that time\u2011limit, the time\u2011limit shall start to run upon the service thereof.\nIn your case this may only be done in the form of a notice signed by defence counsel or by an attorney, or to be recorded by the court registry.\u201d 10.  Still, on 21 December 2012 the applicant typed and signed an appeal letter to the Rheine District Court and asked the clinic\u2019s staff to post it. This was done on the following day (Saturday 22 December). 11.  On Friday 28 December 2012 the applicant\u2019s appeal letter reached the Rheine District Court, and was forwarded to the M\u00fcnster Regional Court where it was received on 3 January 2013. 12.  On 8 January 2013 the Regional Court informed the applicant that his appeal was belated. It underlined that the applicant had been instructed after the judgment\u2019s delivery that an appeal could only be recorded by the registry of the District Court but could not be lodged in writing. 13.  On 14 January 2013 the court\u2011appointed lawyer, who had resumed his activity for the applicant, requested a reinstatement of the proceedings in accordance with Article 44 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Wiedereinsetzung in den vorherigen Stand - see paragraph 19 below) and lodged an appeal on points of law. He explained that the applicant had misunderstood his counsel\u2019s instruction on how to lodge an appeal. The applicant had believed that he was able to choose whether he wanted to lodge the appeal in writing or have it recorded by the registry either at the Rheine District Court or the M\u00fcnster Regional Court. He could also have expected the appeal, posted on 22 December, to reach the Rheine District Court by 27 December 2012. 14.  On 11 March 2013 the Federal Prosecutor General observed, inter alia, that:\n\u201cHe [defence counsel] referred to Article 299 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by using wording which was not per se wrong but potentially misleading because it could be understood that the appeal on points of law might be lodged either (by the applicant himself) with the record of the Rheine District Court\u2019s registry or in writing with the same court.\u201d\nHowever, according to the Federal Prosecutor General, the oral instruction on the day of the hearing was sufficient. 15.  On 9 April 2013 the court-appointed lawyer submitted that:\n\u201c... already at the time of trial the applicant was confined to a psychiatric clinic because of his mental illness. It may be that the oral instructions on the right to appeal given after the delivery of the judgment were correct and complete. However, when judgment was passed which ordered his confinement to a psychiatric hospital, the applicant was not in his right mind. Communication between the applicant and his defence counsel was impossible. The applicant was obviously in an exceptional mental state. In such a situation, taking into account the applicant\u2019s psychiatric illness, it must be assumed that he had not understood the oral instructions on the right to appeal which were given immediately after the delivery of the judgment.\u201d 16.  On 24 April 2013 the Federal Court of Justice rejected the applicant\u2019s request for reinstatement and consequently dismissed his appeal on points of law as inadmissible because it had been lodged out of time. It held that it was not necessary to examine whether, with regard to the Christmas holidays, the applicant should have expected his letter to be delivered only on 28 December 2012. Rather, it found decisive that the applicant had been expressly instructed on the day of the judgment\u2019s delivery that an appeal could only be lodged with the Rheine District Court to the record of the registry, but not in writing. An accused who misunderstood the oral instruction and therefore lodged an appeal out of time was himself responsible for this. The Federal Court of Justice distinguished the applicant\u2019s case from case\u2011law which made exceptions for a foreigner who was not defended by counsel. Moreover, the applicant\u2019s defence counsel had given him instructions on the form and time\u2011limit for an appeal. According to the Federal Court of Justice, the content of this letter was not misleading but reflected correctly the applicable law. There was nothing to show that the applicant might not have understood the oral instructions by the presiding judge for mental health reasons. He misunderstood the subsequent written instructions of his defence counsel in the same way. 17.  The applicant filed a constitutional complaint to the Federal Constitutional Court. He stated, inter alia, that another lawyer had advised him that his court\u2011appointed defence counsel had been under an obligation to file the appeal on points of law. 18.  On 29 June 2013 the Federal Constitutional Court declined to consider the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint for adjudication, without providing reasons (no. 2 BvR 1243/13).", "references": ["8", "7", "9", "0", "6", "5", "4", "2", "1", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1977 and lives in West Drayton. 5.  The applicant claims to have entered the United Kingdom illegally on 18 November 2003 with her son (\u201cS\u201d), who was born on 13 July 2000. On 22 November 2003 S was admitted to hospital with serious injuries. 6.  On 3 December 2003 S became the subject of an interim care order and the applicant was later charged with child cruelty under section 1(1) of the Children and Young Persons Act 1993 and with Grievous Bodily Harm with intent. 7.  On 29 January 2004 the applicant claimed asylum on the basis that if returned to Nigeria she would be killed by the wife of a man who, she alleged, had sexually assaulted her. Her application was rejected by the Secretary of State for the Home Department on 26 April 2004. 8.  On 25 May 2004 the applicant was diagnosed with a psychotic illness and detained in hospital for one week. 9.  In July 2004 the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal against the refusal of her asylum claim on asylum and human rights grounds, finding, inter alia, that she was not a credible witness. 10.  On 24 August 2004 the applicant pleaded guilty to one count of child cruelty. She was granted bail pending a further hearing set for 7 February 2005. She then absconded for a period of over two years. 11.  In March 2005 a residence order was made in favour of S\u2019s father and the child was returned to Nigeria. 12.  On 14 July 2005 the applicant gave birth to her second child (\u201cM\u201d), who had a different father to S. 13.  On 26 September 2007 the applicant was arrested and charged with possession of false documentation with intent to commit fraud. She was convicted and on 12 December 2007 she was sentenced to nine months\u2019 imprisonment. 14.  On 7 April 2008 the applicant was convicted of child cruelty. Before sentencing the applicant for the offence of child cruelty, the Crown Court asked Dr O, a specialist registrar in forensic psychiatry, to produce a report. The report, which was dated 29 May 2008, indicated that the applicant suffered from a recurrent depressive disorder and emotionally unstable personality disorder. However, at the date of the report her depressive and psychotic symptoms were being managed with medication and therapy, with the result that her mental illness was not considered to be of a nature or degree to warrant treatment either in the prison healthcare wing or in hospital. She did not, therefore, fulfil the criteria for treatment under the Mental Health Act 1983 (\u201cthe 1983 Act\u201d). 15.  On 21 July 2008 the applicant was sentenced to twelve months\u2019 imprisonment for the offence of child cruelty. She also pleaded guilty to the offence of failure to surrender to bail and was sentenced to three months\u2019 imprisonment, to be served concurrently. The judge recommended deportation in view of the seriousness of the offences. 16.  On 5 August 2008 the United Kingdom Border Agency decided to deport the applicant. She therefore remained in detention under immigration powers when her criminal sentence ended on 8 August 2008. 17.  On 12 August 2008 the applicant appealed against the decision to deport her. In her notice of appeal she reiterated her claim that she was at risk of being killed in Nigeria and that she had no family connections there. As M had been taken into the care of the local authority and was the subject of care proceedings, she also asserted a right to remain in the United Kingdom until those proceedings had concluded. 18.  On 5 December 2008 the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal dismissed her appeal but found that it would be proportionate to allow her to remain in the United Kingdom for the short period that it would take to complete the care proceedings in respect of M. 19.  The applicant was refused bail on 12 January 2009 and again on 17 March 2009 on the grounds that she could not be relied on to comply with bail conditions, she offered no sureties and she represented a danger to herself and to others. 20.  On 30 April 2009 the applicant obtained a report from Professor K, a medical expert, on her mental health. He agreed with the diagnosis of Dr O and concluded that the applicant was not suitable for compulsory treatment under the 1983 Act as she was not in need of in-patient psychiatric care and her mental health needs could be met in the community. She was taking medication and if necessary could be admitted to hospital on a voluntary basis. Professor K did, however, note that the applicant\u2019s mental health was likely to deteriorate in response to continued detention, although it should improve in response to release in the community. 21.  Bail was again refused by the authorities on 1 June 2009 in view of the risk of the applicant once again absconding. 22.  On 19 June 2009 the applicant made representations requesting that the decision to deport be reversed or, alternatively, that the representations be treated as a fresh asylum claim pursuant to the relevant immigration rules. In these representations the applicant claimed that she faced a real risk of treatment contrary to Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention if she were deported to Nigeria due to her mental health status and the poor standard of treatment facilities in the destination country. Additionally, the applicant claimed that her family life with M would be irrevocably disrupted. 23.  On 25 June 2009 a judge in the Family Court made a care and placement order in respect of M. In concluding that the threshold criteria were met, he stated that:\n\u201cI am satisfied the evidence supports a finding of likelihood, that is to say a real possibility, of harm to [M], founded on [S\u2019s] grave injuries; the previous court\u2019s findings in respect of those; the mother\u2019s mental history; her plea to a seriously abusive offence against [S]; her absenting herself from the care and the criminal processes; the social and practical vulnerability produced by the parties\u2019 lack of immigration status; and their criminal offending, with its practical consequences for their availability to [M]. I am satisfied the matters I have outlined placed [M], at the relevant time, at significant risk of physical and emotional harm.\u201d 24.  Following the decision of the Family Court, on 21 September 2009 Professor K prepared a further report. He noted that the applicant\u2019s mental state had deteriorated considerably since he last saw her as she was more depressed and more floridly psychotic. She was also experiencing side\u2011effects from the medication she was taking. Between May 2009 and September 2009 she had fought with another detainee, sustained injuries while being restrained, ingested washing powder, attempted to tie a ligature around her neck, stolen food from other detainees and smashed things in her room. Professor K considered that the deterioration in her mental health was largely due to her continued immigration detention. He expressed the opinion that the applicant would now benefit from hospital assessment and treatment and recommended her transfer under the provisions of section 48 of the 1983 Act. 25.  On 10 October 2009 Professor K gave an opinion that the applicant was not fit to act as a litigant. He reiterated that she should be transferred to hospital under section 48 the 1983 Act. However, a transfer to a mental health hospital required the agreement of two clinicians responsible for a patient\u2019s care. The applicant was not transferred as there was no agreement about whether she fulfilled the relevant criteria. 26.  On 8 December 2009 the United Kingdom authorities contacted the responsible clinicians to request another mental health assessment of the applicant. However, the clinicians indicated that a further assessment was unnecessary as she had had four assessments already. The applicant was seen by the General Practitioner in the Immigration Removal Centre, who was satisfied that the medication being prescribed was best suited to her mental health situation and confirmed that there was no merit in arranging a further psychiatric assessment. 27.  On 14 December 2009, following what the Court of Appeal described as a \u201clengthy delay\u201d the Secretary of State refused to treat the applicant\u2019s representations as a fresh claim for asylum. Further similar representations led to a further decision on 26 April 2010 in which the Secretary of State maintained that the conditions for a fresh claim were not met. 28.  On 16 December 2009 the applicant lodged a judicial review claim challenging the lawfulness of her detention and the failure to transfer her to a mental hospital for compulsory treatment. She then added a further challenge to the refusal to treat her representations as a fresh claim for asylum. She was represented in these proceedings by the Official Solicitor as she lacked capacity to conduct the litigation on her own behalf. 29.  In or around February 2010 the applicant was admitted to the Acute Assessment Wing of a hospital after attempting suicide. 30.  Around this time Professor K examined the applicant once more and produced a report dated 1 March 2010. He noted that her condition had deteriorated due to her continued detention; she was more depressed, was describing mood-congruent auditory hallucinations, and continued to make multiple attempts to self-harm. He once again expressed the view that she should be transferred to hospital for compulsory treatment under section 48 of the 1983 Act. 31.  While the applicant was in hospital she was examined by a nurse. She assessed the applicant\u2019s risk of harming children as grade three on a scale of zero to three. She was also at a risk of suicide, deliberate self-harm and other offending behaviour at grade two. This gave the applicant a summary risk to herself of two and to others of three. Although the nurse noted that the applicant\u2019s mood had improved since 1 March 2010, she still considered that she had ongoing and enduring mental health problems and that her needs could not adequately be met in Yarl\u2019s Wood Immigration Removal Centre. 32.  The applicant was readmitted to the Acute Assessment Wing on 12 March 2010, following a further attempt to self-harm. 33.  On 15 March 2010 the applicant was assessed by Dr R, a consultant psychiatrist, Dr S, Acting Consultant for the Crisis Team, and Dr I of General Adult Psychiatry. They noted that she displayed a tendency to act impulsively and without consideration of the consequences. She also had a tendency to self-harm and exhibited behaviour which could be interpreted as suicidal. Furthermore, they considered her to be in an extremely stressful situation, given her detention and the ongoing care proceedings. In view of these considerations, they concluded that the applicant remained at very high risk due to her impulsivity and unpredictability. Although that risk could only be contained by constant supervision, this need could be met at Yarl\u2019s Wood. Hospital admission would not provide management different to that. 34.  The applicant was accordingly discharged back to Yarl\u2019s Wood. 35.  On 23 March 2010 Professor K considered Dr R\u2019s report along with other materials. He agreed that the applicant was at high risk of suicide, but considered that this required not only constant supervision but also treatment of the underlying problem, which would be more appropriately managed therapeutically in a hospital setting. He further noted that other doctors had recommended psychological intervention in a secure in-patient setting. 36.  Throughout the applicant\u2019s detention, monthly detention reviews were carried out. During these reviews any change in circumstances was recorded, the likelihood of removal within a reasonable time was considered, and a proposal was made with regard to whether detention should be maintained. 37.  Permission for the applicant\u2019s first judicial review challenge was granted on 14 May 2010 and the hearing took place on 22 and 23 July 2010. 38.  On 13 August 2010 the judicial review application was dismissed by a High Court judge, who found that while the Secretary of State had failed to take into account paragraph 55.10 of her own policy, Enforcement Instructions and Guidance (see paragraphs 58-63 below), when considering the justification for the applicant\u2019s detention between 8 August 2008 and 28 April 2010 (\u201cthe first period of detention\u201d), that failure had not caused any damage since the decision to detain would have been the same even had the policy been correctly considered and applied. The judge therefore dismissed the claim for false imprisonment. 39.  The judge found that the policy had been taken into account from 29 April 2010 up to the date of the hearing on 22 July 2010 (\u201cthe second period of detention\u201d). He therefore found that continuing detention was lawful during this second period. The judge also rejected submissions that the period of detention had become unreasonable and unlawful under the principles set out in R v. Governor of Durham Prison, ex parte Hardial Singh [1974] 1 WLR 704 (\u201cthe Hardial Singh principles\u201d) (see paragraph 54 below). In this regard, he noted that, taking an analytical approach to each of the periods of detention following 8 August 2008, the applicant\u2019s detention was explicable by steps she had taken, or failed to take (for example, cooperation in relation to emergency travel documents, and the conflicting advice in the hands of the authorities as to the effect of detention on her mental condition and the possibility of treating it while in detention). In relation to the applicant\u2019s own conduct, the judge noted that:\n\u201cIt is clear from the Hardial Singh principles that obstacles to the Claimant\u2019s removal caused by the Claimant\u2019s conduct do not count in the formula. The initial conduct of the Claimant was her commission of the offence on her son. Relevant to the decision to deport and to detain pending deportation were her conviction for absconding and her conviction for fraud. The Claimant\u2019s utilisation of the rights available under the legislation to challenge the Defendant\u2019s decisions allowed her to remain in the UK. In a sense she is rightfully in the United Kingdom while these processes unwind. On the other hand, they are of her choosing since she could repatriate herself voluntarily to Nigeria. Put neutrally as the authorities do, without tendentious issues such as fault, it is her conduct which has caused her to be here. She appealed asylum and deportation decisions, engaged at some stages in the family proceedings and issued a purported fresh claim and judicial review.\u201d 40.  With regard to the Secretary of State\u2019s refusal to accept the applicant\u2019s representations as a fresh claim, the judge found that the further representations were not \u201csignificantly different\u201d from material that had already been considered. Further, and in any event, the judge found that there was no Article 3 issue within the meaning of N. v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 26565/05, ECHR 2008 and that any interference with the applicant\u2019s rights under Article 8 \u00a7 1 was justified under sub-paragraph 2. 41.  The applicant appealed to the Court of Appeal against the dismissal of her judicial review claim on 13 August 2010. Permission was granted in light of the recent judgment of 23 March 2011 by the Supreme Court in R (Walumba Lumba and Kadian Mighty) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] UKSC 12 (\u201cLumba and Mighty\u201d) (see paragraphs 64-65 below), in which the application by the Secretary of State of a \u201csecret policy\u201d in respect of immigration detention was held to be unlawful in violation of public law principles. 42.   On 31 August 2010 the applicant applied for assisted return to Nigeria under the Facilitated Reintegration Scheme (a scheme under which financial incentives are provided for a voluntary return by an individual to his or her country of nationality) but the application was refused in all the circumstances of the case. 43.  The applicant was served with a deportation order on 25 November 2010. Although she submitted further representations for a fresh asylum and human rights claim the immigration authorities refused to revoke the deportation order. The immigration authorities also declined to give her a further statutory appeal right in relation to that decision and removal directions were set for 27 January 2011. The applicant challenged this decision by way of judicial review and obtained an injunction preventing removal until this judicial review claim had been determined. 44.  On 6 July 2011, shortly before the Court of Appeal hearing, the applicant was released on bail by the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal. 45.  At the court hearing, the Secretary of State conceded that following the decision of the Supreme Court in Lumba and Mighty the applicant\u2019s detention between 8 August 2008 and 28 April 2010 had been unlawful on account of a failure to consider the guidance on detention of mentally ill persons in the published policy on immigration detention (see paragraphs 58\u201163 below). As a result, on 28 July 2011 the Court of Appeal allowed the applicant\u2019s appeal against the High Court\u2019s judgment. However, as the Secretary of State had continued to detain the applicant after the relevant policy had been taken into account (from 29 April 2010 onwards), the court was satisfied that she would have been detained during the earlier period even if the policy had been considered. Moreover, having assessed all the evidence in the case \u2013 in particular, the risk of the applicant reoffending, self-harming, or absconding \u2013 the court concluded that it had been open to a reasonable decision-maker to detain the applicant in all the circumstances of the case. Despite the concerns over her mental health, the balance of expert advice was that her needs could be managed appropriately in detention. It therefore concluded that not only would the applicant have been detained during this period, but that she could have been detained lawfully. 46.  With regard to the Hardial Singh principles, the court did not consider that the period of detention had become unreasonable by the date of the hearing before the judge, either on account of its length or because it should have been apparent that it would not be possible to effect deportation within a reasonable period. On the contrary, the court considered that deportation within a reasonable period had remained a sufficient prospect at every stage. In this regard, it noted that there was no external barrier to removal and no case-specific problem such as the absence of travel documentation. The only intermittent delaying factor was the applicant\u2019s legal challenges but that did not oblige a finding that the prospects of removal were fanciful. Although it accepted that the Secretary of State could have responded sooner to the \u201cfresh claim\u201d representations, the \u201clengthy delay\u201d only had a minor effect overall and did not constitute a failure to act with due diligence. 47.  Finally, in relation to the Secretary of State\u2019s refusal to treat the new representations as a fresh claim, the court found that he had been entitled to reach the conclusion he did. 48.  Consequently, the court awarded the applicant nominal damages of GBP 1 in relation to the period which had been conceded to be unlawful. Permission to appeal was refused by the Supreme Court on 7 February 2012. 49.  The applicant succeeded in quashing the decision not to give her a further statutory appeal right in relation to the decision to refuse to revoke the deportation order in light of the second set of representations for a further fresh claim (see paragraph 43 above). This case is now being reconsidered by the authorities in light of all the current circumstances. 50.  In the meantime, the applicant has brought further judicial review claims (not related to the present application). She has also been litigating in the Family Court and is bringing a personal injury claim against the immigration authorities. 51.  By the end of July 2010 contact between the applicant and M had been limited to two hours every two months with a view to further reduction and the prospect of a goodbye meeting once the applicant was deported or M adopted. However, the local authority subsequently agreed not to proceed with adoption and instead opted for long-term fostering for M. The applicant had her first contact with M in July 2012 and the local authority have agreed to further contact every three months.", "references": ["8", "9", "0", "7", "6", "1", "3", "5", "4", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1955. At the time of lodging his application, he was detained in Kaisheim Prison. He was released subsequently. 6.  The applicant has been continuously addicted to heroin since 1973, when he was aged 17. He has also been suffering from hepatitis C since 1975 and has been HIV-positive since 1988. He has been considered 100% disabled and has been receiving an employment disability pension since 2001. He has tried to overcome his addiction to heroin with various types of treatment (including five courses of in-house drug rehabilitation therapy), all of which failed. From 1991 to 2008 the applicant\u2019s heroin addiction was treated with medically prescribed and supervised drug substitution therapy. Since 2005, the applicant had reduced the dosage of his drug substitution medication (Polamidon) and consumed heroin in addition to that medication. 7.  In 2008 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of drug trafficking and taken in detention on remand in Kaisheim Prison, where his drug substitution treatment was interrupted against his will. On 3 June 2009 the Augsburg Regional Court convicted the applicant of drug trafficking, sentenced him to three years and six months\u2019 imprisonment and, having regard to a previous conviction, to another two years and six months\u2019 imprisonment. It further ordered the applicant\u2019s placement in a drug detoxification facility, to be executed after a period of six months\u2019 detention in prison. The applicant was still not provided with substitution treatment for his heroin addiction. On 10 December 2009 he was transferred to a drug rehabilitation centre in G\u00fcnzburg, Bavaria, where he underwent abstinence\u2011based treatment for his addiction, without additional substitution treatment. 8.  On 19 April 2010 the Memmingen Regional Court declared the applicant\u2019s detention in the detoxification facility terminated and ordered his retransfer to prison. In a decision dated 25 June 2010 the Munich Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. Having regard, in particular, to the views expressed by the applicant\u2019s treating doctors, the court considered that it could no longer be expected with sufficient probability that the applicant could be cured from his drug addiction or could be prevented for a considerable time from relapsing into drug abuse. He had secretly consumed methadone at the clinic and lacked motivation to lead a drug-free life. 9.  The applicant was transferred back to Kaisheim Prison on 30 April 2010. The prison doctors gave him various painkillers for chronic pain resulting from his polyneuropathy, on a daily basis. During his detention, the pain in his feet, neck and spine became such that, at least during certain periods, he spent most of his time in bed. 10.  The applicant was examined by an external doctor for internal medicine, H., on the prison authorities\u2019 request in October 2010. H. did not consider any changes in the treatment of the applicant\u2019s HIV and hepatitis C infections necessary. Having regard to the applicant\u2019s chronic pain linked to his long-term drug consumption and polyneuropathy, he suggested that the prison medical service reconsider the possibility of drug substitution treatment. He subsequently confirmed that the applicant should be examined by a doctor specialised in drug addiction therapy to that end. 11.  The applicant also obtained, on his request, an opinion drawn up by an external doctor specialised in drug addiction treatment (B.) dated 27 July 2011, on the basis of the written findings of doctor H. and the Kaisheim Prison doctor\u2019s and authorities\u2019 findings and statements, but without having been able to examine the applicant in person. B. considered that from a medical point of view, drug substitution treatment had to be provided to the applicant. He explained that in accordance with the Federal Medical Association\u2019s Guidelines for the Substitution Treatment of Opiate Addicts (Richtlinien der Bundes\u00e4rztekammer zur Durchf\u00fchrung der substitutionsgest\u00fctzten Behandlung Opiatabh\u00e4ngiger) of 19 February 2010 (see paragraph 30 below), drug substitution therapy was internationally recognised as being the best possible therapy for long-standing opioid addicts. Detoxification caused the person concerned serious physical strain and extreme mental stress and should only be attempted in cases of a very short opioid dependence. Drug substitution therapy prevented a deterioration of the patient\u2019s state of health and a high risk to life, which arose particularly after forced abstinence in detention. It further prevented the spreading of infectious diseases such as HIV and hepatitis C. It had to be clarified whether, in the applicant\u2019s case, further treatment for the hepatitis C from which he suffered was necessary. 12.  By submissions dated 6 June 2011, which he supplemented subsequently, the applicant made a request to the Kaisheim prison authorities for treatment with Diamorphin, Polamidon or another heroin substitute for his heroin addiction. Alternatively, he requested that the question of whether such substitution treatment was necessary be examined by a drug addiction specialist. 13.  The applicant claimed that drug substitution treatment was the only adequate treatment for his medical condition. Under the relevant Guidelines of the Federal Medical Association for the Substitution Treatment of Opiate Addicts, drug substitution treatment, which he had received prior to his detention, was the required standard treatment for his condition and had to be continued during his detention. 14.  The applicant claimed that, as confirmed by doctor H., the serious chronic neurological pain from which he was suffering could be considerably alleviated by drug substitution treatment, as had been the case during his previous substitution treatment. Having been addicted to heroin for almost forty years, he stood hardly any chance of leading a totally drug\u2011free life on release from prison. His rehabilitation could therefore better be furthered by providing him drug substitution treatment. While undergoing such treatment previously, he had been able to lead a relatively normal life and to complete training as a software engineer. 15.  Furthermore, referring to doctor B.\u2019s opinion, the applicant claimed that he was in need of Interferon therapy in order to treat his hepatitis C infection. In view of his poor physical and mental health, it was impossible to carry out such treatment without simultaneous drug substitution therapy. Substitution also helped to protect other prisoners from infection when using the same needles as he did for the consumption of drugs and diminished the trafficking and uncontrolled consumption of illegal drugs in prison. He also considered that the prison doctors did not have specialist knowledge in drug addiction treatment and asked to be examined by an external specialist. 16.  After the prison authorities\u2019 first decision dismissing the applicant\u2019s application was quashed by the Augsburg Regional Court on 4 October 2011 for lack of sufficient reasoning, the prison authorities, on 16 January 2012, again dismissed the applicant\u2019s request. 17.  The prison authorities argued that substitution treatment was neither necessary from a medical point of view nor a suitable measure for the applicant\u2019s rehabilitation. With regard to the medical necessity of drug substitution therapy, the prison authorities, relying on prison doctor S.\u2019s statement, considered that drug substitution therapy was not a necessary treatment for the purposes of section 60 of the Bavarian Execution of Sentences Act (see paragraph 27 below). They found that the applicant, who was severely addicted to drugs, had not received drug substitution treatment prior to his current detention in Kaisheim Prison. He had been placed in a drug rehabilitation centre for five months before his transfer to Kaisheim Prison, where he had been treated by medical experts with considerable knowledge of drug addiction treatment. The applicant had neither been given substitution treatment in the clinic, nor had the doctors recommended substitution treatment in prison. After three years in detention, he no longer suffered from physical withdrawal symptoms. Moreover, his condition with regard to his HIV and hepatitis C infections was stable and did not require any therapy for which substitution treatment was a necessary precondition. As suggested by the prison doctor, the applicant should use the opportunity to wean himself off opioids, such as heroin and its substitutes, while in prison, as it was very difficult to obtain drugs there. 18.  With regard to the applicant\u2019s social rehabilitation and treatment (sections 2 and 3 of the Bavarian Execution of Sentences Act, see paragraph 27 below), the prison authorities added that the main reason for which addicts underwent drug substitution therapy was to prevent them from becoming impoverished and from becoming involved in drug-related criminality. In prison, these risks were not present. Furthermore, the applicant had already shown that substitution therapy while he was at liberty had not prevented him from consuming other drugs or committing crimes, which had been caused by his antisocial nature. Moreover, the applicant had also consumed drugs while in detention. Therefore, providing him substitution treatment could lead to a risk to life and limb. 19.  On 26 January 2012 the applicant, relying on the reasons he had submitted to the prison authorities, appealed against the decision of the prison authorities to the Augsburg Regional Court. He further submitted that the authorities of Kaisheim Prison, where no substitution treatment had ever been provided, had omitted to examine the medical necessity of drug substitution therapy under the relevant criteria laid down, in particular, in the Federal Medical Association\u2019s Guidelines for the Substitution Treatment of Opiate Addicts, which were clearly met in his case. He further argued that under the applicable administrative rules for substitution treatment in prison in the Land of Baden-W\u00fcrttemberg, he would be provided with drug substitution therapy, which is carried out in the prisons of the majority of the German L\u00e4nder. 20.  On 28 March 2012 the Augsburg Regional Court, endorsing the reasons given by the prison authorities, dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. It added that it was not necessary to obtain the opinion of a drug addiction expert. The prison doctors of Kaisheim Prison had sufficient training to decide on the medical necessity of drug substitution therapy, irrespective of the fact that drug substitution therapies might never have been used in that prison. The administrative rules for substitution treatment in prison applicable in the Land of Baden-W\u00fcrttemberg were irrelevant, given that Kaisheim Prison was situated in the Land of Bavaria. 21.  On 4 May 2012 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with the Munich Court of Appeal. He submitted that the Regional Court\u2019s failure to investigate sufficiently whether drug substitution treatment was necessary, under the applicable Federal Medical Association\u2019s Guidelines and with the help of an independent doctor specialised in drug addiction treatment, had breached section 60 of the Bavarian Execution of Sentences Act and Article 3 of the Convention. Refusing him the alleviation of his intense neurological pain with an existing and medically necessary treatment constituted inhuman treatment. 22.  On 9 August 2012 the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as ill\u2011founded. In the court\u2019s view, the applicant had failed to show why drug substitution therapy was the one specific medical treatment he needed. He had further failed to prove that the prison doctors of Kaisheim Prison were not qualified to decide about the medical necessity of heroin substitution. The applicant\u2019s objection against the Court of Appeal\u2019s decision was rejected. 23.  On 10 September 2012 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court. He complained that his right to respect for his physical integrity under the Basic Law had been breached because he was denied drug substitution therapy, the only suitable therapy to treat his chronic pain, which would make Interferon therapy possible and allow him to reduce his craving for heroin and lead a \u201cnormal\u201d everyday prison life without isolation. He further complained that his right to be heard under the Basic Law had been violated as the domestic courts had not taken into consideration the medical opinions he had submitted to show that a substitution treatment was necessary and had failed to consult an independent specialised expert. 24.  On 10 April 2013 the Federal Constitutional Court declined to consider the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint without giving reasons (file no. 2 BvR 2263/12). 25.  On 17 November 2014 the Kaisheim prison authorities rejected the applicant\u2019s fresh request to be provided with substitution treatment in preparation for his release. The applicant\u2019s counsel was advised to ensure that the applicant was taken to a drug rehabilitation clinic immediately on his release in order to prevent him from taking an overdose of heroine as soon as he was at liberty. 26.  On 3 December 2014 the applicant was released. When examined by a doctor on 5 December 2014 he tested positive for methadone and cocaine. The doctor confirmed that the applicant would receive drug substitution treatment from 8 December 2014 onwards.", "references": ["6", "9", "0", "2", "8", "4", "5", "7", "3", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "5.  The first applicant, born in 1953, is the sister of the second applicant, born in 1946, the aunt of the third applicant, born in 1984, and the daughter of the fourth applicant, born in 1920. The first, second and third applicants live in Lviv. The fourth applicant having died in January 2013, the first applicant expressed the wish to pursue the proceedings in her stead. 6.  On 27 July 2002 the Air Force of Ukraine organised a military aviation show in the \u201cSknyliv\u201d airdrome in Lviv (\u201cthe Sknyliv air show\u201d) to commemorate the sixtieth anniversary of the 14th Air Force Corps. The agenda for the event included a static display of military aircraft and other equipment and a live aerobatics show by military pilots. 7.  The event was attended by several thousand individuals, including the third applicant; Mrs Natalya Mykhayliv, the first applicant\u2019s daughter; her spouse Mr Andriy Mykhayliv and their two daughters Natalya and Andriana, born in 1994 and 1998 respectively. 8.  During the aerobatics performance, an SU-27 military aircraft piloted by Colonels V.T. and Y.Y. crashed into the static aircraft display site where there were numerous spectators, where it exploded. Both pilots had successfully ejected before the explosion. As a result of the crash, seventy-seven people died and nearly three hundred sustained injuries. 9.  Four members of the Mykhayliv family died on the spot. The third applicant suffered a post-traumatic stress reaction. 10.  According to the applicants, following the accident, the military authorities immediately started cleaning up the site, shovelling the bodies into a pile, washing off the blood and small organic remains, and burying body fragments under the sand to conceal the evidence of the disaster. They also attempted to prevent people from photographing and filming. Senior Air Force staff and civilian authorities occupying the VIP lounge fled in panic, causing a traffic jam and obstructing access to the site for police and medical professionals. 11.  The Government contested this account. They noted, in particular, that the law-enforcement authorities had arrived promptly at the scene and had not recorded any instances of inappropriate conduct by the military personnel present there. According to them, the bodies of the victims were inspected by the police at the scene and then carefully transported to mortuaries for forensic examination and identification. 12.  Following the accident, the first and third applicants went to the mortuary in search of their relatives\u2019 remains. According to them, they were obliged to wait long hours in the heat before being allowed to enter the premises. Once inside, they had to search through numerous bodies and body fragments piled up on the floor to identify those of their relatives. Unrefrigerated remains, which were decomposing in the heat, emitted a terrible odour. 13.  On 5 August 2002 a panel of forensic experts examined the bodies of Mr and Mrs Mykhayliv and their daughters, and concluded that they had sustained fatal cerebral trauma and numerous other injuries. In particular, Mr Mykhayliv had sustained a severe concussion; the head of Mrs Mykhayliv had been completely destroyed; the heads of the children had been partly destroyed, with fragments missing. The documents on file indicate that the experts\u2019 conclusions were based on external examination of the bodies. 14.  The applicants submitted that the bodies had been autopsied in spite of the first applicant\u2019s objections. 15.  On an unspecified date the applicants collected the bodies of Mr and Mrs Mykhayliv and their daughters and buried them in the Yanivske cemetery in Lviv. According to the applicants, one of the girls had a gold earring missing. They further submitted that the head of Mrs Mykhayliv had been extracted from the crashed aircraft engine and, in spite of their pleas, had not been returned to them along with some other unspecified body fragments. 16.  The Government submitted that unidentified body fragments of the Sknyliv accident victims had been buried in a common grave in the Goloskivske cemetery in Lviv after all reasonably available possibilities of identifying them had been exhausted. They also provided several documents produced by the General Prosecutor\u2019s Office in August and September 2002, apparently in response to the first applicant\u2019s requests for further measures to be taken with a view to identifying body fragments, including a distorted female head, as possibly belonging to her deceased relatives. It appears from these documents that the chief investigator ordered some of the measures requested by the first applicant but rejected other requests as unfounded. It was also noted in the documents that, while the authorities had had a distorted female head in their possession, it could not have belonged to Mrs Mykhayliv, because, according to the expert findings, her head had been completely destroyed. 17.  On various dates several concurrent investigations were opened to establish the circumstances of the accident, including investigation by a special Government Commission set up for this purpose, the Ministry of Defence, the Lviv City Council, the Prosecutor\u2019s Office, and Sknyliv Tragedy, a non-governmental organisation founded by survivors of the accident and those who had lost relatives at the air show. 18.  On 27 July 2002 the President of Ukraine set up a special Commission (the Government Commission for the investigation of the causes of the catastrophe of the military aircraft of the Air Force of Ukraine; \u201cthe Special Commission\u201d) with a specific mandate to investigate the circumstances of the accident and coordinate assistance to its victims. The Commission was chaired by the President of the National Security and Defence Council. Other members of the Commission included senior officials from the Ministries of Emergencies, Transport, Finances, Health, Interior and Social Protection, officers of the Security Service of Ukraine, the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces, the State Aviation Transport Department, and the Lviv Regional State Administration. The Commission also engaged several experts from the \u201cSukhoy\u201d construction bureau (the SU-27 aircraft manufacturer, Russia) and two test pilots from the Russian Federation as aviation experts. 19.  Following the investigation, which included inspecting the accident site, interviewing individuals involved in the organisation of the air show and examining the relevant documents, as well as deciphering data from the flight data recorders, on an unspecified date in 2002 the Special Commission reported on the facts as follows. 20.  In June 2002 Colonel-General V.S. (the Air Force Commander-in-Chief) authorised the aerobatics show at the request of Lieutenant-General S.O. (the 14th Corps Commander). The Air Force Headquarters appointed a mixed team of officers from different units, including Colonel V.T., from Kirovske, Crimea as the first pilot; Colonel Y.Y., of the Air Force Headquarters, stationed in Vinnytsia, as the second pilot; and Lieutenant-Colonel Y.Ya., stationed in Mirgorod, as the aerobatic performance director. Lieutenant-General A.T. and Major-General A.L., both stationed locally in Lviv with the 14th Corps Command, were also designated to join the mission, one as \u201cair show flights director\u201d and the other as \u201cchief safety officer\u201d. 21.  On 24 July 2002 V.T., Y.Y. and Y.Ya. carried out their only training flight as a team. On the orders of the Air Force Headquarters, the flight took place at a military aerodrome in Ozerne, near Zhitomir. According to the Special Commission, that flight could not qualify as a rehearsal for the performance at the air show, as it included a different sequence of manoeuvres; its purpose was rather to improve and practise piloting techniques. The Commission also established that V.T. had requested an additional training flight in Ozerne and that his request had been turned down by the command, citing a shortage of fuel. Although the air show preparation programme included an on-site rehearsal flight on 26 July 2002, the 14th Corps Commander decided to cancel it for the same reason. The pilots were not formally apprised of the boundaries of the aerobatics zone or the placement of spectators. 22.  Before the show, the pilots were provided with a different aircraft from the one in which they had carried out their training flight. There was a certain asynchronism in the performance of the right and left engines of this aircraft. Overall, however, it was in an acceptable technical condition and remained fully operational until it crashed. The aircraft had been supplied with extra fuel in order to enable the pilots to return to Ozerne without landing at the site of the air show. The fact that the pilots had trained in a different aircraft and with less fuel had a negative impact on their readiness for performing aerobatic displays. For unspecified reasons, the pilots decided to take off without the mandatory anti-gravitation suits (\u201cg-suits\u201d). On arrival at the Sknyliv aerodrome, the pilots immediately started the performance, without taking any time to familiarise themselves with the site, which was new to them. During the performance, the aircraft exited the designated aerobatics zone, the boundary of which was some 150 metres from the spectators\u2019 area. Neither A.T. nor Y.Ya., directing the flight from the ground, warned them of that fact or directed them to return to the designated zone. Still outside of the zone, V.T. decided to perform a certain aerobatic display (called \u201cthe trunk\u201d), which he had never practised before and which was not included in his mission order. He made a technical mistake in its performance and, as the second pilot did not intervene when appropriate, the pilots lost control of the aircraft and it started falling. Subsequent efforts by the crew to regain altitude were futile. Accordingly, the Special Commission concluded that the principal cause of the accident was a technical mistake on the part of the first pilot in performing a manoeuvre which he had not been commissioned to perform. It also noted that the prompt and appropriate intervention of the second pilot could have saved the situation and that loss of life and damage to health could have been avoided had the ground crew properly guided the pilots to stay within the aerobatics zone. 23.  The Special Commission also noted serious shortcomings in the organisation of the air show, including poor coordination between various officers and authorities involved in its preparation; unsatisfactory crew training, and lack of appropriate emergency and spectator-safety planning, which contributed to the disaster. The Commission noted, in particular, as follows:\n\u201cThe serious consequences of the aviation catastrophe ... were the result of irresponsibility, negligence, lack of discipline, official neglect and breach of applicable regulations ... on the part of many leading officers of the Armed Forces, in particular, the generals and officers of the Air Force Headquarters.\nThe tragedy was also the result of the absence of a system of effective supervision of the execution of orders ... by the respective air force officials \u2013 from its Commander-in-Chief to the members of the crew of the SU-27. As a result, the generals and officers involved in the preparation and staging of [the air show] were not apprised of the real state of affairs concerning the necessary measures to be carried out, while the immediate participants in the aerobatic performance proved to be ill-prepared for it.\u201d 24.  The Special Commission criticised, in particular, V.S. (the Air Force Commander-in-Chief) and his colleagues from the Air Force Headquarters responsible for the military training \u2013 Lieutenant-General O.V. and Major-General V.A. \u2013 for not having developed appropriate specific normative guidelines for the aerobatic performances. In the Commission\u2019s view, these were much needed given the lack of general regulations on the relevant matters. The Special Commission also criticised V.S. and his colleagues for not having ensured a proper distribution of tasks between their subordinates engaged in the show and their direct supervision on behalf of the Air Force Headquarters. In the Special Commission\u2019s opinion, such supervision was particularly important in view of the involvement in the show of officers from different military units that were not subordinate to each other and not accustomed to performing any tasks together. It also noted that Lieutenant-General S.O. (the 14th Corps Commander) and his subordinates, in particular Major-General A.T. and Colonel A.L. (the 14th Corps chief flight safety officer), had failed to put in place any meaningful land-and-air safety precautions plan. In addition, the Special Commission regretted S.O.\u2019s decision to cancel the on-site rehearsal flight and concluded that the officers designated to direct the flight as ground crew (A.T. and Y.Ya.) had had no relevant experience or clearance for such a mission. 25.  The Special Commission also reported on numerous procedural breaches on the part of the local administration and municipal authorities in authorising the air show. In particular, K., deputy mayor of Lviv with responsibility for humanitarian issues, had exceeded his authority in authorising it instead of the mayor himself. The mayor, having learned of the military authorities\u2019 initiative to organise the air show, took little action to coordinate the relevant preparatory activities. The show was authorised without the involvement of the competent officers and services legally responsible for carrying out assessments of the relevant safety risks and for taking the necessary prevention and response measures. The local authorities also failed to set up a necessary air show coordination committee and to organise a safety inspection of the aerodrome site before the show. 26.  In September 2002 the Ministry of Defence produced a Report on the internal investigation, largely reiterating the findings of the Special Commission. In particular, it concurred that the immediate cause of the accident was the first pilot\u2019s unforeseen misconduct, whose grave consequences could have been avoided or mitigated, were it not for the second pilot\u2019s and the ground crew\u2019s failure to intervene in good time. It also recognised that the organisation of the air show had been marked by significant shortcomings, including an unsatisfactory land and air safety precautions plan; refusal to arrange at least one training flight for the crew over the Sknyliv aerodrome; and poor supervision by the Air Force Headquarters and the 14th Corps Command of the preparatory activities. In addition, it was noted that the necessary regulatory framework was missing, and the organisers had drawn guidelines from the regulations on ordinary military training, which were not adapted for staging air shows for civilian spectators. 27.  Referring to the conclusions of the investigation, on 6 September 2002 the Minister of Defence issued order no. 305 (On the unsatisfactory organisation of the demonstration flight and the SU-27 aircraft disaster at the Sknyliv aerodrome), whereby a number of officers engaged in the organisation of the show were subjected to disciplinary sanctions. In particular, Lieutenant-General S.O. (the 14th Corps Commander) was demoted; Lieutenant-General O.V., (Deputy Air Force Commander-in-Chief on military training) was dismissed from the military \u201cfor unsatisfactory performance of service duties in respect of the preparation for and supervision of the air show at the Sknyliv aerodrome, and for personal irresponsibility\u201d; Major-General V.A. was dismissed from the military \u201cfor a negligent attitude to the performance of service duties and low personal executive discipline\u201d; and four other high-ranking Air Force officers received warnings and were subjected to other sanctions. In addition, Colonel\u2011General V.S., the Air Force Commander-in-Chief, was also dismissed from the military service on disciplinary grounds, and the new Air Force Commander-in-Chief was instructed to impose disciplinary sanctions on \u201cother officers guilty of breaches of duty during the preparation and staging of the air show\u201d. The issue of disciplinary responsibility for the pilots of the crashed aircraft and the ground crew which had operated their flight, was reserved pending a criminal investigation of the accident. 28.  On 22 October 2002 the Lviv City Council Special Temporary Investigation Commission delivered its report. It stated that numerous authorities shared, to various extents, common responsibility for the poor organisation of the show. It noted, in particular, that:\n\u201c2.2.  ... in the course of the preparation and staging of the demonstration flights ... the military establishments, the specialised central State aviation facilities and departments, the municipal authorities and their particular officers failed to comply with a number of provisions of the current law, governing the procedure of preparation and staging the events of such a scale, which failures, to various extents, resulted in the catastrophe and such a major loss of human life ...\u201d 29.  The Commission concluded that the local authorities had played an ancillary role in the organisation of the air show. However, they had acted negligently in authorising it in breach of formal procedures and without soliciting all relevant information from the military authorities. They had also failed to develop an appropriate emergency prevention and response plan for the air show. According to the Commission, the municipal authority had been completely disengaged from any safety-related decision-making and its overall performance had been marked by \u201c...a certain confusion and lack of clear understanding by the higher officers of the scope of their responsibilities.\u201d In view of this, the Commission recommended that the City Council evaluate the performance of the Mayor and other municipal officers and clarify its policy concerning the distribution of functions between them. It also invited the Mayor to impose disciplinary sanctions on his staff members who were at fault for breach of duty. 30.  The Commission next concluded that the negligence of the city authority had not been a direct cause of the accident, and attributed the primary responsibility for it to the military authorities, having provided the following overall political assessment of the accident:\n\u201c[the accident is] ... a consequence of the generally irresponsible policy of the National Government, which has neglected reformation of the Army and the Navy, leading to a loss unprecedented for a civilised country... of military efficiency and patriotic spirit, criminally negligent performance of their official duties by the military command at all levels, loss of pride in the military service and marginalisation of the material and technical procurement of the armed forces and military servicemen ...\n\u201c... [the accident] ... demonstrated the inadequacy of the current legal framework, the inadequacy of the State control system in respect of flight safety; irresponsible and negligent performance by officers at all levels of their duties under the law in force; the need to establish civilian control over the activities of the army; and the need to modernise and effectively reform the armed forces of Ukraine ...\u201d 31.  On 1 October 2003 the Sknyliv Tragedy Lviv-based NGO founded by the relatives of the accident victims and its survivors published its own investigation report based on interviews and other information collected from public and private sources. In addition, the report featured an assessment of V.T.\u2019s piloting techniques by S., a civil aviation pilot, who had lost family members at the Sknyliv air show. 32.  Similarly to the reports produced by the governmental authorities, the authors of this report concluded that the immediate cause of the crash was error by the first pilot in performing a manoeuvre, which had been neither envisaged by his mission order nor practised by him before the show, while the second pilot and ground crew did not take the opportunity to intervene in respect of the first pilot\u2019s conduct. In addition to that, in the opinion of the authors of the report, the Air Force Commander-in-Chief and the 14th Corps Commander, who had been watching the performance from the VIP lounge, had also failed to act to prevent the accident, as they had had direct radio connection with the ground crew and could have intervened at any moment. 33.  Notwithstanding the aforementioned findings, in the opinion of the authours of the report, the accident had largely resulted from a structural problem. The responsibility for it had to be borne by numerous entities, including the Ministry of Defence, the Air Force Headquarters, the authorities of the 14th Air Force Corps, the Lviv city and regional authorities, and the civil aviation authorities (the Ukraviatrans State Aviation Transport Department and the Ukraerorukh State Company), which had given permission for the aerobatic performance without checking its terms of reference. 34.  In particular, the authors of the report considered that the pilots\u2019 mission had been poorly developed and had not been properly communicated to all parties involved. The mission order approved on 12 July 2002 by Lieutenant-General O.V. of the Air Force Headquarters was at variance with the aircraft specifications. A subsequent explanatory document to the mission order approved by Colonel O.K., the first pilot\u2019s direct supervisor, was inconsistent with these specifications and with the aforementioned mission order. None of these documents specified such important parameters of the mission as engine performance mode, attack angles and acceleration coefficient to be observed during particular manoeuvres. Marginal flight parameters, such as minimum speed and height and maximal attack angle, which had been developed by the 14th Air Force Corps officers, were unsuitable for the performance of most of the manoeuvres which formed part of the event programme. 35.  The authors of the report also criticised the 14th Corps Command for designating too small an aerobatics zone, (2,500x1,600 metres, when 3,514 x2,000 metres would have been required). They noted that it was technically impossible for the pilots to perform their programme within the boundaries of this zone and not to find themselves above the spectators\u2019 heads. 36.  Finally, the report also attributed part of the responsibility for the accident to the local municipal and regional authorities, which had disengaged themselves from any safety-related and emergency-prevention planning as well as to the civil aviation authorities (the Ukraviatrans and Ukraviarukh State agencies) for giving authorisations for the air space to be used in breach of the relevant procedural rules. 37.  On 27 July 2002 the Western Region Military Prosecutor\u2019s Office instituted criminal proceedings to investigate the circumstances of the accident. 38.  On 28 July 2002 the case was transferred for investigation to the General Prosecutor\u2019s Office and assigned to the Deputy Chairman of the Investigation Division of the Chief Department for Military Prosecutors\u2019 Offices. The team of some twenty investigators and other officers from the military prosecutor\u2019s office dedicated to the case was supplemented by nineteen civilian investigative officers from the Lviv Regional Prosecutor\u2019s Office, department of the interior and the State Security Service. The composition of the team was modified on several occasions, each time consisting of both military and civilian officers. 39.  On 4 February 2003 the prosecution commissioned an aviation expert assessment, which was carried out by a group of four Air Force officers in active service, a retired Air Force flight safety specialist and a civilian aviation expert. 40.  On 15 April 2003 the group produced its report, in which it concurred with the earlier findings made by the Special Commission and other entities concerning the principal causes of the accident. As regards the quality of the organisation of the show, the experts found that the pilots\u2019 mission as such had not been incompatible with the SU-27 specifications, and that the size and location of the aerobatics zone had been acceptable. At the same time, in the experts\u2019 view, the organisational flaws had included, among others, a failure on the part of the superior officers to draw up comprehensive documents and guidelines in order for the crew to understand the scope of their mission, and to supervise more closely the execution of orders. 41.  On 30 May 2003 the civilian expert engaged in the above assessment issued a separate opinion in which he stated, inter alia, that in his view the aerobatics zone had been too small; its location had been inherently dangerous and the pilots\u2019 mission order had been incompatible with the SU\u201127 specifications. 42.  On 2 June 2003 the prosecutor\u2019s office solicited an opinion from two other experts, both retired USSR Air Force officers, who at the material time had been on the staff of the Air Force scientific centre for combat application, to clarify the matters in dispute and other questions. 43.  On 11 June 2003 the investigation obtained a conclusion by these two experts, in which they reported of numerous shortcomings in the air show organisation. In addition to the shortcomings pointed in the earlier Special Commission\u2019s report, they concluded that the aerobatics zone was too small; the boundaries of the zone were not clearly marked on site so as to be visible from the aircraft, which factor impaired the pilots\u2019 ability to orient themselves; the location of the aerobatics zone was potentially dangerous in case of any unforeseen situation; the airfield\u2019s preparation for the show was carried out without any account being taken of the possibility of pilot error or any other emergency; the crew did not receive a single mission order defining its mission according to all applicable standards; various documents defining its flight parameters were not comprehensive and not fully consistent with each other; the officers of the flight safety service failed to reveal the above shortcomings; the pilots were allowed to take off without g-suits and their preparedness being checked by any competent authority; the position of \u201cair show flights director\u201d assigned to Major-General A.T., which did not feature in any military training documents, appeared to be redundant; it paralleled that of the ordinary aerodrome flights director, with a lack of clarity as to the distribution of authority between the two officers; neither Major-General A.T. nor Colonel Y.Ya., who directed the flight, had the proper clearance, experience, and qualifications; and there was no assessment of the quality of the first pilot\u2019s piloting technique during the training flight in Ozerne on 24 July 2002. In practice, the pilots\u2019 training was coordinated and supervised only by Colonel O.D., stationed at the Ozerne aerodrome, who had neither the authority nor the qualifications to assess their preparedness. The experts also noted that, regard being had to the army hierarchy, it was for the Air Force Commander-in-Chief to issue an appropriate formal order clearly designating the officers responsible for the mission and determining their personal responsibilities, as well as to bear responsibility for their proper training, since the programme envisaged the involvement of crew members and the use of equipment from various military units. 44.  According to the experts, these and other shortcomings constituted breaches of numerous provisions contained in the relevant regulatory framework, including special military aviation guidelines, in particular: Guidelines for execution of flights for the Ukrainian Air Force, enacted by order no. 249 of the Deputy Minister of Defence on 25 December 1998 (\u041d\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0430\u043d\u043e\u0432\u0430 \u043f\u043e \u0432\u0438\u043a\u043e\u043d\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044e \u043f\u043e\u043b\u044c\u043e\u0442\u0456\u0432 \u0432 \u0430\u0432\u0456\u0430\u0446\u0456\u0457 \u0417\u0431\u0440\u043e\u0439\u043d\u0438\u0445 \u0421\u0438\u043b \u0423\u043a\u0440\u0430\u0457\u043d\u0438, \u041d\u0412\u041f-99); Air Force Navigation Service Guidelines of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, enacted by order no. 54 of the Air Force Commander of Ukraine on 9 November 1992 (\u041d\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0430\u043d\u043e\u0432\u0430 \u043f\u043e \u0448\u0442\u0443\u0440\u043c\u0430\u043d\u0441\u044c\u043a\u0456\u0439 \u0441\u043b\u0443\u0436\u0431\u0456 \u0430\u0432\u0456\u0430\u0446\u0456\u0457 \u0417\u0431\u0440\u043e\u0439\u043d\u0438\u0445 \u0421\u0438\u043b \u0423\u043a\u0440\u0430\u0457\u043d\u0438, \u041d\u0428\u0421-93); General Rules on Flights in Ukrainian Air Space, enacted by order no. 62 of the Air Force Commander of Ukraine on 10 December 1992 (\u041e\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0432\u043d\u0456 \u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u0438\u043b\u0430 \u043f\u043e\u043b\u044c\u043e\u0442\u0456\u0432 \u0443 \u043f\u043e\u0432\u0456\u0442\u0440\u044f\u043d\u043e\u043c\u0443 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0441\u0442\u043e\u0440\u0456 \u0423\u043a\u0440\u0430\u0457\u043d\u0438, \u041e\u041f\u041f-93); Regulation on Prevention of Aviation Incidents in the Ukrainian Air Force, enacted by order no. 210 of the Air Force Commander on 29 October 1999 (\u041f\u043e\u043b\u043e\u0436\u0435\u043d\u043d\u044f \u043f\u0440\u043e \u0437\u0430\u043f\u043e\u0431\u0456\u0433\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044f \u0430\u0432\u0456\u0430\u0446\u0456\u0439\u043d\u0438\u0445 \u043f\u043e\u0434\u0456\u0439 \u0443 \u0412\u0456\u0439\u0441\u044c\u043a\u043e\u0432\u043e-\u041f\u043e\u0432\u0456\u0442\u0440\u044f\u043d\u0438\u0445 \u0421\u0438\u043b\u0430\u0445 \u0423\u043a\u0440\u0430\u0457\u043d\u0438, \u041f\u0417\u0410\u041f-2000), and several others. Similarly to the findings contained in other reports, the experts concluded, in particular, as follows:\n\u201c... One of the reasons for the emergence of the ... incident ... was the existence of significant shortcomings in the ... preparation and staging of the ... air show and lack of clear distribution of duties between the officers ... which, in turn, led to lack of coordination between ... the persons engaged in the preparation, as well as to the absence of effective control over their activity.\u201d\nIf the foregoing normative acts had been unconditionally complied with, the breaches in the organisation of the demonstration flight could have been detected and remedied, and the grave consequences avoided ...\u201d 45.  The investigation ended on 10 August 2004. Ten officers, including both pilots and their ground support crew; the Air Force Commander-in-Chief (O.S.); O.V. and V.A. of the Air Force Headquarters; the Commander of the 14th Corps (S.O.); the 14th corps chief safety officer (A.L.) and the commander of the Air Force unit based in Ozerne (O.D.) were committed for trial. 46.  On an unspecified date in 2004 S.O., previously demoted from his post as 14th Corps Commander, was appointed first deputy Air Force Commander-in-Chief. 47.  On 27 August 2004 the Deputy Prosecutor General disjoined the criminal proceedings against V.S., O.V., V.A. and S.O. and referred their case (hereafter referred to as \u201cthe organisers\u2019 case\u201d) for additional investigation. He found, in particular, that it was necessary to clarify whether there was a causal link between the omissions imputed to those officers and the aircraft crash. 48.  For that purpose, on 24 September 2004 two civilian experts were commissioned to carry out an additional assessment. The four defendants challenged that appointment, alleging that the experts concerned were not competent to evaluate their performance. S.O. proposed six other candidates in their stead. The prosecutor\u2019s office dismissed the challenge to the civilian experts, but agreed to include three of the candidates proposed by S.O. in the group, having found that they were sufficiently independent. It rejected the other three candidates, citing possible conflict of interest in view of their current or former employment with the Air Force Headquarters. Subsequently, two more retired military officers were included in the group, which finally consisted of two civilian experts and five retired military officers. Four of the military officers (including the three candidates proposed by S.O.) were serving at the material time in the faculty of the National Military Academy and the fifth expert was deputy director for flight safety at a military aircraft repair company belonging to the Ministry of Defence. 49.  On 8 February 2005 the five military experts produced a report in which they concluded that all four defendants had duly fulfilled their responsibilities in respect of the organisation of the air show and that none of them had breached any service duty or other applicable provisions. The group also concluded that the applicable legal framework governing the staging of military air shows and the organisation of aerobatic performances had been adequate and sufficient and that there had been no need for the defendants to develop any additional rules or guidelines before the air show. In the group\u2019s view, the misconduct by the first pilot was the sole cause of the accident. Their conclusion, insofar as relevant, read as follows:\n\u201cThe only reason for the crash of the SU-27 aircraft was the execution by the pilot of an unplanned piloting manoeuvre, in the course of which he committed grave errors in piloting technique, which caused the falling of the aircraft and the catastrophic consequences.\u201d 50.  On 11 May 2005 the two civilian experts also produced a report, which largely replicated the findings and the language of the report issued by their military counterparts. 51.  In the meantime, on an unspecified date, the case in respect of the pilots, the ground crew and two other officers of the lower rank (hereafter the \u201cperformers\u2019 case\u201d) was transferred to the court for trial. 52.  During the trial, the defendants pleaded innocent of any wrongdoing. In particular, Major-General A.T. noted that there had been no normative document defining the responsibilities of an \u201cair show flights director\u201d. Having been appointed to this position created by order of the 14th Corps Commander, he had developed his own reference document listing his duties for the Commander\u2019s approval and had done his best in performing them. In his opinion, the appointment could not have made him responsible for direct supervision of the pilots\u2019 training at a different airfield and ensuring their readiness, as neither of them had belonged to the 14th Corps or been placed under his command. He considered that regard being had to their position in the military hierarchy, the pilots had to report directly to the Air Force Commander-in-Chief. 53.  Colonel A.L. of the 14th Corps flight safety service likewise asserted that he had properly performed his service duties and had prepared sufficient documentation concerning flight safety during the air show. He had submitted the relevant documents for review by 14th Corps Command as well as by the relevant sectors in the Air Force Headquarters, and had not received any negative feedback. Colonel A.L. further admitted that he had never personally instructed the pilots on the safety measures and had never checked on their readiness for the flight. In his view, such responsibilities fell outside his authority and had to be carried out by the pilots\u2019 direct superiors, who did not belong to the 14th Corps. 54.  Lieutenant-Colonel Y.Ya., the aerobatic performance director, asserted that, having been informed of the size and boundaries of the aerobatics zone on 24 July 2002, he had warned Major-General A.T. and the pilots of his doubts concerning its safety. However, having been told that the relevant parameters had been approved by the higher command and it was too late to change anything, he had executed the orders of his superiors and directed the flight as best he could. 55.  Colonel V.T. (the first pilot) alleged, in particular, that during the flight the aircraft had become uncontrollable due to forces beyond his control. He denied an accusation that he had deviated from his mission order, and submitted that in his view the way to perform the disputed manoeuvre was a matter for the pilot\u2019s discretion, particularly as his mission order had no specific instructions to this end. Moreover, prior to the flight, he had discussed the disputed manoeuvre with Colonel Y.Y. (the second pilot), who he had considered to be the crew captain, as he was higher in the military hierarchy, and the latter had no objections to his choice. Colonel V.T. also noted that the documents defining his mission had not defined the boundaries of the aerobatics zone. He had been taken by surprise when he saw on arrival on site that the spectators were to the left of the runway, as according to his orders, his manoeuvres were also to be carried out to the left. In any event, he considered himself obliged to carry out his orders without arguing. 56.  Colonel Y.Y. (the second pilot) submitted that he had considered the first pilot to be the crew captain and that he himself was obliged to refrain from interfering with his actions. He concurred with the first pilot that the way to execute the disputed manoeuvre, which was not specified in the mission order, was a matter for the pilot\u2019s discretion. 57.  On 23 June 2005 the Central Region Military Court of Appeal, sitting in a panel consisting of three military judges and acting as a first-instance court, found both pilots, the air show flights director and the aerobatic performance director guilty of breaches of flight regulations within the meaning of Article 416 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (\u201cthe CCU\u201d) and sentenced them to fourteen, eight, six and five years\u2019 imprisonment respectively. It further found the chief of the 14th Corps flight safety service guilty of having a negligent attitude towards military service within the meaning of Article 425 paragraph 2 of the CCU, and sentenced him to four years\u2019 imprisonment, suspended, with probation. By way of reasoning, the court referred extensively to the relevant findings of the Special Commission and the aviation experts\u2019 assessment of 11 June 2003 (see paragraphs 20-22 and 43-44 above) in so far as they related to the actions of the above officers, as well as described the overall shortcomings in organising the show. 58.  The sixth defendant, Colonel O.D., who had coordinated V.T.\u2019s and Y.Y.\u2019s training programme in Ozerne and supplied the aircraft for the show, was found to have performed his duties in good faith and acquitted. 59.  On 2 March 2006 the Military Panel of the Supreme Court of Ukraine upheld this judgment on appeal and it became final. 60.  In the meantime, on an unspecified date the General Prosecutor\u2019s Office decided to continue with the \u201corganisers\u2019 case\u201d, having disagreed with the expert conclusions of 8 February and 11 May 2005, and on 25 January 2006 suspended S.O.\u2019s authority as the Deputy Air Force Commander. 61.  On 11 January 2008 the defendants in this case were committed for trial on charges of having a negligent attitude towards military service within the meaning of Article 425 paragraph 2 of the CCU. O.V. and V.A. were additionally charged with breaches of flight regulations within the meaning of Article 416 of the CCU. Finally, V.S. and S.O. were additionally charged with exceeding their authority within the meaning of Article 424 paragraph 3 of the CCU by inappropriately using State funds for a celebration of a bogus memorial date and staging aerobatic performances in the absence of an appropriate regulatory framework. 62.  On 11 June 2008 the Central Region Military Court of Appeal, sitting in a panel of three military judges and acting as a first-instance court, acquitted all four defendants of the above charges, largely relying on the expert conclusions of 8 February and 11 May 2005. It found that the provisions of Article 416 of the CCU did not apply to O.V. and V.A., as they had not operated the flight and had not been directly involved in its preparation. Other charges were dismissed as unsubstantiated. In particular, all the defendants were found to have carried out their service duties properly. The court noted that they had taken numerous measures to ensure proper organisation of the show and had produced a large volume of documents correctly delegating tasks to different officers. They had also reasonably trusted the pilots, the supporting crew and other officers to carry out the tasks assigned to them. No legal act could be interpreted as conferring on the defendants a different range of duties or imposing an obligation to act in a different manner. The relevant allegations of the prosecution, as well as the conclusions of the Special Commission and the expert findings dated 11 June 2003 in respect of the defendants were incorrect, being based partly on an overly broad interpretation of the applicable legal provisions and partly on references to provisions that were wrongly applied in the context. The court did not refer to the internal investigation of the Ministry of Defence in its judgment. The relevant excerpts of the court judgment read as follows:\n\u201c... the members of the [Special Commission] concluded that the immediate cause of the catastrophe ... derived from mistakes in the piloting technique ... outside the designated aerobatics zone ... The same conclusion was adopted by the court, which examined the criminal case concerning [V.T.] and others. All other circumstances connected to the organisation of the show in the court\u2019s view did not in any way affect the wrongdoings by [the first pilot] and, moreover, they could not have been foreseen or taken into account by the organisers of the show ...\n... As far as the size of the aerobatics zone was concerned, which, according to the experts, was insufficient for the performance of the mission ... this breach was not the cause of the catastrophic situation, since the SU-27 aircraft was practically never within its boundaries ...\nReports on the crew\u2019s readiness for the flight were produced properly, and it was following their receipt that [V.S.] as well as [S.O.] gave permission for the flight to go ahead;\nThe decision to hold the show was taken by the 14th Air Force Corps Commander [S.O.]: this decision was coordinated by him with the Air Force Commander-in-Chief [V.S.], and they acted within the scope of their authority. With a view to preparation of the festivities and organisation of the flight by SU-27, the 14th Corps Command jointly with the Air Force Headquarters took a number of relevant measures: orders were issued; show plans were drafted; agendas were put in place; and air and static display schemes were developed ... The 14th Corps Commander performed his duties with respect to the preparation of the show in accordance with the applicable law, having properly distributed duties among his subordinates ... Issues concerning preparation of the show and supervision over the performance of the delegated tasks were discussed at meetings organised by [S.O.] ...\nThe court\u2019s conclusions ... are also not affected by the cancellation of the [on-site] ... rehearsal flight ... In the court\u2019s view, this fact did not affect the cause of the disaster, which was deviation by [V.T.] from his mission ...\u201d 63.  The Prosecutor\u2019s Office and numerous injured parties appealed against this verdict before the Military Panel of the Supreme Court. In its appeal, the prosecution asserted, in particular, that the preparation for the show was based exclusively on the military training documents, which took no account of the specifics of an aerobatic performance involving civilian spectators. Lacking a body of relevant legislation and regulations, the Air Force Command had been obliged to develop specific documents adapting the military training rules for this purpose before planning the show. As an aerobatics performance could not be equated to an ordinary military training flight, a special training programme had to be set up, and the crew had to have special clearance. However, the reports by the Special Commission, the Ministry of Defence and the aviation experts indicated that not only did the defendants fail to act in developing relevant rules and regulations, but they also failed to supervise compliance with the existing general rules. The court\u2019s findings were at odds with the findings by these authorities, and no justification was provided for them. Moreover, they were inconsistent with the court\u2019s own position adopted in the judgment of 23 June 2005, where it heavily relied on the conclusions of the Special Commission and the aviation expert assessment in examining various aspects of the case and had referred to the relevant findings concerning poor organisation of the show in its reasoning. 64.  On 22 October 2008 the Military Panel of the Supreme Court of Ukraine rejected the appeals and upheld the acquittals. 65.  On 25 April 2003 the applicants lodged civil actions within the aforementioned criminal proceedings against the military officers, claiming damages for the deaths of the Mykhayliv family from the Ministry of Defence. The first applicant claimed 36,000,000 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH) in compensation for non-pecuniary damage for the deaths of her daughter, granddaughters and son-in-law; the second applicant claimed UAH 2,000 in compensation for pecuniary damage and UAH 6,000,000 for non-pecuniary damage for the deaths of her niece and her family; the third applicant claimed UAH 1,000 for pecuniary damage and UAH 3,000,000 for non\u2011pecuniary damage for the deaths of her cousin and her family; and the fourth applicant claimed UAH 6,000,000 in compensation for non\u2011pecuniary damage for the deaths of her granddaughter and her family. 66.  On 23 June 2005, when pronouncing the verdict in the \u201cperformers\u2019 case\u201d, the court ruled on the applicants\u2019 civil claims and awarded the pecuniary damages claimed by the second and third applicants in full. It further awarded UAH 220,000[1] in non-pecuniary damages to the first applicant and UAH 60,000[2] under this head to each of the other applicants. 67.  On 2 March 2006 the Military Panel of the Supreme Court rejected the applicants\u2019 appeals, in which they claimed higher compensation. 68.  On 21 and 31 August, 18 October and 29 November 2006 the first, fourth, third and second applicants, respectively, obtained the judgment awards due to them. 69.  On various dates the applicants also brought further civil actions against the Ministry of Defence in the \u201corganisers\u2019 case\u201d. 70.  On 22 October 2008 the Supreme Court left these claims unexamined, regard being had to the acquittals of the defendants. 71.  On 27 July 2002 the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine allocated 10,000,000[3] Ukrainian hryvnias from the State reserve fund to the Lviv Regional State Administration towards liquidating the consequences of the accident (Decree no. 1085). 72.  On 29 July 2002 the Regional Administration created a commission to deal with distribution of the above funds, and determined the categories of expenses to be covered (Decree no. 718). According to the Administration\u2019s decision, UAH 5,485,000 was to be distributed to the families of the deceased. The sums were to be disbursed to spouses, children, parents and dependents of the deceased victims, in amounts ranging from UAH 20,000 to UAH 40,000 depending on the family circumstances. The decree further allocated a total of UAH 2,075,000 to the surviving victims; UAH 500,000 to help the families with arranging funerals and providing gravestones; UAH 180,000 towards medical and rehabilitation costs; UAH 553,000 towards prosthetic care and relevant rehabilitation expenses, and the remaining funds to other categories of expenses. According to the Government, the relevant funds were disbursed to the addressees before the end of 2002. 73.  On 3 September 2002 the Parliament of Ukraine decided to transfer one day\u2019s salary of each Member of Parliament, with their consent, to the benefit of the Sknyliv accident victims. 74.  On 27 November 2002 the Lviv City Council\u2019s Executive Committee decided how to distribute the UAH 849,475 received by the municipality in charitable donations (Decree no. 522). According to this decision, UAH 202,475 of these funds were to be distributed to the families of the deceased; UAH 405,000 to those with serious irreversible health damage; UAH 121,492 to those with serious injuries and who were receiving in-patient treatment; UAH 80,520 to those with injuries of medium seriousness and who were receiving in-patient treatment, and UAH 39,970 to those receiving outpatient treatment. 75.  On various other occasions the authorities took additional decisions allocating financial and other assistance to various categories of the victims (such as decrees no. 730 of 15 August 2003, no. 1078 of 5 December 2003, and no. 221 of 5 March 2004 by Lviv City Council, Decree no. 328 of 19 July 2012 by the Lviv Mayor, and others). Pursuant to these decisions, further funds were allocated for medical check-ups and rehabilitation procedures, to cover the costs of holidays in recreational facilities for children, and for lump-sum payments to victims of the accident. 76.  The first applicant received UAH 47,690[4] in various payments from the State under the above programmes. The first, second and fourth applicants also received UAH 40,270[5], UAH 6,000[6] and UAH 4,000[7] respectively from State-managed private charitable donations raised in aid to the victims. 77.  The parents of Mr Mykhayliv were paid UAH 68,000[8] in State aid in connection with the deaths of their son and granddaughters. They received a further amount of UAH 60,000[9] from State-managed charitable donations. It appears from the evidence available that Mrs Mykhayliv\u2019s in-laws did not lodge any civil claims within the criminal proceedings.", "references": ["3", "6", "5", "7", "1", "8", "4", "9", "2", "0", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicants were born in 1973 and 1975 respectively and live in P. 7.  The applicants lived with their parents in A, Croatia. In August 1991 the first applicant joined the Croatian Army and left his home, and in November 1991 the second applicant went to live in Germany. 8.  In the second half of November 1991 the Yugoslav People\u2019s Army, together with Serbian paramilitary forces, gained control of A, which thus became a part of the \u201cSerbian Autonomous Region of Krajina\u201d (hereinafter \u201cthe Krajina\u201d). 9.  On 6 January 1992 two unknown men took the applicants\u2019 parents, S.C. and P.C., from their home in A. On 7 January 1992 the bodies of the applicants\u2019 parents were driven by municipal employees in a truck to the front of their house. The applicants\u2019 uncle was called and he gave the municipal employees clothes for the burial of the applicants\u2019 parents. 10.  On 7 January 1992 the A police carried out a search of a flat occupied by X in A and found an automatic gun, a hand gun and some bullets. 11.  On 7 January 1992 the A police interviewed police officers R.B., M.S., D.J., V.K., M.T., D.K. and M.M. The police officers, apart from R.B., had been on duty at a checkpoint in R. Street in A between 7 p.m. on 6 January 1992 and 7 a.m. on 7 January 1992. 12.  R.B. said that on 6 January 1992 at about 7 p.m. police officer X had asked him, R.B., as his hierarchical superior, for permission to take a short leave of absence. He, R.B., had granted the request. R.B. did not know when X had returned to duty at the police station, but thought that he had seen him between 11 p.m. and midnight that same evening. 13.  M.S. said that at about 8 p.m. on 6 January 1992 a vehicle had approached the checkpoint and D.J. had stopped it. At that time he, M.S., had been in the barracks. D.J. and D.K. had entered and asked him if he knew a police officer with a birthmark on his face or a Volkswagen vehicle with the number 44 as the last digits on its registration plates, which he did not. At about 10 p.m. the same day, however, he stopped a Volkswagen vehicle which had 44 as the last two digits on its registration plates. The vehicle was driven by police officer X, who was known personally to M.S., D.J. and D.K. confirmed that it was the same vehicle which had passed from the opposite direction at about 8 p.m. 14.  D.J. said that at about 8.10 p.m. on 6 January 1992 a vehicle of Volkswagen make had approached the checkpoint and that he had stopped it. The driver had been dressed in the uniform of the civil police. D.J.\u2019s attention had been diverted by a vehicle which had come from the opposite direction and he had stopped it. At that moment the Volkswagen had suddenly started up and left in the direction of K. D.K. told him that he had not had the time to fully examine the vehicle but that he had seen that the driver and the person in the front passenger seat were dressed in the uniforms of the civil police. He had also seen two civilians in the back seat, a man and a woman. D.K. noted down the registration number of that vehicle. At about 11 p.m. the same day police officer M.S. stopped a vehicle which had arrived from the direction of K and asked the other police officers on duty whether it was the same vehicle they had stopped at about 8 p.m., which D.J. confirmed. The only occupants were the driver and the person in the front passenger seat. D.J. asked them who the other passengers had been and where they had taken them. The driver said that the passengers had been S.C. and P.C. and that they had left them in a village. 15.  M.T. and D.K. confirmed the above events. 16.  On 8 January 1992 the A police interviewed X and Y, two police officers. They both admitted that on 6 January 1992 they had taken S.C. and P.C. in X\u2019s vehicle. On the outskirts of A the police had stopped them. However, the attention of the police had been diverted by another vehicle and X and Y had quickly driven away. They had taken S.C. and P.C. to the village of J. X said that there they had taken S.C. and P.C. out of the vehicle and started walking. He had been carrying an automatic gun and at one point S.C. had attempted to take it from him, resulting in a commotion in which the weapon had fired and killed S.C. After that Y had shot and killed P.C. Y said that X had killed S.C. when they had arrived in J and then forced him, Y, to kill P.C. 17.  On 9 January 1992 the A police lodged a criminal complaint with the B public prosecutor against X and Y, alleging that on 6 January 1992 at 10.30 p.m. in J, a village near the town of A, they had killed S.C. and P.C. They had first driven the victims in X\u2019s vehicle to J and taken them out of the vehicle. X had then killed S.C. with an automatic gun and Y had killed P.C. with a hand gun. 18. On 28 January 1992 the B County Court opened an investigation in respect of X and Y on suspicion of killing S.C. and P.C. 19. On 13 April 1992 an investigating judge of the B County Court commissioned a ballistics report. 20.  In August 1995 the Croatian authorities regained control of the town of A. In 1996 the United Nations Security Council established the United Nations Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (\u201cUNTAES\u201d). On 15 January 1998 the UNTAES mandate came to an end and the transfer of power to the Croatian authorities began. 21.  On 16 April 1996 the A police interviewed M.C., the brother of the late S.C., who told them that his brother and his brother\u2019s wife had been killed on 6 January 1992. Their bodies had been given to him by the police of the \u201cSerbian Autonomous Region of Krajina\u201d and he had been allowed to bury them. 22.  On 19 September 2000 the C police interviewed M.M., who said that on 6 January 1992 he had been on duty, together with M.B., at the entrance to village J. At about 9 p.m. he and M.M. had been walking towards a ramp by the barracks where all patrols had their meeting point and had heard a vehicle being driven, followed by several gun shots and then a vehicle starting up again. When they arrived at the meeting point they found Lj.\u010c., D.J. and M.P. there, who told them that \u201ctwo fools [had] just brought two people in a car and killed them by the road.\u201d None of the officers on patrol dared go to the crime scene. Soon they all went home. In the morning of 7 January 1992 the police from A came to M.M.\u2019s house and took him to A police station, where they interviewed him and told him that X and his friend had killed S.C. and his wife. He had heard that X had moved to Bosnia and Herzegovina. 23.  On 21 September 2000 the C police interviewed the applicants, who had learned from B.\u017d., who lived with their parents during the relevant period, that X and Y had been charged with the killing of the applicants\u2019 parents. 24.  On 4 January 2001 an investigating judge of the C County Court (\u017dupanijski sud u C) ordered an investigation concerning X and Y, who were not available to the Croatian authorities, on suspicion of killing S.C. and P.C. An international arrest warrant was also issued against the suspects, who had absconded. 25.  On 8 February 2002 the Ministry of the Interior asked the Ministry of Justice whether extradition proceedings would be instituted against the suspects. 26.  On 14 January 2005 Interpol in Washington informed the Croatian authorities that the Department of Homeland Security in Cleveland, Ohio, had a valid location for Y. On 19 January 2005 the Ministry of the Interior informed the Ministry of Justice, asking the latter to institute proceedings for Y\u2019s extradition. On 20 January 2004 the Ministry of Justice asked the C County Court for the relevant documents with a view to seeking Y\u2019s extradition from the United States authorities. All the evidence from the case file was translated into English and on 11 January 2006 the Ministry of Justice sent a \u201crequest for [Y\u2019s] temporary arrest\u201d to the US Department of Justice through diplomatic channels. 27.  On 10 January 2007 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the Ministry of Justice that the US Department of Justice had requested some additional documents. On 10 May 2007 the C County Court sent the requested information and documents to the Ministry of Justice. 28.  It appears that on 12 and 13 February 2008 the Croatian and US authorities held consultations in Zagreb in connection with the extradition of Y. 29.  On 8 April 2008 the C County State Attorney\u2019s Office again asked the Ministry of Justice to seek Y\u2019s extradition. On 17 June 2008 the Ministry of Justice sent additional documents to the US Department of Justice in connection with Y\u2019s extradition. 30.  In April 2009 the US Department of Homeland Security asked the Croatian Ministry of Justice for legal assistance in connection with the criminal investigation pending against Y in the United States on charges of attempted procurement of United States citizenship by fraud, and fraud and misuse of visas, permits and other official documents. They asked for all documents related to any criminal offences Y might have committed. This request was forwarded to the State Attorney\u2019s Office on 7 January 2013. 31.  On 26 March 2014 the State Attorney\u2019s Office forwarded the requested documents, translated into English, to the US Department of Homeland Security. 32.  In 2002 the Ministry of Justice agreed that an international arrest warrant should be issued in respect of X. 33.  On 2 January 2008 an investigating judge of the C County Court asked the competent court in Serbia to hear evidence from X in connection with the killing of S.C. and P.C. On 28 July 2008 the Serbian authorities asked for a certified translation of that request and all relevant documents into the Serbian language. 34.  On 13 August 2008 the Croatian Ministry of Justice sent a note to the Serbian Ministry of Justice to the effect that, according to an agreement between the two States, each State party had the right to communicate in its own language and to submit documents in that language without the need for translations. 35.  On 18 February 2009 the Serbian authorities heard evidence from X. He said that the criminal proceedings against him and Y for the murder of S.C. and P.C. had been instituted in 1992 in the B Municipal Court and that they had been acquitted. He also denied any involvement in the killing of S.C. and P.C. On 3 March 2009 his statement was forwarded to the Croatian authorities. 36.  On 16 March 2006 the applicants brought a civil action against the State in the C Municipal Court (Op\u0107inski sud u C), seeking non-pecuniary damages in the amount of 500,000 Croatian kuna (HRK) each (about 65,500 euros (EUR)), in connection with the killing of their parents. They relied on sections 1 and 2 of the 2003 Liability Act. 37.  On 9 March 2007 the C Municipal Court granted the applicants\u2019 claim and awarded them each HRK 300,000 (about EUR 40,000), finding that the killing of the applicants\u2019 parents had been an act of terror. This judgment was reversed by the C County Court on 3 December 2009. The applicants were also ordered to pay the State HRK 52,500 (about EUR 6,800) in costs, comprising the fees chargeable for the State\u2019s representation by the State Attorney\u2019s Office. The relevant part of that judgment reads as follows:\n\u201cThe plaintiffs in the first-instance proceedings based their claim for damages on the provisions of the 2003 Liability Act .... It is necessary to point to the content of section 3 of that Act, which provides that the obligation to compensate for damage exists irrespective of whether the person responsible has been identified, criminally prosecuted or found guilty. However, having regard to the correct establishment of the facts by the first-instance court, which found that the events at issue had occurred on 7 January 1992 in the village of J, in the then occupied territory of the Republic of Croatia which at that time was under the control of illegal formations of the \u201cSerbian Republic of Krajina\u201d and outside the control of the Republic of Croatia and its lawful bodies, the appellant\u2019s submission that [the killing of the plaintiffs\u2019 parents] ... amounted to war-related damage is well-founded.\nSection 2 of the Act on the Assessment of War-related Damage ... provides that war-related damage is damage caused by enemy or illegal groups, or legal bodies of the Republic of Croatia, as well as accomplices of these groups and bodies, where that damage occurred directly or indirectly at the time specified in section 1 of that Act (from 15 August 1990 until the end of hostilities and war operations conducted against the Republic of Croatia). Therefore, given the nature, place and time of the events at issue (the killing of innocent civilians in the occupied territory of the Republic of Croatia during the Homeland war), it is to be concluded that the events at issue are to be legally classified as war-related damage and that the appellant is not responsible for them or for the damage thus caused.\n...\u201d 38.  This judgment was upheld by the Supreme Court on 19 June 2012. The court endorsed the County Court\u2019s finding that the killing of the applicants\u2019 parents amounted to war-related damage and added, in so far as relevant, the following:\n\u201cEven though the act giving rise to the plaintiffs\u2019 claim for damages presents certain similarities with a terrorist act since [both] imply [an act of] violence, the act of damage [in the present case] differs significantly from terrorist acts in its features since it contains additional elements and amounts to war-related damage for which the defendant is not liable. This is because the damage did not occur in the territory under the de facto sovereignty of the Republic of Croatia but in the then occupied territory, where there was no possibility for lawful action by the bodies of the Republic of Croatia; this circumstance excludes the otherwise objective liability of the defendant. Furthermore, the act of damage in the present case was not carried out with the sole aim of seriously disturbing public order (this being the aim characteristic of an act of terror) but also involved the use of force, killing and expulsion of the civilian population on that territory with the aim of destroying the internal security and stability of the Republic of Croatia and preventing its lawful bodies from functioning.\n...\u201d 39.  On 1 February 2013 the applicants lodged a constitutional complaint. They argued, inter alia, that in a number of its previous judgments the Supreme Court had recognised the plaintiffs\u2019 right to compensation for damage caused by death during the Homeland War in Croatia, and cited seven judgments of that court adopted between 2006 and 2010 (see paragraph 52 below). The constitutional complaint was dismissed on 9 May 2013.", "references": ["6", "1", "4", "0", "5", "8", "2", "7", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1970 and lives in Gaziantep. 5.  In 2010 the applicant and his family left Uzbekistan to escape the oppression they faced on account of their religious beliefs. After spending some time in Kazakhstan, in 2010 they entered Turkey by legal means. 6.  Subsequent to their arrival in Turkey, the applicant and his wife made a request for asylum. The applicant\u2019s wife was granted a residence permit in the city of Gaziantep pending her asylum request, but the applicant was not able to obtain one as he could not pay the requisite fee for the permit. The applicant, therefore, resided illegally in Gaziantep. 7.   On 5 April 2011 the applicant and his family travelled from Turkey to Ukraine to seek medical treatment for his wife. The applicant was subjected to a fine of 900 Turkish liras (TRY) by the Turkish border police on account of his illegal residence in Turkey. He was also banned from entering the country for five years. 8.  On 4 May 2012 the applicant and his family attempted to re-enter Turkey through Sabiha G\u00f6k\u00e7en Airport in Istanbul. The applicant, however, was not permitted entry, and he was placed in the detention facility at the airport for \u201cinadmissible passengers\u201d pending his repatriation to Ukraine. 9.  On 5 May 2012 the applicant lodged an objection to his repatriation and lodged a new asylum request. 10.  On 13 May 2012 the Ministry of the Interior (\u201cthe Ministry\u201d) requested the offices of the Istanbul and Gaziantep governors to notify the applicant that he would be accommodated at the airport detention facility pending a decision on his asylum request. According to a note dated 21 May 2012 addressed by the Istanbul governor\u2019s office to the Ministry, the applicant was notified as requested. The note did not, however, indicate when the relevant notification had been made. 11.  On 30 May 2012 the Ministry rejected the applicant\u2019s asylum request. The applicant was notified of this decision on 31 May 2012. He was also informed on that date that he could lodge an objection to the Ministry\u2019s decision within seventy-two hours, that he would be deported in the event of the dismissal of his objection and that he would continue to be accommodated in the airport detention facility in the meantime. 12.  On 1 June 2012 the applicant lodged an objection to the Ministry\u2019s decision. 13.  On 10 July 2012 the applicant was transferred from Sabiha G\u00f6k\u00e7en Airport to the Kumkap\u0131 Foreigners\u2019 Removal Centre in Istanbul (\u201cthe Kumkap\u0131 Removal Centre\u201d). 14.  The applicant was kept in the Kumkap\u0131 Removal Centre until 15 August 2012. On that date, he was granted a temporary residence permit pending his asylum request. 15.  There is no information in the case file regarding the outcome of the applicant\u2019s asylum request. 16.  The applicant claimed that the detention facility at Sabiha G\u00f6k\u00e7en Airport where he had been kept for sixty-eight days between 4 May and 10 July 2012 had been a room of about 20 square metres and that, while the numbers had fluctuated, the room had accommodated up to fifteen people at times. There had been no furniture in the room suitable for sleeping on, but only five chaises longues, which had been impossible to rest on. The applicant further claimed that throughout his detention, he had not been allowed to leave that room, nor had he had any contact with the outside world, including with a lawyer. He had also been denied any access to natural light and fresh air, as the room in question had had no windows. According to the applicant, the detention facility had been designed for holding inadmissible passengers for short periods and had been unsuitable for long-term detention. All other passengers in his situation had either been released or repatriated after one or two days of detention at most.\n(b)  Kumkap\u0131 Removal Centre 17.  The applicant claimed that the Kumkap\u0131 Removal Centre had been severely overcrowded at the time of his detention. He had had to share a dormitory room of approximately 35 square metres with thirty to forty-five other people, who had been provided with only fifteen bunk beds to sleep on. He had had to spend all his time in that humid and smoke-filled room without being able to engage in any social activities and had not been allowed access to outdoor exercise throughout his detention. The applicant further alleged that the overcrowding of the removal centre had led to hygiene problems. The building had been infested with insects and there had been frequent outbreaks of contagious diseases. The quality and quantity of the food provided had also been fairly poor. 18.  The Government claimed that the room in which the applicant had been held at Sabiha G\u00f6k\u00e7en Airport had measured 53.73 square metres. The room had been equipped with five beds for men, as well as a ventilation system, a television, a toilet and a shower. The room had had a padded sitting area for rest and sleep, and had been cleaned every day. The Government submitted that during the applicant\u2019s stay between 4 May and 10 July 2012, the number of detainees had never exceeded five. They did not, however, submit any documents in support of that submission, such as a list of the detainees kept in the detention facility during the relevant period. Nor did they submit any photographs of the detention facility, despite the Court\u2019s request to that effect.\n(b)  Kumkap\u0131 Removal Centre 19.  The Government stated that the Kumkap\u0131 Removal Centre\u2019s capacity had been reduced from 560 to 300, in line with recommendations made by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (\u201cthe CPT\u201d), following its visit in June 2009. Accordingly, the number of detainees during the period of the applicant\u2019s detention had never exceeded 300. They did not, however, submit the registers recording the occupation rates during the period in question. 20.  The Government stated that the detainees had been accommodated on three floors at the removal centre: the first two floors had been reserved for male detainees, and the third floor for females. The information provided as to the number and size of the rooms was, however, inconsistent. While the Government claimed in their observations that there had been five dormitory rooms on each floor, measuring 50, 69, 76 and 84 square metres respectively, the information note prepared by the Ministry and appended to their observations indicated that there had been only four rooms on the first floor, measuring 50, 58, 76 and 84 square metres, and five rooms on both the second and third floors, measuring 50, 58, 69, 76 and 84 square metres. The Government stated that they were not able to provide information as to the exact number of people that the applicant had shared a room with, because detainees had been left to make their own choice of rooms. They submitted, however, that there had been fifteen to twenty beds in each room. 21.  The Government further submitted that there had been a cafeteria measuring 69 square metres on each floor, where breakfast, lunch and dinner had been served daily. The detainees had had the right to outdoor exercise in suitable weather conditions, as well as the right to engage in sports and watch television. The detainees had had access to medical care in cases of emergency and a doctor had visited the removal centre once a week. As for hygiene standards in the facility, there had been six cleaning staff working full time at the removal centre, and the building had been disinfected at certain times. 22.  In support of their claims, the Government submitted, inter alia, photographs of two of the dormitory rooms, both of which appeared well-lit and fairly clean, as well as of the hallway and the cafeteria on one of the floors reserved for male detainees. Although the total number of beds cannot be ascertained from the photos, it can be determined that there were at least twenty\u2011two beds (that is to say eleven bunk beds) in both rooms. It is further observed that there were two rows of bunk beds positioned against the walls in both rooms, leaving a narrow corridor in the middle of the room. While some of the bunks were touching each other, others were separated by big metal lockers. No other furniture, such as tables and chairs, was present in the rooms; there were blankets on the beds in only one of the rooms and the other room had no bedding at all. A television was available on each floor in the cafeteria. Moreover, a metal sit\u2011up bench and an exercise bike were shown in the photograph of the hallway. No photos of the toilets or the showers were provided. 23.  The Government also submitted an outdoor photo of some detainees in the removal centre\u2019s courtyard. There were no men amongst these detainees \u2013 only women and children.", "references": ["8", "5", "3", "7", "9", "4", "0", "6", "No Label", "1", "2"], "gold": ["1", "2"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1972. He was detained at the Gaziantep Foreigners\u2019 Removal Centre (\u201cthe Gaziantep Removal Centre\u201d) at the time of the events giving rise to this application. His current address is unknown. 6.  In 2000 the applicant fled to Turkey because he was being searched for by the Russian authorities. It appears that shortly before his escape, he had lost his right leg in a bomb attack that struck a mosque in Chechnya. 7.  Subsequent to his departure from Russia, criminal proceedings were brought against the applicant by the Russian authorities before the Cerkessk City Court on the following charges: (i) participation in an armed insurrection and membership of an armed organisation with the purpose of overthrowing the constitutional order and violating the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation and (ii) possessing firearms and ammunition. It appears that the Cerkessk City Court issued a detention order in respect of the applicant in his absence. 8.  On 24 January 2008 the applicant was taken into police custody in Istanbul in the context of an operation against al-Qaeda. He was subsequently taken to Gaziantep, where he was placed in pre-trial detention at the Gaziantep H-Type Prison upon the order of the Gaziantep Magistrate\u2019s Court. 9.  On an unspecified date criminal proceedings were commenced against the applicant before the Adana Assize Court. 10.  On 28 January 2009 the Adana Assize Court ordered the applicant\u2019s release from the Gaziantep H-Type Prison. There is no further information in the case file as regards the outcome of the criminal proceedings. 11.  Following his release from prison on 28 January 2009, the applicant was placed in detention at the Gaziantep Removal Centre, which is attached to the Gaziantep Security Directorate. 12.  On an unspecified date the Russian authorities requested the extradition of the applicant. On 3 April 2009 the Gaziantep Assize Court refused that request, holding that the offences in question were of a political nature and that under international and national laws, alleged perpetrators of such offences could not be extradited. 13.  On 23 October 2009 the applicant applied to the Gaziantep governor\u2019s office with a request for asylum. On 26 April 2010 the applicant was notified that his request had been rejected. 14.  In the meantime, on 8 April 2010 the applicant submitted a petition to the Ministry of the Interior (\u201cthe Ministry\u201d), where he requested to be released and to be granted a residence permit. The applicant\u2019s requests were dismissed by the Ministry. The applicant\u2019s objection to that decision was further dismissed by the Ministry on 10 June 2010. 15.  On 24 July 2010 the applicant was released from the Gaziantep Removal Centre, on the condition that he leave Turkey within fifteen days. It appears that the applicant left Turkey shortly after his release. 16.  According to the information in the case file, the applicant met with his lawyer a total of nine times between 3 March 2009 and 27 July 2010 during his detention at the Gaziantep Removal Centre.", "references": ["0", "9", "7", "8", "3", "4", "5", "1", "6", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1967 and lives in Stari Bar, Montenegro. At the relevant time he was a professional basketball player. 6.  On 9 July 1997 the applicant brought a claim against the basketball club for which he had been playing, Vojvodina BFC (Ko\u0161arkaski klub Vojvodina BFC), based in Novi Sad. The club had the status of a citizens\u2019 association. 7.  On 17 February 1998 the Novi Sad Municipal Court (hereinafter \u201cthe Municipal Court\u201d) ruled in favour of the applicant, ordering Vojvodina BFC (hereinafter \u201cthe debtor\u201d) to pay him, within fifteen days, the sum of 110,550 dinars (RSD \u2013 approximately 10,000 euros (EUR) at the time) and RSD 8,500 (approximately EUR 730) in costs, together with statutory interest. The judgment became final on an unspecified date in 1998. 8.  Following a request by the applicant on 15 October 1998 for enforcement, on 19 October 1998 the Municipal Court issued an enforcement order. 9.  On 25 December 1998 the applicant informed the court that the debtor did not have sufficient funds in its bank account and proposed that the judgment be enforced by the sale of the debtor\u2019s immovable assets situated on the premises of the Vojvodina Sports and Business Centre. On 17 March 1999 an enforcement order to that effect was issued. 10.  In the meantime, a new basketball club, NIS-Vojvodina, was formed. 11.  On 25 December 2002 the Central Bank in Novi Sad informed the court that the debtor\u2019s bank account had been frozen. 12.  On 14 March 2003 the applicant informed the court of another bank account in the debtor\u2019s name. On 9 May 2003 he asked the court not to carry out the enforcement by sale of the debtor\u2019s immovable assets as he had asked previously, because it appeared that assets did not belong to the debtor, but to the basketball club NIS-Vojvodina. 13.  On 12 May 2003 the Municipal Court ordered enforcement in accordance with the applicant\u2019s request of 14 March 2003. 14.  On 25 June 2003 the Central Bank in Novi Sad informed the court that the account details the applicant had provided did not concern the debtor but the basketball club NIS-Vojvodina, and that the debtor\u2019s account was still frozen. 15.  On 14 July 2003 NIS-Vojvodina appealed against the enforcement order of 12 May 2003. It claimed not to be the debtor\u2019s legal successor. 16.  On 1 April 2004 a three judge panel of the Municipal Court (hereinafter \u201cthe panel\u201d) refused to hear the appeal until the enforcement judge determined the debtor\u2019s liabilities. 17.  On 24 June 2004 NIS-Vojvodina filed a submission, denying any connection with the applicant\u2019s debtor. 18.  On 19 October 2004 the Municipal Court asked the applicant to comment on NIS-Vojvodina\u2019s submission and propose another method of enforcement. 19.  As the applicant failed to do so, on 11 January 2005 the Municipal Court suspended (obustavio) the enforcement against NIS-Vojvodina. The applicant appealed. 20.  On 14 February 2005 the panel instructed the enforcement judge to establish if there was any relationship between the debtor and NIS\u2011Vojvodina before transferring the file back to it again. 21.  On 30 May 2005 the Ministry of Education and Sport informed the Municipal Court that the applicant\u2019s debtor had appeared on their register of sports organisations since 3 August 1999, while NIS-Vojvodina had never been registered. 22.  In the proceedings that followed, the enforcement judge, relying on the Ministry\u2019s information note of 30 May 2005, found that NIS-Vojvodina was not the debtor\u2019s legal successor and transferred the case file to the panel on 1 September 2005. 23.  On 16 March 2006 the panel upheld the decision of 11 January 2005, finding that there were no grounds to continue enforcement against NIS-Vojvodina. 24.  On 1 September 2011 the Novi Sad Commercial Court opened insolvency proceedings in respect of the debtor and adopted the restructuring plan it had devised. According to the plan, the debtor would pay the applicant RSD 1,229,332.42 (approximately EUR 10,000) over five years, paying him one fifth of the total amount each year. 25.  .  On 17 September 2012 the debtor paid the applicant one fifth of the above-mentioned sum, that is to say RSD 245,866.48 (approximately EUR 2,000). 26.  There is no information in the case file as to whether the applicant received any payments thereafter.", "references": ["4", "9", "8", "1", "7", "6", "2", "5", "0", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1980 and lives in Moscow. 6.  Prior to its privatisation, the 31.1 square-metre flat at 12-5 Ulitsa Lavochkina, Moscow, had been owned by the City of Moscow. Sh. had resided there as a tenant under the social housing agreement with the city. 7.  On 17 May 2003 Sh. died. 8.  On 25 July 2003 Sh.\u2019s ex-boyfriend, Un., and an unidentified person impersonating Sh. had their marriage registered in the Tambov Region. Un. then applied to the local housing office, where he presented his marriage certificate and was registered as residing in Sh.\u2019s flat as a tenant. On 31 October 2003 the title to the flat was transferred to Un. under the privatisation scheme. On 25 December 2003 the privatisation transaction and Un.\u2019s title to the flat were registered by the Moscow City Committee for Registration of Real Estate Transactions (the \u201cCity Registration Committee\u201d). 9.  On an unspecified date the prosecutor\u2019s office opened a criminal investigation into Un.\u2019s activities in respect of the flat and on 5 May 2005 the Golovinskiy District Court of Moscow found him guilty of fraud and sentenced him to a term of imprisonment. The flat was transferred to the Department for Housing of the City of Moscow (the \u201cHousing Department\u201d). 10.  On 30 August 2005 the District Court granted claims lodged by the prosecutor on behalf of the city authorities and ordered the annulment of Un.\u2019s marriage certificate and the privatisation agreement, and the revocation of his title to the flat. The parties did not appeal against that judgment and it became final. 11.  When Un. was released in 2011, having served a prison sentence for fraud, the city authorities had not yet informed the City Registration Committee of the judgments of 5 May and 30 August 2005. Un. was therefore still officially registered as the flat\u2019s owner and on 28 October 2011 he sold the flat to S. On 8 November 2011 the City Registration Committee registered the sale agreement and S.\u2019s title to the flat. 12.  On 22 December 2011 S. sold the flat to the applicant. The sale agreement was registered by the City Registration Committee on 29 December 2011. The applicant moved in and resided in the flat with his girlfriend. 13.  On an unspecified date the Housing Department brought a civil claim against the applicant seeking, inter alia, (1) the revocation of the applicant\u2019s title to the flat and his eviction; and (2) restitution of the flat to the City of Moscow. 14.  On 30 October 2012 the District Court examined the case. It conceded that the applicant was a bona fide purchaser of the flat. Nevertheless, relying on Article 302 of the Russian Civil Code, the court granted the Housing Department\u2019s claims, pointing out that it remained open to the applicant to sue S. in order to have his rights protected. The applicant appealed. 15.  On 12 March 2013 the Moscow City Court upheld the judgment of 30 October 2012 on appeal. 16.  On 3 June 2013 the City Court refused to grant the applicant leave to lodge a cassation appeal against the judgments of 30 October and 12 March 2013. 17.  On 12 February 2014 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, in a single-judge formation, dismissed a cassation appeal lodged by the applicant against the judgments of 30 October and 12 March 2013. 18.  On 26 July 2013 the district bailiff\u2019s service instituted enforcement proceedings in respect of the judgment of 30 October 2012. According to the applicant, he was evicted on 18 November 2013. 19.  On 22 January 2014 the Sergiyev Posad Town Court of the Moscow Region granted a claim for damages against S. lodged by the applicant and awarded him 4,330,000 Russian roubles (RUB). On 28 February 2014 the judgment became final. 20.  On an unspecified date the bailiff instituted enforcement proceedings in respect of the judgment of 22 January 2014. On 17 June 2014 the proceedings were discontinued as it had been impossible to establish S.\u2019s whereabouts. 21.  According to the Government, on 14 August 2014 the bailiff\u2019s superior quashed the decision of 17 June 2014 and the enforcement proceedings are still pending.", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "5", "8", "7", "2", "6", "No Label", "4", "9"], "gold": ["4", "9"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1968 and lives in Diyarbak\u0131r. 5.  At the time of the events in question the applicant was the vice\u2011president of HAK-PAR (Hak ve \u00d6zg\u00fcrl\u00fckler Partisi \u2013 the Rights and Freedoms Party). 6.  On 4 January 2004 the party held its first ordinary congress at a restaurant in Ankara, where the applicant was elected by the delegates to act as the meeting\u2019s chairman. 7.  On 28 February 2005 a public prosecutor at the Ankara public prosecutor\u2019s office filed an indictment with the Ankara Criminal Court of First Instance against thirteen members of HAK-PAR, including the applicant, for acting in violation of section 81 (c) of Law no. 2820 during the congress on the grounds, inter alia, that there had been banners in Kurdish and that most of the speeches given by the delegates had been in Kurdish. 8.  The applicant acknowledged before the first-instance court that he had not intervened as the chairman when certain delegates had spoken in Kurdish. In this connection, he submitted that, as a founder member of HAK\u2011PAR, he believed that Kurdish should be used in all areas of life; that those who spoke Kurdish were speaking in their mother tongue; and that he believed that it was neither legal nor ethical for him to intervene to force people to speak in a language other than their mother tongue. He maintained that such speeches could not have constituted an offence, when taking into account laws that had been enacted in compliance with the conditions for membership of the European Union, and the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights. In this connection, the applicant also submitted that the relevant provisions of Law no. 2820 were contrary to the Constitution. 9.  On 7 December 2005 the first-instance court dismissed an application from the defendants to suspend the proceedings and transfer the case to the Constitutional Court for examination of the compatibility of the relevant provisions with the Constitution. 10.  On 14 February 2007 the Ankara Criminal Court of First Instance convicted the applicant of the charges. In particular, the court considered that the applicant had, despite warnings from a government superintendent present at the congress, continued to allow certain delegates to give their speeches in Kurdish, in breach of section 81 (c) of Law no. 2820. The applicant was sentenced to one year\u2019s imprisonment. 11.  On 23 March 2011 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of the first-instance court on the ground that the latter had failed to give any consideration to whether the conditions for suspending the delivery of the judgment against the defendants, pursuant to Article 231 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, had been met. 12.  On 6 December 2011 the Ankara Criminal Court of First Instance ordered that the criminal proceedings against the applicant and the other defendants be terminated, on the ground that the statutory time-limit prescribed under domestic law had expired.", "references": ["5", "1", "4", "9", "8", "7", "0", "3", "2", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Moscow. 6.  On 1 February 1994 F. bought a 19.3 square metre flat at 22-2-68 Nagatinskaya Naberezhnaya, Moscow. On 23 July 1997 F. died intestate and without heirs. According to the Government, his flat was locked and sealed by the housing maintenance company. 7.  On an unspecified date N. brought a civil action seeking recognition as F.\u2019s heir-at-law. The City of Moscow authorities took part in the proceedings as a respondent. On 8 February 2010 the Simonovskiy District Court of Moscow granted her claim and recognised her title to F.\u2019s flat. The judgment came into force on 19 February 2010. 8.  On 14 May 2010 N. sold the flat to K. The transaction was registered by the Federal Registration Service. 9.  On 24 June 2010 the Moscow City Court quashed the judgment of 8 February 2010 on appeal and dismissed N.\u2019s claims. 10.  On 6 July 2010 K. sold the flat to the applicant. On 21 July 2010 the Federal Registration Service registered the sale agreement and the transfer of the title to the flat to the applicant. 11.  On an unspecified date the Housing Department brought a civil action claiming that N. had been erroneously recognised as F.\u2019s heir-at-law and that the City of Moscow should inherit his property instead. 12.  On 8 November 2012 the District Court granted the Housing Department\u2019s claims. It ordered the transfer of title to the flat to the City and the requisition of the flat from the applicant. The court also considered that the applicant had not demonstrated due diligence when buying the flat from K. and could not be recognised as a bona fide purchaser. 13.  On 4 February 2013, following an appeal by the applicant, the Moscow City Court upheld the judgment of 8 November 2012. 14.  On 15 April 2015 the District Court granted the Housing Department\u2019s claims against the applicant and ordered her eviction. 15.  According to the Government, the applicant has not been evicted and continues to reside in the flat. 16.  On 9 December 2013 the Perovskiy District Court of Moscow granted a claim by the applicant for damages against K. and awarded her, inter alia, 4,060,006 Russian roubles (RUB). K. appealed. 17.  On 20 March 2014 the Moscow City Court upheld the judgment of 9 December 2013 on appeal. 18.  According to the Government, the bailiff failed to establish K.\u2019s whereabouts or locate any of his assets. The judgment in the applicant\u2019s favour remains unenforced. The enforcement proceedings are still pending.", "references": ["0", "3", "7", "5", "6", "8", "1", "2", "4", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1945 and lives in Ankara. 5.  At the time of the events giving rise to the present application, the applicant\u2019s daughter, Serpil \u0130mren, worked as a secretary for a private company engaged in the trade of mineral oil, namely Kros Petrol Madeni Ya\u011f Turizm \u0130n\u015faat Emlak \u0130th. \u0130hr. San. Tic. Ltd. \u015eti (\u201cthe company\u201d). On 18 December 2002, at approximately 8.30 a.m., a fire broke out at her workplace when one of her colleagues, M.Y., attempted to light the wood-burning stove used to heat the office area by pouring petrol onto it. Serpil \u0130mren sustained serious injuries as a result of the fire. On 17 January 2003 she died at the hospital where she had been receiving treatment for her burns. 6.  Upon being informed of the fire, three police officers arrived at the scene of the incident at approximately 9.30 a.m. on 18 December 2002. They prepared a report describing the state of the premises in the aftermath of the fire and a sketch map of the scene of the incident. 7.  At 10.50 a.m. on the same day two police officers went to the hospital where the applicant\u2019s daughter Serpil \u0130mren had been taken for treatment. They reported that she was not in a condition to make a statement regarding the incident. 8.  At 11 a.m. the police interrogated two suspects in relation to the fire, namely M.Y., Serpil \u0130mren\u2019s colleague who had apparently started the fire, and K.N.Y., who was the owner of the company for which Serpil \u0130mren was working. M.Y described the incident as noted in paragraph 5 above. K.N.Y. stated that he had not been at the workplace at the time of the incident. 9.  On 27 December 2002 the Ankara public prosecutor filed a bill of indictment with the Ankara Criminal Court of First Instance against M.Y. for starting a fire and causing bodily harm by negligence. 10.  On the same day the Ankara public prosecutor delivered a decision not to prosecute in relation to K.N.Y. 11.  On 1 April 2003 the Ankara Criminal Court of First Instance issued a decision of non-jurisdiction and transferred the case to the Ankara Assize Court. 12.  In the meantime, inspectors from the Ministry of Labour and Social Security (\u201cthe Ministry\u201d) initiated an investigation into the incident. According to their report dated 28 February 2003, the necessary precautions had not been taken at the relevant workplace to prevent and put out fires, such as training the employees in fire safety and the operation of wood\u2011burning stoves. Such training was particularly important bearing in mind that the company was engaged in the mineral oil business. 13.  Relying on the inspectors\u2019 findings regarding the lack of precautions necessary for the prevention of fires in the deceased\u2019s workplace, on 18 April 2003 the applicant lodged a new complaint with the Ankara public prosecutor\u2019s office against the owner of the company, K.N.Y. 14.  On 26 May 2003 the Ankara public prosecutor issued an additional indictment against K.N.Y. for causing Serpil \u0130mren\u2019s death by negligence. 15.  On an unspecified date the applicant joined the criminal proceedings as a civil party. 16.  There is no information in the case file as to when the Ankara Assize Court started hearing the case. On 16 September 2003 the second hearing was held, during which the court heard the statements of the defendants and two prosecution witnesses. 17.  At the third hearing held on 5 December 2003 the Ankara Assize Court heard three defence witnesses. It also ordered that an on-site inspection be carried out at the workplace on 23 February 2004 by court\u2011appointed experts. It appears from the information in the case file, however, that the on-site inspection was carried out on 12 April 2004. 18.  On 16 April 2004 the court-appointed experts issued their report, where they largely repeated the findings of the Ministry\u2019s inspectors noted in paragraph 12 above. The experts concluded that M.Y. and K.N.Y. each bore 50 % responsibility for the incident. 19.  On 19 April 2004 the Ankara Assize Court requested that the Forensic Medicine Institute issue a report examining whether a causal link existed between Serpil \u0130mren\u2019s death and the fire at her workplace. In a report dated 4 June 2004 the Forensic Medicine Institute confirmed that Serpil \u0130mren had died on account of complications caused by the burns she had sustained during the fire. 20.  In the meantime, on 6 May 2004 the Ankara Assize Court ordered the employer\u2019s insurance company to provide the accident report prepared in the aftermath of the incident, along with photographs and any other documents relevant to the incident. On 9 July 2004 the insurance company submitted the requested documents. 21.  Relying mainly on the reports issued by the court-appointed experts and the inspectors of the Ministry, as well as the report of the Forensic Medicine Institute, on 29 April 2005 the Ankara Assize Court convicted the defendants as charged and sentenced each of them to ten months\u2019 imprisonment and a fine. The defendants appealed against this judgment. 22.  On 1 May 2006 the public prosecutor\u2019s office attached to the Court of Cassation remitted the case to the Ankara Assize Court for reassessment of the sentence in the light of the new Criminal Code (Law no. 5237) that had entered into force in June 2005. 23.  On 17 November 2006 the Ankara Assize Court convicted the defendants once again as charged and issued the same sentence and fine. The defendants appealed against this judgment. 24. On 13 October 2008 the Court of Cassation quashed the Ankara Assize Court\u2019s judgment of 17 November 2006. It found that the first\u2011instance court had to consider whether the procedure of suspension of pronouncement of judgments (h\u00fckm\u00fcn a\u00e7\u0131klanmas\u0131n\u0131n geri b\u0131rak\u0131lmas\u0131) provided for in section 231 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Law no. 5271), as amended on 6 December 2006, was applicable in the circumstances. 25.  On 26 February 2009 the Ankara Assize Court convicted the defendants once again and sentenced them to the same term of imprisonment and fine as before. It held that the pronouncement of the judgment could not be suspended having regard, inter alia, to the nature of the offence and the gravity of the incident. The defendants appealed against this judgment. 26.  On 27 December 2010 the Court of Cassation held that the criminal proceedings should be discontinued on the grounds that the prosecution of the offence in question had become time-barred. 27.  On 18 July 2003 the applicant initiated proceedings against K.N.Y., the owner of the company for which her daughter had worked, before the Ankara 13th Labour Court (\u201cthe labour court\u201d) requesting compensation in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage following her daughter\u2019s death. 28.  On 23 October 2003 the labour court dismissed the case, which it found should have been brought against the company for which the victim had worked rather than against K.N.Y. 29.  On 5 November 2003 the applicant brought compensation proceedings before the labour court against the company in relation to her daughter\u2019s death. 30.  It appears from the information in the case file that during the three hearings held in April, June and October 2004, the labour court heard the parties\u2019 witnesses (four witnesses in total). 31.  At the hearing held on 25 September 2007 the applicant requested the appointment of experts to determine the defendant company\u2019s responsibility for her daughter\u2019s death. The labour court accepted that request and on 24 October 2007 it appointed three experts. 32.  On 28 November 2007 the experts delivered their report, in which they found that the accused company and its owner, K.N.Y., bore 70 % and 5 % responsibility, respectively, for Serpil \u0130mren\u2019s death. According to the experts, the remaining responsibility lay with M.Y., who was not a party to the proceedings before the labour court. 33.  Relying on the findings of the experts, on 3 March 2009 the applicant brought an additional compensation claim before the Ankara 7th Labour Court against K.N.Y. On 15 July 2009 the Ankara 7th Labour Court decided to join the case against K.N.Y. to the proceedings pending before the Ankara 13th Labour Court against the company. 34.  Between 14 April 2004 and 28 December 2010 the labour court held twenty-three hearings. However, apart from those mentioned in paragraphs 30 and 31 above, the labour court did not take any procedural action during that period and decided to adjourn the case at the end of each hearing pending a judgment in the criminal proceedings. 35.  At its first hearing following the termination of the criminal proceedings, which was held on 3 May 2011, the labour court ordered the appointment of an expert to determine the applicant\u2019s pecuniary damage as a result of her daughter\u2019s death. However, the expert was not officially appointed until 9 October 2012. 36.  On 26 November 2012 the court-appointed expert delivered the report on the extent of the damage suffered by the applicant. 37.  Between 8 February 2012 and 3 February 2014 the labour court held ten more hearings. It appears that six of those hearings were postponed pending information from the Social Security Institution (Sosyal G\u00fcvenlik Kurumu) concerning the benefits received by the applicant following her daughter\u2019s death. 38.  On 4 June 2014 the labour court delivered its judgment on the case. It rejected the applicant\u2019s claims in respect of pecuniary damage, except for funeral costs in the amount of 1,306 Turkish liras (TRY) (approximately 455 euros (EUR)), plus interest (TRY 40 to be paid by K.N.Y. and the rest by the company). It granted her request in respect of non-pecuniary damage and ordered the payment of TRY 10,000 (approximately EUR 3,480), together with interest (TRY 1,000 to be paid by K.N.Y. and the rest by the company). 39.  On 27 April 2015 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of the labour court. 40.  It appears from the information in the case file that the applicant has not yet received payment of the damages ordered by the labour court. It also appears from the applicant\u2019s undisputed allegations that during the time it took to reach a decision on her civil claim, the company had closed down and the damages ordered by the court against that company could therefore not be collected.", "references": ["1", "5", "6", "4", "2", "3", "7", "8", "9", "No Label", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1970 and currently lives in London. 6.  On 16 October 2008 the Frankfurt am Main District Court issued a penal order against the applicant. Having regard to the written submissions the applicant had made on the charges to the prosecution, the court found the applicant guilty of withholding and embezzlement of employee salaries and sentenced her to a fine of 100 daily rates of EUR 50. 7.  According to the record of service, a form containing several options as to the way in which court mail was served, which was issued by a courier and returned to the District Court, the courier had attempted to hand over the penal order to the applicant at her residence on 7 November 2008 at 2.10 p.m. As this had not been possible, the courier had served the penal order on the applicant by placing it in the mailbox appurtenant to her residence (Article 180 of the Code of Civil Procedure, see paragraph 29 below). 8.  On 27 December 2008 the applicant filed an objection against the penal order with the Frankfurt am Main District Court and applied for the reinstatement of the proceedings. She argued that her objection was not time-barred as the penal order had not been served on her on 7 November 2008. She had only learnt about the existence of a penal order issued against her on 20 December 2008 when she had found in her mailbox a bill of the court cashier requesting her to pay the fine imposed in the penal order. On calling the court cashier, she had been informed of the order\u2019s alleged service on 7 November 2008. 9.  The applicant claimed that she was sure that no penal order had been served on her on 7 November 2008. She stated that her counsel, Mr N. Dotterweich, and her husband had been at a court hearing at the Hanau District Court on 7 November 2008 and had therefore come to visit her at her house on that day. In the afternoon she had bade farewell to her counsel. When accompanying him to the front gate, she had checked her mailbox for her daily mail in his presence. She had found neither a penal order nor a notice that a penal order had been deposited in another place. 10.  On 6 February 2009 the applicant\u2019s counsel supplemented the applicant\u2019s submissions. He claimed that he, the applicant, the applicant\u2019s mother who was living in the same house as the applicant and the applicant\u2019s husband who lived in London had all been at the applicant\u2019s house at the time the penal order had allegedly been served. Counsel and the applicant had returned to the applicant\u2019s residence at around 12.15 p.m. after having attended a hearing at the Hanau District Court. The applicant\u2019s husband had arrived shortly before them and had been waiting for them, together with the applicant\u2019s mother. 11.  The applicant\u2019s counsel explained that no one had rung the doorbell to hand over the penal order while they had been at the applicant\u2019s residence. They would have noticed the doorbell ringing, as the applicant had dogs, which were outside and would have barked. At around 3.30 p.m. they had all left the house. At that moment the applicant had taken the mail out of her mailbox. She had immediately checked the contents. There had been no official letter from a court. Such a letter would have stood out and would therefore have been noticed by the persons present, as official court letters came in bright yellow envelopes. The applicant\u2019s husband, counsel and the common daughter of counsel and the applicant had then left. 12.  The applicant\u2019s counsel further submitted that the private postal service company J., which had been in charge of the delivery of official court mail for the Frankfurt am Main District Court, was known for its unreliability. In December 2008, hence shortly after the alleged delivery, the company had had to register as insolvent. 13.  The applicant\u2019s counsel added to his submissions the affirmations in lieu of an oath of the applicant\u2019s mother, the applicant\u2019s husband and himself confirming his submissions. The applicant\u2019s mother stated, in particular, that she had paid special attention when her daughter took the mail out of the mailbox as, owing to the fact that they lived in the same house, part of her mail was sometimes put into her daughter\u2019s mailbox. The applicant\u2019s husband declared that when the applicant had taken out the mail he had paid special attention because he had formerly also lived at that address and sometimes mail addressed to him was still sent there. 14.  On 9 April 2009 the Frankfurt am Main District Court rejected the applicant\u2019s objection against the penal order as inadmissible and dismissed her application for reinstatement of the proceedings. The court considered it proved that the penal order had been served on the applicant on 7 November 2008 at 2.10 p.m. as was certified by the record of service. The applicant had therefore failed to file her objection, which was received by the court on 27 December 2008, within the two-week time-limit and the penal order had hence become final (see paragraph 27 below). 15.  The District Court was also of the view that there was no reason to grant the applicant reinstatement of the proceedings, as it was not apparent why the applicant had been prevented, through no fault of her own, from submitting her objection against the penal order within the two-week time\u2011limit after the delivery of 7 November 2008. 16.  The court found that the record of service had probative value for the fact that the penal order had been put into the applicant\u2019s mailbox by the courier on 7 November 2008 (Article 418 of the Code of Civil Procedure, see paragraph 29 below). In accordance with the settled case-law, this could only be disproved if facts were presented that convinced the court that there was no possibility that the facts certified by the record of service were correct. The applicant had not been able to furnish the court with such counter-evidence. 17.  In its assessment of evidence, the Frankfurt am Main District Court had regard to the written statement of the courier who had delivered the applicant\u2019s penal order, whom it had had interviewed by the police as a witness. The courier had explained that she had been registered with J. company to help her husband with the delivery of the court mail since October 2008. When asked by the police to describe how she had delivered official court letters she had stated that official court letters had always been in yellow envelopes. She confirmed that she always rang the doorbells of the addressees. If they did not respond she would deposit a \u201cletter of notification\u201d (Benachrichtigungsschreiben) in the mailbox. She confirmed that the signature on the record of service concerning the applicant was hers, the date and the time had been filled in by her husband. She did not specially remember either the service on 7 November 2008 or the applicant\u2019s house. When cautioned that she did not have to respond to questions if there was a risk that she might incriminate herself, she had confirmed that she was sure she had served the mail correctly or left a \u201cnotice\u201d (Benachrichtigung). 18.  The District Court concluded that the courier had testified that she had always served the official court mail in accordance with the rules. Moreover, when asked by the police, the Frankfurt am Main branch of J. company had confirmed that no irregularities were known to the company with regard to the service of the court mail. The courier had had no incentive to embezzle the applicant\u2019s mail. 19.  The court considered, in contrast, that the story described by the applicant to disprove the service of the penal order seemed fabricated. It took into consideration that the declarations in lieu of an oath all came from persons who were close to the applicant and who had a considerable interest in the outcome of the criminal proceedings against her. It further noted that the applicant had not mentioned all the persons who had allegedly been present when she checked her mail in her first submission of 27 December 2008. Moreover, it was not in accordance with general experience in life for someone to check his mail in front of all his family members. As it had been proved by the record of service that the penal order had been put into the applicant\u2019s mailbox, potential shortcomings by the courier\u2019s failure to ring the doorbell first \u2013 which according to the applicant would have resulted in her dogs barking, which they allegedly had not done at the relevant time \u2013 would, in any event, have been remedied by the actual service. 20.  On 22 April 2009 the applicant, represented by her lawyer, appealed against the decision of the Frankfurt am Main District Court. She claimed, in particular, that according to articles in a national newspaper, the unreliability of the postal service company J. had been revealed, inter alia, by the Oldenburg Court of Appeal and the Kiel Regional Court and that an Aachen local newspaper had reported that court mail had been found in a refuse shed. 21.  The applicant further pointed out that the courier\u2019s witness statement contradicted the record of service. The courier had described the service of the penal order by way of putting a written notice into the addressee\u2019s mailbox, which constituted a substituted service in accordance with Article 181 of the Code of Civil Procedure (see paragraph 29 below). In contrast, the record of service certified service by way of placing the penal order itself in the applicant\u2019s mailbox, which constituted substituted service in accordance with Article 180 of the Code of Civil Procedure (see paragraph 29 below). 22.  On 10 June 2009 the Frankfurt am Main Regional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal against the decision of the Frankfurt am Main District Court. The court, essentially endorsing the reasons given by the District Court, confirmed the District Court\u2019s finding that the penal order had effectively been served on the applicant on 7 November when placed in the applicant\u2019s mailbox (Article 37 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, read in conjunction with Article 180 of the Code of Civil Procedure, see paragraphs 28-29 below). 23.  The Regional Court considered that the applicant had not furnished the court with sufficient counter-evidence. The court did not have to decide whether J. company had been reliable in all cases. In the case before it, the courier and her husband had had no reason to commit post embezzlement and forgery of documents. The affirmations in lieu of oaths could not prove that the penal order had not been in the mailbox on 7 November 2008. The affirming persons had not testified that they had constantly paid special attention to a possible ringing of the doorbell. Furthermore, it could not be ruled out that the applicant had been inattentive when going through the mail because of the presence of guests. It was likely that the penal order had been hidden among other mail and had probably inadvertently been thrown away or simply ignored. 24.  On 14 August 2009 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court in which she claimed that her constitutional right to be heard and her right to a fair trial had been breached in the criminal proceedings against her. 25.  On 22 September 2009 the Federal Constitutional Court declined to consider the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint without giving reasons (file no. 2 BvR 1891/09). The decision was served on the applicant\u2019s counsel on 30 September 2009.", "references": ["9", "1", "6", "8", "5", "2", "7", "4", "0", "3", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1945 and is currently detained in HMP Long Lartin. 5.  Between 16 May and 13 July 2005 the applicant was tried before a judge and jury in the Crown Court at Snaresbrook for various offences relating to an attempt, together with other unknown persons, to import cocaine worth GBP 35 million into the United Kingdom from Guyana via ports in the Netherlands and Belgium. 6.  Pursuant to Her Majesty\u2019s Courts and Tribunals Service policy, notes of recordings of trials are destroyed after five years. Although the present application was lodged with the Court in 2007, consideration of the applicant\u2019s complaints was adjourned pending judgment in Al-Khawaja and Tahery v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 26766/05 and 22228/06, ECHR 2011. Consequently, by the date the United Kingdom Government received notice of the application, transcripts of the applicant\u2019s criminal trial had for the most part been destroyed. 7.  However, from the information available, the circumstances of the trial which give rise to the present application may be summarised as follows. 8.  On the 21 June 2004 a ship called the \u201cLee Frances\u201d entered the port of Rotterdam. Part of the cargo was a single container which contained palletised drums of molasses from Georgetown, Guyana. The following day the container was searched by customs officials and certain drums \u2013 purportedly containing molasses \u2013 were found to contain 700 kg of high purity cocaine worth GBP 35 million. The officials refilled the drums with dummy contents and the ship continued to Antwerp where the container was offloaded. The applicant was arrested and interviewed on 29 June 2004, shortly after contacting HM Revenue and Customs to make enquiries about the container. He was charged, inter alia, with assisting in the commission outside the United Kingdom of an offence punishable under the law of Guyana (the export of drugs from that country), contrary to section 20 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, and with the attempted importation of drugs to the United Kingdom. 9.  There were allegations that the applicant had been involved in \u201cjury fixing\u201d in a previous, unrelated trial. Therefore, before the trial the prosecution applied to the court for the following security measures:\n\uf02d the assignment of a security team to chaperone the jury at all times;\n\uf02d the identification of the jury by number and not by name;\n\uf02d the verification by police of the identity of anyone wishing to enter the courtroom\u2019s public gallery;\n\uf02d the search of members of the public entering the building;\n\uf02d the retention of all visitors\u2019 mobile telephones during the trial;\n\uf02d the erection of protective screens to shield the jury and the applicant from the public gallery; and\n\uf02d the covering of the glass panels in the doors to the court room to prevent people seeing into the room. 10.  The defence were informed of the application and given the opportunity to oppose it. They initially did so on the basis that the protective screens, taken together with the other security measures, would lend a sinister feel to proceedings which would be likely to prejudice the applicant in the eyes of the jury. However, at the conclusion of argument the defence indicated that they were prepared to withdraw their objections provided that the whole of the public gallery was covered rather than just part of it, as had been originally suggested. The trial judge therefore made the order requested. 11.  The defence subsequently attempted to withdraw that concession on the basis that the physical appearance of the screens was more imposing than had been anticipated. They again suggested that the whole trial could be heard in camera but this proposal was rejected by the trial judge, who did not consider that the screens could in any way impinge upon the fairness of the trial. 12.  It was accepted by the prosecution and the defence that the main issue in the case was whether or not the applicant had intended to import drugs into the United Kingdom. 13.  It was the prosecution\u2019s case that the applicant had purchased the cocaine in Guyana under the assumed name of \u201cDavid Keen\u201d, the manager of a company called Premier Molasses, and that he had intended to import the cocaine into the United Kingdom. The shipment containing the cocaine had been the last of four shipments procured by Premier Molasses from Guyana. The previous three shipments had been delivered via Antwerp to various locations in the United Kingdom, including to an address belonging to an acquaintance of the applicant. There was evidence of telephone calls between the applicant and his acquaintance, which coincided with the deliveries, as well as payments by the acquaintance to the applicant\u2019s account in Guyana. It was suggested by the prosecution that the previous three shipments had been practice runs for the fourth shipment, which contained the cocaine. Although there was one witness in Guyana who stated that the drums containing the cocaine were to be offloaded in Antwerp and transported to the Netherlands (see paragraph 31 below), the prosecution argued that this had been an attempt by the applicant to set up a defence should he be caught. 14.  VO, who was based in Antwerp, was the customs broker for Premier Molasses\u2019 shipping agents. 15.  VO was responsible for issuing each shipment with an agricultural import licence to confirm that the shipment complied with European Union quotas. He was also responsible for guaranteeing the payment of duty on each shipment. 16.  He made three separate statements between 30 June 2004 and 20 January 2005. He also supplied the prosecuting authorities with the original files relating to all four shipments from Guyana. This included all documents relating to the first three shipments, for which he had arranged carriage to the United Kingdom, and correspondence from David Keen asking him to arrange transport for the fourth shipment to the United Kingdom. 17.  Having provided the statements and documentary evidence, VO refused to give live evidence at the applicant\u2019s trial. VO\u2019s explanation for refusing to attend court was recounted in the evidence of DH, a United Kingdom customs official who had been present when VO was interviewed in Belgium. According to DH (who gave evidence at trial), VO believed that, in accordance with Belgian practice, having spoken to investigators on three separate occasions, he had done enough. 18.  The prosecution made several attempts to convince VO to appear as a witness before the trial began. In particular, they wrote to him emphasising the importance of his evidence, making it clear that all expenses would be met and inconvenience kept to a minimum, and informing him that if he did not attend his previous assistance might be wasted. They also tried to reach him through his employer but were told that he was on leave and could not be contacted. 19.  Despite knowing of VO\u2019s reluctance to attend for several months before the trial, the prosecution opened their case referring to his evidence. Two weeks into the trial, when it became clear that VO would not testify, the trial judge directed the prosecution to contact him again. In a letter to VO, the prosecution offered various options to him, including giving evidence via live video link from his home in Belgium. Meanwhile, the defence also wrote to him seeking clarification on apparent inconsistencies in his account. All of these efforts were ignored. 20.  Leave was then given for VO\u2019s statements to be read to the jury pursuant to section 116 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. 21.  When interviewed, VO provided information about the logistical arrangements for the routing of the fourth shipment to the United Kingdom. He stated that:\n\u201cIt was clear for [sic] all the files that the destination of the load was England. Premier Molasses had already applied for an import licence for the United Kingdom for the job relating to the container and sent it to us. The transport operation ultimately did not take place because I did not receive an original bill of lading; that meant it was physically impossible for me to take delivery of the container.\u201d 22.  He also gave evidence of his previous dealings with \u201cDavid Keen\u201d. He explained that, whilst they had never met in person, he and Mr Keen had done business in May and October 2003, at the time of the importation of two of the earlier three shipments, both of which had been destined for the United Kingdom. 23.  VO\u2019s statements referred to a telephone call he had received from a woman at Premier Molasses, who told him that the contents of the container were not to be imported to the United Kingdom but instead sold to a Dutch company. He had asked her for written instructions and details of the Dutch firm, but none was ever given. 24.  A United Kingdom customs officer, BT, referred in his evidence at trial to a conversation between the Belgian shipping agents and a woman from Premier Molasses who he believed was called \u201cN\u201d. This would appear to be the same telephone call referred to by VO (see paragraph 23 above). However, in one of his statements VO indicated that he did not know of anyone called \u201cN\u201d in connection with the case. 25.  The applicant claimed that BT could only have obtained this information by the interception of the telephone call. He further claimed that, as a consequence, the \u201cdiscrepancy\u201d between the evidence of BT and VO could not be further investigated as the prosecution indicated that there was a danger that the prohibition on the disclosure of intercept evidence (including telephone intercept evidence) might be compromised (see sections 17 and 18 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (\u201cRIPA\u201d) at paragraphs 55-56 below). However, the Government have submitted a transcript of BT\u2019s evidence which demonstrates that the prosecution did not object to any question based on the prohibitions in RIPA. 26.  One month prior to BT giving evidence a discussion had taken place between the trial judge and counsel in the absence of the jury. The discussion touched on issues of intercept evidence and on the \u201cN\u201d call. In the course of the discussion, the defence argued that, since they could not seek disclosure of intercept evidence, when any such issue arose the prosecution should be obliged to satisfy themselves that there was nothing in the material to which they had or could have access which would either undermine their case or assist the defence case. The prosecution neither confirmed nor denied that any interception had taken place, or that they had or had not sought any intercept material. However, they confirmed that they had revisited their duty of disclosure and had nothing further to add. The trial judge subsequently declined to make any ruling on the issue. 27.  The prosecution led evidence that \u201cDavid Keen\u201d was a false identity assumed by the applicant in the context of business carried out on behalf of Premier Molasses. In particular, they submitted evidence from the Home Office that there was no record of any person by that name. There were also three witnesses from Guyana who identified the applicant as David Keen and faxes in the name of David Keen sent from the applicant\u2019s address. 28.  The prosecution relied on various pieces of logistical evidence which supported their contention that, as with the previous three shipments, the true destination of the fourth shipment was the United Kingdom. This included details of bank transactions, the issuing of shipping licences and other similar communications between Premier Molasses and VO, and the fact that David Keen had pushed for early delivery of the shipment to the United Kingdom. The paperwork relating to the fourth shipment was consistent with that relating to the previous three shipments. 29.  Finally, the prosecution invited the jury to draw adverse inferences as to the applicant\u2019s guilt based on his failure to disclose facts material to his defence when first interviewed. These \u201cmaterial facts\u201d included his apparent belief that he was importing cannabis into the Netherlands and his allegation that VO was a party to the conspiracy (see paragraph 30 below). 30.  The applicant\u2019s initial defence was that he believed that he was arranging a shipment of sugar but had been duped by business associates into arranging the importation of drugs. However, during the trial it came to light that he was fabricating evidence to concoct this defence. Consequently, the applicant admitted that this defence was untrue. Thereafter, he advanced a new defence, which was that he had been involved in a conspiracy to traffic cannabis from Guyana to the Netherlands (via Antwerp) and that VO had been party to this conspiracy. He continued to deny the main count on the indictment, which concerned the attempted importation of drugs to the United Kingdom. However, on 23 June 2005 he pleaded guilty to the separate offence under section 20 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 (see paragraph 8 above). 31.  The applicant relied heavily on the evidence of one of the shipping agents in Guyana, AA, who recalled a conversation in which the applicant told him that the drums which were later found to contain drugs were to be unloaded at Antwerp. 32.  The applicant accepted that import licences for the fourth shipment had been made out for the United Kingdom but claimed that this had been a mistake by customs. Those licences had been returned by Premier Molasses using registered delivery and replaced with the appropriate licences for the Netherlands. 33.  The trial judge\u2019s summing-up contained the following directions to the jury. 34.  On the measures taken to ensure the safety of the jury, the trial judge said:\n\u201cLet me remind you of what I said at the beginning of the case about the special security measures taken during the trial. These precautions exist to protect both you, you the jury, and the defendant from any outside interference. Perhaps, as I said at an early stage when we started, it may be that I am being overly cautious, but make no mistake about it at all, none of these measures are to be regarded as any reflection whatsoever on the defendant and they are entirely irrelevant to the issue as to whether he is \u2018guilty\u2019 or \u2018not guilty\u2019 and we all know that something can appear sinister, which on investigation turns out to be completely innocent. We had, perhaps, an example of it during the case, when someone feared that their spouse was being followed, the matter was fully investigated and although rightly reported to me, it was, in fact, completely innocent. It just demonstrates how careful we must be and assumptions can often be wrong.\u201d 35.  In relation to the reading of VO\u2019s statements, the trial judge directed the jury:\n\u201c[A]s you know the general rule in the courts is that unless evidence is agreed it has to be given orally from the witness box, unless there is an admission, or there is an agreement on both sides.\nWell there is no agreement as to the accuracy of what [VO] says. On the contrary, the prosecution have been allowed to adduce the evidence; the defence do not accept a word of it - they say that he is on it and that he has acted in a thoroughly dishonest way.\u201d 36.  He then considered the practical difficulties that arose in relation to VO\u2019s evidence:\n\u201c[A]s he did not come to court, his evidence does have certain limitations and I want to draw them to your attention.\nFirst of all, when someone\u2019s statement is read out, you do not have the opportunity of seeing him in the witness-box, seeing him in the flesh and sometimes when you do see a witness in the flesh you do get a much clearer idea of whether that evidence is honest and accurate.\nSecondly, his evidence has not been tested by the defence under cross-examination and, therefore, you have not had the opportunity of seeing how the evidence survived that form of challenge or test. So you must, therefore, consider the evidence of [VO] in the light of those limitations and you should only act upon it if, having taken those matters into account, you are, nevertheless, sure that it is reliable.\u201d 37.  The trial judge gave a similar warning as to the limitations of VO\u2019s evidence in the absence of cross-examination just before he summarised VO\u2019s evidence. 38.  After this, and having reviewed the efforts made to oblige VO to attend court, the trial judge stated:\n\u201cWhat I seek to emphasise, in fairness to the defendant is that when you assess the evidence of [VO], you look at all the circumstances, throw it all into the melting pot, all the warnings that I have given you, take it all into account and then decide the weight you can properly attach to it; it is a matter for you.\u201d 39.  Whilst they were considering their verdict, the jury asked for \u2013 but was refused \u2013 copies of the transcripts of VO\u2019s statements. Instead, the trial judge re-read the relevant part of his summing-up summarising those statements. Having done so, he also reminded the jury of the criticism which had been made of the statements by the defence and of his previous warnings to them. 40.  The applicant was convicted unanimously by the jury on 13 July 2005. He appealed against his conviction to the Court of Appeal. 41.  The application for leave to appeal was initially considered and rejected by a single judge of the Court of Appeal. 42.  The applicant then renewed his application to the full court, which dismissed the appeal on 20 February 2007. 43.  There were four grounds of appeal before the Court of Appeal which are relevant to the present application. 44.  First, it was argued that the admission of VO\u2019s statements had violated Article 6 of the Convention and, in particular, that the trial judge would never have allowed the statements to be read had he been aware that BT\u2019s evidence regarding the \u201cN\u201d telephone call would cast doubt on VO\u2019s reliability. 45.  Secondly, the applicant argued that the prosecution had failed to comply with their duty of disclosure under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 in respect of the telephone conversation involving VO and \u201cN\u201d, since this had been important exculpatory evidence. 46.  Thirdly, the applicant maintained that either evidence of the interception of the telephone conversation should have been disclosed to the trial judge or the trial should have been abandoned. 47.  Fourthly, again relying on Article 6 of the Convention, the applicant argued that the security measures in place to protect the jury had violated his right to a fair trial. In support of this fourth ground, he relied on a witness statement prepared by a journalist who had tried to cover the trial. In the statement the journalist indicated that when she first tried to enter the courtroom, she was told by a court official that the trial had finished. However, after remonstrating with the official she was allowed to enter. Once inside, the proceedings were inaudible on account of the screens sealing the public gallery. When she asked if anyone else had complained about the arrangements, she was told that she was the first person to try to attend the trial. Furthermore, she had been told that she could not report anything because there were reporting restrictions in place. Finally, the journalist stated that although she had attended major criminal trials throughout the United Kingdom, she had never encountered such measures, and she considered that as a result the applicant\u2019s trial was to all intents and purposes a secret trial. 48.  In respect of VO\u2019s non-attendance at trial, the Court of Appeal acknowledged that the prosecution\u2019s failure to mention this fact until late in the proceedings was a cause for concern. However, it considered that the dispute over whether VO knew \u201cN\u201d was a \u201cvery slender foundation indeed\u201d for any suggestion that his evidence was so unreliable that it ought not to have been allowed to be read. 49.  The court also noted the advantages that the applicant had obtained through VO\u2019s absence:\n\u201cIt meant that, in so far as he [VO] gave evidence inconsistent with that of the applicant, he was not in court to make that contention good. While the statement by him that the container was intended for the United Kingdom was damaging to the applicant\u2019s case, the applicant had the evidence that was available before the jury to the effect that he had identified particular pallets that were to come out of the container at Antwerp [the evidence of the Guyana shipping agent AA]. It was of assistance to the applicant to have the evidence of [VO] about the instructions that the cargo had been sold to a Dutch company.\u201d 50.  The court was therefore not satisfied that there would have been any positive advantage to the defence in calling VO and thus concluded that there was no arguable basis for criticising the admission of his statements. 51.  The court then turned to the ground of appeal concerning the prosecution\u2019s duty of disclosure. It did not consider that the facts were such as to afford any basis for suggesting that the prosecution had failed either to comply with their duty of disclosure or to follow the Attorney General\u2019s guidelines on the matter (see paragraph 59 below). In fact, even taking this ground together with the absence of VO, the Court of Appeal declared it impossible to find any arguable basis for believing that the prosecution had not fulfilled its duty to ensure that any questions which arose would be examined properly and in accordance with the relevant duties. 52.  Finally, as far as the security measures were concerned, the court began by noting a concession by counsel for the applicant that this ground alone, even if successful, could not compromise the safety of the applicant\u2019s conviction. The court recounted the history of the pre-trial proceedings and noted that the essence of the complaint was largely based on the security screens. The court acknowledged that the security measures clearly caused difficulties but had not been raised by the journalist or anyone else at the time. Ultimately, however, the court concluded that the issue had been dealt with \u201cfully and fairly\u201d by the trial judge.", "references": ["1", "9", "4", "3", "0", "2", "5", "6", "8", "7", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "6.  On various dates, criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicants in Uzbekistan on suspicion of sedition; of creating, leading and of being members of a religious fundamentalist, extremist, separatist or other prohibited organisation; and, in respect of the first applicant, of the distribution of material threatening public order and causing incitement to ethnic or religious hatred. 7.  Orders for their arrest were issued by the Uzbek authorities and they were placed on an international list of wanted persons. 8.  They left Uzbekistan on various dates and eventually arrived in Ukraine. 9.  On 3 April 2009 the Ukrainian migration authorities dismissed the first applicant\u2019s asylum application as being groundless. The applicant appealed. 10.  On 15 June 2010 the first applicant was arrested by the Ukrainian police as a person appearing on the international list of wanted persons. 11.  On 16 June 2010 the police applied to the Irpin Town Court (\u201cthe Town Court\u201d) for the applicant\u2019s arrest under provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure concerning arrest of people suspected of criminal offences in Ukraine. 12.  On 17 June 2010 amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure concerning extradition and detention pending extradition came into force (see paragraph 59 below). 13.  On the same day, the Town Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention by up to ten days, considering that additional information was needed about his personal situation. It relied on legislation applicable to persons charged with criminal offences in Ukraine and did not refer to the new provisions of the Code concerning extradition. 14.  On 24 June 2010 the Town Court, acting under the amended provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure concerning extradition, issued an order for the applicant\u2019s provisional arrest for forty days, pending the receipt of an extradition request from the Uzbek authorities. On 30 June 2010 the Kyiv Regional Court of Appeal upheld that order. 15.  On 23 July 2010 the Kyiv Shevchenkivsky District Court (\u201cthe Shevchenkivsky Court\u201d), upon an application by the General Prosecutor\u2019s Office of Ukraine (\u201cthe GPO\u201d), ordered the applicant\u2019s arrest pending extradition, for a period not to exceed eighteen months, until the extradition proceedings had been completed. On 9 August 2010 the Kyiv City Court of Appeal upheld that order. 16.  On 21 June 2011 the Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeal quashed the migration authorities\u2019 decision of 3 April 2009 and ordered that the applicant\u2019s request for asylum be reconsidered. 17.  On 24 January 2012 the first applicant was released. 18.  On 14 December 2009 the UNHCR recognised the second applicant as a refugee under its mandate. 19.  On 23 December 2009 the migration authorities dismissed the second applicant\u2019s application for asylum in Ukraine as being groundless. 20.  On 29 June 2010 the second applicant was arrested by the Ukrainian police as a person appearing on the international list of wanted persons. 21.  On 2 July 2010 the Bila Tserkva Court ordered the applicant\u2019s provisional arrest for up to thirty days, until the receipt of an extradition request. 22.  On 28 July 2010 the UNHCR issued a certificate stating that it had recognised the applicant as a refugee. On 29 July 2010 the applicant lodged that certificate, together with his objections to the detention request, with the Shevchenkivsky Court. 23.  On 29 July 2010 the Shevchenkivsky Court ordered the applicant\u2019s detention pending extradition for up to eighteen months, until the extradition proceedings had been completed. On 9 August 2010 the Kyiv City Court of Appeal upheld that order. 24.  On 25 June 2011 the Kyiv Circuit Administrative Court quashed the migration authorities\u2019 decision of 23 December 2009 and ordered them to re-examine the applicant\u2019s application. 25.  On 29 January 2012 the applicant was released. 26.  On 4 November 2009 the migration authorities dismissed the third applicant\u2019s application for asylum in Ukraine as being groundless. The applicant appealed. 27.  According to police records, at 9.30 p.m. on 8 July 2010 the third applicant was arrested by the Ukrainian police as a person appearing on the international list of wanted persons. 28.  On 10 July 2010 the police requested that the Kyiv-Svyatoshyn District Court (\u201cthe Kyiv-Svyatoshyn Court\u201d) place the applicant under provisional arrest pending receipt of an extradition request from Uzbekistan. 29.  In his submissions to the Kyiv-Svyatoshyn Court, the applicant opposed the police request on the grounds, in particular, that the proceedings concerning his request for asylum were still pending. In his submissions he stated that he had been arrested at 2 p.m. on 9 July 2010 and did not make any complaint in that regard. 30.  On 12 July 2010 the Kyiv-Svyatoshyn Court ordered the applicant\u2019s provisional arrest for up to thirty days, until the receipt of an extradition request. 31.  On 19 July 2010 the Kyiv Regional Court of Appeal quashed the order of 12 July 2010 and remitted the request for provisional arrest to the first-instance court for fresh examination. The Court of Appeal held, in particular, that the first-instance court had failed to examine in detail the applicant\u2019s personal situation and whether there were obstacles to his extradition. 32.  On 3 August 2010 the Kyiv-Svyatoshyn Court ordered the applicant\u2019s provisional arrest for up to forty days. It held that his arguments concerning an alleged risk of ill-treatment in Uzbekistan had to be examined within the framework of the proceedings for extradition. 33.  On the same day, the police lodged a request for the applicant\u2019s detention pending extradition, based on an extradition request which had arrived in the meantime (see paragraph 37 below). 34.  On 4 August 2010 the Shevchenkivsky Court ordered the applicant\u2019s detention for up to eighteen months, until the extradition proceedings had been completed. On 12 August 2010 the Kyiv City Court of Appeal upheld that order. 35.  According to the Government, on 14 July 2011 the Kyiv Circuit Administrative Court upheld the migration authorities\u2019 decision of 4 November 2009. 36.  On 6 February 2012 the applicant was released. 4.  Extradition inquiry in respect of the first three applicants and applications for asylum in Sweden and the United States of America 37.  On 9 July 2010 the GPO received formal requests from the Uzbek authorities for the first and third applicant\u2019s extradition and on 27 July 2010 received a similar request concerning the second applicant. The GPO asked the Kyiv regional prosecutor\u2019s office to conduct an extradition inquiry into the applicants\u2019 cases. 38.  On 10 July 2010 the GPO asked the Security Service and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for information about the first applicant, in particular whether he was being persecuted by the Uzbek authorities owing to political or religious activities. On 29 and 14 July 2010 similar requests were sent concerning the second and third applicants. 39.  On the same dates, the GPO asked the Uzbek authorities to provide more detailed information about the acts of which the applicants were suspected and for assurances concerning the applicants\u2019 treatment if they were extradited. 40.  On 3 August 2010 the Security Service informed the GPO that it had no information concerning the details of the first and third applicants\u2019 activities in Uzbekistan. 41.  On 24 August, and 2 and 6 September 2010 the Uzbek authorities provided the assurances requested by the GPO in respect of the third, second and first applicants respectively. 42.  On 24 August and 16 November 2010 the GPO, in response to its previous request, received copies of documents from the Uzbek authorities describing the nature of the charges against the third and first applicants in Uzbekistan. 43.  On 14 October 2010 the Ambassador of the United States of America (\u201cthe US\u201d) to Ukraine asked the GPO to facilitate a visit to the detained Uzbek nationals on 15 and 21 October 2010 by representatives of the US Department of Homeland Security for interviews as part of the process of examining their requests for asylum in the US. 44.  According to the second applicant, on 1 October 2010 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded to the GPO\u2019s request for information. 45.  On 22 November 2010 the GPO received the reports of the Kyiv regional prosecutor\u2019s office on the results of its extradition inquiries concerning the applicants. The reports recommended that the applicants\u2019 extradition be refused, pursuant to paragraph 4 of Article 466 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which provides that extradition can be refused where \u201cthe competent authority of the foreign State has not provided, at the request of the central authority, additional materials or data, without which a decision on the extradition request may not be taken\u201d. 46.  On 8 April 2011 the GPO wrote to the US Embassy. It referred to the visit of the US officials to the first and third applicant and to information provided to the GPO by the second applicant\u2019s lawyer that his application for asylum was pending before the US authorities. The GPO asked the Embassy to inform it of any progress in examining the applicants\u2019 requests for asylum. 47.  On 5 July and 2 September 2011 the GPO again requested information from the US Embassy, indicating that no response to its previous requests had been received. 48.  On 18 October 2011 the US Embassy informed the GPO that members of its staff needed to visit the first and third applicants in order to finalise their asylum applications and take their fingerprints. It requested assistance in arranging such a visit. 49.  On 16 December 2011 the UNHCR informed the GPO that it had recognised the first three applicants as refugees under its mandate and invited the GPO to give due weight to this decision in examining Uzbekistan\u2019s extradition requests. It further stated that the US authorities were in the process of examining the first and third applicants\u2019 requests for asylum. The UNHCR added that it could not facilitate the second applicant\u2019s resettlement because he was in a polygamous marriage. 50.  On 23 January 2012 the UNHCR informed the GPO that the first applicant had been granted asylum in Sweden. 51.  On 10 and 20 February 2012 the GPO decided not to extradite the third and first applicants to Uzbekistan in view of the fact that they had been granted asylum in the US and Sweden respectively. The GPO also observed that the information originally submitted by the Uzbek authorities in support of their requests for extradition had been insufficient and that the Uzbek authorities had not remedied that, despite the GPO\u2019s requests. The GPO considered that that too constituted an obstacle to the applicants\u2019 extradition to Uzbekistan. 52.  The parties did not inform the Court of any final decision concerning the second applicant\u2019s extradition. As of the date of the submission of the applicants\u2019 observations in reply to those of the Government, that is 9 December 2013, no such decision had been made. 53.  On 2 July 2010 the applicant was arrested by the Ukrainian police. He was released on the same day but re-arrested on 6 July 2010. 54.  On 9 July 2010 the Bila Tserkva District Court ordered his provisional arrest for up to thirty days. 55.  On 5 August 2010 the applicant was released as no extradition request had arrived by that date. 56.  On 16 August 2010 the GPO received an extradition request from the Uzbek authorities. 57.  On 7 October 2010 the GPO decided to refuse extradition on the grounds that the offence with which he had been charged under Uzbek law, namely creating, leading and being a member of a religious fundamentalist, extremist, separatist or other prohibited organisation, were not offences under Ukrainian criminal law.", "references": ["5", "7", "4", "8", "3", "6", "0", "1", "9", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1988 and lives in Ikaria. 7.  On 30 July 2007 the applicant, wishing to pursue a course of higher education, applied for and was granted permission to defer his enlistment for military service. On 24 September 2012 he interrupted the deferral. As a result, he was required to report to the recruitment centre on 23 January 2013. 8.  On 22 January 2013 he applied for leave to perform alternative service on the grounds that he was a conscientious objector. 9.  On 27 May 2013 he appeared before the armed forces\u2019 special committee (established by section 62 of Law no. 3421/2005) to explain the nature of his conscientious objection. He stated that his objection was based on moral values stemming from the religious education he had received from his mother, a Jehovah\u2019s Witness, and on his own approach to life, involving the rejection of anything linked to war, violence or destruction in all its forms. The following is an extract from his interview:\n\u201cQuestion: Tell us about your beliefs.\nAnswer: I grew up in a home where we were respectful of God. My mother is a Jehovah\u2019s Witness. My father is an atheist. I believe that since God does not allow me to perform armed service in this world, I would be insulting him if I were to do so.\nQuestion: So you are citing religious reasons to justify your refusal to perform armed service.\nAnswer: In substance, yes, but as I have not yet been baptised, I cannot provide you with a certificate from the Church of the Jehovah\u2019s Witnesses. That is why I am also relying on moral grounds.\nQuestion: Why have you not yet been baptised?\nAnswer: I still have some way to go. My behaviour is not yet completely suitable. I have decided to get baptised, but to do so I still need to make further progress and study the Scriptures and the Word of God in more detail.\nQuestion: How have you come to the conclusion that God has nothing to do with war?\nAnswer: I have not drawn that conclusion, but if I do enlist and serve worldly power, I will find myself on the wrong side when God decides to take action.\nQuestion: Do you think it is feasible to eradicate violence from this world?\nAnswer: It is hard to eradicate violence and armies by good will alone.\nQuestion: Have you ever witnessed a violent incident, and if so, how did you react?\nAnswer: Yes, I was assaulted. I tried to keep my response to a minimum by immobilising the attacker.\nQuestion: By reacting in that way, were you not using violence?\nAnswer: No, it was self-defence, and I do not think that self-defence involves the use of pure violence.\nQuestion: So you acknowledge that there is a lawful authority and that some entities may potentially use force where necessary?\nAnswer: Yes, I acknowledge lawful authority. The law of mankind exists until the divine law arrives. I believe that people should submit to lawful authority. But there is a difference between submitting to it and becoming part of it.\nQuestion: Are you a member of a non-violent organisation?\nAnswer: No; for me, religious reasons take priority over reasons linked to morals ...\u201d 10.  Only three of the five members of the special committee were present when it interviewed the applicant, namely two officers of the armed forces and an adviser of the State Legal Council. The other two members \u2013 two university professors specialising in psychology, philosophy or social sciences \u2013 were unable to attend and were not replaced. 11.  On 27 May 2013 the special committee decided unanimously to propose that the applicant\u2019s application be rejected. It found that the religious and ethical arguments he had put forward for being exempted from armed service were unsubstantiated. Firstly, he was not a member of the Jehovah\u2019s Witnesses community, and secondly, he had not shown that he had taken part in non-violent movements; on the contrary, he had stated that self-defence was not a form of violence and that people should submit to lawful authority. 12.  On 30 July 2013 the Minister of National Defence rejected the application on the grounds proposed by the special committee. 13.  On 5 September 2013 the applicant applied to the Supreme Administrative Court for judicial review of the decision by the Minister of National Defence. 14.  Firstly, he challenged the composition of the special committee that had adjudicated on his case, and complained in particular that the two university professors had been absent on that occasion. He submitted that as a result of their absence and the failure to replace them, the very nature of the committee had been distorted, since the military officers had formed a majority among the three members present. In the applicant\u2019s view, the officers were inherently ill-disposed towards conscientious objectors and did not have the expertise in philosophy and psychology to make an objective assessment of the grounds put forward by them. 15.  Secondly, the applicant argued that the Minister\u2019s decision had not contained sufficient reasons, seeing that (a) it had incorrectly mentioned that he had cited religious grounds without being an adherent of a religion; and (b) the members of the committee had displayed prejudice by asserting that conscientious objectors had to be activists and anti-authority or to publicise their views, whereas the law did not lay down any such conditions. 16.  Thirdly, the applicant complained of an infringement of his right to conscientious objection, arguing that the mere assertion of that right, coupled with his behaviour in practice (not possessing a firearms licence or having any convictions for offences involving violence), was sufficient to justify his application for exemption from armed service. 17.  In judgment no. 1289/2014 of 7 April 2014 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s application. 18.  In response to his first argument, it noted that the members of the committee sat on an equal basis and that the absence of two of the members therefore had no effect on the quorum and did not distort the nature of the committee. 19.  With regard to his second argument, the Supreme Administrative Court explained that, after examining whether the applicant was a follower of a religion that prohibited the use of force, whether he had taken part in non-violent movements and whether his philosophy of life prevented him from handling weapons, the committee had concluded that his conscientious objection was not accompanied by corresponding behaviour. It also dismissed his argument that opponents to the use of violence who did not publicly identify themselves as such were victims of discrimination, holding that the law required clear proof of their beliefs and that, moreover, the fact of not falling within the exceptions provided for by law was insufficient. 20.  As to the third argument, the Supreme Administrative Court held that neither international instruments nor domestic legislation established a right to be exempted from armed service simply by citing conscientious objection. Such an exemption had to be subject to the conditions laid down by law, including the submission of sound and convincing reasons to justify it. It added that conscientious objection could not be established on the basis of a simple declaration, and nor could it be inferred from negative facts, such as not having any convictions for assault and not possessing weapons. On the contrary, it was necessary to provide evidence of active behaviour over a certain period, but the applicant had failed to do so. 21.  On 19 May 2014 the applicant was ordered to pay a fine of 6,000 euros (EUR) for insubordination; with interest for late payment, the amount was increased to EUR 7,940.85. On 11 July 2014 the applicant applied to the Mytilene Administrative Court to have the fine set aside. The case is still pending, but the authorities have seized a sum from his bank account.\n...", "references": ["3", "7", "8", "9", "6", "4", "0", "1", "2", "No Label", "5"], "gold": ["5"]}
+{"input": "4.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 5.  Nepalese Gurkha soldiers have served the Crown since 1815, initially as soldiers in the (British) Indian Army. Following Indian independence in 1947, six Gurkha regiments were transferred to the Indian Army, while four regiments became an integral part of the British Army. More than 200,000 Gurkha soldiers fought in the two world wars, and in the past fifty years they have served in Hong Kong, Malaysia, Borneo, Cyprus, the Falklands, Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan. They have served in a variety of roles, mainly in the infantry but also as engineers and in signals and logistics units. 6.  Today, they form the Brigade of Gurkhas (\u201cthe Brigade\u201d), in which only Nepali nationals are eligible for service. The Brigade is not an operational brigade in the conventional sense; rather, it is an administrative entity which ensures that Gurkha units, into which all Gurkha soldiers are recruited and serve, are able to be integrated into \u2013 and form part of \u2013 other operational brigades in the British Army. 7.  The Brigade was originally based in the Far East, in the region formerly known as Malaya. In 1971 the Brigade\u2019s base moved to Hong Kong. On completion of the handover of Hong Kong to China in July 1997, the home base moved to the United Kingdom. Consequently, the majority of Gurkhas are currently stationed in the United Kingdom, although since 1962 a section of the Brigade has been stationed in Brunei. 8.  Pursuant to a memorandum of understanding of 9 November 1947 (\u201cthe Tripartite Agreement\u201d), the Governments of the United Kingdom, India and Nepal agreed that the salary of Gurkhas serving in the British Army would be set by reference to rates applied by India in respect of Indian soldiers so as to avoid competition between the Indian and British armies for Gurkha recruits. The Brigade\u2019s basic pay was therefore set in accordance with the Indian Pay Code, although cost-of-living allowances were paid for service outside Nepal. These allowances used to be calculated by reference to local living expenses (for example, in Hong Kong or Brunei), but in 1997, when the Brigade\u2019s home base moved to the United Kingdom, a \u201cuniversal addition\u201d was introduced to ensure that, whenever a Gurkha soldier was serving outside Nepal, his take-home pay would be similar to that of a non-Gurkha soldier in the British Army of comparable rank and experience. However, the \u201cuniversal addition\u201d was not treated as pensionable pay. 9.  Prior to 1 April 2006, Married Accompanied Service entitlement (that is, an entitlement for the soldier to be accompanied by wife and children) was for one married accompanied tour of between two and three years in the first fifteen years of service and for permanent accompanied service for Gurkhas ranked Colour Sergeant and above. However, with effect from 1 April 2006, those who had served for three years or more in the Brigade were entitled to Married Accompanied Service (in other words, they were entitled to be joined in the United Kingdom by their wives and children). 10.  Gurkha soldiers are required to retire after fifteen years\u2019 service, subject to the possibility, dependent on rank, of one or more yearly extensions. 11.  In comparison, other soldiers in the British Army are entitled to serve for twenty-two years. 12.  Historically, Gurkha soldiers were discharged to Nepal and it was presumed that they would remain there during retirement.\n(a)  The 2004 amendments to the Immigration Rules 13.  On 25 October 2004 the Immigration Rules (HC 394) were changed to permit Gurkha soldiers with at least four years\u2019 service who retired on or after 1 July 1997 (the date that the Gurkha\u2019s home base relocated to the United Kingdom) to apply for settlement in the United Kingdom. Approximately 90 per cent of the 2,230 eligible Gurkha soldiers have since applied successfully to settle in the United Kingdom with their qualifying dependants.\n(b)  The 2009 amendments to the Immigration Rules 14.  On 21 May 2009 the Secretary of State for the Home Department announced a new policy under which all former Gurkhas who had served in the British Army for at least four years would be eligible for settlement in the United Kingdom. Approximately thirty-five per cent of those eligible have since applied for resettlement in the United Kingdom. 15.  The Tripartite Agreement provided that the pensions of Gurkhas serving in the British Army would also be set by reference to the rates applied by India to Indian soldiers.\n(a)  The Gurkha Pension Scheme 16.  In 1949 the Gurkha Pension Scheme (\u201cGPS\u201d) was established by Royal Warrant and applied the former Indian Army Pensions Code to Gurkhas serving in the Brigade. Pension entitlements under the GPS were index-linked to the cost of living in Nepal as it was presumed that the Gurkhas would retire there. Pensions were immediately payable upon retirement and could not be deferred. A Gurkha who retired without having served fifteen years would be entitled to no pension whatsoever. 17.  In 1981 Gurkha pensions were reviewed and the rate payable was set at the highest rate applicable under the Indian Army pension arrangements. 18.  In 1999, following a ministerial review, the rates applicable to the pensions of Gurkhas in the Brigade were increased by over 100 per cent, taking them over the scales set by the Indian Army. The rationale for the increase was that a Gurkha who retired from the Brigade to Nepal would not receive the benefit of various schemes which soldiers retiring from the Indian Army could access, such as the provision of certain medical facilities. The increase applied to all Gurkhas regardless of the date of discharge.\n(b)  The Armed Forces Pension Scheme 19.  Non-Gurkha soldiers retiring from the British Army are entitled to pensions under either the Armed Forces Pensions Scheme 1975 (\u201cAFPS 75\u201d) or the Armed Forces Pensions Scheme 2005 (\u201cAFPS 05\u201d) depending on when they commenced service. Neither scheme is index\u2011linked with the cost of living in the soldier\u2019s country of origin. 20.  Under the AFPS, soldiers are eligible for deferred pensions, payable at the age of 60, provided that they have rendered at least two years\u2019 service before leaving the British Army. In order to receive an immediate pension officers are required to serve for sixteen years and all other ranks are required to serve for twenty-two years; however, in practice fewer than one fifth of non-Gurkha soldiers in the British Army serve for sufficiently long periods to be eligible for an immediate pension. 21.  The annual pension entitlement under the GPS is broadly equivalent \u2013 taking into account the adjustments made in 1981 and 1999 \u2013 to one-third of that under the AFPS.\n(c)  Review of Gurkhas Terms and Conditions of Service 22.  Following the 2004 amendment to the Immigration Rules (see paragraph 13 above), the Secretary of State for Defence announced a review of the Gurkhas\u2019 Terms and Conditions of Service. The review noted that the 2004 amendment to the Immigration Rules and the changes to Married Accompanied Service (see paragraph 9 above) had changed the traditional assumption that British Gurkhas would retire in Nepal, and pointed to a future in which they could be expected increasingly to regard the United Kingdom, rather than Nepal, as their family base. The Review Team therefore concluded that, the affordability issues notwithstanding, the major differences in Gurkha terms and conditions of service could no longer be justified on legal or moral grounds and recommended that they be modernised by bringing them largely into line with those available to the wider Army. 23.  With regard to pensions, the review concluded that on balance the GPS was more suitable than the AFPS to support the life-cycle of the great majority of Gurkhas up until July 1997. However, moving the Brigade\u2019s base to the United Kingdom and the subsequent change to the Immigration Rules had altered the previously valid assumption that Gurkhas would retire in Nepal. For a Gurkha retiring to a second career in the United Kingdom, the GPS profile was\n\u201cclearly wrong, paying sums too small to be useful at a time when he does not need them and an inadequate pension at retirement age. As the life profile of the typical Gurkha approaches that of his UK/Commonwealth counterpart, there can be little to be said in favour of providing them with such different pension benefit profiles.\u201d 24.  The report recommended that serving and retired members of the Brigade should be allowed to transfer from the GPS to either AFPS 75 or 05, depending on when they enlisted. Those who were already in the GPS and wished to remain in it could do so, but it would be closed with effect from April 2006.\n(d)  The Gurkha Offer to Transfer 25.  In March 2007 the United Kingdom formulated the Gurkha Offer to Transfer (\u201cGOTT\u201d) and this was given effect in the Armed Forces (Gurkha Pension) Order 2007 (\u201cthe 2007 Order\u201d). Gurkhas who retired before 1 July 1997 did not qualify for the GOTT. However, the GOTT enabled Gurkha soldiers who retired on or after 1 July 1997 to transfer from the GPS to either AFPS 75 or AFPS 05 depending on when they first enlisted in the British Army. The terms of any transfer were such that the accrued rights to a pension for service after 1 July 1997 would transfer into the AFPS scheme on a year-for-year basis. 26.  In respect of service rendered before 1 July 1997 the Explanatory Memorandum to the 2007 Order explained that\n\u201calthough Gurkha service from 1 July 1997 is transferable on a one-for-one basis, Article 2 L4 provides that pre-1997 Gurkha service counts proportionately depending upon the rank of the transferee. This proportion is not arbitrary: it has been arrived at after careful calculation by the Government Actuary\u2019s Department. It represents broadly the value of the pre-1997 benefits accrued in the GPS. A Gurkha transferring to either AFPS will be given fair pension value for his GPS service.\u201d 27.  Under the actuarial calculation adopted by the Government, a year\u2019s service before 1 July 1997 translated \u2013 in terms of pension entitlement \u2013 to the equivalent of between 23 and 36 per cent of the value of a year\u2019s service of a non-Gurkha soldier of equivalent rank. 28.  The transition from the GPS to the AFPS for those opting to transfer who were already in receipt of a pension under the GPS did not deprive them of their existing GPS pension, which would continue to be paid. Transfer to the relevant AFPS occurred at 60 or 65, when they received the preserved pension. However, as they had been in receipt of the GPS pension from around the age of thirty-three, the capital value of the pension pot at retirement age would be reduced by the payments received under the GPS up to that date. 29.  Nearly all serving Gurkhas elected to transfer to the AFPS (only 0.3 per cent elected to remain in the GPS). Of those who had retired, but remained eligible for transfer, approximately three per cent elected to remain in the GPS. 30.  The first applicant is a non-governmental unincorporated association that acts on behalf of 399 former members of the Brigade. 31.  The second applicant is a former Gurkha soldier who retired from the Brigade on 8 February 1997 after having accumulated fifteen years\u2019 service. As he completed his service prior to 1 July 1997, he is ineligible to transfer any of his pensionable years to one of the AFPSs. His pension continues to be governed by the GPS and, as such, is valued at approximately fifty per cent of that which a British soldier of equivalent rank would receive for the same period and type of service. 32.  The third applicant is a former Gurkha soldier who retired from the Brigade on 31 July 2002 after having accumulated almost thirty-one years\u2019 service. The last five years of service were transferred into the AFPS on a year-for-year basis. The preceding twenty-six years of service were transferred under an actuarial calculation pursuant to the 2007 Order. Under that calculation the pensionable value of each of his years of service was regarded as equivalent to approximately twenty-seven per cent of a pensionable year served by a British soldier of equivalent rank engaged in the same type of service. 33.  On 7 March 2008 the applicants issued an application for judicial review in the High Court challenging the legality of both (a) the decision that Gurkhas who retired prior to 1 July 1997 were not entitled to transfer their pension rights under the GPS into the AFPS and (b) the decision that, for those Gurkhas who retired after 1 July 1997, service before that date did not rank on a year-for-year basis. The challenge was advanced on three grounds: under the Race Relations Act 1976 (namely, that there had been a breach of a procedural duty to promote equality of opportunity); on grounds of irrationality; and under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 read together with Article 14. In relation to the third ground, the applicants alleged that they were discriminated against in their entitlement to an army pension on the basis of their age and/or nationality. In particular, they argued that they were treated differently both from younger Gurkha soldiers who had (more) years of service after 1 July 1997 and from regular British Army soldiers. 34.  The applicants were granted permission to pursue their judicial review application. A hearing took place in October 2009. At the hearing the parties agreed that the 2009 change to the Immigration Rules (see paragraph 14 above) was irrelevant for the purpose of the proceedings. 35.  On 11 January 2010 the High Court dismissed the application on all three grounds. In respect of the age discrimination challenge the High Court relied on its earlier decision in R (Gurung) v. Ministry of Defence [2008] EWHC 1496 (Admin) (summarised at paragraphs 45 \u2013 49 below), in which it held that the difference in treatment did not occur due to the difference in age but due to the dates at which service had been rendered. The judge in the present applicants\u2019 case noted that\n\u201cwhen lines are drawn for any purpose by reference to dates the result may well include some indirect age discrimination.\u201d 36.  In reaching this conclusion, the court rejected the argument \u2013 advanced by the applicants \u2013 that age discrimination should be treated as a \u201csuspect\u201d ground. 37.  In respect of the discrimination-on-grounds-of-nationality challenge the High Court considered that it was bound by R (Purja and Others) v. Ministry of Defence [2003] EWCA Civ 1345 (summarised at paragraphs 41 \u2013 44 below), in which the Court of Appeal had ruled that Gurkhas with service before 1 July 1997 were in a markedly different position from other soldiers serving in the British Army before that date. The difference in pension arrangements reflected the different historical position of the Gurkhas. Although the High Court accepted that the 2004 change in the Immigration Rules (see paragraph 13 above) undermined some of the assumptions supporting the decision in Purja, it held that the changes did not affect the reasoning of the Court of Appeal as that reasoning applied to the calculation of pension entitlements which accrued before 1 July 1997. For all the reasons advanced by the High Court Judge in Gurung, the High Court considered that the choice of 1 July 1997 to mark the boundary for different treatment of accrued pension was a rational and reasonable one. 38.  The applicants were granted permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal. On appeal, their case was put exclusively by reference to Article 14 of the Convention read together with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. 39.  On 13 October 2010 the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicants\u2019 appeal. In respect of the discrimination-on-grounds-of-nationality claim the Court of Appeal, like the High Court, considered itself bound by the decision in Purja (cited above). In respect of the age-discrimination claim the court, relying on the Strasbourg Court\u2019s judgment in Neill v. the United Kingdom, no. 56721/00, 29 January 2002, held that even if a relevant comparison could be drawn between older and younger Gurkhas, the Ministry of Defence could easily justify the difference in treatment. 40.  On 13 December 2010 the Supreme Court refused to grant the applicants permission to appeal.", "references": ["5", "0", "7", "4", "2", "6", "9", "8", "1", "3", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1979 and is currently serving a prison sentence in Ukraine. 5.  On 29 October 2004 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of murder, robbery and attempted murder. He remained in police custody until 17 January 2005. 6.  The applicant alleged that during his stay in police custody between 29 and 31 October 2004 he had been tortured by unspecified police officers, as a result of which he had confessed to having committed the crimes of which he was suspected. In the course of a medical examination on 1 November 2004 the doctors noted a number of bruises and lesions on the applicant\u2019s limbs, chest and back The applicant alleges that no medical treatment was given to him for his injuries. 7.  The applicant stated that he had subsequently brought his allegation of ill-treatment by the police before the trial courts but the courts had not responded to it. He provided no copy of his complaints. 8.  On 1 November 2004 the applicant was taken to court; the court ordered his remand in custody pending completion of the criminal investigation against him. 9.  On 17 January 2005 the applicant was placed in a cell in Kyiv Temporary Investigative Isolation Unit (\u201cSIZO\u201d) no. 13. 10.  On 24 March 2005, following his conviction (see paragraph 21 below), he was transferred to a high-level security cell within the same SIZO for detainees sentenced to life imprisonment by a final judicial decision. From that day onwards the rules applicable to this latter category of detainees had also been applied to the applicant. In particular, his clothes were taken away from him and instead he was given special orange clothes bearing the words \u201clife imprisonment\u201d in large print on the front and back; when leaving his cell the applicant had at all times been escorted by a special unit of guards in black uniforms with masks covering their faces. 11.  The applicant complained to the courts about the allegedly unlawful execution of his sentence. On 24 March 2006 the Shevchenkivskyy District Court refused to consider his complaint for lack of substantiation and failure to pay the court fee. The applicant did not appeal against that ruling. 12.  On 14 December 2005 the applicant was placed in Sokalska Correctional Colony no. 47 (the \u201cSokalska Colony\u201d). In March 2012 the applicant was transferred to the SIZO in Lviv, which was later reorganised as a detention centre for convicted prisoners. 13.  According to the applicant, the conditions of his detention in the colony were debasing. In particular, he alleged that the drinking water and food had been of poor quality, that he had not received adequate medical assistance and that he had been subjected to psychological pressure by the colony staff. 14.  The applicant raised those allegations before the prosecutors. On 23 June 2006, the deputy prosecutor responsible for supervising prison authorities\u2019 compliance with the law informed him by letter that an inquiry had been carried out into his allegations but that it had not revealed any irregularities in his conditions of detention. According to the medical information submitted by the applicant, while in detention he had been medically examined and had been given the necessary treatment. 15.  The applicant alleged that in the course of the investigations and the trial he had been prohibited from corresponding by ordinary mail with his relatives and his counsel and from making telephone calls. The applicant did not raise those allegations before the authorities. 16.  Between 24 March and 4 August 2005 the applicant had four one\u2011hour visits from his mother and father. 17.  The applicant stated, in general terms, that following his conviction on 24 March 2005 he had not been allowed to have long meetings with his relatives and that the duration and frequency of the short visits they had been permitted to make had been considerably limited. He provided no further details in that regard. 18.  During his first interrogation, on 30 October 2004, the applicant had the assistance of a lawyer of his own choosing. The next day, due to the latter\u2019s failure to appear, the applicant was assisted by a lawyer appointed for him by the authorities. On an unspecified date the applicant hired a new lawyer, who continued to defend him during the investigation and trial. The applicant\u2019s mother also took part in the proceedings as the applicant\u2019s representative. 19.  In the course of the investigation and trial, the applicant admitted that he had committed the murders and the attempted murder of which he was suspected. 20.  The criminal investigation of the applicant\u2019s case was completed in January 2005. Subsequently, the criminal case was referred to the Kyiv Regional Court of Appeal for trial. 21.  On 24 March 2005 the court found the applicant guilty of the aggravated murder of two persons \u2012 one of whom was a minor \u2012 and of the attempted murder of another person, with the aim of stealing the victims\u2019 property. The court based its judgment on statements made by the applicant during the investigation and at the trial, the testimonies of one of the victims and six witnesses \u2013 one of whom had caught the applicant at the scene of the crime \u2212 and the conclusions of several forensic examinations, including a psychiatric examination which found that the applicant had been aware and in control of his actions at the time of the offences. The applicant was held to be exceptionally dangerous to society and was sentenced to life imprisonment, together with the confiscation of all his property. 22.  The same judgment ordered his continuing detention in the Kyiv SIZO. 23.  The applicant lodged an appeal. He contended that he had committed the crimes whilst of unsound mind and requested an additional psychiatric examination. 24.  In his appeal, the applicant\u2019s lawyer contested the first-instance court\u2019s finding that the applicant had committed the murders with the aim of stealing the victims\u2019 property. 25.  On 4 August 2005 the Supreme Court upheld the judgment of 24 March 2005 and it accordingly entered into force on that date. 26.  In December 2005 the applicant requested that the Kyiv Regional Court of Appeal provide him with copies of certain documents from his case file, including the verbatim records of his questioning during the investigation, the decisions concerning his detention, and various procedural decisions taken in the course of the investigation and trial, which he intended to submit to the Court in support of his application. In a letter dated 19 January 2006, a Court of Appeal judge informed the applicant that his request had been refused, pointing out that the procedure governing applications to the European Court of Human Rights did not require the submission of the documents of which the applicant had sought copies. 27.  On an unspecified date the applicant\u2019s mother, acting on his behalf, made similar requests, which were refused by the Deputy President of the Court of Appeal on 14 and 30 March 2006, on the same grounds.", "references": ["4", "8", "9", "1", "2", "5", "7", "0", "3", "6", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1973 and lives in Krasnoyarsk. 5.  On 16 March 2001 a senior investigator of the Krasnoyarsk regional prosecutor\u2019s office charged the applicant with large-scale trafficking in firearms and ammunition and issued a warrant for his arrest. 6.  On 3 June 2002 and in view of the additional charges brought against the applicant another arrest warrant was issued. This decision did not set a time-limit for the applicant\u2019s detention and it has never been served on him. 7.  On 27 September 2003 the applicant was arrested in Monaco and on 29 April 2005 he was extradited to Russia. He was placed in remand prison IZ-77/4 in Moscow with a view to a subsequent transfer to Krasnoyarsk. 8.  Before his final admission to Krasnoyarsk prison, the applicant was held in several different remand prisons and repeatedly complained about his unlawful detention. 9.  On 11 May 2005 criminal proceedings against the applicant were resumed. On the same day the investigator from the Krasnoyarsk Prosecutor\u2019s office initiated a request for extension of the applicant\u2019s detention. 10.  On 31 May 2005 the Krasnoyarsk Regional Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention from 10 May 2005 until 17 August 2005 inclusive. The matter was heard in the presence of the investigator, the prosecutor \u2012 who supported the application for extension \u2012 and counsel Mr V., who left the issue of the applicant\u2019s detention for determination by the court. 11.  On 8 June 2005 he arrived at Krasnoyarsk prison IZ-24/1. 12.  On 24 June 2005 the applicant filed a statement of appeal. He submitted in particular that his detention had been contrary to the requirements of the Russian Constitution and the new Code of Criminal Procedure, that the arrest warrants of 16 March 2001 and 3 June 2002 had never been served on him or his counsel, and that the detention hearing had been held in his absence. 13.  On 17 August 2005 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld this detention order on appeal, in the presence of only the prosecutor. 14.  On 21 May 2007, after two rounds of proceedings, the Regional Court found the applicant guilty of attempted murder, causing grievous bodily harm and leadership of a criminal enterprise and sentenced him to eleven years\u2019 imprisonment. 15.  On 19 February 2008 the Supreme Court upheld the conviction. 16.  On 20 December 2006 he complained to the Zheleznodorozhny District Court of Krasnoyarsk, which had territorial jurisdiction over the place of his detention, about unjustified delays in the criminal proceedings and a violation of the right to respect for his family life. He alleged that following his conviction on 9 February 2006, he had not been allowed to have any visits from his relatives. 17.  On 28 December 2006 the District Court declared his complaint inadmissible, finding that the matters complained of were outside the court\u2019s jurisdiction. On 27 February 2007 the Krasnoyarsk Regional Court upheld the inadmissibility decision at final instance. 18.  On 13 March 2007 the applicant had a meeting with his mother.", "references": ["6", "5", "8", "9", "7", "4", "3", "1", "0", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Nizhniy Tagil, the Sverdlovsk Region. 6.  On 14 October 2005 the applicant voluntarily came to the police to report that he had stabbed his girlfriend Ms O. to death. On the same date he was charged with her murder. 7.  On 15 October 2005 the applicant was placed in custody in remand prison no. 3 of Nizhniy Tagil. 8.  On 15 November 2005 the applicant underwent an outpatient psychiatric expert examination, which established that he had committed manslaughter while in the state of temporary incapacity (\u00ab\u0441\u043e\u0441\u0442\u043e\u044f\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0444\u0438\u0437\u0438\u043e\u043b\u043e\u0433\u0438\u0447\u0435\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0430\u0444\u0444\u0435\u043a\u0442\u0430\u00bb). 9.  On 9 December 2005 the investigation file was transferred for trial to the Leninskiy District Court of Nizhniy Tagil (\u201cthe District Court\u201d). 10.  On an unspecified date the District Court appointed counsel to the applicant, Mr K. 11.  On 28 March 2006 the District Court ordered another outpatient psychiatric expert examination of the applicant upon the prosecutor\u2019s request and ordered that the measure of restraint remain unvaried. 12.  On 2 June 2006 the District Court held a hearing on extension of the term of the pre-trial detention in the applicant\u2019s absence. As Mr K. was on leave, the District Court appointed Mr L. as the applicant\u2019s counsel. The District Court extended the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention until 2 September 2006. 13.  On 29 June 2006 the applicant was served with a copy of the detention order of 2 June 2006. He appealed against it on 30 June 2006. 14.  On 7 July 2006 the District Court ordered that the applicant be subject to an inpatient psychiatric expert examination and ordered that the measure of restraint remain unvaried. 15.  On 24 August 2006 the District Court held a hearing on extension of the term of the pre-trial detention in the applicant\u2019s absence. Given that Mr K. was again on leave, the District Court appointed Ms S. as the applicant\u2019s counsel for the hearing. The District Court extended the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention until 2 December 2006. 16.  On 28 August 2006 the applicant was admitted to the regional psychiatric hospital to undergo an inpatient examination pursuant to the District Court\u2019s order of 7 July 2006. 17.  On 25 September 2006 a report of the inpatient psychiatric expert examination was drawn up stating that the applicant had been fully capable of understanding the consequences of his actions at the moment of the crime. 18.  On 26 October 2006 the District Court, having examined the criminal case against the applicant, found him guilty of murder of Ms O. and sentenced him to eleven years\u2019 imprisonment. 19.  On 8 December 2006 the Sverldovsk Regional Court (\u201cthe Regional Court\u201d) examined in the absence of the applicant or any counsel on his behalf the statement of appeal of 30 June 2006 against the detention order of 2 June 2006 and dismissed it. The delay in examining the appeal was not explained. 20.  On 22 December 2006 the applicant was served with a copy of the detention order of 24 August 2006. 21.  On 25 December 2006 the applicant requested the District Court to restore the time\u2011limit for lodging an appeal against the detention order of 24 August 2006. 22.  On 15 January 2007 the District Court granted the request noting that the applicant had been served with a copy of the detention order \u201cuntimely\u201d. 23.  On 23 January 2007 the applicant appealed against the detention order of 24 August 2006. 24.  On 14 February 2007 the Regional Court upheld the applicant\u2019s conviction of 26 October 2006 on appeal. The applicant was notified of the outcome of the appeal hearing on 5 April 2007. 25.  On 30 March 2007 the Regional Court examined the applicant\u2019s statement of appeal of 23 January 2007 against the detention order of 24 August 2006 in the absence of the applicant or any counsel on his behalf and dismissed it. The delay in examining the appeal remained unexplained. 26.  The date on which the applicant was served with a copy of the appeal decision of 8 December 2006 is at dispute between the parties. According to the Government, the applicant was served with it on 7 June 2007. To support their claim, they enclosed a copy of acknowledgement of receipt dated 7 July 2006 stating that the applicant had been served on that date with a copy of a ruling of 7 July 2006. According to the applicant, he was served with the copy after the introduction of the present application before the Court, that is, after 14 June 2007. 27.  On 2 April 2013 the Cherdynskiy District Court of the Perm Region released the applicant on parole.", "references": ["8", "4", "1", "9", "0", "3", "5", "7", "6", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1953 and lived in Magnitogorsk, in the Chelyabinsk Region until his arrest. 7.  On 28 June 2011 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of having committed a criminal offence. He remained in custody throughout the investigation and trial. 8.  On 29 March 2012 the Pravoberezhniy District Court of Magnitogorsk sentenced him to thirteen years and ten months\u2019 imprisonment. The sentence was upheld on appeal by the Chelyabinsk Regional Court on 16 August 2012. 9.  In 2012, following a complaint by the applicant of pain in his lower abdomen, he was diagnosed with an enlarged prostate gland and underwent surgery in relation to that condition. 10.  In April 2013 the applicant was transferred to the prison tuberculosis hospital in Chelyabinsk for testing of his urogenital system. Two operations were performed in the hospital, but various problematic symptoms relating to his urinary system persisted. 11.  In February 2014 a biopsy of prostate tissue revealed the presence of cancer cells. The applicant was diagnosed with terminal prostate cancer which had spread to his liver and inguinal lymph nodes. His condition was aggravated by a wasting syndrome and paraneoplastic syndrome. 12.  According to the applicant, he did not have access to the required medication in the hospital, and therefore his condition worsened. 13.  On 30 October 2014 a medical panel confirmed his diagnosis, adding a list of secondary illnesses to it. The doctors concluded that the applicant\u2019s medical condition made him eligible for early release. 14.  On 26 January 2015 the Metallurgicheskiy District Court of Chelyabinsk \u201cthe District Court\u201d examined the applicant\u2019s request for early release on health grounds. In the proceedings the applicant was represented by Mr A. Lepekhin, a lawyer from Agora. 15.  At the hearing the doctor who was treating the applicant testified that his condition had significantly deteriorated since the beginning of 2014. He received painkillers in hospital, but effective medical treatment was unavailable, owing to a lack of the required medication. 16.  The acting head of the hospital stated that the applicant could only receive adequate medical treatment in another hospital. 17.  The prosecutor opposed the applicant\u2019s being released, citing his failure to reform while in detention. He also stated that the release was not necessary, as the applicant could receive the required medical treatment within the prison system. 18.  The court rejected the applicant\u2019s request for release. It found that he had failed to improve himself, that is to say, the aim of reforming him as a prisoner had not been achieved. His medical condition did not preclude further detention, as the requisite medical treatment was available within the prison system. To receive it, the applicant only needed a transfer to a different hospital. 19.  On 7 April 2015 the Chelyabinsk Regional Court upheld the above decision on appeal, having fully endorsed the reasoning of the lower court. It also noted that, in addition to pain relief and therapy to relieve symptoms, the applicant could have chemotherapy, should the prison hospital receive the required medication. 20.  In the meantime, on 26 March 2015 the applicant sought interim measures from this Court under Rule 39 to ensure adequate medical treatment or his release from detention. 21.  On 27 March 2015 the Court decided to apply Rule 39, indicating to the Government that it was desirable in the interests of the proper conduct of the proceedings that the applicant should be immediately examined by medical experts who were independent of the prison system, with a view to determining: (1) whether the treatment he was receiving in the prison hospital was adequate with regard to his condition; (2) whether his state of health was compatible with detention in prison hospital conditions; and (3) whether his condition required his placement in a specialist, possibly civilian, hospital. Furthermore, the Government were also to ensure his transfer to a specialist hospital, should the medical experts conclude that he required it. 22.  On 9 April 2015 the Government responded to the Court\u2019s letter of 27 March 2015, asserting that the scope and quality of the applicant\u2019s medical treatment in the prison hospital corresponded to his needs. They alleged that, owing to the gravity of the applicant\u2019s condition, only treatment of his symptoms was recommended, and such treatment was being provided in full. They submitted the following documents: a typed copy of the applicant\u2019s medical file; certificates from detention facilities summarising the applicant\u2019s treatment and describing his state of health; a report by a medical panel of 30 October 2014 confirming his eligibility for early release; a copy of the District Court\u2019s decision of 26 January 2015; a statement by the acting head of the hospital in which he noted that the District Court had misinterpreted his testimony given on 26 January 2015, as he had never discussed the possibility of the applicant being treated in another hospital; and a statement by the head of the prison hospital in which he confirmed that the cancer treatment was only possible in a special oncological centre, and that he had never argued that it was accessible within the prison system. 23.  On 28 May 2015 the applicant\u2019s lawyer submitted that the Government had not made arrangements for the independent medical examination indicated by the Court to be carried out. However, two independent doctors summoned by the applicant\u2019s lawyer had assessed the quality of his medical treatment in detention and the compatibility of further detention in the prison hospital with his state of health. In an expert report dated 23 May 2015 the doctors had concluded that the treatment the applicant was receiving in the prison hospital was inadequate. The belated diagnosis of prostate cancer and the failure to provide active treatment, such as glandular therapy, radiation therapy or surgery were mentioned among other major shortcomings on the part of the medical authorities. The doctors had also noted that the applicant could not be provided with adequate medical treatment in the prison hospital, because it had no licence for inpatient treatment of cancer patients and urological diseases. Accordingly, the experts had concluded that his detention in that facility did not correspond to his medical needs, and threatened his life. 24.  Over the following months the applicant\u2019s health continued to deteriorate, and the wasting syndrome progressed. 25.  On 24 August 2015 the medical panel prepared a new report, again recommending the applicant\u2019s early release on health grounds. A court hearing on the matter was scheduled for 11 September 2015. Four days before that date the applicant died of cancer. 26.  At the request of the applicant\u2019s lawyer, Mr A. Lepekhin, the Investigative Committee carried out a preliminary inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the applicant\u2019s death, which ended with a decision of 15 October 2015 not to open a criminal case.\nII.  RELEVANT DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL LAW\nMedical care afforded to detainees 27.  The relevant provisions of Russian and international law on the medical care of detainees are set out in the following judgments: Ivko v. Russia, no. 30575/08, \u00a7\u00a7 55-63, 15 December 2015; Amirov v. Russia, no. 51857/13, \u00a7\u00a7 50-57, 27 November 2014; Pakhomov v. Russia, no. 44917/08, 30 September 2011; and Yevgeniy Alekseyenko v. Russia, no. 41833/04, 27 January 2011.", "references": ["0", "9", "3", "8", "7", "2", "5", "6", "4", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1984 and lives in Volgograd. 5.  On 26 October 2002 the applicant was arrested on a charge of murder. On 28 October 2002 the Traktorozavodskiy District Court of Volgograd authorised his pre-trial detention. The applicant remained in custody during the investigation and pending the trial. 6.  On 24 November 2003 the Volgograd Regional Court scheduled the trial of the applicant and seven other defendants for 24 December 2003. The court also ruled that the trial was to be held in camera. 7.  On 26 April 2005 the Volgograd Regional Court convicted the applicant of murder committed out of national hatred and sentenced him to nine years\u2019 imprisonment. The applicant appealed. 8.  On 22 February 2006 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the applicant\u2019s conviction on appeal. The court decided to hear the applicant\u2019s case in his absence. His lawyer was present and made submissions to the court. 9.  On 30 August 2010 the applicant was released on parole. 10.  On 8 December 2010 the Presidium of the Supreme Court quashed the judgment of 22 February 2006 by way of supervisory review and remitted the matter for fresh consideration. 11.  On 1 February 2011 the Supreme Court held a new appeal hearing. The court found that the case had become time-barred under the statute of limitations and discharged the applicant from serving a prison sentence. The applicant\u2019s lawyer was present and made submissions to the court. The applicant did not attend the hearing.", "references": ["1", "0", "5", "9", "8", "4", "7", "6", "2", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant, Mr Mokhammed Makhmud, is a Somali national, who was born in 1979 and currently lives in the United States of America. 5.  On an unspecified date the applicant arrived to Russia. He was granted refugee status by the Russian authorities and applied to the United States authorities for asylum. 6.  According to the Russian authorities, the applicant was involved in transportation of four illegal migrants from Russia to Finland. 7.  On 28 May 2012 the applicant was arrested and formally charged. 8.  On 31 May 2012 the Primorsk District Court of St Petersburg remanded the applicant in custody. The District Court noted that the applicant was a foreign national without a permanent place of residence in Russia and official employment and charged with a serious crime. The District Court also noted that his application for asylum was pending before the United States Consulate in Russia. 9.  On 1 June 2012 the applicant\u2019s representative appealed. 10.  On 12 July 2012 the St Petersburg City Court quashed the detention order of 31 May 2012 on appeal and referred the matter back to the first-instance court. 11.  On 19 July 2012 the District Court, relying on the same grounds, ordered the applicant\u2019s detention between 28 May and 28 July 2012. In doing so, the District Court considered that neither the applicant\u2019s refugee status nor his permanent place of residence and dependent family members (wife and child) justified the application of an alternative preventive measure. Finally, it referred to the applicant\u2019s intention stated at the hearing eventually to leave the Russian territory. 12.  On 20 July 2012 the applicant\u2019s counsel appealed. 13.  On 3 September 2012 the St Petersburg City Court upheld the detention order on appeal. 14.  On 20 July 2012, the District Court, relying on the same grounds, extended the applicant\u2019s detention. 15.  On 26 July 2012 the applicant appealed. 16.   On 13 September 2012 the St Petersburg City Court upheld the detention order on appeal. 17.  On 12 September 2012, the District Court, relying on the same grounds, extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 14 October 2012. 18.  On 18 September 2012 the applicant appealed. 19.  On 13 December 2012 the St Petersburg City Court rejected the applicant\u2019s counsel\u2019s appeal. 20.  On 22 January 2013 the St. Petersburg City Court held a preparatory hearing and again extended the applicant\u2019s detention for another six months. 21.  On 25 January 2013 the applicant appealed. 22.  On 14 March 2013 the St Petersburg Regional Court upheld the detention order. 23.  On 4 June 2013 the District Court, by a collective detention order in respect of both co-defendants, extended the applicant\u2019s detention for another three months. 24.  On 13 June 2013 the applicant appealed. 25.  On 4 September 2013 the St Petersburg City Court upheld the detention order on appeal. 26.  On 26 September 2013 the District Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 28 December 2013. The applicant was in detention pending trial at least until 2 January 2014. 27.  On 9 April 2014 the District Court found the applicant guilty and convicted him to two years\u2019 imprisonment.", "references": ["0", "8", "5", "6", "3", "4", "9", "1", "7", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1970 and lives in Naberezhnyye Chelny. 6.  On 4 March 2012 the applicant was arrested by a police officer, Z., and accused of disorderly behaviour in a public place, an offence under Article 20.1 of the Federal Code of Administrative Offences (\u201cthe CAO\u201d), punishable by a fine or up to fifteen days\u2019 detention. It appears that the applicant was then taken to the police station and remained there for some time. 7.  In the police station, Z. compiled an administrative offence record, thereby instituting administrative offence proceedings against the applicant. The record read as follows:\n\u201c4 March 2012\nI have made the following findings under Article 28.3 of the Code of Administrative Offences:\n[The applicant] was drunk and used foul language against passers-by, waving his arms in the air; he was trying to start a fight, and did not rectify his behaviour despite remarks from passers-by. Thus, he gravely offended public order and committed an administrative offence under Article 20.1 of the CAO.\nThe fact of the offence has been confirmed by: witness K.\n[The applicant] has been informed of his rights and obligations under Articles 48 and 51 of the Constitution, and Articles 1.5, 24.2 and 25.1 of the CAO: that the person who is being prosecuted for an administrative offence has the right, inter alia, to have access to all the material in the file, to testify, to adduce evidence, to lodge interlocutory applications and challenges, and to have legal assistance.\n...\nDecision: to submit to a court\nSignature: deputy chief officer, 5 March 2012\u201d 8.  Officer Z. also issued a written report stating that the applicant had used foul language against passers-by. 9.  It appears that one of the passers-by, N., accepted a request to make a written statement attesting to the fact that the applicant had been drunk and had used foul language. 10.  On 5 March 2012 the police officer submitted the record to his superior, who decided that the case should be transferred to a court for examination. 11.  On an unspecified date, the administrative offence file was submitted to a justice of the peace for adjudication. It appears that the file contained the offence record, Z.\u2019s report and N.\u2019s statement. It is unclear whether there was any written statement from K. at that time. 12.  On 29 March 2012 the justice of the peace held a hearing. It is unclear whether it was a public one. 13.  The applicant made a written statement that he had been apprised of his procedural rights. 14.  As can be seen from the judgment in this case (see below), the applicant was accused at the trial of using foul language in the presence of other people, while being drunk, thus breaching public order. 15.  The applicant, who is himself a lawyer, did not appoint a legal representative. He pleaded not guilty and made oral submissions on the charge against him. 16.  After a request, Officer Z. was present at the hearing and made an oral statement. The court also heard N. and K.. It appears that the justice of the peace asked Z. and N. a couple of questions. 17.  By judgment of 29 March 2012 the justice of the peace found the applicant guilty and imposed a fine of 500 Russian roubles (the equivalent of 13 euros at the time) on him. The judgment read as follows:\n\u201cThe court holds that, while drunk, the defendant used foul language in the presence of other people and thus breached public order ...\nThe defendant\u2019s guilt is confirmed by Z.\u2019s report and N.\u2019s testimony ... The use of foul language in a public place is unacceptable and discloses a form of disorderly behaviour ... In the court\u2019s view, the use of aberrant language in a public place in the presence of at least one person constitutes an offence under Article 20.1 of the CAO. Moreover, the defendant continued to use foul language during his arrest and while being taken to the police station ...\u201d 18.  The applicant appealed to the Naberezhniye Chelny Town Court. He argued, inter alia, that although the offence record referred to his using foul language \u201cagainst passers-by\u201d, the justice of the peace had phrased the charge as using foul language \u201cin the presence of other people\u201d; the judge had not retained the phrase from the offence record, which stated that the applicant \u201c[had not rectified] his behaviour despite remarks from passers\u2011by\u201d. 19.  On 16 April 2012 the Town Court held a hearing. It is unclear whether it was a public hearing. The appeal court examined the applicant and upheld the judgment of 29 March 2012. On that date, the appeal decision and the trial judgment became final. The appeal court held as follows:\n\u201cThe justice of the peace convicted [the applicant] of using foul language in the presence of others, thus breaching public order ...\nThe appeal court dismisses the argument that the mere use of aberrant language in respect of one person does not disclose an offence. The offence of disorderly conduct is constituted by actions breaching public order and peace. Such actions include using foul language in a public place, insulting people, destruction of or damage to others\u2019 property ... Each of these actions may amount to disorderly behaviour if it breaches public order and discloses a manifest disregard to society ...\nCertain factual contradictions between the information in the administrative offence record, Z.\u2019s report and N.\u2019s testimony (as regards use of foul language on account of low culture rather than in respect of passers-by) were dispelled during the trial following the interview of the witnesses ...\u201d 20.  The applicant applied to the Deputy President of the Supreme Court of the Tatarstan Republic for judicial review under Article 30.12 of the CAO. Having examined the file, by decision of 15 June 2012 the Deputy President upheld the court decisions of 29 March and 16 April 2012. 21.  The applicant did not seek further review before the Supreme Court of Russia.", "references": ["1", "9", "5", "7", "0", "2", "4", "8", "6", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1973 and lives in Belgrade. 6.  The applicant and S.S. (\u201cthe respondent\u201d) married in 1998. Their son V.S. was born in August 1999. They lived in the respondent\u2019s parents\u2019 house in a neighbourhood of Belgrade. 7.  In May 2008 the applicant moved to her parents\u2019 house in the same neighbourhood. V.S. continued living with his father and his paternal grandparents. 8.  On 19 May 2008 the applicant filed a request for interim custody with the competent first-instance court. 9.  On 8 July 2008 the first-instance court rejected the applicant\u2019s request for interim custody, but granted her extensive access rights in respect of the child pending the final outcome of the custody proceedings. This interim access order was immediately enforceable. 10.  It appears that the interim access order was respected, with some resistance on the part of the child, until 13 August 2008, when the child ran away from the applicant during a visit and went back to the respondent\u2019s house. 11.  On 22 September 2008 the enforcement judge ordered enforcement of the said access order. After several failed attempts by the applicant to spend time with the child in accordance with the order, the enforcement judge sent a bailiff on 18 and 20 November 2008 to make an unannounced visit to monitor the applicant\u2019s attempt to make contact with the child. During the visit, the bailiff informed the enforcement judge that the respondent had brought the child to the front gate of the house, but the child had refused to leave with the applicant, even after the respondent tried to persuade him, and had gone back inside. After receiving the report, the enforcement judge scheduled an enforcement hearing for 5 December 2008. 12.  On 5 December 2008 the enforcement judge ordered a child support team from V.S.\u2019s school to implement a system of psychological preparation to assist the child\u2019s acceptance of contact with his mother. 13.  On 9 January 2009 the enforcement judge asked the Social Care Centre to contemplate initiating corrective monitoring of the respondent\u2019s exercise of parental rights in the light of the respondent\u2019s substantial influence on the child\u2019s hostility toward his mother. 14.  On 7 April 2009 the Social Care Centre placed the respondent under formal corrective supervision (korektivni nadzor nad vr\u0161enjem roditeljskog prava). On 19 June 2009 the Social Care Centre, with the approval of the enforcement judge, applied the same measure to the applicant so as to enhance the parents\u2019 collaboration with a view to satisfying the child\u2019s emotional needs. 15.  In the meantime, on 5 June 2009, the enforcement judge heard a psychologist working with the child. The psychologist advised the judge that interviewing the child within the proceedings would not be in his best interest. 16.  Due to the respondent\u2019s failure to prepare the child appropriately for the contact with his mother, on 4 May 2009 the enforcement judge ordered the respondent to pay a fine in the amount of 10,000 Serbian dinars (RSD) and on 6 June 2009 a fine in the amount of 150,000 RSD, both within three days. On 5 October 2009 the competent second-instance court rejected the respondent\u2019s appeals against the fines. On 19 February and 10 May 2010, after the failure of the applicant to pay the fines, the enforcement judge ordered their mandatory enforcement. 17.  On 26 November 2009 the Social Care Centre asked the enforcement judge to postpone enforcement of the access order for three months in view of the pending parental therapy. The Centre further asked for, and the judge approved, a further three months of therapy, stating that an improvement in the child\u2019s attitude as well as in the parents\u2019 relationship had been achieved. The Centre also proposed to the applicant and the respondent to stay the ongoing court proceedings until the therapy had ended. They observed that the court proceedings, in which the parents acted as opponents, jeopardised the progress achieved to date. It would appear that the applicant and the respondent did not accept this recommendation. 18.  The parental therapy, which at that time had already lasted for six months, included 23 sessions in which the Social Care Centre\u2019s professionals continuously and intensively worked with the applicant, the respondent, the child and the paternal grandparents to reach mutually acceptable arrangements and enforce the interim measures in line with the best interest of the child. 19.  On 13 July 2010 the custody judgment of 24 November 2009 became final (see paragraph 33 below) and the decision on interim custody rights came to an end. The enforcement proceedings were later formally terminated by the enforcement judge on 28 February 2011. The enforcement judge, however, explicitly ordered continuation of the enforcement in respect of the fine of June 2009. 20.  On 25 October 2008 the applicant lodged a new request for interim custody after the Mental Care Institute (Institut za mentalno zdravlje, hereafter \u201cMCI\u201d) conducted an examination of the parental capacity of both parties at the request of the first-instance court. The MCI report recommended that custody be awarded to the applicant. 21.  On 11 November 2008 the first-instance court granted interim custody to the applicant and ordered the respondent immediately to surrender the child to her. It also quashed the part of the interim order of 8 July 2008 containing its decision not to grant custody to the applicant. The rest of the interim access order remained in force. 22.  On 4 December 2008 the enforcement court ordered enforcement of the interim custody order. The respondent appealed on 26 December 2008, claiming that the child himself did not want to live with the applicant. The appeal was rejected on 29 September 2009. 23.  The first attempt to reunite the applicant with the child took place on 22 December 2008. The enforcement judge, a bailiff, several representatives of the Social Care Centre, two uniformed policemen, three plain clothes policemen, the applicant and her lawyer all entered the courtyard of the respondent\u2019s house, expecting that the child would be surrendered. The judge and the Centre\u2019s representatives explained to the child in front of the others that he should leave and go with his mother to her house, but the child rejected the planned reunion and went back inside. The respondent allegedly would not allow the enforcement to take place in the house. He maintained that he had informed the child that various officials would come, but had not prepared him for reunion. The applicant refused forceful removal of the child. The enforcement judge noted that the child was not yet prepared for a transfer of custody and postponed the enforcement until January 2009 at the Social Care Centre\u2019s premises. The enforcement judge asked the parties and the Social Care Centre\u2019s representative to prepare the child adequately for the next reunion. 24.  On 15 January and 4 February 2009 the enforcement judge adjourned the custody transfer scheduled for those dates as it was awaiting an opinion from the Social Care Centre regarding the formal corrective supervision of the respondent, as requested in the interim access enforcement proceedings (see paragraph 14 above). 25.  The enforcement judge re-scheduled the transfer of custody for 1 April 2009 at the Social Care Centre\u2019s premises. The attempt of transfer was conducted in the presence of the enforcement judge, the psychologist, the psychiatrist and the lawyer from the Social Care Centre and police officers. The child again refused to be separated from his father. The police explained that they could not forcefully remove the respondent from the premises to enable the social experts and the judge to facilitate a conversation with the child in his absence, since the child was clinging on the father, crying and refusing to let him go. It appears that the applicant was also against the use of force (according to a report to the enforcement judge by the Social Care Centre of 31 March 2010, the applicant refused the possibility of the use of force throughout the proceedings). The Social Care Centre recommended that psychotherapeutic support be provided for the child. The enforcement of the custody transfer was postponed. Shortly afterwards, the respondent was placed under the corrective supervision of the Social Care Centre (see para. 14 above). 26.  On 5 June 2009 the enforcement judge held a hearing which appears to have been the last one within these enforcement proceedings. 27.  The applicant petitioned the enforcement judge to fine the respondent for obstructing her contact with the child, hoping that this would compel him to surrender the child. 28.  On 26 June 2009 the enforcement judge imposed on the respondent a fine in the amount of 150,000 RSD for failing to appropriately psychologically prepare the child for the reunification. It would appear that the fine has been paid. 29.  On 12 February and 31 March 2010 the Social Care Centre informed the enforcement judge that its psychological therapies in respect of the family in question had produced no results (see paragraphs 17-18 above). According to their reports, it became clear that the respondent had cooperated in form only and had in fact failed to take steps to encourage the child to have substantive contact with the applicant. 30.  On 13 July 2010 the custody judgment of 24 November 2009 became final and the decision on interim custody rights came to an end. From that moment, efforts to enforce the final custody judgment commenced (see paragraphs 38-42 below). On 25 March 2011 the enforcement judge formally terminated the enforcement proceedings. 31.  On 19 May 2008 the applicant lodged a civil claim requesting the dissolution of her marriage with S.S., sole custody of V.S. and maintenance. 32.  On 24 November 2009 the first-instance court dissolved the applicant\u2019s marriage, granted her sole custody of V.S. and specified the respondent\u2019s access rights. 33.  On 13 July 2010 and 18 January 2011 the second-instance court and the Supreme Court of Cassation, respectively, upheld this judgment. 34.  On 28 December 2009 the applicant filed a constitutional appeal with the Constitutional Court of Serbia (Ustavni sud Republike Srbije). She relied on various Articles of the Constitution, Articles 6, 8 and 13 of the Convention and Articles 3 and 9 the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. She sought redress for the protracted length of the custody and subsequent criminal proceedings and the non-enforcement of the judicial interim access and custody decisions in her favour which, she claimed, violated her rights to a fair trial and to family life. She also complained that she had not had any legal avenue available to expedite those proceedings. 35.  On 22 July 2010 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal. 36.  As regards the protracted length of the custody proceedings, the Constitutional Court considered that the first-instance court had acted diligently, without any substantial periods of inactivity. It found the case to have been particularly complex, as the expert findings regarding the best interests of the child had conflicted with the latter\u2019s own wish as to who to live with. 37.  It also found that the non-enforcement of the interim access and custody orders during the same period had been attributable to the particular complexity of the case, as the child had objected to being reunited with the applicant. It found that the enforcement court had undertaken, without any delay, all necessary measures, including fining the respondent, for the purpose of enforcing effectively the applicant\u2019s rights. 38.  The judgment of 24 November 2009 became enforceable on 27 September 2010 and the enforcement order was issued on 29 November 2010. 39.  The first forcible transfer of custody was scheduled for 9 March 2011, but the child refused any kind of contact with the applicant. The court noted that the respondent had failed to prepare the child for reunion. The applicant explicitly refused to countenance the use of force against the respondent and the child as the means of enforcement. The enforcement was therefore adjourned. 40.  On 23 March 2011, upon the initiative of the Social Care Centre, the applicant and the respondent signed an Agreement on Access Rights designed to assist the re-establishing of contact between the applicant and V.S. in order to facilitate the enforcement of the custody judgment. 41.  Despite this agreement, on 25 March 2011 the enforcement court imposed a fine on the respondent in the amount of RSD 100,000 because of his failure to comply with the judgment of 24 November 2009. It also ruled that the respondent was to be given three days from the date of receipt of that order to surrender the child voluntarily to the applicant and with the added condition that, should he fail to do so, he would have to pay a further fine of RSD 150,000. The respondent did not comply with the order and it seems that the fine in the amount of 100.000 RSD was subsequently imposed and paid. 42.  The court scheduled a new forcible transfer of custody for 9 March 2011. In preparation for the enforcement, the Social Care Centre\u2019s psychologist drew up a detailed plan of action. The psychologist\u2019s assessment, after working with the child, was that such a transfer would be impossible or highly traumatic for the child and the enforcement was postponed once again. 43.  On 9 February 2011 the respondent filed a claim for revision of the judgment of 24 November 2009, seeking sole custody of V.S. He also requested an interim custody order to the same effect. 44.  On 24 June 2011 the Social Care Centre provided the first-instance court with an expert opinion. The Social Care Centre acknowledged that there had been no mechanisms available to facilitate a forcible physical transfer of child custody to the applicant in view of the respondent\u2019s refusal. According to the report, the only feasible proposal would be for the child to continue living with his father. Even though, taking into account the chronology of events, parental capacity, justice and equity, the opposite proposal would be more appropriate, it could propose only this arrangement \u201cnot as an expression of their wish, but as the sole solution which is possible to impose and enforce in practice\u201d. A change of residence would in any event have a negative impact on the child\u2019s development. 45.  On 20 June 2012 the first-instance court granted sole custody to the respondent, ordered the applicant to pay child maintenance and specified the applicant\u2019s access rights as eight hours every weekend, as well as specified periods of school holidays. 46.  On 29 August 2008 and 23 June 2009 the applicant filed criminal complaints against the respondent for parental child abduction and continuous non-compliance with the interim access and custody orders. On 2 June 2009 and 28 September 2010 the competent prosecutor\u2019s office charged the applicant with those crimes. None of the scheduled hearings was held. In September 2011 the first-instance court stayed the criminal proceedings as the prosecutor\u2019s office had dropped the charges. The applicant subsequently took over the prosecution as subsidiary prosecutor. On 20 June 2012 the first-instance court, in a reasoned judgment, acquitted the respondent. It found, on the basis of numerous testimonies, three expert opinions, four expert reports from the civil proceedings case-file and other documentary evidence that the respondent always made the child available for enforcement, that he never physically or verbally, actively or passively obstructed enforcement at any point, and that there were no indications that the child ever showed signs that he was under pressure or undue influence not to have contact with his mother. On 25 October 2012 the second-instance court upheld this judgment. 47.  It would appear that the applicant and her son have re-established contact with each other since the signing of the Agreement on Access Rights of 23 March 2011 and the revision of the custody judgment of 20 June 2012. It would appear that they have been meeting every weekend for at least an hour without supervision. The child still lives with the respondent.", "references": ["1", "2", "9", "7", "0", "3", "4", "8", "5", "6", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 6.  The first applicant, Mr Aleksey Yuryevich Vlasov, was born in 1957 and lives in Moscow. 7.  On 6 October 2008 Mr Vlasov applied to the Federal Migration Service for a travel passport which would allow him to go abroad. 8.  On 27 October 2008 the Golovinskiy District Court of Moscow convicted him of smuggling and sentenced him as follows:\n\u201c... the penalty in the form of three years\u2019 imprisonment is not to be enforced and is to be considered conditional with a three years\u2019 probationary period.\nTo require Mr Alexey Vlasov to report twice a month during the probationary period to the authority in charge of execution of conditional sentences, and to inform [that authority] of any change of residence ...\u201d 9.  On 11 November 2008 his application for a travel passport was refused by reference to the fact that he had been given a suspended three\u2011year sentence whose period of suspension had not yet expired. 10.  The applicant Mr Vlasov applied for judicial review of the refusal. 11.  On 3 June 2009 the Butyrskiy District Court of Moscow upheld the refusal as lawful, finding as follows:\n\u201cThe argument by Mr Vlasov to the effect that the Golovinskiy District Court\u2019s judgment of 27 October 2008 contained an exhaustive list of restrictions during the probation period which did not include a restriction on leaving Russia and which was not, in the claimant\u2019s view, subject to expansive interpretation by State officials, does not contradict section 15(4) of the Entry and Exit Procedures Act which provides for a restriction on the right to leave for abroad in cases of both actual custodial and suspended sentences. A person who is given a suspended sentence is a convicted offender serving a sentence, and may be relieved from punishment only after the period of suspension has expired. Mr Vlasov\u2019s period of suspension expires on 14 January 2012 and after its expiry Mr Vlasov\u2019s criminal conviction will be spent in accordance with Article 86 of the Criminal Code. Until that time Mr Vlasov is an offender serving a sentence, which is a ground for restricting his right to leave for abroad.\u201d 12.  On 18 August 2009 the Moscow City Court rejected an appeal against the District Court\u2019s judgment. It held:\n\u201cThe arguments that Mr Vlasov was subjected to restrictions that go beyond those imposed by his conviction and that he was compelled to serve the sentence within the Russian Federation, whereas he needed to take care of his business interests and perform his duties abroad, are not grounds for setting aside the correct judgment [of the first-instance court].\u201d 13.  The second applicant, Mr Mikhail Mikhaylovich Benyash, was born in 1977 and lives in Sochi. 14.  On 31 August 2011 the Tsentralnyy District Court of Sochi convicted Mr Benyash of extortion and sentenced him to three years\u2019 imprisonment, suspended for three years. He was released in the courtroom. On 12 October 2011 the Krasnodar Regional Court upheld the conviction on appeal. 15.  On 5 December 2011 the Federal Migration Service refused Mr Benyash\u2019s application for a travel passport, noting that he had been arrested on 1 September 2010 and that, according to the available information, the criminal proceedings against him were still pending. 16.  The applicant Mr Benyash applied for judicial review of the refusal. 17.  On 28 June 2012 the Tsentralnyy District Court of Sochi upheld the refusal as lawful:\n\u201c...for the time being the conviction of 31 August 2011 is not yet spent, Mr Benyash is a convicted offender, and, accordingly, the refusal [of travel documents] does not violate his rights\u201d. 18.  On 29 November 2012 the Krasnodar Regional Court rejected the appeal, endorsing the reasoning of the District Court. 19.  On 11 April 2013 the Regional Court refused him leave to appeal to the cassation instance.", "references": ["5", "9", "2", "1", "7", "4", "3", "8", "6", "0", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Radishchevo, Moscow Region. 6.  In 1997, as a result of an accident, the applicant\u2019s house had partially burnt and he had to live in the attic, which was not designed for lodging. The applicant considered that in the circumstances the authorities were under an obligation to provide him with free housing. His civil action against the municipality was dismissed in court. 7.  In January 2006 the applicant lodged complaints with the State Duma and the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation against the judges who had dealt with his civil case. In particular, the applicant, using abusive language, accused them of having taken bribes from the defendant in the amount of USD 30,000, falsification of evidence, terrorism, abuse of power as well as inciting racial and ethnic hatred. 8.  On 13 March 2006 the applicant was arrested under suspicion of having committed defamation of a judge and deliberately false denunciation. 9.  On 14 March 2006 the Meshanskiy District Court of Moscow (\u041c\u0435\u0449\u0430\u043d\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0439 \u0440\u0430\u0439\u043e\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u0441\u0443\u0434 \u0433. \u041c\u043e\u0441\u043a\u0432\u044b) remanded the applicant in custody. His detention on remand was subsequently extended at regular intervals by relevant detention orders. 10.  The investigator ordered the applicant\u2019s psychiatric evaluation in the State Academic Centre for Social and Forensic Psychiatry in Moscow (\u0413\u043e\u0441\u0443\u0434\u0430\u0440\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u043d\u0430\u0443\u0447\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u0446\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0440 \u0441\u043e\u0446\u0438\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u0438 \u0441\u0443\u0434\u0435\u0431\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u043f\u0441\u0438\u0445\u0438\u0430\u0442\u0440\u0438\u0438 \u0438\u043c. \u0412.\u041f. \u0421\u0435\u0440\u0431\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0433\u043e) (\u201cthe Forensic Psychiatry Centre\u201d). 11.  On 20 June 2006 the experts concluded that he showed symptoms of paranoid personality development, was in need of an outpatient supervision and treatment. At the same time they concluded that the applicant was sane, fit to stand trial and highlighted that he had no history of mental disorders. 12.  On 1 August 2006 the prosecution transferred the applicant\u2019s case to the Moscow City Court (\u041c\u043e\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0432\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0439 \u0433\u043e\u0440\u043e\u0434\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u0441\u0443\u0434) for examination. The City Court ordered an additional forensic psychiatric examination by the Forensic Psychiatry Centre. 13.  On 21 November 2006 the experts concluded that the applicant was suffering from a chronic mental disorder - paranoid personality development \u2013 and needed involuntary treatment in a specialised psychiatric facility. The experts based their assessment, inter alia, on the applicant\u2019s \u201covervalued\u201d ideas expressed in numerous petitions to various authorities \u201cin a grotesque form\u201d, attempts to \u201cfind the truth\u201d, contradictions in his opinions, ambivalence etc. The experts also concluded that the applicant had been insane at the time of the impugned offences and unfit to stand trial. 14.  On an unspecified date the City Court ordered another forensic psychiatric examination of the applicant by the Forensic Psychiatry Centre. 15.  On 7 February 2007 the new report confirmed the findings of the previous report of 21 November 2006. In addition, the experts found that the applicant was a danger to society, stating as follows:\n\u201c[T]aking into account that [the applicant] shows, in subjectively significant situations, a tendency towards rapid formation of overvalued ideas which sometimes reach a delusional level, broadening of the circle of persons brought into the focus of these emotions, grave emotional disturbances with non-corrective behavior, rejection of regime requirements, lack of critical attitude to his [emotional] state, dissimulation, [he] is a danger to the society and needs compulsory treatment in a specialised psychiatric hospital\u201d. 16.  On 20 February 2007 the City Court having established the principal facts in respect of the abovementioned offences discontinued criminal proceedings against the applicant due to his insanity. The court referring to the findings and recommendations of the psychiatrists ordered the applicant\u2019s involuntary treatment in a psychiatric hospital. 17.  On 5 April 2007 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation summarily upheld the lower court\u2019s decision. 18.  In April 2007 the applicant was transferred from a remand prison to a psychiatric facility. In June 2008 he was released from the hospital.", "references": ["4", "6", "0", "9", "3", "8", "1", "7", "5", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1966 and lives in Chi\u0219in\u0103u. 6.  The applicant was a shareholder in a limited liability company created in 2002 with a registered capital of 5,400 Moldovan lei (MDL) (the equivalent of some 396 euros (EUR)). At the time of the events he owned 50% of the company\u2019s shares. The other half of the shares was owned by A.N. 7.  On 13 January 2009 A.N. lodged an action with the Chi\u015fin\u0103u Economic Court seeking the applicant\u2019s exclusion from the list of shareholders on the grounds, inter alia, that he had not paid for his part of the shares, that is to say he had only paid MDL 1,080 instead of MDL 2,700. The applicant objected, claiming that the action was time-barred: under the relevant law, it had to be introduced within three years of the creation of the company. The applicant also presented bank documents which showed that A.N. had not paid his part of the shares until September 2009. 8.  On 14 March 2009 the Chi\u015fin\u0103u Economic Court dismissed the action against the applicant on the grounds that it was time-barred. A.N. appealed. 9.  The hearings before the Economic Court of Appeal took place on five different dates: 30 April, 27 May, 2 June, 4 June and 9 June 2009. On 2 June 2009 A.N.\u2019s representative submitted that the applicant had not paid his contribution and that he had been asked to do so every year since the creation of the company in 2002. When asked whether there were any minutes to confirm the contention that the applicant had been summoned to pay his contribution, he answered that he was not aware of any such minutes. 10.  On 4 June 2009 A.N.\u2019s representative presented for the first time minutes of a meeting of the company\u2019s shareholders, which had allegedly taken place on 20 February 2007. The minutes showed that the applicant had admitted to not having paid for the totality of his shares and had pledged to pay within one month or lose his status as a shareholder in the company. 11.  The applicant objected that the minutes in question had been forged. He argued, inter alia, that his first name had been spelt wrongly and that the signature was not his. He requested that an expert authentication of his signature be carried out. His request was not mentioned in the transcript of the hearing. 12.  On 9 June 2009 the parties made their closing statements at the hearing before the Economic Court of Appeal. The applicant reiterated that the minutes of a shareholders\u2019 meeting dated 20 February 2007 had been forged and requested that an expert authentication be carried out. A document containing his submissions was attached to the file. 13.  On the same date the Economic Court of Appeal adopted a judgment in the case by which it upheld the appeal, reversed the judgment of the first-instance court and found in favour of A.N. In ruling on the case, the Court of Appeal relied entirely on the minutes of the shareholders\u2019 meeting dated 20  February 2007. 14.  Several days after the pronouncement of the judgment, the applicant had access to the case file and noted that the transcript of the hearing of 4 June 2009 did not contain a record of his request for an expert authentication of his signature. He made an official request to have the transcript corrected. However, on 17 June 2009 the Economic Court of Appeal rejected his request. 15.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court of Justice claiming, inter alia, that the proceedings had been unfair because the Economic Court of Appeal had used as the main and sole piece of evidence in the ruling against him a forged document, namely the minutes of a shareholders\u2019 meeting dated 20 February 2007. The Economic Court of Appeal had given decisive weight to that document in spite of his express statement that the signature on the document was not his. He had requested to have the document authenticated by an expert, but the court had rejected his request without giving any reasons. He stressed that A.N. had not relied on the minutes of 20 February 2007 either in his initial action or in his appeal against the judgment 14 March 2009. He had presented them for the first time during the fourth hearing before the Economic Court of Appeal. In support of his assertion that the minutes in question had been forged, the applicant submitted evidence that between 11 and 22 February 2007 he had been undergoing medical treatment in Israel and could not therefore have attended a shareholders\u2019 meeting held on 20 February 2007. He presented documents issued by the Moldovan border authorities and Israeli stamps in his passport confirming his travel to Israel between the above-mentioned dates. He also reiterated his objection concerning the statute of limitations and urged the Supreme Court to quash the judgment of the Economic Court of Appeal and order a re-examination of the case. 16.  In the proceedings before the Supreme Court of Justice, A.N. presented for the first time a copy of minutes of a meeting of the company\u2019s shareholders which had allegedly taken place on 23 February 2007. In the new minutes the applicant was recorded as acknowledging that in the previous minutes dated 20 February 2007, the date had been wrongly indicated and that the correct date should have been 23 February 2007. 17.  On 17 December 2009 the Supreme Court of Justice dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law, upholding the judgment of the Economic Court of Appeal. It did not respond to the applicant\u2019s argument that A.N.\u2019s action was time-barred or to the contention that the Economic Court of Appeal\u2019s judgment had been based on a forged document. Nor did the Supreme Court respond to the applicant\u2019s argument that the Economic Court of Appeal had rejected without any reasons his request for an expert authentication of the minutes of 20 February 2007. Instead, relying on the minutes of 20 February 2007, the Supreme Court concluded that the applicant had not paid the totality of his shares in the company. The Supreme Court did not mention the new minutes dated 23 February 2007 presented by A.N. in the proceedings before it. 18.  On an unspecified date the applicant lodged a criminal complaint against A.N., alleging that he had forged the company shareholders\u2019 minutes dated 20 February 2007. In the course of the criminal proceedings, an expert from the National Forensic Centre presented his report dated 7 August 2010, in which he concluded that the signature on the minutes of the company shareholders\u2019 meeting dated 20 February 2007 did not belong to the applicant. The criminal proceedings are pending.", "references": ["5", "7", "8", "1", "4", "9", "0", "6", "2", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicants were prosecuted in Russia for various crimes. They were arrested and detained while the crimes were investigated and pending trial. Their detention was ordered and extended by the courts. The detention orders were essentially based on the gravity of the charges, the primary grounds being the risk of the applicants\u2019 absconding and interfering with the course of justice. The detention and extension orders used stereotyped formulae, without addressing specific facts or considering alternative preventive measures. 5.  The first applicant was born on 27 April 1961 and lived, prior to his arrest, in Poronaysk, Sakhalin Region. He was arrested on 27 February 2003 on suspicion of sexual assault and was placed in detention. He remained in custody while the crime was investigated and pending trial. On 9 February 2007 the Poronayskiy Town Court of the Sakhalin Region convicted him of sexual assault and sentenced him to six years and nine months\u2019 imprisonment. On 6 June 2007 the Sakhalin Regional Court upheld his conviction on appeal. 6.  The second applicant was born on 29 May 1971 and lived, prior to his conviction, in Samara. He was arrested on 13 March 2007 on suspicion of bribery. On 14 March 2007 he was released. On 29 March 2007 he was arrested again and placed in custody. He was released on 12 September 2007. On 20 May 2008 he was convicted of bribery and sentenced to one year and six months\u2019 imprisonment. 7.  The third applicant was born on 14 October 1979 and lived, prior to his arrest, in Ulybino, Novosibirsk Region. He was arrested on 15 August 2007 on suspicion of drug dealing. He remained in custody while the crime was investigated and pending trial. On 3 February 2011 the Novosibirsk Regional Court convicted him of drug dealing and abuse of power, and sentenced him to eight years and six months\u2019 imprisonment. On 18 October 2011 the Supreme Court of Russia upheld his conviction on appeal. 8.  The fourth applicant was born on 29 November 1986 and lived, prior to his conviction, in Turukhansk, Krasnoyarsk Region. On 23 April 2010 he was arrested on suspicion of murder. On 24 April 2010 a court remanded him in custody. His detention was subsequently extended. On 17 October 2012 he was convicted of aggravated murder and was sentenced to fifteen years\u2019 imprisonment. 9.  On various dates the applicants\u2019 complaints about lengthy pre-trial detention were communicated to the Government. The Government were asked to inform the Court of their position regarding a friendly settlement of the cases and any proposals they wished to make. The Government did not reply. 10.  On 27 August 2015 the Court invited the applicants to submit their claims for just satisfaction. The applicants did not reply.", "references": ["9", "6", "1", "0", "3", "7", "4", "5", "8", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "8.  The applicant was born in Pakistan in 1963 and currently lives in sheltered accommodation in Haina (Land of Hesse, Germany). 9.  In December 1991 the applicant and her husband, a Pakistani national, arrived in Germany. The husband was granted refugee status. In October 1993 the applicant\u2019s own application for the same status was refused. On 16 June 1994 she was granted a temporary residence permit as the spouse of a refugee. On 11 February 1995 she gave birth to a son. In 1998 the couple separated. The son stayed with the applicant, who then worked as a cleaner in different companies. 10.  On 7 September 2001 she was awarded a permanent residence permit. 11.  In March 2004 the applicant lost her job on account of behavioural issues. In July 2004 she and her husband divorced. In 2005 a family court transferred custody rights over her son to her former husband and ruled that the child should live with his father from then on. 12.  On 31 May 2004 the applicant was placed in pre-trial detention for having killed a neighbour. Following an attempt to self-harm, she was provisionally transferred to a psychiatric hospital. 13.  On 13 July 2005 the Giessen Regional Court ordered the applicant\u2019s permanent confinement in a psychiatric hospital. It established that she had committed manslaughter while in a state of mental incapacity, noting that at the material time she had been suffering from acute psychosis. A medical expert certified that she had symptoms of schizophrenia and diminished intelligence, and that she was unaware of her own psychological condition. The Regional Court concluded that she still represented a danger for the general public and therefore had to be committed to a psychiatric hospital. A guardian was also appointed for the applicant. 14.  On 4 June 2009 the Waldeck-Frankenberg administrative authority ordered the applicant\u2019s expulsion. Referring in particular to the act which had led to her committal to the psychiatric hospital and her general state of mental health, the authority concluded that she posed a danger to public safety which outweighed her personal interest in not being expelled, despite her long stay in Germany and her residence status. It noted that the applicant was not economically integrated, had an insufficient command of German, which was an obstacle to her therapy, only had limited contact with her former husband and her son and remained immersed in Pakistani culture. The authority added that the applicant could be given the necessary medical treatment for her condition in Pakistan and receive support from her family there. 15.  The applicant lodged an appeal against that decision with the Kassel Administrative Court, accompanied by a request for a stay of execution. During the interlocutory proceedings the administrative authorities undertook not to execute the expulsion order until the Administrative Court had ruled on the merits. 16.  In November 2009 the applicant was granted certain privileges in the hospital, such as occasional days of leave, and subsequently, after an improvement in her mental health, she started working full\u2011time in the hospital\u2019s laundry department. 17.  On 1 March 2011 the Administrative Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. In reaching that decision it noted that she had committed a serious act, that she lacked awareness of her own condition and that there was a high risk of her reoffending. Moreover, she was not socially and economically integrated into German society, especially owing to her lack of German language skills. The Administrative Court added that the applicant had no significant family ties in Germany because she had been divorced for years and parental authority over her son had been granted to his father. With regard to the situation in Pakistan, it noted that according to information supplied by the German Embassy in Pakistan, basic medical care for patients with mental illness was available in large cities such as Lahore and that the applicant could afford the treatment she needed as she would be receiving a monthly pension of around 250 euros (EUR). It found that although members of the applicant\u2019s family in Pakistan had indicated to the German Embassy that they were not prepared to take her in, it was conceivable that they might help her to arrange for the required treatment in return for payment of a few euros. It also endorsed the administrative authority\u2019s conclusion that the applicant had not expressed prominent views in favour of the Ahmadiyya religion, so there would be no specific danger for her in that regard. 18.  On 23 May 2011 the Hesse Administrative Court of Appeal refused the applicant leave to appeal, noting that the Administrative Court had taken into account all the relevant facts of the case. On 2 August 2011 it dismissed a complaint by the applicant of a breach of the right to be heard, in which she had, in particular, argued that the court had not given proper consideration to her submissions on her improved state of health, the death of her sister in Pakistan and the living conditions she would face in the event of her return there. 19.  On 13 December 2011 the Federal Constitutional Court, without providing reasons, dismissed a constitutional complaint by the applicant (no. 2 BvR 1923/11). 20.  Previously, on 24 November 2011, the Marburg Regional Court, on the recommendation of a medical expert, had suspended the implementation of the hospital treatment order and released the applicant on probation (F\u00fchrungsaufsicht) for a five-year period. The applicant was, in particular, required to remain in regular contact with the hospital\u2019s medical personnel and to continue to take the prescribed medication. The Regional Court held that, thanks to the treatment, the danger of the applicant\u2019s reoffending had receded sufficiently for the residual risk to be tolerable. 21.  Since the expulsion order was issued, the applicant\u2019s presence in Germany has been tolerated under the tolerated residence (Duldung) measures set out in section 60a of the Residence Act (see paragraph 27 below). The latest of these measures, which are generally valid for six months, was ordered on 22 March 2016 and is valid until 17 February 2017. 22.  In its judgment of 23 April 2015 the Chamber held, by six votes to one, that there had been no violation of Article 8 of the Convention (see paragraph 4 above). 23.  Following the Chamber judgment, on 14 September 2015 a panel of the Grand Chamber acceded to the applicant\u2019s request for the case to be referred to the Grand Chamber (see paragraph 5 above). 24.  In their observations of 7 January 2016 on the merits of the case, the Government, in their own name and on behalf of the Land of Hesse, which is responsible for deciding on the applicant\u2019s residence rights, gave an assurance that before taking any measures for the applicant\u2019s removal, the German administrative authorities would issue a new expulsion order taking account of the time which had passed. They further certified that a new expulsion order could not be issued unless and until a thorough medical examination of the applicant had confirmed that neither her removal nor her settlement in Pakistan would expose her to a life-threatening medical risk. 25.  Subsequently, in reply to several questions put by the Court, the Government declared that the administrative authorities would not expel the applicant on the basis of the original expulsion order, that the assurance they had given could be relied on to prevent any attempt to remove the applicant on the basis of the original expulsion order and that the German authorities considered themselves bound by that undertaking at all levels, since it had been made in consultation with and with the agreement of the Hesse Land government. 26.  On 9 February 2016 the Government officially requested that the Court strike the application out of its list of cases in accordance with Article 37 \u00a7 1 (b) of the Convention. On that occasion they reiterated the aforementioned assurance, specifying that any new expulsion order would replace the original one and that the applicant would have access to all the remedies available in German law if she wished to challenge it.", "references": ["2", "1", "7", "5", "0", "6", "8", "9", "4", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1973 and is currently serving a prison sentence in Sokyryany Prison no. 67. 6.  In September 2001 the applicant and an acquaintance, F., decided to carry out a carjacking. On the night of 17-18 September 2001 they stopped a taxi for that purpose. F. shot the driver in the head and the two then took him to a forest, where F. and the applicant fired several more shots into the victim and abandoned the body. According to the applicant, he believed that the driver was already dead when he shot at him. When driving the car later on, the applicant and F. encountered the traffic police who ordered them to stop. They did not obey the order and attempted to flee. The applicant threw a grenade at the police, but it went wide. Eventually F., who was driving, lost control of the car, which caused it to stop. The applicant opened fire and seriously wounded one of the police officers. 7.  In order to overcome the applicant\u2019s resistance, the police officers hit him on the head several times with the handle of a gun. He lost consciousness and was handcuffed. His apprehension took place at about 3 a.m. on 18 September 2001. 8.  While the parties were not in dispute as regards the facts summarised above, their account of subsequent events differed. 9.  According to the Government, no further coercive measures were used against the applicant. 10.  According to the applicant, he was seriously ill-treated after his arrest and his account of subsequent events is as follows. In his application form he submitted that once the police had seen him regain consciousness, at about 5 a.m., they had taken him to the Suvorivskyy district police station where they had beaten him. In his observations in reply to those of the Government, the applicant added that he had also been beaten in the two hours between his apprehension and transportation to the police station. The applicant also alleged that upon his arrival at the police station the officers had thrown him to the floor and had started kicking and punching him and hitting him with rubber truncheons. They had allegedly sought to take revenge on him for wounding their colleague and to make him confess to the criminal offences under investigation. The applicant\u2019s beating had allegedly continued until 7 or 8 a.m. 11.  At an unspecified time on the morning of 18 September 2001 a forensic medical expert examined the applicant. As noted in the report of the examination, the applicant was 195 cm tall and was of strong constitution. The following injuries were detected: four painful swellings (two of which were coupled with sores) of up to 4 cm in diameter on the back part of the head and on both temples, two oval bruises on the forehead of 8 x 5 cm and 5 x 4 cm, bruises on both eyelids, a slightly swollen bridge of the nose, bruises on the sides of the nose extending to the eyelids, and linear sores on both wrists. The expert found that the applicant could have sustained the injuries in question in the course of his arrest. The applicant stated to the expert that he had not been beaten in police custody. 12.  According to the applicant, his medical examination was limited to the visible parts of his body not covered by clothes, and the expert failed to document the many bruises that covered the rest of his body. The applicant also alleged that the police officers had talked to the doctor in private before the examination. Furthermore, they had allegedly threatened the applicant that if he complained they would kill him. 13.  As further submitted by the applicant, on 29 September 2001 the police tried to transfer him from the Kherson Temporary Detention Facility (\u201cthe ITT\u201d, part of the police system) to the Kherson Pre-Trial Detention Centre (\u201cthe SIZO\u201d), but the SIZO\u2019s administration refused to admit him because of his many injuries. 14.  On 5 October 2001 the applicant was transferred to the SIZO, where a doctor examined him. No injuries were documented. The applicant submitted to the Court, without providing any further details, that the report of the examination had been wrongly dated as 8 October 2001 (instead of 5 October) and that it had been false. 15.  The applicant stated that throughout his detention in the ITT, from 18 September to 5 October 2001, he had been subjected to torture such as the administration of electric shocks, being suspended from a horizontal metal bar while his hands were handcuffed behind his back, suffocation with a gas mask and plastic bag, and having his fingers crushed in doors. The applicant also alleged that police officers had jumped on his chest from a desk while he lay on the floor. 16.  With his observations to the Court of 16 July 2014 the applicant submitted a handwritten copy of a complaint to the Kherson regional prosecutor\u2019s office (\u201cthe Kherson prosecutor\u2019s office\u201d) dated 5 October 2001 (with a handwritten confirmation by two inmates that the applicant had handed the complaint to the guard on duty for dispatching). He complained about his \u201ccontinual beating, torture and humiliation\u201d following his arrest on 18 September and during his detention in the ITT. He further submitted that the medical examination of 18 September 2001 had been incomplete and that the Kherson SIZO had disregarded his requests for a medical examination and the documentation of various injuries, which he did not specify. 17.  According to another, similar handwritten note submitted to the Court on 16 July 2014, the applicant had on 7 October 2001 complained to the governor of the Kherson SIZO that the guards had torn up his complaints to the prosecution authorities on 5 and 6 October 2001. He also complained that although he had been taken to the SIZO on 5 October 2001 with injuries all over his body, the SIZO official on duty had rejected his request for a medical examination. 18.  According to the applicant, on 9 October 2001 he sent another complaint to the Kherson prosecutor\u2019s office. 19.  On 18 February 2002 a forensic medical report was issued in respect of the applicant\u2019s injuries following his arrest. Having studied the case file, the forensic expert stated that the applicant had had a hemorrhage in the soft tissues of his head, sores and bruises on his face and scalp, and sores on his wrists. The injuries in question could have been inflicted on 18 September 2001 in the circumstances the applicant had described during his questioning as an accused (that is resulting from being hit on the head with the handle of a gun). The expert classified the injuries as minor. There is no further information in the case file about the report or where it was used. 20.  The applicant raised his complaint of ill-treatment during his trial at the Kherson Regional Court of Appeal (\u201cthe Kherson Court\u201d, see, in particular, paragraphs 40 and 41 below). As a result, on 21 May 2003 a trial court judge requested that the Kherson prosecutor\u2019s office carry out an investigation into the matter. 21.  On 30 May 2003 the Kherson prosecutor\u2019s office refused to open a criminal case against the police officers for lack of corpus delicti in their actions. The prosecutor relied on the statements of the police officers, who denied ill-treating the applicant and his co-defendants, as well as on documents from the SIZO administration, which stated that no injuries had been found on the defendants during their medical examinations and that they had not raised any complaints. According to the applicant, he had only been able to familiarise himself with the prosecutor\u2019s decision after almost a year, on 2 March 2004. 22.  As the applicant and his co-defendants maintained their complaints during the trial, in June 2003 the judge once again requested that the prosecution authorities investigate the matter. 23.  On 7 November 2003 the Kherson prosecutor\u2019s office again refused to open a criminal case against the police officers, using the same reasoning as before. 24.  The applicant challenged that decision before the courts. 25.  On 30 July 2004 a judge at the Kherson Komsomolskyy District Court (\u201cthe Komsomolskyy Court\u201d), following a hearing which included the prosecutor but not the applicant or his lawyer, dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaint as unfounded. 26.  On 7 September 2004 the Kherson Court quashed that decision as being formalistic and lacking reasoning. It remitted the case to the same court for fresh examination by a different judge. 27.  On 10 September 2004 the Komsomolskyy Court once again dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaint. This time the applicant\u2019s lawyer was present at the hearing. The judge heard the parties and studied the case file. He noted that the prosecutor had rightly dismissed the applicant\u2019s allegation of ill-treatment after questioning all those involved and studying the relevant reports on the medical examinations. 28.  On 19 October 2004 the Kherson Court, siting as a panel of three judges, upheld that decision and its reasoning. 29.  On 3 December 2004 the Supreme Court rejected the applicant\u2019s request for leave to appeal against the above decisions on points of law on the ground that the criminal proceedings against him were still pending. 30.  On 18 September 2001, at about 3 a.m., the applicant was arrested by the traffic police. At 10 a.m. the police drew up a report about his arrest. He was placed in the Kherson ITT. 31.  On the same date criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant on suspicion of aggravated robbery and murder, illegal arms handling and an attempt on the life of law-enforcement officials. By that time there were already other criminal proceedings pending against him. 32.  On an unspecified date further charges were brought against the applicant and several other people. Overall, the criminal proceedings in question involved twelve suspects and concerned twelve episodes of criminal activity, including numerous counts of theft, robbery and murder, committed between 1998 and 2001. 33.  On 22 September 2001 the Komsomolskyy Court ordered the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention for an initial period of two months. The court referred to the seriousness of the charges against the applicant and noted that he might abscond or hinder the investigation if at liberty. That decision could be challenged on appeal within three days of its pronouncement. The hearing took place in the presence of the prosecutor, but in the absence of the applicant and his lawyer. According to a handwritten note with the judge\u2019s signature, the applicant was told of the decision on the day it was pronounced. The applicant, however, said that he became aware of it after a considerable delay, which prevented him from lodging an appeal. 34.  On 24 September 2001 the investigator in charge of the case issued a decision to extend the term of the applicant\u2019s detention in the ITT to ten days (instead of the legally allowed maximum of three days, after which the applicant had to be transferred to the local SIZO \u2013 see paragraph 77 below). That decision was explained by the need to carry out witness confrontations, crime reconstructions and other investigative measures with the applicant\u2019s participation. 35.  On 12 November 2001 the Komsomolskyy Court extended the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention to four months on the ground that he was suspected of grave criminal offences and there were no reasons to change the preventive measure. The applicant\u2019s lawyer, who was present at the hearing, did not object. The applicant could appeal against that decision within three days, but did not do so. 36.  On 10 January 2002 the Kherson Court, following a hearing which included the prosecutor, but not the applicant or his lawyer, extended the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention to six months (until 18 March 2002) on the same grounds as before. That decision was not amenable to appeal. According to the applicant, he only became aware of it after a long delay. 37.  On 1 March 2002 the pre-trial investigation was completed and the applicant and his lawyer received access to the case file. 38.  On 18 March 2002 the applicant complained to both the prosecution authorities and the courts that the period of his pre-trial detention had expired on that date and had not been extended. Accordingly, he requested to be released without delay. It appears that there was no follow-up to his complaints. 39.  On 14 June 2002 the applicant and his co-accused were indicted. 40.  On 5 August 2002 the Kherson Court held a preparatory hearing, during which it decided to keep the applicant in detention. The case file does not contain a copy of that decision. 41.  On 7 December 2004 the Kherson Court found the applicant guilty of the charges and sentenced him to life imprisonment. 42.  On 11 May 2006 the Supreme Court quashed that judgment and remitted the case to the same trial court for fresh examination. It held, in particular, that the applicant\u2019s defence rights had been violated on account of his removal from the hearing, in breach of procedural rules. The Supreme Court also ruled to keep the applicant in detention as a preventive measure, without further reasoning. 43.  On 20 April 2007 the Kherson Court delivered a new judgment convicting the applicant of various criminal offences and sentenced him to fifteen years\u2019 imprisonment. 44.  On 8 April 2008 the Supreme Court quashed that judgment in the part concerning the applicant on the grounds that the trial court had modified the charges against him without respecting the applicable procedural rules. Accordingly, the case was remitted for fresh consideration again. The ruling of the Supreme Court made no mention of any preventive measure in respect of the applicant pending the delivery of a new judgment. 45.  On 29 December 2009 the Kherson Court again found the applicant guilty on a long list charges and sentenced him to life imprisonment. 46.  On 20 September 2011 the Supreme Court quashed that judgment too and remitted the case to the trial court for fresh examination. 47.  On 6 October 2011 the Kherson Court transferred the case to the Bilozerka Town Court (\u201cthe Bilozerka Court\u201d) following jurisdiction\u2011related amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure. 48.  In July, August and September 2012 the applicant applied to the trial court for release on an undertaking not to abscond. He submitted that he had already been detained for over eleven years and that his continued detention was unjustified. He referred, in particular, to the poor conditions of his detention and his deteriorating health. The applicant also noted that he had already settled the victims\u2019 civil claims. 49.  On 19 July, 6 August and 27 September 2012 the Bilozerka Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s applications for release on the grounds that he had failed to show that he would not abscond or hinder the implementation of various procedural decisions if he was released. 50.  On 6 August 2012 the Bilozerka Court discontinued the criminal proceedings against the applicant on a number of charges as they had become time\u2011barred. 51.  On 8 October 2012 the same court found the applicant guilty of armed robbery, aggravated murder and an attempt on the life of a law\u2011enforcement official and sentenced him to fifteen years\u2019 imprisonment. 52.  In the absence of any appeals, on 28 October 2012 the judgment became final. 53.  During the daily outdoor walk on 16 August 2005 in the Kyiv SIZO one of the guards allegedly hit the applicant with a rubber truncheon in the stomach and on the hip. The applicant did not submit any further details about that incident. 54.  On 12 September 2005 the applicant was transferred to the Kherson SIZO. According to the authorities, he was examined on the same day by doctors, who did not detect any injuries. The applicant submitted that no such examination had taken place. 55.  On 20 September 2005 the applicant\u2019s lawyer wrote to the governor of the Kherson SIZO that the applicant had complained of having been beaten by a guard in the Kyiv SIZO. The lawyer therefore requested a medical examination of his client. 56.  On 4 October 2005 a commission of three doctors examined the applicant. According to the applicant, that was his first examination in the Kherson SIZO. The doctors documented a 3.5-cm-long brown pigmented linear mark on the side of the applicant\u2019s left hip and a round mark of slightly pigmented skin with irregular edges in the paraumbilical area of the left part of his stomach. 57.  On 6 October 2005 the SIZO administration informed the applicant\u2019s lawyer of the above report. 58.  On 26 October 2005 three doctors examined the applicant again. Their findings were the same as on 4 October 2005. On a later, unspecified date the SIZO governor wrote about the findings to the applicant\u2019s lawyer. 59.  The applicant complained to various authorities that he had been beaten on 16 August 2005 and that his injuries had never been properly documented. His complaints were forwarded to the Kyiv city prosecutor\u2019s office (\u201cthe Kyiv prosecutor\u2019s office\u201d). 60.  Extracts from the applicant\u2019s medical records in detention, which were provided to the Court by the Government, contain a copy of a report on a medical examination of the applicant in the Kherson SIZO of 13 February 2006. It mentioned, in particular, that the applicant had pigmented skin marks. Their description was identical to that given in the reports of 4 and 26 October 2005 (see paragraphs 56 and 58 above). 61.  On 22 March 2006 the Kyiv prosecutor\u2019s office wrote to the applicant that his complaints were without basis. 62.  It is not known whether the applicant took that complaint further. 63.  On 5 February 2014 the administration of the Kyiv SIZO informed the Government\u2019s Agent that all the records for 2005 had been destroyed after the expiry of a five-year limit for their storage. 64.  During various unspecified periods from 5 October 2005 until his transfer to Sokyryany Prison on 24 December 2012, the applicant was detained in SIZOs in Kherson, Odessa and Kyiv. 65.  According to the applicant, he was held in overcrowded, unheated and damp cells, with no ventilation and poor lighting. There were allegedly no laundry facilities for detainees, and the cells were infested with insects. The applicant also contended that his cell mates had smoked all the time and that he had been exposed to passive smoking. He submitted numerous statements by his cellmates confirming the accuracy of the above description of their conditions of detention. The applicant also submitted several colour photographs of his cells in the Kherson and Kyiv SIZOs showing, in particular, tight metal grids on the windows, an extremely small space between the various items of furniture in the cell, poor sanitary facilities, and a lavatory which could be seen from the door. 66.  According to the Government, the conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention were acceptable. They noted that the parts of the Kherson SIZO where he had been detained in 2005 had been demolished since that time because they had been dilapidated and not subject to capital repairs. The Government therefore submitted that they could not provide any more details about the conditions of detention there. 67.  During his transportation between the SIZOs and to court hearings, the applicant was allegedly handcuffed at all times (sometimes for up to thirty-two hours), not given sufficient food and water, deprived of sleep and unable to use the toilet when needed. 68.  The applicant complained about the conditions of his transportation to the prosecution authorities and sought to bring criminal charges against the escorting officers concerned. 69.  On 29 June 2006 the Kyiv Garrison Military Prosecutor\u2019s Office refused to open criminal proceedings against the escorting officers owing to a lack of corpus delicti in their actions. The applicant unsuccessfully challenged that decision before the courts at three levels of jurisdiction. 70.  According to the Government, the conditions of the applicant\u2019s transportation were not in breach of his rights. 71.  The applicant also alleged that during his detention his health had seriously deteriorated. In particular, he had contracted tuberculosis and had had unspecified heart problems, for which he had not obtained adequate medical treatment. His requests for medical assistance had allegedly been refused by the authorities. 72.  The Government provided the Court with detailed information in chronological order about the applicant\u2019s health and the medical care provided to him in detention. His health-related concerns included the residual effects of tuberculosis (contracted in 2003), micro-cardiosclerosis, and some digestive disorders. As can be seen from the applicant\u2019s medical file, he had regular medical examinations and received treatment for his health problems. 73.  In January 2007 the Court asked the applicant to submit copies of his cassation appeals against the judgment of 7 December 2004, showing the dates he had lodged them with the courts dealing with the criminal case against him. 74.  On 11 March and 25 April 2007 the applicant asked the trial court to provide him with copies of all his cassation appeals and those of his co\u2011defendants. 75.  On 7 May 2007 the trial court judge dealing with the criminal case in question wrote to the applicant that there were no grounds to grant his request as he had already received all the copies he had asked for, which was confirmed by acknowledgments of receipt with his signature in the case file. Furthermore, the judge noted that the applicant had also been given the possibility to familiarise himself with the case file.", "references": ["4", "0", "5", "9", "8", "6", "7", "No Label", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["1", "2", "3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Velika Reka. 6.  He was employed by Holding Kompanija \u201cKomgrap\u201d \u2013 DD \u201cKomgrap gradnja\u201d, a socially-owned company based in Belgrade (hereinafter \u201cthe debtor\u201d). 7.  On 3 February 2006, the First Belgrade Municipal Court ordered the debtor to pay the applicant specified amounts on account of salary arrears and social insurance contributions, plus the costs of the civil proceedings. This judgment became final on 31 July 2006. 8.  On 23 October 2006, upon the applicant\u2019s request to that effect, the Fourth Belgrade Municipal Court accepted the enforcement of the said judgment and further ordered the debtor to pay the applicant the enforcement costs. 9.  On 24 December 2010 the Belgrade Commercial Court opened insolvency proceedings in respect of the debtor (St. 4372/2010). 10.  On 22 June 2011 the applicant submitted his respective claims. 11.  On 31 October 2010 the Belgrade Commercial Court dismissed these claims as out of time. The Commercial Appeals Court upheld that decision on 26 June 2012. 12.  The insolvency proceedings against the debtor are still ongoing. 13.  On 23 April 2010 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal. 14.  The Constitutional Court dismissed his appeal on 14 July 2011. 15.  On 13 March 2012 the applicant lodged a new constitutional appeal. 16.  On 26 January 2012 the Constitutional Court dismissed again his appeal. On 28 December 2012 that decision was delivered to the applicant.", "references": ["5", "7", "4", "0", "8", "2", "1", "6", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1952 and lives in Bellevue, Washington, USA. He is a president of Global Fishing Inc., a corporation which was the largest importer of crab to the United States of America. 6.  On 29 June 2007 the Investigating Committee of the Ministry of the Interior of the Russian Federation opened a criminal investigation into crab poaching in Russia\u2019s exclusive economic zone in the Bering Sea and the Sea of Okhotsk. The investigation concerned the charges of engagement in organised criminal activities, unlicensed fishing activities in Russia\u2019s exclusive economic zone and money laundering. The decision to open the investigation identified Global Fishing Inc. as a major purchaser of the crab illegally harvested in the said region. 7.  On 20 September 2007 the applicant was arrested in a hotel in Moscow. His passport was confiscated. 8.  On 21 September 2007 the Tverskoy District Court of Moscow authorised the applicant\u2019s detention pending investigation. In particular, the court noted:\n\u201cWhen deciding that [the applicant] should be detained [pending investigation], the court notes that he is suspected of having committed a grave and serious offence, that he does not have a permanent residence in Russia, that there are reasons to believe that, if released, the applicant might abscond or continue his criminal activity, destroy the evidence or in any other way interfere with the criminal proceedings against him. Under such circumstances, application of any restrictive measure other than deprivation of liberty would not be feasible\u201d. 9.  On 27 September 2007 the Investigating Committee formally charged the applicant with engagement in organised criminal activities, money laundering and unlicensed fishing activities in Russia\u2019s exclusive economic zone. 10.  On 10 October 2007 the Moscow City Court upheld the decision of 21 September 2007 on appeal. 11.  On 16 November 2007 the District Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 29 February 2008. The applicant\u2019s lawyers attended the hearing. The applicant was unable to attend for health reasons. He asked to be released on bail or alternatively on personal surety given by the chief rabbi of Russia. He presented to the court positive character references from two U.S. senators. He further argued that he was not fit for detention for ill\u2011health. In this respect he relied on the opinion prepared by his family doctor, which indicated that the applicant suffered from arthritis, high cholesterol, kidney stones, chronic pyelonephritis, gastritis, loss of hearing in the right ear, nasal allergies, frequent headaches and dizziness. He also submitted a guarantee signed by Mr Sh. who undertook to accommodate the applicant at his place of residence in Moscow pending investigation. The court dismissed the applicant\u2019s arguments noting as follows:\n\u201cThe court takes into account the arguments presented by the defence, including the references concerning his character. It discerns no new material facts or circumstances justifying [the applicant\u2019s] release or application of another restrictive measure.\nIt follows from the materials submitted that [the applicant] is charged with a very serious offence, he is a national of another state. The medical documents presented do not demonstrate that [the applicant] is unfit for detention.\nThe court concludes that the grounds for the [applicant\u2019s] detention have not ceased to exist. Accordingly the restrictive measure applied cannot be lifted or replaced with a less strict one, including the bail.\u201d 12.  On 26 December 2007 the City Court upheld the decision of 16 November 2007 on appeal. 13.  On 21 February 2008 the District Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention pending investigation until 29 May 2008. The court reiterated that the applicant\u2019s detention was justified due to the gravity of the charges and lack of a place of permanent residence in Russia. The application for release on bail or personal surety was dismissed. On 26 March 2008 the City Court upheld the decision of 21 February 2008 on appeal. 14.  On 28 May 2008 the District Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 29 August 2008. The court reiterated practically verbatim the reasoning used in the previous court order. On 23 June 2008 the Moscow City Court upheld the court order of 28 March 2008 on appeal. 15.  On 19 August 2008 the City Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 29 November 2008. According to the applicant, the court referred to the gravity of the charges and his \u201csignificant financial possibilities\u201d. On 2 October 2008 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the court order of 19 August 2008 on appeal. In particular, the Supreme Court noted:\n\u201cIt follows from the materials in the case-file that [the court] took into account the gravity of the charges against [the applicant]..., and it is reasonable to assume that, if at large, he may abscond..., or continue his criminal activities, or threaten the witnesses, the victims and other parties to the proceedings, or destroy the evidence... that may be found in foreign companies or interfere with investigation in any other way. ... [I]n view of the extreme complexity and scope of the case, there are no grounds for [the applicant\u2019s] release.\nFurthermore, the grounds for the applicant\u2019s detention have not ceased to exist and there are no exclusive circumstances rendering the lifting or replacement of the restrictive measure... possible.\u201d 16.  On 20 November 2008 the City Court extended the pre-trial detention in respect of the applicant, E. and S., his co-defendants, noting as follows:\n\u201cAccording to the materials submitted, E., S. and [the applicant] are charged with a number of offences, including especially serious ones for which a custodial sentence exceeding two years can be applied in the event of conviction.\nIt follows from the investigator\u2019s motion, submitted materials and his explanation given in court, that the criminal case is very complex, fourteen people were indicted, a big volume of investigative activities have been carried out, including those under way in different regions in the Russian Federation; there are complex forensic expert examinations ongoing, the responses to the inquiries sent are still pending, including the ones concerning international criminal assistance, the investigators have planned numerous activities aimed at establishment of facts to be proved and completion of the investigation.\nOn the basis of the aforesaid, and in view of the circumstances of the case, the court finds that the investigator\u2019s arguments that the defendants\u2019 detention should be extended are convincing and justified and that the grounds for extension of their detention are exceptional regard being had to the nature of the charges and pending investigative activities aimed at the completion of the investigation.\nIn the course of investigation the information was obtained that, should they be released, the defendants might abscond or interfere with the proceedings.\nHaving regard to the circumstances of the case, the submitted materials and other information, including the one pertaining to the defendants\u2019 character, the court concludes that there are sufficient grounds to believe that, should they be released, the defendants might abscond, put pressure on witnesses and other parties to the proceedings, try to conceal or destroy evidence in order to obstruct justice.\nUnder such circumstances... E., S., and [the applicant] should be detained pending investigation which means that the grounds and the circumstances ... taken into consideration by the court when deciding on their detention have not changed and it is still necessary to detain them.\nIn view of the above, it is not possible to use a less strict restrictive measure in respect of E., S., and [the applicant], including release on bail.\nWhen deciding on the extension of the defendants\u2019 detention, the court takes into account the circumstances as required by [law], notably their family status, age, health condition, and character information submitted by the defence.\u201d 17.  On 14 January 2009 the Supreme Court upheld the decision of 20 November 2008 on appeal. The court dismissed the applicant\u2019s argument that the City Court\u2019s findings that he might abscond, continue criminal activities, obstruct justice, destroy evidence had been erroneous and unsubstantiated. 18.  On 17 February 2009 the applicant received an amended and finalised bill of indictment. 19.  On 19 February 2009 the City Court extended the detention of the three defendants, including the applicant, until 20 March 2009 in view of pending investigation. It noted in respect of the applicant as follows:\n\u201cEven though... [the applicant] does not have a criminal record, is married and have a child, prior to his arrest was employed and had a permanent source of income, he is charged with a number of very serious offences which entail, in case of conviction, a custodial sentence exceeding two years and which, according to the investigators\u2019 version, have been committed by an organised criminal group managed by E. and [the applicant]... The applicant is a national of another state, he does not have a permanent place of residence in the Russian Federation...\nThe above information about the applicant\u2019s character and the gravity of the charges are, in the court\u2019s opinion, sufficient to assume that he may abscond, despite his and his defence\u2019s declarations and assurances. Furthermore, according to the report of policemen Z. and V., the applicant..., if released, is planning to flee abroad and continue criminal activities connected to illegal fishing in the exclusive economic zone of the Russian Federation, put pressure on witnesses, try to destroy physical evidence. In addition, [the applicant] repeatedly tried to bribe the officials in order to influence the investigation. Besides, E., S. and [the applicant] have been trying to get in touch with other members of the organised criminal group who are still at large. It follows from the testimony of witness P., that American companies are taking steps to secure [the applicant\u2019s] release.\u201d 20.  On 23 March 2009 the Supreme Court upheld the decision of 19 February 2009 on appeal. 21.  On 11 March 2009 the City Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention pending the defendants\u2019 study of the case file, which comprised 160 volumes, until 20 June 2009. The court referred to the gravity of the charges against the applicant and the lack of permanent residence in Russia. It further reiterated that the applicant might put pressure on witnesses, obstruct justice or abscond. On 21 April 2009 the Supreme Court upheld the decision of 11 March 2009 on appeal. 22.  On 28 May 2009 the City Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 20 September 2009. The court noted that the defendants, including the applicant, and eighteen lawyers that represented them had not completed the study of the case file. As to need for detention pending investigation, the court reiterated the formula which it used for prior extensions. On 16 July 2009 the Supreme Court upheld the decision of 28 May 2009 on appeal. 23.  On 26 August 2009 the applicant completed the study of the case file. 24.  On 15 September 2009 the City Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 20 December 2009 noting that the applicant\u2019s co-defendants and their lawyers needed further time to complete the study of the case-file. Referring to the gravity of the charges against the applicant and the lack of a permanent residence and of \u201cestablished social links\u201d in Russia, the court noted that the applicant might abscond, put pressure on witnesses and other parties to the proceedings in order to obstruct justice. On 29 October 2009 the Supreme Court upheld the decision of 15 September 2009 on appeal. 25.  On 4 December 2009 the City Court received the applicant\u2019s case\u2011file and on 17 December 2009 it extended the defendants\u2019 pre-trial detention until 4 June 2010 noting as follows:\n\u201c[The defendants] have been remanded in custody. This restrictive measure corresponds to the nature and seriousness of the charges against them. The circumstances underlying the [defendants\u2019] remand in custody have not ceased to exist. Notwithstanding personal surety and a possibility of bail proposed by [the applicant], the fact that [the applicant] and S. have minor children, the length of their pre-trial detention, the measure of restraint earlier imposed on [the defendants] should remain unchanged.\u201d 26.  On 25 February 2010 the Supreme Court upheld the decision of 17 September 2009 on appeal. 27.  It appears that on an unspecified date the applicant\u2019s case was transferred for trial to the Kamchatka Regional Court. 28.  On 27 May 2010 the Regional Court extended the defendants\u2019 pre\u2011trial detention until 4 September 2010 noting that the circumstances underlying their remand in custody had not ceased to exist. 29.  On 2 September 2010 the Regional Court extended the defendants\u2019 detention until 4 December 2010 reiterating verbatim its reasoning of 27 May 2010. 30.  On 29 November 2010 the Regional Court considered it possible to release the defendants on bail in the amount of 5,000,000,000 Russian roubles (RUB). The applicants submitted that they were unable to pay such bail. The court reasoned that the bail in a lesser amount would not ensure the defendants\u2019 appearance before it and extended their detention until 4 March 2011 reiterating its earlier reasoning. 31.  On 16 December 2010 the jury delivered a not-guilty verdict in the applicant\u2019s case. The applicant was released on the same date. On 17 January 2011 the Regional Court issued the relevant judgment advising the applicant of his right to rehabilitation. 32.  On 27 April 2011 the Supreme Court upheld the judgment of 17 January 2011 on appeal. 33.  On 21 May 2008 in an article entitled Special Protection for the Mafia (\u00ab\u0421\u043f\u0435\u0446\u043f\u0440\u0438\u043a\u0440\u044b\u0442\u0438\u0435 \u0434\u043b\u044f \u043c\u0430\u0444\u0438\u0438\u00bb) Rossiyskaya Gazeta, an official national newspaper, published an interview about the criminal investigation with General Ts., the head of the department of the Investigating Committee of the Ministry of the Interior of the Russian Federation. In the interview Ts. referred to the applicant as the head of an international criminal organisation which had been engaged in illegal fishing activities conducted in Russia\u2019s territorial waters. 34.  On 28 and 29 May 2008 General Ts. gave two interviews about the criminal investigation which were broadcast by Channel One, the national TV channel. Ts. reiterated his previous statements alleging that the applicant had been the head of the illegal fishing business and referred to him as \u201cthe don of the crab mafia\u201d. 35.  On 28 February 2013 the Regional Court granted the applicant\u2019s claims for damages against the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation in part. The court awarded the applicant RUB 83,208,240 in respect of lost earnings and RUB 603,000 as reimbursement of legal costs and expenses. 36.  On 21 May 2013 the Regional Court upheld the judgment of 28 February 2013 on appeal. 37.  On 24 October 2014 the District Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s claims for pecuniary damages resulting from criminal prosecution against the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation. 38.  On 20 March 2015 the City Court upheld the judgment of 24 October 2014 on appeal.", "references": ["8", "0", "7", "5", "3", "6", "4", "1", "9", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "5.  On 29 June 2005 the \u010ca\u010dak Commercial Court ordered a socially-owned company Fabrika Reznog Alata \u010ca\u010dak AD (hereinafter \u201cthe debtor\u201d) to pay the first applicant specified amounts on account of damages, plus the costs of the civil proceedings. 6.  On 22 February 2006 the Belgrade High Commercial Court amended the first instance judgment by ordering the debtor to also pay the first applicant specified amounts on account of lost profits and increasing the awarded costs of proceedings. This judgment became final on an unspecified date. 7.  On 26 June 2007, upon the first applicant\u2019s request to that effect, the \u010ca\u010dak Commercial Court ordered the enforcement of the said judgments and further ordered the debtor to pay the first applicant the enforcement costs. 8.  On 17 March 2009 the debtor paid the first applicant a part of the sums specified in the said judgments. 9.  On 30 March 2010 the Privatisation Agency ordered the restructuring of the first applicant\u2019s debtor. As a result, the ongoing enforcement proceedings against the debtor were stayed. 10.  On 11 March 2011 the first applicant lodged a constitutional appeal. 11.  On 21 May 2014 the Constitutional Court found a violation of the first applicant\u2019s right to a hearing within a reasonable time and of its right to the peaceful enjoyment of its possessions. It further awarded the first applicant 1,000 euros (EUR) as just satisfaction for non-pecuniary damage and ordered the court in \u010ca\u010dak to expedite the proceedings. The Constitutional Court dismissed the first applicant\u2019s request for pecuniary damages as premature, since the enforcement proceedings were still pending. 12.  On 11 July 2003 the Kraljevo Commercial Court established the secured property right of the applicant on certain commercial premises and ordered GP Jastrebac (hereinafter \u201cthe debtor\u201d) , a socially-owned company undergoing insolvency proceedings, to finish the construction of that property. The Commercial Court further ordered the debtor to pay the second applicant a certain amount if it failed to do so. This decision became final on an unspecified date. The debtor never finished the construction of the property in question. 13.  On 9 September 2009 the debtor paid the applicant a part of the amount established by the decision. 14.  On 11 May 2011 the second applicant lodged a constitutional appeal. 15.  On 26 March 2014 the Constitutional Court found a violation of the second applicant\u2019s right to a hearing within a reasonable time. It further awarded him EUR 500 as just satisfaction for non-pecuniary damage and ordered the competent court to expedite the insolvency proceedings. The Constitutional Court dismissed the second applicant\u2019s complaint concerning his right to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions as well as his request for pecuniary damages, since the insolvency proceedings were still pending. 16.  On 22 September 2003 the Belgrade Commercial Court ordered a socially-owned company, DP Fabrika termotehni\u010dkih ure\u0111aja i monta\u017ee \u201cCER\u201d \u010ca\u010dak (hereinafter \u201cthe debtor\u201d), to pay the third applicant specified amounts on account of damages, plus the costs of the civil proceedings. This judgment became final by 17 October 2003. 17.  On 30 October 2006, upon the third applicant\u2019s request to that effect, the Belgrade Municipal Court accepted the enforcement of the said judgment and further ordered the debtor to pay the first applicant the enforcement costs. 18.  On 12 October 2011 the third applicant lodged a constitutional appeal. 19.  On 17 April 2014 the Constitutional Court found a violation of the third applicant\u2019s right to a hearing within a reasonable time. It also awarded the third applicant EUR 800 as just satisfaction for non-pecuniary damage and ordered the competent court to expedite the proceedings. The Constitutional Court dismissed the third applicant\u2019s complaint concerning its right to the peaceful enjoyment of possessions and its request for pecuniary damages as premature, since the enforcement proceedings were still pending.", "references": ["8", "6", "1", "4", "2", "5", "0", "7", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1942 and 1943, respectively, and lived in Tambov. 6.  On 25 April 2007, the applicants\u2019 son, P.Z., was charged with large\u2011scale fraud; his name was placed on the list of fugitives from justice. 7.  On 7 May 2007 the Basmannyy District Court in Moscow authorised a search of the applicant\u2019s flat in Tambov with a view to locating P.Z. and removing accounting, legal and financial documents relating to the alleged fraud. 8.  The search was carried out three days later and a number of documents, communication devices and the applicants\u2019 travel passports were removed. 9.  The applicants complained to a court about the investigator\u2019s actions. They submitted, in particular, that there had been no legal basis for removing their identity documents. 10.  On 9 July 2007 the Basmannyy District Court rejected their complaints. It held that it was not competent to review the way in which the evidence in the criminal proceedings had been obtained, and that the applicants\u2019 constitutional rights had not suffered any impairment. 11.  On 10 October 2007 the Moscow City Court upheld the District Court\u2019s decision in a summary fashion, without addressing the applicants\u2019 arguments.", "references": ["4", "8", "1", "2", "7", "3", "9", "5", "0", "6", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "7.  The applicant was born in 1955. He is currently being detained in Krasnoyarsk. 8.  On 10 December 2010 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of incitement to murder. On the same day the Tsentralniy District Court of Krasnoyarsk authorised his pre-trial detention. 9.  Subsequently the applicant\u2019s detention was extended on a number of occasions in the course of the investigation and trial in view of the gravity of the charges against him and the risks of his absconding, seeking to influence witnesses and reoffending. 10.  On 5 May 2012 the District Court found the applicant guilty of the charges and sentenced him to five years\u2019 imprisonment in a correctional colony. On 4 September 2012 the Krasnoyarsk Regional Court upheld the conviction, but decreased the sentence by two months. 11.  During the admission process at remand prison no. IZ-24/1 in Krasnoyarsk the applicant told the medical staff that he had hypertension. The diagnosis was confirmed by a prison doctor, who prescribed him hypotensive medication and regular monitoring of his blood pressure. 12.  In April 2011 the applicant was admitted to Prison Tuberculosis Hospital no. 1 in Krasnoyarsk (\u201cthe prison hospital\u201d) for two weeks of inpatient treatment for his hypertension. A chest X-ray showed that he had a mild case of pneumonia and he was also diagnosed with another chronic condition. In the hospital the applicant received the full range of treatments for his conditions. 13.  In June 2011 the applicant had a hypertensive crisis. Several weeks later his lawyer complained to the prison authorities of inadequate medical care. 14.  A medical examination in August 2012 showed that the applicant had recovered from pneumonia and that there were positive developments with his hypertension. 15.  In 2012 and 2013 the applicant was moved between various detention facilities and had routine medical checkups. 16.  In April 2013 he was sent to a minimum security settlement colony. The applicant and other inmates performed repairs to a nearby children\u2019s health camp. The applicant complained only of fatigue and headache to medical staff during that period. 17.  According to the applicant, in May 2013 he started experiencing pain in the chest, pelvic area and testicles. His ability to walk was hindered by severe pain. He took painkillers sent by his relatives. The detention authorities ignored his complaints and on several occasions confiscated the painkillers. 18.   In written submissions, Mr Kh., Ms K. and Ms B., detainees who worked with the applicant in the children\u2019s camp from May 2013, confirmed the above statements. They submitted that the applicant had been seriously ill, had been barely able to walk and had often complained about severe pain. No proper medical examination or treatment had been arranged despite the applicant\u2019s requests for inpatient treatment. Inmates had injected the applicant with painkillers supplied by his relatives. 19.  On 2 September 2013 the applicant asked the head of the detention facility to authorise a medical examination and treatment outside the facility owing to a serious spine and leg condition that had worried him since May 2013. He stated that over the previous three months he had received pain relief medication provided by his relatives, but that his condition had not got better. 20.  Following the applicant\u2019s complaint, he was sent to a civilian clinic in Krasnoyarsk for a magnetic resonance imaging scan (MRI). An examination carried out on 22 January 2014, two days after his admission, revealed a prostate tumour and affection of the bone. A consultation by an oncologist was prescribed. 21.  On the next day the applicant complained about the quality of his treatment to the Federal Service for the Execution of Services in Krasnoyarsk. The complaint was forwarded to the applicant\u2019s ward but was dismissed as ill-founded on 10 February 2014. 22.  On 14 February 2014 the applicant was taken to the Regional Cancer Hospital in Krasnoyarsk, where he was diagnosed with prostate cancer with metastasis to the pelvic bone. According to his medical records, he suffered mild to intense pain. 23.  Six days later a medical panel certified the applicant as having a second-degree disability. 24.  Between 21 March and 3 April 2014 the applicant was examined and treated in the prison hospital. While tests performed in the hospital did not disclose any cancer, hospital officials acted on the diagnosis of 22 January 2014 and prescribed drug treatment for prostate cancer. 25.  On 15 May 2014 the applicant was examined by an oncologist, who recorded his cancer treatment and ordered tests. 26.  In August 2014 the applicant spent two weeks in the prison hospital. 27.  The following month he was seen by doctors and was prescribed further treatment for cancer. The medical staff apparently complied fully with that prescription. 28.  On 19 September 2014 a medical panel concluded that the applicant\u2019s state of health warranted his early release on medical grounds. Ten days later the Sosnovborsk Town Court of the Krasnoyarsk Region dismissed an application for early release, finding that the applicant was receiving the required treatment in detention. On 23 December 2014 the Regional Court quashed the decision on procedural grounds and remitted the case for fresh consideration. The parties did not inform the Court of the outcome of those proceedings. However, given the further developments, it appears that the applicant remained in detention. 29.  On 9 April 2015 the applicant was certified as having a first-degree disability. 30.  In May 2015 he was admitted to the prison hospital for a medical examination and treatment. There are no details regarding his subsequent treatment. 31.  The applicant was detained in the remand prison between 10 December 2010 and 25 May 2015, save for short periods in the prison hospital. The applicant complained of the poor conditions of his detention, including overcrowding. The Government disagreed.", "references": ["9", "5", "0", "3", "8", "6", "2", "7", "4", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "4.  The first applicant was born in 1952 in the Novosibirsk Region. 5.  On 25 January 1996 the Krasnoyarsk Regional Court convicted him of murder, assault on a public official and other crimes and sentenced him to death. By a Presidential pardon of 17 May 1999, the death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. 6.  Since 24 December 1999 the first applicant has served his sentence in the IK-2 facility for life prisoners in the Perm Region. He has changed cell several times. It appears from the original registration logs and floor plans submitted by the Government that all the cells measured 10.5 or 11.3 square metres and were designed to accommodate up to three prisoners. The first applicant has never had more than two cellmates. 7.  As regards the conditions of his detention between 1999 and 2009, the first applicant submitted that the toilet was located in the corner of the cell, behind a one-metre-high partition. It was connected to the sewer directly, without a U-bend pipe, and foul smells stayed in the cell. The window did not open and access to natural light was restricted because of a metal sheet fixed directly outside the window. 8.  The first applicant stated that in 2009 major repair works had been carried out and the conditions had improved. The toilets and ventilation had been repaired, a higher partition and a door installed, the window shutters removed, and access to natural light and air had been improved. 9.  The second applicant was born in 1969 in Moscow. 10.  On 3 December 1997 the Moscow City Court found him guilty of several murders and rape, and sentenced him to life imprisonment. 11.  Since 10 March 1998 the second applicant has served his sentence in the IK-5 facility for life prisoners in the Vologda Region. The facility is located on an island in a former monastery that was built in 1810 and converted into a prison in 1996. Individual cells have no running water or sewerage. Prisoners have a water tank and a bucket instead. 12.  In 2011, a supervising prosecutor instituted infringement proceedings against the facility\u2019s management under Article 45 of the Code of Civil Procedure, seeking to enforce compliance with legal requirements. The prosecutor noted that only the mess, kitchen, bathhouse and shared toilets on each floor had centralised water supply, whereas the individual cells had no running water or sewage connection. Water was supplied from an artesian well but it fell short of sanitary requirements because it contained too much iron and sediment. Cells had no ventilation. Prisoners were given buckets for their daily needs: one bucket of water for drinking and washing and one to use as a toilet. Every day prisoners took their toilet buckets to the toilet at the end of the corridor where they emptied and washed them. This had to do be done by the prisoners while their hands remained handcuffed behind their back, in compliance with standard practice. In 2009 the Federal Penitentiary Service had prepared an engineering and design blueprint for connecting all the cells to the mains and sewers but funding for the project had not been allocated. The prosecutor asked the court to require the facility\u2019s management and the regional branch of the Federal Penitentiary Service to connect all the cells to the water supply and sewers, to install ventilation and to improve the quality of the water. 13.  By a judgment of 24 August 2011, the Belozerskiy District Court of the Vologda Region granted the prosecutor\u2019s claim and directed the management of the prison to connect all the cells to the mains, sewers and a ventilation system within one year and to improve the water quality within six months. 14.  In 2013, the second applicant sued the Ministry of Finance for compensation for non-pecuniary damage caused by the substandard sanitary conditions at the IK-5 facility. By a judgment of 17 April 2013, upheld on appeal on 21 June 2013, the Belozerskiy District Court dismissed his claim as unfounded. It found that the cell was ventilated through a small opening in the window and that the temperature was normal, that there was a toilet consisting of a bucket with a lid, and a tank for drinking water, and that sanitary regulations did not require the installation of a sewage system \u201cin territories where sewers were not available\u201d. The court also noted that the claimant had not produced any evidence showing that the conditions of his detention in the period between 1998 and 2013 had been inadequate.", "references": ["8", "6", "5", "9", "0", "4", "2", "3", "7", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1959 and is currently detained in Dob prison. 6.  The applicant was engaged in a business providing online sexual services, which was registered in V\u0161enory in the Czech Republic. He cooperated with certain Dutch and American enterprises. In September 2001 a dispute arose between the applicant and his Dutch partners, one of them being H.C.Z., who wished to discontinue their cooperation. After meeting H.C.Z., together with his bodyguard E.M.L., also a Dutch national, in Prague on 14 September 2001, the applicant connected one of the studios involved in the production to the network of his American partner. 7.  On 18 September 2001 the applicant, his brother M.\u0160. and another Slovenian citizen, A.S., were in a villa in V\u0161enory where the applicant had set up his studio. The applicant had arranged another meeting with H.C.Z., so in the evening the latter appeared at the villa accompanied by his bodyguard E.M.L. Ms M.S. and another three persons were also present in the villa. The applicant, M.\u0160., H.C.Z. and E.M.L. then met in the bedroom, where H.C.Z. was shot dead. 8.  After the shooting, the applicant, M.\u0160. and A.S. fled the scene of the crime and eventually returned to Slovenia. Bruised and scared, E.M.L. was later that evening found by police hiding in nearby bushes. 9.  During the preliminary investigation, on 19 and 20 September 2001 the Czech authorities questioned E.M.L., who stated that H.C.Z. had been killed by the applicant. E.M.L. provided a detailed description of the applicant and an account of the events at issue. He stated that he had come to Prague together with his boss H.C.Z. and had made the applicant\u2019s acquaintance a few days before the shooting, adding that at the first meeting the applicant had appeared hostile to him. E.M.L. met the applicant briefly once again before the evening of 18 September. 10.  According to E.M.L., on the evening in question, the applicant asked for a meeting with H.C.Z., so he and E.M.L. drove to the villa in V\u0161enory. The door was opened to them by a young man, who was later identified as A.S. A woman whom they had also met before \u2013 Ms M.S. \u2013 was sitting in the living room. H.C.Z. was called into the bedroom, while E.M.L. waited outside the open bedroom door. The applicant and another man E.M.L. did not know were standing in the room. E.M.L. described the other man as looking a lot like the applicant, almost his twin, only older. While that man neither spoke nor did anything, the applicant immediately pulled a gun from behind his back, aimed at H.C.Z.\u2019s forehead, and fired at him. After the first shot, E.M.L. turned around and started to run. In the corridor he passed A.S. and ran out through the main door, to the street and into the bushes. E.M.L. stated that he had heard another shot being fired before he escaped from the villa. He then saw the applicant and A.S. follow him, but after a ten-minute search they left, and soon afterwards he heard a car driving away from the villa very fast. 11.  The investigators also examined a number of other witnesses involved in the applicant\u2019s business, among whom M.S., who stated that the applicant had a particular interest in firearms. On the day of the shooting, M.S. was in the living room together with the applicant, A.S., and the applicant\u2019s brother M.\u0160., whom she described as a man looking older than the applicant. When the doorbell rang, A.S. opened the door and two men entered the living room. According to M.S., the applicant and M.\u0160. were in the bedroom when H.C.Z. and E.M.L. entered the living room. H.C.Z. stepped forward into the bedroom, while E.M.L. stood at the bedroom door. Immediately after H.C.Z. entered the bedroom, M.S. heard four to five shots. E.M.L. ran away, and the applicant and A.S. followed him. According to M.S., M.\u0160. also ran after E.M.L., with a gun in his hand. Another two women and a man were present at the house and heard the shots, but did not witness the shooting. They stated that A.S. and the applicant would not allow them to call the police at first, but after the three men left one of the women called the police. 12.  In addition to taking statements from the witnesses, the Czech authorities examined and recorded the scene of the crime, and performed a forensic examination of H.C.Z.\u2019s body and a ballistic examination of the bullets and cases found at the scene of the shooting. After the investigation was concluded, the competent prosecutor charged the applicant with the murder of H.C.Z. The indictment was served on his court-appointed lawyer on 10 October 2001. However, since the applicant was eventually found to have gone back to Slovenia and voluntarily begun serving a prison sentence for an unrelated offence, the Czech authorities contacted the Slovenian authorities, seeking to take over the proceedings against the applicant. 13.  In January 2002 jurisdiction over the case was transferred to the Novo Mesto District Court. When questioned by the investigating judge on 2 August 2002, the applicant stated that H.C.Z. and E.M.L. had come to the villa threatening them. E.M.L. was carrying a gun and forced the applicant to lie down on the floor, while H.C.Z. ran into the bedroom. The applicant heard some commotion and then a few shots were fired. A few moments later E.M.L. left the villa. The applicant followed him out and saw another, unknown man standing outside by the car. The applicant understood that E.M.L. had ordered the other man to bring reinforcements and kill the people in the villa. E.M.L. then went towards the nearby woods. The applicant went back inside and saw H.C.Z.\u2019s dead body in the bedroom. The applicant, M.\u0160. and A.S. later drove away in their car, but were afraid to go to the police for fear of being killed. 14.  In a statement made on 26 June 2002 the applicant\u2019s brother M.\u0160. confessed to the murder of H.C.Z. He was subsequently questioned by the investigating judge on 21 August 2002 and stated that he had been woken up by the arrival of H.C.Z. and E.M.L. The day before, he had bought a gun for protection from the applicant\u2019s business competitors, which he had put under the pillow. Hearing the visitors, M.\u0160. tucked the gun into his belt and got out of bed. The door to the bedroom suddenly opened and H.C.Z. came into the room, while another, dark-skinned man (E.M.L.) stood at the door, holding something in his hand. M.\u0160. heard someone say \u201cHe\u2019s got a gun\u201d, and understood that it was E.M.L. who was holding a gun. M.\u0160. pulled out his own gun and pointed it at H.C.Z. to show that he would defend himself if attacked. However, H.C.Z. laughed and approached him, so M.\u0160. fired a warning shot at the floor. H.C.Z. nevertheless came close to him and hit him in the face. M.\u0160. then fired a shot at him in self-defence; nevertheless H.C.Z. attacked him and tried to push him to the ground. When M.\u0160. managed to break free from H.C.Z.\u2019s grip, he fired again, this time hitting H.C.Z. who staggered away and fell to the bed. M.\u0160. stated that he was holding the gun at waist level, trying at the same time to get free from H.C.Z.\u2019s grip, and that the shots were fired from that position. 15.  According to M.\u0160., he and H.C.Z. were the only two people in the bedroom, the applicant and A.S. having been forced to lie down on the floor by E.M.L. When M.\u0160. looked in to the other room they were getting up from the floor. The applicant and A.S. told M.\u0160. that another person was standing in front of the villa. They were all scared, so they packed their things and drove away. M.\u0160. added that he had thrown the gun away at their first stop on the motorway, still in the Czech Republic. 16.  On 20 September 2002 A.S. was questioned by the investigating judge and stated that he had opened the door when the bell rang. The applicant also came out of the bedroom. H.C.Z. and E.M.L. entered the villa, E.M.L. ordering A.S. and the applicant to lie on the floor in the corridor. E.M.L. was holding a gun. H.C.Z. moved forward into the living room. A.S. then heard two or three shots being fired inside the villa. He waited a few moments and when he lifted his head, E.M.L. was gone. M.\u0160. came out into the corridor, holding a gun in his hand. The applicant, A.S. and M.\u0160. then went into the bedroom to check on H.C.Z., whom they found dead. 17.  On 1 October 2002 the district state prosecutor\u2019s office lodged an indictment charging the applicant with murder. At the trial hearing conducted by the Novo Mesto District Court the applicant changed his statement, claiming that when the doorbell had rung he had been in the bedroom collecting some business-related documents, while his brother M.\u0160. had been lying on the bed. He had heard hissing sounds from the other room, so he went out to check what was happening, but was stopped at the bedroom door by H.C.Z., who grabbed him by the chest with one hand and signalled to E.M.L. with the other. H.C.Z. dragged the applicant out of the bedroom and across the living room and then he went back into the bedroom. The applicant saw his brother get up from the bed and point his gun at H.C.Z. Meanwhile, E.M.L., who had a gun in his hand, ordered the applicant to lie down on the floor. Kneeling down, the applicant saw H.C.Z. hit M.\u0160. in the bedroom, and he also saw that M.\u0160. was holding a gun. Then he heard four shots. After the shooting stopped, E.M.L. ran away, shouting that they were all finished. The applicant, who followed him out, saw a silhouette of another man standing beside a car parked outside. The applicant, M.\u0160. and A.S. were afraid of retaliation for H.C.Z.\u2019s death, so they quickly escaped. 18.  When faced with inconsistencies between his previous statement made during the investigation and the account he gave at the trial, the applicant explained that he had not wished to implicate his brother in H.C.Z.\u2019s death and that he had been in poor health when he had given his previous statement. 19.  The applicant\u2019s brother M.\u0160. again asserted that he had thrown the gun with which he had shot H.C.Z. away once they had reached the motorway and started to feel safer. Moreover, M.\u0160. stated that he did not think that he could be mistaken for his brother, as the applicant was more strongly built and dressed in a higher-class way. 20.  On the basis of the forensic analysis of the crime scene and the case file submitted to the Slovenian authorities by the Czech authorities, a forensic ballistic report was prepared by a ballistic expert, F.S. He found that H.C.Z. had suffered three gunshot wounds, one to the front of his chest, another to the right side of his stomach and the third to his left arm. The expert found that H.C.Z. had been shot in the stomach at a range of less than 10 cm; however, the gun barrel did not touch his body at the moment of impact. However, the bullets which had hit H.C.Z.\u2019s left arm and chest were fired from more than 50 cm away. Considering that two bullets and three cartridge cases were found at the crime scene, F.S. presumed that one shot hit the wall either directly or after causing a wound to H.C.Z.\u2019s left arm, and that the force of the impact caused the bullet to shatter. Another bullet was found in H.C.Z.\u2019s chest, while the bullet that had entered his stomach had exited his body under the shoulder blade. According to the expert, at the moment of the shooting H.C.Z. was entering the room, while the shooter was inside the room, firing all three shots while standing. Having regard to these considerations, F. was of the view that the account of the events given by E.M.L. was both possible and likelier than the account given by M.\u0160., which was not possible at all. No shot had been fired at the floor, and no shot had been fired while the shooter and H.C.Z. were in direct contact as described by M.\u0160. 21.  Furthermore, a medical report establishing the cause of H.C.Z.\u2019s death was prepared, also on the basis of the Czech case file. Medical expert A.\u0160. found that H.C.Z. had died as a result of internal bleeding which was due to trauma caused by gunshot wounds to his body. He was hit by two or three bullets, twice from a distance of more than 50 cm and once from a distance of less than 10 cm. Given the direction of the bullets and the angle at which they entered H.C.Z.\u2019s body, A.\u0160. concluded that the shooter and the victim were standing facing each other and that the victim was approximately 20 cm taller than the shooter. Also, A.\u0160. confirmed that the injuries to H.C.Z.\u2019s body were consistent with the account given by E.M.L., while M.\u0160.\u2019s account did not correspond to the forensic conclusions. 22.  E.M.L. was summoned to the trial hearing but did not appear. The applicant nevertheless requested the opportunity to cross-examine him in order to clarify the circumstances of the shooting and the exact positions of everyone who was in the bedroom at the material time. M.S. and two other witnesses did not appear at the trial hearing either. The trial court decided to read out the statements they had given during the investigation. 23.  On 17 January 2003 the Novo Mesto District Court found the applicant guilty of murdering H.C.Z. and sentenced him to thirteen years\u2019 imprisonment. 24.  Both the district prosecutor and the applicant appealed against the judgment, and on 12 June 2003 the Ljubljana Higher Court granted the prosecutor\u2019s appeal, increasing the applicant\u2019s prison sentence to fifteen years. 25.  The applicant lodged a request for the protection of legality (appeal on points of law, an extraordinary legal remedy) before the Supreme Court, which was granted on 19 May 2005. The applicant\u2019s complaint that he should have been given the opportunity to cross-examine E.M.L. and other foreign witnesses was found to be well grounded, and the case was remitted to the District Court for re-examination with the instruction that the applicant be given the opportunity to cross-examine E.M.L., who was considered the key witness in the case against him. 26.  During the re-trial, the Novo Mesto District Court obtained a ballistic report prepared by the Czech experts, which corresponded to the conclusions of the Slovenian expert F.S. about the number of shots fired and the trajectories of the bullets. The applicant, however, who by then had regained his liberty, obtained a report prepared by another ballistic expert, V.M., who criticised on certain points of the report prepared by the expert F.S. In particular, V.M. took the view that the shots could have been fired from a closer range than that established by F.S., and that the latter\u2019s conclusion that H.C.Z. had been standing at the moment of impact was not supported by the available material evidence. In this light, the applicant requested the District Court to appoint a new ballistic expert and to perform a special 3D reconstruction of the crime scene. 27.  The District Court also summoned E.M.L., M.S. and a certain A.B., who had also been involved in the internet services featuring interactive sexual content, to testify at the hearing scheduled for 15 November 2005. However, on that date none of the witnesses appeared before the court, so the District Court requested legal assistance from the Czech and Dutch judicial authorities, asking its foreign counterparts to hear the three witnesses in the applicant\u2019s presence. 28.  On 13 January 2006 M.S. was questioned by the Local Court in Hradec Kr\u00e1lov\u00e9, Czech Republic, in the presence of the applicant and his counsel. M.S. again testified that on the evening of the events at issue, H.C.Z. and E.M.L. had come into the living room asking for the applicant. Then H.C.Z. went into the bedroom, while E.M.L. stopped at the door. M.S. did not remember hearing any voices, but immediately after H.C.Z. stepped inside M.S. heard four or five shots being fired in the bedroom. M.S., frightened, went into the corner of the room and saw E.M.L. running through the room, followed by the applicant, A.S. and M.\u0160., who was holding a gun. However, M.S. pointed out that she could not see into the bedroom and could not say who had fired the shots. 29.  On 28 March 2006 the investigating judge of the Regional Court of The Hague, examined E.M.L., who gave essentially the same account of events as during the investigation, reiterating that he was entirely convinced that the person who had shot H.C.Z. was the applicant, while another man very similar to the applicant had also been present in the bedroom where the shooting had taken place. E.M.L. declared that he would not be willing to appear at the trial in Slovenia or in the Czech Republic because he was afraid for his life, adding that he was ready to cooperate, but only in the Netherlands.\n 30.  The investigating judge also heard A.B., who had testified that the applicant had worked for him in the Czech Republic but had then tried to take over his business and had threatened him several times, also with a gun. Moreover, A.B. stated that he had warned H.C.Z. about the applicant, but the latter would not be intimidated and left for Prague anyway. 31.  At the hearing on 12 April 2006 the Novo Mesto District Court established that the applicant and his counsel had not been notified about the questioning of E.M.L. and A.B. due to the urgency of the matter. The court decided to request the Dutch authorities to give the applicant the opportunity to cross-examine those witnesses; however, the investigating judge of the Regional Court of The Hague refused to allow the applicant to attend the examination in person, finding that the witnesses\u2019 safety could be at risk and that they might not be willing to give a statement. Having been informed about the decision of the Dutch investigating judge, the applicant insisted, at the hearing on 16 June 2006, that he should be given the opportunity to personally confront E.M.L., or else the latter\u2019s statement should be excluded from evidence. 32.  The second examination of E.M.L. and A.B. on 4 July 2006 was conducted in the presence of the applicant\u2019s counsel, who asked them a number of questions, some of which had been previously prepared by the applicant. A.B.\u2019s testimony mostly concerned his and the applicant\u2019s role in the business they had been involved in in the Czech Republic. As regards E.M.L.\u2019s testimony regarding the shooting of H.C.Z., it was to a large extent consistent with his previous statements; however, when asked to identify on the floor plan of the bedroom where the shooting had taken place the location of the applicant and that of his brother M.\u0160., E.M.L. showed opposite positions to the ones he had shown when questioned by the Czech police in 2001 and by the Dutch investigating judge for the first time. Alerted to the similarity between the applicant and his brother, E.M.L. responded that he had definitely recognised the applicant at the material time. When asked if he could still recognise the applicant and M.\u0160. and distinguish between them, E.M.L. responded that he had only seen the applicant twice, but thought that he could recognise him, although he could not say so with certainty. However, he acknowledged that as he had only seen the applicant\u2019s brother M.\u0160. once, and that very briefly, he was not certain he could still tell the difference between them. Lastly, E.M.L. emphasised again that he was not willing to attend the trial in Slovenia, adding that neither would he consent to being questioned by video link if that meant that the applicant could see him. 33.  E.M.L.\u2019s and A.B.\u2019s statements were later read out at the hearing before the Novo Mesto District Court in accordance with the rules of domestic criminal procedure (section 340 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Procedure Act) which provide that a witness\u2019s statement may be read out if he or she lives abroad and fails to appear at a hearing despite being duly summoned. Hearing E.M.L.\u2019s testimony, the applicant commented that E.M.L. had switched the positions of himself and his brother during the shooting, which meant that he had confused the two brothers for one another. 34.  Meanwhile, on 24 April 2006 the \u0160marje pri Jel\u0161ah Traffic Police stopped the applicant and found a gun in his car. The applicant told the officers that the gun had been used in the 2001 murder in the Czech Republic. He further alleged at the trial that his brother M.\u0160. had told him where he had discarded the gun back in 2001. Returning from the Czech Republic, where he had been at the hearing of M.S., the applicant had gone to find the gun. M.\u0160. supported the applicant\u2019s account of events by specifying that he had not thrown the gun away, as previously stated. He had in fact hidden it under a concrete plate and had later drawn a map showing the approximate location of the gun, so that the applicant would be able to find it. Ballistic expert F.S. established that the gun corresponded with the model and the calibre used in the murder of H.C.Z. Moreover, the gun was clean and oiled, with no traces of corrosion or any other imperfections. F.S. thus concluded that the gun could not have been left out in the open for several years. The Czech ballistic experts confirmed that the bullets and cartridge cases submitted to them by the Slovenian authorities matched the bullets and cartridge cases found at the crime scene and in H.C.Z.\u2019s body, and had undoubtedly been fired from the same weapon. 35.  Moreover, ballistic expert F.S. and medical expert A.\u0160. were heard by the Novo Mesto District Court and explained the conclusions of their reports. The applicant, not persuaded by their statements, reiterated his request for further ballistic analysis and a 3D reconstruction of the crime scene; however, the District Court dismissed his request. 36.  On 12 September 2006 the Novo Mesto District Court delivered a judgment finding the applicant guilty of H.C.Z.\u2019s murder and sentenced him to fifteen years in prison. Noting that the applicant could not be present at the examination of E.M.L. and A.B. in the Netherlands because of the decision of the Dutch investigating judge, which fell beyond the jurisdiction of the Slovenian courts, the District Court nonetheless concluded that since the applicant\u2019s counsel was present and moreover had submitted questions written by the applicant to both witnesses, the applicant\u2019s defence rights were not violated. 37.  Moreover, the District Court explained that it had refused the applicant\u2019s request for a 3D forensic reconstruction because ballistic expert F.S. had explained that this method would have not been reliable in the circumstances of the case. As regards the applicant\u2019s request for another ballistic expert to be appointed, the District Court pointed out that any doubts raised by the ballistic report prepared by the defence\u2019s expert V.M. had been removed by the questioning of experts F.S. and A.\u0160. at the hearing. 38.  In its conclusion that it was the applicant who had shot H.C.Z., the District Court relied on the testimony given by E.M.L. The court noted that, when cross-examined by the applicant\u2019s counsel, E.M.L. had confused the position of the applicant and M.\u0160. on the floor plan of the bedroom, but nonetheless found that his statement regarding the identity of the shooter was persuasive, since he had known the applicant and had maintained throughout the proceedings that he had seen him pulling a gun and firing a shot at H.C.Z. The account given by E.M.L. was further corroborated by forensic evidence and the testimony of M.S. regarding the sequence of events. Moreover, it was noted that M.S. had not seen E.M.L. carry a gun, as had been alleged by the applicant, M.\u0160. and A.S. 39.  As regards the applicant\u2019s motive for shooting H.C.Z., the District Court examined in great detail his role in the business in which he had been involved, and referred to his apparent dispute with the Dutch partners. Finally, the court pointed out numerous discrepancies between the applicant\u2019s statements given during the investigation and at the trial, and the fact that the gun with which H.C.Z. had been killed had been found in the applicant\u2019s possession. The District Court did not believe the applicant\u2019s and M.\u0160.\u2019s statement that the gun had been hidden under a concrete plate alongside a Czech motorway and then found years later, intact and oiled, by the applicant. As regards M.\u0160.\u2019s testimony, the court found it unreliable. In particular, it found that M.\u0160.\u2019s account of the shooting was not supported by the forensic evidence taken at the scene of the crime or by the entry and exit wounds found on H.C.Z.\u2019s body. 40.  The applicant appealed against the judgment, raising, inter alia, the argument that he should have had the opportunity to cross-examine E.M.L. in person, either in the courtroom or by video link. 41.  On 1 February 2007 the Ljubljana Higher Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. It found that the District Court had properly assessed the evidence, and that the applicant\u2019s defence rights had not been violated on account of his inability to cross-examine E.M.L. in person. It noted that the grounds relied on by the investigating judge in The Hague, who refused to allow the applicant\u2019s presence at the examination, were identical to those provided in section 178 \u00a7 4 of the Slovenian Criminal Procedure Act. It concluded that the applicant\u2019s defence rights had been safeguarded by the attendance of his lawyer at E.M.L.\u2019s examination. It further noted that E.M.L. had provided credible and consistent testimony, which had not been refuted by any of the expert reports; in addition, his account of the events leading to the shooting and his escape from the villa was confirmed by M.S. 42.  On 24 January 2008 the Supreme Court decided on the applicant\u2019s request for the protection of legality. It rejected the applicant\u2019s complaint of a violation of his defence rights due because he did not have the opportunity to cross-examine the main witness for the prosecution, finding that the applicant had been familiar with E.M.L.\u2019s testimony and had had an adequate and sufficient opportunity to effectively challenge it through the assistance of his counsel. Moreover, in response to the applicant\u2019s assertion that E.M.L. had confused him for his brother, the Supreme Court observed that E.M.L. had been viewed by the lower courts as a reliable and credible witness because his testimony had been consistent throughout the proceedings, including his identification of the applicant as the shooter. Moreover, E.M.L.\u2019s statement had been corroborated by other evidence, in particular by M.S.\u2019s testimony. The Supreme Court emphasised that the defence had been acquainted with E.M.L.\u2019s initial statement given to the Czech authorities and thus in the position to effectively challenge the reliability and veracity of his testimony. In the Supreme Court\u2019s opinion, the applicant\u2019s counsel had used this opportunity at the hearing of E.M.L. in The Hague, where she had asked, inter alia, a number of questions relating to the reliability of E.M.L.\u2019s identification of the shooter. Therefore, although the applicant had not been present during E.M.L.\u2019s cross-examination, the Supreme Court was convinced that his rights of defence had not been violated. 43.  The applicant subsequently appealed to the Constitutional Court, which on 6 April 2010 declared his constitutional complaint inadmissible.", "references": ["7", "0", "1", "4", "9", "2", "5", "8", "6", "3", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Budapest. 5.  On 6 January 2000 the applicant brought an action against his parents before the Si\u00f3fok District Court for dissolution of joint ownership of a real property. 6.  On 21 March 2000 the court suspended the proceedings pending the adjudication of a preliminary question in other proceedings. Upon termination of the other proceedings on 17 November 2005, the Si\u00f3fok District Court continued hearing the case. 7.  On 25 August 2006 the court again suspended the proceedings pending the adjudication of a preliminary question in another related procedure. Upon termination of these proceedings on 30 August 2007, the Si\u00f3fok District Court ordered continuation of the case on 17 November 2008. 8.  An agreement was reached between the parties which was acknowledged and incorporated into a judgment by the Si\u00f3fok District Court on 5 May 2011.", "references": ["8", "2", "5", "1", "4", "9", "6", "7", "0", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "7.  The applicant was born in 1967 and lived before his arrest in the town of Yoshkar-Ola in the Mariy El Republic. 8.  In 2010 the applicant was convicted of murder, possessing firearms and aggravated robbery. He was sentenced to fifteen years\u2019 imprisonment. 9.  In April 2012 he was diagnosed with cancer of the left kidney. According to a medical certificate, on 25 July 2012 he underwent ablation in the prison hospital. A month later he was discharged and transferred to a correctional colony, despite complaining of deteriorating health. 10.  On 18 December 2012 a pulmonary fluorography revealed that the applicant had \u201csuspected nidal shadows (in the middle zones) on the right and left sides\u201d. An MRI performed a month later confirmed that he had metastases in the lungs. 11.  On 6 March 2013 a medical panel diagnosed him with \u201cstage 3 cancer\u201d of the left kidney (stage 4 is the final in the development of cancer). 12.  On 28 March 2013 the applicant was examined by another medical panel. The diagnosis included stage 4 cancer of the left kidney and multiple metastases in the lungs, as well as various secondary illnesses of the cardiovascular and digestive systems. The panel concluded that the applicant was eligible for early release as he suffered from a condition included in the list of serious illnesses precluding the serving of sentences in correctional institutions, as provided for by Decree no. 54 of the Government of the Russian Federation of 6 February 2004. 13.  A month later the Ingondinskiy District Court ordered the applicant\u2019s release, finding that his condition was \u201cserious enough\u201d to warrant his discharge. The decision was quashed upon an appeal by a prosecutor and the matter was sent back to the District Court for re\u2011examination. 14.  On 24 July 2013 the District Court rejected a request by the applicant for release, citing the panel\u2019s report of 6 March 2013 and, in particular, the fact that he had been diagnosed with stage 3 cancer, which was not included in the list of illnesses. At the same time, the District Court dismissed the findings made by another medical panel on 28 March 2013, considering that examination to have been \u201cunlawfully conducted\u201d. It also noted that the \u201capplicant\u2019s behaviour did not show his determination to get on the road to recovery\u201d. 15.  On 21 November 2013 the District Court dismissed another request for early release by the applicant. Accepting that he suffered from stage 4 cancer, the court nevertheless held as follows:\n\u201c... [the applicant] is a particular danger to society, his improvement level is negligible, and according to the [colony] administration he has not got on the road to recovery. [The applicant] regularly receives symptomatic treatment and, in view of the specifics of his disease, does not need another kind of treatment.\u201d\nThe decision of 21 November 2013 was appealed against and became final on 14 May 2014. 16.  The applicant\u2019s lawyer sought the opinion of an independent expert from the Blokhin Cancer Research Centre of the Russian Academy of Sciences. On 22 April 2014 three of its specialists prepared a reply, stressing that appropriate treatment could prolong the life expectancy of those suffering from stage 4 cancer for up to thirty months and that there were grounds to believe that the applicant needed specific antitumour treatment. 17.  In May and June 2014 Ms Artemyeva unsuccessfully applied to have the applicant transferred from the correctional colony, where no anti-cancer treatment was available, to the prison hospital. 18.  On 2 July 2014 a new medical panel diagnosed him with stage 3 kidney cancer with growing multiple lung metastases and metastases in the mediastinal lymph nodes. The panel\u2019s findings also referred to the results of a computer tomography, which had revealed tuberculomas in the left lung. 19.  In August 2014 the applicant\u2019s lawyer lodged a complaint against the administration of the correctional colony, alleging that they had failed to provide her client with adequate medical care. She requested that the court authorise the applicant\u2019s transfer to the prison hospital. 20.  On 1 October 2014 the District Court dismissed the complaint, but granted the transfer request. Relying on statements by a representative of the applicant\u2019s correctional colony and Ms Artemyeva, the court found that the applicant was not receiving anti-cancer treatment in the colony as such treatment had to be prescribed by an oncologist. The colony medical unit did not employ this type of specialist. 21.  On 20 October 2014 an independent forensic expert studied the applicant\u2019s medical file at the request of his lawyer, and concluded that since the end of 2012 his condition had called for tumour immunotherapy. The expert also noted that since August 2012 his treatment had been merely symptomatic and that his drug regimen was limited to painkillers. 22.  At the end of July 2014 the applicant asked the Court to apply Rule 39 of the Rules of Court and to indicate to the Russian authorities that he should be provided with the necessary medical care or released from prison on health grounds. 23.  On 5 August 2014 the Government were requested under Rule 54 \u00a7 2 (a) of the Rules of Court to submit information about the applicant\u2019s health, the quality of the medical assistance he was receiving and the conditions of his detention. 24.  On 15 September 2014 the Government responded, providing the Court with the applicant\u2019s entire medical file. In addition, in merely a few lines, they stressed that:\n(a) the applicant was undergoing treatment in the prison hospital;\n(b) his health was satisfactory and \u201cnothing was life-threatening\u201d;\n(c) the medical care was afforded to him \u201cin full\u201d, was \u201cappropriate\u201d to his condition and complied both with the requirements of Russian law and the guarantees of Article 3 of the Convention; and\n(d) his illnesses were not included in the list of illnesses precluding the serving of sentences in correctional institutions. 25.  The applicant responded in November 2014, maintaining his claims of absent or sporadic medical assistance. He again relied on the conclusions of the forensic medical expert made on 20 October 2014. 26.  Following receipt of the Government\u2019s submissions and the applicant\u2019s comments on them, on 12 November 2014 the Acting President of the Section decided to indicate to the Government, under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, that the applicant should be immediately examined by medical experts independent from the penal system, including by an oncologist, with a view to determining (a) whether the treatment he was receiving in detention was adequate to his condition; (b) whether his current state of health was compatible with detention in a correctional colony or prison hospital; and (c) whether his current condition required his admittance to a specialist hospital or release. The Government were also asked to ensure his immediate transfer to a specialist hospital if the medical experts concluded that such admittance was required. 27.  The Court wrote to the Government on 13 November 2014. On 4 December 2014 the Government responded, submitting various documents.\n(i)  A typed copy of the applicant\u2019s medical history drawn up between September and November 2014, which contained a detailed schedule showing his daily intake of drugs. It appears from that document that he received basic analgesic and hypotensive drugs and cough medicine, and that an oncologist had prescribed him \u201clifelong\u201d immunotherapy with a drug called \u201creodoron\u201d. However, the drug intake schedule did not contain any mention of the drug \u201creodoron\u201d.\n(ii)  Certificates issued by the acting head of the medical unit in the applicant\u2019s correctional colony, listing the diagnosis and giving a short description of general medical procedures. According to the certificates, on 20 November 2014 the applicant\u2019s condition was \u201csatisfactory\u201d and his illnesses \u201cdid not present any danger\u201d to his life. The certificates also indicated that there were no signs of progressive lung failure or \u201ccancer intoxication\u201d (paraneoplastic syndromes, such as fever). The acting head of the unit nevertheless noted that any illness, including those suffered by the applicant, could be life-threatening.\n(iii)  A certificate dated 24 November 2011 issued by the head of the applicant\u2019s correctional colony setting out his criminal record and convictions and indicating that since 23 August 2014 he had been detained in the correctional colony as there were no grounds to keep him in the prison hospital. 28.  In a one-page document the Government also answered the three questions which on 12 November 2014 the Court had asked to be addressed to independent medical experts. In particular, they stressed that upon the applicant\u2019s arrival at each correctional institution he had undergone clinical tests and had been examined by medical specialists. He had thus been placed under regular medical supervision in relation to his illnesses. The Government argued that his condition was satisfactory and that there was no threat to his life as he was afforded medical care appropriate to his condition and in the required amount. They concluded that his condition did not call for admittance to a specialist hospital or release. 29.  The applicant commented on the Government\u2019s information, insisting that the medical assistance afforded to him was inadequate and that his life was in imminent danger unless antitumor and radiation treatment were administered to him. He relied on the results of a medical examination on 18 December 2014, which had revealed new and growing metastases in the right adrenal gland, the left brain hemisphere and the right cerebellar hemisphere. 30.  The applicant also submitted an alternative expert report commissioned by his lawyer. On 17 January 2015 two forensic medical experts from St. Petersburg State Medical University prepared a report responding to the three questions put by the Court in its decision of 12 November 2014. Assessing the quality of the applicant\u2019s medical assistance, the experts noted that since August 2012 the applicant had only received symptomatic treatment with anaesthetics for his kidney cancer. No other cancer-related treatment had been given until December 2014. The experts drew up a list of various established and widely applied medical procedures, including immunotherapy, extensive chemotherapy and radiotherapy, which should have been provided to a patient such as the applicant to improve his condition and extend his life. The experts stressed that even after the growing metastasis in the applicant\u2019s brain was discovered in December 2014 the prison doctors had not considered the possibility of radiotherapy. The experts noted that the drug \u201creodoron\u201d mentioned in his medical record did not exist. They further criticised other aspects of his medical assistance, including the frequency and direction of important medical examinations. The experts concluded that the applicant\u2019s life expectancy was critically low. He had no more than a few months to live, particularly in view of the fact that he was not being afforded the necessary treatment. 31.  Following communication of the case to the parties, on 29 June 2015 the Government informed the Court that the applicant had died on 8 April 2015. They submitted a copy of the death certificate and asked the Court, in the absence of any person wishing to pursue the application on his behalf, to strike the case out of the list of cases pursuant to Article 37 \u00a7 1 (c) of the Convention. 32.  The Government included the applicant\u2019s medical record drawn up between December 2014 and April 2015 in a letter to the Court dated 24 September 2015. They also enclosed a number of certificates prepared by the acting heads of the correctional colony and colony medical unit. The acting head of the colony laid down the details of the applicant\u2019s criminal record, indicated that he had not made any complaints to the colony administration between 21 November 2014 and 8 April 2015 and that a request he had made for early release had been dismissed by the Ingodinskiy District Court on 16 March 2015. In separate certificates the acting head of the medical unit recorded the progress of the applicant\u2019s illness, placing particular emphasis on the rapid deterioration of his health in 2014 when new and growing metastases had been discovered in his lungs, lymph nodes, adrenal gland and brain, and the development of cancer intoxication, accompanied by serious bilateral polysegmental pneumonia, brain oedema and terminal kidney failure. The applicant\u2019s condition had been considered particularly serious between 18 December 2014 and 1 February 2015, and then between 24 March and 8 April 2015. The assessment had been changed to moderately serious for the period 1 February to 23 March 2015, although no changes in the long list of conditions had been recorded. 33.  In the letter of 18 August 2015 the applicant\u2019s lawyer informed the Court that Ms Artemyeva, the applicant\u2019s sister and heir, wished to continue the proceedings before the Court on the applicant\u2019s behalf. The lawyer enclosed a birth certificate as proof of the applicant and Ms Artemyeva\u2019s relationship and copies of letters sent by various Russian authorities to Ms Artemyeva in response to complaints alleging that they had failed to properly treat the applicant.", "references": ["6", "2", "0", "5", "7", "9", "8", "4", "3", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1967 and 1970 respectively and live in Rostov-on-Don. 6.  On 26 December 2006 the applicants were arrested and placed in a detention centre operated by the Rostov-on-Don police. 7.  On 1 January 2007 and 31 December 2006 respectively, the applicants were transferred to remand prison no. IZ-61/1 in Rostov-on-Don, where they were held until 23 March 2012. 8.  The first applicant, Mr Reznik, submitted that between 1 January and 15 May 2007 he had been held in cells 117 and 118 of the remand prison, which measured 6 square metres and had six sleeping places but accommodated up to nine inmates. In cells 42, 44 and 45, where he stayed from 15 May until November 2007, the surface area was approximately 11 square metres for twelve sleeping places and up to eleven inmates. For the next few years he was in cell 111, the largest of all the cells he was held in at 14 square metres, with up to five people sharing. On some occasions he and his cellmates had to take turns to sleep. The first applicant produced written statements by Mr F., Mr K. and Mr S., with whom he had been detained in the same cells in 2007-2009, 2009, and 2006-2010, respectively. The statements corroborated his account of the conditions of detention. 9.  The Government did not contest the fact that the applicant\u2019s former cellmates had been held in the same remand prison as the applicant or the veracity of their statements. 10.  The second applicant, Ms Guzeyeva, submitted that apart from the first month she had been detained in cell 184, which measured 25 square metres, had eight sleeping places and held between ten and twenty-six inmates. Because of a lack of sleeping places she had to take it in turn to sleep, not only in bed but also on the floor. 11.  The Government provided a description of the applicants\u2019 conditions of detention, relying on certificates issued in June 2015 by the director of the remand prison, photographs of the cells, prisoner transfer logs (\u0441\u0443\u0442\u043e\u0447\u043d\u0430\u044f \u0432\u0435\u0434\u043e\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c \u0443\u0447\u0451\u0442\u0430 \u043b\u0438\u0446, \u0432\u0440\u0435\u043c\u0435\u043d\u043d\u043e \u0432\u044b\u0431\u044b\u0432\u0448\u0438\u0445 \u0438\u0437 \u0441\u043b\u0435\u0434\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0438\u0437\u043e\u043b\u044f\u0442\u043e\u0440\u0430) and registration logs (\u0436\u0443\u0440\u043d\u0430\u043b \u043a\u043e\u043b\u0438\u0447\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0435\u0440\u043a\u0438 \u043f\u043e\u0434\u043e\u0437\u0440\u0435\u0432\u0430\u0435\u043c\u044b\u0445, \u043e\u0431\u0432\u0438\u043d\u044f\u0435\u043c\u044b\u0445 \u0438 \u043e\u0441\u0443\u0436\u0434\u0451\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0445). They submitted that the number of prisoners in the cells where the applicants had been held had not exceeded the occupancy limit. 12.  The prisoner transfer log shows that the applicants were detained in the following cells:\n \nMr Reznik\nCell \nDate\n117\n21 February 2007\n42\n16 June; 16 and 23 September, 1, 7; 13 and 14 October; 11, 12, 18 and 26 November 2008; 1, 15 and 22 September, 6 and 27 October, 10 and 17 November 2009\nMs Guzeyeva\nCell \nDate\n184\n21 February, 14 May and 14 August 2007; 14 March and 16 June 2008 13.  The prison director\u2019s certificates specify that cell 44 \u201cwas equipped with three sleeping places\u201d and measured 14.3 square metres. They also indicate, in particular, that the applicants were held in the following cells:\n \nMr Reznik\nCell\nSurface, sq. m\nInmates\nPeriod\n118\n8\n2\n14 January to 14 May 2007\n44 14.  The registration logs did not contain the names of prisoners but listed numbers that could be interpreted as the cell number, its maximum occupancy and the actual number of prisoners on a given date. All the cell numbers and maximum occupancy figures were pre-printed, except for the maximum occupancy figures of the applicants\u2019 cells, which were written by hand. For example, in the log of 9 June 2008, the maximum capacity was handwritten for cells 42, 44, 45, 111, 117, and 118 (see Mr Reznik\u2019s cell numbers above); and for 184 and 192 (Ms Guzeyeva\u2019s cells), and matched the actual number of prisoners in those cells. 15.  The Government also provided undated photographs of cells 42, 44, 45, 111, 117, 118, and 192, which were taken from the corridor through the door, which was ajar. One of the photographs shows cell 44, with the list of cell equipment on the door indicating that it contains \u201csix two-tier beds\u201d. The inside of the cell is not visible. The applicants denied that the photographs showed the cells in which they had been held because those cells had not had the vaulted ceilings that were visible in the photographs. 16.  On 14 December 2010 the Kirovskiy District Court of Rostov\u2011on\u2011Don convicted the applicants and their co-defendants of illegal banking operations and forgery, and sentenced them to six years\u2019 imprisonment and a fine. The court ordered the forfeiture of the applicants\u2019 money as \u201cthe proceeds of crime\u201d. 17.  On 13 March 2012 the Rostov Regional Court amended the judgment on appeal, reducing the sentences and revoking the forfeiture order on the grounds that the relevant provisions of criminal law had been enacted after the commission of the crimes. 18.  The applicants lodged several claims for the return of their property. On 21 March 2013 and 10 February 2014 the Kirovskiy District Court ordered the return of part of the money to the applicants, which they received shortly thereafter. The court considered that the rest of the money was to be forfeited to the State. 19.  The applicants appealed and by a final decision of 16 December 2015 the Rostov Regional Court ordered the rest of the applicants\u2019 property to be returned to them, finding that the District Court\u2019s forfeiture order had been unlawful and procedurally defective. 20.  The applicants recovered the remaining amounts on 20 January and 18 February 2016.", "references": ["5", "6", "2", "0", "9", "3", "4", "7", "8", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1991 and lives in Moscow. 6.  On 6 May 2012 the applicant was arrested during the dispersal of a political rally at Bolotnaya Square in Moscow. He was found guilty of failure to obey lawful police orders, an offence under Article 19.3 of the Code of Administrative Offences, and was subsequently charged with participation in mass disorder and with having committed violent acts against police officers, criminal offences provided for by Articles 212 \u00a7 2 and 318 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code. He was detained and tried on these charges and was convicted to a prison term of two years and three months. 7.  The background facts relating to the planning, conduct and dispersal of the assembly at Bolotnaya Square are set out in more detail in the judgment Frumkin v. Russia (no. 74568/12, \u00a7\u00a7 7-65, 5 January 2016). The parties\u2019 submissions on the circumstances directly relevant to the present case are set out below. 8.  On 23 April 2012 five individuals (Mr I. Bakirov, Mr S. Davidis, Ms Y. Lukyanova, Ms N. Mityushkina and Mr S. Udaltsov) submitted notice of a public demonstration to the mayor of Moscow. The aim of the demonstration was \u201cto protest against abuses and falsifications in the course of the elections to the State Duma and of the President of the Russian Federation, and to demand fair elections, respect for human rights, the rule of law and the international obligations of the Russian Federation\u201d. 9.  On 3 May 2012 the Moscow Department of Regional Security approved the route from Kaluzhskaya Square, down Bolshaya Yakimanka Street and Bolshaya Polyanka Street, followed by a meeting at Bolotnaya Square, noting that the organisers had provided a detailed plan of the proposed events. The march was to begin at 4 p.m., and the meeting had to finish by 7.30 p.m. The number of participants was indicated as 5,000. 10.   On 4 May 2012 the First Deputy Head of the Moscow Department of Regional Security held a working meeting with the organisers of the demonstration at Bolotnaya Square, at which they discussed the security issues. The organisers and the authorities agreed that the assembly layout and the security arrangements would be identical to the previous public event organised by the same group of opposition activists on 4 February 2012. On that occasion, the venue of the meeting had included the park at Bolotnaya Square and the Bolotnaya embankment. 11.  On 5 May 2012 the Tsentralnyy District Prosecutor\u2019s Office of Moscow issued a warning to two of the organisers, Mr Davidis and Mr Udaltsov, against exceeding the notified number of participants and against erecting camping tents at the meeting venue, an intention allegedly expressed by the organisers at the working meeting. 12.  On the same day the Moscow Department of the Interior published on its website the official information about the forthcoming demonstration on 6 May 2012, including a map. The map indicated the route of the march, the traffic restrictions and an access plan to Bolotnaya Square; it delineated the area allotted to the meeting, which included the park at Bolotnaya Square. Access to the meeting was marked through the park. 13.  On the same day the Police Chief of the Moscow Department of the Interior adopted a plan for safeguarding public order in Moscow on 6 May 2012 (the \u201csecurity plan\u201d). In view of the forthcoming authorised demonstration at Bolotnaya Square and anticipated attempts by other opposition groups to hold unauthorised public gatherings, it provided for security measures in Moscow city centre and set up operational headquarters to implement them. The police units assigned to police the march and the meeting counted 2,400 riot police officers, of which 1,158 were on duty at Bolotnaya Square. They were instructed, in particular, to search the demonstrators to prevent them from taking tents to the site of the meeting and to obstruct access to Bolshoy Kamenyy bridge, diverting the marchers to Bolotnaya embankment, the place of the meeting. The adjacent park at Bolotnaya Square had to be cordoned off. 14.  At about 1.30 p.m. on 6 May 2012 the organisers were allowed access to the meeting venue to set up their stage and sound equipment. The police searched the vehicles delivering the equipment and seized three tents found amid the gear. They arrested several people for bringing the tents. 15.  At the beginning of the march, the organisers signed an undertaking to ensure public order during the demonstration and gave assurances to the police that the limits on the place and time allocated for the assembly would be respected and that no tents would be placed on Bolotnaya Square. 16.  The march began at 4.30 p.m. at Kaluzhskaya Square. It went down Yakimanka Street peacefully and without disruption. The turnout exceeded expectations, but there is no consensus as to the exact numbers. The official estimate was that there were 8,000 participants, whereas the organisers considered that there were about 25,000. The media reported different numbers, some significantly exceeding the above estimates. 17.  At about 5 p.m. the march approached Bolotnaya Square. The leaders found that the layout of the meeting and the placement of the police cordon did not correspond to what they had anticipated. Unlike on 4 February 2012, the park at Bolotnaya Square was excluded from the meeting venue, which was limited to Bolotnaya embankment. 18.  Faced with the police cordon and unable to access the park, the leaders of the march \u2013 Mr S. Udaltsov, Mr A. Navalnyy, Mr B. Nemtsov and Mr I. Yashin \u2013 stopped and demanded that the police open access to the park. The cordon officers did not enter into any discussion with the protest leaders and no senior officer was delegated to negotiate. After about fifteen minutes of attempting to engage with the cordon officers, at 5.16 p.m. the four leaders announced that they were going on a \u201csit-down strike\u201d and sat on the ground. The people behind them stopped, although some people continued to go past them towards the stage. 19.  Between 5.20 p.m. and 5.45 p.m. two State Duma deputies tried to negotiate the enlargement of the restricted area by moving the police cordon behind the park along the lines expected by the organisers. At the same time the Ombudsman of the Russian Federation, at the request of police, attempted to persuade the leaders of the sit-in to resume the procession and to head towards the meeting venue at Bolotnaya embankment where the stage had been set up. During that time no senior police officer or municipal official came to the site of the sit-down protest, and there was no direct communication between the authorities and the leaders of the sit-in. 20.  At 5.50 p.m. the crowd around the sit-down protest built up, which caused some congestion, and the leaders abandoned the protest and headed towards the stage, followed by the crowd. 21.  At 5.55 p.m. the media reported that the police authorities were regarding the strike as a provocation of mass disorder and were considering prosecuting those responsible for it. 22.  At the same time a commotion near the police cordon occurred at the place vacated by the sit-down protest, and the police cordon was broken in several places. A crowd of about 100 people spilled over into the empty space beyond the cordon. Within seconds the police restored the cordon, which was reinforced by an additional riot police force. Those who found themselves outside the cordon wandered around, uncertain what to do next. Several people were apprehended, others were pushed back inside the cordon, and some continued to loiter outside or walked towards the park. The police cordon began to push the crowd into the restricted area and advanced by several metres, pressing it inwards. 23.  At 6 p.m. Ms Mityushkina, on police instructions, announced from the stage that the meeting was now over, but apparently her message was not heard by most of the demonstrators or the media reporters broadcasting from the spot. The live television footage provided by the parties contained no mention of her announcement. 24.  At the same time a Molotov cocktail was launched from the crowd at the corner of Malyy Kamennyy bridge over the restored police cordon. It landed outside the cordon and a passer-by\u2019s trousers caught fire. It was promptly extinguished by the police. 25.  At 6.15 p.m. at the same corner of Malyy Kamennyy bridge the riot police began breaking into the demonstration to split up the crowd. Running in tight formations, they pushed the crowd apart, arrested some people, confronted others, and formed new cordons to isolate sections of the crowd. Some protesters held up metal barriers and aligned them so as to resist the police, threw various objects at the police, shouted and chanted \u201cShame!\u201d and other slogans, and whenever the police apprehended someone from among the protesters they attempted to pull them back. The police applied combat techniques and used truncheons. 26.  At 6.20 p.m. Mr Udaltsov climbed onto the stage at the opposite end of the square to address the meeting. At this point, he was arrested. Mr Navalnyy attempted to go up onto the stage, but he was also arrested, and so was Mr Nemtsov, five minutes later. 27.  Meanwhile, at the Malyy Kamennyy bridge the police continued dividing the crowd and began pushing some sections away from the venue. Through loudspeakers they asked the participants to leave for the metro station. The dispersal continued for at least another hour until the venue was fully cleared of all protesters. 28.  On the same day the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation opened a criminal investigation into the suspected mass disorder and violent acts against the police (Articles 212 \u00a7 2 and 318 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code). 29.  On 28 May 2012 an investigation was also launched into the criminal offence of organising mass disorder (Article 212 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code). The two criminal cases were joined on the same day. 30.  On 24 May 2013 the first criminal case against twelve individuals suspected of participation in mass disorder, including the applicant, was transferred to the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow for the determination of criminal charges (the first \u201cBolotnaya\u201d case). 31.  On 21 February 2014 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow pronounced a judgment in the first Bolotnaya case. It found eight individuals, including the applicant, guilty of participation in mass disorder and of violent acts against police officers during the public assembly on 6 May 2012. They received prison sentences of between two and a half and four years; one of them was released on parole. The applicant was sentenced to two years and six months\u2019 imprisonment. Three co-defendants had previously been pardoned under the Amnesty Act and a fourth had his case disjoined from the main proceedings. This judgment was upheld by the Moscow City Court on 20 June 2014. It reduced the applicant\u2019s prison sentence to two years and three months. 32.  On 24 July 2014 the Moscow City Court found Mr Udaltsov and Mr Razvozzhayev guilty of organising mass disorder on 6 May 2012 and sentenced them to four and a half years\u2019 imprisonment. On 18 March 2015 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the judgment of 24 July 2014, with amendments. 33.  On 18 August 2014 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow examined another \u201cBolotnaya\u201d case and found four persons guilty of participating in the mass disorder and of committing violent acts against police officers during the demonstration on 6 May 2012. They received prison sentences of between two and a half and three and a half years; one of them was released on parole. This judgment was upheld by the Moscow City Court on 27 November 2014. 34.  At the time of arrest the applicant was a student at the political science faculty of the Moscow State University and lived with his wife and their child born in 2011. On 6 May 2012 he arrived at Bolotnaya Square to take part in the demonstration and, according to him, he did not take part in any disorder or clashes with the police, although he was in the area where clashes occurred. At one point during the dispersal of the demonstration he picked up from the ground a small round yellow object and threw it over the heads of the protesters in the direction of the police. He was arrested shortly after that. There is no information as to whether he was detained on that day. 35.  On 17 May 2012 the applicant was charged with non-compliance with a lawful order by a police officer on 6 May 2012. He was found guilty of the offence provided by Article 19.3 of the Code of Administrative Offences and was sentenced to 24-hours\u2019 detention. 36.  Until 9 June 2012 the applicant continued to study at the university while living with his family at his usual address. On the latter date he was detained on suspicion of having participated in mass disorders on 6 May 2012. 37.  On 11 June 2012 the Basmannyy District Court examined and granted the request to detain the applicant pending criminal investigation. It reasoned as follows:\n\u201cIn assessing the circumstances under investigation, [the court takes account of] the submitted materials and the indicated information in their integrity, as well as the personality of [the applicant], who is suspected of having committed criminal offences one of which is characterised as grave and the other of medium gravity, punishable by up to two years of deprivation of liberty, and therefore giving sufficient reasons to believe that the applicant is likely to abscond, to continue his criminal activity, to destroy evidence, or to otherwise obstruct the investigation of the criminal case.\u201d 38.  The court dismissed the applicant\u2019s request for an alternative preventive measure, including bail of 500,000 Russian roubles (RUB), and personal guarantees of several state officials and found that his release was not required on health grounds. It ordered the applicant\u2019s detention until 6 July 2012. On 2 July 2012 the Moscow City Court upheld the detention order. 39.  On 18 June 2012 charges were brought against the applicant under Articles 212 \u00a7 2 (participation in mass disorder) and 318 \u00a7 1 (violence against a public official) of the Criminal Code. He was accused, in particular, of shouting slogans and throwing an unidentified small round yellow object that had hit the police officer\u2019s shoulder. 40.  On 3 July 2012 the Basmannyy District Court examined the investigator\u2019s request to extend the term of the applicant\u2019s detention by four months. The applicant asked for another preventive measure pending trial. He offered bail of RUB 500,000 or the personal guarantees of a State Duma deputy, two Moscow municipal deputies and one academic. His request for an alternative preventive measure was supported by petitions signed by six Moscow municipal deputies and three personal references from his place of residence and the university. The applicant also made a plea for release on health grounds, having provided medical certificates confirming that he was suffering from a high-degree myopia and asthma. On the same day the court found that the circumstances that had justified the detention order had not changed and, referring to the gravity of the charges and the complexity of the investigation, extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 6 November 2012. This extension order was upheld by the Moscow City Court on 6 August 2012. 41.  On 29 October 2012 the Basmannyy District Court granted another extension of the applicant\u2019s detention, until 6 March 2013, essentially on the same grounds and noting that the circumstances that had justified the detention order had not changed. This extension order was upheld by the Moscow City Court on 26 November 2012. 42.  On 7 November 2012 the charges against the applicant were updated with a statement that the applicant\u2019s and others\u2019 acts had cumulatively caused the police officer a haematoma on the head, leg and shoulder. The classification of the offences remained unchanged. 43.  On 1 March 2013 the Basmannyy District Court granted a new extension of the applicant\u2019s detention, until 9 June 2013, essentially on the same grounds as before and noting that the circumstances that had justified the detention order had not changed. On 10 April 2013 the Moscow City Court upheld this extension order. 44.  On 23 April 2013 the Moscow City Court examined a fresh request for the extension of the applicant\u2019s detention and granted it until 6 July 2013. The decision read as follows:\n\u201cThe materials presented [by the investigator] reveal that the grounds for choosing the preventive measure in respect of [the applicant] were not only the gravity of the charges but also the information about the personality of [the applicant] who could abscond from the investigation and trial, threaten witnesses, or otherwise obstruct the proceedings in the case, if released.\nThe aforementioned grounds ... have not changed, have not lost their relevance to date, and the circumstances of the case [and] the nature of the crime committed by [the applicant] lead the court to conclude that the need for the [pre-trial detention] has not, at this stage, ceased to exist ...\nThis term is reasonable, [it] is justified by the objective circumstances, it is not in conflict with the term of the pre-trial investigation, also extended on the same grounds ...\nIn accordance with the Constitutional Court\u2019s [case-law], the proportionality of the preventive measure to the [gravity of the] charges imputed to [the applicant] show that in this case the public interests, in particular those related to the criminal investigation, override the importance of the principle of respect of individual liberty.\u201d 45.  On 24 May 2013 the applicant\u2019s criminal case was transferred to the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court for the determination of criminal charges. 46.  On 30 May 2013 the Moscow City Court upheld the extension order of 23 April 2013. 47.  On 6 June 2013 the latter court granted another extension of the applicant\u2019s detention until 24 November 2013. This decision concerned eleven defendants and read, in so far as relevant, as follows:\n\u201c... the court concludes that the preventive measure in respect of [all defendants] ... is to remain unchanged because the reasons taken into account when these measures were chosen have not ceased to exist and have not changed ...\n... [the defendants] are accused of [grave crimes punishable by prison sentences] ...\nRegard being had to all the available information about the personality of [the defendants] and the nature of the criminal offences imputed to each of them, the court still has sufficient grounds to believe that the said defendants, if at liberty, may flee the trial or otherwise obstruct the course of justice, [motivated by] the gravity of the charges.\n... no other measures of restraint would secure the aims and goals of the judicial proceedings ...\nThe court takes into account the arguments of Mr Akimenkov, Mr Belousov and Mr Barabanov and their counsel concerning the health problems which occurred in custody, but notes that no documentary evidence that these defendants have diseases threatening their life or health and incompatible with the detention in custody have been provided.\u201d 48.  On 2 July 2013 the Moscow City Court upheld the extension order of 6 June 2013. 49.  On 6 August 2013, during the court hearing the applicant made an application for release which was dismissed by the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court on the same day. 50.  On 11 September 2013 the Ombudsman of the Russian Federation applied to the Presidium of the Moscow City Court with a complaint about the extension of the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention, and requested an alternative preventive measure for him. 51.  On 22 October 2013 the applicant applied for release on the grounds of his child\u2019s medical condition, as well as the deterioration of the applicant\u2019s own health. This application was supported by several prominent public personages, including university professors, the dean of the faculty of political science and a State Duma deputy, all of whom provided personal guarantees. On 2 October 2013 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court rejected this application. 52.  On 1 November 2013 the Moscow City Court refused the Ombudsman\u2019s request of 11 September 2013. 53.  On 19 November 2013 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court granted another extension of detention in respect of nine defendants, including the applicant. It ordered their detention until 24 February 2014 on the grounds of the gravity of the charges. It held, in particular, as follows:\n\u201c[The defendants] are charged with a criminal offence provided for by Article 212 \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Code, which belongs to the category of grave crimes punishable by a prison sentence of over three years. Furthermore, [some defendants] are charged with a criminal offence provided for by Article 318 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code, also punishable by a prison sentence of over three years.\nDespite the defendants being registered as having permanent addresses in the Russian Federation, the analysis of the overall information about [the defendants\u2019] personalities, and the nature of the offences imputable to them, give the court sufficient grounds to consider that the defendants, if the preventive measure is changed to another one not involving deprivation of liberty, may flee the trial or otherwise obstruct the course of justice, [motivated by] the gravity of the charges ... the reasons taken into account when these measures were chosen have not ceased to exist and have not changed ...\u201d 54.  On 17 December 2013 the Moscow City Court upheld the extension order of 19 November 2013. 55.  The applicant has high-degree myopia. According to a 2009 medical certificate, his eyesight in the right eye was minus 10 dioptres, and on the left eye minus 6 dioptres. 56.  From 19 June 2012 to 29 June 2013 the applicant was detained in remand prison IZ-77/5, and from 29 June 2013 he was held in IZ-77/2. Upon his arrival at the remand prisons the applicant was subjected to medical checks which did not reveal any health issues. 57.  The parties agree that on most days the number of inmates in the cell did not exceed the design capacity. They also agree that the size of the cells and the number of detainees allowed the applicant four square metres of personal space and that the applicant had an individual sleeping place in every cell. 58.  The parties provided the following accounts of the conditions in these cells. According to the applicant, the cells were inadequately lit and ventilated, excessively hot in summer and cold in winter, all with a lavatory pan separated from the living space by a chin-high plastic partition providing insufficient privacy. The applicant alleged that he had been constantly exposed to cigarette smoke, and although the window in the cell could be opened it gave onto a courtyard used for incinerating rubbish, letting in fumes. Therefore the cell constantly lacked fresh air, and the forced ventilation could not compensate for it. Outdoor exercise was limited to one hour per day. The applicant also claimed that the window was too high to give sufficient light for reading or working with documents. Finally, he alleged that access to drinking water was conditional on the purchase of an electric kettle. 59.  According to the Government, the artificial light in the cells was maintained at 100 watts round the clock except at night, from 10 p.m. to 6 a.m., when it was 75 watts; they provided measurement tables for this detention centre created in August 2013, which stated that the brightness in the cells was between 149 and 454 lux, the temperature in the cells between 26oC and 29oC, and the humidity between 36% and 45%. They indicated that in IZ\u201177/5 the detainees had access to a gym upon their written request. 60.  On 11 July 2012 the applicant applied in writing to the head of the facility for a medical examination. He alleged that he had been suffering from asthma and high-degree myopia. On 20 September 2012 he made a similar application to the investigator of the criminal case. 61.  On 3 October 2012 the investigator granted the applicant\u2019s request for a medical examination. This decision read as follows:\n\u201c... the performance of a medical examination ... falls outside the competence of the investigating bodies ...\nHowever, given that the state of health of the accused Mr Belousov is of importance to the present criminal case, the investigating bodies have sent the relevant request to the administration of [IZ-77/5] stating the need to carry out, in the shortest possible time, the medical examination of the accused Mr Belousov, the results of which are to be submitted to the investigating bodies for inclusion in the criminal case file.\u201d 62.  It appears that the medical examination was not carried out. 63.  On 28 November 2012 and 11 January 2013 the public commission for the monitoring of detention facilities visited IZ-77/5, and, according to the Government, the applicant made no complaints about the conditions of detention or the lack of medical assistance on either occasion. 64.  On 3 September 2013 the applicant had a hypertension crisis during a court hearing. An ambulance was called and provided him with the necessary assistance. 65.  Following his complaints of headaches, on 6 September 2013 the applicant was placed in the medical ward of IZ-77/2. Upon admission, the applicant was diagnosed with hypertension. He remained in the medical ward for a period of at least two months for his blood pressure to be monitored. 66.  The applicant alleged that the conditions in IZ-77/2 were poor, in particular on account of the lack of outdoor exercise and inadequate sanitary arrangements. He specified that the lavatory pan was separated from the living space by a chest-high partition providing insufficient privacy. According to the applicant\u2019s letter of 30 July 2013, he had not been able to have a shower since his transfer to IZ-77/2. 67.  According to the Government, the conditions in the cells of IZ-77/2 were as follows: the toilet was separated by a solid partition from the rest of the cell and ensured the necessary privacy; the state of the sanitary facilities was satisfactory; the cells were treated for disinfection and pest-control once every three months and whenever necessary; the applicant was entitled to one hour\u2019s outdoor exercise per day; the cell was cleaned and the bedding changed once a week; the cells were equipped with forced ventilation and could be aired through a hinged window pane. Artificial light was provided at 100 watts by day and 75 watts by night. The glazed windows let in sufficient daylight. 68.  Pursuant to the request of the applicant\u2019s counsel filed on an unidentified date, on 31 January 2014 the applicant was examined by an ophthalmologist and was diagnosed with high-degree myopia (minus 13 dioptres on both eyes). 69.  During the hearing of the applicants\u2019 criminal case, which began in July 2013, the applicant and his co-defendants were regularly transferred from the remand prisons to the court-house and back. All the defendants attended the hearings on three or four consecutive days every week. According to the Government, the applicant\u2019s trial involved ninety-one court hearings, and it appears that the applicant was transferred to attend all of them. A typical schedule on a hearing day is represented by the following two-week extract submitted by the applicant:\n \n02/07/2013\n03/07/2013\n04/07/2013\n09/07/2013\n10/07/2013\n11/07/2013\nWake up\n5 a.m.\n6 a.m.\n7 a.m. 9.30 a.m.\nArrival at the court-house\n10 a.m.\n10 a.m.\n10 a.m.\n10 a.m.\n10 a.m.\n10 a.m.\nEnd of hearing\n5 p.m.\nadjourned\n7 p.m.\n5 p.m.\n6 p.m.\n3 p.m.\nBoard the van\n8 p.m.\n8 p.m.\n8 p.m.\n9 p.m. 70.  According to the applicant, this schedule left him insufficient time for sleep between the court hearings, gave him no time to prepare for the next day\u2019s hearing, and deprived him of hot meals. 71.  He further alleged that the conditions in the prison assembly rooms and in the transfer van (\u00ab\u0430\u0432\u0442\u043e\u0437\u0430\u043a\u00bb) had been appalling, in particular owing to overcrowding. He claimed that he was cramped together with other detainees and their belongings in a small tin cabin without windows, ventilated only through a roof hatch. The benches were spaced at 30 cm, and the detainees had to get in and out by walking on others. Smoking was allowed, which caused further discomfort, especially to non-smokers. Occasionally, they were transferred in vans divided into tight individual metal cubicles. In both types of vans the cabin overheated in the summer and froze in cold weather. The transfer lasted for two to six hours depending on the number of pick-up points and traffic conditions. There was no opportunity to use a toilet during the transfer, even at other pick-up points where the van could wait for hours. 72.  At the Moscow City Court before and after the hearings the applicant and his co-defendants were held in convoy cells. According to the applicant, these were poorly lit and often overcrowded, and access to a toilet was subject to the availability of a convoy officer. Some of the convoy cells on the ground floor of the court-house were as small as two square metres, and each could be shared by two detainees. The applicants\u2019 account was supported by witness statements submitted by his co-defendant Mr Kavkazskiy and those given by his three fellow inmates, unrelated to the present case; their detailed accounts of the prison transfers in the relevant period, as well as of the convoy cells at the Moscow City Court, were consistent with the applicant\u2019s submissions. 73.  According to the Government, the morning transfer to the court\u2011house did not exceed 1.5 hours, and the transfer back lasted for up to three hours because of the evening traffic. Also, the applicant\u2019s schedule allowed for eight hours of uninterrupted sleep. They indicated that the wake-up time at the detention centres was 6 a.m., the pickup would take place at 8 a.m., and the drop-off after the hearing at 9.30 p.m.; assembly before and after the transfer did not exceed 30 minutes. All the detainees were provided with packed meals for the whole day out at the court-house, and they were given hot water at lunchtime. They further indicated that the vans used for the transfer were 2009-2011 models of KAMAZ\u20114308\u2011AZ, KAMAZ\u2011OTS\u2011577489\u2011AZ (both designed for 32 detainees), GAZ\u2011326041\u2011AZ (designed for seven detainees), and GAZ\u20113309\u2011AZ (designed for 19 detainees). As regards the convoy cells at the Moscow City Court, they submitted that the applicant and his co-defendants were detained in convoy area of the court-house, which included four cells measuring 12 square metres each and toilets, including a wheelchair-accessible one, which the detainees could use on demand, accompanied by the convoy. They submitted that the cells had adequate light and ventilation, and that they were furnished with tables and benches. During the intervals in the hearing the defendants could use an electric kettle to boil water. 74.  On 6 June 2013 the court proceedings began in hearing room no. 338 of the Moscow City Court. The latter court lent its premises to the Zamoskvoretsky District Court so as to accommodate all the participants in the proceedings, the public and the press. In that hearing room ten defendants were held in a glass cabin measuring 3.2 m x 1.7 m x 2.3 m (height). The Government submitted that the glass cabin was a permanent courtroom installation consisting of a steel frame and sheets of bulletproof glass, with a partition inside, a steel mesh ceiling and a secure door; the cabin was equipped with benches. The walls of the cabin had slots allowing documents to be passed between the defendants and their counsel; ventilation outlets were at floor level, and near the dock was an air conditioner. The cabin was equipped with microphones allowing for consultations with counsel and facilitating the defendants\u2019 participation in the proceedings. The Government specified that convoy officer guarded the cabin on both sides, supervised the defendants and intercepted any attempts of \u201ccontact with outsiders\u201d, but the defendants could communicate with their counsel with the court\u2019s permission. 75.  The applicant submitted that the glass cabin lacked space and ventilation and that it was virtually soundproof, hampering the defendants\u2019 participation in the proceedings and their communication with counsel. The benches had no backrests, and the lack of space made it impossible to have documents; it was impossible to consult counsel or the case file during the hearing. The applicant also submitted that the video evidence examined at the hearing could not be seen by him from the cabin because of the distance between the cabin and the screen and his poor eyesight. 76.  In August 2013 the proceedings moved to hearing room no. 635 of the Moscow City Court. This hearing room was equipped with two glass cabins similar to the one in hearing room no. 338, except that there were no slots in them. Each cabin measured 4 m x 1.2 m x 2.3 m (height). From 2 August 2013 one of the defendants was no longer placed in the glass cabin owing to a change in the measure of restraint for him. The nine remaining defendants were divided between the two cabins. 77.  From mid-September 2013 to the end of 2013 the hearings continued on the premises of the Nikulinskiy District Court of Moscow (hearing room no. 303), and in January and February 2014 at the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court (hearing room no. 410). These hearing rooms were equipped with metal cages in which the nine defendants (from 19 December 2013 eight), including the applicant, sat during the hearings. According to the photographs submitted by the applicants, the dimensions of the cages were similar to the glass cabins described above and, likewise, they were not equipped with any furniture other than benches. 78.  On 6 June 2013 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow began a preliminary hearing of the criminal case against ten participants in the public assembly at Bolotnaya Square charged with participation in mass disorders and violent acts against police officers. On 18 June 2013 the same court began the hearing on the merits. 79.  On 13 November 2013 police officer F., the victim of the applicant\u2019s assault, was examined as a witness. He testified that the applicant had thrown an unidentified yellow object which had hit him on the shoulder and caused him pain. The applicant asked for F.\u2019s statements made during the investigation, which contained no mention of the yellow object or the applicant, to be read out in court. The applicant pointed out that no identification parade had been held during the investigation to enable F. to identify the person who had assaulted him; instead, the applicant and F. had been questioned in confrontation, whereby the applicant had been the only person introduced to F. as the likely perpetrator. The court refused the applicant\u2019s request for F.\u2019s statements to be read out. 80.  On 21 February 2014 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow pronounced judgment. It found, in particular, as follows:\n\u201cBetween 4 p.m. and 8 p.m. on 6 May 2012 ... at Bolotnaya Square ... unidentified persons ... called those present [at the venue] to move outside the agreed meeting venue, to defy the lawful orders of the police ..., to use violence ... which led to mass disorder accompanied by the use of violence against public officials in connection with the performance of their duties [and] the destruction of property.\nOn the same day at 5 p.m. at the latest [the defendants] acquired the criminal intent to participate in mass disorder and to use violence ...\nThus, in furtherance of this criminal intent, at an unidentified time and place Mr Belousov acquired an unidentified solid yellow round object with the intention of using it to cause violence against officials ...\n... together with other participants ... Mr Belousov repeatedly chanted anti\u2011government slogans.\nMoreover ... the participants in the mass disorder threw chunks of tarmac, stones, sticks and other objects at the police ... which hit them on various body parts, and [the defendants] ... [who] participated in the mass disorder ... implemented their criminal intent to use violence against public officials ... applied physical force not endangering life or health of those [officials] ...\nMr Belousov used violence not endangering the life or health of [Mr F.] ...\nBetween 5 p.m. and 8.10 p.m. on 6 May 2012 ... unidentified participants in the mass disorder deliberately administered at least three blows and kicks to [F.\u2019s] head, body and limbs, after which Mr Belousov ... deliberately targeting [F.], threw an unidentified solid yellow round object, which hit [F.] on the upper right side of the chest, causing him physical pain.\nAs a result of Mr Belousov and other unidentified persons\u2019 actions [F.] sustained physical pain and injuries in the form of bruising and abrasion of the soft tissues of the parietal region, bruising of the ... left forearm, abrasion on the ... right shin, [all of] which, assessed individually or cumulatively, constituted injuries not endangering life or health, and not entailing short-term health impairment or minor durable professional incapacitation ...\nMr Belousov ... pleaded not guilty and testified that ... he wanted to see why the meeting was not starting [and] went to Malyy Kamennyy Bridge ... [he] saw the riot police cordon ... [and officers] arresting some [participants] ... [he] was looking to leave and went to the middle of Bolotnaya Square and saw a girl who tripped on something and nearly fell. Without looking at it closely he picked it up from the ground; it felt soft and slimy ... and threw it away without aiming it at anyone ... he joined hands with other protesters chanting \u201cOne for all and all for one!\u201d, \u201cUnited, we are invincible!\u201d. At this moment three police officers ran up to him, grabbed him and carried him to the police vehicle ...\nPolice officer [F.] testified that ... after the cordon was restored ... he was heading into the crowd to arrest offenders ... somebody hit him three times on the head ... then he felt a blow from a heavy object on his shoulder. From the corner of his eye he saw [Mr Belousov] take a swing and toss something ... like a billiard ball.\n... Mr Belousov was filmed at the moment he threw a yellow object at the police ...\nThe [defendants\u2019] argument that no mass disorder took place is considered by the court unsubstantiated because ... as a result of the premeditated actions of a group of individuals who organised ... obstruction to the demonstrators\u2019 march on their way to the intended meeting venue where the stage was, which caused discontent among the protesters towards ... the police ... those who were leading the march and who were able to make an unhindered approach to the meeting venue changed their tactics and called for ... a sit-in, hoping thus to secure a decision to change the placement of the cordon to their advantage and to extend their area beyond what had been agreed ... As a result ... the protesters forced their way through the police cordon ... public order was disrupted ... because of the larger crowd, uncontrollable and incited by organised groups ... conditioned the applicants\u2019 intent to participate in such actions, accompanied by chunks of tarmac and plastic bottles being thrown and violence towards the police otherwise being used. Conscious of their participation in spontaneously erupted disorder and wishing to take part in it, the defendants joined the mass movement ...\n... the court takes into account the nature and the degree of [the applicant\u2019s] involvement in the mass disorder ... and considers it possible to give him a sentence below the minimum punishment provided for by Article 212 \u00a7 2.\u201d 81.  The applicant was sentenced to two years and six months\u2019 imprisonment, calculated on the basis of a two-year prison term under Article 212 of the Criminal Code partly concurrent with a one-year prison term under Article 318 of the Criminal Code. The applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention counted towards the prison sentence. 82.  The applicant appealed. He contested the first-instance court\u2019s finding that mass disorder had taken place, and alleged that there had only been isolated clashes between the protesters and the police, caused by the authorities\u2019 last-minute decision to alter the layout of the meeting venue and aggravated by their excessive crowd-control measures. He denied that the object he threw hit anybody; he alleged a breach of procedure for questioning in confrontation with the victim, police officer F., and complained that the court had refused to have the records of the latter\u2019s interrogation conducted during the investigation read out. He also complained about the conditions in which he was escorted to the courtroom, the intensity of the hearing schedule, and that he had been placed in a glass cabin during the trial, claiming that it hindered his communication with counsel. 83.  On 20 June 2014 the Moscow City Court upheld the first-instance judgment, also reducing his prison sentence to two years and three months, comprising a one-year-and-nine-month term under Article 212 of the Criminal Code and a nine-month term under Article 318 of the Criminal Code, to run partly concurrently. 84.  On 8 September 2014 the applicant was released after serving his prison term.", "references": ["5", "9", "6", "8", "4", "0", "No Label", "7", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["7", "1", "2", "3"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicants in the present cases are Russian nationals. Their names, years of birth and places of residence are tabulated below. 5.  The applicants sued different municipal companies, referred to in the Appendix as the \u201cdebtor companies\u201d, in various unrelated sets of the court proceedings. 6.  The companies were incorporated as municipal unitary enterprises set up by decisions of local administrations and provided services tabulated below in the respective municipal districts in several regions of Russia. The companies had \u201cthe right of economic control\u201d (\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043e \u0445\u043e\u0437\u044f\u0439\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0432\u0435\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f) over the assets allocated to them by the administrations in order to carry out their statutory activities. 7.  On the dates tabulated below by decisions of the local authorities some of the assets allocated to the companies were transferred back to the administration. 8.  At a later point insolvency proceedings were opened in respect of the debtor companies. As a result, the companies were subsequently liquidated. The dates on which the insolvency started and ended are tabulated below. 9.  On the dates tabulated below domestic courts by separate judgments made pecuniary awards in the applicants\u2019 favour, to be paid by the debtor companies. Particulars of each judgment are summarised in the appended table. 10.  On the dates listed in the Appendix the awards became enforceable. 11.  The final judicial decisions in the applicants\u2019 favour have remained unenforced due to companies\u2019 insolvency and subsequent liquidation. Several applicants\u2019 subsequent court actions against authorities, including subsidiary liability claim, legal succession proceedings or claims for damages against the respective local administrations, as well as repetitive complaints to the bailiffs\u2019 service or the prosecutor\u2019s office in connection with pending criminal proceedings brought in 2006-07 with regard to the company\u2019s insolvency (applications nos. 20018/07, 10313/08, 36611/08, 56499/09, 42111/10, 43017/10, and 61212/10) proved futile. 12.  On 20 November 2009 the applicant in application no. 10313/08 died. On 1 November 2010, his widow, Anishchenko Raisa Yakovlevna, expressed her willing to participate in the proceedings before the Court in her late husband\u2019s stand.", "references": ["0", "4", "6", "5", "8", "1", "7", "2", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1948 and lives in Split. 6.  She is the owner of a flat in Zagreb with a surface area of 80.58 square metres. The flat is occupied by a \u201cprotected lessee\u201d (za\u0161ti\u0107eni najmoprimac), a certain Ms S.\u0160. Under the Lease of Flats Act (Zakon o najmu stanova), which entered into force on 5 November 1996, such lessees are subject to a number of protective measures, such as the duty of landlords to contract a lease of indefinite duration, payment of protected rent (za\u0161ti\u0107ena najamnina), the amount of which is set by the Government and significantly lower than the market rent; and better protection against termination of the lease. 7.  The applicant refused to recognize S.\u0160., who had been living in her flat since 1975, as a holder of a specially protected tenancy (\u201cstanarsko pravo\u201d) and to conclude a lease contract with her. On 18 May 2007 S.\u0160. brought a civil action against the applicant before the Zagreb Municipal Civil Court (Op\u0107inski gra\u0111anski sud u Zagrebu) relying on sections 33(3) and 37(2) of the Lease of Flats Act (see paragraph 18 below), seeking recognition of her legal status of a protected lessee and obtaining a judgment in lieu of the lease contract. 8.  Shortly afterwards in 2007 the applicant brought a counterclaim before the same court seeking to obtain a judgement ordering S.\u0160. and the members of her household to vacate the flat in question. She also sought that S.\u0160. be ordered to pay her 500 Croatian kunas (HRK) per month[1] together with the accrued interest, for the period between June 2002 and December 2006. The applicant specified that the said amount represented her estimate of a freely negotiated rent (\u201cslobodno ugovorena najamnina\u201d) as provided by section 6 of the Lease of Flats Act and the Government of Croatia\u2019s Decision on the determination of the level of freely negotiated rent (Odluka o utvr\u0111ivanju slobodno ugovorene najamnine, Official Gazette no. 120/00). 9.  By a judgement of 5 December 2011 the Zagreb Municipal Civil Court found in favour of S.\u0160. It recognised her legal status of a protected lessee and substituted the lease contract stipulating protected rent in the amount of HRK 190.25 per month[2]. The court dismissed the applicant\u2019s counterclaim as unfounded. 10.  On 11 December 2012 the Zagreb County Court (\u017dupanijski sud u Zagrebu) dismissed an appeal by the applicant and upheld the first-instance judgement, which thereby became final. 11.  The applicant then lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) alleging violations of her right to equality before the law guaranteed by Article 14 of the Constitution and of her ownership rights guaranteed by Articles 48, 49 and 50 of the Croatian Constitution (see paragraph 17 below). By a decision of 12 September 2013 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint. This decision was served on the applicant\u2019s representative on 23 September 2013. 12.  The applicant submitted a document dated 11 May 2007 from which it follows that the protected rent for her flat was set at HRK 178.73[3]. The Government submitted a document dated 16 April 2015 from which it follows that the protected rent was set at HRK 217.57[4]. 13.  According to the documents submitted by the parties, the applicant was not obliged to pay the condominium fee into the common reserve fund for the flat. That fee was incumbent on another individual. 14.  According to the applicant, she never paid any income tax on the income generated by renting her flat subject to the protected lease scheme. The Government did not contest this information. 15.  The applicant furnished information as regards the monthly market rent for renting out flats in the vicinity of hers. She submitted an advertisement from the Internet dated 2 June 2014 offering for rent a flat of a similar size as hers (80 m\u00b2) for EUR 700 per month, and another one dated 17 December 2014 of 36 m\u00b2 for EUR 420 per month. In addition to this she submitted a copy of a lease agreement of 30 January 2014 for a flat with the surface area of 44.94 m\u00b2 rented out for HRK 1,600 per month[5]. 16.  The Government did not furnish any information in this respect.", "references": ["3", "6", "1", "0", "7", "8", "5", "4", "2", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Sibinj. 6.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7.  The applicant was a civil servant of the City of Slavonski Brod, working in its Office for Public Relations and Protocol (Grad Slavonski Brod, Ured za odnose s javno\u0161\u0107u i protokol \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe City of Slavonski Brod\u201d). In 2007 he was suspended from the civil service on account of having been accused of severe breaches of his official duties. 8.  For the duration of his suspension, that is to say between September 2007 and September 2008, the applicant was entitled to monthly salary compensation in the amount of 60% of the salary remitted in the month prior to his suspension from the civil service. 9.  On 5 September 2008 the Osijek Civil Service Tribunal (Slu\u017ebeni\u010dki sud u Osijeku) found the applicant guilty of severe breaches of his official duties and fined him 10% of the salary paid to him in the month in which the said sanction was imposed. 10.  On 14 October 2008, after the applicant lodged an appeal, the Superior Civil Service Tribunal (Vi\u0161i slu\u017ebeni\u010dki sud) amended the impugned decision and fined the applicant 5% of his salary paid in the month in which the said sanction was imposed. 11.  On 3 November 2008 the applicant lodged an application for the reimbursement of the portion of his gross salary \u2013 in the total amount of 78,428.47 Croatian kunas ((HRK), approximately 10,900 euros (EUR) at the time) \u2013 withheld during the suspension period between September 2007 and September 2008, together with accrued default interest running from the date of his suspension until payment of the said portion. He was of the opinion that by withholding 40% of his salary for a period of 12 months and imposing a fine on him the administrative bodies had punished him twice. 12.  By a decision of 17 November 2008 the City of Slavonski Brod dismissed that application. 13.  The applicant then lodged an appeal, which was dismissed as ill-founded by the same administrative body that delivered the above-mentioned decision (that is to say the City of Slavonski Brod). However, in its decision of 22 December 2008 it gave the instruction that the applicant had a right to bring an administrative action against it before the Administrative Court. 14.  On 22 January 2009 the applicant brought an administrative action, in accordance with the City of Slavonski Brod\u2019s ruling. 15.  On 1 January 2012 certain amendments to the Court Act entered into force and the Administrative Court became the High Administrative Court. 16.  By a decision of 4 January 2012 the High Administrative Court, relying on sections 9 and 30(1), point 5, of the Administrative Disputes Act, declined jurisdiction in respect of the subject matter, stating that an ordinary municipal court (redovni, op\u0107inski sud) was the appropriate court to hear the applicant\u2019s case, and declared the applicant\u2019s action inadmissible. This decision was final. On 16 February 2012 it served its decision on the applicant\u2019s representative. 17.  On 12 March 2012 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint. He complained, inter alia, that his right to a fair hearing, in particular his right of access to court, as guaranteed by Article 29 of the Croatian Constitution and Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, had been violated when the High Administrative Court had declared his action inadmissible. In particular, he argued that according to the Supreme Court\u2019s case-law, ordinary municipal courts did not have jurisdiction over disputes arising from legally binding decisions of administrative bodies. He also argued that even if he had brought a civil action, it would have been time-barred because it had taken the High Administrative Court more than three years to declare his administrative action inadmissible. 18.  By a decision of 5 July 2012 the Constitutional Court declared the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint inadmissible on the grounds that the case raised no constitutional issue. On 17 July 2012 it served its decision on the applicant\u2019s representative. 19. On 6 September 2012 the applicant brought a civil action in the Slavonski Brod Municipal Court (Op\u0107inski sud u Slavonskom Brodu) for reimbursement of salary arrears withheld between September 2007 and September 2008. 20.  By a judgment of 20 March 2013 the first-instance court dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim as time-barred. It held, inter alia, that given that the High Administrative Court had declared the applicant\u2019s administrative action inadmissible, it could not be deemed that the statutory limitation period had been interrupted. It relied on section 242(2) of the Civil Obligations Act. 21.  By a judgment of 12 August 2013 the Slavonski Brod County Court (\u017dupanijski sud u Slavonskom Brodu) dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld the first-instance judgment of 20 March 2013.", "references": ["9", "1", "6", "5", "7", "0", "3", "2", "8", "4", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Lisbon. 6.  The applicant is a university professor. At the relevant time he was also a columnist for O Independente, a national weekly newspaper. The applicant had previously worked at the Portuguese Meteorological Institute (Instituto Portugu\u00eas de Metereologia \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe IM\u201d) (since renamed the Portuguese Sea and Atmosphere Institute (Instituto Portugu\u00eas do Mar e da Atmosfera), where he had acted as vice-president from May 2003 to April 2004 and where he had been the project coordinator of a project co-funded by the EU agency EUMETSAT from May 1998 until he was removed from this position by the President of the IM, A.S., on 6 January 2006. 7.  On 3 March 2006 O Independente published an article entitled \u201cBad weather at the Institute\u201d, which contained statements by the applicant on the problems faced in the implementation of the project. 8.  The article also contained statements by A.S., which downplayed the applicant\u2019s statements and cast aspersions on the applicant\u2019s ability to lead the project, his professional capacity and seriousness. The relevant parts of the article read as follows:\n\u201c... Someone who does not share these views is the President of the IM, [A.S.], who has assured O Independente that \u2018the project does not face any risk\u2019 and denigrated Carlos C\u00e2mara, whom he does not recognise as having the \u2018skills to evaluate the development of the project\u2019, and his opinions ... With regard to C\u00e2mara leaving the project, [A.S.] mentioned that the former scientific coordinator \u2018had broken a relationship of trust\u2019, adding that his behaviour and his profile had led to his removal ...\u201d 9.  On 10 March 2006 O Independente published an opinion article, entitled \u201cThe Liar\u201d, written by the applicant in reply to the article of 3 March 2006. The article was divided into three parts: i) the reasons he had decided to write the article; ii) the problems with the project in question, namely financial mismanagement and lack of staff; and iii) a reaction to the statements made by A.S. The relevant parts of the article read as follows:\n\u201cLast Friday, O Independente devoted an article to the circumstances surrounding my removal from scientific coordinator of the project...\nContacted by A.F.S., my declarations focused on two issues of extreme gravity since they undermine the operational functioning of the project: the lack of a cost centre for the financial management and the non-recruitment of the necessary elements for its execution. Naturally, the journalist attempted to get the other party\u2019s opinion and so contacted the President of the IM, [A.S]. He could have either confirmed my statements or lie shamelessly. [He] opted for the latter and the issue ceased to be an incident (unfortunate) in my professional career to become something that deserved the attention of a chronicle.\nIn relation to the financial management, the President of the IM stated that \u2018both the IM and the \u2018manager\u2019 of the project are aware of all the expenses and funding involved\u2019. Clear and objective questions require clear and objective answers and the question is solely one of whether there is a cost centre and if, in 2005, the financial execution reports were regularly made showing that the amount of 1,187,135 euros \u2013 768,315 euros of which received from EUMETSAT in the beginning of 2005 and the remainder 418,820 euros to be invested by the IM \u2013 was spent in accordance to the plan signed by the President. And it would be desirable that the reports were signed by the financial controller of the project, the existence of which is envisaged in the [project] plan but was never hired.\nRegarding the lack of staff, the President of the IM stated that \u2018the current coordinators counter this insufficiency\u2019. Clear and objective questions require clear and objective answers and the only question that arises is whether the proposed contracts were in fact made. I say that no financial report was ever made nor any contract despite the existence \u2013 since October 2004! \u2013 of a list of names of people to hire.\nBy denying these facts \u2013 which are easy to demonstrate \u2013 the President shows that he is a liar ... Unlike the President of the IM \u2013 who without the political support he has wouldn\u2019t be anything else other than an A. [referring to the President of the IM\u2019s first name] \u2013 in the world in which I engage professionally, I don\u2019t need to be a \u201ccoordinator\u201d in order to have my expertise recognised. In that world \u2013 in which my expertise comes from peer recognition and is the result of the evaluation of my work \u2013 the President of the IM is nothing but a petty liar [mentiroso reles] and a poor wretch [pobre diabo]. And being the president is nothing more than a mere accident ... of base politics.\u201d 10.  On an unknown date A.S. lodged a criminal complaint against the applicant, accusing him of defamation. He alleged that the applicant\u2019s article had disseminated defamatory statements about him. On an unknown date A.S. sought leave to participate in the proceedings as an assistant (with victim status) to the public prosecutor (assistente) and lodged a claim for damages against the applicant. 11.  The Lisbon Criminal Court reviewed the documents which had been submitted to the proceedings and took oral evidence from witnesses and established that the applicant\u2019s professional capacity and expertise in meteorology and climatology were highly recognised at the national and European levels. It further established that from 2004 to 2006, when the applicant had been coordinating the project, he had written various emails and memoranda which had been addressed to the manager of the project, C.T., and the Science Minister reporting problems in the implementation of the project, and an additional open letter to staff working for the IM; the applicant had also had a meeting with the Secretary of State for Science and Innovation where those problems had been discussed. Five witnesses testified that a tense relationship had existed between the applicant and A.S. at the IM. 12.   By a judgment of 14 July 2010, the Lisbon Criminal Court convicted the applicant of aggravated defamation. According to the judgment, by making the impugned statements the applicant had wilfully defamed A.S. by making disparaging allegations in respect of him. The court further noted that the applicant\u2019s article, and in particular the choice of the words \u201cpetty liar\u201d and \u201cpoor wretch\u201d, had been vindictive and a personal attack on A.S. The relevant parts of the judgment read as follows:\n\u201cThe article published on 10 March 2006 was the culmination of a tense relationship between [the applicant] and the assistant to the public prosecutor and an example of their professional disagreements.\n... following an analysis of the phrases used in the article, in particular \u201cpetty liar\u201d and \u201cpoor wretch\u201d, the court is of the opinion that [the applicant] did not limit himself to objective criticism within a professional context and veered into attacking the assistant, given that those value judgments go beyond mere professional criticism and fall within the hard core of the right to reputation.\n... the phrases in question are objectively offensive. [The applicant], given his education and experience in the journalistic field, knew that those [phrases] were capable of undermining the assistant\u2019s personal honour, as they did.\nEven though [the applicant] has a sharp, direct and somehow incisive way of writing, he acknowledged in his first declarations that he would probably not use the same writing tone today. The truth is that [the applicant] exceeded himself by writing and addressing those phrases in respect of the assistant in an opinion article in a newspaper which, at the time, had a wide circulation.\n...\nIn a cold and strict analysis of the facts which were established in the instant case ... there are no doubts that [the applicant] wanted, and managed, to libel the offended by imputing to him epithets such as the \u2018President of the IM is nothing more than a petty liar and a poor wretch\u2019 which are harmful to his personal and professional honour and by calling into question his personal competence and good name. They are value judgments and not statements of fact ...\n...\nThe instant case does not fall in a political context. We are within a weather circle (c\u00edrculo da metereologia) in which the President of the IM is at risk. As a person exercising a leadership position in a public body, he is subject to criticism ...\nHowever ... there cannot be a total squeezing of the right to honour of the person concerned.\nIf throughout the article in question in the instant case [the applicant] objectively criticised the assistant\u2019s professional performance, even in reply to the previous article published on 3 March 2006, he [the applicant] drifted into a personal attack motivated by a feeling of revenge when he stated that \u2018the President of the IM is nothing more than a petty liar and a poor wretch\u2019. In fact, [the applicant], dissatisfied with the fact that, in his opinion, the assistant had called into question his professional competence, used as a counterattack these value judgments which do not concern the work of the assistant but directly involved the person concerned.\nWhile the word \u2018liar\u2019 would be a fact and as such addressed towards the professional performance of the assistant, the phrases \u2018petty liar\u2019 and \u2018poor wretch\u2019 constitute value judgments which, in the opinion of this court, are excluded from objective criticism and fall within the scope of a personal attack on the assistant.\n...\nIn the instant case, [the applicant] knew that the offended was the President of the IM, a public body, and wrote those words about him in order to address the duties performed and the activity performed in relation to those functions.\n...\n[The applicant] went further than what his right to defence of the public interest and his right to criticism would allow. By making value judgments such as the ones examined, there cannot be grounds to excuse [the applicant] as the defence of public interest cannot justify such a squeezing of the right to honour and good name. The right to criticism has to remain within the objective criticism of the duties performed by the person concerned and not displace into personal criticism, into personal attack. In fact, the phrases had only one purpose \u2013 to be used as a counterattack to the interview given by the assistant to a journalist in which he mentioned that he did not consider that [the applicant] was competent to evaluate the progression of the programme, and with the aim of downgrading and humiliating the assistant.\u201d 13.  The Lisbon Criminal Court sentenced the applicant to 250 day fines, totalling 2,000 euros (EUR). He was also ordered to pay EUR 3,000 in damages to A.S. 14.  On an unknown date the applicant appealed against the judgment to the Lisbon Court of Appeal. 15.  On 17 February 2011 the Lisbon Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance decision. The relevant parts of the judgment read as follows:\n\u201cIn the instant case the phrases \u2018petty liar\u2019 and \u2018poor wretch\u2019, in the context of the written piece concerning the professional relationship between the assistant and [the applicant], their academic background and their personal relationship, cannot be disregarded as [the applicant] wishes. Despite the possibility of \u2018widening\u2019 the scope of the concept of freedom of expression, [the applicant]\u2019s education enables us to understand that he meant what he said. In other words, he cannot claim that the word \u2018liar\u2019 was not from the ethical and moral point of view \u2018innocent\u2019 and even less when the adjective \u2018petty\u2019 is added ... [The applicant] could probably have achieved the \u2018informative\u2019 result which he wanted by only [saying] \u2018misrepresenting the truth\u2019. However, that did not happen as he added an adjective to the expression in such a way as to make a sharper negative evaluation of the person concerned. And, in our opinion, [he did so] in an unnecessary and disproportionate way.\nThere is no need to argue that the professional status of the parties makes freedom of expression unlimited, in comparison with other situations where the parties involved are not national figures.\nWhat happens must be precisely the opposite. Not only because it is not normal for high-level civil servants to use bad language, but also because their knowledge and education ordain that they accept and solve their professional disagreements without resorting to personal \u2018attacks\u2019 in public discussions.\n ...\nEven within this context of tense professional relationship, there can be doubt that the phrases \u201cpetty liar\u201d and \u201cpoor wretch\u201d are objectively defamatory, capable of undermining one\u2019s character and how one is considered ...\nIn this regard, [the applicant]\u2019s desired freedom of expression went much further than the limits covered by criticism by entering into the sphere of the offence of honour (an indivisible feeling, referring both to the professional and personal aspect [of the individual]) and into the scope of defamation.\u201d", "references": ["2", "3", "7", "0", "5", "9", "4", "1", "8", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1975 and lives in Rijeka. He is a professor of theology. As a professor of theology he was qualified to teach Catholic religious education and courses in ethics and culture, as provided under the relevant domestic law (see paragraph 36 below). 7.  On the basis of a proposal from the applicant\u2019s local priest, the archbishop of the Rijeka Archdiocese (Rije\u010dka Nadbiskupija) issued the applicant with a canonical mandate (missio canonica) (no. 492/08-2002) authorising him to teach Catholic religious education. 8.  On 1 September 2003, following the intervention of the Catechetical Office of the Rijeka Archdiocese (Katehetski ured rije\u010dke Nadbiskupije), the applicant was offered, without having to undergo a public competition, a contract of employment of indefinite duration as a layman teacher of Catholic religious education in two State high schools in Opatija. 9.  The applicant\u2019s appointment was based on the Agreement of 18 December 1996 between the Holy See and Croatia on education and cultural affairs and the relevant complementary domestic regulations (see paragraphs 32, 40-41, 43-44 below). He was thereby employed in the public service and remunerated by the State. 10.  At the time, the applicant was married to T.F. They had married in a religious ceremony on 14 December 2002 and their marriage had been recognised at the same time by the civil authorities, as provided for under the relevant domestic law (see paragraphs 33 and 38 below). 11.  The applicant\u2019s subsequent divorce from T.F. was registered before the civil authorities, and in March 2006 he married another woman in a civil ceremony. 12.  On 18 April 2006 the Rijeka Archdiocese informed the applicant that his civil marriage to another woman while still bound, in the eyes of the Church, by the religious marriage to his previous wife was contrary to Christian doctrine and disqualified him from teaching religious education. The relevant part of the letter read:\n\u201cIt has been established that in March this year you concluded a civil marriage although you are still bound by the Sacrament of Matrimony to a third person. The local Catechetical Office of the Rijeka Archdiocese issued you a mandate to teach Catholic religious education in school. Each religious education teacher must demonstrate that he is \u2018outstanding in true doctrine and the witness of a Christian life\u2019 (Canon 804 \u00a7 2) and must participate in the sacramental and evangelical community of a parish. The new situation does not enable you to do this.\nYou are therefore invited to explain in writing as soon as possible the manner in which your canonical situation can be harmonised with canonical mandate no. 492/08-2002 and then, by 28 April 2006, to come for a meeting in the Catechetical Office.\u201d 13.  After obtaining the applicant\u2019s explanation of his situation, on 31 August 2006 the Rijeka Archdiocese withdrew his canonical mandate to teach Catholic religious education. 14.  On the same day the Rijeka Archdiocese informed the two schools in which the applicant was employed of the new situation. The relevant part of the letter read:\n\u201cWe should inform you that on 31 August 2006 canonical mandate no. 492/08-2002 was withdrawn from the teacher of religious education, Petar Trava\u0161.\nThe canonical mandate was withdrawn under Article 3 \u00a7 2 of the Agreement between the Holy See and Croatia on education and cultural affairs (Official Gazette-International Contracts no. 2/1997) because of a breach of Canon Law (Canon 804 \u00a7 2). Petar Trava\u0161 explained his situation in writing.\u201d 15.  On 8 September 2006, relying on section 106 \u00a7 1(2) of the Labour Act (regular termination of an employment contract), the schools dismissed the applicant from his teaching job on the grounds that he could no longer be a teacher of Catholic religious education without a canonical mandate. They stressed that it had been impossible to find another position for the applicant or to offer him an alternative post within the schools. The applicant was given two months\u2019 notice and the right to an indemnity. 16.  On 13 October 2006 the applicant instituted proceedings in the Opatija Municipal Court (Op\u0107inski sud u Opatiji), challenging the decisions on his dismissal. 17.  On 22 February 2007 the Opatija Municipal Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s civil action on the grounds that as stipulated in the Agreement between the Holy See and Croatia and the related Agreement between the Government of Croatia and the Croatian Episcopal Conference on Catholic religious education in State schools and pre-school institutions, he could not teach Catholic religious education without a canonical mandate. The Opatija Municipal Court also found that the schools had examined the possibility of appointing the applicant to another suitable post, but that as there was no such post, they had justifiably terminated his contract of employment. 18.  The applicant challenged the judgment of the Opatija Municipal Court by lodging an appeal before the Rijeka County Court (\u017dupanijski sud u Rijeci). He argued that he had not breached the Labour Act or any other relevant legislation and that the Agreement between the Government of Croatia and the Croatian Episcopal Conference did not require that a person whose canonical mandate had been withdrawn should be dismissed. 19.  On 17 October 2007 the Rijeka County Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal, endorsing the findings and reasoning of the Opatija Municipal Court. 20.  On 18 and 19 February 2008 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske) and a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) respectively. He relied, inter alia, on Articles 8 and 14 of the Convention, and the corresponding provisions of the Constitution, arguing that there had been an unjust interference with his private and family life as a result of the decisions on his dismissal, and that his dismissal had been of a discriminatory nature. He contended, in particular, that the conclusion of a second marriage contract in a civil ceremony could not be a reason for dismissal under the Labour Act or any other State laws. He therefore considered that his dismissal based on the fact that he had divorced his former wife and remarried in a civil ceremony had disproportionately affected his private life. 21.  On 3 December 2008 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law as unfounded, endorsing the reasoning of the lower courts. In particular, the Supreme Court stressed that the applicant\u2019s dismissal had been based on the withdrawal of his canonical mandate, which was a necessary requirement for employment as a teacher of Catholic religious education as provided for under the relevant domestic law. The Supreme Court also held that it was not for the schools or the courts to enter into the examination of the reasons for the withdrawal of the applicant\u2019s canonical mandate by the Church. 22.  On 7 February 2009 the applicant supplemented his constitutional complaint by extending his arguments to the judgment of the Supreme Court. He contended in particular that the Supreme Court\u2019s refusal to examine the reasons for his dismissal had essentially deprived him of the possibility to have those reasons effectively challenged in court. 23.  A public hearing was held and on 22 May 2013 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint, finding that there had been no violation of his right to respect for his private and family life, or any discrimination against him. The relevant part of the decision reads:\n\u201c10.1.2. It follows from the available material and the [appellant\u2019s] constitutional complaint that the appellant\u2019s first marriage had been concluded in a religious ceremony before an official of the religious community and that [the appellant] was divorced on the basis of a final court decision as provided for under the relevant Croatian law. The Constitutional Court notes that the appellant subsequently concluded a new marriage in a civil ceremony without any restriction imposed by the State. It follows that the State did not inhibit his determination to remarry, nor did it prevent him from remarrying and founding a new family.\nAccordingly, the appellant\u2019s right to marry under Article 12 of the Convention and his constitutional right to respect for his family life under Article 35 of the Constitution and Article 8 of the Convention has not been breached.\n...\n 10.2.2. ... [T[he Constitutional Court starts by observing that the Republic of Croatia and the Holy See concluded an Agreement on education and cultural affairs, signed in Zagreb on 18 December 1996. The Act ratifying that Agreement came into force on 11 February 1997 and thereby this international treaty became part of the internal legal order of the Republic of Croatia with precedence in terms of its legal effects over the [domestic] statutes.\nBy this Agreement the Republic of Croatia undertook certain obligations which must be abided by and respected. Primarily, it undertook to secure Catholic religious education in all State elementary and high schools and all pre-school institutions as a mandatory class for all those who have chosen that course, under the same conditions applicable to other mandatory classes.\n[The Agreement] stipulates that Catholic religious education will be taught by qualified religious education teachers who are suitable for that position, in the opinion of the Church authorities, and meet the requisite legal requirements of the Croatian legislation. It also stipulates that teachers of religious education must hold a canonical mandate (missio canonica) issued by the diocesan bishop, and that withdrawal of the mandate leads to an immediate loss of the right to teach Catholic religious education. Under the Agreement, teachers of religious education are members, together with their pupils, of the educational corps ... The Republic of Croatia undertook to regulate the programme and functioning of Catholic religious education in schools of all types and levels by a special agreement between the Republic of Croatia and the Croatian Episcopal Conference.\nThe Constitutional Court considers it necessary to note at this point that the appellant is wrong when he argues that the Agreement between the Holy See and Croatia on education and cultural affairs does not require a canonical mandate as a condition for employment and that such a requirement only flows from the Agreement between the Government of Croatia and the Croatian Episcopal Conference on Catholic religious education in State schools and pre-school institutions of 29 January 1999. The appellant specifically contends that the Agreement between the Government [of the Republic of Croatia] and the Croatian Episcopal Conference is a bilateral agreement which \u2018is not a statute and does not have the status of an international treaty\u2019 and thus could not be binding for [him and the State] nor could it be applied to [his] case, as was done by the [lower] courts.\nAlthough the appellant relies on an erroneous premise that the canonical mandate, as a condition for employment as a teacher of religious education, has been stipulated (only) by the Agreement between the Government [of the Republic of Croatia] and the Croatian Episcopal Conference, it could be held that in essence he considers that the consequences of the withdrawal of the canonical mandate on his contract of employment, and his position of teacher of religious education, are contrary to the Constitution.\nThe Constitutional Court reiterates that the requirement to hold a canonical mandate in order to teach religious education, and the consequences of its withdrawal (loss of the right to teach Catholic religious education), are provided for under Article 3 of the Agreement between the Holy See and Croatia on education and cultural affairs. ... 10.2.3. The Constitutional Court considers it necessary to examine the special requirement stipulated by the Vatican agreements for employment as a teacher of religious education \u2013 the canonical mandate.\nThe Constitutional Court firstly notes that the Government of the Republic of Croatia have so far concluded seven agreements on questions of mutual interest with different religious communities, in particular with:\n- the Serbian Orthodox Church in Croatia (Official Gazette no. 163/03);\n- the Islamic community in Croatia (Official Gazette no. 196/03);\n- the Evangelical Church in Croatia and the Christian Reformed Church in Croatia (Official Gazette no. 196/03);\n- the Evangelical (Pentecostal) Church in Croatia, the Christian Adventist Church in Croatia and the Baptist Union of Croatia (Official Gazette no. 196/03);\n- the Bulgarian Orthodox Church in Croatia, the Croatian Old Catholic Church and the Macedonian Orthodox Church in Croatia (Official Gazette nos. 196/03 and 141/04);\n- the Jewish community Bet Israel in Croatia (Official Gazette no. 4/12); and\n- the Coordination of Jewish townships in Croatia (Official Gazette no. 4/12).\nAll these agreements have been concluded under the Act on the Legal Status of Religious Communities (Official Gazette no. 83/02) and they all contain identical provisions concerning, for example, mandatory religious education classes for those who have chosen them, the teaching of these courses under the same conditions as other mandatory courses, and the necessity for teachers of religious education to hold the requisite mandate to teach religious education, which can always be withdrawn \u2018for reasons of deficiencies related to the correctness of teaching and personal morality\u2019.\nSuch a requirement, given the nature of their job and its proximity with the mission of dissemination of the church\u2019s teaching, in the Constitutional Court\u2019s view, is not an excessive burden for persons who have chosen to become teachers of religious education. The assessment of a person\u2019s adequacy [to teach religious education] by the competent church authorities is a concretisation of the freedom of the church\u2019s activity and the right to religious freedom, which [also] includes the right of parents to a religious education of their children. 10.2.4. The enforcement of the obligation undertaken by an international agreement, namely the organisation of Catholic religious education in State elementary and high schools and pre-school education institutions, as provided for under the Agreement between the Holy See and Croatia on education and cultural affairs and the Agreement between the Government of Croatia and the Croatian Episcopal Conference, brought religious education teachers into the employment system of the Republic of Croatia. Although their employment status is not fully defined by these Agreements, the provisions of the Agreement between the Holy See and Croatia on education and cultural affairs in themselves show that the employment status of religious education teachers is a sui generis employment status \u2013 in order to teach religious education they must be suitable for that position in the opinion of the Church authorities; they must hold a canonical mandate and the withdrawal of the mandate leads to the loss of the right to teach Catholic religious education.\nAt the public hearing \u2013 on the basis of evidence given by the Director of the Administration for legal affairs of the Ministry of Science, Education and Sport of the Republic of Croatia S.S.B., it has been undoubtedly established that the employment of all teachers of religious education was conducted without an open competition, although that has not been provided for under the relevant law. It was only [later], after the public hearing, by section 12 of the amendments to the Act on Tuition and Education in Elementary and High Schools (Official Gazette no. 90/11) that a new section 107 \u00a7 10(6) was introduced, which provides that a contract of employment without an open competition may be concluded for the position of religious education teacher.\nIn June 2000 the Ministry of Education and Sport forwarded to all county offices for education, culture, information, sport and technical culture a letter concerning the employment status of religious education teachers in elementary and high schools; more precisely, concerning their hiring and dismissal.\nThe letter indicates that a contract of employment is to be concluded with religious education teachers meeting the relevant requirements, and that if the diocesan bishop by means of a decree withdraws the canonical mandate to teach Catholic religious education from a religious education teacher due to deficiencies related to the correctness of the teaching and personal morality, the contract of employment is to be terminated under section 107 of the Labour Act as an extraordinary dismissal. 10.2.5. It therefore follows that the appellant also entered the State education system without participating in an open competition. At the public hearing he stated that, on the basis of the local priest\u2019s recommendation the bishop had given him the mandate, the Ordinary had acted as an intermediary, and the school had given him the employment. Thus, by having the canonical mandate and meeting all other requirements, the appellant and the defendants concluded a \u2018classical\u2019 contract of employment under the Labour Act, which does not mention the canonical mandate or the consequences of its possible withdrawal.\nAt the public hearing, when asked whether he had been aware of the consequences of his conduct on the right to teach religious education, the appellant stated that he had passed the exam in canon law which he could not have passed without learning [also the issues] concerning those consequences. It follows that the appellant knew that his position depended on the mandate given by the diocesan bishop and that he would lose it if the mandate were withdrawn.\nAccordingly, although he had concluded a \u2018classical\u2019 employment contract under the Labour Act, the appellant could not have expected, after he had lost the canonical mandate as a consequence of entering into a new civil marriage while he was still in a \u2018religious\u2019 marriage with a third person, that he would be able to continue to teach religious education. However, he could have expected, irrespective of the internal instructions of the Minister, that the schools where he was employed would take all necessary measures to employ him in another post. This is because the withdrawal of the canonical mandate leads to the loss of the right to teach Catholic religious education and not dismissal or the loss of his degree in theology. Under section 2 of the By-law on the educational level and pedagogical-psychological education of teachers in high schools (Official Gazette nos. 1/86 and 80/99), a degree in theology [opens the possibility] of teaching courses in ethics and culture.\nAccording to the findings of the first-instance court, the defendants had examined the possibility of employing the appellant in another post but, as such a post had not existed, they terminated his contract of employment by so-called regular dismissal, which gives rise to the right to a notice period and an indemnity. In so doing, the defendants acted in the usual manner for terminating a contract of employment by so-called regular dismissal. The Constitutional Court therefore finds that the appellant has not been treated differently from other workers, including employees in schools, in the situation of a termination of a contract of employment by so-called regular dismissal.\nThe assessment of the lawfulness of the termination of the appellant\u2019s contract of employment was, in the light of the relevant labour law, conducted by the [competent] courts at three levels of jurisdiction. In view of the fact that for the position of teacher of religious education there is a further special requirement, without which it is impossible to conclude a contract of employment (a canonical mandate), and having found that the appellant, due to the withdrawal of [the canonical mandate] no longer met the requirements for teaching Catholic religious education, and the fact that the defendants had tried to find him another post ..., the [competent] courts, in the Constitutional Court\u2019s view, applied a constitutionally acceptable interpretation according to which the appellant\u2019s contract of employment had been terminated in accordance with the relevant law. 10.2.6. Against the above background, in view of the defendants\u2019 conduct following the withdrawal of the appellant\u2019s canonical mandate and in view of the manner in which the competent courts provided him with judicial protection in terms of the State\u2019s obligations under the Vatican agreements, the Constitutional Court finds that the appellant has been afforded sufficient protection of his [employment rights].\u201d 24.  Judge D.K. appended a concurring opinion to the decision, agreeing with the findings of the majority. However, he argued that the Constitutional Court had not sufficiently appreciated the fact that the applicant had voluntarily consented to his position depending on the canonical mandate, which the diocesan bishop was authorised to issue and to withdraw. 25.  The President of the Constitutional Court gave a dissenting opinion in which she argued, in particular, that the normative framework for the employment of teachers of religious education, based on the Agreement between the Holy See and Croatia on education and cultural affairs, had not been implemented sufficiently precisely in the relevant domestic employment system, which had left a number of issues undetermined. 26.  The decision of the Constitutional Court was served on the applicant\u2019s representative on 27 May 2013. 27.  In March 2010 T.F. applied to the Rijeka First-instance Inter-diocesan Matrimony Court (Interdijecezanski \u017eenidbeni sud prvog stupnja u Rijeci) for the annulment of her religious marriage to the applicant on the grounds that, when entering into the marriage, he had demonstrated \u201ca positive act of the will excluding marriage itself\u201d (see paragraph 45 below, canon 1101 \u00a7 2). 28.  On 16 August 2012 the Rijeka First-instance Inter-diocesan Matrimony Court accepted T.F.\u2019s application and annulled her religious marriage to the applicant. The decision was then forwarded for examination to the Zagreb Inter-diocesan Appeal Court (Me\u0111ubiskupijski prizivni sud u Zagrebu). 29.  The proceedings were held in the applicant\u2019s absence because he had failed to respond to the court\u2019s summons. During the proceedings, an email sent by the applicant to T.F. on 4 December 2009 was admitted as evidence. In the email the applicant stated that if he \u201ccould return all other sacraments [he] would gladly do it. This way, if [he] managed to get rid of only one, which, as [they] both knew, never existed, [his] heart would be happier.\u201d 30.  On the basis of the evidence adduced, on 24 April 2013 the Zagreb Inter-diocesan Appeal Court upheld the decision of the Rijeka First-instance Inter-diocesan Matrimony Court annulling the applicant\u2019s religious marriage to T.F.", "references": ["6", "7", "0", "4", "5", "8", "2", "1", "9", "3", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Split. 6.  The applicant is the owner of a commercial building in Split, which he uses as a car repair workshop. The building in issue was bought from the State in 2001. At the time of purchase, no limitation on its use was registered or apparent. 7.  On 28 March 2003 the Split Department for the Conservation of Cultural Heritage (Ministarstvo kulture, Uprava za za\u0161titu kulturne ba\u0161tine, Konzervatorski odjel u Splitu, hereafter \u201cthe Split Department\u201d) ordered a measure of preventive protection relating to cultural heritage with regard to the applicant\u2019s building, pending the final evaluation of its cultural value. It explained that the building, which was being used as a car repair workshop at that point, appeared to be a rare example of early industrial architecture in Split, and therefore this warranted a measure limiting its use by the applicant. Under section 10 of the Protection and Preservation of Cultural Heritage Act (Zakon o za\u0161titi i o\u010duvanju kulturnih dobara, hereafter \u201cthe Cultural Heritage Act\u201d) the measure would remain in place for a period of three years, and, in accordance with section 11 of the same Act, would afford the same protection as a final protective measure (see paragraph 21 below). 8.  The decision ordering the preventive protection was not transmitted to the applicant. It was forwarded to the land registry of the Split Municipal Court (Op\u0107inski sud u Splitu) and duly registered in the land register. 9.  On 10 January 2007, after the expiry of the three-year period, the Split Department again ordered a measure of preventive protection with regard to the applicant\u2019s commercial building, reiterating the same grounds as those specified in its previous decision. 10.  The applicant was not informed of the above decision relating to the second measure of preventive protection in respect of his building. On 3 September 2007 the measure was registered in the land register. 11.  On 16 October 2007, after becoming aware of the second measure of preventive protection following an enquiry with the land registry, the applicant challenged the extended application of that measure before the Ministry of Culture (Ministarstvo culture, hereafter \u201cthe Ministry\u201d). He contended, in particular, that he had not been informed of the decision ordering the preventive protection, and that the protection could no longer be ordered, since the maximum duration of such a measure under the Cultural Heritage Act was three years. The applicant also enquired about compensation in respect of the pecuniary damage he had sustained as a result of the measure of preventive protection. 12.  On 8 January 2008 the Split Department forwarded the applicant\u2019s appeal to the Ministry. It stressed that the decision of 10 January 2007 extending the preventive protection after the expiry of the first three-year period had been necessary, owing to the fact that it had not been possible to obtain an excerpt from the land register from the Split Municipal Court, and that the building represented an important example of early industrial architecture in Split. 13.  On 31 January 2008 the Ministry dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal as unfounded, on the grounds that there was nothing in the law preventing the competent authority from applying the measure twice for periods of three years, and that the measure of preventive protection had not limited the applicant\u2019s ownership rights. It also pointed out that it was necessary to extend the preventive protection in respect of the building, as the determination of its heritage value required further comprehensive assessment. 14.  On 9 March 2008 the applicant lodged an administrative action in the Administrative Court (Upravni sud Republike Hrvatske), challenging the lawfulness and reasonableness of the measure of preventive protection, and emphasising the passivity of the competent authorities in finally resolving the matter. He also contended that the decisions of the lower authorities had been arbitrary. He pointed out that, contrary to what the Ministry had stated, his ownership rights had been significantly limited, as his freedom to deal with the property as he wished had been restricted. In particular, his several attempts to sell the building and set up another business cooperation had failed, owing to the existing preventive protection. The applicant also asked the Administrative Court to award him 200,000 euros (EUR) in respect of the damage he had sustained as a result of the conduct of the administrative authorities. 15.  Meanwhile, the Split Department found that the applicant\u2019s building should not be registered as an object of cultural heritage. On 15 April 2010, after the expiry of the measure of preventive protection, the Split Municipal Court ordered that the entry concerning the measure be deleted from the land register. 16.  On 18 May 2011 the Administrative Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s administrative action as unfounded, endorsing the reasoning of the lower authorities. In particular, it pointed out that there had been solid evidence suggesting that the building was an important object of cultural heritage, and that the measure of preventive protection was therefore justified given the need to carry out further assessments. Moreover, the Administrative Court considered that nothing in the relevant domestic law prevented the adoption of the second decision on preventive protection following the expiry of the first three-year time-limit. 17.  On 10 September 2011 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske), complaining of a violation of his property rights under Article 48 of the Constitution with regard to the allegedly unlawful and unreasonable application of the measure of preventive protection in respect of his property. 18.  On 14 December 2011 the Constitutional Court declared the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded.", "references": ["1", "7", "4", "2", "0", "6", "5", "8", "3", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Chelyabinsk. 6.  In 1971 a local factory, which was the owner of a block of flats, assigned the flat at 125-56 Ulitsa Kommuny, Chelyabinsk, to P. under a social housing agreement. In 1992 the title to the building was transferred to Chelyabinsk Municipality. P. resided in the flat as a tenant until his death on 3 December 2010. 7.  Following P.\u2019s death, Chelyabinsk Municipality started the process for registering the flat as vacant in order to assign it to another person eligible for social housing. However, it turned out that, according to the documents, the flat was no longer municipal property and that it belonged to L. The federal registration service sent the relevant data to the head of the municipality\u2019s administration on 16 February 2011. The head of the administration asked the regional prosecutor to look into the situation with the flat. 8.  The prosecutor established that the flat had been subject to a number of transactions. According to the relevant documents, on 9 November 1992 the factory had signed a privatisation agreement to transfer the flat to Kh. On 3 December 1992 the transaction was registered by the registration service. On 25 January 2011 Kh. sold the flat to L., who sold it on 21 April 2011 to Ya. Those transactions were also registered by the registration service. 9.  A police investigator questioned Kh., who denied having anything to do with the flat. As regards his passport details indicated in the privatisation agreement, he explained that in 2009 and 2010 he had lost his passport twice and that he had never met P. or L. The police further established that L., who was serving in the army at the time, had also lost his passport in 2009. 10.  On 31 March 2011 the prosecutor responded to the head of the administration advising him as follows:\n\u201cIt appears that the persons who were parties to the transactions with the flat committed a crime in this respect. Accordingly the materials have been forwarded to the [police] for further inquiry ... .\n[The police] will inform you of the results of the inquiry ... .\nFurthermore, in order to prevent further transactions with the flat, I have asked the Chief State Registrar to refuse state registration of any future transactions with the flat.\u201d 11.  On an unspecified date the police opened a criminal investigation into the transactions involving the flat. 12.  On 22 June 2011 Ya. sold the flat to the applicant. 13.  On 30 June 2011, acting on behalf of the municipality, the prosecutor brought an action against Kh., L. and Ya. to seek repossession of the flat and the annulment of all transactions executed in respect of it. The prosecutor argued that Kh., had never resided in the flat and that the flat had never been transferred to him from the municipality under a privatisation scheme. The prosecutor asked the court to invalidate the privatisation agreement of 9 November 1992 and subsequent transactions in respect of the flat as having no basis in law. The Tsentralniy District Court of Chelyabinsk fixed a hearing for 1 September 2011. 14.  On 6 July 2011 the registration service issued a certificate confirming the purchase of the flat by the applicant and her title to it. 15.  On 16 September 2011 the District Court granted the applicant\u2019s request and allowed her to take part in the proceedings initiated by the prosecutor. She claimed that she had bought the flat in good faith and that the municipality could not recover it from her. 16.  On 5 October 2011 the District Court issued an injunction against the registration of any transactions involving the flat. 17.  On 23 December 2011 the Tsentralniy District Court of Chelyabinsk granted the prosecutor\u2019s claims brought on behalf of the municipality. The applicant\u2019s title to the flat was annulled and transferred to the municipality. The court also ordered the applicant\u2019s eviction. Lastly, it ruled that Ya. should return to the applicant the sum she had paid for the flat. The court reasoned as follows:\n\u201cPursuant to Article 302 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation, if a property has been purchased from a person who had no right to sell it, and the purchaser is unaware and could not have been aware [of that fact] (the bona fide purchaser), the owner shall have the right to reclaim that property from the purchaser, if the said property was lost by the owner or by the person into whose possession the owner has conveyed the property, or if it was stolen from either of them, or if it left their possession against their will in another way.\nIt has been established in the course of the proceedings that the flat in question left the municipality\u2019s possession against the latter\u2019s will. Accordingly, the flat ... should be recovered from [the applicant] and transferred to the municipality.\u201d 18.  On 5 March 2012 the Chelyabinsk Regional Court upheld the judgment of 23 December 2011 on appeal. The court also noted that the applicant could not be recognised as a bona fide purchaser given that she had known that the flat had been resold three times within five months. 19.  On 13 December 2013 Ya. died. The part of the judgment of 23 December 2011 concerning the monetary award in the applicant\u2019s favour remains unenforced. 20.  According to the Government, the applicant has not been evicted and continues to reside in the flat. 21.  On an unspecified date the applicant brought an action against the State, alleging that the local authorities\u2019 inaction had resulted in her buying a flat from a person who had no right to sell it to her. 22.  On 19 December 2013 the Tverskoy District Court of Moscow dismissed the applicant\u2019s claims. 23.  On 16 June 2014 the Moscow City Court upheld the judgment of 19 December 2013 on appeal.", "references": ["1", "7", "2", "5", "4", "3", "0", "6", "8", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
+{"input": "6.  The first applicant, Mr T. P. was born in 1981 and is currently serving his prison term in S\u00e1toralja\u00fajhely. 7.  On 22 November 2006 the N\u00f3gr\u00e1d County Regional Court convicted the first applicant of murder committed with special cruelty and abuse of firearms. The applicant was sentenced to life imprisonment with no possibility of parole. 8.  On 28 June 2007 the Budapest Court of Appeal upheld the judgment, adding that the murder had been committed for \u2018villainous\u2019 reasons, namely, the applicant was considered to have killed the victim in a particularly atrocious manner, so as to prevent her from reporting the initial abduction and stabbing and thereby to cover up a previous crime. 9.  On 14 February 2008 the Supreme Court dismissed the first applicant\u2019s petition for review. 10.  On 5 November 2013 the President of the Republic dismissed the applicant\u2019s request for pardon, by which he sought commutation of his life sentence to twenty years fixed-term imprisonment as well as allowing the possibility of his release on parole. 11.  The second applicant, Mr A.T. was born in 1985 and is currently serving his prison term in S\u00e1toralja\u00fajhely. 12.  On 14 May 2010 the Borsod-Aba\u00faj-Zempl\u00e9n County Regional Court convicted the second applicant of double murder and abuse of firearms. He was sentenced to life imprisonment with no possibility of parole. 13.  On 9 November 2010 the Debrecen Court of Appeal upheld this judgment. 14.  On 13 September 2011 the Supreme Court dismissed the second applicant\u2019s petition for review. 15.  On 23 October 2014 the President of the Republic dismissed the applicant\u2019s request for pardon, by which he sought commutation of his life sentence to twenty years fixed-term imprisonment as well as allowing the possibility of his release on parole.", "references": ["2", "3", "7", "0", "9", "8", "4", "6", "5", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1983 and lived in Verkhnyaya Pyshma, Sverdlovsk Region. 7.  On 27 May 2012 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of murder. He remained in detention throughout the investigation and trial. 8.  On 18 January 2014 the Verkhnyaya Pyshma Town Court convicted the applicant of the charges and sentenced him to ten years\u2019 imprisonment. 9.  The applicant was seriously ill at the time of the arrest. He suffered from advanced HIV, long-term tuberculosis at the stage of lung tissue destruction and chronic hepatitis C. 10.  In June 2012 the applicant was admitted to the tuberculosis unit of the medical wing of remand prison no. IZ-66/1 in Yekaterinburg for treatment. On his admission to prison he had informed the doctor that he had been receiving tuberculosis treatment for several years, but that it had not been successful. A drug regimen based on a combination of five anti\u2011tuberculosis drugs was prescribed for him. In the second half of 2012 a highly active antiretroviral therapy was ordered by a medical panel for his HIV. 11.  A chest X-ray carried out on 26 September 2012 revealed the formation of lung cavities, showing the further progress of the disease. 12.  On 23 January 2013 drug susceptibility testing was performed. It showed that the applicant\u2019s tuberculosis was resistant to all the drugs he had received since June 2012, when his treatment had begun. No alteration in his treatment took place until 18 April 2013, when the applicant was admitted to Prison Hospital no. 6 in St Donato in Sverdlovsk Region. Given the development of the applicant\u2019s drug resistance, a medical panel at the hospital ordered different antibiotics to be used. 13.  The applicant\u2019s condition improved slightly and on 10 February 2014 he was discharged from the hospital to a medical wing. However, in the following months he started experiencing back pain. In July 2014 a tuberculous infection of the vertebrae was diagnosed and the applicant was readmitted to the prison hospital. 14.  On 26 September 2014 a medical panel found him eligible for early release on health grounds. His application for release was examined by the Leninskiy District Court of Nizhniy Tagil on 27 November 2014. At the hearing the applicant\u2019s doctor testified that he was suffering from serious diseases, that he could not care for himself and that the prospects of his recovery were poor. On the same day the District Court dismissed the application, citing the applicant\u2019s history of previous convictions which, in the court\u2019s opinion, demonstrated that he \u201chad failed to take the path of improvement\u201d. The decision was upheld on appeal by the Sverdlovsk Regional Court on 24 February 2015. 15.  On 12 March 2015 the applicant asked the Court to apply Rule 39 of the Rules of Court and to indicate to the Government that he should be provided with adequate medical care and immediately released. The applicant stated that he was not receiving the necessary medical care and treatment in detention, despite suffering from a life-threatening and rapidly progressing illness. The deterioration of his condition required an urgent medical intervention, which was unavailable in the prison hospital. 16.  On 23 March 2015 the President of the Section, acting upon the applicant\u2019 s request, decided to apply Rules 39 and 41 of the Rules of Court, indicating to the Government that the applicant should be immediately examined by medical experts which were independent from the prison system. They were to determine (1) whether he was receiving adequate treatment in the prison hospital for his condition; (2) whether his state of health was compatible with detention in the conditions of a prison hospital; and (3) whether his condition required his admission to a specialist, possibly civilian, hospital. Furthermore, the Government were to ensure his transfer to a specialist hospital if the medical experts concluded that admission to such a hospital was necessary. 17.  On 7 April 2015 the Government responded to the Court\u2019s letter of 24 March 2015. It submitted documents related to the applicant\u2019s conviction; certificates issued by the head of the detention facility where the applicant had been previously detained, describing the state of his health and giving a list of medical procedures he had undergone; documents showing that the detention facility was authorised to provide medical services to inmates; extracts from the applicant\u2019s medical history; certificates issued by the head of the prison hospital describing the state of the applicant\u2019s health, the quality of the medical treatment and the conditions of his detention; handwritten statements by three of the prison hospital\u2019s staff stating that they had provided the applicant with the necessary care; the report of the special medical panel of 26 September 2014; and copies of the decisions of 27 November 2014 and 24 February 2015 on his applications for early release. 18.  The Government also asserted that the scope and quality of the treatment provided to the applicant in the prison hospital was appropriate for his state of health. However, they admitted that there had been a serious deterioration in the applicant\u2019s condition in 2014. Lastly, they submitted that an examination of the applicant by a medical panel to check his entitlement to early release had been scheduled for 9 April 2015. 19.  On 22 May 2015 the applicant\u2019s representative reported that the independent medical examination had not been carried out by the Government. However, two independent doctors acting at the request of the applicant\u2019s lawyer had assessed the quality of the applicant\u2019s medical treatment in detention and whether his further detention in the prison hospital was appropriate for someone as ill as him. In their report, dated 20 May 2015, the doctors concluded that the medical care provided by the detention authorities had been inadequate, particularly in view of the continued use of ineffective drugs. They also stated that the applicant required spinal surgery owing to the tuberculous infection of the vertebrae and that it was vital he be transferred from the prison hospital to a specialist medical facility. 20.  On 22 May 2015 the Leninskiy District Court of Nizhniy Tagil dismissed the applicant\u2019s second application for release on health grounds, referring to his failure to improve his character. 21.  On 21 August 2015 the Sverdlovsk Regional Court set aside that decision. The court held that the applicant should be released immediately, owing to the state of his health and the absence of disciplinary violations. 22.  After his release the applicant was admitted to a civilian hospital in Verkhnyaya Pyshma, where he died on 3 October 2015.", "references": ["8", "2", "6", "3", "9", "7", "5", "0", "4", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicants were born in 1950 and in 1949, respectively, and live in Matosinhos. 5.  On 16 March 2005 A.C. and M.L. instituted civil proceedings against the applicants and other four defendants before the Matosinhos Court seeking the payment of 11,843.48 euros (EUR) due to the alleged sale of a part of the plaintiffs\u2019 property. 6.  On 29 March 2005 the applicants were summoned to challenge the action against them; which they did not. In the notification letter they were given notice that the lack of opposition would entail the confession of the facts pursuant to Article 484 \u00a7 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (see paragraph 11 below). 7.  Between 21 April 2005 and 24 May 2013 several procedural steps took place either by action of the plaintiffs, the remaining defendants or the Matosinhos Court. In particular: on 21 April 2005 the remaining defendants contested the action; on 3 November 2005 the plaintiffs submitted observations in reply; on 17 October 2007 the plaintiffs lodged a request seeking the intervention of I.T. in the proceedings, which was admitted by the Matosinhos Court on 29 May 2009; on 15 December 2010 the judge gave directions concerning the matters to be discussed at the hearing (despacho saneador); on 21 March 2012, following I.T.\u2019s death, the Matosinhos Court stayed the proceedings pending the outcome of inheritance proceedings. 8.  On 24 May 2013 the applicants submitted a power of attorney and requested that the case-file be uploaded to the legal platform \u201cCITIUS\u201d for consultation. 9.  On 10 January 2014 the applicants requested the participation of an expert of their own choosing in the preparation of the expert report which had been sought by the plaintiffs. On an unknown date the other defendants in the proceedings lodged an opposition to the applicants\u2019 request. 10.  On 16 October 2015 the Matosinhos Court adopted a judgment in which it ruled in favour of the applicants.", "references": ["9", "1", "6", "5", "7", "8", "2", "0", "4", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1953 and 1957 respectively and live in the village of Savelyevskaya, in the Naurskiy District of the Chechen Republic. The second applicant is the first applicant\u2019s brother-in-law. 6.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.\nThe events of 8 October 1999 7.  At the material time, a counterterrorist campaign \u2013 involving intense military clashes between federal troops and local rebels \u2013 was taking place in the Chechen Republic. The law-enforcement bodies and the courts were not functioning. Upon the arrival of the military in Savelyevskaya, the local residents did not flee but remained in their homes. The village and the area around it were under the control of federal troops that were stationed in the vicinity. 8.  At the beginning of October 1999 the outskirts of the village came under artillery fire, which forced the residents to seek the military\u2019s permission to evacuate their cattle. 9.  After permission to evacuate the cattle was obtained, on 8 October 1999 (in the documents submitted the date was also referred to as 8 October 2000), at around noon, the applicants and their neighbours, Mr R.M. and Mr M.R., arrived at the agreed spot at a copse of trees next to Savelyevskaya and approached the Russian federal servicemen who were stationed in the vicinity. The servicemen agreed to let them pass through to the field where their cattle were pastured to retrieve them. However, after the applicants, Mr R.M. and Mr M.R., had walked about several dozen metres away in the direction of the pasture, the servicemen opened fire on them. As a result, both applicants received wounds to the upper extremities (\u0432\u0435\u0440\u0445\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u043a\u043e\u043d\u0435\u0447\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438) and fell on the ground. Having witnessed the attack, a civilian, Mr D., tried to approach the servicemen, but was shot dead in the presence of the applicants and Mr M.R. Meanwhile, Mr R.M. managed to crawl away and inform the local authorities about the incident. 10.  Both applicants and Mr M.R. remained on the ground for several hours; each time they tried to get up they were subjected to gunfire. Then three military servicemen approached, blindfolded them and took them to the premises of military unit no. 54262. In the meantime, after Mr R.M. informed the authorities of the incident, the head of the local administration, Mr Kh.S., arrived at the military unit, spoke to the servicemen and had the detainees released. As a result of the injuries she had sustained during the attack the first applicant was left with a permanent disability of the third degree. 11.  The applicants\u2019 cattle remained under the control of the servicemen and were never returned. According to the first applicant, as a result of the incident she lost sixteen head of cattle and the second applicant four head of cattle. In November 1999, after military unit no. 54262 had changed its stationing location from the vicinity of Savelyevskaya to a site elsewhere, the applicants and their relatives found the remains of seven cows whose meat had been consumed by the military unit; nine head of cattle were missing completely. 12.  In July 2000, as soon as the local law-enforcement bodies had begun functioning again in their district, the applicants lodged an official complaint in respect of the events of 8 October 1999 with the local police (see paragraph 15 below). Towards September 2000 the law-enforcement bodies in other parts of Chechnya started to function again. 13.  In support of their account of the events of 8 October 1999 the applicants furnished the Court with statements from witnesses Mr M.R. and Mr R.M., both dated 10 July 2008. 14.  The Government did not contest the applicants\u2019 account of the attack against them on 8 October 1999 and the loss of their cattle, but stressed that the perpetrators had not been identified. In their observations on the admissibility and merits of the application of 9 April 2012, they stated, in particular, the following:\n\u201c... the damage to the applicants\u2019 health occurred as a result of unidentified persons opening fire on them on 8 October 1999 in the village of Savelyevskaya in the Naurskiy District. After the shooting the unidentified persons stole cattle belonging to the applicants ...\u201d 15.  On 17 July 2000 the first applicant complained in writing of the infliction of bodily injuries and the theft of her livestock to the Naurskiy district temporary department of the interior (\u041d\u0430\u0443\u0440\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0439 \u0412\u0440\u0435\u043c\u0435\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u041e\u0442\u0434\u0435\u043b \u0412\u043d\u0443\u0442\u0440\u0435\u043d\u043d\u0438\u0445 \u0414\u0435\u043b) (hereinafter \u201cthe Naurskiy VOVD\u201d). 16.  In her complaint she described the circumstances of the attack and stated, in particular, that she had been wounded by military servicemen, who had then blindfolded her and taken her and two other men to the premises of their military unit. She further stated that after her release the cattle had remained in the hands of the military and that all her efforts to recover them had been to no avail. 17.  On 20 July 2000 the investigators questioned the first applicant, who stated that on 8 October 1999 she, the second applicant and Mr M.R. had gone to the pasture where cattle had been grazing, including a number of cows belonging to her. On the way there, at around noon, she had seen one of her cows lying shot and dying on the ground. The first applicant had approached her cow, but had been stopped by a group of military servicemen in light-coloured camouflage uniform, armed with machine guns, standing next to an armoured personnel carrier (hereinafter \u201cthe APC\u201d). The first applicant had asked for their permission to drive the cattle home; one of the servicemen had gone to the APC and spoken to someone on the radio. After that he had returned and said that the applicants and Mr M.R. could proceed and collect their cattle. The applicant had walked just several metres away when she and her two companions had been subjected to gunfire, as a result of which she had been wounded in the left arm and the second applicant in the right arm. They had fallen to the ground and stayed there for about three to five hours; each time they had tried to get up, shots had been fired in their direction. Then three military servicemen had approached them, ordered them to put their hands behind their heads, blindfolded them and taken them in the APC to the premises of military unit no. 54262. The applicant provided the investigators with a detailed description of those three servicemen\u2019s appearance. At the military unit the applicants had been given medical assistance. The applicant had asked the unit commander to drive her cattle over to pasture land lying closer to the village. The commander had promised to do that but he had not kept his promise and her cattle had gone missing. Then the head of the village administration had arrived and taken the applicants and Mr M.R. home. The applicant provided the investigators with a detailed description of the unit commander. She further stated that after the military unit had left the place where it had been stationed, she had gone to the field and found an envelope with the address of one of the servicemen who had been stationed there and that she still had the envelope and could provide it to the investigators. Subsequently the unit commander, Vadim, had visited her at home with a nurse to assist with the treatment of her wounded arm. Between August 1999 and February 2000 the applicant had not been able to seek official medical assistance, as hospitals in Chechnya had not been functioning. In February 2000, when the local hospital had resumed its activities, she had gone there and sought medical assistance for her wounded arm; she had stayed in the hospital for one month but had been left with a disability. 18.  On 20 July 2000 the investigators questioned the second applicant and Mr M.R., both of whom stated that on 8 October 1999 they and the first applicant had gone out to drive their cattle home. On their way to the pasture they had met military servicemen who had given them permission to take their cattle home. However, after they and the applicant had then walked a dozen metres away from the servicemen the latter had opened fire. The first applicant had fallen to the ground, bleeding. Then the second applicant and Mr M.R. had screamed, asking the servicemen to stop firing, but to no avail. As a result, the second applicant had been shot in the upper extremities. Then they had fallen to the ground and after several hours had been found by the servicemen and taken to the military unit. 19.  On 12 October 2000 the Naurskiy VOVD opened criminal case no. 30471 on account of the infliction of minor bodily injuries on the applicants (Article 112 \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Code). The decision stated:\n\u201c... on 8 October 1999 during the day unidentified persons intentionally inflicted bodily injuries on [the applicants] ...\u201d 20.  On 20 October 2000 the investigators granted the first applicant victim status in the criminal case and questioned her again. She reiterated her earlier statement (see paragraph 17 above) and added that the unit commander\u2019s name had been Vadim and that he had had the rank of lieutenant-colonel. She also provided a detailed description of her disappeared cattle and reiterated that as a result of the incident she had lost sixteen cows. 21.  On 20 October 2000 the investigators seized the envelope found by the applicant on the former premises of the military unit (see paragraph 17 above). 22.  On 23 October 2000 the investigators granted the second applicant victim status in the criminal case and questioned him again. His statement was similar to that of the first applicant (see paragraph 17 above). In addition, he stated that after the servicemen had taken him, the first applicant and Mr M.R. to the military unit\u2019s premises, they had provided him with medical assistance for his wounded arm and that the unit commander, a lieutenant-colonel named Vadim, had given him his apologies for his soldiers\u2019 actions. Subsequently, the officer had visited him at home with a nurse to assist with the treatment of his wounds, as the local hospitals had not been functioning at that time. The second applicant also provided the investigators with a detailed description of his four cows, which had disappeared as a result of the incident. 23.  On 24 October 2000 the investigators granted Mr M.R. victim status in the criminal case and questioned him. His statement concerning the incident was similar to the ones given by the applicants (see paragraphs 17 and 18 above). In addition, he provided a detailed description of the three servicemen who had approached him and the applicants after the shooting. He also stated that the commander\u2019s name had been Vadim and that his military rank had been that of lieutenant-colonel. Two days after the events, on 10 October 1999, he had gone to the place of the incident and found the corpses of two of his cows, which had been shot. Two other cows had gone missing. 24.  On 24 October 2000 the investigators questioned two of the first applicant\u2019s neighbours, Ms S.G. and Ms P.Kh., both of whom stated that they had not witnessed the incident in October 1999, but that they had been told that the first and second applicants had been shot and wounded by the military servicemen and one man had been shot dead by them and that as a result of the incident the applicants\u2019 cattle had been lost. 25.  On 30 October 2000 an expert examination ordered by the investigator took place; the examination identified the scars on the first applicant\u2019s left forearm as likely to have resulted from a perforating firearms wound in the circumstances described by her and categorised them as bodily harm of \u201cmedium gravity\u201d. 26.  On the same day, 30 October 2000, the second applicant was also examined by the expert. The examination identified the scars on his right forearm and the fingers of the left hand as likely to have resulted from perforating firearms wounds and categorised them as bodily harm of \u201cminor gravity\u201d. 27.  On 20 and 23 October 2000 respectively both applicants were granted victim status in the criminal case. The relevant decisions stated, amongst other things, that:\n\u201c... on 8 October 1999 unidentified persons ... inflicted bodily injuries on [the applicants] and stole [their] cattle ...\u201d 28.  Two months later, on 12 December 2000, the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. The applicants were not informed of that suspension. 29.  On an unspecified date between January 2001 and May 2005 the first applicant complained to a supervising prosecutor about the delays in the investigation. On 29 July 2005 the Naurskiy VOVD replied to the complaint, stating that the investigation had been suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. 30.  On an unspecified date in 2005, the first applicant also lodged an official complaint about his lack of access to the investigation file. On 28 December 2005 the Naurskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office (hereinafter \u201cthe district prosecutor\u2019s office\u201d) replied to her, stating that she could access the file only upon the completion of the criminal investigation. 31.  In 2005 the first applicant lodged several complaints about the delays in the investigation with the Prosecutor General\u2019s office, which forwarded them to the district prosecutor\u2019s office. The complaints remained unanswered. 32.  It appears that as a result of the first applicant\u2019s complaints, the investigation was resumed on 18 January 2006 and the applicants were informed accordingly. 33.  On 28 January 2006 the investigators examined the envelope seized from the first applicant (see paragraph 21 above). As a result, the name and the address of officer B. (to whom it had been sent at an address in the town of Kostroma) were established. 34.  On 6 February 2006 the investigators examined the crime scene in the vicinity of the village of Savelyevskaya. No evidence was collected. 35.  On 20 February 2006 the investigators again questioned the first applicant, whose statement was similar to the ones she had given previously (see paragraphs 17 and 20 above). 36.  On 22 February 2006 the investigators questioned the second applicant, who reiterated his earlier statements (see paragraphs 18 and 22 above). In addition, he stated that the body of the man who had been shot dead during the incident had been recovered by the villagers about a week after the events and buried shortly afterwards. 37.  On 22 February 2006 the investigators questioned Mr Z. Kh., who stated that in October 1999 he had assisted in negotiating the applicants\u2019 and Mr M.R\u2019s release from the premises of the military unit. Mr Z. Kh. stated that he did not know what military unit it was. 38.  On 22 February 2006 the investigators questioned Mr Kh.S., who stated that since 1999 he had been the head of the local administration. His statement was similar to those given by the applicants. In addition, he stated that the commander of the military unit had promised to drive the cattle back to the village, but that this had not happened. 39.  On 22 February 2006 the investigators again questioned Mr M.R., whose statement was similar to the ones he had previously given (see paragraphs 18 and 23 above). 40.  On 26 February 2006 the investigators terminated the investigation of criminal case no. 30471 because of the expiry of the time-limits for prosecution under Articles 78 and 112 of the Criminal Code. 41.  On the same date (26 February 2006) the investigators refused (in the light of the expiry of the time-limit) to initiate a new criminal investigation into the injuries sustained by the applicants on 8 October 1999. 42.  On 17 March 2006 investigators in Kostroma questioned officer B., who stated that in October 1999 he had been serving in military unit no. 54262, which had been stationed in the Naurskiy District, Chechnya. He had no information concerning the attack on the applicants and had no idea who had been the commander of the military unit at the material time. Officer B. stated that in December 2000 (while he had been in Chechnya) he had been questioned about the incident, but he could not remember by whom and under what circumstances. 43.  On 26 April 2008 the head of the Naurskiy VOVD overruled the decision to terminate the criminal investigation as unsubstantiated and premature and ordered that the proceedings be reopened and the case file be transferred to another law-enforcement body, in accordance with the rules of jurisdiction. The reasoning for the decision stated, inter alia, the following:\n\u201c... The investigation established that an unidentified person had opened fire and wounded in the arm [the first and the second applicants], causing them medium and minor gravity bodily harm, respectively [...]\n... it was also established that unidentified persons had committed the theft of sixteen cows belonging to [the applicants] and of two cows belonging to Mr M.R.\nOn 26 February 2006 the investigation of the criminal case was terminated for failure to identify the perpetrators.\nThe examination of the contents of the criminal case file demonstrated that the victims [the applicants] had been shot at with firearms, from a distance ... and the location of their wounds showed that life-threatening damage could have been caused to them ... In addition, according to the information in the case file, Mr D. had been shot and killed on the spot in [the applicants\u2019] presence.\nIn the light of the above, the investigation of the criminal case failed to establish in full whether an attempt on the lives of [the applicants] had been made by the unidentified persons who [were responsible for] their gunshot wounds ...\u201d 44.  On 29 April 2008 the re-opened criminal case file no. 30471 was forwarded to the Naurskiy Inter-district Investigations Department of the Chechnya Prosecutor\u2019s office (hereinafter \u201cthe investigations department\u201d) for investigation. 45.  On 7 May 2008 the investigations department refused to institute criminal proceedings, noting that:\n\u201c... [the applicants] had been injured in non-vital parts of their bodies, which was confirmed by expert examinations. Therefore, there are no grounds for thinking that the alleged perpetrators intended to commit ... \u2018attempted murder\u2019,.. as argued by [the applicants] ...\u201d\nThe decision did not mention anything about the applicants\u2019 cattle. 46.  On 14 May 2008 the investigations department adopted a decision terminating the investigation in criminal case no. 30741 because of the expiry of the time-limits for prosecution. 47.  From the documents submitted it appears that on 10 July 2008 the supervising prosecutor overruled the above decision to terminate the criminal investigation as unsubstantiated and premature. 48.  On 14 March 2012 the deputy Chechnya district prosecutor overturned the investigations department\u2019s decision of 7 May 2008 to refuse to open a criminal case (see paragraph 45 above) as unlawful and unsubstantiated. The applicants were informed thereof. 49.  On the same date (14 March 2012) the deputy Chechnya prosecutor also ordered that the criminal case file be sent to the Chechnya Investigations Committee for further investigation. The decision criticised the investigators\u2019 failure to take basic steps and stated, amongst other things, the following:\n\u201c... at the same time, the investigation established that the shooting had been aimed at them [the applicants, Mr M.R., Mr R.M. and Mr D.] and had been carried out with automatic firearms simultaneously, from the same place next to the forest; as a result [the applicants] had received gunshot wounds of varying gravity and [Mr D.] had been shot dead.\nTherefore, the above information provides grounds for concluding unequivocally that the unidentified person had the clear intention of killing [the applicants and Mr D.]; ... thus, the actions of the unidentified person should be deemed to constitute murder under parts 1 and 2 (subparagraph \u201ca\u201d) of Article 105 of the Russian Criminal Code, and the case file in respect of criminal case no. 30471 should be transferred to the Chechnya Investigations Committee for investigation and joined with criminal case no. 60012 [concerning the killing of Mr D.].\nIn addition, up until the present, no request for information concerning the exact place where military unit no. 546262 was stationed has been sent. Neither has any request for information concerning the possible stationing of a military unit next to Savelyevskaya in the Naurskiy District been forwarded.\nThe military commander of the Naurskiy District, officer A.S. Kalugin, has not been questioned about the circumstances of the incident.\u201d 50.  As can be seen from the documents submitted, the investigation is still pending.\n(b)  Proceedings against the investigators 51.  On 12 April 2008 the first applicant lodged a complaint before the Naurskiy District Court (hereinafter \u201cthe District Court\u201d) challenging the decision of 26 February 2006 to terminate the investigation. She argued, inter alia, that she had been both the target of an attempted murder and a victim of theft and asked for the case to be transferred to the Military Prosecutor\u2019s Office for a proper investigation. 52.  On 26 April 2008, shortly before the scheduled start of the first-instance court hearing (see paragraph 43 above), the prosecutor quashed the decision of 26 February 2006 and as a result, by a decision of 28 April 2008 the District Court rejected the first applicant\u2019s complaint as groundless. 53.  On 19 June 2008 each applicant lodged a complaint before the District Court challenging the investigations department\u2019s refusal of 7 May 2008 to initiate a criminal investigation. 54.  On 10 July 2008 the District Court rejected the complaints, as the impugned decision had already been quashed earlier on the same date (see paragraph 47 above). 55.  On an unspecified date between January and March 2009 the applicants lodged a complaint before the District Court about the defects in the investigation and the investigators\u2019 failure to act with expedition. 56.  On 8 April 2009 the District Court examined and partly rejected their complaint. It ruled that the investigators could only be criticised for their failure to inform the applicants in a timely manner about the procedural decisions in the criminal case. The decision stated, among other things, the following:\n\u201c... the court has no legal rights to impose obligations on the investigation bodies concerning the order and direction of the conduct of the investigation.\n... The complaint should be allowed only in part and only in so far as the investigator ... failed to inform [the applicants] in a timely manner about the decisions taken in the case ...\u201d. 57. On 13 May 2009 this decision was upheld by the Supreme Court of the Chechen Republic on appeal.", "references": ["3", "6", "5", "8", "1", "7", "4", "2", "No Label", "0", "9"], "gold": ["0", "9"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Hatay. 5.  On 20 February 1998 the applicant\u2019s ten-year-old son, Erhan Cevrio\u011flu, was found dead, together with his friend G.B., who was around the same age, after falling into a water-filled hole on a construction site where they had apparently been playing. The cause of death was determined as drowning. 6.  The hole on the construction site was covered by the Municipality of Antakya (\u201cthe Municipality\u201d) in the aftermath of this tragic incident. 7.  Shortly after the incident, criminal proceedings were instigated against the owner of the construction site, H.C. (also referred to as \u201cthe employer\u201d) and three officials from the Antakya Municipality for causing death by negligence and failing to comply with the regulations and orders, pursuant to Article 455 of the Criminal Code in force at the material time (Law no. 765). 8.  During the course of the criminal proceedings the Hatay Criminal Court of First Instance obtained three different expert reports with a view to determining liability for the death of the applicant\u2019s son.\n(a)  The first expert report 9.  The first report, dated 16 April 1998, was drawn up by three civil engineers. The report noted at the outset that the hole in question, which measured 5 x 15 metres with a 2 metre depth, had been dug in the side yard of the construction for use as a shelter and no safety measures had been taken to enclose it. The hole was located 36 metres from the main avenue and 18 metres from the closest apartment building. The witnesses interviewed at the scene of the incident, including two construction workers, confirmed that no precautions had been taken to cover or otherwise enclose the hole. The two workers indicated that they had initially placed wooden planks on the south side of the hole but had later removed them after discovering that children were throwing them into the hole. They further stated that the construction workers were aware that the hole in question regularly filled up with rainwater and one of them said that they occasionally used the water that accumulated in the hole for construction work. The workers disagreed, however, as to when the hole had been dug: while one of them claimed that it had been there since June or July 1997, the other one said that it had been dug only two months prior to the incident. 10.  On the basis of their observations and the witness statements, the committee of experts concluded that the deceased children had been partly at fault for the incident (25%), as the construction site where they had been playing was clearly not a play area. The experts noted that the Municipality also bore 25% responsibility for the two children\u2019s deaths, as (i) they had failed to duly inspect whether the construction, for which it had issued a permit, had complied with the rules on work safety, and to ensure that the construction site had been properly closed off with wooden panels as a safety measure, and (ii) it was not clear on what legal ground it had allowed the digging and the use of the hole in question as a shelter, as such shelters had to be built beneath buildings and not in open spaces. According to the experts, the remaining responsibility (50%) lay with the owner, H.C., who had failed to put in place the necessary safety measures on the construction site, such as building a wooden fence around the hole, erecting warning signs or recruiting a security guard to control access to the construction site.\n(b)  The second expert report 11.  On 25 May 1998 a second report was prepared by three occupational safety experts. Reiterating the factual findings in the previous report of 16 April 1998, the experts identified four main causes of the accident in question: (i) absence of wooden panels around the construction site, which was located in a residential area in close proximity to other houses and public roads; (ii) absence of any railing around the hole; (iii) absence of signs prohibiting entry into the construction site or warning against the water-filled hole on the site; and (iv) lack of diligence of the deceased children. The experts indicated that responsibility for all of the causes identified, save for the last one, lay with the employer, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Labour Code (Law no. 1475) and the Regulation on Workers\u2019 Health and Occupational Safety in Construction Work (Yap\u0131 \u0130\u015flerinde \u0130\u015f\u00e7i Sa\u011fl\u0131\u011f\u0131 ve \u0130\u015f G\u00fcvenli\u011fi T\u00fcz\u00fc\u011f\u00fc) in force at the material time. They noted that, according to the information provided to the investigation authorities by the applicant, the hole in question had been open for the past eight to ten months, and a number of residents from the neighbourhood had warned H.C. to take the necessary safety measures against the hazards on the construction site, particularly vis-\u00e0-vis children. However, H.C. had disregarded all their warnings, saying that parents were responsible for attending to the safety of their children. They further noted that at the time of the incident the construction work had been suspended and the site had been unsupervised. 12.  Relying on the information and evidence they had gathered, the experts concluded that H.C. had principal liability for the incident (75%) on account of his failure to take the necessary safety precautions in and around the construction site in compliance with the relevant laws and regulations. They stressed that the failure to install wooden panels around the construction site was one of the principal reasons for the accident. They further found that the remaining responsibility lay with the deceased children, as they should have been aware of the perils of entering a construction site and approaching a water\u2011filled hole, even at their young age. The experts considered, lastly, that while the Municipality had a general duty to inspect construction sites and impose penalties for breaches of the laws, they could not be held accountable for failing to conduct inspections, impose safety precautions or issue penalties unless it could be proven with conclusive evidence that the authorities had overlooked the deficiencies on the construction site despite having been aware of them, or had otherwise neglected their duties, which evidence was lacking in the instant case.\n(c)  The third expert report 13.  On 4 April 1999 a third expert report was issued by a committee of experts from the Istanbul Technical University. The report indicated that neither the construction site nor the hole in which the deceased children had drowned had been surrounded by panels or a wooden fence to prevent unauthorised access. Similarly, there had been no warning signs around the construction site or the hole. According to the expert report, H.C. had made the following statements in the aftermath of the incident before the investigative authorities and the trial court:\n\u201c... [After digging the hole on the construction site], I enclosed the hole with wooden planks. Children kept removing the planks. That is why the hole was not closed off. [At the time of the incident] the hole was filled with water following rainfall. On a previous occasion, we had pumped the rainwater out. I was in Ankara at the time [of the incident]. I have no fault here... . If I had not been out of town, I would have checked the hole and covered it.\n...\nIn view of the size and depth of the hole, it was not possible to cover it. We had therefore put planks around it... There were no warning signs around the hole. I was in Ankara when the incident took place, and the construction had stopped while I was gone. The hole filled up with water whenever it rained... It must have filled up again when I was away, there was no opportunity to remove the water.\u201d 14.  Referring to the relevant provisions of the Labour Code, the Regulation on Workers\u2019 Health and Occupational Safety in Construction Work and the Municipalities Act (Law no. 1580) in force at the material time (see \u201cRelevant domestic law\u201d, below, for further details), the experts from the Istanbul Technical University found that H.C. and the Municipality were 75% and 25% at fault respectively and that no liability could be attributed to the deceased children. They indicated that since the construction work had started, none of the safety measures required under the relevant legislation had been put in place. Moreover, no permission had been obtained for the digging of the hole or the \u201cshelter\u201d in question, which had claimed the two children\u2019s lives; nor had any safety measures been taken around it to prevent accidents. The experts stressed that the dangers posed by the hole had been aggravated when it rained, as the muddy surface made it easier for people to slip and fall in. The responsibility for failure to take any safety measures around the hole or to prevent access to the construction site, despite the knowledge that the site attracted children, fell firstly on the contractor and then on the Municipality, which was required to inspect the construction site periodically in order to identify deficiencies and issue the necessary warnings; the Municipality authorities had clearly neglected that duty.\n(d)  Judgment of the Hatay Criminal Court of First Instance 15.  On 14 April 2000, relying on the third expert report, the Hatay Criminal Court of First Instance held that \u0130.H.S., who was the director of reconstruction at the Municipality (belediye imar m\u00fcd\u00fcr\u00fc), and the construction owner, H.C., were 25% and 75% responsible for the incident respectively. Accordingly, the court found the accused guilty as charged. 16.  However, on 9 July 2001 the Court of Cassation quashed that judgment, finding that the case should have been examined under Law no. 4616, which provided, inter alia, for the suspension of criminal proceedings in respect of certain offences committed before 23 April 1999. 17.  Accordingly, on 6 August 2001 the trial court decided, pursuant to section 1(4) of Law no. 4616, that the criminal proceedings should be suspended and eventually discontinued if no offence of the same or of a more serious kind was committed by the defendants within the next five years. 18.  On 16 September 2002 the family members of both deceased children, including the applicant, initiated compensation proceedings before the Hatay Civil Court of First Instance against H.C., his construction company and the Antakya Municipality, arguing that they bore joint responsibility for their children\u2019s deaths. The applicant and his family claimed 5,000,000,000 Turkish liras (TRL)[1] in respect of pecuniary damage and TRL 3,000,000,000[2] in respect of non-pecuniary damage, together with interest accrued from the date of the incident. 19.  On 5 November 2004 an expert report was prepared by a mechanical engineer, who was also an expert on occupational safety, and an architect at the request of the Hatay Civil Court of First Instance. After setting out the circumstances in which the incident had occurred, much like in the previous reports submitted to the criminal court, and referring to the relevant provisions of the Labour Code and the Regulation on Workers\u2019 Health and Occupational Safety in Construction Work, the experts concluded that H.C. bore 85% of the responsibility for the incident on account of his failure to take the necessary safety measures on the construction site, such as erecting wooden panels or other fencing around the site, taking special precautions in those parts of the site that presented a danger of falling, placing warning signs as necessary, informing the construction workers of possible hazards at the construction site and employing a guard to control access to the site. They indicated in particular that the unenclosed hole, which had been opened in June or July 1997, had presented a grave danger for the residents and the children in the neighbourhood, which risk increased when the hole filled with water and became slippery on the edges following rainfall. They also stressed that, according to the relevant Court of Cassation jurisprudence, the responsibility of the employer was not limited to putting the necessary safety measures in place to avert the existing and potential dangers on the construction site, but he or she was also required to supervise compliance with those measures. 20.  Turning to the liability of the deceased children, the report held that while it was natural for the children to have been playing out on the street, they should not have entered the construction site and approached the water-filled hole, the dangers of which were obvious bearing in mind in particular that the ground had been slippery at the relevant time. It therefore found that the children bore the remainder of the liability for their own deaths on account of their failure to display the necessary care and diligence. 21.  As for the alleged responsibility of the Municipality, the experts stated that the latter had had no involvement in the construction, apart from issuing the necessary permits. Moreover, the accident had occurred within the boundaries of the construction site, and not in a public space or other area under the direct responsibility of the Municipality. In such circumstances, the Municipality could not be held responsible for the deficiencies on the construction site; otherwise, the Municipality would have to be held liable for all accidents occurring in any construction. They accordingly concluded that the owner of the construction site bore sole responsibility for the site. 22.  On 22 March 2005 the Hatay Civil Court of First Instance upheld the applicant\u2019s case in part. The court stated that, after examining the findings of the Hatay Criminal Court of First Instance and the expert reports submitted to that court, it had requested a further expert report in order to clarify the conflicting aspects of the previous reports. On the basis of that final report, the court established that the responsibility of H.C. and his construction company for the incident was 85%. It thus concluded that H.C. and the construction company were to pay TRL 5,000,000,000 in respect of pecuniary damage to the applicant and his wife and TRL 3,000,000,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage to the applicant, his wife and their three surviving children as requested, with interest accrued from the date of the incident. The court dismissed the case concerning the Municipality, as no fault could be attributed to it on the facts before it. 23.  On 12 April 2006 the applicant, along with the other claimants, appealed against the decision of the first-instance court. They mainly argued that, despite the Municipality\u2019s liability for the incident having been established in the criminal proceedings, the Hatay Civil Court of First Instance had ordered a new expert report against their wishes, and moreover had disregarded their objections concerning the findings in the said report. The Municipality was clearly responsible for the deaths of the two children for having tolerated the presence of a large and uncovered water-filled hole in the very centre of the city for months on end, yet its responsibility had been disregarded by the first-instance court. 24.  On 18 June 2007 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment with regard to the part concerning the Municipality. It noted that the first\u2011instance court should have dismissed the case against the Municipality at the outset for procedural reasons, without examining its substance, as the complaints concerning the Municipality\u2019s responsibility to inspect the construction site fell within the jurisdiction of the administrative courts. The Court of Cassation upheld the rest of the judgment. 25.  Accordingly, on 11 December 2007 the Hatay Civil Court of First Instance dismissed the case against the Municipality. The court also noted that its previous judgment concerning H.C. and his construction company had become final and that there was no need to render a new judgment in respect of that part of the case. 26.  The applicant did not appeal against that judgment, which eventually became final on 16 February 2009. 27.  On an unspecified date in 2009 the applicant, together with other family members, brought compensation proceedings before the Hatay Administrative Court against the Municipality for the death of their son and brother Erhan Cevrio\u011flu due to the alleged negligence on the part of the Municipality in the discharge of its inspection duties. 28.  On 31 December 2009 the Hatay Administrative Court requested a copy of the case file pertaining to the compensation proceedings initiated by the applicant and others from the Hatay Civil Court of First Instance. Subsequently, on 29 January 2010 the Administrative Court requested the case file of the criminal proceedings against H.C. and the municipality officials from the Hatay Criminal Court of First Instance. On 23 March 2010 the Administrative Court also requested the applicant\u2019s lawyer to submit the relevant criminal court decision along with the expert reports submitted to that court. 29.  On 9 December 2010 the Hatay Criminal Court of First Instance informed the Administrative Court that the relevant criminal case file could not be found. However, on 14 February 2011 the applicant\u2019s lawyer submitted the requested documents to the administrative court. In the meantime, the case file pertaining to the compensation proceedings was also made available by the Hatay Civil Court of First Instance. 30.  On 11 March 2011, relying solely on the expert report submitted to the Hatay Civil Court of First Instance on 5 November 2004, and without undertaking any analysis of its own as to the responsibilities of the Municipality under the applicable legislation and whether it had fulfilled those responsibilities, the Hatay Administrative Court held that no fault was attributable to the Municipality on the facts of the instant case and thus dismissed the compensation claims of the applicant and his family. The Hatay Administrative Court emphasised in its judgment that the earlier ruling of the Hatay Civil Court of First Instance, which had apportioned liability for the incident between H.C. and his company and the deceased children, had also been upheld by the Court of Cassation. 31.  On 15 November 2011 the Adana District Administrative Court upheld the judgment of the first-instance court, and on 26 April 2012 it rejected rectification requests lodged by the applicant and his family. 32.  According to a declaration submitted to the Hatay Civil Court of First Instance on 23 October 2013 by the lawyer who had represented the applicant in the proceedings before that court, the applicant and his family had not received any compensation from H.C. and his company, nor had they commenced enforcement proceedings against the latter.", "references": ["1", "9", "8", "2", "7", "5", "3", "6", "4", "No Label", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Warsaw. 6.  On 30 March 2007 the applicant, who was at that time a journalist of the weekly magazine Wprost, contacted A.C., the then rector of the University of Gda\u0144sk, in order to inform him that she considered him to be a long-term informant for the communist secret services in the past. She did not refer to any relevant documentary evidence in her possession. 7.  On 2 April 2007 the applicant published an article in Wprost entitled \u201cAgents Wearing Ermine\u201d, alleging that during the communist times A.C. had been an informant for the communist secret police. The article had the subheading \u201cLeaders of university anti-vetting revolt collaborated with communist secret services\u201d. A photo showing A.C. in the course of his official duties alongside the article had the caption: \u201cA.C., rector of the University of Gda\u0144sk, used to be an informant for the communist secret services under the name Lek\u201d. The article did not quote its sources, referring in general terms to unspecified documents. 8.  The article was also published on the magazine\u2019s website (www.wprost.pl), where it was available until 8 April 2007. 9.  On 9 May 2007 the applicant obtained consent from the President of the Institute of National Remembrance (Instytut Pami\u0119ci Narodowej \u2013\u201cthe IPN\u201d) to access its files. The IPN\u2019s tasks included, inter alia, storing and researching documents of the communist security services. On 10 May 2007 the applicant checked its files registered as Virginia no. 23461, IPN Gd 003/190. 10.  On an unspecified date A. C. informed the prosecution authorities that he had been libelled by the author of the article. On 10 May 2007 the Regional Prosecutor in Warsaw refused to institute a criminal investigation and informed A.C. that the offence alleged could only be prosecuted by way of private prosecution. 11.  A.C.\u2019s lawyer requested Wprost to publish an apology rectifying the allegations against him and his reply to them. On 15 May 2007 the magazine refused to do so. 12.  On 14 May 2007 the magazine published an article written by the applicant (but signed R.P.) entitled \u201cThe Party of Fear\u201d. It was available on the magazine\u2019s website until 20 May 2007. Its main thrust was that high\u2011society former informants opposed amendments to vetting legislation introduced in 2006 (see paragraphs 36 below) for fear that their past would come to light. It referred to A.C. as a former informant and contained his photo as rector of the University of Gda\u0144sk. 13.  On 15 May 2007 the Media Ethics Council (Rada Etyki Medi\u00f3w), a body composed mainly of media representatives designated to observe whether journalists followed the applicable rules of professional ethics, sent a letter to the applicant. It criticised the articles in so far as they alleged A.C.\u2019s involvement with the communist secret services, saying that the arguments presented by the applicant in the articles were not sufficiently convincing. It also criticised the applicant for her failure to refer to the precise sources of her allegations. It further referred to a previous public plea to the media requesting them to deal with allegations of collaboration with the communist secret services with the utmost diligence, seriousness and caution, so as not to cause detriment to anyone and to avoid a sensationalist approach to a very serious issue. It recommended that only thoughtful discussion should be held about themes of such importance as collaboration with the secret services and the manner in which vetting legislation should be applied, commensurate with the gravity of the issues involved. 14.  On 12 August 2007 the same magazine published an article \u201cNew Documents about the Chancellor \u2013 Informant\u201d. It was available on the magazine\u2019s website until 19 August 2007. Its thrust was also that A.C. was a former informant. The article did not quote its sources and merely referred generally to unspecified documents. A photo of A.C. was again published alongside it. 15.  On 14 August 2007 A.C. brought a private bill of indictment against the applicant and S.J., the editor-in-chief of the magazine at that time. It was argued that they had libelled him by publishing the articles and by disseminating untrue information alleging secret and conscious collaboration with the communist secret services. It was submitted that this publication could discredit him in the eyes of the public and result in him losing the confidence necessary to perform his duties as a public university rector, a criminal offence punishable under Article 212 of the Criminal Code. 16.  Criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant and S.J., but were subsequently stayed in May 2010 to obtain information about the result of the vetting process (procedura lustracyjna) in respect of A.C. which was pending at the time. 17.  At a hearing on 15 March 2011 in the latter proceedings, the Gda\u0144sk Regional Court held, referring to documents stored by the IPN, that A.C. had made a true vetting statement to the effect that he had not been an informant for the communist secret services. The court established that he had been registered as such, but without his consent or knowledge. It further noted that on 15 April 2003 A.C. had obtained the security certificate issued by the Internal Security Agency guaranteeing him access to classified information. He had therefore already been positively vetted for integrity by the authorities of a democratic State prior to the judgment. 18.  The Gda\u0144sk Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance judgment on 7 July 2011. 19.  On 11 October 2011 the criminal proceedings against the applicant were resumed. 20.  On 15 February 2012 the Warsaw District Court held that the applicant and editor were guilty of libel under Article 212 \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Code. 21.  The court found that the plaintiff had been working at the University of Gda\u0144sk since 1974. He had been questioned by the communist secret police on several occasions before 1989, when the communist system in Poland had collapsed.\nThe applicant had contacted him, apparently by telephone, prior to publication of the first article of 2 April 2007 claiming to know that he had been an informant. She had neither informed him about any IPN documents on which she would be basing her allegations nor sought to meet him in person. 22.  The applicant stated before the court that she had written the articles motivated by the public interest. A.C. was a well-known personality and society should be made aware of persons in positions of responsibility who were former informants for the communist secret police. 23.  The court considered that while before it the applicant had referred to IPN documents, neither the documents she had submitted originating from these files nor the full file obtained by the court had supported the conclusion that A.C. had been an informant. Certain documents did not refer to him at all, while others did not indicate that he had been an informant. He had never declared willingness to become one. The court referred to a document in the IPN\u2019s files which noted his reluctance to be involved with the services when urged by them to turn into an informant. In these files he was only referred to as being on the staff of the university in the 1970s. They also demonstrated that he had been questioned by the communist services after coming back to Poland following a scholarship in the United States. 24.  The court concluded that the documents it had before it in evidence were manifestly insufficient to hold that the plaintiff had been an informant. 25.  In the light of the documents available, the thesis advanced by the applicant was not only devoid of factual basis, but also incompatible with her obligation to show proper journalistic diligence. She had only obtained access to the full set of IPN files concerning A.C. after her first article had been published. She had only received a decision from the director of the IPN allowing her to access the documents on 9 May 2007, after the article had been published and created a considerable media stir. She had failed to contact A.C. prior to the publication to try to check the veracity of the information, apart from her telephone call to him whereby she had only informed him that she would be publishing the article. 26.  The Warsaw District Court concluded that the applicant had failed to show the journalistic diligence required of her under section 12 of the 1984 Press Act. The impugned articles contained unreliable information, which she had assessed in a superficial manner. Being an informant for the communist secret police was perceived in society in an extremely negative manner. It was therefore not open to doubt that allegations made by the applicant could stigmatise A.C. and undermine public confidence in his capacity to hold office within the meaning of Article 212 of the Criminal Code. The mere fact that the court had gathered more material relevant to establishing the facts concerning A.C.\u2019s past than the applicant had had at her disposal prior to the publication of the impugned articles demonstrated that she had formulated her allegations without a sound factual basis. In the light of that material, it had to be concluded that the statements made in the article were untrue, or at least unfounded. 27.  The court referred to the Court\u2019s case-law on Article 10 of the Convention on freedom of the press. It noted that that freedom carried duties and responsibilities on the part of journalists. It was limited by the criterion of truthfulness on the one hand, and the necessity to protect important values such as dignity, reputation, honour and the private life of individuals on the other. In the present case, the applicant had not had sufficient knowledge at her disposal to support the factual thesis she had advanced in the articles. She had therefore overstepped the limits of acceptable criticism, defamed the plaintiff and thereby committed a criminal offence. 28.  The court imposed fines on the applicant and her co-defendant, the magazine\u2019s editor-in-chief. It determined the amount of the applicant\u2019s fine at 3,000 Polish zlotys (PLN - approximately 750 euros (EUR)) and ordered her to pay PLN 2,500 (approximately 625 EUR) to charity. The court observed that the amount of the fine had been determined with regard to the degree of the applicant\u2019s guilt. The publication of the articles had been her idea and she had written them. However, the fine imposed on her was lower than that imposed on the editor, regard being had to the fact that her income was lower than his. The court further noted that the plaintiff had demanded that a custodial sentence be imposed on the applicant. However, the court was of the view that a non-custodial sentence was sufficient in the circumstances, commensurate with the gravity of the offence. It further ordered that the judgment be made public, having regard to a request submitted by the plaintiff and Article 215 of the Criminal Code, which obliged the court to allow such requests in cases involving convictions based on Article 212 of that Code. 29.  The applicant and her co-accused appealed, raising many procedural arguments. 30.  On 26 September 2012 the Warsaw Regional Court upheld the judgment, essentially sharing the findings and views of the first-instance court. The defendants\u2019 appeals were considered by the court to be unfounded. The court ordered the applicant to pay PLN 300 (approximately EUR 85) in costs to the State Treasury. It further ordered her and her co\u2011accused to pay jointly the plaintiff\u2019s costs before the appellate court, amounting to PLN 3,100 (approximately EUR 775).", "references": ["3", "2", "9", "5", "8", "7", "6", "4", "0", "1", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant, Mr Andrzej Klibisz, is a Polish national who was born in 1968 and is currently detained in W\u0142oc\u0142awek Prison. 6.  On 31 August 1995 the Chief Prosecutor of Lithuania requested the Polish prosecution authorities to carry out a criminal investigation against the applicant, who had been charged in Lithuania with certain offences he had allegedly committed there. On the basis of the bilateral 1993 Cooperation Agreement, the Polish authorities took over the case. 7.  On 7 March 1996 the Warsaw Regional Prosecutor (Prokurator Okr\u0119gowy) issued a decision to remand the applicant in custody for a period of seven days. The applicant was suspected of the murder of a certain T.K., the attempted murder of a certain W.S. in Vilnius in 1994 and illegal possession of weapons. 8.  On 8 March 1996 at 1 p.m. the applicant appeared voluntarily at the Warsaw Police Headquarters (Komenda Policji) in connection with a matter unrelated to the proceedings which are the subject of the instant application. He was immediately arrested. He was not served with the prosecutor\u2019s decision ordering his detention. 9.  On 14 March 1996 the Warsaw Regional Prosecutor issued another decision to retain the applicant in custody. He gave as reasons for his decision the existence of a reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the offences in question, and the gravity of the charges. 10.  On 1 April 1996 that decision was upheld by the Warsaw Regional Court (S\u0105d Okr\u0119gowy). Neither the applicant nor his lawyer were allowed to attend the hearing. They were not, therefore, able to present their arguments to the court. In addition, neither the applicant nor his lawyer had access to the case file in order to prepare their appeal against the decisions ordering the applicant\u2019s detention. 11.  On 15 March 1996 the applicant\u2019s lawyer lodged an interlocutory appeal, challenging the fact that his client had been detained by a prosecutor\u2019s decision. It appears that the appeal was not entertained by the authorities. 12.  On 21 March 1996 the Warsaw Regional Prosecutor rejected the applicant\u2019s lawyer\u2019s application to have the preventive measure in question lifted. 13.  On 3 June 1996 the Warsaw Regional Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 30 September 1996. Neither the applicant nor his lawyer were authorised to attend the hearing and to present their arguments orally. They did not have access to the case file. 14.  That decision was upheld by the Warsaw Court of Appeal (S\u0105d Apelacyjny) on 4 July 1996. Only the prosecutor attended the appellate hearing. The applicant and his lawyer were not allowed to attend the hearing and were not granted access to the case file. 15.  Subsequently, the applicant\u2019s detention was extended by numerous consecutive court decisions. The decision of the Warsaw Court of Appeal of 19 September 1996 (upheld by the Supreme Court (S\u0105d Najwy\u017cszy) on 22 November 1996) and the decision of the Warsaw Court of Appeal of 6 December 1996 (upheld by the Supreme Court on 13 January 1997) were all justified by the courts by the existence of strong evidence against the applicant, comprising the testimony of the alleged victim W.S., the results of the line-up and confrontation with witnesses, as well as by the gravity of charges and a need to take additional investigatory measures. 16.  The Supreme Court\u2019s hearing of 22 November 1996 and the Warsaw Court of Appeal\u2019s hearing of 6 December 1996 were held in the presence of the prosecutor, with neither the applicant nor his lawyer entitled to attend or to have access to the case file. 17.  Meanwhile, the Warsaw Regional Court on 16 May and 12 August 1996, the Warsaw Court of Appeal on 8 October 1996 and the Supreme Court on 4 December 1996 refused to lift the preventive measure in question as requested by the applicant and his lawyer. 18.  The court\u2019s hearing of 16 May 1996 was held with the prosecutor present, whereas the applicant and his lawyer were not allowed to participate. In addition only the prosecutor had access to the case file. 19.  On 7 February 1997 the Warsaw Court of Appeal extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 8 March 1997, giving as reasons for the decision, inter alia, the fact that the suspect and his lawyer were in the process of consulting the case file. 20.  On 4 March 1997 the applicant was indicted on charges of the murder of T.K., the attempted murder of W.S. and illegal possession of weapons. 21.  Subsequently, the applicant\u2019s detention was not formally extended. Nevertheless he remained in custody beyond 8 March 1997. 22.  On 6 May 1997 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s interlocutory appeal lodged against the decision of 7 February 1997. The Supreme Court observed, however, that the lodging of an indictment did not transform the interim detention into a measure sine die. Consequently, if a defendant was to remain in detention, a domestic court had to issue a decision to extend the interim measure in question each time it was about to expire. 23.  The applicant\u2019s lawyer followed with an application for the release of his client pending the proceedings. On 19 May 1997 the Warsaw Regional Court refused to lift the measure and conversely, extended it until 14 March 1998. On 20 June 1997 the Warsaw Court of Appeal decided to uphold the decision to extend the detention, but only until 8 March 1998. 24.  The applicant\u2019s subsequent applications for release were rejected by the Warsaw Regional Court on 27 June 1997 and 26 March 1998. Neither the applicant nor his lawyer had the opportunity to attend the latter hearing or have access to the case file. The prosecutor was present. 25.  The applicant\u2019s detention was further extended by the Supreme Court on 21 April 1998, until 31 August 1998, and on 15 October 1998, until 30 November 1998, on the grounds of the existence of strong evidence against him, the gravity of the charges, the complexity of the case and the need to obtain statements from witnesses who lived in Lithuania. 26.  Meanwhile, the first hearing in the applicant\u2019s case took place on 11 February 1998. 27.  On 23 October 1998 the Warsaw Regional Court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to life imprisonment and to ten years\u2019 deprivation of civic rights. 28.  On the same day, the Regional Court decided to extend the applicant\u2019s detention until the moment he started serving his imprisonment sentence. On 2 June 1999 the Warsaw Regional Court rejected an application for release lodged by the applicant\u2019s lawyer. 29.  On 25 January 2000 the Warsaw Court of Appeal quashed the judgment of 23 October 1998 and ordered that the applicant\u2019s detention be continued. On 1 February 2000 the applicant lodged an interlocutory appeal. On 7 April 2000 the detention decision was upheld by the Warsaw Court of Appeal. 30.  On 19 July 2000 the Warsaw Regional Court refused to release the applicant on bail as sought by his lawyer. On 30 August and 18 December 2000, and 7 February 2001 the Warsaw Regional Court issued decisions to continue the applicant\u2019s detention. They were upheld by the Warsaw Court of Appeal on 10 October 2000, 16 January and 3 April 2001 respectively. 31.  On 7 February 2001 the Warsaw Regional Court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to twenty-five years\u2019 imprisonment and to ten years\u2019 deprivation of civic rights (no. VIII K 168/00). 32.  Subsequently the applicant\u2019s detention was extended by the Warsaw Regional Court\u2019s decisions of 26 April 2001 (upheld by the Warsaw Court of Appeal on 5 June 2001) and of 16 July 2001 (upheld on 31 August 2001), and by the decision of the Warsaw Court of Appeal of 19 October 2001 (upheld by the same court on 16 November 2001). 33.  On 18 December 2001 the Warsaw Court of Appeal upheld the judgment of 7 February 2001 (II AKa 467/01). 34.  On 22 October 2002 the Supreme Court quashed the second-instance judgment of 18 December 2001 and decided to continue the applicant\u2019s detention. 35.  On 29 November 2002 the Supreme Court rejected the applicant\u2019s request to have a legal-aid lawyer appointed for the purpose of \u201crequesting the revocation of the court decisions to extend his detention\u201d. 36.  On 7 January 2003 the Warsaw Court of Appeal decided not to lift the measure in question as sought by the applicant, and on 17 January 2003, extended his detention. The latter decision was upheld by the same court on 18 February 2003. 37.  On 18 February 2003 and 11 April 2003 the Warsaw Court of Appeal decided again not to lift the measure and furthermore, in a separate decision of 11 April 2003, extended the detention until 22 July 2003. The latter decision was upheld by the same court on 13 May 2003. On 17 June 2003 and on 5 September 2003 the Warsaw Court of Appeal refused to lift the preventive measure. On 11 July 2003 the same court decided to extend the applicant\u2019s detention further. On 18 July and 14 August 2003 the Warsaw Court of Appeal decided again neither to lift the applicant\u2019s detention nor to order a substitute preventive measure. 38.  On 20 October 2003 the Warsaw Court of Appeal upheld in principle the judgment of 7 February 2001, altering, because of amendments to the Criminal Code, only the legal classification of certain offences accompanying the main charges of murder and attempted murder (no. II Aka 487/02). 39.  On 12 May 2004 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s cassation appeal and his conviction became final. 40.  Throughout the criminal proceedings the applicant was represented by a lawyer of his own choice. The applicant was present at the hearings and accompanied by his counsel. At the final stage of the proceedings the applicant was represented by a lawyer appointed by the court for the purpose of lodging a cassation appeal against the judgment of the Warsaw Court of Appeal of 20 October 2003. 41.  The applicant brought an action for compensation alleging that his detention between 10 March 1996 and 8 March 1997, between 8 March 1997 and 18 December 2001, and between 22 October 2002 and 20 October 2003 had been unlawful. With regard to the first-mentioned period, the applicant argued that detaining him on the basis of a prosecutor\u2019s decision, and not a court\u2019s, was in breach of Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Regarding the second-mentioned period, the applicant argued that after his indictment he had continued to be detained beyond the term prescribed in the relevant court\u2019s decision. Finally, in connection with the third-mentioned period, the applicant complained that having quashed his second-instance conviction, the Supreme Court had decided to extend his detention despite the fact that the applicant had been absent from the relevant hearing, thus, in breach of the principle of equality of arms. 42.  On an unspecified date the applicant challenged the impartiality of numerous judges who had decided on the extension of his detention pending the outcome of the criminal proceedings. He requested that those judges be excluded from the examination of his case for compensation for unlawful detention. 43.  On 14 January 2003 the Warsaw Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s motion. In connection with the challenge of the impartiality of Judge B.S. and Judge G.S, the court held that the applicant had failed to show that there was a reasonable doubt as to the impartiality of those judges. The court stated that the applicant had merely expressed his personal conviction that the judges in question had given unjustified decisions to keep him in custody. The court concluded that the fact that a judge had given a decision contrary to the wishes of a party was not an indication of any personal prejudice of that judge against that party. 44.  On 12 October 2005 the Warsaw Regional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim for compensation. With regard to the first period of detention, the court considered it to be in compliance with the applicable provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1969, which at the relevant time provided that pre-trial detention was to be ordered by the prosecutor, whose decision could be challenged in court. Regarding the second period in question, the court acknowledged that the practice of considering pre-trial detention as a measure sine die upon the indictment of a detainee had been changed by the 1996 Supreme Court\u2019s Resolution. However, the decision to extend the applicant\u2019s detention on 19 May 1997 was considered justified since the court had applied the literal meaning of the relevant procedural provisions. Finally, as to the third period complained of, the court found that there were no shortcomings in the impugned proceedings before the Supreme Court and that the decision to maintain the applicant\u2019s detention upon the quashing of his conviction had been fully justified. 45.  That judgment was upheld by the Warsaw Court of Appeal on 1 March 2006. A cassation appeal was not available. 46.  On 13 December 2004 the applicant lodged with the Supreme Court two complaints under the 2004 Act. He claimed compensation for the alleged delays in the Supreme Court\u2019s examination of his interlocutory appeals against the decisions of the Warsaw Appeal Court of 19 September 1996 and 7 February 1997 extending his pre-trial detention. 47.  On 14 January 2005 the Supreme Court gave two decisions, dismissing both of the applicant\u2019s complaints. 48.  In both decisions the court considered that the proceedings in question had not been unreasonably lengthy, bearing in mind the fact that judges of the Supreme Court had had to examine voluminous material in what was a complex case. 49.  On 17 December 2004 the applicant lodged with the Supreme Court two complaints under the 2004 Act. He claimed compensation for the alleged delays in the Supreme Court\u2019s examination of the Warsaw Regional Court\u2019s appeals to extend his detention of 4 March 1998 (Supreme Court\u2019s decision of 21 Aril 1998) and of 25 August 1998 (Supreme Court\u2019s decision of 15 October 1998). 50.  On 14 January 2005 the Supreme Court gave two decisions, dismissing both of the applicant\u2019s complaints on the ground that no delays had occurred in the proceedings in question. 51.  On 27 April 2005 the Supreme Court refused to entertain the applicant\u2019s appeals against those decisions. 52.  The applicant lodged thirty complaints under the 2004 Act about a breach of his right to a trial within a reasonable time at various stages of the criminal proceedings against him. 53.  On 16 June 2005 the Supreme Court (no. SPK 12/05) refused to entertain the complaints related to the proceedings before the Warsaw Court of Appeal no. II AKa 467/01 and no. II AKa 487/02. The Supreme Court held that the applicant had not complied with the procedural requirements of the relevant domestic law because his application with the ECHR had not been lodged during the impugned appellate proceedings but during the preceding first-instance trial no. VIII K 168/00. 54.  On 16 June 2005 the Supreme Court (no. KSP 5/05) refused to entertain the complaint lodged in relation to the pending proceedings concerning the breach of the right to a trial within a reasonable time (no. II S 3/05), on the ground that such a complaint was not available under the applicable domestic law. 55.  On 16 June 2005 the Supreme Court (no. WZ 38/05) upheld the Supreme Court\u2019s order of 27 April 2005. 56.  On 16 August 2000 the Warsaw Regional Prosecutor opened an inquiry into the allegations that during his detention in Barczewo Prison the applicant had uttered threats and incited third persons to kill Judge B.P., who had presided in the applicant\u2019s criminal case. 57.  On 28 December 2001 the applicant was charged with the above\u2011mentioned offence. 58.  On 30 November 2004 the Warsaw Regional Prosecutor closed the investigation on the ground that the applicant had not committed the offence in question. 59.  The applicant brought numerous civil actions for infringement of his personal rights in connection with various events. 60.  On 3 February 2005 the applicant filed a civil action under Article 417 of the Civil Code seeking compensation for a breach of Article 6 and other provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights, which had allegedly been committed by domestic courts and penitentiary facilities in relation to the applicant\u2019s main criminal case (VIII K 168/00).\nOn 8 May 2007 the Warsaw Regional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim, considering that the plaintiff had failed to substantiate some of his allegations and to demonstrate that the remainder of the alleged procedural shortcomings and the actions of the respondent had been unlawful or linked with any damage which the applicant might have suffered.\nOn 2 July 2008 the Warsaw Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal.\nOn an unspecified date the applicant\u2019s lawyer informed him that a cassation appeal against that judgment was without any prospects of success. 61.  On 13 October 2005 the applicant brought a civil action under Article 417 of the Civil Code, seeking compensation for the fact that in the official letter of 27 December 2004 the Deputy Governor (Zast\u0119pca Dyrektora) of Radom Remand Centre had stated that the applicant was guilty of uttering threats against Judge B. P.\nOn 8 June 2006 the Radom Regional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s action. It was established that the official letter in question contained information that proceedings for uttering threats were pending against the applicant and did not, as the applicant had alleged, imply that he was guilty of uttering threats. In fact, the impugned criminal proceedings against the applicant had been terminated on 21 December 2004 but the remand centre\u2019s administration had been informed about it only on 28 December 2004, that is, one day after the deputy governor\u2019s letter was sent.\nOn 16 November 2006 the Lublin Court of Appeal upheld that decision. 62.  On 19 November 2006 the applicant brought a civil action for compensation for infringement of his personal rights in that a judge of the Penitentiary Commission of Radom Remand Centre had found him guilty of uttering threats against Judge B. P.\nOn 21 November 2006 the Radom Regional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim as manifestly ill-founded. On 6 June 2007 the Lublin Court of Appeal upheld that judgment. The applicant did not lodge a cassation appeal in the case. 63.  On 5 November 2006 the applicant brought a civil action for compensation for breach of his personal rights in that the Governor (Dyrektor) of Radom Remand Centre had reported to the Penitentiary Commission that the applicant had been uttering threats against Judge B. P.\nOn 30 March 2007 the Radom Regional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim.\nOn 4 July 2007 the Lublin Court of Appeal upheld that judgment.\nOn 23 October 2007 the Lublin Court of Appeal granted legal aid for the purpose of lodging a cassation appeal in the case. By letter of 26 November 2007 the applicant\u2019s lawyer informed the applicant that there were no grounds for such an appeal and that consequently that he would not lodge one on the applicant\u2019s behalf. 64.  It appears that 18 April 2006 the applicant brought another civil action for compensation in relation to an unspecified event.\nOn 30 November 2006 the Radom Regional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim.\nOn 26 June 2007 the Lublin Court of Appeal upheld that judgment. On 13 August 2007 it rejected the applicant\u2019s request for legal aid. 65.  On an unspecified date in 2009 the applicant brought a civil action for libel against a certain M.G., the applicant\u2019s former fellow cellmate, who had allegedly informed the prosecution services that the applicant had been uttering death threats against Judge B.P.\nOn 22 July 2010 the W\u0142oc\u0142awek Regional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s action, holding that he had failed to prove that the respondent had acted unlawfully. 66.  The applicant submitted photocopies of three envelopes which contained letters sent to him at his address in Warszawa-Bia\u0142o\u0142\u0119ka Remand Centre by the Regional Inspectorate of the Prison Service, the Country Election Office (Krajowe Biuro Wyborcze) and the Central Board of the Prison Service (Centralny Zarz\u0105d S\u0142u\u017cby Wi\u0119ziennej) respectively. 67.  The first envelope bears two rectangular stamps reading \u201cWarszawa Bia\u0142o\u0142\u0119ka Remand Centre Received ... L.dz [an abbreviation]....\u201d (\u201cAreszt \u015aledczy Warszawa Bia\u0142o\u0142\u0119ka Wp\u0142yn\u0119\u0142o ... L.dz. ...\u201d). The date of 13 December 2002 is printed in the middle of one of the stamps and the date of 24 December 2002 on the other. The envelope also bears a stamp reading \u201cLetter censored date ...\u201d (\u201cList ocenzurowano dnia ...\u201d). The date of 18 December 2002 has been written by hand on the dotted line and an illegible signature is visible next to it. 68.  The second envelope bears similar rectangular stamps reading \u201cWarszawa Bia\u0142o\u0142\u0119ka Remand Centre Received ... L.dz....\u201d (\u201cAreszt \u015aledczy Warszawa Bia\u0142o\u0142\u0119ka Wp\u0142yn\u0119\u0142o ... L.dz. ...\u201d). The date of 11 December 2002 is printed in the middle of one of these stamps and the date of 19 December 2002 on the other. \u201cLetter censored date ...\u201d (\u201cList ocenzurowano dnia ...\u201d) has been stamped over one of the rectangular stamps. The date of 17 December 2002 has been handwritten on the dotted line and an illegible signature is visible next to it. 69.  The third envelope bears two rectangular stamps reading \u201cWarszawa Bia\u0142o\u0142\u0119ka Remand Centre Received ... L.dz....\u201d (\u201cAreszt \u015aledczy Warszawa Bia\u0142o\u0142\u0119ka Wp\u0142yn\u0119\u0142o ... L.dz. ...\u201d). The date of 11 December 2002 is printed in the middle of one of these stamps and the date of 19 December 2002 on the other. The envelope also bears a stamp reading \u201cLetter censored date ...\u201d (\u201cList ocenzurowano dnia ...\u201d). The date of 17 December 2002 has been handwritten on the dotted line and an illegible signature is visible next to it. 70.  The applicant complained about the interference with his correspondence to the penitentiary authorities. 71.  He also brought a related civil action for the infringement of personal rights, seeking 100,000 Polish zlotys (PLN - approximately 24,500 euros (EUR)) of compensation. 72.  On 27 November 2006 the Warsaw Regional Court awarded the applicant PLN 5,000 in compensation for the infringement of his personal rights on account of the fact that three letters sent to him from the Regional Inspectorate of the Prison Service, the Country Election Office and the Central Board of the Prison Service had been censored by mistake. 73.  By virtue of the same judgment the applicant, who at the beginning of the proceedings had been exempted from court fees, was ordered to pay PLN 5,000 towards a part of an unpaid court fee. 74.  The applicant and the respondent appealed. 75.  On 28 June 2007 the Warsaw Court of Appeal upheld the first\u2011instance judgment on the merits and quashed the part concerning the court\u2019s fees. 76.  The applicant also submitted a photocopy of an envelope containing the letter which had been sent to him on 12 December 2002 by the Registry of the Court. 77.  The envelope bears two rectangular stamps reading \u201cWarszawa Bia\u0142o\u0142\u0119ka Remand Centre Received ... L.dz....\u201d (\u201cAreszt \u015aledczy Warszawa Bia\u0142o\u0142\u0119ka Wp\u0142yn\u0119\u0142o ... L.dz. ...\u201d). The date of 16 December 2002 is printed in the middle of one of these stamps and the date of 24 December 2002 on the other. The envelope also bears a stamp reading \u201cLetter censored date ...\u201d (\u201cList ocenzurowano dnia ...\u201d). The date of 18 December 2002 has been handwritten on the dotted line and an illegible signature is visible next to it. 78.  It appears that the applicant complained about the interference with his correspondence to the penitentiary authorities. 79.  He also brought a related civil action for the infringement of personal rights, seeking PLN 100,000 of compensation. 80.  On 9 August 2007 the Warsaw Regional Court awarded the applicant PLN 1,000 of compensation for unlawful interference with the applicant\u2019s correspondence and waived the court fees. 81.  The applicant did not appeal. 82.  The applicant has been in continuous detention since 8 March 1996. 83.  He complained that throughout his entire detention he had been held in overcrowded cells with the right to only one hour of an outdoor exercise per day and to one shower per week. More recently, the applicant submitted that despite the fact that the domestic authorities claimed to have resolved the issue of overcrowding in detention facilities, the conditions of his own detention had not improved. 84.  The applicant maintained that the authorities of different detention facilities had persecuted him for helping his fellow inmates write legal motions and complaints and for spreading information about the case\u2011law of the ECHR. The alleged persecution took the forms of: placing the applicant under a special regime for dangerous prisoners, transferring him frequently between different detention facilities, sending him to prisons located far from his family\u2019s home and confiscating his personal belongings. 85.  The applicant was detained in this detention facility (in his hometown) during the following periods: (1) from 8 March 1996 until 26 March 1997, (2) from 14 January until 19 November 1998, (3) from 12 January 2000 until 20 February 2001, (4) from 3 December 2001 until 18 March 2002, (5) from 11 February until 25 June 2003, (6) from 23 July until 16 December 2003; (7) from 13 May until 1 June 2004; and (8) from 4 until 14 February 2008.\n(a)  Description of the living conditions 86.  As established by the Warsaw Regional Court in the course of the civil proceedings described below, during the six terms of his detention in Warszawa Mokot\u00f3w Remand Centre, the conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention were the following. 87.  The applicant had been detained in cells, in which the space per person had at all times been inferior to 3 square metres. From 1 January until 31 December 2000 the maximum capacity of the remand centre had been exceeded by almost 5%. 88.  As a non-smoker the applicant had been assigned to non-smoking cells. The internal rules, however, had not been respected by his fellow\u2011prisoners and the applicant had been exposed to cigarette smoke. The toilet annex in the applicant\u2019s cells had been separated from the rest of the cell either by a piece of plywood with the entrance covered with a piece of fabric or by a concrete wall with a sliding door. In most cases the applicant\u2019s cells had not been ventilated. 89.  In addition, the applicant submitted that during his detention in Warszawa Mokot\u00f3w Remand Centre he had not received a non-meat diet (dieta jarska), which had been contrary to a doctor\u2019s recommendations and which had allegedly resulted in malnutrition and, consequently, a deterioration in his health. 90.  During his detention under high-security regime, from 13 May until 1 June 2004, the applicant was committed to a single-occupancy cell and was in complete isolation from other prisoners. Every day he had a one-hour period of an outdoor exercise alone. Every few days he had access to the remand centre\u2019s day-room in which he was also alone. He did not have access to any sporting, education or leisure activities. The applicant was subjected to personal checks when he was admitted to and transferred from the remand centre and, on a daily basis, each time he left and returned to his cell. The applicant\u2019s cell with the exception of the toilet area, the outdoor yard, day-room and all other places open to the applicant, were under constant camera surveillance.\n(b)  Related civil action and complaints 91.  On 7 March 2006 the applicant brought a civil action in tort against Warszawa Mokot\u00f3w Remand Centre. He invoked Article 417 of the Civil Code and Article 3 of the Convention. He claimed PLN 500,000 in compensation for his alleged suffering, during his entire stay in that remand centre, resulting from overcrowding and poor living and sanitary conditions and from exposure to cigarette smoke. 92.  On 7 November 2008 the Warsaw Regional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim. The domestic court examined the case under Article 23 of the Civil Code in conjunction with Article 448 of that code. The court held that the suffering which the applicant had experienced because of the overcrowding had not been great enough to warrant an award of compensation. It was stressed that despite the overcrowding, the overall sanitary and living conditions in the remand centre had been acceptable. The domestic court did not rule on the issue of the applicant\u2019s passive smoking. 93.  On 19 December 2008 the applicant appealed against that judgment. 94.  It appears that on an unspecified date the appeal was dismissed by the second-instance court. 95.   It appears that the applicant also complained to the penitentiary authorities about the conditions of his detention under high-security regime. 96.  In this facility (200 km from his hometown) the applicant was detained during the following periods: (1) from 26 March 1997 until 14 January 1998; and (2) from 11 September until 9 October 2002. He did not make any specific submissions in respect of the conditions of his detention there. 97.  In this establishment (230 km from his hometown) the applicant was detained from 19 November 1998 until 12 January 2000. He submitted that he had been detained in an unheated cell (no. 11 wing XIV) in temperatures as low as 14 degrees Celsius with an average temperature of 16-17 degrees Celsius in wintertime. 98.  In this facility (270 km from his hometown) the applicant was detained (1) from 20 February until 3 December 2001; and (2) from 17 January until 7 February 2006. 99.  He did not make any specific submissions in respect of the conditions of his detention there. 100.  The applicant was detained in this prison (in his hometown) during the following periods: (1) from 18 March until 24 April 2002; (2) from 22 May until 11 September 2002; (3) from 9 October 2002 until 11 February 2003; (4) from 30 September until 18 November 2005; (5) from 7 until 15 February 2006; (6) from 30 August 2007 until 4 February 2008; (7) from 14 February until 8 April 2008; (8) from 24 April until 7 May 2008; (9) from 1 until 23 October 2008; and (10) from an unspecified date after 13 February 2012 until an unspecified date before 5 March 2012.\n(a)  Description of the living conditions 101.  In his application form of 15 November 2010 the applicant complained about the conditions of his detention in Warszawa Bia\u0142o\u0142\u0119ka Prison. He submitted that he had been detained together with another inmate in a single-occupancy cell measuring 5 square metres and then, together with five other inmates, in a cell measuring 13 square metres. The cells in question were run down, dirty, not ventilated and badly-lit. There was mould on the walls and water dripped from the ceiling whenever someone was using the tap in the cell upstairs. The applicant had one hour of outdoor exercise per day. Prisoners did not have the opportunity to participate in any activities. The prison\u2019s computer room, which had been funded by the European Union, was permanently locked. The applicant had a shower once a week but could barely wash himself because the shower heads were designed to limit water consumption. The applicant\u2019s meals were always served cold one hour and a half after the distribution round had started. 102.  The applicant also submitted that he had been beaten up by a warden in Warszawa Bia\u0142o\u0142\u0119ka Prison.\n(b)  Related civil action 103.  On an unspecified date the applicant brought a civil action in tort against Warszawa Bia\u0142o\u0142\u0119ka Prison. He was represented by a lawyer practising in Warsaw. 104.  On 12 February 2010 the Warsaw Regional Court dismissed the action. 105.  On 26 May 2010 the applicant was informed by his lawyer that the latter had failed to appear at the court\u2019s final hearing and had not been aware of the ruling. In consequence the lawyer had failed to request a reasoned judgment from the first-instance court and to lodge an appeal. The lawyer offered to pay the applicant PLN 2,000 in compensation for his own negligence (\u201cnienale\u017cyte wykonanie obowi\u0105zku\u201d) and instructed the applicant about the possibility of bringing a civil action if he considered that amount insufficient. 106.  The first-instance judgment became final on 30 August 2010.\n(c)  Penitentiary complaints 107.  In 2002 the applicant filed several complaints with different penitentiary authorities about the lack of a vegetarian diet, frequent power cuts and other issues relating to the living conditions in Warszawa Bia\u0142o\u0142\u0119ka Remand Centre. None were successful. 108.  On 11 July 2002 the Director of the Warsaw Regional Inspectorate of the Prison Service informed the applicant that detention facilities were not under any duty to cater to the dietary preferences of detainees if, as in the applicant\u2019s case, they were not medically justified. 109.  On 7 January 2003 the applicant complained to a competent penitentiary judge, inter alia, that he had been punched by a warden in the course of an argument they had had in the morning of the same day. On 28 February 2003 the judge, who had examined witnesses\u2019 statements and the report from the applicant\u2019s medical examination immediately after the incident, found the applicant\u2019s allegations to be unfounded. 110.  The applicant was detained in that facility (287 km from his hometown) from 24 April until 22 May 2002. He alleged that he had not received proper medical care there. 111.  The applicant was detained in this facility (140 km from his hometown) from 25 June until 23 July 2003.\n(a)  Description of the living conditions 112.  In his application form, which was received by the Registry on 30 November 2010, the applicant complained about the conditions of his detention in \u0141\u00f3d\u017a Prison, to which he had been committed for psychiatric observation. He alleged that his cell had been overcrowded. The toilet had been separated by a brick wall, which was only one-metre high. Because the windows had been blocked by heavy blinds, the cell had not been ventilated and the temperature inside had reached up to 40 degrees Celsius.\n(b)  Alleged medical malpractice 113.  The applicant had had one hour of outdoor exercise per day. He also submitted that, on 4 July 2003, during an EMG head examination which had been carried out in the prison, his arm had been badly damaged and he had not been prescribed any physiotherapy for that.\n(c)  Related civil proceedings concerning medical malpractice and detention conditions 114.  On 6 September 2006 the applicant brought a civil action for compensation for the health damage which he had allegedly suffered as a result of the negligence of the medical staff of \u0141\u00f3d\u017a Prison on 4 July 2003 and of inadequate care, namely the lack of physiotherapy, afterwards. On 14 April 2008 the applicant broadened the scope of his claim by alleging a breach of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights in that the prison authorities had failed to ensure that the conditions of his detention in \u0141\u00f3d\u017a Prison were adequate. 115.  On 22 January 2010 the \u0141\u00f3d\u017a Regional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s civil action. 116.  The claim concerning the alleged medical malpractice was examined by the court under Article 417 of the Civil Code in conjunction with Article 445 of that code, whereas the claim concerning the allegedly inadequate conditions of detention was examined under Article 24 of the Civil Code in conjunction with Article 448 of that code. 117.  As regards the claim under Article 417 of the Civil Code the domestic court analysed in detail the course of the medical procedure in question and a number of medical experts\u2019 reports. It was concluded that the medical staff who had performed the applicant\u2019s EMG scan on 4 July 2003 had not made any errors. The damage to the nerve of the applicant\u2019s arm had occurred much later and it was impossible to determine its cause. The court considered, however, that there was certainly no causal link between the events of 4 July 2003 and the damage suffered by the applicant. 118.  As regards the claim under Article 24 of the Civil Code, the respondent party raised an objection, arguing that pursuant to Article 4421 of the Civil Code the statutory three-year limitation period for claims in tort had elapsed, at the latest, three years after the applicant had left \u0141\u00f3d\u017a Prison, that is, on 23 July 2006. 119.  The domestic court did not address the respondent\u2019s objection and examined the case on the merits. 120.  The following facts were established by the court on the basis of the data from various prison and hospital registers, and prison inspection reports. In the relevant period the applicant had been detained in cells nos. 303 and 305. The space per person in those cells had at all times been greater than the statutory minimum standard of 3 square metres. The cells had been well-lit and well-ventilated even though the windows had indeed been partly covered by semi-transparent blinds attached to the outside wall at an angle, creating a twenty-six centimetre gap between the window and the blind. A toilet annex in each cell had been sufficiently separated and clean. 121.  In the light of the above facts the court held that the applicant\u2019s personal rights had not been infringed. 122.  On 20 May 2010 the \u0141\u00f3d\u017a Court of Appeal upheld the first\u2011instance judgment. 123.  The applicant was detained in this prison (160 km from his hometown) (1) from 16 December 2003 until 12 January 2004. He did not make any specific submissions in respect of the conditions of his detention in that period. The applicant was again committed to that detention facility (2) from an unspecified date, no later than 11 August 2011 until an unspecified date before 20 February 2012 and (3) from an unspecified date before 2 July 2012 until the present day. 124.  The applicant submitted that on 11 August 2011 he was committed to cell no. 118 in wing S. On 12 August 2011 he was moved to cell no. 213 in wing E and on 19 August 2011, to another cell in wing B. On 22 August 2011 he was committed to cell no. 214 in wing D and later, to cell no. 210 in wing D. On 28 December 2011 he was transferred to cell no. 202 in wing D and on 16 January 2012 to cell no. 210 in the same wing. 125.  The above mentioned cells of wing D, which was reserved to prisoners attending school, were, for the most part, shared by five inmates (including the applicant). The statutory minimum standard of 3 square metres had not been secured in those cells. They were insufficiently lit and the toilet annex was small. The applicant had access to shower once a week for 10 minutes at a time. No additional shower was allowed to the applicant on the days when he worked in the school workshop. 126.  From September 2011 until September 2012 (presumably with a break when he was detained in Warszawa S\u0142u\u017cewiec Remand Centre \u2013 see paragraph 250 below) the applicant attended vocational high school three days per week. From September until late-October 2012 he was enrolled in an additional technical course from Monday through Friday. 127.  From May through September prisoners could use the prison\u2019s football pitch once a week for 45 minutes. Throughout the year they had an hour-long outdoor exercise per day in a small concrete yard. 128.  The applicant submitted that he and his cellmates often quarrelled and got in fights because of tension caused by their constant rotation between cells. 129.  On 23 October 2012 the applicant was transferred to a single cell no. 114 in wing F. 130.  On 21 November 2012 the Penitentiary Commission of W\u0142oc\u0142awek Remand Centre decided to revoke the applicant\u2019s authorisation to study in view of the applicant\u2019s moderate progress in resocialisation and unfavourable criminological prognosis which he had received on 20 November 2012. On 11 December 2012 this decision was partly changed on appeal and the applicant was allowed to resume his education. 131.  On 18 December 2012 the Penitentiary Commission of W\u0142oc\u0142awek Remand Centre decided to continue the applicant\u2019s detention in a closed\u2011type prison in view of the seriousness of the offence of which he had been convicted, his increasingly vexatious behaviour, disobedience and unfavourable criminological prognosis. 132.  The applicant is currently attending the remand centre\u2019s school. 133.  The applicant was detained in this facility (100 km from his hometown) (1) from 12 January until 13 May 2004; (2) from 28 June 2004 until 30 September 2005; (3) from 18 November 2005 until 17 January 2006; (4) from 15 February 2006 until 30 August 2007; (5) from 7 May until 1 October 2008 (one-day prison leave on 11 August); (6) from 23 October 2008 until 1 July 2009; (7) from 14 until 27 August 2009; and (8) from 24 September 2009 until 12 February 2010.\n(a)  Detention from 12 until 20 January 2004 under increased supervision 134.  On 10 January 2004 the Deputy Director General of the Prison Service informed the administration of Radom Remand Centre that the applicant had been charged with uttering threats against Judge B.P., who had been involved in the applicant\u2019s criminal trial (see paragraphs 56 \u2011 58 above).\nAs a result, on 13 January 2004 the Governor of Radom Remand Centre issued a decision, in which he established the following detention regime in respect of the applicant. 135. (1) Personnel monitoring the applicant\u2019s private correspondence were to pay particular attention to the content of the applicant\u2019s letters. Any letter containing threats against Judge B.P. or any other member of the justice department was to be immediately transferred to the remand centre\u2019s governor or his deputy.\n(2) The applicant\u2019s prison education officer (wychowawca) was to monitor the applicant\u2019s official correspondence (korespondencja urz\u0119dowa). The remand centre\u2019s governor or his deputy was to be immediately informed if any irregularities were discovered.\n(3) Two officers were to be designated to monitor the applicant\u2019s telephone conversations. The remand centre\u2019s governor or his deputy was to be immediately informed if any irregularities were discovered. In the event that the applicant was heard uttering threats against Judge B.P. or any other member of the justice department, the telephone call was to be interrupted.\n(4) The applicant\u2019s conversations during his visits (widzenia) were to be subject to \u201cstrict supervision\u201d by a designated prison officer. Supervisors were to be immediately informed if any irregularities were discovered. In the event the applicant was heard uttering threats against Judge B.P. or any other member of the justice department, the conversation was to be interrupted. 136.  From 12 until 20 January 2004 the applicant was detained in wing XI of Radom Remand Centre under the above-described special supervision regime. He did not submit, however, if in the material time any of his letters, phone calls or conversations with visitors had been monitored as described the preceding paragraph. The Government submitted that the relevant remand centre\u2019s registers of correspondence or visits did not exist. 137. As to the living conditions in the remand centre, the applicant submitted that he had not received any food and had lived off what he bought in the prison canteen. The power in the electric sockets had been turned off each morning between 9 and 11 o\u2019clock. 138.   On an unspecified date in January 2004 the applicant informed the Head of the Security Department of Radom Remand Centre (Kierownik Dzia\u0142u Ochrony) that he feared for his life and well-being because a certain W.S., a convicted criminal who had been the victim and the prosecution witness during the applicant\u2019s trial, had been detained in Radom Remand Centre.\n(b)  Detention from 20 January until 13 May 2004 and from 28 June until 5 October 2004 under high-security regime\n(i)  The imposition of the special regime 139.  On 20 January 2004 the Head of the Security Department applied to the Penitentiary Commission of Radom Remand Centre for the applicant\u2019s classification as a \u201cprisoner posing a serious threat to society or to security of a detention facility\u201d (wi\u0119zie\u0144 stwarzaj\u0105cy powa\u017cne zagro\u017cenie spo\u0142eczne albo powa\u017cne zagro\u017cenie dla bezpiecze\u0144stwa zak\u0142adu karnego) and his detention under high-security regime. The regime was to entail (1) general security measures as regulated by the law, including the monitoring and censorship of the applicant\u2019s correspondence and monitoring and control of his telephone conversations and visits, and, in addition, (2) the use of handcuffs and fetters during the applicant\u2019s transport; (3) transport only with the help of police; and (4) handcuffing the applicant behind the back anywhere outside the remand centre\u2019s living quarters.\nIt was noted as reasons for the request that the applicant had been convicted of a serious offence and sentenced to a long term in prison and that he was hostile towards the officers of the justice department. In consequence, the applicant was considered likely to pose a real threat to society and remand centre\u2019s internal order, and to abscond, in particular, during transport outside the remand centre. 140.  On 20 January 2004 the Penitentiary Commission of Radom Remand Centre, acting under Article 76 \u00a7 1 (7) of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences (\u201cthe Code\u201d), decided to place the applicant under high\u2011security regime for prisoners posing a serious threat to society or to security of a detention facility. This status is regulated by Article 88 \u00a7 5 of the Code in conjunction with Article 88 (a) \u00a7 1 of that Code. The Commission\u2019s decision did not contain any written grounds. 141.  The applicant appealed. 142.  On 9 February 2004 the Radom Regional Court examined the applicant\u2019s appeal and observed that already in 2003 the Penitentiary Commission of Warszawa Mokot\u00f3w Remand Centre had classified the applicant as a prisoner posing a serious threat to security of that detention facility. It was also noted that one day after the applicant had been transferred to Radom Remand Centre, the Deputy Director General of the Prison Service informed the remand centre\u2019s administration that the applicant had been uttering threats against Judge B.P. (see paragraph 134 above). It had been derived from the above-mentioned letter that the applicant was likely to pose a real threat to the security of the other judges of the bench. In view of the above, the Radom Regional Court decided to uphold the Penitentiary Commission\u2019s decision on the applicant\u2019s status. 143.  On 20 April and 5 July 2004 the administration of Radom Remand Centre issued two identical requests to extend the applicant\u2019s high security detention regime. The requests were justified by invoking: (1) the gravity of the offences of which the applicant had been convicted and the long sentence; (2) the fact that the applicant manifested his hostility towards the agents of the justice department; (3) serious lack of moral character; and (4) other unspecified features of the applicant\u2019s character and his personal qualities (w\u0142a\u015bciwo\u015bci i warunki osobiste) which, together with the above\u2011mentioned elements, made him a person who posed a serious threat to the society and to the security of the remand centre. 144.  On 20 April and again, on 5 July 2004 the Penitentiary Commission examined the above-mentioned requests and reviewed the applicant\u2019s situation. It was found that the original reasons for the imposition of the special regime were still valid. Consequently, it was decided that the applicant\u2019s status be extended, each time, for another three months. 145.  The applicant initially appealed against the review decision of 20 April 2004. Later on, however, he withdrew his appeal in protest that the penitentiary authorities had not granted him access to his entire prison record but only to reports of the relevant authorities which had been used in the proceedings before the Penitentiary Commission and which concerned the applicant\u2019s conduct and character. Consequently, on 16 September 2004 the Radom Regional Court formally discontinued the appellate proceedings. 146.  During the third review proceedings, the administration of Radom Remand Centre, submitted that the applicant had stopped posing a threat to the security and internal order of the remand centre and of the officers of the justice department and did not cause any problems to the remand centre\u2019s staff. 147. Consequently, on 5 October 2004 the Penitentiary Commission of Radom Remand Centre decided that the applicant\u2019s special status be lifted.\n(ii)  The features of the regime 148. On 20 January 2004 the applicant was moved to the wing for \u201cdangerous\u201d prisoners. On 13 May 2004 he was temporarily transferred to Warszawa Mokot\u00f3w Remand Centre and then, to Sztum Prison. The special regime was also enforced in these two detention facilities (see paragraphs 90 above and 204 below). On 28 June 2004 he returned to Radom Remand Centre (see paragraph 133 above).\n(\u03b1)  The applicant\u2019s isolation and other special measures 149. During his detention in Radom Remand Centre, from 20 January until 8 March, 14 April until 13 July and from 3 to 13 September 2004 (a total of 5 months), the applicant was committed to a solitary cell. From 8 March until 14 April, 13 July until 3 September and from 13 September until 5 October 2004 (a total of 4 months), he shared his cell with one or two other persons. 150.  The applicant submitted that from 9 March until 1 April 2004 he had been committed to cell no. 109 together with a smoking fellow inmate. 151. The applicant\u2019s cells, except for the toilet annex, were under constant camera surveillance. The light was on all the time. 152.  The applicant was scheduled to have his daily outdoor exercise in the company of another special-type prisoner from cell no. 405. Because the prisoner in question regularly refused to go outside, the applicant had his walks alone. The applicant was not authorised to participate in sporting activities with other prisoners. During one hour twice and sometimes, three times per week he had individual access to a day-room with a TV-set, books and magazines. The Government submitted that the applicant had been authorised to attend cultural and educational courses and catholic mass but they were unable to say whether the applicant had indeed made use of those facilities. The applicant submitted that with the classification as a \u201cdangerous prisoner\u201d he had not had access to any such activities. 153.  The applicant was subjected to strip searches each time he left and returned to his cell, for example, from an outdoor exercise, telephone booth or the appointment with the prison\u2019s doctor. The applicant submitted that on average he had been subjected to four to eight personal checks per day. He also stressed that the frequency and the very practice of strip searches was unjustified in the light of the fact that the applicant had at all times been under camera surveillance or wardens\u2019 supervision.\n(\u03b2)  Censorship of the applicant\u2019s correspondence and monitoring of his telephone calls and visits 154.  The applicant\u2019s incoming and outgoing private and official correspondence continued to be opened and read and his telephone calls and visits, to be monitored by the remand centre\u2019s administration. 155.  The applicant submitted that because of the lapse of time, he had not been able to keep the receipts or the copies of the relevant letters. He stated, however, that in 2004 he had sent approximately 4,000 letters and that all of them had been censored. He enumerated 1,128 of such letters and, additionally, 48 incoming censored letters.\nThe applicant also submitted that when he had been detained in Radom remand Centre in 2004 the following visits (eleven in total) had taken place: on 23 February, 15 and 29 March, 12 July, 23 August, 27 September, 4 October, 11 and 21 November and 30 December 2004 \u2013 with his brother K.K. and on 26 July 2004 - with a certain A.W.\nIn addition 180 telephone conversations which the applicant had in 2004 in Radom Remand Centre were controlled. 156.  The Government submitted that the relevant remand centre\u2019s registers of correspondence or visits did not exist but acknowledged that the practice of routine monitoring and censoring of the applicant\u2019s correspondence, telephone calls and visits had been in place.\n(iii)  Related penitentiary complaints and civil action 157.  The applicant lodged numerous complaints with the penitentiary authorities in relation to the conditions of his detention under high-security regime. They were to no avail. 158.  On 30 January 2007 he also brought a civil action for compensation on account of his detention under a high-security regime from 20 January until 5 October 2004 and false accusations that he had been uttering threats against Judge B.P. The outcome of these proceedings is unknown.\n(c)  The applicant\u2019s detention from 5 October until 24 November 2004 under increased supervision\n(i)  The conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention 159.  On 5 October 2004 the applicant was transferred to cell no. 404 in general wing IX.\n(ii)  The applicant\u2019s correspondence\n(\u03b1)  The monitoring of the correspondence 160.  On 11 November 2004 the Governor of Radom Remand Centre (Dyrektor) decided that the applicant, even though no longer classified as a prisoner posing a serious threat to society or to security of a prison, should, nevertheless, be treated with particular precaution because of the threats he had uttered in the past against judge B.P. To that effect the applicant\u2019s correspondence was to be checked by the remand centre security guard (inspektor dzia\u0142u ochrony) in the applicant\u2019s presence. 161.  It is uncontested that all of the applicant\u2019s incoming and outgoing mail was opened and read. 162. The applicant submitted that on 18 and 19 November 2004 he had wished to send two private letters to his fellow prisoners K.S. and P.K. The letters contained information on prisoners\u2019 rights and the procedure under the European Convention on Human Rights. Attached to one of the letters was a brochure containing a summary of the Court\u2019s case-law. 163.  The envelopes were inspected and the letters read by a remand centre officer. Because the letters contained comments by the applicant, which were considered as a threat to the remand centre\u2019s internal order, they were seized. 164.  It is unclear whether the above-mentioned inspection was carried out during the dispatching of the letters in the applicant\u2019s wing and in his presence or rather, on their receipt in the wing of the addressee, K.S. 165.  It appears that the letters were eventually delivered to the addressees. The ECHR\u2019s brochure, however, was taken out and put in the remand centre\u2019s depository (see paragraph 175 below).\n(\u03b2)  The applicant\u2019s complaints about the monitoring of his correspondence 166.  In November and December 2004 the applicant lodged several applications with the Radom Regional Court to complain about the monitoring of his correspondence under the increased supervision regime, the seizure of his private letter to S.N. and, further, about the arbitrariness and unlawfulness of his disciplinary punishment of 23 November 2004 and the living conditions in his solitary cell. 167.  In an official letter of 27 December 2004 the Deputy Governor of Radom Remand Centre informed the Radom Regional Court that the following findings, concerning the applicant\u2019s correspondence, had been made in the course of an internal inquiry. 168.  After the decision of 11 October 2004 the applicant\u2019s official correspondence had been monitored by an authorised officer in the applicant\u2019s presence. The letters had been opened and their content checked. The procedure had been in compliance with Articles 90 (8) and 242 \u00a7 6 of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences. 169.  On 18 and 19 November 2004 two private letters had been sent by the applicant to a fellow prisoner K.S. who was, at that time, detained in wing XIII of the same remand centre as the applicant. The letters had been opened and read. It was revealed that the envelopes contained documents from the applicant\u2019s criminal proceedings and official letters which had been sent by various penitentiary authorities to the applicant. Handwritten notes by the applicant had been on top of some of those documents. The applicant had made insulting remarks about the Deputy Head of the Prison Service. He had also informed K.S. that he was preparing an application to the ECHR about the living conditions in the remand centre and that he was going to distribute copies of it among the detainees. They would then be able simply to sign that model application and send it to the ECHR on their own behalf.\nIn the letter of 19 November 2004 the applicant had further informed K.S. that he had taken steps to encourage detainees to lodge complaints with the ECHR. That, in the applicant\u2019s view, would make the remand centre\u2019s authorities reduce the overcrowding and comply with other minimum standards set out in the Convention. 170.  The warden, who had monitored the letters in question, had considered that they were aimed at raising tension among detainees. He had applied to the remand centre\u2019s governor for authorisation to seize the correspondence. Having read the letters in question, the governor had decided to seize them and include them in the applicant\u2019s personal file. Hehad considered that the content of the letters might be a threat to the remand centre\u2019s internal order and security. The applicant had been informed about the governor\u2019s decision in compliance with Article 105 \u00a7 4 of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences. 171.  Because the applicant\u2019s actions had been perceived as a serious violation of the remand centre\u2019s internal discipline and order, an application for his disciplinary punishment had been filed with the remand centre\u2019s governor on 23 November 2004 (see paragraphs 176 - 178 below). 172. On 30 December 2004 the penitentiary judge of the Radom Regional Court examined five complaints from the applicant, concerning, among others, the monitoring of his correspondence, and considered all of those complaints ill-founded. 173.  As far as the issue of the applicant\u2019s correspondence was concerned, the court found that the governor\u2019s decision of 11 November 2004 to monitor the applicant\u2019s correspondence had been in compliance with the law and justified in the applicant\u2019s case. Moreover, the regional court came to the following conclusion:\n\u201cThere are no grounds to call into question the [fact] of intercepting the [applicant\u2019s] letters to [K.S.] and [P.K.] because those letters contained information and documents other than instructions as to how, where to and what to write about the conditions of [detention]. [Phrases such as]: \u2018prisoners are treated inhumanely\u2019 appeared in those letters. Such statements are groundless and [were] employed with the goal of making a particular impression and [to enhance] the \u2018effectiveness of [the applicant\u2019s] actions.\u2019\u201d 174.  On 10 January 2005 the applicant complained to the penitentiary judge that the Governor of Radom Remand Centre had confiscated his private copy of a brochure on the case-law of the ECHR, which he had intended to send to K.S., a fellow prisoner detained in another establishment. 175.  In reply, by letter of 9 February 2005 the penitentiary judge informed the applicant that his complaint was manifestly ill-founded. The judge gave an account of the events which had led to the applicant\u2019s complaint. He considered that the governor\u2019s decision to confiscate the brochure in question had been justified in the light of the fact that the applicant, in his letter to K.S., had incited the latter to lodge complaints against the prison authorities with the ECHR. The brochure in question was included to help K.S. in drafting his ECHR application. It was also noted that, even though as of 22 November 2004 the applicant could have requested the return of the brochure in question from the prison depository, he had not done so.\n(d)  The applicant\u2019s disciplinary punishment from 23 November until 8 December 2004\n(i)  The imposition and the features of the measure 176.  On 23 November 2004 the Governor of Radom Remand Centre received an application to punish the applicant for inciting his fellow prisoners to rebellion by disseminating information about their Convention rights and the procedure for applying to the ECHR. 177.  On the same day, having heard the applicant and his prison education officer (wychowawca) the governor imposed on the applicant a disciplinary punishment in the form of fourteen days\u2019 solitary confinement. 178.  The sanction was applied from 24 November until 8 December 2004.\n(ii)  The applicant\u2019s appeal against the measure 179.  On 23 November 2004 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Radom Regional Court to challenge the governor\u2019s decision to impose a disciplinary punishment by placing him in solitary confinement. He also asked that the enforcement of the punishment be stayed while his appeal was pending. 180.  On 30 December 2004 the penitentiary judge of the Radom Regional Court heard the submissions of the prosecutor and of the applicant. The court upheld the impugned decision. 181.  The penitentiary court noted that the applicant had admitted that he had been disseminating information about prisoners\u2019 Convention rights among his fellow inmates in Radom Remand Centre and that he had transferred such information by letters to K.S. and P.K. The information in question concerned, in particular, the minimum living standards required by the Convention for detention facilities and instructions on how to lodge an application with the Court. The applicant admitted that he had been encouraging his fellow inmates to send applications to Strasbourg by assuring them that he would prepare model letters for them. He stressed, however, that his actions had not been aimed at starting rebellion but rather at achieving the improvement of the living conditions in that establishment. 182.  In addition, the penitentiary court took note of the threats which the applicant had been heard to express in the following words: \u201cYou wanted me in Radom [Remand Centre], so now you have it; this is only the beginning! I will put [this place] in order, do you understand?!\u201d 183.  The court found that the applicant, through his actions, had incited other prisoners to rebellion and thus the governor had been justified in imposing a disciplinary punishment on him. 184.  Moreover, the penitentiary court considered that the governor had acted in compliance with Articles 144 and 145 \u00a7 1 of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences in deciding that his decision of 23 November 2003 was not to be announced publicly. 185.  The court did not rule on the applicant\u2019s request to stay the enforcement of his disciplinary punishment.\n(iii)  Complaint about the unreasonable length of the proceedings concerning the applicant\u2019s disciplinary punishment 186.  On 3 December 2004 the applicant filed with the Lublin Court of Appeal via the Radom Regional Court a complaint under the 2004 Act alleging an unreasonable delay in the above-mentioned proceedings concerning the challenge to his disciplinary punishment. The complaint was rejected by the Radom Regional Court on 2 February 2005.\n(iv)  Conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention during his disciplinary punishment\n(\u03b1)  Description of the living conditions 187.  During his disciplinary punishment, from 24 November until 8 December 2004, the applicant was detained consecutively in cells nos. 305 and 306. In the applicant\u2019s submission, the temperature in the cells in question had dropped to 12 degrees Celsius. The windows were sealed with nails and could not be opened. The glass was painted white and did not let any light inside.\n(\u03b2)  Related penitentiary complaints 188.  On an unspecified date in December 2004 the applicant complained to the Radom Regional Court about, among other things, inadequate temperature, lighting and ventilation in his solitary cells. 189.  In an official letter of 27 December 2004 the Deputy Governor of Radom Remand Centre informed the Radom Regional Court that the temperature in the cells in question had been maintained by an automatic system at 20 degrees Celsius. The lighting and ventilation had met the required standards. The windows had not been nailed shut. 190.  On 30 December 2004 the penitentiary judge of the Radom Regional Court examined five complaints from the applicant, concerning, among other things, inadequate living conditions in his solitary cells.\nThe penitentiary court found that the temperature in the applicant\u2019s cells had been maintained automatically at 20 degrees Celsius. The heating system had been checked and the applicant had not complained. The lighting and ventilation had been adequate in both cells in question. The windows had not been sealed. When the applicant had complained that his bed was broken, he had been moved, without any delay, to cell no. 306.\nThe applicant\u2019s complaint about the conditions of his detention was therefore considered ill-founded.\n(\u03b3)  Civil action concerning the applicant\u2019s disciplinary punishment 191.  It appears that on 9 May 2005 the applicant brought a civil action under Article 417 of the Civil Code and numerous articles of the Convention. He claimed compensation on account of the alleged degrading and inhuman treatment resulting from the imposition and the conditions of his disciplinary punishment. 192.  On 30 March 2007 the Warsaw Regional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim. On 29 May 2008 the Warsaw Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. A cassation appeal against that judgment was available to the applicant under Polish law. It is unclear, however, whether he used the remedy.\n(e)  The applicant\u2019s detention in 2005 and 2006 193.  On 18 July 2005 the applicant came across prisoner W.S. in the Radom Remand Centre\u2019s yard but no incident was reported. 194.  The applicant had regular visits from his relatives and friends. Altogether fifty persons were authorised to apply for a visit in the remand centre. Many of them visited the applicant regularly. The Government submitted that it was impossible to establish who had actually visited the applicant at the material time. 195.  On 5 June 2006 and on an unspecified date the remand centre\u2019s governor refused to authorise the applicant\u2019s first cousin, P.W. and his former inmate, Z.W. to visit the applicant in the remand centre. It was considered that the persons in question were not related to the applicant and that one of them was a former detainee. The authorities also expressed the opinion that the list of people authorised to apply for a visit was long enough to allow the applicant sufficient contact with the outside world and to maintain his family ties. 196.  On 23 August and 11 October 2006 the Radom Regional Court upheld the governor\u2019s decisions.\n(f)  The applicant\u2019s civil action concerning his solitary confinement and restrictions on receiving visitors 197.  On 19 July 2005 the applicant brought a civil action against Radom Remand Centre, seeking compensation under Article 417 of the Civil Code for an alleged infringement of his personal rights. He claimed that, as a form of punishment for disseminating information about the ECHR, he was detained in isolation from other detainees. He also alleged a breach of Article 8 of the Convention in that: (1) the remand centre\u2019s authorities had not authorised visits from his brother, P.W. and his close friend, Z.W.; (2) his letters and telephone conversations were monitored and the numbers of people he called were registered; (3) for eighteen months there had been no supply of hot water in the remand centre; and (4) W.S., a convicted criminal with whom the applicant was in conflict, was detained in the same establishment, which put the applicant in constant danger. 198. On 7 May 2007 the Radom Regional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s action.\nA number of the applicant\u2019s fellow inmates and the remand centre\u2019s staff testified in the course of the civil proceedings. It was established that the applicant had been placed under a typical security regime for his own protection and at his own request. The regime was not aimed at the applicant\u2019s isolation from other detainees and had certainly not been imposed as a punishment for his active role in disseminating information about Convention prison standards and the ECHR. 199. The fact that the applicant had had his daily outdoor exercise alone had been an incidental result of the refusal of another special-regime detainee who had been scheduled to accompany the applicant to go outside. The remand centre\u2019s refusal to authorise the applicant to do sports together with other detainees in a gym or on an outdoor field was considered justified because such authorisation normally constituted a reward for prisoners\u2019 good behaviour, and the applicant had not earned such a reward. 200. The monitoring of the applicant\u2019s letters and telephone conversations was considered justified by the fact that the applicant, due to the nature of the offences of which he had been convicted and the opinions of prison wardens, had been classified by the Penitentiary Commission as a \u201cdangerous prisoner\u201d. 201. Lastly, it was established that the applicant had regular visits from his relatives and friends. Altogether fifty persons were authorised to apply for a visit in the remand centre. Therefore, the authorities\u2019 refusal to authorise additional two people, P.W. and Z.W., had been justified and had not caused the applicant any harm. 202.  The court concluded that all the actions undertaken by the remand centre\u2019s administration and staff had been lawful and justified by the need to protect the remand centre\u2019s internal order and to provide security to the applicant and his fellow inmates. 203. On 18 September 2007 the Lublin Court of Appeal upheld the first\u2011instance judgment.\nOn 15 February 2008 the applicant\u2019s lawyer informed him that there were no grounds for lodging a cassation appeal. 204.  The applicant was detained in this prison (301 km from his hometown) from 1 until 28 June 2004. At the material time, he was still classified as a \u201cprisoner posing a serious threat to society or to security of a prison\u201d and, accordingly, was detained under a high-security security regime.\nThe applicant did not make any specific submissions in respect of the conditions of his detention there.\nThe Government submitted that the applicant\u2019s cell had been under constant camera surveillance. The images from the area of the toilet annex were blurred.\nThe applicant had a one-hour period of an outdoor exercise and was subjected to a strip search each time he left and returned to his cell.\nThe applicant did not make any penitentiary complaints in relation to his detention in that facility. 205.  The applicant was detained in this prison (287 km from his hometown) from 8 until 24 April 2008. He did not make any specific submissions in respect of the conditions of his detention there. 206.  The applicant was detained in this prison (110 km from his hometown) from 1 July until 13 August 2009. He did not make any specific submissions in respect of the conditions of his detention there. 207.  The applicant was detained in this remand centre (290 km from his hometown) from 27 August until 4 September 2009. He did not make any specific submissions in respect of the conditions of his detention there. 208.  The applicant was detained in this prison (343 km from his hometown) from 4 until 24 September 2009. He did not make any specific submissions in respect of the conditions of his detention there. 209.  The applicant was detained in this prison (165 km from his hometown) from 12 February until 13 May 2010.\n(a)  Living conditions in the prison 210.  He did not make any specific submissions in respect of the living conditions during his detention there. He submitted, however, that he had been persecuted by the prison staff, who imposed disciplinary punishment on him on any pretext. Requests for the applicant\u2019s punishment were sent to the penitentiary court on 6, 13, 18, 19 and 20 April 2010.\n(b)  The applicant\u2019s disciplinary punishment 211.  On 6 January 2011 the applicant submitted information concerning his disciplinary punishment in Opole Lubelskie Prison. 212.  On 20 April 2010 a certain S. M., the Deputy Governor of Opole Lubelskie Prison imposed a disciplinary punishment on the applicant in the form of fourteen days\u2019 solitary confinement. 213.  The applicant appealed against that decision, arguing that the time\u2011limit for the punishment of the alleged offences, which had taken place on 22 March 2010, had expired. 214.  On 24 June 2010 the penitentiary court upheld the impugned decision, considering the applicant\u2019s calculation of the statutory time-limit inaccurate. The decision was served on the applicant on 9 July 2010. 215.  The applicant submitted to the Court that the measure had not been imposed in compliance with the law, because under Article 144 \u00a7 1 of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences, only a prison governor had the power to order detention in a solitary cell. 216.  The applicant was detained in this prison (220 km from his hometown) from 13 until 20 May 2010.\n(a)  The imposition of a high-security regime 217.  On 13 May 2010 the administration of Pi\u0144cz\u00f3w Prison requested that the applicant be classified as a prisoner posing a serious threat to society or to security of a prison on the following grounds: (1) the applicant had been convicted of murder with the use of arms and an attempted murder; (2) he had been previously classified as a special-type prisoner within the meaning of Article 88 \u00a7 3 of the Code; (3) in Opole Lubelskie Prison he had been gathering information about officers of Radom Remand Centre and had been inciting prisoners to rebellion; (5) he had received disciplinary punishments many times during his incarceration; (6) he seriously lacked moral character and was vexatious; (7) he had close links with the criminal world; and (8) prisoners looked up to him because of his leadership qualities and facility to dominate other people and the fact that he had become a self-declared speaker for prisoners\u2019 rights. 218.  On 13 May 2010 the Penitentiary Commission of Pi\u0144cz\u00f3w Prison, having heard the applicant and taken under consideration the reasons for the above-mentioned request, classified the applicant as a prisoner posing a serious threat to society and the security of the prison within the meaning of Article 88 \u00a7 3 of the Code. 219.  The applicant appealed, arguing that he had been behaving correctly and therefore, his classification as a high-security prisoner had been not fair. 220.  On 6 September 2010 the Kielce Regional Court examined the applicant\u2019s appeal under Article 7 \u00a7 1 of the Code as to the formal compliance of the impugned Commission\u2019s decision with the law and as to the alleged arbitrariness of its assessment of the applicant\u2019s character and his conduct.\nThe domestic court held that that the impugned decision had been given in compliance with the law and that the substantive grounds on which it was based, were fully confirmed by the material in the applicant\u2019s personal file, including documents, transcripts of the applicant\u2019s intercepted telephone conversations and information derived from the monitored correspondence of other prisoners. 221.  The applicant\u2019s special status was lifted in Tarn\u00f3w Prison on 9 August 2010 (see paragraph 230 below).\n(b)  The features of the regime 222.  The applicant was placed in solitary confinement. He was entitled to a one-hour long period of outdoor exercise every day. On three occasions, however, the applicant decided not to leave his cell. In the applicant\u2019s submission, the cell was like a dungeon, dark and not ventilated. 223.  In accordance with the special detention regime, the applicant had been monitored twenty-four hours per day via a short-circuit camera installed in the cell. The toilet was not separated from the cell\u2019s living area. The Government submitted that the recording system automatically blurred the applicant\u2019s private parts. 224.  The applicant had also been subjected to strip-searches each time he left and returned to his cell. In his submission, that was from two to eight times a day. In the Government\u2019s submission, the applicant had not left his cell as frequently as he had claimed. At the material time, he did not receive any visitors and did not wish to attend the culture and education activities which were available in prison. Depending on whether he decided to go to the outdoor yard, he spent 23 or 24 hours inside his cell. Consequently, he had not been subjected to personal checks as often as he had claimed.\nThe applicant maintained that during his personal checks, he had had to undress in the presence of several wardens. The Government did not contest this but submitted instead that the officers conducting the search had all been male and that no third parties had been present. 225.  The applicant also submitted that once a week on his way to and from the shower, he had been handcuffed and escorted by four wardens. Two of them watched the applicant in the shower.\n(c)  Related penitentiary complaints and criminal and civil proceedings 226.  It appears that the applicant made a number of penitentiary complaints in relation to his detention in Pi\u0144cz\u00f3w Prison under high\u2011security. 227.  On 1 July 2010 the Opole Lubelskie District Prosecutor decided to refuse to open an investigation into the applicant\u2019s allegations that the officers of Opole Lubelskie Prison had deliberately registered in the applicant\u2019s personal file false information about his attempts to organise prison rebellion, which in turn had led to his transfer to Pi\u0144cz\u00f3w Prison and his detention under a high-security regime in that facility. 228.  A vast material was gathered in the course of the preliminary criminal investigation. It included copies of reports of a prison psychologist, the applicant\u2019s supervisor, wardens and many other members of the staff and administration of Opole Lubelskie Prison who in the relevant time had examined and monitored the applicant\u2019s conduct and resocialisation progress and who interviewed and monitored his fellow-inmates. Copies of all these documents have also been submitted to the Court. The documents in question, without any exception, stated that the applicant had seriously lacked moral character, had been a trouble maker and had been inciting his fellow inmates to rebellion. The action was scheduled for 1 June 2010 and it was going to involve breaking of the plastic window blinds in all cells. 229.  In the light of the applicant\u2019s detention history, the prosecutor came to the conclusion that the above-mentioned material was credible. Consequently, recording the relevant information about the applicant\u2019s conduct in his personal file was not in breach of the rights and duties of the prison\u2019s officers. Similarly, the subsequent decision of the Penitentiary Commission of the Opole Lubelskie Prison on the applicant\u2019s transfer to Pi\u0144cz\u00f3w Prison had been dictated by justified fear that the applicant had posed a serious risk to the security of Opole Prison. 230.  The applicant was detained in this prison (300 km from his hometown) from, presumably, 20 May until an unspecified date prior to October 2010. His special detention regime was maintained until 9 August 2010. 231.  Under high-security regime, the applicant was detained in a solitary cell. In his submission, the cell in question was small and badly-lit and ventilated. 232.  The applicant was entitled to a daily one-hour long period of an outdoor exercise under surveillance. On two occasions he decided not to leave his cell. The Government submitted that from 20 May until 11 June 2010 the applicant had been entitled to attend culture and sports events organised in prison. Despite that, he had decided to remain in his cell.\nThe applicant could listen to a radio broadcast of a catholic mass and meet with a priest. 233.  The applicant\u2019s cell was under constant surveillance via a short\u2011circuit camera which, in the Government\u2019s submission, blurred his private parts. 234.  The applicant was subjected to strip searches each time he left and returned to his cell. In the Government\u2019s submission, the search had been conducted by one male officer. The applicant claimed that personal checks had been conducted from two to eight times per day, often inside his cell under the camera surveillance. 235.  During his detention in Tarn\u00f3w Prison, the applicant\u2019s mail and phone calls were monitored. In the applicant\u2019s submission, his family and friends\u2019 visits were restricted to two hours per month. 236.  The applicant submitted that on 20 May 2010 the wardens at Tarn\u00f3w Prison had taken away all his documents concerning his proceedings before the domestic courts and the ECHR and his own law books. On 28 June 2010 the applicant had been allowed for the first time to consult those documents and books in a separate room. He had been given 30 minutes to do so and was not allowed to take anything back to his cell. 237.  The applicant lodged penitentiary complaints and brought a civil action for compensation on account of inadequate conditions of his detention in Tarn\u00f3w Prison (no. I C 864/10). These proceedings are currently pending before the domestic court. 238.  The applicant was detained in that prison (150 km from his hometown) for an unspecified period.\n(a)  Living conditions in the prison 239.  The applicant submitted that he had been detained in overcrowded, badly-lit and unventilated cells. He had only one-hour outdoor exercise per day and no cultural or leisure activities were available. Food served in Czerwony B\u00f3r - \u0141om\u017ca Prison was of poor quality and low nutritional value. In September 2010 the applicant informed the Court that prisoners did not have access to hot water. 240.  The applicant also claimed to have been persecuted by the prison\u2019s administration. He claimed that the prison authorities had imposed a disciplinary punishment on him in order to \u201cbreak him\u201d and to discourage him from writing to the ECHR. 241.  He also submitted that: on 13 December 2010 he had been verbally and physically assaulted by a prison warden; on 20 December 2010 he had been assaulted by a certain A.C., a prison staff member, and on 7 January 2011 some of the applicant\u2019s personal belongings (such as toothpaste and other toiletries, writing paper, garbage bags, coffee and pork sausages) had been stolen or destroyed by a certain A.C., a prison warden.\n(b)  The applicant\u2019s disciplinary punishment 242.  On 31 January 2011 the applicant submitted information concerning his disciplinary punishment in Czerwony B\u00f3r - \u0141om\u017ca Prison. 243.  On 5 November 2010 a certain S. S., the Deputy Governor of Czerwony B\u00f3r - \u0141om\u017ca Prison imposed a disciplinary punishment on the applicant in the form of twenty-eight days\u2019 solitary confinement. The measure had been ordered after the applicant had insulted the deputy governor. 244.  The applicant appealed against that decision, arguing that his behaviour had not justified solitary confinement. The applicant also asked that the execution of the measure be put on hold pending the proceedings before the penitentiary court. 245.  By an order of 22 November 2010 a penitentiary judge of the \u0141om\u017ca Regional Court refused to postpone the execution of the disciplinary punishment. 246.  The applicant appealed against the order, arguing that his disciplinary punishment had not been ordered in compliance with the law, because under Article 144 \u00a7 1 of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences, only a prison governor had the power to order detention in a solitary cell. 247.  On 10 January 2011 the penitentiary court (\u0141om\u017ca Regional Court) upheld the impugned prison governor\u2019s decision of 5 November 2010, having established that the applicant had written a note in which he had gravely insulted the prison\u2019s deputy governor. 248.  In a separate decision of the same date the penitentiary court upheld the penitentiary judge\u2019s order of 22 November 2010. It was reiterated that according to the applicable provisions, disciplinary punishment should always be immediately enforced. Moreover, the court held that the wording \u201ca prison governor\u201d in Article 144 \u00a7 1 of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences should be interpreted as extending to a prison\u2019s deputy governor. The applicant\u2019s disciplinary punishment had therefore been ordered in compliance with the law. 249.  From an unspecified date the applicant was detained in Zamo\u015b\u0107 Prison (253 km from his hometown). He did not make any specific submissions in respect of the living conditions in the prison. 250.  It appears that the applicant was detained in that facility from an unspecified date prior to 5 March 2012 until an unspecified date prior to 2 July 2012.\nHe did not make any specific submissions in respect of the living conditions and the regime in this remand centre. 251.  Moreover, the applicant complained about the inconvenience of being frequently transferred between different prisons. He submitted that he should be detained in Warsaw Remand Centre because his family lived in that city. Instead, he had been sent to detention facilities across the whole country. Since 1996 the applicant had been transferred from one detention facility to another at least forty-four times. A number of his prisons were located as far as 300 km from his hometown.\nThat practice had caused the applicant and his family additional stress and suffering and effectively restricted contact with his relatives. 252.  The applicant and his family lodged with the relevant penitentiary authorities multiple complaints and applications for the applicant\u2019s definitive transfer to a prison close to his hometown. 253.  The applicant submitted that the domestic civil courts had not implemented the recent judgments of the ECHR delivered in the cases of Orchowski and Sikorski. Civil actions brought by prisoners, who alleged breaches of their personal rights on account of overcrowding and inadequate conditions of detention were always dismissed by the courts and the plaintiffs were ordered to bear the costs of the proceedings. The applicant claimed that the civil remedy was therefore illusory. 254.  To that effect the applicant submitted a copy of a letter sent to him on 15 May 2009 by the Deputy of the President of the Warsaw Regional Court (Wiceprezes S\u0105du Okr\u0119gowego). The letter stated that out of a total number of fifteen actions in tort, which had been brought by detainees against Warszawa Bia\u0142o\u0142\u0119ka Remand Centre, in fourteen judgments the court had dismissed the claims and in one judgment (of 17 December 2007) the plaintiff had been awarded compensation in the amount of PLN 10,000. 255.  The applicant submitted copies of a dozen other domestic court rulings in which the claims on account of overcrowding and inadequate conditions of detention had been dismissed. 256.  On 27 October 2002 when the applicant was detained in Warszawa Bia\u0142o\u0142\u0119ka Remand Centre, he was not allowed to cast his vote in the elections to municipal and district councils and provincial assemblies (wybory do rad gmin, rad powiat\u00f3w i sejmik\u00f3w wojew\u00f3dztw). He lodged numerous complaints in that connection. 257.  By the letter of a penitentiary judge of the Supreme Court of 7 November 2002 and a letter of the Warsaw Election Commissary (Komisasz Wyborczy) of 3 December 2002, the applicant was informed that he should have been allowed to cast his vote in the elections because on 23 October 2002 the remand centre\u2019s management had been officially notified that the ruling depriving the applicant of his civic rights had been quashed by the Supreme Court on 22 October 2002. The applicant was further informed that, following the Supreme Court\u2019s judgment, he should have immediately lodged a reclamation about the fact that his name was missing from the register of persons entitled to vote in the remand centre (reklamacja na nieprawid\u0142owo\u015bci w spisie wyborc\u00f3w). 258.  On 9 December 2002 the Warsaw District Prosecutor (Prokurator Rejonowy) refused to open a criminal investigation into the applicant\u2019s allegations of non-compliance by the staff of the Warszawa Bia\u0142o\u0142\u0119ka Remand Centre with their official duties (niedope\u0142nienie obowi\u0105zk\u00f3w s\u0142u\u017cbowych) in that on 27 October 2002 the applicant had not been allowed to participate in the local elections.", "references": ["6", "2", "4", "0", "7", "9", "3", "8", "5", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1995 and lives in Kaunas. He is a Ukrainian national and has lived in Lithuania since 2006. 7.  On the evening of 22 October 2011 the Panemun\u0117 Police Department of the Kaunas District received a call that a man had been robbed in the street by several young men in the neighbourhood close to the railway station. Several police cars were sent to the area in search of the suspected robbers. 8.  That same evening, shortly before midnight, the applicant was walking to see his girlfriend who lived in the same neighbourhood. At that time he was sixteen years old. He was approached by a police car in which there were three officers A.R., \u017d.S. and R.A. They asked the applicant to stop and take his hands out of his pockets. As the officers were getting out of the car, the applicant started running away from them. The officers informed other police patrols in the neighbourhood that they were chasing a young man who fitted the description of one of the suspected robbers. 9.  The applicant was apprehended by the police near a bus stop close to the railway station. Three police cars were present during his arrest:\n(a)  the first police patrol, which comprised officers O.K., R.V. and V.F.;\n(b)  the second police patrol, which comprised officers A.R., \u017d.S. and R.A.;\n(c)  officers of the operational division \u2013 driver T.S. and investigator L.L. 10.  The applicant was apprehended by T.S., who subsequently handed him over to A.R., \u017d.S. and R.A. He was handcuffed, put into a police car, and taken to the Panemun\u0117 police station, where a record of an administrative violation was drawn up, charging him with disobeying lawful orders of the police (see paragraph 16 below). 11.  The officers telephoned the applicant\u2019s mother R., and agreed that she would pick up the applicant from the railway station. Officers A.R., \u017d.S. and R.A. drove the applicant to the station and handed him over to his mother around 1 a.m. that same night. 12.  Subsequently the applicant and his mother, on the one hand, and the police officers, on the other, presented different accounts surrounding the applicant\u2019s arrest. 13.  Immediately after the arrest, A.R., \u017d.S. and R.A. all submitted identically worded reports to their superior:\n\u201cOn 22 October ... around 11.45 p.m. ... we noticed a suspicious young man who corresponded to the description of a youth who had recently fled from the police. After we addressed [him], he stopped; when we were getting out of the car to talk to him, he suddenly started to run. He did not respond to our order to stop ... Soon he was noticed ... close to the railway station ... and he was apprehended. Then he began kicking out, fell to the ground, and resisted being apprehended, so we warned him that physical coercion would be used. The young man ignored this and continued actively resisting and kicking out, so when detaining him we were forced to use physical coercion and restraining measures, namely a truncheon and handcuffs. The young man was arrested and taken to the Panemun\u0117 police station ...\u201d 14.  On 24 and 26 October 2011 the applicant\u2019s mother R. complained to the Kaunas District Police Department and the Kaunas City Prosecutor that her minor son had been beaten by police officers while being apprehended. She claimed that one of the officers had hit the applicant with a truncheon in the police car numerous times, and that afterwards his body had been covered in bruises and he had had difficulties walking. 15.  On 24 October 2011 the applicant was examined by a court medical expert. The report on the results of that examination, issued in November 2011, found several contusions on the applicant\u2019s body \u2013 both shoulders and upper arms, his chest, both thighs and calves and the left knee. It determined that the contusions had been caused by a hard blunt object of cylindrical shape, from eighteen or more blows (a\u0161tuoniolika ar daugiau traumini\u0173 poveiki\u0173). The report also found a tear injury (pl\u0117\u0161tin\u0117 \u017eaizda) on the applicant\u2019s left thumb caused by a hard blunt object, and bruised skin on his left wrist which could have resulted from handcuffing. It concluded that the injuries corresponded to negligible health impairment (ne\u017eymus sveikatos sutrikdymas) and that they could have occurred at the time and in the circumstances described by the applicant (see paragraph 14 above and paragraph 25 below). 16.  On 23 October 2011 the Panemun\u0117 Police Department drew up a record of an administrative violation against the applicant. He was accused of insulting police officers by using swear words and of disobeying their lawful orders, contrary to Article 187 \u00a7 2 of the Code of Administrative Violations. 17.  On 27 April 2012 the Kaunas District Court held an oral hearing. Police officers A.R., \u017d.S. and R.A. all testified that the applicant had run away from them and had not complied with their order to stop. They also stated that while being apprehended near the railway station the applicant had violently resisted, had been kicking out and shouting, and had thrown himself on the ground, as a result of which the police had had to use a truncheon and handcuffs against him. 18.  In the hearing the applicant admitted having run away from the officers because he had been afraid that they would beat him. However, he denied that he had resisted being apprehended near the railway station. The applicant\u2019s lawyer also pointed out that a medical examination had detected at least eighteen blows from a hard blunt object on the applicant\u2019s body (see paragraph 15 above) and argued that the police officers were lying in order to cover up the fact that they had beaten him. 19.  On 4 May 2012 the Kaunas District Court found the applicant guilty and fined him 150 Lithuanian litai (LTL, approximately 43 euros (EUR)). The court found no reason to doubt the credibility and impartiality of the police officers, and considered that their consistent testimonies proved that the applicant had violently resisted the police. 20.  On 11 July 2012 the Kaunas Regional Court upheld the judgment of the lower court. 21.  On 24 October 2011 the Head of the Panemun\u0117 Police Department instructed the officers of that department to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the applicant\u2019s allegations that he had been ill-treated by the police while being apprehended. 22.  The inquiry was conducted by an investigator of the Division of Crimes against the Civil Service and Public Interest of the Criminal Investigation Unit of the Kaunas District Police Department. As submitted by the Government, that division had been established for the specific purpose of investigating crimes allegedly committed by police officers. 23.  On 5 November 2011 A.R. was questioned as a witness. The written record of the interview repeated almost identically the wording of his initial report (see paragraph 13 above), and added:\n\u201cWe found out that [the applicant] was a minor only at the police station ... Had we known that earlier, we would not have used physical coercion and restraining measures against him ... At the time of the arrest, there was blood on [the applicant\u2019s] hand. I don\u2019t know how he hurt it. He didn\u2019t complain about anything, so we didn\u2019t take him to a doctor ... We delivered [the applicant] to his mother ... She began scolding her son and even thanked us for bringing him to her. She complained to us that she had problems with her son because he wasn\u2019t obeying her and was skipping school.\u201d\nOn the same day the officer \u017d.S. was also questioned as a witness and the written record of his interview was almost identical to that of A.R. 24.  On 8 November 2011 the investigator examined the jacket the applicant had been wearing during his arrest and found stains on the lower back of the jacket which were \u201cpossibly similar to old bloodstains\u201d (galimai pana\u0161ios \u012f seno kraujo \u017eymes). 25.  On 15 November 2011 the applicant was questioned as a witness and stated:\n\u201cOn 22 October 2011, around midnight I was walking ... I saw a police car ... it stopped, then one of the officers told me, \u201ctake your hands out of your pockets\u201d. I took my hands out of my pockets, then the officer got out of the car and walked towards me, then I started running away and the police car started chasing me ... I ended up near a bus stop close to the railway station and there I was arrested by the police. Two uniformed police officers got out of a car, one of them (the driver) asked me why I was out of breath. I said that I was trying to catch the trolleybus. [That officer] said through the portable radio, \u201cwe\u2019ve got one\u201d. Then two other officers in uniform arrived on foot; one of them had a shaved head. Soon another police car arrived in which there were two uniformed officers. I knew one of the officers, A.R., because he was my classmate\u2019s father. The officers who had come on foot approached me and the one with the shaved head told me that I would \u201cpay for running away from them\u201d (dabar a\u0161 gausiu, kad b\u0117gau nuo j\u0173), and with A.R. they swore at me ... Then A.R. handcuffed me behind my back and put me into a police car, in the back, and told me to sit there. Soon the officer with the shaved head got into the car and sat down in front of me. He took out a truncheon and began to hit me on various parts of the body. He hit me about fifteen times on the legs, about seventeen times on the arms, once on the back, once kicked me in the stomach, and once punched me in the face. I was made to lie down on the floor of the car and the officer with the shaved head told me to pray. I was praying and they were laughing at me. I also remember that on the way to the police station one of the officers told me that I would take the blame for somebody else\u2019s robbery. I said nothing. There were three officers in the car, one of them was A.R., the other was the one with the shaved head who was sitting next to me, and the third was about 172 cm tall; this one had a large build and short dark hair ...\nIn the police station A.R. took me to another room where he told me that if I didn\u2019t defend his daughter, next time it would be worse. I told him that I would defend his daughter so that nobody beat her. I gave them my mother\u2019s telephone number, and the officers called her and took me to her ... The officer with the shaved head handed me over to my mother and said \u201cI don\u2019t know how you will react but the officers have given him a little lesson to not run away from them the next time.\u201d 26.  On 22 November 2011 the investigator examined twenty-two photographs of the applicant which had been taken by his mother on 23, 25 and 29 October 2011. The investigator noted that injuries were visible on the applicant\u2019s forehead, arms and legs, upper chest and the left side of his back. Several of the photographs showed a shoe with stains similar to bloodstains. 27.  On 23 November 2011 A.R. was questioned again. The written record of the interview was almost identical to his previous statements (see paragraphs 13 and 23 above), and added:\n\u201c... I arrived at the place where [the applicant] had been apprehended ... He was actively resisting: he was kicking out and had fallen on the ground. After being asked to calm down and get into a police car, he continued disobeying those lawful orders and resisted being apprehended, he started biting, so he was warned that physical coercion would be used against him. The young man ignored this and continued actively resisting and kicking, so we were forced to use physical coercion in order to arrest him, namely combat wrestling methods (kovini\u0173 imtyni\u0173 veiksmai) and restraining measures, namely a truncheon and handcuffing him behind the back. While \u017d.S. and R.A. were arresting [the applicant], I took out handcuffs and got ready to put them on him. As I remember, the truncheon was used by \u017d.S. in order to arrest [the applicant] ... [The applicant] was acting aggressively and unpredictably. He was put in the back of the police car ... \u017d.S. was driving the car, I was sitting next to the driver, and R.A. was in the back with [the applicant]. We asked him why he had fled from the police. He said that he had been afraid. We asked why he had been afraid if he hadn\u2019t done anything, but he didn\u2019t respond. In the car [the applicant] was calm; no physical coercion or restraining measures were used against him there. We noticed that his finger was injured (bleeding) but he refused to be examined by doctors. He said that he had hurt his finger on the fence or in the bushes while running away from the police. His clothes were dirty and the jacket was torn. [The applicant] had dirtied his clothes and torn his jacket when running away from the police ...\nIn the police station, when [the applicant\u2019s] identity was established I realised that he was my daughter\u2019s classmate ... Then I said to him, \u201cGod forbid something happens to my daughter\u201d. I also said, \u201cI will defend my daughter\u201d. I can\u2019t remember my exact words, but I let it be known that he must not hurt my daughter. As far as I am aware, this young man is prone to doing such things. In the police station neither I nor other officers hit [the applicant] ... I did not use any swear words and did not humiliate him. I didn\u2019t see the other officers acting inappropriately in respect of [the applicant] either.\u201d 28.  The following day R.A. was questioned as a witness and the written record of his interview was almost identical to that of A.R. (see paragraph 27 above). However, he stated that A.R. had not discussed any personal matters with the applicant and that it did not seem as though A.R. and the applicant knew one another. 29.  On 24 November 2011 officer O.K. was questioned as a witness. He confirmed that on the night of 22 October 2011 he had been on duty together with officers R.V. and V.F. He further stated:\n\u201c... After we arrived near the railway station, I saw an arrested young man who was actively resisting arrest, purposely falling on the ground and kicking out at officers, so the officers warned him that if he didn\u2019t calm down physical coercion and restraining measures would be used against him. The young man continued behaving in an aggressive manner and actively resisting arrest, so officers used physical coercion, after which the young man was handcuffed and put into a police car ...\u201d 30.  On 28 November 2011 the investigator submitted a report to the Head of the Criminal Investigation Unit of the Kaunas District Police Department, suggesting that no pre-trial investigation should be opened. The investigator concluded that the use of physical force by the police officers had been a necessary and proportionate response to the applicant\u2019s violent resistance and aggressive behaviour.\nOn the same day the Head of the Criminal Investigation Unit approved the investigator\u2019s conclusion and decided not to open a pre-trial investigation. 31.  The applicant\u2019s mother appealed against that decision, asking for a pre-trial investigation to be opened and for it to be entrusted to an authority other than the police. On 19 December 2011 the Kaunas City Prosecutor partly upheld the appeal. The prosecutor opened a pre-trial investigation, noting that the medical examination of the applicant had shown numerous injuries, so it was necessary to assess whether the use of force by the police officers had been within the limits provided in the law (see \u201cRelevant domestic law\u201d below). However, the prosecutor refused to entrust the pre\u2011trial investigation to another authority, finding no reason to doubt the impartiality of the police investigator. 32.  On 2 February 2012 officer T.S. was questioned as a witness. He confirmed that on the night of 22 October 2011 he had been on duty with officer L.L., and that following information that a young man had fled from the officers towards the railway station, they had driven there in the police car. T.S. further stated:\n\u201cI drove the police car towards the said young man and asked him to come closer, which he did. He was breathing hard, and, I saw that one of his hands was bleeding ... Soon afterwards three officers arrived on foot and one or two cars arrived ... In order to prevent the young man from fleeing, I held him by one sleeve. When he saw the approaching officers, he began to squirm and tried to get away ... After he was handed over to the officers, I saw that he was actively resisting arrest with his legs and arms, he was squirming and he fell on the ground with full force, making it more difficult to arrest him. The officers, using force, took him to the police car ... I didn\u2019t see the officers hit the young man or use any restraining measures such as handcuffs or a truncheon. As I remember, he was taken to the car by possibly two officers, I don\u2019t remember exactly because around six officers were present at the scene. Soon afterwards L.L. and I left and I didn\u2019t see anything else.\u201d 33.  On 10 July 2012 the applicant\u2019s mother submitted a request to the Kaunas City Prosecutor for the investigation to be transferred to the prosecutor\u2019s office on the grounds that the Kaunas police officers could not be considered impartial. She also asked for several investigative actions, such as interviews with her and with the applicant, and for the officers who had allegedly ill-treated the applicant to be identified.\nThe following day the Kaunas City Prosecutor dismissed the request for the investigation to be transferred to the prosecutor\u2019s office, finding no grounds to doubt the impartiality of the police investigator. However, the prosecutor instructed the investigator to carry out the actions requested by the applicant\u2019s mother.\nIt appears that the applicant\u2019s mother did not appeal against that decision. 34.  On 30 July 2012 officer R.V. was questioned as a witness. He confirmed that on the night of 22 October 2011 he had been on duty together with officers O.K. and V.F. He stated that when they had arrived at the railway station the applicant had already been put into the police car. R.V. stated that he did not see how the applicant was put into the car, nor did he see the officers using any coercive or restraining measures against him.\nOn 31 July 2012 officer V.F. was questioned as a witness; the written record of his interview was almost identical to that of R.V. 35.  On 3 August 2012 the applicant\u2019s mother R. was questioned as a witness. She stated that around 1 a.m. on 23 October 2011 police officers had delivered the applicant to her near the railway station. She stated:\n\u201cWhen [the applicant] got out of the police car, he was limping on one leg ... The officers explained to me that they had caught him ... and that he fitted the description of a robber. When my son approached me, I began scolding him, but the officer \u017d.S. told me, \u201cdon\u2019t scold him, we already gave him a good lesson about running away from the police\u201d ... A.R. asked me, \u201cis there a father or are you raising him alone?\u201d, and then said, \u201cthat\u2019s why they grow up like this\u201d. My son and I then left. Around 3 a.m. that night, when we were eating in the trolleybus, my son undressed and I saw that his body was covered in bruises ... My son told me that one of the officers (the one with the shaven head) had beaten him up. As I know now, that was \u017d.S.\u201d. 36.  That same day the applicant was granted victim status and further questioned. He stated that he had initially run away from the police officers because it was dark and he had been afraid that they would beat him up. However, when he reached the railway station he was no longer afraid because the area was well lit and there were other people nearby. The applicant added:\n\u201cOne of the officers who had come on foot \u2013 the one with the shaved head, as I know now it was \u017d.S. \u2013 swore at me in Russian, from which I understood that I would be beaten up for running away. Officer A.R., who is my classmate\u2019s father, handcuffed me behind my back, put me in the back of a police car and closed the door. \u017d.S. came from the other side of the car, opened the door and sat down next to me; he took out a truncheon and started hitting me on various parts of my body, except for the head. He hit me around fifty times. No other officers were in the car at that time. Then \u017d.S. got out of the car, talked to the officers and got back in the car, in the driver\u2019s seat. A.R. sat next to the driver and the third officer sat next to me ...\nAt the police station ... A.R. approached me and said, \u201cnow I will show you\u201d. I asked, \u201cwhy, I don\u2019t bother your daughter, I don\u2019t even talk to her\u201d. A.R. led me behind a wall, put an electroshock device on the left side of my stomach and threatened to use it if I didn\u2019t defend his daughter from my friends; he also said that if he caught me one more time, he would beat me even more. I agreed to defend his daughter ...\nI want to add that I injured my left thumb while running away from the officers and it was bleeding; that\u2019s why there were bloodstains on my jacket at the spot where my hands were handcuffed. The officers did not provide me with the first aid. All the blows were struck by one officer, \u017d.S. I was beaten only in the police car; nobody beat me at the police station ... I suffered physical injuries due to the beating.\u201d\nThe applicant denied having resisted the police officers or having sworn at them. He also said that he had fallen down while running towards the railway station but not while being apprehended. 37.  In September 2012 a court medical expert carried out an additional examination of the applicant\u2019s medical file. The report on the results of that examination confirmed the findings of the previous medical report (see paragraph 15 above). It also specified that the applicant\u2019s injuries were not likely to have been caused by falling down (su\u017ealojim\u0173 visuma griuvimui neb\u016bdinga), nor by punching or kicking, but that they had most likely been caused by a hard blunt object of a cylindrical shape. 38.  On 5 October 2012 confrontations were arranged between the applicant and each of the officers A.R., \u017d.S. and R.A. separately. All the officers repeated their earlier statements (see paragraphs 13, 23, 27 and 28 above) and the applicant denied them. A.R. confirmed that he had handcuffed the applicant. The officers stated that none of them had used any swear words or threats to the applicant. Meanwhile the applicant insisted that he had not resisted the officers and that he had not been warned about the possible use of restraining measures. He also denied falling to the ground while being apprehended near the railway station. 39.  That same day a confrontation was arranged between the applicant and O.K. The officer stated that when he had arrived at the railway station the applicant was already in handcuffs and he was squirming but not actively resisting. He could not remember which officers had put the applicant into the police car.\nDuring a subsequent interview on 8 October 2012 O.K. retracted the statement he had made in his first interview, in which he had said that he had seen the applicant actively resisting the officers (see paragraph 29 above). O.K. stated that he had been mistaken and that his statements made during the confrontation were the correct ones. 40.  On 12 December 2012 the Kaunas City Prosecutor discontinued the pre-trial investigation. The prosecutor held that physical force had been used against the applicant only to the extent that was strictly necessary to arrest him, and that the applicant\u2019s allegations that he had been beaten up in the police car with a truncheon had not been proven. The Kaunas City Prosecutor also considered that the officers A.R., \u017d.S. and R.A. could not have known at the time of the arrest that the applicant was a minor. The prosecutor concluded that the mere fact that the applicant had sustained injuries was insufficient to find that the police officers had acted unlawfully. 41.  On 18 March 2013 the Kaunas District Court upheld the prosecutor\u2019s decision. The court concluded that there was no \u201cobjective and indisputable evidence\u201d that the police officers had exceeded their legal powers. It also referred to the earlier court judgments which had found the applicant guilty of an administrative violation (see paragraphs 19-20 above), concluding that the officers had had the right to use physical coercion in response to the applicant\u2019s resistance. The court also considered that the pre-trial investigation had been thorough and comprehensive.\nOn 11 April 2013 the Kaunas Regional Court upheld that judgment. 42.  Subsequently the applicant\u2019s mother requested the reopening of the investigation, but her request was dismissed on the grounds that there were no relevant new circumstances.", "references": ["3", "7", "9", "6", "5", "2", "0", "8", "4", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1958 and lives in Prague. 6.  The applicant claims to have been living in Prague since 18 November 2000, when the Czech authorities granted him a visa for an extended stay (a long-term residence permit). On 18 February 2008 the applicant was granted the right to reside permanently in the Czech Republic (a permanent residence permit). However, he did not de-register his domicile (prebivali\u0161te) in Croatia. 7.  On 5 June 2008 the applicant bought a car (a Mercedes S 350 L) in Germany and on 10 June 2008 he registered it in the Czech Republic in his name. 8.  On 11 June 2008 the applicant entered Croatia in his car. He claimed that the purpose of his visit was, inter alia, to de-register his domicile in Croatia. 9.  On 15 June 2008 the applicant was stopped by the police in Zagreb while driving his car. The police authorities, finding it suspicious that a Croatian national was driving a car with foreign licence plates, impounded the car and reported the matter to the Customs Administration, suspecting that the car had been imported into Croatia without payment of the relevant taxes and that an administrative offence had thus been committed. 10.  On 17 June 2008 the applicant de-registered his domicile in Croatia. 11. On 15 September 2008 the applicant re-registered his domicile in Croatia. 12.  Meanwhile, on 16 June 2008 the Customs Administration of the Ministry of Finance had instituted administrative proceedings (upravni postupak) with a view to establishing whether the applicant was liable to pay taxes on the importation of his vehicle and if so, in what amount. On the same day the Customs Administration had issued a decision impounding the applicant\u2019s car, against which the applicant did not appeal. 13.  On 11 December 2008 the Customs Administration issued a decision ordering the applicant to pay, by 30 December 2008, the customs debt (consisting of the VAT and the special tax on motor vehicles) owed on the importation of his car, which amounted to 527,747.08 Croatian kunas (HRK).[1] 14.  The applicant did not appeal against that decision, which thus became final and enforceable on 3 January 2009. 15.  Since the applicant did not pay the above sum, on 23 February 2009 the Customs Administration instituted administrative enforcement proceedings and issued a decision confiscating his car and ordering its sale with a view to collecting the above-mentioned customs debt. 16.  By a decision of 5 June 2009 the Ministry of Finance, as the second-instance administrative authority, dismissed an appeal by the applicant and upheld the first-instance decision of 23 February 2009. 17.  On 6 October 2009 the applicant brought an action in the Administrative Court (Upravni sud Republike Hrvatske). 18.  On 9 May 2012 that court, which in the meantime had become the High Administrative Court (Visoki upravni sud Republike Hrvatske), dismissed the applicant\u2019s action. 19.  In the meantime, on 17 July 2008 the Customs Administration had also instituted administrative offence proceedings (prekr\u0161ajni postupak) against the applicant for importing his car into Croatia without paying the relevant taxes. 20.  On 31 July 2008 the Customs Administration found the applicant guilty of committing an administrative offence under section 241(1) subparagraph 10 of the Customs Act (see paragraph 29 below), and fined him HRK 5,000[2]. The Customs Administration found that the applicant had had his domicile in Croatia at the time of the commission of the offence. Therefore, it was irrelevant that he did not pay income tax in Croatia, that he had health insurance in the Czech Republic and not in Croatia, and that he had been granted the right to reside permanently in the Czech Republic. By having his domicile in Croatia he failed to satisfy the conditions for exemption from payment of customs duties set forth in Article 5 of Annex C to the Convention on Temporary Admission (\u201cthe Istanbul Convention\u201d), which stated that the registered owner of a vehicle registered abroad must, in order to qualify for exemption, have his domicile outside the territory of the State into which the vehicle was being brought (see paragraph 45 below). 21.  On 8 September 2008 the High Court for Administrative Offences (Visoki prekr\u0161ajni sud Republike Hrvatske) quashed the first-instance decision on account of incomplete facts, and remitted the case to the Customs Administration. The relevant part of that decision reads as follows:\n\u201c[The Customs Administration] states, as the decisive reason for its decision to find the accused guilty, that [he] has his domicile in ... Croatia, at [an] address in Zagreb, ..., and that the fact that he possesses a residence permit, that is, a valid visa, of the Czech Republic, is not sufficient evidence for the accused to be entitled to import [his] vehicle with total exemption from customs duties under the Convention on Temporary Admission.\nHowever, it is precisely such explanation of the contested decision that, along with the other elements in the case file, shows that the taking of evidence was flawed, that [the Customs Administration] did not give [sufficient] reasons for the decisive facts on which it based its decision, and that they [that is, those facts and the reasons given] are in strong contradiction with each other. [In particular, the Customs Administration] while acknowledging the fact that [the accused] possesses a residence permit, that is, a visa, of the Czech Republic, further gives as reasons [to support the finding] that the accused has a domicile in ... Croatia, that he is not a taxpayer in ... Croatia, and that he is not even insured with the Croatian Health Insurance Fund.\n....\n... [D]uring the first-instance proceedings [before the Customs Administration] the accused stated circumstances and furnished evidence which, in his view, suggested that he had not committed the offence of which he was accused. [The Customs Administration therefore] needed to examine the evidence more thoroughly with a view to establishing the [relevant] facts completely and correctly.\n...\nThis court considers that what is missing in the present case are the reasons for not accepting the status of the accused in the Czech Republic, the explanation of where the accused actually lives [resides] and, consequently, a clear conclusion as to whether or not he satisfied the conditions set out in Article 5 of Annex C of the Convention on Temporary Admission ....\u201d 22.  In the resumed proceedings, by a decision of 9 October 2008 the Customs Administration again found the applicant guilty of committing the same administrative offence and fined him HRK 5,000. The Customs Administration again found that at the time of the commission of the offence the applicant had had his domicile in Croatia according to the Domicile and Residence of Citizens Act (see paragraph 32 below) and thus did not satisfy the conditions for exemption from payment of customs duties set forth in Article 5 of Annex C to the Istanbul Convention (see paragraph 45 below). Therefore, the fact that the applicant resided in the Czech Republic was of no relevance as he had not proved that he had his domicile there. The relevant part of that decision reads as follows:\n\u201cAfter having examined the evidence ..., this authority finds that the accused, Miljenko \u017daja, committed the customs-related administrative offence he was charged with, defined in section 241(1) subparagraph 10 of the Customs Act.\nSection 241(1) subparagraph 10 [of the Customs Act] provides that a fine for an administrative offence is to be imposed on a person who treats goods as if they satisfy the conditions for temporary admission, and that conduct is contrary to the conditions for the temporary admission of goods set forth in the Customs Act or in the [Istanbul] Convention.\nIn the proceedings it was established beyond doubt that on 15 June 2008 the accused was found operating the vehicle in question with foreign licence plates of the Czech Republic on the territory of Croatia as if he satisfied the conditions for temporary admission, and that conduct was contrary to the conditions for temporary admission of goods set forth in the Customs Act or in the [Istanbul] Convention because he was a Croatian national who at the time of the commission of the offence had his domicile in Croatia.\nThe rights and obligations of participants in customs proceedings and the powers of the customs authorities as regards means of transport imported by natural persons into Croatian customs territory are regulated by the provisions of the [Istanbul] Convention. Likewise, customs proceedings and supervision of means of transport with foreign licence plates in the Croatian customs territory is regulated by the provisions of the Customs Act and the Decree on the implementation of the Customs Act.\nIt is established beyond dispute that the accused is a Croatian national who at the time of ... the offence had his domicile in ... Croatia. His defence that he had a registered residence in the Czech Republic was not accepted as a ground for exemption from liability ... Namely, the mere fact that he possesses a residence permit is not a proof that would entitle him to import [his] car with total relief from payment of customs duties under the Convention on Temporary Admission because he does not have his domicile abroad.\nThis is so because the procedure for temporary admission of private means of transport is regulated by Article 5 of Annex C to the [Istanbul] Convention in such a way that means of transport for private use must be registered in a territory other than that of temporary admission in the name of a person having a seat or domicile outside the territory of temporary admission and be imported and used by persons residing in that territory.\nAs regards his personal status, it has been established beyond doubt that the accused is a Croatian national, and that until 17 May 2008 he had [his] domicile in Croatia, in Zagreb. Furthermore, after the accused was reported as having committed the administrative offence, he de-registered his domicile in Zagreb \u2013 in this authority\u2019s view \u2013 merely to avoid liability for the offence. At the time of the commission of the offence the accused did not satisfy the conditions for temporary importation with total relief and [was thus not entitled to] operate a vehicle with foreign licence plates. Namely, [Article 5 of] Annex C to the [Istanbul] Convention expressly provides that the right to temporary importation belongs to persons who have domicile outside the territory of temporary admission, that is, outside Croatia.\nThis authority has examined the argument of the accused that he is not a taxpayer in Croatia, which is evident from the certificate of 23 June 2008 issued by the Tax Administration, as well as the evidence [to the effect] that he is neither insured with the Croatian Health Insurance Fund nor has social security [cover] in Croatia. However, that evidence cannot lead to the adoption of a different decision, because the fact of [having or not] health insurance or social security is not evidence of domicile abroad.\nThis authority has also taken into account the fact that the accused had health insurance in the Czech Republic as of 3 October 2007. However, having [health] insurance is itself not relevant for the adoption of a different decision because the fact of [possessing] insurance, which according to the accused\u2019s own statement is voluntary, does not give [him] the right to temporary admission of the vehicle in question with total relief.\nOn the basis of these findings of fact, and in accordance with the foregoing provisions, this authority has established beyond doubt that the accused did not satisfy the conditions for temporary admission, and that, by handling the vehicle in question contrary to [those] conditions, he committed the administrative offence defined in section 241(1) subparagraph 10 of the Customs Act.\nThis authority has [also] examined the argument of the accused that he is registered in the Czech Republic [as an alien] for an extended stay, of which he submitted evidence [in the form of] a certificate [issued] by the Police of the Czech Republic. However, that evidence does not prove his domicile abroad, but only his stay. What is more, at the hearing held on 30 September 2008 the accused himself stated only the fact of his residence in the Czech Republic, which confirms that at the time of the commission of the offence he did not satisfy the conditions for the temporary admission of vehicles with total relief, in accordance with Annex C to the [Istanbul] Convention.\nIn particular, it is beyond doubt that at the time of the commission of the offence the accused had his domicile in Croatia. Section 2 of the Domicile and Residence of Citizens Act provides that a citizen\u2019s domicile is the place where he has settled with the intention of permanently living there, and in which he has permanent accommodation secured.\nThe solemn statement of the commercial company [ERC] of 13 August 2008 stating that it would provide accommodation for Miljenko \u017daja as of 1 January 2008 was also examined in the proceedings. However, [that statement] is not decisive for exempting [the accused] from liability because it was issued after this authority adopted its [first] decision of 31 July 2008 and because the statement in question does not give him the right to temporary admission with total relief.\nThe statement given by P.\u0106. (before a notary public on 22 September 2008), which was also examined during the proceedings, is illogical and contrary to [both] the statement of Miljenko \u017daja and the solemn statement of 13 August 2008 in that it suggests that the flat [in Prague in which the applicant claimed to be living] was rented to P.\u0106., and not to the accused, whereas the solemn statement of ERC of 13 August 2008 suggested that it provided Miljenko \u017daja with accommodation at the address [in Prague]. After examining that evidence, this authority considers that it was obtained with a view to proving that the accused had rented accommodation to live in abroad.\nMoreover, the evidence of the accused that his wife is a director of company PZM in Prague is not relevant either, because in his statement of 22 July 2008 he stated that his wife lived in Zagreb and had her business in Croatia.\nThis authority does not dispute the fact that the accused is disabled, with a degree of disability of 100%, of which he submitted as evidence a membership card [issued by an association of disabled persons] in his name indicating his domicile [as being] in Zagreb ...\nIn the proceedings all the evidence furnished by the accused was examined. However, by that evidence the accused did not prove that he had been living abroad.\nFrom all the evidence it is apparent that at the time of the commission of the offence the accused was a Croatian national who had his domicile in Croatia, with all the rights and obligations attached to that. The accused could not pose in Croatia as a person having domicile abroad and enjoy the rights of [such] a person in [his own] country, where until 17 June 2008 he had his domicile. Therefore, the accused did not satisfy the conditions for the temporary admission of a foreign car to the territory of the Republic of Croatia with total relief under Annex C [to the Istanbul Convention] and the Decree on the implementation of the Customs Act because his domicile was in Croatia at the time of the commission of the offence.\nIn the light of the foregoing, this authority has adopted a decision finding the accused guilty, as stated in the operative provisions.\u201d 23.  By a decision of 29 October 2008 the High Court for Administrative Offences dismissed an appeal by the applicant and upheld the first-instance decision, endorsing the reasons given therein. The relevant part of that decision reads as follows:\n\u201cAgainst the first-instance decision the accused ... lodged ... an appeal on the grounds of breaches of procedure, incomplete and incorrect findings of fact, misapplication of the substantive law, and a wrong decision on the sanction. In the appeal the accused essentially argues ... that he has proved that at the time of entry into the Republic of Croatia he satisfied all statutory requirements for legally entering [Croatia] with the car in question, that the first-instance authority called into question the validity of the visa of the Czech Republic, where he was [first] granted an extended stay, and from 18 February 2008 the right to reside permanently, [and] that he uses the flat in Prague without restrictions. He therefore considers that there are no legal grounds or evidence for a finding that he committed the administrative offence in question.\n...\nThe appeal is unfounded.\n...\nThe accused unjustifiably denies liability for the administrative offence committed, because the first-instance authority[,] ... on the basis of his statement given at the hearing of 30 September 2008 and ... the written evidence[,] ... correctly concluded that his conduct had all the elements of the administrative offence defined in section 241(1) subparagraph 10 of the Customs Act. [The accused] was on 15 June 2008 in Zagreb found operating a Mercedes Benz vehicle ... with foreign licence plates of the Czech Republic as if he satisfied the conditions for temporary admission, and that conduct was contrary to the conditions for temporary admission of goods given that at the time of the commission of the offence he had his domicile in Croatia. Since that conduct was contrary to the conditions for temporary admission of goods set forth in the Customs Act and the [Istanbul] Convention, he committed the administrative offence defined in section 210(1) subparagraph 10 of the Customs Act.\n...\nThe other appellate arguments are also unfounded because the ... Customs Administration ... correctly and accurately established the [relevant] facts ... and correctly applied the substantive law...\nIn particular, special conditions for the temporary importation of means of transport are prescribed in Article 5 of Annex C to the Convention on Temporary Admission in Chapter III, where subparagraph (b) provides that means of transport for private use must be registered in a territory other than that of temporary admission, in the name of a person having seat or domicile in a territory other than that of temporary admission, and [must] be imported and used by persons having domicile in such a territory. The Domicile and Residence of Citizens Act in its section 2 provides that domicile is the place where a citizen has settled with the intention of permanently living there.\nTherefore, given that during the [first-instance] proceedings the decisive fact that the accused is a Croatian national who at the time of the commission of the offence had his domicile in the territory of the Republic of Croatia was established beyond doubt, he did not satisfy the conditions for temporary admission of a foreign car to the territory of the Republic of Croatia set out in the above-cited provisions of the Annex to the Convention on Temporary Admission.\n[This court] therefore upholds as correct in its entirety the decision of the first-instance authority ... whereby the accused was found guilty and sanctioned for the administrative offence defined in section 210(1) subparagraph 10 of the Customs Act ...\u201d 24.  The applicant then, on 12 November 2008, lodged a constitutional complaint against the second-instance decision, alleging violations of his constitutional rights to fair proceedings, equality before the law and equality before the courts and other public authorities. In so doing he relied on Article 14 paragraph 2, Article 26 and Article 29 paragraph 1 of the Croatian Constitution (see paragraph 26 below). He argued that the High Court for Administrative Offences had misinterpreted the text of Article 5 of Annex C to the Istanbul Convention, which in the official text did not refer to \u201cdomicile\u201d but to \u201cliving\u201d abroad. Therefore, the fact that while living in Prague he had kept his domicile in Croatia was not relevant. The applicant further argued that the meaning given to certain legal terms in domestic legislation could not be relied on in interpreting the same or similar terms used in international agreements. In particular, the applicant argued as follows:\n\u201cIn the decision [of 29 October 2008] the High Court for Administrative Offences totally wrongly quoted the text of Article 5 subparagraph (b) ... of Annex [C] to the Convention on Temporary Admission by stating [that it] \u2018provides that means of transport for private use must be registered in a territory other than that of temporary admission, in the name of a person having seat or domicile in a territory other than that of temporary admission, and [must] be imported and used by persons having domicile in such a territory\u2019 [emphasis added].\nHowever, the text Article 5 subparagraph (b) ... of Annex [C] to the Convention on Temporary Admission published in the Official Gazette [\u2013 International agreements] no. 16/98 is completely different and reads:\n\u2018... means of transport for private use must be registered in a territory other than that of temporary admission, in the name of a person having seat or domicile in a territory other than that of temporary admission, and [must] be imported and used by persons living in such a territory\u2019 [emphasis added].\nThe obvious difference between [the two texts] is that the High Court for Administrative Offences refers to [having] domicile in the territory of another State as a condition for using a foreign car whereas the text of the Convention [on Temporary Admission] ... refers to ... living in the territory of another State, which is legally not the same.\nBesides, the fact of living in the territory of another State, that is, in the State from which the disputed car originates, cannot be assessed in accordance with Croatian laws, and especially not in the way [the High Court for Administrative Offences] did it, but in accordance with the Convention [on Temporary Admission] itself and the Decree on the implementation of the Customs Act, .... [T]hat fact of living in the territory of another State is to be proved by work or residence permit.\n... all customs offices in Croatia have, upon a citizen\u2019s entry into [Croatia] by car, been establishing the fact of living in another State by checking only work or residence permit.\nIt is evident that in the instant case [the authorities] departed from the relevant law and the established practice ... by deliberately misquoting the relevant provisions with a view to creating conditions for the complainant\u2019s conviction at all costs.\n...\n[T]he complainant proved beyond doubt, by presenting a valid visa for an extended stay, the contract on the use of a flat and a social security certificate, that he has de jure and de facto been living in the Czech Republic, and that he had legally bought the car in accordance with the Czech laws. [It follows that] the complainant perfectly legally entered Croatia in accordance with Article 5 subparagraph (b) ... of [Annex C to] the Convention on Temporary Admission, and that by so doing he did not commit a customs offence defined in section 241(1) subparagraph 10 of the Customs Act. In any event, the customs office [in question] would not have allowed the complainant to enter the territory of Croatia if he did not satisfy the said conditions.\nIt is totally unclear why the complainant should, as stated in the first-instance decision, pay any customs debt [in the situation] where he did not ask for customs clearance but only temporary admission. If the customs authorities considered that temporary admission was not allowed then they could have ordered that the car be exported from Croatia ... at the expense of the complainant.\nThe above described proceedings are certainly a chicanery for the reasons as stated and at the same time constitute a dangerous precedent for all other citizens of Croatia ...\nIf such proceedings would apply to all Croatian nationals operating cars with foreign licence plates, only a few [such] cars daily could enter Croatia. Besides, if that view of the lower judicial and other authorities on the [interpretation of the relevant] substantive law is to be accepted, not a single one of hundreds of thousands of Croatian citizens temporarily working in Germany, Italy or Switzerland could enter Croatia because they all legally have domicile in Croatia. [In this way] several thousands of cars should be confiscated every year, especially from citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina having double nationality who enter Croatia on a daily basis.\nIn particular, the [contested] decisions infringed the right to impartial and fair proceedings guaranteed by Article 29 of the Croatian Constitution because for the reasons set out above those decisions are certainly neither fair nor impartial. On the contrary, they are absolutely biased and blatantly unfair.\nThe decision to prosecute only the complainant and not hundreds of thousands of others certainly constitutes a violation of Article 14 paragraph 2 of the Constitution whereby equality before the law is guaranteed to the complainant, and also of Article 26 of the Constitution which guarantees equality of all Croatian citizens before courts and other State authorities.\u201d 25.  By a decision of 8 April 2009 the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) dismissed the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint, finding that the contested decisions were based on a \u201cconstitutionally acceptable interpretation and application of the relevant substantive law\u201d. The Constitutional Court\u2019s decision was served on the applicant\u2019s representative on 22 April 2009. It reads as follows:\n\u201c5. According to section 241(1) subparagraph 10 of the Customs Act a ... natural person shall be liable for an administrative offence if he or she handles [the] goods as if they satisfy the conditions for temporary admission, and that conduct is contrary to the conditions for temporary admission of goods set forth in the Customs Act or in the Convention on Temporary Admission,\nConvention on Temporary Admission, Annex C, Article 5 subparagraph (b) provides as follows:\n(b) means of transport for private use must be registered in a territory other than that of temporary admission, in the name of a person having seat or domicile in a territory other than that of temporary admission, and be imported and used by persons living in such a territory.\nHaving regard to the cited provisions of the Customs Act and Article 5 subparagraph (b) of the Annex C to the Convention on Temporary Admission, as well as the facts established in the proceedings ... (in particular the fact that it was established ... that at the time of the commission of the offence the complainant had registered domicile in Croatia in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Domicile and Residence of Citizens Act), the Constitutional Court finds that the legal views expressed in the contested decisions are based on a constitutionally acceptable interpretation and application of the relevant substantive law. The Constitutional Court considers that the relevant administrative authority and the High Court for Administrative Offences, relying on the facts established in the proceedings, gave reasons for their views expressed in the contested decisions, which undoubtedly do not result from an arbitrary interpretation and application of the relevant substantive law.\nThe Constitutional Court therefore finds that the complainant\u2019s right to equality before the law guaranteed by Article 14 paragraph 2 of the Constitution was not violated by the contested decisions. 6. Article 29 paragraph 1 of the Constitution provides as follows:\nEveryone has the right that an independent and impartial court established by law decides fairly and within a reasonable time on his rights or obligations, or as regards suspicion or accusation of a criminal offence.\n[In the present case] the administrative and judicial authorities acted within their jurisdiction established by law. It is evident from the case-file that the first-instance administrative authority took evidence in accordance with the Administrative Offences Act and that the High Court for Administrative Offences decided on the complainant\u2019s appeal on the merits. It is also evident that the complainant had an opportunity to follow and participate in the proceedings, and that he could undertake all permitted procedural actions and lodge a remedy. The contested decisions are sufficiently reasoned and adopted in accordance with the relevant procedural rules.\nFor these reasons, the [Constitutional] Court finds that the contested decisions did not violate the complainant\u2019s constitutional right to fair proceedings.\nAs regards the complainant\u2019s argument that in similar cases the relevant authorities proceed differently, that in itself does not mean that the complainant\u2019s constitutional right was violated by the contested decisions. In the [Constitutional] Court\u2019s view, in the proceedings [complained of] the contested decisions were adopted in accordance with the relevant legislation. [T]herefore the fact that different decisions may have been adopted in other proceedings is of no relevance for the lawfulness of the decisions contested before the Constitutional Court in these proceedings, nor can it lead to a different decision in this particular case. 26.  The relevant part of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia (Ustav Republike Hrvatske, Official Gazette no. 56/90 with subsequent amendments) provides as follows:\nArticle 14(2)\n\u201cEveryone shall be equal before the law.\u201d\nArticle 26\n\u201cEvery citizen of the Republic of Croatia and [every] foreigner shall be equal before the courts and other State or public authorities.\u201d\nArticle 29(1)\n\u201cEveryone has the right that an independent and impartial court established by law decides fairly and within a reasonable time on his rights or obligations, or as regards suspicion or accusation of a criminal offence.\u201d\nArticle 31(1)\n\u201cNo one shall be punished for an act which, before it was committed, was not defined as a criminal offence by a statute or international law ...\u201d\nArticle 134\n\u201cInternational agreements in force which have been concluded and ratified in accordance with the Constitution and made public shall be part of the internal legal order of the Republic of Croatia and shall have precedence over the [domestic] statutes. ...\u201d 27.  The relevant part of the 1999 Constitutional Act on the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia (Ustavni zakon o Ustavnom sudu Republike Hrvatske, Official Gazette no. 99/99) \u2013 \u201cthe Constitutional Court Act\u201d), as amended by the 2002 Amendments (Ustavni zakon o izmjenama i dopunama Ustavnog zakona o Ustavnom sudu Republike Hrvatske, Official Gazette no. 29/02), which entered into force on 15 March 2002, reads as follows:\nSection 62\n\u201c1. Anyone may lodge a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court if he or she deems that a decision of a State authority, local or regional government, or a legal person invested with public authority, on his or her rights or obligations, or as regards a suspicion or accusation of a criminal offence, has violated his or her human rights or fundamental freedoms, or the right to local or regional government, guaranteed by the Constitution (\u201cconstitutional right\u201d) ... 2. If another legal remedy is available in respect of the violation of the constitutional rights [complained of], the constitutional complaint may be lodged only after that remedy has been exhausted. 3. In matters in which an administrative action or, in civil and non-contentious proceedings, an appeal on points of law [revizija] is available, remedies shall be considered exhausted only after a decision on these legal remedies has been given.\u201d\nSection 65(1)\n\u201cA constitutional complaint shall contain ... an indication of the constitutional right alleged to have been violated, [together] with an indication of the relevant provision of the Constitution guaranteeing that right ...\u201d\nSection 71(1)\n\u201c ... [t]he Constitutional Court shall examine only the violations of constitutional rights alleged in the constitutional complaint.\u201d 28.  On 9 July 2001 the Constitutional Court delivered decision no. U\u2011III-368/1999 (Official Gazette no. 65/01) in a case where the complainant relied in her constitutional complaint on Articles 3 and 19 paragraph 1 of the Constitution, neither of which, under that court\u2019s case-law, concerned a constitutional right. The Constitutional Court nevertheless allowed the constitutional complaint, finding violations of Articles 14, 19 paragraph 2 and 26 of the Constitution, on which the complainant had not relied, and quashed the contested decisions. In so deciding it held as follows:\n\u201c... a constitutional complaint cannot be based on either of the constitutional provisions relied on [by the complainant in her constitutional complaint].\nHowever, the present case, as will be explained further, concerns a specific legal situation as a result of which this court, despite [its] finding that there have not been, and cannot be, any violations of the constitutional rights explicitly relied on by the complainant, considers that there are circumstances which warrant the quashing of [the contested] decisions.\n...\nNamely, it is evident from the constitutional complaint and the case file that there have been violations of [constitutional] rights, in particular those guaranteed by Article 14 (equality, equality before the law), Article 19 paragraph 2 (guarantee of judicial review of decisions of state and other public authorities) and Article 26 (equality before the courts and other state or public authorities) of the Constitution ...\u201d 29.  The relevant provisions of the Customs Act (Carinski zakon, Official Gazette, no. 78/99 with subsequent amendments), which was in force between 1 January 2000 and 30 June 2013, at the material time read as follows:\nSection 4(1)\n\u201cFor the purposes of this Act certain terms have the following meaning: 2. persons having domicile \u2013 seat in the customs territory are:\n- Natural persons having domicile or habitual residence in the customs territory,\n...\u201d\n \nSection 241(1)\n\u201cA fine ... of between 1,000 and 100,000 kunas for an administrative offence shall be imposed on ... a natural person:\n... 10. if he or she handles [the] goods as if they satisfy the conditions for temporary admission, and that conduct is contrary to the conditions for temporary admission of goods set forth in this Act or in the Convention on Temporary Admission,\n...\u201d 30.  The Decree on the implementation of the Customs Act (Uredba za provedbu Carinskog zakona, Official Gazette, no. 161/03 with subsequent amendments), which was in force between 1 November 2003 and 30 June 2013, at the material time read as follows:\nChapter 5\nTemporary Importation\nDivision 2\nConditions for Granting Temporary Importation with Total Relief\nSubdivision 1\nRoad vehicles\nSection 265(1)\n\u201cTotal relief [from customs duties] shall be granted for road vehicles ... in the following cases:\n(a)  if they are registered outside the customs territory of the Republic of Croatia and in the name of a person outside [that territory]; in the event that [they] are not registered, these conditions shall be considered satisfied if they are owned by a person having seat outside the customs territory of the Republic of Croatia,\nb) if they are used by persons having seat outside the customs territory of the Republic of Croatia ...\u201d\n...\nSection 269\n\u201cWithout prejudice to the application of any special provisions, the time-limit for the completion of the temporary importation is ... for road vehicles for private use ... six months within a twelve-month period.\u201d 31.  The relevant part of the General Tax Act (Op\u0107i porezni zakon, Official Gazette, nos. 127/02 and 150/02), which was in force between 1 January 2001 and 31 December 2008, provided as follows: 4.  Taxpayer\u2019s abode\n[Fiscal] Domicile and habitual residence\nSection 37\n\u201c(1)  For the purposes of this Act it shall be considered that the taxpayer has [fiscal] domicile [prebivali\u0161te] [in a place] where he or she owns or possesses a home [stan] continuously for [a period of] at least 183 days in one or two calendar years. Actual presence in the home is not required.\n (2)  If the taxpayer owns or possesses more than one home his [fiscal] domicile shall be in the place where his or her family has domicile, and for the taxpayer who is single, the place where he or she predominantly stays, or the place from which he or she predominantly sets off to work or to exercise other [professional] activity.\n(3)  If the taxpayer has [fiscal] domicile both in Croatia and abroad, he or she shall be considered a domestic taxpayer.\n(4)  A taxpayer shall have his or her habitual residence [uobi\u010dajeno boravi\u0161te] within the meaning of this Act in a place in which he or she is staying under circumstances from which it may be concluded that he or she does not reside in that place or that territory only temporarily. Permanent residence or intermittent residence lasting at least 183 days in one or two calendar years shall be considered habitual residence for the purposes of this Act. Short periods of absence lasting no longer than one year shall not be relevant for the determination of habitual residence.\u201d 32.  The relevant provisions of the Domicile and Residence of Citizens Act (Zakon o prebivali\u0161tu i boravi\u0161tu gra\u0111ana, Official Gazette no. 53/1991), which was in force between 8 October 1991 and 29 December 2012, read as follows:\nSection 1\n\u201cEvery Croatian citizen present on the territory of the Republic of Croatia has domicile in the Republic of Croatia, and may also have residence.\u201d\nSection 2\n\u201cA citizen\u2019s domicile [prebivali\u0161te] is the place where he or she has settled with the intention of permanently living there.\u201d\n...\nSection 5\n\u201cA citizen\u2019s residence [boravi\u0161te] may be habitual or temporary.\nA habitual residence [uobi\u010dajeno boravi\u0161te] is a place in which a citizen resides permanently without the intention of settling there.\nA temporary residence [privremeno boravi\u0161te] is a place in which a citizen stays up to thirty days.\u201d\nSection 6(1)\n\u201cCitizens have a duty to register and de-register domicile, habitual residence and any change of address.\u201d\nSection 16\n\u201c(1)  A fine of between [10 and 25 euros] in kuna equivalent for an administrative offence shall be imposed on:\n- those who do not register or de-register their domicile or change of address or do not report residence or do not do so within the prescribed time-limit (section 6 paragraph 1, ...);\n- those who give false or incorrect information when registering their domicile, residence or change of address (...).\u201d 33.  It has generally been accepted among Croatian legal scholars that domicile has two elements: (a) the objective element (corpus), that is, the fact that an individual has settled (established, set up a home) in a particular place, and (b) the subjective element, that is, the intention (the will) of permanently living there (animus semper manendi). However, once established, domicile is not lost by the mere loss of one of its constituent elements. For example, a person who is (temporarily) absent from the town where he or she has established his or her domicile will not lose that status if he or she wishes to live there permanently, that is, as long as he or she intends to return to it. Likewise, a person who has established his or her domicile in a particular town but no longer intends to (permanently) live there will not lose his or her domicile in that town while he or she still lives there, that is, as long as he or she does not actually move elsewhere. 34.  Thus Croatian nationals who temporarily work and live abroad are considered to have retained their domicile in Croatia (see, for example, Supreme Court cases nos. G\u017e-4608/75 and Rev-325/81). For example, in case no. Us-8015/2002 of 23 November 2006 the Administrative Court quashed the decision of the Ministry of the Interior to de-register of its own motion the domicile of a Croatian national who had left Croatia for employment in a foreign country. It ruled that there was no legal basis for such a decision in the Domicile and Residence of Citizens Act as the plaintiff had left Croatia only temporarily, without the intention of permanently remaining abroad. The relevant part of that judgment reads as follows:\n\u201cFrom the provisions [of the Domicile and Residence of Citizens Act] ... it follows that every Croatian national present in the territory of the Republic of Croatia has a guaranteed domicile in the Republic of Croatia and that Croatian nationals freely decide which place in [its] territory ... to choose as their domicile. In so doing what is decisive is the will of the citizens themselves, because only the place where a citizen has settled with the intention of permanently living there may be regarded as his or her domicile...\nThe case file ... suggests that the plaintiff, her husband and her children had ... their registered domicile in the Republic of Croatia in the town of H. ... and that they had all gone together, for reasons of the husband\u2019s employment, to live temporarily in ... Bosnia and Herzegovina, without the intention of staying there permanently. Furthermore, [the case file] also suggests that the plaintiff\u2019s husband is, together with his father, the co-owner of a house in H., while in ... Bosnia and Herzegovina they do not own any immovable property.\u201d 35.  In that case the Administrative Court particularly emphasised that the Domicile and Residence of Citizens Act did not provide how long a person could be absent from the place of his or her domicile for the absence to have legal consequences. For the same reason, in its judgment no. Rev-87/1996-2 of 14 February 1996 the Supreme Court was able to rule, though in the context of housing legislation, that the defendant\u2019s (a Croatian national) absence from Croatia for reasons of employment, which had lasted six years during which he and his family lived in Canada, obtained Canadian nationality and his children went to school, could still be considered temporary. 36.  While a person may have only one domicile, it is clear (see section 1 of the Domicile and Residence of Citizens Act in paragraph 32 above) that he may at the same time have his domicile and (habitual) residence in different places (for example, students, army recruits, prisoners, long-term hospital patients, who study, serve or are being treated in a place different from the place of their domicile). 37.  The relevant provisions of the Administrative Offences Act (Prekr\u0161ajni zakon, Official Gazette no. 107/07 with subsequent amendments), which has been in force since 1 January 2008, are as follows. 38.  Section 82(3) provides that if the Administrative Offences Act does not contain specific provisions on the procedure in administrative offence proceedings, the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act (see paragraph 41 below) should apply mutatis mutandis. 39.  Sections 214-216 provide for the remedy of reopening of proceedings before the High Court for Administrative Offences, and regulate the procedure following a petition for reopening. 40.  Section 220 reads as follows:\n\u201c(1)  The Principal State Attorney may lodge a request for the protection of legality against final judicial decisions ... if the law has been breached.\n(2)  The provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act concerning the lodging of and deciding on the request for the protection of legality shall be applied mutatis mutandis in administrative offence proceedings.\n(3)  The State Attorney does not have to lodge a request for the protection of legality if he or she considers that [even though] the law was breached, that breach did not affect the correctness of the decision and [the case] does not concern a legal issue important for the consistency of the case-law or for the protection of human rights.\u201d 41.  The relevant provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act (Zakon o kaznenom postupku, Official Gazette no. 152/08 with subsequent amendments), which has been in force since 1 September 2011, read as follows:\nSection 502\n\u201c(1)  ...\n(2)  The provisions concerning the reopening of criminal proceedings shall be applicable also in the case where a petition to review a final judicial decision has been filed on the basis of a final judgment of the European Court of Human Rights whereby, in respect of the accused, a violation of the rights and freedoms under the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms was found.\n(3)  A petition for reopening of the proceedings on the basis a final judgment of the European Court of Human Rights may be lodged within thirty days of the date on which the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights becomes final.\u201d\n...\nSection 509\n\u201c(1)  The Principal State Attorney may lodge a request for the protection of legality against final judicial decisions if the law has been breached.\n(2)  The Principal State Attorney shall lodge a request for the protection of legality against a judicial decision adopted in [criminal] proceedings in a manner which constitutes a violation of fundamental human rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution, international law or [primary] legislation.\n(3)  ...\u201d\nIII.  RELEVANT CZECH LAW\nThe Aliens\u2019 Residence Act 42.  The relevant part of Act No. 326/1999 on the Residence of Foreigners in the Territory of the Czech Republic (Z\u00e1kon \u010d. 326/1999 Sb., o pobytu cizinc\u016f na \u00fazem\u00ed \u010cesk\u00e9 republiky \u2013 \u201cthe Czech Residence of Aliens Act\u201d), as in force at the material time, provides as follows:\nSection 68\n(1) A permanent residence permit shall be issued to foreigners, at their request, after five years of continuous residence in [the country].\n (2) The period referred to in paragraph 1 shall include residence in [the country] on [the basis of] a long-term visa [that is, a visa for a term exceeding 90 days] or a [long-term] residence permit ...\n (3) The period referred to in paragraph 1 shall include also periods of absence [from the country] during the time of residence, if each period of absence does not exceed six consecutive months, or if, in total, they do not exceed ten months ...\n (4) ...\u201d 43.  The Convention on Temporary Admission (\u201cthe Istanbul Convention\u201d) of 26 June 1990, which entered into force on 27 November 1993, is an instrument of the World Customs Organization. Temporary admission without payment of customs duties is provided for in order to minimise the costs of border crossing and facilitate the free movement of goods across frontiers. The aim of the Istanbul Convention is to simplify and harmonise temporary admission procedures. It has sixty-five Contracting Parties (of which forty-four have ratified its Annex C Concerning Means of Transport), including Croatia, the Czech Republic and the European Union. 44.  According to its Article 34 \u00a7 3, the Istanbul Convention was drafted \u201cin a single original, in the English and French languages, both texts being equally authentic\u201d. 45.  The relevant provisions of the Istanbul Convention read as follows:\nCHAPTER I\nGeneral provisions\nDefinitions\nArticle 1\n\u201cFor the purposes of this Convention, the term:\n(a) \u2018temporary admission\u2019 means :\nthe Customs procedure under which certain goods (including means of transport) can be brought into a Customs territory conditionally relieved from payment of import duties and taxes and without application of import prohibitions or restrictions of economic character; such goods (including means of transport) must be imported for a specific purpose and must be intended for re-exportation within a specified period and without having undergone any change except normal depreciation due to the use made of them;\n...\u201d\n...\nANNEX C\nANNEX CONCERNING MEANS OF TRANSPORT\n...\nCHAPTER II\nScope\nArticle 2\n\u201cThe following shall be granted temporary admission in accordance with Article 2 of this Convention:\n(a) means of transport for commercial use or for private use;\n(b) ...\u201d\nCHAPTER III\nMiscellaneous provisions\nArticle 5\n\u201cFor the facilities granted by this Annex to apply:\n(a) ...\n(b) means of transport for private use must be registered in a territory other than that of temporary admission, in the name of a person established or resident in a territory other than that of temporary admission [the French text of the Istanbul Convention reads: r\u00e9sidant en dehors du territoire d\u2019admission temporaire], and be imported and used by persons resident in such a territory [r\u00e9sidant dans un tel territoire].\u201d\n...\nArticle 9\n\u201c1. ... 2. Means of transport for private use may remain in the territory of temporary admission for a period, continuous or not, of six months in every period of twelve months.\u201d 46.  The Istanbul Convention entered into force in respect of Croatia on 3 December 1998. It was incorporated into the Croatian legal system by the Government\u2019s Decree on Accession to the Convention on Temporary Admission (Uredba o pristupanju Konvenciji o privremenom uvozu, Official Gazette \u2013 International Agreements, no. 16/98). The term \u201cpersons resident\u201d in Article 5 of Annex C was in the Croatian text of the Istanbul Convention translated on its first occurrence as \u201cosobe s prebivali\u0161tem\u201d (\u201cpersons having domicile\u201d) and on its second occurrence as \u201cosobe koje \u017eive\u201d (\u201cpersons living\u201d or \u201cpersons who live\u201d). The Croatian version of Article 5 of Annex C to the Istanbul Convention, as published in the Official Gazette \u2013 International Agreements (no. 16/1998 of 3 December 1998), reads as follows:\n\u201cZa primjenu povlastica koje jam\u010di ovaj Aneks:\n(a) ...;\n(b) prijevozna sredstva za privatnu uporabu moraju biti registrirana na teritoriju razli\u010ditom od teritorija privremenog uvoza, na ime osoba sa sjedi\u0161tem ili prebivali\u0161tem na teritoriju izvan teritorija privremenog uvoza, i moraju ih uvesti i koristiti osobe koje \u017eive na tom teritoriju.\u201d 2.  The practice of the Croatian authorities\n(a)  The practice as submitted by the Government\n(i)  The practice of the Customs Administration and the case-law of the High Court for Administrative Offences 47.  From the (unpublished) practice of the Customs Administration (decisions nos. P-1411/07 of 11 September 2007, P-374/08 of 27 November 2008, P-967/08 of 22 December 2008, and P-520/08 of 23 April 2010) and the case-law of the High Court for Administrative Offences (decisions nos. FP\u017e-88/09 of 28 January 2009, FP\u017e-75/09 of 25 March 2009, FP\u017e-1162/10 of 8 February 2011, and FP\u017e-1285/07 of 18 May 2011), submitted by the Government, it follows that those authorities interpreted the term \u201cpersons resident\u201d in Article 5 of Annex C to the Istanbul Convention as \u201cpersons having domicile\u201d, and in so doing referred to the definition of domicile provided in the Domicile and Residence of Citizens Act (see paragraph 32 above).\n(ii)  The case-law of the Administrative Court 48.  From the (published) case-law of the Administrative Court submitted by the Government, it follows that that court has also interpreted the term \u201cpersons resident\u201d in Article 5 of Annex C to the Istanbul Convention as \u201cpersons having domicile\u201d, and in so doing referred to the definition of domicile provided in the Domicile and Residence of Citizens Act. 49.  In cases nos. Us-12183/2005 of 29 October 2008 and Us-11809/2005 of 19 March 2009, the Administrative Court dismissed actions by plaintiffs who had imported vessels registered abroad into Croatia without paying the relevant taxes. It so decided because it had established that the plaintiffs had both domicile and habitual residence in Croatia. In particular, the court found that the plaintiffs had domicile in Croatia not only because they had their registered domicile in the country, but also because they had had health and pension insurance there. 50.  In case no. Us-11745/2001 of 18 January 2006 the Administrative Court dismissed an action by a plaintiff who had imported a car registered abroad into Croatia without paying the relevant taxes. It established that the plaintiff had domicile in Croatia not only because he had registered domicile in the country but also because he did not possess a foreign residence or work permit.\n(b)  Other relevant practice\n(i)  The Customs Administration\u2019s opinions 51.  In a series of opinions issued in the period between 19 December 2006 and 10 January 2013 (opinions no. 212-01/06-01/126 of 19 December 2006, no. 415-01/07-01/09 of 30 March 2007, no. 413-01/07-01/70 of 9 May 2007, no. 413-04/07-01/127 of 10 August 2007, no. 413-01/08-01/235 of 4 June 2008, no. 413-01/08-01/557 of 12 December 2008, no. 413-01/09-01/59 of 26 January 2009, no. 303-01/09-01/03 of 6 February 2009, no. 413-01/09-01/247 of 15 April 2009, no. 413-01/10-01/209 of 31 May 2010, no. 413-01/12-01/135 of 3 April 2012, no. 413-01/11-01/319 of 15 September 2011, no. 413-01/11-01/376 of 24 October 2011, no. 413-01/12-01/77 of 27 February 2012, no. 413-01/12-01/199 of 23 May 2012, no. 413-01/12-01/234 of 13 June 2012, no. 413-01/12-01/379 of 20 September 2012, no. 413-01/12-01/481 of 22 November 2012, no. 413-01/13-01/4 of 3 January 2013, no. 413-01/13-01/7 of 7 January 2013, and 413-01/13-01/7 of 10 January 2013), issued in reply to queries from individuals, the Customs Administration consistently held that the term \u201cperson resident\u201d referred to in Annex C to the Istanbul Convention was to be interpreted as \u201cpersons having habitual residence\u201d. In none of these opinions did the Customs Administration refer to the definition of domicile provided in either the Domicile and Residence of Citizens Act or the General Tax Act. Rather, in one of the opinions (opinion of 31 May 2010) it cited the definition of habitual residence provided in the Domicile and Residence of Citizens Act (see paragraph 32 above), whereas in four of the opinions (opinions of 22 November 2012 and of 3, 7 and 10 January 2013) it referred to the definition of habitual residence provided in the General Tax Act (see paragraph 31 above). While in the first of the above-cited opinions (opinion of 19 December 2006) the Customs Administration held that persons having registered domicile in Croatia could not be considered to have habitual residence abroad, in another of the opinions it expressly stated that domicile was irrelevant for determining whether a person had habitual residence (opinion of 15 September 2011). 52.  The view of the Customs Administration is best summarised by the following quotation (opinions of 26 January 2009, 6 February 2009, 15 April 2009, 15 September 2011 and 20 September 2012):\n\u201cThe use of foreign goods in the customs territory of the Republic of Croatia, within the temporary importation procedure, is governed by sections 145-152 of the Customs Act and the corresponding provisions, that is, sections 260-297, of the Decree on the implementation of the Customs Act, further to the International Convention on Temporary Admission.\nThe basic rule in section 265 of the above-mentioned Decree is that motor vehicles registered outside the customs territory of the Republic of Croatia in the name of a person with habitual residence [s uobi\u010dajenim boravi\u0161tem] outside the customs territory can be used (operated) in our country only by those persons who also have habitual residence [uobi\u010dajeno boravi\u0161te] in another country (the notion of habitual residence implies permanent stay in a certain territory for at least 183 days in a year). In addition to foreign nationals residing in another country, Croatian nationals residing in a third country for work, study or other reasons who occasionally enter Croatia with their vehicles for a visit, holidays and the like may also benefit from this rule. In the case of customs control [aimed at] establishing whether the aforementioned conditions for the use of vehicles with foreign licence plates are met, it is necessary to provide as evidence a residence permit, residence registration [form] or [proof of] accommodation, employment, study or the like, abroad.\u201d\n(ii)  The Customs Administration\u2019s press release of 4 April 2011 53.  On 4 April 2011 the Customs Administration issued a press release entitled \u201cThe use of vehicles with foreign licence plates in the Customs Territory of the Republic of Croatia\u201d. The relevant part of that press release reads as follows:\n\u201cThe Ministry of Finance \u2013 Customs Administration, with a view to informing the public of the applicable customs regulations and [in order] to prevent possible irregularities or illegal acts due to ignorance ..., wishes by issuing the following press release to inform the public of the rules regarding the use of vehicles with foreign licence plates in the customs territory of the Republic of Croatia.\nThe use of foreign goods in the customs territory of the Republic of Croatia, in particular cars with foreign licence plates, is permitted under the temporary importation procedure. In terms of the customs regulations, the temporary importation procedure, which is regulated by national legislation (sections 145-152 of the Customs Act and sections 260-297 of the Decree on the implementation of the Customs Act) and by the International Convention on Temporary Admission (the Istanbul Convention), allows the temporary admission of goods with conditional exemption from customs duties and taxes ...\nIn accordance with Annex C to the Convention on Temporary Admission, the right to temporary importation of a vehicle with exemption from customs duties and taxes may be granted under the following conditions:\nMeans of transport for private use:\n- must be registered in a territory other than the territory of temporary admission,\n- must be registered in the name of a person having a seat or domicile in the territory of another state and\n- must be imported and used by persons living in that territory.\nThis means that the right to temporary importation of means of transport for private use (cars, vessels, motorcycles, etc.) with foreign registration belongs to persons with a seat, domicile or habitual residence in the territory of another state.\nHabitual place of residence is the place where a person, regardless of his or her nationality, usually lives for more than six months in each calendar year for personal or professional reasons or, in the case of an unemployed person, for personal reasons that suggest [that there are] close ties between the person and the place where he or she lives.\nThat is why, for example, a motor vehicle with foreign licence plates may in the Republic of Croatia be driven exclusively by a foreign national with residence in the country of registration, another foreign national having residence in a third country, or by a Croatian national who has habitual place of residence abroad. [In those cases] the vehicle may altogether (that is, irrespective of the fact that it may occasionally leave the customs area of the Republic of Croatia) be present and used in ... Croatia for up to six months in a twelve-month period, after which the vehicle has to leave the customs area. A Croatian or foreign national who has habitual place of residence in ... Croatia, must not use a vehicle with foreign registration plates in Croatia, regardless of the fact he or she may possess a driving licence of the country of registration.\n...\nWhat is relevant in terms of exercising the rights set forth in Annex C to the Convention on Temporary Admission is not the nationality but domicile or residence of the person using the vehicle.\nThat means, for example, that a person who is both a Croatian and foreign national, and has domicile and habitual residence in the Republic of Croatia, shall be considered a domestic natural person.\nIf, therefore, a person with Croatian, foreign or dual nationality has habitual residence in the customs territory of the Republic of Croatia, he or she must not drive vehicles with foreign licence plates, that is, vehicles in respect of which customs duty, excise tax and VAT have not been paid.\nOtherwise [that person shall be] considered as committing a serious customs offence which in the end, besides a fine, may entail the application of the protective measure of confiscation of the vehicle as the object of the offence, and the collection of the customs debt (the customs duty, VAT and the excise tax) [due on the importation] of that vehicle. In particular, in supervising the temporary admission of vehicles in accordance with Annex C to the Convention on Temporary Admission, during 2010 the Customs Administration carried out a total of 956 interventions [that is, spot-checks], of which in 302 cases it found irregularities, and [collected] customs debts in the total amount of HRK 5,664,943.11.\u201d\n(iii)  The Customs Administration\u2019s instruction of 1 June 2011 54.  On 1 June 2011 the Customs Administration issued an Instruction on the use of vehicles with foreign licence plates in the Republic of Croatia, which was addressed to all custom offices as a practice direction. The relevant part of that instruction reads as follows:\n\u201cThe following instruction is given with a view to removing doubts and uncertainties and [in order to] harmonise procedures relating to the application of Annex C to the Convention on Temporary Admission and the use of cars with foreign licence plates in the customs territory of the Republic of Croatia:\nLawful use of foreign means of transport within the customs territory of the Republic of Croatian is granted under the temporary importation procedure.\nTemporary importation of means of transport, including motor vehicles, is provided for in Annex C to the Convention on Temporary Admission.\nIn accordance with Annex C to the Convention on Temporary Admission, the right to temporary importation of motor vehicles with exemption from customs duties and taxes may be exercised under the following conditions:\nMeans of transport for private use:\n- must be registered in a territory other than the territory of temporary importation,\n- must be registered in the name of a person having a seat or domicile in the territory of another state and\n- must be imported and used by persons living in a territory other than the territory of temporary importation.\nThis means that the right to the temporary importation of vehicles with foreign registration for private use may be exercised by persons who have a seat, domicile or habitual residence in the territory of another state. Thus, [only] persons who normally live in the territory of a country other than the country of temporary importation may benefit from the procedure of temporary importation of means of transport. In this regard, for example, a motor vehicle with foreign licence plates may be driven in the Republic of Croatia by:\n- a foreign national with residence in the country of registration,\n- a foreign national having residence in a third country,\n- a Croatian national who has habitual residence (uobi\u010dajeno boravi\u0161te) abroad.\nIn this connection elements such as employment or [otherwise] earning a living, health insurance, etc. are the elements that may be indicative of habitual residence in a certain country, which [however] does not mean that the existence or non-existence of one of the conditions listed automatically constitutes [decisive] evidence of habitual residence in that country.\n...\nIt follows ... that nationality alone, or even temporary residence granted to a person in a particular country, does not automatically entitle to or prohibit from the driving of cars with foreign licence plates in the customs territory of the Republic of Croatia. Rather, the persons in question have to prove their right to operate foreign vehicles by the available documents. This means that credible evidence has to be furnished that those persons ... do not live in the customs territory of the Republic of Croatia.\nThus, the fulfilment of the conditions for the use of foreign motor vehicles in the customs territory of ... Croatia ... is to be assessed on a case-by-case basis, on the basis of the available evidence, which the beneficiary of the temporary admission procedure has to obtain and present.\u201d\n(iv)  Decisions of the Customs Administration and the Ministry of Finance and the case-law of the Administrative Court 55.  In the first-instance decision of the Customs Administration no. UP/I-415-02/06-01/115 of 23 May 2006, which was upheld by the second-instance decision of the Ministry of Finance UP/II-415-05/06-01/700 of 6 July 2006, both authorities in interpreting the term \u201cperson resident\u201d referred to in Annex C to the Istanbul Convention relied on the definition of fiscal domicile and habitual residence provided in the General Tax Act (see paragraph 31 above). By its judgment no. Us-9157/2006-16 of 9 September 2009 the Administrative Court dismissed the subsequent action for judicial review against those decisions, relying on the fact that the plaintiff had registered domicile in Croatia. 56.  In the second-instance decision of the Ministry of Finance UP/II-471-01/07-01/176 of 9 January 2008, whereby it upheld the first-instance decision of the Customs Administration no. UP/I-415-02/05-01/101 of 4 July 2007, the Ministry in interpreting the same term also relied on the definition of fiscal domicile and habitual residence provided in the General Tax Act (see paragraph 31 above). By its judgment no. Us-2367/2008-6 of 5 October 2010 the Administrative Court dismissed the subsequent action for judicial review against those decisions. In so doing it referred to the notion of fiscal domicile and habitual residence as defined in the General Tax Act. 57.  In its judgment no. Us-11421/2005-7 of 31 July 2008 the Administrative Court relied on the definition of fiscal domicile and habitual residence provided in the General Tax Act (see paragraph 31 above) when interpreting the term \u201cperson resident\u201d referred to in Annex C to the Istanbul Convention . 58.  The OECD Model Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital of 11 April 1977, also known as the OECD Model Convention on Elimination of Double Taxation, is a \u201csoft\u201d law instrument adopted within the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development in Europe, which is intended to serve as a model for drafting bilateral agreements for the avoidance of double taxation. The relevant part of the Model Convention reads as follows:\nCHAPTER I\nSCOPE OF THE CONVENTION\nArticle 1\nPERSONS COVERED\n \u201cThis Convention shall apply to persons who are residents of one or both of the Contracting States.\u201d\n...\nCHAPTER II\nDEFINITIONS\n...\nArticle 4\nRESIDENT\n\u201c1. For the purposes of this Convention, the term \u201cresident of a Contracting State\u201d means any person who, under the laws of that State, is liable to tax therein by reason of his domicile, residence, place of management or any other criterion of a similar nature .... 2. Where by reason of the provisions of paragraph 1 an individual is a resident of both Contracting States, then his status shall be determined as follows:\n a) he shall be deemed to be a resident only of the State in which he has a permanent home available to him; if he has a permanent home available to him in both States, he shall be deemed to be a resident only of the State with which his personal and economic relations are closer (centre of vital interests);\n b) if the State in which he has his centre of vital interests cannot be determined, or if he has not a permanent home available to him in either State, he shall be deemed to be a resident only of the State in which he has an habitual abode;\n c) if he has an habitual abode in both States or in neither of them, he shall be deemed to be a resident only of the State of which he is a national;\n d) if he is a national of both States or of neither of them, the competent authorities of the Contracting States shall settle the question by mutual agreement. 59.  Provisions identical to Article 4 \u2013 the original title of which was \u201cFiscal Domicile\u201d \u2013 of the OECD Convention are contained in Article 4 of the United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention between Developed and Developing Countries, as well as in all 55 bilateral agreements for the avoidance of double taxation concluded by Croatia. For example, those provisions are contained in Article 4 of the agreements with the Czech Republic (Official Gazette \u2013 International Agreements nos. 88/99 and 6/12, which entered into force on 28 December 1999) and France (Official Gazette \u2013 International Agreements no. 7/04, which entered into force on 1 September 2005), as well as in Article 4 of the agreement concluded between the former Yugoslavia and the United Kingdom (Official Gazette of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia \u2013 International Agreements no. 7/82), which entered into force on 16 September 1982 and applies to Croatia by virtue of its notification of succession on 8 October 1991. In those agreements the term \u201cresident\u201d (r\u00e9sident) (in the agreements with France and the Czech Republic), or \u201cfiscal domicile\u201d (in the agreement with the United Kingdom) were translated into Croatian as \u201crezident\u201d or (in the agreement with the United Kingdom) \u201cfiskalni domicil\u201d. The term \u201cpermanent home\u201d (foyer d\u2019habitation permanent) was translated as \u201cprebivali\u0161te\u201d or, in the agreement with the United Kingdom, \u201cstalno mjesto stanovanja\u201d. The term \u201cplace of habitual abode\u201d (lieu de s\u00e9jour habituel) was translated as \u201cuobi\u010dajeno boravi\u0161te\u201d. 60.  The relevant part of the Resolution (72) on the Standardisation of the Legal Concepts of \u201cDomicile\u201d and of \u201cResidence\u201d, adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 18 January 1972 at the 206th meeting of the Ministers\u2019 Deputies, reads as follows:\nANNEX\nRULES\nDomicile\n\u201cNo. 1. The concept of domicile imports a legal relationship between a person and a country governed by a particular system of law or a place within such a country. This relationship is inferred from the fact that that person voluntarily establishes or retains his sole or principal residence within that country or at that place with the intention of making and retaining in that country or place the centre of his personal, social and economic interests. This intention may be inferred, inter alia, from the period of his residence, past and prospective, as well as from the existence of other ties of a personal or business nature between that person and that country or place.\nNo. 2. A person\u2019s domicile is regarded as continuing until another domicile is acquired.\nNo. 3. ...\u201d\n...\nResidence\n\u201cNo. 7. The residence of a person is determined solely by factual criteria; it does not depend upon the legal entitlement to reside.\nNo. 8. A person has a residence in a country governed by a particular system of law or in a place within such a country if he dwells there for a certain period of time. That stay need not necessarily be continuous.\nNo. 9. In determining whether a residence is habitual, account is to be taken of the duration and the continuity of the residence as well as of other facts of a personal or professional nature which point to durable ties between a person and his residence.\nNo. 10. The voluntary establishment of a residence and a person\u2019s intention to maintain it are not conditions of the existence of a residence or an habitual residence, but a person\u2019s intentions may be taken into account in determining whether he possesses a residence or the character of that residence.\u201d 61.  In the official Croatian translation of the Council\u2019s Directive of 28 March 1983 on tax exemptions within the Community for certain means of transport temporarily imported into one Member State from another (Directive 83/182/EEC on tax exemptions for temporarily imported vehicles) the term \u201cnormal residence\u201d is translated into Croatian as \u201cuobi\u010dajeno boravi\u0161te\u201d.", "references": ["3", "7", "1", "0", "6", "2", "9", "8", "4", "5", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1965 and lives in Daugavpils. 6.  On 5 October 2004 at about 5 p.m. the applicant, who was under the influence of alcohol, was involved in a fight outside a grocery store in the presence of several witnesses. He stabbed another individual with a knife, as a result of which the latter died. The same day the police opened a murder investigation into the death. 7.  At 9 p.m. on the same day the applicant \u2013 who in August 2004 had been released from prison, having served a sentence for an earlier conviction for inflicting physical injuries \u2013 was placed under arrest on suspicion of murder. The record of his arrest contained a written statement from him confirming that he did not need a lawyer. 8.  On 6, 7 and 13 October 2004 the police questioned the applicant as a suspect. The interview records contained his signatures confirming that he had been informed of his right to instruct a lawyer to attend his interview, and that he did not need one.\nDuring his first interview the applicant denied any involvement in the fight or the murder.\nDuring his second interview he stated that on 5 October 2004, having consumed alcohol, he had been riding a bicycle when O. had suddenly run into him from an alley. They had started arguing and O. had hit the applicant, who had responded with several punches. Afterwards, two other young men had joined in the fight, and the applicant had been kicked to the ground. At some point the applicant had noticed that a woman was restraining O. and not letting him approach the applicant. Another unknown young man, who had not taken part in the fight, had restrained the applicant. The applicant had thought that the young man was going to attack him, and had therefore picked up his knife from the ground and stabbed him. 9.  On 4 November 2004 the applicant was formally accused of murder under section 116 of the Criminal Law (Krimin\u0101llikums) for having stabbed the victim with the intent to kill him \u201cbecause of a personal conflict\u201d. 10.  On 5 November 2004 the applicant was provided with a State-appointed lawyer, S., to assist him during the preliminary investigation. On the same day he was questioned as an accused person in the presence of S. He partially admitted his guilt. In essence, he reiterated the statements made in his earlier interviews. He stated that he had used the knife against the victim because he had known that the victim wanted to hit him, although he could not say whether the victim had already hit him at that point or, if not, when the victim was going to attack him. 11.  On 30 November 2004 the judge extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 5 February 2005. The judge noted that S. had submitted that keeping the applicant in detention was not justified, as he did not present any danger and had no reason to evade justice, since he had a job and a permanent place of residence. 12.  On 22 December 2004 the public prosecutor charged the applicant with murder under section 116 of the Criminal Law. S. was present. On the same day the applicant was questioned in the presence of S. and confirmed his earlier testimony of 5 November 2004 (see paragraph 10 above). 13.  On 24 December 2004, between 10 a.m. and 1 p.m., the applicant familiarised himself with the case file in the presence of S. He wrote in the relevant record that he had no remarks or requests, and also asked to be provided with a lawyer for his trial. 14.  On 3 January 2005 the public prosecutor transferred the case to the Daugavpils Court (Daugavpils tiesa) for trial. 15.  On 10 and 13 January 2005 the applicant complained to the Daugavpils Court that he had not been assisted by a lawyer when he had familiarised himself with the case file. 16.  On 18 February 2005 S. was assigned to the applicant\u2019s case to assist him in the proceedings before the Daugavpils Court. On the same day S. familiarised himself with the case file. 17.  On 23 March 2005 the applicant complained to the Daugavpils Court that S. had convinced him to partially admit his guilt, although he had not wished to do so. Furthermore, S. had not been present when he had familiarised himself with the case file. He did not wish to be assisted by S. 18.  On 7 April 2005 a first-instance hearing was held. The court examined the applicant\u2019s complaint regarding S., who stated that his client\u2019s own interests and those relating to his defence diverged. S. invited the court to uphold the applicant\u2019s application for him to be released from his duties. After the court decided to release S. from his duties, the applicant stated that he needed to be assisted by a lawyer. The proceedings were adjourned. 19.  On 27 May 2005 a senior lawyer of the Daugavpils Bar refused the court\u2019s request to provide the applicant with another State-appointed lawyer, stating that S. had carried out his duties diligently, and Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Krimin\u0101lprocesa kodekss) did not give an accused the right to freely choose a lawyer. The applicant had the right to appoint a lawyer of his own choice (and pay for his or her services), and the right to waive his right to legal assistance. 20.  On 6 June 2005 the applicant asked the Daugavpils Court to provide him with a State-appointed lawyer. 21.  On 9 June 2005 the Latvian Bar Association informed the applicant that, in the event that an accused raised an unjustified challenge in respect of his or her lawyer, he or she had a right to request another lawyer, at his own expense. 22.  On 16 June 2005 the applicant was provided with a State-appointed lawyer, D., to assist him in the proceedings before the Daugavpils Court. On the same day D. familiarised himself with the case file. 23.  On 17 June 2005 a hearing was held before the Daugavpils Court. The applicant asked the court to ensure the attendance of several witnesses. D. maintained that application. The next hearing was fixed for 1 September 2005. 24.  On 20 June 2005 the applicant wrote a letter to D. and asked why he had agreed to represent him, given their \u201cunpleasant\u201d first meeting during which D. had indicated his intention to refuse to act as the applicant\u2019s counsel. The applicant also asked D. to guarantee that he would persuade the trial court to order three new measures in order to obtain evidence. According to the applicant, the following measures would prove his innocence in relation to the murder charge: searches of other unspecified witnesses, polygraph testing, and another psychiatric examination. The applicant stated that if D. did not wish to defend him, then he had the opportunity to withdraw from the case, which would provide a satisfying solution for them both. However, if D. acted in the same way as his previous defence lawyer, the applicant would ask the trial court to discharge D. from his duties. 25.  On 1 September 2005 the applicant submitted several written applications to the Daugavpils Court. He asked for the criminal case to be remitted to the prosecutor\u2019s office in order to rectify the bill of indictment by changing his motive for the alleged offence. The court dismissed the application, as it had not yet started its adjudication or assessment of the evidence. The court further dismissed the applicant\u2019s second application to end his pre-trial detention. As regards a third application to examine evidence concerning the scene of the crime and search other unspecified witnesses, the court decided to postpone examination of those requests until the end of its adjudication. In that regard, it noted that all defence witnesses had been summoned to the hearing. The court then dismissed the applicant\u2019s application for another forensic medical examination on the grounds that one had already been carried out in November 2004. All the applications were dealt with at a hearing and the applicant was present when the relevant decisions were announced. 26.  During the hearing, D. reserved his comments as regards the applicant\u2019s application to call other unspecified witnesses and have a new indictment, on the grounds that those were matters to be examined at the end of court\u2019s adjudication. He supported the applicant\u2019s application for additional psychiatric examination and the attendance of all the defence and prosecution witnesses summoned to the trial. With regard to the applicant\u2019s other application, D. stated that it was at the court\u2019s discretion. 27.  In his subsequent written application (\u201ca refusal\u201d (\u043e\u0442\u0432\u043e\u0434)), the applicant relied on Article 99 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and asked the court to release D. from his duties. In that application, the applicant referred to his letter to D. dated 20 June 2005 (see paragraph 24 above), to which the applicant had expected a favourable response, but to which D. had not responded. The written application stated that the applicant was refusing the services of D. on the grounds that all applications made to the court on 1 September 2005 had been drafted by the applicant, and D. had not shown any interest in asking the court to order the examination of witness statements about the scene of the crime, new psychiatric expert evidence, or the correction of the motive in the bill of indictment. D. had merely supported the above applications.\nAt the end of the written application the applicant asked the Daugavpils Court to provide him with another State-appointed lawyer who would carry out his function in compliance with Article 97 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 28.  In reply to the applicant\u2019s application, D. presented the applicant\u2019s letter of 20 June 2005 to the court and invited it to establish whether the applicant needed a lawyer at all. In reply to a question put by the court, the applicant could not name a lawyer to be provided for him. 29.  On the same day the Daugavpils Court decided to uphold the applicant\u2019s application to release D. from his duties and rejected his application for appointment of another legal aid lawyer. It noted that the applicant had declined the services of D. because the latter could not guarantee that he would be acquitted, and the applicant had been of the opinion that D. had not adequately defended him. Daugavpils Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s application on the grounds that he had twice been provided with a lawyer and had twice refused their services. Under Article 96 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a lawyer was appointed by a court and not chosen by an accused himself. In accordance with Article 99, an accused had the right to waive his or her right to legal assistance, but no right to request replacement of a lawyer. According to the Daugavpils Court, the applicant\u2019s refusal of D.\u2019s services had been unjustified, and meant that he did not wish to have a legal aid lawyer at all. The court stated that the applicant was seeking to delay the proceedings. 30.  From 1 September 2005 onwards the applicant did not have legal assistance in the first-instance proceedings. 31.  During the hearing of 1 September 2005, when invited by the court to put questions to witnesses, he refused to do so, stating each time that he would either ask questions when represented by a lawyer or not ask questions at all. At the applicant\u2019s request, the Daugavpils Court adjourned the hearing to summon other absent witnesses. 32.  During the hearing of 24 October 2005 the applicant, referring to section 71 of the Criminal Procedure Law (Krimin\u0101lprocesa likums) (see paragraph 53 below), asked the court to ensure that his defence rights were respected. His earlier applications to replace the two State-appointed lawyers could not be construed as a waiver of his right to legal assistance; he had refused the assistance because of a \u201cdisagreement\u201d and a \u201cfailure to provide legal assistance\u201d. The applicant asked the court to provide him with a list of lawyers and a means of communicating with them, or, in the alternative, to ensure that he was assisted by one of the two lawyers he named. The court explained that the applicant\u2019s application for a lawyer had been decided on 1 September 2005. It adjourned the hearing in order to summon absent witnesses. 33.  During the next hearing on 17 November 2005 the applicant alleged that at least thirty people had been present when the alleged crime had taken place, but only eight of them had been called as witnesses. He therefore asked the court to identify the other witnesses. In reply to a question put by the court, the applicant confessed that he had stabbed the victim, but stated that he had not intended to kill him. At the applicant\u2019s request, the Daugavpils Court adjourned the hearing, giving him time to give evidence and to submit a list of defence witnesses. 34.  On 21 November 2005 Judge Z. of the Daugavpils Court sent the applicant a list of lawyers practising in Daugavpils whom the applicant could contact in order to obtain a legal consultation. He noted that the case file contained no evidence pertaining to the applicant\u2019s status as a person of low income, and that the applicant would be provided with a State-appointed lawyer at appeal stage if the case were to reach it. 35.  At a hearing on 12 January 2006 the Daugavpils Court examined several applications lodged by the applicant. As regards another application for appointment of a lawyer, the court held that the matter had previously been decided and could not be re-examined. During the same hearing the Daugavpils Court verified that the applicant had duly received the document setting out the charges against him. The court upheld the applicant\u2019s application for an adjournment, and adjourned the hearing to give him time to prepare for the arguments in court. 36.  On 31 January 2006 the prosecutor amended the charges against the applicant by changing the motive of the crime to, \u201cacting with no reason, being guided by hooligan tendencies\u201d. 37.  On 6 February 2006 the Daugavpils Court found the applicant guilty of murder. The court noted that the applicant had partly admitted his guilt during the preliminary investigation in saying that he had stabbed the victim, but claiming that he had not intended to murder him. The court went on to refer to the evidence of seven witnesses who had been in the immediate vicinity of the incident. The court did not have any doubts as regards the applicant\u2019s intent. He had stabbed the victim in the chest and had himself testified that he had aimed to stab the victim in the left part of his chest. All the witnesses, except one, had confirmed that the applicant had stabbed the victim after the fight had ended. The applicant had had no need to defend himself, because the victim had been unarmed and had not posed any threat to him. On the contrary, the victim had not taken part in the fight at all, but had wanted to stop it. The court dismissed as unreliable the evidence of an eyewitness who had been transported to a hearing and detained with the applicant. 38.  In addition, the court relied on documentary evidence, such as the conclusions of the forensic psychiatric examination. The applicant was sentenced to twelve years\u2019 imprisonment. 39.  As regards the applicant\u2019s right to legal aid assistance, the court observed that he had twice refused the services of State-appointed lawyers. The Code of Criminal Procedure, as in force on 1 September 2005, did not provide for the right of an accused to decline the services of a lawyer. The court further dismissed the applicant\u2019s allegation that the State-appointed lawyers had not provided him with adequate legal assistance. At that point, the court had not yet started to hear the evidence. In addition, the applicant had wanted the lawyers to guarantee that he would be acquitted, and had referred to their performance in cases where they had assisted other individuals. The court also noted that witnesses had twice been called to testify, once following an application by the applicant, who had then refused to put any questions to them, arguing that he had not been granted a lawyer. 40.  On 26 February 2006 the applicant lodged an appeal, which he supplemented on 26 March 2006. He submitted that his defence rights had been violated and asked the Latgale Regional Court (Latgales apgabaltiesa) to call all the witnesses, without providing any reason for that application. He stated that he needed a lawyer at an appeal hearing, and asked for an opportunity to meet him or her prior to the appeal hearing to agree on a defence strategy. 41.  On 11 May 2006 the applicant was provided with a State-appointed lawyer, M. 42.  At a hearing on 17 May 2006 the applicant was assisted by M. He and M. asked the court to adjourn the hearing, stating that more time was needed in order to prepare a defence. The hearing was adjourned until 8 November 2006. 43.  On 8 November 2006 the applicant was represented by a State-appointed lawyer, V. At a hearing held on the same day the court read out witness statements and the applicant did not raise any objections to the statements in substance. When invited to ask questions, the applicant asked the court to call all the witnesses who had testified before the first-instance court again, in addition to some other witnesses. His application was on the grounds that he had twice refused legal assistance as a result of the different opinions of his lawyers about the conduct of his defence. The court dismissed that application, because the applicant had not made it in his appeal. 44.  On 8 November 2006 the Regional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld the first-instance judgment. The appellate court noted that there were no discrepancies in the witness testimonies and they were concordant with the applicant\u2019s testimonies. It also noted that it was the applicant who had started the fight and demonstrated a readiness to use a knife against an unarmed victim, therefore no question of self-defence arose. 45.  As to the fairness of the proceedings, the Regional Court found that the first-instance court had afforded the applicant an opportunity to choose a lawyer and exercise his defence rights. Referring to the reasoning of the first-instance court, the Regional Court agreed that his refusal to accept the services of the two lawyers had been unjustified. Having examined the content of the applicant\u2019s submissions, applications and complaints in the criminal proceedings, it did not find that any of the conditions of section 83 of the Criminal Procedure Law had been fulfilled. The appellate court concluded that the applicant had been able to defend himself. The first-instance court had called the witnesses twice, however the applicant had refused to put any questions to them, citing unfounded excuses. 46.  On 13 December 2006 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law against the aforementioned decision with the Criminal Cases Division of the Senate of the Supreme Court (Augst\u0101k\u0101s tiesas Sen\u0101ta Krimin\u0101llietu departaments). He made a complaint regarding the quality of the legal services provided by the State-appointed lawyers and the decision of the first-instance court to deprive him of legal assistance. 47.  In addition, the applicant alleged that his guilt could have been \u201cmitigated\u201d if he had been given a psychiatric assessment and polygraph testing, and if additional defence witnesses had been questioned. He also complained in a general manner that neither of the lower courts had granted him permission to put questions to the witnesses. 48.  On 16 January 2007 the Senate of the Supreme Court refused to consider the applicant\u2019s appeal.", "references": ["9", "7", "8", "2", "6", "5", "4", "1", "0", "3", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1947 and lives in Tirana. 5.  By a final judgment of 21 June 1996 the Tepelen\u00eb District Court ordered the Tepelen\u00eb District Council (K\u00ebshilli i Rrethit) to pay the applicant 530,941 Albanian leks (ALL) as compensation for the nationalisation of her house by the State in 1967. The judgment became final on an unspecified date in 1996. 6.  On 15 July 1998 an enforcement writ was issued. 7.  By a final judgment of 25 April 2008 the Gjirokast\u00ebr District Court ordered the Gjirokast\u00ebr Regional Council (K\u00ebshilli i Qarkut) to pay the applicant ALL 1,237,336 as compensation for the delayed enforcement of the Tepelen\u00eb District Court decision of 21 June 1996. The judgment became final on 25 May 2008. 8.  On 27 June 2008 an enforcement writ was issued. 9.  From 1996 to 2009 the applicant had continuously addressed letters to the authorities for the enforcement of the final judgments. She also instituted enforcement proceedings before a bailiff. 10.  On 23 January 2009 the Constitutional Court acknowledged that there had been a breach of the fair trial as a result of the non-enforcement of the final judgments. 11.  On 8 December 2009 both judgments were enforced and the sums were paid to the applicant.", "references": ["0", "7", "8", "9", "4", "2", "6", "5", "1", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicants, Mr K.S. and his wife Mrs M.S., were born in 1939 and 1942 respectively and live in Lauf. 6.  In 2006 the German secret service (Bundesnachrichtendienst) bought a data carrier from a certain K. for a considerable amount of money. The data carrier contained financial data from the Liechtenstein L. Bank relating to 800 people. K., who had formerly been an employee of the L. Bank, had illegally copied the data. The data carrier was submitted to the German tax investigation authorities, which subsequently instigated proceedings against, inter alia, the applicants, in relation to tax evasion crimes. 7.  On 10 April 2008 the Bochum District Court (\u201cthe District Court\u201d), following an application from the Bochum prosecutor\u2019s office, issued a search warrant in respect of the home of the applicants, who were suspected of having committed tax evasion between 2002 and 2006. The search warrant allowed the seizure of papers and other documents concerning the applicants\u2019 capital, both inside and outside Germany, especially documents concerning information on foundations and any documents that could help to determine the true tax liability of the applicants since 2002. 8.  The search warrant indicated that, in the course of investigations against another suspect, the prosecution had obtained information that the applicants had established the \u201cK. Foundation\u201d on 17 January 2000 and the \u201cT.U. S.A.\u201d on 14 June 2000. The applicants were suspected of having made financial investments via these two associations with the L. Bank in Liechtenstein, for which they were liable for tax in Germany. According to the search warrant, the applicants had failed to declare about 50,000 euros (EUR) of the yearly interest accrued from the capital of both the K. Foundation and T.U. S.A. in their tax returns for the years 2002 to 2006. It indicated that the applicants had evaded tax payments of EUR 16,360 in 2002, EUR 24,270 in 2003, EUR 22,500 in 2004, EUR 18,512 in 2005 and EUR 18,000 in 2006. The search warrant stated that the house search was urgently needed in order to find further evidence and that, weighing the seriousness of the alleged crimes against the constitutional rights of the applicants, the house search was proportionate. 9.  On 23 September 2008 the applicants\u2019 flat was searched and one envelope containing L. Bank documents and five computer files were seized. 10.  The applicants appealed against the search warrant. They argued that the warrant had not been granted in accordance with the law. It had been based on material which had been acquired in breach of international law, especially the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters of 20 April 1959 and the Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime of 8 November 1990, because the data had been stolen from the L. Bank and had been bought by the secret service. The acquisition of the data had also violated domestic law, as the secret service had no authorisation to obtain tax data. In fact, such an act was a criminal offence under German law, as it infringed section 17(1) and section 17(2)(2) of the Unfair Competition Act (\u201cdivulgence of official secrets\u201d (Geheimnisverrat)). Furthermore, the secret service was not authorised to forward tax data to the financial authorities and the prosecution, as this infringed the German legal principle of separation of the secret service and the police/prosecution (Trennungsprinzip). 11.  On 8 April 2009 the Bochum District Court dismissed the appeal. It was of the view that the house search had been legal as it had been based on a lawful search warrant. The court had no doubt that it had been lawful to base the search warrant on the information contained in the Liechtenstein data carrier, as, in its view, the data had neither been seized in direct violation of international law nor by circumventing international treaties. 12.  The District Court was also of the view that the search warrant in question could be issued on the basis of the information in the data carrier, as the secret service had only played a passive role in acquiring it. According to the court, there was no indication that the secret service had incited a third person to steal the data, and it had merely accepted the data from a third person when this person had offered it. The fact that the secret service might have remunerated the seller did not, in the court\u2019s view, change the fact that the secret service had only played a passive role. In the court\u2019s opinion, it was within the secret service\u2019s remit to acquire the data carrier in the prescribed way and hand the data over to the prosecution, as the data carrier contained 9,600 sets of data concerning international cash flows. 13.  On 7 August 2009 the Bochum Regional Court dismissed the applicants\u2019 appeal. It held that the search warrant had been lawful, even if it was true that the German authorities had infringed domestic criminal law in obtaining the evidence. Even assuming that the German authorities might have committed the criminal offences of acting as an \u201caccessory to a criminal offence\u201d (Beg\u00fcnstigung, Article 257 \u00a7 1 of the German Criminal Code) and an \u201caccessory to the divulgence of official secrets\u201d (Beihilfe zum Geheimnisverrat, section 17(1) and section 17(2)(2) of the Unfair Competition Act, in conjunction with Article 27 of the German Criminal Code) in buying the Liechtenstein data from K., and that K. might have committed the offence of \u201cindustrial espionage\u201d (Betriebsspionage, section 17(2)(1) of the Unfair Competition Act), it considered the search warrant to have been lawful. With regard to the applicants\u2019 allegation that the data had been acquired in breach of international law, the Regional Court doubted any such breach. 14.  As regards the question whether illegally obtained evidence could be used in criminal proceedings, the Regional Court referred to a decision of the same court of 22 April 2008, where it had held in a similar case and with regard to the same data carrier that the interest in prosecuting the suspects outweighed the possible infringements of criminal law, as the principal criminal act of \u201cdata theft\u201d had been committed by a third party and not by the German authorities. According to the well-established case-law of the Federal Court of Justice, evidence that had been illegally acquired by a third party could generally be used in criminal proceedings, unless it had been acquired through coercion or force. It also had to be considered that the use of the \u201cstolen\u201d data had not infringed the core of the applicants\u2019 private sphere, but their business affairs. Furthermore, the \u201cdata theft\u201d had not primarily infringed the rights of the applicants, but the data-protection rights of the bank from which it had been \u201cstolen\u201d. Thus, the Liechtenstein data was not excluded as evidence and the search order could be based on it. As to the presumed breach of international law, the court added that such a breach would not lead to the unlawfulness of the search warrant, firstly because international law did not grant the applicants any personal rights and secondly because the use of the evidence did not in itself constitute a breach of international law. 15.  On 11 September 2009 the applicants lodged a constitutional complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court. They were of the view that the Regional Court and the District Court should have decided that the search warrant had not been in accordance with the law, as the use of the Liechtenstein data as a basis for a search warrant had violated international treaties and the sovereignty of Liechtenstein, which had protested against the use of the data. 16.  Furthermore, they argued that their right to respect for their home under Article 13 of the Basic Law had been infringed, as the search warrant had been based on evidence that had been acquired by the secret service and passed on to the prosecution in violation of domestic law. The data purchase from K. had constituted a criminal act. Moreover, the secret service had no authority under German law to purchase such data. Furthermore, the transfer of the Liechtenstein data from the secret service to the financial authorities and the prosecution had violated the principle of the separation of the secret service and the prosecution in Germany. The infringement of domestic law had been so severe that the criminal courts should have come to the conclusion that the Liechtenstein data could not have formed the basis of a search warrant. They would thus have been obliged to declare the search warrant illegal. 17.  On 9 November 2010 the Federal Constitutional Court dismissed the constitutional complaint as manifestly ill-founded. It found that the fact that the search warrant had been based on the Liechtenstein data did not infringe Article 13 of the Basic Law. 18.  The Federal Constitutional Court reiterated that there was no absolute rule that evidence which had been acquired in violation of procedural rules could never be used in criminal proceedings (compare paragraph 28 below). The court further pointed out that it had to be borne in mind that the case at hand did not concern the question of whether evidence could be admitted in a criminal trial, but only concerned the preliminary question of whether evidence that might have been acquired in breach of procedural rules could form the basis of a search warrant in criminal investigation proceedings. Even if evidence was considered inadmissible in criminal proceedings, this did not automatically mean that the same was true for all stages of criminal investigations. 19.  Furthermore, the court reiterated that it was not its role to substitute itself for the authorities in the interpretation and application of domestic law, but to review, in the light of the Basic Law, the decisions taken by the authorities in the exercise of their margin of appreciation. 20.  In applying these general principles to the case at hand, the Federal Constitutional Court ruled, at the outset, that it was not necessary to decide upon the question whether the acquisition of the data had been in breach of national or international law or violated the principle of the separation of the secret service and the prosecution in Germany, as the Regional Court had departed in its decision from the applicants\u2019 allegation that the evidence might in fact have been acquired in breach of domestic and international law, including criminal law. 21.  The Federal Constitutional Court found that the fact that the Regional Court based its legal assessment on the assumption that the acquisition of the data had been in breach of domestic and/or international law was not arbitrary and hence could not be found to be in violation of Article 13 of the Basic Law. Its finding that the applicants could not invoke international law in their favour only showed a different legal opinion without disregarding the applicants\u2019 basic rights. Furthermore, the Federal Constitutional Court considered reasonable the District and Regional Court\u2019s legal assessment that the principle of separation of the secret service and the prosecution had not been infringed, as the facts of the case did not show that the secret service had either ordered or coordinated the \u201cdata theft\u201d, but had been offered the data on K.\u2019s own initiative. Acquiring data in such a way and passing it on to the prosecution could not violate the principle of separation, and hence could not render a search warrant unconstitutional. 22.  With regard to the Regional Court\u2019s finding that the search order could be based on the Liechtenstein data the Federal Constitutional Court found that the Regional Court\u2019s legal assessment sufficiently took into account the applicants\u2019 basic rights as the Regional Court had departed from the applicants\u2019 allegation that the evidence had been obtained in breach of domestic law and thus based its decision on, what was, for the applicants, the best possible assumption. 23.  The Federal Constitutional Court further considered that the Regional Court had struck a fair balance between the different interests at stake. The alleged breach of national and/or international law did not entail an imperative prohibition to use the evidence in the proceedings at issue. Furthermore, the Regional Court had rightly pointed out that the data did not relate to the core area of the applicants\u2019 private life, but to their business activities. It had recognized the decisive interest at stake, namely the applicants\u2019 right to inviolability of their home, and took it sufficiently into account, as nothing showed that German authorities purposely and systematically breached international or domestic law in obtaining the data carrier. 24.  On 2 August 2012 the Nuremberg District Court acquitted the applicants of the charges of tax evasion, finding that it had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt that the capital of the foundation in question had been invested in an interest-bearing way.", "references": ["5", "8", "4", "2", "0", "1", "7", "3", "9", "6", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1944. At the time of lodging his application, he was detained in a Centre for persons in preventive detention in Hamburg-Fuhlsb\u00fcttel Prison. He now lives in Pinneberg. 6.  On 28 March 1994 the L\u00fcbeck Regional Court convicted the applicant of rape and sexual assault. It sentenced him to eight years\u2019 imprisonment and ordered his preventive detention under Article 66 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 23 below). The court found that in August 1986 the applicant, having acted with full criminal responsibility, had raped an eighteen-year-old woman whom he had lured into a forest. It noted that between 6 October 1970 and 28 May 1991 the applicant had been convicted of five counts of rape of young women, committed only a couple of months after his release from prison. Therefore, and having consulted a medical expert, the court found that the applicant had a propensity to commit serious sexual offences and was dangerous to the public. 7.  On 10 January 2002 the applicant, who had fully served his prison sentence, was placed for the first time in preventive detention, initially in L\u00fcbeck Prison. He had thus served ten years in preventive detention by 9 January 2012. 8.  On 2 October 2012 the L\u00fcbeck Regional Court, having heard the applicant in person as well as his lawyer, by whom he was represented throughout the proceedings, ordered the applicant\u2019s preventive detention to continue. 9.  The Regional Court considered that the requirements set up by Article 67d of the Criminal Code, read in the light of the Federal Constitutional Court\u2019s judgment of 4 May 2011 (see paragraph 23 below), in order for retrospectively-extended preventive detention to continue, were met. It found that the applicant suffered from a mental disorder, for the purposes of section 1 (1) of the Therapy Detention Act (see paragraph 23 below). He had a personality and conduct disorder as described by the relevant tool for the classification of diseases, the International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems in its current version (ICD-10). The Regional Court endorsed the findings which psychiatric expert B. had made in his report dated 4 June 2010 on the possibility of granting relaxation of the conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention (Vollzugslockerungen) after having examined the applicant in person. The expert had found that the applicant suffered from a profound and serious personality disorder with narcissistic elements and a lack of self-esteem. His disorder was characterised by denying and idealising conduct, total denial of his own aggression and minimisation of his criminal acts. 10.  Furthermore, in the Regional Court\u2019s view, there was still a high risk that the applicant, owing to the said specific circumstances relating to his person and his conduct, would commit the most serious sexual offences if released. It had repeatedly been confirmed, in particular, by expert B. and by the Hamburg-Eppendorf University hospital, that the applicant needed comprehensive therapy for sexual offenders in a social therapeutic institution. However, the applicant, who had not completed therapy, had confirmed at the hearing that he refused transfer to the prison\u2019s social therapeutic department. Furthermore, the applicant had already raped six women and had repeatedly reoffended shortly after his release. 11.  On 24 October 2012 the applicant lodged an appeal against the Regional Court\u2019s decision with the Schleswig-Holstein Court of Appeal. He argued that his continued preventive detention beyond the former ten\u2011year time-limit breached the Basic Law, as interpreted by the Federal Constitutional Court, and the Convention. He complained, in particular, that the Regional Court had failed to obtain a new report by a different expert and had relied on the report of expert B. dating back two-and-a-half years, on relaxation of the conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention, which had not addressed the issues relevant to his continued detention. 12.  On 21 November 2012 the Schleswig-Holstein Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. As regards the finding that the applicant suffered from a mental disorder for the purposes of section 1 (1) of the Therapy Detention Act, the Court of Appeal stressed that the decision to extend the applicant\u2019s preventive detention had not only been based on the written report submitted by expert B. in 2010. The expert had been heard in person by the Regional Court in different proceedings (concerning the applicant\u2019s transfer to a psychiatric hospital, see paragraph 19 below) on 6 June 2012 and had updated and confirmed his previous findings. His assessment had further been shared by the Hamburg-Eppendorf University hospital in its statement dated 27 March 2012 on the therapeutic progress made by the applicant. The hospital, having regard to the voluminous case\u2011file, had confirmed expert B.\u2019s conclusion that the applicant, who had refused any therapeutic treatment for years, suffered from a profound personality disorder as defined by the ICD-10, namely a narcissistic personality disorder with emotionally unstable and sadistic elements. 13.  The Court of Appeal, having regard to the applicant\u2019s previous offences and the fact that therapy to date had not yielded success, further agreed that there was still a high risk that the applicant would commit the most serious sexual offences if released. As had been confirmed by the applicant in the hearing before the Regional Court, his personal and therapeutic situation had not changed since the Court of Appeal\u2019s last decision of 18 November 2011 in which, in periodic review proceedings, it had ordered the extension of the applicant\u2019s preventive detention. 14.  On 17 December 2012 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court. He complained that the extension of his preventive detention beyond the former statutory ten-year time-limit had violated his right to liberty and the protection of legitimate expectations in a State governed by the rule of law. 15.  The applicant claimed that the restrictive criteria set up by the Federal Constitutional Court in its judgment of 4 May 2011 for a continuation of his retrospectively extended preventive detention had not been met. In particular, the order for the continuation of his preventive detention had been based on an old expert report on relaxation of the conditions of his detention, which had not addressed the criteria set up by the Federal Constitutional Court. In these circumstances, the courts had not had at their disposal a sufficient basis for concluding that he had a mental disorder for the purposes of the Therapy Detention Act. In any event, he did not suffer from a mental illness as required by Article 5 \u00a7 1 (e) of the Convention. 16.  On 20 March 2013 the Federal Constitutional Court, without giving reasons, declined to consider the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint (file no. 2 BvR 2886/12). 17.  From 10 January 2002 until 22 May 2013 the preventive detention order against the applicant was executed in L\u00fcbeck Prison, where the applicant was detained together with persons serving their prison sentence. For as long as the applicant\u2019s detention was executed at that prison during the time covered by the proceedings at issue, the applicant, having refused repeated offers of treatment, in particular transfer to the social\u2011therapeutic institution of L\u00fcbeck Prison, apparently did not undergo any therapy for sexual offenders. His occasional conversations with the prison psychologists had been discontinued in May 2012. 18.  On 22 May 2013 the applicant was transferred to the newly-set-up Centre for persons in preventive detention in Hamburg-Fuhlsb\u00fcttel Prison. That Centre was built in order to comply with the constitutional requirement, as defined by the Federal Constitutional Court in its judgment of 4 May 2011, to differentiate between preventive detention and imprisonment. Soon after his transfer to that Centre the applicant started comprehensive therapy, including one-to-one and group therapy sessions. He was granted leave without escort from March 2014 onwards. 19.  Prior to the proceedings at issue, on 14 June 2012 the L\u00fcbeck Regional Court dismissed the prosecution\u2019s request to transfer the applicant to a psychiatric hospital for the further execution of his preventive detention under Article 67a \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 23 below). Having heard psychiatric expert B., the Regional Court found that the applicant\u2019s reintegration into society could not better be supported in a psychiatric hospital. It was necessary for the applicant to undergo therapy for sex offenders in a social-therapeutic department in prison or possibly with an external social therapist. Transferring the applicant, who was not willing to undergo therapy, to a psychiatric hospital against his will would not yield any success. 20.  On 24 October 2013, in new review proceedings, the Hamburg Regional Court ordered the applicant\u2019s preventive detention to continue. It had regard to the report dated 28 August 2013, submitted by psychiatric expert L., on the applicant\u2019s mental condition and the danger he represented. Having examined the applicant in person, L. had considered that the applicant was an accentuated personality, possibly with sadistic personality traits, and lacked self-esteem. He found, however, that the applicant could not be diagnosed with a mental disorder as defined in the ICD-10; in particular, he showed no signs of sexual sadism. There was a medium risk that the applicant would again commit serious sexual offences if released. 21.  On 29 August 2014 the Hamburg Regional Court, having regard to an additional report drawn up by expert L., declared the applicant\u2019s preventive detention terminated and ordered his release on 1 October 2014. It found that the applicant neither suffered from a mental disorder nor was there a high likelihood that he would commit the most serious crimes of violence or sexual offences if released.", "references": ["7", "2", "0", "5", "4", "3", "9", "6", "1", "8", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1975. As of October 2013, he was serving a life sentence in Kherson Prison no. 61. On 21 March 2014 his representative informed the Court about the applicant\u2019s new address, which was Lugansk Pre-Trial Detention Centre (SIZO), without any further details. 7.  On 24 (or 25 according to the Government) September 2004 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of robbery and murder. According to the applicant, the police subjected him to various forms of ill-treatment following his arrest. 8.  On 23 November 2005 the Court of Appeal of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, sitting as a court of first instance, found the applicant guilty of aggravated robbery, two counts of murder, and unlawful possession of firearms. The court sentenced him to life imprisonment with confiscation of property. 9.  The applicant appealed on points of law. 10.  On 20 April 2006 the Supreme Court upheld the judgment of the first-instance court. 11.  The applicant was detained in the following detention facilities:\n- the Simferopol Temporary Detention Facility (\u201cthe Simferopol ITT\u201d, a part of the police system): from 25 September to 26 October and from 4 to 19 November 2004 (during the intervening period from 26 October to 4 November 2004 the applicant was undergoing a forensic psychiatric examination in a psychiatric hospital);\n- the Simferopol Pre-Trial Detention Centre (\u201cthe Simferopol SIZO\u201d): from 19 November 2004 to 16 March 2006 and from 2 May to 18 October 2006;\n- the Dnipropetrovsk SIZO: from 17 March to 6 April, from 25 April to 1 May and from 19 to 29 October 2006;\n- the Kyiv SIZO: from 7 to 25 April 2006 (that is during the time when the applicant\u2019s case was examined by the Supreme Court);\n- the Odessa SIZO: from 30 October to 4 November 2006 (the applicant raised no complaints in respect of his detention there); and\n- Kherson Prison no. 61: from 4 November 2006 onwards. 12.  The applicant did not specify the cells in which he had been detained. According to him, he was held in an overcrowded, cold and damp cell located in a basement and lacking fresh air and sufficient daylight. He also alleged that he had not been provided with any bed linen. Furthermore, he was allegedly deprived of access to shower and had no facilities for shaving. Nor could he enjoy any outdoor walks. The nutrition was allegedly very poor and did not correspond to the applicant\u2019s needs given his health condition. 13.  The applicant further submitted that, although he was suffering from active tuberculosis, he had had to share his cell with healthy inmates, which had provoked conflicts. 14.  According to the applicant, when he was transferred back to the ITT on 4 November 2004 after his forensic psychiatric examination, the temperature in his cell was very low. Nonetheless, the ITT administration withheld his warm clothes. As a result, the applicant allegedly caught bronchitis and pneumonia. 15.  The Government submitted that they were not able to provide details as to the specific cells, in which the applicant had been detained, because the relevant records had been destroyed with the passage of the envisaged period of their storage. The Government therefore provided information about all the cells of the Simferopol ITT based on the information note issued by the ITT\u2019s governor on 11 December 2012. 16.  As specified in that information note, the ITT had nine cells able to accommodate up to forty-two inmates. Seven of those cells were identical: each of them measured 10 sq. m. and was designated for four persons. The eighth cell measured 13 sq. m. and accommodated two inmates. And, lastly, there was a bigger cell, measuring 21 sq. metres, which was designated for eight persons. 17.  All the cells were located in a semi-basement. Each of them had a window and was equipped with a forced ventilation system. 18.  The cells had beds for each inmate, a table, a lavatory and a washstand with centralised water supply. There was also centralised heating in the ITT functioning during the cold season (end of autumn, winter and beginning of spring). 19.  According to the Government, the inmates were provided with all the required bed linen in the ITT.\n(b)  In the Simferopol SIZO 20.  According to the information note issued by the governor of the Simferopol SIZO on 29 November 2012 at the request of the Government\u2019s Agent, the applicant was detained in the following cells:\n- from 19 November 2004 to 18 March 2005 and from 22 April to 23 November 2005 \u2013 in cell no. 101;\n- from 18 March to 22 April 2005 \u2013 in cell no. 105;\n- from 23 to 25 November 2005 \u2013 in cell no. 69;\n- from 24 November 2005 to 16 March 2006, from 30 June to 7 July 2006 and from 14 to 21 July 2006 \u2013 in cell no. 72; and\n- from 23 to 30 June, from 7 to 14 July and from 21 July to 18 October 2006 \u2013 in cell no. 70. 21.  Cells nos. 101 and 105 were ordinary cells, which the applicant shared with two other inmates for most of the time. According to the applicant, however, starting from 29 June 2005 his cell-mates were transferred to other cells and he remained alone in cell no. 101. Cells nos. 69, 70 and 72 belonged to the maximum security unit and the applicant was in solitary confinement there. 22.  The case file contains a copy of the SIZO governor\u2019s decision of 24 November 2005 about the applicant\u2019s placement in a separate cell of the maximum security unit on the ground of the prevention of the spread of tuberculosis (the applicant was then diagnosed with active tuberculosis). 23.  Given that in 2007 the numbering of the SIZO cells had been changed, the Government found it impossible to locate with precision each cell, in which the applicant had been detained. They, however, submitted that all the cells of the same category (ordinary or maximum security) had the same characteristics. 24.  According to the information provided by the Government, each of the cells had a double-glazed window enabling natural ventilation and penetration of daylight. All the cells were equipped with ventilating equipment, water supply and sewerage, as well centralised heating. There was all the required furniture in the cells. 25.  According to the applicant, his cells were cold and damp. The window in cell no. 101 was allegedly not glazed and the inmates had to cover it with blankets and plastic bags. 26.  The maximum security cells were allegedly very small and had poor lighting and ventilation. The applicant also submitted that the toilet had not been separated from the living area and smelled of excrement. There was no hot water supply and cold water was supplied irregularly. 27.  Furthermore, the nutrition was allegedly very basic often being limited to bread, porridge and soup with sour cabbage. According to the Government, however, the nutrition for the detainees had been in accordance with the applicable legal requirements. 28.  Lastly, the applicant submitted that the special \u201clife prisoner\u201d uniform had been too small for him, which had caused him discomfort and had provoked mockery by other inmates. The Government noted, without further details, that wearing a special uniform was a legal requirement.\n(c)  In the Dnipropetrovsk SIZO 29.  According to the applicant, he was detained in a solitary cell measuring 1.7 by 3 metres in a semi-basement. It had a concrete floor and was equipped with a bench, which was also made of concrete. The light in the cell was very poor. The toilet was not separated from the rest of the cell. 30.  The Government did not make any submissions in respect of the conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention in the Dnipropetrovsk SIZO.\n(d)  In the Kyiv SIZO 31.  The applicant was held in a solitary cell, in allegedly poor conditions. Furthermore, he was allegedly denied the opportunity to use the common shower facilities. Instead, on 12 and 19 April 2006 he was locked for an hour in a small room equipped with a cold-water tap on the level of his stomach. As the temperature inside was very low, he preferred not to wash himself. The applicant had therefore no access to warm shower for the entire period of his detention in the Kyiv SIZO (from 7 to 25 April 2006). 32.  The Government did not comment on this period of the applicant\u2019s detention.\n(e)  In Kherson Prison no. 61 33.  The applicant, being a life prisoner, was transferred from one cell to another every ten days. According to him, all the cells, in which he had been detained (he mentioned, in particular, cells nos. 8, 10, 11 and 14) were damp and cold. In some of them, the walls were covered with mold and fungus. 34.  Furthermore, the prison cells allegedly lacked sufficient daylight and fresh air. They were not ventilated artificially and the only access to fresh air was through a window, which could not be opened wider than five centimetres. The applicant also submitted that the windows were closed during the inmates\u2019 daily outdoor walks, as the cells were then being disinfected by ultraviolet germicidal irradiation lamps. 35.  The applicant specified the size and population of only two cells: cell no. 8 measured 21 sq. m. and was shared by four inmates; and cell no. 14 measured about 15 sq. m. and accommodated three inmates. 36.  During the period from May 2007 to December 2010 there were major repairs in the prison, which had allegedly caused the applicant such inconveniences as having to bear with a high level of noise and inhaling construction dust and paint smells. 37.  The applicant further submitted that the yard for outdoor walks (which lasted two hours per day) had no shelter to protect detainees from rain or sun. 38.  According to the Government, the conditions of detention in the prison were in compliance with the standards established by the Court. 39.  On 17 October 2012 an official of the Kherson City Prosecutor\u2019s Office in charge of the supervision of lawfulness in penitentiaries, a representative of the Association of Ukrainian human rights monitors in law-enforcement institutions, as well as the governor and the deputy governor of the prison, conducted \u201ca monitoring visit\u201d of the prison. According to their report, all the maximum security cells were located below the ground level and were damp. Cell no. 8 (in which the applicant was detained at the time) measured 21 sq. m. and accommodated four inmates. It had sufficient daylight and artificial light. It was, however, impossible for inmates to switch on/off the light or to regulate its brightness. The cell had natural ventilation and the window could be opened from inside. There was centralised heating, but at the time of the visit the weather was warm and the heating was off. The toilet was separated from the living area. There was a washstand, but the water tap was leaking. There were minor flood traces on the ceiling, which the administration explained by a recent accident. 40.  On an unspecified date in October 2012 the deputy governor of the prison issued an information note about the conditions of detention in that prison at the request of the Government\u2019s Agent. It stated, in particular, that cell no. 8 had a window of 1.3 by 1.1 metres, one 220V lamp and one night watch light (36V). The prison official also stated that between May 2007 and December 2010 the maximum security unit of the prison had undergone major refurbishments. In October 2012 some minor repairs were carried out in cell no. 8. 41.  The Government submitted four photographs of cell no. 8, showing a spacious and light room in a visually good state of repair. According to the applicant, those photographs had been taken after his detention in that cell and were of no relevance for his case. 42.  According to the information provided by the Government, the prison cells were disinfected on a daily basis during the detainees\u2019 outdoor walks. The applicant noted that this did not happen when inmates chose not to go for a walk because of poor weather conditions. 43.  As further submitted by the Government, cells for smear-positive and smear-negative inmates were located on different floors and had separate shower facilities, X-ray examination rooms and walking yards. The applicant specified that it had not been so before October 2012. 44.  Prior to his detention the applicant had been suffering from chronic hepatitis, neurocirculatory asthenia, varicose veins, and astigmatism of both eyes. It is not known whether he had undergone any medical treatment in that connection. 45.  Furthermore, in 1995 the applicant was diagnosed with tuberculosis for the first time. In November 2001 his tuberculosis disease was considered to have developed in a chronic form. 46.  On 30 November 2001 the applicant was admitted for inpatient treatment to the Zaporizhzhya regional tuberculosis dispensary. 47.  On 22 February 2002 he was discharged from it on the ground of his refusal from the treatment and his continued absence. 48.  On 18 March 2002 the applicant was re-admitted to the aforementioned dispensary for treatment. 49.  On 30 April 2002 he was discharged on the ground of his persistent breaches of the treatment regimen and the dispensary\u2019s rules. 50.  According to an information note issued by the dispensary\u2019s chief doctor at the request of the applicant\u2019s lawyer on 24 April 2013, during his treatment there in 2002 the applicant had been administered anti-tuberculosis medicines of the first and the second lines. 51.  On 26 May 2003 the applicant was recognised as falling within the third category of disability (the mildest) on account of his tuberculosis disease.\n(b)  During the applicant\u2019s detention 52.  On 25 September 2004 the applicant underwent a medical examination upon his admission to the Simferopol ITT. As recorded in the ITT\u2019s journal, the applicant informed the doctor about his tuberculosis disease, but did not raise any complaints. 53.  On 11 October 2004 the ITT governor wrote to the Simferopol prosecutor that, according to the conclusion of a tuberculosis specialist of the same date, the applicant was suffering from an active form of tuberculosis and required further examination and inpatient treatment in a hospital environment. At the time of writing he was, however, detained in the ITT as an ordinary detainee. The ITT governor requested the prosecutor to help in organising the applicant\u2019s transfer to a tuberculosis dispensary. It appears that there was no follow up to that request. 54.  On 26 October 2004, upon the applicant\u2019s admission to the psychiatric hospital for his forensic psychiatric examination, a tuberculosis specialist examined him. The applicant complained of coughing with purulent sputum, general weakness, breathlessness and a considerable loss of weight. He was diagnosed with active fibrous-cavernous pulmonary tuberculosis at the stage of infiltration and was prescribed isoniazid, rifampicin, pyrazinamide, ethambutol, streptomycin and some other medications and vitamins. 55.  On 1 November 2004, while still in the psychiatric hospital, the applicant was X-rayed and repeatedly examined by a tuberculosis specialist. The doctor confirmed the earlier diagnosis and recommended the continuation of the medicinal treatment, subsequent monitoring of the applicant\u2019s condition and his isolation. 56.  On 4 November 2004 the applicant was transferred back to the Simferopol ITT. According to him, his medical treatment for tuberculosis was disrupted at that point. 57.  On 19 November 2004, following the applicant\u2019s transfer to the Simferopol SIZO, a panel of doctors, including a tuberculosis specialist, examined him. He was prescribed with: isoniazid, rifampicin, pyrazinamide, ethambutol and streptomycin \u2013 for an intensive treatment phase (for the periods from 19 November 2004 to 28 February 2005, from 1 August to 30 November 2005 and from 2 May to 30 August 2006) and isoniazid, rifampicin and pyrazinamide \u2013 for a follow-up treatment phase (for the periods from 1 March to 31 July 2005, from 1 December 2005 to 16 March 2006 and from 1 September to 13 October 2006). 58.  According to the applicant\u2019s medical file, he was provided with the prescribed medications on a daily basis. Furthermore, during his detention in the Simferopol SIZO the applicant was examined by a tuberculosis specialist and underwent sputum smear testing on a monthly basis. He also had regular chest X-ray examinations. The applicant\u2019s diagnosis remained the same and his X-raying showed no changes in the state of his lungs. The applicant\u2019s medical file pertaining to his pre-trial detention contains no reference to his drug susceptibility test. 59.  The applicant complained to various authorities, in particular, about his solitary confinement, which he did not consider to be justified on medical grounds. On 8 September 2005 an official of the regional office of the State Department for the Enforcement of Sentences wrote to the applicant that he was the only detainee suffering from an active form of tuberculosis and his isolation was justified. He was receiving regular medical treatment. Furthermore, as stated in the letter, he had undergone drug susceptibility testing carried out with the participation of the Simferopol city tuberculosis dispensary. 60.  On 18 October 2006 the applicant was transferred from the Simferopol SIZO to Kherson Prison no. 61. 61.  On 4 November 2006 the applicant arrived in Kherson Prison no. 61 having the status of a penitentiary tuberculosis hospital (before his arrival in the prison he had been detained in the Dnipropetrovsk and Odessa SIZOs (see paragraph 11 above), where he allegedly received no medical treatment). 62.  Immediately after the applicant\u2019s arrival in the prison, a panel of doctors examined him and diagnosed him with: chronic pulmonary tuberculosis, chronic hepatitis in an aggravation phase, neurocirculatory asthenia, varicose veins, and astigmatism of both eyes. He was placed in the prison\u2019s medical unit for inpatient treatment. 63.  On 28 November 2006, following the applicant\u2019s complaint about heartache, weakness and loss of appetite, he was examined by a general practitioner who diagnosed him with chronic hepatitis in an aggravation phase and neurocirculatory asthenia of cardiac type. The doctor prescribed some medications to the applicant and recommended that he undergo an electrocardiogram. It appears that the above recommendation had not been implemented. As the applicant continued raising the same complaints, a general practitioner again examined him on 15 January and 6 June 2007. He confirmed the earlier diagnoses and prescribed medications. 64.  Furthermore, in December 2006, April 2007, January 2008 and March 2009, as well as in May and July 2011, an ophthalmologist diagnosed the applicant with astigmatism of both eyes and prescribed eyeglasses for him. It is not known whether the applicant received the eyeglasses according to the prescription. 65.  The applicant\u2019s chest X-raying in January 2007 (the exact date is illegible) showed that his tuberculosis disease was progressing. 66.  On 20 February 2007 the applicant underwent a drug susceptibility test, which established that he was resistant to isoniazid, rifampicin, pyrazinamide, ethambutol and streptomycin. His treatment was therefore corrected and he was prescribed different medicines (such as kanamycin, ethambutol, para-aminosalicylic acid, ciprofloxacin and ofloxacin). 67.  On 27 April 2007, 24 April 2008, 30 April 2010 and 27 May 2011 the applicant was recognised as falling into the second category of disability on account of his tuberculosis disease (for a period of one or two years, with his condition to be reassessed thereafter). 68.  On 15 April 2008 the applicant\u2019s X-raying showed negative developments in his lungs. 69.  His subsequent X-ray examinations on 3 and 28 October 2008 indicated that his condition \u201cwas becoming stable\u201d. Accordingly, the applicant\u2019s treatment was changed from inpatient to outpatient. 70.  In March 2009 his tuberculosis disease progressed again. As a result, on 13 March 2009 he was referred again to the prison\u2019s medical unit for inpatient treatment. 71.  On 13 April, 28 July and 28 September 2009 the applicant refused to take the anti-tuberculous medicines. 72.  On 5 May and 15 September 2009 he also refused from X-raying. 73.  On 14 June, 14 July, 19 August, 8 October and 10 November 2009 the applicant refused that his blood samples be taken for analysis. 74.  On 20 April and 29 December 2010 the applicant underwent further X-ray examinations of his chest, which showed no changes in his lungs. 75.  On 26 January 2011 a neurologist diagnosed the applicant with cervical spine osteochondrosis and recommended him to put a hard surface (something like a wood shield) beneath his matrass. According to the applicant, the prison administration did not allow him to do that. 76.  On 15 March and 15 September 2011 the applicant refused to take the anti-tuberculous medicines. 77.  On 29 March, 5 July, 8 September and 11 October 2011 his X-raying showed no changes in his condition. 78.  As indicated in the applicant\u2019s medical records, on 28 October 2011 his treatment was corrected. He was prescribed with: pyrazinamide, para-aminosalicylic acid, capreomycin, ofloxacin and cycloserine. 79.  On 30 January, 4 May and 13 November 2012 the applicant had his chest X-rayed again. Like before, no changes in his lungs were reported. 80.  On 10 May 2012 the applicant agreed in writing to palliative care. He wrote that he was aware of the reasons and consequences of that decision and that he had taken it without any pressure. 81.  On 14 September 2012 the prison administration wrote a letter to the applicant\u2019s mother in reply to her complaint, in particular, regarding his medical care. The prison governor stated that the applicant\u2019s treatment for tuberculosis had been without effect for a long period of time, as he had developed multi-resistance to all possible anti-tuberculosis drugs. Accordingly, it had been proposed to the applicant that his treatment be confined to palliative care and he had accepted that proposal. It was explained in the letter that the palliative care consisted of the administration of two anti-tuberculosis drugs of the first line (isoniazid and rifampicin) regardless of the applicant\u2019s resistance to them. As rifampicin was not available in the prison, it had been replaced with ethambutol. Lastly, the prison official wrote that the palliative care had been prescribed to the applicant for life. 82.  On 27 September 2012 the National Institute of Tuberculosis Studies and Pulmonology, to which the applicant\u2019s mother had also complained about his medical treatment in detention, responded to her. The director of the Institute wrote that, as it appeared from the medical file, the applicant\u2019s tuberculosis disease had become incurable. Accordingly, the prospects of its treatment were deplorable regardless of the place of that treatment. Lastly, as noted in the letter, it was open for the applicant to apply for release on the ground of his incurable infectious disease. 83.  As confirmed by a record in the applicant\u2019s file of 16 November 2012, his X-ray examinations had not shown any positive changes in the state of his lungs since 2008. More specifically, the lung cavities were not disappearing. 84.  On 7 December 2012 the prison doctors recommended to continue the applicant\u2019s inpatient treatment according to the prescribed regimen. 85.  There is no information in the case file regarding the applicant\u2019s health condition and treatment thereafter. 86.  On 11 June 2006 the applicant sent his first letter to the Court, in which he complained, in particular, about the physical conditions of his detention and the lack of adequate medical care. 87.  On 20 June 2006 the Registry sent him an application form and accompanying explanatory documents and instructed him to submit a duly completed and signed application form within six weeks from the date of receipt of the Court\u2019s letter. 88.  In October 2006 the Court received several copies of the completed application form from the applicant, in which he elaborated, in particular, on the complaints, which he had outlined in his initial letter to the Court, including about the conditions of his detention in the Simferopol, Dnipropetrovsk and Kyiv SIZOs. According to him (and confirmed by his three cell-mates), he had attempted to send his application form on 30 August 2006, but the administration of the Simferopol SIZO had refused to dispatch it unless he deleted any complaints about his conditions of detention there. The applicant also submitted that the domestic courts had rejected his requests for access to some documents in his case file, which he intended to enclose to his application form, on the ground that he had already received copies of those documents, which was confirmed by his signature. Furthermore, the administration of the Simferopol SIZO allegedly refused to produce copies of some documents at the applicant\u2019s request. 89.  On 1 February 2012 the applicant sent a letter to the Court supplementing his application form with a complaint about poor physical conditions of detention and inadequate medical care in the Kherson prison.", "references": ["9", "0", "6", "3", "5", "7", "2", "4", "8", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1943 and lives in London. 6.  The applicant is of Cypriot origin and has lived all of his adult life in London. In 1997 he and another British national, C.G., bought a plot of land in the Glyfada district of Athens. 7.  In 1998 the applicant and C.G. asked the mortgage registry to register the deed of sale for the land in question. The mortgage registry refused to do so, since the State claimed ownership of the land. According to the Forestry Commission of the Ministry of Agriculture, the land had been classified as part of the forest estate since 1976. 8.  In 2002 the applicant secured an order from the Athens Court of First Instance requiring the mortgage registry to register the deed of sale; the mortgage registry did so on 31 January 2003. The applicant paid the sum of 36,911.63 euros (EUR) in registration fees. 9.  The public prosecutor\u2019s office appealed against the order and succeeded in having it set aside and the registration declared void. 10.  On 29 March 2004 the investigating judge drew up an indictment in respect of the applicant and C.G., accusing the applicant of having forged: (a) a certificate from the tax authorities attesting that he had paid inheritance tax on land valued at EUR 63,768,920, whereas he knew that the land was part of the public forest estate and the tax had not been paid; and (b) a document allegedly issued by the Penteli Forestry Commission attesting that the land was not part of the forest estate. The investigating judge also accused him of having used the forged documents to persuade the administrative authorities that the land was privately owned and could be the subject of a transaction, in particular a deed of transfer. 11.  The file included a handwriting analysis requested by the public prosecutor\u2019s office, dated 29 June 2003 and produced by a lawyer and graphology expert, M.M.K., who had taken an oath on 17 April 2003 to discharge that function. The sixty-two-page report concluded that one of the two documents \u201cappeared to have been entirely written\u201d by the applicant and contained an illegible signature, whereas aspects of the signature on the other document \u201cstrongly suggested that it had been added\u201d by the applicant\u2019s co-accused. On 8 May 2003 the applicant, through his lawyer, had appointed another expert, C.T.S., as a \u201ctechnical adviser\u201d to assist him. 12.  When presenting his defence to the investigating judge on 29 March 2004, the applicant disputed the competence of the graphologist M.M.K. He mentioned that two associations of graphologists of which she had claimed to be a member had stated that they had no knowledge of her and that a British graphologist, F.C., had noted in a report that M.M.K. was not qualified and that her comments were incorrect. However, the applicant did not submit any reports by his own technical adviser. 13.  On 7, 28 and 29 December 2004 the applicant submitted three reports by a different expert, D.K., whom he had instructed. The reports concluded that the documents in issue had not been written by the applicant and that the report by M.M.K. was inaccurate. 14.  On an unspecified date the applicant and C.G. were committed for trial in the Athens Criminal Court of Appeal, sitting as a bench of three judges, on charges of forgery and the use of forged documents. 15.  The hearing, concerning not only the applicant but also other individuals whose cases had been joined to his, was initially set down for 8 May 2006 and was then adjourned until 30 October 2006 and subsequently 12 March 2007, as the defendants\u2019 lawyers were unable to attend. It eventually took place on 12, 14 and 20 March 2007. 16.  On 12 March 2007 counsel for the applicant asked the president of the Criminal Court of Appeal to call M.M.K. and D.K. to give evidence. The president adjourned the hearing and directed that the public prosecutor\u2019s office was to ensure the attendance of the two experts. On the resumption of the hearing on 14 March 2007, only D.K. was present; he confirmed the findings set out in his three reports. No explanation was given for M.M.K.\u2019s absence. Subsequently, all the evidence was read out (105 documents running to a total of more than 1,500 pages), including the report by M.M.K., the defence witnesses gave testimony, and counsel for the defence asked questions and made their submissions without mentioning the need to examine other witnesses. At the end of the hearing, the president asked all the parties to the proceedings whether they wanted any additional examinations or explanations, but they replied in the negative. 17.  On 20 March 2007 the Criminal Court of Appeal found the applicant guilty of forgery and the use of forged documents and sentenced him in absentia to twelve years\u2019 imprisonment. Addressing the findings of M.M.K.\u2019s report, it noted the following:\n\u201cThe forgery of the aforementioned certificates by the first two defendants has been validly proved beyond all doubt, in particular through the handwriting analysis by the graphology expert M.M.K., the contents of which the court finds entirely convincing; in addition, the report\u2019s credibility is backed up by the documents in the file and the witness testimony. It can be established with little effort from an assessment of these items of evidence that the certificates were forged by the defendants, who, moreover, were the only people with an interest in taking such action.\u201d 18.  On 20 March 2007 the applicant appealed against that judgment to the Athens Criminal Court of Appeal, sitting as a bench of five judges. The hearing, which had initially been set down for 6 February 2009, was adjourned until 20 November 2009 and subsequently 19 March 2010, as counsel for the defendant was unable to attend. 19.  The hearing eventually took place on 19, 26 and 29 March and 8 April 2010. The Court of Appeal upheld the applicant\u2019s conviction in his absence but reduced his sentence to eleven years\u2019 imprisonment. At the end of the hearing, counsel for the defence asked the Court of Appeal to examine D.P. as a witness, and also the experts D.K. and M.M.K. 20.  The Criminal Court of Appeal refused the request in respect of all the witnesses mentioned, holding as follows:\n\u201cThe defendants\u2019 request to call the graphologist [M.M.K.] and the witness [D.P.] cannot be accepted as it is not deemed necessary in view of the evidence gathered so far. The graphologist [M.M.K.] has produced a detailed analytical report, which has been read out in court ...\nWith regard to the forged documents, several expert reports have been submitted and read out; accordingly, the attendance of these witnesses is also unnecessary on account of the evidence gathered. The defendants who are asking for the above-mentioned witnesses to be called to testify in court have, moreover, not stated the reason for their request ...\u201d 21.  As regards the expert report by M.M.K., the Court of Appeal held that the applicant had had no factual or legal basis for challenging it, and that his objections were contradicted by the factual circumstances, which were established and undisputed. Summing up, over six pages, the factual circumstances as established by the documents and the witness testimony, the Court of Appeal also mentioned the findings of M.M.K.\u2019s report, describing it as \u201cdetailed\u201d while adding:\n\u201cThe contents and conclusions of the handwriting analysis by M.M.K. are convincing and consistent with the documents issued by the tax authorities, the Forestry Commission, the Criminal Investigation Department and the other documents that have been read out, and also with the witness testimony.\u201d 22.  On 15 February 2010 the applicant appealed on points of law. He alleged that there had been a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 3 (d) of the Convention in that he had been convicted solely on the basis of the report by M.M.K., without having been allowed to cross-examine her at the hearings in the courts of first instance and appeal. The applicant relied on an extensive body of the Court\u2019s case-law in this area and even reproduced the relevant passages, translated into Greek, of seven judgments of the Court. He pointed out that although his counsel had asked both the first-instance and the appellate court to examine M.M.K., she had not appeared in court despite having been called to give evidence. He noted that in the appeal proceedings the defendants\u2019 request had been refused on the grounds that M.M.K. had produced a detailed analytical report, the conclusions of which had been read out in court. Nevertheless, the applicant had been deprived of his right to cross-examine her. 23.  The hearing, which had been set down for 1 April 2011, was postponed until 18 November 2011 at the applicant\u2019s request. In a judgment of 5 April 2012 (finalised on 7 May 2012 and certified as authentic on 4 July 2012) the Court of Cassation dismissed the appeal on points of law. In response to the ground of appeal alleging a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 3 (d), it held:\n\u201c... However, these requests [by the defendants], as formulated, were wholly vague and the court ... was not obliged to reply to them in detail. Nevertheless, the court rejected the requests in the following terms, on sufficient and substantiated grounds: \u2018The defendants\u2019 request to call the graphologist [M.M.K.] and the witness [D.P.] cannot be accepted as it is not deemed necessary in view of the evidence gathered so far. The graphologist [M.M.K.] has produced a detailed analytical report, which has been read out in court ... The defendants who are asking for the above-mentioned witnesses to be called to testify in court have, moreover, not stated the reason for their request ...\u2019 Accordingly, the ground of appeal submitted to that end by John Constantinides, alleging a violation of Article 510 \u00a7 1 (a) and (d) [failure to provide specific reasons] of the Code of Criminal Procedure, is unfounded and must be dismissed, since no provision relating to the accused\u2019s defence rights has been infringed, whether Article 6 \u00a7 3 (d) of the Convention or the constitutional requirement to provide detailed and specific reasons for a judicial decision.\u201d\n...", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "4", "9", "8", "0", "7", "5", "6", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "4. The applicant was born in 1938 and lives in Mykolayiv. 5. The applicant\u2019s son, A.G., was born in 1966. Among other health conditions, he suffered from tuberculosis, Aids and drug addiction. He also had an infected phlegmon (inflammation) on his right shin. 6.  On 4 May 2007 A.G. was arrested on suspicion of drug-related crimes and placed in a temporary detention centre (\u201cthe ITT\u201d) belonging to the Mykolayiv police. 7.  On 7 May 2007 the Tsentralnyy District Court of Mykolayiv ordered A.G.\u2019s pre-trial detention. 8.  During his detention in the ITT, he was attended by the ambulance doctors who provided him with requisite medical treatment. On 19 May 2007 he was transferred to the surgical ward of the local hospital where he was treated for his phlegmon. Following the treatment the doctors considered that he could be held in detention facilities. The applicant was returned to the ITT. 9.  According to the results of the domestic investigations, at about 9.30 p.m. on 23 May 2007 an ITT officer heard moaning coming from the cell where A.G. was detained. At that time, A.G. was alone. The officer checked the cell and saw him with his mouth open, breathing heavily and repeating that he felt bad and needed air. ITT officers removed him from the cell and took him to the entrance area to get some fresh air, where they carried out first aid. An ambulance arrived at 9.43 p.m. and confirmed that A.G. was dead. 10.  According to the post-mortem examination report, A.G. died from ischaemic heart disease, which had been aggravated by acute heart failure. Linear strangulation bruises were found on his neck, which indicated interrupted asphyxiation. According to the report, asphyxiation had been attempted ten minutes before death, and could have aggravated A.G.\u2019s chronic illnesses. 11.  On more than fifteen occasions between 2007 and 2012 the investigators at the local prosecutor\u2019s office, having conducted pre\u2011investigation inquiries, refused to initiate criminal proceedings in connection with the death of the applicant\u2019s son. Their decisions were quashed as unsubstantiated by supervising prosecutors and the courts, and further pre-investigation inquiries were ordered. 12.  On 14 December 2012 the authorities initiated criminal proceedings, in accordance with the 2012 Code of Criminal Procedure. 13.  On 27 March 2013 an investigator at the prosecutor\u2019s office of the Zavodskyy District of Mykolayiv terminated the criminal proceedings, finding no elements of a crime on the part of the ITT officers in question. 14.  On 24 July 2013 the Zavodskyy District Court of Mykolayiv quashed the decision of 27 March 2013 as unfounded, noting that the investigator had failed to take the necessary measures in the case. 15.  On 3 October 2013 the investigator terminated the criminal proceedings, concluding that there was no evidence to suggest that the ITT staff had caused the death of the applicant\u2019s son. He admitted that certain pieces of evidence could not be obtained. In particular, bed linen and a rope fashioned from bed linen, which had been found in the cell, could not be examined any further, as they had been destroyed after the post-mortem examination. For the same reasons, it was not possible to carry out a reconstruction of the events. He further noted that on 24 May 2007 a site inspection had been carried out, but no video-recordings or sketches of the scene had been made, and no photographs had been taken. 16.  Relying on the available evidence, the investigator found that, shortly before his death, the applicant\u2019s son had unsuccessfully attempted to commit suicide by asphyxiating himself with a rope which he had produced from the bed linen. According to the latest medical findings, his death had been caused by interrupted mechanical asphyxiation; the visible injuries on his neck suggested that heart failure had resulted from the attempted strangulation. 17.  As regards the applicant\u2019s son\u2019s condition during his detention, the available medical evidence suggested that A.G. had not had any acute condition necessitating his admission to hospital during his detention in the ITT; on the other hand, he had been medically supervised within the ITT. Furthermore, his serious illnesses, such as the tuberculosis and HIV, suggested that his physical condition would have gradually deteriorated in any event. Having examined the case, the investigator concluded that the ITT officers could not have envisaged the fatal developments. He added that the applicant\u2019s son had been provided with appropriate nutrition and had not refused food.", "references": ["8", "6", "3", "7", "9", "1", "2", "5", "4", "No Label", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1967 and lives in Kharkiv. 6.  Late in the evening of 15 August 2010 the applicant had a fight with his neighbour. The neighbour complained to the police that the applicant had injured him. 7.  On the morning of 16 August 2010 the police took the applicant to the Kyivskyy District police station in Kharkiv (\u201cthe district police\u201d). The applicant was at the police station from 7 a.m. to 9.45 a.m. and gave evidence in relation to the fight with his neighbour. The applicant claimed that he had acted in self-defence. According to the Government, at 9.45 a.m. the applicant left the police station and had no further contact with the police during the period at issue. His presence at the police station from 7 a.m. to 9.45 a.m. was noted in the police\u2019s records. 8.  According to the applicant, at 9.45 a.m., as he left the police station, police officers took him and drove him to a forest where they beat him up and tortured him using handcuffs and an electric shock device. The police officers then took the applicant to another part of the police station that he had just left, where they continued to ill-treat him. During that time the police officers put pressure on the applicant to admit that he had intended to murder his neighbour. On 19 August 2010 they released him. 9.  On 21 August 2010, following the applicant\u2019s complaint to the internal security unit of the Kharkiv Region police, he was examined by a forensic medical expert. The latter found that the applicant had sustained bruises on his head, nose, upper lip and chest. The expert considered those injuries as being minor and that they could have been caused by blunt, solid objects during a period of three to five days before the medical examination. 10.  On 25 August 2010 the assistant prosecutor of the Kyivskyy District prosecutor\u2019s office of Kharkiv (\u201cthe prosecutor\u2019s office\u201d) inspected the premises of the police station where the applicant had allegedly been ill-treated. He found traces of a brown substance on the floor, wall, and balcony, as well as on the pillowcase and two mattress covers. Samples of the substance were taken and submitted to an expert for examination. 11.  On 26 August 2010 the expert stated that the brown substance was blood. 12.  The prosecutor\u2019s office then questioned police officers A., M.B., M.A. and G. They all denied the allegations of ill-treatment and submitted that the applicant had sustained the injuries before being taken to the police station, namely during the scuffle with his neighbour. The officers stated that the applicant\u2019s nose had been injured before and that it bled from time to time, that he had been offered an antiseptic tissue, that he had declined an offer by the police officers to go to a hospital and that he had continued voluntarily to give evidence about the fight with his neighbour. They also mentioned that the applicant had gone on to the balcony to have a smoke where he might have left traces of blood. 13.  On 7 and 8 October 2010 the applicant submitted further complaints of ill-treatment to the internal security unit of the Kharkiv Region police and the prosecutor\u2019s office. 14.  On 29 October 2010 the prosecutor\u2019s office, having completed its pre-investigation inquiry, refused to initiate criminal proceedings concerning the applicant\u2019s allegations that he had been ill-treated by police officers between 16 and 19 August 2010. According to that decision, the applicant had only been present at the district police station between 7 a.m. and 9.45 a.m. on 16 August 2010 and there had been no evidence suggesting that the police officers had been involved in any alleged ill\u2011treatment or unlawful detention. The applicant challenged that decision in the courts. 15.  On 23 February 2011 the Kyivskyy District Court of Kharkiv (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) found that the decision of 29 October 2010 by the prosecutor\u2019s office had been lawful and substantiated. The applicant appealed. 16.  On 11 April 2011 the Court of Appeal upheld the District Court decision of 23 February 2011. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. 17.  On 9 February 2012 the Higher Specialised Court for Civil and Criminal Matters quashed the District Court decision of 23 February 2011 as unfounded and remitted the case to the District Court for fresh consideration. 18.  On 10 May 2012 the District Court reversed the decision of the prosecutor\u2019s office of 29 October 2010, finding that the measures taken to examine the applicant\u2019s allegations had been insufficient. The court ordered a further pre-investigation inquiry to establish the applicant\u2019s whereabouts between 16 and 19 August 2010 and the circumstances in which he had sustained his injuries. 19.  On 27 June 2012 the prosecutor\u2019s office refused to initiate criminal proceedings against the police officers for lack of corpus delicti. According to the decision, which referred to the explanations by the police officers and other evidence, the applicant had left the police station at 9.45 a.m. on 16 August 2010 and there had been no involvement of the officers in any unlawful action in relation to the applicant. 20.  On 19 May 2014 the applicant lodged a complaint under the Code of Criminal Procedure of 2012 (\u201cthe CCP of 2012\u201d), alleging that he had been ill-treated by police officers. 21.  On 11 August 2014 the Kharkiv Region prosecutor\u2019s office commenced a pre-trial investigation in relation to the alleged events of 16 to 19 August 2010. 22.  On 13 November 2014 a forensic medical expert issued a report repeating the findings of the forensic report of 21 August 2010 as regards the documented injuries. 23.  On 15 December 2014 the Kharkiv Region prosecutor\u2019s office terminated the investigation, finding that the applicant\u2019s allegations had been refuted by the statements of the police officers, other witnesses, and documentary and medical evidence which suggested that the applicant might have sustained minor injuries during his fight with the neighbour on 15 August 2010. 24.  On 15 September 2010 a forensic medical expert issued a report stating that the applicant\u2019s neighbour had sustained three incised wounds, one of which had been on the neck. 25.  On 23 September 2010 the district police opened criminal proceedings in relation to the moderately severe injuries sustained by the applicant\u2019s neighbour during the fight of 15 August 2010. Subsequently, the case was classified as attempted murder. 26.  At 2.45 p.m. on 9 December 2010 an investigator with the district police arrested the applicant on suspicion of attempted murder. The investigator relied on Article 115 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1960 (\u201cthe CCP of 1960\u201d). As regards the grounds for the applicant\u2019s arrest without a court decision, the investigator cited the three sub-paragraphs of the first paragraph of Article 106 of the CCP of 1960 (see paragraph 45 below). He further noted in his report that the applicant had been suspected of attempted murder, that he had a record of serious offences, and that his arrest would prevent the applicant from absconding and impeding the execution of a judgment. The investigator then charged the applicant and questioned him in relation to the case. 27.  On 10 December 2010 the District Court ordered the applicant\u2019s pre\u2011trial detention. It stated that the applicant had been charged with a serious crime, that he had two criminal offences on his record, and that he had no official income. The court concluded that there was a risk that if the applicant remained at liberty he might impede the establishment of the truth, hide evidence, influence the investigation, abscond or reoffend. The court further considered that a personal guarantee, which had been offered by an NGO in respect of the applicant, would not ensure his proper conduct during the criminal proceedings. Furthermore, there had been no suggestion that the applicant could not be held in a detention facility for health reasons. 28.  On 16 December 2010 the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal (\u201cthe Court of Appeal\u201d) dismissed an appeal by the applicant against the decision of 10 December 2010, finding that there were sufficient grounds to keep him in custody. 29.  On 4 February 2011 a bill of indictment was approved by the prosecutor and the case file was sent to the District Court. 30.  On 25 February 2011 the District Court committed the applicant for trial on a charge of attempted murder. As regards the preventive measure, the court ruled that the applicant should be held in custody. It stated that the applicant had been charged with a serious offence, that he was unemployed, had refused to admit his guilt, and that he had two serious offences on his criminal record. The court pointed out that no new information had been added to the material which had been examined earlier by the District Court and the Court of Appeal when deciding on keeping the applicant in custody. 31.  On 11 May, 1 July and 29 September 2011 the District Court dismissed applications by the applicant for a change in the preventive measure and maintained its earlier decision to keep him in custody. The court stated that the applicant had been charged with a serious offence, was unemployed, had a criminal record, and had refused to admit his guilt. As to the question of bail, the court noted that no document had been produced to suggest that any funds were available for that purpose. 32.   On 12 March 2012 the applicant was released from custody after giving a written undertaking not to abscond. The District Court stated that the trial was in its final stages so the applicant could no longer impede the establishment of the truth. The applicant also had a permanent place of residence where he lived with his family. 33.  On 13 August 2012 the District Court convicted the applicant of inflicting minor bodily injuries on his neighbour. The court found that attempted murder had not been established during the trial. It sentenced the applicant to two years of restriction of liberty. Having regard to the period of the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention, the court found that the sentence had been served. 34.  On 14 February 2013 the Kharkiv Court of Appeal upheld the judgment of 13 August 2012. 35.  On 9 December 2010, following his arrest and questioning (see paragraph 26 above), the applicant was placed in a police cell. According to the applicant, on the evening and night between 9 and 10 December 2010 police officers beat him up at the police station. 36.  As the applicant had complained about his health, he was examined late in the evening of 9 December 2010 by a panel of doctors who found no injuries on his body. 37.  On 10 December 2010 the hearing before the District Court concerning the preventive measure in the applicant\u2019s case was interrupted because the applicant had to be provided with medical care. The ambulance team which arrived at the court stated that the applicant had concussion, a haematoma by the left eye and a bruise on his chest. The applicant complained that the injuries had been inflicted by police officers. 38.  On the same day the deputy prosecutor of the Kyivskyy District of Kharkiv ordered that the applicant be examined and asked the medical expert to detail, among other things, the nature, quantity, location, and severity of his injuries. He also asked the expert to state whether the injuries could have been inflicted by the applicant himself. 39.  On 11 December 2010, following the court decision of 10 December 2010 to hold the applicant in custody (see paragraph 27 above), he was taken under escort to the Kharkiv pre-trial detention centre. Upon arrival he was examined by the medical staff who documented the following injuries: a haematoma by the left eye, bruises on the left abdominal area and neck, a haematoma on the right thigh, and swelling in his genitals. 40.  On 13 December 2010 a doctors\u2019 panel examined the applicant and found that he had sustained bruising on the soft tissue of his head and had a haematoma on his left eyelid. 41.  On 14 December 2010 the applicant was examined by a forensic medical expert as requested (see paragraph 38 above). In his report of 15 December 2010 the expert stated that the applicant had sustained bruises on his face, neck, chest, left shoulder, right leg and right shin. The expert considered the injuries to be minor and that they had been inflicted by blunt, solid objects during a period of between three to six days before the examination. The expert added that all the injuries could have been self\u2011inflicted. 42.  On 21 December 2010 the prosecutor\u2019s office, having concluded its pre-investigation inquiry, refused to open criminal proceedings concerning alleged police brutality against the applicant on 9 and 10 December 2010. According to the decision, there had been no evidence suggesting that the applicant\u2019s injuries documented after the alleged ill-treatment had been caused by police officers. The decision referred to the police officers\u2019 statements that the applicant had inflicted the injuries on himself. 43.  The applicant challenged that decision before the District Court, but received no reply. In 2012, 2013 and 2015 he made applications to the District Court in relation to his complaint, but to no avail.", "references": ["6", "8", "0", "3", "9", "4", "7", "5", "No Label", "1", "2"], "gold": ["1", "2"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Stara Zagora. 6.  The applicant worked as head teacher in a secondary school in Stara Zagora. 7.  On 19 July 2002 the head of the Regional Education Inspectorate (\u201cthe REI\u201d) of the Ministry of Education dismissed the applicant on disciplinary grounds. 8.  The applicant brought a claim against the REI, challenging the order for her dismissal and seeking reinstatement and compensation for lost earnings. 9.  By a judgment of 2 April 2003 the Stara Zagora District Court (\u0420\u0430\u0439\u043e\u043d\u0435\u043d \u0441\u044a\u0434) allowed the applicant\u2019s claims. That judgment was upheld by the Stara Zagora Regional Court (\u041e\u043a\u0440\u044a\u0436\u0435\u043d \u0441\u044a\u0434) and the Supreme Court of Cassation on 18 July 2003 and 24 November 2005 respectively. In the course of the proceedings, neither the opposing party nor any of the courts raised any doubts as to whether the REI was the correct defendant in the case. 10.  Following the entry into force of the judgment of 24 November 2005, the applicant applied to take up her duties on 6 December 2005. On the same day a new order for her dismissal was issued by the head of the REI. 11.  On an unspecified date, at the latest in January 2006, the applicant lodged an appeal against the dismissal order with the Stara Zagora District Court, challenging its lawfulness, and seeking reinstatement to her previous post and compensation for loss of income. It appears from the case file that at the first court hearing, the date of which was not specified, the REI argued that it was not the proper defendant in the case and that the claims had to be addressed to the secondary school in which the applicant had been working prior to her dismissal. The REI submitted that Article 61 \u00a7 2 of the Labour Code and section 37(4) of the Education Act provided that the applicant\u2019s employer was the school. 12.  During a court hearing on 12 April 2006 the District Court ruled in favour of the objection, and, reasoning that the proper defendant in the case was the school, discontinued the proceedings. 13.  The applicant appealed against that decision before the Stara Zagora Regional Court. 14.  On 26 May 2006 the Regional Court quashed the decision of the lower court, explicitly stating that the proper defendant in the applicant\u2019s case was the REI. It remitted the case to the first-instance court for examination on the merits. 15.  By a judgment of 8 December 2006 the District Court allowed the applicant\u2019s claims. 16.  Following an appeal lodged by the REI, on 27 April 2007 the Regional Court upheld the judgment. 17.  The REI lodged an appeal on points of law. On 16 April 2008 the Plovdiv Appeal Court (\u0410\u043f\u0435\u043b\u0430\u0442\u0438\u0432\u0435\u043d \u0441\u044a\u0434), sitting as a court of cassation according to a legislative amendment entered into force in July 2007, quashed the judgment of the lower court and dismissed the applicant\u2019s claims. It found that the REI was not the applicant\u2019s employer under the law and was not, therefore, the proper defendant in the case. Thus, the claims brought against it were unfounded. The court ruled that the applicant\u2019s claims had to be brought against the school in which she had been working prior to her dismissal, as that school was her employer.", "references": ["7", "6", "9", "0", "8", "2", "1", "4", "5", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant, Mr Claus Moog, was born in 1972 and lives in Cologne. 6.  The applicant\u2019s son, D., was born on 18 July 1998. The applicant and D.\u2019s mother, Ms K., separated in 1999. D. has been living with his mother ever since. 7.  Since 1999, the parents have been in dispute over contact and custody. On 18 May 1999, upon the applicant\u2019s request, the Cologne Family Court (\u201cthe Family Court\u201d) granted the applicant two visitation periods per week. This decision was modified on 24 March 2000 by a settlement according to which the applicant had a right of contact for eight hours every Saturday. Following an application by the applicant to have his contact time increased, the Family Court held on 16 January 2001 an oral hearing, joined the proceedings on contact to the proceedings on custody rights previously initiated by Ms K. in 1999, and commissioned an expert opinion with regard to the custody of D. On 1 October 2001 the applicant requested that the Family Court impose a fine on Ms K., because she was not cooperating. On 16 November 2001, after the appointed psychology expert had informed the Family Court that he considered that contact with the father was in the child\u2019s best interest, the parties concluded an in-court settlement according to which contact between the applicant and his son should be re-established. By the end of 2001, the applicant had visited the child twice in kindergarten. 8.  On 7 January 2002 the applicant renewed his request to have a fine imposed, because Ms K. was not cooperating. Subsequently, the Family Court issued an interim decision concerning the applicant\u2019s contact rights. Following that, the applicant visited his son once in kindergarten. On 20 March 2002 the Family Court warned Ms K. that it would impose a fine amounting to 2,000 euros (EUR) if she did not comply with her obligations under the settlement concluded on 16 November 2001. 9.  On 28 July 2002 the court-appointed expert, Dr K., having examined the situation of both parents and their child, submitted her report regarding custody. She considered that the child enjoyed contact with his father. However, both parents tended to instrumentalise the child in the pursuit of their own interests. They did not communicate. Accordingly, there was no basis for joint custody. A transfer of custody to the father would not solve the problem, only shift it. On 22 October 2002 the Family Court granted Ms K. custody while rejecting her prior application for a suspension of contact; it granted the applicant contact with his son for six hours each week. Furthermore, it appointed a contact facilitator (Umgangspfleger) charged with facilitating contact periods between the applicant and his son, but declined to appoint a guardian ad litem (Verfahrenspfleger) on the grounds that the child\u2019s interests were sufficiently safeguarded by the court\u2011appointed expert. 10.  On 18 February 2003 the Cologne Court of Appeal dismissed Ms K.\u2019s related appeal. It held that Ms K. had \u201cintentionally sabotaged\u201d the applicant\u2019s contact with his son. If she did not ensure implementation of the applicant\u2019s contact, the attribution of custody might have to be reconsidered. 11.  On 6 August 2003 the applicant again applied to have the Family Court impose a fine because Ms K. was not cooperating. On 12 August 2003 the Family Court ordered Ms K. to ensure the applicant\u2019s right to contact, failing which a fine could be imposed. Ms K. lodged an appeal. On 2 December 2003 the Cologne Court of Appeal quashed the decision. It found that, according to Ms K.\u2019s submissions and a report by the treating paediatrician and psychotherapist Dr D., the child showed mental abnormalities after contact with the applicant. According to the doctor this was caused by the conflict between the parents. There was thus no doubt that enforcement of the applicant\u2019s right to contact would be harmful to the child. 12.  On 20 June 2005 Ms K., after having been informed that the applicant had visited D. in his kindergarten, applied for the suspension of contact. 13.  On 15 November 2005 the Family Court heard testimony from the child, who declared that he did not wish to see his father anymore. 14.  On 18 January 2006 the applicant once again applied for contact. 15.  On 30 January 2006 the Family Court decided to obtain an affidavit (eidesstattlich versicherte schriftliche Zeugenaussage) from Dr D., the child\u2019s paediatrician. 16.  On 11 March 2006 Dr D. submitted her affidavit stating that the child had been deeply traumatised by being separated from his mother for forced contact with the applicant from the age of ten months, and by the increasingly hostile relationship between his parents. In 2003, contact with his father was followed by extremely aggressive outbursts. D. was in need of psychotherapy, which could not yet be initiated because of his young age and lack of maturity. 17.  On 19 May 2006 the Family Court granted the applicant three contact meetings with the child under the supervision of two court\u2011appointed psychological experts. 18.  On 13 September 2006 the experts informed the Family Court that they had been unable to supervise contact because Ms K.\u2019s counsel had informed them that both Ms K. and the child had been advised not to talk to the applicant on medical grounds. 19.  On 18 December 2006 the Family Court decided to take a witness statement from the director of D.\u2019s kindergarten as to the child\u2019s behaviour and his relationship with the applicant and with his mother. 20.  On 13 March 2007 the director of the kindergarten submitted a witness statement. She considered that the contact between the applicant and the child which had taken place in June 2005 had been beneficial. She strongly recommended continuing contact visits because the child lived in a rigid world out of touch with reality, highly controlled by his mother and without being able to freely choose his playmates or games. The child reacted to this excessive control in a violent manner. To strengthen the development of the child\u2019s own personality and to let the child experience the real world, a counterbalancing authority figure outside of the child\u2019s mother\u2019s family was greatly needed. 21.  On 30 March 2007 the applicant lodged a fresh application for custody to be transferred to him. 22.  On 24 April 2007 the Family Court issued an interim decision and provisionally granted the applicant contact with the child for seven hours once a month. The court furthermore ordered the mother to prepare D. for contact and to refrain from influencing the child against his father. It found that D. had been pleased when he had met his father. If he had appeared to react emotionally, this had presumably been provoked by his mother. Contact between the applicant and his son was in the child\u2019s best interest. The Family Court furthermore announced that it would impose a fine if Ms K. did not cooperate. 23.  On the first visit, scheduled for 2 June 2007, the son refused to leave with the applicant. 24.  In its statement dated 22 June 2007 the Youth Office gave an account of its conversations with Ms K., the child\u2019s paediatrician Dr D., the child\u2019s school teacher, the applicant and the child. According to this report Dr D. highly recommended family therapy in order to prepare contact between the child and the applicant. The child declared that he wanted to be left in peace and did not want to see his father. He could imagine visits if his parents stopped quarrelling and if his father did not oblige him to go to the Youth Office. According to the child\u2019s school teacher the child needed respite from the legal situation and the applicant lacked empathy. The Youth Office concluded that, with regard to the discrepancy between these submissions, expert opinion was necessary. 25.  On 9 July 2007 the Family Court imposed a coercive fine of EUR 3,000 on Ms K. on the ground that she had failed to meet her obligations under the court order of 24 April 2007. 26.  On 8 January 2008, in the proceedings regarding custody, the Family Court heard testimony from the child, who declared that he did not want to live with his father and that he did not want to go to court anymore. He added that he only saw his paediatrician rarely. 27.  On 8 February 2008, following an appeal by Ms K., the Cologne Court of Appeal quashed the decision to fine her on the grounds that there were serious doubts as to whether Ms K. was able to cooperate in preparing D. for contact with the applicant. According to a medical certificate issued by a psychologist dated 7 January 2008, Ms K. suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder manifesting itself in uncontrollable agitation patterns, palpitations, feelings of panic, trembling, nausea and feelings of helplessness and despair. This clinical picture raised serious doubts as to her ability to properly prepare the child for contact meetings between himself and the applicant. Moreover, in the custody proceedings the child had stated that he had not wanted to have contact with his father at that time. It was not reasonable to act counter the child\u2019s wishes; it was preferable to initiate therapeutic measures. The court further considered that the question of custody rights had to be clarified with regard to Ms K.\u2019s psychological problems and that the hearing of expert opinion in the parallel proceedings on custody rights was indispensable. 28.  On 20 March 2008 the Family Court informed the parties that it did not appear possible to implement contact. Accordingly, it would suspend the contact proceedings pending the proceedings on custody rights, in which an expert opinion would be commissioned. Subsequently, during the custody proceedings the Family Court appointed an expert to examine whether it was in the child\u2019s best interest that his mother maintained custody. 29.  On 25 November 2008 the Family Court held a hearing at which the applicant and the mother\u2019s counsel were present. 30.  On 12 December 2008, before the expert had submitted her expert opinion, the Family Court decided to suspend the applicant\u2019s contact until 31 December 2011. It considered that because of the massive and continuing conflict between the parents, the child would experience a serious conflict of loyalty if contact was enforced. This would seriously jeopardise his welfare. The court further considered that Ms K., because of her own stress disorder, which had been established by medical certificates, was not able to prepare the child for contact meetings with the applicant properly. As had already been pointed out by the court-appointed expert in 2002 (see paragraph 9 above), contact without a minimum of cooperation between the parents would put serious strain on the child. This should be avoided considering his ongoing therapeutic treatment. In view of the lack of co-operation from Ms K., it had to be expected that forced contact would again traumatise the child. Consequently the child\u2019s well-being required the suspension of the applicant\u2019s contact rights for three years in order to allow the child to undergo trauma therapy (Traumatherapie). 31.  On 5 January 2009 the applicant appealed against the Family Court\u2019s suspension of contact. He complained, inter alia, that the Family Court had relied on an outdated expert report, failed to explore the child\u2019s true wishes and assumed a traumatisation of the child which had never been confirmed by an independent expert. 32.  On 30 January 2009 the expert submitted a preliminary expert opinion in the custody proceedings, stating, inter alia, that contact with the applicant would not jeopardise the child\u2019s welfare. 33.  On 12 May 2009 the Family Court rejected the applicant\u2019s application for custody while having regard to the fact that neither the appointed guardian ad litem nor the expert had been able to examine Ms K. and the child owing to Ms K.\u2019s refusal. It relied on the expert\u2019s preliminary report according to which a transfer of custody was not in the child\u2019s best interest, although there was no indication that contact with the applicant would jeopardise the child\u2019s welfare. On the other hand there were indications that Ms K.\u2019s obstructive attitude towards contact between the applicant and the child would do so. On 30 June 2009 the Cologne Court of Appeal dismissed a related appeal by the applicant. 34.  On 30 June 2009, the Cologne Court of Appeal rendered its decision on the basis of the case-file and confirmed the Family Court\u2019s decision to suspend contact (see paragraph 30 above), even though this decision meant that Ms K., who \u2013 for whatever reason \u2013 had wanted to prevent contact with the applicant, had managed to attain her aim. It observed that the child, when heard by the Family Court on 8 January 2008 during the custody proceedings, had clearly stated that he currently did not wish to see his father. By a letter to the guardian ad litem dating from 2008, the child had stated that he did not wish to discuss this issue further, having already expressed his opinion five times. The Youth Office had confirmed on 22 June 2007 that D. wanted to be left in peace and that he had not wanted to see his father, as the latter always \u201cobliged him to go to the Youth Office\u201d. This was in line with D.\u2019s statement to his paediatrician in 2007. These statements demonstrated that D. had established an association between his father and the court hearings, which he disliked. Only a period of respite could give D. the feeling that he could decide on his own whether he wished to see his father. Furthermore, this period of time would also allow Ms K. to reflect on her behaviour. She should be aware of the fact that D., when reaching adolescence, would be in urgent need of his father as a counterbalancing authority figure. The applicant\u2019s own submissions did not lead to different conclusions. The conflict of loyalty to which D. was exposed was certainly not exclusively imputable to Ms K. Furthermore, it would undoubtedly not be compatible with the child\u2019s welfare to separate him from both parents and to place him in a boarding school, as had been suggested by the applicant. Referring to its decision on custody rights given on that same day, the Court of Appeal lastly observed that D. was developing in a positive way. 35.  On 10 August 2009 the Federal Constitutional Court declined to consider the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint regarding both contact and custody, without giving reasons (no. 1 BvR 1831/09).", "references": ["7", "9", "3", "0", "1", "5", "2", "8", "6", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1968 and lives in Vlora. 7.  On 30 May 2007 the Vlora District Court ordered the Vlora Construction Police (Policia e Nd\u00ebrtimit dega Vlor\u00eb) to pay the applicant 2,795,956 Albanian leks (\u201cALL\u201d) for the unjustified destruction of his property. 8.  On 11 June 2008 the decision was upheld by the Vlora Court of Appeal and became final. 9.  On 11 September 2008 an enforcement writ was issued. 10.  From 2009 to 2012 the bailiff unsuccessfully sought the enforcement of the decision from the Vlora Construction Police and the National Urban Construction Inspectorate (Inspektorati Nd\u00ebrtimor Urbanistik Komb\u00ebtar). 11.  To date, the final decision has remained unenforced.", "references": ["2", "6", "9", "4", "8", "1", "5", "7", "0", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1982 and is detained in HM Prison Dovegate, Uttoxeter. 6.  On 3 August 2001 the applicant was sentenced by the Crown Court to custody for life for causing grievous bodily harm. The minimum period (\u201ctariff\u201d) was set at two years, eight and a half months, less time spent on remand. The tariff expired on 18 April 2004 and he became eligible for parole. 7.  The Parole Board subsequently examined his case in order to review whether his detention remained necessary for the protection of the public. On 26 May 2005 it decided not to direct his release but recommended that he be transferred to open conditions. That recommendation was rejected by the Secretary of State. 8.  A second recommendation to the same effect was made, following the applicant\u2019s second Parole Board review on 31 January 2007 and rejected by the Secretary of State on 23 May 2007. At the conclusion of its statement of reasons for rejecting the Board\u2019s recommendation, the National Offender Management Service (\u201cNOMS\u201d) wrote:\n\u201cThe Secretary of State has therefore decided that you should remain in closed conditions and your next review will conclude in January 2008.\u201d 9.  The accompanying letter stated:\n\u201cIt has been decided that your case will next be referred to the Parole Board for a provisional hearing to take place in JANUARY 2008.\n...\nYou will be notified by the Parole Board nearer the time about the exact date of that hearing.\nAt your next review the Parole Board will consider your suitability for release by way of a paper panel. This consideration will take place approximately 12 weeks prior to your provisional hearing [in January 2008]. If you are not content with the paper panel\u2019s decision you may request that the case proceeds to the arranged oral hearing.\u201d 10.  The case was referred to the Parole Board on 21 December 2007. On 6 May 2008 the applicant and the Parole Board were sent relevant reports as required by the applicable rules. On 16 May 2008 the Parole Board gave case-management directions requiring additional reports. On 8 October 2008 the Parole Board received the further reports requested. The hearing took place on 8 January 2009. On 23 January 2009 the Parole Board directed the applicant\u2019s release. He was released from prison four days later. 11.  Meanwhile, in autumn 2008, the applicant commenced judicial review proceedings against the Secretary of State and the Parole Board seeking damages for the delay in holding the hearing. He relied on Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention. He was granted permission to bring proceedings on 13 October 2008. 12.  On 5 June 2009 the claim was dismissed by the High Court. Leave to appeal was granted by the Court of Appeal on 27 October 2009. 13.  On 14 December 2010 the Court of Appeal handed down its judgment. After carefully reviewing the facts and the individual periods of delay encountered, it concluded that there had been a delay of ten months, from March 2008 to January 2009, in the holding of the Parole Board hearing which was unjustified and for which the Secretary of State was responsible. This delay had prevented the applicant from having the lawfulness of his continued detention decided in accordance with Article 5 \u00a7 4. On the question of damages, the court was satisfied that the applicant had shown, on a balance of probabilities, that he would have been released had the review taken place in March 2008. Damages on the basis of a loss of liberty were therefore appropriate. 14.  In its judgment of 29 March 2011 on the amount of damages to be awarded, the court considered a number of just satisfaction awards in cases before this Court in which breaches of Article 5 \u00a7 4 had been found. It distinguished between cases where the delay had merely led to feelings of frustration and those where it had been established that, but for the delay in the holding of the hearing, the applicant would have been released earlier. It awarded the sum of 10,000 pounds sterling (\u201cGBP\u201d) by way of compensation for the loss of ten months\u2019 conditional liberty. 15.  The applicant sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court on the ground that the award was inadequate. The Parole Board sought leave to appeal on the ground that the award was excessive. Leave was granted to both parties, and the applicant was in addition given permission to argue that his detention after March 2008 constituted false imprisonment at common law or a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention. In respect of his latter argument, he relied on this Court\u2019s findings in James, Wells and Lee v. the United Kingdom, nos. 25119/09, 57715/09 and 57877/09, 18 September 2012. 16.  In its judgment of 1 May 2013 the Supreme Court unanimously rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal and allowed the appeal of the Parole Board, reducing the damages award to GBP 6,500. 17.  As regards the alleged violation of Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, Lord Reed, giving the leading opinion, observed that Article 5 \u00a7 4 provided a procedural entitlement designed to ensure that persons were not detained in violation of their rights under Article 5 \u00a7 1. However, he added, a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 4 did not necessarily result in a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 1. He considered this Court\u2019s judgment in James, Wells and Lee, cited above, not to be directly relevant to the applicant\u2019s case since that judgment concerned lack of access to rehabilitation courses and the just satisfaction awards made were for the feelings of distress and frustration resulting from continued detention without access to courses, and not for loss of liberty. Lord Reed noted that the delay in the applicant\u2019s case appeared to have been the result of errors by administrative staff, \u201cof a kind which occur from time to time in any system which is vulnerable to human error\u201d. While it was extremely unfortunate that the errors had occurred and had resulted in the prolongation of the applicant\u2019s detention, they were not of such a character, and the delay was not of such a degree, as to warrant the conclusion that there had been a breach of Article 5 \u00a7 1. 18.  On the matter of damages for the violation of Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention, Lord Reed reviewed relevant case-law of this Court where a violation of Article 5 \u00a7\u00a7 1, 3 or 4 had been found, focusing in particular on cases concerning a delay in holding a hearing intended to address the question whether a convicted prisoner should be released. He considered that no clear guidance could be derived from the cases since none concerned awards for loss of liberty resulting from a violation of the speedy decision guarantee in Article 5 \u00a7 4. While, he said, an appellate court would not interfere with an award of damages simply because it would have awarded a different figure if it had tried the case at first instance, in the applicant\u2019s appeal the court was being invited to give guidance as to the appropriate level of awards in cases of this character. For that purpose, the court had undertaken a fuller analysis of the case-law of this Court than the Court of Appeal. Lord Reed concluded:\n\u201c87.  ... In the light of that analysis, and applying the general approach which I have described ..., it appears to me that an award in the region of \u00a36,500 would adequately compensate Mr Faulkner for his delayed release, bearing in mind the conditional and precarious nature of the liberty foregone. That amount falls well short of the award of \u00a310,000 made by the Court of Appeal. In the circumstances, it is in my view appropriate for this court to allow the Board\u2019s appeal and to reduce the award accordingly.\u201d", "references": ["1", "5", "9", "7", "6", "3", "8", "4", "2", "0", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1977 and prior to his arrest his permanent address had been in Svitlovodsk, Kirovograd Region. 7.  On an unspecified date prior to his arrest the applicant had been diagnosed with hepatitis C (\u201cHCV\u201d). 8.  On 26 June 2014 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of committing a drug-related offence and on 7 July 2014 placed in Kirovograd Remand Prison no. 14 (\u201cthe prison\u201d). 9.  On 27 June 2014 the Svitlovodsk Court remanded the applicant in custody. The applicant appealed, arguing in particular that he was suffering from HCV. On 14 July 2014 the Kirovograd Regional Court of Appeal upheld the detention order. 10.  The applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention was subsequently extended until his conviction. 11.  On 24 March 2015 the Svitlovodsk Court convicted the applicant of the unlawful purchase, possession and transportation of drugs and sentenced him to three years\u2019 imprisonment. 12.  On 13 October 2015 the Kirovograd Regional Court of Appeal amended the applicant\u2019s sentence and released him on probation. 13.  On 8 July 2014 the prison governor sent a letter to the Svitlovodsk Central Hospital. According to the letter, the applicant had informed the prison authorities that he had been diagnosed with HCV in 2013 in Svitlovodsk but that he had not provided any more detailed information in this respect. The governor asked the hospital to confirm whether the applicant had indeed been examined for HCV and if so, what the results of the examination had been. The prison received no reply. 14.  On 6 August, 27 November and 3 December 2014 and on 9 January and 4 June 2015 the applicant consulted the prison doctor, complaining in particular of discomfort in the hypochondrium (below the lower ribs), on the right-hand side. According to the applicant\u2019s medical record, the applicant claimed to be suffering from HCV, but the doctor noted that there were no documents to support this diagnosis. The applicant asked for a medical certificate, to be provided to the courts examining his criminal case. According to three separate reports signed by three prison employees, during three of those consultations \u2013 those of 6 August and 27 November 2014 and 4 June 2015 \u2013 the applicant was offered an opportunity to undergo a \u201cblood test\u201d (it is unspecified of which type) to verify whether he had HCV but refused without giving any reasons. The applicant denied the latter allegation. 15.  On 13 August 2014 the prison\u2019s medical unit issued a certificate stating that the applicant, according to his own statement, was suffering from HCV and that during his stay in the prison he had consulted the prison doctor on several occasions in this connection and received treatment for his symptoms. 16.  On 3 December 2014 the prison governor informed the applicant\u2019s lawyer that on 6 August and 27 November 2014 the applicant had consulted the prison doctor concerning his HCV and had been prescribed treatment for his symptoms. The governor went on to state that it was planned that a consultation would be arranged with an infectious diseases specialist who would be able to order the necessary examinations and prescribe treatment for the applicant. 17.  On 3 March 2015 a blood test, apparently an HCV antibody test, came up positive. On the same day an ultrasound examination showed that the applicant\u2019s liver had undergone diffuse changes. 18.  On 8 June 2015 the head of the prison\u2019s medical unit issued a certificate which stated that the applicant\u2019s health had worsened in the previous two months and that he was suffering from fatigue, nausea, and weight loss. The certificate also stated that in order to ascertain the state of his health the applicant needed to be examined by an infectious diseases specialist of the Kirovograd Central City Hospital (\u201cthe City Hospital\u201d). 19.  On 19 June 2015 the acting President of the Section, upon the applicant\u2019s request under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, decided to indicate to the Government that they should present the applicant urgently for medical examination by a specialised doctor of the City Hospital; secure for the applicant immediately, by appropriate means, treatment to his state of health; and inform the Court by 17 July 2015 about the applicant\u2019s state of health and the measures undertaken. 20.  From 6 until 9 July 2015 the applicant underwent an in-patient examination at the City Hospital in the course of which a number of blood tests and an ultrasound examination were conducted and the applicant was examined by a number of specialists. 21.  On 9 July 2015 the hospital issued an opinion according to which the applicant was suffering from \u0441hronic HCV \u201cin an inactive phase\u201d and liver impairment. He was prescribed hepatoprotectors (Carsil and Ursohol). It was recommended that he undergo additional blood tests, namely the polymerase chain reaction (PCR) test for HCV, and, within ten days, another general blood test and a biochemical blood test. The applicant was to remain under the supervision of a gastroenterologist and an infectious diseases specialist. 22.  On 14 July 2015 the Government informed the Court about the applicant\u2019s examination at the City Hospital. 23.  On 19 August 2015 the applicant complained to the Court that the recommendations of the City Hospital doctors were not being followed. On 26 August 2015 the Court invited the Government to comment on those allegations. 24.  On 1 September 2015 the applicant started to be treated with hepatoprotector medicine. On 3 September 2015 he underwent general and biochemical blood tests which, according to the Government, revealed no abnormality. On 15 September 2015 he was consulted by a gastroenterologist and an infectious diseases specialist, who confirmed the diagnosis of inactive chronic hepatitis. 25.  On 15 September 2015 the Government informed the Court of the measures taken from 1 to 15 September 2015. 26.  The relevant part of the Report to the Ukrainian Government on the visit to Ukraine carried out by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment from 9 to 21 October 2013 reads as follows:\n\u201c161. The CPT is concerned by the lack of systematic screening and treatment for blood-borne viral hepatitis in the Ukrainian prison system. The delegation was informed that, currently, there was no National Programme for detecting and treating hepatitis in Ukraine (and no national standard for treatment), and that penitentiary establishments were not provided with any specific hepatitis medication. The Committee recommends that measures be taken to remedy this regrettable state of affairs.\u201d 27.  In 2013 the Ukrainian Parliamentary Commissioner for Human Rights published a special report dedicated to the monitoring of the observance of the right to medical care in the remand prisons within the purview of the State Correctional Service of Ukraine. The report contains the following observations concerning the rights of hepatitis patients (p. 35).\nDiagnosing and treating hepatitis in patients was not a priority for remand prisons\u2019 medical units. Testing was only voluntary and could only be conducted on the initiative of the prisoner in question. In practice it was difficult to get hepatitis diagnosed and treated. Where this happened, treatment was mainly conducted at the expense of relatives and friends, who furnished medications to prisoners. Only prisoners with HIV/AIDS could receive hepatitis treatment at public expense.\nMedical units of remand prisons were in no position to ensure the treatment of acute hepatitis B and C and could only provide long-term antiviral and stabilising anti-inflammatory outpatient treatment. 28.  On 29 April 2013 the Cabinet of Ministers approved a State programme for the prevention, diagnosis and treatment of viral hepatitis for the period until the end of 2016. The programme stipulates a number of goals to be achieved over that period, including extending access to hepatitis treatment to 30% of all patients.", "references": ["3", "7", "2", "9", "5", "6", "4", "8", "0", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1982 and is serving a prison sentence in Donskoy, Tula Region. 5.  On 27 June 2005 the Zhukov District Court of the Kaluga Region found the applicant guilty of battery and manslaughter and sentenced him to eleven years and one month\u2019s imprisonment. On 6 September 2005 the Kaluga Regional Court upheld the applicant\u2019s conviction on appeal. 6.  On 20 December 2005 the applicant started serving a prison sentence in correctional colony no. IK-1 in the Tula Region. Prior to the applicant\u2019s arrest and conviction, he suffered from duodenal ulcer, chronic bronchitis and high blood pressure. In detention he developed chronic gastritis, hernia of a diaphragm, chronic cholecystitis, lipomas and pilonidal cysts. 7.  On 23 January 2012 the applicant was placed in a disciplinary cell. During the day time, the pull-down beds were folded up during the day. The inmates were able either to stand or sit on a metal stool fastened to the floor. The cell was cold and damp. There was no ventilation system. Because of the cracks in the door and windows, there was constant draught. The toilet was separated with a 80-centimetre high partition from the living area of the cell. There was no hot water supply. The applicant was allowed 1.5 hours\u2019 daily exercise and one 30 minutes\u2019 shower per week. 8.  On 21 March 2012 the applicant started having a fever resulting from an inflamed pilonidal cyst in the coccyx area. 9.  On 22 March 2012 a prison doctor examined the applicant, prescribed him a treatment by antibiotics and pain killers. The doctor also recommended that the applicant consult a surgeon. 10.  On 23 March 2012 the head of the correctional colony extended the applicant\u2019s detention in a disciplinary cell for another fifteen days. The prison doctor examined the applicant and concluded that he was fit for detention in the disciplinary cell. He continued the prescribed treatment. 11.  On 28 March 2012 the applicant was admitted to a prison hospital at correctional colony no. IK-5. According to the applicant, he was able to consult a surgeon only on 5 April 2012. The applicant\u2019s surgery was scheduled on 10 April 2012. 12.  On 8-9 April 2012 the applicant\u2019s cyst opened up and the inflammation stopped. 13.  On 18 April 2012 the applicant was released from hospital and transferred back to the correctional colony. 14.  On 25 April 2012 the applicant consulted a surgeon and a neurologist at the hospital of correctional colony no. IK-2. He was prescribed medication for high blood pressure. The surgeon recommended that the applicant undergo a surgery in connection with the pilonidal cyst. 15.  From 14 to 30 August 2012 the applicant underwent additional examination and treatment at the surgical division of the hospital at correctional colony no. IK-5. According to the doctors who treated the applicant, no surgery was required. 16.  According to the applicant, on 5 June 2012 the applicant was summoned by the head of the operations division of the colony. There were several officers present in the office. They advised the applicant to withdraw his application before the Court. They threatened him that, should he choose to pursue his application, he would be serving the rest of his sentence in a disciplinary cell without family visits and he could be charged with another offence. The applicant complied. He signed a letter. It was stamped by the colony and dispatched to the Court on 6 June 2012. 17.  On 14 June 2012 the applicant wrote another letter to the Court wherein he asked the Court to disregard his previous letter that he had had to write because of the pressure put on him by the administration of the colony. 18.  On 25 June 2012 the Court received the applicant\u2019s letter wherein he asked for withdrawal of his complaint. The letter bore a stamp of the correctional colony and a number attributed to by the administration.", "references": ["7", "2", "1", "5", "3", "8", "4", "9", "6", "0", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1984 and is detained in Saint-Petersburg. 5.  On 22 April 2004 he was arrested on suspicion of murder. 6.  On 24 April 2004 the Vyborgskiy Federal District Court of Saint-Petersburg authorised the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention. He remained in custody pending investigation and trial. 7.  On 7 February 2005 the District Court extended the applicant\u2019s pre\u2011trial detention. The court referred to the gravity of charges, the applicant\u2019s character, lack of permanent residence in Saint-Petersburg, and risk of absconding or re-offending. 8.  On 7 April 2005 the District Court returned the case to the prosecutor and extended the applicant\u2019s detention without specifying any reasons. 9.  On 15 September 2005, 21 October 2005 and 15 December 2005 when extending pre-trial detention, the District Court reproduced the grounds for detention described above. 10.  On 2 March 2006 the Saint-Petersburg City Court quashed the detention order of 15 December 2005 and remitted the case for a fresh examination. 11.  On 16 March 2006, 22 March 2006 and 21 June 2006 the District Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention referring to the gravity of charges, absence of permanent residence, his character, possibility of absconding and committing crimes. The applicant and his lawyer did not attend the hearing on 21 June 2006. 12.  On 30 June 2006 the Vyborgskiy District Court of Saint-Petersburg convicted the applicant of murder and theft. 13.  On 31 January 2007 the Saint-Petersburg City Court upheld his conviction on appeal. As regards the applicant\u2019s appeal against the detention order of 21 June 2006, the court noted that the lower court had failed to ensure the applicant\u2019s and his lawyer\u2019s presence at the hearing of 21 June 2006. However, in view of the applicant\u2019s conviction, it discontinued the appeal proceedings finding them unnecessary.", "references": ["0", "9", "8", "3", "1", "5", "7", "6", "4", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "5.  Mr Semenov was born in 1959 and lives in Tver. 6.  Ms Bachurina was born on 8 November 1978 and lived before her arrest in the village of Strelnitsa, Voronezh Region. 7.  On 13 April 2006 Mr Semenov was arrested on suspicion of several counts of aggravated bribery. On 17 April 2006 the Tsentralniy District Court of Tver ordered his placement in custody. The detention was further extended by the District Court on 11 July and 11 September 2006. 8.  Mr Semenov appealed: on 14 July 2006 against the detention order of 11 July 2006 and on 12 September 2006 against the order of 11 September 2006. 9.  On 22 August and 3 October 2006, respectively, the Tver Regional Court dismissed the appeals and upheld the detention orders. 10.  On 11 October 2006 the Regional Court extended Mr Semenov\u2019s detention. 11.  Nine days later Mr Semenov lodged an appeal statement with the Russian Supreme Court via the Regional Court. 12.  On 16 November 2006 the Regional Court dispatched the case-file to the Supreme Court which on 11 January 2007 upheld the decision of 11 October 2006. 13.  On 26 December 2006 the Regional Court once again extended the detention. 14.  Between 11 and 30 January 2007 Mr Semenov and his co-defendants lodged their appeals with the Supreme Court via the Regional Court. On 1 March 2007 the Regional Court transmitted the case-file to the Supreme Court which on 11 April 2007 upheld the order.\nII.  THE CASE OF MS BACHURINA (APPLICATION No. 56124/07) 15.  On 14 July 2007 Ms Bachurina was arrested on suspicion of attempted large scale trafficking of drugs. Two days later the Zyuzinskiy District Court of Moscow authorised her detention. 16.  On 19 July 2007 Ms Bachurina appealed against the detention order. 17.  The detention order was upheld on appeal by the Moscow City Court on 27 August 2007.", "references": ["5", "9", "4", "3", "0", "8", "6", "7", "1", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1972 in Villahermosa (Ciudad Real) and is currently serving a prison sentence in Spain. 6.  At the time of the facts the applicant was in prison on remand in Foncalent (Alicante). 7.  On 20 October 2009 the applicant was found guilty of a disciplinary offence by the disciplinary board of Alicante Prison and punished under the General Prison Rules. The punishment was: four weekends in isolation for having threatened prison officers (Rule 108 (b)); twenty days without group recreational activities for having disobeyed the orders given by prison officers in the fulfilment of their duties (Rule 109 (b)); and twenty days without group recreational activities for having damaged prison property (Rule 109 (e)). 8.  The applicant appealed against the sanction before the Comunidad Valenciana post-sentencing judge no. 2 (Juzgado de Vigilancia Penitenciaria n.o 2). 9.  On 17 November 2009 the post-sentencing judge found partially in the applicant\u2019s favour and revoked the sanction imposed under Rule 109 (b). 10.  On 19 November 2009 a State agent in charge of judicial communications attempted unsuccessfully to serve the applicant in person with the post-sentencing judge\u2019s decision. The applicant had been transferred to a prison in Villena (Alicante). 11.  On 28 January 2010 the applicant was served in person with the post-sentencing judge\u2019s decision of 17 November 2009. He signed an acknowledgment of receipt. 12.  The applicant lodged a reforma appeal with the same post-sentencing judge, who on 18 February 2010 confirmed her previous decision. A copy of the decision on appeal was served on the applicant. He signed an acknowledgment of receipt. 13.  The applicant lodged an amparo appeal with the Constitutional Court. He invoked Articles 20 (freedom of expression) and 24 (right to be presumed innocent) of the Constitution. 14.  By a communication of 22 March 2010 the Constitutional Court asked the post-sentencing judge to provide it with a copy of the applicant\u2019s case file. 15.  On 12 April 2010 the post-sentencing judge transferred the applicant\u2019s case file to the Constitutional Court. 16.  By a decision of 30 September 2010 the Constitutional Court declared the applicant\u2019s amparo appeal inadmissible as devoid of any special constitutional significance. That decision was served on the applicant on 7 October 2010. 17.  On 22 December 2010 the applicant asked the post-sentencing judge for a copy of his case file for submission to the European Court of Human Rights. He relied on sections 234 and 454 of the Judicature Act (see paragraph 31 below). He did so from a prison in Zuera (Saragossa) to which he had been transferred. 18.  On 4 January 2011 the applicant sent his first letter to the Court giving notice of his intention to lodge an application under Article 34 of the Convention. 19.  On 14 January 2011 the Court\u2019s Registry acknowledged receipt of the applicant\u2019s letter and invited him to submit a duly completed application form by 11 March 2011. 20.  On 26 January 2011 the post-sentencing judge refused the applicant\u2019s request for a copy of his case file on the grounds that his case \u201cwas still pending before the Constitutional Court\u201d. 21.  On 2 February 2011 the applicant sent his application form to the Court. He raised complaints under Article 6 \u00a7 2 and Article 10 \u00a7 1 of the Convention. He enclosed a copy of the Constitutional Court\u2019s decision declaring his amparo appeal inadmissible. He further referred to the post-sentencing judge\u2019s decisions of 17 November 2009 and 18 February 2010 in field \u201c17. Other decisions\u201d of the application form. However, he did not enclose a copy of those decisions. 22.  On 4 February 2011 the applicant sent a communication to the post-sentencing judge. He stated that the Constitutional Court had delivered a decision in his case on 30 September 2010; that he intended to initiate proceedings before the European Court of Human Rights; and that in order to do so he should be provided with a certified copy of his case file without delay and before the deadline of 11 March 2011. 23.  On 22 February 2011 the post-sentencing judge\u2019s registrar rejected the applicant\u2019s request, referring to the decision of 12 April 2010 (see paragraph 15 above) and stating that the European Court of Human Rights had the power to request the case file itself. That decision was served on the applicant on 4 March 2011. 24.  On 3 March 2011 the Court acknowledged receipt of the applicant\u2019s application form and invited him to send in all relevant domestic decisions by 3 June 2011. 25.  On 4 March 2011 the applicant informed the Court that he had unsuccessfully requested a certified copy of his complete case file from the post-sentencing judge. He complained that the domestic authorities were hindering his right to a defence. 26.  On 14 March 2011 the applicant resubmitted his request for a copy of the whole case file to the post-sentencing judge. He referred to the Court\u2019s letter of 3 March 2011. 27.  On 1 April 2011 the post-sentencing judge rejected the applicant\u2019s request and refused to provide him with a copy of his case file. She informed the applicant that, for the purposes of subsequent applications before other courts, those courts could request the case files from the domestic courts directly. That decision was served on the applicant on 6 April 2011. 28.  On 7 April 2011 the applicant informed the Court that the post-sentencing judge had refused to provide him with a copy of his case file.", "references": ["1", "5", "2", "4", "7", "8", "0", "6", "9", "3", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1979 and lived, prior to his arrest, in Krasnogorsk, Moscow Region. 5.  On 5 July 2007 the applicant, a police officer at the material time, was arrested on suspicion of abuse of official powers causing serious damage. On 10 July 2007 he was formally charged with the imputed crime. Subsequently he was additionally charged with embezzlement on a large scale as part of an organised criminal group. 6.  On 6 July 2007 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow remanded the applicant in custody on the ground of the gravity of charges. The court also reasoned that he might put pressure on witnesses, destroy evidence or interfere with investigation. 7.  On 3 September 2007, 11 December 2007, 10 April 2008 and 1 July 2008 the District Court extended the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention stating that the investigation was still pending, the case comprised 118 volumes and concerned fifteen suspects, the applicant had been suspected of a serious crime, could interact with his accomplices, abscond, destroy evidence and threaten witnesses. The court also took into account the applicant\u2019s state of health, character and family status however it did not provide any detailed arguments in this respect. 8.  On 30 December 2008 and 20 April 2009 the District Court issued collective detention orders in respect of the applicant and other co-accused pending their study of the case-file. The court referred to the gravity of the charges, the defendants\u2019 possibility to abscond, commit crimes and interfere with the investigation. 9.  The applicant\u2019s appeals against the detention orders were rejected. 10.  On 9 June 2010 the Moscow City Court acquitted the applicant of all charges.", "references": ["9", "8", "6", "5", "7", "0", "1", "3", "4", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Moscow. 6.  An EU-Russia summit was scheduled for 17 and 18 May 2007 to take place in Samara. On 18 May 2007 the applicant was travelling to Samara to take part in the opposition rally \u201cMarch of Dissent\u201d which had been organised to coincide with the summit. He was accompanied by several activists who were also travelling to the rally. At 8.30 a.m. the applicant and his fellow activists arrived at Terminal 1 of Sheremetyevo airport, Moscow, and attempted to check in for a flight to Samara (flight no. SU0697). The parties have submitted different versions of events as to what then happened. Each version is set out below. 7.   The applicant submits that, when he presented his passport for identity check, police officer A. seized the passport and the ticket. The applicant was required to leave the check-in area and to follow officer A. He was taken to a police office on the second floor of the airport. Five other persons from his group were escorted from the check-in hall in the same manner. 8.  At 11.20 a.m. the applicant and the five others were ordered to remain on the second floor of the airport and were informed that they would have to be questioned as to how they had purchased their allegedly forged tickets. 9.  At 12.20 p.m. the operative duty police officer from Department of the Interior (Criminal Division), Captain N., questioned the applicant as to where he had bought his ticket. The applicant replied that his ticket had been purchased lawfully and refused to give any further explanation, relying on his constitutional right to remain silent. He maintains that he was under orders not to leave and that he was prevented from leaving the police office by an armed policeman who was guarding the doorway. The applicant remained at the police station until 1.30 p.m. 10.  The applicant has submitted three documents in support of his version of events. 11.  The first is a copy of the record (\u043f\u0440\u043e\u0442\u043e\u043a\u043e\u043b) of search and confiscation completed by Captain N. It records that the applicant was searched and his aeroplane ticket confiscated, in accordance with Articles 21.1, 27.7 and 27.10 of the Code of Administrative Offences (see relevant domestic law at paragraphs 25 and 26 below). At the bottom of the record, the applicant has written that it had been explained to him that the search and seizure could be appealed to a higher authority and that, while the record had been handed to him at 1 p.m., the actual seizure of the ticket by officer A. had taken place at 8.30 a.m. at the check-in desk. 12.  The second is a pro forma statement (\u043e\u0431\u044a\u044f\u0441\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435), filled in by Captain N. In it, he records that he began filling out the statement at 12.40 p.m. and finished at 12.50 p.m., and that, when asked, the applicant refused to given an explanation for the ticket. On the statement the applicant has written that the ticket was obtained legally and that, relying on Article 51 of the Constitution (the right against self-incrimination) he refused to give any further explanation because he had been detained illegally in the departure hall without explanation. He has also written that, from 8.30 a.m. until 12.50 p.m., he had been deprived of his freedom of movement, and that no documents had been provided to him until then. 13.  The third is a handwritten declaration made by the applicant and five others while at the airport. It reads:\n\u201cWe, the undersigned, state that today, 18 May 2007, at Sheremetyevo Airport [terminal] 1 we were prevented from taking flight 813 to Samara because [officer A.] seized our tickets at the check-in desk.\nAt present we are at the airport building under the surveillance of the police officers, with our passports confiscated.\nAt 11.20 police officers [A.], [C.] and [S.] categorically prohibited us to leave the second floor of the airport.\nAt the same time, they indicated that we have to provide an explanation to the police officers because some tickets were allegedly forged.\nAs of 12.20 we are still detained in the hall of the airport without any documents being provided to us.\n(signed)\u201d 14.  The Government submitted that, on 17 May 2007, the Department of the Interior\u2019s Sheremetyevo airport branch received information on forged tickets being sold for the 18 May Moscow-Samara flight. On 18 May 2007, officers from the branch, acting on that information, were present at check\u2011in and examined the tickets of all passengers on the flight. In the course of their checks, twenty tickets bearing signs of forgery were found: they had worn spots and the forms on which the tickets were printed appear dubious. Those tickets were confiscated and the passengers who had presented them were prevented from boarding. The tickets were subsequently sent for forensic examination, which showed thirteen tickets with signs of writing on top of the original text. 15.  As regards the applicant\u2019s allegations, the Government commented that their records indicated that his ticket for the flight had been seized but there was no record of his passport also being seized. If it had been, the applicant would have been able to make a written comment to that effect in the search record which had been drawn up by the police, but he had not done so. Under section 11 of the Police Act (see paragraph 24 below) the police had the right to seek an explanation from the applicant regarding the ticket, and he had been invited to provide one. The applicant\u2019s allegation that he was questioned from 8.30 a.m. to 1.30 p.m. was not supported by the police records. 16.  The applicant complained to the Moscow Transport Prosecutor\u2019s Office about having been unlawfully detained by the police and requested that those responsible be prosecuted. 17.  On 28 June 2007 the prosecutor\u2019s office decided not to open criminal proceedings against the policemen. The decision stated, in so far as relevant, as follows:\n\u201c... on 18 May 2007 the [police] together with the Sheremetyevo airport security service carried out a check of the passengers leaving on the flight no. 813, Moscow \u2013 Samara. During the check [they] discovered thirteen plane tickets with traces of forgery, which were seized. Later [the police] conducted an inquiry under Articles 144-145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.\nWhen questioned, [officer A.] stated that on 17 May 2007 at 6 p.m. he received operative information that some forged tickets had been sold for the Moscow-Samara flight leaving on 18 May 2007 [...]\nOn 18 May 2007 he verified this information by checking all passengers\u2019 tickets [...] for that flight.\n...Thirteen plane tickets were found to have traces of forgery, such as scuff marks, and also the ticket blanks used for printing the tickets were suspicious.\n[The police] seized the tickets and removed the passengers from the flight. [A.] wrote a report concerning these facts ... after that, the materials were sent to the [Sheremetyevo police unit].\nWhen questioned, the Head of the Operational-Search Unit of the Aviation Division of the Department of the Interior, [S.], stated that, on 18 May 2007, on the occasion of the high-profile summit in Samara the policemen of the Aviation Division of the Moscow branch of the Department of the Interior, together with its subordinate units in the airports of the Moscow region, carried out operational search activities to identify persons of an extremist nature intending to organise mass riots.\nIn this connection, the police carried out checks on persons leaving for Samara. On 18 May 2007 [S.], together with [the operative officer A.B.] arrived at the Sheremetyevo airport, where, at 7.30 a.m., check-in began for flight no.813 Moscow \u2013 Samara. Together with the [airport security screening service] they checked all passengers, which included screening their luggage with special equipment and checking their documents. During the check some [officers] noticed that tickets of certain passengers had additional non-standard notes, and, when inspected, these tickets raised doubts as to their authenticity. Because of that, thirteen suspected forged tickets were seized and the passengers were questioned about the circumstances of their purchase. Moreover, several passengers decided not to fly, without explaining why. On the same day similar checks were conducted for other flights to Samara.\n...\nThe [sales director of the airline] confirmed that the tickets were issued and sold [in a normal manner].\n...\nAn expert examination of the twenty seized tickets ... revealed that seven tickets had no corrections of the original content. For thirteen of the tickets, the examination revealed that secondary text had been added on top of the original text in the fields \u2018flight number\u2019 and \u2018time\u2019.\nTherefore, the inquiry has established that [the policemen] had acted within their powers and with sufficient grounds when seizing the tickets of the passengers for flight no.813 Moscow \u2013 Samara.\n...\nHeld: 1.  To refuse the institution of criminal proceedings further to the complaint about the commission of criminal offences of [abuse of powers] and [exceeding official powers] by the [eleven policemen involved] for absence of corpus delicti.\u201d 18.  The applicant challenged this decision before a court under the procedure set out in Article 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. He requested that the decision dispensing with criminal proceedings be declared unlawful and that the prosecutor\u2019s office be ordered to remedy the shortcomings in it. 19.  On 20 July 2007 the Golovinskiy District Court of Moscow examined and rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal. It noted that the applicant had complained to the prosecutor\u2019s office about his five-hour detention and about the seizure of his ticket to Samara. It also observed that the applicant had challenged the prosecutor\u2019s refusal to open criminal proceedings claiming, inter alia, that the police had unlawfully restricted his liberty and in violation of his right to freedom of expression and to freedom of assembly. It also noted that the applicant had claimed that he had been deprived of his constitutional rights by the prosecutor\u2019s office. 20.  The court considered that the prosecutor\u2019s office had taken its decision in accordance with the procedure provided for by law and remained within its competence while doing so. It upheld the finding that no criminal offence could be imputed to the police officers in question. The court found the applicant\u2019s allegations about the unlawfulness of the ticket seizure to be unsubstantiated, finding that the seizure had been carried out in accordance with Articles 27.7 and 27.10 of the Code of Administrative Offences (see paragraph 26 below). The court further found that the applicant had been taken to the airport police quarters to provide an explanation for the purchase of his ticket. He had not been \u201cisolated\u201d at the police station. Therefore, there had been no grounds for applying the three-hour time-limit for the application of preventative measures in administrative offences cases (as provided for by the Code of Administrative Offences), or for the drawing up of a detention report (\u043f\u0440\u043e\u0442\u043e\u043a\u043e\u043b \u043e \u0437\u0430\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0436\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0438). 21.  The court concluded that the prosecutor\u2019s decision was lawful and well-founded. 22.  The applicant brought a cassation appeal against that decision. He claimed that the measures applied to him were contrary to the Code of Administrative Offences, and that there had been violations of his constitutional rights to liberty, freedom of expression and freedom of assembly. 23.  On 20 August 2007 the Moscow City Court examined and dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. It noted that the subject matter of the applicant\u2019s appeal to court had been the lawfulness of the prosecutor\u2019s refusal to institute criminal proceedings against the officers who had allegedly violated his constitutional rights. It upheld the decision not to institute criminal proceedings as correct in substance and form. It further held that the alleged breach by the police offices of statutory detention limits were outside the scope of the first-instance court\u2019s [power of] review.", "references": ["5", "0", "6", "3", "9", "1", "4", "8", "No Label", "7", "2"], "gold": ["7", "2"]}
+{"input": "5.  The first applicant, Ms Jen\u0151n\u00e9 Barcza, was born in 1962 and lives in Solym\u00e1r; the second applicant, Ms J\u00e1nosn\u00e9 B\u00e1sits, was born in 1957 and lives in Dunabogd\u00e1ny; the third applicant, Mr L\u00e1szl\u00f3 P\u00e1vai, was born in 1930 and lived in Le\u00e1nyfalu. 6.  The applicants were co-owners of a vacant plot of land situated in the urban area of the municipality of Le\u00e1nyfalu. It was originally designated as non-agricultural land and registered under plot no. 2733. 7.  On an unspecified date, the Central Danube Valley Directorate of Water Management (K\u00f6z\u00e9p-Duna-v\u00f6lgyi V\u00edz\u00fcgyi Igazgat\u00f3s\u00e1g) established a protection zone for the water reserve of Le\u00e1nyfalu municipality. According to this decision, the applicants\u2019 property, together with other plots of land, formed part of the protection zone. The administrative decision ordered the owner of the protected water reserve, the Hungarian State, to make an offer compensating the owners of the plots of land within the protection zone within sixty days. 8.  On 16 December 2002 the General Directorate of Water Management (Orsz\u00e1gos V\u00edz\u00fcgyi Igazgat\u00f3s\u00e1g) upheld the first-instance decision on the establishment of a protection zone for the municipality\u2019s water reserve. The decision also required that if the owner of the protected water reserve was different from that of the land in the protection zone, the owner of the protected water reserve had the obligation to acquire ownership of the land in the protection zone, either through expropriation or through a sale and purchase agreement (see paragraphs 24 and 25 below). That decision also quashed the obligation to proceed with compensation for the landowners within sixty days. 9.  By a decision of 4 October 2005 the Szentendre District Land Registry redesignated the applicants\u2019 plot of land as an \u201cinner protection zone\u201d. 10.  Under the law, owners of land within the water protection zone were under an obligation to refrain from any activity that could endanger water quality or lead to pollution and from constructing any facility that did not serve the purposes of the water reserve. Moreover, they were obliged to allow the use of their property for any work necessary for the maintenance of the water reserve (see paragraph 25 below). 11.  On 16 November 2005 the owners of the plots of land within the protection zone addressed a letter to the Treasury Asset Management Directorate (Kincst\u00e1ri Vagyoni Igazgat\u00f3s\u00e1g), the trustee of the water reserve, offering their plots of land for sale and asking the Directorate to make an offer. 12.  The Directorate transferred the request to the Central Danube Valley Inspectorate for Environmental Protection, Nature Conservation and Water Management (K\u00f6z\u00e9p-Dunav\u00f6lgyi K\u00f6rnyezetv\u00e9delmi \u00e9s V\u00edz\u00fcgyi Igazgat\u00f3s\u00e1g), which, due to lack of jurisdiction, returned the case to the Directorate on 13 December 2005, informing the Ministry of Environment Protection and Water Management about the measure. On 12 April 2006 the Ministry instructed the Danube Regional Waterworks Inc. (Duna Menti Region\u00e1lis V\u00edzm\u0171 Zrt.), the managing body of the water reserve, that the expropriation fell within the Waterworks\u2019 competence. 13.  Meanwhile, in proceedings initiated by some of the landowners, the Pest County Regional Court established that the Treasury Asset Management Directorate was under an obligation to proceed with the expropriation. Accordingly, the applicants made a new representation to the Ministry on 31 October 2007, asking it to make an offer within thirty days of receipt of the letter. 14.  On 18 February 2008 they re-submitted their request to the Central Directorate for Water and Environment (V\u00edz\u00fcgyi \u00e9s K\u00f6rnyezetv\u00e9delmi K\u00f6zponti Igazgat\u00f3s\u00e1g), the body appointed by the Ministry for further decision-making. 15.  On 11 August 2008 the owners of the plots of land, including the applicants, asked the Central Hungarian Regional Administration Office (K\u00f6z\u00e9p-magyarorsz\u00e1gi Region\u00e1lis K\u00f6zigazgat\u00e1si Hivatal) to instruct the Ministry to proceed with the expropriation by setting a time-limit. 16.  Their request was dismissed on 11 August 2008. According to the Administration Office, the owners had first requested the expropriation of their properties on 31 October 2007, thus the statutory three-year period during which the Ministry could acquire the property had not expired. The owners sought judicial review of this decision. 17.  By a decision of 22 October 2009 the Pest County Regional Court overturned the administrative decision and remitted the case to the Administration Office, stating that the three-year period had expired since the expropriation proceedings were initiated, on 16 November 2005, at which time the claimants had offered their plot of land for sale. 18.  On 2 December 2008 the Danube Regional Waterworks informed the applicants that any measure concerning the ownership of the disputed plot of land fell within the competence of the State. 19.  On 19 January 2009 the Central Directorate for Water and Environment informed the applicants that it had appointed a limited liability company to prepare the sale and purchase agreements and the documents necessary for the expropriation by 29 May 2009. 20.  On 27 January 2009 the limited liability company forwarded a purchase offer for the acquisition of the applicants\u2019 plot of land for 3,974,000 Hungarian forints (HUF \u2013 approximately 13,000 euros (EUR)). The applicants disputed the amount of the compensation; nevertheless, the case file indicates that they never received an answer to their submissions. 21.  On 14 December 2010 the Pest County Governmental Office (Pest Megyei Korm\u00e1nyhivatal) (the legal successor of the Central Hungarian Regional Administration Office) ordered National Asset Management Inc. (Magyar Nemzeti Vagyonkezel\u0151 Zrt) (the legal successor of the Treasury Asset Management Directorate) to serve an expropriation notice on the land owners within ninety days of receipt of the decision. This did not take place. After the deadline had passed the applicants applied to National Asset Management Inc. seeking the enforcement of the compulsory expropriation decision. The application was granted by the Government Office; despite this National Asset Management Inc. did not respond to any of the measures taken by the Government Office. Accordingly, the Government Office proceeded with the expropriation of its own motion, commissioning an expert opinion and holding hearings. 22.  Finally, the decision on the expropriation of the applicants\u2019 plot of land was issued by the Government Office on 16 December 2011, establishing the amount of compensation at HUF 39,170,000 (approximately EUR 126,000).\nThe applicants received the compensation on 27 January 2012.", "references": ["2", "5", "6", "7", "8", "4", "3", "1", "0", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Beograd. 6.  On 19 September 1996 certain A.N. (hereinafter \u201cthe debtor\u201d) was sentenced for fraud in criminal proceedings and ordered to pay 18, 425 Serbian dinars (RSD) to PP Reprek, a company based in Serbia and owned by the applicant. 7.  On 17 December 1998 the said company filed with the District Court in Belgrade a request for enforcement based on the judgment in said criminal proceedings. Following an order to specify a motion for enforcement, the decision on enforcement was adopted on 29 April 1999. 8.  On 15 October 1999 the enforcement court ordered the Ministry of Interior to provide the exact address of the debtor. 9.  On 7 February 2000 the bailiff noted that the debtor had moved away to an unknown address. 10.  On 27 October 2000 the case was adjourned. 11.  On 7 May 2005 the applicant requested the continuation of the enforcement proceedings on behalf of his company. 12.  On 4 October 2005 the enforcement court again ordered the Ministry of Interior to provide the exact address of the debtor. 13.  By letter of 21 October 2005, the Ministry informed the enforcement court of the debtor\u2019s address. 14.  On 18 November 2005 the bailiff went to the address provided by the said Ministry and established that the debtor was no longer living there and that he had moved away to an unknown address. 15.   On 20 January 2006 the enforcement Court requested the Ministry of Interior to provide the exact address of the debtor and his latest known place of residence. 16.  On 24 October 2006 the enforcement court informed the applicant that the Ministry did not establish the exact address of the debtor nor did it initiate misdemeanour proceedings against the debtor in accordance with Article 25 of the Domicile and Temporary Residence Act (see paragraph 22). 17. On 31 May 2007 the insolvency proceedings against the applicant\u2019s company \u201cReprek\u201d were completed. The said company ceased to exist and all its assets were transferred to the applicant. 18.  The enforcement court adjourned the case on 31 March 2010.", "references": ["6", "8", "2", "7", "9", "0", "1", "5", "4", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1960 and lived, prior to arrest and conviction, in Cheboksary. 5.  On 27 January 2004 the applicant was arrested. He remained in custody pending investigation and trial. 6.  On 7 October 2005 the Leninskiy District Court of Cheboksary convicted the applicant of fraud and sentenced him to six years and nine months\u2019 imprisonment. 7.  On 13 December 2005 the Supreme Court of the Chuvash Republic upheld his conviction on appeal. The court reduced the applicant\u2019s sentence to five years and ten months. 8.  On 22 June 2007 the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the Chuvash Republic quashed the judgments of 7 October and 13 December 2005 and remitted the case for a fresh examination. The applicant was remanded in custody. 9.  On 11 July 2007 the Leninskiy District Court ordered the applicant to stay in prison pending trial. 10.  On 22 November 2007 the Leninskiy District Court extended the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention, having noted that:\n\u201c... Taking into account the seriousness of the charges against [the applicant], his health condition, personal profile, a possibility that he might abscond, the court considers that the previous measure of restraint should remain unchanged ...\u201d 11.  On 5 February 2008 the Supreme Court of the Chuvash Republic upheld this decision on appeal. 12.  By decision of 24 December 2007, as upheld on appeal, the Leninskiy District Court extended the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention for three months. Having heard the parties, the court ruled that:\n\u201c... As it can be seen from the case file, [the applicant] has been accused of a serious crime, which is punishable with an imprisonment exceeding two years. The grounds, which were used to put him in custody ..., have not ceased to apply. Being at large, [the applicant] may abscond and continue his criminal activity...\u201d 13.  On 27 March 2008 the Leninskiy District Court convicted the applicant of fraud and sentenced him to five years and ten months\u2019 imprisonment. 14.  On 1 July 2008 the Supreme Court of the Chuvash Republic upheld his conviction appeal.", "references": ["6", "4", "8", "5", "7", "1", "3", "0", "9", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1976 and lives in Neftekamsk, Bashkortostan Republic. 5.  On 4 September 2008 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of causing and inciting prostitution of minors and unlawful breaking and entering. According to the record of the arrest, a number of witnesses made statements about the applicant\u2019s involvement in the said crimes. 6.  On 5 September 2008 the Leninskiy District Court of Ufa remanded the applicant in custody noting as follows:\n\u201c[The applicant] is charged with serious offences, which fact suggests that, being a former law enforcement officer, if released, he may interfere with the establishment of the truth, influence or threaten witnesses and victims, continue criminal activities or abscond and it will not be possible to complete the investigation or conduct a trial. The Court considers that [a less strict] restrictive measure cannot be applied.\u201d 7.  The applicant remained in custody pending investigation and trial. Relying on the seriousness of the charges against the applicant, the District Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention during investigation on 30 October and 18 December 2008. On 15 July and 20 October 2009, 20 January, 15 April, 16 June, 19 August and 15 November 2010 the Supreme Court of the Bashkortostan Republic extended the applicant\u2019s detention pending trial. Each time the Supreme Court issued a collective detention order in respect of five defendants, including the applicant, and noted that the circumstances underlying their remand in custody had not ceased to exist. Relying further on the seriousness of the charges against the five defendants, the Supreme Court reasoned that, if released, they might abscond, continue criminal activities or interfere with the establishment of the truth. The applicant\u2019s appeals were to no avail. 8.  On an unspecified date the applicant was charged with abuse of power and organisation of a criminal gang. 9.  On 27 December 2010 the Supreme Court of the Bashkortostan Republic found the applicant guilty of several counts of causing and inciting prostitution of minors, abuse of power and unlawful breaking and entering. He was acquitted of organisation of a criminal gang and one count of causing and inciting prostitution of minors. 10.  On 27 April 2011 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the applicant\u2019s conviction on appeal. 11.  On 21 July 2011 the applicant was released on parole. 12.  Following the remand in custody on 5 September 2008, the applicant was detained in remand prison no. IZ-3/1 in Ufa. On 20 April 2009 the applicant was transferred to remand prison no. IZ 3/5 in Dyurtyuli where he was detained until 12 October 2009. 13.  On 27 February 2009 the applicant sent a letter to the Court alleging a violation of his right to liberty and asking the Court to send him an application form. His letter was registered as application no. 19857/09. 14.  On 17 April 2009 the Court sent a letter to the applicant which contained an application form to be filled out. In the letter the Court advised the applicant that he was to submit a completed application form by 12 June 2009. The Court\u2019s letter was sent to remand prison no. IZ-3/1 in Ufa. The applicant was not detained at the remand prison at the moment and the Court\u2019s letter was forwarded, to correctional colony no. IK-4. According to the stamp on the Court\u2019s letter of 17 April 2009, the correctional colony received it on 2 September 2009. Then the administration of the correctional colony sent the letter back to remand prison no. IZ-3/1. The remand prison received it on 14 September 2009 and forwarded it to remand prison no. IZ\u20113/5 where the applicant was detained. The letter arrived there on 2 October 2009 and on the same day the applicant received it (according to the applicant, he received the letter on 5 October 2009).", "references": ["3", "8", "6", "9", "0", "1", "5", "4", "7", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1961 and lives in Kaunas. 6.  In 1994 the applicant obtained a loan of 30,100 Lithuanian litai (LTL \u2013 approximately 8,718 euros (EUR)) from the State. The purpose of the loan was to build or buy an apartment. In 2000 the applicant became the owner of an apartment built by a public association, and in exchange she took over the association\u2019s loan of LTL 90,036 (EUR 26,076) from the State. The apartment was pledged to the bank as collateral. Both loans were given under preferential conditions \u2013 the annual interest rate was lower than the average annual interest rate for loans given by private banks at that time. Both loans were administered by a State bank, the State Commercial Bank of Lithuania (hereinafter \u201cthe bank\u201d). In 1998 that bank transferred the claims to some of its loans, including both of the applicant\u2019s loans, to another State bank, the Savings Bank of Lithuania. In 2001 the latter bank was privatised and became the private bank AB Hansabankas. 7.  On 13 August 2001 the applicant concluded an agreement with a third party, A.E., under which the applicant paid LTL 30,870 (EUR 8,940) and bought from A.E. the right to restoration of title in respect of 1.47 hectares of land in Kaunas. That land had belonged to A.E.\u2019s grandfather, S.F., who had died in 1949. It had been determined by a ruling of the Kaunas District Court of 23 May 2001 that S.F. had owned a total of 68.26 hectares of land in Kaunas. Following that ruling, A.E. sold the right to restoration of title in respect of different parts of that land to over a hundred individuals, including the applicant. 8.  On 23 October 2001 the Kaunas County Administration (hereinafter \u201cthe KCA\u201d) restored the applicant\u2019s title in respect of 1.47 hectares of land. At the applicant\u2019s request, her property rights were restored by cancelling her outstanding debt to the State (see paragraphs 31-33 below). The KCA estimated that the value of that plot of land was LTL 70,560 (EUR 20,435.60), and its indexed value was LTL 112,896 (EUR 32,697), an amount equal to the applicant\u2019s outstanding debt under the two loan agreements of 1994 and 2000 (see paragraph 6 above). 9.  On 10 November 2001 the KCA forwarded to the Ministry of Finance a list of individuals, including the applicant, whose property rights it had decided to restore by cancelling their debts to the State. 10.  On 16 November 2001 the KCA ordered an internal audit into the restoration of property rights in respect of the land which had belonged to S.F. (see paragraph 7 above). The audit report, delivered on 7 December 2001, found that the documents in the possession of the KCA showed that from 1927 to 1940 S.F. had sold parts of his land to numerous individuals, and that, as a result, at the time of his death he had owned no more than 15.58 hectares. Accordingly, the audit report considered that the size of S.F.\u2019s land, as established by the Kaunas District Court (see paragraph 7 above), had been incorrect, and recommended that the KCA suspend the restoration of property rights in respect of any land which had previously been considered as belonging to S.F. 11.  Following the internal audit, on 14 December 2001 the KCA suspended the restoration of property rights in respect of S.F.\u2019s land. It informed the Ministry of Finance about the suspension, and asked it to suspend the cancellation of debt for all the individuals on the previously submitted list, including the applicant (see paragraph 9 above). 12.  Subsequently the Kaunas Regional Prosecutor (hereinafter \u201cthe prosecutor\u201d), at the request of the KCA and relying on the findings of the audit report, asked the domestic courts to reopen the civil proceedings concerning the size of S.F.\u2019s land, and to suspend the enforcement of all the KCA\u2019s decisions concerning the restoration of property rights in respect of that land. On 21 March 2002 the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court suspended the enforcement of the KCA\u2019s decisions. The applicant participated in the court proceedings as a third party and appealed against the suspension, but on 25 April 2002 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed her appeal. On 23 October 2002 the Supreme Court reopened the civil proceedings concerning the size of S.F.\u2019s land, on the grounds that the audit report had revealed relevant information which had not been known at the time of the adoption of the Kaunas District Court\u2019s ruling of 23 May 2001. 13.  In the reopened proceedings, on 30 April 2003 the Kaunas District Court determined that S.F. had owned 48.40 hectares of land. On 30 June 2004 the Kaunas Regional Court partly amended that judgment and determined that S.F. had owned 47.91 hectares of land. The latter judgment became final. The KCA and the applicant participated in the reopened proceedings as third parties. 14.  On 25 October 2004 the prosecutor asked the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court to revoke the order suspending the enforcement of the KCA\u2019s decisions concerning the restoration of property rights in respect of S.F.\u2019s land. The prosecutor submitted that the total amount of land affected by those decisions was less than 47.91 hectares, so there was no risk of restoring property rights in respect of land which had not belonged to S.F. On 26 October 2004 the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court granted the prosecutor\u2019s application. 15.  On 9 November 2004 the KCA asked the Ministry of Finance to resume the cancellation of debt with regard to the applicant and other individuals (see paragraph 9 above). 16.  On 6 December 2004 the Ministry of Finance issued a certificate confirming the cancellation of the applicant\u2019s outstanding debt to the State, amounting to LTL 112,896 (EUR 32,697). On that same day the bank received the certificate from the Ministry and cancelled the applicant\u2019s debt. 17.  It appears that from 23 October 2001 to 6 December 2004 the applicant did not make any loan repayments to the bank and the bank did not request any such payments. However, until September 2002 she was paying interest and late payment fines under the two loan agreements, and paid a total of LTL 5,222.26 (EUR 1,512.47). 18.  On 26 January 2005 the bank informed the applicant that she owed it LTL 13,140.56 (EUR 3,805.77) in interest and late payment fines under the two loan agreements. 19.  On 3 February 2005 the bank lodged a civil claim against the applicant concerning the unpaid interest and late payment fines under the loan agreement of 1994, amounting to LTL 2,909.33 (EUR 842.60). It asked the Kaunas District Court to order interim measures \u2013 seizing the applicant\u2019s apartment. On the same day the bank unilaterally terminated the loan agreement of 2000 and asked the court to begin the forced recovery of the debt under that agreement, amounting to LTL 10,231.23 (EUR 2,963.17), by seizing the applicant\u2019s apartment, which had been pledged to the bank as collateral. 20.  On 7 February 2005 the Kaunas District Court seized the applicant\u2019s apartment and informed her that, following her failure to repay the debt under the loan agreement of 2000 within one month, the apartment would be sold at auction. The following day the court also granted the bank\u2019s application for interim measures concerning the loan agreement of 1994, but having found that the applicant\u2019s apartment had already been seized, the court ordered the seizure of the applicant\u2019s movable property, financial assets and property rights, amounting to the sum of LTL 2,909.33. 21.  On 24 February 2005 the applicant submitted a counterclaim against the bank. She stated that on 23 October 2001 the KCA had restored her property rights by cancelling her debt to the State, but due to circumstances beyond the applicant\u2019s control the Ministry of Finance had only informed the bank about the cancellation on 6 December 2004. The applicant submitted that from 23 October 2001 until 6 December 2004 she had repeatedly contacted the bank and asked it to not count the interest and late payment fines. Thus, she considered that the bank had known about the cancellation of her debt, and it was therefore unjust and unfair for it to ask her for any payments for that period, or to unilaterally terminate the loan agreement of 2000. The applicant further asserted that in the period of 2001\u20112002 she had paid the bank a total of LTL 5,222.26 (EUR 1,512.47) in interest and late payment fines under the two loan agreements; she claimed that there had been no grounds for the bank to accept those payments, and asked the court to order the bank to return them to her. 22.  On 22 March 2005, at the applicant\u2019s request, the Kaunas District Court suspended the forced recovery of the debt by means of seizing the applicant\u2019s apartment, pending the examination of the claim and counterclaim in the civil case. On 18 October 2005 the court lifted the order for seizure of the applicant\u2019s apartment because the bank had not requested its sale at auction within the time-limit prescribed by law. 23.  On 22 February 2006 the Kaunas District Court granted the bank\u2019s civil claim in part. The court found that the applicant\u2019s debt had only been cancelled on 6 December 2004, so there were no grounds to find that her obligation to honour the loan agreement with the bank had ended before that date. The court held that the applicant had been using the loan during the period of 2001-2004, and thus she was obliged to pay interest to the bank. Accordingly, it ordered the applicant to pay the bank LTL 2,705.52 (EUR 783.57).\nHowever, the Kaunas District Court also noted that the loan had been given to the applicant by the State and not by the bank, so the latter could not claim to have suffered any losses due to late payments. The court found no bad faith on the part of the applicant \u2013 it considered that she had had legitimate grounds to expect that the cancellation of her debt, ordered on 23 October 2001, would be implemented promptly. Accordingly, the court decided that the bank had no grounds to claim late payment fines, and ordered it to return to the applicant LTL 72.25 (EUR 20.93) which she had already paid.\nThe applicant\u2019s counterclaim was dismissed. 24.  The applicant appealed against that judgment, but on 1 June 2006 the Kaunas Regional Court dismissed her appeal and upheld the first-instance judgment in its entirety. The court considered that the applicant had to assume the risks resulting from her agreement with A.E., which had enabled her to seek the cancellation of her outstanding debt after paying a sum that was several times lower than that debt (see paragraphs 7-8 above), especially as the bank had not been a party to that agreement. The court also noted that the delay in the cancellation of the applicant\u2019s debt had been caused not by the actions of the bank but by those of the KCA and the prosecutor, so the bank had had the right to receive interest payments during the period in question. 25.  In those proceedings, the courts did not examine whether the applicant had been under an obligation to pay interest and late payment fines under the loan agreement of 2000, because she had not made such a claim. As submitted by the applicant and not disputed by the Government, on an unspecified date in 2006 the applicant paid LTL 10,231.23 (EUR 2,963.17) in interest and late payment fines requested by the bank under that agreement. 26.  On 3 July 2006 the applicant submitted to the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court a civil claim for damages against the KCA, the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office and the Ministry of Finance. She claimed that because of the unnecessary and unjustified delay in the cancellation of her debt from 23 October 2001 until 6 December 2004, caused jointly by those three institutions, she had suffered financial losses of LTL 20,926.73 (EUR 6,060.80), consisting of interest and late payment fines paid under the two loan agreements, as well as legal expenses incurred in the civil proceedings instituted by the bank. She also claimed non-pecuniary damages of LTL 15,000 (EUR 4,344.30) for the stress and frustration caused during that delay. 27.  On 13 July 2006 the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court refused to accept the applicant\u2019s claim, on the grounds that complaints against the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office and the Ministry of Finance \u2013 and, as a result, the entire claim \u2013 had to be examined by the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court (see paragraph 38 below). 28.  On 26 April 2007 the applicant submitted to the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court a civil claim for damages against the KCA only. She again claimed pecuniary damages of LTL 20,926.73 and non-pecuniary damages of LTL 15,000 in respect of damage allegedly caused by the unjustified delay in the cancellation of her debt. The applicant argued that the KCA had acted unlawfully by suspending the restoration of her property rights and asking the prosecutor to apply for the reopening of the civil proceedings concerning the size of S.F.\u2019s land. The Prosecutor General\u2019s Office and the Ministry of Finance participated in the proceedings as third parties. 29.  On 11 June 2007 the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim. It held that the principle of the rule of law obliged the KCA to ensure that the restoration of property rights was conducted in accordance with the applicable laws. The court considered that, in the presence of well-founded doubts about the actual size of the land owned by S.F., the KCA had acted lawfully and diligently by suspending the restoration of the property rights and initiating the reopening of the proceedings. The fact that the courts dealing with the reopened proceedings had found that S.F. had owned less land than initially determined (48.40 hectares and 47.91 hectares, as opposed to the initial estimate of 68.26 hectares) showed that the suspension had had a proper basis. Accordingly, the court concluded that the KCA had acted lawfully and there were no grounds to award damages to the applicant. 30.  The applicant appealed against that judgment, but on 12 March 2008 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed her appeal and concluded that the KCA\u2019s actions in initiating the suspension of its decisions concerning the restoration of property rights had been in accordance with domestic law. In addition, the Supreme Administrative Court distinguished between the KCA\u2019s competence and that of the Ministry of Finance: while the KCA was responsible for the restoration of property rights, it was the Ministry of Finance which had the authority to cancel the applicant\u2019s debt and issue the bank with a certificate confirming such cancellation. The KCA\u2019s request of the Ministry of Finance to suspend the cancellation of the applicant\u2019s debt (see paragraph 11 above) had not been legally binding on the Ministry, and had had no legal effect on the cancellation of the debt. The court further held that the suspension of restoration of the applicant\u2019s property rights had been ordered not by the KCA but by the ruling of the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court of 21 March 2002, and the ruling had been revoked by that same court only on 26 October 2004 (see paragraphs 12 and 14 above). Accordingly, the Supreme Administrative Court concluded that the KCA could not be held responsible for the suspension of the restoration of the applicant\u2019s property rights and the cancellation of her debt, and thus there were no grounds to award her damages.", "references": ["0", "8", "2", "9", "1", "3", "4", "5", "7", "6", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicants were born in 1947 and 1950, respectively. The first applicant, Mr Kryukov, lives in Kolpashevo, the Tomsk Region. The second applicant, Mr Lantsev, died on 28 October 2007. On 10 March 2008 his widow, Ms Raisa Pavlovna Lantseva, stated her wish to pursue the complaint of her late husband before the Court. 5.  On 30 June 1997 the applicants were dismissed from work on the grounds of redundancy. 6.  On 17 July 1997 the applicants sued their former employer for reinstatement, salary arrears and compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 7.  On 10 September 1997 the Kolpashevo Town Court of the Tomsk Region dismissed the applicants\u2019 claims in full. 8.  On 17 October 1997 the aforesaid judgment was quashed further to the applicants\u2019 appeal by the Tomsk Regional Court and the case was remitted for fresh examination. 9.  On 16, 20 and 22 January 1998 the applicants amended their claims. 10.  On 18 March 1998 the hearing was adjourned until 20 April 1998 at the defendant\u2019s request in view of its representative\u2019s health condition. 11.  On 23 April 1998 the Town Court allowed the applicants\u2019 claims in part. 12.  On 8 September 1998 the Regional Court upheld the judgment in part but remitted the claim for salary arrears for a fresh examination. 13.  On 25 November and 8 December 1998 the hearings were adjourned at the applicants\u2019 request. 14.  On 15 December 1998 the applicants further amended their claims and asked for a forensic accountant to be appointed. The proceedings were adjourned until 11 February 1999 to allow the accountant to prepare his report. 15.  On 11 February 1999 the applicants lodged a new claim. 16.  By the judgment of 11 February 1999 the Town Court partly allowed the applicants\u2019 claims. 17.  On 23 April 1999 the Regional Court quashed the first-instance judgment and remitted the case for fresh examination. 18.  On 26 August and 30 November 1999 the hearings were adjourned. 19.  On 13 January 2000 the applicants amended their claims. 20.  On 14 January 2000 the applicants\u2019 claims were satisfied in part by the Town Court. 21.  On 15 February 2000 the judgment was upheld on appeal by the Regional Court. 22.  On 13 March 2002 the Presidium of the Tomsk Regional Court, by way of supervisory review, quashed judgments of 14 January and 15 February 2000 and remitted the case for fresh consideration. 23.  The hearings of 10 April, 20 August and 10 October 2002 were adjourned. 24.  On 23 May 2002 the hearing was adjourned until 30 July 2002 for collecting additional evidence, on 1 November 2002 - for obtaining a graphologist\u2019s report, and on 26 May 2003 \u2013 for taking further evidence from the defendant. 25.  On 31 July and 31 October 2002 and 27 May 2003 the applicants lodged new claims. 26.  On 4 June 2003 the proceedings were stayed as the defendant company was in the process of reorganisation which lasted until 19 July 2004. 27.  By judgment of 1 October 2004, the Town Court granted the applicants\u2019 claims in part. 28.  On 14 December 2004 the Regional Court upheld the judgment on appeal.", "references": ["5", "0", "2", "1", "6", "8", "4", "9", "7", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1958 and lives in Tambov. 6.  On 23 October 2006 the Leninskiy District Court of Tambov (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) ordered the Tambov town administration to pay the applicant approximately 776,150 Russian roubles (RUB) in social benefits and inflation losses, and recalculated regular payments received by the applicant due to his participation in the clean-up operation at the Chernobyl nuclear disaster site. The judgment entered into force on 3 November 2006. 7.  On 7 November 2006 the District Court clarified the judgment of 23 October 2006. 8.  On 29 November 2007 the judgment of 23 October 2006 was executed, i.e. in approximately one year and one month after it became final. 9.  On 1 August 2008 the District Court awarded the applicant RUB 87,060.05 of interest and RUB 5,000 in compensation for non-pecuniary damage in respect of the delayed enforcement of the judgment of 23 October 2006. The decision came into force on 10 September 2008 and was fully enforced on 24 November 2008.", "references": ["2", "7", "5", "1", "4", "6", "8", "0", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1953 and lived, prior to his arrest in St Petersburg. 5.  On 20 December 2005 the applicant was put on the wanted list on suspicion of a murder and gangsterism. 6.  On 17 July 2007 the Vyborskiy District Court of St Petersburg remanded the applicant in custody in absentia. 7.  On 20 October 2007 the applicant was arrested in Hungary. 8.  On 13 September 2008 he was extradited to Russia and placed in detention. 9.  On 28 April 2009 the St Petersburg City Court extended the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention referring to the seriousness of the charges and the applicant\u2019s attempt to abscond. The applicant remained in detention pending investigation and trial. The court concisely reiterated in its detention orders the above reasons and stated that the applicant might interfere with investigation, commit crimes, threaten witnesses and that he could not be released on bail. 10.  The applicant\u2019s appeals against the detention orders were rejected on the following dates:\n \nDate of the detention order\nDate of the introduction of the appeal\nDate of the appeal hearing\n28 April 2009\n4 May 2009\n2 July 2009\n4 May 2009\n8 May 2009\n2 July 2009\n19 August 2009\n31 August 2009\n22 October 2009\n14 October 2009\n16 October 2009\n21 December 2009\n14 January 2010\n18 January 2010\n16 February 2010\n15 February 2010\n18 February 2010\n26 April 2010 11.  On 29 April 2010 the Saint-Petersburg City Court convicted him of murder and gangsterism and sentenced him to 16 years\u2019 imprisonment. On 7 October 2010 the Supreme Court of Russia upheld this decision on appeal.", "references": ["5", "0", "1", "6", "3", "9", "7", "8", "4", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1967 and until his conviction lived in Ivdel, a town in the Sverdlovsk Region. 6.  In April 2000 the applicant was arrested on charges of murder and arson. 7.  On 24 July 2000, as the investigation unfolded, the local official newspaper the North Star printed an interview with a deputy town prosecutor about a spike in murder rates. The prosecutor said:\n\u201cIn the first half of 2000 our town reported fourteen murders \u2013 a historic high, it seems. Twelve of them have already been solved, thanks to the industry of the police department and the investigators from the prosecutor\u2019s office....\nThe fingerprint identification of ex-convict [N.B.] (whose body was found in [a river]) has allowed to discover his enemies and to prove that he was beaten by three inhabitants of Ivdel seeking [...] to settle scores for his murder of [another man] for which [he] had served almost nine years. It has been established that [N.B.\u2019s] two murderers \u2013 [the applicant\u2019s codefendant] and S. Turyev, both ex-convicts \u2013 were complicit in the early\u2011March murder of [L.R.] who had dared to report them to the police for past wrongs. [Her] body was dumped in a wood near the airport and was found only in May. As those crimes were not solved in time, [the applicant\u2019s codefendant] rampaged on and on 20 April killed [another woman] who had witnessed the night-time arson at Vizhayskaya Street that had killed five.\nBy the way, both [L.R.] and [the other woman] (whose body was found in a well next to the sports centre) had been garrotted with a wire. All three persons arrested in this multicount case will undergo forensic psychiatric observation because of the gravity of the crimes committed, which carry up to twenty years or life in prison. But even after these downright senseless murders, the crime wave in the town continued.\u201d 8.  When the case came to trial before the Sverdlovsk Regional Court, the applicant moved to disqualify the prosecutor for the prejudice apparent in that interview. On 4 October 2002 the court refused the motion because the prosecutor had only cited facts from the investigative file, had affirmed the applicant\u2019s complicity but not his guilt, and was not personally interested in the outcome of the trial. 9.  On 22 January 2003 the court sentenced the applicant to twenty years\u2019 imprisonment for arson and the murders of N.B. and L.R. On 23 October 2003 the Supreme Court upheld the sentence, leaving unanswered the applicant\u2019s complaint about the press interview. 10.  In reply to a post-conviction complaint brought by the applicant, in December 2004 the Sverdovsk Regional Prosecutor\u2019s Office found that the interview had breached the agency\u2019s ethics policy as it had preceded the trial without, however, tangibly redressing the applicant.", "references": ["7", "2", "4", "1", "8", "5", "0", "6", "9", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicants were prosecuted in Russia for various crimes. They were arrested and detained pending investigation and trial. Their detention was ordered and extended by the courts. The detention orders were essentially based on the gravity of the charges, the primary grounds being the risk of the applicants\u2019 absconding and interfering with the course of justice. The detention and extension orders used stereotyped formulae, without addressing specific facts or considering alternative preventive measures. 5.  The first applicant was born in 1973 and lived, prior to his arrest, in Yekaterinburg, Sverdlovsk Region. In 2007 the applicant was arrested in Ukraine. On 24 May 2008 he was extradited to Russia and was placed in pre-trial detention until 27 December 2010 when he was released on bail. On 22 April 2011 the Kirovskiy District Court of Yekaterinburg convicted him of fraud. 6.  The second applicant was born in 1978 and lived, prior to his arrest, in Angarsk, Irkutsk Region. On 23 September 2007 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of fraud. On 25 September 2007 the court remanded him in custody. On 24 June 2010 the Irkutsk Regional Court convicted the applicant of fraud. 7.  The third applicant was born in 1967 and lived, prior to his arrest, in Yekaterinburg. The applicant was arrested on 16 August 2012. On 17 August 2012 the court held to place him in pre-trial detention. On 10 October 2013 the Sverdlovsk Regional Court convicted the applicant of trespass, battery, robbery and sexual assault.", "references": ["4", "9", "1", "8", "7", "6", "3", "5", "0", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1978 and lived in Cheboksary before his conviction. He is currently serving a sentence in Novocheboksarsk. 6.  In April 2006 a criminal case was opened into the theft of money belonging to the applicant\u2019s cousin, Ms G. 7.  On 8 September 2006 G. was found dead in her flat with several gunshot wounds. On 9 September 2006 a criminal case was opened into her murder. 8.  On 14 September 2006 the applicant, who was suspected of the theft and whose whereabouts were unknown, was placed on a police wanted list. 9.  At around 10 p.m. on 6 October 2006 the applicant was arrested on the street. He was handcuffed and taken to the police station of the Moskovskiy district police department of Cheboksary (\u041c\u043e\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0432\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0439 \u0420\u041e\u0412\u0414 \u0433. \u0427\u0435\u0431\u043e\u043a\u0441\u0430\u0440\u044b \u2013 \u201cthe district police\u201d). According to Ms P. and two other female witnesses, the applicant had no injuries before his arrest. 10.  The applicant was escorted to the police station at around 11 p.m. He was taken in handcuffs to room no. 217 on the first floor (\u201csecond floor\u201d in Russian) and interviewed by operative police officers Ch. and F. about the theft and murder. He gave a partial confession, stating that he had stolen less money from the victim, but denied murder. 11.  The parties provided different accounts of the events at the police station. 12.  According to the applicant, police officers Ch. and F., who were drunk at the time, demanded that he confess to the theft and murder. They allegedly beat him up, delivering blows to his head, ears, body and legs, and threatened him with rape. At about 3 a.m. they shackled a 40 kg weight to his hands, which he was made to hold while they continued to physically assault him. At about 4 a.m. they made him stand on the windowsill of an open window and threatened to throw him out and make it look as if he had attempted to flee or commit suicide if he did not confess to the murder. After refusing to do so, one of the police officers allegedly pushed him out of the window. 13.  According to the Government, in the course of the police interview the applicant, who was drunk when he was taken to the police station, suddenly climbed on a table and jumped out of the window. This course of events was reported by police officers Ch. and F. to their superior on 7 October 2006. They stated that they had taken the applicant for an interview in room no. 217 in handcuffs as he had been drunk, had had a strong smell of alcohol coming from his mouth, had behaved aggressively and inadequately and had used obscene and threatening language towards them. 14.  Shortly before 6 a.m. on 7 October 2006 the applicant was given first aid by the ambulance service, which diagnosed him with a closed head injury, concussion and bruises of the soft tissue on the face and on both feet. According to the paramedic and his assistant, they found the applicant lying on the tarmac conscious; he was handcuffed without any weight shackled to him. 15.  At 6.15 a.m. the applicant was taken to the Cheboksary Town Emergency Hospital handcuffed on a stretcher, accompanied by police officers Ch. and F. After surgery his right foot was in plaster and his left foot had a weight fixed to it. The applicant was shackled to the bed by one of his hands and guarded by a police officer. 16.  From 11.20 to 11.55 a.m. on 7 October 2006 an investigator from the district police questioned the applicant in hospital as a suspect in the theft case, in the presence of a lawyer. He reiterated his confession (see paragraph 10 above). From 7 to 8.30 p.m. that evening an investigator from the Moskovskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office questioned him as a witness in the murder case. 17.  According to Ms P. and the applicant\u2019s mother, who visited the applicant in the hospital, the applicant\u2019s eyes were both bruised (which is also evident on photographs of the applicant in hospital), his left ear was swollen, his teeth were loose and he could hardly talk. According to his mother, his left ear was unresponsive and he could not hear, his head and chin were badly bruised, and he had bruises and cuts on his wrists. The applicant told his mother that he had been beaten up and threatened with rape by two police officers, who had shackled a 40 kg weight to him and threatened to throw him out of a window if he did not confess to the crimes. He could not remember what had happened next. 18.  At 1.10 p.m. on 10 October 2006 an investigator from the district police drew up a record of the applicant\u2019s arrest at 1 p.m. that day as a suspect in the theft case. On 11 October 2006 the Moskovskiy District Court of Cheboksary (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) dismissed the investigator\u2019s request to have the applicant remanded in custody on the grounds that he had been hospitalised and could not participate in the hearing himself. 19.  At 2.15 p.m. on 13 October 2006 an investigator from the Moskovskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office drew up a record of the applicant\u2019s arrest at 2.10 p.m. that day on suspicion of the murder. On the same day the District Court extended his arrest until 16 October 2006. 20.  On 16 October 2006 the criminal cases concerning the theft and murder were joined and the applicant was charged with both crimes. The District Court remanded him in custody. 21.  On the same day the applicant, who had been undergoing continuous inpatient treatment in hospital since 7 October 2016, was transferred to the Cheboksary pre\u2011trial detention facility. 22.  By an order of 21 October 2006 the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Chuvashiya held police officers Ch. and F. liable in disciplinary proceedings for failing to properly guard the applicant and leaving him without permanent surveillance on 7 October 2006. They were issued with a severe warning. The order stated that in the course of the applicant\u2019s interview the police officers, who had failed to carry out their duties in accordance with the service regulations and to take into account the applicant\u2019s personality, had opened a window thereby creating conditions for the applicant to jump out of it. 23.  On 22 November 2006 the applicant confessed to the murder of G. in the course of his questioning as an accused, in the presence of his lawyer. 24.  On 8 February 2007 the District Court convicted him of theft, murder and possession of a firearm, and sentenced him to fourteen years\u2019 imprisonment. The period of his arrest and remand in custody from 10 to 12 October 2006 and from 13 October 2006 onwards was counted towards his sentence. The judgment entered into force on 5 April 2007. 25.  The following injuries were recorded during the applicant\u2019s initial examination at the Cheboksary Town Emergency Hospital on 7 October 2006: a soft tissue injury to the head, scratches on the face and knees, swelling and bruises on the left hip, a fractured left foot and a dislocated right foot. He was diagnosed with a closed head injury, concussion, bruises and scratches on the head soft tissue and left hip and knee joints, and fractures to both feet. 26.  On 8 October 2006, during his inpatient treatment in hospital, the applicant, who had complained that one of his teeth was loose and painful, was examined by a dentist and diagnosed with a \u201ccontusion of tooth 41\u201d (lower tooth on the right side). On 11 October 2006 an otolaryngologist examined him in connection with the impaired hearing in his left ear and diagnosed him with otitis. 27.  From 22 October to 12 November 2006 the applicant received inpatient treatment in the medical facility of Chuvashiya correctional colony no. 4 (IK-4). 28.  It appears from a report by a panel of forensic psychiatrists dated 24 November 2006 that the applicant suffered from a personality disorder which did not require medical treatment or exclude his criminal responsibility. The experts did not assess the applicant\u2019s fall from the window of the police station. 29.  On 11 December 2006 an investigator of the Moskovskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office ordered a forensic medical examination of the applicant. The investigator stated that at about 5 a.m. on 7 October 2006 the applicant had fallen from office no. 217 on the first floor of the police station and received injuries to both feet. The investigator asked whether on 7 October 2006 the applicant had had any injuries other than those to both of his feet, and if so, how and when they had been received, whether they could have been received as a result of a fall onto tarmac from the first floor, where they were located and how serious they had been. 30.  Following an examination of the applicant\u2019s hospital records, a forensic medical expert concluded on 14 December 2006 that the information concerning the applicant\u2019s initial examination in hospital on 7 October 2006 was undetailed. Information on the exact location, number and morphological characteristics of the injuries was missing, and was insufficient to determine the time and order they had been inflicted to distinguish them and determine which could have been as a result of the applicant being punched and kicked and which could have been as a result of his fall from the first floor. It was stated in the expert\u2019s report that the applicant had not attended the examination, after asking in writing to carry it out in his absence. 31.  On 11 October 2006 the applicant\u2019s mother lodged a complaint with the Chuvashiya prosecutor\u2019s office concerning her son\u2019s alleged ill\u2011treatment and unlawful deprivation of liberty from 6 to 10 October 2006. 32.  On 8 November 2006 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Moskovskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office concerning his alleged ill\u2011treatment by the police officers, requesting that criminal proceedings be opened against them. 33.  The Moskovskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office and subsequently the Cheboksary inter-district investigation department of the investigative committee at the Chuvashiya prosecutor\u2019s office refused to open a criminal case into the applicant\u2019s alleged ill-treatment and unlawful deprivation of liberty twenty-four times, pursuant to Article 24 \u00a7 1 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (\u201cCCrP\u201d), because none of the elements of the offences provided for in Articles 127, 285, 286, 299 and 301 of the Criminal Code (unlawful deprivation of liberty, abuse of powers, criminal prosecution of persons known to be innocent and unlawful arrest and detention respectively) were present in respect of the actions of the police officers. They concluded that the applicant\u2019s allegations could not be confirmed by a pre-investigation inquiry. 34.  The pre-investigation inquiry was resumed twenty-three times as the decisions refusing to open a criminal investigation were set aside by higher authorities within the prosecutor\u2019s office and subsequently the investigative committee as unsubstantiated, unlawful or based on an incomplete inquiry.\n(i)  A refusal on 21 October 2006 was overruled on 5 December 2006 on the grounds, inter alia, that nothing had been done to establish whether there had been a 40 kg weight in office no. 217. Moreover, police officers Ch. and F. had carried out non-investigative actions involving the applicant, a suspect in the criminal case, from 11 p.m. to 5.42 a.m. on the night of 6 October 2006, and no assessment of the lawfulness of those actions had been carried out.\n(ii)  A refusal on 12 December 2006 was overruled on 13 December 2006. It was noted that office no. 217 had been inspected and no weights had been found.\n(iii)  Twenty further decisions refusing to open a criminal case taken between 18 December 2006 and 9 October 2008 were overruled. In particular, a refusal on 22 May 2008 was overruled on 5 June 2008 on the grounds that instructions by the deputy head of the investigative committee of Chuvashiya given on 22 November 2007 had still not been fulfilled. A refusal on 16 June 2008 was overruled on 16 June 2008 on the grounds that deficiencies identified by the deputy head of the prosecutor\u2019s office of Chuvashiya on 5 December 2006, the Moskovskiy District Court of Cheboksary on 6 March 2007 and the Supreme Court of Chuvashiya on 12 April 2007 had still not been corrected.\n(iv)  A refusal on 27 October 2008 was overruled on 28 October 2008 on the grounds that the investigative committee of Chuvashiya acknowledged that investigator S. had been found liable in disciplinary proceedings for stalling the inquiry and issuing unlawful and unsubstantiated decisions based on an incomplete inquiry.\n(v)  A refusal on 2 December 2008 was upheld by the courts as a result of a review under Article 125 of the CCrP (see paragraph 40 below). 35.  In the most recent refusal issued on 2 December 2008 investigator A. from the Cheboksary investigative committee found that the applicant, who had been wanted in the theft case, had been arrested and taken to the police station and remained there on suspicion of committing it. His being held in room no. 217 for five hours had been necessary for carrying out operational\u2011search measures. Police officers Ch. and F. had handcuffed him lawfully in order to guard him and prevent him from escaping or harming himself or others. His hospitalisation had made it impossible for him to be arrested as a suspect on 7 October 2006. He had been handcuffed in hospital to prevent him from attempting to escape again. 36.  The investigator also found that the applicant had jumped out of the window himself in order to flee, without any coercion by the police officers. His allegations that he had been subjected to physical violence had not been confirmed. The investigator stated that injuries other than those to both feet had been found on the applicant at the time of his admission, as set out in the forensic medical expert\u2019s report of 14 December 2006. However, the lack of any detailed description of those injuries in the applicant\u2019s medical records had made it impossible to establish when and how they had been received, in particular whether they had been received as a result of him falling from the first floor or being beaten up. 37.  The investigator\u2019s decision of 2 December 2008 referred, inter alia, to statements by police officers Ch. and F. They said that after the applicant\u2019s arrest on 6 October 2006 they had interviewed him in room no. 217 about the theft and the murder of G. of which he had been suspected. The applicant had given a partial confession to the theft but had denied murder. He had been convicted of a criminal offence in the past and had tried to escape from a police station by jumping out of a toilet window. The incident had prompted the police to install iron bars on it. In September 2006, after the murder of G., the applicant had been hospitalised for a drug overdose, but had not been arrested because after the hospital had alerted the police he had managed to escape. During the interview on 6 October 2008 the applicant, who had been drunk and had smelled of alcohol, had behaved provokingly and insulted them with obscene words. They had therefore handcuffed him (placing his hands in front) to avoid any attempts to escape or commit suicide. At about 5 a.m., as F. had been leaving the room, the applicant had jumped on a table adjacent to an open window and jumped out. Ch. claimed that he had been putting documents into a safe at the time, while F. said that Ch. had been sitting at the table and the applicant had been sitting on a chair near the table immediately before jumping out of the window. Access to the window had been blocked by the table. It had been possible to reach and open it while sitting at the table. They had taken the applicant to hospital and guarded him there to prevent him attempting to flee again. 38.  The decision of 2 December 2008 also referred to the applicant\u2019s statements that immediately before his arrest he had been drinking, and to statements by the investigator from the district police and a police officer who had guarded the applicant at the hospital on 9 October 2006 that the applicant had allegedly stated off the record that he had jumped out of the window himself trying to flee, without any influence by the police officers. It also relied on statements by duty police officer T. that in the early morning of 7 October 2006 he had seen on a monitor (no video recordings had been made) that somebody had fallen out of the window of the police station. He had been the first to go near the applicant lying on his back with his hands handcuffed to his front. Nothing had been attached to his hands. In his earlier statements set out in the refusal to open a criminal case of 21 October 2006, T. explained that at around 5 to 6 a.m. on 7 October 2006 he had seen on a monitor that somebody was lying near the entrance of the police station. Police officers and ambulance staff approached him. T. had not gone near him himself and had neither seen him nor whether there had been any objects near him. 39.  Refusals of 17 February 2007 and 25 April 2007, as well as the refusal of 2 December 2008, were reviewed by the domestic courts in accordance with Article 125 of the CCrP. The applicant\u2019s complaints concerning the two 2007 refusals were allowed. In decisions of 6 March and 13 September 2007 the District Court found that they were unlawful and lacked reasoning. The decision of 6 March was upheld on appeal on 12 April 2007 by the Supreme Court of Chuvashiya, which noted that it was necessary to assess the lawfulness of the handcuffing and guarding of the applicant in hospital before his detention in the criminal proceedings. The decision of 13 September 2007 also found the Moskovskiy district prosecutor\u2019s failure to enforce the District Court\u2019s previous decision of 6 March 2007 unlawful. 40.  On 3 November 2009 the District Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal against the most recent refusal to open a criminal case, finding that the investigating authorities had carried out all the measures necessary for establishing the relevant facts fully, objectively and thoroughly, and had taken a reasoned decision on the basis of a full and comprehensive inquiry in accordance with the law. On 10 December 2009 the Supreme Court of Chuvashiya upheld that decision on appeal, noting that in disagreeing with the District Court\u2019s findings, the applicant\u2019s representative had misinterpreted the relevant domestic law.", "references": ["0", "3", "8", "9", "6", "7", "4", "5", "No Label", "1", "2"], "gold": ["1", "2"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicants are Russian nationals who live in Kizel, Perm Region. Their names and dates of birth are tabulated below. 5.  The applicants sued the municipal unitary enterprise \u201cGorvodokanal\u201d (\u041c\u0423\u041f \u00ab\u0413\u043e\u0440\u0432\u043e\u0434\u043e\u043a\u0430\u043d\u0430\u043b\u00bb) (hereafter \u201cthe company\u201d) for salary arrears. 6.  The company was incorporated as a municipal unitary enterprise set up by a decision of the local administration and provided water supply in the town of Kizel. The company had \u201cthe right of economic control\u201d (\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043e \u0445\u043e\u0437\u044f\u0439\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0432\u0435\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f) over the assets allocated to it by the administration in order to carry out its statutory activities. 7.  On 7 September 2006 the company was declared insolvent and its liquidation started. 8.  In 2007 and 2009 domestic courts by separate judgments made pecuniary awards in the applicants\u2019 favour, to be paid by the company. Particulars of each judgment are summarised in the appended table. 9.  On the dates listed in the Appendix the awards became enforceable. 10.  The applicants alleged that the judgments had remained unenforced. According to the Government, all the judgments, except the one delivered on 16 October 2009 in Mr Martov\u2019s favour, had been fully enforced in December 2007-April 2010. The judgment of 16 October 2009 had not been enforced since Mr Martov had failed to submit the execution writ to the liquidator. The Government corroborated their statements by a certificate issued by the company\u2019s liquidator on 6 February 2012. According to that document, the judgment of 1 August 2007 in Mr Martov\u2019s favour had been enforced in full, whereas the execution writ issued in 2009 had never reached the liquidator. The document says nothing about other applicants.\n 11.  The applicants submitted to the Court a copy of a letter they had received from the Prosecutor\u2019s office of Kizel, dated 3 June 2011. According to the letter, in November 2009 Mr Martov submitted to the liquidator the execution writ in respect of the judgment of 16 October 2009.", "references": ["1", "4", "6", "8", "5", "7", "0", "2", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1951 and lived, prior to his arrest, in Irkutsk. 5.  On 14 May 2008 the applicant was arrested. On an unspecified date he was charged with three counts of pimping and pandering, extortion and illegal keeping of firearms. The court remanded him in custody. 6.  On 5 March 2009 he was committed for trial before the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Irkutsk. 7.  On 3 August 2009 the District Court extended his pre-trial detention on the ground that the circumstances of the case had not changed since the applicant\u2019s arrest, he was accused of a serious crime, did not live at his domicile, hence he could abscond, threaten witnesses and interfere with the investigation. 8.  On 26 November 2009 and 2 March 2010 the District Court extended the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention referring to the above grounds and stating that the victims of his crimes were minors. The court also took into account the applicant\u2019s character, his state of health and age. 9.  The applicant\u2019s appeals against the detention orders were rejected. 10.  On 29 March 2010 the District Court convicted him as charged.", "references": ["1", "0", "7", "3", "8", "4", "9", "5", "6", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "5.  During the autumn of 2004 the applicant assembled several explosive devices with the purpose of extorting money from commercial banks in order to donate the proceeds to orphans. On 25 December 2004 he planted and exploded one of the devices in front of the bank M.; there were no casualties. He then planted another explosive device equipped with a timer and accompanied by a threatening note. It was disarmed. 6.  Criminal proceedings were initiated against the applicant; however he was diagnosed with schizotypal personality disorder. On the basis of this diagnosis the Moscow City Court (\u041c\u043e\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0432\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0439 \u0433\u043e\u0440\u043e\u0434\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u0441\u0443\u0434) on 7 February 2007 relieved the applicant of criminal liability and ordered his involuntary treatment. 7.  In 2010 the applicant was discharged. He moved to the Republic of Altay, where he registered for psychiatric supervision with the local psychiatric hospital. In April 2012 his schizotypal personality disorder condition was noted several times as being in stable remission. 8.  On Friday, 14 September 2012 at 11.45 p.m., following a request by the local medical services and information received from the municipal authorities, the applicant was apprehended by the police and taken to Gorno-Altayskaya Psychiatric Hospital (\u0413\u043e\u0440\u043d\u043e-\u0430\u043b\u0442\u0430\u0439\u0441\u043a\u0430\u044f \u043f\u0441\u0438\u0445\u0438\u0430\u0442\u0440\u0438\u0447\u0435\u0441\u043a\u0430\u044f \u0431\u043e\u043b\u044c\u043d\u0438\u0446\u0430, hereinafter \u201cGAPB\u201d). The grounds for the request were the refusal of the applicant to undergo planned outpatient treatment, stated ideas concerning revenge against and murder of certain regional officials, and the applicant\u2019s own complaints about the \u201cworsening\u201d of his condition. 9.  On 15 September 2012 a medical counselling panel composed of the resident psychiatrists of the hospital examined the applicant and diagnosed him with schizotypal personality disorder in decompensation. The panel also found that the applicant was a danger to himself or others and there was a risk of significant damage to his health owing to the deterioration or aggravation of his psychiatric condition in the absence of psychiatric assistance. The relevant parts of the panel\u2019s report read as follows:\n\u201c[The report begins with a detailed account of the applicant\u2019s personal and medical history with a special accent on the events related to the assembly and use of explosive devices and his subsequent involuntary treatment in psychiatric facilities.]\n[Mr Makarov] refused medication stating that \u2018he [had] a sufficient supply\u2019. Refused planned inpatient treatments. In recent months the attending psychiatrist has observed changes in his mental state \u2013 mood swings from depression to hypomania, statements about \u2018social pressure\u2019, and conflicts with local and regional public bodies. During the appointments he mentioned \u2018bad ideas about killing Mr B. [the governor of the region]\u2019 ...\nMental state: Conscious. Since his admission refused to discuss his condition, actions, behaviour, reasoning that \u2018this whole situation is a political conspiracy of Mr B. and his team\u2019; considers medical personnel and doctors to be \u2018accomplices\u2019, \u2018you are in with B.\u2019s gang\u2019. Does not engage in discussion, leaves the doctor\u2019s office, slams doors. Refuses to consume food and to give samples for analysis. Suspicious of all statements and actions directed at him.\nConclusion: Considering the clinical history of severe mental disorder, avoidance of in- and outpatient treatment, criminal behaviour in acute mental state in the past, his own complaints about \u2018worsening\u2019 of the condition, coupled with refusal of voluntary treatment, the panel [considers involuntary hospitalisation in a psychiatric facility to be necessary] ...\u201d 10.  On Monday, 17 September 2012 the hospital applied for judicial authorisation of the applicant\u2019s involuntary hospitalisation under section 29 (a) and (c) of the Psychiatric Assistance Act 1992, since the applicant was a danger to himself or others and there was a risk of significant damage to his health owing to the deterioration or aggravation of his psychiatric condition in the absence of psychiatric assistance. On the same day the Gorno-Altayskiy Town Court (\u0413\u043e\u0440\u043d\u043e-\u0430\u043b\u0442\u0430\u0439\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0439 \u0433\u043e\u0440\u043e\u0434\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u0441\u0443\u0434, hereinafter \u201cthe Town Court\u201d) received the application and extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 20 September 2012. 11.  On 19 September 2012 the Town Court granted the application for the applicant\u2019s involuntary hospitalisation. The hearing was attended by the applicant, his counsel Mr M., the representative of the hospital, and the prosecutor. Upon an application by the prosecutor, the court ordered that the hearing be held in camera in order to protect the applicant\u2019s privacy in respect of his medical condition; the applicant himself and his representative objected to that decision. The relevant parts of the judicial order read as follows:\n\u201c[The reasoning of the order begins with a detailed account of the applicant\u2019s personal and medical history with a special accent on the events related to the assembly and use of explosive devices and his subsequent involuntary treatment in psychiatric facilities.]\n[According to his medical records] on 7 November 2011 Mr Makarov complained of aggravation of his mental state: tension, restless sleep, gloominess, references to the need for psychiatric treatment, however he refused it owing to lack of trust in the doctors ...\nBetween December 2011 and March 2012 Mr Makarov did not visit his attending psychiatrists despite repeated reminders ...\nOn 11 July 2012 during a visit to his attending psychiatrist Mr Makarov complained of \u2018bad ideas of killing Mr B.\u2019 and other persons said by him to be involved in making his diagnosis public. Complained of persecution by local media, officials, insisted on obtaining a certificate concerning aggravation of his mental condition. Schizotypal personality disorder in acute state. Refused planned inpatient treatment.\n[The order goes on to provide an account of the applicant\u2019s most recent hospitalisation and reproduces the relevant parts of the medical counselling panel report.]\nThe court considers that the report of the medical counselling panel was prepared by competent professionals in the relevant field of studies, and due consideration was given to the clinical history of Mr Makarov ... The report contains the symptoms [showing the severity of Mr Makarov\u2019s condition], it states the diagnosis. Having regard to the information obtained through psychiatric observation, the history of criminal behaviour, anxiety, tension and ideas in respect of public officials, the experts concluded that in his current mental state Mr Makarov is a danger to himself or others and there was a risk of significant damage to [his] health owing to the deterioration or aggravation of his psychiatric condition in the absence of psychiatric assistance. There are no reasons to doubt the objectivity and impartiality of the experts.\nDuring the hearing Mr Makarov did not contest his diagnosis ... however he argued that his disorder was not severe and he was in a remission state ... Refused inpatient treatment ... Stated that he needed specialised assistance, but not from GAPB; in his statements and replies demonstrated denial and aversion towards [any assistance from them] ... Stated that he supressed the need for psychiatric care with willpower ...\nIt has been established during the hearing that Mr Makarov needs psychiatric assistance, since otherwise he may suffer from severe deterioration of his health, because he suffers from a severe mental disorder, avoids treatment, refuses assistance of attending psychiatrist, his mental condition aggravated, he has aggressive thoughts and ideas, refuses food, refuses voluntary inpatient treatment ...\u201d 12.  In a separate ruling the Town Court observed that the application for involuntary hospitalisation had been submitted outside the statutory forty-eight-hour time-limit and urged the hospital administration to avoid similar occurrences in future. 13.  On 19 October 2012 the applicant\u2019s counsel appealed against the order arguing, inter alia, (a) that the Town Court had failed to demonstrate the need for hospitalisation, and (b) that the application for involuntary hospitalisation had been lodged outside of the statutory time-limit and thus the applicant had been detained without a court order for more than forty\u2011eight hours. On 29 October 2012 his counsel lodged an additional statement of appeal. 14.  On 14 November 2012 the Supreme Court of the Republic of Altay (\u0412\u0435\u0440\u0445\u043e\u0432\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u0441\u0443\u0434 \u0420\u0435\u0441\u043f\u0443\u0431\u043b\u0438\u043a\u0438 \u0410\u043b\u0442\u0430\u0439) dismissed the appeal and upheld the lower court\u2019s order as well-reasoned and lawful. Concerning the applicant\u2019s detention beyond the time-limit without a court order, the Supreme Court stated that the delay had been caused by the hospital administration, while the courts had complied with the procedural time-limits.", "references": ["6", "8", "3", "7", "9", "4", "5", "1", "0", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Shuya, in the Ivanovo Region. 6.  The applicant sued her former employer (the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Kalmykiya, hereafter \u201cthe Ministry\u201d). 7.  On 27 October 1999 the Elista Town Court of the Republic of Kalmykiya (\u201cthe Town Court\u201d) awarded the applicant monthly payments as compensation for damage to her health, with subsequent index-linked adjustment in accordance with changes in the statutory minimum monthly salary. The judgment came into force on 9 November 1999. 8.  On 26 November 2002 Federal Law No. 152-FZ was adopted, which, inter alia, amended the procedure for index-linking compensation awards for damage to health. According to the new law, such payments were to be adjusted in accordance with changes in the level of inflation. The minimum monthly salary no longer served as the basis for index-linking. 9.  In November 2006 the Ministry applied the new method of index\u2011linking, and recalculated the monthly payments to be paid to the applicant. This resulted in a decrease in the actual monthly amount she received from 10,370.51 Russian roubles (RUB) to RUB 7,396.59, as established in March 2007. 10.  The applicant initiated three sets of proceedings, claiming delay interest in respect of three distinct periods. On 22 February and 3 April 2007 (upheld on 20 July 2007) the Justice of the Peace of Elistinskiy Court Circuit no. 5 of the Republic of Kalmykiya (\u201cthe Justice of the Peace\u201d) ordered the Ministry to pay the applicant the interest in respect of certain delays in the monthly payments, in accordance with the judgment of 27 October 1999. On 22 February 2007 the judge agreed with the applicant\u2019s calculation of the delay interest (based on the index-linking of the monthly payments in accordance with the changes in the statutory minimum monthly salary). On 3 April 2007 the court calculated the delay interest based on the amount of the monthly payments, as index-linked in line with the rate of inflation. 11.  On 7 May 2007 the Justice of the Peace refused the applicant\u2019s claim for the delay interest. On 8 August 2007 the Town Court quashed the above decision and ordered the Ministry to pay the delay interest as calculated by the applicant. The court held that, in the absence of a relevant judicial decision, the Ministry had unlawfully changed the mode of index-linking ordered by the judgment of 27 October 1999. 12.  In the meantime, on 7 May 2007 the Ministry requested clarification of the judgment of 27 October 1999 as regards the method of index-linking. On 25 June 2007 the Town Court held that, as a result of changes in the relevant legislation, as of 1 January 2003 the index-linking of the amounts in question was to be based on changes in the level of inflation. On 11 October 2007 the Supreme Court of the Republic of Kalmykiya upheld the decision of the Town Court. 13.  In a letter received on 1 October 2009 the applicant informed the Court that in August 2009 the Ministry had stopped paying the monthly payments, owing to a lack of funds in the relevant budget. 14.  According to the Government, the amount due to the applicant from August 2009 onwards was paid to her in full on 8 October 2009. On 11 November 2009 the Town Court awarded her delay interest for late payment in respect of the delays in payment between September and October 2009. The judgment came into force on 23 November 2009, and was executed on 9 December 2009.", "references": ["0", "7", "1", "2", "4", "6", "9", "8", "3", "5", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1927. 6.  He owned a house with a yard in Plovdiv, which were expropriated in 1982 on the basis of section 98 (1) of the Territorial and Urban Planning Act of 1973 (\u0417\u0430\u043a\u043e\u043d \u0437\u0430 \u0442\u0435\u0440\u0438\u0442\u043e\u0440\u0438\u0430\u043b\u043d\u043e\u0442\u043e \u0438 \u0441\u0435\u043b\u0438\u0449\u043d\u043e \u0443\u0441\u0442\u0440\u043e\u0439\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e) with a view to constructing a residential building. The expropriation decision stated that the applicant was to be compensated with a two-room flat and a garage in a building which the municipality intended to construct. 7.  On an unspecified date the flat due in compensation was constructed and delivered. However, the applicant never received the garage which had also been due to him. 8.  In April 2008 the applicant complained to the Plovdiv municipality of the failure to provide him with a garage. By a letter of 11 June 2008 the deputy mayor of Plovdiv informed him that the municipality had no garages available and that it was currently constructing a building with underground garages, one of which could be offered to him. 9.  In February 2010 the applicant wrote once again to the municipality, and was informed in reply that the construction of the building mentioned earlier had not been completed. 10.  In 2014 the municipality offered the applicants\u2019 heirs a garage, which the latter refused as it was situated at more than ten kilometers from their place of residence.", "references": ["4", "8", "3", "1", "2", "5", "7", "0", "6", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1961 and lives in Pernik. 5.  Her mother owned a house with a yard in the city, which were expropriated in 1978 on the basis of section 98 (1) of the Territorial and Urban Planning Act of 1973 (\u0417\u0430\u043a\u043e\u043d \u0437\u0430 \u0442\u0435\u0440\u0438\u0442\u043e\u0440\u0438\u0430\u043b\u043d\u043e\u0442\u043e \u0438 \u0441\u0435\u043b\u0438\u0449\u043d\u043e \u0443\u0441\u0442\u0440\u043e\u0439\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e \u2013 \u201cthe TUPA\u201d) with a view to constructing a highway. It was stated in the expropriation decision that the applicant\u2019s mother was to be compensated with a three-room flat, and the applicant was to receive a two\u2011room flat. 6.  The flat that the applicant\u2019s mother was due was constructed and provided to her in 1985. Until then the family lived in a municipally-owned dwelling. 7.  The expropriated house was pulled down in 1986. 8.  In a decision of 14 July 2000, issued on the basis of section 100 of the TUPA, the Pernik mayor indicated the exact flat to be provided to the applicant. It measured 75 square metres and was situated in a building under construction. It was stated in the decision that the flat\u2019s value was 22,424.84 Bulgarian levs (BGN), although it was not specified whether this amount took into account the value of the expropriated properties. Later on in 2000 the applicant paid to the municipality BGN 28,000 for the flat\u2019s value; it is unclear how this amount was arrived at. 9.  The building where the flat was situated was completed in 2003, but the flat that the applicant was due was never handed over to her. The applicant was told that it had been transferred by the municipality to third parties. 10.  In the following years the applicant and her mother filed complaints with the regional governor, the Prime Minister and the Parliament. 11.  The authorities have not yet fulfilled their obligation to provide the applicant with a flat. The applicant states that she does not have another dwelling and that together with her husband and children she has been living with her parents in their flat.", "references": ["0", "1", "5", "6", "2", "7", "4", "3", "8", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Prague. 6.  In a judgment of 25 January 2005 the Prague 4 District Court (obvodn\u00ed soud), relying on Article 10 \u00a7 1 of the Civil Code, deprived the applicant of legal capacity. Based on an expert opinion and the testimony of the applicant\u2019s father, the court concluded that the applicant was suffering from alcoholic dementia, which was a permanent mental disability, and that he was unable to perform any legal acts on his own. The applicant was represented by a guardian ad litem and was therefore not heard by the court, which found that it appeared from the expert opinion that he was unable to understand the relevance of the proceedings. For the same reason, the court dispensed with the delivery of the judgment to the applicant. 7.  In a decision of 21 April 2009, which became final on 21 July 2009, the District Court appointed the Prague 11 Municipality Office (m\u011bstsk\u00e1 \u010d\u00e1st) as the applicant\u2019s public guardian (ve\u0159ejn\u00fd opatrovn\u00edk). 8.  The applicant has attempted to regain his legal capacity several times, but his requests have always been refused. On 4 March 2010, refusing another request to restore legal capacity to the applicant, the District Court banned him from lodging further requests for one year because there was no possibility of his condition changing within that period. It relied on an expert opinion of 5 January 2010, which stated, inter alia:\n\u201c[the applicant] presents a picture of a chronic alcoholic in the terminal stage of alcoholism, with complete loss of control over drinking, complete lack of awareness of his illness, severe and irreversible damage to his health fully or partially caused by alcohol abuse and social and economic downfall which, in addition to his complete lack of awareness, also indicates serious personality changes objectively caused by detected brain atrophy.\n...\n[I]t is a long-lasting disorder which cannot be completely repaired even by treatment that is fully successful. ...\n[L]oss of control over drinking and complete lack of awareness regarding alcohol abuse and its consequences result in a high probability of the repetition of previous relapses and, therefore, in behaviour which could, for similar reasons, pose a threat to the financial, social and personal stability of the person examined.\u201d 9.  In a judgment of 16 October 2012 the District Court, having examined an expert report and heard the expert and the applicant, decided to limit the latter\u2019s legal capacity to act. It restricted his legal capacity so that he was not entitled to dispose of funds and conclude contracts exceeding 500 korunas (CZK) (18 euros (EUR)) per month. The court noted that according to the expert report, the applicant was suffering from mixed organic dementia up to intermediate level and with a continued lack of awareness of his state of health. In addition, he was unable to make more complex legal decisions independently. The applicant lodged appeals on 1 and 13 November 2012. 10.  The Prague Municipal Court (m\u011bstsk\u00fd soud) scheduled a hearing for 4 April 2013 and summoned the applicant. However, his lawyer was not informed about the hearing because his public guardian had refused to sign the power of attorney and so none of the courts recognised the lawyer as the applicant\u2019s legal representative. The court subsequently cancelled the hearing and remitted the case to the District Court, which on 3 June 2013 assigned a new guardian to the applicant. The new guardian granted the power of attorney to a lawyer to represent the applicant in the proceedings on legal capacity. 11.  On 8 August 2013 the Municipal Court quashed the judgment of 16 October 2012 and sent the case back to the District Court which in a judgment of 12 June 2014 decided to limit the legal capacity of the applicant, for a period of twelve months, so that he was not entitled to dispose of funds exceeding 1,500 CZK (EUR55) per week. 12.  On 30 July 2015 the District Court initiated ex officio the proceedings on legal capacity and guardianship. At the same time, it ordered an expert opinion in psychiatry. It appears that the proceedings are still ongoing. 13.  The applicant was admitted to the Prague-Bohnice psychiatric hospital seven times: in 2004 (for two weeks); in 2005 (for two weeks); in 2006 (for four and a half months); in 2007 (for two months); in 2008 and 2009 (for six and a half months); in 2009 (for three weeks); and during 2009 and 2010 (for thirteen months). 14.  The applicant\u2019s hospital discharge report of 11 October 2010 stated, inter alia, that he had been suffering from a mental and behavioural disorder caused by alcohol, that he was an alcoholic and that he had repeatedly experienced deliria tremens. 15.  In the record of a telephone conversation between the applicant\u2019s public guardian and a neighbour on 11 November 2011 it was noted, inter alia, that complaints about the applicant had been escalating, as he had been causing disturbance at night as a result of his excessive drinking and had been urinating on the stairs. 16.  Another record of a telephone conversation between the public guardian and the applicant on 6 December 2010 stated, in particular, that the applicant had confirmed that he had not taken any of the medication prescribed to him by the psychiatrist. 17.  During a conversation with the applicant\u2019s public guardian on 10 January 2011 the applicant\u2019s son said that his father had always kept many animals and that his treatment of them was bordering on cruelty because he did not feed them. He also allowed them in his bed, and as a result the bed was drenched and smelled foul. Moreover, the carpets and other furnishings in the flat were dirty and badly damaged. 18.  On 17 January 2011 the public guardian urged the applicant not to yell at passers-by. The applicant replied that he was a psychologist and teacher, and practised communication with people in that way. 19.  On 19 January 2011 Dr M.P. mentioned that the applicant was suffering from repeated alcohol abuse, alcohol-related cognitive impairment and alcoholic dementia. He was an alcoholic who did not cooperate and was unaware of his alcohol abuse. 20.  On 21 January 2011 the applicant\u2019s neighbours complained to the public guardian that the applicant was disturbing them at night, that an unbearable smell was exuding from his flat, that he had been urinating on the stairs and kept falling down when drunk, and that the situation was continuously getting worse. 21.  On 31 January 2011 the public guardian received another telephone call from the applicant\u2019s neighbour complaining about the behaviour of the applicant, who had been drunk, towards herself and her child. The neighbour said that she was afraid of him. On the same day, the applicant\u2019s parents visited his public guardian to try to resolve the problematic situation relating to the applicant\u2019s inappropriate behaviour. They expressed the view that the best solution would be their son\u2019s placement in a specialised institution, such as the social care home in Letiny, as other institutions in Terez\u00edn or S\u00fdrovice were not available. The social care home in Letiny is a private institution. 22.   On the same day, the applicant, in a state of drunkenness, visited his public guardian. From the record of the visit it appears that the applicant was unable to express himself coherently. 23.  In his report of 4 February 2011 the treating psychiatrist noted, in particular, that the applicant was suffering from a psychosomatic disorder, namely alcoholic dementia. 24.  On 7 February 2011 the applicant\u2019s guardian accompanied the applicant to the social care home in Letiny, a limited liability company. There she signed an agreement on the provision of residential social services to the applicant for an unlimited period of time and the applicant was admitted to the home. 25.  The applicant\u2019s guardian noted on the same day that the applicant\u2019s parents could no longer take care of him; his mother had apparently talked to her son about his placement in the institution in advance, and after some hesitation, the applicant had agreed to be transferred there. It was noted, however, that he did not want to go to the institution, but having talked with his guardian about rehabilitation and medical care, he eventually agreed. 26.  In a letter of the same date received by the District Court on 10 February 2011, the Municipal Office informed the court about the applicant\u2019s placement in the social care home. They maintained that the placement had been necessary because he had been spending most of his money on alcohol, he had spent most of his time sitting on a bench in front of his house verbally harassing passers-by, he had been unable to dress appropriately and sometimes he had been too drunk to receive his lunch, which had been brought to his door every day. Moreover, he had been making an excessive number of visits to doctors, requesting various examinations of his brain, thumb, knee, eyes and so on. He had also been sending confusing allegations to various institutions, such as courts, ministries and animal rights organisations. 27.  The applicant disagreed with his placement and contacted a number of authorities, including his public guardian. On 28 March 2011 he also called an emergency line and contacted the police, who dismissed his complaint, not finding any unlawfulness. 28.  On an unspecified date the District Court telephoned the Municipal Office for more information about the applicant\u2019s placement in the social care home. The Municipal Office answered by letter on 2 May 2011, repeating the reasons set out in its submission of 7 February 2011 and informing the District Court that the applicant had been placed there for an indefinite period as he was no longer able to live on his own. 29.  On 11 February, 6 May and 1 June 2011 the applicant informed the District Court that he was being held in the social care home against his will and demanded his release. In his application to the court of 5 May 2011 he complained against his public guardian and asked that she be replaced by another person living near his domicile. The District Court did not react to any of his requests. 30.  On 19 May 2011 the applicant sent a letter to the director of the social care home and to his public guardian alleging that he had been placed in the social care home involuntarily. The applicant\u2019s guardian did not react to the letter. The director replied that given that the public guardian and the doctor had consented to his placement in the social care home, he had to remain there. 31.  On 21 July 2011, after having been contacted by the applicant, a lawyer from the Mental Disability Advocacy Centre (Centrum advokacie du\u0161evn\u011b posti\u017een\u00fdch) (hereinafter \u201cthe MDAC\u201d) in Brno visited him in the social care home. The applicant signed a power of attorney authorising the lawyer to act on his behalf. On 25 July 2011 the lawyer sent a request for the applicant\u2019s immediate release to the director of the social care home and to the public guardian. The director replied on 28 July 2011 that the applicant\u2019s placement was legal as he had been deprived of legal capacity and his guardian had given consent to it. On 3 August 2011 the applicant received a similar answer from his public guardian, who considered the power of attorney signed by the applicant as invalid, given that he had been deprived of his legal capacity. 32.  On the same date, the applicant\u2019s lawyer requested the Plze\u0148-jih District Court (okresn\u00ed soud) to issue a decision on the lawfulness of his client\u2019s involuntary hospitalisation under Article 191a of the Code of Civil Procedure. As the court did not react, on 16 August 2011 the applicant\u2019s lawyer lodged a request with the Plze\u0148 Regional Court (krajsk\u00fd soud) to set a time-limit for a procedural measure under section 174a of the Courts and Judges Act (no. 6/2002). 33.  From 2 to 16 August 2011 the applicant was hospitalised at the Mula\u010dova hospital in Plze\u0148 for planned orthopedic surgery. 34.  The public guardian\u2019s records of 17 and 18 August 2011, respectively, indicated the following:\n\u201cI talked on the phone with [the senior nurse]. She stated that she would try to transfer [the applicant] to a rehabilitation institution but afterwards they do not want to take him back. She informed me about it in order to give us the possibility to look intensively for another institution.\u201d\n\u201cThe director of the [social care] institution ... informed me on the phone that he had been in touch with the legal department about how to cancel the agreement and he had established that it was not possible. He is therefore sending me a letter informing me that [the applicant] is unhappy and that they want to discharge him. He stated that they were worried that [the applicant] might jeopardise the functioning of the whole institution because he lied and verbally attacked employees and constantly annoyed them by sending sms. In answer to the question what the position of the psychiatrist is..., he said that she had not allowed [the applicant] to go for walks without assistance and she considered his state of health poor.\u201d 35.  On 23 August 2011 the applicant was transferred to the Hora\u017e\u010fovice Convalescent Home \u2013 Long-term Care Hospital (Nemocnice n\u00e1sledn\u00e9 p\u00e9\u010de \u2013 L\u00e9\u010debna dlouhodob\u011b nemocn\u00fdch). 36.  On 23 August 2011 the applicant\u2019s lawyer lodged a request with the Municipal Court through the Prague 4 District Court arguing that the guardianship court, namely the Prague 4 District Court, had been inactive in the matter of his client\u2019s detention and had not initiated guardianship proceedings (opatrovnick\u00e9 \u0159\u00edzen\u00ed) seeking to solve the conflict of interests between the applicant and his public guardian. He argued that the guardianship court should have informed the relevant court, namely the Plze\u0148-jih District Court, about the applicant\u2019s involuntary hospitalisation so that proceedings on its lawfulness could have been instituted. Furthermore, the guardianship court itself should have instituted proceedings to supervise the applicant\u2019s public guardian under Articles 178 \u00a7 1 and 193 \u00a7 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 37.  On the same day, the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal (\u00fastavn\u00ed st\u00ed\u017enost) alleging that his rights to respect for his private life, to liberty, freedom from discrimination and a fair trial had been violated by the procedure pursued by the Municipal Office and the Prague 4 District Court on account of his detention in the social care home. He argued that the Municipal Office had violated those rights by placing him in the social care home without his consent and the District Court by remaining inactive in the face of the situation. He also requested the Constitutional Court (\u00dastavn\u00ed soud) to issue an interim order for his release from detention. 38.  On 19 September 2011 the Municipal Court decided not to undertake any action on the applicant\u2019s request of 23 August 2011 because the power of attorney submitted by his lawyer was invalid on account of the applicant\u2019s lack of legal capacity to sign it and because his public guardian had informed the court, on 16 September 2011, that she would not join the proceedings. 39.  On 27 September 2011 the public guardian terminated the agreement with the social care home. The applicant was not informed about this in advance. The applicant, who was at that time hospitalised in the Hora\u017e\u010fovice Convalescent Home \u2013 Long-term Care Hospital (see paragraph 35 above), was discharged from the hospital on the same day. The discharge report issued by the hospital also contained information about his mental state:\n\u201cCurrent mental state:\n...\nSuspicion \u2013 but in his case legitimate \u2013 indicated paranoia in respect of his guardian and her behaviour, or family members ...\n[His] mood reactively depressive, ...\nIntellect abilities [are] entirely without signs of degradation, humiliation let alone a sign of dementia! ...\nFrom the current mental state of the applicant, it does not appear that there is any need to continue limiting him in his fundamental human rights and limiting his capacity to act.\nConclusion:\nBehaviour disorder when using alcohol \u2013 psychotic residual disorder and later on ethylic encephalopathy, dementia ...\nThe 55 year old patient, who has a history of behavioural disorders when drinking alcohol, was admitted for rehabilitation after surgery to his right foot. ... As he repeatedly demands a review of his situation and refuses to stay in Letiny, a psychiatric consultation was carried out. The problems were discussed with his guardian ... according to whose recommendation [the applicant] told workers in Letiny, upon [their] information, his discharge is planned with home care, and psychiatric supervision is ensured.\n...\u201d 40.  On 4 October 2011 the Regional Court rejected the applicant\u2019s request of 16 August 2011, holding that his lawyer had not been authorised to lodge such a request. The applicant\u2019s signature on the power of attorney was invalid as he had been deprived of legal capacity (see also paragraph 32 above). The court added:\n\u201cEven if there were not those reasons to reject the claim, it would not be possible to grant [it]. ... It is not possible to set a time-limit to carry out an act \u2013 the issuance of a decision on the commencement of the proceedings \u2013 if that act depends on the discretion of a court which is not obliged to decide on the commencement of proceedings but is doing so on the basis of a motion. ...\u201d 41.  On 12 October 2011 the Ombudsman (Ve\u0159ejn\u00fd ochr\u00e1nce pr\u00e1v) issued a report in response to a letter from the applicant dated 29 April 2011. The report stated, inter alia:\n\u201cThe applicant was also prescribed psychiatric medication, both regular and in the event of \u2018unease\u2019 ... It appears however that the medication \u2018in the event of unease\u2019 has not yet been administered to the applicant. In answer to a question concerning medication in general, the applicant stated that before his admission to the institution, he had not taken any medication. In reply to a question as to what would happen if he refused to take the medication, he answered that he had asked this question to a male nurse, who had said that in that case the medication would be administered to him by injection. For this reason the applicant did not refuse the medication. Only on one occasion did he express the wish not to take a certain medicine and the doctor of the institution prescribed him another drug, which he had not taken before either.\n...\nThe public guardian ... made a mistake when she \u2018placed\u2019 the applicant in the institution without having previously received the approval of the guardianship court.\n...\nIf the court does not approve an act as legal, the act is void ab initio. In respect of some acts that have already been carried out, a subsequent \u2018disapproval\u2019 by the court could not lead to an effective reparation, and it is evident that [those acts] require the approval of the court before [their accomplishment] ...\nIn my opinion, legal acts connected with the involuntary placement of an incapacitated person in a social care institution are of such character and thus require prior approval, provided that there is enough time.\n...\nApart from the fact that the provisions of the civil law require that the legal act \u2013 the conclusion of the contract on provision of residential social services \u2013 be approved by the court, another requirement of generally binding rules, or more precisely the commitments of the Czech Republic under international law, cannot be overlooked, i.e. Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention ...\n...\n[In the applicant\u2019s case], in order to comply with the Convention, the Czech Republic ... guarantees ... the right to institute proceedings in which the court would speedily decide on the lawfulness of the deprivation of liberty and order the [applicant\u2019s] release if the deprivation of liberty is unlawful.\n...\nAccordingly, in the case of admission of a person who is deprived of legal capacity to a medical institution, which he is not allowed to leave, the detention procedure should be initiated as provided for by Article 191a of the Code of Civil Procedure, despite the possible approval of the guardian. ...\u201d 42.  On 25 October 2011 the Prague 11 Municipal Office, in reaction to the findings of the Ombudsman, requested the District Court to approve the agreement signed by the public guardian on the provision of residential social services of 7 February 2011. 43.  In a judgment of 10 November 2011 the District Court approved ex post facto the agreement signed by the public guardian and the termination of the applicant\u2019s confinement in the social care home. The reasoning merely stated that the approval of those legal acts was in accordance with the law and in the interests of the applicant. The decision became final as the guardian ad litem, the Prague 4 Municipal Office, waived its right of appeal. The applicant was not summoned to appear before the court in those proceedings, which lasted only ten minutes; nor was he informed about them. 44.  On 28 November 2011 the applicant lodged a second constitutional appeal challenging the decisions of the Prague Municipal Court of 19 September 2011 and the Plze\u0148 Regional Court of 4 October 2011, the procedural measures taken by the Prague 4 District Court and the Plze\u0148-jih District Court and, lastly, the practice of the Prague 11 Municipal Office. He developed, in the reasoning of the constitutional appeal, his complaints regarding the alleged interference with his rights to respect for his private life, home and correspondence during his stay in the social care home without, however, mentioning them in his final plea (\u017ealobn\u00ed petit). 45.  On 28 March 2012 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant\u2019s first constitutional appeal. Regarding his request for an interim order, it held that as he was no longer being detained, it had no power to assess the alleged violations because they had already ceased. The same applied in respect of the procedural steps taken by the Prague 11 Municipal Office and by the Prague 4 District Court, as the District Court, in its judgment of 10 November 2011, had approved the agreement concluded with the social care home by the public guardian and the latter\u2019s termination of the agreement. The Constitutional Court referred to a previous decision (no. IV. \u00daS 1348/09) in which it had declared manifestly ill-founded a complaint that a court had not carried out a review of lawfulness under Article 191a of the Code of Civil Procedure when a legally incapacitated person had been detained with the consent of his guardian. The Constitutional Court\u2019s decision was notified to the applicant\u2019s lawyers on 30 March 2012. 46.  In a report of 4 April 2012 by I.K., the psychiatrist treating the applicant, it is noted, inter alia, that since the applicant\u2019s discharge from the social care home he had not been attending for regular check-ups and had refused to take any medication with the exception of hypnotics. He had been visited by a nurse who had occasionally found him drunk. According to the psychiatrist, the applicant had behaved inappropriately, the neighbours had complained about him because he shouted at them and threatened them, at night he played loud music, he was meeting with the homeless, he soiled the common premises \u2013 he poured water on them and urinated there \u2013 and he drank alcohol. The psychiatrist concluded that the applicant was dangerous to others and was not able to lead an independent life. 47.  On 17 April 2012 the Constitutional Court declared inadmissible also the applicant\u2019s second appeal. It held that the applicant had failed to challenge both decisions addressed in his constitutional appeal by lodging a plea of nullity under Article 229 \u00a7 1(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure. It added that as he was no longer detained, it was not appropriate to apply section 75(2) of the Constitutional Court Act by which it could waive the obligation to exhaust other effective remedies if the significance of the appeal extended substantially beyond the personal interests of the appellant. 48.  In a letter of 4 December 2012 the Prague 11 Municipal Office, having sumarised the legal situation, stated that:\n\u201cOn the basis of the aforementioned documents, the public guardian considers unsubstantiated your allegation that your rights were violated on 7.2.2011 and, therefore, the filing of an action for protection of your personal rights by a lawyer of your choice ... [is found] irrelevant. For this reason, the public guardian will not conclude a contract on your legal representation in order to introduce the action for protection of your personal rights with an attorney-in-law [Ch.].\n[Taking into account the judgment of 16 October 2012] and provided that your agreement with the lawyer ... will not exceed CZK 500 per month you can conclude it on your own. ...\u201d 49.  On 13 February 2013, in reply to a letter from the Government Agent, the Municipal Office informed him that the public guardian had talked to the applicant about his placement. She had also informed his family, staff of the Prague-Bohnice psychiatric hospital and his psychiatrist. 50.  The Government stated that the regime in the social care home allowed patients to leave the institution either accompanied by a staff member, family member or guardian, or alone on the approval of a psychiatrist. According to the institution\u2019s psychiatrist, the applicant never asked to leave the premises as he had problems with his knee. Visits to patients were not limited. 51. The applicant\u2019s personal belongings were deposited in a lockable cupboard in his room. Since his arrival, he had had a mobile phone, which was repeatedly recharged. A coin-operated phone box was also accessible without any restrictions. Any post was sent to the applicant\u2019s guardian, who always forwarded it to the addressee according to the applicant\u2019s instructions. The applicant received pocket money on request. 52.  The social care home provided accommodation, meals and health care, including care provided by specialist doctors, assistance with ordinary self-care, and assistance with personal hygiene or provision of conditions for personal hygiene. It also provided educational, training and stimulation activities, mediation of contact with the social environment, social and therapeutic activities and other services. 53.  According to the applicant, the social care home provided residential social services primarily for patients with Alzheimer\u2019s disease and dementia. Most of the patients were elderly and severely physically and mentally disabled. It was a closed institution, which he could not leave. The only possibility for outdoor activities was in a small garden with a high fence. Patients shared rooms. The applicant could not send any correspondence independently, but had to do so through employees of the home who sent some letters to his public guardian instead of to the address indicated by him, based on an assessment of whether it was official or private correspondence. Some letters that the applicant received had been opened. Furthermore, his state of health was allegedly not assessed before admission to the social care home or on his arrival. Once there, he was prescribed medication. When he refused to take it, he was threatened that it would be administered by injection. 54.  According to the Government, the medication that had been prescribed to the applicant on his discharge from the Prague-Bohnice psychiatric hospital was modified by the institution\u2019s psychiatrist on the basis of repeated examinations. The applicant\u2019s medical check-ups performed by the psychiatrist took place on 1 March, 5 April and 31 May 2011. Moreover, his psychiatrist was informed about his health on 4 and 24 March, 9 May, 28 June and 29 July 2011. 55.  From the information provided by the applicant\u2019s psychiatrist, which was confirmed by the director of the institution, it appears that during his stay in the social care home, the applicant took the medication voluntarily. 56.  On 27 March 2012 the applicant lodged a claim for damages against the State under the State Liability Act (no. 82/1998). He alleged that his rights had been violated by his public guardian on account of his unlawful detention. The Ministry of Justice rejected his claim. 57.  On 30 March 2012 the applicant lodged a similar claim, arguing that the Plze\u0148-jih District Court and the Plze\u0148 Regional Court had erred in not instituting proceedings to determine the lawfulness of his detention under Article 191b of the Code of Civil Procedure and that the Prague 4 District Court and the Prague Municipal Court had remained inactive despite his numerous submissions describing his detention. 58.  On 27 September 2012 the Ministry of Justice rejected the applicant\u2019s second claim, holding that under the State Liability Act, the State was liable only for damage caused either by a final unlawful decision, which had been later quashed, or by irregular official conduct. Regarding the latter, it held that the alleged shortcomings in the proceedings did not constitute irregular official conduct for which the State could be held responsible because the conduct had resulted in a decision. The former situation did not arise in the present case either, as there had been no final decision that was later quashed as illegal. Furthermore, the Ministry did not find that the applicant had suffered any damage. It considered that his own behaviour had been at the origin of the facts, because of his excessive drinking. It added that in any case the applicant\u2019s lawyer had no right to submit those claims to the Ministry, as the applicant had been deprived of his legal capacity and a guardian had been appointed to act on his behalf. 59.  On 28 September 2012, following the rejection of his claim for damages by the Ministry of Justice, the applicant brought an action against the Czech Republic seeking damages for the incorrect procedure followed by the courts. He argued in particular that the courts had refused to institute proceedings following his claims concerning his detention and that the court procedure on guardianship had been erroneous. 60.  In letters of 8 April 2013 the Prague 2 District Court informed the applicant\u2019s representatives that given that the applicant had been deprived of his legal capacity, he could not have granted them power of attorney. Accordingly, the court had decided not to accept them as the applicant\u2019s legal representatives. On the same day, the court appointed a guardian ad litem, the Prague 2 Municipal Office, to represent the applicant. 61.  In a letter of 28 June 2013 the Prague 2 Municipal Office informed the Prague 2 District Court that as the Prague 4 District Court had approved the agreement with the social care home, they would not join the proceedings for damages. 62.  In a decision of 11 July 2013 the District Court discontinued the proceedings for damages on the grounds that, as the applicant was fully legally incapacitated, the power of attorney that he had given to his representatives was null and void, and that in a letter of 28 June 2013 the guardian ad litem had informed the court that it would not join the proceedings. According to the applicant, he was unaware of the court\u2019s decision as his guardian ad litem failed to inform him. Consequently, the statutory period to file an appeal lapsed to no effect, and the decision became final.", "references": ["8", "1", "6", "3", "0", "5", "7", "9", "4", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1975 and prior to her arrest had a permanent address in Artsyz in Odessa Region. 6.  In 2009 the applicant was diagnosed with HIV. 7.  In September 2012 she was arrested on suspicion of drug dealing. 8.  In December 2012 the applicant started receiving anti-retroviral therapy (\u201cART\u201d). 9.  On 16 September 2013 the Odessa Malynovsky District Court convicted the applicant of a number of drug-related offences and sentenced her to six years and six months\u2019 imprisonment. 10.  On an unspecified date the applicant appealed on points of law to the Higher Specialised Civil and Criminal Court (\u201cthe HSC\u201d). 11.  On 5 October 2014 the applicant arrived at Zbarazh Correctional Colony no. 63 (\u201cthe Colony\u201d) to serve her sentence. 12.  On 17 October 2014 a cytology test revealed indications of cervical cancer. 13.  On 6 December 2014 the applicant was transferred to the oncology department of the hospital at the Lviv Pre-Trial Detention Centre (\u201cthe Oncology Facility\u201d) for medical examination. 14.  On 15 December 2014 the Oncology Facility issued its conclusion concerning the applicant. In addition to stage IV HIV, she was diagnosed with cervical cancer. The opinion stated that due to the state of the applicant\u2019s immune system, surgery was to be ruled out. It was recommended that the applicant be transferred to the hospital at Daryivska Correctional Colony no. 10 in Kherson Region, which specialised in HIV treatment (\u201cthe HIV Treatment Facility\u201d) for normalisation of T-cell levels, and then transferred back to the Oncology Facility. 15.  On the same day the applicant was transferred back to the Colony. 16.  On 3 March 2015 the applicant was admitted to the HIV Treatment Facility. Upon conclusion of a course of ART, on 11 March 2015 the HIV Treatment Facility issued a certificate stating that the applicant had been receiving ART without interruption since December 2012. Her diagnosis was recorded as stage IV HIV with heavy immunosuppression, cervical cancer, chronic hepatitis in remission, ovarian cysts, fibroma of the vocal cords, and oral candidiasis. It was recommended in particular that the applicant continue ART and take hepatoprotectors. The applicant was referred to the Oncology Facility. 17.  On 17 March 2015 the applicant left the HIV Treatment Facility under guard and on 5 April 2015 arrived back at the Colony where she was put under the supervision of the prison doctor (a general practitioner) as an outpatient and continued with her ART. 18.  On 16 April 2015 the applicant left the Colony under guard and on 22 April 2015 arrived at the Kyiv Pre-Trial Detention Centre (\u201cthe Kyiv SIZO\u201d) in order to be able to attend the appeal hearings in her case. 19.  On 25 May 2015 the applicant lodged a request with the Kyiv Shevchenkivsky District Court (\u201cthe Shevchenkivsky Court\u201d) seeking release on health grounds. 20.  In an undated letter submitted to the Shevchenkivsky Court on 8 June 2015 the Kyiv SIZO governor and the head of its medical unit informed the court that the applicant was receiving ART at the SIZO but her cancer could only be treated with radiation therapy, which could not be provided at the SIZO. 21.  On 10 June 2015 a test revealed that the applicant had (an apparently low) viral load of less than forty copies per ml. 22.  On 25 June 2015 the Shevchenkivsky Court rejected the applicant\u2019s request for release. 23.  On 1 July 2015 the Acting President of the Section decided, upon the applicant\u2019s request under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, to indicate to the Government that they should present the applicant urgently for medical examination by a specialist doctor; secure immediately, by appropriate means, treatment of the applicant appropriate to her conditions, and inform the Court by 1 August 2015 about the applicant\u2019s state of health and the measures undertaken. 24.  On 6 July 2015 the Government Agent\u2019s office asked the prison authorities to take appropriate action to ensure the applicant\u2019s examination and treatment and to inform it of the applicant\u2019s situation. 25.  On 8 July 2015 the SIZO governor asked the Kyiv City Clinical Oncology Centre (\u201cthe Kyiv Oncology Centre\u201d), a specialist civilian institution, to arrange for the examination of the applicant by one of the Centre\u2019s specialists. 26.  On 13 July 2015 the applicant was examined by a gynaecological oncologist from the Kyiv Oncology Centre. The doctor recommended that the applicant (i) have a further consultation with an infectious diseases specialist concerning the possibilities for cancer treatment in the light of her living with HIV and (ii) undergo radiation therapy at an institution specialising in gynaecological oncology. 27.  On 16 July 2015 the applicant was examined by an infectious diseases specialist. The specialist recommended a change in the ART scheme and noted that there were no contraindications for treatment of her cervical cancer. 28.  On 29 July 2015, the applicant refused to change the ART scheme stating that \u201cno viral load has been found\u201d in her (\u0432\u0438\u0440\u0443\u0441\u043d\u0430\u044f \u0437\u0430\u0433\u0440\u0443\u0437\u043a\u0430 \u0443 \u043c\u0435\u043d\u044f \u043d\u0435 \u0432\u044b\u044f\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0430). 29.  On 30 July 2015 the applicant wrote a statement to the SIZO governor informing him that she did not wish to start her radiation therapy at that moment because she feared she would not have enough time to complete it while at the Kyiv SIZO, where she would be held until HSC examined her appeal against her conviction. 30.  On 31 July 2015 the Government informed the Court of the steps taken by the authorities after the Court had indicated the interim measure and provided the relevant medical documentation. 31.  On 7 August 2015 the applicant was examined by a panel of specialists at the Kyiv Oncology Centre. Her diagnoses were confirmed and she was prescribed radiation therapy. 32.  On 27 August 2015 the HSC upheld the applicant\u2019s conviction but reduced her sentence to four years. 33.  On 14 September 2015 the applicant wrote to the Court, alleging that the Government had failed to comply with the interim measure indicated by the Court. In particular, she alleged that she was still not receiving the recommended radiation therapy. She also alleged that her transfer to the Oncology Facility would be conducted by rail in conditions incompatible with her state of health. 34.  On 16 September 2015 the applicant left the Kyiv SIZO for the HIV Treatment Facility, travelling through the Odessa SIZO, where she was held from 17 to 19 September, and the Kherson SIZO, where she was held from 20 to 24 September 2015. On 24 September 2015 she arrived at the HIV Treatment Facility. 35.  On 17 September 2015 the Court asked the Government to provide factual information concerning the reasons for which the applicant had not been treated with radiation therapy and the specific plans for her future treatment. 36.  From 24 September 2015 the applicant started a course of examinations and treatment at the HIV Treatment Facility and at the Kherson Regional Oncology Clinic. 37.  On 25 September 2015 the Government again informed the Court of the medical examinations the applicant had undergone during the period following the Court\u2019s decision to indicate the interim measure. 38.  From 5 to 27 October 2015 the applicant underwent radiation treatment at the Kherson Regional Oncology Clinic; she was recommended another course starting on 17 November but on 14 November 2015 she refused to undergo it citing the side effects of the previous treatment. 39.  On 25 October 2015 the Government informed the Court of the applicant\u2019s first radiation therapy course. 40.  On 30 October 2015 the applicant left the HIV Treatment Facility and on 14 November 2015 she was admitted to the Oncology Facility. 41.  On 4 January 2016 the applicant was released on health grounds. 42. The 2012 Report of the Ukrainian Parliamentary Commissioner for Human Rights on the Monitoring of Places of Detention contains the following observations concerning the transportation of prisoners (pages 50\u201154).\nMore than 90% of rail cars used are older than their planned useful life (twenty-eight years). They lack ventilation creating intolerable conditions in the summer. In winter, they are cold because of the old heating systems. The hard beds in the prisoners\u2019 compartments lack mattresses and bed linen.\nCompartments are overcrowded meaning that a car with a seventy-person capacity may carry 100 or more people. Access to toilets is difficult. Access to potable water is erratic and no hot food is provided.\nGiven that the prisoners are made to endure such conditions for days, the Report considered it possible to characterise them as cruel and degrading treatment. 43.  The relevant reports of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman and Degrading Treatment and Punishment (\u201cthe CPT\u201d) concerning conditions of transportation of prisoners in Ukraine can be found in the judgments of Yakovenko v. Ukraine (no. 15825/06, \u00a7\u00a7 59\u201161, 25 October 2007) and Andrey Yakovenko v. Ukraine (no. 63727/11, \u00a7\u00a7 71-73, 13 March 2014). 44.  The relevant international and domestic materials concerning the treatment of HIV and related diseases can be found in the judgment of Sergey Antonov v. Ukraine (no. 40512/13, \u00a7\u00a7 54-56, 22 October 2015).", "references": ["3", "8", "2", "7", "0", "6", "9", "5", "4", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1977 and is currently serving a life sentence in Ladyzhynska prison no. 39. 6.  In the evening on 17 August 2005 the applicant arrived from Sumy, where he lived, to Kyiv. Shortly thereafter, at 21.20 p.m., while still being at the railway station, he was arrested on suspicion of two counts of murder and robbery committed earlier that month in Sumy. Some items belonging to the victims were found in his luggage. 7.  The applicant stated in his application that no coercive measures had been applied to him during or after his arrest on 17 August 2005. He also noted that immediately after his arrest he had been brought to the local police station, where the officer on duty had examined him and had drawn up a report about his injuries in the presence of two attested witnesses. The report stated that the applicant had abrasions on his back and stomach. 8.  The applicant spent the night at the police station, without any investigative measures undertaken. 9.  On 18 August 2005 three police officers, who had arrived from Sumy, transported the applicant to that city (340 km from Kyiv) in their vehicle. 10.  The applicant\u2019s account of the subsequent events is as follows. He was handcuffed and had one of his ankles shackled in a tight manner. When he protested, one of the officers hit him several times in the stomach. The police stopped their car in a forest, made him go out and subjected him to cruel ill-treatment with a view to extracting his confession to the investigated criminal offences. The applicant maintained that he had only witnessed the offences in question, whereas those were his acquaintances, A. and Se., who had committed them. The police officers severely beat him all over his body. Subsequently they undressed him, stuffed his mouth with earth and grass, and raped him with a wooden stick. The applicant urinated involuntarily. He conceded to all their requirements. After a pause, during which the officers drank alcohol, while the applicant stayed in the car with the driver, they made him \u201crehearse\u201d his confessions. They insisted that he should plead guilty without mentioning the involvement of anybody else. 11.  The police car arrived at the Kovpakivskyy police station in Sumy at about 6 p.m. on 18 August 2005. 12.  According to the case-file materials, on 18 August 2005, at 6.20 p.m., the applicant\u2019s arrest was reported and his rights of a criminal suspect were explained to him. 13.  On the same day, at 7 p.m., a forensic medical expert (a woman), acting at the investigator\u2019s instruction, examined the applicant, who was naked. She finalised the examination report on 16 September 2005, in which she documented the following injuries: a bruise measuring 2 x 1 cm in the applicant\u2019s left temple, another bruise of about the same size on the right part of his head, a 6 x 0.2 cm bruise and abrasion under his right eye, a horizontal linear abrasion on the right part of his torso measuring 3  x 0.6 cm, a bruise of 2 x 1 cm and a vertical linear abrasion measuring 18 x 3 cm on his left thigh. Furthermore, there were linear abrasions up to 1 cm wide around both wrists of the applicant. The applicant explained the origin of his injuries as follows: upon his arrival to Kyiv some unknown persons had beaten him up at about 9 p.m. at the railway station. The expert stated that the injuries in question had been inflicted \u201cby blunt hard objects\u201d and that the applicant could have sustained them at the time he indicated. Lastly, the injuries were evaluated as insignificant. 14.  The applicant submitted that the expert had not reported all his injuries and that he had not dared to complain to her of his ill-treatment, firstly, because of the presence of the officers in question during his examination and, secondly, because he had been ashamed in front of a woman. 15.  As indicated by the applicant in his application form and confirmed by the case-file materials, from 7.20 to 10.50 p.m. on 18 August 2005 he was questioned in respect of and confessed to one count of murder (of Ms Ch.), in the presence of a lawyer, Mr M., appointed for him by the investigator. More specifically, he submitted that Ms Ch. had been his acquaintance, he had met her by chance near a forest, they had had a conflict and he had killed her with a knife that had fallen out of her picnic bag. The applicant also stated that he had taken the victim\u2019s jewelleries and mobile phone and had sold them. 16.  Furthermore, according to the applicant\u2019s account submitted in his application form, his questioning had started before and continued during his medical examination, in the presence of many police officers including those who had ill-treated him. He also alleged that he had not had the possibility to talk in private to the lawyer, who, in any event, had not shown any interest in the case and had remained passive. 17.  In his reply to the Government\u2019s observations on the admissibility and merits of the application, the applicant submitted a different version of the events: that his first questioning had actually taken place on 19 August 2005 and that its report had wrongly been dated 18 August 2005. 18.  The applicant was placed in the Sumy Temporary Detention Facility (\u201cthe Sumy ITT\u201d, a part of the police infrastructure), in which he was detained until his transfer to the Sumy Pre-Trial Detention Centre (\u201cthe Sumy SIZO\u201d) on 7 October 2005. 19.  On an unspecified date the administration of the Sumy ITT issued an information note about the meetings the applicant had with police officers. It appears that two of the officers, who had convoyed him from Kyiv to Sumy and whom he accused of his ill-treatment, visited him in the ITT on seven occasions during the period from 18 August to 7 October 2005. 20.  On 19 August 2005, during the crime reconstruction, the applicant reiterated his confession to Ms Ch.\u2019s murder and the theft of her belongings. 21.  On the same date the applicant was questioned, in the presence of his lawyer Mr M., in respect of another count of murder, of Ms S. (some household appliances from her flat and her husband\u2019s military identity card had been found in the applicant\u2019s luggage following his arrest on 17 August 2005 \u2013 see paragraph 6 above). 22.  On 27 and 30 August 2005 the applicant reiterated his confessions. During his questioning on the last-mentioned date he, however, modified his account of the events as regards the murder of Ms Ch. He submitted that he had in fact used his own butterfly-type knife, which he had bought at a market in July that year. 23.  On 1 September 2005 a reconstruction of the criminal offences was carried out, during which the applicant maintained his confessions, in the presence of his lawyer. 24.  According to the applicant, on 28 September 2005 his lawyer and the investigator had an informal conversation with him. They requested him to tell them the truth regarding his role in the criminal offences under the investigation. By that time the applicant had written seven \u201cpleas of guilt\u201d, but, as his interlocutors had supposedly stated, none of them appeared convincing. The applicant complained of his ill-treatment and submitted that he was remaining under the constant pressure on the part of the police officers concerned. The investigator promised him to take measures to protect him. 25.  During his questioning on 30 September 2005 the applicant retracted his earlier confessions as obtained under duress. He stated that he had only been a witness of the crimes and that the murders had been committed by other persons, A. and Se., who had later forced him to sell the property belonging to the victims. The applicant indicated those persons\u2019 first names and physical description. 26.  Two police officers implicated in the alleged ill-treatment of the applicant visited him in the SIZO (where he had been transferred from the ITT on 7 October 2005) on 18, 22 and 30 November 2005. They allegedly continued putting pressure on him, to which the investigator failed to react. 27.  On 31 January 2006 the investigator in charge of the applicant\u2019s criminal case was replaced. 28.  On an unspecified date in January 2006 Mr M. allegedly admitted in his conversation with the applicant\u2019s mother that he was under pressure and was not therefore in a position to duly defend her son\u2019s rights. 29.  On 6 February 2006 the applicant started to be represented by Ms S., a lawyer contracted by his mother, instead of the appointed lawyer Mr M. 30.  On 13 February 2006 the formal charges of two counts of murder for profit and aggravated robbery were brought against the applicant. During his questioning on that date the applicant stated once again that his initial confessions had been the result of his ill-treatment by the police officers who had ensured his transfer from Kyiv to Sumy on 18 August 2005 (see paragraphs 9 and 10 above). 31.  On 15 February 2006 an investigator of the Sumy Regional Prosecutor\u2019s Office refused to institute criminal proceedings in respect of the applicant\u2019s complaint of ill-treatment by the police officers for the lack of corpus delicti in their actions. It was noted in the decision that the applicant had raised that complaint for the first time during his questioning on 13 February 2006. The officers concerned denied the veracity of his allegations. One of them submitted that the applicant had voluntarily decided to confess to the criminal offences in question during his transfer from Kyiv to Sumy. Although the applicant had some injuries, he had himself explained that he had sustained them during a conflict with unidentified persons prior to his arrest. 32.  On 21 March 2006 the above decision was sent to the applicant with a note that he could challenge it before a court within seven days of the date of its receipt. The applicant did not, however, appeal against that decision. According to him, he intended to raise the complaint of his ill-treatment during his trial as his lawyer had advised him. 33.  On 12 May 2006 the Sumy Regional Court of Appeal (\u201cthe Sumy Court\u201d) sitting as a court of first instance found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to life-term imprisonment with confiscation of all his property. The court relied on the applicant\u2019s confessions made during the pre-trial investigation as eventually modified by him (see paragraph 22 above). It noted certain factual inconsistencies in his statements, but considered them insignificant. The court also took into account the forensic and material evidence in the case. Namely, it could not be ruled out that the blood discovered under Ms Ch.\u2019s fingernails could have originated from the applicant. Nor could it be excluded that the applicant had smoked the cigarettes found at the crime scene in Ms S.\u2019s flat. Furthermore, certain items belonging to the victims had been discovered on him or sold by him to other persons, which he did not contest. 34.  The applicant had requested the court to summon a number of witnesses, who might have seen him in a local bar together with A. and Se. or who might have been able to identify those persons. The court called numerous witnesses indicated by the applicant, but not all of them. Those heard by the court could not identify the persons described by the applicant. 35.  The trial court examined and dismissed as unfounded the applicant\u2019s allegation of his ill-treatment by the police. It noted that although some injuries had been detected on him following his arrest, he had himself explained their origin as resulting from his beating by unknown persons. Furthermore, he had stated in writing that he had no complaints against the police. Lastly, the court noted that the applicant had complained for the first time about his ill-treatment only on 13 February 2006. It relied on the prosecutor\u2019s decision of 15 February 2006 not to initiate criminal proceedings against the police, which the applicant could but had not challenged. 36.  On the same date the Sumy Court also issued a separate ruling criticising the applicant\u2019s delayed transfer from the Sumy ITT to the SIZO (see paragraph 18 above). It noted that instead of the legally established maximum of three days the applicant had been detained in the ITT for three weeks. 37.  Both the applicant and the lawyer acting on his behalf appealed against the conviction, arguing principally that the applicant\u2019s guilt had not been proven (there had been no sufficient material evidence and the statements of the applicant and of the witnesses had been inconsistent) and that the conviction was based on the applicant\u2019s statements obtained under duress. They also argued that the court had not allowed the applicant\u2019s requests to summon a witness who had been acquainted with the supposed murderers and that the statements of several witnesses who had allegedly seen those persons had not been attached sufficient weight. 38.  On 17 August 2006 the Supreme Court partly changed the reasoning of the verdict, having upheld, on the whole, the findings of the first-instance court and the applicant\u2019s sentence. The Supreme Court noted that the applicant\u2019s complaints of ill-treatment were unsubstantiated and that they had been rejected by the prosecutor\u2019s decision against which the applicant had failed to lodge an appeal. The Supreme Court also noted that the applicant\u2019s allegation about other persons\u2019 responsibility for the crimes had been duly examined at the pre-trial stage and during the trial and that it was unsubstantiated. 39.  On 9 April 2007 the applicant was transferred from the SIZO to Ladyzhynska prison no. 39 to serve his sentence. 40.  On 31 January 2007 the Registry of the Court acknowledged receipt of the completed application form from the applicant. By the same letter it requested him to specify whether he had appealed against the prosecutor\u2019s decision of 15 February 2006 and to provide a copy of his cassation appeal, as well as any other documents in substantiation of his complaints under Article 6 \u00a7 3 (c) and (d) of the Convention. 41.  On 31 May 2007 the applicant informed the Court that he had not challenged the decision in question. He also sent a copy of the cassation appeals against his conviction lodged by him personally and by his lawyer. 42.  On 6 July 2007 the Registry wrote to the applicant that his case was ready for examination by the Court and that he would be informed about the subsequent procedures in due time. 43.  The applicant submitted numerous supplements to his application. He provided, in particular, extensive details as regards the conditions of his detention in the pre-trial detention facilities in Sumy (the ITT and the SIZO). Subsequently the Court declared those complaints inadmissible (see paragraph 4 above). As regards the applicant\u2019s conditions of detention in Ladyzhynska prison no. 39, the submissions before the Court are confined to the following two letters from the applicant\u2019s mother. 44.  On 24 November 2009 the Registry received a letter from the applicant\u2019s mother (who represented him at the time) of an unspecified date, in which she submitted that her son was in a desperate situation in prison being subjected to constant beatings and humiliations. She noted that he had been \u201cplaced in a cell without light for seven days\u201d and that he \u201chad been wearing a winter hat whereas the temperature was about 30\u00baC\u201d. 45.  On 10 October 2011 another letter from the applicant\u2019s mother was received, in which she submitted that the conditions of his detention in the prison amounted to his \u201cconstant torture\u201d. In substantiation, she enclosed an incomplete photocopy of the applicant\u2019s letter to her dated 9 August 2011. The applicant had complained to his mother about poor conditions in the prison, about his harassment by the guards and about having had to share his cell with an inmate, with whom he had a conflict. He had also written that he had cut his left wrist as a protest and that no adequate medical care had been provided to him in that regard.", "references": ["7", "4", "2", "0", "9", "5", "8", "6", "No Label", "1", "3"], "gold": ["1", "3"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Sofia. 5.  The applicant\u2019s husband owned a house with a yard and a garage in Sofia. 6.  On 14 June 1985, by decision of the Sofia mayor, the property was expropriated with a view to constructing a school. The decision, based on section 98 (1) of the Territorial and Urban Planning Act of 1973 (\u0417\u0430\u043a\u043e\u043d \u0437\u0430 \u0442\u0435\u0440\u0438\u0442\u043e\u0440\u0438\u0430\u043b\u043d\u043e\u0442\u043e \u0438 \u0441\u0435\u043b\u0438\u0449\u043d\u043e \u0443\u0441\u0442\u0440\u043e\u0439\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e \u2013 \u201cthe TUPA\u201d), stated that the applicant\u2019s husband was to be compensated with a four-room flat and a garage in a building which the municipality intended to construct. 7.  By a supplementary decision of 12 September 1986, based on section 100 of the TUPA, the mayor determined the exact location, size and other details in respect of the future flat to be provided in compensation. No mention was made however of the garage. Even though, after judicial review initiated by the applicant\u2019s husband, in a final judgment of 18 March 1987 the Sofia City Court ordered the mayor to supplement the decision and specify the exact garage to be provided to the applicant\u2019s husband, this was not done. 8.  In 2004 the municipal authorities transferred to the applicant\u2019s husband property to a flat different from the one described in the decision of 12 September 1986, which however he did not contest. 9.  The applicant\u2019s husband passed away in 2005. By virtue of his will, all his property was left to the applicant. 10.  In a letter signed by the chief architect of Sofia and dated 8 July 2009 the applicant was informed that the decision of 12 September 1986 had not yet been supplemented to specify the garage to be provided to her because no buildings with garages earmarked for the purpose were being built. 11.  In August 2009 the applicant challenged before the courts the mayor\u2019s failure to issue a decision specifying the garage to be provided to her. In a final judgment of 23 June 2010 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed her claim, noting that the case at hand did not concern what was defined by statute as \u201cunlawful failure to act\u201d, but instead the enforcement of the judgment of 18 March 1987 (see paragraph 7 above), which had to be pursued under a different procedure. 12.  In parallel proceedings brought on an unspecified date in 2009, the applicant sought damages from the Sofia municipality for wrongful failure to provide her with a garage. In a final decision of 23 September 2010 the Supreme Administrative Court declared the claim inadmissible, on the ground that the courts had already established in the judgment of 23 June 2010 that there had not been any unlawful failure to act on the part of the administrative authorities.", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "7", "8", "1", "6", "5", "4", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1940 and lives in Donetsk. 7.  In the end of November 2001 the applicant was visited by two unfamiliar men, V.S. and A.N., who offered to buy half of the flat she lived in for 700 United States dollars (USD). It was a one-bedroom flat, measuring 43.3 square meters, recently privatised and acquired in equal shares by the applicant and her adult son, Y. The applicant refused to sell her half of the flat. According to her, the price offered was extraordinarily below the market value. In any event, she had no reason to sell the flat, which had been her long-established home for several decades. In response, V.S. and A.N. warned the applicant that she would regret her decision, because Y., (who was married and lived elsewhere), had offered the other half of the flat as a gift to V.S. If the applicant refused to sell her half for the price, which was offered to her, or to exchange it for a smaller flat on the outskirts of the city, V.S. would move into the flat and create intolerable living conditions for her. 8.  Subsequently the applicant learned that on 18 December 2001 Y. had signed a notarised gift deed in which he transferred his title to half of the flat (which was not as divided into allocated parts of the whole) to V.S. 9.  From November 2002 A.N., V.S. and their acquaintances started regularly visiting the applicant\u2019s flat, demanding that she sell. According to the applicant, on numerous occasions they broke the locks, insulted and harassed her and caused damage to her property. Subsequently a part and then the entire of V.S.\u2019s share in the flat was formally acquired by A.N. as a gift, whose value amounted to 5,602 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH) according to the gift certificates. However, irrespective of this transfer, A.N. and V.S. continued to act in concordance in demanding the applicant move out and sell her share. 10.  For instance, on 23 November 2002 A.N. and V.S. broke the locks on the entrance door when the applicant was away, entered the flat and, upon the applicant\u2019s arrival, reiterated their demands that she sell her share. As the applicant protested against their presence in the flat and their overall conduct, a conflict emerged, in the course of which A.N. hit the applicant in the chest inflicting a bruise and causing soft tissue swelling. 11.  On 26 November 2002 A.N., V.S. and several strangers broke into the applicant\u2019s flat again. As they were irritated by the barking of the applicant\u2019s dog, V.S. started kicking her and chased her out. Subsequently the applicant found her dog\u2019s dead body in a garbage container. 12.  Also on an unspecified date in November 2002 V.S. arrived in the flat after 11 p.m. (when the applicant was already asleep) and opened the balcony door, holding it open for some four hours notwithstanding the freezing temperature outside. In response to the applicant\u2019s subsequent reprimands, he explained that he wished for her to catch a cold as she had been disagreeable. 13.  On 15 December 2002, when the applicant\u2019s daughter was visiting the applicant, V.S. arrived in the flat again. A conflict emerged, in the course of which V.S. hit the applicant on the head and stomach, inflicting concussion and blunt trauma of the abdominal wall. He also hit the applicant\u2019s daughter on the head and other parts of the body, inflicting cerebral concussion and bruising of legs and arms. As a result of the conflict, the applicant and her daughter had to seek medical assistance for their injuries and the applicant received inpatient hospital treatment. 14.  Subsequently V.S. and A.N. started installing in the flat from two to six strangers without the applicant\u2019s consent. These tenants, mostly young males, behaved in a discourteous way. In particular, they organised loud parties; frivolously used, damaged and stole the applicant\u2019s belongings; created insanitary conditions; carelessly used electricity, gas and appliances, frequently left the entrance door open, and ignored requests to contribute towards the maintenance charges on the flat. 15.  On numerous occasions the applicant attempted to drive the tenants away or to call them to order. Her efforts resulted in conflicts, in the course of which she was harassed and intimidated. Her attempts to replace the locks on the entrance doors to prevent unauthorised entry into the flat resulted in them being broken and in the tenants, who frequently changed, moving in again, in spite of her discontent. As she was unable to withstand such living conditions and was afraid for her life and limb, the applicant effectively moved out, contending herself with odd living arrangements. However, she paid short visits to the flat regularly, to supervise the situation. 16.  In the beginning of June 2003 V.S. drove his car onto the footpath, where the applicant was standing waiting for a bus, scaring and nearly hitting her. 17.  On 11 July 2003 at about 9.20 a.m. V.S. again arrived in the flat, when the applicant was in it, and demanded that she surrender her share. A conflict emerged, in the course of which V.S. punched the applicant in the stomach, causing her physical pain. 18.  On three further occasions (30 July 2004, 5 August and 1 December 2005) the applicant was severely beaten by V.S., twice accompanied by his acquaintance A.L. The applicant suffered physical pain and bruising. On 30 July 2005, in addition to that, she also sustained a second concussion, which necessitated inpatient treatment. 19.  On various dates the applicant learned that A.N. and V.S. had also acquired ownership of shares in numerous other flats in Donetsk and that they had behaved similarly with the co-owners of these flats, inducing them to sell their shares on unfavourable terms. 20.  On 16 October 2003 the Voroshylivsky district prosecutor instituted civil proceedings on the applicant\u2019s behalf, seeking rescission of the gift deed between Y. and V.S. and the eviction of the latter on the grounds that the gift deed had been executed without the applicant\u2019s consent. 21.  On 12 November 2003 the Voroshylivsky District Court of Donetsk (hereafter \u201cthe Voroshylivsky Court\u201d) allowed this claim, having found, in particular, that Article 113 of the Civil Code of Ukraine of 1963 did not authorise the transfer of title to a part of shared property, which had not been divided into allocated parts and that it also obliged co-owners of a shared property to seek the consent of their counterparts before carrying out transactions in it. 22.  On 5 February 2004 the Donetsk Regional Court of Appeal (hereinafter \u201cthe Regional Court\u201d) quashed this judgment following an appeal by the applicants\u2019 opponent and dismissed the prosecutor\u2019s claim, having found that, unlike in the case of selling part of a shared property, giving it as a gift to a third party did not require the co-owners\u2019 consent. 23.  On 10 August 2004 the Supreme Court of Ukraine dismissed the applicant\u2019s and the prosecutor\u2019s requests for leave to appeal in cassation against the Regional Court\u2019s judgment. The judgment became final. 24.  On 5 October 2004 the applicant instituted civil proceedings seeking the dispossession of V.S. (joined by A.N., when he acquired part of V.S.\u2019s share and replaced by him, when he acquired the entire share), of his share in the flat, regard being had to his unlawful conduct towards her, the impossibility of joint use of the flat, and his refusal to pay his share of the maintenance costs. She further sought a judicial rescission of their right to occupy the flat and compensation for the costs she had borne on the flat with their shares. The defendants lodged a counterclaim, alleging, in particular, that the applicant had been interfering with their personal life and belongings, provoking conflicts, harassing them and creating intolerable living conditions, which made it impossible for them to fulfil their desire to settle in the flat. They sought damages from the applicant for this conduct and demanded that the flat be divided into allocated parts. 25.  On 21 June 2005 the District Court allowed the applicant\u2019s claim in part and dismissed her opponents\u2019 counterclaim. In particular, referring to Article 365 of the new Civil Code of Ukraine of 2003, it ordered the dispossession of A.N. (by then the owner of half the flat) of his share against payment by the applicant of compensation in the amount of UAH 5,602. The court noted, in particular, that there was extensive evidence that the defendants had allowed numerous strangers to live in the flat; that the applicant had been harassed; and that the flat\u2019s appliances and the applicant\u2019s belongings had been misused and damaged. It further concluded that, regard being had to the flat\u2019s size and layout, it was not possible for the co-owners to use it jointly in a harmonious manner or to have it reasonably divided into two independent halves for each of them to use separately. At the same time, A.N.\u2019s dispossession in return for fair compensation would not put him at a substantial disadvantage, since he had another registered residence and predominantly used the disputed flat for subletting to other persons. The court next found that, since A.N. had received the flat as a gift, fair compensation would be the payment of the indicative price (UAH 5,602) declared by the parties as that share\u2019s value in the latest gift deeds. Finally, the court found that A.N. and V.S. had no longer any right to occupy the flat and ordered partial reimbursement of the maintenance costs incurred by the applicant on the flat. 26.  On 20 October 2005 the Regional Court, having reviewed the case on appeal by the applicant\u2019s opponents, upheld the judgment with respect to the reimbursement of the costs borne on the flat by the applicant and the revocation of V.S.\u2019s right to occupy it, as he no longer owned any share in the flat. It then quashed the ruling to dispossess A.N., having noted that, according to the expert assessment, the market value of the disputed flat had been appraised at UAH 147,756, which meant that value of half the flat had been UAH 73,878. The court further stated that the applicant\u2019s claim for dispossession of A.N. and revocation of his right of occupancy had not been based on any legal provision. The relevant part of the judgment read as follows:\n\u201cNeither the provisions of the Housing Code of Ukraine nor those of the Civil Code of Ukraine of 2003, which the applicant cites as the basis for her claims, nor the Property Law of Ukraine, envisage dispossession of the owner of his or her property and his or her eviction from a flat owned by him or her on the grounds cited by the applicant.\u201d 27.  The applicant appealed in cassation. She noted, in particular, that A.N. and V.S. had acquired shares in a number of Donetsk flats and had deliberately created intolerable living conditions for their co-owners in order to obtain the flats in their entirety on terms grossly unfavourable to the other co-owners. She further alleged that, having no other residence and being a victim of constant harassment, she had abandoned the flat and had been requesting refuge from various acquaintances. 28.  On 2 December 2005 the district prosecutor also lodged a cassation appeal on the applicant\u2019s behalf, in which he corroborated her submissions that the defendants had been harassing her, had been using the flat in bad faith and had forced the applicant, a senior lady, to leave the dwelling she had occupied for many years. He also alleged that the sum proposed by the applicant in compensation for the defendants\u2019 share in the flat had been fair, as it had been equal to the flat\u2019s value indicated in the gift deeds on the basis of which A.N. had received the disputed share. 29.  On 11 January 2006 the Supreme Court of Ukraine rejected the applicant\u2019s request for leave to appeal. 30.  On 22 January 2006 it likewise rejected the prosecutor\u2019s request for leave to appeal and the Regional Court\u2019s judgment became final. 31.  On numerous occasions between 2002 and 2007 the applicant complained to the Voroshylivsky district police in Donetsk (\u201cthe district police\u201d) about various instances of verbal and physical harassment, damage to and taking of her property and attempts by V.S. and A.N. to extort her share in the flat. 32.  On various dates police officers arrived in the applicant\u2019s flat in response to her calls for help. They examined the situation, questioned the applicant and her opponents, and subsequently refused to institute criminal proceedings (in particular, 22 January, 7 February and 24 December 2002; 22 and 24 January, 22 February, 5 and 22 March, 15 July, 30 August, 18 September, 12, 16 and 24 October, 4, 15 and 19 November and 5 December 2003; 1 June, 3 and 9 August and 15 November 2004, 20 January, 23 July, 6 August, 19 November, 13 and 28 December 2005; and 4 and 31 March and 16 and 27 July 2006). In their refusals, the police noted that the prosecution of A.N., V.S. and their acquaintances was unwarranted since the relevant facts disclosed the existence of a chronic domestic conflict between lawful occupants of a flat, who attempted to engage the police in resolving their private disagreements. The hostilities took place inside the household and did not breach the public peace. Both parties had accused each other of provoking conflict and it was not evident, which party had in fact assaulted the other and which had acted out of self\u2011defence. In any event, during these conflicts the applicant had sustained no serious damage to her health and had not presented any evidence that her belongings had in fact been taken or damaged by the accused individuals. It was not possible to exclude that she had falsified the disappearance of her belongings in order to compromise the unwanted tenants. The police further recommended that the applicant resolve the dispute concerning the use of the flat in civil proceedings and assured her that \u201cpre-emptive conversations\u201d had been had with the purported offenders to foster respectful conduct on their part. On several occasions the police had issued official warnings to them, advising them of the impermissibility of antisocial behaviour. 33.  On 30 January 2003 the prosecutor\u2019s office quashed a decision not to institute criminal proceedings in connection with the injuries caused to the applicant on 15 December 2002. On several occasions the applicant enquired about the status of these proceedings and received no reply. In 2006 the applicant was informed that the investigation had been suspended. 34.  On 19 October 2005 the head of the district police instructed his officers to place the applicant\u2019s flat on the police register for frequent visits with a view to preventing any offences and infringements of applicable law. He noted, in particular, that the investigations had confirmed the applicant\u2019s allegations concerning A.N.\u2019s and V.S.\u2019s disruptive conduct. In particular, it had been established that they had been allowing numerous tenants to live in the co-owned flat, who had brought it into a decrepit and insanitary state. The persons who had been occupying the flat had also taken the applicant\u2019s personal belongings without her authorisation and had used her furniture, equipment and appliances in a careless manner, as a result of which these objects were deteriorating. Moreover, these persons had interfered with the applicant\u2019s ability to access the flat by changing the locks and thus effectively precluding her from living there. He also acknowledged that numerous pre-emptive conversations and warnings given by the police had not brought about any improvements. 35.  On several other occasions (in particular, 28 February 2006, 4 September 2006, 19 February 2007 and 6 March 2007) the Ministry of the Interior in Donetsk acknowledged, in response to the applicant\u2019s further complaints, that her allegations concerning A.N.\u2019s and his associates\u2019 interference with her home had some basis. They further assured the applicant that her address had been placed on the police register for frequent visits. 36.  On 18 July 2006 the applicant lodged a private criminal complaint against V.S., A.N. and A.L. with the Voroshylivsky Court. Relying on Articles 125 and 126 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, she alleged that the defendants had systematically beaten and verbally harassed her. In this respect the applicant referred to the incidents of 23 November and 15 December 2002, 30 July 2004 and 5 August 2005 (see paragraphs 10, 13 and 18 above). She also submitted that, in her view, these incidents had to be approached not as isolated instances of ill-treatment, but as episodes of systematic and premeditated criminal conduct by an organised criminal association functioning with a view to extorting flats from Donetsk residents. She submitted that the same individuals had engaged in similar conduct vis\u2011\u00e0-vis a number of other co-owners of properties in the city. Accordingly, she requested the District Court\u2019s assistance in transmitting her complaints to the public law-enforcement authorities with a view to instituting criminal proceedings concerning extortion and coercion. 37.  On various dates five other residents of Donetsk joined the proceedings, alleging that the same defendants had acquired shares in their flats and had been pressurising and terrorising them with a view to extorting the remaining shares. 38.  On 19 December 2006 Judge M. of the Voroshylivsky Court decided that the applicant\u2019s and other complainants\u2019 allegations disclosed an appearance that serious crimes, warranting institution of public criminal proceedings, had been committed. Accordingly, the judge instituted criminal proceedings on suspicion of fraud, extortion, coercion, circumvention of the law and several other crimes, and transferred the case to the Donetsk regional prosecutor for investigation. 39.  On 24 January 2007 the prosecutor\u2019s office appealed against this decision, alleging that applicable law did not authorise judges to institute public criminal proceedings in the above circumstances. 40.  On 27 March 2007 the Regional Court upheld the prosecutor\u2019s office\u2019s appeal and returned the case to the Voroshylivsky Court to be examined by another judge with respect to the complaints which could be addressed in private prosecution proceedings. 41.  Subsequently (23 August 2007) Judge P. of the Voroshylivsky Court returned the applicant\u2019s and other complainants\u2019 submissions without examination. She found that the injured parties had failed to comply with the rules on territorial jurisdiction and with other unspecified procedural requirements. 42.  On 26 July 2007 the regional police instituted criminal proceedings in respect of a complaint about extortion lodged by a certain A.C., who had allegedly been forced to abandon her flat on account of the intolerable living conditions created by the co-owners of her flat. 43.  On 15 August 2007 the police joined the applicant\u2019s complaints concerning extortion to the aforementioned criminal proceedings. 44.  On the same date A.N., V.S. and A.L. were arrested and placed in custody. 45.  On various further dates complaints by eleven other individuals relating to the same persons\u2019 misconduct were joined to the proceedings. 46.  On 29 December 2007 deputy head of the regional prosecutor\u2019s office signed the bill of indictment in respect of A.N., V.S. and A.L. charging them, in particular, under Article 189 \u00a7 4 of the Criminal Code, with extorting property in an organised group and transferring the case to the Kyivskiy District Court of Donetsk (hereafter \u201cthe Kyivskiy Court\u201d) for trial. 47.  On various dates in 2008 the defendants were released from custody pending trial. 48.  On 24 May 2011 the Kyivskiy Court acquitted all the defendants of the charges under Article 189 of the Criminal Code. It noted, in particular, as follows:\n\u201c... The court comes to a conclusion that the basis of the present criminal proceedings is the existence of a private-law dispute between the defendants and the injured parties concerning the use of shared property, which the injured parties demand to resolve by way of criminal proceedings in view of their extremely antagonistic relationship with the defendants.\u201d 49.  On 27 February 2012 the Regional Court quashed this verdict on appeal by the prosecution and the injured parties and remitted the case for retrial. 50.  On 17 April 2012 the defendants were rearrested and placed in custody. 51.  On 12 October 2012 the Kyivskiy Court found that all the defendants were guilty of extortion under Article 189 \u00a7 4 and sentenced them to eleven, ten and eight years\u2019 imprisonment respectively. It also ordered the confiscation of all their personal property. The court found, in particular, that the case-file contained sufficient evidence that the episodes of the applicant\u2019s harassment (listed in paragraphs 10, 12-13 and 16\u201118 above) had indeed taken place. It also awarded the applicant UAH 35,273.47 in pecuniary and UAH 30,000 in non-pecuniary damage to be paid jointly and separately by the defendants. 52.  On 6 March 2013, following an appeal by the defendants, the Regional Court upheld this verdict on appeal concerning all points, except one episode unrelated to the applicant\u2019s case. 53.  On 18 September 2014 the Higher Specialised Civil and Criminal Court rejected the cassation appeals lodged by A.N. and V.S.", "references": ["5", "2", "8", "7", "3", "0", "9", "6", "No Label", "1", "4"], "gold": ["1", "4"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicants were born in 1952 and 1955 respectively and live in Sofia. 5.  The first applicant\u2019s parents owned part of a house in Sofia. 6.  In 1986 the house was expropriated with a view to constructing a street and a residential building. The expropriation decision, based on section 98 (1) of the Territorial and Urban Planning Act of 1973 (\u0417\u0430\u043a\u043e\u043d \u0437\u0430 \u0442\u0435\u0440\u0438\u0442\u043e\u0440\u0438\u0430\u043b\u043d\u043e\u0442\u043e \u0438 \u0441\u0435\u043b\u0438\u0449\u043d\u043e \u0443\u0441\u0442\u0440\u043e\u0439\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e \u2013 \u201cthe TUPA\u201d), provided in particular that in compensation the applicants were to receive a three-room flat. 7.  By another decision of 28 May 1993, based on section 100 of the TUPA, the mayor indicated the exact future flat to be provided as compensation to the applicants. It measured 87 square metres and was situated in a building to be constructed by the Sofia municipality. Its value was set at 21,185 old Bulgarian levs (BGL), later amended to BGL 21,231. The applicants paid to the municipality the part of this amount which was not covered by the value of the expropriated property. 8.  In 1990 the applicants, their children and the first applicant\u2019s parents were accommodated in a three\u2011room municipal flat. They remained in it until 2004, when they chose to move to another dwelling better adapted for the first applicant\u2019s mother\u2019s frail state of health. 9.  On an unspecified date in 2005 the applicants brought a tort action against the Sofia municipality, claiming pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage on account of its continued failure to build and provide them with a flat. 10.  The action was dismissed on 21 February 2006 by the Sofia District Court, which found that the applicants had not proven that they had sustained damage, in particular because they had been accommodated in a municipally-owned dwelling, and that in any event domestic law provided for a special remedy for persons in the applicants\u2019 situation, namely the possibility to request a new valuation of the expropriated property. 11.  Following that judgment, the applicants made a request for a new valuation. In a letter by the municipality dated 2 June 2006 and signed by a deputy mayor, they were informed that they were not entitled to seek such a valuation since they had not been the owners of the expropriated property. 12.  In the meantime the flat due to the applicants was built and they took possession of it on 19 June 2006. 13.  In the tort proceedings, in judgments of 14 December 2006 and 8 July 2008 the Sofia City Court and the Supreme Court of Cassation upheld the Sofia District Court\u2019s judgment of 21 February 2006, reiterating its findings. 14.  In these proceedings the applicants were ordered to pay 1,200 new Bulgarian levs (BGN, the equivalent to 612 euros \u2013 EUR) in court fees.", "references": ["3", "2", "6", "7", "0", "1", "8", "5", "4", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
+{"input": "5.  On 25 October 2011 two persons wearing black masks entered the applicants\u2019 house with an intention to rob them. They hit V.K., the applicants\u2019 husband and father, as well as the first applicant, inflicting on them severe injuries. In consequence, on 1 November 2011 V.K. died. After the incident, the first applicant was admitted to hospital where she remained in the intensive care unit until 4 November 2011. 6.  On 3 November 2011 the public prosecutor requested that the Skopje Court of First Instance (\u201cthe trial court\u201d) launched preliminary proceedings against F.T. (seventeen-year old at the time) on account of aggravated robbery and remanded him in custody. On the same date, the trial court ordered F.T.\u2019s detention for fifteen days. The detention was ordered on account of the risk of him absconding and interfering with the investigation, namely \u201cinfluencing the victims witnesses, in particular since they live in (F.T.\u2019s) vicinity\u201d. 7.  By a decision of 17 November 2011, an investigating judge of the trial court extended F.T.\u2019s detention for fifteen days for the same reasons as before. On 1 December 2011 the investigating judge ordered his release finding that \u201chis attendance at the trial can be secured with a more lenient measure (seizure of passport and obligation to report to the court) ... Taking into account the individual circumstances and needs of [F.T.], his age, the fact that he is a regular student in third year of secondary school and a young man in development, [the court] considers that there are grounds for termination of the detention order ...\u201d 8.  On 13 January 2012 the public prosecutor lodged an indictment against F.T. and a certain S.G. They were indicted on charges of aggravated robbery with respect to the incident of 25 October 2011. 9.  On 7 June 2012 the Skopje Court of First Instance, after it had heard evidence from the accused, the applicants, witnesses, experts, representatives of a Social Welfare Centre (who suggested that F.T. should be sentenced to a prison term if he was found guilty), and admitted considerable material evidence, including several expert reports (including a psychiatric expert report which confirmed that F.T. had been mentally fit when the crime had been committed) established the following:\n\u201cAt 1.30 a.m. on 25 October 2011 the accused S.G. and F.T., on the basis of a prior agreement, arrived [at the applicants\u2019 house] with an intention to steal movable objects. With the use of force and dangerous object \u2013 a metal hammer with a wooden grip, they intentionally inflicted serious injuries on the now deceased V.[K.] and [the first applicant] in order to achieve their aim ... Wearing black masks, [S.G. and F.T.] arrived in front of [the applicants\u2019 house] ... V.K. opened the door. They both entered the house. S.G. immediately started hitting V.K. on the head and hands with the metal hammer. V.K. sustained serious injuries-head wounds, multi-fragmented fractures accompanied with brain haemorrhages under the hard tissues of the brain ... linear skull fracture, as a result of which he died on 1 November 2011. Soon after, L.J., [the first applicant\u2019s daughter and the second and third applicants\u2019 sister] appeared and started screaming. S.G. then physically assaulted her by hitting her on the head ... She fell down, pretending to be dead. After [the first applicant] had heard L.J.\u2019s screaming, she arrived in the kitchen in order to see what was going on, but when she arrived in the living room, she was assaulted by the minor F.T. He punched her hard in the head, inflicting severe injuries, namely four head wounds [cuts and bruises]; two sizeable skull fractures; haemorrhages under the soft tissues of the brain; and a brain lesion in the area of the left temple ... ... [the first applicant], V.[K.] and L.[J.] were taken by ambulance to Skopje Hospital. They were admitted by I.S., a doctor who was on duty at the time, who noted the serious physical injuries which both V.[K.] and [the first applicant] had sustained. They were kept in hospital, since their injuries were life-threatening ...\u201d 10.  As stated in the judgment, \u201c[the second applicant] was not able to recognise her parents given their injuries. Her mother was so much beaten that she could not see; her eyes were closed and her face was so much coloured (\u043c\u043e\u0434\u0440\u043e) that she could not recognise her.\u201d 11.  The court found S.G. and F.T. guilty of aggravated robbery and, relying on Article 237(4) in relation to sub-paragraph 1 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 16 below), sentenced them to six and five years\u2019 imprisonment respectively. The time which F.T. had spent in pre-trial detention was to be deducted from the total length of his custodial sentence. As victims, the applicants were advised to pursue compensation claims by means of a separate civil action for damages. 12.  By judgments of 26 November 2012 and 12 March 2013, the Skopje Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, respectively, dismissed F.T.\u2019s complaints about alleged errors on the facts and law, as well as alleged violations of the procedural rules. Both courts upheld the lower court\u2019s judgment finding no grounds to depart from the facts as established by the trial court and the reasons given for the conviction. 13.  On 2 January 2013 an enforcement judge responsible for execution of the custodial sentence issued an incarceration order (\u0443\u043f\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043d \u0430\u043a\u0442) in respect of F.T. According to that order, F.T. was required to report to Ohrid Detention Centre on 30 January 2013 in order to serve the sentence. On 17 January 2013 F.T. requested that the sentence be postponed for family and health reasons. This request was dismissed by decisions of 21 January and 12 February 2013 by the enforcement judge and a three-judge panel of the trial court, respectively. On 21 February 2013 the detention centre informed the enforcement judge that F.T. had not arrived at the facility on the specified date. By letters dated 28 February, 8 April and 20 May 2013, the enforcement judge notified the trial court in Skopje responsible for minors about F.T.\u2019s failure to report to the detention facility and sought instructions \u201cgiven the urgent nature of the proceedings\u201d. These letters remained unanswered. 14.  The Government submitted that after the above correspondence, no enforcement judge had been appointed to deal with the case for over eight months. After such a judge had been appointed, on 27 March 2014 another incarceration order had been issued in respect of F.T. The latter sought, to no avail, for the custodial sentence to be adjourned. On 2 May 2014 the detention centre advised again that F.T. had not arrived at the facility. 15.  On 30 June 2014 the enforcement judge ordered F.T.\u2019s arrest. F.T. was arrested on 10 July 2014 and started serving his custodial sentence on 11 July 2014. The detention centre confirmed by letter that F.T. would remain in custody until 27 June 2019.", "references": ["9", "1", "2", "3", "7", "5", "4", "8", "6", "No Label", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1966. At the time she submitted her complaint she lived in Madona Region, Latvia. 6.  On 17 November 2006 the Madona District Court, acting as a first\u2011instance court, found the applicant guilty of a traffic offence which had caused moderate bodily injury to a victim. The court ordered the applicant to perform 100 hours of community service and suspended her driving licence for a year. 7.  In establishing the applicant\u2019s guilt, the first-instance court relied on incriminating statements by the victim and two witnesses. It also relied on other evidence, including a medical expert opinion on the bodily injuries sustained by the victim. 8.  The applicant appealed against the judgment to the Vidzeme Regional Court. She alleged, inter alia, that the first instance court had failed to order an inspection and a technical examination of her vehicle, and had also not carried out a confrontation of witnesses. 9.  On 13 February 2007 the Vidzeme Regional Court upheld the judgment of the first-instance court but changed in part the punishment by revoking the suspension of the applicant\u2019s driving licence. 10.  On 8 March 2007 the applicant submitted an appeal on points of law to the Senate of the Supreme Court. She alleged that the appellate court had failed to carry out and to order a number of investigating activities. Specifically, according to the applicant, the appellate court has not carried out a confrontation between the witnesses and the victim. It has not ordered an investigative experiment, an inspection and a technical examination of her vehicle. 11.  The applicant maintained that the evidence in the case was not sufficient to establish her guilt, and thus the appeal court had acted contrary to numerous sections of the Criminal Procedure Law. 12.  In a letter dated 11 April 2007 a judge of the Senate of the Supreme Court informed the applicant that on 11 April 2007 her appeal on points of law was not admitted for examination in the cassation proceedings. It relied on section 573 of the Criminal Procedure Law and stated that \u201c[the appeal on points of law] was not substantiated by any fundamental infringement of the Criminal Law or the Law on Criminal Procedure\u201d. It was also stated that it was not within the competence of the cassation court to re-examine or obtain evidence, or to explain the factual circumstances of the case.", "references": ["5", "9", "7", "0", "6", "2", "3", "1", "4", "8", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1977 and lives in Athens. 6.  While studying in Turkey (1994-1999) the applicant had become a pro-communist and pro\u2011Kurdish political activist. In 1997 he opened a literary caf\u00e9, which was frequented by individuals favourable to such a political stance. In 2000 the Turkish police arrested the applicant, and he was prosecuted for infringing State constitutional order (Article 146 of the Turkish Criminal Code). The applicant was also held in the \u201cwhite (isolation) cells\u201d in Kandra Prison. He went on hunger strike for 171 days, causing him to develop Wernicke-Korsakoff syndrome, a pathology which can cause irreversible damage to health and prove fatal. Given the threat to the applicant\u2019s life, the Turkish authorities decided to release him. 7.  In 2002 the applicant fled to Greece, where he submitted an asylum application on 15 January 2002. On 18 February 2002 the General Secretary of the Ministry of Public Order, adjudicating at first instance, rejected that application, giving summary reasons. 8.  On 21 March 2002 the applicant appealed to the Ministry of Public Order against that decision. On 29 January 2003, having been summoned to attend the Advisory Board on Asylum, he presented the latter with a number of documents showing that he had suffered torture in Turkey on account of his political opinions, including a medical report drawn up by the Greek Medical Centre for the Rehabilitation of Torture Victims and an Amnesty International document. On the same day the Advisory Board on Asylum issued a favourable opinion in respect of the applicant. 9.  Further to that favourable opinion, under Article 3 \u00a7 5 of Presidential Decree No. 61/1999 (on the procedure for the examination of asylum applications), the Minister for Public Order should have taken a decision within twenty-four hours on whether or not to grant the applicant international protection. However, by the date on which the application was referred to the Court, the Minister had not taken any decision and therefore had neither ratified nor rejected the Board\u2019s opinion. 10.  Between 2003 and 2015 the applicant lived in Athens and attended the police station every six months in order to renew his asylum-seeker\u2019s card. Under domestic law that card did not constitute a residence permit and therefore did not secure all the attendant rights: it only allowed the asylum-seeker not to be expelled and to reside in the national territory with \u201ctolerated status\u201d while his application was being examined. More specifically, under domestic law the asylum-seeker was not entitled to engage in an occupation, undertake vocational training, marry, obtain a driving licence, hold a bank account or apply for family reunion. 11.  In 2003, while he was living in Athens, the applicant was joined by his wife from Turkey. However, her presence in Greece only became lawful in 2008, when she obtained a short-term work permit. In 2010 the couple had a son. In 2011 the applicant\u2019s wife returned to Istanbul with the child owing to health problems. The couple divorced in 2012. 12.  Meanwhile, on 5 August 2005, the Turkish Interpol Office had issued an extradition request in respect of the applicant. That request had been based on accusations similar to those used in 2000 which had been assessed by the Greek authorities during the examination of his asylum application. 13.  On 12 March 2013 the applicant was arrested in Patras. On 26 March 2013 the indictment division of Patras Court of Appeal examined the extradition request and unanimously decided to reject it. The division based its decision on the risk run by the applicant of suffering ill-treatment on account of his political opinions, should he be extradited. It further noted that the nature of the offences for which extradition had been requested had only been described vaguely and abstractly in the request submitted by the Turkish authorities.\n... 14.  On 27 March 2013 the public prosecutor appealed to the Court of Cassation against the decision of the indictment division of Patras Court of Appeal. 15.  On 26 April 2013 the Court of Cassation upheld the impugned decision. 16.   The applicant had meanwhile been actively seeking to secure a final decision. He had written to the Ombudsman of the Republic on 21 March and 25 June 2012, and to the Minister for Public Order on 19 November 2013, 16 June 2014 and 27 February 2015. 17.  Furthermore, it emerged from correspondence among a number of different authorities (between police authorities and between the police and other authorities) on 23 February 2007, 16 October 2012, 14 November 2012 and 28 January 2015, that the applicant\u2019s asylum application was still pending before the Minister for Public Order.\n...", "references": ["2", "0", "8", "3", "5", "7", "6", "9", "No Label", "1", "4"], "gold": ["1", "4"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Istanbul. 6.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7.  At the time of the events giving rise to the application, the applicant was working at the Directorate of National Palaces as a secretary. On an unspecified date in 2002, following ongoing conflict with a colleague and at the request of a certain professor, M.\u00dc., from the same Directorate, the applicant was demoted. When she complained about her demotion to her friend, M.G., the latter offered to call professor M.\u00dc., who was a mutual acquaintance, and seek a reconciliation between the parties and thus her possible reinstatement. The applicant accepted this offer. 8.  It appears that subsequently M.G. made a number of harassing phone calls to the professor with violent threats to hurt his son, accompanied by a ransom request. The professor, in turn, filed a criminal complaint against both M.G. and the applicant in relation to these threatening calls, which resulted in charges being brought on 3 December 2002 against M.G. for threatening the professor, and against the applicant for inciting M.G. 9.  In his statements during the criminal proceedings, M.G. admitted to having threatened the professor, but claimed that he had had no intention of hurting anyone. He asserted that he had only meant to scare the professor, at the applicant\u2019s request. 10.  The applicant, on the other hand, denied M.G.\u2019s allegations. She claimed that, although she had taken up M.G.\u2019s offer to contact the professor to settle the dispute which had caused her demotion, she had never instructed him to threaten or otherwise harass the professor. 11.  On 27 October 2005 the Istanbul Assize Court convicted M.G. as charged, but acquitted the applicant on the grounds of a lack of sufficient evidence to corroborate the allegations against her. That decision, which was not appealed against by the defendants, was finalised on 4 November 2005. 12.  In the meantime, on 31 December 2002, shortly after her indictment, the applicant had been dismissed from the position to which she had been demoted, without receiving payment in lieu of notice or severance pay. It appears that her employment contract was terminated under section 17 of the now defunct Law no. 1475 (the Labour Law), without any further information being given as to the exact grounds for her dismissal under that provision. 13.  On 30 October 2003 the applicant brought an action against the Directorate of National Palaces before the Bak\u0131rk\u00f6y Labour Court, claiming severance pay and payment in lieu of notice on grounds of wrongful dismissal. 14.  On 28 March 2006 the Bak\u0131rk\u00f6y Labour Court rejected the applicant\u2019s application. On the basis of its examination of the case file before the Istanbul Assize Court, the labour court first found it established that the applicant had incited M.G. to commit the offences of making threats and requesting a ransom, and had breached the relationship of trust with her employer. In the light of those findings, it then concluded that the termination of the applicant\u2019s employment contract had been in accordance with section 17 of Law no. 1475. The relevant part of the judgment reads:\n\u201c...In their observations, the respondent party submitted that the applicant had incited her friend to threaten and extort ransom from M.\u00dc, and that she had confessed to the charges against her in her statement to the police...\nThe court has requested the case file of the Istanbul 6th Criminal Assize Court and examined the entire criminal investigation file. Based on its examination, it notes that the other accused M.G., in his statement to the police of 19 November 2002, stated that it was the applicant who had instructed him to threaten M.\u00dc. on the telephone and ask for a ransom; and that it was again she who had called him one day and had explained how M.\u00dc. had demoted her, and that when he had visited the applicant at the office, she had said that M.\u00dc. should also suffer just as she suffered and that it would be best to threaten him with kidnapping his son unless he gave 50 billion Turkish Liras. M.G. also stated that he had called M.\u00dc. 8 or about 10 times from the telephone numbers 0212 XXX XXX and 0532 XXX XXX, hence based on the following, the court finds it established that the plaintiff had incited M.G. to commit the crime.\nThe court has also given regard to the documents submitted by the plaintiff\u2019s employer and finds it established that the plaintiff\u2019s contract had been terminated on the basis of the fact that the plaintiff had incited M.G. to commit the crime of making threats and requesting a ransom.\nBased on the documents submitted by the parties, the statements made during the proceedings, the statements of M.G. in the criminal case file, the court finds that the employer is under no obligation to continue employing the plaintiff and that the relationship of trust between the employer and the employee was breached and therefore the termination of the employment contract was just and lawful.\u201d 15.  The applicant appealed against the decision of the Bak\u0131rk\u00f6y Labour Court. In her appeal, she maintained that the labour court had erroneously based its decision on the fictitious statements made by M.G. during the criminal proceedings, in total disregard of the fact that she had been acquitted of incitement by the Istanbul Assize Court. 16.  On 20 December 2006 the Court of Cassation upheld the decision of the Bak\u0131rk\u00f6y Labour Court.", "references": ["2", "9", "8", "5", "1", "7", "4", "6", "0", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1971 and lives in Arzamas. 5.  In the early hours of 5 June 2005, at about 3 a.m., the police arrested the applicant. In the morning he was interviewed and later taken to the hospital because he broke the window and injured himself. At 6 p.m. the arrest record was drawn up; it gave 6 p.m. as the time of the applicant\u2019s arrest. 6.  On 7 June 2005 the Lukoyanovskiy District Court in the Nizhny Novgorod Region remanded the applicant in custody for an initial two\u2011month period. 7.  On 8 August 2005 the District Court held a hearing to decide, among other matters, on an extension of the applicant\u2019s detention. The applicant asked for release; counsel for the applicant pointed out that, since the authorised detention period had ended on 5 August 2005, his detention in the following three days had been unlawful. The District Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention, finding that the \u201cpreventive measure [should] remain unchanged\u201d. 8.  In the statement of appeal against the District Court\u2019s extension order, the applicant complained that the custodial measure which had already expired could not \u201cremain unchanged\u201d. The appeal was forwarded to the Regional Court only on 8 September 2005. 9.  On 23 September 2005 the Regional Court rejected the appeal in a summary fashion, without addressing the applicant\u2019s arguments. 10.  On 25 January 2006 the District Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 25 April 2006, without informing the applicant or his representative about the hearing or giving any reasons for its decision. The applicant filed an appeal on 30 January 2006 which was dismissed by the Regional Court on 31 May 2006. 11.  By judgment of 25 August 2006, as upheld on appeal on 17 October 2006, the applicant was found guilty and given a custodial sentence.", "references": ["6", "9", "4", "3", "8", "0", "1", "7", "5", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Opfikon. 6.  The applicant had been employed as a hairdresser since 1993 and she had compulsory accident insurance under the Federal Law on Accident Insurance (see Relevant domestic law below). On 28 August 1995 she was hit by a motorcycle while crossing the road and fell on her back. She was hospitalised overnight owing to suspected concussion resulting from the impact of her head against the ground. 7.  On 2 October 1995 the applicant was examined by a rheumatologist who diagnosed her with a cervical trauma and possible cranial trauma. On 6 December 1995 her family doctor certified that her injuries had resulted in total incapacity for work until the end of the year. 8.  On 29 January 1996 the applicant was examined at the Zurich University Hospital. The doctor who examined her predicted that she could make a gradual return to work. Nevertheless, on 12 June 1996 another doctor in the same hospital declared the applicant totally incapable of work. 9.  At the request of her insurance company, the applicant\u2019s health was assessed by means of orthopaedic, neurological, neuropsychological and psychiatric examinations by the insurance-disability medical examination centre (COMAI) of St. Gallen. On the basis of the assessment carried out by that centre, the applicant was declared fully capable of work with effect from February 1997. 10.  By a decision of 23 January 1997 the insurance company informed the applicant that her entitlement to daily allowances would end on 1 April 1997. 11.  On 4 February 1997 the applicant submitted an objection to that decision and enclosed a report of a neurologist, who confirmed an almost permanent headache, limited head movement, pain radiation towards the shoulders and arms with sensory disorders as well as sleep disorders. In addition, the specialist suspected that the applicant had suffered whiplash and that she was affected by a neuropsychological dysfunction. 12.  In September 1997 the insurance company rejected the applicant\u2019s complaint finding no causal link between the accident and her health problems. 13.  The applicant appealed to the Social Insurance Court of the Canton of Zurich (Sozialversicherungsgericht des Kantons Z\u00fcrich). 14.  In a decision of 24 August 2000, the Social Insurance Court allowed the applicant\u2019s appeal. It overturned the insurance company\u2019s decision and remitted the case for further clarifications. Taking into account the partial contradictions that existed between the different medical reports, the court considered that the consequences of the accident for the applicant\u2019s state of health were not sufficiently established. Moreover, a doubt remained as to whether the applicant had suffered trauma to her neck and spine. The insurance company was thus required to clarify the issue. 15.  The insurance company subsequently ordered a multidisciplinary examination, which was conducted by an institute of medical experts in Basel. In their report the experts concluded that the applicant was totally incapacitated in respect of the duties required in her profession. However, the insurance company challenged this report once it found that a doctor who had participated in its preparation had previously carried out a private examination of the applicant in the initial stages of the proceedings. 16.  The insurance company therefore ordered another medical report, which was delivered on 11 November 2002. The report observed the existence of a causal link between the accident and the damage to the applicant\u2019s health, and was accompanied by a neuropsychological report, which noted a brain dysfunction subsequent to a head injury. 17.  Meanwhile, by a decision of 21 March 2002 the competent social security authority (Sozialversicherungsanstalt) of the Canton of Zurich granted the applicant a full disability pension with retroactive effect. 18.  Subsequently, the applicant asked the insurance company on several occasions to comment on its obligation to grant her insurance benefits. 19.  On 5 October 2003 another expert report commissioned by the insurance company was prepared solely on the basis of the previous examinations. The medical expert confirmed the existence of a causal link between the accident and the applicant\u2019s health problems, and concluded that the applicant\u2019s illness had led to a total incapacity for work. 20.  On 14 January 2005 the insurance company issued a decision confirming the termination of the applicant\u2019s benefits as of 1 April 1997. The applicant lodged a complaint against that decision. 21.  On 11 June 2005, another independent physician concluded, solely on the basis of the previously drafted medical reports, that these medical findings were not sufficiently explicit as regards causality. According to him, the applicant\u2019s incapacity for work amounted to not more than 20%. He also strongly criticised the approach and findings of other medical experts. On the basis of this report, on 22 September 2005 the insurance company dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaint on the grounds of lack of a causal link between the accident and her medical conditions. 22.  The applicant appealed, arguing that most of the medical reports had found a causal link and that the only report denying the existence of such a link was based solely on medical reports by other experts instead of on a direct examination. 23.  On 28 December 2005 the Social Insurance Court recognised the existence of a causal link between the accident and the health problems the applicant complained of, and allowed her appeal. The matter was referred to the insurance company for it to decide on the right of the applicant to insurance benefits. 24.  Thereafter, the insurance company invited the applicant to undergo a medical evaluation of her functional abilities, which she refused. The applicant was then issued with a formal notice within the meaning of Article 43 (3) of the Social Security Act inviting her to undergo the said evaluation and warning her about the legal consequences of failing to do so indicated in the said provision (see \u00a7 38 below). No mention of the possibility of covert monitoring was mentioned. 25.  Thereafter, on 3, 10, 16 and 26 October 2006 the applicant was monitored by private investigators, commissioned by the insurance company. The surveillance was performed on four different dates over a period of twenty-three days and lasted several hours each time. The undercover investigators followed the applicant over long distances. Following the surveillance, a detailed monitoring record was prepared. Pursuant to that report, the applicant appears to have become aware of the secret surveillance on the last day of implementation of the measure. 26.  In a decision dated 17 November 2006 the insurance company refused the applicant\u2019s representative access to the surveillance report. The applicant then lodged a complaint with the supervisory authority, namely the Federal Office of Public Health, objecting to the failure to take a decision on her benefits entitlement. 27.  On 14 December 2006 the insurance company sent the private investigators\u2019 report to the applicant. The report included the surveillance footage and declared that it considered it necessary to conduct a fresh neurological assessment of the applicant. However, the applicant refused to undergo any further examination and asked for a decision on her benefits to be taken. 28.  In a decision of 2 March 2007 the insurance company again refused to grant any benefits to the applicant on the basis of the images recorded during the surveillance and her refusal to undergo a neurological examination. 29.  The applicant lodged a complaint against that decision, claiming a pension on the basis of a degree of disability of 100% as well as compensation for damage to her physical integrity. She also asked for the surveillance case file to be destroyed. 30.  On 12 April 2007 another neurologist appointed by the insurance company, Dr H., released an anonymous expert opinion based on evidence and drafted taking into account all the medical examinations and assessments carried out previously as well as the surveillance images. He found that the applicant\u2019s incapacity to work amounted to 10%. Furthermore, he estimated the damage to the applicant\u2019s physical integrity at between 5% and 10%. On the basis of the analysis of the surveillance images he concluded that the restriction on her capacity to lead a normal life was minimal. 31.  On 14 March 2008 the Federal Office of Public Health gave the insurance company a deadline to decide the applicant\u2019s complaint. By a decision of 10 April 2008, the insurance company rejected the applicant\u2019s request for destruction of the images and decided to grant her daily allowances and a pension on the basis of a disability degree of 10%. 32.  On 6 May 2008 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Social Insurance Court claiming compensation for damage to her physical integrity as well as a disability pension based on 70% disability. In addition, she claimed interest at 5% on arrears on the daily allowances remaining unpaid since the accident. She also asked for the expert opinion on the evidence taking into consideration the material resulting from the surveillance be to be removed from her case file. The applicant complained that the surveillance had been \u201creprehensible and inappropriate\u201d and had constituted an \u201cattack on her personality\u201d. 33.  On 29 May 2009 the Social Insurance Court found in favour of the applicant. In particular, it ruled that owing to the lack of legal basis for the surveillance the monitoring record was not admissible as evidence. As a result, it denied any probative value of the expert opinion based on the evidence, which had taken into account the illegal surveillance. Moreover, according to the court\u2019s previous decision of 28 December 2005, the applicant was not required to undergo any further examinations. Therefore, she was entitled to refuse a medical assessment of her functional abilities. 34.  The insurance company lodged an appeal against this decision before the Federal Court, criticising in particular the amount of benefits to be granted to the applicant. 35.  In its judgment of 29 March 2010, of which the applicant was notified on 19 April 2010, the Federal Court ruled that, in accordance with its earlier jurisprudence (see below \u00a7 43), the surveillance of the applicant by private investigators had been lawful and the surveillance file was therefore a valid piece of evidence. After evaluating the surveillance file it found that the medical reports contradicted the images and videos showing the applicant walking her dog, driving a car long distances, going shopping, carrying groceries and opening the boot of the car by moving her arms above her head without noticeable restrictions or unusual behaviour. Moreover, it found that there were discrepancies, not only between the results of the surveillance and the medical reports but also between the medical reports which had been drafted before the surveillance. Finally, the examination of the applicant by a neurologist was necessary and admissible because she had previously refused to undergo an assessment of her functional capacities and a neurological examination, which were required in the circumstances. Accordingly, the Federal Court denied the probative value not only of the medical reports attesting to the applicant\u2019s complete incapacity to work but also of the reports attesting to her incapacity to work of a lesser degree. Therefore, the insurance company had acted correctly in ordering a reassessment of her ability to work through a critical review of all previous medical reports. Following an analysis of this expert opinion report based on evidence, the Federal Court held that its findings were convincing. It quashed the decision of the Social Insurance Court, except for the considerations relating to the interest on arrears. 36.  Subsequently the applicant lodged a request with the Federal Court for interpretation of its decision in the light of the established case\u2011law concerning the probative value of the medical reports. The Federal Court dismissed her request, concluding that she had submitted her application not for the purposes defined in this legal remedy, but rather to argue a violation of Articles 6 and 8 of the Convention.", "references": ["0", "6", "5", "3", "8", "1", "2", "7", "9", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1948 and lives in Budapest. 5.  On 9 March 2006 the applicant submitted a request for an increase of her disability pension before the Budapest Governmental Authority (Directorate of Pension Insurance), which dismissed her claim on 21 August 2006. The applicant lodged an appeal against the decision on 10 October 2006. The Central-Hungarian Regional Insurance Directorate acting as a second-instance authority upheld the first-instance decision on 4 January 2007. 6.  The applicant sought the judicial review of the second-instance decision within the statutory time-limit. She submitted her statement of claim on 9 February 2007 to the first-instance administrative authority, in line with the applicable procedural laws. 7.  In the absence of any developments in the case, the applicant notified the first-instance administrative authority about upholding her claim on 18 March 2010. The first-instance administrative authority subsequently forwarded the applicant\u2019s statement of claim to the Budapest Labour Court on 20 July 2010. 8.  The Budapest Labour Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim on 14 June 2011.", "references": ["6", "2", "5", "0", "8", "1", "4", "9", "7", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "1.  The case originated in an application (no. 52257/11) against Hungary lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (\u201cthe Convention\u201d) by eleven Hungarian nationals, Mr Tibor Bak, Mrs L\u00e1szl\u00f3n\u00e9 Csat\u00e1ri, Mr Istv\u00e1n Csillag, Mr Andr\u00e1s Hal\u00e1sz, Ms Bogl\u00e1rka L\u00e1szl\u00f3, Mr Zolt\u00e1n Lex, Mr M\u00e1rk Marsi, Mr S\u00e1ndor Orosz, Mrs Kl\u00e1ra P\u00e1pain\u00e9 Armuth, Mr Gy\u00f6rgy  Rosta and Mr Attila Sz\u00e9les (\u201cthe applicants\u201d), on 8 August 2011. A list of applicants is annexed to the present judgment. 2.  The applicants were represented by Mr Cs. Tordai, a lawyer practising in Budapest. The Hungarian Government (\u201cthe Government\u201d) were represented by Mr Z. Tall\u00f3di, Agent of the Ministry of Justice. 3.  On 31 August 2015 the applicants\u2019 complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention concerning the imposition of 98% tax on part of their severance payment was communicated to the Government. 4.  On 10 November 2015 and 9 June 2016 the Court received friendly settlement declarations signed by the Government and seven applicants under which the latter agreed to waive any further claims against Hungary in respect of the facts giving rise to their complaints against an undertaking by the Government to pay Mrs L\u00e1szl\u00f3n\u00e9 Csat\u00e1ri 20,600 euros (EUR), Mr Istv\u00e1n Csillag EUR 19,300, Mr Zolt\u00e1n Lex EUR 46,700, Mr M\u00e1rk Marsi EUR 8,300, Mr S\u00e1ndor Orosz EUR 28,300, Mr Gy\u00f6rgy Rosta EUR 16,000, and Mr Attila Sz\u00e9les EUR 11,100, to cover any pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage as well as costs and expenses. These sums will be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable on the date of payment, and will be free of any taxes that may be applicable. They will be payable within three months from the date of notification of the strike-out decision taken by the Court. In the event of failure to pay these sums within the said three-month period, the Government undertook to pay simple interest on them, from the expiry of that period until settlement, at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points. The payment will constitute the final resolution of the case in respect of these seven applicants. 5.  The first applicant, Mr Tibor Bak was born in 1965 and lives in Dunakeszi. From June 2002 he was employed at the State-owned National Development Bank Ltd. His employment was terminated by mutual agreement in June 2010. The upper bracket of his severance payment was taxed at 98% rate. The Government did not contest the levy of the special tax on his severance payment; but in their observations they rectified the tax amount. The first applicant did not contest this. Accordingly, special tax was levied on his severance payment in the amount of 7,617,826 Hungarian Forints (HUF) (approximately EUR 25,400). 6.  The fourth applicant, Mr Andr\u00e1s Hal\u00e1sz was born in 1961 and lives in Budapest. From October 2002 he was employed at the State-owned National Export-Import Bank Ltd. His employment was terminated on 29 October 2010. The upper bracket of his severance payment was taxed at 98% rate. The Government did not contest the levy of the special tax on his severance payment; but in their observations they rectified the tax amount. The fourth applicant did not contest this. Accordingly, special tax was levied on his severance payment in the amount of HUF 9,125,270 (approximately EUR 30,400). 7.  The fifth applicant, Ms Bogl\u00e1rka L\u00e1szl\u00f3 was born in 1967 and lives in Budapest. From April 2007 she was employed at the State-owned MFB Investment Ltd. Her employment was terminated by mutual agreement on 29 October 2010. The upper bracket of her severance payment was taxed at 98% rate. The Government did not contest the levy of the special tax on her severance payment; but in their observations they rectified the tax amount. The fifth applicant did not contest this. Accordingly, special tax was levied on her severance payment in the amount of HUF 6,508,053 (approximately EUR 21,700). 8.  The ninth applicant, Mrs Kl\u00e1ra P\u00e1pain\u00e9 Armuth was born in 1957 and lives in Budapest. From January 2008 she was employed at the State-owned National Asset Management Ltd. Her employment was terminated by mutual agreement in 2010. The upper bracket of her severance payment was taxed at 98% in the amount of HUF 2,932,623 (approximately EUR 9,700). The Government did not contest this. In a letter dated of 17 March 2016 the ninth applicant submitted that due to some special accounting methods applied in her case, she had received further bonuses from her previous employer calculated pro rata temporis for the years of 2011 and 2012; in respect of these bonuses additional special tax had been levied in the amount of altogether HUF 829,119 (approximately EUR 2,700). The applicant received a certificate from her employer regarding the deduction of special tax from the subsequently received bonuses on unspecified dates in 2011 and 2012.", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "2", "7", "6", "5", "8", "1", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1987 and lives in Nizhniy Novgorod. 6.  The applicant and two minors (Z. and S.) were suspected to be implicated in several car thefts. 7.  On 23 August 2007 the Leninskiy District Court of Nizhniy Novgorod (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) authorised the applicant\u2019s detention on remand in connection with the car thefts, referring to the gravity of the charges and an unspecified risk that she would put pressure on minors S. and Z. The judge concluded that the applicant could obstruct the proceedings. Z. was also detained on 28 August 2007. 8.  On 5 September 2007 the Nizhniy Novgorod Regional Court upheld the detention order on appeal. 9.  On 13 September 2007 the investigator ordered a psychiatric examination of the applicant to verify whether she was fit to stand trial. On 8 October 2007 the experts found that the applicant suffered from a mental deficiency. The experts concluded that her mental conditions did not exclude a criminal liability and that she did not require any compulsory psychiatric treatment. 10.  The District Court, referring to the need to complete the investigation \u201cin the absence of grounds for varying or cancelling the measure of restraint\u201d, issued further detention orders extending the term of the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention on 18 October and 14 December 2007, and on 15 January 2008. 11.  In February 2008 the criminal case against the applicant and her co\u2011defendants was submitted for trial before the District Court. 12.  On 18 February 2008 the District Court, noting that the applicant had been charged with a serious crime and could exercise pressure on the minor co-defendants if at liberty, decided to maintain her in custody until 1 August 2008. 13.  On 11 July 2008 the judge ordered the applicant\u2019s and Z.\u2019s release, concluding that there was no longer necessary to maintain them in custody, given that they had made admissions and that the applicant was unlikely to put any pressure on her co-defendants. 14.  By judgment of 1 September 2008, the applicant was convicted on several charges and acquitted of the remainder, in particular, of the charges pertaining to involvement of minors in criminal activities. She was sentenced to a suspended prison term. 15.  On 23 August 2007 the applicant was placed in remand prison IZ\u201152/1 in Nizhniy Novgorod. She was kept in cell no. 7/56 measuring 66 square metres. According to the applicant, the cell accommodated up to forty persons. In the Government\u2019s submission, twenty-seven to thirty-five inmates shared the cell during that period. 16.  On 20 December 2007 the applicant was transferred to cell no. 30/349 measuring 12.14 square metres, which she shared with another detainee. 17.  In December 2007 the Committee Against Torture retained Ms P., an advocate, who visited the applicant in the remand centre on 27 December 2007 and 21 February 2008. The applicant explained to the advocate that a certain \u201cOlga\u201d, a prison staff member, asked her about her complaint to the Court and told her to make written statements indicating that she \u201chad no claims against the remand centre\u201d. 18.  In the meantime, on 8 February 2008 Mr Ryzhov, the applicant\u2019s representative before the Court, sought a permission to see the applicant in the remand centre in order to obtain further details concerning the conditions of her detention. The applicant\u2019s representative showed a simple authority form signed by the applicant and authorising him to represent her before the Court. 19.  On 28 February 2008 the administration of the remand centre informed the representative that such permission could be granted by the District Court dealing the criminal case against the applicant. 20.  Instead of applying for a court order, the applicant\u2019s representative sought judicial review of the above refusal. By decision of 25 March 2008 the Sovetskiy District Court of Nizhniy Novgorod confirmed the above refusal considering that the applicant\u2019s representative had not been vested with any authority to represent the applicant in the judicial review proceedings because he had not had an \u201cadvocate\u201d status, as required by the Civil Code or the Code of Civil Procedure; a copy of the authority form concerning the proceedings before the Court had not been duly attested. 21.  On 6 May 2008 the Nizhniy Novgorod Regional Court upheld the Sovetskiy District Court\u2019s decision on appeal.", "references": ["8", "0", "9", "7", "5", "4", "3", "6", "1", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1989 and lives in Vanadzor. 6.  On 2 August 2010 the applicant appeared voluntarily at the Gugark Town Police Department and confessed that earlier that day, during a street fight, he had injured another individual, Y.P., with a knife after the latter threatened him with a gun. The applicant also surrendered his knife and Y.P.\u2019s gun, which he had seized from Y.P. 7.  On the same date the investigator decided to institute criminal proceedings against the applicant under Article 113 Criminal Code (CC) on account of wilful infliction of medium gravity damage to Y.P.\u2019s health, and to apply a written undertaking not to leave his place of residence as a preventive measure in respect of the applicant. The investigator cited the following grounds for his decision:\n\u201c... Taking into account that the materials of the criminal case provide sufficient grounds to believe that, if at large, [the applicant] will not abscond from the authority dealing with the case, obstruct the investigation and commit a criminal offence ...\u201d 8.  On 9 August 2010 the charge against the applicant was modified to a more severe one under Article 112 of the CC following the results of the forensic medical examination, according to which the damage to health suffered by Y.P. was grave and life-threatening. 9.  On the same date the investigator filed a motion with the Lori Regional Court seeking to have the applicant detained, taking into account the fact that the materials of the case provided sufficient reasons to believe that, if at large, the applicant could obstruct the investigation by exerting unlawful influence on the persons involved in the proceedings and commit a new criminal offence, as well as the nature and dangerousness of the offence. 10.  The applicant objected to this motion, arguing, inter alia, that it was unreasoned and did not contain any arguments in support of the allegation that he could commit any of the acts prescribed by Article 135 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP). It was incompatible with Article 5 of the Convention to provide stereotyped reasoning for detention or to rely solely on the severity of the sentence. The applicant requested that the written undertaking not to leave his place of residence be maintained. 11.  On 10 August 2010 the Lori Regional Court, having heard the applicant, found the investigator\u2019s motion to be well-founded and decided to grant it by ordering the applicant\u2019s detention for a period of two months:\n\u201c... taking into account the nature and dangerousness of the act committed by [the accused], and the fact that, if at large, he may abscond from the authority dealing with the case or obstruct the investigation by exerting unlawful influence on the persons involved in the criminal proceedings, as well as avoid liability and sentence.\u201d 12.  On 12 August 2010 the applicant lodged an appeal arguing, inter alia, that his detention on conditions provided by Article 135 of the CCP was incompatible with the guarantees of Article 5 of the Convention. The Regional Court had failed to take into account the fact that the investigator\u2019s motion did not indicate any actions that he might commit if at large. He had appeared voluntarily with a confession and had assisted the investigation by appearing every time upon the investigating authority\u2019s summons, participating in various investigative measures and confrontations; his identity and place of residence were known to the authorities. There were therefore no circumstances precluding the application of a written undertaking not to leave his place of residence. The investigator had not produced any evidence that he had ever tried to abscond or obstruct the investigation or that he would abscond, obstruct the proceedings, commit a criminal offence or avoid criminal liability or serving the imposed sentence. The applicant further argued that the sole reason for changing the type of preventive measure and imposing detention was the modification of the charge against him to a more severe one. 13.  On 3 September 2010 the Criminal Court of Appeal decided to uphold the Regional Court\u2019s decision, finding that:\n\u201c... the severity of the sentence risked by [the applicant] provides sufficient ground to believe that, if at large, [the applicant] may abscond from the authority dealing with the case, obstruct the investigation and avoid criminal liability and serving the imposed sentence ...\n...\nThus, the Regional Court ... has ensured the requirement of [Article 134 of the CCP] to prevent the accused\u2019s inappropriate behaviour in the course of the criminal proceedings, as it was impossible to ensure this by applying other available preventive measures in this particular case and was also in the public interest.\u201d 14.  On 24 September 2010 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, which was declared inadmissible for lack of merit by the Court of Cassation\u2019s decision of 29 October 2010. 15.  On 23 September 2010 the investigator filed a motion seeking to have the applicant\u2019s detention, which was to expire on 9 October 2010, extended by two months. This motion stated that there was a need to carry out further investigative measures, while the reasons for the applicant\u2019s detention, namely the risks of his obstructing the investigation and committing a new offence, still persisted. 16.  The applicant objected to this motion and requested that the Regional Court release him on bail. 17.  On 4 October 2010 the Regional Court decided to grant the investigator\u2019s motion, finding that the grounds for the applicant\u2019s detention \u2013 as stated in its decision of 10 August 2010 \u2013 still persisted, and it was necessary to extend the detention in order to complete the investigation. It further decided to dismiss the applicant\u2019s motion for release on bail on the same grounds. 18.  On 7 October 2010 the applicant lodged an appeal, arguing, inter alia, that the Regional Court had failed to state any concrete facts or evidence suggesting that, if at large, he would abscond or obstruct the investigation. As regards the refusal to apply bail, the applicant argued that it was not based on any of the grounds envisaged by Article 143 of the CCP. In particular, his identity was known, he had a permanent place of residence and had never tried to abscond. 19.  On 20 October 2010 the Criminal Court of Appeal upheld the decision to extend the applicant\u2019s detention and to refuse his release on bail, finding it to be lawful and well-founded. As regards specifically the question of bail, the Court of Appeal stated at the outset that the grounds for refusal of bail mentioned in Article 143 of the CCP were not exhaustive. It then concluded that it was impossible to replace the applicant\u2019s detention with bail on the same grounds which justified the necessity of keeping him in detention. 20.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, which was declared inadmissible for lack of merit by the Court of Cassation\u2019s decision of 16 December 2010. 21.  On 8 November 2010 the applicant filed a motion with the Lori Regional Court seeking to be released on bail. He submitted, inter alia, that he had a permanent place of residence, had never absconded or obstructed the investigation and that on the contrary he had assisted in the disclosure of the crime. 22.  On 19 November 2010 the Regional Court decided to dismiss the motion, finding that the grounds for the applicant\u2019s detention \u2013 as stated in its previous decisions \u2013 still persisted. This decision was subject to appeal before the Criminal Court of Appeal within ten days. 23.  On 24 November 2010 the investigator filed a motion seeking to have the applicant\u2019s detention, which was to expire on 9 December 2010, extended by one month, citing similar reasons as previously. 24.  The applicant objected to this motion and requested the Regional Court to release him on bail. 25.  On 3 December 2010 the Regional Court decided to grant partially the investigator\u2019s motion, finding that the grounds for the applicant\u2019s detention still persisted and extending his detention by fifteen days. The applicant\u2019s motion for release was dismissed on the same grounds. This decision was subject to appeal before the Criminal Court of Appeal within five days. 26.  On 10 December 2010 the investigator filed a motion seeking to have the applicant\u2019s detention, which was to expire on 24 December 2010, extended by another month. This motion stated, inter alia, that the bill of indictment was not ready yet and the grounds for the applicant\u2019s detention still persisted. 27.  On 15 December 2010 the Regional Court decided to grant partially the investigator\u2019s motion, extending the applicant\u2019s detention by fifteen days. At the same time, the Regional Court examined the question of the applicant\u2019s release on bail and concluded that it \u201cfound it possible to replace the detention imposed on [the applicant] with bail\u201d. 28.  On 16 December 2010 the applicant was released upon the payment of the amount of bail fixed by the Regional Court. 29.  On 25 January 2011 the investigator decided to drop the charges against the applicant, cancel the bail and terminate the criminal proceedings. This decision stated, inter alia, that the applicant had inflicted grave damage on Y.P\u2019s health in self-defence and therefore his actions lacked corpus delicti.", "references": ["1", "7", "3", "4", "8", "5", "0", "6", "9", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1982 and resides in Vinnytsia. 5.  The applicant suffers from emotional instability and slight mental retardation since childhood. Several forensic psychiatric examinations found him to have sufficient mental capacity to be held criminally liable. 6.  On 17 July 2007 Ms O., a tobacco kiosk seller, was stabbed to death at her working place. 7.  On 19 July 2007 the applicant was apprehended by the police. According to the police reports, that measure was undertaken on at least two different occasions, each time in respect of an administrative (minor) offence formally unrelated to the murder. 8.  Under the first police report, at 2.30 a.m. on 19 July 2007, the applicant was noted in a public place while being in a state of manifest alcohol intoxication, swearing and disturbing passers-by. When the police ordered him to produce his documents and follow them to their vehicle, he resisted in a vehement manner. As indicated in the apprehension report, at 10.30 a.m. on 19 July 2007 the applicant was taken to the court for the examination of the above administrative offence case. 9.  In the morning on the same day the Vinnytsya Leninskyy District Court (\u201cthe Leninskyy Court\u201d) found the applicant guilty of the administrative offence of resisting the police and fined him 150 Ukrainian hryvnias (around 14 euros). 10.  It is not known what exactly happened next. The case file contains two more reports on the applicant\u2019s administrative apprehension dated 19 July 2007. According to one of them, he was released at 9.40 p.m. on that date, without any further details being indicated. As noted in the other report, at 10.10 p.m. on that day the applicant was apprehended again in respect of an administrative offence. According to the related judicial ruling of 20 July 2007 (see paragraph 14 below), at 3.25 p.m. on 19 July 2007 the police apprehended the applicant in a street after he resisted to an identity check. 11.  It appears from the materials of the criminal proceedings against the applicant, which were instituted later (see paragraph 19 below), that on 19 July 2007 he was questioned in respect of Ms O.\u2019s murder. He submitted that he had bought cigarettes at her kiosk on 17 July 2007, without anything unusual having happened. The case file does not contain any further information regarding that questioning. 12.  On the same day the applicant had a conversation with his cell-mate in the temporary detention facility, Yu., who convinced him to confess to the murder. He also promised the applicant money in exchange for the information as to where the applicant had thrown the knife. The applicant drew a scheme. Subsequently the police found the knife at the indicated place. Yu.\u2019s statements and the related material evidence were eventually relied on by the trial court in the criminal proceedings against the applicant. 13.  Still on 19 July 2007, from 6.30 to 7.30 p.m., the police carried out a search in the applicant\u2019s flat in the context of the investigation of the murder of Ms O. It appears that they seized his shirt. 14.  On 20 July 2007 the Leninskyy Court found the applicant guilty of the administrative offence of resisting the police at 3.25 p.m. on 19 July 2007 (see also paragraph 10 above) and sentenced him to five days\u2019 administrative detention to be calculated from 19 July (at 3.25 p.m.) to 23 July 2007. 15.  On the same day the applicant was questioned as a witness in the murder case. He reiterated his statement that he had only bought cigarettes at Ms O.\u2019s kiosk. 16.  On 21 July 2007 the applicant was questioned again as a witness concerning the murder of Ms O. He confessed to having stabbed her several times after she had refused to give him cigarettes without payment. 17.  On the same day the applicant repeated his confession during a reconstruction of the crime. He also showed where he had thrown the knife. 18.  Later on 21 July 2007 the applicant was questioned as a criminal suspect. The questioning took place in the presence of a lawyer appointed for him. As noted in the investigator\u2019s decision to that effect, there were sufficient reasons to suspect the applicant of the murder and, given the fact that he suffered from a mental disorder, his legal representation was mandatory. During that questioning the applicant retracted his earlier confession and submitted that he had not been at the tobacco kiosk on the day of the murder. He explained that he had invented his confession being scared that otherwise he would not be released. 19.  On 23 July 2007 at 9.20 p.m. the applicant was formally arrested on suspicion of Ms O.\u2019s murder. The arrest report noted that there were eyewitnesses who had directly pointed at him as the offender. During his questioning on that and the following day the applicant confessed to that crime. 20.  On 26 July 2007 the Leninskyy Court ordered the applicant\u2019s pre\u2011trial detention as a preventive measure pending trial. 21.  The trial court remitted the case for additional investigation many times. According to the case-file materials, the most recent such remittal took place on 31 October 2013. There is no information about any subsequent developments.", "references": ["5", "7", "9", "0", "1", "4", "6", "8", "3", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1981 and lives in Lviv. 6.  On 29 January 2007 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of murder. 7.  On 1 February 2007 the Lviv Shevchenkivskyy District Court (the Shevchenkivskyy Court) ordered his detention as a preventive measure pending trial, for an initial period of two months. 8.  On 28 March 2007 the same court extended the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention for two more months on the ground that there was a considerable volume of investigative measures to be carried out and there were no reasons for changing the preventive measure. 9.  On 29 May 2007 the investigation was completed and the applicant and his lawyer received access to the case file. 10.  On 6 July 2007 another set of criminal proceedings was instituted against the applicant, for infliction of grievous bodily harm. 11.  On 10 July 2007 the two criminal cases were joined. 12.  On the same day the Lviv Regional Court of Appeal (the Court of Appeal) extended the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention to six months. 13.  On 27 July 2007 the case was referred to the Shevchenkivskyy Court, which held a preliminary hearing on 31 August 2007. It ordered the applicant\u2019s further detention without fixing any time-limits. 14.  The Shevchenkivskyy Court remitted the case for further investigation three times (on 8 October 2007, as well as on 19 May and 18 November 2008). The appellate court quashed the first two decisions (on 18 December 2007 and 26 August 2008), but upheld the last one (on 27 March 2009). All the judicial rulings in question maintained the applicant\u2019s continued detention without further reasoning. 15.  On 14 May 2009 the investigation was completed and the case was referred for trial, this time to the Court of Appeal as a first-instance court. 16.  On 27 May 2009 the Court of Appeal held a preliminary hearing, at which it decided, among other things, to remit the case for further investigation once again and to maintain the applicant\u2019s detention. 17.  On 4 August 2009 the Supreme Court quashed the above decision in so far as it concerned the remittal issue and rejected the applicant\u2019s request for release on the ground that he was accused of serious crimes. 18.  On 15 June 2010 the Court of Appeal found the applicant guilty of murder and attempted murder and sentenced him to thirteen years\u2019 imprisonment. 19.  On 22 February 2011 the Supreme Court upheld that judgment. 20.  On 29 January 2016 the applicant was released following the legislative amendments pertaining to the enforcement of sentences.", "references": ["1", "5", "6", "9", "3", "7", "0", "8", "4", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Stryy. 6.  On 25 December 1997 the Stryy prosecutor lodged civil proceedings on behalf of the Stryy City Council seeking to have declared that the applicant had lost her right to occupy a flat provided to her under the protected social tenancy scheme, as she had abandoned it. 7.  On 2 February 1998 the Stryy Court allowed this claim. 8.  The applicant appealed in cassation. She argued, in particular, that she had not abandoned the flat. She had been absent from Stryy because she had been serving a prison sentence. By the time of the court hearing, she had moved back into the flat and had paid the charges owing. She also noted that she had two dependent children and no other residence. 9.  On 16 March 1998 the Lviv Regional Court rejected the cassation appeal by the applicant and the judgment of 2 February 1998 became final. The court noted, in particular, that, as followed from the documents on file, the applicant had been absent from Stryy from 13 March 1996 until 13 December 1997, in view of her arrest followed by a criminal conviction and a prison sentence in Russia. According to Article 71 of the applicable Housing Code, she had lost her occupancy right in respect of the flat previously occupied by her within the period of six months after her conviction had become final. 10.  On the same date the court also addressed the City Council in a separate ruling (\u043e\u043a\u0440\u0435\u043c\u0430 \u0443\u0445\u0432\u0430\u043b\u0430) inviting it to consider the applicant\u2019s personal situation and the need for her reintegration into society in deciding on how to use the flat formerly occupied by her. It noted, in particular, that the applicant had no other housing, was unemployed and had two children. The applicant\u2019s children were registered as residents in a two-room flat, which belonged to the applicant\u2019s mother, who was ailing and apparently reluctant to share accommodation with the applicant. 11.  On 1 April 1998 the Stryy Mayor reacted at the Lviv Regional Court\u2019s separate ruling informing it that the Stryy Prosecutor had instituted the proceedings against the applicant without consulting the City Council, which had no interest in evicting the applicant. He also assured the court that the City Council would take no action to have the applicant evicted. 12.  On 20 May 1998 the Stryy prosecutor instituted eviction proceedings against the applicant under Article 109 of the Housing Code, referring to the fact that she had no legal basis to continue residing in the flat but refused to move out voluntarily. In addition, he presented a letter signed by nine residents of the same building, who alleged that the applicant was regularly organising loud parties and inviting guests with criminal record, who breached peace and damaged public property. 13.  On 18 June 1998 the Stryy Court ordered the applicant\u2019s eviction referring to Article 109 of the Housing Code and the fact that she had lost occupancy right in respect of the disputed flat. This judgment became final and was enforced on 13 October 1998. 14.  According to the applicant, following eviction she was forced to rent rooms in the flats of various acquaintances and was unable to establish a stable home. 15.  According to the Government, following eviction, the applicant and her two children lived with her mother in the latter\u2019s two-room flat which measured 32 sq. m. 16.  On 13 December 2000 the Stryy Court awarded tenancy of the applicant\u2019s former flat to A.N., who then acquired it from the municipality through a privatisation scheme and sold it on to O.M. soon afterwards. 17.  Following the applicant\u2019s numerous complaints concerning the alleged unfairness of the court decisions depriving her of her occupancy rights, on 30 May 2001 the Presidium of the Lviv Regional Court quashed the judgments of 2 February and 16 March 1998 by way of extraordinary procedure and remitted the applicant\u2019s case to the Stryy Court for a fresh examination. 18.  After several rounds of proceedings, on 7 October 2002 the Lviv Regional Court of Appeal upheld the applicant\u2019s right to occupy the disputed flat having rejected the prosecutor\u2019s claim against her. It noted, in particular, that, although the applicant had indeed been absent from the disputed flat for a period exceeding six months before the prosecutor had filed the proceedings, by resuming its occupancy before the case had been examined by the first-instance court, the applicant had restored her right to occupy the disputed flat. 19.  On 27 May 2003 the Supreme Court of Ukraine upheld the above judgment and it became final. 20.  On an unspecified date the applicant instituted civil proceedings seeking the invalidation of all the transactions in respect of the disputed flat, O.M.\u2019s eviction and a court order allowing the applicant to move back into the flat. 21.  On 6 July 2005 the Stryy Court found that there was no call to divest O.M. of her title to the flat, as she had acquired it in good faith when the flat had lawfully belonged to A.N. At the same time, regard being had to the decision restoring the applicant\u2019s right to occupy the same flat, it obliged the City Council to provide the applicant with replacement housing unit equivalent to the flat at issue. 22.  This judgment became final and in October 2005 the bailiffs instituted enforcement proceedings. 23.  On 20 October 2005 the City Council informed the applicant that it was unable to execute the judgment at the material time, since it had no available housing and no funds to build new units. 24.  According to the Government, on an unspecified date the City Council offered the applicant a flat located in V. Street, but the applicant refused. 25.  According to the applicant, she was never offered any flats by the City Council. 26.  On 28 June 2006 the bailiffs sent the writ of enforcement back to the applicant as unenforceable. It is not clear whether the applicant was in receipt of the above writ. 27.  On various occasions the applicant unsuccessfully complained about the non-enforcement of the judgment of 6 July 2005 to various authorities. 28.  On 30 May 2007 the Lviv Regional Prosecutor\u2019s Office informed the applicant that they saw no reason to intervene in the situation on the applicant\u2019s behalf, as her right to municipal housing had been restored by way of court proceedings, and the bailiffs\u2019 service had initiated the enforcement proceedings, which, according to their information, had been pending at the material time. 29.  On 30 May 2008 the bailiffs\u2019 service informed the applicant, in response to her complaint about delay in the enforcement of the judgment given in her favour, that the enforcement writ had been returned to her in 2006. However, she retained the right to re-introduce it and demand re\u2011opening of the enforcement proceedings subject to statute of limitation established by applicable law. 30.  In August 2008 the applicant identified a flat located in Sh. Street, which was vacant following the death of its former owner in January 2008, and moved into it. According to the applicant, this accommodation was in a dilapidated state and she had invested substantial sums for repairs and renovation. 31.  On an unspecified date the applicant instituted civil proceedings seeking to regularise her occupancy of the flat in Sh. Street. 32.  On 13 October 2010 the court awarded the flat to the municipality as intestate property and allotted to the applicant the right to occupy it under the protected social tenancy scheme. 33.  On 20 July 2012 the applicant acquired the flat from the municipality through a privatisation scheme and registered herself as the owner.", "references": ["8", "2", "1", "0", "7", "5", "6", "9", "3", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in Lviv. 6.  According to the applicant, at about 7 p.m. on 20 February 2002 he was stopped in the street by officers of the municipal guard (\u043c\u0443\u043d\u0456\u0446\u0438\u043f\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u0430 \u0434\u0440\u0443\u0436\u0438\u043d\u0430) and brought to the Lviv medical sobering-up centre, in spite of the fact that he was sober. Y.B., a paramedic working at the centre, concluded, after merely examining the applicant\u2019s appearance and without administering any laboratory tests, that he was suffering \u201cfrom alcohol intoxication of an intermediate degree.\u201d Accordingly, the applicant was confined in the centre in order to sober up. 7.  At about 7 a.m. on 21 February 2002 the sobering-up centre\u2019s staff informed the applicant\u2019s mother on the telephone of her son\u2019s whereabouts and invited her to pick him up from the centre. 8.  At about 8 a.m. on the same day the applicant\u2019s mother arrived and escorted the applicant home, having paid a service charge of 34.80 hryvnias (UAH) (around 7 euros). 9.  Before being discharged, the applicant signed a report on his confinement (\u201cthe confinement report\u201d), which stated that he had been placed in the sobering-up centre at 10.20 p.m. on 20 February 2002 after having consumed 250 millilitres of vodka and that he had no complaints in respect of the sobering-up centre\u2019s staff. This report also contained illegible handwritten observations of the centre\u2019s paramedic concerning the applicant\u2019s pulse and other health-related indicators taken upon his placement in the centre. 10.  At about 1 p.m. on 22 February 2002 the applicant complained to a doctor at Lviv Municipal Clinic No. 3 (\u201cthe Municipal Clinic\u201d) that on 20 February 2002 he had been arbitrarily confined in the sobering-up centre, even though he had been sober, and beaten by officers of the municipal guard in response to his peaceful protests. 11.  On the same date the applicant was certified as having no alcohol in his urine. He was also found to be suffering from contusions on one of his elbows and in the eyebrow area. Also on the same date, the police were notified by the medical staff that the applicant had complained about having been beaten. 12.  From 25 February 2002 until 18 March 2002 the applicant continued to be treated as an outpatient at his local polyclinic for the above injuries. 13.  On 15 April 2002 the Lviv Regional Police addressed a letter to the applicant, indicating that the Municipal Clinic\u2019s notification to the police of 22 February 2002 concerning the applicant\u2019s complaint regarding his alleged beating had been registered in their log. It further noted that K., a police officer, had been assigned to conduct an inquiry into that complaint. He had been found liable to be disciplined for inaction on his part, notably for not having questioned the parties concerned. The applicant was also given assurances that the complaint would be investigated further. 14.  On 3 July 2002 the applicant received a letter from the Lviv Prosecutor\u2019s Office stating that an inquiry into his complaints concerning the actions of the municipal guard officers and the sobering-up centre paramedic had concluded that those complaints were ill-founded. 15.  On numerous occasions between July 2002 and April 2003 the applicant complained to various departments in the prosecutors\u2019 office that his allegations of ill-treatment had not been properly investigated \u2013 notably, that none of the parties concerned had ever been questioned. 16.  On various dates the prosecutor\u2019s office responded that those complaints had been ill-founded and that on 3 July 2002 the applicant had already received a proper response. 17.  After receiving the final letter (dated 11 July 2003) to this effect, the applicant no longer pursued his attempts to instigate an investigation by the prosecutor\u2019s office. 18.  On 20 August 2007 the Lviv Regional Prosecutor\u2019s Office, having archived the case file material, destroyed it; it did so because the statutory time-limit for archiving a case file following the termination of the relevant investigation had lapsed. 19.  In July 2002 the applicant lodged a civil suit with the Shevchenkivsky District Court in Lviv against the Lviv municipal guard, the municipal guard officers who had brought him to the sobering-up centre and paramedic Y.B. He sought non-pecuniary damages, alleging that his confinement had been arbitrary and that he had been ill-treated. 20.  On 17 August 2002 the chief officer of the municipal guard informed the District Court in a letter that on 20 February 2002 the applicant had been stopped by his officers because he \u201chad been walking unsteadily, falling over, and shouting obscenities\u201d. 21.  At trial, the applicant submitted, inter alia, that he could not describe in detail when and how the injuries had been inflicted on him. He also maintained that on 21 February 2002, following his discharge from the sobering-up centre, he had had to attend a court hearing in an unrelated case. Having been occupied in court for the whole day, he had not been able to visit a doctor until 22 February 2002. 22.  Y.B., the sobering-up centre\u2019s paramedic, submitted that in determining the applicant\u2019s degree of alcohol intoxication he had acted in accordance with \u201cthe instruction issued by the medical department of the Ministry of Interior\u201d. According to this instruction, it was not necessary to perform laboratory tests to establish the level of a person\u2019s alcohol intoxication. Such a conclusion was to be made by making a visual examination and by measuring such vital indicators as pulse rate and blood pressure. The paramedic further submitted that the applicant had had no injuries either upon his placement in the facility or upon his release. 23.  On 6 June 2003 the court rejected the applicant\u2019s claims as unsubstantiated. It referred, in particular, to the applicant\u2019s own acknowledgment in the confinement report that he had drunk 250 milliliters of vodka and had no complaints against the staff of the sobering-up centre. As regards the applicant\u2019s ill-treatment complaint, the court noted that the prosecutor\u2019s office had refused to institute criminal proceedings in respect of the incident, having found the applicant\u2019s complaint unsubstantiated. Likewise, the applicant had failed to explain convincingly in court why, having been released on the morning of 21 February 2002, he had first complained of his injuries and had undergone alcohol tests only on 22 February 2002, some thirty hours later. The court noted that the applicant\u2019s claim that he had been occupied by a court hearing for the entire day on 21 February 2002 was unsubstantiated, as the relevant registry records indicated that on that day the applicant had been in court between 9.00 a.m. and 9.20 a.m. only. In these circumstances, the court found that the applicant had most likely sustained his injuries after his release. 24.  The applicant appealed. He submitted, in particular, that the confinement report did not constitute reliable evidence, as it had been signed by him under duress. The report was largely illegible, and contained numerous inaccuracies (for example, the wrong time was given for his arrest). However, the applicant had agreed to sign it because he had been afraid that otherwise he might not be discharged. The applicant also complained that the first-instance court had unreasonably refused his request for the prosecutor\u2019s office to be obliged to produce the results of its inquiry concerning the applicant\u2019s complaints. 25.  On 13 October 2003 the Lviv Regional Court of Appeal rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal, having found that he had failed to substantiate his allegations. It also noted that there had been no need to ask the prosecutor\u2019s office for the results of its inquiry because the fact that it had refused to institute criminal proceedings into the applicant\u2019s complaint had been sufficient to dismiss the matter. 26.  The applicant lodged a cassation appeal. He noted, in particular, that his arrest and confinement had been arbitrary, since neither the confinement report nor any other document stated the circumstances in which he had been arrested or the grounds for his confinement. He further noted that the method by which it had been determined that he had been suffering from alcohol intoxication of an \u201cintermediate degree\u201d had been based on a visual examination only, without any objective tests having been undertaken. This method was arbitrary and neither the defendant authority nor the courts had referred to any specific legal provision governing such a practice. The applicant also submitted that the authorities had acted arbitrarily in not notifying his family of his whereabouts until some twelve hours after he had been deprived of his liberty. He further complained that neither the prosecutor\u2019s office nor the civil courts had made any effort in good faith to establish the circumstances in which he had sustained his injuries; thus, his version of events remained credible and unrebutted. 27.  On 28 March 2006 the Supreme Court of Ukraine rejected the applicant\u2019s request for leave to lodge a cassation appeal.", "references": ["7", "5", "0", "8", "6", "1", "9", "3", "4", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1927 and lives in R\u012bga. 5.  On 10 August 1998 the Office of the Prosecutor General separated materials of the criminal case no. 81204496 and initiated new criminal proceedings in respect of the applicant\u2019s activities during the period from 1948 to 1953, when he was an investigator at the Ministry of State Security of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Latvia. According to the Office of the Prosecutor General, the applicant had participated in political repressions of the Soviet regime. 6.  On 23 October 1999 the prosecutor informed the applicant that he was suspected of having committed genocide. More specifically, the Office of the Prosecutor General alleged that the applicant had participated in military operations against members of the Latvian armed resistance, collected evidence in criminal proceedings against them, arrested them and their supporters and collected evidence and arrested people who had possessed anti-Soviet manuscripts. On the same date the prosecutor for the first time questioned the applicant as a suspect. 7.  From 29 October 1999 to 28 December 1999 the applicant was detained on remand. 8.  On 25 November 1999 the applicant was charged with crimes against humanity and genocide. 9.  On 26 July 2000 the prosecutor drafted the bill of indictment and sent the case to the Riga Regional Court for adjudication. The indictment concerned seven different episodes involving thirteen alleged victims. 10.  On 23 October 2002 the applicant\u2019s new defence counsel requested the Riga Regional Court to postpone at least for three weeks the hearing, which was scheduled for 24 October 2002, so that he would have enough time to acquaint himself with the applicant\u2019s criminal case file. 11.  On 24 October 2002 the hearing was postponed indefinitely due to the responsible judge\u2019s illness. 12.  On an unknown date the applicant\u2019s criminal case was taken over by another judge of the Riga Regional Court. On 14 September 2004 the judge informed the applicant\u2019s defence counsel that the hearing was scheduled for 11 October 2004. 13.  The Riga Regional Court held hearings on 11, 12 and 18 October 2004. The next hearing was scheduled for 13 December 2004. However, on 7 December 2004 the judge informed the applicant that the hearing was postponed to 21 March 2005 due to a protracted examination of another criminal case. 14.  On 21 March 2005 the Riga Regional Court continued examination of the applicant\u2019s criminal case and on 4 April 2005 the court delivered its judgment, acquitting the applicant. 15.  The prosecutor appealed against the judgement. On 19 December 2005 the Criminal Cases Chamber of the Supreme Court quashed the first-instance court\u2019s judgment and remitted the case to the first-instance court. This decision was finalised on 16 March 2006. 16.  On 23 March 2006 the applicant\u2019s defence counsel appealed against the appellate court\u2019s decision of 19 December 2005. With a decision of 28 April 2006 the Senate of the Supreme Court quashed this decision and remitted the case to the appellate court. 17.  On 2 May 2006 the judge of the Criminal Cases Chamber of the Supreme Court scheduled the appeal hearing for 7, 8 and 9 February 2007. 18.  Upon the prosecutor\u2019s request, on 7 February 2007 the appellate court suspended the case pending an expert medical report on the applicant\u2019s capacity to participate in the hearing and to serve a prison sentence. 19.  On 17 April 2007 the court\u2019s decision ordering the forensic examination was forwarded to the State Centre for Forensic Medical Examination. On 24 April 2007 also the applicant\u2019s criminal case file was sent to this institution. On 28 August 2007 the State Centre for Forensic Medical Examination delivered the results of the forensic examination. 20.  Following the applicant\u2019s forensic expertise, the examination of the applicant\u2019s criminal case before the appellate court was continued on 27 and 28 February 2008. On 7 March 2008 the appellate court upheld the judgment of the Riga Regional Court of 4 April 2005 acquitting the applicant. The decision was finalised on 9 May 2008. 21.  On 19 May 2008 the prosecutor appealed against this decision. 22.  With a final decision of 27 August 2008 the Senate of the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the appellate court.", "references": ["7", "5", "9", "2", "8", "4", "0", "1", "6", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "9.  The applicant was born in 1987 and lives in Kur\u0161anec. 10.  In a judgment of the \u010cakovec County Court (\u017dupanijski sud u \u010cakovcu) of 19 June 2008, upheld by the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske) on 3 February 2009, the applicant was sentenced to two years\u2019 imprisonment for armed robbery. 11.  On 2 July 2010 the \u010cakovec Municipal Court (Op\u0107inski sud u \u010cakovcu) sentenced him to one year\u2019s imprisonment for theft, which was confirmed by the \u010cakovec County Court on 3 November 2010. 12.  Following a request by the applicant, on 26 August 2011 a three-judge panel of the \u010cakovec County Court took into account those two convictions and sentenced him to a single term of two years and eleven months\u2019 imprisonment. 13.  On 16 October 2009 the applicant was transferred from a semi-open regime in Turopolje State Prison (Kaznionica u Turopolju) to Bjelovar County Prison (Zatvor u Bjelovaru) to serve the prison sentence originally imposed by the \u010cakovec County Court on 19 June 2008 (see paragraph 10 above). The reason for the transfer, as indicated in a report of Turopolje State Prison, was the applicant\u2019s inappropriate behaviour and threats of escape. 14.  The applicant remained in Bjelovar Prison until 16 March 2011, when he was transferred to Vara\u017edin County Prison (Zatvor u Vara\u017edinu) following a decision by the Ministry of Justice Prison Administration (Ministarstvo pravosu\u0111a, Uprava za zatvorski sustav) of 11 March 2011. 15.  According to the applicant, during his stay in Bjelovar Prison he was placed in overcrowded cells. He alleged in particular that for a period of fifty days in total he disposed of less than 3 square metres (sq. m) of personal space, including for a period of twenty-seven consecutive days. There were also several non-consecutive periods in which he was allocated between 3 and 4 sq. m of personal space in the cells (see paragraph 17 below). 16.  The applicant further submitted that the cells in which he had been held were badly maintained, humid, dirty and insufficiently equipped with lockers and chairs for all inmates. The sanitary facilities were in the same room as the living area, from which they were not fully separated. Those facilities were about half a metre away from the dining table and there was a constant smell in the cell. Moreover, he had not been given any opportunity to engage in prison work and in general was not provided with sufficient access to recreational and educational activities. The prisoners were allowed to move freely outside the locked part of the prison between 4 and 7 p.m., and the out-of-cell facilities were inadequate and insufficient, particularly given that there was only an open recreation yard. The nutrition was poor and the hygiene conditions were inadequate, especially since the toilet was not separated from the living area. The inmates did not have sufficient access to hot water and were allowed to shower only once or sometimes three times per week. 17.  According to the Government, while in Bjelovar Prison the applicant had at his disposal an average of 3.59 sq. m of personal space. He was held in four different cells, the conditions of which are detailed in the table below.\nThe measurements of the cells indicate their overall size (as provided by the Government) and with the in-cell sanitary facility deducted (based on the methodology enunciated in paragraph 114 below). That calculation is based on an approximate measurement of the sanitary facility (1.9 sq. m) according to the floor plans of Bjelovar Prison, which the Government provided to the Court and which are not disputed by the applicant.\n \nCell no.\nPeriod of\ndetention\nTotal number of inmates \nOverall surface area in\nsq. m\nPersonal space in sq. m\n \nSurface\nminus\nsanitary\nfacility\nin sq. m\nPersonal space in\nsq. m\n \n1/O 18.  The Government further explained that each cell in which the applicant had been accommodated had had windows allowing in natural light and fresh air. Artificial light was also secured and all cells were heated by a central heating system and equipped with a communication system enabling the inmates to contact prison staff immediately in case of need. All cells had a toilet fully separated from the living area and equipped with its own ventilation system. All cells had direct access to drinking water. The cells were constantly maintained and some necessary reconstruction work and improvements to the facilities had been carried out in 2007, July 2009 and May-July 2010, as well as in 2011, 2012 and 2013. Furthermore, the inmates were provided with all necessary hygiene and sanitary facilities. This included a shower three times per week and after sports activities. Every inmate was also regularly provided with the necessary toiletries and cleaning supplies for keeping the cells clean. The inmates were provided with clean bedding and bedspreads every fifteen days, or more often if necessary. In addition, the inmates were provided with the necessary clothing although they were allowed to use their own clothes. Nutrition was based on an assessment by experts and the quality of the food was constantly monitored by the competent State authorities. The inmates were provided with three meals per day meeting the necessary nutrition requirements, as supervised by the prison doctor. Meals could be taken to cells or eaten in a common room. 19.  The Government also explained that the inmates were allowed to move freely outside their cells in the morning and afternoon, and to use the indoor and outdoor facilities of Bjelovar Prison. This in particular included two hours of outdoor exercise and in addition free out-of-cell movement inside the prison between 4 and 7 p.m. Specifically, in the ordinary daily regime, the inmates would wake up at 7 a.m. on working days and at 7.30 a.m. on weekends and public holidays. They would then wash, tidy their beds, and have breakfast, followed by the morning cleaning of the cell. Leisure time was scheduled afterwards, until 1 p.m., when they had an opportunity to take part in a number of activities. Leisure time was followed by lunch served between 1 and 2 p.m. The period after lunch was usually set aside for various group activities and meetings with lawyers and prison staff. Between 4 and 7 p.m. all cell doors were opened again, enabling the inmates to move about within the prison and to use its facilities as they saw fit. Dinner was served from 7 p.m., followed by the evening tidying and cleaning of the cells and other rooms in the prison. 20.  The Government submitted that Bjelovar Prison was equipped with a recreation area located in the courtyard, which, in addition to the asphalted parts, included a lawn. The surface area of the courtyard was 305 sq. m. There was also direct access to drinking water and artificial light as well as protection from inclement weather available in the recreation area. The gym was open between 8 a.m. and 12.30 p.m. and between 2 and 6 p.m., and the basketball court was open on working days between 3 and 4 p.m. and at the weekends in both the morning and the afternoon. The recreation area was also equipped with a badminton court and ping-pong tables. The inmates were able to borrow books and use other services of the Bjelovar library, which were regularly available in the prison. The prison administration also organised religious ceremonies and contacts with cultural and religious associations. Each cell was equipped with cable television, which could be watched between 7 a.m. and 11 p.m. during working days, and between 7.30 a.m. and midnight at weekends and on public holidays. There were also radio receivers in the cells and the possibility of borrowing and watching films from a collection available in Bjelovar Prison. In addition, the inmates were allowed to socialise by playing board games. There was also a room for spousal visits and the inmates were allowed to obtain various goods from outside the prison. Bjelovar Prison also offered a possibility of education in prison but the applicant had decided not to avail himself of that opportunity. Remunerated work in prison was available in accordance with the economic possibilities, which were at the time limited due to the general economic crisis. A possibility of work outside the prison existed but the applicant\u2019s previous threats to escape and his inadequate behaviour in detention had not made him eligible for this possibility. During his stay in Bjelovar Prison, the applicant had regularly received medical treatment. He had seen his family four times while standing trial for another offence in \u010cakovec and had been allowed to speak to them by telephone twenty minutes per week, with an additional ten minutes on public holidays. 21.  The Government substantiated their arguments with photographs taken in 2007, 2010 and 2011 in the context of the renovation of the prison and visits by various officials to the prison, floor plans and other relevant documentation related to the available facilities in Bjelovar Prison and the applicant\u2019s health care and nutrition. 22.  On 24 March 2010 the applicant lodged a request with the Bjelovar Prison administration through a lawyer, asking to be transferred to Vara\u017edin Prison for personal and family reasons. 23.  On 26 April 2010 he complained to the Ministry of Justice Prison Administration in general terms about the conduct of the Bjelovar Prison administration, alleging that they had never offered him the opportunity to have a meeting with the relevant officials, that his request for a transfer had been ignored and that the prison food had been inadequate. 24.  The applicant again reiterated his request for a transfer to Vara\u017edin Prison on 6 May 2010, citing personal and family reasons, particularly his family\u2019s lack of financial means, which made it difficult for them to visit him. 25.  On 14 July 2010 the Ministry of Justice Prison Administration replied to the applicant\u2019s complaints, finding them ill-founded in all respects. It pointed out that he had been given sufficient opportunity to have contact with his family by telephone and while attending the court hearings in March, April and July 2010 in the criminal proceedings against him, that he had not been engaged in any work because there had been an insufficient number of work posts in Bjelovar Prison, that he had had seven meetings with the prison governor and twenty-five meetings with various other Bjelovar Prison officials, and that food had been prepared in consultation with experts, the prison diet having been continuously supervised by the prison doctor. 26.  On 24 August 2010 the applicant complained about the conditions of his detention to a sentence-execution judge of the Bjelovar County Court (\u017dupanijski sud u Bjelovaru). He pointed out that central to his complaints was his wish to be transferred to another prison closer to his family. He also complained, in particular, that his request to engage in prison work had not been answered. He was being detained with seven other inmates in cell no. 8, which measured 18 sq. m in total and was inadequately equipped and maintained. Hygiene conditions were poor, given that he had been allowed to take a shower only three times per week. 27.  Following the applicant\u2019s complaint, the sentence-execution judge requested a detailed report from Bjelovar Prison concerning the conditions of his detention. 28.  After obtaining the relevant report and hearing the applicant in person, on 7 October 2010 the sentence-execution judge dismissed his complaints as ill-founded. She found, in particular, that the applicant had sufficient personal space at his disposal, given that four other persons were at the time placed with him in the same cell. The sentence-execution judge also found that the applicant was provided with sufficient hygiene and sanitary facilities, and that he was not engaged in prison work since such opportunities did not exist for all prisoners in Bjelovar Prison. 29.  On 15 October 2010 the applicant lodged an appeal against the sentence-execution judge\u2019s decision with a three-judge panel of the Bjelovar County Court, alleging that she had erred in her factual findings, as cell no. 8 had been occupied by up to eight inmates. 30.  On 21 October 2010 a three-judge panel of the Bjelovar County Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal as ill-founded, endorsing the reasoning of the sentence-execution judge. It also explained that the required standard for personal space under the Enforcement of Prison Sentence Act, namely 4 sq. m, was the recommended minimum standard that should in principle be respected, but that there could be no automatic violation of a prisoner\u2019s rights if such a standard was temporarily not complied with. In view of the fact that a reduction in the applicant\u2019s personal space in cell no. 8 had only been temporary, the three-judge panel considered that there had been no violation of his rights. 31.  On 5 November 2010 the applicant complained to the Bjelovar County Court about the decision of its three-judge panel. He argued that for the first six months following his arrival at Bjelovar Prison, he had been detained in cell no. 1, measuring 17.13 sq. m, where six inmates in total had been detained. He had then spent one month in cell no. 8 on the first floor with six inmates, which had measured 17.13 sq. m. He had then been placed in another cell, also marked \u201ccell no. 8\u201d, which again measured 17.13 sq. m, where he had spent six months with eight inmates. At the time of his complaint he was being held in cell no. 4 with six inmates. 32.  On 20 November 2010 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske), relying on Article 14 \u00a7 2 (equality before the law), Article 26 (equality before the State authorities) and Article 29 (right to a fair trial) of the Constitution, complaining in general terms of a lack of personal space and work opportunities in Bjelovar Prison. He also relied on section 74(3) of the Enforcement of Prison Sentences Act, guaranteeing adequate personal space to detainees, and alleged that this provision had not been complied with in his case. 33.  On 26 November 2010 the applicant complained to the Ombudsperson (Pu\u010dki pravobranitelj) that he had not been granted a transfer to a prison closer to his family, and alleged in general terms that the conditions of his detention had been inadequate. 34.  Meanwhile, in November 2010 the applicant joined a group of inmates who complained to the sentence-execution judge about inadequate general conditions in Bjelovar Prison. 35.  By a letter of 7 December 2010 the Ombudsperson invited the applicant to further substantiate his complaints. 36.  The applicant replied to that request on 21 December 2010, indicating that the sentence-execution judge and the three-judge panel of the Bjelovar County Court had never examined his complaints properly, and that he had not been granted 4 sq. m of personal space in detention as required under the Enforcement of Prison Sentences Act. 37.  In March 2011 the applicant saw a psychiatrist, who found that the applicant was frustrated with his internment and the impossibility of seeing his family. 38.  On 12 April 2011 the Ombudsperson replied to the applicant\u2019s letter that, according to the information available, his accommodation in Bjelovar Prison had fallen short of the requirements of adequate personal space under the Enforcement of Prison Sentences Act. The Ombudsperson also pointed out that the cell where the applicant was being detained had been renovated in 2010, and complied with all hygiene and health standards. The Ombudsman also noted that, just like ninety-two other inmates, the applicant had not been engaged in prison work, as there had been an insufficient number of work posts for all prisoners. 39.  On 5 June 2012 the Constitutional Court declared the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint (see paragraph 32 above) inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded. The relevant part of the decision reads:\n\u201cIn his constitutional complaint, the complainant was unable to show that the Bjelovar County Court had acted contrary to the constitutional provisions concerning human rights and fundamental freedoms or had arbitrarily interpreted the relevant statutory provisions. The Constitutional Court therefore finds that the present case does not raise an issue of the complainant\u2019s constitutional rights. Thus, there is no constitutional law issue in the case for the Constitutional Court to decide upon ... \u201d 40.  The Constitutional Court\u2019s decision was served on the applicant\u2019s representative on 18 June 2012.", "references": ["4", "6", "9", "7", "0", "3", "5", "2", "8", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant company is a limited liability company based in Vienna. It is the owner and publisher of the weekly news magazine Profil. 6.  Until 2007 the Land of Carinthia (Land K\u00e4rnten) owned almost 50% of the shares of Hypo Alpe-Adria Bank. From 1996 until 2006 a man called Mr. Rauscher was in charge of the treasury department of the bank. In that capacity he was responsible for authorising foreign currency transactions. He was answerable only to the bank\u2019s executive board, which consisted of three members. While Mr. Rauscher was head of the treasury department, his father, who had been a regional government member responsible for finance until 1996, was also on the bank\u2019s supervisory board. The father had that position until 2003. 7.  At the beginning of 2006 the bank\u2019s executive board informed the Financial Market Authority (Finanzmarktaufsicht, \u201cthe FMA\u201d) that the bank had financial difficulties. On 31 March 2006 the executive board held a meeting with the executive board of the FMA and informed it that the bank had made a loss of several hundred million euros in 2004. Mr Kulterer, the chief executive of the bank, informed the FMA that the treasury department had gone over its internal transaction limit of 100 million euros (EUR) by EUR 47 million. 8.  Between 1 and 6 April 2006 a number of daily newspapers published reports on the investigation and mentioned Mr Rauscher by name as responsible for the speculative transactions in question. Among those articles was one by newspaper Der Standard published on 4 April 2006 (see Standard Verlags GmbH v. Austria (no. 3), no. 34702/07, \u00a7\u00a7 6-17, 10 January 2012). 9.  On 5 April 2006 the FMA filed criminal information (Strafanzeige) about offences committed in relation to the business of Hypo Alpe-Adria Bank against the three members of the executive board and Mr Rauscher, accusing them of embezzlement by investing money entrusted to the bank contrary to the instructions of the executive board. In substance, the FMA alleged that Mr Rauscher had authorised highly speculative transactions with foreign currency derivatives (swaps), disregarding instructions by the executive board. 10.  In its issue of 10 April 2006, the applicant company published an article on the investigations into the heavy losses incurred by Hypo Alpe\u2011Adria Bank. The front cover of Profil had the words: \u201cK\u00e4rntner Hypo\u2011Aff\u00e4re \u2013 Wie viel wusste Haider?\u201d (\u201cCarinthian Hypo affair - How much did Haider know?\u201d). 11.  The article, headlined \u201cSchwere Hypothek\u201d (\u201cHeavy Mortgage\u201d), ran to nine pages. It reported on the enormous loss of EUR 328 million incurred by Hypo Alpe-Adria Bank in 2004, the question of who was responsible for the damage and whether there were failings in the bank\u2019s risk management. It accused the bank\u2019s executive board of failing to give information to the supervisory board, the bank\u2019s accountants and the FMA, and of trying instead to hush up the losses by manipulating the balance sheets for 2004, which meant that the full extent of the damage was only discovered by external accountants when examining the balance sheets for 2005. The accountants had then informed the FMA. Furthermore, the article featured an interview with Mr Kulterer, confronting him with those accusations. Mr Kulterer was quoted as accusing Mr Rauscher of having disregarded internal guidelines in his foreign currency transactions.\nThe relevant passages of the article read as follows:\n\u201cBy the time the warning system was triggered the disaster had long since run its course. On Wednesday 17 November 2004 the risk management and control software programme in the head offices of Hypo Alpe-Adria Bank in Klagenfurt showed, in all the relevant departments of the bank, exactly the kind of figures which bring managers of credit institutions out in a cold sweat: staggering losses on investment operations. In the treasury division, which manages the bank\u2019s liquidity and for that purpose trades, among other things, in interest rates and currencies, there was a shortfall of more than 100 million euros. \u2018At that point we immediately called a halt\u2019 said CEO Wolfgang Kulterer. However, as several similar operations were in progress simultaneously, it was impossible \u2018to close the floodgates at once\u2019. When that was eventually done, the losses stood at 328 million euros, several times higher than the self-imposed threshold of 100 million.\nTreasury manager Christian Rauscher, who was responsible for authorising the transactions, was immediately told to clear his desk. (This son of the former SP\u00d6 regional finance chief Max Rauscher was not available for comment). However, the consequences of the orgy of speculation, which lasted just two weeks, continue to preoccupy the bank\u2019s management. And they are not the only ones: in particular, the manner in which Kulterer and his colleagues dealt with the loss-making transactions has also come to the attention of the authorities in recent days. Last Wednesday the financial markets supervisory authority (the FMA) even saw fit to lodge a criminal complaint against the entire executive board. Rauscher is the object of a preliminary enquiries [Vorerhebungen] (file no. 3 St 79/06x) before the Klagenfurt Regional Court on suspicion of embezzlement. The executive board faces charges of misrepresenting the end-of-year accounts, in other words, falsifying the balance sheets.\n...\nThe transactions in question were all performed between 20 September and 5 October 2004. According to Hypo boss Kulterer, Rauscher \u2013 in breach of internal regulations \u2013 gambled, by means of so-called swaps, on the occurrence of a highly explosive combination of two trends on the financial markets: on the one hand a fall in interest rates and on the other a rise in the dollar and the yen against the euro. A few weeks later, on 17 November 2004, the perfect storm hit.\n...\nLack of controls. Rapid rates of growth motivate not just the boss, but also the employees \u2013 including the now ex-treasury manager Christian Rauscher. According to inside sources, Rauscher may have set the stakes so high precisely because he wanted to make his mark as a candidate for the vacant post of department manager. After all, high stakes mean correspondingly high profits if all goes according to plan. A marked surplus on his account would undoubtedly have boosted his chances of securing the post.\u201d 12.  The article continued with an overview of the history of Hypo Alpe\u2011Adria Bank, which had gone from being a regional bank to an international investment bank in the space of fifteen years. The article looked at previous business transactions which had resulted in risks and losses for the bank and the conduct of the executive board. Finally, the article examined the relationship between the bank\u2019s management and local politicians and asked how much Mr Haider, the then regional governor of Carinthia, knew of the losses, and when he had found out about them. It noted that the Land of Carinthia owned 49.4% of the bank and that funds from the bank had financed a number of political projects in the region, in particular Mr Haider\u2019s Future Fund (Zukunftsfonds), designed to fund infrastructure and other large-scale projects. 13.  On 14 June 2006 Mr Rauscher brought proceedings against the applicant company for disclosing his identity in breach of section 7a of the Media Act (Mediengesetz). He submitted that he was not a public figure and that his position at the bank had not been such as to justify the disclosure of his name. He asserted that when authorising the transactions at issue he had acted in accordance with his instructions and with the approval of his superiors. The publication of his name had had negative repercussions on his professional advancement and had not been justified by any public interest. 14.  On 19 August 2008 the Vienna Regional Criminal Court (Landesgericht f\u00fcr Strafsachen) dismissed Mr Rauscher\u2019s action. It found that the following facts had been established: the article had provided a comprehensive report on the losses of Hypo Alpe-Adria Bank. At the time the article had been published, the Land of Carinthia had owned 49.4% of the bank. The claimant\u2019s father had been a regional government member responsible for finances and had also been on the bank\u2019s supervisory board until April 2003. The claimant had been the head of the bank\u2019s treasury department since 1999. He had not been active in politics nor had he been in the public eye in connection with his professional activity. The Regional Court noted that the task of a bank\u2019s treasury department was to carry out liquidity and finance planning for the bank. Hypo Alpe-Adria\u2019s treasury department had been directly answerable to the executive board. The transactions which had subsequently led to such enormous losses had been carried out between the end of September and the beginning of October 2004 and the claimant had been the main person in charge. On 5 April 2006 the FMA had sent information to the Klagenfurt public prosecutor\u2019s office on three members of the executive board, who were suspected of manipulating the bank\u2019s balance sheets, and on the claimant who was suspected of embezzlement for carrying out unauthorised foreign currency transactions. Following receipt of that information the public prosecutor\u2019s office had started preliminary enquiries. From 24 May 2006 preliminary investigations (Voruntersuchung) had been conducted by the Regional Court. Criminal proceedings against the claimant had been discontinued in 2008. After accusations against the claimant had been published in various media, his employment contract had been terminated. He had not been able to find a similar position in another bank. 15.  The Regional Court noted that section 7a (1) of the Media Act required a weighing of the claimant\u2019s interest in the protection of his identity and the public interest in its disclosure. As a rule, adults who were suspected of having committed a crime were only protected against the disclosure of their identity if such disclosure disproportionately affected their professional advancement. 16.  It observed that at the material time the Land of Carinthia owned almost 50% of Hypo Alpe-Adria Bank. That fact alone demonstrated an increased public interest as the taxpayer had a right to know who was responsible for the bank\u2019s losses. The applicant had been a senior employee at the bank, and had been suspected of embezzlement. Although the criminal proceedings had still been at an early stage, the Financial Market Authority, the competent controlling authority, had laid criminal information against the claimant. Moreover, the chief executive of the bank, Mr Kulterer, had levelled similar accusations against him. Having regard to the function of the press as a \u201cpublic watchdog\u201d and the circumstances of the case, the Regional Court found that the public interest of obtaining information outweighed the claimant\u2019s interest in not having his name disclosed. 17.  On 20 April 2009 the Vienna Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht) granted an appeal by the claimant, declared that the disclosure of his identity in the article had violated his rights and ordered the applicant company to pay him EUR 3,000 euros in compensation and to reimburse his procedural costs. 18.  The Court of Appeal found that the Regional Court\u2019s conclusion had been wrong after it had weighed the conflicting interests at issue. It shared the view of the Regional Court that there was a public interest in knowing who was responsible for Hypo Alpe-Adria Bank\u2019s losses due to the fact that the Land owned 50% of the bank. However, the article should have confined itself to mentioning the head of the bank\u2019s treasury department without disclosing his name. The public interest in reporting on the criminal offences at issue had not in itself been sufficient to justify disclosing the claimant\u2019s identity. The fact that the claimant had been answerable to the executive board, although he had an important position in the bank, and that the criminal proceedings against him had been at an early stage, meant that the claimant\u2019s interest in protecting his identity outweighed the public interest in the disclosure of his name. 19.  The applicant company lodged an application under Article 363a of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Strafproze\u00dfordnung) with the Supreme Court (Oberster Gerichtshof). It submitted in particular that the Vienna Court of Appeal\u2019s judgment had violated Article 10 of the Convention as there had been an overriding public interest in what it had reported, including the disclosure of Mr Rauscher\u2019s identity. 20.  On 17 March 2010 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant company\u2019s application. It examined in detail the reasons given by the Court of Appeal. Referring to the Court\u2019s findings in \u201cWirtschafts-Trend\u201d Zeitschriften-Verlagsgesellschaft mbH v. Austria (no. 2) ((dec.), no. 62746/00, 14 December 2002), the Supreme Court found that the appeal court had correctly weighed the conflicting interests of the claimant under Article 8 on the one hand and of the applicant company under Article 10 on the other, especially because of the early stage of the criminal proceedings against the claimant. 21.  The Supreme Court\u2019s judgment was served on the applicant company\u2019s counsel on 15 April 2010.", "references": ["2", "4", "5", "1", "3", "0", "7", "9", "8", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in C\u0103l\u0103ra\u0219i. 6.  On 26 October 2005 the applicant and her daughter drank water from taps in their apartment and shortly thereafter they felt unwell. On 29 October 2005 the applicant\u2019s daughter, who was twelve at the time, was admitted to hospital with a diagnosis of \u201cserious acute dysentery\u201d. The applicant was admitted to hospital with the same diagnosis on 31 October 2005. She was released from hospital on 13 November 2005, a day later than her daughter. 7.  The applicant lodged a court action against the local utilities provider (\u201cthe provider\u201d), a State-owned company, claiming 100,000 Moldovan lei (\u201cMDL\u201d, approximately 6,700 euros (EUR) at the time) in compensation for the harm caused to her health and for the related inconveniences, including subsequent investigations and disinfection. 8.  On 1 March 2006 the C\u0103l\u0103ra\u015fi District Court found in her favour. It found that various sanitary, medical and technical reports had established that in the vicinity of the applicant\u2019s apartment block the sewage pipe was situated above the drinking water pipe and was leaking. The water pipe had cracked on 26 October 2005 and sewage water had infiltrated the drinking water pipe. The court also established that the pipes had been used since 1977 and that their expected lifespan was fifteen years. A total of five people, all of whom had drunk water from taps connected to the same water pipe, had been admitted to hospital with the same diagnosis at approximately the same time as the applicant. Taking into consideration such elements as the amount of physical and mental suffering caused to the applicant and her daughter, the court awarded her MDL 10,000 (approximately EUR 648 at the time). 9.  The parties appealed. On 26 April 2006 the Chi\u015fin\u0103u Court of Appeal rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal and partly accepted the provider\u2019s appeal. It reduced the award to MDL 5,000 (EUR 310) because it found exaggerated \u201cboth the sum claimed by [the applicant] and that awarded to [her]\u201d. 10.  The parties appealed. On 25 October 2006 the Supreme Court of Justice upheld the judgment of 26 April 2006. It found that the lower court had taken into consideration the nature and seriousness of the mental suffering caused to the applicant, as well as the degree of guilt of the defendant. That judgment was final.", "references": ["8", "7", "2", "6", "1", "9", "5", "0", "3", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1960 in the Georgian SSR of the USSR. He had lived in Russia since 1995. On 23 November 2007 his Georgian nationality was revoked by a decree of the President of Georgia. 6.  In 1998, 2007 and 2009 the applicant was convicted of drug-related \noffences in Russia and given a custodial sentence. The most recent sentence was set to expire on 11 October 2012. 7.  On 8 October 2012 the Ministry of Justice issued a decision declaring that the applicant\u2019s presence in Russia would be undesirable upon his release (the \u201cexclusion order\u201d). 8.  On 11 October 2012 the Federal Migration Service (FMS) issued a deportation order against the applicant and asked the Abakan Town Court of the Khakassiya Republic to authorise the applicant\u2019s placement into the detention centre for aliens pending his deportation. On the same day the Town Court granted the request, holding that the applicant should remain in the centre \u201cuntil his deportation\u201d. 9.  On 1 November 2012 the Abakan Town Court, and on 16 January 2013 the Supreme Court of the Khakassiya Republic, confirmed the validity of the exclusion and deportation orders. On 8 April 2013 the applicant\u2019s request for leave to appeal was rejected. 10.  On 7 November 2012 the Supreme Court of the Khakassiya Republic heard the applicant\u2019s appeal against the decision on his placement in custody. The Supreme Court upheld the detention order but limited it in time until 31 December 2012. 11.  On 14 December 2012 the Abakan Town Court examined an application for an extension of the time-limit. Noting that the FMS had not yet received a response from the Georgian Interests Section as to the applicant\u2019s nationality, it extended the time-limit until 1 July 2013. 12.  The applicant filed an appeal. He submitted that, upon serving the sentence, he should have been given an opportunity to leave Russia of his own will but that had been refused to him. 13.  On 24 January 2013 the Supreme Court of the Khakassiya Republic rejected the appeal. It further held that the Town Court had erred in fixing a specific time-limit for the applicant\u2019s detention and that the applicant should remain in detention \u201cuntil his deportation\u201d. On 8 April 2013 the applicant\u2019s request for leave to appeal was rejected. 14.  On 1 March, 16 October and 23 November 2012 the FMS inquired the Georgian Interests Section at the Embassy of Switzerland in Moscow whether or not the applicant was a Georgian national. On 5 February 2013 the Georgian Interests Section replied that the applicant\u2019s Georgian nationality had been revoked by the President\u2019s decree on 23 November 2007. 15.  On 30 January and 19 February 2013 the applicant asked the FMS to consider his deportation to Turkey where he owned real estate and where he had lived between 2001 and 2005. On 27 February 2013 the FMS applied for assistance to the Consular Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). However, on 16 May 2013 the MFA explained that it was unable to issue laissez-passer documents to foreign nationals and referred the FMS to the Turkish Embassy in Moscow. 16.  In June 2013 the FMS established a working group on the applicant\u2019s deportation. On 1 July 2013 the group sent a request to the Turkish Embassy and also asked the Georgian Interests Section whether the President\u2019s decree revoking the applicant\u2019s Georgian nationality could be quashed in connection with the Georgian amnesty act of 13 January 2013. 17.  The applicant complained to a court about an excessive length of his detention. He submitted that he had been spent more than eight months in custody owing to the FMS\u2019s failure to act diligently in the deportation proceedings. On 26 July 2013 the Abakan Town Court agreed with the applicant\u2019s claim, noting that more than six months had lapsed between a first inquiry to the Georgian Interests Section about the applicant\u2019s nationality dated 1 March 2012 and the second inquiry dated 16 October 2012, that no information about any action by the FMS in the period between 27 February and 1 July 2013 had been submitted, and that a request to the Turkish Embassy had been sent more than forty-five days after receiving the MFA\u2019s explanation. The Town Court pronounced unlawful the FMS\u2019s failure to act but refused to fix a time-limit for the applicant\u2019s detention, referring to the Supreme Court\u2019s judgment of 24 January 2013 (see paragraph 13 above). 18.  In the meantime, Georgian counsel for the applicant\u2019s family challenged the President\u2019s decree revoking the applicant\u2019s Georgian nationality in the Tbilisi City Court. Hearings were held on 26 September and 11 and 22 October 2013. On 11 November 2013 the City Court granted the claim and set aside the decree. That decision was upheld on appeal on 10 January 2014. 19.  On 24 February 2014 the applicant obtained Georgian passport. On 3 March 2014 he was deported from Russia.", "references": ["8", "4", "3", "0", "7", "6", "5", "9", "1", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1958 and lives in Hamburg. 6.  On 26 August 2004 the Zagreb Municipal State Attorney\u2019s Office (Op\u0107insko dr\u017eavno odvjetni\u0161tvo u Zagrebu; hereinafter: the \u201cState Attorney\u2019s Office\u201d) indicted the applicant and another person in the Zagreb Municipal Criminal Court (Op\u0107inski kazneni sud u Zagrebu) on charges of aggravated fraud under Article 224 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 4 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 14 below). 7.  The applicant was tried in summary proceedings (skra\u0107eni postupak). On 11 February 2009 the Zagreb Municipal Criminal Court found the applicant and the other accused guilty as charged and sentenced the applicant to one year\u2019s imprisonment, suspended for four years. She was also ordered, jointly with the other accused, to pay damages to the victims in the total amount of 230,335.22 Croatian kunas (HRK; approximately 31,100 euros (EUR)). 8.  The applicant appealed against her conviction and sentence, challenging all legal and factual aspects of the case and asking that her conviction be quashed and a retrial ordered. She submitted, in particular, that she had not had fraudulent intentions, but had merely acted as an intermediary between the loan provider and the borrowers in order to earn commission for herself. Moreover, she stressed that the trial judge had erred in the factual findings and had failed to obtain certain evidence requested by her, which meant that some crucial facts had been left undetermined. She also asked that she and her defence lawyer be allowed to appear at the session of the appeal panel. 9.  On 20 January 2011 the Bjelovar County Court (\u017dupanijski sud u Bjelovaru), without informing the applicant or her lawyer, examined the case without holding a hearing. After examining all of the factual and legal issues of the case it dismissed the appeal and upheld the applicant\u2019s conviction and sentence. 10.  On 5 April 2011 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske), complaining of a lack of fairness of the criminal proceedings against her. She contended in particular that she had not been allowed to appear at the session of the appeal panel. 11.  On 29 September 2011 the Constitutional Court declared the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded.", "references": ["1", "8", "0", "5", "2", "7", "6", "4", "9", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1966 and 1985 respectively. They live in Perm, Russia. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.\n  The circumstances of the case 6.  In 1995 the first applicant moved to Russia from Tajikistan. In 1998 he was sentenced by the Dzerzhinsky District Court in Perm to eight years of imprisonment for drug trafficking. In 2011 that conviction was expunged. 7.  At some point after his arrival in Russia, the first applicant entered into a relationship with the second applicant. In 2006 the couple had a son and in 2009 they officially registered their marriage. There were two other children in the applicants\u2019 family from the second applicant\u2019s previous marriage. 8.  The documents submitted indicate that the first applicant lived in Russia on regularly extended temporary residence permits and was allowed to work. He was also involved with the Union of Tajiks in Russia (\u0421\u043e\u044e\u0437 \u0422\u0430\u0434\u0436\u0438\u043a\u043e\u0432 \u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0438), a public organisation promoting cultural ties between Tajikistan and Russia. 9.  On 13 May 2013 the first applicant left Russia to go to Tajikistan. On 21 May 2013 on his way back to Russia, at Yekaterinburg Koltsovo airport, he was informed that he was not allowed to re-enter the country. The written notice given to him stated that he was the subject of an exclusion order and of a re\u2011entry ban on the basis of section 27 \u00a7 1 of the Entry Procedure Act, that is to say \u201cfor the purposes of ensuring the defensive capacity or security of the State, or protecting public order or health\u201d. No indication of the length of the ban\u2019s duration, the authority responsible or any other information was given. 10.  After the first applicant had been refused admission to Russia, on various dates between May and November 2013 the second applicant sent requests to a number of executive authorities, including the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (\u0424\u0435\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u0430\u044f \u0441\u043b\u0443\u0436\u0431\u0430 \u0431\u0435\u0437\u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438 (\u0424\u0421\u0411)) (hereinafter \u201cthe FSS\u201d) and its department in the Perm Region (\u0424\u0435\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u0430\u044f \u0441\u043b\u0443\u0436\u0431\u0430 \u0431\u0435\u0437\u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438 \u043f\u043e \u041f\u0435\u0440\u043c\u0441\u043a\u043e\u043c\u0443 \u043a\u0440\u0430\u044e) (hereinafter \u201cthe Regional FSS\u201d), the Federal Border Service (\u041f\u043e\u0433\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0447\u043d\u0430\u044f \u0441\u043b\u0443\u0436\u0431\u0430), the Russian Ministry of the Interior (\u041c\u0438\u043d\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e \u0432\u043d\u0443\u0442\u0440\u0435\u043d\u043d\u0438\u0445 \u0434\u0435\u043b \u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0439\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u0424\u0435\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438) (\u041c\u0412\u0414)), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (\u041c\u0438\u043d\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e \u0438\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u0434\u0435\u043b \u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0439\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u0424\u0435\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438 (\u041c\u0418\u0414)), the Russian Drug Enforcement Agency (\u0424\u0435\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u0430\u044f \u0441\u043b\u0443\u0436\u0431\u0430 \u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0439\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u0424\u0435\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438 \u043f\u043e \u043a\u043e\u043d\u0442\u0440\u043e\u043b\u044e \u0437\u0430 \u043e\u0431\u043e\u0440\u043e\u0442\u043e\u043c \u043d\u0430\u0440\u043a\u043e\u0442\u0438\u043a\u043e\u0432 (\u0424\u0421\u041a\u041d)), and the Russian Federal Migration Service (\u0423\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0438 \u0424\u0435\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u043c\u0438\u0433\u0440\u0430\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u0441\u043b\u0443\u0436\u0431\u044b (\u0424\u041c\u0421)) (hereinafter \u201cthe FMS\u201d) and its Perm Region department (hereinafter \u201cthe Perm Region FMS\u201d) asking whether it had been they who had taken the decision for the first applicant to be excluded from Russia. In their replies the agencies either denied having provided the basis for the re-entry ban or refused to provide information. The applicants furnished the Court with copies of their information requests to the above agencies and their replies. 11.  In the absence of information concerning the basis for the exclusion and the executive authority responsible therefor, in December 2013 the applicants lodged a complaint with the Leninskiy District Court of Perm against the Perm Region FMS, alleging that it had taken the decision to exclude the first applicant for reasons unknown and stating that the first applicant\u2019s inability to enter Russia had disrupted their family life. By a decision of 20 February 2014 the Leninskiy District Court rejected the complaint, stating that the subject of the complaint should have been not the Perm Region FMS, but the Regional FSS. 12.  At the end of February 2014 the applicants lodged a complaint against the Regional FSS with the Dzerzhinsky District Court of Perm and requested that the exclusion order be quashed and the re-entry ban lifted. The Dzerzhinsky District Court forwarded the complaint to the Perm Regional Court (hereinafter \u201cthe Regional Court\u201d), as under domestic regulations regional courts were to examine cases involving State secrets. 13.  On 16 May 2014 the Regional Court examined the complaint in camera. Prior to that examination the second applicant and the applicants\u2019 counsel gave undertakings of confidentiality concerning the information examined in camera hearing. The Regional FSS provided the court with the case file concerning the first applicant. The file, which seemed to comprise about two hundred and forty pages, was reviewed by the judge within the space of a few minutes. Neither the second applicant nor the applicants\u2019 counsel was allowed to see the file\u2019s contents. 14.  The Regional FSS was represented at the hearing by its counsel. Another FSS officer, an operational search officer who had participated in operational measures against the first applicant, was called as a witness. According to the executive agency, the exclusion order and the re-entry ban had been imposed on the first applicant on the basis of a report drafted by the Regional FSS dated 7 September 2012 according to which the first applicant was a member of an extremist group and had incited ethnic tensions. The Regional FSS refused to specify which actions of the first applicant had served as the basis for the ban. When the applicants\u2019 counsel tried to question the FSS operational officer concerning the factual basis for the report of 7 September 2012, the latter refused (with the judge\u2019s approval) to answer. According to the second applicant, neither she nor her counsel was allowed access to any of the documents that had served as the basis for the exclusion order. 15.  On 16 May 2014 the Regional Court upheld the first applicant\u2019s exclusion and the re-entry ban, stating, inter alia, that according to the witness statement of the FSS operational search officer \u201cthe [first] applicant had been involved in activities threatening State security. This has been confirmed by the secret operational documents presented, which have been reviewed by the court and returned to the representative of the FSS\u201d. The court further stated that the decision to exclude the first applicant had been issued in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law and its reasoning had referred to the information submitted by the Regional FSS; therefore, it had been lawful. As to whether the imposition of the re-entry ban amounted to an interference with the right to family life, the court stated that interests of the society prevailed over the private interests of the [first] applicant. The court further stated that given the fact that the entry ban was valid at least until the end of 2014, the second applicant and her son could visit the first applicant in the summer of 2014 during the school holidays.\n(b)  Appeal to the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation 16.  The applicants lodged an appeal against the decision of 16 May 2014 with the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation (hereinafter \u201cthe Supreme Court\u201d) stating, inter alia, that (i) neither they nor their representative \u2013 despite having given an undertaking of confidentiality \u2013 had been told anything about the content of the information that had served as the basis for the exclusion and (ii) the court had taken into account the operational information furnished by the Regional FSS even though that evidence had not been formally submitted and should therefore not have been considered. The applicants further stated that the information furnished by the FSS did not give details of the nature of the first applicant\u2019s activity that had allegedly posed a risk to the national security. Finally, the applicants stated that the ban had disrupted their family life and that the Regional Court had failed to balance the interests at stake. 17.  On 23 July 2014 the Supreme Court upheld the decision of 16 May 2014, stating in general terms that the Regional Court had duly examined the legal basis for the exclusion, and that its decision had been lawful and had balanced public and private interests. 18.  As can be seen from the documents submitted it is unclear until what date the first applicant\u2019s re-entry ban shall remain in force. 19.  According to the Government, on 10 January 2015 the first applicant re-entered Russia. On 20 March 2015 the Perm Region FMS granted him a temporary residence permit, valid until 20 March 2018. The first applicant currently resides in Russia. 20.  On 13 January 2015 the Regional FSS lodged a claim for reimbursement of transportation and lodging expenses related to the examination of the appeal against the first applicant\u2019s exclusion order on 23 July 2014 by the Supreme Court in Moscow. The Regional Court examined the claim in camera and ruled that the first applicant was to reimburse the amount of 19,404 Russian roubles (RUB) (about 300 euros (EUR)), as claimed. On 4 April 2015 the applicants paid the above amount. 21.  As regards the Court\u2019s request in respect of the information and documents that had served as the basis for the first applicant\u2019s exclusion, the Government did not furnish any documents.", "references": ["8", "9", "3", "2", "1", "5", "6", "0", "7", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1980 and lives in Slavonski Brod. 6.  In response to a request from the police, on 26 November 2007 the State Attorney\u2019s Office for the Suppression of Corruption and Organised Crime (Ured za suzbijanje korupcije i organiziranog kriminaliteta) asked an investigating judge of the Zagreb County Court (\u017dupanijski sud u Zagrebu) to authorise the use of special investigative measures, namely tapping the telephone conversations of the applicant and several other individuals on the grounds of their suspected participation in organised drug trafficking, customs evasion, and the abuse of power and authority. 7.  On 27 November 2007 the investigating judge granted the request and issued an order for the use of secret surveillance measures. His statement of reasons read as follows:\n\u201cThe State Attorney\u2019s Office for the Suppression of Corruption and Organised Crime asked the investigating judge to authorise the use of phone tapping measures under Article 180 \u00a7 1 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure in respect of ... Damir Ba\u0161i\u0107 [and others] on the grounds that a preliminary [police] investigation suggested that these individuals were engaged in criminal activity involving the commission of offences under Articles 173 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 2, 298 \u00a7 2, 337 and 333 of the Criminal Code.\nHaving assessed the [State Attorney\u2019s] request, and in view of [the request from the police], it is established that there is probable cause for believing that the criminal offences have been committed and that the requisite investigation in the present case could not be carried out by any other means, or would be extremely difficult. In addition, given that the matter concerns the offences enumerated in Article 181 \u00a7 1 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the request has been granted and it was decided as indicated in the operative part of this order.\u201d 8.  In the course of the investigation, the investigating judge issued several further secret surveillance orders to the same effect. In addition to the phone tapping, the investigating judge also authorised the covert monitoring of the suspects. 9.  On the basis of the evidence obtained by the aforementioned use of secret surveillance measures, on 2 July 2008 the police lodged a criminal complaint against the applicant and five other persons with the Slavonski Brod County State Attorney\u2019s Office (\u017dupanijsko dr\u017eavno odvjetni\u0161tvo u Slavonskom Brodu) in connection with suspected drug trafficking and customs evasion. 10.  On the same day the applicant was brought before an investigating judge of the Slavonski Brod County Court (\u017dupanijski sud u Slavonskom Brodu), who questioned him in connection with the charges brought against him. The applicant decided to remain silent and not give any evidence. 11.  On 4 July 2008 the investigating judge opened an investigation in respect of the applicant and the other suspects in connection with suspected drug trafficking. She also ordered the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention. 12.  After the completion of the investigation, on 25 November 2008 the Slavonski Brod County State Attorney\u2019s Office indicted the applicant and four other persons in the Slavonski Brod County Court on charges of drug trafficking. 13.  On 12 June 2009 the applicant asked the Slavonski Brod County Court to exclude from the proceedings the evidence obtained by means of secret surveillance as being unlawfully obtained. He argued that the secret surveillance had been carried out on the basis of orders which had been issued contrary to the relevant domestic law and practice of the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) in that they contained no reasoning justifying the use of secret surveillance. 14.  At a hearing on 18 June 2009 the Slavonski Brod County Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s request as unfounded. At the same hearing the applicant pleaded not guilty to the charges held against him, whereas three other defendants pleaded guilty. The trial bench heard several witnesses and an expert witness and examined the reports in the case file. 15.  A further hearing was held on 29 September 2009 at which the applicant reiterated his request for the exclusion of the evidence obtained by secret surveillance as being unlawfully obtained. The applicant further contended that his exact location at the moment of the alleged commission of the offence at issue should be established by obtaining the location tracking data of the mobile phone which he had allegedly used. 16.  The trial bench dismissed the applicant\u2019s request as unfounded and decided to continue with the examination of evidence. It heard two witnesses and an expert witness and adjourned the proceedings in order for the defence to obtain copies of the secret surveillance recordings. 17.  At a hearing on 26 November 2009 the applicant argued that a list of incoming and outgoing calls for the mobile phones allegedly used by the defendants should be obtained in order to clarify all the circumstances of the case. The trial bench dismissed his request as unfounded and proceeded with the examination of the secret surveillance audio recordings. The defence did not have particular objections to the recordings but they expressed doubts as to the identification of one of the speakers as one of the applicant\u2019s co-accused. 18.  At a hearing on 14 December 2009 the trial bench heard further secret surveillance audio recordings. The defence had no particular objections to the recordings but requested that some additional evidence and recordings be examined at the trial. 19.  Further hearings were held on 2 and 19 February 2010 at which the trial bench examined the secret surveillance recordings. The applicant reiterated his request for an expert telecommunications report to establish the location of his mobile phone at the moment of the alleged offence. The defence also challenged the credibility of a police report concerning the applicant\u2019s surveillance, expressing doubts as to the reasons why there were no recordings accompanying that report. In this connection the trial bench heard evidence from the police officer in charge of the operation, Z.H., who explained that no recordings had been made for fear that, in the circumstances, the suspects might have noticed that they were being followed. The trial bench also heard evidence from another police officer, B.V., who explained the method of identifying the mobile phones used by the defendants. Following B.V.\u2019s questioning, the trial bench dismissed all further requests for the examination of evidence and adjourned the hearing for the preparation of the defendants\u2019 closing statements. 20.  On 26 February 2010 the trial bench heard the parties\u2019 closing arguments. 21.  By a judgment of 1 March 2010 the Slavonski Brod County Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to five years\u2019 imprisonment. As to the applicant\u2019s arguments concerning the alleged unlawfulness of the secret surveillance orders, that court held that the orders had outlined reasons for believing that the applicant had probably participated in the commission of the offence at issue and that the investigation could not have been conducted by other means. 22.  The Slavonski Brod County Court further held that all doubts on the part of the defence as to the accuracy of the recordings had been clarified by questioning the police officers, who had explained the manner in which the recordings had been obtained and documented. It also found that the available police reports on covert monitoring provided sufficient information as to the defendant\u2019s location at the moment of the commission of the offence and that there was therefore no need to obtain further evidence, such as mobile phone location data, in that respect. It therefore dismissed the applicant\u2019s objections to the use of the evidence obtained by secret surveillance and proceeded with its detailed assessment when determining the applicant\u2019s guilt. 23.  On 21 April and 6 July 2010, relying on the case-law of the Constitutional Court \u2012 according to which secret surveillance orders needed to be properly reasoned in order to satisfy the requirement of lawfulness under the relevant domestic law \u2012 the applicant lodged an appeal against the first-instance judgment with the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske). He also complained about the use of the evidence thereby obtained in securing his conviction. 24.  On 21 September 2010 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld the first-instance judgment. It stressed in particular that the alleged lack of reasoning justifying the secret surveillance orders could not result in the unlawfulness of the evidence obtained by the use of such secret surveillance. It also held that all the relevant circumstances of the case had been properly established by the first-instance court and that the applicant\u2019s conviction had been based on a proper and convincing assessment of evidence and the relevant facts. 25.  On 23 November 2010 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court complaining that his right to respect for private life and confidentiality of correspondence, as guaranteed under Articles 35 and 36 \u00a7 1 of the Constitution, had been breached by the unlawful and unjustified secret surveillance, and that his right to a fair trial under Article 29 of the Constitution had been breached by the use of the evidence thereby obtained in the criminal proceedings against him. 26.  On 11 July 2012 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint as unfounded, endorsing the reasoning of the Supreme Court. It considered in particular that the criminal proceedings against the applicant, taken as a whole, had not been unfair. The decision of the Constitutional Court was served on the applicant on 11 September 2012.", "references": ["8", "1", "9", "0", "7", "6", "2", "3", "5", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1982, 1967 and 1978 respectively and live in Podgorica. 6.  The applicants were employees of the USA Embassy (\u201cthe Embassy\u201d) in Montenegro. The first applicant worked as a protocol specialist/translator, and the second and third applicants as security guards. All the applicants were local staff. 7.  The employment contract between the locally employed staff and the Embassy provided, inter alia, as follows:\n\u201c3. Services to be Performed. The employee agrees to perform all the duties set forth in the Position Description in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth herein.\n[...] 12. Disputes. All disputes between the employee and the Government arising out of this agreement shall be decided by the Management Officer or, in the absence thereof, the designee of the Management Officer, provided that the employee shall have the right to appeal in writing within thirty (30) days of receipt of notice of any such decision to the Chief of Mission [at the American Embassy Podgorica].\u201d 8.  The first applicant\u2019s main duties and responsibilities were related to assisting in organising official receptions, lunches and dinners; questions relevant to protocol and local practices and customs; maintaining a contact database; drafting correspondence in English and Montenegrin; interpreting and translating documents, articles and incoming correspondence; arranging official calls; ensuring press coverage of ceremonial events; organising official visits and serving as a contact person between the front desk and the host country officials. 9.  The second and third applicants\u2019 main duties and responsibilities were continuous surveillance of an area around their fixed posts for security hazards; checking ID cards, screening visitors and vehicles, and controlling parking; recognising emergencies and unusual incidents, and acting accordingly. They could occasionally be required to work at other locations and for special functions such as VIP visits, receptions and dinners at the Principal Officer\u2019s Residence. 10.  Between 14 February 2009 and 28 June 2012 the applicants were informed by the Embassy that they were dismissed. 11.  On 26 July 2010 the Court of First Instance (Osnovni sud) in Podgorica, apparently upon the third applicant\u2019s claim to that effect, quashed the decision on his dismissal and ordered his reinstatement. It would appear that on an unspecified date thereafter this decision became final. 12.  Between 22 November 2010 and 26 July 2012 the applicants instituted separate civil proceedings against the Embassy. All the applicants claimed compensation: the first applicant sought compensation for non-pecuniary damage caused by the wrongful dismissal, and the second and third applicants claimed compensation for loss of earnings. The first and second applicants, in addition, sought reinstatement. 13.  On 26 May 2011 the Court of First Instance in Podgorica declared that it lacked competence to deal with the first applicant\u2019s claim and rejected it (tu\u017eba [se] odbacuje), which decision was upheld by the High Court on 21 June 2011. On 4 October 2011 the Supreme Court quashed these decisions. Relying on section 29 of the Civil Procedure Act, section 2 (1) of the Labour Act and section 46 of the Resolution of Conflict of Laws and Regulations of other States Act (see paragraphs 30, 33 and 35 below), the Supreme Court considered that the Montenegrin courts had jurisdiction to examine the merits of the first applicant\u2019s claim. 14.  Between 8 September 2011 and 24 September 2012 the Court of First Instance in Podgorica declared that it lacked competence to deal with the applicants\u2019 claims (in a re-trial in respect of the first applicant) and rejected them. In substance, the court considered that the respondent State had immunity provided for by international law, and therefore could not be subjected to the jurisdiction of another State\u2019s court. In rejecting the first applicant\u2019s claim the court further held that granting immunity to the respondent State could not be considered a restriction on access to court, as provided in Article 6 of the Convention. While the court acknowledged that in international and comparative law there were restrictions on State immunity in respect of employment-related disputes, it also held that recruitment (pitanja u vezi sa zapo\u0161ljavanjem) in a foreign diplomatic mission or an embassy was an issue which could be \u201cvery sensitive or of a confidential nature\u201d and might relate to the diplomatic and organisational policy of a foreign State. In ruling upon the second and third applicants\u2019 claims, the Court of First Instance relied also on the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, which provided that the function of Embassies was to represent foreign States, and held that therefore the jurisdiction of the domestic courts was excluded. The court also relied on Article 22 of the Vienna Convention, which provided for the inviolability of the premises of Embassies. 15.  On various dates thereafter the applicants appealed. The first applicant submitted, inter alia, that by examining the merits of her claim the courts would not interfere with the other party\u2019s sovereignty. She also submitted that the Court of First Instance had to examine the claim on the merits pursuant to the decision of the Supreme Court of 4 October 2011 and relied on section 415 of the Civil Procedure Act (see paragraph 32 below). 16.  Between 20 November 2011 and 6 December 2012 the High Court upheld the first-instance decisions, in substance endorsing their reasoning. The High Court further held, upon the first applicant\u2019s appeal, that a violation of sections 367 (1) and 415 of the Civil Procedure Code (see paragraphs 31 and 32 below) by the first-instance court did not render the first-instance decision unlawful, in particular as it was undisputed that the respondent party had its seat in another State and only a diplomatic representation in Montenegro. In ruling upon the second applicant\u2019s claim it held that the jurisdiction of the domestic courts was not explicitly provided for either by the law or an international agreement. 17.  Between 1 November 2012 and 10 May 2013, ruling upon the applicants\u2019 appeals on points of law, the Supreme Court upheld the previous decisions on the grounds that the respondent party was a foreign State with its own legal personality and the domestic courts had no competence to rule upon the applicants\u2019 claims. The court relied on section 29 of the Civil Procedure Act, section 46 of the Resolution of Conflict of Laws and Regulations of other States Act, and Article 3 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. In ruling upon the third applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law the Supreme Court also held, inter alia, that granting immunity to a foreign State in civil proceedings pursued a legitimate aim of complying with international law and encouraging good diplomatic relations between States, and that it could not be considered as a restriction on access to court in violation of Article 6 of the Convention. 18.  Between 10 January 2013 and 12 July 2013 the applicants lodged separate constitutional appeals. On 18 November 2015 the Constitutional Court dismissed the first and third applicants\u2019 constitutional appeals, while the second applicant\u2019s constitutional appeal would appear to be still pending. The Constitutional Court held that there had been no violation of Article 6 of the Convention as the decisions had been issued by tribunals established by law, which had acted within their competence, and which had given clear reasons for their decisions. There was therefore no arbitrariness in the courts\u2019 rulings. In ruling upon the third applicant\u2019s constitutional appeal the Constitutional Court in addition held that pursuant to the case-law of the Court and the Constitutional Court \u201cit [was] not the task of these courts to examine the conclusions of the regular courts in respect of the substantive law application, except in cases where [...] procedural rights were violated ([such as ...], the right of access to court) [...]\u201d. However, it did not go into any analysis about the third applicant\u2019s right of access to court.", "references": ["6", "7", "4", "8", "2", "0", "1", "5", "9", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1985 and lives in the Tula Region. 5.  In the late evening of 28 October 2005 the applicant paid a visit to his friend Ch. who worked as a guard at a parking lot. On 29 October 2005 at 3 a.m. Ch., while making a round of the parking lot, discovered N. who was severely beaten up and was lying on the ground. Ch. called the police and the ambulance. The ambulance doctor K., when arrived, pronounced N. dead. 6.  On 2 November 2005 the prosecutor\u2019s office opened an investigation into N.\u2019s death. On several occasions it was suspended due to the investigator\u2019s failure to identify the perpetrator. Both the applicant and Ch. were questioned as witnesses. 7.  On 29 June 2006 the investigator questioned Kuv. who submitted that in December 2005 Ch. had told him about the events of 28-29 October 2006 implicating the applicant in N.\u2019s death. According to Kuv., the applicant\u2019s family had put pressure on him in order to make him recant. He was then granted anonymity and referred to in the case-files materials as S.N. 8.  On 25 July 2006 the prosecutor questioned Ch. granting him anonymity. According to Ch., on 29 October 2005 N. showed up at the guard\u2019s shack. He wanted to take a shortcut through the parking lot. Ch. refused to open the gate. The applicant swore at N. saying that he would show N. the way out and would beat him up. The applicant left together with N. Then he returned and told Ch. that he had beaten N. on the stairs and that N. had fallen down. According to the applicant, he had overdone with the beatings. Ch. went to look at N. who was still alive. It took Ch. some time to call the ambulance. The applicant asked him to keep the incident secret. 9.  On the same day the applicant was arrested on suspicion of manslaughter. He remained in custody pending investigation. On an unspecified date he was charged with murder 10.  On 31 August 2006 the Proletarskiy District Court of Tula opened the trial. The applicant pleaded not guilty. The trial judge questioned the applicant\u2019s mother S. who submitted that Ch. had told her that policemen had threatened him to make him testify against the applicant. Ch.\u2019s anonymity was lifted and he also testified in court. He confirmed that he had falsely accused the applicant due to the pressure put on him by policemen. 11.  On 11 September 2006 the prosecutor asked the court to question S.N. in the conditions excluding visual observation of the witness to the parties to the proceedings. He further explained that the decision to grant anonymity to the said witness had been taken in the course of the preliminary investigation of the case in order to ensure his safety and security of person. The trial judge left the courtroom and questioned S.N. in the presence of the trial secretary in a separate room. S.N. reiterated his earlier statement made to the police which was similar with Ch.\u2019s testimony. Then the judge and the secretary returned to the courtroom where the judge read out S.N.\u2019s testimony. The prosecutor, the applicant and his lawyer were allowed to put questions to the witness through the trial secretary. In response to the questions put by the applicant\u2019s lawyer, S.N. explained he had fear of the applicant\u2019s relatives who put pressure on him. 12.  On 29 September 2006 the court heard I., a friend of the applicant and Ch. She submitted that she had been in the guard\u2019s shack with Ch. on 28 October 2005. When N. had showed up, the applicant had not been there yet. 13.  The trial judge also heard, upon the applicant\u2019s request, L. and Naz., the applicant\u2019s relatives, and D., Ch.\u2019s mother, who claimed that Ch. had told them about the police putting pressure on him. 14.  The other witnesses who testified during the trial were (1) R., Sv. and Z., who had seen N. on 28 October 2005 and confirmed that he had been in an inebriated state on that day, (2) K., the ambulance doctor who had pronounced N. dead and (3) police officer Yu., who had questioned Ch. in the course of investigation. The court also reviewed the crime scene investigation report and the forensic medical report which indicated that N.\u2019s death resulted from a cranio-cerebral injury. 15.  On 31 January 2007 the District Court found the applicant guilty of manslaughter and sentenced him to six years\u2019 imprisonment. The court based its findings on Ch.\u2019s testimony given by him as an anonymous witness in the course of the investigation. As regards Ch.\u2019s testimony during the trial, the court considered it unreliable, in view of Ch.\u2019s friendship with the applicant. The court took also into account the fact that the inquiry conducted by the prosecutor\u2019s office in this connection found no case to answer against the policemen who had allegedly put pressure on Ch. It further relied on N.S.\u2019s testimony. The court did not consider D., I., L., Naz. and S. as credible witnesses due to them being the applicant\u2019s relatives or friends. 16.  On 30 May 2007 the Tula Regional Court upheld the applicant\u2019s conviction on appeal.", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "5", "8", "6", "3", "7", "2", "9", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicants are a family who lived in Yerevan in a house on a plot of land measuring 1,385.6 sq. m. in total and situated at 13 Byuzand Street. The second and third applicants are the first applicant\u2019s wife and son. 7.  On an unspecified date the first applicant lodged a request with the Spandaryan District People\u2019s Court of Yerevan seeking to invalidate an agreement concluded in 1933 between his grandparents and a state agency according to which their house, comprising the house itself and the plot of land, was transferred to that state agency. He thus sought recognition of his ownership rights for the above-mentioned house and the plot of land. 8.  On 19 August 1994 the Spandaryan District Court granted the claim by annulling the above agreement and recognising the applicant as the owner of the house and the plot of land. No appeal was made against this judgment and it became final. 9.  It appears that on 3 November 1994 an ownership certificate for the house and the plot of land was issued to the applicant by virtue of the judgment of 19 August 1994. 10.  Upon application by the First Deputy to the President of the Supreme Court, on 9 February 1995 the Civil Panel of the Supreme Court quashed the judgment of 19 August 1994. 11.  On 8 December 1995 the first applicant lodged a claim with the Civil Panel of the Supreme Court seeking recognition of his inheritance and ownership rights in respect of the house situated at 13 Byuzand Street. In the concluding part of the claim, the first applicant mentioned that he sought recognition of his inheritance rights both in respect of the house and the plot of land. 12.  On 11 December 1995 the Civil Panel of the Supreme Court of Armenia examined the first applicant\u2019s claim and decided to dismiss it. 13.  On 22 September 1997 the Presidium of the Supreme Court quashed the judgment of 11 December 1995 and decided to grant the claim. 14.  On 29 December 1998 the Plenary Session of the Court of Cassation (the highest judicial instance established by the Constitution of 1995 and functioning since 10 July 1998) examined the decision of 22 September 1997 upon a supervisory appeal lodged by the General Prosecutor\u2019s Office and decided to leave it in force. 15.  It appears that the first applicant was given a new ownership certificate in respect of the house and the plot of land which mentioned the decision of 22 September 1997 as a ground for the ownership right. 16.  On an unspecified date the first applicant lodged a claim against third persons who owned two small premises situated on his plot of land. 17.  On 18 July 2000 the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan granted the first applicant\u2019s claim. In particular, it found that the applicant\u2019s ownership right to the plot of land situated at 13 Byuzand Street had been restored by the decision of of the Presidium of the Supreme Court of 22 September 1997, therefore any premises situated on it had to be recognised as being under his ownership as well. 18.  On 1 August 2002 the Government adopted Decree no. 1151-N, approving the expropriation zones of the real estate situated within the administrative boundaries of the Kentron District of Yerevan to be taken for State needs, having a total area of 345,000 sq. m. Byuzand Street was listed as one of the streets falling within such expropriation zones. A special body, the Yerevan Construction and Investment Project Implementation Agency (hereafter, \u201cthe Agency\u201d) was set up to manage the implementation of the construction projects. 19.  On 17 June 2004 the Government decided to contract out the construction of one of the sections of Byuzand Street to a private company, Vizkon Ltd. The latter was authorised to negotiate directly with the owners regarding the property subject to expropriation and, should such negotiations fail, to institute court proceedings on behalf of the State seeking forcible expropriation of such property. It appears that on 8 December 2004 Vizkon Ltd reached an agreement with Tosp Ltd, a valuation agency, for the latter to carry out a valuation of the immovable property situated at 13 Byuzand Street. 20.  On 19 May 2005 Tosp Ltd carried out a valuation, according to which the market value of the applicants\u2019 house was 54,494,000 Armenian Drams (AMD), while that of the plot of land was AMD 276,230,000. 21.  On 15 April 2005 the Agency held a meeting of its governing board, which included representatives of the Government, the State Real Estate Registry (the SRER), the Ministry of Finance and Economy, the Mayor\u2019s Office and the Police Department, at which it was decided to issue a new type of ownership certificate to the first applicant for the house and the plot of land situated at 13 Byuzand Street. 22.  On 13 May 2005 a new ownership certificate for the house and the plot of land was issued to the first applicant. As a ground for registration of the ownership right, it mentioned the judgment of the Spandaryan District People\u2019s Court of Yerevan of 19 August 1994, the decision of the Presidium of the Supreme Court of 22 September 1997, the decision of the Plenary Session of the Court of Cassation of 29 December 1998 and the judgment of the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan of 18 July 2000. 23.  On 22 November 2005 Vizkon Ltd lodged a claim on behalf of the Mayor of Yerevan against the SRER, seeking to invalidate the registration of the first applicant\u2019s ownership of the plot of land, claiming that it had never been recognised by any judicial act. It also requested that the first applicant be involved in the proceedings, as a third person whose rights were affected by the claim. 24.  On 13 January 2006 the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan granted the claim, finding that the first applicant\u2019s ownership of the plot of land had never been recognised by a judicial act. 25.  On 24 January 2006 the first applicant lodged an appeal against this judgment. 26.  On 27 February 2006 the Court of Appeal dismissed the claim as unsubstantiated. In particular, it found that the first applicant\u2019s right to the plot of land had been recognised by the decision of the Presidium of the Supreme Court of 22 September 1997 and the judgment of the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of 18 July 2000. 27.  On an unspecified date, Vizkon Ltd lodged an appeal on points of law against this judgment. 28.  On an unspecified date, the rapporteur, Judge H. of the Court of Cassation, presented to the first applicant an agreement of a friendly settlement with the Agency, Vizkon Ltd and the SRER. According to the proposal, the first applicant was to receive USD 390,000, a flat measuring 160 sq. m. and office premises measuring 40 sq. m. in the centre of Yerevan in exchange for his revocation of ownership of the house and the plot of land. 29.  On 19 April 2006 the applicant sent a reply to the judge informing her of his refusal to sign a friendly settlement. 30.  On 21 April 2006 the Court of Cassation held a hearing of the appeal with the participation of the parties. Having heard that the first applicant had refused to sign a friendly settlement with the Government, the Chairman of the Civil Chamber of the Court of Cassation, Judge M., who ex officio presided over the examination of the appeal, stated:\n\u201cEach party should come to a solution through compromise... If we continue dragging out this dispute, we will celebrate its hundredth anniversary... Name the day and the hour when it is convenient for you to come and express all your ideas in the presence of the parties before Judge H...but try to have an efficient discussion before Judge H. ... you have a lot of time until [then]. Have a meeting and a discussion, and try to find common points in the friendly settlement so that your discussion is efficient.\u201d\nWith this, Judge M. closed the hearing. 31.  On 5 May 2006 the Court of Cassation held another hearing of the appeal. On learning that the first applicant still refused to sign a friendly settlement, Judge M. stated:\n\u201cYou have many times participated in the Chamber hearings and must have noticed that the Chamber always attaches importance to the fact of which party has refused to sign a reasonable friendly settlement. So this is the last time that we, the Chamber, give you an opportunity until the next hearing ... to discuss once more [the friendly settlement] issues and submit your reply to ... [Judge] H.\u201d\nWith this, Judge M. closed the hearing. 32.  It appears that the first applicant persisted in his reluctance to sign a friendly settlement. 33.  On 28 July 2006 the Civil and Economic Chamber of the Court of Cassation, composed of Judge M., president, and Judges H., G. and A., quashed the judgment of 27 February 2006 and remitted the case for a fresh examination. The relevant parts of this decision read as follows:\n\u201c...It follows from the examination of [the relevant court decisions] that no ownership right of [the first applicant] had ever been recognised in respect of any plot of land, therefore there are no legal grounds for the registration of [the first applicant\u2019s] ownership to the land.\n...\nIn these circumstances, the arguments with regard to the violations of the substantive and procedural law raised in the appeal on points of law are substantiated since the above-mentioned court decisions have not recognised [the first applicant\u2019s] ownership right to any plot of land, therefore there are no legal grounds for the registration of [the first applicant\u2019s] title. Moreover, [the first applicant\u2019s] title had been registered in respect of State-owned land without any legal basis.\u201d 34.  On 15 September 2006 the Civil Court of Appeal examined the claim anew and granted it, finding that the first applicant\u2019s ownership right to the plot of land had not been recognised. In particular, it held:\n\u201c... it follows from the examination of [the relevant court decisions] that no ownership right of [the first applicant] had ever been recognised in respect of any plot of land ... Therefore, [the first applicant\u2019s] ownership right in respect of the State\u2011owned plot of land was registered without any legal ground.\u201d 35.  On 12 February 2007 the first applicant lodged an appeal on points of law against this judgment arguing, inter alia, that the Court of Appeal had not been independent and impartial since it had been bound by the findings of the Court of Cassation expressed in the decision of 28 July 2006. 36.  On 2 March 2007 the Court of Cassation declared the appeal inadmissible for lack of merit. 37.  On 25 December 2005 Vizkon Ltd informed the first applicant that the house he owned was situated within an alienation zone. It also informed him that his house had been valued by a licensed valuation organisation at AMD 54,494,000 and offered him, as the owner, this sum as compensation for alienation. An additional sum would be paid to him as a financial incentive in accordance with Government Decree no. 759-N of 19 May 2005, if he agreed to sign an agreement and to hand over the property within one month. 38.  It appears that the first applicant did not accept the offer. 39.  On 26 January 2006 the Yerevan Mayor\u2019s Office instituted proceedings against the first applicant, seeking to terminate his ownership of the house by paying him compensation and to have him evicted. Vizkon Ltd also joined these proceedings as a third party. 40.  On 18 April 2006 the Constitutional Court declared, inter alia, Government Decree no. 1151-N of 1 August 2002 and Article 218 of the Civil Code (the CC) to be unconstitutional, but decided that the impugned legal provisions had to remain effective until a law establishing a legal regime for expropriation was adopted but that, in any event, the latest date on which they would lose their legal force was 1 October 2006. 41.  On 22 August 2006 the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan examined the claim in the presence of the first applicant and a representative of the Mayor\u2019s Office. The District Court decided to grant the claim, awarding the first applicant 54,494,000 Armenian drams and ordering his eviction. The District Court based its findings on Articles 218\u2011221 and 283 of the Civil Code. 42.  On 4 September 2006 the first applicant lodged an appeal, which was scheduled to be examined by the Civil Court of Appeal on 25 September 2006. 43.  During the night of 24 to 25 September 2006 the first applicant felt unwell and was taken by ambulance to hospital, where he was diagnosed with impaired cardiac function. 44.  On 25 September 2006, before the beginning of the hearing, the Court of Appeal received a written request lodged by the first applicant seeking adjournment of the hearing because of his health problems. It appears that a hospital certificate stating that he was in hospital was attached to the request. 45.  On 25 September 2006 the Court of Appeal held a hearing in the absence of the first applicant and his representative but in the presence of representatives of the Mayor\u2019s Office and Vizkon Ltd, who made their submissions in relation to the first applicant\u2019s appeal, asking that it be rejected. As regards the first applicant\u2019s request to reschedule the hearing, according to the record of the hearing, the Court of Appeal refused to adjourn it on the ground that the first applicant had a representative who had participated in the proceedings before the District Court. By the judgment adopted on the same date the Court of Appeal upheld the judgment of 22 August 2006 confirming the amount awarded by the District Court. The judgment stated that the first applicant had failed to appear despite having been duly summoned to the hearing. 46.  On 2 October 2006 the first applicant, having undergone medical treatment, was discharged from the hospital. 47.  On 20 December 2006 the first applicant lodged an appeal on points of law against the judgment of 25 September 2006. 48.  On 16 January 2007 the Court of Cassation declared the first applicant\u2019s appeal inadmissible for lack of merit. 49.  The judgment of the Court of Appeal of 25 September 2006 entered into force at the time of its delivery and was immediately enforceable. 50.  In May 2007 the first applicant sought to terminate the enforcement proceedings in respect of the judgment of 25 September 2006 with reliance on the Constitutional Court\u2019s Decision of 18 April 2006, which had found Governmental Decree no. 1151-N and Article 218 of the CC incompatible with the Constitution. 51.  On 11 June 2007 the Department for Execution of Judicial Acts enforced the judgment by demolishing the house. 52.  On 6 July 2007 the Court of Appeal dismissed the first applicant\u2019s application, finding that on 11 June 2007 the judgment had been enforced and the enforcement proceedings had been terminated. 53.  On 18 May 2007 the second and third applicants lodged an appeal with the Court of Cassation against the judgment of the Court of Appeal of 25 September 2006 alleging that they had learned of the house expropriation proceedings against the first applicant only on 19 February 2007. In the appeal, the second and third applicants argued that they enjoyed the right of use of accommodation in respect of the first applicant\u2019s house, therefore the expropriation proceedings also affected their proprietary rights. They thus claimed that the authorities had failed to make them parties to these proceedings and that the alleged deprivation of their property was not lawful and in the public interest. 54.  On 24 July 2007 the Court of Cassation declared the appeal of 18 May 2007 inadmissible for lack of merit finding, inter alia, that the second and third applicants\u2019 rights were not affected as the first applicant was the sole owner of the house in question.", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "6", "8", "5", "7", "4", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
+{"input": "5.  On 7 October 2000 S.M. was stabbed by two persons during an event in a caf\u00e9 in the town of Kostanay, Kazakhstan. He died on the way to hospital. 6.  The following day the authorities of Kazakhstan started an investigation into the incident, the applicant and his friend, B.M., being the main suspects. 7.  A number of eyewitnesses were questioned. In particular, witness Kh.H., the owner of the caf\u00e9, stated that he had seen the applicant and B.M. having a conversation with the victim and his nephew, G.T. At the time of the incident he had been outside the caf\u00e9 and went back in when he heard the noise. Thereafter he learnt from those present that B.M. and the applicant had stabbed the victim and escaped.\nWitness K.H., Kh.H.\u2019s son, stated that he had been in the kitchen when he heard the noise and came out into the hall. He then saw the applicant with a knife in his hands going towards the victim.\nWitness G.T. stated that he had been with his uncle, the victim, in the caf\u00e9 and had witnessed the applicant and B.M. stabbing him.\nWitness O.D., the cook who worked in the caf\u00e9 at the relevant time, stated that she had seen the applicant and B.M. having an argument with the victim and stabbing him, after which both of them had fled.\nWitness V.H., Kh.H.\u2019s brother, who had also been in the caf\u00e9 that night, stated that he had seen B.M. and the victim having an argument, after which the former had stabbed the victim, and then the applicant had also stabbed him.\nWitness G.A. submitted that he had been in the caf\u00e9 with his wife on the day of the incident and had witnessed B.M. and the applicant attacking the victim and that he had seen a knife in the applicant\u2019s hands.\nA number of other persons, namely A.O. and A.G., singers, V.K. and E.B., guests, and L.T., the camera person in charge of filming the event, were also questioned. These witnesses did not provide any concrete details or mention any names and stated that they had either been far away from those fighting or for some other reason had not seen exactly what happened. Witness L.T. had recognised the applicant in a photograph shown to him during the investigation. 8.  On 21 January 2004 the investigative authorities of Kazakhstan brought charges against the applicant and his detention was ordered. Since his whereabouts were unknown, a search was initiated for him. 9.  On 5 November 2004 the applicant was arrested in Armenia. 10.  In May 2005 the applicant was released after no agreement was reached between the law enforcement authorities of Armenia and Kazakhstan as regards his extradition. 11.  On 29 May 2006 the Kostanay Regional Court found B.M. guilty of murder and sentenced him to seventeen years\u2019 imprisonment. 12.  As regards the applicant, the case was sent to Armenia for him to be prosecuted in his country of nationality. 13.  On 8 July 2008 the Vagharshapat Police investigation unit took over the case and the charges against the applicant were brought into conformity with the relevant provisions of the Criminal Code of Armenia. The applicant was charged with premeditated murder. 14.  On 21 August 2008 the applicant was arrested. He was questioned on the same day and refused to make any statement in respect of the events of 7 October 2000. 15.  In the course of the investigation the applicant requested a confrontation with witnesses V.H., G.A., G.T., K.H., L.T. and O.D. The investigator dismissed his motion on the ground that both in the course of the investigation and at B.M.\u2019s trial those witnesses had reinstated their statements against him. 16.  On 20 October 2008 the case file, including the finalised indictment, was transmitted to the Southern Criminal Court (one of the first instance criminal courts before the relevant amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure) to be set down for trial. 17.  On an unspecified date the applicant\u2019s lawyer filed a motion seeking to remit the case for further investigation on the ground that, inter alia, it was necessary to carry out several confrontations given that there were substantial contradictions between the applicant\u2019s statements and the statements of witnesses V.H., G.A., G.T., K.H., L.T. and O. D. It appears that the Southern Criminal Court never examined this request. 18.  Following the amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure the case was taken over by the Armavir Regional Court. 19.  According to the applicant, the eleven witnesses residing in Kazakhstan (see paragraph 7 above), who had made statements against him, were not properly summoned and the Regional Court did not obtain any proof that they had been notified about the trial. The applicant further claimed that at the preparatory hearing the victim\u2019s legal heir, S.M.\u2019s wife, had submitted declarations from five out of the eleven witnesses stating their reasons for being unable to attend the hearings. The declarations, drafted in Russian, were not properly examined by the Regional Court but were included in the case file and it was decided to continue the examination of the case in the absence of all the witnesses. 20.  The Government argued that all eleven witnesses were properly summoned to the applicant\u2019s trial. However, it had not been possible to locate all of them, while eight of the witnesses submitted to the trial court declarations certified by a notary in Kazakhstan stating their inability to attend the trial for financial, family or work-related issues. 21.  The applicant pleaded not guilty at the trial and contested the veracity of the statements of the witnesses made during the investigation of the case in Kazakhstan. 22.  The victim\u2019s legal heir testified before the trial court that on 7 October 2000 her husband, S.M., had attended an event in the caf\u00e9 together with G.T. She had then been told by relatives that her husband had been stabbed during a fight. 23.  At the hearing of 26 May 2009 the applicant filed a motion seeking to have examined in court the video recordings from the crime scene included in the case file. He claimed that it was necessary to identify other witnesses of the incident and clarify the colour of his outerwear on the day of the crime. The Regional Court dismissed this motion. 24.  On 19 June 2009 the Regional Court convicted the applicant of murder and sentenced him to fourteen years\u2019 imprisonment. In doing so, the Regional Court stated, in particular, the following:\n\u201cThe Court, taking into account and having assessed the evidence supporting the accusation, finds that [the applicant\u2019s] guilt in the offence was established by the following evidence that has been collected in the course of the investigation and examined in the court proceedings:\nThe [trial] statement of the victim\u2019s legal heir ... according to which at around 8 p.m. on 7 October 2000 her husband S.M. attended an event in ... the caf\u00e9 together with G.T. She was told ... by the relatives that during a fight in the caf\u00e9 Armenian men [B.M.] and [the applicant] had stabbed her husband...\nThe statement of witness Kh.H. ... (witness Kh.H.\u2019s pre-trial statement was read out)\nThe statement of witness K.H. ... (witness K.H.\u2019s pre-trial statement was read out).\nThe statement of witness G.T. ... (witness G.T.\u2019s pre-trial statement was read out).\nThe statement of witness O.D. ... (witness O.D.\u2019s pre-trial statement was read out).\nThe statement of witness V.H. ... (witness V.H.\u2019s pre-trial statement was read out).\nThe statement of witness G.A. ... (witness G.A.\u2019s pre-trial statement was read out).\nThe statement of witness A.O. ... (witness A.O.\u2019s pre-trial statement was read out).\nThe statement of witness A.G. ... (witness A.G.\u2019s pre-trial statement was read out).\nThe statement of witness V.K. ... (witness V.K.\u2019s pre-trial statement was read out).\nThe statement of witness L.T. ... (witness L.T.\u2019s pre-trial statement was read out).\nThe statement of witness E.B. ... (witness E.B.\u2019s pre-trial statement was read out).\n[The applicant\u2019s] guilt ... has been substantiated also by:\nThe judgment of 29.05.2006 of Kostanay Regional Court ...\n... clarifications provided by expert ... during the above-mentioned court proceedings that there were two penetrating knife injuries on the body ... each one of the injuries could by itself have caused the death.\nThe statement of technical expert [during the proceedings before the Kostanay Regional Court] ...\nThe conclusion of the forensic medical examination of 31.10.2000 ... S.M.\u2019s death had been caused by extensive haemorrhage as a result of liver wounds.\nThe statement of forensic medical expert [during the proceedings before the Kostanay Regional Court] ... Each stab wounded the liver.\nThe conclusion of technical forensic examination of 21.10.2005 ... according to which ... the traces of two penetrating wounds ... discovered on S.M.\u2019s vest could have been inflicted by a ... knife.\nThe records of examination of the crime scene, records of ... examination of victim S.M.\u2019s clothes, two video recordings of the event, the video recording of the examination of the body during the examination of the crime scene and forensic medical examination.\u201d 25.  The applicant lodged an appeal claiming, inter alia, that there had been no confrontation between him, B.M. and the witnesses against him during the investigation of the case, either in Kazakhstan or in Armenia. He further complained that the Regional Court had failed to summon properly the witnesses and relied on their pre-trial statements without good reason. He also complained about the fact that the video recordings from the crime scene had not been examined during the trial, although the Regional Court relied on them as evidence against him. 26.  On 31 August 2009 the Criminal Court of Appeal upheld the applicant\u2019s conviction with reliance on the same evidence. As regards the non-attendance of witnesses the Court of Appeal stated that, according to the materials of the case, the witnesses had been properly summoned but had submitted statements about their inability to appear before the court due to lack of funds or reasons relating to family or work and reinstated their statements made during the pre-trial investigation. 27.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law raising arguments similar to those submitted in his previous appeal. 28.  On 12 November 2009 the Court of Cassation declared the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law inadmissible for lack of merit stating, inter alia, that the Court of Appeal had reached the correct conclusion as regards the applicant\u2019s complaints about his inability to examine the witnesses against him.", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "7", "9", "1", "8", "6", "5", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Baku. 6.  The circumstances of the case are similar to those in Gahramanli and Others v. Azerbaijan (no. 36503/11, \u00a7\u00a7 6-32, 8 October 2015). 7.  The applicant was nominated by the Classic wing of the Popular Front party to stand as a candidate in the parliamentary elections of 7 November 2010 in the single-mandate Zangilan-Gubadly Electoral Constituency No. 125. The applicant lost the election in his constituency. 8.  After election day, the applicant lodged a complaint with the Central Electoral Commission (the \u201cCEC\u201d) concerning a number of irregularities in his constituency that had allegedly taken place during election day. He complained of various types of irregularity, including interference by public officials, illegal campaigning, obstruction and intimidation of election observers, ballot-box stuffing, repeated voting by the same individuals, incorrect vote-counting procedures, and a falsely inflated voter turnout. In support of his allegations, the applicant submitted various types of evidence documenting specific instances of the irregularities complained of, including statements made by election observers, and video and audio recordings. 9.  On 20 November 2010 the CEC issued a decision rejecting the applicant\u2019s claims. Its reasoning was similar to that in the CEC decision in Gahramanli and Others (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 21-26). 10.  The applicant lodged further complaints with the Baku Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court which, on 24 November and 1 December 2010 respectively, dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeals. Their reasoning was similar to that in their respective decisions in the Gahramanli and Others case (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 27-32). 11.  In the meantime, before the Supreme Court delivered its final decision in the applicant\u2019s case, on 29 November 2010 the Constitutional Court had confirmed the country-wide election results, including the election results in the applicant\u2019s constituency, as final (ibid., \u00a7 30). 12.  At the material time Mr Intigam Aliyev was representing not only the applicant in the present case, but also a total of twenty\u2011seven other applicants in cases concerning the 2010 parliamentary elections and a number of applicants in other cases before the Court. 13.  On 8 August 2014 criminal proceedings were instituted against Mr I. Aliyev, which are the subject of a separate application brought by him before the Court (application no. 68762/14). On 8 and 9 August 2014 the investigation authorities seized a large number of documents from Mr I. Aliyev\u2019s office, including all the case files relating to the proceedings pending before the Court, which were in Mr Aliyev\u2019s possession and which concerned over 100 applications in total. The file relating to the present application was also seized in its entirety. The facts relating to the seizure and the relevant proceedings are described in more detail in Annagi Hajibeyli v. Azerbaijan (no. 2204/11, \u00a7\u00a7 21-28, 22 October 2015). 14.  On 25 October 2014 the investigation authorities returned a number of the case files concerning the applications lodged before the Court, including the file relating to the present application, to Mr Aliyev\u2019s lawyer.", "references": ["0", "2", "6", "4", "5", "9", "7", "8", "3", "1", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "1.  The case originated in an application (no. 62614/13) against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (\u201cthe Convention\u201d) by a Russian national, Mr Gayk Levonovich Sarkisyan (\u201cthe applicant\u201d), on 23 September 2013. 2.  The applicant was represented by Mr A. Anokhin and Ms M. Gordeyeva, lawyers practising in Astrakhan. The Russian Government (\u201cthe Government\u201d) were represented by Mr G. Matyushkin, Representative of the Russian Federation at the European Court of Human Rights. 3.  On 28 January 2016 the complaints concerning Article 5 \u00a7 3 and Article 5 \u00a7 4 were communicated to the Government and the remainder of the application was declared inadmissible pursuant to Rule 54 \u00a7 3 of the Rules of Court. 6.  In particular, the Government acknowledged that the applicant had remained in pre-trial detention for an excessively lengthy period in violation of Article 5 \u00a7 3 of the Convention. They offered to pay the applicant 1,200 euros and invited the Court to strike the application out of the list of cases in accordance with Article 37 \u00a7 1 (c) of the Convention. The amount would be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable on the date of payment, and would be payable within three months from the date of notification of the Court\u2019s judgement. In the event of failure to pay this amount within the abovementioned three-month period, the Government undertook to pay simple interest on them, from the expiry of that period until settlement, at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points. The declaration did not mention the applicant\u2019s complaint under Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention.", "references": ["4", "9", "8", "7", "3", "6", "5", "1", "0", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1959 and is currently detained in Baia Mare Prison. 6.  On 10 January 2002 an investigation was opened against the applicant for embezzlement, forgery and abuse of his official position as Minister for Agriculture. The criminal investigation ended on 19 December 2003 with the applicant\u2019s indictment together with three other co-accused. 7.  On 27 April 2011 the applicant was convicted of the above-mentioned crimes by the High Court of Cassation and Justice and sentenced to seven years\u2019 imprisonment. 8.  On 28 May 2012 the applicant\u2019s appeal against the above-mentioned judgment was rejected with final effect by a five-judge panel of the High Court of Cassation and Justice. The full text of the judgment became available to the applicant on 1 November 2012. 9.  The applicant started serving his sentence in Gherla Prison on 31 May 2012. On 2 April 2013 he was transferred to Baia Mare Prison where he is currently serving his sentence. On admission to prison, the applicant was already suffering from type II diabetes, which was being treated with insulin, hypertension, ischaemic heart disease, biliary lithiasis and lumbar discopathy. 10. According to the report drawn up on the applicant\u2019s arrival in Gherla Prison on 31 May 2012 the applicant was allowed to take with him to his cell, among other items, one glucometer with forty-one test strips and needles as well as several drugs. 11.  During his ten-month stay in Gherla Prison the applicant was taken to the medical ward eighteen times. He was given a special diet for diabetics and was allowed to work. He was taken to diabetes specialists outside the prison system on several occasions where he was prescribed a special diet, medication and constant self-monitoring of his glycaemia level. According to the applicant\u2019s medical chart in Gherla Prison his glycaemia levels were measured two, three or four times per day at the prison\u2019s infirmary. Copies of the same medical chart also show that the applicant regularly received medication from the prison infirmary. On 9 October 2012 his signature confirmed the receipt of thirteen drugs including vitamin C and omega 3. 12.  Forensic medical examinations conducted in September and December 2012 concluded that the applicant\u2019s diseases could be treated within the prison system. 13. In Baia Mare Prison the applicant was examined at the prison\u2019s infirmary twenty-four times between April 2013 and September 2014. In addition, he was taken for specialist diabetes and nutrition examinations at the Baia Mare County Hospital nine times between 24 May 2013 and 2 October 2014. 14. According to the Government\u2019s submissions and copies of the applicant\u2019s medical chart, throughout his detention in Baia Mare Prison the applicant was given, as needed and according to doctors\u2019 prescriptions, insulin and drugs for his hypertension as well as neurotrophic, gastric protective, hypercholesterol and other drugs. 15. According to the information provided by the National Administration of Prisons the applicant made no complaints concerning his medical treatment. On 10 August 2012 the applicant\u2019s lawyer was informed that the complaint against the applicant\u2019s placement in the closed prison regime had been rejected. On 5 September 2013 the applicant\u2019s lawyer was informed by the Baia Mare Prison administration that the applicant could not be compensated for the work he had performed in detention with permission to leave the prison. 16.  The applicant alleged that he had been transported in conditions which had not allowed him to take his insulin. In addition, the food provided during transport had not been adapted to his diabetes. The vehicles in which he had been transported lacked air conditioning and other prisoners had been smoking during the trips. 17.  From the Government\u2019s submissions it appears that the applicant was transferred sixteen times between detention facilities, to the hospital or to the courts, in special vehicles (Iveco, Mercedes or Raba vans) which were well-maintained and met the legal comfort requirements. They were fitted with windows, lights, heating and sunroofs. Some of them also had air-conditioning. The number of detainees transported never exceeded the number of available seats. Detainees were provided with food and water during transfers, and were allowed bathroom breaks. Smoking was strictly prohibited in the vehicles. 18.  According to the information provided by the National Administration of Prisons, the applicant was allowed to take with him his personal glycaemia kit and medication and was therefore able to measure his glycaemia. Moreover, during long drives a number of breaks were taken allowing the applicant to administer his treatment. As regards the food received during transport, the applicant was provided with a diabetic menu as follows: during transport to and from Gherla Prison the applicant received 100 grams of biscuits, 100 grams of cheese, one egg and 500 grams of bread; during transport to and from Baia Mare Prison the applicant received 320 grams of unsalted cheese, two eggs, 300 grams of processed poultry meat, 260 grams of semi-white bread and 250 grams of apples. Copies of the prison menus were submitted in support of these assertions. 19.  According to the prison visits record the applicant often received food packages which included sweets, fruits and vegetables as well as bottles of juice, all of which he was allowed to take with him during transport. 20. The Government submitted that the prison authorities had received no complaints or requests from the applicant in connection with the conditions of transport.", "references": ["6", "7", "8", "4", "1", "9", "5", "0", "2", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "6.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7.  The applicant was born in 1984 and moved to live in Russia in the early 2000s. 8.  In 2008 she met A.U., a Russian national, and they started living together in the Krasnodar Region. In 2009 the applicant\u2019s daughter from a previous marriage moved in with them to attend a primary school. On 16 March 2012 the applicant and A.U. married and on 23 August 2012 their son was born. He acquired Russian nationality. 9.  On 30 March 2013 the applicant was returning home by train after a visit to Ukraine, together with the two children. Shortly after midnight on 31 March 2013 the Russian Border Control Service handed her a notice, informing her that she would not be allowed to re-enter Russia, in accordance with the Entry and Exit Procedures Act. The notice did not specify the grounds for that decision. 10.  In April 2013 the applicant\u2019s husband obtained a copy of a decision pronouncing her presence in Russia to be undesirable (\u201cthe exclusion order\u201d), which the Consumer Protection Authority (CPA) had issued on 9 June 2012. The text of the order indicated that the applicant\u2019s presence in Russia had been declared undesirable by the Krasnodar regional division of the CPA on 9 June 2012, in accordance with section 25.10 of the Entry and Exit Procedures Act. It did not state any facts or reasons for the applicant\u2019s exclusion. It directed the applicant to leave Russia by 22 June 2012 or face deportation and informed her that she would be denied re-entry to Russia, in accordance with section 27 of the Entry and Exit Procedures Act. It subsequently transpired that the basis for the exclusion order was that during her pregnancy in 2012 the applicant had tested positive for HIV and that the hospital had reported her HIV-positive status to the CPA. 11.  According to the Government, the Krasnodar division of the CPA sent the exclusion order to the applicant by registered mail on 19 June 2012. They produced a log of registered correspondence which was to be submitted to the post office for dispatch on that date. 12.  The applicant\u2019s husband, acting as the claimant and also as the applicant\u2019s representative, challenged the exclusion order before the Russian courts, claiming in particular that the CPA had disregarded the applicant\u2019s family connections in Russia and her state of health. 13.  On 24 May 2013 the Tsentralnyy District Court in Sochi rejected the claim in summary fashion, repeating verbatim the text of the exclusion order and holding that it was lawful. On 23 July 2013 the Krasnodar Regional Court upheld the District Court\u2019s judgment, finding that the applicant\u2019s infection with HIV \u201ccreated a real threat to the Russian population\u201d. 14.  In the statement of appeal to the cassation instance, the applicant\u2019s husband prayed in aid the position of the Russian Constitutional Court which emphasised the necessity to take humanitarian considerations into account when deciding on the removal of a family member, and on the Court\u2019s case\u2011law under Article 8 of the Convention. He pointed out that the applicant\u2019s husband and newborn son were Russian nationals, that her daughter was enrolled in a Russian school and that the HIV infection was in a latent stage. On 30 September and 19 December 2013 the Krasnodar Regional Court and the Supreme Court of Russia respectively issued summary decisions, dismissing the application for an examination of the case by the cassation instance. 15.  The applicant and her daughter eventually took up residence in Novogrodovka in the Donetsk Region of Ukraine. Her husband and their son have been living in St Petersburg, Russia. The husband was unable to visit her in the Donetsk Region. 16.  On 12 March 2015 the Constitutional Court ruled on a constitutional challenge brought by the applicant and two other aliens and their Russian spouses against section 11(2) of the HIV Prevention Act, section 7(1)(13) of the Foreign Nationals Act, and section 25.10 of the Entry and Exit Procedures Act. The Constitutional Court held that migration laws can lawfully restrict access to Russia by non-Russian nationals whose medical condition might jeopardise public health and pose a threat to national security. It acknowledged the contemporary medical consensus that HIV did not pose a threat to public health because it could not be transmitted merely because of the presence of an infected individual in the country or through casual contact, airborne particles, food or water. The Constitutional Court held as follows:\n\u201c1.  To declare that the closely related provisions of section 25.10 of the Entry and Exit Procedures Act, section 11(2) of the HIV Prevention Act, and section 7(1)(13) of the Foreign Nationals Act are incompatible with the Russian Constitution ... in so far as they allow [the executive authorities] to declare undesirable the presence of a foreign national or a stateless person whose family permanently resides in Russia, to issue a deportation order or an entry ban, to refuse him a residence permit or to cancel a previously issued residence permit solely because that person is HIV-positive, provided that the person has complied with the legal requirements on HIV-positive individuals relating to the prevention of spreading the infection, and provided that no other circumstances would call for such restrictions. 2.  The federal legislator should \u2013 in the light of the requirements of the Russian Constitution and the position of the Constitutional Court, as expressed in the present judgment \u2013 introduce the necessary amendments into the existing corpus of laws which would clarify the grounds and the procedure for making decisions relating to the right of HIV-positive foreign nationals or stateless persons to stay and live in the Russian Federation.\u201d\nPending such amendments, the Constitutional Court directed that the executive and judicial authorities be guided by the position it had formulated in the judgment. 17.  On 20 April 2015 the applicant\u2019s husband applied to the Tsentralnyy District Court in Sochi for a reconsideration of the District Court\u2019s judgment of 24 May 2013 on account of the new case-law of the Constitutional Court. On 3 July 2015 the District Court dismissed his application. It found that, lacking the information that the applicant had been receiving antiretroviral therapy, she must be presumed to be a threat to others, including those with whom she had social and casual contact. The District Court also stated that she was not a law-abiding individual because she had given birth to a child in Russia after her presence there had been declared undesirable. 18.  The applicant\u2019s husband appealed and on 22 October 2015 the Krasnodar Regional Court quashed the above judgment, finding that the District Court had not heeded the position of the Constitutional Court and had incorrectly shifted the burden of proof onto the applicant:\n\u201cThe Krasnodar office of the Consumer Protection Authority did not produce any evidence of Ms Ustinova\u2019s conviction under Article 122 of the Criminal Code (Infection by HIV) and/or under Article 6.1 of the Code of Administrative Offences (Concealing the source of HIV infection). Nor did it show that she had breached any obligation which the law imposes on HIV-positive individuals, for instance, by refusing to take antiretroviral therapy. No such information is available in the case file, whereas the court establishes that [the applicant and her husband] are both receiving medical treatment. It follows that the first-instance court\u2019s finding that Ms Ustinova\u2019s presence constitutes a threat to other Russian residents, including those with whom she has had social and casual contact, is erroneous and contradicts the Constitutional Court\u2019s judgment since the mere fact of HIV infection is not a ground for applying such important restrictions on her private life.\u201d 19.  The Regional Court pronounced the exclusion order unlawful and directed the Krasnodar office of the Consumer Protection Authority to redress the effects of the violation. 20.  In response to the Court\u2019s request for additional information of 12 May 2016 (see paragraph 4 above), on 29 June 2016 the Government submitted that the applicant had crossed the Russian border on 17 August 2015. On 18 May 2016 the Federal Migration Service issued her a three\u2011year temporary residence permit. On 31 May 2016 the Consumer Protection Authority informed the Border Control Service about the annulment of the exclusion order. Lastly, the Government indicated that measures for removing her name from the list of persons who should be refused entry to Russia, \u201c[were] being taken\u201d. 21.  The applicant replied that she had only been able to re-enter Russia by crossing the border between Ukraine and Belarus and by continuing from Belarus to Russia, as there are no controls on the Belarus-Russia border. As of 16 August 2016, she has not been notified that the exclusion order of 9 June 2012 was formally rescinded and that the Border Control database was updated accordingly.", "references": ["7", "6", "9", "5", "3", "8", "0", "2", "1", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "10.  The applicant, Magyar Helsinki Bizotts\u00e1g (Hungarian Helsinki Committee), is a non-governmental organisation (NGO) that was founded in 1989. It monitors the implementation of international human-rights standards in Hungary, provides legal representation to victims of alleged human-rights abuses and promotes legal education and training both in Hungary and abroad. Its main areas of activity are protecting the rights of asylum seekers and foreigners in need of international protection, and monitoring the human-rights performance of law-enforcement agencies and the judicial system. In particular, it focuses on access to justice, conditions of detention, and the effective enforcement of the right to defence. 11.  Between 2005 and 2007 the applicant NGO conducted a project \u201cModel Legal Aid Board Programme\u201d aimed at developing and testing a model to overcome shortcomings in the system for the ex officio appointment of defence counsel. The study summarising the outcome of the project was published in 2007 under the title \u201cWithout Defence\u201d, suggesting that there should be a standard set of criteria developed to assess the quality of defence counsel\u2019s work. 12.  In 2008, as a follow-up to its 2005-2007 survey, the applicant NGO launched a new project entitled \u201cThe Right to Effective Defence and the Reform of the ex-Officio Appointment System\u201d. Together with the Ministry of Justice and Law Enforcement and various bar associations, the applicant NGO developed a questionnaire aimed at evaluating the performance of defence counsel. It also assessed the quality of legal representation provided by ex officio appointed and retained defence counsel, by examining the case files in 150 closed criminal cases. In parallel, the applicant NGO made a contribution in respect of Hungary to the comparative research project \u201cEffective Defence Rights in the European Union and Access to Justice: Investigating and Promoting Best Practices\u201d carried out in nine European countries and funded by the European Commission and the Open Society Justice Initiative.\nThe results of the two projects were presented at a conference in April 2009, the conclusions of which were summarised in the report \u201cIn the Shadow of Suspicion: A critical account of enforcing the right to an effective defence\u201d. 13.  In addition, the applicant NGO carried out continuous advocacy activities for reform of the ex officio appointments system; in cooperation with the Budapest Bar Association, it also drew up recommendations for a proposed code of professional ethics for ex officio defence counsel. 14.  In the applicant NGO\u2019s assessment, its research showed that the system of ex officio appointed defenders did not operate adequately, essentially because the investigative authorities, in particular the police, were free to choose defence counsel from a list compiled by the relevant bar associations. This gave rise to distrust on the part of defendants. Furthermore, according to the applicant NGO\u2019s findings, many police departments had recourse to the same lawyers or law firms in the majority of cases, resulting in defence counsels\u2019 dependency on ex officio appointments to earn their living. The applicant NGO also concluded that the selection system lacked transparency. 15.  In 2009, in the framework of the project \u201cSteps Towards a Transparent Appointment System in Criminal Legal Aid\u201d, an experimental method was put in place, in cooperation with the applicant NGO, the county bar associations and certain county police departments. A key facet of this method was replacement of the existing system of discretionary appointments by a randomised computer-generated one. 16.  As a feature of the project, the applicant NGO requested the names of the public defenders selected in 2008 and the number of assignments given to each lawyer from a total of twenty-eight police departments, situated in the seven Hungarian regions. The aim of the data request was to demonstrate whether there existed discrepancies in police departments\u2019 practice in appointing defence counsel from the lists provided by the bar associations. These requests were made under section 20 (1) of Act no. LXIII of 1992 (\u201cthe Data Act\u201d). The applicant NGO maintained that the number of defence counsel appointments was public-interest data (k\u00f6z\u00e9rdek\u0171 adat) and that thus the names of defence counsel were data subject to disclosure in the public interest (k\u00f6z\u00e9rdekb\u0151l nyilv\u00e1nos adat). 17.  Seventeen police departments complied with the request; a further five police departments disclosed the requested information following a successful legal challenge by the applicant NGO. 18.  On 18 August 2009 the applicant NGO addressed the same request to the Hajd\u00fa-Bihar County Police Department, seeking access to information concerning the names of defence counsel appointed in the police department\u2019s area of jurisdiction and the number of appointments given to each defence counsel. 19.  In its response of 26 August 2009 the Hajd\u00fa-Bihar County Police Department refused the applicant NGO\u2019s request, stating that \u201cthe names of the defence counsel are not public-interest data nor information subject to disclosure in the public interest under section 19(4) of the Data Act, since defence counsel are not members of a body performing State, municipal or public duties. Thus their names constitute private data, which are not to be disclosed under the law\u201d. The police department also referred to the disproportionate burden the provision of the data would impose on it. 20.  A similar request by the applicant NGO was rejected by the Debrecen Police Department on 27 August 2009. 21.  On 25 September 2009 the applicant NGO brought an action against these two police departments, arguing that ex officio defence counsel performed a duty in the interest of the public which was financed from public funds. Data concerning them thus qualified as information subject to disclosure in the public interest. 22.  In its counter-claim, the Hajd\u00fa-Bihar County Police Department maintained its view that the names of defence counsel constituted personal data rather than information subject to disclosure in the public interest, since they neither carried out their tasks within the scope of the duties and competences of the police departments, nor were they members of those bodies. It further maintained that processing the data requested by the applicant NGO would entail a prohibitive workload. 23.  The Debrecen Police Department requested the discontinuation of the proceedings. 24.  The Debrecen District Court joined the two cases. On 21 October 2009 the District Court found for the applicant NGO, ordering the respondents to release the relevant information within 60 days. 25.  The court found that although defence counsel did not qualify as persons performing public duties, they were also not employees or agents of the respondent police departments, and the question whether defence was an activity of a public-interest nature was a matter which should be assessed with reference to its aim and role. Referring to Article 46 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on mandatory defence and to Article 48 of the same Code on the investigative authorities\u2019 duty to appoint defence counsel under certain conditions, the court observed that the duties of the investigative authorities also included giving effect to the constitutional right to defence. The court concluded that measures concerning the exercise of mandatory defence qualified as public-interest activities, and any related data were of great importance for society and were not to be considered as a matter of personality rights or subject to the protection of private interests. The names of defence counsel and the number of their respective appointments did not therefore constitute information of a private nature, in relation to which disclosure would only be possible with the approval of the person concerned. The court went on to state that, given the public-interest nature of mandatory defence, the interest in informing society seemed to be stronger than the need to protect privacy, which in any case was not infringed since the role of defence counsel was public from the moment of indictment. The court ordered the respondents to surrender the information requested. 26.  Both police departments appealed, reiterating in essence their argument that the names and number of appointments of defence counsel did not represent information subject to disclosure in the public interest, but personal data, since those persons did not perform State, municipal or public duties. They also maintained that the transfer of the requested information would cause an undue burden. 27.  In its judgment of 23 February 2010, the Hajd\u00fa-Bihar County Regional Court, acting as a second-instance court, overturned the first\u2011instance judgment and dismissed the applicant NGO\u2019s claim in its entirety. The court rejected the applicant NGO\u2019s argument that ex officio defence counsel exercised public functions within the meaning of the Data Act. In the court\u2019s view, the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure relied on by the applicant NGO provided for equal recognition before the law and for the right to defence and imposed a duty on the State to ensure these rights. However, the provisions did not prescribe that the activities of ex officio defence counsel were public duties, irrespective of the fact that they were financed by the State. The court held that the duty of the police to appoint defence counsel in certain cases was to be distinguished from the latter\u2019s activities. It noted that personal data could only be processed under section 5(1) of the Data Act for a well-defined purpose in the exercise of a right or in fulfilment of an obligation, and that personal data processed by the police departments could only be transferred with the permission of the person concerned. 28.  The applicant NGO sought review of the second-instance judgment, maintaining that although the names of the defence counsel and the number of their respective appointments were personal data, this was nevertheless information subject to disclosure in the public interest as being related to the public duties carried out by ex officio defence counsel. 29.  The Supreme Court dismissed the applicant NGO\u2019s petition for review on 15 September 2010. It upheld the Regional Court\u2019s judgment in substance, partly modifying its reasoning. 30.  The Supreme Court held as follows:\n\u201c... [W]hat needs to be examined is whether defence counsel are to be considered \u2018other persons performing public duties\u2019. The Supreme Court considers, in compliance with Recommendation no. 1234/H/2006 of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Data Protection, that the question of whether an individual was a person performing public duties has to be determined solely on the basis of the provisions of the Data Act. Only a person vested with independent powers and competences is to be considered a person performing public duties.\nIn answering this question [of interpretation of the notion of \u2018persons performing public duties\u2019], the applicant\u2019s argument concerning Article 137(2) of the Criminal Code is irrelevant, since that provision only prescribes that defence counsel were to be regarded as persons performing public duties for the purposes of the Criminal Code itself, but not for the purposes of the Data Act or for any other legal relationship.\nUnder Article 57 \u00a7 3 of the Constitution, the State has a duty to secure the right to defence. The courts, the prosecution services and the investigative authorities perform this task by, in particular, ensuring the right to defence (Article 5 \u00a7 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure) and by appointing defence counsel when required under Articles 46 and 48 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In so doing, these bodies accomplish their public duties, which are thus terminated with the appointment of defence counsel. Following his or her appointment, a defence counsel\u2019s activities constitute private activities although they are performed in pursuance of a public goal.\nThe court has thus found that defence counsel cannot be regarded as \u2018other persons performing public duties\u2019, since no powers or competences defined by law are vested in them. The mere fact that procedural laws specify rights and obligations in respect of persons performing the task of defence counsel in criminal proceedings cannot be interpreted as constituting powers and competences defined by law. In respect of the right to defence, the Code of Criminal Procedure prescribes obligations only for authorities, not for defence counsel. The wording of Article 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which states that prosecution, defence and adjudication are separate tasks, also supports this view.\nThus, the names and number of appointments of defence counsel constitute personal data under section 2(1) of the Data Act. Accordingly, under section 19(4) of the Data Act, the respondent police departments cannot be obliged to surrender such personal data. It follows that the second-instance court was right to dismiss the applicant\u2019s action.\u201d", "references": ["8", "5", "7", "1", "0", "3", "4", "2", "9", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1963 and 1964 respectively and live in Kaunas. 6.  The first applicant was the owner of a private unlimited liability company (individuali \u012fmon\u0117) (see paragraphs 29-31 below). In 2001 another company brought a claim against her company to recover rent arrears for its premises together with interest for late payment. During the proceedings before the court of first instance the first applicant asked for several adjournments due to her illness, one of which was granted. On 27 February 2001 the Kaunas Regional Court ordered the first applicant\u2019s company to pay a total of 211,883 Lithuanian litai (LTL \u2013 approximately 61,365 euros (EUR)) to the claimant company. The first applicant appealed and on 26 June 2001 the Court of Appeal remitted the case to the court of first instance for fresh examination. On 27 September 2001 the first applicant brought a counterclaim for LTL 167,018, alleging that the claimant company had failed to properly fulfil its contractual obligations. On 8 April 2002 the Kaunas Regional Court allowed the claim and allowed the counterclaim in part, ordering the first applicant\u2019s company to pay LTL 211,884 and the claimant company LTL 5,295. The first applicant appealed and on 15 July 2002 the Court of Appeal increased the sum to be paid by the claimant company to LTL 8,103. The first applicant submitted a cassation appeal and on 29 January 2003 the Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeal\u2019s decision. In those proceedings the first applicant\u2019s company was always represented by a lawyer hired by her. 7.  On 28 March 2003 the Kaunas Regional Court instituted bankruptcy proceedings in respect of the first applicant\u2019s company. 8.  In 2004 the second applicant asked the domestic courts to reopen the rent arrears proceedings and to suspend the bankruptcy proceedings. He claimed that he had not been party to the proceedings even though he was the first applicant\u2019s husband and the private unlimited liability company was a joint matrimonial asset. The second applicant was represented by a lawyer throughout those proceedings. The second applicant also asked for an adjournment of the proceedings due to his lawyer\u2019s absence and his request was granted. 9.  On 25 May 2004 the Kaunas Regional Court refused to reopen the proceedings because the second applicant had failed to lodge his claim within the prescribed time-limit of three months of becoming aware of the circumstances providing the grounds for the reopening of the proceedings. He appealed and on 26 August 2004 the Court of Appeal returned the case to the court of first instance for fresh examination. During the proceedings, the second applicant asked for adjournment due to his lawyer\u2019s absence, which was granted. On 7 January 2005 the Kaunas Regional Court decided to reopen the rent arrears proceedings. On 19 January 2005 it joined them to the bankruptcy proceedings. The second applicant submitted several appeals against the joining of the two cases but they were subsequently dismissed. 10.  On 20 June 2005 the Kaunas Regional Court examined the reopened rent arrears case, concluded that the second applicant should not have been involved in the proceedings and rejected the request of the second applicant to have the decision of the Kaunas Regional Court of 8 April 2002 quashed (see paragraph 6 above). The applicants appealed against this decision and on 9 August 2005 the Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the Kaunas Regional Court of 20 June 2005 not to quash the decision of the Kaunas Regional Court of 8 April 2002 regarding the payment of rent arrears, but observed that the second applicant should have been involved in the proceedings because that was the main reason for reopening the rent arrears case. The second applicant requested legal aid in order to prepare a cassation appeal against the Kaunas Regional Court\u2019s decision of 20 June 2005 and the Court of Appeal\u2019s decision of 9 August 2005. On 4 November 2005 his request was accepted by the Kaunas State Guaranteed Legal Aid Service (hereinafter \u201cthe Legal Aid Service\u201d). The first applicant also requested legal aid to prepare comments on the second applicant\u2019s cassation appeal. On 6 January 2006 her request was granted by the Legal Aid Service. On 20 March 2006 the Supreme Court examined the applicants\u2019 cassation appeals, observing that the reopened case concerned only procedural aspects and that the merits had not been examined at all. The case was returned to the Kaunas Regional Court for fresh examination. 11.  On 12 August 2005 both applicants requested legal aid to prepare claims with regard to the bankruptcy and rent arrears proceedings. On 7 September 2005 both applicants\u2019 requests were denied because their claims were directly related to their commercial or independent professional activities. The applicants started administrative proceedings, complaining about the decisions of the Legal Aid Service not to provide them with legal assistance. The applicants asked for legal aid in the administrative proceedings, which they were given on 2 November 2005 and 6 January 2006 respectively. On 10 February and 1 August 2006 respectively the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court and the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed as unsubstantiated the applicants\u2019 claims concerning the refusal to grant them legal aid, holding that under domestic law, legal aid was unavailable if the claims were directly related to a person\u2019s commercial or independent professional activities (see paragraph 28 below). 12.  On 4 April 2006 the Kaunas Regional Court decided to separate the bankruptcy case from the rent arrears case. 13.  On 8 May 2006 both applicants requested that the Court of Appeal transfer the bankruptcy and rent arrears cases to the Vilnius Regional Court, but their request was dismissed on 15 May 2006 by the Court of Appeal. 14.  On 22 May 2006 both applicants submitted two requests for legal aid: one concerned the preparation of the cassation appeal against the Court of Appeal\u2019s refusal to transfer their cases to the Vilnius Regional Court and the other concerned the reopening of the bankruptcy case. The requests were rejected on 25 May 2006 by the Legal Aid Service as their claims were directly related to their commercial or independent professional activities (see paragraph 28 below). The applicants started administrative proceedings, complaining about the decisions of the Legal Aid Service not to provide them with legal assistance. On 28 September 2006 and 6 April 2007 respectively their complaints were dismissed by the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court and the Supreme Administrative Court, which again held that under domestic law, legal aid was unavailable if the claims were directly related to a person\u2019s commercial or independent professional activities. The applicants asked for the proceedings to be reopened but their request was dismissed on 8 May 2008 by the Supreme Administrative Court. 15.  On 12 July 2006 the second applicant submitted a request to have the examination of the rent arrears case suspended because the administrative proceedings concerning legal aid were ongoing (see paragraph 11 above). His request was granted by the Kaunas Regional Court the same day. In the meantime the applicants submitted a request to the Kaunas Regional Court and asked for the time-limit for submissions in the rent arrears case to be extended and the legality of the refusal of the legal aid to be examined. On 22 August 2006 the time-limit for submissions was extended but the legality of the refusal to grant them legal aid was not examined as it was considered to be outside the court\u2019s jurisdiction. 16.  On 5 July 2006 both applicants submitted a request for legal aid for their representation in the reopened rent arrears case. It was rejected on 12 July 2006 by the Legal Aid Service as their claim was directly related to their commercial or independent professional activities (see paragraph 28 below). The applicants started administrative proceedings, complaining about the decision of the Legal Aid Service not to provide them with legal assistance. On 22 December 2006 and 8 June 2007 respectively their complaint was dismissed by the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court and the Supreme Administrative Court, which again held that under domestic law, legal aid was not available if the claims were directly related to a person\u2019s commercial or independent professional activities. The applicants asked for the proceedings to be reopened but their request was dismissed on 8 May 2008 by the Supreme Administrative Court. 17.  The examination of the rent arrears case was resumed but was suspended by the Kaunas Regional Court on 5 September 2006 due to the ongoing administrative proceedings concerning the legal aid (see paragraph 16 above). 18.  After the examination of the rent arrears case was resumed on 28 June 2007 by the Kaunas Regional Court, the applicants asked for adjournments numerous times due to their own inability to be present. All their requests were granted by the Kaunas Regional Court. 19.  On 21 November 2007 both applicants submitted a request to the Legal Aid Service for legal aid for their representation in the reopened rent arrears case but their requests were dismissed on 27 November 2007 as their claim was directly related to their commercial or independent professional activities (see paragraph 28 below). The applicants started administrative proceedings, complaining about the decision of the Legal Aid Service not to provide them with legal assistance. On 7 April 2008 and 6 February 2009 respectively their complaint was dismissed by the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court and the Supreme Administrative Court, which again held that under domestic law, legal aid was not available if the claims were directly related to the person\u2019s commercial or independent professional activities. 20.  On 20 December 2007 the Kaunas Regional Court examined the reopened rent arrears case and held that the first applicant\u2019s company had to pay LTL 134,746 in unpaid rent and interest. 21.  On 19 January 2008 both applicants appealed, asking for the examination of the rent arrears case to be suspended until the administrative proceedings concerning legal aid were concluded (see paragraph 19 above). Their request was granted on 6 May 2008 by the Kaunas Regional Court. 22.  On 3 June 2009 the Court of Appeal resumed the rent arrears case and scheduled a hearing for 6 October 2009. On 25 June 2009 the applicants were sent a notice informing them that the case would be examined in a \u201cpublic hearing in writing\u201d (vie\u0161ame teismo pos\u0117dyje ra\u0161ytinio proceso tvarka) on 6 October 2009. The applicants responded on 2 October 2009 (as indicated on the post mark) that they would not be able to attend the hearing because on 30 September 2009 they were sent a notice that another case involving the first applicant was being examined at the same time that day. This letter was received by the Court of Appeal on 7 October 2009. On 6 October 2009 the Court of Appeal held an oral hearing where none of the parties were present. It examined the case in the parties\u2019 absence, holding that all the parties had been duly notified of the date and time of the hearing. On 23 October 2009 the applicants\u2019 appeal was dismissed. 23.  On 3 November 2009 both applicants submitted requests for legal aid for the preparation of a cassation appeal against the decision of 23 October 2009 of the Court of Appeal. Their requests were left unexamined on 6 November 2009 as they were considered to be analogous to the previously submitted and already rejected requests. 24.  As a consequence, no cassation appeal was submitted because in accordance with the provisions of domestic law, such appeals had to be submitted by a lawyer. 25.  The applicants brought proceedings against the State for damages, alleging that the decisions of the domestic courts had been unlawful. They submitted numerous complaints, including about being deprived of legal representation. On 3 March and 17 November 2014 respectively their complaints were rejected by the Vilnius Regional Court and the Court of Appeal. Their cassation appeal was rejected on 24 February 2015 by the Supreme Court.", "references": ["9", "4", "1", "5", "6", "7", "0", "8", "2", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Budapest. At the material time, he was a Member of Parliament and a member of the largest opposition party, the Hungarian Socialist Party. 6.  At the plenary parliamentary session on 18 March 2013 the applicant made an interpellation. After the respondent Government member\u2019s reply, the applicant had the floor to give a counter-reply. According to the applicant and not contested by the Government, during his speech numerous remarks were made. Once the applicant finished talking, he sat down and showed his left middle finger in the direction of the Jobbik MPs. 7.  On 25 March 2013 the Speaker initiated disciplinary proceedings against the applicant. He submitted a proposal to the plenary to fine him \u2013 under section 48(3) of Act no. XXXVI of 2012 on Parliament \u2013 131,410 Hungarian forints (approximately 450 euros) for using a blatantly offensive expression.\nThe Speaker\u2019s proposal reads as follows:\n\u201cSPEAKER OF PARLIAMENT\nDecision in disciplinary matter\nProposal to impose a fine\nAccording to the minutes of Parliament\u2019s session of 18 March 2013, Tibor Szanyi MP used a blatantly offensive expression during the counter-reply (viszonv\u00e1lasza sor\u00e1n, sic) of his interpellation.\nFor this reason, I propose, under section 48(3) of Act no. XXXVI of 2012 on Parliament and in application of my prerogatives under subparagraph 6 of the same, that Parliament\nimpose a fine\nwhose amount should be one-third of the MP\u2019s honorarium, that is, HUF 131,410.\nBudapest, 25 March 2013\nSigned: L\u00e1szl\u00f3 K\u00f6v\u00e9r\u201d\nAn affirmative decision was adopted by the plenary on 28 March 2013, without any remedy available. 8.  On 30 April 2013 the applicant submitted \u2013 under section 90 of Parliamentary Resolution no. 46/1994. (IX.30.) OGY (\u201cthe Rules of Parliament\u201d) \u2013 an interpellation to the Speaker. It was addressed to the Minister of National Development and concerned the publication of the list of successful bidders in the national tender for tobacco retail licences. 9.  It reads as follows[1]:\n\u201cThe nation has acquired 1,500 tobacco retailers. They have most of the dough[2]; more precisely FIDESZ\u2019s[3] pals and cronies have it. The mafia-government cannot be bothered that several thousands of petrol station keepers, grocers, newsagents or real tobacco retailers have lost their living.\nTobacco retailers have not had a significant margin, exactly 4.5 per cent. This was generally just enough to cover perhaps the overheads, although the costs of lease of the shop and the employees\u2019 wages had to be generated beyond this profit. It has been the State in any case that got the real profit through the excise tax and the VAT.\nWhat is happening now? Every twenty tobacco retailers will go bankrupt and be replaced by one, that is, instead of every twenty retailers, one will have the concentrated profit.\nHowever, the newly introduced 10 per cent profit, now due to the cronies (cs\u00f3kosoknak j\u00e1r\u00f3), will result in a situation in which the [new] \u201cnational\u201d retailers will have forty times higher profit than was usual. Forty-fold profit for the pals and the cronies! This is big-time bloody swinishness (v\u00e9rb\u0151 diszn\u00f3s\u00e1g)!\nTobacco licences are, in Europe, normally the privilege of those with impaired working abilities. Why? Because this work requires the least mobility, it is locally done and not too complicated. The government have finished off this tradition by forcing into unemployment tens of thousands of employees of small Hungarian enterprises; instead, they give all the opportunities to their obese pals, who can now freely select their underpaid dummy employees among the freshly expropriated losers.\nThe government\u2019s trust of lies is disseminating their false sermon. But there is no point in lying; the tens of thousands who have been sacked and their families will not be deceived. But I am going even further. There is not one living soul in this country who would believe your deceitful talk.\nNot even yourselves, since you are perfectly aware that you are legislating in order to rob. You have sacrificed tens of thousands of real Hungarian employments in order to be able to freely abuse the State monopoly.\nI am asking therefore the Honourable Minister: is your face not burning with shame?\nAnd if it is, are you then planning to surrender the power and duly hide your head? Or else are you planning to continue looting the country, now completely without a face, that is, barefacedly (pof\u00e1tlanul)?\u201d 10.  The interpellation was refused by the Speaker on 6 May 2013 \u2013 under section 97(4) of the Rules of Parliament \u2013 with the reasoning that it contained statements that were injurious to the prestige of Parliament and inadmissible in a democratically functioning system.\nNo remedy lay against the decision. 11.  The applicant submitted a further interpellation on the same topic on 21 May 2013. This interpellation reads as follows[4]:\n\u201cThe recent weeks were mostly about you distributing tobacco licences. To benefit from that, one basically needed to be right-wing, extreme right-wing. But to get the golden prize of the juicy retail spots possibly generating millions per day, one needed to belong to, one way or another, the jamboree of buddies of the local FIDESZ-chieftains.\nTo win, you did not even need to have business premises. Originally, it was sufficient to undertake to sell tobacco and to adore FIDESZ. In exchange and ex post facto, you have increased the statutory profit rate and, at the same time, prohibited tobacco selling anywhere else, destroying tens of thousands of shops and their employees, under the slogan \u201clet the strong live and the weak perish\u201d.\nYou, a mercenary of FIDESZ, are apparently eager to keep serving the other projects of FIDESZ as well, that is, what you can buy in these [new] shops will include, in addition to tobacco, alcohol, gambling tickets, newspapers and even things to lick. The category of \u201cthings to lick\u201d seems still to be open, but one can fear that whatever you can buy in these \u201cSpahi-shops\u201d, such as tax-free spirits, will be prohibited elsewhere. Amongst these, I am sure, you will consider sex toys, common horse-riding equipment, and, to please your [extreme right-wing] friends, maybe penis pumps as well or those dance bars around which naked strippers jerk.\nI am asking you: have you calculated the damage you are causing to provincial Hungary through this operation? Will the licences issued be sufficient for the mayors and MPs of FIDESZ, reduced to a dummy existence after the falling down? Do you believe that the democratic forces winning the 2014 elections will allow your failed teams to continue operating on these looting fields?\nMy previous, prohibited question also targeted this issue: is your face not burning with shame? Since then, the answer has become clear: no, it is not, because you have already been, without a face, or to use your favourite expression, barefacedly playing games with the livelihood of the Hungarian people. You have pushed anyone into misery; you have taken away even the allowances of the most miserable, those disabled \u2013 just to be able to stuff your mafia feeding on public procurement.\nI am asking therefore another question: are you willing to rush voluntarily onto History\u2019s garbage dump, or do you want first to try your luck with the bold game called \u201cpower or prison\u201d?\nI am awaiting your reply!\u201d\nThe interpellation was refused by the Speaker on 27 May 2013, with reasoning similar to the one above (see paragraph 10 above). No remedy lay against the decision.", "references": ["9", "3", "5", "0", "1", "2", "8", "7", "4", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1976 and is detained in Togliatti, Samara Region. 7.  On 19 October 2006 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of drug dealing. 8.  On 20 October 2006 the Samarskiy District Court of Samara remanded the applicant in custody. The court held that the applicant was suspected of a serious crime, that he could abscond, commit crimes, destroy evidence, threaten witnesses or in any other way interfere with the investigation. 9.  On 18 December 2006 the District Court extended the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention. The court reproduced the reasoning of the previous detention order. The court also indicated that the applicant had played a leading part in the criminal activities. 10.  On 15 February 2007 the District Court extended the applicant\u2019s pre\u2011trial detention on the ground that the investigation was still pending and it was necessary to conduct some investigative activities. The court further referred to the same grounds as in the previous detention orders. 11.  The Samara Regional Court rejected the applicant\u2019s appeals against the detention orders. 12.  On 1 June 2007 the Bolshechernigovskiy District Court of the Samara Region convicted the applicant of drug trafficking and sentenced him to 11 years\u2019 imprisonment and a fine. On 21 August 2007 the Samara Regional Court upheld his conviction on appeal.", "references": ["7", "8", "0", "5", "9", "1", "4", "6", "3", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1985 and lives in Vilnius. 6.  At around 12.30 p.m. on 28 April 2006, the applicant\u2019s motorcycle collided with a car driven by M.N. in a residential area of Vilnius. M.N. was not injured, but the applicant suffered multiple spinal fractures and serious damage to his spinal cord. As a result of the accident, he lost the ability to walk and became disabled. 7.  On the day of the accident, 28 April 2006, the Vilnius City Police Department opened a pre-trial investigation concerning a possible violation of road traffic safety regulations resulting in an accident that caused non\u2011severe impairment to another person\u2019s health (Article 281 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code). The pre-trial investigation was supervised by the Vilnius City District Prosecutor\u2019s Office (hereinafter \u201cthe district prosecutor\u201d). 8.  On the same day M.N. was questioned as a witness. He stated that before the collision he had been driving at a speed of around 50 km/h and had decided to overtake the car in front of him. The road had two lanes. He checked that there were no cars in the left-hand lane, coming either from in front or from behind, indicated left and overtook the car. He then indicated right and began returning to the right-hand lane. At that moment he felt a blow to the back of his car but did not understand what had happened. He drove for another thirty metres and stopped the car. Then he noticed that a motorcycle and its rider were lying on the ground, and called the police and the ambulance service. He had not seen the motorcycle before the collision. 9.  On the same day the police investigator examined the scene of the accident. The investigator\u2019s report indicated that the accident had occurred on a sunny day, on a straight paved road which had been dry. It described the location of the applicant\u2019s motorcycle and M.N.\u2019s car as they had been found after the accident, as well as the presence of skid marks and fragments of glass and plastic on the road. All those elements were also indicated in a sketch drawn by the investigator. The sketch included a column for drivers to sign if they agreed that the scene of the accident had been depicted accurately, but it was not signed by either the applicant or M.N. 10.  On the same day the investigator examined the applicant\u2019s motorcycle and M.N.\u2019s car. The investigator\u2019s report described the damage to the front, back and both sides of the motorcycle, and to the back of the car. It also stated that before the accident both the motorcycle and the car had been in good technical condition and working properly. 11.  On the same day a court medical expert took blood samples from the applicant and M.N. in order to determine whether they had been sober. The examination detected no traces of alcohol in the blood of either of them. 12.  On 4 May 2006 the applicant was granted victim status in the investigation and questioned about the details of the accident. He stated that before the collision he had been driving at about 60 km/h and had decided to overtake a bus and two cars. Seeing that the left-hand lane was free, he began overtaking the bus and the cars and accelerated to about 70 km/h. After overtaking them, while still in the left-hand lane, he slowed down to 50 km/h, but as that lane was free, he decided to also overtake three more cars and a truck. He began to accelerate again, but then one of the three cars, which at that moment was about fifteen metres in front of him, suddenly pulled out into the left-hand lane without indicating. The applicant applied the brakes but started losing control of the motorcycle, so he released the brakes before applying them again. The front wheel of the motorcycle hit the back of the car. The applicant fell off the motorcycle and landed on the road. He did not see what happened to the motorcycle after the collision. He lay on the ground until the ambulance arrived and took him to hospital. 13.  On 5 May 2006 a court medical expert concluded that the applicant\u2019s injuries corresponded to severe health impairment. 14.  On an unspecified date the legal ground for the pre-trial investigation was changed to Article 281 \u00a7 3 of the Criminal Code \u2013 violation of road traffic safety regulations, which resulted in an accident causing severe impairment to another person\u2019s health. 15.  From 3 to 16 May 2006 the police investigator questioned the applicant\u2019s mother and five eyewitnesses to the accident. It appears that the eyewitnesses provided contradictory testimonies as to the location and speed of the two vehicles immediately before the collision, the distance between them and the exact account of the events leading up to the collision. 16.  On 15 May 2006 the investigator examined the scene of the accident together with M.N. The latter indicated the trajectory of his car before the collision and the exact location of the collision. 17.  On 20 June 2006 the applicant was informed that a forensic expert would be instructed to examine the circumstances of the accident and establish an account of the events. The applicant\u2019s lawyer submitted additional questions to be forwarded to the expert. The relevant order adopted on 14 July 2006 by the Vilnius City Second District Court and forwarded to the expert on 1 September 2006 does not appear to have included the questions submitted by the applicant\u2019s lawyer. 18.  The examination was carried out by an expert from the Forensic Science Centre of Lithuania (Lietuvos teismo ekspertiz\u0117s centras), a governmental institution responsible for carrying out forensic examinations required by courts and other pre-trial investigation bodies. The expert was provided with the sketch of the accident (see paragraph 9 above) and photographs of the two vehicles, and asked to determine the location of the collision, to estimate the speed of the motorcycle before the collision, and to establish who had been responsible for the accident. The expert report, delivered on 31 January 2007 (hereinafter \u201cthe first expert report\u201d), stated that the description of the skid marks and the fragments of glass and plastic on the road indicated that the collision had occurred in the right-hand lane. The expert estimated the speed of the motorcycle immediately before the collision as at least 70.3 km/h and, assuming that the speed limit on that road was 50 km/h, noted that the applicant had exceeded that limit. The expert concluded that the accident had been caused by the applicant because he had been exceeding the speed limit and had started applying his brakes too late to avoid the collision. 19.  On 22 February 2007 the district prosecutor instructed the police investigator to carry out a number of additional investigative actions, including:\n\u2212  interviewing the officer who had sketched the accident scene (see paragraph 9 above) in order to determine whether the sketch was accurate and why it had not been signed by the applicant and M.N.;\n\u2212  examining the scene of the accident together with the applicant in order to verify his account of the events leading to the collision;\n\u2212  finding out whether, at the time of the accident, there were any traffic signs on the road indicating the speed limit, or any restrictions on overtaking;\n\u2212  additionally questioning an eyewitness who had claimed that following the collision the applicant\u2019s motorcycle had risen up in the air and landed in the right-hand lane, in order to clarify the details of that testimony; and\n\u2212  questioning another eyewitness identified by the applicant\u2019s mother. 20.  On 26 February 2007 the applicant\u2019s mother, R.K., whom the applicant had authorised to act on his behalf, complained to the district prosecutor that the pre-trial investigation was being carried out slowly and ineffectively. She claimed that the sketch of the accident was inaccurate, as proven by the absence of the drivers\u2019 signatures. She also complained that the investigators had not questioned all the eyewitnesses to the accident and had not eliminated the contradictions between different testimonies. R.K. further complained that the questions of the applicant\u2019s lawyer had not been forwarded to the expert examining the circumstances of the accident (see paragraph 17 above). Lastly, she complained that the prosecutor had sent that expert\u2019s report to the wrong address, so she and the applicant had not received it. R.K. asked the court to change the investigator in charge of the pre-trial investigation and to ensure that essential investigative measures were carried out. 21.  On 16 March 2007 the district prosecutor upheld R.K.\u2019s complaint. The pre-trial investigation was transferred to a different investigator within the Vilnius City Police Department and the investigator was instructed to carry out the investigative measures requested by R.K. As to the forensic expert\u2019s report, the prosecutor informed R.K. that the questions to be submitted to the expert had been approved by a court decision, which the applicant had not challenged. 22.  On 27 March 2007 the district prosecutor notified the Vilnius City Police Department that the newly appointed investigator was conducting the pre-trial investigation \u201cin a sluggish manner\u201d (vangiai), contrary to the requirement to complete it in the shortest possible time. 23.  In March and April 2007 the police investigator carried out the additional investigative measures ordered by the district prosecutor (see paragraph 19 above). 24.  On 18 April 2007, in response to R.K.\u2019s complaint, the district prosecutor informed her that the police officer who had drawn up the sketch of the accident had been questioned and confirmed its accuracy, so there were no grounds to suspect that the sketch had been falsified. The prosecutor also noted that an internal inquiry had been opened concerning the absence of the drivers\u2019 signatures on the sketch of the accident. 25.  Subsequently, in his order to the Vilnius City Police Department the district prosecutor pointed out that the absence of the drivers\u2019 signatures on the sketch had given R.K. legitimate doubts as to its accuracy, and asked the police to look into the officers\u2019 actions when drawing up the sketch. On 29 May 2007 the inquiry found that the police investigator who had carried out the initial investigative measures and who had been responsible for ensuring that the drivers signed the sketch had not performed her duties properly. However, the investigator was not given a disciplinary penalty because more than one year had passed since the breach and she was no longer working in the interior affairs system. 26.  On 21 May 2007 R.K. complained to the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office that the district prosecutor was not properly supervising the pre-trial investigation, which was slow and ineffective. She raised similar complaints to those she had raised before (see paragraph 20 above) and asked for the removal of the prosecutor who had been in charge of supervising the investigation. On 15 June 2007 the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office dismissed R.K.\u2019s complaint, finding no serious breaches in the prosecutor\u2019s actions. The Prosecutor General\u2019s Office also held that although the prosecutor had sent some documents to an incorrect address, those same documents had also been sent to the applicant\u2019s lawyer, so the applicant had in fact received them. 27.  On 10 December 2007 the Vilnius City Second District Court ordered an additional forensic examination of the circumstances of the accident. The examination was carried out by the same expert from the Forensic Science Centre as before (see paragraph 18 above). The expert report, delivered on 16 June 2008 (hereinafter \u201cthe second expert report\u201d), did not make a fresh estimate of the speed of the applicant\u2019s motorcycle but relied on the findings of the first expert report and considered that the applicant had been travelling at a speed of at least 70.3 km/h. It found that the speed limit at the location of the accident had been 60 km/h and not 50 km/h, as assumed in the first expert report, which nonetheless meant that the applicant had exceeded the speed limit. Having examined the sketch of the accident and the damage to both vehicles, the second report confirmed the conclusion of the first report that the collision had occurred in the right\u2011hand lane, while the motorcycle was moving into it from the left-hand lane. It found no data indicating that M.N. had been driving at speeds in excess of the speed limit or that he had done anything which might have caused the accident. The report concluded that the accident had been caused by the applicant: the main cause had not been the speed of the motorcycle but the difference between the speed of the two vehicles, and the fact that the applicant had not started to brake in time to avoid the collision. 28.  On 13 August 2008 the district prosecutor discontinued the pre-trial investigation on the grounds that M.N.\u2019s actions had not amounted to a crime as provided for by Article 281 \u00a7 3 of the Criminal Code. R.K. appealed against that decision before a senior prosecutor, arguing that the investigation had been biased and incomplete. She stressed in particular that the sketch of the accident had been inaccurate, as proven by the absence of the drivers\u2019 signatures (see paragraph 9 above). She also submitted that the prosecutor had disregarded the testimonies of some eyewitnesses that the collision had occurred in the left-hand lane and that it had caused the applicant\u2019s motorcycle to rise up in the air and land in the other lane (see paragraph 19 above). Her appeal, however, was dismissed. The senior prosecutor pointed out that two expert reports had concluded that the accident had been caused not by M.N. but by the applicant himself, and that the testimonies of several eyewitnesses had confirmed that conclusion. 29.  R.K. appealed before the Vilnius City First District Court. She again argued that the sketch of the accident was inaccurate, as proven by the absence of the drivers\u2019 signatures. She also submitted an opinion by a specialist in the field of road traffic accidents, issued at R.K.\u2019s request on 17 October 2008 (hereinafter \u201cthe specialist\u2019s opinion\u201d), which had concluded that although both the applicant and M.N. had exceeded the speed limit, that fact had not been the cause of the accident. The specialist considered that the accident had occurred in the left-hand lane and that it had been caused by M.N. suddenly entering that lane \u2013 despite the applicant\u2019s attempts to brake and slow down, it had not been objectively possible for him to avoid the collision. 30.  On 20 November 2008 the Vilnius City First District Court upheld R.K.\u2019s appeal and reopened the pre-trial investigation. The court noted the contradictory findings of the expert reports on one hand and the specialist\u2019s opinion on the other hand, and considered that it was necessary to conduct a fresh forensic examination by a different expert in order to eliminate those contradictions. 31.  On 23 February 2009 the police investigator ordered a fresh examination of the circumstances of the accident. The examination was carried out by a different expert from the Forensic Science Centre. In his report, delivered on 15 May 2009 (hereinafter \u201cthe third expert report\u201d), the expert examined the sketch of the accident and photographs of the two vehicles, and estimated that immediately before the collision the applicant had been travelling at a speed of at least 70 km/h, and that it was not possible to determine the speed at which M.N. had been driving. The report also stated that the motorcycle had hit the right side of the car, so even if, as claimed by the applicant, the car had entered the left-hand lane suddenly and unexpectedly, that would not have caused the collision, which had occurred in the right-hand lane. The report concluded that the accident had been caused by the applicant, who had exceeded the speed limit and had not slowed down in time to avoid the collision. 32.  On 3 June 2009 the district prosecutor discontinued the pre-trial investigation on the grounds that M.N.\u2019s actions had not amounted to the crime stipulated in Article 281 \u00a7 3 of the Criminal Code. On 7 July 2009 a senior prosecutor upheld that decision, noting that the third expert report had confirmed that the accident had been caused by the actions of the applicant and not of M.N. 33.  R.K. lodged an appeal with the Vilnius City Second District Court, submitting that the third expert report was inaccurate, in particular because it concluded that the collision had occurred in the right-hand lane, which was contrary to the material in the case file. She also submitted that the third expert report had not refuted the conclusions of the specialist\u2019s opinion. R.K. further argued that the testimonies of some eyewitnesses had clearly demonstrated that the accident had been caused by M.N. (see paragraph 28 above), but they had not been properly considered by the prosecutor. 34.  On 5 August 2009 the Vilnius City Second District Court upheld the appeal and reopened the pre-trial investigation. The court held that it was necessary to address the arguments presented in R.K.\u2019s appeal and that the third expert report had to be assessed together with the other available evidence, such as reports concerning the location of the accident and eyewitness testimonies. 35.  On 23 November 2009 the Vilnius City Second District Court ordered a fresh expert examination of the circumstances of the accident. The order was forwarded to the Forensic Science Centre on 4 March 2010, together with the specialist\u2019s opinion. The examination was carried out by a different expert from the Forensic Science Centre. The expert report, delivered on 11 June 2010 (hereinafter \u201cthe fourth expert report\u201d), examined the sketch of the accident and photographs of the two vehicles, and estimated that immediately before the collision the applicant had been travelling at a speed of at least 70.3 km/h. It found that although it was not possible to estimate the speed at which M.N. had been driving, the fact that the motorcycle had hit the back of the car meant that the car had been going slower than the motorcycle. The expert considered that it was not possible to determine the trajectory of the two vehicles before the collision. However, even if the applicant\u2019s version was to be believed and M.N.\u2019s car had suddenly entered the left-hand lane at a distance of fifteen metres from the applicant\u2019s motorcycle (see paragraph 12 above), the applicant could have slowed down and avoided the collision. The fourth expert report concluded that the accident had occurred in the right-hand lane and that it had been caused by the applicant who had exceeded the speed limit and had not slowed down in time to avoid the collision. 36.  In January and February 2010 the police investigator again questioned the applicant, M.N. and some of the eyewitnesses questioned previously. 37.  R.K. was informed about the findings of the fourth expert report on 2 August 2010. She complained to the district prosecutor that she had not been given the opportunity to submit additional questions to the expert, in particular, whether having collided with the car, the motorcycle could have risen up in the air and landed in a different lane, as claimed by some eyewitnesses (see paragraph 28 above). R.K. also complained that the expert had relied on low-quality photographs of the motorcycle but had not examined the motorcycle itself, and that the report\u2019s findings had been incorrect. On 8 September 2010 the district prosecutor upheld R.K.\u2019s complaint and ordered the police investigator to examine the applicant\u2019s motorcycle and to forward R.K.\u2019s questions to the expert who had conducted the fourth examination. On 18 October 2010 the expert responded that the description of the location of the accident showed that during the collision the motorcycle had not risen up into the air. 38.  On 2 November 2010 the district prosecutor again discontinued the pre-trial investigation on the grounds that M.N.\u2019s actions had not amounted to the crime stipulated in Article 281 \u00a7 3 of the Criminal Code. On 22 December 2010 a senior prosecutor upheld that decision, considering that the fourth expert report had assessed all the material collected during the pre-trial investigation, including the specialist\u2019s opinion, and that R.K. had been given sufficient opportunity to present her questions to the expert. 39.  On 17 February 2011 the Vilnius City Second District Court dismissed an appeal lodged by R.K. and upheld the prosecutor\u2019s decision. The court considered that expert reports and eyewitness testimonies demonstrated that M.N. had entered the left-hand lane within a safe distance from the applicant\u2019s motorcycle, and thus had not violated road traffic safety regulations. Although there had been contradictory eyewitness testimonies as to the exact distance between M.N.\u2019s car and the applicant\u2019s motorcycle, the court considered that any doubts had to be interpreted in M.N.\u2019s favour. The court also held that the conclusions of the specialist\u2019s opinion that the collision had occurred in the left-hand lane had been contrary to the description of the location of the accident as provided in the sketch (see paragraph 9 above). 40.  On 22 March 2011 the Vilnius Regional Court quashed the lower court\u2019s decision and reopened the pre-trial investigation. It held that the decision to discontinue the investigation had not been based on a comprehensive assessment of all the collected material but had relied exclusively on evidence favourable to M.N., disregarding the applicant\u2019s statements, eyewitness testimonies, and the specialist\u2019s opinion. The court disagreed with the conclusion that M.N. had started overtaking within a safe distance from the applicant\u2019s motorcycle, and noted that M.N. had also had an obligation to make sure that none of the drivers behind him had started overtaking, so it was possible that he had committed the crime stipulated in Article 281 \u00a7 3 of the Criminal Code. The court observed that the question of M.N.\u2019s criminal responsibility would be best determined by a court examining the case on the merits. 41.  On 30 May 2011, at R.K.\u2019s request, another expert from the Forensic Science Centre submitted an opinion that, judging from the damage to both vehicles, there were no grounds to believe that the motorcycle had risen up in the air when it had collided with M.N.\u2019s car. 42.  On 31 May 2011 the district prosecutor discontinued the pre-trial investigation as time-barred, while also observing that the investigation had not identified any grounds to believe that a crime may have been committed (the prosecutor did not refer to the Vilnius Regional Court\u2019s decision of 22 March 2011 \u2013 see paragraph 40 above). The prosecutor\u2019s decision does not appear to have been appealed against. 43.  On 18 August 2011 the applicant submitted a civil claim for damages against M.N. He stated that the accident and the resulting injuries and disability had caused him significant distress, inconvenience and emotional trauma. The applicant claimed 600,000 Lithuanian litai (LTL \u2212 approximately 173,772 euros (EUR)) in non-pecuniary damages and LTL 76,739.37 (EUR 22,225) in pecuniary damages for medical expenses and rehabilitation. 44.  On 26 September 2012 the Vilnius Regional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim. It relied on the expert reports delivered during the pre\u2011trial investigation and noted that all of them had established that the accident had been caused not by M.N. but by the applicant himself. Although the specialist\u2019s opinion, delivered at the request of the applicant\u2019s mother, had reached a different conclusion, the court considered that the fourth expert report had taken its findings into consideration, and that it was thus unnecessary for the court to discuss the specialist\u2019s findings separately. It also observed that the judgment of the Vilnius Regional Court of 22 March 2011 (see paragraph 39 above) could not be interpreted as affirming M.N.\u2019s responsibility for the accident. As a result, the court concluded that it had not been established that M.N. had breached any legal requirements, which was a pre-condition for his civil liability to arise. The court also noted that the applicant had bought the motorcycle only two days before the accident, that he had not had any prior experience in driving that kind of vehicle, and that the motorcycle had not undergone a technical examination before the accident. Accordingly, the court found that the applicant himself may have breached road traffic safety regulations. The civil claim was dismissed and the applicant was ordered to pay LTL 1,521 (EUR 440.5) in legal expenses to M.N. and the State. 45.  On 2 December 2013 the Court of Appeal upheld the judgment of the lower court in its entirety.", "references": ["4", "8", "6", "0", "2", "5", "9", "3", "7", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Vilnius. 6.  From 2 March 1992 to 2 January 2006 the applicant worked at the Swedish embassy in Vilnius. 7.  She began as a receptionist and translator and was later promoted to be cultural, information and press officer. 8.  On 9 February 2001 the applicant wrote a letter to the Swedish ambassador in Vilnius. She stated that since 1998 a major change had been made to her work description \u2013 she had started managing cultural affairs, enjoying partial independence in decision-making and a high degree of responsibility for financial matters. She was considered as being responsible for certain categories of business because she had to draft budgets for cultural projects. Unfortunately, up to that point no adjustment in her contract had been made. 9.  The contract drawn up by the Swedish embassy in Vilnius on 19 November 2001, which the applicant and the ambassador signed, read as follows:\n\u201cWork description \u2013 Sniege Naku \u2013 information officer (cultural affairs, social secretary etc.)\nMs Naku\u2019s work description is as follows:\n- handles cultural and information matters in consultation with the Ambassador and the Cultural Attach\u00e9 in Riga\n- programme-maker for visitors from Swedish Government Offices as well as for other Swedish authorities\n- social secretary \u2013 mainly to the Ambassador but if needed also to the Counsellor, First and Second secretary\u2019s\n- replacement for D.Z. and I.N.\u201d 10.  The applicant submitted several letters of recommendation to the Court which were written between 1994 and 2006 by her Swedish colleagues at the embassy, including the ambassador to Lithuania between 1991 and 1994. The letters attested to her loyalty, dedication, communication skills and good working record.\nThe applicant also submitted another letter, signed on 30 June 2011 by her former Swedish colleague, Ms G. F. In the letter Ms G. F. stated that between 2003 and 2004 she had been posted as cultural attach\u00e9 to the Baltic states, stationed in Riga, but also accredited to Vilnius, where she worked approximately one week a month. Ms G. F. stated that during that time she had worked closely with the applicant and that they had planned and carried out various projects. All the major projects had been cleared with the ambassador. The budgets had been relatively modest. Ms G. F. also stated that for the four years she had worked with the applicant she had never felt that the applicant had made a single payment without asking her, or without clearing them with the ambassador. 11.  According to the Swedish Government, in 2003 and 2004 a new routine was introduced at the Vilnius embassy by which diplomatic staff had to take decisions on financial support payments, and the applicant lost her authority to deal with those matters independently. It was around that time that a new ambassador, Mrs M. K., was appointed. 12.  The accreditation certificate issued to the applicant by the Lithuanian Foreign Ministry on 6 October 2004 stated that the applicant was \u201cpart of the administrative technical staff at the embassy of the Kingdom of Sweden (\u0160vedijos Karalyst\u0117s ambasados administracinio techninio personalo nar\u0117)\u201d. The other page of the certificate stated that the applicant \u201cdid not enjoy any diplomatic immunities or privileges (asmens imunitetai ir privilegijos: N\u0116RA)\u201d. It also said that pursuant to Article 38 \u00a7 2 of the Vienna Convention jurisdiction over the applicant was to be exercised so that the functioning of the embassy would not be disturbed (see paragraph 53 below). 13.  On 3 November 2004 the applicant and the Swedish ambassador M. K. signed a document entitled \u201cTerms and conditions of employment for locally engaged personnel at the Embassy of Sweden in Vilnius\u201d. The document read that Lithuanian laws applied to the employment relationship between the applicant and the embassy regarding conditions such as the payment of tax, social security contributions, overtime, sick leave, the right to leaves of absence or severance payments. Pursuant to section 17 of that document, Lithuanian legislation was to be complied with as regards dismissal from work and the employer had to have \u201cobjective grounds for dismissal\u201d. Under section 18, an employee could be dismissed for committing a criminal act, seriously neglecting his duties, or committing further breaches of the requirements of his duties despite warnings having been given. 14.  The applicant was also the chairperson of the trade union for locally employed staff at the embassy, which was registered in 1999. Between October 2004 and June 2005 the trade union made several written complaints to the embassy about working conditions. The letters complained of a deteriorating and oppressive working atmosphere, the confused delegation of tasks, incomplete job descriptions or changes in job descriptions without local employees being consulted, a lack of clear communication, and a lack of trust. The union expressed the view that a collective agreement between the locally employed staff and the embassy could resolve such issues. 15.  The applicant\u2019s job description of 21 March 2005, although not signed by either the Swedish ambassador or the applicant, gave her title as \u201cCultural, Information and Press Officer\u201d, who worked \u201cin cooperation with and under the guidance of the Counsellor for Political Affairs/Cultural Attach\u00e9 or in relevant matters with the Second Secretary\u201d. The applicant\u2019s functions were described as follows:\n\u201cOperates, coordinates and assists in cultural/information events and general promotion projects;\nCoordinates the annual and long-term cultural/information and general promotion planning;\nCoordinates the cultural and information budget;\nOperates and assists in matters regarding press, TV and radio;\nAssists the Second Secretary with the communication strategy;\nHandles and prepares correspondence and inquiries related to cultural, information and press matters Responsible for the \u2018cultural calendar\u2019 on the home page;\nPrepares and Processes applications for financial and other support;\nProcesses the annual report on culture and other relevant reports;\nResponsible for the Head of Missions newspapers\u2019 review and certain translations;\nPrepares and makes drafts of speeches on certain occasions;\nActing as interpreter on certain occasions;\nResponsible for collecting, filing and translating various cultural and other adequate information;\nHandles customs\u2019 matters, as well as relevant notes, and setting arrangements for other proceedings including transportations of individuals and exhibitions;\nSetting arrangements for cultural events in cooperation with the Counsellor for Political Affairs/Cultural Attach\u00e9 for lunches, dinners and receptions, including making guests lists writing invitation, bookings and other general assistance;\nResponsible for the information material from the Swedish Institute - including ordering, filing and distribution and as well the information room;\nResponsible for the \u2018interpreters\u2019 list\u2019 and the \u2018cultural board\u2019;\nHandles the annual \u2018book list\u2019;\nAccepts and performs other duties assigned by the Head of Mission.\u201d 16.  By a letter of 17 May 2005 the Lithuanian State Civil Servants\u2019 Trade Union (Lietuvos valstyb\u0117s tarnautoj\u0173 profesin\u0117 s\u0105junga) also wrote to the Swedish ambassador to Lithuania. The letter expressed concern that local personnel at the embassy were treated unfairly. The union also considered that diplomatic immunity in labour relations applied only to diplomats and their families. In contrast, labour relations between a diplomatic representation and staff who were permanent residents of Lithuania were regulated by Lithuanian law. This also flowed from the 1961 Vienna Convention, which did not grant diplomatic immunity from the civil jurisdiction. 17.  On 14 July 2005 the ambassador replied to the union that the embassy was \u201cvery anxious to be a good employer\u201d. However, the embassy \u201chad not signed, and would not sign, collective agreements. The embassy as a diplomatic representation is subordinated by the Vienna Convention and thus does not have to adhere to the Lithuanian Labour Code\u201d. 18.  On 26 July 2005 Swedish radio announced and other media published articles about a report by the Swedish Labour Inspector that locally employed staff at Swedish embassies received less pay and had worse working conditions than their Swedish colleagues. The Swedish trade unions also stated that although there was no lack of legal regulation, locally employed staff would often not assert their rights for fear of losing their job. 19.  According to the Swedish Government, in the autumn of 2005 a new post of counsellor for cultural affairs was established at the embassy, which was taken up by a Swedish diplomat, Mr T. S., who became the applicant\u2019s immediate superior. The Swedish Government also stated that according to internal embassy memorandums drafted by T.S. the applicant was a source of conflict at the embassy. There were long but fruitless discussions concerning the applicant\u2019s work description. According to T.S., the applicant ignored his decisions and instructions, took decisions on her own on granting financial support, failed to follow agreed plans and lacked skills in a number of areas. 20.  On 8 November 2005 the embassy drafted a new job description for the applicant. She was named \u201cOfficer for Cultural and Information Affairs\u201d, and was to handle \u201ccultural matters in consultation with the Counsellor for Cultural Affairs T.S.\u201d. Her functions were essentially identical to those given in the job description of 21 March 2005 (see paragraph 15 above). The same day, the applicant informed the embassy in writing that she did not agree with that job description because it lacked a clear definition of her responsibilities and those of T.S. She expressed a wish to involve a neutral person in negotiations over her working duties. 21.  The following day, 9 November 2005, the ambassador presented the applicant with a \u201cLetter of caution\u201d. According to the letter, the ambassador saw no future for the applicant at the embassy, due to the applicant\u2019s \u201cdifficulties to cooperate\u201d, \u201clack of performance\u201d, \u201cconstant questioning and arguing over duties to be performed\u201d and \u201cinability to cope with changes in [the] Embassy\u2019s and/or [the applicant\u2019s] own tasks\u201d. The applicant was given two days to hand in her resignation, or the embassy would \u201ctake other action\u201d. 22.  According to a statement written by one of the applicant\u2019s former Lithuanian colleagues at the embassy, D.K., on 9 November 2005 the applicant was asked to hand over her keys to the embassy and leave the premises immediately. The following day the applicant came to work as usual but was not let into the embassy. According to D.K., he saw the applicant \u201cwaiting in terrible cold for around one hour outside until the reception opened for visitors. Then she walked in, sat for a while and then left. The next day she fell seriously ill and never returned [again]\u201d. 23.  On 11 November 2005 the applicant went on sick leave. The sick leave certificates, issued by the Central Polyclinic (Centro poliklinika) in Vilnius, confirm that she was on sick leave as of that date. The leave was prolonged on a weekly basis and without interruption until 2 March 2006. At one point during that time, in January 2006, she was admitted for two weeks to Vilnius University Hospital\u2019s neurology unit, where she was diagnosed with reversal ischemic neurological deficit in the vertebrobasilar basin. The applicant was also on sick leave in December 2006 and for some months in 2007. 24.  Whilst the applicant was on sick leave, on 21 November 2005, the Lithuanian trade union confederation (Lietuvos profesini\u0173 s\u0105jung\u0173 konfederacija) organised a protest in front of the Swedish embassy building in Vilnius against the applicant\u2019s dismissal. The protest was covered by news outlets in Sweden. According to a statement by one of the applicant\u2019s former Lithuanian colleagues at the embassy, K.M.P., the local staff of the embassy did not attend the protest for fear of negative repercussions. 25.  On 23 November 2005 the Swedish embassy sent a decision to the applicant\u2019s home address which stated that a disciplinary sanction would be imposed on the applicant \u2013 dismissal from work for gross misconduct. The ambassador stated that she had been informed on 4 and 9 November 2005 that the applicant had accused her Swedish colleague T.S. of being \u201cunbalanced\u201d, that on several occasions the applicant had breached security rules at the embassy by opening a window on street level that had no bars, and that she had conducted a private meeting at the embassy, which was an unacceptable use of her working time. 26.  In written replies of 5 and 8 December 2005, the applicant noted that she had indeed called T.S. \u201cunbalanced\u201d during an employee meeting at the embassy, but that that had been because he had earlier shouted at her and had never apologised. The applicant also stated that staff at the embassy had never signed any safety or security regulations. Lastly, the meeting referred to by the ambassador had concerned asking a cleaning company to come to the embassy, and that such a practice had been begun by Swedish staff and had been used continually during previous years. The applicant noted that she had never received any prior warning of the accusations against her, which were a pretext to get rid of her because of her trade-union activities. 27.  On 20 December 2005 the embassy sent a letter to the applicant\u2019s home, stating that the embassy had had confirmation of the applicant\u2019s sick leave from the social insurance office (Sodra), attesting that the applicant had been ill up to 3 December. The applicant was asked to present a continuous or new doctor\u2019s certificate no later than 30 December, including an indication of when she would recover. 28.  On 30 December 2005 the Swedish embassy dismissed the applicant from her post, effective as of 2 January 2006. The order referred to Article 136 \u00a7 3 (2) of the Lithuanian Labour Code, which permits an employer to terminate an employment contract without giving prior notice to the employee if the latter has committed an act of gross misconduct. The embassy referred to its decision of 23 November 2005 in order to impose such a sanction on the applicant (see paragraph 25 above). The embassy also stated that on 5 December 2005 it had received a sick leave certificate from the applicant that was valid until 3 December, but that no medical certificates had been presented thereafter, despite a written request. According to the applicant\u2019s version of events, and as attested in writing by her former Lithuanian colleague D.K., in November and December 2005 she had kept the Swedish embassy informed of her illness, with her husband also taking sick leave certificates to the embassy in person. An internal embassy memorandum shows that on 5 January 2006 the applicant\u2019s husband had taken a sick leave certificate to the embassy for the period up to 2 January 2006. 29.  The applicant\u2019s dismissal was subsequently mentioned on the internet site of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions as one of the mistreatments which had taken place in 2005. The report stated:\n\u201cthe explanation given by [the ambassador], when interviewed by Swedish radio, was that Ms Naku was dismissed for not doing her job properly, but she declined to give further details. However, before the new ambassador took office, Ms Naku had not received any complaints about her work during her fourteen years of service. Meanwhile, [the ambassador] explained to the Baltic Times newspaper ... that, as a diplomatic representation, the embassy did not have to comply with Lithuanian labour legislation, that the tone of trade union letters was rude and that there could not be any collective agreements in a diplomatic mission.\u201d 30.  Arguing unlawful dismissal, the applicant brought proceedings against the Swedish embassy in the Vilnius Regional Court. She submitted that \u201cfor the last seven years I have been the Head of Culture and information projects at the embassy (pastaruosius septynis metus esu ambasados Kult\u016bros ir informacios projekt\u0173 vadov\u0117)\u201d, and asked to be reinstated to her former post. She also sought pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages. The applicant argued that she had been dismissed while on sick leave, which was a clear breach of Lithuanian law (see paragraph 48 below). She also challenged the allegation that she had committed acts of gross misconduct as the grounds for her dismissal, contrary to what had been suggested by the embassy. Lastly, she noted that as a result of her arbitrary dismissal she had suffered loss of reputation and her health had significantly deteriorated. She stated that she had been destroyed, both psychologically and physically. 31.  On 19 May 2006, the Kingdom of Sweden claimed immunity from the jurisdiction of the Lithuanian courts:\n\u201cReply to civil claim \u2013 re Mrs Sniege Naku\nWith reference to the Court\u2019s letter/announcement of March 6, 2006, regarding civil case No. 2-1479/41/06, the Swedish Government demands that the plaintiff\u2019s case is refused with reference to acknowledged case law of the Republic of Lithuania (V.Stukonis vs. US Embassy and A.Cudak/Senkevic vs. the Embassy of the Republic of Poland).\n[M.K.]\nAmbassador\u201d 32.  By a judgment of 5 June 2006 the Vilnius Regional Court granted the embassy\u2019s request for the merits of the applicant\u2019s complaints to be left without examination because the embassy had invoked the defence of diplomatic immunity. The court stated:\n\u201cContemporary international law and doctrine acknowledge the doctrine of limited immunity, whereby immunity from the jurisdiction of foreign state courts is granted only in areas of State activities which are regulated by public law, and eliminates the possibility of applying State immunity in the area of private law, not linked with the implementation of State sovereignty. Accordingly, when trying to establish whether in the present case the respondent can claim State immunity, it is necessary to establish the nature of the relationship between the plaintiff and the respondent, because this relationship determined what kind of immunity \u2013 absolute or limited \u2013 should be applied to the State. The plaintiff worked at the embassy of the Kingdom of Sweden as Head of Culture and Information Projects. Even though a labour contract had been concluded between the plaintiff and the defendant, the job position of the applicant in itself (pati ie\u0161kov\u0117s pareigyb\u0117) pre-supposes (suponuoja) that the legal relationship between the parties had a civil service nature (a public-law relationship) rather than that of labour (a private law relationship), because the plaintiff\u2019s functions were linked to the implementation of the Kingdom of Sweden\u2019s sovereignty. The embassy, as an institution of a foreign diplomatic service, represents a foreign State, maintains international relations, implements foreign policy goals and defends the rights and interests of its citizens and other individuals. Accordingly and also based on the legal practice of the Lithuanian courts, work of such a nature belongs to a relationship regulated by public law (the Supreme Court\u2019s decisions in the civil cases of V. Stukonis vs the USA Embassy and A. Cudak/Senkevi\u010d vs the Embassy of Poland). The ability of the court to protect the rights of the plaintiff depends on whether the foreign State has demanded that the doctrine of State immunity be applied. In this case the embassy of the Kingdom of Sweden made such a request on 19 May 2006, relying on Lithuanian case-law. This means that the case must be discontinued.\u201d 33.  The applicant appealed, arguing that the lower court\u2019s conclusion on applying State immunity had been superficial as it had been based solely on a request by the Swedish embassy, whereas the applicant\u2019s job at the embassy had had nothing to do with the exercise of the sovereign authority of the Kingdom of Sweden. The applicant emphasised that by itself the fact that she had been the head of culture and information projects did not prove that there had been a State civil service relationship (valstyb\u0117s tarnybos pob\u016bd\u017eio santykiai) between her and the embassy. She pointed out that the first\u2011instance court had not examined the scope of her functions. She also relied on the 1972 European Convention on State Immunity (see paragraph 54 below). Even though neither Lithuania nor Sweden had acceded to that Convention, it was significant for comparative purposes. In that context the applicant noted that under Articles 4 and 5 of that Convention States could not ask for the application of State immunity in private-law cases, particularly if the proceedings related to a contract of employment between the State and an individual and where the work was performed on the latter\u2019s State territory. That was precisely the case of the applicant, who had a work contract with the Swedish embassy, which was regulated by the Lithuanian Labour Code. 34.  On 7 September 2007, in written proceedings, the Court of Appeal upheld the lower court\u2019s decision by holding the following:\n\u201cThe chamber agrees with the first-instance court\u2019s legal argumentation that a foreign state has a right to invoke State immunity from foreign jurisdiction (1961 Vienna Convention \u2018On Diplomatic Relations\u2019). International law and international law doctrine acknowledge the doctrine of limited immunity, when immunity from foreign courts\u2019 jurisdiction is granted only to a State\u2019s activity in the public-law sphere, and immunity does not apply in the private law sphere, which is not linked to exercising sovereignty. When establishing whether the dispute arose from a relationship covered by absolute State immunity or from a relationship where the State does not have immunity, it is necessary to establish the nature of the dispute. The plaintiff stated that a labour contract (darbo sutartis) has been concluded between her and the embassy of the Kingdom of Sweden. Accordingly, it is necessary to establish whether the applicant and the embassy of the Kingdom of Sweden had employment legal relationship (darbo teisiniai santykiai), or a State civil service legal relationship (valstyb\u0117s tarnybos teisiniai santykiai). It transpires from the case file that the plaintiff S. Naku worked at the embassy of the Kingdom of Sweden as the head of culture and information projects (kult\u016bros ir informacijos projekt\u0173 vadov\u0117). The chamber holds that even though a labour contract had been concluded between the parties, the very title of the job (pagal pa\u010dios pareigyb\u0117s pavadinim\u0105) shows that the duties assigned to the applicant helped the Kingdom of Sweden to a certain extent (tam tikru aspektu) to execute its sovereign functions. For that reason the first\u2011instance court correctly held that there was not a labour (private), but a State civil service (public) legal relationship, regulated by public law. Even though the plaintiff in her appeal states that her job functions were not related to implementing the Kingdom of Sweden\u2019s sovereignty, she did not provide the court with evidence to prove that.\nTaking into account that the embassy of the Kingdom of Sweden notified the court that it does not agree to be a defendant in the proceedings related to the plaintiff\u2019s lawsuit, the chamber concludes that the first-instance court was correct in holding that it did not have jurisdiction in this case. The arguments the plaintiff raised in her appeal do not refute that conclusion.\nIt must be noted that the application of state immunity from the jurisdiction of Lithuanian courts does not prohibit the plaintiff from submitting an analogous lawsuit in a court in the Kingdom of Sweden.\u201d 35.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, which was drafted by an advocate. She argued that there had been a breach of her right of access to a court in that the lower courts had only applied the principle of State immunity on the basis of the title of her job and without any further examination of the relations between her and her employer or of the nature and the scope of her duties, in order to conclude that her work had related to the sovereignty of the Kingdom of Sweden. If a foreign State did not agree that a case against it should be decided in a court of another State, proper arguments and proof had to be presented. However, it was not clear from the decisions of the lower courts on what grounds the Kingdom of Sweden had asked for immunity and why a request to apply State immunity was of itself deemed to be sufficient for the Lithuanian courts. The applicant reiterated that she and the Swedish embassy had been bound by work relations of a private nature, based on an employment contract concluded under the Lithuanian Labour Code. 36.  The applicant also requested that the Supreme Court ask the European Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling and to interpret Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters. In the applicant\u2019s view, the Vilnius Regional Court and the Court of Appeal had in their decisions disregarded point 13 of the preamble to that Regulation as well as Article 19 thereof (see paragraph 61 below). 37.  By a ruling of 6 April 2007, in written proceedings, the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law. It noted that Lithuania had not ratified the 2004 United Nations Convention on State Immunities. Accordingly, the provisions of that Convention, including Article 11, could be seen only as guidelines (see paragraphs 59 and 60 below). 38.  As to the question of State immunity from foreign courts\u2019 jurisdiction, the Supreme Court noted the lower courts\u2019 conclusion that \u201cfrom the title of the applicant\u2019s job description (head of culture and information projects) it was already possible to conclude that the duties which were assigned to her contributed to a certain extent (tam tikru aspektu) to the Kingdom of Sweden\u2019s implementation of its sovereign functions. Therefore, the parties were not linked by legal employment relations regulated by private law, but by legal civil service regulations under public law, that is to say relations for which a State may invoke the doctrine of immunity.\nThe Supreme Court also held:\n\u201c... the chamber also observes that international practice is not consistent as concerns the question of which persons working at a diplomatic representation of another State participate in the public functions of the State they represent and who, as a result, work in the civil service of the represented State, on the one hand, and which persons are engaged in activities that are not related to the performance of State functions, and whose activity consequently falls under private law, on the other. Given that there are no international legal norms which are obligatory and regulate the above questions, it is for each State to decide which persons who work at a diplomatic representation should be considered as being in State service [of a foreign State]. As can be seen from the limited case-law of the Republic of Lithuania, it is considered that everyone who works in a diplomatic representation of a foreign State, that is to say, the administrative and technical personnel and service personnel of a diplomatic representation, in one way or another contribute to the performance of the sovereign rights of a represented State, carrying out public-law functions, and therefore they are considered to be [employed] in the civil service of that State. For example, in a ruling of 25 June 2001, in the civil case A.\u010c. (S.) v the Embassy of the Republic of Poland ..., the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff, who worked at the embassy of the Republic of Poland as a receptionist at the front desk, that is to say she had a technical job, was helping Poland in the implementation of its sovereign rights, and that as a result she was in a legal civil service relationship with the Embassy of Poland.\nThe chamber concludes that in the present case, taking into account the fact that the plaintiff [the applicant] worked at the embassy of the Kingdom of Sweden as the head of cultural and information projects and was thus a member of the administrative-technical staff at the diplomatic representation, the lower courts have correctly established that she and the Kingdom of Sweden were in a legal civil service relationship regulated by public law. It is also noteworthy that Article 3 of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations mentions, among the functions of a diplomatic representation, the collection of information about conditions and developments in the receiving State, as well as the promotion of friendly cultural relations. Therefore it is evident that the plaintiff [the applicant], as the head of cultural and information projects, was helping the embassy of the Kingdom of Sweden to perform the functions of the represented State in the receiving State. This also confirms that the plaintiff and the Kingdom of Sweden were in a legal civil service relationship.\nThe chamber dismisses the [applicant\u2019s] arguments that the fact that the defendant, when employing the plaintiff and when dismissing her, relied on the Labour Code of the Republic of Lithuania, shows that the parties were in a legal labour law relationship and not a State civil service legal relationship. The fact that the parties chose an employment contract to formalise the legal relationship between them and that they noted that Lithuanian law is applicable [to that relationship], is not in itself a ground to conclude that the parties were bound by an employment legal relationship, and not by that of the civil service, because, as has been mentioned, all the members of the diplomatic representation\u2019s staff who work at the representation are considered to be in the civil service of the [represented] State, irrespective of the nature of the contracts concluded with them.\nThere are also no grounds for the [applicant] to rely on the definition of a civil servant prescribed in the Lithuanian law on the State Civil Service. It is a universally recognised principle that the legal status of State institutions and thus of civil servants is defined in accordance with the law of that State. In this case the question to be decided is the legal relationship between the [applicant] and the embassy of the Kingdom of Sweden, and not that between the applicant and Lithuanian State institutions.\n[The applicant] in her appeal on points of law also argues that an objection by a foreign State against a case being heard in another State\u2019s court must be reasoned and based on evidence. For the [applicant] it is not clear from the lower courts\u2019 decisions on what basis the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden demanded that State immunity be applied and why those courts found the embassy\u2019s letter alone to be sufficient.\nThe chamber notes that it is clear from the letter signed by the ambassador of the embassy of the Kingdom of Sweden to Lithuania, which was given to the Lithuanian courts, that the Kingdom of Sweden demands (reikalauja) the doctrine of state immunity to be applied in the [applicant\u2019s] case. Therefore, as the courts have established that in the present case the dispute arose from a legal relationship regulated by public law, where the Kingdom of Sweden can invoke the doctrine of State immunity, the aforementioned demand is sufficient to conclude that Lithuanian courts have no jurisdiction to decide this dispute.\u201d 39.  The Supreme Court also dismissed the applicant\u2019s request for a referral to the European Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling. For the Supreme Court, a referral would only have been necessary if a domestic court had established that the parties had been in a legal employment relationship regulated by private law, in which case the Kingdom of Sweden could not have claimed immunity. However, given that it had been established that the applicant and the embassy of Sweden had been in a civil service legal relationship, regulated by public law, and that a State or its embassy could thus ask for immunity from a foreign court\u2019s jurisdiction, there was no basis to apply the rules of Regulation No. 44/2001. Lastly, the Supreme Court noted that a preliminary ruling was only necessary when a national court had doubts as to the correct application of European Union law, which was not the case. 40.  The Lithuanian Constitution provides that a person whose constitutional rights or freedoms have been violated has the right to apply to a court (Article 30). 41.  There is no special legislation governing the issue of State immunity in Lithuania. The question is usually resolved by the courts on a case-by-case basis, with reference to the provisions of various bilateral and multilateral treaties (see also Cudak v. Lithuania [GC], no. 15869/02, \u00a7\u00a7 19-22, ECHR 2010). 42.  After the Court\u2019s judgment in the case of Cudak (cited above), Ms Cudak asked the Lithuanian courts to reopen her case of unlawful dismissal from the Polish embassy. By a ruling of 16 September 2010 the Supreme Court reopened the civil case and remitted it to the Vilnius Regional Court for fresh examination. 43.  In February 2011 Ms Cudak resubmitted and revised her civil claim (pateik\u0117 patikslint\u0105 ie\u0161kin\u012f) by asking: (1) that her dismissal from her job at the Polish embassy on 22 November 1999 be declared unlawful and that she be returned to her earlier job as secretary and switchboard operator; (2) that she be awarded her salary for forced absence from work (u\u017e priverstin\u0119 pravaik\u0161t\u0105) from the Polish embassy from the day of her dismissal to 31 January 2011, which was over 257,000 Lithuanian litai (LTL), as well as interest on that sum; and (3) to award her litigation costs. 44.  By a ruling of 13 May 2011 the Vilnius Regional Court dismissed her civil claim. It held that she had not proved that she had been dismissed for reasons related to sexual harassment. 45.  On 11 November 2011 the Court of Appeal quashed that decision and partly granted the claim by acknowledging that she had been dismissed unlawfully. However, the appellate court found that in her initial lawsuit of 9 December 1999 she had not asked the court to reinstate her to her former job at the Polish embassy because of unfavourable working conditions there, but to award her compensation instead. Under Article 42 \u00a7 3 of the Labour Code that amount was equal to twelve months\u2019 salary. It was only in her revised claim of February 2011 that she had changed her demands and asked for reinstatement, under Article 42 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 2 of the Labour Code, and for compensation for the entire period of her forced absence from work. 46.  The Court of Appeal then noted that twelve years had passed since she had worked at the Polish embassy. It was only natural that working duties and the structure of jobs at the embassy had changed. Moreover, the embassy had no free posts in which to employ her. For those reasons the Court of Appeal considered it fair to not reinstate the applicant but to award her approximately LTL 23,000, the equivalent of twelve months\u2019 salary at the Polish embassy, plus costs for litigating in Lithuania. 47.  On 26 June 2012 the Supreme Court upheld the appellate court\u2019s decision. 48.  The Labour Code, which regulates disputes over employment contracts, provides that while exercising their rights and fulfilling their duties employers and employees are bound to comply with laws, observe the common rules of life and adhere to the principles of reasonableness, justice and honesty. The abuse of one\u2019s rights is prohibited. It is prohibited to hinder the formation of trade unions by employees and to interfere with the lawful activities of unions (Article 35). It is also prohibited to give notice of the termination of an employment contract and to dismiss someone from work when an employee is on temporary sick leave (Article 131 \u00a7 1). Employees who have temporarily lost their functional capacity owing to sickness are to retain their position and duties if they are absent from work for no more than 120 days consecutively or for not more than 140 days within the previous 12 months (Article 133 \u00a7 2). An employer is entitled to terminate an employment contract without giving the employee any prior notice when the employee commits an act of gross misconduct (Article 136 \u00a7 3 (2)). An act of gross misconduct is a breach of discipline at work involving a gross violation of the provisions of laws and other legal acts which directly regulate the employee\u2019s work, or any other gross transgression of work duties or work regulations. An act of gross misconduct at work may involve improper conduct with visitors or customers or any other acts which directly or indirectly violate a person\u2019s constitutional rights (Article 235). 49.  The Labour Code also provides that if an employee has been dismissed from his or her job without proper legal grounds or in breach of the law, the court will reinstate him or her and order the payment of his or her average salary from the time of the unlawful dismissal until the execution of the court\u2019s decision (Article 297 \u00a7 3). However, should the court establish that the employee may not be reinstated for economic, technological, organisational or similar reasons, or because he may find himself in unfavourable conditions, the court will declare the dismissal unlawful and award the employee his or her average salary from the time of the unlawful dismissal until the execution of the court\u2019s decision, as well as severance pay (Article 297 \u00a7 4). Severance pay depends on the employee\u2019s length of service. If the employee, as the applicant in this case, has worked in a particular job for between 120 and 240 months, severance pay is equal to the sum of five average salaries (Article 140 \u00a7 1 (5)). 50.  As regards the interpretation and application of Article 297 \u00a7\u00a7 3 and 4 of the Labour Code, the Supreme Court summed up its well\u2011established practice in a ruling of 30 March 2010 in a civil case no. 3K\u20113\u2011139/2010. It observed that once a dismissal had been declared unlawful, it was for the court examining the case to verify whether any unfavourable conditions prevented the return of the employee to his previous job. The court had to examine the existence of such conditions ex officio, irrespective of whether the employee had relied on that ground in his claim. Similarly, the court was not bound by the employee\u2019s claim. Paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article 297 of the Labour Code were alternative measures to protect the employee\u2019s rights and promote social justice. Accordingly, should the court find that the employee could not return to his former job because of unfavourable conditions, it should apply Article 297 \u00a7 4 of the Labour Code as a remedy for the breach of the employee\u2019s rights. If no such unfavourable conditions had been established, the court should apply Article 297 \u00a7 3. 51.  Article 135 \u00a7 1 (2) and (4) of the Code of Civil Procedure at the relevant time provided that a civil claim must contain a description of the factual circumstances on which the claim was based (aplinkyb\u0117s, kuriomis ie\u0161kovas grind\u017eia savo reikalavim\u0105 (faktinis ie\u0161kinio pagrindas)), and the plaintiff\u2019s claim (ie\u0161kovo reikalavimas (ie\u0161kinio dalykas)). The plaintiff could change either the basis of the claim or the claim itself until the judge had decided to hear the case in a court hearing, or later in the proceedings if the respondent or the court did not object (Article 141 \u00a7 1). 52.  The Public Employment Act (1994:260) of the Kingdom of Sweden sets out that the Act applies to employees of the Swedish Parliament and its authorities and to employees of authorities under Government control. Section 3 of the Act explicitly states that it does not apply to employees who are taken on locally by the Swedish State abroad and who are not Swedish nationals. Labour law issues of such employees are normally regulated by contracts. 53.  Article 1 of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, in force in Lithuania as of 14 February 1992, reads as follows:\nArticle 1\n\u201cFor the purpose of the present Convention, the following expressions shall have the meanings hereunder assigned to them:\n(a)  The \u2018head of the mission\u2019 is the person charged by the sending State with the duty of acting in that capacity;\n(b)  The \u2018members of the mission\u2019 are the head of the mission and the members of the staff of the mission;\n(c)  The \u2018members of the staff of the mission\u2019 are the members of the diplomatic staff, of the administrative and technical staff and of the service staff of the mission;\n(d)  The \u2018members of the diplomatic staff\u2019 are the members of the staff of the mission having diplomatic rank;\n(e)  A \u2018diplomatic agent\u2019 is the head of the mission or a member of the diplomatic staff of the mission;\n(f)  The \u2018members of the administrative and technical staff\u2019 are the members of the staff of the mission employed in the administrative and technical service of the mission;\n...\u201d\nArticle 3\n\u201c1.  The functions of a diplomatic mission consist, inter alia, in:\n(a)  Representing the sending State in the receiving State; ...\n(d)  Ascertaining by all lawful means conditions and developments in the receiving State, and reporting thereon to the Government of the sending State;\n(e)  Promoting friendly relations between the sending State and the receiving State, and developing their economic, cultural and scientific relations. 2.  Nothing in the present Convention shall be construed as preventing the performance of consular functions by a diplomatic mission.\u201d\nArticle 38\n\u201c1.  Except insofar as additional privileges and immunities may be granted by the receiving State, a diplomatic agent who is a national of or permanently resident in that State shall enjoy only immunity from jurisdiction, and inviolability, in respect of official acts performed in the exercise of his functions. 2.  Other members of the staff of the mission and private servants who are nationals of or permanently resident in the receiving State shall enjoy privileges and immunities only to the extent admitted by the receiving State. However, the receiving State must exercise its jurisdiction over those persons in such a manner as not to interfere unduly with the performance of the functions of the mission.\u201d 54.  The relevant provisions of the 1972 European Convention on State Immunity (\u201cthe Basle Convention\u201d) read as follows:\nArticle 4\n\u201c1.  Subject to the provisions of Article 5, a Contracting State cannot claim immunity from the jurisdiction of the courts of another Contracting State if the proceedings relate to an obligation of the State, which, by virtue of a contract, falls to be discharged in the territory of the State of the forum. 2.  Paragraph 1 shall not apply where:\n(a)  in the case of a contract concluded between States;\n(b)  if the parties to the contract have otherwise agreed in writing;\n(c)  if the State is party to a contract concluded on its territory and the obligation of the State is governed by its administrative law.\u201d\nArticle 5\n\u201c1.  A Contracting State cannot claim immunity from the jurisdiction of a court of another Contracting State if the proceedings relate to a contract of employment between the State and an individual where the work has to be performed on the territory of the State of the forum. 2.  Paragraph 1 shall not apply where:\n(a)  the individual is a national of the employing State at the time when the proceedings are brought;\n(b)  at the time when the contract was entered into the individual was neither a national of the State of the forum nor habitually resident in that State; or\n(c)  the parties to the contract have otherwise agreed in writing, unless, in accordance with the law of the State of the forum, the courts of that State have exclusive jurisdiction by reason of the subject matter. ... \u201d 55.  The Convention\u2019s Explanatory Report indicates that \u201c[a]s regards contracts of employment with diplomatic missions or consular posts, Article 32 shall also be taken into account\u201d. That Article provides as follows:\nArticle 32\n\u201cNothing in the present Convention shall affect privileges and immunities relating to the exercise of the functions of diplomatic missions and consular posts and of persons connected with them.\u201d 56.  Neither Lithuania nor Sweden is party to the Basle Convention. The Lithuanian Supreme Court has, however, acknowledged the pertinence of general principles of international law, and in particular of that Convention when questions related to State immunity are being examined (see Cudak, cited above, \u00a7 17). 57.  In 1979 the United Nations International Law Commission (ILC) was given the task of codifying and gradually developing international law in matters of jurisdictional immunities of States and their property. It produced a number of drafts that were submitted to States for comment. The Draft Articles that were used as the basis for the text adopted in 2004 dated back to 1991. The relevant part of the text then read as follows:\nArticle 11 \u2013 Contracts of employment\n\u201c1.  Unless otherwise agreed between the States concerned, a State cannot invoke immunity from jurisdiction before a court of another State which is otherwise competent in a proceeding which relates to a contract of employment between the State and an individual for work performed or to be performed, in whole or in part, in the territory of that other State. 2.  Paragraph 1 does not apply if:\n(a)  the employee has been recruited to perform functions closely related to the exercise of governmental authority;\n(b)  the subject of the proceeding is the recruitment, renewal of employment or reinstatement of an individual;\n(c)  the employee was neither a national nor a habitual resident of the State of the forum at the time when the contract of employment was concluded;\n(d)  the employee is a national of the employer State at the time when the proceeding is instituted; or\n(e)  the employer State and the employee have otherwise agreed in writing, subject to any considerations of public policy conferring on the courts of the State of the forum exclusive jurisdiction by reason of the subject matter of the proceeding.\u201d 58.  In the commentary on Article 11 of the Draft Articles of 1991, the International Law Commission observed that the rules formulated in that Article appeared to be consistent with the trend in the legislative and treaty practice of a growing number of States. The Commission also held:\n(a)  Nature and scope of the exception of \u2018contracts of employment\u2019\n\u201c...\n(3)  With the involvement of two sovereign States, two legal systems compete for application of their respective laws. The employer State has an interest in the application of its law in regard to the selection, recruitment and appointment of an employee by the State or one of its organs, agencies or instrumentalities acting in the exercise of governmental authority. It would also seem justifiable that for the exercise of disciplinary supervision over its own staff or government employees, the employer State has an overriding interest in ensuring compliance with its internal regulations and the prerogative of appointment or dismissal which results from unilateral decisions taken by the State.\n(4)  On the other hand, the State of the forum appears to retain exclusive jurisdiction if not, indeed, an overriding interest in matters of domestic public policy regarding the protection to be afforded to its local labour force. Questions relating to medical insurance, insurance against certain risks, minimum wages, entitlement to rest and recreation, vacation with pay, compensation to be paid on termination of the contract of employment, and so forth, are of primary concern to the State of the forum, especially if the employees were recruited for work to be performed in that State, or at the time of recruitment were its nationals or habitual or permanent residents there. Beyond that, the State of the forum may have less reason to claim an overriding or preponderant interest in exercising jurisdiction. The basis for jurisdiction is distinctly and unmistakably the closeness of territorial connection between the contracts of employment and the State of the forum, namely performance of work in the territory of the State of forum, as well as the nationality or habitual residence of the employees. Indeed, local staff working, for example, in a foreign embassy would have no realistic way to present a claim other than in a court of the State of forum. Article 11, in this respect, provides an important guarantee to protect their rights. The employees covered under the present article include both regular employees and short-term independent contractors.\u201d\n(b)  The rule of non-immunity\n\u201c(5)  Article 11 therefore endeavours to maintain a delicate balance between the competing interests of the employer State with regard to application of its law and the overriding interests of the State of the forum for the application of its labour law and, in certain exceptional cases, also in retaining exclusive jurisdiction over the subject\u2011matter of a proceedings,\n(6)  Paragraph 1 thus represents an effort to state the rule of non-immunity. In its formulation, the basis for the exercise of jurisdiction by the competent court of the State of the forum is apparent from the place of performance of work under the contract of employment in the territory of the State of the forum. (...)\u201d\n(c)  Circumstances justifying maintenance of the rule of State immunity\n\u201c(8)  Paragraph 2 strives to establish and maintain an appropriate balance by introducing important limitations on the application of the rule of non-immunity, by enumerating circumstances where the rule of immunity still prevails.\n(9)  Paragraph 2 (a) enunciates the rule of immunity for the engagement of government employees or rank whose functions are closely related to the exercise of governmental authority. Examples of such employees are private secretaries, code clerks, interpreters, translators and other persons entrusted with functions related to State security or basic interest of the State. Officials of established accreditation are, of course, covered by this subparagraph. Proceedings relating to their contracts of employment will not be allowed to be instituted or entertained before the courts of the State of forum. The Commission on second reading considered that expression \u2018services associated with the exercise of governmental authority\u2019 which had appeared in the text adopted on first reading might lend itself to unduly extensive interpretation, since a contract of employment concluded by a State stood a good chance of being \u2018associated with the exercise of governmental authority\u2019, even very indirectly. It was suggested that the exception provided for in subparagraph (a) was justified only if there was a close link between the work to be performed and the exercise of governmental authority. The word \u2018associated\u2019 has therefore been amended to read \u2018closely related\u2019. (...)\n(10)  Paragraph 2 (b) is designed to confirm the existing practice of States in support of the rule of immunity in the exercise of the discretionary power of appointment or non-appointment by the State of an individual to any official post or employment position. This includes actual appointment which under the law of the employer State is considered to be a unilateral act of governmental authority. So also are the acts of \u2018dismissal\u2019 or \u2018removal\u2019 of a government employee by the State, which normally take place after the conclusion of an inquiry or investigation as part of supervisory or disciplinary jurisdiction exercised by the employer State. This subparagraph also covers cases where the employee seeks the renewal of his employment or reinstatement after untimely termination of his engagement. The rule of immunity applies to proceedings for recruitment, renewal or employment and reinstatement of an individual only. It is without prejudice to the possible recourse which may still be available in the State of forum for compensation or damages for \u2018wrongful dismissal\u2019 or for breaches of obligation to recruit or to renew employment. In other words, this subparagraph does not prevent an employee from bringing action against the employer State in the State of the forum to seek redress for damage arising from recruitment, renewal of the employment or reinstatement of an individual. The Commission on second reading replaced the words \u2018the proceeding relates to\u2019 adopted on first reading by the words \u2018the subject of the proceeding is\u2019 to clarify this particular point. (...)\u201d 59.  In December 2004 the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property (hereinafter \u2013 \u2018the 2004 United Nations Convention\u2019). It was opened for signature on 17 January 2005, and has not yet entered into force. One of the major issues that had arisen during the codification work by the ILC related to the exception from State immunity in so far as it related to employment contracts. The Convention, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:\nArticle 5 \u2013 State immunity\n\u201cA State enjoys immunity, in respect of itself and its property, from the jurisdiction of the courts of another State subject to the provisions of the present Convention.\u201d\nArticle 6 \u2013 Modalities for giving effect to State immunity\n\u201c1.  A State shall give effect to State immunity under article 5 by refraining from exercising jurisdiction in a proceeding before its courts against another State and to that end shall ensure that its courts determine on their own initiative that the immunity of that other State under article 5 is respected. 2.  A proceeding before a court of a State shall be considered to have been instituted against another State if that other State:\n(a)  is named as a party to that proceeding; or;\n(b)  is not named as a party to the proceeding but the proceeding in effect seeks to affect the property, rights, interests or activities of that other State.\u201d\nArticle 11 \u2013 Contracts of employment\n\u201c1.  Unless otherwise agreed between the States concerned, a State cannot invoke immunity from jurisdiction before a court of another State which is otherwise competent in a proceeding which relates to a contract of employment between the State and an individual for work performed or to be performed, in whole or in part, in the territory of that other State. 2.  Paragraph 1 does not apply if:\n(a)  the employee has been recruited to perform particular functions in the exercise of governmental authority;\n(b)  the employee is:\n(i)  a diplomatic agent, as defined in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961;\n(ii)  a consular officer, as defined in the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963;\n(iii)  a member of the diplomatic staff of a permanent mission to an international organisation or of a special mission, or is recruited to represent a State at an international conference; or\n(iv)  any other person enjoying diplomatic immunity;\n(c)  the subject matter of the proceeding is the recruitment, renewal of employment or reinstatement of an individual;\n(d)  the subject matter of the proceeding is the dismissal or termination of employment of an individual and, as determined by the head of State, the head of government or the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the employer State, such a proceeding would interfere with the security interests of that State;\n(e)  the employee is a national of the employer State at the time when the proceeding is instituted, unless this person has the permanent residence in the State of the forum; or\n(f)  the employer State and the employee have otherwise agreed in writing, subject to any considerations of public policy conferring on the courts of the State of the forum exclusive jurisdiction by reason of the subject matter of the proceeding.\u201d 60.  Lithuania did not vote against the adoption of that text but has not ratified it either (see Cudak, cited above, \u00a7 31). 61.  The Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters sets out, in part 13 of the Preamble, that in relation to employment the weaker party should be protected by rules of jurisdiction more favorable to his interests than the general rules provide for. The Regulation also reads:\nArticle 19\n\u201cAn employer domiciled in a Member State may be sued: 2.  in another Member State:\n(a)  in the courts for the place where the employee habitually carries out his work or in the courts for the last place where he did so, or\n(b)  if the employee does not or did not habitually carry out his work in any one country, in the courts for the place where the business which engaged the employee is or was situated.\u201d", "references": ["1", "7", "0", "8", "9", "4", "2", "5", "6", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicants complained of the excessive length of different civil and criminal proceedings under Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention. 7.  All applicants obtained decisions of the Constitutional Court of Serbia, which found a violation of their right to a hearing within reasonable time (see appended table for details of each civil proceedings and Constitutional Court\u2019s decisions). The court, additionally, declared that the applicants were entitled to the non-pecuniary damages sought, in accordance with Article 90 of the Constitutional Court Act (see paragraph 14, Article 90, below). 8.  All the applicants filed requests with the Commission for Compensation for payment of non-pecuniary damages. 9.  On 14 October 2010 the Commission for Compensation offered to pay Ms Prohaska Prodani\u0107 RSD 60,000 (at the time approximately EUR 600) for non-pecuniary damage incurred and RSD 25,000 for costs and expenses. She refused to accept that payment as the Commission did not specify the deadline by which the sum would be paid. On 15 September 2015, the Ministry of Justice paid her RSD 85,000. 10.  The applicant V. Tomi\u0107 contacted the Commission for Compensation on several occasions and requested the payment of non-pecuniary damage. It would appear that he had received no response. 11.  On 16 March 2011 the Commission for Compensation offered to pay Mr D. Trpkovi\u0107 RSD 35,000 (at the time approximately EUR 350), but he refused to accept this amount, deeming it insufficient.", "references": ["7", "1", "2", "5", "6", "9", "4", "0", "8", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The first applicant was born in 1952 and lives in Hausen (Canton of Aargau). The second applicant, who was born in 1990, is the son of the first applicant. He lives in Egypt. 6.  The first applicant entered Switzerland in 1997, where he applied for asylum in the same year. At that time, the second applicant remained in Egypt, where he was cared for by his mother. The first applicant\u2019s asylum application was rejected by the competent authorities. 7.  In March 1999 the first applicant married a Swiss national and obtained a residence permit. In 2000 a daughter was born to the couple. 8.  In 2002 the second applicant visited his father in Switzerland for three months based on a tourist visa valid for that period. 9.  In July 2003 the second applicant re-entered Switzerland for purposes of family reunification with his father. 10.  In February 2004 the first applicant was granted a permanent residence permit. In August 2004 he obtained Swiss nationality and has since held nationality of both Switzerland and Egypt. 11.  After encountering difficulties in school and with his step-mother, the second applicant returned to Egypt in January 2005, where he was cared for by his mother and his paternal grandmother. 12.  In 2006 the first applicant separated from his spouse. The latter continued to live in Switzerland with the couple\u2019s daughter. 13.  On 1 March 2006 the first applicant lodged a request for family reunification with the second applicant, who was 15 and a half years old at the time and for whom he had custody according to Egyptian law. 14.  On 15 February 2007 the Migration Office of the Canton of Aargau refused that request. 15.  On 12 March 2007 the applicant lodged an appeal against that decision with the Legal Unit of the Migration Office of the Canton of Aargau. 16.  On 6 June 2007 that authority dismissed the appeal. 17.  On 26 June 2007 the applicant lodged an appeal against that decision with the Court of Appeal in Foreigners\u2019 Law (Rekursgericht im Ausl\u00e4nderrecht) of the Canton of Aargau. 18.  On 7 September 2007 that court granted the applicant\u2019s appeal. In a very detailed decision it noted that the requirements for family reunification under Article 17 \u00a7 2 third sentence of the Act on the Residence of Foreign Nationals (Bundesgesetz \u00fcber Aufenthalt und Niederlassung der Ausl\u00e4nder, ANAG) were not met (see relevant domestic law and practice paragraphs 31\u201133 below). Largely basing its reasoning on Article 8 of the Convention, it considered, however, that the applicants\u2019 interests in respect for their family life prevailed over those of the public. It ordered the Migration Office of the Canton of Aargau to arrange for a residence permit for the second applicant. 19.  Subsequently, the Migration Office of the Canton of Aargau declared that it would grant a permanent residence permit to the second applicant for purposes of family reunification and, on 28 January 2008, transferred the file to the Federal Office of Migration to seek the required consent. On 4 March 2008 the latter refused to give its consent, finding that the requirements for family reunification were not met and that the decision of the court of the Canton of Aargau was in contradiction to the case-law of the Federal Supreme Court. 20.  On 4 April 2008 the first applicant lodged an appeal against that decision with the Federal Administrative Court, both in his own name and in that of his son. 21.  On 30 July 2009 the applicants informed the authorities that the situation of the second applicant had changed. His mother had moved to Kuwait with her new spouse and he was now cared for exclusively by his paternal grandmother. 22.  On 2 February 2010 the Federal Administrative Court dismissed the appeal. It noted, first, that the requirements for family reunification under Article 17 \u00a7 2 third sentence of the Act on the Residence of Foreign Nationals were not met (see relevant domestic law and practice paragraphs 31-33 below). It found, second, that the applicants could not rely on Article 8 of the Convention, as the second applicant had reached the age of adulthood and was not dependant on the first applicant (see relevant domestic law and practice paragraph 33 below). 23.  On 8 March 2010 the applicants lodged an appeal against that decision with the Federal Supreme Court. 24.  On 5 July 2010 the Federal Supreme Court dismissed that appeal. It considered, in particular, that the relationship between the two applicants was not paramount (\u201cvorrangig\u201d), even though the first applicant had the right of custody for the second applicant according to Egyptian law. It noted that the first applicant had not applied for family reunification immediately after his arrival in Switzerland, that the second applicant was cared for by his mother and his grandmother in Egypt until he turned 18 years, that the second applicant had lived almost all of his life in Egypt and had more important social and personal ties to his country of origin, which would be negatively affected if he moved to Switzerland, and that he had returned to Egypt after having stayed with his father in Switzerland for one and a half years. It observed that the first applicant had, thus, at that time, preferred that the second applicant lived with his mother and that the second applicant would face even more severe challenges to integration now than he had during his first stay in Switzerland, given his age. While noting that the first applicant had a close relationship to his daughter in Switzerland and that he could, thus, not be expected to relocate to Egypt to live there with the second applicant, the court noted that the applicants had not submitted sufficient reasons to justify the second applicant\u2019s reunion with his father in Switzerland. 25.  Moreover, the Federal Supreme Court considered that the circumstances of the present case differed from those of Tuquabo-Tekle and Others v. the Netherlands, no. 60665/00, 1 December 2005. The latter concerned a situation where only one parent, the child\u2019s mother, was still alive. The mother had tried to bring her child to the Netherlands as soon as possible after her arrival. Moreover, the child\u2019s grandmother who cared for her in Ethiopia had taken the child out of school against the mother\u2019s will and planned a forced marriage. 26.  On 7 October 2010 the Court refused to apply Rule 39 of the Rules of the Court.", "references": ["0", "9", "3", "5", "1", "2", "7", "8", "6", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1976 and lives in Achkhoy-Martan, Chechen Republic. 5.  On 13 January 2001 two soldiers of the Russian federal forces M. and P. came to the applicant\u2019s house to buy drugs. After the applicant sold heroin to them, unknown persons attacked the soldiers, put them in a car and took them to a hide-out where they were kept for five days. The kidnappers also took M.\u2019s automatic gun. The soldiers were released by law-enforcement officers on 18 January 2001. The gun was never found. 6.  On an unspecified date the authorities opened a criminal investigation into the soldiers\u2019 abduction. The applicant was the only suspect. Other perpetrators had not been identified. 7.  According to the applicant, on 4 April 2007 at approximately 7 p.m. he was arrested on suspicion of having participated in abduction of M. and P. According to the arrest record, the applicant was arrested on 5 April 2007 at 10:40 a.m. 8.  On 6 April 2007 the Achkhoy-Martan District Court of the Chechen Republic authorised the applicant\u2019s detention pending the criminal proceedings against him. 9.  On an unspecified date the investigator questioned M. and P. Both of them submitted that they had been abducted from the inner yard adjacent to the applicant\u2019s house. They had come to the applicant\u2019s house to buy drugs. The applicant had asked them to enter to help him move the car that had been parked inside. After they had been done with the car, they had been attacked by four persons. M. had cried out to the applicant for help, but the applicant had done nothing. After that they had been blindfolded, put in a car and taken to another place. 10.  On 26 June 2007 the District Court found the applicant guilty of abduction and theft of firearms and sentenced him to seven years\u2019 imprisonment. The court relied on the statements of M. and P. given during the questioning by the investigator, the written statements made by their parents to whom M. and P. had told about their abduction, the written statements made by other soldiers who confirmed that M. and P. had been missing in 2001. Investigator Mir. testified in court as regards his questioning of M. and P. The court also heard a number of the applicant\u2019s relatives and neighbours who testified as to the applicant\u2019s character and the curfew introduced in the village in 2001 and studied the materials from the case-file prepared by the investigator. As regards the use of M. and P.\u2019s written statements, the court noted as follows:\n\u201c... According to [the rules of criminal procedure], if the victim of the crime fails to appear in court, the court, if requested by a party to the proceedings or of its own motion, may decide to have the [victim\u2019s] earlier statement read out in the event of a natural calamity or other extraordinary circumstances preventing the [victim\u2019s] appearance in court. The court considers that the victims were prevented from appearing in court for the following reasons: their psychological state, i.e, their lack of desire to reminisce about the circumstances of the abduction coupled with deprivation of liberty and, possibly, with the life threat, and to live through this again; lack of safety during the trip to Chechen Republic where the political situation is still troublesome, especially ... for ethnic Russians who are not locals; a risk that the [applicant\u2019s] relatives might put pressure on them; and the fact that they live far away and do not have means to pay for the trip to attend the court hearing. The court considers such circumstances to be extraordinary and preventing the victims from appearing in court.\u201d 11.  On 15 August 2007 the Supreme Court of the Chechen Republic upheld the applicant\u2019s conviction on appeal. 12.  On 26 December 2011 the applicant was released.", "references": ["2", "7", "8", "0", "4", "1", "6", "5", "9", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1974 and lived in the Sverdlovsk Region. 5.  On 6 April 2012 the Leninskiy District Court in Nizhniy Tagil issued a detention order in respect of the applicant who had been charged with murder and had absconded. The order was to be valid for an initial period of two months following the applicant\u2019s arrest. 6.  On 19 February 2013 the applicant was apprehended in China and extradited to Russia. 7.  On 30 April 2013 the Leninskiy district prosecutor asked the District Court to extend the applicant\u2019s detention for a further two months. On the same day the District Court granted the application in part. It extended the authorised period of detention \u201cfor one month, until 19 May\u201d. 8.  The applicant filed an appeal. He complained, in particular, that the initial two-month detention period had expired already on 19 April 2013 and that his subsequent detention had been unlawful. 9.  On 10 June 2013 the Sverdlovsk Regional Court rejected the appeal. On 26 September 2013 a judge of the Regional Court refused the applicant leave to appeal to the regional cassation instance. 10.  On 4 March 2014 a judge of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation refused the applicant leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. The judge noted, in particular, that the belated filing of an application for an extension of the authorised period of detention was not a ground for varying the custodial measure.", "references": ["9", "5", "3", "0", "4", "8", "7", "6", "1", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "5.  The Republic of Karelia (\u201cKarelia\u201d) is a subject (constituent region) of the Russian Federation. Under Article 73 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, subjects of the Federation possess the full authority of the Russian State in all matters other than those that come within the sole jurisdiction of the federal government or within the shared jurisdiction of federal subjects and the federal government to the degree of the latter\u2019s scope of authority. 6.  At the relevant time, the Legislative Assembly of Karelia (hereinafter \u201cthe LA\u201d) had fifty members elected by universal direct suffrage for a five-year term. Twenty-five seats were allocated on a proportional representation basis to registered party lists receiving at least 7% of the region-wide vote, while the remaining seats were allocated to the winners of twenty-five single-mandate constituencies, determined by majority vote. There was no minimum turnout for the election to be valid, and each voter could only vote for one party and one candidate in the electoral constituency in which he or she resided. 7.  The regional branch of the Yabloko political party was registered by a competent State authority (at that time the regional department of the Ministry of Justice) in 2002. 8.  On 26 April 2006 the regional council of the applicant party called for a regional party conference to be held in two sessions on 27 May and 12 August 2006, respectively. The aim was to prepare for the LA elections that were to take place in autumn 2006. 9.  Between 27 April 2006 and 26 May 2006 local party branches throughout Karelia held assemblies and conferences in accordance with the Yabloko party\u2019s articles of association (hereinafter, \u201cthe charter\u201d) and selected delegates to attend the regional party conference. At the time, the regional party had over 3,800 members, of whom 474 were so-called \u201cregistered party members\u201d, that is, members who had specifically asked to be registered with the local party bodies in order to participate more actively in the party\u2019s work, such as regional conferences. As a result, the 474 registered members elected forty-seven delegates to the regional conference. 10.  On 27 May 2006 thirty-seven delegates present at the conference expressed their desire to participate in the upcoming LA elections. The nomination of candidates to the party list and electoral circuits was left to the second session scheduled for 12 August 2006. 11.  On 10 and 11 June 2006 the Yabloko party at national level held its Thirteenth Party Congress, which adopted several amendments to the party\u2019s charter. The charter maintained the division between party members and registered party members. In accordance with paragraph 9.1.14 of both versions the right to elect and be elected to the party\u2019s governing and controlling bodies was reserved to registered members. The 2006 version specified, additionally, that party members who did not register automatically delegated the right to elect and be elected within the party to the registered party members of the relevant local branch. 12.  On 4 July 2006 the LA set an election date of 8 October 2006. 13.  On 27 July 2006 the amendments to the Yabloko national party charter were registered with the Federal Registration Service, upon which date they came into force. 14.  On 12 August 2006 the regional party conference resumed. Thirty-seven of the forty-seven party delegates were present, and a quorum was declared. In accordance with the party\u2019s charter, the conference nominated a 25-member party list and candidates for three electoral constituencies by secret ballot. The second and third applicants were chosen to run for office in two single-mandate constituencies. 15.  The conference was attended by two representatives from the Karelia Directorate of the Federal Registration Service of the Ministry of Justice, and two members of the Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Karelia (\u201cthe Electoral Commission\u201d). At that time they did not report any irregularities in the conduct of the regional party conference. 16.  On 16 August 2006 the applicant party submitted documents to the Electoral Commission in order to participate in the forthcoming election. On 21 August 2006 it paid the requisite deposits (150,000 Russian roubles (RUB) in respect of the party list and RUB 60,000 in respect of each of the three single-mandate candidates). 17.  On 17 and 22 August 2006, after reviewing the documents, the Electoral Commission issued Orders nos. 65/343-3 and 66/352-3, by which it registered the applicant party\u2019s three candidates, including the second and third applicants, and the party list. 18.  On 31 August 2006 the Karelia Directorate of the Federal Registration Service wrote to the Electoral Commission and informed it that the party conference of 12 August 2006 had been based on the participation of registered party members, and not party members in general. It referred to the provisions of the legislation on political parties (see below) which guaranteed equal rights of participation in party activities for all members. It argued that the party could not make a distinction between registered and other party members for the purposes of internal activities. As such, the conference of 12 August 2006 had been held in breach of the applicable legislation. 19.  On 8 September 2006 the Electoral Commission applied to the Supreme Court of the Republic of Karelia (hereinafter the Karelia Supreme Court) to annul its own decision to register the party list and single-mandate candidates. Referring to the letter of 31 August 2006, the Commission referred to the provision of the Basic Guarantees Act allowing the judicial annulment of the registration of individual candidates and party lists where \u201cnew facts\u201d had come to light showing a violation of federal or regional law regulating the nomination of candidates. 20.  In the meantime, on 11 September 2006 the Electoral Commission wrote to the head of the Federal Registration Service and informed him of the application lodged with the court. It also enquired which version of the charter should be applicable to the party conference of 12 August 2006 since the party had submitted the 2004 version to the Commission. 21.  On 12 September 2006 the Federal Registration Service replied to the Electoral Commission that the new charter had been registered by that service on 27 July 2006 and that on the same day the old version of the document had ceased to be valid. The regional party should therefore have submitted the new version as the one applicable to their conference of 12 August 2006. At the same time, the Service stated that in June 2006 Yabloko had received a warning from it in connection with its differentiating between registered and other party members, and that the new version of the charter had contained provisions designed to correct that. In view of those considerations, the decision of the regional conference of 12 August 2006, which had been based on the previous version and had taken only registered members into account, could be seen as being in breach of the relevant legislation. 22.  On 15 September 2006 the Karelia Supreme Court allowed the application of the Electoral Commission and annulled the decisions of 17 and 22 August 2006 to register the applicant party\u2019s list and candidates. It referred to the conclusions of the Federal Registration Service and found that the procedure whereby only registered members had taken part in the decision-making process had contradicted the legislation on elections and on political parties. It also noted that the party had submitted an invalid version of its charter. 23.  More specifically, the court concluded that the annulment decision was justified because the participation of a minority of the party\u2019s regional membership in the nomination process had thwarted \u201cthe will of the majority\u201d, finding as follows:\n\u201cIf one takes a formal approach to the problem it seems that all the requirements governing the nomination of the lists of candidates were observed.\nAt the same time the court believes that the procedure for the nomination of the lists of candidates [to the LA] was breached.\nIt was established at the court hearing that only so-called \u2018registered members of the party\u2019 participated and nominated the lists of candidates [to the LA] at the regional conference.\nWhat is the difference between \u2018registered members of the party\u2019 and \u2018unregistered members\u2019? Let us turn to section 7 of the party\u2019s charter...\nThe practice of applying these provisions of the charter in the party\u2019s regional division in the Republic of Karelia is such ... that members of the party determine themselves whether to actively participate in the work of the regional branch of the party or to participate [only] as needed ... Accordingly, they decide whether to register with the regional branch or not. If a party member asks to be registered, one of the local branches, or the regional one, registers him with the [relevant] branch. From that moment the party member obtains the rights provided for by p. 9.1.14 of the charter...\nIt is impossible to agree with applying the party\u2019s charter in such a way. ...\nSection 8.4 of the [Political Parties Act] states that political parties should provide an equal opportunity for representation in a party\u2019s governing bodies, in election lists and other positions ... Section 23.4 and 5 of the [Political Parties Act] establish that members of political parties take part in its functioning, have rights and bear obligations in line with the charter. Members have the right to elect and be elected to the party\u2019s governing bodies, ... receive information about the party\u2019s activities and the work of its governing bodies. However, this right, under p. 9.1.14 of the [Yabloko] charter, is reserved to a limited number of persons \u2013 \u2018registered members\u2019 \u2013 which in turn breaches the principle of the equality of party members as set out in Section 8.1 of the [Political Parties Act].\nAs a result, while the number of party members in Karelia was 3,824 (1 April 2006), the Conference was attended by 37 delegates who represented 394 registered members (15% of the total number of members). ...\nA democratic regime is characterised by the wide participation of the population in forming the organs of State authority and a wide spectrum of political rights and freedoms for citizens governed by the rule of law, the protection of the rights and legal interests of citizens and others. One can imagine that those exact same elements should appear in the activities of any democratic party.\nThe Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation has emphasised the significance of the principle of the mandatory will of the majority, pointing out that \u2018...elections as a means of determining the will of the people and forming the corresponding legitimate organs of State authority and local government, on whose behalf they exercise public authority, is based on the priority of the will of the majority of voters taking part in the vote\u2019 (ruling of the Constitutional Court of 5 November 1998...).\nThis principle applies with equal measure to the nomination of lists of candidates to [the legislature], since the basis for forming the representative bodies are the [candidates] nominated by political parties.\nIn this specific case the principle of the \u2018will of the majority\u2019 was violated.\nIn such circumstances, the court believes that the order for submitting electoral lists of candidates to the Karelia LA has been breached.\u201d 24.  The court dismissed the applicant party\u2019s argument that interpreting the law in such a way constituted interference by the State authorities with the party\u2019s internal organisation. The court responded by saying that it had been the conference\u2019s duty to ensure compliance with the applicable legislation. 25.  Lastly, the court noted that the party had submitted an invalid version of its charter. As a consequence, the court cancelled the registration orders of 17 and 22 August 2006. 26.  The applicant party lodged an appeal against that decision with the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. It stressed that the difference in treatment between registered and other party members could not be regarded as a \u201cnewly discovered fact\u201d since it had been based on the party\u2019s charter of 2004, which had been registered with the relevant service. A record of the entire proceedings of the conference had been submitted to the Karelia Registration Service, together with a copy of the charter on which both stages of the conference had been based. The party also pointed out that the Service had had two members present at the conference in August 2006, and therefore should have been fully aware of the procedure applied. 27.  On 29 September 2006 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation dismissed the applicant party\u2019s appeal, with reasoning that was similar to that of the Karelia Supreme Court. 28.  As a result of the annulment order coming into force the applicant party lost its election deposits. 29.  On 8 October 2006 elections to the Fourth Legislative Assembly took place. The party list and the single constituency candidates nominated by the applicant party were not present on the ballot. The fourth applicant submitted that she had cast a ballot for the Yabloko party list, but that her choice had not been counted in the election results. 30.  The Government submitted the following information about the elections which took place on 8 October 2006. Seven parties competed for places in the regional assembly: the Karelia branch of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) (obtained 12.77% of the votes cast), the Party of National Resurrection \u201cPeople\u2019s Will\u201d (1.58%), the regional branch of the Patriots of Russia party (4.39%), the regional branch of United Russia (38.92%), the regional branch of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) (8.86%), the regional branch of the Russian Party for Life (16.19%) and the regional branch of the Russian Pensioners\u2019 Party (12.06%). The total number of people who voted in the elections was 183,503, or 32.98% of the electorate. 31.  The Government also presented information about the subsequent election to the Karelia LA, in which Yabloko candidates had participated. That election took place on 4 December 2011 and had five parties competing. Yabloko obtained 7.13% of the votes and had deputies elected to the LA. A total of 50.03% of voters took part.", "references": ["9", "0", "5", "2", "3", "6", "4", "1", "8", "7", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1987 and lives in Helsinki, Finland. 7.  On 19 February 2007 the Harju County Court in Estonia convicted the applicant of murder. In the criminal proceedings T. was heard as a witness. In its judgment the domestic court dismissed the applicant\u2019s argument that he had shot the victim in self-defence. The applicant was subsequently transferred to Finland to serve his prison sentence. 8.  On 11 December 2008 V., the owner of the apartment where the applicant had committed the crime brought a civil action against the applicant before the Harju County Court. He claimed compensation for damage caused as a consequence of the offence (damaged chair which had been hit by the bullet, damaged or lost belongings (mostly various items used to wrap parts of the victim\u2019s cut up body), damaged flooring after the police had cut out a piece of parquet with a bullet mark to serve as evidence, a lock cylinder removed for evidence, cleaning bills, unpaid utility bills) in the amount of 28,259 kroons (EEK) (corresponding to approximately 1,806 euros (EUR)). The plaintiff submitted to the court documentary evidence (material from the criminal case, photos, invoices, inventory list of the apartment attached to the contract between V. and the victim) in support of his claims. 9.  On 14 January 2009 the County Court ruled that the action was accepted for proceedings and that the case was to be dealt with in simplified proceedings (lihtsustatud menetlus) under Article 405 \u00a7 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CCP) (Tsiviilkohtumenetluse seadustik). It also explained to the parties that if they wished to be heard, they would have to notify the court within fifteen days of the date of receiving the decision. The applicant was asked to provide the court with a written reply to the action. 10.  On 8 April 2009 the applicant informed the County Court in writing that he did not object to accepting the action for proceedings but he contested the claim, arguing that he had not damaged or destroyed the items in question. He further contended that he had not committed murder but had shot the victim in self-defence; in so far as the alleged damage related to the collection of evidence, it had been caused by the police; the claims were unsubstantiated in part. He requested examination of the case at a court hearing and asked that he and two witnesses (T. and K. \u2013 Estonian and Finnish forensic experts) be summoned and questioned in court. He stated that he wished to explain that he had not caused the damage and had acted in self-defence. As to the witnesses, he also wished them to give evidence about his acting in self-defence. 11.  On 7 May 2009 plaintiff V. replied in writing to the applicant\u2019s submissions, stating that he did not deem it necessary for the applicant to be present in person at the court hearing. He asked the court to dismiss the applicant\u2019s request for the summoning of witnesses, as these individuals would be unable to give testimony about the items in the apartment or their value, and their statements could not refute the findings of a final court decision. He also submitted additional evidence to the court (a photo of one of the items in question; a bank statement about the payment of utility bills; price lists to prove the cost of another damaged item and the cost of cleaning services). 12.  On 8 July 2010 the County Court ruled that the case was to be examined in written proceedings (kirjalik menetlus) under Article 404 of the CCP. The court noted the plaintiff\u2019s agreement to the case being examined in written proceedings and that the applicant wished to be heard. It then went on to explain that under Article 404 of the CCP a written procedure could be applied when the amount of the claim was under 50,000 kroons (EUR 3,196) and a party\u2019s appearance in court was significantly hindered by a long distance or for any other good reason. It gave the parties a thirty\u2011day time-limit from the date of receipt of the decision for making any written submissions. No appeal lay against this decision. 13.  No submissions were made to the court within the thirty-day time limit. 14.  By a judgment of 3 December 2010 the County Court adjudicated the case in simplified and written proceedings. The court noted in its judgment that it had also examined the material pertinent to the related criminal case and relied as documentary evidence on the statements made by T. in the criminal proceedings. Relying on the judgment in the criminal case, the County Court considered it established that the applicant had not acted in self-defence when he killed the victim. Based on the material of the criminal case as well as documentary evidence submitted by V., the County Court accepted V.\u2019s claim in part, that is in the amount of EEK 22,337 (EUR 1,428, which amounted to 79% of the initial claim). The court found on the basis of the applicant\u2019s submissions that accepting the claim was not justified in so far as it concerned the lock cylinder, unpaid utility bills and certain allegedly damaged items. It was noted in the judgment that an appeal lay to the Tallinn Court of Appeal and that the appeal could be examined in a written procedure unless examination at a court hearing had been requested in the appeal. 15.  On 22 December 2010 the applicant filed an appeal against the County Court\u2019s judgment. He complained that, although he had requested an oral hearing before the County Court, no hearing had been held. He had therefore been deprived of an opportunity to be examined and to explain his position, according to which he had caused no unlawful damage to the plaintiff\u2019s property. He relied on Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention and also referred to persons whose examination he had requested. He challenged the County Court\u2019s reliance on the criminal court\u2019s judgment and claimed that in a civil case it should be possible to challenge facts established in a criminal case. 16.  On 7 January 2011 the Tallinn Court of Appeal refused to accept the applicant\u2019s appeal. It noted that the County Court had examined the case in simplified proceedings (lihtmenetlus). In such circumstances, the Court of Appeal could only accept an appeal for examination if the County Court in its judgment had granted leave to appeal or a provision of substantive or procedural law had clearly been incorrectly applied or it was clear that the evidence had been wrongly assessed and this could have significantly influenced the court\u2019s ruling. The County Court had not granted leave to appeal. The Court of Appeal did not find that in the case at hand it could be said that the County Court had clearly incorrectly applied a provision of substantive or procedural law or clearly wrongly assessed the evidence or breached the right to be heard (\u00e4rakuulamise \u00f5igus). The County Court had examined the matter under Article 405 \u00a7 1 of the CCP in simplified proceedings. Pursuant to Article 405 \u00a7 1 of the CCP, in such proceedings the court had to guarantee that the fundamental rights and freedoms and the essential procedural rights of the parties were observed and that the parties were heard (kohus kuulab menetlusosalise \u00e4ra) if they so requested. However, for that it was not necessary for a court hearing (kohtuistung) to be conducted. On 8 July 2010 the County Court had ruled that the case was to be examined in written proceedings and had given the parties an opportunity to make written submissions. The applicant had thus been guaranteed an opportunity to present his position to the court. The Court of Appeal further noted that the applicant had not objected under Article 333 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 2 of the CCP to the County Court\u2019s decision of 8 July 2010 whereby the court had ordered that the case be examined in simplified proceedings and requested the applicant to make his submissions in writing. Pursuant to Article 333 \u00a7 3 and Article 652 \u00a7 6 of the CCP (see paragraphs 19 and 20 below) the Court of Appeal could not therefore consider these arguments in the appellate proceedings. The Court of Appeal concluded that there was no legal basis for it to accept the applicant\u2019s appeal for examination. 17.  The applicant lodged an appeal against the Court of Appeal\u2019s decision, arguing that by refusing to allow him a hearing the County Court had clearly violated procedural law and Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention. 18.  On 30 May 2011 the Supreme Court decided not to examine the appeal.", "references": ["7", "2", "0", "8", "4", "9", "5", "1", "6", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1944 and lives in Sofia. 5.  The applicant\u2019s father owned a house with a yard in Sofia, which were expropriated by a decision of the mayor of 16 April 1987 with a view to constructing embassy buildings. The decision, based on section 98 (1) of the Territorial and Urban Planning Act of 1973 (\u0417\u0430\u043a\u043e\u043d \u0437\u0430 \u0442\u0435\u0440\u0438\u0442\u043e\u0440\u0438\u0430\u043b\u043d\u043e\u0442\u043e \u0438 \u0441\u0435\u043b\u0438\u0449\u043d\u043e \u0443\u0441\u0442\u0440\u043e\u0439\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e \u2013 \u201cthe TUPA\u201d), stated that the applicant\u2019s father was to be compensated with a two-room flat and the applicant was to be compensated with another, three-room, flat. 6.  By a supplementary decision of 15 April 1988, based on section 100 of the TUPA, the mayor determined the exact location, size and other details in respect of the future flats to be offered in compensation. The flats were to be situated in a building which had to be constructed by the Bureau for Servicing the Diplomatic Corps (\u201cthe BSDC\u201d). The one to be provided to the applicant\u2019s father measured 64.26 square metres. 7.  In 1987 the applicant\u2019s parents and the applicant and his family were settled in a two-room municipally-owned flat. 8.  In 1991 the plans for the construction of the building where the future flats offered in compensation were to be located were cancelled. 9.  The expropriated house was pulled down and the construction works on the plot of land started on an unspecified date. 10.  In February 1996 the applicant\u2019s father passed away. 11.  By a decision of the mayor of 10 July 1996 the applicant was allocated another flat, with a surface which was about 28 square metres bigger than the surface of the flat originally offered in compensation to him. He was not required to pay an additional amount for the bigger flat. On an unspecified date in 1996 the applicant and his family moved in that dwelling, and his mother continued occupying the municipally-owned flat. 12.  In the years that followed the applicant filed numerous requests with the authorities, asking them to find a suitable two-room flat to be provided to him and his mother in lieu of the one which had initially been due. On several occasions before 2001 the BSDC proposed flats but the applicant and his mother turned them down, either because they were not in the vicinity of the expropriated property or because they were not self-contained dwellings. 13.  On 10 June 2004 the applicant requested that the mayor of Sofia offer as compensation one of the several flats in the vicinity of the expropriated property managed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, successor to the BSDC. The request was made in accordance with section 103 (5) of the TUPA providing for the so-called re-compensation (\u043f\u0440\u0435\u043e\u0431\u0435\u0437\u0449\u0435\u0442\u044f\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0435). As no response followed, the applicant lodged an appeal against the mayor\u2019s tacit refusal. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also participated in the proceedings. In a final judgment of 9 April 2008 the Supreme Administrative Court quashed the tacit refusal and remitted the case back to the mayor for examination of the request. It held that it was the duty of the mayor, and not of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to provide a flat to the heirs of the applicant\u2019s father. 14.  It appears that even after that judgment the mayor never took a decision on the applicant\u2019s request for re-compensation. 15.  In the meantime, the applicant\u2019s mother was evicted from the municipally-owned flat she had been occupying. In 2007 she died, whereupon the applicant became the sole owner of the future flat allocated in compensation to his father for the 1987 expropriation. 16.  In 2014, after the present application\u2019s communication to the Government, the applicant was requested to file once again with the Sofia mayor a formal re-compensation request. He did so on 4 August 2014. It is unclear whether any decision on the matter has been taken after that.", "references": ["5", "1", "2", "6", "3", "8", "0", "4", "7", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1949 and lives in Baku. 6.  The applicant\u2019s daughter (S.J.) was born in 1979 and was married to an officer of the Ministry of National Security (\u201cthe MNS\u201d). 7.  On an unspecified date in 2006 S.J. brought a civil action against her husband for divorce. In November 2006 the divorce proceedings were pending before the Binagadi District Court. 8.  On 15 November 2006 S.J. fell from the balcony of a flat on the seventh floor of a block of flats. 9.  At 1 p.m. on 15 November 2006 S.J. was admitted to the Clinical Medical Centre where she was placed in the intensive care unit. On arrival at the hospital, she was diagnosed with traumatic brain injury, blunt trauma of the stomach, fractures of various bones and traumatic shock. 10.  On 20 November 2006 S.J. was transferred to the Oil Workers\u2019 Hospital where she died on the same day. 11.  On 16 November 2006 criminal proceedings were instituted under Article 125 (incitement to suicide) of the Criminal Code by the Binagadi district prosecutor\u2019s office. 12.  On 20 November 2006 the investigator in charge of the case ordered a post-mortem forensic examination of S.J., which was carried out on the same day. Forensic report no. 143 dated 14 December 2006 showed that S.J.\u2019s death resulted from traumatic shock caused by rupture of the bladder and numerous bone fractures. The expert also found that there were various injuries on S.J.\u2019s body which might have been sustained because of her fall from the balcony or in other circumstances. 13.  It appears from the documents in the case file that in November 2006, and in January, March and April 2007, various people, including the applicant, S.J.\u2019s husband, colleagues and relatives, were questioned as witnesses by the prosecuting authorities within the framework of the criminal proceedings. 14.  In the meantime, on 6 February 2007 the criminal case was assigned to the Baku city prosecutor\u2019s office. 15.  On 24 and 26 February 2007 an investigator at the Baku city prosecutor\u2019s office ordered a commission to carry out a forensic examination of S.J.\u2019s death. 16.  In April 2007 a histological forensic examination was conducted on the basis of twenty-two samples taken from S.J.\u2019s organs, including the stomach, lungs, liver and intestines. The experts issued forensic histological report no. 318 dated 26 April 2007, concluding that there were toxic changes in S.J.\u2019s liver and digestive organs. 17.  In June 2007 a commission, formed on the basis of the investigator\u2019s decisions of 24 and 26 February 2007 and composed of three experts, issued forensic report no. K81/2007. The experts, who conducted the examination on the basis of S.J.\u2019s medical records from 15 to 20 November 2006 and the results of the post-mortem and histological forensic examinations, concluded that the cause of the death was \u201cgeneral poisoning\u201d (\u00fcmumi intoksikasiya) which had resulted from endogenic toxic substances developed in the body owing to multiple traumas and toxic substances introduced into the digestive organs. The experts confirmed the existence of various injuries on S.J.\u2019s body, finding that there was a causal link between the injuries she had sustained and her death. 18.  On 24 August 2007 the investigator ordered a new forensic examination of S.J.\u2019s death by a commission. In particular, he asked the experts to determine the cause of death, to establish what kind of injuries had been on S.J.\u2019s body and in what order they had been inflicted. He further asked them to determine which of those injuries had been sustained as a result of the fall and which of them had been caused by a blunt object. 19.  A commission composed of four experts issued forensic report no. K69/2007 which confirmed the findings of forensic report no. K81/2007 on the cause of death. In that connection, the experts concluded that the death had resulted from poisoning. However, they pointed out that they were not able to determine the origin of the poisoning because no blood sample or sample from the digestive system had been taken for chemical forensic examination during the forensic examination conducted immediately after the death. The experts further concluded that some of the injuries found on S.J.\u2019s body could not have been sustained as a result of a fall and had been inflicted by a blunt object beforehand. 20.  In the meantime, in April and November 2007 two forensic trace evidence examinations were carried out at the request of the investigator. The forensic reports, dated 10 April and 29 November 2007, took into consideration the place where S.J.\u2019s body had made contact with the ground and concluded that she could have jumped from the balcony. Moreover, a forensic report dated 10 May 2007 concluded that S.J. had been feeling low before her death and that signs of depression and neurological issues had been observed at that time. 21.  On 5 February 2008 a face-to-face confrontation was held between the applicant and the father of S.J.\u2019s husband. 22.  On 5 February 2008 the investigator ordered a new commission to carry out a forensic examination of S.J.\u2019s death. A commission composed of five experts issued forensic report no. K69/2008 which repeated the findings of the previous reports about it being impossible to identify the origin of the poisoning. The experts also confirmed the findings of the previous reports as to the existence on S.J.\u2019s body of various injuries sustained by a blunt object and not by a fall. 23.  On 30 March 2008 the criminal case was assigned to the Serious Crimes Unit of the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office. 24.  On 28 July and 16 October 2008 the applicant\u2019s lawyer wrote to the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office complaining of the ineffectiveness of the investigation. The lawyer noted that he had been threatened by telephone because S.J.\u2019s husband, an MNS officer, was involved in the criminal case. He also asked the prosecuting authorities to identify the people who had made the threatening calls. 25.  By a decision of 2 September 2008, the investigator granted the applicant victim (z\u0259r\u0259r \u00e7\u0259kmi\u015f \u015f\u0259xs) status. 26.  On 24 September 2008 the applicant lodged a request with the investigator in charge of the case to reclassify it under Article 120 of the Criminal Code (murder). In particular, relying on the findings of the forensic reports that some of the injuries on S.J.\u2019s body had been sustained before her fall from the balcony, the applicant stated that S.J. had been beaten beforehand and had then been thrown from the balcony by force. He also pointed out that she had been poisoned in the hospital, which had caused her death. 27.  On 6 October 2008 the applicant wrote again to the investigator, reiterating his request of 24 September 2008. 28.  By a decision of 6 October 2008, the investigator refused to grant the applicant\u2019s request, finding that at that stage of the proceedings there was no evidence that S.J. had been murdered. 29.  On 27 October 2008 the applicant appealed against that decision to the Deputy Prosecutor General, reiterating his previous complaints. 30.  By a letter of 10 November 2008, the Deputy Prosecutor General rejected the request. 31.  By a letter of 22 November 2008, the Prosecutor General informed the applicant that numerous investigative steps had been taken and that the investigation was waiting for the determination of the origin and nature of the poisoning. 32.  On 12 December 2008 the applicant complained to the Deputy Prosecutor General, noting that contrary to the requirements of the criminal law he had not received any reasoned decision concerning his request of 27 October 2008, but had received only a letter dated 10 November 2008 which had informed him that his request had been rejected. 33.  On 30 December 2008 the applicant complained to the Prosecutor General. In particular, he claimed that the investigation had not been effective, that the Deputy Prosecutor General\u2019s decision against reclassifying the criminal case as murder under Article 120 of the Criminal Code had not provided sufficient reasoning, and that the investigation had failed to examine S.J.\u2019s blood sample. 34.  On 27 October 2009 the applicant brought a civil action against the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office, asking the court to order the prosecuting authorities to carry out an effective investigation into his daughter\u2019s death. 35.  On 29 October 2009 the Sabail District Court refused to admit the claim, finding that a complaint about acts and omissions by the prosecuting authorities could not be examined in civil proceedings. 36.  On 5 November 2009 the investigator ordered a new commission to carry out a forensic examination of S.J.\u2019s death. A commission composed of ten experts issued forensic report no. 239/KES dated 25 November 2009 which reiterated the findings of the previous forensic examinations about it being impossible to identify the origin of the poisoning and the existence of various injuries on S.J.\u2019s body which had been sustained before her fall from the balcony. The experts further found that it had been possible to administer the toxic substances to S.J. while she was in the clinic. 37.  In the meantime, it appears from the documents in the case file that in September and December 2008, and in January, April, October and November 2009, the prosecuting authorities questioned various people as witnesses, including the experts who had participated in the forensic examinations, S.J.\u2019s husband and his relatives. 38.  On 19 December 2009 a new forensic trace evidence examination conducted at the request of the investigator confirmed that S.J. could have fallen to the place her body was found as a result of jumping from the balcony. 39.  On 25 January 2010 the applicant again requested that the prosecuting authorities reclassify the case as murder under Article 120 of the Criminal Code, taking into consideration the fact that the death had resulted from an unidentified poison and that various injuries on S.J.\u2019s body had been sustained before her fall from the balcony. 40.  By a letter of 2 March 2010, the Deputy Prosecutor General rejected the request. 41.  On 8 December 2010 the applicant reiterated his request for the reclassification of the case as murder under Article 120 of the Criminal Code. 42.  By a decision of 17 December 2010, the investigator refused to grant the applicant\u2019s request, finding that at that stage of the proceedings there was no evidence that S.J. had been murdered. 43.  In December 2010 the prosecuting authorities questioned the experts who had participated in the forensic examinations concerning S.J.\u2019s death as witnesses. 44.  On 6 January 2011 the investigator ordered the examination of the jacket that S.J. had been wearing on 15 November 2006 in order to establish whether there were any bloodstains on it. On 11 January 2011 the forensic expert issued forensic report no. 07/2011-MTBS concluding that there was no trace of blood on the jacket. 45.  It appears from the documents in the case file that the applicant received a letter dated 14 February 2011 from the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office in reply to his numerous letters to the prosecuting authorities about the progress of the investigation. The prosecuting authorities informed him in that letter that the investigation would be carried out effectively and that he would be informed of its results. 46.  On 16 March 2011 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint in court about the ineffectiveness of the investigation. 47.  On 17 March 2011 the Sabail District Court refused to admit the complaint, finding that the applicant\u2019s lawyer had failed to join his power of attorney to the application. 48.  On an unspecified date the applicant brought a civil action with Baku Administrative Economic Court No. 1, reiterating his previous complaints. 49.  On 26 July 2011 the court refused to admit the claim, finding that it could not be examined in administrative proceedings, and transferred it to the Sabail District Court. 50.  In September and October 2011 the prosecuting authorities again questioned as witnesses the experts who had participated in the forensic examinations concerning S.J.\u2019s death. 51.  By a decision of 13 September 2011, the Sabail District Court decided to transfer the case to the appellate court to determine which court had jurisdiction. 52.  On 12 October 2011 the Baku Court of Appeal held that the applicant\u2019s claim could not be examined in civil proceedings. 53.  On 30 December 2011 the Supreme Court upheld the Baku Court of Appeal\u2019s decision of 12 October 2011. 54.  In the meantime, on 28 December 2011 the investigator decided to terminate the criminal proceedings for failure to identify the perpetrator of the crime, although all the relevant investigative actions had been carried out. 55.  On 16 February 2012 the applicant lodged a complaint against the investigator\u2019s decision with the Nasimi District Court, asking the court to overrule it. 56.  By a decision of 6 March 2012 the Nasimi District Court upheld the applicant\u2019s complaint and overruled the investigator\u2019s decision. The court found that the investigator had failed to comply with the supervising prosecutor\u2019s instructions and had unlawfully terminated the criminal proceedings. The court also referred to the Court\u2019s case-law, pointing out that the domestic authorities should conduct an effective investigation in accordance with their Convention obligations. It appears from the Nasimi District Court\u2019s decision of 6 March 2012 that in the proceedings before the court the investigator stated that on 27 January 2009 a request for a chemical forensic examination in the United Kingdom to determine the type of poisoning had been sent to the Ministry of Justice, but that no reply had been received. The investigator further stated that the investigation of the case had become very difficult as a long time had gone by since the commission of the crime and some items of evidence related to the case had been lost when it had been transferred from the Binagadi district prosecutor\u2019s office to the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office. 57.  On 30 November 2012 the investigator again decided to terminate the criminal proceedings relying on the same grounds. The wording of the investigator\u2019s decision was identical to that of 28 December 2011. 58.  On 5 February 2013 the applicant appealed against the decision. He complained, inter alia, that he had not been duly informed of the investigator\u2019s decision to terminate the criminal proceedings, that the investigation, which had lasted for more than six years, had not been effective, that although S.J. had been beaten and then thrown from the balcony the criminal case had not been examined under Article 120 of the Criminal Code as murder, and that the investigation had failed to establish the origin of the poisoning. 59.  On 27 February 2013 the Nasimi District Court granted the applicant\u2019s appeal and overruled the investigator\u2019s decision of 30 November 2012. In that connection, the court held that the investigator should not have terminated the criminal proceedings by relying solely on the fact that it had been impossible to identify the perpetrator of the crime and had to take all the relevant steps to identify that person. The court also found that the investigation had been inactive for a long period of time and that the applicant had been provided with the investigator\u2019s decision of 30 November 2012 only on 26 January 2013. 60.  On 30 November 2013 the investigator again decided to terminate the criminal proceedings, relying on the same grounds. The investigator\u2019s decision was identical in its wording to the previous ones. 61.  On 7 February 2014 the applicant appealed against that decision, reiterating his previous complaints. 62.  On 21 February 2014 the Nasimi District Court overruled the investigator\u2019s decision of 30 November 2013. The court found that the investigator had taken no action to identify the perpetrator of the crime since its decision of 27 February 2013. 63.  At the time of the most recent communication with the parties \u2212 that was on 31 March 2015 when the last observation was filed in this case by the Government - the criminal proceedings were still pending.", "references": ["5", "7", "6", "1", "9", "4", "3", "2", "8", "No Label", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "5.  The first applicant was born in 1969 and is serving a life sentence in Perekhrestivka in the Sumy region (oblast). The second applicant was born in 1967 and is serving a life sentence in Gorodyshche in the Rivne region. 6.  According to the findings of the domestic courts, in early 2000 Mr A.B. formed an armed gang which included the applicants, Mr Vladimir Zakshevskiy (the applicant in the case of Zakshevskiy v. Ukraine, no. 7193/04, \u00a7 11, 17 March 2016), Mr S.S., Mr I.K., Mr A.S. and two others. At the time the first applicant, A.B. and Mr Zakshevskiy were former police officers and S.S. was an active police officer. 7.  The domestic courts subsequently convicted the applicants, Mr Zakshevskiy, I.K. and S.S. of various degrees of participation in attacks committed by the gang in four regions and also of the offence of participation in an armed gang (banditry). The attacks were initially investigated by the authorities as unrelated crimes committed by unidentified people. 8.  The description of the attacks is set out in the Appendix as Episodes 1-7. 9.  On various dates criminal proceedings instituted in the four regions were eventually consolidated into the case initially opened to investigate a series of attacks in and around Kharkiv (Episodes 4-6). 10.  According to the Government, on 29 October 2001 the first applicant was charged in absentia with participation in the Kharkiv attacks, which had been classified as robberies. 11.  On 17 November 2001 the first applicant was arrested in Moscow, Russia. The next day the suspected gang leader A.B. was killed there while resisting arrest. 12.  On 30 January 2002 the first applicant was extradited to Ukraine. 13.  On 4 and 11 February 2002 the first applicant signed two documents explaining in detail his rights as a suspect or accused in the course of the pre-trial investigation, including the right to have a lawyer appointed for him, to consult a lawyer before being questioned for the first time and the right to remain silent. He waived those rights. 14.  On 11 February 2002 the first applicant was questioned in the capacity of an accused, admitted his guilt on the charges of robbery, and confessed to a minor role in the Kharkiv attacks. 15.  On 3 April 2002 the first applicant was questioned in the capacity of a witness, without a lawyer, about the Luhansk murder (see Episode 2 in the Appendix). He denied any involvement in that crime but stated that he had known A.B. since 1998 and that A.B. had confessed to him during their stay in Moscow that he had committed the Luhansk murder. 16.  On 1 July 2002 the first applicant participated in a reconstruction of the attack on Mr and Mrs Va., one of the Kharkiv episodes. The first applicant stated that he and several accomplices had attacked Mrs Va. He also stated that A.S. had shot in Mr Va.\u2019s direction during the attack. 17.  On 10 July 2002 the first applicant was charged with offences connected with the attacks set out in the Appendix, including several murders. 18.  While being questioned on the same day the applicant retracted all his previous statements, claiming that they had been given under physical and psychological pressure. 19.  On the same day, the investigator appointed a lawyer for the applicant after finding that he had to be represented because of the murder charges but could not hire a lawyer himself. 20.  On 11 July 2002 the defence lawyer met the applicant. 21.  In August and December 2000 the second applicant was questioned as a witness about the Luhansk murders and a killing in Donetsk. He denied any knowledge of or involvement in either crime but admitted that he knew A.B., had had a conflict with one of the victims, and that on the night of the Luhansk murder the second applicant had lent his lorry to the victims. 22.  On 14 October 2001 the second applicant was arrested. On the same day he was questioned in the presence of a lawyer hired by his wife. He confessed to participation in the attacks on Mr and Mrs Va. and Mr A.I. and described the active role that the first applicant had played in them. In particular, he stated that the first applicant had taken A.S., armed with a handgun, to the place where Mr A.I. had been murdered (Episode 5). 23.  On 7 November 2001 the second applicant was questioned in the presence of his lawyer about the circumstances of the Crimea attack (Episode 7) and participated in a reconstruction. He described his and Mr Zakshevskiy\u2019s role in the attack, stating that he had arrived at the scene of the crime on a motorcycle with Mr Zakshevskiy. The latter had approached the victims\u2019 car and then the second applicant had heard gunshots. The second applicant had then shot at the ground near the feet of Mr R.M., one of the victims, to scare him. 24.  Subsequently, the second applicant also confessed to participation in in several other attacks. He retracted his confessions later in the investigation. 25.  On 11 November 2001 Mr Zakshevskiy surrendered himself to the police and provided statements to the effect that the second applicant and A.B. had told him in 2000 that they had committed the Donetsk murder and that he had also learned at the time that the first applicant and A.B. had committed the Luhansk murder. He also described the two attacks in Toretsk, the attacks on the shoe sellers near Kharkiv, and the Crimea attack (Episodes 3, 6 and 7). He repeated those statements the next day (see Zakshevskiy, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 10 and 11). In particular, in describing the attack on the shoe sellers, he stated that the applicants had followed the victims in a car while Mr Zakshevskiy, I.K. and another member of the gang had waited in ambush in an Opel Vectra near the road. After being given a signal over the telephone, Mr Zakshevskiy and I.K., wearing traffic police uniforms, had stopped the cars of two groups of victims in quick succession, first a Gazel minivan and then a Mercedes. They had threatened the victims with handguns and taken their cars to a nearby forest. Afterwards, the applicants had arrived and loaded stolen shoes and money into their car. 26.  On 12 and 13 October 2001 Mr G.G. made statements to the investigating authorities in the presence of a lawyer, implicating the applicants in the Kharkiv attacks. 27.  On 28 March, 23 April and 10 July 2002 S.S. was questioned in the presence of his lawyer. He stated that he had been present at the scene of the Luhansk murder in a red BMW and had observed A.B. and the first applicant commit that crime. He also stated that he had helped A.B. and the latter\u2019s \u201cacquaintance\u201d to bring two handguns back from the Crimea. 28.  Arrested in Belarus in December 2001, I.K. was extradited to Ukraine. On 20 March 2002 he, while denying any active role in the crimes, stated in the presence of his lawyer that he had seen A.B. and the first applicant commit the Luhansk murder and witnessed the applicants participate in the attack on the shoe sellers near Kharkiv. 29.  At a later stage of the pre-trial investigation the applicants\u2019 co\u2011defendants retracted their statements, saying they had been given under physical and psychological duress. 30.  In the course of the pre-trial investigation a number of victims and other witnesses made statements subsequently used in the applicants\u2019 conviction. There was no possibility for the applicants to put questions to those victims and witnesses at that stage or later. The substance of their statements, as given in the trial court\u2019s judgment, is set out in the Appendix. 31.  The applicants and their co-defendants Mr Zakshevskiy, S.S. and I.K. stood trial at the Donetsk Regional Court of Appeal, acting as a trial court (\u201cthe trial court\u201d). 32.  On 14 February 2005 the trial court noted that a number of victims and other witnesses had failed to appear and ordered the police to bring Mr and Mrs Va., Mr V.K. and Mr R.K., and R.M. (Episodes 4, 6 and 7 respectively) to court. On 17 March 2005 the trial court ordered the police to bring Mr G.S. and Mr N.K., witnesses to the Luhansk murder, to court on 6 April 2005. 33.  On 6 April 2005 N.K. appeared. However, the hearing had to be adjourned because one of the judges was ill. The presiding judge asked whether the witness would appear at the next hearing. He replied that he wished to confirm the statements he had given in the course of the pre-trial investigation, and that the only point he might be confused about was the make of the foreign car he had seen on the night of the murder, since he was not a specialist. He asked not to be called again, citing his extreme poverty and the long distance to the court. 34.  At a subsequent hearing the court read out reports from the police that V.K., R.K. and R.M. could not be brought to the court because they were not present at the addresses they had given and could not be found. The court also read out the death certificate of G.S. and statements by N.K., O.Va. and S.Va. that they were unable to attend. 35.  The court then sought the parties\u2019 opinions as to whether it would be justifiable to declare that it was not possible to obtain the appearance of those witnesses at the trial and to read out their statements. The applicants\u2019 lawyers did not object although the defendants insisted that the witnesses be questioned. 36.  The court ruled that it considered that it was not possible to have the witnesses attend the trial and proceeded to read out their pre-trial statements. 37.  On 6 October 2005 the trial court delivered its judgment. It convicted the applicants of banditry, armed robbery and related offences of carjacking, aggravated murder and attempted aggravated murder. It acquitted the applicants of several counts of robbery for lack of proof. It sentenced them to various terms of imprisonment on the charges other than murder. In respect of the murder charges the sentence was life imprisonment, which was also the final sentence for both applicants. 38.  The specific crimes of which the applicants were convicted and the key evidence relied on for those convictions is set out in the Appendix. 39.  Ten pages of the judgment were dedicated to whether the defendants\u2019 pre-trial statements could be used in evidence even though they had been retracted. In concluding that they could be used, the trial court referred in particular to corroborating evidence, including expert reports and physical evidence on the firearms used in the crimes (see Appendix). 40.  A further four pages of the judgment were dedicated to a discussion of whether the defendants\u2019 pre-trial statements had been coerced. In rejecting that allegation, the court stated in particular that: (i) the second applicant\u2019s statements had been made in the presence of a lawyer hired by his wife; (ii) the defendants had changed their statements over the course of the investigation to minimise their own role in the crimes and their culpability, which was inconsistent with their allegation that their statements had been forced on them by the authorities; (iii) a video recording of the second applicant\u2019s interview and of a reconstruction of the crime with him and Mr Zakshevskiy had shown that his statements had been given freely; (iv) two investigations of the defendants\u2019 allegations of undue pressure and ill-treatment conducted by the prosecutor\u2019s office at the trial court\u2019s request had found no proof in support of the allegations, which was consistent with the court\u2019s own conclusions. 41.  In response to the applicants\u2019 allegations of various procedural irregularities, in particular alleged violations of their right to defence, in the course of the pre-trial investigation, the trial court stated that all evidence obtained in violation of the Code of Criminal Procedure had been excluded from the file and the remaining evidence had been obtained in compliance with the Code. 42.  Upon completion of the trial the first applicant began studying the case file. On 12 May 2006 he signed a statement that he had examined the record of the trial in full. Afterwards, he examined the case file on at least five days up to 2 August 2006. 43.  On various dates the applicants lodged appeals and supplementary appeals against their conviction, arguing in particular that the trial court had convicted them without sufficient proof, and based on pre-trial statements given under duress rather than on their testimony in court. They also alleged that their defence rights had been breached in various ways. 44.  In his appeal the first applicant submitted, in particular, that the witnesses G.S. and N.K. had in the course of the pre-trial investigation identified, based on photographs, A.B. as the person they had seen standing on the road at the scene of the Luhansk murder dressed as a traffic police officer. He also submitted that Mr and Mrs Va. had given descriptions of the attackers in their pre-trial statements which had not fitted him. 45.  The second applicant submitted, in particular, that in the course of his pre-trial interviews R.M. had stated that he clearly remembered the attackers, would be able to recognise them by their faces and voices and had provided a description which had enabled an identikit picture to be prepared. However, that picture, in the second applicant\u2019s opinion, had not looked like him. 46.  On 19 October 2006 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicants\u2019 arguments as unsubstantiated and upheld their conviction and sentence. It stated, in particular, that the trial court findings that the applicant were guilty were supported by various evidence, in particular the statements of witnesses G.S. and N.K., Mr and Mrs Va. and R.M.", "references": ["7", "1", "8", "2", "9", "6", "4", "5", "0", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1971. As of 19 February 2011, the date on which he lodged his application with the Court, he was serving his sentence of imprisonment in a penitentiary institution in Yerevan. 6.  On 27 April 2009 the applicant, together with his friend D.T. and two other persons, D.O. and M.S., went to the town of Goris to visit his friend, M.K., who was serving his sentence in a penitentiary institution there. 7.  Upon their arrival, the administration of the penitentiary institution refused to grant them permission to see M.K. Nevertheless, they were allowed to hand over a parcel to be delivered to him. 8.  The applicant gave money to D.T., D.O. and M.S. to buy food for M.K. and remained in the penitentiary facility in order to start the formalities. He signed a warning concerning the responsibility for sending prohibited items to a prisoner. D.T., D.O. and M.S. brought a cake that they had bought from a local store. The cake was handed over to the administration as a parcel to be delivered to M.K. 9.  Subsequent inspection of the parcel revealed that there was a disposable syringe filled with liquid inside the cake. 10.  On the same date the investigator decided to assign a forensic medical examination of the items discovered. 11.  On 29 April 2009 the expert delivered his opinion, which stated that the substances examined were narcotics. 12.  On 30 April 2009 criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant. 13.  On 11 May 2009 the applicant was charged with illegal acquisition and supply of narcotics in large amounts. The applicant denied the charges. His case was that he had not been inside the parcel drop-off room when the cake was handed over. 14.  In the course of the investigation M.S., D.T. and D.O. were questioned as witnesses. 15.  During his interview M.S. stated that he, D.T. and D.O. had bought a cake which they had then given to the applicant. Thereafter they had all entered the room where parcels for prisoners were dropped off and there he had seen the applicant putting the syringe inside the cake and spreading the cream so that it could not be seen. D.T. and D.O. stated that they had given the cake to the applicant before it was handed over to the administration of the penitentiary facility. G.B., the officer of the penitentiary facility who had inspected the parcel, stated during questioning that he had discovered a syringe filled with liquid inside the cake which was to be delivered to M.K. 16.  At a confrontation with the applicant held on 4 November 2009, M.S. reiterated his previous statements. 17.  Following the confrontation, the applicant complained about the way it had been conducted. He complained, inter alia, that the investigator had failed to record a number of important statements proving his innocence and that he had put several questions to M.S. which were neither recorded nor answered. In this connection the Deputy Prosecutor of the Syunik Region questioned the applicant on 6 November 2009 and recorded his complaints. The applicant also requested that another confrontation be held. His complaints remained unanswered. 18.  On 19 November 2009 the bill of indictment was finalised and the case was transmitted to the Syunik Regional Court, sitting in the town of Goris, to be set down for trial. The list of persons to be summoned for trial included M.S., D.T., D.O., residents of the town of Kapan, and G.B., who lived in Goris. 19.  On 26 November 2009 Judge D. of the Regional Court took over the case and scheduled the first hearing for 7 December 2009. 20.  On 1 December 2009 Judge D. summoned M.S., D.T. and D.O. to the hearing. The summonses sent to D.T. and D.O. were returned to the court. The letter addressed to D.T. contained a note made by the courier on 3 December 2009 which stated that D.T. was in Yerevan and the letter addressed to D.O. contained a similar note, made on 4 December 2009, which stated that the latter was abroad. 21.  Having been summoned, M.S. sent a written note to Judge D. stating that he would be in Yerevan for personal business from 4 December until the end of the month and would not be able to appear at the trial. 22.  On 7 December 2009 Judge D. summoned M.S., D.T. and D.O. to the hearing rescheduled for 17 December 2009. 23.  On 17 December 2009 Judge D. made a decision to compel witnesses M.S. and D.T. to appear at the rescheduled hearing to be held on 22 February 2010, given that no valid reasons for their non-attendance had been submitted. The enforcement of this decision was assigned to the police. 24.  Judge D. was thereafter provided with a certificate issued on 19 February 2010 by a hospital in Yerevan according to which D.T. had been undergoing treatment there since 17 February 2010. 25. By letter of 22 February 2010 the police informed Judge D. that M.S. no longer resided at the address indicated and, according to his brother\u2019s statement, had left for Saint Petersburg in January, while D.T. had signed a written undertaking at the police station to appear at the hearing of 22 February 2010. 26.  The hearing of 22 February 2010 was postponed until 9 March 2010 because Judge D. was ill. 27.  By letter of 9 March 2010 the police informed Judge D. that, according to D.T.\u2019s mother, he had left for Yerevan at the end of February to undergo medical treatment. 28.  At the hearing of 9 March 2010 Judge D. decided to proceed with the applicant\u2019s trial in the absence of witnesses M.S., D.T. and D.O. The relevant parts of the record of this hearing read as follows:\n\u201c... Witnesses M.S., D.T., D.O. are not present at the hearing before the court, Kapan Police Department has informed us that M.S. has not resided in the city of Kapan since January 2010, he went to Saint Petersburg, Russian Federation, and D.T. is receiving medical treatment in Yerevan.\nThe prosecutor opined:\nProceed with the trial, read out the statements of absent witnesses M.S., D. T. and D.O. made during the investigation.\nDefence lawyer ... opined:\nProceed with the trial since, in reply to the court\u2019s decision to compel the witnesses, the Kapan Police Department has stated the impossibility of their attendance.\nThe accused opined:\nProceed with the trial although my wife saw M.S. 3 days ago.\nHaving heard the opinions of the parties, the court decides to proceed with the trial and read out the pre-trial statements of absent witnesses M.S., D.T. and D.O.\n... the accused replied:\nThey have not told the truth. [D.O.] has been a bit correct.\nI did not enter the drop-off room after the cake was delivered.\nIt is a lie that I put a syringe inside the cake.\nI was not in the drop-off room, I do not know whether [D.T.] is lying or not ...\u02ee 29.  On 15 April 2010 the Regional Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to five and a half years\u2019 imprisonment. In doing so it stated, in particular, the following:\n\u201cHaving assessed the evidence examined ... the court finds it established that [the applicant] illegally acquired ... narcotics, placed them inside a cake and attempted to deliver them to ...prisoner [M.K.] but they were discovered and seized by the officers of ... penitentiary facility during the inspection of the parcel.\n[The applicant] pleaded not guilty and reiterated his statements made during the investigation ... that ... when they brought the cake, he had already signed [the papers] ... then they brought the cake and gave it to [G.B.]. He did not touch the cake, did not see or take it ...\nAccording to witness G.B.\u2019s statement before the court, several young men among whom he had recognised [the applicant], came to visit prisoner M.K. The visit did not take place and they wished to hand over a parcel... They left and came back a bit later with a cake. During the inspection of the cake a medical disposable syringe ... was discovered inside the cake...\nWitness A.A. stated before the court that he worked in the ... penitentiary facility... he was invited to the parcel drop-off room where he saw a disposable syringe that had been discovered inside a cake ...\n... the pre-trial statement of witness M.S. ... which he confirmed during the confrontation with [the applicant] ...\n... the pre-trial statement of witness D.T. ...\n... the pre-trial statement of witness D.O ...\nA warning according to which [the applicant] handed over a parcel addressed to [M.K.] and had been warned about the responsibility for sending items prohibited by law ...\n... the record of discovery of a prohibited item ...\n... the record of seizure of the discovered prohibited item ...\n... the opinion of the forensic expert ...\nThus, the court finds it established that [the applicant] committed the offence charged and that his guilt in committing it has been substantiated.\n[The applicant\u2019s] arguments ... are unsubstantiated and are rebutted by the evidence listed above.\u02ee 30.  The applicant lodged an appeal complaining, inter alia, that the witnesses against him were not questioned in court. 31.  On 29 June 2010 the Criminal Court of Appeal upheld the applicant\u2019s conviction. In doing so, it stated that the Regional Court had duly examined and decided upon the applicant\u2019s motions seeking to have the witnesses questioned in court. 32.  On 20 July 2010 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law complaining, inter alia, of the non-examination of witnesses against him either in the Regional Court or in the Court of Appeal. 33.  On 20 August 2010 the Court of Cassation declared the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law inadmissible for lack of merit.", "references": ["1", "9", "4", "0", "8", "2", "5", "7", "6", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Yambol. 5.  The applicant and his brother co-owned a house with a yard and a garage in Yambol. 6.  By a decision of the mayor of 31 January 1983 the property was expropriated with a view to constructing a residential building. The decision, based on section 98 (1) of the Territorial and Urban Planning Act of 1973 (\u0417\u0430\u043a\u043e\u043d \u0437\u0430 \u0442\u0435\u0440\u0438\u0442\u043e\u0440\u0438\u0430\u043b\u043d\u043e\u0442\u043e \u0438 \u0441\u0435\u043b\u0438\u0449\u043d\u043e \u0443\u0441\u0442\u0440\u043e\u0439\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e \u2013 \u201cthe TUPA\u201d), stated that the applicant and his brother were to be compensated with flats in a building which the municipality intended to construct. 7.  On an unspecified date the flats were constructed and delivered to the applicant and his brother. 8.  On 13 July 1994 the mayor modified the decision of 31 January 1983, stating that the two brothers were also to be compensated with a common garage. The applicant\u2019s brother informed the mayor that he renounced his right to compensation with a garage in the applicant\u2019s favour. 9.  By a supplementary decision of 30 May 1995, based on section 100 of the TUPA, the mayor held that the applicant was to be compensated with the right to build a garage on a municipal land and determined the exact location of the future garage. The applicant did not appeal against that decision and apparently prepared to start the construction works. 10.  By a decision of 9 October 2002 the mayor modified the previous decision of 30 May 1995, indicating another municipal plot of land where the future garage was to be built, as it had turned out that the previous one was not owned by the municipality. That decision was not appealed against by the applicant, but was eventually set aside by the Yambol regional governor after it had been contested by third persons. 11.  On an unspecified date in 2010 the applicant brought a tort action against the Yambol municipality, claiming a wrongful failure on its part to provide him with a garage. The action was dismissed, the final judgment being given by the Supreme Administrative Court on 30 March 2011. The domestic courts held that no unlawful inactivity on the part of the authorities had been established, neither had it been shown that the applicant had sustained any damage. 12.  In June 2011 the applicant agreed to receive compensation in cash in lieu of the garage due to him. It appears that the municipality had been offering such a solution since 2007. The compensation in cash was paid to the applicant on 4 April 2012.", "references": ["5", "6", "1", "2", "8", "3", "4", "0", "7", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1971. 6.  In connection with an investigation into an international prostitution ring, measures were taken to intercept telephone conversations in accordance with Article 706-95 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, on one mobile telephone line in particular: from 5 p.m. on 6 August 2009 until 8.39 p.m. on 19 August 2009, on the basis of an order of 5 August 2009 by the Chamb\u00e9ry judge responsible for matters concerning civil liberties and detention (\u201cthe liberties and detention judge\u201d), authorising interceptions for two weeks; and from 28 August 2009 until 11 September 2009, on the basis of an order of 26 August 2009 by the same judge. Two conversations with a person using a mobile phone belonging to a certain I.K., which were recorded on 4 September 2009, appeared to incriminate the applicant: one between a woman identified as R.G. and a man known as Kiril, later identified as the applicant, and the other between the same woman and another man, in which the same Kiril was referred to in terms suggesting that he was involved in the prostitution ring. 7.  A judicial investigation was opened on 2 October 2009 into alleged offences of living on the earnings of prostitution with aggravating circumstances, committed as part of an organised gang; trafficking in human beings, committed as part of an organised gang; and criminal conspiracy. A warrant for the applicant\u2019s arrest was issued on 28 July 2010 by Judge N.C., the vice-president responsible for the investigation at the Lyons tribunal de grande instance. After being arrested in Germany pursuant to the warrant, which had in the meantime been converted into a European arrest warrant, the applicant was handed over to the French authorities at 11.45 a.m. on 16 December 2010; he was then brought before the Strasbourg public prosecutor and immediately placed in administrative detention in Strasbourg. At 10.56 a.m. on 20 December 2010 he was brought for the first time before B.G., the investigating judge dealing with the case, who placed him under formal investigation for the above-mentioned offences. At about 5 p.m. on the same day, the Lyons liberties and detention judge, to whom the matter had been referred by the investigating judge, interviewed the applicant and remanded him in custody pending trial. 8.  Although the alleged offences were classified as serious crimes, the interviews and confrontations carried out during the investigation were not recorded, by virtue of the exception provided for in the seventh paragraph of Article 116-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as applicable at the material time.\n... 13.  On 17 June 2011 the applicant applied to the Investigation Division of the Lyons Court of Appeal to have various procedural steps declared void, including the order for his detention, the interviews and confrontations carried out during the investigation and the interception of various telephone conversations. He submitted two requests for preliminary rulings on constitutionality, concerning respectively the seventh paragraph of Article 64-1 and the seventh paragraph of Article 116-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, pursuant to which no video recording had been made of the interviews and confrontations. 14.  On 6 September 2011 the Investigation Division dismissed most of the application to have the procedural steps declared void (except for one point concerning the interception of telephone conversations), in particular restating the reason given in its previous decision of 13 January 2011. In two further judgments delivered on the same day, it referred the requests for preliminary rulings on constitutionality to the Court of Cassation. 15.  On 14 September 2011 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, relying in particular on Article 5 \u00a7 3, Article 6 \u00a7 1 and Article 14 of the Convention and the constitutional principle of equality. 16.  On 18 January 2012 the Court of Cassation referred the requests for preliminary rulings on constitutionality to the Constitutional Council and deferred judgment pending the Council\u2019s decision. 17.  In a decision of 6 April 2012 (no. 2012-228/229 QPC) the Constitutional Council declared the seventh paragraphs of Articles 64-1 and 116-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure unconstitutional, holding that by providing for an exception to the rule of compulsory video recording of interviews in connection with serious offences where such interviews were carried out during preliminary or judicial investigations into serious offences relating to organised crime or undermining the fundamental interests of the nation, the impugned provisions infringed the principle of equality. It pointed out that the abrogation of those provisions would take effect from the publication of its decision and would apply in the case of persons in police custody or under formal investigation who were questioned or interviewed from that date onwards. 18.  In a judgment of 10 May 2012 the Criminal Division of the Court of Cassation dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law. ... It rejected his argument that there had been violations of the Convention (he had relied on Articles 6 and 14 of the Convention and, more broadly, the right to a fair trial and the prohibition of discrimination) and the Constitution as a result of the application of the seventh paragraphs of Articles 64-1 and 116-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in his case. Firstly, it held that the Constitutional Council had specified that the abrogation of the provisions in question would apply only in the case of persons in police custody or under formal investigation who were questioned or interviewed following the publication of its decision, so that his argument had in that respect become devoid of purpose. Secondly, it observed that the applicant had not been questioned in police custody and that, although his interviews by the investigating judge had not been recorded on video, \u201cthis did not result in any infringement of his rights under the Convention, be it his defence rights or the right to a fair trial, seeing that he was given the option of receiving legal assistance, and had the opportunity to review the manner in which the questions and answers had been transcribed in the record, which had been approved by a registrar, to ask for any corrections to be made and to challenge, at any stage of the proceedings, the meaning and scope of his statements as transcribed\u201d. 19.  ... Lastly, it held that \u201cit is not possible for anyone other than the party concerned to complain of a breach of the substantive requirements governing police custody, or of the lack of a video recording of police questioning or interviews by the investigating judge, in support of an application to have a procedural step or document declared void\u201d; accordingly, the applicant was not entitled to object that the judgment appealed against had stated that there was no cause to declare void any police questioning or interviews by the investigating judge concerning individuals other than himself. 20.  In a judgment of 28 October 2011 the Lyons Criminal Court found the applicant guilty of the alleged offences, although it dismissed the charge of trafficking in human beings. It sentenced him to four years\u2019 imprisonment and a fine of 10,000 euros (EUR). 21.  In a judgment of 20 July 2012 the Lyons Court of Appeal upheld the judgment as to the issue of guilt and sentenced the applicant to six years\u2019 imprisonment with a minimum term of two-thirds of the sentence, as well as imposing a fine EUR 10,000 and a five-year exclusion order from the d\u00e9partements of Savoie and Bas-Rhin. 22.  An appeal on points of law by the applicant \u2013 whose sole argument was that French criminal law was not applicable \u2013 was rejected by the Criminal Division of the Court of Cassation in a judgment of 12 June 2013.", "references": ["4", "5", "7", "6", "2", "3", "8", "0", "1", "9", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1964. He is currently serving a prison sentence. 5.  At the time of the events the applicant had previous convictions from 1983 and 1989. He was released from prison in October 2002. 6.  Following his release from prison the applicant cohabited with T.B. in the village of Blahovishchenka, in the Zaporizhzhya Region. T.B.\u2019s sister cohabited with Sh. in the same village. 7.  On the evening of 24 April 2006 Sh. visited T.B. and the applicant. A conflict arose between him and the applicant, developing into a fight which T.B. attempted to settle down. At a certain point the applicant seized a knife and stabbed Sh. in the chest. The latter was taken to hospital, but he died shortly afterwards. 8.  Later that evening the applicant was taken to the police station, where he was questioned in relation to the incident. He stated that he did not know who might have stabbed the victim. The applicant was not released and remained at the police station. 9.  At 2.00 a.m. on 25 April 2006 the applicant confessed that he had had a fight with Sh., and that during the fight he had grabbed a knife and stabbed Sh. twice in the chest and abdominal area. 10.  At 8.00 p.m. on 25 April 2006 the investigator drew up an arrest report in respect of the applicant. According to the report, the applicant was suspected of murder. 11.  On 26 April 2006 the applicant was allowed to consult a lawyer for the first time. On that day he was questioned again. He explained that he had stabbed Sh. when falling down from the blows he had received from him. The stab had been unintentional. Later on the same day, in the course of a reconstruction of the events, the applicant showed how he had been beaten by Sh. and how he had fatally stabbed him. 12.  On 27 April 2006 a court ordered the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention. 13.  On 28 April 2006 the applicant was questioned again. Before the questioning, the applicant signed a waiver of his right to a lawyer. He then made statements about the incident which were similar to those which he had made earlier. 14.  On 15 June 2006 the applicant was charged with aggravated murder and questioned again in the presence of his lawyer. That day, he stated that he had acted in self-defence, as Sh. had approached him with a glass bottle. 15.  On 2 August 2006 the Zaporizhzhya Regional Court of Appeal (\u201cthe Court of Appeal\u201d) commenced the trial of the applicant. During the trial, he stated that he had fatally stabbed Sh., who had approached him with a glass bottle, while trying to defend himself. 16.  On 8 August 2006 the court found the applicant guilty of aggravated murder and sentenced him to life imprisonment. The court relied on the material, oral, expert and documentary evidence examined during the hearings. It referred in particular to the applicant\u2019s self-incriminating statements made on 25 April 2006 and later. His allegation that he had acted in self-defence was rejected as unsubstantiated. 17.  The applicant and his lawyer appealed, claiming that the conviction was unfounded and that his right to a lawyer had not been properly ensured. 18.  On 21 December 2006 the Supreme Court considered the applicant\u2019s case and upheld the conviction. However, having regard to his behaviour immediately after the incident, namely the efforts he had made to provide the victim with medical assistance, it reduced the sentence to fifteen years\u2019 imprisonment. 19.  On three occasions between August and October 2006 the Court of Appeal allowed the applicant to have family visits. 20.  On 16 August 2006 the applicant lodged an application with the Court of Appeal, asking for permission to correspond with his relatives. His application was registered by the SIZO mailing service under number 2/k\u2011517. No reply followed. 21.  On 2 October 2006 the applicant made the same application, which was registered by the SIZO mailing service under number 2/k-579. No reply followed. 22.  On 12 October 2006 the applicant complained to a prosecutor in that regard, but received no response.", "references": ["6", "2", "0", "1", "8", "7", "9", "5", "No Label", "3", "4"], "gold": ["3", "4"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1948 and lives in Sofia. 5.  The applicant was one of the co-owners of a house with a yard in the town of Troyan. 6.  By a decision of the mayor of 15 March 1983 the property was expropriated with a view to constructing residential and administrative buildings. The decision, based on section 98 (1) of the Territorial and Urban Planning Act of 1973 (\u0417\u0430\u043a\u043e\u043d \u0437\u0430 \u0442\u0435\u0440\u0438\u0442\u043e\u0440\u0438\u0430\u043b\u043d\u043e\u0442\u043e \u0438 \u0441\u0435\u043b\u0438\u0449\u043d\u043e \u0443\u0441\u0442\u0440\u043e\u0439\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e \u2013 \u201cthe TUPA\u201d), provided that the applicant was to be compensated with a three-room flat in a building which the municipality intended to construct. 7.  By a supplementary order of 27 March 1990, based on section 100 of the TUPA, the mayor determined the exact location, size and other details in respect of the future flat to be offered to the applicant. 8.  The applicant and the other owners continued occupying the expropriated house. Even though the applicant lived in Sofia, she apparently continued to keep in it possessions of hers. 9.  The building where the applicant\u2019s flat was initially to be located was finished in 2003, but it was smaller than originally planned and no flat in it could be offered to the applicant. The reason for the change of plans, which had been decided upon in 1995, was the restitution of part of the land earmarked for the construction to its previous owners, under restitution legislation adopted in 1992. 10.  In April 2001 the municipality issued a building permit for a new building with flats, to be situated on the plot of land where the applicant\u2019s expropriated house was still standing. The permit was renewed in 2004, 2007 and 2010. In the meantime, construction plans were approved, and towards the end of 2003 the municipality allocated the flats to their future owners. On the basis of that distribution, on 13 January 2004 the mayor issued a new decision under section 100 of the TUPA in respect of the applicant, revoking the previous decision of 27 March 1990 (see paragraph 7 above) and indicating the exact flat in the new building to be provided to her in compensation. The newly allocated flat measured 94 square metres, slightly bigger in size than the one offered in 1990. 11.  Nevertheless, dissatisfied with the decision of 13 January 2004, the applicant challenged it before the courts, claiming that it impermissibly modified the 1990 decision dealing with the same matter. The proceedings continued until 20 November 2007 when, in a final judgment, the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s application for judicial review. 12.  In the meantime, in 2005 the applicant made a request to the mayor, seeking the revocation of the 1983 expropriation order in respect of her share of the property. As no response followed, she applied for the judicial review of the mayor\u2019s tacit refusal. The ensuing proceedings were initially stayed to await the outcome of those described in the previous paragraph. Once they were resumed, in a final judgment of 24 July 2009 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the application for judicial review, finding that the preconditions for restitution had not been met. 13.  On 13 and 28 August 2009 the mayor ordered the applicant\u2019s eviction from the expropriated house and that the house be pulled down. The applicant applied for the judicial review of both orders. The first one was upheld by the courts in a final judgment of 14 February 2011, and the second one on 20 April 2010. Meanwhile, in September 2009 the applicant was evicted. 14.  The house was pulled down on an unspecified date, after which the municipality selected a company to carry out the construction works on the site, which started in April 2011. In the meantime, the applicant contested before the courts the 2001 building permit (see paragraph 10 above) concerning the building to be constructed, but was unsuccessful. 15.  The building was finished in 2014 and in July 2014 the applicant was invited to receive the keys to her flat. She refused to do so and instead of that challenged before the courts the authorization for the building to be used, claiming in particular that the construction had not been of sufficient quality. The course of these proceedings is unclear.", "references": ["8", "5", "2", "3", "1", "6", "0", "7", "4", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicants live or lived (the second applicant) in Split. The applicants\u2019 other personal details are set out in the Appendix. 7.  Except for the third and the fourth applicants who are the co-owners of the same flat, each applicant is (and the second applicant was before her death) the owner of a flat in Split occupied by \u201cprotected lessees\u201d (za\u0161ti\u0107eni najmoprimci). Under the Lease of Flats Act (Zakon o najmu stanova), which entered into force on 5 November 1996, such lessees are subject to a number of protective measures, such as the duty of landlords to contract a lease of indefinite duration, payment of protected rent (za\u0161ti\u0107ena najamnina), the amount of which is set by the Government and significantly lower than the market rent; and better protection against termination of the lease. 8.  In 2005 the applicants brought civil actions before the Split Municipal Court (Op\u0107inski sud u Splitu), seeking to obtain judgements ordering the State to pay them the difference between the protected rent they were entitled to receive under the domestic legislation and the market rent they could have obtained if their flats were not subject to the protected lease scheme. The applicants argued that the inadequate level of the protected rent imposed on them under the Lease of Flats Act unduly restricted their right of ownership. The applicants relied, inter alia, on Article 48 \u00a7 1 and Article 50 of the Croatian Constitution (see paragraph 18 below). 9.  The Split Municipal Court dismissed the applicants\u2019 actions as unfounded. These judgements were upheld by the Split County Court (\u017dupanijski sud u Splitu), and in case of the third and fourth applicants, also by the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske). In their complaints lodged with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske), the applicants alleged violations of their right to a fair hearing guaranteed by Article 29 \u00a7 1 and of their right to compensation in case of ownership restrictions guaranteed by Article 50 \u00a7 1 of the Croatian Constitution while referring also to its Article 48 \u00a7 1 (see paragraph 18 below). By decisions of 25 January and 14 December 2011 and 29 March and 9 February 2012 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicants\u2019 constitutional complaints, respectively. 10.  According to the information submitted by the applicants, the level of the monthly protected rent for their flats changed in the period after the entry into force of the Convention in respect of Croatia (5 November 1997) in the manner indicated below. The Government did not contest this information\nThe amount of the protected rent for the first applicant\u2019s flat \nApplication no.\n35444/12\nSize of the flat in square metres\nThe amount of the protected rent in HRK\nPeriod 174.80\n5 September 2012 - onwards\nThe amount of the protected rent for the second applicant\u2019s flat \nApplication no.\n35576/12\nSize of the flat in square metres\nThe amount of the protected rent in HRK\nPeriod 350.62\n1 January 2013 - onwards\nThe amount of the protected rent for the third and fourth applicants\u2019 flat[1]\nApplication nos.\n41555/12 and 41558/12\nSize of the flat in square metres\nThe amount of the protected rent in HRK\nPeriod 160.08\n5 September 2012 - onwards\nThe amount of protected rent for the fifth applicant\u2019s flat\nApplication no.\n48914/12\nSize of the flat in square metres\nThe amount of the protected rent in HRK\nPeriod 11.  According to the applicants, the condominium fee paid into the common reserve fund by the owners of the flat for maintenance etc., for the first applicant\u2019s flat was set at 140 Croatian kunas (HRK) on 1 March 1998 and has not been changed since. For the third and fourth applicants, as the co-owners of the same flat, the condominium fee was set at HRK 101.20 on 1 January 1998 and has not changed since. As to the second and the fifth applicants\u2019 flats, the condominium fee has never been set. The Government did not contest this information. 12.  According to the applicants, they never paid any income tax on the income generated by renting out their flats subject to the protected lease scheme. 13. The applicants furnished information as regards the monthly market rent for renting out flats in the vicinity of theirs. 14.  The first applicant submitted:\n- a copy of a lease agreement of 30 September 2013 for a flat in the same building with the surface area of 32.9 m\u00b2 rented out for HRK 2,000 per month,\n- an advertisement from the newspapers of 4 September 1999 offering for rent a flat in Split of a similar size as his (60 m\u00b2) for 650 German Marks (DEM) per month,\n- an advertisement from the Internet dated 15 November 2013 offering for rent a furnished flat of 50 m\u00b2 for EUR 300 per month, and another one dated 9 December 2014 of 60 m\u00b2 for EUR 500 per month, \n- an advertisement from the Internet dated 21 November 2014 offering for rent a two bedroom flat for EUR 112 per day in the high season, and for EUR 60 per day in the low season. 15.  The second and fifth applicants submitted:\n- an advertisement from the newspapers of 16 December 1998 offering for rent a furnished flat of 78 m\u00b2 for DEM 800 per month,\n- an advertisement from the Internet dated 4 December 2014 offering for rent a furnished flat of 85 m\u00b2 for EUR 1,200 per month, and another one of 8 July 2014 offering for rent a furnished flat of 80 m\u00b2 for EUR 1,000 per month,\n- an advertisement of a real-estate agency offering for rent a flat of 80 m\u00b2 for EUR 1,000 per month. \nThese applicants also claimed that their flats could be offered for rent during high season for EUR 150 per day. 16.  The third and fourth applicants submitted:\n - an advertisement from the newspapers of 25 September 1999 offering for rent a non-furnished flat in Split of 80 m\u00b2 for DEM 600 per month, and another one of 2 October 1999 offering for rent a flat of 93 m\u00b2 for DEM 1,000 per month,\n- an advertisement from the Internet dated 8 December 2014 offering for rent a furnished flat of 60 m\u00b2 for EUR 500 per month, and another one dated 3 December 2014 offering for rent a flat of 55 m\u00b2 for EUR 400 per month. These applicants also claimed that their flat could be offered for rent during high season for a minimum of EUR 50 per day. 17. The Government submitted that the applicants had not demonstrated that they would have been able to rent out their flats at all or to rent them out for the monthly rent indicated above (see paragraphs 14-16), pointing out to the negative effect the financial crisis had had on the real-estate market. The Government furnished information from the tax authorities according to which the monthly market rent for flats in the vicinity of those of the applicants ranged, in the period between 2005 and 2015, from HRK 750 to HRK 5,320. The data submitted referred to nine flats and read as follows: \n \nSize in square metres\nMonthly rent in HRK\nRelevant period\n38\n1,850.00\n2009 - 2012\n60\n4,777.37\n2007 - 2010\n26 900.00\n2005 - 2012\n36\n1,473.12\n2011 - 2012\n62\n5,320.00\n2015\n62\n3,800.00\n2010 - 2014\n47\n1,475.00\n2010 - 2012\n56\n1,000.00\n2008 - 2009", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "4", "1", "7", "8", "6", "5", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
+{"input": "11.  The first applicant, Mr A, was born in 1960 and lives in Norway. The second applicant, Mr B, was born in 1965 and lives in Florida, United States of America. 12.  The applicants and Mr E.K. owned a Gibraltar-registered company Estora Investment Ltd. (\u201cEstora\u201d). Mr T.F. and Mr G.A. owned the Samoa/Luxembourg-registered company Strategic Investment AS (\u201cStrategic\u201d). In June 2001 Estora acquired 24% of the shares in Wnet AS. Strategic acquired 46% of the shares in Wnet AS. In August 2001 all the shares in Wnet AS were sold to Software Innovation AS, at a substantially higher price. The first applicant\u2019s share of the sale price was 3,259,341 Norwegian kroner (NOK) (approximately 360,000 euros (EUR)). He transferred this amount to the Gibraltar-registered company Banista Holding Ltd., in which he was the sole shareholder. The second applicant\u2019s share of the sale price was NOK 4,651,881 (approximately EUR 500,000). He transferred this amount to Fardan Investment Ltd., in which he was the sole shareholder.\nMr E.K., Mr G.A. and Mr T.F. made gains on similar transactions, while Mr B.L., Mr K.B. and Mr G.N. were involved in other undeclared taxable transactions with Software Innovation AS.\nThe revenue from these transactions, amounting to approximately NOK 114.5 million (approximately EUR 12.6 million), was not declared to the Norwegian tax authorities, resulting in unpaid taxes totalling some NOK 32.5 million (approximately EUR 3.6 million). 13.  In 2005 the tax authorities started a tax audit on Software Innovation AS and looked into the owners behind Wnet AS. On 25 October 2007 they filed a criminal complaint against T.F. with \u00d8kokrim (the Norwegian National Authority for Investigation and Prosecution of Economic and Environmental Crime) with regard to matters that later led to the indictment of the first applicant, along with the other persons mentioned above and the second applicant, for aggravated tax fraud.\nThe persons referred to in paragraph 12 above were subsequently prosecuted, convicted and sentenced to terms of imprisonment for tax fraud in criminal proceedings. It may also be noted that:\n-  the prison term to which Mr E.K. was sentenced at first instance was upheld at second instance, even though the second-instance court found it somewhat mild; in the meantime he had had a 30% tax penalty imposed on him;\n-  the length of Mr B.L.\u2019s term of imprisonment was fixed in the light of his having previously had a 30% tax penalty imposed on him;\n-  Mr G.A. was neither sentenced to a fine nor had a tax penalty imposed on him;\n-  Mr T.F. was in addition sentenced to a fine corresponding to the level of a 30% tax penalty;\n-  Mr K.B. and Mr G.N. were each sentenced to a fine in accordance with the approach set out in the Supreme Court\u2019s ruling in Rt. 2011 p. 1509, with reference to Rt. 2005 p. 129, summarised at paragraph 50 below.\nA summary of the particular circumstances pertaining to the first and second applicants is given below. 14.  The first applicant was interviewed first as a witness on 6 December 2007; on 14 December 2007 he was arrested and gave evidence as a person charged (\u201csiktet\u201d). He admitted the factual circumstances but did not accept criminal liability. He was released after four days. 15.  On 14 October 2008 the first applicant was indicted for violations of sections 12-1(1)(a), cf. 12-2, of the Tax Assessment Act 1980 (ligningsloven) (see paragraph 43 below for the text of these provisions). 16.  On 24 November 2008 the Tax Administration (skattekontoret) amended his tax assessment for the years 2002 to 2007, after issuing a warning to that effect on 26 August 2008, with reference inter alia to the tax audit, to the criminal investigation, to the evidence given by him, as mentioned in paragraph 13 above, and to documents seized by \u00d8kokrim in the investigation. For the year 2002 the amendment was made on the ground that the first applicant had omitted to declare a general income of NOK 3,259,341 (approximately EUR 360,000), having instead declared a loss of NOK 65,655. Moreover, with reference to sections 10-2(1) and 10\u20114(1) of the Tax Assessment Act (see paragraph 42 below for the text of these provisions), the Tax Administration ordered him to pay a tax penalty of 30%, to be calculated on the basis of the tax that he owed in respect of the undeclared amount. The decision had regard inter alia to evidence given by the first and second applicants during their interviews in the criminal investigation. The first applicant did not lodge an appeal against that decision and paid the outstanding tax due, with the penalty, before the expiry of the three-week time-limit for lodging an appeal. 17.  On 2 March 2009 the Follo District Court (tingrett) convicted the first applicant on charges of aggravated tax fraud and sentenced him to one year\u2019s imprisonment on account of his having failed to declare, in his tax return for 2002, the sum of NOK 3,259,341 in earnings obtained abroad. In determining the sentence the District Court had regard to the fact that the first applicant had already been significantly sanctioned by the imposition of the tax penalty. 18.  The first applicant appealed, complaining that, in breach of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 to the European Convention on Human Rights, he had been both prosecuted and punished twice: in respect of the same offence under section 12-1 he had been charged and indicted by the public prosecutor, had then had a tax penalty imposed on him by the tax authorities, which he had paid, and had thereafter been convicted and sentenced. 19.  In a judgment of 12 April 2010 the Borgarting High Court (lagmannsrett) unanimously rejected his appeal; similar reasoning was subsequently given by the Supreme Court (H\u00f8yesterett) in a judgment of 27 September 2010 (summarised below). 20.  In its judgment of 27 September 2010 the Supreme Court first considered whether the two sets of proceedings in question had concerned the same factual circumstances (samme forhold). In this connection it noted the developments in the Convention case-law expounded in the Grand Chamber judgment of Sergey Zolotukhin v. Russia ([GC], no. 14939/03, \u00a7\u00a7 52, 53, 80\u201182, 84, ECHR 2009) and the attempt in that judgment to harmonise through the following conclusion:\n\u201c... Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 must be understood as prohibiting the prosecution or trial of a second \u2018offence\u2019 in so far as it arises from identical facts or facts which are substantially the same. ... The Court\u2019s inquiry should therefore focus on those facts which constitute a set of concrete factual circumstances involving the same defendant and [are] inextricably linked together in time and space ...\u201d. 21.  In the present instance, the Supreme Court observed, there was no doubt that the factual circumstances underlying the decision to impose tax penalties and the criminal prosecution had sufficient common features to meet these criteria. In both instances, the factual basis was the omission to declare income on the tax return. The requirement that the proceedings relate to the same matter had accordingly been met. 22.  The Supreme Court next examined whether both sets of proceedings concerned an \u201coffence\u201d within the meaning of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7. In this regard the Supreme Court reiterated its ruling as reported in Norsk Retstidende (\u201cRt.\u201d) 2002 p. 509 (see paragraph 45 below) that tax penalties at the ordinary level (30%) were consistent with the notion of \u201ccriminal charge\u201d in Article 6 \u00a7 1. That earlier assessment had relied on the three so\u2011called \u201cEngel criteria\u201d (the legal classification of the offence under national law; the nature of the offence; and the degree of severity of the penalty that the person concerned risked incurring) as spelled out in the Court\u2019s judgment in Engel and Others v. the Netherlands (8 June 1976, \u00a7 82, Series A no. 22). Of importance for the Supreme Court\u2019s assessment was the general preventive purpose of the tax penalty and the fact that, because 30% was a high rate, considerable sums could be involved. The Supreme Court further had regard to its judgment as reported in Rt. 2004 p. 645, where it had held in the light of the Strasbourg case-law (to the effect that the notion of \u201cpenalty\u201d should not have different meanings under different provisions of the Convention) that a 30% tax penalty was also a criminal matter for the purposes of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 \u2013 a stance adopted without further discussion in Rt. 2006 p. 1409. 23.  The Supreme Court also noted that both the Directorate of Taxation (Skattedirektoratet) and the Director of Public Prosecutions (Riksadvokaten) were of the view that it was unlikely that a tax penalty at the ordinary level would not be deemed criminal punishment for the purposes of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7. 24.  The Supreme Court further had regard to the Court\u2019s more recent case-law (Mjelde v. Norway (dec.), no. 11143/04, 1 February 2007; Storbr\u00e5ten v. Norway (dec.), no. 12277/04, 1 February 2007; Haarvig v. Norway (dec.), no. 11187/05, 11 December 2007, with references to Malige v. France, 23 September 1998, \u00a7 35, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998\u2011VII; and Nilsson v. Sweden (dec.), no. 73661/01, ECHR 2005\u2011XIII) to the effect that a wider range of criteria than merely the Engel criteria applied to the assessment under Article 4 of Protocol No. 7. It found confirmation in Sergey Zolotukhin (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 52-57) \u2013 later followed in Ruotsalainen v. Finland (no. 13079/03, \u00a7\u00a7 41\u201147, 16 June 2009) \u2013 that the three Engel criteria for establishing the existence of a \u201ccriminal charge\u201d for the purposes of Article 6 applied equally to the notion of criminal punishment in Article 4 of Protocol No. 7. 25.  Against this background, the Supreme Court found no ground on which to depart from its above-mentioned rulings of 2004 and 2006, holding that tax penalties at the ordinary level were to be regarded as \u201ccriminal punishment\u201d (straff) for the purposes of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7. 26.  It went on to observe that a condition for protection under the above\u2011mentioned provision was that the decision which barred further prosecution \u2013 in this case the decision of 24 November 2008 to impose ordinary tax penalties \u2013 had to be final. That decision had not been appealed against to the highest administrative body within the three-week time-limit, which had expired on 15 December 2008, and was in this sense final. If, on the other hand, the expiry of the six\u2011month time-limit for lodging a judicial appeal under section 11-1(4) of the Tax Assessment Act were to be material, the decision had not yet become final when the District Court delivered its judgment of 2 March 2009. 27.  The words \u201cfinally acquitted or convicted\u201d in Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 had been formulated with a view to situations where the barring decision was a judgment in a criminal case. The Court had established that a decision was final when it was res judicata, when no further ordinary remedies were available. In this regard, the time when a decision became res judicata according to the rules of national law would be decisive. Neither the wording of the provision, nor its drafting history, nor the case-law provided any guidance for situations where the barring decision was an administrative one. It was pointed out that, in Rt. 2002 p. 557, the Supreme Court had expressed an authoritative view to the effect that a tax assessment decision, including a decision on tax penalties, ought to be regarded as final when the taxpayer was precluded from challenging it (p. 570), without specifying, however, whether it was the time-limit for an administrative appeal, or rather for a judicial appeal, which was decisive. In the present case, the Supreme Court observed that the best solution would be to consider that the three-week time-limit for an administrative appeal was decisive in relation to Article 4 of Protocol No. 7. Otherwise, there would be clarity only after six months in cases where the taxpayer did not institute proceedings before the courts and, where he or she did so, only after a legally enforceable judgment \u2013 a period that would vary and could be lengthy. The decision of 24 November 2008 was therefore to be considered as final for the purposes of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7. 28.  The Supreme Court noted that the first applicant had been charged on 14 December 2007 and that the warning about the amendment of his tax assessment had been sent on 26 August 2008. Thereafter the case concerning the tax penalties and the criminal case had been conducted in parallel until they had been decided respectively by a decision of 24 November 2008 and a judgment of 2 March 2009. A central question in this case was whether there had been successive prosecutions, which would be contrary to Article 4 of Protocol No. 7, or parallel treatment, which was permissible to some extent. In this connection the Supreme Court had regard to two inadmissibility decisions, R.T. v. Switzerland (dec.), no. 31982/96, 30 May 2000; and Nilsson v. Sweden, cited above, in particular the following passage from the latter:\n\u201cHowever, the Court is unable to agree with the applicant that the decision to withdraw his driving licence amounted to new criminal proceedings being brought against him. While the different sanctions were imposed by two different authorities in different proceedings, there was nevertheless a sufficiently close connection between them, in substance and in time, to consider the withdrawal to be part of the sanctions under Swedish law for the offences of aggravated drunken driving and unlawful driving (see R.T. v. Switzerland, cited above, and, mutatis mutandis, Phillips v. the United Kingdom, no. 41087/98, \u00a7 34, ECHR 2001-VII). In other words, the withdrawal did not imply that the applicant was \u2018tried or punished again ... for an offence for which he had already been finally ... convicted\u2019, in breach of Article 4 \u00a7 1 of Protocol No. 7.\u201d 29.  In the present case, the Supreme Court held that there could be no doubt that there was a sufficient connection in substance and time. The two cases had their basis in the same factual circumstances \u2013 the lack of information on the tax return which had led to a deficient tax assessment. The criminal proceedings and the administrative proceedings had been conducted in parallel. After the first applicant had been charged on 14 December 2007, a warning had followed on 26 August 2008 about an amendment to his tax assessment, then an indictment on 14 October 2008, the tax authorities\u2019 decision of 24 November 2008 to amend the assessment, and the District Court\u2019s judgment of 2 March 2009. To a great extent the administrative-law and criminal-law processing had been interconnected. 30.  The purpose behind Article 4 of Protocol No. 7, to provide protection against the burden of being subjected to a new procedure, had applied to a lesser degree here, in as much as the first applicant had had no legitimate expectation of being subjected to only one procedure. In such a situation the interest in ensuring effective prosecution was preponderant. 31.  Following the tax audit in 2005 referred to in paragraph 13 above, during the autumn of 2007 the tax authorities reported to \u00d8kokrim that the second applicant had failed to declare on his tax return for the tax year 2002 income of NOK 4,561,881 (approximately EUR 500,000) earned from his sale of certain shares. 32.  On 16 October 2008 the Tax Administration put the second applicant on notice that it was considering amending his tax assessment and imposing a tax penalty, referring inter alia to the tax audit, the criminal investigation and the evidence given by him, mentioned in paragraph 13 above, and to documents seized by \u00d8kokrim in the investigation. On 5 December 2008 the Tax Administration amended his tax assessment to the effect that he owed NOK 1,302,526 (approximately EUR 143,400) in tax in respect of the undeclared income. In addition, with reference to sections 10-2(1) and 10\u20114(1) of the Tax Assessment Act, it decided to impose a tax penalty of 30%. The decision had regard inter alia to evidence given by the first and second applicants during interviews in the criminal investigation. The second applicant paid the tax due, with the penalty, and did not appeal against the decision, which became final on 26 December 2008. 33.  In the meantime, on 11 November 2008 the public prosecutor indicted the second applicant for a violation of section 12-1(1)(a), cf. section 12-2, of the Tax Assessment Act on the ground that for the tax year(s) 2001 and/or 2002 he had omitted to declare income of NOK 4,651,881 on his tax return, which represented a tax liability of NOK 1,302,526. The public prosecutor requested the Oslo City Court (tingrett) to pass a summary judgment based on his confession (tilst\u00e5elsesdom). In addition, Mr E.K., Mr B.L. and Mr G.A. pleaded guilty and consented to summary trials on a guilty plea. 34.  On 10 February 2009 the second applicant (unlike E.K., B.L. and G.A.) withdrew his confession, as a result of which the public prosecutor issued a revised indictment on 29 May 2009, including the same charges. 35.  On 30 September 2009 the City Court, after holding an adversarial hearing, convicted the second applicant on the charges of aggravated tax fraud and sentenced him to one year\u2019s imprisonment, account being taken of the fact that he had already had a tax penalty imposed on him. 36.  The second applicant appealed against the City Court procedure to the Borgarting High Court, arguing in particular that by reason of the prohibition against double jeopardy in Article 4 of Protocol No. 7, the fact that he had had a tax penalty imposed on him constituted a bar against criminal conviction. Thus he requested that the City Court\u2019s judgment be quashed (opphevet) and that the prosecution case be dismissed (avvist) from the courts. 37.  In a judgment of 8 July 2010 the High Court rejected the second applicant\u2019s appeal, relying essentially on its reasoning in the case of the first applicant, which was similar to that of the Supreme Court summarised above (see paragraphs 20 to 30 above). Thus, the High Court found that the tax authorities\u2019 decision of 5 December 2008 ordering him to pay a tax penalty of 30% did constitute a criminal punishment (straff); that the decision had become \u201cfinal\u201d upon the expiry of the time-limit for lodging an appeal on 26 December 2008; and that the decision on the tax penalty and the subsequent criminal conviction concerned the same matter. 38.  Moreover, as in the case of the first applicant, the High Court considered that parallel proceedings \u2013 both administrative and criminal \u2013 were to some extent permissible under Article 4 of Protocol No. 7, provided that the second proceedings had commenced before the first had become final. Where that minimum requirement had been fulfilled, an assessment had to be made of the state of progress of the second set and, not least, as to whether there was a sufficient connection in substance and in time between the first and second decisions. 39.  As to the concrete assessment of the second applicant\u2019s case, the High Court observed that the criminal proceedings and the tax proceedings had in fact been conducted in parallel since as far back as the tax authorities\u2019 complaint to the police in the autumn of 2007 and until the decision to impose the tax penalty had been taken in December 2008. This state of affairs was similar to the case of the first applicant. The second applicant had been indicted and the case referred to the City Court with a request for a summary judgment on the basis of his confession on 11 November 2008, before the decision on the tax penalty. The criminal proceedings had thus reached a relatively advanced stage by the time the decision to impose the tax penalty had been taken. The nine-month period \u2013 from when the tax authorities\u2019 decision of 5 December 2008 had become final until the second applicant\u2019s conviction of 30 September 2009 by the City Court \u2013 had been somewhat longer than the two-and-a-half-month period in the case of the first applicant. However, this could be explained by the fact that the second applicant had withdrawn his confession in February 2009, with the consequence that he had had to be indicted anew on 29 May 2009 and an ordinary trial hearing had had to be scheduled. Against this background, the High Court (like the City Court) concluded that there was undoubtedly a sufficient connection in substance and time between the decision on the tax penalties and the subsequent criminal conviction. 40.  On 29 October 2010 the Appeals Leave Committee of the Supreme Court refused the second applicant leave to appeal, finding that such leave was warranted neither by the general importance of the case nor by any other reason.", "references": ["8", "5", "6", "4", "0", "1", "7", "3", "2", "9", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1980 and lives in Samara. 5.  At about 8.35 p.m. on 14 October 2009 the applicant was apprehended by officers of the Federal Service for Drug Control (\u0424\u0421K\u041d, \u201cthe drugs police\u201d) during a test purchase of drugs from him. According to the applicant, he was brought to their premises at around 11 p.m. His account was corroborated by two drug police officers and two attesting witnesses. An arrest record was not compiled. Furthermore, at around 2 a.m. on the following day he was put in a cell that had not bed or stool, light, lavatory or running water, and was smeared with dirt and faeces. During his detention he had not been provided with food or drink, or permitted to use the toilet, but had had to urinate in a plastic bottle. At 6.30 p.m. a criminal case was instituted against the applicant, and thirty minutes later an investigator drew the arrest record, thus formally remanding the applicant in custody. At 11.55 p.m. on the same day he was transferred to a temporary detention centre. 6.  On 16 October 2009 the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Samara remanded the applicant in custody. In particular, the court mentioned the following arguments: seriousness and nature of charges; previous conviction not being expunged; absence of \u201cregular source of income\u201d; hence possibility of continuing criminal activities or absconding or obstructing justice in any other manner. The applicant did not appeal. 7.  On 11 December 2009 the District Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 15 January 2010 finding that the grounds on which the preventive measure had previously been imposed still persisted and there was no reason to vary the preventive measure. Additionally, the court mentioned that the applicant had permanent place of residence and employment but it further stated that the applicant \u201cdid not have a regular source of income\u201d. 8.  On 22 December 2009 the Samara Regional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal, endorsing the reasoning of the district court. The prosecutor was present at the appeal hearing unlike both the applicant and his counsel. 9.  On 12 February 2010 the Kuybyshevskiy District Court of Samara found the applicant guilty of selling large quantities of narcotics and sentenced him to eight years\u2019 imprisonment in a strict-security institution. 10.  On 4 May 2010 the Samara Regional Court upheld the conviction. The prosecutor was present at the appeal hearing whereas both the applicant and his counsel were absent.", "references": ["7", "8", "9", "6", "5", "0", "4", "No Label", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["1", "2", "3"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1977 and is currently serving a sentence in a correctional colony in the Tambov Region. 5.  On 17 July 2007 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of robbery. On the following day the Meshchanskiy District Court of Moscow authorised his detention. 6.  On 6 September 2007 the Taganskiy District Court extended the detention. That detention order was upheld on appeal on 22 October 2007 by the Moscow City Court. 7.  Another extensions of detention followed on 16 October 2007 and 11 December 2007. The applicant appealed against both detention orders. 8.  On 17 January 2008 the applicant was convicted as charged and sentenced to nine years\u2019 imprisonment. The conviction became final on 19 March 2008. 9.  On 2 July 2008, in reply to the applicant\u2019s complaint about the failure to examine his appeal, the City Court informed him that his appeal against the detention order of 16 October 2007 was not received by the City Court. However, by a letter of 22 August 2008 the City Court forwarded the applicant\u2019s appeal statement lodged on 17 October 2007 to the District Court, requiring it to perform procedural steps necessary to initiate the appeal proceedings. The City Court also informed the applicant that his appeal complaint of 17 October 2007 was mistakenly attached to another case-file. 10.  No further information on organisation of the appeal hearing against the detention order of 16 October 2007 was provided.", "references": ["1", "8", "9", "4", "7", "5", "6", "3", "0", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1982 in Achinsk, Krasnoyarsk Region. He lives in Krasnoyarsk. 6.  On 21 January 2005 the Achinsk Town Court of the Krasnoyarsk Region convicted the applicant of aggravated robbery and sentenced him to nine years\u2019 imprisonment. He was sent to Krasnoyarsk Region correctional colony no. IK- 235/26-22 to serve his sentence. 7.  On 22 August 2007, owing to repeated violations of prison rules, the applicant was placed in the single-cell wing (\u0435\u0434\u0438\u043d\u043e\u0435 \u043f\u043e\u043c\u0435\u0449\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u043a\u0430\u043c\u0435\u0440\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0442\u0438\u043f\u0430, hereinafter \u201cthe EPKT\u201d), a stricter regime of the correctional colony, for eleven months. He was allegedly beaten up by EPKT guards on two occasions. 8.  The applicant submitted that on 5 March 2008 a new detainee \u201cof a lower social status\u201d was placed in his cell, which was shared with other detainees. Soon a heated quarrel broke out between the applicant and the newcomer. Prison guards entered the cell, took the applicant out, kicked his legs, twisted his hands, threw him to the floor and then dragged him to a search room. There they delivered blows to his head and body, handcuffed him to the ceiling of a metal cage and left him alone for an hour. Upon their return the guards put him in a spread-eagled position and started beating him, until he fell to the floor. They continued beating him for another two to three hours. 9.  Two days later the applicant was sentenced to fifteen days\u2019 detention in a disciplinary cell. 10.  According to the applicant, on 9 April 2008 he was again beaten up by prison guards under the pretext of a minor disciplinary offence. The beating continued for two or three hours. The applicant insisted that the beating had been so severe that he had lost ability to walk unassisted. Thereafter he was dragged back to his cell where he was locked up alone. 11.  The applicant further submitted that on the morning of 10 April 2009 he was taken to the office of the head of the unit where he slumped into a chair, half lying on it as he was unable to sit up straight due to a pain in his back and leg. A prison guard hit the applicant on the head and ordered him not to fake injuries. 12.  The applicant was allegedly forced to write a statement to the head of the prison service of the Krasnoyarsk Region, stating that no force had ever been used against him or any other detainees in the correctional colony and that his health problems had resulted from an accident in childhood. 13.  During his detention the applicant suffered from chronic gastritis, urethritis and ischialgia. His health-related complaints were addressed by a prison doctor, who provided him with treatment when necessary. 14.  In the EPKT the applicant was subjected to routine daily check-ups for bodily injuries. No injuries were recorded during the entire period of his detention. 15.  On 10 March 2008, five days after the first incident of alleged ill\u2011treatment, the applicant complained to a prison doctor about pain in the small of his back. The doctor diagnosed lumbalgia, prescribed drugs and ointment, and noted in his file that the applicant\u2019s skin was \u201cpeculiarity\u2011free\u201d. 16.  On three occasions in the same month the applicant complained of constricting chest pain, frequent urination, a headache and pain in the small of the back. The doctor diagnosed lumbalgia, \u201cneurocirculatory dystonia of the hypertensive type\u201d and cystitis. Medication was prescribed. 17.  In the end of March 2008 the applicant again visited the prison doctor to complain about a sprained ankle. The doctor discovered an oedema on his ankle with a scar measuring 1cm. The applicant explained that it was the result of a childhood trauma. In addition, he also made a written statement that his back pain and leg problems were chronic and that he had not been ill-treated in the correctional colony. Having recorded the absence of any injuries on the applicant\u2019s body, the doctor prescribed analgesics. 18.  On 18 April 2008, nine days after the alleged second episode of ill\u2011treatment, the applicant complained of pain while urinating. The doctor recorded acute cystitis and amended the drug regimen. In the last days of that month he complained, for the first time, of pain on his left shin. The doctor noted that the left leg was swollen and the applicant was unable to stand on it. He diagnosed a blood circulation disorder and prescribed medication. 19.  The applicant\u2019s medical condition did not improve and on 13 May 2008 he was placed in the old wing of the prison hospital. He informed the hospital doctors that he had started experiencing the pain in his leg after a fall in the cell in the first days of March 2008. His diagnosis of acute deep-vein thrombosis of the left leg, lymphedema, and degenerative disc disease were addressed by conservative treatment, leading to the amelioration of his condition. 20.  The applicant was discharged from the hospital on 22 May 2008 with instructions to continue treatment and use a walking stick. 21.  In the summer of 2008 the applicant started using crutches. In July 2008 a doctor recorded significant swelling of his left leg accompanied by bluish coloration of the area. The diagnosis of relapsed lymphedema led to the amendment of his drug regimen. At the same time, the applicant made a statement stating that he had not been subject to any ill-treatment. 22.  By mid-October 2008 the leg oedema abated. 23.  In November 2008 the applicant was again placed in the old wing of the prison hospital. He was diagnosed with post-thrombotic disease and nephroptosis. The treatment was effective and on 21 November 2008 he was discharged. The doctor prescribed a drug regimen and recommended that the applicant not use crutches. 24.  In the beginning of 2009 the applicant\u2019s leg swelled again. On 28 March 2009 he was admitted to the new wing of the prison hospital where the conditions were, according to the applicant, satisfactory. His treatment in the hospital continued until 27 April 2009 and resulted in the decrease of the oedema and associated inflammation. Compression stockings, drugs and limiting of physical activity were prescribed. 25.  In the beginning of 2010 the applicant underwent symptomatic treatment for degenerative disc disease. In September 2010 his medical condition was declared stable with his chronic illness having been taken under control. 26.  In 2011-12 the applicant had allergic dermatitis, rhinopharyngitis, lumbodynia and vegetative-vascular dystonia, without any condition being considered serious or problematic. The illnesses were addressed with drug therapy. 27.  In August 2008, during a meeting with his mother, the applicant complained of having been beaten by the guards. On 10 September 2008 his mother asked for a thorough inquiry into the alleged ill-treatment. 28.  On 24 October 2008 the Boguchanskiy district prosecutor visited the applicant, who submitted his account of the events and asked for a criminal case to be opened. 29.  The investigating authorities collected extracts from the applicant\u2019s medical records and written explanations from a guard who had been allegedly involved in the beatings. The colony officers denied using force against the applicant, supporting their arguments with the applicant\u2019s written statements of 17 July 2008 and written statements by his fellow inmates. The inmates insisted that the applicant had suffered for a long time from chronic back pain and swollen leg syndrome, which had become particularly acute every spring and autumn. Tired of the difficulties of prison life, the applicant had allegedly told the inmates that he had intended to use his chronic ailments to obtain a transfer to a hospital, where he \u201ccould rest\u201d. 30.  On 15 November 2008 a senior investigator of the prosecutor\u2019s office dismissed the complaint, having found no evidence of criminal conduct. 31.  The above decision, as well as another three similar decisions of 27 June, 8 August and 5 September 2011, was overturned by a higher\u2011ranking prosecutor, who criticised the lack of thoroughness of the investigation. 32.  On 12 September 2011 an expert from the Krasnoyarsk Bureau of Forensic Medical Examination was asked to look into the possible cause of the applicant\u2019s leg condition, including the possibility of it having a trauma\u2011related cause related to the alleged beatings in March and April 2008. The expert found that the condition could not have resulted from the beatings. 33.  On 16 January 2012 the investigating authorities again refused to open a criminal case. The refusal was overturned by a high-ranking prosecutor who ordered further investigation steps. 34.  In the new round of the investigation the investigator questioned Mr V., the only inmate who had not previously been interviewed. Unlike all the other witnesses, who had denied the beatings, he said that on 5 March 2008 the prison officers had taken the applicant out of his cell, after a conflict with a \u201clow caste\u201d cellmate, to a search room. He had then heard guards shouting and the applicant moaning. However, he had not seen any injuries on the applicant, but had seen the latter limping several days after the incident. The applicant had insisted that he had been beaten by the guards. 35.  On 28 September 2012 a new medical expert report was prepared, with the expert asked to see whether any of the applicant\u2019s illnesses could have resulted from having been beaten. After having examined the applicant and his medical file, the expert found no evidence of ill-treatment and insisted that the applicant\u2019s medical condition could not have been caused by or linked to the beatings. The main finding was that the applicant\u2019s illnesses were no more than \u201cindependent pathological processes without any traumatic influence\u201d. 36.  On 12 October 2012 the investigating authorities dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaints of ill-treatment. 37.  From 22 August 2007 to 13 May 2008, and from 22 May to 17 July 2008 the applicant was detained in the EPKT. On several occasions he was also detained in various disciplinary cells, with the most recent periods of this detention being between 7 and 22 March 2008 and between 19 and 24 August 2009. During the latter period he was detained in cell no. 12, which measured 15.2 square metres. The cell was equipped with two double plank beds. 38.  The applicant provided a very general and summary-like description of his detention in all the disciplinary cells, complaining of poor ventilation and lighting and inadequate sanitary conditions. 39.  According to the Government, the number of cellmates in disciplinary cell no. 12 did not exceed four. The applicant was afforded a daily hour-long walk in the prison yard. The cell was ventilated by means of a window casement. The window itself, measuring 90 by 60 centimetres, allowed sufficient daylight. The cell was also lit by a 150-watt lamp from 5 a.m. to 9 p.m. and a 40-watt security light at night. The toilet in the cell was separated from the main area by a one-metre high partition, ensuring privacy. The cell was clean and disinfected. The applicant was given uniform, underwear and slippers. Once a week he could take a shower. 40.  In June 2008 the applicant lodged a claim seeking compensation for non-pecuniary damage allegedly caused by the poor conditions of his detention in the prison hospital and ineffective medical care. He also sought leave to appear. The presiding judge informed the applicant that there was no procedural obligation to transport a convicted inmate to a civil case in which he or she was a party. 41.  On 30 December 2008 the court ordered an expert report to assess the quality of the medical treatment afforded to the applicant in detention. In a report on 29 June 2009 experts stated that the applicant had received inpatient treatment in full compliance with the generally recognised medical standards. The deterioration of his health in November 2008 could have been caused either by the natural course of his illness or by his failure to adhere to doctors\u2019 recommendations. The experts noted that the applicant had suffered from chronic conditions, including vascular illness, degenerative disc disease of the thoracic and lumbar spine with Schmorl\u2019s nodes and first-stage nephroptosis of the right kidney. He had received adequate medical treatment. 42.  On 23 November 2009 the Zheleznodorozhniy District Court dismissed the claim, having considered that the medical treatment received in the prison hospital had been adequate and successful, given the significant improvement of his health. The applicant was not brought to the hearing, while the representatives of the prison hospital appeared. The District Court again cited the lacuna in the Russian law pertaining to the participation of convicts in their civil cases. 43.  That judgment was upheld on appeal by the Krasnoyarsk Regional Court on 17 March 2010. The parties to the proceedings did not appear. No comments were made by the Regional Court on account of their absence. 44.  In 2010 the applicant lodged a claim for non-pecuniary damages against the correctional colony, arguing that the conditions of his detention in the EPKT had been appalling and that he had not had adequate medical care in the colony. 45.  On 1 April 2010 the Achinsk Town Court ordered an expert examination, asking for an assessment of the quality of the treatment afforded to the applicant between 5 March and 17 July 2008. 46.  On 29 July 2010 the commission presented its report. It concluded that the applicant was provided, timeously and in full compliance with the existing legal requirements, with the necessary treatment which any person was entitled to receive in a general, non-specialised, medical facility. The experts also stressed that there were no scientifically available means to properly diagnose the applicant\u2019s deep-vein thrombosis before the illness had manifested itself through acute symptoms, such as pain. The deterioration in his health could have been either the natural development of the illness, or could have resulted from his failure to follow medical recommendations. The experts noted no episodes of belated medical treatment or evidence of a failure to provide him with conservative treatment. 47.  In the meantime the applicant asked the Town Court to ensure his presence at the hearing. The application for leave to appear was dismissed with reference to the lack of a legal provision regulating inmates\u2019 transport to civil courts. 48.  On 28 April 2011 the Town Court, having examined the case in the applicant\u2019s absence, dismissed the claim. It found that his vascular condition could not have been diagnosed earlier and that it had been developing in a stealthy fashion throughout the detention. As soon as the symptoms had appeared, the applicant had started receiving timely and adequate medical care. 49.  On 7 September 2011 the Regional Court examined the case in the absence of the parties. It noted that the applicant\u2019s presence was not required given the specific nature of his claim and the limited usefulness of oral submissions.", "references": ["6", "7", "2", "4", "5", "8", "9", "0", "1", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant company is a limited liability company incorporated under Croatian law, which has its seat in Zagreb. 5.  On 21 June 2000 the applicant company instituted civil proceedings before the Zagreb Municipal Court (Op\u0107inski sud u Zagrebu) against the Croatian Health Insurance Fund seeking payment of 11,500 Croatian kunas (HRK)[1] which had been unjustifiably seized from the company\u2019s bank account for the alleged failure to pay health insurance contributions. 6.  The Municipal Court scheduled sixteen hearings of which six were adjourned (in the period between 10 May 2005 and 3 November 2009) at the request of the applicant company. 7.  The applicant company\u2019s director failed to attend the hearing scheduled for 6 November 2006 without giving any reasons for his absence. Therefore, by a decision of the same day, the court decided to suspend the proceedings (mirovanje postupka) pursuant to the law. The proceedings continued upon the request of the applicant company of 21 February 2007. 8.  The statutory conditions for the suspension of proceedings were again fulfilled on 2 March 2010 when the applicant company\u2019s director attended the hearing but failed to engage in litigation. Accordingly, on the same date the Municipal Court issued a decision declaring that the applicant company\u2019s action was to be considered withdrawn, pursuant to the law. 9.  By a decision of 17 September 2010 the Zagreb County Court (\u017dupanijski sud u Zagrebu) dismissed an appeal lodged by the applicant company against the first-instance decision. The County Court\u2019s decision was served on the applicant company on 3 January 2011. 10.  Meanwhile, on 1 April 2010 the applicant company lodged a request for protection of the right to a hearing within a reasonable time (zahtjev za za\u0161titu prava na su\u0111enje u razumnom roku) with the Zagreb County Court, complaining about the excessive length of the above civil proceedings. 11.  On 3 September 2010 the applicant company\u2019s request was forwarded to the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske). 12.  By a decision of 13 July 2011 the Supreme Court found a violation of the applicant company\u2019s right to a hearing within a reasonable time and awarded it HRK 5,000[2] in compensation. It held that (a) even though there were no substantial periods of inactivity the mere fact that the Municipal Court had scheduled sixteen hearings suggested that the proceedings had not been conducted efficiently, and (b) the conduct of the applicant company significantly contributed to their length (see paragraphs 6-8 above). 13.  The applicant company appealed. 14.  By a decision of 6 September 2012 a three-judge panel of the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and served its decision on the applicant company on 13 November 2012. 15.  By a decision of 31 January 2013 the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) declared inadmissible the applicant company\u2019s subsequent constitutional complaint, and served that decision on the company on 23 March 2013. The Constitutional Court held that the contested second-instance decision was not open to constitutional review.", "references": ["7", "8", "9", "2", "1", "0", "5", "6", "4", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1936 and lives in Kragujevac. 6.  On 13 December 2006 the applicant filed a civil claim in criminal proceedings as injured party. 7.  On 18 November 2010 the Kragujevac Court of First Instance delivered the first instance judgment. 8.  On 20 October 2011 the Kragujevac Appellate Court delivered the second instance judgment. This judgment was delivered to the applicant on 7 November 2011. 9.  On 18 February 2014 the Constitutional Court of Serbia rejected the applicant\u2019s constitutional appeal.", "references": ["1", "0", "5", "9", "2", "6", "8", "4", "7", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicants were born in 1964 and 1975 respectively and lived in Moscow. 5.  On 5 April 2005 the Presnenskiy District Court in Moscow found the applicants and their co-defendants guilty of extortion and gave them a custodial sentence. On 31 October 2005 the Moscow City Court upheld the conviction on appeal. 6.  On 26 January 2006 the Presidium of the City Court quashed the appeal judgment of 31 October 2005 for formal defects and ordered a new appeal hearing. It did not mention the matter of the defendants\u2019 detention. No ordinary appeal lay against that decision but the second applicant complained to the Supreme Court about the City Court\u2019s failure to render a decision on his measure. On 13 December 2006 a judge of the Supreme Court rejected his complaint, finding as follows:\n\u201cThe fact that [the Presidium of the City Court] unjustifiably (\u043d\u0435\u043e\u0431\u043e\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u043d\u043e) omitted to rule on the preventive measure is not a ground for setting aside its decision because it appears from the ... City Court\u2019s decision of 26 July 2006 and the ... District Court\u2019s decision of 31 August 2006 that the matter of detention was addressed in subsequent judicial decision which maintained the custodial measure in respect of [the second applicant].\u201d 7.  On 26 July 2006 the City Court held a new appeal hearing and quashed the initial conviction for formal defects, ordering a re-trial. It also held that there were no grounds for varying the preventive measure and maintained it without setting a time-limit or relying on any provisions of the domestic law. 8.  On 21 August 2006 the District Court held a preliminary hearing and fixed the trial date for 31 August. It maintained the custodial measure, without citing any reasons, references to the domestic law or time-limits. 9.  On 31 August 2006 the District Court returned the case file to prosecutor and extended the applicants\u2019 detention, referring to the gravity of the charges but without setting a time-limit. On 30 October 2006 the City Court rejected the applicants\u2019 appeals against the extension order. 10.  On 16 January 2007 the District Court extended the applicants\u2019 detention until 28 February 2007, relying on the gravity of the charges and unspecified circumstances that indicated a risk of perverting the course of justice. On 21 February 2007 the City Court quashed the detention order of 16 January because of an incorrect date in its text. It maintained the custodial measure without giving reasons. On 27 February 2007 the District Court issued an identically worded detention order which was upheld on appeal on 16 April. 11.  On the same date the District Court granted a further extension of the applicants\u2019 detention until 30 April 2007, relying on the gravity of the charges. The extension order was upheld on appeal on 25 June 2007. 12.  Further extensions were approved by the District Court on 27 and 28 April (upheld on appeal on 25 June), 8 and 16 May (upheld on appeal on 23 July), and 13 June 2007 (upheld on appeal on 1 August). 13.  On 11 October 2007 the District Court found the defendants guilty and gave them custodial sentences.", "references": ["1", "7", "3", "4", "0", "9", "8", "6", "5", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "8.  The applicants were born in 1985 and 1980 and live in Jilemnice and Prague respectively. 9.  The applicant gave birth to her first child in hospital in 2007 without any complications. According to her, during the birth the medical personnel present were urging her to agree to undergo various kinds of medical intervention even though she had expressly stated her wish not to be subjected to any unnecessary medical treatment. She was also forced to give birth in a position she did not find comfortable. She wanted to leave the hospital a few hours after the birth as both she and the baby were healthy, but a doctor ordered her to stay in the hospital. She therefore did not leave until the next day, when she presented a letter from her paediatrician, who confirmed that the applicant would take care of the child. 10.  In 2010 the applicant became pregnant for the second time with an expected delivery date in the middle of May 2011. The pregnancy was free from complications and the medical examinations and tests did not indicate any problems. Since she considered that giving birth in a hospital had been stressful for her, the applicant decided to give birth at home and searched for a midwife to assist at the birth. However, she was unable to find any midwife who was willing to assist her with a home birth. 11.  On 5 April 2011 she wrote to her health-insurance company and to the Liberec Regional Office (krajsk\u00fd \u00fa\u0159ad) asking for help in finding a midwife. 12.  On 7 April 2011 the health-insurance company replied that Czech legislation did not provide for the possibility of a public health-insurance company covering costs arising from home births and that it therefore had no contracts with any health professionals providing such services. Moreover, prevailing expert medical opinion did not approve of home births. 13.  In a letter of 13 April 2011 the Regional Office added that the midwives listed in its register of health professionals were, in any event, only allowed by law to attend births at premises possessing the technical equipment required by Decree no. 221/2010 and not in a private home. 14.  Not having found any health professional to assist her, the applicant gave birth to her son alone at home on 11 May 2011. 15.  On 1 July 2011 she lodged a constitutional appeal (\u00fastavn\u00ed st\u00ed\u017enost), complaining that she had been denied the possibility of giving birth at home with the assistance of a health professional, in violation of her right to respect for her private life. 16.  On 28 February 2012 the Constitutional Court (\u00dastavn\u00ed soud) dismissed the appeal, holding that it would be contrary to the principle of subsidiarity for it to decide on the merits of the case, because the applicant had not exhausted all the available remedies, which included an action for protection of personal rights under the Civil Code and an application for judicial review under Article 82 of the Code of Judicial Administrative Procedure. It nevertheless expressed its doubts as to the compliance of Czech legislation with Article 8 of the Convention and asked the relevant parties to initiate a serious and well-informed debate about new legislation. Nine out of the fourteen judges attached separate opinions to the decision, in which they disagreed with the reasoning behind it. Most of them considered that the Constitutional Court should have dismissed the appeal as an actio popularis and should have refrained from expressing any views on the constitutionality of the legislation concerning home births. 17.  The applicant is the mother of two children who were born at home in 2008 and 2010 with the assistance of a midwife. The midwives attended the births without any authorisation from the State. 18.  According to the applicant, before deciding to give birth at home, she had visited several hospitals, which had all refused her requests to deliver the baby without any medical intervention that was not strictly necessary. They had also refused to agree to her wish for uninterrupted contact with the baby from the moment of birth, as the regular practice was to take the child away from the mother immediately after the birth to be weighed and measured and for further medical observation for a period of two hours. 19.  At the time of lodging the present application, the applicant was pregnant again, with an expected delivery in the middle of May 2012. The pregnancy was free from complications and she again wished to give birth at home with the assistance of a midwife. However, she was unable to find a midwife willing to assist because of the risk of a heavy fine if medical services were provided without authorisation. The applicant asked various authorities to help to find a solution. 20.  In a letter of 18 November 2011 the Ministry of Health replied that it did not provide medical services to individual patients and that the applicant should make enquiries to the City of Prague (M\u011bsto Praha), which, acting as a regional office, registered and issued licences to health professionals. 21.  On 29 November 2011 the applicant\u2019s health-insurance company informed her that the attendance of a health professional at a home birth was not covered by public insurance. 22.  On 13 December 2011 the City of Prague informed the applicant that no midwife registered in Prague was authorised to assist with home births. 23.  On 7 May 2012 the applicant gave birth to a child in a maternity hospital in Vrchlab\u00ed, 140 km away from Prague. She had chosen that hospital because of its reputation for respecting the wishes of mothers during delivery. Nevertheless, according to her, not all her wishes had been respected. Despite the fact that both she and the child had been healthy and that no complications had occurred during the birth, the applicant had had to stay in the hospital for seventy-two hours. The newborn baby had been separated from her after the birth, and before leaving the maternity hospital the remains of the child\u2019s umbilical cord had been cut off despite her wishes to the contrary. 24.  In its bulletin no. 2/2007 of February 2007 the Ministry of Health published practice guidelines, which stated:\n\u201cConducting a delivery in the Czech Republic is regarded as a health-care service that is provided only in a health-care institution. Each health-care institution must fulfil the statutory requirements ... and the requirements laid down by the relevant secondary legislation.\u201d 25.  On 20 March 2012 the Ministry of Health set up an expert committee on obstetrics with the objective of studying the issue of home births. There were representatives of care recipients, midwives, physicians\u2019 associations, the Ministry of Health, the Government\u2019s Commissioner for Human Rights and public health-insurance companies. The representatives of the physicians\u2019 associations boycotted the meetings, declaring that the current state of affairs was satisfactory and that, in their view, there was no need to change anything. Subsequently, the Minister of Health removed the representatives of care recipients, midwives and the Government\u2019s Commissioner for Human Rights, with the argument that only by changing the committee\u2019s composition in this way it would be possible for it to agree on certain conclusions. 26.  On 18 January 2013 the Governmental Council for Equal Opportunities for Women and Men (Rada vl\u00e1dy pro rovn\u00e9 p\u0159\u00edle\u017eitosti \u017een a mu\u017e\u016f), an advisory body to the Government, recommended the prevention of further discrimination against women in the enjoyment of their right to a free choice of the method and circumstances of giving birth and the place of delivery. It also recommended the prevention of discrimination against midwives by permitting them to practise their profession fully through their inclusion in the public health-insurance system. The Council also referred to the recommendations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, which monitors implementation of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, to support its position that women should have a choice of where to give birth. 27.  In its bulletin no. 8/2013 published on 9 December 2013, which replaced the previous practice guidelines of 2007, the Ministry of Health described the procedure for providers of health-care services when discharging newborns into their own social environment. It stated that the recommendation of specialists was that a newborn should be discharged from the maternity hospital no sooner than seventy-two hours after birth. The new procedure allows for the discharge of the newborn from the maternity hospital less than seventy-two hours after the birth at the request of the newborn\u2019s legal representative, provided that the latter:\n\u201c(a) has submitted a written withdrawal of his or her agreement to the provision of medical services to the newborn, or a written statement declaring his or her disagreement with the provision of the medical services, or, alternatively, such agreement or disagreement has been entered in the newborn\u2019s medical documentation ...;\n(b) has been demonstrably and duly informed about the possible consequences following the discharge of the newborn before seventy-two hours have elapsed since the birth ...;\n(c) has been duly informed that \u2013 in the interests of the subsequent healthy development of the newborn \u2013 the Czech specialist medical associations recommend: 2. that a blood sample be taken within forty-eight to seventy-two hours following the birth for the purposes of screening for hereditary metabolic malfunctions ...\u201d 28.  According to estimated data provided by the World Health Organisation for 2004, the Czech Republic was among the countries with the lowest perinatal mortality rate, which is defined as the number of stillbirths and deaths in the first week of life. The rate for the Czech Republic was 0.4%. In other European countries the figures ranged from 0.5% in Sweden and Italy to 4.7% in Azerbaijan. In most European countries the figures were below 1%. According to their 2006 report, perinatal mortality is an important indicator of maternal care and maternal health and nutrition; it also reflects the quality of available obstetric and paediatric care, comparing different countries. The report recommended that, if possible, all foetuses and infants weighing at least 500 g at birth, whether alive or dead, should be included in the statistics. The reported data regarding stillbirths were not adjusted to this effect in the study. 29.  According to the European Perinatal Health Report on the health and care of pregnant women and babies in Europe in 2010, issued in 2013 within the framework of the activities of the Euro-Peristat Project, the Czech Republic was among the countries with the lowest mortality rate for newborns in the first twenty-seven days of their life. The rate was 0.17%. The data for other countries included in the report, mostly European Union member States, ranged from 0.12% for Iceland to 0.55% for Romania. 30.  It appears that no midwives have been prosecuted in the Czech Republic for attending home births per se. Several have been prosecuted, however, for alleged malpractice in connection with a delivery at home. The applicants referred to the cases of Ms \u0160. and Ms K., who are both well-known promoters of natural deliveries without any unnecessary medical intervention and who used to regularly conduct home deliveries. 31.  On 27 March 2013 the Prague 6 District Court (obvodn\u00ed soud) found Ms \u0160. guilty of negligently causing the death of a baby who was stillborn. She was sentenced to two years\u2019 imprisonment, suspended for five years, and prohibited from practising the occupation of midwife for three years. The culpability of Ms \u0160. was based on the fact that she had not strongly advised the mother to contact a medical facility when consulted by telephone during a labour that was already ongoing at home. She had thus given flawed advice to the mother-to-be without actually examining her. The conviction was upheld on appeal by the Prague Municipal Court (m\u011bstsk\u00fd soud) on 29 May 2013, although the sentence was changed to fifteen months\u2019 imprisonment, suspended for thirty months, and two years\u2019 prohibition on practising as a midwife. 32. On 29 April 2014 the Supreme Court (Nejvy\u0161\u0161\u00ed soud) quashed the judgments of the lower courts. Ms \u0160. was eventually acquitted by the District Court on 23 May 2016. It appears that the proceedings are currently pending before the appellate court. 33.  On 21 September 2011 the Prague 3 District Court found Ms K. guilty of negligently causing bodily harm to a baby whose home birth she had attended and who had stopped breathing during the delivery. The baby died several days later. Ms K. was sentenced to two years\u2019 imprisonment, suspended for five years, prohibited from practising as a midwife for five years, and ordered to pay 2,700,000 Czech korunas (CZK) (equivalent to 105,000 euros (EUR)) by way of reimbursement of the costs incurred by the insurance company in treating the child until the latter\u2019s death. According to the court, the malpractice on the part of Ms K. consisted in the fact that she had not followed the standard procedures for deliveries as laid down by the Czech Medical Association (\u010cesk\u00e1 l\u00e9ka\u0159sk\u00e1 komora) and her conduct had thus been non lege artis. The criminal complaint was not lodged by the parents but by a hospital. 34.  On 24 July 2013 the Constitutional Court quashed all the judgments in the case against Ms K., finding that there had been a violation of her right to a fair trial. It held that the conclusions of the ordinary courts as to Ms K.\u2019s guilt had been too subjective and were not supported by the evidence beyond all reasonable doubt, thereby violating the principle of the presumption of innocence. It stated in particular that the courts had uncritically relied on an expert opinion which they had failed to subject to thorough scrutiny. It held that \u2013 on the basis of the expert opinion \u2013 the courts had applied very strict liability to the conduct of Ms K. in a situation where it had not been clear how she could have prevented the baby\u2019s death. Moreover, it had been established that she had tried to help the baby and had called an ambulance immediately after establishing that the baby had hypoxia. To foresee every possible complication during delivery and be able to react to it immediately, as was required of Ms K., would ultimately lead de facto to an absolute prohibition of home births. In that context the Constitutional Court noted:\n\u201c... a modern democratic State founded on the rule of law is based on the protection of individual and inalienable freedoms, the delimitation of which closely relates to human dignity. That freedom, which includes freedom in personal activities, is accompanied by a certain degree of acceptable risk. The right of parents to a free choice of the place and mode of delivery is limited only by the interest in the safe delivery and health of the child; that interest cannot, however, be interpreted as an unambiguous preference for deliveries in hospital.\u201d", "references": ["5", "2", "0", "4", "7", "8", "6", "1", "9", "3", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The first and second applicants were born in 1940 and 1942 respectively and live in Kaunas. The third applicant was born in 1977 and lives in France. The first and second applicants are husband and wife, and the third applicant is their daughter. 6.  On 25 January 2001 the Vilnius County Administration (hereinafter \u201cthe VCA\u201d) acknowledged G.O.\u2019s right to restoration of title in respect of 0.728 hectares of land in the Antaviliai estate in the Vilnius Region. That land had belonged to G.O.\u2019s father and had been nationalised by the Soviet regime. 7.  The following day G.O. sold his right to restoration of title in respect of that plot of land in equal parts to four buyers: the three applicants and V.M. (the first and second applicants\u2019 son, and the third applicant\u2019s brother). The sale agreement was signed by V.M., acting as the applicants\u2019 representative. The four buyers paid, in equal parts, a total of 15,000 Lithuanian litai (LTL; approximately 4,344 euros (EUR)) to G.O. 8.  On 25 June 2001 the VCA issued documents confirming the applicants\u2019 and V.M.\u2019s right to receive 0.182 hectares of land each from the State for free. As the second applicant had been a deportee of the Soviet regime, in line with the domestic law she and her family had priority rights to have their property rights restored. The applicants and V.M. were provided with four plots of land (one plot each) in the city of Vilnius the following month. 9.  In August and September 2001 the applicants, represented by V.M., sold their plots to third parties for the price of LTL 25,000 (EUR 7,241) for each plot. The sale agreements indicated that the indexed value of each plot, estimated by the Vilnius Branch of the State Enterprise Registry of Land and Other Immovable Property (\u017dem\u0117s ir kito nekilnojamojo turto kadastro ir registro valstyb\u0117s \u012fmon\u0117s Vilniaus filialas), was LTL 25,650 (EUR 7,429). 10.  In October 2001 the Vilnius City Police Department opened a pre\u2011trial investigation concerning allegations of fraud in connection with the restoration of property rights in the Vilnius Region. It was suspected that an organised criminal group was forging documents showing deportee status in order to obtain priority rights in the property restoration process. It was also suspected that some officials of regional authorities had unlawfully restored property rights to individuals who did not have such rights. 11.  On 26 November 2001 V.M. was interviewed as a witness in the investigation and asked to explain how he and his family (the applicants) had obtained land in Vilnius. V.M. stated that in 1994 he had befriended E.K. who was his wife\u2019s stepbrother. V.M. knew that E.K.\u2019s job was related to land measurement. Sometime in 2000 V.M. mentioned to E.K. that his mother (the second applicant) had been a deportee. Then E.K. told him that it was possible to acquire restoration rights from other persons and get certain privileges available to former deportees. After about six months E.K. informed V.M. that he had found a person who was willing to sell his restoration rights. E.K. advised V.M. that it was better if the contract with that person (G.O.) was signed by four family members and not just one, because that way they could obtain four separate plots of land. E.K. dealt with all the related paperwork and contacted public officials, while V.M. only signed the sale agreements with G.O. After V.M. and his family had received plots of land, E.K. suggested selling them, and found buyers for all the four plots. V.M. submitted that he had not known the buyers previously and had only met them when signing the agreements. He received LTL 25,000 from each buyer. In all their dealings related to the land V.M. and his family trusted E.K. and assumed that he knew all the relevant legal acts, as his work was related to land. Neither V.M. nor the applicants paid any money to E.K. at any point. 12.  On 10 January 2002 V.M. was again interviewed as a witness in the investigation. He retracted his previous statement in part and stated that he had not received payment for the four plots of land (LTL 25,000 for each plot) and did not know if the buyers had paid that money to E.K. or to anyone else, or if they had paid anything at all. V.M. also stated that in the autumn of 2001 E.K. had informed him about the pending pre-trial investigation and advised him to tell the authorities, if questioned, that he (V.M.) had received the payment. E.K. had assured V.M. that everything had been done lawfully, but now V.M. considered that he had been misled and deceived by E.K. 13.  It appears that none of the applicants were interviewed or had any procedural status in the investigation. 14.  On 15 June 2007 the Vilnius City District Prosecutor ruled that \u201cthe facts of the case confirmed that suspects A.\u017d., G.S. and S.\u017d. had acted unlawfully\u201d and that \u201cduring the investigation it was indisputably established (negin\u010dytinai nustatyta) that suspect A.\u017d. had unlawfully included relatives of friends or acquaintances of hers on the list of those who had priority right to have their property rights restored\u201d. That same ruling discontinued the investigation as time-barred. 15.  In January 2002 the prosecutor of the Vilnius Region (hereinafter \u201cthe prosecutor\u201d) lodged a claim before the Vilnius City First District Court, asking for the administrative decisions which had acknowledged G.O.\u2019s right to restoration of title, the sale of G.O.\u2019s restoration rights to the applicants (and V.M.), and all the administrative decisions which had allocated land to them, to be overturned. That claim was amended in June and September 2002 and June 2005. The prosecutor submitted that the Law on Restitution, in force at the material time, entitled G.O. to receive one plot of up to 0.2 ha, with the remainder of his land being compensated for in other ways (see \u201cRelevant domestic law\u201d below), so the applicants were not entitled to be allocated a plot of land of that size each. The prosecutor also submitted that the VCA had unlawfully restored the applicants\u2019 rights to property in the order of priority: even though the second applicant had been a deportee, G.O. had not, and thus he did not have the right to transfer to the applicants priority rights which he himself did not have. 16.  On 20 February 2006 the Vilnius City First District Court allowed the prosecutor\u2019s claim in part. The court found that the authorities had lawfully decided to restore G.O.\u2019s property rights and that the latter had lawfully sold those rights to the applicants. However, the court upheld the prosecutor\u2019s argument that G.O. did not have the right to sell more rights than he had himself, and that the applicants\u2019 property rights could only have been restored under the same conditions as would have been applied had they been restored to G.O. The court observed that although such a rule had not been explicitly stipulated in the Law on Restoration at the time when G.O. sold his rights to the applicants, that rule stemmed from a systemic and logical interpretation of that Law, as well as from legal acts of lower rank (see paragraphs 32 and 34 below). Accordingly, the court held that the applicants had the right to receive one plot of land of up to 0.2 ha, but not three separate plots of that size, and they were not entitled to restoration in the order of priority. It overturned the administrative decisions which had allocated the land to the applicants. 17.  As a result, the Vilnius City First District Court ordered the applicants to return to the State the plots of land which they had received from it for free. Since they had sold the land to third parties and restitution in integrum was not possible, the court decided that they had to pay the State the market value of that land. In line with Article 6.147 \u00a7 2 of the Civil Code (see paragraph 38 below), when property subject to restitution is transferred and the person who transferred it has acted in good faith, he or she has to compensate in the amount of the market value of the property at the time when it was received or transferred, or at the time of restitution, whichever is lowest. The court noted that the prosecutor had not alleged that the unlawful transaction had occurred because of the applicants\u2019 fault or that they had acted in bad faith; nor had it been determined, at the time of the proceedings, that any crime had been committed. Accordingly, the court ordered the applicants to return to the State an amount corresponding to the market value of the land at the time they sold it, as that value was the lowest. On the basis of an estimate by the State Enterprise Centre of Registers, each applicant was ordered to pay LTL 216,000 (EUR 62,560). 18.  The applicants appealed against that judgment; on 6 June 2006 the Vilnius Regional Court dismissed their appeal. The court considered that obliging the applicants to pay compensation in the amount of the market value of the land was not disproportionate, because they still retained the right to have property rights restored and to obtain new plots. 19.  On 5 June 2007 the Supreme Court dismissed a cassation appeal by the applicants. It held that ignorance of the law could not absolve anyone of responsibility, and thus the applicants should have known that property rights had been restored to them in breach of peremptory legal norms, especially as there was information that they had been advised by E.K., who worked in a municipal land reform department (see paragraphs 11-12 above). 20.  On 29 June 2007 the applicants submitted a claim against the State for pecuniary damages before the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court. They contended that each of them had received LTL 25,000 for selling the land but had been ordered to pay LTL 216,000 to the State each, and thus had suffered pecuniary losses of LTL 191,000 (EUR 55,317) each. They also asked for pecuniary damages of LTL 5,230 (EUR 1,514) for the court fees each of them had had to pay in the previous proceedings (see paragraphs 15-19 above). 21.  After submitting their claim, the applicants applied for suspension of the execution of the Vilnius City First District Court\u2019s judgment of 20 February 2006 (see paragraph 16 above), submitting that they did not have sufficient funds to comply with it. On 7 December 2007 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court rejected their application on the grounds that the execution of the judgment had not been started yet, and that, in any event, if the applicants did not have sufficient funds nothing would be seized from them. 22.  On 13 March 2008 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court dismissed the applicants\u2019 claim for damages. The court acknowledged that the VCA had acted unlawfully when allocating land to the applicants; however, it considered that the applicants had not proven that they had suffered any pecuniary damage. The court noted that the applicants still had the right to restoration of title to G.O.\u2019s land, because their agreement had not been cancelled, and that they were on the list of candidates to be given new plots of land. Accordingly, until such plots were given to them it was not possible to assess whether the applicants had suffered pecuniary damage or not. 23.  The Vilnius Regional Administrative Court also noted that there had been a criminal investigation concerning the VCA\u2019s unlawful decisions restoring property rights. Although the investigation was eventually discontinued, it had nonetheless \u201cindisputably established\u201d that certain employees of the VCA had unlawfully issued documents recognising restoration rights (see paragraph 14 above). The court noted that one of those employees was E.K., whom the applicants had consulted. Accordingly, the court held that the applicants should have known that they had received the land unlawfully and that they had themselves contributed to the pecuniary damage \u201cby acting carelessly and negligently\u201d (veikdami ner\u016bpestingai ir neatsargiai). 24.  The applicants appealed against that judgment. They submitted, inter alia, that even if they had contributed to the pecuniary damage, the main agent who had caused those damages had been the VCA. Therefore, they argued that, in line with the provisions of the Civil Code (see paragraphs 39-40 below), the liability should have been distributed proportionately between the VCA and the applicants and not placed solely on them. The applicants also submitted that the fact that V.M. had consulted E.K. did not prove that the applicants had conspired with E.K. or other unlawfully acting officials, or that the applicants had pressured any officials to act unlawfully to their benefit. The applicants contended that after their restoration rights had been cancelled the original state of affairs should have been restored, and they should not have been obliged to pay more than they had received. 25.  On 2 March 2009 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the applicants\u2019 appeal and upheld the judgment of the lower court. It underlined that the applicants had received the land from the State for free, and that they had immediately sold it to third parties who had to be considered bona fide acquirers. The court held that by selling their plots for a price that was significantly lower than their market value the applicants had acted at their own risk, and thus the difference between what they had received (LTL 25,000 each) and what they were obliged to pay to the State (LTL 216,000 each) could not be regarded as pecuniary damage. The Supreme Administrative Court further held that even if the applicants had suffered pecuniary damage, they could not be awarded damages because they themselves had acted unlawfully. Relying on the Supreme Court\u2019s judgment of 5 June 2007 (see paragraph 19 above), the Supreme Administrative Court considered that the applicants had abused their rights by attempting to get from the State more land than G.O. had been entitled to receive. Accordingly, having concluded that both the applicants and the VCA had acted unlawfully, the court relied on Article 6.282 \u00a7 1 of the Civil Code (see paragraph 40 below) and held that there were no grounds to award them pecuniary damages. 26.  Subsequently the applicants applied for reopening of the proceedings, but on 31 December 2009 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed their application. 27.  In March 2013 a bailiff began executing the Vilnius City First District Court\u2019s judgment of 20 February 2006 (see paragraph 16 above). According to the documents in the Court\u2019s possession, from that date until June 2015 the first and second applicants each paid LTL 2,445 (EUR 708) in monthly payments ranging from LTL 69 (EUR 20) to LTL 200 (EUR 58). The third applicant paid LTL 3,249 (EUR 941) in monthly payments ranging from LTL 69 (EUR 20) to LTL 300 (EUR 87). At the time of the parties\u2019 observations to the Court, the execution was ongoing. The Government submitted that in the future, when the applicants were provided with new plots of land (see paragraphs 28-30 below), the remaining amount could be recovered from those plots. 28.  On 19 July 2007 the VCA included the applicants (and V.M.) on the list of individuals who had the right to have title to property restored in the area around Vilnius. Their number in the list was 1417 B. 29.  On 14 March 2016 the applicants (and V.M.) were informed by the National Land Service that they were number 185 in the above-mentioned list. They were invited to a meeting of candidates during which they would be able to choose one plot of land of up to 0.12 hectares in joint ownership. 30.  As submitted by the Government, that meeting took place on 5 April 2016 and the first and second applicants, as well as V.M., were present but the third applicant was not. Since the four of them were entitled to receive one plot of land in joint ownership, the first and second applicants (and V.M.) were not allowed to choose a plot in the absence of the third applicant. The Government further submitted that there was still land available in the area around Vilnius and that the applicants would be invited to another meeting, planned to take place in the autumn of 2016. At the time of the parties\u2019 observations to the Court, the applicants\u2019 property rights had not yet been restored.", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "7", "8", "6", "5", "2", "3", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Donetsk. 6.  On 29 May 1997 the Donetsk Kirovskyy District Court (\u201cthe Kirovskyy Court\u201d) found the applicant guilty of robbery and sentenced him to three years\u2019 imprisonment. 7.  On 18 July 1997 the Donetsk Regional Court of Appeal (\u201cthe Regional Court\u201d) granted amnesty to the applicant. 8.  On 26 September 1997 the same court, following an objection (\u043f\u0440\u043e\u0442\u0435\u0441\u0442) by its president, quashed the decision of 18 July 1997 and upheld the judgment of 29 May 1997 by a final decision. The applicant became aware of the Regional Court\u2019s decision of 26 September 1997 only after his arrest in February 2003 (see paragraph 10 below). 9.  In October 1997 the Kirovskyy Court sent its judgment to the local police with a view to ensuring its enforcement. As submitted by the applicant and eventually established by the domestic courts (see paragraph 12 below), he continued living at his permanent address. Although he was placed on a wanted list for a brief period in December 1997, neither during that period nor thereafter did the police try to contact him. 10.  On 12 February 2003 the Kirovskyy police arrested the applicant at his home and brought him to Dzerzhynsk prison no. 2 to serve his sentence. 11.  Following numerous unsuccessful complaints to the prosecution authorities, in March 2003 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Kirovskyy Court, stating that his arrest and detention had been unlawful and requesting to be released. 12.  After several rounds of proceedings, on 23 March 2006 the Kirovskyy Court allowed the applicant\u2019s claim and found the impugned actions of the police officers unlawful. The court found no evidence in the case file that the applicant had been informed of the court hearing and the final decision of 26 September 1997. He had been arrested more than five years later. By that time his sentence had become time-barred, a fact which the police had been obliged, but had failed, to check. As regards the applicant\u2019s request for release, the Kirovskyy Court stated that the issue was no longer of relevance (see paragraph 14 below). 13.  On 23 June 2006 the Regional Court upheld the above decision. 14.  In the meantime, on 27 April 2005, the Dzerzhynskyy Local Court ordered the applicant\u2019s release on parole. The applicant was released on 4 May 2005 once all the formalities had been completed. 15.  In 2006 the applicant lodged a claim for damages against the Ministry of the Interior on account of his unlawful arrest and detention. He relied on the Compensation Act, under which a person could claim such compensation if the unlawfulness of his or her arrest and detention had been established by a judicial decision (see paragraph 26 below). The applicant referred in that connection to the court\u2019s decision of 23 March 2006, in which his deprivation of liberty had been found to be unlawful (see paragraph 12 above). 16.  On 3 April 2007 the Kirovskyy Court rejected his claim as unfounded. It noted the existence of the judicial decision referred to by the applicant without, however, commenting on it. The court observed that the applicant had appealed against neither the judgment of 29 May 1997 nor the ruling of 26 September 1997 (see paragraphs 6 and 8 above). It also observed that he had been released without any conclusion about his guilt. Having relied on the above considerations, the Kirovskyy Court concluded that the applicant had failed to prove that he had been deprived of his liberty unlawfully. 17.  On 26 June 2007 the Regional Court upheld that decision. 18.  On 22 August 2007 the applicant\u2019s representative, G., appealed on points of law. 19.  On 6 September 2007 the Supreme Court gave the applicant a deadline of 16 October 2007 to submit the power of attorney. Its ruling referred to the applicant\u2019s case number as registered by the Supreme Court. 20.  As confirmed by a postal acknowledgement of receipt, on 17 October 2007 the Supreme Court received a registered letter from the applicant\u2019s representative, which had been dispatched on 12 October 2007 and which concerned the case under the number indicated in the ruling of 6 September 2007. According to the applicant, his representative had sent the requested authority form by the above-mentioned registered letter. According to the Government, the content of that letter and the documents enclosed, if any, could not be established in the absence of their detailed description on the acknowledgment of receipt. 21.  On 30 October 2007 the Supreme Court returned the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law without examination. It held that, contrary to its instructions of 6 September 2007, he had failed to submit the power of attorney \u201cwithin the set time-limit and before the delivery of the present ruling\u201d. 22.  On 9 November 2007 the Supreme Court sent its ruling to the applicant\u2019s representative. According to the applicant, his representative received it on 24 November 2007. 23.  On 3 December 2007 G. requested that the Supreme Court give reasons for the dismissal of the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law, since the ruling of 6 September 2007 had been complied with. There was no reply to that request.", "references": ["9", "7", "1", "5", "6", "3", "0", "8", "4", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicants are Russian nationals. They were owners of flats in Moscow. The State authorities reclaimed the flats, and the applicants\u2019 title to the real property in question was annulled. To date, some of the applicants have been evicted from the property. In other cases, the eviction proceedings are still pending or were discontinued. 6.  The applicant in this case is Mariya Nikolayevna Pchelintseva, who was born on 15 June 1979 and lives in Moscow. 7.  Prior to its privatisation, the flat at 4-78 Angarskaya Ulitsa, Moscow, had been owned by the City of Moscow. Kor. had resided there as a tenant under the social housing agreement with the City. 8.  On 22 February 2002 Kor. signed a power of attorney authorising G., inter alia, to conduct transactions on her behalf in respect of the said flat. 9.  On 29 May 2002 the title to the flat was transferred to Kor. under a privatisation scheme. 10.  On 2 June 2002 Kor. died. 11.  On 6 September 2002, acting by virtue of the power of attorney, G. sold the flat to A. 12.  On 12 November 2002 A. exchanged the flat for another one located at 20-2-144 Angarskaya Ulitsa, Moscow, owned by the Housing Department. 13.  On 21 November 2002 A. sold the 38.8 square metre flat at 20-2-144 Angarskaya Ulitsa, Moscow, to the applicant. 14.  On 29 March 2006 the prosecutor\u2019s office opened a criminal investigation into the above-mentioned property transactions. 15.  On an unspecified date the prosecutor lodged civil claims on behalf of the City of Moscow, seeking: (1) invalidation of the power of attorney allegedly signed by Kor.; (2) invalidation of all of the above-mentioned property transactions; and (3) the applicant\u2019s eviction. 16.  On 29 November 2006 the Timiryazevskiy District Court of Moscow granted the prosecutor\u2019s claims in full. The court conceded that the applicant was a bona fide purchaser of the flat. However, it ruled that the case fell under one of the two exceptions to the protection of a bona fide purchaser\u2019s title, which required that precedence be given to the previous owner. The applicant\u2019s title to the flat was annulled and the title was transferred to the City of Moscow. The court also ordered the applicant\u2019s eviction. The applicant appealed. 17.  On 20 March 2007 the City Court upheld the judgment of 29 November 2006 on appeal. 18.  In October 2010 the applicant was evicted from the flat. On 21 October 2010 the bailiff discontinued the eviction proceedings. 19.  On 24 February 2010 the Koptevskiy District Court of Moscow granted a claim for damages lodged by the applicant against the real estate agency which had represented her in the flat purchase. The District Court awarded her, inter alia, pecuniary damages in the amount of RUB 928,000. 20.  The judgment of 24 February 2010 was not enforced because the agency had been declared insolvent. 21.  The applicant in this case is Tatyana Stanislavovna Dedik, who was born on 22 April 1973 and lives in the Moscow Region. 22.  Prior to its privatisation, the flat at 14-73 Ulitsa Grishina, Moscow, had been owned by the City of Moscow. Ye. had resided there as a tenant under the social housing agreement with the City. On 2 July 2008 Ye. died. 23.  On an unspecified date An. pasted her photograph in Ye.\u2019s passport and applied for the privatisation of the flat where Ye. used to live. Her request was granted and title to the flat was transferred to her. 24.  On 12 January 2008 An., posing as Ye., sold the flat to the applicant. 25.  On an unspecified date the Housing Department brought a civil claim seeking restitution of the flat. In their opinion, the flat belonged to the City of Moscow and the applicant should be divested of her ownership rights in respect of it. 26.  On 30 November 2010 the Kuntsevskiy District Court of Moscow granted the authorities\u2019 claims in full. The court conceded that the applicant was a bona fide purchaser of the flat. However, it ruled that the case fell under one of the two exceptions to the protection of a bona fide purchaser\u2019s title, which required that precedence be given to the previous owner. The applicant\u2019s title to the flat was annulled and title was transferred to the City of Moscow. The court also ordered the applicant\u2019s eviction. The applicant appealed. 27.  On 14 March 2011 the Moscow City Court upheld the judgment of 30 November 2010 on appeal. 28.  According to the Government, the applicant was evicted from the flat on 25 September 2012. 29.  On 14 November 2014 the City of Moscow entered into a social housing agreement with the applicant, who now resides in the flat as a tenant. 30.  The applicants in this case are Oksana Aleksandrovna Polevoda, who was born on 14 June 1974, and her two children, Yuriy Aleksandrovich Polevoda, born on 11 February 1999, and Natalya Aleksandrovna Polevoda, born on 28 November 2002. The applicants live in Moscow. 31.  Prior to its privatisation the flat at 27-3-50 Kastanayevskaya Ulitsa, Moscow, had been owned by the City of Moscow. V. had resided there as a tenant under the social housing agreement with the City. On 1 November 2001 V. died. 32.  On 10 September 2002 the local housing authorities authorised an exchange of flats between V. (whom they presumed was still alive) and S. The latter moved into the flat. 33.  On 24 December 2002 the local housing authorities authorised another exchange of flats between S. and K. On 16 April 2003 the City housing authorities transferred title to the flat to K. under the privatisation scheme.\nOn 8 May 2003 K. sold the flat to the first applicant. 34.  On an unspecified date the Housing Department brought a civil action against the applicants. The housing authorities alleged that, in view of the fraudulent nature of the first transaction in respect of the flat, the first applicant\u2019s title to the flat should be annulled and the flat repossessed by the City. 35.  On 24 December 2010 the Dorogomilovskiy District Court of Moscow dismissed the City\u2019s claims. 36.  On 26 August 20011 the Moscow City Court quashed the judgment of 24 December 2010 and remitted the matter for fresh consideration. 37.  On 13 December 2011 the District Court granted the claims against the applicants. It recognised the City\u2019s title to the flat and ordered the applicants\u2019 eviction. The court conceded that the first applicant was a bona fide purchaser of the flat. However, it ruled that the case fell under one of the two exceptions to the protection of a bona fide purchaser\u2019s title, which required that precedence be given to the City of Moscow as the previous owner of the flat. 38.  On 26 October 2012 the City Court upheld the judgment of 13 December 2011 on appeal. 39.  According to the Government, the applicants were not evicted and continue to reside in the flat. The City of Moscow is considering the possibility of entering into a social housing agreement with them. 40.  On 20 June 2013 the Timiryazevskiy District Court of Moscow granted the first applicant\u2019s claim for damages against K. and awarded her, inter alia, RUB 7,649,000. K. appealed. 41.  On 16 October 2013 the Moscow City Court upheld the judgment of 20 June 2013 on appeal. 42.  According to the Government, the enforcement proceedings are still pending and offer a sufficient prospect of success, given the activities carried out by the bailiffs with the aim of recovering the debt from K. 43.  The applicant in this case is Svetlana Alekseyevna Dergacheva, who was born on 29 September 1960 and lives in Moscow. 44.  Prior to its privatisation, the flat at 13-2-113 Belomorskaya Ulitsa, Moscow, had been owned by the City of Moscow. On 21 February 2007 the local municipal authorities assigned the flat to Yo. and her family under the social housing agreement. 45.  On 4 December 2007 the City housing authorities transferred ownership of the flat to Yo. under the privatisation scheme. 46.  On 25 February 2009 Yo. sold the flat to the applicant. 47.  On 13 October 2010 the Koptevskiy District Court of Moscow found Yo. guilty of fraud. The court established that Yo. had fraudulently acquired the tenancy rights in respect of the flat. 48.  On an unspecified date the Housing Department brought a civil action seeking, inter alia, the return of the flat to the City and the applicant\u2019s eviction. The Housing Department further claimed that the applicant should not be recognised as a bona fide purchaser of the flat given that she had been Yo.s\u2019 colleague and knew her quite well and that the price she had paid for the flat had been below its market value. 49.  On 14 February 2012 the Golovinskiy District Court of Moscow granted the claims against the applicant. The court noted that the Housing Department had failed to substantiate, with any evidence, their allegations that the applicant had bought the flat in bad faith and rejected them. However, it ruled that the case fell under one of the two exceptions to the protection of a bona fide purchaser\u2019s title, which required that precedence be given to the City of Moscow, as the previous owner of the flat. Lastly, the court ordered that Yo. return to the applicant the purchase price paid by her. 50.  On 26 June 2012 the Moscow City Court upheld on appeal the part of the judgment of 14 February 2012 concerning the restitution of the City\u2019s title to the flat and the applicant\u2019s eviction and discontinued the proceedings as regards the repayment by Yo. of the purchase price to the applicant. 51.  The eviction proceedings are still pending. 52.  The applicants in this case are Fakir Mukhamad Gulom Mukhamad Karim, who was born on 10 May 1968, his wife Svetlana Aleksandrovna Karim, who was born on 6 July 1979[1], and their sons Gleb Fakirovich Karim, born on 17 October 2008, and Timofey Fakirovich Karim, born on 16 June[2] 2010. The applicants live in Moscow. 53.  Prior to its privatisation, the flat at 9-13 Yartsevskaya[3] Ulitsa, Moscow, had been owned by the City of Moscow. Z. had resided there as a tenant under the social housing agreement with the City. On 2 August 2007 Z. died. 54.  Acting by virtue of a power of attorney issued on 1 April 2008, V. signed a flat privatisation agreement on behalf of Z. on 28 April 2008 and then sold the flat to P. on 2 June 2008. 55.  On 19 August 2008 P. sold the flat to the first applicant. 56.  On an unspecified date the Housing Department brought a civil claim seeking restitution of its title to the flat. 57.  On 17 January 2012 the Kuntsevskiy District Court of Moscow granted the claim. It restored the City\u2019s ownership of the flat and ordered the applicants\u2019 eviction. The court conceded that the first applicant was a bona fide purchaser of the flat. However, it ruled that the case fell under one of the two exceptions to the protection of a bona fide purchaser\u2019s title, which required that precedence be given to the City of Moscow as the previous owner of the flat. 58.  On 8 August 2012 the Moscow City Court upheld the judgment of 17 January 2012 on appeal. 59.  According to the Government, the applicants were not evicted and continue to reside in the flat. On 24 October 2014 the City authorities entered into a social tenancy agreement with the first and fourth applicants.", "references": ["7", "6", "0", "1", "8", "2", "3", "4", "5", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicants, Mr Vladimir Karapetyan (the first applicant), Ms Martha Ayvazyan (the second applicant), Mr Araqel Semirjyan (the third applicant) and Ms Karine Afrikyan (the fourth applicant), are Armenian nationals who were born in 1969, 1967, 1973 and 1954 respectively and live in Yerevan. 6.  At the material time, the applicants occupied different posts within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, namely Head of Press and Information Department, Head of NATO Division of Arms Control and International Security Department, Counsel of the European Department and Head of USA and Canada Division of the American Department respectively. 7.  On 19 February 2008 a presidential election was held in Armenia. The main contenders were the then Prime Minister, Serzh Sargsyan, and the opposition candidate, Levon Ter-Petrosyan. Immediately after the election, Levon Ter-Petrosyan announced that the election had been rigged. From 20 February 2008 onwards nationwide protests, such as demonstrations and sit-ins, were organised by thousands of Levon Ter-Petrosyan\u2019s supporters. 8.  On 23 February 2008 several ambassadors for Armenia in foreign countries made the following statement:\n\u201cWe, the undersigned, remaining faithful to our calling as Armenian diplomats and led by our feeling of responsibility before the Republic of Armenia and the Armenian people, with concern for the situation which has arisen in Armenia, with profound respect for the right of Armenian citizens to free elections, with the conviction that only a president elected as a result of free and fair elections can best tackle the challenges facing our country on the international level and substantially raise the international image of Armenia, express our support to our compatriots who have risen to struggle for freedom, protection of the right to a fair election and establishment of true democracy in Armenia.\nConsidering the preservation of stability in the country important and public accord necessary, we appeal to our compatriots and especially the representatives of all the structures in the country responsible for maintaining public order and peace to avoid the temptation of resolving problems by use of force.\nWe appeal to all television companies in Armenia, and especially to Armenian Public Television, to ensure impartial and comprehensive coverage and to provide live airtime to representatives of all the powers who have a constructive position in overcoming the current inner-political crisis.\nWe appeal to all our colleagues working both in Armenia or abroad to join our statement.\u201d 9.  This statement was reported by the mass media on the same day. According to the first applicant, he also received the statement via his electronic mail. According to the Government, the ambassadors who issued this statement were dismissed from their posts the following day and their dismissal was widely reported in the media. 10.  On 24 February 2008 the applicants made the following statement:\n\u201cBy joining the statement issued by our colleagues from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs we express our concern with the situation created in Armenia, fraught with internal and external undesirable challenges, and outrage against the fraud of the election process, which shadow the will of our country and society to conduct a civilised, fair and free presidential election.\nAs citizens of Armenia, we demand that urgent steps be undertaken to call into life the recommendations contained in the reports of the international observation mission, as well as other prominent international organisations.\nOnly by acting in conformity with the letter and spirit of the law can we create democracy and tolerance in Armenia and earn the country a good reputation abroad.\u201d 11.  The names of the applicants, with the indication of their office, appeared under the statement. It appears that this statement was reported by several mass media outlets, including Radio Liberty, on the same day. 12.  On 25 February 2008 the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Armenia adopted decrees dismissing the first, second and third applicants from office. The fourth applicant was dismissed from office by a similar decree on 3 March 2008. As a ground for the dismissals, the decrees referred to sections 40, subsection 1, point (j) and 44, subsection 1, point (c), of the Diplomatic Service Act (\u0540\u0540 \u0585\u0580\u0565\u0576\u0584\u0568 \u00ab\u0534\u056b\u057e\u0561\u0576\u0561\u0563\u056b\u057f\u0561\u056f\u0561\u0576 \u056e\u0561\u057c\u0561\u0575\u0578\u0582\u0569\u0575\u0561\u0576 \u0574\u0561\u057d\u056b\u0576\u00bb, containing description which stated, inter alia, that a diplomat had no right to use his official capacity and work facilities for the benefit of parties and non-governmental organisations, or in order to carry out other political or religious activity (see paragraphs 22-24 below). 13.  On an unspecified date in March 2008, the applicants instituted administrative proceedings challenging their dismissal and seeking to be reinstated in their work. In particular, they claimed that the decrees on their dismissal contained no reasons regarding the particular instance where they had made use of their official capacity and work facilities for the benefit of parties or non-governmental organisations or for engaging in political or religious activities, as prohibited by the sections of the Diplomatic Service Act. They also claimed that dismissal on the ground of convictions and opinions was prohibited by law. 14.  On 10 April 2008 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as a respondent, lodged a response with the Administrative Court (\u0540\u0540 \u057e\u0561\u0580\u0579\u0561\u056f\u0561\u0576 \u0564\u0561\u057f\u0561\u0580\u0561\u0576), claiming that the applicants, by making their statement of 24 February 2008 which had then been reported by the mass media and announced during the demonstration, had engaged in political activities. Furthermore, the applicants had made use of their official capacity since they indicated their official titles in the statement. 15.  On 29 May 2008 the Administrative Court dismissed the applicants\u2019 claim, finding that their dismissal from work was lawful since the applicants, by making the impugned statement, in essence had engaged in political activity. In this respect, the Administrative Court mentioned that the impugned statement concerned political processes as it contained a political assessment of election and post-election events. Furthermore, that statement, as well as that of the ambassadors, had been read aloud during the demonstration organised by a political force and had received a political assessment. The Administrative Court also found that the applicants, by indicating their post titles, had made use of their official capacity. The applicants\u2019 right to freedom of expression, as protected by Article 27 of the Constitution (\u0540\u0540 \u054d\u0561\u0570\u0574\u0561\u0576\u0561\u0564\u0580\u0578\u0582\u0569\u0575\u0578\u0582\u0576), was not breached since the applicants, in exercising that right, had made use of their official status and work facilities. Therefore, the restriction on that right was in compliance with Article 43 of the Constitution. Besides, the applicants had not been dismissed on the ground of their political opinion, but because in disseminating that opinion they had made use of their official status, which was prohibited by law. 16.  On an unspecified date, the applicants lodged an appeal on points of law against the judgment of the Administrative Court, claiming, inter alia, a violation of their right to freedom of expression, as protected by Article 10 of the Convention. Besides, they claimed that they had been discriminated against on grounds of political opinion, in violation of Article 14, since those diplomats or state officials who had expressed publicly their support for the pro-governmental candidate had never faced any sanctions: the true reason for their dismissal was their critical opinion of government actions in the sphere of human rights and democratisation. They also claimed that their dismissal had been based on an erroneous interpretation of sections 40, subsection 1, point (j) and 44, subsection 1, point (c), of the Diplomatic Service Act since they had not made use of their official capacity or work facilities when making the impugned statement. Furthermore, the statement had not been made for the benefit of any political party and it could not be qualified as political activity as such. 17.  On 23 September 2008 the Court of Cassation (\u0540\u0540 \u057e\u0573\u057c\u0561\u0562\u0565\u056f \u0564\u0561\u057f\u0561\u0580\u0561\u0576) decided to declare the applicants\u2019 appeal on points of law inadmissible for lack of merit.", "references": ["9", "2", "5", "8", "0", "4", "7", "6", "3", "1", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in Moscow. 6.  Prior to its privatisation, the flat at 10-3-34 Bolshoy Rogozhskiy Pereulok, Moscow, had been owned by the City of Moscow. R. had resided there as a tenant under the social housing agreement with the City. On 31 May 1993 the title to the flat was transferred to R. under a privatisation scheme. 7.  On 12 August 1996 R. died. 8.  In October 1999 Yar. applied to a notary seeking recognition as R.\u2019s heir. In support of his application, Yar. submitted a will allegedly signed by R. on 9 February 1996. 9.  On 2 June 2000 the notary granted the request and issued a certificate confirming, inter alia, that Yar. had inherited R.\u2019s flat. 10.  On 20 June 2000 the Moscow City Committee for Registration of Real Estate Transactions (the \u201cCity Registration Committee\u201d) registered the certificate, confirming Yar.\u2019s title to the flat. 11.  On 13 July 2000 Yar. sold the flat to the applicant. On an unspecified date the City Registration Committee registered the transaction and issued the relevant deed, confirming the applicant\u2019s title to the flat. The applicant moved in and resided in the flat. After the birth of her daughter in 2004, she resided there with her daughter. 12.  On an unspecified date the authorities opened a criminal investigation concerning the forgery of the will issued on behalf of R. 13.  On 6 June 2001 the Taganskiy District Court of Moscow found Yar. guilty of fraud and sentenced him to five years\u2019 imprisonment and confiscation of property. In particular, the court established that Yar., acting in concert with other persons, whose identity was not known, had fraudulently acquired R.\u2019s flat and sold it to the applicant on the basis of a forged will. The judgment became final on 25 July 2001. 14.  On 5 March 2002 the prosecutor brought a civil claim on behalf of the Department for Housing of the City of Moscow (the \u201cHousing Department\u201d) seeking (1) the annulment of R.\u2019s will and of the applicant\u2019s title to the flat; (2) the applicant\u2019s eviction; (3) restitution of the flat to the City of Moscow; and (4) annulment of the purchase agreement between Yar. and the applicant, and the reimbursement by Yar. of the amount the applicant had paid for the flat. 15.  On 16 December 2003 the District Court examined the case in the applicant\u2019s absence and granted the prosecutor\u2019s claims in full. The applicant appealed. 16.  On 16 June 2004 the Moscow City Court held that the District Court had failed to duly inform the applicant of the date and time of the hearing. It quashed the judgment of 16 December 2003 and remitted the case for fresh consideration. 17.  In the new set of proceedings the applicant brought a counterclaim against the City of Moscow, seeking to be recognised as a bona fide purchaser of the flat. 18.  On 14 November 2005 the District Court invalidated R.\u2019s will and Yar.\u2019s title to the flat. The court established that the property was escheat and ordered its restitution to the City of Moscow. It also ordered the applicant\u2019s eviction. The court dismissed the remainder of the prosecutor\u2019s claims concerning the annulment of the sale contract concluded by Yar. and the applicant, and the former\u2019s obligation to return the sum paid by the applicant to her. As regards the applicant\u2019s counterclaim, the court recognised that she had bought the flat in good faith. However, it found that because Yar. had acquired R.\u2019s flat fraudulently, he had, in fact, stolen it from the City of Moscow and the latter had the right to reclaim the flat from the applicant, despite the fact that she was a bona fide purchaser. 19.  On 24 January 2006 the City Court upheld the judgment of 14 November 2005 on appeal. 20.  On 23 March 2006 the district bailiff\u2019s service instituted enforcement proceedings in respect of the judgment of 14 November 2005. 21.  On 2 April 2008 the applicant and her daughter were evicted from the flat. According to the applicant, they had to move in with her parents and her brother and his family. 22.  According to the Government, on 9 April 2010 the flat was reassigned to Sh., who had been on the social housing waiting list for twenty-five years. 23.  On 12 May 2011 the District Court recognised the City\u2019s title to the flat. In particular, the court established that R. had died intestate and without heirs and that her flat should have been transferred to the State as escheat property. The court also terminated the applicant\u2019s title to the flat. 24.  On 22 September 2011 the City Court upheld the judgment of 12 May 2011 on appeal.", "references": ["3", "7", "6", "8", "0", "5", "2", "1", "4", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant, who was born in 1952, is a farmer and the head of a farming company, A. He lives in Borzna. 6.  In the winter of 2001, S.Sh., the newly-appointed head of a private agricultural company, D., requested that the law-enforcement authorities investigate the suspected misappropriation of D.\u2019s property. In particular, S.Sh. stated that in the autumn of 2000, K., another agricultural company, had written off a debt of 15,517 Ukrainian hryvnyas (UAH) owed to his company, although the latter had not received any payment. 7.  On 17 and 21 March 2001 the applicant, interviewed in connection with the inquiry into the case, informed the police that in the autumn of 2000 he had received twenty concrete slabs from K. in settlement of a debt to D., of which he was a shareholder. The applicant said he had used the slabs to construct a trench for A., to which D. had also owed money. D.\u2019s former director had been aware of that fact. The transaction had not been finalised on the books as there had been disagreements between the parties over the price of the slabs and on various procedural issues. 8.  On 3 May 2001 the Borznyanskiy district prosecutor (the \u201cdistrict prosecutor\u201d) instituted criminal proceedings against the applicant on suspicion of fraudulently appropriating slabs that he had received on D.\u2019s behalf. 9.  On 6 June 2001 a police investigator called the applicant in for questioning as a witness in connection with the case, but rejected his request to be assisted by a lawyer during the questioning. According to the applicant, his lawyer had accompanied him to the investigator\u2019s office but had not been allowed to be present during the questioning. 10.  In the course of the questioning the applicant again admitted to receiving the slabs and using them on his farm. He also explained that the transaction had not been finalised in the accounts because the parties had had debts to each other and had still been negotiating over how to write those debts off. In any event, the directors of K. and D. had been well aware that the applicant had used the slabs on his own farm and had never objected to that use. As can be seen from the copy of the record of the questioning submitted to the Court, it was apparently filed as pages 82 and 83 in the domestic case file. 11.  On 5 July 2001 the applicant was officially indicted for the fraudulent appropriation of twenty concrete slabs transferred by the K. company to the D. company in payment of a debt. On the same date, the applicant was questioned as a defendant in the presence of his lawyer but he refused to testify and relied on his right to silence. 12.  On 11 July 2001 the applicant was informed of the completion of the pre-trial investigation and committed to stand trial in the Borznyanskiy District Court (\u201cthe District Court\u201d). 13.  On an unspecified date the applicant presented the authorities with an agreement dated 14 April 2001 and signed by the directors of K., D. and himself. According to that document, the three parties had agreed that the value of the twenty slabs received by the applicant was UAH 2,000 and that the transfer of the slabs to the applicant covered the relevant portion of K.\u2019s debt to D. and D.\u2019s debt to the applicant\u2019s farm. 14.  By September 2001 the above agreement had been reflected in all three parties\u2019 documents relating to accounting, tax and other matters. 15.  In the course of the trial, the District Court questioned the applicant and numerous other individuals, including the directors and accountants of D. and K., and examined various documents. As can be seen in the minutes of the court hearings submitted by the Government, the documents examined in the course of the trial included \u201ca letter from the farming company\u201d, included as page 65 in the domestic case file. 16.  During the trial, the applicant, represented by a lawyer of his own choice, reiterated that he had had no fraudulent intent in taking possession of the slabs and that the three parties had decided on all the details of the transaction in April 2001 (that is, before the criminal proceedings had been instituted against him). The transaction had also been properly accounted for in all the paperwork by September 2001 (that is, before the trial had commenced). The delay in finalising the papers had been due to various objective circumstances, including initial disagreements between the parties concerning the scope of the transaction and a fair price for the slabs, the replacement of D.\u2019s director in November 2000, and a lengthy break in the functioning of D.\u2019s accounts office. 17.  On 13 August 2003 the District Court found the applicant guilty of the charges. It found that although the case had eventually been settled, there was sufficient evidence that the applicant\u2019s initial intent had been fraudulent. In justifying that finding, the court noted, in particular, as follows:\n\u201cAs regards the arguments by the defendant Loboda G.I. that ... the three-party agreement had been concluded ... before the initiation of the criminal case, and that the managers of the three entities had agreed on the price and procedure for the transfer of the concrete slabs, the court cannot accept them, as they contradict the case file materials and the evidence examined in court. It appears from the case file materials that the above-mentioned agreement was submitted by Loboda G.I. at the end of the pre-trial investigation. It can be seen from the testimony of the witnesses ... that [K.\u2019s debt to D.], amounting to UAH 15,517, had been reinstated after having been written off ... According to ... order no. 6 of August 2001 the slabs transferred were valued at UAH 2,000 and [K.\u2019s] debt to D. as of 1 September 2001 remained at UAH 13,517.\nThe aforementioned evidence shows that an understanding between the managers of [K.], [D.] and [A.] concerning the price and procedure for the transfer was reached after the criminal case had been instituted, in the course of the pre-trial investigation. These findings correspond to the declarations by the head of the farming company Loboda G.I. contained on pages 65 and 67 of volume 1 of the case, dated June 2001\u201d. 18.  The District Court then granted the applicant an amnesty and released him from any punishment. 19.  On the same date the court issued a separate ruling (\u043e\u043a\u0440\u0435\u043c\u0430 \u043f\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0430\u043d\u043e\u0432\u0430) in which it drew the attention of the district prosecutor to various procedural shortcomings in the preparation of the case for trial. It noted, in particular, as follows:\n\u201cOn 3 May 2001 the [district prosecutor] initiated criminal proceedings against [the applicant]. On 6 June 2001 the [police investigator] ... questioned [the applicant] as a witness, despite ... sufficient evidence ... for him to be questioned as a defendant, in compliance with all the requirements of the Code of Criminal Procedure of Ukraine ...\nWith regard to the said breaches, the testimony [of the applicant] given ... during his questioning as a witness on 6 June 2001 was not taken into account by the court as evidence in the present case ....\u201d 20.  It appears from the case-file materials that on an unspecified date the applicant filed an appeal against his conviction, which was accepted for examination. No copy of this appeal has been provided to the Court. 21.  On 27 August 2003 lawyer I. also filed a separate appeal in the applicant\u2019s interests. In this appeal he challenged, primarily, the substantive conclusions of the trial court and contended that the applicant\u2019s actions had not been criminal. 22.  On 23 October 2003 the Chernigiv Regional Court of Appeal (\u201cthe Court of Appeal\u201d) upheld the applicant\u2019s conviction. Referring to statements by various witnesses and the documentary evidence on file, it concluded that the applicant had not made any reasonable and meaningful efforts to regularise his appropriation of the slabs until the criminal proceedings had been instituted. 23.  The applicant lodged a cassation appeal, in which he complained, in particular, that his right to mount a defence had been breached on account of his being questioned without a lawyer on 6 June 2001. He argued that it was clear from the phrase, \u201cThese findings correspond to the declarations by the head of the farming company Loboda G.I. contained on pages 65 and 67 of volume 1 of the case, dated June 2001\u201d in the District Court\u2019s judgment of 13 August 2003, that the testimony he had given on 6 June 2001 had in fact been relied on for his conviction, in spite of the District Court\u2019s formal decision to exclude the record of that questioning from the case file. 24.  On 28 October 2004 the Supreme Court of Ukraine examined submissions by the applicant, in the absence of both the applicant and his lawyer. However, the prosecutor was present and advised the Panel to reject the applicant\u2019s arguments. 25.  On the same date the Supreme Court rejected the applicant\u2019s cassation appeal, finding that the lower courts had correctly assessed the facts and applied the law. Without addressing directly the applicant\u2019s complaint concerning the breach of his right to defence, it made the following general remark concerning the procedural fairness of the proceedings:\n\u201c... no breaches of the provisions of the criminal-procedure law in the course of pre-trial investigation as well as during the court proceedings can be identified\u201d. 26.  A copy of the Supreme Court\u2019s ruling of 28 October 2004 was sent to the applicant by post on 29 August 2005 and, according to him, was received on 29 September 2005. 27.  At various times the applicant made unsuccessful attempts to institute criminal proceedings against the investigator who had questioned him on 6 June 2001, and to begin administrative and civil proceedings to challenge various purported procedural omissions on the part of the District Court judge in his case.", "references": ["0", "2", "9", "6", "4", "5", "7", "8", "1", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicants in this case are Natalya Sergeyevna Ponyayeva, who was born on 7 July 1978, and her two daughters, Svetlana Aleksandrovna Oleneva, born on 18 March 2006, and Anastasiya Aleksandrovna Oleneva, born on 11 July 2000. The applicants live in Moscow. 6.  Prior to its privatisation, the flat at 83-3-4 Ulitsa Svobody, Moscow, had been owned by the City of Moscow. Ol. had resided there as a tenant under the social housing agreement with the City. 7.  On 13 August 2003 Ol. was tried for having made a fake terror threat. He was relieved from criminal liability and committed to a psychiatric institution for treatment. 8.  On 3 February 2004, when Ol. was still undergoing inpatient treatment, an unidentified person applied for a new passport on his behalf and asked notary B. to issue two powers of attorney authorising several persons to carry out transactions on Ol.\u2019s behalf in respect of the flat. 9.  On 9 March 2004 the Department of Housing of the City of Moscow (the \u201cHousing Department\u201d) transferred the title to the flat to Ol. under a privatisation scheme. The privatisation agreement on behalf of Ol. was signed by a person acting by virtue of the power of attorney of 3 February 2004 and subsequently registered by the Moscow City Department of the Federal Registration Service (the \u201cRegistration Service\u201d). 10.  On 1 April 2004 B. and K. bought the flat from Ol. On 13 April 2004 the Registration Service registered the transaction and issued the relevant deed confirming B. and K.\u2019s title to the flat. 11.  On 12 January 2005 the Tushinskiy District Court of Moscow granted a claim lodged by B. against Ol. In particular, the court found that the latter had forfeited the right to reside in the flat and annulled his residence registration. 12.  On 10 March 2006 B. and K. sold the flat to the first applicant. The Registration Service registered the transaction and issued the relevant deed confirming the applicant\u2019s title to the flat. 13.  On 31 January 2006 the prosecutor\u2019s office received a complaint from N., an acquaintance of Ol., in which she alleged that the latter had been fraudulently deprived of the flat. On 14 March 2006 the district department of the interior opened a criminal investigation into the matter. According to the Government, the investigation is pending to date. 14.  On 14 May 2008 the inter-district prosecutor brought a civil claim on behalf of Ol. and the Housing Department behalf seeking invalidation of the privatisation and subsequent transactions in respect of the flat. 15.  On 2 July 2010 the District Court granted the prosecutor\u2019s claim. In particular, it established that Ol.\u2019s signatures on the power of attorney authorising third parties to act on his behalf in respect of the flat and his signature on other related documents had been forged. The court conceded that the first applicant was a bona fide purchaser of the flat. However, it ruled that the case fell under one of the two exceptions to the protection of a bona fide purchaser\u2019s title, which required that precedence be given to the previous owner, in this case the City of Moscow. In this connection, the court reasoned that Ol.\u2019s rights could be adequately protected only by means of restoring the City of Moscow\u2019s ownership in respect of the flat. The first applicant\u2019s title to the flat was annulled and the ownership was transferred to the City of Moscow. The court further recognised Ol.\u2019s right to reside in the flat and ordered the applicants\u2019 eviction. The applicants appealed. 16.  On 6 April 2011 the Moscow City Court upheld the judgment of 2 July 2010, in substance, on appeal. 17.  According to the Government, the title to the flat was not transferred to the City of Moscow and the applicants continued to reside in the flat.", "references": ["5", "8", "1", "4", "2", "7", "0", "6", "3", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
+{"input": "5.  Both applicants were born in 1943 and live in Vladivostok. 6.  The first applicant is the editor of a weekly newspaper, Arsenyevskiye Vesti (\u0410\u0440\u0441\u0435\u043d\u044c\u0435\u0432\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0435 \u0432\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0438), and the second applicant is a journalist and columnist there. It has a circulation of 17,100. The newspaper is published and distributed in the Primorskiy Region. 7.  In late 2003 during a campaign for elections to the national parliament, the State Duma, the newspaper published a number of satirical and parodic articles on the course of the campaign in the Primorskiy Region. They featured a Russian online cartoon character, a girl called Masyanya, who was very popular at the time, going from St Petersburg to Vladivostok as an election observer. 8.  An article in issue no. 46 of the newspaper for 13-19 November 2003 contained a pretend interview with Masyanya, stating that on her arrival at Vladivostok Airport she had been attacked and injured by local prostitutes, who did not want outsiders competing with them and who had forced her to return to St Petersburg. Masyanya had had a particularly fierce fight with a certain Vasilinka, the director of an escort agency called Contact or Image! (\u0430\u0433\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e \u0438\u043d\u0442\u0438\u043c\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u0443\u0441\u043b\u0443\u0433 \u041a\u043e\u043d\u0442\u0430\u043a\u0442 \u0438\u043b\u0438 \u0438\u043c\u0438\u0434\u0436!). The article stated that Vasilinka had refused to make any comments. 9.  In issue no. 47, dated 20-26 November 2003, in a column called \u201cNadezhda Alisimchik\u2019s Hummock of View\u201d[1] (\u041a\u043e\u0447\u043a\u0430 \u0437\u0440\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u041d\u0430\u0434\u0435\u0436\u0434\u044b \u0410\u043b\u0438\u0441\u0438\u043c\u0447\u0438\u043a) written by the second applicant, Arsenyevskiye Vesti published a pretend interview with Vasilinka. The article was headlined \u201cCandidates must be known from the inside!\u201d (\u041a\u0430\u043d\u0434\u0438\u0434\u0430\u0442\u043e\u0432 \u043d\u0443\u0436\u043d\u043e \u0437\u043d\u0430\u0442\u044c \u0438\u0437\u043d\u0443\u0442\u0440\u0438!). The relevant part read as follows:\n\u201cNonetheless, we managed to get in touch with Vasilinka, the director of the escort agency Contact or Image! for an interview and photograph. Vasilinka proved to be a dame with a touch of greed and was pulled by a free advert for her agency in our newspaper, although she warned us that she would not answer a single question about that \u2018bitch\u2019 Masyanya.\n\u2018This ragtag bunch from St Petersburg has no reason to be here because my agency Contact or Image can handle the elections \u2013 all my girls are professionals, and I myself am a lawyer and have extensive working experience as a prosecutor. Sporadically, during elections, I run the Contact or Image escort agency in coordination with superior organisations. There is no conflict here \u2013 the clientele is the same, and there is no need to spend money on protection on the side. Besides, this is a good opportunity for the Contact or Image escort agency to study its clients from the inside, which is particularly important when working with candidates to the State Duma. This is, so to say, a governmental order, which, I think, is also supported by the President. Especially as it\u2019s for extra income, and there\u2019s no such thing as too much money, even when one is at liberty,\u2019 Vasilinka told our newspaper.\nWe asked this prostitute-werewolf to comment on the list of candidates to the State Duma for circuit no. 52 ...\u201d 10.  The article was followed by a list of candidates and Vasilinka\u2019s comments on them, using slang words and expressions commonly used in the criminal underworld. Some candidates were described in more positive terms than others. To the left of the article was a picture of a female dressed in a one-dollar banknote. The figure\u2019s left hand pointed in the direction of three handwritten letters which were reproduced in small type. The face on the figure, which had long, flowing hair, was a photograph of the then prosecutor of the Primorskiy Region, Mr V. 11.  On 9 December 2003 Mr V., in a private prosecution, brought criminal proceedings against the applicants, under Article 130 \u00a7 2 of the Russian Criminal Code, before the Justice of the Peace of Circuit no. 27 in the Frunzenskiy District of Vladivostok (\u201cthe Justice of the Peace\u201d). He alleged that the article headlined \u201cCandidates must be known from the inside\u201d and the picture published in issue no. 47 of Arsenyevskiye Vesti for 20-26 November 2003 had been highly insulting, had aimed at damaging his honour and human dignity and had ascribed negative characteristics to his personality in an indecent, cynical and defamatory manner. He pointed out, in particular, that there was no doubt that the article had referred to him as it had stated that the character Vasilinka, \u201cwas a lawyer herself and had extensive working experience as a prosecutor\u201d. Mr V. further submitted that the article in question, and the comments in respect of the list of the candidates, had been written in slang words and expressions and had represented him as an immoral and corrupt \u201cprostitute-werewolf\u201d, thus clearly indicating the intention of the writers to humiliate and insult him. He also complained that the picture accompanying the article had been put together in an indecent manner, in breach of the established rules of behaviour and public morals. 12.  By a judgment of 2 June 2004 the Justice of the Peace convicted the applicants as charged. The court noted in particular:\n\u201cIn issue no. 47 for 20-26 November 2003 in the column headlined \u201cNadezhda Alisimchik\u2019s Hummock of View\u201d the newspaper Arsenyevskiye Vesti published an article \u2018Candidates must be known from the inside\u2019 which was accompanied by a photographic collage showing a female body covered with a one-dollar banknote. The photographic collage shows the face of the claimant, the prosecutor of the Primorskiy Region, [Mr V.], portrayed with long hair. The article contains an interview with \u2018Vasilinka\u2019, the director of an escort agency and states that it was possible not only to get in touch with her, but also to obtain her photograph. The text of the article and the portrayal of the prosecutor of the Primorskiy Region, [Mr V.], as an immoral and corrupt \u2018prostitute-werewolf\u2019 in an indecent and insulting manner damage the claimant\u2019s honour and dignity.\nThe claimant\u2019s representative has highlighted the insulting nature of the information published in the newspaper ... pointing out that the claimant is a public figure and often takes part in TV programmes; his photograph has been published on numerous occasions in the media, and [Mr V.\u2019s] face is therefore well known to people in the Primorskiy Region.\nHaving examined the photographic collage and the text of the article ... the use of the name \u2018prostitute-werewolf Vasilinka\u2019, the explanations of the claimant\u2019s lawyer, who has insisted that the character\u2019s name in the article and the surname of the prosecutor of the Primorskiy Region have the same root, and that the article states that the character is a lawyer by profession and has extensive working experience as a prosecutor, the court concludes that [the applicants] undertook deliberate actions which were insulting to [Mr V.], and which were committed publicly as [the insult was disseminated] in a newspaper, that is to say in the media.\n... The applicants\u2019 actions ...were intended to damage the honour and dignity and the professional reputation of the prosecutor of the Primorskiy Region, [Mr V.]...\u201d 13.  The court found the applicants guilty of aggravated insult as it had been published in the media, and fined each of them 30,000 Russian roubles (RUB) (approximately 860 euros (EUR)). 14.  On 19 July 2004 the Frunzenskiy District Court of Vladivistok (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) delivered its decision in the appeal proceedings. 15.  At the hearing the applicants had contested the guilty verdict. The second applicant had stated that the article in question had been written as a parody of various negative social phenomena, especially corruption during the elections and the role of the law-enforcement agencies. The first applicant stated that the article had been misinterpreted and that it had in fact concerned violations committed by law-enforcement agencies during the election campaign. She also argued that the picture had not been related to the article, nor had it depicted the prosecutor of the Primorskiy Region. 16.  The appellate court found it established that \u201c[the applicants had] deliberately insulted\u201d Mr V. when in issue no. 47 of Arsenyevskiye Vesti for 20-26 November 2003 they had in the column called \u201cNadezhda Alisimchik\u2019s Hummock of View\u201d published an article entitled \u201cCandidates must be known from the inside!\u201d, accompanied by a photographic collage representing a female body with the face of the prosecutor of the Primorskiy Region, the body having been covered with a one-dollar banknote. In the District Court\u2019s opinion, \u201cthe text of the article and the photographic collage [were] of an insulting nature, ascribe[d] negative characteristics, expressed in an indecent manner, to Mr V.\u2019s personality and damage[d] the honour and dignity of Mr V., the prosecutor of the Primorskiy Region, as a private individual and as an official\u201d. 17.  The appellate court observed, in particular, that the article had involved an interview with the director of an escort agency, \u201cVasilinka\u201d, who \u201csporadically, during elections, [ran] the escort agency Contact or Image in coordination with superior organisations\u201d, and that the article was followed by \u201cdirector Vasilinka\u2019s rating of the candidates\u201d, using slang words and expressions on her behalf. The photographic collage had illustrated the text about \u201cVasilinka\u201d, a \u201cprostitute-werewolf\u201d, who \u201cherself is a lawyer and has extensive working experience as a prosecutor\u201d. In the District Court\u2019s opinion, \u201cthe said information [was] of an insulting nature, since it degrade[d] Mr V.\u2019s honour and dignity\u201d. In reaching that conclusion, the District Court \u201c[took] into account the fact that the prosecutor of the Primorskiy Region, Mr V., [was] a public figure and his photograph [had] been published in the media on many occasions ...\u201d 18.  With reference to its findings, the appellate court concluded that the applicants \u201c[had taken] deliberate actions which [had been] of an insulting nature in respect of Mr V. and were performed in public, as [the impugned information] was disseminated in the media\u201d. In the District Court\u2019s opinion, although Mr V.\u2019s surname had not been mentioned in the article, the image which had illustrated the article had used a photograph of him. It had therefore been clear that information \u201cof an insulting nature\u201d had related to Mr V. The District Court observed that, \u201cby virtue of his office, Mr V. [was] a public figure and readers [could] therefore easily understand that the photographic collage [showed] Mr V.; so that readers [were] not mistaken, the name of the character in the article, \u2018Vasilinka\u2019, [had] the same root as Mr V.\u2019s surname, and the character [was] a lawyer by profession and has extensive working experience as a prosecutor\u201d. 19.  The District Court further held as follows:\n\u201cThe court cannot accept the defendants\u2019 arguments that it has not been proven that [Mr  V.] was insulted as, in the court\u2019s opinion, it is the text of the article and the photographic collage that are themselves insulting. Judging by its location on the page and its composition, the said photographic collage accompanies the article headlined \u201cCandidates must be known from the inside\u201d. Besides, the text itself refers to the fact that the photographic collage represents that very \u2018Vasilinka\u2019 who is the character in the article. The article states \u2018nonetheless we managed to get in touch with the director of the escort agency Contact or Image, Vasilinka, for an interview and a photograph. Vasilinka proved to be a dame with a touch of greed and was pulled by a free advert for her agency in our newspaper\u2019.\n...In the court\u2019s opinion, the offence took place in the form of public speech in the media, [the applicants] acted deliberately, the related words \u2018prostitute\u2019 and \u2018werewolf\u2019 indicate an intention to humiliate, dishonour and disgrace the subject of the article and photographic collage and, in a figurative sense, portray condemnable and distinctly negative characteristics, which are seen by the public as well as the person to whom they are addressed as insulting. In the court\u2019s opinion, representing the prosecutor of the Primorskiy Region as an immoral and corrupt \u2018prostitute-werewolf\u2019 is intended to ascribe distinctly negative characteristics to [Mr V.\u2019s] personality in an indecent form.\u201d 20.  The appellate court concluded that the first-instance judgment had been well-founded and dismissed the applicants\u2019 appeal. 21.  By a decision of 30 August 2004 the Primorskiy Regional Court upheld the applicants\u2019 conviction at final instance, endorsing the reasoning of the lower courts. 22.  On 23 March 2005 a bailiff issued a writ of execution in respect of the first applicant, ordering her to pay the fine and an execution fee of RUB 2,200. 23.  On 5 April 2005 the first applicant informed the bailiff that she was unable to pay the fine in one amount owing to a lack of funds. She requested that she be authorised to pay by instalments over six months. It appears that her request was refused and the first applicant had to borrow a part of the fine from the bank. According to the first applicant, she was able to pay back the money she borrowed six months later. 24.  The second applicant was also unable to pay the total amount of the fine and execution fee in one amount. She paid in instalments by deductions from her wages until 28 February 2006.", "references": ["9", "0", "5", "7", "2", "3", "1", "4", "8", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1977, and lived until his arrest in the town of Krasnyy Sulin, Rostov Region. He died in a prison tuberculosis hospital in Rostov-on-Don. 7.  On 27 March 2007 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of having been involved in drug trafficking. He was remanded in custody. 8.  Two days later the Krasnyy Sulin Town Court of the Rostov Region authorised the applicant\u2019s detention, having noted the gravity of the charges against him and the possibility of his absconding and reoffending in the light of the fact that he had not been living at his registered address in Krasnyy Sulin at the time of his arrest. The court also noted that the fact that the applicant was suffering from tuberculosis did not negate the indicated risks. 9.  The applicant\u2019s case was joined to the case of Ms P., his alleged accomplice. The two defendants were to stand trial together before the Town Court. 10.  On several occasions the Town Court extended the detention of the two defendants, each time using similar wording, citing the gravity of the charges and the lack of any change in the circumstances and risks which had initially warranted their detention. 11.  On 6 September 2007 the medical authorities informed the Town Court that the applicant\u2019s state of health did not allow him to attend court hearings. On the same day the proceedings were stayed until his recovery. 12.  On 29 October 2007, after receiving notice of the applicant\u2019s expected discharge from a prison hospital, the Town Court resumed the proceedings and scheduled a hearing for 26 November 2007. 13.  Two days later the head of the prison hospital informed the Town Court that the applicant\u2019s medical condition warranted further treatment in the hospital. The date of his discharge was unclear. 14.  On 26 November 2007 the Town Court again stayed the proceedings until the applicant\u2019s recovery and collectively extended his and Ms P.\u2019s detention for three months, until 29 February 2008, employing the same reasoning as on the previous occasions. The detention order contained no detailed assessment of the accuseds\u2019 individual circumstances. 15.  In January 2008 the prison hospital informed the Town Court that the applicant was receiving treatment and that it was impossible to predict the date of his discharge. 16.  It appears that at some point the proceedings against Ms P. were disjoined from those of the applicant. 17.  The Town Court continued regularly extending the applicant\u2019s detention, citing the gravity of the charges and the risks of his absconding or reoffending. 18.  In April and May 2008 the Town Court and the prison hospital exchanged correspondence concerning the applicant\u2019s state of health. The medical authorities stated that the patient was unable to attend owing to a risk of his spreading tuberculosis. 19.  Towards the end of August 2008 the Town Court asked the medical authorities to allow a hearing on the hospital premises. The head of the prison hospital agreed and on 12 September 2008 the proceedings resumed. 20.  On 25 September 2008 the Town Court found the applicant guilty of two counts of the production and attempted sale of opium and sentenced him to six years\u2019 imprisonment. 21.  On 27 January 2009 the Rostov Regional Court quashed the judgment on appeal and remitted the case for fresh consideration, ordering that the applicant remain in custody. 22.  In the course of the new round of proceedings the Town Court, on a number of occasions, authorised the applicant\u2019s continued detention. Each time the gravity of the charges and the risks of his re-offending and absconding served as the reason for the extension. The extension orders were formulated in the same standard manner. The applicant did not attend the hearings as his tuberculosis remained contagious. The orders were upheld on appeal. 23.  On 14 May 2009 the Town Court decided to stay the proceedings until the applicant\u2019s recovery. The applicant appealed. 24.  The proceedings were resumed less than a month later at the request of the applicant. The hearings were to be held on the hospital premises. 25.  On 23 June 2009 the Town Court found the applicant guilty of drug trafficking and sentenced him to four years\u2019 imprisonment. 26.  On 14 July 2009 the Regional Court upheld the most recent detention order, stating as follows:\n\u201cThe [case-file] materials ... show that the preventive measure was imposed [on the applicant] in conformity with the requirements of law. The circumstances of the case were [also] taken into account [by the court], as well as information about [the applicant\u2019s] personality.\n[The Town Court] came to the correct conclusion that the circumstances that had [indicated the necessity for] the applicant\u2019s detention had not changed. Its conclusion that no other preventive measure might be applied to [the applicant] could not be disputed.\u201d 27.  On 25 August 2009 the Rostov Regional Court upheld the applicant\u2019s conviction. 28.  In 2006, prior to his arrest, the applicant was diagnosed with advanced tuberculosis, pleurisy, and inflammation of the tissue layers lining the lungs and inner chest wall. He was treated in the Rostov Regional State Tuberculosis Hospital. 29.  Following his arrest on 27 March 2007, the applicant was admitted to remand prison no. IZ-61/3 in Novocherkassk. During the admission procedure the applicant informed the prison authorities that he was suffering from tuberculosis. A chest X-ray examination on 9 April 2007 revealed that both his lungs were damaged by an active, advanced form of tuberculosis and that the right lung was partially collapsed on account of the presence of air in the thorax. The condition was further complicated by pleurisy. A course of drugs, dietary nutrition and the drainage of fluid from the pleural cavity were prescribed. 30.  The parties disagreed on whether the applicant had received the prescribed treatment. While a report by the detention authorities in April 2010 stated that he had been given the treatment in full, the applicant\u2019s medical file did not contain any information confirming that he had complied with the course of drug treatment. 31.  On 8 August 2007 the applicant\u2019s health deteriorated and he was taken by ambulance to the prison tuberculosis hospital in Rostov-on-Don. The applicant was regularly examined by doctors, underwent various medical tests and received treatment for tuberculosis. His right lung was drained after the insertion of a chest tube. 32.  On 9 January 2008 a drug susceptibility test was performed. It revealed that the applicant\u2019s tuberculosis was resistant to five drugs, including those which had been given to him in the hospital. Several days later his drug treatment was amended and the illness was brought under control. 33.  On 3 June 2008 pulmonary surgery was prescribed by the head of the hospital\u2019s surgical unit. 34.  According to a medical report of 28 April 2010 submitted by the Government, three days later the applicant\u2019s health worsened and it was no longer possible to perform the prescribed operation. The applicant\u2019s medical file does not contain any records regarding the deterioration of his health during that three-day period. 35.  Regular chest X-ray examinations carried out in the subsequent period revealed the development of complications and showed no improvement in the course of the disease. The applicant was recommended a non-surgical course of treatment. 36.  The applicant\u2019s medical file shows that at the beginning of January 2009 he several times refused to follow a round of drug therapy. On 30 January 2009 he consulted a psychologist and a psychiatrist on this matter. 37.  On 5 June 2009 a tuberculosis specialist established that the applicant\u2019s infection was spreading and that his overall condition had worsened to the extent that surgical intervention was no longer possible. The applicant started undergoing new, multi-drug therapy under the close supervision of doctors. On 3 December 2009 and 12 February 2010 the doctors confirmed that the applicant could not undergo the prescribed pulmonary surgery due to the continuing deterioration in his health. 38.  On 29 October 2010 a medical panel concluded that the applicant\u2019s condition warranted his early release from detention. 39.  On 10 November 2010 the Town Court ordered the applicant\u2019s release on health grounds. 40.  Four days later he died in detention of tuberculosis.", "references": ["6", "7", "0", "4", "5", "8", "3", "9", "No Label", "1", "2"], "gold": ["1", "2"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1967 and lived in Rostov-on-Don prior to his arrest. 5.  On 30 March 2006 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of murder. By judgment of 16 May 2006, the Orlovskiy District Court of the Rostov Region found him guilty and sentenced him to seven years\u2019 imprisonment. On 18 July 2006 the Rostov Regional Court upheld the conviction. The applicant and his counsel lodged an application for supervisory review of the conviction. 6.  On 12 April 2007 the Presidium of the Regional Court, upon hearing the prosecutor, counsel for the applicant and for the injured party, quashed the conviction for formal defects and ordered a re-trial. The Presidium directed that the applicant should be held in custody, without citing grounds for the custodial measure or setting a time-limit for its application. 7.  On 26 June 2007 the District Court held a preliminary hearing and fixed the trial date for 3 July. By the same decision, the court determined that the applicant should remain in custody because he was charged with a particularly serious offence and could pervert the course of justice if released. The applicant and his counsel filed an appeal against the extension order. 8.  On 31 July 2007 the Regional Court examined the appeal in the absence of the applicant and his counsel. It annulled the detention order on the ground that the District Court had failed to set a time-limit for the applicant\u2019s detention, in breach of the requirements of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It did not take any decision regarding the applicant\u2019s further detention and referred the issue to the District Court for a new examination. 9.  On 7 September 2007 the District Court extended the applicant\u2019s pre\u2011trial detention for a period of six months starting from 28 April 2007 and lasting until 28 October 2007, referring to the gravity of the charges and the applicant\u2019s new line of defence which, in the District Court\u2019s view, was an indication that he might abscond. On 8 October 2007 the Regional Court rejected in a summary fashion the appeal against the extension order. 10.  On 15 October 2007 the District Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 28 December 2007, referring to the gravity of the charges and the flight risk. On 11 December 2007 the Regional Court upheld the detention order on appeal. 11.  On 13 December 2007 the District Court examined the applicant\u2019s request for release. Noting that the trial was approaching the final stage, that the witnesses had been heard, and that the applicant had family and dependent children, the court held that the applicant could be released on bail. The applicant was released the following day. On 5 February 2008 the Regional Court quashed the bail decision, holding that the District Court had not taken proper account of the gravity of the charges. On 20 February 2008 the District Court reconsidered the matter and held that the applicant should be re-detained for a further three months on account of the gravity of the charges against him. On 26 March 2008 the Regional Court upheld the detention order on appeal. 12.  On 3 March 2008 the District Court found the applicant guilty of murder and sentenced him to five years\u2019 imprisonment. On 23 April 2008 the Regional Court upheld the conviction.", "references": ["1", "0", "6", "4", "8", "7", "9", "5", "3", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1965 and lives in the Leningrad Region. 5.  On 25 February 2009 an investigator charged the applicant with kidnapping in absentia and put his name of the international list of fugitives from justice. On the same day the investigator asked the Vasileostrovskiy District Court in St Petersburg to detain the applicant on remand. 6.  On 2 March 2009 the District Court granted the investigator\u2019s application for a detention order, referring to the gravity of the charges against the applicant. 7.  On 22 July 2009 the applicant was apprehended in the Vologda Region and transferred to a remand prison in St Petersburg. 8.  On 30 July 2009 the applicant was interviewed and received a copy of the charge sheet. He also submitted an appeal against the detention order of 2 March. 9.  On 1 September 2009 the St Petersburg City Court heard the appeal and set aside the detention order, finding that the failure to follow the legal procedure for putting the applicant\u2019s name on the list of fugitives from justice amounted to a \u201cfundamental breach\u201d of the rules of criminal procedure. It ordered a new examination of the detention matter but did not specify whether or not the applicant should remain in custody. As it happened, the applicant was not released. 10.  On 18 September 2009 the District Court refused the investigator\u2019s request for a detention order. It held, firstly, that the gravity of the charges was not a sufficient reason for detaining the applicant and, secondly, that the procedure for putting his name on the list of fugitives from justice had not been followed. The applicant was released in the courtroom. 11.  On 21 October 2009 the District Court found the applicant guilty and gave him a custodial sentence conditional on four years\u2019 probation.", "references": ["6", "7", "1", "0", "8", "5", "4", "9", "3", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Moscow. 5.  On 11 January 1999 the parish of the Russian Orthodox Church of the Dormition of the Theotokos (the \u201cParish\u201d) brought a civil claim against the applicant and her family claiming title to the land plot de facto used by the latter. 6.  In May 1999 the applicant brought a counterclaim seeking annulment of the Parish\u2019s title to the land plot. 7.  On 23 November 1999 the Butyrskiy District Court of Moscow granted the Parish\u2019s claim and dismissed the counterclaim lodged by the applicant. 8.  On 18 February 2000 the Moscow City Court upheld the judgment of 23 November 1999 on appeal. 9.  In July 2000 the city prosecutor\u2019s office, upon the applicant\u2019s request, asked for the supervisory review of the above judgments. 10.  On 24 August 2000 the Presidium of the Moscow City Court quashed the judgments of 23 November 1999 and 18 February 2000 by way of supervisory review and remitted the matter for fresh consideration. 11.  It appears that both parties amended their claims in part for several times. The applicant eventually sought recognition of her property title to the land plot in question. 12.  On 4 May 2005 the District Court granted the applicant\u2019s claims in full. The Parish appealed. 13.  On 11 August 2005 the City Court upheld the judgment of 4 May 2005 on appeal. 14.  It appears the judgment of 4 May 2005 was not enforced. 15.  On 25 December 2005 the Parish asked for the supervisory review of the judgments in the applicant\u2019s favour. 16.  On 13 July 2006 the Presidium of the City Court quashed the judgments of 4 May and 11 August 2005 by way of supervisory review and remitted the matter for fresh consideration. 17.  On 31 January 2007 the proceedings discontinued due to the absence of the parties.", "references": ["6", "4", "2", "8", "0", "1", "5", "7", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1975 and lives in Rudinsk\u00e1. 7.  On 17 December 2008 the applicant lodged a civil action with the \u017dilina District Court (file no. 8 C 240/2008) seeking an order for the defendant (a municipality) to enter into a contract with her concerning the transfer of a flat, in which she resided. 8.  The District Court scheduled two hearings for 8 June and 8 July 2009; it ruled on the merits of the action and granted the action on the latter date.\nThe applicant lodged an appeal; the judgment was quashed by a court of appeal on 8 April 2010 and the matter was remitted on 4 June 2010 to the District Court. 9.  The applicant lodged a complaint under Article 127 of the Constitution with the Constitutional Court contesting the length of the proceedings in so far as those had been held before the District Court. 10.  On 11 October 2012 the Constitutional Court (file no. II. \u00daS 423/2012) rejected her complaint on the ground that, prior to lodging her constitutional complaint, the applicant had failed to exhaust ordinary remedies, in particular lodging a complaint with the President of the District Court under the Courts Act (Law no. 757/2004).\nThe Constitutional Court noted that the court of appeal had transferred the case file to the District Court on 4 June 2010 and that the applicant had lodged her constitutional complaint on 27 September 2012. It found that, within that period, the District Court had failed actively to proceed with the matter for one year and a half.\nThe Constitutional Court observed that the Court\u2019s previous case-law \u2013 such as I\u0161tv\u00e1n and I\u0161tv\u00e1nov\u00e1 v. Slovakia (no. 30189/07, 12 June 2012), which concerned a delay of more than six years \u2013 dealt with unjustified delays imputable to the courts that were substantially longer than those in the present case (one year and a half). The Constitutional Court considered that, because the unjustified delays in the present case had been shorter (compared to those in respect of I\u0161tv\u00e1n and I\u0161tv\u00e1nov\u00e1 and other similar cases), it was justified in requiring \u2013 before turning for protection to the Constitutional Court \u2013 that the applicant lodge a complaint with the President of the District Court with a view to accelerating her proceedings. 11.  Following the Constitutional Court\u2019s decision, the District Court scheduled a hearing for 9 September 2015. At the time of communication of the application the proceedings were still pending.", "references": ["7", "0", "4", "1", "9", "5", "8", "6", "2", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Vienna. 6.  M.K., the applicant\u2019s son born in 1981, was taken to the Otto Wagner Hospital on 19 March 2010 suffering from an acute episode of paranoid schizophrenia. The Otto Wagner Hospital is a public institution of the City of Vienna specialising in neurology, orthopaedics, psychiatry and pulmonology. It is situated on a vast area outside the city center in the west of the green-belt of Vienna, consisting of some 26 hospital buildings with annexes, a church, a museum, a theatre and a large park. 7.  In a decision of 7 April 2010, the F\u00fcnfhaus District Court (Bezirksgericht) ordered M.K.\u2019s involuntary placement in the psychiatric unit of that hospital pursuant to section 8 of the Hospitalisation Act (Unterbringungsgesetz). 8.  On 12 May 2010 M.K. failed to return from an authorised walk in the hospital grounds. He had escaped from the premises and died after jumping in front of a subway train. 9.  Subsequently, in August 2010 the applicant brought a civil action in the Vienna Regional Civil Court (Landesgericht f\u00fcr Zivilrechtssachen) under the Official Liability Act (Amtshaftungsgesetz) against the City of Vienna (Stadt Wien) as the authority responsible for the hospital, seeking compensation of 20,000 euros (EUR) plus interest in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage. 10.  She stated that in 2006 and 2007 her son had already undergone inpatient treatment for paranoid schizophrenia at the Otto Wagner Hospital and the Vienna General Hospital (Allgemeines Krankenhaus Wien). Hospitalisation had been ordered on 19 March 2010 because M.K. had posed a danger both to himself and others. He had attacked a chewing gum dispenser with a sledgehammer and appeared to be utterly confused when the police arrived on the scene. The expert Dr P., who was called to assess M.K.\u2019s mental state, diagnosed him with paranoid schizophrenia. Because of M.K.\u2019s delusional behaviour, there was a risk that he would harm himself or others. The expert concluded that M.K.\u2019s mental state required him to be placed in a closed psychiatric institution. 11.  However, on 25 and 29 March 2010 M.K. managed to escape from the closed ward of the Otto Wagner Hospital and was found and brought back only after a search conducted by the police and the hospital staff. On 12 May 2010 he escaped from the open ward to which he had been transferred in the meantime, and committed suicide by jumping in front of a subway train. 12.  The applicant claimed that she had suffered a massive shock as a result of her son\u2019s death. Before his involuntary placement in the hospital, M.K. had lived with her in the same household and they had had a very close relationship. The applicant claimed that as a result of his death she had suffered from depression and insomnia and had been seeing a psychotherapist since June 2010. Nonetheless, her mental state had not improved since. 13.  The fact that her son had been able to escape from the hospital premises led the applicant to conclude that the hospital staff had acted negligently in the performance of their duties. Because M.K.\u2019s behaviour had been unpredictable, he should have been under strict supervision. In the circumstances, and especially because he had managed to escape twice before, restriction of his freedom of movement within a closed ward was proportionate, necessary and adequate. Furthermore, such restriction should have included a degree of supervision by the hospital staff. The contract for M.K.\u2019s treatment had included duties of protection and care. There had been signs of suicidal thoughts on the patient\u2019s part, and the hospital staff should therefore have prevented him from leaving the ward. However, the necessary diligence had not been exercised. For these reasons, the applicant claimed that the City of Vienna had been at fault and was therefore responsible for the non-pecuniary damage she sustained. 14.  The City of Vienna asked the Vienna Regional Civil Court to dismiss the applicant\u2019s claim. It argued that M.K.\u2019s involuntary placement in the psychiatric institution on 19 March 2010 had been necessary as he had not been aware of his mental illness and had refused to be treated. At the time, he had been utterly confused and it had not been possible to reason with him. Because of the threat he posed to himself and others, he had repeatedly had his freedom of movement restricted whilst in hospital and had had to be medicated parenterally. On 25 March 2010 he had left the acute station without permission and went to his parents\u2019 place. When the police and the ambulance brought him back to the hospital, he had had to be sedated intravenously because of the highly psychotic state he was in. On 29 March 2010, only four days later, he escaped again from the acute station, but was apprehended by the hospital\u2019s security staff on the premises of the hospital. However, from 2 April 2010, M.K.\u2019s attitude changed and he became willing to take oral medication. From that day on, his freedom of movement was no longer restricted. He had appeared well-adjusted and friendly. In view of the progress in his treatment, and as he appeared more reasonable and able to abide by agreements, he had been transferred from the acute station to the subacute ward on 20 April 2010. However, he had then succumbed to so\u2011called \u201cdynamic exhaustion\u201d (dynamische Entleerung), which manifested itself in a noticeable loss of drive and the desire for a quiet environment. The hospital staff had therefore tried to animate M.K. through occupational therapy and recreational walks in the hospital grounds, which \u2212 on the basis of a well-documented medical order \u2212 he had been allowed to take on his own as of 21 April 2010. This medical order had taken into account the fact that M.K. had twice before escaped from his ward. Thereafter, however, M.K. had continued to receive treatment for over three weeks and there had been a considerable improvement in his condition. Moreover, he had been made aware that he was not allowed to leave the hospital premises and had to notify the staff before going out for a walk and again upon his return. He had also been permitted to leave the building to smoke a cigarette. The hospital had maintained detailed documentary records of his medical treatment and progress. There had been no indication of suicidal thoughts. However, on 12 May 2010 at 5.15pm the doctor on duty was informed by the hospital staff that the applicant\u2019s son had not returned from an authorised walk in the hospital grounds and had apparently taken his personal clothing with him. A search operation had immediately been initiated on the premises and at the same time the police had been asked to search for him. At approximately 9pm the police informed the hospital that M.K. had been killed in a subway train accident at around 4 pm. 15.  The City of Vienna submitted that under the provisions of the Hospitalisation Act and in keeping with current practice in the treatment of mentally ill patients, \u201copen\u201d psychiatry was the norm and restriction of a patient\u2019s freedom of movement was permissible only in cases of absolute necessity and within the bounds of proportionality. In the present case, by 12 May 2010 restriction of the physical movement of the applicant\u2019s son (known as \u201cfixation\u201d), and/or the spatial restriction of his movement to the confines of a psychiatric bed, or his permanent supervision, were no longer medically indicated, nor would such measures have been reasonable or adequate. On the contrary, the lack of any indication of suicidal thoughts on the part of M.K. would have rendered any further restriction of his freedom of movement unlawful under the Hospitalisation Act. 16.  During the oral hearing of 3 September 2012 the applicant reduced her claim to 15,000 EUR plus 4% interest per annum. 17.  On 30 November 2012 the Vienna Regional Civil Court granted the claim. It found that even shortly before his death on 12 May 2010, it could be assumed that M.K. still posed a threat to himself and others, in particular because he still suffered from the delusional idea that he was a different person and did not recognise his parents as his own. Self-harming behaviour could occur outside the hospital environment, due to overstimulation, even in patients who had shown progress after a psychosis. It was no longer possible to determine whether the applicant\u2019s son had jumped in front of the subway train in order to deliberately commit suicide, or whether he followed a spontaneous impulse or a delusional thought to that end. In any event the hospital should have made sure that he was not able to leave the hospital grounds, even if therapeutic walks were medically indicated and permissible in the circumstances. 18.  From a legal perspective, the Regional Civil Court affirmed that, as the authority responsible for the Otto Wagner Hospital, the City of Vienna could be held accountable for any culpable action or omission by its organs or officials, pursuant to section 1 of the Official Liability Act. At the material time, the applicant\u2019s son had been lawfully hospitalised by a decision of the F\u00fcnfhaus District Court of 7 April 2010, which remained valid until 21 May 2010. Sections 3 and 33 of the Hospitalisation Act in force at the time provided that, in cases where hospitalisation had been ordered, it was also necessary to guard against threats potentially posed by the patient. Accordingly, the hospital was obliged to ensure restriction of the patient\u2019s freedom of movement in order to protect against potential damage. In the instant case, M.K. was allowed to take walks on the hospital premises because such walks were medically indicated. However, no measures were taken to ensure that he respected the restrictions on his freedom of movement. There was no effective supervision of his walks or their duration. By disregarding its duty of supervision, the hospital had implemented the Hospitalisation Act incorrectly. It was immaterial that the applicant\u2019s son had not shown any signs of suicidal tendencies because the hospitalisation was originally effected because of the danger he posed to himself and to others. Therefore, even if he did not pose a threat to himself anymore, the requirement for hospitalisation was still valid because of the threat he posed to others. In the instant case, the lack of supervision of M.K. resulted in the applicant having to suffer the shock of the death of her son. The court concluded that the civil claim was justified and granted the applicant EUR 15,000 plus interest by way of compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 19.  The City of Vienna appealed, claiming that the court had wrongly assessed the evidence, that its finding of facts was incorrect, and that it had wrongly interpreted the law. 20.  On 26 March 2013 the Vienna Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht) granted the defendant\u2019s appeal and dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim. In its view, there had been no causal link between the wholly unexpected suicide of the applicant\u2019s son and the alleged dereliction of the hospital\u2019s duty of supervision under the Hospitalisation Act. Although it was stated in the hospital admission report that there was a danger of M.K.\u2019s putting himself and others at risk due to his disoriented state, it was also explicitly mentioned that he had no suicidal thoughts. According to the expert opinion by Dr P of 25 May 2012, the continuation of M.K.\u2019s hospitalisation on 12 May 2010 was indicated only because of the threat he posed to others, in particular to his mother, but no longer to himself. This was the reason why his freedom of movement at that point had been restricted to the hospital premises rather than just the closed ward. The court found that in the light of the improvement in his symptoms, it was not unusual that he had been allowed to take walks for therapeutic purposes, even if it might have been advisable to allow these walks only when accompanied by hospital staff. 21.  The Court of Appeal further affirmed that there had been no indication of self-harm during M.K.\u2019s entire stay at the hospital. He had not voiced suicidal thoughts or undertaken any actions of a suicidal nature. It could not be established whether his jumping in front of the subway train was a suicide which he had planned even before he left the hospital premises, or whether it had been a spontaneous act of self-harm resulting from his psychosis. Naturally, M.K. would not have been able to commit suicide if he had been prevented from leaving the hospital grounds. Even with patients whose psychotic symptoms had improved, the phenomenon of overstimulation could occur if they left the therapeutic environment, whereas such a situation was much less likely to occur within the confines of a hospital. Section 3 \u00a7 1 of the Hospitalisation Act referred, as its purpose, only to the protection of the life and limb of the mental patient himself and third parties. The behaviour of M.K. had not been foreseeable because there had no longer been any indication of possible self-harm at the material time and his action was therefore not attributable to the hospital. The fact that the risk of self-harm could never be entirely excluded in the case of psychotic patients did not change this assessment. 22.  The applicant appealed, arguing that at the time when M.K. had committed suicide, the initial decision by the F\u00fcnfhaus District Court on his hospitalisation had still been valid and was based on the assessment that he posed a danger to himself and others because of his paranoid schizophrenia. No new expert opinion had been obtained, and the hospital had not informed the guardianship court (Pflegschaftsgericht) that the threat of self\u2011harm had ceased to exist. Consequently, the medical indication would still have been a restriction of M.K.\u2019s freedom of movement. By failing to restrict his movement, the hospital had acted contrary to the court decision ordering his hospitalisation. 23.  On 18 July 2013 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal, upholding the legal and factual findings of the Court of Appeal. It added that a lawful implementation of the Hospitalisation Act was possible both inside and outside a closed ward. M.K.\u2019s hospitalisation had therefore not been unlawful, even though he had been placed in the open ward from 20 April 2010. Contrary to the applicant\u2019s line of argumentation, the Otto Wagner Hospital had not had a duty to implement the F\u00fcnfhaus District Court\u2019s decision on M.K.\u2019s hospitalisation in a manner which compelled it to restrict his movement. This followed from section 32 of the Hospitalisation Act \u2013 according to which a hospitalisation order could be lifted at any time by the head of the institution \u2013 and section 33, which stated that restriction of movement was permissible in limited cases only. The District Court\u2019s decision had not defined the extent or duration of any specific restriction of movement. Section 33 of the Hospitalisation Act provided that a restriction of freedom of movement might only be used as an exceptional measure and \u201clast resort\u201d. Also, Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention restricted the permissibility of isolating mentally ill patients. Even within a closed ward, mentally ill patients had to have the widest possible amount of freedom of movement. Only the more restrictive measures under section 33 of the Hospitalisation Act were subject to judicial review. 24.  The Supreme Court also stated that from a therapeutic perspective M.K. had been allowed to take unaccompanied walks because of the improvement in his condition. Moreover, from the time he had been authorised to take these walks, he had always returned without problems. This measure, which had been ordered by the psychiatrist treating him, had therefore been proportionate and necessary pursuant to section 33 of the Hospitalisation Act. In conclusion, the hospital had not acted culpably, for which reason the applicant\u2019s claim under the Official Liability Act was not justified.", "references": ["8", "3", "5", "1", "9", "6", "4", "0", "7", "2", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1950 and lived in Budapest. 7.  Having been a judge since 1 January 1978 and a member of the Supreme Court since 1 March 1994, on 15 November 2009 he was appointed Vice-President for a six-year term by the President of the Republic, after being proposed for the post by the President of the Supreme Court. 8.  The mandate of the President of the Supreme Court was prematurely terminated, upon the entry into force of the Fundamental Law on 1 January 2012, in reaction to his criticisms and publicly expressed views regarding proposed judicial reforms (see Baka v. Hungary [GC], no. 20261/12, \u00a7 151, 23 June 2016). 9. In connection with these events, a proposal for the termination of the applicant\u2019s mandate as Vice-President was submitted to Parliament on 23 November 2011, and was adopted on 28 November 2011 in the form of section 185 of Act no. CLXI of 2011 on the Organisation and Administration of the Courts (\u201cthe AOAC\u201d) (see Baka, cited above, \u00a7 30). Accordingly, as of 1 January 2012, the applicant was removed from his position as Vice-President, three years and ten months before the scheduled expiry of his mandate. He remained in office as president of one of the Civil Law division benches of the K\u00faria (the historical appellation by which the Supreme Court was renamed in 2012). 10.  On 7 February 2012 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court challenging the termination of his position. In its judgment no. 3076/2013. (III. 27.) AB, adopted by eight votes to seven, the Constitutional Court rejected the constitutional complaint. It held that the premature termination of the applicant\u2019s term of office as Vice-President had not violated the Fundamental Law, since it had been sufficiently justified by the full-scale reorganisation of the judicial system and important changes made in respect of the tasks and competences of the President of the K\u00faria. It noted that the K\u00faria\u2019s tasks and competences had been broadened, in particular with regard to the supervision of the legality of municipal council regulations (for the relevant parts of the Constitutional Court\u2019s judgment see Baka, cited above, \u00a7 55).\nSeven judges dissented and considered that the changes concerning the judicial system, the new K\u00faria and the person of its president had not fundamentally affected the status of the Vice-President. The position of the Vice-President within the organisation of the supreme judicial instance had not changed. Under the Act LXVI of 1997 on the Organisation and Administration of the Courts, the Vice-President was already entitled to act in the stead of the President of the Supreme Court only with regard to managerial tasks at the Supreme Court, but not with regard to his or her functions as President of the National Council of Justice (see Baka, cited above, \u00a7 56). The dissenting judges concluded that the premature termination of the applicant\u2019s term of office had not been sufficiently justified by the reorganisation of the judicial system; and that it had weakened the guarantees in respect of the separation of powers, had been contrary to the prohibition on retroactive legislation, and had breached the principle of the rule of law and the right to a remedy. 11.  On 6 July 2012, as a consequence of the lowering of the judges\u2019 mandatory retirement age pursuant to section 90 (ha) of Act no. CLXII of 2011 on the Legal Status and Remuneration of Judges (\u201cthe ALSRJ\u201d) (see Baka, cited above, \u00a7 52), the President of the Republic released the applicant from his duties as a judge with effect from 31 December 2012. 12.  In its judgment no. 33/2012. (VII. 17) AB of 16 July 2012, the Constitutional Court declared unconstitutional and consequently annulled the provisions on the compulsory retirement age of judges (see Baka, cited above, \u00a7 53). On the basis of that judgment, the Budapest Labour Court found, in a first-instance judgment of 21 March 2013, that the termination of the applicant\u2019s judicial service had been unlawful and reinstated him \u2013 without, however, ordering his reinstatement in his previous position as president of one of the Civil Law division benches of the K\u00faria. 13.  Following the Constitutional Court\u2019s judgment of 16 July 2012, Parliament adopted a modified scheme governing the reduction of judges\u2019 compulsory retirement age and provided different options for those who had already been affected by the unconstitutional legislation (see Act no. XX of 2013 referred to in Baka, cited above, \u00a7 54). The applicant opted not to be reinstated and received lump-sum compensation for the termination of post as a judge.", "references": ["8", "1", "3", "5", "9", "2", "6", "7", "0", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1979. He is currently serving a sentence in correctional colony no. IK-1 in Penza. 7.  In the early morning of 7 August 2007 the applicant stabbed a man in the leg during a drunken fight. Several hours later the victim died in hospital from massive blood loss. 8.  On the same day the applicant was arrested. According to the police, he had started the fight and knifed the victim. 9.  Two days later the applicant was remanded in custody by the Salsk Town Court of the Rostov Region (\u201cthe Town Court\u201d). It was further extended at the investigative authorities\u2019 requests on a number of occasions given the seriousness of the charges, negative references about the applicant\u2019s character and the fact that the applicant did not have permanent residence or a job. 10.  On the day of the incident a medical expert, B., performed an autopsy of the victim at the request of the investigator. He concluded that the victim, M., had died from blood loss between midnight and 4 a.m. on 6 August 2007. 11.  The next day the investigator asked B. to carry out a repeat examination of the body, without informing the applicant or his lawyer. The expert stated that the victim had died between midnight and 4 a.m. on 7 August 2007. A considerable amount of alcohol was found in the victim\u2019s system. 12.  On 12 September 2007 a doctor discovered several bruises on the applicant\u2019s body. The date the injuries were sustained could not be determined. 13.  In October 2007 the defence were presented with the autopsy report. Having been informed of their procedural rights, including the right to challenge an expert, seek the appointment of a particular person as an expert, adduce further questions, be present during an expert examination in person and make comments or requests, including in writing, the applicant and his lawyer studied the expert report and signed it without making any remarks or objections. 14.  The applicant\u2019s main line of defence at trial was that he had acted in self-defence against the unlawful actions of the victim, who had allegedly attacked him with a knife. The prosecution disputed that version of events with the in-court testimony of six people who had witnessed the incident. In particular, five of the witnesses stressed that the applicant had attacked the victim with a knife. The other witness stated that he had not seen the fight itself but had seen the victim lying wounded and had been told by others present that the applicant had knifed him and had then fled. 15.  The autopsy expert testified that on the night of the murder the victim had been heavily drunk to such a point that he had been unable to think clearly. He had died because of a knife wound to his femoral artery. Neither the applicant nor his lawyer asked the expert to explain any possible contradictions between the two autopsy reports. They did, however, challenge the admissibility of the second report in view of the fact that they had only been notified of it afterwards. The trial court rejected the objection, noting that the defence had had an opportunity to put questions to the expert in open court or to seek an additional expert examination. 16.  The defence repeatedly asked the trial court to hear the three witnesses who had allegedly seen the fight. The applicant said that he had seen one of the witnesses working at the Central Market but he did not know her name. The trial court, convinced by the prosecution witnesses that the three individuals had not been present during the attack, dismissed the applicant\u2019s request. It also noted that it had no legal power to find witnesses. 17.  The day before the verdict, the applicant unsuccessfully asked the trial court to order an additional autopsy of the victim. 18.  On 8 August 2008 he was convicted of unintentional killing and sentenced to eight and a half years\u2019 imprisonment. His conviction was mainly based on the expert and witness testimony and the second autopsy report. 19.  On 12 November 2008 the Rostov Regional Court quashed the conviction because of certain contradictions in the legal analysis of the applicant\u2019s criminal intent. The case was remitted for fresh examination. The Regional Court also ordered that the applicant should remain in custody pending a retrial. 20.  On 19 December 2008 the trial court rejected an application by the applicant for release, in which he complained that his detention had been excessively lengthy, that there was no reason to suspect that he had been involved in the crime, that he had a permanent place of residence and that he suffered from a serious medical condition. The court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 20 March 2009, referring to the seriousness of the charges, negative references about the applicant\u2019s character and the \u201cneed to proceed with the trial.\u201d 21.  On 29 December 2008 the defence appealed against the detention order. A week later the applicant gave the prison authorities an amended statement of appeal, which reached the trial court on 19 January 2009. It was returned as belated. 22.  On 19 January 2009 the Regional Court examined the appeal in the absence of the applicant and his lawyer. It neither verified whether the defence had been duly summoned nor looked at the reasons for their absence or reflected upon the need to obtain their attendance. Having heard the prosecutor, who insisted on the importance of the applicant\u2019s continued detention, the Regional Court upheld the detention order, agreeing that the seriousness of the charges and stage of the proceedings warranted the extension. 23.  On 18 March 2009 the Town Court again extended the detention until 20 June 2009. In addition to the grounds previously indicated, it held that there was a lack of evidence to support the applicant\u2019s argument of poor health. 24.  Nine days later the applicant lodged an appeal and application for leave to appear. 25.  On 8 April 2009 the Regional Court held a hearing. The defence were absent but the prosecutor attended and argued in favour of the applicant\u2019s continued detention. There is nothing to suggest that the reasons for the defence\u2019s absence were checked by the court. It held that the applicant\u2019s presence was not necessary since his arguments were set out in his statement of appeal. Referring to the length of the criminal proceedings, the court decided to reduce the period of the applicant\u2019s detention by one month until 20 May 2009. 26.  In the meantime, the trial court proceeded with the examination of the case. The applicant\u2019s only request was to have defence witnesses heard who were allegedly meant to testify that the applicant had not had any injuries prior to the fight and that all the prosecution witnesses had agreed to make untrue statements about him. It was dismissed by the trial court as irrelevant and ill-founded. The trial court again noted the difficulties in finding one of the witnesses in the absence of any relevant information about her identity. 27.  The applicant also challenged the autopsy reports and, in particular, the cause of death. 28.  On 21 January 2009 the trial court heard the autopsy expert. The applicant was removed from court because of insulting conduct towards the expert. The applicant\u2019s counsel stayed, but did not call into question the two reports or other expert evidence. The applicant\u2019s subsequent requests for an additional cross-examination of the expert were dismissed as unfounded. 29.  On 13 May 2009 the trial court convicted the applicant of unintentional killing and sentenced him to eight and a half years\u2019 imprisonment. The judgment was based on the in-court testimony of six prosecution witnesses, including eyewitnesses to the incident, the second autopsy report and the expert\u2019s testimony. The court found that the weight of the evidence proved that the applicant had not acted in self-defence. 30.  On 7 October 2009 the Regional Court upheld the sentence. It confirmed the findings of fact and law and concluded that there had been no procedural violations in the applicant\u2019s case. 31.  The parties submitted the applicant\u2019s medical documents for the period September 2008 to January 2013. 32.  It appears that in late September 2008 the applicant complained to a prison doctor of palpitations, fatigue, shortness of breath and chest pain. The prison doctor examined him on 29 September 2008, diagnosed him with mitral valve prolapse and ordered that he be transferred to a prison hospital \u201cin due course\u201d. 33.  On 23 December 2008 the applicant underwent an echocardiogram, which revealed symptoms of supraventricular tachycardia. He was also seen by a cardiologist, who confirmed the diagnosis of mitral valve prolapse and diagnosed him with neurocirculatory dystonia (\u043d\u0435\u0439\u0440\u043e\u0446\u0438\u0440\u043a\u0443\u043b\u044f\u0442\u043e\u0440\u043d\u0430\u044f \u0434\u0438\u0441\u0442\u043e\u043d\u0438\u044f). A course of drugs was prescribed. 34.  On 28 January 2008 the applicant was admitted to the interregional prison hospital in the Rostov Region. Having undergone various medical tests and consultations he was diagnosed with grade II mitral valve prolapse, neurocirculatory dystonia and various comorbidities, such as encephalasthenia and behavioural disorder. The applicant was prescribed vitamin B, cardiovascular and hypotensive drugs and painkillers. He received the prescribed medication until he was discharged from the hospital on 24 February 2009. Doctors recommended further treatment with beta blockers, potassium and magnesium based drugs, nootropics and vasoprotective medication. 35.  It seems that no significant changes occurred in the applicant\u2019s medical condition over the months that followed. His medical file does not contain any information on whether the detention authorities complied with the prescription. The applicant stated that he had not received the prescribed drugs for an entire year. 36.  On 20 November 2009 a panel of psychiatrists examined the applicant and found that he suffered from organic personality disorder and vegetative nervous system disorder in the form of somatophrenia. 37.  In 2010 a prison doctor saw the applicant on several occasions in relation to the latter\u2019s chronic gastritis, acute respiratory disease, urinary infection and heart condition. After each visit a course of drugs was prescribed. On several occasions he was seen by a psychiatrist about his physical symptoms. 38.  Over the year that followed the applicant mostly complained to the prison doctor of heartburn and palpitations. Unsatisfied with the quality of care and drugs he was receiving, he insisted on an in-depth medical examination of his condition. 39.  In July 2011 a psychiatrist noted that the applicant had minor depressive disorder and a tendency to bring vexatious claims. 40.  The following month the applicant was sent to a civilian hospital in Penza for an in-depth medical examination. A gastroduodenoscopy showed that he had superficial gastroduodenitis, duodenogastric reflux and partial erosion of the esophagus. An abdominal ultrasound did not reveal any pathological conditions. Shortly after his return to the correctional colony he was prescribed various medicines to treat his conditions. He was regularly seen by a prison doctor and psychiatrist. His general medical condition remained satisfactory. 41.  In January 2012 the applicant developed acute rhinitis, which was cured by prison doctors within several weeks. In March 2012 he received medical treatment for anxiety disorder and was given medication for a mild case of gingivitis. 42.  On 6 September 2012 the deputy head of the prison hospital examined the applicant and noted that the applicant was absolutely convinced that he was in a serious state of ill health. The applicant submitted a number of general complaints and alleged that he become infertile in detention. However, there were no signs of any acute physical or psychiatric conditions, save for a runny nose. The applicant\u2019s heart problems had not worsened. He refused to undergo a medical examination in a prison hospital, giving the excuse that he was \u201ctoo busy\u201d until January 2013. 43.  In late 2012 and the beginning of 2013 the applicant was diagnosed with chronic noninflammatory prostatitis and prescribed a complex course of treatment based on antibiotics.", "references": ["3", "0", "6", "1", "9", "4", "8", "7", "5", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1976 and lived, prior to his arrest, in Olekminsk, Sakha (Yakutia) Republic. 5.  On 23 December 2008 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of murder. 6.  On 25 December 2008 the Olekminskiy District Court of the Sakha (Yakutia) Republic remanded the applicant in custody. 7.  On 21 February, 19 March, 18 May, 18 June, 15 August, and 12 September 2009 the court extended the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention and held that despite the fact that he had permanent residence, job and family, he should remain in detention as the investigation was still pending, he could threaten witnesses or re-offend. 8.  On 18 June 2009 the judge stated in his detention order as follows:\n\u201c... the circumstances of the case have not changed. [The applicant] ... committed the crime under the influence of alcohol ..., he concealed that he had committed the crime ...\u201d 9.  On 27 November 2009 the court replaced the pre-trial detention with a house arrest. 10.  On 10 June 2010 the Olekminskiy District Court convicted the applicant of murder and sentenced him to 8 years\u2019 imprisonment. On 10 August 2010 the Supreme Court of Russia upheld his conviction on appeal.", "references": ["6", "9", "0", "4", "2", "1", "5", "7", "8", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicants were prosecuted in Russia for crimes. They were arrested and detained while the crimes were investigated and pending trial. Their detention was ordered and extended by the courts. The detention orders were essentially based on the gravity of the charges, the primary grounds being the risk of the applicants\u2019 absconding and interfering with the course of justice. The detention and extension orders used stereotypical formulae, without addressing specific facts or considering alternative preventive measures. 5.  The first applicant was born on 20 August 1983 and lived, prior to his arrest, in Yekaterinburg, Sverdlovsk Region. The applicant was arrested on 30 March 2005 on suspicion of fraud and placed in detention. He remained in custody pending investigation and trial. 6.  On 19 April and 14 July 2006 his pre-trial detention was extended. His appeals against these detention orders were considered on 23 July and 3 November 2006 respectively. The applicant and his lawyer did not attend the hearing on 19 April 2006. 7.  On 23 October 2006 the Leninskiy District Court of Yekaterinburg convicted the applicant of fraud and sentenced him to three years\u2019 imprisonment. 8.  The second applicant was born on 2 November 1972 and lived, prior to his arrest, in Vorkuta, Komi Republic. The applicant was arrested on 14 January 2008. He remained in custody pending investigation and trial. 9.  On 5 June and 2 September 2009 the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention was extended. His appeals against these detention orders were examined on 24 July and 30 October 2009. The applicant and his lawyer were not present at the hearings on 24 July, 2 September and 30 October 2009. 10.  On 6 November 2009 the Vorkuta Town Court of the Komi Republic convicted him of drug dealing and sentenced him to fourteen years and nine months\u2019 imprisonment and a fine. 11.  Having regard to the similarity of the main issues under the Convention in the above cases, the Court decides to join the applications and examine them in a single judgment.", "references": ["9", "1", "8", "3", "7", "5", "0", "4", "6", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicants are close relatives of persons who disappeared as a result of a large-scale sweeping operation conducted by the Russian federal military forces in Mesker-Yurt between 21 May and 11 June 2002. 7.  The Court has already examined cases in which other residents of Mesker-Yurt were abducted by federal servicemen in 2002 in the following judgments: Amanat Ilyasova and Others v. Russia, no. 27001/06, 1 October 2009, concerning the abduction and subsequent disappearance of Mr Musa Ilyasov on 11 August 2002; Ilyasova and Others v. Russia, no. 1895/04, 4 December 2008, concerning the abduction and subsequent disappearance of Mr Adam Ilyasov on 15 November 2002; Magamadova and Iskhanova v. Russia, no. 33185/04, 6 November 2008, concerning the abduction and subsequent disappearance of Mr Viskhadzhi Magamadov and Mr Khaskhan Mezhiyev on 14 November 2002; Petimat Magomadova v. Russia, no. 36965/09, 9 January 2014, concerning the abduction and subsequent disappearance of Mr Buvaysar Magomadov on 27 October 2002; Aliyeva and Dombayev v. Russia no. 67322/099 January 2014, concerning the abduction and subsequent disappearance of Mr Apti Dombayev on 4 November 2002; Kosumova and Others v. Russia, no. 27441/07, 7 June 2011, concerning the abduction and subsequent disappearance of Mr Abdul Kasumov on 21 November 2002; and Takhayeva and Others v. Russia, no. 23286/04, 18 September 2008, concerning the abduction and subsequent disappearance of Mr Ayub Takhayev on 13 November 2002. 8.  The relevant facts are summarised below. The personal data of the applicants and their missing relatives are summarised in the attached table (Appendix I). 9.  The circumstances of all the abductions are similar and can be summarised as follows. At the material time the village of Mesker-Yurt was under curfew. The federal forces had set up checkpoints on the roads leading to and from the settlement. 10.  Between 21 May and 11 June 2002 servicemen of the Russian federal forces conducted a large-scale \u201csweeping-up\u201d operation in Mesker-Yurt. On 21 May 2002 they arrived in the settlement in several armoured personnel vehicles (APCs) and other military vehicles, such as UAZ minivans and URAL lorries. They blockaded the village and set up a temporary filtration camp on the outskirts. Nobody was allowed to leave the village. 11.  The servicemen, who spoke Russian without an accent, checked the residents\u2019 identity documents. After the check they took some of the residents away, including the applicants\u2019 relatives, under the pretext of needing to carry out further identity checks. They told the applicants that their relatives would be released once the checks had been completed. 12.  The majority of the applicants\u2019 relatives were taken away between 21 May and 5 June 2002, either from their homes or from the local mosque, where they had been hiding in the belief that it was a safe place. All of the residents detained during the special operation were taken to the temporary filtration camp. 13.  The applicants visited the temporary filtration camp on several occasions and passed food to their relatives through the servicemen guarding it. 14.  On 4 June 2002 the body of Mr Adam Temersultanov, who had been detained during the special operation, was thrown from a military UAZ vehicle on the outskirts of the village. He was found by local residents. The other sixteen abducted men were transferred from the filtration camp to an unknown location. The applicants have had no news of their missing relatives ever since. 15.  On an unspecified date between 9 and 17 June 2002 the military unit conducting the special operation in Mesker-Yurt left the place where they had been stationed as well as the temporary filtration camp in the vicinity of the village. On 17 June 2002, local residents went to the place where the unit had been stationed and found several pits with blown-up human remains. 16.  From the documents submitted by the parties it transpires that along with the applicants\u2019 relatives, a number of other residents of Mesker-Yurt, including Mr R. Makhtykhanov, Mr M. Magomedov and Mr I. Gachayev, were abducted during the special operation. All of them, like the applicants\u2019 relatives, were arrested at home or at the mosque and taken to the filtration camp. They then went missing. 17.  According to the applicants, as a result of the special operation, nineteen residents of Mesker-Yurt were killed and a number of others, including their relatives, have gone missing.\n(b)  Information submitted by the Government 18.  The Government did not submit their version of the events and did not dispute the circumstances of the abductions as presented by the applicants. 19.  From the Government\u2019s submission concerning the official investigation into the events, it transpires that during a passport check on 27 May 2002, federal servicemen killed Mr A. Saltamirzayev. In addition, on 4 June 2002 a resident of Mesker-Yurt, Mr I. Khadzhimuradov, died as a result of an explosion and on 5 June 2002 two other residents of Mesker-Yurt, Mr M. Malayev and Mr A. Temersultanov, died under similar circumstances. 20.  Mr Islam Ortsuyev was born in 1980. On 21 May 2002 a group of armed servicemen abducted him from his house at 157 Lenina Street.\n(b)  Abduction of Mr Adam Gachayev 21.  Mr Adam Gachayev was born in 1973. On 21 May 2002 a group of armed servicemen abducted him from the family house at 24 Sheripova Street (in the documents submitted, also referred to as Vishnevaya Street).\n(c)  Abduction of Mr Aslan Israilov and Mr Anzor Israilov 22.  Mr Aslan Israilov was born in 1981 and his brother, Mr Anzor Israilov, was born in 1984. On 21 May 2002 a group of armed servicemen abducted the brothers from their house at 71 Lenina Street.\n(d)  Abduction of Mr Ibragim Askhabov 23.  Mr Ibragim Askhabov was born in 1983. On 22 May 2002 a group of armed servicemen abducted him from his house at 8 Checkhova Street. 24.  According to the applicants, shortly after the abduction they learnt from undisclosed sources that in June 2002 Mr Askhabov had been detained on the premises of the Shali district department of the interior (\u0428\u0430\u043b\u0438\u043d\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0439 \u0440\u0430\u0439\u043e\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u043e\u0442\u0434\u0435\u043b \u0432\u043d\u0443\u0442\u0440\u0435\u043d\u043d\u0438\u0445 \u0434\u0435\u043b (\u0420\u041e\u0412\u0414)) (\u201cthe ROVD\u201d) and then transferred elsewhere.\n(e)  Abduction of Mr Shaip Makhmudov 25.  Mr Shaip (also spelled as Shoip) Makhmudov was born in 1980. On 23 May 2002 a group of armed servicemen abducted him on the outskirts of Mesker-Yurt where he was tending cattle. In the documents submitted the place of the abduction was also referred to as 63 Tereshkova Street.\n(f)  Abduction of Mr Sayd-Magomed Abubakarov 26.  Mr Sayd-Magomed Abubakarov was born in 1982. On 21 May 2002 (in the documents submitted the date was also referred to as 23 May 2002) a group of armed servicemen, who arrived in two APCs with registration numbers 588 and 466, abducted  him from his house at 64 Lenina Street.\n(g)  Abduction of Mr Lechi Temirkhanov 27.  Mr Lechi Temirkhanov was born in 1980. On 21 May 2002 a group of armed servicemen abducted him from his uncle\u2019s house at 1 Moskovskaya Street.\n(h)  Abduction of Mr Apti Dedishov, Mr Abu Dedishov and Mr Adam Dedishov 28.  Mr Apti Dedishov was born in 1965, and his brothers, Mr Abu Dedishov and Mr Adam Dedishov, were born in 1968 and 1971. On 22 May 2002 a group of armed servicemen abducted the brothers from their family house at 6 Shkolnaya Street. 29.  On 11 June 2002 residents of Mesker-Yurt found clothing belonging to the Dedishov brothers and human remains on the outskirts of the village.\n(i)  Abduction of Mr Suliman Magomadov and Mr Salambek Magomadov 30.  Mr Suliman Magomadov was born in 1978 and his brother, Mr Salambek Magomadov, was born in 1980. On 23 May 2002 (in the documents submitted the date was also referred to as 25 May 2002) a group of armed servicemen abducted the brothers from their house at 19 Shkolnaya Street.\n(j)  Abduction of Mr Vakha Ibragimov 31.  Mr Vakha Ibragimov was born in 1975. On 1 June 2002 a group of armed servicemen abducted him from the village mosque in Mesker\u2011Yurt (in the documents submitted the address was also referred to as 4 Gorkova Street).\n(k)  Abduction of Mr Abu Dudagov 32.  Mr Abu Dudagov was born in 1981. On 5 June 2002 a group of armed servicemen abducted him from the village mosque in Mesker-Yurt (in the documents submitted the address was also referred to as 1 Sportivnaya Street).\n(l)  Abduction of Mr Adam Temersultanov and subsequent discovery of his body 33.  Mr Adam Temersultanov (in the documents submitted also spelled Timersultanov) was born in 1976. On 25 May 2002 he went to the village mosque in Mesker-Yurt and stayed there for several days during the special operation, believing that it was a safe place. 34.  On 30 May 2002 the servicemen conducting the special operation took Mr Temersultanov from the mosque to a checkpoint situated on a nearby bridge for an identity check and detained him. 35.  On 4 June 2002 some villagers saw one of the military UAZ vehicles used for the special operation with Mr Temersultanov\u2019s body in it; they then saw servicemen throw the body out of the vehicle. According to the applicants, Mr Adam Temersultanov\u2019s body bore signs of violence. 36.  Mr Magomedrasul Magomedov was born in 1951. At the material time he and the applicants lived in the settlement of Komsomolskoye in the Kizilyurt district of Dagestan. On 23 May 2002, Mr Magomedov went to visit his sister in Mesker-Yurt, Chechnya, with his friend, Mr Kh. M. 37.  On 24 May 2002 Mr Magomedov and Mr Kh. M. wanted to leave Mesker-Yurt, but the entire settlement was cordoned off by military servicemen and all the roads leading to and from the village were blocked due to the special operation. 38.  On an unspecified date at the beginning of June 2002 Mr Magomedov and Mr Kh. M. were told by the servicemen to go to the village mosque and join the other residents who had gathered there. On the same day, the servicemen took Mr Magomedov from the mosque to the temporary filtration camp. His whereabouts remain unknown. As for Mr Kh. M., he was allowed to leave the village a few days later. 39.  In response to the Court\u2019s request for a copy of the contents of the criminal cases opened in connection with the abductions, the Government did not furnish any documents but provided an information statement concerning the investigation of joint criminal case no. 14/90/0091-11. 40.  The applicants in Ortsuyeva and Others (application no. 3340/08) furnished the Court with copies of numerous requests for assistance in the search for their relatives lodged by them with various State authorities between 2002 and 2008 and the replies received thereto. 41.  The information submitted by the parties concerning the investigation into the abduction can be summarised as follows. 42.  Between June and July 2002 the Shali district prosecutor\u2019s office opened criminal cases nos. 59114, 59125, 59126, 59127, 59128, 59129, 59133, 59134, 59135, 59136, 59138, 59163, 59164, and 59171 under Article 126 of the Criminal Code (abduction) in respect of the abduction of the relatives of the applicants in Ortsuyeva and Others (application no. 3340/08). It also opened criminal case no. 59166 in respect of the abduction of the relative of the applicants in Magomedova and Others (application no. 24689/10). 43.  On 6 August 2002, all of the criminal cases, along with cases nos. 59113 and 59205 opened in connection with the abduction of other residents of Mesker-Yurt, were joined under joint criminal case no. 59113. 44.  On 26 December 2002 the joint criminal case was forwarded to the military prosecutor\u2019s office of the United Group Alignment (\u041e\u0431\u044a\u0435\u0434\u0438\u043d\u0435\u043d\u043d\u0430\u044f \u0433\u0440\u0443\u043f\u043f\u0438\u0440\u043e\u0432\u043a\u0430 \u0432\u043e\u0439\u0441\u043a (\u041e\u0413\u0412)) (\u201cthe UGA\u201d) for further investigation. The applicants were not informed thereof. 45.  On an unspecified date between January 2003 and April 2007, while the proceedings were suspended, the military prosecutor\u2019s office remitted joint criminal case no. 59113 to the Chechnya prosecutor\u2019s office for further investigation. The applicants were not informed thereof. 46.  On 19 April 2007 the investigation of the criminal case was resumed. It was then suspended again on 20 April 2007 for failure to identify the perpetrators. The relevant decision stated, among other things:\n\u201c... the preliminary investigation has established that between 21 May and 10 June 2002 in the vicinity of Mesker-Yurt in the Shali district of the Chechen Republic, servicemen of the Russian Ministry of Defence and the Russian Ministry of the Interior together with servicemen from the Department of the Execution of Sentences of the Russian Ministry of Justice, conducted a special operation to check identity documents and identify members of illegal armed groups. During the special operation unidentified persons abducted twenty-one local residents whose whereabouts have not been established since ...\u201d 47.  On 20 April 2007 the investigation of the joint criminal case was suspended yet again for failure to identify the perpetrators. The applicants were not informed thereof. 48.  According to the documents submitted, the special operation in Mesker-Yurt was conducted under the command of General Bornovitskiy and on an unspecified date between 2002 and 2007 the applicants and their relatives forwarded that information to the investigators. It is unclear whether any steps were taken to verify the information. 49.  From the documents submitted it appears that on various dates between 2002 and 2007 the applicants and/or their relatives gave statements to the investigating authorities. In their statements, they stressed that their relatives had been abducted by military servicemen during the special operation, and taken to the temporary filtration camp and that they had been missing ever since. 50.  Furthermore, on various dates between 2002 and 2010 the applicants lodged complaints and requests for assistance in the search for their relatives with the investigative authorities and other State bodies. In reply, they were informed either that their complaints had been forwarded to another law\u2011enforcement or military agency, or that the investigating authorities were taking operational search measures to establish the abducted men\u2019s whereabouts and identify the culprits. 51.  According to the documents submitted by the applicants in Ortsuyeva and Others (application no. 3340/08), between 2002 and 2010 the applicants lodged numerous complaints and information requests concerning the search for their abducted relatives and the progress of the investigation into the matter. 52.  Between 2002 and 2010 the applicants in Magomedova and Others (application no. 24689/10) lodged a number of complaints and information requests with the authorities as well. For instance, from a copy of the decision of the Kizilyurt Town Court of 5 April 2010 declaring Mr Magomedrasul Magomedov dead, it transpires that on unspecified dates in March 2003, April 2005, May 2006, December 2009 and March 2010 the applicants requested assistance in searching for him and complained to the supervisory prosecutors of the lack of progress in the investigation. In reply, they were informed that proceedings were under way and that the necessary measures were being taken. 53.  From the documents submitted it follows that between 2002 and 2010 the investigation of the criminal case consisted mostly of taking short statements from the applicants and/or some of their relatives and forwarding numerous requests for information to various State bodies. The proceedings were suspended and resumed on several occasions for failure to identify the perpetrators. The applicants were either not informed thereof or informed with significant delays. 54.  It appears that following complaints lodged by the applicants, on 4 October 2011 the investigation of the joint criminal case was resumed and transferred again to the military authorities \u2013 the main military investigations department of the investigative committee of the Russian Federation. The relevant decision gave the following reason for the transfer:\n\u201c... the investigation has established that the military servicemen who conducted the special operation in Mesker-Yurt between 21 May and 10 June 2002 were involved in the abductions.\u201d\nThe joint criminal case file was given a new number, 14/90/0091-11. It is unclear whether the applicants were informed of those decisions. 55.  On 16 December 2011 the investigation of the criminal case was suspended again for failure to identify the perpetrators. It was subsequently suspended and resumed again on several more occasions. The last suspension of the proceedings took place on 29 April 2015. 56.  From the information statement furnished by the Government, it transpires that between 2011 and 2015 the investigators questioned twenty-eight people, including the applicants, and forwarded about 310 information requests to various authorities. No new information was obtained. 57.  The proceedings are still pending.", "references": ["8", "4", "3", "5", "7", "6", "9", "No Label", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["0", "1", "2"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1996 and 1995 respectively. At the time of the introduction of the application the two applicants were detained in Safi Barracks Detention Centre, Safi, Malta. 6.  Mr Burhaan Abdullahi Elmi entered Malta in an irregular manner by boat on 16 August 2012. Upon arrival, he was registered by the immigration police and given an identification number (12U-029). During the registration process the immigration authorities asked the applicant to provide his personal details, including name, nationality, and age. He informed them that he was born in 1996 and therefore was sixteen years old. The Government claimed that he was seventeen years old. Although no interpreter was present the applicant was helped by some other irregular immigrants who had arrived with him and who could speak English. 7.  He was then presented with two documents in English, one containing a Return Decision and the other a Removal Order. The Return Decision stated that he was a prohibited immigrant by virtue of Article 5 of the Immigration Act (Chapter 217 of the Laws of Malta) because he was in Malta \u201cwithout means of subsistence and liable to become a charge on public funds\u201d. The Return Decision also informed the first applicant that his stay was being terminated and of the possibility to apply for a period of voluntary departure. The Removal Order was based on the consideration that the applicant\u2019s request for a period of voluntary departure had been rejected. It informed him that he would remain in custody until removal was affected and that an entry ban would be issued against him. The two documents further informed him of the right to appeal against the Decision and Order before the Immigration Appeals Board (\u201cthe IAB\u201d) within three working days. 8.  The first applicant claimed that the contents of the decision in English were not explained to him, and that he could not understand the language. According to the Government, in practice the immigration police inform the migrants verbally in English about their right to appeal, and the migrants translate for each other. 9.  He was further provided with an information leaflet entitled \u201cYour entitlements, responsibilities and obligations while in detention\u201d in Arabic, a language he did not understand. According to the Government the first applicant did not request a booklet in another language. 10.  In accordance with Article 14 (2) of the Immigration Act (see Relevant domestic law), the first applicant was detained. He was originally detained in Warehouse 2 at Safi Barracks, and in 2013 was moved to Block B. 11.  Mr Cabdulaahi Aweys Abubakar entered Malta in an irregular manner by boat on 31 August 2012. Upon arrival, he was registered by the immigration police and given an identification number (12W-062). During the registration process the immigration authorities asked the second applicant to provide his personal details, including name, nationality, and age. He informed them that he was born in 1995 and therefore was seventeen years old. 12.  He was then presented with two documents in English, one containing a Return Decision and the other a Removal Order. The Return Decision stated that he was a prohibited immigrant by virtue of Article 5 of the Immigration Act (Chapter 217 of the Laws of Malta) because he was in Malta \u201cwithout means of subsistence and liable to become a charge on public funds\u201d and \u201cwithout leave granted by the principal Immigration Officer\u201d. The Return Decision also informed the second applicant that his stay was being terminated and of the possibility to apply for a period of voluntary departure. The Removal Order was based on the consideration that the applicant\u2019s request for a period of voluntary departure had been rejected. It informed him that he would remain in custody until removal was affected and that an entry ban would be issued against him. The two documents further informed him of the right to appeal against the Decision and Order before the Immigration Appeals Board (\u201cthe IAB\u201d) within three working days. 13.  The second applicant claimed that the contents of the decision in English were not explained to him, and that he could not understand the language. According to the Government, in practice the immigration police inform the migrants verbally in English about their right to appeal, and the migrants translate for each other. 14.  He was further provided with an information leaflet entitled \u201cYour entitlements, responsibilities and obligations while in detention\u201d in Arabic, a language he did not understand. According to the Government the second applicant did not request a booklet in another language. 15.  In accordance with Article 14 (2) of the Immigration Act (see Relevant domestic law), the second applicant was detained. He was originally detained in Warehouse 2 at Safi Barracks and in January 2013 was moved to Block B. 16.  A few days following Mr Burhaan Abdullahi Elmi\u2019s arrival he was called for an information session provided by the Staff of the Office of the Refugee Commissioner. He was assisted in submitting the Preliminary Questionnaire (PQ), thereby registering his wish to apply for asylum under Article 8 of the Refugees Act, Chapter 420 of the Laws of Malta (see Relevant domestic law, below). He stated on the form that he was sixteen years old. 17.  A few days following Mr Cabdulaahi Aweys Abubakar\u2019s arrival he was called for an information session provided by the Staff of the Office of the Refugee Commissioner. He was assisted in submitting the PQ, thereby registering his wish to apply for asylum. He stated on the form that he was born in 1995 and was seventeen years old. 18.  In Mr Burhaan Abdullahi Elmi\u2019s case, on 31 August 2012 he was referred to AWAS for age assessment. Within a few weeks of his arrival, three people from AWAS interviewed him. After the interview they informed him that as they could not confirm his minor age through the interview they would send him for a further age verification (FAV) test \u2011 this would be an X-ray of the bones of the wrist. He was taken for the FAV test shortly after his interview. The first applicant claimed that, some weeks later, in or around October 2012, he was informed verbally by AWAS staff that he was found to be a minor and that he would be released shortly. 19.  Until the date of the lodging of the application, that is eight months after his arrival in Malta, Mr Burhaan Abdullahi Elmi had not received a written decision informing him of the outcome of the age\u2011assessment procedure, and was still in detention. 20.  In Mr Cabdulaahi Aweys Abubakar\u2019s case, on 18 September 2012 he was referred to AWAS for age assessment. He was interviewed by three people from AWAS in the third week of September 2012. After the interview they informed him that as they could not confirm his minor age through the interview they would send him for a FAV test. He was taken for the FAV test on 8 February 2013, five months after his interview with AWAS. The second applicant claimed that, some weeks later, in March 2013, he was informed verbally by AWAS staff that he was found to be a minor and that he would be released shortly. 21.  Until the date of the lodging of the application, that is almost eight months after his arrival in Malta, Mr Cabdulaahi Aweys Abubakar had not received a written decision informing him of the outcome of the age\u2011assessment procedure, and was still in detention. 22.  In the meantime both Mr Cabdulaahi Aweys Abubakar and members of the Jesuit Refugee Service who visited him in detention contacted AWAS on a number of occasions to inquire about the case, but no reply was forthcoming. 23.  Mr Burhaan Abdullahi Elmi claims to have been held in very difficult conditions of detention with adult men of various nationalities. In Warehouse 2 and Block B, of Safi Detention Centre, physical conditions were basic and he often lacked the most basic necessities, including clothing, particularly shoes, which were only replaced every four months. Recreational activity was limited, and the yard was taken over by adult males, making it difficult for a young person like him to play with them. Educational activities were virtually non-existent. There was a lack of information, difficulties communicating with the outside world, and obstacles in obtaining the most basic services. Moreover, the centre was overcrowded and lacked protection from abuse and victimisation. Fights often broke out between men of different origins, nationalities or tribes, and he also referred to an episode where he had been beaten up by a fellow detainee. Noting there was no privacy or security, Mr Burhaan Abdullahi Elmi stressed that he felt very insecure in detention, and that his food was often stolen by detainees as was his blanket. He explained that Warehouse 2 was worse than Block B, it was like a big hall of people, hundreds of people, and he had a bunk bed in this big warehouse. He considered that the conditions in Warehouse 2 were very similar to those in Warehouse 1, which had been documented in a number of reports, including two CPT reports of 2007 and 2011. The first applicant also stated that he had difficulty communicating with a doctor in the absence of an interpreter and that he suffered from dizziness and eye problems. 24.  Mr Cabdulaahi Aweys Abubakar\u2019s narration about the conditions of detention in Warehouse 2 and Block B are similar to those referred to by the first applicant. Mr Cabdulaahi Aweys Abubakar also noted that in the first two weeks of his detention he had had stomach pains, but no doctor was available, nor was an ambulance called. He alleged that he had headaches and rashes on his scalp; however, the detention authorities would not provide him with the shampoo prescribed by the doctor. He noted that in October 2012 the detention authorities had not taken him to a hospital appointment; it had had to be rescheduled to March 2013. On that date, the doctor prescribed medication, however, up to the date of the introduction of the application (17 April 2013) this had not been forthcoming. He also referred to an incident in which he had been beaten up by a fellow detainee who had allegedly also previously attacked another detainee with a knife. He noted that when he arrived in detention he was given two bed sheets, a blanket, a T-shirt, and two pairs of underwear, but no shoes, not even flip\u2011flops. The second applicant further explained that they were fed chicken every day and that he was unable to keep in touch with his relatives, as the five-euro phone card distributed to them every two months only allowed four minutes of talk time to Somalia. 25.  The Government informed the Court that following the lodging of the application with the Court, on 19 April 2013 Mr Burhaan Abdullahi Elmi was released from detention under a care order and placed in an open centre for unaccompanied minors. He subsequently left Malta before the termination of his asylum proceedings; indeed the last day of registration at the open centre was 2 August 2013. In the absence of any further contact with the Office of the Refugee Commissioner, on 31 August 2013 the applicant\u2019s asylum claim was implicitly \u201cwithdrawn as discontinued\u201d. 26. It appears that the first applicant absconded and went to Germany and was held by the German authorities, who in turn requested the Maltese authorities to take him back in terms of the Dublin Regulation. Following the acceptance of that request on 7 May 2014 the Maltese authorities were informed by the German authorities that return was suspended pending proceedings in Germany. 27.  In a signed declaration sent to the Court by his legal representatives the first applicant admitted to being in Schonbach, Germany, as he was waiting there for the outcome of the judicial proceedings as to whether he would be sent back to Malta in terms of the Dublin II Regulation to have his asylum claim determined. 28.  The Government informed the Court that following the lodging of the application with the Court, on 24 April 2013 Mr Cabdulaahi Aweys Abubakar was released from detention under a care order and placed in an open centre for unaccompanied minors. He was granted subsidiary protection on 14 September 2013.", "references": ["5", "6", "3", "9", "4", "7", "8", "0", "No Label", "1", "2"], "gold": ["1", "2"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1966 and lives in Roslavl, the Smolensk Region. 6.  On 15 June 2003 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of unintentional manslaughter. On 30 September 2003 he was committed to stand trial before the Leninskiy District Court of Smolensk. On 10 October 2003 the District Court fixed the first trial hearing and ordered that the applicant should remain in custody. 7.  On 26 April 2004 the Leninskiy District Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to twelve years\u2019 imprisonment. The judgment became final on 10 July 2004 when the Smolensk Regional Court upheld it on appeal. 8.  In February 2005 the applicant lodged an action with the Leninskiy District Court, arguing that his detention from 2 to 26 April 2004 had been unlawful as there had been no legal order authorizing his detention during that period. He sought compensation for non-pecuniary damage. 9.  On 23 September 2005 the Leninskiy District Court, in the presence of a defendant\u2019s representative, dismissed the applicant\u2019s action, finding that the applicant\u2019s conviction precluded him from claiming compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damages. Its operative part reads as follows:\n\u201cGiven that Mr Artemenko was found guilty of the crime in relation to which he had been detained since 17 June 2003, he did not acquire the right to exoneration and to compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage.\nTherefore, there exist no grounds for satisfying Mr Artemenko\u2019s claim for compensation in respect of his unlawful detention pending trial.\u201d 10.  The applicant appealed, complaining, inter alia, that the District Court had refused to secure his attendance and had not provided him with copies of materials presented by the defendants. He also maintained his initial claim for compensation. 11.  On 29 November 2005 the Smolensk Regional Court upheld the judgment of 23 September 2005 in the applicant\u2019s absence.", "references": ["4", "6", "5", "2", "1", "9", "8", "7", "0", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1944 and lives in Kremenchuk. 5.  On 11 August 2007 Inna Puzyr, the applicant\u2019s daughter, was found stabbed to death in bushes by the roadside. 6.  On the same date the Poltava Regional Police instituted criminal proceedings into the suspected murder. 7.  On an unspecified date the applicant was called to testify as a witness in connection with the above investigation, and for this reason his subsequent request to join the proceedings as an aggrieved party was refused. 8.  On 18 August 2007 V.K., the applicant\u2019s other daughter, joined the proceedings as an aggrieved party. 9.  On 25 August 2007 O.T., a resident of a village close to the place of where the applicant\u2019s daughter was stabbed, was arrested on suspicion of having committed this crime. Having initially pleaded guilty, O.T. subsequently retracted his confession, denying any involvement with the crime and complaining that the police had subjected him to ill-treatment. 10.  On an unspecified date the criminal proceedings against O.T. were discontinued as no evidence had been collected to corroborate his confessional statements, which were inconsistent with other evidence on file. 11.  On 7 September 2007 V.K. complained to the Chief of the local police department that the investigation into the case had been ineffective. She also complained that she had not been able to participate in it in a meaningful way, as she had not been allowed to consult the case file and had been very poorly informed about the measures undertaken by the authorities with a view to identifying her sister\u2019s murderer. 12.  On 12 September 2007 the Acting Chief of the Poltava Regional Police informed V.K. that he had detected no irregularities in the manner in which the investigation had been conducted and that \u2012 according to the applicable law \u2012 aggrieved parties were not entitled to consult case files until completion of the pre-trial investigation, that is to say, until the likely perpetrator has been identified and committed for trial. 13.  On 10 October 2007 the investigation was suspended as no leads had been identified. 14.  On 30 October 2007 the District Prosecutor\u2019s Office quashed the decision to suspend the proceedings and ordered a further inquiry, noting that the investigation had been carried out in a perfunctory manner. 15.  On 20 November 2007 V.K. again complained to the Kremenchuk prosecutor\u2019s office that the renewed investigation had, in her view, been perfunctory and ineffective. She submitted that she suspected R.P., her sister\u2019s husband, of having murdered her and referred to numerous delays in carrying out the investigative activities, which \u2012 in her view \u2012 had resulted in the loss of important evidence. 16.  On 23 January 2008 the Chief of the Poltava Regional Department of the Interior acknowledged to V.K. that there had been many inadequacies in the investigation of her sister\u2019s violent death and notified her that the chief and deputy chief of the investigative department had been reprimanded for poor planning of their department\u2019s work and supervision of their subordinates. Investigator S.Y., who had worked on the case, had been replaced by V.N., who had extensive expertise in investigating homicide and other violent crimes. 17.  On 5 March 2008 R.P. was arrested and confessed to having killed the applicant\u2019s daughter because she had refused to give him a divorce. 18.  On 6 March 2008 a reconstruction of the crime scene was organised, at which R.P. demonstrated how he had committed the murder. 19.  On an unspecified date R.P. retracted his confession, claiming it had been given under duress from the police. 20.  On 15 August 2008 the proceedings in respect of R.P. were discontinued in the light of irreconcilable discrepancies between his retracted confessional statements and other evidence on file. As there were no further leads pointing to a potential perpetrator, the proceedings were suspended. 21.  On 26 March 2009 the Poltava Regional Prosecutor\u2019s Office notified V.K. \u2012 in response to an enquiry from her concerning progress in the case \u2012 that unspecified operative and inquisitorial activities had been underway, but that no leads had been uncovered. 22.  Following a new complaint by V.K. concerning the inadequacy of the investigation, on 20 May 2009 the Deputy Minister of Interior ordered a renewal of proceedings. Having consulted the case file, he noted that leads to at least two potential perpetrators had not been properly followed up and identified some twenty-five investigative steps which could have been taken. He also stated that, in his view, virtually no action aimed at identifying the murderer had been taken in 2008, that the operative officers had carried out the instructions received from the investigative officers in a perfunctory manner, and that the investigative and operative departments needed to streamline their methods of communication. 23.  On 28 December 2009 S.J., a new investigator assigned to the case, suspended the proceedings, having uncovered no new leads after completion of further investigative steps. 24.  The proceedings were renewed and then suspended on several further occasions, reference being made to the insufficiency of the measures taken (specifically, on 11 May 2010, 2 April and 22 October 2011). 25.  On 15 April 2013, following the entry into force of the new Code of Criminal Procedure, the applicant was admitted into the proceedings as an aggrieved party and given an opportunity to consult the case file. 26.  On 19 August 2013 the applicant complained to the Minister of Interior that, having studied the file, he found that the entire investigation had been marred by prohibitive delays and inactivity. In his view the competent authorities had, for an extensive period of time, focused predominantly on investigating the probability that his daughter had been stabbed by her husband rather than organising a prompt and comprehensive examination of the objective evidence. A lot of time had been lost. The applicant also gave several suggestions as to further potential witnesses to be questioned, the specific type of the knife which could have been used to stab his daughter, and the circle of persons who might possess such a weapon. 27.  On 2 October 2013 the Deputy Chief of the investigative department of the Poltava Police informed the applicant that no new leads had been uncovered, but his suggestions would be taken into account in further investigation. 28.  On several subsequent occasions the police authorities provided similar answers to further complaints and suggestions made by the applicant and V.K. concerning investigative steps that could be taken.", "references": ["2", "7", "5", "3", "6", "9", "4", "1", "8", "No Label", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1976 and is currently detained at Nubarashen Prison. 6.  On 1 July 2009 criminal proceedings were instituted on account of the murder of K.S. who had been shot dead at 1.30 a.m. that day in the town of Alaverdi. 7.  The applicant presented himself to the police later that day, surrendered a gun and confessed to the murder. 8.  The applicant was charged the same day with murder and illegal possession of firearms. 9.  On the same date the police interviewed K.M., who was K.S.\u2019s girlfriend and had been present at the scene of the murder. She stated that it had been the applicant, her neighbour, who, after yelling and swearing, had started to shoot at K.S.\u2019s car moments after she had got out of it. 10.  On 3 July 2009 the applicant was questioned. He denied the charges and refused to testify. 11.  When interviewed, S.S., K.S.\u2019s sister, stated that she had been aware of some problems between her brother and a friend of the applicant. According to her statement, the applicant had once called to find out K.S.\u2019s whereabouts. She had then informed K.S. about this and he had become anxious. 12.  K.M.\u2019s parents, S.M. and A.M., stated during their interviews that on the day of the murder they had heard gunshots and that shortly after K.M. had run into their house in tears, saying that the applicant had killed K.S. right in front of her. 13.  On 14 January 2010 the applicant\u2019s brother, V.M., was killed. 14.  At an additional questioning on 9 March 2010, the applicant stated that he had confessed to the murder to cover up for his brother, who had a newborn baby and took care of their parents. The applicant stated that there was no longer any need to cover up for V.M. because he was dead. The applicant\u2019s alibi was that on the day of the murder he had visited his father\u2019s friend V.J. at around 10.30 p.m. and had stayed in his house until around 2.30 a.m. 15.  On 12 March 2010 V.J. was interviewed and denied that the applicant had been in his house until that late. He stated, in particular, that the applicant had indeed come to his house at around 10 p.m. but had only stayed for about an hour or an hour and a half. At around 11.30 p.m. V.M. had come and told the applicant that they needed to go and see someone and they had left. 16.  At a formal confrontation between the applicant and V.J. the latter reiterated his previous statement that the applicant had come to his house at around 10 p.m. and had stayed there for no more than two hours. The applicant did not make any statement. 17.  On 27 April 2010 the bill of indictment was finalised and the case was referred to the Lori Regional Court for trial. The prosecution relied on the following evidence: statements from S.S., K.M., S.M., A.M. and V.J., the record of the formal confrontation between the applicant and V.J., the results of forensic examinations, including a biochemical examination which had shown the presence of gunshot residue on the clothes worn by the applicant on the day of the murder, and the records of various investigative actions. 18.  By a decision of 13 May 2010 the Regional Court scheduled the first hearing in the applicant\u2019s case to take place on 21 May 2010. 19.  By a letter of 14 May 2010 the Regional Court summoned K.M. to appear at the hearing of 21 May 2010. The summons was returned to the Regional Court. 20.  The Regional Court summoned K.M., S.M. and V.J. to a rescheduled hearing on 17 June 2010. 21.  On 17 June 2010 the Regional Court held a hearing at which the duly summoned K.M., S.M. and V.J. failed to appear. The Regional Court made a decision to compel the witnesses to attend a rescheduled hearing on 29 June 2010. The enforcement of the decision was assigned to the police. 22.  On 29 June 2010 the police sent a letter to the Regional Court informing it that, inter alia, K.M. was absent from her place of residence. 23.  On the same date the Regional Court held a hearing and, stating that its decision to compel the witnesses, including K.M., had remained unenforced, it decided to order them to appear at the next hearing, to be held on 22 July 2010. 24.  The Regional Court thereafter held at least three more hearings - on 7 September, and 21 and 22 October 2010, each time making decisions to order the absent witnesses, including K.M., to attend. According to certificates delivered by the police on 20 and 25 October 2010, K.M. was absent from her place of residence when the police visited. The certificate of 20 October 2010 stated that S.M. told the police that her daughter was abroad. 25.  The Regional Court eventually examined the applicant\u2019s case in K.M.\u2019s absence. 26.  On 4 November 2010 the Regional Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to thirteen years\u2019 imprisonment. In doing so, it stated, in particular, the following:\n\u201cExamination and evaluation of the evidence:\nOn 1 July 2009 ... [the applicant] made a confession ... and, having surrendered a gun, stated that he had shot at [K.S.\u2019s] car that night ...\nIn the course of the investigation [the applicant] did not accept the charges against him stating that his deceased brother [V.M.] had killed [K.S.]; he had been in ... [V.J.\u2019s] house ...\nAt the trial [the applicant] pleaded not guilty ...\nThe crime committed by [the applicant] is proven by the following evidence collected in the case:\nThe statement of the victim\u2019s legal heir, the witness S.S. ...\n... the pre-trial statement of the witness K.M. ...\n... the pre-trial statements of the witnesses S.M. and A.M. ...\n... the pre-trial statement of the witness V.J. by which he entirely denied [the applicant\u2019s] statement that at the time of the murder [the applicant] had been in his house.\n[V.J.] maintained his statement during the confrontation with [the applicant] ...\n... the record of the examination of the scene of the incident ...\n... the record of the examination of the body ...\n... the record of the examination of the ... car ...\n... the record of the seizure of [the applicant\u2019s] clothes ...\n... the record of the photo line-up ... according to which K.M. had identified [the applicant] ...\n... the record of ... the confession and surrender of the gun ...\nThe conclusion of the forensic medical examination [concerning K.S.\u2019s injuries] ...\n[Other forensic evidence]\nThe conclusion of the biochemical forensic examination ... that gunshot residue was discovered on [the applicant\u2019s] clothes worn on the day of the incident.\n[Material evidence] \u02ee 27.  The applicant lodged an appeal, complaining, inter alia, that K.M., the sole eyewitness to the incident and whose pre-trial statement had been the only evidence directly incriminating him in the offence, had not been examined in court. 28.  On 20 December 2010 the Criminal Court of Appeal took over the case and scheduled the first hearing in the case for 11 January 2011. 29.  On 11 January 2011 the applicant\u2019s lawyer applied to the Court of Appeal, seeking, inter alia, to have K.M summoned. The Court of Appeal granted the application as far as the question of K.M.\u2019s presence was concerned and summoned her to appear at the next hearing. 30.  K.M. did not appear before the Court of Appeal. The applicant stated that he then applied to have K.M.\u2019s statements declared inadmissible. According to the applicant, the Court of Appeal decided to address the application during deliberations but then failed to do so. 31.  On 26 January 2011 the Court of Appeal upheld the applicant\u2019s conviction, relying on the same body of evidence as the Regional Court. The judgment did not address the issue of K.M.\u2019s non-attendance. 32.  On 22 February 2011 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, complaining, inter alia, about the lack of an examination of the witnesses against him, both in the Regional Court and the Court of Appeal. 33.  On 12 April 2011 the Court of Cassation declared the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law inadmissible for lack of merit.", "references": ["4", "9", "6", "2", "5", "0", "7", "8", "1", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1972 and lives in Baku. 6.  He was a journalist and at the relevant time was working as editor\u2011in\u2011chief of the Demokrat newspaper. He was also a member of the Musavat Party. 7.  On 2 April 2011 a number of opposition parties held a demonstration at Fountains Square in Baku. The applicant went to the place where the demonstration would be held, intending to participate in it. 8.  On arriving at Fountains Square at around 2.15 p.m. on 2 April 2011, the applicant was arrested by a group of police officers and taken to the Nasimi District Police Office (\u201cthe NDPO\u201d). 9.  After his arrival at the police office, the applicant was placed in the exercise yard of the NDPO temporary detention centre with other arrested persons. A few minutes later the deputy head of the NDPO, S.N., arrived at the detention centre with two men, one of whom was wearing a police uniform while the other was in plain clothes. The applicant introduced himself as a journalist and asked S.N. the reasons for his arrest. The two men accompanying S.N. then held the applicant\u2019s arms while S.N. punched and kicked him in different parts of his body. After having physically assaulted the applicant, S.N. and the other two men left the detention centre. 10.  At around 11 p.m. on 2 April 2011 the applicant was given a formal warning, under Article 298 of the Code of Administrative Offences, for participating in an unauthorised demonstration and was released from detention. 11.  The Government maintained that the applicant had not been subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment in police custody. 12.  The Government also submitted an administrative offence record drawn up at 4.30 p.m. on 2 April 2011, according to which the applicant had been warned, under Article 298 of the Code of Administrative Offences, for violation of the rule regulating the organisation and holding of gatherings. The applicant had signed the record and made a comment confirming his participation in the demonstration. 13.  On 4 April 2011 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint with the Nasimi district prosecutor\u2019s office, claiming that on 2 April 2011 he had been ill-treated by S.N. in police custody. 14.  On 6 April 2011 the investigator in charge of the case questioned the applicant, who reiterated his allegation of ill-treatment. In particular, he stated that on 2 April 2011, while he had been detained in the exercise yard of the temporary detention centre of the NDPO with other arrested persons, he had been beaten by S.N. and two other men, one of whom had been wearing a police uniform while the other had been in plain clothes. When he had asked S.N. the reasons for his arrest, the two men accompanying S.N. had held his arms and S.N. had physically assaulted him by punching and kicking him in different parts of his body. 15.  On 6 April 2011 the applicant was examined by a forensic expert. It appears from forensic report no. 01/MES dated 9 April 2011 that the expert noticed a bruise (qan\u00e7\u0131r) measuring 4.5 by 2.5 cm on the outer side of the applicant\u2019s right calf (bald\u0131r). He concluded that the injury had been caused by a hard blunt object and that the time at which it had been inflicted corresponded to 2 April 2011. 16.  On 12 and 14 April 2011 the investigator questioned T.Y. and N.S. as witnesses in connection with the applicant\u2019s ill-treatment complaint. The two witnesses, who had also been arrested on 2 April 2011 and detained in the temporary detention centre of the NDPO, confirmed that on 2 April 2011 the applicant had been beaten by S.N. in the exercise yard of the NDPO temporary detention centre. In this connection, T.Y. stated that, when S.N. and two other men had arrived at the temporary detention centre, S.N. had begun insulting the applicant. S.N. had also kicked him in the stomach. As the applicant had objected to it, S.N. and the two men accompanying him began to beat the applicant. N.S. also stated that S.N. and the two men accompanying him had begun insulting the arrested persons immediately after their arrival at the temporary detention centre. As the applicant had objected to their attitude, they had beaten him severely. 17.  On 15 April 2011 the investigator questioned S.N., who refuted the applicant\u2019s allegations. S.N. claimed that he had not used force against the applicant and that, in any event, he had not been on the premises of the NDPO between 1 and 7 p.m. on 2 April 2011 when the applicant had been taken there. 18.  On 18 April 2011 the investigator separately questioned two police officers, M.V. and R.M., who had been on guard duty at the NDPO on 2 April 2011. The wording of their statements was identical. They each stated that none of the persons arrested on 2 April 2011 had been placed in the exercise yard of the temporary detention centre and that none of them had been beaten. They also stated that S.N. had not been present when the arrested persons had been taken to the police office. 19.  On 20 and 22 April 2011 the investigator separately questioned two police officers, I.M., who had participated in the applicant\u2019s arrest on 2 April 2011, and I.S., who was the neighbourhood police officer for the area where the applicant was arrested. Their statements were identical. They each claimed that the applicant had not been placed in the exercise area of the temporary detention centre and had not been beaten in police custody. They also claimed that S.N. had not been present at that time at the police office. Moreover, I.M. stated that when he had taken the applicant to the police office he had not been aware of any injury on the applicant\u2019s body. However, such an injury might have been inflicted during the unlawful demonstration. 20.  On 25 April 2011 the deputy prosecutor of the Nasimi district prosecutor\u2019s office issued a decision refusing to institute criminal proceedings in connection with the applicant\u2019s complaint of ill-treatment. In his decision, after having summarised the conclusions of the forensic report and the statements given by the applicant, T.Y. and N.S., as well as S.N. and the other four police officers questioned during the inquiry, the prosecutor concluded in one sentence that the available evidence did not disclose any appearance of a criminal act. The relevant part of the decision reads as follows:\n\u201cAs no appearance of a criminal act was disclosed in the material collected during the inquiry at the request of Hajili Mustafa Mustafa oglu, who claimed that on 2 April 2011 he had sustained injury as a result of a beating by the deputy head of the NDPO, S.N., the institution of criminal proceedings should be refused.\u201d 21.  On 5 January 2012 the applicant lodged a complaint against that decision with the Nasimi District Court, arguing that the prosecutor\u2019s decision was unsubstantiated. In particular, he claimed that the prosecutor had not taken into consideration the conclusions of the forensic report and the statements from T.Y. and N.S. The applicant also complained that the prosecutor had failed to give any explanation as to the circumstances in which the injury had been caused. 22.  It appears from the transcript of the court hearing of 16 January 2012 that in the proceedings before the Nasimi District Court the applicant\u2019s lawyer asked the court to hear T.Y. and N.S., who had testified during the inquiry in support of the applicant\u2019s complaint of ill-treatment. He also asked the court to order the examination of video recordings from the NDPO\u2019s security cameras. In reply to the lawyer\u2019s requests, the investigator in charge of the case stated at the hearing that the NDPO\u2019s security cameras were only for surveillance purposes and did not record. The court granted the lawyer\u2019s request concerning the examination of the video recordings from the security cameras. 23.  On 24 January 2012 the Nasimi District Court dismissed the complaint, finding that the prosecutor\u2019s decision of 25 April 2011 had been lawful and properly substantiated. The court held that, although the expert had noticed a bruise on the applicant\u2019s body, it had not been established that the injury had been inflicted by S.N. As regards the video recordings, the court noted that they were no longer available. The NDPO had replied to its request relating to the examination of the video recordings that the security cameras in question had not contained a memory card and, therefore, the video recordings had been automatically deleted one month later. The judgment made no mention of the witness statements made in favour of the applicant\u2019s ill-treatment claim. 24.  On 27 January 2012 the applicant appealed against the decision, reiterating his previous complaints. In particular, he complained that the prosecutor had failed to give any explanation of how the injury noticed by the forensic expert had been caused. He also requested the appellate court to hear T.Y. and N.S., claiming that the first-instance court had ignored their witness statements without any reason. The applicant further complained about the conflicting explanations given by the investigator and the Nasimi District Court as to the impossibility of obtaining video recordings from the NDPO\u2019s security cameras. Whereas the investigator had explained that those cameras were simply for surveillance purposes and did not record, the first-instance court had indicated in its decision that the impossibility was due to the absence of memory cards in the security cameras, which led to automatic deletion of the video recordings one month later. 25.  On 6 February 2012 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and upheld the Nasimi District Court\u2019s decision of 24 January 2012. The appellate court\u2019s decision made no mention of the applicant\u2019s particular complaints.", "references": ["6", "8", "5", "0", "9", "7", "4", "2", "3", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Baghramyan village. 6.  On 26 June 2001 Suren Muradyan was drafted into the Armenian army and assigned to military unit no. 59703 of the Nagorno Karabakh Armed Forces (hereafter, the military unit) situated in the unrecognised Nagorno Karabakh Republic (hereafter, Nagorno Karabakh). During his service he also participated in the activities of the music squad as a trumpet player. 7.  From 24 or 25 July 2002 Suren Muradyan started to feel unwell. His temperature occasionally rose to 40oC, he shivered and had headaches, and suffered from nausea and loss of appetite. 8.  It appears that on the next day Suren Muradyan, who remained in the barracks throughout this period, was visited by the head of the military unit\u2019s medical service, A.H. (hereafter, military unit doctor A.H.). The outcome of this visit is unclear. It further appears that on 27 July 2002, when Suren Muradyan\u2019s condition worsened, his fellow servicemen once again called A.H., who at the time was at the aid post. He refused to visit, telling them that Suren Muradyan should come to the aid post himself. 9.  It further appears that later Suren Muradyan was visited by the head of the military unit\u2019s aid post, S.G. (hereafter, military unit doctor S.G.), who apparently administered anti-fever pills and gave some injections. Suren Muradyan was apparently diagnosed as having \u201cacute respiratory illness\u201d. 10.  Throughout this entire period only two entries were made in Suren Muradyan\u2019s personal medical file kept at the military unit\u2019s aid post, on 29 July and 1 August 2002, according to which Suren Muradyan was suffering from general asthenia, loss of appetite, body aches, muscle pain and high fever. Anti-fever medicine was prescribed, such as analgin and paracetamol. 11.  On 3 August 2002 at 6.30 p.m. Suren Muradyan, whose condition had deteriorated, was taken to the military hospital of Mekhakavan (Nagorno Karabakh) by military unit doctor S.G. At the time of admission Suren Muradyan complained of general asthenia, nausea, fever and shivering. As a preliminary diagnosis \u201cmalaria\u201d was indicated. The acting head of the infection unit of the hospital, I.M. (hereafter, hospital doctor I.M.), was assigned as his doctor in charge. 12.  At 6.45 p.m. Suren Muradyan underwent a preliminary examination. His temperature was 38.5oC and his general condition was considered to be of medium gravity. He believed himself to have been ill for the past week with periodic rises of temperature and shivering fits. His lungs were checked and abdomen palpated. Upon palpation, the left side of his abdomen caused him pain, while the right side caused only light pain. In conclusion it was noted that Suren Muradyan was to undergo close observation of his temperature and a parasitological examination, taking into account that he was serving in a malaria hotbed and had preliminary clinical signs of malaria. Anti-fever medicine and vitamins were prescribed and he was put on a drip. 13.  On 4 August 2002 at 11 a.m. Suren Muradyan\u2019s general condition was considered relatively satisfactory and his temperature was 37.2oC. He had no shivering fits. 14.  At 3.30 p.m. Suren Muradyan started shivering and his temperature rose to 39.8oC. A general blood test and a parasitological examination were assigned, and a blood sample was taken for examination. 15.  At 7.40 p.m. Suren Muradyan\u2019s condition worsened. He was conscious and agitated. He vomited, complained of nausea and abdominal pains and was pale and breathing heavily. According to the medical orderly, Suren Muradyan fell down after returning from the lavatory. While being examined, he lost consciousness and his pulse disappeared. A resuscitation specialist was urgently called. 16.  At 7.45 p.m. the resuscitation specialist registered Suren Muradyan\u2019s clinical death and started resuscitation therapy. 17.  At 9.15 p.m., after the resuscitation therapy proved ineffective, Suren Muradyan\u2019s biological death was registered. According to the results of the parasitological test, which became known on the same day, no trace of malaria was discovered in Suren Muradyan\u2019s blood sample. 18.  On 5 August 2002 investigator G. of the Hadrut Garrison Military Prosecutor\u2019s Office of Nagorno Karabakh ordered a post-mortem examination of Suren Muradyan\u2019s body to be conducted by a forensic medical expert in Yerevan, Armenia. The expert was asked to determine the time and cause of death, the existence of any external injuries, their nature, method of infliction and possible link with the death. The above\u2011mentioned blood sample was also presented to the expert for a malaria test. 19.  On the same day the investigator conducted an external examination of Suren Muradyan\u2019s body. He then took a statement from a senior nurse from the hospital reception who submitted that Suren Muradyan, upon his arrival at the hospital, was feeling so unwell that he could hardly speak and asked to lie down. After he told hospital doctor I.M. that he had been feeling this way for the last eight days, I.M. angrily asked military unit doctor S.G., who had accompanied Suren Muradyan to the hospital, why he had been brought to the hospital so belatedly. The nurse further confirmed that Suren Muradyan had been brought to the hospital with suspected malaria. 20.  On 6 August 2002 forensic medical expert M.B. started the post\u2011mortem examination, including an autopsy, of Suren Muradyan\u2019s body and on the same day sent a telegram to investigator G., saying that Suren Muradyan had died as a result of acute internal bleeding caused by a ruptured spleen resulting from an internal blunt injury to the left side of the abdomen involving old and new bruises. 21.  On the same day the investigator decided, taking into account that Suren Muradyan had been subjected to ill-treatment, to institute criminal proceedings no. 91204602 under Article 105 \u00a7 2 of the old Criminal Code of Armenia (intentional infliction of grave bodily harm resulting in the victim\u2019s death). 22.  On 7 August 2002 at least six servicemen of the military unit were questioned as witnesses. According to their statements, on 21 July 2002 a group of servicemen of the military unit, including Suren Muradyan, had been taken to the town of Martuni (Nagorno Karabakh) in order to participate in a comedy contest organised between teams from different military units. The group was accompanied by lieutenant V.G. and captain D.H. (hereafter, officers V.G. and D.H.). After the contest, the servicemen had been taken to a post office, outside which an argument had erupted between officers V.G. and D.H. on one side and Suren Muradyan on the other. Officer V.G. claimed that a watch that Suren Muradyan was wearing belonged to him and had been lost some days before, during a table tennis match. Officers V.G. and D.H. had both started swearing at Suren Muradyan. Officer V.G. had then grabbed Suren Muradyan\u2019s hand and removed the watch. Suren Muradyan had explained that he had borrowed the watch from a fellow serviceman, whose name he did not know, to wear at the comedy contest. Officers V.G. and D.H. did not believe him and gave him a deadline to reveal the identity of that person. They further claimed that a second watch had been lost and ordered Suren Muradyan to find and bring it within the same deadline. Officer D.H. had threatened that, if he failed to do so, he would get into trouble. After the incident the group had walked to the bus to return to the military unit. Suren Muradyan and officers V.G. and D.H. had walked apart, calmly discussing something.\nIn reply to the investigator\u2019s question, the servicemen stated that neither V.G. nor D.H. had hit Suren Muradyan during the argument. They further stated that they had heard later from Suren Muradyan that during the following days he had been taken on several occasions by officers V.G. and D.H. to the office of lieutenant colonel K.Z., the acting commander of the military unit, who was also its deputy commander (hereafter, officer K.Z.). There he had been given a deadline to comply with their demands. Officer K.Z. had threatened that, if he failed to do so, he would get into trouble and would be punished. From 24-25 July 2002 Suren Muradyan had started to feel unwell and stayed in bed. A couple of times he had been visited by military unit doctors A.H. and S.G. On 2 August a group of servicemen of the military unit had travelled to the town of Stepanakert (Nagorno Karabakh) to participate in another round of the contest. Suren Muradyan had gone along but could not participate as he felt very unwell. The group had returned to the military unit from Stepanakert late at night and on the following day Suren Muradyan had been taken to hospital.\nIn reply to the investigator\u2019s question, the servicemen stated that they were unaware if Suren Muradyan had been beaten or had been involved in a fight. 23.  On the same date two other servicemen of the military unit, K.E. and G.M., were questioned. Serviceman K.E. stated that he had been present during the table tennis match in question, while serviceman G.M. stated that he was the person who had lent the watch to Suren Muradyan. On 23 or 24 July 2002 (according to serviceman G.M.) or 25 July 2002 (according to serviceman K.E.) all three of them had been taken several times by officers V.G. and D.H. to officer K.Z.\u2019s office in the headquarters, where they were asked about the watches. There they had been given a deadline until 6 p.m. to find and bring the second watch. When they had returned at 6 p.m., Suren Muradyan and serviceman K.E. had been ordered to enter first, while serviceman G.M. had entered after they went out. According to serviceman G.M., they had been given two more days, while according to serviceman K.E., they had been given until Saturday (27 July) morning to find the second watch. Serviceman K.E. further stated that on 27 July he had been temporarily transferred to a different location for works and was no longer involved in this story. He added that when he and Suren Muradyan had been together in the office nobody had touched them. 24.  On 9 and 10 August 2002 respectively the investigator took statements from officers D.H. and V.G. in their capacity of witnesses, who recounted the events that had taken place on 21 July 2002 in Martuni, including the argument between them and Suren Muradyan near the post office. Officer V.G. stated, inter alia, that Suren Muradyan had voluntarily removed and handed the watch to him. Officer D.H. stated, inter alia, that he had met Suren Muradyan on the next morning in front of the headquarters and had given him a three-day deadline to find and bring the second watch. Both officers further stated that following the expiry of the three-day deadline they had taken Suren Muradyan and serviceman K.E. to the office of officer K.Z. who had had a talk with them in private.\nNo questions were posed by the investigator to officer D.H., while officer V.G. was asked several questions about the argument of 21 July 2002. Officer V.G. admitted swearing at Suren Muradyan, as well as briefly shaking and pulling on his hand, but denied hitting him and could not remember whether he or officer D.H. had slapped him. 25.  On 11 August 2002 the investigator questioned officer D.H. as a witness, posing a number of questions about the argument of 21 July 2002. The investigator further asked for information on the follow-up meetings, to which officer D.H. confirmed his earlier statement, adding that he had not heard any noise coming from officer K.Z.\u2019s office while waiting outside. 26.  On the same date serviceman K.E. was questioned again. He added to his previous statement that officer K.Z. had sworn at them but had not hit them, when he and Suren Muradyan were in his office. 27.  On 12 August 2002 officers D.H. and V.G. were questioned again and asked further questions about the argument of 21 July 2002. Officer D.H. was further asked, inter alia, whether he had had personal motives in summoning Suren Muradyan so often to the headquarters, as well as why no entry had been made in Suren Muradyan\u2019s medical file until 3 August 2002, if he had asked for medical help already on 25 July 2002. 28.  On 17 August 2002 the investigator took a statement from officer K.Z. in his capacity as a witness. Officer K.Z. confirmed that he had summoned Suren Muradyan and serviceman K.E. to his office for a talk in connection with the lost watches. During their talk Suren Muradyan had been allowed to go and fetch serviceman G.M. He had then had a talk with all three of them, releasing G.M. first and ordering the other two to find and bring the second watch. Officer K.Z. further stated that on 29 July 2002 he had again summoned Suren Muradyan and serviceman K.E. but the latter had come alone since Suren Muradyan was unwell. He had then ordered serviceman K.E. to fetch Suren Muradyan. When the latter came, he had asked what was wrong with him and why he was staying in the barracks, to which Suren Muradyan had replied that he had a fever and was taking treatment prescribed by the doctor. He had then given them one week to find the second watch.\nThe investigator posed two questions to officer K.Z.: (a) whether he had beaten, slapped or sworn at Suren Muradyan or serviceman K.E. when they were in his office, which officer K.Z. denied, and (b) whether he was alone when he met with them, to which officer K.Z. replied that he had met them only in his office. 29.  On 2 September 2002 the applicant was granted victim status. 30.  On 11 September 2002 the post-mortem examination was completed and its results were sent to the Hadrut Garrison Military Prosecutor\u2019s Office. The relevant parts of forensic medical expert M.B.\u2019s conclusions read as follows:\n\u201cExternal examination of the corpse. ... Injuries: There is an abrasion measuring 0.8 x 0.6 cm on the right side of the forehead, which is located lower than the surrounding skin and has a dark red surface. ...\nInternal examination of the corpse. ... In the thickness of the muscles in the area of the left side of the abdomen, in the projection of the spleen, bruising measuring 10 x 9 cm was discovered...\nThe blood sample taken from Suren Muradyan at the hospital was sent to the Ministry of Defence of Armenia and the National Security Service of Armenia for a bacteriological examination...\nThe following reply, dated 21 August 2002, was received from military unit no. 74252 of the Ministry of Defence of Armenia on 28 August 2002 ... \u2018three-day-old malaria agents ... were found as a result of a bacteriological examination under a microscope slide of Suren Muradyan\u2019s blood smear taken at the hospital\u2019. According to the results of the forensic histological examination ... dated 11 September 2002 ... \u2018Forensic histological conclusion: ... old and new bruises to soft tissues in the area of the left side of the abdomen; internal bruising of the spleen\u2019.\nForensic medical diagnosis. A closed blunt injury to the abdomen, old and new bruises to soft tissues and muscles in the area of the left side of the abdomen, enlarged spleen..., spleen rupture and bruising, ... Acute internal bleeding. Malaria. An abrasion on the right side of the forehead...\nConclusions.\n... 2.  Suren Muradyan\u2019s death was caused by acute internal bleeding resulting from the rupture of the deformed and enlarged spleen, accompanied by a closed and diffuse abdominal injury and by old and new bruises in the area of the left side of the abdomen. 3.  The following injuries were identified as a result of the forensic medical examination of Suren Muradyan\u2019s corpse: old and new bruises to soft tissues and muscles in the area of the left side of the abdomen, spleen rupture and bruising ... [and] an abrasion on the right side of the forehead. ... Of the above-mentioned bodily injuries the old and new bruises to soft tissues and muscles in the area of the left side of the abdomen [and] spleen rupture and bruising ... were inflicted by blunt objects or tools having a limited surface; judging by the nature of the old and new bruises to soft tissues and muscles in the area of the left side of the abdomen it can be said that the old bruises are more than about 8-10 days old, while the new bruising is about 1-2 days old. The closed and diffuse abdominal injury accompanied by spleen rupture and acute internal bleeding is considered a grave bodily injury posing threat to life and has a direct causal link with [Suren Muradyan\u2019s] death. The abrasion on the right side of the forehead was inflicted while alive by a blunt object having a limited surface and is considered a minor bodily injury... 4.  As indicated above, the death occurred more than 8-10 days after the infliction of the main injuries (the above-mentioned old bruising in the area of the left side of the abdomen, in all probability accompanied by an initial sub-capsular rupture of the spleen and absorbent haemorrhage). As regards the abrasion on the right side of the forehead and the new bruise, these were inflicted 1-2 days before death.\n... 12.  It follows from the reply received from Laboratory no. 3 of the Ministry of Defence of Armenia that three-day-old malaria agents were discovered in the blood sample [taken from Suren Muradyan at the military hospital]. 31.  On 12 September 2002 officers V.G. and D.H. were arrested under Article 251 of the old Criminal Code of Armenia (insult of a subordinate by a violent act by a superior). 32.  On 13 September 2002 they were charged under the same Article and were detained. This decision stated that on 21 July 2002 at around 6.30 p.m. near Martuni post office, officers V.G. and D.H., being public officials and suspecting Suren Muradyan of theft, instead of applying disciplinary sanctions, attacked him in front of about fifteen servicemen by swearing at him, thereby humiliating him. It further stated that officer V.G., having pulled at Suren Muradyan, caused him physical pain. 33.  On 14 September 2002 officers V.G. and D.H. were questioned as suspects and both confirmed that on 21 July 2002 they had pulled and sworn at Suren Muradyan near the Martuni post office. They were asked questions about the swear words used. 34.  On 25 September 2002 investigator G. decided to assign a panel forensic medical examination in order to determine the scope of responsibility of the military unit and the hospital doctors for Suren Muradyan\u2019s death, including the timeliness and accuracy of the diagnosis and the treatment provided, the timeliness of his transfer to hospital and whether they could have detected the injuries revealed by the post-mortem examination. This decision stated, inter alia, that on 21 July 2002 Suren Muradyan had had an argument with two officers of the military unit, V.G. and D.H., after which, starting from 24 July, his health had deteriorated. 35.  On 6 October 2002 a serviceman of the military unit\u2019s music squad was questioned. He stated that Suren Muradyan had had no arguments or scuffles with anybody. On the way back from Martuni, Suren Muradyan had told him that he had got into trouble because of this watch and that \u201cnow they would frame him\u201d. However, Suren Muradyan had never told him or others that he had been ill-treated, even in reply to a direct question following his visit to officer K.Z.\u2019s office. The serviceman confirmed that Suren Muradyan had started to feel unwell from 24 July 2002. He further stated that he and others had wiped sweat from Suren Muradyan\u2019s forehead, belly, back and legs during his illness but had not noticed any traces of injuries. On the second day of his illness, military unit doctor A.H. had come to visit him and concluded that he had caught cold. Several days later military unit doctor S.G. had come, said that Suren Muradyan had flu and given him some pills. On the last days Suren Muradyan had been very ill: he had lost a lot of weight and staggered when walking, so they had to accompany him to the toilets. 36.  On 6 November 2002 the experts conducting the panel forensic medical examination produced their opinion. According to its conclusions, it had been possible for the doctors of the military unit not to discover the injuries which led to Suren Muradyan\u2019s death since there were no visible traces of injuries on the surface of the skin. The enlarged spleen might have been caused by malaria and the injury sustained by Suren Muradyan might have brought about the sub-capsular bleeding which later led to a ruptured spleen and acute internal bleeding. Referring to the fact that no malaria agents were discovered in Suren Muradyan\u2019s blood sample by the parasitological examination of 4 August 2002, the experts attributed this to the fact that agents could be detected at the stage of the disease when the sick person experiences shivering and fever accompanied by high temperature. The opinion lastly stated that, given that no malaria agents had been discovered, not specific but symptomatic treatment had to be prescribed, and in fact had been provided in full. 37.  On 7 November 2002 serviceman G.M. was questioned again and stated that both Suren Muradyan and serviceman K.E. had denied having been beaten or sworn at during their first visit to officer K.Z.\u2019s office. When he and Suren Muradyan visited the office the next morning, officer K.Z. had said to him \u201cWhy did you enter? You go out, you have received your punishment\u201d. In reply to the investigator\u2019s question, serviceman G.M. stated that he had not noticed any bruises or signs of pain on Suren Muradyan when he came out of the office five minutes later. He could not say what officer K.Z. meant by his statement and whether it meant that now it was Suren Muradyan\u2019s turn to be punished. 38.  On 2 December 2002 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Military Prosecutor of Armenia, arguing in detail that his son had died as a result of a beating by officers V.G., D.H., K.Z. and another officer, B., as well as the failure of the doctors of the military unit, S.G. and A.H., to provide medical assistance. He claimed that serviceman G.M. had admitted during questioning, in his presence, that he had been badly ill-treated by officer K.Z. in his office. Suren Muradyan had been next to enter that office, alone, and the following morning he had been so unwell in bed that he was not able to return to officer K.Z.\u2019s office. The applicant alleged that the beating which resulted in Suren Muradyan\u2019s ruptured spleen and subsequent death had taken place at that moment. He further claimed that the doctors had intentionally refused to provide medical assistance and to transfer Suren Muradyan to hospital in order to cover up the abuse. The applicant requested the Military Prosecutor to identify those responsible for his son\u2019s death. 39.  On 10 December 2002 investigator G. decided to order an additional forensic medical examination. In addition to the questions asked earlier, the experts were requested to determine whether the military unit and the hospital doctors could have detected the spleen enlargement and what they were supposed to do if it had been detected, as well as whether Suren Muradyan\u2019s spleen could have ruptured earlier and been followed by slow bleeding. 40.  On 11 December 2002 the forensic medical experts produced an additional opinion. According to its conclusions, since on 29 July 2002 Suren Muradyan had not complained of abdominal pains, the doctors of the military unit had no reason to suspect malaria and diagnosed his condition as an acute respiratory illness. The opinion further stated that usually a doctor was obliged to deliver a diagnosis after having carefully examined the patient. Suren Muradyan\u2019s medical file contained his complaints but no indication of results of any such examination. If on 29 July 2002 Suren Muradyan\u2019s spleen had already been enlarged, it would have been possible to detect this through palpation and to transfer him to hospital. The same was possible at the hospital. As regards the sub-capsular rupture of the spleen, it was almost impossible to detect. Had the spleen rupture been detected and the spleen removed by surgery, Suren Muradyan\u2019s life could have been saved. Lastly, the injuries discovered by the post-mortem examination were not detected by the doctors since there were no visible traces of injuries on the outer part of the skin. 41.  On 15 December 2002 a serviceman, K.B., who had been undergoing treatment at the hospital when Suren Muradyan was admitted, was questioned. He stated that he had become acquainted with Suren Muradyan upon the latter\u2019s admission to hospital. Suren Muradyan had looked very ill and told him that he had spent the last eight days in the barracks. K.B. further stated that he had not noticed any bruises on Suren Muradyan\u2019s forehead or any fights or arguments during his two-day stay in hospital. 42.  On 4 February 2003 the criminal case against officers V.G. and D.H. concerning the charges of insult was disjoined from the main criminal proceedings concerning Suren Muradyan\u2019s death since there was no causal link between the two. A new number was assigned to the disjoined case (no. 91200703). 43.  During the investigation a number of other unrelated offences committed by officers V.G. and D.H. were revealed. As regards, in particular, officer D.H., the investigation revealed that in April 2002 he had kicked a soldier for sleeping on watch duty and broken the soldier\u2019s arm. Officer D.H. was charged with inflicting bodily injuries. 44.  On 28 February 2003 the bill of indictment concerning the disjoined case was submitted to the Syunik Regional Court. 45.  By a letter of 19 March 2003 the Minister of Defence of Nagorno Karabakh filed a motion with the Syunik Regional Court requesting that a non-custodial sentence be imposed on officer D.H. and that he stay under the control of the military unit command, taking into account his long and diligent service in the armed forces, the report/request of the command of formation no. 42009 and the fact that he regretted his actions and that his actions posed no danger to society. 46.  On 12 April 2003 forensic medical expert M.B. was questioned. He confirmed that Suren Muradyan had already been ill with malaria when he sustained the old bruises in the area of the left side of the abdomen. He stated that the fact that Suren Muradyan was ill might have accelerated the transformation of the sub-capsular rupture into a full rupture and internal bleeding. However, even a healthy spleen could suffer a sub-capsular rupture from a blow, later leading to a full rupture. The transformation of the sub-capsular rupture into full rupture could happen with or without external influence. The expert lastly confirmed that the new bruises found on Suren Muradyan\u2019s body and the abrasion to the left side of his forehead could have been caused by his falling on the hospital floor not long before his death. 47.  On 18 April 2003 serviceman G.M. was questioned again and confirmed that no sound of blows or other loud noise could be heard when he had waited for Suren Muradyan outside the office. Later he had heard rumours that Suren Muradyan had been beaten by officers V.G. and D.H. Serviceman G.M. further explained that he had inquired with Suren Muradyan and serviceman K.E. whether they had been beaten, because officer K.Z. had hit him a few times while in the office. He lastly requested that no criminal proceedings be brought against officer K.Z. because he had hit him just two or three times on his buttocks. 48.  On 24 April 2003 the applicant contacted the investigating authority, willing to provide additional information. On the next day he was questioned and stated that in October-November 2002 he had heard from a former colleague of his, who in mid-August 2002 had visited a relative serving in the same military unit, that he had heard one of the officers saying that a serviceman matching Suren Muradyan\u2019s description had recently died as a result of a beating by officer V.G. 49.  On 26 April 2003 both the former colleague and his relative serving in the military unit were questioned and confirmed this information but could not remember the name of the officer in question. On 4 October 2003 the former colleague\u2019s relative was once again questioned and stated that the officer\u2019s name was V.M. 50.  On 27 April 2003 several more persons were questioned, including military unit doctors S.G. and A.H., hospital doctor I.M., and an orderly of the hospital, H.G. 51.  Military unit doctor S.G. stated, inter alia, that a few months before, during a conversation with serviceman G.M., he had asked the latter to confirm the rumours that Suren Muradyan had been beaten by officers V.G. and D.H., to which serviceman G.M. replied that he was not aware of that. S.G. was further asked questions regarding the medical assistance provided to Suren Muradyan at the military unit. 52.  Military unit doctor A.H. claimed that he had also examined Suren Muradyan once, including palpating his abdomen, but no abnormalities were found or bruises and injuries revealed. He was further asked to explain as to why he had refused to visit Suren Muradyan after being called by the latter\u2019s fellow serviceman. 53.  Hospital doctor I.M. stated that it was he who had initially diagnosed Suren Muradyan as having malaria, because of the symptoms and the fact that he was serving in a malaria hotbed. Suren Muradyan had not told him, except on the day he died, that he had been beaten or that he had fallen, and since there were no symptoms he did not put such questions to the patient. However, on the last day, when he rushed to provide medical aid to Suren Muradyan, the latter, when asked what had happened, told him \u201cI have pain in my belly, I feel very ill, I fell not long ago in the ward\u201d. 54.  Hospital orderly H.G. stated that on 4 August 2002 at 7 p.m. Suren Muradyan had told him that shortly before he had felt giddy and fallen down. About half an hour later he had called a doctor because Suren Muradyan\u2019s condition had worsened and then, after Suren Muradyan lost consciousness, he summoned the resuscitation specialist, who came and started resuscitation procedures. 55.  On an unspecified date the court proceedings into the disjoined criminal case against officers V.G. and D.H. on account of insult commenced at the Syunik Regional Court of Armenia, sitting in Stepanakert (Nagorno Karabakh). It appears that officer V.G. pleaded guilty and admitted that he had sworn at and pushed Suren Muradyan and pulled the watch off his wrist, but said that he had not hit him. 56.  On 5 May 2003 the Syunik Regional Court found officers V.G. and D.H. guilty as charged and sentenced them to one year\u2019s imprisonment. 57.  On 2 June 2003 officer V.G. was released on parole. 58.  On 10 July 2003 the investigation into Suren Muradyan\u2019s death (criminal case no. 91204602) was taken over by the Military Prosecutor\u2019s Office of Armenia and assigned to investigator H. 59.  On 12 September 2003 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Military Prosecutor\u2019s Office of Armenia, claiming that the investigation was flawed and had failed to reveal those responsible for his son\u2019s death, despite the fact that there was sufficient evidence that he had died as a result of ill\u2011treatment by the three officers, V.G., D.H. and K.Z. 60.  On 1 October 2003 military unit doctor A.H. was questioned again and confirmed his earlier statement (see paragraph 52 above). 61.  On 6 October 2003 serviceman G.M. was questioned again and added to his previous statements that on the day of their first visit to officer K.Z.\u2019s office, K.Z. had hit him two or three times with a wooden pole on his buttocks when he was alone in his office. 62.  On 11 November 2003 a confrontation was held between serviceman K.E. and another serviceman, during which K.E. stated that on the day of their first visit to officer K.Z.\u2019s office they had also gone to officer D.H.\u2019s office where the latter had started screaming at them because of the stolen watch. Officer K.Z. also threatened to undress them in front of the entire battalion if they failed to find the second watch. 63.  On 5 December 2003 serviceman G.M. was questioned again and described in greater detail how officer K.Z. had taken a wooden pole from behind a safe, told him to lean against the wall and hit him three times on his buttocks. 64.  On 14 April 2004 officer V.G. was questioned and stated that he had not provided the full story in his previous testimony and that during the argument between him and Suren Muradyan on 21 July 2002 he had grabbed the latter\u2019s left wrist with his right hand and started shaking it briskly, during which Suren Muradyan\u2019s fist had touched the left side of his abdomen in the area of the spleen. Being very angry, he had not noticed whether Suren Muradyan\u2019s facial expression had changed as a result of the blow, but he had not displayed any unusual movements or convulsions. Officer V.G. further denied hitting Suren Muradyan. 65.  On 19 April 2004 the investigator questioned two of the servicemen, A.P. and D.M., who had previously testified on 7 August 2002 and asked them to describe how officer V.G. had pulled on Suren Muradyan\u2019s hand on 21 July 2002. According to A.P., officer V.G. had grabbed Suren Muradyan\u2019s left forearm, while according to D.M. \u2013 the left wrist, and had pulled forcefully. Suren Muradyan had tried unsuccessfully to free his arm. When he was pulling back his arm, officer V.G.\u2019s hand was also being pulled back with it. Officer V.G. had then removed the watch with his other hand, while still holding on to Suren Muradyan with his right hand. 66.  On 2 August 2004 the applicant was questioned and stated that some days earlier he had bumped into a number of servicemen who had told him about the circumstances of Suren Muradyan\u2019s murder and the identities of those who had ill-treated him. According to them, Suren Muradyan had told them that he had been summoned to the headquarters where he had been badly beaten by officers V.G., D.H. and K.Z., as a result of which he had lost consciousness and been taken back to the barracks by couriers. The applicant requested that these allegations be investigated. 67.  On 9 August 2004 the Military Prosecutor of Armenia addressed a letter to the Head of the National Security Service of Nagorno Karabakh, informing him of the applicant\u2019s allegations and requesting that those circumstances be clarified. 68.  On 17 and 19 August 2004 the investigator questioned officers D.H. and V.G. respectively. Both denied the above allegations. Officer V.G. added that the only time that there had been any use of force in respect of Suren Muradyan was during the incident of 21 July 2002, when he had shaken Suren Muradyan\u2019s hand briskly, during which his hand had touched Suren Muradyan\u2019s abdomen. In reply to the investigator\u2019s question as to why he had earlier stated that it had been Suren Muradyan\u2019s hand that touched the abdomen while now he was stating that it had been his hand, officer V.G. stated that, since he was holding Suren Muradyan\u2019s hand in his hand, both his and Suren Muradyan\u2019s hands had touched the abdomen. 69.  On 2 September 2004 the investigator decided to assign an additional panel forensic medical examination and pose further questions to the medical experts, taking into account that it had been established that during the argument of 21 July 2002 officer V.G. had accidentally hit Suren Muradyan in the left side of the abdomen. It had been further established that on 4 August 2002 Suren Muradyan had fallen at the hospital, with his left hand under his belly. 70.  On 16 September 2004 forensic medical expert M.B. was questioned again. He stated that the sub-capsular rupture and the bruising to the soft tissues had been caused by direct contact with a blunt object. If, during that blow, officer V.G. had held in his hand the deceased\u2019s forearm or part of his wrist, those parts must have touched the front wall of the deceased\u2019s abdomen during the blow, while the injuries, namely the rupture and the bruising to the soft tissues of the abdominal area, were caused by direct contact with officer V.G.\u2019s fist; contact between the deceased\u2019s wrist or forearm with that area could not have caused the sub-capsular rupture. If the deceased\u2019s wrist or forearm or fist touched the abdomen, then officer V.G.\u2019s fist must have undoubtedly touched the front wall of the abdomen. 71.  On 12 October 2004 the panel of experts produced their opinion in reply to the questions posed by the investigator\u2019s decision of 2 September 2004. As regards the responsibility of the military unit and the hospital doctors, the experts found that they had failed to reach a timely and accurate diagnosis and to provide adequate medical treatment. The opinion further included, inter alia, the following questions and answers:\n(1)  Question: what impact could the blow sustained by Suren Muradyan during the argument of 21 July 2002 have had on his health? Could it have caused spleen rupture, internal bruising and subsequently death? Answer: as a result of the blow sustained during the argument of 21 July 2002, Suren Muradyan sustained bruises to muscles and a sub-capsular rupture of his spleen which later led to his death.\n(2)  Question: was he ill with malaria on 21 July 2002 and why were no malaria agents found in his blood sample at the military hospital, if three\u2011day-old malaria agents were found in the same sample following a later test? Answer: on 21 July 2002 Suren Muradyan was suffering from malaria.\n(3)  Question: what impact would the above-mentioned blow have had on his health if he had not been ill with malaria? Answer: depending on the strength, location and nature of the blow, it was possible not to sustain a sub-capsular rupture, but even a light blow could cause spleen rupture to an unhealthy and deformed spleen.\n(4)  Question: could he have sustained bruises to soft tissues in the area of the left side of his abdomen by falling at the hospital on 4 August 2002? Answer: the new bruising to soft tissues in the area of the left side of Suren Muradyan\u2019s abdomen could have been caused by his fall at the hospital.\n(5)  Question: exactly when did his spleen rupture occur, and would his life have been unequivocally saved, if diagnosis had been made in a timely manner? Answer: the sub-capsular rupture of Suren Muradyan\u2019s spleen occurred on 21 July 2002, while the second rupture occurred on 4 August 2002 at 7.10 p.m., as a result of which he most likely lost consciousness and fell down. Had the internal bleeding been diagnosed in a timely manner, it might have been possible to save Suren Muradyan\u2019s life. 72.  On 21 October 2004 forensic medical expert K.H., who had contributed to the opinions of 6 November and 11 December 2002 and 12 October 2004, was questioned. Asked about the discrepancies between the findings in those opinions, expert K.H. stated that it must have been an automatic mistake and admitted that she had not read one of the opinions before signing it. She further stated that the reason why no trace of malaria had been discovered at the Mekhakavan hospital could have been due to lack of proper equipment. She lastly stated that an enlarged spleen in a person suffering from malaria would become hard and filled with blood, the capsule would be strained and become more sensitive. Even a light blow might cause a sub-capsular rupture. 73.  On 4 November 2004 hospital doctor I.M. was questioned and added to his previous statement that the pain upon palpation of Suren Muradyan\u2019s abdomen made him suspect that it was connected with malaria. In reply to the investigator\u2019s question as to why he had not administered anti-malaria treatment if he had been convinced of that diagnosis, I.M. replied that he had had to wait for the result of the parasitological test. Furthermore, often an initial negative result of such test did not mean that a patient had no malaria and this could be confirmed only after a third negative result. 74.  On 5 November 2004 the forensic medical expert who had presided over the panel which had produced the opinion of 12 October 2004 was questioned and confirmed the responsibility of both the military unit and the hospital doctors. 75.  On the same date the Head of the National Security Service of Nagorno Karabakh sent a letter, marked \u201csecret\u201d, to the Military Prosecutor of Armenia. The relevant parts of the letter read as follows:\n\u201cTo your [letter] of 9 August 2004: ...\nThe following has been disclosed as a result of the activities aimed at revealing the circumstances, which are of interest, concerning the death on 4 August 2002 of private [Suren Muradyan], a compulsory military serviceman of military unit no. 59703.\nFor the purpose of clarifying the names of those servicemen who, after the well\u2011known beating of [Suren Muradyan], accompanied him to the barracks or were eyewitnesses, a list of staff of the military unit\u2019s music squad, who have been demobilised and are Armenian nationals, was retrieved. At present only the deputy commander of the military unit, [officer K.Z.] (since the incident he has become uncommunicative and avoids discussing this matter even with his close relatives), continues to serve in the said military unit, while [officer D.H.] has possibly moved to [another] military unit, while [officer V.G.] has been demobilised.\u201d 76.  On 15 November 2004 the Minister of Defence of Nagorno Karabakh filed a motion with the Military Prosecutor of Armenia, asking for officer K.Z. not to be prosecuted, taking into account his positive characteristics, his impeccable service in the armed forces and his active participation in the struggle for the existence of Nagorno Karabakh, as well as the report/request of the command of formation no. 42009. 77.  On 17 November 2004 charges were brought against hospital doctor I.M. under Article 375 \u00a7 2 of the new Criminal Code of Armenia (abuse of authority or public position, accidentally resulting in grave consequences) on the ground that he had failed to provide adequate treatment to Suren Muradyan. 78.  On 19 November 2004 the Military Prosecutor of Armenia lodged an application with the Court of Cassation seeking to re-open the proceedings concerning the criminal case against officer V.G. on the basis of a newly established circumstance. The Military Prosecutor submitted that all possible hypotheses had been verified and it had been established that, apart from the incident of 21 July 2002, Suren Muradyan had no other conflicts and had good relations with fellow servicemen and officers. It followed from the statements made by officer V.G. on 14 April and 19 August 2004, in which he admitted that during the incident of 21 July 2002 both his and Suren Muradyan\u2019s hands had touched the left side of the victim\u2019s body, that the sub-capsular rupture of Suren Muradyan\u2019s spleen was a result of that incident. 79.  On the same date the applicant lodged a challenge with the General Prosecutor\u2019s Office against the Military Prosecutor and other employees of the Military Prosecutor\u2019s Office, arguing in detail that they had failed to conduct an adequate investigation into his son\u2019s death. 80.  On 18 and 29 November 2004 charges were brought against military unit doctors A.H. and S.G. under Article 375 \u00a7 2 of the new Criminal Code of Armenia. 81.  On 24 November 2004 the Senior Assistant to the General Prosecutor decided to dismiss the applicant\u2019s challenge of 19 November 2004. This decision stated, inter alia:\n\u201cOn 10 July 2003 the criminal case [concerning Suren Muradyan\u2019s death] was transferred from the Hadrut Garrison Military Prosecutor\u2019s Office to the investigative division of the Military Prosecutor\u2019s Office of Armenia, where following an investigation it was disclosed that from 22 to 25 July 2002 [officers D.H. and V.G.] had on several occasions summoned [Suren Muradyan] to the headquarters of the military unit, demanded the lost watch and, having received no positive reply, had taken him to [the acting commander of the military unit, K.Z.], who in his office had hit [Suren Muradyan], as well as serviceman [K.E.], who had been called to the office in connection with the same matter, with a wooden pole.\nAccording to the materials of the case, a number of witnesses testified that during the argument of 21 July 2002 nobody had hit [Suren Muradyan]. In the course of additional questioning [officer V.G.] alleged that during the argument of 21 July 2002 he, infuriated by [Suren Muradyan\u2019s] behaviour, had grabbed his hand and shaken it briskly, during which his hand had touched [Suren Muradyan] in the area of the spleen.\u201d\nThe decision further referred to the expert opinion of 12 October 2004 and specifically its finding that Suren Muradyan had sustained bruises to muscles and a sub-capsular rupture of his spleen as a result of the blow sustained during the argument of 21 July 2002. The Senior Assistant to the General Prosecutor concluded that the arguments raised by the applicant had been examined in the course of a thorough and objective investigation by the Military Prosecutor\u2019s Office and his challenge was therefore unfounded. 82.  On 10 December 2004 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of the Syunik Regional Court of 5 May 2003 in its part concerning officer V.G. (see paragraph 56 above) and remitted the case for further investigation. 83.  On 14 December 2004 the investigator, finding that there were discrepancies between previous expert opinions, and also upon the request of one of the accused, namely military hospital doctor I.M., decided to assign a new panel forensic medical examination. 84.  On 24 December 2004 the criminal case against officer V.G. on charges of insult was re-joined to the main criminal proceedings concerning Suren Muradyan\u2019s death. 85.  On 28 December 2004 new charges were brought against officer V.G. under Article 375 \u00a7 2 (abuse of authority or public position, accidentally resulting in grave consequences). It appears that he was detained on the same day. 86.  On 25 January 2005 the panel of experts produced their opinion in reply to the questions posed by the investigator\u2019s decision of 14 December 2004, confirming their earlier findings regarding the responsibility of the military unit and the hospital doctors. The opinion also included, inter alia, the following question and answer:\nQuestion: what was the intensity of the blow sustained by Suren Muradyan, considering that it caused bruising of deep muscles? Answer: it was impossible to determine the exact intensity of the blow in the absence of relevant medical criteria, although it could be asserted that the blow had been of certain intensity. 87.  On 18 February 2005 the applicant lodged a complaint with the General Prosecutor\u2019s Office similar to that of 12 September 2003. He also offered to bring witnesses who, according to him, could tell the truth, namely that on 24 July 2002 his son had been beaten by officers V.G., D.H. and K.Z., as a result of which he had suffered the fatal injury. The witnesses could further confirm that his son had lost consciousness and that military unit doctor A.H. had provided first aid and was therefore aware of the ill\u2011treatment. 88.  On 21 and 22 February and 5 and 10 March 2005 the investigator posed a number of questions, suggested by the applicant, to the four forensic medical experts who had produced the opinion of 25 January 2005. Three of the experts were unable to answer the applicant\u2019s question about whether it was possible for his son, who on 21 July 2002 had allegedly been ill with malaria and had an enlarged spleen, not to complain, have fever or shiver and to feel well. The fourth expert stated that his son might have experienced dull pain.\nIn reply to the applicant\u2019s question about whether it was possible for his son, whose spleen was enlarged and already ruptured, not to complain for three days of any pain, to feel healthy, participate in exercises and to play the trumpet, two of the experts were unable to provide an answer, the third expert stated that it was only a sub-capsular rupture and not a full one, and the fourth expert stated that it was possible for him not to complain if the sub-capsular rupture had been small, and possible to complain if had been big.\nIn reply to the applicant\u2019s question about how his son would have reacted (screaming, losing consciousness, and so on) when he sustained the injury resulting in extensive bruising and a sub-capsular spleen rupture, three of the experts stated that different people felt and expressed pain differently. The fourth expert stated that it was equally possible for him to feel or not to feel pain. One of the experts also added that it was only a sub\u2011capsular rupture and the spleen was not a painful organ.\nIn reply to the applicant\u2019s question about whether the bruising would have been visible from the outside, one expert referred to the findings in the opinion, two experts said \u201cnot necessarily\u201d, while the fourth expert stated that it would have been visible, although external bruises healed faster than internal ones.\nIn reply to the applicant\u2019s question concerning the responsibility of the military hospital doctor, all experts stated that the doctor had no reason to suspect internal bleeding because the patient had failed to inform him about the injury, there were no visible external traces and the clinical signs were similar to those of malaria. The hospital doctor had carried out all the examinations and tests which he was obliged to in such circumstances. The applicant alleged that each time the investigator had posed this question to an expert, he would first invite him to leave the room. The answers given to this question by all four experts in his absence were almost identical. 89.  On 25 March 2005 the investigator decided to discontinue criminal proceedings against military hospital doctor I.M. for lack of corpus delicti, finding that I.M. had carried out all possible examinations which he was able and obliged to perform in the circumstances. This conclusion was reached on the basis of the above statements of the four forensic medical experts. 90.  On 29 March 2005 the Military Prosecutor of Armenia decided not to prosecute officer K.Z. for beating serviceman G.M. This decision stated that officer K.Z., suspecting Suren Muradyan and serviceman K.E. of lying about the lost watch, had started swearing at them and demanding that they find it. Thereafter he had ordered them to leave his office and called serviceman G.M. When the latter had told the same story as the two other servicemen, officer K.Z. had become furious, started swearing and ordered serviceman G.M. to turn towards the wall, whereupon he had taken a 120 cm long pole and twice hit serviceman G.M. on his buttocks. Serviceman G.M. had started crying and after leaving the office he had asked Suren Muradyan and serviceman K.E. whether they had also been beaten, to which both of them replied \u201cno\u201d. The decision concluded that it was not necessary to prosecute officer K.Z. because he had no criminal record, was known to be of good character and regretted his actions. The motion of the Ministry of Defence of Nagorno Karabakh asking not to prosecute him was also taken into account. 91.  On an unspecified date the applicant submitted to the investigating authority a photograph of his son allegedly performing on stage at the comedy contest in Stepanakert on 2 August 2002, arguing that this proved that his son was not yet that ill on that day. The version that his son felt ill and could not perform had been made up on purpose in order to justify the deterioration of his condition and his transfer to hospital. In reality, upon arriving at the military unit from Stepanakert, he had once again been beaten by the officers on the night from 2 to 3 August 2002, which had caused the spleen rupture. This was also confirmed by the new bruising to soft tissues in the area of the left side of the abdomen revealed during the autopsy. 92.  On 15 April 2005 the bill of indictment was finalised and on 16 April 2005 approved by the Military Prosecutor of Armenia. Its relevant parts stated as follows:\n\u201cA number of hypotheses have been checked in the course of the investigation, which have been investigated in an objective manner. Thus, because of a watch found on [Suren Muradyan\u2019s] wrist [officers D.H. and V.G.] invited him to the headquarters on several occasions and presented him to the acting commander of the military unit, [K.Z.], who in an attempt to clarify the above-mentioned question, subjected to beating [serviceman G.M. He] did not, however, beat or hit [Suren Muradyan].\n...\nIt has been confirmed by the investigation that on 21 July 2002, as [officer V.G.] noticed on Suren Muradyan\u2019s wrist his younger brother\u2019s stolen watch, he argued with him, grabbed his hand, started swearing and shook it briskly, during which he hit Suren Muradyan\u2019s abdomen resulting in a sub-capsular rupture of his spleen. Thereafter from 24 July 2002 Suren Muradyan\u2019s health started to deteriorate while in the military unit. On 25 July 2002 Suren Muradyan was visited by [military unit doctor A.H.,] who failed to diagnose Suren Muradyan\u2019s real illness and to make any entries [in the registers] and, having given several paracetamol pills, left. When on 27 July 2002 [A.H.] was called to provide medical assistance to Suren Muradyan, he refused to come and provide assistance and said that the patient should be brought to the aid post. Thereafter Suren Muradyan\u2019s fellow servicemen called [military unit doctor S.G.]. The latter came, also failed to diagnose Suren Muradyan\u2019s real illness and, having given some anti-fever injections and several paracetamol pills, left. Hence, Suren Muradyan remained ill in the military unit until 3 August 2002, which was also in violation of Order no. 586 of the Minister of Defence of 29 May 2000, namely Suren Muradyan was transferred to hospital later than the prescribed 7 days, as a result of which it was impossible to save [his] life.\nDuring the investigation at his additional questioning as a witness on 14 April and 19 August 2004 [officer V.G.] regretted his actions and stated that he had not provided the full story in his previous statements and added that during the incident of 21 July 2002 both his and Suren Muradyan\u2019s hands had hit the left side of the latter\u2019s abdomen.\n...\nThe investigation carried out has confirmed that the sub-capsular rupture of Suren Muradyan\u2019s spleen resulted from [officer V.G.\u2019s] actions during the incident of 21 July 2002.\u201d 93.  All three defendants, namely military officer V.G. and military unit doctors A.H. and S.G., were accused under Article 375 \u00a7 2 of the CC in connection with the above acts. 94.  On 21 December 2005 the Syunik Regional Court, sitting in the town of Goris (Armenia), found officer V.G. guilty as charged and sentenced him to five years\u2019 imprisonment, minus the one year and twenty\u2011four days already spent in detention, finding it to be confirmed that on 21 July 2002 officer V.G., during an argument with Suren Muradyan about a stolen watch, shook briskly Suren Muradyan\u2019s hand, and in doing so his hand touched the left side of Suren Muradyan\u2019s abdomen causing a sub\u2011capsular rupture of the spleen. As regards military unit doctors A.H. and S.G., the Regional Court re-qualified the charges from Article 375 \u00a7 2 to Article 376 \u00a7 2 of the CC (official negligence resulting in grave consequences) and, applying Article 64 of the CC, sentenced each of them to a fine of 200,000 Armenian drams (AMD). The Regional Court also granted the civil claim lodged by the applicant and ordered officer V.G. to pay 1,000 United States dollars (USD) and military unit doctors A.H. and S.G. to pay AMD 200,000 each as reimbursement of funeral costs and legal costs incurred by the applicant. 95.  On 4 January 2006 the applicant lodged an appeal. He argued in detail that there was sufficient evidence suggesting that his son had been harassed by a number of high-ranking officers, including V.G., D.H. and K.Z., in the period between 21 and 24 July 2002 and that the fatal injury had been inflicted by them on 24 July. The applicant referred, in particular, to a witness statement by his son\u2019s fellow serviceman, according to which his son had woken up in the night of 24 July and complained that he was feeling ill. The same followed from the findings of the post-mortem examination, according to which the initial bruising had been inflicted 8-10 days before death. Furthermore, 24 July was the last day of the deadline fixed by the officers. The investigating authority was deliberately ignoring this evidence and had failed to clarify what had happened on that day, while the proceedings had been perfunctory and not objective and aimed to lead the case into an impasse and not to punish the murderers. The applicant further referred to the fact that serviceman G.M. had admitted that he had been ill-treated by officer K.Z. in his office. It followed from the decision of the General Prosecutor\u2019s Office of 24 November 2004 that the same had happened to his son. The accused, officer V.G., had also admitted in court that he had been outside officer K.Z.\u2019s office when the latter ill-treated Suren Muradyan and that he had heard him scream. Furthermore, no explanation had been given for the second bruising and abrasion on the forehead sustained by his son 1-2 days before his death. The applicant further complained that the Regional Court had failed to clarify what was meant by the \u201cwell-known beating of Suren Muradyan\u201d referred to in the letter of the Head of the National Security Service of Nagorno Karabakh, as well as the circumstances and perpetrators of this beating. Lastly, as regards the military unit doctors, the applicant complained that the re\u2011qualification of the charge had been inaccurate and the sentence imposed too lenient. 96.  Appeals against the judgment of 21 December 2005 were lodged also by officer V.G. and the Prosecutor, who sought harsher penalties. 97.  On 20 March 2006 the Criminal Court of Appeal commenced the appeal proceedings. Officer V.G. admitted before the Court of Appeal that either his or Suren Muradyan\u2019s hand had possibly touched the latter\u2019s abdomen during the argument of 21 July 2002, but argued that Suren Muradyan\u2019s spleen could not have ruptured as a result of that contact. 98.  In the course of the proceedings, upon the applicant\u2019s request, two witnesses, serviceman K.B. (see paragraph 41 above) and hospital orderly H.G. (see paragraph 54 above), were summoned and examined in court. K.B. stated that Suren Muradyan had told him at the hospital that he had been called to the headquarters by officer D.H. on the day when the latter was on duty and beaten by him, officers V.G. and K.Z. and another officer, N., because of the watch. The officers had pushed him to the ground and started kicking him, while officer K.Z. hit him with a wooden pole. They had demanded that he bring the watch or its value in cash. The most active beaters were officers V.G. and K.Z. He had been beaten so badly that the headquarters couriers had had to carry him back to the barracks. On the next day he was called again by officer K.Z. He had been unable to go but K.Z. had insisted. Thereafter he had remained in the barracks for eight days. H.G. stated that upon admission to hospital Suren Muradyan was very agitated and kept uttering swear words directed at officers V.G., D.H. and K.Z. He then said that he had been beaten by officers V.G. and K.Z.\nBoth K.B. and H.G. stated that they had been afraid to tell the truth at their questioning during the investigation as they had been military servicemen at that time. They had been demobilised now, had nothing to be afraid of and were telling the truth. K.B. added that Suren Muradyan had asked him not to tell this to anyone in order not to get into trouble. 99.  Officer K.Z. was also summoned and examined in court. He denied having ill-treated Suren Muradyan, but admitted that he had hit serviceman G.M. for having stolen the first watch. 100.  The Court of Appeal sent an inquiry to the National Security Service of Nagorno Karabakh asking for clarification of the content of the letter of 5 November 2004. 101.  By a letter of 27 April 2006 the Head of the National Security Service of Nagorno Karabakh informed the court that the expression \u201cwell\u2011known beating\u201d had been used merely as a brief description of the incident and had no other meaning. 102.  The applicant submitted once again before the Court of Appeal that his son had died as a result of ill-treatment by officers V.G., D.H. and K.Z., while the military unit doctors had failed to provide adequate medical assistance. 103.  On 20 June 2006 the Criminal Court of Appeal delivered its judgment, upholding that of the Regional Court in its part concerning the guilt of officer V.G. and military unit doctors A.H. and S.G. However, it decided to modify the penalty in respect of A.H. and S.G., imposing a suspended sentence of three and a half and three years\u2019 imprisonment respectively, with two years\u2019 and one and a half years\u2019 probation period respectively. The Court of Appeal decided also to modify the judgment in its part concerning the applicant\u2019s civil claim, by annulling the award of AMD 200,000 to be paid by both A.H. and S.G., on the ground that they had already paid those amounts to the applicant voluntarily. 104.  As regards the statements of former servicemen K.B. and H.G., as well as the applicant\u2019s arguments, the Court of Appeal found that these were not sufficient grounds for bringing harsher charges against officer V.G. or for remitting the case for further investigation with the aim of bringing criminal proceedings against officers D.H. and K.Z. Firstly, the court was required by law to examine the case only in respect of the accused and within the scope of the charge against him. Secondly, the law prescribed only two grounds for remitting a case for further investigation, namely (1) if the investigating authority had committed a substantial violation of procedural law or (2) upon the Prosecutor\u2019s request, if there were grounds for harsher prosecution or prosecution on a different factual basis. No such request had been filed by the Prosecutor, while the investigating authority had carried out a thorough, full and objective investigation by examining a number of hypotheses, none of which confirmed that Suren Muradyan had been ill-treated. The Court of Appeal further noted that both K.B. and H.G. had been questioned on numerous occasions during the investigation but had never made such statements in the past. Moreover, they cited as their source of information the late Suren Muradyan. The Court of Appeal lastly referred to the letter of the Head of the National Security Service of Nagorno Karabakh of 27 April 2006. 105.  On 29 June 2006 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, raising similar arguments. 106.  The Prosecutor also lodged an appeal on points of law, seeking that the case be remitted for fresh examination in its part concerning the military unit doctors on the ground that the sentence imposed was too lenient. 107.  On 4 August 2006 the Court of Cassation decided to dismiss the applicant\u2019s appeal and to grant that of the Prosecutor, finding that the sentence imposed on military unit doctors A.H. and S.G. had not been proportionate to the gravity of the offence and remitting that part of the case for fresh examination. 108.  On 15 September 2006 the applicant received a copy of this decision. 109.  On 26 September 2006 the Criminal Court of Appeal examined the case anew in its part concerning military unit doctors A.H. and S.G. and decided to sentence them to four years and three and a half years\u2019 imprisonment respectively. At the same time the Court of Appeal decided to grant amnesty and to release them from serving their sentence.", "references": ["5", "4", "7", "1", "2", "6", "3", "9", "8", "No Label", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in Sevastopol. 6.  The applicant worked at the joint-stock company Sevastopolskyy Morskyy Zavod (\u201cthe SMZ\u201d). On 30 November 1996 she retired and started working for its subsidiary company, Sevmorremo. 7.  She brought several claims against her former employer, seeking salary arrears and compensation for late payment of salary. 8.  In June 1997 the applicant lodged a claim with the labour disputes commission of the SMZ, seeking salary arrears. On 6 June 1997 the commission awarded her 462.36 hryvnias (UAH) in salary arrears (approximately 100 euros (EUR) at the material time). On 17 June 1997 it issued a certificate in respect of that decision. 9.  On 22 July 1997 the Nakhimovskyy District Court of Sevastopol (\u201cthe Nakhimovskyy Court\u201d) instituted enforcement proceedings. The applicant received the full amount of the award in two instalments, on 6 February and 28 November 2001 respectively. 10.  On 19 May 1998 the applicant brought a claim in the Nakhimovskyy Court, seeking compensation for the SMZ\u2019s failure to pay her salary arrears in a timely manner. 11.  On 25 August 1998 the court awarded her UAH 1,709.74 (about EUR 369 at the material time) in compensation for the period 1 December 1996 to 25 July 1998. The judgment was not appealed against and became final. 12.  On 4 September 1998 the Nakhimovskyy District Bailiffs\u2019 Service instituted enforcement proceedings in respect of the judgment, but it remained unenforced. 13.  On 9 April 2001 the President of the Sevastopol Court lodged with the Presidium of the same court a request for supervisory review (protest) of the Nakhimovskyy Court\u2019s judgment of 25 August 1998. On 27 April 2001 the Presidium allowed the request, quashed the judgment and remitted the case for fresh consideration. It held that the first-instance court had failed to provide sufficient reasons for its judgment of 25 August 1998. 14.  On an unspecified date the enforcement proceedings in respect of that judgment were discontinued. 15.  In the meantime, on 17 March 1999 the applicant lodged a new claim with the Nakhimovskyy Court, seeking compensation for the SMZ\u2019s failure to pay her salary arrears during the period 26 August 1998 to 17 March 1999. 16.  On 19 May 1999 the court rejected the applicant\u2019s claim. It held that that claim had already been determined in its judgment of 25 August 1998. 17.  The applicant appealed in cassation, contending that her claim concerned new circumstances, in particular the new period of delay in payment of her salary arrears. On 6 June 1999 the Sevastopol Court quashed the decision of 19 May 1999 and adopted a new decision discontinuing the proceedings, relying on the same grounds as the first-instance court. 18.  On 1 March 2001 the applicant lodged another claim with the Nakhimovskyy Court. She sought compensation for the SMZ\u2019s failure to pay her salary arrears from 1 December 1996 to 6 February 2001. 19.  On 14 June 2001 the applicant requested the Nakhimovskyy Court to examine her claims of 19 May 1998 and 1 March 2001 jointly. On 23 July 2001 the court allowed her request. 20.  On 30 August 2001 the court, following a request from the applicant, ordered an expert examination in the case and suspended the proceedings. 21.  On 25 March 2002 the applicant amended her claim and requested compensation for the non-payment of her salary arrears during the period 1 December 1997 to 28 November 2001. 22.  On 4 July 2002 the expert\u2019s report was submitted to the court and the proceedings were resumed. 23.  On 28 January 2004 the court found against the applicant. It held that she had failed to lodge her claims within the three-month limitation period provided by Article 233 of the Labour Code, which had started to run on 6 June 1997, the day the labour disputes commission had awarded her salary arrears. 24.  On 20 May 2004 the Sevastopol Town Court of Appeal upheld the judgment of 28 January 2004. On 28 November 2006 a panel of three judges of the Supreme Court rejected the applicant\u2019s request for leave to appeal in cassation.", "references": ["7", "8", "1", "4", "0", "9", "2", "5", "6", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Sofia. 5.  The applicant\u2019s father owned a house with a yard and a garage in Sofia. 6.  Pursuant to a decision of the mayor issued on 27 July 1978, the property was expropriated for the purposes of constructing a residential building. The order, based on section 98 (1) of the Territorial and Urban Planning Act (\u0417\u0430\u043a\u043e\u043d \u0437\u0430 \u0442\u0435\u0440\u0438\u0442\u043e\u0440\u0438\u0430\u043b\u043d\u043e\u0442\u043e \u0438 \u0441\u0435\u043b\u0438\u0449\u043d\u043e \u0443\u0441\u0442\u0440\u043e\u0439\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e \u2013 \u201cthe TUPA\u201d), provided that the applicant\u2019s father was to be compensated with a two-room flat and a garage in a building which the municipality planned to construct. 7.  In a supplementary decision of 19 February 1979, based on section 100 of the TUPA, the mayor specified the exact location, size and other details in respect of the flat to be provided by way of compensation. As no mention was made of a garage, the applicant\u2019s father applied for judicial review of that decision. In a final judgment of 21 June 1979 the Sofia City Court found in his favour and referred the case back to the administrative authorities with instructions to specify the exact garage to be provided as compensation. 8.  In 1982 the flat in question was constructed and handed over to the applicant\u2019s father. 9.  After 1992 the applicant\u2019s father filed numerous requests with the municipal authorities asking them to specify the exact garage to be given to him. By a letter of 12 January 2008 the chief architect of Sofia informed him that no buildings with garages earmarked for the purpose of compensation were being constructed at the moment. 10.  In 2008 the applicant\u2019s father brought an action for damages under the State and Municipalities Responsibility for Damage Act (\u0417\u0430\u043a\u043e\u043d \u0437\u0430 \u043e\u0442\u0433\u043e\u0432\u043e\u0440\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0442\u0430 \u043d\u0430 \u0434\u044a\u0440\u0436\u0430\u0432\u0430\u0442\u0430 \u0438 \u043e\u0431\u0449\u0438\u043d\u0438\u0442\u0435 \u0437\u0430 \u0432\u0440\u0435\u0434\u0438) for unlawful failure on the part of the Sofia municipality to fulfill its obligations to build and provide him with a garage. The action was dismissed in a final judgment of 21 June 2011 of the Supreme Administrative Court, on the grounds that no unlawful failure to act on the part of the authorities had been established. 11.  In the meantime, on 7 April 2008 the applicant\u2019s father passed away. The applicant is his only heir.", "references": ["7", "0", "5", "8", "1", "6", "4", "2", "3", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicants\u2019 dates of birth and places of residence are given in the Appendix. 5.  At the material time all the applicants were members of an opposition party, the Popular Front Party of Azerbaijan (\u201cthe PFPA\u201d), which together with some other parties formed a political union, Milli Shura. The first applicant was chairman of the Youth Committee of the PFPA and a journalist for the Azadlig newspaper. The fourth applicant was a member of that committee and the fifth applicant was a member of its board. The second applicant was chairman of the Jalilabad district branch of the PFPA and had also been a candidate of the PFPA-Musavat political bloc in the parliamentary elections of 2010. The third and sixth applicants were bodyguards for a chairman of the PFPA, Mr A.K. 6.  It appears that the period from 2011 to 2013 was marked by an increase in political sensitivity in the country generated, inter alia, by the presidential elections, which took place in October 2013. 7.  During the same period all the applicants participated in a number of peaceful opposition demonstrations. In the course of many of them, most of the applicants were arrested and subsequently convicted, as the assemblies had not been authorised. In particular, the second and third applicants were arrested during a demonstration on 20 October 2012 and the fourth and fifth applicants were arrested during a demonstration on 26 January 2013. The second and fourth applicants were also arrested during a demonstration on 11 March 2013. 8.  According to the applicants, they had also intended to participate in upcoming protests planned by Milli Shura (including a protest scheduled for 9 March 2014, which was eventually cancelled). In addition, the fourth applicant was an organiser of a protest scheduled for 23 February 2014. According to him, he had created a Facebook group calling for the resignation of the Baku city mayor, who had allegedly insulted the Azeri nation in a speech by saying that the only man in the country was the President. The group had invited the public to participate in a demonstration against the mayor. 9.  All the applicants were arrested in either February or March 2014. The fourth applicant was arrested on 22 February, the first, second and third applicants on 27 February, and the sixth applicant on 5 March. The fifth applicant claimed that he had also been arrested on 5 March, but according to the official records, he was arrested early in the morning (at around 7 a.m.) on 6 March. 10.  According to the official records:\n(a)  the first applicant was arrested for disobeying a lawful order of a police officer to stop swearing loudly without addressing anyone in particular;\n(b)  the police approached (stopped) the second and sixth applicants because they had been noticed \u201cbehaving suspiciously\u201d, the third applicant because he was suspected of committing a traffic accident, the fifth applicant because there was a complaint against him by a certain Ms K.N., and the fourth applicant because there was \u201cinformation\u201d about him. All those applicants were arrested because when police officers had approached (stopped) them, they had deliberately failed to comply with an order to produce an identity document and/or had been rude or \u201cshowed resistance\u201d. 11.  All the applicants contested the official version of their arrest:\n(a)  The first, second and third applicants claimed that they had been approached by police officers and had been requested to follow them to a police station or office, and that they had obeyed those requests. The third applicant also submitted that he had been requested to show his identity document and that he had obeyed that request too. Furthermore, the first and second applicants argued that the reasons given by the police officers for arresting them had been different from the official versions. Thus, the police had demanded that the first applicant follow them to a police station because \u201cthere was a problem with a loan he had obtained from a bank\u201d. He went to the police station together with his father. Sometime later, his father was requested to leave the police station, while the first applicant remained in police custody. The police demanded that the second applicant follow them to a police office because \u201cthe chief of police wanted to see him\u201d.\n(b)  The fourth, fifth and sixth applicants submitted that they had been arrested by people in plain clothes, without any explanations, and that initially they had not known that those persons were police officers. In particular, the fourth applicant claimed that he had been arrested at his flat and that the persons who had arrested him had also seized his computer and had taken him to a police station. Later the police accessed his Facebook account through that computer and put a notice on it that the demonstration planned for 23 February 2014 had been cancelled. The fifth applicant claimed that he had been arrested in the evening of the day before the officially recorded date and had spent the night in custody. 12.  At the respective police stations or offices, administrative offence reports (inzibati x\u0259ta haqq\u0131nda protokol) were issued against the applicants, setting out the charges against them. All the applicants were charged with an administrative offence under Article 310.1 of the Code of Administrative Offences (\u201cthe CAO\u201d) (failure to comply with a lawful order of a police officer). The first applicant was also charged under Article 296 of the CAO (minor hooliganism). 13.  According to the applicants, they were never served with copies of the administrative offence reports or with other documents from their case files. They were also not given access to a lawyer after their arrest or while they were in police custody. 14.  According to a record (protokol) issued by a police officer (who had arrested the fifth applicant and prepared an administrative offence report on him) and signed by that police officer and the fifth applicant, a State-funded lawyer was proposed to the applicant, but the applicant refused his assistance. The lawyer\u2019s name and signature are missing from that record. 15.  According to a statement (\u0259riz\u0259) written by the fourth applicant at a police office on the day of his arrest, he had refused the services of a lawyer. 16.  On various dates the applicants were brought before the respective first-instance courts, which adopted their decisions on the merits on the same dates (see Appendix). 17.  According to all the applicants, they were not given an opportunity to appoint lawyers of their own choosing. State-funded lawyers were appointed to assist them. 18.  According to the documents in the respective case files, the first, third, fifth and sixth applicants refused the assistance of State-funded lawyers and decided to defend themselves in person. 19.  According to the transcripts of the respective hearings, in their oral submissions the State-funded lawyer for the second applicant (Mr K.K.) briefly asked the court to discontinue the administrative case, and the State\u2011funded lawyer for the fourth applicant (Ms S.H.) briefly asked the court to consider the young age of the applicant. 20.  In their statements before the courts the first, second, third, fourth and sixth applicants contested (see paragraph 11 above) the police officers\u2019 versions of the events. The first applicant argued that he had been arrested for his political activity. The third applicant argued that the police\u2019s allegation that they were investigating a car accident was a lie and that the police had wanted to frame him. The fourth applicant argued that he had been arrested for the comments he had posted on Facebook against the Baku city mayor. 21.  The courts disregarded those statements. 22.  The fifth applicant, however, gave a self-incriminatory statement confirming the police officers\u2019 account of the events. He subsequently claimed that he had done so because the previous day he had been threatened with more serious charges and had still felt under the control of the police. 23.  During the hearings with regard to the first, second, fourth and fifth applicants only the police officers who, according to the official records, had arrested the applicants and/or issued administrative offence reports on them were questioned as witnesses. In their statements those police officers reiterated the official version of the reasons for the applicants\u2019 arrests (see paragraph 10 above). 24.  In the case of the third applicant the court questioned three prosecution witnesses. All three stated that the applicant \u201chad argued with the police officers, resisted and insulted them, saying to a police major \u2018why have you brought these puppies here?\u2019\u201d. 25.  In the case of the sixth applicant the court did not question any witnesses. 26.  The courts found that the applicants had committed the administrative offences attributed to them (see paragraph 10 above). They convicted the applicants under Article 310.1 of the CAO and sentenced them to periods of administrative detention varying from ten to twenty days (see Appendix). The first applicant was also convicted under Article 296 of the CAO. 27.  On various dates the applicants lodged appeals with the Baku Court of Appeal, presenting their version of the facts surrounding their arrests, and arguing that they had been unlawfully arrested for their political activity, including their active participation in demonstrations (the first, second, third, fifth and sixth applicants) or the comments they had posted on social media (the fourth applicant). The applicants also complained that the hearings before the respective first-instance courts had not been fair. 28.  In addition, the fifth applicant submitted that previously he had given self-incriminatory statements for fear of being framed for the offence of illegal possession of drugs. He also complained that he had been kept in the police station overnight from 5 to 6 March 2014 without any official decision or record of his detention. 29.  All the applicants were represented before the Baku Court of Appeal by lawyers of their own choosing. 30.  On various dates the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the applicants\u2019 appeals and upheld the decisions of the respective first-instance courts, stating that the conclusions reached by those courts were correct (see Appendix).", "references": ["8", "1", "9", "4", "5", "6", "0", "No Label", "7", "2", "3"], "gold": ["7", "2", "3"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1983 and lives in I\u011fd\u0131r. 5.  On 14 January 2005, while the applicant was serving as a conscript in the army, he fell from the roof where he was on guard. Subsequently, he was treated in various civilian and military hospitals. According to a medical report dated 4 May 2005, the applicant was diagnosed as suffering from a left parietal craniotomy and was declared unfit for military service. 6.  On 8 July 2005 the applicant applied to the Ministry of Defence for compensation for his injury. 7.  Following a tacit dismissal of the claim by the administrative authorities, the applicant initiated compensation proceedings in respect of the injuries he had sustained during his military service before the Supreme Military Administrative Court on 1 November 2005. He sought 20,000 Turkish liras (TRY) (approximately 12,400 euros (EUR)[1]) in respect of pecuniary damage and the same sum in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 8.  An expert report dated 4 October 2007 assessed the applicant\u2019s pecuniary damage at TRY 58,384 (approximately EUR 36,260). 9.  On 19 October 2007 the applicant asked the court to increase his initial claim via an amendment (\u0131slah), stating that he had only become aware of the true extent of his pecuniary damage when he had received the expert\u2019s report. 10.  On 28 November 2007 the Supreme Military Administrative Court ruled in favour of the applicant and awarded him the full amount of his initial claim in respect of pecuniary damage, namely TRY 20,000. It awarded him a further TRY 12,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage. However, the court dismissed the applicant\u2019s application for an amendment, considering itself bound by the initial claim. The court stated in particular:\n \u201cThe purpose of an amendment is to rectify a procedural act. Having regard to the judgment of the Constitutional Court published in the Official Journal of 4 November 2000, we must conclude that, in civil law, injured persons are entitled to seek additional compensation once an expert report has been issued. However, in the proceedings before the Supreme Military Administrative Court, the time-limits of one year [from the date when a claimant becomes aware of the impugned act] and sixty days from the date of referral of the administrative authorities apply. Under section 46(4) of the Supreme Military Administrative Court Act, the amount claimed cannot be rectified once those deadlines have passed. Consequently, the applicant\u2019s amendment claim must be rejected for being out of time ...\u201d 11.  By a judgment of 16 April 2008 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s application for rectification of its previous decision.", "references": ["6", "0", "1", "8", "4", "5", "7", "2", "9", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "11.  The three applicants belong to the Romanian Church United to Rome, also known as the Greek Catholic or Uniate Church. 12.  In 1948 the Greek Catholic Church was dissolved by Decree no. 358/1948, and its assets, with the exception of parish property, were transferred to the State; an inter-departmental committee was given responsibility for determining the ultimate allocation of the parish property. However, the committee never completed this task and the parish property was transferred to the Orthodox Church under Decree no. 177/1948. 13.  In 1967 the property comprising the church building and the adjoining courtyard, which had belonged to the first applicant, was entered in the land register as having been transferred to the ownership of the Lupeni I Romanian Orthodox Parish (\u201cthe Orthodox parish\u201d). 14.  After the fall of the communist regime in December 1989, Decree no. 358/1948 was repealed by Legislative Decree no. 9/1989. The Uniate Church was officially recognised by Legislative Decree no. 126/1990 on certain measures concerning the Romanian Church United to Rome. Article 3 of that Legislative Decree provided that the legal status of property that had belonged to the Uniate parishes and that was in the possession of the Orthodox Church was to be determined by joint committees made up of representatives of both Uniate and Orthodox clergy. In reaching their decisions, the committees were to take into account \u201cthe wishes of the worshippers in the communities in possession of these properties\u201d. 15.  Article 3 of Legislative Decree no. 126/1990 was amended by Government Ordinance no. 64/2004 and Law no. 182/2005. Under the amended decree, in the event of disagreement between the members of the clergy representing the two denominations in a joint committee, the party with an interest in bringing judicial proceedings could do so under \u201cordinary law\u201d (drept comun, see the procedure referred to in paragraphs 41 and 121 below). 16.  The first applicant was legally re-established on 12 August 1996 and the applicants brought proceedings before the joint committee to have their former properties returned to them, but without success. 17.  The domestic law, in particular Legislative Decree no. 126/1990 and the amendments made to it in 2004 and 2005, is set out in paragraphs 39 to 43 below. 18.  On 23 May 2001 the second applicant brought proceedings before the domestic courts against the Arad Orthodox Archdiocese and the Orthodox parish. It requested that the expropriation of the church building and cemetery in Lupeni, carried out on the basis of Decree no. 358/1948, be set aside, and that the church be returned to the first applicant. The first and third applicants were mentioned in the initial statement of claim as representatives of the second applicant. 19.  By a judgment of 10 October 2001, the Hunedoara County Court (\u201cthe County Court\u201d) declared the action inadmissible on the ground that the dispute ought to be settled through the special procedure established by Legislative Decree no. 126/1990, that is, before the joint committee. 20.  The first and second applicants lodged an appeal against that judgment. On 22 February 2002 they requested a stay of proceedings so that the case could be resolved by friendly settlement. On 25 March 2003 they applied for it to be restored to the court\u2019s list of cases. On the same day, the Alba-Iulia Court of Appeal (\u201cthe Court of Appeal\u201d) dismissed the appeal, holding that the action was premature. In a final judgment of 24 November 2004, ruling on an appeal on points of law (recurs) by the first and second applicants, the High Court of Cassation and Justice (\u201cthe High Court\u201d), quashed the Court of Appeal\u2019s judgment and sent the case back to that court to be examined on the merits. 21.  On 12 May 2006, in application of the legislative amendments to Legislative Decree no. 126/1990 which gave the courts jurisdiction to rule on the merits of cases concerning properties that had belonged to the Uniate parishes and were in the possession of the Orthodox Church (see paragraph 42 below), the Court of Appeal upheld the second applicant\u2019s appeal and sent the case back to the County Court. 22.  On 27 July 2006, when the case was restored to the County Court\u2019s list, the action was amended in order to add the first and the third applicants formally as claimants in the proceedings. On 8 November 2006 the applicants supplemented their action with a claim for recovery of possession of the properties in question, on the basis of ordinary law. 23.  The County Court asked the parties to organise a meeting in order to decide the fate of the church building in question, and to inform it of the outcome of the negotiations by 25 April 2007. The parties met on 20 April 2007 without reaching an agreement. 24.  By a judgment of 27 February 2008, the County Court dismissed the applicants\u2019 action on the ground that the Orthodox parish had become the legally recognised owner of the contested property by virtue of Decree no. 358/1948 and that it had behaved as an owner, inter alia by ensuring that the church was maintained properly. 25.  By a judgment of 26 September 2008, ruling on an appeal by the applicants, the Court of Appeal set aside the judgment of 27 February 2008 on grounds of a procedural defect and remitted the case to the County Court. 26.  By a judgment of 13 February 2009, the County Court found in favour of the applicants and ordered that the church be returned to the first applicant. Comparing the parties\u2019 title deeds in respect of the property in question, it noted that the Greek Catholic party had been entered in the land register as owner of the property from 1940, and that in 1967 the Orthodox Church had entered its ownership right to the same property, transferred to it under Decree no. 358/1948. It held that the repealing of Decree no. 358/1948 had had the effect in the present case of terminating the Orthodox party\u2019s right of ownership over the disputed property. It also pointed out that the first applicant did not have a place of worship and that it was obliged to hold its religious services in premises which it rented from the Roman Catholic Church. 27.  By a judgment of 11 June 2010, the Court of Appeal allowed an appeal lodged by the Orthodox parish and dismissed the applicants\u2019 action. On the basis of the evidence in the case file, it noted, firstly, that the church building being claimed and two parsonages in Lupeni had been constructed between 1906 and 1920 by Eastern-rite Orthodox and Greek Catholic worshippers and that, after its construction, the church building had been used alternately for services by both denominations. It noted that in 1948 the members of the Greek Catholic Church had been obliged to convert to the Orthodox Church and that this church building had been transferred to the ownership of the Orthodox Church, which had maintained it and carried out renovation work. 28.  The Court of Appeal also examined statements, collected by the County Court, from four witnesses. It noted that these statements supported the statistical data indicating that there were more Orthodox than Greek Catholic worshippers in Lupeni. It noted that, according to the most recent census, there were 24,968 Orthodox worshippers and 509 Greek Catholic worshippers in Lupeni. It also compared the witness statements, written documents attesting to the number of Greek Catholic worshippers as declared when the Greek Catholic Church was re-established in Lupeni, and data from the most recent census conducted in Lupeni. 29.  It then reasoned as follows:\n\u201c... although the action was based on the provisions of ordinary law, namely Article 480 of the Civil Code, in view of its subject matter the court cannot rule without applying the provisions of Article 3 \u00a7 1 of Legislative Decree no. 126/1990, to the effect that the legal situation of places of worship and parsonages ... must be determined taking account of the wishes of the worshippers in the community that is in possession of the properties\u201d. 30.  It considered that, given that there were more Orthodox than Greek Catholic worshippers in Lupeni, including the converts who no longer wished to return to the Greek Catholic Church, their refusal had to be taken into account in ruling on the case. It found that \u201chaving regard to the social and historical realities, ignoring the wishes and proportional strength of Orthodox worshippers, who are in the majority, in relation to the far fewer Greek Catholic worshippers, would be to undermine the stability and certainty of legal relations\u201d. 31.  The Court of Appeal held that the fact that Decree no. 358/1948 had been repealed did not automatically mean that the Orthodox Church\u2019s title had been annulled, as this Decree represented the law in force at the time that the ownership right was transferred. In consequence, it considered that, although it had been granted under legislation which had subsequently been declared unlawful, the Orthodox Church\u2019s title had been valid from the date on which the transfer had been made, with the result that the action to recover possession was unfounded. 32.  The applicants lodged an appeal on points of law before the High Court, alleging that the Court of Appeal had incorrectly applied the legal provisions governing actions for recovery of possession. They argued that the right of ownership could not be linked to a religion\u2019s majority status, since ownership was a legal concept that was independent of the numerical strength and wishes of the parties. 33.  On 15 June 2011 the High Court, by a majority, delivered a final judgment in which it set out, in detail, the decisions taken by the lower courts. Reiterating that those courts alone had jurisdiction to establish the facts, it endorsed their findings of fact. It dismissed the applicants\u2019 appeal on points of law and upheld the judgment delivered on appeal. As to the applicable law, it held, in particular, as follows:\n\u201cPursuant to Legislative Decree no. 126/1990 ... a distinction is made between two situations: (a) that in which the property is in the ownership of the State ... (b) that in which the places of worship and the parishes have been taken over by the Romanian Orthodox Church and in respect of which [the question of] restitution will be decided by a joint committee made up of representatives of the clergy of the two denominations, a committee which will take account of the wishes of the worshippers in the communities in possession of these properties.\nIn the light of those provisions, the Court of Appeal, examining an action for recovery of possession of a place of worship, correctly applied the criterion of the wishes of the (predominantly Orthodox) worshippers of the community in possession of the property, while simultaneously emphasising the unlawfulness of the reasoning of the first-instance court, which had merely compared the title deeds and ignored the special law...\nHowever, it appears that there are 24,968 Orthodox worshippers and 509 Greek Catholic worshippers in Lupeni, that the worshippers who were obliged to transfer to the Orthodox Church in 1948 do not wish to return to the Greek Catholic Church and that an attempt has been made to resolve [the dispute] through the joint clerical committee (according to the minutes of 20 April 2007 ... the Orthodox party had indicated that the request for the return of the place of worship could not be granted, having regard to the wishes of the worshippers in the parish and the fact that since 1948 the place of worship has been administered by the Orthodox believers)...\nThe fact of supplementing Article 3 [of Legislative Decree no. 126/1990] with a paragraph stating \u201cIf the committee does not meet within the period established in its mandate, or if the committee does not reach a conclusion or if one of the parties is dissatisfied with the decision taken by the committee, the party with an interest in bringing judicial proceedings may do so under ordinary law\u201d does not mean that actions for restitution governed by the special provisions are transformed into applications to establish title under ordinary law.\nA court which is required to examine such an action cannot ignore the special regulations in this area, which indicate the criterion to be taken into account in resolving such claims, namely the wishes of the worshippers in the community in possession of the property.\nIn other words, by virtue of its full jurisdiction and in order not to compromise access to justice, a court may be called upon to decide an action on the merits, even though the prior procedure did not culminate in a decision by the joint clerical committee; at the same time, however, it may not go beyond the limits imposed by the special statutory framework.\nThe priority to be given to the criterion of the worshippers\u2019 wishes was decided by the legislature, which wished in this way to regulate an area which concerns the buildings assigned to a particular use (places of worship), [and so] the court is not entitled to criticise the law.\nMoreover, in ruling on the alleged unconstitutionality of Article 3 of Decree no. 126/1990 and the criterion of the worshippers\u2019 wishes, the Constitutional Court has stated that the text did not infringe the principle of democracy of the Romanian State, nor that of the freedom of religious denominations (CC decision no. 23/1993, CC decision no. 49/1995)...\nIn the Court of Appeal\u2019s view, the fact that the State unlawfully dispossessed the Greek Catholic Church of its places of worship in 1948 cannot be remedied \u2013 in a State subject to the rule of law \u2013 by committing the opposite error, that is, by failing to take account of the wishes of the majority of worshippers at the point of adopting the given measure. Returning the properties which belonged to the Greek Catholic Church without respecting the criteria imposed by Article 3 \u00a7 1 of Legislative Decree no. 126/1990 would undermine the stability and certainty of legal relations. A right cannot be reconstructed in abstracto, in disregard of social and historical realities, and mitigation of past damage must not create disproportionate new problems...\nMoreover, in order to be able to bring an action for recovery of possession under ordinary law rather than under the special law, the appellants must rely on the existence of a \u201cpossession\u201d, namely of a pecuniary right that could be relied upon by them.\nHowever, the Greek Catholic denomination was dissolved by Decree no. 358/1948 and the assets of the Greek Catholic Church passed into the ownership of the State. The building in question is currently entered (in the land register ... as belonging to the Lupeni I Romanian Orthodox Church.\nThe fact that, through Legislative Decree no. 9/1989, the Romanian Church United to Rome (Greek Catholic) was officially recognised following the repeal of Decree no. 358/1948 does not mean that all of its titles to property were restored, in so far as the right of ownership is subject to a procedure (namely the provisions of Legislative Decree no. 126/1990 and its subsequent amendments), and the hope of obtaining title to property is not to be equated with a possession...\u201d 34.  In a separate opinion, one of the judges sitting in the case noted that the legislature\u2019s reference to ordinary law could not be reduced to a purely procedural dimension, but was to be interpreted as the application of a rule of substantive law. Referring to the rules governing the preparation of statutes, the judge expressed the opinion that if the legislature had wished to ascribe a specific meaning to this reference to \u201cordinary law\u201d, it ought to have done so explicitly. As an action for recovery of possession involved a comparison of the relevant property titles, the judge concluded that the Orthodox Church had no such title to the church building in question.", "references": ["4", "5", "2", "0", "6", "1", "7", "8", "9", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "9.  The applicant was born in 1966. She is currently detained in Forest-Berkendael Prison. 10.  On 22 September 1990 the applicant married B.M., whom she divorced after the events to which the application relates. According to her explanations, since 1983 B.M. had been living with Dr M.S., a man fifteen years his elder, who had taken him in following B.M.\u2019s arrival from Morocco, providing him with a home and paying for his studies. 11.  The applicant and her husband had five children. In 1992, shortly after the birth of her first child, the applicant began suffering from depression and stopped working as a French and history teacher, only returning for a few months in 1993. Dr M.S. certified her unfit for work on account of depression and asthenia. Subsequently, her insurance company\u2019s medical adviser confirmed that she was unfit for work on account of depression. In October 1996 a report by a court-appointed psychiatrist, which was later endorsed by the Employment Tribunal, diagnosed her as suffering from \u201crecurrent endogenous anxiety and depression, with a slightly destabilised basic personality\u201d, rendering her more than 66% unfit for work. The expert concluded as follows:\n\u201c... social contact feeds a sense of persecution and interpretative paranoia. The patient is socially withdrawn and has a tendency to retreat into herself. When faced with anxiety-inducing situations, the patient regresses emotionally, retreats into herself and takes refuge in passive-receptive and hypochondriac behaviour. On account of her intrinsic sensitivity, her anxiety may be combined with reactive depression. To conclude, we are confronted with a fragile, sensitive and anxious personality, with feelings of abandonment and phobic and obsessional components, who is likely, in situations of anxiety, to regress emotionally, to withdraw into herself and to develop various manifestations of anxiety, persecution and depression.\u201d 12.  The applicant and B.M. lived in a house which had been bought in their name but paid for by Dr M.S. The applicant\u2019s husband worked part-time as Dr M.S.\u2019s administrative assistant. 13.  On 25 June 2004, on the recommendation of Dr M.S., who was her general practitioner, the applicant consulted a psychiatrist, D.V., who prescribed an antidepressant, sleeping tablets and anti-anxiety medication. Dr D.V., who had suggested that the applicant undergo psychiatric monitoring, saw her again on 4 February 2005, among other occasions, and wrote to M.S. recommending that he prescribe her a new antidepressant, as well as sleeping tablets and anti-anxiety medication. The applicant consulted D.V. once a month between February 2005 and the summer of 2006. The latter noted that the applicant appeared to be \u201calways very tense and suffering from nervous exhaustion, constituting all the hallmarks of rumination\u201d and that she showed \u201csymptoms of social withdrawal and abnormal exhaustion during household tasks\u201d. In the spring of 2006 the applicant reported to D.V. that she felt isolated from her own family. From September 2006 she saw him every three weeks. In December 2006 D.V. successively prescribed the applicant two types of sleeping tablets. On 12 January 2007 she linked her exhaustion to the fact that she could not bear Dr M.S.\u2019s presence, and on that occasion D.V. noted \u201ca feeling of dependence\u201d on M.S. financially, \u201ca feeling of insecurity\u201d and \u201ca feeling towards that person [M.S.] which was one of intrusion, of having an unwelcome person under her roof, and also a great deal of ambivalence\u201d. 14.  Dr D.V. saw the applicant again on 30 January and 9 and 13 February 2007. On the last-mentioned date the applicant wrote him a letter, which read:\n\u201cDoctor, I don\u2019t feel very well when I wake up, I have trouble getting out of bed and I have stomach cramps. I have to get up though because I have diarrhoea every morning. I have this big knot. The whole of my left arm is frozen. I feel so sad, deeply sad. I can no longer manage a coffee in the morning. I feel very weak and lacking energy. I am afraid all the time. I am afraid of myself. I am afraid of the future. When I walk down the street, I am afraid. I don\u2019t have the courage. I don\u2019t know where to find the courage and I am tired of it all. I don\u2019t want to believe in a better future. I am at a dead end. I have been to a shop. I went to see if they had a very sharp meat knife. I don\u2019t know how I am going to tell my husband all this, that I don\u2019t feel well and that I have always kept it hidden that I felt so bad about myself and in my head and that I was taking medication. Please do something for me. I am being crushed by a mass of bad feelings. I have never felt so vulnerable. I feel unwell during the night. I often wake up and think. Ms Lhermitte ...\u201d 15.  In February 2007 the applicant mentioned sharp knives to D.V. on one or two occasions. D.V. interpreted this as \u201can impulse phobia\u201d. He saw her again on Friday 23 February 2007, noting that the applicant remained \u201cextremely preoccupied as well, in the absence of her husband who [had] gone to Morocco again, and [found] herself having to deal alone with her uneasy feelings towards [M.S.]\u201d. 16.  Early in the morning of 27 February 2007, the day before the incident, the applicant went to Dr D.V.\u2019s practice and delivered a second letter which she had just written. The letter read as follows:\n\u201cDr [V.], you don\u2019t have much time. I have not felt well these last few days. I\u2019m having dark thoughts. They are suicidal thoughts which are going to carry me away and I will take my children with me. It\u2019s a daily struggle. My friend [V.G.] is supporting me. There is no solution to my problem. I feel walled up. I feel like a prisoner. I no longer have the strength. I don\u2019t think my husband will save me because whichever way you look at it, he is in a favourable position. He is coming home tomorrow evening but I can\u2019t tell him of all my pain and distress. The family situation cannot be turned around. I have already had suicidal thoughts in the past. I imagine scenarios which are both true and realistic and I know I am capable. This is not a game. Sorry to take up your time! Ms Lhermitte ...\u201d 17.  Later that day, in the early afternoon, the applicant telephoned Dr D.V.\u2019s practice to check that her letter had actually been received. 18.  The applicant\u2019s letters addressed to Dr D.V. dated 13 and 27 February 2007 were not included in the file on the criminal investigation. D.V. later indicated that they had not formed part of the applicant\u2019s medical records. 19.  On 28 February 2007 the applicant left a final letter, together with a bag of jewellery, in the letterbox of her friend and confidante V.G. The letter read as follows:\n\u201cMy dear friend [V.],\nI have cut off my phone and I am now starting to write this letter.\nI hope you will not be shocked by what I\u2019m going to write.\nYou must show it to [Dr D.V.] who will be at \u00c9rasme [hospital] on Friday morning at 9. He will be able to help you and explain what you explained to me so kindly when you came to my house. I don\u2019t have the courage to get things moving and I am completely frozen and paralysed with fear because there is no solution to my problem. You have always opened your door to me and my children and have been a ray of sunshine in our life, and I will thank you forever. I have decided to go a long way away with the children forever. One day, you\u2019ll see, we\u2019ll meet again but I don\u2019t regret this final solution.\nPlease let my sister Mireille ... and my other sister Catherine ... know. Please forgive me. I beg my sisters to forgive me if I have hurt them. I can no longer bear this situation, because my husband is blind and deaf and despite that, he is happy in this situation.\n[M.S.] is a bastard who has ruined my life and robbed me of my privacy with my husband and children. I left the hell of my parents\u2019 home only to fall into another hell. ...\u201d 20.  The applicant ended her letter by asking her friend to share her jewellery with her two sisters. She also left a voicemail message on V.G.\u2019s mobile phone \u2013 in a voice which the investigating officers later described as \u201ctrembling\u201d and \u201chesitant\u201d \u2013 telling V.G. that she had left a letter and a present in her letterbox and asking to be \u201cforgiven\u201d, before saying \u201cgoodbye\u201d. 21.  Afterwards, using two knives which she had stolen from a department store, the applicant killed her five children one by one before attempting suicide. 22.  After writing the message \u201ccall the police\u201d on a sheet of paper stuck to her front door, she telephoned the emergency services to say that she had killed her five children and to report her suicide attempt. When the police, the ambulance crew and the medical services arrived at the scene, they found the applicant, who was injured, and the bodies of the five children with their throats slit. 23.  When the applicant was admitted to the intensive-care unit on the day of the incident, the doctor treating her noted \u201cdepressive, self-destructive thoughts against a background of psychotropic, anti-anxiety and antidepressant medication\u201d. During her initial police interview, the applicant had explained that she had acted in a fit of despair caused by her family\u2019s dependence on Dr M.S. 24.  On 1 March 2007 an investigating judge at the Nivelles Court of First Instance charged the applicant with the intentional and premeditated homicide of her five children. The applicant was also placed in pre-trial detention. 25.  Forensic medical reports produced between 12 March and 31 December 2007 concluded that the five homicides had been committed in a relatively short time \u2013 about ten minutes in each case \u2013 and that, in view of the speed at which the events had occurred, they were the result of a preconceived plan. In addition, toxicological analyses carried out on blood samples taken from the applicant confirmed that she had only been taking a combination of anti-anxiety medication and sleeping tablets, the plasma levels detected being described as subtherapeutic \u2013 in other words, very low. 26.  The investigating judge ordered several psychological reports. Two psychologists examined the applicant and submitted their respective reports on 30 October and 8 November 2007. They both concluded that the applicant was suffering from inner fragility requiring massive, rigid defences to preserve a perfect facade. She had developed a maternal omnipotence and a lack of psychological distance between the children and herself. Thus, by killing her children \u2013 love-objects in whom she had over-invested \u2013 the applicant was killing herself both as a person and as a mother. 27.  A psychiatric assessment was also ordered by the investigating judge, who appointed a panel of three psychiatrists, Drs G., B. and M. The panel of experts examined the applicant and drew up a report dated 30 October 2007, in which they concluded:\n\u201cWe consider that [the applicant] was in a severe state of anxiety and depression which encouraged her to act as she did and profoundly impaired her judgment, without destroying it altogether.\n...\nThe accused was not suffering at the time of the events, and is not currently suffering, from a mental disorder or a severe mental disturbance or defect making her incapable of controlling her actions.\u201d 28.  In an order of 17 June 2008 the Indictments Division (chambre des mises en accusation) of the Brussels Court of Appeal, upholding an order made by the investigating judge on 19 May 2008, committed the applicant to stand trial in the Assize Court for the following offence:\n\u201c... in Nivelles, on 28 February 2007,\nhaving knowingly, intentionally and with premeditation, killed the following persons:\n- [Y.M.], born on 13 August 1992;\n- [N.M.], born on 13 February 1995;\n- [My.M.], born on 20 April 1997;\n- [Mi.M.], born on 20 May 1999;\n- and [Me.M.], born on 9 August 2003.\u201d 29.  The indictment of 19 October 2008, drawn up by the Principal Public Prosecutor, ran to fifty-one pages and gave an account of the precise sequence of events, the steps taken and evidence obtained during the investigation, and the forensic medical reports; a substantial part of it also focused on the applicant\u2019s personal history and family life and the motives and reasons that had prompted her to carry out the killings, particularly in the light of the expert assessments of her psychological and mental state. 30.  The applicant\u2019s trial took place in the Assize Court of the province of Walloon Brabant from 8 to 19 December 2008. At the start of the trial the indictment was read out by the Advocate-General representing the prosecution, and the nature of the offence forming the basis of the charge and any circumstances that might aggravate or mitigate the sentence were likewise indicated. 31.  While giving testimony during the trial in the Assize Court, Dr D.V. mentioned the existence of the two letters dated 13 and 27 February 2007 which the applicant had addressed to him. He produced them in court, thus disclosing them for the first time in the proceedings. In view of this new evidence, the President of the Assize Court duly instructed the panel of three psychiatrists, G., B. and M., who had already been involved at the investigation stage and had already confirmed their findings orally before the Assize Court, to produce a further report. 32.  On 14 December 2008 the panel of three psychiatrists adopted a report in which they expressed a unanimous opinion. They began by noting by way of introduction:\n\u201c[The first question, concerning the applicant\u2019s ability to control her actions at the time of the events and at present] is regularly the most difficult and controversial because of the \u2018all or nothing\u2019 nature of the answer that has to be given regarding inability to control one\u2019s actions, so much so that some psychiatrists have for that reason declined to produce expert reports in criminal cases. A total loss of control over one\u2019s actions is absolutely clear only in certain cases, such as delusional psychosis (\u2018dementia\u2019). In other cases, it is more debatable and the personal conviction of the experts will be influenced by the presence of certain indicators. Their conclusions, in concise form, must give precise answers to the questions set out in the instructions. These answers reflect the experts\u2019 personal conviction after carrying out the various written procedures. They are only ever an informed opinion, and not an absolute scientific truth.\u201d\nThe experts went on to make the following findings in particular:\n\u201cThe letter of 13 February [2007] suggests all the signs of melancholic major depression. ... These melancholic states are grounds for emergency hospital admission, or observation, where necessary. ... In the second letter, although in terms of content she unequivocally expresses her anxiety in relation to a suicide where \u2018I will take my children with me, because there is no longer any future\u2019, in terms of meaning she is clearly asking for help, apparently foreseeing her inability to control her future actions. ... These documents thus demonstrate beyond doubt that Ms Lhermitte no longer felt capable of controlling her actions ... it has always been clear that there was mental disturbance ... new evidence [warrants] the firm conviction that at the time of the events, Ms Lhermitte was incapable of controlling her actions on account of a severe mental disturbance. ... Ms Lhermitte developed a severe state of anxiety and depression ... [and] a transient dissociative state of depersonalisation, causing her to perform acts of extreme violence. Only operational thought remains; reflective consciousness is momentarily lost. ... Currently ... she remains fragile and there is still a chance, particularly because mourning is impossible, that she will experience a further episode of mental disturbance making her incapable of controlling her actions: the possibility remains that she may attempt suicide ...\nCONCLUSIONS\nThe mental examination of Genevi\u00e8ve Lhermitte prompts the following conclusion:\nThe accused was suffering at the time of the events from a severe mental disturbance making her incapable of controlling her actions, and is currently suffering from a severe mental disturbance warranting long-term treatment. ...\u201d 33.  The experts presented their report during the trial, on 16 December 2008. 34.  On 18 December 2008, after the submissions of the prosecution and the parties had been heard, the jury was called to answer the following five questions put to it by the court\u2019s president:\n\u201c1st question (principal question as to guilt)\nIs the accused Genevi\u00e8ve Lhermitte, present before this court, guilty of having knowingly and intentionally killed [Y.M.], [N.M.], [My.M.], [Mi.M.] and [Me.M.] in Nivelles on 28 February 2007?\n2nd question (subsidiary to the 1st question, to be answered by the jury only if it has answered the 1st question in the affirmative)\nIs it established that the intentional homicide referred to in the first question was premeditated?\n3rd question (principal alternative as to the commission of an act classified as a serious crime, to be answered by the jury only if it has answered the 1st question in the negative)\nIs it established that the accused Genevi\u00e8ve Lhermitte, present before this court, committed the act classified as a serious crime of having knowingly and intentionally killed [Y.M.], [N.M.], [My.M.], [Mi.M.] and [Me.M.] in Nivelles on 28 February 2007?\n4th question (subsidiary to the 3rd question, to be answered by the jury only if it has answered the 3rd question in the affirmative)\nIs it established that the act classified as a serious crime referred to in the 3rd question was premeditated?\n5th question (principal question as to social protection, concerning the accused\u2019s current mental state, to be answered by the jury only if it has answered the 1st question in the affirmative or the 3rd question in the affirmative)\nIs it established that the accused Genevi\u00e8ve Lhermitte, present before this court, is suffering either from a mental disorder or from a severe mental disturbance or defect making her incapable of controlling her actions?\u201d 35.  Counsel for the applicant did not raise any objections to these questions. The following day, after withdrawing to deliberate on their own without the judges, the members of the jury answered \u201cyes\u201d to the first two questions, concerning the applicant\u2019s guilt, and \u201cno\u201d to the last question, concerning her current mental state. 36.  Subsequently, the Assize Court, composed of both the three judges and the jury, deliberated on the sentence to be imposed. In a judgment of 19 December 2008 it took note of the guilty verdict reached by the jury alone and sentenced the applicant to life imprisonment. In conformity with Article 364, final paragraph, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Assize Court provided the following reasons for the punishment:\n\u201cThe accused\u2019s heavy family responsibilities and her painful feelings of isolation and dependence may account for a legitimate desire for greater personal freedom. Her mental fragility, depression and character no doubt made it more difficult to handle this desire and, through dialogue, to seek possible improvements within the limits of her specific circumstances, taking into account all those close to her.\nHowever, neither those factors, nor even a wish to escape from what she considered a dead-end situation through suicide, nor a lack of appropriate help, can provide a sufficient explanation for the acts of extreme violence which she resolved to commit, and which she carried out in cold blood. ...\nRegard being had to the specific circumstances relating both to the accused\u2019s character and to her living environment, the genuine difficulties experienced by her do not constitute mitigating factors, given the extremely serious nature of her acts.\u201d 37.  As an ancillary penalty, the applicant was stripped of all titles, ranks and functions she held and was permanently deprived of certain rights in accordance with Articles 19 and 31 of the Criminal Code as in force at the material time. Lastly, the judgment was to be printed and publicly displayed in the municipality where the crime had been committed, in accordance with Article 18 of the Criminal Code. 38.  On 8 January 2009 the applicant appealed on points of law, raising the same complaints as those submitted before the Court. 39.  On 6 May 2009 the Court of Cassation dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. As regards the fact that the questions to the jury had not dealt with each of the five homicides separately but had considered them as a whole, it observed in particular that the parties had agreed to the wording of the questions put to the jury. It also pointed out that the requirement for the verdict to take the form of a simple \u201cyes/no\u201d answer to the questions put to the jury was laid down in Article 348 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In response to the applicant\u2019s argument that no reasons had been given for the jury\u2019s disagreement with the experts\u2019 unanimous opinion that she had been suffering from a severe mental disturbance making her incapable of controlling her actions at the material time and at the time of the trial, the Court of Cassation held:\n\u201cIn noting the accused\u2019s cold-blooded manner and her determination to carry out her crimes, the judgment indicates the reason why the Assize Court did not accept that the perpetrator had been suffering from any mental disturbance making her incapable of controlling her actions at the time of the events.\nFurthermore, the judgment notes that the appellant\u2019s attitude demonstrates a lack of awareness of her responsibility, which she will be able to remedy through self-reflection while serving the sentence.\nThe judgment therefore states the reasons why the conditions for the application of the Social Protection Act are not satisfied.\u201d", "references": ["8", "2", "1", "0", "3", "4", "6", "7", "9", "5", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1949 and lives in San Gwann. 7.  A robbery took place on 12 May 1995 in the home of Mr and Ms Z. (the former is a lawyer by profession). According to the versions of the victims at the time, the robbery was carried out by five to seven hooded men who appeared to be under the effects of drugs. They had entered through the roof and sought to find the safe. Various items were stolen and the victims were injured while they were being held face down in the bedroom. According to Mr Z. during the robbery one of the robbers said, \u201cGive us the two buckets of gold you told us you had in your possession\u201d. Further conversations between the robbers indicated that they had a southern Maltese accent. When questioned after the incident the victims stated that they had not recognised anyone at the time, since they had been kept face down in the bedroom during the robbery. The Government contested the latter fact, relying on the version of events given by Mr Z. in 2002 (see below). 8.  The applicant and his brother, like their father previously, had done work for the Z. family as plumbers and electricians. 9.  During the investigation Mr Z. mentioned the applicant and his brother as possible people who had had access to his house and had been familiar with it, without indicating that he identified either of them as the robbers. Thus, despite the fact that the applicant had been questioned by the Police in June 1995, neither of them had, at the time, or later, been charged in connection with this robbery and no criminal prosecution ever ensued because of the lack of any evidence pointing in their direction. 10.  In 1996, the relationship between the brothers and Mr Z. broke down following Mr Z.\u2019s failure to make payments to the applicant\u2019s company. Following this, in 1997 Saliba Brothers (the company owned in part by the applicant) instituted proceedings against Mr Z. claiming payment for services rendered (these proceedings were eventually withdrawn following payment of the outstanding amount). 11.  The applicant alleged that pending the above\u2011mentioned proceedings, Mr Z. had started bad-mouthing the applicant to neighbours \u2011 who had also suffered burglaries \u2013 stating that it had been the applicant, that is to say the electrician they all used, who had committed them. The Government noted that according to the evidence tendered by E.C., a neighbour of Mr and Ms Z. (see below), it had been a common perception that families who had been regular clients of the applicant had been robbed. The applicant highlighted that the same E.C., in cross\u2011examination had twice confirmed that he had had no suspicions that the applicant had somehow been involved in the robbery. 12.  Five years after the robbery, in June 2000, Mr and Ms Z. sued the applicant in civil proceedings for the damage resulting from the said robbery as, in retrospect, Mr Z. considered that he recognised the applicant as one of the robbers. 13.  During the proceedings, the court heard evidence from Mr Z. (including a lengthy affidavit) and accepted an affidavit from Mr Z.\u2019s wife. The applicant was unable to cross-examine Ms Z. on the basis of medical advice given by an ex parte doctor who had testified before the court to the effect that Ms Z. had been suffering from depression for around eight years and that in the last two years her state of health had become much worse (she had been spending her days in bed not wanting to know about anything going on around her and had become dependent on others). He considered that there was no hope of this situation changing in the near future. When asked whether Ms Z. had been in a position to understand what she had been saying at the time of the incident, the ex parte doctor replied \u201cI think so, of course she was\u201d. 14.  The applicant\u2019s request to have Ms Z.\u2019s statement expunged from the record was refused. 15.  In all, the evidence presented before the court consisted of the following:\nOn behalf of the applicant:\n- The affidavit of the applicant, as well as his oral testimony (where he noted the good relationship that had existed between him and the plaintiff and categorically denied any involvement in the robbery, during which he had been at home sleeping, and claimed that the plaintiffs had instituted the case only in response to the proceedings his company had lodged against Mr Z., in which they had eventually been successful; following these proceedings Mr Z. had started telling neighbours who had been robbed that he (the applicant) had been responsible; he related that the morning following the incident he had been surprised to see the police on the road at the Salibas\u2019 shop, close to Mr Z.\u2019s house and, after hearing what had happened, he had repeatedly tried to call Mr Z. to offer a helping hand. Since he had not been able to get through, he had gone to the house where he had been greeted warmly at the entrance by Mr Z., who had recounted what had happened during the night including a reference to three persons who Mr Z. had claimed had been watching the roof intermittently for a period; some days later, while the applicant had been visiting a relative in hospital with his family, they had also visited Ms Z.; Mr Z. had been happy to see him (the applicant) and had told him not to worry about the money he had been owed as only a little had been stolen and it had not even been worth the beating they got; the applicant further noted that he had been surprised about Ms Z.\u2019s written testimony, given the relationship of mutual respect they had had, and he wished to cross-examine her; he further recounted how he had been called out to Mr Z.\u2019s house during the night only once, and that he had never fallen off a ladder, contrary to what had been alleged by Mr Z. He further referred to certain jobs completed in the house and to a number of named individuals who could have seen the safe; he stated that the only times he had avoided Mr Z. had been when the latter had failed to pay him; he noted that contrary to what Mr Z. had alleged, he had had no connection to arms or drugs (save for possessing a hunting rifle with the relevant police permits, which he had no longer used); he stated that he had not stopped work on one of Mr Z.\u2019s properties of his own motion, but because Mr Z. had told him to do so; the applicant had also explained this to N.S.T (an architect); the applicant also contradicted various elements of Mr Z.\u2019s affidavit; in particular he denied ever having been told about buckets of gold by Mr Z., and reference to such gold had only been made by Mr Z. during the proceedings lodged against him, and by the police one time when they had questioned him (the applicant));\n- The affidavit of the applicant\u2019s wife (she recounted that the applicant had only left the house twice during the night since 1989 \u2013 once to go to the Z. family\u2019s premises following an urgent call-out, and once to go to another client; She also recounted their visit to Ms Z. after the robbery and in what circumstances they had met prior to the robbery; she lastly explained how surprised and hurt she was about Mr. Z.\u2019s actions in their regard).\n- The two affidavits of the applicant\u2019s two brothers (F. and S.) and the oral testimony of F. (F. confirmed that he had worked everywhere in the house, including next to the safe, together with other workmen from his company and that other named individuals had had access to the house as they had also rendered services there; he also denied that he had ever spoken to W.B. (the Z. family\u2019s caretaker) about payments due, and that he had ever taken anything from Mr Z. without permission, contrary to what had been alleged by him. He further stated that when questioned by the police two years after the incident they had asked him whether he had been aware of the position of the safe and the buckets of gold; in his oral testimony he confirmed that he had fallen off a ladder once in Mr Z.\u2019s house contrary to Mr Z.\u2019s statement alleging that it had been the applicant who had fallen); (S. testified that the brothers had stopped work on one of the projects because Mr Z. had not confirmed that he had wished them to continue and had failed to pay sums already due, and in respect of which they had thus sued Mr Z. S. also contradicted other events recounted by Mr Z. in his testimony and noted that he had never discussed due payments with W.B.)\n- The seven affidavits of the applicant\u2019s seven sisters (who denied ever having made certain statements to Mr Z., which he had imputed to them in his testimony, or having gone to his house, or even having known him);\n- The cross-examination of Mr Z. (at two hearings);\n- The cross\u2011examination of the police investigator, G.C. (at two hearings);\n- The cross-examination of a neighbour, M.C.\nOn behalf of the plaintiffs:\n- The two affidavits of Mr Z.\nIn the first affidavit Mr Z. explained the history and the good relationship he had had with the applicant\u2019s family and how much the Z. family had cared for and trusted the applicant. He stated that at the time of the robbery the Saliba brothers had been working on project D. but works had been stalled; that the applicant\u2019s sisters had gone to his office worried and in fear of the applicant, who they said was clever and armed; Mr Z. explained that a few weeks before the robbery the applicant had been working at the house, including on the roof, and at one point, while distracted, the applicant had fallen off a ladder; Mr Z. explained that on some occasions both the applicant and his brother had had access to the door of his roof and had known how to open it, and had also worked close to the safe. Mr Z. stated that in more recent years it had been only the applicant who had attended to jobs in the house and who had come during the late hours of the night, coming promptly and not charging them, even though he usually charged for all his services, even minor ones \u2013 thus, he had been the only one in the world, and nobody else, who had the knowledge of the house as it would be at night time. Mr Z. related that on one occasion, where payment to the applicant was likely to be delayed, he had reassured the applicant by referring to his (Mr Z.\u2019s) numerous immovable properties and told the applicant precisely to \u201crest assured you have two buckets of gold as guarantee\u201d. Mr Z. noted that he had never used these words with anyone else and that the applicant had appeared to take him literally; he stated that later on the applicant had also admitted to these words having been uttered to him. Mr Z. recounted the robbery: how, while the Z couple had been asleep, they had heard chaos in the entrance of the house and one man had run through the corridor directly towards them and asked him for gold. Another two men had followed and kept the couple in the bedroom in the dark; one of them (who injured his wife while holding her on the ground) had again asked for gold stating that they would go and consume drugs, while the other had repeated \u201cgive us the gold you told us you have\u201d. Mr Z. stated that he had recognised the words on the spot, as those he had once uttered to the applicant. Mr Z. noted that the two people who had held them in the bedroom had appeared to be under the effects of drugs; while they had been asking for gold it had become clear that they had been targeting the safe. Twenty minutes later another voice had called out from the end of the corridor that they could leave and so they had done so. Mr Z. stated that once the robbers had left the bedroom he had followed them and recognised the applicant as one of the six or seven men - \u201cI recognised him with my eyes, after already knowing that he was one of them through my ears\u201d. Mr Z. held that the applicant had been the only one to have remained silent. Having known the applicant closely and worked with him for around twelve years, Mr Z. felt that he could recognise his mannerisms, stature, height and behaviour, as well as his movements and head inclinations, which corresponded to what he had seen. Mr Z. continued to explain that it had been natural not to say anything in that moment of shock and fear, but that:\n\u201cI knew from the start that he was part of the group because I was told so and because I recognised him, he had kept his distance but I saw him leave in the car with the others as if [qisu] the bottom part of his face uncovered\u201d.\nWhile various rooms had been searched, only the contents of the safe had been stolen. Mr Z. explained that one of the robbers had exclaimed \u201cthere it is\u201d and they had initially tried to remove the safe, but then they found the key to it in Ms Z.\u2019s purse, which as a habit she regularly kept on the armchair in the sitting room. Confronted with this situation Mr Z. reiterated that on that date the applicant and his brother had been the only two persons who had known about the safe as they had been the only people who had entered that part of the house on multiple occasions since 1991, and the louvres had been always closed. Mr Z. recalled how after the robbery numerous people had come and seen the safe, but not the applicant or his brothers. The applicant had had all the knowledge necessary, including how to open the roof door, where to cut the phone line, where to find the purse, and other useful details to facilitate such a robbery, which had taken place in twenty minutes during the night. Mr Z. continued to explain the situation after the robbery. He stated that the working relationship had ended and that the applicant had gone to the house a couple of hours after the robbery; he had offered no help and had just shown his face; nor had he offered any help when he had gone to visit Ms Z. in hospital, with his wife and daughter who, had not been known to the couple. Mr Z. testified that a few days after the robbery he had gone to buy a bulb from the applicant, who had expressed no sympathy. Mr Z. stated that subsequently the applicant had called him to tell him he would no longer work on project D., and Mr Z. noted that the architect N.S.T. and their caretaker W.B. had said that the applicant had refused to work for Mr Z. any longer as he had no longer had money, and that he had failed to pay the brothers money due for services rendered. It had also been strange that sometime after the robbery, Mr. Z had sent invoices claiming such fees and had started avoiding the applicant. Yet in 1995 the applicant had sent the couple a Christmas card and in 1996 invited them to his daughter\u2019s wedding. Mr Z. further referred to various robberies which had taken place in households in the neighbourhood which had been all clients of the applicant. He stated that M.C. had told him that the applicant had been the last person in the room before she had found her jewellery box missing. He reiterated the changed attitude of the applicant towards him following the robbery and had even instituted civil claims in judicial proceedings. The Saliba brothers had also not told him that their father had died, even though he had been the testamentary executor nominated by their late father. According to Mr Z. the applicant had known that had they not been sure of his responsibility, they would not have instituted proceedings against him.\nIn a later affidavit, Mr Z. clarified that it had been only three of the sisters who had gone to him in fear of their brother. He considered the applicant\u2019s wife\u2019s affidavit as totally untruthful; likewise the applicant\u2019s brothers\u2019, in particular in connection with the reasons why work on project D. had stopped \u2013 he noted that the real reason had been the robbery and the fact that the applicant had realised he had been caught \u2013 and in connection with their exchanges with W.B. Mr Z. also considered the applicant\u2019s testimony to have been untruthful and therefore an indication of guilt, and indicated a number of lies therein.\n- The affidavit of Ms Z. (to the effect that robbers had targeted the safe, which they had tried to remove entirely until they had found the key to it in her handbag; she stated that absolutely nobody had known about the safe before the robbery as nobody had entered that very private area of the house; she further stated that it had been only the applicant who \u2013 in the three years before the robbery \u2013 had continuously and at all times of day and night entered all parts of the house as he had been their trusted handyman, and that sometimes he had been accompanied by his brother and that they had both known about the safe. She reiterated that it had been only the applicant who had had access to the safe and had known the house by night, knowledge which neither his brother nor the domestic help had had. She explained that she had been told that after the incident the applicant had gone to their house and to visit her in hospital with his family; he had also sent a Christmas card and invited the couple to his daughter\u2019s wedding; however he had not wanted to continue working on one of Mr Z.\u2019s projects and had eventually sued them in court without giving them prior notice. She considered this to be odd given their good relationship, which had dated back many years, and she thus considered that they had had something to hide.);\n- The affidavit of the architect on project D., N.S.T. (who stated that the reason given by the applicant for stopping the works on project D. had been that Mr Z. had had no money);\n- The affidavit of W.B. an employee of the Z. family (who testified that the Saliba brothers had been the trusted electricians and plumbers of the Z. family and they had stopped working on any of the Z. family\u2019s properties after the robbery (unlike other workers); he stated that the brothers had once asked him why Mr Z. had not been paying them as Mr Z. had told them that compared to the gold he had not even a breadcrumb had been taken. Another time the brothers had told him (W.B.) that they had not wanted to work for Mr Z. anymore as he had had no money. When he (W.B.) had told Mr Z. what the brothers had told him, Mr Z. had told W.B. that he had once told the applicant not to worry if he had not paid up immediately as he had had two buckets of gold as a guarantee for any outstanding debt. Mr Z. had explained to him (W.B.) that the applicant had taken him literally and that the applicant had expected to find more than he had actually found in the safe; W.B. also stated that he had never entered that private part of the house where the safe had been. Lastly, he denied participation in the robbery);\n- The affidavits of two neighbours, E.C. and M.C. (E.C. stated that he and other neighbours had been robbed while being clients of the applicant who ran a shop on the same road where they lived \u2013 this fact was known in the area);\n- Evidence of police inspectors S.G. and J.C. (S.G. confirmed that at the time of the incident they had not known who the robbers had been: J.C. stated that the investigators had spoken about the applicant in June 1995 and that subsequently he had been questioned (amongst others \u2013 five people altogether) as a person with the knowhow to commit such a robbery, as well as a result of Mr Z.\u2019s claim to the effect that he had mentioned the buckets of gold only to the applicant. J.C. also stated that Mr Z. had said that only one of the four or five robbers had spoken during the incident);\n- The cross-examination of the applicant\u2019s two brothers and four of his sisters\n- Breakdown of the plaintiff\u2019s claim, confirmed under oath by Mr Z., and a number of supporting documents. 16.  By a five-page judgment of 10 October 2006 the Civil Court (First Hall), in its civil jurisdiction, considered that the applicant had taken part in the robbery and therefore ordered him to pay damages yet to be quantified, and requested that the plaintiffs submit a claim. The court admitted that there had been various inconsistencies in the testimony of Mr Z. \u2013 for example statements that the applicant had been silent and yet that the victim had recognised him through his sense of hearing, as well as his statement that someone had told him that it had been the applicant. The court further noted that many of Mr Z.\u2019s arguments indicating that the applicant was implicated had weakened his version. These arguments based the applicant\u2019s guilt on the fact that i) he had fallen off a ladder; ii) that he had invited Mr and Ms Z. to his daughter\u2019s wedding; iii) that he had not informed Mr and Ms Z. about the demise of his father; iv) that he had been paid for work by means of land; v) that he had sent the Z. family a postcard; vi) that the applicant had fallen out with his brothers; and vii) that the applicant had been \u201csilent and absent\u201d. Indeed these repeated arguments had been far-fetched and banal, usually an indication that an individual was not convinced of his statement. The court noted that the only established facts were that the robber had known both the house (allowing him to move comfortably within it and find what he wanted) and Mr Z. (giving the robber a reason to remain silent during the robbery). While the applicant had not been the only one to have had these traits, the applicant had been one of the few who had had them. Furthermore, the robbers had known about the \u201cbuckets of gold\u201d, which Mr Z. had allegedly mentioned to the applicant. In the court\u2019s view the robbers had either known this from the applicant and, if so, the applicant would have had no other reason to share this information apart from bad intentions, or the robber had actually been the applicant himself. The court noted that this unfortunately indicated that Mr Z. had used this factor for the identification of the applicant, and it would have been better to have solely relied on visual identification. 17.  Nevertheless, the court considered Mr Z.\u2019s testimony reliable on the basis that identification could be based on mannerisms, movements and a silhouette, even if the face and voice remained hidden. It concluded that the applicant \u201chad taken part in the robbery\u201d and in application of the civil code was responsible for the damages suffered by the claimants. 18.  By a decree of the same date the court ordered Mr Z. to lodge a schedule of damage within two months. 19.  By means of an affidavit of 13 November 2006, confirmed under oath by Mr Z., the Z. family claimed damage amounting to around 125,000 euros (EUR) covering the items and money stolen (including a list of jewellery drawn up with the assistance of a professional who had not taken an oath) and the expenses to repair the damage caused to the house. They further claimed medical expenses of EUR 85,000 in relation to the injuries suffered. 20.  On 8 January 2007 the applicant made submissions on this point requesting that the court not allow the affidavit of 13 November 2006 as evidence on the grounds that the stage of putting forward evidence had been closed two years earlier and Mr Z. had declared that he no longer had any evidence to submit. 21.  By a judgment of 4 March 2008, the Civil Court (First Hall), in its civil jurisdiction, ordered the applicant to pay EUR 130,000 in damages, specifically for the EUR 125,000 in stolen items and cash and for the damage done to the house, as declared by Mr Z.; and EUR 5,000 in medical expenses. The court noted that the victims were not required to have receipts of the items obtained over several years or proof of how much cash they had had in the house. In such circumstances the best proof was the victims\u2019 declaration under oath, the veracity of which (after having seen the house) the court had no reason to doubt. Thus, damages for items stolen had to be granted on the basis of Mr Z.\u2019s claim. However, as to the medical expenses, while it was true that the claim had also been made under oath, given that the expenses had been incurred after the robbery and after the couple had already decided to sue, the court considered that the claimants should have kept receipts of such expenses and therefore made this award arbitrium boni viri. 22.  By a decree of the same day the court refused the applicant\u2019s request not to allow the submission of the claim for expenses rendered by means of an affidavit not confirmed under oath by the ex parte expert and submitted after the stage for submissions of evidence had closed. 23.  On 17 March 2008, the applicant appealed against all the above decisions. In his appeal application and again orally during the appeal hearing he asked the court to allow his brother to appear in court (to show that the victim could not differentiate between the two brothers \u2013 see paragraph 15 above in connection with the testimonies concerning the ladder incident). The appeal application read as follows:\n\u201cAt this stage, the plaintiff is humbly making a formal request to the Court of Appeal to allow the applicant to produce as evidence before it his brother [F.S.] in order for the court to be able to confirm the above ...\u201d\nThe Government contested the fact that the written request had been repeated orally, as no such record had been found in the acts of the proceedings. The Court of Appeal gave no reply to this request. 24.  The Court of Appeal, by a judgment of 6 October 2009, reiterated that it was well known that it was not for it to alter the assessment of evidence in the absence of compelling reasons. It noted that for civil proceedings to reach a finding it sufficed for a judge to have a \u201cmoral certainty\u201d, as opposed to proof beyond reasonable doubt as required in criminal proceedings. It was true that a more rigorous test was required when a person was being accused of a crime in the context of civil proceedings, particularly when the issue was the identity of the person. However, Maltese law did not provide what was necessary for identification, only what was not necessary, thus leaving it to the judge to decide according to his discretion. In the present case, the whole case depended on Mr Z.\u2019s identification of the applicant, which the first\u2011instance court had chosen to believe despite the inconsistencies and contradictions in his and Ms Z.\u2019s testimonies. In this connection one had to bear in mind that the memory of a victim of a violent robbery could suffer psychological effects which may result in inconsistencies. Having examined the acts of the proceedings and the applicant\u2019s submissions, it considered that it need not depart from the first-instance court\u2019s findings because the applicant\u2019s arguments were secondary to the actual identification of the applicant and were therefore not justified. 25.  As to the dismissal of the applicant\u2019s objection in relation to the claim for damages which were allowed at a later stage, the court considered that the claim was not new evidence as such and it was the only proof of the damage that had been caused. Moreover, it had been the court which had requested that Mr Z. lodge the claim and the applicant had had the possibility of making submissions in reply, thus no prejudice had been caused. 26.  As to the award of damages, the Court of Appeal noted that Mr Z.\u2019s testimony had been made under oath; the list of jewellery had been drawn up with the assistance of an expert (although he had not confirmed it under oath); thus, Mr Z. could not be blamed for not presenting further evidence of the damage, particularly since some items had been inherited and others purchased long before, as well as because certain documents had also been in the safe and had been stolen during the robbery. Mr. Z. had not valued the items himself and had appropriately engaged a jeweller to perform the evaluation. Had the applicant had doubts as to that person\u2019s expertise, he could have, at the relevant time, challenged him and called him as a witness. 27.  The applicant instituted constitutional redress proceedings claiming a violation of, inter alia, Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention. 28.  By a judgment of 7 October 2011 the Civil Court (First Hall), in its constitutional jurisdiction, rejected the applicant\u2019s claims. 29.  It considered that the applicant had not been found guilty of a criminal offence, but was responsible for damages arising as a result of that crime. In consequence the proceedings remained under civil law and the burden of proof remained that used for civil cases, namely a balance of probabilities, and did not require a more onerous degree of proof. It noted that the first court had assessed the evidence available and considered that the identification of the applicant had been convincingly established; the Court of Appeal found no reason to alter that conclusion. Thus there was nothing which indicated a breach of the applicant\u2019s rights. 30.  As to the applicant\u2019s inability to cross-examine Ms Z., it noted that there had been a valid reason, namely her poor health as confirmed by her doctor, and the applicant had had the opportunity to comment on her written testimony. In its view there had been nothing arbitrary in the court\u2019s decision to allow that statement, as it had been acting within its discretion. Furthermore, the applicant had not appealed against this matter before the Court of Appeal. As to the refusal of the appeal court to call for his brother, it noted that it was not the Court of Appeal\u2019s role to re-examine witnesses and the applicant\u2019s brother had already given testimony in written and oral form at first instance. As to the refusal not to allow the \u201clate\u201d claim for damages, it found that this fell within the court\u2019s discretion to proceed with the case in the way it deemed fit in the interests of justice. Lastly, no issue arose from the courts\u2019 acceptance of an evaluation of damage which had not been confirmed under oath by the expert, and such an evaluation fell within the discretion of the courts. It concluded that the applicant\u2019s rights had not been breached. 31.  The applicant appealed. 32.  By a judgment of 15 October 2012 the Constitutional Court also rejected the applicant\u2019s claims. It considered that in the civil proceedings the first-instance court had had no doubt about Mr Z.\u2019s testimony and his identification of the applicant and nothing indicated that that court had not taken into consideration all the necessary evidence for its assessment. Furthermore, the Court of Appeal had not found there were compelling reasons to alter that decision. 33.  As to the failure of the Court of Appeal to hear evidence from the applicant\u2019s brother, it considered that although this request had been made in writing amongst other pleadings in the appeal application, it had not been reiterated in the concluding requests of the appeal application. There was also no note in the minutes of the hearings that this matter had been raised orally. In any event, the applicant\u2019s brother had given testimony at first instance and, given that such a decision fell within the discretion of the courts, the applicant had not proved that the failure to re-examine the witness had caused him prejudice. 34.  As to the inability of the applicant to cross-examine Ms Z., the Constitutional Court noted that her testimony (unlike that of her husband) had not referred to the identification of the applicant, which had been nearly the only factor on which the civil court had based its decision. Thus, no prejudice had been caused to the applicant. It followed that no issue of equality of arms arose as a result of the two procedural steps examined above. 35.  As to the decision on the damage, the Constitutional Court considered that the principle of onus probandi incumbit ei qui dicit non ei qui negat had been respected, as the civil court had opined that the damage had been proved by Mr Z. 36.  According to the documents submitted, following the above judgments the applicant became extremely depressed and unfit for work. He was thus excused from work and began to receive a disability pension. He considered that had he continued to work, he would have earned much more. According to the Government the applicant was certified as unfit for work on 1 July 2005 and retired when he was sixty-one and has since then been in receipt of a pension. 37.  On 25 March 2010 Mr and Ms Z. made a request for a judicial sale by auction of property belonging to the applicant in order to have the courts\u2019 judgment enforced. Another such request was made on 11 February 2013. 38.  The applicant attempted to obtain the entire case file concerning the civil proceedings; however, he was informed that it had gone missing from the Registry of the Courts of Malta; the applicant lodged the application before this Court with the documents in his possession. The Government located the file following communication of the application and submitted it to the Court. 39. In 2015, since they had not yet received payment from the applicant, the Z. family instituted civil proceedings against the applicant\u2019s brother F., asking the court to declare him responsible for the same robbery and asking the court to order (in solidum with the applicant) the payment of the same damages liquidated by the Court of Appeal in its judgment of 6 October 2009. 40.  The photos submitted to this Court by the applicant show, in particular, a difference in height and hair colour between the applicant and his brother.", "references": ["8", "2", "4", "7", "1", "6", "0", "5", "9", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicants are Russian nationals. They owned rooms in a dormitory building in the municipality of Samara. The municipality reclaimed the building, and the applicants\u2019 title to the real property in question was annulled as a result of civil proceedings brought against them by a prosecutor on behalf of the municipality. According to the Government, the judgment has not been enforced and the applicants continue to reside in the rooms they had bought. 6.  Ms Vasyukhina and Mr Vasyukhin (application no. 45173/08) submitted that they had never moved into the rooms as they were occupied by other individuals. 7.  In 1993 a State-owned enterprise called Samaraavtotrans was privatised and reorganised into a joint-stock limited liability company called Stroitel. The privatisation plan was approved by the municipality and the Regional Property Fund signed the plan on its behalf. In accordance with the privatisation plan, all residential buildings previously listed on Samaraavtotrans\u2019s balance sheet were to be transferred to the municipality, while the administrative buildings were to be taken over by Stroitel. The privatisation plan referred to a building located at no. 61 Yunykh Pionerov Avenue, Samara, as an administrative building (used for non-residential purposes), and it was transferred to Stroitel. 8.  As a result of a number of reorganisations of Stroitel, the title to the building in question was transferred to the closed joint-stock company, Stroitel-M. Subsequently, separate rooms in the building were resold to third parties, including the applicants. The information concerning the applicants\u2019 titles to the property can be found in the appendix below. According to the title deeds, the applicants were owners of non-residential premises. 9.  The applicants moved into the rooms and resided there. 10.  On 23 August 2002 the Samara Region Commercial Court found the Samaraavtotrans privatisation plan and the agreement of 10 November 1993 \u2013 which the Regional Property Fund and Stroitel had entered into, and which partly concerned the transfer of the title to the building to Stroitel \u2013 null and void. 11.  On an unspecified date the Promyshlenniy district prosecutor, acting in the interests of the municipality, brought an action against Stroitel, Stroitel-M and the owners of the rooms in the former dormitory building, including the applicants. Referring to the invalidation of the privatisation of Samaraavtotrans, the prosecutor submitted that the subsequent transactions relating to the building were also null and void, and asked the court to return the title to the building to the municipality. 12.  According to the applicants, on 27-28 October 2003 the Promyshlenniy District Court of Samara (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) dismissed the prosecutor\u2019s claim. On 20 January 2004 the Samara Regional Court (\u201cthe Regional Court\u201d) quashed that judgment and remitted the matter to the District Court for fresh consideration. 13.  On 14 June 2005 the District Court dismissed the prosecutor\u2019s claim. On 2 August 2005 the Regional Court upheld the judgment of 14 June 2005 on appeal. 14.  On 18 May 2006 the Presidium of the Regional Court quashed the judgments of 14 June and 2 August 2005 by way of supervisory review, and remitted the matter to the District Court for fresh consideration. The Presidium noted that the lower courts had erroneously applied substantive and procedural laws when deciding the matter. 15.  On 14-19 November 2007 the District Court allowed the prosecutor\u2019s claim in full. The court recognised that the owners of the rooms were bona fide purchasers, but ordered that the title to the building be transferred to the municipality. The municipality, the true owner of the building, had not authorised the purchase of the rooms in the building by their current owners. Accordingly, the sale of the building in the absence of authorisation by the municipality meant that the municipality had lost possession against its will, and could recover its property from bona fide purchasers. 16.  On 12 February 2008 the Regional Court upheld the District Court\u2019s judgment of 14\u201119 November 2007 on appeal. 17.  The applicants in the present application, Mr Vitaliy Vasyukhin and Ms Darya Vasyukhina, were minors at the relevant time. 18.  On an unspecified date, acting on their behalf, the applicants\u2019 mother sued Mr B. (the person who had sold the rooms to the applicants) for damages. 19.  On 10 December 2010 and 16 June 2011 the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Samara granted her claims and awarded damages in the amount of 600,000 Russian roubles (RUB) to each of the applicants. On 10 February and 4 July 1011 the Regional Court upheld the above-mentioned judgments on appeal. 20.  On an unspecified date a bailiff initiated enforcement proceedings. On 4 March 2014 he discontinued the enforcement proceedings, noting that it was impossible to establish Mr B.\u2019s whereabouts or identify his assets, if any such assets existed. 21.  It appears that the enforcement proceedings in respect of the judgment of 16 June 2011 are still pending.", "references": ["1", "4", "6", "5", "7", "3", "0", "8", "2", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1969 in Lebanon. 6.  On 12 January 1993, at the age of 23, he entered Denmark and requested asylum, which was refused by a final decision of 31 October 1994. 7.  On 17 November 1994 he applied for a residence permit based on his marriage to a Danish national of Lebanese origin. She had entered Denmark as a child in 1985. His request was granted temporarily, until August 1996. Subsequently it was granted permanently. In 2000 he was also granted asylum under section 7 of the Aliens Act (Udl\u00e6ndingloven). 8.  The couple have eight children, all Danish nationals, who at the beginning of 2010 were 14, 13, 12, 10, 9, 7, 6 and 4 years old, respectively. 9.  The applicant never went to school in Lebanon and he has never had a job, either in Lebanon or in Denmark. In Denmark he received social benefits until 16 November 2004, when he was granted an early retirement pension by the State due to his poor health: he suffered in particular from post-traumatic stress disorder. His wife was granted an early retirement pension due to back problems. 10.  The applicant speaks and understands Danish but he cannot read or write the language. He also speaks and understands Arabic, but cannot read or write it. The same applies to his wife. They speak Arabic between themselves and with their children. 11.  The applicant\u2019s wife has eighteen siblings living in Denmark. 12.  The applicant has no other family in Denmark. His mother and sister live in Lebanon. He also has a sister in Syria. 13.  The applicant has a criminal record which includes, inter alia, a conviction in 2000 for grave disturbance of public order and a suspended sentence of twenty days\u2019 imprisonment, a conviction in June 2005 sentencing him to twenty days for committing violence against a public servant in the performance of his office, and a conviction in February 2007 for the same kind of offence, for which he was sentenced to three months\u2019 imprisonment. 14.  On 9 September 2009 the applicant was arrested and detained on remand charged with, inter alia, various counts of drug trafficking and dealing. 15.  By a judgment of 10 June 2010 the City Court in Odense (retten i Odense) found him guilty, in part jointly with others, of 18 counts of offences including drug trafficking and drug dealing contrary to Article 191 of the Criminal Code with regard to a significant amount of hashish (more than 100 kg in total, in addition to an attempt to import a large supply from Holland) and an attempt to buy 200 g of cocaine, all committed in the period from 2006 until 9 September 2009. In addition he was convicted of coercion by violence and threats, blackmail, theft, handling stolen property, escaping while under arrest and possession of weapons. 16.  When sentencing the applicant to five years\u2019 imprisonment the City Court took into account, in particular, the significant amount of hashish and cocaine; that the latter was a \u201chard drug\u201d; the huge profit that the applicant had obtained from the resale; the long period concerned; the applicant\u2019s absolute leading role, notably in relation to the drug dealers under him, whom he had subjected to violence and threats; and that as a member of a gang, he had delivered hashish for resale to various towns in the region. It was also noted that the applicant had previous convictions. Finally, the sentence was determined partially as a supplementary penalty because some of the offences had been committed before the applicant\u2019s previous conviction. 17.  The amount of 404,500 Danish kroner (DKK), equivalent to approximately 54,000 euros (EUR), and gold jewellery found in the applicant\u2019s home during a search were confiscated as profit from the crimes. It was noted that the applicant and his wife, who both received State benefits and who, when calculating their expenses, apparently had a deficit in their household budget for 2007, 2008 and 2009 amounting to a total of at least DKK 2.5 million (approximately EUR 335,600) could not substantiate that they had obtained the goods legally. For example, the applicant\u2019s wife denied knowledge of a receipt dated 20 October 2008 for 255.6 g of gold jewellery bought in her name in Dubai for DKK 43,000. 18.  Moreover, pursuant to section 24b of the Aliens Act, the City Court ordered the applicant\u2019s expulsion, suspended and with two years\u2019 probation. The City Court noted that the seriousness of the crimes spoke heavily for his expulsion without suspension, but having regard to his wife, who stated that she could not follow her husband to Lebanon, and his eight children in the country, the court did not find that there was sufficient basis for an unsuspended expulsion order. 19.  On appeal, by a judgment of 30 March 2011 the conviction was upheld in part by the High Court of Eastern Denmark (\u00d8stre Landsret) and the sentence was increased to six years\u2019 imprisonment due notably to the nature and quantity of the drugs, the extent of the drug offences committed and the applicant\u2019s leading role. By three votes to three, with the more beneficial outcome in the applicant\u2019s favour, the expulsion order remained suspended. 20.  The public prosecution appealed to the Supreme Court (H\u00f8jesteret) against the judgment as regards the suspended expulsion order. New evidence was adduced in this respect, notably as regards the applicant\u2019s and his wife\u2019s ties to Denmark, Lebanon and Syria. They were both heard. 21.  The applicant explained that he had been in Lebanon for thirty days during the summer of 2009. He had no contacts there but his mother and sister. His other sister lived with her husband and their five children in a refugee camp in Syria. He had stayed there for twenty or twenty-two days during the summer of 2007, for fourteen days during the summer of 2008 and for sixteen days in December 2008. 22.  The applicant\u2019s wife and children had been to Syria two or three times in 2009 to visit the applicant\u2019s sister there. Since the applicant\u2019s arrest in September 2009, she and the children had spent one and a half months in Syria in 2010, and two months in 2011. During the spring of 2011 she had gone alone to Syria for seven or ten days because the sister had fallen ill. 23.  During the summer of 2009 the applicant began negotiations to buy an apartment in Syria because his wife and children went there quite often. He also wanted to buy a shop in the same building. Twice he transferred money via Western Union to his sister to buy the apartment, but it was given up when he was arrested. 24.  The applicant\u2019s wife stated that she could not follow her husband if he were expelled to Lebanon or Syria. She and the children would not be able to stand living in either of those countries, and the children could not live outside Denmark. 25.  Statements obtained from the Children\u2019s Department at the municipality and the children\u2019s schools and day-care institutions recounted that several of the eight children had serious problems, including of a psychological and educational nature. Four of the children received special education and several of the children needed extra support and supervision in their schools and institutions. Massive public support measures had been provided due to a significant need to teach them normal social behaviour. Finally, the placement of some of the sons in public care was under consideration. 26.  According to a police report of 9 August 2011, based on interceptions carried out during the criminal proceedings against the applicant, it was established that in the period from 21 April 2009 to 10 September 2009, thus a period of less than 5 months, there had been nine hundred and sixty\u2011seven calls to and from overseas numbers on the applicant\u2019s and his wife\u2019s home telephone. These concerned eighty different foreign telephone numbers, including thirty-eight in Lebanon and nine in Syria. To the numbers in Lebanon there had been in total four hundred and thirty-three calls, and to the numbers in Syria there had been three hundred and six calls. The applicant explained in this connection that the calls to Lebanon had mainly been to people from Denmark who had been on vacation in Lebanon and that the calls to Syria had been to his sister. The applicant\u2019s wife explained that she often talked to her sister-in-law in Syria. She also had family in Lebanon. Nevertheless she did have difficulties understanding why there had been calls to thirty-eight different numbers in Lebanon. 27.  According to a police report of 18 August 2011, it appeared that in the period from 18 January 2006 to 15 June 2011 the applicant, his wife and their children had made various transfers of money to Syria and Lebanon. Sixteen of those concerned a total of DKK 71,471 and were made in the applicant\u2019s name. After the applicant\u2019s arrest in September 2009, his wife had transferred money to the applicant\u2019s sisters in Lebanon and Syria. 28.  In its judgment of 12 October 2011, by a majority of six votes to one, the Supreme Court decided to expel the applicant with a life-long ban on his return. 29.  It observed that the applicant had been convicted of drug trafficking offences under Article 191 of the Penal Code and attempt thereof on five counts for 59.5 kg of hashish for resale (count 53a); 23 kg for resale (count 56); not less than 15 kg for resale (count 58); entering a deal to buy 200 g of cocaine for resale, which failed (count 60); and an attempt to smuggle in a large amount of hashish from Holland, which failed (count 61). He had also been convicted of offences under the Stimulants Act for having possessed and transferred not less than 10.6 kg of hashish, which failed as to 6 kg (count 59); and for having possessed 1.632 kg of hashish for resale. 30.  In addition he was convicted of coercion by use of violence or threats of violence (counts 54 and 57a); extortion (count 57); theft (count 64); six counts of handling stolen goods (counts 66, 67, 68, 69, 70 and 71); under the Act on Weapons (count 65); and under Article 124 of the Penal Code for having fled as a detainee (count 74). 31.  The Supreme Court went on to analyse the case in the light of the Court\u2019s case-law, notably Maslov v. Austria [GC], no. 1638/03, ECHR 2008 and took the following into account. 32.  The applicant was a stateless Palestinian who had entered Denmark in 1993 at the age of 23. He had been sentenced to six years\u2019 imprisonment for comprehensive and organised resale of large amounts of hashish, for attempting to buy 200 g of cocaine, and for attempting to smuggle in hashish. Moreover, the drug trafficking had taken place over more than two and a half years and the applicant had had a leading and central role. 33.  In addition he had committed coercion by use of violence or threat of violence against his drug dealers to maintain them as sellers and against clients who could not pay for the drugs. He claimed to have been among the top five members of the \u201cBlack Ghost\u201d gang in Odense. He had also been convicted of extortion for having demanded so-called \u201cprotection\u2011money\u201d for \u201cBlack Ghost\u201d. Moreover, he had previously been convicted under Article 119 of the Penal Code for violence against a public servant and sentenced to three months\u2019 imprisonment. 34.  The Supreme Court also emphasised that although the applicant had been in Denmark since 1993, he was not well integrated into Danish society and he had limited Danish language skills. He had no ties to Denmark via work or education. He had been receiving State early retirement pension since 2004. 35.  The applicant\u2019s spouse was a Danish citizen. She was born a Palestinian national and had lived briefly in Lebanon, arriving in Denmark at the age of nine. The couple\u2019s children, who at the relevant time were between five and sixteen years old, were also Danish citizens. They were born in Denmark and went to school and institutions in the country. 36.  The applicant and his family spoke Arabic. 37.  The Supreme Court further noted that the applicant still had ties to Lebanon, where his mother and sister lived and where the applicant had lived until he entered Denmark at the age of 23. He also had ties to Syria, where a sister and her family lived, and where the applicant had stayed for three weeks in 2007, for four weeks in 2008, and in 2009. Before his arrest, the applicant had set about buying an apartment in Syria for the family to use during stays there. 38.  The applicant\u2019s spouse had family in Lebanon. Moreover, she had regular contact with the applicant\u2019s sister and family in Syria, and she had spent several vacations there, for instance in 2008 and 2009 as well as one and a half months in 2010 and two months in 2011. She had eighteen siblings in Denmark. She had stated that she would be unable to follow the applicant if he were deported from Denmark to Lebanon or Syria, and that the children would not manage outside Denmark. 39.  The majority of six judges concluded: \u201c[the applicant] has had a leading and central role in the commission of persistent, organised and aggravated drug crimes. Despite regard for his spouse and children in Denmark, we therefore find that he should be expelled with a permanent ban on his entry, see section 32, subsection 2 (V), of the Aliens Act.\u201d 40.  The minority of one judge found \u201cAs found by the majority, [the applicant] is guilty of drug offences of particular gravity. However, I find that regard for his eight minor children makes expulsion conclusively inappropriate, see section 26, subsection 2, of the Aliens Act.\u201d 41.  On 11 January 2012 the applicant was convicted for having possessed a mobile phone while in prison. He was sentenced to imprisonment for seven days. 42. It transpires from the Danish Civil Registration System that the applicant and his wife divorced with effect from 21 November 2012. 43.  According to the Prison and Probation Service, the applicant had served two-thirds of his sentence on 22 September 2013. 44.  In the meantime, on 13 August 2013, the National Police had submitted the applicant\u2019s case to the Danish Immigration Service (Udl\u00e6ndingestyrelsen) for a decision as to whether, upon return, the applicant would risk treatment as described in section 31 of the Aliens Act. 45.  Having found, inter alia, that the applicant would not be at risk of being subjected to the death penalty, or to torture, or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment upon return, on 11 July 2014 the Danish Immigration Service found that the applicant could be returned to Lebanon. That decision was upheld on appeal on 19 November 2014 by the Refugee Appeals Board (Flygtningen\u00e6vnet). 46.  The applicant\u2019s request that the Court apply Rule 39 of the Rules of Court was refused on 23 December 2014 by the Acting President of the Second Section. 47.  It appears that the applicant was deported to Lebanon shortly thereafter.", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "8", "5", "4", "1", "7", "9", "6", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicants were born in 1990, 1989 and 1990 respectively and live in Moscow. 7.   D.E. was a major in the police. He was born in 1977. 8.  On 28 November 2008 he was promoted to chief of the Tsaritsino branch of the Moscow Department of the Interior. 9.  On the evening of 26 April 2009 D.E. had a birthday party. Shortly after returning home from the venue, he left again. 10.  Between 12.30 and 1.20 a.m. on 27 April 2009 D.E. took a taxi to the Ostrov shopping centre on Shipilovskaya Street in Moscow. He was wearing police uniform and was armed with a handgun. 11.  Initially, he fired several gunshots at the driver, E., who died of his injuries in hospital. 12.  After D.E. got out of the car, he walked between some apartment blocks. Near one of them he saw two people he did not know, Ms S. and Mr K. Without saying anything, he opened fire and shot Ms S. three times and Mr K. twice. After a while he saw Mr L. and shot at him, also without saying a word. Mr L. however managed to run away. 13.  D.E. then walked towards the Ostrov shopping centre. As it was open twenty-four hours a day, there were always people inside. D.E. opened fire at a group of people who were near the entrance, firing at least two shots at the first applicant and at least one shot at the second and third applicants. Another person, Ms B., was also wounded. 14.  D.E. entered the shopping centre and approached Mr T. and Ms P. Without saying a word, he shot Mr T. in the head. After he fell to the ground, D.E. took Ms P. by the arm, pointed the gun at her head and, holding her hostage, continued moving through the shopping centre. Eventually, Ms P. managed to break free and run away. 15.  When he passed a checkout counter, D.E. shot at a cashier, Ms T., who was killed instantly. 16.  Staff and customers of the shopping centre tried to hide from D.E. Some of them used the fire exit and found themselves in the service yard of the shopping centre. D.E. followed them and, threatening them with his gun, ordered all the women who were hiding behind some boxes to step forward. One of them, Ms F., was trying to protect her pregnant daughter who was hiding together with her. She obeyed and approached D.E. He then pointed the gun at her head and pushed her towards a wall. He apparently intended to shoot her, but was distracted by a police unit that arrived at the scene. The police ordred him to let the people go, and surrender. D.E. started shooting at the police and Ms F. was able to escape, as were the other people hiding in the service yard. D.E. was subsequently apprehended by the police. 17.  In the course of the events D.E. killed two people and wounded several others. 18.  The first applicant suffered injuries to his head and body. He had a bullet entrance wound to the side of the face (parotic region) and an exit wound near the nose. He also had concussion and fractures to the walls of the right maxillary sinus and lower jaw. He also had a penetrating wound to the lumbar region, a ruptured spleen, a penetrating wound to the liver and diaphragm ligaments and a foreign body in the mediastinum. 19.  The second applicant suffered head wounds. She had a perforating wound to the left cheek and oral cavity with a fractured lower jaw. 20.  The third applicant had a non-penetrating wound to the left of the neck, a fractured left shoulder blade and a foreign body in the neck muscles. 21.  On 27 April 2009 criminal proceedings were instituted against D.E. on two counts of murder and twenty-six counts of attempted murder in and around the Ostrov shopping centre. 22.  On 5 May 2009 D.E. was dismissed from the police with effect from 27 April 2009. 23.  On 7 May 2009 the first applicant was granted victim status in the criminal proceedings. 24.  On 14 May 2009 D.E.\u2019s mother was questioned. She submitted, in particular, that as a child he had had head injuries. At the age of between eleven and twelve years old he had suffered from severe headaches and throughout his school years he had been under the supervision of a neuropathologist. After the seventh grade he had been transferred to a different school because he would frequently have disagreements with his schoolmates. After the ninth grade he had been exempted from his school examinations on medical advice. 25.  Between 25 June and 23 July 2009 a forensic psychological and psychiatric examination of Major D.E. was conducted by three psychiatrists and a psychologist. According to the conclusions set out in report no. 514 of 23 July 2009, D.E. did not suffer from any mental disorder, but had \u201caccentuated\u201d personality traits. The conditions he had suffered as a child and head injuries had led to the development of emotional instability, excitability, anxiety and demonstrative behaviour. This explained the difficulties in his adapting to school life and his behavioural deviations, which required psychiatric help. At the time of committing the offences he was accused of D.E. had not suffered from any temporary psychiatric disorder \u2013 that was apparent from the lack of evidence of his being in a psychotic state accompanied by delirium or hallucinations. He was able to understand the meaning of his actions and control them. He was neither a drug addict nor an alcoholic, although at the time of the events he had been in a moderate state of alcohol intoxication, as confirmed by an expert medical examination. 26.  The psychologist who participated in the forensic examination stated that after his promotion in December 2008 until the time of the events D.E. had been in a \u201csubjectively complex\u201d situation. This had included an increased volume of work and management of a new team. D.E.\u2019s qualities such as perfectionism, being highly demanding toward himself and others, needing to control all areas of professional activity and intolerance towards colleagues lacking diligence or competence had required, in the given situation, full use of his physical and personal resources. At the same time he had not been as enthusiastic about his new job as he had been about his previous job. Significant limitations on his independence and permanent accountability coupled with a lack of satisfaction from his work had led to emotional tension. D.E. had repeatedly wished to leave his job, but had felt responsibility for his duties and towards his subordinates. He had felt exhausted and had asked for leave, which his superiors had not granted him at the time. A complicated relationship with his wife had constituted another source of frustration. Furthermore, news of his direct supervisor leaving his job had constituted an additional traumatic factor, causing feelings of confusion unusual for D.E. The evening before the events D.E. had had his birthday party, which he had organised in the hope that he could relax in the company of his family and friends. However, on the morning of the party he had been busy at work and after leaving for the day, had expected to be called back. He had therefore been in a state of emotional tension. The fact that his wife and her father had been late for the party and the subsequent strained conversation he had had with her, coupled with his work-related anxiety and the feeling that the party had not gone as planned, had amplified the accumulated emotional tension and exhaustion. At the time of committing the offences D.E. had not been in an emotionally disturbed state. 27.  In October 2009 (the exact date is illegible) the second applicant was granted victim status in the criminal proceedings. 28.  On an unspecified date the third applicant was also granted victim status in the criminal proceedings. 29.  On 19 February 2010 the Moscow City Court convicted D.E. of two murders, twenty-two counts of attempted murder, including the attempted murder of the applicants and law-enforcement officials, and the unlawful use of firearms. He was sentenced to life imprisonment. The court also stripped him of the rank of major. 30.  When questioned in court D.E. pleaded partially guilty. He submitted that he had no recollection of the events and could not explain where and how he had come into possession of the handgun or cartridges. However, he did recognise himself on the footage of the CCTV at the shopping centre and therefore admitted that he had killed a man and tortured a woman, although he could not explain why he had done so. He pleaded not guilty with regard to all the other charges. 31.  The court questioned numerous witnesses, who confirmed the account of events given in the preceding paragraphs. In particular, D.E.\u2019s wife submitted that on returning from his birthday party he had behaved strangely. After he had left, she had called his parents and they had started to search for him. Police officers F. and Ya., who had apprehended D.E. at the Ostrov shopping centre, submitted that when they had asked him why he had done it, he had responded that \u201c[you] should live [your] life in such a way that [you] would not want to live it again\u201d. According to police officer Ya., D.E. also said that if he had had a machine gun \u201c[it] would have been more fun\u201d and, in response to a question about where he had got the firearms, he responded that, being police officers, they should know. 32.  The court also noted that D.E. had had a 1968 Makarov ShI 3192 handgun and at least thirty-three cartridges. It further referred to information provided by the Tula Cartridge Factory on 26 August 2009 to the effect that the cartridges used by D.E. had been manufactured at the factory in 2002 and 2004. It had supplied cartridges to, in particular, the Moscow Department of the Interior. There had been no instances of cartridge theft reported. The court also referred to information provided by the Moscow Department of the Interior to the effect that the handgun used by D.E. had been reported stolen from the arms store of the North Caucasus Department of the Interior for the Rostov Region. It also referred to a judgment issued by the Proletarskiy District Court of Rostov-on-Don on 19 March 2001 convicting two officials of the theft of 128 handguns from that arms store in the period between June 1998 and April to May 2000, which included the handgun used by D.E. 33.  According to the Government, on 23 March 2010 a criminal investigation into arms trafficking was instituted under Article 22 of the Criminal Code with respect to the sale of the handgun and ammunition to D.E. However, it was subsequently suspended as the culprit could not be identified. 34.  On 8 June 2010 the Supreme Court of Russia upheld D.E.\u2019s conviction and sentence on appeal. 35.  On 17 September 2009 M., an investigator from the Investigative Committee at the Prosecutor\u2019s Office of the Russian Federation, addressed the Minister of the Interior with a recommendation on measures to be taken with a view to rectifying the circumstances that had been conducive to the crime being committed. The recommendation noted that according to the forensic psychiatric examination, D.E. had been found to be of sound mind. However, since childhood he had been under the supervision of a neuropathologist on account of his psycho-emotional instability, but this had not been taken into account by the military medical panel which had found him fit to serve in the police. In the course of the psychological examination it had been established that one of the reasons for his psychologically traumatic situation had been his promotion to the position of chief of the Tsaritsino branch of the Moscow Department of the Interior. Referring to the findings of the forensic examination (see paragraph 26 above), the recommendation mentioned that D.E. had not been as interested and enthusiastic about his new duties as he had been about his previous work in the criminal police. Significant limitations on his independence and permanent accountability together with a lack of satisfaction from his work had led to emotional tension. 36.  The recommendation went on to say that on 14 November 2008 D.E. had undergone an appraisal. The Appraisal Board had decided that he corresponded to the position he held and considered his promotion a possibility. However, the investigation established that D.E. had not been fit for the position of chief of the Tsaritsino branch of the Moscow Department of the Interior due to his moral and professional qualities. In particular, he had a poor knowledge of police service in the domain of public security and was irritable with his subordinates. The Appraisal Board had therefore had a very perfunctory attitude towards its duties, and the appraisal had not corresponded to the objectives set by the applicable regulations. Improper performance of duties by staff members of the human resources services of the agencies of the interior and their perfunctory attitude towards recruitment and the promotion of staff had led to persons unfit due to their personal and professional qualities being promoted to senior positions. Furthermore, the Ministry of the Interior had failed to conduct explanatory work with its staff to ensure respect for the rule of law, despite its functioning being based precisely on the principles of respect for human rights and humanism. The actions of D.E. had thus discredited the police. 37.  The recommendation concluded that the above-mentioned failures on the part of the agencies of the interior had contributed to D.E committing serious crimes. It advised that measures should be taken aimed at their rectification. 38.  On 19 February 2010, the date D.E. was convicted, the Moscow City Court also issued a special ruling. It stated that in the course of the trial it had been established that in his childhood D.E. had been treated for conditions related to mental disorders and disorders of the central nervous system in medical institutions of agencies of the interior. However, those circumstances had not been taken into account when D.E. had been accepted to serve in the police and subsequently promoted to chief of the Tsaritsino branch of the Moscow Department of the Interior, even though the relevant medical data had been available at the institutions that provided medical care to the staff of the agencies of the interior. There had thus been a breach of section 19 of the Police Act, sections 130 and 131 of the Order of the Ministry of the Interior of 14 July 2004 and section 9.7 of the Order of the Ministry of the Interior of 14 December 1999. 39.  Furthermore, the court noted that in the course of the trial it had been established that when committing the offence D.E. had used cartridges that had been manufactured in the Tula Cartridge Factory which had supplied cartridges to, in particular, the Moscow Department of the Interior. According to information submitted by the factory, no instances of cartridge theft were reported. The court thus concluded that, while holding the position of chief of the Tsaritsino branch of the Moscow Department of the Interior, D.E. had obtained the cartridges in breach of the Instruction concerning the storage of firearms established by Order of the Ministry of the Interior no. 13 of 12 January 2009 and had later used them for committing particularly serious offences. 40.  Having regard to the irregularities in the functioning of the Ministry of the Interior which had contributed to the offences committed by D.E., the court ruled that it would draw the attention of the Minister of the Interior to the said irregularities and invite him to take measures aimed at their rectification. 41.  The first and second applicants sued D.E. for damages. The first applicant claimed compensation for medical expenses in the amount of 114,609 roubles (RUB), and the second applicant in the amount of RUB 27,631. Each applicant also claimed RUB 2,000,000 as compensation for non-pecuniary damage. 42.  On 31 July 2012 the Nagatinskiy District Court of Moscow partially allowed the claims. The court established that D.E. had been responsible for causing injuries to the first and second applicants. The court awarded RUB 19,980 (approximately 500 euros (EUR)) to the first applicant and RUB 27,631 (approximately EUR 691) to the second applicant for pecuniary damage. It stated, in particular, that whereas the first applicant\u2019s medical expenses in the amount of RUB 19,980 had been necessarily incurred, he had also claimed RUB 94,629 in respect of surgery he would have to undergo in order to extract a bullet from his anterior mediastinum. However, according to the forensic expert examination conducted, such surgery was not recommended since the bullet was separated from the tissue and did not pose a danger to the first applicant\u2019s health, whereas any attempt to extract it might lead to unexpected complications. Having regard to the defendant\u2019s financial situation and making its assessment on an equitable basis, the court also awarded RUB 350,000 (approximately EUR 8,750) to the first applicant and RUB 250,000 (approximately EUR 6,250) to the second applicant for non-pecuniary damage. 43.  On 4 December 2012 the Moscow City Court upheld the judgment on appeal. 44.  On an unspecified date the first and second applicants instituted proceedings against the Ministry of the Finance, the Federal Treasury and the Moscow Department of the Finance for damages, arguing that they had suffered injuries as a result of the unlawful actions of a State official. D.E. participated in the proceedings as a third party. 45.  On 29 July 2009 the Nagatinskiy District Court of Moscow dismissed the first applicant\u2019s claim. The court stated that under Articles 52 and 53 of the Constitution and Articles 1064 \u00a7 1 and 1069 of the Civil Code, the State was liable for the unlawful actions of a State official performed in the course of his duties. However, if a State official caused damage as a result of activities unrelated to exercising the duties of the State service, he was liable under Article 1064 \u00a7 1 of the Civil Code. The court found that in the case at hand D.E.\u2019s unlawful actions that had caused damage to the first applicant had taken place between 12.30 and 1.20 a.m. at the Ostrov shopping centre, outside D.E.\u2019s working hours and the territorial jurisdiction of the Tsaritsino branch of the Moscow Department of the Interior. They had therefore been unrelated to his duties as a State official. The fact that at the relevant time he had held the position of chief of the Tsaritsino branch of the Moscow Department of the Interior and had had the rank of major did not constitute grounds for the State\u2019s liability under Article 1069 of the Civil Code, as it had been established that D.E. had caused damage as a result of activities unrelated to the duties of his service. The court also dismissed the first applicant\u2019s arguments that the State should be held liable for the damage because (i) at the time of the events D.E. had been dressed in police uniform; (ii) he had used cartridges that had belonged to the Tsaritsino branch of the Moscow Department of the Interior; (iii) under Section 18 of the Police Act a police officer carried out his or her duties irrespective of the time, place or his or her position; and (iv) D.E. had been dismissed from service for discrediting the police. The court held that under section 18 of the Police Act, as a general rule a police officer carried out his or her duties taking into account his or her position, duty hours and whereabouts. Exceptions to that rule were provided in section 18(3) and (4) and concerned instances where a police officer had to take urgent measures to provide assistance to victims of offences, save lives, prevent a crime being committed or apprehend a person suspected of committing an offence. In such cases a police officer had to perform his or her duties irrespective of his or her position, duty hours and whereabouts. However, this was not the situation at hand and therefore D.E. had not been acting in the exercise of his State duties and there were no grounds to hold the State liable for his actions. The fact that he had been wearing police uniform and had used cartridges that had belonged to the Tsaritsino branch of the Moscow Department of the Interior had no bearing. The fact that D.E. had been dismissed for discrediting the police meant that his actions had been incompatible with the status of a police officer, but not that he had performed the actions that had caused damage to the first applicant in the course of his duties. 46.  On 6 October 2009 the Moscow City Court upheld the judgment. It noted that there was no evidence that would unequivocally confirm that the actions in question had been performed by D.E. in the course of his duties as a civil servant. 47.  On 23 September 2009 the Nagatinskiy District Court of Moscow dismissed the second applicant\u2019s claim. The court\u2019s reasoning was identical to that in its judgment of 29 July 2009 in respect of the first applicant\u2019s claim. 48.  On 1 December 2009 the Moscow City Court upheld the judgment. As in its decision of 6 October 2009, it noted that there was no evidence that would unequivocally confirm that the actions in question had been performed by D.E. in the course of his duties as a civil servant. 49.  Subsequently, having regard to the special ruling of the Moscow City Court of 19 February 2010, the first and second applicants applied for the civil proceedings to be reopened in the light of newly discovered circumstances. 50.  On 9 April 2010 the Nagatinskiy District Court of Moscow dismissed their requests in two separate rulings. It held that there were no significant new circumstances that would warrant reopening the proceedings. 51.  On 15 November 2010 the third applicant underwent a polygraph test to assess her perception of the police officers after the events of 27 April 2009. According to the results of the test, on 27 April 2009 she had taken D.E. for a police officer and, as a result of the events, had developed feelings of fear and apprehension towards police officers. 52.  Between 19 November and 5 December 2010 an expert psychological examination was conducted with a view to establishing how the fact that at the time of the events D.E. had been wearing police uniform had affected the third applicant\u2019s psychological state. According to the results of the examination, police uniform affects a person\u2019s behaviour as in general people tend to display loyalty and obedience towards symbols of authority due to the latter\u2019s legitimacy and conventionality and their fear of reprisal in the event of their refusal to obey. The fact that the perpetrator had been wearing police uniform had undoubtedly affected the third applicant\u2019s behaviour and psychological state and had limited her ability to choose a behavioural pattern aimed at protecting her life and health. At the time of the examination the third applicant felt an uncontrollable fear of officials wearing police uniform. When she saw one she felt anxiety, apprehension and panic. There was a direct connection between the events and the third applicant\u2019s psychological state characterised by depression, emotional tension and instability, negative feelings, the tendency to avoid new experiences, a pessimistic outlook on life and a change in moral values. 53.  On 29 September 2011 the third applicant instituted proceedings against the Ministry of Finance for damages. She argued that damage had been caused as a result of a police officer\u2019s unlawful exercise of his powers. She argued, in particular, that (i) D.E. had used firearms that he had obtained in the course of his service in the police; (ii) any judicial decision recovering damages from D.E. would remain unenforced since, being convicted to life imprisonment, he would have no sources of income and therefore no assets to recover the judgment debt from; (iii) the polygraph test had proven that on the night of the events the third applicant had taken D.E. for a police officer; and (iv) according to the results of the expert psychological examination, the fact that D.E. had been wearing police uniform had affected the third applicant, rendering her defence difficult. 54.  On 7 December 2012 the Tverskoy District Court of Moscow dismissed the claim. Relying on Articles 150, 151, 1064 \u00a7 1 and 1069 of the Civil Code and referring to D.E.\u2019s conviction, the court found no evidence that damage had been caused to the third applicant by the unlawful actions of a law-enforcement officer. The court found that the claim had been brought against the wrong defendant and that it should have been brought against D.E. It dismissed the argument that any judgment against D.E. would remain unenforced as speculative. The third applicant\u2019s reference to the fact that D.E. had used cartridges that had belonged to the Moscow Department of the Interior was also dismissed as \u201cbeing based on a wrong assessment of the facts established by the court\u201d. The court also stated that the third applicant\u2019s personal perception of the perpetrator dressed in police uniform did not constitute grounds for allowing the claim. It further noted that the reference to the Court\u2019s case-law in the statement of claim constituted an arbitrary interpretation of judicial decisions irrelevant to the case. 55.  On 16 April 2012 the Moscow City Court upheld the judgment on appeal.", "references": ["7", "4", "3", "9", "8", "1", "6", "2", "5", "No Label", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicants, Ms Natalya Borisovna Trapeznikova, Ms Yuliya Sergeyevna Trapeznikova and Ms Anastasiya Sergeyevna Antonova, are Russian nationals who were born in 1969, 1985 and 2004 respectively and live in Novosibirsk. The applicants are members of the family of Mr Sergei Antonov. 6.  On 1 June 2006 Mr Antonov started serving a three-year prison sentence in correctional colony no. IK-8 in the Novosibirsk Region. When examined by a doctor on 5 June 2006, he stated that following a cranio\u2011cerebral injury he had been under psychiatric supervision since 1996 and that he had been suffering from drug addiction since 2004. 7.  On 4 May 2006 Mr Antonov had swallowed several metal objects, including a spoon, and had cut himself on his stomach. On 5 May 2006 he had been taken to hospital and had been treated until 19 May 2006. 8.  On 20 July 2007 Mr Antonov was transferred to disciplinary cell no. 14 for smoking outside the designated area. On 22 July 2007 he complained of a headache and of feeling ill. At 7.10 p.m. Doctor M. examined Mr Antonov, noted that he had high blood pressure and gave him an injection. On the doctor\u2019s recommendation, Mr Antonov was transferred to another cell in the disciplinary section, where he was detained alone. As requested by the doctor, he was provided with bed linen. Doctor M. examined Mr Antonov again at 9.25 p.m. and noted that his condition had improved. At 9.40 p.m. the cell where Mr Antonov was held was locked and the alarm system was turned on. The guards in charge of the disciplinary cells observed Mr Antonov at 1.06 a.m. on 23 July 2007 through a peephole in the cell door. He was lying on his bed. During the next round of visits at 1.30 a.m. the guards saw Mr Antonov, hanging. They reported this to the duty officer. After entering the cell, the officers discovered Mr Antonov hanging by a ligature fashioned out of a bed sheet. They cut the rope and put his body on the floor. Doctor M. examined Mr Antonov\u2019s body and noted no injuries apart from the ligature mark on his neck. 9.  According to the death certificate, Mr Antonov died on 22 July 2007. 10.  According to an autopsy conducted on 24 July 2007, the cause of death was asphyxiation by hanging. In addition to the ligature mark on his neck, the forensic expert Ch. documented bruises on the deceased\u2019s head behind the left ear, at the corner of his right eye, on the right cheek and on the right side of the lower jaw. The expert decided against conducting a histological examination given that he had no doubts about the cause of Mr Antonov\u2019s death. 11.  On an unspecified date the acting head of the correctional colony conducted an internal inquiry. He established that despite Mr Antonov\u2019s condition the administration of the correctional colony had not provided him with any psychiatric supervision or treatment. It had been obvious from Mr Antonov\u2019s case file that he had had suicidal tendencies. 12.  On 28 July 2007 the deputy city prosecutor K. refused to institute a criminal investigation into Mr Antonov\u2019s death. The investigator based his decision on the reports filed by Doctor M. and the officers who had discovered Mr Antonov\u2019s body, the report on the inspection of the cell where Mr Antonov had been found and on his body, and on his medical file. He also questioned prisoners Bel., F. and Ber. who had been detained with the deceased in cell no. 14, where he had been held prior to his removal to a cell where he was found. They submitted that they had not had any conflicts with him. 13.  On 31 July 2007 the first applicant asked the regional prosecutor to institute a criminal investigation into Mr Antonov\u2019s death. Referring to the numerous injuries on Mr Antonov\u2019s body, she challenged the official version that he had committed suicide by hanging himself. 14.  On 22 August 2007 the city prosecutor P. quashed the decision of 28 July 2007 and ordered a further inquiry into the circumstances of Mr Antonov\u2019s death. Referring to the first applicant\u2019s complaint, he considered it necessary to determine the existence and origin of the injuries on Mr Antonov\u2019s body. 15.  On 28 August 2007 deputy city prosecutor K. refused to open a criminal investigation into Mr Antonov\u2019s death. The prosecutor again questioned F., Ber. and Bel., who had been detained with Mr Antonov in cell no. 14 on 22 July 2007. They submitted that it had been very stuffy in the cell and that at around 4 p.m. Mr Antonov had complained of a headache. He had been sitting at the table, had stood up and had then fallen down, hitting his head against the table. They had not noticed any injuries on Mr Antonov. The prosecutor concluded that Mr Antonov had committed suicide by hanging himself. 16.  On 13 September 2007 the first applicant appealed against the decision of 28 August 2007. 17.  On 23 September 2007 the deputy regional prosecutor A. quashed the decision of 28 August 2007 and ordered a further inquiry. He noted that it was necessary to obtain information concerning Mr Antonov\u2019s health, to determine whether the medical assistance provided to him had been sufficient and prompt and to establish whether it had been known that Mr Antonov had intended to commit suicide. The prosecutor also ordered the noose used by Mr Antonov to be found and for it to be examined. Lastly, the prosecutor noted that the inquiry had failed to take into account the injuries on Mr Antonov\u2019s head and that it was necessary to determine their origin and whether they had had any connection with his death. 18.  On 18 October 2007 investigator Fom. refused to open a criminal investigation into Mr Antonov\u2019s death, repeating verbatim the findings of the previous inquiry. 19.  On 29 October 2008 a supervising prosecutor quashed the decision of 18 October 2007 as premature and unsubstantiated. 20.  On 8 November 2007 investigator Fom. again refused to open a criminal investigation into Mr Antonov\u2019s death. In addition to the earlier findings the investigator examined Mr Antonov\u2019s medical file. He again questioned Doctor M. about the state of Mr Antonov\u2019s health on 22 July 2007. The doctor explained that following the treatment he had been given Mr Antonov had been in a satisfactory condition and that it had been possible to leave him alone in a cell. The investigator also questioned the forensic medical expert Ch., who had conducted the autopsy. The expert considered that the injuries on Mr Antonov\u2019s head could have been due to convulsions which had caused an impact with blunt, solid objects. 21.  On 12 November 2007 the supervising prosecutor dismissed the first applicant\u2019s complaint against the decision of 8 November 2007. 22.  On 18 January 2008 the first deputy head of the regional investigative committee quashed the decision of 8 November 2007 and ordered a further inquiry, noting that the prosecutor\u2019s instructions of 23 September 2007 had not been followed. 23.  On 1 February 2008 investigator Am. refused to institute criminal proceedings. Relying on the materials of the previous inquiries, the investigator confirmed the earlier finding that Mr Antonov had committed suicide. The investigator could not establish the cause and time of the injuries on Mr Antonov\u2019s body, but he noted that they were not related to his death. 24.  On 16 September 2008 the head of the regional investigative committee quashed the decision of 1 February 2008. 25.  On 30 September 2008 investigator V. again refused to open a criminal investigation, relying on the earlier findings. On 13 October 2008 that decision was quashed on the grounds of the incompleteness of the inquiry. 26.  The investigating authorities subsequently refused to open a criminal investigation into Mr Antonov\u2019s death on 25 October 2008 and 2 January 2009. On 8 December 2008 and 12 January 2009 respectively the supervising prosecutor quashed those decisions and ordered a further inquiry into the matter, noting each time that the inquiry had been incomplete and the findings contradictory. In particular, on 8 December 2008, the regional prosecutor noted that the reports of 23 July 2007 and 23 October 2008 concerning the inspection of the cell where Mr Antonov had been found had given different and mutually contradictory descriptions of the layout of the cell. 27.  On an unspecified date a senior investigator, S., started another inquiry in response to the first applicant\u2019s complaint. The investigator questioned the correctional colony officers who had been on duty on 22 July to 23 July 2007 and had seen or observed Mr Antonov on those days. She also saw Ozh., the prison psychiatrist, and a drug counsellor, Kot. Ozh. stated that he had never seen Mr Antonov or prescribed him any psychiatric supervision or treatment. After studying Mr Antonov\u2019s medical file, the investigator established that he had a history of drug addiction, one instance of self-harming and had undergone treatment in a psychiatric institution prior to his incarceration. The investigator noted that the cell where Mr Antonov had been found dead had been mistakenly indicated in the inquiry case file as no. 38 and conducted an examination of cell no. 00. On 11 February 2009 the investigator talked to the forensic expert Ch., who submitted that his superior had advised him against making any written statements about the autopsy. If necessary, the investigator could question him as a witness within the framework of the criminal proceedings. On 13 February 2009 S. concluded that Mr Antonov had committed suicide and refused to open a criminal investigation into his death. She also considered that the injuries found on Mr Antonov\u2019s head had resulted from convulsions which had caused his body to repeatedly strike against a metal grill. 28.  The senior investigator\u2019s decision was subjected to judicial review at two levels of jurisdiction. On 11 March and 27 April 2009 the Dzerzhinskiy District Court of Novosibirsk and the Novosibirsk Regional Court respectively upheld the investigator\u2019s findings on Mr Antonov\u2019s death.", "references": ["6", "8", "5", "7", "3", "9", "2", "1", "4", "No Label", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1974 and is detained in the Tomsk Region. 7.  On 2 December 2007 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of murder and two days later was placed in remand prison no. IZ-70/1 in Tomsk. On 13 November 2008 he was found guilty and sentenced to eleven years\u2019 imprisonment. The conviction was upheld on appeal. Since 18 February 2009, save for short periods of detention in the remand prison, the applicant has been held in correctional colonies nos. 2 and 4 in the Tomsk Region. 8.  The applicant submitted that during his pre-trial detention he had not been examined by a dentist and had not received any dental treatment because, as he had been informed, the remand prison neither possessed any dental equipment nor employed a dentist. The only alternative to treatment had been tooth extraction by a doctor who visited the facility once or twice a month. While in the correctional colony, the applicant had been unable to obtain any dental treatment for extended periods of time because the dental drill and X\u2011ray scanner were broken. Moreover, the colony\u2019s dentist was habitually either on holiday or away attending training courses. The applicant produced statements written by five inmates with whom he had been detained in the same penal institutions from 2007-2014. The statements corroborated his account of the lack of effective dental treatment. 9.  The applicant also submitted that he had received dental treatment for the first time on 8 June 2011 in the correctional colony. Since that time, he had undergone scaling and cleaning procedures, and extraction of teeth, but had not been prescribed any painkillers for the toothache he was suffering. Although the applicant was diagnosed with periodontitis on 19 February 2009, it was not until 20 November 2013 that treatment of the disease had been prescribed. 10.  During his detention the applicant lost nine teeth in total. He was unable to obtain orthodontic treatment even at his own expense. He had therefore asked a fellow inmate to make him temporary metal dental prostheses to replace several teeth, but they did not fit well. On 23 December 2014 the applicant had been examined by a visiting dentist from another correctional colony who recommended examination by a specialist dentist once released. 11.  The applicant also submitted several photos of his oral cavity dated 2 February and 28 April 2014, which showed that he had lost at least two front teeth within the given timespan. A medical certificate issued by the applicant\u2019s dentist on 27 June 2014 confirmed the presence of dental prostheses for eight teeth and the absence of another ten. Another dentist\u2019s certificate of 24 March 2016 showed that there were thirteen teeth missing in total. 12.  The applicant brought the issue of inadequate medical treatment to the attention of various domestic authorities, including the head of the remand prison, the Tomsk regional prosecutor\u2019s office, and the Federal Service of Execution of Sentences (\u201cthe FSIN\u201d), but all to no avail. 13.  The Government submitted that the applicant had undergone medical examinations in each penal facility and had been provided with the requisite medical treatment. They relied, in particular, upon certificates issued by the director of prison hospital no. 70 of Tomsk and the director of correctional colony no. 2, extracts from the applicant\u2019s medical file, lists of medicines and medical appliances available at the respective penal institutions, staff lists, and the penal institutions\u2019 medical licences. 14.  The applicant\u2019s medical file contained the following entries. On 19 February 2009 the applicant was examined by a dentist for the first time after his placement in detention on 4 December 2007, and he was diagnosed with periodontitis. On 30 December 2010 the dentist concluded that \u201cthe oral cavity required sanitisation\u201d. On 3 February 2011 the applicant raised his dental problems during a visit to the head of the medical unit but there was no entry in the medical file indicating that the applicant\u2019s complaint had been investigated. On 2 March 2011 the dentist recommended extraction and further treatment of teeth to the applicant. Four days later an exacerbation of his chronic periodontitis was diagnosed and one tooth was extracted. Eleven days later the applicant was informed that he could have dental prostheses fitted at his own expense. Between 3 June and 20 July 2011 he visited the dentist on seven occasions, during which he was diagnosed with gingivitis of the front teeth and dental caries, three permanent dental fillings were put in, the gingivitis was treated and the tartar build-up was removed. On 1 and 8 December 2011 the dentist diagnosed the applicant as having chronic periodontitis and found that the oral cavity required sanitisation. The cleaning procedure was performed eight months later. On 20 November 2013 the applicant was diagnosed with inflammatory degenerative periodontitis and received treatment for it. Between 20 March and 5 May 2014 the dentist again confirmed the diagnosis, prescribed treatment and extracted three teeth. 15.  Between 10 July and 7 August 2014 the applicant visited the medical unit three times and asked for dental prostheses. It was explained that such treatment could be provided at the applicant\u2019s own expense. Meanwhile the dentist confirmed the diagnosis of inflammatory degenerative periodontitis, prescribed treatment, extracted another tooth, removed a dental bridge and cleaned the tartar build-up. 16.  On 23 December 2014 the applicant was examined by two dentists, who confirmed the partial absence of teeth in both jaws, with some of them being replaced by metal prostheses. They did not diagnose periodontitis and concluded that the applicant did not require orthodontic treatment. A dentist who carried out a checkup on 22 October 2015 arrived at the same conclusions, but noted some teeth missing on the upper jaw only. The applicant was found to be \u201capparently healthy\u201d. 17.  The Government did not contest the veracity of the statements made by the applicant\u2019s former cellmates.", "references": ["6", "9", "7", "5", "8", "0", "3", "2", "4", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in \u0160ibenik. 6.  On an unspecified date an investigation was opened in respect of the applicant and four other persons, A.B., D.D., G.A. and E.R., in connection with the killing in Split of S.I.T.J, a British national. During the investigation A.B. gave oral evidence twice. 7.  On 28 May 1997 the applicant was indicted before the Split County Court on charges of murder, while A.B., D.D., G.A. and E.R. were charged under the same indictment with participating in a fight which resulted in the death of one person. During the proceedings before the trial court A.B. did not testify and the oral evidence he had given during the investigation was read out. The applicant denied the veracity of his evidence. 8.  On 19 July 2000 the Split County Court, composed of a panel of two professional judges and three lay judges, acquitted the applicant and found the other accused guilty as charged. Upon an appeal by the Split County State Attorney\u2019s Office, on 5 December 2002 the Supreme Court quashed the judgment in respect of the applicant and dismissed the charges against the other accused on account of the statutory prescription period. The Supreme Court also ordered that fresh proceedings against the applicant be conducted by a trial panel composed of different judges. 9.  In the fresh proceedings a panel of two different professional judges and three different lay judges of the Split County Court heard evidence from A.B. in the presence of the applicant and his defence lawyer on 18 February 2004. However, since one of the lay judges changed during the proceedings, the trial had to start afresh. At a hearing held on 10 July 2007 the applicant agreed that A.B.\u2019s statement could be read out and on the same day the Split County Court again acquitted the applicant. That judgment was also quashed by the Supreme Court, on 22 January 2008, which again ordered a fresh trial with different judges. 10.  A third round of proceedings was held before a panel of two different professional judges (I.R. and Ar.B.) and three different lay judges (B.S., G.M. and S.B.) of the Split County Court. At a hearing held on 23 February 2010 A.B. gave oral evidence in the presence of the applicant and his defence counsel. On 24 March 2010 Judge Ar.B. was replaced by Judge M.\u0160. and the lay judge B.S. was replaced by another lay judge, J.B. At a hearing held on 8 July 2010 that panel heard evidence from A.B., in the presence of the applicant and his defence counsel. On 17 February 2011 Judge M.\u0160. was replaced by Judge M.M. and the trial had to start afresh. During the renewed proceedings the trial panel heard evidence from various witnesses, save for the witness A.B. whose prior statement was read out at a hearing held on 7 June 2011 because he was in a psychiatric institution. A.B. was the only witness who said that he had seen the applicant attacking the victim. A request by the applicant for the trial panel to hear the witness in person was denied on the grounds that the witness was undergoing treatment for alcoholism in a psychiatric institution and that any absence from the institution would have a negative effect on his treatment. 11.  On 16 June 2011 the Split County Court found the applicant guilty of murder and sentenced him to eleven months\u2019 imprisonment, suspended for five years. 12.  In an appeal of 5 August 2011, the applicant, inter alia, challenged the veracity of the evidence given by A.B. and objected to the trial court\u2019s decision not to hear evidence from that witness in person. The applicant countered the reason given by the trial court for not requesting A.B. to come to the hearing by submitting that the witness\u2019s psychiatric treatment was scheduled to be completed in about two months and that such a delay would not affect the applicant\u2019s trial. 13.  On 27 March 2012 the Supreme Court upheld the judgment of 16 June 2011. The relevant part of the Supreme Court\u2019s judgment reads:\n\u201cThe accused is not right in [alleging] that the first-instance court committed a serious breach of the rules of criminal procedure when it, without the [defence\u2019s] consent, read out the statements of witnesses A.B. and G.A. The [first-instance] court was correct in deciding to read out the statement of witness A.B. (page 967 of the case file), who was questioned several times in these criminal proceedings, because a letter from the Rab Psychiatric Hospital shows that he was undergoing medical treatment, namely that \u2018... the medical treatment is ongoing and possible absence would not contribute to the overall therapeutic procedure ...\u2019 (page 965 of the case file).\u201d 14.  A subsequent constitutional complaint by the applicant was dismissed by the Constitutional Court on 12 July 2012.", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "7", "6", "3", "9", "1", "8", "5", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in the village of Krasnyy Yar in the Staropoltavskiy district of Volgograd Region. 6.  On 5 August 2002 a quarrel broke out between the applicant and T. on one side and the applicant\u2019s brothers V. and P. and P.\u2019s wife, E., on the other. V. and E. called the police. 7.  At about 8 p.m. police officers D., S., Sh. and Z. arrived and took statements from E., who complained that at about 6 p.m. the applicant and T. had burst into her home. The applicant had used obscene language towards her, threatening to \u201ckill everyone\u201d and attempting to hit her and her seven year\u2011old daughter. The police also took statements from A. who explained that she had been with E. when the applicant and T. had come over, asked about V. and then entered V.\u2019s home. She had then heard shouting, and E.\u2019s daughter had run in to tell her mother that there was a quarrel taking place in V.\u2019s courtyard. E. had attempted to enter the courtyard but T. had not let her in. The applicant had come out of V.\u2019s courtyard, using obscene language towards E. and threatening her with violence. The applicant and T. had followed E. into her house, continuing to insult and threaten her in the presence of her young daughter. This had continued until E.\u2019s husband, P., had arrived home and the applicant and T. had then left. 8.  The police officers took the applicant to the Staropoltavskiy district police station. They arrived at about 11 p.m. 9.  According to the applicant, he was thrown into the boot of the police car and driven for about 80 kilometres. During the journey the police officers stopped the car and assaulted him. He was allegedly again assaulted at the police station. In particular, he was allegedly punched many times in the head and chest. 10.  At an unspecified time that day police officer Sh. drew up a report charging the applicant with petty hooliganism, an offence under Article 20.1 of the Code of Administrative Offences. It was stated in the report that at 6 p.m. on 5 August 2002 the applicant had started a brawl with E., using abusive language and attempting to hit her. 11.  At the police station the applicant was placed in a cell for administrative offenders overnight. Another detainee, K., was also being held in the cell. 12.  At about 9 a.m. on 6 August 2002 the applicant was brought before a judge of the Staropoltavskiy District Court, who found that at 6 p.m. on 5 August 2002 the applicant had started a brawl with E. while drunk and had used obscene language towards her. The applicant was sentenced to two days\u2019 administrative detention for petty hooliganism. 13.  After the hearing the applicant was placed in the Staropoltavskiy district police temporary detention facility. At his request and in view of his condition, an ambulance was called. 14.  Before taking him to hospital, an ambulance paramedic, N., diagnosed the applicant with a traumatic rupture of the left eardrum, bruising to the left of the ribcage, two fractured left ribs, a stomach injury and bruising to the left hip. 15.  On the same day he was examined by an otolaryngologist from the Staropoltavskiy District Polyclinic. He complained of ringing in the left ear and stated that he had been assaulted by police officers. The otolaryngologist concluded that in addition to chronic otitis, the applicant had signs of traumatic otitis of the left ear. 16.  On his admission to the Staropoltavskaya Central District Hospital the applicant stated that on 5 August 2002 he had been assaulted by his brother and then by police officers. He complained of pain in the left of the ribcage, around the eighth and ninth ribs. He had an abrasion measuring 7 by 1.2 centimetres on the left of the chest. His final diagnosis was a fractured eleventh left rib confirmed by X-ray images, soft tissue bruising, abrasions on the left of the chest and traumatic otitis of the left ear. 17.  On 8 August 2002 he was discharged and sent for outpatient treatment by an otolaryngologist, a physician assessment and monitoring by a surgeon. 18.  The applicant received outpatient treatment at home. He was sent for a neurosurgical examination at the Volgograd Regional Polyclinic, where X-ray images showed that he had sustained fractures to the top and bottom of the left of the skull. He was urgently admitted to the Volgograd Regional Hospital. On admission the applicant complained that he had been suffering from recurrent headaches, ringing in the ears and dizziness, and hearing loss in the left ear. He explained that on 5 August 2002 he had been assaulted by police officers. 19.  The applicant\u2019s hospital treatment lasted from 24 October to 11 November 2002. He was diagnosed with a closed head injury, mild bruising on the brain, a fractured left temporal bone (confirmed by X\u2011ray images), otitis of both ears, loss of hearing in the right ear and first degree mixed hearing loss in the left ear. 20.  On 8 August 2002 the applicant lodged a complaint with the chief of the Staropoltavskiy district police regarding his alleged ill\u2011treatment by police officers. He stated that during the incident before his arrest V. had hit him on the left hip with a spade handle, and he had punched him back in the face. 21.  On 10 August 2002 T. submitted a statement to the same chief of police describing the circumstances of the incident before the police arrived. He confirmed the applicant\u2019s version of events. 22.  On 20 August 2002 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint with the prosecutor\u2019s office. 23.  On 4 September 2002, following a pre-investigation inquiry, the Staropoltavskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office instituted criminal proceedings, finding that there was sufficient indication that the elements of a crime under Article 286 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Criminal Code (abuse of powers) were present in respect of the officers\u2019 actions. 24.  On 7 September 2002 the applicant was given victim status. 25.  On the same day P. was questioned as a witness in relation to the quarrel on 5 August 2002. He stated that he had punched T. but had not touched the applicant, and that the applicant had been \u201cabsolutely healthy\u201d and had had no bruises or any other injuries. 26.  V. stated that on 5 August 2002 the applicant and T. had entered his house, and that the applicant had punched him in the eye. He had managed to trap the applicant underneath him, and T. had pulled him off the applicant by the legs. 27.  N., the paramedic who had provided the applicant with first aid on 6 August 2002 at the police station, gave the following statements as a witness: the applicant had complained of headaches, loss of hearing in the left ear, pain in the chest, stomach and left hip and shortness of breath. He had had hearing loss and fresh coagulated blood around his left ear, a sharp pain around his left ribs and pain in the stomach. 28.  On 23 October 2002 the prosecutor\u2019s office ordered a forensic medical opinion to establish the origin of the applicant\u2019s injuries, stating that at about 2 p.m. on 5 August 2002 the applicant had been hit in the right hip by V. with a spade handle, and that the applicant had alleged to have been punched multiple times by police officers on his way to the Staropoltavskiy district police station, where he had allegedly been taken in the boot of a police car. 29.  M., an expert from the Volgograd regional forensic medical bureau and A., a radiologist from the Volgograd Regional Hospital examined the applicant\u2019s medical records, X-ray images of his skull and temporal bones taken on 24 and 28 October 2002 and X-ray images of his ribcage taken on 23 October 2002. In their report, dated 17 December 2002, they established that the applicant had a closed head injury in the form of mild bruising on the brain and a fractured left temporal bone, further complicated by traumatic otitis of the left ear. Those injuries had been caused by hard blunt objects and amounted to \u201csevere damage to health\u201d. The applicant also had a blunt injury to his ribcage with a fractured eighth left rib and an abrasion on the left of the chest, caused by hard blunt objects, which amounted to \u201cmedium damage to health\u201d. The experts did not exclude the possibility that the injuries had been caused at the time and in the circumstances as alleged by the applicant. 30.  On 4 January 2003 the applicant did not identify Z. during an identification parade, saying that he had not seen whether it had been D. and Z. who had assaulted him on the road, but that they certainly had not assaulted him at the police station. On 15 January 2003 the criminal proceedings concerning the two officers were terminated under Article 24 \u00a7 1 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (\u201cCCrP\u201d) because none of the elements of a crime were present in respect of their actions. 31.  On 21 January 2003 the prosecutor\u2019s office ordered an additional forensic medical opinion. 32.  On 13 February 2003 S., an expert from the Volgograd regional forensic medical bureau, examined the criminal case documents submitted to him by the prosecutor\u2019s office. These included statements by P., V., the paramedic N. and police officers Sh. and S. (see paragraphs 25-27 above and paragraph 33 below), the applicant\u2019s medical records and X-ray images of his ribs, temporal bones and skull dated 23, 24 and 28 October 2002. S. concluded that on 5 August 2002 the applicant had received the following injuries: a fractured left temporal bone with a rupture of the left eardrum, a displaced fracture of the eighth left rib and a fractured sixth left rib, and an abrasion on the left of the chest. On 24 October 2002 the applicant had been diagnosed with mild bruising on the brain. The expert concluded that all the injuries could have been inflicted in the manner alleged by the applicant, given their nature, number and location, the mechanism of their formation, the means of their infliction, notably by punching and kicking, the positions of the victim and attackers in relation to each other, and the direction of the blows. 33.  On 15 January 2003, during his examination as a suspect, police officer Sh. stated that he had not noticed any injuries on the applicant during his arrest on 5 August 2002, journey to the police station or at the police station. Nor had the applicant complained that anybody had injured him. Police officer S., who was also examined as a suspect that day, stated that he had seen abrasions on the applicant\u2019s face immediately after his arrest. 34.  On 4 March 2003 the Staropoltavskiy district deputy prosecutor terminated the criminal proceedings against police officers S. and Sh. The decision stated that before his arrest on 5 August 2002 the applicant, who had been drunk, had committed an act of petty hooliganism against V. The applicant and V. had then physically assaulted each other. The decision also included statements by the applicant saying that V. had hit him in the left hip with a spade handle and that he had punched him back in the face, that he had travelled to the police station in the boot of a police car after being thrown in by police officers, that during the journey the officers had stopped the car and beaten him up, punching him in the head and chest, after seeing that he had dented the boot lid, and that they had assaulted him again at the police station. The decision relied on the statements of D., S., Sh., Z. and other police officers who had denied the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill\u2011treatment. 35.  On 15 April 2003 the Staropoltavskiy district prosecutor annulled the decision of 4 March 2003 as the possibility of the applicant\u2019s injuries being inflicted during the fight with V. had not been properly explored. 36.  On 16 May 2003 the Staropoltavskiy district deputy prosecutor issued a new decision terminating the proceedings, containing essentially the same wording as the previous decision. It was annulled on 9 February 2004 by the Volgograd regional deputy prosecutor as the exact circumstances of the applicant\u2019s alleged ill-treatment had not yet been determined. 37.  On 9 March 2004 an investigator of the Staropoltavskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office terminated the criminal proceedings against police officers S. and Sh. on the same grounds as previously. 38.  According to a letter of 27 August 2004, the Volgograd regional prosecutor\u2019s office requested the Staropoltavskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office to examine complaints by the applicant concerning the improper handling of the investigation and report on the results. According to a letter from the Volgograd regional prosecutor\u2019s office dated 24 December 2004, a similar request was made in relation to a complaint by him concerning the termination of the proceedings. The Staropoltavskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office was requested to submit its report before 13 January 2005. 39.  According to letters addressed to the applicant from the Volgograd regional prosecutor\u2019s office and an investigator of the Staropoltavskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office, dated 3 February 2005 and 10 February 2005 respectively, the decision of 9 March 2004 was set aside on 4 February 2005 and the investigation was reopened. 8.  Decision of 10 March 2005 terminating the criminal proceedings against police officers S. and Sh., annulled on 9 September 2005 40.  According to a letter from the Volgograd regional prosecutor\u2019s office dated 3 November 2005, a new decision terminating the proceedings was issued on 10 March 2005 and annulled on 9 September 2005. According to a letter dated 17 May 2005, the Volgograd regional prosecutor\u2019s office had in the meantime requested the district prosecutor\u2019s office to inform the applicant of the results of the investigation and report back before 4 June 2005. 41.  On 24 October 2005 the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office informed the applicant that his complaint concerning the termination of the proceedings had been forwarded to the Volgograd regional prosecutor\u2019s office for examination. 42.  On 19 June 2006 it requested the Staropoltavskiy district prosecutor to examine the applicant\u2019s complaint concerning the investigation in the case and report back before 30 June 2006. 43.  On 17 November 2011 the Court invited the Government to submit information concerning the investigation in the applicant\u2019s case. 44.  On 21 December 2011 the Volgograd regional prosecutor\u2019s office set aside the decision of 9 March 2004 terminating the criminal proceedings as the possibility of the applicant receiving the injuries in the fight with V. had not been examined. An additional investigation was ordered. 45.  The Volgograd regional prosecutor\u2019s office carried out an internal investigation in connection with some irregularities found in the case file. It stated in its report of 31 January 2012 that the decisions of 4 February and 9 September 2005 (see paragraphs 39-40 above) were nowhere to be found and that according to new information received from the Staropoltavskiy district prosecutor and his deputy, the decision of 9 March 2004 had not been annulled. The prosecutor\u2019s office therefore concluded that the decisions of 4 February 2005 and 9 September 2005 had never been taken. The report also noted other irregularities, such as the failure of the prosecutor\u2019s office to send copies of the decisions taken in the case to their supervisory authorities or the information centre of the Ministry of the Interior, such as the decision of 9 February 2004. 46.  On 1 March 2012 the Pallasovskiy inter-district investigation division of the Volgograd regional investigative committee ordered a new forensic medical examination of the applicant in order to determine what, if any, injuries the applicant had had after the events of 5 August 2002, and whether he could have received them as a result of falling over or striking himself against something. 47.  Zh., an expert from the Staropoltavskiy district unit of the Volgograd regional forensic medical bureau, examined the applicant but found no injuries on him. As the applicant\u2019s medical records and X-ray images from 2002 had been lost, the expert based his opinion on information contained in previous expert reports, notably a report dated 18 September 2002 containing information about his treatment at the Central District Hospital (see paragraph 16 above) and an expert\u2019s suggestion that an opinion should be sought from a more experienced expert, and reports dated 17 December 2002 (see paragraph 29 above) and 13 February 2003 (see paragraph 32 above). 48.  In his report of 29 March 2012 Zh. concluded that the only injuries he could confirm were the abrasion on the chest and bruising to the eighth and ninth ribs. They could have been received on 5 August 2002 as a result of the applicant falling over and striking himself against protruding hard blunt objects \u2013 it was unlikely that they had been inflicted by punching and kicking. As regards the other injuries, noted in the expert reports of 17 December 2002 and 13 February 2003, Zh. considered that they could not be taken into account in the assessment of damage to the applicant\u2019s health because no information about the relevant clinical manifestations or reliable X-ray imaging supporting them could be found in the previous expert reports. 49.  On 9 April 2012 the investigative committee ordered a new expert opinion, using the same questions as previously (see paragraph 46 above) because the conclusions made by Zh. in his report of 29 March 2012 completely contradicted the conclusions made by the experts in 2002 and 2003. 50.  A report of 19 April 2012, prepared by a panel of five experts from the Volgograd regional forensic medical bureau, confirmed the abrasion on the left of the chest which, according to them, could have been caused on 5 August 2002 by a hard blunt object with a limited surface area, as a result of hitting or being hit by it. 51.  The experts noted that no traumatic injuries to the skull or healed rib fractures had been found on the applicant\u2019s X\u2011ray images made on 16 March 2012 and 9 April 2012 respectively. 52.  As the X-ray images of the ribcage, skull and temporal bones of 23, 24 and 28 October 2002 had been lost, the experts found it impossible to draw any conclusions as to the fractured left temporal bone, bruising on the brain or fractured eighths and eleventh ribs diagnosed previously. 53.  The experts considered that the medical records described in the previous expert reports contained no objective confirmation as to the diagnosis of traumatic otitis of the left ear, such as injuries or bleeding in that area, and concluded that the ringing and impaired hearing of which the applicant had complained had been explained by his chronic otitis. 12.  Decision of 30 April 2012 terminating the criminal proceedings against police officers S. and Sh., annulled on an unspecified date 54.  On 30 April 2012 the investigative committee terminated the proceedings in accordance with Article 24 \u00a7 1 (2) of the CCrP, because none of the elements of a crime were present in respect of the actions of police officers S. and Sh.. The decision was based, inter alia, on the following new statements received during the additional investigation in 2012. 55.  On 30 January 2012 E. stated that on 5 August 2002 she had seen the applicant assaulting V. but had not seen V. assaulting the applicant. After the quarrel between the two men the applicant had followed her to her house, where V. had retreated. The applicant had threatened and verbally abused her, and she had had no choice but to call the police. 56.  On 30 January 2012 P. stated that the applicant had had no injuries before his arrest on 5 August 2002. He had been behaving aggressively, shouting threats at E. and V. 57.  On 30 January and 7 February 2012 respectively, the applicant\u2019s wife and T. stated that the applicant had had no injuries before his arrest. 58.  On 19 March 2012 V. stated that the applicant and T. had burst into his house and attacked him. He had pushed the applicant, who had fallen onto his left side. He had then jumped on him and punched him in the head. 59.  Police officers D., S., Sh. and Z. stated that on arriving in the village of Krasnyy Yar they had learned that the applicant and T. had assaulted V., and that the applicant had also threatened to kill E. and had hit her. They had arrested the applicant and T. and had then gone to E.\u2019s house and taken statements. They had then set off to the police station. Once outside Krasnyy Yar, they had released T. because there had been too many people in the car, the engine had been overheating. T. had been behaving calmly, unlike the applicant. No violence had been used against the applicant, who had been in the passenger compartment of the car and not the boot as alleged. When arrested, the applicant had had traces of blood on his face and T\u2011shirt and coagulated blood in his left ear. His untidy appearance and dirty face had given the impression that he had been fighting with somebody. He had been moaning and holding the left of his chest, and had clearly been in pain. 60.  K., the detainee who had shared the same cell as the applicant on the night of 5 August 2002, stated that the applicant had had coagulated blood in his left ear and a swollen lip. He had been complaining of chest pain and coughing painfully. It also transpires from statements by K. and police officer G. that on their way to court on the morning of 6 August 2002 the applicant had been walking slowly. At one point he had crouched down, holding his right hand to the left of his body and saying that his ribs were aching. He had also been coughing painfully. On their way back to the police station the applicant had crouched down and complained of feeling unwell. There had been sweat on his forehead. He had been unable to lift his hands above chest height because of the pain. An ambulance had been called. 61.  N., the paramedic who had examined the applicant at the police station, stated that he had complained of headaches, loss of hearing on the left side, chest pain, difficulty breathing and pain in the left hip. He had stated that his brother had hit him on the hip with a spade handle. When asked about the origin of the other injuries, he had not said anything. One of the police officers, who had been present during the examination, had shouted that the applicant had also been hit in the ear with a spade handle. 62.  According to an examination report of the police car which had been used to take the applicant to the police station on 5 August 2002, the right side of the boot lid, the part closest to the petrol tank, had been dented. The decision stated that the location of the dents was different from where the applicant had said he had dented the lid, that the police officers had been unable to provide any explanation as to the dents, and that it was now impossible to examine the car as it had been written off. 63.  Relying on the results of the 2012 forensic medical examination, the decision stated that the only injuries confirmed were the abrasion on the chest and bruising to the ribs, and that the applicant could have received them in the fight with V. as had been confirmed by V. in 2012. 64.  It appears that on an unspecified date the decision of 30 April 2012 was annulled and the investigation was reopened. 65.  In his report of 29 May 2012, ordered by the investigating authority on 7 March 2012, a forensic psychologist found that the applicant had a tendency to use fantasy and invention in order to fill gaps in his memory, and that during his examination by the expert he had displayed signs of giving already prepared statements, hiding information or giving false information about the conflict situation between him and T. on one side and his brothers and E. on the other. 66.  The report referred to witness statements given in the case about the events of 5 August 2002. In particular, on 6 February 2012 V. had stated that the applicant and T. had burst into his house. The applicant had punched him in the face and T. had grabbed him by the legs. The applicant had then, while sitting on him, punched him repeatedly in the face and chest. V. had stated that he had not even struck the applicant once. During his additional examination on 19 March 2012 V. had stated that in the course of the fight with the applicant and T. he had managed to slip out, finding himself on top of the applicant and punching him in the head. During the reconstruction of events V. had stated that after bursting into his house the applicant and T. had knocked him down, T. had held him by the legs and the applicant, while sitting on him, had punched him five or six times in the face and chest. He had punched the applicant in the head. He had then managed to slip out and trap the applicant underneath him. Sitting on the applicant, he had tried to punch him but T. had pulled him off by the legs. 67.  On 3 June 2012 the proceedings against police officers S. and Sh. were terminated in accordance with Article 24 \u00a7 1 (2) of the CCrP because none of the elements of a crime had been present in respect of their actions. In addition to the evidence set out in the previous decision, the decision of 3 June 2012 relied on statements by E.\u2019s daughter that after the incident between the applicant and V. the applicant had attacked her, throwing her to the ground and kicking her about six times. He had then tried to hit her mother, E. The decision also referred to the conclusions made by the expert psychologist (see paragraph 65 above). 68.  It was concluded, as in the previous decision, that the applicant\u2019s allegations of police ill\u2011treatment had not been based on real facts and that the only injuries confirmed in 2012, namely the abrasion on the chest and bruising to the ribs, could have been received by the applicant in the fight with V., as had been confirmed by V. in 2012.", "references": ["3", "0", "7", "9", "4", "2", "5", "8", "6", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Moscow. 7.  On 14 May 2012 the Dorogomilovskiy District Court, Moscow (\u201cthe District Court\u201d), awarded 45,460.21 Russian roubles to N., to be paid by the applicant. The judgment of 14 May 2012 entered into force on the same day. 8.  On 16 October 2012 the District Court issued a writ of execution. 9.  By a ruling of 14 January 2013 a bailiff with the Dorogomilovskiy bailiffs\u2019 service, Moscow (\u201cthe bailiff\u201d), initiated enforcement proceedings. The applicant was invited to voluntarily comply with the judgment debt within three days of the date on which he received a copy of that ruling. 10.  On the same date the bailiff issued a ruling restricting the applicant\u2019s right to leave the country for a period of six months on the grounds that the judgment creditor had asked for such a restriction to be imposed on the applicant. The ruling was based on the 2007 Federal Act on Enforcement Proceedings (sections 6, 14, 30, 64, 67 and 68) and the 1996 Federal Act on Leaving and Entering the Russian Federation (Procedures) (section 15(5)). 11.  On 25 February 2013 the bailiffs\u2019 service sent copies of the rulings of 14 January 2013 to the applicant. The applicant only received them on 12 March 2013. 12.  The applicant, not having been aware until 12 March 2013 of the travel restriction imposed on him, decided to visit his one-year-old daughter, who lived in Italy. However, on 2 March 2013, the applicant was stopped by border guards as he was attempting to board a plane. 13.  On 13 March 2013, after having received copies of the rulings of 14 January 2013, the applicant paid the judgment debt. 14.  On 14 March 2013 the applicant complained to the Chief Bailiff of Moscow about the actions of the bailiff. He submitted that the bailiff had sent him copies of the rulings of 14 January 2013 only after the expiry of statutory time-limits. Furthermore, the bailiff had imposed the travel ban on him on the same date as that on which the enforcement proceedings had been initiated. This indicated that the bailiff had not had at his disposal any information as to whether he (the applicant) had been evading voluntary compliance with the writ of execution. 15.  On 21 March 2013 the bailiffs\u2019 service lifted the travel restriction and terminated the enforcement proceedings. 16.  On 4 April 2013 the Deputy Chief Bailiff of Moscow examined the applicant\u2019s complaint of 14 March 2013. He acknowledged that the rulings of 14 January 2013 had been sent to the applicant outside the statutory time\u2011limits and allowed the applicant\u2019s complaint in that part. However, he found, with reference to section 67 (2) of the 2007 Federal Act on Enforcement Proceedings, that the travel ban had been imposed on the applicant in accordance with law. 17.  On 23 May 2013 the applicant challenged in court the bailiff\u2019s ruling of 14 January 2013 imposing a travel ban on him. He submitted that the ruling had not been duly reasoned since he had never evaded the obligations imposed on him by the judgment of 14 May 2012. Furthermore, in breach of statutory requirements, he had not been duly informed of the travel restriction imposed on him since he had only received the bailiff\u2019s ruling on 12 March 2013. 18.  On 12 September 2013 the District Court examined and dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaint. The District Court held, in particular, that the bailiffs had imposed the travel restriction on the applicant under section 30 of the 2007 Federal Act on Enforcement Proceedings, which allows the imposition of such a restriction (upon the request of a judgment creditor) before the expiry of the time-limit set for voluntary payment of the judgment debt. 19.  In his appeal against the judgment of 12 September 2013, the applicant submitted that the District Court, in taking its decision, had not applied section 15 of the 1996 Federal Act on Leaving and Entering the Russian Federation (Procedures), which provided that the right of a Russian citizen to leave the Russian Federation could be temporarily restricted only when it had been established that he or she had evaded obligations imposed on him or her by a court. 20.  On 16 December 2013 the Moscow City Court (\u201cthe City Court\u201d) upheld the judgment of 12 September 2013. 21.  On 10 February 2014 the applicant lodged a cassation appeal with the Presidium of the City Court. 22.  On 17 March 2014 a judge of the City Court refused to refer the applicant\u2019s cassation appeal to the cassation court. 23.  On 3 July 2014 the Constitutional Court refused to accept for examination the applicant\u2019s complaint concerning whether section 30(2) and section 67(2) of the 2007 Federal Act on Enforcement Proceedings were compatible with the Constitution (Ruling no. 1561-O). 24.  In particular, the Constitutional Court held that section 67(2) of that Act could not be applied in the course of enforcement proceedings independently from the general provisions on the application of temporary travel restrictions set out in section 67(1) and in the absence of confirmation that the debtor had been notified of the enforcement proceedings instituted in respect of him and of his obligation to voluntarily comply with the writ of execution within the time-limit set by the bailiffs\u2019 service. The bailiffs\u2019 service was entitled to impose travel restrictions only in cases in which the debtor had not complied with the writ of execution within the statutory five\u2011day period, running from the date on which the debtor received the decision to initiate enforcement proceedings. 25.  Having regard to the above, the Constitutional Court concluded that the closely linked provisions of section 30(2) and section 67(2) of the 2007 Federal Act on Enforcement Proceedings did not provide for the possibility that the bailiffs\u2019 service could grant the judgment creditor\u2019s request for the imposition of a travel ban on the debtor at the same time as it took the decision to initiate enforcement proceedings (that is to say, before the expiry of the deadline set for voluntarily enforcement of the writ of execution) and also before it received confirmation that the debtor had been aware of the enforcement proceedings initiated in his respect and had evaded voluntary compliance with the writ of execution. Therefore, the legal provisions challenged by the applicant could not be regarded as having breached the applicant\u2019s constitutional rights. 26.  Following the Constitutional Court\u2019s decision the applicant lodged a request with the District Court for it to review its judgment of 12 September 2013 under the procedure for re-opening of cases due to new circumstances. 27.  On 8 October 2014 the District Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s request, having found that the provisions referred to by the applicant had not been declared incompatible with the Constitution by the Constitutional Court and that the interpretation by the Constitutional Court of those provisions could not be considered as constituting new circumstances. 28.  On 2 April 2015 the City Court upheld that decision. 29.  On 10 June 2015 a single judge of the City Court declined to refer the applicant\u2019s cassation appeal for consideration by the Court of Cassation. 30.  On 31 August 2015 a single judge of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation refused to refer the applicant\u2019s cassation appeal for consideration by the Supreme Court.", "references": ["6", "7", "8", "4", "1", "5", "9", "0", "3", "2", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1982 and lives in \u015e\u0131rnak. 6.  On 3 September 2005 a demonstration was held in the Gemlik district of the city of Bursa by the Association for the Solidarity of Prisoners\u2019 and Convicts\u2019 Relatives (Tutuklu ve H\u00fck\u00fcml\u00fc Yak\u0131nlar\u0131 Yard\u0131mla\u015fma ve Dayan\u0131\u015fma Derne\u011fi \u2013 \u201cTuhay-Der\u201d) in order to protest about the conditions of detention in prisons, and in particular those of Abdullah \u00d6calan, the leader of the PKK (the Workers\u2019 Party of Kurdistan), an illegal armed organisation. 7.  On 5 September 2005 a group who had attended the demonstration in Gemlik returned to Cizre, a district of \u015e\u0131rnak, and a gathering was held in front of the building of the Cizre branch of the People\u2019s Democratic Party (Demokratik Halk Partisi \u2013 \u201cDEHAP\u201d). The applicant, as president of the \u015e\u0131rnak branch of the DEHAP, made a speech during that gathering. 8.  On 6 October 2005 the Cizre public prosecutor filed a bill of indictment with the Cizre Criminal Court against the applicant and four others. The applicant was charged with disseminating propaganda in favour of a criminal organisation and its goals, proscribed by Article 220 \u00a7 8 of the Criminal Code, on account of his speech on 5 September 2005. The public prosecutor submitted that the following passages in the speech constituted propaganda in favour of an illegal organisation:\n\u201c... We want peace in this country. Those who wish for war prevent us from having peace. As you know, Mr Abdullah \u00d6calan, the leader of the Kurdish people, called for a ceasefire six years ago. The Government have failed to take a proper view of that six-year unilateral ceasefire and therefore the war has re-started. We have once again started to receive the bodies of guerrillas and soldiers. We want an end to the crying of the mothers of guerrillas and soldiers. We want peace. Mr Abdullah \u00d6calan has not been able to meet his lawyers or members of his family for the last three months. We believe that that sanction is harmful to the peace process.\u201d 9.  On 7 October 2005 the Cizre Criminal Court accepted the bill of indictment. 10.  On 24 July 2006 upon the request of the Cizre Criminal Court, the \u015e\u0131rnak Criminal Court obtained the applicant\u2019s defence statements. The applicant contended that he had not praised an illegal organisation in his speech and that he had not intended to disseminate propaganda. He noted that he had only thanked those who had made an effort to bring about peace. The applicant finally stated that the slogans chanted by the crowd during his speech had promoted peace. 11. The Cizre Criminal Court held nine hearings on the merits of the case and obtained a report by an expert on the video-recordings of the gathering of 5 September 2005, which stated that the applicant had made a speech to a crowd. Subsequently, on 22 December 2006, the Cizre Criminal Court issued a decision that it lacked jurisdiction as it considered that the acts of the accused should be examined under the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713). The case was transferred to the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court. 12.  On 7 April 2007 the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court ordered an expert to examine the video-recordings of the gathering of 5 September 2005. 13.  On 8 May 2007 the applicant made a statement to the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court. He contended that he had not disseminated propaganda during his speech but had only thanked those who had worked for peace and had also condemned Abdullah \u00d6calan\u2019s solitary confinement. The applicant denied the allegation that he had referred to Abdullah \u00d6calan as the leader of the Kurdish people. He further noted that there had been no violent incidents during or after his speech. Following his speech the demonstrators had dispersed quietly and the slogans that had been chanted while he spoke had been peaceful. 14.  According to the report, dated 21 May 2007, on the examination of the police video-recordings of the gathering of 5 September 2005 submitted by the expert to the first-instance court, the applicant had made the following speech:\n\u201c... Friends, I would like to say a few words about how grateful we are to you. First of all, as you already know, we left \u015e\u0131rnak to go to the peace meeting, Gemlik meeting which was organised by Tuhay-Der. As a result of the arbitrary security measures taken by the security forces and the fact that we were forced to wait two and a half hours at each checkpoint for identity checks, we were not able to travel as fast as we wanted. For us, those who conducted themselves in such a manner are the people who do not want peace in this country (his speech is interrupted by applause and ululations). Subsequently, we were taken into police custody because of our democratic reaction to the search order. We were kept in police custody for one night and then taken before a court. The court released us. However, it took a decision to place me under judicial control. I have to go to give my signature every Monday and I am banned from travelling abroad (His speech is interrupted by boos and the slogan \u2018Bar\u0131\u015fa uzanan eller k\u0131r\u0131ls\u0131n\u2019 (\u2018May those hands which aim to damage peace be broken\u2019). We condemn with contempt the mentality which obstructed the meeting in Gemlik; we condemn with contempt the fact that Mr Abdullah G\u00fcl, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, called us \u2018provocateurs\u2019 as well as the mentality which prevented the peace meeting from taking place and which blocked and attacked the crowds. Two vehicles were burned. A person lost his life and hundreds were injured. We condemn with contempt the mentality which is against your and the Kurdish people\u2019s sensibility, your wish for peace and the meeting on peace. We want peace in this country. We want harmony. Those who are against unity and solidarity in this country and those who do not want this country to reach modernity, that is to say, who obtain an unjustified gain out of this war, prevent us from having peace ... As you know, Mr Abdullah \u00d6calan, the leader of the Kurdish people (His speech is interrupted by the slogan \u2018Biji Serok Apo\u2019 (\u2018Long live President \u00d6calan\u2019) called for a ceasefire six years ago. The Government have failed to take a proper view of that six-year unilateral ceasefire and therefore the war has re-started. We have once again started to receive the bodies of guerrillas and soldiers. We want an end to the crying of the mothers of guerrillas and soldiers in this country. We want peace in this country. We will continue our struggle for peace. The demonstration organised by Tuhay-Der will contribute to peace because a one-month ceasefire has been declared. Mr Abdullah \u00d6calan has not been able to meet his lawyers or members of his family for the last three and a half months. We believe that that sanction is harmful to the peace process. That is why we participated in the peace march that was organised by Tuhay-Der. We thank those who attended that demonstration for their wish for peace and for their determination, despite injustice and obstructions. We hope that our friends who were injured will recover soon. We condemn with contempt those who obstructed the peace march. We want peace and we will continue to struggle for peace. I thank you all. You can disperse now in silence ...\u201d 15.  According to the report, the demonstrators waved yellow, red and green pieces of cloth and carried photographs of Abdullah \u00d6calan. Some of the applicant\u2019s co-accused were seen chanting slogans or carrying photographs of Abdullah \u00d6calan. In particular, one of them chanted the slogans \u201cBiji Serok Apo\u201d (\u201cLong live President \u00d6calan\u201d) and \u201cDi\u015fe di\u015f kana kan, seninleyiz \u00d6calan\u201d (\u201cA tooth for a tooth, blood for blood, we are with you \u00d6calan\u201d) for periods of thirty-seven and ten seconds respectively. Another accused was seen chanting the slogans \u201cD\u0131sa d\u0131sa serhildan serokeme \u00d6calan\u201d (\u201cRise up again and again, our president is \u00d6calan\u201d), \u201cBask\u0131lar bizi y\u0131ld\u0131ramaz\u201d (\u201cWe will not be defeated by oppression\u201d), \u201cPKK halkt\u0131r. Halk burada.\u201d (\u201cThe PKK is the people. The people are here.\u201d), \u201c\u015e\u0131rnak ovas\u0131 PKK\u2019nin yuvas\u0131\u201d (\u201c\u015e\u0131rnak is the home of the PKK\u201d) for periods of between six and fifteen seconds while waving a photograph of Abdullah \u00d6calan. Some other demonstrators also chanted the slogan \u201cSava\u015fta bar\u0131\u015fta seninleyiz \u00d6calan\u201d (\u201cIn war and in peace we are with you \u00d6calan\u201d). 16.  On 19 February 2008 the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court delivered its judgment. The court noted that those who disseminated propaganda in favour of the PKK were expressing their support and approval for the PKK, whose methods were those of terrorism and violence. The court accordingly considered that the dissemination of propaganda in favour of that organisation essentially amounted to incitement to violence and the use of terrorist methods. The first-instance court further noted that it was a well-known fact that during illegal demonstrations and meetings PKK members and supporters disseminated propaganda by way of waving photographs of the leader of the PKK and yellow, red and green pieces of cloth, symbolising the so-called flag of the PKK. The court thus concluded that on 5 September 2005 the accused had disseminated propaganda by acting in support of the PKK\u2019s aims and by their acts in front of the building of the Cizre branch of the DEHAP. 17.  As regards the applicant, the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court also noted that he had referred to Mr \u00d6calan as \u201cthe leader of the Kurdish people\u201d and to members of the PKK who had been killed as \u201cguerrillas\u201d. The court also found it established that the applicant had directed the demonstrators who had chanted slogans in favour of the PKK, waved yellow, red and green pieces of cloth and carried photographs of Abdullah \u00d6calan. The Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court further noted that section 7(2), as amended by Law no. 5532, which had entered into force on 18 July 2006, was more favourable to the applicant than the previous version of the same provision in force on the date the applicant had committed the acts that constituted the basis for his conviction (see paragraph 19 below). As a result, the first-instance court convicted the applicant of disseminating propaganda in favour of a terrorist organisation under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713, as amended by Law no. 5532, and sentenced him to ten months\u2019 imprisonment. The court also ordered that Article 53 \u00a7\u00a7 1, 2 and 3 of the Criminal Code should apply in respect of the applicant (see paragraph 20 below). 18.  On 13 July 2010 the Court of Cassation upheld the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court\u2019s judgment.", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "4", "5", "9", "8", "0", "7", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Dubna, Moscow Region. 6.  On 4 February 2003 she was charged with contempt of court and criminally insulting the presiding judge and parties at a hearing on 22 December 2002 in which she had acted as a defendant\u2019s representative. 7.  An outpatient forensic psychiatric examination of the applicant was ordered in the course of the pre-trial investigation. On 2 July 2003 she was apprehended and taken to a psychiatric facility for examination. On 3 July 2003 she was examined by a panel of psychiatrists, who concluded that her clinical state was unclear and that no answers could be given concerning her mental health state. She was released, the panel recommending a placement in the State Academic Centre for Social and Forensic Psychiatry in Moscow (\u0413\u043e\u0441\u0443\u0434\u0430\u0440\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u043d\u0430\u0443\u0447\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u0446\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0440 \u0441\u043e\u0446\u0438\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u0438 \u0441\u0443\u0434\u0435\u0431\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u043f\u0441\u0438\u0445\u0438\u0430\u0442\u0440\u0438\u0438 \u0438\u043c. \u0412.\u041f. \u0421\u0435\u0440\u0431\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0433\u043e) (\u201cthe Forensic Psychiatry Centre\u201d) for an inpatient forensic psychiatric examination. 8.  On 27 October 2003 the Dmitrov Town Court of the Moscow Region (\u0414\u0438\u043c\u0438\u0442\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0439 \u0433\u043e\u0440\u043e\u0434\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u0441\u0443\u0434 \u041c\u043e\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0432\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u043e\u0431\u043b\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0438) (\u201cthe Town Court\u201d), having considered the applicant\u2019s complaint of unlawful apprehension and deprivation of liberty between 2 and 3 July 2003, ruled in her favour. The court reasoned that the detention had been unlawful, since the sanction for the crime she was suspected of did not provide for any form of deprivation of liberty. The applicant did not initiate any further proceedings in this regard. 9.  On 4 November 2003 the prosecution made an application for the court to order an involuntary forensic psychiatric examination of the applicant at the Forensic Psychiatry Centre. 10.  On the same day the Town Court granted the prosecutor\u2019s application. The relevant part of its order reads:\n\u201cBy virtue of paragraph 1 of Article 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a defendant may be placed in a psychiatric hospital if a forensic psychiatric examination requires his assessment in the hospital.\n... the court considers that it should allow the application by the investigator, Ms D., to place [the applicant] in [the Forensic Psychiatry Centre] for a forensic psychiatric evaluation, because [the applicant] is in need of such a hospital examination.\u201d 11.  The applicant and her representative did not attend the hearing, because they had not been summoned to it. However, both the prosecutor and the investigator attended and made oral submissions. 12.  On an unspecified date the applicant appealed, complaining, inter alia, that she had not been given an opportunity to present her case to the Town Court. 13.  Between 25 December 2003 and 5 April 2004 the applicant applied to adjourn her appeal hearing five times. Her application was granted on each occasion. On 29 December 2003 during the appeal hearing in a separate set of proceedings she accused the judges of criminal conspiracy and attempted murder. 14.  On 15 January 2004 the applicant was also charged with criminal slander of certain judges during the hearing of 29 December 2003. The proceedings in respect of the two criminal cases were joined. 15.  On 9 April 2004 the applicant was apprehended by the authorities and transferred to the Forensic Psychiatry Centre. On 13 April 2004 a panel of psychiatrists issued a report, concluding that the applicant suffered from \u201cparanoid personality development\u201d, and that she had not been able to understand or control her actions during the events of 22 December 2002 (contempt of court) and 29 December 2003 (criminal slander). The report further stated that she presented a danger to others and therefore needed compulsory treatment in a psychiatric facility. On the same day the applicant was released. 16.  Two weeks later on 27 April 2004 the Moscow Regional Court (\u041c\u043e\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0432\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0439 \u043e\u0431\u043b\u0430\u0441\u0442\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u0441\u0443\u0434) (\u201cthe Regional Court\u201d) held a hearing on the applicant\u2019s appeal against the the Town Court\u2019s decision of 4 November 2003 authorising psychiatric examination, and rejected it. As regards the applicant\u2019s complaint about the hearing taking place in her absence, the Regional Court noted that Article 165 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provided for ex parte hearings where there was judicial authorisation of investigative actions, including internment in a psychiatric facility for forensic examination (as set out in Article 203 of the Code). 17.  On 14 September 2004 the Moscow City Court (\u041c\u043e\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0432\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0439 \u0433\u043e\u0440\u043e\u0434\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u0441\u0443\u0434) (\u201cthe City Court\u201d) adopted decisions in two sets of criminal proceedings against the applicant. The first decision terminated the criminal proceedings relating to the contempt of court charges in respect of the events of 22 December 2002. The applicant\u2019s statements, while offensive, were found to have been lacking the degree of insult requisite for incurring criminal liability. In the second decision, the City Court established the principal facts of the events of 29 December 2003. Concluding that the applicant had acted in a state of insanity, it terminated the criminal proceedings against her and ordered her to undergo compulsory medical treatment in a psychiatric facility. It relied on the findings and recommendations of the Forensic Psychiatry Centre\u2019s report of 13 April 2004 in its reasoning. 18.  On 22 December 2004 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the lower court\u2019s decisions. 19.  It appears from the parties\u2019 submissions that the applicant was not detained and did not receive any treatment pursuant to the City Court\u2019s order until 2006. 20.  On 23 March 2006 the applicant was involuntarily admitted to Moscow Regional Psychiatric Hospital no. 14 (\u041c\u043e\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0432\u0441\u043a\u0430\u044f \u043e\u0431\u043b\u0430\u0441\u0442\u043d\u0430\u044f \u043f\u0441\u0438\u0445\u0438\u0430\u0442\u0440\u0438\u0447\u0435\u0441\u043a\u0430\u044f \u0431\u043e\u043b\u044c\u043d\u0438\u0446\u0430 \u2116 14) for compulsory psychiatric treatment. 21.  On 16 May 2006 a panel of hospital psychiatrists concluded that the applicant\u2019s mental health had improved and she no longer posed a danger to society. On the same day an application to discharge the hospital order and discontinue the compulsory treatment was sent to the Town Court. 22.  On 22 May 2006 the Town Court scheduled the hearing of the application for the next day. However, it was adjourned until 2 June 2006, because the applicant\u2019s representative failed to appear and additional medical records and statements had to be obtained. Two subsequent hearings were adjourned following applications by the applicant\u2019s representatives. 23.  On 10 July 2006 the Town Court ordered the applicant\u2019s compulsory treatment to be discontinued. Her representative lodged an appeal, arguing that the proceedings should have been discontinued from the very beginning, and that the applicant should have been released, since there had been no need for any compulsory treatment. On 31 August 2006 the Regional Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the lower court\u2019s decision. 24.  The applicant was released from hospital on 15 August 2006.", "references": ["7", "3", "4", "9", "6", "5", "1", "8", "0", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1935 and lives in the city of Ternopil, Ukraine. 6.  The applicant stated that in 1999 she had lent 21,500 United States dollars (USD) to Mrs Sh. She also stated that the loan had been repaid in part, and as of June 2002, a debt of USD 13,400 remained outstanding. 7.  According to the applicant, on the morning of 30 July 2002 Mrs Sh. and Mrs Sh.\u2019s husband beat her in the front yard of their house after the applicant had asked them to repay the outstanding debt. She also alleged that the incident had occurred in public \u201cin front of passers-by who eye\u2011witnessed it\u201d. 8.  In the testimonies she gave to the police after the criminal investigation had been opened (see paragraph 15 below), the applicant specified that in the course of the conflict Mrs Sh. had struck her on the head with a wet towel, then punched her on the head and on her breast, and Mr Sh. had also punched her on the head. 9.  According to the statements of Mr and Mrs Sh. and several other witnesses who were interrogated by the police (see paragraphs 16 and 23 below), the applicant and Mrs Sh. had a confrontation on 29 July 2002. No injuries were inflicted on the applicant in the course of that dispute. 10.  On 30 July 2002 the applicant was taken by ambulance to the emergency unit of the Ternopil Town municipal hospital, being admitted there at 5.30 p.m. According to the medical records, at the time of the applicant\u2019s admission she was diagnosed with a brain concussion but no other traumatic injuries. On 31 July 2002 the doctors diagnosed bruising to the applicant\u2019s breast. 11.  The applicant remained in hospital from 30 July to 23 August 2002. 12.  On 30 July 2002 the applicant\u2019s husband lodged a complaint with the Ternopil Town police department. He claimed that Mrs Sh. and her husband had punched the applicant in the head and breast in the yard of their house. 13.  On 9 August 2002 the police refused a request to institute criminal proceedings against Mr and Mrs Sh. for lack of corpus delicti. 14.  On 4 September 2002 the Ternopil Regional Bureau of Forensic Medical Examinations (\u041e\u0431\u043b\u0430\u0441\u043d\u0435 \u0431\u044e\u0440\u043e \u0441\u0443\u0434\u043e\u0432\u043e-\u043c\u0435\u0434\u0438\u0447\u043d\u043e\u0457 \u0435\u043a\u0441\u043f\u0435\u0440\u0442\u0438\u0437\u0438) carried out a forensic medical examination. The forensic experts recorded that on 30 July 2002 the applicant had been admitted to hospital. Upon hospitalisation the applicant stated that at 11.00 a.m. that morning she had been beaten by \u201can acquaintance\u201d. The forensic experts also found that the applicant had sustained a brain concussion and had a bruise on the right side of her chest. As she had suffered from the brain concussion for more than three weeks, this injury was qualified as a bodily injury of medium severity. The bruise was qualified as a light bodily injury. 15.  On 29 October 2002 the Ternopil deputy prosecutor quashed the decision of 9 August 2002 and instituted criminal proceedings against Mr and Mrs Sh. 16.  On 30 October 2002 the police questioned Mrs Sh. The Government provided copies of her testimony, which are, however, incomplete. It would appear that Mrs Sh. stated that she had borrowed USD 8,100 from the applicant without signing any formal documents, and had subsequently repaid this sum. She also testified that on 29 July 2002 the applicant and the applicant\u2019s husband had come to her house and demanded the interest on the above amount. Mrs Sh. refused to pay the interest and there had been a dispute with the applicant, following which the applicant left. 17.  On 19 November 2002 the police questioned the applicant\u2019s husband as a witness. 18.  On 2 and 4 January 2003 the police questioned three individuals, Mrs P., Mr Pukh. and Mr Pa., who were eye-witnesses to the incident. 19.  On 3 January 2003 the deputy head of the investigation office of the Ternopil Town police department (\u0437\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0443\u043f\u043d\u0438\u043a \u043d\u0430\u0447\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u0438\u043a\u0430 \u0421\u0412 \u0422\u041c\u0412 \u0423\u0412\u0421\u0423 \u0432 \u0422\u0435\u0440\u043d\u043e\u043f\u0456\u043b\u044c\u0441\u044c\u043a\u0456\u0439 \u043e\u0431\u043b\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0456) ordered an additional forensic medical examination. 20.  On 13 January 2003 the expert commission of the Ternopil Regional Bureau of Forensic Medical Examinations confirmed the findings of the expert examination of 4 September 2002. In addition, the experts noted that the applicant\u2019s brain concussion and the bruise had been inflicted by a blunt object and could not have been sustained by falling. The experts also stated that the dynamics of the applicant\u2019s clinical picture corresponded to her allegation that the injuries had been inflicted on her on 30 July 2002. They finally concluded that the brain concussion had been caused by a series of blows to the head. 21.  On 14 January 2003 the police questioned Mr Sh. as a suspect. He gave the same testimony as his wife (see paragraph 16 above). 22.  Between 15 January and 27 January 2003 multiple face-to-face confrontations were carried out between the applicant, the suspects and various witnesses who had been questioned earlier, including Mr T., Mr Pa., Mrs P. and Mr Pukh. 23.  On 25 February 2003 the deputy head of the investigation office of the Ternopil Town police department terminated the criminal proceedings against Mr and Mrs Sh. for lack of evidence that a crime had been committed. Two accounts of events were noted in that decision, one suggested by the applicant and another one put forward on the basis of the statements of Mr and Mrs Sh. and two witnesses, T. and B. According to this second account of events, there had been a verbal confrontation between the applicant and Mrs Sh. on 29 July 2002 in the yard of the latter\u2019s house, during which no injuries had been inflicted on the applicant. It was noted in the decision that numerous witnesses had been questioned, face\u2011to\u2011face interrogations had been held and forensic medical examinations had been carried out. It was concluded that, in view of the conflicting witness statements, it was impossible to establish whether the incident had occurred on 29 or 30 July 2002 and the police did not have sufficient evidence to prosecute Mr and Mrs Sh. 24.  On 4 March 2003 the Ternopil Town Prosecutor quashed the above decision and ordered an additional investigation. 25.  On 4 April 2003 the police again terminated the criminal proceedings against Mr and Mrs Sh. They noted that Mr and Mrs Sh. testified that they had borrowed USD 8,100 from the applicant and had subsequently repaid this sum. Mr and Mrs Sh. maintained that on 29 July 2002 the applicant had come to their house together with her husband and had demanded the interest on the above amount. According to them, the applicant had with her a small pot containing an unknown liquid, which she said was acid. She had threatened to pour the acid into the eyes of the Sh.\u2019s child. Mr Sh. called the police, but the applicant and her husband had left before they arrived. The police concluded that the evidence obtained as a result of the investigative measures was insufficient to prosecute Mr and Mrs Sh. and the identity of the applicant\u2019s assailant had not been established. 26.  Between March 2003 and September 2006 the criminal proceedings in the applicant\u2019s case were terminated on eight occasions (on 4 April 2003, 5 June 2003, 5 August 2003, 14 September 2003, 28 December 2003, 17 May 2004, 27 August 2004 and 16 February 2005). All of these decisions were quashed by a senior prosecutor who ordered an additional inquiry, finding repeatedly that the investigation of the case had been \u201cincomplete\u201d. 27.  In particular, in the decision of 5 May 2003 the deputy head of the investigation office of the Ternopil Town police department ordered that a reconstruction of the incident be staged with a view to establishing the facts of the case and in order to support or rebut the conflicting statements of the witnesses. He ordered specifically that it be established in the course of the reconstruction whether the witnesses (including T. and B.) could in fact have been able to observe the incident from the street outside the yard, as claimed by them. In a later decision, of 8 December 2004, a senior prosecutor from the Ternopil Regional Prosecutor\u2019s Office noted, inter alia, the need to also question the ambulance personnel who had conveyed the applicant to the emergency unit on 30 July 2002. 28.  On 6 May 2003 the police questioned Mr K., a taxi driver. He testified that on 30 July 2002 he had been driving his taxi and had picked up the applicant and her husband on the street where the house of Mr and Mrs Sh. is located. He added that the applicant had been in distress and held her hands to her head. 29.  On 17 January 2004 the first deputy Ternopil City Prosecutor (\u043f\u0435\u0440\u0448\u0438\u0439 \u0437\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0443\u043f\u043d\u0438\u043a \u043f\u0440\u043e\u043a\u0443\u0440\u043e\u0440\u0430 \u043c\u0456\u0441\u0442\u0430 \u0422\u0435\u0440\u043d\u043e\u043f\u043e\u043b\u044f) noted that the investigating officer had failed to follow instructions and take the investigative measures required by the decision of 5 May 2003 (see paragraph 27 above). 30.  In 2004 disciplinary proceedings were instituted against investigating officer Z. for certain procedural violations, as a result of which the investigation became protracted. The outcome of these proceedings is unknown. 31.  On 23 September 2006 the police took two procedural decisions in the case. By the first decision the police terminated the criminal proceedings against Mr and Mrs Sh., reiterating the reasons given in the decision of 4 April 2003. By the second decision the criminal investigation of the case was stayed until the identity of the person who inflicted the injuries on the applicant could be established.", "references": ["6", "0", "5", "4", "7", "9", "8", "2", "3", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1972 and lives in Kerch. 6.  At the material time the applicant worked as an investigation officer in the environmental protection prosecutor\u2019s office (\u043f\u0440\u0438\u0440\u043e\u0434\u043e\u043e\u0445\u043e\u0440\u043e\u043d\u043d\u0430 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u043a\u0443\u0440\u0430\u0442\u0443\u0440\u0430). 7.  On 4 October 2005 S. complained to the Prosecutor\u2019s Office of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (\u201cthe ARC\u201d) (\u043f\u0440\u043e\u043a\u0443\u0440\u0430\u0442\u0443\u0440\u0430 \u0410\u0432\u0442\u043e\u043d\u043e\u043c\u043d\u043e\u0457 \u0440\u0435\u0441\u043f\u0443\u0431\u043b\u0456\u043a\u0438 \u041a\u0440\u0438\u043c) that the applicant and U., a prosecutor\u2019s assistant, had extorted 5,000 United States dollars (USD) from him for the purpose of carrying on a fishing business. Later K. and R. lodged similar complaints. 8.  On 7 October 2005 at around 3 p.m. the applicant was arrested at his workplace after receiving 2,000 USD from S., and 200 USD and 500 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH) from R. The applicant\u2019s office was searched and 2,000 USD were found in one of the books on his table. The applicant\u2019s meetings with R. and S. had been taped. On the same day criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant and U. for bribe-taking. 9.  On 10 October 2005 the Tsentralnyy District Court of Simferopol (\u201cthe Tsentralnyy Court\u201d) authorised the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention. The court held that the applicant was accused of committing a serious crime and might escape, or hinder the investigation, or continue his criminal activity. The applicant appealed. 10.  On 18 October 2005 the applicant complained to the Kerch Local Court that his arrest on 7 October 2005 had been unlawful since there had been no grounds to arrest him. The court forwarded this complaint to the Kerch Prosecutor\u2019s Office, noting that the court was not competent to consider such complaints while the case was under investigation. The Kerch Prosecutor\u2019s Office transferred the applicant\u2019s complaint to the Prosecutor\u2019s Office of the ARC. 11.  On 1 December 2005 the Prosecutor\u2019s Office of the ARC informed the applicant that his arrest was justified and lawful. 12.  On the same day the Court of Appeal of the ARC upheld the decision of 10 October 2005. 13.  On 5 December 2005 the Tsentralnyy Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 7 February 2006 on the same grounds as before. The applicant appealed. 14.  On 20 December 2005 the Court of Appeal of the ARC upheld the decision of 5 December 2005. It held that there was sufficient evidence that the applicant had committed a serious crime. If at large, the applicant might continue his criminal activity, or hinder the investigation, or abscond. 15.  On 18 January 2006 the Feodosiya Town Court (\u201cthe Feodosiya Court\u201d) accepted the applicant\u2019s case for trial. 16.  On 6 February 2006, in the committal hearings, the Feodosiya Court maintained the applicant\u2019s detention without giving any reason or setting any time-limit. 17.  On 21 February 2006 the Feodosiya Court rejected the applicant\u2019s request to change the preventive measure to an undertaking not to abscond, noting that the applicant was accused of having committed a serious crime, and might abscond or hinder the investigation. The applicant appealed. 18.  On 23 May 2006 the Feodosiya Court found the applicant and U. guilty of several counts of bribe-taking and sentenced them to six and five years\u2019 imprisonment, respectively, with confiscation of half of their property. 19.  On 14 September 2006 the Court of Appeal of the ARC terminated proceedings in respect of one count of bribery concerning the applicant and upheld the remainder of the judgment. 20.  On 24 July 2007 the Supreme Court of Ukraine rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law. 21.  From 10 October 2005 to 4 February 2006 and from 5 February to 5 September 2006 the applicant was detained in Simferopol Pre-Trial Detention Centre no. 15 (\u0406\u0437\u043e\u043b\u044f\u0442\u043e\u0440 \u0442\u0438\u043c\u0447\u0430\u0441\u043e\u0432\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0442\u0440\u0438\u043c\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044f \u2116 15 \u043c. \u0421\u0456\u043c\u0444\u0435\u0440\u043e\u043f\u043e\u043b\u044f) (\u201cthe Simferopol SIZO\u201d) and in the Feodosiya Temporary Detention Centre (\u0456\u0437\u043e\u043b\u044f\u0442\u043e\u0440 \u0442\u0438\u043c\u0447\u0430\u0441\u043e\u0432\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0442\u0440\u0438\u043c\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044f \u043c. \u0424\u0435\u043e\u0434\u043e\u0441\u0456\u044f) (\u201cthe Feodosiya ITT\u201d) respectively. 22.  In the Simferopol SIZO the applicant shared cell no. 29, which measured 10 square metres, with four other detainees. There were no chairs in the cell and it was in a poor state of repair. There were cockroaches and other insects. The toilet space was very narrow \u2013 around 45-50 centimetres in width \u2013 which caused the applicant, who is 1.94 metres tall and weighs 160 kilograms, considerable difficulties. The detainees were able to take a shower only once every seven to ten days. 23.  In the Feodosiya ITT the applicant was detained in cell no. 27, which measured 4.7 square metres, together with four or more detainees. The cell had no windows and no furniture. The toilet space was very narrow \u2013 around 30 centimetres in width. The applicant had not been able to take a shower, and detainees had had to sleep in turns. 30 minutes\u2019 outside exercise was possible once every ten to fifteen days in a small yard which measured 4.5 square metres. The applicant submitted undated photos of a cell, in which it is apparent that the toilet (a hole in the floor plugged by a plastic bottle) is separated from the living space by a wall approximately one metre high. Beside the toilet there is a sleeping place (allegedly a mattress on a wooden bench or on the floor). 24.  According to the Government, cell no. 29 in the Simferopol SIZO had been designed for occupancy by three inmates and had had 9.3 square metres of living space, thus allowing some 3.1 square metres per inmate, which had been in compliance with the domestic standards. In accordance with the relevant regulations, the cell had been disinfected on a daily basis and the detainees had had weekly access to bathing facilities. The statutory regulations did not include chair provision for this cell. 25.  As regards the Feodosiya ITT, the applicant\u2019s cell had 5.7 square metres of living space and had been designed to accommodate two inmates. The cell had been lit by electric light, equipped with a ventilating system ensuring circulation of air and furnished with wooden sleeping platform, separated toilet and wash-stand. The detainees had been provided with pillows and mattresses. The detention facility had had a shower room with hot and cold water and a small backyard for daily walks. 26.  On 6 March 2006 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Feodosiya Court about the conditions of his detention in the ITT (overcrowding, no windows in the cell, no possibility of taking a shower, lack of out-of-cell activities). He requested that the court find the inaction of the Feodosiya ITT authorities in this respect unlawful and to oblige it to remedy the situation. 27.  On 14 March 2006 the court forwarded the complaint to the Feodosiya Prosecutor\u2019s Office as the appropriate decision-making body. 28.  On 20 March 2006 the Feodosiya Prosecutor\u2019s Office informed the applicant that some violations of the law by the Feodosiya ITT authorities had been established and that the relevant instructions had been given to remedy the situation, with no further details provided. 29.  On 23 June 2006 the applicant again lodged his complaint with the Feodosiyskyy Court, having stated that neither his complaint to the Feodosiya ITT authorities nor to the prosecutor\u2019s office had remedied his situation. He requested that the inaction of the Feodosiya ITT authorities be declared unlawful. This complaint was again forwarded by the court to the Feodosiya Prosecutor\u2019s Office. 30.  On 23 and 28 July 2006 the Feodosiya Prosecutor\u2019s Office sent the applicant a reply similar to that in the letter of 20 March 2006. According to the applicant, he did not receive these letters. 31.  On 1 July 2006 the applicant complained to the Court of Appeal of the ARC (\u201cCourt of Appeal\u201d) about the failure of the Feodosiya Court to consider his complaint on the merits. He requested that the Court of Appeal oblige the latter to consider his complaint against the Feodosiya ITT on the merits and to bring disciplinary measure to bear on the respective judge of the Feodosiya Court. 32.  On 1 August 2006 the Court of Appeal assigned the applicant\u2019s complaint to the Leninskiy District Court of the ARC (\u201cthe Leninskiy District Court\u201d). 33.  On 2 August 2006 the applicant complained to the Prosecutor\u2019s Office of the ARC about the alleged failure of the Feodosiya Prosecutor\u2019s Office to consider his complaints about conditions of detention. 34.  On 31 August 2006 the Leninskiy District Court refused to open administrative proceedings concerning the applicant\u2019s complaint as the procedural decisions of a judge in such a case were not subject to appeal under the rules of administrative procedure. Any decision to the contrary would, in the court\u2019s opinion, constitute an unlawful interference with the administration of justice. The court dismissed as unsubstantiated the applicant\u2019s allegations that the failure of the Feodosiya Court to entertain his complaint amounted to a denial of access to a court. It noted in this respect \u2012 in accordance with the Criminal Procedure Code and the Prosecutor\u2019s Act (\u0417\u0430\u043a\u043e\u043d \u0423\u043a\u0440\u0430\u0457\u043d\u0438 \u00ab\u041f\u0440\u043e \u043f\u0440\u043e\u043a\u0443\u0440\u0430\u0442\u0443\u0440\u0443\u00bb) \u2012 that it was for the prosecutor\u2019s offices to supervise observance of the law in detention centres. The applicant was free to complain to the court about the prosecutor\u2019s inaction, if appropriate, but he had failed to do so. 35.  The applicant appealed. 36.  On 12 October 2006 the applicant received a letter from the Prosecutor\u2019s Office of the ARC in which it referred to the responses given earlier to the applicant by the Feodosiya Prosecutor\u2019s Office. 37.  On 12 December 2006 the Court of Appeal of the ARC upheld the decision of 31 August 2006. It noted in particular that the applicant had submitted to the Feodosiya Court a complaint regarding the poor conditions of detention but not an administrative claim against the Feodosiya ITT for the protection of his rights, as was required by the Code of Administrative Justice. This being so, his complaint had been forwarded to the competent authorities as required by the relevant domestic legislation. 38.  On 21 April 2009 the Higher Administrative Court of Ukraine rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal on the points of law. 39.  On 17 September 2007 the applicant lodged an administrative claim with the Menskiy District Court of the Chernigiv Region (\u201cthe Mesnkiy District Court\u201d) against the Feodosiya ITT authorities claiming, inter alia, damages for the harm inflicted by the inhuman and degrading conditions of his detention. 40.  On 15 October 2007 the Menskiy District Court admitted the applicant\u2019s claim for consideration. 41.  On 23 November 2007 the Menskiy District Court rejected the claim as having been lodged outside the one-year time-limit set by the law, since the applicant had been transferred from the Feodosiya ITT on 5 September 2006. 42.  The Court of Appeal and the Higher Administrative Court upheld the above decisions on 1 April 2008 and 21 December 2010 respectively.", "references": ["6", "9", "4", "5", "7", "8", "0", "3", "No Label", "1", "2"], "gold": ["1", "2"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1958 and lives in Kor\u00e7a. 5.  On 14 July 1995 and 14 June 1996 the Kor\u00e7a Commission on Restitution and Compensation of Properties (Komisioni i Kthimit dhe Kompensimit t\u00eb Pronave) (\u201cthe Commission\u201d) decided to recognise the applicant\u2019s inherited property title to two plots of land measuring 118 sq. m and restore them to the applicant. 6.  On an unspecified date the Kor\u00e7a Regional Company for the Distribution of Electricity (Nd\u00ebrmarja zonale e shp\u00ebrndarjes s\u00eb energjis\u00eb elektrike) (\u201cthe defendant\u201d) started the construction of a high-voltage line on the applicant\u2019s plots of lands. 7.  On an unspecified date the applicant sought an injunction to suspend the construction works. 8.  On 13 January 2006 the Kor\u00e7a District Court (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) issued an injunction and ordered the construction to be suspended. On 8 March 2006 and 4 May 2007 the Kor\u00e7a Court of Appeal (\u201cthe Court of Appeal\u201d) and the Supreme Court respectively upheld that decision. 9.  On 26 January 2006 the applicant brought an action against the defendant to bring the construction works to an end immediately, remove the high-voltage line and restore the site to its previous state. 10.  On 30 January 2006 the bailiff in the case discontinued enforcement proceedings concerning the decision of 13 January 2006 on the grounds that the works had been suspended. 11.  On 7 April 2006 the District Court ordered the immediate termination of the works on the applicant\u2019s plot of land, the removal of the high-voltage line and the restoration of the site to its former state (ndalimin e punimeve si dhe duke detyruar ana e paditur t\u00eb heq\u00eb kabllot, t\u00eb dy linjat dhe ta kthej\u00eb pron\u00ebn n\u00eb gjendjen e m\u00ebparshme). The District Court reasoned that the defendant had unlawfully constructed that line on the applicant\u2019s property.\nOn 27 June 2006 the Court of Appeal upheld that judgment. On an unspecified date the defendant lodged an appeal with the Supreme Court against the lower courts\u2019 judgments. 12.  On 10 August 2006 the applicant requested that the bailiff enforce the judgment of 7 April 2006, as upheld by the Court of Appeal on 27 June 2006. However, as the proceedings on the merits of the case were pending before the Supreme Court (see paragraph 11 above), on 8 September 2006 the Supreme Court provisionally decided to stay the enforcement proceedings. 13.  Subsequently, the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal against the Supreme Court\u2019s decision of 8 September 2006. 14.  On 16 May 2007 the Constitutional Court dismissed the appeal on the grounds that an examination of the applicant\u2019s action on the merits was pending before the Supreme Court. 15.  On 11 January 2008 the Supreme Court upheld in a final judgment the District Court\u2019s judgment of 7 April 2006 and the Court of Appeal\u2019s judgment of 27 June 2006. 16.  On 22 February 2008, following the Supreme Court\u2019s judgment of 11 January 2008, the applicant again requested that the bailiff enforce the judgment of 7 April 2006. 17.  From 2008 to 2011 the bailiff unsuccessfully sought to enforce the final judgment. In particular, on 29 February 2008 the bailiff sought to have the defendant comply voluntarily with the judgment. The bailiff further imposed a fine of 71,155 Albanian leks (ALL) on the defendant.\nOn 10 April 2008 the bailiff again ordered the defendant to pay a fine for failing to comply with the final judgment.\nOn 21 September 2011 and 25 November 2011 the defendant informed the bailiff that the applicant was prepared to solve the dispute with the authorities by way of a friendly settlement.\nOn 17 November 2014 the applicant informed the bailiff that the defendant had failed to reach a settlement with her. She requested the continuation of the enforcement proceedings. 18.  On 8 April 2015 the bailiff imposed another fine on the defendant for failing to comply with the final judgment. 19.  On 20 May 2008 the applicant filed a criminal complaint against the bailiff and the Distributor Energy Operator (Operatori i Shp\u00ebrndarjes s\u00eb Energjis\u00eb Elektrike) (\u201cDEC\u201d) for failure to comply with the judgment of 7 April 2006. It appears that on an unspecified date the Court of Appeal discontinued the proceedings by virtue of a final judgment. 20.  On 11 July 2008 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint against the Albanian Electricity Corporation (Korporata Elektroenergjetike Shqiptare) (\u201cAEC\u201d) and the Kor\u00e7a municipality for \u201cdestruction of private property\u201d. On 14 July 2011 the prosecutor\u2019s office discontinued the criminal proceedings in a final decision. 21.  On an unspecified date the applicant brought a civil action against C.E.Z Shp\u00ebrndarje sh.a, which had privatised DEC, claiming damages and loss of profit. 22.  On 7 May 2012 the District Court decided to stay the proceedings and await the conclusion of the civil proceedings instituted by AEC against the administrative decisions of 14 July 1995 and 14 June 1996 (see paragraph 24 below), which had recognised the applicant\u2019s property rights. 23.  On 6 December 2012 the Court of Appeal amended that decision and decided that the proceedings could continue. It appears that the case is still pending before the domestic courts. 24.  On 6 February 2007 AEC brought a civil action against the applicant to annul the administrative decisions of 14 July 1995 and 14 June 1996 on the grounds that the plots of land had belonged to and had been used by AEC since 1960. 25.  On 24 January 2008 the District Court ordered the freezing of the title to the applicant\u2019s plots of land (vendim p\u00ebr marrjen e mas\u00ebs s\u00eb sigurimit t\u00eb padis\u00eb duke bllokuar pron\u00ebn n\u00eb Zyr\u00ebn e Regjistrimit t\u00eb Pasurive t\u00eb Paluajtshme). On 12 December 2008 and 26 January 2012 the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court lifted the freezing order. 26.  On 31 July 2008 the District Court decided, at the applicant\u2019s request, to stay the proceedings and await the conclusion of other civil and criminal proceedings instituted by the applicant. On 6 January 2009 and 17 October 2013 the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court respectively upheld that decision. 27.  On 5 March 2014 the District Court discontinued its examination of the case on the grounds that AEC had failed to attend a hearing without good reason. It would appear that AEC did not appeal against that judgment and it became final on an unspecified date. 28.  On two other occasions AEC and DEC brought civil actions against the applicant to annul the administrative decisions of 14 July 1995 and 14 June 1996. On 17 April 2012 and 22 December 2014, respectively, the District Court discontinued its examination of the actions on the grounds that AEC and DEC had failed to attend hearings for no good reason. It appears that they did not appeal against either judgment and they became final on an unspecified date.", "references": ["7", "5", "4", "8", "2", "0", "1", "6", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1952 and lives in Tirana. 5.  On 18 June 2009 the applicant, who worked as General Deputy Director of State Social Service (Z\u00ebvend\u00ebs Drejtor i P\u00ebrgjithsh\u00ebm i Sh\u00ebrbimit Social Shtet\u00ebror) at the Ministry of Work, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities (Ministria e Pun\u00ebs, \u00c7\u00ebshtjeve Sociale dhe Shanseve t\u00eb Barabarta) (\u201cthe Ministry\u201d) was dismissed. 6.  On 27 January 2010 the Tirana District Court accepted in part the applicant\u2019s action against his dismissal. It ordered the applicant\u2019s reinstatement and the payment of damages corresponding to five months\u2019 salaries. By final judgment of 23 November 2010 the Tirana Court of Appeal upheld the Tirana District Court\u2019s judgment. 7.  On 6 May 2011 an enforcement writ was issued. 8.  From 2011 to 2014 the bailiff office unsuccessfully attempted the enforcement of the final judgment. 9.  On 9 December 2014 the authorities finally paid the damages to the applicant. 10.  On 8 April 2016 the State Social Service requested the Ministry to examine the applicant\u2019s reinstatement. On the same day the State Social Service addressed a letter to the Department of the Public Administration, stating that the position of the Deputy Director was available.", "references": ["4", "9", "6", "7", "5", "2", "0", "8", "1", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant company is a limited liability company registered in 2004 in Ukraine, with its registered office in Kyiv. 6.  On 12 April 2005 the applicant company and another company, S., concluded an agreement by which the applicant company undertook to provide information and analytical services to S., and the latter undertook to pay for those services. On 24 November 2005 the parties concluded an additional agreement for supplementary services to be provided to S. by the applicant company. 7.  On 27 April 2006 the applicant company lodged a claim against S. with the Kyiv Commercial Court, seeking recovery of an alleged debt under the above agreement, as well as the payment of penalties and legal fees. 8.  On 9 June 2006 the Kyiv Commercial Court opened the proceedings in the case. 9.  On 11 September 2006, during a hearing in the case, S. submitted a counterclaim, seeking that the agreement be declared void. The court adjourned the hearing until 14 September 2006 without deciding on the admissibility of the counterclaim. 10.  On 14 September 2006 the judge hearing the case accepted S.\u2019s counterclaim for joint consideration with the original claim by the applicant company. At the same hearing, the judge granted S.\u2019s counterclaim in part and rejected the original claim of the applicant company in full. According to the record of the hearing, the hearing lasted ten minutes. 11.  On 13 October 2006 the applicant company lodged an appeal on points of law against the judgment of 14 September 2006 with the Higher Commercial Court of Ukraine (\u201cthe HCCU\u201d). It argued that the proceedings before the first-instance court had not been adversarial, and had not complied with the principle of procedural equality between the parties: the first-instance court had not provided the applicant company with an opportunity to prepare and submit observations as to S.\u2019s counterclaim or collect and provide evidence in defence. The applicant company requested that the impugned judgment be quashed and the case remitted to the first-instance court for fresh consideration. 12.  On 9 November 2006 the HCCU returned the applicant company\u2019s appeal on points of law to it without considering the appeal on the merits, because the relevant court fee had not been paid in full. 13.  On 21 November 2006 the applicant company resubmitted its appeal on points of law with proof of having paid the full court fee. The appeal on points of law was submitted together with a cover letter. In the cover letter, the applicant company set out the circumstances which had resulted in its missing the deadline for appealing on points of law, and asked the HCCU to extend the relevant time-limit and consider the appeal. Apart from that information, the cover letter contained the date, name and address of the court to which it was addressed, the case reference number, the parties\u2019 contact details, and the disputed amount which was the subject of the case. The letter ended with a list of enclosures, the applicant company\u2019s lawyer\u2019s details, his signature and a stamp. 14.  On 19 December 2006 the HCCU found that the applicant company had submitted the second appeal on points of law outside the time-limit provided for by Article 110 of the Code of Commercial Procedure, and had failed to enclose an application for an extension. Relying on sub-paragraph 5 of Article 111-3 \u00a7 1, the HCCU declined to consider the applicant company\u2019s appeal on points of law. 15.  On 4 January 2007 the applicant company challenged the decision of 19 December 2006 before the Supreme Court, arguing that on 21 November 2006 it had in fact applied for an extension of the time-limit for lodging the appeal on points of law with the HCCU. The application had been included in the text of the cover letter accompanying the appeal on points of law. 16.  On 22 February 2007 the Supreme Court upheld the decision of 19 December 2006.", "references": ["4", "8", "5", "7", "2", "0", "6", "9", "1", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1963. In 2002 he was convicted and sentenced to fifteen years\u2019 imprisonment. At the relevant time the applicant was serving his sentence in a prison. 6.  On 1 February 2005, following a request submitted by the applicant\u2019s wife in accordance with Article 107 of the Family Code, the local civil status registry dissolved their marriage. The applicant was sent a notification about the divorce. 7.  Later in February 2005 the applicant and his new female partner, K., were prevented from marrying as the applicant had not obtained a divorce certificate, as required by Article 116 of the Family Code. That document could be obtained exclusively by the applicant at the relevant civil status registry. 8.  The applicant requested that he be escorted to the registry in order to obtain the divorce certificate. His request was refused as the domestic law did not provide for the escorting of prisoners on such grounds. 9.  On 16 June 2005 the prosecutor informed the applicant that under Article 116 of the Family Code he had the right to remarry after he had obtained a divorce certificate. However, this would be possible only after his release from prison. 10.  On 17 August 2005 the Deputy Minister of Justice considered a complaint lodged by the applicant concerning the authorities\u2019 failure to provide him with a divorce certificate for the purpose of remarriage. He stated that under domestic law it was not possible to carry out the relevant actions in prison; nor was it possible to issue a power of attorney for another person to act on behalf of the applicant in relation to that matter. The Deputy Minster informed the applicant that amendments to the domestic legislation had been prepared. 11.  On 23 January 2006 and 20 July 2007 the Ombudsman\u2019s Office informed the applicant that they were aware of that issue and that amendments to the domestic legislation had been prepared by the Ministry of Justice. 12.  On 30 July 2007 the State Prison Department informed the applicant that he would be able to obtain a divorce certificate after his release from prison. The amendments to the domestic legislation had yet to be considered. 13.  On 16 October 2008 the Ministry of Justice issued Order no. 1761/5 providing for a temporary procedure for registering divorces and issuing divorce certificates in prisons. 14.  In December 2008 the applicant was personally informed of the procedure introduced by the Ministry of Justice. 15.  On 6 February 2009, at the applicant\u2019s request, he was provided with a divorce certificate in prison. 16.  On 13 July 2009 the applicant and K. applied for the registration of their marriage. On 14 August 2009 the local civil status registry registered their marriage.", "references": ["9", "6", "3", "4", "0", "7", "5", "8", "2", "1", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "7.  The applicant was born in 1966 and lives in Cherkasy. 8.  On 23 August 2001 the Cherkasy Regional Court of Appeal found the applicant guilty of murder, attempted murder and illegal possession of firearms, and sentenced him to life imprisonment. On 12 February 2002 the Supreme Court upheld that judgment. 9.  Subsequently, the applicant applied to the courts for a review of his sentence. Although initially the courts refused the requested review, in 2009 the Supreme Court changed the applicant\u2019s sentence to fifteen years\u2019 imprisonment, considering that life imprisonment had been imposed on him not in compliance with the law. 10.  During the investigations and trial the applicant was held in the Cherkasy Temporary Investigative Isolation Unit (\u201cthe SIZO\u201d) No. 30. He remained there until 22 September 2004, when he was transferred to Kyiv SIZO no. 13. 11.  On 15 October 2004 the applicant was placed in Sokalska Correctional Colony no. 47 in the Lviv Region (\u201cSokalska Prison\u201d). In November 2007 he was transferred to the Zamkova Correctional Colony no. 58, in the Khmelnytsk Region (\u201cZamkova Prison\u201d). 12.   In May 2012 the applicant suffered an ischemic stroke and was taken to a hospital within the Shepetivska Correctional Colony No. 98, in which he underwent treatment as regards the stroke and generally hypertension. On 23 October 2012 the applicant was released from prison. In particular, it was noted that given his health condition he could no longer serve his sentence and he no longer posed danger to the society. 13.  According to the applicant, on the day he arrived at Sokalska Prison (15 October 2004) he was beaten by several guards. As a result, he allegedly suffered an eye injury and several bruises and scratches on his body. Subsequently, the applicant was placed in a cell in which he was visited by a group of officers, including the prison governor and medical officer, with a view to completing the formalities related to the applicant\u2019s transfer to that prison. The applicant claimed to have complained to those officers that he had been beaten up, but to no avail. Allegedly, his injuries were not noted and he received no medical assistance. In October 2005 the applicant was diagnosed with left-eye mydriasis of traumatic origin, which allegedly developed because of the eye injury he had received on 15 October 2004. 14.  The applicant stated that on 19 October 2004 he had asked the prison authorities to send a complaint about his alleged beating to a prosecutor. The administration of the prison refused to send that complaint or other similar complaints which the applicant continued submitting after that date. 15.  On 28 June 2006, during an official visit to the prison by a prosecutor in charge of supervising the prison authorities\u2019 compliance with the law, the applicant handed his complaint of beating to that prosecutor. 16.  By a decision of 18 August 2006, the prosecutor refused to open a criminal investigation into the applicant\u2019s complaint, finding that there was no evidence of the alleged beating. The prosecutor based his decision on the information available from the applicant\u2019s medical file and the written statements obtained from the prison staff, including the medical officer who had examined the applicant upon his arrival at the prison, and also from some of the prisoners who had been transferred to the prison on the same day as the applicant. Those prisoners, except for one of them, L., stated that the prison staff had not beaten or otherwise ill-treated them. L. stated that he had been punched on the limbs and back, but that he had not seen other prisoners being beaten. 17.  On 26 October 2006 the applicant challenged the prosecutor\u2019s decision before the courts, stating that it had not been based on the facts. In support of his appeal, the applicant submitted a statement, allegedly written by L. in June 2005, that the applicant had had bruises on his limbs on 16 October 2004. 18.  The courts at two levels of jurisdiction upheld the prosecutor\u2019s findings, relying, in the main, on the material contained in the prosecutor\u2019s file concerning the applicant\u2019s complaint that he had been beaten. 19.  The applicant stated that the courts had refused his requests to be heard in person and for the prisoners who had been detained with him in Sokalska Prison to be questioned. The applicant lodged a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court. 20.  On 17 December 2007 the Supreme Court refused to consider the applicant\u2019s cassation appeal, because he had failed to submit certified copies of the lower courts\u2019 decisions. On 30 January 2008 the applicant sent the required copies to the Supreme Court, asking it to review his case in cassation. The applicant did not provide any further information concerning that set of proceedings. 1.  Size of the cells, sanitation and hygiene, quality of food and water and application of restraints\n(a)  Submissions by the applicant 21.  During his detention in Sokalska Prison between October 2004 and November 2007 the applicant stayed in cells of twelve square metres, together with three other inmates. According to him, as the cells contained sanitary facilities, four bunks, a table and two benches, the applicant and his cellmates had very limited living space, which, given the fact that they spent twenty-three hours a day in the cell and were not allowed to take physical exercise, was humiliating and intolerable. The cells were unventilated, always damp, and not sufficiently heated in winter. For several weeks in 2004 and 2005 the applicant was held in the same cells in which inmates suffering from the open form of tuberculosis were also detained. 22.  Every time he left his cell the applicant was handcuffed and was followed by several prison officers with a guard dog. While the applicant was escorted to a medical unit or a meeting place, allegedly a felt-lined bag was put over his head, which prevented him from seeing and limited his air supply. When the applicant was taken out of his cell to the exercise area he was allegedly obliged to walk with his hands handcuffed behind his back and raised above his head, causing him physical and mental suffering. The exercise area measured about twenty-two square metres; it was damp and lacked direct sunlight. 23.  According to the applicant, the food and water provided to him and other prisoners were unsatisfactory and hazardous to their health. The prison authorities did not ensure adequate sanitary conditions and he was not offered a chance to work and earn money to enable him to purchase medicine, sanitary supplies or additional food. 24.  In 2005-06 the applicant allegedly tried to complain to prosecutors about the conditions of his detention. However, the prison authorities refused to send, or delayed sending, about twenty letters addressed by the applicant to prosecutors. Although some of his letters reached the prosecutors, his complaints about the conditions of his detention contained in those letters were not examined.\n(b)  Submissions by the Government 25.  According to the Government, a part of the applicant\u2019s submissions concerning the conditions of his detention, specifically his allegations that he had been detained in cells with poor sanitary and hygiene conditions together with inmates suffering from the open form of tuberculosis, that he had been escorted to a medical unit or a meeting place with a felt-lined bag over his head, and that while handcuffed he had been obliged to walk with his hands raised above his head, were untrue and not supported by any evidence. 26.  The Government stated that the open-air exercise area measured twenty-four square metres and was equipped with a canopy protecting inmates from rain and snow. It was not dark or damp. There was also equipment enabling inmates to do physical exercises. 27.  They further submitted that the applicant had had no opportunity to work, as at the time no facilities for work were available in the maximum security sector of Sokalska Prison. The food and water was regularly checked and was of adequate quality. 28.  The Government contended that the applicant had made no complaint to the domestic authorities concerning the material conditions of his detention. 29.  According to the applicant, his principal health problem was hypertension and in 2005 he had had four heart attacks. Allegedly, he had not received adequate medical treatment in that regard and had not been allowed to keep medication he needed. 30.  In August 2005 the applicant complained of inadequate medical assistance to a prosecutor in charge of supervising the prison authorities\u2019 compliance with the law. The prosecutor conducted an inquiry into the applicant\u2019s complaints of inadequate medical assistance. The prosecutor found that the medical assistance provided to the applicant by the administration of the prison had been adequate; the applicant was informed of this by a letter of 3 November 2005. The prosecutor\u2019s finding was based on the information contained in the applicant\u2019s medical file, according to which the applicant had received treatment for hypertension in October and December 2004, in January and February 2005, and between April and July 2005, which included the administration of inosine, nitroglycerinum and other medication. It was noted that the applicant had also been given the medication his relatives had sent him. The treatment prescribed by the prison doctors was later endorsed by a cardiologist from a civilian hospital, who examined the applicant in August 2005. 31.  The applicant disagreed with the prosecutor\u2019s findings and complained to the Sokal Town Court. By a ruling of 20 February 2006, the court refused to deal with the applicant\u2019s complaint, holding that the matter fell outside the court\u2019s jurisdiction. On 14 August 2006 the Lviv Regional Court of Appeal upheld that ruling. On 8 July 2008 the Higher Administrative Court quashed those decisions, finding that the matter had to be examined in the framework of the administrative proceedings. The case was remitted to the Lviv Administrative Court for fresh examination. By a ruling of 16 October 2008, that court returned the case, refusing to examine it as the applicant had failed to submit a formal claim with documents in support. The applicant did not pursue the matter further.\n(b)  Submissions by the Government 32.  According to the information submitted by the Government, throughout the period of his detention in the SIZO and in Sokalska Prison the applicant had been examined by various doctors, including doctors from civilian medical institutions, and had been provided with treatment for different medical issues he had at the time, including hypertension. 33.  According to the applicant, during his post-conviction detention he maintained contact with his wife, two minor children whose ages were not specified, his mother, and four other relatives. Generally, he was entitled to family visits no more than once every six months and for no longer than four hours per visit. 34.  During his stay in the Cherkasy SIZO allegedly only three adults and one child or two adults and two children could be present at any one time at such meetings. In Sokalska Prison no more than two adults and one child could be present at any one time. His family members, who lived in the Cherkasy Region, had experienced difficulties travelling to see him in Sokalska Prison, which is in the Lviv Region (about 700 km away). 35.  In that prison, only one room was made available for family visits, on a specified day (Sunday), which, because of the high demand for such visits, usually resulted in the duration of the visits being substantially reduced. In particular, the applicant\u2019s meetings with his family on 28 November 2004, 29 May 2005 and 28 November 2006 lasted no longer than two hours, whereas on 27 November 2005 and 28 May 2006 they lasted no longer than three hours. 36.  The family visits took place in the presence of a guard with a guard dog; the applicant was placed in a cage and separated from the others by a glass partition. The applicant and his visitors had to use a telephone during such meetings and their conversations were constantly monitored by a prison guard. 37.  Despite numerous requests by the applicant, the administration of the Cherkasy SIZO and Sokalska Prison did not allow him to have any intimate contact with his wife. The refusal was based on the ground that prisoners sentenced to life imprisonment did not have a statutory right to long family meetings. 38.  Between 15 October 2004 and 2 November 2005 the applicant allegedly was not allowed to make any telephone calls to his family. On the latter date he was allowed to make a telephone call to his wife, the duration of which was limited to five minutes. Subsequently, the applicant was only allowed to receive telephone calls once every three months upon his written request. 39.  The applicant complained to the Sokalska Prison authorities about the above-mentioned restrictions on family visits and telephone calls. In reply, they provided the applicant with extracts of the provisions of the Code on the Execution of Sentences of 2003 governing the conditions of detention of persons sentenced to life imprisonment. 40.  The Government challenged the trustworthiness of part of the applicant\u2019s submissions concerning restrictions on family visits and telephone calls, specifically his allegations that family visits had lasted less than two hours, that he had not been allowed to make telephone calls between 15 October 2004 and 2 November 2005, that other restrictions had been imposed on his right to make telephone calls after 2 November 2005, that only three adults and one minor child or two adults and two minor children had been allowed to visit him at any one time in the Cherkasy SIZO, that only two adults and two minor children had been allowed to visit him at any one time in Sokalska Prison, and that those visits had taken place in the presence of a guard with a guard dog. The Government further stated that the applicant had not raised those complaints before the domestic authorities. 41.  In a letter dated 19 May 2012 the applicant stated that the Court\u2019s letter, sent to him in January 2012, had been opened and read by the administration of Zamkova Prison no. 58, where he had been serving a prison sentence, and that he had been persecuted by the administration of the Prison for communicating with the Court. In particular, the applicant was placed in solitary confinement for the period from 28 January to 15 May 2012; on an unspecified date all the documents in his possession and his pen were taken from him; and he was not given the opportunity to contact his relatives for two months, the exact calendar period not being specified. The applicant also stated that before those events he had been subjected to disciplinary sanctions when he had received letters from the Court in detention, but provided no details in this regard. 42.  The Government in their turn contended that no letter to the applicant had been opened, that there had been no interference with his communication with the outside world, and that the applicant\u2019s allegations of persecution for complaining to the Court were wholly unfounded. According to them, the applicant was disciplined on several occasions for breaches of prison regulations, which included, inter alia, not respecting the prison daily schedule and insulting the prison guards. 43.  On 4 July 2002 the applicant lodged an application with the Court, complaining, inter alia, under Article 3 of the Convention that he had been tortured by the police and under Articles 6 and 7 of the Convention that he had been unfairly convicted and that his sentence had not been based on the law in force at the material time. 44.  In order to substantiate his complaints before the Court, the applicant tried to obtain from the domestic courts copies of various documents from his criminal case file. By letters dated 19 April and 10 May 2002 and 26 March 2003 his requests for copies of documents were refused by the President and Vice-President of the Cherkasy Regional Court of Appeal as having no basis in law. 45.  In 2002-03 the applicant\u2019s mother and wife, who were given leave to represent him during his trial (see paragraph 8 above) and after the trial by a ruling of 6 March 2003 issued by a judge of the Cherkasy Regional Court of Appeal, visited that court on several occasions with a view to obtaining copies of the documents from the applicant\u2019s criminal case file. According to the applicant, they were not allowed to consult the file or to take any documents from it. On an unspecified date their copy of the ruling of 6 March 2003 was allegedly taken and not returned by that judge. 46.  By letters dated 19 August 2003 and 25 February 2004, the Court asked the applicant to submit documentary evidence in respect of his complaints under Articles 3 and 6 of the Convention. In particular, he was invited to submit copies of his written complaints to the national authorities concerning his alleged ill-treatment, a copy of the prosecutor\u2019s decision concerning those complaints, a copy of his cassation appeal against the judgment of the Cherkasy Regional Court of Appeal of 23 August 2001, and copies of his written applications to have a witness on his behalf examined by that court. 47.  Further to the Court\u2019s letters, the applicant submitted several requests to the Donetsk Regional Court of Appeal, asking for copies of the requested documents. The applicant\u2019s requests were refused, but he was informed that, at the request of the Court, the entire criminal case file would be sent to it. 48.  On an unspecified date the applicant\u2019s mother hired a lawyer to represent the applicant before the authorities. The lawyer obtained copies of the documents indicated in the Court\u2019s letters, and they were subsequently submitted to the Court. However, the applicant stated that the lawyer had not obtained copies of all the necessary documents, and that the applicant\u2019s mother\u2019s further attempts to obtain copies of additional documents had been unsuccessful. 49.  Meanwhile, the applicant lodged a complaint with the Prydniprovskyy District Court against the judges of the Cherkasy Regional Court of Appeal, challenging their refusal to provide him with copies of documents from his case file or to allow his relatives to represent him before the domestic authorities. 50.  On 10 June 2004 the court dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaint, holding that the matter did not fall to be considered by the courts. On 16 November 2004 the Cherkasy Regional Court of Appeal confirmed the ruling of the first-instance court. 51.  On 16 June 2006 the Higher Administrative Court rejected the applicant\u2019s cassation appeal as lodged out of time. According to the applicant, he missed the deadline because the Sokalska Prison authorities had failed to dispatch his correspondence on time. The applicant lodged a new cassation appeal with the Higher Administrative Court, together with a request for an extension of the time-limit. The outcome of that appeal is unknown. 52.  On 27 March 2007 the Court declared the applicant\u2019s previous application inadmissible.", "references": ["6", "7", "5", "2", "0", "3", "8", "9", "No Label", "1", "4"], "gold": ["1", "4"]}
+{"input": "5.  The first applicant is a former World Chess Champion. He and the other six applicants are political activists. 6.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7.  On 24 November 2007 a group of opposition politicians organised protests rallies in several Russian cities, including Moscow. They were part of a public campaign \u201c[f]or the consolidation of democratic forces in order to defend the Constitution and the legal order\u201d initiated before the Presidential elections in March 2008. 8.  On that day the applicants attended a gathering on Academician Sakharov Prospekt, which had been organised by the second applicant and approved by the authorities. According to the applicants, at 3 p.m., at the end of the gathering, they started walking to the location of another authorised gathering which took place on Chistoprudnyy Boulevard between 2 p.m. and 4 p.m. The Government alleged that some 1,500 people took part in the procession, a figure contested by the applicants as grossly overestimated. It appears that on their way, which ran past Myasnitskaya Street, the applicants also intended to take a petition to the Central Electoral Committee. However, their route was blocked by the riot police and they were arrested, with excessive force allegedly being used against them. 9.  At 3.45 p.m. the first and second applicants were taken to the Basmannyy District police station. A duty officer drew up an administrative offence statement (\u043f\u0440\u043e\u0442\u043e\u043a\u043e\u043b \u043e\u0431 \u0430\u0434\u043c\u0438\u043d\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0430\u0442\u0438\u0432\u043d\u043e\u043c \u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043e\u043d\u0430\u0440\u0443\u0448\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0438) in respect of each of them on the basis of reports (\u0440\u0430\u043f\u043e\u0440\u0442) by police officers M. and U. The applicants were charged with breaching the established procedure for conducting public events and disobeying lawful police orders, offences under Articles 20.2 \u00a7 2 and 19.3 of the Code of Administrative Offences (\u043f\u0440\u043e\u0442\u043e\u043a\u043e\u043b \u043e\u0431 \u0430\u0434\u043c\u0438\u043d\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0430\u0442\u0438\u0432\u043d\u043e\u043c \u0437\u0430\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0436\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0438). Their administrative detention was ordered with reference to Article 27.3 of the Code. The first applicant was detained until 6.20 p.m. that evening, and the second applicant until an unspecified time on 26 November 2007. 10.  Immediately after his release from detention the first applicant appeared before the Justice of the Peace of Circuit no. 382 of the Krasnoselskiy District of Moscow. According to the first applicant, members of the public who wanted to attend the hearing of his case were prevented from entering the court, which had been cordoned off by the riot police. He claimed that even his lawyers had experienced difficulties getting into court. He applied for the hearing to be adjourned until 26 November 2007 to allow him time to study the case file with his lawyer and prepare his defence. The hearing was adjourned, but only until 7.15 p.m. that evening. 11.  The first applicant applied for six witnesses to be called and examined. These included four police officers and two eyewitnesses waiting outside the courthouse. He also requested that certain video and photographic material be admitted as evidence. 12.  The Justice of the Peace examined police officers M. and U., who stated that after the public gathering the first applicant had participated in an unauthorised march down Myasnitskaya Street towards Chistoprudnyy Boulevard and had chanted \u201cDown with Putin!\u201d. The first applicant pleaded not guilty and disputed the police officers\u2019 testimony and police reports. He testified that he had been arrested while walking alongside other people from one authorised gathering to another. When he had seen that the path had been blocked by the police he had turned back as ordered, but as he had walked away he had been arrested. He insisted that there had been no other way of complying with the police\u2019s order to disperse than to turn back. He denied that there had been an organised march, or that he had called out to anyone to follow him. 13.  On the same day the Justice of the Peace found the first applicant guilty of both charges, establishing that he had marched among some 1,500 people in what had constituted an unauthorised public event. She based her findings on M. and U.\u2019s witness statements and written reports, the administrative offence statements in respect of two charges and the report on the administrative arrest. She dismissed the applicant\u2019s testimony as false, finding that it contradicted the police officers\u2019 testimony and reports, and that the latter were trustworthy because they had \u201cno vested interest\u201d. She sentenced the first applicant to five days\u2019 administrative detention, noting that he had a previous conviction for a similar administrative offence. 14.  On 26 November 2007 the same Justice of the Peace considered the administrative charges against the second applicant. He applied for six witnesses to be called and examined, including five police officers and one defence witness. The Justice of the Peace examined only police officer U., who gave essentially the same testimony as in the first applicant\u2019s case. The second applicant pleaded not guilty and alleged that he had been arrested while walking from the authorised meeting to the metro station. As in the first applicant\u2019s case, the Justice of the Peace based her findings on U.\u2019s witness statements and the written police reports. She dismissed the second applicant\u2019s testimony on the same grounds as in that case. She found him guilty of both charges and sentenced him to five days\u2019 administrative detention. 15.  On the same day the Meshchanskiy District Court of Moscow examined and dismissed appeals lodged by the first and second applicant. 16.  The applicants served their sentences in detention centres for administrative offenders (\u0441\u043f\u0435\u0446\u043f\u0440\u0438\u0435\u043c\u043d\u0438\u043a). 17.  The other applicants were arrested in the same circumstances and were also convicted of administrative offences.", "references": ["5", "6", "4", "8", "1", "0", "9", "No Label", "7", "2", "3"], "gold": ["7", "2", "3"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1967 and lives in Lakha-Varanda, Chechen Republic. 5.  On 11 July 2008 P. caused a traffic accident while driving and damaged the applicant\u2019s car. According to P., the applicant threatened him, asking for cash for his car\u2019s repair. 6.  On 16 July 2008 P. reported the applicant to the regional police department for combatting organised crime. The police decided to run a special operation to arrest the applicant. They gave P. 2,000 United States dollars (USD) and 90,000 Russian roubles (RUB) in marked notes. At around noon several police officers arrived at a car market where P. worked. At about 5 p.m. the applicant entered P.\u2019s office. P. met the applicant and gave him the money he had received from the police. Immediately thereafter, the policemen arrested the applicant. According to the police officers, the applicant resisted the arrest and they had to handcuff him. The applicant was then taken to the regional police department for combatting organised crime. At 5 p.m. the policemen searched the applicant and found heroin on him. Lay witnesses F. and R. were present during the search. The applicant alleged that it was the police officers who had planted the drug on him. 7.  At 8 p.m. on 16 July 2008 police captain A. drew up an administrative arrest record, according to which the applicant had \u201cfailed to comply with the policemen\u2019s legitimate request to present his identification document, resisted them and tried to abscond\u201d. No legal assistance was made available to the applicant. 8.  On 17 July 2008 at 12.45 p.m. investigator S. from the town police department opened a criminal investigation against the applicant on suspicion of illegal drug possession. At 6.20 p.m. she drew up a criminal arrest record. 9.  On 18 July 2008 the Odintsovo Town Court authorised the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention. The court noted as follows:\n\u201cAs is apparent from the evidential material submitted, [the applicant] is suspected of having committed a serious offence and he has a prior criminal record. If released, he might abscond and interfere with [administration of justice]. \u201d 10.  The applicant appealed, noting that he had been arrested by the police a day before the record of his arrest was prepared and that the Town Court had failed to take his fact into consideration. He also argued that the Town Court had ignored the fact that he had a permanent place of residence in Moscow, that he had been the sole provider for two minor children and his wife, that he was in the fourth year of study by correspondence at a higher educational establishment and that he had employment. Nor had the prosecutor furnished any evidence disclosing the applicant\u2019s intent to abscond or to interfere with the administration of justice. Lastly, he noted that the arrest order did not indicate a time-limit for his detention. 11.  On 5 August 2008 the Moscow Regional Court upheld the arrest order of 18 July 2008 on appeal. 12.  On 15 September 2008 the Town Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 17 November 2008. The court reasoned as follows:\n\u201cAs is apparent from the evidential material submitted, [the applicant] is charged with a serious offence and has a prior criminal record. Accordingly, if released, he might abscond and interfere with [administration of justice].\u201d 13.  On 12 November 2008 the Town Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 31 December 2008. The court reasoned as follows:\n\u201cTaking into account the fact that [the applicant] is charged with a serious offence which he committed whilst on parole, that he has a prior criminal record and that he might abscond, continue his criminal activities, and interfere with the administration of justice, it is necessary that [the applicant] remain in custody. \u201d 14.  On 16 December 2008 the Town Court set the trial-date for 23 December 2008. The court also ordered that the applicant remain in custody pending examination of the case and noted as follows:\n\u201c... According to the material submitted by the prosecutor, [the applicant] had been previously convicted. He is charged with a[n] ... offence classified as particularly serious ... . ... The court considers that, if released, [the applicant] might abscond. Furthermore, [the applicant\u2019s] release might interfere with the comprehensive and objective examination of the evidence. Accordingly, the measure of restraint previously imposed on [the applicant] cannot be lifted.\u201d 15.  On 18 December 2008 the Town Court opened the trial. 16.  On 22 May 2009 the Town Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 8 September 2009 noting as follows:\n\u201cHaving heard the parties\u2019 arguments, the court concludes that, in view of the fact that [the applicant] is charged with a ... grievous offence ... which he committed whilst on parole, the court considers that, if released, he might abscond or continue criminal activities. Furthermore, the [applicant\u2019s] release might interfere with the comprehensive and objective examination of the case. Accordingly, ... the detention imposed on [the applicant] cannot be lifted.\u201d 17.  On 25 June 2009 the Town Court returned the case file to the prosecutor\u2019s office for rectification of certain omissions and extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 8 September 2009. The court referred to the gravity of the charges against the applicant and noted that the latter was charged with having committed a serious offence whilst released on parole. 18.  On 16 July 2009 the Regional Court upheld the decision of 22 May 2009 on appeal. 19.  On 23 July 2009 the Regional Court upheld the decision of 25 June 2009 on appeal. 20.  On an unspecified date the prosecutor\u2019s office returned the case file to the Town Court. 21.  On 2 November 2009 the Town Court opened the trial. On the same date the applicant studied the material in the case file at the court-house. He tore several pages out of the case file and burnt them. 22.  During the subsequent hearings the court heard evidence from a certain P., police officers And., Rom., Ak., Z., Shch., and T. \u2212 who had taken part in the applicant\u2019s arrest \u2212 the head of the police unit Pl., lay witness R. \u2212 who had been present when the applicant was searched on 16 July 2008 \u2212 and forensic expert P., who had run a laboratory test on the heroin found on the applicant. 23.  On 11 and 12 November and 2, 3, 4 and 8 December 2009 the applicant received repeated reprimands from the presiding judge for making threats and insulting persons present in the courtroom. The judge warned the applicant that he might be removed from the courtroom for continuing with such disruptive behaviour. 24.  On 9 December 2009 the director of the company that provided the interpreters for the trial complained to the court that the applicant had threatened the interpreters who had earlier taken part in the proceedings. 25.  On 16 December 2009 the applicant refused to leave the remand prison to attend a trial hearing. The hearing was adjourned. 26.  On 17 December 2009 the court held the last trial hearing. The presiding judge confirmed the presence of the parties and witnesses. L., a police officer who had been in charge of the operation leading to the applicant\u2019s arrest on 16 July 2008, appeared for questioning. The applicant insulted the witness. The presiding judge reprimanded the applicant and warned him that he would be removed from the courtroom if he persisted with his disruptive behaviour. The applicant started talking in Chechen. The interpreter refused to interpret and asked the court to relieve him of his duties. The presiding judge informed the parties that the interpreters who had earlier taken part in the proceedings had decided to refuse further engagement in view of the insults and threats made by the applicant. The applicant talked back to the judge in Chechen. The interpreter refused to interpret into Russian. The presiding judge again reprimanded the applicant and warned him about his possible removal from the courtroom. The presiding judge presented the report from the remand prison management stating that on 16 December 2009 the applicant had refused to be transported from the remand prison to the court-house for the hearing. The presiding judge asked the prosecution and defence whether it was possible, in the circumstances, to remove the applicant from the courtroom. The prosecutor did not object. The applicant stated that the presiding judge\u2019s conduct clearly demonstrated that he was being pressurised by high-ranking law-enforcement officials to deliver an unlawful judgment in the applicant\u2019s case and that his decision to remove the applicant from the courtroom would be unlawful and in contravention of the Convention. The court ruled as follows:\n\u201c... the court decides to remove [the applicant] from the courtroom ... for the following reasons. [The applicant] has repeatedly been disruptive in the courtroom in the course of the trial, including the current hearing. In particular, ... while studying the material in the case file, [the applicant] destroyed five pages thereof. He repeatedly refused to appear in the courtroom referring to his needs to pray, eat, wash and go to the bathroom. On several occasions he refused to appear before the court alleging that he was ill. However, the emergency response doctors summoned did not confirm his allegation. He has insulted witnesses and other participants in the proceedings and shown disrespect for the judges participating in the trial by making negative comments about the judicial system in Russia. He claimed to know the home address of [a witness] and one of the judges. He has made statements and comments unrelated to the trial. During this hearing, [the applicant] insulted a witness ... . After [the applicant] said something in the Chechen language, the interpreter asked the court to [relieve him of his duties] ... . The head of the interpreters\u2019 agency reported that [the applicant] spoke Chechen [in the courtroom] with the sole intention of insulting and threatening the interpreters.\u201d 27.  The trial continued in the applicant\u2019s absence. The court questioned L., who, at the time, had been in charge of the special operation conducted in response to P.\u2019s complaint about the applicant extorting money from him. The applicant\u2019s lawyer was present and put questions to the witness. The court also established that witness F. had failed to appear and decided that the statement he had made earlier to the investigator should be read out. The court also read out statements made by witnesses Shch. and T. earlier during the trial as those witnesses had also failed to appear. Lastly, the court granted a request from the applicant\u2019s lawyer and read out several earlier statements made by the applicant and several witnesses for the defence who had failed to appear. According to the record of the court hearing, the applicant refused to return to the courtroom to participate in the closing arguments. The judgment was read out in the applicant\u2019s absence. 28.  The Town Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to four years\u2019 imprisonment. The court based its findings on statements made by witnesses questioned by the investigator and the court, police reports and other material in the case file, and forensic evidence. The court accepted the prosecution\u2019s version of events, namely that the applicant had been arrested by special police forces in the course of an operation targeting him as a racketeer as alleged by P. and that heroin had been found on him during the search conducted immediately after his arrest. 29.  On 13 April 2010 the Moscow Regional Court upheld the applicant\u2019s conviction on appeal. 30.  On 11 December 2013 the Presidium of the Moscow Regional Court reviewed the applicant\u2019s conviction and reduced the applicant\u2019s sentence to three years and two months\u2019 imprisonment. 31.  On 21 May 2009 the applicant was taken to the Odintsovo police station. According to applicant, at the station he was assaulted by three police officers. They throttled him and pulled his arms behind his back causing him enormous pain. 32.  On 21 and 22 May 2009 the applicant was examined by a paramedic. According to the official report, the applicant complained about chronic stomach pain. 33.  On 22 May 2009 the applicant\u2019s lawyer complained to the police and the prosecutor\u2019s office about the incident of 21 May 2009. 34.  On 25 May 2009 the police completed an internal inquiry into the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment. It was established that five police officers had had to subdue the applicant during a body search. They had pinned him to the ground and handcuffed him. 35.  On 10 July 2009 investigator B. refused to institute criminal proceedings against the alleged perpetrators. On 31 August 2009 his superior quashed the said decision and remitted the matter for further inquiry. 36.  On 9 September 2009 investigator D. dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaint as unsubstantiated and refused to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers. Relying on the evidential material obtained in the course of the inquiry, he concluded that the police officers had acted in accordance with the law. It appears that the applicant did not appeal against the decision of 9 September 2009. 37.  Following communication of the application to the Government, on 4 February 2014 the Acting Head of the Investigative Committee of Odintsovo Town quashed the decision of 9 September 2009 and remitted the matter for further inquiry. The parties did not disclose the outcome of the proceedings. 38.  On 25 September 2009, remand prison director M. ordered the applicant\u2019s placement in a disciplinary cell. 39.  According to the applicant, on their way to the disciplinary cell M. repeatedly hit the applicant against the wall, administering blows to his head and body. The applicant\u2019s nose and lips began to bleed. Then the guards handcuffed the applicant and continued beating him. 40.  According to the Government, the applicant refused to enter the disciplinary cell. Instead, he threw a punch at M.\u2019s face and M. hit his head against the wall. M. tried to subdue the applicant by pulling his right arm behind his back. The applicant resisted and kicked M. Guard N. came to M.\u2019s rescue and pulled the applicant\u2019s arm behind his back. The applicant fell to the floor and his nose bled. The guards handcuffed the applicant and took him to a cell where he calmed down. The guards called an ambulance. 41.  On the same date the prison director and the guards reported the use of force against the applicant. According to the reports, M. pulled the applicant\u2019s right arm behind his back using a combat technique and guard K. handcuffed the applicant to put an end to his resistance. 42.  On an unspecified date the applicant underwent a medical examination. According to the medical report the applicant had sustained the following injuries: bruises on the right forearm and shoulder, left shoulder, left armpit and left calf; a bruised wound on the lower lip. 43.  On 6 October 2009 the applicant complained that he had been beaten up by M. On 15 October 2009 investigator Mar. dismissed the applicant\u2019s allegations as unsubstantiated and refused to institute criminal proceedings against M. 44.  On 12 October 2009 a medical forensic expert examined the applicant and his medical case history. The expert concluded that the applicant\u2019s injuries could have resulted from impact by blunt and solid objects and that the applicant might have sustained the injuries on 25 September 2009 as a result of blows or a fall. The expert concluded that the injuries were not serious and had not caused any harm to the applicant\u2019s health. 45.  On 22 October 2009 the expert issued an additional forensic report, noting that it was impossible to determine the exact date on which the applicant had sustained the injuries. It could have been on 25 September 2009 or some time before or after that date. 46.  On 7 October 2009 the prosecutor\u2019s office opened a criminal investigation into the incident of 25 September 2009. The applicant was charged with the use of force against a State agent. 47.  On an unspecified date the Town Court received the file and opened the trial. During the trial, the applicant maintained his innocence. He claimed that the remand prison director and the guards had beaten him up on 25 September 2009 and he had then been prosecuted on trumped-up charges to cover up for the beatings. 48.  On 16 December 2010 the Town Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to six years\u2019 imprisonment. The court dismissed the applicant\u2019s version of events as unsubstantiated, relying on the prosecution and defence witnesses\u2019 statements and forensic evidence. On 17 March 2011 the Regional Court upheld the applicant\u2019s conviction on appeal. The court also re-calculated the applicant\u2019s sentence. It took into account that the applicant had two previous convictions and sentenced him cumulatively to seven years\u2019 imprisonment. 49.  On 11 December 2013 the Presidium of the Regional Court reclassified the charges against the applicant by way of supervisory review, reduced his sentence to five years\u2019 imprisonment and sentenced him cumulatively to five and a half years\u2019 imprisonment. 50.  On 29 October 2010 the applicant was detained in remand prison no. IZ\u201177/4 in Moscow. According to the applicant, the prison guards beat him and nine other inmates. According to the Government, the applicant was inciting other inmates to disobey the guards. He also threatened the guards and insulted them. The guards used rubber truncheons and handcuffs to subdue the applicant. 51.  On 3 November 2010 the applicant took part in a hearing at the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation by means of video link. The applicant demonstrated to the judges extensive bruising on his stomach, chest and lower back and claimed that he had been beaten up by guards of the remand prison. 52.  On 9 November 2010 the Supreme Court informed the Moscow City Prosecutor of the applicant\u2019s injuries and forwarded the applicant\u2019s complaint about the beatings in the remand prison. 53.  According to the Government, on 12 January 2014 an investigator completed the inquiry into the incident of 29 October 2010 and refused to institute criminal proceedings against the prison guards. On 27 January 2014 the district prosecutor quashed the decision of 12 January 2014 and remitted the matter for further inquiry. The Government did not disclose the outcome. 54.  According to the applicant, on 24 June 2012 he was beaten up whilst in detention in correctional colony no. IK-19 in the Sverdlovsk Region. According to the Government, the applicant had an altercation with inmate Ur. As a result, the applicant sustained bruises and a bone fracture on the right side of the face and concussion. On an unspecified date the authorities instituted criminal proceedings against Ur. The parties did not disclose their outcome.\n(b)  Correctional colony no. IK-2 55.  On an unspecified date the applicant was transferred to correctional colony no. IK-2 in Yekaterinburg. 56.  According to the applicant, on 29 September 2012 some time after 10 p.m. a group of young and strongly-built men entered his cell and beat him up. They were led by inmate O. 57.  According to the applicant, on 1 October 2012 a man wearing the uniform of a major and accompanied by several medical orderlies entered the applicant\u2019s cell. The major started beating the applicant, who was lying on the bed. The major then told the orderlies to pull the applicant off the bed and continued the beatings, administering multiple blows to the applicant\u2019s head and other parts of the body. 58.  On 7 October 2012 the applicant was transferred to correctional colony no. IK-19 in the Sverdlovsk Region. Upon arrival, he underwent a medical examination. The medical practitioners recorded a wound on the applicant\u2019s head and a bruise near the hip bone. The applicant explained that he had sustained the injuries as a result of the beatings to which he had been subjected in correctional colony no. IK-2. The management of correctional colony no. IK-19 forwarded the relevant report to the regional investigation committee but it was never received by them. According to the Government, the authorities\u2019 inquiry into the loss of the report is still pending. 59.  According to the Government, the inquiries into the incidents of 29 September and 1 October 2012 are still pending. 60.  Between 17 July 2009 and 13 April 2011 the applicant was detained in identical conditions in the temporary detention centre in Odintsovo, in remand prison no. IZ\u201150/1 in Mozhaysk and in remand prison no. IZ-77/4 in Moscow. The cells were overcrowded, dirty, poorly ventilated and insufficiently lit. The toilet offered no privacy. The use of a shower was limited. 61.  From 22 November 2012 to 11 January 2013 the applicant was held in remand prison no. IZ-66/1 in Yekaterinburg.\n(a)  Temporary detention centre in Odintsovo 62.  On numerous occasions between 10 November 2008 and 17 December 2009 the applicant was held in the temporary detention centre in Odintsovo. According to the Government, the centre comprised fifteen cells measuring 184 sq. m in total. The centre had an outdoor area where the inmates were able to exercise. The inmates were able to take a shower at least once a week. They were provided with three meals per day and an individual sleeping place, bed linen, toiletries, a bowl, a mug and a spoon. 63.  According to the applicant, at all times the cells in the temporary detention centre were overcrowded and the personal space available to the inmates fell short of the statutory minimum standard of 4 sq. m. The cells were dirty and there was no ventilation. The lighting was poor and insufficient for reading. The access to shower facilities was limited. The applicant received one meal a day. On the days of the court hearings, the applicant did not have any meals at all.\n(b)  Remand prisons nos. IZ-50/1 in Mozhaysk and IZ-77/4 in Moscow 64.  The applicant did not provide a description of the conditions in which he was detained in remand prisons nos. IZ-50/1 in Mozhaysk and IZ\u201177/4 in Moscow, beyond alleging that they were identical to the conditions of his detention in the temporary detention centre in Odintsovo.\n(c)  Remand prison no. IZ-66/1 in Yekaterinburg 65.  On 22 November 2012 the applicant was placed in cell no. 423 in remand prison no. IZ-66/1 in Yekaterinburg. The cell measured no more than 15 sq. m and was equipped with four beds. Between seven and nine inmates were held in the cell, together with the applicant. 66.  From 29 November to 28 December 2012 the applicant was held in cell no. 240. The cell was constantly overcrowded and housed between eighteen and thirty inmates. 67.  From 29 December 2012 to 11 January 2013 the applicant was held in cell no. 2. It measured 6.23 sq. m and housed two inmates. 68.  According to the applicant, on the days of the court hearings and on the days when there was a change of the applicant\u2019s place of detention, he was woken up early and placed in an overcrowded holding cell. He was then taken to the place of his destination (a court-house or a detention facility) in a prison van. On each occasion the number of the persons transported with the applicant exceeded the van\u2019s capacity of 24 persons. The vans were dirty and unventilated and had no heating. The trip lasted several hours. The van compartments were stiflingly hot in the summer and very cold in the winter.\n(b)  Description provided by the Government 69.  According to the Government, the applicant was transported in GAZ vans which comprised two compartments measuring 6.2 sq. m and 1.2 sq. m respectively, in strict compliance with the vans\u2019 design capacity. The vans were equipped with ventilation and heating. The trips from the temporary detention centre in Odintsovo to the Odintsovo Town Court lasted no more than 5 to 10 minutes. The trips from the same detention centre to the courts in Moscow lasted no more than three hours. 70.  According to the applicant, at the court-house he was placed in a holding cell measuring 5 sq. m together with two to four other inmates. He was held in such conditions for several hours awaiting the hearing. He was allowed to use the toilet only once. The cell was not ventilated. All the other detainees smoked and the applicant, a non-smoker, was exposed to the others\u2019 tobacco smoke. 71.  On 13 April 2011 the applicant was transported to correctional colony no. IK-19 in the Sverdlovsk Region. The trip lasted from 13 to 27 April 2011.\n(a)  Description provided by the applicant 72.  According to the applicant, he was held with twelve to fourteen other inmates in a train compartment of which the capacity was a maximum of six persons. During the stops, the applicant was housed in remand prisons in Moscow, Chelyabinsk and Yekaterinburg. All the cells there were overcrowded. The applicant was not provided with an individual sleeping place.\n(b)  Description provided by the Government 73.  According to the Government, the applicant was transported in a train compartment measuring 159 x 214 x 287 cm. At no time did the number of inmates transported in one compartment together with the applicant exceed ten persons, the compartment\u2019s capacity being twelve persons. It was equipped with eight sitting and four sleeping places. The applicant was provided with dry food rations and drinking water.", "references": ["4", "8", "3", "7", "9", "0", "6", "5", "No Label", "1", "2"], "gold": ["1", "2"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1970 in Armenia. Until his arrest in 2008 he lived in Kurgan, Russia. On 20 September 2012 the Sverdlovsk Region office of the Federal Migration Service ordered his deportation to Armenia. It seems that the deportation order was executed on 11 October 2012. 6.  On 3 August 2008 the applicant, while under the influence of alcohol, took a car without the owner\u2019s consent and crashed into a tree. As a result of this accident he sustained multiple injuries, including a thighbone fracture, a dislocated hip and facial wounds. 7.  The applicant was taken by ambulance to Kurgan Town Hospital where he was admitted to an intensive care unit. He was connected to a medical ventilator and subjected to emergency anti-shock treatment. The doctors sutured his wounds. A metal pin for skeletal traction was inserted through the heel bone of his broken leg and the applicant was placed in a special metal frame with weights attached to his injured leg. 8.  Several days later his condition improved and he was transferred to a trauma department, where he remained bedridden in a skeletal traction frame. Osteosynthesis surgery was to be performed in due course. 9.  On 6 August 2008 the police opened a criminal case into car theft. 10.  It appears that during the investigation the authorities learned that the applicant was wanted by the authorities of the Republic of Belarus for a murder allegedly committed in 2003 in Minsk. 11.  A police investigator asked the attending doctor whether the applicant could be discharged from hospital and transferred to a detention facility. 12.  On an unspecified date the doctor informed the investigator that the applicant was in need of inpatient treatment on account of multiple injuries, including facial injuries, a dislocated hip and a thighbone fracture. Citing the seriousness of his condition the doctor noted that the applicant could not be transported to a court or police station. The doctor stated that police detention centres and remand prisons in Kurgan were unable to ensure the appropriate medical care to the applicant. 13.  On 8 August 2008 the investigator reported the content of the above letter to his superior. 14.  Four days later, upon a request from an investigator, a medical expert commenced an examination of the applicant to assess the seriousness of his injuries. Without informing the hospital administration and without having received the results of the expert examination, the police arrested the applicant and took him to remand prison no. IZ-45/1 in Kurgan. It does not seem that any special arrangements for the applicant\u2019s transport were made. 15.  It was noted in the expert report completed on 3 September 2008 that the applicant\u2019s injuries were of \u201cmedium\u201d seriousness. 16.  On 13 August 2008 the Kurgan Town Court, at the request of the Kurgan prosecutor and in the absence of the applicant, ordered his detention pending the receipt of an extradition request from the Belarusian authorities. That ruling was based on Article 466 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of Russia (\u201cthe CCrP\u201d) and Article 61 of the Convention on Legal Assistance and Legal Relations in Civil, Family and Criminal Matters (\u201cthe Minsk Convention\u201d). 17.  On 21 August 2008 the Kurgan Regional Court quashed the order of 13 August 2008 in view of the applicant\u2019s absence from the hearing before the Town Court. The Regional Court remitted the issue for fresh consideration. 18.  A week later, this time after hearing evidence from the applicant, the Town Court, on the basis of the same legal provisions, ordered his detention until receipt of the extradition request from the Republic of Belarus. 19.  On 4 September 2008 the Regional Court upheld the applicant\u2019s detention on appeal. 20.  According to the applicant, only on 14 October 2008 did the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office inform the competent Belarusian authorities of the applicant\u2019s arrest. 21.  The General Prosecutor of the Republic of Belarus requested the applicant\u2019s extradition. 22.  On 25 August 2009 the Russian Prosecutor General\u2019s Office ordered the applicant\u2019s extradition to stand trial in Belarus. 23.  According to the applicant, in March 2010 he was extradited to the Republic of Belarus. 24.  On 23 March 2010 the Belarusian authorities closed the criminal case due to the absence of corpus delicti in the applicant\u2019s actions. He was then returned to Russia. 25.  In the meantime, on 29 August 2008, in the context of the criminal investigation into car theft, the Kurgan Town Court ordered the applicant not to leave Kurgan. 26.  On 23 September 2008 the Town Court changed the measure of restraint to detention pending investigation. The decision was based on the seriousness of the charges, the fact that the applicant had been on the run and had no permanent residence in Russia. The Regional Court upheld that detention order on appeal. 27.  On 22 November 2008 the Town Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 5 December 2008, citing the seriousness of the charges and the lack of a permanent residence in Russia. 28.  On 4 December 2008 and 4 January 2009 the Town Court again extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 5 and 30 January 2009, respectively. In addition to the previously employed arguments, the detention orders were held to be justified by the necessity to complete the investigation. The latest detention order was upheld on appeal by the Regional Court on 15 January 2009. 29.  On 27 March 2009 the Kurgan Town Court convicted the applicant of car theft and sentenced him to four years\u2019 imprisonment in a correctional colony. 30.  On 26 May 2009 the Regional Court upheld the conviction and sentence, but amended the type of the detention facility where the applicant was to serve his sentence to a settlement colony. 31.  It is clear from entries made by civilian doctors in the applicant\u2019s medical history on 12 August 2008, the day of his arrest, that he was in satisfactory health; his body temperature, which had fluctuated for several days, was 37.7\u02daC; the pain syndrome was decreasing; his stitches were dry; and no signs of inflammation were present. The metal pin remained in his leg. In the discharge summary drafted on account of the applicant\u2019s arrest, \u201ccontinued medical treatment\u201d and crutches were prescribed. The attending doctor explicitly noted that the patient had been taken from the hospital without the consent of the chief doctor. 32.  On admission to the remand prison the applicant was examined by a feldsher (medical assistant), who recorded the visible bodily injuries. No medical tests were performed and no treatment was prescribed. The applicant was not provided with any mobility aid devices, such as a wheelchair, crutches or a walking stick. 33.  It was not disputed by the parties that the next day the applicant had been placed in a cell designed to accommodate a maximum of four inmates. The cell measured 15.4 sq. m. On 13 August and between 15 and 19 August 2008 the applicant had to share that cell with seven other inmates, with each inmate thus having no more than 1.9 sq. m of floor space. Several inmates, including the applicant, had no places to sleep. 34.  According to the applicant, in the remand prison he experienced a leg pain, nausea and loss of consciousness. 35.  Medical entries show that the applicant was seen by a prison doctor for the first time on 18 August 2008, in response to his complaints of pain, nausea and vertigo. After a visual examination, the doctor ordered the transfer of the applicant to Regional Anti-Tuberculosis Prison Hospital no. OF-73/1 in Kurgan (\u201cthe prison hospital\u201d) \u201cfor treatment and skeletal traction\u201d. The transfer was performed the next day. 36.  In the prison hospital several medical tests were performed. Owing to technical problems the applicant could not undergo an X-ray examination of his legs ordered by a doctor. He was seen by a surgeon and a neurologist. 37.  The surgeon, having considered the time that had passed from the termination of the skeletal traction, removed the metal pin from the applicant\u2019s leg. A walking stick was prescribed. 38.  The neurologist diagnosed the applicant with vegetative-vascular dystonia and prescribed a month-long drug regimen. 39.  The applicant was discharged from hospital on 27 August 2008 in a \u201csatisfactory condition\u201d. 40.  The medical documents in the Court\u2019s possession cover the period up to 21 May 2009. They show that at that time the applicant was seen by the prison doctor on account of his chronic peptic and liver conditions. It does not appear that he underwent any medical examination or treatment related to the leg condition. 41.  As to the conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention during that period, the Government submitted that the applicant had been transferred between several cells of the remand prison, some of which were overcrowded. In particular, between 30 September and 8 October 2008, between 26 January and 19 March, 24 March and 10 April, 11 April and 2 June 2009 the applicant was afforded less than 2.7 sq. m of floor space, and occasionally less than 2 sq. m. According to the applicant, the cells were poorly ventilated, had non-partitioned toilets and were infested with bugs, mice and lice. 42.  On 2 June 2009, the applicant was sent to serve his sentence in a settlement colony. He was released on 22 September 2012, after having served his sentence in full. 43.  According to him, he continued to walk with a limp after the release, because the broken leg had knitted in a wrong position.", "references": ["5", "4", "3", "7", "8", "6", "0", "9", "No Label", "1", "2"], "gold": ["1", "2"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Tomsk. 6.  At the material time the applicant, a freelance journalist, was working for a newspaper, Tomskaya Nedelya (\u00ab\u0422\u043e\u043c\u0441\u043a\u0430\u044f \u043d\u0435\u0434\u0435\u043b\u044f\u00bb), with a circulation of 66,585. The newspaper is published and distributed in the Tomsk Region. 7.  On 9 December 1999, in its \u201cSocial Aspect\u201d section, the newspaper published an article by the applicant headlined \u201c[S.\u2019s] mother was dying here\u201d (\u00ab\u0417\u0434\u0435\u0441\u044c \u0443\u043c\u0438\u0440\u0430\u043b\u0430 \u043c\u0430\u0442\u044c [\u0421.]\u00bb). The article described everyday life in a State-owned care home for the elderly, Lesnaya Dacha, giving examples of various residents who were or had been living there. It exposed practical difficulties encountered by the personnel in taking care of the residents in the absence of necessary equipment, and also mentioned that quite a few residents had been abandoned in the care home by their relatives. 8.  The article then mentioned the mother of Mr S. (his full surname was given in the headline and in the article), a former deputy of the national parliament (the State Duma), who at that time was standing in elections to the State Duma. The article stated:\n\u201c... Quite a few respectable people bring their ill relatives to the care home in an attempt to escape unnecessary troubles.\u201d\nThat sentence was followed by text in bold letters:\n\u201cThere is, for example, a room in which the mother of Deputy [S.] died. It is now named after him. It is a single room, however small and narrow. The ill and massively corpulent woman lay here for four months. Nurses remember that it was very hard to lift and turn her ...\u201d 9.  The article also referred to the care home\u2019s chief medical officer, Mr M., as having stated that empathy \u2013 mercy \u2013 towards the patients was a necessary quality for the personnel in order to work in that institution, and that it was a particularly rare quality at that time which should be revived. The article then quoted Mr M. as follows (the paragraph below was also printed in bold letters):\n\u201c... It is for lack of mercy for their next of kin that their relatives bring them here, in order to avoid troubles, as if they themselves are not within God\u2019s power. Sometimes ordinary nurses happen to be more merciful than people in authority ...\u201d 10.  The above-mentioned two paragraphs were the only ones printed in bold in the whole article. 11.  On 31 January 2000 Mr S.S., Mr A.S. and Ms O.K.-S., who were respectively Mr S.\u2019s father, brother and sister, brought defamation proceedings against the applicant. They claimed that the above-mentioned extracts contained statements aiming to create negative feeling on the part of readers towards the S. family and influence them as voters during the elections. They argued in particular that those statements made readers think that the S. family had had no mercy for their closest relative \u2013 their wife and mother \u2013 that they had taken her to Lesnaya Dacha to get rid of her, and that they had not paid her any visits and had not taken care of her. The claimants insisted that those statements were untrue and damaging to their honour and dignity, and sought compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage. They also referred to Article 24 of the Russian Constitution, which prohibited the dissemination of information about an individual without his or her consent. 12.  On 17 April 2000 the Leninskiy District Court of Tomsk delivered its judgment. It rejected as unfounded the claimants\u2019 argument concerning a breach of their right to respect for their private life, noting that, by placing their relative, Mrs S., in a State-owned medical institution for the elderly, the claimants had stepped out of the private sphere and into the public domain, and therefore the constitutional principle of the inviolability of private life was inapplicable in the circumstances. The court, having examined certain witnesses, also considered that Mrs S. had indeed caused the claimants inconvenience and complicated their life, and that they had therefore decided to place her in a medical institution. The court thus concluded that the sentence stating \u201c...quite a few respectable people bring their ill relatives to the care home in an attempt to escape unnecessary troubles...\u201d could not be said to be untrue, whether it was the applicant\u2019s generalisation or a sentence relating to the claimants, as alleged by them. The court further found, with reference to relevant evidence adduced by the applicant, that the information concerning Mrs S.\u2019s living conditions in Lesnaya Dacha was also accurate. It also rejected as unfounded the claimants\u2019 argument that the disputed publication had been propagandistic and had aimed to influence voters\u2019 opinions; in this respect, it noted that the text of the article was socially oriented and contained general argument concerning the problems affecting ill and elderly people, with the specific example of the Lesnaya Dacha care home. The court also noted that the general statements of the care home\u2019s chief medical officer concerning a lack of mercy for next of kin had had no link to the claimants or other members of the S. family. 13.  On 30 June 2000 the Tomsk Regional Court upheld the above judgment on appeal. 14.  On 30 May 2001 the Presidium of the Tomsk Regional Court, in supervisory review proceedings, dismissed an extraordinary appeal against the judgment of 17 April 2000 and the appeal decision of 30 June 2000, thus upholding those decisions. 15.  On 28 June 2002, in supervisory review proceedings, the Supreme Court of Russia quashed the judgment of 17 April 2000 and the decisions of 30 June 2000 and 30 May 2001, and sent the case back to the first-instance court for fresh examination. 16.  In a judgment of 20 May 2003 the Leninskiy District Court of Tomsk again dismissed the claims against the applicant, employing reasoning similar to that of the judgment of 17 April 2000. 17.  On 17 October 2003 the Tomsk Regional Court examined the case, on appeal by the claimants. They maintained their claim, stating that the relevant part of the impugned publication had interfered with their private life, and had contained statements damaging to their honour and dignity. 18.  The appellate court set aside the judgment of 20 May 2003 on the grounds of incorrect application by the first-instance court of the substantive law, and delivered a new decision. It noted that, according to Resolution no. 11 of the Supreme Court of Russia (see paragraph 27 below), a claimant was under an obligation to prove the fact of the dissemination of information, whereas a defendant was under an obligation to prove that such information corresponded to reality. The appellate court found that the claimants in the present case had discharged that obligation. 19.  In relation to the sentence stating \u201c...quite a few respectable people bring their ill relatives to the care home in an attempt to escape unnecessary troubles...\u201d, the Tomsk Regional Court disagreed with the first-instance court\u2019s view that the sentence was true and was not damaging to the claimants\u2019 honour and dignity. In particular, the regional court noted that the headline of the article and the sequence of its sentences made it clear that the statement, along with the reference to the lack of mercy for next of kin, although generalised, related to the claimants. In support of this conclusion, the appellate court referred to the statements of two witnesses who had confirmed that they had perceived the extracts to relate to the claimants. 20.  The appellate court went on to examine evidence confirming the poor physical and mental condition of Mrs S., and noted the claimants\u2019 argument that they had placed her in Lesnaya Dacha because of the need to ensure proper medical assistance and care, rather than for lack of mercy. It stated that the applicant had not submitted any evidence capable of refuting that argument, whereas by virtue of Article 152 of the Russian Civil Code, she, as a defendant, was under an obligation to prove the accuracy of her statements. The appellate court also referred to the statement of a witness who had \u201cexplained that information disseminated in respect of the claimants, to the effect that Mrs S.\u2019s relatives had not taken care of her, had not corresponded to reality\u201d. The court thus concluded that the disputed information was untrue. 21.  It further found that the disputed information, namely that the claimants had placed their seriously ill close relative in the care home for the elderly because of a lack of mercy, and in order to avoid unnecessary troubles, was a statement that the claimants had breached their moral principles, and was therefore damaging to their honour and dignity, according to the resolution of the Supreme Court. The Tomsk Regional Court thus concluded that the information in the publication that \u201c...quite a few respectable people bring their ill relatives to the care home in an attempt to escape unnecessary troubles because of lack of mercy for their next of kin...\u201d was untrue and damaging to the claimants\u2019 honour and dignity, and ordered the applicant to pay 10,000 Russian roubles (RUB \u2013 approximately 285 euros (EUR)) to each of the three claimants as compensation for non-pecuniary damage. 22.  The appellate court\u2019s decision remained silent as regards the claimants\u2019 argument that the impugned article had interfered with their private life. 23.  By a decision of 4 March 2004 a judge of the Tomsk Regional Court declined the applicant\u2019s application to institute supervisory review proceedings in respect of the appellate court\u2019s decision. 24.  On 13 October 2004 the Presidium of the Tomsk Regional Court, in supervisory review proceedings, upheld the decision of 17 October 2003, endorsing its reasoning, but reducing the amount of the award in respect of non-pecuniary damage. The applicant was ordered to pay RUB 4,000 (approximately EUR 110) to each of the three claimants.", "references": ["8", "5", "9", "7", "3", "2", "0", "4", "1", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Sk\u00f8rping. 6.  By an indictment of 25 October 2007 the applicant, jointly with three co\u2011accused, was charged with violation of intellectual property rights under section 299 b of the Penal Code of a particularly aggravated nature, comprising professionally organised production, importation and sales, in which the defendants had cooperated on marketing substantial quantities of counterfeit goods in the form of designer knives, lamps and similar products. 7.  From the beginning of 2006 the applicant was represented by lawyer A, and as from 21 August 2009, the applicant was represented by lawyer B. 8.  By letters of 1 and 9 September 2009 A submitted his claim for legal costs to the City Court for work performed from 2006 until 2009. By decision of 24 September 2009 the City Court granted A fees in the amount of DKK 183,862.50 (approximately EUR 24,700) plus VAT and reimbursement of costs in the amount of DKK 2,060 which was provisionally to be paid by the Treasury. It appears that the transcript of the court records was sent to counsel A and the prosecutor in accordance with usual practice. Neither the applicant nor B was informed of this decision. 9. The case was heard before the City Court (Retten i Viborg) over 15 days between 24 September and 4 December 2009. 10.  By a judgment of 4 December 2009, the City Court convicted the applicant and the three co-accused. The applicant was convicted on two out of fifteen counts and given a six months\u2019 suspended sentence, and 120 hours of community service due to his good personal circumstances and the fact that his role had been a minor one. In addition the proceeds, estimated at 40,000 Danish Kroner (DKK), were confiscated, as were various copies of designer goods, such as lamps and cutlery. The applicant and B were present when the judgment was passed. The operative part of the judgment, including the matter of payment of legal costs, was read aloud when the judgment was passed. 11.  A few days later lawyer B received a transcript of the judgment, which in the operative part relating to legal fees stated:\n\u201cEach of the accused is to pay the legal costs relating to them, including the fee to counsel appointed to them.\u201d 12.  The applicant did not appeal against the judgment to the High Court, nor did the public prosecution. 13.  According to a court record of 5 January 2010, the City Court approved the costs to be paid to B in the amount of DKK 247,200 (approximately EUR 33,200) plus VAT and reimbursement of other costs amounting to DKK 32,423. It was stated that the amount was to be paid by the applicant. 14.  On 17 January 2010, on behalf of the applicant, B appealed against the decision. He did not contest the amount granted, but claimed that it should be paid entirely or partly by the Treasury. In support thereof, and with reference to section 1008, section 2, of the Administration of Justice Act, he submitted that the applicant had only played a minor role in the criminal case; that an extensive part of the production of evidence did not relate to him; that he had been acquitted of one count; and that the total fee was of a significant amount. 15.  On 25 January 2010, the applicant received an invoice from the police, dated 19 January 2010, requesting him to pay legal costs in the amount of DKK 573,311 (approximately EUR 77,000) including A\u2019s and B\u2019s fees. This was the moment when the applicant became aware for the first time of the fees that had been granted to A. 16.  On 26 January 2010, on behalf of the applicant, B extended his appeal of 17 January 2010 also to include the payment of costs to A, which in the applicant\u2019s view should be paid entirely or partly by the Treasury. He also requested that the City Court send him the court records of the decision to grant fees to A. 17.  On 8 February 2010 the City Court submitted a letter to B, with which was enclosed a copy of the judgment of 4 December 2009, which on 5 February 2010 had been rectified on page 90 in the operative part as follows:\n\u201cThe accused are to pay the legal costs, so that each of them pays the legal costs relating to them, including the fees for their appointed counsel.\u201d 18.  The court records of 24 September 2009 and A\u2019s letters of 1 and 9 September 2009 were also enclosed with the letter. 19.  By letter of 11 February 2010, B informed the High Court of Western Denmark that the applicant withdrew his appeal as regards the fees to be paid to B. Moreover, he requested permission to submit further observations as regards the fee that the applicant had been ordered to pay to A. 20.  In a supplementary pleading of 4 March 2010, B maintained that A\u2019s fees should be paid by the Treasury. He pointed out that the fees payable to A and B totalled DKK 573,311 and that therefore the payment duty would be manifestly disproportionate to the applicant\u2019s responsibility and circumstances. Referring to section 1008, subsection 4, of the Administration of Justice Act, he thus requested that the payment duty be reduced. In his view, the time-limit for appealing against the decisions on the fees to be paid to A should, at the earliest, run from 25 January 2010, the date on which the applicant received the invoice from the police and thus became aware for the first time of the fees that had been granted to A. 21.  By decision of 10 March 2010 the High Court dismissed the appeal as being lodged out of time. More specifically, it stated:\n\u201cThe interlocutory appeal does not concern the amount of the fee granted to the applicant\u2019s two defence lawyers; it only concerns the City Court\u2019s decision that the applicant must pay the legal costs relating to him, including the fee to his appointed counsel. This decision was integrated in the judgment of 4 December 2009 and the applicant, who was present when the judgment was passed, was informed of the decision during that hearing. Accordingly, the time-limit must be calculated from 4 December 2009, pursuant to section 969 of the Administration Act, even if the applicant only later learned how much the legal costs, including the fees for the defence counsel, amounted to. Thus, the time-limit had expired when the interlocutory appeal was lodged on 17 January 2010.\u201d 22.  Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was refused by the Appeals Permission Board on 18 June 2010.\nII.", "references": ["5", "7", "3", "8", "9", "2", "4", "0", "1", "6", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1967 and until his arrest lived in Menzelinsk, the Tatarstan Republic. 6.  In 1999 he was convicted and sent to serve his sentence in a correctional colony. 7.  In April 2008 a further set of charges was brought against the applicant. To ensure his participation in the ensuing investigation he was transferred to remand prison no. IZ-16/3 in the Tatarstan Republic (\u201cthe remand prison\u201d). On several occasions he was transported to a temporary detention unit at the Naberezhnyye Chelny police station (\u201cthe temporary detention unit\u201d). 8.  The applicant was detained in the remand prison during several periods between 7 April 2008 and 7 October 2009. At that time he was placed in cells nos. 306, 320 and 512. 9.  According to the applicant, for most of the period of his detention, 184 days between 7 April 2008 and 11 February 2009, he was detained alone in cell no. 512. The cell was in a poor sanitary condition and was infested with vermin. The toilet pan was not separated from the living area. The cell was poorly lit and the ventilation system did not function. Metal shutters on the windows blocked access to natural light and fresh air. The cell was not equipped with either a television set or a radio, and newspapers were not available. In the remaining period, until 7 October 2009, the applicant occupied cells nos. 306 and 320. The bedding in those cells was torn and dirty. The cells had no television set or refrigerator. The quality of food in the remand prison was poor. Throughout the entire period of his detention the applicant was allowed access to the exercise yard, which was dirty and dusty, for only fifty minutes a day. 10.  During several periods between 23 April 2008 and 21 August 2009, amounting to 207 days in total, the applicant was held in the temporary detention unit. This facility was overpopulated and inmates had no access to outdoor exercise. 11.  In October 2008 the applicant complained of toothache to a prison doctor and received painkillers. 12.  As the applicant\u2019s suffering continued, on 22 January 2009 an investigator asked the head of the remand prison to arrange for him to be examined by a dentist. A similar request was submitted by the head of the medical unit on 10 February 2009. 13.  On 19 May 2009 the custodial authorities transported the applicant to a civilian dentist, who diagnosed chronic pulpitis and periodontitis, and provided some treatment. The dental treatment was not completed. Urgent removal of the applicant\u2019s dental crowns and further treatment with a view to fitting a dental prosthesis were strongly advised. According to the dentist, delay in the treatment could lead to grave complications, such as the loss of the chewing function, osteomyelitis and sepsis. 14.  On 25 May 2009 the applicant was taken to a civilian clinic, where a dentist removed his lower dental bridge and one of the problem teeth. The dentist was unable to complete the treatment as the applicant had to be transported back to the detention facility. 15.  In June 2009 the applicant brought a civil claim against the prison authorities, seeking dental treatment as advised by the doctor treating him and compensation for non-pecuniary damage. The Naberezhnyye Chelny Town Court dismissed the claim on 19 August 2009, having found that the applicant had been provided with adequate medical assistance. On 17 September 2009 the Supreme Court of the Tatarstan Republic upheld the judgment on appeal. 16.  Between 24 December 2009 and 16 March 2010 a civilian dentist removed the dental crowns and bridges from twenty-two of the applicant\u2019s teeth, extracted two teeth, and treated and shaped the remaining teeth for the forthcoming dental restoration work. In a letter to the head of the remand prison dated 30 March 2010, the dentist stressed that it was crucial to ensure that the applicant was transported to the clinic in line with the fixed schedule, starting from 13 April 2010. Failure to do so would entail the necessity to start the treatment anew. The dentist also pointed out that the excessively long time the treatment had taken had already caused substantial suffering to the applicant and increased the risk of digestive problems. 17.  Having not been taken to the dentist as recommended, the applicant submitted several requests for the dental treatment, stating that he had lost the ability to chew and in addition to severe teeth pain he started experiencing stomach pain. On 17 June 2010 the authorities gave their approval for the applicant to be transported to the dentist. 18.  According to written statements of the applicant\u2019s inmate dated 1 July 2010, the applicant had been tormented by unbearable pain and could not sleep normally for several months. Owing to the constant pain and the lack of teeth the applicant had to refuse prison food for several days. 19.  In August 2010 the applicant was taken to a dentist who completed the dental restoration. 20.  The applicant complained that throughout the entire period of his dental treatment, when he had been left practically toothless, no alternative soft food had been made available to him.", "references": ["5", "9", "0", "3", "4", "8", "7", "2", "6", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1952. Until his death in 2016 he was detained in correctional colony no. 14 in the village of Olovyannaya, Zabaykalsk Region. 7.  On 29 January 2014 the Fokino Town Court of the Primorskiy Region convicted the applicant of murder and sentenced him to six and a half years\u2019 imprisonment. On the same day he was taken into custody. 8.  Prior to his detention the applicant sustained several spinal injuries and lost the ability to walk unaided. Since 2013 he has been confined to a wheelchair. 9.  On his admission to a remand prison in January 2014, the applicant was given a general medical check-up by the doctor on duty, to whom he complained of lower back and joint pain. The doctor provisionally diagnosed him with spinal tuberculosis. No drugs were prescribed. 10.  According to the applicant\u2019s submissions, which were not disputed by the Government, he was put in an ordinary cell not equipped for wheelchair\u2011using detainees. As a result he suffered various inconveniences, including restricted access the toilet. 11.  Several days later he was seen by a medical specialist, who amended his diagnosis to osteoporosis with compression fractures of two discs of the lumbar spine. 12.  In February 2014 he was examined by a neurologist, who noted that one of his diagnoses was paraplegia, impairment in motor function of the lower extremities. He was advised to undergo various medical examinations and tests, including magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) of the spine and a hip X-ray. 13.  In April 2014 a prison surgeon established that the osteoporosis affected not only the applicant\u2019s spine, but also his legs. He was prescribed pain relief medication and advised to undergo several medical tests. 14.  There is no information in the applicant\u2019s file to suggest that the remand prison authorities gave him medication, an MRI scan or radiography. According to the applicant, even painkillers were unavailable in the remand prison. 15.  On 9 April 2014 the applicant was sent to serve his sentence in correctional colony no. IK-14/7. On his arrival he was seen by a prison doctor who, in addition to the spinal and joint conditions, diagnosed him with coronary heart disease, angina pectoris and moderate hypertension disease. He was prescribed and provided with comprehensive drug treatment. 16.  The Government did not provide any evidence to show that the correctional colony had any special facilities to accommodate wheelchair\u2011using prisoners. 17.  On 30 July 2014 the applicant was sent to prison hospital no. 1 in Chita, Zabaiykalsk Region, for an in-depth medical examination to establish whether he was entitled to early release on medical grounds. 18.  A hip X-ray revealed that he suffered from an old displaced fracture of the cervical hip with full avulsion of the greater trochanter. 19.  On 27 August 2014 a specialist medical panel of the prison hospital concluded that the applicant was not eligible for early release, because none of his illnesses were included in the governmental decree containing a list of illnesses precluding offenders from serving their sentences. On the same day the applicant was discharged from the prison hospital. 20.  On 2 October 2014 the Olovyannaya District Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s application for early release, referring to the medical report of 27 August 2014. That decision was upheld on appeal by the Zabaiykalsk Regional Court on 16 December 2014. 21.  In the meantime the applicant lodged several complaints with the head of the prison medical authorities, the Federal Service for the Execution of Sentences and the Federal Supervisory Service for Healthcare and Social Development of the Russian Federation. The latter authority found a shortcoming in the applicant\u2019s treatment, namely a failure to ensure he was examined by an orthopaedic traumatologist. 22.  On 25 March 2015 the applicant was seen by a traumatologist, who diagnosed him with an inguinal hernia and recommended surgery to be performed at a later date. The doctor also stated that he should be provided with a walking stick and a walking frame. 23.  Over the months that followed the applicant was regularly seen by prison doctors and provided with hypotensive drugs and pain relief drugs. 24.  In the meantime he brought a civil claim against the medical authorities seeking compensation for damage to his health caused by inadequate medical treatment. 25.  On 15 June 2015 the Central District Court of Chita dismissed the claim. Having looked at the list of medical services provided to the applicant, the court concluded that he had been afforded adequate medical treatment. It appears that no appeal followed. 26.  On 1 September 2015 a neurologist ordered the applicant\u2019s admission to the prison hospital, which would involve a train journey. The applicant refused, arguing that prison train carriages were not equipped to transport wheelchair-using detainees. 27.  On 27 June 2016 the applicant died of a heart attack.", "references": ["9", "6", "2", "0", "8", "4", "7", "5", "3", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1976 and lives in Moscow. 5.  On 13 October 2006 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court in Moscow remanded the applicant in custody on the charge of fraud. Subsequently the District Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention on 8 December 2006 and on 2 February, 10 April, 29 May and 18 September 2007. Each time the District Court attached preponderant weight to the gravity of the charges against the applicant. On 21 May and 4 July 2007 the Moscow City Court rejected the appeals against the detention orders of 10 April and 29 May 2007, respectively. 6.  The City Court authorised further extensions of the applicant\u2019s detention on 28 September and 26 December 2007. The Supreme Court rejected his appeals on 31 October 2007 and 15 February 2008, respectively. 7.  On 14 February 2008 the case was submitted for trial. On 20 February, 30 June and 17 December 2008 and 18 March and 18 June 2009 the District Courts in Moscow prolonged the applicant\u2019s detention pending trial, referring mainly to the gravity of the charges. The most recent extension order was issued for the period until 19 September 2009. 8.  Between 27 January 2007 and 16 May 2008 the applicant was detained in the IZ-77/1 remand prison in Moscow. The prison was filled beyond the design capacity and cells were severely overcrowded. He was later transferred to another remand prison in Moscow.", "references": ["6", "0", "8", "9", "4", "3", "7", "5", "No Label", "1", "2"], "gold": ["1", "2"]}
+{"input": "10.  The applicant was born in 1958. He lived in Brussels and died there on 7 June 2016. 11.  He arrived in Belgium via Italy on 25 November 1998, accompanied by his wife and a six-year-old child. The applicant claimed to be the father of the child, an assertion which the Government contested. The couple subsequently had a child together in August 1999 and another in July 2006. 12.  On 29 December 1998 the applicant was arrested and taken into custody on charges of theft. On 14 April 1999 he received a sentence of seven months\u2019 imprisonment, which was suspended except for the period of pre\u2011trial detention. 13.  In 1999 and 2000 the applicant and his wife were arrested on several occasions in connection with theft offences. 14.  On 28 April 2000 the applicant\u2019s wife was sentenced to four months\u2019 imprisonment for theft. 15.  On 18 December 2001 the applicant was convicted of a number of offences including robbery with violence and threats, and received a sentence of fourteen months\u2019 imprisonment, which was suspended except for the period of pre-trial detention. 16.  On 9 November 2005 the applicant was sentenced by the Ghent Court of Appeal to three years\u2019 imprisonment for involvement in a criminal organisation with a view to securing pecuniary advantage using intimidation, deception or corruption. 17.  Having already spent time in pre-trial detention, he was subsequently detained in Forest Prison and then in Merksplas Prison, where he continued to serve his sentence. 18.  On 26 November 1998, the day after their arrival, the applicant and his wife lodged an asylum application. 19.  As the applicant\u2019s wife stated that she had travelled through Germany, a request to take back the applicant and his family was sent to the German authorities under the Dublin Convention of 15 June 1990 determining the State responsible for examining applications for asylum lodged in one of the Member States of the European Communities (\u201cthe Dublin Convention\u201d). 20.  After the German authorities had refused the request, it transpired that the applicant and his family were in possession of a Schengen visa issued by the Italian authorities. A request to take charge of them was therefore sent to the Italian authorities and was accepted on 4 June 1999. 21.  On 22 September 1999 the applicant lodged a further asylum application, using a false identity. It was immediately rejected after his fingerprints had been checked. 22.  On 23 October 2000 the Aliens Office informed the applicant\u2019s lawyer that the proceedings concerning the asylum application of 26 November 1998 had been concluded on 11 June 1999 with the refusal of the application. 23.  On 20 March 2000 the applicant lodged a first request for regularisation for a period of more than three months, on the basis of section 9(3) (since 1 June 2007, section 9bis) of the Aliens (Entry, Residence, Settlement and Expulsion) Act of 15 December 1980 (\u201cthe Aliens Act\u201d). In support of his request the applicant stated that he and his wife had a daughter born in Georgia before their arrival in Belgium and another daughter born in Belgium in 1999. 24.  On 30 March 2004 the Aliens Office declared the request devoid of purpose as the applicant had left the country and been intercepted in Germany. It found that the request was in any case unfounded in view of the fact that the applicant\u2019s medical treatment for tuberculosis had ended (see paragraph 49 below). The Aliens Office also referred to the applicant\u2019s lack of integration in Belgium and the numerous breaches of public order he had committed. 25.  On 28 April 2004 the applicant lodged a second request for regularisation of his residence status on the basis of section 9(3) of the Aliens Act. He cited as exceptional circumstances the duration of his residence in Belgium and his integration into Belgian society, the risks that a return to Georgia would entail for his children\u2019s schooling, the fact that he had been the victim of persecution and his state of health. 26.  The Aliens Office declared the request inadmissible on 5 April 2007 on the ground that the evidence adduced did not amount to exceptional circumstances for the purposes of section 9(3) of the Act such as to warrant the lodging of the request in Belgium rather than with the competent diplomatic mission or consulate, as was the rule. The Aliens Office noted that the applicant had been allowed to remain in the country for the sole purpose of the asylum proceedings, which had been concluded by a final decision. It also cited as reasons the lack of any need for medical supervision, the applicant\u2019s precarious and unlawful residence status, the absence of a risk of persecution in Georgia and the possibility for the children to continue their schooling in that country. 27.  In a judgment of 29 February 2008 the Aliens Appeals Board rejected an application by the applicant to set aside the Aliens Office\u2019s decision. It noted in particular that, since the decision complained of had not been accompanied as such by a removal measure, it could not give rise to a risk of violation of Article 3 of the Convention. 28.  On 10 September 2007, relying on the same grounds as those invoked under section 9ter of the Aliens Act (see paragraph 54 below) and on his family situation, the applicant lodged a request for regularisation on exceptional grounds under section 9bis of the Aliens Act. 29.  On 7 July 2010 the Aliens Office refused the request for regularisation, taking the view that the protection of the State\u2019s best interests took precedence over the applicant\u2019s social and family interests and that by committing serious punishable acts the applicant himself had placed his family\u2019s unity in jeopardy. That decision was served on the applicant on 11 July 2010. 30.  On 26 July 2010 the applicant lodged a request with the Aliens Appeals Board under the ordinary procedure for a stay of execution of the decision of 7 July 2010 rejecting his request for regularisation of his status, together with an application to have that decision set aside. In so far as necessary, the application also related to the order to leave the country issued on the same date (see paragraph 78 below). The applicant alleged a violation of Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention and argued that his serious health problems amounted to exceptional humanitarian circumstances as defined by the Court in D. v. the United Kingdom (2 May 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997\u2011III), that he would not have access to treatment in Georgia and that the discontinuation of treatment would lead to his premature death. He further alleged an infringement of Article 8 of the Convention and of the International Convention on the Rights of the Child, on the ground that if he were returned to Georgia he would be separated from his family permanently. 31.  The request and application were refused by the Aliens Appeals Board in a judgment of 16 March 2015 on the ground that the applicant had not attended the hearing or been represented. 32.  On 5 November 2009 the applicant\u2019s wife lodged a request for regularisation on exceptional grounds under section 9bis of the Aliens Act, relying on her family situation and the duration of her residence in Belgium. 33.  On 29 July 2010 she and her three children were granted indefinite leave to remain. 34.  In 2006, while the applicant was in prison (see paragraph 17 above), he was diagnosed with chronic lymphocytic leukaemia in Binet stage B, with a very high level of CD38 expression. No treatment was commenced. 35.  As his health had deteriorated, the applicant was admitted to the Bruges prison hospital complex from 14 August to 23 October 2007 in order to receive a course of chemotherapy. 36.  A report prepared on 11 February 2008 by Antwerp University Hospital, where the applicant was being treated, stated that his condition was life-threatening and that, on the basis of the averages observed in 2007, his life expectancy was between three and five years. The report stated that, following treatment, his white blood cell count had fallen significantly. 37.  From 8 to 14 May 2010 the applicant was confined to hospital in Turnhout with respiratory problems. The medical report concerning his stay recommended that the applicant be treated as an outpatient by a lung specialist and a haematologist. This treatment did not materialise on his return to Merksplas Prison, where he was being held. 38.  On 22 July 2010 a doctor from Antwerp University Hospital visited the applicant in the Merksplas closed facility for illegal aliens (see paragraph 79 below), to which he had been transferred in the meantime, in order to carry out a full medical check-up. The doctor\u2019s report noted that the applicant\u2019s leukaemia, which was progressing rapidly towards Binet stage C, had not been monitored sufficiently and that a different course of chemotherapy was required. 39.  In August 2011 the applicant\u2019s condition worsened and the doctors observed that his leukaemia had progressed to Binet stage C, with anaemia and widespread enlargement of the lymph nodes (life expectancy of twenty\u2011four months). It was decided to switch to a different course of chemotherapy. 40.  On 12 September 2012 a doctor from the haematology department of St Pierre University Hospital in Brussels, where the applicant was being treated following his release (see paragraph 82 below), drew up a certificate which stated as follows:\n\u201c... 41.  After a relapse diagnosed in 2013, the doctors in St Pierre University Hospital observed in March 2014 that the applicant\u2019s leukaemia had developed into lymphocytic lymphoma, and his chemotherapy was adjusted accordingly. A positron\u2011emission tomography (PET) scan performed on 22 September 2014 showed a lack of response to the chemotherapy, a progression of the disease in the lymph nodes and the liver, and a pulmonary infection. 42.  The applicant\u2019s treatment was handed over to the Institut Bordet in Brussels, a hospital devoted exclusively to the treatment of cancer patients. 43.  In December 2014 the applicant began to receive a new course of treatment as part of a study. He was given Ibrutinib, designed in particular to improve his overall condition, which had been compromised by complications arising out of the treatment (fungaemia, pulmonary infections, septicaemia and cholecystitis, resulting in his being admitted to hospital on several occasions). The treatment was prescribed in order to improve the applicant\u2019s overall condition in preparation for a donor stem cell transplant. 44.  A medical certificate issued on 25 May 2015 by the specialist treating the applicant, Dr L., head of the experimental haematology laboratory at the Institut Bordet, stated that the patient\u2019s viral load was stable. The doctor stressed that discontinuing treatment would result in the patient\u2019s death. Because of the patient\u2019s immunosuppression and the aggressive nature of the leukaemia, treatment in a specialised haematology unit was necessary, as was a donor stem cell transplant, which offered the only remaining prospect of a cure provided that it was performed during the two-year \u201cwindow of response\u201d to Ibrutinib. 45.  The applicant stated that the stem cell transplant, originally scheduled to take place in April 2015, had not been performed to date because he did not have a residence permit in Belgium as required by the Organ Removal and Transplant Act of 13 June 1986. 46.  On 14 July 2015 a new medical report was prepared by Dr L. which read as follows:\n\u201cThe patient\u2019s CLL [chronic lymphocytic leukaemia]\n...\nThe patient has been suffering from CLL for nine years (diagnosed in 2006), and by 2011 had already reached stage C and Rai IV [stage IV according to the Rai criteria]. He had already had three lines of treatment prior to Ibrutinib, which he is currently taking, and was refractory to the third line of treatment (R-CVP chemotherapy).\nIt is clear from the medical literature that if Ibrutinib is discontinued in such a situation, the average life expectancy is three months. ...\nThe literature also shows that only 7% of patients being treated with Ibrutinib achieve complete remission. Mr Paposhvili is currently in partial remission and is thus wholly dependent on the treatment. This is a new targeted therapy to which he would have no access in his country of origin. With continuous treatment the patient\u2019s prognosis is more favourable, with an 87% survival rate after three years. ...\nCLL and especially treatment with Ibrutinib can give rise to serious complications which fully justify regular supervision in a specialised setting. This is particularly true since the patient is in a weak state and has a serious medical history (tuberculosis and stroke) and significant comorbidities (active chronic hepatitis and COPD [chronic obstructive pulmonary disease]). ...\nIn the case of a young person \u2013 Mr Paposhvili is only 57 \u2013 the current guidelines advocate using Ibrutinib in order to obtain the best possible response, followed by a donor peripheral blood stem cell transplant. A HLA [human leukocyte antigen] matched donor has been identified for the patient.\nAlthough risky, a donor transplant offers the only prospect of a cure for the patient; he would be unable to have such a transplant in his country of origin.\n...\nConclusions\nThe [Aliens Office\u2019s medical adviser] concludes ... [that] the condition of the patient\u2019s vital organs is not directly life-threatening. That all depends on what is meant by \u2018directly\u2019. The patient is suffering from a cancer that is potentially fatal in the short term (median survival time nineteen months) ... and most likely within six months without appropriate treatment.\nMoreover, if the treatment is not tailored to the patient\u2019s overall immunosuppression, there is a serious risk of death caused by infection, especially in a Gold stage II COPD patient with a history of tuberculosis. ...\u201d 47.  On 1 August 2015 treatment with Ibrutinib became eligible for reimbursement in Belgium. 48.  Because of the side-effects of this treatment, which might compromise the donor transplant, the dose of Ibrutinib was reduced from three doses to one dose per day. 49.  In 2000 the applicant was diagnosed with active pulmonary tuberculosis. He was treated for that condition under the emergency medical assistance and social welfare assistance schemes. 50.  During 2008 the applicant\u2019s tuberculosis was found to have become active again. 51.  As a result of that disease the applicant developed chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, for which he received treatment. 52.  In addition, the applicant suffered from hepatitis C, which was also diagnosed in 2006 and was probably linked to a history of drug abuse. It was accompanied by liver fibrosis. According to a medical report dated 24 April 2015 his hepatitis, which had been treated effectively in 2012 and 2013, had become stable. 53.  A magnetic resonance imaging scan carried out in March 2015 showed that the applicant had suffered a stroke, resulting in permanent paralysis of the left arm. The effects of the stroke were managed with an anti-epilepsy drug. 54.  On 10 September 2007, relying on Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention and alleging, in particular, that he would be unable to obtain treatment for his leukaemia (see paragraph 34 above) if he were sent back to Georgia, the applicant lodged a first request for regularisation on medical grounds on the basis of section 9ter of the Aliens Act. 55.  On 26 September 2007 the Aliens Office refused the request on the ground that, under section 9ter(4) of the Act, the applicant was excluded from its scope on account of the serious crimes which had given rise in the meantime to a ministerial deportation order issued on 16 August 2007 (see paragraph 73 below). 56.  On 17 December 2007 the applicant lodged a request for a stay of execution of that decision under the ordinary procedure, together with an application to set aside. He alleged in particular that the Aliens Office had relied exclusively on the ministerial deportation order in excluding him from the scope of section 9ter of the Aliens Act, without investigating his state of health or the risk he ran of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention, and without weighing up the interests at stake as required by Article 8 of the Convention. 57.  In a judgment of 20 August 2008 the Aliens Appeals Board dismissed the applicant\u2019s claims in the following terms:\n\u201cIt is clear from the wording of [section 9ter] that there is nothing to prevent the administrative authority, when dealing with a request for leave to remain on the basis of the above-mentioned section 9ter, from ruling immediately on the exclusion of the person concerned from the scope of the said section 9ter without first being required to take a decision on the medical evidence submitted to it, if it considers at the outset that there are substantial grounds for believing that the person concerned has committed any of the acts referred to in section 55/4, cited above. Indeed, the examination of that evidence is superfluous in such a situation since the person responsible for taking the decision has in any event already decided that the individual is excluded from the scope [of section 9ter].\n...\nAs regards the alleged violation of Article 3 of the Convention, it should be observed that the decision complained of in the present application is not accompanied by any removal measure, with the result that the alleged risk of discontinuation of treatment in the event of the applicant\u2019s return to Georgia is hypothetical.\u201d 58.  The Aliens Appeals Board also dismissed the complaint under Article 8 of the Convention in view of the fact that the impugned decision had not been accompanied by any removal measure. 59.  In the meantime, on 3 April 2008, the applicant had lodged a second request for regularisation on medical grounds on the basis of section 9ter of the Aliens Act. In addition to his various health problems he referred to the fact that he had been continuously resident in Belgium for eleven years and had lasting social ties in that country, and to his family situation. He also argued that if he was sent back he would be left to fend for himself while ill in a country in which he no longer had any family ties and where the medical facilities were unsuitable and expensive. 60.  The request was refused by the Aliens Office on 4 June 2008 for the same reason it had cited previously (see paragraph 55 above). 61.  On 16 July 2008 the applicant lodged an application with the Aliens Appeals Board to have that decision set aside. 62.  In a judgment of 21 May 2015 the Aliens Appeals Board rejected the application to set aside. It held that, where the above-mentioned exclusion clause was applied, the Aliens Office was not required to rule on the medical and other evidence contained in the request for regularisation. According to the Aliens Appeals Board, such examination was superfluous by virtue of the exclusion clause alone. The Board pointed out that its task was to review the lawfulness of the measure. This review did not permit it to substitute its own assessment of the facts that were deemed to have been established and were not apparent from the administrative file; rather, its task was confined to ensuring that the formal requirement to provide reasons had been complied with and that the reasoning was not based on a manifest error of assessment. As to the complaints alleging a violation of Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention, the Aliens Appeals Board stated that the assessment of the medical situation of an alien facing removal whose request for regularisation had been rejected should be carried out, as applicable, at the time of enforcement of the removal measure. 63.  On 22 June 2015 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law against that judgment with the Conseil d\u2019\u00c9tat. One of the grounds of appeal was based on Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention. The applicant submitted that the Aliens Appeals Board could not have been unaware that several orders to leave the country had already been issued against him prior to the decision not to examine his request for leave to remain, and that his expulsion had been suspended only as a result of the interim measure applied by the Court (see paragraph 87 below). The applicant further argued that the Aliens Appeals Board had breached the provisions of the Convention by postponing until the date of enforcement of the removal measure the examination of the medical situation of an alien suffering from a serious illness who had requested leave to remain on medical grounds, without studying the specific risks. 64.  In an order of 9 July 2015 the appeal on points of law was declared inadmissible. The Conseil d\u2019\u00c9tat held that, contrary to the applicant\u2019s assertion, the grounds for setting aside advanced before the Aliens Appeals Board had simply stressed, in a theoretical and general manner, that section 9ter of the Act encompassed the application in domestic law of the obligation under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention prohibiting the removal of a seriously ill person if such a measure was liable to result in death or inhuman and degrading treatment; no specific explanation had been given, however, as to how the applicant himself risked facing that situation. The Conseil d\u2019\u00c9tat also observed that the applicant had not argued before the Aliens Appeals Board that orders to leave the country had been issued against him, or that a removal measure could be revived; he was therefore unable to rely on those arguments in his appeal on points of law. In any event, the Conseil d\u2019\u00c9tat held that the Aliens Appeals Board had in no way erred in finding that the examination of the medical situation of an alien facing removal whose request for leave to remain had been rejected should be carried out, as applicable, at the time of enforcement of the measure. 65.  The applicant was requested to report to the Aliens Office\u2019s medical service on 24 September 2012 for a medical check-up and to enable the Belgian authorities to reply to the Court\u2019s questions. 66.  The report prepared by the medical adviser on that occasion listed the consultations held and the treatment that had been administered to the applicant. It stated that his leukaemia had stabilised after several cycles of chemotherapy and was being monitored closely, and that the applicant was under medical supervision for his lung disease. 67.  Referring to the Court\u2019s judgment in the case of N. v. the United Kingdom ([GC], no. 26565/05, ECHR 2008), the report concluded as follows:\n\u201cOn the basis of this medical file it cannot ... be concluded that the threshold of severity required by Article 3 of the Convention, as interpreted by the Court, has been reached ...\nIt appears from the medical file that the diseases to which the medical certificates refer ... do not disclose a direct threat to the patient\u2019s life. The conditions from which the applicant suffers are serious and potentially fatal but are currently under control.\nNone of the patient\u2019s vital organs is in a condition that is directly life-threatening. His hepatitis C is not currently causing any cirrhosis. The pulmonary disease is being controlled by treatment consisting solely of an inhaled corticosteroid. The patient\u2019s haematological disorder is currently stable. The lymph nodes are no longer swollen and the patient\u2019s haemolytic anaemia is resolved. Chemotherapy has been discontinued for the time being.\n... Neither monitoring of the patient\u2019s vital parameters nor ongoing medical supervision is necessary in order to ensure the patient\u2019s survival.\nThe disease cannot be considered at present to be in the terminal stages. ... The patient is close to Binet stage A at present. His chronic obstructive pulmonary disease is also currently under control.\u201d 68.  A medical report drawn up on 23 June 2015 by the medical adviser to the Aliens Office provided a detailed review of the applicant\u2019s clinical history and current state of health and the treatment being administered. It concluded as follows:\n\u201cOn the basis of [the] medical file it cannot therefore be concluded that the threshold of severity set by Article 3 of the Convention, which requires a risk to life on account of the applicant\u2019s critical condition or the very advanced stage of his or her illness, has been reached (N. v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 26565/05, ECHR 2008, and D. v. the United Kingdom, 2 May 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997\u2011III).\nThe diseases referred to in the most recent update to the medical file ([Dr L.], 25 May 2015) ... do not disclose:\n\u2013 a direct threat to the life of the patient. The illnesses from which the applicant suffers are serious and potentially fatal but are currently under control. ...\n\u2013 that the condition of the patient\u2019s vital organs is directly life-threatening. ...\n\u2013 a critical state of health. Neither monitoring of the patient\u2019s vital parameters nor ongoing medical supervision is necessary in order to ensure the patient\u2019s survival. The disease cannot be said to be in the terminal stages at present ...\u201d 69.  On 10 June 1999, on the grounds that the Belgian authorities did not have responsibility under the Dublin Convention for examining the asylum application, the Aliens Office issued an order for the applicant and his wife to leave the country with a view to their transfer to Italy. However, their departure was postponed because the applicant\u2019s wife was pregnant. 70.  After the birth, the family was granted leave to remain until 14 October 1999 because the new-born baby was in hospital. Their leave to remain was subsequently extended until 15 March 2000 on the ground that the child needed regular supervision by a paediatric gastroenterologist. 71.  The time-limit for enforcement of the order for the family to leave the country was extended several times during the first half of 2000 because of the need to treat the applicant\u2019s tuberculosis (see paragraph 49 above) and the six-month course of anti-tubercular treatment required by the whole family. 72.  On 23 October 2000 the Aliens Office informed the applicant\u2019s lawyer that the time-limit had been extended until such time as the applicant and his child were fully recovered. 73.  On 16 August 2007, while the applicant was serving a prison sentence (see paragraph 17 above), the Minister of the Interior, in a deportation order issued under section 20 of the Aliens Act, directed the applicant to leave the country and barred him from re-entering Belgium for ten years. The order referred to the applicant\u2019s extensive criminal record, allied to the fact that \u201cthe pecuniary nature of the offences demonstrate[d] the serious and ongoing risk of further breaches of public order\u201d. 74.  The order became enforceable on the date of the applicant\u2019s release but was not in fact enforced because the applicant was undergoing medical treatment at the time. 75.  The applicant, who was in hospital, did not contact his lawyer in order to lodge an application to have the ministerial order set aside. However, on 15 November 2007 the lawyer lodged an application on his own initiative. In a judgment of 27 February 2008 the Aliens Appeals Board rejected the application as being out of time. 76.  In the meantime, as the applicant was about to finish serving the prison sentence imposed in 2005, he was transferred on 14 August 2007 to Bruges Prison with a view to implementation of the ministerial deportation order. He remained there until 27 March 2010, when he was transferred to Merksplas Prison. 77.  During his time in Bruges Prison the applicant was visited on an almost daily basis by his wife and/or his children. The authorities of Merksplas Prison, to which he was subsequently transferred and where he remained until 11 July 2010, informed the applicant that they did not have a record of the number of visits he had received. 78.  In parallel with its decision of 7 July 2010 refusing the applicant\u2019s request for regularisation on exceptional grounds (see paragraph 29 above), the Aliens Office on 7 July 2010 issued an order for him to leave the country, together with an order for his detention. These orders, made on the basis of section 7(1)(1) of the Aliens Act, were served on the applicant on 11 July 2010. 79.  Also on 7 July 2010 it was decided that the applicant should be transferred on 13 July to the Merksplas closed facility for illegal aliens with a view to his removal to Georgia. 80.  On 16 July 2010 the Georgian embassy in Brussels issued a travel document valid until 16 August 2010. 81.  On the same day the applicant lodged a request for a stay of execution under the ordinary procedure, together with an application to set aside, directed specifically against the above-mentioned order to leave the country of 7 July 2010. 82.  On 30 July 2010, two days after the indication by the Court of an interim measure (see paragraph 87 below), an order was made for the applicant\u2019s release and he was given until 30 August 2010 to leave the country voluntarily. 83.  In a letter dated 30 August 2010 counsel for the applicant applied for an extension of the time-limit for enforcement of the order to leave the country. The time-limit was initially extended until 13 November 2010 and was subsequently extended several times until 19 February 2011. 84.  On 18 February 2012 the Aliens Office issued an order to leave the country \u201cwith immediate effect\u201d pursuant to the ministerial deportation order of 16 August 2007. 85.  The above-mentioned request and application were rejected by the Aliens Appeals Board in a judgment of 29 May 2015 on the ground that the applicant had not attended the hearing or been represented. 86.  In the meantime, on 23 July 2010, the applicant applied to the Court for interim measures under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Relying on Articles 2, 3 and 8 of the Convention, he alleged that if he were removed to Georgia he would no longer have access to the health care he required and that, in view of his very short life expectancy, he would die even sooner, far away from his family. 87.  On 28 July 2010 the Court indicated to the Belgian Government that it was desirable, in the interests of the parties and the proper conduct of the proceedings before the Court, to suspend enforcement of the order for the applicant to leave the country issued on 7 July 2010 \u201cpending the outcome of the proceedings before the Aliens Appeals Board\u201d. 88.  The applicant was arrested on several occasions between 2012 and 2015 for shoplifting. 89.  In addition, in July 2013 the Aliens Office was contacted by the Luxembourg police and customs cooperation centre, which reported that the applicant was in detention in the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. 90.  In May 2014 a warrant was issued for the applicant\u2019s arrest for theft. The applicant was detained in Bruges Prison and released a few days later. 91.  Two notarised deeds of sale dated 24 March and 5 August 2015 record the transfer by the applicant, represented by E.B., to a certain Aleksandre Paposhvili, of a plot of building land for a sum of 30,000 euros (EUR) and a plot of farmland for a sum of EUR 5,000. Both plots are located in the village of Kalauri in the Gurjaani region of Georgia.", "references": ["0", "7", "8", "3", "9", "6", "5", "2", "No Label", "1", "4"], "gold": ["1", "4"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant, S.C. Fiercolect Impex S.R.L., was a Romanian limited liability company, with a registered office in Cluj-Napoca. 5.  On 7 March 2002 the Cluj Prefecture issued the applicant company with an operating permit, which was valid until 7 March 2005. The applicant company was required to apply for an extension of the permit if the initial conditions of operation did not change. Its main activity consisted in collecting and recycling scrap iron. 6.  Under Article 5 of Order no. 265/2001 (see paragraph 28 below) an application for extension of the operating permit had to be submitted at least thirty days prior to the expiry of the previous permit. As the applicant company\u2019s permit was due to expire on 7 March 2005, on 4 January 2005 it applied for an extension of the existing permit. 7.  The applicant company also applied to the Regional Environment Agency (\u201cREA\u201d) for an environmental permit, which according to the law had to accompany the application for extension of the operating permit. 8.  REA registered the applicant company\u2019s application but refused to accept the accompanying documents on the grounds that on 20 December 2004 a new order providing for the authorisation of activities with a significant impact on the environment had been adopted and the guidelines for implementing the new order had not yet been published. 9.  The relevant guidelines were published on 11 January 2005. 10.  In a letter of 25 January 2005, REA informed the applicant company that under the new Order no. 876/2004, its activity was considered to have a significant impact on the environment and that it should therefore follow the authorisation procedure set out in that order. The applicant company was invited to submit new supporting documents within thirty days. 11.  The applicant company submitted the requested documents on 27 January 2005. 12.  A new environmental permit was issued on 24 March 2005. On 14 April 2005 the prefecture issued a new operating permit. 13.  Between 7 March and 14 April 2005 the applicant company continued to carry out its activity. 14.  Following an inspection carried out at the applicant company\u2019s headquarters, on 6 May 2005 the Cluj Finance Inspectorate (Garda Financiar\u0103 Cluj) fined the company ROL 25,000,000 (approximately 694 euros) and ordered the confiscation of ROL 768,471,700 (approximately EUR 21,347), representing the market value of the scrap iron collected for recycling between 8 March and 14 April 2005. The finance inspectorate based its decision (proces-verbal de constatare \u015fi sanc\u0163ionare a contraven\u0163iilor) against the applicant company on Article 13 (a) of Emergency Government Ordinance no. 16/2001. 15.  The applicant company lodged a complaint against the decision of the Cluj Finance Inspectorate, claiming that the competent authorities were responsible for the delay in issuing the operation permit. In this connection, it argued that the application for an extension of the operating permit had been lodged in good time, namely on 4 January 2005. 16.  On 2 August 2005 the Cluj-Napoca District Court dismissed the complaint as unfounded. It noted that the decision of 6 May 2005 was in accordance with Article 17 of Government Ordinance no. 2/2001. It also noted that the applicant company had continued to carry out its activity despite the fact that its operating permit had expired on 7 March 2005; it had therefore infringed Article 7 \u00a7 1 in conjunction with Article 13 (a) of Emergency Government Ordinance no. 16/2001. The court dismissed the applicant company\u2019s claim that liability for its situation lay with the authorities for failing to issue its environmental and operating permits in time, holding that such a claim would be relevant only within the framework of a tort action and could not be raised as a reason for exonerating a company that had committed an administrative offence. 17.  The applicant company appealed. On 2 December 2005 the Cluj County Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the decision of the first\u2011instance court on the same grounds. 18.  The applicant company brought administrative proceedings against REA, seeking to recover the damages incurred as a result of the late issuing of the environmental permit. It based its action on Law no. 554/2004. It claimed that because of the amendment to the legislation concerning the procedure for issuing permits, the competent authority had not issued its permit in due time. It pointed out that even after the publication of the guidelines for the application of the new order on 11 January 2005, REA had not acted effectively, as it had not written to the applicant company until 25 January 2005. Moreover, REA had interpreted the applicant company\u2019s application as a request for a new permit instead of for an extension of the existing permits, given that the operation conditions had not changed. That had further delayed the authorisation procedure. 19.  On 10 March 2006 the Cluj County Court dismissed the action as premature, holding that the applicant company had not followed the prior procedure required by law before lodging an action with the court. 20.  The applicant company lodged an appeal, claiming that the dismissal of its action as premature had been unjustified given that the defendant agency had already submitted its observations on the merits. 21.  On 31 May 2006 the Cluj Court of Appeal allowed the applicant company\u2019s appeal. It quashed the first-instance judgment and remitted the case to the first-instance court for examination on the merits. 22.  On 15 September 2006 the Cluj County Court dismissed the applicant company\u2019s action. It held that the applicant company had not complied with the obligation to lodge an application for a new environmental permit forty-five days prior to the expiry of the existing permit, as provided for by Article 16 of the new order regulating the procedure for obtaining an environmental permit, namely Order no. 876/2004. It noted that the previous order, no. 265/2001, had provided only for the obligation to obtain an environmental permit, without establishing the procedure to be followed in that respect. It concluded that the competent agency had issued the environmental permit within the ninety\u2011day deadline provided for by the new order and could not therefore be held liable for the damages incurred by the applicant company. 23.  The applicant company lodged an appeal on points of law, pointing out that on 4 January 2005 when it had lodged its application for an extension of the operating permit, the guidelines for implementation of the new order had not yet been published. It also claimed that it had been unable to apply for a new permit forty-five days prior to the expiry of its existing environmental permit on 31 January 2005, as the new order had entered into force on 20 December 2004 and the relevant guidelines had not been published until 11 January 2005. The applicant company also complained that the first-instance court had interpreted Article 16 of Order no. 876/2004 to mean that the administrative authority had the option of extending the existing permit if the operating conditions had not changed, instead of an obligation to extend the permit. In this connection, the applicant company pointed out that, like the previous order, the new order provided for the ope legis extension of an existing permit for up to five years if the company\u2019s operating conditions had not changed. It also pointed out that at the time of lodging its application for a new permit on 4 January 2005, the applicable law was Order no. 265/2001, which provided for a time-limit of thirty days for the issuance or renewal of an operating permit. 24.  On 8 February 2007 the Cluj Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant company\u2019s appeal on points of law, upholding the first\u2011instance judgment. It held that the law applicable to the applicant company was Order no. 876/2004, which had entered in force before the expiry of the applicant company\u2019s environmental permit. It concluded that even assuming that the administrative authorities were liable for non-compliance with the applicable legislation, the applicant company had had no right to continue an illicit activity in the absence of the authorisation required by law. The applicant company should have suspended its activity until it had obtained the necessary permits and should then have brought proceedings seeking to recover any damages \u2013 as long as it could prove the existence and extent of such damages. 25.  Following a request lodged by the sole shareholder of the applicant company on 10 February 2010, the National Chamber of Commerce took note of the voluntary dissolution of the company. 26.  In January 2013, before the Court had communicated the applicant company\u2019s complaints to the respondent Government, the administrator and sole shareholder, Mr Teodor Morar, informed the Court of the company\u2019s dissolution on 24 February 2010 and his intention to continue the procedure initiated before the Court by the applicant company.", "references": ["1", "5", "9", "7", "2", "0", "8", "4", "6", "3", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1951 and until his arrest lived in Vladivostok, Primorskiy Region. 6.  At the relevant time the applicant was in charge of the Alfa Bank\u2019s branches in the Russian Far East, the central office of which was in Vladivostok. 7.  A financial audit of the branch conducted in 2003 revealed a shortage of assets amounting to several million euros. 8.  On 21 November 2003 a criminal case was opened against the applicant and seven other suspects (the \u201cfirst case\u201d). 9.  On 5 January 2004 the police charged the applicant with abuse of his position and issued an order prohibiting him from leaving Vladivostok. 10.  In August 2005 the charges were amended to multiple counts of aggravated embezzlement and money laundering committed by an organised criminal group. 11.  On 9 September 2005 the criminal investigation into several counts of embezzlement was detached from the original proceedings to create a separate criminal case (the \u201csecond case\u201d). 12.  On 28 September 2005 the Pervorechenskiy District Court of Vladivostok dismissed the investigating authorities\u2019 request to authorise the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention in the context of the first criminal case. It found no evidence that the accused had violated the undertaking not to leave Vladivostrok or had ever failed to comply with police orders. The court noted that the applicant was a person of mature years, permanently residing at a known address, that he had no criminal record, had never attempted to abscond, and, at the time in question had been undergoing inpatient medical treatment in a hospital. Accordingly, such a severe preventive measure as detention could not be justified. That decision was upheld on appeal by the Primosrskiy Regional Court on 21 November 2005. 13.  One month later the Presidium of the Regional Court quashed the District and Regional courts\u2019 decisions by way of supervisory review and remitted the issue for a fresh consideration. 14.  On 23 January 2006 the District Court remanded the applicant in detention. It referred chiefly to the gravity of the charges, the fact that the accused had continued informally running a legal entity, was allegedly involved in criminal activity and that he had twice failed to comply with police summonses. The court also stated that his state of health did not preclude him from detention. It concluded that, if at large, the applicant might reoffend, obstruct the proper administration of justice, or abscond. The Regional Court upheld that decision on appeal on 20 February 2006. 15.  On 21 March 2006, relying solely on the gravity of the charges, the District Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 21 May 2006. The Regional Court upheld the order on appeal on 22 May 2006, stating that it had been issued in accordance with the law and duly reasoned. 16.  Over the following months the applicant\u2019s detention was extended on several occasions, including on 2 March, 1 June and 3 September 2007. Along with the gravity of the charges the courts based their decisions on the findings that \u201cthe circumstances which had initially warranted the detention had not changed\u201d and that the applicant\u2019s state of health, albeit poor, did not warrant his release. The aforementioned detention orders were unsuccessfully challenged on appeal on 3 March, 4 June and 7 September 2007. The Regional Court upheld them on 26 March, 3 July and 24 September 2007 respectively. 17.  In the meantime, in August 2006, the authorities completed the investigation in the second case and sent the case file, comprising 326 volumes, to the Frunzenskiy District Court of Vladivostok for examination on the merits. The investigation in the first case was completed later, in December 2007. The applicant and his accomplices were charged with 103 counts of aggravated money laundering, embezzlement and fraud committed by an organised criminal group. 18.  On 4 December 2007 the District Court held a hearing concerning the extension of the applicant\u2019s and his co-suspects\u2019 detention. Although the applicant was present, two of his retained lawyers failed to appear. According to the records of telephone conversations drawn up by a legal secretary, the lawyers had been informed of the hearing by telephone. To safeguard the applicant\u2019s rights, the District Court appointed one of the duty lawyers to represent him and paused the hearing to give her an opportunity to study the case file. When the hearing resumed, the applicant\u2019s lawyer opposed to the extension of the detention, referring, among other things, to the applicant\u2019s health problems and the fact that the address of his residence was known. The court rejected these arguments, stating that they had been already examined and dismissed in the proceedings relating to the previous detention orders. On the grounds that the circumstances justifying the applicant\u2019s remand in custody had not changed, the court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 4 March 2008. 19.  The applicant alleged that neither he nor his lawyers had been informed about the court hearing of 4 December 2007 and that the telephone conversation records from the case-file were unreliable as evidence. 20.  Two days later the applicant appealed, arguing that his lawyers had not been notified about the court hearing and had therefore been unable to attend it. As a result, his right to be defended by counsel of his choice had been violated. 21.  According to the Government, given the non-attendance of the applicant\u2019s lawyer and the failures of the detention authorities to ensure the presence of the applicant, the proceedings were postponed on several occasions. They were eventually held on 7 February 2008. The Regional Court upheld the impugned decision, finding that the extension order was well-founded and that the District Court had lawfully appointed legal aid counsel to represent the applicant in a situation where his ordinary counsel, who had been duly summoned, had failed to attend. The appeal hearing was conducted in the presence of the applicant and his lawyers. 22.  On 3 March 2008, repeating the wording of its previous detention orders, the District Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 4 June 2008. That detention order was upheld on appeal on 10 April 2008. 23.  On 27 May 2008 the District Court considered that there was no necessity for the further detention of the applicant as the investigating authorities had completed the collection of evidence, and the applicant could therefore no longer hamper the investigation. The court ordered him to be released on bail. The next day the applicant was released from detention. The court\u2019s order was confirmed on appeal on 23 June 2008. 24.  Neither the applicant nor the Government provided the Court with information about the outcome of the criminal proceedings. From the last correspondence dated December 2010, it appears that they were still pending before the District Court. According to the information submitted by the parties, the trial was stayed on several occasions owing to the applicant\u2019s inability to attend it on health grounds, as was confirmed by a prison doctor. It also appears that certain delays were attributed to changes in the composition of the trial court. 25.  Prior to his detention the applicant had been suffering from hypertension, had had a heart attack and had undergone coronary artery bypass surgery in a civilian hospital. 26.  During the admission procedure to a remand prison the applicant told a prison doctor about his history of heart disease and was diagnosed with coronary disease and angina pectoris. One week later he was transferred for a medical examination and treatment to the Regional Prison Hospital in Vladivostok, where he was subjected to various medical tests. They confirmed the coronary disease and showed that his angina pectoris was at an advanced stage associated with a high risk of a further heart attack. The applicant was prescribed drug therapy which, according to medical entries dated 2 February and 20 March 2006, led to an improvement in his health. 27.  On 5 April 2006 the applicant was discharged from the prison hospital. Over the following months he was moved between the remand prison and the prison hospital. 28.  Having suffered a serious hypertensive crisis in late June 2006, the applicant was admitted to the prison hospital on 7 July 2006. He remained there until his release from detention on 28 May 2008. 29.  On the day of the applicant\u2019s admission to the prison hospital the head of the therapeutic department established that the hypertensive disease had progressed to the most advanced stage. Dietary nutrition and multidrug therapy were prescribed. 30.  Throughout his stay in the hospital the applicant was seen by the attending doctors around four times per week. Temporary augmentation of blood pressure and angina pectoris attacks were noted after the applicant\u2019s participation in court hearings or consultations with lawyers. 31.  Despite taking four hypotensive drugs, in December 2007 the applicant suffered another hypertensive crisis. A follow-up electrocardiogram examination revealed a certain worsening of the heart condition. Some days later the applicant\u2019s drug regimen was adjusted. The adjustment had a positive effect on his health. 32.  The applicant was discharged from the hospital for outpatient treatment in a satisfactory health condition. The doctor recommended continued intake of hypotensive and antiplatelet drugs along with medication for enhancing the cardiac metabolism.", "references": ["8", "0", "9", "5", "7", "4", "6", "1", "No Label", "2", "3"], "gold": ["2", "3"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1976 and, prior to his arrest, lived in Oblivskaya, Rostov Region. 5.  On 22 October 2007 the applicant, a police officer at the time, was arrested on suspicion of drug dealing. 6.  On 24 October 2007 the Leninskiy District Court of Rostov-on-Don authorised the applicant\u2019s remand in custody. He remained in custody pending investigation and trial. Referring to the seriousness of the charges and the applicant being a police officer, the courts extended his pre-trial detention on the grounds that he might abscond, or interfere with the administration of justice, or put pressure on witnesses and other defendants. 7.  The applicant lodged appeals against the detention orders. On 4 January and 22 February 2008 the Regional Court upheld the decisions of 29 December 2007 and 6 February 2008 in the applicant\u2019s absence. The applicant and his lawyer were informed about the hearings but the applicant was not granted leave to attend. The applicant\u2019s lawyer attended the hearing on 22 February 2008. The prosecutor was present and made submissions to the court. 8.  On 17 December 2008 the District Court found the applicant guilty of several counts of illegal drug dealing and sentenced him to fourteen years\u2019 imprisonment. 9.  On 10 June 2009 the Regional Court quashed the judgment of 17 December 2008 on appeal and remitted the matter to the trial court for fresh consideration. The court ordered that the applicant remain in custody. 10.  On 15 July 2009 the District Court scheduled a preliminary hearing of the case and ordered that the applicant remain in detention. On 18 November 2009, 29 January and 29 April 2010 the District Court adjourned the hearing of the case. It further extended the applicant\u2019s detention on the ground that he was charged with grievous criminal offences and might abscond. 11.  On 6 May 2011 the applicant was found guilty.", "references": ["9", "5", "1", "6", "3", "7", "4", "0", "8", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in Oradea. He has been a lawyer since 1997. 6.  On 11 December 2008 the National Anticorruption Department instituted criminal proceedings against the applicant and a police officer for traffic of influence (trafic de influen\u0163\u0103). The applicant was accused, as a lawyer, of having requested and received money from a client in return for persuading certain judges, other than in the context of the judicial proceedings, to adopt a favourable judgment in his client\u2019s case. 7.  On the same day the case prosecutor authorised several police officers to enforce a warrant to appear (mandat de aducere) issued in the applicant\u2019s name on the basis of Articles 183 and 184 of the Criminal Procedure Code. According to the warrant, the applicant\u2019s presence was required in order to be heard as a suspect (\u00eenvinuit) in the criminal investigation instituted in File no. 206/P/2008. No other reasons or conditions were stated on the authorisation or the warrant itself. 8. On 12 December 2008 at 8 a.m. a police officer went to the applicant\u2019s office in the city of Oradea to enforce the warrant to appear. According to the police officer\u2019s report, the applicant was shown the warrant to appear and was escorted to the police station in the nearby town of Salonta. At 9.40 a.m. the applicant was handed over to two other police officers who escorted him to the Timi\u015foara office of the National Anticorruption Department (T.N.A.D.). According to the escorting police officers\u2019 report, which was signed also by the applicant, he was handed over to the prosecutor at 11.40 a.m. 9.  According to the record of the statements the applicant made before the prosecutor, he was heard as a suspect by the prosecutor at the T.N.A.D. from 12 noon to 4.50 p.m. After the questioning the applicant was charged with the crime of traffic of influence. 10.  According to the applicant, his phone, wallet and watch had been confiscated by the police officers and were held during this entire time. Moreover, he had been constantly guarded by the police. 11.  By an order issued on 12 December 2008 the applicant was placed in police custody for twenty-four hours commencing at 5.10 p.m. 12.  On 13 December 2008 the prosecutor\u2019s request for the placement of the applicant in pre-trial detention for thirty days was allowed by the Timi\u015foara Court of Appeal. The applicant complained before the court that he had been unlawfully deprived of his liberty from 8 a.m. to 5.10 p.m. on the previous day. He requested that the above-mentioned period be deducted from his time in custody. The court considered that it was not competent to decide on this complaint and suggested that the applicant should have used the procedure provided by Article 1401 of the Criminal Procedure Code. 13.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law (recurs) against that judgment, reiterating that he had been unlawfully deprived of his liberty. On 17 December 2008 the High Court of Cassation and Justice rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law as ill-founded without addressing his complaint regarding the lawfulness of his detention prior to his placement in police custody. 14.  On 12 March 2010 the applicant was found guilty with final effect and given a suspended sentence of four years\u2019 imprisonment for traffic of influence.", "references": ["9", "1", "5", "6", "4", "7", "0", "8", "3", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1967 and lives in Chi\u0219in\u0103u. 5.  On 2 October 2008 the Chi\u0219in\u0103u Court of Appeal delivered a judgment acknowledging the applicant\u2019s entitlement to a disability pension. Owing to the lack of an appeal, the judgment became final on 22 October 2008. 6.  On 1 December 2008 the Ministry of Defence lodged an appeal on points of law. 7.  On 4 February 2009 the Supreme Court of Justice allowed the appeal on points of law, quashed the judgment of 2 October 2008 and remitted the case for a fresh examination on the merits. After several rounds of proceedings, on 2 March 2011 the Supreme Court of Justice finally acknowledged the applicant\u2019s entitlement to a disability pension. 8.  Meanwhile, after communication, the Prosecutor General, following a request from the Government Agent, lodged an application for revision with the Supreme Court of Justice, seeking the reopening of the proceedings and redress for the violation of the applicant\u2019s rights. In those proceedings, the applicant claimed 29,069.17 Moldovan lei (MDL) in respect of pecuniary damage, MDL 25,000 in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage, MDL 29,784.60 for legal costs and MDL 4,000 for miscellaneous expenses. On 23 June 2011 the Supreme Court of Justice found a violation of the applicant\u2019s rights as a result of the quashing of the final judgment in his favour. It set aside the judgment of 4 February 2009 and the subsequent judgments adopted in the reopened proceedings and decided to restore the final judgment of 2 October 2008 in the applicant\u2019s favour. The court then awarded the applicant MDL 15,000 (equivalent to 890 euros (EUR)) in respect of non-pecuniary damage, MDL 15,000 for legal costs and MDL 1,000 for miscellaneous expenses. The court dismissed the applicant\u2019s claims in respect of pecuniary damage, arguing that they could not be examined by direct application of Article 41 of the Convention.", "references": ["8", "4", "5", "6", "1", "0", "7", "2", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
+{"input": "9.  The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Baktal\u00f3r\u00e1nth\u00e1za. 10.  Between 1 May 1975 and 14 July 1997 the applicant was employed and made the statutory contributions to the social-security scheme. Subsequently, she was in receipt of unemployment benefit from 15 September 1997 until 9 September 1998. 11.  In response to a request lodged on 16 October 2001, the applicant was granted a disability pension (rokkants\u00e1gi nyugd\u00edj) later that same year on the basis of a retrospective finding that she had lost, as of 1 April 2001, 67% of her capacity to work on account of various ailments. This assessment was maintained in 2003, 2006 and 2007. 12.  As of 2008 the legislation on the methodology used to assess health impairment in occupational contexts changed. In application of the new methodology, the applicant\u2019s disability was assessed by an expert at 40% on 1 December 2009. Without envisaging any procedure for rehabilitation, the assessment panel scheduled the next check-up of her medical status for 2012. 13.  The Government submitted that, under the new methodology, the applicant\u2019s previous condition of 67% loss of working capacity would have corresponded to 54% overall health impairment. Since, however, she was found to have only 40% health impairment, her condition had to be deemed to have improved in the intervening period.\nThe applicant submitted that the connection suggested by the Government between the scores of 67% in the old system and 54% in the new system was not based on any legal text. In her submission, her condition had not improved at all; the difference in scores was solely a consequence of changing the methodology used. 14.  As a consequence of the applicant\u2019s newly assessed 40% level of disability, on 1 February 2010 the relevant pension insurance directorate withdrew her entitlement to the disability pension. The applicant appealed against that decision. On an unspecified date, the decision was upheld by the second-instance pension insurance authority.\nAt the relevant time the monthly amount of the applicant\u2019s disability pension was 60,975 Hungarian forints (HUF), approximately 200 euros (EUR).\nOn 25 March 2010 the applicant brought an action before the Ny\u00edregyh\u00e1za Labour Court, challenging the administrative decision. 15.  The Ny\u00edregyh\u00e1za Labour Court heard the case, and appointed an expert with a view to obtaining an opinion as to the reasons for the difference in the scores. In an opinion of 16 February 2011, the expert submitted that the old score of 67%, as well as the new one of 40%, were correct under the respective methodologies; at any rate, the applicant\u2019s condition had not significantly improved since 2007. 16.  Observing that the applicant had accumulated 23 years and 71 days of service time, the court retained the disability score of 40% and dismissed her action on 1 April 2011. The applicant was ordered to reimburse the amounts received after 1 February 2010. The court noted that the applicant\u2019s next medical assessment was due in 2012. It drew her attention to the possibility of making a renewed application for disability pension should her health deteriorate. 17.  In 2011 the applicant requested another assessment of her disability. On 5 September 2011 the first-instance authority assessed it at 45%, scheduling the next assessment for September 2014. The second-instance authority changed this score to 50% on 13 December 2011, with a reassessment due in March 2015. Such a level would have entitled her to disability pension had rehabilitation not been possible. However, this time the assessment panel envisaged the applicant\u2019s complex rehabilitation within a 36-month time-frame, and recommended that she be entitled to rehabilitation allowance (rehabilit\u00e1ci\u00f3s j\u00e1rad\u00e9k). Nevertheless, no such rehabilitation took place, and the applicant did not receive rehabilitation allowance. 18.  As of 1 January 2012, a new law on disability and related benefits (Act no. CXCI of 2011) entered into force. It introduced additional eligibility criteria. In particular, instead of fulfilling a service period as required by the former legislation, the persons concerned had to have at least 1,095 days covered by social security in the five years preceding the submission of their requests. Individuals who did not meet this requirement could nevertheless qualify if they had no interruption of social cover exceeding 30 days throughout their careers, or if they were in receipt of a disability pension or rehabilitation allowance on 31 December 2011. 19.  On 20 February 2012 the applicant submitted another request for disability allowance (rokkants\u00e1gi ell\u00e1t\u00e1s). Her condition was assessed in April 2012, leading to the finding of 50% disability. On 5 June 2012 her request was dismissed because she did not have the requisite period of social cover. Rehabilitation was not envisaged. The next assessment was scheduled for April 2014. 20.  Between 1 July and 7 August 2012 the applicant was employed by the Mayor\u2019s Office in Baktal\u00f3r\u00e1nth\u00e1za. 21.  On 15 August 2012 the applicant submitted a fresh request for disability pension under the new law. She underwent another assessment, during which her degree of disability was again established at 50%. Rehabilitation was not envisaged. 22.  In principle, such a level of disability would have entitled the applicant to a disability allowance under the new system. However, since her disability pension had been terminated in February 2010 (that is, she was not in receipt of a disability pension or a rehabilitation allowance on 31 December 2011) and, moreover, she had not accumulated the requisite number of days of social-security cover or demonstrated uninterrupted social cover, she was not eligible, under any title, for a disability allowance under the new system. Instead of the requisite 1,095 days covered by social security in the five preceding years, the applicant had been covered for 947 days. According to the Government, had the law not been so amended, the applicant would again have become eligible for a disability pension, since her health impairment was again assessed as exceeding the relevant threshold in 2012. 23.  The applicant\u2019s request was refused by the relevant authority of Szabolcs-Szatm\u00e1r-Bereg County on 23 November 2012 and, on appeal, by the National Rehabilitation and Social Welfare Authority on 27 February 2013. On 27 March 2013 the applicant filed an action with the Ny\u00edregyh\u00e1za Administrative and Labour Court, challenging these administrative decisions. On 20 June 2013 the court dismissed her case. This judgment was not subject to appeal. 24.  From 1 January 2014 the impugned legislative criteria were amended with a view to extending eligibility to those who have accumulated either 2,555 days of social-security cover over ten years or 3,650 days over fifteen years. However, the applicant does not meet these criteria either. 25.  In 2011 and 2012 the applicant received a monthly housing allowance from the local municipality, in the amount of HUF 4,100 (EUR 14) in 2011 and HUF 5,400 (EUR 18) in 2012. The applicant also applied for the basic welfare allowance (rendszeres szoci\u00e1lis seg\u00e9ly), but her request was denied because she did not meet the statutory requirements.", "references": ["8", "0", "2", "1", "6", "7", "4", "3", "5", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1989 and lives in Nyzhni Sirogozy. 6.  On 31 May 2013 the Solonyansky district police department in Dnipropetrovsk Region instituted criminal proceedings in respect of a carjacking. 7.  On 4 June 2013 the applicant was arrested as a suspect in connection with the incident. 8.  On 5 June 2013 the investigating judge of the Solonyansky District Court remanded the applicant in pre-trial detention until 4 August 2013 on the grounds that he was suspected of a serious crime, was unemployed, had no funds, did not live in the area and was not living at his official registered address. It was also considered that he might evade his procedural obligations and abscond to avoid investigation and trial. 9.  On 21 June 2013 the applicant was charged with the robbery of G., committed together with V. 10.  On 21 June 2013 the pre-trial investigation ended and the case against the applicant and V. was referred to the Solonyansky District Court. The case was then transferred to the Krasnogvardiysk District Court in Dnipropetrovsk (\u201cthe District Court\u201d). 11.  On 2 August 2013 the District Court remitted the case for further investigation and remanded the applicant in custody until 1 October 2013, noting that he had been suspected of a serious crime and might continue his criminal activities. 12.  On 1 October 2013 the District Court held a preliminary hearing in the case and extended the detention of the applicant and V. until 29 November 2013. It noted, without going into any detail or indication to which of the co-accused it referred, that \u201cother preventive measures will not ensure the appropriate behaviour of the accused\u201d during the trial. 13.  On 26 November 2013 the District Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 24 January 2014, noting that he and V. had been charged with serious crimes, did not live in the area and were unemployed. It was also considered that they might influence witnesses and other participants in the proceedings or otherwise obstruct criminal proceedings, given that the trial had not yet started. 14.  On 27 December 2013 the applicant applied for release to the District Court complaining about, among other things, his state of health. 15.  On 21 January 2014 the District Court examined and rejected that application. The court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 21 March 2014 on the same grounds as those given in its previous decision of 26 November 2013. As to his health problems, the court noted that he had been treated successfully for renal colic and was fit for trial. 16.  On 19 March 2014 the District Court rejected a further application for release lodged on 26 February 2014 and extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 19 May 2014 on the same grounds as those given on the two previous occasions, adding that he was aware of the punishment for the crime he had been charged with and thus might obstruct the criminal proceedings to avoid criminal liability. 17.  On 22 April, 17 June and 15 July 2014 the District Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 20 June, 15 August, and 12 September 2014 respectively, on the same grounds as those given in its decisions of 26 November 2013 and 21 January 2014. 18.  On 15 August 2014 the applicant lodged another application for release with the District Court. 19.  On 4 September 2014 the District Court examined and rejected that application, extending the applicant\u2019s detention until 2 November 2014. It repeated its previous reasoning, adding that he was aware of the punishment for the crime he had been charged with and thus might obstruct the criminal proceedings to avoid criminal liability. It also added that he and his co\u2011accused V. had no strong social ties. 20.  On 30 September 2014 the applicant lodged another application for release, which was rejected on 9 October 2014. The District Court repeated its previous reasoning, noting in addition as grounds for his detention that he was not studying. 21.  On 31 October 2014 the District Court rejected that application and extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 29 December 2014, giving reasons similar to those given on 4 September 2014. 22.  On 9 December 2014 the District Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 6 February 2015, repeating the reasoning given in its previous decisions. 23.  On 27 January 2015 the applicant and V. were convicted by the Krasnogvardiysk District Court of robbery and carjacking and sentenced to five years\u2019 imprisonment. The court also decided to reduce the remainder of the prison sentence (namely the part not covered by the pre-trial detention) by half under the Amnesty Act. 24.  On 12 June 2015 the Mensky District Court in Chernigiv Region allowed the applicant\u2019s application for early release.", "references": ["7", "1", "3", "4", "9", "0", "5", "8", "6", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant had a restitution claim concerning movable property located in Opo\u010dno Castle. The castle itself belonged to another person, of whom the applicant is not an heir. The movable property was initially confiscated from a predecessor of the applicant during the German occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1942 on the orders of the German Secret State Police, which considered him to be an enemy of the German Reich. After the end of the Second World War, the property was once again confiscated, in 1945, by the Czechoslovak State under the Bene\u0161 decrees as he was considered to be of German nationality. That expropriation was quashed on appeal by the National Council in Prague (zemsk\u00fd n\u00e1rodn\u00ed v\u00fdbor) on 21 January 1947 after it had been established that the applicant\u2019s predecessor was of Czechoslovak nationality and had been loyal to the Czechoslovak State. What happened to the property afterwards is disputed and was discussed in the domestic decisions. 7.  On 31 March 1992, the applicant\u2019s father, together with his cousin, Ms. Kristina Colloredo-Mansfeld, claimed the restitution of movable property which had been in Opo\u010dno Castle. The applicant entered the proceedings as the heir and legal successor to his father, who died in 1998. 8.  Due to a large number of items in question, the first-instance court decided the case by way of three separate judgments. 9.  In 1999 the Pardubice District Court (okresn\u00ed soud) returned a collection of 68 paintings to the applicant and his co-plaintiff. That judgment was upheld on appeal by the Hradec Kr\u00e1lov\u00e9 Regional Court (krajsk\u00fd soud) on 1 June 2000 and the defendant\u2019s appeal on points of law was dismissed. Those proceedings are not part of the present applications. 10.  On 27 October 2006 the District Court ordered the National Heritage Institute to return to the applicant and his co-plaintiff certain movable property located in Opo\u010dno Castle. It found that the applicant\u2019s predecessor had been the owner of the property on the critical date, that is 25 February 1948 (see Gratzinger and Gratzingerova v. the Czech Republic (dec.), no. 39794/98, \u00a7 24, ECHR 2002\u2011VII), and that the statutory conditions for its restitution had been fulfilled. 11.  On 18 October 2007 the Regional Court quashed the judgment and dismissed the action. It held that the property in question had been taken away from the applicant\u2019s predecessor before 25 February 1948 and that therefore the legislation on restitution did not apply. During a hearing on 8 October 2007, the court did not raise with the parties any questions or elements of evidence but was merely listening to the comments of the parties on the decision of the first-instance court, after which the case was adjourned for delivery of a judgment. 12.  The Regional Court based its decision on two pieces of evidence. Firstly, there was a letter of 24 June 1947 from the national administrator of Opo\u010dno Castle to his superiors, informing them about a visit by the applicant\u2019s predecessor to the castle. The second piece of evidence was a decision by the Ministry of Agriculture of 30 April 1947 by which Opo\u010dno Castle had been declared State cultural property (hereinafter \u201cthe 1947 decision\u201d). The 1947 decision had not been raised with the parties in the course of the hearing and the parties had not received an opportunity to comment on it. In its reasoning the Regional Court noted that it was aware of the existence of the document through the exercise of its functions. 13.  On 11 February 2009 the Supreme Court (Nejvy\u0161\u0161\u00ed soud) dismissed an appeal on points of law (dovol\u00e1n\u00ed) lodged by the applicant. It noted that the appellate court had reached its conclusion, inter alia, on the basis of the 1947 decision. It did not address the applicant\u2019s argument that he had not seen that decision and had not been able to comment on it. 14.  On 11 August 2010 the Constitutional Court (\u00dastavn\u00ed soud) dismissed a constitutional appeal by the applicant as manifestly ill-founded. It noted the importance of the 1947 decision, but stated that the requirements of Article 121 of the Code of Civil Procedure had been met and that it was not necessary to prove facts which were generally known, or known to a court through the exercise of its functions. 15.  On 22 April 2009 the District Court dismissed the rest of the applicant\u2019s restitution claim. In its reasoning it referred to the judgment of the Regional Court of 18 October 2007 and that of the Supreme Court of 11 February 2009. 16.  On 27 January 2011 the Regional Court upheld the first-instance judgment. The court relied as evidence on a letter by the Ministry of Agriculture of 27 May 1957 referring to the 1947 decision. Despite the applicant\u2019s repeated requests, the 1947 decision was not produced for the parties. 17.  On 28 November 2011 the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal by the applicant on points of law. 18.  On 19 April 2012 the Constitutional Court dismissed a constitutional appeal by the applicant, claiming a violation of his right to a fair trial and to his property, as manifestly ill-founded.", "references": ["4", "9", "8", "2", "6", "0", "5", "7", "1", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "10.  The applicants were born in 1983, 1987 and 1988 respectively. Mr Khlaifia (\u201cthe first applicant\u201d) lives in Om Laarass (Tunisia); Mr Tabal and Mr Sfar (\u201cthe second and third applicants\u201d) live in El Mahdia (Tunisia). 11.  On 16 September 2011 in the case of the first applicant, then the next day, 17 September, in the case of the second and third applicants, the applicants left Tunisia with others on board rudimentary vessels heading for the Italian coast. After several hours at sea, their vessels were intercepted by the Italian coastguard, which escorted them to a port on the island of Lampedusa. The applicants arrived on the island on 17 and 18 September 2011 respectively. 12.  The applicants were transferred to an Early Reception and Aid Centre (Centro di Soccorso e Prima Accoglienza \u2013 \u201cCSPA\u201d) on the island of Lampedusa at Contrada Imbriacola where, after giving them first aid, the authorities proceeded with their identification. According to the Government, on this occasion individual \u201cinformation sheets\u201d were filled in for each of the migrants concerned (see paragraph 224 below); this is disputed by the applicants (see paragraph 222 below). 13.  They were accommodated in a part of the centre reserved for adult Tunisians. According to the applicants, they were held in an overcrowded and dirty area and were obliged to sleep on the floor because of the shortage of available beds and the poor quality of the mattresses. They had to eat their meals outside, sitting on the ground. The centre was kept permanently under police surveillance, making any contact with the outside world impossible. 14.  The applicants remained in the CSPA until 20 September, when a violent revolt broke out among the migrants. The premises were gutted by fire and the applicants were taken to a sports complex on Lampedusa for the night. At dawn on 21 September they managed, together with other migrants, to evade the police surveillance and walk to the village of Lampedusa. From there, with about 1,800 other migrants, they started a demonstration through the streets of the island. After being stopped by the police, the applicants were taken first back to the reception centre and then to Lampedusa airport. 15.  On the morning of 22 September 2011 the applicants were flown to Palermo. After disembarking they were transferred to ships that were moored in the harbour there. The first applicant was placed on the Vincent, with some 190 other people, while the second and third applicants were put on board the Audace, with about 150 others. 16.  The applicants described the conditions as follows. All the migrants on each vessel were confined to the restaurant areas, access to the cabins being prohibited. They slept on the floor and had to wait several hours to use the toilets. They could go outside onto the decks twice a day for only a few minutes at a time. They were allegedly insulted and ill-treated by the police, who kept them under permanent surveillance, and they claimed not to have received any information from the authorities. 17.  The applicants remained on the ships for a few days. On 27 September 2011 the second and third applicants were taken to Palermo airport pending their removal to Tunisia; the first applicant followed suit on 29 September. 18.  Before boarding the planes, the migrants were received by the Tunisian Consul. In their submission, the Consul merely recorded their identities in accordance with the agreement between Italy and Tunisia of April 2011 (see paragraphs 36-40 below). 19.  In their application the applicants asserted that at no time during their stay in Italy had they been issued with any document.\nAnnexed to their observations, the Government, however, produced three refusal-of-entry orders dated 27 and 29 September 2011 that had been issued in respect of the applicants. Those orders, which were virtually identical and drafted in Italian with a translation into Arabic, read as follows:\n\u201cThe Chief of Police (questore) for the Province of Agrigento\nHaving regard to the documents in the file, showing that\n(1)  on \u201817 [18] September 2011\u2019 members of the police force found in the province of \u2018Agrigento\u2019, near the border of: \u2018island of Lampedusa\u2019, Mr [surname and forename] born ... on [date] ... \u2018Tunisian\u2019 national ... not fully identified, \u2018undocumented\u2019 (sedicente);\n(2)  the alien entered the territory of the country by evading the border controls;\n(3)  the identification (rintraccio) of the alien took place on/immediately after his arrival on national territory, and precisely at: \u2018island of Lampedusa\u2019;\nWHEREAS none of the situations [provided for in] Article 10 \u00a7 4 of Legislative Decree no. 286 of 1998 is present;\nCONSIDERING that it is appropriate to proceed in accordance with Article 10 \u00a7 2 of Legislative Decree no. 286 of 1998;\nORDERS\nthat the above-mentioned person be\nREFUSED LEAVE TO ENTER AND RETURNED\n\u2013  An appeal may be lodged against the present order within a period of sixty days from the date of its service, with the Justice of the Peace of Agrigento.\n\u2013  The lodging of an appeal will not, in any event, suspend the enforcement (efficacia) of the present order.\n\u2013  The director of the Migration Office will proceed, for the enforcement of the present order, with its notification, together with a summary translation into a language spoken by the alien or into English, French or Spanish; and with its transmission to the diplomatic or consular delegation of the State of origin, as provided for by Article 2 \u00a7 7 of Legislative Decree no. 286 of 1998; and with its registration under Article 10 \u00a7 6 of the said Legislative Decree.\nTo be escorted to the border at: \u2018Rome Fiumicino\u2019\n[Issued at] Agrigento [on] 27[29]/09/2011 on behalf of the Chief of Police\n[Signature]\u201d 20.  These orders were each accompanied by a record of notification bearing the same date, also drafted in Italian with an Arabic translation. In the space reserved for the applicants\u2019 signatures, both records contain the handwritten indication \u201c[the person] refused to sign or to receive a copy\u201d (si rifiuta di firmare e ricevere copia). 21.  On their arrival at Tunis airport, the applicants were released. 22.  A number of anti-racism associations filed a complaint about the treatment to which the migrants had been subjected, after 20 September 2011, on board the ships Audace, Vincent and Fantasy. 23.  Criminal proceedings for abuse of power and unlawful arrest (Articles 323 and 606 of the Criminal Code) were opened against a person or persons unknown. On 3 April 2012 the public prosecutor sought to have the charges dropped. 24.  In a decision of 1 June 2012 the Palermo preliminary investigations judge (giudice per le indagini preliminari) granted the public prosecutor\u2019s request. 25.  In his reasoning the judge emphasised that the purpose of placing the migrants in the CSPA was to accommodate them, to assist them and to cater for their hygiene-related needs for as long as was strictly necessary, before sending them to an Identification and Removal Centre (Centro di Identificazione ed Espulsione \u2013 \u201cCIE\u201d) or taking any measures in their favour. At the CSPA the migrants could, according to him, obtain legal assistance and information about asylum application procedures.\nThe judge shared the public prosecutor\u2019s view that the interpretation of the conditions concerning the grounds for and duration of the confinement of migrants in a CSPA was sometimes vague. He also agreed with the public prosecutor that a range of factors were to be taken into consideration, leading to the conclusion that the facts of the case could not be characterised as a criminal offence.\nThe judge noted that the Agrigento police authority (questura) had merely registered the presence of the migrants at the CSPA without taking any decisions ordering their confinement. 26.  According to the judge, the unstable balance on the island of Lampedusa had been upset on 20 September 2011, when a group of Tunisians had carried out an arson attack, seriously damaging the CSPA at Contrada Imbriacola and rendering it incapable of fulfilling its purpose of accommodating and assisting migrants. The authorities had then organised transfer by air and sea to evacuate migrants from Lampedusa. The following day, clashes had taken place in the island\u2019s port between the local population and a group of foreigners who had threatened to explode gas canisters. The judge explained that there had thus been a situation which was likely to degenerate, and which was covered by the notion of \u201cstate of necessity\u201d (stato di necessit\u00e0) as provided for in Article 54 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 34 below). It was thus an imperative to arrange for the immediate transfer of some of the migrants by using, among other means, the ships.\nAs to the fact that, in the emergency situation, no formal decision had been taken to place the migrants on board the ships, the judge found that this could not be regarded as an unlawful arrest and that the conditions for the migrants\u2019 transfer to CIEs were not satisfied. Firstly, the CIEs were overcrowded, and secondly, the agreements with the Tunisian authorities suggested that their return was supposed to be prompt. The fact that a refusal-of-entry measure (respingimento) had been ordered in respect of the migrants, without judicial scrutiny, a few days after their arrival, was not unlawful in the judge\u2019s view. The calculation of a \u201creasonable time\u201d for the adoption of that measure and for the migrants\u2019 stay in the CSPA had to take account of logistical difficulties (state of the sea, distance between Lampedusa and Sicily) and of the number of migrants concerned. In those circumstances, the judge concluded that there had been no infringement of the law.\nMoreover, the judge was of the view that no malicious intent could be attributed to the authorities, whose conduct had been prompted first and foremost by the public interest. The migrants had not sustained any unfair harm (danno ingiusto). 27.  In so far as the complainants had alleged that the way in which the migrants had been treated had been detrimental to their health, the judge noted that the investigations had found that nobody on the ships had applied for asylum. Those who, at the Lampedusa CSPA, had expressed an intention to do so, together with any vulnerable individuals, had been transferred to the centres of Trapani, Caltanissetta and Foggia. Unaccompanied minors had been placed in temporary accommodation and no pregnant women had been transferred to the ships. The migrants on board had been able to receive medical assistance, hot water, electricity, meals and hot drinks. Moreover, as recorded in a press agency note of 25 September 2011, T.R., a member of parliament (MP) had boarded the ships in the port of Palermo, and had observed that the migrants were in good health, that they were receiving assistance and were sleeping in cabins containing bed linen or reclining seats (poltrone reclinabili). Some of the Tunisians had been taken to hospital, while others had been treated on board by medical staff. Accompanied by the deputy chief of police (vice questore) and by police officers, the MP in question had talked with some of the migrants. He had thus been able to observe that they had access to prayer rooms, that the food was satisfactory (pasta, chicken, vegetables, fruit and water) and that the Civil Protection Authority (Protezione civile) had provided them with clothing. Some of the migrants had complained of a lack of razors, but the MP had observed that this could be explained by a measure taken to prevent self-harm. 28.  The judge noted that, even though the migrants had not been in custody or under arrest, a photograph published in a newspaper had shown one of them with his hands bound by black ribbons and in the company of a police officer. He had been part of a small group of individuals who, fearing immediate removal, had engaged in acts of self-harm and had caused damage to buses. In the judge\u2019s view, the restraint in question had been necessary to guarantee the physical well-being of the persons concerned and to avoid aggressive acts against police officers who were neither armed nor equipped with any means of coercion. In any event, the conduct of the police officers had been justified by a \u201cstate of necessity\u201d, within the meaning of Article 54 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 34 below). 29.  In the light of the foregoing, the preliminary investigations judge concluded that the case file contained no evidence of the physical and mental elements of the offences provided for in Articles 323 and 606 of the Criminal Code. 30.  Two other migrants in respect of whom a refusal-of-entry order had been issued challenged those orders before the Agrigento Justice of the Peace. 31.  In two decisions (decreti) of 4 July and 30 October 2011, respectively, the Justice of the Peace annulled those orders.\nIn his reasoning the judge observed that the complainants had been found on Italian territory on 6 May and 18 September 2011 respectively and that the orders at issue had been adopted only on 16 May and 24 September 2011. While acknowledging that Article 10 of Legislative Decree no. 286 of 1998 (see paragraph 33 below) did not indicate any time-frame for the adoption of such orders, the judge took the view that a measure which by its very nature restricted the freedom of the person concerned had to be taken within a reasonably short time after the identification (fermo) of the unlawful migrant. To find otherwise amounted to allowing de facto detention of the migrant in the absence of any reasoned decision of the authority, which would contravene the Constitution.", "references": ["7", "6", "3", "5", "0", "8", "4", "9", "No Label", "1", "2"], "gold": ["1", "2"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1971 and lives in Helsinki. 6.  The applicant and her partner began to cohabit in 2003. Their daughter was born in November 2004. In the spring of 2006 the applicant felt that, in her view, the child\u2019s father was behaving strangely with the child and that the child did not want to stay at home alone with her father. She also started to fear for her own and her child\u2019s safety as the father was, in her view, violent. In May 2006 the applicant and her daughter left the child\u2019s father. 7.  In July 2006 the child\u2019s father initiated custody and contact rights proceedings vis-\u00e0-vis his daughter. 8.  In August 2006 the Kouvola District Court (k\u00e4r\u00e4j\u00e4oikeus, tingsr\u00e4tten) gave an interim decision that the father was to meet his daughter for two hours every other weekend under supervision. This arrangement continued for about a year but was disrupted for some time in 2007. According to the applicant, the child was often restless and talked strangely after the meetings with her father. 9.  On 15 June 2007 the Kouvola District Court gave another interim decision according to which the father had a right to meet with his daughter for 2 to 4 hours at a time without supervision. 10.  On 21 August 2007 the Kouvola District Court held an oral hearing about the custody and contact rights. 11.  On 4 September 2007 the Kouvola District Court gave both parents joint custody of the child. She was to live with her mother and to meet her father every other weekend from Friday to Sunday and during the holidays, unsupervised. The meetings were, however, temporarily discontinued for the duration of the pre-trial investigation (see below). On 9 January 2008 the Kouvola Appeal Court upheld the District Court\u2019s decision. 12.  The applicant claimed that after the third unsupervised visit with the father in August 2007, her almost three-year-old daughter\u2019s behaviour changed radically and she was showing strong symptoms. The child was using vulgar language and was restless and anxious. The child had told her mother about things that her father did to her. She kept repeating these issues and suffered from increasingly bad nightmares. The applicant contacted a child psychiatrist. On 16 August 2007 she contacted the child welfare authorities in Helsinki reporting her suspicions of sexual abuse. 13.  On 29 August 2007 the child welfare authorities reported the matter to the police. They recommended that the meetings with the father be discontinued for the duration of the investigation. 14.  On 5 September 2007 the pre-trial investigation conducted by the Helsinki Police Department commenced. Both parents were questioned. On 14 September 2007 the Forensic Child and Adolescent Psychiatry Centre received an official request for assistance from the Helsinki Police Department. At the time the child was two years and ten months old. The Centre replied that children under three years old could not be interviewed within the forensic-psychological interview framework as it was not possible to obtain reliable information on possible sexual abuse from children under three years of age, especially in situations involving custody disputes. Such interviews became effective only in respect of children aged four years or more. 15.  On 20 September 2007 a physiological examination was carried out to determine whether the child showed any signs or symptoms of the alleged abuse, but no such external signs were revealed. The pre-trial investigation was concluded on 15 October 2007 as there was no appearance of any crime. 16.  After having received information about the conclusion of the pre\u2011trial investigation, the applicant contacted the Forensic Child and Adolescent Psychiatry Centre on 18 October 2007 and expressed her surprise that no psychological assessment had been conducted in the matter. 17.  In a telephone conversation of 19 October 2007 the applicant expressed to the social worker her fear that her child continued to be at risk of being subjected to sexual abuse when meeting her father and insisted on another investigation. She was concerned that the pre-trial investigation by the police had not been complete and that the social workers would be responsible if something happened to her child while the meetings with the father were not supervised. The social worker in turn explained to the applicant that the pre\u2011trial investigation had not brought to light any somatic signs or symptoms that would suggest sexual abuse of the child. Moreover, concerning the visiting rights, the social worker explained that the decision of 4 September 2007 by the Kouvola District Court was still in force and that if the applicant was not satisfied with it, she would have to appeal against it in courts of law instead of complaining about it to the child welfare authorities. However, the applicant insisted on making the second report to the child welfare authorities, claiming that she had been threatened with loss of her custody rights if she did not allow the meetings with the father. The father of the child received information about this report from the police. 18.  On 18 January 2008 the applicant submitted another child welfare report and the second report to the police, insisting on another investigation and stating that she suspected that someone was abusing her child during visits to the child\u2019s father. She also reported the matter to the social workers in Helsinki. 19.  On 25 and 28 January 2008 respectively the applicant took her daughter to an emergency clinic for examination as she had trouble sleeping and was behaving oddly. No somatic signs or symptoms of sexual abuse were found. 20.  The Kouvola Police Department started to investigate the matter. As the applicant had taken the child to a doctor on 25 and 28 January 2008, no new physical examination was carried out. The pre-trial investigation was concluded on 4 May 2008 as there was no appearance of any crime. 21.  On 18 February 2008 the applicant lodged a complaint with the National Authority for Medico-legal Affairs (Terveydenhuollon oikeusturvakeskus, R\u00e4ttsskyddscentralen f\u00f6r h\u00e4lsov\u00e5rden) about the fact that the child had not been heard at all during the pre-trial investigation in autumn 2007. The case was transferred ex officio to the regional State Provincial Office (l\u00e4\u00e4ninhallitus, l\u00e4nsstyrelsen). 22.  On 18 February 2008 the applicant also lodged a complaint with the Parliamentary Ombudsman (eduskunnan oikeusasiamies, riksdagens justitieombudsman), asking him to investigate why the police did not hear her child during the pre-trial investigation. 23.  On 16 April 2008 the Parliamentary Ombudsman decided not to take any measures as the police investigation was still pending before the Kouvola Police (see paragraph 20 above). He did not have competence to give orders to the police concerning the investigation of the matter as he could not examine the actions of private individuals. 24.  On 24 November 2008 the regional State Provincial Office found that there was no minimum age for hearing a child and that the three-year age\u2011limit for child psychiatric interviews was only a recommendation. The child had only been two years and ten months old at the time of the first police investigation. No new physical examination had been carried out during the second pre-trial investigation as such an examination had been carried out on 25 and 28 January 2008. The Office decided to take no action in the applicant\u2019s case. 25.  On an unspecified date, the father of the child asked the police to investigate whether the applicant had defamed him as she had given false information about him to the social worker on 19 October 2007, claiming that the child was in danger of being sexually abused by her father during their upcoming meetings (see paragraph 17 above). He claimed that these allegations were not true and that the applicant\u2019s motive for such accusations was that she wanted to have sole custody of the child and hamper the meetings between the father and the child. 26.  On 17 February 2009 the Public Prosecutor pressed charges against the applicant for having insisted on 19 October 2007 that the child was in danger of being sexually abused by her father after the police had already investigated the matter and, on 15 October 2007, found no appearance of any crime. 27.  On 11 September 2009 the Helsinki District Court convicted the applicant of defamation and sentenced her to 45 day-fines, amounting to 630 euros (EUR). She was ordered to pay the father EUR 1,000 in non\u2011pecuniary compensation and his costs and expenses amounting to EUR 1,885.66. The court\u2019s reasoning was the following:\n\u201cThe insinuation made by M.P. and referred to in the charges cannot be understood to refer to any other person than [the father of the child] and it was made in a situation in which M.P. knew about the decision of the Helsinki Police Department to stop investigating the suspected sexual abuse of a child, which investigation had been initiated solely on the basis of the information submitted by her. According to the decision, the investigation did not reveal any such evidence on the basis of which the threshold of \u201creason to suspect\u201d would have been attained. The decision refers to the somatic examination of the child, requested by the police and conducted on 20 September 2007 by a specialist in paediatrics at which M.P. was also present. According to the medical certificate, the girl\u2019s somatic status was normal and there were no external signs of sexual abuse.\nFrom the medical certificate of 15 October 2008, which was admitted as written evidence, it appears that the meetings between the father and the child had been supervised until 16 June 2007 and that thereafter until the filing of the police report on 29 August 2007 and the freezing of the meetings, there had been unsupervised day meetings only three times, lasting four hours each. [The father of the child] stated that out of these few meetings one meeting had taken place in an amusement park, which was not disputed by M.P. M.P. stated that the sexually-coloured talk of the child had started already during the supervised visits. At that time the child was less than three years old.\nOn the sole basis of the meeting circumstances and the medical examination, M.P. could not have had strong grounds to consider that her insinuation of the crime was true, even if the child had said what she was alleged to have said. Nor could the child\u2019s other, more general symptoms have given sufficient confirmation of her insinuation.\nWhen assessing whether one is guilty of defamation, it is irrelevant that the act has been committed by pursuing an earlier report to child welfare authorities and that it has been made to a public official who is bound by confidentiality. Even in a child welfare report one must not give untruthful and smearing information or insinuations about others. M.P. must have understood that the insinuation was of such a kind that in any event it would come to the knowledge of [the child\u2019s father] and that its content, being almost of the worst kind, was bound to cause him suffering.\n...\nIgnorance of legal provisions does not eliminate the punishability of an act. Taking into account what has been said above about the circumstances of the case and the nature of the criminal insinuation, there is no basis for considering that M.P.\u2019s act could be regarded as manifestly excusable due to a mistake.\nOn the basis of the grounds expressed above, the District Court considers that M.P. did not have any such reasons to make an insinuation towards [the father of the child] that she would have had a reasoned ground to do so without defaming him.\u201d 28.  By letter dated 12 October 2009 the applicant appealed against the judgment of the District Court to the Helsinki Appeal Court (hovioikeus, hovr\u00e4tten). She claimed only to have voiced her previous concern as the child was not heard at all during the concluded pre-trial investigation. Her concerns were not directed at the father but at the fact that a danger to the child\u2019s health still existed. It had been the child welfare authorities who had qualified these concerns as relating to sexual abuse. Sexual abuse did not always leave physical marks which could be revealed by medical examination but it was a grave procedural mistake not to interview the child during the pre-trial investigation. She considered this mistake to be so substantial that the danger to her child\u2019s health still existed despite the outcome of the investigation. She also referred to the case Juppala v. Finland, no. 18620/03, 2 December 2008. 29.  On 5 January 2011, after having held an oral hearing, the Helsinki Appeal Court upheld the District Court judgment. The court found the following:\n\u201cOn the basis of the oral hearing held, the Appeal Court has no reason to assess the evidence differently than the District Court. The acts committed by M.P. [...] fulfil the constituent elements of defamation, criminalised by Chapter 24, section 9, of the Penal Code. The fact that the insinuation was made to a public official who is bound by confidentiality is not relevant when assessing the constituent elements, as appears from the Supreme Court precedent 2006:10. M.P. [...] did not have sufficiently strong grounds to hold the information true in a situation where [she] knew that the pre-trial investigation into [the child\u2019s father] had terminated. Although child protection considerations have to be taken into account, a conviction in these circumstances is not in contradiction with freedom of expression which is protected as a fundamental and human right. M.P. has considered that she is free from criminal liability under Chapter 4, section 2, of the Penal Code due to a mistake as to the unlawfulness of her act as she had mistakenly regarded her act as lawful because of a reason similar to erroneous advice given by public officials. The pre\u2011trial investigation had, however, been started solely on the basis of information given by M.P. and this investigation was already terminated, M.P. being aware of it, before the commission of the present act. Therefore there are no grounds to apply the provision concerning mistake as to the unlawfulness of the act. Nor is there any reason to change the District Court judgment as far as the conviction is concerned.\u201d 30.  By letter dated 7 March 2011 the applicant appealed to the Supreme Court (korkein oikeus, h\u00f6gsta domstolen), reiterating the grounds of appeal already presented before the Appeal Court. 31.  On 14 December 2011 the Supreme Court refused the applicant leave to appeal. 32.  On 18 March 2010 the father of the child requested the Helsinki District Court to order that the child live with him. 33.  On 25 January 2011 the Helsinki District Court ordered that the child was to live with her father in Kouvola. This decision was upheld by the Helsinki Appeal Court on 2 December 2011. On 11 May 2012 the Supreme Court refused the applicant leave to appeal. 34.  The applicant has complained to the Court about these proceedings in a separate application (see application no. 71785/12 M.P. and E.B. v. Finland) which was declared inadmissible on 17 April 2014. 35.  On an unspecified date the applicant asked the Ministry of the Interior (sis\u00e4asiainministeri\u00f6, inrikesministeriet) to investigate whether the decision not to hear the child was acceptable. On 7 May 2012 the Ministry of the Interior transferred the matter to the National Police Board (Poliisihallitus, Polisstyrelsen). 36.  On 3 August 2012 the National Police Board found that police conduct in the matter had been appropriate. The police had conducted an adequate pre-trial investigation without leaving any issues unclarified.", "references": ["0", "3", "5", "7", "8", "1", "2", "9", "4", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1984. He is currently serving a prison sentence in Valmiera. 5.  On several occasions between 2009 and 2011 the applicant was escorted to court hearings from various detention facilities where he was being held. During these transfers the applicant was subjected to strip-searches. According to the applicant, he was ordered to strip naked in the presence of other inmates and escorting officers, to assume embarrassing positions (squatting), and to submit to a visual inspection of his body. 6.  The strip-searches of the applicant were carried out on 9 December 2009, 8 and 11 June 2010, 22 February and 8 June 2011. 7.  The applicant lodged several applications with the administrative courts concerning the strip-searches. They were all joined in one set of administrative proceedings (no. A420533911). 8.  On 20 June 2012 the Administrative District Court (Administrat\u012bv\u0101 rajona tiesa) dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaints and terminated the proceedings. It held that the strip-searches had been objectively justified on security grounds and the manner in which they had been conducted had not gone beyond what had been required to ensure the efficacy of those searches. Therefore these searches had not \u201csignificantly interfere[d]\u201d with the applicant\u2019s rights and had not constituted an \u201caction of a public authority\u201d (see paragraphs 17 and 18 below). The applicant appealed. 9.  On 13 September 2012 the Administrative Regional Court (Administrat\u012bv\u0101 apgabaltiesa) dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld the ruling of the lower court. 10.  On 5 November 2012 the Senate of the Supreme Court (Augst\u0101k\u0101s tiesas Sen\u0101ts) quashed the ruling of the appeal court and remitted the case to the first-instance court. The Senate of the Supreme Court found that the strip-searches had had a legitimate goal, namely ensuring public safety, and had not been carried out in an abusive manner. However, the lower courts had not sufficiently addressed the applicant\u2019s argument that he had been subjected to strip-searches in the presence of other persons. 11.  On 27 February and 11 April 2013 hearings took place before the first-instance court. In order to clarify the facts eleven witnesses \u2013 seven escorting officers and four prisoners \u2013 were called. 12.  On 13 May 2013 the Administrative District Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaints and terminated the proceedings. 13.  As concerns the strip-searches carried out on 9 December 2009, 8 and 11 June 2010, the court, on the basis of witness testimony, found that the applicant had been searched in the presence of one inmate and at least one additional escorting officer. However, taking into account that the applicant had not voiced any concerns in this regard during the first round of proceedings, the court concluded that \u201cthe strip-searches ... had not humiliated the applicant in the eyes of others or in his [own] eyes\u201d. Accordingly, the court could not establish a \u201csignificant violation\u201d of the human rights guaranteed under Article 95 of the Constitution and Article 3 of the Convention. 14.  As concerns the strip-searches carried out on 22 February and 8 June 2011, the court found that the evidence did not support the applicant\u2019s allegation that he had been searched in the presence of other persons. The court dismissed the applicant\u2019s further allegations (the presence of female officers, being exposed to the court\u2019s staff and passers-by, unsanitary touching of his food) as unsubstantiated. 15.   On 9 July 2013 the Senate of the Supreme Court, by a final decision, dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld the ruling of the lower court.", "references": ["0", "4", "8", "5", "7", "1", "3", "6", "2", "9", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1968 and lives in Novomoskovsk. 5.  At about 5.30 p.m. on 1 August 2004 a fight took place involving the applicant, Z. and Sh. On 15 November 2005 the Novomoskovsk Court convicted the applicant of gang hooliganism committed against Z. and Sh., and gave him a suspended prison sentence of three years. On 10 February and 19 December 2006 respectively the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court upheld the applicant\u2019s conviction and sentence. According to the applicant, his conviction had been based on an incorrect assessment of the evidence. 6.  At about 7 p.m. on 1 August 2004 a group of people, including Z. and Sh. and two volunteer citizen guards (\u0434\u043e\u0431\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0456\u043b\u044c\u043d\u0430 \u043d\u0430\u0440\u043e\u0434\u043d\u0430 \u0434\u0440\u0443\u0436\u0438\u043d\u0430), who were identified in the course of the ensuing proceedings (see paragraphs 9-11 below), entered the yard of the applicant\u2019s house and, according to the applicant, assaulted him. In particular, he was punched, hit with a gas pistol and kicked in the head and torso and as a result briefly lost consciousness. According to the material available in the case (see paragraph 9 below), the volunteer citizen guards used force against the applicant while exercising their powers under the relevant regulations (see paragraph 13 below) in an attempt to take him to a police station in relation to the incident of 1 August 2004 (see paragraph 5 above). 7.  Subsequently, the applicant was admitted to Novomoskovsk Central Hospital, where a physician found two bruises near the applicant\u2019s right eye, a wound on the back of his head and numerous abrasions on the right side of his back. The applicant was also diagnosed with concussion. During subsequent examinations by a forensic expert in December 2004 and April 2006, the applicant was found to have developed post-traumatic otitis media. The applicant\u2019s injuries were classified as being partly minor and partly moderate. 8.  On 1 August 2004 the applicant filed a complaint with the Novomoskovsk police, seeking to have criminal proceedings instituted against those who had beaten him. 9.  The applicant\u2019s complaint was examined initially by the police and later by prosecutors. Between December 2004 and March 2009 they issued a number of decisions rejecting the applicant\u2019s complaint, finding, inter alia, that the applicant had been injured after disobeying the lawful orders of the volunteer citizen guards, who had lawfully resorted to force in order to take him to a police station in relation to the incident of 1 August 2004 (see paragraph 5 above). Those decisions were overturned by different courts, which considered, principally, that the applicant\u2019s complaint had not been examined thoroughly. 10.  On 12 March 2009 the Novomoskovsk Prosecutor opened criminal proceedings related to the applicant\u2019s complaint and ordered the police to investigate the incident of 1 August 2004 at the applicant\u2019s house. 11.  In the course of the investigation the two volunteer citizen guards who had taken part in the incident on 1 August 2004 at the applicant\u2019s house died. For that reason, the proceedings concerning those two people were terminated on 17 July 2009. On the same date the police terminated the proceedings concerning Z. and Sh., finding that there had been no elements of a crime in their actions. The police noted that two witnesses had stated that the volunteer citizen guards who had died had beaten the applicant on 1 August 2004. 12.  On 16 December 2009 the police suspended the investigation, finding that it was impossible to identify any other people involved in the incident of 1 August 2004 at the applicant\u2019s home. No further investigation was carried out.", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "7", "5", "8", "6", "9", "2", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1986. He died on 3 November 2015. Ms N. Z\u012bmele, the applicant\u2019s grandmother, informed the Court of her wish to pursue the proceedings on his behalf. 6.  The relevant facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7.  In July and August 2011 the police opened four criminal investigations into three incidents of theft and an incident of robbery. On 29 August 2011 these investigations were joined. 8.  On 12 August 2011 the police arrested the applicant on suspicion of robbery. He was held in custody on this basis until 14 August 2011, when he was placed under arrest on suspicion of theft. 9.  On 15 August 2011 the police lodged an application with the Ludza District Court (Ludzas rajona tiesa) for the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention in relation to the theft investigation. 10.  On 16 August 2011 an investigating judge granted the application. With regard to the suspicion of theft, he reasoned as follows:\n\u201cthere are reasons to suspect that [the applicant] has committed the crime under section 175(3) of the Criminal Law (Krimin\u0101llikums) [theft] ... These suspicions are confirmed by the evidence gathered in the criminal case.\u201d 11.  On 18 August 2011 the applicant appealed against that decision. 12.  On 2 September 2011 the Latgale Regional Court (Latgales apgabaltiesa) dismissed the appeal. With regard to the suspicion of theft, the judge stated:\n\u201cThe ... suspicion that [the applicant] has committed the crime ... is confirmed by the information contained in the file.\u201d 13.  No appeal lay against the aforementioned decision. 14.  On 19 September 2011 the public prosecutor charged the applicant with robbery, theft, involving a minor in theft and petty theft on the basis of the facts as alleged. 15.  On 26 September 2011 the applicant familiarised himself with the case material. 16.  On 28 September 2011 the prosecutor transferred the case to the Ludza District Court for adjudication. She set out the case against the applicant and detailed the evidence upon which the prosecution intended to rely. 17.  On 17 October 2011 the investigating judge decided to keep the applicant in detention. He gave the following reasoning:\n\u201cthe accusation against [the applicant] of the crimes under sections 175(3) [theft], 176(2) [robbery], 180(2) [petty theft] and 172 [involving a minor in theft] of the Criminal Law ... is confirmed by the evidence gathered in the criminal case.\u201d 18.  No appeal lay against the aforementioned decision. 19.  On 28 December 2011 and 23 April 2012 the applicant\u2019s detention was extended. The judge stated as follows:\n\u201c[the applicant\u2019s] detention is based on the suspicion that he has committed the crime under section 175(3) of the Criminal Law [theft]... in other criminal proceedings [he] has been declared a suspect in relation to crimes under sections 180(1) [petty theft] and 176(2) [robbery] ...\n...\nThere has been no change in the reasons noted in the detention order of 16 August 2011 ... which had been re-examined in [the subsequent decisions]...\u201d 20.  On 3 February, 19 June and 6 August 2012, the applicant complained to the Ludza District Court that it had failed to assess his detention in relation to the alleged robbery. 21.  On 6 August and 2 November 2012, and on 25 January 2013 the judge decided to continue the applicant\u2019s detention, using largely the same wording as in the previous decisions. In addition, she noted that the twenty-four-month period allowed by section 277(7) of the Criminal Procedure Law (Krimin\u0101lprocesa likums) for detention had been observed because the applicant had also been accused of an especially serious offence, robbery, under section 176(2) of the Criminal Law. 22.  The aforementioned decisions were not subject to appeal.", "references": ["0", "6", "4", "9", "8", "7", "3", "1", "5", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "5.  On 9 June 2004, the applicant, 69 at the time, was walking in the centre of Kharkiv and was hit in the face by a pellet fired from an air gun. 6.  The applicant was admitted to hospital the same day and the pellet was removed from her face. It was subsequently seized as evidence by the police. The doctors noted in the applicant\u2019s medical file that she had a gunshot wound on the infraorbital region of her face. 7.  Later that day she lodged a criminal complaint with the police. The applicant alleged that the shot had been fired from a particular flat in a building in the centre of Kharkiv. 8.  From 10 to 26 June 2004 the applicant underwent outpatient medical treatment for her injury. 9.  On 2 July 2004, at the request of the police, she was examined by an expert, who concluded that the applicant\u2019s injury was of a minor degree and might have been caused by a gunshot. On 31 October 2005 the applicant underwent an additional medical examination, which confirmed the previous conclusion. 10.  By decisions of 22 March and 8 December 2005 and 9 August 2006, the police refused to open criminal proceedings, stating that it was not possible to identify the offenders and that the applicant\u2019s allegations that the shot had been fired from a particular location were unfounded. They further found that there had been no serious breach of public order in the applicant\u2019s case and noted that the applicant could have lodged a criminal complaint directly with a court in the framework of private prosecution proceedings. Despite her repeated requests, the applicant was not given access to the police investigation file related to the incident of 9 June 2004. 11.  On appeal by the applicant, those decisions were annulled by different prosecutors and the courts generally on the grounds that the police enquiry had fallen short of the requirements of a full and objective examination of the circumstances of the case. It was noted that the police had failed to examine the relevant evidence, including the pellet, and that the case contained elements of the crime defined by Article 296 of the Criminal Code (hooliganism). In particular, on 21 August 2007 the Dzerzhynskyy District Court of Kharkiv ruled that the case should be returned to the prosecutors for further investigation. 12.  No further investigation was carried out after that date. 13.  By a letter of 21 August 2009, the Deputy Prosecutor of the Dzerzhynskyy District of Kharkiv informed the applicant that the investigation case file had gone missing. There is no information as to any further developments in that regard. 14.  On 7 November 2009 the applicant died. Her death was unrelated to the incident of 9 June 2004.", "references": ["5", "6", "7", "4", "3", "2", "0", "9", "8", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "6.  From 20 January 2006 onwards the Tax Agency (Skatteverket) conducted audits of value-added tax, employers\u2019 social security contributions (arbetsgivaravgifter) and income tax at the three Swedish companies Ergonia Sweden AB, SNS-LAN Trading AB (\u201cSNS\u201d) and Mouse Trapper Nordic AB. The audit covered the period June 2001 \u2013 June 2005. On 4 March 2008 the Tax Agency applied to the County Administrative Court (l\u00e4nsr\u00e4tten) in Stockholm for permission to take coercive measures in respect of SNS under section 8 of the Act on Special Coercive Measures in Taxation Procedures (Lagen om s\u00e4rskilda tv\u00e5ngs\u00e5tg\u00e4rder i beskattningsf\u00f6rfarandet, 1994:466 \u2013 hereafter \u201cthe Coercive Measures Act\u201d), in particular the search and seizure of certain documents and other material. 7.  The Tax Agency\u2019s application contained detailed information on what it had been able to establish in regard to the above-mentioned companies during the audits. The Agency stated that it suspected that significant amounts of money had been withheld from Swedish taxation through irregular transactions between SNS and a Swiss company. According to the Agency, the latter company had been established solely in order to evade taxes on some of the business profits in the above-mentioned Swedish companies. While it was considered highly likely that the persons owning or having a decisive influence in the Swedish companies, including a Mr  Toivo Jurik, were also running the Swiss company, it had proved impossible to obtain information on ownership and control of the latter company from the persons involved, who claimed that they had no knowledge of these matters. After Mr Jurik had been shown an extract of the Swiss company register, where he was listed as an executive, he had admitted that he and another person involved in the Swedish companies had been present at the establishment of the Swiss company but that he was listed as an executive only for formal reasons. The other person mentioned had since stated that he would not assist the Tax Agency any further in the audit. The Agency therefore considered that it could not continue to investigate the ownership issue and the accuracy of certain business costs unless it obtained access to documents that showed the Swiss company\u2019s relationship to the Swedish companies and their owners and leaders as well as the Swiss company\u2019s role in the business activities. In the Agency\u2019s view, there were no alternative means of review. 8.  Not considering it appropriate to order SNS to provide the required documents, the Tax Agency further requested that the application for coercive measures should not be communicated to the company and that it should not be notified of the court\u2019s decision before the measures had been undertaken, as there was a risk that the documents to be searched and seized could be withheld or destroyed. 9.  As SNS had recently been liquidated and had not had its own business premises, the requested search should be made at two addresses connected to Mr Jurik, who had been responsible for the bookkeeping in all three audited companies and was also representing SNS in its contacts with the Tax Agency, and therefore could be expected to be in possession of the required documentation. Thus, the search should start at the registered premises of the parent company, Draupner Universal AB (\u201cDraupner\u201d), at the address P.O. Hallmans gata 15, Stockholm. This was a flat which, in addition to being owned by Draupner and serving as its registered address, was rented by Mr Jurik and used as a pied-\u00e0-terre. Draupner was owned by Mr Jurik\u2019s children but was represented and run by Mr Jurik himself. If the necessary documents were not found at the first address, the search should continue at the office of Mr Jurik at the applicant law firm (whose name at the time was Hagenfeldt Advokatbyr\u00e5 AB), at the address D\u00f6belnsgatan 15, Stockholm. 10.  By a judgment of 10 March 2008 the County Administrative Court granted the Tax Agency\u2019s application and ordered that the judgment was immediately enforceable. Agreeing with the Tax Agency, the court considered that there was a substantial risk that documents could be withheld, corrupted or destroyed and that, having regard to Mr Jurik\u2019s connection with SNS and the two addresses in question, there was good reason to assume that the documents relevant to the audit of SNS were to be found at those addresses. While a search and seizure undertaken at a location different from the audited party\u2019s business premises involved a particular encroachment on rights of integrity, the court found that, in the case at hand, the importance of the measures outweighed the intrusion caused. 11.  The search of the two designated premises took place on 14 March 2008 and was conducted by officials of the Enforcement Authority (kronofogdemyndigheten) in Stockholm and several auditors of the Tax Agency. The flat was searched first. Present were Mr Carl Lindstrand, a lawyer of the applicant law firm, representing Mr Jurik (who was at the time in Switzerland), and \u2013 towards the end of the search \u2013 Mr Roland M\u00f6ller, who, as an associate of the law firm, had been the liquidator of SNS and who was also the designated person to be served writs on behalf of Draupner in Sweden. According to the minutes of the proceedings, drawn up by one of the officers of the Enforcement Authority, the persons present were reminded of the possibility to request exemption of documents. 12.  During the search of the flat, material of interest that belonged to Draupner was found. Since Draupner had been involved in transactions connected with the activities of SNS, a decision to audit the company was taken on site by the audit manager of the Tax Agency. She also took an interim decision to use coercive measures against Draupner, in accordance with section 15 of the Coercive Measures Act. It was decided to search for and seize material relating to the audit of Draupner both at the flat and at the applicant law firm. In the latter respect, the decision referred to the fact that not only Mr Jurik but also Mr M\u00f6ller had offices there. 13.  The need for an immediate decision and enforcement was explained by the substantial risk of corruption of material. The decision referred to sections 7-9 of the Coercive Measures Act and to the County Administrative Court\u2019s judgment of 10 March 2008. 14.  At the flat 19 files with accounting material, an external hard disk drive and a torn document were seized and the hard disk drive of a computer as well as a USB memory stick were copied (mirrored). This was specified in a report drawn up and submitted to the parties concerned the same day by the Enforcement Authority. 15.  The premises of the applicant law firm \u2013 that is, the offices of Mr Jurik and Mr M\u00f6ller \u2013 were searched thereafter, again in the presence of Mr Lindstrand and Mr M\u00f6ller. Attending was also a legal representative whom the applicant had appointed. The issue of possible exemption of documents was discussed and the representative was given a list of the officers attending. Cupboards, shelves and computers in the two offices were searched and a safe was opened by Mr M\u00f6ller, all monitored by the applicant\u2019s representative. However, no material of relevance was found on the premises. At the end of the proceedings, the applicant\u2019s representative requested that the external hard disk drive and the USB memory stick \u2013 seized and copied, respectively, at the flat \u2013 be exempted from the audit. 16.  The applicant and SNS appealed against the County Administrative Court\u2019s judgment of 10 March 2008. On 7 April 2008 the Administrative Court of Appeal (kammarr\u00e4tten) in Stockholm dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal and struck out the case in so far as it concerned SNS. In regard to the applicant, it stated that, while the appealed judgment did indeed allow the use of coercive measures on the premises of the applicant law firm, the reason for this was not that the law firm was the subject of the measures but that it could be assumed that documents relevant to the audit of SNS would be found there. In these circumstances, the appellate court concluded that the applicant was not affected by the appealed judgment in such a way that it was entitled to appeal against it. With respect to SNS, the court considered that, as the coercive measures had already been enforced, it did not have a justified interest in having them examined by a second judicial instance. 17.  By a decision of 19 June 2008 the Supreme Administrative Court (Regeringsr\u00e4tten) refused the applicant and SNS leave to appeal. On 3 July 2008 the court dismissed an appeal in the same matter lodged by Mr Jurik, noting that he had not previously been a party to the case and could not therefore join the proceedings at the level of the Supreme Administrative Court. 18.  The Tax Agency\u2019s interim decision of 14 March 2008 to use coercive measures against Draupner was referred to the County Administrative Court, which received it on 17 March 2008, the following Monday. The Agency stated as reasons for its decision that Draupner had had transactions connected to SNS, its subsidiary company, that there had been special reasons to search for material at the applicant law firm as two of Draupner\u2019s representatives, Mr Jurik and Mr M\u00f6ller, had offices there and that the risk of corruption of material was acute in view of the fact that, during the ongoing enforcement, it had become apparent to persons involved which transactions and connected documents were to be examined. Draupner requested that the decision be quashed, referring, inter alia, to attorney-client privilege pertaining to its representatives. By a judgment of 26 March 2008 the interim decision was confirmed by the court, which found that the seizure of the documents at issue had been justified. The court further considered that there was a substantial risk that the documents would be withheld, corrupted or destroyed if they were returned. 19.  Draupner and Mr Jurik appealed to the Administrative Court of Appeal. On 22 August 2008 the court struck out Draupner\u2019s appeal and dismissed that of Mr Jurik. As in the similar case concerning SNS (see paragraph 16 above), the court took into account that the coercive measures had already been enforced and considered therefore that Draupner did not have a justified interest in having them examined by a second judicial instance. In regard to Mr Jurik, it was noted that he had not been a party to the case at the lower court. 20.  On 28 January 2009 the Supreme Administrative Court refused Draupner leave to appeal. 21.  Draupner also appealed against the Tax Agency\u2019s decision of 14 March 2008 to conduct an audit. On 18 June 2008 the Tax Agency dismissed the appeal because, in accordance with Chapter 6, section 2 of the Tax Assessment Act (Taxeringslagen; 1990:324), no appeal lay against such a decision. This determination was upheld by the County Administrative Court on 11 July 2008. 22.  On 19 September 2008 the Administrative Court of Appeal quashed the Tax Agency\u2019s decision to dismiss the appeal and the County Administrative Court\u2019s judgment and referred the case back to the County Administrative Court. The appellate court found that the Tax Agency had lacked a legal basis for its decision; instead of dismissing Draupner\u2019s appeal, it should have submitted it to the County Administrative Court for determination. 23.  After a new examination of the case, the County Administrative Court dismissed the appeal in a decision of 3 October 2008, finding that no appeal lay against a decision to conduct a tax audit and that the European Convention was not applicable to such a decision. In addition, it noted that, while the audit decision itself did not involve any harm to Draupner, possible detriment caused by the audit procedure could be removed or mitigated through a request for the exemption of documents from the audit. Such a request was at the time already under examination by the court (see paragraphs 35-43 below). 24.  On 15 January 2009 the Administrative Court of Appeal rejected Draupner\u2019s further appeal, agreeing with the lower court\u2019s assessment. 25.  By a letter dated 14 March 2008, the day of the search of the flat and the law office, and received by the County Administrative Court on 17 March 2008, the applicant requested that those parts of the material seized and copied at the flat that could concern the law firm be exempted from the audit. It mentioned, in particular, the external hard disk drive and the USB memory stick. Noting that both SNS and Draupner were clients of the law firm, the applicant argued that the material it sought to have exempted was protected by attorney-client privilege. 26.  By a decision of 26 March 2008 the County Administrative Court dismissed the request, finding that the applicant lacked legal standing in the matter. It noted that the material had been seized from Draupner and was therefore not under the applicant\u2019s right of disposition. 27.  The applicant appealed to the Administrative Court of Appeal, demanding that all seized and copied material except for the files with accounting material be exempted. It also requested that an oral hearing be held on the question of its legal standing in the matter. Mr Jurik joined the applicant\u2019s appeal. 28.  On 18 April 2008 the Administrative Court of Appeal refused the request for an oral hearing, finding it unnecessary. 29.  By a judgment of 22 August 2008 the Administrative Court of Appeal rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal and agreed with the lower court that the applicant did not have legal standing concerning the requested exemption of documents, as the coercive measures had not been directed against the law firm. Mr Jurik\u2019s appeal was dismissed, as he had not been a party to the case at the lower court. 30.  The applicant made a further appeal, stating, among other things, that the Tax Agency\u2019s original interim decision of 14 March 2008 concerning Draupner and the County Administrative Court\u2019s judgment of 26 March 2008 confirming that decision had been directed against the law firm because they allowed a search in the firm\u2019s offices. Moreover, the coercive measures employed had led to the seizure of material which allegedly belonged to the applicant and could contain information covered by attorney-client privilege. In the latter respect, the applicant claimed that the external hard disk drive and the USB memory stick had been used by its associate lawyer Mr Jurik in his work for the firm. 31.  On 28 January 2009 the Supreme Administrative Court refused the applicant leave to appeal. 32.  In the decision of the Administrative Court of Appeal of 18 April 2008 not to hold an oral hearing (see paragraph 28 above) three judges participated, one of whom was a co-opted member (adjungerad ledamot). She was also a civil servant at the Tax Agency, albeit formally on leave of absence while temporarily serving with the court. The Tax Agency being the opposing party, the applicant challenged her impartiality and called for her disqualification from the case. 33.  On 14 May 2008 the Administrative Court of Appeal, sitting in a different formation, rejected the objection, noting that the co-opted member was on leave from her post at the Tax Agency. 34.  By a judgment of 5 March 2009 the Supreme Administrative Court, which had regard to Strasbourg case-law, rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal, declaring that the objection had not been justified. It considered that the issue of objective impartiality had to be examined in light of the individual character of the case at hand. In this respect, it noted that the co-opted member\u2019s tasks at the Tax Agency had concerned activities of a different type than those relevant in the case and had been performed in a different part of the country. Furthermore, she was only one of three judges participating in the decision in question, which had concerned a request for an oral hearing. She had not participated in the judgment on the merits of the case. 35.  Draupner, represented by Mr Lindstrand, requested that all material seized or copied during the audit be exempted, in particular because it contained information protected by attorney-client privilege pertaining to the applicant law firm and its clients. 36.  On 16 October 2008 the County Administrative Court rejected the request. It stated that Draupner was the subject of a tax audit and that all electronic or paper documents linked to the company\u2019s business found on its premises should be considered as belonging to it and being eligible for examination in the audit. The court noted that the company register listed Mr Jurik as a board member and signatory of Draupner. Furthermore, the available evidence in the case showed that he was the representative of the company and that the flat where the search and seizure had taken place constituted the company\u2019s business premises. As the documents at issue had been found at that flat, they should be considered to belong to Draupner, concern its business and, as a rule, be included in the audit. While the coercive measures used could not therefore be considered to have contravened the Coercive Measures Act or the Convention, the question remained whether there were reasons to exempt some or all of the material. Noting that the burden of proof rested with the audited party, the court considered that the company had not demonstrated that the documents were covered by any of the exemptions under the Act. 37.  Upon Draupner\u2019s appeal, the Administrative Court of Appeal, on 5  March 2009, decided to quash the County Administrative Court\u2019s judgment and refer the case back to that court. The appellate court found that the lower court had not examined the contents of all the documents, which was a requirement for the assessment of the question of exemption. 38.  The County Administrative Court then directed Draupner to specify its request in greater detail, which the company did. By a judgment of 14 September 2009 the court rejected the company\u2019s requests for an oral hearing and an inspection of the flat but granted that a few seized documents be exempted from examination by the Tax Agency, as they were considered to be Mr Jurik\u2019s private documents. It further considered that deleted files, which were readable only after reconstruction, could not be the object of a seizure under the Coercive Measures Act and could therefore neither be exempted nor used by the Tax Agency. 39.  Draupner and the Tax Agency appealed. Draupner agreed that 17 of the 19 files seized on 14 March 2008 could be handed over to the Tax Agency for examination, following which the request for exemption concerned the remaining material seized and copied on that day. The Tax Agency requested that it be allowed to examine deleted and reconstructed data files. 40.  On 14 September 2010 the Administrative Court of Appeal rejected Draupner\u2019s appeal, but granted that of the Tax Agency. Draupner\u2019s procedural requests for an oral hearing and an inspection were rejected, but the court held a preparatory meeting with the parties to determine the continued proceedings in the case, notably the method for examining the disputed material. The court found that, due to the extremely extensive data material \u2013 more than 300,000 files and entries \u2013, it was impossible to examine each and every data file, and the Tax Agency was therefore instructed to list the documents and files it considered as part of its examination after which Draupner would have an opportunity to lodge a new request for exemption. The appellate court agreed with the County Administrative Court\u2019s assessments that the material, including the hard disk drive and the USB memory stick, had been seized on Draupner\u2019s business premises, that there was, accordingly, a presumption that it was included in the audit and eligible for the Tax Agency\u2019s examination and that the burden of proof for exemptions rested with the company, even though a modest level of evidence was sufficient. With regard to Draupner\u2019s assertion that certain documents came under attorney-client privilege, the court noted that the Tax Agency had not ordered a law firm to provide information in the case and that the documents had not been seized at a law firm. It also considered that the particular circumstances of the case did not show that certain documents were protected by such privilege. 41.  On 15 November 2010 the Supreme Administrative Court refused Draupner leave to appeal. 42.  After the Tax Agency had listed the documents and files it wished to examine, Draupner made a new application for exemption of documents which was partially approved by the County Administrative Court on 24 November 2011 in regard to some documents which were considered to be of a private nature. However, none of the documents for which exemption had been requested were found to have such content that attorney-client privilege applied. 43.  On 21 February 2012 the Administrative Court of Appeal upheld the lower court\u2019s judgment. On 8 May 2012 the Supreme Administrative Court (now H\u00f6gsta f\u00f6rvaltningsdomstolen) refused Draupner leave to appeal. 44.  The applicant and Mr Jurik made a complaint to the Parliamentary Ombudsman (Justitieombudsmannen) against the handling of the case by the Tax Agency, the County Administrative Court and the Administrative Court of Appeal and assessments made by these instances. On 11 December 2008 the Ombudsman found no reason to take action. 45.  The applicant also petitioned for a re-opening of the Supreme Administrative Court\u2019s decision of 28 January 2009 not to grant leave to appeal in the case concerning the applicant\u2019s request for exemption of documents. This petition was rejected by the Supreme Administrative Court on 20 September 2010. 46.  The audits concerning SNS and Draupner were eventually discontinued and no taxation decisions were taken on the basis of the audits. All documents were returned to Draupner. Like SNS, Draupner has since been liquidated.", "references": ["2", "6", "3", "5", "7", "1", "8", "9", "0", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "9.  The first applicant, Ms Lia Shioshvili, was born in 1977 and lives in Gurjaani (Georgia). She is the mother of the second, third, fourth and fifth applicant, all Georgian nationals and born respectively in 1995, 1997, 2000 and 2004. 10.  During the period from the end of September 2006 to the end of January 2007 identity checks of Georgian nationals residing in Russia were carried out in the streets, markets and other workplaces as well as at their homes. Many were subsequently arrested and taken to police stations. After a period of custody in police stations, they were grouped together and taken by bus to a court, which summarily imposed administrative penalties on them and gave decisions ordering their administrative expulsion from Russian territory. Subsequently, some were taken to detention centres for foreigners where they were detained for varying periods of time, and then taken by bus to various airports in Moscow, and expelled to Georgia by aeroplane. Some of the Georgian nationals against whom expulsion orders were issued left the territory of the Russian Federation by their own means (for further details as to the background of the case see Georgia v. Russia (I), cited above, \u00a7 45). 11.  On 29 May 1998 the first applicant, her husband and her two children arrived in the Russian Federation for the first time. At that time there was no visa requirement for Georgian citizens in place. In the subsequent years the first applicant, her husband and the children had been back and forth several times between the Russian Federation and Georgia. 12.  In 2003 the first applicant and her children again entered the territory of the Russian Federation with a visa valid for one month. They settled together with their husband/father in the village of Karinskoye, in the Odintsovski district of Moscow city. 13.  In September 2004 the first applicant gave birth to her fourth child, the fifth applicant. The first applicant did not apply for a birth certificate for the fifth applicant at that time, since she was unlawfully residing in Russia. 14.  At the beginning of October 2006, the applicants moved to the city of Ruza in order to avoid expulsion. 15.  On 18 October 2006 a police officer visited the applicants\u2019 family home in Ruza and requested the first applicant to produce her identity papers. Owing to the absence of visa documents the officer asked all applicants to follow him to the local police station, where an administrative offence report was drawn up. The applicants left the police station after approximately 30 minutes. The police officer informed the first applicant that a court hearing concerning her case would take place soon. He further advised her to apply for a birth certificate for the fifth applicant. 16.  On 25 October 2006 the Georgian Consulate in Moscow issued a temporary birth certificate for the fifth applicant, valid until 14 November 2006. 17.  On 7 November 2006 a hearing before the Ruzskiy District Court of the Moscow Region took place, following which an expulsion decision was issued. The court only ordered the expulsion of the first applicant, even though mentioning in its decision that she was mother to four children. The hearing lasted about ten minutes and despite the first applicant\u2019s limited knowledge of the Russian language, she was not assisted by an interpreter. 18.  On 20 November 2006, after having received the expulsion decision of 7 November 2006 all five applicants left Moscow. Due to suspended air, rail, road, sea and postal communications between the Russian Federation and Georgia, the applicants took the train from Moscow to Baku (Azerbaijan). The first applicant was eight months pregnant at the material time and her four minor children were eleven, nine, six and two years old.\na)  The applicants\u2019 version of the subsequent events 19.  According to the applicants their train was stopped by Russian migration officers on 22 November 2006 at approximately 10.30 pm near the Russian/Azerbaijani border and all Georgian nationals were asked to get off the train with their belongings. The officers collected the applicants\u2019 identity and travel documents and confiscated 400 USD from the first applicant, which allegedly had not been declared. The officers informed all the Georgians including the applicants, that there were various irregularities in their documents and that they could not continue their journey, whereas all non\u2011Georgians could resume their journey on the train. 20.  The five applicants were then requested to walk with the other Georgian nationals to a bus, which went to Derbent. Two migration officers escorted the group but would not inform them of the authorities\u2019 intention nor where the group was being taken. Due to the cold weather and her advanced pregnancy the walk and the bus ride were particular difficult for the first applicant. In particular, since she had to carry a suitcase and her youngest child. Her oral complaints to the officers about these circumstances were of no avail. 21.  Once the group arrived in Derbent, the migration officers asked the group to accompany them to the migration service office. The first applicant was unable to continue walking and waited outside for two hours with her children. She was worried for the health of her minor children and for the unborn child. 22.  On 23 November 2006, at about 3 am, the group was taken to Derbent train station for the night. They had to pay 500 rubles to the police officers, who guarded them, to be allowed to go to the toilet. No water or food was provided. 23.  At daybreak, the police officers asked the group to go to the migration service office again, where they spent the whole day waiting outside at a temperature of 5o C. 24.  In the evening the first applicant\u2019s health deteriorated, her children were crying and coughing and no shelter, water or food was offered by the authorities. Finally, the group of Georgians rented an unheated, four-room basement flat in Derbent, for which the first applicant had to pay 200 rubles per day for her and the children. Three women and six children from the group of Georgians, including the applicants, settled in one room, which had four beds. The remaining three rooms were occupied by more than 20 Georgian men. 25.  According to the applicants the migration officers regularly visited the flat, but the first applicant\u2019s complaints about her worsening health were to no avail. 26.  On 29 November 2006 the first applicant tried to cross the Russian/Azerbaijani border with her three eldest children, the second, third and fourth applicant. The fifth applicant stayed with the other Georgians, as her birth certificate had expired on 14 November 2006. However, they were stopped by the customs officers who indicated that the court\u2019s expulsion decision only concerned the first applicant and not her children. They were subsequently sent back to Derbent. 27.  The first applicant\u2019s health worsened, she suffered from a cold and had a fever, became depressed and had repeated asthma attacks. 28.  On 3 and 4 December 2006, after having gone back and forth to the migration service office, and with the help of an employee from the consulate service of the Georgian Embassy in Moscow, the first applicant finally obtained transit visa for her children and all other necessary documents, so that all five applicants could leave for Georgia. 29.  Several national broadcasting television companies reported on the Georgians\u2019 situation in Derbent on a daily basis between 1 and 7 December 2006.\nb)  The Government\u2019s version of the subsequent events 30.  According to the Government the border control services, which conducted immigration controls in the trains going to the Republic of Azerbaijan, did not bring any Georgian nationals to the migration services on 22 or 23 November 2006. However, on 23 November 2006 the name of the fifth applicant was registered by the Line Division of the Interior at Derbent station in the register of passengers put off trains. She was, however, registered as a Russian national. The other four applicants were not registered in the aforementioned register. 31.  The Government further explained that according to the normal procedure persons, who are put off international trains, are invited to the Police Line Division to include their personal data in the register. These persons, however, are neither coerced to do so, nor accompanied on their route to the station, nor passed over to the migration service department. 32.  Further investigations by the Russian authorities revealed, according to the Government, that the first applicant temporarily resided in a house in Derbent with the consent of the house owners. According to the testimony of the house owners the first applicant lived there free of charge, was not accompanied by children and no police officer or other official visited the first applicant in the house. 33.  On 5 December 2006 a group of 30 Georgians, including the applicants, travelled to the Russian/Azerbaijani border in two buses that they had hired. At the border the customs officers checked the documents for several hours, while the applicants had to wait standing outside. 34.  With another bus the group travelled through the city of Baku to the Azerbaijani/Georgian border. The last 5 kilometres to the border the applicants had to walk, as the bus driver had asked them to get off the bus: The first applicant and her youngest child, the fifth applicant, were able to take a taxi to the border, but the three other applicants had to continue walking; the temperature was below 3o C. 35.  After having arrived in Georgia, the first applicant\u2019s health was particularly bad. She suffered from a severe cough and fever, her right leg had grown numb and her general condition was extremely weak. Owing to her financial situation and the lack of health insurance the applicant did not visit a hospital right away. On 11 December 2006 a pregnancy examination showed that the pregnancy was progressing and that the fetus was well. 36.  On 12 December 2006, the first applicant\u2019s health worsened, she had an asthma attack and severe abdominal pain. 37.  On 14 December 2006, the first applicant was taken to hospital where she gave birth to a stillborn child the next day. 38.  According to the death certificate issued by the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs on 15 December 2006, the child died as a result of \u201cintranatal hipoqsy\u201d caused by a viral infection. The birth history no 364/12, issued on the same date, stated that \u201cthe stress experienced by the pregnant mother during the expulsion could be considered a reason for the child\u2019s death\u201d. 39.  During the following months, the first applicant suffered from severe depression and panic attacks. Furthermore, the fourth applicant developed a very bad cough and caught pneumonia. The fifth applicant, the first applicant\u2019s youngest child, was deeply affected psychologically by the expulsion: she was constantly crying and afraid of other people and diagnosed with \u201cbehavioral disorder\u201d. 40.  On 23 July 2008, the first applicant lodged a complaint with the General Prosecutor\u2019s office of the Russian Federation. She directly mentioned violations of Articles 3 and 14 of the Convention and requested a thorough investigation and the punishment of those responsible. 41.  On 9 October 2008, the first applicant\u2019s representative received an answer, informing him that the complaint had been forwarded to the Prosecutor of Derbent and that he would be notified about further procedural actions taken in this respect. 42.  However, he received no further information from the Russian authorities.", "references": ["2", "7", "3", "6", "4", "5", "0", "8", "9", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1942 and lives in Kutina. 6.  On 12 February 1989 he concluded a sale contract with Ms M.A., Mr J.A. and Mr Z.A. whereby they sold him a house in Kutina for 47,000 German marks (DEM). Because the applicant actually paid only DEM 30,000 they brought a civil action against him in the Kutina Municipal Court (Op\u0107inski sud u Kutini) seeking payment of the remaining DEM 17,000. 7.  By a judgment of the Kutina Municipal Court of 20 May 1994, which became final on 30 November 1994, the applicant was ordered to pay to the sellers (hereinafter \u201cthe creditors\u201d) the equivalent of DEM 17,000 in domestic currency, together with accrued statutory default interest (running from 15 December 1989) and the costs of the proceedings. 8.  On 12 March 2003 the creditors applied to the same court (hereinafter \u201cthe enforcement court\u201d) for enforcement of that judgment. Specifically, they sought (a) the equivalent of 8,691.96 euros (EUR) in Croatian kunas (HRK), together with accrued statutory default interest running from 15 December 1989, (b) the costs of the above civil proceedings in the amount of HRK 1,860, together with accrued statutory default interest (running from 20 May 1994), and (c) the costs of the enforcement proceedings. 9.  On 18 March 2003 the enforcement court issued a writ of execution (rje\u0161enje o ovrsi) in respect of the seizure and sale of the applicant\u2019s immovable property, in particular his house, with a view to settling the creditors\u2019 claim. 10.  During the enforcement proceedings a court-appointed expert assessed the value of the applicant\u2019s house at HRK 384,197[1]. 11.  After two unsuccessful attempts on 16 February and 23 March 2005 to sell it through public auction, the enforcement court on 13 April 2005 at a third public auction sold the house and awarded it to the enforcement creditors for HRK 100,000. In so doing it relied on section 97(4) of the 1996 Enforcement Act, as amended in 1999, (hereinafter \u201cthe 1999 Amendments\u201d) under which at a third public auction a debtor\u2019s immovable property could be sold without restrictions regarding the lowest price (see paragraphs 25-26 below). 12.  Since the creditors did not pay the purchase price within the set time-limit, on 28 November 2006 the court set aside its decision of 13 April 2005 and re-ran the third public auction. 13.  At a third public auction, held on 10 December 2008, the enforcement court sold the applicant\u2019s house and awarded it to a certain Mr D.D. for HRK 50,000[2]. The court again based its decision on section 97(4) of the 1996 Enforcement Act, as amended by the 1999 Amendments (see paragraph 11 above and paragraphs 25-26 below). 14.  Following an appeal by the applicant, on 1 April 2009 the Sisak County Court (\u017dupanijski sud u Sisku) quashed the decision of 10 December 2008 to award the applicant\u2019s house to Mr D.D. and remitted the case. It held that the enforcement court had misinterpreted section 97(4) and that the contested decision was in breach of section 6 of the Enforcement Act because that court had not sufficiently respected the applicant\u2019s dignity and the requirement that the enforcement be the least onerous for the debtor (see paragraph 30 below). It noted that the purchase price was not sufficient to cover even half of the debt, which on 13 April 2005 had amounted to HRK 107,974.40[3], meaning that the sale of the applicant\u2019s house had not achieved the main purpose of the enforcement proceedings \u2013 namely, the settlement of the creditors\u2019 claim. The relevant part of that decision reads:\n\u201cThe enforcement debtor ... justly complains about the sale of the property [in question] ... for an amount significantly lower than its established value.\n...\nBy having sold for HRK 50,000 a property [worth] HRK 384,197, the first-instance court evidently misinterpreted ... [section 97(4) of the Enforcement Act].\nThat is so because the rule contained in section 97(4) is not of a mandatory nature [ius cogens], as it merely allows that property ... to be sold at a third public auction without restrictions regarding the lowest price ... (the text of that provision literally reads \u2018 ... may be sold ...\u2019 ).\n... the enforcement court has to interpret the said provision in the light of the basic principles of [enforcement] procedure, as well as in accordance with the purpose sought to be achieved by the proceedings.\nBy selling for HRK 50,000 property [worth] HRK 384,197 and awarding it to the buyer, the first-instance court breached section 6 of the Enforcement Act, which imposes the duty on an enforcement court, in carrying out an enforcement, to respect the debtor\u2019s dignity and make [the enforcement] the least onerous for him or her.\nFurthermore, the purpose of enforcement proceedings is to settle the claim of an enforcement creditor. Having regard to the fact that the creditors\u2019 claim in these proceedings on 13 April 2005 ... amounted to HRK 107,974.40 and that now, on account of the lapse of time and accrued [default] interest, it is [even] higher ..., given that the established value of the property is three times higher than the debt, and since the price offered at the last public auction would not settle even half of the debt, it is reasonable to conclude that accepting the said offer was in breach of section 6 of the Enforcement Act and that it cannot be held that the sale in question was carried out with a view to achieving the purpose of enforcement proceedings \u2013 namely, settling the creditor\u2019s claim.\u201d 15.  In the resumed proceedings the enforcement court again scheduled a third public auction, which was held on 12 May 2009 and at which the applicant\u2019s house was again sold to D.D. but this time for HRK 70,000[4]. 16.  Accordingly, by a decision of 3 June 2009 the court awarded the applicant\u2019s house to D.D. The applicant appealed against that decision, arguing that his house had been sold for less than one-fifth of its value, which had not been sufficient to settle the creditors\u2019 claim in full. In so doing he referred to the reasons given by the Sisak County Court in its decision of 1 April 2009 (see paragraph 14 above). 17.  On 2 October 2009 the enforcement creditors informed the enforcement court that they considered that their claim had been settled in full. 18.  By a decision of 20 December 2010 the Sisak County Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld the decision of 3 June 2009 to award the applicant\u2019s house to D.D. (see paragraph 16 above). The relevant part of the County Court\u2019s decision, which was served on the applicant\u2019s representative on 12 January 2011, reads:\n\u201cIt is not disputed that on 3 June 2009 a third public auction was held, at which the debtor\u2019s property was sold for HRK 70,000. The third public auction was carried out in accordance with section 97(4) of the Enforcement Act, which provides that if a property is not sold at a second auction, the court shall, within 15 to 30 days [of the second auction], schedule a third auction at which the property may be sold without restrictions regarding the lowest price [calculated in proportion to its] established value.\u201d 19.  On 11 February 2011 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint alleging violations of his right to equality before the law and his right of ownership, as guaranteed by Article 14 paragraph 2 and Article 48 of the Croatian Constitution (see paragraph 22 below). In so doing he repeated, in substance, the arguments raised in his appeal. 20.  On 19 May 2011 the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) declared the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint inadmissible on the grounds that the contested decision was not open to constitutional review. That decision was served on the applicant\u2019s representative on 6 June 2011. 21.  Meanwhile, by a decision of 14 February 2011 the enforcement court distributed the proceeds of the sale to the enforcement creditors, and by a decision of 18 May 2011 ordered the applicant\u2019s eviction from the house. The applicant\u2019s appeals against those decisions were dismissed by the Sisak County Court.", "references": ["2", "1", "5", "6", "8", "7", "4", "0", "3", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1959 in Urdoma, the Russian Federation. He lives in K\u0117dainiai, a town in Lithuania. 7.  The applicant is a businessman. He used to be a politician. In 2003 he established and was chairman of the Labour Party (Darbo partija) in Lithuania. In the parliamentary elections of 2004, the Labour Party obtained more votes than any other political party. Between December 2004 and June 2005 the applicant was Minister of the Economy, but resigned from that post after the Chief Official Ethics Commission (Vyriausioji tarnybin\u0117s etikos komisija) found that he had breached the principle of not mixing private and public interests. 8.  In May 2006 a criminal investigation was opened on suspicion of fraudulent accounting by the Labour Party. The authorities suspected that the applicant, acting in complicity with three other members of that party \u2011 the party treasurer and two high-level administrators \u2013 as well as one other person, had doctored the Labour Party\u2019s accounts. The Labour Party, as a legal entity, was also a suspect in the case.\nLater that month the authorities searched the applicant\u2019s home in K\u0117dainiai town, as well as the Labour Party\u2019s headquarters. 9.  In June 2006 the prosecutor attempted to call the applicant for questioning. However, the applicant could not be reached on his telephone, nor summoned. The applicant\u2019s wife explained to the prosecutor that the last time she had seen her husband was in May 2006, when he had left for the Russian Federation. The applicant\u2019s wife refused to give any other testimony related to her husband. 10.  On 23 June 2006 the applicant sent the Lithuanian Attorney General a letter to the effect that he was aware of the ongoing pre-trial investigation regarding him and the Labour Party, and that some of his party colleagues had already been questioned. He claimed that he was staying in the Russian Federation, without disclosing his exact address. He asserted that the criminal case was \u201ca dirty political game\u201d (teisin\u0117s institucijos dalyvauja ne\u0161variame politiniame \u017eaidime) and had no basis, and expressed his intention to involve international organisations in his case. He also stated that he would return to Lithuania when his family circumstances permitted. In particular, his brother had recently died in Russia and his mother needed support. 11.  On 28 June 2006 the applicant resigned from the post of Labour Party chairman. 12.  On 17 July 2006 the Labour Party website made public the applicant\u2019s \u201cLetter to the People of Lithuania\u201d (Lai\u0161kas Lietuvos \u017emon\u0117ms), in which he stated that he would not hurry to return to Lithuania because he was expecting the [Lithuanian] authorities to start a search for him. He did not wish to be questioned in the Republic of Lithuania, and wanted international organisations to be involved in his proceedings. 13.  On 23 August 2006 the prosecutor decided to declare the applicant a suspect in the criminal case. The prosecutor found that, as chairman of the Labour Party and also acting in an organised group with other members of that party, the applicant had sought to finance the party unlawfully and to avoid the financial supervision of the party and its political campaigns, by organising the party\u2019s fraudulent accounting from 2004 to 2006. As a result, it had been impossible to establish the structure of the party\u2019s assets and expenditure for those years. In particular, the Labour Party had omitted from its accounts some 8,000,000 Lithuanian litai (LTL \u2013 approximately 2,300,000 euros (EUR)) worth of income, and some LTL 7,300,000 (approximately EUR 2,100,000) worth of expenditure. The applicant had also provided inaccurate data to the Central Electoral Commission and the tax authorities. This was in breach of a number of Criminal Code provisions (see paragraph 71 below), as well as the Law on the Funding of Political Parties and Political Campaigns (see paragraph 70 below). 14.  On 25 August 2006 the Vilnius City Second District Court sanctioned, in absentia, the applicant\u2019s arrest and remand in custody on the grounds that he had known about the criminal proceedings but was hiding in the Russian Federation and had failed to present himself to the prosecutors to take part in the criminal proceedings. It was reasonable to assume that the applicant would continue to hide from the Lithuanian authorities, thus obstructing the investigation. On the same day the prosecutor ordered a search for the applicant.\nIn September 2006 both decisions were made available to the applicant\u2019s lawyer. 15.  On 26 August 2006 at the Labour Party congress, another person was elected as chairman of the Labour Party in the applicant\u2019s place. 16.  On 15 September 2006 the authorities of the Russian Federation arrested the applicant in Moscow. On the same day he asked for political asylum in Russia and was immediately released. On the basis of information that reached them by Interpol, the Lithuanian prosecutors then asked their colleagues in the Russian Federation to arrest the applicant and to extradite him to Lithuania.\nBy a letter of 22 January 2007, the Deputy Attorney General of the Russian Federation refused the request, relying on Article 3 of the European Convention on Extradition, which states that extradition will not be granted if the offence in respect of which it is requested is regarded by the requested State as a political offence or as an offence connected with a political offence. 17.  Having taken into account the criminal charges in respect of the Labour Party, including evidence by independent auditors, on 14 November 2006 the Central Electoral Commission decided not to allocate it appropriations from the State budget. 18.  In January 2007 the Central Electoral Commission confirmed the applicant as a Labour Party candidate in elections to the municipal council of the K\u0117dainiai district. Given that electoral candidates in municipal elections had immunity from prosecution, the prosecutor asked the Central Electoral Commission to permit the restriction of the applicant\u2019s freedom and his prosecution (see Article 49 \u00a7 1 of the Law on the Elections to the Seimas, cited in paragraph 67 below). At a hearing attended by the applicant\u2019s lawyer, the prosecutor and representatives of the media and the Labour Party, the Central Electoral Commission granted that request. 19.  On 12 February 2007 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed an appeal lodged by the applicant\u2019s lawyer, who asserted that the restriction of his client\u2019s liberty was in breach of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention because he would then be unable to meet potential voters and proclaim his electoral programme. The Lithuanian court had regard to the Court\u2019s case-law on the subject and emphasised that the right to stand for elections was not absolute (the Supreme Administrative Court referred to Sukhovetskyy v. Ukraine, no. 13716/02, \u00a7\u00a7 50 and 51, ECHR 2006\u2011VI). Moreover, according to the Venice Commission guidelines, fundamental rights and freedoms, including the freedom to move within a State, could be limited in order to protect the public interest (see paragraph 74 below). In the applicant\u2019s case, he had not been denied the very essence of his right to be elected. The State, for its part, had an obligation to prosecute criminal acts and to take measures to ensure that criminal proceedings were not unduly protracted. The applicant had been hiding from prosecution in Russia, which showed that he had deliberately breached Lithuanian law by avoiding arrest which had earlier been sanctioned by a court (see paragraph 14 above). The Supreme Administrative Court did not find erroneous the argument put forward by the Central Electoral Commission that \u201cthe applicant sought immunity status as a candidate in his own interests, which essentially had no connection with his electoral rights\u201d. One could not dismiss the likelihood that if immunity from prosecution was granted, the applicant could return to Lithuania, and would leave the country before his immunity expired [elected members of municipal councils do not have immunity from prosecution, see paragraph 69 below]. This would undermine society\u2019s trust in the State and in the authorities\u2019 duty to investigate crimes and prosecute perpetrators to protect society from attempts to commit crime. 20.  The Supreme Administrative Court also emphasised that the prosecutor\u2019s request to lift the applicant\u2019s immunity had no connection with his participation in the municipal elections; nor was it intended to prevent the applicant from being elected. In fact, the criminal proceedings had started long before the municipal elections, the date of which was not announced by the Seimas until July 2006. The applicant therefore had plenty of time to return to Lithuania from hiding in Russia and to testify in the criminal case, thus also being able to fully take part in the municipal elections. 21.  Whilst de facto residing in the Russian Federation, the applicant took part in the municipal elections in Lithuania on 25 February 2007, and was successfully elected. 22.  On 23 April 2007 the Central Electoral Commission granted a request submitted by the applicant to annul his powers as a member of the municipal council. 23.  In the spring of 2007, A.V., a member of the Homeland Union (T\u0117vyn\u0117s S\u0105junga) political party, who was elected to the Seimas for the term from 2004 to 2008 representing the Dz\u016bkija constituency, became mayor of the Alytus district municipality and therefore resigned from the Seimas.\nIn April 2007 the Central Electoral Commission consequently announced new elections to the Seimas in that constituency. 24.  In July 2007, the Labour Party decided to take part in the parliamentary elections in the Dz\u016bkija constituency, which were to take place on 7 and, if necessary, on 21 October (second round of voting). The Labour Party confirmed the applicant as its candidate in that constituency. 25.  On 4 September 2007, the Central Electoral Commission confirmed the applicant as a candidate in the Seimas elections. 26.  On 5 September 2007, the Central Electoral Commission announced the list of ten candidates who were to stand in that single-member constituency. The applicant\u2019s name was among those listed, and the electoral campaign started on that day. 27.  On the same day, a spokesperson for the State President stated that the President found it \u2018odd that a person who had asked for political asylum in Russia, decried the Lithuanian institutions and was being searched for by the Lithuanian law-enforcement authorities, could be registered as a candidate in the parliamentary elections\u2019. 28.  On the basis of a request by the prosecutor, on 6 September 2007 the Central Electoral Commission decided that the applicant could be arrested or his liberty could be otherwise restricted during the electoral campaign, until he was elected and took the oath as a parliamentarian.\nThe applicant appealed through his lawyer. He relied, inter alia, on Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. 29.  By a final decision of 13 September 2007, the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the appeal. It noted that the immunities of candidates in municipal elections were analogous to those applied in the context of elections to the Seimas. The grounds for lifting the applicant\u2019s immunity had already been decided by the res judicata Supreme Administrative Court decision of 12 February 2007 (see paragraphs 19 and 20 above). No new factual circumstances had been brought to the court\u2019s attention to justify a different ruling. 30.  The applicant, accompanied by a group of Labour Party Members of Parliament, returned to Vilnius from Moscow on 26 September 2007. On the same day he was arrested, signed the notice of the offences of which he was suspected, was questioned and remanded in custody. 31.  At a hearing before the Vilnius City Second District Court of 27 September 2007, at which the applicant was present, the court decided to vary the remand measure to house arrest. The court noted that the earlier court order to arrest and detain the applicant had been adopted whilst he was being searched for (see paragraph 14 above). Now, that he had returned to Lithuania from Russia, and was not refusing to testify, a milder remand measure could be imposed. The court thus ordered the applicant to stay at his home in K\u0117dainiai town from 8 p.m. to 8 a.m., not to leave the K\u0117dainiai town area, not to communicate with the three other suspects in his criminal case, and not to attend public places (nesilankyti vie\u0161osiose vietose). 32.  On 1 October 2007 the applicant requested the Vilnius Regional Court to release him from house arrest, claiming that such a remand measure interfered with his electoral rights, in particular, to meet with voters in the Dz\u016bkija electoral district. The applicant relied on Article 3 of Protocol No. 1. He also mentioned that he wished to leave K\u0117dainiai town so that he could visit a medical establishment in another town.\nFor his part, the prosecutor lodged an appeal with the Vilnius Regional Court, urging it to impose pre-trial detention on the applicant. 33.  During the first round of voting in the Dz\u016bkija single-member constituency, which took place on 7 October 2007, the applicant and another candidate received, respectively, 20 and 30 per cent of the votes. They would thus compete in a second round of elections, which was scheduled for 21 October. 34.  By a final ruling of 8 October, the Vilnius Regional Court upheld the lower court\u2019s decision to place the applicant under house arrest, with the exception that he was now allowed to visit public places from 8 a.m. to 8 p.m. The prohibition on his leaving K\u0117dainiai town remained effective. The court held that the applicant should be kept under house arrest in order to protect interests important to society: he had earlier been hiding from the prosecutor, the sums not accounted for by the Labour Party amounted to millions of Lithuanian litai, and there was reason to believe that he could obstruct the investigation. The court also considered that house arrest would not interfere with the applicant\u2019s electoral rights or with his business or family interests. 35.  On 9 October 2007, the Labour Party asked the Central Electoral Commission to intervene as an intermediary with a view to the prosecutors mitigating the remand measure, house arrest, so that the applicant could compete in the parliamentary electoral campaign on equal grounds.\nOn 11 October 2007 the Central Electoral Commission answered in the negative: should it express any opinion about the reasonableness of the applicant\u2019s remand measure, this could be interpreted as undue interference with the courts\u2019 competence and a breach of the principle of separation of powers. 36.  On 10 October 2007, the applicant himself asked the prosecutors to modify the remand measure for the period of 10-21 October, and to allow him to leave K\u0117dainiai town so that he could go to the Dz\u016bkija constituency, situated about 115 kilometres away, to meet the voters and compete with the other candidate on equal terms. The applicant stated that his meetings with the voters during the second round of elections would start on 12 October. He also added a two-page document describing the schedule of meetings between members of his party, including some renowned party members, and voters. From the documents in the Court\u2019s possession it transpires that those meetings had already taken place from 28 September to 7 October, that is, before the first voting round, in the Dz\u016bkija constituency. The schedule indicated that the applicant would have taken part in those meetings had the prosecutors allowed him to meet the voters. 37.  By a decision of 15 October 2007, the prosecutor rejected the applicant\u2019s request. He noted that the applicant had earlier made public statements that he could lead the electoral campaign even without physically being in Lithuania. For the prosecutor, the applicant could also take part in the electoral campaign by other means provided for by law, and without violating the conditions of his house arrest. The prosecutor stressed that house arrest had been imposed on the applicant by a court ruling of 27 September 2007 and had been upheld by a higher court on 8 October 2007. Accordingly, the applicant must have known in advance, and before making plans for meeting voters, about the limitations his house arrest entailed. 38.  On 16 October 2007 the Labour Party asked the prosecutor to permit the applicant to leave K\u0117dainiai town for the Dz\u016bkija constituency during the electoral campaign. The following day the prosecutor rejected that request, relying on the grounds set out by the earlier court rulings of 27 September and 8 October, and the prosecutor\u2019s decision of 15 October. 39.  On 17 October 2007 the applicant also lodged an appeal with the higher prosecutor, asking him to modify the remand measure, house arrest, and to permit him to meet voters \u201ceye-to-eye\u201d in order to compete in the elections on equal grounds with the other candidate. The applicant also insisted that he wanted permission to leave K\u0117dainiai town in order to visit doctors in other towns and for his business interests. Quoting certain information in the press, the applicant insisted that there had been a political decision to prevent him from becoming elected. 40.  The applicant\u2019s appeal was dismissed by the higher prosecutor on 19 October. The prosecutor noted that the applicant had known of the final Vilnius Regional Court ruling of 8 October 2007, which was not amenable to appeal, but had ignored it. Despite the adoption of that ruling, he had drawn up a schedule of meetings with voters. There were no new circumstances warranting a change in the applicant\u2019s remand measure. The prosecutor\u2019s decision was sent to the applicant on 19 October 2007, and could have been appealed against to the court.\nThe applicant claimed that he had received that decision on 26 October 2007. 41.  During the second round of voting in the Dz\u016bkija constituency on 21 October 2007, the applicant received 5,094 votes (or 44 per cent of the votes cast). The other candidate, who was a member of the Homeland Union political party, received 6,596 votes (or 56 per cent of the votes cast), and thus became a member of the Seimas. 42.  On 17 November 2007 the applicant was re-elected as chairman of the Labour Party. 43.  After the parliamentary elections, the prosecutor granted or refused a number of the applicant\u2019s requests to leave his home in K\u0117dainiai. In particular, in October 2007 the prosecutor permitted the applicant to leave K\u0117dainiai town so that he could visit, during the daytime \u2013 between 8 a.m. and 8 p.m. \u2013 a cemetery in a village situated in K\u0117dainiai district for All Saints Day on 1 November 2007. 44.  In November 2007 the applicant asked the prosecutor for permission to visit the K\u0117dainiai sports school, situated in Vilainiai village in the K\u0117dainiai district, where the Labour Party congress (rinkiminis suva\u017eiavimas) was to take place. The applicant pointed out that Vilainiai village and K\u0117dainiai town \u201ctouched each other on the map\u201d (Vilaini\u0173 kaimas ir K\u0117daini\u0173 miestas ribojasi, tod\u0117l K\u0117daini\u0173 sporto mokykla yra prakti\u0161kai ant kaimo ir miesto ribos). He also asked the prosecutor for permission to attend the same sports school to play tennis four times a week, a sport that the applicant had practised previously. The prosecutor granted those requests. 45.  In November 2007 the prosecutor permitted the applicant to leave K\u0117dainiai town to visit, later that month, doctors in Kaunas, a town situated approximately 50 kilometres from K\u0117dainiai town. 46.  On 26 November 2007 the applicant also asked the prosecutor for permission to take part in a live show, \u201cDancing with the Stars\u201d, which was to be filmed between 7 p.m. and 10 p.m. on 30 November 2007 in the Vikonda leisure and entertainment centre (pramog\u0173 centre) in K\u0117dainiai. The prosecutor declined the request, holding that the timing was incompatible with the house arrest, which was imposed on the applicant from 8 p.m. to 8 a.m. The prosecutor pointed out that the applicant had known beforehand about the house arrest conditions, which did not match those of the television show. 47.  In December 2007 the prosecutor also refused a request made by the applicant two days previously to be permitted to travel to Brussels to attend a meeting of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe Party (Europos demokrat\u0173 partija), scheduled for later that month. The prosecutor referred to the ruling of the Vilnius Regional Court of 8 October 2007 and noted that such a request could not be granted because the applicant had been avoiding justice for a long time. Moreover, \u201cthe house arrest prohibited the applicant from even leaving the area of K\u0117dainiai town\u2019. 48.  With the prosecutor\u2019s permission, in December 2007 the applicant visited a cardiology clinic in Kaunas. The doctors there recommended that the applicant return to that clinic for consultations and for more profound tests in January 2008. Having obtained a fresh authorisation by the prosecutor, in January 2008 the applicant stayed in the Kaunas clinic for one night and underwent several more tests later that month. 49.  In February 2008, the applicant asked the prosecutor to permit him to stay eleven days in a convalescence sanatorium in Druskininkai (a town situated approximately 180 kilometres from K\u0117dainiai). The applicant referred to the Kaunas cardiologists\u2019 recommendations and stated that the necessary procedures could be performed only in that particular sanatorium. The prosecutor granted the request, also stressing that the applicant had earlier requested to see the material in the case file, but had never come to the prosecutor\u2019s office to see them. The applicant had until 22 February 2008 to do so (see the following paragraph). 50.  The pre-trial investigation in the criminal case was terminated on 28 December 2007, and the applicant was then allowed to see the material in the case file until 22 February 2008 and, if necessary, to make requests to supplement the file. 51.  According to a survey of the press carried out at the applicant\u2019s request, from April 2006 until February 2008, the words \u201cLabour Party ... suspect\u201d, \u201cUspaskich ... suspect\u201d had been mentioned in 210 press articles. 52.  On 14 April 2008 the criminal case was transferred to the Vilnius Regional Court for examination. 53.  On 29 April 2008 the Vilnius Regional Court released the applicant from house arrest. The court modified that remand measure to an obligation not to leave his place of residence in K\u0117dainiai town for longer than seven days without informing the authorities, and to pay bail of LTL 1,500,000. The applicant also signed an agreement not to communicate with the four other persons suspected in the criminal case. 54.  During the parliamentary elections of October 2008, the applicant and another member of his political party, who was a co-accused in the criminal case, were elected to the Seimas from 2008 to 2012 for the Labour Party. They therefore obtained immunity from prosecution. In December 2008 the Seimas allowed the applicant\u2019s prosecution and the restriction of his freedom. The Seimas also permitted the prosecution of the applicant\u2019s co-accused. 55.  By a ruling of 26 June 2009 of the Court of Appeal, the remand measure \u2013 the obligation not to leave the applicant\u2019s place of residence \u2013 was revoked. The other remand measure, bail, remained in force. 56.  On 7 June 2009, the applicant was elected to the European Parliament as a Labour Party\u2019s Member. He resigned his parliamentary seat in Lithuania, because under Lithuanian law a Member of the European Parliament could not be a member of the Seimas at the same time (see paragraph 68 below). The Lithuanian authorities then asked the European Parliament to lift the applicant\u2019s immunity in order to allow his prosecution. The prosecutor stated, inter alia, that as a result of fraudulent book-keeping of the Labour Party and the submission of such information to the Central Electoral Commission and the tax authorities in 2005-07, the State had suffered serious pecuniary damage in the sum of about LTL 6,000,000 (approximately EUR 1,700,000), because appropriations had been allocated to the Labour Party from the State budget. 57.  Having heard the applicant, and having had regard to a report by its Committee on Legal Affairs, in September 2010 the European Parliament lifted the applicant\u2019s immunity, thus allowing the criminal proceedings in Lithuania to continue (decision P7_TA-PROV(2010)0296). The European Parliament noted that the applicant had been charged with offences of false accounting in relation to the financing of a political party during a period prior to his election to the European Parliament. No cogent evidence had been adduced as to the existence of any fumus persecutionis and the offences with which the applicant had been charged had nothing to do with his activities as a Member of the European Parliament. 58.  In October 2012 the applicant and two of his co-accused were all elected to the Seimas of 2012-16 for the Labour Party. The applicant then asked the Central Electoral Commission in Lithuania to annul his mandate as a Member of the European Parliament. His request was granted. At the prosecutors\u2019 request, the Seimas lifted the applicant\u2019s immunity and the criminal proceedings resumed. 59.  By a judgment of 12 July 2013 the Vilnius Regional Court found the applicant guilty of fraudulent accounting committed in complicity with three other persons, under Articles 24 \u00a7 4, 205 \u00a7 1, 220 \u00a7 1 and 222 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code. The court sentenced the applicant to four years\u2019 imprisonment.\nThe applicant and the prosecutor appealed against the conviction. 60.  Following reorganisation of the Labour Party, the criminal case against it was discontinued by the same judgment of the Vilnius Regional Court, applying by analogy Article 3 \u00a7 1 (7) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which provides that criminal proceedings cannot be conducted in respect of a deceased person. In particular, on 14 May 2013 the legal personality of the Labour Party ceased to exist after its reorganisation, and on the same day it was struck from the Register of Legal Entities. The Labour Party merged with the Leiboristai political party, and on the same day a new legal entity was registered under the name of the Labour Party (Darbo partija (Leiboristai)). Later that year the latter party merged with another political party \u2013 the Christians Party (Krik\u0161\u010dioni\u0173 partija). It was registered as a new legal entity but under the previous name, the Labour Party (Darbo partija).\nAccording to the Government, that new party continued to use the same logo as it had used before May 2013. 61.  On 25 May 2014 the applicant was again elected to the European Parliament as a Labour Party member. In June 2014 the Central Electoral Commission in Lithuania granted the applicant\u2019s request to resign his seat in the Seimas. 62.  At the request of the Lithuanian courts, in March 2015 the European Parliament lifted the applicant\u2019s immunity. This time the European Parliament noted, inter alia, that the criminal proceedings at issue were identical, in terms of content, to the proceedings in respect of which it had already lifted the applicant\u2019s immunity in 2010 (see paragraph 57 above). At that time the applicant had been charged with, in essence, heading an organised group with the aim of committing a number of criminal offences, with disregard for his duty, as party chairman, to monitor the party\u2019s finances. For example, fictitious books were allegedly kept in order to conceal revenue and expenditure. In general, he was alleged to have frequently given instructions not to officially declare or record various business and financial transactions. From the documents in the European Parliament\u2019s possession it was clear that the definition of the offences giving rise to the charges against the applicant had always remained the same. Moreover, no convincing evidence was available to demonstrate fumus persecutionis. The offences of which the applicant was accused had nothing to do with his work as a Member of the European Parliament. Lastly, the European Parliament noted that the decision on the waiver of immunity in no way constituted a statement of opinion regarding the applicant\u2019s guilt or innocence, as this was the subject of national proceedings. 63.  On 1 February 2016 the Court of Appeal upheld the applicant\u2019s conviction under Article 222 of the Criminal Code for fraudulent management of the Labour Party\u2019s accounts, having acted in an organised group. He was acquitted under Article 182 of the Criminal Code. The criminal case under Article 220 of the Criminal Code was discontinued because of prescription. 64.  On the basis of an appeal on points of law lodged by the prosecutor, the criminal case is currently pending before the Supreme Court.", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "5", "9", "7", "6", "0", "4", "8", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant is a community of owners of a building located in Madrid. 5.  On 13 June 1991 L., the co-owner of a house located next to the applicant\u2019s building, filed a complaint before the Madrid municipality, complaining that a dividing wall belonging to the applicant\u2019s building and two other buildings located next to it was in poor condition. 6.  On 25 April 1994, in view of the \u201cserious risk of harm\u201d posed by the poor condition of the wall, the municipality repaired it motu proprio. 7.  On 30 August 1994 the applicant received a decree issued by the municipality on 29 July 1994, informing it that the repairs had been carried out in view of the \u201cserious risk of harm\u201d posed by the condition of wall in question, and ordering it to pay a provisional amount of 18,030.36 euros (EUR). 8.  On 21 October 1994 the applicant initiated proceedings opposing the municipality\u2019s demand, contesting the necessity of the urgent repairs. 9.  On 29 October 1994, before the Madrid High Court of Justice, the applicant brought a first set of judicial administrative proceedings (recurso contencioso-administrativo) against the decree of 29 July 1994, complaining of the shortcomings of the procedure which had led to the municipality repairing the wall. 10.  On 18 March 1996 the municipality asked the applicant to pay the remainder of the amount owed: the final cost of the repairs minus the amount already paid as a provisional amount. 11.  On 16 July 1996, before the Madrid High Court of Justice, the applicant initiated a second set of judicial administrative proceedings (recurso contencioso-administrativo), contesting the amount of the requested payment and asking for a suspension of its obligation to pay that amount. 12.  On 20 November 1996 the application to suspend its obligation to pay was rejected. That decision was confirmed by the Madrid High Court of Justice and the Supreme Court on 11 July 1997 and 23 February 2001 respectively. 13.  On 6 March 1998 both sets of judicial administrative proceedings were joined. 14.  On 9 December 2004 the Madrid High Court of Justice ruled against the applicant, on the grounds that the repairs had been carried out by the municipality in view of the poor condition of the wall and the \u201cserious risk of harm\u201d present at that time, which had given the municipality no other choice but to repair it and then ask the applicant for payment in respect of the costs incurred. The Madrid High Court of Justice also confirmed the amount set for the costs of the repairs. 15.  On 3 March 2005 the applicant lodged a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court, which was declared inadmissible more than four years later on 29 May 2009. This decision was served on the applicant on 9 June 2009. 16.  On 10 December 2009 the applicant lodged an amparo appeal with the Constitutional Court. 17.  On 31 January 2010 the community of owners agreed to authorise Mr. Garc\u00eda Caballero to act on its behalf in the framework of the judicial proceedings concerning the costs of the repairs to the wall. 18.  By a decision of 28 April 2010 the Constitutional Court declared the amparo appeal inadmissible on the grounds that \u201cthe constitutional significance of the appeal had not been justified\u201d. This decision was served on the applicant on 6 May 2010.", "references": ["8", "1", "9", "7", "4", "2", "5", "0", "6", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "7.  During the period from the end of September 2006 to the end of January 2007 identity checks of Georgian nationals residing in Russia were carried out in the streets, markets and other workplaces and at their homes. Many were subsequently arrested and taken to police stations. After a period of custody in police stations, they were grouped together and taken by bus to a court, which summarily imposed administrative penalties on them and gave decisions ordering their administrative expulsion from Russian territory. Subsequently, after sometimes undergoing a medical visit and a blood test, they were taken to detention centres for foreigners where they were detained for varying periods of time, and then taken by bus to various airports in Moscow, and expelled to Georgia by aeroplane. Some of the Georgian nationals against whom expulsion orders were issued left the territory of the Russian Federation by their own means (for further details as to the background of the case see Georgia v. Russia (I) [GC], no. 13255/07, \u00a7 45, ECHR 2014). 8.  The applicant entered the territory of the Russian Federation on 1 June 2006 on a multiple entry business visa, valid until 27 May 2007. On 4 October 2006 immigration officers stopped the applicant on the street, checked his identity documents and brought him to the Department of the Interior in the Vykhino District of Moscow, where he was detained. On 5 October 2006 the Kuzminskiy District Court of Moscow fined the applicant (RUB 1,000) for failure to observe the applicable registration procedure and ordered his administrative expulsion from the Russian Federation. He was subsequently, around midday, released. On 8 October 2006 the applicant left the Russian Federation by his own means. 9.  The applicant entered the territory of the Russian Federation on 12 August 2006 on a multiple entry business visa. Subsequently he registered at his place of residence with the competent authority and worked as a driver in Moscow. On 1 October 2006 the applicant was detained in the Cheremushkinskiy militia department. On 3 October 2006 the Cheremushkinskiy District Court of Moscow found the applicant liable under Article 18.10 \u00a7 2 of the Code of Administrative Offences, as he had not applied for a work permit. The court fined the applicant (RUB 1,000) and ordered his administrative expulsion from the Russian Federation. He was subsequently transferred to the Kankova militia department, where he was detained until the next day. On 4 October 2006 he was transferred to the Centre for Temporary Detention of Aliens no.1, where he stayed until his deportation. On 6 October 2006 the applicant was taken to a military airport and was flown to Georgia with a cargo plane. 10.  The applicant entered the territory of the Russian Federation on 6 July 2000 under the visa-free regime and settled in the village of Mescheryakovka in the Arkadakskiy District of the Saratov Region. On 10 October 2006 the applicant was arrested by police officers during an identity check operation in the area of his residence. Later that same day the Arkadakskiy Disrtict Court of the Saratov Region found him guilty of staying in the country without the required residence permit. The court fined the applicant (RUB 1,000), ordered his detention and his expulsion. Subsequently the applicant was transferred to a detention centre for aliens. On 12 October 2006, after friends of the applicant had paid the administrative fine and bought him an aeroplane ticket to Armenia for the next day, the applicant was released. On 13 October 2006 the applicant left the territory of the Russian Federation, leaving behind his property and belongings. 11.  The applicant entered the territory of the Russian Federation in 2004 and worked on a market in Moscow. On 4 October 2006 the market was raided by a special unit of the police and the applicant, together with around twenty other Georgian nationals, was arrested. The applicant was brought to the Department of the Interior in the Southern Orekhovo-Borisovo District of Moscow. On 5 October 2006 the Nagatinskiy District Court of Moscow found her guilty of staying in the country without the required residence permit. The court fined the applicant (RUB 1,000), ordered her detention and her expulsion. Subsequently the applicant was transferred to the Centre for Temporary Detention of Aliens no. 2. On 17 October 2006 the applicant was taken to a military airport and flown to Georgia with a cargo plane. 12.  The applicants entered the territory of the Russian Federation in December 2002/January 2003 and lived there without the required visa, at the latest since 25 December 2003. On 6 October 2006 both applicants were apprehended by the police and brought to the Ivanovskoye police station of the Department of the Eastern Administrative District of Moscow. On the same day the Perovskiy District Court of Moscow fined both applicants (RUB 1,500 each) for staying in the country without the required registration and ordered their expulsion. Subsequently both applicants were released. On 16 October 2006 the applicants left the Russian Federation by their own means with their son, leaving behind most of their belongings. 13.  An alleged detention of the applicants\u2019 son and the fact whether the applicants owned a car, which they had to leave behind when leaving the Russian Federation, are matters of contention (see paragraphs 50-52 below). 14.  The applicant entered the Russian Federation on an unknown date on a multi-entry business visa, valid until 15 August 2007. She had registered her place of residence through a private agency and received a certificate valid until 16 March 2007. On 11 October 2006 the applicant was apprehended by police officers for an inspection of her identity documents and was brought to the Vykhino police station in Moscow, where she was subsequently detained. On 12 October 2006 the Kuzminskiy District Court of Moscow fined the applicant (RUB 1,000) for not complying with the applicable registration obligation, ordered her detention and expulsion. On 13 October 2006 the applicant was transferred to the Centre for Temporary Detention of Aliens no. 2, where she was detained until her expulsion. On 17 October 2006 she was brought by bus to Demododova airport and was flown to Georgia.\n(b)  Levan KOBAIDZE and Koba KOBAIDZE (born respectively on 8 April 1986 and 7 October 1988) 15.  The first applicant stayed in the Russian Federation on a multi-entry business visa, valid until 13 February 2007, and had registered his place of residence through a private agency. The second applicant had a temporary document issued by the Consulate of Georgia, authorising his residency in the Russian Federation until 5 November 2006. On 11 October 2006 the applicants were apprehended by police officers for an inspection of their documents and brought to the Vykhino police station in Moscow, where they were subsequently detained. On 12 October 2006 the Kuzminskiy District Court of Moscow fined the applicants (RUB 1,000 each) for not complying with the applicable registration obligation and ordered their detention and expulsion. On 12 October 2006 the applicants were transferred to the Centre for Temporary Detention of Aliens no. 1, where they were detained until their expulsion. On 28 October 2006 the applicants were brought by bus to Demododova airport and were flown to Georgia.\n(c)  Nato SHAVSHISHVILI (born on 18 March 1956) 16.  The applicant had lived in Russia since 2005 and had a visa and registration valid until 19 October 2006. On 18 October 2006 the applicant left the Russian Federation by her own means. 17.  An alleged detention of the applicant in the beginning of October 2006 is a matter of contention (see paragraphs 53-55 below).\n(d)  David LATSABIDZE (born on 15 March 1961) 18.  The applicant had lived in Moscow since 1992. He worked as an engineer, had a visa valid until 28 October 2006 and a registration certificate, issued by a private agency, valid until the same day. 19.  It is a matter of contention, whether the applicant had been detained, whether his expulsion was ordered by a court and whether he was deported (see paragraphs 56-59 below).\n(e)  Artur SARKISIAN and Andrei SARKISIAN (born respectively on 23 February 1981 and on 12 November 1982) 20.  The applicants had lived in the Russian Federation since 1993, most recently in Moscow. The first applicant had a visa valid from 8 May 2006 until 7 May 2007. The second applicant had a visa valid from 30 June 2006 until 19 June 2007. Both applicants were in possession of registration certificates, valid until respectively 8 November 2006 and 30 December 2006. The applicants left the Russian Federation on 19 October 2006 by their own means. 21.  An alleged detention of both applicants is a matter of contention (see paragraphs 60-62 below).\n(f)  Gocha KHMALADZE (born on 17 December 1968) 22.  The applicant had lived in the Russian Federation since 2001. He had a visa valid until 30 August 2007 and a registration certificate that had expired on 18 September 2006. On 11 October 2006 the applicant was arrested by police officers and was brought to the Department of the Interior in the Vykhino district of Moscow, where he was detained. On 12 October 2006 the Kuzminskiy District Court of Moscow fined the applicant (RUB 1,000), ordered his detention and subsequent expulsion. After the decision of the District Court the applicant was transferred to the Centre for Temporary Detention of Aliens no. 1, where he was detained until his expulsion. On 28 October 2006 the applicant was brought by bus to Demododova airport and was flown to Georgia.\n(g)  Irina KALANDIA (born on 18 January 1980) 23.  The applicant had lived in Moscow since 1997. She had a valid visa and a registration, but no work permit. On 27 September 2006 she was apprehended by police officers in a grocery store, and, after her identity papers had been checked and an administrative report had been drawn up, the applicant was released. On 6 October 2006 the Simonovskiy Court of Moscow found the applicant guilty of working without the required work permit and fined her (RUB 1,000). In addition the court ordered her detention and subsequent expulsion. After the court hearing the applicant was detained and brought to the Centre for Temporary Detention of Aliens no. 2, where she was detained until her expulsion. On 10 October 2006 the applicant was brought to Demododova airport and was flown to Georgia.\n(h)  Kakha TSIHISTAVI (born on 24 February 1983) 24.  The applicant entered the Russian Federation in May 2005 and settled in Moscow. He had a valid visa until 1 March 2007. On 3 October 2006 the applicant was apprehended by officers of the Department of the Interior of the Mozhayskiy district of Moscow and brought to their station, where he was detained. On the same day the Kuntsevskiy District Court of Moscow fined the applicant for not observing the applicable registration procedure and ordered his detention and expulsion. The applicant was brought to the Centre for Temporary Detention of Aliens no. 1, where he was detained until his expulsion. On 11 October 2006, after the applicant\u2019s relatives had bought him an aeroplane ticket to Georgia, he was brought to the airport and released. The applicant left the Russian Federation on that day.\n(i)  Koba NORAKIDZE (born on 17 April 1969) 25.  The applicant had arrived in Moscow for the first time in February 2002. Since then he had lived, with short interruptions, in the Russian Federation and worked as a driver. After the last interruption he entered the Russian Federation on 4 March 2006 on a one month visa. On 6 October 2006 the Litkarinskiy Town Court of Moscow Region discontinued proceedings against the applicant for not observing the applicable registration procedure. On 23 October 2006 the Kuzminskiy District Court of Moscow fined the applicant (RUB 1,000) for not observing the applicable registration procedure. The court also ordered his expulsion from the Russian Federation. On 24 October 2006 the applicant left Russia by aeroplane. 26.  The arrests and detentions surrounding the two court decisions are matters of contention (see paragraphs 63-66 below).\n(j)  Khatuna DZADZAMIA (born on 27 January 1983) 27.  The applicant arrived in the Russian Federation in 1993 for the first time. On 6 September 2004 she was expelled from the Russian Federation due to a violation of visa-related regulations. On 8 October 2004 the applicant returned to Moscow. For the relevant time the applicant had a visa and registration, valid until respectively 8 October 2006 and 28 February 2007. The Presnenskiy District Court of Moscow decided that the expulsion decision of 2004 had included a five year ban from entering the Russian Federation. Consequently it fined the applicant (RUB 1,500), ordered her detention and expulsion. After several days of detention the applicant was expelled from the Russian Federation. 28.  The exact circumstances and dates of the applicant\u2019s arrest, detention, court decision and expulsion are matters of contention (see paragraphs 67-70 below). 29.  The applicant entered the territory of the Russian Federation on 12 August 2006 on a multiple entry business visa. Subsequently she registered at her place of residence with the competent authority through a private agency. On 11 October 2006 the Tverskoy District Court of Moscow fined the applicant (RUB 1,000) for not having a valid, but a counterfeited, registration certificate. The court also ordered her detention and expulsion. At the latest on 12 October 2012 the applicant was transferred to the Centre for Temporary Detention of Aliens no. 2, where she was held until her expulsion. On 17 October 2006 the applicant was taken to a military airport and was flown to Georgia with a cargo plane. 30.  The date of the applicant\u2019s arrest and her detention before 12 October 2006 are matters of contention (see paragraphs 71-73 below). 31.  The conditions of detention in the different places of detention are a matter of contention (see paragraphs 111-112 below).", "references": ["8", "3", "6", "7", "5", "9", "4", "0", "No Label", "1", "2"], "gold": ["1", "2"]}
+{"input": "5.  On 26 March 2004 the applicant acquired an apartment in Housing Cooperative (\u201cborettslag\u201d) X. At her request, on 29 March 2004 its Governing Board (hereinafter \u201cthe Board\u201d) approved the applicant\u2019s acquisition. Before she moved in, the Board became aware that the applicant\u2019s son, Mr A, had caused serious problems in Housing Cooperative Y, where the applicant had previously been part owner and resident and where in recent years her son had cohabited with her. Housing Cooperative X therefore became particularly concerned that only the applicant move into the cooperative and informed her that it contemplated withdrawing its approval of her as a part owner. It asked her to make a written undertaking to the effect that Mr A would not move to the apartment in X. In this connection, the Board referred to the fact that in her request for approval of her part ownership she had indicated that her household would consist of one person. 6.  After a brief exchange of correspondence between Housing Cooperative X and the applicant\u2019s Attorney B., he stated in a letter of 26 May 2004 that \u201c[o]n behalf of [the applicant] it is hereby confirmed that it is she, not her son [Mr A] who will move into the apartment nr 2036 in Z Street 14 C as soon as it will be ready for takeover on 5 July 2004\u201d. The letter further confirmed the correctness of the information previously provided that the household would \u201cconsist of one person\u201d. Against this background, the Board maintained its earlier approval of the applicant as a part owner. 7.  By a letter of 23 May 2006, Attorney K., on the behalf of the Housing Cooperative, pointed out to the applicant that Mr A seemed to have moved to her apartment, in breach of the conditions for the approval of her as part owner. K. referred to the fact that the Board over a long period had received several complaints regarding Mr A\u2019s conduct at the Housing Cooperative and to his conviction by Oslo City Court (tingrett) of 10 March 2006 for violent assault and frightening and disturbing behaviour vis-\u00e0-vis neighbours at Z Street 14 B and 14 C; and the fact that it followed from the judgment that Mr A\u2019s residence was Z Street 14 C. In a letter of 2 June 2006 Attorney B. disputed inter alia that Mr A had an address in Z Street 14 C. 8.  On 2 September 2008, the Board held a meeting. According to the minutes it was decided that its \u201csecretary was to inform Attorney [K.] of the new situation and to request him to initiate eviction proceedings against Sagvolden\u201d. 9.  On 14 April 2009, Attorney K. sent to the applicant on behalf of the Housing Cooperative a letter ordering her to sell her part (salgsp\u00e5legg) in accordance with section 5-22 of the Housing Cooperative Act 2003 (burettslagslova, see paragraph 75 below). K. referred to his previous correspondence and to Mr A\u2019s conviction by the City Court of 23 June 2008 (see paragraph 18 below), by which he was sentenced to eighteen days\u2019 imprisonment for violent assault and frightening and disturbing behaviour vis-\u00e0-vis neighbours in Housing Cooperative X. He further referred to the fact that Mr A on several occasions had been imposed judicial restraining orders prohibiting him to contact four members of the Housing Cooperative, the last such order with effect until 5 April 2009 (see paragraph 38 below). Attorney K. added that the conditions for eviction under section 5-23 had been fulfilled, but that for the time being it had been deemed sufficient to order sale of the apartment. 10.  Upon expiry of the three month time-limit for sale, set pursuant to section 5-22 of the Housing Cooperative Act, Attorney M., who had succeeded Attorney B. as the applicant\u2019s representative, responded by a letter of 15 July 2009 that the order of sale would not be complied with. 11.  On 29 December 2005 Mr A had been indicted under Article 390A of the Penal Code for having by frightening or disturbing behaviour or other inconsiderate behaviour violated the right of another person to be left in peace. According to the indictment:\n\u201c(a) At 00h00 on Friday, 29 July 2005, at [Z Street] 14B, Oslo, he came walking fast towards Mr [H.F.] and told him that \u2018he ought to watch out\u2019 and \u2018that he would keep an eye on him\u2019. These affirmations were in the circumstances frightening to Mr [H.F.].\n(b) On Saturday, 30 July 2005, at [Z Street] 14C, Oslo, he told Mrs [T.L.B.]: \u2018The vengeance is sweet, the vengeance is best cold, it may happen anytime and anywhere, it may not necessary be me directly.\u2019 This statement was in the circumstances frightening to Mrs [T.L.B.].\n(c) On Monday, 12 September at [Z Street] 14C, Oslo, he contacted Mrs [T.L.B.] and stated amongst other things: \u2018Watch out, you have not seen anything yet\u2019. This statement was in the circumstances frightening to Mrs [T.L.B.]\u201d\nHe was also indicted under Article 228(1) (later changed to Article 282(2)) of the Penal Code for having committed violent assault against another person or in any other way having assailed him bodily:\n\u201cAt 16h00, on Sunday, 13 November 2005 at [Z Street] 14C, Oslo, he grabbed the arms of Mr [C.B.] [son of Mrs T.L.B.] and flung him around making him fall on a bicycle. Thereafter he again grabbed him and pushed him into a wall.\u201d 12.  By an additional indictment of 10 February 2006, Mr A was indicted with another offence under Article 390A of the Penal Code:\n\u201cAt around 11.30 a.m. on Wednesday, 21 December 2005, outside the shopping mall in [Y Road], he went towards Mr [E.L.] as the latter came out of the shopping mall carrying a full shopping basket on his way to his car. He followed Mr [E.L.] while talking to him loudly and went up to his face while stating inter alia \u2018I will beat the shit out of you ... you fat donkey\u2019, or similar. He placed himself in front of the car, thus preventing Mr [E.L.] from putting his shopping items inside his car, while affirming \u2018I won\u2019t move\u2019.\u201d 13.  In a judgment of 10 March 2006, the City Court, after holding an oral hearing at which Mr A was represented by a lawyer and witnesses were heard, convicted Mr A of the charges and sentenced him to 120 days\u2019 imprisonment. The sentence included the conditional part of a sentence imposed by the City Court in a judgment of 31 October 2003 by which Mr A had been convicted of an offence under Article 390A of the Penal Code. 14.  In meting out the sentence, the City Court attached considerable weight to the fact that Mr A had twice (last time in 2003) been convicted for a number of offences of a similar nature, that he had actively approached the victims, and that his conduct to a great extent affected people in their homes and closest environment, thereby destroying the victims\u2019 and their families\u2019 feeling of safety and wellbeing at their homes and in the near vicinity. A further aggravating factor was the extent, the intensity and duration of his conduct and Mr A\u2019s inability and unwillingness to cease his criminal conduct. 15.  Mr A did not lodge an appeal against his above conviction and sentence which thus became final. 16.  On 22 January 2008 Mr A was inter alia indicted under Article 228(1) of the Penal Code for having committed the following violent assaults:\n\u201c(a) At around 12h00, on Wednesday, 25 April 2007, at Z Street 14C, Oslo, he took a strangulation grip on T.L.B.\n(b) At around 21h15 on Wednesday, 12 September 2007, outside Z Street 14B, Oslo, he punched Mr H.F. in his chest with a clenched fist. ...\u201d 17.  In an additional indictment of 14 April 2008, Mr A was charged under the same provision as follows:\n\u201cAt around 18h15 on Saturday, 12 January 2008, in the staircase of the garage building of Z Street 14C, Oslo, he hit and/or pushed Mr D.H. in the chest with clenched fists so that the latter fell backward towards a wall, whereupon he pulled Mr D.H. by his arm/or jacket into the building.\u201d 18.  By a judgment of 23 June 2008, the City Court convicted Mr A of the above charges. It found proven, not that he had taken a strangulation grip on Mrs T.L.B., but that he had intentionally pushed her against a door or a wall with one hand; that he had pushed Mr H.F. or hit him in his chest but not that he had hit him hard; and that he had held around Mr D.H.\u2019s chest and had pushed him against the wall, both in the staircase and in the garage but that he had not hit Mr D.H. The City Court observed that, while all three offences would normally warrant the imposition of fines, Mr H.F.\u2019s advanced age and frailness were an aggravating factor as were the number of the offences adjudicated as well as the fact that Mr A had been convicted in the past for similar and in part more serious offences. He had moreover not understood the gravity of his actions. The City Court sentenced Mr A to eighteen days\u2019 imprisonment. 19.  Mr A did not lodge an appeal against the above judgment which thus became final. 20.  On 2 September 2009 the Housing Cooperative issued a warning of compulsory sale (section 4-18 of the Enforcement Act, tvangsfullbyrdelsesloven) and on 1 October 2009 it instituted proceedings against her before the relevant section (Oslo byfogdembete) of the Oslo City Court (tingrett), to obtain an order of compulsory sale of her apartment, from a specialised judge entrusted inter alia with such matters.\n(a)  The applicant\u2019s pleadings 21.  The applicant, represented by the same lawyer as before the European Court, reiterated that according to section 4-8 of the Housing Cooperative Act the case ought to be examined under an ordinary procedure (i s\u00f8ksm\u00e5ls former \u2013 which in principle included an oral hearing if the respondent\u2019s objections against compulsory sale was not \u201cclearly groundless\u201d). In her written pleadings she sought to address this question legally and factually, while pointing out that a complete presentation of evidence would be made at a later stage (i behandlingen av s\u00f8ksm\u00e5let). She submitted notably as follows. 22.  In the first place the applicant requested the City Court to dismiss the case on the ground that the Board\u2019s decision had not provided a legal basis for Attorney K. to initiate proceedings against her for compulsory sale. The decision had stated \u201cSagvolden\u201d, not Torill Sagvolden, and \u201ceviction\u201d, not compulsory sale (see paragraph 8 above). 23.  She also argued that it would create an unreasonable situation if the Housing Cooperative X\u2019s interest in her removal were to carry more weight than her needs at the age of eighty in not being put on the street. She had previously moved from the previous Cooperative Y to Cooperative X and had left old disputes behind her. However, because of a warning system within the OBOS system (a cooperative building association owned by its 330.000 members and which included both Cooperatives), already before moving into X she had been persecuted by allegations related to Y. There would hardly be any alternative for her. The situation had evolved over time and she ought to be entitled to admit Mr A in her household. Due to her age, she had become increasingly dependent on his assistance. 24.  The criminal matters pertaining to Mr A dated far back in time and could not justify compulsory sale, especially since the situation had improved and both the applicant and Mr A were open to negotiate on other appropriate default measures. The most recent offence dated from January 2008. The decisions on restraining orders (see paragraph 38 below) could not carry any weight since the threshold for prohibition on contact was low and did not require a preponderance of probabilities. The alleged harassment and threats was in great part due to a paranoid perception of some of the neighbours. 25.  The applicant requested the City Court, before conducting any procedure on the merits, to first decide on her request that the case be dismissed.\n(b)  The City Court\u2019s decision 26.  By a decision (kjennelse) of 26 April 2010, the City Court upheld the Housing Cooperative X\u2019s request for an order of compulsory sale of the applicant\u2019s apartment, to be carried out by an official assistant (medhjelper). 27.  The City Court first dismissed the applicant\u2019s contention that there was no decision by the Board which could constitute a basis for compulsory sale. The mention in the decision of \u201cSagvolden\u201d could not be understood in any other way than as referring to the applicant. From section 5-23 of the Housing Cooperative Act, it clearly followed that it was the applicant, as the owner of the apartment in question, who was the person whom the Housing Cooperative ought to address in all cases concerning the owner\u2019s duties and responsibilities. It was the owner\u2019s breach of such that could justify an eviction order. It followed from the case-law and legal doctrine that the owner was to be identified with the members of his or her household, both in the sense that faults on their part were relevant and that an eviction measure would also concern them; it was not possible to limit a request for an eviction order to concern only one or some of the members of a given household or to concern only the owner and not the other occupants. 28.  The City Court further rejected the applicant\u2019s argument that the Board\u2019s decision did not concern compulsory sale (\u201ctvangssalg\u201d) but only eviction (\u201cutkastelse\u201d). The Housing Cooperative\u2019s lawyer had stated that the Board was of the view that the conditions for eviction had been fulfilled but that the Cooperative had opted to limit its demand by initiating proceedings for compulsory sale. Since the Board\u2019s decision on eviction implied compulsory sale, to proceed with the latter and less extensive measure first clearly fell within that decision. This did not exclude that a request for an eviction order be made subsequently. 29.  No arguments had been raised by the applicant suggesting that the Housing Cooperative\u2019s demand ought to be dismissed. Nor was there anything to indicate that Attorney K. had exceeded the powers conferred on him by the Board. 30.  Moreover, no objection had been made as regards the contents of the plaintiff\u2019s claim for an order of compulsory sale or about the requirements as to warnings. The formal requirements for seeking an order of compulsory sale had been fulfilled (sections 5-22 and 5-23 of the Act). 31.  The condition for requiring sale was that the owner of the part in question had \u201csubstantially defaulted\u201d his or her obligations (\u201cmisheld pliktene sine vesentleg\u201d). The request for compulsory sale ought to be referred for examination according to the ordinary procedure applicable to ordinary appeals (which in principle include an oral hearing) if, within the statutory time limit, objections had been raised against compulsory sale that could not be regarded as \u201cclearly groundless\u201d. 32.  The assessment of whether \u201csubstantial default\u201d had occurred concerned not only the owner\u2019s conduct but also that of other members of his or her household, as the owner undoubtedly ought to be identified with them. In the instant case, the circumstances that could justify enforcement measures related to the conduct of Mr A. 33.  In this regard, the City Court observed that it was undisputed that the reason why the applicant had been obliged to leave her apartment in Housing Cooperative Y had been the serious problems that her son had caused there. In applying to the Board of Housing Cooperative X for its approval to become a new part owner, she had requested approval for one person only. Accordingly, it ought to be assumed that only she would occupy the apartment. Before moving in, she had confirmed through her lawyer that her household consisted of one person. Previously she had written to the Housing Cooperative X without replying to questions of whether her son would move in. It was only after the Housing Cooperative X\u2019s request to the applicant of 19 May 2004 for confirmation that Mr A would not move to the estate that Attorney B. had responded in the affirmative by letter of 26 May 2004. She was then well informed that it was precisely the matters regarding her son which was the reason for the Board\u2019s request for confirmation that he would not move into the flat. 34.  According to section 16 of the then applicable Housing Cooperative Act, an approval of a new part owner could be withdrawn within a year if the owner had provided inaccurate, or withheld, substantial information and the owner ought to have been aware of this. In view of the situation at the material time and the applicant\u2019s confirmation, the Housing Cooperative X could assume that the applicant had committed herself to moving in alone and in any event without her son. Both the Board\u2019s approval and her confirmation had dated approximately six years back in time and it was only at present that she for the first time had alleged that the Housing Cooperative had forced her to make the said declaration by threatening to take unlawful action. On this point, the City Court observed that the only measure which the Housing Cooperative X contemplated was to refuse approval of the applicant as a new part owner and there was nothing to indicate that it had been unlawful to envisage such a measure. 35.  Furthermore, where the board of a Housing Cooperative had become aware that problems with a part owner had occurred in another Housing Cooperative, it ought to be able to take the matter into account in its assessment of whether or not to approve that person as a new part owner. There were no elements to suggest that the information received by Housing Cooperative X had been obtained in an unlawful manner. Whether and to what extent any outsiders had acted unlawfully was not for the City Court to consider in the present case. 36.  It was unclear at what time Mr A had moved into the applicant\u2019s apartment. According to the Oslo City Court\u2019s judgment of 10 March 2006, Mr A had stated that he was living in Z Street 14C. From the same judgment it appeared that the criminal offences for which he was convicted had occurred in Z Street 14B and 14C in July 2005. It was also undisputed by the applicant that she had been cohabiting with Mr A in her apartment for an extended period. However, since the applicant, as a part owner, was responsible for the conduct by members of her household as well as her visitors, it was not decisive when Mr A had moved in. 37.  The City Court noted that it was clearly established that Mr A, by the judgments of 10 March 2006 and 23 June 2008 respectively, had been convicted of having committed violent assault and frightening behaviour against three neighbours at Z Street 14B and 14C. The episodes in the 2006 judgment had occurred on 29 and 30 July, 12 September and 13 November 2005. The 2006 judgment described inter alia Mr A as a person who perceived everyone in respect of whom there was a contradiction or a disagreement as being part of a conspiracy against him (for further details see paragraph 54 below). His use of violence was perceived as unprovoked. He had infringed people at their homes, in such a way as to destroy the victims\u2019 and their families\u2019 sense of safety and wellbeing at their homes and nearby. According to an assessment of Mr A made by a court appointed expert in 2003, he extensively and systematically had perceptions and experiences of conspiracy which were almost impossible to influence and which according to the 2006 judgment were still prevailing at that time. 38.  The judgment of 23 June 2008 had concerned episodes from April and September 2007 and January 2008 involving violations of Article 228(1) of the Code of Penal Procedure. Also in this judgment it had been found proven that Mr A had generally behaved in an intensive and intrusive manner. He was tall and strong, went very close to the person with whom he wanted to discuss and shouted to them with a load and aggressive voice. He was moreover inclined to block the passage of people he wanted to talk to and had a low threshold for taking one step further and grab or push people. This he did in a manner which was so aggressive as to make people anxious of the possibility of further and more serious violence being perpetrated.\nIn addition to the above-mentioned judgments, he had been imposed restraining orders by the police prohibiting him from visiting the following neighbours:\n- Ms T.L.B. and her children, for the period from 3 May 2007 to 3 May 2008;\n- Mr H.F., from 20 September 2007 to 20 September 2008;\n- Mr D.H., from 22 February to 22 August 2008; and\n- Mr J.-E.S., from 5 November 2008 to 5 April 2009. 39.  All these matters showed a person who over a long period had displayed frightening and disturbing behaviour vis-\u00e0-vis a number of neighbours in the Housing Cooperative where he was living with his mother, and where the incidents had led to convictions and prohibitions on contact over longer periods. It was also undisputed that Mr A had reacted with a particularly high degree of intensity vis-\u00e0-vis the Board and some of its members. 40.  As regards the applicant\u2019s allegation that the conditions had improved and that both she and Mr A were prepared to negotiate on alternative default measures, the City Court noted that the Housing Cooperative\u2019s communications to the applicant had led to tirades of phone calls and e-mails with accusations against members of the Board and complaints to different public institutions. This was also supported by the description made by the City Court in its judgment of 10 March 2006. As the applicant had failed to indicate what other appropriate default measures could consist of, the respondent Housing Cooperative could not be required to take further initiatives in this case. 41.  Whether the conditions for ordering compulsory sale had been fulfilled essentially depended on whether substantial default and conduct in breach of section 5-23 had materialised at the time when the order of sale was issued (namely 14 April 2009). 42.  Considering the circumstances of the case as a whole, the City Court found that by reason of her admission of Mr A as a member of her household and of his conduct over a longer period, the applicant had substantially defaulted on her obligations as a part owner. Furthermore, Mr A\u2019s conduct had caused serious disturbance to other occupants and had violated section 5-23 of the Housing Cooperative Act. For this reason, the issuing of a warning before compulsory sale had not been a requirement. 43.  In the City Court\u2019s view the applicant\u2019s interests on account of her old age ought not to carry more weight than those of other occupants in the Housing Cooperative. It found it established that her obligations as a part owner had been seriously defaulted, in any event since 2005. Whilst it was understandable that it was more difficult for a person aged eighty to find and move to a new home, this could not be decisive in this case where neighbours had been harassed over a number of years. Despite her own confirmation that she moved in alone, the applicant had let her son live in the apartment with all the problems this had caused to other occupants. Therefore, she ought to bear the consequences of her own choice even though this were to make it problematic for her to find another house within the OBOS Housing Cooperative system. 44.  The Board\u2019s decision on eviction had been taken on 2 September 2008, around two months after Mr A\u2019s conviction of 23 June 2008 and eight months after his commission of one of the offences. This was his second conviction for offences committed against neighbours while the first had concerned offences committed in 2005. The Board had taken and followed up its decision with reasonable expedition. 45.  Moreover, the applicant\u2019s contention that the police had acted in breach of their duty of confidentiality, by providing information to Housing Cooperative X concerning Mr A in relation to Z Street 14 C, could have no bearing on the present case. 46.  Considering all of the applicant\u2019s pleas against compulsory sale as being \u201cclearly groundless\u201d in the sense of sections 5-22, cf. section 4-8(2) of the Act, the City Court upheld the Housing Cooperative\u2019s claim and ordered that sale take place by an assistant. 47.  The applicant appealed against the City Court\u2019s decision to the Borgarting High Court (lagmannsrett), complaining of the former\u2019s assessment of the evidence, its application of the law and procedure. Maintaining in the main her arguments before the City Court, she requested that the Housing Cooperative X\u2019s action be dismissed; in the alternative, she argued that the request for compulsory sale was unlawful in that no evidence had been adduced to show that she had defaulted her obligations vis-\u00e0-vis the Housing Cooperative or, in any event, that any such default had been substantial. In the further alternative, she submitted that, after refusing to dismiss the suit, the City Court had failed to refer her case for examination according to the ordinary procedure (involving in principle an oral hearing) and had wrongly considered her objections against compulsory sale as being clearly groundless; therefore, she asked the High Court to quash the City Court\u2019s decision and to refer the case back for re-examination in accordance with the ordinary procedure. The applicant submitted that she could not cope with the thought of having to move house again and that she never believed that she would have to do so. The apartment really suited her and the fact that her son lived with her had made her feel that she received the help and care she needed in daily life.\n(b)  The High Court\u2019s decision 48.  By a decision of 5 August 2010 the High Court rejected her appeal. From the outset it observed that sufficient light had been shed on the case for it to determine the appeal on the basis of the written case-file (Article 29-15(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure). 49.  As regards the applicant\u2019s allegations that the imposition of compulsory sale suffered from deficiencies, the High Court found it clear that the Board\u2019s decision provided an adequate basis for notifying her of the measure in accordance with section 5-22 of the Housing Cooperative Act. 50.  The High Court did not find it necessary to take a stance on whether the terms \u201ceviction case\u201d ought to be read as relating to the vacating of premises (compare paragraph 28 above). In that event, as also assumed by the City Court, it was obvious that there was a possibility to opt for the less intrusive measure, namely the imposition of an order to sell the flat. The above decision most probably was an acknowledgment of a request by the Board to its attorney to take the necessary steps to bring the Cooperative\u2019s relationship with the applicant to an end. More than this could not be required, bearing in mind especially the long historical background to the case. 51.  Nor could the applicant succeed with her argument that she had not been sufficiently identified because the Board only used her surname. As also pointed out by the City Court, as for proceedings concerning eviction it was also the situation for those on compulsory sale that only the owner of the part of the Housing Cooperative in question could be the addressee. It could not be assumed that any other intention lay behind the Board\u2019s decision. 52.  Finally, the High Court shared the City Court\u2019s view that a prior warning had not been a prerequisite for obliging her to sell her part. Since, in accordance with the findings below, the conditions of serious disturbance and nuisance had been fulfilled for obliging her to vacate the flat pursuant section 5-23(1) of the Act, the requisite of prior warning under section 5-22(1) of the Act did not apply. 53.  Like the City Court, the High Court found it established that the applicant\u2019s son, Mr A, for years had displayed conduct vis-\u00e0-vis the household\u2019s neighbours constituting serious disturbance and nuisance to them. The City Court judgments of 10 March 2006 and 23 June 2008 concerned several offences under Articles 228 and 390A of the Penal Code, all of which, but one, had been aimed at neighbours in the Housing Cooperative. 54.  The High Court further considered that the matters in respect of which Mr A had been charged and convicted did not give the full picture of the conduct that had prompted the Housing Cooperative to react with default measures in regard to the applicant. In this connection the High Court pointed to the findings made by the City Court in its 2006 judgment, which stated:\n\u201cBoth from previous judgments and the statements given in this case, it emerged that the accused over many years had repeatedly contacted a number of neighbours and other persons with whom he considered he was in conflict. He had repeatedly levelled new accusations and more or less veiled threats against these persons and had in part made very serious and degrading remarks and descriptions. His conduct beyond this had also been perceived as disturbing, frightening and wholly unreasonably intense, both in form, extent and frequency. For instance, amongst other things, at times he was positioning himself more or less in the background in order to suddenly ambush by getting very close to and to some extent hindering the passage of the person he was talking to, while raising his voice and using threating body language and mimicking.\u201d 55.  The City Court had further referred to the fact that Mr A in connection with a criminal case in 2003 had undergone a thorough expert examination, which had inter alia concluded that he had extensive, systematic perceptions and experiences of conspiracy that were almost impossible to influence. Also the judgment of 2008 had described acts and conduct by Mr A that clearly corresponded to that description. 56.  The High Court also noted that, during the period from 3 May 2007 until 5 November 2008, Mr A had been imposed restraining orders prohibiting him from contacting altogether four of his neighbours, the last such order having expired on 5 April 2009. 57.  In the High Court\u2019s assessment, the matters for which the applicant\u2019s son had been convicted constituted by their nature, their number and the extent of the period in which they had been committed \u2013 namely from 29 July 2005 until 12 January 2008 \u2013 when seen as a whole, such default as fulfilled the conditions for requiring that the flat be vacated according to section 5-23(1) and the imposition of compulsory sale pursuant to section 5-22(1). This conclusion was further strengthened by the information that the incidents ought to be considered as a pattern of behaviour that was capable of creating an atmosphere of insecurity in the near environment. 58.  Having reached this conclusion, the High Court found it unnecessary to examine whether Mr A\u2019s moving into the applicant\u2019s flat contrary to the declaration made on her behalf by Attorney B on 26 May 2004 amounted to serious default in the sense of the Housing Cooperative Act. 59.  Nor could the applicant succeed with her argument that the conditions had subsequently improved. 60.  The High Court found that the conditions for the imposition of default measures under sections 5-22 and 5-23 had in any event been fulfilled on 14 April 2009 when the order of sale was sent to the applicant, which \u2013 as also held by the City Court \u2013 was the decisive time for the assessment (see paragraphs 9 and 41 above). 61.  The argument that the applicant\u2019s high age should influence the assessment could not lead to any other conclusion. It was not difficult to see the sad side to hers having to move and, for that matter, even in the situation of her son. However, it was their own acts that had led to forcible sale of the apartment pursuant to section 5-22(2), cf. section 4-8(2) of the Act. 62.  Thus, none of the grounds of appeal had succeeded and the High Court agreed with the City Court that they ought to be considered to be \u201cclearly groundless\u201d (section 4-8(2)). Her contention that the City Court should not have determined the case without holding an oral hearing could not be upheld either. 63.  Against this background the High Court rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal. 64.  The applicant appealed against the High Court\u2019s decision. She pointed out that the proceedings threatened her right to housing and that it was a serious case especially in view of her advanced age, eighty years. As regards the procedure, she submitted that the question was whether compulsory sale ought to occur under a written procedure or an ordinary procedure comprising an oral hearing. Her very considerable interest in keeping her apartment ought to be weighed against the Housing Cooperative\u2019s limited interest in carrying out compulsory sale without an oral hearing. The competing interest in the case ought to have implications in the assessment of questions of procedure and the application of the law. The High Court\u2019s reasoning had been summary; it had failed to deal with all her arguments and had omitted to comment on the interpretation of the terms \u201cclearly groundless\u201d and \u201csubstantial default\u201d. The applicant requested the Supreme Court to quash the High Court\u2019s decision and to refer her case back to the City Court for fresh examination under the ordinary procedure with an oral hearing. 65.  On 1 October 2010, the Appeals Leave Committee of the Supreme Court (H\u00f8yesteretts ankeutvalg), whose jurisdiction was limited to reviewing the High Court\u2019s procedure and interpretation of the law, rejected the appeal, finding it obvious that it could not succeed. 66.  The assistant appointed to implement the compulsory sale, Attorney F., subsequently advertised the applicant\u2019s apartment for sale. The highest bid was NOK 2,200,000 (currently corresponding to approximately EUR 240,000) from Mrs G. On 16 June 2012 Mr F. communicated the bid to the City Court for validation (stadfestelse), following which all interested parties were given two weeks for expressing objections. Before the expiry of the time-limit, the applicant and Mr A objected to the sale. 67.  By a decision of 1 July 2011 the relevant section of the Office of the City Recorder (byfogdembete) validated the above-mentioned bid. 68.  On 16 December 2011 the High Court rejected an appeal by the applicant and her son against the City Court\u2019s decision to validate the bid, as did the Appeals Leave Committee of the Supreme Court on 18 July 2012 finding it obvious that the appeal could not succeed. 69.  In conjunction with the above proceedings, the applicant and/or Mr A unsuccessfully pursued multiple other matters regarding the sale of the applicant\u2019s apartment (request for replacement housing; miscellaneous complaints regarding the office of the Execution and Enforcement Commissioner\u2019s (namsmannen) handling of the sale; a demand of access to documents in the possession of OBOS; disqualification of all police officers employed at the Court of the Office of the City Recorder; Mr A\u2019s compensation claim against the State on account of the police having communicated information about him to OBOS allegedly in breach of their duty of confidentiality; his compensation claim against OBOS for its manner of processing information pertaining to him; his demand that OBOS remove from its archives and destroy a police report related to him; and his request for access to a file in OBOS\u2019s possession) as well as a request for the joinder of these proceedings and an oral hearing. All these claims were rejected as being groundless by the relevant sections of the Oslo City Court (18 May and 1 July 2011), the High Court (14 and 16 December 2012) and the Appeals Leave Committee of the Supreme Court (18 July 2012). On 16 November 2012 the applicant was notified that the new owner had demanded that the applicant vacate the apartment following the implementation of compulsory sale. 70.  On 5 December 2012 the Court of the Office of the City Recorder warned the applicant that, as previously announced on 22 October 2012, he had decided to take the necessary steps to have her evicted from the flat on 18 December 2012 at 10 a.m., should she not voluntarily vacate the premises. 71.  On 10 March 2015, the Government forwarded a copy of a handwritten note, dated 10 February 2015, by which the applicant instructed her then lawyer Mr M\u00f8rk to withdraw her application immediately. She stated that any enquiries should be addressed to her son Mr T. or to her daughter Ms G. and emphasised that her son Mr A was not entitled to represent her. The Government also suggested that the application be struck out. On 31 March 2015, Mr Danielsen of the same law firm as Mr M\u00f8rk, replied that he had replaced the latter and that the applicant wished to maintain her application. 72.  On 30 March 2015 Mr A, represented by Mr Marius Reiker\u00e5s, sought leave to intervene as a party or as a third-party in the proceedings (Articles 34 and 36 \u00a7 32 of the Convention). On 20 May 2015, having examined the matter in the light of Rule 44 \u00a7 3 of the Rules of Court, the President of the First Section (to which the application was allocated at the time) decided to refuse the request as she considered, having regard to the state of the proceedings in the case, that the intervention requested would not be in \u201cthe interest of the proper administration of justice\u201d. Thereafter the President decided to resume the proceedings, which had been temporarily suspended pending consultation of the parties on the afore-mentioned. 73.  On 2 November 2015 the applicant died. 74.  Following the applicant\u2019s death, on 4 November 2015, Mr A, represented by Mr M. Reiker\u00e5s, informed the Court that he wished to pursue the application. On 16 December 2015 the Government asked the Court to strike the application out of its list of cases. On 12 January 2016, Mr Danielsen, the lawyer acting for the deceased applicant, informed the Court that her two other heirs, Mr T. and Ms G., wished to pursue the application. On 2 and 3 February 2016 the Court received further observations on these matters from Mr Reiker\u00e5s and the Agent of the Government.", "references": ["9", "6", "0", "8", "4", "3", "1", "7", "2", "5", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "7.  The first applicant, Mr J. Maxian, was born in 1949. The second applicant, Ms I. Maxianov\u00e1, was born in 1965. They are spouses and live in Vienna, Austria. 8.  The applicants have lodged thirteen applications with this Court already, most of which concerned their involvement in a convoluted cluster of litigation relating to a suite of real properties. A number of those sets of proceedings were interrelated and were often stayed pending the outcome of another set of proceedings concerning related matters. 9.  The present application concerns an action brought by the applicants before the Dunajsk\u00e1 Streda District Court on 11 April 2005, which was registered under the file no. 4C 65/2005 (\u201cthe main proceedings\u201d). The applicants believed that they had had ownership rights in respect of a property which they had rented out to individuals for payment. 10.  During the main proceedings, the applicants were involved in two other separate sets of auxiliary proceedings held before the same court (see paragraphs 18 to 21). Owing to a dispute over the aforesaid real property in the context of these two sets of auxiliary proceedings, the main proceedings were stayed on two occasions. The details are described below. 11.  On 16 May 2005 the District Court issued a payment order which was challenged by the defendants. Following this, the District Court held several hearings, dealt with the applicants\u2019 application to modify the claim and tried to serve the court documents on one of the defendants, whose address was unknown. 12.  On 28 September 2006 the District Court stayed the proceedings pending the outcome of the first set of auxiliary proceedings (see paragraph 18) and this decision was upheld on appeal with final effect on 27 September 2007. Subsequently, the applicants lodged an appeal on points of law to no avail. 13.  Between 9 September and 1 December 2008 the District Court monitored the first set of auxiliary proceedings and once those were finalised it resumed the main proceedings on 20 March 2009. The District Court then dealt with the applicants\u2019 applications to modify the claim, it ordered the taking of expert evidence, scheduled a number of hearings, and traced the defendants\u2019 whereabouts in order to serve the court documents on them since they were continually changing address. 14.  On 17 September 2012 the District Court stayed the proceedings for the second time pending the outcome of the second set of auxiliary proceedings (see paragraph 21). The applicants appealed this decision unsuccessfully and the decision on staying the main proceedings became final on 16 January 2014. The main proceedings have not been resumed since their interruption. However, the District Court has regularly monitored their state. 15.  The applicants complained before the Constitutional Court about the length of the main proceedings on two occasions. In their second constitutional complaint, they also challenged the alleged unfairness of the domestic courts\u2019 decisions to stay those proceedings. 16.  On 7 September 2010 the Constitutional Court (file no. I. \u00daS 291/2010) rejected their first complaint as manifestly ill-founded on the grounds that the proceedings had been stayed between 2006 and 2009 pending the outcome of the first set of auxiliary proceedings. It examined the periods before the main proceedings had been stayed in September 2006 and after they had been resumed in March 2009 and found no inactivity at the material times. It also found that the applicants had contributed to the delays by making five applications to modify the particulars of their claim. 17.  On 4 June 2014 the Constitutional Court (file no. I. \u00daS 267/2014) rejected the applicants\u2019 second complaint as manifestly ill-founded. It examined the procedural steps taken by the District Court following the applicants\u2019 first constitutional complaint until 17 September 2012, when the District Court had stayed the main proceedings for the second time. It noted that the District Court had been obliged to find the defendants\u2019 address. It found only a short period of inactivity in the District Court\u2019s procedure amounting to four months, which in itself did not breach the applicants\u2019 right to a hearing within a reasonable time. The Constitutional Court further stated that the applicants\u2019 arguments about the unfairness of the domestic courts\u2019 decisions on the staying of the proceedings were manifestly ill-founded. It also noted that they had failed to raise some of their arguments about the alleged unfairness and the lack of reasoning before the lower courts, in particular before the appellate court. 18.  The first set of auxiliary proceedings was brought in 1996 against the applicants (file no. 4 C 204/96) and concerned a dispute over the validity of the purchase agreement concerning a contested real property, which they had purportedly been renting to other persons. The judgment dismissing that claim became final on 10 November 2008. 19.  In April 2003, the applicants jointly received a domestic award from the Constitutional Court amounting to the equivalent of 2,656 euros (EUR) in damages for the breach of their right to a hearing within a reasonable time in the context of those proceedings (file no. II. \u00daS 197/02). 20.  They also introduced an application in respect of the length of proceedings with this Court (no. 50780/11), which was declared inadmissible by a Single Judge on 28 June 2012 (see for example Maxian and Maxianov\u00e1 v. Slovakia, (dec.), no. 44482/09, 24 July 2012). 21.  The second set of auxiliary proceedings commenced on 14 March 2011 and once again related to a dispute over the validity of the purchase agreement concerning the aforesaid real property (file no. 10C 62/2011). These proceedings are still pending. 22.  Within the context of another of the applicants\u2019 cases pending before this Court (application no. 10816/12), the Court established of its own motion that on 7 May 2015 the applicants had challenged the length of the second set of auxiliary proceedings (file no. 10C 62/2011) by way of a constitutional complaint, relying on Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention and Article 48 \u00a7 1 of the Constitution. 23.  The Constitutional Court declared their complaint admissible on 11 February 2016. The Court has received no further information about the outcome of these constitutional proceedings.", "references": ["2", "6", "4", "1", "7", "8", "9", "5", "0", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "10.  During the period from the end of September 2006 to the end of January 2007 identity checks of Georgian nationals residing in Russia were carried out in the streets, markets and other workplaces and at their homes. Many were subsequently arrested and taken to police stations. After a period of custody in police stations, they were grouped together and taken by bus to a court, which summarily imposed administrative penalties on them and gave decisions ordering their administrative expulsion from Russian territory. Subsequently, after sometimes undergoing a medical visit and a blood test, they were taken to detention centres for foreigners where they were detained for varying periods of time, taken by bus to airports in Moscow, and expelled to Georgia by aeroplane. (for further details as to the background of the case see Georgia v. Russia (I) [GC], no. 13255/07, \u00a7 45, ECHR 2014). 11.  The applicant was born in 1959 in Senaki (Georgia) and married to Mr Tengiz Togonidze, a Georgian national born in 1958. Together they had lived in St Petersburg since 2004. In April 2006 Mr Togonidze had started suffering from coughing fits, shortness of breath and thickening of the aorta walls. 12.  In May 2006 the applicant returned to Georgia because her visa had expired. Mr Togonidze, whose visa had expired on 9 February 2005 and whose registration was no longer valid either, stayed in St Petersburg. 13.  At about 8.50 p.m. on 3 October 2006 Mr Togonidze was arrested by police officers in St Petersburg and placed in detention. 14.  At about 3.30 p.m. on 4 October 2006 the Nevskiy District Court of St Petersburg ordered Mr Togonidze to be expelled from the Russian Federation and detained at the St Petersburg special detention centre for aliens pending his administrative expulsion on the ground that he had infringed the residence rules governing foreign nationals, namely Article 18.8 of the Code of Administrative Offences. The court also fined the applicant in the amount of RUB 1,500. 15.  Mr Togonidze was subsequently brought to the reception centre for foreigners of the Main Internal Affairs Directorate for St Petersburg and Leningrad Region. Upon his arrival he was examined by a medical officer, who found that Mr Togonidze did not show any health problems preventing him from being placed in the reception centre. Mr Togonidze informed the medical staff that he suffered from asthma attacks and was subsequently placed together with another Georgian detainee who suffered from asthma in a cell measuring between 35 and 40 m2 with 25 to 30 other Georgian nationals. 16.  The sanitary conditions of the cell were very poor, as the toilets were only separated from the rest of the cell by a partition measuring 1.1 m at one side, and there was a lack of fresh air. In addition, while Mr Togonidze was provided with possibilities to take walks, he was not permitted outdoor activities. 17.  On 13 October 2006 Mr Togonidze was suffering from nausea and a headache and asked for medical assistance. Subsequently a medical officer checked his blood pressure and temperature, which was slightly raised. He was given paracetamol. A re-examination the same day showed that his temperature was back to normal. 18.  On 14 October 2006 Mr Pataridze, Consul of Georgia in the Russian Federation at the material time, visited the detention centre. When he saw Mr Togonidze, who was having difficulties breathing and whose face had turned black, he had requested that Mr Togonidze be immediately transferred to a hospital but that request was not complied with. 19.  On 16 October 2006 Mr Togonidze, together with 24 other Georgian nationals, was placed in a bus to Domodedovo Airport in Moscow with a view to his expulsion by aeroplane to Georgia. Prior to entering the bus the detainees and their belongings were searched. In addition the detainees were accompanied by 20 officers of the special police force of the Main Internal Affairs Directorate (OMON) on the bus and two further police cars escorted the bus on the way to the airport. 20.  The conditions of transport in the bus were very difficult, with no air conditioning, and although the journey lasted between eight and nine hours, the officers who had been accompanying the detainees had not allowed them to open the windows. On the way to the airport the bus stopped five times to let people, allegedly for a bribe, use the toilet and purchase food. Exiting the bus was closely monitored by the accompanying police officers. 21.  On 17 October 2006 between 7 and 8 a.m. the bus arrived at the airport and around 8.30 a.m. Mr Togonidze, whose health had deteriorated during the bus ride, was allowed to leave the bus upon the request of Mr Pataridze, who was awaiting the Georgian nationals at the airport. 22.  Mr Pataridze indicated that when Mr Togonidze had got off the bus he had seen that he was very ill and was \u201csuffocating like a fish out of water\u201d and begging to be allowed to breathe fresh air. 23.  On the way to the terminal Mr Togonidze collapsed after walking a few steps and died. A called ambulance was unable to resuscitate him and he was declared dead at 10.20 a.m. 24.  On 18 October 2006 the Bureau of Forensic Medical Examination of the Moscow Health Department conducted an autopsy of Mr Togonidze\u2019s corpse and indicated that his death was caused by tuberculosis. In addition blood and urine samples were taken and sent for forensic chemical examination. 25.  On 19 October 2006 the Moscow Regional Prosecutor\u2019s Office decided not to initiate criminal proceedings, as the competent prosecutor found that Mr Togonidze had died of a natural cause. 26.  During the forensic chemical examination of the taken blood and urine samples methadone was detected in both samples. In regard to the urine sample a high-performance liquid chromatography (HLPC) was applied, which established 0,11 mg% methadone and 0,69 mg% methadone metabolite in Mr Togonidze\u2019s urine. A closer inspection of Mr Togonidze\u2019s blood was not conducted and the exact level of methadone in his blood was not established. Based on these findings the Bureau of Forensic Medical Examination of the Moscow Health Department finally concluded that Mr Togonidze had died of methadone poisoning. 27.  On 8 November 2006 the decision not to initiate criminal proceedings of 19 October 2006 was quashed and the case file was forwarded for additional examination. 28.  On 9 November 2006 the Moscow Regional Prosecutor\u2019s Office decided again not to initiate criminal proceedings. This time finding that, owing to detecting methadone in the urine and blood of Mr Togonidze (see paragraph 26 above) and finding three injection marks on his corpse, there was evidence for repeated use of narcotics for a long period of time. Therefore the prosecutor concluded that Mr Togonidze took the methadone voluntarily and that his death was caused by negligent poisoning with methadone. 29.  On 14 December 2006 the General Prosecutor\u2019s Office of the Russian Federation proposed that the decision of 9 November 2006 would be quashed and further investigations would be conducted. It held that thus far the deterioration of Mr Togonidze\u2019s health during the bus ride had not sufficiently been examined and that relevant officials had not been interviewed. 30.  On 15 December 2006 the Federal Migration Service challenged the allegation that Mr Togonidze had died of methadone poisoning, saying that he had died of tuberculosis. 31.  On 20 December 2006 a criminal investigation was initiated against an unknown person for selling methadone to Mr Togonidze at an unknown date and unknown location. 32.  On 30 July 2007 the decision to dismiss criminal proceedings was quashed and the case was forwarded for additional examination. In particular it was held that the dismissal was premature and that it should be established whether any narcotics were found on Mr Togonidze, the amount of methadone taken by him, whether such a dose could be lethal, why Mr Togonidze\u2019s health deteriorated during the bus ride and whether he received adequate health care during his detention and transfer to the airport. 33.  On 8 August 2007 the criminal proceedings were dismissed and on 9 August 2007 the dismissal was quashed again, as the instructions of 30 July 2007 had not been fulfilled. 34.  On 14 August 2007 the criminal proceedings were dismissed again and the dismissal was quashed on 11 December 2007. 35.  On 20 December 2007 criminal proceedings were finally dismissed. A subsequent request to quash the dismissal was denied on 14 February 2008 and confirmed on 1 September 2010. 36.  Based on the documents provided by the Government, and in particular on the autopsy report and the report of the forensic chemical examination, the applicant submitted her own medical report regarding her husband\u2019s death. The report was compiled by a forensic pathologist, Dr John Clark \u2013 a former lecturer at different universities in the United Kingdom and chief pathologist for the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) \u2013 supported by a forensic toxicologist, Dr Hilary Hamnett. 37.  The experts pointed out that the Russian authorities gave the cause of death as methadone intoxication based on the fact that methadone was detected in the blood and urine of Mr Togonidze and that he had three injection marks on his body. They also emphasised that the authorities concluded from these facts that Mr Togonidze had repeatedly used narcotics for a long period of time. As regards the needle punctures they pointed out that the injection mark at the bend of the left elbow stemmed most probably from the resuscitation attempts at the airport, in which intravenous drugs were given, and that the other two marks, on the lower third of the left shoulder, appear as a very unusual site for self-injection of drugs. They further indicated that methadone is usually taken in liquid form and only very uncommonly by injection. In addition, according to their opinion, the last few hours of Mr Togonidze\u2019s life did not coincide with the \u2018normal\u2019 death of a person dying from methadone intoxication. Being a sedative, people dying from methadone intoxication typically do so after a period of unconsciousness. Mr Togonidze, however, did not show any signs of drowsiness and was able to talk to the Georgian consul and walk a few steps before suddenly collapsing. Lastly they pointed out that the conclusion of repeated drug use was not confirmed by an analysis of a hair sample or finding any supporting evidence, such as needles, ampoules or syringes, on Mr Togonidze\u2019s corpse or in his cell. 38.  As regards the forensic chemical examination the experts indicated that the applied analyses appear not to have been carried out according to international recommendations and that the level of methadone was only measured in the urine and not in the blood. In their opinion it is unacceptable to conclude intoxication on urine levels alone, as drugs accumulate in the bladder over time and only blood levels can give an indication of a likely intoxication or incapacitation. 39.  In sum the forensic pathologist concluded that there was no scientific justification for giving methadone intoxication as the cause of death. He himself would have given the cause of death as suppurative bronchopneumonia due to chronic obstructive airways disease. He further indicated that, given Mr Togonidze\u2019s chronic lung disease, he was more likely to develop a chest infection and to progress his pneumonia in a crowded, airless space. The deterioration of his health, however, would have been noticeable, as he would have been unwell and showed signs such as wheezing and coughing. A timely hospitalisation and antibiotic treatment would have been the correct course of action.", "references": ["3", "4", "9", "6", "5", "2", "7", "8", "No Label", "0", "1"], "gold": ["0", "1"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1978 and lives in Sumgayit. 6.  On 6 March 2010 the applicant was arrested by the police on suspicion of possession of narcotic substances. According to a record dated 6 March 2010 relating to the carrying out of operational measures and the seizure of physical evidence (\u0259m\u0259liyyat t\u0259dbirl\u0259rinin ke\u00e7irilm\u0259si v\u0259 maddi s\u00fcbutun g\u00f6t\u00fcr\u00fclm\u0259si haqq\u0131nda protokol), the applicant was arrested by the police at 11.30 p.m. on 6 March 2010 in Sumgayit, on the basis of operational information that he was in possession of narcotic substances. He did not resist arrest and was taken to the Sumgayit City Police Office (\u201cthe Police Office\u201d), where he was searched in the presence of two police officers and two attesting witnesses. It appears from the record that the applicant was not represented by a lawyer. During the search, narcotic substances were found on his person. 7.  On 9 March 2010 the applicant was charged with illegal possession of a large quantity of narcotic substances with intent to sell, under Article 234.4.3 of the Criminal Code. 8.  On 10 March 2010 the Sumgayit City Court, relying on the official charges brought against the applicant and the prosecutor\u2019s request to apply the preventive measure of remand in custody (h\u0259bs q\u0259timkan t\u0259dbiri), ordered the applicant\u2019s detention for a period of two months, calculating the period of detention from 9 March 2010. 9.  The applicant did not appeal against that decision. 10.  On the same day the Sumgayit City Court also delivered a separate special decision (x\u00fcsusi q\u0259rar), acknowledging a violation of the applicant\u2019s right to liberty. In this connection, the court held that the investigator had unlawfully deprived the applicant of his liberty, because the applicant had not been brought before a judge within forty-eight hours of his arrest, as required by the relevant law. The court also informed the Police Office about the investigator\u2019s unlawful action, and asked the Police Office to inform it about the measures taken in this respect within one month. 11.  According to the applicant, following his arrest by the police on 6 March 2010, he was taken to the Police Office, where he was detained in various rooms. He was repeatedly subjected to ill-treatment in police custody, with the aim of extracting a confession from him. He was also forced by the police to make an incriminating statement against two other people arrested in connection with possession of narcotic substances. As he refused to make the statements requested by the police, on 6 and 7 March 2010 he was regularly beaten with wooden and rubber truncheons, and was given electric shocks and cigarette burns by police officers X., S. and M. 12.  On 10 March 2010 the applicant met his lawyer for the first time when he was brought before the Sumgayit City Court. According to the applicant\u2019s lawyer, he made an oral complaint at the hearing before the Sumgayit City Court in the presence of the Sumgayit city deputy prosecutor, complaining that the applicant had been ill-treated in police custody. He also pointed out the signs of ill-treatment present on the applicant\u2019s body, and requested his examination by a forensic expert. However, no action was taken by the court or the prosecuting authorities in respect of the applicant\u2019s ill-treatment. 13.  On 3 and 10 April 2010 the applicant\u2019s lawyer lodged a written complaint with the investigator in charge of the case, complaining that the applicant had been ill-treated in police custody. In this connection, he pointed out that, although he had made such a complaint at the hearing of 10 March 2010 before the Sumgayit City Court, no action had been taken by the investigating authorities. The lawyer asked the investigator for a forensic examination of the applicant. He also asked the investigator to question the applicant and organise a formal face-to-face confrontation between the applicant and the other co-accused in his presence. No action was taken by the investigator. 14.  On an unspecified date in April 2010 the lawyer informed the Ombudsman of the applicant\u2019s ill-treatment in police custody and the investigator\u2019s failure to order a forensic examination of the applicant. 15.  Following a conversation between the applicant and agents from the Ombudsman\u2019s Office in a temporary detention centre, on 22 April 2010 the Ombudsman requested that the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office carry out a forensic examination of the applicant and conduct an effective investigation into his allegation of ill-treatment. 16.  By a letter of 7 May 2010, the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office informed the lawyer that the complaint submitted by the Ombudsman concerning the applicant\u2019s alleged ill-treatment by the police would be examined, and he would be informed of its outcome. 17.  In the meantime, on 5 May 2010 the investigator had ordered a forensic examination of the applicant. It appears from forensic report no. 600 dated 11 May 2010 that the forensic expert noticed an abrasion (s\u0131yr\u0131q) measuring 5 cm by 1.2 cm on the applicant\u2019s left wrist joint. He concluded that the injury had been caused by a hard blunt object, and could have been inflicted on 6 March 2010. The expert stated that the severity of the injury had not been determined, because it was not an injury causing harm to health. 18.  On an unspecified date in May 2010 the applicant\u2019s case was assigned to another investigator. 19.  On 25 May 2010 the applicant\u2019s lawyer was provided with a copy of the forensic report of 11 May 2010. He immediately asked for a new forensic examination, claiming that the applicant\u2019s forensic examination had been conducted in his absence and in breach of relevant procedural rules. He also claimed that, although numerous injuries were still visible on the applicant\u2019s body, the expert had noted only one injury in his report. 20.  On 26 May 2010 the investigator granted the request and ordered a new forensic examination of the applicant. 21.  On 1 June 2010 the applicant\u2019s lawyer lodged a new request with the investigator, asking to participate in the forensic examination. He also asked the investigator to allow him to photograph and make a video recording of the forensic examination. 22.  On 3 June 2010 the investigator granted the request in part, allowing the lawyer to participate in the forensic examination. 23.  On 8 June 2010 the Sumgayit city deputy prosecutor refused to institute criminal proceedings in connection with the applicant\u2019s allegation of ill-treatment. He held that it had not been established that the applicant had been beaten by the police officers, or that the injury found on his left wrist joint had been caused by them while he was in police custody. However, the prosecutor also found that the applicant had been unlawfully detained in police custody from 6 to 7 March 2010 in the absence of any official record of his arrest. In this connection, he decided to inform the Police Office of the unlawful actions of the police officers. 24.  In the meantime, on an unspecified date the applicant\u2019s lawyer had lodged a complaint with the Sumgayit City Court under the procedure concerning the review of the lawfulness of procedural actions or decisions by the criminal prosecuting authority under Article 449 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. He complained, in particular, that the applicant had been ill-treated in police custody, that the investigator had failed to reply to his complaints concerning the ill-treatment, and that the applicant\u2019s procedural rights had been violated within the framework of the criminal proceedings. 25.  In the proceedings before the Sumgayit City Court the judge heard the applicant, the two other co-accused, the applicant\u2019s lawyer, the police officers involved in the applicant\u2019s arrest, and the two investigators who had been in charge of the applicant\u2019s case. Although the police officers denied the ill-treatment allegation, the investigator who had replaced the first investigator in charge of the case stated that he had also noticed the signs of a beating on the applicant\u2019s body during his questioning. 26.  On 25 June 2010 the Sumgayit City Court delivered a decision, finding that the applicant had been subjected to torture and violent treatment (i\u015fg\u0259nc\u0259 v\u0259 zorak\u0131 r\u0259ftar) in police custody. In this connection, the court relied on the conclusions of the forensic report of 11 May 2010 and the statement made by one of the investigators. The court also held that, at the court hearing, the applicant\u2019s body had shown signs of ill-treatment as established by the court. The court further found that the applicant had been unlawfully detained in the Police Office, and that he had been questioned by the investigator in the absence of his lawyer. The court ordered the Sumgayit city prosecutor\u2019s office to investigate the fact that he had been ill\u2011treated. 27.  On 5 July 2010 the Sumgayit city prosecutor lodged an objection against the Sumgayit City Court\u2019s decision of 25 June 2010. 28.  On 21 July 2010 a panel composed of two forensic experts issued a report concerning the second forensic examination of the applicant. It appears from forensic report no. T76/2010 that the applicant was examined by the forensic experts in the presence of his lawyer on 23 June 2010. During the examination the applicant stated that he had been tortured in police custody, and gave a detailed description of his ill-treatment. In particular, he stated that on 6 and 7 March 2010 police officers X., S. and M. had tortured him with truncheons, a device which gave electric shocks and cigarette burns. As a result of the examination, the experts noticed numerous scars (\u00e7ap\u0131q) and areas of pigmentation (piqmentasiya sah\u0259l\u0259ri) on various parts of the applicant\u2019s body. They pointed out that, while the scars had been caused by a hard blunt object, the areas of pigmentation had resulted from intense heat. The experts concluded that these injuries had been inflicted three to six months prior to the examination, and the characteristics of the injuries did not contradict the applicant\u2019s description of ill-treatment. 29.  On 27 July 2010 the Sumgayit Court of Appeal dismissed the prosecutor\u2019s objection, finding the first-instance court\u2019s decision justified. As to the fact of the applicant\u2019s ill-treatment, the appellate court held that this was supported by the expert reports of 11 May and 21 July 2010, which confirmed the existence of various injuries on his body. The court further held that the investigator who had replaced the first investigator in charge of the case had also stated before the court that he had noticed injuries on the applicant\u2019s body when he had questioned him. The court lastly noted that it had taken into account the fact that, although the applicant had been examined by the forensic experts a few months after his beating by the police officers, there were still signs of ill-treatment on his body. 30.  On 24 August 2010 the applicant\u2019s lawyer lodged a complaint with the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, complaining that the investigating authorities had failed to investigate the applicant\u2019s ill-treatment, despite the explicit acknowledgment of the fact of the ill-treatment by the court decisions of 25 June and 27 July 2010. 31.  On 20 September 2010 the Sumgayit city deputy prosecutor again refused to institute criminal proceedings in connection with the applicant\u2019s ill-treatment. The prosecutor concluded that the injuries found on the applicant\u2019s body had not been caused in police custody. In this connection, he noted that the applicant was a drug addict and that there was a likelihood that the injuries had been caused by \u201cexternal influences\u201d (k\u0259nar t\u0259sirl\u0259rd\u0259n) before he had been taken to the temporary detention centre. 32.  On 8 October 2010 the applicant\u2019s lawyer lodged a complaint with the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office against that decision. He complained, in particular, that the prosecuting authorities had unlawfully refused to investigate the applicant\u2019s ill-treatment, despite the explicit acknowledgment of the fact of the ill-treatment by the relevant court decisions. 33.  No action was taken by the prosecuting authorities. 34.  On 7 May 2010 the Sumgayit City Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention pending trial for a period of one month, namely until 7 June 2010. The court indicated as the reason for its decision that it needed more time to perform some investigative actions, such as the carrying out of forensic narcotic and psychiatric examinations. It further relied on the gravity of the charges against the applicant, and the existence of a risk of his absconding from and obstructing the investigation. 35.  The applicant appealed against that decision, claiming that the first\u2011instance court had failed to justify the extension of his detention. 36.  On 14 May 2010 the Sumgayit Court of Appeal upheld the first\u2011instance court\u2019s decision. The appellate court\u2019s reasoning was essentially the same as that in the first-instance court\u2019s decision. 37.  On 3 June 2010 the Sumgayit City Court again extended the applicant\u2019s detention for a period of one month. The court justified this by relying on the necessity to carry out further investigative actions within the framework of the criminal proceedings. 38.  On 4 June 2010 the applicant appealed against the decision, reiterating that there was no reason to hold him in detention, and that the first-instance court had failed to justify his continued detention. 39.  On 11 June 2010 the Sumgayit Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the extension order was justified. The appellate court justified its decision by relying on the gravity of the charges and the risk of the applicant\u2019s absconding from the investigation. 40.  On 6 July 2010 the Sumgayit City Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 22 July 2010. The court again justified the extension by relying on the necessity to carry out further investigative actions. 41.  The applicant did not appeal against that decision. 42.  On 11 July 2010 the investigator reclassified the criminal charges against the applicant, replacing the previous charges under Article 234.4.3 of the Criminal Code with new charges under Article 234.1 (illegal possession of narcotic substances in a quantity exceeding that necessary for personal consumption, without intent to sell). 43.  On 21 July 2010 the investigator issued a bill of indictment under Article 234.1 of the Criminal Code and filed it with the Sumgayit City Court. 44.  On 6 August 2010 the Sumgayit City Court held a preliminary hearing. At that hearing, the prosecutor stated that there had been numerous breaches of procedural rules during the investigation, and that the bill of indictment had not been compiled in accordance with the requirements of the relevant law. He asked the court to discontinue its examination of the criminal case and remit it to the prosecutor supervising the investigation. The court granted the prosecutor\u2019s application. The court\u2019s decision made no mention of the applicant\u2019s detention, even though the latest extension order had expired on 22 July 2010. Under domestic law, a decision taken at a preliminary hearing was not open to appeal. 45.  On 13 August 2010 the prosecutor lodged an application with the Sumgayit City Court, asking for an extension of the applicant\u2019s detention until 7 September 2010. 46.  On 16 August 2010 the Sumgayit City Court dismissed the application, finding that there was no basis for such an extension. However, taking into account the prosecutor\u2019s intention to lodge an objection against that decision, the court ordered the applicant\u2019s detention for a period of seven days. 47.  On 23 August 2010 the Sumgayit Court of Appeal dismissed the prosecutor\u2019s objection and upheld the first-instance court\u2019s decision. The applicant was released from detention. 48.  On the same day the applicant lodged a request with the investigator, asking for unlawfully obtained evidence to be removed from the case file and the criminal proceedings against him to be discontinued. 49.  By a decision of 26 August 2010, the investigator dismissed the applicant\u2019s request. 50.  In the meantime, following the applicant\u2019s release from detention, on 25 August 2010 the investigator in charge had issued a decision placing the applicant under police supervision (polisin n\u0259zar\u0259ti alt\u0131na verm\u0259). The decision did not detail the duration of that preventive measure. According to the applicant, his placement under police supervision lasted approximately five or six months, during which time he was obliged to report to the police twice a week and not leave the city where he resided. At the end of this period, although he was no longer required to report to the police, he was not provided with any official decision confirming the end of his placement under police supervision.", "references": ["8", "5", "0", "4", "9", "7", "6", "No Label", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["1", "2", "3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1968 and is serving a prison sentence in Samara. 6.  The police suspected that the applicant and a number of other people were involved in a series of car thefts. On an unspecified date the police applied for judicial authorisation to intercept the suspects\u2019 mobile telephone communications. 7.  According to the Government, on 6 December 2004 the Samara Regional Court authorised the tapping of the applicant\u2019s mobile telephone. 8.  From 17 to 26 December 2004 the police intercepted the applicant\u2019s mobile telephone calls. They recorded five audio tapes and on 13 January 2005 forwarded them to the investigator. 9.  On 26 December 2004 the applicant was arrested during an attempted car-jacking. According to the applicant, three police officers handcuffed him and kicked him in the face and on the head during the arrest. The applicant was then taken to a police station where the beatings continued. 10.  On an unspecified date the applicant retained legal counsel. 11.  On 28 December 2004, in response to a complaint by the applicant, the investigator looking into the matter noted that the applicant had resisted arrest and that the police officers had had to use force on him. The investigator ordered the applicant to have a medical examination. 12.  On 30 December 2004 a forensic expert examined the applicant and documented the following injuries:\n\u201cBruises around the right and left eyes and on the right part of the head;\nHaemorrhage ... on the left of the lower lip;\nBruises on the nose, right cheek, forehead and right knee joint.\u201d 13.  In the expert\u2019s opinion, the injuries had been inflicted between three and eight days before the examination and had not caused any serious damage to the applicant\u2019s health. 14.  On 21 January 2005 the prosecutor\u2019s office dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaint of ill-treatment in police custody as unsubstantiated. The applicant did not appeal. 15.  On 28 December 2004 the Leninskiy District Court of Samara authorised the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention. The applicant did not appeal. 16.  On 30 December 2004 the applicant was charged with multiple car thefts. On an unspecified date he was also charged with the organisation of a criminal gang. 17.  On 25 February 2005 the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Samara extended the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention until 23 April 2005. The applicant remained in custody pending the conclusion of the investigation and trial. 18.  On 27 February 2006 the Samara Regional Court fixed the trial for 13 March 2006. 19.  On 12 March 2007 the prosecution dropped the criminal gang charges and several of the car theft charges. On the same day the Regional Court found the applicant guilty of eleven car thefts and sentenced him to twelve years\u2019 imprisonment. In establishing the applicant\u2019s guilt, the court relied, inter alia, on the recordings of the intercepted mobile telephone calls between the defendants. According to the applicant, the court refused to provide him with access to the judicial authorisation for the interception of his mobile telephone communications. The court order in question of 6 December 2004 was not in the case file, which contained only a certificate confirming the taking of that decision by the Regional Court. 20.  On 13 November 2007 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the applicant\u2019s conviction on appeal. As regards the interception of the defendants\u2019 mobile telephone calls, the court noted as follows:\n\u201cIt is clear from the material in the case file that the Regional Court authorised the interception of the [defendants\u2019] telephone communications ...\nPursuant to [the applicable legislation], information about covert operational and search activities is classified as a State secret. The judicial decision authorising the conduct of such operational and search activities and the material submitted [by the police] when applying for such a decision are kept only in [police] files.\nThe arguments in the [defendants\u2019] statements of appeal that the decision [authorising interception] had not been included in the case file raise no issue under the law.\nIt is clear from the material in the case file that [the police officer] Yu. was authorised, in accordance with the law, to carry out the interception and recording of the defendants\u2019 telephone communications. The said operational and search activity was conducted in compliance with the provisions of [the applicable legislation].\nThe [appeal court] dismisses as unsubstantiated the defendants\u2019 complaints that violations committed [by the police] in the course of the interception and recording of their telephone communications should render that evidence inadmissible.\nThe [appeal court] discerns no violations of [applicable laws] in the course of the storage, transfer, inspection of, and listening to, the audiotapes containing the recording of the defendants\u2019 telephone communications.\nThe results of [the interception of the defendants\u2019 telephone communications] were submitted to the investigator and the court in accordance with an instruction prepared on the basis of [the applicable legislation].\u201d 21.  From 26 to 31 December 2004 the applicant was detained in a temporary detention centre. The cell where he was held had no windows. The applicant did not receive a mattress or sheets. The lighting was dim. According to the applicant, his requests for medical assistance were ignored. 22.  From 31 December 2004 to 8 September 2007 and from 26 December 2007 to 14 January 2008 the applicant was detained in remand prison SIZO-1 in Samara.\n(a)  Description provided by the Government 23.  The Government provided copies of the prison\u2019s population register for each day of the applicant\u2019s detention in the remand prison and the relevant floor plans. Their submissions can be summarised as follows:\nPeriod of detention\nCell no.\nCell surface area (sq. m)\nNumber of inmates\nNumber of beds\nFrom 31 December 2004 to 1 March 2005\n8 24.  According to information submitted by the governor of the remand prison, the applicant was provided with a mattress, a pillow, a blanket, bed linen, towels, cutlery, a mug and a bowl. The bed linen was changed weekly. The applicant had the possibility to take weekly showers and a daily one-hour walk. 25.  The toilet in each cell was separated from the living area by a partition that was 1.5 to 2 m high and a door that was 1.1 m high. The distance from the toilet to the dining table was at least 1.5 m.\n(b)  Description provided by the applicant 26.  According to the applicant, his cells were at all times overcrowded. The number of sleeping places was insufficient and the inmates took turns to sleep. On most days he had no more than 2 sq. m of personal space. 27.  All the inmates smoked and the applicant, a non-smoker, was exposed to second-hand smoke. There was virtually no gap between the toilet and the dining table. The toilet offered no privacy. The partition separating it from the living area of the cell was only 1 m high and there was no door. Cells 8, 58, 60 and 61 were infested with bedbugs. On several occasions inmates suffering from scabies and having lice were detained in the same cells as the applicant. It was very cold in the winter and stiflingly hot in the summer.\n(c)  Description provided by other inmates 28.  According to inmate Sh., from 4 September 2006 to 7 September 2007 he was detained in cell 34 which measured no more than 30 sq. m and housed from 28 to 34 inmates. The cell was dirty, damp and infested with cockroaches, bedbugs and lice. The inmates often suffered from colds and scabies. The food was of poor quality. The lighting was insufficient for reading or writing. The toilet was not separated from the living area of the cell. 29.  According to inmate Ye., who was detained in cell 61 together with the applicant from 15 February to 19 April 2006, most cells in the remand prison measured approximately 30-35 sq. m and housed from 20 to 28 inmates. The number of beds was insufficient and the inmates had to take turns to sleep. The toilet was 1.5 m away from the dining table. It was very cold in the cells during the winter and the inmates had to sleep with their coats on. In the summer the temperature in the cells exceeded 30oC. The cells were poorly ventilated and constantly smelled of sweat and tobacco smoke. The inmates suffered from scabies and fungus infection. Hot water was not supplied. Many cells in the remand prison were infested with cockroaches and bedbugs 30.  According to inmate K., he was detained in cell 61 from February to March 2006. He provided a description of the conditions of detention which reproduced verbatim the statement made by inmate Ye. 31.  From 9 September to 25 December 2007 the applicant was detained in remand prison SIZO-3 in Moscow. 32.  According to the applicant\u2019s submissions of 15 April 2013, the conditions of his detention in Moscow were identical to those in Samara. 33.  According to the Government, in 2004-2007 the transport of inmates to and from courts in Samara was carried out by GAZ-3307 prison vans. Each van had two compartments measuring 2.1 by 1.2 m with seating capacity for ten people and one compartment measuring 0.62 by 0.72 m for one person. The distance between the remand prison and the court-house was approximately 9-10 km and the travel time was less than one hour.\n(b)  Description provided by the applicant 34.  The applicant was transported over 58 times from his remand prison to court and back. On those days he normally had to wake up at 4 a.m. and had no breakfast. From 6 to 9 a.m. he was held in a holding cell. At 8 a.m. he received a bag of food for the day at the court-house. It normally comprised dry bread, instant soup and tea. No hot water was provided during the day and it was not possible to prepare the soup or tea. The van collected inmates from different prisons and made stops at various courts, meaning that the applicant\u2019s journey from the remand prison to court lasted longer than an hour. On the way back, the applicant was again placed in a holding cell measuring 12-13 sq. m with another fifteen to thirty inmates. 35.  In the summer it was stiflingly hot inside the van. Natural ventilation through the hatches was insufficient and it was difficult to breathe. There was no internal lighting when the engine was off. The floor of the van was extremely dirty and was covered with cigarette ends, bits of food and other litter. It was impossible to use the toilet during the journey.", "references": ["9", "5", "3", "6", "0", "8", "2", "7", "No Label", "1", "4"], "gold": ["1", "4"]}
+{"input": "5.  The facts of the applications, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 6.  The first applicant was born in 1967 and lives in Perm. 7.  On 6 May 2003 the first applicant was stopped by a customs officer at a Moscow international airport and found to be in possession of 10,200 euros (EUR) and 8,755 US dollars[1] (USD) which he failed to report on his customs declaration. 8.  On 4 December 2003 the Golovinskiy District Court in Moscow convicted the first applicant of smuggling and issued a confiscation order in respect of the foreign currency he had carried on him. On 5 February 2004 the Moscow City Court upheld the judgment on appeal. 9.  Further to an application from a deputy Moscow prosecutor, on 5 December 2008 the Presidium of the Moscow City Court amended the judgment. Noting that there was no evidence that the confiscated currency had been the instrument of a crime or had been criminally acquired, it cancelled the confiscation order and ordered the confiscated money to be refunded to the first applicant. 10.  On 3 June 2009 the amount of 628,750 Russian roubles (RUB)[2] was credited into the first applicant\u2019s bank account. 11.  The first applicant sued the Ministry of Finance, seeking to recover the interest accrued on the retained amount during the period from 6 May 2003 to 3 June 2009, which he assessed at RUB 458,777. 12.  On 25 August 2009 the Tverskoy District Court in Moscow granted his claim in part. It awarded the first applicant RUB 11,719.20[3] in respect of the period from 2 April 2009 when his representative had submitted the bank details to the Ministry of Finance until 3 June 2009 when the transfer had been made. The District Court did not say anything about the part of the claim concerning the previous six-year period. 13.  The second and third applicants were born in 1967 and 1971 respectively and live in Graz, Austria. 14.  On 11 October 2004 the customs officer at a Moscow international airport stopped the second and third applicants as they were carrying EUR 14,600 and 14,980 euros in cash, respectively, which they had not reported on their customs declarations. 15.  On 14 and 16 February 2006 the Golovinskiy District Court in Moscow found the second and third applicants guilty as charged and issued confiscation orders. On 10 April 2006 the Moscow City Court upheld the conviction on appeal. 16.  On an application from a deputy Moscow prosecutor, on 26 August 2011 the Presidium of the Moscow City Court amended the judgments in respect of the second and third applicants. Noting that there was no evidence that the confiscated currency had been the instrument of a crime or had been criminally acquired, it cancelled the confiscation orders and ordered to refund RUB 526,471.62 to Ms Sumann and RUB 540,174.30 to Mr Sumann.[4]", "references": ["8", "0", "7", "2", "3", "4", "6", "1", "5", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1971 and lives in D\u0119bowa K\u0142oda. 6.  In 1997 the applicant married R. In 2004 R. underwent infertility treatment so she could conceive a child with him. 7.  In autumn 2004 the applicant met A.H. In January 2005 he moved out of the flat he had lived in with R. 8.  On 31 October 2005 A.H. gave birth to their daughter, M. 9.  On 25 September 2006 the applicant filed a petition for divorce. At first he requested a no-fault divorce. In his petition the applicant referred to various marital misunderstandings and quarrels for which he blamed the respondent. He admitted that he had moved out of the matrimonial home, but did not mention his involvement with a new partner. 10.  At a hearing held on 15 November 2006 the applicant refused to undergo the mediation process provided for by divorce law. R. did not agree to a divorce, declared that she loved the applicant and asked the court to dismiss the divorce petition. 11.  Subsequently, the applicant requested a divorce on fault\u2011based grounds. 12.  During the proceedings thirteen witnesses were heard. Most of them were of the opinion that the marriage seemed happy until autumn 2004. Only the applicant\u2019s mother, his two colleagues and his cousin recalled minor arguments between the spouses. 13.  During the final hearing on 9 February 2009 the respondent reiterated her refusal to divorce. 14.  On 17 February 2009 the Lublin Regional Court refused to grant the divorce to the applicant. The court held that he was the only person responsible for the breakdown of his marriage because he had failed to respect the obligation of fidelity. The court did not find it credible that problems had already begun within the first year of the marriage. It observed that until 2004 the applicant had not wanted children. In that year he had changed his mind. For that reason R. had undergone surgery, the operation having taken place in August 2004. 15.  The marital situation had subsequently changed when the applicant had met A.H. He had no longer wished to have a child with his wife. The court noted contradictions between the testimony given by the applicant, who had referred to the alleged serious problems in marital life prior to 2004 on the one hand, and the decision to treat R.\u2019s infertility in summer 2004 on the other. The respondent had been shocked by the applicant\u2019s unfaithfulness and had been treated for depression since autumn 2004. 16.  The court acknowledged that there had indeed been \u201ca complete and irretrievable marriage breakdown\u201d within the meaning of Article 56 \u00a7 1 of the Family and Guardianship Code. Reconciliation was unlikely as the applicant had consistently rejected all attempts made by R. to reconcile their differences. Moreover, he had been in a relationship with A.H. for almost four years and had a child with her. 17.  The court emphasised that under Article 56 \u00a7 3 of the Family and Guardianship Code, a divorce could not be granted if it had been requested by the party whose fault it was that the marriage had broken down, if the other party refused to consent and the refusal of the innocent party was not \u201ccontrary to the reasonable principles of social coexistence\u201d (zasady wsp\u00f3\u0142\u017cycia spo\u0142ecznego) within the meaning of Article 5 of the Civil Code. 18.  The court considered that R.\u2019s refusal to divorce should be presumed to be compatible with those universally accepted principles. It referred to the case-law of the Supreme Court to the effect that a refusal of consent to a divorce was to be presumed to be compliant with those principles unless there were case-specific indications to the contrary. There was no indication that when refusing to give her consent R. had acted out of hatred, was motivated by vengeance, or simply wanted to vex the applicant. The court emphasised that she had repeatedly stated during the proceedings that she was ready to reconcile with him despite the fact that he had a child with another woman. 19.  The court stressed that the duration of the applicant\u2019s new relationship could not by itself be considered to be a sufficient reason for granting the divorce. 20.  The applicant appealed against the judgment. He argued, inter alia, that the court had erred in holding that a spouse\u2019s refusal to consent to a divorce could be disregarded only when it was of an abusive nature or was dictated by hostility towards the spouse seeking the divorce. The court should have examined the negative social consequences caused by continuing the formal existence of failed marriages. In his case, it had failed to do so. 21.  On 16 June 2009 the Lublin Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. 22.  The applicant did not request to be served with the written grounds for the appellate judgment. The grounds were therefore not prepared. 23.  The judgment was final, a cassation appeal against a divorce judgment not being available in law.", "references": ["3", "6", "9", "1", "0", "2", "7", "5", "8", "4", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicants are owners or co-owners of residential buildings which comprise flats that were or still are subject to rent control. They obtained ownership of the flats by various means, such as restitution, donation, inheritance or purchase. Under the relevant legislation they had to accept that the flats were occupied by tenants with a regulated rent and that they could charge them no more than the maximum amount of rent fixed by the State. The relevant legislation precluded them from unilaterally terminating the leases, or selling the flats other than to the tenants (\u201cthe rent\u2011control scheme\u201d). The particulars of the flats affected by the rent\u2011control scheme are set out in Appendixes 2\u20115 (columns A\u2011F). 7.  The situation of the applicants is structurally and contextually the same as in Bitt\u00f3 and Others v. Slovakia (no. 30255/09, 28 January 2014 (merits) and 7 July 2015 (just satisfaction) and three subsequently decided cases concerning the rent control\u2011scheme in Slovakia (Krahulec v. Slovakia, no. 19294/07; Bukov\u010danov\u00e1 and Others v. Slovakia, no. 23785/07; and Rudolfer v. Slovakia, no. 38082/07, all adopted on 5 July 2016). 8.  It is in dispute between the parties in the present case what amount of rent the applicants would be able to receive by letting their flats under free\u2011market conditions. By extension, that disagreement translates into an argument over the proportion of the market rent that the regulated rent represents. 9.  In that connection, the Government submitted an expert\u2019s opinion drawn up in 2010 in relation to all four applications (\u201cthe Government\u2019s expert opinion\u201d), according to which the monthly free-market rent for flats comparable to the applicants\u2019 was between 6.13 and 6.48 euro (EUR) per sq. m in the municipality of Bratislava-Star\u00e9 Mesto and EUR 5.05 and 5.35 per sq. m in the municipality of Bratislava-Nivy. The regulated rent in the flats owned by the applicants ranged between EUR 0.80 and 1.7 per sq. m. According to those calculations therefore, the regulated rent of the flats possessed by the applicants corresponded to some 14-26% of the market rent in 2010. The relevant data are set out in Appendixes 2\u20115 (columns G\u2011I). 10.  The applicants for their part relied on different sources of information to support their contention that the regulated rent was disproportionately low compared with similar flats to which the rent-control scheme did not apply. The data submitted by them are set out below separately in relation to each application. 11.  The applicants maintained that in 2007 the regulated rent ranged between EUR 76 and 84 a month whereas the average free-market rent for comparable flats in a similar location was EUR 956 a month. They submitted an expert\u2019s opinion which showed that the difference between the general rental value of the property and the regulated rent they actually received was EUR 88,431.53 for the period between 2000 and 2011. 12.  The applicants submitted that in 2010 the regulated rent for their flats amounted to EUR 95 and 105 a month, whereas the monthly free-market rent for comparable flats was EUR 616. They relied on data from the National Association of Real Estate Agencies (\u201cthe NAREA\u201d). Depending on the period and the relevant law in force, the regulated rent represented some 5-13% of the market rent for comparable flats in the area. They further submitted that the sum which they and the other co\u2011owners had invested in repairing the building was ten times the income they obtained from letting the flats under the rent\u2011control scheme. 13.  In 2008 the applicant was allowed to charge a monthly rent of EUR 40 to 60 for each of his flats. He submitted that the market rent in the same area in 2005 was between EUR 305 and EUR 366 a month for the single-room flat and between EUR 396 and EUR 488 a month for the two-room flats. He relied on information about average rental prices published in the press. 14.  The applicants submitted that the regulated rent for their flats ranged between EUR 38.5 and 104 a month in 2010. Relying on data from the NAREA, they maintained that the market rent for comparable flats in the area amounted to approximately EUR 616 a month.", "references": ["8", "0", "1", "4", "2", "5", "6", "7", "3", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1980 in Tetovo and lives in Golema Re\u010dica in the municipality of Tetovo in \u201cthe former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia\u201d. He arrived in Switzerland in 1989 via family reunification and was granted a permanent residence permit. 7.  On 1 July 1999 the applicant married a national of \u201cthe former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia\u201d, born in 1978, who arrived in Switzerland in 1990 and who also held a permanent residence permit. The couple has two children, born in 2001 and 2005, who are likewise nationals of \u201cthe former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia\u201d. 8.  After leaving school, the applicant did not undergo professional training, but worked in a variety of jobs, namely as a postman, mailman, plasterer and construction worker, with brief periods of unemployment. 9.  On 13 March 2003 the Zurich District Court convicted the applicant of embezzlement for having sold a rental car to a third person in September 2000 and gave him a suspended sentence of three months\u2019 imprisonment. 10.  On 16 December 2004 the Supreme Court of the Canton of Zurich convicted the applicant of homicide with indirect intent (Eventualvorsatz) and serious violations of the rules of road traffic. On 4 October 2000, while he was engaged in a car race on a public road with an acquaintance, the applicant, driving at a speed of at least 170 kilometres per hour, lost control of his car and crashed into a lamppost, which caused the death of his passenger. That court took the view that the applicant, by agreeing to engage in the race, had deliberately taken the risk of killing him. It found that the applicant had acted with a high degree of recklessness and sentenced him to five years and three months\u2019 imprisonment. 11.  The applicant\u2019s appeals against this conviction were dismissed by the Cantonal Court of Cassation on 10 December 2005 and by the Federal Supreme Court on 28 March 2006. 12.  On 25 April 2006 the applicant started serving his sentence. 13.  On 30 September 2007 the Hinwil District Office (Statthalteramt) sentenced the applicant to a fine of 120 Swiss Francs (CHF) for the purchase and consumption of marihuana. 14.  On 28 October 2009 the applicant was released on parole after having served two thirds of his sentence. 15.  On 27 July 2009, after having heard the applicant, the Migration Office of the Canton of Zurich revoked the applicant\u2019s permanent residence permit. It found that the conditions for revocation pursuant to, inter alia, Article 63 \u00a7 1 lit. a in conjunction with Article 62 lit. b of the Federal Act on Foreign Nationals (Ausl\u00e4ndergesetz, AuG, see relevant domestic law and practice paragraph 27 below) were met. After considering the circumstances of the case, it concluded that the public interest in the applicant\u2019s removal outweighed his interest in enjoying his family life with his wife and children in Switzerland. It ordered his expulsion pursuant to Article 66 \u00a7 1 of the Federal Act on Foreign Nationals. 16.  On 30 September 2009 the government (Regierungsrat) of the Canton of Zurich dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal lodged on 27 August 2009. 17.  On 10 February 2010 the Administrative Court of the Canton of Zurich dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal lodged on 20 October 2009. It considered that the applicant had committed a serious criminal offence, that he was not well integrated in Switzerland despite the length of his stay, that expert prognosis regarding the likelihood that he would reoffend was positive but did not rule out any such risk, that he spoke Albanian and was familiar with the culture in \u201cthe former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia\u201d, where he spent parts of his childhood and which he had visited since. It concluded that the decision to revoke his permanent residence permit was proportionate. Moreover, the court noted that the applicant\u2019s wife was a national of \u201cthe former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia\u201d as well, knew Albanian and the country\u2019s culture, and was not well integrated in Switzerland either. Observing that the couple\u2019s children were five and nine years old and thus of an adaptable age, it concluded that the applicant\u2019s wife and children could reasonably be expected to relocate to \u201cthe former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia\u201d with him. 18.  On 9 March 2010 the applicant appealed that decision, arguing that the decision to revoke his permanent residence permit was disproportionate. 19.  On 27 July 2010 the Federal Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. It considered that the main criminal offence, of which the applicant was convicted, intentional homicide, was a particularly serious one. While it acknowledged that he had lived in Switzerland for over twenty years, which had thus become the centre of his life, it found that he was neither professionally nor socially integrated. It considered that he had no stable employment, but considerable debts. Both he and his wife and children had benefitted significantly from social welfare. Moreover, the court considered that the applicant could reasonably (re-)integrate in \u201cthe former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia\u201d, considering that he spoke Albanian, was born there and had spent a part of his childhood there and had visited the country since. It observed that the same was true for his wife, who likewise originated from \u201cthe former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia\u201d, where she spent the first twelve years of her life and still had relatives. She knew Albanian and visited the country annually on holiday. At the same time, she was not well integrated in Switzerland as she did not undergo any professional training after leaving school, had received social welfare as from 2005 and only started to work in 2010. As far as their children were concerned, the court considered that they attended primary school and kindergarten, respectively, and were still of an adaptable age. The Federal Supreme Court concluded that the public interest in the applicant\u2019s removal outweighed the applicant\u2019s interest in remaining in Switzerland and enjoying respect for his family life there, also noting that his wife and children had a choice between either following him to \u201cthe former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia\u201d or remaining in Switzerland and maintaining contact through short but regular visits. 20.  On 16 October 2010 the applicant left Switzerland in compliance with the expulsion order. 21.  On 10 December 2010 the Federal Office for Migration issued an entry ban against the applicant for a period of nine years. 22.  In late 2011 the applicant\u2019s wife and children relocated to \u201cthe former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia\u201d to live with him. 23.  On 14 May 2013 the Federal Administrative Court, on the applicant\u2019s appeal, reduced the duration of the re-entry ban to seven years due to proportionality considerations. It found that the conditions in Article 67 \u00a7\u00a7 2 lit. a and 3 of the Federal Act on Foreign Nationals for the issuance of an entry ban for a period of more than five years were met (see relevant domestic law and practice paragraph 26). It considered that the offence committed by the applicant was particularly serious and that he continued to be a serious threat to public order, notwithstanding his mostly good behaviour since the commission of the offence and positive personality development. It noted that the applicant could ask for a temporary suspension of the entry ban for humanitarian or other important reasons (Article 67 \u00a7 5 of the Federal Act on Foreign Nationals) and that the applicant\u2019s wife, who originated from \u201cthe former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia\u201d herself, could visit him there together with their children and also maintain contact by various means of communication. 24.  In August 2015, i.e. after almost four years, the applicant\u2019s wife and children returned to Switzerland to avoid the expiry of their permanent residence permit pursuant to Article 61 \u00a7 2 of the Federal Act on Foreign Nationals (see relevant domestic law and practice paragraph 27) and because their socioeconomic living conditions in \u201cthe former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia\u201d were difficult. They live in Zurich.", "references": ["2", "4", "7", "8", "3", "1", "0", "9", "6", "5", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1980 and lives in the Kyiv Region. 6.  On 15 August 2006 the applicant got involved in a drunken brawl with a stranger and beat him to death. 7.  The date of his arrest cannot be established with certainty. According to the applicant, he was arrested on 20 August 2006. An internal police inquiry established the date as 22 August. The official arrest record gives the time and date of his arrest as 6.45 p.m. on 24 August. 8.  On 25 August 2006 the Sovetskiy District Court in Omsk remanded the applicant in custody. On the same day he was seen by a medical expert who noted two abrasions on his forehead that could have been caused by a solid blunt object four to six days prior to the examination. 9.  On 28 December 2006 the applicant was convicted of murder and sentenced to nine years\u2019 imprisonment in a high-security facility. 10.  On 21 January 2007 the applicant asked the prosecutor to investigate his allegation that police officers had beaten him up after his arrest. On 11 March 2008 the prosecutor refused institution of criminal proceedings. On the following day the decision was quashed and an additional inquiry was ordered. Since then the investigative authorities and courts issued and subsequently quashed at least eight decisions to open criminal proceedings into the alleged ill-treatment. Referring to the statements from three police officers and from the investigator all of whom denied any ill-treatment or intimidation, the decision of 31 December 2009 concluded that the applicant\u2019s allegations were unsubstantiated because the expert had determined his injuries to have been caused no later than 21 August, that is to say, three days prior to his arrest. On 28 July 2015 the prosecutor of the Sovetskiy District in Omsk annulled the decision of 31 December 2009 and ordered an additional inquiry which should establish whether or not the applicant had been brought to the police station already on 20 August 2006 and whether or not the specific police officer described by the applicant had been on duty on that day. 11.  Between 26 February 2007 and 30 October 2009 the applicant served the sentence in IK-9, a correctional institution in Omsk. The dormitory was crammed and in a poor state of repair. On the latter date the applicant was transferred to IK-3 where he stayed until 26 March 2010. The dormitories in which the applicant slept were overcrowded, affording at times no more than 1.5-1.7 sq. m per detainee. The access of natural light was restricted by plastic film covering the windows. The toilets, located in a separate building, were equipped with 7 pans for 600 detainees. On 26 March 2010 the applicant was transferred to LIU-2, a medical facility, where he appears to have stayed until the end of his sentence on 23 August 2015. The premises of the facility were overcrowded and afforded no more than 1.8 sq. m of space per detainee.", "references": ["4", "9", "7", "2", "6", "5", "3", "8", "0", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Krosno. 6.  From 29 April 1997 to 29 April 1999 he was employed by a Polish company which was carrying out construction work in Germany. The Polish workers were employed on the basis of the international agreement signed on 31 January 1990 between Poland and Germany on the secondment of workers of Polish companies to carry out construction work (Umowa mi\u0119dzy Rz\u0105dem Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej a Rz\u0105dem Republiki Federalnej Niemiec o oddelegowaniu pracownik\u00f3w polskich przedsi\u0119biorstw do realizacji um\u00f3w o dzie\u0142o z 31 stycznia 1990 r., Dz.U. 1994, Nr 98, Poz. 474). The rates of the applicant\u2019s pay were determined by an employment contract and the regulations which the contract referred to. 7.  On 16 July 1999 the applicant lodged a civil claim against his former employer for payment. He claimed that, instead of the rate of 8 or 8,5 German Marks (DEM) per hour which he had been receiving under his employment contract in the period from 29 April 1997 to 29 April 1999, he should have been receiving a higher rate of pay. Relying on the provisions of the above-mentioned international agreement, he claimed that he should have been receiving a rate comparable to that of the German workers occupying the same positions. 8.  On 19 June 2000 the Opole Regional Court gave a partial judgment in which it established that the applicant was entitled to the rates of pay fixed in the employment contract.\nThe court observed that the essential issue in the case was whether the applicant was entitled to a higher rate of pay, equivalent to that paid to the German employees working in similar positions at the material time. It was noted in this connection that the parties had not chosen to regulate the employment contract under German law. Instead Polish labour law was applicable.\nIn so far as the applicant relied on the provisions of the international agreement of 1990 (see paragraph 6 above) and argued that it should serve as the basis for setting his rate of pay, the court observed that this agreement was of a public-law character. Its object and purpose was to regulate relations between Poland and Germany in the construction market with a view to preventing unfair competition by Polish companies setting wages of construction workers working in Germany at too low a level, and to protect Polish workers against being paid too low a rate. 9.  The applicant appealed. He argued that the Opole Regional Court had violated the provisions of the Labour Code. In the applicant\u2019s opinion, the court\u2019s finding that the applicant\u2019s rates of pay were fixed in his employment contract was erroneous, because that contract did not contain any rates (only symbols which were not understood by the applicant). Besides, in his view, the court had violated the provisions of the above\u2011mentioned international agreement, according to which the rates of the applicant\u2019s pay should be comparable to those received by the German workers occupying the same positions. 10.  On 15 November 2000 the Court of Appeal quashed the first-instance partial judgment on account of its procedural shortcomings and remitted the case to the lower court. The Court of Appeal comprised three judges. Judge H.Sz. sat on the bench. He was not a judge rapporteur and he did not preside. 11.  The Court of Appeal found that in the applicant\u2019s case there were no grounds for delivering a partial judgment. It noted that a partial judgment could be delivered only when a part or some of the claims in a lawsuit had been sufficiently clarified for the decision. In the applicant\u2019s case there was only one claim and thus there had been no grounds for delivering the partial judgment.\nIn the final part of the written grounds for the judgment the Court of Appeal stated that the position of the Opole Regional Court as to the substance of the case was supported by the wording of the international agreements and existing domestic case-law. This part of the court\u2019s reasoning read as follows:\n\u201cAs to the substantive grounds for the court\u2019s legal view expressed in the judgment under appeal, it should be stated that it finds support in the content of the Agreement between the Governments of the Republic of Poland and the Federal Republic of Germany on the secondment of workers of Polish companies to carry out construction work (Journal of Laws 1998/84, items 474 and 475) as well as in the hitherto interpretation of this agreement in judicial decisions (see, e.g., III A Pa 29/00 Wroc\u0142aw Court of Appeal, decision of 31 May 2000).\u201d 12.  On 10 December 2002 the applicant challenged one of the judges, alleging his partiality. He further requested that the case be transferred to another town because, in his view, the judges were not impartial and the defendant company \u201chad enjoyed considerable influence in Opole.\u201d 13.  On 20 March 2003 the Wroc\u0142aw Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s request. 14.  On 5 April 2003 the applicant appealed. 15.  On 16 January 2004 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal, finding no grounds for the judges of the Opole Regional Court to step down. 16.  On 24 May 2004 the Opole Regional Court gave judgment granting the applicant\u2019s claim in part and dismissing the remainder. The Regional Court ordered the defendant company to pay the applicant the sum of 11,934 Polish zlotys (PLN) for unused leave. As to the rate of the applicant\u2019s pay, the court reiterated the reasoning of the judgment of 19 June 2000 and dismissed the claim (see paragraph 8 above). 17.  The applicant appealed. 18.  On 25 November 2004 the Wroc\u0142aw Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. The court accepted the reasoning of the first-instance court. 19.  On 20 January 2005 the applicant\u2019s lawyer lodged a cassation appeal on his behalf. 20.  On 29 November 2005 the Supreme Court examined the cassation appeal, quashed the challenged judgment and remitted the case to the Court of Appeal. 21.  The Supreme Court considered that the Polish-German agreement of 1990 was not a source of universally binding law and did not contain provisions applicable to labour relations. The agreement could not be regarded as constituting the legal basis for claims of employees concerning remuneration for their work. Moreover, Poland\u2019s accession to the European Union did not have an impact on the applicability of that agreement. Furthermore, the European Union law did not apply retroactively to situations predating Poland\u2019s accession.\nThe fact that employees\u2019 claims concerning the applicable minimum wages could not be regarded as having their legal basis in the said Polish\u2011German agreement did not mean, in the court\u2019s opinion, that those claims could not be raised upon the basis of employment contracts. In the Supreme Court\u2019s view, the Court of Appeal had not sufficiently clarified the meaning of those contracts in the light of statements made by the Polish company concerning the applicant\u2019s employment conditions and the obligations imposed on the company by the provisions of German law to which those statements referred. 22.  On 8 December 2006 the Wroc\u0142aw Court of Appeal, having taken into account the recommendations of the Supreme Court, again dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal lodged against the Regional Court\u2019s judgment of 24 May 2004. The court reiterated that the applicant was entitled to the rates of pay fixed in his employment contract. 23.  On 28 March 2007 the applicant lodged a further cassation appeal with the Supreme Court.\nHe first raised substantive arguments. He averred that the Opole Regional Court had disregarded the provisions of the Labour Code. In the applicant\u2019s opinion, the court\u2019s finding that his hourly rate of pay had been fixed in his employment contract had been erroneous, because that contract had not contained any rates (only symbols which the applicant had not been able to understand). Besides, in his view, the court had disregarded the provisions of the applicable international agreement (see paragraphs 6 and 8 above), according to which the applicant\u2019s rate of pay should have been comparable to that received by the German workers occupying the same positions.\nHe further complained that the appellate court had failed to take heed of the interpretation of the applicable law expressed by the Supreme Court in its previous judgment as to the applicable rate of the applicant\u2019s salary.\nIt was further argued that the court had failed to take into consideration the evidence gathered in the case. The court had also erred when refusing to allow certain requests for evidence to be taken.\nThe applicant further complained that in the written grounds for its judgment the Court of Appeal had failed to provide reasons for which it had disregarded the interpretation of relevant applicable provisions made in the past by the Supreme Court \u2013 a substantive question which had been crucial for the outcome of the case. 24.  On 14 May 2008 the Supreme Court, sitting as a bench of three judges, dismissed the applicant\u2019s cassation appeal.\nJudge H.Sz., who had sat on the bench of the Court of Appeal deciding the case on 15 November 2000, had in the meantime been promoted to the Supreme Court. He sat on the bench of the Supreme Court. He was not a judge rapporteur and he did not preside.\nThe Supreme Court noted that the appellate court, contrary to the applicant\u2019s objection, had followed the interpretation of the applicable law expressed by the earlier judgment of the Supreme Court (pronounced on 29 November 2005) given in the same case. In this judgment the Supreme Court had confirmed that the international agreement referred to by the applicant could not be regarded as a legal source of employees\u2019 and employers\u2019 rights and obligations. The appellate court\u2019s decision had followed this view and it had confirmed that the substantive provisions of that agreement had not applied to the setting of the applicant\u2019s rate of pay, which had been fixed by his employment contract. 25.  The Supreme Court stressed that in his cassation appeal the applicant raised the same complaint which had already been made in his earlier cassation appeal. This was inadmissible as under section 39820 of the Code of Civil Procedure (see paragraph 33 below) it was not allowed to found a cassation appeal against a judgment rendered after a new examination of a case upon complaints contrary to the interpretation previously established by the Supreme Court dealing with the earlier cassation appeal lodged in the same case. 26.  Additionally, the Supreme Court noted that the interpretation made by the lower courts of the applicant\u2019s contract of employment, seen as a whole, had taken into account the applicant\u2019s employer\u2019s declarations submitted to the German authorities and also a wealth of other evidence in so far as it had been relevant for the determination of the applicant\u2019s working conditions and remuneration. 27.  The Supreme Court further observed that the applicant\u2019s remuneration had been set at the level of the minimal remuneration of German employees performing similar work determined on the basis of the Law on Collective Bargaining. 28.  In so far as the applicant complained in his cassation appeal of the alleged failure of the courts to take further evidence and of the assessment of the evidence they had carried out, those complaints could not be examined in the context of those proceedings. It was not the task of the Supreme Court in cassation proceedings to act as an ordinary court of appeal and to examine issues concerning the admissibility and assessment of evidence and the factual findings made by the lower courts.", "references": ["4", "8", "5", "1", "6", "0", "9", "2", "7", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "7.  The applicant was born in 1988 in Margilan, Uzbekistan. He arrived in Russia on 2 October 2014. 8.  On 5 September 2014 the applicant was charged in absentia with participation in the extremist religious movement Hizb ut-Tahrir al Islami and activities threatening the constitutional order. On the same day the authorities ordered his pre-trial detention and issued an international search and arrest warrant bearing his name. 9.  On 24 December 2014 the applicant was arrested in Moscow. On 26 December 2014 the Cheremushkinskiy District Court of Moscow ordered and subsequently prolonged his detention. 10.  On 22 January 2015 the applicant was further charged with organising a local branch of Hizb ut-Tahri al Islami in one of the regions of Uzbekistan. 11.  On 23 January 2015 the Uzbek prosecution authorities requested the applicant\u2019s extradition on the above charges. The request included assurances regarding the proper treatment of the applicant, which were formulated in standard terms. 12.  On 21 May 2015 the applicant\u2019s extradition in respect of certain charges was authorised by the Deputy Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation. 13.  The applicant challenged this decision in the courts, arguing that he belonged to a vulnerable group and therefore faced a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 at the hands of the Uzbek authorities. 14.  On 13 October 2015 his appeals were dismissed by a final decision of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. Without reference to any relevant evidentiary material, the Supreme Court considered that the applicant\u2019s claims were hypothetical and lacked specific indications regarding the level of risk, and observed that the situation in a requesting state might change over time. It also found that the assurances of the Uzbek authorities were satisfactory. 15.  On 5 June 2015 the applicant lodged a request for refugee status, referring to persecution in Uzbekistan on religious grounds. 16.  On 9 November 2015 his request was refused by a final administrative decision of the migration authorities. The applicant challenged this decision in the courts, referring inter alia to the risk of ill\u2011treatment. 17.  On 18 May 2016 his appeals were dismissed by a decision of Moscow City Court. 18.  On 25 December 2015 the Meshchanskiy District Court of Moscow ordered the applicant\u2019s expulsion for violating the migration rules. The applicant\u2019s appeal, which referred to the risk of ill-treatment, amongst other factors, was dismissed by the Moscow City Court on 24 February 2016. 19.  On 16 February 2016 the applicant applied for temporary asylum. No information concerning the outcome of these proceedings was supplied by the parties.", "references": ["3", "5", "0", "8", "4", "9", "7", "6", "2", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1961, 1963 and 1966 respectively and live in the town of Taganrog. 6.  On 2 July 2001 the Neklinovskiy District Court of the Rostov Region found the applicants guilty of various offences but declared that they need not serve their respective sentences because the case was time-barred. On 2 October 2001 the Rostov Regional Court upheld the judgment on appeal. 7.  On 31 January 2002 the Presidium of the Rostov Regional Court quashed by way of supervisory review the decisions of 2 July and 2 October 2001 and discontinued criminal proceedings against the applicants. It found that the courts had not been in a position to decide on the applicants\u2019 guilt because the whole case had been time-barred. 8.  The applicants sued the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation for, among other things, compensation in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage in connection with their prosecution. 9.  In its judgment of 1 March 2005 the Taganrog Town Court of the Rostov Region rejected their claims. It reasoned as follows:\n\u201c... The court finds that, since the applicants\u2019 guilt of the commission of the above\u2011mentioned crimes was established, the use of the measure of restraint was justified. This being so, the court has no reason to grant the applicants\u2019 claims for compensation in respect of the non-pecuniary damage resulting from their unlawful detention and the obligation not to leave their usual place of residence. ...\u201d 10.  On 11 May 2005 the Rostov Regional Court upheld the judgment of 1 March 2005 on appeal. It stated that:\n\u201c ... The first instance court, in reaching its decision refusing to grant the applicants\u2019 claims for compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage, correctly assumed that the decision of the Presidium of the Rostov Regional Court dated 31 January 2002 cleared them of liability on non-exonerating grounds. In the court\u2019s view, since the applicants\u2019 guilt of the commission of the above-mentioned crimes was established, the application of the measure of restraint during the investigation was justified.\nThe court\u2019s conclusion is a correct one, made following the examination and proper assessment of the legally relevant circumstances of the case. ...\u201d", "references": ["0", "1", "9", "6", "4", "2", "5", "8", "7", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1976 and lives in Bia\u0142ystok. 6.  The applicant is deaf and mute. He uses sign language to communicate with other people. 7.  The applicant and A.N. married on 20 August 2005. A.N. suffers from a hearing impairment and has had a hearing implant fitted. She communicates both orally and through sign language. 8.  The son (S.N.) of the applicant and A.N. was born on 10 December 2006. He also suffers from a hearing impairment. In February 2007 the applicant and his wife separated. On 11 June 2007 A.N. filed a petition for divorce. 9.  In the course of the divorce proceedings, on 19 July 2007 the Bia\u0142ystok Regional Court issued an interim decision on the applicant\u2019s contact with his son. Under that decision, the applicant could visit his son every Tuesday and Thursday between 4 p.m. and 6 p.m. and every Sunday between 2 p.m. and 5 p.m. at the child\u2019s place of residence and without the presence of any third parties. 10.  The court ordered experts from the Bia\u0142ystok office of the Family Consultation Centre (Rodzinny O\u015brodek Diagnostyczno-Konsultacyjny \u2011\u201cthe RODK\u201d) to prepare an opinion on the suitable form and frequency of the applicant\u2019s contact with his son. In the course of his interview with the experts, the applicant underlined his commitment to maintaining contact with the child, without giving any details. The experts established that the applicant had not been visiting his son as frequently as he was allowed under the interim decision of 19 July 2007. The last contact had occurred on 25 August 2007. 11.  In their opinion, dated 15 October 2007, the experts underlined that the emotional ties between the mother and the child were strong and natural. However, the ties between the applicant and his son were weak and superficial. In the view of the experts, taking into account the necessity to ensure the proper development of the child, contact between the applicant and the child should take place four times a month and last two hours on each occasion. 12.  On 15 November 2007 the Bia\u0142ystok Regional Court granted a decree of divorce without ascribing blame for the breakdown of the marriage. In its judgment the court also ruled that parental authority should be exercised by both parents and that the child should reside with the mother. It further ruled that the applicant had a right to see his son on the first three Fridays of each month from 4 p.m. until 6 p.m. and on every fourth Sunday of each month from 11 a.m. until 1 p.m. Contact should take place at the mother\u2019s home in her discreet presence but in the absence of third parties. The applicant was further ordered to pay child maintenance. 13.  It appears that neither of the parties appealed against the judgment, which consequently became final on 6 December 2007. 14.  In August 2011 the applicant filed an application with the Bia\u0142ystok District Court for a change to his contact arrangements. He asked the court to be allowed to have contact with his son on every second and fourth weekend of each month from 3 p.m. on Friday until 6 p.m. on Sunday, away from the mother\u2019s home. He also asked to be allowed to see his son for some time over the Christmas and Easter periods and to spend with him half of the winter holidays and half of the summer school holidays. The applicant argued that the child had already reached the age of five and needed increased contact with his father in order to strengthen their ties. 15.  The applicant admitted that after the divorce he had not seen his son for one year on account of his health problems. He submitted that his son was happy to spend time with him and to play with him. The applicant asserted that he had been able to provide appropriate care to his son and that in the event of need he could count on the support of his family. It was the mother of the child who had obstructed his contact with the child and made the atmosphere unfriendly. For example, she refused to pass on oral messages from their son to the applicant. The mother did not inform him about important decisions concerning the child and tried to marginalise him. 16.  The mother submitted that the applicant had remained passive during his meeting with S.N. and that she had not obstructed those meetings. In her view, S.N. did not have any emotional ties with his father and did not need contact with him. Further, the applicant would be unable to properly care for S.N. The mother lived together with her parents and her son. 17.  On 4 November 2011 a court guardian submitted a report to the court. According to that report, the applicant had not been visiting his son regularly on account of his being treated for depression and other illnesses. He had not seen his son since 12 October 2011. However, the mother of the applicant had been visiting her grandson regularly. 18.  On 15 March 2012 the applicant applied for an interim decision and asked for the right to have contact with his son during the second day of the Easter holidays, from 10 a.m. to 5 p.m., and to take him away from his place of residence. On 23 March 2012 the Bia\u0142ystok District Court issued an interim decision allowing the applicant to visit his son during the second day of the Easter holidays from 11 a.m. to 1 p.m. at the child\u2019s place of residence. 19.  On 30 April 2012 the RODK issued an opinion commissioned by the District Court. It had been prepared by a psychologist, an education specialist and a psychiatrist who had met the parents and the child and had been assisted by an interpreter of sign language. The experts stated that emotional ties between the mother and the child were strong \u2013 indeed, the mother had a tendency to be overprotective. The child\u2019s ties with the father were superficial and weak. The child recognised the applicant as his father but did not consider him a part of his family. The father\u2019s ties with the child were positive, but founded on limited experience and high expectations. These ties were also affected by the communication difficulties between them. The experts further noted that the conflict between the parents impeded their cooperation with regard to the child. They suggested that the parents be counselled by a specialist with a view to their being taught how to accept each other as a parent. 20.  The experts opined that an increase in contact, as requested by the applicant, was not advisable, on account of the limited level of communication between him and the child, the child\u2019s age and history, and the strength of the child\u2019s ties with the mother and maternal grandparents. They recommended, however, that contact should also take place outside the mother\u2019s home (at playgrounds, during walks) but in her presence. The mother should cooperate with the father and support him in making his contact with the child more diverse. The experts noted that the ability of the applicant to care independently for his son was considerably limited. In their view, the interests of the child required that the parents cooperate with each other, despite the communication problems. The experts added that the mother should be more proactive in this regard but that the father should not contest the mother\u2019s decisions concerning the child. 21.  The applicant contested the experts\u2019 findings and alleged that the opinion should have been prepared with the assistance of a specialist in deaf education and a psychologist specialising in the needs of deaf people. He claimed that their finding that contact could not take place without the presence of the mother on account of his (that is to say the applicant\u2019s) disability amounted to discrimination. The experts had also disregarded the possibility of the paternal grandmother rendering assistance and of ordering the parents to undergo family therapy. 22.  The District Court heard evidence from the RODK experts. The psychologist, G.H., admitted that the RODK did not have specialised methods of examining deaf people but stated that such methods were not necessary in respect of determining the advisability of maintaining contact. She noted that the child was well-developed and rehabilitated (zrehabilitowanym). The main obstacle in respect of contact was the conflict between the parents and the lack of cooperation between them. Such circumstances created a particular difficulty in the case of a child with a hearing impairment. The psychologist observed that the applicant\u2019s disability also constituted an objective obstacle. In her opinion, contact should take place two to three times a month. 23.  The court dismissed the applicant\u2019s request for a second expert opinion since the earlier opinion was complete and comprehensive. 24.  The court also heard the parties and witnesses (family members). It further took into account information submitted by a court guardian after visiting the applicant\u2019s and the mother\u2019s respective homes, together with relevant documentary evidence. 25.  On 9 August 2012 the Bia\u0142ystok District Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s application for a change to the contact arrangements. 26.  The court established that the parents of S.N. remained in conflict and could not reach an agreement regarding the child\u2019s contact with the father. Since September 2009 the child had attended a nursery school with an integration unit, where he had remained under the supervision of a specialist in deaf education, a speech therapist and a psychologist. He suffered from a hearing impairment and used a hearing aid. The child required specialised medical care and followed a rehabilitation programme. He was certified as having a second-degree disability. 27.  Having regard to all the evidence, and in particular the expert opinion, the court found that the requested change to the contact arrangements would not be in the child\u2019s best interests. It was true that the first decision in respect of contact had been given five years previously, when S.N. had been a baby and when the presence of his mother during contact had been justified by the child\u2019s age. However, the age of the child was not the only element to consider. Other relevant elements were the specifics of the child\u2019s development, his state of health, his disability, the need for his permanent medical rehabilitation and his heavy dependence on his mother and maternal grandparents. The court found that these elements still justified the discreet presence of the mother and at her home during the applicant\u2019s contact visits. It noted that the requested change to the contact arrangements would be too far-reaching, since the applicant wanted to see his son more often, outside S.N.\u2019s place of residence and without the mother being present. The court observed that except for the first two months of the child\u2019s life the applicant had not lived with him or cared for him. The applicant admitted that he had not always kept to scheduled visits. Sometimes the reasons for this had been beyond his control (health problems or evening school commitments) and sometimes contact had been obstructed by the mother. However, in consequence, his limited and irregular involvement in the child\u2019s life had adversely influenced the emotional ties between the father and the son. 28.  The court underlined that the applicant had not been fully availing himself of his rights to contact his son, as granted by the divorce judgment. Nonetheless, once their ties were strengthened and the applicant made full use of the rights already granted to him, it would be possible to extend contact. 29.  The court also found that it could not disregard the communication problems between the applicant and his son. It did not agree with the applicant that this constituted a discriminatory measure against him; rather, it constituted an objective and independent factor that hampered his communication with the child. The applicant, irrespective of his own and his son\u2019s disability, had an incontestable right to contact with his son. However, the communication problem should be taken into account in regulating the contact arrangements so they would remain as favourable as possible to the child. The court noted that the applicant used mostly sign language (and articulated a few single words), while the child communicated only orally, so communication difficulties naturally arose. For this reason, it was still justifiable that the mother, who was able both to use sign language and communicate orally, should be present during the applicant\u2019s visits. The mother\u2019s presence, which provided the child with a sense of security, could also help him to relax during his meetings with the father. The court disagreed with the applicant that the paternal grandmother could ensure proper communication between him and his son. The issue was not only about interpreting between sign language and speech but also about ensuring security and stability, which could only be provided by the mother. The applicant\u2019s son did not know his paternal grandmother well and so her presence would not compensate for the absence of his mother. 30.  The court underlined that the applicant\u2019s contact with his son should first and foremost ensure the security and stability of the child. The stress to which he would be exposed in the event of a change to his current environment and in the absence of persons with whom he usually spent his time would certainly jeopardise the child\u2019s well-being and damage his sense of security. The court dismissed the applicant\u2019s argument that the child spent most of his day in a nursery school (that is to say outside his home and without his mother), so he could easily stay at the applicant\u2019s father\u2019s home. It noted that the mother had been preparing her son for nursery school over a long period of time and had at first attended the school with him for short periods of time so he could become familiar with the place. 31.  The court observed that the child\u2019s paternal grandmother had not visited her grandson for some time and was therefore not a person with whom the child was familiar or who could assist as an interpreter between the applicant and his son. 32.  The fact that the child had been paying short unsupervised visits to a neighbour of the mother\u2019s family did not support the applicant\u2019s argument either. The court noted that the neighbour was a familiar person to the child, since he had been regularly visiting the child\u2019s family. In addition, the unsupervised visits to the neighbour\u2019s flat did not last longer than one hour. 33.  Lastly, the court did not consider it necessary to impose an obligation on the parents to undergo family therapy. It noted that the experts had opined that both parents required contact with a specialist who would assist them in mutually accepting each other as a parent. However, the only suitable place for such therapy for persons with impaired hearing was the premises of a foundation (fundacja) attached to the nursery school attended by the child. The mother stated that she already attended a parent support group there and the applicant declared that he could do the same. In these circumstances, the court found that there was no need for its intervention. 34.  The applicant lodged an appeal with the Bia\u0142ystok Regional Court. He argued that the District Court had failed to respect the principle of non-discrimination against deaf and mute persons by dismissing his application for unsupervised contact with his son. He invoked Article 4 \u00a7 1 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. The applicant further argued that the lower court had erred in holding that the child\u2019s interests did not justify a change to contact arrangements. The expert opinion indicated that the presence of the mother during contact created tensions between the parents and that this was unfavourable to the child. In addition, according to some witnesses, the contact took place in the presence of third parties. 35.  The applicant contested the lower court\u2019s finding that the child\u2019s paternal grandmother was a stranger to him; he argued that the child would not be exposed to stress in the event of contact without the mother\u2019s presence and outside her home in view of the fact that the child attended nursery school and was cared by a neighbour a few times a week. Lastly, the applicant contested the refusal to order a supplementary expert opinion. 36.  On 23 November 2012 the Bia\u0142ystok Regional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. It found that the lower\u2019s court assessment of the evidence had been correct and that the refusal to order a supplementary expert opinion had been justified. 37.  The Regional Court noted that the contact arrangements could be amended if the interests of the child so required (Article 1135 of the Family Code). It concurred with the lower court that there was no justification for a change to the existing arrangements since the applicant already had the possibility of regular contact with his son and if used this would enable the parties to strengthen their ties. The findings of the RODK experts clearly supported the conclusion that no change was necessary. The Regional Court also agreed that the existing conflict between the parents would certainly prevent the applicant from benefitting from increased contact. It stressed that the priority of the court in such cases was to take into account the interests of the child, not the interests of either of his or her parents. 38.  It further underlined that the presence of the mother during visits was necessary in order to ensure the child\u2019s sense of security since the mother was the primary carer, with strong ties to the child. The paternal grandmother could not provide the same sense of security. In addition, the mother\u2019s presence would solve the problem of communication between the applicant and the child. The Regional Court did not agree with the applicant that the lower court\u2019s taking into account the issue of communication barrier had amounted to discrimination against him. The communication barrier was a real obstacle to the forging of ties between the applicant and his son and it could not be disregarded, given that the interests of the child were of primary consideration, overriding the individual interests of the parents. The Regional Court stressed that this constituted an objective obstacle, not a form of discrimination against the applicant. 39.  In July 2011 A.N. brought an action in the Bia\u0142ystok District Court for an order limiting the scope of the applicant\u2019s parental authority over S.N. to those issues that concerned their son\u2019s education. She submitted that the applicant had refused to give his consent to an identity document being issued for the child. 40.  In October 2011 the applicant brought a counteraction seeking an order to compel A.N. to undergo family therapy. He argued that A.N. was acting to the child\u2019s detriment by refusing to cooperate with the applicant in matters concerning the child. She also humiliated and insulted the applicant in the child\u2019s presence and undermined his authority. 41.  On 2 August 2012 the Bia\u0142ystok District Court restricted the applicant\u2019s parental authority over S.N. to issues concerning his education. It dismissed the applicant\u2019s counteraction. 42.  The court relied on the opinion prepared by the experts of the RODK for the purposes of the proceedings. The experts concluded that the joint exercise of parental authority was practically impossible. The reason for this was the permanent conflict between the parents, as well as the communication difficulties. The experts recommended that both parents undergo therapy with a view to developing their parenting skills. They further pointed out that that the possibility of communication between the applicant and his son was significantly restricted because of the different method that each used to communicate. In the view of the experts, the mother of the child properly exercised her parental authority, in particular with respect to the child\u2019s needs, the necessity of treatment, and the development of the child\u2019s social skills. 43.  Having regard to the evidence, the court found that it was justifiable to restrict the applicant\u2019s parental authority and limit it only to matters concerning the child\u2019s education. Its decision was motivated by the lack of agreement between the parents in respect of the exercise of parental authority. The applicant was not to be solely blamed for this situation. Furthermore, communication with the applicant was limited on account of his disability; however, the mother had been aware of this fact since the beginning of their relationship. The court further took into account the fact that the child was being raised by the mother, the parents lived apart, and there was a communication barrier between the applicant and the child. This was of importance in respect of matters concerning the child\u2019s health.\nThe court underlined that the fact that communication between the applicant and his son was limited did not mean that the applicant was a bad father. The court found that it was not necessary to give the applicant the possibility to have a say in matters concerning the child\u2019s medical treatment since these were sometimes urgent \u2013 therefore, it was the mother, with whom the child lived, who should decide on them. 44.  With regard to the applicant\u2019s request for the mother to be obliged to undergo family therapy, the court did not find this justified. It took into account the fact that the mother had already been attending a support group and found no reasons to formally oblige her to undergo therapy. It was established that the mother had independently taken important decisions concerning the child of which she had not informed the applicant and that she was overprotective. Nonetheless, the court found that she properly exercised her parental authority and that the child\u2019s welfare was not endangered. 45.  The applicant appealed. 46.  On 23 November 2012 the Bia\u0142ystok Regional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. It underlined that the court of first instance had comprehensively assessed the evidence in the case. In the view of the Regional Court, the limitation of the applicant\u2019s parental authority was in the interests of the child. It ruled that the communication barrier constituted an objective obstacle to relations between the applicant and his son and that taking it into account could not be considered to constitute a form of discrimination against the applicant.", "references": ["8", "6", "0", "2", "9", "3", "5", "7", "1", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1988 and is detained in Saransk. 5.  On 3 August 2009 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of the rape of a girl, who was also a minor. 6.  On 5 August 2009 the Staroshaygovskiy District Court of the Mordovia Republic remanded him in custody. He remained in pre-trial detention pending investigation and trial on the grounds that he was accused of a serious crime, might reoffend, abscond, destroy evidence, threaten witnesses, or interfere with the investigation. 7.  On 24 December 2010 the Supreme Court of the Mordovia Republic found him guilty as charged. 8.  On 4 October 2010 the applicant, acting for himself, submitted his first letter to the Court. 9.  On 4 August and 4 October 2010 he provided two powers of attorney authorising Mr Frimu, one of his cellmates, to represent him before the Court.", "references": ["0", "9", "5", "6", "3", "4", "1", "8", "7", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicants were born in 1976 and 1978 respectively and live in Basle. 7.  The first applicant, who was born in Turkey, moved to Switzerland at the age of 10. On completing a business-studies course in Basle, he returned temporarily to Turkey to attend classes in Islamic studies; while there, he met the second applicant, who became his wife. She moved to Switzerland in 1999 under the provisions for family reunion. When the present application was lodged she was on a training course to become a playgroup leader (Spielgruppenleiterin). The first applicant speaks fluent Swiss German. 8.  Three daughters were born to the applicants, on 8 July 1999, 22 June 2001 and 7 July 2006 respectively. The present application concerns only the first two daughters. They were initially enrolled in the Vogelsang primary school in Basle. The eldest daughter subsequently attended an \u201corientation school\u201d (Orientierungsschule, between the primary and secondary levels). 9.  Swimming lessons are part of the compulsory school curriculum; under the applicable legislation in the canton of Basle Urban, pupils cannot be exempted until they reach puberty (see paragraph 27 below). This fact was brought to the applicants\u2019 attention on 11 August 2008 through a recommendation entitled \u201cGuidelines on dealing with religious matters in schools\u201d (see paragraph 27 below). The applicants, who are devout Muslims, refused to send their daughters to the swimming lessons on the grounds that their beliefs prohibited them from allowing their children to take part in mixed swimming lessons. They stated that although the Koran did not instruct women to cover their bodies until puberty, their beliefs required them to prepare their daughters for the precepts that would be applied to them from that point onwards. As the holders of parental responsibility for their daughters, the applicants alleged that there been a violation of their own rights. 10.  By a letter of 13 August 2008, the Public Education Department of the Canton of Basle Urban (Erziehungsdepartement des Kantons Basel-Stadt) advised the applicants that under section 91 (9) of the Education Act of the Canton of Basle Urban (see paragraph 24 below), they were liable to a maximum fine of 1,000 Swiss francs (CHF) (around 923 euros (EUR)) each if their daughters did not comply with the obligation to attend school. 11.  On 30 March 2010 the head teacher of the school held a meeting with the applicants in order to resolve the situation. The applicants continued to refuse to send their daughters to the swimming lessons. By letters of 30 March and 4 May 2010, the applicants were again invited to send their daughters to the swimming lessons. In spite of these attempts by the school, the applicants\u2019 daughters continued to be absent from the swimming lessons. 12.  On 4 May and 14 June 2010 the school authorities asked the Head of the Public Education Department to open fixed-penalty proceedings against the applicants. On 17 June 2010 the applicants were invited to comment again as part of those proceedings. 13.  By a letter of 28 July 2010, the education authorities ordered the applicants to pay a fine of CHF 350 (about EUR 323) per parent and per child (a total of CHF 1,400 CHF \u2013 about EUR 1,292) for acting in breach of their parental duties (see section 91 (8) and (9) of the Education Act of the Canton of Basle Urban, paragraph 24 below). 14.  An appeal by the applicants against that decision was dismissed by the Court of Appeal of the Canton of Basle Urban (Appellationsgericht des Kantons Basel-Stadt) on 30 May 2011. 15.  Drawing on its leading decision of 24 October 2008 (see Federal Supreme Court judgment 135 I 79; paragraph 29 below), the Federal Supreme Court, by a judgment of 7 March 2012, dismissed an appeal by the applicants, holding that the authorities\u2019 refusal to exempt their daughters from mixed swimming lessons in primary school had not breached the applicants\u2019 right to freedom of conscience and belief. 16.  It accepted that this refusal represented a breach of freedom of religion. Nonetheless, it considered that the swimming lessons formed part of the compulsory school curriculum in the Canton of Basle Urban and that this obligation had a sufficiently solid legal basis. It cited, firstly, section 22 of the Education Act of the Canton of Basle Urban, which stated that gymnastics was one of the compulsory lessons in primary school, and section 139 of the same Act, stating that at least three hours of the pupils\u2019 weekly timetable was to be spent in physical education. It also held that, under section 17 of the Act, boys and girls at primary-school level were, in principle, to attend classes together. It further stated that, in accordance with section 68 of the Act, the precise organisation of this subject, especially the various lessons and the number of hours allocated to them, was set out in the curriculum, point 9.2.4 of which provided that swimming formed part of compulsory gymnastics and sports lessons. 17.  The Federal Supreme Court then pointed out that pupils could be exempted from lessons or from certain subjects, and any such decision was to be taken by the school authorities at the request of teachers or of persons responsible for the children\u2019s education (section 66 (5) and (6) of the Education Act; see paragraph 24 below). It noted that detailed information on exemptions was set out in point 34 of the School Regulations (Schulordnung) of the Canton of Basle Urban, and that the arrangements for dealing with religious issues in schools were included in a Recommendation (Handreichung) that had been issued by the Education Department of the Canton of Basle Urban in September 2007. It added that, under point 5.1 of that recommendation, exemption from swimming classes could only be granted to pupils who had reached the age of puberty. It also indicated that from the sixth year of school (that is, generally when pupils had reached the age of twelve), girls and boys attended physical education and swimming lessons separately (point 5.3 of the recommendation). 18.  The Federal Supreme Court further held that the applicants\u2019 argument that the recommendation had no legal validity was irrelevant in this case, in so far as, in its view, the recommendation was in any event merely a tool to assist in balancing the competing interests involved in reaching a decision on an exemption request. It also considered the fact that swimming was not taught in all the canton\u2019s schools and that ice-skating, which also appeared as a lesson in the curriculum, was not taught at all in practice, to be irrelevant in assessing the legal basis.\nThe Federal Supreme Court accordingly concluded that the measure had a valid legal basis. 19.  As to the public interest and the proportionality of the interference, the Federal Supreme Court upheld the lower court\u2019s judgment to the effect that it was of paramount importance to ensure that children were integrated, irrespective of their origin, culture or religion. It further considered that the interference was lessened by the fact that the swimming lessons were mixed only until the age of puberty, and that the impact of the measure was attenuated by the accompanying measures (separate changing rooms and showers, and the option of wearing a burkini). 20.  The Federal Supreme Court also found irrelevant the applicants\u2019 argument that their children were receiving private swimming lessons, holding that what was at stake for the children was not simply learning to swim, but also submitting to the conditions surrounding the teaching itself (\u00e4ussere Bedingungen des Unterrichts). It held that the school\u2019s function of social integration, valid in respect of all pupils, required that exemptions for swimming classes be granted only sparingly. The refusal to grant an exemption in the present case thus corresponded to its new practice, according to which educational obligations were, in principle, to be recognised as prevailing over compliance with the religious precepts (religi\u00f6se Gebote) of one part of the population. For that reason, the comparison with exemptions granted for medical reasons was also irrelevant. 21.  Having regard to the foregoing factors, the Federal Supreme Court concluded that the refusal to grant an exemption from the mixed swimming classes had not breached the applicants\u2019 right to freedom of religion.", "references": ["1", "4", "7", "6", "8", "5", "0", "3", "2", "9", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicants, Dorina and Viorel-Aurel[2] Ioni\u021b\u0103, were born in 1976 and 1972 respectively and live in Br\u0103ila. 6.  On 7 November 2005 the applicants\u2019 son, aged four years and nine months at that time, underwent surgery for the removal of polyps, which was performed by Dr C.B. in the State-run Br\u0103ila Emergency Hospital. 7.  Dr C.B. decided to perform the operation under general anaesthetic with tracheal intubation. The general anaesthesia was performed by Dr P.A, assisted by P.V.I., a staff nurse. 8.  After surgery the child was immediately transferred to the intensive care unit. Ten minutes after his transfer P.V.I. informed Dr P.A that the child was cyanotic and had no pulse. 9.  The child suffered a haemorrhage, causing blood to flood his lungs. A team of doctors tried to resuscitate him and clear his respiratory channels, but without any success. The child was declared dead two hours after the operation. 10.  A criminal investigation into the cause of death was opened by the Br\u0103ila police on the same day. 11.  Dr C.B. and Dr P.A. were questioned and gave written statements. 12.  An autopsy report issued by the Br\u0103ila Forensic Service (Serviciul de medicin\u0103 legal\u0103 Br\u0103ila) on 8 November 2005 said that the applicants\u2019 son had died of acute respiratory failure as a result of the blood that had blocked his airways and flooded his lungs. It also noted that the child had suffered from several congenital deficiencies which had probably played a role in the post\u2011operative complications: myocardia and hepatic dystrophy, and interatrial septum aneurisms. 13.  The report was sent for the approval of the commission for confirmation and supervision of the Ia\u015fi Forensic Institute (Comisia de avizare \u0219i control din cadrul IMF Ia\u015fi). On 5 May 2006 the commission confirmed that the child\u2019s death had occurred after surgery and had been caused by the blood that had blocked his airways and lungs. It held that there had been a causal link between the post-operative treatment and the child\u2019s death. It noted the deflation of the balloon of the catheter (balona\u015ful sondei de \u00eentuba\u0163ie), applied after post-operatively to prevent the ingress of blood into the lungs, as a possible cause of the presence of blood there and in his airways. 14.  On 12 October 2006 the superior commission of the Mina Minovici Forensic Institute examined all the documents and approved the conclusions of the commission for confirmation and supervision of the Ia\u015fi Forensic Institute. 15.  On 8 November 2005 the child\u2019s father lodged a disciplinary complaint against Dr C.B. and Dr P.A. 16.  The disciplinary committee of the Br\u0103ila College of Doctors opened an investigation into the patient\u2019s death, collecting documents from the patient\u2019s medical file and taking statements from Dr C.B. and Dr P.A., as well as from the doctors involved in the resuscitation procedure post\u2011operation. It gave its decision on 9 July 2007 by which it concluded that the child\u2019s death could be included among cases of sudden death (with a frequency of 2-4 % owing to the child\u2019s pre-existing medical conditions: myocardia and hepatic dystrophy, and inter-atrial septum aneurisms). Although the committee concluded that there had been no direct link between the child\u2019s death and the doctors\u2019 medical conduct, it reprimanded both doctors for their failure to perform the necessary pre-surgical medical tests and to seek the applicants\u2019 informed consent before surgery. 17.  The applicants objected to the committee\u2019s conclusions and their appeal was examined by the superior disciplinary committee of the National College of Doctors. 18.  An expert medical opinion was submitted to the committee and was used by it in reaching its final conclusions. The expert noted, among other things, that the child\u2019s preparation for surgery had not been appropriate as his examination before anaesthesia had been \u201cvery superficial\u201d; in this respect the committee noted the lack of a radioscopy of the lungs, of an EKG and an exploration of the necessary time for blood coagulation. In the expert\u2019s view, the doctors had ignored the child\u2019s severe congenital deficiencies as they had considered that surgery for the removal of polyps had been a \u201cminor intervention\u201d and therefore no special precautions had been necessary. 19.  By a decision of 6 June 2008 the superior disciplinary committee of the National College of Doctors quashed the decision of 9 July 2007 and fined each doctor 1,000 Romanian lei (the equivalent of approximately 220 euros (EUR)). It found that the child\u2019s pre-surgical tests had been insufficient for avoiding post-operative complications. Therefore, it held that Dr C.B. and Dr P.A. had infringed Article 53 of the Medical Deontological Code, pursuant to which a doctor should perform diagnoses with maximum diligence in order to determine the adequate treatment and avoid predictable complications that might occur for a patient under his or her care. 20.  The committee further stated that the presence of blood in the child\u2019s airways could not be explained on the basis of the documents and statements in the file. It noted that all the doctors and the nurses who had given evidence stated that the balloon of the intubation catheter had been leak\u2011proof (etanche); however, the fact that the cause of death had been the presence of blood in the child\u2019s lungs could only lead to the conclusion that such statements had been inaccurate. 21.  Relying on Articles 58 and 60 of the Deontological Code and Article 6 of Law no. 46/2003, the committee also noted that the parents had not given their informed consent. 22.  On 7 November 2005 the applicants lodged a criminal complaint alleging that the flawed surgical and post-surgical treatment received by their son had resulted in his death. They asked that those responsible be identified and held accountable for their son\u2019s death. They joined the criminal proceedings as civil parties. 23.  Following a request of the Br\u0103ila Police Inspectorate, on 19 July 2006 Br\u0103ila Emergency Hospital stated that the medical staff members in charge of monitoring the child were Dr P.A. during the intervention and the child\u2019s transfer to the intensive care unit and P.V.I. while in the intensive care unit. 24.  On 5 January 2007 the prosecutor\u2019s office of the Br\u0103ila District Court decided to institute criminal proceedings against Dr P.A. 25.  P.V.I. was interviewed as a witness immediately after the child\u2019s death, during the preliminary criminal investigation. During the criminal proceedings against Dr P.A., in spite of the fact that she had been repeatedly summoned, the investigating authorities were not able to question her as she had not been found. She had left her job at the Br\u0103ila Emergency Hospital in January 2006. 26.  The prosecuting authorities interviewed several doctors and nurses from the hospital\u2019s medical staff who had been involved in the applicants\u2019 son\u2019s post-operative care. 27.  Dr P.A. lodged a request with the investigating body for a new forensic medical report. He pointed out that there were major contradictions between the autopsy report and the opinion issued by the commission for confirmation and supervision of the Ia\u015fi Forensic Institute. 28.  On 4 April 2007 the Br\u0103ila Police Inspectorate asked the Ia\u015fi Forensic Institute to carry out a forensic expert report that would identify the cause and circumstances of the child\u2019s death. The Ia\u015fi Forensic Institute replied that a new forensic report could not be produced as the evidence examined had been sent by Br\u0103ila Forensic Service to the Mina Minovici National Forensic Institute. 29.  On 20 February 2008 Dr P.A. submitted an extrajudicial expert report. It stated that the cause of death had not been the presence of blood in the child\u2019s lungs owing to a lack of adequate post-operative monitoring, but the post-operative reaction of a child with pre-existing medical conditions (cardiac congenital malformation, hepatic dystrophy, renal stasis, mesenteric adenopathy and hemorrhagic enterocolitis) mentioned in the medical records kept by the child\u2019s paediatrician. The report noted a generalised inflammatory reaction associated with diffused haemorrhages in his digestive tract, lungs, heart and spleen. 30.  The applicants gave evidence to the investigating authorities on 23 January 2008. They contended that they had not been properly informed about the risks of surgery and of the general anaesthetic and consequently they had not given their consent for such interventions. 31.  On 30 June 2008 the Br\u0103ila Police Inspectorate ordered that a new forensic report be produced by the Mina Minovici National Forensic Institute. The applicants, Dr P.A. and the investigating authorities submitted several questions for the forensic experts. They asked, among other things, whether the pre-existent medical condition of the child had influenced his unfavourable post-surgical evolution and whether administration of a general anaesthetic had been the right option, given the age and the diagnosis of the child. The child\u2019s father also asked the Forensic Institute whether the post-operative monitoring of the child had been adequate. 32.  However, on 28 July 2008 the Forensic Institute replied that it could not deliver such a report because under the relevant domestic legislation a new forensic expert report could not be ordered unless there were new medical and factual elements. Accordingly, the Forensic Institute stated that it maintained its previous opinion. 33.  Copies of the documents from the disciplinary file were added to the criminal file. 34.  On 30 September 2008 the prosecutor\u2019s office of the Br\u0103ila County Court decided to discontinue the criminal proceedings against Dr P.A., finding, in the light of evidence gathered in the case, that there had been no element of criminal negligence in his conduct. That decision was upheld on 10 November 2008 by the chief prosecutor of the same prosecutor\u2019s office. 35.  A complaint by the applicants against the prosecutors\u2019 decisions was allowed by the Br\u0103ila District Court on 25 February 2009. The prosecutors\u2019 decisions were quashed and the District Court kept the file for fresh consideration. It considered that although a new forensic report had not been produced, the decision of the superior committee of the National College of Doctors provided enough information concerning the cause of death, which had been the presence of blood in the child\u2019s airways owing to the balloon of the tracheal catheter not being tight enough. It considered that it should be established whether the post-operative monitoring of the child by Dr P.A. had been appropriate and more precisely whether Dr P.A. should have noticed the non-functioning catheter. 36.  Dr C.B. and Dr P.A. gave statements before the District Court on 18 January 2010. Moreover, members of the medical staff that had attempted resuscitation gave evidence (on 1 March, 20 April and 8 June 2008). Some of them maintained that the blood in the lungs could be explained by the resuscitation attempts and that the balloon of the catheter had been kept tight all the time after surgery. 37.  P.V.I. did not give evidence before the court as, although summoned, she did not attend the hearings. According to several reports issued by bailiffs seeking to bring her before the court, she had left the country for Italy. Based on the material in the case file it does not appear that the court took special measures to identify her address there. 38.  The child\u2019s father gave evidence before the Br\u0103ila District Court on 18 January 2010. He reiterated his claims for pecuniary and non\u2011pecuniary damages. He again contended that the doctors had not informed his family about the risks of surgery and in particular of the general anaesthetic and accordingly they had not given their informed consent. 39.  On 1 October 2010, after several hearings, the Br\u0103ila District Court acquitted Dr P.A. and dismissed the applicants\u2019 civil claim as unfounded. 40.  The District Court took into account the extrajudicial forensic report submitted by Dr P.A. It noted that the conclusions of the extrajudicial report were in total contradiction to the conclusions of the medical report of 8 November 2005 and the conclusions of the commission for confirmation and supervision of the Ia\u015fi Forensic Institute. 41.  This judgment was upheld by a decision of the Br\u0103ila County Court delivered on 21 December 2010. 42.  The County Court did not take into account the conclusions of the extrajudicial forensic report as in its opinion it represented only extrajudicial evidence which could not set aside the conclusions of competent forensic institutes. 43.  The County Court concluded that the death of the child had been caused by the presence of blood in his airways and lungs. However, based on the evidence in the file, it was not possible to explain when the blood had entered the child\u2019s airways because of the deflation of the catheter\u2019s balloon. Moreover, the post-operative complications occurred ten minutes after the child had been transferred to the intensive care unit, while under the supervision of P.V.I. The County Court held therefore that Dr P.A. could not be held responsible for the deflation of the catheter\u2019s balloon after surgery. 44.  The applicants lodged an appeal on points of law against that decision. They requested that the court extend the criminal investigation to P.V.I., who had had the child under her supervision in the intensive care unit. 45.  By a decision of 15 April 2011 the Gala\u0163i Court of Appeal allowed the applicant\u2019s appeal and quashed the decisions of the lower courts. Noting that the lower courts had not examined the allegation made by the child\u2019s parents that they had not given their consent for surgery and the general anaesthesia, the appeal court sent the file back to the Br\u0103ila District Court. 46.  On 22 December 2011 the Br\u0103ila District Court acquitted Dr P.A. It held that no causal link existed between the death of the child and the presumed omission of the medical authorities to obtain the applicants\u2019 informed consent for the administration of a general anaesthetic. 47.  It further held that it could not establish beyond any reasonable doubt that Dr P.A. had been negligent in ensuring the tightness of the catheter\u2019s balloon after surgery. Consequently, the court dismissed the applicants\u2019 civil claim as unfounded. 48.  The court also dismissed the applicants\u2019 request to extend the criminal investigation to P.V.I. on the grounds that, under Article 337 \u00a7 1 of the CCP, only the prosecutor could ask for the extension of the investigation to other persons while the proceedings were pending before the courts. 49.  This judgment was upheld by a final decision delivered by the Gala\u0163i Court of Appeal on 22 May 2012. 50.  On 28 October 2008 the applicants instituted separate civil proceedings against the Br\u0103ila Emergency Hospital and doctors C.B. and P.A. in the Br\u0103ila District Court for the pecuniary and non\u2011pecuniary damages they had sustained as a result of their son\u2019s death. 51.  On 23 April 2009, referring to Article 19 of the CCP (see paragraph 57 below), the court stayed the civil proceedings pending a final decision in the criminal proceedings. It noted that the outcome of the civil proceedings would depend to a large extent on the verdict in the criminal proceedings. 52.  On 29 January 2013 the Br\u0103ila District Court lifted the stay of the civil proceedings. However, the applicants gave up their separate civil claim on 6 March 2013.", "references": ["6", "3", "1", "8", "5", "4", "7", "2", "9", "No Label", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1969. 6.  On 27 June 2005 a criminal investigation was initiated into a theft allegedly committed by the applicant in the Republic of Uzbekistan. On 12 September 2005 an investigator ordered the applicant\u2019s arrest and placed him on the list of fugitives. 7.  It appears that in the meantime the applicant moved to the Russian town of Perm. On 21 January 2007 he was arrested there. On 23 January 2007 a prosecutor issued a decision to detain the applicant pending resolution of the extradition request in his regard. The decision referred to Article 61 of the Convention on Legal Assistance and Legal Relations in Civil, Family and Criminal Matters (signed in Minsk on 22 January 1993 and amended on 28 March 1997, \u201cthe Minsk Convention\u201d). It did not indicate that it was amenable to appeal. On 25 January 2007 the prosecutor wrote to the prison authorities asking them to hold the applicant in detention until further notice. 8.  On 19 February 2007 the Uzbek authorities requested the applicant\u2019s extradition. On 6 March 2007 the prosecutor applied to the court for authorisation of the applicant\u2019s detention pending extradition. He again relied on Article 61 of the Minsk Convention and Articles 97\u2011101, 108 and 466 \u00a7 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of Russia (\u201cthe CCrP\u201d). On 9 March 2007 the Leninskiy District Court of Perm authorised the applicant\u2019s detention pending extradition. The District Court did not set a limit on the length of the applicant\u2019s detention. It referred to Article 108 of the CCrP. On 27 March 2007 the Perm Regional Court upheld the decision on appeal. No court subsequently reviewed or extended the applicant\u2019s detention. 9.  It appears that on 10 July 2007 the applicant was handed over to the authorities of the Republic of Uzbekistan.", "references": ["9", "4", "3", "1", "7", "5", "0", "8", "6", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicants are the wife and daughter of Mr Ivan Mirchev Pashaliysky, who was killed on 2 June 2000 in an office situated in a hotel in Sofia. He died as a result of suffering severe trauma to his brain, chest, torso and limbs, which led to irreversible damage to several of his vital organs. The trauma was caused by a number of kicks and punches and blows inflicted with different objects. 6.  On the day of the incident a private security guard was called to the office premises where Mr Pashaliysky was later found dead in order to investigate a brawl reportedly happening there. The security guard knocked on the office entrance door and an individual, S.V., opened it. The security guard caught a brief glimpse of Mr Pashaliysky lying helpless on the floor with blood on his face. S.V. was holding a long oval-shaped object. Having been told by S.V. that there was no problem, the security guard left. 7.  It would appear that earlier that day, using the telephone of the office in question, S.V. had called Ch.M., a friend and business partner of Mr Pashaliysky, threatening to kill them both if Ch.M. failed to deliver an undisclosed sum of money to S.V. without delay. 8.  The incident was reported to the police by an investigator, who had been tipped off earlier the same day. The police arrested S.V. that night. Traces of the crime having been discovered on S.V.\u2019s hands and clothes, an investigator charged him on 3 June 2000 with murder. On 5 June 2000 a prosecutor indicted S.V. for the murder of Ivan Mirchev Pashaliysky, which had been committed three days earlier. 9.  A prosecutor from the Sofia city public prosecutor\u2019s office found on 20 April 2001 that there were reasons for amending the indictment by applying a law providing for a heavier penalty. She also found that not all available evidence had been collected. In particular, no expert DNA analysis had been carried out on the material found under the victim\u2019s nails; several key witnesses had not been questioned about the reasons for their presence in the office in which the victim had been killed on the day in question and about the reason for the return to the office of one of them during the evening of the same day; no confrontation had been held between two of those witnesses, despite several discrepancies between their respective statements; and no information had been collected about the state in which the police officers had found the accused at the time of his arrest. On 20 April 2001 the prosecutor returned the case to the investigating authorities for further investigative measures, giving specific instructions aimed at the remedying of the deficiencies in the investigation. 10.  The case was returned on three other occasions (on 17 July 2001, 18 July 2003 and on 2 October 2003) for further investigative steps, which the prosecutor listed specifically. 11.  The case file was sent to the Sofia City Court on an unspecified date in November 2003. Both applicants were named as private prosecutors and the second applicant, at her request, also as a civil party seeking non\u2011pecuniary damages. 12.  At the start of the trial the defendant\u2019s lawyer claimed that the indictment was defective because it did not contain a clear description of the offence with which the defendant had been charged; the lawyer sought, without success, the return of the case for further investigation. A number of hearings took place during the trial. The proceedings before the Sofia City Court ended on 11 June 2007, when the court sentenced S.V. to fifteen years\u2019 imprisonment and ordered him to pay damages to the second applicant. 13.  Both S.V. and the applicants lodged appeals with the Sofia Court of Appeal. S.V. submitted in particular that the sentence had been based entirely on guesswork as to who the perpetrator had been. Most importantly, S.V. claimed that the indictment had been entirely silent about the manner in which he was considered to have killed the victim, there being no description of the circumstances in which the victim was killed. Referring to interpretative decision no. 2 of 2002 of the Supreme Court of Cassation (see paragraph 21 below), he claimed that these procedural flaws were fundamental and that the court should have returned the case to the investigation stage. 14.  On 18 July 2008 the Sofia Court of Appeal accepted that the indictment had not contained a description of how the accused had killed the victim and that this had been a fundamental procedural defect which had prevented the defendant from effectively exercising his rights. The court then quashed the first-instance court sentence and returned the case to the pre-trial stage so that the procedural flaw in question could be redressed. 15.  On 16 August 2008 the prosecution indicted S.V. anew for the murder of Mr. Pashaliysky and the first-instance court, the Sofia City Court, opened fresh proceedings against him. The first two scheduled hearings were postponed because the defendant\u2019s lawyer failed to appear. On 11 February 2009 the court recognised the second applicant as a civil party seeking non-pecuniary damages but refused to name both applicants as private prosecutors. After an appeal by the applicants that refusal was quashed on 13 March 2009 by the Sofia Court of Appeal. The witnesses were then heard again in the course of the trial so that the applicants could exercise their rights as private prosecutors. 16.  Sixteen hearings took place thereafter, at which the applicants made numerous requests for evidence to be gathered and witnesses to be heard. Subsequently, the presiding judge was elected President of the Supreme Administrative Court as a result of which the trial stage was started anew. A new presiding judge was appointed, yet no further hearing was scheduled for about a year. The applicants complained about the delay to the Inspectorate of the Supreme Judicial Council, asking that disciplinary sanctions be imposed on the new presiding judge. The Inspectorate replied on 21 February 2012. It acknowledged that the criminal proceedings in the case had lasted eleven years and recognised that this was incompatible with the requirement of a reasonable length of proceedings. It nonetheless held that the judge in question could not be sanctioned, given that the duration of the other cases that she had heard had not exceeded an acceptable length. 17.  On an unspecified later date the new presiding judge was sent back to the court from which she had been transferred and the case had to begin anew once again. 18.  On 9 December 2013 the proceedings before the first-instance court ended. The Sofia City Court found S.V. guilty of murder and sentenced him to twelve years\u2019 imprisonment. The first-instance court also ruled that S.V. had to pay some 50,000 euros (EUR) in damages to the second applicant as a civil party. After an appeal by S.V. the Sofia Court of Appeal carried out a thorough analysis of the witness statements given at first instance, of the record of the examination of the murder scene conducted on the day after the killing, of the search and seizure measures, and of the conclusions of the numerous expert reports, the autopsy, etc. Following this, on 22 December 2014 the appellate court upheld the guilty verdict and sentence, but lowered the amount in damages to be paid to the second applicant to around EUR 8,000. Following a cassation appeal by S.V. the Supreme Court of Cassation upheld the appellate court\u2019s judgment in its entirety in a final judgment of 2 November 2015.", "references": ["8", "9", "5", "0", "4", "2", "3", "7", "1", "6", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Molodetske, in the Donetsk Region. 6.  On 28 January 2007 the applicant, at the material time a member of the Shakhtarsk District Council and president of the local branch of the Party of Regions, read out a letter at a meeting attended by over forty party members and inhabitants of the village of Zolotarevka which contained the following text:\n\u201cTo the Member of the Shakhtarsk District Council, President of the district branch of the Party of Regions, Mr Lykin V.V., from the inhabitants of the village of Zolotarevka ...\nWe, the inhabitants of Zolotarevka ... appeal to you with indignation concerning the election and performance of the Deputy President of the Shaktarsk District Executive Committee, Mr G. Sh. [full name given].\n...\nHe is a grabber and a petty tyrant. How can he serve the district after having destroyed all the work in Zolotarevka during his four years in office? He had no formal audiences, took decisions unilaterally, and was rude and impolite. He came to work in the morning, but then hid in his illegal firms in Makeyevka or in the computer centre in Kharsyzk, while continuing to receive his salary and bonuses. Funds were allocated for renovation of the water supply system, but he did not manage them ... All the village ... was drowning in weeds and rubbish ... No discussion about petty things, we want to know specifically why [G.Sh.] should get away with the following:\n(1).  [he] collected 30 hryvnias per household [for renovation of the water supply system] on Sh. and P. streets, and what did he spent it on?\n(2).  [he] removed all the metal parts from the boiler room in the kindergarten ... ;\n(3).  [he] uncovered and removed 400 metres of water pipes;\n(4).  with his knowledge, the century-old oak trees in the forest have been felled.\nWe request your support ... All who voted for the [Party of] Regions, that is 95% [of the voters] are disgusted, and demand [G.Sh.]\u2019s resignation from the district council. He should be expelled from the Party of Regions.\u201d 7.  This text was followed by eleven signatures, with no indication of full names. 8.  After having read out the letter, the applicant expressed his personal dissatisfaction with G.Sh.\u2019s performance as a party activist and an elected public official, and was joined in this by several other participants. Mrs A. stated that she was one of the authors of the letter, and that she agreed with all the allegations contained in it. 9.  G.Sh. was given the floor and argued that the allegations against him were defamatory and lacked any evidential basis. 10.  In February 2007 G.Sh. instituted civil proceedings in the Shakhtarsk Court, seeking non-pecuniary damages from the applicant for having disseminated defamatory information about him. He maintained in particular that the applicant had had no right to read out the letter, which had contained unverified defamatory information accusing him of criminal and corrupt conduct. As the purported authors of the letter had signed it without indicating their full names or address details, it should have been disposed of without any follow-up as an anonymous application within the meaning of the Citizens\u2019 Applications Act. G.Sh. also submitted that the applicant had given him a photocopy of the disputed letter before the Zolotarevka meeting, and had warned him about his intention to read it out. G.Sh. had protested on the grounds that the text was defamatory, yet the applicant had disregarded his opinion. 11.  On 17 September 2007 the Shaktarsk Court declared that the applicant had been at fault in defaming G.Sh., and awarded the latter 200 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. In particular, the court found that the letter should have been treated as an anonymous application by citizens within the meaning of section 5 of the Citizens\u2019 Applications Act. Instead of not pursuing the allegations in the letter, the applicant had acted unlawfully in making it public without verifying the serious accusations against G.Sh. which it contained. 12.  The applicant, represented by Mr V. Filipenko, appealed. He argued that the Citizens\u2019 Applications Act was not applicable to the facts of the case. In particular, reading out and discussing the content of a letter from voters at a political party gathering could not be deemed an official follow\u2011up in respect of an anonymous application by citizens within the meaning of the above instrument. Moreover, the letter was not \u201canonymous\u201d, given that Mrs A. at least had claimed authorship. As regards the nature of the letter, it contained no false allegations of fact. In particular, G.Sh. himself had confirmed that UAH 30 per household had been collected for the renovation of the water supply conduit, and that the boiler-room equipment in the kindergarten had been dismantled upon his orders. There was also evidence in support of other factual allegations. Critical assessment of those facts by some village inhabitants was not susceptible of proof and constituted reasonable value judgments on their part, for which the applicant could not be held responsible. In addition, G.Sh. should have been tolerant of the criticism, as it related to his performance as an elected public official. 13.  On 3 December 2007 the Donetsk Regional Court of Appeal upheld the judgment of the Shaktarsk Court. It found that the court had rightly concluded that the letter had been anonymous, as it was not possible to identify the authors from the signatures contained therein, and that it had been addressed to the applicant as a public official rather than a private individual, hence the Citizens\u2019 Applications Act had been properly applied. Furthermore, the trial court had rightly concluded that the applicant had not verified the accuracy of the accusations contained in the letter as required by Article 302 of the Civil Code of Ukraine, and had therefore been liable for disseminating defamatory statements against G.Sh. 14.  On 30 January 2008 the Supreme Court of Ukraine rejected the applicant\u2019s request for leave to appeal in cassation.", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "5", "9", "3", "0", "7", "8", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1984, 1988 and 1987 respectively. The first applicant currently lives in Odessa. The third applicant left Ukraine for Ethiopia on 23 November 2014. His current whereabouts are unknown. The second applicant died on 6 March 2015. According to the applicants\u2019 representative, the second applicant died of a \u201cnatural cause\u201d. No further details were given in this regard. The Court was not informed of anyone wishing to pursue the application on his behalf. 6.  The following is a summary of the events that led the applicants to seek asylum outside their countries of origin, as submitted by the applicants. 7.  The first applicant is an Orthodox Christian. When he was fifteen years old he was forcibly recruited to the army in Eritrea. After having served for two months he deserted and left for Djibouti. In the meantime, his father went missing after he had been arrested by the Eritrean authorities for having complained about the first applicant\u2019s forcible military service. The first applicant believed that his father had been tortured and murdered by the authorities. 8.  The second applicant was a Protestant Christian. Initially, he left Eritrea for Ethiopia together with his family. After the outbreak of armed conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the second applicant\u2019s family moved back to Eritrea, though the second applicant remained in Ethiopia as he feared persecution for his religion and forcible military service in Eritrea. As he could have been expelled by the Ethiopian authorities to Eritrea, the second applicant left for Djibouti in 2007. 9.  The first and second applicants stayed in Djibouti illegally for several years. In that country both applicants were repeatedly arrested by the authorities allegedly in connection with the armed conflict between Djibouti and Eritrea in June 2008. 10.  The third applicant left Ethiopia for Djibouti in 2005 for unspecified reasons. From 2008 to 2010 he was employed by an Ethiopian transport company operating in Djibouti. The third applicant submitted that as he had been a member of the \u201cMedre[k] political party\u201d, he had been dismissed by his employer after that party had lost the 2010 election in Ethiopia to the \u201cEhadeg party\u201d. The third applicant\u2019s identity card issued by the Ethiopian authorities was retained by his former employer. Thus the third applicant remained in Djibouti illegally and was at risk of possible deportation by the Djiboutian authorities to his country of origin, Ethiopia, where he risked persecution \u201cas a traitor to the Ehadeg political regime\u201d. 11.  The Government did not comment on those submissions. 12.  On 18 January 2012, with the intention of seeking asylum in any country other than Djibouti or their countries of origin, the applicants covertly boarded a commercial vessel flying the flag of the Republic of Malta. The vessel was leaving the port of Djibouti and heading for Tuzla, Turkey. 13.  The next day the applicants were discovered by the vessel crew. The vessel\u2019s owner and insurer were informed accordingly. 14.  When the vessel was passing through the Suez Canal, the insurer tried to arrange with the Egyptian authorities that the applicants could disembark in Egypt, but the authorities refused the request. 15.  Following the vessel\u2019s arrival in Tuzla on 3 February 2012 the Turkish authorities and a representative of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (\u201cthe UNHCR\u201d) in Turkey met with the applicants on board the vessel. The applicants were not allowed to disembark. Their allegations of persecution in their home countries written in the Amharic and Tigre languages were passed by the vessel\u2019s insurer to the representative of the UNHCR office in Turkey. 16.  On 21 February 2012 the vessel left Tuzla in the direction of the port of Mykolayiv in Ukraine. 17.  On 24 February 2012, sometime before the vessel anchored in the port of Mykolayiv, a non-governmental organisation \u201cFaith, Hope, Love\u201d, which at the time was based in Odesa and assisted refugees and asylum\u2011seekers under a contract with the UNHCR, contacted the head of the Border Control Service in the Southern Region of Ukraine informing him that there were two nationals of Eritrea and a national of Ethiopia on board the vessel and that, according to the UNHCR, they might require international protection. The organisation requested leave for their lawyer, Z., to meet with the applicants. 18.  On 25 February 2012 Ukrainian border guards embarked the vessel and met with the applicants. According to information provided by the Government, the applicants did not submit any requests to the border guards. 19.  Later on that day, Z. went to Mykolayiv port to see the applicants. She was allowed to embark the vessel and meet with the applicants. She discussed their situation with them and informed them of the asylum procedures in Ukraine. The discussion was in English in the presence of three border guards and two port security officers. As only the first applicant could speak English, he interpreted the discussion into Amharic, which the other two applicants could understand. 20.  According to the applicants, during the discussion they expressed the wish to seek asylum in Ukraine and started filling in asylum applications with the help of one of the border guards who had knowledge of English. That border guard was an official interpreter at the State Border Control Service. However, sometime later the border guards stated that they could not accept the asylum applications from the applicants, as the applicants were on board a vessel flying the flag of a foreign State. Such applications had to be submitted to the vessel\u2019s captain. On the same grounds the border guards refused to allow the applicants to disembark. The border guards asked Z. to leave the vessel. Allegedly, Z. was not given sufficient time and interpretation facilities to provide assistance to the applicants in respect of their asylum claims. 21.  According to the Government, during that meeting the applicants did not submit applications for asylum; nor did they express a wish to do so. As the applicants had no identity documents, the head of the border-guard unit decided to refuse them leave to enter Ukraine. No copy of that decision was provided to the Court. The Government submitted copies of reports drawn up by the border guards who had been present at that meeting, which indicated that the meeting had lasted for five hours and that the applicants had stated that they needed time to decide whether they wished to request asylum in Ukraine. Z. left the vessel without raising any complaints. The head of the border-guard unit stated in her report that she had explained to the applicants that \u201cin the circumstances the border guards had not been able to accept asylum applications from them\u201d. 22.  On 28 February 2012 the applicants, allegedly having been misled by the vessel\u2019s captain who was acting on the instructions of the Ukrainian border guards, signed type-written statements in English, according to which they had boarded the vessel with the aim of reaching Sweden \u201cin search of better living conditions\u201d and that they did not \u201cneed the status of refugee, addition[al] [or] temporary protection in Ukraine\u201d. In a letter he sent to the UNHCR on 6 March 2012, the captain stated that the above\u2011mentioned type-written statements had been prepared and brought on board by Ukrainian border guards on 28 February 2012. 23.  The Government submitted that the applicants themselves had asked the captain to help them to prepare the above-mentioned type-written statements. The Government relied on the captain\u2019s statements obtained on 3 March 2012 when he had been questioned by the migration authorities. In particular, the captain stated that he and the first applicant had prepared the statements and had given them to the other applicants to sign. 24.  On 2 March 2012 Z., acting on the applicants\u2019 behalf, lodged with the Court a request for interim measures to be imposed under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. She stated that the applicants risked removal to Saudi Arabia, for which the vessel was scheduled to depart on 3 March 2012. In their submissions before the Court, the Government did not contest this statement. Z. further argued that in Saudi Arabia asylum-seekers were granted no form of protection and were exposed to the risk of being repatriated. According to her, there was a real risk that the authorities of Saudi Arabia would forcibly return the applicants to their countries of origin where they would be subjected to ill-treatment. She essentially requested the Court to indicate to the Government of Ukraine that the applicants should be allowed to leave the vessel and should be granted access to a lawyer and to the asylum procedure. 25.  On the same day the Court granted the request. 26.  On 3 March 2012 the border guards accompanied by an officer from the State Migration Service embarked the vessel and met with the applicants. According to the Government, it was during that meeting that the applicants requested asylum in Ukraine. They were allowed to disembark and to cross the State border. 27.  On 16 March 2012 the applicants were questioned by the migration authorities concerning their asylum applications. According to the applicants, during the questioning they were not provided with adequate translation or any explanation of the relevant regulations. Nor were they provided with legal assistance. 28.  The parties have not informed the Court about the outcome of the applicants\u2019 asylum applications lodged in March 2012; nor have they provided any further details as regards their examination by the migration authorities. 29.  It appears from their submissions that in 2014 the applicants lodged new asylum applications with the authorities. 30.  On 19 August 2014 the Odesa Regional Department of the Migration Service (the \u201cORDMS\u201d) rejected the third applicant\u2019s asylum application, finding that it was manifestly ill-founded. The third applicant did not challenge that decision on appeal. On 23 November 2014 he decided to leave Ukraine for Ethiopia. The UNHCR helped him to organise the travel arrangements. The applicants\u2019 representative did not provide any further information as regards the third applicant, as since the third applicant\u2019s departure from Ukraine the representative has lost contact with him. 31.  On 9 December 2014 the ORDMS refused the second applicant\u2019s application, finding that his submissions were contradictory and did not concern a situation in which refugee status or complementary protection could be granted. He appealed to the Odesa Administrative Court. The proceedings were eventually terminated as the second applicant died on 6 March 2015. 32.  On 12 August 2015 the ORDMS refused the first applicant\u2019s application, principally for the same reasons as in the case of the second applicant. The first applicant appealed to the Odesa Administrative Court, which has not yet decided on the matter.", "references": ["7", "2", "5", "3", "4", "0", "8", "9", "6", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1942 and lives in Lamlash. 5.  In 1966 the applicant founded a business which was later incorporated as Arakin Limited (\u201cArakin\u201d). 6.  In the second half of the 1980s, Arakin became involved in commercial disputes. In 1986 Tods Murray solicitors were retained in relation to those disputes. However, Tods Murray\u2019s fees were not settled in full by Arakin. 7.  On 27 May 1996 Tods Murray commenced legal proceedings against Arakin in the Outer House of the Court of Session (the first-instance civil court in Scotland in respect of claims over a certain value) for payment of 32,696.75 pounds sterling (\u201cGBP\u201d) in respect of fees relating to a dispute against Arakin\u2019s former accountants. 8.  On 30 January 1998 Arakin issued a counterclaim alleging professional misconduct and negligence. It sought GBP one million. 9.  The dispute gave rise to four sets of overlapping proceedings. First, the proceedings to establish Tods Murray\u2019s fees, which ran from 8 October 1996 to 2 October 2008 (in this the courts were assisted by the auditor for taxation, an expert officer of the Outer House who advises the court on disputes concerning legal fees); second, proceedings in respect of Arakin\u2019s allegations of fraud against Tods Murray running from July 2001 to 22 January 2004; third, proceedings concerning the principal claim and counterclaim which ran from 9 January 2009 to 14 November 2012; and fourth, proceedings settling the overall costs of the case (excluding the fraud proceedings) which ran from 14 November 2012 to 13 November 2014. 10.  On 8 October 1996, the Outer House ordered a detailed account of the fees owed to be produced to the auditor for taxation, in order for the amount of the fees due in respect of the litigation in question to be determined. 11.  By March 1997 all accounts had been lodged with the auditor. On 4 August 1997 the taxation hearing began before the auditor. It lasted four weeks. On 27 March 1998 the auditor issued his reports. 12.  The parties objected and from April 1998 the Outer House which was responsible for overseeing the taxation proceedings, held a number of hearings to settle the procedure and deal with the notes on objections, and also to hold a preliminary debate in the claim and counterclaim (the third proceedings). Some hearings were discharged at Arakin\u2019s request. The court however refused Arakin\u2019s request to stay the case. 13.  The auditor issued his report on 26 October 1999. 14.  By 14 October 1999 Arakin\u2019s then solicitors had ceased acting for it. In February 2000 Arakin\u2019s new solicitors withdrew from acting. From that time onwards Arakin had no legal representation. The applicant sought to appear at hearings in early 2000, on Arakin\u2019s behalf. 15.  The applicant subsequently applied for summary decree in the counterclaim and dismissal of the principal action. This was dismissed as incompetent on 22 June 2001. 16.  Between June 2001 and April 2002, the Outer House sought to regulate the procedure in relation to the notes of objection lodged by both parties in respect of the accounts and dealt with other motions lodged by the applicant. It held a number of hearings. 17.  However, no further progress could be made on the notes of objections until the allegations of fraud had been determined (the \u201csecond proceedings\u201d; see paragraphs 23-28 below). In the course of 2002 and 2003, the court heard various incidental motions by the applicant who increased the sum sought in the counterclaim to GBP forty-five million. He also renewed motions which had previously been refused. 18.  The allegations of fraud made by the applicant having been determined, the Outer House on 24 March 2004 ordered a two-day hearing on the notes of objections for 7 June 2004, which finally concluded on 12 November. In total, around fifty objections had been made, of which, seven were lodged by Tods Murray and the remainder by the applicant. 19.  On 28 April 2006 the Outer House gave a judgment on the notes of objections, running to 223 paragraphs. Tods Murray appealed. On 14 July 2006 the Inner House ordered that there should be a hearing on 21 March 2007. Following that hearing, the Inner House found in favour of Tods Murray on all three points raised in the appeal. On 27 April 2007 the case was remitted to the Outer House. 20.  On 9 May 2007, the Outer House ordered the parties to lodge their proposals for further procedure. 21.  The accounts were returned to the auditor to consider the impact of the notes of objection which had been upheld. On 21 January 2008 a taxation hearing was held before the auditor and on 2 June 2008 he reported on his taxation of the remitted accounts. He assessed the total amount due in legal fees as GBP 409,597.50. Tods Murray accepted that Arakin had paid GBP 321,766.39 to date and the sum sued for was therefore the balance of GBP 87,831.11. 22.  On 24 September 2008 a final hearing took place on the notes of objections. On 2 October 2008 the Outer House delivered its judgment, finally determining all questions relating to the valuation of the accounts. The taxation proceeding were therefore at an end. 23.  In the meantime in July 2001, the applicant made allegations about the authenticity of the court papers, which developed into allegations of fraud against Tods Murray and their solicitors. Hearings took place before the Outer House between August and December 2001. On 20 December 2001 the Outer House ordered the applicant to lodge, by 11 January 2002, particulars of his allegations. On 18 January 2002 it directed that the case be heard on 13 February 2002. On that date, having regard to further allegations made by the applicant, it ordered that he lodge details of these allegations within fourteen days. On 6 March 2002, a factual hearing on the allegations was fixed for 14 May 2002. This hearing lasted 15 days but was ultimately insufficient. 24.  From May 2002 the court repeatedly attempted to fix hearing dates that the applicant did not accept; the case was finally heard in August 2003. 25.  On 31 October 2003 the court issued an opinion rejecting the applicant\u2019s allegations in their entirety. It concluded, inter alia, that none of the allegations were well-founded; that the applicant had made representations which he knew or ought to have known were incorrect; that the hearing had taken an inordinate length of time because the applicant had persistently resorted to irrelevant lines of inquiry and had been disorganised in his presentation; that the hearing had been used as a vehicle to air grievances going beyond its scope and to advance the applicant\u2019s interests in other litigation; that the applicant\u2019s approach had been reckless; and that he had had no reasonable grounds for his asserted belief in the truth of the allegations. 26.  The applicant sought leave to appeal the decision to the Inner House of the Court of Session. On 21 April 2004 the Inner House dismissed the application to appeal as incompetent since leave had not been obtained from the Outer House. 27.  In the meantime, on 22 January 2004, the Outer House awarded costs against the applicant at a punitive rate in light of his conduct. The court also ordered that their payment was a condition to proceed with the counterclaim. Between 2004 and 2009 the amounts remained unpaid and the matter proceeded on the basis that the only issues to try were contained in the principal claim. 28.  In early August 2009, the applicant paid the amounts to which the order of 22 January 2004 referred. 3.  The third set of proceedings: the principal claim and the counterclaim\n(a)  The preliminary determination of the legal issues (the \u201clegal debate\u201d) 29.  Following the conclusion of the taxation proceedings, the Outer House heard the parties on several occasions between 9 January 2009 and 22 October 2009 to determine future procedure and finally listed an eight\u2011day hearing of legal issues to commence on 1 December 2009. By the time of the hearing the applicant sought over GBP sixty-two million in his counterclaim. On 10 December 2009, after an eight-day hearing, the court reserved judgment. 30.  On 9 July 2010 the Outer House delivered its opinion. It noted that Tods Murray\u2019s claim was a simple one, namely an action for payment of a debt. The applicant\u2019s position, it said, was \u201ca great deal more complicated\u201d. Despite lengthy written pleadings, the court had found it \u201cdifficult to determine the precise factual background\u201d upon which he relied. Turning first to his defences to the principal claim, the court rejected all except one, namely the applicant\u2019s argument that he had paid the fees due in full. This, the court said, was a matter for evidence appropriate for the subsequent factual hearing. 31.  As to the counterclaim, after a careful examination of the applicant\u2019s evidence, the court held that it was an \u201cabuse of process\u201d. It noted that very grave allegations had been made but that the applicant had produced no expert opinion to support them. 32.  The applicant appealed against the decision. Between 20 October 2010 and 28 January 2011 the Inner House dealt with various procedural aspects of the appeal. On 3 March 2011 the Inner House heard the appeal and refused it. The case was remitted to the Outer House.\n(b)  The hearing on the facts 33.  On 11 May 2011 the Outer House heard both parties and fixed a hearing on the facts. On 21 July 2011 that hearing took place. A day was set aside for further argument and the parties lodged detailed notes of arguments, the applicant\u2019s running to one hundred pages. 34.  On 14 February 2012 the court handed down its judgment. It noted that Tods Murray\u2019s case was \u201cstraightforward and cogent\u201d but that it had been \u201cvery difficult to discern the defence to the action\u201d. The applicant had repeated \u201cscurrilous allegations\u201d against partners in Tods Murray and the witnesses he had led had been of no assistance in determining the question before the court. The court also commented that the applicant had sought to revisit many points which had already been decided. It found in favour of Tods Murray in the principal claim and held that the applicant was liable in the sum of GBP 86,376.40. 35.  The applicant appealed. On 6 March 2012 the Inner House found the appeal suitable for urgent disposal. A hearing took place on 4 and 5 July. In a judgment of 14 November 2012 the Inner House upheld the decision of the Outer House. It commented that it \u201chad not found it easy to understand the arguments which [the applicant] sought to advance\u201d. It further noted:\n\u201cThroughout the course of this protracted litigation Mr McNamara has sought to revisit arguments and allegations which have not found favour with the court on previous occasions ...\nMany of the issues which Mr McNamara has sought to argue before us cannot be argued competently before us now.\u201d 36.  It held that it was not open to it to revisit the various decisions it had made previously concerning aspects of the litigation in the context of interim appeals. This brought to an end the substantive issues in the litigation. 37.  The only remaining issue was costs. Tods Murray applied for its costs and the applicant lodged various applications. The Outer House listed a hearing to take place on 1 July 2013. However, the applicant contacted the court stating he was unwell, so it was adjourned to 22 July. He then told the court he was on holiday on 22 July. The court found this an inadequate reason for non-attendance and maintained the date. 38.  The applicant did not appear at the hearing on 22 July 2013. The Outer House granted a further one-week adjournment in order to allow the applicant a \u201cfinal opportunity to appear\u201d. The clerk of court and Tods Murray\u2019s solicitors sought to bring the hearing, which had been re-listed for 29 July 2013, to the applicant\u2019s attention by e-mail, telephone and by personal attendance at the applicant\u2019s home address. 39.  On 29 July 2013 the applicant did not appear and the hearing proceeded in his absence. The judge found in favour of Tods Murray on the issue of expenses at an enhanced, punitive rate of expenses in light of the applicant\u2019s conduct. The court commented:\n\u201cWhen this action was first raised in 1996, it appeared to be in short compass. The pursuer sought payment from the defender of its outstanding professional fees. It was therefore a simple action for recovery of a debt. Since then, Mr McNamara has introduced a great many factual and legal issues, which have been exhaustively examined over many hearings.\u201d 40.  In relation to the applicant\u2019s conduct he found that it had been:\n\u201c ...unreasonable and incompetent. He has thereby caused the pursuer unnecessary expense...\u201d 41.  It also awarded an additional fee to Tods Murray to reflect the \u201chuge amount\u201d of correspondence and documents sent to the Tods Murray\u2019s solicitors by the applicant, much of which was irrelevant, the complexity of the proceedings, having regard to the \u201cnumber, difficulty and novelty of the questions raised\u201d, the skill time, labour and specialist knowledge required of the solicitors and the accusations of deception, incompetence and bad faith levelled against individual solicitors at Tods Murray. It rejected a number of motions lodged by the applicant. 42.  The applicant appealed and lodged a number of documents. The appeal was refused on 16 July 2014. On 13 November 2014 the applicant was found \u201cliable in the expenses\u201d (that is, liable for the costs) of that appeal. His various motions were dismissed. The Inner House again noted that the applicant had sought to reopen issues already determined and continued to express his dissatisfaction with the court\u2019s substantive decisions. 43.  Meanwhile, in 2009 the Lord Advocate (the chief legal officer of the Scottish Government) applied to have the applicant declared a vexatious litigant. He relied on four sets of proceedings, including the Tods Murray litigation. 44.  On 4 June 2009 the Inner House declared the applicant a vexatious litigant but excluded the Tods Murray litigation from the order. It referred to the applicant\u2019s ill-founded allegations about lack of authenticity of documents which it said were a \u201cserious abuse of process\u201d. In coming to this conclusion it also took into account the finding that he had used a proof in the Tods Murray litigation for collateral purposes. Moreover, he had wasted time because of his disorganisation and persistent pursuit of irrelevant matters in that litigation. It noted that the applicant had accepted that his lack of legal expertise had caused delay in the proceedings.", "references": ["0", "2", "5", "8", "9", "6", "7", "1", "4", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicants were placed in Menemeni police station in Thessaloniki, either in pre-trial detention or serving prison sentences. Applicants nos. 1 and 6 were detained in cell no. 1, applicants nos. 2 and 4 were detained in cell no. 2 and applicants nos. 3, 5 and 7 were detained in cell no. 3. At the time they submitted their application they had been detained for periods ranging from one to six months. 5.  The first six applicants were transferred to Thessaloniki General Detention Facility on the following dates: applicant no. 2 was transferred on 30 November 2013, applicant no. 3 was transferred on 6 December 2013, applicant no. 4 was transferred on 11 February 2014, applicant no. 5 was transferred on 7 February 2014 and applicant no. 6 was transferred on 18 November 2013. The parties disputed the date on which applicant no. 1 was transferred: according to the Government\u2019s submissions, he was transferred on 18 September 2013, whereas the applicant argued that he was transferred on 3 December 2013. According to the material in the Court\u2019s possession, applicant no. 7 was still being detained in Menemeni police station on 24 May 2014. 6.  The applicants alleged that Menemeni police station had been entirely inappropriate for long periods of detention, as in their cases. It had consisted of three cells on the first floor and two sanitary facilities situated outside the cells. Cells nos. 1 and 2 had measured 10 square metres and had accommodated four detainees each, while cell no. 3 had measured 6 square metres and had accommodated five detainees. The cells had been equipped with beds but had no blankets. The applicants further stressed that the cells had been filthy and that there had been inadequate access to natural light. Cell no. 1, in particular, had not had a window. 7.  Detainees had been confined to their cells and had not been allowed to spend time outside, which had affected their psychological health. They had had to ask permission from the guards to use the restroom. Recreational activities had not been offered and cells had not been equipped with televisions. 8.  Healthy detainees had been held together with drug users or sick detainees, resulting in their exposure to contagious diseases. The police station had not had the necessary means to transfer detainees to a hospital in case of emergency. 9.  Instead of food, detainees had been offered 5.87 euros per day, which had not sufficed to cover their daily dietary needs, either in terms of quantity or quality. 10.  On 19 November 2013 the applicants had lodged a complaint with the public prosecutor, complaining of the conditions of their detention but had not received a reply. 11.  The Government submitted that Menemeni police station had been housed in a building constructed in 2008 on the basis of quality specifications necessary to ensure proper conditions of detention. It had consisted of three cells: cell no. 1 had measured 23 square metres and had three built-in beds, cell no. 2 had measured 23.3 square metres with four built-in beds and cell no. 3 had measured 26 square metres with five beds. The capacity of the police station had never been exceeded. 12.  The Government affirmed that there had been two sanitary facilities with hot water outside the cells. They submitted two contracts with cleaning companies for the building for the periods in question: one from 10 June 2013 to 10 August 2013 and the other from 11 August 2013 to 11 October 2013. The contracts included cleaning the detention areas and the sanitary facilities every day and disinfecting the detention areas once a week. 13.  When the number of detainees had allowed it, drug addicts had been detained separately from the rest of the detainees. In addition, the staff at Menemeni police station had made every possible effort to accommodate detainees\u2019 needs by painting the facilities often, cleaning or replacing the bedding and by resolving any problem in general that might have risen. 14.  Regarding recreational activities, the Government stressed that detainees had had unlimited access to telephone cards and that it had been standard practice for them to receive newspapers and magazines. 15.  The Government confirmed that the applicants had not been provided with meals but had received 5.87 euros a day to order food from restaurants, given that police stations did not have any cooking facilities. 16.  An on-call doctor had been available on a 24-hour basis in Thessaloniki Police Headquarters (\u0391\u03c3\u03c4\u03c5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc \u039c\u03ad\u03b3\u03b1\u03c1\u03bf \u0398\u03b5\u03c3\u03c3\u03b1\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd\u03af\u03ba\u03b7\u03c2). In urgent cases, inmates had been transferred to local hospitals. Additionally, police staff had been responsible for administering prescribed medications to detainees, as ordered by a doctor. 17.  The Government pointed out that the applicants had not referred to or adduced any evidence that they had needed medical treatment which they had not received. On the contrary, according to the police station\u2019s records, applicants nos. 4, 5 and 7 had been taken to local hospitals on various occasions.", "references": ["8", "2", "9", "5", "7", "6", "3", "4", "0", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1970 in Rafah, Gaza. He currently lives in Kyiv. 7.  Between 1977 and 1993 the applicant lived mainly in Rafah. He claimed to have been involved in the activities of Fatah, the Palestinian political organisation. 8.  In 1993 the applicant went to Ukraine to study. The same year he entered Kyiv Polytechnic University. In 1999 the applicant finished his studies at the University and obtained a master\u2019s degree in biomedical electronics. In 2001 the applicant enrolled in a postgraduate course at the same University. In 2003 he withdrew from the course as he had no money to pursue his studies. The applicant claims that since 2003 he has been working as a freelance translator/interpreter for the Embassy of Libya in Kyiv and for various private companies (the applicant speaks fluent Arabic, English and Russian, and understands Ukrainian). 9.  In 1998 the applicant married a Ukrainian national. In 2007 they divorced. In 2011 the applicant married another Ukrainian national; their marriage lasted for less than two months. In March 2013 the applicant entered into a relationship with another Ukrainian national. In January 2014 they married and currently live together as a family. 10.  The applicant visited Gaza twice in 2000. According to the applicant, one of the visits was due to his father\u2019s death. Since December 2000 the applicant has remained in Ukraine without leaving its territory. 11.  In 2001 the applicant was issued with a registration card by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (\u201cUNRWA\u201d). The card bears the name \u201cHicham Ahmad Sadiddin Hmeid\u201d. The applicant attributes the difference in the spelling of his name to varying transliterations of Arabic names. Similar cards were issued to the applicant\u2019s mother and sister, who currently reside in Rafah. 12.  Prior to November 2009 the applicant was staying in Ukraine on the basis of passports of limited duration, issued by the Palestinian Authority, and temporary residence permits, which were regularly extended by the Ukrainian police. In 2008-09 an extension of the applicant\u2019s residence permit was requested by the Embassy of Palestine and granted by the Ukrainian authorities, as at the time access to the Palestinian territories was problematic. 13.  In 2003 the applicant started preparing documents to apply for a permanent residence permit on the basis of his marriage to a Ukrainian national. He could not complete his application because his then brother-in-law was opposed to the applicant being registered as resident in the flat in which the applicant, his then wife and brother-in-law resided at the time. 14.  On 9 March 2010 the applicant applied to the migration unit within the Golosiyivkyy District Police Department in Kyiv for an extension of his residence permit. The police noted that the applicant\u2019s residence permit had expired in November 2009 and that since then the applicant had been in Ukraine in violation of migration regulations. 15.  On 10 March 2010, at the request of the police, the Golosiyivskyy District Court in Kyiv, relying on Article 203 \u00a7 1 of the Code on Administrative Offences, ordered the applicant to pay a fine for violating migration regulations. 16.  The applicant\u2019s identification documents were kept by the Golosiyivkyy District Police Department pending the outcome of the applicant\u2019s request for an extension of his residence permit. 17.  According to the applicant, about a week later his residence permit was extended until 15 September 2011. The Government contested that submission, stating that no extension had been granted. 18.  In the meantime, on 11 March 2010 the applicant was stopped by officers of the Solomyanskyy District Police Department in Kyiv for an identity check. As he had no identification documents, the applicant was arrested and taken to the police station. The applicant stated that his explanation that his documents were being kept at another police department had not been taken into account. On 12 March 2010 the applicant was taken to the Solomyanskyy District Court in Kyiv, which, having examined the material submitted by the police, fined the applicant for failure to carry identification and foreigner\u2019s registration documents. 19.  On 28 April 2010 the applicant was stopped by officers of the Desnyanskyy District Police Department in Kyiv for an identity check. Having noted that the applicant was living in a flat in Kyiv without a rent contract or official registration, the officers asked the Desnyanskyy District Court in Kyiv to fine the applicant. By a decision of 28 April 2010, the court ordered the applicant to pay a fine for violating migration regulations. 20.  The applicant did not appeal against the court decisions convicting him of administrative offences, as he had no legal representation and took the view that those decisions would not have any consequences for his stay in Ukraine. 21.  On 16 September 2011 the applicant went to the migration unit of the Chief Police Department in Kyiv to apply for an extension of his residence permit. On the way he was stopped by officers of the migration unit of the Solomyanskyy Police Department in Kyiv, who informed the applicant that there had been an order deporting him from Ukraine. The officers seized the documents the applicant had with him for his application for an extension of his residence permit, including his passport and marriage certificate. The documents have not been returned to the applicant. The applicant claimed that for that reason he could not provide a copy of his most recent residence permit. 22.  Subsequently the applicant contacted a lawyer, who helped him to obtain copies of the decisions concerning his expulsion and to lodge an appeal against them (see paragraph 28 below). 23.  On 17 March 2010 the Solomyanskyy District Police Department in Kyiv issued a decision stating that the applicant should be removed from Ukraine for violation of migration regulations and banning him from entry to the country until 12 March 2015 under section 32 of the Legal Status of Foreigners and Stateless Persons Act 1994 (see paragraphs 64-67 below). In the decision, it was noted that the applicant had come to Ukraine in 2005 for a private visit; that after the expiry of his residence permit he had remained in Ukraine illegally; that he had not requested an extension of his residence permit; that he had no relatives in Ukraine; that he had no work permit; that he had earned his life working at a market in Kyiv; and that he was \u201cknown to the police\u201d. 24.  According to the Government, the applicant was informed of the decision of 17 March 2010 on the same day and asked for a court hearing on his expulsion case (see paragraph 27 below) in his absence. In support, they provided copies of written statements allegedly signed by the applicant and by a translator. 25.  The applicant claimed that he had not been informed of that decision and that the written statements in that regard had been forged by the police. The applicant also argued that he had not been aware that subsequently, in May 2010, the police had initiated court proceedings for him to be forcibly removed from Ukraine. 26.  In their written submissions made in the course of those proceedings, the police reiterated the findings in the decision of 17 March 2010 and requested the Kyiv Administrative Court to order the applicant\u2019s immediate forcible removal and his placement in a facility for temporary detention of foreigners and stateless persons for the period necessary to prepare the removal. In the latter regard, the police argued that there were reasons to believe that the applicant would try to remain illegally in Ukraine. 27.  On 18 May 2010 the Kyiv Administrative Court heard the case in the absence of the parties, having noted that the applicant had submitted a written statement that he did not wish to be present and that he agreed with the expulsion decision, and also that the police were not able to attend the hearing because of their high workload. The court relied on the findings in the decision of 17 March 2010 and allowed the claims of the police. In its decision, the court noted that its ruling was to be enforced immediately and that it could be appealed against within ten days under Articles 185-187 of the Code of Administrative Justice. If no appeal was lodged against the decision it would enter into force after the expiry of the ten-day period. 28.  According to the applicant, he was informed of the decision of 18 May 2010 on 25 November 2011. On 29 November 2011 a lawyer submitted an appeal on the applicant\u2019s behalf, together with a request for renewal of the ten-day time-limit, to the Kyiv Administrative Court for further transfer to the Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeal. 29.  In the appeal, the applicant argued that he had been studying in Ukraine between 1993 and 1999. In December 2000 he had returned from Palestine to Ukraine fearing persecution by the Israeli authorities. Without providing any further details, the applicant stated that he had been arrested and tortured by the Israeli authorities with the aim of obtaining his confession of cooperation with Hamas. The applicant further noted that he was married to a Ukrainian national, that he had been officially allowed to stay in Ukraine until 16 September 2011, and that on that day the police had seized his identification documents and ordered him to leave Ukraine. The applicant also expressed the wish to apply for asylum once the Migration Service started accepting asylum applications according to the new regulations (see paragraphs 75-79 below). 30.  The applicant complained that the first-instance court had failed to examine all the facts pertinent to the case and to hear him. According to the appeal, the applicant had not been informed of the decision of 17 March 2010 and had not asked the court to hear the case in his absence. 31.  He also argued that the first-instance court had not checked whether it was safe for the applicant to return to Palestine and had not been informed of the circumstances essential for the outcome of his case. In particular, the applicant argued that the Ukrainian police had withheld the information that he had a valid residence permit and that he had used to be married to a Ukrainian national. The applicant complained that the expulsion decision of 17 March 2010 had been taken in violation of Articles 2, 3 and 5 of the Convention, given the human rights situation in Palestine, and in violation of the domestic procedure. 32.  On 14 November 2012 the Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeal heard the case in the absence of the parties. It is unknown whether the applicant or his lawyer intended to take part in the hearing and, if so, whether they informed the Court of Appeal accordingly. 33.  The appeal was rejected as unsubstantiated. In particular, the Court of Appeal relied fully on the findings of the first-instance court and noted that \u201cthe claimant, having been removed from Ukraine, had crossed the Ukrainian border despite the existing entry ban\u201d. The decision entered into force immediately. 34.  On 6 December 2012 the applicant lodged with the Higher Administrative Court a cassation appeal challenging the factual and legal findings of the lower courts. The applicant also complained that his expulsion from Ukraine would be contrary to Article 8 of the Convention given his personal and family ties with that country. 35.  On 3 October 2013 the Higher Administrative Court overturned the lower courts\u2019 decisions on the ground that they had failed to examine whether there were grounds preventing the applicant\u2019s expulsion under Ukrainian law. The Higher Administrative Court also noted that the lower courts had not given due consideration to the applicant\u2019s private and family life interests in Ukraine. The case was thus sent for re-examination to the first-instance court. 36.  After another round of examination by the courts at the first and appeal levels of jurisdiction resulting in a decision ordering the applicant\u2019s forcible removal from Ukraine, in February 2014 the case was sent back to the start again by the Higher Administrative Court, for the same reasons as in its decision of 3 October 2013. 37.  On 29 October 2014 the Desnyanskyy District Court, to which the case was eventually remitted, refused the application for the applicant\u2019s forcible expulsion. 38.  The court held that the applicant\u2019s forcible removal from Ukraine would be in violation of his right to respect of family life as guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention, having regard in particular to the fact that the applicant was married to a Ukrainian national. It also found that, in the event of his removal to Palestine, the applicant\u2019s life and security would be endangered, given the armed conflict on that territory, which would entail a violation of Ukraine\u2019s commitments under Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention. The court took the view that the applicant had grounds to be given the status of refugee or of a person in need of complementary protection. The court also noted that, by operation of the statutory one-year time-limit (see paragraph 58 below), the applicant could no longer be considered as having committed the administrative offences of which he had been convicted in 2010 (see paragraphs 15, 18 and 19 above). 39.  That decision was not appealed against and became final. 40.  On 25 January 2012 the applicant lodged an asylum application with the State Migration Service. According to the applicant, in his application he stated that he feared persecution by Hamas if returned to Gaza, as he had been a member of Fatah. 41.  According to the applicant, during the assessment of his asylum case migration officers questioned him on two occasions. They asked formal questions not related to the substance of his allegations. 42.  On 1 August 2012 the applicant received a written notice dated 21 June 2012 that his asylum application had been refused by a decision of the State Migration Service of 17 May 2012 and that he could challenge it before the courts. No copy of the decision was given to the applicant. 43.  On 3 August 2012 the applicant challenged the refusal of his asylum application before the Kyiv Administrative Court. In particular, the applicant argued that he had not been informed of the reasons for that decision, and that this prevented him from effectively appealing against it. The applicant also argued that the examination of his application had not been thorough and objective, as his questioning had been formalistic and no additional information had been sought concerning the general situation in Palestine or the applicant\u2019s personal circumstances from other State authorities, such as the State Security Service, or from the applicant himself, to check the reliability of his submissions. The applicant stated that he had not been given access to the evidence in the inquiry. He maintained his allegation that he was at risk of persecution by Hamas, and also argued that if returned to Gaza, as a male Palestinian he ran a real risk of ill-treatment by the Israeli authorities, even though he did not support Hamas. In that regard, he referred to the reports of Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch concerning the human rights situation in Palestine in 2012. The applicant also contended that the Migration Service had disregarded that, as a Palestinian refugee registered with UNRWA and outside its field of operation he was entitled to the same protection in Ukraine as refugees under the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951. 44.  On 20 September 2012 the court rejected the applicant\u2019s case, finding that the Migration Service had examined the matter thoroughly and fully and that the applicant\u2019s arguments were unsubstantiated. In particular, the court noted that the material relating to the applicant\u2019s asylum proceedings demonstrated that he did not run an individual and real risk of persecution by the Palestinian authorities, as Hamas and Fatah had entered into negotiations concerning a transitional government for Palestinian territories; he had not been subjected to such persecution at any time; the applicant had not provided any evidence that he would not be able to avail himself of the protection of his country of origin; he had travelled freely to and from Palestine; all his family lived there; and he did not face criminal prosecution there. The court also noted that the applicant had left his country of origin voluntarily for economic and personal reasons; he had had his residence permit in Ukraine repeatedly extended for personal reasons; and he had requested asylum only after he had not been able to legalise his further stay in Ukraine. Relying on the latter ground, the court found that the applicant had missed the time-limit for lodging an asylum application pursuant to Article 5 of the Refugees and Persons in Need of Complementary or Temporary Protection Act of 2011. On the whole, the court found that it had been for the applicant to provide documents or persuasive arguments demonstrating that he had run a real and personal risk of persecution, which he had failed to do. 45.  On 25 October 2012 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeal. In particular, he stated that his allegations of risk of persecution by Hamas and by the Israeli authorities were, inter alia, supported by the fact that his passport had been issued by the Palestinian Authority associated with Fatah, by his registration card issued by the UNRWA, and by various international reports, which neither the Migration Service nor the court of first instance had sought to obtain or examine. According to the applicant, the court\u2019s review of his case had not been full or thorough, thus falling short of the requirements of the Refugees and Persons in Need of Complementary or Temporary Protection Act of 2011, as interpreted by the Plenary Higher Administrative Court (see paragraphs 80-86 below). 46.  On 4 December 2012 the Court of Appeal rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal, having agreed with the first-instance court in that the applicant had failed to substantiate his asylum application as required by the national law and pertinent international documents, including the European Union Council Directive of 1 December 2005 on minimum standards on procedures in member states for granting and withdrawing refugee status and the Guidelines on procedures and criteria for determining refugee status under the 1951 Geneva Convention, issued by the UNHCR in 2011. 47.  The applicant appealed in cassation, stating that the lower courts had not fully examined the material pertinent to his case, which had resulted in a wrong dismissal of his asylum request, in violation of Articles 3, 8 and 13 of the Convention. As to Article 8, the applicant noted that he had studied in Ukraine between 1993 and 1999, that since 2000 he was permanently resident on its territory, and that he was married to a Ukrainian national. 48.  On 7 February 2013 the Higher Administrative Court rejected the applicant\u2019s cassation appeal, having found no elements demonstrating that the lower courts had erred in the application of substantive or procedural law or that review of the evidence in the case was required. 49.  In November 2014 the applicant lodged a new asylum application with the State Migration Service. 50.  On 24 December 2014 the Kyiv Department of the State Migration Service refused to examine the application, finding that it was wholly unsubstantiated. 51.  On 20 July 2015 the Kyiv Administrative Court overturned that decision, having found that the State Migration Service had failed to thoroughly examine the matter. The court in particular found that, although the arguments on which the applicant\u2019s new application for asylum had been based were the same as in the applicant\u2019s initial application, the new application needed to be reconsidered in the light of the decision of the Desnyanskyy District Court of 29 October 2014 and on the basis of the new Act on the Legal Status of Foreigners and Stateless Persons, which had entered into force on 25 December 2011. It therefore ordered the State Migration Service to reconsider the applicant\u2019s new asylum application. 52.  The reconsideration of the applicant\u2019s new asylum application is currently pending. According to the Government, by operation of section 1 of the Refugees and Persons in Need of Complementary or Temporary Protection Act (see paragraph 79 below), this gives the applicant a lawful ground to stay in Ukraine for the duration of the said reconsideration. 53.  As he could not obtain asylum in Ukraine and in order to use all possible opportunities to legalise his stay in Ukraine in order to evade expulsion, in 2014 the applicant applied for leave to immigrate, principally relying on the fact that he was married to a Ukrainian citizen. The Migration Service refused to examine his application as there were inconsistences in the spelling of his name in the applicant\u2019s asylum seeker\u2019s certificate and in his passport and marriage certificate. The applicant\u2019s requests for the relevant changes to be made in the documents were allegedly ignored by the authorities. 54.  The applicant further claimed that an official from the Migration Service told him that he would have to leave Ukraine and to apply for leave to immigrate from abroad in order to obtain leave to enter Ukraine lawfully. 55.  According to the applicant, he could not leave Ukraine as he had nowhere to go. In Palestine his life and health would be endangered and he had not maintained close links with the place where he lived before he had moved to Ukraine. In his view, he could not apply for leave to immigrate into Ukraine, as he could not be considered as staying on its territory \u201con lawful grounds\u201d, which was required by the Immigration Act (see paragraph 74 below). According to the Government, the applicant could not apply for leave to immigrate while his asylum application was being examined. Furthermore, pursuant to Article 4 \u00a7 3 (1) of the Immigration Act leave to immigrate could be granted to an alien who had been married to a Ukrainian citizen for over two years (see paragraph 74 below). At the time, the applicant\u2019s marriage had lasted for less than two years. Thus, no leave to immigrate could be granted to him on that ground. 56.  The parties did not inform the Court of any further developments in that regard.", "references": ["6", "1", "3", "9", "4", "8", "7", "5", "2", "0", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1969, 1968 and 1972 respectively and live in Lan\u017ehot (Messrs. B\u00e1t\u011bk and Elsner) and B\u0159eclav (Mr Bla\u017eej). 6.  From September 2003 to January 2004 the applicants were employed by the Lan\u017ehot Customs Office on the border with the Slovak Republic. On 1 December 2003, pursuant to Article 158e of the Code of Criminal Procedure (\u201cthe CCP\u201d) an undercover police agent infiltrated the team of customs officers. As a result of her observations over the following two months, the customs officers were suspected of corruption, namely taking bribes from truck drivers in exchange for granting priority or trouble-free customs clearance. The undercover agent left the Customs Office on 6 February 2004. 7.  During March and April 2004 testimony was taken in the presence of a judge from twenty truck drivers from different countries in accordance with the provisions of Article 158a of the CCP, that is to say this step was taken as an urgent or non-repeatable measure (neodkladn\u00fd nebo neopakovateln\u00fd \u00fakon). The records show that the drivers\u2019 testimonies were similar. According to the applicants, interviews with four of the drivers were of decisive significance. Three of them were of Romanian nationality and one of them was a Bulgarian citizen. The applicants, being not yet charged, were not present at these interviews. 8.  Witness I.P.D. testified that it was common practice for the customs officers to ask drivers for documents and to check whether there was some money enclosed. If not, the drivers had to wait for hours to be cleared. He admitted that he had paid bribes on two or three occasions but he could not remember individual customs officers.\nWitness C.D. testified that he had always had to pay 5 euros (EUR) in order to avoid inconvenience during customs clearance. He described one customs officer as a corpulent person with thinning brown hair. He did not remember any other officer.\nWitness S.B. testified that he had paid 5 EUR on each of the ten trips he had made to pass the customs control. He was not able to describe any of the customs officers.\nWitness A.A.U. confirmed the existence of corrupt practices at the customs office in question but could not specify any particular person. 9.  On 22 April 2004 the applicants were charged, together with fifteen other individuals, with abuse of the authority of public official and accepting bribes. In February 2005 they were officially indicted. 10.  On 14 December 2005 the B\u0159eclav District Court (okresn\u00ed soud) heard the police agent as an anonymous witness (utajen\u00fd sv\u011bdek) under the provisions of Article 55 \u00a7 2 and Article 209 of the CCP. She gave her testimony outside the courtroom using an audio streaming device. She did not recount any specific case of the acceptance of a bribe, stating only that her reports and the information therein were fully reliable. The third applicant was present at the hearing. He was represented by a defence counsel. The other two applicants were absent and were represented by a substitute defence counsel. Only the third applicant put a question to the anonymous witness.\nIn the course of the trial, the applicants argued that the agent would have been unable to see any other customs officers from her work-station, that none of the alleged acts had been filmed by the cameras installed at their workplace, and that the officers\u2019 numbered rubber stamps could have been used by other people. 11.  On 25 May 2006 the District Court found the applicants and other accused persons guilty as charged. They were sentenced to one year\u2019s imprisonment suspended for two years\u2019 probation and were fined. The court established the factual background to the body of evidence. The agent\u2019s written report constituted directly incriminating evidence. The court further relied on customs documents stamped using the personal rubber stamps of specific customs officers, comparing these with the testimony of the truck drivers, the records of service rotations and the database linking the applicants to the times at which the interviewed truck drivers obtained their customs clearance. The District Court stated:\n\u201cAs regards the defendant Roman B\u00e1t\u011bk, he is incriminated by the relevant documentary evidence referring to counts 2 and 3 of the indictment and counts 4 and 5 of the indictment, from which it is apparent that he used a rubber stamp with the number 005 and that his personal number was 20627, these numbers appearing on the relevant documents. When it comes to counts 2 and 3 of the indictment, he is also incriminated by the witness statements of the Bulgarian driver [D.] and the Romanian driver [C.D.] who, according to their records, passed the border crossing point at the time in question, and their papers and travel documents bear the respective numbers of the defendant B\u00e1t\u011bk. The above fully corresponds to the report from the defendant\u2019s employer regarding the placement of the defendant, i.e. where \u2012 that is to say at which work-station \u2012 he was positioned at the time concerned. As to counts 4 and 5 of the indictment, the defendant B\u00e1t\u011bk is also incriminated by a police officer of the Czech Republic who saw the defendant accepting a bribe and recorded this fact in the corresponding document, produced in evidence, which also corresponds with the testimony of the undercover agent given before the court.\nAs regards the defendant Radek Bla\u017eej, he is incriminated by the documentary evidence produced as regards counts 6 and 7 of the indictment, specifically the control sheets showing his personal number 16898 and rubber stamp number 090. He is also incriminated by the testimony of the Romanian driver [C.D.] and by a report from his former employer stating the defendant\u2019s whereabouts at the time concerned. As to count 7 of the indictment, the defendant Radek Bla\u017eej is also incriminated by the undercover police agent of the Czech Republic who saw the defendant accepting a bribe.\nAs regards the defendant Karel Elsner, he is incriminated on counts 8, 9 and 10 of the indictment by the documentary evidence produced, especially by control sheets which were stamped with his personal number and also by other use made of his personal number, as is apparent in the corresponding computer records. He is also incriminated by the witness statement of [S.D.], who submitted details of his border crossing to the authorities and notes of bribes given at a specific time and place. As to count 9 of the indictment in relation to the defendant Karel Elsner, the witness stated that on 10 November 2003 he gave a bribe at a particular time and \u2012 by checking the driver and the documentation relating to his border crossing \u2012 it was established who had cleared him and who had stamped his documents, from which it is clearly apparent that it was the defendant Elsner who carried out the administrative measures concerned and hence received the bribe. As to count 10 of the indictment, Karel Elsner is also mentioned in the anonymous agent\u2019s report.\u201d 12.  The District Court explained that the truck drivers\u2019 statements were read out at the hearing pursuant to Article 211 \u00a7 2 b) of the CCP. The drivers had been interviewed in the presence of a judge during the pre-trial stage of the proceedings, because it had been deemed necessary to take the step of obtaining their testimonies as an urgent or non-repeatable measure since they were foreign nationals and it would have been almost impossible for the court to reach them at a later stage. The undercover police agent was heard as an anonymous witness pursuant to Article 209 of the CCP because of her potential future activities. 13.  The applicants appealed against the judgment. They firstly argued that the truck drivers could have been questioned under the corresponding international treaties \u2012 namely the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters and bilateral treaties on mutual judicial assistance with Romania (treaty of 25 October 1958) and Bulgaria (treaty of 25 November 1976) \u2012 and that they could have been granted immunity in exchange for testifying. They also contested the legal grounds and the necessity for the non-disclosure of the identity of the undercover police agent. According to them, she did not risk bodily harm or any other danger of interference with her fundamental rights as required by Article 55 \u00a7 2 of the CCP. The argument about her future activities was not sufficient justification. Moreover, the delays between the questions asked at trial and her replies implied that she had had with her some notes or someone whom she had consulted about her answers before replying. 14.  On 22 March 2007 the Brno Regional Court (krajsk\u00fd soud) rejected the applicants\u2019 appeal as unsubstantiated, arguing as follows:\n\u201c(...) the hearing of an undercover police agent as a witness is in practice exceptional, occurring only in the particular circumstances of a specific case and in the interests of proper clarification and vindication of particularly serious criminal actions and the conviction of the perpetrators thereof. In such circumstances, and when such an agent is heard as a witness, Article 55 \u00a7 2, Article 183a \u00a7 4, and Article 209 of the CCP would be applicable. In the instant case, the provisions of the CCP regulating the agent\u2019s testimony were not violated and the allegations of some of the defendants that the agent had been heard as an anonymous witness in order to allow her to consult her notes or another person are unsubstantiated. The first-instance court had no doubts about the agent\u2019s reliability as a witness. She reliably described how she had obtained the information about the criminal activity of the accused and how she had evaluated, recorded and processed it (...)\nUnder Article 160 \u00a7 4 of the CCP, a non-repeatable measure is a measure which cannot be repeated before the trial court. Questioning a witness who is a foreign national or stateless person without a permanent residence permit in the Czech Republic can be considered to be this kind of measure. None of the witnesses had a link to the Czech Republic of the kind which could have justified the conclusion that they would remain in the country or appear if summoned. The witnesses merely pass through the territory in the course of their work as truck drivers. The interviews with these witnesses were conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The allegations of the defendants that the witnesses did not even know the content of the records they had signed, and that they had been forced to testify and promised immunity if they stated particular facts, are not substantiated by the case file, and no other facts corroborating these allegations have been ascertained. It is apparent from the file that the truck drivers were questioned in the presence of an interpreter and in the presence of judges of the B\u0159eclav District Court (...). Under Article 158a of the CCP, a judge who performs the urgent or non\u2011repeatable measure of examining a witness or in an identity parade also bears responsibility for the legality thereof.\" 15.  The applicants filed a constitutional appeal alleging a violation of Article 6 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3 d) of the Convention and complaining about the depositions of the truck drivers and the anonymous witness. 16.  On 2 April 2009 the Constitutional Court (\u00dastavn\u00ed soud) dismissed the constitutional appeal as manifestly ill-founded. It stated that the complaints raised at the previous instances had been properly addressed and that the courts had provided sufficient justification to show that the evidence had been obtained in accordance with the provisions of the CCP.", "references": ["0", "6", "4", "8", "5", "3", "2", "9", "1", "7", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1971 and lives in Daugavpils. 6.  On 16 January 1995 Inspector S.K. of the Daugavpils City Police arrested the applicant and took him to the police station. The applicant, who had category 2 disability status in relation to his eyesight, did not offer any resistance. Subsequently, S.K. beat up the applicant by delivering several blows to his head, near to his eyes. When the applicant fell to the ground, S.K. kicked him at least once in the chest. 7.  After this injury, the deterioration of the applicant\u2019s sight accelerated, leading to retinal detachment. In 1995 and 1996 he had several eye operations, including three in a hospital in Moscow, but the retinal detachment continued to progress. In April 1996 he was granted category 1 disability status for complete loss of vision. 8.  On 30 January 1995 criminal proceedings were initiated against S.K. On the same date the applicant was joined as a civil party to those proceedings. 9.  In February 1995 a forensic medical report was drawn up. It stated that on 16 January the applicant had sustained numerous injuries, which by their nature were considered moderate, resulting in long-term health problems of more than twenty-one days and permanently reducing his capacity to work by at least a third. 10.  On 22 March 1995 charges were brought against S.K. and on 8 August 1995 the case was sent to the Daugavpils Court for adjudication. 11.  S.K. did not appear at the first hearing on 1 November 1995. The Daugavpils Court held that the case could not be heard in his absence and issued a warrant for his arrest. In December 1995 the warrant was sent to the Daugavpils police station. 12.  During the same hearing the applicant\u2019s lawyers asked the trial court to order a second forensic medical report in an attempt to establish the nature and seriousness of the injuries sustained. The prosecutor supported the request and the Daugavpils Court ordered a report. 13.  In January 1998, January 1999 and August 1999 the Daugavpils Court asked the Daugavpils police station for information about the measures taken and results achieved in executing the arrest warrant. In reply to each request the police sent identical responses stating that S.K. was wanted and that the trial court would be informed when he was caught. In August 1999 the police informed the Daugavpils Court that, according to information received, S.K. had left Latvia. 14.  In December 1996 the forensic medical service reminded the Daugavpils Court that it had not received any original medical documents. In July 1998 and January 1999 the Daugavpils Court asked the Russian authorities for assistance in obtaining originals of medical records relating to the applicant\u2019s operations (see paragraph 7 above). For unknown reasons the documents were not obtained and as a result, the report could not be drawn up. 15.  On 16 November 1999 the prosecutor asked the trial court to order a forensic medical examination to confirm the classification of the offence. After the initial forensic medical report the applicant\u2019s health had deteriorated and he had completely lost his sight. According to the prosecutor, there were therefore grounds to consider that that might be related to the injuries which had been inflicted on the applicant in 1995. The Daugavpils Court upheld the prosecutor\u2019s request and ordered the third forensic medical examination. A medical panel was asked to comment on what kind of trauma had caused the injuries; whether the applicant had lost his sight as a result of the injuries inflicted on him in 1995; to what extent he had been incapacitated before the injuries and their severity. 16.  On 7 December 1999 a medical report was drawn up. It stated that on 16 January 1995 the applicant had sustained injuries which by their nature were considered minor, resulting in health problems of no more than six days. The report continued that prior to the injuries the applicant had had serious and progressively deteriorating myopia. The applicant\u2019s sight problems had become worse as a result of the head injuries sustained on 16 January 1995, and that had led to further deterioration of his sight.\nIt was also noted that, under domestic law, the worsening of a pre\u2011existing condition did not as such serve as grounds for reclassifying the seriousness of an injury. Serious eye disorders could develop and result in the loss of sight even without trauma. In the light of the above, the report did not establish a direct causal link between the injuries inflicted on the applicant in 1995 and his loss of sight. 17.  In April 2000 the Daugavpils Court refused to grant the applicant\u2019s request for another medical report for lack of reasoning. 18.  From June 2000 to February 2003 a total of five hearings were postponed because experts, doctors, including an ophthalmologist, did not attend and several medical experts needed to be called. In particular, on two occasions between 27 September 2001 and 9 January 2002 and between 18 December 2002 and 24 February 2003 hearings were postponed at the request of the applicant, as he had asked for a doctor and a forensic expert to be summoned. 19.  On 10 April 2002, at the request of Daugavpils Court, a panel of experts drew up the fourth medical report which stated that the applicant had suffered at least one blow to his right eye and to his thorax. The injuries sustained by him were considered minor. The report continued by stating that on 16 January 1995 the applicant had suffered injuries to his head that had resulted in a serious worsening of his eye disorder (myopia) with the recurrence of retinal detachments in both eyes followed by further deterioration of his sight. The worsening of a pre-existing condition, including after earlier injuries, did not in itself provide a basis for determining a more serious classification of bodily injury. A severe and progressive eye disorder (myopia) could deteriorate and lead to retinal detachment even if no injuries had been suffered, and eventually lead to complete loss of vision. The experts concluded that the applicant\u2019s head injuries of 16 January 1995 had no direct causal link with the subsequent deterioration of his vision and his category 1 disability status. 20.  On 23 February 2003 the applicant lodged a claim with the trial court for compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage. 21.  On 27 February 2003 the Daugavpils Court found guilty S.K. in absentia for abusing his official power in a violent and disrespectful manner. He was sentenced to three years\u2019 imprisonment. 22.  In relation to the applicant\u2019s civil claim the Daugavpils Court held that the total amount claimed, namely 156,853 Latvian lati (LVL) (around 224,075 euros (EUR)) and 8,400 United States dollars (USD) had not been supported by evidence. The majority of the documents confirming payment of the medical expenses had been submitted in German and English, and in order to invite a translator it would have to delay the adjudication. In addition, the applicant had not stated which part of the expenses related to the consequences of the injuries sustained. Accordingly, the trial court decided as follows:\n\u201cTo recognise the [applicant\u2019s] rights to compensation from the State for material, pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage caused by the criminal offence, and to remit (nodot) the question of the precise amount to be awarded/enforced (piedz\u012bt) to the court to decide in civil proceedings\u201d.\nThe judgment became final on 11 March 2003. 23.  On 20 April 2004 the Riga Regional Court registered the applicant\u2019s civil claim dated 23 March 2003 against the Ministry of the Interior and the State Police. The applicant claimed compensation for damage caused by the criminal offence committed by Inspector S.K. In the claim the applicant relied on the operative part of the judgment of the Daugavpils Court (see above), section 27 of the Law on Police and various provisions of the Civil Law which regulated tort liability. Relying on sections 2347 and 2349 of the Civil Law in particular, the applicant claimed pecuniary and non-pecuniary (mor\u0101lo kait\u0113jumu) damages of LVL 197,624.31 (EUR 282,320) for blindness, mutilation and disfigurement (sakrop\u013cojums un iz\u0137\u0113mojums), loss of future income (atraut\u0101 pe\u013c\u0146a) and medical expenses. 24.  On 2 February 2006 the Riga Regional Court, acting as a first\u2011instance court, relied, amongst other provisions, on Article 92 of the Constitution and section 27 of the Law on Police, and accepted the applicant\u2019s civil claim in part. He was awarded LVL 90,000 (EUR 128,500) in non-pecuniary damages for the damage caused to his health and LVL 4,502.81 (EUR 6,432.58) in pecuniary damages from both defendants on a pro rata basis for his medical expenses. 25.  According to the Riga Regional Court, the applicant\u2019s claim for compensation for non-pecuniary damage came within the scope of section 2349 of the Civil Law, a lex specialis providing no specific criteria for awarding compensation. The court referred to the findings of the experts in the criminal proceedings and stated that the applicant\u2019s bodily injuries caused by the police officer might have been the reason for the worsening of his eye disorder (myopia) that had resulted in a rapid deterioration of his sight and eventually complete loss of vision. 26.  On 27 September 2006 the Supreme Court reviewed the case following appeals by the applicant, the State Police and the Ministry of the Interior. It ruled that the first-instance court had been incorrect in concluding that the applicant\u2019s injuries had amounted to mutilation and disfigurement under section 2349 of the Civil Law. The applicant\u2019s claim for compensation for non-pecuniary damage was dismissed. The pecuniary damages were reduced to LVL 4,427.81 (EUR 6,325.44). 27.  Regarding the applicant\u2019s claim for pecuniary damages, the Supreme Court ruled that the judgment adopted in the criminal proceedings against S.K. only proved that he had committed a crime using violence against the applicant. The four usual criteria for establishing tort liability and compensation thus had to be satisfied (see paragraph 30 below). In the judgment of 27 February 2003 the first and fourth criteria had been established. The Supreme Court analysed all the medical data before it concerning the applicant\u2019s health and concluded that the State Police were liable to pay pecuniary damages to the applicant for his medical expenses under section 2347 of the Civil Law. 28.  Regarding the applicant\u2019s claim for non-pecuniary damages, the Supreme Court concluded that the loss of the applicant\u2019s sight had occurred under specific circumstances, including his previous state of health. It was also noted that the loss of his sight was not directly linked to the bodily injuries sustained by him on 15 January 1995. There was therefore no evidence to prove that his bodily injuries had amounted to mutilation or disfigurement, as provided in section 2349 of the Civil Law. 29.  In a preparatory meeting on 22 February 2007 the Senate of the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal on points of law by the applicant as not raising any relevant legal issues. 30.  In a letter dated 21 October 2010 addressed to the Government, the Supreme Court stated that there were no grounds for the national courts to extend the scope of the applicant\u2019s claim and decide on the awarding of non-pecuniary damages on the following grounds. The applicant had claimed pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages for injuries sustained as a result of police ill-treatment. In this regard he had relied on sections 2347 to 2349 of the Civil Law, which provided that compensation could be claimed for mutilation and disfigurement. In order to determine whether the consequences of the alleged injuries were those stipulated in the legal provision, the domestic courts had to establish the essential conditions of tort liability, namely (i) unlawful conduct, (ii) damage, (iii) a causal link between the unlawful conduct and damage claimed and (iv) fault. In the applicant\u2019s case, no such conclusions could be drawn on the basis of the medical documents. The applicant had lost his sight owing to various coexisting circumstances, not as a result of the injuries sustained in January 1995. 31.  The Supreme Court also stated that with the amendments of 1 March 2006 the Civil Law contained a general legal provision (section 1635 of the Civil Law) for claiming non-pecuniary damages. Nevertheless, it did not have retroactive effect and therefore the national courts could not apply it in the applicant\u2019s case. According to the Supreme Court, no such obligation could be inferred from any other legal acts on the account that the subject matter of the present civil dispute did not concern the public law obligation which the Latvian State had undertaken in the area of human rights. 32.  Furthermore, the Supreme Court indicated that in the applicant\u2019s case the ten-year statutory limitation period for claiming damages had started to run on 11 March 2003, the day the final judgment in the criminal case became effective. The Supreme Court therefore considered that the applicant still had the right to rely on Article 92 of the Constitution and lodge a claim for compensation for damage caused by a criminal offence. In that regard the Supreme Court referred to the judgment of 16 December 2009 in the so-called \u201cTalsi tragedy\u201d case, in which it ruled that a person has the right to receive compensation for violations of his or her human rights.", "references": ["5", "7", "4", "9", "6", "2", "8", "0", "No Label", "1", "3"], "gold": ["1", "3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1967 and lives in Prague. 6.  In the period between 30 December 2005 and 8 June 2006 the applicant was found to have addressed emails to C., his former partner, stating, among other things:\n\u201c... It is this [C.] that I wish to see; I don\u2019t want to meet the other one again. I gave up the possibility of keeping her at bay by any means (such as pictures of her injecting drugs, pictures of her offering prostitution services or pictures of her masturbating), because I have so much respect for her that I did not want to spend any more hours trying to pull off dirty tricks on her, naively believing that the second time I would be able to open her eyes to the truth. ...\nYou say that you are scared of me. Well, get rid of that fear finally; otherwise we cannot even be very good friends ...\nI suggest we draw a line under the past, particularly the evil period, and turn over a new leaf. In the same spirit, I suggest not talking about the evil things ever again; otherwise you will not be able to get rid of your fear ...\n... Are we really only able to talk to each other when I yell at you or tie you up or abduct you in my car, or do I have to think up a similar dirty trick? Do I have to become evil before you can hear me out and are willing to talk to me? You are not going to believe me, but it hurt me that I had to lower myself to that level. ...\nIt\u2019s a pity that one has to abduct you or tie you up, in other words simply use means of physical restraint in order to make you listen and carefully think about and evaluate what they have told you. I would be happier if you could do so without such actions ...\n... promise made in the car ...\nBecause I have not humiliated you either, although I had a good opportunity to do so. I could have taken pictures of you, forced you to make a porn movie and sent it to all those people in England. I could have forced you to sign whatever I wished for, and I know that you would forced yourself to sign whatever I wished and I know that you would have done it at that moment. Do not wonder about the things I am able to think about; wonder about why I have not done so ...\nI will tell her everything about what I have done to you as well as why I have done it; I will give her your contact details, and maybe she can help us become closer ...\nI told the psychologist everything about what I have done to you, ... how I was bad to you, including the threats I have recently made in order to make you hear me out. When I told her about how I tied you up, she replied that I must not do that to you ever again and that I should be glad that you have not turned me in ...\nOn Monday, it will be one month since that last time I threatened you and intimidated you ...\n... all my threats are really just my defensive response to various feelings of injustice ...\nWhen you were at my place, I could have done whatever I wanted with you; but I\u2019m not like that, it is hard to hurt you in any way because I love you ...\nIf you cannot accept it, I will not do anything more than what I have repeated a thousand times when we made that agreement at Christmas ...\nI will do or pay someone to do something that will harm you. Ranging from pettiness to heavy force that would be in violation of the law ...\n[C.], I\u2019m slowly starting to realise that my feelings for you are heading towards freezing point and hatred is starting to prevail ...\u201d 7.  On 7 June 2006 C. made a statement about the applicant\u2019s threatening telephone calls and emails at the police station in Surrey (the United Kingdom). On the next day, upon police advice, she changed her telephone number and email address. 8.  On 23 June 2006 the Prague 1 District Prosecutor\u2019s Office (obvodn\u00ed st\u00e1tn\u00ed z\u00e1stupce) received an anonymous criminal complaint containing allegations of the sexual abuse of children. The female informer indicated that a certain C. had confessed that she had participated in sexual abuse whilst working as an au pair in the United Kingdom. 9.  In July 2006 several individuals including the applicant were questioned in connection with the criminal investigation into the criminal complaint. 10.  On 13 July 2006 C.\u2019s mother made a statement at the police station in Prague 1 according to which the applicant had tied C. up in his apartment and had shown her a bag in which he intended to carry her away. She stated, in particular, that:\n\u201cOn 6 June 2006, my daughter called me, asking me whether I had time and that maybe I should sit down. She informed me that she had not been dating [L.], as she had claimed the entire time she dated [the applicant], but that instead she had been dating [the applicant], who had allegedly threatened and was currently still threatening her with physical annihilation if she would not resume her relationship with him; he had also demanded that [C.] continue to have sexual relations with him. She decided to tell me about the entire matter only after he had allegedly sent her an email with the words ... \u2018and don\u2019t forget that you have a family \u2013 mother, brother \u2013 back at home\u2019 ... Given her experience of him, [C.] considers it very likely that this threat could be carried out by [the applicant]. Since that time she had changed her email address and phone number; she also informed me that she had changed her place of residence in England because she did not want to have contact with him any more. In addition, my daughter informed me that she had also reported the entire matter in England, where she had been questioned about the matter after suffering a mental breakdown there. This condition of my daughter was caused by the actions of the [applicant], who had continuously been sending her emails and threatening her. My daughter said that she had these emails at her disposal ...\nIn addition, I learned from my daughter that [the applicant], during the period when he was communicating and was able to communicate with her, had told her that she could come back to him, that she was in no danger from him because he had started seeing a psychologist ... in order to reduce or eradicate his violent behaviour, which he was aware of and had been using against her \u2013 against [C.] ...\u201d 11.  On 19 July 2006 C.\u2019s female friend D.B. stated that, in a letter of 28 January 2006, C. had confided in her about the forcible coercion by the applicant, which had taken place on 29 December 2005. She further stated that, at about the same time, C. had called her from the United Kingdom, telling her that the applicant had been menacing her and her family with threats to their lives. In addition, she said that the applicant had contacted her by SMS, by phone and by email. She submitted the letter to the police. 12.  On 7 August 2006 the police asked the Prague 6 District Prosecutor\u2019s Office to apply for an \u201curgent or non-repeatable measure\u201d (neodkladn\u00fd nebo neopakovateln\u00fd \u00fakon) pursuant to Article 158a of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter \u201cthe CCP\u201d), and the following day an interview with C. was conducted. The request included a very detailed justification explaining that the applicant had forcibly coerced C. in the Czech Republic as well as in the United Kingdom, where she had filed a criminal complaint. At the time of making that request, C. had been living and working in the United Kingdom but arrived back in the Czech Republic for the purpose of her interview on 8 August 2006. Her employment and the distance between the place of her employment and Prague, where she was interviewed, made it impossible for her to travel more often to the Czech Republic, where she did not feel safe anyway, given the prior events. 13.  On the same day, a prosecutor at the District Prosecutor\u2019s Office asked the Prague 6 District Court (obvodn\u00ed soud) to secure the presence of a judge during C.\u2019s interview, which was to be carried out as an urgent and non-repeatable measure. 14.  On 8 August 2006 the police interviewed C. as a witness in the presence of a judge pursuant to Article 158a of the CCP. At that time, the applicant had not been charged and was therefore not present at the interview. C. stated at the outset that:\n\u201c... [S]ince September 2005 I have been working as an au pair in the United Kingdom. ... I arrived in the Czech Republic on the basis of an agreement with the police authorities of [the Czech Republic] and upon the advice of my employer, ..., who is a police officer, after the actions of [the applicant] reached such an intensity that I started to be really scared.\u201d\nShe further stated that the applicant had not come to terms with the fact that she had broken off their intimate relationship. She described in detail the acts of intimidation conducted by him in the form of phone calls, SMS messages, emails, letters and verbal threats. She also stated that on 29 December 2005, between 12 noon and 4.30 p.m., she had been present in the applicant\u2019s flat, where he had tied her to the bed, partially undressed the lower part of her body, and threatened to drug her with heroin, to carry her out from the flat in a large bag and to hand her over to unspecified persons to be trafficked to Turkey for 100,000 CZK (EUR 3,622) unless she promised to resume their intimate relationship, which she had broken off on 25 December 2005. According to her, the applicant had threatened to take pornographic pictures of her or to record a porn movie with her, which he would then send to her employer in the United Kingdom and the company which had acted as intermediary in finding her a job in the United Kingdom. Furthermore, on 1 January 2006 they had been in a car together and the applicant had threatened to throw C. into a snowdrift and drive off, or to kill both her and himself in a deliberate car accident. C. also stated that the applicant had searched through her mobile phone contacts to find the number of her female friend D.B., whom he had contacted at a later date. C. wrote an explanatory letter to D.B. She had also phoned her mother and had confided in her about the intimidation by the applicant. C. also stated that the applicant was seeing a psychotherapist. As the intimidation continued, C. filed a criminal complaint at a police station in the United Kingdom on 7 June 2006.\nShe also stated:\n\u201cUpon the advice of the police in the United Kingdom, on 8 June 2006 I changed my mail address, after 9 June 2006 I also changed the number of my mobile phone and at the advice of my employer, I have also the confidential employment that [the applicant] or his eventual messengers could not contact me. ...\n...\nI was asked to make comment on the email notice which was made anonymously at the Prague 1 District Prosecutor\u2019s Office on 23 June 2006 at 10.48 a.m.. ... I do not know any girl who would meet me in a club in the United Kingdom; I do not know any such girl who would know the information about me, which were written in this denouncement. ... The information indicated in this denouncement corresponded to what [the applicant] knows about me, what I foolishly told him in the past.\u201d\nAt the end of the interview, C. submitted copies of her email exchanges with the applicant and a tape recording of his voice messages, and made available SMS messages on her mobile phone for transcription. 15.  On 25 October 2006 a judge at the Prague 6 District Court ordered the compilation of a list of incoming and outgoing telephone calls from the applicant\u2019s mobile phone between 20 December 2005 and 31 July 2006. On 26 October 2006 he ordered the compilation of a list of communications executed from three mail-boxes between 14 February and 30 June 2006 and between 1 January and 30 June 2006, respectively. On 31 October 2006 the judge ordered the compilation of a list of communications carried out from several of the applicant\u2019s other mail-boxes in the period from 25 December 2005 to 30 June 2006, and also the provision of information on the total number of communications logged in these mailboxes between 25 December 2005 and 18 October 2006. On the same day, the judge ordered the compilation of a list of outgoing telephone calls from the applicant\u2019s land line on 9 June 2006 between 11 a.m and 3 p.m. 16.  On 5 April 2007 criminal proceedings were initiated against the applicant for unlawful restraint (omezov\u00e1n\u00ed osobn\u00ed svobody) in concurrence with coercion (vyd\u00edr\u00e1n\u00ed), defamation (pomluva) and false accusation (k\u0159iv\u00e9 obvin\u011bn\u00ed). 17.  In April 2007 a search was conducted in both the applicant\u2019s flat and the commercial premises where he ran his business, upon the search orders issued on 16 and 18 April 2007 respectively. The applicant was arrested on 20 April 2007 and was charged with unlawful restrain, coercion, defamation and false accusation, and released afterwards. 18.  The police continued to gather evidence during 2007 and 2008. They obtained an expert psychiatric opinion on the applicant\u2019s health, analysed his computer, carried out a search of his flat and questioned a number of witnesses. 19.  On 27 April 2007 C.\u2019s mother was interviewed. She stated, in particular, that:\n\u201cOn 6 June 2006 ... my daughter called me at work, started crying on the phone ... She told me that ... she had been dating [the applicant] the entire time. [She] continued crying a lot, which made me realise that this was not all there was to it. It made me feel physically sick. She continued the story, saying that when she was at home for Christmas [the applicant] had abducted her. She had agreed to meet him somewhere in Prague they met normally and agreed to go out for a drink in the evening. But he said that he needed to change clothes so they would first drive to his place and then go out later in the evening. In the apartment, however, he tied her up and menaced her with horrible threats. At that time, she did not tell me any details. ... At the same time, during our phone conversation we came onto the topic of the threatening emails that [the applicant] had been sending her the entire time. She said that she had not paid much attention to them but that lately it had got completely out of hand and ... he had started threatening to kill her and, finally, had sent her an email saying that she should not forget that she had her entire family in Prague, specifically mentioning her mother and brother, and that she should not forget that he knew where we lived.\n...\nI personally contacted the psychologist ... She confirmed that my daughter had phoned her as well. She said that she had advised her ... to immediately cut off all contact with [the applicant] ... I told her about what [the applicant] had done to my daughter at Christmas 2005 and she essentially replied that [the applicant] had also told her about it and that she had strictly forbidden him to ever do such a thing again ...\n[C.] told me that in December 2005, when she was in his flat, [the applicant] had tied her up, threatened to kill her, to traffic her, to make a movie of her taking drugs or a porn movie; he had also searched through her handbag and taken a piece of paper with her home address or had written it down, had searched through the address book in her mobile phone and had accessed her electronic mail box after forcing her to give him the password ...\u201d 20.  The investigation having been concluded in May 2008, the applicant was indicted for coercion under Article 235 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 2 of the Criminal Code on 16 June 2008. This legal classification of his criminal acts was more serious than that indicated in the notice served on him on 20 April 2007, when he had been charged with deprivation of personal liberty under Article 231 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 2 of the Criminal Code in conjunction with coercion under Article 235 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code. According to the applicant, he had not been informed about it, contrary to Article 176 \u00a7 2 of the CCP. 21.  According to the Government, on 10 September 2008 C. apologised through her mother for not being able to attend the hearing before the District Court. 22.  The trial started on 14 October 2008. As C. apologised for not attending the main hearing, the statement made by her on 8 August 2006 was therefore read out. The applicant claimed that C.\u2019s residence abroad had not been a sufficient reason for carrying out her interview as an urgent measure and that her statement should not be read out at the trial. He argued that the conditions laid down in Article 211 \u00a7 2 of CCP had not been met. 23.  The District Court tried to summons C. again. In its letter of 12 March 2009, the court sent a summons to the main hearing to C. through her mother. On 13 March 2009 the District Prosecutor\u2019s Office sent to the District Court copies of the documents justifying the urgent need to interview C., namely the request of 7 August 2006 to secure the presence of a judge during an urgent and non-repeatable measure and the police letter of 7 August 2006. 24.  In a letter of 24 April 2009, C. informed the presiding judge that, although she had been summonsed, she was unable to attend the main hearing because she had been working abroad for more than four years and intended to stay abroad on a permanent basis. She stated that the circumstances justifying the applicant\u2019s criminal prosecution were very stressful for both her and her mother. It appears that the District Court did not try to summon C. again. 25.  In a judgment of 8 December 2009 the District Court found the applicant guilty of coercion and sentenced him to two and a half years\u2019 suspended prison sentence subject to a probationary period of two years. The court explicitly noted that in finding the applicant guilty, it mainly relied on the testimony of C., but also on a statement made by D.K., a schoolfriend of C.\u2019s, who stated that she had received emails concerning C.; the statement by M.V., C.\u2019s psychotherapist, who testified that C. had confided in her about having been taken somewhere by the applicant against her will; the statement by C.\u2019s mother; a testimony by L.B. implying that the applicant and C. had met at Christmas 2005; expert opinions in cybernetics and computer technology and in psychiatry; the emails sent by the applicant to C. between 30 December 2005 and 8 June 2006; and the letter from C. to D.B., in which C. wrote to her female friend about the applicant\u2019s violent behaviour. 26.  The court then stated:\n\u201cBased on such secured evidence, the court came to a clear conclusion, finding the defendant guilty as indicated in the verdict of the judgment. The defendant denies any such behaviour and actions on his part directed against [C.] as described in the judgment; however, he has clearly been proved guilty by the evidence taken. The court relied in particular on the testimony of witness [C.], who described the defendant\u2019s actions in great detail. The testimony is consistent with further evidence taken. This includes email correspondence, which corroborates the victim\u2019s statement and the victim\u2019s mother\u2019s statement to the effect that the victim had confided in her about everything on 6 June 2006. A brief description of the defendant\u2019s behaviour was also included in the letter sent by the victim to her female friend [D.B.] which was available to the court ... In his expert opinion, the expert concluded that it was absolutely possible and posed no problem for the defendant to use previously prepared straps to tie the victim to bed and partially undress the bottom half of her body, and that it was absolutely possible and posed no problem for him to tie her up in the manner she had described ...\u201d 27.  On 13 February 2010 the applicant appealed, raising a number of procedural, factual and interpretational complaints. He claimed, inter alia, that C.\u2019s statement remained uncorroborated evidence on which his conviction was based. 28.  In his extensive submissions of 26 March 2010, he requested that C. be questioned in order, inter alia, to clarify the contradictions between the statements given by C., her mother, and her psychologist and the applicant\u2019s testimony. He also suggested that an expert opinion be drawn up by a psychiatric expert to assess the reliability of C. and to complete and assess other evidence, including the hearing of three witnesses who had been rejected without adequate reasoning by the first instance court. He also requested that the Prague Municipal Court (m\u011bstsk\u00fd soud) postpone the public hearing, without giving any reason in this respect. 29.  The hearing before the Municipal Court was held on 30 March 2010 in the absence of the applicant, who had apologised in writing on 29 March 2010 indicating that he could not attend the hearing due to serious personal and family reasons, but agreeing that the court carry out merely the procedural acts allowed by Article 263 \u00a7 5 of the CCP and asking, at the same time, to postpone the hearing afterwards. At the hearing he was represented by counsel who, contrary to the applicant\u2019s written appeal, did not request that any further evidence be taken. The court, having rejected the applicant\u2019s request to postpone the hearing, examined his appeal, upholding the conviction of the first instance court. 30.  The court found that the applicant\u2019s guilt had been securely established in particular by the statement given by C., which was not the only evidence against the applicant, her statements having been corroborated by further indirect evidence, such as the testimony of her mother, in whom C. had confided at the material time. The appellate court also found that, although C. and her mother had not had a close relationship before, C. contacted her out of fear for her and her brother\u2019s life and described the acts of coercion carried out by the applicant. Witness C.\u2019s mother also claimed that the initial anonymous criminal complaint sent by email to the Prague 1 District Prosecutor\u2019s Office had been sent by the applicant, who had thus lodged a false accusation. Her testimony was examined in detail. The indirect evidence also included text messages sent by the applicant on 5 June 2006 and the criminal complaint filed by C. in the United Kingdom on 7 June 2006. The time concurrence was thus a significant factor, too. 31.  As regards the reliability of C. and the assessment of evidence, the court stated:\n\u201c... the assessment of the evidence is reasonable and convincing, as is [the District Court\u2019s] conclusion concerning the reliability of witness [C.]. The District Court was not wrong in believing this witness, who proved the defendant\u2019s guilt of the criminal acts. The testimony of the victim was not the only convincing evidence against the applicant on which the District Court based its conclusion about the defendant\u2019s guilt, since the defendant\u2019s criminal acts are also proved by a chain of indirect evidence corroborating the testimony of the victim and confirming the credibility of her statements. This includes, in particular, the testimony of her mother ... in whom the victim confided during a phone call on 6 June 2006 in which she described the defendant\u2019s actions, including the way he had tied her up in his apartment, threatened her and sent her threatening emails. The testimonies given by [C.] and her mother ... regarding the relevant facts correspond to the content of the criminal complaint filed by the victim at the police station in Surrey, United Kingdom ... on 7 June 2006. The defendant\u2019s complaint that the unreliability of the victim is proved by the fact that she did not confide earlier in her mother or a close female friend about his alleged behaviour is ill-founded: the evidence taken clearly shows that the victim and her mother did not previously have a particularly close relationship since she did not confide in her mother about her relationship with the defendant. This is understandable given that she was allegedly abused by the mother\u2019s partner (as the victim confided in the defendant). Furthermore, the victim was already back in the United Kingdom at the relevant time (as of 3 January 2006) and her contact with the defendant was conducted solely via mobile phone calls and email correspondence. In these circumstances, the behaviour of the victim appears rather logical and understandable, i.e. confiding in her mother and brother concerning the threats to their health and her life in an SMS message. ... The reliability of the victim and the veracity of her testimony is also corroborated by the emails included in the ... These emails, which were submitted to the police by the victim, correspond case file to her testimony as to the timeframe and the contents ... It is hardly possible for the Municipal Court to believe that the victim would systematically and for many months beforehand prepare all the evidence ... in order to be able to file a criminal complaint against the defendant. In addition to the above, the defendant\u2019s contacts with the victim (which he himself did not deny) and her reliability are also clearly shown in the defendant\u2019s affidavit of 2 June 2006 ..., in which the defendant declared he did not have any financial claims against the victim. Finally, one should not disregard the statement of an impartial witness ... namely the victim\u2019s psychotherapist, who confirmed that the victim came to her because of relational problems with the defendant, confided in her about having been held by the defendant against her will and driven off somewhere in his car, and about his emails threatening to harm her if she left him. All this indirect evidence is interrelated and consistent with the victim\u2019s testimony. Consequently, the defendant\u2019s complaint concerning the unreliability of the victim is ill-founded ... As a result, the District Court correctly believed the testimony given by the victim in relation to this matter, considering her testimony in general to be credible ...\nThe defendant\u2019s behaviour and verbal aggression, as documented in the emails and SMS messages sent by him escalated at a later stage, prompting the victim to file a criminal complaint and change her contact details because she was afraid of the defendant\u2019s behaviour after he threatened to harm her mother and brother. ...\u201d 32.  In respect of the applicant\u2019s complaint concerning C.\u2019s interview, which was conducted as an urgent and non-repeatable measure under Article 158a of the CCP, the Municipal Court noted that:\n\u201cThe victim was duly interviewed in the presence of a judge ..., with the unrepeatability of the measure being determined by the long-term residence of the witness in the United Kingdom. The justification of such a procedure and the unavailability of the witness were confirmed by the efforts of the District Court to secure her attendance at the main hearing, which the witness repeatedly failed to attend, providing a written statement to the effect that she was residing abroad on a long-term basis and would not be able to attend the main hearing in the foreseeable future. Therefore, the Municipal Court deemed legal the procedure applied by the District Court whereby, after exhausting the possibility of examining the victim in the main hearing for unavailability due to her residence abroad, it read out the statement she had made ... in the pre-trial proceedings in accordance with Article 211 \u00a7 2(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Although this was key evidence, it was not the only evidence proving the defendant\u2019s guilt ...\u201d 33.  The appellate court admitted that the prosecutor had violated Article 176 \u00a7 2 of the CCP in reclassifying the charges without notifying the applicant. It found, however, that this omission did not impact on the legality and correctness of the reviewed judgment to the extent that a duty to reverse it resulted. 34.  On 18 July 2010 the applicant filed an appeal on points of law (dovol\u00e1n\u00ed) which was rejected as unsubstantiated by the Supreme Court (Nejvy\u0161\u0161\u00ed soud) on 30 November 2010. The court stated that the appellate court had not proceeded erroneously in having decided the case in the absence of the applicant, who had not sufficiently substantiated his request to have the hearing postponed. It added that the applicant\u2019s counsel had not requested that further evidence be gathered and assessed and that, therefore, there had been no need to postpone the hearing. 35.  On 13 March 2011 the applicant filed a constitutional appeal (\u00fastavn\u00ed st\u00ed\u017enost) which was dismissed by the Constitutional Court (\u00dastavn\u00ed soud) in a decision of 1 December 2011 which was served on the applicant on 9 December 2011. Having analysed the testimony given by C., the Constitutional Court found that, although it was direct evidence, it was corroborated by a chain of indirect evidence, especially the testimony of her mother. In respect of the remaining complaints, the Constitutional Court agreed with the findings of the lower courts stating, in particular:\n\u201cThe applicant\u2019s complaints regarding the search in his flat and non-residential premises and lands are unsubstantiated. The search in the applicant\u2019s domicile was carried out in compliance with Article 83 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on the basis of the search order issued by the Prague 6 District Court. The applicant had the opportunity, if he was convinced that the search is unlawful, to lodge a constitutional appeal against this order ... In a constitutional appeal against the final judgment of conviction, it is possible, in connection with a search carried out unlawfully, complain in particular the inadmissibility of concrete pieces of evidence which were gathered and on the basis of which [an applicant] was found guilty. However, the applicant did not expressly submit any concrete evidence which would be gathered illegally. ...\u201d 36.  On 30 August 2012 the applicant submitted to the Ministry of Justice a claim for compensation for damages caused by delays in the criminal proceedings under the State Liability Act (no. 82/1998). On 24 September 2012 his claim was rejected as having been introduced outside the six-month statutory time-limit. On 24 May 2013 the applicant filed an action for damages against the Ministry, which appears to be still pending before the Prague 2 District Court.", "references": ["5", "4", "7", "1", "9", "6", "0", "2", "3", "8", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The first applicant was born in 1933 and lives in Brussels. The second applicant was born in 1958 and is detained in Verviers Prison. 6.  On 12 January 1998 an attempted robbery was carried out on an armoured van owned by the B.Z. company on the motorway adjacent to the municipality of Waremme in Belgium. Two of the three occupants of the van were killed. Two vehicles abandoned by the perpetrators were found on the scene, and a Kalashnikov, two Fal-type magazines and ammunition were discovered inside the latter. 7.  A ballistic expert assessment carried out on 14 February 1998 revealed that the Fal-type weapon had been used in an attack on a mail van in Dison in 1996. 8.  The surviving occupant of the armoured van recounted the attack, pointing out that it had been carried out by five masked men wearing gloves. 9.  The Li\u00e8ge public prosecutor submitted those facts to an investigating judge, classifying them as assault and robbery accompanied by murder. 10.  An anonymous witness stated that the possible offenders included one L.C., who had been convicted of offences linked to organised crime and had been acting as an informer, as well as L.M., who subsequently became a co-defendant (see paragraph 13 below). On 30 March 1998 L.C. stated that he had been invited by the second applicant and C.K., who was also a co-defendant, to reconnoitre the area prior to the attack on the B.Z. armoured van. L.C.\u2019s partner, E.E., subsequently confirmed that witness statement. The anonymous witness was murdered on 4 October 1999. 11.  According to a document prepared by the Li\u00e8ge Federal Police on 19 June 2002, an individual who had been detained at the time, R.C., had voiced a wish to \u201ccooperate with the judicial authorities in exchange for certain advantages\u201d. On 11 March 2002 R.C., who was known to the police in connection with numerous robbery offences, had been charged with complicity in armed robbery in a different banditry case, the \u201cB. case\u201d. On 20 June 2002, R.C. was questioned by the police concerning the attack on the B.Z. van and the Dison mail van. 12.  On 24 June 2002 the arrest warrant issued against R.C. in the B. case was quashed on the grounds of insufficient evidence, but he remained in detention to serve the remainder of a two-and-a-half year sentence. 13.  According to the aforementioned document (see paragraph 11 above), when R.C. had again been questioned by the police on 25 June 2002, he had mentioned, in connection with the attack on the B.Z. van, the names of the applicants and of L.M. and J.S., who subsequently became co-defendants. 14.  On 30 September 2002 a warrant was issued for the purposes of a police hearing of R.C., following which he was first questioned officially on 2 October 2002. On that occasion he confirmed his wish to make disclosures on high-profile individuals in the organised crime circles, including the applicants, and, in particular, on the attack on the armoured van in Waremme. 15.  On 25 October 2002, according to the aforementioned document prepared by the Li\u00e8ge Federal Police, the Witness Protection Board ordered provisional emergency protection measures in respect of R.C. 16.  On 28 October 2002 R.C. was heard by the investigating judge as a witness under oath. R.C.\u2019s statements were reproduced in the indictments subsequently drawn up by the Federal Prosecutor. He admitted his involvement in preparing the attack on the van at the beginning of 1994, stating that the second applicant had been one of the instigators. He explained that in 1997 he had left the group of instigators following his conviction for other offences. Subsequently, while in prison in 2000, he had approached M.A., a member of the aforementioned group, which had in the end refrained from taking part in the attack on the van. M.A. had recounted the course of events and discussed the first applicant\u2019s involvement in the attack on the van. 17. On 5 November 2002 R.C. was released on licence. 18.  On 31 October 2002 the first applicant had a face-to-face meeting with R.C. and a warrant was issued for his arrest. The second applicant was arrested on 4 November 2002. 19.  Appearing before the investigating judge, the applicants denied any involvement in the attack on the van in Waremme, claiming that L.C. and R.C., who were themselves involved in organised crime, had provided false information. The first applicant also described, as an alibi, exactly what he had been doing and when on the day of the attack on the van. 20.  The applicants were released on licence in the absence of sufficient evidence to prolong their pre-trial detention, under decisions taken by the Indictments Division of the Li\u00e8ge Court of Appeal, on 30 October 2003 in respect of the first applicant and on 27 November 2003 in respect of the second applicant. 21.  On 15 September 2004 L.M., one of the co-defendants, was murdered. 22.  On 15 November 2004 D.S. informed the Li\u00e8ge Federal Police Department that he feared for his life and that he was prepared to submit to questioning on L.M.\u2019s murder in exchange for police protection. The police questioned him on 2 December 2004. On 6 December 2004 he officially informed the authorities of his intention to cooperate with the authorities and to give statements on the Waremme attack. 23.  According to the indictment subsequently drawn up by the Federal Prosecutor (see paragraph 34 below), R.C. and D.S. hardly knew each other even though they both belonged to the world of organised crime. 24.  On 9, 10 and 16 December 2004 D.S. officially gave evidence as a witness, and his statements were reproduced in the indictment. He provided the investigators with information which he had obtained from L.M., in particular stating the names of those involved in the attack, including the applicants, and mentioning that the attack had been prepared a long time in advance by a different team and that one of the weapons discovered in one of the vehicles abandoned at the scene of the crime had been purchased by L.M. from the first applicant and used in an attack on a van in 1996. 25.  On 20 December 2004 D.S. was granted provisional emergency protection. In a statement of 28 October 2005 he mentioned the assistance which he had received by way of protection measures. The special protection was lifted on 22 December 2005. 26.  After D.S.\u2019s initial statements, the investigators travelled to France following an international letter of request in order to present M.A. with the statements made by D.S. M.A admitted that he had met the latter and that they had discussed the information which he had given R.C. in confidence (see paragraph 16 above), and also that he had reconnoitred with R.C. prior to the van attack. 27.  On 8 March 2005 H.P., the wife of the late L.M., was also questioned, in the framework of police protection measures, in particular concerning the B.Z. van attack. She cited the name of the second applicant but said that she did not know whether the first applicant had taken part in the van attack. 28.  In 2006 the applicants had several face-to-face meetings with the witnesses D.S. and H.P., who maintained their statements. 29.  In the meantime, on the basis of the statements by D.S. and H.P., the applicants were arrested once again, on 18 May and 8 June 2005 respectively. Appearing before the investigating judge, they contested the new evidence against them, arguing that D.S. was an untrustworthy character who had negotiated his witness statement in order to secure criminal impunity. The second applicant also contested H.P.\u2019s statements. Subsequently, the first applicant admitted that the alibi which he had put forward after his first arrest (see paragraph 19 above) had been \u201cmade up\u201d. 30.  On 28 September 2006 the Indictments Division of the Li\u00e8ge Court of Appeal ordered the first applicant\u2019s release. 31.  On 19 December 2006 the investigation was closed by the investigating judge. On 6 March 2007 the Federal Prosecutor applied for twelve persons, including the applicants, to be committed for trial. On 26 June 2007 the Li\u00e8ge Court of First Instance, sitting in private, committed those twelve defendants for trial before the Indictments Division of the Li\u00e8ge Court of Appeal in order to decide on possible committal for trial before the Assize Court. On 3 December 2007 the Indictments Division committed the twelve defendants for trial before the Li\u00e8ge Assize Court. 32.  Four persons, including the first applicant, lodged appeals on points of law against the judgment of the Indictments Division. Those appeals on points of law were dismissed by the Court of Cassation by judgment of 19 March 2008. 33.  In February 2008 D.S. died of natural causes. 34.  On 2 July 2008 the Federal Prosecutor deposited the 130-page indictment. 35.  On 3 September 2008 the Li\u00e8ge Assize Court commenced proceedings against eleven of the defendants, including the applicants, for offences connected with the attack on the B.Z. van, as well as other offences linked to organised crime. 36.  During a hearing before the Assize Court, V., a prosecution witness, stated that R.C. had been awarded a bounty. The President of the Assize Court invited R.C. to explain himself. The latter stated, with his face in plain view, that he had been paid 50,000 euros (EUR). He explained that he had received half of that sum in 2006 and the other half just before his appearance before the Assize Court in 2008. 37.  On 3 March 2009 the Li\u00e8ge Assize Court acquitted two of the defendants and convicted the other nine, including the applicants. The first applicant was convicted of offences linked to the attack on the van, in his capacity as leader of a criminal organisation. The aggravating circumstances of murder and of bearing or using a firearm were not made out against him. He was sentenced to fifteen years\u2019 imprisonment and twenty years\u2019 placement at the Government\u2019s disposal. The second applicant was convicted of offences of robbery committed in Luxembourg and of the offences committed in Waremme and Dison. The aggravating circumstance of murder was made out against him in the attempted robbery in Waremme. He was sentenced to thirty years\u2019 imprisonment. The applicants\u2019 conviction was also based on the charges of possession of firearms and leadership of a criminal conspiracy and a criminal organisation. 38.  On 30 September 2009, since the Li\u00e8ge Assize Court had given no reasons for its sentences, and with reference to the Chamber\u2019s judgment in the case of Taxquet v. Belgium (no. 926/05, 13 January 2009), the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment inasmuch as it adjudicated on the proceedings brought against four appellants, including the applicants, and referred the case to the Brussels-Capital Assize Court. 39.  On 1 February 2010 the Federal Prosecutor filed a bill of indictment. That bill set out R.C.\u2019s and D.S.\u2019s witness statements verbatim (see paragraphs 16, 22 and 24 above). 40.  On 2 April 2010 the retrial commenced before the Brussels-Capital Assize Court. 41.  During the proceedings the applicants filed conclusions contesting, pursuant to Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, the lawfulness of the prosecution inasmuch as it had been based on the statements of R.C. and D.S., the latter having since died.\n... 44.  By interlocutory judgment of 2 July 2010, the Assize Court declared ill-founded the applicants\u2019 request that their prosecution be declared inadmissible, and ordered the immediate continuation of proceedings.... 49.  On 28 September 2010 the jury found the applicants guilty, in particular, of the attack on the B.Z. van in their capacity as leaders of a criminal organisation. The main reasons for the jury\u2019s decision were subsequently summarised as follows in a statement of reasons issued by the Assize Court that same day:\n\u201cThe [first applicant\u2019s guilt] regarding his involvement in the attempted robbery in Waremme on 12 January 1998 transpires from the concurring statements of [R.C. and D.S.], which come from different sources. Those indirect testimonies are corroborated by the objective fact that a Kalashnikov was found in the Chrysler vehicle on the scene of the crime. When an \u2018appeal for witnesses\u2019 programme was broadcast, [D.S.] recognised that weapon as one of those belonging to [L.M.], who had purchased it from [the applicant].\n...\nAmong the sources of R.C.\u2019s information to the effect that [the applicant] had taken part in the Waremme attack were [the second applicant and J.S.], both of whom admitted that they had had talks with [R.C.], although they disputed the content of those talks.\n...\nThe [second applicant\u2019s guilt] regarding his involvement in the attempted robbery in Waremme on 12 January 1998 transpires from the concurring statements of [R.C., D.S. and H.P.], and from the information provided by C.S. as confirmed by witness E.E. Those statements and information are confirmed by objective facts ... (ballistic links relating to the use of the same Fal firearm and ammunition found in a bag handed over to J.P.M. by [the second applicant]).\u201d 50.  By judgment of 30 September 2010 the Assize Court determined the sentence. ... The court sentenced the first applicant to fifteen years\u2019 imprisonment and the second to twenty-five years\u2019 imprisonment. 51.  Relying on a series of violations of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, the applicants lodged an appeal on points of law against the aforementioned three judgments of the Brussels Assize Court. The Court of Cassation dismissed that appeal on points of law by judgment of 30 March 2011. 52.  In contesting the interlocutory judgment of 2 July 2010, the applicants argued that R.C.\u2019s witness statement could only be taken into consideration if it came from a citizen desirous of promoting justice, but not from a person who was testifying for reasons of personal interest. The Court of Cassation dismissed that plea on the following grounds:\n\u201c... it falls to the trial court to gauge the impact on the evidential value of a witness statement of its purported venal motivation. ... The reasons impelling a witness to testify may give rise to doubts concerning his or her credibility, but that is not necessarily inconsistent with the holding of a fair trial.\nArticle 6, cited above, does not prohibit ... the judge from using in evidence a statement by a witness under police protection pursuant to Articles 102 to 111 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, even where such witness is an informer who has decided, after having provided information under informer status, to testify officially in court.\u201d 53.  The applicants submitted that R.C.\u2019s use of the status of informer and then that of witness, given that confidentiality had been observed in respect of his contacts as informer with the police, had amounted to a violation of the principle of adversarial proceedings, because his statement had been used in evidence against them, especially since that witness had received a bounty in the context of his informer status. The Court of Cassation dismissed those arguments as follows:\n\u201cAn official statement by a person having previously provided information under informer status does not infringe the general principle of law relating to compliance with the rights of the defence, given that it has the effect of making the witness statements subject to inter partes debate and that the confidentiality requirement set out in Article 47decies, \u00a7 6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not cover evidence referred to the trial court.\n...\nThe right to a fair trial requires the communication neither of information supplied by an informer nor of data on the contacts which that informer has had with the police.\nThe subsequent questioning of such informer as a witness has the effect of making his statements subject to inter partes debate. The judgment notes that, according to the police officers having received the statements contained in the case-file, the latter do not diverge from the information previously supplied confidentially.\nThe appellant\u2019s submission to the effect that the confidentiality of the informer\u2019s involvement has the effect of removing the evidence which the latter provided against him from the inter partes debate is therefore unjustified.\u201d 54.   The Court of Cassation gave the following reply to the applicants\u2019 criticism of the fact that the procedure for granting a threatened witness assistance and protection is not subject to court supervision and, owing to its confidentiality, prevents the defendant from establishing that the financial assistance provided is tantamount to the covert purchase of witness statements:\n\u201cArticle 6 of the Convention requires the prosecuting authorities to communicate to the defence all the relevant evidence in their possession for or against the defendant.\nThe right to disclosure concerns neither the measures taken in order to protect witnesses at risk of reprisals, on pain of exposing the latter to the danger which those measures are supposed to prevent, nor the management of a police officer\u2019s contacts with an informer, on pain of jeopardising the implementation of that specific investigative method.\nThe limits on the disclosure of those confidential data are adequately offset by the oral adversarial proceedings conducted before the jury, since the case-file presented to the latter comprises no elements other than those communicated to the defence and the latter has had an opportunity before the trial court to criticise the statements received against the defendant, as regards both their content and their origin.\nThe judgment lawfully decides that the lack of supervision by an independent and impartial court of the procedure for granting protection to threatened witnesses has no impact on the fairness of the proceedings.\u201d 55.  The first applicant complained that the statement of reasoning of 28 September 2010 had been based on two indirect witness statements whose authors had been paid to testify against the applicants. The Court of Cassation declared that plea inadmissible as being based on a factual premise. For the remainder it considered that Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention did not relate to a jury\u2019s assessment of the evidential value of the evidence presented to it. The court also dismissed the second applicant\u2019s argument concerning the insufficiency and irrelevance of the evidence used by the jury to corroborate the statements given by the protected witnesses. 56.  Finally, the first applicant complained that the judgment of 30 September 2010 determining the sentence had not taken account of the abnormal length of the proceedings against the applicants when the sentence was passed. The Court of Cassation had dismissed the argument on the grounds that the Assize Court, on the basis of the specific circumstances of the case, had legitimately ruled that the proceedings had not been excessively lengthy.\n...", "references": ["2", "1", "6", "8", "9", "0", "7", "3", "4", "5", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicants are husband and wife. They were both born in 1957 and live in Colares. 6.  The first applicant is a well-known journalist in Portugal. At the time in question he was the editor of the daily newspaper P\u00fablico. 7.  On 29 September 2006 the newspaper published an editorial written by the first applicant entitled \u201cThe strategy of the spider\u201d (\u201cA estrat\u00e9gia da aranha\u201d); the editorial addressed the election of the President of the Supreme Court of Justice, which had taken place the day before. The article expressed the first applicant\u2019s opinion of the newly elected President, Judge N.N., and on what his election meant for the Portuguese judicial system. The first applicant\u2019s editorial reads as follows:\n\u201cThe strategy of the spider N.N., the man who will be presiding over the Supreme Court, represents the dark side of our judiciary.\nDo you want a symbol, a representative, an exemplar of the wrongs of the Portuguese judicial system? That\u2019s easy: simply mention the name of N.N. and all the wrongs you can think of regarding corporatism, conservatism, atavism, manipulation, games of shadows and influence immediately spring to mind.\nThe judge \u2013 because we are talking about a judge \u2013 is a man as intelligent as he is Machiavellian. For years, first in the Trade Union Association of Judges [Associa\u00e7\u00e3o Sindical dos Ju\u00edzes], then [as a member of] the High Council of the Judiciary [Conselho Superior da Magistratura \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe HCJ\u201d], and lastly [sitting on] the Supreme Court of Justice, this person \u2013 of whom the majority of Portuguese people have never heard \u2013 has been weaving a web of connections, of back-scratching, of favours and undertakings (there is an even worse word, but I will avoid it) which enabled him yesterday to stick into his somewhat tousled mane the peacock feather he has been lacking: the presidency of the Supreme Court of Justice. The position is not worth very much (who, among the readers, knows that the current president of that court is, formally, the fourth-highest-ranking figure of State?). It carries some sinecures, perhaps some perks ... but it has little effective power.\nThe problem, however, lies in this question: has, or will have [effective power]? The gentlemen judges, who some time ago engaged in a dispute with [the judges of] the Constitutional Court to determine who occupied the more important place in the hierarchy (those of the Supreme Court won ... but gave to those of the Constitutional Court the consolation of having at their disposal a high-end car ...) aren\u2019t even much respected. [That is] their own fault, as it is known that they occupy their seats in the Supreme Court only for some months in order to beef up their pensions. The president of that giant college of most reverend judges has had little power; [however,] ... N.N. presented himself to the voters \u2013 that is to say, to his peers, and those whom he helped to promote to a position from which one day they would be able to elect him \u2013 under the kind of manifesto which makes the hair of the most peaceful citizen stand on end. The man didn\u2019t do this out of the goodness of his own heart: at the same time that he was acting as a trade unionist (he asked for an increase in his salary and that less work be given to judges ...) he acted as someone who wanted to overthrow the regime (by wanting to sit on the Council of State [Conselho de Estado]) and added the glittering (due to the amount of accumulated tallow) hat of \u201cresister\u201d of reforms in the judicial sector. If it was advisable for a President of the Supreme Court to pay greater attention to Montesquieu and the principle of the separation of powers than to the playbook of the CGTP [General Confederation of Portuguese Workers], N.N. did exactly the opposite. He laid out his demands in the grandiose manner of a steelworker in a futuristic \u201csocialist realism\u201d painting, forgetting that he is a judge and the highest representative of the third [branch of government], the judiciary, and claimed a place at the table of the \u201cfirst [branch]\u201d, the executive. It is true that the power of the Council of State is as innocuous as the plume of being president of the Supreme Court, but the claim has in itself two perversities. Firstly, it is a sign that N.N. cares more about his public prominence than the problems of justice. Secondly, and much more serious, the man is volunteering himself to be the face of a group of judges [that is] against the reforming decisions of those holding political power which are currently the subject of a broad consensus between the government party and the main opposition force.\nIt is so pathetic as to make one laugh, were we not in Portugal and if we did not understand how the strategies of the spiders work. The man, I believe without fear of contradiction, is so intelligent and skilful as to be dangerous. But he already has an opponent: the new Attorney-General of the Republic, P.M., one of the rare people to have had the courage to stand up to him.\u201d 8.  There was coverage of the election in the days preceding and following it in various articles in the national press. One of those articles, published in P\u00fablico on 6 August 2006, was an interview with a member (juiz conselheiro) of the Supreme Court of Justice, P.M., who had severely criticised the electoral system for the post of President of the Supreme Court of Justice. The relevant parts of the interview read as follows:\n\u201c... Q.: Why don\u2019t you agree with the current system of electing the President of the Supreme Court of Justice (SCJ)? P.M.: One of the functions of the High Council of Judiciary (HCJ) is the grading of judges who rise to the post of member of the SCJ. How do they get to the Supreme Court? Through a competition, and an assessment of their work by the members of the HCJ. Among those members there is a president of judges who, obviously ... has a certain degree of control over [those judges]. It does not cross anyone\u2019s mind that they aren\u2019t people whom he trusts ... and I myself am not questioning those people. What is at stake is the system. P.M.: Just look at what happens. The Vice-President of the HCJ is one of the key figures in the choosing of members of the SCJ. That man should never be able to run [for elections to the SCJ] because those who are going to elect him are those whom he has graded. P.M.: It is a distorted system ... It is not the people \u2013 they are all serious and honest; the problem is the system itself. P.M.: Yes; the way these [elections] work raises doubts and questions. It is an election which has the appearance of being distorted. Whether it is, I don\u2019t know ... But it is clear that if [a person] has a key role in the admission of A or B to an [organisation], then when [that person] has a vote he is going to vote for the person who admitted him.\u201d 9.  Between 2001 and 2006 several articles on the system of elections to the post of President of the Supreme Court of Justice were published in the media within the context of elections held within that period. Some of these articles called the system into question. For example, on 13 July 2004, Di\u00e1rio de Not\u00edcias published an article, written by L.L. and entitled \u201cGrading of judges may involve a strategy of power\u201d (\u201cGradua\u00e7\u00e3o de ju\u00edzes pode envolver estrat\u00e9gia de poder\u201d), for which he had interviewed a judge who had challenged the 2004 [competition] to the Supreme Court and who had made allegations that Judge N.N. had been behind the alleged strategy. In that article, L.L. made reference to a document circulating among judges in which it was alleged that \u201cN.N. prepared the grading of judges in order to secure a sufficient number of votes for him to be elected as President of the SCJ in the next election.\u201d 10.  On 7 December 2007 Judge N.N. brought an action in the Lisbon Civil Court against the applicants for defamation. He sought non-pecuniary damages amounting to 150,000 euros (EUR). The applicants contested the action against them and argued that the second applicant should not have been a party (ela era parte ileg\u00edtima) in that she had neither benefited from the article nor had had previous knowledge of it. In fact, the second applicant had not participated at all in the writing or publication of the first applicant\u2019s article; the civil proceedings for defamation had been instituted against her on the basis of Articles 1691 and 1695 of the Portuguese Civil Code. 11.  During the proceedings the first applicant attempted to prove, inter alia, (i)  that he had based his opinion on the different articles that had been published in the media on the elections to the Supreme Court of Justice, on information obtained from a source whose identity was confidential, and on conversations he had had with different people from the judiciary (including judges who had challenged the results of the competition for posts as judge in 2004); (ii)  that the article concerned an issue of public interest; and (iii)  that he had written it in good faith. In this regard, several witnesses, including journalists and people from the judiciary (comunidade judici\u00e1ria), were heard. The relevant statements read as follows:\n(i)  M.P., chairman of the Bar Association from 2007 to 2013, with whom the first applicant talked, mentioned that he had had conversations with Judge N.N.\u2019s opponents, who had made references to the methods Judge N.N. used to obtain what he wanted;\n(ii)  M.J., a former President of the Bar Association, considered that the first applicant had made a political criticism and that he had not intended to attack the man personally but rather in his capacity as a politician and in terms of his way of engaging in politics and of his career, which had been based on trade unionism;\n(iii)  L.L. mentioned that he had contacted, regarding the article he had written, different people from the judiciary (judges who had raised suspicions regarding the competition to the Supreme Court, judges from the trade union association of judges, and prosecutors) about Judge N.N. and the system of elections to the Supreme Court; he also acknowledged that he had not talked with members of the HCJ or with Judge N.N. about the issue. 12.  On 13 November 2009 the Lisbon Civil Court found for the plaintiff. It considered that the article in question had damaged the plaintiff\u2019s reputation and that the expressions used by the first applicant had been disproportionate and had clearly exceeded the limits on freedom of expression. It considered that the article had diminished public confidence in Judge N.N. and in the High Council of the Judiciary, thus damaging his honour and reputation. The first applicant was ordered to pay EUR 35,000 in compensation for non-pecuniary damage. With regard to the second applicant, the Lisbon Civil Court held that under Article 1692 of the Civil Code she should not have been a party to the proceedings and that the compensation amount due arose from an action only attributable to the first applicant. The relevant parts of the judgment read as follows:\n\u201c...\nThe editorial is ... the responsibility of its editors ..., appears in each edition of the publication and focuses on the most important events of the day or of that edition and aims to comment, analyse, urge \u2013 in sum, form opinion.\n...\nThe editorial in question was published on 29 September 2006 \u2013 the day immediately following the plaintiff\u2019s election as President of the Supreme Court of Justice.\nThe established facts demonstrate to us that the plaintiff, as a member of the Supreme Court of Justice, applied for the post of president of that court and was elected with 53 votes out of a possible 72 votes, which means that he was elected by 73.6% [of the possible votes].\nThis is the context of the editorial.\n...\n[The editorial examines] the plaintiff on two levels: how he, allegedly, managed to achieve the electoral results; and his electoral programme as a candidate for election to the presidency of the Supreme Court.\nWith regard to the first topic ... in [the editorial] there is no expression of any value judgment. It is stated as a fact \u2013 as a manner of behaviour on the part of the plaintiff: that the plaintiff helped those who elected him to rise to the post of member of the Supreme Court of Justice, given the function that he exercised throughout his life as a union leader and as both a member and Vice-President of the High Council of the Judiciary.\nThe essential aim was to state that throughout his life, the plaintiff had pursued a strategy [to attain power] which had built a college of electors in which he could have confidence, [pursuing that aim] via the functions he had exercised, particularly [during his time at] the HCJ.\nIt is true that the plaintiff was leader of the trade union association of judges, a member of the HCJ between 1989 and 1990 (and Vice-President between 2001 and 2004) and on 28 September 2006 was elected President of the Supreme Court.\n...\nThe defendant did not prove the veracity of this allegation.\nThe defendant further argues that the opinion expressed in the editorial was based \u2013 given the lack of transparency of the whole procedure \u2013 on his knowledge of the ongoing public debate about the election of the President of the Supreme Court of Justice, of the functioning of the High Council of the Judiciary, and of the plaintiff.\n...\nIn the instant case it is established that when the defendant wrote the editorial, he was familiar with the news and opinions mentioned in documents [contained in the case file] ... and had talked to people.\nThe facts established concern the publication of several articles on the above-mentioned topics ...\nHowever it is not understood how or to what extent these articles allowed the applicant to reach the conclusion that: \u201cFor years, first in the trade union association of judges then [as a member of] the High Council of the Judiciary, and lastly [sitting on] the Supreme Court of Justice, this person \u2013 of whom the majority of the Portuguese have never heard \u2013 has been weaving a web of connections, of back-scratching, of favours and undertakings (there is an even worse word but I will avoid it) which enabled him yesterday to stick into his somewhat tousled mane the peacock feather he has been lacking: the presidency of the Supreme Court of Justice.\n...\nIn the light of the above, there is nothing which allows us to reach the conclusion that the defendant had determined the veracity of his comments [by means of accessing] credible, diverse and verifiable sources of information.\n...\n[With regard to the plaintiff\u2019s] electoral programme as a candidate in the election of the President of the Supreme Court of Justice ... [t]he statements he made in support of that programme] have some factual basis.\nIn fact, it was proved that in the letter he distributed to his colleagues, the plaintiff, as a candidate for the presidency of the Supreme Court, defended the enshrinement \u2013 through a constitutional revision \u2013 of the President of the Supreme Court as a permanent member of the Council of State, as well as the improvement in a timely manner, consistent with the economic situation of the country, of the remuneration of members of the Supreme Court of Justice.\nThe plaintiff\u2019s opinions may be \u2013 and in a democratic state are \u2013 subject to criticism, even more so when they are expressed within the context of his candidacy in the election of the President of the Supreme Court of Justice.\n...\u201d 13.  On an unknown date, both the first applicant and Judge N.N. lodged appeals against the first-instance judgment with the Lisbon Court of Appeal. The first applicant argued, inter alia, that the judgment of the Lisbon court had breached his freedom of expression and should therefore be overturned. He further contended that the compensation amount that he had been required to pay was extremely high and contested some of the facts that had been established by the court. He argued that he had obtained some information only on condition that the source providing that information would remain anonymous. 14.  In his appeal Judge N.N. argued that the level of compensation should have been set at a higher amount and that the second applicant should have been considered a party to the proceedings. 15.  On 9 November 2010 the Lisbon Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance judgment. It held that some of the first applicant\u2019s comments had not exceeded the limits on freedom of expression, but that most of the content of the article had constituted an attack on Judge N.N.\u2019s honour, honesty and reputation. The Court of Appeal emphasised that the first applicant had exceeded his right to criticise and inform. It further considered that the first applicant had not been able to prove in the proceedings the veracity of some of the allegations made in the article, even though they had been based on previous articles published in the Portuguese media about Judge N.N. and his election as President of the Supreme Court of Justice. With regard to the facts, the Lisbon Court of Appeal considered that the facts had been correctly established. 16.  The Lisbon Court of Appeal ordered the applicants jointly to pay Judge N.N. EUR 60,000, plus interest, in compensation for non-pecuniary damage. It considered the second applicant to be a legitimate party to the proceedings and, with regard to her, it based its decision on the fact that the applicants were married under the community property system (regime de comunh\u00e3o de adquiridos) and she did not have any source of income and that therefore, under the Portuguese Civil Code, the income earned by the first applicant as a journalist and editor of a newspaper directly benefited both of them. 17.  On an unknown date in November 2010 the applicants and Judge N.N., respectively, lodged an appeal and a cross-appeal (recurso subordinado) against that judgment with the Supreme Court of Justice. 18.  On 15 December 2011 the Supreme Court of Justice declined to examine the applicants\u2019 appeal. It considered that the judgment of the Lisbon Court of Appeal had not clearly identified all those facts which it had considered to be proven; this made it impossible for the Supreme Court to hear the appeal. The Supreme Court ordered that the case be remitted to the Lisbon Court of Appeal in order for it to correct its statement of facts; this would enable the Supreme Court of Justice to analyse the points of law that had been raised. 19.  On 13 November 2012 the Lisbon Court of Appeal delivered a new judgment in which it upheld its previous judgment of 9 November 2010.\nAs to the facts, the Lisbon Court of Appeal considered, inter alia, the following to have been established:\n(i)  the plaintiff had been the only candidate for the post of President of Supreme Court of Justice and had previously been a member and the Vice-President of the High Council of the Judiciary;\n(ii)  several articles had been published in the press and in blogs (in the periods preceding and following the election) about Judge N.N. and his electoral programme and past elections for the presidency of the Supreme Court of Justice;\n(iii)  on 6 August 2008 the newspaper P\u00fablico had published an interview with P.M., a member of the Supreme Court of Justice, in which he had questioned the system of elections to the post of President of the Supreme Court of Justice on the grounds that it could be distorted in so far as the HCJ\u2019s functions included the grading of judges who ascended to the post of member of the Supreme Court;\n(iv)  with regard to a past competition to the Supreme Court of Justice, the daily newspaper Di\u00e1rio de Not\u00edcias had, in 2004, published two different articles in which it had raised questions about the grading of judges by the HCJ and the possible power strategy involved; in one of the articles (for one of which a judge of a Court of Appeal who had participated in the competition had been interviewed and for which a document known to judges had been consulted) it had been mentioned that Judge N.N. had already mustered support for his election in the next elections for the post of President of Supreme Court;\n(v)  in 2001 P\u00fablico had published an editorial [by the then editor] criticising the system of electing the President of the Supreme Court and of HCJ judges; with regard to the latter, criticism was made of Judge N.N.\u2019s lobbying on his own account of while exercising his functions as union leader;\n(vi)  the first applicant\u2019s editorial had received both positive and negative comments in the press and in blogs;\n(vii)  the first applicant had had knowledge of the different articles which had been published in the media before the elections and had spoken to different people about them, Judge N.N. and the functioning of the HCJ. 20.  As to the analysis of the merits of the case, the relevant parts of the judgment read as follows:\n\u201c...\nIn the present case, it is important to take into account [the fact] that the person referred to in the ... text written by the defendant is a public figure, being the fourth-highest-ranking figure of State: the President of the Supreme Court of Justice.\nDespite his being a public figure, and therefore more liable to [be the target of] public criticism, his honour is still protected ...\n...\n... [I]t is important to emphasise that it appeared in the period which followed the election of the President of the Supreme Court of Justice by his peers.\n...\n... the text does not affect the plaintiff only as a public figure but also in his strictly personal sphere. In fact, starting with the latter, the expressions \u201cwhich enabled him yesterday to stick into his somewhat tousled mane the peacock feather he has been lacking\u201d and \u201c... and added the glittering (due to the amount of accumulated tallow) hat of \u2018resister\u2019 of reforms in the judicial sector\u201d seem to manifestly extend beyond the right to inform and to criticise, attacking the plaintiff\u2019s personal dignity within his private sphere ...\n...\nIn sum, the above-mentioned segment [of the editorial article] exceeds the proportionality inherent in the legitimate purpose of debate and critical information ...\nThat is not the case when the defendant attributes corporatism, conservatism and atavism to the plaintiff.\n...\n... [T]hese expressions fall within the scope of what has to be borne by a public figure ...\n...\nLet us now analyse the passages where it is said that we face a man and judge who \u201chas been weaving a web of connections, of back-scratching, of favours and undertakings (there is an even worse word but I will avoid it)\u201d and who \u201cpresented himself to the voters \u2013 that is to say, to his peers, and those whom he helped to promote to a position from which one day they would be able to elect him\u201d.\n...\n... [T]he above-mentioned passages put into question the professional ethics of the plaintiff in the exercise of his functions...\n...\nHowever in the instant case there was no proof given of the allegations against the plaintiff; on the contrary, ... the right to inform was exceeded.\u201d 21.  With regard to the amount awarded to Judge N.N. in pecuniary damages, the Lisbon Court of Appeal held as follows:\n\u201cIn the instant case, the non-pecuniary damage, reflected in the violation of the right to a good name and the reputation of the plaintiff, given its severity ... had ... a negative impact in the personal sphere, including his family and professional circle, of the plaintiff.\n...\nBesides that, and this is the decisive point for the determination of the amount to be awarded, the piece written by the defendant, despite the degree of offence and suffering [caused to] the plaintiff, was not an obstacle to his re-election by a large majority (larger than that previously, as everybody knew) to the same post. As such, the severity of what the defendant wrote did not have an impact on the professional future of the plaintiff ...\nIn this context, it is also important to take into account the average amount ascribed to the value of life under the case-law of the Supreme Court of Justice (which is nowadays increasing): EUR 60,000.\nIn the light of the above, and under the applicable legal framework, it is appropriate to award the amount of EUR 60,000.\u201d 22.  On 21 November 2012 and 6 December 2012 Judge N.N. and the applicants respectively lodged with the Supreme Court of Justice an appeal and a cross-appeal against the judgment of the Lisbon Court of Appeal. On 25 January 2013 the applicants submitted their grounds of appeal. They complained, inter alia, that the judgment of the Lisbon Court of Appeal of 13 November 2012 was in breach of freedom of expression and that the amount which they had been ordered to pay as compensation to Judge N.N. was excessive. 23.  On 22 February 2013 the appeals before the Supreme Court of Justice were discontinued on the ground that Judge N.N. had not submitted any grounds of appeal (julgado deserto o recurso e caducado o recurso subordinado). As a consequence, the applicants were unable to challenge the outcome of the judgment of the Lisbon Court of Appeal of 13 November 2012.", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "9", "7", "1", "5", "8", "2", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1966 and is currently detained in Giurgiu Prison. 5.  On 24 June 1999 the C\u0103l\u0103ra\u015fi County Court convicted the applicant of burglary, rape and murder and sentenced him to twenty five years\u2019 imprisonment. In application of Article 71 of the Criminal Code, his right to vote and to be elected was withdrawn during detention. 6.  The decision became final on 25 February 2000 when the Supreme Court of Justice dismissed the appeal on points of law lodged by the applicant. 7.  The applicant is currently serving his prison sentence in Giurgiu Prison where he has been held since 21 January 2009. 8.  The applicant described the conditions of his detention as follows:\n-  there was no water during summer days;\n-  he was placed with smokers (in the court-room and for few days during detention) although he did not smoke;\n-  the windows were covered with bars and thick galvanised wire which rendered the ventilation of the cell impossible;\n-  he was transported to court hearings in small dirty vans, with no ventilation or natural light;\n-  from 2009 until the date of the last information received (22 July 2014) he had been held with five other inmates in a 17.65 sq. m cell infested with bugs. 9.  Based on the documents presented by the Prison Administration, the Government explained that during his stay in Giurgiu Prison the applicant had occupied the following cells, all non-smoking:\n- cells nos. A305, A306, A328, B232, C109, C116, C126, C127, C215, C216, C225, E1.22, E3.7, E3.12, E3.24, E3.26, E3.32, E4.5, E4.14, E4.25, E4.27, E5.32, E10.8, E10.11 which each measured 17,65 sq. m and which he shared with a maximum of five other detainees, between 26 January 2009 and 5 August 2010, between 12 August and 6 September 2010, between 7 March and 28 April 2011, between 20 May and 22 August 2011, between 29 August 2011 and 3 February 2012, between 9 February and 2 April 2012, between 7 May and 23 July 2012, between 2 August and 13 September 2012, between 4 October 2012 and 4 March 2013, between 11 March and 11 April 2013, between 18 and 29 April 2013, between 7 May 2013 and 7 February 2014 and between 21 February and 22 July 2014.\n- cells nos. C317, C333, C336 and E3.19 which each measured 9.66 sq. m and which he shared with another person, between 21 and 26 January 2009, between 6 September and 10 October 2010, between 12 and 20 May 2011 and between 7 and 21 February 2014. 10.  The sanitary annexe measured 2.7 sq. m and was provided with a sink, a shower cabin, shelves, mirror and a toilet. All rooms had windows and ventilation. The detainees collected the trash and cleaned the cells twice every day. 11.  The inmates received the hygiene products from the prison administration and had access to warm water twice every week. Access to drinking water was unlimited. 12.  The information submitted by the Prison Administration concerned conditions of detention only until 22 July 2014. 13.  According to the Government, from 21 February 2014 onwards the applicant had been sharing the cells with a maximum of four other persons, in compliance with the decision adopted on 31 January 2014 by the Giurgiu District Court (see paragraph 15 below). 14.  The applicant complained repeatedly to the post-sentencing judge (Law no. 275/2006 on the execution of sentences; hereinafter \u201cLaw no. 275/2006\u201d) about the conditions of his detention. 15.  By two decisions of 29 August and 21 November 2013 the post-sentencing judge for Giurgiu Prison noted that the applicant was no longer held with smokers. The judge also considered that because of the large number of inmates held in that Prison, it was impossible to ensure more personal space for the applicant. He also concluded that in so far as the inmates were responsible for cleaning their cells, the presence of bugs was not the authorities\u2019 fault, but that of the prisoners. The applicant appealed against these two decisions. On 31 January 2014 the Giurgiu District Court ordered the Giurgiu Prison administration to ensure the applicant 4 sq. m of personal space, as provided by law. 16.  The applicant also complained before the post-sentencing judge for Slobozia Prison, that while he was held in there, from March to May 2013, he was again placed in cells with smokers. On 7 October 2013 the post\u2011sentencing judge dismissed the request as having been lodged after the expiry of the ten-day time-limit provided for by Law no. 275/2006. The decision was upheld by the Slobozia District Court on 10 March 2014. 17.  Ruling on a similar complaint lodged by the applicant about his stay in a cell with smokers from 8 to 11 March 2013 in Rahova Prison, the post\u2011sentencing judge for this prison decided, on 19 March 2013, that no measure could be imposed on Rahova Prison as the applicant was no longer there. He also noted that the applicant could bring a separate claim for compensation before the civil courts.", "references": ["0", "9", "4", "3", "8", "6", "5", "2", "7", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant company is a limited liability company with its seat in Ansfelden. 5.  On 3 May 2000 the applicant company applied to the Linz-Land District Administrative Authority (Bezirkshauptmannschaft \u2013 DAA) for the permission to modify its facility site by constructing a loading zone and a noise protection wall. An oral hearing was held on 1 March 2001. 6.  On 12 July 2001 the applicant company lodged an application for transfer of jurisdiction, because the DAA had not rendered a decision within the statutory six-month time-limit. 7.  By decision of 23 July 2001 the DAA granted the applicant company permission to modify its facility site and dismissed the objections lodged by persons living in the vicinity of the site (hereinafter, \u201cthe neighbours\u201d). 8.  On 18 December 2001 the Upper Austria Regional Governor (Landeshauptmann von Ober\u00f6sterreich \u2013 hereinafter, \u201cthe Regional Governor\u201d) lifted the DAA\u2019s decision because of lack of jurisdiction, and on 19 December 2001 he dismissed the applicant company\u2019s application for transfer of jurisdiction. 9.  The applicant company appealed against the latter decision, but its appeal was dismissed by the Federal Minister of Economy and Labour (Bundesminister f\u00fcr Wirtschaft und Arbeit \u2013 hereinafter, the \u201cMinister\u201d) on 20 August 2002. 10.  The Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgerichtshof) lifted the Minister\u2019s decision on 17 December 2002 and held that the Regional Governor was the competent authority to decide on the matter. 11.  On 16 October 2003 the Minister lifted the Regional Governor\u2019s decision of 19 December 2001 and held that the latter was competent to decide on the merits of the applicant company\u2019s case. 12.  Meanwhile, on 14 January 2002 the DAA had granted the applicant company permission to modify its facility site and dismissed the neighbours\u2019 objections. 13.  On 22 December 2003 the Regional Governor lifted the DAA\u2019s decision because of lack of jurisdiction, and granted the applicant company the permission. 14.  On 26 January 2004 the neighbours appealed against this decision to the Minister. 15.  On 1 September 2004 the applicant company filed an application for transfer of jurisdiction, because a decision had not been reached within the statutory six-month time-limit. 16.  On 7 September 2004 the Administrative Court ordered the Minister to take a decision within three months. On 11 November 2004, upon request by the Minister, it extended the time-limit by another six months. 17.  On 11 May 2005 the Administrative Court refused another request by the Minister for an extension of the time-limit and assumed jurisdiction. After having requested an additional statement from an official expert (Amtssachverst\u00e4ndiger) on 14 October 2008, the Administrative Court dismissed the neighbours\u2019 appeal as being unfounded by judgment of 1 July 2010 (served on the applicant company\u2019s counsel on 28 July 2010).", "references": ["2", "5", "4", "6", "1", "9", "0", "7", "8", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The first applicant was born in 1971 and lives in Devecser. The second applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Ajka. The applicants are of Roma origin. 6.   Mr G.F., a Member of Parliament from the right-wing Movement for a Better Hungary Party (Jobbik Magyarorsz\u00e1g\u00e9rt Mozgalom P\u00e1rt, hereinafter referred to as Jobbik), announced that a demonstration would take place on 5 August 2012 in Devecser under the slogan \u201cLive and let live\u201d. The reason for the demonstration was that riots had broken out between Roma and non-Roma families of the municipality on 25 July 2012. Following that incident, seventeen people were questioned by the police, and an enhanced police presence was ordered in the municipality, with the constant surveillance of streets inhabited by the Roma community. 7.  In the applicants\u2019 submission, the police were aware that the presence of a hostile crowd in the municipality could lead to violent acts. The police had been informed through official sources that in addition to the members of Jobbik, nine far-right groups, known for their militant behaviour and anti-Roma and racist stance, would also be present at the demonstration. They had also been informed that the demonstrators would seek conflict with the police and the minority community. According to the far-right organisations\u2019 websites, the demonstration was aimed \u201cagainst Roma criminality\u201d, \u201cagainst the Roma of Devecser beating up Hungarians\u201d and \u201cagainst the Roma criminals unable to respect the rules of living together\u201d. 8.  Devecser was classified as special zone of risk, (kiemelten vesz\u00e9lyeztetett) and eight police patrol units were dispatched to the municipality to ensure an increased presence and carry out checks as of 1 August 2012. About 200 police officers were deployed in Devecser to secure the demonstration, including members of the Operational Squad. On the day of the demonstration checks were increased throughout the county, including traffic check points. The Veszpr\u00e9m county police department also asked members of the Ethnic Roma Self-Government of Veszpr\u00e9m county to inform the Roma population about the upcoming demonstration. 9.  About 400 to 500 people were present at the demonstration. Mr G.F. announced that the demonstration was about the justified self-protection of Hungarians. Invoking the crimes committed by members of the Roma community, he demanded the reintroduction of the death penalty and threatened the Roma community that if the criminality continued, Jobbik would return to Devecser. He also announced that the Roma were not \u201cnormal\u201d. 10.  In his speech, Mr L.T., leader of the Sixty-four Counties Youth Movement (Hatvann\u00e9gy V\u00e1rmegye Ifj\u00fas\u00e1gi Mozgalom), mentioned that Roma criminality was omnipresent in the country and wherever this ethnic group appeared, only destruction, devastation and fear came. In his opinion the Roma population wanted to exterminate Hungarians, which left the latter with the choice of becoming victims or fighting back. Mr A.L., leader of the Civil Guard Association for a Better Future (Szebb J\u00f6v\u0151\u00e9rt Polg\u00e1r\u0151r Egyes\u00fclet) stated that hundreds of Hungarians were killed yearly by the Roma with the approval of the State. In his view there was a destruction of civilians going on in Hungary. He called on the demonstrators to sweep out the \u201crubbish\u201d from the country, to revolt and to chase out the treasonous criminal group supressing Hungarians. He closed his speech by saying that the Hungarians were entitled to use all means to achieve those goals. Mr Zs.Ty., leader of the Outlaws\u2019 Army (Bety\u00e1rsereg), spoke about the characteristics of a racial war and an ethnic-based conflict. He said that before such conflict escalated, a message should be sent. He mentioned that the Roma minority was genetically encoded to behave in a criminal way and declared that the only way to deal with the Roma was by applying force to \u201cstamp out this phenomenon that needs to be purged\u201d. Mr I.M., the leader of the New Guard (\u00daj G\u00e1rda), called on the Government to end Roma criminality and warned that if Hungarians ran out of patience, there would be trouble. Finally, Mr I.O., the vice-president of Jobbik in Veszpr\u00e9m county, told participants that there would be no mercy and that every criminal act and every prank would be revenged; if the State authorities did not live up to their obligations to protect civilians from Roma criminality, this would be done by the population itself. 11.  Following the speeches, the demonstrators marched down V\u00e1s\u00e1rhelyi Street, the neighbourhood of Devecser inhabited by the Roma community, chanting \u201cRoma criminality\u201d, \u201cRoma, you will die\u201d, and \u201cWe will burn your house down and you will die inside\u201d, \u201cWe will come back when the police are gone\u201d, and obscene insults. They also called on the police not to protect the Roma residents from the demonstrators and to let them out from their houses. Sporadically, quasi\u2011military demonstrations of force occurred, involving military-style uniforms, formations, commands and salutes. 12.  Certain demonstrators covered their faces, dismantled the cordon and were equipped with sticks and whips. Those leading the demonstration threw pieces of concrete, stones and plastic bottles into the gardens, encouraged by the crowd following them. 13.   The Government and the applicants disagreed as to other aspects of the demonstration. 14.  During the march through the Roma neighbourhood, which lasted approximately thirty minutes, both applicants stayed in the gardens of houses in V\u00e1s\u00e1rhelyi Street. The first applicant submitted that he had overheard the police stating on their radio that the demonstrators were armed with sticks, stones, whips and metal pipes. Furthermore, one of his acquaintances had been injured by a stone thrown into his garden, but the police officer to whom the applicant had reported the incident had not taken any steps. In the second applicant\u2019s submission, two of the demonstrators leading the march had had a list and had pointed out to the crowd the houses that were inhabited by Roma people. 15.  According to the applicants, the police were present during the demonstration but remained passive and did not disperse the demonstration; nor did they take any steps to establish the criminal responsibility of the demonstrators. The report of the police\u2019s contact officer noted that the organiser of the demonstrations, Mr G.F. had not been able to keep the events under control and had been unwilling to confront the participants. 16.  According to the Government, the commander of the security forces immediately took action when the participants started to act violently, managed the crowd appropriately and separated hostile demonstrators from others. 17.  On 21 September 2012 the Minister of the Interior, reacting to a letter from civil society organisations, informed the public that the conduct of the police had been adequate and that forty people, including five demonstrators, had been questioned by the police. Following a statement from two injured persons, the police opened criminal proceedings against unknown perpetrators on charges of \u201cdisorderly conduct\u201d (gar\u00e1zdas\u00e1g), which was subsequently amended to \u201cviolence against a member of a group\u201d (k\u00f6z\u00f6ss\u00e9g tagja elleni er\u0151szak). It appears from the case file that a further criminal investigation was opened into charges of \u201cviolence against a member of a group\u201d several months after the incident. 18.  In November 2012 the Office of the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights published a report on the events. The report concluded that the police had failed to assess whether the event had infringed the rights and freedoms of others. Such assessment would have led to the conclusion that the people living in the neighbourhood were forced as a \u201ccaptive audience\u201d to listen to the injurious statements that had been made. According to the report, the demonstration had been used to incite ethnic tensions on the basis of the collective guilt of the ethnic group. It went on to state that by not enforcing the limits of freedom of assembly, the police had caused anomalies in respect of the right to peaceful assembly and the Roma population\u2019s right to dignity and private life. It also pointed out that certain speeches had been capable of inciting hatred, evidenced by the fact that stones had been thrown at Roma houses following the speeches. The Commissioner found it regretful that the police had failed to identify the perpetrators on the spot, which was inconsistent with their task of preventing and investigating crimes and with the right to dignity, non-discrimination and physical integrity. 19.  Both applicants complained to the Veszpr\u00e9m county police department about the failure of the police to take measures against the demonstrators, thereby endangering their life and limb and their human dignity. 20.  On 22 November 2012 the police department dismissed the applicants\u2019 complaint, finding that the conditions for dispersal of the demonstration had not been met, since any illegal or disorderly conduct on the part of the demonstrators had ceased within ten minutes. The police department held that the demonstration had remained peaceful, since, apart from the throwing of stones, no actual conflict had broken out between the police, the demonstrators and members of the Roma minority. It also found that only a small group of demonstrators had been armed with sticks and whips. As regards the failure of the police to carry out identity checks on demonstrators and to hold suspects for questioning (el\u0151\u00e1ll\u00edt\u00e1s), the police department found that such measures would only have aggravated the situation and strengthened the demonstrators\u2019 hostility towards the police. 21.  On appeal, the National Police Service upheld the first-instance administrative decision. Following a request for judicial review lodged by the applicants, it nonetheless overruled the first-instance decision and remitted the case to the county police department. 22.  By its decisions of 29 October 2013 and 25 June 2014 the Veszpr\u00e9m county police department dismissed both applicants\u2019 complaints again on identical grounds. The police department found that the demonstration had remained essentially peaceful, because the majority of the participants had not aligned themselves with those committing violent acts. The police department observed that there had been grounds to disperse the demonstration, since some participants had been armed and there had been a reasonable suspicion that some of them had committed the criminal offence of violence against a member of a group. Nonetheless, it concluded that dispersing the demonstration would have carried a high risk since, based on previous experience, those participants intent on violence would probably have turned against the police. 23.  The National Police Service upheld those decisions on appeal on 19 December 2013 and 5 August 2014, respectively, stating that although under section 14 of Act no. III of 1989 (\u201cthe Freedom of Assembly Act\u201d) the police had been under an obligation to disperse the demonstration, they could refrain from such action if it carried a higher risk than allowing the demonstration to continue. Furthermore, the commander of the operation had been right not to apply measures against certain individuals, since that would have led to a clash between the demonstrators and the police, endangering not only the police themselves, but the local residents too. The second-instance authority acknowledged that the unlawful acts of certain demonstrators had infringed the fundamental rights of the applicants, but concluded that seeking to protect those rights would have caused more harm than good. 24.  The applicants sought judicial review of those decisions, arguing that under section 14 of the Freedom of Assembly Act the police were under an obligation to disperse non-peaceful demonstrations irrespective of the proportionality of such a measure. 25.  In its judgments delivered on 3 December 2014 and 19 March 2015 the Veszpr\u00e9m Administrative and Labour Court dismissed the applicants\u2019 claims. It found that although the non-peaceful character of a demonstration could serve as grounds for its dispersal, this was only so if the demonstration as a whole had ceased to be peaceful. Sporadic acts of violence, as in the present case, could not serve as legitimate grounds for dispersal. The court also considered that the police had a margin of discretion when deciding on the dispersal of a demonstration. As regards the applicants\u2019 claim that the police should have taken law-enforcement measures against certain individuals, the court pointed out that such actions would have led to clashes between the demonstrators and the police. The court therefore concluded that even if there had been grounds to terminate the demonstration or to apply law-enforcement measures against certain individuals, the police had been justified in not having done so. It added that, in any event, the potential infringement of the applicants\u2019 fundamental rights had been caused not by the alleged inactivity of the police, but by the conduct of the demonstrators. 26.  The applicants lodged a petition for review with the K\u00faria. In its judgments of 23 September 2015 and 6 January 2016 the K\u00faria reiterated that under the Freedom of Assembly Act no. III of 1989 the dispersal of demonstrations was a possibility rather than an obligation for the police and restrictions on the fundamental rights of others did not in themselves justify the restriction of the right of assembly. Furthermore, dispersal could only be used as a last resort, if the demonstration was likely to entail serious consequences. Relying on the report by the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights, the K\u00faria considered that despite certain violent actions, the demonstration had on the whole remained peaceful. The court went on to find that the police had been under an obligation to respect the principle of proportionality and had been right to conclude that dispersing the march could have caused more serious prejudice to the Roma community than allowing the demonstration to continue in a controlled manner.\nAs regards the lack of individual measures, the K\u00faria found that an operational unit of the police (csapater\u0151) had been deployed to maintain order, and that such a measure had not allowed for police officers to single out and act against individual demonstrators.\nThe K\u00faria also rejected the applicants\u2019 argument that the police had done nothing to protect them and other members of the Roma minority. It found it established that the police had used a cordon to contain the demonstrators and had ensured the subsequent prosecution of perpetrators by logging events, and taking video footage and photographs. 27.  The applicants, together with the Hungarian Helsinki Committee, lodged a criminal complaint concerning the speeches delivered at the demonstration and the attacks to which the Roma community had been subjected. The case was subsequently joined to a criminal complaint lodged by third persons concerning the same issue. On 22 November 2012 the Veszpr\u00e9m county police department opened an investigation into charges of violence against members of a group under Article 174/B of the Criminal Code. The police department opened a separate investigation, under Article 269 point (b) of the Criminal Code (incitement against a group), into the issue of the speeches delivered during the demonstration. 28.  The investigation into incitement against a group was discontinued by the police department on 24 September 2013. The police department considered that although the content of the speeches had been injurious to the Roma minority and was morally reprehensible, it could not be classified as a crime. In particular, the speeches had not been meant to trigger unconsidered, instinctive, harmful and hostile reactions. By the same decision, the police department informed the applicants that it had asked the prosecutor\u2019s office to press charges against an individual for violence against member of a group. 29.  Following a complaint lodged by the applicants, the Veszpr\u00e9m County Prosecution Office upheld the decision to discontinue the investigation. It held that the legally protected interest in the criminalisation of incitement against a group was public morale. Thus the applicants were not victims of the alleged criminal act and had no standing to lodge a complaint against the decision to discontinue the investigation. However, the county prosecution office re-examined the decision on its own motion. It held that the speeches delivered in Devecser contained abusive, demeaning statements concerning the Roma minority and might have contained statements that evoked hatred, but that they had not provoked active hatred and had not called on the audience to take violent action against the local Roma. 30.  As regards the investigation into the offence of violence against a member of a group, the police established that four persons had taken part in violent acts, in particular the throwing of stones. Three of the alleged perpetrators could not be identified, while the Veszpr\u00e9m County Prosecutor\u2019s Office pressed charges against the fourth person, Mr T.K. He was found guilty as charged on 2 June 2015 by the Ajka District Court and sentenced to ten months\u2019 imprisonment, suspended for two years. On appeal the Veszpr\u00e9m High Court upheld Mr T.K.\u2019s conviction but amended his sentence to one year and three months\u2019 imprisonment, suspended for three years. 31.  The applicants, together with a third person, also lodged a criminal complaint against unknown perpetrators for breach of discipline in the line of duty, under Article 438 of the Criminal Code. Those proceedings were discontinued on 17 October 2012 by a decision of the Central Investigation Office of the Public Prosecutor, which held that the criminal offence could only be committed by soldiers in military service, but not by police officers.", "references": ["3", "7", "6", "8", "0", "1", "9", "5", "2", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "5.  The first applicant, Ms Floare Cacuci, was born on 2 March 1939 and lives in Oradea. She is an accounting expert and the owner and general manager of the second applicant, S.C. Virra & Cont Pad SRL, a single\u2011member company based in Oradea. Both applicants were members of the Romanian Institute of Accounting Experts and Certified Accountants (Corpul exper\u021bilor contabili \u0219i contabililor autoriza\u021bi din Rom\u00e2nia). 6.  On 30 July 2001 the criminal department of the Bihor County Police ordered a forensic accounting report in a criminal case it was dealing with. The first applicant was appointed to produce this report, which concerned pecuniary damage to the State budget in the sum of 22,143,258,699 Romanian lei (ROL), allegedly caused by S.C. T.P. SRL, a private company. The first applicant\u2019s fees in relation to that expert report amounted to ROL 497,250,000.\nClaiming that she had not been fully paid for the report, on 25 January 2004 the first applicant submitted to the county police only approximately ninety-five pages of the report, which actually consisted of more than five hundred pages. She only submitted the conclusions of the report. The annexes justifying the conclusions were thus not appended on that occasion, but at a later date (see paragraph 22 below).\nThe first applicant alleged that, when asked by the Police to hand in the remaining pages of the report, she had replied that the report was on her computer, and that, since she had not received any payment for it, she was not able to print it, as it was extremely long. 7.  On 25 March 2005 the first applicant, together with two other accounting experts, was appointed by the Oradea District Court to produce a forensic accounting report in a criminal case concerning tax fraud, forgery and the use of forged documents \u2013 offences allegedly committed by two third parties, M.G.S. and C.V.C, in their capacity as managers of two private companies. A fourth expert, who was assisting M.G.S. and C.V.C., was also appointed to participate in producing the report.\nThe conclusions of the report, which was submitted on 15 September 2005 by the three experts and with which the assisting expert agreed, noted that no damage had been caused to the State budget by the managerial activities of M.G.S. M.G.S. and C.V.C were acquitted on 7 December 2005 by the Oradea District Court. That judgment was later upheld by the Bihor County Court on 28 May 2007 on appeal, and by the Oradea Court of Appeal on 22 May 2008 in an appeal on points of law. 8.  On 18 October 2005 the prosecutor\u2019s office attached to the Oradea District Court proposed to initiate ex officio criminal investigations against the first applicant in relation to an offence of intellectual forgery (fals intelectual, defined by Article 289 of the Criminal Code) in connection with the second forensic accounting report. The prosecutor noted that the report was based solely on documents provided by M.G.S., in spite of the fact that it stated that the district court\u2019s case file had been consulted. In the case file, there was no request from any of the experts to either consult the file or obtain copies of it. The conclusions of the report were therefore not based on all the documents on file, in spite of what the report stated. 9.  The prosecutor\u2019s proposal also concerned the two other accounting experts, who were investigated for the same offence as the first applicant. 10.  The proposal to initiate criminal investigations in respect of the first applicant was confirmed by the prosecutor\u2019s office on 19 October 2005. 11.  On 20 October 2005 the prosecutor\u2019s office attached to the Oradea District Court filed an application with the court, asking it to issue a search warrant in respect of the first applicant\u2019s home.\nThe prosecutor argued that there was a reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed intellectual forgery while producing the second forensic accounting report, in order to help one of the defendants, M.G.S, avoid investigation. The grounds for this suspicion were: the report\u2019s conclusions contradicted the conclusions of a previous report which had been produced by another accounting expert during the criminal investigation; the report objectives proposed by M.G.S. had most likely been copied and pasted into the report itself, the two documents having the same page settings, wording, spelling and grammar mistakes; and there was no proof that the first applicant had ever studied the case file in the court\u2019s archives or requested copies of the documents in order to produce the expert report, therefore the report was probably based solely on information provided by M.G.S.\nThe prosecutor also stated that, in accordance with the decision of 19 October 2005, a criminal investigation had already been initiated in respect of the first applicant in relation to intellectual forgery.\nThe prosecutor further submitted that important evidence relating to the production of the second expert report \u2013 such as a computer, a printer, files and documents (whether on paper or on disc) \u2013 could be obtained from the first applicant\u2019s home. 12.  On the same day the Oradea District Court \u2013 sitting as a single judge, Judge F.P. \u2013 allowed the prosecutor\u2019s application and issued a warrant to search the first applicant\u2019s home, with the aim of discovering evidence concerning the alleged offence of intellectual forgery. In accordance with the relevant domestic law, the decision was taken in camera, in the presence of the prosecutor and without summoning the parties.\nThe warrant was to last three days, the court stating that the search was to be carried out in compliance with Articles 101, 103-108 and 111 of the Romanian Code of Criminal Procedure (hereafter \u201cthe RCCP\u201d \u2013 see paragraph 46 below). It was formulated as follows:\n\u201cBased on Article 100 of the RCCP, in view of the prosecutor\u2019s application issued on 20 October 2005 and the investigative work which has been presented, namely: the minutes attesting to the decision of the prosecutor to initiate criminal investigations ex officio, confirmation of the proposal to initiate criminal investigations against Cacuci Floare in relation to the offence of intellectual forgery as set out in Article 289 of the Criminal Code, and the forensic reports included in the file, [the court] authorises that a home search (perchezi\u021bie domiciliar\u0103) be performed at the suspect\u2019s place of residence, [the suspect being] Cacuci Floare, daughter of ..., born on ..., in Oradea, ..., in the Bihor District.\nThe search shall be performed in compliance with Articles 101, 103-108 and 111 of the RCCP.\nThis warrant is to last three days from the day of issue.\nGiven in camera on 20 October 2005 at 3 p.m.\u201d 13.   According to the first applicant, on 21 October 2005, while she was in the street, having just left her house, she was stopped by a police officer, who told her that he had a search warrant for her home. The first applicant asked to be assisted by her lawyer. The police officer then searched her bag, from which he seized some personal documents, including an orange notebook containing various phone numbers. Subsequently, a prosecutor entered the first applicant\u2019s home in order to perform the home search, accompanied by three police officers, one of whom was an information technology (IT) specialist. 14.  According to the Government\u2019s version of events \u2013 supported by the documents in the file, as issued by the criminal investigating authorities (see paragraph 42 below) \u2013 the search of the bag was carried out inside the first applicant\u2019s home. 15.  The first applicant\u2019s lawyer arrived at the beginning of the search, namely around ten minutes after the first applicant had been stopped in the street (see paragraph 13 above); two assistant witnesses, who were neighbours of the first applicant, were also present during the search. 16.  The prosecutor\u2019s notes in the search report produced on that occasion at the place of residence of the first applicant state that the first applicant was asked to surrender the items used to commit the alleged offence of intellectual forgery, namely the computer, the printer, and the documents on which the second expert report was based (Articles 96-99 of the RCCP, see paragraph 45 below). The first applicant confirmed the existence of such items at her place of residence.\nAccording to the search report, the first floor of the building was occupied by the first applicant\u2019s office, where she claimed to keep the objects which had been requested and other objects essential to her professional duties.\nSeveral items and documents were found, the first applicant claiming that everything belonged to the second applicant. She showed the prosecutor a lease contract concluded between herself and the second applicant in respect of the use of one half of the immovable property.\nAccording to the report, the following objects were seized: the computer\u2019s central processing unit, one printer, four files and documents concerning various forensic accounting reports, one CD, forty-two floppy discs, an orange notebook containing several notes written by the first applicant and telephone numbers \u2013 one of which belonged to M.G.S., see paragraph 7 above \u2013 and an empty printer cartridge box. 17.  The applicants argued that, while the copy of the search report handed to them at that moment had made no mention of the manner in which the seized items had been sealed, the copy in the criminal file contained supplementary information on page 4, mentioning that the objects had been put in a sealed cardboard box labelled MAI (the Ministry of Internal Affairs) 15980. 18.  At the end of the search the first applicant declared, in the presence of her lawyer, that she would submit written objections at a later stage. The witnesses had no objections concerning the manner in which the search had been carried out. 19.  According to the report, the search started at 8.45 a.m. and was finished by 12.30 p.m. 20.  On 18 November 2005, at the request of the prosecutor, the Oradea District Court issued a warrant for a search of the computer system and IT data seized from the applicants on 21 October 2005, namely one CD and forty-two floppy discs. The court gave reasons for its decision, accepting that there was sufficient indication that the IT data would prove that the impugned expert report had been partly copied from a document given to the first applicant by M.G.S (see paragraph 11 above).\nThe warrant was to last three days, starting on 21 November 2005. 21.  According to the applicant, on 18 November 2005 she was summoned to the Cluj District police headquarters to participate in the unsealing of the computer on 21 November 2005. She went there with her lawyer, where they noted that the sealed box was different to the box which had been used at her house during the search (see paragraphs 16-17 above). She therefore asked that the two witnesses who had been present at the search be summoned to attest that the box was different, but the request was refused. Consequently, together with her lawyer, she decided to leave the police headquarters without attending the unsealing and search procedure. 22.  On 5 December 2005 the first applicant submitted the missing 497 pages from the first expert report (see paragraph 6 above) to the Oradea District Court, following payment of 60% of her fee. 23.  On 8 November 2005, pursuant to Articles 275-2781 of the RCCP (see paragraph 47 below), the first applicant filed a complaint against the search carried out on 21 October 2004 (see paragraphs 13-19 above). She contested both the search itself and the manner in which it had been carried out.\nThe first applicant submitted that the warrant had been issued only in respect of her home, and not in respect of the registered office of the second applicant. In spite of that, a search of the whole house had been carried out, including the space used by the second applicant. The seized items and documents belonged to the second applicant.\nThe first applicant also submitted that the search had not been necessary, and could have been avoided if she had been asked to submit the relevant items and documents, as set out in Article 98 of the RCCP (see paragraph 45 below). Furthermore, no reasons had been given to justify the search measure.\nShe argued that the limits of the search warrant had been exceeded by the search carried out in respect of her purse, which constituted a body search (perchezi\u0163ie corporal\u0103), and by the fact that she had been prevented from using her mobile phone during the search.\nShe complained of the manner in which the electronic devices seized had been sealed on that occasion.\nShe further referred to the seizure of various items from her home, namely \u201cpersonal documents and personal notebooks which had no connection to the criminal charge against her\u201d, concluding that all the above circumstances constituted evidence of a breach of her right to a private life, personal inviolability, professional secrecy, and right of property. 24.  On 24 November 2005 the head prosecutor of the prosecutor\u2019s office attached to the District Court of Oradea dismissed the first applicant\u2019s claims, finding that the complaint against the search measure itself was inadmissible, given the lack of specific legal provisions allowing for such an appeal, while the complaint concerning the carrying out of the search was ill-founded. 25.  Concerning the appeal against the search measure itself, the prosecutor gave reasons for his inadmissibility decision, stating that it was inconceivable that any search warrant application would be debated in adversarial proceedings, as such a procedure would impede the very purpose of the search, namely the discovery and collection of specific evidence from a specific place without prior notice.\nThe prosecutor stated that the search at the applicant\u2019s home had been conducted in accordance with the law. The warrant had been issued in respect of her residence as stated on her identification documents. The prosecutor submitted that the investigating authorities had had no obligation to check whether that residence was also the registered office of various private companies. In the impugned forensic expert report, the first applicant had given her identification details, including her place of residence, without mentioning that the report had been issued by or on behalf of the second applicant. Moreover, during the search, the first applicant had submitted a lease contract concluded between herself and the second applicant concerning one half of the immovable property, without specifying or determining which half belonged to which party.\nThe prosecutor also stated that the investigating authorities had been obliged to seize all pieces of physical evidence found at the search location, irrespective of who owned them, and that the pieces not belonging to the suspect had been returned to their owner at the end of the criminal trial. 26.  Concerning the body search, namely the search of the first applicant\u2019s bag, the prosecutor submitted that the relevant forensic rules set out clearly and authoritatively that such a search had to be performed before the start of a home search, \u201cso as to preclude any potential act of aggression against the authorities or self-aggression, but also so as to locate and collect any potential corpora delicti thus hidden by the searched person (in [this] case, documents)\u201d.\nThe rules also provided that the investigating authorities were obliged to prevent any people inside the building in question from communicating with people outside, whether by phone or otherwise, which justified the fact that the first applicant had been temporarily prevented from using her mobile phone. 27.  In respect of the manner in which the seized electronic devices had been sealed, the prosecutor stated that the report produced on that occasion had been signed by both the first applicant and her lawyer, and no objections had been raised. As mentioned in the report, the central processing unit of the computer had been sealed in a cardboard box with the MAI seal. In any event, the manner in which the seized objects had been sealed could not affect the legality of the search, but possibly their use as evidence in the criminal proceedings. 28.  The first applicant contested that decision before both the prosecutor\u2019s office attached to the County Court of Bihor and the Oradea District Court. 29.  It is unclear whether any response to that complaint was given by the prosecutor\u2019s office. In any event, the same complaint was assessed by the domestic courts in two separate sets of proceedings, as detailed below. 30.  In the first set of proceedings, started by the first applicant on 23 December 2005, the Oradea District Court gave its judgment on 29 June 2006, dismissing the first applicant\u2019s complaint as inadmissible in respect of the search measure itself, and ill-founded in respect of the manner in which the search had been carried out. The court stated that, in the event that she was indicted, the first applicant would be entitled to lodge with the criminal courts complaints regarding the search and the acts of the prosecutor. 31.  The first applicant appealed. On 28 November 2006 the Bihor County Court dismissed her appeal, upholding the first instance court\u2019s decision. It considered that the search had been lawful and in compliance with the warrant issued by the Oradea District Court. Furthermore, at the material time, the first applicant, assisted by her lawyer, had not objected to either the search or the manner in which it had been carried out.\nThe court considered that it would be \u201cabusive\u201d to have an adversarial procedure for debating the necessity of a search, either before or after it was carried out. 32.  In the second set of proceedings, a complaint lodged by the first applicant on 4 January 2006 reiterated the same main arguments as those presented in the proceedings described above. In particular, it referred to the fact that the limits of the search warrant had been exceeded as follows: the warrant had only been issued in respect of her home, and not in respect of the registered office of the second applicant; no warrant had existed in respect of her purse or mobile phone; certain items, like her personal notebooks, had been seized even though they had no connection with the criminal charge. The computer had been seized without being appropriately sealed, therefore the first applicant had refused to take it back in the absence of verification and confirmation by an expert that the IT data had not been altered. The first applicant argued that the real aim of the prosecutor and the police had been to seize her computer in order to copy the 497 pages of annexes to the first accounting expert report (see paragraph 6 above).\nIn any event, the search had not been necessary, as she would have surrendered all required items and documents if she had been asked to. 33.  The complaint was allocated to a single judge for determination, Judge F.P., who on 21 February 2006 asked to recuse herself from the case, as it had been she who had examined and approved the application for a search warrant on 20 October 2005 (see paragraph 12 above).\nThat request was dismissed by the President of the Oradea District Court on the same day. It was noted that the first applicant had expressly confirmed that she was not challenging the search measure itself, but the manner in which it had been carried out. In such circumstances, there was no reason for Judge F.P. to withdraw from the case. 34.  In the context of the second set of proceedings, on 28 June 2006 the first applicant lodged an application calling into question the constitutionality of the provisions of Article 100 \u00a7 4 of the RCCP (see paragraph 46 below). She claimed that the impugned provisions breached a claimant\u2019s defence rights, right to a fair trial and right to an effective remedy, as he or she was denied the right to participate in proceedings and contest a search measure. 35.  The application was dealt with by the Romanian Constitutional Court (\u201cthe Constitutional Court\u201d), which gave its judgment on 30 November 2006, dismissing the objection as ill-founded. The Constitutional Court firstly found that the constitutionality of the impugned provisions had already been examined and found to be in accordance with the Constitution (the court referred to its decision of 21 October 2004, detailed in paragraph 52 below). The court reiterated that only the legislature could dictate the jurisdiction of the domestic courts and trial procedure.\nFurthermore, the Constitutional Court held that the issuing of a search warrant was a procedural measure and not a trial in itself, and that therefore the summoning of parties was not obligatory, especially as a search was conducted in the presence of the interested parties and/or their representative. Moreover, interested parties had at their disposal several opportunities and means to contest any measure taken during a criminal investigation or criminal trial. 36.  The case was sent back to the Oradea District Court, which gave its judgment on 31 January 2007, dismissing the first applicant\u2019s complaint. The court noted that a similar claim lodged by the first applicant in another set of proceedings had already been dismissed by a final judgment (see paragraph 31 above).\nThe court further stated that the search had been carried out in compliance with the domestic legal provisions and in the presence of the prosecutor, the applicant and her lawyer, and no objections had been raised at the material time.\nIt appears that the decision was not appealed against by the first applicant. 37.  In January 2006 the second applicant was struck off the list of the Romanian Institute of Accounting Experts and Certified Accountants; the first applicant was removed from the list from January 2006 until 7 April 2010, allegedly as a result of the criminal investigations against her. 38.  The first applicant was indicted on 27 September 2009, charged with perjury as a witness in a criminal trial, aiding and abetting a perpetrator (with specific reference to the criminal trial concerning M.G.S. and C.V.C.), and spoliation (the material alteration, thereby invalidation) of evidence.\nThe indictment referred to the items seized during the search of 21 October 2005, namely documents relating to the forensic accounting reports issued by the first applicant and relevant to several criminal proceedings against various suspects (C.V.C., A.D., F.K., G.P.); the prosecutor considered that such documents had been withheld by the first applicant for the purpose of obstructing justice.\nThe indictment stated that the criminal proceedings against the two other accounting experts (see paragraph 9 above) were to be terminated (scoatere de sub urm\u0103rire penal\u0103). 39.  By a judgment of 30 November 2010 the Oradea District Court acquitted the first applicant of all charges.\nIn relation to the charge of perjury, the court held that such a charge was relevant where an expert had been called before a court to give oral evidence, which had not been the case with regard to the first applicant. In relation to the written evidence given by the first applicant in the form of the forensic accounting report, the court held that the report was a collective piece of work produced by the three experts appointed in the case. Even if evidence had been adduced proving that only one of the experts had personally studied the file in the court\u2019s archives, it could not be inferred that the work had been done by the first applicant exclusively and in the absence of consideration of all the relevant documents and consultation with the other experts.\nThe court further stated that there was insufficient proof that the first applicant had favoured M.G.S. The accounting expert report had been produced with the other experts appointed in the case. The first applicant had been selected as an expert in the impugned criminal proceedings from a list of six experts, and it had therefore been impossible for her to plan to help M.G.S in any way.\nWith reference to the documents found at the first applicant\u2019s residence during the search carried out on 21 October 2005, the court stated that they had not been in her possession unlawfully, as all of them had been given to her by the police for the purpose of allowing her to produce the relevant forensic accounting reports. It could therefore not be inferred that the applicant had withheld the documents with the intention of obstructing justice. The court ordered that all IT equipment seized from the first applicant should be returned to her once the judgment became final. 40.  By a judgment of 21 April 2011 the Oradea Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal lodged by the prosecutor and upheld the first-instance court\u2019s judgment, stating essentially that the presumption of innocence in respect of the first applicant had not been rebutted. The only dissenting opinion of the Oradea Court of Appeal considered that the case should have been remitted to the first-instance court for a re-trial, as the first-instance judgment had lacked appropriate reasoning. 41.  The first applicant filed several criminal complaints against the relevant prosecutors and police officers who had requested and carried out the search of 21 October 2005 with various domestic authorities (the Romanian Senate, the High Council of the Judiciary and the Ministry of Internal Affairs), accusing them of abuse of office for carrying out the search in breach of Articles 100-111 of the RCCP (see paragraph 46 below). She reiterated her arguments: a special warrant and a separate report had been needed for the body search (Article 106), and another warrant had been necessary for the search of the company\u2019s registered office (Article 111). 42.  Those complaints were joined and assessed in a unique case file, being dismissed as ill-founded by the Oradea Court of Appeal on 20 September 2006. The court upheld the prosecutor\u2019s decision. In respect of the complaint concerning the body search, it found that the search of the applicant\u2019s bag had been carried out inside her house, as a preliminary step of the actual search measure. Furthermore, the home search warrant had been issued in respect of an address, not in respect of a person or company. The court concluded that all the complaints were ill-founded.\nThat decision was upheld by the High Court of Cassation and Justice on 10 November 2006. 43.  The first applicant also submitted to the Court a copy of another undated criminal complaint, which was addressed to the prosecutor\u2019s office attached to the High Court of Cassation and Justice. In the complaint, the first applicant claimed that the search report had been forged with regard to the manner in which the computer had been sealed (see paragraphs 16-17 above). She also stated that, at some point after the search, she had noticed that the data on her computer relating to various forensic accounting reports which she had produced had been altered while at the police headquarters, so as to provide evidence to incriminate her.\nIn the absence of any registration number or reference to a domestic file number, it is unclear if and when that complaint was lodged with the domestic authorities; assuming that it was, it is equally unclear whether the first applicant received any response.", "references": ["5", "6", "0", "9", "8", "3", "7", "2", "1", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1961. According to the latest information in the Court\u2019s possession, he was serving a sentence in the Pravieni\u0161k\u0117s Correctional Home. 6.  On 30 May 2006 the applicant wrote to the Ministry of Education and Science (\u0160vietimo ir mokslo ministerija, hereinafter \u201cthe Ministry\u201d), requesting information about the possibility of enrolling at university. He mentioned having graduated in 1996 from the Medical Faculty of Vilnius University. The applicant stated that he wished to pursue studies via distance learning to acquire a second university degree (studijuoti neakivaizdiniu b\u016bdu auk\u0161tojoje mokykloje), this time in \u201claw with a specialisation in human rights\u201d (teis\u0117s studijos su \u017emogaus teisi\u0173 pakraipa). The applicant mentioned that he was a prisoner and thus could not physically attend the place of study. 7.  In a letter of 12 June 2006 sent to the applicant at the Pravieni\u0161k\u0117s Correctional Home, the Ministry of Education and Science wrote that information about the study programmes could be found on the website <www.aikos.smm.lt>. This website states that it belongs to the Ministry of Education and Science, and is administered by a public entity, the Centre for Information Technologies in Education (\u0160vietimo informacini\u0173 technologij\u0173 centras), which is a public institution founded by the Ministry of Education and Science. The website contains information about learning and study possibilities in Lithuania. The website states the following about the aims of the \u201cAIKOS\u201d system:\n\u201cAIKOS is an open system for providing information, consultation and guidance, the main aim of which is to provide information about opportunities for learning in Lithuania.\nAIKOS provides the possibility of searching information about professions, qualifications, studies and study programmes, educational and science institutions and rules of admission...\nAIKOS allows users to submit a question to a consultant and to receive a reply ...\nThe information provided in the central part of the AIKOS website under the sections \u2018I wish to learn\u2019, \u2018I wish to study\u2019, \u2018I wish to improve my qualifications\u2019 reflects only the current and most pertinent information relevant to the current academic year and is aimed at those who wish to enter university, vocational school, or a secondary school, or who wish to improve their qualifications. The site also contains historical data regarding education ...\nAIKOS provides information to three groups of users: adults, children (up to fourteen years of age) and English speakers. The users may use more functions after they have registered on this site.\nThe AIKOS website is refreshed daily, to reflect information about education and science institutions, study and learning programmes and the qualifications a person receives upon graduating from those programmes, ... programmes for improving qualifications... It also provides information from the Lithuanian Labour Exchange about job vacancies and unemployment. The latter information on the AIKOS website is renewed monthly...\u201d 8.  On 28 June 2006 the applicant wrote to the Pravieni\u0161k\u0117s Correctional Home authorities, noting the reply by the Ministry and asking to be granted Internet access to a website \u201cwhere there was information from the Ministry about studies, as well as to [the applicant\u2019s] email accounts hosted on the Internet sites <www.one.lt> and <www.yahoo.com>\u201d. 9.  On 1 July 2006 the Pravieni\u0161k\u0117s Correctional Home governor replied that the prison authorities did not consider the Ministry\u2019s reply to be comprehensive. In particular, the Ministry had not taken into account the applicant\u2019s particular situation \u2013 namely that he was in prison. The prison considered that the Ministry should have provided a comprehensive reply in writing. According to the prison governor, \u201cgiven that the Ministry\u2019s reply did not satisfy [the applicant], the latter should write to the Ministry again, so that he is provided with a comprehensive reply\u201d. 10.  The prison governor also informed the applicant that the request to have Internet access could not be granted because at that time none of the legislation allowed the prisoners to use the Internet or to have a mailbox. For that reason, the Pravieni\u0161k\u0117s Correctional Home authorities were unable to grant the applicant\u2019s request. 11.  The applicant then lodged a complaint with the Department of Prisons (Kal\u0117jim\u0173 departamentas), arguing that none of the laws prohibited him from obtaining information from a State institution electronically. The applicant referred to the Ministry\u2019s reply and asked to be granted Internet access. 12.  On 26 July 2006 the Department of Prisons responded that the legal instruments regulating the execution of sentences did not permit prisoners to use the Internet. It was suggested that the applicant again ask the Ministry to provide the information he sought. 13.  On 1 August 2006 the applicant started court proceedings, referring to his correspondence with the Ministry and challenging the Pravieni\u0161k\u0117s Correctional Home authorities\u2019 decision not to grant him access to Internet. 14.  In their written response to the court, the Pravieni\u0161k\u0117s Correctional Home authorities noted that, although prisoners had a right to address requests and complaints to the State authorities under Article 100 of the Code of the Execution of Sentences (see paragraph 29 below), this meant correspondence by regular post and not via electronic communication. Furthermore, the use of mobile phones in prisons was prohibited so that prisoners could not continue their criminal activity whilst serving a sentence. According to the Pravieni\u0161k\u0117s Correctional Home authorities, a number of fraudsters had already cheated people of large sums of money with the help of mobile phones. If the prisoners had the right to use Internet, they could pursue criminal activities and could also coordinate the activities of criminal organisations. Lastly, given that postal correspondence between prisoners was not permitted, providing prisoners with access to the Internet would make that prohibition pointless. The same was true regarding the prohibition in the 1st Annex of the Code of the Execution of Sentences of the prisoners\u2019 possession of topographic maps (see paragraph 30 below). 15.  The Prisons Department also asked the court to dismiss the applicant\u2019s complaint, arguing that although Article 96 of the Code of the Execution of Sentences permitted prisoners to use computers (see paragraph 29 below), this did not encompass the right to Internet use. There was no right under Lithuanian law for a prisoner to be provided with Internet access. 16.  On 2 February 2007 the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaint. Having reviewed the legal provisions regulating prisoners\u2019 conditions of detention, the court pointed out that the prisoners could communicate with State institutions by postal correspondence and that their letters had to be sent via the prison authorities (see paragraph 33 below). Giving Internet access to prisoners would not be compatible with those legal norms. However, as the Internet was not an object, it was not possible to list Internet among the \u201cobjects\u201d which the prisoners were not allowed to have in prison. At the same time, from the existing ban on telephone and radio communication devices in prison it was obvious that this ban included the Internet. Such prohibition was aimed at preventing crimes being committed in prison. The court also observed that the requirements were set by order of the prison authorities and were therefore mandatory for the applicant, as he was under an obligation to obey prison orders. 17.  The applicant appealed, disputing the lower court\u2019s interpretation of domestic law. He also argued that the lower court had ignored the fact that the core of his complaint was the restriction of his right to education and the right to obtain information. The applicant relied on Article 25 of the Constitution (see paragraph 28 below), and Articles 10 and 14 of the Convention. 18.  The Pravieni\u0161k\u0117s Correctional Home authorities replied, indicating that there was \u201ca secondary school (vidurin\u0117 mokykla) in the prison where students could access all the literature necessary for their studies. The secondary school graduation exams showed good results\u201d. Furthermore, the prisoners could pursue computer literacy studies organised by the Elektr\u0117nai vocational school (Elektr\u0117n\u0173 profesinio rengimo centras), and that institution had not asked for Internet access. The prison thus considered that Internet access, or the lack thereof, had no impact on the quality of studies. 19.  On 11 December 2007 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaint. The court noted that, for its users, the Internet provided very wide opportunities to use email, to obtain information, to download files, and to sell or buy things. The Internet could be used for more than merely educational purposes. However, the right to use the Internet was not absolute and this right could be restricted to certain social groups. This stemmed from Article 10 of the Code of the Execution of Sentences (see paragraph 29 below). There was no legal provision in Lithuania permitting prisoners to use the Internet. Even so, the prisoners\u2019 right to have computers could not be interpreted so widely as to encompass the right to have Internet access. The Supreme Administrative Court lastly noted that if prisoners had access to the Internet, the prison authorities would be hampered in their fight against crime by being unable to fully monitor the prisoners\u2019 activities. 20.  On 30 June 2006 the Elektr\u0117nai Vocational Educational Centre (Elektr\u0117n\u0173 profesinio mokymo centras) awarded the applicant a diploma in computer skills. 21.  According to the Government, in 2007-2008 the applicant had attended English language courses and computer literacy courses organised by a secondary school in Kaunas region. 22.  In 2006 the applicant started court proceedings, arguing that in July 2006 he had been held in the Luki\u0161k\u0117s Prison for seven days in degrading conditions. Among other things, he also argued that the Luki\u0161k\u0117s Prison authorities had seized the personal computer which the applicant had brought with him into prison. 23.  On 15 January 2007 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court dismissed the claim by the applicant as unfounded. 24.  In a final ruling of 12 October 2007, the Supreme Administrative Court concluded that the computer had been unlawfully seized by the Luki\u0161k\u0117s Prison authorities. However, the court found that the conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention had been satisfactory overall, except for a few minor details, and that the gravity of those violations was not such as would amount to inhuman or degrading treatment. 25.  In 2006 the Pravieni\u0161k\u0117s Correctional Home authorities granted the applicant\u2019s request for an extended visit by his parents. However, the applicant later committed a disciplinary offence, and for that reason the extended visit was denied. 26.  On 4 May 2007 the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court upheld the refusal of the extended visit as legitimate. 27.  By a final ruling of 6 February 2008 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the lower court\u2019s decision.", "references": ["8", "5", "9", "7", "2", "4", "3", "0", "1", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1966 and lives in Valea C\u0103lug\u0103reasc\u0103. 6.  In 1993 the applicant was sentenced to twenty years\u2019 imprisonment for homicide. Between 24 November 2004 and 12 November 2008 he was serving his sentence in Arad Prison. 7.  The applicant alleged that, between 24 November 2004 and 2 October 2008, while he had been under a closed prison regime in Arad Prison, he had been taking his daily three hours of exercise in outside yards which lacked access to toilets or running water. At certain times there were as many as fifty prisoners in one recreation yard. Especially during the hot days of summer the situation could have been described as inhuman and humiliating, because he had been forced to satisfy his physiological needs together with other prisoners along the fences of the yard, in the same place where they were supposed to walk and breathe fresh air. 8.  The applicant alleged that he had on numerous occasions asked the Arad Prison administration to provide sanitary facilities and running water in the recreation yards. His requests had been consistently ignored or had received the reply that renovation works were planned for the future. 9.  On 4 June 2008, the applicant lodged a new complaint asking the prison authorities to equip the recreation yards with running water and toilets. The prison authorities noted on the applicant\u2019s request that in fact he had been allowed to take water with him during his daily exercise and he had also been able to go to his cell in order to satisfy his physiological needs during this time. They further noted \u201cAt the moment renovation works are under way in the yards.\u201d 10.  On 16 July 2008 the post-sentencing judge in Arad Prison rejected a complaint on the same matter lodged by the applicant. The judge held that Law no. 276/2006 on the execution of sentences did not provide for the right to have access to sanitary facilities and water during the prisoners\u2019 daily outside exercise. 11.  Relying on the provisions concerning the prisoners\u2019 right to daily exercise set forth by Law no. 276/2006 as well as the provisions of Article 3 of the Convention, the applicant made a complaint against the above-mentioned decision before the Arad District Court. He also sought compensation for non-pecuniary damage in respect of the inhuman treatment he had been suffering during his daily exercise since 24 November 2004 in Arad Prison. The Arad Prison administration maintained before the court that the law did not provide for an obligation to equip the recreation yards with sanitary facilities. 12.  In a final judgment of 28 October 2008 the Arad District Court found that the applicant had indeed been deprived of access to a toilet and drinking water during daily exercise, and that this was in breach of Article 48 of Law 275/2006, which regulates prisoners\u2019 right to daily exercise. The court based its decision on witness statements as well as on information submitted by the prison authorities. In view of the evidence before it, the court allowed the applicant\u2019s complaint and ordered the Arad Prison authorities to ensure the applicant\u2019s right to daily exercise in a yard provided with sanitary facilities and drinking water. The applicant\u2019s request for damages was rejected as out of time, since it had not first been raised before the post-sentencing judge. 13.   In the meantime, on 23 October 2008 the post-sentencing judge in Arad Prison had studied another complaint lodged by the applicant in respect of another alleged breach of his rights. In this context the post-sentencing judge held that he was not competent in law to deal with the applicant\u2019s request for compensation for non-pecuniary damage. 14.  On 2 October 2008 the applicant was placed under a semi-open detention regime, because his prison term was approaching its end. He was moved to a different prison wing, where the recreation yard was provided with both toilets and drinking water. 15.  On 12 November 2008 the applicant was conditionally released from prison. 16.  In a letter dated 2 June 2014, submitted by the Government, the National Administration of Prisons mentioned that the recreation yards of Arad Prison could not technically be equipped with sanitary facilities because the prison lacked a sewage collection and disposal system. At the time the letter was sent, running water had been made available in all yards.", "references": ["9", "4", "2", "0", "8", "5", "3", "7", "6", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant company B.K.M. Lojistik Tasimacilik Ticaret Limited Sirketi has its registered office in Istanbul. 7.  On 13 November 2008 customs officers stopped and checked the applicant company\u2019s lorry, in which they found packages of unknown content. A preliminary test of the content revealed that the packages contained heroin. The customs officers informed the police accordingly. 8.  On 14 November 2008 the police inspected the lorry and its trailer and found 105 kg of heroin. The driver, a Turkish citizen, was arrested and detained. The lorry was seized and the trailer and its goods became the object of a customs procedure. On an unspecified date the applicant company received documents enabling the goods contained in the trailer to be delivered to their destination. The trailer was returned to the applicant company. Subsequently, the police filed a criminal complaint against the driver with the Ptuj District State Prosecutor\u2019s Office. 9.  On 15 November 2008 the Ptuj District State Prosecutor\u2019s Office charged the driver with the production and trafficking of illegal drugs under Section 186(1) of the Criminal Code. The District State Prosecutor further requested that the applicant company\u2019s lorry be confiscated under Section 186(5) of the Criminal Code since it had been used for the transportation of illegal narcotic drugs. 10.  On 25 November 2008 the applicant company asked the Ptuj District Court to provide it with the case-file concerning the charges against the driver. It also enquired when it would be able to retake possession of the seized lorry. On 8 December 2008 the court informed the applicant company of the charges against the driver. It further informed the applicant company that the lorry had been seized in accordance with Section 220 of the Criminal Procedure Act read in conjunction with Section 186(5) of the Criminal Code and that no decision could be made on the return or confiscation of the lorry until a decision on the merits had been issued. On 23 December 2008 the applicant company informed the court that it opposed the District State Prosecutor\u2019s request for confiscation of the lorry. 11.  On 29 December 2008 the Ptuj District Court found the driver guilty of drug trafficking and sentenced him to nine years\u2019 imprisonment. It ordered that the lorry be returned to the applicant company. It held that confiscation was possible only if one of the conditions set out in the second paragraph of Section 73 of the Criminal Code were met, namely the existence of reasons of general security or morality. The District Court considered that that condition had not been met, taking into account the fact that there was no indication that the applicant company knew about the transportation of the illegal material. 12.  Both the driver and the Higher State Prosecutor appealed. On 21 May 2009 the Maribor Higher Court modified the first-instance judgment and, relying on Sections 73(3) and 186(5) of the Criminal Code, ordered the confiscation of the lorry. It held that the legislative framework provided for mandatory confiscation in cases of drug-related criminal offences since the nature of their commission, their magnitude and the dangerous consequences thereof called for the extension of coercive measures to persons who were not the perpetrators of the criminal offence, irrespective of whether or not the owners of the vehicle knew what the perpetrator had been transporting. The Higher Court explained that in accordance with Section 73(2) of the Criminal Code, objects used in the commission of a criminal offence could be confiscated even when they did not belong to the perpetrator, in so far as the third party\u2019s right to claim damages from the perpetrator was not thereby affected. Moreover, Section 73(3) provided for the possibility of mandatory confiscation in cases provided for by the statute. Thus, Section 186(5) of the Criminal Code implemented those two provisions by providing mandatory confiscation of the means of transport used for transportation and storage of illegal substances. 13.  On 17 July 2009 the applicant company lodged a constitutional complaint against the aforementioned decision and an initiative for review of the constitutionality of Section 186(5) of the Criminal Code, alleging a violation of its property rights. It complained in particular that it had not known that the lorry was being used for illegal purposes, adding that the first-instance court had explicitly established its non-involvement in the commission of the criminal offence at issue. Claiming that it had not had an effective possibility to prevent the abuse of its property for criminal purposes, the applicant company stressed that the lorry had been subject to regular controls concerning possible vehicle modifications and hidden compartments. Thus, according to the applicant company, the measure complained of constituted a punishment and an unjustified and disproportionate interference with its property and that it had not had the opportunity to participate in the criminal proceedings. 14.  On 29 September 2011 the Constitutional Court dismissed both the constitutional complaint and the initiative. In reviewing the contested legislation, the Constitutional Court confirmed the Higher Court\u2019s view that Section 186 of the Criminal Code provided for mandatory confiscation of vehicles used for the transportation and storage of drugs or illegal substances in sport, regardless of their ownership. According to the Constitutional Court, drug-related criminal offences sanctioned under Section 186 of the Criminal Code represented a great evil and an extremely high degree of threat not only from the perspective of the individual, but also from the perspective of society as a whole; the purpose of the impugned measure was to prevent the commission of such criminal offences in the future and thus to protect important legal values in society, such as health and life \u2013 especially of young people. The Constitutional Court stressed that the nature of the criminal offences in question, the manner in which they were committed and their consequences justified the interference with the ownership rights of all owners of the means of transport used for drug-trafficking, regardless of their potential involvement in the criminal activities at issue, adding that a different regulation governing the confiscation of goods would diminish considerably the possibilities for effectively preventing the criminal offences in question. 15.  Balancing the general interests in question with the property rights of the applicant company, the Constitutional Court held that the measure complained of did not amount to an excessive interference despite the fact that the applicant company had had no effective possibility for preventing the misuse of its property for criminal purposes and had not participated in the commission of the criminal offence. In this connection, the Constitutional Court pointed out that legal certainty required that every instance of legally recognised damage be adequately protected. Thus, by virtue of Section 73(2) of the Criminal Code, the confiscation did not affect the right of third parties to claim compensation from the offender. Under the general rules of tort law, the injured owner had the possibility and the right to exact compensation from the person responsible for the damage. The Constitutional Court added that it was for the regular courts to establish in each individual case whether all the elements required for recognition of the alleged damage and thus for payment of compensation were fulfilled. 16.  Meanwhile, on 29 June 2009 the Ptuj District Court informed the applicant company that the lorry was to be sold at a public auction and that it could submit written comments in this respect. On 6 July 2009 the applicant company replied that it was willing to buy the confiscated lorry. On 20 October 2011 the court ordered the sale of the lorry and informed the applicant company thereof. On 30 November 2011 the lorry was sold at public auction for 12,000 euros (\u201cEUR\u201d). According to the Government the lorry was sold to the applicant company. In this regard, they submitted a document stating that the lorry had been sold to \u201cB.K.M. LOJISTIK, TAS.VE TIC.LTD.STI\u201d, a company from Istanbul. However, the applicant company contested that statement, alleging that it was another company that had purchased the lorry. The Government did not reply to this submission.", "references": ["4", "6", "7", "5", "2", "3", "8", "0", "1", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1966 and lives in Tbilisi. 6.  The applicant and K.G. began living together in 1999. On 9 January 2000 their daughter, L.G., was born. She was raised mainly by her maternal grandmother in Georgia while both parents, whose relationship soon ended, left to work abroad. 7.  On 31 March 2008 K.G. applied to the Tbilisi City Court for her daughter to be officially registered as resident at her address. On 19 May 2008 a summons was sent to the applicant at his registered address, informing him of K.G.\u2019s action. According to the courier, the summons could not be served as the house was closed up and no one was living there. The summons was only sent once. On 3 June 2008 the court of first instance, acting on the basis of Article 78 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter, \u201cthe CCP\u201d \u2013 see paragraph 15 below), ordered information concerning the proceedings to be published in a daily newspaper called 24 hours. On 24 June 2008 the Tbilisi City Court granted K.G.\u2019s application. The decision was taken in the absence of the applicant, whose whereabouts, according to the ruling, could not be established. 8.  On 12 December 2008 the Tbilisi City Court, acting upon another application by K.G., ruled again by default that L.G. could be issued with an international passport and leave the territory of Georgia without her father\u2019s consent. No specific time-limit for that restriction of the applicant\u2019s parental rights was given in the ruling. The court again stated that the applicant\u2019s whereabouts were unknown and ordered the information about the proceedings to be published in 24 hours. Unlike the first set of default proceedings, the summons was sent twice to the applicant at the address he had registered at. It was again not delivered. The courier noted that the house was closed up. 9.  It appears from the case file that the custody and guardianship authority, which represented the interests of the child in the above proceedings, made its own attempts to contact the applicant. In conclusions submitted to the Tbilisi City Court, the authority noted that during its visit to the applicant\u2019s registered address it had learnt from neighbours that he had sold the house in 2003 and left for Moscow. Both default decisions were sent to the applicant\u2019s registered address and, as they could not be served, were consequently published in 24 hours according to the procedure provided for in Article 78 of the CCP (see paragraph 15 below). 10.  On 6 June 2012 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Tbilisi City Court, seeking to have both default decisions set aside. He stated that he had learnt about the decisions only in May 2012. He also explained that he had not been living in Georgia at the material time, which his former partner had well known. The default proceedings had been unfair as he had not been properly summoned to the hearings. 11.  By a decision of 16 August 2012 the Tbilisi City Court rejected the applicant\u2019s application. The court ruled, with reference to Articles 71 \u00a7 3 and 422 of the CCP (see paragraphs 15 and 17 below), that the applicant had been duly informed about the proceedings via public notifications in a newspaper and that there was therefore no legal basis to set the impugned decisions aside. It noted that the applicant had been registered at the address where the summonses had been sent and that for the purposes of the proceedings the courts had been justified in using that very address. 12.  That decision was upheld by the Tbilisi Court of Appeal on 31 October 2012. It reasoned that the domestic courts had been right to send the summonses to the applicant\u2019s only available registered address. Furthermore, as it had not been possible to serve the summonses on the applicant, the procedure of delivering a summons via a public notification, as provided for in Article 78 of the CCP, had been duly employed. 13.  In his last communication with the Court on 15 December 2014, the applicant stated that he could still not have any contact with his daughter.", "references": ["8", "2", "9", "1", "0", "7", "4", "6", "5", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1982 and lives in Kartsa, in the North Ossetia-Alania Republic. 6.  According to the applicant, on 10 January 2007 at approximately 10.30 p.m. the applicant and K. were walking down the street in their town. A white Lada car drove up to them and stopped. Two persons in plain clothes got out, one of whom was a local police lieutenant, Ts. While Ts. was talking to the applicant and K., two more vehicles \u2013 an Audi and a Volkswagen \u2013 drove up. Seven or eight men in plain clothes got out of the cars. They pushed the applicant into one of the cars. K. broke free and escaped. 7.  The individuals who had arrested the applicant took him to an office on the third floor of the police station, where they punched and kicked him and insulted him, shouting that \u201call Ingush should be crushed\u201d. From time to time they put a black plastic bag over his head to suffocate him. They took off his shoes and beat him on his heels. When the applicant lost consciousness, they poured cold water over him to revive him. They then took him to another office on the first floor. 8.  There the policemen planted a grenade in the pocket of his jacket. They searched him and \u201cfound\u201d the grenade. The applicant was then interviewed by the investigator. During the questioning, he told the investigator about the arrest (abduction) and the planting of the grenade. 9.  According to the Government, on 10 January 2007 at around 10.15 p.m. the police officers asked the applicant to go with them to the police station. The applicant refused, shouting obscenities. His reaction made the officers suspect that he might be in possession of a weapon which he could use against them. They made the decision to use force to arrest the applicant, and when he resisted they restrained him, using a combative technique. The police officers then took the applicant to the police station, where he was subjected to a medical examination due to his inebriated state. The medical report prepared on 11 January 2007 indicated that the applicant did not have any injuries. 10.  On 11 January 2011 the investigator questioned the police officers who had carried out the applicant\u2019s arrest. Police captain T. submitted that the decision to arrest the applicant had been taken on the basis of \u201coperative\u201d information received on 10 January 2010 that the applicant was in possession of firearms and ammunition and that he was the leader of a group of young people of Ingush ethnic origin who disturbed peace in the town and provoked tension between Ingush and Ossetian population. He stated that the policemen had stopped the applicant in the street, and had then put him in the car and taken him to the police station, where they had searched him and found a grenade. Lieutenant Ts. confirmed T.\u2019s statement as regards the applicant\u2019s arrest. 11.  On 11 January 2007 police captain R. instituted criminal proceedings against the applicant on the charge of illegally possessing a grenade. At 9 p.m. the applicant signed an undertaking not to leave town and was released pending investigation. 12.  On the same date the applicant\u2019s parents retained a lawyer to represent him. The lawyer filmed the applicant\u2019s injuries using her mobile phone. 13.  On 12 January 2007 forensic medical expert Tkh. examined the applicant. The applicant submitted that on 10 January 2007 a group of persons unknown to him had \u201cbeaten him up\u201d. They had kicked him, had beaten him with a stick and had throttled him. The medical expert documented the following injuries: \u201ca bruise near the upper edge of the right shoulder blade measuring 4.5 by 4 cm ...[;] similar bruises on the rear surface of the chest at the level of the sixth to ninth ribs measuring 10 by 8 cm and on the rear surface of the chest at the level of the tenth to eleventh ribs measuring 8 by 6.5 cm; [bruises] near the sixth to eighth vertebrae measuring 8 by 1.5 cm\u201d. The expert concluded that the bruises resulted from the impact of blunt solid objects, possibly at the time and in the circumstances indicated by the applicant. 14.  On 16 February 2007 the prosecutor\u2019s office discontinued the criminal investigation against the applicant on the charge of illegally possessing a grenade and advised him of his right to \u201crehabilitation\u201d. The prosecutor found as follows:\n\u201cThe investigative actions were conducted in violation of [the rules of criminal procedure] and the proceedings should be discontinued in view of the following:\nThe case file contains no information as regards the reasons for the [applicant\u2019s] arrest;\n[The applicant] was not searched at the place of his arrest ...; instead, the search was carried out at [the police station];\nIn contravention of [the rules of criminal procedure], ... the taking of the [applicant\u2019s] fingerprints was not documented ... ;\nThe case file contains no evidentiary material as regards the examination of the grenade or the detection and recovery of the fingerprints; accordingly the findings set out in the forensic dactyloscopic expert report must be regarded as inadmissible evidence ... .\u201d 15.  On 19 February 2007 the deputy municipal prosecutor opened a criminal investigation into the applicant\u2019s unlawful arrest and detention at the police station. On 1 March 2007 the applicant was given victim status in respect of the crime and questioned as to the events of 10 January 2007. 16.  The criminal investigation into the applicant\u2019s allegations about his ill\u2011treatment in police custody was discontinued on several occasions. The decisions in this regard were taken on 19 April, 23 May and 20 November 2007, and 29 June 2012. 17.  On 24 December 2014 the decision of 29 June 2012 was quashed and the case was re-opened. The acting head of the regional investigative committee held that the earlier investigation had been perfunctory and ordered further investigation. 18.  On 12 January 2015 the deputy regional prosecutor studied the evidence in the applicant\u2019s case file and identified the following defects in the investigation: (1) the investigating authorities had failed to complete all the necessary actions in order to clarify the facts in connection with the alleged ill-treatment; (2) no findings had been made as regards the existence of the applicant\u2019s injuries; (3) the contradictions in the statements made by the forensic medical expert and the applicant had not been reconciled; (4) the investigating authorities had failed to question the forensic medical expert and the forensic expert who conducted a dactyloscopic examination; (5) the investigating authorities had failed to establish whether the police had conducted an internal inquiry in response to the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment; (6) the investigating authorities had not conducted a face\u2011to-face confrontation between the police officers and the applicant in order to reconcile the contradictions in their statements; (7) the investigating authorities had failed to identify the persons who had been present at the police station when the applicant was searched. 19.  It appears that the criminal investigation is still ongoing at the present time. 20.  According to the Government, on 19 March 2009 the Primorskiy District Court of Novorossyisk found the applicant guilty of robbery and sentenced him to two and a half years\u2019 imprisonment. On 8 November 2011 the applicant was released on parole.", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "7", "5", "8", "9", "6", "No Label", "1", "2"], "gold": ["1", "2"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicants are all Romanian nationals of Roma origin and heirs of I.B., who instituted the domestic proceedings. Those proceedings were still pending when I.B. died on 1 April 2010. 5.  I.B.\u2019s heirs pursued the case before the domestic courts and lodged a complaint before the Court both on his own and their behalf. 6.  On the night of 15 August 2008, L.N. moved in with her boyfriend, the fifth applicant, at his father\u2019s (I.B.\u2019s) home. She was sixteen at the time. 7.  The next morning, accompanied by the second and third applicants, L.N. went to Clejani Police and made a written statement before the chief police expressing her wish to live in her boyfriend\u2019s home. She chose to make this statement because she came from an affluent non-Roma family.\nThe same evening V.M., the applicants\u2019 neighbour, gave a statement to the police, confirming that L.N. had arrived and was staying voluntarily in I.B.\u2019s home. 8.  On 21 August 2008 L.N. and her boyfriend were invited to the Clejani Mayor\u2019s Office, where they met with the deputy mayor, a representative of the Department for Social Assistance from the mayor\u2019s office, the chief police from the Clejani Police Office, and two police officers from the neighbouring commune of Bulbucata and the town Mih\u0103ile\u015fti. L.N. reiterated that she was living with the Boac\u0103 family voluntarily and asked the police to hand over her jewellery and her mobile phone to her mother. 9.  On 27 August 2008, around noon, the Clejani chief of police, together with members of the Giurgiu Rapid Intervention Squad (\u201cthe R.I.S.\u201d, Deta\u015famentul Poli\u0163iei pentru Interven\u0163ie Rapid\u0103) and two plain-clothes policemen travelled by car to I.B.\u2019s house. One of the plain-clothes policemen got out of the vehicle and asked I.B. if he was keeping a girl in his home against her will. He reiterated that L.N. was staying with them voluntarily, as she herself had declared in front of the authorities. He called for L.N. to come out of the house. He asked the policemen if they had a search warrant, to which one of them reacted by hitting him in the face and telling him that his warrant consisted of \u201ca fist and a gun\u201d. They told him that the warrant was at the mayor\u2019s office. 10.  Meanwhile L.N. came out of the house and reiterated that she was living there of her own free will. At the sight of L.N., the man who had hit I.B. signalled to the masked R.I.S. officers to enter the yard. 11.  I.B. took refuge in the yard. Several other people were also present in the house at that time: I.B.\u2019s sons, the fifth and the sixth applicants; I.B.\u2019s partner, the seventh applicant; and C.I., I.B.\u2019s daughter-in-law, along with her minor children I.A.B. (three years and eight months) and G.M.B. (one year and eight months; see paragraphs 37 and 64 (b) below). 12.  The police broke a gate and five windows. They dragged L.N. off the premises. In the course of the assault, the police fired rubber bullets. I.B. witnessed that the sixth applicant, who had become scared and started running towards the back yard, was hit in the buttocks by a bullet fired by one of the policemen. He fell to the ground and was helped up by two neighbours. The masked police continued to fire in the air and threw tear gas. The children I.A.B. and G.M.B. lost consciousness. 13.  The sixth applicant was taken to hospital in Bolintin Deal. The medical report indicated the existence of a superficial wound and gave a detailed description of the ecchymosis (bruising). It concluded that the wound could have been caused by the impact of a hard object, but excluded firearms as there were no traces of gunpowder or an ecchymosed perilesional ring. The sixth applicant was 15 years old at the time. 14.  I.B., the applicants, and some of their neighbours left for the mayor\u2019s office to ask about the search warrant. Shortly afterwards, police officers entered the office, but the mayor asked them to leave again as the situation was calm. It was found that the police did not have a warrant to enter I.B.\u2019s home that day. 15.  Relying on the findings of the domestic courts, the Government made the following submissions as to the incident in question. 16.  On 27 August 2008 L.N.\u2019s father reported to the police that his daughter had disappeared and had apparently gone to her boyfriend\u2019s home. He believed that his daughter was being kept against her will and thought that she might have been drugged. 17.  The police decided to investigate the whereabouts of the girl. As the boyfriend had a criminal record of violent crime and as the Boac\u0103 family members were known to the police for being violent, the local police team was reinforced by a team of five members of the R.I.S. 18.  Upon arrival at I.B.\u2019s home, the police showed their badges and inquired about the girl. I.B. and the fifth applicant invited them in. Four police officers entered the house and talked to L.N. The Boac\u0103 family members tried to influence L.N., but eventually she decided to go with the police back to her parents\u2019 home. 19.  At that point, the Boac\u0103 family became violent: the seventh applicant shouted \u201cnobody leaves alive\u201d and the men picked up bats and knives, threatening L.N.\u2019s and the police officers\u2019 physical integrity. In order to protect L.N. and themselves, the police issued a warning and then, as it had no effect, used tear gas against the assailants. The attack continued as the Boac\u0103 family threw stones, bricks and glass at the police car where L.N. had been put for safety. As a fresh warning was also ignored, the police fired vertical warning shots in the air. 20.  According to the police statements, nobody was injured during the operation. 21.  On 12 and 17 September and 24 November 2008 I.B. and his counsel filed criminal complaints against the policemen involved in the incident of 27 August 2008, alleging brutality. They described in detail the police operation and the harm sustained by the Boac\u0103 family members, including the destruction of their property. I.B. also complained that this was not the first instance of police brutality against his family and believed that the police discriminated against them and treated them badly because of their Roma origin. He informed the prosecutor that he wished to produce documents and to bring eyewitnesses to support his allegations. 22.  The investigation was carried out by the prosecutor\u2019s office attached to Giurgiu County Court. The prosecutor in charge took statements from the eight police officers who had participated in the events: the chief of police, the two local policemen and the five members of the rapid intervention squad. They all described the events as in paragraphs 16 to 20 above. L.N. and her parents also gave statements to the police. 23.  Nobody from the Boac\u0103 family was interviewed by the police. The court officer in charge of the service procedure recorded that I.B. and the fifth applicant had refused to accept the summonses, which had therefore been posted on their door. I.B. and the fifth applicant had informed the court officer that Romano CRISS had taken on their defence case and that they would go to the prosecutor\u2019s office if summonsed. 24.  According to the police\u2019s mission statement and the report of the operation, the police officers had been equipped with firearms and tear gas and had used them in self-defence. 25.  The investigators concluded in their report that the use of force had been proportionate and had lasted only as long as the Boac\u0103 family continued to be violent. They ruled out any racial motive for the operation. They also recorded that the damage to the police van was being examined by a panel which would make a proposal regarding appropriate compensation. 26.  Based on the investigators\u2019 report, on 7 May 2009 the prosecutor\u2019s office decided not to prosecute. It found that the police officers had had no intention of harming the Boac\u0103 family members. The prosecutor considered the force used to have been only defensive and employed in order to allow the policemen to leave the premises safely with L.N. after the police had come under attack by the Boac\u0103 family. The prosecutor also concluded that the injury sustained by the sixth applicant was not consistent with a gunshot wound and was thus irrelevant for the purposes of the investigation. Lastly, the prosecutor noted that I.B. and the fifth applicant had refused to accept the summons to give statements in the case. 27.  I.B. contested the decision, arguing that the investigators had failed to hear evidence from the eyewitnesses. On 12 June 2009 the prosecutor in chief of the Giurgiu County Prosecutor\u2019s Office upheld the decision of 7 May 2009 (see paragraph 26 above). 28.  I.B. lodged a complaint against the prosecutors\u2019 decisions with the Giurgiu County Court. He pointed out that the prosecutors had failed to question the eyewitnesses and had only taken statements from the policemen involved. He provided the names of the eyewitnesses. He also maintained that he had not received any summons to appear before the prosecutor. 29.  The County Court gave its ruling on 11 November 2009. Based on the evidence in the file, it dismissed the complaint. It found that the police officers had acted within the lawful limits of their authority. Their purpose had not been to harm the Boac\u0103 family members, but rather to protect themselves and L.N. from imminent attack. It also dismissed as unfounded I.B.\u2019s allegation that he had not been invited to testify before the prosecutor. 30.  I.B. appealed against that decision but died while the appeal proceedings were still pending. On 12 October 2010, based on a certificate issued on 15 September 2010 by the local administration, the applicants (except for the seventh applicant, Mrs Nina Niculae) were recognised as heirs. The seventh applicant, who had also expressed her wish to participate in the proceedings after I.B.\u2019s death, did not object to the interlocutory judgment of 12 October 2010. She did not participate in the ensuing proceedings. 31.  On 14 December 2010, based on the evidence in the file, the Bucharest Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. The County Court decision thus became final.", "references": ["5", "8", "7", "0", "9", "4", "3", "6", "2", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "5.  A list of the applicants is set out in the appendix. 6.  On 23 December 2011 the applicants, political activists, participated in a demonstration organised by the political party \u201cPolitics Can Be Different\u2019\u201d (Lehet M\u00e1s a Politika). The demonstrators blocked the entrance of a car park adjacent to the Parliament building by chaining themselves to each other and to concrete columns situated next to the entrance. 7.  Following the incident the Budapest main police department opened criminal investigations against twenty-nine persons, including the applicants, on charges of violation of personal liberty under Article 175(1) of Act no. IV on the [old] Criminal Code. 8.  On 9 March 2012 Parliament enacted Act no. XII of 2012 (\u201cthe Amnesty Act\u201d) (see paragraph 12 below), which entered into force on 10 March 2012. 9.  On 29 March 2012 the Budapest main police department discontinued the criminal investigation against the twenty-nine suspects, pursuant to Article 190 \u00a7\u00a7 1 (e) and 2 of the Code on Criminal Procedure on the grounds that they had been granted amnesty. The applicants did not appeal against that decision. 10.  On 6 September 2012 six of the applicants, Ms Bende, Ms Kalocsai, Ms \u00c1mon, Ms Sz\u00e9kelyn\u00e9 R\u00e1kosi, Mr Moldov\u00e1n and Mr Gaj\u00e1rszki, lodged a constitutional complaint requesting the Constitutional Court to declare sections 1, 2 and 4 of the Amnesty Act unconstitutional as infringing the right to their reputation and the principle of presumption of innocence. 11.  The Constitutional Court declared the complaint inadmissible. It reasoned that the complaint did not raise any constitutional-law issues of \u201cfundamental importance\u201d, since it was based on an erroneous interpretation of the law. The Constitutional Court pointed out that the language employed by the Act could not be interpreted as establishing that the applicants had indeed committed the offence. In any event, the complaint was time-barred since it had been lodged outside the statutory 180 days\u2019 time-limit following the entry into force of the legislation.", "references": ["5", "0", "2", "8", "6", "7", "4", "3", "9", "1", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "7.  The US nationals (\u201cthe US applicants\u201d) started proceedings for the adoption of children from Russia between 2010 and 2012. They had complied with the requirements set by the United States authorities, having obtained favourable appraisals of their living and financial conditions and their suitability to adopt a child. Some of the applicants had had to comply with additional requirements laid down in the Agreement between the United States of America and the Russian Federation Regarding Cooperation in Adoption of Children (\u201cBilateral Agreement on Adoption\u201d) upon its entry into force on 1 November 2012. They then applied to the competent Russian authorities who, except in those cases where the adoption proceedings had focussed on a particular child from the outset, provided them with information concerning the children who were available for adoption. 8.  In most cases the US applicants received a positive decision from the Russian authorities regarding both the impossibility of placing the child in a Russian family and their suitability to become adoptive parents. As part of the adoption procedure, they obtained a referral to visit the child concerned, which enabled them to spend several days with him or her at the respective orphanage. They visited the children and reaffirmed their formal agreement to adopt them. In some cases, according to the US applicants, they had formed a bond with the child even before initiating the adoption procedure, and one case concerned the adoption of the brother of a previously adopted girl (cases nos. 23890/13, 37173/13 and 42340/13 respectively; see the specific circumstances below). In such cases the adoption procedure referred to a particular child from the outset. Many of the prospective adoptive children suffer from serious health issues and require specialist medical care. 9.  By the end of 2012 most of the US applicants had completed all the requisite steps of the adoption procedure prior to submitting the adoption application to a court. However, on 21 December 2012 the Russian State Duma adopted the Federal Law no. 272-FZ on Measures in respect of Persons Involved in a Breach of Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms, Rights and Freedoms of Nationals of the Russian Federation (\u201cLaw no. 272\u2011FZ\u201d), which, inter alia, banned the adoption of Russian children by nationals of the United States. The law entered into force on 1 January 2013. 10.  Adoption proceedings were halted in respect of those US applicants who had not submitted an adoption application to a court before the entry into force of Law no. 272-FZ. 11.  In respect of those US applicants who had submitted an adoption application to a court but had not attended a hearing before the entry into force of Law no. 272-FZ, the courts discontinued the adoption proceedings, relying on Law no. 272-FZ. Some of the applicants appealed. Their appeals were dismissed. 12.  Applications for adoption submitted by US nationals after 1 January 2013 were rejected on procedural grounds, with similar reference to Law no. 272-FZ. Where an application had been submitted on behalf of the US applicants by an adoption agency, it was rejected on the grounds that the agency could not submit an application to the court because the activities of such agencies had been banned. Where the application had been submitted by some other kind of representative, it was rejected because it should have been submitted by such an adoption agency only. 13.  The US applicants were subsequently removed from the State databank containing information on prospective adoptive parents, meaning that they could no longer be considered as such. 14.  After spring 2013 some of the prospective adoptive children were transferred for adoption by different families or placed in foster families.\n(b)  Circumstances surrounding the entry into force of the Bilateral Agreement on Adoption and Law no. 272-FZ 15.  On 13 July 2011 the United States and the Russian Federation signed the Bilateral Agreement on Adoption setting out the procedure for intercountry adoption between the two States. It entered into force on 1 November 2012. 16.  On 21 December 2012 the Russian State Duma adopted Law no. 272-FZ \u2012 which was signed by the President on 28 December 2012 \u2012 also known as the \u201cAnti-Magnitsky Law\u201d or the \u201cDima Yakovlev Law\u201d due to the circumstances underlying its adoption. The law has been described as a response to the Russia and Moldova Jackson-Vanik Repeal and Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012 passed by the United States Congress in November/December 2012 and signed by the US President on 14 December 2012 (the \u201cMagnitsky Act\u201d). The Magnitsky Act imposed sanctions on the Russian officials who were thought to be responsible for the death of Sergei Magnitsky, a lawyer who had exposed alleged large-scale tax fraud involving State officials and subsequently died in custody. The Magnitsky Act prohibited the Russian officials from entering the United States and using the United States\u2019 banking system. The list of the eighteen individuals concerned was made public by the Administration of the President of the United States. 17.  The Russian authorities\u2019 response involved the passing of a similar act in respect of United States nationals responsible for gross human rights violations, prohibiting their entry into Russia and freezing their assets within Russia. However, Section 4 \u00a7 1 of Law no. 272\u2011FZ also introduced a ban on the adoption of Russian children by United States nationals. The introduction of that provision was prompted by the death in 2008 of Dima Yakovlev, a Russian toddler adopted by United States nationals. He was left alone for nine hours strapped in his adoptive father\u2019s car after the latter forgot to take him to his day-care centre. The father was eventually acquitted of involuntary manslaughter. This news created a stir in the Russian media and resulted in the highlighting of a number of abuse cases involving Russian children adopted by United States nationals, leading to calls from certain Russian authorities to restrict or end adoptions by US nationals. 18.  On 28 December 2012 the United States Department of State released a statement concerning the adoption of Law no. 272-FZ which read, insofar as relevant:\n\u201cWe deeply regret Russia\u2019s passage of a law ending inter-country adoptions between the United States and Russia and restricting Russian civil society organizations that work with American partners. American families have adopted over 60,000 Russian children over the past 20 years, and the vast majority of these children are now thriving thanks to their parents\u2019 loving support. The Russian government\u2019s politically motivated decision will reduce adoption possibilities for children who are now under institutional care. We regret that the Russian government has taken this step rather than seek to implement the bilateral adoption agreement that entered into force in November. We are further concerned about statements that adoptions already underway may be stopped and hope that the Russian government would allow those children who have already met and bonded with their future parents to finish the necessary legal procedures so that they can join their families.\u201d 19.  On 1 January 2013 Law no. 272-FZ entered into force. On the same date the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the US Embassy in Moscow that, pursuant to Section 4 \u00a7 2 of Law no. 272-FZ, Russia was terminating the Bilateral Agreement on Adoption. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Bilateral Agreement on Adoption, it should have remained in force until one year from the date on which one of the States Parties informed the other Party of its intention to terminate the Agreement, and this move therefore caused confusion regarding the validity of the agreement and the outcome of the pending adoption cases involving prospective adoptive parents from the United States. 20.  During a briefing on 8 January 2013, a United States Department of State spokesperson announced that Russia had informed the United States of its intention to suspend the Bilateral Adoption Agreement. 21.  On 10 January 2013 news agencies including the BBC and RIA Novosti reported that the Russian President\u2019s Press Secretary had stated that the Bilateral Agreement on Adoption was still in force on that date and that it would remain valid until early January 2014. On the afternoon of the same day the Russian Ministry of External Affairs posted a comment on its website stating that Russia had not merely suspended the Bilateral Agreement on Adoption but had terminated it, and that a communication to this effect had been handed over to the United States Embassy in Moscow on 1 January 2013. 22.  On 13 January 2013 about twenty thousand people gathered on the streets of Moscow to take part in an action called March Against Scoundrels to protest against Law no. 272-FZ. 23.  The law was also criticised by human rights organisations including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch and received numerous negative reactions from the media, including Time, The Economist and The Guardian. Most of the critical commentators argued that the law was politically motivated and detrimental to the children\u2019s interests. 24.  On 15 January 2013 forty-eight members of the United States Congress sent a letter to the President of Russia, Vladimir Putin, on behalf of the United States families affected by Law no. 272-FZ. The letter requested exemption for families who were in the final stages of the adoption procedure and invited Russia to re-join the Bilateral Agreement on Adoption. 25.  On 22 January 2013 the Russian Supreme Court issued a letter instructing the lower courts to allow the transfer of adopted Russian children into families of United States nationals where the adoption decision had been taken prior to 1 January 2013, even if it had entered into force after that date. 26.  Proceedings in all cases involving prospective adoptive parents from the United States in which a decision on adoption had not been delivered before 1 January 2013 were halted, irrespective of the status of the proceedings. 27.  On 2 July 2013 the Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) adopted a Resolution on Intercountry Adoption in which it called on member States \u201cto recognize the foundational bond between prospective adoptive parents and the child and to honor and protect these nascent families\u201d and urged them \u201cto resolve differences, disputes, and controversies related to intercountry adoptions in a positive and humanitarian spirit\u201d so as \u201cto avoid any general, indiscriminate disruption of intercountry adoptions already in progress that could jeopardize the best interests of the child, harm the nascent family, or deter prospective adoptive parents from pursuing an intercountry adoption\u201d see paragraph 301 below). Although Russia was not specifically referred to in the Resolution, it was introduced by US Senator Roger Wicker in direct response to the ban on adoptions by United States nationals. 28.  According to a news report by RIA Novosti of 5 July 2013, the Russian Ministry of External Affairs dismissed as futile any attempts by the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly to make Russia annul the previously adopted decisions concerning intercountry adoption, the latter being in full compliance with international law. 29.  Application no. 6033/13 was lodged on 22 January 2013 by three groups of applicants.\n(i)  First group of applicants 30.  A.J.H., born on 16 May 1976, and J.A.H., born on 26 June 1977, who live in Vaughn, Montana, United States (the US applicants), and D.M., who was born on 17 August 2009 and lives in Lobnya, the Moscow Region. 31.  D.M. suffers, in particular, from Down syndrome, delayed psychological and speech development, congenital heart disease and insufficient blood flow. He was born prematurely. 32.  Having completed the necessary steps for intercountry adoption within the United States, the US applicants were registered in the Russian State databank as prospective adoptive parents on 6 August 2012. They were assisted by the authorised adoption agency \u201cHand in Hand\u201d. 33.  On 24 September 2012 the US applicants obtained a referral to visit D.M. from the Ministry of Education and Science. They visited him every day between 24 and 28 September 2012 and again between 10 and either 13 or 14 January 2013[2]. Each visit lasted between an hour and an hour and a half. 35.  On 15 November 2012 the adoption application was submitted to the Moscow Regional Court. The hearing initially scheduled for 21 December 2012 was rescheduled for 15 January 2013 at the applicants\u2019 request. 36.  On 10 January 2013 the US applicants arrived in Russia and visited D.M. every day between 10 and either 13 or 14 January 2013[3]. 37.  On 15 January 2013 the US applicants appeared before the court. However, the hearing was adjourned at the request of the Ministry of Education of the Moscow Region, which cited a lack of guidance from the Supreme Court of Russia on the application of Law no. 272-FZ. A new hearing was scheduled for 21 January 2013. 38.  On 21 January 2013 the US applicants appeared before the court. However, the Moscow Regional Court postponed the hearing until 11 February 2013 in response to a similar request from the Ministry of Education of the Moscow Region. 39.  On 22 January 2013 the US applicants left for the United States. They booked a flight for 9 February 2013 in order to be present at the next hearing. 40.  On 23 January 2013 the US applicants\u2019 representative, Ms Zakharina[4], was informed that the hearing had been rescheduled for an earlier date, namely 30 January 2013. This left the US applicants insufficient time to reschedule their trip to Russia, and they were unable to be present at the hearing. 41.  On 30 January 2013 the Moscow Regional Court discontinued the adoption procedure on the grounds that under Law no. 272-FZ the US applicants had no right to adopt D.M. The US applicants appealed. 42.  On 14 May 2013 the Moscow Regional Court upheld the decision of 30 January 2013. The US applicants lodged cassation appeal. 43.  On 26 August 2013 the Moscow Regional Court refused leave to have the cassation appeal examined by the Presidium. 44.  According to the Government, D.M. has been placed with a foster family.\n(ii)  Second group of applicants 45.  G.D.C., born on 14 August 1980 and who lives in Salt Lake City, Utah, United States (\u201cthe US applicant\u201d), and E.G., who was born on 28 May 2010 and lives in St. Petersburg. 47.  The US applicant initiated the adoption procedure in December 2011. Having completed the necessary steps for intercountry adoption within the United States, the US applicant was registered in the Russian State databank as a prospective adoptive parent on 8 November 2012. She was assisted by the authorised adoption agency \u201cHand in Hand\u201d. 48.  On 28 November 2012 the US applicant obtained a referral to visit E.G. from the Ministry of Education and Science. She visited her every day between 28 November and 1 December 2012. Each visit lasted approximately two hours. 51.  On 13 February 2013 the St. Petersburg City Court rejected the application on the grounds that G.D.C. could not be represented by her representative, E.F., because an application of this kind could only be submitted by an authorised agency. The US applicant appealed. 53.  On 12 March 2013 the US applicant resubmitted the application through another representative, O.T. 54.  On 21 March 2013 the second application was rejected for the same reasons. The US applicant appealed. 55.  On 2 and 12 April 2013 the St. Petersburg City Court dismissed the appeals against its decisions of 13 February and 21 March 2013 respectively. 56.  On 31 May 2013 the US applicant was informed that she had been removed from the State databank as a prospective adoptive parent. 57.  According to the Government, E.G. has been placed with a foster family.\n(iii)  Third group of applicants 58.  J.M., born on 1 June 1981, and A.M., born on 14 April 1982, who live in Gainesville, Georgia, United States (the US applicants), and V.T., who was born on 30 September 2008 and lives in Mytischy, the Moscow Region. 59.  V.T. is developmentally delayed, he suffers from Down syndrome, hearing loss, heterotropy, intrauterine hypoxia, congenital heart disease (he underwent heart surgery in 2009 where an electric cardiostimulator was implanted), and a number of other illnesses. 60.  The US applicants, who have two biological children and one adopted child, initiated the procedure to adopt another child in March 2012. Having completed the necessary steps for intercountry adoption within the United States, they were registered in the Russian State databank as prospective adoptive parents on 17 August 2012. They were assisted by the authorised adoption agency \u201cHand in Hand\u201d. 61.  On 1 October 2012 the US applicants obtained a referral to visit V.T. from the Ministry of Education and Science. They visited him every day between 1 and 5 October 2012 and again between 17 and 21 January 2013. Each visit lasted four hours. 63.  On 30 November 2012 the adoption application was submitted to the Moscow Regional Court. The hearing initially scheduled for 22 January 2013 was rescheduled for 12 February 2013 at the request of the Ministry of Education. However, on the same date the prosecutor requested that the proceedings be speeded up due to the uncertainty over the child\u2019s fate. Eventually the hearing was rescheduled for 31 January 2013. 64.  On 31 January 2013 the Moscow Regional Court discontinued the adoption procedure on the grounds that under Law no. 272-FZ the US applicants had no right to adopt V.T. The US applicants appealed. 65.  On 14 May 2013 the Moscow Regional Court upheld the decision of 31 January 2013 on appeal. The US applicants lodged cassation appeal. 66.  On 10 December 2013 the Moscow Regional Court refused leave to have the cassation appeal examined by the Presidium. 67.  On 22 April 2013 the US applicants were removed from the State databank as prospective adoptive parents, an action of which they were not informed until 26 April 2013. 68.  According to the Government, V.T. is still available for adoption, and the competent authorities provide prospective adoptive parents looking for a child with information about him.\n(b)  Application no. 8927/13 69.  Application no. 8927/13 was lodged on 4 February 2013 by J.J., born on 12 December 1983, and Jn.J., born on 25 January 1984, who live in Dover, New Jersey, United States (the US applicants), and A.M., who was born on 27 January 2007 and lives in Moscow. 71.  The US applicants initiated the adoption procedure in March 2012. Having completed the necessary steps for intercountry adoption within the United States, they were registered in the Russian State databank as prospective adoptive parents on 16 November 2012. They were assisted by the authorised adoption agency \u201cHand in Hand\u201d. 72.  On 26 November 2012 the US applicants obtained a referral to visit A.M. from the Ministry of Education and Science. They visited her every day between 27 and 30 November 2012. Each visit lasted two to three hours. 73.  On 28 December 2012 the adoption application was submitted to the Moscow Regional Court. The hearing was first scheduled for 8 February 2013, but then rescheduled for 31 January 2013. As it left the US applicants insufficient time to reschedule their trip to Russia, they asked the court to postpone the hearing. 74.  On 31 January 2013 the Moscow Regional Court rejected the request to postpone the hearing and discontinued the adoption procedure on the grounds that under Law no. 272-FZ the US applicants had no right to adopt V.T. The US applicants appealed. 76.  On 22 April 2013 the US applicants were removed from the State databank as prospective adoptive parents. 77.  According to the Government, A.M. has been placed with a foster family.\n(c)  Application no. 10549/13 78.  Application no. 10549/13 was lodged on 11 February 2013 by J.E.L., born on 1 June 1962 and A.M.L., born on 4 February 1972, who live in Williamsport, Pennsylvania, United States (the US applicants), and S.T., who was born on 29 November 2011 and lives in Volgograd. 80.  The US applicants initiated the adoption procedure in December 2011. Having completed the necessary steps for intercountry adoption within the United States, they were registered in the Russian State databank as prospective adoptive parents on 13 June 2012. They were assisted by the authorised adoption agency \u201cChristian World Adoptions, Inc.\u201d. 81.  On 23 October 2012 the US applicants obtained a referral to visit S.T. from the Ministry of Education and Science. They visited her twice a day between 24 and 29 October 2012. Each visit lasted two hours. 83.  On 1 February 2013 the adoption procedure was discontinued on the grounds that under Law no. 272-FZ the US applicants had no right to adopt S.T. 84.  On 15 February 2013 the US applicants appealed. On 20 February 2013 the Volgograd Regional Court stayed the appeal proceedings and instructed the US applicants to correct certain deficiencies by 20 March 2013. On 3 April 2013 the appeal statement was returned to the US applicants. On 25 April 2013 they resubmitted the appeal. On 7 May 2013 the Volgograd Regional Court extended the time-limit for appeal. 86.  On 14 February 2013 the US applicants were informed that they had been removed from the State databank as prospective adoptive parents. 88.  Application no. 12275/13 was lodged on 18 February 2013 by nine groups of applicants.\n(i)  First group of applicants 89.  M.S.P., born on 15 May 1974, and A.N.P., born on 6 March 1980, who live in Papillon, Nebraska, United States (the US applicants), and A.A., who was born on 21 June 2005 and lives in St. Petersburg. 90.  A.A. suffers from Down syndrome, moderate mental deficiency, delay in physical development, strabismus, planovalgus deformity, and hyperbilirubinemia. 91.  The US applicants initiated the adoption procedure in August 2011. Having completed the necessary steps for intercountry adoption within the United States, they were registered in the Russian State databank as prospective adoptive parents on 6 September 2012. They were assisted by the authorised adoption agency \u201cHand in Hand\u201d. 92.  On 8 October 2012 the US applicants obtained a referral to visit A.A. from the Committee on Social Policy of the St. Petersburg Administration. They visited her on three days in October 2012. Each visit lasted between one and a half and two hours. 94.  On 24 December 2012 the application was returned to the US applicants\u2019 representative, E.F. In the court\u2019s ruling, it was stated that it had been returned at E.F.\u2019s request. According to the US applicants, they did not ask E.F. to withdraw the application, and she did not apply to the court to have it withdrawn. Rather, the court asked her to take it back. The US applicants were not informed of this ruling, but having learned about it, they filed a complaint against it, arguing that they had never requested their representative to withdraw the application and that the power of attorney did not empower her to do that. On 4 June 2013 the St. Petersburg City Court set aside the ruling of 24 December 2012. It appears that no further decisions were taken in the case. 95.  On 31 May 2013 the US applicants were informed that they had been removed from the State databank as prospective adoptive parents. 96.  According to the Government, A.A. is still available for adoption, and the competent authorities provide prospective adoptive parents looking for a child with information about her.\n(ii)  Second group of applicants 97.  D.S.G., born on 29 May 1974 and who lives in New York, New York, United States (the US applicant), and O.N., who was born on 24 June 2011 and lives in St. Petersburg. 98.  O.N. suffers from a mixed developmental disorder, atopic dermatitis, food allergies and hypermetria of both eyes with astigmatism. 99.  The US applicant initiated the adoption procedure in December 2011. Having completed the necessary steps for intercountry adoption within the United States, she was registered in the Russian State databank as a prospective adoptive parent on 9 October 2012. She was assisted by the authorised adoption agency \u201cInternational Assistance Group, Inc.\u201d. 100.  On 24 December 2012 the US applicant obtained a referral to visit O.N. from the Committee on Social Policy of the St Petersburg Administration. She visited her twice a day between 24 and 28 December 2012. Each visit lasted two hours. 102.  On 11 February 2013 the adoption application was submitted to the St. Petersburg City Court by the adoption agency. 103.  On 13 February 2013 the St. Petersburg City Court rejected the application on the grounds that as of 1 January 2013 the agency\u2019s activity had been banned in Russia pursuant to Law no. 272-FZ. On 4 March 2013 the US applicant appealed. 104.  On 25 March 2013 the appeal statement was returned to the US applicant without examination on the grounds that it had been lodged outside the applicable time-limit. 105.  On 31 May 2013 the US applicant was informed that she had been removed from the State databank as a prospective adoptive parent. 106.  According to the Government, O.N. has been adopted by a different adoptive family.\n(iii)  Third group of applicants 107.  B.C., born on 13 June 1965, and J.W.S., born on 4 January 1955, who live in Sag Harbor, New York, United States (the US applicants), and A.R., who was born on 24 March 2010 and lives in St. Petersburg. 108.  A.R. was abandoned by her parents, who suffered from substance addictions, at the age of eleven months. She is hepatitis C positive and suffers from a mixed developmental disorder and planovalgus deformity. 109.  The US applicants had two children, a son and a daughter. After their daughter died of paediatric cancer at the age of twelve, they decided to adopt a child, since their son did not wish to be an only child. The US applicants initiated the adoption procedure in February 2011. Having completed the necessary steps for intercountry adoption within the United States, they were registered in the Russian State databank as prospective adoptive parents on 18 October 2012. They were assisted by the authorised adoption agency \u201cInternational Assistance Group, Inc.\u201d. 110.  On 28 November 2012 the US applicants obtained a referral to visit A.R. from the Committee on Social Policy of the St Petersburg Administration. They visited her twice a day between 27 and 30 November 2012. Each visit lasted two hours. 112.  On 10 February 2013 the adoption application was submitted to the St. Petersburg City Court by the adoption agency. 113.  On 13 February 2013 the St. Petersburg City Court rejected the application on the grounds that, as of 1 January 2013, the agency\u2019s activity had been banned in Russia pursuant to Law no. 272-FZ. 114.  On 31 May 2013 the US applicants were informed that they had been removed from the State databank as prospective adoptive parents. 115.  According to the Government, A.R. has been adopted by a different adoptive family.\n(iv)  Fourth group of applicants 116.  T.L.B.-S., born on 21 June 1968 and who lives in Oldtown, Maryland, United States (the US applicant), and V.O., who was born on 7 August 2005 and lives in St. Petersburg. 117.  V.O. suffers from Down syndrome, mental deficiency, umbilical hernia, planovalgus deformity, atopic dermatitis and hypermetria of a light degree. 118.  The US applicant has two biological children and a son adopted from Russia. She decided to adopt another child and, having completed the necessary steps for intercountry adoption within the United States, she was registered in the Russian State databank as a prospective adoptive parent on 1 November 2012. The US applicant was assisted by the authorised adoption agency \u201cSmall World Adoption Foundation of Missouri Inc.\u201d. 119.  On 12 November 2012 the US applicant obtained a referral to visit V.O. from the Committee on Social Policy of the St Petersburg Administration. She visited her daily on several days in November 2012. Each visit lasted between one and a half and two hours. 121.  According to the US applicant, she did not have sufficient time to prepare all the necessary documents in order to be able to submit the adoption application to a court before the entry into force of Law no. 272\u2011FZ. After its entry into force she realised that this would be futile, although she remained willing to adopt V.O. 122.  On 31 May 2013 the US applicant was informed that she had been removed from the State databank as a prospective adoptive parent. 123.  According to the Government, V.O. is still available for adoption, and the competent authorities provide prospective adoptive parents looking for a child with information about her.\n(v)  Fifth group of applicants 124.  S.M., born on 12 May 1966, and K.M., born on 30 April 1968, who live in Lake Elsinore, California, United States (the US applicants), and V.G., who was born on 19 December 2005 and lives in St. Petersburg. 126.  Having completed the necessary steps for intercountry adoption within the United States, the US applicants were registered in the Russian State databank as prospective adoptive parents on 9 February 2012. They were assisted by the authorised adoption agency \u201cHand in Hand\u201d. 127.  On 18 July 2012 the US applicants obtained a referral to visit V.G. They visited her every day between 18 and 20 July 2012. Each visit lasted three hours. 129.   On 26 November 2012 the adoption application was submitted to a court by the US applicants\u2019 representative E.F. from the adoption agency. 130.  According to the Government, on 30 November 2012[5] the St. Petersburg City Court stayed the proceedings and instructed the US applicants to rectify certain shortcomings by 30 December 2012[6]. In particular, they were asked to corroborate the powers of their representative to act as such in matters concerning adoption in view of the fact that the power of attorney had been issued to E.F. as a private person, whereas pursuant to Article 4 \u00a7 4 of the Bilateral Agreement on Adoption only authorised agencies could act as representatives. On 9 January 2013 the application was returned to E.F. on the grounds that the shortcomings had not been rectified. 131.  According to the US applicants, they were never informed of any alleged shortcomings in their adoption application. Furthermore, several days before 1 January 2013 a judge had called E.F. and had asked her to withdraw the application, even though E.F.\u2019s power of attorney did not authorise her to do so. Several days later E.F. found out that the application had been \u201clost\u201d and the only record of submission was a note in the court\u2019s register. 132.  The US applicants also allege that on 11 January 2012 the head of a branch of adoption agency \u201cHand in Hand\u201d had asked the Chairman of the St. Petersburg Committee on Social Policy for permission to continue its activity as an adoption agency in St. Petersburg through its legal representatives E.F. and I.Z. The permission was granted, and on 11 January 2012 the adoption agency \u201cHand in Hand\u201d issued E.F. with a power of attorney valid for three years to represent the interests of adoptive parents before the courts of St. Petersburg. 133.  According to the Government, the St. Petersburg Committee on Social Policy did not have the competence to authorise the activity of an adoption agency. The matter fell within the exclusive competence of the Ministry of Education. E.F. and I.Z. were registered at the Ministry of Education as employees of the adoption agency \u201cHand in Hand\u201d during the period 2009-11. 134.  According to the US applicants, on 12 and 28 March and 3 April 2013 their representative O.T. requested a copy of the St. Petersburg City Court\u2019s ruling on their application. However, the file was not in the registry and she was not presented with a copy. On 11 April 2013 O.T. resubmitted her request to Judge G. and the President of the St. Petersburg City Court. In a letter of 16 April 2013 Judge G. refused to provide her with a copy of the ruling. On 22 April 2013 O.T. filed a complaint against the refusal. It is not clear whether the complaint has been examined. 135.  According to the Government, O.T.\u2019s request was refused as there were no procedural means whereby to provide persons acting as intermediaries in adoption proceedings with copies of documents. 136.  On 31 May 2013 the US applicants were informed that they had been removed from the State databank as prospective adoptive parents. 137.  According to the Government, V.G. is still available for adoption, and the competent authorities provide prospective adoptive parents looking for a child with information about her.\n(vi)  Sixth group of applicants 138.  Q.S., born on 8 April 1979, and W.S., born on 6 May 1980, who live in Salt Lake City, Utah, United States (the US applicants), and D.K., who was born on 26 May 2011 and lives in Perm. 139.  D.K. suffers from Down syndrome, psychomotor development delay, anomaly in heart development, partial atrophy of optic discs, astigmatism and cytomegalovirus infection. 140.  The US applicants initiated the adoption procedure in July 2012. Having completed the necessary steps for intercountry adoption within the United States, the US applicants were registered in the Russian State databank as prospective adoptive parents on 11 December 2012. They were assisted by the authorised adoption agency \u201cGlobal Adoption Services Inc.\u201d. 141.  On 19 December 2012 the US applicants obtained a referral to visit D.K. They visited her twice a day between 19 and 21 December 2012. Each visit lasted approximately two hours. 143.  The adoption application was not submitted to the court. According to the US applicants, it would have been submitted if it had not been for the entry into force of Law no. 272-FZ. 144.  According to the Government, on 24 April 2013 the US applicants were informed that they had been removed from the State databank as prospective adoptive parents. According to the US applicants, they were never informed of this fact. 145.  According to the Government, D.K. has been placed with a foster family.\n(vii)  Seventh group of applicants 146.  S.A.K., born on 9 May 1960 and who lives in Chicago, Illinois, United States (the US applicant), and K.R., who was born on 31 May 2009 and lives in St. Petersburg. 147.  K.R. suffers from a mixed developmental disorder, planovalgus deformity, adenoids, hypertrophy of palatine tonsils, hepatosplenomegaly and physiological phimosis. 148.  The US applicant has already adopted a girl from Russia. She decided to adopt another child and initiated the adoption procedure in May 2012. Having completed the necessary steps for intercountry adoption within the United States, the US applicant was registered in the Russian State databank as a prospective adoptive parent on 9 October 2012. The US applicant was assisted by the authorised adoption agency \u201cInternational Assistance Group Inc.\u201d. 149.  On 21 November 2012 the US applicant obtained a referral to visit K.R. from the Committee on Social Policy of the St Petersburg Administration. She visited her every day between 21 and 23 November 2012. Each visit lasted two hours. 151.  On 11 February 2013 the adoption application was submitted to the St. Petersburg City Court by T. from the adoption agency. 152.  On 13 February 2013 the court returned the application on the grounds that the activity of the adoption agency had been banned pursuant to Law no. 272-FZ. The US applicant appealed. 153.  On 27 March 2013 the appeal statement was returned on the grounds that it had been submitted in breach of procedural rules. In particular, it failed to state whether the US applicant had been provided with a translation of the ruling and her signature had not been certified by a notary. The US applicant filed a complaint against this ruling. 155.  On 31 May 2013 the US applicant was informed that she had been removed from the State databank as a prospective adoptive parent. 156.  According to the Government, K.R. has been adopted by a different adoptive family.\n(viii)  Eighth group of applicants 157.  C.B., born on 1 December 1967, and T.B., born on 23 October 1966, who live in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, United States (the US applicants), and A.E.A., who was born on 22 August 2011 and lives in Perm. 158.  A.E.A. suffers from delay of psychomotor and speech development delay, anomaly in heart development, umbilical hernia and had prenatal contact with HIV. 159.  The US applicants initiated the adoption procedure in May 2011. Having completed the necessary steps for intercountry adoption within the United States, they were registered in the Russian State databank as prospective adoptive parents on 6 February 2012. They were assisted by the authorised adoption agency \u201cAdopt a Child\u201d. 160.  On 19 November 2012 the US applicants obtained a referral to visit A.E.A. They visited her twice a day between 19 and 23 November 2012. Each visit lasted between one and a half and two hours. 161.  The adoption application was not submitted to a court. According to the US applicants, after their visit to Russia in November 2012 they had to amend a number of documents in their adoption file so as to make it conform with the Bilateral Agreement on Adoption. However, Law no. 272\u2011FZ left them no time to submit the adoption application to a court before its entry into force. 162.  On 24 April 2013 the US applicants were informed that they had been removed from the State databank as prospective adoptive parents. 163.  According to the Government, A.E.A. has been placed with a foster family.\n(ix)  Ninth group of applicants 164.  J.R.V., born on 3 January 1973, and M.L.V., born on 27 May 1973, who live in Aurora, Colorado, United States (the US applicants), and Dz.L., who was born on 13 July 2010 and lives in St. Petersburg. 165.  On 4 April 2014 the US applicants\u2019 representative informed the Court that they wished to withdraw the application.\n(e)  Application no. 23890/13 166.  Application no. 23890/13 was lodged on 5 April 2013 by M.W., born on 2 February 1961, and D.W., born on 17 March 1964, who live in Woodstock, Virginia, United States (the US applicants), and M.K., who was born on 21 March 1998 and lives in Chelyabinsk. 167.  M.K. was born prematurely. He suffers, in particular, from Russell\u2011Silver syndrome, light cognitive disorder, delay of neurological and behavioural development and chronic gastritis. 168.  Between 2001 and 2012 the US applicants were involved in charity work in the Chelyabinsk Region. In particular, they helped with the renovation of an orphanage, where in 2008 they met M.K. 169.  According to the US applicants, having developed a close relationship with M.K., in the winter of 2011-2012 they decided to adopt him and initiated the adoption procedure. They contacted about forty adoption agencies asking for assistance with the procedure. However, their attempts were unsuccessful as no adoption agency worked with the Chelyabinsk Region. For this reason they decided to proceed on their own, although the adoption agency Beacon House Adoption Services agreed to provide them with advice on the procedure. 170.  In March 2012, during a consultation at the Ministry of Social Relations of the Chelyabinsk Region, the US applicants expressed their wish to adopt M.K. According to the US applicants, the ministry confirmed that there were no authorised adoption agencies operating in the Chelyabinsk Region and stated that the US applicants could proceed on their own. At the same time their adoption file was rejected on the grounds that the apostille on certain documents was incorrect and some additional documents were required. 171.  In March 2012 the US applicants twice visited M.K. at the orphanage, with each meeting lasting three hours. 172.  On 30 July 2012 the US applicants submitted to the Ministry of Social Relations of the Chelyabinsk Region a corrected set of documents for the adoption of M.K. 173.  However, on 8 August 2012 the Minister of Social Relations of the Chelyabinsk Region informed the US applicants that, since the Bilateral Agreement on Adoption had been ratified, with effect from 10 August 2012 individual applications for adoption could not be accepted. For this reason he returned their application for non-compliance with the requirements set by Government Decree no. 654 of 4 November 2006 (see paragraph 318 below). 174.  On 17 August 2012 the US applicants contacted the Head of the State databank, who wrongly informed them that the Bilateral Agreement on Adoption had not been ratified and that they could proceed with the adoption procedure on their own. 175.  In a telephone conversation on 20 August 2012 the US applicants told the Ministry of Social Relations of the Chelyabinsk Region about the information received from the Head of the State databank. According to the ministry, it was awaiting official clarifications from the Head of the State databank to this effect. 176.  On 22 August 2012 the US applicants again contacted the Ministry of Social Relations of the Chelyabinsk Region by telephone and were told that they could proceed with the adoption on their own. 177.  On 22 August 2012 according to the US applicants and on 4 September 2012 according to the Government, the adoption file was resubmitted to the Ministry of Social Relations of the Chelyabinsk Region. 178.  On 19 September 2012 the adoption file was returned and the US applicants were requested to amend certain documents and to enclose some additional documents. 179.  On 3 December 2012, having amended the adoption file, the US applicants again resubmitted the application. By that time the Bilateral Agreement on Adoption \u2012 including a provision stating that an adoption application might only be submitted through an authorised agency \u2012 had entered into force. 180.  On 11 December 2012 the Ministry of Social Relations of the Chelyabinsk Region rejected the application on the grounds that it had been submitted by the US applicants directly and not by an authorised adoption agency. It was recommended that the US applicants re-apply via an agency. 181.  According to the applicants, the adoption procedure was eventually halted by the entry into force of Law no. 272-FZ. 183.  According to the Government, since 1 September 2014 M.K. has been attending the South Urals Vocational School (\u042e\u0436\u043d\u043e-\u0423\u0440\u0430\u043b\u044c\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0439 \u043c\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e\u043f\u0440\u043e\u0444\u0438\u043b\u044c\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u043a\u043e\u043b\u043b\u0435\u0434\u0436) and lives in the school dormitory.\n(f)  Application no. 26309/13 184.  Application no. 26309/13 was lodged on 18 April 2013 by C.Z., born on 29 October 1974, and S.Z., born on 2 October 1976, who live in Simpsonville, South Carolina, United States (the US applicants), and A.K., who was born on 8 November 2008 and lives in Zelenogradsk. 185.  A.K. suffers from psychological developmental disorder, speech development delay, enuresis and dysarthria. A.K. was taken from his home by social workers in August 2011 as he had been neglected and possibly abused by his parents. 186.  The US applicants have previously adopted a boy from Russia. They initiated the procedure for adoption of another child in April 2012. Having completed the necessary steps for intercountry adoption within the United States, they were registered in the Russian State databank as prospective adoptive parents. They were assisted by the authorised adoption agency \u201cAdoption Associates Inc.\u201d. 187.  On 15 October 2012 the US applicants obtained a referral to visit A.K. from the Ministry of Education of the Kaliningrad Region. They visited him twice a day between 15 and 19 October 2012. They spent four to five hours per day with A.K. 189.  According to the Government, the US applicants never made an application to a court for A.K.\u2019s adoption. 190.  According to the US applicants, they submitted the adoption application to the Kaliningrad Town Court, and the hearing was scheduled for 17 January 2013. On 28 December 2012 they were informed that the hearing had been cancelled due to the adoption of Law no. 272-FZ. 191.  On 30 April 2013 the US applicants were informed that they had been removed from the State databank as prospective adoptive parents. 192.  According to the Government, A.K. has been adopted by a different adoptive family.\n(g)  Application no. 27161/13 193.  Application no. 27161/13 was lodged on 11 April 2013 by S.S., born on 13 March 1978, and G.S. born on 30 January 1982, who live in Shirley, New York[7], United States (the US applicants), and E.O., who was born on 14 September 2009 and lives in Perm. 194.  E.O. is HIV positive. She suffers from speech development delay, slight anomaly in heart development, atopic dermatitis, vegetative dysfunction of the Keith-Flack node and planovalgus deformity. 195.  The US applicants initiated the adoption procedure in March 2012. Having completed the necessary steps for intercountry adoption within the United States, they were registered in the Russian State databank as prospective adoptive parents on 6 September 2012. 196.  On 6 September 2012 the US applicants obtained a referral to visit E.O. from the Ministry of Education of the Perm Region. They visited her twice a day between 6 and 12 September 2012. Each visit lasted approximately two hours. 197.  On 10 September 2012 the US applicants formally agreed to adopt E.O. They were not assisted by any adoption agencies. 199.  According to the US applicants, the adoption application had been finalised by 28 December 2012. However, the procedure was halted by the entry into force of Law no. 272-FZ. 200.  On 24 April 2013 the US applicants were informed that they had been removed from the State databank as prospective adoptive parents. 201.  According to the Government, E.O. has been adopted by a different adoptive family. According to the US applicants, her adoptive parents are not Russian nationals either, and in 2013 E.O. was taken to Ireland.\n(h)  Application no. 29197/13 202.  Application no. 29197/13 was lodged on 29 April 2013 by C.M.S., born on 27 February 1967 and who lives in New York, NY, United States (the US applicant), and A.N., who was born on 9 December 2011 and lives in St. Petersburg. 203.  At birth A.N.\u2019s umbilical cord was wrapped around his neck, which led to a number of complications. He suffers from congenital heart disease, open foramen oval; congenital renal disease, pyelectasis; mixed psychological development disorder and motor and speech development delay. 204.  The US applicant initiated the adoption procedure in early 2012. Having completed the necessary steps for intercountry adoption within the United States, the US applicant was registered in the Russian State databank as a prospective adoptive parent on 15 November 2012. The US applicant was assisted by the authorised adoption agency \u201cAdopt a Child Inc.\u201d. 205.  On 19 December 2012 the US applicant obtained a referral to visit A.N. from the Committee on Social Policy of the St Petersburg Administration. She visited him twice a day between 19 and 21 December 2012. Each visit lasted between an hour and an hour and a half. 207.  On 18 February 2013 an adoption application dated 9 January 2012 was submitted to the St. Petersburg City Court by D. acting on the basis of a power of attorney. 208.  On 19 February 2013 the St. Petersburg City Court returned the application without examination on the grounds that the power of attorney had been issued to D. as a private person whereas, pursuant to Article 4 \u00a7 4 of the Bilateral Agreement on Adoption, only authorised agencies were permitted to act as representatives. No appeal was lodged against the ruling. 209.  On 31 May 2013 the US applicant was informed that she had been removed from the State databank as a prospective adoptive parent. 210.  According to the Government, A.N. has been adopted by a different adoptive family.\n(i)  Application no. 32224/13 211.  Application no. 32224/13 was lodged on 13 May 2013 by R.K.B., born on 21 December 1969, and T.B., born on 7 December 1973, who live in Wetumpka, Alabama, United States (the US applicants), and V.B., who was born on 3 March 2012 and lives in Volgograd. 212.  V.B. suffers from a motor dysfunction, psychological development disorder, heart defects such as open oval window and lesion of the mitral valve, and had prenatal contact with hepatitis C. 213.  The US applicants have previously adopted a girl from Kazakhstan. In September 2011 they initiated the procedure to adopt another child from Russia. Having completed the necessary steps for intercountry adoption within the United States, they were registered in the Russian State databank as prospective adoptive parents on 27 June 2012. They were assisted by the authorised adoption agency \u201cChristian World Adoption Inc.\u201d. 214.  On 13 December 2012 the US applicants obtained a referral to visit V.B. from the Ministry of Education of the Volgograd Region. They visited her twice daily between 14 and 20 December 2012. Each visit lasted approximately two hours. 216.  The adoption application was never submitted to a court. According to the US applicants, the adoption procedure was halted by the entry into force of Law no. 272-FZ. 217.  On 30 January 2013 the US applicants were informed that they had been removed from the State databank as prospective adoptive parents. 218.  According to the Government, V.B. has been adopted by a different adoptive family.\n(j)  Application no. 32331/13 219.  Application no. 32331/13 was lodged on 16 May 2013 by D.M.L., born on 25 February 1972, and De.M.L., born on 7 November 1968, who live in Omaha, Nebraska, United States (the US applicants), and R.P., who was born on 19 February 2012 and lives in Vladivostok. 220.  R.P. was born prematurely. He suffers from prenatal encephalopathy of anoxic-ischemic genesis, a light anomaly in heart development in the form of an additional chord of the left heart ventricle, and narrowing of palpebral fissure. 221.  The US applicants initiated the adoption procedure in January 2012. Having completed the necessary steps for intercountry adoption within the United States, they were registered in the Russian State databank as prospective adoptive parents on 20 November 2012. They were assisted by the authorised adoption agency \u201cBeacon House Adoption Services, Inc.\u201d. 222.  On 17 December 2012 the US applicants obtained a referral to visit R.P. They visited him daily between 17 and 21 December 2012. Each visit lasted between an hour and an hour and a half. 223.  The US applicants formally agreed to adopt R.P. However, according to the Government, they had not signed the statement confirming that they had studied his medical file. Therefore, the subsequent steps set out in Government Decree no. 217 of 4 April 2002 prior to submission of an adoption application to a court were not taken. In particular, no confirmation was received from the State databank that the child was available for adoption. 225.  On 31 July 2013 the US applicants were removed from the State databank as prospective adoptive parents. 226.  On 31 October 2013 the US applicants filed a complaint against the Directorate of Education and Science of the Primorye Region and the Administration of the Primorye Region to the Leninskiy District Court of Vladivostok. They claimed that the defendants had prevented them from finalising the adoption procedure. 227.  On 5 November 2013 the complaint was returned without examination on the grounds of lack of territorial jurisdiction. 228.  On 18 November 2013 the US applicants\u2019 representative D. resubmitted the complaint to the Frunzenskiy District Court of Vladivostok. 229.  On 19 December 2013 the Frunzenskiy District Court of Vladivostok dismissed the complaint, having found that the US applicants\u2019 removal from the State databank as prospective adoptive parents was compliant with Law no. 272-FZ. The US applicants appealed. 231.  According to the Government, R.P. has been adopted by a different adoptive family.\n(k)  Application no. 32351/13 232.  Application no. 32351/13 was lodged on 16 May 2013 by J.F.B., born on 24 October 1966 and who lives in Boston, Massachusetts, United States (the US applicant), and M.I. who was born on 18 April 2011 and lives in Vsevolzhsk, the Leningrad Region. 233.  M.I. was born prematurely and suffers from speech and psychomotor development delay, internal hydrocephalus, and a congenital heart defect. 234.  The US applicant initiated the adoption procedure in July 2011. Having completed the necessary steps for intercountry adoption within the United States, she was registered in the Russian State databank as a prospective adoptive parent on 19 September 2012. The US applicant was assisted by the authorised adoption agency \u201cAdopt a Child Inc.\u201d. 235.  On 8 October 2012 the US applicant obtained a referral to visit M.I. She visited her every day between 8 and 12 October 2012. Each visit lasted between an hour and a half and two hours. 236.  On 9 October 2012 according to the US applicant and on 11 October 2012 according to the Government, the US applicant formally agreed to adopt M.I. 237.  On 19 December 2012 the US applicant submitted the adoption application to the Leningrad Regional Court. 238.  On 25 December 2012 the Leningrad Regional Court stayed the proceedings due to certain shortcomings in the documents submitted. In particular, on the certificate confirming that the US applicant had undergone the requisite training for prospective adoptive parents, her middle name was not indicated, causing the court to express doubts as to whether the certificate had actually been issued to her. In addition, the validity of the certificate confirming her living conditions had expired on 7 November 2012 and she therefore needed to renew it. Moreover, the application did not contain any information about M.I.\u2019s father and siblings, if any; the medical certificate detailing M.I.\u2019s state of health failed to include the opinions of certain doctors; information about the US applicant\u2019s income was not accurate; and a document corroborating the US applicant\u2019s housing rights was not attached. The court instructed the US applicant to rectify the shortcomings by 28 February 2013. According to the Government, the above decision was not appealed against and became final on 2 February 2013. 239.  On 17 January 2013 the Leningrad Regional Court discontinued the adoption proceedings and returned the application without examination on the grounds that, pursuant to Law no. 272-FZ, the US applicant did not have a right to adopt M.I. According to the US applicant, she appealed. It is not clear whether the appeal was examined. 240.  On 15 February 2013 the US applicant was removed from the State databank as a prospective adoptive parent. According to the Government, she was informed of this on 30 May 2013. According to the US applicant, she never received any information to this effect. 241.  According to the Government, M.I. has been adopted by a different adoptive family. According to the US applicant, M.I.\u2019s adoptive parents are not Russian nationals either.\n(l)  Application no. 32368/13 242.  Application no. 32368/13 was lodged on 16 May 2013 by L.A.P., born on 3 March 1966, and J.N.T., born on 5 August 1971, who live in Long Beach, NY, United States (the US applicants), and K.K., who was born on 24 August 2010 and lives in St. Petersburg. 243.  K.K. was abandoned at birth by her mother, who was a drug addict. She suffers from mixed psychological disorders and hypotrophy of the first degree. 244.  The US applicants initiated the adoption procedure in 2011. Having completed the necessary steps for intercountry adoption within the United States, they were registered in the Russian State databank as prospective adoptive parents on 16 August 2012. They were assisted by the authorised adoption agency \u201cNew Hope Christian Services\u201d. 245.  On 20 February 2012 the US applicants obtained a referral to visit K.K. from the Committee on Social Policy of the St Petersburg Administration. They visited her every day between 21 and 23 February 2012. Each visit lasted approximately two hours. 248.  On 12 November 2012 the St. Petersburg City Court stayed the proceedings on the grounds that certain documents were not enclosed and instructed the US applicants to submit them by 11 December 2012. At the US applicants\u2019 request, the deadline was subsequently extended to 15 January 2013. According to the US applicants, after the entry into force of the Bilateral Agreement on Adoption, they had to comply with additional requirements introduced by the Agreement. Later they also had to provide proof that their house had not been affected by Hurricane Sandy, which hit the north-eastern United States in October 2012. 249.  On 15 January 2013 the St. Petersburg City Court returned the application without examination on the grounds that the additional documents submitted by the applicants were not complete. In particular, the section of the report on the US applicants\u2019 living conditions containing the date and signature had not been translated. A photograph of the child\u2019s room was not informative. Moreover, there were no photographs of the US applicants with K.K., and a document confirming that the US applicants had undergone the requisite training for prospective adoptive parents had not been enclosed. No appeal was lodged against this ruling. 251.  On 23 May 2013 St. Petersburg City Court returned the application without examination on the grounds that it had been submitted by a private person acting on the US applicants\u2019 behalf, whereas pursuant to virtue of Article 4 \u00a7 4 of the Bilateral Agreement on Adoption it could only be submitted by an authorised agency. The US applicants appealed. 252.  On 20 June 2013 St. Petersburg City Court returned the appeal statement without examination, making reference to Law no. 272-FZ. 253.  On 31 May 2013 the US applicants were informed that they had been removed from the State databank as prospective adoptive parents. 254.  According to the Government, K.K. has been adopted by a different adoptive family.\n(m)  Application no. 37173/13 255.  Application no. 37173/13 was lodged on 7 June 2013 by J.W.H., born on 29 July 1981, A.M.H., born on 18 March 1969 (the US applicants) and G.N.Y.H., born on 3 December 2008, who live in Smartsville, California, United States, and V.B., who was born on 14 November 2001 and lives in Prokopyevsk. 256.  V.B. suffers from light mental development delay, light speech development delay and a mixed form of dysgraphia and dyslexia. 257.  On 5 July 2010 the US applicants adopted the third applicant, G.N.Y.H. As a result of what appears to be a clerical mistake, the information about her siblings had not been included in the State databank. 258.  According to the Government, the information regarding G.N.Y.H.\u2019s brother, V.B., had been included in G.N.Y.H.\u2019s file, however, and the US applicants had studied this in March 2010. 259.  In the decision of the Kemerovo Region Court of 5 July 2010 on G.N.Y.H.\u2019s adoption it was stated that although G.N.Y.H. had an elder brother, V.B., the court considered it possible for G.N.Y.H. to be adopted alone because the children were being placed in different institutions, their family relations had been interrupted, and the adoption was in the interests of G.N.Y.H. 260.  According to the US applicants, having learned that G.N.Y.H. had a brother, they started corresponding with V.B. and sent him letters, photos and parcels. They also started making enquiries with a view to adopting V.B. as well. In a letter of 29 April 2011 the prosecutor\u2019s office of the Kemerovo Region advised the US applicants that, as they had been registered as the prospective adoptive parents in respect of one particular child, they would have to reapply to the competent authorities and resubmit documents amended accordingly should they wish to adopt another child. In a letter of 15 June 2011 the same prosecutor\u2019s office acknowledged that the information on G.N.Y.H.\u2019s siblings had not been included in the State databank as a result of a clerical mistake. It noted, however, that the information about V.B. had been included in G.N.Y.H.\u2019s personal file, which the US applicants had studied on 24 March 2010. The prosecutor\u2019s office also confirmed that V.B. was available for adoption and that it was open to the US applicants to apply to the competent authorities for his adoption. The US applicants then initiated the adoption procedure. 261.  On 12 May 2012 \u201cHand in Hand\u201d, an authorised adoption agency acting on behalf of the US applicants, filed an application for V.B.\u2019s adoption with the Directorate of Education and Science of the Kemerovo Region. On the same date the US applicants were registered in the State databank as prospective adoptive parents. 262.  According to the Government, the US applicants had initially intended to visit V.B. in June 2012, but they asked if they might change the dates of their visit to October 2012. However, they did not reapply for a later visit. Accordingly, they were never issued with a referral to visit V.B. and never met him. 263.   According to the US applicants, at the relevant time they had also applied to adopt another child from Russia, X., and they had accepted a referral to visit her in June 2012. They then also received a referral to visit V.B. in June 2012. Although they were willing to meet both children, they were advised that it was necessary to finalise the adoption of X. first. Accordingly, they asked for permission to visit V.B. in October 2012. However, they were subsequently advised that in July 2012 the regional authorities had banned the adoption of children by US nationals following an incident of ill-treatment of a child from the Kemerovo Region by his adoptive parents from the United States. 264.  In December 2012, when the US applicants went to Russia to finalise the adoption of X., they learned that the regional ban on adoption of children by US nationals had been lifted. However, the US applicants were unable to proceed with the adoption of V.B. due to the entry into force of the Law no. 272-FZ. 266.  Application no. 38490/13 was lodged on 12 June 2013 by A.B., born on 24 July 1964 and who lives in Bellevue, Nebraska[8], United States (the US applicant), and Ye.L., who was born on 23 July 2009 and lives in Novosibirsk. 267.  Ye.L. was born prematurely. He suffers from hearing loss, speech development delay and respiratory ailments. 268.  The US applicant initiated the adoption procedure in 2008. As the adoption agency\u2019s licence was later revoked, she had to restart the procedure in 2011. Having completed the necessary steps for intercountry adoption within the United States, the US applicant was registered in the Russian State databank as a prospective adoptive parent on 25 June 2012. 269.  On 19 July 2012 the US applicant obtained a referral to visit Ye.L. She visited him on four consecutive days in July 2012. 271.  According to the US applicant, preparation of an adoption file took more time after the entry into force of the Bilateral Agreement on Adoption, which stipulated a number of additional requirements. The adoption application was ultimately not submitted to a court due to the entry into force of Law no. 272-FZ. 272.  On 10 June 2013 the US applicant was informed that she had been removed from the State databank as a prospective adoptive parent. 273.  According to the Government, Ye.L. has been placed with a foster family.\n(o)  Application no. 42340/13 274.  Application no. 42340/13 was lodged on 30 June 2013 by M.B., born on 28 December 1966, and D.B., born on 9 November 1968, who live in Alabaster, Alabama, United States (the US applicants), and K.S., who was born on 29 November 2005 and lives in St. Petersburg. 275.  K.S. suffers from psychological development delay, atopic dermatitis, planovalgus deformity and a phonematic disorder. 276.  Between 13 December 2010 and 17 January 2011 K.S. stayed at the US applicants\u2019 home as a part of the orphan-hosting programme \u201cNew Horizons for Children\u201d. 277.   As soon as K.S. had left, the US applicants started making enquiries about adoption. In March 2011 they started the adoption procedure. 278.  On 20 February 2012 the US applicants were registered in the State databank as prospective adoptive parents. 279.  After 2011, the US applicants met with K.S. on three occasions. Each time they came to St. Petersburg for a week and visited K.S. daily. Each visit lasted from two to three hours. 280.  According to the Government, on 13 December 2011 the US applicants submitted the application for K.S.\u2019s adoption to the St. Petersburg City Court. As certain documents were not enclosed, the proceedings were stayed and the US applicants were instructed to submit the documents requested by 10 January 2012. The term was then extended to 9 February 2012. As the US applicants failed to submit the documents, on the latter date the adoption application was returned to them without examination. No appeal was lodged against this ruling. 281.  According to the US applicants, in November-December 2011 and February-March 2012 they had travelled to Russia as they wished to adopt K.S. and her younger brother. It transpired that they were unable to go ahead with the adoption because, although K.S.\u2019s mother\u2019s parental rights had been revoked, the revocation of her father\u2019s parental rights was pending but not yet finalised. This issue was resolved in March 2012. However, in April 2012 the US applicants were informed that K.S.\u2019s biological mother had had a baby girl, and that K.S. thus had two siblings. In May 2012 they amended the adoption file so as to apply for adoption of three children: K.S. and both her brother and sister. In September 2012 they were obliged to comply with additional requirements introduced by the Bilateral Agreement on Adoption, which included additional training courses. The adoption procedure was ultimately halted by the entry into force of Law no. 272-FZ. 282.  According to the Government, K.S. is still available for adoption, and the competent authorities provide prospective adoptive parents looking for a child with information about her.\n(p)  Application no. 42403/13 283.  Application no. 42403/13 was lodged on 30 June 2013 by M.M., born on 20 September 1974, and J.M., born on 9 August 1976, who live in Westminster, MD, United States (the US applicants), A.M., who was born on 11 June 2002 and lives in Furmanov, the Ivanovo Region, and D.T., who was born on 22 October 2002 and lives in Kineshma, the Ivanovo Region. 284.  A.M. and D.T. are not related. Their parents have been stripped of parental rights. D.T. suffers from mitral heart prolapse, residual encephalopathy, mixed disorder of psychological development and gallbladder anomaly. A.M. had been adopted at the age of five years old but was then returned to the orphanage. She suffers from a mixed disorder of psychological development and light myopia. 285.  The US applicants initiated the adoption procedure in 2011. Having completed the necessary steps for intercountry adoption within the United States, they were registered in the Russian State databank as prospective adoptive parents on 11 April 2012. They were assisted by the authorised adoption agency \u201cHand in Hand\u201d. 286.  On 13 September 2012 the US applicants obtained a referral to visit both A.M. and D.T. from the Department of Social Security of the Ivanovo Region so as to choose between the two girls. They visited D.T. twice and A.M. three times in September 2012 and eventually decided to adopt both girls. 287.  On 27 September 2012 the US applicants formally agreed to adopt A.M. and D.T. According to the US applicants, A.M. and D.T. met and bonded. 289.  On 6 November 2012 the Ivanovo Regional Court stayed the proceedings on the grounds that certain documents, such as confirmation of the US applicants\u2019 registration in the State databank and the girls\u2019 entry permits for the United States, were not enclosed. It instructed the US applicants to submit the documents requested by 27 November 2012. 291.  On 4 December 2012 the Ivanovo Regional Court returned the adoption application without examination on the grounds that the US applicants had failed to provide the documents requested. 293.  On 18 December 2012 the Ivanovo Regional Court stayed the proceedings on the grounds that some of the enclosed documents did not satisfy the procedural requirements. In particular, (i) although the US applicants had submitted a property certificate concerning a plot of land, it did not provide sufficient information about their dwelling; (ii) the attestation of the US applicants\u2019 suitability to become adoptive parents had been issued more than a year previously and was therefore outdated; and (iii) medical opinion concerning the US applicants\u2019 state of health did not satisfy the Ministry of Health requirements. The US applicants were instructed to rectify these shortcomings by 10 January 2013. 294.  On 9 January 2013 the Ivanovo Regional Court rejected the application on the grounds that, pursuant to Law no. 272-FZ, the US applicants did not have a right to adopt A.M. and D.T. The US applicants appealed. 295.  On 4 February 2013 the Ivanovo Regional Court upheld the ruling of 9 January 2013 on appeal. The US applicants lodged an appeal on points of law. 296.  On 17 April 2013 the Presidium of the Ivanovo Regional Court rejected the appeal on points of law. 297.  On 25 April 2013 the US applicants were informed that they had been removed from the State databank as prospective adoptive parents. 298.  According to the Government, A.M. is still available for adoption, and the competent authorities provide prospective adoptive parents looking for a child with information about them. D.T. has been placed with a foster family.", "references": ["0", "9", "6", "3", "1", "5", "7", "2", "No Label", "8", "4"], "gold": ["8", "4"]}
+{"input": "5.  The first and second applicants were born in 1984 and 1982 respectively and live in Vienna. The third applicant was born in 1972 and lives in Switzerland. 6.  The following summary of the background of the case and the events in Austria is based on the submissions by the applicants. The account of the investigation in Austria is based on the submissions by both parties. 7.  The applicants are all nationals of the Philippines. The first and third applicants were recruited in 2006 and 2009 respectively by an employment agency in Manila to work as maids or au pairs in Dubai (United Arab Emirates). The second applicant travelled to Dubai in December 2008 for the same purpose, at the suggestion of the first applicant, not via an agency. All of the applicants had their passports taken away by their employers. During the course of their work in Dubai, they allege that they were subjected to ill-treatment and exploitation by their employers, who also failed to pay them their agreed wages and forced them to work extremely long hours, under the threat of further ill-treatment. 8.   In late 2006 the first applicant contacted an agency in Manila in order to find a job abroad. She is a single mother with one daughter who was eight months old at the time. She signed a contract in which she agreed to work for a family in Dubai for two years, from December 2006 until December 2008. The contract also stipulated that she would be paid 700 United Arab Emirates dirhams (AED \u2013 approximately 150 euros (EUR) at that time) per month to work for eight hours each working day. Upon her arrival in Dubai the first applicant was taken to her employers, who were two sisters or sisters-in-law sharing one large residence with their families. One of them took possession of her passport. 9.  For most of the initial two-year contract the first applicant was not subjected to physical abuse or direct threats of harm by her employers, and she was paid regularly. However, she had to work from 5 a.m. to midnight throughout the initial two-year period. Her duties included looking after her employers\u2019 children, preparing meals, cleaning the house, doing the laundry and numerous other jobs around the house and garden. During the first nine months she was required to perform this work seven days per week without a single day off, and was not allowed to leave the house unsupervised. She was not allowed to have her own telephone and was only allowed to call her family in the Philippines once a month, the costs of these calls being deducted from her wages. Further, the first applicant was forbidden from speaking to any of the other workers from the Philippines in their native language. She was constantly hungry, as she was generally only given the family\u2019s leftover food. Only when she accompanied the family to the supermarket approximately once a month was she allowed to buy some basic food for herself. 10.  After approximately nine months, the first applicant faced the first punishments by her employers. She was forced to sleep on the floor when they found out that she had been talking to another employee from the Philippines in their native language. When she became ill after sleeping on the cold floor, her employers prevented her from buying medicine or contacting a doctor; instead, she had to continue working the same hours. 11.  Towards the end of her two-year contract, the first applicant\u2019s employers informed her that they wished her to stay, and offered her better pay, more days off and a telephone of her own, as well as permission to visit her family, provided that she recruited someone to take over her job while she was away. The first applicant finally agreed to extend her contract and returned to the Philippines for three months. Owing to the incentives and the prospect of improved working conditions, she asked the second applicant to take over her role in Dubai during the time she was away. 12.  While the first applicant was in the Philippines, she received threats from her employers that if she did not return to Dubai to work, she would be banned from ever going back there, and the second applicant would be subjected to ill-treatment. The first applicant therefore returned to Dubai in April 2009. 13.  After she returned to Dubai, she was taught how to drive. After she failed her first driving test, she was forced to pay for further lessons and tests out of her own salary, with four further driving tests costing AED 700 each, a month\u2019s salary. While she was driving, one of her employers hit her on the shoulder on a number of occasions to force her to speed up. The employer also started to slap or hit her regularly for no or little reason. She also repeatedly threatened to let her husband hit the first applicant if she did not follow her orders or made any mistakes. 14.  The first applicant accompanied her employers on trips to Europe, Australia, Singapore and Oman, where she spent significant amounts of time locked up in hotel rooms or under the close supervision of her employers. She only had to visit one embassy in person to obtain entry documents, and that was in relation to a trip to London, at which time she was ordered by her employers to lie about her work conditions. When they arrived in London, the first applicant was not allowed at any time to leave the apartment in which they were staying. 15.  The second applicant was married with three young children in the Philippines. Her husband had no regular work. Because she expected better pay in Dubai, she agreed to work for the same employers as the first applicant. The employers in Dubai arranged a visiting visa for her, under false pretences. As a result of this arrangement, the second applicant did not approach the employment agency in the Philippines and did not have a written contract with her employers. Her understanding was that she would get AED 700 per month, which would be paid directly to her family in the Philippines. 16.  In December 2008 the second applicant started to work in Dubai. After the first applicant returned to the Philippines for three months in January 2009 (see paragraph 11 above), the employers significantly changed their conduct towards the second applicant. They threatened not to pay her family if she made any mistakes. They refused to let her leave Dubai, including by refusing to return her passport and ordering her to repay them her travel costs and related expenses. They also told her that she would be put in prison if she ran away or went to the authorities in Dubai for help. They physically and emotionally abused her, and there was one incident when one of her employers struck her across the shoulder using significant force. She was also forced to work from around 5 or 6 a.m. until midnight or 1 a.m. the following day. 17.  Between April 2009 and June 2010 the violent and threatening behaviour of the employers increased. The second applicant was punched by one of her employers on one occasion, and in another incident the employer aimed a hard slap at her face, but instead struck her across the shoulder. 18.  The third applicant\u2019s family were desperate for money to pay for crucial medical treatment for her brother. Therefore, in 2009 she contacted an employment agency in the Philippines and was offered work as a maid in Dubai. She was informed that she would be earning between AED 800 and 1,000 (approximately EUR 160 to 200 at that time) per month, roughly twice her salary in the Philippines. Upon her arrival in Dubai in 2009 she had to hand over her passport and mobile phone to someone supposedly working for the employment agency. She was told that these items would be returned to her when she finished her work in Dubai. 19.  The third applicant was working for a family member of the first and second applicants\u2019 employers. The applicants got to know each other, as the two families met every Friday. They secretly shared their experiences on these occasions. 20.  The third applicant was also bound by working hours going from 6 a.m. to midnight. Her employer forced her to clean her car in the sun and in unbearable heat, and she was prohibited from going to the toilet without letting her employer know. She was only allowed to call her family in the Philippines once a month, and only in the presence of her employer. She did not receive any remuneration at all for the first three months of her employment. Afterwards, she only received approximately AED 750 per month, less than what had been agreed. On one occasion she was slapped by her employer, and on a different occasion she witnessed another employee being hit over the head. 21.  When the third applicant told her employer that she wished to return to the Philippines, she was told that she would have to pay the cost of the flight and the agency fees, which her employer knew she could not afford at that point. Her employer also made it clear that, in any event, her passport would not be returned to her until she had completed at least nine months of work in Dubai. Subsequently, the third applicant was too scared to ask to leave Dubai again, owing to her fear that her employer would take her earnings from her or refuse to return her passport for an even longer period. 22.  On 2 July 2010 the applicants\u2019 employers took them along on a short holiday trip to Austria. The applicants all stayed at the same hotel in the city centre of Vienna. The applicants slept in their own, separate apartment together with the female children. The male children slept in the same apartment as their parents. As in Dubai, the applicants had to take care of all of the employers\u2019 children and perform numerous other domestic duties. They were still required to work from approximately 5 or 6 a.m. until midnight or even later. The third applicant was regularly shouted at by her employer, for example if she failed to get all the children ready early every morning. In addition, their employers woke the first applicant up at around 2 a.m. and forced her to cook food for them. Furthermore, the first applicant was forced to carry the employers\u2019 twenty suitcases into the hotel by herself. While the applicants were in Austria, their passports remained with their employers. In the hotel in Vienna in which the applicants were staying, they became acquainted with N., an employee at the hotel who could speak Tagalog, the first applicant\u2019s mother tongue. 23.  When the applicants accompanied their employers to a zoo one or two days after their arrival in Austria, one of the children went missing for some time. One of the employers started screaming at the first and third applicants in a manner which the applicants had not experienced before. The first applicant found the level of verbal abuse extreme, and this was a particularly distressing and humiliating experience for her. The employer threatened to beat the third applicant, and said that \u201csomething bad\u201d would happen to her if the child was not found safe and well. By this stage, the third applicant had formed the impression that this employer, of whom she lived in a constant state of fear, was a dangerous person who might try to hurt her very badly. She had the feeling that the violence towards her was likely to escalate at any time. Therefore, she believed that something bad was going to happen to her if she remained with the family. Similarly, the first applicant believed that they could not live with their conditions of work any longer, and did not want to risk waiting to see what happened if they travelled with their employers from Vienna to London, as they were scheduled to do. The applicants therefore decided to speak to N., the Tagalog-speaking employee at the hotel, to see whether she could help them. 24.  The night following the incident \u2013 that is, two or three days after their arrival in Austria \u2013 the applicants left the hotel with the help of N., who had organised a car to pick them up in a side street near the hotel and take them to a \u201csafe place\u201d. The applicants subsequently found support within the local Filipino community in Vienna. 25.  In April or May 2011, approximately nine months after they had left their employers, the applicants contacted a local NGO called \u201cLEF\u00d6\u201d for assistance in reporting their ill-treatment, abuse and exploitation to the police. LEF\u00d6 is actively involved in the fight against trafficking in human beings in Austria. It is financed though government funds, in particular for the provision of assistance to victims of trafficking. In July 2011 the applicants decided to turn to the Austrian police and filed a criminal complaint (Strafanzeige) against their employers. They explained that they had been the victims of human trafficking. On 11 and 21 July and 17 August 2011, accompanied by representatives of LEF\u00d6, they were interviewed at length by officers from the Office to Combat Human Trafficking (B\u00fcro f\u00fcr Bek\u00e4mpfung des Menschenhandels) at the Federal Office of Criminal Investigations (Bundeskriminalamt). In their report, the officers concluded that the offences had been committed abroad. 26.  The applicants were informed that their employers had also made allegations about their conduct, alleging, inter alia, that they had stolen money and a mobile phone from them when they had fled the hotel. Those allegations were subsequently formally recognised by the Austrian authorities as false. The applicants all expressed their willingness to actively cooperate with the authorities and to engage in criminal proceedings against their employers. 27.  On 4 November 2011 the Vienna public prosecutor\u2019s office (Staatsanwaltschaft Wien) discontinued the proceedings under Article 104a of the Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe CC\u201d) relating to human trafficking (see paragraph 35 below), pursuant to Article 190 \u00a7 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Strafprozessordnung \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe CCP\u201d \u2013 see paragraph 36 below). On 14 November 2011 the public prosecutor gave a short written decision with reasons for the discontinuation of the proceedings. In the public prosecutor\u2019s view, the offence had been committed abroad by non-nationals, and did not engage Austrian interests within the meaning of Article 64 \u00a7 1 (4) of the CC. 28.  On 30 November 2011 the applicants lodged an application to continue the investigation (Fortsetzungsantrag) with the Vienna Regional Criminal Court (Straflandesgericht Wien). They submitted that Austrian interests had indeed been engaged, and that their employers had continued to exploit and abuse them in Austria. In their view, the elements of the crime punishable under Article 104a \u00a7 1 (2) of the CC had been present. 29.  The Vienna public prosecutor\u2019s office then submitted a statement to the Vienna Regional Criminal Court, specifying its reasons for discontinuing the investigation. There had been no indication in the case file that any of the criminal actions exhaustively listed in Article 104a of the CC had occurred in Austria, particularly since the offence had already been completed in Dubai (zumal das Delikt bereits in Dubai vollendet wurde), and the accused were not Austrian citizens. Furthermore, from the applicants\u2019 statements (looking after children, washing laundry, cooking food), it did not appear that they had been exploited in Austria, especially since they had managed to leave their employers only two to three days after their arrival in Vienna. 30.  On 16 March 2012 the Vienna Regional Criminal Court dismissed the applicants\u2019 application. The relevant parts of the decision read (translation from German):\n\u201cThe decision to discontinue [criminal proceedings] requires \u2013 by implication \u2013 that the facts of a case are sufficiently clear, or a lack of indication that investigations would be promising.\nThere is no reason for further prosecution if, on the basis of the ... results of the investigation, a conviction is no more likely than an acquittal ...\nAccording to Article 64 \u00a7 1 (4) of the CC, if Austrian interests have been harmed by the offence or the perpetrator cannot be extradited, Austrian criminal laws apply independently of the criminal laws of the place where the crime was committed, for example in relation to the offence of kidnapping for ransom under Article 104a of the CC. Owing to the fact that the applicants spent approximately three days in Vienna, the conditions regarding the fulfilment of the elements of the crime under Article 104a \u00a7 1 (2) of the CC have not been met, since the relevant acts relating to the exploitation of labour must be committed over a longer period of time; therefore, the commission of the offence in Austria is ruled out.\nThe jurisdiction of the Austrian criminal-law enforcement authorities cannot be deduced from Article 64 \u00a7 1 (4) of the CC either.\nAustrian interests are engaged if either the victim or the perpetrator is an Austrian citizen, or if the criminal acts have a concrete connection to Austria, or if an obligation arises under international law in relation to the prosecution of certain offences. Austrian interests are, in any event, engaged if a criminal offence under Articles 102, 103, 104 or 217 of the CC is committed against an Austrian citizen, or if Austrian funds or Austrian securities (Wertpapiere) are the subject of offences under Article 232, or Article 237 in conjunction with Article 232, of the CC.\nThe applicants\u2019 argument that the elements of the crime under Article 104a of the CC had also been fulfilled in Austria therefore fails, and the plea that the alleged criminal actions against them by their employers in Dubai ... would lead to an obligation on the part of Austria under international law is likewise not convincing. In relation to the present case, [this latter argument] also cannot be inferred from the quoted [Supreme Court] judgment no. 11 Os 161/81, which affirmed that Austrian interests had been damaged as a result of the import into Austria of a large amount of narcotics for transport...\u201d\nThis decision was served on the applicants\u2019 counsel on 23 March 2012. 31.  In January 2013 two of the three applicants lodged a civil claim against their employers with the Vienna Labour and Social Court (Arbeits\u2011und Sozialgericht) in order to claim their wages. However, they alleged that because of the high risk of having to pay the costs of the proceedings because the employers did not reside in Austria, they withdrew the action. 32.   The NGO LEF\u00d6 not only assisted the applicants in filing a criminal complaint against their employers, but also supported them in applying for a special residence permit in Austria for victims of human trafficking, under the former section 69a of the Residence Act (Niederlassungs- und Aufenthaltsgesetz \u2013 see paragraph 46 below). 33.  All three applicants were granted a residence permit for special protection purposes in January 2012, valid for one year initially. Subsequently, because of their progressing integration, they were granted other types of residence permits with longer periods of validity. 34.  The applicants were officially registered in the Central Register (Melderegister) from the point when LEF\u00d6 started supporting them. A personal data disclosure ban was enacted on the Central Register for their protection, so that their whereabouts would not be traceable by the general public.", "references": ["8", "4", "6", "1", "5", "7", "3", "0", "9", "2", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Toru\u0144. 6.  He is a publicist and a professor of sociology. 7.  On 13 March 2007 the applicant was interviewed on the telephone by M.Z., a journalist from Rzeczpospolita, a national daily newspaper, on the subject of lustration of journalists which at that time was widely commented on in the media. The transcript of that interview was sent to the applicant by email. The applicant sent the text back with some minor corrections. 8.  On 14 March 2007 the newspaper published the applicant\u2019s opinion. It was titled \u201cJournalists under autohypnosis\u201d (\u201c\u017burnalisci pod wplywem autohipnozy\u201d) and included the following paragraph:\n\u201cSome people easily reach for personal arguments. The Gazeta Wyborcza journalist S.B., in a conversation with me stated: professor Zybertowicz speaks now, although during the communist times he was quiet. This is classic. A.M. repeatedly said: I spent so many years in prison, so now I am right. Unfortunately, moral integrity in one situation does not automatically indicate a complete cognitive judgment in another situation.\u201d (\u201cNiekt\u00f3rzy z \u0142atwo\u015bci\u0105 si\u0119gaj\u0105 w niej po argumenty personalne. Dziennikarz \u201eGazety Wyborczej\u201d S.B. w dyskusji ze mna oznajmi\u0142: prof. Zybertowicz teraz zabiera glos, cho\u0107 za komuny siedzia\u0142 cicho. To ju\u017c klasyka. A.M. wielokrotnie powtarza\u0142: ja tyle lat siedzia\u0142em w wi\u0119zieniu, to teraz mam racje. Niestety, z ewentualnej prawo\u015bci moralnej w jednej sytuacji nie wynika automatycznie zdolno\u015b\u0107 do kompletnej oceny poznawczej w innej\u201d)\nThe text was published in a column: \u2018polemic/discussion/analysis\u2019. 9.  On 26 and 27 March 2007 a legal representative of A.M., an editor-in chief of Gazeta Wyborcza, one of the biggest daily newspapers, sent a legal letter to the applicant, offering to settle the issue amicably provided that the applicant published a relevant apology. He referred to the phrase: \u201cThis is classic. A.M. repeatedly said: I spent so many years in prison, so now I am right\u201d 10.  The applicant refused the request and published the letter in Rzeczpospolita on 10 April 2007. 11.  On 30 April 2007, A.M., brought a civil action in the Warsaw Regional Court (S\u0105d Okr\u0119gowy) requesting legal protection of his personal rights. He requested that the applicant be ordered to publish an apology and to pay damages of 15,000 Polish zlotys (PLN) (approximately 3,570 euros (EUR)) to a charity. 12.  On 17 December 2007 the Warsaw Regional Court allowed the plaintiff\u2019s claim. It ordered the applicant to publish an apology on the first, second or third page of Rzeczpospolita for publishing untrue information. It further determined the exact length of the apology (not smaller than 10 x 15 cm) and ordered the applicant to pay PLN 10,000 (approximately EUR 2,380) to a charity and PLN 1,500 (approximately EUR 357) in court fees. 13.  During the proceedings the court questioned the applicant, the plaintiff and the journalist M.Z. The court did not take into consideration two private expert opinions on language analysis provided by the applicant and A.M. The court further stressed that while the parties\u2019 representatives had questioned these opinions they had not asked for a court-appointed expert on linguistics nor requested that their experts be heard by the court as witnesses. The court did not find any basis to appoint an expert of its own motion. 14.  The Warsaw Regional Court considered that the phrase \u201cA.M. repeatedly said: I spent so many years in prison, so now I am right\u201d was a statement of fact, given that it was a phrase allegedly used many times by A.M. However, it had not been proved that A.M. had ever used the above words. 15.  The applicant claimed before the court that the phrase used in the interview was an acceptable journalistic summary of A.M.\u2019s opinions and his set of views demonstrated during numerous public appearances. According to the applicant, it was possible to summarise one\u2019s way of thinking. He further confirmed that he was not aware of any public speech given by A.M. which included the phrase in question. However, the phrase was not a direct quote, since it was not in quotation marks. It was a reconstruction, interpretation and paraphrase, demonstrating A.M.\u2019s mindset. He submitted examples of numerous public statements made by A.M. between 1982 and 2007, in which A.M. had referred to his stay in prison during the communist-era. 16.  The court considered that even though the phrase was not in quotation marks, it was a direct quote, since there was a colon, thus: \u201cA.M. repeatedly said: ...\u201d. The court referred to the Polish language dictionary of 1996 according to which a colon was used in particular to introduce direct quotations such as in the present case. Since A.M. had never used these exact words this information was untrue and had breached his personal rights. The court further went on to examine whether the statement could have been treated as an acceptable paraphrase, and considered, referring to the same Polish dictionary, that it was not possible to paraphrase a set of moral views. In conclusion the court held that A.M.\u2019s personal rights had been breached because the applicant had failed to prove that he was acting within the existing legal order. 17.  On the applicant\u2019s appeal, on 15 October 2008 the Warsaw Court of Appeal (S\u0105d Apelacyjny) upheld the first-instance judgment and ordered the applicant to pay PLN 1,170 (approximately EUR 278) in court fees for the proceedings before the second-instance court. The court agreed with the reasoning presented by the Regional Court. It considered that the use of the colon, as in \u201cA.M. repeatedly said: ...\u201d would indicate the factual nature of the phrase. This view was made with reference to general knowledge and did not need any special information. It further held that this phrase could not be considered to be a \u201cparaphrase\u201d. However, as no expert opinion on linguistics was obtained, further reflections on this issue were pointless. 18.  The court further examined numerous quotes from A.M.\u2019s public appearances, and established that in none of those statements A.M. had used the exact phrase attributed to him.   Consequently, the court considered that the phrase used by the applicant had breached the plaintiff\u2019s personal rights, in particular his credibility, reputation and good name, showing him as petty-minded. In view of the plaintiff\u2019s professional situation, it impeded him from practising his profession and damaged his position as editor-in-chief of one of the biggest daily newspapers. 19.  The applicant lodged a cassation appeal. In particular, he referred to Article 10 of the Convention, and pointed out that the Court of Appeal had failed to obtain an expert opinion on linguistics. 20.  On 25 February 2010 the Supreme Court (S\u0105d Najwy\u017cszy) dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. The court referred to the reasons given by the lower courts. It further confirmed that while under Article 232 of the Civil Procedure Code (\u201cCCP\u201d) a court might obtain evidence of its own motion, such situations were exceptional. In the present case it had not been necessary to order an opinion from an expert on linguistics. As correctly noted by the Court of Appeal the decisive factor for interpretation was the understanding of an average reader. The newspaper Rzeczpospolita was addressed to a wide group of recipients and therefore these articles should have been interpreted according to widely acceptable interpretation rules. Lastly, the court explained that the phrase in question had not ceased to be informative with reference to the personality of the parties. Furthermore, it could not have been perceived differently, because it had been made in the context of a public debate on lustration of journalists. The way an article was perceived depended on the choice of words rather than its political context or publication in a particular column. The Supreme Court also ordered the applicant to pay PLN 270 (approximately EUR 64) in court fees for the appeal proceedings. 21.  The applicant paid PLN 10,000 (approximately EUR 2,380) to a charity in October 2008. At the same time he also arranged for the publication of an apology in Rzeczpospolita, for which he paid PLN 3,502.62 (approximately EUR 900). 22.  During the proceedings against the applicant, several thousand people signed a letter titled \u2018Defending freedom of expression\u2019, which was handed to the Ombudsman on 21 November 2008. They argued that a publicist had a right to express this type of opinion about other participants in a public debate. 23.  In reply, on 26 November 2008 a group of Polish intellectuals published a letter, titled \u2018Against lies\u2019, in which they stressed that freedom of expression had limits, in particular the other person\u2019s right to dignity and good name. Therefore, in their opinion, spreading untrue information was not protected by any law.", "references": ["0", "1", "5", "2", "4", "7", "8", "9", "3", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1973 and lives in Ceske Budejovice (Czech Republic). 5.  On 26 August 1998 the Wels Regional Court (Landesgericht) issued an arrest warrant against the applicant, as he was suspected, inter alia, of having committed aggravated fraud on a commercial basis in several countries together with numerous other suspects, and of being a member of a criminal organization. 6.  On 12 September 1998 the applicant was arrested in Germany and extradited to Austria on an unspecified date. He remained in detention on remand until 23 July 1999. 7.  On 14 January 1999 the Wels Public Prosecutor\u2019s Office (Staatsanwaltschaft) filed a bill of indictment against the applicant. The applicant\u2019s objection against it was dismissed by the Linz Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht) on 26 March 1999. 8.  On 13 January 2003 the applicant filed a request under section 91 of the Courts Act (Gerichtsorganisationsgesetz) for the setting of a time-limit (Fristsetzungsantrag) in order to accelerate the proceedings. Thereupon, the Wels Regional Court held a first hearing on 25 March 2003. 9.  On 29 October 2003 the court decided to separate the proceedings against the applicant from those against the other accused. 10.  On 9 December 2003 the applicant requested that the trial against him be resumed. An oral hearing was held on 5 May 2004. 11.  In March and July 2004 the applicant filed further requests under section 91 of the Courts Act. 12.  On 6 December 2004 the applicant lodged an application with the Court (no. 127/05), complaining under Article 6 of the Convention about the length of the criminal proceedings against him. On 9 June 2008 the applicant and the Government agreed on a friendly settlement of that case against a payment of 12,300 euros (EUR) by the Government. Consequently, the Court decided to strike application no. 127/05 out of its list of cases (see Benes v. Austria (dec.) no. 127/05, 8 July 2008). 13.  On 4 September 2008, following the issuance of the above\u2011mentioned strike-out decision, the applicant requested the Wels Regional Court to discontinue the proceedings against him, or in the alternative to set a new date for a hearing as soon as possible. 14.  On 15 April 2009 the Wels Regional Court held another oral hearing. The applicant failed to attend because he had fallen ill. During that hearing, the public prosecutor lodged the request that another expert opinion be obtained, to which the Wels Regional Court acceded. 15.  The following oral hearing was set for 21 October 2009, but was cancelled because the court-appointed expert had informed the court that he would need three to five more weeks to finalise his opinion. Following an urgent reminder which the Wels Regional Court had sent to the expert, it learned on 18 October 2010 that the expert had passed away. On 1 September 2011 a new expert was appointed. 16.  On 1 September 2011, 17 November 2011 and 13 December 2012, the applicant filed further requests under section 91 of the Courts Act, which were dismissed by the Linz Court of Appeal on 7 November 2011, 1 February 2012 and 2 January 2013 respectively. In its last decision, the Court of Appeal observed that the expert opinion had been finalised and submitted to the trial court on 19 December 2012. 17.  On 28 May 2013 the Wels Regional Court acquitted the applicant from all charges, partly because his guilt could not be proven, partly because the public prosecutor had withdrawn the indictment.", "references": ["0", "9", "6", "7", "4", "1", "5", "8", "2", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicants, Mr Ramaz Tsartsidze, Mr Samvel Bozoyani, Mr Mamuka Gelashvili (applicants nos. 1-3, case no. 1); Mr Alexander Mikirtumov, Mr Binali Aliev (applicants nos. 4-5, case no. 2); Mr Gia Dzamukov, Mr Vladimer Gabunia (applicants nos. 6-7, case no. 3); Mr Boris Gogoladze, Ms Anastasia Tvaradze, Ms Madona Kapanadze (applicants nos. 8-10, case no. 4); and Mr Jimsher Gogelashvili, Mr George Kurua and Mr Omar Chubinidze (applicants nos. 11-13, case no. 5) are all Jehovah\u2019s Witnesses. Their application to the Court relates to five cases of religiously motivated aggression to which they were allegedly subjected in Georgia at various times. The events described in cases nos. 1 and 4 were the subject of the Court\u2019s examination in the case of Begheluri and Others v. Georgia (no. 28490/02, 7 October 2014). 6.  The following account of the facts is based on the applicants\u2019 submissions. 7.  This part of the application concerns the applicants Mr R. Tsartsidze, Mr S. Bozoyani and Mr M. Gelashvili (applicants nos. 1-3). 8.  On 16 September 2000 nineteen coaches and several cars with Jehovah\u2019s Witnesses headed to Marneuli to attend the convention at Mr Tsartsidze\u2019s premises. The police set up checkpoints along the route and blocked the roads, preventing the Jehovah\u2019s Witnesses from reaching their destination. At the same time, the police authorised a coach containing extremist members of the Orthodox Church, led by Mr V. Mkalavishvili, also known as Father Basil (see Members of the Gldani Congregation of Jehovah\u2019s Witnesses and Others v. Georgia, no. 71156/01, \u00a7 11, 3 May 2007), to continue their journey to Marneuli in order to attack and damage the site within Mr Tsartsidze\u2019s property where the Jehovah\u2019s Witnesses were to gather. The attackers destroyed objects for religious use and seized items belonging to others. The police officers who were in attendance refused to intervene. Property belonging to the Jehovah\u2019s Witnesses, including 1.5 tonnes of religious literature was confiscated. The religious literature was burnt in the street. Other items (tents, 400 benches, and other items) were distributed to local residents by Father Basil\u2019s supporters (see Begheluri and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 16-21). 9.  According to estimates made on 25 January 2001 and 28 February 2002, the stolen and destroyed equipment and material was worth about 9,000 euros (EUR) and the 1.5 tonnes of stolen and burnt religious literature was worth about EUR 700. 10.  On 16 October 2000 applicants nos. 1-3, other Jehovah\u2019s Witnesses, the representation of the Pennsylvania Watchtower in Georgia and the Union of Jehovah\u2019s Witnesses, lodged an administrative complaint with the Mtatsminda-Krtsanisi District Court in Tbilisi against the Ministry of the Interior, the governor of Marneuli, the Marneuli chief of police and his deputy and twelve other police officers involved in the case. The applicants sought compensation for the pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage caused by the State\u2019s agents. 11.  On 8 May 2001 the Mtatsminda-Krtsanisi District Court decided to consider the Ministry of the Interior as a third-party intervener and referred the case to the Marneuli District Court for examination. 12.  On 13 May 2002 the Marneuli District Court dismissed the applicants\u2019 complaint as ill-founded. The court considered it to have been shown that individuals acting under the orders of Father Basil had attacked Mr Tsartsidze\u2019s property and the Jehovah\u2019s Witnesses. As to the Marneuli police, the court held that they had not been informed that a convention was due to be held on 16 September 2000 at Mr Tsartsidze\u2019s home and had been taking part on that date in an anti-drugs operation in the area bordering Azerbaijan. The court found that the defendants who were police officers had gone to the scene only after the attack in question and had only been able to observe the damage that had already been done. They could not therefore have contributed by being passive or taking part in the acts of religious aggression against the applicants. 13.  On 18 June 2002 the applicants lodged an appeal with the Tbilisi Regional Court complaining that the court of first instance had ignored the fact that the police had turned back the Jehovah\u2019s Witnesses but had allowed Father Basil and his supporters to go through the same checkpoints. The applicants argued that their witness statements had been disregarded by the first-instance court in favour of unsubstantiated statements by the police officers. The applicants also challenged the status of third-party intervener granted to the Ministry of the Interior in spite of the fact that it had been cited as a defendant. 14.  On 30 December 2003 the regional court dismissed the applicants\u2019 appeal on the same grounds as the first-instance court. 15.  On 29 September 2004 an appeal on points of law by the applicants was dismissed by the Supreme Court, which considered that the applicants had not demonstrated an \u201cintentional\u201d or \u201cnegligent\u201d breach of professional obligations by the police officers. 16.  This part of the application concerns Mr Alexander Mikirtumov and Mr Binali Aliev, applicants nos. 4 and 5. 17.  On 26 October 2000, when about thirty members of the Azerbaijani Congregation of Jehovah\u2019s Witnesses were preparing to hold a meeting in Marneuli at Mr Aliev\u2019s home, five plainclothes police officers entered the property. They included S.Kh. and G.N., who, a few days earlier, had allegedly taken part in the attack on the Jehovah\u2019s Witnesses at Mr Tsartsidze\u2019s property (see case no. 1), and N.N. The police officers stated that the meeting could not go ahead. Using insulting language towards the participants, they ordered them to leave the premises. They confiscated religious books and Bibles belonging to the Jehovah\u2019s Witnesses. 18.  Mr Aliev and Mr Mikirtumov, a pastor, were taken to the police station. There, they were insulted by Officer G.N., who ordered Mr Mikirtumov to leave Marneuli and never to return, otherwise he would face serious problems. S.Kh. ordered Mr Aliev not to hold any more religious gatherings at his home if he wished to avoid problems with the police. Mr Mikirtumov was then forced into a car and driven away from Marneuli. 19.  On 27 November 2000 the two applicants, together with the representation of the Pennsylvania Watchtower in Georgia and the Union of Jehovah\u2019s Witnesses, lodged an administrative complaint with the Mtatsminda-Krtsanisi District Court against the Ministry of the Interior and the police officers involved. As well as identifying the three police officers, the applicants also gave the number plates of the two vehicles in which the police officers had arrived. They asked that the Ministry of the Interior make a public apology, in accordance with the Police Act, and bring disciplinary proceedings against its staff. The applicants also asked that they be paid compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage and that a directive be sent to all police stations in the country, saying that the rights of Jehovah\u2019s Witnesses were to be respected. 20.  On 6 June 2001 the case was sent to the Marneuli District Court, which sent it in turn to the Bolnisi District Court on 14 May 2002. 21.  Questioned by that court, the applicants and other people who had attended the meeting confirmed the above-mentioned facts. Officers S.Kh. and G.N. denied the accusations. While G.N. claimed that he had never entered Mr Aliev\u2019s property on the date in question and was seeing the applicants for the first time, S.Kh. stated that he had that day seen G.N. and other police officers, who were his subordinates, in front of Mr Aliev\u2019s house. He had gone to see what was happening. G.N. had explained that a group of people had informed the police that a meeting of Jehovah\u2019s Witnesses was due to be held and had asked the police to intervene before they did so themselves. The police officers had therefore been obliged to go to the premises. According to S.Kh., G.N. had entered Mr Aliev\u2019s property in order to ask him not to hold the meeting, so as to avoid a clash with the group of individuals in question. S.Kh. stated that he had then continued his journey and denied having taken the two applicants to the police station. He acknowledged, however, that G.N., Mr Aliev and Mr Mikirtumov had been taken together \u201csomewhere\u201d. According to S.Kh., if the applicants had been taken to the police station on the day concerned they would have been questioned, and their visit to the police station duly registered. He criticised the applicants for failing to lodge a complaint with the police chief if they had indeed been taken unlawfully to the police station. 22.  The two applicants, on the contrary, submitted that they had been taken to S.Kh.\u2019s office and that he had ordered that they be required to give written undertakings, respectively, to leave Marneuli and for Mr Aliev not to allow religious meetings at his home. S.Kh. denied those allegations also. 23.  On 17 June 2003 the proceedings brought by the applicants were dismissed as ill-founded. In the court\u2019s opinion, it had not been established that the police officers in question had prevented the religious meeting from being held at Mr Aliev\u2019s home, confiscated the religious books and taken the two applicants to the police station in order to forbid them from performing religious rites in accordance with their faith. With regard to the statements made by four eyewitnesses, the court held that they were not reliable because they had been made by people taking part in the meeting, who had an interest in supporting the applicants\u2019 complaint. Moreover, the statements made by the complainants had been completely rejected by the police officers. Consequently, the court found that there was nothing to prove that the police officers had failed in their professional obligations, within the meaning of Article 1005 \u00a7 1 of the Civil Code. 24.  On 21 October 2004 the Tbilisi Regional Court upheld the judgment of 17 June 2003, on the same grounds as those used by the lower court. 25.  On 23 February 2005 the Supreme Court, ruling in written proceedings, dismissed an appeal by the applicants on points of law. It concluded that the applicants had failed to prove either an intentional or a negligent breach of duties by the respondent police officers. 26.  This part of the application concerns Mr Gia Dzamukov and Vladimer Gabunia (applicants nos. 6 and 7 respectively). 27.  On 2 September 2000, while in possession of religious tracts, Mr Dzamukov was stopped in the street in Kutaisi by two uniformed police officers, E.K. and E.Ch. His bag with religious literature was confiscated and he was taken to the police station. The applicant was struck by several police officers, including E.Ch., before being released. Before leaving the police station, the applicant asked that his belongings be returned to him. In reply, E.Ch. came up to him and attempted to strangle him with his tie, ordering the applicant to get out of his sight. Outside the station, police officers blocked his path and threatened to beat him with their truncheons. Seeing that the applicant refused to leave and insisted that the confiscated religious literature be returned, a police officer came up and threw his Bible in his face. 28.  On returning home, the applicant and his wife noticed that his chest was red. He also found it painful. His wife immediately went to the police station, protesting about the way her husband had been treated, and asking for the return of the confiscated belongings. She was, in turn, insulted and chased out of the premises. 29.  On the following day, Mr Gabunia, applicant no. 7, was walking in the street in Kutaisi with religious tracts. He gave one to E.K., who was accompanied by another police officer. In response, E.K. reprimanded him, stating that his conduct was not worthy of a Christian. B.M., the second police officer, punched him in the stomach and, after he had fallen to the ground, pulled his bag away from him. The police officers emptied the bag and tore up the religious literature inside. They kept two Bibles for themselves. When the applicant insisted that they return his Bible, B.M. threatened to put him in his car and dump him in the Rioni River. 30.  On 2 October 2000 the applicants lodged an administrative complaint with the Kutaisi Court against the Ministry of the Interior, the chief and deputy chief of Kutaisi police and police officers B.M. and E.K. Claiming that their rights guaranteed by Article 19 of the Constitution and Articles 9 and 14 of the Convention had been breached, they asked that the Ministry of the Interior issue a public apology and bring disciplinary proceedings against two of its staff who, in their opinion, had failed to comply with their professional duties, as provided for in the Police Act. The applicants also asked to be compensated in respect of pecuniary and non\u2011pecuniary damage, in application of Article 1005 \u00a7 1 of the Civil Code. 31.  Questioned by the court, the applicants confirmed the above\u2011mentioned events. Mr Gabunia described in detail the place where he had met the two police officers, and stated that they had been in uniform and wore badges. He also provided information about the make, colour and registration number of their car. Mr Dzamukov provided the registration number of the car in which he had been taken to the police station. His wife gave the registration number of the vehicle in which E.Ch. had followed her., while Ms L.K., a witness to the incident at the police station, confirmed that she had seen Mr Dzamukov there. E.Ch. denied the allegations, stating that he had been on leave on the day in question and had not been in Kutaisi. B.M. and E.K. also denied the allegations, claiming that they were seeing the applicants for the first time. 32.  On 7 June 2002 the applicants\u2019 complaint was dismissed as ill\u2011founded. The court pointed to the rights guaranteed by Article 19 of the Constitution and noted that, historically, no religion had ever been persecuted in Georgia. It further noted the following:\n\u201cIt is also well known that many of Jehovah\u2019s Witnesses blatantly violate the requirements of Article 19 \u00a7 3 of the Constitution and frequently impose their opinion and belief on others, thus violating their rights.\u201d\nThen the court set aside the three witness statements in favour of the applicants on the ground that those people had not been eyewitnesses. In addition, it noted the following:\n\u201cThe first two witnesses are Jehovah\u2019s Witnesses and the applicants\u2019 friends, and they have an interest in having the case decided in the applicants\u2019 favour.\u201d\nAs the applicants had not submitted any other valid evidence (medical reports, torn-up religious literature, or other items), their allegations were held to be ill-founded. Lastly, the court noted that Mr Dzamukov had waited one year before adding E.Ch.\u2019s name to his complaint. 33.  The applicants lodged an appeal, stating that submitting the destroyed religious literature to the court would have had no valid evidential value, since it would not have sufficed to prove that the police officers concerned had torn up the literature on the date in question. The applicants also explained that it had not been necessary to obtain a medical report, given that they had not received serious wounds or injuries. That did not, however, alter the fact that they had been struck by the police officers. Furthermore, in their opinion, the insults directed against them on account of their faith had been sufficient to establish that the police officers had been negligent in carrying out their professional duties. 34.  On 18 December 2002 the Kutaisi District Court dismissed the applicants\u2019 appeal on the same grounds as the first-instance court. In particular, it took account of the fact that the police officers had denied the allegations and that the applicants had suffered no physical injuries. It concluded that, in the absence of sufficient evidence to the contrary, there had been no damage to the applicants\u2019 dignity or any infringement of their right to freedom of religion, which ruled out the application of Article 1005 \u00a7 1 of the Civil Code and the granting of compensation. 35.  According to the applicants, the appeal court took into consideration an oral statement by E.K., who had claimed that he did not recognise a white car with the registration number DAQ 492, which Mr Dzamukov had nonetheless identified as being that in which the two police officers had been patrolling at the time of the incident in question. After the hearing, however, E.K. had left in that same vehicle, which had been parked in front of the regional court. The applicants took a photograph, and attached it to their appeal on points of law. They complained, in particular, that E.K.\u2019s denial had been accepted by the first-instance court and on appeal without any supporting evidence. 36.  After postponing the hearing several times on account of the absence of the defending parties, the Supreme Court examined the applicants\u2019 appeal on points of law in written proceedings, and dismissed it on 17 October 2003. It criticised the applicants for failing to bring criminal proceedings against the police officers. The Supreme Court stated that acknowledging that the police officers had failed in their professional obligations in the impugned manner (attacking and assaulting the applicants) would be equivalent to recognising, in the context of administrative proceedings, their criminal guilt, which would be contrary to the law. At the same time, if the accusation against the police officers had indeed been confirmed in criminal proceedings, the applicants would have been entitled to compensation, and also to a public apology. 37.  The Supreme Court\u2019s judgment was served on the applicants on 27 November 2003. 38.  This part of the application concerns Mr Boris Gogoladze, Mrs Anastasia Tvaradze and Mrs Madona Kapanadze (applicants nos. 8-10 respectively). 39.  On 1 April 2001 a group of Jehovah\u2019s Witnesses was returning from a religious meeting in the village of Dviri, Borjomi region. At a bus stop they met Mr S.Kh., the deputy governor of the town of Borjomi, Mr J.B., the governor of Dviri, and about fifteen local residents. One of the latter, assaulted Mr Gogoladze, wounding him on the cheek, and tore a bag containing religious literature and other personal effects from his hands. Then he struck the two applicants on the head with a shoulder strap ripped from Mr Gogoladze\u2019s bag. The two governors, who watched the attack, directed insults at the victims. In the end they asked the assailant to desist and left with him (see Begheluri and Others, cited above, \u00a7 56). 40.  On 30 April 2001 the applicants filed an administrative complaint with the Borjomi Court against the Borjomi regional administration, the local police chief and the two governors concerned. The applicants asked that the officials apologise publicly and that the regional administration take disciplinary proceedings against them. They also claimed compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage (Article 1005 \u00a7 1 of the Civil Code). 41.  On 17 September 2001 the court dismissed the applicants\u2019 complaint on the grounds that the governors had not been under a legal obligation to ensure the maintenance of public order. It concluded that it had not been shown that they themselves had organised the attack in question or had personally attacked or assaulted the applicants. The decision was upheld on appeal by the Tbilisi Regional Court on 25 July 2003. The regional court held that ensuring the maintenance of public order did not amount to a \u201cpressing obligation\u201d on the governors. 42.  On 13 February 2004 the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal on points of law by the applicants, using the same grounds as the regional court. 43.  This part of the application concerns Mr Jimcher Gogelashvili, George Kurua and Omar Chubinidze (applicants nos. 11-13). 44.  On 27 March 2001 a group of Orthodox religious extremists led by Mr P. Bluashvili, a leader of the Jvari movement, burst into Mr Gogelashvili\u2019s flat, where a congregation of Jehovah\u2019s Witnesses was holding a meeting. The assailants ordered the Jehovah\u2019s Witnesses, whom they described as Christ-insulters and Satanists, to hand over their religious literature and to leave the premises. The Jehovah\u2019s Witnesses protested, referring to provisions of the Constitution, but were nonetheless obliged to comply. Mr Kurua was insulted by Mr Bluashvili, who then pulled on his tie to strangle him. 45.  After confiscating religious literature from the people present in the flat, the attackers opened the cupboards and took out similar literature, first throwing it on the floor, and then out of the window. The benches used by the Jehovah\u2019s Witnesses during the meeting were also thrown out of the window. 46.  The attack was recorded on video. Moreover, an individual wearing civilian clothes, who, according to the applicants, was a police officer named L. Gogolauri, appears on the screen. He stands in the courtyard, observes the Jehovah\u2019s Witnesses being chased from the flat and allows a child to leave, carrying a bench that has been thrown from a window. 47.  The applicants assessed the pecuniary damage caused by the attack in question at about EUR 760 (audio-visual equipment, religious literature, benches, and other items). They submitted an audit report, dated 23 May 2001, in support of their claim. 48.  On the day after the above incident the same group of attackers publicly burned the religious literature taken from Mr Gogelashvili\u2019s home at the main market in Rustavi. That scene was also captured in the above\u2011mentioned recording. According to the applicants, the police officers patrolling the market did not react. 49.  On 30 April 2001 the Jehovah\u2019s Witnesses who had been victims of the attack, including the three applicants named above, as well as the representation of the Pennsylvania Watch Tower in Georgia and the Union of Jehovah\u2019s Witnesses, filed an administrative complaint with the Mtatsminda-Krtsanisi Court against the Ministry of the Interior, Mr Th.A., the chief of Rustavi police, Mr L.G., the head of the police station involved in the case, and Mr K.Z., a police officer. They alleged that the officials had failed in their professional obligations and had breached Articles 8-11, 13 and 14 of the Convention. 50.  In particular, the applicants asked that the Ministry of the Interior issue a public apology, in accordance with section 8(37) of the Police Act, and bring disciplinary proceedings against the above-named police officers. The applicants also claimed compensation in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage, in application of Article 1005 \u00a7 1 of the Civil Code, and asked that a directive be sent to all police stations in the country, stating that the rights of Jehovah\u2019s Witnesses were to be respected. Drawing the court\u2019s attention to the spread of violence against Jehovah\u2019s Witnesses throughout the country, they asked that it rule on their case in accordance with the law, as, in their opinion, a proper judicial decision could help to halt such violence. 51.  The court heard the three applicants and other Jehovah\u2019s Witnesses who had been victims of the attack. They all complained about the passivity of the police officers present at the scene. Mr Gogelashvili stated that when the attack had begun, he had gone to a police station located about a hundred metres from his building. After some delay, two police officers had accompanied him back to the scene. He had seen that books and furniture were being thrown out of the window. The police officers had taken no action. He had then run up the stairs to his flat to retrieve some money that he kept in a cupboard. He had found that the cupboard door had been broken and that EUR 130 had been stolen. Mr Gogelashvili complained that the police officers had not intervened to prevent the violation of his private property or to protect the victims. 52.  Mr Kurua stated that immediately after leaving the flat on the attackers\u2019 orders, he had gone to the police station, where he had learned that the alarm had already been raised. He had asked that police officers return with him, in order to \u201cintimidate\u201d the attackers. The officers had refused to accompany him. 53.  Mr Chubinidze stated that during the attack he had telephoned the police from the flat, but that the person on the other end of the telephone had hung up immediately. He had then been obliged to comply with the orders to leave the flat. He had managed to grab his bag back from an attacker who had taken it. 54.  On 10 May 2002 the court decided to strike the case out of its list of cases, on the basis of a letter, allegedly signed by the applicants, withdrawing their complaint. On 5 June 2002 they lodged an appeal, stating that the signatures on the letter in question had been forged and that they had never withdrawn their complaint. On 16 December 2002 the appeal court overturned the decision of 10 May 2002 and proceedings resumed. 55.  Questioned by the Mtatsminda-Krtsanisi District Court, a representative of the Ministry of the Interior argued that it had not been established that the police had been present at the scene and asked that the applicants\u2019 complaint be dismissed. The police officers themselves did not attend the hearings on two consecutive dates. Obliged to rule in their absence, on 16 July 2003 the court dismissed the complaint as ill-founded. It considered it established that the applicants had been attacked by a group of individuals led by Mr Bluashvili on 27 March 2001. It considered, however, that the applicants had not demonstrated that the police had been present at the scene or that they had watched passively as acts had been committed against property and the applicants\u2019 rights to freedom of religion. Accordingly, it had not been established that the police officers had failed to perform their professional duties within the meaning of Article 1005 \u00a7 1 of the Civil Code. Nonetheless, in the same decision, the court acknowledged that, after having been informed of the attack, the police officers had gone to the scene, which had resulted in a decision to place the attackers under investigation. According to the court, in the context of the latter criminal proceedings, it would be lawful for the applicants to submit a claim for compensation against the individuals who had infringed their rights. The decision made no reference to the burning of literature at Rustavi market. 56.  On 25 June 2004 the Tbilisi Regional Court upheld the first-instance judgment, repeating the grounds used in it. Neither the representative of the Ministry of the Interior nor the police officers appeared. 57.  On 2 March 2005 the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal on points of law lodged by the applicants. The court concluded that the fact of a breach of duty by the police, either intentionally or by negligence, had not been proven.", "references": ["0", "7", "9", "2", "6", "1", "3", "4", "No Label", "8", "5"], "gold": ["8", "5"]}
+{"input": "4.  The first applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Korsakov, Sakhalin Region. The second applicant was born in 1948 and lives in Moscow. 5.  The applicants sued the Trest Zhilishchnogo Hozyajstva municipal company (\u041c\u041f \u00ab\u0422\u0440\u0435\u0441\u0442 \u0436\u0438\u043b\u0438\u0449\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0445\u043e\u0437\u044f\u0439\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0430\u00bb \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe municipal company\u201d) in two unrelated sets of civil proceedings. 6.  On 22 January 2003 the Korsakovskiy Town Court of the Sakhalin Region (hereinafter \u201cTown Court\u201d) granted the claim by the first applicant for salary arrears and ordered the municipal company to pay him 1,270 euros (EUR). The judgment became final on the same date, but remained unenforced. 7.  On 1 March 2004 the Town Court granted the claim by the second applicant for compensation for the damage to her health sustained as a result of the acts of one of the municipal company\u2019s employees. The court awarded the applicant EUR 16,256. The judgment became final on 25 May 2004. It was partly enforced in 2004 and in 2006-07; the applicant received EUR 11,888. 8.  On 7 May 2007, in the course of insolvency proceedings in respect of the municipal company, the Commercial Court of the Sakhalin Region (hereinafter \u201cthe Commercial Court\u201d) granted the second applicant\u2019s claim for compensation of lost income and dismissed the remainder of the applicant\u2019s claims. She was awarded EUR 44,044. The second applicant appealed. On 18 July 2007 the Commercial Court discontinued the appeal proceedings on the grounds that the municipal company had been liquidated. The Commercial Court relied on Articles 49 \u00a7 3 and 63 \u00a7 8 of the Civil Code of Russia as interpreted by the Plenary Supreme Commercial Court in Ruling No. 29 of 15 December 2004 (see paragraphs 13-14 below). 9.  The municipal company was incorporated as a municipal unitary company set up by a decision of the local authority and provided heating supply and maintenance services in respect of municipal housing. The municipal company had \u201cthe right of economic control\u201d (\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043e \u0445\u043e\u0437\u044f\u0439\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0432\u0435\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f) over the assets allocated to it by the local authority in order to carry out its statutory activities. 10.  According to the second applicant, on 27 April 2002 the local authority withdrew most of the assets from the municipal company\u2019s economic control. The assets were subsequently transferred to a newly created company; the debts remained with the municipal company. 11.  On 27 September 2005 the municipal company was declared insolvent and it was put into liquidation. On 7 May 2007 the Commercial Court ended the liquidation proceedings.", "references": ["0", "8", "4", "7", "6", "2", "5", "1", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Toru\u0144. 6.  The applicant is a publicist and a professor of sociology. 7.  On 11 January 2008 Rzeczpospolita, a national daily newspaper, published an article titled \u201cZybertowicz \u2013 so far 2:0 to the Third Polish Republic\u201d (Zybertowicz: na razie 2:0 dla III RP). The article contained information about three civil lawsuits against the applicant instituted by A.M., the editor-in-chief of one of the biggest daily newspapers, Gazeta Wyborcza, and a certain M.S and Z.S. The article also included a comment by the applicant on the lawsuits in question:\n\u201cIn a way it is quite interesting [to note] who has lodged [civil] claims against me so far: two agents and one their fierce defender\u201d (\u201cSwoj\u0105 drog\u0105 to ciekawe, kto mnie dotychczas pozwa\u0142 do s\u0105du: dw\u00f3ch agent\u00f3w i jeden ich zaciek\u0142y obro\u0144ca\u201d)\u201d 8.  On 19 March 2008, A.M. brought a civil action in the Warsaw Regional Court (S\u0105d Okr\u0119gowy) requesting legal protection of his personal rights. He asked that the applicant be ordered to publish an apology and to pay damages of 20,000 Polish zlotys (PLN) (approximately 4,761 euros (EUR)) to a charity. 9.  On 1 April 2008 the Warsaw Regional Court transferred the case to the Toru\u0144 Regional Court. 10.  On 20 August 2008 the Warsaw Court of Appeal (S\u0105d Apelacyjny) quashed this decision. 11.  On 9 June 2009 the Warsaw Regional Court gave judgment and partly allowed the plaintiff\u2019s claim. It ordered the applicant to publish an apology on the first, second or third page of Rzeczpospolita. It further determined the exact size and wording of the apology. The court also ordered the applicant to pay PLN 1,000 (approximately EUR 238) to a charity and PLN 1,025 (approximately EUR 244) in court fees. 12.  During the proceedings the court questioned the applicant and the plaintiff. The applicant argued that the phrase in question had represented his opinion about A.M.\u2019s public statements. Referring to several published statements and excerpts from articles written by A.M., the applicant claimed that he had had a good factual basis for giving this opinion of A.M.\u2019s views about lustration. 13.  The court also obtained an opinion from an expert on linguistics. The expert was asked in particular to reply to the question of whether the phrase \u201ctwo agents and one their fierce defender\u201d, in the context of the case, constituted a statement of fact or an opinion. In his opinion of 6 May 2009 the expert stated that the phrase in question had been a statement of fact and not a hypothesis or supposition. In addition, taking into account the readers\u2019 presumed general knowledge it was obvious that A.M. had been identified in the article as having defended two agents. The plaintiff submitted to the court a second expert report (dated 2 January 2009), in which another expert on language analysis confirmed that the applicant\u2019s statement had been a statement of fact. 14.  The Warsaw Regional Court noted that the applicant, when formulating the statement in question, referred in particular to a number of published statements made by A.M. in which he had criticised the lustration law. The applicant also relied on an earlier Warsaw Court of Appeal judgment confirming that Z.S. had indeed collaborated under communism with the Security Service. 15.  The court further held that everyone, including those not following the news carefully, was aware that M.S. and Z.S. had been accused of collaborating with the Security Service. In particular, readers of Rzeczpospolita should have been aware of that fact as the newspaper had published numerous articles on the issue. 16.  The Warsaw Regional Court also held that, judging by both the applicant\u2019s statement and the whole article, it did not appear that A.M. had been an \u201cagent\u201d. While the applicant in his statement had not specified who in his opinion had been \u201can agent\u201d and who \u201ctheir fierce defender\u201d, from the nature of the publication and taking into account the readers\u2019 general knowledge it was clear that it was the plaintiff who was considered to be \u201cthe fierce defender of two agents\u201d. At the same time, the court accepted that had the applicant used a more general formulation and referred only to A.M.\u2019s attitude towards the lustration law such words could have fallen within the limits of acceptable criticism and it would not have been necessary to protect A.M.\u2019s personal rights. 17.  Lastly, the court considered that from the published statements and quotes from A.M.\u2019s public statements which the applicant had submitted during the proceedings it did not appear that A.M. had ever actually defended those two particular persons. 18.  In conclusion, the court held that A.M.\u2019s personal rights had been breached, but only partially. For this reason the court considered that the plaintiff\u2019s claim had been exaggerated; therefore, it lowered the sum to be paid to the charity. 19.  Both parties appealed. 20.  On 11 March 2010 the Warsaw Court of Appeal modified the first\u2011instance judgment and ordered the applicant to pay PLN 10,000 (approximately, EUR 2,380) to the charity and PLN 2,845 (approximately EUR 677) in court fees. The applicant was also ordered to publish an apology in Rzeczpospolita. 21.  The court in principle agreed with the reasoning presented by the Regional Court. It held that while the phrase \u201cfierce defender of two agents\u201d had breached A.M.\u2019s personal rights, it was not defamatory. The court further agreed with the Regional Court that the applicant had named A.M. as having defended two particular persons. However, he had failed to prove that his statement had been true. Consequently, the court considered that the phrase used by the applicant had breached the plaintiff\u2019s personal rights (in particular his good name) and had conflicted with the values espoused by him. 22.  The court referred to the ongoing public debate in Poland about the necessity of lustration in order to explain and disclose the role of various special services after the World War II. It noted that in the context of that debate the phrase that someone was \u201ca fierce defender of ... agents\u201d suggested that that person had defended them, justified their actions and searched for a way to absolve them from any responsibility in the eyes of the public. Consequently, attributing to someone the role of \u201cfierce defender of ... agents\u201d was a breach of that person\u2019s good name and suggested that that person\u2019s behaviour had been contrary to the public good. 23.  The court also held that the phrase in question had been a statement of fact. However, it considered that there had been no basis for concluding that A.M. had defended any agents, or more generally, defended activities of the communist secret services that had been harmful to the public. On the contrary, he had firmly condemned such activities. He had objected to lustration being understood as a tool to destroy people and being used as an argument in political games. 24.  With reference to the sum to be paid to the charity the court noted that the applicant was a highly educated university professor holding numerous public offices. A person in the applicant\u2019s situation should have been aware of how his statement would have been understood by an average reader of Rzeczpospolita and whether there was any basis for attributing to someone the role of \u201c[fierce] defender\u201d of ... agents. The court further held that the sum of PLN 1,000 to be paid to charity was symbolic and that PLN 10,000 was a more appropriate sum, given the circumstances of the case \u2013 especially considering that it was not an excessive burden for the applicant. 25.  The applicant lodged a cassation appeal. In particular, he referred to Article 10 of the Convention. 26.  On 24 March 2011 the Supreme Court (S\u0105d Najwy\u017cszy) refused to entertain the applicant\u2019s cassation appeal on account of the lack of important legal issues to be considered in the case. The court, relying on Article 10 of the Convention, noted that freedom of expression did not have an absolute character. It further referred to its own case-law, according to which the necessity to prove that a statement of fact was true was not an excessive requirement and did not infringe the freedom of political debate. 27.  On 19 April 2010 A.M.\u2019s representative instituted enforcement proceedings in the Warsaw District Court aimed at compelling the applicant to comply with the obligations imposed by the Warsaw Court of Appeal\u2019s judgment of 11 March 2010. 28.  On 15 June 2010 the Warsaw District Court ordered the applicant to publish the apology ordered by the Warsaw Court of Appeal in Rzeczpospolita. After the applicant failed to comply with that order, on 10 June 2011 the Warsaw District Court allowed A.M. to publish the apology in Rzeczpospolita in the applicant\u2019s name and ordered him to cover the fee for its publication in the amount of PLN 23,124 (approximately EUR 5,505). The applicant received a significant discount on that fee.", "references": ["2", "9", "6", "0", "5", "3", "1", "7", "4", "8", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The first applicant was born in 1980 and the second applicant was born in 1981. They live in Jdioara and Darova respectively. 6.  On 16 November 2012 the first applicant\u2019s husband, Mr Ciprian Ionel Piu, went to the forest near Jdioara, accompanied by I.M.R. and L.D. The latter was the son of I.D.D., a local police officer 7.  According to the applicants, they all took part in an illegal logging operation. The person who organised the aforementioned operation was L.D. He regularly recruited young men from the village to do this. He bought them alcohol and took them to the forest without providing them with the necessary protective equipment or with any essential safety information. His practices, known by the locals, had created two other victims previously. One of the victims had died and the other had suffered serious injuries. The investigations opened into the aforementioned two incidents had failed to identify and punish those responsible, because of the alleged involvement of local police officers. 8.  According to the first applicant her husband\u2019s death happened in suspicious circumstances and the perpetrators of the offence were police officers and others protected by them. She further stated that on the day her husband went to the forest she and her family were informed by a third party that her husband had met with an accident. They went looking for him and found him dead in the forest. 9.  On 16 November 2012 the Gavojdia Police Department was informed about the incident by a third party. 10.  On the same date, the aforementioned police department, in particular police officers C.S. and M.S., carried out an investigation at the scene of the accident (cercetare la fa\u021ba locului) in the presence of two assistant witnesses, namely I.M. and V.A. 11.  On the same date the Gavojdia Police Department, namely police officer C.S., opened of its own motion a preliminary investigation against I.M.R. for involuntary manslaughter (ucidere din culp\u0103). 12.  On the same date police officer C.S. asked the Timi\u015foara Forensic Institute to produce a forensic necropsy report. He asked the aforementioned institute to establish the victim\u2019s cause of death, whether the victim\u2019s body had signs of violence, and if so what had caused them, as well as the alcohol level in the victim\u2019s blood. 13.  On 17 November 2012 and 3 October 2013 police officer C.S. took a statement from I.M.R. with regard to the circumstances of the accident. 14.  On the same date the Timi\u015f Forensic Department produced a medical certificate confirming the first applicant\u2019s husband\u2019s death. According to the aforementioned report, his death had been violent and had been caused, inter alia, by a closed angle cranium-cerebral trauma and by the resulting haemorrhage. 15.  On 15 January 2013 the Timi\u015foara Forensic Institute produced the forensic necropsy report (see paragraph 12 above). It concluded that the victim\u2019s death had been violent and had been caused by an acute cardio\u2011respiratory insufficiency following a cranial cerebral trauma and a resulting haemorrhage. Moreover, the signs of violence discovered on the victim\u2019s body could have been caused by being hit with or striking against a hard object in the context of the impugned forest accident. Furthermore, the alcohol level in the victim\u2019s blood was 1.05 grams for every thousand millilitres. 16.  On 6 February, 26 February and 13 May 2013 police officer C.S. took statements from members of the victim\u2019s family, including the victim\u2019s mother and the first applicant, who had asked the authorities, inter alia, to punish those responsible for the death of their relative. 17.  On 8 February 2013 police officer C.S. took a statement from L.D. with regard to the circumstances of the accident. 18.  By a report (referat) of 19 March 2013 police officer C.S. noted that LDIACR and the victim\u2019s family had made repeated requests for the investigated offence to be requalified from involuntary manslaughter to murder. Consequently, he proposed that the case be referred to the Timi\u015f Prosecutor\u2019s Office, which had the competence to investigate such allegations. 19.  In March 2013 the victim\u2019s mother also asked the Lugoj Prosecutor\u2019s Office to open a criminal investigation against L.D., I.M.R. and I.D.D. for murder (omor). 20.  On 26 March 2013 the Lugoj Prosecutor\u2019s Office noted the victim\u2019s family\u2019s requests for a murder investigation and decided to refer the case to the Timi\u015f Prosecutor\u2019s Office, which had the competence to investigate the allegations. 21.  On 8 April 2013 a prosecutor attached to the Timi\u015f Prosecutor\u2019s Office decided not to open a criminal investigation (ne\u020bceperea urm\u0103ririi penale) against L.D., I.M.R. and I.D.D. for murder. Moreover, he referred part of the case back to the Lugoj Prosecutor\u2019s Office for the investigation against I.M.R. for involuntary manslaughter to be continued. The prosecutor held that according to the available evidence and the statements of I.M.R. and L.D., the victim\u2019s death had been the result of an accident and had not been caused intentionally by any of the suspects. That decision was communicated to the victim\u2019s mother. 22.  On 22 and 23 May 2013 both the victim\u2019s mother and the first applicant joined the criminal proceedings as civil parties and claimed pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages. 23.  On 17 October 2013 police officer C.S. took the testimony of I.H., one of those familiar with the events which had resulted in the first applicant\u2019s husband\u2019s death. 24.  By a report of 14 November 2013 police officer C.S. proposed not to open a criminal investigation (ne\u020bceperea urm\u0103ririi penale) against L.D. and I.M.R. It established that on the day of the incident the first applicant\u2019s husband had gone to the forest by tractor together with L.D. and I.M.R., the owner and operator of the tractor, to collect dried wood. While they had been using the tractor to tow a tree the aforementioned tree had started rolling uncontrollably and had hit the first applicant\u2019s husband on the head, killing him. Because the victim had not been an employee of a company at the time of the accident, what happened could not have been considered a work accident. The witness I.H. had testified that he did not know how many people had gone to the forest that day or any other details concerning the accident. Also, the witness R.S., another person familiar with the events which had resulted in the first applicant\u2019s husband\u2019s death, was unavailable for questioning because he had left the country. 25.  The report held that the first applicant\u2019s husband\u2019s accident was caused by a flawed logging operation, which had not foreseen solutions that could have reduced or eliminated the risks of him suffering an accident. He had not kept a safe distance from the tree which was being towed with a flexible steel cable, so that the directions of its movement could not have been controlled. Also he did not have the appropriate equipment for working in the forest. 26.  The report further held that L.D. had not been close to the area where the accident had happened, and therefore he could not have been responsible for an act of involuntary manslaughter. Furthermore, the impugned act had lacked one of the elements of an offence, namely guilt. An act which had occurred as a result of unforeseeable circumstances (caz fortuit) could not amount to an offence. The suspects had been unable to foresee that event, notably the fact that the tree had changed direction while it was moving, thus killing the victim. 27.  On 26 November 2013 a prosecutor attached to the Lugoj Prosecutor\u2019s Office examined the aforementioned proposal and decided not to open a criminal investigation against L.D. and I.M.R. The decision was communicated to the first applicant\u2019s mother-in-law. 28.  The first applicant\u2019s mother-in-law challenged the decision before a superior prosecutor. 29.  On 27 January 2014 a superior prosecutor attached to the Timi\u015f Prosecutor\u2019s Office allowed the victim\u2019s mother\u2019s challenge, quashed the decision of 26 November 2013 (see paragraph 27 above), and referred the case back to the Lugoj Prosecutor\u2019s Office. It held that further evidence had to be adduced to the case file. In particular, a technical expert report had to be produced which could have established the cause and dynamics of the accident. Moreover, the norms that had been breached when the impugned event had happened had to be indicated. Furthermore, I.M.R., L.D. and I.D. had to be questioned again and the necessary arrangement had to be made for the questioning of R.S. (see paragraph 24 above). Lastly, any other evidence that could have clarified the circumstances of the case had to be adduced to the file. 30.  In March 2014 the Lugoj Prosecutor\u2019s Office ordered the Lugoj Police Department to reopen the investigation into the circumstances of the first applicant\u2019s husband\u2019s death. 31.  On 11 March 2014 the Lugoj Police Department decided to open a criminal investigation against L.D. and I.M.R. for involuntary manslaughter. 32.  On 19 March 2014 the victim\u2019s mother lodged a challenge (cerere de recuzare) against the investigators of the case and asked for the investigation to be carried out by investigators outside Timi\u015f County. She alleged that the inquiry had been delayed by the investigators and that they had been trying to unlawfully protect those responsible. 33.  On an unspecified date the victim\u2019s mother informed the Lugoj Prosecutor\u2019s Office that her challenge had not concerned police officer C.A., who was investigating the case after the reopening of the proceedings, or the prosecutor who was supervising the aforementioned police officer. 34.  On 7 April 2014 a prosecutor attached to the Lugoj Prosecutor\u2019s Office dismissed as inadmissible the victim\u2019s mother\u2019s challenge (cerere de recuzare) against the investigators of the case and her request for the investigation to be carried out by investigators outside Timi\u015f County. It held, inter alia, that the victim\u2019s mother had failed to indicate any of the reasons provided by law for a challenge in order to support her application. Furthermore, there had been no evidence that police officer C.A., had lacked impartiality. The decision was communicated to the victim\u2019s mother. 35.  On 19 May, 23 and 24 June 2014 the Lugoj Police Department questioned I.M.R. and L.D. and took R.S.\u2019s testimony in respect of the circumstances of the case. 36.  On 20 May 2014 the Lugoj Police Department asked an appointed expert to produce a technical expert report by 10 June 2014 in order to clarify the circumstances of the victim\u2019s death and to identify those responsible for the accident. 37.  On 10 June 2014 the aforementioned expert produced his report. 38.  On 24 June 2014 the Lugoj Police Department took the victim\u2019s mother\u2019s statement. In her statement she had acknowledged that she had been given a copy of the technical expert report produced in the case and that she had no objections in respect of the appointed expert or the content of the report. 39.  By a report of 25 June 2014 the Lugoj Police Department proposed to close the criminal investigation against L.D. and I.M.R. It held, inter alia, that once L.D., I.M.R. and the first applicant\u2019s husband were in the forest they had started moving trees from a difficult area to a more easily accessible one, using the tractor being operated by I.M.R. Before they had started moving a fourth tree, L.D. had been sent to collect some of their belongings which had been left in a different location. Meanwhile, the first applicant\u2019s husband had attached the tree to the tractor and had signalled I.M.R. to start moving the tree. During the moving operation, the tree had started rolling uncontrollably and had hit the first applicant\u2019s husband on the head, killing him. 40.  The report also held that according to I.M.R.\u2019s statement the time which had elapsed between the moment he had checked (s-a asigurat) that the first applicant\u2019s husband was at a safe distance from the tree and the moment the victim was hit by the said tree was very short. Once he had realised what had happened he had stopped the tractor immediately and rushed to help the victim. When L.D. had returned with their belongings, I.M.R. had asked him to call the emergency services. As L.D. had not been able to make a phone call in the forest because of poor cellular network, he had decided to rush towards the village in search of a better location for a phone call. Eventually L.D. had reached the village of Jdioara and had managed to call the emergency services. At the same time he had met the victim\u2019s brother and had informed him of the accident. Subsequently, L.D. had gone home in order to wait for the police and the ambulance in order to lead them to the location of the accident. Once L.D. had returned to the location of the accident accompanied by the police, he had been advised to leave again in order to avoid a potential conflict with the victim\u2019s family. 41.  The report further held that R.S., the witness proposed by the victim\u2019s mother, had stated that he had been at work at the time of the accident and had been informed about the victim\u2019s death by telephone. 42.  The report noted that according to the technical expert report the main cause of the accident was the victim\u2019s failure to position himself at a safe distance from the tree and to maintain permanent visual contact with I.M.R. in order to determine whether the moving tree had stopped or had become stuck. Therefore, he had breached the relevant safety and security norms for working in the forest and had not been wearing protective equipment, in particular a helmet. If the victim had been positioned correctly, the accident would not have happened even if the tree had started rolling. Another important cause of the accident was the fact that according to the toxicology report the victim had been working under the influence of alcohol. 43.  Relying on the aforementioned considerations and the conclusions of the technical expert, the report concluded that the individuals responsible for causing the accident could not be identified. However, it was clear that the two suspects had not been at fault. Moreover, the relevant legislation concerning work safety had not been applicable because those involved in the incident were not employees. 44.  On 30 June 2014 a prosecutor attached to the Lugoj Prosecutor\u2019s Office decided to close (clasat) the criminal investigation opened against L.D. and I.M.R. The prosecutor held on the basis of the available evidence that none of the suspects had been responsible for the victim\u2019s death. The incident had been the result of unforeseeable circumstances given that the tree had been towed with a flexible steel cable whose direction of movement would have been impossible to control, and there was no appropriate equipment for working in the forest. It would have been impossible for the suspects to foresee the event, as the tree had changed direction while it was moving and thus had killed the victim. Moreover, L.D. was not near the location of the accident at the time. Consequently, there was no connection between his conduct and the act of involuntary manslaughter. 45.  On 3 July 2014 the aforementioned decision was communicated to the victim\u2019s mother at her home address in Lugoj. 46.  The second applicant is the first applicant\u2019s brother. 47.  On 2 July 2013 the second applicant and two of his brothers lodged a criminal complaint with civil claims against L.D. and R.S. for assault, insult, slander and attempted murder. They also lodged a criminal complaint with civil claims against an unidentified gendarme for assault, abuse of office, and misconduct. The second applicant argued that on 30 June 2013 he had visited the first applicant in Jdioara and had taken part in a ceremony commemorating his brother-in-law. After the ceremony had ended he had been followed by L.D. and R.S.; the former had hit him, rendering him unconscious. Subsequently, both L.D. and R.S. had punched and kicked him. After a police officer and two unidentified gendarmes had arrived at the scene of the incident, he had been threatened, caught by the nose, slapped and cursed by one of the two unidentified gendarmes. 48.  On 4 July 2013 the Timi\u015foara Forensic Institute produced a forensic report concluding that the second applicant had suffered traumatic lesions which could have been sustained on 30 June 2013 and could have been the result of being hit by or against hard objects. Moreover, the lesions had required seven days of medical care, in the absence of complications. 49.  The forensic report noted that the forensic examination had established that the second applicant had suffered a bruised left eye and injuries to the lower and upper lip and to his forehead. Moreover, it noted that according to the medical documents produced by the Lugoj Town Hospital on 1 July 2013 the second applicant had been taken to hospital by ambulance and had suffered, inter alia, an acute closed cranium cerebral trauma and contusions on the nasal pyramid, lower jaw and thorax. 50.  On 27 June 2014 a prosecutor attached to the Lugoj Prosecutor\u2019s Office decided to close the criminal investigation in the case on the grounds that there was no evidence that the suspects had committed the alleged offence. 51.  The second applicant challenged the decision before a superior prosecutor. 52.  On 6 October 2014 a superior prosecutor attached to the Lugoj Prosecutor\u2019s Office dismissed the second applicant\u2019s challenge and upheld the decision of the lower prosecutor. 53.  The applicant appealed against the Lugoj Prosecutor Office\u2019s decisions before the domestic courts. 54.  On 20 January 2015 the Lugoj District Court allowed the second applicant\u2019s appeal, quashed the Lugoj Prosecutor\u2019s Office\u2019s decisions, and referred the case back to the aforementioned prosecutor\u2019s office in order for a criminal investigation to be opened against L.D. It held that the prosecutor\u2019s office had closed the investigation by relying on an incorrect finding. Consequently, in order to clarify the circumstances of the case it instructed the investigating bodies to question the second applicant, L.D., and the witnesses heard during the investigation again. Moreover, it held that others who were familiar with the investigated incident could also be heard. 55.  On 23 June 2015 a prosecutor attached to the Lugoj Prosecutor\u2019s Office decided to close the criminal investigation in the case in respect of L.D. At the same time it disjoined part of the case and referred it back to the Gavojdia Police Department in order to continue the investigation and identify the perpetrators of the alleged offences. The prosecutor noted that even though the victims of the incident had been heard again and they had repeated their earlier statements as well as their request for those against whom they had complained to be punished, they had not asked for additional evidence to be adduced to the case file. Also, seven witnesses had been heard again in the case, but none of them had provided new information about the events of 30 June 2013. None of the said witnesses could have confirmed that L.D. or another person had hurt or threatened the second applicant. Only one of the witnesses had testified that he had seen the second applicant on the ground at the site of the incident and that the latter had told him that L.D. had hit him. However, the aforementioned witness had also stated that at the moment of his conversation with the second applicant he had not seen L.D. in the area and therefore he could not have confirmed the second applicant\u2019s statement. 56.  The prosecutor also noted that even though the victims of the incident had later declared that they knew the identity of the perpetrators, at the time of the incident and after the police had arrived they had been unable to identify the perpetrators and had stated that they did not know their identity. 57.  The prosecutor further noted that one of the witnesses proposed by one of the second applicant\u2019s brothers had not been heard because he had left the country and no substitute had been suggested. Also the applicant\u2019s other brother, who had also been involved in the incident, was not interviewed after he had lodged his complaint against the alleged perpetrators, and there was no evidence that he had been threatened or coerced to remain silent. 58.  The prosecutor held that even though the occurrence of the incident of 30 June 2013 had not been contested and had been proven by the available forensic report, it was not possible to establish clearly that L.D. or R.S. had committed the alleged offences, as they had not been seen at the site of the incident or in the company of the victim. Given the absence of direct and clear evidence which could have proven L.D.\u2019s or R.S.\u2019s guilt, there is doubt that they committed the alleged offences, which works to their advantage. 59.  The second applicant challenged the decision before a hierarchical prosecutor. 60.  On 21 July 2015 a superior prosecutor attached to the Lugoj Prosecutor\u2019s Office dismissed the second applicant\u2019s challenge and upheld the decision of 23 June 2015. 61.  The applicant appealed against the Lugoj Prosecutor Office\u2019s decisions before the domestic courts. He argued, inter alia, that the decisions of the prosecutor\u2019s office had been unfair and unlawful and had both protected and failed to investigate the State agents involved in the incident. 62.  By a final judgment of 6 October 2015 the Lugoj District Court dismissed the second applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld the decisions of the prosecutor\u2019s office. It held that the investigating authorities had heard evidence from the victims, the suspects and the witnesses in the case and had correctly established the facts of the case. 63.  To the knowledge of the Court the investigation against other possible perpetrators of the incident of 30 June 2013 is still open. 64.  On 14 January, 8 March, 2 July, and 10 December 2013 the applicants or their family informed LDIACR about the abuses that had allegedly been committed against them and against their family by L.D., R.S. and certain local police officers on 16 November 2012 and after that date. Moreover, they voiced their concern that the investigations initiated into the first applicant\u2019s husband\u2019s death and into the incident of 30 June 2013 had been suppressed and delayed because of the family relationships between one of the suspects and several local police officers. Consequently, they asked LDIACR for help in punishing those responsible. 65.  On 8 and 13 February 2013 LDIACR informed the Romanian Ministry of the Interior and the Timi\u015f County Police Department about the applicants\u2019 and their family\u2019s allegations, including the alleged family relationships between one of the suspects and several local police officers, and asked them for an investigation. 66.  On 17 April 2013 the Internal Affairs Department of the Timi\u015f County Police Department informed LDIACR, inter alia, that the issues raised by the non-governmental organisation in its notifications could not be established as fact. 67.  On 17 October 2013 the Internal Affairs Department of the Romanian Police notified LDIACR that its allegations did not refer to acts or circumstances which had clearly attested that certain police officers had willfully (cu vinov\u0103\u021bie) breached the relevant ethical and deontological standards and/or those concerning the fulfilment of their professional duties. 2.  The denunciation for abuse of office lodged against the police officers involved in the investigation concerning the death of the first applicant\u2019s husband 68.  On 8 February 2013 LDIACR initiated proceedings before the Timi\u015f Prosecutor\u2019s Office denouncing an abuse of office (abuz \u00een serviciu) allegedly committed by the local police officers involved in the investigation of the first applicant\u2019s husband\u2019s death. It argued, inter alia, that police officer I.D.D., together with two other police officers who were his brother-in-law and son-in-law, had manipulated the investigation, had tried to protect their own interests, and had attempted to distort the truth about what had happened on the day the first applicant\u2019s husband died. 69.  On 2 October 2013 a prosecutor attached to the Timi\u015f Prosecutor\u2019s Office decided not to open a criminal investigation against the aforementioned police officers. It held, inter alia, that the three police officers who were the object of the denunciation were identified as I.D.D., G.B. and C.S. Moreover, given the statements taken from the police officers and from the first applicant, there was no indication that I.D.D. and G.B. had committed any act of abuse of office, as they had not been involved in the investigation into the first applicant\u2019s husband\u2019s death. Also, the first applicant\u2019s husband had been asked to take part in the logging operation by L.D., and therefore there had been no indication that I.D.D. had incited the victim to commit an offence. Furthermore, there was no sufficiently strong indication that police officer C.S. had knowingly failed to fulfil or had insufficiently fulfilled his lawful duties during the investigation into the first applicant\u2019s husband\u2019s death, or that he had affected the legal interest of the victim\u2019s family. 70.  The decision was communicated both to LDIACR and to the first applicant. 71.  LDIACR challenged the decision before a superior prosecutor attached to the Timi\u015f Prosecutor\u2019s Office. It argued, inter alia, that its action had been based on statements made by the victim\u2019s family and by villagers. Moreover, the investigators had ignored I.D.D.\u2019s threats and aggressive behaviour towards the family of the victim, as well as the fact that two other similar incidents had happened in the area before 16 November 2012. 72.  On 9 October 2013 a superior prosecutor attached to the Timi\u015f Prosecutor\u2019s Office dismissed LDIACR\u2019s challenge and upheld the decision of the lower prosecutor. The decision was communicated to LDIACR.", "references": ["9", "3", "7", "8", "5", "2", "6", "4", "No Label", "0", "1"], "gold": ["0", "1"]}
+{"input": "5.  The first applicant divorced the second applicant\u2019s father on 22 December 2008 by means of a court-approved divorce agreement. According to the agreement, she was to exercise parental rights and the father had contact rights, the use of the family dwelling and was obliged to pay approximately 50 euros (EUR) a month in child support. The child was to live with her mother, and her father could see her on the first and third weekend of every month, for thirty days during the summer, and for a week during the winter or spring. The agreement did not make reference to a specific address, or even a town or a city where the first applicant was supposed to live with the child. 6.  On 25 November 2009, upon a request by the child\u2019s father for a change in the contact regime between him and his daughter, the first instance civil court approved another agreement between the parents, which extended the duration of the father\u2019s weekend contact by a few hours. The parents also agreed that the father would collect the child from her mother\u2019s home in Kazanlak, Bulgaria, and would take her back to the same location; the father could spend his time with the child at one of two specific addresses in Bulgaria, located in Koprivshtitsa and Srednogorovo respectively. If the mother changed her address, she had to inform the father by registered mail within ten days of such a change. 7.  On 18 March 2009 the first applicant brought a claim under Article 72 of the 1985 Family Code before the Varna District Court, seeking the court\u2019s authorisation for the child to leave the country in the absence of her father\u2019s agreement. She submitted that she was in a committed relationship with a Bulgarian man who lived in the United Kingdom, where he worked as a ship engineer. They intended to marry and she wished to settle in the United Kingdom, and live with him and her daughter. Notwithstanding the above, the first applicant specified that, in the event that the court did not grant her application for permission for the child to travel, she would remain in Bulgaria to care for her as a responsible parent. 8.  On 30 October 2009 the Varna District Court rejected the first applicant\u2019s claim for the child\u2019s unrestricted travel abroad with only her mother, finding that it could not be in the child\u2019s interests. More specifically, the reasons given were that the mother could not show that she had a fixed place of residence abroad, or a secure income with which to ensure her daughter\u2019s well-being, and that the child\u2019s absence from Bulgaria would pose an obstacle to the father\u2019s exercise of his contact rights. 9.  The first applicant appealed against the refusal to the Varna Regional Court. She claimed that the father showed no interest in the child and did not pay any child support. His refusal to allow the child to leave the country for any period of time prevented her from taking her on holiday abroad and residing in Montrose in the United Kingdom, where she had a fianc\u00e9 and could provide her daughter with better material conditions. She and her partner intended to marry that year, but her child\u2019s inability to leave the country with her would make this impossible. 10.  The Varna Regional Court allowed her appeal on 22 February 2010. It held that she had the necessary parenting qualities, including the ability to create an emotionally comforting environment for the child and provide her with financial support. That had been decided at the time she had been granted custody of her daughter, and had not been either challenged or refuted subsequently. The first applicant\u2019s parental abilities and the care she provided to her daughter would not change as a result of her crossing the national border. In view of the strained relationship between the two parents, the court considered that permission for the child to travel abroad with only her mother should be granted for the whole of the child\u2019s infancy, that is, until she reached majority. The court also held that the change in the mother\u2019s circumstances constituted grounds for changing the contact regime between father and child, but did not adjudicate on that matter. 11.  Following a cassation appeal by the father, in June 2010 the Supreme Court of Cassation suspended enforcement of the second-instance court\u2019s judgment while the issue was pending before it. On 1 November 2010, in a final judgment, it refused to allow the second applicant to travel abroad in the absence of her father\u2019s agreement. 12.  The court first observed that there was conflicting domestic jurisprudence on the question of granting unlimited permission for a minor\u2019s travel abroad in the absence of both parents\u2019 agreement. Some courts (including the second instance one in the present case) found that when a parent who had been granted custody (\u0443\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0436\u043d\u044f\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0435 \u043d\u0430 \u0440\u043e\u0434\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0442\u0435 \u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u0430) had the necessary parental skills, such permission could not be refused. Other courts considered that when a parental consensus was missing, granting permission for unlimited travel abroad was only going to cause further disturbance and resentment in the relationship between the parents, which was likely to result in additional disputes between them, and this was not in the interests of the child. 13.  Examining the present case, the court relied in particular on its well\u2011established and binding case-law, according to which permission for a child\u2019s unrestricted travel abroad with one parent only could not be granted because, as a matter of principle, that could never be in the best interests of the child. More specifically, there was a risk that a parent applying for such permission could take the child to countries which were in a state of war or where there was a high risk of natural disasters, thus endangering the child\u2019s well-being and depriving the State of the opportunity to ensure his or her protection. Also, if the parent took the child to a country which was not a member of the European Union, or with which Bulgaria had no reciprocal agreement regarding legal assistance, the authorities would not be able to ensure that the contact rights of the other parent were enforced. 14.  The court held that permission to travel abroad with only one parent could be granted only in respect of fixed destinations and for a limited period of time, and when this was in the interests of the child. 15.  Turning to the specific case, the court held that the first applicant had not presented any guarantees as to where the child would be taken or how the father\u2019s contact rights would be exercised. Importantly, the first applicant had not sought in court a change in the regime for contact between the child and the father with a view to her and the child moving their primary place of residence to the United Kingdom. In any event, the first applicant had presented in the proceedings before the court only her personal assertions in respect of her future in the United Kingdom, but no evidence to demonstrate the facts she claimed. She purported that she would get married; however, this was an uncertain future occurrence which did not depend solely on her will. The situation would have been entirely different, if she had been married and had settled in good material conditions in another country. In such a case, the question of whether it would be in the child\u2019s interest to join her mother abroad would be open for discussion. However, as this was not the case, in view of the young age of the child, the court found that it was not in her interest for her mother to be granted permission to take her abroad at any time, for an unlimited duration and to unknown destinations throughout the period before the child reached majority. 16.  On 18 December 2011, a little over a year after the final judgment of the Supreme Court of Cassation on the issue of the child\u2019s travel, the first applicant and her partner, who was still living in the UK, married in Bulgaria. Several days earlier, on 1 December 2011, the second applicant\u2019s father had explicitly agreed to her leaving the country with her mother. He signed an initial declaration for the period between 5 January 2012 and 15 June 2012, and has apparently been signing such declarations authorising year-long periods ever since. As a result, the applicants have been able to travel to, live and study in the United Kingdom, where they were at the time of their last correspondence with the Court. 17.  Since leaving Bulgaria in January 2012, the child has been in regular contact with her father over the phone and Skype, and has spent time with him every summer.", "references": ["0", "3", "5", "7", "9", "8", "2", "4", "6", "1", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant, a former police officer, was born in 1962 and lives in Zaporizhzhya. He is also acting on behalf of his son, V., who was born in 1991. 6.  On 13 September 2003 four people, including the applicant, were apprehended by officers of the Zaporizhzhya office of the Security Service of Ukraine (\u0421\u043b\u0443\u0436\u0431\u0430 \u0411\u0435\u0437\u043f\u0435\u043a\u0438 \u0423\u043a\u0440\u0430\u0457\u043d\u0438 \u2013 \u201cthe SBU\u201d) in Novokateshchino village while attempting to transport opiate drugs with a view to selling them on. They were taken to the SBU\u2019s premises for questioning. After being informed of his privilege against self-incrimination, the applicant made a written statement to the effect that he had appeared at the crime scene by chance, at the request of a friend with whom he and his son had been looking for a place to fish. 7.  Later the same day criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant and two other people on suspicion of illegal production, storage and sale of drugs. 8.  On 14 September 2003 criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant and the two others on suspicion of membership of an organised crime group. 9.  On the same date the applicant was arrested. Having been informed of his procedural rights as a suspect, he refused to give evidence without a lawyer present. 10.  On 15 September 2003 the applicant\u2019s wife hired a lawyer, G., to represent the applicant. 11.  On 16 September 2003 the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention was ordered by a court. 12.  On 19 September 2003 the applicant requested that G. be admitted to the proceedings as his lawyer. 13.  On the same date, in the presence of his lawyer, the applicant denied his involvement in the crime. 14.  On 23 September 2003, in the presence of his lawyer, the applicant was charged with drug-related crimes and questioned. He did not want to be informed of his rights and stated that he would not give any evidence during the pre-trial investigation. 15.  On 2 October 2003 the applicant was questioned in the presence of his lawyer. He provided some biographical details as well as information on his family status, state of health and place of residence. 16.  On 18 November 2003 the applicant was again questioned in the presence of his lawyer. 17.  On 15 December 2003 all the criminal proceedings against the applicant were joined. 18.  On 18 December 2003 the applicant was questioned in the presence of his lawyer. He did not confess to the crimes. 19.  On 22 and 23 December 2003 confrontations between the applicant and his co-accused were conducted with his lawyer present. 20.  On 24 December 2003 amended charges were brought against the applicant in his lawyer\u2019s presence. The applicant pleaded not guilty. 21.  On 6 February 2004 the applicant\u2019s wife was admitted to the proceedings as the applicant\u2019s lay representative. 22.  On 10 February 2004, upon his written consent, the applicant was questioned without a lawyer. 23.  On 9 March 2004 the criminal case against the applicant and his co\u2011accused was sent to the Leninsky District Court of Zaporizhzhya (\u201cthe District Court\u201d). During the trial the applicant pleaded not guilty. He maintained that the case had been fabricated by his enemies and that all the evidence had been falsified and was inadmissible. In fact, he, a retired police officer, had been arrested in the company of drug addicts with whom he had been in contact as an advisor to the local police. They might have been producing drugs for their own use. He further claimed that his case should benefit from being examined in camera by a judge who had security clearance, to protect State secrets concerning the functioning of his network of informants. 24.  In May 2004 F., a lawyer hired by the applicant\u2019s wife, was admitted to the proceedings to represent the applicant. 25.  On 25 October 2005, after having heard the case in public hearings, the District Court convicted the applicant and his co-defendants of drug\u2011related offences. The applicant was sentenced to eight-and-a-half years\u2019 imprisonment and the confiscation of his personal property was ordered. 26.  The applicant, represented by his lawyer and his wife, appealed. He repeated his arguments advanced at trial and complained that he had been unable to defend himself properly during the trial as he had been reticent in order to safeguard confidential information concerning the network of informants. He also complained of various procedural breaches in the collection of evidence. He alleged, with no further details, that he had had no access to a lawyer from the first questioning and, even after his lawyer had been allowed access, the authorities had tried to carry out a number of investigative steps without the lawyer present. 27.  On 26 April 2006 the Zaporizhya Regional Court of Appeal allowed the defence\u2019s request to have the proceedings held in camera to prevent public disclosure of information concerning the network of informants and required all the defence lawyers and representatives to undergo security clearance to continue taking part in the proceedings. The applicant\u2019s wife did not receive security clearance in time for the appeal hearing and did not attend it. 28.  On 22 June 2006 the Court of Appeal upheld the trial court\u2019s judgment. 29.  On 18 December 2007, following a prior appeal by the applicant, the Supreme Court of Ukraine quashed this decision and remitted the case for fresh consideration. It noted, in particular, that the applicant\u2019s right to defence had been breached since the applicant\u2019s wife had been unable to take part in the appeal hearing. It further found that the Court of Appeal had addressed the parties\u2019 arguments in a summary way only, while it should have given detailed explanations in response to those arguments. 30.  On 22 December 2008 the Court of Appeal reviewed the case in the presence of the applicant\u2019s wife. It upheld the applicant\u2019s conviction, reduced his sentence to eight years\u2019 imprisonment and ordered the confiscation of his personal property. The conviction was mainly based on the records of the crime-scene inspection and the testimonies of the applicant\u2019s co-defendants, which the trial court found to be corroborated by witness statements, and other evidence in the case. 31.  On 2 July 2009 the Supreme Court of Ukraine rejected the applicant\u2019s request for leave to appeal on points of law. 32.  The applicant\u2019s twelve-year-old son was with him when he was apprehended on 13 September 2003. He was taken with him to the SBU and remained in the same room with the applicant for most of the time. No other family members were informed of the boy\u2019s whereabouts. 33.  On the morning of 14 September 2014, after the applicant had been formally arrested, his son was returned to his mother. 34.  On 3 January 2004 the applicant\u2019s wife lodged a criminal complaint with the Zaporizhzhya regional prosecutor\u2019s office (\u201cthe prosecutor\u2019s office\u201d) in which she alleged, inter alia, that her son had been unlawfully detained at the SBU\u2019s premises between 13 and 14 September 2003. 35.  On 9 February 2004, having questioned the applicant and the SBU officers, the prosecutor refused to institute criminal proceedings as it had been established that no pressure had been applied to the applicant\u2019s son and that he had been able to move freely and had not been deprived of his liberty. It was further noted that the applicant had not complained of the SBU staff\u2019s attitude towards his son. 36.  On 20 April 2004 the applicant\u2019s son challenged the above decision before the Prosecutor General. 37.  In April 2004 the applicant and his wife lodged another complaint concerning the alleged unlawful detention of their son with the prosecutor\u2019s office. 38.  On 7 May 2004 the prosecutor\u2019s office, having questioned the applicant, his wife and son, as well as the SBU officers and some witnesses, refused to institute criminal proceedings in respect of the above complaint, having found no corpus delicti in the officers\u2019 actions. It was established during the relevant investigation that the applicant\u2019s son had been taken to the SBU\u2019s premises at the applicant\u2019s request and had not been arrested or detained and had been returned to his relatives as soon as the decision to arrest the applicant had been taken; and that the applicant had raised no complaints during his son\u2019s stay at the SBU. It was also noted in the relevant resolution that the applicant\u2019s wife had refused to provide her son\u2019s medical file to prove her allegations concerning the worsening of his state of health and that there had been a contradiction in the applicant\u2019s statements and between his and his son\u2019s account of events. The prosecutor thus concluded that the allegations of unlawful deprivation of liberty or of other violations of the applicant\u2019s son\u2019s rights appeared to be ill-founded. He noted that no intention on the part of the officers to interfere with the applicant\u2019s son\u2019s personal security, specifically his freedom of movement, had been established. Likewise, there had been no evidence that the applicant\u2019s son had been subject to any form of pressure or ill-treatment. 39.  On 11 May 2004 the applicant\u2019s wife and son instituted civil proceedings against the SBU before the Zhovtnevy District Court of Zaporizhzhya claiming damages for the unlawful detention of her son. Following a request of the applicant\u2019s wife of 15 October 2004, her civil claim was joined to the criminal proceedings against the applicant. 40.  On 23 July 2004 the deputy prosecutor of Zaporizhzhya Region quashed the resolution of 7 May 2004 as being premature, given that no evidence regarding the applicant\u2019s son\u2019s state of health had been obtained. 41.  On 31 July 2004, having questioned the applicant\u2019s son\u2019s doctors who had observed him in the course of his care previously, the prosecutor again refused to institute criminal proceedings for the same reasons as before. It was noted, inter alia, that none of the doctors had observed any worsening of the applicant\u2019s son\u2019s state of health and that no worsening of his health had been evident from his medical file either. 42.  On 14 October 2004 the prosecutor\u2019s office instituted disciplinary proceedings against two officers of the SBU for their negligence towards the applicant\u2019s son. It noted, inter alia, that the applicant\u2019s son had not been formally arrested (\u0437\u0430\u0442\u0440\u0438\u043c\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0439) but had been kept at the SBU\u2019s premises for no reason and no measures had been taken to return him to his relatives. The prosecutor further observed that the applicant\u2019s son had not been subject to any form of ill-treatment. He also stressed the fact that the applicant\u2019s arrest report had been drafted only the next day after the applicant\u2019s initial arrest, in breach of the requirements of the domestic law. This resolution had been sent to the SBU for relevant measures to be taken. 43.  On 27 October 2004 the SBU informed the prosecutor\u2019s office that the respective officers could no longer be disciplined as the one-year statutory time-limit had expired. It was also observed in that letter that no violations of domestic law by the SBU officers had been established by a number of investigations into the events complained of and that the applicant\u2019s son had stayed with the applicant at the SBU\u2019s premises from 13 to 14 September 2003 at the applicant\u2019s own request. 44.  On 5 November 2004 the applicant\u2019s wife complained to the Prosecutor General about the prosecutor\u2019s decision of 31 July 2004. 45.  On 25 October 2005, when convicting the applicant, the District Court delivered a separate ruling, in which it listed the procedural violations committed by the investigating authorities in the criminal proceedings against the applicant. The fact that the applicant\u2019s son had remained in the SBU\u2019s premises for about twenty-four hours after the applicant\u2019s initial arrest, without his relatives having been informed of his whereabouts and with no medical assistance provided in view of the stress he had been under, was listed among the violations referred to by the court. The Chief of the SBU in Zaporizhzhya was invited by the court to take appropriate measures in view of the above mentioned violations. 46.  On 25 January 2006 the applicant appealed to the Ordzhonikidzevsky District Court of Zaporizhzhya against the prosecutor\u2019s refusal of 31 July 2004 to institute criminal proceedings against the SBU officers. 47.  On 3 April 2006 the applicant\u2019s complaint was left without consideration on the merits. The court noted in this connection that the relevant investigation files had been joined to the criminal case against the applicant and that therefore the prosecutor\u2019s decision was not subject to appeal outside of those criminal proceedings. 48.  During the proceedings in his criminal case before the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court the applicant and his wife repeatedly requested, referring to the separate ruling of 25 October 2005 by the District Court (see paragraph 45 above), that measures be taken to bring the respective officers to trial for the unlawful detention of their son. The case file does not suggest that in their appeals the applicant or his wife claimed damages in this connection. 49.  On 22 December 2008, in its judgment upholding the applicant\u2019s conviction, the Court of Appeal observed that the complaint related to the unlawful detention of the applicant\u2019s son had been considered by the prosecutor\u2019s office and no corpus delicti under criminal law had been found on the part of the SBU officers. The court made no separate ruling in this connection. The Supreme Court did not address this issue in its decision of 2 July 2009.\nII.  Conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention in Zaporizhzhya Pre-Trial Detention Centre no. 10 (\u201cthe SIZO\u201d). 50.  The applicant was detained in the SIZO from 17 September 2003 to 14 July 2006 and from 18 March 2008 to 24 February 2009. 51.  According to the applicant, the conditions of his detention were grossly inadequate. The cells were overcrowded. In particular, a cell measuring 3.8 square metres with one bed could be occupied by eight to ten persons. As a result, detainees had to take turns to sleep. A bucket, which served as a toilet, was located in plain sight one metre away from the eating area. It had no cover and was emptied only once a day. The ventilation was very poor. The cell smelled of excrement, was filled with cigarette smoke and was damp, in particular as the detainees washed and dried their laundry there. It was also infested with cockroaches, lice and bedbugs. The shower, which had lukewarm water, was available only once every ten days. Access to natural daylight was severely limited because of a dense grill on the window. The electric lighting was so dim that it was impossible to read or write without damage to the eyes. The food was meagre and insufficient to meet the detainees\u2019 nutritional needs. Outside walks were available only on a scarce and irregular basis. Detainees sick with contagious diseases, such as tuberculosis, venereal diseases, pediculosis and scabies, were held in the same cells as healthy detainees and not provided with medical assistance. As a result, the applicant also contracted scabies and other skin diseases. 52.  According to the information provided by the Government, the applicant had been held in the following cells while in the SIZO:\ncell no. 18 \u2013 21.87 sq. m ( intended for eight detainees );\ncell no. 65 \u2013 10.99 sq. m (intended for four detainees);\ncell no. 70 \u2013 20.4 sq. m (intended for four detainees);\ncell no. 36 \u2013 12.05 sq. m (intended for four detainees). 53.  The conditions in those cells had been adequate and the space per detainee had not been less than 2.5 sq. m, as provided for by the relevant domestic legislation. All the cells had been equipped with a toilet and a ventilation system. Running water and mains drainage had been available. They noted, referring to the relevant documents, that there had never been a cell measuring 3.8 sq. m in the SIZO. 54.  The Government further stated, referring to the relevant domestic regulations, that detainees had been provided with appropriate food and linen and had had weekly access to shower facilities and one-hour daily walks. They contested the statement that the applicant had shared a cell with smokers and those suffering from infectious diseases, pointing to the applicant\u2019s failure to provide the respective evidence and called attention to the fact that there had been a special isolation wing in the SIZO for detainees suffering from such diseases. 55.  On 10 March 2006, following the applicant\u2019s complaints concerning the improper conditions of his detention in the SIZO, the prosecutor\u2019s office carried out an inspection visit there and found the applicant\u2019s complaint to be partially substantiated. It found, inter alia, that some cells \u2013 not the ones in which the applicant had been detained \u2013 and utility rooms had been in poor sanitary condition and had been infested by cockroaches; and that the cell space for persons infected with tuberculosis had not been in compliance with the relevant domestic standards. The SIZO governor was instructed to remedy the situation. No evidence in support of the applicant\u2019s allegations of improper nutrition and poor lighting had been found.\nIII.  Medical care provided to the applicant in pre\u2011trial detention 56.  On 15 May 2001, following retirement from the police service, the applicant underwent a medical examination and was diagnosed with osteochondrosis, chronic gastritis in remission, chronic hepatitis, chronic pancreatitis, trichromatic anomalies, uric acid diathesis and adiposity of the first degree. According to the applicant, he was advised to undergo inpatient treatment twice a year and to appear before a special panel to decide on whether he had to be assigned disability status in view of his illnesses. He submitted that the relevant medical examination had been scheduled for the end of September 2003 but had not been carried out as he had been arrested. 57.  Upon his arrival at the SIZO the applicant underwent a medical examination during which he raised no complaints about his state of health. His medical file contained a certificate, issued on 14 September 2003 by an emergency hospital, stating that he was suffering from ischaemic heart disease, cardiosclerosis, angiosclerosis of the coronary vessels, symptomatic hypertension, and chronic bronchitis. In view of the available information on the applicant\u2019s illnesses, he was put on the list for regular medical check-ups and was prescribed medical treatment. 58.  On 20 and 23 September, 1 October, 17 November and 24 December 2003, 11 November 2004 and 4 July and 1 December 2005 the applicant complained to the SIZO medical unit of headaches and, on some occasions, of heart pain and dizziness. He was diagnosed with first- or second-degree hypertension and received antihypertensive medication. His blood pressure was subsequently regularly monitored and, when necessary, antihypertensive treatment was provided. 59.  On 20 November 2003, 24 and 30 May and 4 July 2004 and 5 July 2005 the applicant complained to the SIZO medical unit of skin eruptions and itching. He was diagnosed with dermatitis and was provided with the necessary medical treatment. 60.  On 9 October 2003 the applicant was examined by a panel composed of the head of the SIZO medical unit, a general practitioner and a physiotherapist. He was diagnosed with hypertension and prescribed the relevant treatment. 61.  In October 2003 the applicant was registered for follow-up care (\u0434\u0438\u0441\u043f\u0430\u043d\u0441\u0435\u0440\u043d\u0438\u0439 \u043e\u0431\u043b\u0456\u043a) in respect of his hypertension. He underwent urine and blood tests which revealed no pathology. 62.  On 1 March 2004 the applicant underwent a medical check-up. He was diagnosed with second-degree hypertension and nephropathy and was prescribed the relevant medical treatment. It was also recommended that the applicant consult an ophthalmologist and a neuropathologist. 63.  On 15 March 2004 the applicant was examined by a neuropathologist from a regional psychiatric hospital located in prison no. 20 and by an ophthalmologist from a civil hospital. The medication prescribed following the examination was administered to the applicant by the SIZO. 64.  On 30 March 2003, 27 August 2004, 24 February, 23 August and 14 December 2005 the applicant underwent X-ray examinations of his lungs and heart, which revealed no problems. 65.  On 23 April 2004, following a request from the applicant\u2019s lawyer, the applicant was examined by the chief neurosurgeon of the Zaporizhzhya Regional Hospital. The prescribed medication was provided to the applicant by the SIZO medical unit. 66.  On 14 and 23 June 2004 the applicant was examined by a neuropathologist. He was diagnosed with second-degree hypertension and nephropathy and was prescribed vascular and antihypertensive medication. 67.  On 29 October 2004 the applicant underwent a medical check-up. He complained of recurrent headaches and dizziness and was diagnosed with second-degree hypertension and nephropathy. Antihypertensive medications were prescribed. 68.  On 7 November 2005 the applicant was examined by a dermatologist. He was diagnosed with neurogenic dermatitis and prescribed the relevant medication. He was also advised to consult a psychiatrist. 69.  On 28 November 2005 the applicant underwent a medical check-up. He complained of headaches and dizziness. His second-degree hypertension was confirmed following the examination and the relevant treatment was prescribed. 70.  On 2 January 2006 the applicant was examined by a dermatologist and was diagnosed with dermatitis. He was advised to continue the treatment prescribed previously. 71.  On 24 January 2006 the applicant was examined by a panel of SIZO physicians comprised of a psychiatrist, a dermatologist and a general practitioner. He was diagnosed with hypertension, chronic gastritis, chronic pancreatitis in remission, chronic hepatitis in remission, heartburn and a hypertensive neurocirculatory dystonia. The relevant medical treatment was prescribed. 72.  On 10 February 2006 the applicant underwent a medical check-up and was diagnosed with arterial hypertension and hypertensive encephalopathy. The relevant treatment was prescribed. The applicant was further advised to consult a neuropathologist and an ophthalmologist. 73.  On 15 February 2006 the applicant was examined by a medical panel comprised of SIZO and civil-institution physicians (an ophthalmologist, a general practitioner and a neuropathologist). He was diagnosed with symptomatic arterial hypertension and an uncomplicated cerebral crisis. It was concluded that the applicant\u2019s state of health did not necessitate inpatient medical treatment. 74.  On 1 November 2006, when serving his prison term in prison no. 45, the applicant was examined by a group of disability experts and recognised as falling into the third (mildest) category of disability for a one-year period. Outpatient treatment for the illnesses he had been suffering from was recommended. 75.  From 15 December 2003 the applicant\u2019s wife lodged a number of complaints with the SBU, prosecutors, courts and other State authorities alleging, inter alia, that the applicant had been unlawfully arrested and detained; that his health was in a critical condition; and that no relevant medical treatment could have been provided to him within the SIZO. She therefore requested that the preventive measure in respect of the applicant be changed and that he be immediately released from detention. 76.  On 22 December 2003 and 9 January 2004, after a number of enquiries, the SBU informed the applicant\u2019s wife that the applicant\u2019s state of health was compatible with detention and that the SIZO had all the necessary facilities to provide the applicant with qualified medical assistance. 77.  On 3 February 2004 the applicant\u2019s wife complained about the above conclusions before the Prosecutor General. 78.  On 2 June 2004, in reply to the applicant\u2019s lawyer\u2019s query about the medical assistance provided to the applicant, the SIZO informed the lawyer that his state of health was compatible with detention and that he was under the regular supervision of the SIZO medical staff. They further submitted that it was at the court\u2019s discretion to allow medical examination of the applicant by medical specialists from civil institutions. 79.  On 15 August 2004 the applicant\u2019s wife asked the prosecutor\u2019s office to provide truthful information about the applicant\u2019s state of health and stated that adequate medical assistance could not be provided to the applicant in the SIZO in view of the absence of the relevant medical specialists at the detention facility. In the light of this, she asked that the applicant undergo a medical examination in a civil medical institution. 80.  On 24 November 2004 the prosecutor, having conducted an investigation into the matter and having studied the applicant\u2019s medical file, replied to the applicant\u2019s wife that her complaint appeared to be unfounded and that adequate medical assistance was being provided to the applicant in the SIZO. 81.  On 4 July 2005 the applicant\u2019s lawyer lodged an application with the District Court requesting that a medical examination of the applicant by neurologists from civil hospitals be ordered. 82.  On 7 September 2005, following enquiries made by the court upon the lawyer\u2019s request, the SIZO provided the court with a certificate, according to which the applicant was under the permanent supervision of the SIZO medical unit and did not necessitate medical examination by specialists other than those practising in the SIZO. It was further noted that his state of health was compatible with detention as none of his diagnoses were on the list of the illnesses, provided for by law, for which early release was possible. The applicant challenged this conclusion before the Office of the Prosecutor General alleging, inter alia, that the certificate had been forged and issued unlawfully by an unauthorised and unqualified medical officer. To verify the applicant\u2019s complaint, the Zaporizhzhya regional prosecutor\u2019s office conducted enquiries and ordered, inter alia, that the applicant be examined by different medical specialists. 83.  On 24 January 2006, in compliance with the prosecutor\u2019s order, the applicant was medically examined by a panel of SIZO physicians (see paragraph 71 above). It was established in the course of that examination that the applicant had been under the close supervision of the SIZO medical unit and, when the need had arisen, of outside doctors; that twice a year, owing to his diseases, he had undergone a medical checkup; that all his complaints had been adequately addressed; and that his state of health had been compatible with detention. It was further established in the course of the prosecutor\u2019s enquiries that the medical certificate of 7 September 2005 had been issued by an authorised person and had contained objective information and had correctly referred to the applicant\u2019s state of health. 84.  On 2 and 23 February 2006, on the basis of the above conclusions, the prosecutor\u2019s office informed the applicant that no violations on the part of SIZO medical staff had been established. 85.  On 13 February 2006 the applicant again complained to the Prosecutor General regarding the allegedly forged certificate of 7 September 2005. 86.  On 3 March 2006, following further enquiries into the applicant\u2019s complaint and another medical examination of the applicant (see paragraph 73 above), the prosecutor\u2019s office informed him that his allegations appeared to be groundless.", "references": ["7", "6", "2", "5", "0", "9", "8", "3", "4", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant company is a German company based in Auengrund. 6.  In July 1994 the applicant company purchased land underneath which lay a limestone deposit (Kalksteinvorkommen). It acquired a mining licence (Bewilligung) to quarry the deposit for twenty-five years. Subsequently the open-cast quarrying of limestone began. It was necessary that the applicant company operated a plant directly next to the quarry in order to process the limestone into construction material. In 1997 it received permission to use the quarry as a landfill (Deponiezulassung) using waste soil from earthworks at other sites. 7.  Meanwhile, the federal authorities began the planning of a new motorway with the preferred option being a route across the quarry. From 29 October until 6 December 1993 maps and documents were disclosed for public inspection in the municipality where the quarry was located. Additionally, on 28 October 1993 information about the planning process was published in the municipality\u2019s gazette. It was apparent from the disclosed documents that the quarrying operation would be affected by the motorway. However, the extent of the adverse effects was not entirely foreseeable because the exact route had not been finalised. The applicant company claimed that it had not been aware of the planning process when it had bought the land in 1994. 8.  On 7 November 2000, in the light of the chosen route across the quarry, the Bad Salzungen Mining Authority (Bergamt) declined to approve the applicant company\u2019s entire operation plan (Hauptbetriebsplan) for the years 2000-02, an administrative prerequisite to operate and continue operating a quarry. Only quarrying limestone in a specific area was approved and only to the extent that the route for the new motorway was not affected. Consequently, the applicant company had to stop quarrying limestone in 2001 and transferred its activity to another nearby mining site. At the old site, 4,700,000 cubic metres of limestone (67% of the original volume) remained in the ground. The applicant company had to bear the costs of relocating the plant, including the removal of machinery and the construction of roads and buildings. An administrative objection (Widerspruch) it lodged against the decision of the Mining Authority was never decided upon. 9.  On 26 May 2003 the Land of Thuringia issued a planning decision (Planfeststellungsbeschluss) for the construction of the motorway, which stated, inter alia, that it would be too costly and time consuming to circumvent the applicant company\u2019s land. 10.  The applicant company brought an action before the Federal Administrative Court. It requested the annulment of the planning decision; in the alternative that it be stipulated in the planning decision that the applicant company be compensated for the interference in its quarrying operation; or in the alternative that it be stipulated in the planning decision that the Land of Thuringia was obliged to take over the quarrying operation, the remaining land and the mining licence. 11.  On 2 February 2004, after the Federal Administrative Court had stated that the relevant part of the planning decision was not sufficiently precise, the Land modified it. It changed the wording that \u201cthe amount and scale of the compensation [had to] be agreed upon in a private-law agreement\u201d and \u201cif the parties d[id] not reach an agreement, the expropriation authorities [would] determine the compensation in separate compensation proceedings\u201d into the wording that \u201cthe seizure [Inanspruchnahme] entitle[d] to compensation\u201d and that \u201cthe amount and scale of the compensation w[ould] not be decided on in the planning decision\u201d. Subsequently, the applicant company and the Land declared the matter resolved (erledigt) and the Federal Administrative Court therefore decided in 2004 to discontinue the proceedings. It split the costs of the proceedings between the applicant company and the Land. 12.  In 2005 the Federal Government seized the applicant company\u2019s land for road construction purposes after it had reached a settlement with the applicant company during the proceedings concerning provisional seisin (vorl\u00e4ufige Besitzeinweisung). On 19 June 2006, following the initiation of formal expropriation proceedings, a court-sworn expert\u2019s report recorded losses and additional costs amounting to 3,589,566.42 euros (EUR), including the value of the limestone, and forgone profits from the landfill, relocation costs and interest. 13.  On 26 March 2008 the Administrative Office of Thuringia Land (Landesverwaltungsamt) expropriated the part of the applicant company\u2019s land on which the motorway had been built and decided that the Federal Government should compensate the applicant company by a payment of some EUR 865,000. That amount included about EUR 22,800 in compensation for the land value as farmland and some of the costs of the relocation of the plant (new infrastructure, transport of machinery and opening the ground of the new mine). There was no formal expropriation of the mining licence. 14.  Both parties requested a judicial review. The Federal Government was, in particular, of the opinion that the cost of the quarrying plant\u2019s relocation should not be compensated. The applicant company requested compensation of an additional EUR 2,301,649.53 plus interest, specifically EUR 1,108,297.00 for the loss of landfill capacity and the respective profits, EUR 492,763.22 for further relocation costs and EUR 700,589.31 for reduced delivery capacity during the transition period. Claims for compensation regarding the value of the land and the value of the limestone were dropped. 15.  On 18 February 2009 the Meiningen Regional Court dismissed the applicant company\u2019s request and \u2013 on the request of the Federal Government \u2013 reduced the amount of compensation to about EUR 22,800. It held that only the value of the expropriated land \u2013 not taking into account that there existed a limestone deposit underneath it \u2013 had to be compensated. Pursuant to section 124(3) of the Federal Mining Act (Bundesberggesetz, see \u201cRelevant domestic law\u201d, paragraph 22), mining rights under the terms of that Act were granted only on the statutory condition that they would have to yield to a public infrastructure project without compensation. Consequently, the actual right to quarry and the linked costs and losses for relocation and the impeded landfill did not generate a compensation claim. While the acquired mining rights constituted \u201cproperty\u201d under Article 14 of the Basic Law, the holder of a mining licence could not rely on making unhindered use of his or her mining rights; he or she could only operate under the limitations stipulated, inter alia, under section 124(3) of the Federal Mining Act. The planning decision was therefore merely actualising the determination of content and limits already inherent in the acquired mining right. 16.  On 27 January 2010 the Thuringia Court of Appeal dismissed a prior appeal lodged by the applicant company. It held that the construction of the motorway had not led to a loss of the applicant company\u2019s mining rights but only to a factual impairment in the exercise of those rights which followed from the preference given to transport infrastructure projects. The relevant provisions, section 124(3) and (4) of the Federal Mining Act, excluded compensation claims. The clarification of the planning decision had not generated a claim regarding the impairment of the applicant\u2019s mining rights and the business operation linked to it, including the landfill. Article 14 of the Basic Law (see \u201cRelevant domestic law\u201d, paragraph 20) had not been infringed because the measure taken had not been unreasonable, even considering that 67% of the mining right had been rendered valueless. 17.  On 14 April 2011 the Federal Court of Justice dismissed an appeal on points of law by the applicant company. It rejected the claim for compensation for the alleged interference with the mining right, mainly relying on section 124(3) of the Federal Mining Act, and in particular on the grounds that an interference with the rights of an established and operational business enterprise (Eingriff in den eingerichteten und ausge\u00fcbten Gewerbebetrieb) should not be compensated either. The enterprise could not enjoy more extensive protection under the law than the economic basis it rested on: the mining right. Referring to its case-law, it reiterated that it made no difference that the applicant company was the owner of the land and, at the same time, the holder of the mining licence. Under German mining law, both entitlements needed to be assessed separately. 18.  The Federal Court of Justice further acknowledged that quarrying was de facto no longer possible. Mentioning that for reasons of proportionality the planning decision might in a case like the present one call for a formal expropriation of the mining rights with corresponding compensation, it found that such a claim \u2013 as well as the issue of disproportionality as such \u2013 should have been raised in the proceedings concerning the planning decision before the Federal Administrative Court (see paragraph 10). Lastly, it observed that the loss of future profits from the landfill was a mere hope for future returns and could thus not be considered a \u201cproperty right\u201d under Article 14 of the Basic Law, but fell only under Article 12 of the Basic Law (right to exercise one\u2019s profession). 19.  On 21 December 2011 the Federal Constitutional Court declined to consider a constitutional complaint lodged by the applicant company without providing reasons (1 BvR 1499/11).", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "3", "2", "6", "7", "8", "5", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicants were or are still detained in Korydallos prison in Athens. 7.  Among them, applicant no. 1 was released on 20 February 2009, applicants no. 2 and 4 were released on 1 July 2013, applicant no. 5 was released on 21 June 2013, applicant no. 12 was released on 4 November 2013, applicant no. 13 was released on 22 August 2013, applicant no. 25 was released on 30 October 2013, applicant no. 26 was released on 24 May 2013, applicant no. 27 was released on 17 July 2013, applicant no. 30 was released on 5 July 2013, applicant no. 32 was released on 2 October 2013, applicant no. 33 was released on 4 October 2013, applicant no. 34 was released on 10 May 2013 and applicant no. 35 was transferred to Larissa Prison on 20 June 2013. 8.  The applicants alleged that the prison had held 2,400 prisoners while it had been designed to accommodate 700. The applicants had been detained in wings A, B, D and E in various cells which all had measured 9 sq. m, including the sanitary facilities, and accommodated four or five prisoners; the living space for each prisoner had therefore been approximately 2 sq. m or even less. Cells designed for one person had had two beds and two or three worn-out mattresses on the floor. 9.  The toilet facilities had been partially separated from the rest of the cells. Access to natural light and ventilation had been inadequate. In addition, there had been insufficient heating and hot water. Cells had been dirty and overrun with cockroaches and other pests and no attempt had been made to exterminate them. Healthy prisoners had been held together with sick prisoners, resulting in their exposure to contagious diseases. There had been no adequate medical care, in particular as regards psychological and physical health. 10.  The inmates had been confined to their cells for sixteen to seventeen hours per day, as recreational or educational activities had not been provided. More specifically, inmates had been required to stay in their cells as follows: from 6.30 p.m. (on average) to 8.30 a.m. and from 11.30 a.m. to 2.45 p.m. every day. They had had to take their meals, which were of poor quality and nutritional value, inside their cells. 11.  Moreover, the prison had been understaffed and had not been able to secure the prisoners\u2019 safety. 12.  On 21 June 2013 the applicants along with other prisoners lodged a complaint with the prison authorities, protesting about their conditions of detention, but did not receive any reply. 13.  The Government asserted that irrespective of the number of prisoners in each cell, which in any case had not been constant, prisoners had had access to a large yard daily from 8 a.m. to 12 p.m. and from 3 p.m. to thirty minutes before sunset. The prison had had a central heating system and hot water had been available on a daily basis in the morning and in the afternoon. Prisoners additionally had been able to use electric heating devices. Every cell had been furnished with a washbasin, a toilet, wooden shelves, a table and chairs. 14.  All the cells had had a window ensuring sufficient light and ventilation. The cells had been regularly disinfected and had been cleaned twice a day by cleaning crews consisting of detainees. All the applicants except applicants no. 4, no. 17, no. 26 and no. 28 had been engaged in this activity. 15.  As regards prisoners\u2019 meals, the Government submitted the menu of two random weeks to demonstrate that they had been comprised of a variety of food. Meals had been served in the cells and prisoners had eaten at in-cell tables. 16.  Prisoners had been able to play sport and each prisoner had had a personal television set with a headset. In addition, they had had the opportunity to take up one of the 640 jobs available, to take part in educational courses or to attend the \u201csecond chance\u201d school. The renovated room of the reading club and the events hall of the \u201csecond chance\u201d school had been available as recreational areas. 17.  All the detainees had had access to the prison\u2019s infirmary which had been open twenty-four hours per day and there had been twenty doctors of different specialities, including two psychiatrists who had offered consultations to the prisoners. In cases of emergency, inmates had been transferred to the Korydallos Prison Hospital or to an external hospital.", "references": ["6", "5", "3", "7", "8", "2", "4", "9", "0", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "6.  The first applicant is a professional photographer. Since 1998 he has owned and managed a single-member limited liability company through which he operates a photography studio in Plovdiv. 7.  In January 2014 the French authorities informed the Bulgarian Border Police that a Turkish national who had a permit to reside in Bulgaria was suspected of forging Bulgarian identity documents and providing them to Turkish nationals residing unlawfully in France. Electronic surveillance had showed that he had exchanged email messages with an alleged accomplice whose email account was hosted by a Bulgarian Internet service provider. 8.  Enquiries by the Bulgarian Border Police revealed that the email account belonged to the first applicant and his company. A wiretap placed on the Turkish national\u2019s French mobile telephone showed that on 4 March 2014 he had called the photography studio\u2019s landline and talked with a woman who spoke Bulgarian with a Russian accent. They discussed the receipt of the photographs of two people. 9.  On 10-11 March 2014 the Turkish national travelled from Bulgaria to France by car, and was arrested shortly after entering French territory. A search of his car revealed eight fake Bulgarian identity cards, five fake Bulgarian drivers\u2019 licences and six fake Bulgarian passports. 10.  Two days later, on 13 March 2014, the Plovdiv district prosecutor\u2019s office applied for warrants to search the photography studio, the first applicant\u2019s car and the applicants\u2019 house, and seize evidence there. It set out the above developments, and said that it was investigating the forging of identity documents in which the main suspect was the above-mentioned Turkish national. According to the available information, he had received assistance from the first applicant. The applications were worded as follows:\n\u201cIn the course of the proceedings, the need has arisen to carry out a search and seizure in [the applicants\u2019 house, the first applicant\u2019s car, and the photography studio], since the available evidence gives probable cause to suspect that [these places] contain items of relevance to the case \u2013 items relating to the subject matter of the case. I therefore ... ask for permission for an investigator to search [these places] with a view to finding and seizing the above-mentioned items.\u201d 11.  Between 3.30 and 4 p.m. the same day, a judge of the Plovdiv District Court, sitting in private, issued three warrants authorising the searches and seizures in the following terms:\n\u201cThe submitted materials make it clear that it is necessary to carry out a search and seizure in [these places] with a view to finding the items set out in the application[s] \u2011 relating to the forging of identity documents and others, relevant to the case which is the subject matter of the criminal proceedings.\u201d 12.  At about 9 a.m. the following day, 14 March 2014, just as the first applicant was leaving his house, he was intercepted by three police officers, two in plain clothes and one in uniform. 13.  The parties\u2019 accounts of the ensuing events differ widely. According to the applicants, the police did not identify themselves, roughly pinned down and handcuffed the first applicant behind his back, scared his two daughters, the third and fourth applicants, who were minors, and then searched the house in a rude and chaotic manner, without presenting the warrant authorising them to do so. According to the Government, whose account was based on a statement informally obtained from one of the officers who took part in the search, the first applicant attempted to run back to the house, possibly to conceal evidence, and was only handcuffed for that reason. The officers searched the house with restraint, specifically endeavouring not to frighten the two children. They were only looking for computers, mobile telephones and similar devices, and did not rummage needlessly through things in the house. 14.  According to the record of the search, it lasted between 9.15 and 10.50 a.m. and took place in the presence of two certifying witnesses. The police seized eleven SIM cards, identity and other documents, a laptop computer, three mobile Internet dongles, and a mobile telephone. 15.  According to the applicants, after the search the officers dragged the first applicant into the street, bent over with his hands handcuffed behind his back, in sight of many neighbours and passers-by. Between 10.55 and 11.05 a.m. they searched his car, from which they did not seize anything. The officers then put the first applicant in a police car and drove to the photography studio, very close to the corner of a busy pedestrian street in the centre of Plovdiv, which they searched between 11.35 a.m. and 12.30 p.m. They again refused to allow the first applicant to acquaint himself with the search warrant. According to the record of that search, the officers seized three desktop computers, two video cameras, two still cameras, several flash memory cards, flash memory drives, and cash. 16.  At about the same time, between 11.15 and 11.30 a.m. the police searched the first applicant himself, without a judicial warrant. They seized three flash memory drives and two mobile telephones. They submitted the search record to a judge of the Plovdiv District Court, who approved it at 5 p.m. the same day. 17.  The officers then took the first applicant to a police station for a \u201cconversation\u201d. According to the first applicant, he was kept in handcuffs the whole time. The Government denied this, noting that if that had indeed been the case, the first applicant would not have been able to sign the search records and produce a handwritten statement in the police station. 18.  In the statement the first applicant explained, inter alia, that he used the email account in which the police were interested (see paragraphs 7 and 8 above) to exchange computer files, mostly image files, with clients of his photography studio. He stated that he agreed to provide access to the account for the needs of the investigation, so that the police could subject the messages in it relating to the Turkish national to examination by an expert, and then gave his password. The Government submitted that the police had used the password to go through the email account, but had not seized any messages from it. The first applicant was released at about 6 p.m. The police did not issue a written order for his detention. 19.  The first applicant\u2019s wife, the second applicant, came back to Plovdiv later that evening. According to her, she had been contacted earlier during the day by telephone by her older daughter, the third applicant, and had become worried at the news that her husband had been arrested and their daughters left alone, frightened, in the house. She kept calling her daughters and trying to call her husband throughout the day. 20.  On 20 March 2014 the investigator in charge of the case asked a computer expert to copy the data from three of the seized flash memory cards to an optical disk. In his report, submitted the following day, 21 March 2014, the expert said that he had copied all the files from two of the cards and that the third card did not contain any files. 21.  On 6 June 2014 the investigator asked the same expert to copy the data from the laptop computer seized in the applicants\u2019 house to an external hard drive and to inspect the three desktop computers seized in the photography studio for the presence of software or files which could be used for the forging of documents. In his report, submitted on 18 June 2014, the expert said that he had copied 192,610 files with a total size of 333,204 megabytes from the laptop computer to an external hard drive, which he enclosed with his report, and that his inspection of the desktop computers had revealed that two of them contained software programs which could be used to edit image files, and that the third computer was defective and could not be booted up. 22.  It is unclear what happened with the data copied from the laptop computer and the two memory cards. 23.  On 17 March 2014 the first applicant asked the Plovdiv district prosecutor\u2019s office to order the return of all the seized items. He submitted that they were not relevant for the case and that he urgently needed them for his work as a photographer. On 20 March 2014 the prosecutor\u2019s office partly allowed the request and ordered the return of some of the items \u2013 two cameras, two flash memory cards, and two video cameras \u2013 but only after the police had made copies of their contents. The next day, 21 March 2014, those items were given back to the first applicant. On 7 April 2014 he appealed to the Plovdiv regional prosecutor\u2019s office, complaining of the refusal of the lower prosecutor\u2019s office to order the return of the remainder of the seized items. It does not appear that he received a formal reply to his appeal, but on 14 May 2014, two months after the seizure, the investigator in charge of the case gave him back three mobile telephones, three mobile Internet dongles, 1,000 euros (EUR), 100 United States dollars, four flash memory cards, and three flash memory drives. The remainder of the seized items were given back to the first applicant a little more than three months after the seizure, on 18 June 2014, immediately after their contents had been inspected by the expert (see paragraph 21 above). 24.  On 9 July 2014 the police sent the case file to the Plovdiv district prosecutor\u2019s office, recommending that the proceedings be discontinued. On 2 September 2014 that office disagreed and instead decided to stay the proceedings on the grounds that the author of the presumed offence had not been identified. On 10 September 2014 it sent the case file back to the police for further investigation. On 18 March 2015 the police again transmitted the case file to the Plovdiv district prosecutor\u2019s office. It appears that the proceedings are still pending. Neither the first nor the second applicant has been charged with an offence.", "references": ["6", "7", "8", "2", "1", "5", "3", "0", "9", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "5.  On 28 April 1993 the applicant rented a municipally-owned shop in the town of Primorsko. The shop consisted of a metal structure built on a concrete foundation on a municipally-owned plot of land. 6.  On 18 September 1995 the applicant asked Tsarevo Municipal Council to be allowed to purchase the shop under the preferential privatisation procedure for tenants of State and municipally-owned property, as provided for in section 35(1) of the Transformation and Privatisation of State and Municipally-Owned Enterprises Act (\u0417\u0430\u043a\u043e\u043d \u0437\u0430 \u043f\u0440\u0435\u043e\u0431\u0440\u0430\u0437\u0443\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0435 \u0438 \u043f\u0440\u0438\u0432\u0430\u0442\u0438\u0437\u0430\u0446\u0438\u044f \u043d\u0430 \u0434\u044a\u0440\u0436\u0430\u0432\u043d\u0438 \u0438 \u043e\u0431\u0449\u0438\u043d\u0441\u043a\u0438 \u043f\u0440\u0435\u0434\u043f\u0440\u0438\u044f\u0442\u0438\u044f \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe Privatisation Act\u201d). She also expressed the wish to buy the plot of land on which the shop was built. As the municipal council did not reply, the applicant applied for judicial review of the municipality\u2019s tacit refusal to sell the shop to her. The first-instance court rejected that application on 31 March 2003. 7.  In a final judgment of 4 November 2003, rectified for errors in October 2004, the Supreme Administrative Court quashed the lower court\u2019s judgment, finding that it had not dealt with all the evidence submitted by the applicant. The last-instance court then observed that the parties were in agreement that, at the time of her privatisation request, the applicant had had a valid rent contract for the shop with the municipal authorities. It further found, on the basis of the submitted evidence, that the shop constituted a separate property unit measuring 140 square metres and that all statutory conditions for privatising the shop under the preferential privatisation procedure had been present. As to the land on which the shop was built, the court observed that it was not part of the rental contract and thus its inclusion in the privatisation of the shop was a matter of discretion for the municipal authorities. The court referred the case back to Tsarevo Municipal Council with instructions for it to open a privatisation procedure by offering to sell the shop to the applicant. 8.  In 2004 the applicant again asked Tsarevo Municipal Council to examine her privatisation proposal. As she did not receive a reply, she applied for judicial review of its tacit refusal to sell the shop to her. 9.  In a final judgment of 28 November 2005, the Supreme Administrative Court held that the applicant met the conditions for the privatisation of the shop. The court specified that, following changes to the country\u2019s administrative map, the privatisation decision had to be taken by Primorsko Municipal Council and it referred the case back to it. 10.  On 25 November 2005 and later again on 30 October 2006, Primorsko Municipal Council explicitly refused to sell the shop to the applicant. She brought judicial review proceedings in respect of those refusals. 11.  In a final judgment of 31 March 2008 the Supreme Administrative Court revoked the refusals as null and void, finding that the municipal council had been obliged to sell the shop to the applicant. The court briefly noted that, whatever the circumstances, no proof had been presented to it by the municipal council in support of its objection that the shop no longer physically existed. 12.  In the meantime, in March and April 1996, the municipal company managing the shop informed the applicant that she had no lease contract for 1996 and invited her to vacate the premises. On an unknown date in 1997, that company lodged a rei vindicatio claim against the applicant. In a final judgment of 3 July 2002, the Supreme Court of Cassation dismissed the company\u2019s claim, holding that the applicant\u2019s lease contract could not be terminated pending the privatisation procedure pursued by her. 13.  On 16 February 1999 the mayor of Primorsko (hereinafter \u201cthe mayor\u201d) ordered the municipal company to demolish the shop. Following a complaint lodged by the applicant with the Governor of the Burgas Region, the latter revoked the mayor\u2019s order on 18 April 2000, finding that the mayor had not been competent to dispose of municipal property without a prior decision of the municipal council to that effect. The Governor further stated that, pending the privatisation procedure, the lease contract with the applicant could not be terminated. 14.  On an unknown date in 1999, the municipal company sold the shop to a private company. On 12 May 1999 the buyer, assisted by municipal employees, prevented the applicant from entering the shop. Following a complaint lodged by the applicant with the prosecutor, on 27 May 1999 the latter established that the buyer had acted in an abusive manner and ordered the police to assist the applicant in regaining possession of the shop. According to the applicant, after she had re-entered the property she discovered that the electricity supply had been cut off. It appears that she ran the shop without electricity until an unspecified date in 2001, when the electricity supply was restored. 15.  In 2000 the buyer brought a rei vindicatio claim in court against the applicant. In a final judgment of 14 October 2003, the Supreme Court of Cassation dismissed that claim, confirming the reasoning in the lower court\u2019s judgment. The last-instance court found in particular that the buyer had not acquired ownership of the shop and that, in any event, the applicant was protected by the Privatisation Act in that she could not be evicted from the shop pending the examination of her privatisation proposal. 16.  Primorsko Municipal Council considered that the shop was dilapidated and unsafe on account of the corrosion of its metal structure and ordered its sale for demolition. At some point in 2005 the municipal council sold the shop to an individual and on 14 February 2006 the mayor ordered the new buyer to demolish the shop. Even though on the following day, 15 February 2006, the mayor revoked his own order, the buyer dismantled the shop on 18 February 2006 with the assistance of the police. The applicant was informed of the demolition by an acquaintance who happened to pass by the shop on the day it was pulled down. She had not known about the sale of the shop before it was demolished. 17.  The parties dispute what happened to the applicant\u2019s goods and belongings. According to the Government, they were listed and taken for safekeeping. According to the applicant, they were destroyed together with the shop. 18.  In 2006 the applicant requested that criminal proceedings be opened against the mayor and the chairperson of Primorsko Municipal Council for breach of duties and obstruction of the enforcement of a final court judgment. In a decision of February 2007 the prosecutor refused her request. He found that it was impossible to open criminal proceedings as the refusals to privatise the shop had been issued by the municipal council, a collective body, whereas criminal responsibility was personal. 19.  On 18 October 2006 and 22 May 2008 respectively the applicant again requested Primorsko Municipal Council to examine her privatisation proposal. In a letter of 10 September 2008 the council informed her that her case was factually and legally complex, and that an ad hoc commission would be formed to propose a solution. On 20 January 2009 the ad hoc commission proposed that an enquiry be made with the Privatisation Agency (the State body in charge of the privatisation of State-owned property). In two letters dated 5 March 2009, sent respectively to the applicant and the municipality, the Privatisation Agency observed that the question about the demolition of the shop had not been raised in the proceedings before the courts. The Agency nonetheless held that the municipality was obliged to comply with court judgments. 20.  In February 2011, the applicant lodged a claim with the Burgas Administrative Court for damages against the Primorsko municipal authorities for their failure to implement the final judgments in her favour. The claim was lodged under the State and Municipalities Responsibility for Damage Act 1988 (\u201cthe SMRDA\u201d). The court split the claim to be examined into two separate sets of proceedings \u2013 the first one against the municipality (\u043e\u0431\u0449\u0438\u043d\u0430) and the second one against the municipal council (\u043e\u0431\u0449\u0438\u043d\u0441\u043a\u0438 \u0441\u044a\u0432\u0435\u0442). 21.  In the first set of proceedings, in which she challenged the mayor\u2019s order of 14 February 2006 that the shop be demolished (see paragraph 16 above), the applicant sought damages for loss of opportunity (\u043f\u0440\u043e\u043f\u0443\u0441\u043d\u0430\u0442\u0438 \u043f\u043e\u043b\u0437\u0438). The Burgas Administrative Court found that the applicant had no standing to pursue this claim because she had not been the addressee of the mayor\u2019s order. Although the shop had been demolished shortly after the order had been issued, that had been irrelevant in respect of the legal proceedings brought by the applicant, given that she had sought compensation for damage specifically stemming from the mayor\u2019s order. The court dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim and terminated the proceedings. That ruling was upheld by the Supreme Administrative Court in a final decision of 17 October 2011. 22.  In the second set of proceedings the applicant sought both pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages stemming from the failure of the municipal council to decide on her privatisation request by implementing the final court judgments ordering it to offer to sell the shop to her. 23.  She specified that she sought pecuniary damages in respect of: the rent she had had to pay between January 1998, when her request to privatise the shop should have been granted, and February 2006, when the shop had been demolished; those of her belongings that had been destroyed together with the shop; the loss of income resulting from the impossibility of collecting rent from a company with which she had concluded a contract on 17 January 2006 in respect of part of the shop; and the impossibility of increasing her investment by buying the plot on which the shop stood and by building upon it. 24.  In addition, the applicant sought non-pecuniary damages in respect of the intense stress and emotional suffering that had led her to fall into a lasting and severe depression, which had been the result of the shop\u2019s demolition and of the failure of the municipal council to sell it to her, despite the final judgments. She provided medical records in respect of her failing health and the related hospital treatment she had undergone.\n(a)  At first instance 25.  Examining the applicant\u2019s claim, the Burgas Administrative Court considered that she was complaining of the municipal council\u2019s tacit refusal to reply to her request of 23 May 2008 to buy the shop. On 3 January 2014 the court found that both claims, for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages, were admissible. 26.  As to the merits, the court held that the claim for pecuniary damages was unjustified and also that there was no causal link between the municipal council\u2019s refusal to privatise the shop and the applicant\u2019s claims for loss of financial opportunity as a result of the impossibility of buying the land and building on it. 27.  As regards the applicant\u2019s claim for non-pecuniary damages, the court accepted it as justified on the basis of the evidence submitted during the proceedings (see paragraph 24 above). In particular it found that it had been demonstrated that the applicant had suffered significantly as a result of the municipal council\u2019s refusal to open a privatisation procedure vis-\u00e0-vis her. The court held that the applicant\u2019s suffering had been caused by the municipal council\u2019s tacit refusal to act upon the final court judgment of 2008. The applicant had succumbed to depression, which had manifested itself in acute feelings of hopelessness and a perception that any future efforts would be futile, as well as in feelings of helplessness, insomnia, a disturbance of memory functions, and attention disorder. Those conditions had further led to a serious deterioration in the applicant\u2019s family environment, given that she had directed all her frustration and negative emotions towards her young daughter. The court awarded the applicant the entirety of her claim, namely about 20,000 euros (EUR), plus interest, as well about EUR 6,500 for costs and expenses. It further declared null and void the municipality\u2019s tacit refusal to act upon her request of 23 May 2008, and returned the case to it for it to take the appropriate action.\n(b)  At last instance 28.  After an appeal lodged by the municipal council, the Supreme Administrative Court found that the lower court had wrongly concluded that the municipal council\u2019s silence amounted to a new tacit refusal to privatise the shop. The applicant was seeking damages stemming from the absence of a privatisation procedure launched by the municipality in respect of the shop. The administrative procedure concerning the privatisation of the shop had begun with the applicant\u2019s initial request of 18 September 1995 (see paragraph 6 above) and had not been completed. The applicant\u2019s subsequent requests to the same effect had not created a new obligation on the part of the municipality concerning the privatisation of the same shop. 29.  The last-instance court further held that, as regards the first final court decision in the applicant\u2019s favour (that of 4 November 2003) it had not created obligations on the part of Primorsko Municipal Council, given that the respondent party required to act under that decision had been the Tsarevo municipality (see paragraph 7 above). Primorsko Municipal Council had only been expected to act in respect of the second final judgment on that question (see paragraph 9 above). 30.  As regards the municipal authorities\u2019 explicit written refusal of 25 November 2005 to open a privatisation procedure (see paragraph 10 above), the court noted that that refusal had been declared null and void in 2008 by another of its benches for being contrary to the first final court decision of 2003 (see paragraph 11 above). 31.  The last-instance court conceded that, objectively, the declaration of the municipal council\u2019s refusal as null and void corresponded to one of the statutory prerequisites for the pecuniary liability of the council. However, the remaining conditions for the council being held so liable had not been met. In particular, the court held \u2013 without elaborating further \u2013 that the applicant had failed to prove both the existence of actual damage and the causal link of any such damage to the municipal council\u2019s refusal to privatise the shop by offering to sell it to her. 32.  Furthermore, the applicant\u2019s claim in respect of the council\u2019s refusal of 25 November 2005 had been inadmissible on account of the expiry of the five-year limitation period, as calculated as of the date of that refusal. Moreover, the council tacit refusal to act upon the 31 March 2008 court decision was of no consequence, given that the shop had no longer physically existed at that time. 33.  Importantly, the obligation on the municipal authorities to privatise property under the Privatisation Act existed only vis-\u00e0-vis individuals who met the conditions stipulated under that Act. The applicant, however, was not among those persons. The reason was that she had not had a valid contract with the municipality at any of the times when she had requested the latter to sell the shop to her, because the contract concluded in 1993 had expired prior to those times. 34.  Moreover, as a matter of principle, the liability of a municipality, or of the State for that matter, under the SMRDA did not include loss of opportunity but only already incurred losses. Consequently, the applicant could not claim loss of opportunity in these proceedings. 35.  In respect of the applicant\u2019s claim for non-pecuniary damages, the court emphasised that these could only be incurred by an individual and not by an enterprise. It was true that in legal terms the sole trader was a physical, as opposed to a legal, person; however, the damage suffered by the applicant stemmed specifically from the economic activity carried out by her in her capacity as a sole trader. Consequently, the applicant as an individual was not entitled to compensation for damage that could have been sustained in the context of the economic activity of the trader. In view of the above, the lower court had wrongly granted the applicant\u2019s claim for non-pecuniary damages. 36.  On the basis of the above, the Supreme Administrative Court quashed the lower court\u2019s judgment and dismissed the applicant\u2019s claims in a final judgment on 3 December 2014. It also held that the applicant had to pay to the municipal council about EUR 4,000 for legal costs and expenses. 37.  On 5 January 2015 the applicant asked the Supreme Administrative Court to rectify its judgment of 3 December 2014 in the part in which it had ordered her to pay the legal costs claimed by the other party (the municipal council). She pointed out that the municipal council had not presented proof that it had indeed incurred those expenses and that, in any event, the council should not be allowed to benefit from its unlawful failure to implement the judgments in her favour. The applicant sought, alternatively, a reduction in those costs. 38.  The Supreme Administrative Court found her request admissible but rejected it as unjustified (\u043d\u0435\u043e\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0432\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043b\u043d\u0430) in a final decision of 2 June 2015. On 25 November 2015 the bailiff invited the applicant to voluntarily comply with the final judgment of 3 December 2014, indicating that failure to pay the sum due would result in the forced sale of items of the applicant\u2019s personal movable and immovable property.", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "2", "6", "5", "3", "8", "7", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicants were domestic court judges. Proceedings were brought against them, resulting in their dismissal from the post of judge. The facts giving rise to their dismissals were established by the High Council of Justice (\u0412\u0438\u0449\u0430 \u0440\u0430\u0434\u0430 \u044e\u0441\u0442\u0438\u0446\u0456\u0457, hereinafter \u201cthe HCJ\u201d). The HCJ\u2019s decisions were submitted to Parliament or to the President of Ukraine (depending on which of those authorities had appointed the applicants to the post of judge) for the final decisions on their dismissals. 6.  The applicants further unsuccessfully challenged their dismissals before the Higher Administrative Court (\u201cthe HAC\u201d) or other courts. 7.  On 4 February 2004 the HCJ established that the applicant had breached the judicial oath. It decided to make submission to Parliament to have the applicant dismissed from the post of judge for \u201cbreach of oath\u201d. The HCJ noted that the applicant had ignored the instructions given to him by the chairman and deputy chairman of his court. In addition, the applicant had unlawfully instituted criminal proceedings against the chairman of the court. The HCJ further noted that the applicant had disregarded the internal rules of the court, his professional competence had not improved and he had had communication difficulties with colleagues from the court. It rejected the applicant\u2019s contentions that the dismissal proposal had not been based on the real facts and that the chairman of the court had been biased against him and had interfered with the applicant\u2019s professional activity. The HCJ concluded that the applicant had not fairly and duly performed his duties and had to be dismissed. 8.  On 22 May 2008 Parliament voted for the applicant\u2019s dismissal and adopted a resolution to that effect.\n(a)  Challenging the HCJ decision 9.  The applicant challenged the HCJ\u2019s decision concerning his dismissal before the courts. 10.  On 13 July 2007 the Shevchenkivskyy District Court of Kyiv rejected the applicant\u2019s claim as unsubstantiated. 11.  On 26 October 2010 the Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeal upheld the judgment. 12.  On 2 November 2010 the applicant unsuccessfully applied to the court of appeal for a copy of the decision of 26 October 2010. 13.  On 17 and 19 November 2010 the applicant lodged cassation appeals against that decision with the HAC. He was not informed about the outcome of the proceedings before the HAC.\n(b)  Challenging the parliamentary resolution 14.  On 22 April 2009 the applicant challenged the parliamentary resolution of 22 May 2008 before the Kyiv Administrative Court. 15.  On 13 October 2009 the court suspended the proceedings pending the outcome of the proceedings concerning the lawfulness of the HCJ\u2019s decision. 16.  On 16 August 2012 the court decided to leave the applicant\u2019s claim without consideration on the merits. 17.  On 7 June 2010 the HCJ established that the applicant had breached the judicial oath. It decided to make submission to the President of Ukraine to have the applicant dismissed from the post of judge for \u201cbreach of oath\u201d. The HCJ noted that the applicant, acting as a first-instance judge, had disregarded the rules governing territorial jurisdiction in a case concerning a labour dispute in a State company. It further found that he had violated the rules governing the interim measures in that case. Substantial damage to the State had been caused as a result of the interim measure ordered. 18.  On 6 July 2010 the President of Ukraine issued a decree dismissing the applicant from the post of judge on grounds of \u201cbreach of oath\u201d. 19.  The applicant instituted proceedings in the HAC challenging the HCJ\u2019s decision and the Presidential decree concerning his dismissal. 20.  On 28 July 2010 the HAC upheld the factual findings and legal assessments of the HCJ in the applicant\u2019s case and dismissed the claims as unsubstantiated. 21.  On 17 May 2010 the HCJ established that the applicant had breached the judicial oath. It adopted two decisions on making submissions to Parliament to have the applicant dismissed from the post of judge for \u201cbreach of oath\u201d. The HCJ noted that the applicant had systematically made procedural mistakes when administering justice, had adopted decisions in breach of domestic law and had wrongly applied interim measures. The HCJ also considered that the applicant had incurred expenses which were manifestly incommensurate with his official income. The HCJ concluded that the facts of the case suggested that the applicant had dishonoured the judicial profession and cast doubt on his objectivity and impartiality. Objections raised by the applicant were rejected as unsubstantiated. 22.  On 3 June 2010 Parliament voted for the applicant\u2019s dismissal and adopted a resolution to that effect. 23.  The applicant instituted proceedings in the HAC challenging the HCJ\u2019s decisions and the parliamentary resolution concerning his dismissal. 24.  On 13 August 2010 the HAC rejected the applicant\u2019s claims as unsubstantiated. 25.  On 11 June 2009 the HCJ established that the applicant had breached the judicial oath. It therefore decided to make a submission to Parliament to have him dismissed from the post of judge for \u201cbreach of oath\u201d. The HCJ noted that the applicant had adopted several unlawful and unsubstantiated decisions and had failed to follow procedural rules when administering justice. Objections raised by the applicant were rejected as unsubstantiated. 26.  On 3 June 2010 Parliament voted for the dismissal of the applicant and adopted a resolution to that effect. 27.  The applicant instituted proceedings against Parliament challenging his dismissal before the HAC. In his claim he also argued that the conclusions of the HCJ were unfounded and unlawful; there had been violations in the proceedings before the HCJ. The HCJ joined the proceedings as a third party. 28.  On 18 August 2010 the HAC rejected the applicant\u2019s claims as unsubstantiated. It found that the HCJ\u2019s conclusions were well-founded and that the decisions of the HCJ and Parliament were lawful. 29.  On 26 May 2010 the HCJ established that the applicant had breached the judicial oath. It adopted three decisions on making submissions to Parliament to have the applicant dismissed from the post of judge for \u201cbreach of oath\u201d. The HCJ noted that the applicant had adopted a number of unlawful and unsubstantiated decisions and that she had failed to follow procedural rules when administering justice. The HCJ considered that the applicant\u2019s procedural mistakes had dishonoured the judicial profession, cast doubt on her objectivity and impartiality, and suggested that she had to be dismissed. Objections raised by the applicant were rejected as unsubstantiated. 30.  On 17 June 2010 Parliament voted for the dismissal of the applicant and adopted a resolution to that effect. 31.  The applicant instituted proceedings in the HAC challenging one of the HCJ\u2019s decisions of 26 May 2010 and the parliamentary resolution concerning her dismissal. 32.  On 23 September 2010 the HAC considered the case. It found that the HCJ\u2019s decision was lawful and substantiated. As to the other two decisions taken on the same day by the HCJ, the HAC noted that the applicant had not challenged them. The HAC concluded that there were no grounds to examine the lawfulness of the HCJ\u2019s other decisions. The HAC further found that the applicant\u2019s right to participate in the plenary session of Parliament had not been respected and declared the parliamentary resolution in respect of the applicant unlawful. 33.  On 23 December 2010 Parliament once again voted for the dismissal of the applicant (on the basis of the HCJ\u2019s decisions of 26 May 2010) and adopted a resolution to that effect. 34.  The applicant instituted proceedings in the HAC challenging the second resolution of Parliament. 35.  On 31 May 2011 the HAC rejected the claim as unsubstantiated. It found that the procedure for the applicant\u2019s dismissal in Parliament and the resolution to that effect were lawful. 36.  On 7 June 2010 the HCJ established that the applicant had breached the judicial oath. It therefore decided to make submission to the President of Ukraine to have him dismissed from the post of judge for \u201cbreach of oath\u201d. The HCJ noted that the applicant had wrongly applied an interim measure in a case where the Ministry of Justice had been the defendant. It concluded that the violation had cast doubt on the applicant\u2019s objectivity and impartiality, and suggested that he had not duly performed his duties and had dishonoured the judicial profession. 37.  On 18 June 2010 the applicant was dismissed by decree of the President of Ukraine. 38.  The applicant challenged his dismissal before the HAC. 39.  On 27 January 2011 the HAC found that the HCJ\u2019s decision was unlawful. It then noted that the applicant had not sought to have the presidential decree concerning his dismissal \u201cdeclared unlawful\u201d but had sought the \u201cquashing\u201d of that decree. However, such a measure was outside the competence of the HAC. In that regard the HAC referred to Article 11 of the Code of Administrative Justice (\u201cthe CAJ\u201d) considering that it was prevented by that provision from examining the case beyond the scope of the claims. 40.  On 18 March 2014 the Acting President of Ukraine reversed the Presidential decree of 18 June 2010 concerning the applicant\u2019s dismissal, having regard to the HAC\u2019s decision of 27 June 2011. 41.  On 19 March 2014 the applicant resumed his office of judge. 42.  On 6 December 2010 the HCJ established that the applicant had breached the judicial oath. It adopted two decisions on making submissions to Parliament to have the applicant dismissed from the post of judge for \u201cbreach of oath\u201d. The HCJ noted that the applicant had violated procedural rules when administering justice and that he had interfered with the activities of the law-enforcement authorities when they carried out a search operation. Those violations had cast doubt on the applicant\u2019s objectivity and impartiality, and suggested that he had not performed his duties properly. The HCJ rejected the applicant\u2019s contentions challenging the dismissal proposal. 43.  On 23 December 2010 Parliament voted for the dismissal of the applicant and adopted a resolution to that effect. 44.  The applicant challenged the decisions of the HCJ and Parliament concerning his dismissal before the HAC. 45.  On 6 April 2011 the HAC rejected the applicant\u2019s claims as unsubstantiated. According to the applicant, on that day the HAC delivered only the introductory and operative parts of the decision. 46.  On 5 May 2011 the HAC dispatched a copy of the full text of the decision to the applicant. Allegedly, the applicant received that letter on 7 May 2011. 47.  On 1 March 2011 the HCJ established that the applicant had breached the judicial oath. It therefore decided to make submission to Parliament to have the applicant dismissed from the post of judge for \u201cbreach of oath\u201d. The HCJ noted that the applicant had adopted several unlawful and unfounded decisions, had wrongly applied an interim measure, and had committed procedural errors when administering justice. The HCJ considered that those violations had cast doubt on the applicant\u2019s objectivity, impartiality and independence; they also suggested that she had ignored requirements of domestic law and had failed to perform her duties properly. The HCJ rejected objections raised by the applicant as unfounded. 48.  The applicant challenged the HCJ\u2019s decision before the HAC. 49.  On 2 June 2011 the HAC rejected the applicant\u2019s claim as unsubstantiated. 50.  On 7 July 2011 a draft parliamentary resolution concerning the applicant\u2019s dismissal was not adopted by a majority vote in Parliament. 51.  On 3 November 2011 Parliament voted for the dismissal of the applicant and adopted a resolution to that effect. 52.  On 17 May 2012 the HAC rejected as unfounded the applicant\u2019s claim against the HCJ and Parliament concerning her dismissal, noting in particular that the HCJ decision of 1 March 2011 had been earlier reviewed by the HAC. The HAC further found no violations in the parliamentary procedure for the applicant\u2019s dismissal. 53.  On 26 May 2010 the HCJ established that the applicant had breached the judicial oath. It therefore decided to make submission to Parliament to have him dismissed from the post of judge for \u201cbreach of oath\u201d. The HCJ noted that the applicant had participated, as a presiding judge, in the consideration of a case in which Judge V., a relative of his, had been a third party. The consideration of that case had resulted in a wrong decision, which had been quashed by a higher court. The HCJ further noted that the applicant had concealed the fact that he and Judge V. were related. The HCJ considered that those facts had cast doubt on the applicant\u2019s objectivity and impartiality; they suggested that he had dishonoured the judicial profession, neglected the ethical rules of judicial conduct, and failed to carry out his duties properly. The HCJ rejected objections raised by the applicant as unfounded. 54.  On 17 June 2010 Parliament voted for the dismissal of the applicant and adopted a resolution to that effect. 55.  The applicant instituted proceedings in the HAC challenging the resolution of Parliament and arguing that the conclusions of the HCJ were unfounded and unlawful. 56.  On 15 September 2010 the HAC considered the case. It noted that the applicant had not challenged the HCJ\u2019s decision as such; nor had he indicated the HCJ as a party to the proceedings. The HAC concluded that there were no grounds to examine the lawfulness of the HCJ\u2019s decision in respect of the applicant. It further found that the applicant\u2019s right to participate in the parliamentary procedure had not been respected and declared the parliamentary resolution concerning the applicant unlawful. 57.  On 23 December 2010 Parliament once again voted for the dismissal of the applicant (on the basis of the HCJ\u2019s decision of 26 May 2010) and adopted a resolution to that effect. 58.  The applicant instituted proceedings in the HAC, challenging the second resolution of Parliament. He claimed that the conclusions of the HCJ were unfounded and unlawful, and that there had been violations in the proceedings before the HCJ. He requested that the HCJ be admitted to the case as a third party. 59.  On 5 July 2011 the HAC considered the case and rejected the claim as unsubstantiated. It noted that the applicant had not challenged the HCJ\u2019s decision as such and found that there were no grounds to review its findings. The HAC further found that the procedure for the applicant\u2019s dismissal in Parliament and the resolution to that effect were lawful. 60.  On 6 December 2010 the HCJ established that the applicant had breached the judicial oath. It decided to make submission to Parliament to have the applicant dismissed from the post of judge for \u201cbreach of oath\u201d. The HCJ noted that the applicant had wrongly applied domestic law in land and administrative cases and had not followed procedural rules when dealing with those cases. It concluded that those violations had cast doubt on the applicant\u2019s objectivity and impartiality; they suggested that he had failed to carry out his duties properly and had dishonoured the judicial profession. Objections raised by the applicant were dismissed as unfounded. 61.  On 21 April 2011 Parliament voted for the applicant\u2019s dismissal and adopted a resolution to that effect. 62.  On 19 May 2011 the applicant applied to the HAC challenging the HCJ\u2019s decision and the parliamentary resolution concerning his dismissal. He also claimed that he had missed the deadline for challenging the HCJ decision because of the serious illness of his child. 63.  On 21 June 2011 the HAC left the applicant\u2019s claim against the HCJ without consideration, finding that the applicant had missed the deadline for challenging the HCJ decision without a valid reason. 64.  On 21 July 2011 the HAC dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim against the parliamentary resolution as unsubstantiated. It noted in particular that the applicant had been informed of the plenary meeting of Parliament and that his failure to appear did not give grounds for declaring the parliamentary resolution unlawful. 65.  On 26 May 2010 the HCJ established that the applicant had breached the judicial oath. It therefore decided to make submission to Parliament to have the applicant dismissed from the post of judge for \u201cbreach of oath\u201d. The HCJ found that the applicant had failed to follow procedural rules when administering justice in a corporate dispute and had adopted an unlawful decision in that case. It considered that those violations suggested that the applicant had dishonoured the judicial profession and had not acted diligently and impartially. Objections raised by the applicant were dismissed as unfounded. 66.  On 17 June 2010 Parliament voted for the dismissal of the applicant and adopted a resolution to that effect. 67.  The applicant instituted proceedings in the HAC challenging the HCJ\u2019s decision and the resolution of Parliament. 68.  On 18 August 2010 the HAC found that the decision of the HCJ was lawful. As to the proceedings in Parliament, the HAC found that the applicant\u2019s right to participate in the parliamentary procedure had not been respected and declared the parliamentary resolution in respect of the applicant unlawful. 69.  On 23 December 2010 Parliament once again voted for the dismissal of the applicant (on the basis of the HCJ\u2019s decision of 26 May 2010) and adopted a resolution to that effect. 70.  The applicant instituted proceedings in the HAC challenging the second resolution of Parliament. At the applicant\u2019s request, the HCJ joined the case as a third party. 71.  On 28 September 2011 the HAC considered the case and rejected the claim as unfounded. It noted that the HCJ\u2019s decision of 26 May 2010 had been earlier reviewed by the HAC. It then found that the procedure for the applicant\u2019s dismissal in Parliament and the resolution to that effect were lawful. 72.  On 14 June 2011 the HCJ established that the applicant had breached the judicial oath. It decided to make submission to Parliament to have him dismissed from the post of judge for \u201cbreach of oath\u201d. The HCJ noted that the applicant had adopted several unlawful decisions and had committed procedural errors when administering justice. It considered that his errors had cast doubt on his objectivity, impartiality and independence, and suggested that he had not performed his duties properly. 73.  On 22 September 2011 Parliament voted for the applicant\u2019s dismissal and adopted a resolution to that effect. 74.  On 4 October 2011 the HAC dismissed a claim brought by the applicant concerning the alleged unlawfulness of the HCJ decision. 75.  On 21 February 2007 the HCJ established that the applicant had breached the judicial oath. It decided to make a submission to Parliament to have her dismissed from the post of judge for \u201cbreach of oath\u201d. The HCJ noted that the applicant had wrongly applied an interim measure in a corporate dispute by which she had groundlessly interfered with the economic activities of a company; she had also failed to follow procedural rules when administering justice in that case. The HCJ found that those violations suggested that the applicant had not acted lawfully, impartially and independently. Objections raised by the applicant were rejected as unsubstantiated. 76.  On 5 June 2008 Parliament voted for the applicant\u2019s dismissal and adopted a resolution to that effect. 77.  The applicant challenged her dismissal before the Vinnytsya Administrative Court, arguing that the HCJ and Parliament had acted unlawfully. 78.  On 28 November 2008 that court rejected the applicant\u2019s claim as unfounded. 79.  On 16 December 2009 the Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal lodged by the applicant. 80.  On 6 March 2012 the HAC dismissed a cassation appeal lodged by the applicant. 81.  On 24 January 2012 the HCJ established that the applicant had breached the judicial oath. It decided to make a submission to Parliament to have him dismissed from the post of judge for \u201cbreach of oath\u201d. The HCJ noted that the applicant had on several occasions taken leave without obtaining the relevant approval from the court administration; he had failed to appear in the office without valid reasons; he had prevented his judicial assistant from performing his functions; he had refused to take cases for consideration; and he had not complied with the requirement to submit income-tax declarations. Having regard to those facts, the HCJ found that the applicant had neglected his professional duties, dishonoured the judicial profession and had to be dismissed. 82.  On 12 April 2012 Parliament voted for the applicant\u2019s dismissal and adopted a resolution to that effect. 83.  Between February and August 2012 the applicant attempted to institute proceedings in the HAC challenging the HCJ\u2019s decision. By several decisions the HAC refused to open proceedings, noting that the applicant had failed to prepare and submit his claim in accordance with the requirements of the CAJ. 84.  The applicant instituted proceedings before the HAC, challenging the parliamentary resolution on his dismissal. 85.  On 5 June 2012 the HAC rejected the applicant\u2019s claim as unsubstantiated. 86.  On 24 January 2012 the HCJ established that the applicant had breached the judicial oath. It decided to make a submission to Parliament to have him dismissed from the post of judge for \u201cbreach of oath\u201d. The HCJ noted that the applicant had on several occasions taken leave without obtaining the relevant approval from the court administration; he had failed to appear in the office without valid reason; he had refused to take cases for consideration; he had delayed the examination of criminal cases; he had prevented his judicial assistant from performing his functions; and he had not complied with the requirement to submit income-tax declarations. Having regard to those facts, the HCJ found that the applicant had neglected his professional duties, dishonoured the judicial profession and had to be dismissed. 87.  On 12 April 2012 Parliament voted for the applicant\u2019s dismissal and adopted a resolution to that effect. 88.  Between February and August 2012 the applicant attempted to institute proceedings in the HAC, challenging the HCJ\u2019s decision. By several decisions the HAC refused to open proceedings, noting that the applicant had failed to prepare and submit his claim in accordance with the requirements of the CAJ. 89.  The applicant instituted proceedings before the HAC, challenging the parliamentary resolution on his dismissal. 90.  On 27 June 2012 the HAC rejected the applicant\u2019s claim as unsubstantiated. 91.  On 24 January 2012 the HCJ established that the applicant had breached the judicial oath. It decided to make a submission to Parliament to have the applicant dismissed from the post of judge for \u201cbreach of oath\u201d. The HCJ noted that the applicant had on several occasions taken leave without obtaining the relevant approval from the court administration; he had failed to appear in the office without valid reason; he had refused to take cases for consideration; he had shown disrespect to the officers of the court registry; and he had not complied with the requirement to submit income-tax declarations. Having regard to those facts, the HCJ found that the applicant had neglected his professional duties, dishonoured the judicial profession and had to be dismissed. 92.  On 12 April 2012 Parliament voted for the applicant\u2019s dismissal and adopted a resolution to that effect. 93.  Between February and October 2012 the applicant attempted to institute proceedings in the HAC, challenging the HCJ\u2019s decision. By several decisions the HAC refused to open proceedings, noting that the applicant had failed to prepare and submit his claim in accordance with the requirements of the CAJ. 94.  The applicant instituted proceedings before the HAC, challenging the parliamentary resolution on his dismissal. 95.  On 20 September 2012 the HAC rejected the applicant\u2019s claim as unsubstantiated. 96.  On 29 May 2012 the HCJ established that the applicant had breached the judicial oath. It decided to make submission to Parliament to have the applicant dismissed from the post of judge for \u201cbreach of oath\u201d. The HCJ found that the applicant had committed numerous procedural errors when reviewing, under newly discovered circumstances, a case involving local authorities. The HCJ considered that the errors had been committed intentionally; they cast doubt on the applicant\u2019s objectivity and impartiality and called for his dismissal. Objections raised by the applicant were rejected as unsubstantiated. 97.  The applicant instituted proceedings in the HAC, challenging the HCJ\u2019s decision. 98.  On 21 June 2012 a draft parliamentary resolution concerning the applicant\u2019s dismissal was not adopted by a majority vote. 99.  On 4 July 2012 the HAC rejected the applicant\u2019s claim against the HCJ as unsubstantiated. According to the applicant, he received the full text of the decision between 24 and 26 July 2012. 100.  On 5 July 2012 Parliament voted for the applicant\u2019s dismissal and adopted a resolution to that effect. 101.  The applicant instituted proceedings before the HAC, challenging the resolution of Parliament. 102.  On 4 September 2012 the HAC considered the case and rejected the claim as unfounded. It noted that the HCJ\u2019s decision of 29 May 2012 had been earlier reviewed by the HAC. It further found that the parliamentary procedure for the applicant\u2019s dismissal and the resolution to that effect were lawful. 103.  On 16 October 2012 the HCJ established that the applicant had breached the judicial oath. It decided to make submission to Parliament to have her dismissed from the post of judge for \u201cbreach of oath\u201d. The HCJ noted that the applicant, as a member of a panel of judges, had participated in the consideration of a criminal case and the adoption of the judgment in that case. Subsequently, that judgment had been partly quashed by a higher court on the grounds that it was unsubstantiated and the sentence was too lenient. The HCJ considered that the first-instance court\u2019s judgment had had negative consequences: it had caused discontent in society, since the criminal case had been widely discussed in the media. The HCJ concluded that the applicant had disregarded the requirements of procedural law, had not acted diligently and impartially when considering the criminal case and had to be dismissed. Objections raised by the applicant were rejected as unfounded. 104.  The applicant instituted proceedings before the HAC, challenging the HCJ\u2019s decision. 105.  On 28 February 2013 the HAC rejected the applicant\u2019s claims as unsubstantiated. It noted, among other things, that the HCJ had repeatedly postponed the hearings due to the applicant\u2019s failure to appear and had properly informed the applicant of the hearings. 106.  On 23 May 2013 Parliament voted for the applicant\u2019s dismissal and adopted a resolution to that effect.", "references": ["7", "1", "2", "9", "8", "0", "6", "5", "No Label", "3", "4"], "gold": ["3", "4"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1967 and lives in Lviv. 5.  Between March 1995 and July 1996 the applicant underwent outpatient treatment for overactive thyroid at the State Oncology Centre in Lviv. She was treated by Dr S. 6.  In July 1996 the applicant\u2019s health deteriorated; she was examined at the State Endocrinology Centre in Lviv and was diagnosed with hypothyroidism. From 13 November to 10 December 1996 the applicant underwent inpatient treatment for hypothyroidism at the Endocrinology Centre. The applicant told the doctors that her hypothyroidism resulted from the treatment with a radiopharmaceutical, J-131 (radioactive iodine), which Dr S. had administered to her between March 1995 and July 1996. The doctors from the Endocrinology Centre recorded in the applicant\u2019s medical file that the applicant suffered from hypothyroidism resulting from the treatment with radiopharmaceuticals. Eventually, the applicant lost her thyroid and was recognized as suffering from the second highest official degree of disability. 7.  On 10 October 1997, at the applicant\u2019s request, Dr S. issued her a certificate stating that throughout 1996 the applicant\u2019s treatment included injections of a radiopharmaceutical, namely radioactive iodine J-131. Dr S. did not specify the dosage or dates on which the applicant had received the injections. 8.  In May and June 1998 the applicant complained to the Lviv Department of the Ministry of Health (\u201cthe Department\u201d) that the radiopharmaceuticals administered to her by Dr S. had seriously damaged her health. 9.  The Department invited the applicant to undergo a medical examination at one of the hospitals in Lviv, however she refused. The Department checked the records of the Oncology Centre and found that they contained no data as regards the applicant\u2019s alleged treatment with radiopharmaceuticals. It was further noted that, according to the applicant\u2019s medical records, between 1995 and 1996 her diagnosis had been unclear. That being the case, the treatment mentioned in the certificate of 10 October 1997 had been inadequate. The Department recommended the Oncology Centre to dismiss Dr S. for that reason. Shortly afterwards Dr S. retired from the Oncology Centre of her own motion. 10.  In July 1998 the applicant complained to the Lviv prosecutor\u2019s office that Dr S. had treated her with J-131, that the treatment had been inadequate and that it had destroyed her thyroid. To support her complaint, the applicant submitted the certificate of 10 October 1997. 11.  In January 1999 an official investigation was launched into the applicant\u2019s complaint which was carried out initially by the prosecutors and later by the police. In the course of the investigation the applicant, Dr S. and a number of other persons were questioned. Also, several forensic examinations were performed. A number of decisions were taken rejecting the applicant\u2019s complaint principally for the reason that, according to the forensic reports, it was impossible to establish the cause of the destruction of the applicant\u2019s thyroid. Those decisions were eventually quashed for incomplete investigation. The most recent decision in that regard was taken by the Frankivskyy District Court in Lviv on 18 January 2016, by which it instructed the police to carry out further investigation in the applicant\u2019s case, finding inter alia that the police had failed to examine all pertinent evidence and that an additional forensic examination was necessary. The investigation has not been completed to date.", "references": ["4", "2", "8", "9", "3", "7", "5", "6", "0", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Kaunas. 6.  In March 2008 the applicant\u2019s mother passed away. At the time of her death, her estate consisted of an apartment, a car, and cash savings of 6,360 Lithuanian litai (LTL, approximately 1,842 euros (EUR)). In her will she left half of the apartment to the applicant\u2019s niece and the remaining property to the applicant and his sister in equal parts. On 27 May 2008 the applicant renounced his part of the inheritance (see paragraph 20 below). 7.  In September 2008 V.L. brought a claim against the applicant before the Kaunas District Court. V.L. submitted that the applicant owed her LTL 14,488 (approximately EUR 4,196) in maintenance payments for their son which he had not paid because he had been insolvent. V.L. argued that by renouncing his part of the inheritance the applicant had violated her rights as a creditor because the inherited property could have been used to cover the applicant\u2019s debt. V.L. therefore invoked Article 6.66 of the Civil Code (see paragraph 23 below) and asked the court to annul the renouncement as being contrary to the interests of the applicant\u2019s creditors. She also asked the court to recognise that the applicant had de facto accepted the inheritance because he had been using his mother\u2019s estate since her death (see paragraph 21 below). 8.  In October 2008 a similar claim under Article 6.66 of the Civil Code was brought by D.L. She submitted that the applicant had been under an obligation to pay her maintenance and that he owed her LTL 8,734 (approximately EUR 2,530). D.L. asked the court to annul the applicant\u2019s renouncement of the inheritance and to recognise that he had de facto accepted it. In March 2009 the Kaunas District Court decided to examine V.L.\u2019s and D.L.\u2019s claims together. 9.  The Kaunas District Court held an oral hearing on 11 November 2009 in which the applicant and both claimants were present. The applicant argued that he had renounced his part of the inheritance for the benefit of his sister who had paid all the expenses of their mother\u2019s funeral. The applicant also submitted that his sister and niece had accepted the entire inheritance and that he had not used any of the property belonging to his late mother\u2019s estate. 10.  On 25 November 2009 the Kaunas District Court partly upheld V.L.\u2019s and D.L.\u2019s claims. It held that the applicant had acted in bad faith by renouncing the inheritance while being insolvent and owing money to the claimants. Accordingly, the court annulled the renouncement on the grounds that it violated the interests of the applicant\u2019s creditors (see paragraph 23 below). However, the court held that there was insufficient evidence to find that the applicant had de facto accepted the inheritance and dismissed that part of the claim. 11.  The applicant appealed against that judgment. D.L. also appealed but the Kaunas District Court refused to accept her appeal for examination because of formal deficiencies \u2013 D.L. had asked to be completely exempted from paying court fees on the grounds that she was disabled and had a low income, but domestic law allowed only for partial exemptions (see paragraph 24 below). D.L. was given ten days to correct the deficiencies in her appeal. On 28 January 2010 the Kaunas District Court held that D.L. had not submitted a corrected appeal within that time-limit so it considered that she had not appealed (see paragraph 25 below). However, on 1 February 2010 the Kaunas District Court referred both the applicant\u2019s and D.L.\u2019s appeals to the Kaunas Regional Court. 12.  On 3 February 2010 the applicant received notice from the Kaunas District Court that the civil case and both his and D.L.\u2019s appeals had been referred to the Kaunas Regional Court, and he was asked to submit a reply to D.L.\u2019s appeal within twenty days. However, a copy of D.L.\u2019s appeal was not enclosed. The applicant sent a letter to the Kaunas Regional Court requesting a copy of the appeal. He received it on 10 April 2010 and submitted a reply on 16 April 2010. 13.  Subsequently the applicant asked the Kaunas Regional Court to proceed with the examination of the case in his absence \u2013 the applicant stated that he had presented all his arguments in his appeal and in his reply to D.L.\u2019s appeal and had nothing else to add. On 15 September 2010 the Kaunas Regional Court held an oral hearing from which the applicant and D.L. were absent but where D.L.\u2019s lawyer was present. 14.  By a judgment of 29 September 2010 the Kaunas Regional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld D.L.\u2019s appeal. The court upheld the findings of the first-instance judgment that the applicant had acted in bad faith by renouncing the inheritance while being insolvent and owing money to his creditors (see paragraph 10 above). The Kaunas Regional Court also found that since his mother\u2019s death the applicant had been using the car previously owned by her and on that basis the court concluded that the applicant had de facto accepted the inheritance (see paragraph 21 below). 15.  The applicant submitted an appeal on points of law but on 27 December 2010 the Supreme Court refused to examine it as raising no important legal questions. 16.  In March 2011 D.L. brought a new claim against the applicant and his sister. D.L. submitted that although the court in previous proceedings had acknowledged that the applicant had de facto accepted the inheritance (see paragraph 14 above), the applicant had not formally completed that acceptance and his sister had remained the official heir to their mother\u2019s estate. D.L. asked the court to annul the applicant\u2019s sister\u2019s rights to one half of the inheritance and to recognise the applicant\u2019s rights to that property. 17.  On 5 March 2012 the Kaunas District Court dismissed D.L.\u2019s claim. The court found that the total value of the applicant\u2019s mother\u2019s estate (the car and the savings) had been LTL 6,860 (approximately EUR 1,987), and that the applicant\u2019s sister had spent LTL 7,817 (approximately EUR 2,264) on their mother\u2019s funeral. In line with domestic law, an heir had the right to cover funeral expenses from a deceased person\u2019s estate before formally accepting the inheritance (see paragraph 22 below). On that basis, the Kaunas District Court held that the applicant\u2019s sister had not inherited any property which could have been used to cover the applicant\u2019s debt to D.L., and thus there were no legal grounds to satisfy D.L.\u2019s claim. That judgment was not appealed against and became final. 18.  In March 2011 the applicant submitted a complaint to the Commission on Judicial Ethics and Discipline concerning the judge of the Kaunas District Court who had examined the civil case (see paragraph 10 above). He complained that the judge had acted in abuse of office by referring D.L.\u2019s appeal to the Kaunas Regional Court because that appeal had not been submitted in accordance with procedural rules (see paragraph 11 above). On 8 June 2011 the Commission dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaint. It held that although the judge had been \u201cinsufficiently attentive\u201d and had referred D.L.\u2019s appeal to the Kaunas Regional Court by mistake, that mistake had not been so grave as to constitute abuse of office. 19.  In August 2011 the applicant petitioned the Prosecutor General to investigate the actions of the judges of the Kaunas District Court and the Kaunas Regional Court. On 30 September 2011 the prosecutor\u2019s office denied the applicant\u2019s request on the grounds that no crime appeared to have been committed. The prosecutor\u2019s decision was subsequently upheld by the courts.", "references": ["1", "6", "5", "7", "0", "9", "3", "4", "2", "8", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "8.  The applicants, Mr Khamtokhu and Mr Aksenchik, were born in 1970 and 1985 respectively. They are currently serving life sentences in the Yamalo-Nenetskiy Region of Russia. 9.  On 14 December 2000 the Supreme Court of the Adygea Republic found the first applicant guilty of multiple offences, including escape from prison, attempted murder of police officers and State officials, and illegal possession of firearms, and sentenced him to life imprisonment. 10.  On 19 October 2001 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the first applicant\u2019s conviction on appeal. 11.  On 26 March 2008 the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation quashed the appeal judgment of 19 October 2001 by way of supervisory review and remitted the matter for fresh consideration. 12.  On 30 June 2008 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the first applicant\u2019s conviction on appeal. The court reclassified some of the charges against him but the life sentence remained unchanged. 13.  On 28 April 2010 the Tomsk Regional Court found the second applicant guilty on three counts of murder and sentenced him to life imprisonment. 14.  On 12 August 2010 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld that conviction on appeal.", "references": ["2", "1", "8", "7", "5", "0", "9", "6", "4", "3", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1980 and lives in Skuodas. He worked as a traffic police officer in the Skuodas Region. 6.  On 7 November 2007, at around 2 p.m., three ten-year-old children were hit by a car in the village of Aleksandrija in the Skuodas Region. Two of the children died at the scene and the third died later that day in hospital. The car left the scene of the crash immediately. A criminal investigation was opened the same day. 7.  The following morning, at around 7 a.m., the applicant turned himself in to the police and confessed that he had been driving the car. The applicant submitted that he had not drunk any alcohol before the accident and that he was unable to give the exact speed he had been going. He stated that he had seen a group of children walking in front of him and \u201chad briefly lost control of the car\u201d, the car had gone off the road and \u201chit something\u201d. The applicant submitted that he did not remember hitting the children \u201cbecause everything had happened very fast\u201d. Nor did he remember anything that had happened after the accident because he \u201chad been in shock\u201d. He stated that the only thing he remembered was waking up in a summer house the morning after the accident, after which he had gone to the police to confess. 8.  On the same day the applicant was served with an official notice that he was suspected of a breach of road traffic safety regulations which had resulted in the death of other persons (Article 281 \u00a7 5 of the Criminal Code) and of a failure to provide assistance to persons in a life-threatening situation (Article 144 of the Criminal Code). He was detained on remand and suspended from his post as a police officer. 9.  The accident attracted considerable media attention. On 8 November 2007 one of the biggest national newspapers, Lietuvos rytas, published an article entitled \u201cA police officer\u2019s BMW crushed fourth\u2011graders\u201d (Policijos patrulio BMW trai\u0161k\u0117 ketvirtokus). The article stated that it was \u201csuspected that the car was being driven by the police officer S. Paulikas\u201d because the car belonged to his mother. It published interviews with several of the village\u2019s residents, who described the details of the accident and alleged that the applicant may have been drunk. The article also mentioned that two years previously another police officer had caused a traffic accident in the Skuodas Region in which two children had received fatal injuries, but that the criminal proceedings against the officer had been discontinued. 10.  On the same day the website of Lietuvos rytas carried an article headlined \u201cAfter horrific accident in Skuodas Region [the Minister of the Interior] suggests [the Police Commissioner General] should resign\u201d. It quoted a statement made by the Minister:\n\u201cApologies will not suffice. The chief of the police must assume personal responsibility for this terrible incident. Especially as this was not the first time that police officers, who are supposed to stop traffic violations, have themselves caused terrible accidents. If I do not receive any reaction from the police chief, I believe that further efforts to improve the work of the police will be impossible and I will be ready to step down myself.\u201d\nThe Police Commissioner General told journalists that he \u201caccepted responsibility\u201d because \u201cthe chief is responsible for what happens in the police organisation\u201d. However, he expressed doubts whether \u201cevery such incident\u201d should lead to the resignation of senior police officers.\nThe article also quoted the President\u2019s spokesperson as questioning \u201chow many more victims of the war on the roads will it take for politicians and State officials to finally notice and start solving the problems on the roads\u201d. The article stated that the President was awaiting a response from the Ministry of the Interior and from the police on whether they had been making sufficient efforts to create \u201can atmosphere of absolute intolerance\u201d for officers and public officials who abused intoxicating substances. 11.  On 9 November 2007 Lietuvos rytas published a photograph of the applicant on its front page, with a caption reading \u201cthe man who caused the horrific accident (kraupios avarijos kaltininkas), S. Paulikas, turned himself in only after it was no longer possible to detect if he had been driving while drunk\u201d. It also published an article entitled \u201cBoth [the Police Commissioner General] and [the Minister of the Interior] must resign\u201d, providing comments from the leaders of the main political parties about who should take political responsibility for the accident and for the \u201cineffective road traffic safety policy\u201d. That day and the day after Lietuvos rytas published details of over a dozen traffic accidents which had been caused by police officers since 2000, where it had been suspected that the officers had driven while being drunk and where people had been killed or seriously injured but the officers had received mild sentences or had escaped criminal liability altogether. 12.  On 12 November 2007 the Police Commissioner General and the Minister of the Interior resigned. In an official statement issued on the same day, the President of Lithuania stated:\n\u201cOver the past few days the whole of Lithuania has shared the pain of [the three families] who lost their children in an accident caused by a police officer. The seventh of November was not only the day of their tragedy but also reflected a serious crisis within the police force. The tragedy in the Skuodas Region emphasised the problems ingrained in the system of interior affairs and further diminished public trust in the police. The loss of children\u2019s lives, the crime committed by an officer and its circumstances require clear answers why that happened, and determined solutions. It is intolerable that crimes committed by officers are justified or punished by relatively mild sentences.\nA police officer must feel a higher degree of responsibility than an ordinary citizen and he must by his actions set an example to society because he has been obliged by the State to protect public order and thus ensure the safety of society. A crime committed by an officer cannot be a simple statistical fact. It must be thoroughly examined and especially strictly evaluated (kruop\u0161\u010diai i\u0161tirtas ir itin grie\u017etai \u012fvertintas).\n...\u201d\nThe rest of the statement discussed problems within the police force, such as a lack of qualified personnel, inadequate training and low pay. It also urged all police officers to act in accordance with their mandate and asked the general public not to judge all officers on the basis of offences committed by a few. 13.  Many more articles in the press reported on the accident, the suspicion that the applicant had driven while being drunk, the funerals of the three children, reactions within the village, public protests in front of Skuodas police station, previous traffic accidents caused by police officers, and the resignations of the Minister of the Interior and the Police Commissioner General. 14.  On 29 December 2007 the applicant was charged with a breach of road traffic safety regulations while being under the influence of alcohol which resulted in the death of other persons (Article 281 \u00a7 6 of the Criminal Code) and with a failure to provide assistance to persons in a life-threatening situation (Article 144 of the Criminal Code). 15.  According to the rules of territorial jurisdiction, the case against the applicant should have been examined by the Skuodas District Court. However, it was transferred to the Klaip\u0117da District Court because two of the Skuodas District Court judges had participated in the pre-trial investigation and the chairperson of the court had previously worked with the applicant\u2019s father. 16.  On 31 January 2008 the Klaip\u0117da District Court began its examination of the applicant\u2019s case. The court heard testimony from the applicant, his colleague M.K., who had been in the car with the applicant at the time of the accident, and another colleague V.J., who had been driving in a different car and had helped the applicant to leave the scene of the accident. It also heard other workmates who had seen the applicant before or soon after the accident, as well as the waitress from the restaurant where the applicant and M.K. had had lunch before the accident, the parents of the three children who had died, residents of the village who had witnessed the accident, and several court-appointed experts.\nThe applicant admitted that he had been driving the car and that the three children had died as a result of the accident. However, he stated that he had not been drunk and had not exceeded the speed limit. He also argued that the accident had been caused by the weather and the reckless actions of some of the children. 17.  All the hearings were held in public as none of the parties had asked for them to be closed, and several newspapers reported on the witness evidence. In a number of publications the applicant was called \u201ca killer of children\u201d (vaik\u0173 \u017eudikas) and mocked for \u201csuddenly losing his memory\u201d (staiga sutriko atmintis) when testifying in court. The colleagues who testified in favour of the applicant were collectively called \u201cdefenders of the killer of children\u201d (vaik\u0173 \u017eudiko u\u017etar\u0117jai) who were \u201ctrying to get him off\u201d (bando i\u0161sukti). The newspapers also expressed sympathy to the children\u2019s families for having to \u201crelive those cruel events\u201d. Excerpts of the testimony of many of the witnesses, both in favour of and against the applicant, as well as the applicant\u2019s final statement, were reprinted word-for-word. 18.  On 17 March 2008 the Klaip\u0117da District Court found the applicant guilty of both charges. The court established that the accident had occurred when the applicant had been under the influence of alcohol. It examined a video-recording from the restaurant where the applicant and M.K. had had lunch before the accident, showing that the two men had each drunk half a bottle of vodka. Another video-recording from the petrol station in which the applicant and M.K. had stopped after lunch showed the applicant buying two more bottles of vodka. Several witnesses \u2013 the waitress from the restaurant, some of the applicant\u2019s colleagues, and people who had been present when the accident had happened \u2013 stated that the applicant had looked and sounded drunk. On the basis of that evidence, the court found that before the accident the applicant had consumed between 200 and 250 grams of alcohol. A court-appointed expert stated that after consuming so much alcohol the alcohol level in the applicant\u2019s blood must definitely have been above the legally permitted threshold of 0.4 per mille (see paragraph 29 below). The court also noted that even though tests of the applicant\u2019s blood and urine had not detected any traces of alcohol, they had not been reliable because they had been taken more than seventeen hours after the accident. The court held that since the applicant had deliberately hidden from the authorities during that period and had only given himself up the morning after the accident (see paragraph 7 above), he could not use the negative blood and urine tests to his advantage. 19.  The Klaip\u0117da District Court also established that at the time of the accident the applicant\u2019s car must have been going at a speed of at least 105 km/h. A court-appointed expert examined the tyre marks at the scene of the accident, the damage done to nearby objects and the positions in which the three children had been found, and reconstructed the course of events of the accident. The applicant\u2019s colleague V.J., who had been driving in the car behind the applicant, testified that he himself had been going at around 100 km/h but had been unable to keep up with the applicant. Several people who had been present at the accident also stated that the noise made by the applicant\u2019s car had indicated a very high speed. The court noted that the speed limit in the village was 50 km/h and that this must have been known to the applicant, who had worked as a police officer in the area. The court concluded that the accident had been caused by the excessive speed of the applicant\u2019s car and not by the weather or the actions of the children. 20.  The Klaip\u0117da District Court also found the applicant guilty of failing to provide assistance to persons in a life-threatening situation. The court noted that the applicant had not shown any interest in the condition of the three children or called an ambulance but had immediately fled the scene of the accident. The court observed that the obligation to help people in life\u2011threatening situations was enshrined in the Law on Police Activity, with which the applicant had had to comply. By failing to do so, he had breached Article 144 of the Criminal Code (see paragraphs 29-30 below). 21.  The court found no mitigating circumstances in the applicant\u2019s favour. However, the fact that the victims had been minors was considered as an aggravating circumstance. The court also took the applicant\u2019s character and his behaviour during and after the accident into account: he had been under the influence of alcohol, three people had died as a result of his actions, he had fled from the scene of the accident, had not expressed any remorse, had attempted to mislead the court by providing contradictory testimony, and his actions had discredited the authority of the police. As a result, the Klaip\u0117da District Court held that the applicant\u2019s punishment should be close to the maximum provided by law (see paragraph 29 below). He was given a consolidated sentence of ten years\u2019 imprisonment, prohibited from driving a vehicle for three years, and ordered to pay a total of 3,000,000 Lithuanian litai (LTL, approximately 870,000 euros (EUR)) in non-pecuniary damages to the families of the three children. 22.  Reporting on the sentence, Lietuvos rytas quoted excerpts from the judgment and published a brief statement by the mother of one of the children, who expressed her overall satisfaction with the judgment but stated that criminal laws should be changed to provide for stricter punishments. 23.  The applicant appealed against the judgment. Among other things, he argued that he had not received a fair trial because of a media campaign against him. He argued that the media had ridiculed and discouraged the witnesses who had testified in his favour and that journalists and high-level State officials had urged the court to order the strictest sentence possible. The applicant stated that this had prevented the first-instance court from examining his case objectively. The applicant also argued that he had been given a stricter punishment because he was a police officer, which had constituted discrimination on the grounds of social status. 24.  On 5 December 2008 the Klaip\u0117da Regional Court partly amended the first-instance judgment. It upheld the lower court\u2019s findings concerning the applicant\u2019s drunkenness and the speed of his car, and dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaint concerning discrimination. However, the Klaip\u0117da Regional Court accepted the applicant\u2019s argument that the age of the victims should not have been considered as an aggravating circumstance because the criminal offence had not been premeditated. Accordingly, the court reduced the consolidated sentence to nine years\u2019 imprisonment. It also considered that the amount of non-pecuniary damages awarded by the first-instance court had been excessive and not reasonably related to the applicant\u2019s means. Instead, the court awarded a total of LTL 900,000 (approximately EUR 261,000) to the three families. The prohibition on driving a vehicle for three years was upheld. 25.  In response to the applicant\u2019s complaints concerning the lack of a fair trial, the Klaip\u0117da Regional Court stated that the media interest in the case had been understandable owing to its sensitive nature and that the media could not be prevented from reporting on public hearings. However, the court held that the first-instance judgment had been well-reasoned and based on reliable evidence, so there were no grounds to find that the judges had been influenced by the media or the statements of any of the officials. 26.  On 8 May 2009 the Supreme Court dismissed a cassation appeal by the applicant and upheld the judgment of the Klaip\u0117da Regional Court. It stated that the appellate court had provided an adequate examination of the applicant\u2019s complaints concerning the fairness of his trial and that there was no need to re-examine them. 27.  In January 2015 the applicant was released on probation. According to the Government\u2019s observations submitted to the Court on 21 June 2016, the applicant had up to that date paid a total of LTL 2,268 (approximately EUR 657) in non-pecuniary damages to the victims\u2019 families.", "references": ["2", "5", "6", "0", "7", "1", "8", "4", "3", "9", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1979 and is detained in Dob pri Mirni. 6.  On 23 April 1999 the 1999 Amendment to the 1994 Criminal Code entered into force (see paragraph 21 below). 7.  On 17 September 2004 the applicant was convicted of robbery by the Ljubljana District Court and sentenced to four years in prison. He began serving his sentence on 7 December 2007 and completed it on 7 December 2011. 8.  On 1 November 2008 the 2008 Criminal Code came into force (see paragraph 22 below). 9.  On 16 June 2009 the applicant was convicted by the Ljubljana District Court of having paid with a bad cheque and of fraudulent use of a bank card in the period between 19 January and 19 August 2005. He was sentenced to five months\u2019 imprisonment. The judgment became final on 7 October 2009. The applicant started to serve the sentence on 7 December 2011. 10.  In the meantime, on 9 April 2009 the Ljubljana District Court found the applicant guilty of murder committed together with another person on 15 September 2002. He was sentenced to thirty years in prison, the maximum penalty provided for under the 1994 Criminal Code applicable at the time at which the offence was committed. The conviction was upheld on appeal by the Ljubljana Higher Court on 9 December 2009 and became final on the same day. 11.  On 28 November 2011 the applicant applied to the Ljubljana District Court to have the three prison terms joined in an overall sentence. 12.  On 13 January 2012 the Ljubljana District Court, by means of a judgment, joined the three above-mentioned prison sentences, including the one for robbery which the applicant had already completed, in an overall sentence. Applying the 2008 Criminal Code as applicable before the introduction of the 2011 Amendment (see paragraphs 22 and 23 below), the court noted that the applicant should have had an overall sentence imposed on him as the conditions under Article 53 of the 2008 Criminal Code (see paragraph 22 below) had been met but the provision had not been applied in his case. While acknowledging that Article 53 \u00a7 2 (2) of the 2008 Criminal Code applied to the case (see paragraph 22 below), the District Court sentenced the applicant to an overall term of thirty years\u2019 imprisonment. In its reasoning, it noted that the principle of the rule of law required, inter alia, that criminal-law provisions be drafted in a clear and precise manner in order to avoid sentences being imposed arbitrarily. It went on to note that the legislation applicable to the present case was unclear, ambiguous and deficient for the following reasons. Although the maximum sentence applicable under the 2008 Criminal Code had been thirty years\u2019 imprisonment and the rules on combining multiple sentences in an overall sentence, enshrined in Article 53 \u00a7 2 (2) of the 2008 Criminal Code, provided that the overall sentence must exceed each of the individual sentences, these same rules prescribed a maximum sentence of twenty years. The court took the view that the legislature had not intended to enact legislation enabling those offenders who had been sentenced to thirty years\u2019 imprisonment for one of the offences for which they subsequently had had their sentences joined to benefit from an overall sentence that would have been ten years lower than the highest individual sentence to which the offender had been sentenced. In support of its view, the District Court pointed out that the 1994 Criminal Code (see paragraph 21 below) had provided that in cases where an offender had been due to serve thirty years\u2019 imprisonment along with sentences for other offences, the overall sentence would have consisted only of that term. Therefore, the District Court considered that the legislature had made an obvious error in Article 53 \u00a7 2 (2) of the 2008 Criminal Code, which had, however, been rectified in the meantime by the 2011 Amendment. The court found that the latter made the rules on the determination of an overall sentence certain, clear and complete and that \u201c[o]nly the so amended provisions therefore prevent[ed] arbitrary sanctioning of criminal offenders for multiple criminal offences as required by the principle of legality\u201d. 13.  The applicant appealed against the judgment, arguing that the District Court\u2019s decision lacked a legal basis and was in breach of the principle of the rule of law and the principle nullum crimen et nulla poena sine lege. He also claimed that the primary method of interpreting legal texts should be semantic interpretation. It was only where that method proved unsatisfactory in determining how a certain rule should be applied that other methods of interpretation should be applied. Lastly, the applicant agreed with the District Court that the provision in question could be regarded as unclear, ambiguous and deficient, but pointed out that any possible ambiguities or deficiencies should not be interpreted to his detriment. 14.  On 29 May 2012 the Ljubljana Higher Court rejected the appeal lodged by the applicant and upheld the first-instance judgment, reiterating the lower court\u2019s reasoning. In the Higher Court\u2019s opinion, the District Court had correctly assessed that the legislature had not intended to permit individuals convicted of several offences from benefiting from a lower maximum term of imprisonment than they would have had to serve if they had been convicted of only one of those offences. According to the Higher Court, such an interpretation would lead to a situation \u201cdefying the law as well as common sense\u201d. 15.  The applicant applied to the Supreme Court for the protection of legality (an extraordinary legal remedy), reiterating his arguments. He also argued that the rule of law was a principle which should not be applied at the courts\u2019 discretion. 16.  On 6 December 2012 the Supreme Court by its judgment I Ips 58203/2011 rejected the application for the protection of legality, disagreeing with the applicant that semantic interpretation should take precedence over all other methods of legal interpretation. The Supreme Court referred to the Higher Court\u2019s judgment, pointing out that the latter court\u2019s reasoning evidently showed that the historical interpretation of the rule on combining multiple sentences also had to be taken into account in assessing the aim of the legislature in enacting the provision at issue. That method of interpretation entailed the examination of not only the provision in its original form, as relied on by the applicant, but also the subsequent amendment, which showed the true aim of the provision. In addition, the Supreme Court relied on the systematic interpretation of the rule in question, emphasising that it could not be interpreted entirely separately from the provisions prescribing that individual prison sentences for various criminal offences must be combined to form an overall sentence. Since under the un-amended 2008 Criminal Code a prison sentence could be imposed for a term not shorter than fifteen days and not longer than thirty years, it was not logical that an overall sentence combining several prison terms, one of which was for thirty years, could be ten years lower than the highest individual prison sentence imposed. According to the Supreme Court, the rules on multiple offences were aimed not at reducing the general maximum prison sentence, but at ensuring that the overall length of several sentences did not exceed the general maximum prison sentence, which in the applicant\u2019s case was thirty years. 17.  The applicant lodged a constitutional complaint, reiterating that the imposition of an overall sentence of thirty years\u2019 imprisonment contravened Article 53 \u00a7 2 (2) of the Criminal Code, which clearly provided that such a sentence could not exceed twenty years. In the applicant\u2019s opinion, the purpose of the provision at issue could be drawn from interpreting it semantically and no additional means of interpretation were therefore required in order to understand the legislature\u2019s intention. 18.  On 24 April 2013 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaint, finding that it did not concern an important constitutional question or entail a violation of human rights with serious consequences for the applicant. 19.  On 24 March 2015 the applicant was convicted of another murder committed on an undefined date between 30 June and 15 September 2002. For that murder he was sentenced to thirty years\u2019 imprisonment, but a new overall sentence of thirty years was imposed. The latter overall sentence covered the previous overall sentence imposed by the judgment of 13 January 2012 (see paragraph 13 above), another sentence of four months imprisonment, which in the meantime had been imposed on him following a conviction for yet another criminal offence, and the thirty years\u2019 imprisonment imposed by that last judgment of 24 March 2015. An appeal and an application for the protection of legality by the applicant were dismissed, the latter by the Supreme Court on 2 June 2016.", "references": ["6", "4", "2", "8", "1", "9", "5", "0", "7", "3", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1980 and lives in Vilnius. 6.  On 5 March 2009 the applicant and his grandmother\u2019s neighbour, 88\u2011year-old J.S., signed a contract on lifelong maintenance (i\u0161laikymo iki gyvos galvos sutartis). Under that contract, J.S. transferred the rights to her apartment to the applicant, who undertook to take care of her until she died by providing her with food and medication, looking after her apartment, walking her dog, and providing any other necessary assistance. 7.  In June 2009 J.S. lodged an application with a court to terminate the contract on the grounds that the applicant had not fulfilled his obligations and had not been taking proper care of her. The applicant objected to the termination and argued that he had complied with the terms of the contract. Relying on the testimony of several witnesses, on 29 January 2010 the Vilnius Regional Court, in an oral hearing at which both the applicant and J.S. were present, granted J.S.\u2019s application and annulled the contract. 8.  The applicant appealed, arguing that he had complied with the terms of the contract and that it should therefore not have been terminated. On 11 October 2010 the Court of Appeal held an oral hearing at which J.S.\u2019s lawyer was present but the applicant and his lawyer were not. According to the Government, a notification letter was sent to the applicant on 21 September 2010. During the hearing the court noted that the applicant had been notified of the hearing (apie pos\u0117d\u012f prane\u0161ta) and proceeded to examine the case in his absence. The Court of Appeal delivered its judgment on 22 October 2010, upholding the first-instance judgment in its entirety. 9.  The applicant lodged a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court. He complained, inter alia, that he had not been duly notified of the hearing before the Court of Appeal and had thus been unable effectively to defend his interests. The applicant submitted that he had received the notification about the time and place of the hearing by standard (non-registered) post only on 14 October 2010, when he had found it in his letter box. However, on 4 November 2010 the Supreme Court refused to examine the applicant\u2019s cassation appeal as raising no important legal questions. The applicant lodged two other cassation appeals, but on 6 December 2010 and 10 January 2011 the Supreme Court refused to examine them, citing the same grounds as previously.", "references": ["8", "7", "5", "6", "9", "4", "1", "2", "0", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1965 and lives in Tr\u017ei\u0161\u010de. 6.  The applicant is a former rally driver who won several national titles and was still actively competing at the time of the events in the case. His company runs a car repair shop which is also authorised to remodel cars intended to be used for competition. 7.  On 17 December 2002 the Novo mesto District Court, at the request of the police, issued a warrant to search the applicant\u2019s premises on the basis of a suspicion that he had exchanged the chassis numbers of two cars in order to be able to register the second one, bought in Austria, and smuggle it through the State border without paying customs duties. He was also suspected of the criminal offences of forgery, certifying false documents as genuine and smuggling. The search warrant included an authorisation for the seizure of items subject to the warrant. On the same day the police conducted a search of the applicant\u2019s car repair shop and seized a Fiat Punto racing car, the car\u2019s registration papers and other documents. 8.  The applicant requested the return of the car several times because he needed it for future competitions from which he could not withdraw owing to contractual obligations towards his sponsors. He also insisted that he had not committed any of the offences he was suspected of. 9.  On 14 February 2003 the Novo mesto District Public Prosecutor lodged a request for a criminal investigation against the applicant in respect of the above-mentioned offences (see paragraph 7). On 19 March 2003 the Novo mesto District Court approved the request. 10.  On 28 March 2003 the applicant paid 74,600 euros (EUR) to lease another racing car, a Fiat Punto 1.6 kit car, for the entire 2003 season. On the same day he competed in a hill climb race with the leased car. He also competed with it in hill climb races on 19 April 2003, 30 May 2003, 23 August 2003 and 13 September 2003 and in rallies on 16 May 2003, 4 July 2003, 5 September 2003, 3 October 2003 and 17 October 2003. 11.  On 19 May 2003 the Novo mesto District Public Prosecutor dropped the prosecution (odstopil od pregona) of the smuggling charge and consequently, on 20 June 2003, the Novo mesto District Court discontinued the criminal investigation of that crime. It referred the proceedings related to forgery and the certification of false documents as true to the Trebnje Local Court (see paragraphs 25 and 26 below). 12.  On 26 May 2003 customs offences proceedings were instituted against the applicant. 13.  On 27 May 2003 the Customs Office issued a seizure order in respect of the same car on suspicion that the applicant had in December 2002 avoided paying duties when importing the car into Slovenia. 14.  On 2 June 2003 the car was transferred from the Novo mesto District Court to the customs authorities. 15.  On an unknown date the applicant lodged a request for an assessment of customs duties under the regular customs proceedings. 16.  On 24 June 2003 the Customs Office issued a declaratory note (ugotovitveni zapisnik), finding that according to information from the police the applicant had bought a Fiat Punto 1.2 in December 2002 and had registered it in Slovenia. The car\u2019s number plates and the metallic plate with the chassis number had then been put on the Fiat Punto 1.6 kit car. That car had been brought onto the territory of Slovenia without any customs duty being paid for it. The note also stated that the duties arose because the applicant had imported the car without paying the duties required by law. As it could not determine the date the debt had been incurred, it based its findings on the regulations in place on 23 May 2003, when the Department for Investigative Matters had found that custom duties for the car had not been paid. It calculated the amount on the basis of documents submitted by the applicant. In the note, the market value of the vehicle was set at EUR 34,000. The customs duties, VAT and vehicle tax were 5,472,143 Slovenian tolars (approximately EUR 22,000). 17.  On 4 July 2003 the decision on the amount of customs duties to be paid by the applicant was issued. 18.  On 7 July 2003 the applicant paid the customs duties and the car was returned to him. He submitted in writing at the same time that he had only paid the customs duties to prevent further losses. 19.  By 19 January 2004 the applicant had obtained all the necessary permits for the car and was able to register it as a special vehicle. 20.  On 30 June 2004 the proceedings for customs offences were discontinued because prosecution had in the meantime become time-barred. 21.  On 14 March 2005 the applicant instituted proceedings against the Republic of Slovenia before the Ljubljana District Court, claiming compensation for the pecuniary losses sustained due to the seizure of his car in the criminal proceedings. He claimed EUR 74,600, the amount he had paid to lease another car. 22.  On 6 September 2005 the Ljubljana District Court dismissed the claim. It held, inter alia, that the seizure of the car had not been unlawful and that the criminal proceedings related to forgery and the certification of false documents as true were still pending. The applicant appealed. 23.  On 8 March 2006 the Ljubljana Higher Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. 24.  On 20 April 2006 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. He later withdrew it because the civil proceedings had been reopened (see paragraph 29 below). 25.  On 16 April 2007 the Trebnje Local Court held that the search warrant of 17 December 2002 had not complied with section 214 of the Criminal Procedure Act because it had lacked evidence of reasonable grounds for suspicion (utemeljeni sum). In particular, basic data such as from whom, when and where the information used as evidence had been collected, was missing. That meant the seizure order had been issued and the car seized on the basis of an unlawful warrant. The court, basing its decision on the exclusionary rule, ordered that all the evidence collected on the basis of the unlawful seizure, including the reports and testimony of experts, should be excluded from the file. 26.  At a hearing held on 23 April 2007 the District Public Prosecutor withdrew the charges against the applicant. On the same day the Trebnje Local Court dismissed the charges of forgery and the certification of false documents. 27.  Following the dismissal of the charges by the Trebnje Local Court (see paragraph 26 above), the applicant on 15 May 2007 applied to reopen the civil proceedings. He alleged that the decisions on the unlawfulness of the search warrant and the discontinuation of the criminal proceedings had to be considered as new evidence which could influence the outcome of the proceedings. 28.  On 21 August 2007 the Ljubljana District Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s application to reopen the proceedings. After a successful appeal, the proceedings were reopened on 2 April 2008. 29.  The applicant on 2 September 2008 withdrew his appeal on points of law after the reopening of the civil proceedings. 30.  In the reopened proceedings the parties submitted the following arguments. The representative of the State argued, inter alia, that the customs duties on the car in question had not been paid and that therefore it could not have been used any way. Once the applicant had paid the duties his debt had been cleared and the car had been able to enter the domestic market. They also argued that the customs proceedings had not taken an unduly long time as they had lasted only from 27 May 2003 to 7 July 2003. The applicant argued, inter alia, that the order which had led to the seizure of the car had been unlawful and that it therefore gave rise to a liability on the part of the State for any damage resulting from it. He also submitted that the Customs Office\u2019s seizure order had been issued only on 27 May 2003 and was thus irrelevant to the question of liability for damage. The applicant also noted that he had not been found guilty in any of the proceedings and had not done anything wrong. He stated that the car that had been seized had been remodelled in his own repair shop and that he had not yet finished the remodelling or necessary paperwork by the time of the seizure. Such a process included obtaining new approval papers and the registration of the vehicle as a special vehicle. He pointed out that he had finished that process and obtained all the necessary documents once the car had been returned to him. 31.  On 10 February 2009 the Ljubljana District Court rejected the applicant\u2019s claim, which it examined under Article 26 of the Constitution and Articles 131 and 148 of the Code of Obligations. The Court found that there was no dispute about the fact that the car had been seized in criminal proceedings. The court noted that it was not bound by the findings of the criminal court that the seizure had been unlawful, but, basing its conclusion on its own assessment, it concluded that the seizure had been ordered on the basis of gossip and newspaper article and that all the other information relating to the alleged offences had been obtained on the basis of the unwarranted seizure. The search warrant had been general and lacking in precision and therefore could not be subjected to any scrutiny. On the basis of such considerations it found that the seizure had not complied with the requirements set out in the Criminal Procedure Act (see paragraph 38 below) and had therefore been unlawful. However, the court found that the causal link between the unlawful seizure and the damage incurred by the applicant had been broken because the applicant would in any event have been unable to use the car for several reasons. Firstly, the applicant, as a professional driver and owner of the repair shop, should have known that any remodelling of the car required a new technical inspection and registration, which the applicant had not done before the seizure. Secondly, no customs duties had been paid on parts that had been imported and then used in the car. The seized car, which had thus not been properly registered or imported in compliance with customs regulations, could not have been used in traffic and the applicant could not have raced with it. The applicant was ordered to pay the opposing party\u2019s costs of EUR 3,462.19. 32.  The applicant lodged an appeal. He argued that he had not been given the opportunity to be heard in respect of the alleged break in the causal link. He noted that, in any case, the car had been seized while it had still been in the process of remodelling and that he had intended to register it at the end of the process. He had only been able to complete that process later, after the car had been returned to him. He also referred to the fact that subsequently he had not encountered any problems in obtaining the necessary certificates in order to register the car. 33.  On 8 July 2009 the Ljubljana Higher Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. It held that the applicant had never claimed or proved that the car parts had been imported in accordance with customs regulations. The Ljubljana District Court had been right in holding that the applicant would not have been able to use the car owing to the illegal importation of the car parts and the incorrect registration procedure. 34.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law (revizija), challenging the conclusions of the court in respect of the break in the causal link and arguing that the loss had already been incurred before the issue of customs duties had arose. He further argued that no customs offence decision had been issued against him and that a car that was not registered for use in normal traffic could still be used in competitions. 35.  On 17 December 2009 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law, confirming that the link in causality had been broken because the applicant had imported some of the car parts in violation of customs regulations. 36.  In the above proceedings before the Ljubljana District Court, Ljubljana Higher Court and the Supreme Court, the applicant paid EUR 3,570.38 in total for court fees. 37.  The applicant lodged a constitutional appeal, arguing that the seizure of his car had been unlawful and that he had therefore been unable to use the car for racing. He argued that by virtue of the courts\u2019 decisions, in particular their position on the causal link, his human rights, including his right to compensation under Article 26 of the Constitution, and the principle of the rule of law had been violated. The constitutional appeal was dismissed by the Constitutional Court on 17 October 2011 by reference to the second paragraph of section 55.b of the Constitutional Court Act (see paragraph 41 below).", "references": ["1", "8", "7", "4", "6", "3", "2", "5", "0", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
+{"input": "5.  In 1961 the applicants\u2019 predecessors were deprived of certain land in favour of the State. 6.  On 26 January 2006 the Ni\u0161 Municipal Court ordered PIK Ni\u0161 (the debtor), a company predominantly comprised of socially-owned capital, as the end user of that land, to pay the applicants specified amounts on account of the compensation for the land in question. 7.  On 25 October 2006 and 1 February 2007 respectively, upon the applicants\u2019 request to that effect, the Ni\u0161 Municipal Court ordered the enforcement of the said judgment and further ordered the debtor to pay the applicants the enforcement costs. This judgment became both, final and enforceable by 16 August 2006. 8.  Only one applicant, Mr Tomislav \u0110or\u0111evi\u0107, never lodged an enforcement request. 9.  On 3 June 2009 the Ni\u0161 Commercial Court opened insolvency proceedings in respect of the debtor (St. 10/09). 10.  Only one applicant, Ms Milica Nikoli\u0107 Jaj\u010devi\u0107, duly submitted her claims therein. 11.  These insolvency proceedings are still ongoing. 12.  On 2 March 2009, 31 August 2009 and 9 June 2010 respectively, all applicants lodged their constitutional appeals. 13.  On 17 March 2011, 4 April 2012 and 23 May 2012, respectively, the Constitutional Court found a violation of the right to a hearing within a reasonable time in respect of all applicants, except Mr Tomislav \u0110or\u0111evi\u0107. However, the court did not award the applicants any damages, merely stating that the applicants \u201chad not claimed non-pecuniary damages\u201d. 14.  The Constitutional Court dismissed the appeal in respect of one applicant, Mr Tomislav \u0110or\u0111evi\u0107, since he had failed to request enforcement of the judgment in question.", "references": ["5", "7", "0", "6", "8", "2", "4", "1", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
+{"input": "8.  The applicants \u2013 a married couple \u2013 were born in 1967 and 1955 respectively and live in Colletorto. 9.  After trying to have a child and having unsuccessfully resorted to medically assisted reproduction techniques, the applicants put themselves forward as adoptive parents. 10.  On 7 December 2006 the applicants obtained official authorisation from the Campobasso Minors Court to adopt a foreign child within the meaning of Law no. 184 of 1983, entitled \u201cThe Child\u2019s Right to a Family\u201d (hereafter, \u201cthe Adoption Act\u201d), subject to the condition that the child\u2019s age was to be compatible with the limits foreseen by the Act (see paragraph 63 below). The applicants state that they waited in vain for a child who was eligible for adoption. 11.  They subsequently decided to try resorting to assisted reproduction techniques again and to a surrogate mother in Russia. To that end, they contacted a Moscow-based clinic. The first applicant stated that she travelled to Moscow, transporting from Italy the second applicant\u2019s seminal fluid, duly conserved, which she handed in at the clinic.\nA surrogate mother was found and the applicants entered into a gestational surrogacy agreement with the company Rosjurconsulting. After a successful in vitro fertilisation on 19 May 2010, two embryos were implanted in the surrogate mother\u2019s womb on 19 June 2010. 12.  On 16 February 2011 the Russian clinic certified that the second applicant\u2019s seminal fluid had been used for the embryos to be implanted in the surrogate mother\u2019s womb. 13.  The first applicant travelled to Moscow on 26 February 2011, the clinic having indicated that the child was due to be born at the end of the month. 14.  The child was born in Moscow on 27 February 2011. On the same day the surrogate mother gave her written consent to the child being registered as the applicants\u2019 son. Her written declaration, bearing the same date and read aloud at the hospital in the presence of her doctor, the chief physician and the head of the hospital department, is worded as follows (English translation of the original Russian version):\n\u201cI, the undersigned... have given birth to a boy in the ... maternity hospital in Moscow. The child\u2019s parents are an Italian married couple, Giovanni Campanelli, born on ... and Donatina Paradiso, born on..., who expressed in writing their wish to have their embryos implanted in my womb.\nOn the basis of the foregoing and in accordance with section 16(5) of the Federal Law on Civil Status and Article 51(4) of the Family Code, I hereby give my consent for the above couple to be entered in the birth record and the birth certificate as parents of the child to whom I have given birth...\u201d 15.  In the days following the child\u2019s birth, the first applicant moved with him into a flat in Moscow, rented by her in advance. The second applicant, who had remained in Italy, was able to communicate with her regularly via internet. 16.  On 10 March 2011 the applicants were registered as the new-born baby\u2019s parents by the Registry Office in Moscow. The Russian birth certificate, which indicated that the applicants were the child\u2019s parents, was certified in accordance with the provisions of the Hague Convention of 5 October 1961 Abolishing the Requirement of Legalisation for Foreign Public Documents. 17.  On 29 April 2011 the first applicant went to the Italian Consulate in Moscow, with the birth certificate, in order to obtain the documents that would enable her to return to Italy with the child. The Italian Consulate issued the documents enabling the child to leave for Italy with the first applicant. 18.  On 30 April 2011 the first applicant and the child arrived in Italy. 19.  In a note of 2 May 2011 \u2013 which was not filed in the proceedings before the Court \u2013 the Italian Consulate in Moscow informed the Campobasso Minors Court, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Colletorto Prefecture and Municipality that the paperwork in respect of the child\u2019s birth contained false information. 20.  A few days later the second applicant contacted the Colletorto municipality, requesting that the birth certificate be registered. 21.  On 5 May 2011 the prosecutor\u2019s office opened criminal proceedings against the applicants, who were suspected of \u201cmisrepresentation of civil status\u201d within the meaning of Article 567 of the Criminal Code, of \u201cuse of falsified documents\u201d within the meaning of Article 489 of the Criminal Code and of the offence set out in section 72 of the Adoption Act, since they had brought the child to Italy in breach of the procedure provided for by the provisions on international adoption contained therein (see paragraph 67 below). 22.  In parallel, on 5 May 2011, the Public Prosecutor\u2019s Office at the Campobasso Minors Court requested the opening of proceedings to make the child available for adoption, since he was to be considered as being in a state of abandonment for the purposes of the law. On the same date the Minors Court appointed a guardian ad litem (curatore speciale) and opened proceedings to make the child available for adoption. 23.  On 16 May 2011 the Minors Court placed the child under guardianship at the request of the Public Prosecutor. The child\u2019s guardian asked the court to suspend the applicants\u2019 parental responsibility, in application of section 10 \u00a7 3 of the Adoption Act. 24.  The applicants challenged the measures in respect of the child. 25.  Following a request of the Minors Court on 10 May 2011, the applicants were visited by a team of social workers on 12 May 2011. Their report, dated 18 May 2011, indicated that the applicants were viewed positively and respected by their fellow citizens, and that they had a comfortable income and lived in a nice house. According to the report, the child was in excellent health and his well-being was self-evident, since he was being cared for by the applicants to the highest standards. 26.  On 25 May 2011 the first applicant, assisted by her lawyer, was questioned by the Larino carabinieri. She stated that she had travelled to Russia alone in September 2008, transporting her husband\u2019s seminal fluid. She stated that she entered into a contract with the company Rosjurconsulting, which had undertaken to find a surrogate mother willing to be implanted with genetic material from the first applicant and her husband through the Vitanova Clinic in Moscow. The applicant explained that this practice was perfectly legal in Russia and had made it possible for her to obtain a birth certificate which identified the applicants as parents. In June or July 2010 the first applicant had been contacted by the Russian company, which informed her that a surrogate mother had been found, and she had given her consent to the medical procedure. 27.  On 27 June 2011 the applicants were heard by the Minors Court. The first applicant stated that, after eight unsuccessful attempts at in vitro fertilisation, which had endangered her health, she had resorted to the Russian clinic, since it was possible in that country to use ova from a donor, which were subsequently implanted in the surrogate mother. 28.  On 7 July 2011 the court ordered that DNA testing be carried out in order to establish whether the second applicant was the child\u2019s biological father. 29.  On 11 July 2011 the Ministry of the Interior asked the Registry Office to refuse to enter the particulars of the birth certificate in the civil\u2011status register. 30.  On 1 August 2011 the second applicant and the child underwent DNA testing. The result of these tests showed that there was no genetic link between them. 31.  Following the outcome of these tests, the applicants sought an explanation from the Russian clinic. Months later, in a letter of 20 March 2012, the clinic\u2019s management informed them that it had been surprised by the results of the DNA test. It stated that there had been an internal inquiry, since an error had clearly occurred, but it had proved impossible to identify the individual responsible for the error, given that there had been dismissals and recruitment of other staff in the meantime. 32.  On 4 August 2011 the Registry Office of the Colletorto Municipality refused to register the Russian birth certificate. The applicants lodged an appeal with the Larino Court against this refusal. The subsequent proceedings are set out in paragraphs 46-48 below. 33.  The Public Prosecutor asked the Larino Court to give the child a new identity and to issue a new birth certificate. 34.  As part of the proceedings to make the child available for adoption which were then pending before the Minors Court (see paragraph 22 above), the applicants asked a psychologist, Dr I., to prepare a report on the child\u2019s well-being. The report drawn up by Dr I. on 22 September 2011, after four meetings with the child, indicates that the applicants \u2013 who were attentive to the child\u2019s needs \u2013 had developed a deep emotional bond with him. The report indicated that the grandparents and other family members also surrounded the child with affection, and that he was healthy, lively and responsive. Dr I. concluded that the applicants were suitable parents for the child, both from a psychological perspective and in terms of their ability to educate him and bring him up. She added that possible removal measures would have devastating consequences for the child, explaining that he would go through a depressive phase on account of a sense of abandonment and the loss of the key persons in his life. In her opinion, this could lead to somatic symptoms and compromise the child\u2019s psycho-physical development, and, in the long term, symptoms of psychotic pathology could emerge. 35.  The applicants asked for the child to be placed with them, with a view to adopting him if necessary. 36.  By an immediately enforceable decision of 20 October 2011, the Campobasso Minors Court ordered that the child be removed from the applicants, taken into the care of the social services and placed in a children\u2019s home (casa famiglia). 37.  The relevant passages of the Minors Court\u2019s decision read as follows:\n\u201c...\nIn their evidence Mr Campanelli and Mrs Paradiso stated that Mrs Paradiso had travelled to Russia carrying her husband\u2019s semen in a special container, and had there entered into an agreement with the company Rosjurconsulting. Under this agreement, Mrs Paradiso had delivered her husband\u2019s semen to a pre-determined clinic. One or more eggs from an unknown female donor had been fertilised in vitro with this semen, and then implanted into another woman, whose identity is known and who had subsequently given birth to the child in question on 27 February 2011. In exchange, Mr Campanelli and Mrs Paradiso had paid a large amount of money. Mrs Paradiso stated that the woman who had given birth to the child had waived her rights to him and had consented to him being referred to on the birth certificate, drawn up in Russia, as the son of Mr Campanelli and Mrs Paradiso (a copy of the informed consent, given on 27 February 2011 by the woman who gave birth to the child, is on file in these proceedings).\nA court-appointed expert witness was then instructed to establish whether the minor child was the biological son of Giovanni Campanelli. In her report the court-appointed expert witness, Ms [L.S.], concluded that the results obtained by means of typing of the DNA of Giovanni Campanelli and the DNA of the minor child [T.C.] rule out Giovanni Campanelli as the child\u2019s biological father.\nIn today\u2019s hearing Mr Campanelli and Mrs Paradiso referred to their previous evidence and Mrs Paradiso repeated that she had taken her husband\u2019s semen to Russia to be used for the purpose of the intended fertilisation.\nHowever, the conclusions of the court-appointed expert witness have not been challenged.\nAt the close of the hearing, the Public Prosecutor requested that the application by Mr Campanelli and Mrs Paradiso be refused, that the minor child be placed in the care of third parties and that a temporary guardian be appointed for him. The child\u2019s guardian ad litem asked that the child be placed in care under section 2 of the Adoption Act and that a guardian be appointed. Mr Campanelli and Mrs Paradiso requested primarily that the court award them temporary care of the child with a view to subsequent adoption; in the alternative, they requested the suspension of these proceedings pending the criminal classification of the offences, and the suspension of the above-mentioned criminal proceedings against them and of the proceedings before the Campobasso Court of Appeal to challenge the refusal to register the child\u2019s birth certificate; again in the alternative, they requested the suspension of these proceedings under section 14 of Law no. 184/1983 for the purpose of a possible repatriation of the minor child to Russia, or, failing that, for the child to be placed with them under section 2 of the cited law.\nThat being the case, the court finds that the statements by Mr Campanelli and Mrs Paradiso regarding the delivery to Russia of Giovanni Campanelli\u2019s genetic material are not supported by any evidence. On the other hand, it has been established that the minor [T.C.] is neither the biological son of Donatina Paradiso, nor, given the evidence of the expert report, of Giovanni Campanelli. At the present time the only certainty is the identity of the woman who gave birth to the baby. The biological parents of the baby, that is, the man and the woman who provided the gametes, remain unknown.\nIn the light of this evidence, the present case cannot be viewed as a case of so-called gestational surrogacy, which is the case where the surrogate mother who gives birth to the baby has no genetic link to him or her, the fertilisation having taken place with the egg(s) of a third woman. Indeed, in order to be able to talk of gestational or traditional surrogacy (in the latter, the surrogate mother makes her own ovules available) there must be a biological link between the child and at least one of the two intended parents (in this specific case, Mr Campanelli and Mrs Paradiso), a biological link which, as has been seen, is non-existent.\u201d\nIn the court\u2019s view, the applicants had thus placed themselves in an unlawful situation:\n\u201cIt follows that by bringing a baby to Italy, passing him off as their own son, in blatant infringement of the provisions of our legislation (Law no. 184 of 4 May 1983) governing inter-country adoption of children, Mr Campanelli and Mrs Paradiso have acted unlawfully. Besides any criminal offences which may have been committed (infringement of section 72(2) of Law no. 184/1983), which are not within the jurisdiction of this court, it is noted that the agreement entered into between Mrs Paradiso and the company Rosjurconsulting had unlawful elements since, given the terms of the agreement (the delivery of Mr Campanelli\u2019s genetic material for the fertilisation of another woman\u2019s ovules), it was in breach of the ban on the use of assisted reproductive technology (A.R.T.) of a heterologous type laid down by section 4 of Law no. 40 of 19 February 2004.\nIn any event, it is pointed out that despite being in possession of the authorisation for inter-country adoption issued by order of this court on 7 December 2006, Mr Campanelli and Mrs Paradiso, as has been stated, intentionally evaded the provisions of Law no. 184/1983, which provide not only that the intended adoptive parents must apply to an authorised body (section 31) but also for the involvement of the Commission for Inter-country Adoption (section 38), the only body competent to authorise entry and permanent residence of a foreign child in Italy (section 32).\u201d\nThe court therefore found it necessary, first and foremost, to put an end to this unlawful situation:\n\u201cIt is therefore necessary, above all, to prevent this unlawful situation from continuing, since to maintain it would be equivalent to ratifying unlawful conduct in open violation of the provisions of our legislation.\nAccordingly, it is necessary to remove the minor child from Mr Campanelli and Mrs Paradiso and place him in an appropriate structure with a view to identifying a suitable couple to foster the child as soon as possible. The Social Services Department of the Municipality of Colletorto is therefore instructed to identify an appropriate structure and to place the child in it. The Italian legislation on adoption applies to this child in accordance with section 37a of Law No. 184/1983, there being no doubt that he is in Italy in a state of abandonment, having been deprived of his biological parents and other relatives, and the mother who gave birth to him having renounced him.\nAdmittedly, it cannot be denied that the child will in all likelihood suffer harm from being separated from Mr Campanelli and Mrs Paradiso. However, given the age of the child and the short time he has spent with them, the court cannot agree with the conclusions of the report by psychologist [Dr I.] (instructed by Mr Campanelli and Mrs Paradiso), finding that it is certain that the child\u2019s separation from them would entail devastating consequences. Indeed, according to the literature on this subject, the mere separation from the main care-givers is not a causal agent of a psychopathological state in a child unless other causal factors are present. The trauma caused by the separation from Mr Campanelli and Mrs Paradiso will not be irreparable, given that a search will begin immediately for a couple able to attenuate the consequences of the trauma, through a compensatory process that will encourage a new adaptation.\nIt is also pointed out that the fact that Mr Campanelli and Mrs Paradiso (and in particular Mrs Paradiso) have put up with the hardships and the difficulties of A.R.T (Mrs Paradiso has also stated that during one of these interventions her life was at risk) and have preferred, despite being in possession of an approval for inter-country adoption, to circumvent Italian legislation on this subject gives rise to the doubt and the fear that the minor child may be an instrument to fulfil a narcissistic desire of Mr Campanelli and Mrs Paradiso or to exorcise an individual or joint problem. In the light of the conduct of Mr Campanelli and Mrs Paradiso during the events under examination, all of this throws a consistent shadow over their possession of genuine affective and educational abilities and of the instinct of human solidarity which must be present in any person wishing to bring the children of others into their lives as their own children.\nThe separation of the minor child from Mr Campanelli and Mrs Paradiso thus corresponds to the best interests of the child.\u201d 38.  According to the applicants, the court\u2019s decision was enforced on the same day, without their having been informed of the decision in advance. 39.  The applicants lodged an appeal (reclamo) before the Campobasso Court of Appeal. They argued, inter alia, that the Italian courts could not contest the Russian birth certificate. They further requested that no measures be taken concerning the child while the criminal proceedings against them and the proceedings challenging the refusal to enter the birth certificate in the Italian civil-status register were pending. 40.  By a decision of 28 February 2012, the Campobasso Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.\nThe Court of Appeal found that the child T.C. was \u201cin a state of abandonment\u201d (in stato di abbandono) within the meaning of section 8 of the Adoption Act, as the applicants were not his parents. In those circumstances, the question of whether or not the applicants were criminally liable and whether or not there had been an error in the use of seminal fluid of unknown origin was not, in its view, relevant. In the Court of Appeal\u2019s opinion, it was not appropriate to await the outcome of the criminal trial or of the proceedings brought by the applicants to challenge the refusal to enter the particulars of the birth certificate in the register. The Court of Appeal also considered that section 33 of Law no. 218/95 (the Private International Law Act) did not prevent the Italian courts from refusing to comply with certified information from a foreign State, and that there was no issue of lack of jurisdiction, since, according to section 37bis of the Adoption Act, \u201c... the Italian law governing adoption, fostering, and necessary measures in case of urgency shall be applicable to a foreign minor child who is in [Italy] in a state of abandonment\u201d (cf. also Cass 1128/92)\u201d. 41.  No appeal to the Court of Cassation lay against that decision (see paragraph 68 below). 42.  In the meantime, on 30 October 2011 the public prosecutor at the Larino Court had ordered the preventive seizure of the Russian birth certificate, on the ground that it was an essential item of evidence. In the prosecutor\u2019s view, in all probability the applicants had not only committed the offences with which they were charged, but they had attempted to conceal them. They had, according to him, inter alia, stated that they were the biological parents and had then corrected their versions of events as these were successively disproved. 43.  The applicants challenged the preventive seizure order. 44.  By a decision of 20 November 2012, the Campobasso Court dismissed the applicants\u2019 appeal on the ground of the strong suspicions that they had committed the offences in question. In particular, the court noted the following facts: the first applicant had spread a rumour that she was pregnant; she had gone to the Italian Consulate in Moscow and implied that she was the natural mother; she had subsequently admitted that the child had been born to a surrogate mother; she had stated to the carabinieri on 25 May 2011 that the second applicant was the biological father, which had been disproved by the DNA tests; she had thus made false statements; she had been very vague as to the identity of the genetic mother; the documents concerning the surrogate motherhood stated that the two applicants had been seen by the Russian doctors, which did not correspond to the fact that the second applicant had not travelled to Russia; the documents relating to the birth did not give any precise date. The court considered that the only certainty was that the child had been born and that he had been handed over to the first applicant against payment of almost 50,000 euros (EUR). In the court\u2019s view, the hypothesis that the applicants had behaved illegally with a view to having the particulars of the birth certificate entered in the civil\u2011status register and to circumventing the Italian legislation thus appeared well-founded. 45.  In November 2012 the Public Prosecutor transmitted the decision regarding the preventive seizure to the Minors Court and indicated that a conviction under section 72 of the Adoption Act would deprive the applicants of the possibility of fostering (affido) the child and of adopting him or other minors. In the Public Prosecutor\u2019s view, there was therefore no other solution but to proceed with the adoption procedure for the child, and his temporary placement with a foster family had therefore been requested, in accordance with sections 8 and 10 of the Adoption Act. The Public Prosecutor repeated his request and emphasised that the child had been removed more than a year previously, and that he had since been living in a children\u2019s home (casa famiglia), where he had developed meaningful relationships with the persons responsible for his care. He explained that the child had thus still not found a family environment to replace the one that had been illegally provided by the couple who had brought him to Italy. According to the Public Prosecutor, the child seemed destined for another separation, even more painful than that from the mother who had given birth to him and then from the woman who claimed to be his mother. 46.  An appeal having been lodged to contest the Registry Office\u2019s refusal to enter the particulars of the Russian birth certificate in the civil\u2011status register, the Larino Court declined jurisdiction on 29 September 2011. The proceedings were subsequently resumed before the Campobasso Court of Appeal. The applicants insisted that the particulars of the Russian birth certificate be entered in the Italian register. 47.  By an immediately enforceable decision of 3 April 2013, the Campobasso Court of Appeal ruled on the transcription of the birth certificate into the Italian register.\nBy way of introduction, the Court of Appeal dismissed the objection raised by the guardian to the effect that the applicants did not have standing to bring an action before that court; it acknowledged that the applicants had standing to bring proceedings in that they were referred to as the \u201cparents\u201d in the birth certificate that they wished to have entered in the civil-status register.\nHowever, the Court of Appeal considered it clear that the applicants were not the biological parents and concluded that there had not therefore been a gestational surrogacy. It noted that the parties were in agreement that the Russian legislation presupposed a biological link between the child and at least one of the intended parents before the term surrogate motherhood could be used. It concluded that the birth certificate was fraudulent (ideologicamente falso) and in breach of Russian law. In the Court of Appeal\u2019s view, given that there was nothing to show that the child had Russian citizenship, the applicants\u2019 argument that Italian law was inapplicable ran counter to section 33 of the Private International Law Act, which stated that the legal parent-child relationship was determined by the national law governing the child at the time of his or her birth.\nThe Court of Appeal added that it was contrary to public order to register the contested birth certificate, since it was fraudulent. It stated that although the applicants had pleaded their good faith, alleging that they were unable to explain why the second applicant\u2019s seminal fluid had not been used in the Russian clinic, this made no difference to the situation and did not alter the fact that the second applicant was not the biological father. 48.  In conclusion, the Court of Appeal held that it was legitimate to refuse to register the Russian birth certificate and to grant the Public Prosecutor\u2019s request that a new birth certificate be issued. The Court of Appeal therefore ordered that a new birth certificate be issued, indicating that the child was the son of persons unknown, born in Moscow on 27 February 2011, and that he would be given a new name, determined in accordance with Presidential Decree no. 396/00. 49.  Following execution of the decision issued by the Minors Court on 20 October 2011, the child was placed in a children\u2019s home for about fifteen months, in a location that was unknown to the applicants. All contact between the applicants and the child was prohibited. They were unable to obtain any news of him. 50.  In January 2013 the child was placed in a family with a view to his adoption. 51.  At the beginning of April 2013 the guardian asked the Minors Court to give the child a formal identity, so that he could be registered for school without complications. He stated that the child had been placed in a family on 26 January 2013, but that he did not have an identity. This \u201cinexistence\u201d had a significant impact on administrative matters, particularly with regard to deciding under what name the child was to be registered for school, for vaccination records, and for residence. While accepting that this situation corresponded to the aim of preventing the applicants from discovering the child\u2019s whereabouts, for his own protection, the guardian explained that a temporary formal identity would enable the secrecy surrounding the child\u2019s real identity to be maintained, while simultaneously enabling him to have access to public services; for the time being, he was entitled only to use emergency medical services. 52.  The case file indicates that this request was granted by the Minors Court and that the child received a formal identity. 53.  The Government have indicated that the child has now been adopted. 54.  The proceedings to make the child available for adoption were resumed before the Minors Court of Campobasso (see paragraph 22 above). The applicants confirmed their opposition to the child\u2019s placement with third persons. The guardian asked for a statement ruling that the applicants no longer had locus standi.\nThe Public Prosecutor asked the Minors Court not to declare the child available for adoption using the name originally given to him, on the ground that, in the meantime, he had opened a second set of proceedings requesting that the child be declared available for adoption under his new identity (child of unknown parents). 55.  On 5 June 2013, the Minors Court held that the applicants no longer had standing to act in the adoption proceedings, given that they were neither the child\u2019s parents nor members of his family within the meaning of section 10 of the Adoption Act. The court stated that it would settle the question of the child\u2019s adoption in the context of the other set of adoption proceedings, referred to by the Public Prosecutor. 56.  No information has been provided by the parties concerning subsequent developments in the criminal proceedings brought against the applicants. It seems that those proceedings are still pending.", "references": ["8", "4", "3", "9", "6", "0", "2", "5", "7", "1", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1948 and lives in Donetsk, Ukraine. According to him, at the material time he had obtained a basic education (\u0441\u0435\u0440\u0435\u0434\u043d\u044f \u0441\u043f\u0435\u0446\u0456\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u0430 \u043e\u0441\u0432\u0456\u0442\u0430) in law and was working as a police officer. 5.  On the morning of 23 August 2001 the applicant had a fight with D. in the course of which blows were exchanged. At least three people witnessed the fight. After the fight the applicant went to work for a twenty\u2011four hour shift. The next morning D. was found dead in the vicinity of the applicant\u2019s place of work. 6.  According to the applicant, he was arrested on the same day \u2013 that is to say 24 August 2001 \u2013 and was detained at the police office until the evening of 25 August 2001. The applicant also submits that during this period he was ill-treated by the police, who forced him to plead guilty, and that he was coerced into declining legal representation. The applicant submits that he did not yield to such pressure and did not make any statements nor confess to committing the murder. He further maintains that the police planted evidence against him, putting a blood stain on his shirt. 7.  On 25 August 2001 the local police instituted criminal proceedings against the applicant, charging him with inflicting grievous bodily harm on D., which resulted in his death. At the end of that day the applicant was released, having signed a written undertaking not to abscond. 8.  Between the end of August and the beginning of September 2001 a hoe was found close to the place where D.\u2019s body had been found. 9.  According to the applicant, he was arrested again on 14 September 2001. However, the arrest report refers to 15 September 2001. On 18 September 2001 the Kirovsky District Court of Donetsk (hereafter \u201cthe District Court\u201d) extended the applicant\u2019s arrest until 25 September 2001. On the latter date the District Court ordered the applicant\u2019s detention on remand. It is not clear from the applicant\u2019s submissions whether he appealed against that court decision. 10.  On 25 August, 15 September and 18 September 2001 the applicant, having been apprised of his right to legal assistance, declined to exercise this right and wished to defend himself in person. On 2 October 2001 he changed his mind and on 16 October 2001 a lawyer was appointed for him (according to the applicant, however, he was only represented by a lawyer from 6 December 2001). 11.  By November 2001 the investigator had taken a number of investigative steps including an on-site inspection, a post-mortem examination of the victim\u2019s body and other forensic examinations, questioning of the applicant and witnesses, and face-to-face confrontations between the latter and the applicant. 12.  On 26 November 2001 the indictment was approved by the district prosecutor and sent to the District Court. 13.  According to the applicant, the decisive evidence against him, namely the aforementioned bloodstained shirt and the hoe, which was believed to be the murder weapon, were not sealed during the investigation, as required by the relevant rules of procedure, and were later replaced with other items more consistent with the charges against him and consequently more incriminating. He denied the charges. 14.  On 11 December 2001 the District Court took over the case and commenced the trial. 15.  On 25 December 2001 it held the first hearing. The applicant and his lawyer filed several motions and requests, including one to record the hearings using audio and video equipment. In order to arrange the latter, the court postponed the hearings until 12 March 2002. 16.  During the trial the applicant filed numerous further requests (for example, to summon additional witnesses, to familiarise himself with the case file, etc.) and challenged the judge and prosecutor on numerous occasions; as to the charges against him, the applicant pleaded not guilty. 17.  On 10 September 2002, after four hearings, the District Court found the applicant guilty of the murder of D. and sentenced him to eleven years\u2019 imprisonment. 18.  On 9 December 2002, in the course of the applicant\u2019s study of the case file, which at the material time consisted of two volumes, the District Court found that the applicant was abusing this right by requesting simultaneous familiarisation with the court minutes and the audio and video recordings, and challenging the lawfulness of the minutes of the court hearings and how the case file was processed. Eventually on 8 January 2003 the District Court terminated the applicant\u2019s study of the case file. On 27 January 2003 the District Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaints concerning the lawfulness of the minutes of the court hearings. 19.  The applicant appealed against the rulings of 8 and 27 January 2003, but the result is not clear. According to the applicant, he was not provided with access to the audio and video records of the court hearings, some of the documents in the case file (for instance, minutes of the court hearings) were drafted in an improper manner (in his view he was not provided with the final version of court minutes but only with a draft version) in illegible handwriting, the case file was improperly processed, etc. 20.  The applicant and his lawyer appealed against the judgment of 10 September 2002, challenging the conclusions of the forensic examinations and the testimonies of a number of witnesses, and alleging procedural shortcomings in the investigation and the trial. They requested discontinuation of the proceedings in question due to lack of evidence of the applicant\u2019s guilt. 21.  On 11 July 2003 the Donetsk Regional Court of Appeal (\u201cthe Court of Appeal\u201d), pointing out a number of the inferior court\u2019s shortcomings (for example, failure to establish how D.\u2019s injuries had been caused and how the blood stain had appeared on the applicant\u2019s shirt, failure to address the applicant\u2019s version of events, etc.), found that the applicant\u2019s guilt was not sufficiently proven, and quashed the judgment. Accordingly, the case was remitted for fresh consideration. 22.  On 23 September 2003 the District Court resumed the trial. 23.  As in the course of his first trial, the applicant again filed a large number of mostly unsuccessful requests and complaints (including some concerning the quality of his defence lawyer\u2019s services) and challenged the judges and prosecutor on numerous occasions. The situation culminated on 26 March 2004 when the applicant was expelled from the court room during the hearing because of his shouting and interrupting the proceedings. After ten hearings had been held, at which, it appears, the applicant\u2019s lawyer was present, the applicant was once again allowed to be present at the court hearing on 21 July 2004. 24.  On 13 June 2004 the applicant refused the assistance of his lawyer, alleging the latter\u2019s collusion and incompetence, and on 21 July 2004 the applicant requested that the court appoint another specified lawyer to represent him. The applicant\u2019s lawyer also sought leave to discontinue his services to the applicant, citing the latter\u2019s offensive behaviour and defamatory statements concerning him. On 21 and 30 July 2004 the District Court dismissed all those requests. 25.  According to the applicant, on 30 July 2004 the court interrupted him and prohibited him from finishing his last plea. 26.  According to the applicant, at several points during the trial and re\u2011trial he requested the summoning of certain witnesses (in particular, C., the investigator; an unidentified policeman who on 24 August 2001 escorted the applicant to the police station; A., the policeman in whose office on 25 August 2001 his bloodstained shirt had allegedly been produced; S., the policeman who signed the protocol on the examination and seizure of the aforementioned evidence), but to no avail. On several occasions he also unsuccessfully challenged the judges who were examining his case. 27.  In June and July 2004 additional forensic examinations were held. 28.  On 2 August 2004, after nineteen hearings, the District Court, having examined the case before it, found the applicant guilty of D.\u2019s murder and sentenced him to eleven years\u2019 imprisonment. In convicting the applicant, the court took into account:\n(a)  the eye-witness testimonies to the fight between the applicant and D. on the morning of 23 August 2001. These stated that D. had sustained no injuries from the fight and that the applicant and D. had had these types of conflicts before;\n(b)  medical evidence of injuries on the applicant\u2019s body. The Court referred to the reports of 25 and 29 August 2001 stating that, according to them, the applicant\u2019s injuries had been caused on \u201c23-24 August 2001\u201d and noted that, according to the applicant\u2019s own explanation to the medical expert, these injuries had been caused by the fight with D. (see paragraph 40 below);\n(c)  the testimonies of those who discovered D.\u2019s body;\n(d)  the testimonies by the applicant\u2019s colleagues, according to which the hoe had been at their workplace on 23 August 2001, before the murder, but could no longer be found there on 24 August 2001, after the murder;\n(e)  the statement by L., the police officer who interrogated the applicant in August 2001, that the applicant had pleaded guilty but refused to confirm his confession in writing;\n(f)  the forensic cytological examination report of 7 September 2001 according to which the blood stain on the applicant\u2019s shirt \u201ccould be from any person, including D.\u201d and was not identified as being the applicant\u2019s blood;\n(g)  the post-mortem examination report of 15 September 2001 according to which the injuries to D. could have been caused either by a blunt instrument or by a hoe;\n(h)  the forensic expert report of 9 October 2001 concluding that it was not possible to establish the features of the instrument with which D. was attacked but \u201cthe probability that the injuries to D. [had been] caused by the hoe under examination [could] not be excluded\u201d;\n(i)  the additional forensic expert report of 9 July 2004 stating that blood would not have gushed out of D.\u2019s injuries during the assault but could have spattered onto surrounding objects. 29.  The court also noted that the procedural shortcomings committed during the pre-trial investigation were not so serious as to prejudice its examination of the case. It did not specify those shortcomings. In addition to the judgment, the court on the same day delivered a special ruling (\u043e\u043a\u0440\u0435\u043c\u0430 \u0443\u0445\u0432\u0430\u043b\u0430) informing the superior investigation authorities of the bad faith and negligence of their subordinates in charge of the applicant\u2019s case. In particular, the court noted that, initially, blood and hair samples had been found on the hoe, but these had subsequently been lost by the investigators at the pre-trial stage. In another special ruling given on the same day, the court informed the head of police of its subordinates\u2019 failure to bring the applicant to the courthouse for the hearings scheduled for 9 March, 28 and 29 July and 2 August 2004 notwithstanding the court\u2019s requests; such a failure, according to the court, had delayed the examination of the applicant\u2019s case. 30.  The judgment itself states that the hearing was public and that the defence lawyer was present. According to the applicant, this judgment was pronounced to him \u201csecretly\u201d on 2 August 2004 in the SIZO, that is to say the remand centre, where he was being detained. In support of his claim, the applicant submitted a copy of the District Court\u2019s letter of the same date requesting that the SIZO administration provide them with a room in which to pronounce the judgment to the applicant. 31.  From 7 October 2004 to 28 February 2005 the applicant familiarised himself with the case file. On the latter date the District Court, alleging the applicant\u2019s abuse of this right, terminated the applicant\u2019s study of the case file. On 9 December 2005 the Court of Appeal remitted the case to the District Court so that the applicant could be given additional opportunity to familiarise himself with the case file. The applicant studied the file additionally from 27 April to 6 May 2005. 32.  At this stage of the proceedings the applicant again challenged the lawfulness of the minutes of the court hearings, obliging the District Court to give interlocutory decisions. 33.  The applicant further appealed against the judgment of 2 August 2004. He maintained, inter alia, that the impugned judgment lacked reasoning and had been \u201csecretly\u201d pronounced to him in the SIZO. 34.  On 29 March 2005 the applicant repeatedly refused the assistance of his lawyer, alleging his collusion and incompetence. 35.  According to the Government, on 9 December 2005 the applicant refused legal assistance from any lawyer. On 17 March 2006, after the applicant had changed his mind, the Court of Appeal ordered that a lawyer be appointed for the applicant and for that reason adjourned the hearing until 31 March 2006. 36.  On 31 March 2006 the Court of Appeal, having reiterated the aforesaid pieces of evidence, upheld the judgment of 2 August 2004. It did not address the alleged lack of \u201cpublicity\u201d of the criminal proceedings against the applicant as maintained in his appeal. 37.  The text of the appellate court\u2019s decision states that the hearing was held in the presence of the applicant and the prosecutor; no indication of the applicant\u2019s lawyer\u2019s presence at the hearing can be found. However, on the same day the applicant, apparently, filed a written statement before the hearing that he rejected the defence lawyer provided to him, and he did not request another one. 38.  On 25 October 2007 the Supreme Court of Ukraine, sitting in camera, rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law. According to the applicant, he familiarised himself with that decision on 28 November 2007. 39.  According to the applicant, on 24 and 25 August 2001 he was \u201cbeaten\u201d (\u201c\u0438\u0437\u0431\u0438\u0432\u0430\u043b\u0438\u201d) by police officers and threatened and psychologically pressurised by the investigator, who allegedly coerced him into pleading guilty. 40.  On 25 August 2001 a forensic medical expert examined the applicant, found some bruises on his shoulders and right elbow, and classified them as light ones. Forensic expert report no. 2948 (\u0430\u043a\u0442 \u0441\u0443\u0434\u043e\u0432\u043e\u2011\u043c\u0435\u0434\u0438\u0447\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u043e\u0441\u0432\u0456\u0434\u0443\u0432\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044f) concluded that these injuries had been caused two or three days before the examination, during a fight or in self\u2011defence. The report contains a typed statement by the expert to the effect that during the examination the applicant had said that he had sustained the injuries in the course of the fight with the victim. The applicant denies that he had made that statement.\nOn 29 August 2001, following an order from the investigator, the same expert re-examined the applicant and came to the same conclusion, stating additionally that the injuries could have been caused between 23 and 24 August 2001 (forensic expert report no. 2948/787). 41.  On 9 November 2001 the prosecutor, having examined the matter proprio motu as required by domestic law, noted that, as the injuries caused to the applicant were light ones, the investigation of such offences was a matter for private prosecution. In the absence of a corresponding complaint by the applicant, the prosecutor refused to institute criminal proceedings. 42.  According to the Government, the applicant had not complained to the prosecutor of ill-treatment by the police and the investigator until 15 December 2001. In his description of ill-treatment the applicant stated that on 24 August 2001 L. had exerted pressure under the applicant\u2019s ear with his finger, had slapped him with the palm of his hand on his forehead and had hit him on the nose with a passport; at the same time another police officer had pushed the applicant in the back with his hand, and had punched him below the knee and on his head. In reply, on 26 December 2001, after holding a preliminary inquiry, the prosecutor refused to institute criminal proceedings, finding no prima facie case. The applicant states that no copies of that or any other decisions on the matter were served on him and he could therefore not challenge them before the domestic courts. 43.  Subsequently the applicant repeatedly asked the prosecutor to institute criminal proceedings against certain specified policemen and the investigator, but to no avail. In particular, the decision of 26 December 2001 was set aside and an additional investigation was ordered; eventually, by decisions of 13 April and 20 June 2002 the prosecutor refused to institute criminal proceedings, finding no corpus delicti in the behaviour of the investigator or the police officers. In particular, in reaching her conclusions in the latter decision the prosecutor took into account:\n-  the conclusions in the forensic report of 25 August 2001 (see paragraph 40 above), namely that the injuries had been caused before the applicant first came into contact with the police;\n-  the report of 12 June 2002 from the ITT (the police detention facility) that in the period from 15 to 18 September 2001 no bodily injuries had been found on the applicant;\n-  the report of 29 December 2001 from the SIZO (the remand prison), according to which the applicant did not complain and had no bodily injuries upon arrival;\n-  the explanations offered by the police officers and the investigator against whose actions the applicant had complained. 44.  The applicant did not appeal against these decisions. According to the Government, both decisions were sent to the SIZO for the applicant\u2019s information. According to the applicant, he was served with a formal notification that the prosecutor had refused to institute criminal proceedings but not with copies of the relevant decisions. On several occasions he asked to be provided with the copies of the relevant prosecutor\u2019s decisions (among others, letters no. \u041b247 sent on 25 May 2004; no. \u041b343 sent on 20 July 2004; no. \u041b23 sent on 18 January 2005; no. \u041b31 sent on 21 May 2008). In fact, a copy of the decision of 20 June 2002 was not sent to him until 11 June 2008. 45.  During the trial the applicant also complained that he had been ill\u2011treated, without however alleging that this treatment resulted in a statement and a confession. On 10 September 2002, in the course of examining the charges against the applicant, the District Court declared the complaint to be unfounded. 46.  On 11 July 2003 the Court of Appeal remitted the criminal case against the applicant for fresh consideration, pointing out the inferior court\u2019s failure to address the applicant\u2019s complaints of ill-treatment. 47.  In its judgment of 2 August 2004 the District Court referred to the applicant\u2019s injuries in the terms set out in paragraph 28 (b) above. 48.  On 9 December 2005, having examined the applicant\u2019s appeal against the judgment of 2 August 2004, the Court of Appeal remitted the case to the District Court and ordered the local Prosecutor\u2019s Office to hold an inquiry into the applicant\u2019s complaints of alleged ill-treatment in the course of the pre-trial investigation. On 7 February 2006 the District Court remitted the case to the prosecutor in compliance with the appellate court\u2019s instructions. According to the Government, the prosecutor sent the copies of the earlier decisions of 13 April and 20 June 2002 to the court and the latter was satisfied with them. 49.  In their decisions of 31 March 2006 and 25 October 2007 the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Ukraine, respectively, rejected the applicant\u2019s complaints of ill-treatment as unsubstantiated (see paragraphs 36 and 38 above). 50.  In the course of the criminal proceedings against the applicant, the applicant or his lawyer applied to the courts on several occasions for release (at least on 27 November and 3 December 2001, 27 August and 21 September 2002) but it is not clear whether the courts examined their requests. 51.  On 23 September 2003 the defence lawyer requested that the District Court release the applicant. He argued that the applicant had had no previous convictions, had his permanent residence in Donetsk and had not gone into hiding during the initial stage of the proceedings against him, had not obstructed the investigation, and that the suspicions raised in the detention order were no longer justifiable. The applicant\u2019s lawyer also referred to the principle of the presumption of innocence. On 27 February 2004 the District Court dismissed the request, limiting its reasoning to a statement that \u201cthere [were] no grounds for replacing the applicant\u2019s detention on remand with a non-custodial preventive measure\u201d. In the operative part the court noted that its decision could be appealed against to the Court of Appeal. 52.  In judgments of 10 September 2002 and 2 August 2004 the District Court and in rulings of 11 July 2003 and 9 December 2005 the Court of Appeal (see paragraphs 17, 28, 21 and 31 respectively) ordered, without any argumentation, that the applicant should remain in detention; they did not specify any time-limit for his detention. 53.  On an unspecified date the applicant requested that the local police and the Prosecutor\u2019s Office institute criminal proceedings in respect of the theft of his property which allegedly took place following his detention in 2001. In February 2002 the local police refused to institute the requested proceedings. Subsequently this decision was quashed and the preliminary inquiry was resumed several times. On 12 October 2006, the latest available decision, the local police again refused to institute the requested proceedings. 54.  The applicant did not appeal against these refusals to a court. 55.  On an unspecified date the applicant requested the local department of the State Pension Fund (hereafter \u201cthe SPF\u201d) to grant him a pension in so far as he was eligible due to his age. In a letter of 6 July 2006 the local department of the SPF replied that the applicant was not entitled to a pension under national law as long as he was serving a prison sentence. 56.  On 16 August 2006 the local department of the SPF stated that the applicant would be entitled to a pension upon his release from prison. 57.  It appears that the applicant did not challenge the aforesaid refusals before any domestic court.", "references": ["8", "7", "6", "5", "9", "0", "4", "3", "No Label", "1", "2"], "gold": ["1", "2"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1968 and lives in Riga. 6.  In 1940, in the territory of Latvia the totalitarian communist regime carried out large-scale nationalisation of privately owned property (for more information see Liep\u0101jnieks v. Latvia (dec.), no. 37586/06, \u00a7 49, 2 November 2010 and case-law cited therein), including a property consisting of a plot of land and buildings in Jurmala which had belonged to a private person M.G. 7.  After the regaining of independence, in 1991 property reform legislation came into force in Latvia and provided that former owners or their heirs could reclaim nationalised property by submitting a request to the local municipality by 1 June 1994. If such a request was not submitted within the statutory time-limit, a court had to decide on restoring property rights, provided a court claim had been submitted before 1 June 1999. 8.  In 1995 V.P.E., acting as a heir of M.G., instituted such proceedings regarding the property in question in the Jurmala City Court. She did not attend the court hearings and in 1997 the court decided to leave her claim without examination. 9.  In 1998 the Jurmala Municipality Land Commission divided the property into two plots on the grounds that no one had requested the restoration of property rights to the land previously owned by M.G. 10. On 19 July 2000 the Cabinet of Ministers issued Order No. 349, which retained one of the plots (hereinafter \u201cthe contested property\u201d) as State property, transferred it to the Ministry of Finance, and obliged the Ministry to register it in the land register (see paragraph 41 below). Two days later the Order was published in the official gazette and in December that year the Ministry of Finance, represented by the State joint\u2011stock company the State Real Estate Agency (Valsts nekustam\u0101 \u012bpa\u0161uma a\u0123ent\u016bra), took it over from Jurmala Municipality. 11.  On 20 December 2000 V.P.E. instituted proceedings in the Jurmala City Court, with Jurmala Municipality as the defendant. She requested the restoration of her property rights to the whole nationalised real estate. 12.  On 2 February 2001 the Jurmala City Court ruled in favour of V.P.E. During the court hearing a representative of Jurmala Municipality supported the claim and confirmed that the property was not the subject of any dispute.\nThe judgment established that V.P.E. was a legitimate heir of the former owner M.G. The Jurmala City Court further held that V.P.E. had on 10 May 1994 submitted a request to Jurmala Municipality, within the time\u2011limit set down in the law, and had later, on 5 July 1995, turned to the court in an attempt to have her rights to the property restored. However, she had not completed the process owing to ill health. Lastly, the judgment stated that the property in question was not possessed by any physical persons in good faith (labtic\u012bgas fiziskas personas) and thus there were no obstacles to returning the real estate to V.P.E. The judgment was not appealed against and became final on 29 February 2001. 13.  At the time the judgment was adopted the Ministry of Finance had not been registered as the owner of the contested property (see paragraph 10 above). On the basis of the above judgment, on 14 May and 17 May 2001 V.P.E. was registered in the land register as the owner of both plots of land. On 21 and 22 May 2001 she sold the contested property to the applicant for 39,000 Latvian lati (LVL) (about 56,000 euros (EUR)). On 22 and 24 May 2001 the applicant was registered as the owner of the property in the land register. In 2001 and 2002 the applicant paid real estate tax on the property. 14.  Meanwhile, on 21 March 2001 the State Real Estate Agency informed the Prosecutor General that, in its opinion, the judgment of 2 February 2001 had infringed the interests of the State and was unlawful. 15.  On 1 June 2001 the Prosecutor General submitted an appeal (\u201cprotests\u201d) to the Senate of the Supreme Court, asking for the Jurmala City Court judgment of 2 February 2001 to be quashed. The objection was based on the grounds that the Jurmala City Court had wrongly applied the land reform legislation, that it had not been competent to hear the case and that it had not taken into consideration the important evidence of Order No. 349, by which the State had become entitled to the contested property. 16.  On 1 August 2001, the Senate of the Supreme Court upheld the Prosecutor General\u2019s objection, quashed the judgment of the Jurmala City Court and ordered a new adjudication of the case. The Senate agreed in substance with the Prosecutor General\u2019s assessment that the Jurmala City Court had erred in choosing the applicable substantive law and that it had overstepped the limits of its competence. Most importantly, Jurmala Municipality had failed to inform the Jurmala City Court about evidence that was pertinent to the restoration of V.P.E.\u2019s property rights. 17.  On 11 January 2002 the Ministry of Finance brought a property claim with Riga Regional Court, acting as a first-instance court, against the applicant and V.P.E. as defendants and Jurmala Municipality as a third party. The claimant asked that the purchase agreement signed by the defendants be declared null and void ab initio, and that the rights of the State to the contested property be recognised. 18.  The claim was based on the sections of the Civil Law regulating property claims. 19.  The Riga Regional Court subsequently decided to join to the above civil proceedings V.P.E.\u2019s claim against Jurmala Municipality for the restoration of her rights to the contested property. 20.  On 16 September 2002 the Riga Regional Court examined the joined claims of V.P.E. and the Ministry of Finance. During the hearing a representative of Jurmala Municipality testified that V.P.E. had failed to request her property rights within the time-limits set by the property reform legislation. The applicant argued that he had been utterly convinced that the property had belonged to V.P.E. when he had purchased it and that he should enjoy protection as a bona fide acquirer of the property. 21.  Relying on Order No. 349 (see paragraph 41 below), the Riga Regional Court recognised that the State had acquired the contested property in 2000. 22.  In an appeal to the Supreme Court, the applicant submitted that the first-instance court ought to have ordered V.P.E. to return him an amount equal to the value of the contested property. 23.  During the hearing, a representative of Jurmala Municipality supported V.P.E.\u2019s claim to the land, but not the buildings. They had allegedly already been transferred to the State. 24.  The Supreme Court, in a judgment of 9 January 2003, dismissed the appeal, holding, inter alia, that it could not be considered that the applicant had acquired the contested land in good faith. In reaching that conclusion the Supreme Court found that the Jurmala City Court\u2019s judgment had been declared unlawful and had been quashed and that therefore any deed concluded with respect to unlawfully acquired property could not be lawful. The appellate court otherwise essentially agreed with the conclusions of the first-instance court. 25.  On 2 April 2003 the Senate of the Supreme Court adopted a judgment in which it dismissed an appeal on points of law by V.P.E. and so the decision to refuse the restoration of her property rights became final. With the same judgment the Senate allowed an appeal on points of law by the applicant. The Senate agreed that the appellate court had erred in considering that the contracts concluded between the applicant and V.P.E. had been invalid. The Senate further indicated that the appellate court had failed to adequately substantiate its finding that the State rather than the applicant was to be declared the owner of the contested property. The quashed part of the judgment was remitted to the appellate court. 26.  On 12 November 2003 the Supreme Court again decided to annul the purchase contracts concluded between V.P.E. and the applicant, to annul the registration of V.P.E.\u2019s and the applicant\u2019s property rights in the land register, and to recognise the State\u2019s property rights. The court\u2019s reasoning was based on section 2006 of the Civil Law, which provides that a purchase contract is to be declared null and void if, inter alia, none of the parties was aware that alienation of the property in question was not permitted. 27.  On the basis of the above judgment, on 27 January 2004 a judge of the land register recorded changes with regard to the contested property. The Ministry of Finance was registered as its owner and from that date onwards it paid the land tax. 28.  After the applicant submitted an appeal on points of law, the Senate of the Supreme Court on 3 March 2004 quashed the Supreme Court\u2019s judgment of 12 November 2003 and remitted the case to that court. The Senate noted, inter alia, that the appellate court had ignored the applicant\u2019s argument that it was necessary to decide on a reversal of the execution of the judgment of the Jurmala City Court. 29.  On 1 December 2004 the Supreme Court adopted a new judgment following the remittal. It upheld the Ministry of Finance\u2019s application to recognise the State\u2019s ownership rights over the contested property and to delete the entry in the Jurmala land register on the applicant\u2019s title.\nThe Supreme Court noted that the applicant had obtained the property unlawfully (prettiesiski) because the Jurmala City Court had exceeded the limits of its competence when adopting the judgment of 2 February 2001. The Ministry of Finance, being the lawful owner of the contested property, could file a property claim against any person who had taken possession of its property. However, the claimant could not seek to annul a contract to which it was not a party and therefore the Ministry\u2019s claim in relation to that was dismissed. The Supreme Court considered that in those circumstances there was no need to address the applicant\u2019s arguments concerning the alleged need to rule on reversing the execution of the Jurmala City Court\u2019s judgment. 30.  In his appeal on points of law, the applicant asked, inter alia, to have the deletion of the entries in the land register revoked. In particular, he referred to the fact that he had relied on land register data and had been a bona fide purchaser. Accordingly, he argued that instead of depriving him of the property, the court should have ordered V.P.E. to compensate the Ministry of Finance for the value of the contested property. 31.  On 23 March 2005 the Senate of the Supreme Court adopted a final judgment in which it dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law. 32.  On 25 August 2005 a land register judge rectified the data and entered the judgment of 23 March 2005 as the basis of the Ministry of Finance\u2019s title to the contested property. 33.  The land register shows that the contested property is leased under an agreement dated 24 August 2005 by a private company which provides restaurant and catering services there. On 29 September 2006 the lease rights were entered in the land register. The long-term lease is valid until 31 August 2030.", "references": ["7", "0", "2", "3", "4", "6", "8", "5", "1", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Simferopol. 6.  In 1990 the applicant graduated from the Ukrainian Printing and Publishing Institute with a diploma in technological engineering. 7.  On 23 August 1990 he was employed as a worker by the Tavrida State Publishing House (hereafter \u201cTavrida\u201d). 8.  In June 1997 the applicant asked N., the director of Tavrida, to place him on the reserve list for promotion to an engineering position corresponding to his qualifications. 9.  Having received no follow-up, in 2000 the applicant applied for the second time. 10.  On 6 March 2000 this application was refused. 11.  On an unspecified date in 2000 the applicant appealed to the Central District Court of Simferopol (hereinafter \u201cthe Central District Court\u201d) seeking, in particular, to oblige his employer to consider him for an engineering position. 12.  During the proceedings, the defendant company submitted that its refusal was connected to the state of the applicant\u2019s mental health. In particular, as was apparent from the information retained on the applicant\u2019s personnel file, in 1981 he had been declared unfit for military service in peacetime in accordance with Article 5b of the then applicable 1973 Diseases and Handicaps Schedule issued by the Ministry of Defence of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (\u201cthe USSR\u201d). In the summer of 1997 the human resources department had obtained from the military enlistment office a certificate stating that the applicant had indeed been dispensed under Article 5b, which read as follows: \u201cpsychosis and psychotic disorders connected to organic cerebral lesions with residual moderately manifested deviations in the mental sphere\u201d. The defendant company further noted that as the applicant had not provided any subsequent information concerning his state of health, his appointment to an engineering position \u2013 which implied managerial responsibilities and supervision of other employees \u2013 was considered unwarranted. A copy of the certificate issued by the military enlistment office was provided to the court for examination during the public hearings. 13.  B., the applicant\u2019s supervisor questioned by the court during the trial, submitted that the applicant had been a diligent employee. However, in his view he lacked the necessary personal skills to occupy a position with managerial responsibilities. In particular, occasionally the applicant had been involved in conflicts with his colleagues. All of them, when questioned by B., had suggested that they did not want to have the applicant as their supervisor. In view of the above and with regard being had to the reasons for the applicant\u2019s dispensation from military service, in B.\u2019s view the management had been correct in refusing the applicant\u2019s application for promotion. 14.  On 17 August 2000 the court rejected the applicant\u2019s claim, having found that promotion of employees was within the employer\u2019s discretion and there was no legal basis for obliging the defendant company to arrange the applicant\u2019s promotion by way of court proceedings in a situation such as that of the applicant. 15.  On 24 September 2000 this judgment was upheld by the Supreme Court of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (\u201cthe ARC\u201d) and became final. 16.  In 2002 Tavrida referred the applicant for a medical examination \u201cwith a view to determining [his] fitness for employment\u201d as an engineer. 17.  On 5 September 2002 the applicant obtained a certificate signed by six medical specialists, including a psychiatrist and a neurologist from the local polyclinic attesting to his fitness for employment as an engineer. 18.  In August 2003 the applicant was appointed as a foreman and in April 2006 as an engineer-technologist. 19.  In October 2000 the applicant instituted civil proceedings against Tavrida seeking damages and apologies from its management for his purported defamation resulting from the dissemination of information concerning the medical grounds for his dispensation from military service. He alleged, in particular, that the defendant company had had no right to enquire of the enlistment office in 1997 about the grounds for his dispensation, to use this information in deciding on his promotion and to disseminate it to his direct supervisor and other colleagues, as well as to communicate it to the court in the framework of the civil dispute. 20.  In January 2001 the applicant modified his claims, seeking to oblige the defendant company, in particular, to promote him to an engineering position and to pay him non-pecuniary damages for the purportedly unlawful processing of his health data, libel, and discrimination on the basis of health. 21.  On 23 January 2001 the Central District Court rejected the applicant\u2019s claim as lacking legal basis. In particular, it noted that labour law did not prohibit employers from enquiring of military enlistment offices about their employees\u2019 military service records. 22.  On 28 March 2001 the Supreme Court of the ARC quashed this judgment and remitted the case for a fresh consideration. It noted that pursuant to section 23 of the Information Act of 1992, health data constituted personal data and could only be collected with the applicant\u2019s consent, unless otherwise envisaged by law. The trial court should have established whether it had been lawful to collect and use the applicant\u2019s psychiatric health data in the manner and in the context in which it had been used; what the purpose of its processing had been and whether it had been justified, regard being had, in particular, to the fact that the data pertained to 1981. The court also noted that section 46 of the Information Act expressly restricted dissemination of confidential medical information. The trial court should have explored whether the enlistment office\u2019s certificate contained confidential medical information and whether the fact that it had become known to other employees had caused damage to the applicant. 23.  In May 2002 the applicant further amended his claim, alleging that the defendant company had processed his health data in breach of: Article 32 of the Constitution of Ukraine; sections 23 and 46 of the Information Act; section 40 of the Legislative Guidelines concerning Protection of Health in Ukraine (\u201cthe Health Protection Guidelines\u201d); and sections 3 and 6 of the Psychiatric Assistance Act. 24.  On 17 May 2002 the Central District Court rejected the applicant\u2019s claim, having requalified it in law as falling within the ambit of Article 7 of the Civil Code of Ukraine of 1963 as in force at the material time and found that the defendant company could not be held liable under that provision for having disseminated defamatory statements. It also noted that the information obtained by the defendant company from the enlistment office, could not qualify as \u201cconfidential medical information\u201d, as it contained a reference to the standardised grounds for dispensation from military service rather than a personalised medical diagnosis. 25.  On 19 February 2003 the Court of Appeal of the ARC (formerly the Supreme Court of the ARC; hereinafter \u201cthe Court of Appeal\u201d) quashed this judgment and remitted the case for a fresh consideration. It noted, in particular, that the Central District Court had arbitrarily requalified the applicant\u2019s claims as falling within the ambit of Article 7 of the Civil Code rather than addressing his arguments concerning the breach of the legal provisions to which he had referred. It further instructed the District Court to take into account the ruling of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine of 30 October 1997 in the case of Ustymenko in interpreting applicable legislation. 26.  On 23 July 2003 the Central District Court took a fresh decision rejecting the applicant\u2019s claims, referring, again, to Article 7 of the Civil Code and having found that there was nothing unlawful either in Tavrida\u2019s or its director\u2019s personal conduct with respect to the processing of the disputed information. Without referring to any legal provisions, the court noted that the director had been authorised to know the reasons for the applicant\u2019s dispensation from military service, as this information had been a part of the personnel record compiled and kept by employers in the ordinary course of business. Discussion of the relevant information with some other company employees had been carried out in good faith: it had only happened in the context of taking a decision on whether the applicant could be appointed to a position with increased responsibilities, including staff management. In doing so, the director had acted within the limits of managerial discretion. 27.  The applicant appealed against this decision. He submitted, in particular, that the information concerning the standardised grounds for his dismissal in 1981 had not been specific enough to serve as a basis for determination of whether or not he could be employed as an engineer in 1997; and that in any case it had been outdated. Should his employer have had any doubts concerning his psychiatric health, it could have asked the applicant to provide a current medical certificate of fitness for work. He further noted that the court had not addressed his arguments under Article 32 of the Constitution of Ukraine, the Information Act and other legal provisions to which he had referred. In addition, the applicant noted that the Central District Court had not cited any references to any legal provisions entitling employers to enquire without their employees\u2019 consent about the reasons for their dispensation from military service, and to have them recorded in their personnel files. In the applicant\u2019s view, this information was not pertinent to his ability to perform engineering duties. The court had also not assessed whether it had been justifiable to communicate the information concerning the applicant\u2019s dispensation to third parties. 28.  On 1 December 2003 the Court of Appeal rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal, upholding the final conclusions reached by the Central District Court, but having amended the reasoning. In particular, it found that Tavrida had been an improper defendant in the applicant\u2019s case, as the applicant\u2019s complaint in substance had concerned the conduct of N. (its director); K. (the human resources officer); and B. (the applicant\u2019s supervisor) acting in their capacity as individuals. The Court of Appeal did not cite any legal provisions in substantiation of its conclusions. 29.  The applicant appealed on points of law arguing that N., K. and B. had been acting in their official capacities when processing his health data, thus the defendant company had been vicariously liable for their actions. He further noted that in any event the court had had the authority to summon the proper defendants in the case, rather than dismissing it, and that both the trial and the appeal courts had never considered his main arguments on the merits. 30.  On 29 May 2006 the Supreme Court of Ukraine refused the applicant\u2019s application for leave to appeal on points of law. 31.  In July 2006 the applicant instituted civil proceedings challenging, in particular, the lawfulness of the actions of N., K. and B. with respect to the processing of his health data. 32.  On 30 November 2006 the Kyivskiy District Court of Simferopol rejected the applicant\u2019s claim as unsubstantiated. The court acknowledged that the disputed data qualified as \u201cconfidential information\u201d falling within the ambit of section 23 of the Information Act. At the same time, it noted that the scope of individual involvement of each of the defendants in collecting and processing this information was not entirely clear. In any event, this processing had been lawful, as according to applicable law, the human resources departments were obliged to keep the military duty records of their staff on file and to synchronise them with the military enlistment offices. The communication of the relevant information by the human resources officer to the company director in connection with deciding on the applicant\u2019s promotion had also been justified, because managers had been entitled to be apprised of their employees\u2019 health, such information being necessary for ensuring a safe working environment. The defendants had obtained access to the disputed information in accordance with the law and processed it for the sole purpose of deciding on the applicant\u2019s promotion; this processing had been carried out in good faith and so had not been unlawful. 33.  The applicant appealed against this decision, alleging, inter alia, that using (in 1997 and 2000) the information concerning the reasons for his dispensation from military service in 1981 with a view to deciding on his promotion had been excessive; that the relevant information had been outdated, incomplete and impertinent; and that should his employer have wanted to check his health status, it should have referred him to a specialised medical commission. 34.  On 24 January 2007 the Court of Appeal rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal. 35.  On 23 May 2007 the Supreme Court rejected a further application by the applicant for leave to appeal on points of law.", "references": ["7", "2", "9", "0", "1", "6", "8", "5", "No Label", "3", "4"], "gold": ["3", "4"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1962 and is detained in Baku. 6.  On 9 June 2008 the Assize Court (A\u011f\u0131r Cinay\u0259tl\u0259r M\u0259hk\u0259m\u0259si \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe Assize Court\u201d), sitting as a court of first instance for serious offences, convicted the applicant and his wife of fraud. The applicant was sentenced to nine years\u2019 imprisonment with confiscation of property, and his wife to seven years\u2019 imprisonment, suspended for five years on probation. 7.  On 23 January 2009 the Baku Court of Appeal (Bak\u0131 Apellyasiya M\u0259hk\u0259m\u0259si \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe Court of Appeal\u201d) overturned the judgment of 9 June 2008, reducing the applicant\u2019s term of imprisonment to seven years and lifting the confiscation of property sanction. 8.  The applicant lodged a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court (Ali M\u0259hk\u0259m\u0259 \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe Supreme Court\u201d). The prosecutor lodged a cassation protest in respect of the judgment of 23 January 2009 with the Supreme Court, requesting that it be set aside and the case remitted to the Court of Appeal. 9.  The Supreme Court scheduled the first hearing for 10 June 2009 but adjourned the proceedings until 24 June 2009 at the request of the applicant\u2019s lawyer who pleaded that he had not enough time to familiarise himself with the case-file and collect further evidence. 10.  At the hearing of 24 June 2009 the applicant\u2019s lawyer requested another adjournment referring to health problems and lack of time for familiarisation with the case-file. The Supreme Court scheduled the next hearing for 1 July 2009. According to the minutes of the hearing of 24 June 2009 provided by the Government, the applicant\u2019s lawyer was present when the court declared that his request had been granted and that the proceedings were adjourned until 1 July 2009. 11.  On 1 July 2009, having examined the case in the absence of the applicant and his lawyer but in the presence of the prosecutor, the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal and accepted the prosecutor\u2019s application for supervisory review in part. The prosecutor made oral submissions during the hearing, seeking the dismissal of the applicant\u2019s appeal. 12.  The Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeal\u2019s judgment as regards the applicant\u2019s conviction, but quashed his wife\u2019s conviction, remitting that part of the case to the Court of Appeal for fresh examination. The Supreme Court found that proof of the applicant\u2019s guilt had been duly established during the trial in the first-instance court and the Court of Appeal and that his actions had been properly classified under criminal law. Citing Article 419.4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Supreme Court\u2019s decision stated that the examination of the case was possible in the absence of the applicant and his lawyer given that the lawyer had failed to appear despite having been duly notified and the applicant, who was serving his prison sentence, had made no request to attend.", "references": ["7", "0", "6", "2", "3", "4", "5", "9", "1", "8", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant, Mr X, is a Sri Lankan national of Tamil origin, who was born in 1979 and resides in Switzerland. 6.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows. 7.  During the 1990s the applicant was a member of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (\u201cthe LTTE\u201d) and participated in armed resistance against the Sri Lankan Government. In late 2003 he was detained in Colombo for about three months. The applicant stated that during this time he had been ill-treated. He furthermore stated that he had been threatened and subjected to surveillance after his release. 8.  On 2 April 2007 the applicant left Sri Lanka for Italy, where he lived until May 2009. His wife, who had remained in Sri Lanka, had allegedly been subjected to searches and questioning by the Sri Lankan police and security forces. She left Sri Lanka on 13 March 2009 and joined the applicant in Italy. 9.  On 25 May 2009 the applicant and his wife illegally entered Switzerland and applied for asylum on grounds of political persecution in Sri Lanka. The applicant emphasised that, as a member of the LTTE, he had participated in armed resistance against the Government of Sri Lanka and had been ill-treated in detention. 10.  On 8 December 2009 the applicant\u2019s wife gave birth to their first child. 11.  In a decision taken on 1 June 2011, the Federal Migration Office (\u201cthe FMO\u201d \u2013 now the State Secretariat for Migration) held that the applicant and his wife did not fulfil the criteria necessary to obtain refugee status because they had failed to present sufficient evidence in support of their claim. Furthermore, the FMO rejected the applicant\u2019s asylum application and ordered the execution of their deportation order to Sri Lanka, finding it enforceable, legal and reasonable (m\u00f6glich als auch rechtm\u00e4ssig und zumutbar). 12.  On 9 June 2011 the applicant\u2019s wife gave birth to their second child. 13.  On 5 July 2011 the applicant and his wife appealed against the FMO\u2019s decision to the Federal Administrative Court, requesting that it annul the deportation order according to which the authorities of the Canton of St Gallen had to deport them no later than 27 July 2011, by force if necessary (pursuant to points 3, 4, and 5 of the operative part of the FMO\u2019s decision of 1 June 2011). However, the applicant did not challenge the FMO\u2019s decision refusing to grant him asylum or to recognise him as a refugee (points 1 and 2 of the operative part of the FMO\u2019s decision of 1 June 2011). 14.  In its judgment of 1 October 2012, the Federal Administrative Court rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal on the merits. The court held that the FMO had violated the applicant\u2019s right to be heard by refusing to grant him and his wife access to certain documents in its possession, namely a country report of 22 December 2011 on the conditions in Sri Lanka, which had been established during an official mission of the FMO in September 2010. Nevertheless, since the FMO had provided the parties with access to these documents at a later date, the Federal Administrative Court concluded that the original violation had been remedied. 15.  The Federal Administrative Court further held that there was no impediment to enforcing the deportation order. In particular, weighing the preponderance of the evidence (mit beachtlicher Wahrscheinlichkeit), it held that neither the applicant\u2019s submissions nor the official file indicated that he or his wife would be subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention if they returned to Sri Lanka. 16.  On 2 November 2012 the applicant and his wife applied to the Federal Administrative Court to have its judgment of 1 October 2012 reconsidered. The applicant claimed that the court had not adequately considered all the relevant evidence. He also submitted a copy of an LTTE magazine cover from 1997, which included his photograph. He also submitted a letter from his sister dated 19 October 2012, as well as confirmation from the Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka that he had lodged a complaint with that institution on 5 October 2012. 17.  In its judgment of 27 November 2012, the Federal Administrative Court rejected the applicant\u2019s application for reconsideration, holding that there were insufficient grounds to reopen the case. It emphasised that the application for reconsideration was an extraordinary remedy, which could not be used to submit facts which could have been raised during the ordinary proceedings. 18.  On 21 August 2013 the applicant and his family were deported to Sri Lanka. Upon arrival at the airport in Colombo, they were detained and questioned for thirteen hours. Following that, the applicant\u2019s wife and children were released, whereas the applicant was incarcerated and ill\u2011treated in Boosa Prison. According to his wife, when she visited the applicant in prison she noted that his face appeared swollen and concluded that her husband had been beaten. 19.   On 6 December 2013 a representative of the Swiss Embassy and a senior protection officer of the UNHCR visited the applicant in the prison governor\u2019s office. During this visit, the representatives noted that the applicant was visibly afraid to speak and that a free conversation with him was impossible. 20.  Following this, the applicant\u2019s family was relocated to Switzerland. 21.  On an unknown date the applicant was transferred to a so-called \u201crehabilitation\u201d prison, from which he was released on 12 April 2015. 22.  After his release, the applicant applied for a visa on humanitarian grounds to the Swiss authorities in order to return to Switzerland and submit a fresh asylum application.  On 21 April 2015 the FMO allowed the applicant to return to Switzerland and he did so on 25 April 2015. 23.  On an unspecified date the applicant submitted a fresh asylum application to the Swiss authorities and on 26 June 2015 his application was granted. 24.  In his application to the Court, the applicant pointed out that in a parallel case another Tamil, Mr Y, had been deported from Switzerland to Sri Lanka on 25 July 2013, that is to say almost a month before the applicant\u2019s own deportation. According to Y\u2019s lawyer, upon his arrival in Sri Lanka he had been detained and subjected to ill-treatment which had led to his hospitalisation. 25.  Furthermore, on 2 August 2013 Y\u2019s lawyer had written to the Swiss Minister of Justice and to the director of the Migration Office asking that all deportations of Tamils to Sri Lanka be suspended. 26.  The director of the FMO commissioned an external investigation into the expulsions of the applicant and Y. The report delivered by Prof. W. K\u00e4lin on 23 February 2014 concluded that, due to a combination of several shortcomings of the Swiss authorities, the individual risk of ill\u2011treatment of the two Tamils in Sri Lanka had not been properly assessed. 27.  In addition, the UNHCR also carried out an assessment of the decision-making process of the FMO in the applicant\u2019s case and identified a number of shortcomings. These consisted of, in particular, the prolonged lapse of time between the asylum application (May 2009) and the execution of the deportation order (August 2013); the fact that the situation in Sri Lanka had changed considerably after the end of the civil war in 2009; the involvement of several FMO employees in different phases of the decision-making process throughout an extended period of time; the fact that the applicant\u2019s hearing had been partly held in a superficial manner and that the authorities had not conducted additional investigations. 28.  The results of both reports were made public on 26 May 2014. 29.  On 10 December 2013 the FMO adopted an internal report on the arrest of the applicant by the Sri Lankan authorities. 30.  After the end of the civil war in Sri Lanka, in 2011 Switzerland resumed deportations of Tamils to that country. The practice was again stopped in September 2013, following the expulsion and ill-treatment of the applicant and Y. 31.  Subsequently, the FMO analysed the situation in Sri Lanka in the light of the results of its missions to that country, the case-law of international courts, the practices of other countries and the reports of international organisations. As a consequence, the FMO has modified its practice concluding that the assessment of risk would now be carried out following criteria developed by the European Court of Human Rights in all cases involving deportations or Sri Lankan nationals.", "references": ["7", "5", "9", "4", "6", "2", "3", "8", "0", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "7.  The applicant was born in 1978. He is currently serving a prison sentence in Uzbekistan. 8.  The information provided by the applicant\u2019s representative and the Government concerning the circumstances of the case is limited and conflicting. The elements at the Court\u2019s disposal are described below. 9.  The following account of events is based on a series of written submissions to the Court by the applicant\u2019s representative. 10.  The applicant, while living in Uzbekistan, was a friend of a former boyfriend of Ms Gulnara Karimova, one of President Islam Karimov\u2019s daughters. At some point Ms Karimova turned against her former boyfriend\u2019s friends. Fleeing political persecution, on 26 December 2010 the applicant moved to Russia. He resided in Moscow with his partner, Ms I., and their child. 11.  In 2011 the Uzbek authorities charged the applicant in absentia with crimes related to religious extremism on account of his alleged involvement in the establishment in 2009 of a jihadist organisation, issued an arrest warrant and put his name on an international wanted list. 12.  On 10 July 2013 the applicant was arrested in Moscow on the basis of the Uzbek warrant. 13.  On 12 July 2013 the Golovinskiy District Court of Moscow authorised the applicant\u2019s detention pending extradition. 14.  On 9 August 2013 the Golovinskiy inter-district prosecutor\u2019s office of Moscow ordered the applicant\u2019s release on the grounds that the Uzbek authorities had not lodged a formal extradition request and that the crimes he had been charged with did not constitute criminal offences under Russian law. It was also noted that the applicant could not have established the jihadist organisation in 2009 as the organisation in question had been banned by the Supreme Court of Russia in 2003. The applicant was then released. 15.  Following his release, the applicant continued to live in Moscow. At some point he applied for refugee status, referring to a risk of ill\u2011treatment in Uzbekistan. 16.  On 8 November 2013 the Moscow Department of the Federal Migration Service (\u201cthe Moscow FMS\u201d) dismissed the allegations of a risk of ill-treatment in Uzbekistan as unfounded and rejected the applicant\u2019s application for refugee status. He challenged that decision in court. 17.  On 12 May 2014 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow approved the applicant\u2019s application, quashed the Moscow FMS\u2019s rejection and ordered it to grant the applicant refugee status. 18.  The applicant\u2019s passport remained in the Moscow FMS\u2019s file concerning his application for refugee status. 19.  Given that no appeal against the judgment of 12 May 2014 was lodged within the required time, the judgment entered into force. 20.  On the evening of 9 June 2014, while the applicant and his family were visiting a friend, Mr T., the applicant\u2019s child fell ill. The applicant and Ms I. decided to take him to hospital and the applicant called a taxi. A silver Lada Priora arrived. Mr T. wanted to accompany the applicant and Ms I., but the Lada\u2019s driver told him that the car had been ordered for two adult passengers only. The applicant, Ms I. and the child got into the taxi. 21.  On their way, at about 7.20 p.m., Ms I. decided to stop at a pharmacy in the centre of Moscow. She took the child out of the taxi and the applicant waited in the car. When Ms I. left the pharmacy she saw that the taxi had driven away. A woman told Ms I. that she had seen two men getting in a parked car, which had then driven off. 22.  Ms I. tried calling the applicant but his mobile telephone was turned off. She then alerted Mr T. 23.  The applicant\u2019s representative was notified of the applicant\u2019s disappearance shortly after. On the same date, that is, on 9 June 2014, he contacted the Federal Security Service (\u201cthe FSB\u201d) and the border control agency, asking them to prevent the applicant\u2019s involuntary removal from Russian territory. According to the applicant\u2019s representative, he suspected the involvement of two FSB officers, \u201cTimur\u201d and \u201cZakhar\u201d, who had shown an interest in the applicant in 2011. Nevertheless, he did not mention those people in his letters to the FSB and the border control agency. 24.  On 18 June 2014 the investigation department of the Uzbek Ministry of the Interior informed the applicant\u2019s father that the applicant had been arrested and placed in custody on 17 June 2014. On 25 June 2015 the applicant\u2019s representative forwarded a copy of the notification to the Court. 25.  The criminal case against the applicant was brought to trial before the Tashkent City Court. He was appointed a legal aid lawyer. 26.  At the end of October 2014 the applicant\u2019s representative, Mr Vasilyev, travelled to Tashkent. He discovered that the applicant had been kept incommunicado in a remand prison in Tashkent. Mr Vasilyev was repeatedly denied access to the applicant.\n(a)  Information communicated orally to Mr Vasilyev by the applicant 27.  Mr Vasilyev attended three hearings at the Tashkent City Court on 31 October, and 3 and 4 November 2014. On 31 October and 3 November 2014 the trial judge allowed Mr Vasilyev to talk to the applicant. During the conversations the applicant sat in a cage in the courtroom surrounded by guards. The applicant\u2019s representative summarised the applicant\u2019s description of the events of 9 June 2014, given orally on 31 October and 3 November 2014, as follows. 28.  At 7 p.m. on 9 June 2014 the applicant had been abducted by two FSB officers. They had put a sack over the applicant\u2019s head during the abduction. They had then taken the applicant to an unidentified house, tied him up and taken the sack off his head. The applicant had recognised the two men as \u201cTimur\u201d and \u201cZakhar\u201d, the FSB officers whom he had met previously in November 2011. The two men had beaten the applicant and kept him inside the house until the following day. 29.  On 10 June 2014 the two FSB officers had taken the applicant to a runway at one of Moscow\u2019s airports without passing through any border or passport controls as the applicant\u2019s passport had remained with the Moscow FMS. The FSB officers had handed the applicant over to Uzbek officials near the steps of a Tashkent-bound airplane. 30.  Once in Uzbekistan, the applicant had been placed under arrest by the Main Investigation Department of the Ministry of the Interior of Uzbekistan on suspicion of crimes related to religious extremism. He had been kept in detention for two months and had been subjected to torture and other ill\u2011treatment by Uzbek law-enforcement officers with a view to securing a self-incriminating statement. The applicant had been tied head downwards to a bar attached to the wall and had been beaten repeatedly. The officers had broken two of the applicant\u2019s ribs and knocked out seven of his teeth.\n(b)  Information provided by Ms I. 31.  On 4 November 2014 the applicant\u2019s representative interviewed Ms I. 32.  Ms I. stated that on 3 May 2011 an FSB officer named \u201cZakhar\u201d and some police officers had come to their Moscow flat to search for the applicant, but had not found him. 33.  In November 2011 \u201cZakhar\u201d and another FSB officer, \u201cTimur\u201d, had interviewed Ms I. about the applicant and his religious views and practices. 34.  Following the applicant\u2019s abduction, on 10 June 2014 Ms I. had called \u201cTimur\u201d on his mobile phone, enquiring about her partner. \u201cTimur\u201d had replied that he was no longer working for \u201cthat office\u201d (the FSB). Ms I. had also tried calling \u201cZakhar\u201d but had received no response. 35.  On 13 June 2014 Ms I. had flown to Tashkent with her son and mother. Upon arrival she had been detained at the airport for seven hours and then released. 36.  Ms I. had been questioned by the investigator in charge of the applicant\u2019s case at the Ministry of the Interior of Uzbekistan, Mr K., but had been denied access to the applicant. When she had seen the applicant in the courtroom, he had made signs to her that he had been beaten.\n(c)  Information provided by the applicant\u2019s mother 37.  On 4 November 2014 Mr Vasilyev interviewed the applicant\u2019s mother, Ms Kh. 38.  Ms Kh. stated that her younger son had been convicted of crimes related to religious extremism in December 2010, which had influenced the applicant\u2019s decision to leave Uzbekistan. She had had occasional contact with the applicant during his time in Moscow. 39.  On 15 June 2014 Ms I. had arrived in Uzbekistan and informed Ms Kh. of the applicant\u2019s abduction. 40.  On 25 June 2014 officers of the Ministry of the Interior of Uzbekistan had come to Ms Kh.\u2019s home and searched it. 41.  On 27 June 2014 the applicant\u2019s mother had visited the investigator, K., who had said that the applicant had voluntarily returned to Tashkent on 8 June 2014 and had gone to the police with a statement of surrender. 42.  Some people had informed Ms Kh. that her son had been severely beaten while in detention. She had not had access to the applicant, but when she had seen him in the courtroom, he had looked very poorly. 43.  On 18 November 2014 the Tashkent City Court found the applicant guilty of crimes under Articles 216 (\u201cthe illegal establishment of public associations or religious organisations\u201d) and 244\u00b2 (\u201cthe establishment of, management of, participation in religious extremist, separatist, fundamentalist or other proscribed organisations\u201d) of Uzbekistan\u2019s Criminal Code and sentenced him to eight years\u2019 imprisonment. 44.  The lawyer appointed for the applicant refused to lodge an appeal against the judgment. 45.  On 26 November 2014 Mr Vasilyev lodged an appeal with the Appeal Chamber of the Tashkent City Court on the applicant\u2019s behalf. It appears that later the applicant withdrew the statement of appeal. 46.  The applicant remains imprisoned in Uzbekistan. 47.  On 29 July 2014 the Moscow FMS lodged an appeal against the judgment of 12 May 2014. The statement accompanying the appeal did not contain any request to restore the time-limit for lodging it. 48.  The Moscow City Court admitted the appeal on an unspecified date. The reasons for admitting it after the time-limit had run out are unknown. 49.  On 19 October 2014 the UNHCR Representation in the Russian Federation (\u201cthe UNHCR\u201d) submitted a memorandum on the applicant\u2019s case to the Moscow City Court for consideration. It was noted that torture was a widespread method of coercion used by the Uzbek authorities to obtain self\u2011incriminating statements from those suspected of involvement in \u201creligious extremism\u201d. The statement read, in particular:\n\u201cAs follows from the document of the Call for Urgent Action published by Amnesty International on 6 November 2014, after the forced return to Uzbekistan, Mr Khamidkariyev was subjected to torture and other kinds of proscribed treatment and punishment for two months with a view to obtaining a confession to made-up charges \u2013 he was tied head down to a bar attached to a wall and beaten, as a result of which he had seven teeth knocked out and two ribs broken.\u201d 50.  On 2 December 2014 the Moscow City Court examined the appeal lodged by the Moscow FMS against the judgment of 12 May 2014, quashed the judgment and upheld the Moscow FMS\u2019s decision of 8 November 2013 owing to the fact that the applicant had not provided \u201cconvincing and irrefutable evidence of the existence of well-founded fears of becoming a victim of persecution in Uzbekistan\u201d. The reasons for examining a belated appeal on the merits were not given in the text of the judgment. 51.  In the course of the proceedings before the Court, the Government sent four sets of correspondence, the contents of which are described below. 52.  By a letter of 1 July 2014 in reply to the Court\u2019s request for information of 10 June 2014, made at the same time as the indication of the interim measures (see paragraph 4 above), the Government informed the Court that \u201cthe relevant State bodies have been informed about the disappearance of the applicant and the indication by the Court of the interim measures under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court\u201d. 53.  They further noted that the applicant had not been \u201capprehended by the officers of any Russian law-enforcement bodies on 9 June 2014 in Moscow\u201d and that \u201chis current whereabouts [are] unknown\u201d. 54.  The Government also stated that on 10 June 2014 the Basmannyy district department of the interior (\u201cthe Basmannyy police\u201d) had received a complaint about the applicant\u2019s kidnapping from Mr T. and that on 19 June 2014 a case file with the preliminary inquiry conducted on the basis of that complaint had been forwarded to the Basmannyy district investigative unit of the Moscow investigative department of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Prosecutor\u2019s Office (\u201cthe investigative authority\u201d) \u201cfor further enquiry and the possible initiation of a criminal case\u201d. 55.  Lastly, they noted that the applicant\u2019s representative\u2019s letter of 25 June 2014 (see paragraph 24 above) had been forwarded to the investigative authority for consideration. 56.   No documents were enclosed with the letter of 1 July 2014. 57.  On 24 October 2014 the Government submitted their observations on the admissibility and merits of the application, the contents of which can be summarised as follows. 58.  On 9 September 2014[1] the investigative authority opened an investigation into the applicant\u2019s kidnapping as criminal case no. 815447 under Article 126 \u00a7 2 (a) of the Russian Criminal Code (\u201caggravated kidnapping\u201d). 59.  In the course of the investigation CCTV pictures from cameras located in the vicinity of the scene of the incident were examined. They showed that on 9 June 2014 at about 7 p.m. the applicant had been kidnapped by unidentified people and taken away by car. 60.  The Government claimed that the Court\u2019s demand to submit lists of passengers checked in on Uzbekistan-bound flights between 9 and 12 June 2014 (see paragraph 5 above) could not be complied with as the lists in question contained personal data about third parties and could not be submitted to the Court without their prior consent. 61.  The Government further submitted that there was no information about the arrest of the applicant on 9 June 2014 by law\u2011enforcement agencies or his detention in remand prisons in Moscow or the Moscow Region, and that no information regarding the applicant crossing the State border had been received at that time. 62.  The notification by the Uzbek authorities to the applicant\u2019s father of 18 June 2014 concerning the applicant\u2019s arrest and detention in Uzbekistan had been added to the criminal investigation file. 63.  The Government concluded that there was no evidence to prove any direct or indirect involvement of the Russian authorities in the applicant\u2019s alleged kidnapping and transfer to Uzbekistan. 64.  The Russian authorities had not been made aware and could not have known of any risk that the applicant might be kidnapped. 65.  The Government were not in a position to provide information on the criminal proceedings against the applicant in Uzbekistan as those proceedings fell outside their jurisdiction. However, they had sent a request for mutual legal assistance to the Uzbek authorities in order to establish the applicant\u2019s whereabouts. 66.  In conclusion, the Government submitted that there had not been any administrative practice of the involuntary removal of persons in respect of whom Rule 39 had been applied to their countries of nationality. Inquiries and investigations were opened into instances of the disappearance of such people. The Russian Prosecutor\u2019s Office oversaw the compliance with Russian law of any decisions taken in the course of such inquiries and investigations. A large group of State agencies had held a co-ordination meeting on 10 September 2014 on the further enforcement of measures to ensure the security of asylum seekers. 67.  No documents were enclosed with the Government\u2019s observations of 24 October 2014. 68.  On 26 February 2015 the Government, in reply to the applicant\u2019s observations on the admissibility and merits of the application, submitted that they reaffirmed the position stated in their observations of 24 October 2014 and commented on the applicant\u2019s just satisfaction claims. 69.  No documents were enclosed with the Government\u2019s correspondence of 26 February 2015. 70.  Following the Court\u2019s additional question to the Government regarding the respondent State\u2019s compliance with Article 38 of the Convention (see paragraph 6 above), the Government submitted a letter which read as follows:\n\u201cWith reference to your letter of 24 April 2015 in respect of the above application, please find enclosed copies of the criminal investigation documents disclosed by the investigative authorities after a repeated request.\nThe Government kindly ask the Court to join the documents to the case-file.\u201d 71.  No answer to the Court\u2019s question under Article 38 of the Convention was given.\n(b)  Documents enclosed 72.  Forty-three pages of various documents issued by the Russian and Uzbek authorities were enclosed with the Government\u2019s cover letter.\n(i)  Documents issued by the Russian authorities\n(\u03b1)  Summary of events in chronological order 73.  The contents of the documents issued by the Russian authorities and which were enclosed with the Government\u2019s letter of 15 May 2015 can be summarised as follows. 74.  On 10 June 2014 Mr T. reported the applicant\u2019s kidnapping to the Basmannyy police and made a statement. Mr T. stated, in particular, that a woman on the street near the pharmacy had seen two men getting into the parked silver Lada Priora. 75.  On 10 June 2014 Ms I. made a statement to the Basmannyy police that at 7 p.m. on 9 June 2014 she, her partner and child had taken a taxi, a silver Lada Priora. She had got out of the car to go into a pharmacy, but by the time she had come out the taxi had disappeared. 76.  On 30 June 2014 the Basmannyy police reported to the investigative authority that they had failed to identify the applicant\u2019s whereabouts and that there had been no \u201cpositive information\u201d concerning any aeroplane or railway tickets issued in the applicant\u2019s name or about the applicant being placed in remand prisons. Furthermore, it was noted that the Moscow department of the FSB and the data centre of the Russian Ministry of the Interior had not sent any reply to the police\u2019s enquiries. The Basmannyy police also reported that the whereabouts of Mr T. and Ms I. were unknown and that it had been impossible to identify the taxi driver who had taken the applicant to the scene of the kidnapping. 77.  On 9 July 2014 the investigative authority decided to open a criminal investigation into the applicant\u2019s kidnapping. The decision described the events as follows:\n\u201cOn 9 June 2014 at about 7 p.m. persons who have not been identified by the investigation, acting jointly and by common accord, approached a car which has not been identified by the investigation parked near house no. 7/2 at Bolshoy Kharitonyevskiy Lane in Moscow, in which Mr Khamidkariyev was travelling, and, having got in the said car against the will of the victim, kidnapped Mr Khamidkariyev, fleeing the scene of the crime in the said car to an unknown destination.\u201d 78.  On 11 September 2014 the investigative authority requested the transport police to inform them whether any aeroplane or railway tickets had been issued in the applicant\u2019s name between 1 June and 1 August 2014. 79.  On 9 October 2014 the investigative authority granted the applicant victim status in case no. 815447. 80.  On 15 January 2015 an investigator with the investigative authority decided to suspend the investigation of case no. 815447. The decision stated that the applicant\u2019s whereabouts had been established as he had been detained in a remand prison in Tashkent, the scene of the incident had been inspected, seven witnesses had been questioned, various requests had been sent to the Russian authorities and a request for mutual legal assistance had been sent to Uzbekistan, but no reply had been received. 81.  On 29 April 2015 the investigator\u2019s superior at the investigative authority overruled the decision of 25 April 2015 to suspend the case and returned it to the investigator on the grounds that the suspension decision had been taken prematurely. It was noted that the following measures had to be taken to ensure a proper investigation: a response to the request for mutual legal assistance from the Uzbek authorities had still to be received, as had replies to \u201cpreviously sent requests\u201d. \u201cOther requisite investigative and procedural measures\u201d also still had to be performed. 82.  On 29 April 2015 an investigator at the investigative authority decided to resume case no. 815447 following the order from his superior. It is clear from the text of the decision that between 9 October 2014 and 29 April 2015 the investigation had been suspended and resumed four times on the basis of decisions by a more senior officer at the investigative authority or by a prosecutor.\n(\u03b2)  Other documents 83.  The materials provided by the Government included the following documents:\n- an undated sheet of paper with no letterhead entitled \u201cFederal Search for an Individual\u201d containing the applicant\u2019s personal information and information on a criminal case pending against him in Uzbekistan, from which it transpires that the applicant was put on a Russian federal wanted list. The sheet contains a handwritten note \u201cDatabase \u2018Region\u2019 of the Russian Ministry of the Interior (has not been arrested)\u201d.\n- an undated document entitled \u201cRequest for legal assistance\u201d addressed to \u201cthe competent State bodies of Uzbekistan\u201d and signed by an investigator at the investigative authority, including a list of questions to ask the applicant, Ms I. and the officers in charge of the applicant\u2019s arrest. The questions concerned, in particular, the circumstances of the applicant\u2019s arrival in Uzbekistan, including how he crossed the border and the reasons for his detention in Tashkent.\n(ii)  Documents issued by the Uzbek authorities 84.  The contents of the documents issued by the Uzbek authorities which were enclosed with the Government\u2019s letter of 15 May 2015 can be summarised as follows. 85.  According to an arrest record drawn up in Russian by the Uzbek police the applicant was placed under arrest at 10.40 a.m. on 14 June 2014 as a suspect in a crime under Article 244\u00b2 \u00a7 1 of the Uzbek Criminal Code. The place of arrest was not indicated in the record. The grounds for the arrest were stated as \u201cother information leading to a suspicion that a person has committed a crime, and if the person has attempted to flee or has no abode or his or her identity has not been established\u201d. The purpose of the arrest was stated as \u201cthere are enough grounds to suspect the person of having committed a crime\u201d. A note observed that \u201cthe arrested person has been placed in a temporary detention unit of the Ministry of the Interior of Uzbekistan\u201d. 86.  According to a document in Russian entitled \u201cRecord of providing an arrested person with the right to make a telephone call\u201d of 14 June 2014, the applicant made use of that right to call his mother between 10.45 and 10.49 a.m. on 14 June 2014 to inform her of his arrest. 87.  The record of the search of the applicant in Russian showed that 300 Russian roubles and one metallic ring were seized from the applicant when he was searched after being arrested. 88.  On 18 June 2014 the Main Investigation Department of the Ministry of the Interior of Uzbekistan informed the applicant\u2019s father that his son, who had been wanted and \u201cdeclared guilty in absentia\u201d, had been arrested on 17 June 2014, placed in custody and had been participating in investigative measures. 89.  According to a Russian translation of a document in Uzbek of 10 February 2015 an investigator, K., at the Ministry of the Interior of Uzbekistan asked the State Customs Committee of Uzbekistan to provide information on \u201cthe facts of crossing the State border of Uzbekistan\u201d by the applicant between 1 June and 1 July 2014. A Russian translation of the reply in Uzbek by the State Customs Committee of Uzbekistan of 12 February 2015 stated that there was no information in the customs\u2019 database on the applicant crossing the Uzbek border between 1 June and 1 July 2014. It was noted that the database was compiled on the basis of written statements by those crossing borders and could thus contain errors owing to differences in people\u2019s handwriting. 90.  According to the record of an interview held on 11 February 2015 K. questioned the applicant as a victim in an unspecified criminal case. The interview was in Russian. In the course of the interview the applicant stated that he had not been arrested by the Russian authorities and that he had voluntarily left Moscow to go to Uzbekistan to visit his ailing mother. He stated that he had had no documents on him. Once in Uzbekistan, the applicant had taken a taxi to his mother\u2019s, but the taxi had broken down and stopped. After getting out of the car, the applicant had been asked by police officers who had happened to be passing for an identification document. Since he had had no such document, he had been taken to a police station for identification and then arrested. The applicant\u2019s answer to a question about his whereabouts between 9 and 15 June 2014 was as follows:\n\u201cOn 9 June 2014 I was at home, in the evening I took the child to hospital, then at about 9 p.m. I returned and stayed at home. Then on 10 June 2014 I was at home and at about 11 p.m. went to the railway station, and at 12 midnight left for Uzbekistan by bus. I was on the road for about seventy-two hours or a little longer, and on 14 June 2014 I arrived at the border between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, then, using roundabout ways, I crossed the border and at about 7 a.m. was on Uzbek territory, where I was arrested by officers of law-enforcement agencies.\u201d 91.  On 12 February 2015 the investigator K. questioned Ms I. as a witness. The interview was in Russian. Ms I. stated that the applicant had voluntarily and secretly left for Uzbekistan by bus on 10 June 2014 and that she had flown to Tashkent on 13 June 2014. 92.  On 12 February 2015 K. questioned one of the police officers who had arrested the applicant, Mr Kh., as a witness. The interview was in Russian. The answer to the question about the circumstances of the applicant\u2019s arrest reads as follows:\n\u201cOn 14 June 2014 at about 7.30 a.m. in the Yakkasarayskiy district of Tashkent Mr Khamidkariyev was stopped with a view to checking his identity documents, however, given that he had no documents on him, the latter was taken to the Yakkasarayskiy district department of the interior of Tashkent, where it was established that Mr Khamidkariyev was wanted, accordingly, Mr Khamidkariyev was taken to the initiator of the search for him in the temporary detention facility of the Ministry of the Interior of Uzbekistan, where the requisite documents were filled in.\u201d 93.  On an unspecified date K. drew up a report on the actions performed under the request for mutual legal assistance. According to the report, the investigator had questioned Ms I., Mr Kh. and the applicant, had received copies of documents pertaining to the applicant\u2019s arrest, requested information concerning the border crossing and had identified two men allegedly connected with the applicant who as of November 2014 had been fighting on the side of ISIS in Syria. 94.  The Government also submitted two documents in Uzbek of 14 June 2014 \u2013 a copy of the first page of Ms I.\u2019s passport, and an extract from the Criminal Code of Uzbekistan with the text of Article 244\u00b2 \u00a7 1 in Russian. The Article reads as follows: \u201cthe establishment, management, or participation in religious extremist, separatist, fundamentalist or other proscribed organisations shall be punishable by five to fifteen years of imprisonment\u201d.\nII.  REPORTS ON UZBEKISTAN BY INTERNATIONAL NON\u2011GOVERNMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANISATIONS 95.  For the relevant reports on Uzbekistan by UN bodies and international non-governmental human rights organisations up to 2014, see Egamberdiyev v. Russia (no. 34742/13, \u00a7\u00a7 31-34, 26 June 2014). 96.  The relevant parts of the Concluding observations on the fourth periodic report of Uzbekistan (CCPR/C/UZB/CO/4) adopted by the UN Human Rights Committee on 20 July 2015, read as follows:\n\u201cState of emergency and counter-terrorism 11. The Committee, while noting that a draft State of Emergency Act has been prepared, remains concerned (CCPR/C/UZB/CO/3, para. 9) that existing regulations on states of emergency do not comply with article 4 of the Covenant. It also remains concerned (CCPR/C/UZB/CO/3, para. 15) about: (a) the overly-broad definition of terrorism and terrorist activities that is reportedly widely used to charge and prosecute members or suspected members of banned Islamic movements; (b) legal safeguards for persons suspected of, or charged with, a terrorist or related crime and allegations of incommunicado detention, torture and long prison sentences in inhuman and degrading conditions in respect of such persons (arts. 4, 7, 9, 10, 14, 18 and 19) ...\nDeaths in custody 12. The Committee is concerned about reports of deaths in custody and denial of adequate medical care. It is also concerned about the lack of effective and independent investigations into such cases (arts. 2 and 6) ...\nTorture 13. The Committee remains concerned that the definition of torture contained in the criminal legislation, including article 235 of the Criminal Code, does not meet the requirements of article 7 of the Covenant, as it is limited to illegal acts committed with the purpose of coercing testimony and therefore in practice is restricted to acts of torture committed only by a person carrying out an initial inquiry or pretrial investigation, a procurator or other employee of a law-enforcement agency, and results in impunity for other persons, including detainees and prisoners. The Committee is also concerned that the State party continues to grant amnesties to persons who have been convicted of torture or ill-treatment under article 235 of the Criminal Code (arts. 2 and 7) ... 14. The Committee remains concerned about reports that torture continues to be routinely used throughout the criminal justice system; that, despite the existing legal prohibition, forced confessions are in practice used as evidence in court, and that judges fail to order investigations into allegations of forced confessions even when signs of torture are visible; that persons complaining of torture are subjected to reprisals and family members are often intimidated and threatened to ensure that complaints are retracted; and that the rate of prosecution is very low and impunity is prevalent (arts. 2, 7 and 14) ...\nLiberty and security of person 15. The Committee remains concerned that the State party retains the 72-hour period of detention of persons suspected of having committed an offence before bringing them before a judge, and therefore welcomes the State party\u2019s statement that the length of custody may be reduced to 48 hours in the future. It is also concerned about deficiencies in the application of the legislation governing judicial control of detention (habeas corpus) in practice, particularly allegations of: (a) forging the time or date of detention to circumvent the legal period of detention: (b) habeas corpus hearings in the absence of the detainee, especially in politically-related cases; (c) violations of the right of detainees to a lawyer, including to a lawyer of their choice, and deficient legal representation provided by State-appointed defence lawyers (arts. 9 and 14).\u201d 97.  The Uzbekistan chapter of the World Report 2015 by Human Rights Watch reads, in so far as relevant, as follows:\n\u201cImprisonment and Harassment of Critics\nThe Uzbek government has imprisoned thousands of people on politically motivated charges to enforce its repressive rule, targeting human rights and opposition activists, journalists, religious believers, artists, and other perceived critics.\n...\nCriminal Justice and Torture\nIn November 2013, the United Nations Committee against Torture stated that torture is \u201csystematic,\u201d \u201cunpunished,\u201d and \u201cencouraged\u201d by law enforcement officers in Uzbekistan\u2019s police stations, prisons, and detention facilities run by the SNB. Methods include beating with batons and plastic bottles, hanging by wrists and ankles, rape, and sexual humiliation.\nAlthough authorities introduced habeas corpus in 2008, there has been no perceptible reduction in the use of torture in pretrial custody or enhanced due process for detainees. Authorities routinely deny detainees and prisoners access to counsel, and the state-controlled bar association has disbarred lawyers that take on politically sensitive cases.\u201d 98.  The chapter on Uzbekistan of Amnesty International\u2019s report for 2014/15, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:\n\u201cTorture and other ill-treatment\nPolice and officers of the National Security Service (SNB) continued to routinely use torture and other ill-treatment to coerce suspects and detainees, including women and men charged with criminal offences such as theft, fraud or murder, into confessing to a crime or incriminating others. Detainees charged with anti-state and terrorism-related offences were particularly vulnerable to torture. Detainees were often tortured by people wearing masks.\nPolice and SNB officers regularly used convicted prisoners to commit torture and other ill-treatment on detainees in pre-trial detention. Under the Criminal Code, prisoners, unlike officials, could not be held responsible for torture but only for lesser crimes. A former detainee described witnessing officers and prisoners torture men and women in interrogation rooms in an SNB pre-trial detention centre, as well as in bathrooms and showers, punishment cells and purpose-built torture rooms with padded rubber walls and sound-proofing. He described SNB officers handcuffing detainees to radiators and breaking their bones with baseball bats.\nCourts continued to rely heavily on confessions obtained under torture to hand down convictions. Judges routinely ignored or dismissed as unfounded defendants\u2019 allegations of torture or other ill-treatment, even when presented with credible evidence.\nTwo men, who were sentenced in 2014 to 10 years in prison each for alleged membership of a banned Islamist party, claimed in court that security forces had tortured them to sign false confessions by burning their hands and feet against a stove. One defendant told the judge that security forces had pulled out his fingernails and toenails. The judge failed to inquire further into the torture allegations, and admitted the confessions as evidence.\n...\nCounter-terror and security\nThe authorities became increasingly suspicious of labour migrants returning from abroad who may have had access to information on Islam which is censored or banned in Uzbekistan, resulting in an increased number of arrests and prosecutions for \u201cextremism\u201d. The authorities claimed that migrant workers were targeted in Russia for recruitment by the IMU, IS or other groups characterized as extremist.\nIn November, security forces detained dozens of labour migrants who had returned from Russia and Turkey, in raids in the capital Tashkent and several regions of the country, amid disputed claims that they were members of the banned Islamist party Hizb ut-Tahrir and had links to IS members in Syria. Human rights defenders reported that security forces used torture to extract confessions from them.\u201d 99.  In April 2015, Amnesty International published a report entitled \u201cSecrets and Lies: Forced Confessions under Torture in Uzbekistan\u201d, which reads, in particular, as follows:\n\u201cTorture is endemic in Uzbekistan\u2019s criminal justice system. Security forces use torture against men and women charged with criminal offences, such as theft and murder, as well as against individuals who have fallen out of favour with the authorities, including former officials, police officers and entrepreneurs. Increasingly, however, over the last 15 years, those particularly vulnerable to torture and other ill\u2011treatment have been men and women charged with or convicted of \u201canti-state\u201d and terrorism-related offences. In particular, these are Muslims worshipping in mosques outside state control or under independent imams, and members or suspected members of political opposition parties and banned Islamic movements or Islamist groups and parties, all of whom the authorities consider a threat to national and regional security.\u201d", "references": ["7", "8", "0", "5", "9", "6", "2", "3", "4", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Syktyvkar, the Komi Republic. He is a musician and a jazz critic. 6.  On 31 December 2007 the applicant published an article on his personal website about a local jazz festival and its president, Mr Y. The article contained a detailed description of the event and scathing criticism of Mr Y. Using various derivatives of Mr Y.\u2019s surname, the article mocked his professional qualities. The jazz festival was described as being \u201ca shoddy piece of work\u201d and Mr Y.\u2019s delivery \u201ccrappy\u201d. 7.  Mr Y. sued the applicant in defamation, arguing that the article was insulting and harmful to his reputation. 8.  On 14 August 2008 the Syktyvkar Town Court found the applicant liable in defamation. The judgment consisted of the text of the article, a summary of the relevant domestic law, a two-page reproduction of the extracts from the article which had been mentioned in the statement of claim and two paragraphs of conclusions. They stated:\n\u201cUsing a distorted form of the plaintiff\u2019s patronymic and last name ... breaches the plaintiff\u2019s right to a name and to a good name, which is unacceptable under the law. Since the defendant committed a breach of the plaintiff\u2019s intangible assets by way of distorting his patronymic and last name in a negative way, the latter shall have the right to compensation in accordance with Article 152 of the Civil Code.\n[The contested extracts] undermine the honour and dignity of the plaintiff as a person, pedagogue and musician because they contain negative information about the plaintiff presented in an affirmative form. Pursuant to Article 152 \u00a7 1 of the Civil Code, the burden to prove the truth of the allegations is on the defendant, who did not submit any evidence to the court showing that the impugned statements were true.\u201d\nThe Town Court awarded the plaintiff 5,000 Russian roubles (RUB) in damages and directed the applicant to publish a retraction on his website. 9.  On 23 October 2008 the Supreme Court of the Komi Republic dismissed an appeal by the applicant. It endorsed the findings of the lower court in a summary judgment. It held that Article 10 of the Convention had not been breached because \u201cthe defendant published statements on the Internet which undermined the honour and dignity of the plaintiff as a person, pedagogue and musician and which contained negative information about him\u201d.", "references": ["8", "0", "9", "2", "4", "1", "3", "7", "5", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1966 and lives in Belgorod. 6.  The applicant had a university degree in law; he did not seek admission to the Bar as an advocate (\u0430\u0434\u0432\u043e\u043a\u0430\u0442). He made his living as a registered private entrepreneur providing legal services. He worked for and later managed Vityaz Arbitration Bureau (\u0430\u0440\u0431\u0438\u0442\u0440\u0430\u0436\u043d\u043e\u0435 \u0431\u044e\u0440\u043e \u00ab\u0412\u0438\u0442\u044f\u0437\u044c\u00bb), a private legal entity in the town of Belgorod. In April 2005 the applicant undertook to provide legal services to a private company in relation to administrative-offence proceedings against it. The company issued two originals of an authority form for the applicant. 7.  According to the applicant, one original was inserted in the file of a then pending case before a commercial court; the other one was used in submissions before the Chief Fire Protection Inspector. 8.  In June 2005 criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant on suspicion of forgery of the administrative-offence record (\u201cthe offence record\u201d) in the above case. According to the authorities, the applicant had added a handwritten note to the record which said, \u201cWe want counsel to be present during the compiling of the offence record\u201d, and modified the date on which a copy of the record had been handed over to the defence. 9.  Up until 21 June 2005 the official database had Vokzalnaya Street as the applicant\u2019s registered residential address. It appears that before or after that date, the applicant moved from his flat (on Vokzalnaya Street) to reside in his mother\u2019s flat in the same town (on Kostyukova Street). He notified the residence registration office about that change. 10.  The investigator dealing with the case issued a summons (sent to the applicant\u2019s address on Vokzalnaya Street) requiring his attendance at her office on 11 July 2005 in order to carry out investigative measures. On 8 July 2005 a police officer reported that he had not delivered the summons since nobody had answered the door at that address. 11.  On 13 July 2005 the applicant was informed of the decision to institute criminal proceedings against him. On the same date, Investigator T. interviewed the applicant, who added handwritten comments to the interview record. It was mentioned in the interview record that the applicant was (temporarily) residing in Shagarovka village; the address on Vokzalnaya Street was mentioned as his official residence; the record also contained a note of the telephone number provided by the applicant. 12.  Further interviews were scheduled for 15 and 19 July 2005, when the applicant refused the services of a legal-aid lawyer, Y. He also refused to sign an undertaking to appear at subsequent interviews when requested by the investigator. 13.  Subsequently, the case was reassigned. On 12 September 2005 a new investigator in charge of the case made telephone calls to the number which had been previously given by the applicant. The applicant abruptly put an end to the conversations. 14.  On 13 September 2005 the investigator called again and talked to the applicant\u2019s wife, who refused to assist the authorities in delivering the summons to the applicant. However, she clarified that the applicant was residing at his mother\u2019s flat (on Kostyukova Street). According to the Government, this address was different from the one he had previously given to the investigating authority. 15. On 21 September 2005 the investigator interviewed the applicant\u2019s wife, who stated that the applicant was living on Kostyukova Street and had been residing in Shagarovka during the summer. 16.  On 27 September 2005 the investigator issued a decision, under Article 113 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (\u201cthe CCrP\u201d) (see paragraph 50 below), ordering that the applicant be brought before her on 3 October 2005 at 10 a.m. It was noted that the applicant resided at his mother\u2019s address and had previously failed to comply with summonses. 17.  A similar decision was then issued on 3 October 2005, apparently, because the decision of 27 September 2005 had not been enforced. 18.  On 21 October 2005 the chief officer of the investigating authority issued a decision, under Article 210 of the CCrP (see paragraph 52 below), requiring that measures be taken to locate the applicant. The decision read as follows:\n\u201cOn several occasions the suspect was summoned for the purpose of investigative measures ... but failed to appear, without reference to any valid excuse. The measures for establishing his current whereabouts have not produced any positive results. The investigating authority has reason to consider that the suspect is taking action to flee prosecution ...\u201d 19.  On 25 January 2006 the police talked to the applicant\u2019s mother, who provided information about the applicant\u2019s office address. At around 10.30 a.m. the police arrived there. The applicant was informed that his name was on the list of wanted persons and that he was to follow the police officer in order to be taken before the investigator with a view to enforcing the decision of 21 October 2005. 20.  According to the applicant, despite having requested it, he was not shown any official authorisation for such an order. In reply to his refusal to comply, the officers warned him that they would employ force. Thus, he was compelled to follow them to the police station to be taken before the investigator. The latter explained that she was not in possession of the case file at that time. At the investigator\u2019s request, the applicant gave a written undertaking to appear before her on 6 February 2006. No other investigative measures were taken on 25 January 2006 in relation to the criminal case. The applicant left the Investigations Unit at around 1 p.m. 21.  It is unclear whether the interview on 6 February 2006 took place. 22.  Subsequently, the applicant brought proceedings under Article 125 of the CCrP complaining of having been deprived of his liberty on 25 January 2006 and also about the decision of 21 October 2005. By a judgment of 21 August 2006, the Sverdlovskiy District Court of Belgorod rejected his claim. It held as follows:\n\u201cThe court dismissed as having no legal basis [the applicant\u2019s] allegation that the circumstances of the case required the drawing up of an arrest record under Article 92 of the CCrP. Such a record \u2018may be\u2019 drawn up (that is to say it is not an obligation) if there are grounds cited in Article 91 of the Code ...\nArticle 92 of the Code contains strict rules concerning arrest and detention of a suspect. Following escorting to the competent official, it is necessary to draw up, within three hours, an arrest record. It should indicate the dates and that notification of the procedural rights has been made. [The applicant] was present in the police station and the Department of the Interior offices for two and a half hours to clarify some details relating to the investigation of the criminal case and to take a decision concerning the pending request regarding [the applicant\u2019s] whereabouts. After this he was free to go. Thus, the court does not accept that the applicant was held within the meaning of Article 91 of the Code.\nTherefore, it was not incumbent on the escorting officer or the investigator to provide counsel, to apprise [the applicant] of his rights or to compile an arrest record.\nUnder Article 5 of the CCrP, arrest is defined as a measure of procedural compulsion used by an enquiring or investigating officer for a period not exceeding forty-eight hours after the actual taking of the person into custody on suspicion of a criminal offence ...\n[The arresting officer] was a law-enforcement officer and thus the court has no doubts that his actions concerning [the applicant\u2019s] escorting to the police station and then to the Department of the Interior were within the scope of his functional responsibilities.\u201d 23.  The applicant appealed, arguing as follows. While agreeing with the court that the situation did not fall within the ambit of \u201cescorting\u201d under Article 113 of the CCrP, he insisted that the court, in substance, had denied the fact of his \u201cdeprivation of liberty\u201d and had failed to cite another applicable statutory basis for it. In particular, the Police Act could not supply a valid basis since it only concerned escorting for identification purposes. In the applicant\u2019s view, Article 92 was applicable and thus the non-observance of its requirements (namely, the drawing up of an arrest record and notification of procedural rights) disclosed unlawfulness. The reference to three hours for drawing up the record did not imply that there had not been \u201cdeprivation of liberty\u201d if a person was held for less than three hours, or that Article 92 of the CCrP would not apply. 24.  On 4 October 2006 the Belgorod Regional Court upheld the judgment in the following terms:\n\u201cThe available material and testimonies do not disclose that the applicant was restricted in his right to liberty and personal security. The court rightly concluded that the investigator had lawfully issued the decision to determine the applicant\u2019s whereabouts. The police had acted on the basis of the investigator\u2019s decision, the enforcement of which required [the applicant\u2019s] escorting to the police. Thus, the police\u2019s actions could not be declared unlawful ...\n[The applicant] was kept in the police station and before the investigator for less than three hours, which means that he was not \u2018arrested\u2019 [or] \u2018detained\u2019 within the meaning of Article 92 of the CCrP.\u201d 25.  On an unspecified date in February or March 2006, the investigation was suspended. It was resumed on 31 March 2006. The applicant was summoned for an interview with Investigator R. \u201con 7 March 2006 at 3 p.m\u201d. According to the applicant, he received the summons only on 7 April 2006. It turned out later on that there had been a mistake in the summons: the interview was planned for 7 April 2006. 26.  On 14 April, 23 May and 1 June 2006 the investigator issued orders for the applicant to be taken to the investigating authority (Article 113 of the CCrP). According to the Government, the police did not enforce these orders since the applicant was not present at his residential and office addresses. 27.  On 28 June 2006 Investigator U. ordered that the applicant be brought before him on 5 July 2006 at 11 a.m. 28.  On 1 July 2006 Investigator B. ordered that the applicant be brought before him on 7 August 2006 at 10 a.m. It was indicated that the applicant had previously failed to comply with summonses (on unspecified date(s)), most recently by referring to an illness but failing to submit any related document. 29.  On 27 July 2006 the chief investigating officer came to the applicant\u2019s office and interviewed him. The applicant made a written statement concerning the criminal case. It appears that the investigating officer issued summonses for further interviews to be held on 28 and 31 July 2006. 30.  According to the applicant, on the same day he gave a written note to the officer indicating that he would not be able to attend on account of his state of health. The applicant did not attend the interview on 28 July 2006. It also appears that the applicant did not attend the interview on 31 July 2006. 31.  A further decision to bring the applicant in for interview was issued on 1 November 2006. 32.  On 2 November 2006 Investigator B. issued a decision ordering the authorities to determine the applicant\u2019s whereabouts and suspending the investigation. 33.  A further decision to bring the applicant in for interview was issued on 7 November 2006. 34.  On 30 November 2006 the deputy town prosecutor ordered the resumption of the investigation. 35.  On 22 December 2006 the chief investigating officer issued an order indicating that the applicant had failed on several occasions without a valid excuse to attend interviews with the investigator(s). Thus, he ordered that the applicant be brought before him on 25 December 2006 at 3 p.m. 36.  On 25 December 2006 the police arrived at the applicant\u2019s office at around 2.45 p.m. and compelled him to follow them to the police station instead of the Investigations Department, which was situated elsewhere. At the police station, the applicant was locked in a room and then provided with a copy of the order of 22 December 2006. The applicant was again informed, in the presence of counsel, of his rights and the decision to carry out a forensic examination. The applicant was interviewed and stated that he had received the summons for an interview scheduled in September or October 2006, but could not come on account of his illness and had informed the investigating authority accordingly; he had not submitted any medical certificate because, according to him, \u201cit [had been] his constitutional right not to do so\u201d. It is unclear whether the applicant left the police station at 5 or 7 p.m. 37.  According to the Government (who referred to the police station\u2019s logbook), the applicant was kept in the police station without being locked up between 3 and 4 p.m. and was then taken before the investigator. The Government submit that the applicant was in one of the offices and that the building entrance door was equipped with an electronic lock for security measures. 38.  The applicant brought proceedings under Article 125 of the CCrP complaining about his arrest on 25 December 2006. By a judgment of 15 January 2007, the District Court rejected his claim. The court held that the applicant had not been arrested, only compelled to appear before the investigator. The court also indicated that it was not possible to challenge the police actions under Article 125 of the Code. On 21 February 2007 the Regional Court upheld that judgment. 39.  On 30 May 2007 the authorities discontinued the criminal proceedings against the applicant due to the expiry of the statutory prosecution period. Apparently, on an unspecified date this decision was quashed. On 1 November 2010 the case against the applicant was discontinued due to the absence of corpus delicti. The applicant was informed that he was entitled to claim compensation from the State (Chapter 18 of the CCrP). 40.  It appears that the applicant\u2019s wife was a private entrepreneur and managed the Vityaz Arbitration Bureau. In October 2005 she employed the applicant as a legal consultant. It appears that on an unspecified date he was appointed as the managing director of the firm. 41.  According to the applicant, following a strained situation at home vis-\u00e0-vis his mother and wife on account of the pending criminal investigation against him, he temporarily moved into his office, using part of it as a dwelling. The office had electricity and heating facilities; it was accessible between 6 a.m. and 10 p.m. Apparently, the applicant did not notify the investigating authority of this change in his personal situation. 42.  On 13 October 2006 the investigator in charge of the criminal case against the applicant issued a warrant authorising the search of Vityaz\u2019s offices, referring to Article 182 of the CCrP (see paragraph 57 below). The investigator indicated that a forensic examination of the applicant\u2019s handwriting was necessary. For this, it was necessary to seize handwriting samples of the applicant and the original of the authority form issued to him by the client private company (see paragraph 6 above). In the investigator\u2019s view, these documents could be found at the premises of Vityaz Arbitration Bureau. 43.  According to the applicant, on 13 October 2006 several officers, including the investigator, arrived in the office. They allowed the applicant to read the search-and-seizure order. He made no request for a lawyer to be present during the search. The officers then carried out the search in the presence of attesting witnesses and examined the applicant\u2019s medical file and asked him questions about the information contained therein. 44.  The applicant sought judicial review of the search-and-seizure order and the manner in which it was implemented. 45.  By a judgment of 23 October 2006 the Sverdlovskiy District Court of Belgorod dismissed the claims. The court held as follows:\n\u201cUnder Article 50 of the CCrP a suspect, accused or another person on his or her instructions may retain counsel. When requested, an [officer involved in a pre\u2011investigation inquiry], investigator, prosecutor or a court shall appoint counsel.\nBefore the beginning of the search [the applicant] made no request for counsel while having had access to the search order ...\nUnder [Articles 38 and 182 of the CCrP] it is within the investigator\u2019s purview to decide whether a search is opportune and, if so, to issue the relevant order, except for a search of residential premises. It is also up to the investigator to decide which documents or other evidence are important for the case ...\n[The applicant\u2019s] allegation that the office ... was his \u2018abode\u2019 is unsubstantiated, within the meaning of Article 139 of the CCrP ... Thus there was no legal requirement to obtain a court order for the search.\u201d 46.  On 29 November 2006, following an appeal by the applicant, the Belgorod Regional Court upheld the judgment, endorsing its reasoning.", "references": ["3", "7", "0", "9", "1", "5", "8", "6", "No Label", "2", "4"], "gold": ["2", "4"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1977, 1972 and 1987 respectively and lived before their convictions in Krasnoyarsk, Cheboksary and Vologda Region. 6.  The facts of the applications, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7.  On 3 May 2013 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of having committed a crime. 8.  On 4 May 2013 the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Krasnoyarsk (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) remanded the applicant in custody. 9.  On 11 June and 11 November 2013, and 14 February 2014 the District Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 30 November 2013, 28 February and 28 May 2014 respectively. 10.  On 4 April 2014 the District Court convicted the applicant of robbery and sentenced him to three years and six months\u2019 imprisonment. The applicant appealed. 11.  During the hearings before the District Court on 11 June, 26 July, 1 October, and 11 November 2013, and 14 February, 14, 21 and 27 March, and 2, 3 and 4 April 2014 the applicant was held in a metal cage. 12.  On 23 June 2015 the Krasnoyarsk Regional Court upheld the judgment of 4 April 2014 on appeal. 13.  On 30 June 2011 the Novocheboksarsk Town Court of the Chuvash Republic convicted the applicant of embezzlement and the illegal acquisition, storage, transfer, transportation and possession of firearms and sentenced him to four years\u2019 imprisonment. 14.  On 11 February 2013 the Leninskiy District Court of Cheboksary (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) convicted the applicant of fraud committed through abuse of position and sentenced him to a fine. 15.  On 1 August 2013 the Supreme Court of the Chuvash Republic reduced the applicant\u2019s fine. 16.  However, on 18 October 2013 the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the Chuvash Republic granted a cassation appeal lodged by the Prosecutor of the Chuvash Republic and quashed the judgment of 11 February 2013 and the appeal decision of 1 August 2013. The case was remitted to the District Court for fresh examination. 17.  On 29 April 2014 the District Court convicted the applicant on nine counts of fraud, acquitted him of a further four counts of fraud and sentenced him to seven years\u2019 imprisonment, taking into account the fact that the applicant had not fully served the sentence imposed on him on 30 June 2011. 18.  On 25 June 2014 the Supreme Court of the Chuvash Republic reclassified the nine counts of fraud on which the applicant had been convicted and sentenced him to seven years\u2019 imprisonment. As regards the four counts of fraud of which the applicant had been acquitted, the Supreme Court quashed the judgment on appeal and remitted the case for fresh examination. Those proceedings are still pending. 19.  During the proceedings before the District Court and the Supreme Court of the Chuvash Republic the applicant was confined in a metal cage. 20.  On 16 September 2014 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of having committed a crime. 21.  On 17 September 2014 the Cherepovets Town Court of the Vologda Region (\u201cthe Town Court\u201d) remanded the applicant in custody. 22.  On 10 November 2014 the Town Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention. 23.  On 12 December 2014 the Town Court convicted the applicant of inflicting grievous bodily harm and sentenced him to three years\u2019 imprisonment. 24.  The applicant was confined in a metal cage when the custodial measure was applied to him, when it was subsequently extended and during the trial.", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "6", "7", "9", "2", "8", "5", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1967 and lives in Bar (Montenegro). 7.  On 6 February and 4 March 2009 the applicant entered Croatia from Montenegro and deposited \u2013 on each occasion \u2013 the sum of EUR 90,000 with a commercial bank in Dubrovnik, without declaring these amounts to the custom authorities. 8.  On 2 June 2009 the Money Laundering Prevention Office (Ured za sprje\u010davanje pranja novca) informed the Financial Inspectorate of the Ministry of Finance (Ministarstvo financija, Financijski inspektorat, hereinafter \u201cthe Ministry\u201d) that on 30 March 2009 the applicant had ordered a transfer of EUR 95,000 from his bank account to the account of a certain Mr S.K. in a bank in the United Arab Emirates. The Money Laundering Prevention Office stated that the funds had originated from the two above-mentioned cash deposits of EUR 90,000 each. 9.  On the same day, 2 June 2009, administrative offence proceedings (prekr\u0161ajni postupak) were instituted against the applicant before the Administrative Offences Council (Vije\u0107e za prekr\u0161ajni postupak) of the Ministry for his failure to declare the sum of EUR 180,000 while entering Croatia, an administrative offence as defined in section 40(1) of the Foreign Currency Act and section 74 of the Prevention of Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism Act (see paragraphs 16-17 below). On the same day the Administrative Offences Council ordered the bank to transfer EUR 180,000 from the applicant\u2019s account to the Ministry\u2019s account, to be kept there until the conclusion of the administrative offence proceedings. 10.  On 1 July, 17 August and 17 September 2009 hearings were held before the Administrative Offences Council. In his defence, the applicant explained that he had sold business premises in Montenegro, and that he had intended to use the money gained from that sale to purchase a flat in Podgorica (Montenegro) from a Croatian national, S.K., who had insisted that the money be paid to him from a Croatian bank account. The applicant provided a written copy of the contract of sale in respect of his business premises dated 25 December 2007, and a preliminary agreement relating to the purchase of the flat in Podgorica dated 18 March 2009. 11.  By a decision of 19 October 2009 the Administrative Offences Council found the applicant guilty of the administrative offence in question and fined him 10,000 Croatian kunas (HRK). At the same time, the Administrative Offences Council imposed a protective measure (za\u0161titna mjera), confiscating the EUR 180,000 pursuant to section 69(2) of the Foreign Currency Act (see paragraph 16 below). The Administrative Offences Council held that the evidence presented did not corroborate the applicant\u2019s defence. In particular, while the applicant had indeed submitted a preliminary agreement relating to the purchase of a flat in Podgorica which had been concluded between himself and S.K., that agreement had been concluded two weeks after the commission of the offence, and the sale price indicated in it (EUR 125,000) did not correspond to the amount he had brought into Croatia. The Administrative Offences Council also held that its decision to apply the protective measure was influenced by the fact that the applicant had been unable to provide sufficient evidence to justify his earlier money transfers to accounts in Tunisia and Jordan belonging to S.K. and S.K.\u2019s wife, totalling EUR 882,900 in the period between 2005 and 2008, and the fact that he had stated that he had opened a non-resident\u2019s account in his name in order to do a favour to S.K., namely in order to transfer money from the sale of S.K.\u2019s wife\u2019s house, deposited on his account, to S.K.\u2019s wife\u2019s accounts. With respect to the scope of the confiscation and the amount of the fine, the Administrative Offences Council held as follows:\n\u201cWith this type of administrative offence, what is important for the purposes of ordering a protective measure is whether the statements of the accused can be supported by relevant documents. If, in terms of amounts and dates, there is no link between the transfers whereby the accused acquired the funds and the business transactions for which those funds were intended, or if [those transfers] do not have a basis in lawful transactions, the Administrative Offences Council cannot apply section 69(4) of the Foreign Currency Act, which allows that, in particularly justified situations where special mitigating circumstances exist, the authority adjudicating on the administrative offence may decide not to confiscate or confiscate only in part the cash that was the object of the offence.\nEarlier transfers from [the applicant\u2019s] account and the motives for opening that non-resident\u2019s account also influenced the decision to impose the protective measure ...\nIn determining the amount of the fine the [Administrative Offences] Council took into account [the applicant\u2019s] admission of guilt and the absence of a criminal record as mitigating circumstances, and the value of the object of the administrative offence as an aggravating circumstance. [Therefore] it imposed a fine which corresponds to the gravity of the offence.\u201d 12.  The applicant appealed by arguing, inter alia, that the imposition of the protective measure of confiscation was disproportionate in the circumstances and therefore contrary to Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. In so arguing, he referred to the Court\u2019s case-law, in particular to the case of Gabri\u0107 v. Croatia (no. 9702/04, 5 February 2009). 13.  By a decision of 23 December 2009 the High Court for Administrative Offences (Visoki prekr\u0161ajni sud Republike Hrvatske) dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld the Administrative Offences Council\u2019s decision, endorsing the reasons given therein. 14.  The applicant then lodged a constitutional complaint, alleging, inter alia, a violation of his constitutionally protected right of ownership. 15.  By a decision of 9 December 2010 the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) declared the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint inadmissible on the grounds that the case did not raise a constitutional issue.", "references": ["6", "7", "4", "1", "0", "8", "5", "2", "3", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
+{"input": "5.  The facts of the cases, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 6.  The applicant was born in 1986 and is detained in Sterlitamak, Perm region. 7.  On 24 August 2009 the Sovetskiy District Court of Ufa convicted the applicant of drug trafficking and sentenced him to four years\u2019 imprisonment with two years\u2019 probation. 8.  On 2 February 2010 the Supreme Court of the Bashkortostan Republic quashed the applicant\u2019s conviction and remitted the case for fresh examination. 9.  On 19 February 2010 the Sovetskiy District Court scheduled the first hearing for 4 March 2010. 10.  On 26 February 2010 the applicant and his lawyer were sent a notification about the hearing by ordinary letter post. According to the applicant, they never received this letter. 11.  On 4 March 2010, in view of the applicant\u2019s failure to appear before it, the trial court ordered his compulsory attendance. 12.  On 18 March 2010 the trial court sent a letter ordering the applicant\u2019s compulsory attendance the following day to the bailiff service in Tuymazy. This letter was not received by the bailiffs until 20 March 2010. 13.  On 19 March 2010 the trial court noted that the applicant had again failed to appear and decided to remand him in custody in absentia. According to the applicant, he and his lawyer had not been notified about the hearing of 19 March 2010. 14.  On 15 April 2010 the applicant was arrested in Tuymazy. According to him, he was apprehended at his place of work. He was placed in a temporary detention centre in Tuymazynskiy district. Later on the same day, he was transferred to Ufa and the judge of the Sovetskiy District Court was informed accordingly. 15.  On 19 April 2010 the applicant\u2019s lawyer lodged an appeal against the detention order of 19 March 2010, arguing that neither the applicant nor his lawyer had been apprised of the hearings of 4 and 19 March. 16.  On 28 April 2010 the judge in charge of the applicant\u2019s case decided that the latter should remain in detention. The applicant and his lawyer were neither notified of nor present at this hearing. 17.  On 10 May 2010 the applicant supplemented the appeal lodged against the decision of 19 March 2010. 18.  On 25 May 2010 the applicant was released at the hearing in return for an undertaking not to leave his place of residence. 19.  On an unspecified date the President of the Sovetskiy District Court confirmed in a letter sent to the applicant\u2019s lawyer that the summonses to the hearing of 4 March 2010 had been sent to the applicant and his representative on 26 February 2010 by ordinary post and that the case file did not contain any indication that they had actually been received by them. 20.  On 26 August 2010 the Supreme Court of the Bashkortostan Republic confirmed the decision of 19 March 2010, finding that the applicant had been duly apprised of the hearings of 4 and 19 March 2010 at his place of residence. 21.  On 15 March 2011 the trial court found the applicant guilty and sentenced him to four years and six months\u2019 imprisonment. The applicant was remanded in custody immediately in the courtroom. 22.  The applicant was born in 1986 and lives in Krasnokamensk, Krasnoyarsk region. 23.  On 28 September 2010 the justice of the peace of judicial district no. 94 postponed the examination of the applicant\u2019s criminal case to 11 October 2010 in view of his absence from the hearing without explanation. According to the applicant, he had not been informed about the hearing. 24.  On 11 October 2010 the justice of the peace ordered suspension of the proceedings and that a search for the applicant be conducted. He also held that, once arrested, the applicant should be remanded in custody. On the same day, the applicant\u2019s name was placed on the search list. 25.  On 4 March 2011 the applicant was arrested by police and placed in a temporary detention centre in Kuraginskiy district. 26.  On 11 March 2011 the applicant submitted a complaint to the prosecutor of the Krasnoyarsk region about his unlawful detention and the police\u2019s failure to inform him about the reasons for his arrest. He referred in particular to their failure to provide him with a copy of the detention order of 11 October 2010 and stated that at the time of his transfer to Minusinsk, Krasnoyarsk region, on 7 March 2011 he had still not been informed of the reasons for his detention. 27.  On 12 April 2011 the trial court convicted the applicant of attempted murder and sentenced him to one year and nine months\u2019 imprisonment. 28.  The applicant was born in 1973 and was detained in Krasnodar. 29.  On 25 April 2013 the applicant was indicted for murder. 30.  On 30 May 2013 the applicant\u2019s name was placed on the international search list because he had fled from his place of residence. 31.  On 14 May 2013 the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Krasnodar issued a detention order in absentia in respect of the applicant. 32.  On 11 July 2013 the applicant was arrested. 33.  On 4 September 2013 the Oktyabrskiy District Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention at a hearing at which the applicant was present. The district court held that the applicant\u2019s guilt was confirmed, both by his own testimonies and by other evidence collected by the investigation. 34.  On an unspecified date the applicant challenged the detention order of 4 September 2013. He referred to Article 5 \u00a7 3 of the Convention, arguing that the authorities had failed to bring him before a judge promptly after he was apprehended on 11 July 2013. He also referred to Article 6 \u00a7 2 of the Convention, arguing that the wording used in the detention order ran counter to the presumption of innocence. 35.  On 16 October 2013 the Krasnodar Regional Court upheld the aforementioned detention order on appeal. It does not appear that the Regional Court addressed any of the applicant\u2019s arguments.", "references": ["6", "1", "0", "8", "9", "5", "7", "4", "No Label", "2", "3"], "gold": ["2", "3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1966 and 1957 respectively. They live in the village of Komsomolskoye in the Chechen Republic. The first applicant is the wife of Mr Shamkhan Abubakarov, who was born in 1963. The second applicant is the wife of Mr Badrudi Abubakarov, who was born in 1949. 6.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7.  At about 4.30 p.m. on 30 September 2002 brothers Shamkhan Abubakarov and Badrudi Abubakarov and their nephew Mr A.El. were travelling in a GAZ-3110 (\u201cVolga\u201d) vehicle on the road leading from the Staraya Sunzha settlement to the village of Berkat-Yurt in Chechnya. 8.  At about 5 p.m. a convoy of three IFVs (\u0411\u041c\u041f-2) was passing along the road. The applicants\u2019 relatives drove to the side to let the IFVs pass. The Volga and a number of other cars were at the side of the road when one of the IVFs suddenly turned and drove over the Volga, and then drove off in the direction of Staraya Sunzha. All three passengers died on the spot. A number of residents of Berkat-Yurt witnessed the incident. 9.  On the same day Sh., an operational search officer from the Grozny department of the interior (\u0420\u0430\u0439\u043e\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u043e\u0442\u0434\u0435\u043b \u0432\u043d\u0443\u0442\u0440\u0435\u043d\u043d\u0438\u0445 \u0434\u0435\u043b (\u0420\u041e\u0412\u0414)) (hereinafter \u201cthe ROVD\u201d), reported the incident to the head of the police station, stating that a Volga had been driven over by an IFV carrying military servicemen. 10.  The police questioned Mr Sh.A. He stated that his brothers Shamkhan Abubakarov and Badrudi Abubakarov and nephew Mr A.El. had been driving home from a funeral when their vehicle had been driven over by an IFV carrying military servicemen, who had fled the scene and gone to the military base in Khankala. 11.  The police also questioned Mr I.A., who stated that he had been driving to Staraya Sunzha when he had seen a convoy of IFVs on the road and a Volga on the kerb letting it pass by. One of the IFVs had suddenly turned in the direction of the Volga, driving over it and killing all three passengers. It had then gone through the checkpoint in Staraya Sunzha. The witness and others present during the incident had immediately driven to the police station to report it. 12.  The police examined the Volga, which had been left at the crime scene. Traces of blood and brain matter were found inside the damaged vehicle. No evidence was collected. 13.  On 1 October 2002 the Grozny district prosecutor\u2019s office instituted an investigation into the accident under Article 264 \u00a7 3 of the Criminal Code (breach of traffic regulations, causing death by negligence). The case file was given the number 56155. 14.  It also ordered a post-mortem examination of Shamkhan Abubakarov, Badrudi Abubakarov and Mr A.El. On 8 October 2002 the experts concluded that their deaths had occurred as a result of the accident. 15.  On 1 October 2002 the investigators questioned Mr B.S. and Mr I.S., both of whom stated that on 30 September 2002 they had been driving a GAZ-53 vehicle when they had seen three IFVs, one of which had had the serial number 171, violating traffic rules. It had driven over a Volga car and then left in the direction of Staraya Sunzha. They had immediately gone to the damaged vehicle and found three people dead inside. 16.  On 8 October 2002 the investigators sent a request to military unit no. 20102 to be provided information on the provenance of IFV no. 171. No reply was given to that or any subsequent requests sent by the investigators. 17.  On 24 November 2002 the supervising prosecutor ordered the investigators to take a number of steps, including questioning numerous eyewitnesses to the incident such as local residents and the law-enforcement officers who had been manning the checkpoints through which the IFVs had passed to flee the scene. 18.  On 11 November or December 2002 the investigators questioned the head of the local administration, Mr Kh.D. who stated, amongst other things, that he had learnt of the incident shortly after it had happened. He had immediately gone to each of the checkpoints on the road between Staraya Sunzha and Berkat-Yurt. At the checkpoint manned by police officers from the Grozny district police station he had been told that, two minutes prior to his arrival, three IFVs had passed through and driven in the direction of Khankala, where the main military base of the federal forces was situated. He had gone to the military prosecutor\u2019s office in Khankala, where he had been told that an investigator had already gone to the scene and established that two of the IFVs had had the serial numbers 171 and 153; that after the IFV had driven over the Volga, a serviceman had got out of one of the IFVs and checked that the car\u2019s passengers were dead. The IFVs had then driven off. The witness also stated that on 2 or 3 October 2002 Mr A.E., who had worked as a driver at the Khankala military base, had told him that at about 5 p.m. on 30 September 2002 he had seen three IFVs of the 78th regiment driving at high speed into the base. 19.  On 1 December 2002 the investigation was suspended on the grounds that the perpetrators had not been identified. The applicants were not informed. 20.  On 28 May 2003 the ROVD replied to the applicants\u2019 request for information, stating that the investigation had established that that at about 4.30 p.m. on 30 September 2002 an unidentified person driving an IFV had had a collision with a Volga being driven by Shamkhan Abubakarov and in which Badrudi Abubakarov had been a passenger. As a result of the accident, the driver and two passengers had died on the spot. The driver of the IFV had fled the scene. The document also stated that the material concerning the accident had been sent to the Khankala military prosecutor\u2019s office. 21.  On an unspecified date prior to 5 June 2006 the investigation was resumed. The applicants were not informed. 22.  On an unspecified date between June and October 2006 the investigation was suspended again. The applicants were not informed. 23.  On 25 October 2006 the deputy district prosecutor overruled the decision to suspend the proceedings as unlawful and ordered that the investigation be resumed and the investigators take a number of steps, including identifying the owners of IFV nos. 171 and 153 and carrying out the orders of 1 October 2002 (see paragraph 14 above). 24.   On 30 October 2006 the applicants were granted victim status in the criminal proceedings. 25.  On various dates in October and November 2006 the investigators questioned a number of residents of Berkat-Yurt, all of whom stated that they had arrived at the scene shortly after the incident and that, according to eyewitnesses, the Volga had been driven over by a military IFV. 26.  On 16 November 2006 the investigators questioned Mr A.D., who stated that at about 4 p.m. on 30 September 2002 he had seen a military convoy on the road between Staraya Sunzha and Berkat-Yurt and a Volga at the side of the road letting the convoy pass by. One of the IFVs had suddenly driven off the road and over the Volga. The IFV had then left in the direction of Khankala. 27.  On 25 November 2006 the investigation was suspended again. 28.  On 4 July 2007 the Grozny District Court of the Chechen Republic allowed the applicants\u2019 complaint against the decision to suspend the investigation. The court stated that between the opening of the investigation on 1 October 2002 and its suspension on 1 December 2002 the investigators had failed to take the necessary steps to identify the perpetrators, limiting themselves to sending two unspecified requests for information to the military authorities, even though it was clear from the case material that after causing the accident the IFVs had entered the Khankala military base. Despite the supervising prosecutor\u2019s instructions given on 25 October 2006, the investigators had only resent two requests for information to the military authorities and had again suspended the investigation on 25 November 2006, as they had received no reply. The court overruled that decision and instructed that the proceedings be resumed. 29.  On 14 July 2007 the supervising prosecutor resumed the investigation, deciding that it had been suspended unlawfully. The investigators were ordered to take a number of steps, including sending new requests to the military authorities concerning the possible provenance of IFV nos. 171 and 153. 30.  On unspecified dates in July 2007 the investigators questioned two residents of Berkat-Yurt, both of whom stated that they had learnt of the incident from their fellow villagers. 31.  On 15 August 2007 the investigation was suspended again. On an unspecified date prior to May 2011 the case was transferred to the Chechnya Investigations Committee. The proceedings are still pending. 32.  The Government did not dispute the facts as presented by the applicants. 33.  At the Court\u2019s request, the Government furnished copies of the entire investigation file in criminal case no. 56155, running to ninety-six pages.", "references": ["5", "8", "2", "1", "7", "9", "3", "4", "6", "No Label", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Yuzhnoukrayinsk. At the time of the events he was the director of a private joint stock company. 5.  In November 2003 the local court delivered a judgment ordering a debt recovery by a certain Mr Ts. to the applicant. On 12 December 2003 Mr Ts.\u2019s wife, acting under a power of attorney, authorised the applicant to use their car. On 9 March 2004 she revoked her power of attorney. The car, however, remained with the applicant. 6.  On 25 and 29 March 2004 criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant on suspicion of forcible assertion of private rights and extortion, following a complaint by Mr Ts. The latter claimed that the applicant was arbitrarily retaining his car and was extorting money for it. 7.  On 30 March 2004 the applicant was arrested in his office as a criminal suspect. He was placed in the Arbuzynka Temporary Detention Facility (\u201cthe Arbuzynka ITT\u201d). Following a search of the company\u2019s premises, the police seized the car in question. 8.  Two days later, on 1 April 2004, Mr Ts. wrote a receipt confirming that the applicant had paid him 1,700 US dollars (USD) in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage and that he had no claims against the applicant. He addressed the receipt in question to the investigator dealing with the applicant\u2019s criminal case. 9.  On the same day the applicant was released subject to a commitment not to leave the town. 10.  On 20 April 2004 the Yuzhnoukrayinsk Town Court (\u201cthe Yuzhnoukrayinsk Court\u201d) quashed the decisions of 25 and 29 March 2004. On 3 June 2004 and 5 April 2005 the Mykolayiv Regional Court of Appeal (\u201cthe Court of Appeal\u201d) and the Supreme Court, respectively, upheld that ruling. The courts held that there had been no grounds for instituting criminal proceedings against the applicant as there was no indication of a criminal offence. 11.  On 21 September 2005 the applicant lodged a claim for damages against the local prosecutor\u2019s office and police. He claimed compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage in respect of the following four issues: his arbitrary criminal prosecution, his unlawful arrest, the allegedly unlawful search of the company\u2019s premises, and the seizure of the car as having amounted to his deprivation of property. More specifically, the applicant complained that there had been no reasons to arrest him and that he had never been summoned to the police. He further noted that his arrest had taken place in his office, in front of his colleagues, and that he had suffered stress and humiliation. He also observed, in the context of the complaint about his unlawful detention, that the conditions of his detention in the Arbuzynka ITT had been very poor (poor food and dirty linen, and impossibility to receive any parcels from the outside). 12.  The applicant\u2019s claim in respect of pecuniary damage included the amount of the debt owed by Mr Ts. to him, which the applicant estimated as being equivalent to the value of the impounded car. The applicant therefore claimed that that car should be returned to him. Furthermore, he claimed an equivalent to USD 5,000, which he had allegedly been forced to pay to Mr Ts. as a result of the unlawfully instituted criminal proceedings (whereas Mr Ts. had indicated a lower amount, USD 1,700, in his receipt \u2013 see paragraph 8 above). The applicant also claimed UAH 150,000 (at the time equivalent to EUR 24,650) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 13.  On 5 May 2006 the Yuzhnoukrayinsk Court allowed the applicant\u2019s claim in part. It awarded him UAH 8,585 in compensation for pecuniary damage, as that was the amount (equivalent to USD 1,700) paid by the applicant to Mr Ts. and confirmed by the latter\u2019s receipt. The court also awarded the applicant UAH 25,000 (at the time equal to about EUR 3,800) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. It relied, in particular, on the Compensation Act and Article 5 of the Convention. The aforementioned amounts were to be paid to the applicant from the State budget. 14.  The applicant, the State Treasury of Ukraine and the Mykolayiv Regional Prosecutor\u2019s Office appealed. 15.  By a letter of 6 July 2006 the Court of Appeal sent the applicant copies of the defendants\u2019 appeals and informed him that he could comment on them by 14 July 2006. The letter also contained a court summons for 19 July 2006. As indicated on the post stamp, it was dispatched on 14 July 2006. The applicant received that letter on 19 July 2006. 16.  On 19 July 2006 the Court of Appeal, following a hearing with the participation of the defendants, but in the applicant\u2019s absence, quashed the judgment of 5 May 2006 and issued a new one. It agreed with the first-instance court\u2019s conclusion that the applicant \u201chad suffered distress as a result of the illegal actions of law-enforcement officials\u201d, but considered the compensation award to be unreasonably high. The appellate court awarded the applicant UAH 5,000 (around 750 euros at the time) in compensation for non-pecuniary damage and UAH 1,000 in costs and expenses. In rejecting his claim for compensation in respect of pecuniary damage, the court noted that the car did not belong to the applicant and the State was not required to reimburse him money paid to a private individual. 17.  Neither the decision of the appellate court nor the verbatim records of its hearing contain any information regarding the notification of the applicant of that hearing. 18.  The applicant appealed on points of law. He complained, in particular, that he had received the summons on the day of the hearing before the appellate court, which prevented him from participating in it. 19.  On 26 November 2007 the Kherson Regional Court of Appeal, acting as a court of cassation, rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law with broadly couched reasoning that it was unsubstantiated.", "references": ["2", "7", "4", "8", "9", "5", "6", "1", "0", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicants were born in 1970 and 1935 respectively and live in Sofia and Ruse. 5.  D.D., father of the second applicant and grandfather of the first applicant, and his son P.R., father of the first applicant, owned a plot of land and a house in Popovo. 6.  By two decisions of the mayor of 9 May 1988 and 27 February 1989 the property was expropriated with a view to constructing a residential building. The decisions, based on section 98(1) of the Territorial and Urban Planning Act of 1973 (\u0417\u0430\u043a\u043e\u043d \u0437\u0430 \u0442\u0435\u0440\u0438\u0442\u043e\u0440\u0438\u0430\u043b\u043d\u043e\u0442\u043e \u0438 \u0441\u0435\u043b\u0438\u0449\u043d\u043e \u0443\u0441\u0442\u0440\u043e\u0439\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe TUPA\u201d), provided that D.D. was to be compensated with a two-room flat in a building which the municipality planned to construct on the expropriated plot, and P.R. with the right to build a house on municipally owned land. 7.  In 1989 the expropriated house was pulled down and in 1994 construction work was started on the site. 8.  By a supplementary decision of 19 April 1991, based on section 100 of the TUPA, the mayor specified the exact location and size of the future flat to be offered to D.D. No supplementary decision was issued however with regard to the right to build a house on municipally owned land which was due to P.R. 9.  D.D. and P.R. passed away in 1998 and 2002 respectively, and D.D.\u2019s wife passed away in 2011. This left the two applicants as heirs of D.D., and the first applicant as sole heir of P.R. 10.  On an unspecified date in 2005 the applicants requested that the mayor of Popovo revoke the expropriation order in respect of their predecessors\u2019 property, under paragraph 9(2) of the transitional provisions of the Territorial Planning Act (\u0417\u0430\u043a\u043e\u043d \u0437\u0430 \u0443\u0441\u0442\u0440\u043e\u0439\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e \u043d\u0430 \u0442\u0435\u0440\u0438\u0442\u043e\u0440\u0438\u044f\u0442\u0430, see paragraph 17 below). The mayor did not respond, which under domestic law was considered a tacit refusal. After the applicants applied for judicial review, the refusal was upheld by the courts, in judgments of the Targovishte Administrative Court (\u201cthe Targovishte Court\u201d) and the Supreme Administrative Court of 9 March and 11 July 2006 respectively. 11.  Following a fresh request by the applicants for the revocation of the expropriation order, in judgments of 10 November 2006 and 25 April 2007 the Targovishte Court and the Supreme Administrative Court annulled a new tacit refusal on the part of the mayor, acknowledging that the preconditions for such a revocation had indeed not been met, but instructing the mayor to examine the applicants\u2019 request under paragraph 9(1) of the transitional provisions of the Territorial Planning Act, providing for the possibility of monetary compensation (see paragraph 17 below). 12.  As the mayor failed once again to take a decision on the applicants\u2019 request, on an unspecified date they challenged his new tacit refusal, which was annulled once again by the Targovishte Court and the Supreme Administrative Court, in judgments of 27 September 2007 and 3 April 2008 respectively. 13.  Following that, on two occasions (3 June 2009 and 15 June 2010) the mayor refused expressly to revoke the expropriation order in respect of the applicants\u2019 property. After the applicants challenged these refusals, they were found to be null and void by the courts, the first one in a final judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of 21 May 2010, and the second one in a judgment of the Varna Administrative Court of 25 March 2011. The courts, finding that the fresh refusals were in contradiction with the earlier court judgments in cases between the same parties, sent the case back to the mayor, instructing him once again to examine it under paragraph 9(1) of the transitional provisions of the Territorial Planning Act. 14.  In April 2011 an expert commission of the municipality assessed the value of the expropriated property and set the amount of compensation to be provided to the applicants at 67,300 Bulgarian levs (BGN). After the applicants challenged that amount, in a judgment of 21 December 2011 the Targovishte Court increased it to BGN 83,500. 15.  That sum was paid to the applicants in June 2012.", "references": ["2", "5", "0", "3", "8", "7", "6", "1", "4", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1955 and is currently serving a prison sentence in Dnipro. 5.  On 20 December 2005 a panel of judges and lay assessors of the Odesa Regional Court of Appeal, sitting as a first-instance court, found the applicant and eighteen other persons guilty of different crimes which they had committed as a gang in the Odesa Region between 1995 and 1999, including banditry, illegal possession of firearms, theft, robbery, burglary, infliction of bodily injuries and murder. The applicant was sentenced to fifteen years\u2019 imprisonment with confiscation of property. The applicant\u2019s conviction was based mainly on his co-defendant\u2019s statements incriminating the applicant and on the fact that a number of objects stolen by the gang had been found in the applicant\u2019s wife\u2019s home during a search on 2 October 1999. 6.  The trial court dismissed the applicant\u2019s allegations that he had been ill-treated by the police at the pre-trial stage of proceedings, having relied essentially on the information provided by the prosecutor\u2019s office, which had previously rejected the applicant\u2019s complaint of ill-treatment as unsubstantiated, and by the authorities of the pre-trial detention centre, in which the applicant had been detained at the material time, that he had not had any injuries. 7.  Before and during the trial the applicant was assisted by different lawyers. The court-appointed lawyer, who represented the applicant during the trial, had his fees paid by the State. 8.  During the investigation and trial the applicant either refused to give any statements concerning the charges against him or denied that he had committed any crimes. During the trial he stated that he had an alibi and requested the trial court to summon a person who could testify that in June 1998 the applicant had been living in another region of Ukraine and therefore had committed no crime in the Odesa Region during that period. That request was refused, as were two other requests, in which the applicant and his lawyer asked the trial court to summon other persons without indicating the charges which their requests concerned or explaining the importance of those persons\u2019 testimony. 9.  According to the applicant, the presiding judge on the panel of the Court of Appeal dealing with his case had not been impartial, as allegedly he and the investigator in the case had studied together at the same law school and one of the witnesses had been the judge\u2019s relative. The applicant provided no document in that regard. 10.  Allegedly in protest to the unlawful manner in which his case was heard by the first-instance court, on 20 May 2005 the applicant stitched up his lips together and went on hunger strike. In this connection, the applicant underwent a medical examination, according to which he had no mental illness.\nII.  THE APPLICANT\u2019S APPEAL AGAINST HIS CONVICTION 11.  In order to prepare an appeal against his conviction, the applicant asked the Court of Appeal to give him time to study the case file which consisted of 171 volumes. The applicant\u2019s request was granted and he was given the file to study on many occasions between March 2006 and February 2007. Allegedly that period was too short and sometimes the applicant had to study the case file together with several other convicts in one cell. Consequently, he did not familiarize himself with the entire case file. 12.  On 17 March 2006 the applicant lodged his initial appeal with the Supreme Court, challenging the judgment of 20 December 2005. On 23 July 2007 he amended his appeal. The applicant mainly argued that his conviction had been based on false evidence. He also complained that the first-instance court had been biased and that it had unlawfully refused to summon witnesses upon his and his lawyer\u2019s requests. 13.  In July 2006 the applicant asked the Court of Appeal to appoint a lawyer to assist him in the preparation of his appeal and in the proceedings before the Supreme Court, as he had no money to hire a lawyer. A judge of that court replied to the applicant that he had to request the local bar association to appoint him a lawyer. The applicant lodged a similar request with the Odesa bar association. On 7 September 2006 he received a reply from the bar association that a decision to appoint a lawyer could be taken by the Court of Appeal. The applicant resubmitted his request for free legal assistance to the Court of Appeal, but it remained unanswered. The applicant complained of the fact that no lawyer had been appointed to him in his amended appeal to the Supreme Court (see paragraph 12 above). 14.  On 30 October 2007 the Supreme Court, having heard the applicant\u2019s and his co-defendants\u2019 appeals, found that the trial had been held in compliance with the procedure and that the first-instance court\u2019s findings of fact had been based on sufficient evidence. While upholding the applicant\u2019s sentence, the Supreme Court partly changed the applicant\u2019s conviction. In particular, the charges of theft were excluded as not based on the correct application of law. 15.  In March 2006 the applicant lodged the present application with the Court, while he was being detained at Odesa Pre-Trial Detention Centre (\u201cthe SIZO\u201d) since August 2001. 16.  According to the applicant, the SIZO authorities persecuted him in that connection. In particular, on 22 November 2007 he was allegedly beaten by the SIZO guards and sustained a head injury. The applicant was given no medical assistance as regards his injury and was placed in an isolation cell until 21 December 2007. Between 22 November and 21 December 2007 the applicant allegedly could not sent letters to the Court. 17.  On 21 December 2007 the applicant was transferred to Dnipropetrovsk Correctional Colony (\u201cthe prison\u201d) to serve his sentence. In the prison, copies of different documents from his criminal case file were taken from him and put in his prison file. The applicant stated, without providing any further details, that the dispatch of his letters to the Court had been often blocked or delayed by the prison authorities and that he had not been allowed to make phone calls to his relatives. 18.  The Government submitted to the Court copies of several reports of the SIZO authorities concerning the applicant\u2019s detention, according to which the applicant had been under special supervision as he had been considered inclined to commit self-mutilation (see also paragraph 10 above). On 22 November 2011 the applicant insulted several guards because they had opened and inspected a parcel which had been sent to him from outside the prison. He also hit his head against the wall in protest to the guards\u2019 actions. Subsequently, the guards took the applicant for medical examination, which did not reveal any serious health issue. In connection with this incident the applicant was disciplined and placed in an isolation cell for fifteen days. On 7 December 2011 the applicant was disciplined and placed in an isolation cell for fourteen days for having insulted and threatened prison guards. 19.  The Government stated that the applicant\u2019s letters had been duly dispatched by the SIZO and Prison authorities and that the Prison authorities had joined to those letters copies of the documents from his prison file which the applicant had asked them to send. They further stated that the applicant had had full access to his criminal case file during the proceedings against him and that he had been able to collect copies of all the documents he had needed for his application.", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "9", "5", "7", "1", "6", "8", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicants were born in 1944, 1964 and 1966 respectively and live in Razgrad. 5.  The first applicant and H.P., her husband and father of the other two applicants, owned a house with a yard and garage in Razgrad. 6.  By a decision of the mayor of 28 June 1988 the property was expropriated with a view to constructing a residential building. The decision, based on section 98(1) of the Territorial and Urban Planning Act (\u0417\u0430\u043a\u043e\u043d \u0437\u0430 \u0442\u0435\u0440\u0438\u0442\u043e\u0440\u0438\u0430\u043b\u043d\u043e\u0442\u043e \u0438 \u0441\u0435\u043b\u0438\u0449\u043d\u043e \u0443\u0441\u0442\u0440\u043e\u0439\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e \u2013 \u201cthe TUPA\u201d), provided that the first applicant and H.P. were to be compensated with a flat and a garage. 7.  By a supplementary decision of 24 July 1991, based on section 100 of the TUPA, the mayor determined the exact location, size and other details in respect of the garage to be offered in compensation, which was to be located in a residential building which the municipality planned to construct. The first applicant and H.P. had to pay for the cost of the garage that was not covered by the value of their expropriated property 4,479 old Bulgarian levs (BGL). It appears that at the time they did not pay that sum, which has since then devalued significantly. 8.  On unspecified dates the flat due to be given to first applicant and H.P. was constructed and delivered to them. The expropriated house and garage were pulled down. 9.  In 1996 the mayor of Razgrad offered the first applicant and H.P. a garage in another part of the city. They refused the offer. 10.  The building where the garage offered to them was to be situated was never constructed. In 2006 the municipality authorised the construction of another building by a private investor in the same place, which did not include garages. 11.  In a letter dated 18 August 2006 the mayor advised the first applicant and H.P. that they could request financial compensation for their expropriated property in lieu of compensation with a garage. In reply, they stated that they did not want such compensation and insisted on receiving a garage. 12.  In February 2009 H.P. passed away and was succeeded by the three applicants. 13.  On an unspecified date in 2010 the applicants brought an action in tort, seeking pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages for the allegedly unlawful failure on the part of the Razgrad municipality to build and provide them with a garage. The action was dismissed by the Supreme Administrative Court in a final judgment on 16 November 2011. It noted that the municipality had not acted unlawfully and had offered various solutions which the first applicant and her husband had rejected.", "references": ["1", "5", "8", "0", "4", "2", "6", "7", "3", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant is a lawyer who also writes articles for various Russian law journals and online legal information databases and networks. 7.  According to the applicant, his work usually requires extensive scientific research, including in the field of law enforcement in the Khabarovsk Region. He supported his assertion with copies of contracts with well-known Russian publishing houses and owners of a number of legal magazines, including one supervised by the Secretariat of the President of the Russian Federation. Under the contracts he undertook the task of writing articles on specific topics of legal and social interest. 8.  Having received an assignment to write an article on prostitution and the fight against it in the Khabarovsk Region, on 12 May 2009 the applicant wrote to the head of the Khabarovsk Region police department by registered letter, asking for statistical data for his research. The relevant parts read:\n\u201c[I am] interested in [receiving] information for the period between 2000 and 2009, in particular:\n- [information on] the number of people found administratively liable under Article 6.11 of the ... Code of Administrative Offences (prostitution), with a breakdown by sex, residence (residents of the Khabarovsk Region or visitors), nationality (nationals of the Russian Federation, foreigners or stateless persons) and the year [of the offence];\n- [information on] the number of criminal cases instituted during the above\u2011mentioned period under Articles 241, 242, 242.1 [and] 127.1 (cases related to sexual exploitation) of the ... Criminal Code, with a breakdown of the specific Articles ... and the year [the case was opened];\n- [information on] the number of individuals found criminally liable under Articles 241, 242, 242.1 [and] 127.1 ... of the ... Criminal Code, with a breakdown by sex, age, educational background, permanent residence (residents of the Khabarovsk Region or visitors), nationality and period [in which the crime was committed];\n- general information on sentences imposed on individuals found criminally liable under Articles 241, 242, 242.1 [and] 127.1 ... of the ... Criminal Code \u2011 the types of sentences and in how many cases they were imposed, and the years [they were imposed].\n...\n[I] stress that I do not need any specific personal information about individuals found administratively or criminally liable; [I only need] general statistical information for writing a scientific article.\u201d 9.  It appears from an acknowledgement of receipt that the letter reached the Khabarovsk Region police department on 25 May 2009. 10.  Under Russian law, State officials must provide a reply to letters from individuals within thirty days. In the absence of any response, on 26 June 2009 the applicant lodged a claim with the Tsentralniy District Court of Khabarovsk (\u201cthe District Court\u201d), complaining that the police authorities had failed to provide him with the information he had requested and requesting for access. Relying on the Information Act (see below) and Article 10 of the Convention, he argued that the officials\u2019 implied refusal to provide him with the information had been unlawful as he had not asked for access to any confidential personal information, State secrets or information related to internal police working methods. He claimed that his request had related purely to statistical data of a general nature collected by the Information Centre of the Khabarovsk Region police department (hereinafter \u201cthe Information Centre\u201d). 11.  On 18 July 2009 the applicant received a letter from the head of the Information Centre, notifying him that information as specific as he had asked for could only be collected on production of a written order issued by a deputy Minister of Internal Affairs, a head of a regional or municipal police department or their divisions or a prosecutor or investigator from a prosecutor\u2019s office. The Information Centre did not collect such information at the request of private individuals. General statistical data summarised by the Information Centre was provided to the Federal Service of State Statistics and in particular its regional office for the Khabarovsk Region, to whom the applicant could apply for the statistical data. 12.  On 19 July 2009 the applicant wrote to the Khabarovsk Region Service of State Statistics (hereinafter \u201cthe Statistics Service\u201d) by registered letter, asking for the statistical data for his research. 13.  On 23 July 2009 the head of the Statistics Service replied, stating that specific statistical information on the fight against prostitution had never been provided by the Khabarovsk Regional police department. 14.  The applicant filed copies of his letters from the Information Centre and Statistics Service with the District Court. 15.  On 4 August 2009 it dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim on the grounds that the Information Centre was not authorised to process data requests from private individuals. Under domestic law, the Statistics Service was tasked with dissemination of official statistical data on a broad variety of subjects, including those falling within the applicant\u2019s field of interest. It also noted that the applicant had failed to obtain the information sought from open sources, such as libraries, archives and the Internet. The District Court also stressed that the information requested did not touch upon the applicant\u2019s rights and legitimate interests, so the authorities\u2019 refusal to grant him access to such information had been lawful and well-founded under section 8(2) of the Information Act. 16.  The applicant appealed, arguing, among other things, that the police authorities had exclusive possession of the information sought by him and that he had no other means, including through assistance from the Statistics Service, of obtaining the necessary data. In addition, he submitted that the fact that his rights and legitimate interests were not affected by the requested information had no bearing on the case as under Russian law, it was not only those directly concerned who were granted access to public information. 17.  On 16 September 2009 the Khabarovsk Regional Court upheld the judgment of 4 August 2009. Relying on section 8(2) of the Information Act, it concluded that the authorities were not obliged to provide the applicant with the information as it did not touch upon his rights and legitimate interests.", "references": ["5", "1", "0", "2", "4", "7", "8", "6", "3", "9", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1933 and lives in Moscow. 6.  On 15 March 1994 the Russian Ministry of Railways (\u201cthe MPS\u201d) approved the construction of garages alongside the Oktyabrskaya railway in Moscow. The decision read as follows:\n\u201cTaking into consideration that the garages on [a 1.3 km] stretch of the Oktyabrskaya railway must carry out the function of a noise shield, the Moscow testing section of the Oktyabrskaya railway of the Ministry of Railways approves the construction of garages 5.5 metres away from the outer rail, on the following conditions: 2.  the construction of the garages shall be in strict compliance with technical safety rules for construction works in a railway zone; 7.  On 14 April 1994 the Main Directorate for Architecture and Planning of the Architecture and Urban Development Committee of the Government of Moscow (\u0413\u043b\u0430\u0432\u043d\u043e\u0435 \u0430\u0440\u0445\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043a\u0442\u0443\u0440\u043d\u043e-\u043f\u043b\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0440\u043e\u0432\u043e\u0447\u043d\u043e\u0435 \u0443\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u043a\u043e\u043c\u0438\u0442\u0435\u0442\u0430 \u043f\u043e \u0430\u0440\u0445\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043a\u0442\u0443\u0440\u0435 \u0438 \u0433\u0440\u0430\u0434\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0440\u043e\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0443 \u0433. \u041c\u043e\u0441\u043a\u0432\u044b) (hereinafter \u201cthe Moscow architecture and planning directorate\u201d) issued a town-planning assignment (\u0433\u0440\u0430\u0434\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0440\u043e\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e\u0435 \u0437\u0430\u043a\u043b\u044e\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435) for the design and construction of garages alongside the Oktyabrskaya railway. The document mentioned, in particular, that the land on which the garages were to be built belonged to the City of Moscow (\u0413\u043e\u0440\u0437\u0435\u043c\u0444\u043e\u043d\u0434) and that the garages were intended to serve as a noise shield along the railway line. 8.  On 31 October 1994 the local administration (\u0423\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u043c\u0443\u043d\u0438\u0446\u0438\u043f\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u043e\u043a\u0440\u0443\u0433\u0430 \u201c\u041c\u0430\u0440\u0444\u0438\u043d\u043e\u201d \u0421\u0435\u0432\u0435\u0440\u043e-\u0412\u043e\u0441\u0442\u043e\u0447\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0430\u0434\u043c\u0438\u043d\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0430\u0442\u0438\u0432\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u043e\u043a\u0440\u0443\u0433\u0430 \u041f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0430 \u041c\u043e\u0441\u043a\u0432\u044b) confirmed that they had no objections to assigning the land in question for the construction of garages by garage-building cooperative \u201cKashenkin Lug\u201d (garage owners\u2019 partnership, \u201cthe GSK\u201d), in accordance with the town-planning assignment. 9.  On 3 December 1994 the applicant joined the GSK and paid his share for a garage (6,500 United States dollars (USD) at the material time). 10.  The garages were constructed accordingly, and on 30 December 1996 the local administration\u2019s inspection board certified that one-storeyed capital (immovable) garages built by the GSK were ready for use. On 31 December 1996 the prefect of the local administration gave his approval. 11.  Garage no. 169 was allotted to the applicant. The local administration issued him with a certificate attesting to his possession of the said garage as from 3 December 1994 (\u0441\u0432\u0438\u0434\u0435\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e \u043e \u0432\u043b\u0430\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0438 \u0433\u0430\u0440\u0430\u0436\u043d\u044b\u043c \u0431\u043e\u043a\u0441\u043e\u043c). The applicant, however, never had his property rights to the garage registered in the real estate register. 12.  On 13 January 2000 Moscow Land Committee concluded a lease agreement with the GSK in respect of the land occupied by the garages. The lease provided that the land plot was allocated for further use of 324 garage boxes and 86 open parking spaces situated on it. That lease agreement remained in force until 31 August 2004. 13.  On 3 March 2003 the Federal State unitary enterprise \u201cOktyabrskaya Railway of the MPS\u201d (\u201cthe Oktyabrskaya Railway of the MPS\u201d) concluded a lease agreement with the GSK in respect of the land occupied by the garages. Under the agreement the lease was valid until 28 February 2004. The parties subsequently extended the validity of the agreement on three occasions: until 28 July, 30 September and 31 December 2004 respectively. Thereafter they tacitly renewed the agreement for an indefinite duration. The GSK continued to pay the rent due under the lease until 31 July 2007. 14.  Under clause 1.3 of the lease agreement, the land plot was allocated for placement of garage boxes. Clause 2.2.5 of the agreement proscribed the construction of permanent structures on the land and provided that temporary structures could be built only upon written approval by the Oktyabrskaya Railway of the MPS. Clause 2.2.10 stipulated that at the end of the lease, all temporary structures were to be removed. Clause 5.2 provided that the lease could be terminated unilaterally in the event of breach of the terms of the lease agreement by the GSK or failure to pay the lease for two months, and in the event that the land in question was required for the purposes of the railway, with one month\u2019s prior notice. Clause 6.2 stipulated that the GSK had no right to modify federal ownership of railway rights of way. 15.  In the meantime, on 18 September 2003 the Russian Government decided to establish an open joint stock company called \u201cRussian Railways\u201d (\u201cthe RZD\u201d), to succeed the MPS. 16.  On 5 March 2008 the Federal Agency for State Property Management responsible for Moscow signed a lease agreement with the RZD in respect of the plot of land on which the garages were situated. 17.  On 14 July 2010 the RZD notified the GSK of the unilateral termination of the lease agreement, with reference to a need that had arisen to use the land in question for the purposes of the railway. The RZD invited the GSK to vacate the plot by 20 August 2010. 18.  The GSK refused to do so and provided the RZD with a list of its members, from which it transpired that the applicant was the owner of garage no. 169. 19.  On 25 April 2011 the RZD notified the applicant of the necessity to vacate the garage. The applicant refused to comply. 20.  On 27 September 2011 the RZD brought court proceedings against the applicant seeking the removal of garage no. 169 from the plot in question. 21.  On 21 November 2011 the Ostankinskiy District Court of Moscow (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) granted the above claim and ordered the applicant to remove the garage within ten days of the judgment becoming final. The District Court further authorised the RZD to remove the garage on their own if the applicant failed to comply with the court\u2019s decision. The District Court held as follows:\n\u201cIt follows from the case-file material that on 3 March 2003 the Federal State unitary enterprise \u201cOktyabrskaya Railway of the MPS\u201d and the GSK signed a lease agreement in respect of a plot of land situated within a railway right of way [\u043f\u043e\u043b\u043e\u0441\u0430 \u043e\u0442\u0432\u043e\u0434\u0430 \u0436\u0435\u043b\u0435\u0437\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u0434\u043e\u0440\u043e\u0433\u0438] for the purposes of reimbursement of its maintenance costs, valid until 28 February 2004, which was subsequently extended on the basis of additional agreements. Pursuant to clause 1.3 of the above lease agreement the land was allocated for the construction of garage boxes. The construction of permanent structures on the land was prohibited (clause 2.2.5). At present the lease agreement has been terminated, which is confirmed by notifications of 14 July and 26 August 2010 on the unilateral termination of the lease agreement with reference to the necessity to use the plot in question for the purposes of the railway.\nThe case file contains a certificate provided by the plaintiff to the effect that the GSK had [paid rent under the lease] until 31 July 2007, and that since then no payments had been made for the use of the plot of land.\nThe procedure for the use of land plots classified as federal property is determined by the Government of the Russian Federation in accordance with section 9 of Federal Law no. 17-FZ of 10 January 2003 on the Railway System in the Russian Federation.\nGovernment Resolution no. 264 of 29 April 2006 stipulates that the use of land classified as federal property and provided to the RZD must be based on a land lease agreement between the Federal Agency for State Property Management (its territorial body) and the RZD.\nPursuant to Federal Law no. 17-FZ of 10 January 2003 on the Railway System in the Russian Federation, railway land is land used or intended for maintaining the activities of rail transport organisations and/or for buildings, constructions, structures and other rail transport facilities, including plots of land situated within railway rights of way and safety areas.\nPlots of land adjacent to railway tracks or intended for the placement of such tracks are classified as railway rights of way, as is land occupied by or intended for the placement of railway terminals, water drainage and protective facilities along railway tracks, communication lines, electric power supply facilities, production and other buildings, constructions, structures, equipment and other rail transport facilities.\nThe plot of land with cadastral number 77:02:21017:032 is intended for the operation and development of the railways, [it] is situated within a railway right of way ...\nBefore the lease agreement in respect of the railway right of way [between the RZD and the Russian Federation] was signed, the plot of land with cadastral number 77:02:21017:032 was classified as rail transport land in accordance with the Transport Land Act approved by decision no. 24 of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of 8 January 1981; decision no. 3020-1 of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation of 27 December 1991 on the division of State property in the Russian Federation; and Federal Law no. 153-FZ of 25 March 1995 on the Federal Railway System.\nMPS decree no. 26 \u201cTs\u201d of 15 May 1999 approved the procedure for the use of federal railway land within railway rights of way.\nIn accordance with this procedure, the size of a right of way is determined in accordance with standards and rules for the design of railway rights of way, approved by the MPS, as well as with design and budget documentation and general schemes for the development and reconstruction of federal rail transport facilities and stations.\nThe revision of the borders and size of rights of way, the withdrawal of temporarily unused plots of land and their reclassification from one category to another is carried out by the competent authorities with the agreement of the railways, pursuant to the legislation of the Russian Federation.\n...\nThe court has established that on part of the plot of land with cadastral number 77:02:21017:032 in the right of way of the Oktyabrskaya railway ... there are garages, including garage no. 169. ...\nNo information has been provided from the Consolidated State Register of Real Estate Titles and Transactions in respect of the garage. No documents have been provided by the defendant or the GSK confirming their right to use the land underneath the garage either.\nThe RZD is the user of the plot of land in question. By virtue of Article 305 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation it is entitled to seek the elimination of violations of its rights, namely the removal of the [applicant\u2019s] garage from the plot.\n...\nTo support his assertion about the lawfulness of his possession of the disputed garage, the defendant submitted to the court a certificate issued by the GSK confirming that he had paid in full his share for the garage. Also, at the request of the defendant the court joined to the case file the following evidence: a copy of the act certifying that the garages were ready for use; notification from the federal service for State registration, inventory and cartography responsible for Moscow about the absence of any information in the Consolidated State Register of Real Estate Titles and Transactions about the disputed plot; the approval by the prefect of [the local administration] of the inspection certificate issued in respect of the garages; correspondence from the Moscow section of the Oktyabrskaya railway of 25 November 1993 on the approval of the construction of the garages within the railway right of way; the town-planning assignment issued by the Moscow architecture and planning directorate on 13 April 1994; the decision of the federal service for State registration, inventory and cartography of 27 April 2011 refusing to issue a cadastral certificate for the disputed plot.\nHowever, these documents do not prove that the applicant acquired property rights in respect of the garage, nor do they prove the lawfulness of the use of the land underneath it. The defendant\u2019s garage [is] an unauthorised construction because it was built on a plot of land that was not allocated for that purpose in accordance with the procedure provided for by law and in the absence of permission issued by a competent authority, whereas a railway right of way can be used exclusively for the construction of rail transport facilities. The [documents provided by the defendant] do not prove that the garage was not an unauthorised construction, because the construction was carried out on land within a railway right of way and therefore was not intended for the building of garages. The approval by the prefect of the local administration of the inspection certificate does not confirm the existence of permission by the federal authorities to use the plot of land in question for building garages, regard being had [to the fact] that the owner of the plot is the Russian Federation and not the City of Moscow.\nThe management of land owned by the State, including giving permission for construction of immovable property, can be done only by the competent federal authority.\nA garage for parking a car by an individual is not a rail transport facility, therefore a plot of land within a railway right of way cannot be considered to be intended for the construction of such a garage (garages).\nBesides, the defendant has failed to submit evidence to the effect that the competent federal authority issued an administrative act on the transfer of a part of the land situated within a railway right of way to the defendant. It therefore follows that the plot of land was not provided to the defendant by the owner, and therefore at the present time the defendant has no legal grounds to use federal property.\n...\nThe applicant would have acquired title to garage no. 169 had it not been an unauthorised construction.\n...\nHaving assessed all the evidence in the case, taking into consideration [the fact] that the defendant did not acquire property rights in respect of the plot of land classified as federal property and located within a railway right of way, on which the disputed garage is situated, that the plot was provided for temporary use, and that it is being used at the present time without any contractual basis, the court comes to the conclusion that the rights of the RZD have been violated in that the plaintiff is prevented from using the land in accordance with its intended purpose. The court therefore considers that there are lawful grounds for granting the plaintiff\u2019s claim for removal of garage no. 169 from the plot of land with cadastral number 77:02:21017:032 ...\u201d 22.  The applicant appealed. He claimed, in particular, that he was entitled to compensation. 23.  On 10 February 2012 the Moscow City Court upheld the above judgment on appeal. The City Court held that the law did not provide for the possibility of claiming compensation for the demolition of an unauthorised construction. 24.  On 3 April 2012 the Ostankinskiy District bailiffs\u2019 service in Moscow instituted enforcement proceedings. The applicant was notified on 12 April 2012. 25.  As the applicant refused to comply voluntarily with the judgment of 21 November 2011, as upheld on appeal on 10 February 2012, the RZD proceeded to demolish his garage. 26.  On 13 June 2012 the Ostankinskiy District bailiffs\u2019 service was informed accordingly. 27.  On 19 June 2012 the enforcement proceedings were terminated. 28.  According to the Government, in August 2013 the construction of the fourth main track of the Oktyabrskaya railway between Moscow and Khimki was completed on the land previously occupied by the garages of the GSK and was opened for circulation of the suburban electric train. In December 2014 noise-reduction barriers were installed along the Oktyabrskaya railway line in the area of the Marfino residential district.", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "2", "7", "8", "6", "4", "9", "5", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1981 and lives in Ni\u0161. 6.  On 2 February 1999 the applicant gave birth to a daughter, A.C. One year later, she married V.C. (\u201cthe respondent\u201d), her daughter\u2019s biological father. 7.  On 1 February 2005 V.C. lodged a claim with the Ni\u0161 Municipal Court, seeking dissolution of the marriage, custody of A.C. and child maintenance. 8.  On 16 May 2005 the Ni\u0161 Social Care Centre granted the applicant interim care and custody of A.C. until the marriage was dissolved. 9.  On 23 June 2005, while the applicant and A.C. were visiting a mental care institute where the child was undergoing treatment for her disturbed mental health as a result of her parents\u2019 divorce, V.C. forcibly removed A.C. from the applicant\u2019s custody and, in so doing, assaulted the latter physically, knocking her unconscious. 10.  On 25 July 2005 the Ni\u0161 Municipal Court issued an interim custody order requiring that V.C. surrender custody of A.C. to the applicant until the end of the marriage dissolution proceedings. 11.  On 5 August 2005 a bailiff accompanied the applicant to the respondent\u2019s home, requesting that the child be surrendered. The respondent\u2019s father and A.C. were also present. The respondent stated that he would not prevent the mother from seeing her child but refused to hand her over, even if it meant paying a fine, claiming that the applicant could not provide suitable living conditions for A.C. and that A.C. preferred living with him. 12.  Faced with the respondent\u2019s failure to comply with the enforcement order, on 12 August 2005 the Ni\u0161 Municipal Court ordered him to pay a fine in the amount of 10,000 Serbian dinars (RSD; approximately 120 euros (EUR)), within three days and to return the child to her mother by the same deadline. 13.  On 18 August 2005 the bailiff again went to the respondent\u2019s home, but there was no one there. On the same day the court contacted the Ni\u0161 Social Care Centre asking for urgent action, since the applicant alleged that domestic violence was taking place there. 14.  On 22 August 2005, the social care centre informed the court that it had advised the applicant and the respondent to visit a mental care institute in order to be provided with appropriate guidance in communicating with each other and in order for the child to resume the interrupted course of treatment. The court was informed that the Doljevac Social Care Centre had taken over responsibility for the case, since that was where the respondent\u2019s residence was located. 15.  On 12 September 2005 the Municipal Court ordered the respondent to pay a further fine in the amount of RSD 50,000 (approximately EUR 590) and to return A.C. to her mother. 16.  On 15 September 2005 the respondent and his father contacted the court, declaring that the child did not want to go to her mother and refusing to pay the fine. 17.  On 20 September 2005 a new attempt was made to enforce the interim order, this time in the presence of a psychologist from the Doljevac Social Care Centre, civilian police officers, the enforcement judge, a bailiff and the applicant. The child started to cry and refused to go with the applicant. The respondent stated that he had spoken with the child, encouraging her to go and live with her mother if she wanted, but the child had refused. The applicant was of the opinion that the child had been given instructions and put under pressure and was in fact strongly attached to her. She wanted to take the child immediately, regardless of her behaviour. The psychologist was against forcible transfer of the custody, claiming that it could have a negative influence on the child\u2019s mental health and lead to autism. The child had already showed some of those symptoms, but they stopped after she had moved into her father\u2019s home, where she had been living for five years. The psychologist proposed that mother and child start to meet under the supervision of the Centre on its premises. She also noted in the minutes that the parents should cease their manipulation of the child. 18.  On 3 October 2005 the first meeting between mother and child was held on the premises of the Centre, but the applicant later told the court that it had not been successful because the child was allegedly subjected to pressure by her father. 19.  At the next meeting, held on 14 October 2005, the child was constantly holding on to her father, crying and avoiding contact with her mother. The psychologist was not present during the meeting, being on sick leave at the time. After leaving the premises of the Ni\u0161 Social Care Centre, the applicant and respondent and other persons present started to fight. The respondent\u2019s father allegedly physically attacked the applicant. The court informed the Doljevac Social Care Centre about the incident, seeking advice as to how to proceed further. 20.  On 2 March 2006 the applicant asked the court to enforce the interim custody order in the presence of the police. 21.  The enforcement of the interim order was to be attempted on 20 March 2006 on the premises of the Ni\u0161 Social Care Centre in the presence of the judge, a psychologist and a teacher from the Centre, the applicant and the respondent\u2019s representative. The respondent and the child did not appear. The child was allegedly ill. 22.  On 29 May 2006 the next enforcement attempt was made. The respondent again failed to appear. According to his representative, he had not been properly summoned. At the hearing, two psychologists were present, one from the Ni\u0161 Social Care Centre and the other from the Doljevac Social Care Centre. Both gave their opinion concerning the forced return of the child to her mother, the psychologist from Ni\u0161 contending that it was the only option, since the father was not willing to hand over the child voluntarily, and the psychologist from Doljevac arguing against it, on the basis that it could have a negative influence on the child\u2019s further development. 23.  The enforcement attempt scheduled for 13 June 2006 was also postponed due to the absence of the respondent and his representative. 24.  On 29 June 2006 the respondent appeared without the child, because she was allegedly sick, but he did not submit any evidence in support of this allegation. Throughout the meeting he claimed that he was willing to hand over the child to the mother but that the child was refusing to cooperate. 25.  On 27 July 2006 the court again ordered the respondent to pay a fine in the amount of RSD 20,000 and to return the child to her mother. 26.  On 25 December 2006 the court asked the Ni\u0161 Mental Care Institute to prepare an opinion concerning the enforcement of the interim custody order because of the difficulties encountered in the proceedings. 27.  The Ni\u0161 Mental Care Institute issued an experts\u2019 report on 28 June 2007. The report contained the opinions of a psychologist, a sociologist and a neuropsychiatrist, all of whom had conducted interviews with the child and both her parents. The experts found that the child\u2019s intellectual ability was on the low side and that her emotional and social maturity was underdeveloped as a result of the family situation. They also found that both parents were manipulating the child and not doing what was in her best interests. Their ultimate opinion was that the forcible removal of the child from her father and her current social environment without proper psychological preparation could at that stage provoke certain psychological disorders. The experts advised that the child should receive psychological and social counselling to help her overcome her resistance towards her mother, that the father and his family should be helped to change their attitude and stop influencing the child\u2019s opinion towards her mother, and that both parents should receive counselling on how to behave in the best interests of the child. 29.  On 12 June 2008 and 28 May 2009 the Ni\u0161 District Court and the Supreme Court of Serbia upheld the Municipal Court\u2019s judgment at second and third instance, respectively. 30.  All of the above-mentioned courts reasoned that, \u201cnotwithstanding her earlier forcible removal from ... [the applicant\u2019s custody] ...\u201d, it was in the best interests of A.C. to remain with her father since a separation could prove psychologically detrimental. In support of this conclusion, the courts referred to a separate opinion drafted by the Doljevac Social Care Centre, in addition to an expert\u2019s report, stating that it would indeed be advisable for A.C. to remain in the environment to which she had become accustomed, where she was surrounded by love and care, and where she had made social connections (see paragraph 27 above). 31.  In addition, the Supreme Court found that there was no evidence that the respondent had committed acts of violence against the child or the applicant. 33.  The applicant never sought enforcement of the judgment of 14 January 2008 as regards the weekly meetings with the child. 34.  On 16 March 2010 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Constitutional Court, alleging a breach of her parental and family rights, essentially complaining about the non-enforcement of the Municipal Court\u2019s interim custody order of 25 July 2005. She also argued that the Supreme Court\u2019s ultimate ruling on the issue of A.C.\u2019s custody had failed to take into account the child\u2019s best interests and had instead retroactively endorsed V.C.\u2019s violent and unlawful conduct and had permanently separated her from her child. 35.  On 15 March 2012 the Constitutional Court dismissed the complaint regarding the interim custody order of 25 July 2005 for being out of time, having been lodged more than 30 days after the applicant had been served with the District Court\u2019s judgment of 12 June 2008. With respect to the applicant\u2019s complaint regarding the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court rejected it on the merits, accepting the Supreme Court\u2019s reasoning entirely. 36.  On 19 October 2007 the Ni\u0161 Municipal Court found V.C. guilty of unlawfully removing A.C. from the applicant\u2019s custody and sentenced him to six months\u2019 imprisonment, suspended for a period of two years. The respondent was ordered to return the child to the applicant within fifteen days of the date on which the judgment became final. This judgment was upheld by the Ni\u0161 District Court on 8 April 2008. 37.  On 18 August 2008, acting upon the applicant\u2019s initiative, the Ni\u0161 municipal public prosecutor requested the revocation of the respondent\u2019s probation, but withdrew the request on 16 December 2008 because the respondent had in the meantime been granted custody of A.C. On 25 December 2008 the Municipal Court terminated the proceedings seeking revocation of the probation. 38. Following the applicant\u2019s claim for review of the judgment of 14 January 2008, on 12 October 2012 the Ni\u0161 Municipal Court granted the applicant custody of A.C. and ordered V.C. to contribute towards her maintenance on a monthly basis. In its reasoning the court explained that A.C. had stated that she now wanted to live with the applicant and that V.C. himself no longer had any objections to this arrangement. This judgment became both final and enforceable on 10 November 2012 and A.C. moved to the applicant\u2019s flat shortly thereafter. 39.  In July 2013 the Ni\u0161 Public Prosecutor\u2019s Office received a criminal complaint that had been lodged against V.C. for failure to make maintenance payments. 40.  It would appear that the applicant re-established contact with her daughter on 19 August 2012, that is to say after a period of seven years, and soon afterwards A.C. went to live with the applicant. However, it seems from the documents submitted by the Government that the mother-daughter relationship was not well re-established. A.C. kept returning to her father whenever she had a misunderstanding with her mother. She even gave a statement to the police to the effect that her mother was maltreating her. 41.  On 27 August 2015 A.C. moved to her father\u2019s home and it appears that she is still living with him by choice. It would also appear that the respondent filed a claim for review of the judgment of 12 October 2012 on custody of A.C. and that those proceedings are still pending.", "references": ["9", "0", "8", "5", "6", "3", "1", "7", "2", "4", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicants were convicted in Russia of various crimes. The applicants and their lawyers, except for Mr Yakupov, whose lawyer was present, were refused leave to attend the appeal hearings on the ground that their presence was unnecessary or without addressing this issue at all. 5.  Following communication of the cases, the supervisory-review courts quashed the appeal judgments at the prosecutor\u2019s request and remitted the cases for fresh examinations before the appellate courts. In most of the cases the applicants and their lawyers were present at the new appeal hearings. Mr Trifonov and Mr Sidelnikov did not ask for leave to appear and did not attend the new hearings, but they were represented by lawyers. 6.  Detailed information about the applicants\u2019 attendance and dates of the hearings is set out in Appendix II. 7.  On 12 November 2002 criminal proceedings were initiated against Mr Zakhodyakin. Since then the criminal proceedings were suspended and reopened several times. 8.  On 26 June 2007 the Vuktyl Town Court of the Komi Republic found the applicant guilty of abuse of office and sentenced him to one year\u2019s imprisonment. On 24 August 2007 the Supreme Court of the Komi Republic upheld that judgment on appeal. 9.  On 8 October 2008 the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the Komi Republic quashed the judgment of 24 August 2007 and remitted the case for a fresh examination. On 7 November 2008 the Supreme Court of the Komi Republic upheld the judgment of 26 June 2007. 10.  On 3 October 2012 the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the Komi Republic quashed the judgment of 7 November 2008 and remitted the case for a fresh examination. On 18 December 2012 the Supreme Court of the Komi Republic upheld the judgment of 26 June 2007.", "references": ["6", "8", "0", "7", "5", "9", "1", "4", "2", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1972 and lives in \u0218op\u00e2rli\u021ba. 6.  On 30 June 2013 the applicant\u2019s sister called the emergency services and reported that the applicant was causing a disturbance in respect of his family (a f\u0103cut scandal \u020bn familie). Two police officers from the Bobice\u015fti police, C.B. and M.D.B., were dispatched to the applicant\u2019s home. 7.  Once they arrived at the applicant\u2019s home, the police officers proceeded to handcuff him in order to take him to the police station, because they claimed that he was aggressive towards them. The officers immobilised him and pushed him to the ground with his face down, even though he was not resisting arrest. They handcuffed him with his hands behind his back, dragged him towards a police car, and banged his head against a metal gate owned by a neighbour, M.V. 8.  The Government acknowledged that the police officers had put the applicant to the ground and had forcibly handcuffed him. They stated, however, that the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment and of being thrown against a metal gate by the police officers were contradicted by the available evidence. The evidence proved that his injuries were not caused deliberately by the police officers. 9.  On 30 June 2013 one of the police officers who had been dispatched to the applicant\u2019s home produced a contravention report, and fined the applicant 1,000 Romanian lei (RON \u2013 approximately 230 euros (EUR)). According to the report, the applicant had offended his father, had been inebriated, and had admitted his actions. The report was signed by the applicant. 10.  From 1 to 3 July 2013 the applicant was in Bagdasar\u2011Arseni Emergency Hospital in Bucharest. According to a medical report produced upon his discharge from hospital, he was diagnosed with a cervical spine injury and a minor cranial cerebral trauma. 11.  On 3 July 2013 the applicant\u2019s father lodged a criminal complaint against police officers C.B. and M.D.B., on the grounds that they had physically abused his son. On 12 September 2013 the applicant took up (\u015fi\u2011a \u020bnsu\u015fit) the criminal complaint lodged by his father against the police officers. 12.  On 14 August 2013 the Olt prosecutor\u2019s office interviewed the applicant\u2019s father with regard to the circumstances of the case. He stated, inter alia, that his son had not been suffering from a psychological illness. On the day of the incident the applicant had been inebriated and had made a scene, but he had not hurt either of his parents. Neither parent had called the police, and the applicant\u2019s father was unaware of who could have done so. The police officers had produced a contravention report in the applicant\u2019s name and had asked him to sign the report without informing him why. The applicant had complied and had signed the contravention report. Subsequently, he had agreed to accompany the police officers to the hospital, but had informed them that he needed to go inside the house to get dressed. The police officers had stopped him from entering the house, pushed him to the ground with his face down, and handcuffed him. Afterwards, they had dragged him away and banged his head against a metal gate owned by M.V. When they had put the applicant in the ambulance he had had blood on his face, and they had left him in the ambulance face down and wearing handcuffs. The following day, Dr B. from the psychiatric unit of Slatina Emergency Hospital had informed him (the applicant\u2019s father) that his son had been seriously beaten, and that he had been transferred to a different hospital because he had suffered a cervical spine injury. 13.  On 12 September 2013 the Olt prosecutor\u2019s office interviewed the applicant. In his statement, inter alia, he asked the investigating authorities to also interview his mother and N.B. with regard to the incident. He also stated that he had signed the contravention report produced by the two police officers, even though he had not been informed by them about its content. One of the police officers had travelled with him in the ambulance. That officer had refused to remove his handcuffs and had punched him in the face. 14.  On the same date the Olt prosecutor\u2019s office interviewed both the applicant\u2019s mother and N.B. His mother stated, inter alia, that the police officers had not allowed her son to get dressed, had chased him through the courtyard, and had tripped him. After he had fallen to the ground they had twisted his hands behind his back and handcuffed him. Because the applicant had been agitated after he had been handcuffed, and had refused to accompany the police officers, they had repeatedly banged his head against the gate owned by M.V. One of the police officers had travelled with the applicant in the ambulance and had continued to beat him until he had been asked by the medical staff in the ambulance to stop the violence. 15.  N.B. stated, inter alia, that he had been on the street on the day of the incident and had seen two police officers handcuff the applicant. Afterwards, they had grabbed him by his hands and had banged his head repeatedly on the gate owned by M.V. N.B. further stated that he had worked with the applicant, and he had not been suffering from any psychological condition or drinking alcohol. 16.  On an unspecified date in 2013 the Olt prosecutor\u2019s office asked the Olt County Forensic Medical Service to examine the available medical documents and produce a forensic expert report in the case. The prosecutor\u2019s office asked the forensic service to determine: the applicant\u2019s injuries and their cause; the number of days of medical care needed for healing; if there was a direct link between the applicant\u2019s injuries and their cause; and if the injuries could also have been caused by something other than intentional force. 17.  On 31 October 2013 the Olt County Forensic Medical Service examined the applicant and the available medical documents. 18.  On 18 November 2013 the Olt County Forensic Medical Service produced a forensic expert report. It noted that on the day of the incident the applicant had been transferred by ambulance to Slatina Emergency Hospital because he had been extremely agitated and his breath had smelled of alcohol. Subsequently, he had been transferred to the hospital\u2019s psychiatric unit and had been sedated. The following day he had started complaining of pain in his cervical spine area, and of paralysis of his right hand. He had been examined and had been diagnosed with a cervical spine injury. The interdisciplinary medical examination carried out by, inter alia, a neurologist, a surgeon and an orthopaedist had not identified any signs of trauma. Eventually, the applicant had been admitted to a specialist hospital and had been operated on in relation to the cervical spine injury. 19.  The forensic report concluded that the applicant\u2019s injury could have been caused on 30 June 2013. Most probably, the injury had been caused by a forced rotation movement of the neck when the applicant had been immobilised and handcuffed. No signs of trauma specific to intentional force had been identified on the applicant\u2019s head, body or limbs during the interdisciplinary examinations carried out after his admissions to Slatina Emergency Hospital and Bagdasar-Arseni Emergency Hospital. The applicant had needed seventy to eighty days of medical care from the moment of his injury. 20.  On 10 January 2014 a prosecutor attached to the Olt prosecutor\u2019s office decided not to open a criminal investigation against the two police officers for abusive behaviour, on the grounds that their actions had lacked the elements of an offence. The prosecutor held that a third party had called the emergency services at the applicant\u2019s sister\u2019s request, because the applicant, who had a history of psychological problems and who had been drunk, had been aggressive and had endangered his own life and safety and that of his family. Once police officers C.B. and M.D.B. had arrived at the scene of the incident, they had asked the applicant to calm down and accompany them to the police station. The applicant had refused the police officers\u2019 demand, and had become aggressive and had verbally abused them. 21.  The prosecutor further held that the applicant\u2019s father had confirmed the fact that the applicant had been drunk at the time of the incident. However, his statements that his son had not been aggressive and that he had been unaware of the identity of the person who had called the emergency services had not been confirmed by the rest of the evidence adduced in the file. Moreover, in such a case, it would have been highly unlikely that an individual would call the emergency services for no reason. According to the prosecutor, those arguments were also supported by the fact that, in the medical report produced by the psychiatric unit of Slatina Emergency Hospital, where the applicant had been taken after the incident, it was stated that the applicant was suffering from a polymorphic personality disorder, which was aggravated by alcohol consumption. Also, his father had acknowledged that the applicant would generally act normally when he was sober, but transformed into a verbally and physically aggressive person once he drank alcohol. 22.  The prosecutor also held that the applicant was known in his village as a violent and aggressive person with psychological problems. He had been investigated in relation to several other criminal files concerning alleged violent acts committed against the members of his family, and for theft, but the investigations had been discontinued after his parents had withdrawn their complaints. 23.  The prosecutor noted that, according to the reports describing the police officers\u2019 intervention and the use of force and handcuffs, once the officers had arrived at the applicant\u2019s home they had realised that he was drunk, and they had been forced to immobilise him and take him to Slatina Emergency Hospital. Also, according to the available medical documents, the applicant had been transferred to the hospital by ambulance, he had been extremely agitated, and his breath had smelled of alcohol. Subsequently, he had been transferred to the hospital\u2019s psychiatric unit and had been sedated. The following day he had started complaining of a cervical spine injury, which had eventually required surgical treatment. In addition, according to the information provided by the psychiatric unit of Slatina Emergency Hospital, since 1998 the applicant had repeatedly been admitted to the unit for similar reasons. 24.  The prosecutor held that the conclusions of the forensic expert report produced on 18 November 2013 contradicted N.B.\u2019s and the applicant\u2019s parents\u2019 testimonies that the applicant\u2019s head had repeatedly been banged against M.V.\u2019s gate by the police officers. 25.  By referring to Article 34 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 2 of Law no. 218/2002, but expressly citing the relevant provisions of Article 33 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 2 of the same aforementioned Law, the prosecutor further held that, given the available evidence, the police officers had not injured the applicant deliberately. His injuries could have been the result of a forced rotation of his neck, which could have happened at the moment when he had been immobilised by the officers. Also, the police officers had stated that they had not hurt the applicant, and had confirmed that he had been drunk, and that he had been transported and admitted to hospital. 26.  The applicant challenged the decision of 10 January 2014 before a more senior prosecutor. 27.  On 29 January 2014 a more senior prosecutor attached to the Olt prosecutor\u2019s office dismissed the applicant\u2019s challenge as ill-founded, and upheld the decision of 10 January 2014. 28.  The applicant appealed against the decision of 29 January 2014 before the Slatina District Court. In his written submissions he argued that the forensic expert report produced in the case was incomplete and superficial. The report had failed to determine if his injury would have been possible considering the physical characteristics of the parties involved in the incident and the standard procedure which had to be followed in cases of handcuffing. Also, the report had not explained how the forced rotation of his neck had happened, as he would not have made such a painful movement instinctively. In addition, the prosecutor\u2019s office had wrongfully dismissed his parents\u2019 and N.B.\u2019s testimonies, as those witnesses had confirmed the police violence, and the forensic report had acknowledged that his injury had most probably been caused as a result of the forced rotation of his neck. Consequently, the applicant argued that the available forensic expert report had to be complemented by another report (completat), and that the second report had to be submitted for the approval of a higher review commission. 29.  The applicant further argued that none of the circumstances set out in sections 1 and 2 of Article 34 of Law no. 218/2002 had applied in his case. Also, even assuming that he had resisted immobilisation, as claimed by the authorities, the handcuffing measure could only have been taken against him if there had been a reasonable suspicion that his behaviour could endanger the police officers\u2019 physical integrity or lives. Even assuming that such a situation had existed, the police officers had still had a lawful duty to use their handcuffs without seriously injuring him. 30.  Lastly, the applicant contended that the prosecuting authorities\u2019 conclusion that the police officers had not hurt him intentionally had been ill\u2011founded, given that the officers had indirectly acted with intent. In particular, they had foreseen the result of their actions, and even if they had not intended that result, they had accepted that it was a possibility. 31.  On 12 March 2014 the Slatina District Court referred the case to the Bal\u015f District Court for examination. 32.  By a final judgment of 9 April 2014 the Bal\u015f District Court, sitting in private as a pre-trial chamber judge, and without the parties being present, dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal against the more senior prosecutor\u2019s decision and upheld that decision. It noted that it had notified the parties about the date of the hearing, but they had failed to submit written observations. The court held that the Olt prosecutor\u2019s office had correctly established that officers C.B. and M.D.B. had not committed the offence of abusive behaviour. Also, the available forensic report did not need to be complemented by an additional report or submitted for approval. The forensic report had examined extensively the available medical evidence, and had concluded that no evidence of trauma as a result of deliberate force had been identified on the applicant\u2019s head, body or limbs during the multidisciplinary examinations. 33.  The court further held that, according to the available medical evidence, the applicant had been in an extreme state of psychomotor agitation, and the cranial X-ray had not shown any post-traumatic injury of the skull. Consequently, the court considered that the existence of a minor cranial cerebral trauma had not contradicted the conclusions of the forensic medical report, which had taken that trauma\u2019s presence into account. 34.  The court also considered that it had been unnecessary for the forensic expert report to explain how the forced rotation of the applicant\u2019s neck had happened, given that the victim would not have made such movements instinctively, because he had been drunk and extremely agitated at the time of the incident, and his behaviour could not have been compared with the normal behaviour of another person. 35.  The court further considered that the prosecutor had correctly dismissed the testimonies in the case, given that, according to the forensic expert report, no trauma as a result of deliberate force had been identified, and the forensic pathologist had had the opportunity to consider the possibility of the applicant\u2019s head being banged repeatedly against a metal gate. 36.  The court held that it was true that the police officers had had a duty to use their handcuffs without seriously injuring the applicant. However, the applicant\u2019s injuries had not been the direct result of the police officers\u2019 actions. They had occurred in circumstances where he had been drunk, violent and extremely agitated, and therefore the police officers could not have controlled their actions towards him. 37.  The court also held that the violent actions towards the applicant had been carried out by the police officers within the framework of their work duties. In addition, the actions had been lawfully justified in order to alleviate the danger the applicant had represented to society and himself, given that he had been drunk, agitated and aggressive, and had been suffering from an organic personality disorder as a result of drinking alcohol. The police officers had not acted with the intent of hitting or hurting the applicant. His injuries had been the result of his immobilisation and handcuffing measures to stop his aggressive actions and transport him to the hospital. Therefore, the police officers\u2019 actions had been justified. 38.  On 22 October 2014 the applicant underwent a medical examination at a private medical establishment, the Medical Civil Association for the Brain. According to a medical report produced by that establishment, the applicant had an organic personality disorder with \u201cpolymorphic decompensation\u201d (decompensare polimorf\u0103). The report noted that the applicant\u2019s symptoms included a moderate intrapsychological tension, concentration difficulties, mixed insomnia and a low resilience to frustration and annoyances. It further noted, inter alia, that the applicant had repeatedly been admitted to psychiatric hospitals, had poor social and family support, and persistent symptoms for which he was receiving treatment. 39.  On 6 January 2015 the applicant underwent a medical examination at Schitu-Greci Psychiatric Hospital, because he was suffering from psychomotor agitation, a conflicted personality disorder, headaches, dizziness and mixed insomnia. According to a medical report produced by the hospital, he was diagnosed with an organic personality disorder and received treatment for his condition. The report also noted that alcohol and coffee consumption, as well as conflict, amounted to risk factors in relation to the applicant\u2019s medical condition. 40.  On 26 May 2015 a neurologist attached to Bagdasar\u2011Arseni Emergency Hospital in Bucharest produced a medical report in respect of the applicant\u2019s medical condition, following his operation for his cervical spine injury. According to the report, inter alia, the applicant continued to experience movement difficulties. Consequently, the report considered it appropriate that the applicant\u2019s ability to work be assessed by a local expert commission, with a view to his potential retirement. 41.  On 8 June 2015 the Caracal branch of an office specialising in expert medical assessment of a person\u2019s ability to work, which was attached to the Olt Retirement Agency, acknowledged that the applicant was suffering from a serious functional deficiency and had completely lost his ability to work.", "references": ["0", "5", "3", "7", "2", "4", "8", "9", "6", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1975 and lives in Tryszczyn. 6.  On 2 December 2002 the applicant\u2019s son J. was born. At that time the applicant lived with the boy\u2019s mother, M.K., in a flat belonging to her parents. In 2003 the applicant moved out after a disagreement with M.K.\u2019s father. 7.  In 2005 the applicant filed a court complaint that M.K. was hindering his contact with his son. 8.  On 2 December 2005 the parties reached a friendly settlement before the District Court detailing when the applicant was able to visit the child. It was agreed that the applicant could see J. on two Saturdays and two Sundays each month from 10 a.m. to 6 p.m., as long as the meetings had been arranged with M.K. the preceding week. The applicant could also take J. on holiday for two weeks during the summer. It was arranged that he would pick the child up from M.K.\u2019s place of residence and take him back. 9.  In 2006 the applicant\u2019s meetings with his son were on some occasions made impossible by the mother, but most of them took place. A few of the visits were cancelled because the child was ill. 10.  On 7 June 2006 M.K. applied to change the applicant\u2019s access rights. M.K. wanted to reduce the amount of time the applicant could spend with J. She also indicated her intention to move to Germany with her son for financial reasons. 11.  On 6 September 2006 the applicant applied to increase his access rights. He stated that M.K. had been interfering with his contact visits. The applicant asked the court to order that he be able to see his son twice a month from 10 a.m. on Friday to 7 p.m. on Sunday; one day at Christmas or Easter from 10 a.m. to 10 a.m. the next day; and three weeks in the summer holidays and one week in the winter holidays. 12.  At a hearing on 17 January 2007 M.K. withdrew her application and the Bydgoszcz District Court discontinued the proceedings. The applicant appealed, complaining that his application had still to be examined. 13.  On 29 March 2007 the Bydgoszcz Regional Court quashed the Bydgoszcz District Court\u2019s decision. The court considered that it had been a mistake to assume that the applicant had consented to the discontinuation of his application just because M.K. had chosen to withdraw hers. It was also established that the applicant\u2019s access rights were not being respected at the time because M.K. had moved to Germany with the child. 14.  On 16 January 2007 M.K. moved to Germany with the child without the applicant\u2019s consent. The parties disagreed on whether or not M.K. had informed the applicant of their address in Germany (the applicant submitted that she had not). 15.  The applicant initiated proceedings under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction of 25 October 1980 (\u201cthe Hague Convention\u201d). On 23 November 2007 the Celle District Court in Germany ordered that the child be returned to Poland to the father or a guardian because under the Hague Convention the mother had abducted the child. The court also noted that the applicant and M.K. had joint custody of J. under Polish law. 16.  On 20 December 2007 the High Court in Celle dismissed an appeal by M.K. and ordered the return of the child to Poland. However, the court agreed that the child need not be handed over to the applicant. It stated that it would be enough to move back to Poland by the required date to comply with the court\u2019s order. 17.  On 14 January 2008 the German Central Agency communicated the above decisions to the Polish Ministry of Justice. The applicant was informed on 15 January 2008. The mother and the child returned to Poland on 6 January 2008. 18.  In January 2007 the applicant lodged an application for sole custody of J. and to establish J.\u2019s place of residence with him. 19.  On 23 July 2007 M.K. lodged an application to grant her sole custody of the child and to establish J.\u2019s place of residence with her. 20.  The proceedings were stayed between September 2007 and January 2008 owing to proceedings pending under the Hague Convention. 21.  On 1 April 2008 the Bydgoszcz District Court approved a settlement between the parties regarding the applicant\u2019s access rights. It was agreed that the applicant would be informed whenever J.\u2019s place of residence changed. It was also agreed that he would be able to see J. every other Saturday and Sunday of the month from 9.30 a.m. to 6.30 p.m.; the second day of Christmas and Easter holidays at the same times; every 1 June from 4 p.m. to 7 p.m.; and for two weeks in the summer holidays from 1 to 15 July. The applicant was also under an obligation to allow M.K. to contact J. when the child was under his care and agreed that he would not see the child on 19 and 20 July 2008 as well as on 18 and 19 July 2009. 22.  According to the applicant\u2019s own statements before the domestic authorities contact took place according to the agreement. 23.  The agreement was further modified by the parties on 29 September 2009 by extending the amount of time the applicant could spend with his child. It was agreed that the applicant would spend two weekends per month from Friday to Sunday with his son, as well as three weeks in the summer holidays and one week in the winter holidays. The applicant was also to have telephone contact with the child. 24.  During the proceedings, on 11 March 2010, the Bydgoszcz District Court ordered the parties to have counselling. The applicant and M.K. began to go to counselling but M.K. pulled out. The court also ordered mediation to resolve their issues. The court ordered the preparation of several expert opinions. In particular the Regional Family Consultation Centre (Rodzinny O\u015brodek Diagnostyczno\u2011Konsultacyjny -\u201cthe RODK\u201d) submitted at least two reports by experts between 2008 and the beginning of 2010. The applicant contested the conclusions of the opinions. 25.  On 19 March 2011 the Bydgoszcz District Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s application to order that J.\u2019s place of residence be with him, leaving the child in M.K.\u2019s care. The court also dismissed M.K.\u2019s application to decrease the applicant\u2019s visiting hours. The applicant and M.K. retained joint custody of J. The court established that in the period up to 2008 the bond between the applicant and the child had weakened considerably owing to a lack of contact between them. However, their relations had significantly improved because after the settlement of 1 April 2008 contact between the applicant and his son had taken place without disturbance. Afterwards, at the applicant\u2019s request, the contact arrangements had been modified on 29 September 2009. The court noted that the parties had had strong disagreements, had stopped talking to each other and should both be held responsible for the situation. According to the experts, the parents were not able to decide together on important aspects of the boy\u2019s life. Nevertheless, the court found that both parents loved their child very much and wanted the best for him. The court found no reasons to limit either parent\u2019s parental rights. 26.  The parties appealed. 27.  On 3 November 2011 the Bydgoszcz Regional Court partly granted the appeal lodged by M.K. and dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. It found it necessary to limit the applicant\u2019s parental rights only to the most important decisions on J.\u2019s health, education, and upbringing. The court considered that the conflict between the parents meant it would not be possible for them to continue to carry out their parental responsibilities jointly. 28.  In the meantime, on 11 August 2010, the Bydgoszcz District Court increased the amount of child support payable by the applicant to M.K. from 400 Polish zlotys (PLN) to PLN 500 per month. 29.  On 19 May 2012 the applicant asked the court to further modify the contact arrangements. He submitted that his relationship with his son had got considerably worse since February 2012 and blamed the mother\u2019s behaviour. The applicant asked for visits to take place in the presence of a guardian. The applicant also sought enforcement of the contact arrangements ordered in the agreement of 29 September 2009 (see paragraph 46 below). 30.  On 20 December 2012 the court commissioned another report by experts from the RODK. The experts met the applicant, M.K. and J. 31.  On 15 February 2013 M.K. applied to annul the settlement of 29 September 2009. She stated that J. refused to see his father and, while waiting for the experts\u2019 report, it would be in his best interests to no longer see his father. 32.  On 19 February 2013 the Bydgoszcz District Court applied an interim measure to limit the applicant\u2019s access rights and ordering that both the applicant and M.K. have counselling. The applicant was allowed to see his son at McDonald\u2019s or another public place for short visits in the presence of his mother or maternal grandparents. The applicant appealed. 33.  On 8 April 2013 J. was questioned in the presence of a psychologist. The boy, eleven years old at the time, stated that he no longer wished to see his father. He stated that the applicant had paid no attention to him during visits and that he had been allowed to play computer games all day. 34.  On 28 May 2013 the Bydgoszcz Regional Court quashed the interim order of 19 February 2013. The court ordered the parties to attend counselling and to submit attendance certificates to the court every two months. The court further emphasised the need to modify the way the father and the child communicated without suspending contact between them, which would lead to breaking the bond between them. 35.  On 13 June 2013 M.K. applied to change the access rights of the applicant agreed in the settlement of 29 September 2009. M.K. asked the court to order that contact should take place every other weekend and be in her or her parents\u2019 presence because J. had not seen the applicant for a long time and would feel unsafe with him. She also requested an interim measure from the court. 36.  On 7 June 2013 the Bydgoszcz District Court gave an interim measure. It stated that the applicant would have the right to see J. every other weekend for two hours on Saturday and two hours on Sunday in a public place and in the presence of M.K. or her parents. Upon appeal by the applicant the decision was amended by the Bydgoszcz Regional Court on 9 September 2013 by extending the length of the meeting to three hours. The visits were to take place in a neutral place, in the presence of M.K. or her parents, and with a guardian for the first three months. 37.  The applicant met his son in November 2013 in a McDonald\u2019s restaurant. The boy was accompanied by his mother and was aggressive and hostile to the applicant. 38.  On 3 March 2014 the RODK issued its report, recommending that the applicant and M.K. have counselling in order to learn to cooperate when making decisions about their son. The RODK also proposed that J. should consult a psychologist. It further observed that relations between the applicant and his son were strained because J. had a negative attitude towards the applicant and no longer liked to have contact with him. That attitude was the result of a negative image of the applicant that had been created under the influence of the mother. 39.  At a hearing on 24 June 2014 the applicant declared that he was no longer attending the meetings because of his son\u2019s disruptive and aggressive behaviour. The last meeting took place in November 2013. 40.  On 8 September 2014 the RODK issued another report which stated that the boy had been loyal to his mother and had turned away from the applicant. 41.  On 18 February 2015, after ineffective mediation, the court modified the contact arrangements by ordering longer meetings with the applicant. The court again ordered the parties to have counselling so they could learn how to reach agreement with each other. The court also noted that the applicant had the possibility to apply for imposing a fine on M.K. for non\u2011compliance with court orders. On 15 May 2015 the applicant appealed. 42.  The proceedings are still pending. 43.  On 31 January 2007 the applicant complained that the arrangements for meeting his child, as established by the agreement of 2 December 2005, were not being enforced. After the child was removed to Germany the applicant initiated proceedings under the Hague Convention (see paragraphs 14-17 above). 44.  On 1 April 2008 the court ordered M.K. to pay a fine if a contact meeting scheduled for 5 April 2008 did not take place. That and subsequent visits took place in accordance with the settlement of 1 April 2008. 45.  On 27 April 2012 the applicant brought a claim to enforce his access rights under Article 598(16) \u00a7 1 and \u00a7 2 of the Polish Code of Civil Procedure (Kodeks Post\u0119powania Cywilnego \u2013 \u201cthe CCP\u201d). He submitted that his relations with his son had worsened substantially since February 2012 for which he blamed the mother\u2019s behaviour. It appears that he withdrew the claim at an unspecified later date. 46.  On 16 May 2012 the applicant requested the assistance of a court guardian during his meetings with the child (see paragraph 29 above). On the same day the applicant brought a claim to enforce the arrangements for meeting his child, as determined by the settlement of 29 September 2009, by imposing a fine on the child\u2019s mother. The applicant submitted that M.K. had been making it impossible for him to call his son although that had been provided for by the settlement. Moreover, after November 2011, when his parental rights had been limited, M.K. had cancelled all his subsequent meetings with his son. Since March 2012 M.K. had started claiming that their child refused to meet him. 47.  By a decision issued on 19 February 2013 the Bydgoszcz District Court ordered that M.K. pay the applicant a penalty each time he was denied his rights to have access to J. as set down by the settlement of 29 September 2009. She was ordered to pay PLN 200 each time she interfered with the applicant\u2019s right to see J. and PLN 50 every time she did not allow them to converse by telephone on Wednesdays as scheduled. The court noted that there was no dispute about the fact that M.K. had prevented the applicant from seeing his son for about one year. M.K. lodged an appeal against the decision but it was dismissed on 26 June 2013 by the Bydgoszcz Regional Court. It appears that the applicant never applied to enforce that decision or to impose penalty payments on M.K.", "references": ["9", "4", "5", "2", "7", "6", "0", "8", "3", "1", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicants were accredited journalists who were authorised to report from the national Parliament. On 24 December 2012 parliamentary proceedings were held on the Budget Act for 2013. The applicants, together with other journalists, were reporting from the Parliament gallery, which was situated above the plenary hall (\u201cthe chamber\u201d) where members of parliament (MPs) were seated. The debate on the approval of the State budget attracted considerable public and media attention, owing to the conflict between opposition and ruling party MPs as to whether or not statutory procedure had been complied with. During the proceedings, opposition MPs approached the President of Parliament (\u201cthe Speaker\u201d) and started creating noise by, inter alia, slapping his table. Soon thereafter, Parliament security officers entered the chamber. They pulled the Speaker out of the chamber and started forcibly removing the opposition MPs. At the same time, other security officers (four officers, according to the Government) entered the gallery and started removing the applicants and other journalists. The Government stated that the security officers had informed those in the gallery that they had to leave for security reasons. The applicants denied that the reasons for their removal had been explained to them. Whereas some journalists complied with those orders, the applicants refused to leave, as the situation in the chamber was escalating and they felt that the public had the right to be kept informed as to what was going on. However, the security officers forcibly removed the applicants from the gallery. 6.  The Government submitted that according to official records (a copy of which was not provided) on that occasion the first applicant had forcibly removed the identification badge from one security officer and had injured him in his chest and leg. The applicants denied that they had injured any officer and submitted that no official document had been drawn up regarding the identity of the officer in question, the nature and severity of the injury or the alleged assailant. The Government further alleged that the applicants had been allowed to follow the events in the parliamentary chamber via a live broadcast in the Parliament\u2019s press room and the adjacent hall. The applicants contested that there had been live stream while the ejection of the opposition MPs had been ongoing, given that the cameras had allegedly been turned against the walls. 7.  At the same time, two opposing groups congregated in front of the Parliament building. According to the Government, several people were injured in those protests. No further information was provided. 8.  In a letter of 26 December 2012 addressed to the media, the Speaker stated, inter alia:\n\u201cHaving regard to the announcements (\u043d\u0430\u0458\u0430\u0432\u0438) that the opposition would not allow the Budget Act to be adopted and that there would be protests and incidents, I requested, under section 43 of the Parliament Act, that the Parliament security service ensure proper work at the session. I would like to underline that the Parliament security service arranges and implements necessary measures to be taken ... having regard to the fact that the gallery is part of the plenary hall, the Parliament security service considered (\u0434\u043e\u043d\u0435\u043b\u043e \u043e\u0446\u0435\u043d\u043a\u0430) that the gallery should be vacated in order to avoid an incident of a larger scale.\nAs Speaker, I regret that such a measure regarding the journalists was taken ...\u201d 9.  On 26 December 2012 the Association of Journalists (represented by its president, the first applicant) sent a letter to the DCPS claiming that the forcible removal of the journalists had violated their rights under Article 10 of the Convention. In the letter, the journalists pushed for proceedings to be brought against those responsible for authorising and carrying out their removal from the gallery. 10.  In a letter dated 6 January 2013, the DCPS informed the applicants that a group of MPs had surrounded the Speaker during the incident of 24 December 2012, and had attempted to physically confront him. They had also insulted and threatened him, whilst at the same time damaging technical equipment. Owing to the security risk, the Speaker had been removed to a place of safety. However, the disturbance in the chamber had continued. In the circumstances, the Speaker had requested, under section 43 of the Parliament Act (\u201cthe Act\u201d, see paragraph 17 below), that the Parliament\u2019s security service restore order so that the discussions could continue. Journalists had been asked to leave the gallery until order was restored. The letter further stated:\n\u201cAn MP who had been involved in the disturbance in the chamber and other people who could have disturbed the journalists in the performance of their tasks were in the gallery.\nIn the meantime, there was information that the protests [in front of the Parliament building] could escalate and that police cordons could be violently broken. All that threatened the security in the Parliament. For these reasons, the journalists were asked to leave the gallery and to continue following the events from the press room, at a designated area. Most of the journalists understood the seriousness of the situation and complied with that request. A smaller group of people in the gallery, including [the applicants], confronted the security officers, disregarded their orders and resisted actively and passively. As a result, a [security] officer sustained an injury to his leg.\u201d 11.  The DCPS concluded that the law enforcement powers employed had not gone beyond the limit of what was acceptable, and that excessive force had not been used. 12.  On 14 June 2013 the President of the State set up an ad hoc commission of inquiry regarding the events in the national Parliament of 24 December 2012. It was composed of five national members, two of whom were MPs. It further included two non-national observers appointed by the European Union. On 26 August 2013 the commission drew up a report, the relevant part of which reads as follows:\n\u201cV - Legal qualifications\n... 5. The absence of appropriate guidelines on dealing with such situations, including the absence of a strategy to deal with media in crisis, led to a situation in which journalists were removed from the Parliament gallery, which violated their rights to freedom of public information (\u0441\u043b\u043e\u0431\u043e\u0434\u0430 \u043d\u0430 \u0458\u0430\u0432\u043d\u043e \u0438\u043d\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0438\u0440\u0430\u045a\u0435) and publicity in the work of Parliament. Parliament should be particularly attentive and open with respect to the freedom of the press to report and to apply the best European practices in this matter ...\u201d 13.  The applicants lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court in which they alleged a violation of their rights under Article 10 of the Convention. They submitted that the parliamentary debate and the related events regarding the approval of the State budget had been of particular public interest. The intervention of the Parliament security officers and the removal of the applicants from the gallery had been neither \u201clawful\u201d nor \u201cnecessary in a democratic society\u201d. With regard to the lawfulness of the measures taken, the applicants argued that section 43 of the Act could not be interpreted as allowing the forcible removal of journalists from the gallery by Parliament security officers. In any event, that provision had not been sufficiently foreseeable. As to the necessity of the measures, they argued that at the critical time, they had been in the gallery and had had no contact with the Speaker or MPs. Accordingly, they had not and could not have contributed to the disturbance in the chamber. Furthermore, they contested the DCPS\u2019s arguments that there had been unauthorised people in the gallery and that the protests in front of the Parliament building had justified their forcible removal (see paragraph 10 above). They urged the court to hold a public hearing (\u0458\u0430\u0432\u043d\u0430 \u0440\u0430\u0441\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u0430) in accordance with Article 55 of the Rules of the Constitutional Court (see paragraph 24 below) and to find a violation of Article 16 of the Constitution (see paragraph 16 below) and Article 10 of the Convention. 14.  At a hearing held on 16 April 2014 in the absence of the parties, the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicants\u2019 complaint. The relevant parts of the decision read as follows:\n\u201cOn the basis of evidence submitted with the constitutional complaint and the reply of the Parliament of the Republic of Macedonia, the court has established the following facts:\n...\nThere was an increased interest on the part of the public and the media in (the parliamentary proceedings) given the importance of the State budget and the fact that before the proceedings, namely in November and December, there had been long, intense and sometimes tense discussions between opposition and ruling party MPs regarding the draft Budget ...\nOn 24 December 2012 ... before the plenary debate of Parliament started, there was a disturbance by a group of MPs who started destroying technical equipment in the chamber. They prevented access to the podium, surrounded the Speaker, preventing him from carrying out his duties, whilst at the same time insulting and threatening him.\nDue to the security risk, the Speaker was taken out of the chamber by security personnel. The disturbance in the chamber continued.\nUnder section 43 of the Parliament Act, the Speaker ordered police officers responsible for parliamentary security to restore order in the chamber and enable the debate to start in an orderly manner. The security personnel considered it necessary to vacate the gallery, in order to ensure the safety of those in the gallery and in the chamber.\nAll those in the gallery, including [the applicants], were asked to leave for security reasons and to follow the events from the press centre.\nMost of the journalists complied with that instruction. A smaller group of people, including [the applicants], confronted the security officers, disregarded their orders, and resisted actively and passively. As a result, a [security] officer sustained an injury to his leg.\n[The applicants] and other journalists, after having been removed from the gallery, remained in the Parliament building and were able to follow the live broadcast of the debate from other premises [the press centre, in a hall adjacent to the gallery].\nAt the same time, in front of the Parliament building, two opposing groups of people gathered. Several people were injured.\nThe plenary debate of the Parliament of 24 December 2012 was public and it was entirely broadcast live on national television and streamed on the Parliament website. When the debate was over, the video material was made available to the public on that website ...\n...\nThe above provisions of the Parliament Act [see paragraph 17 below] and the Rules of Parliament [see paragraph 23 below] ... provide that the Speaker is responsible for maintaining order in the Parliament. In the event of disorder, he or she can take several measures (warning, denial of the right to speak, exclusion of MPs). Provisions regarding order during parliamentary proceedings concern all those participating in the session.\nThe court considers that the removal of [the applicants] from the gallery amounted to an interference with their freedom to carry out their professional duties and to inform the public about events that were of considerable interest for the citizens of the Republic of Macedonia \u2013 the events in Parliament regarding the approval of the State budget for 2013, in which the public had significant interest in following and being informed about.\n...\nThe legal ground for the impugned measure was section 43 of the Parliament Act, which specified who was responsible for keeping order in the Parliament building \u2013 a special security unit, and which authorised the Speaker to decide and take measures in the event of disturbance of that order by MPs and other external persons participating in the work of Parliament.\nAs to the necessity of the measure ... it has to be examined in the light of the concrete circumstances of the case, namely the events that took place inside the Parliament building, namely in the chamber, as well as the disorder outside the Parliament building. The strained atmosphere in the chamber, which prevented a regular and normal start of the proceedings, has to be taken into account. In this connection it is to be noted ... that a larger group of MPs assaulted the Speaker, who was immediately removed from the chamber by security officers. There were a number of incidents, including damage to furniture, which culminated in objects being thrown in the chamber \u2013 some in the direction of the gallery. In such circumstances, the Parliament security service considered that in order to protect the journalists in the gallery, they should be moved to a safer place where they would not be in danger. Such an assessment should not be viewed as conflicting with the journalists\u2019 right to attend parliamentary proceedings and report on events that they witnessed. In fact, the journalists \u2013 most of them on the same day \u2013 submitted and published their reports in the evening editions of their newspapers, which implies that there was no violation of their freedom of expression.\nThe actions of the security officers constitute standard practice for these and similar situations in case of endangerment, i.e. protection of media representatives while reporting from places of crises, demonstrations and other potentially dangerous events ...\nThe fact that the journalists had been present within and outside the Parliament building since the morning of 24 December 2012, and were reporting on the events as they occurred, confirms that, notwithstanding the indications and expectations that discussion about the approval of the Budget would be tense, they were allowed access to the Parliament building and the gallery in order to carry out their function and inform the public about the debate. Accordingly, there was no preconceived idea to prevent the journalists from reporting on the debate. After they left the gallery, [the applicants] and other media representatives were allowed to remain in the parliamentary press centre ... from where they could have followed the live broadcast on the Parliament website and on the dedicated TV channel.\n... The physical removal of journalists from the gallery required by the concrete escalation of chaos and disorder aimed to protect them and ensure order in the chamber, and not to restrict their freedom of expression or to prevent them from carrying out their function, i.e. to inform the public.\u201d 15.  In a dissenting opinion, Judge N.G.D. of the Constitutional Court stated, inter alia, the following:\n\u201c... My dissenting opinion mainly concerns the inability objectively to decide the case ... I consider that the written information, facts and evidence available to the court were insufficient ...\nThe decision [of the Constitutional Court] contains contradictory reasons given that it ... establishes that the removal of journalists amounted to an interference with their right to carry out their function and to inform the public about an event of indisputable public interest, but it finds that such an intervention was justified ... without there being a solid factual basis in support of that finding.\n...\nI think that it is of crucial importance that the Constitutional Court clarifies and explains the reasonableness of the assessment of the situation and the reason for which the journalists were removed from the gallery ...\nIn order to establish the facts and assess the need for [their] removal ... it was necessary to determine the reason which prompted the security officers to remove them, despite the undisputed fact that all the incidents and disorder in the Parliament chamber were physically and clearly isolated and distant from [the gallery]. It is absurd that [such a removal] was carried out \u2018for the safety of journalists\u2019, when it is clear that they were in their seats and were completely passive; they did not participate in the events at all, but only observed ... It is a fact that the journalists did not contribute to the conflictual situation in any respect [not disputed by Parliament]; they did not disturb order in the Parliament building; they were in direct contact neither with the Speaker or the MPs, nor with the events outside the Parliament building ... Besides, it is clear that the journalists themselves did not feel threatened; so they did not seek and expect any protection.\u201d", "references": ["0", "7", "1", "5", "9", "4", "8", "2", "No Label", "6", "3"], "gold": ["6", "3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1940 in Troschenreuth, in the former German Democratic Republic (GDR), and lives in Bayreuth. 6.  The applicant is the natural and only daughter of Mr A.W., who recognised paternity in 1951. She lived in the territory of the former GDR until 1984, while her father lived in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), having married. The father and the daughter corresponded regularly during that period. Between 1954 and 1959, the applicant also visited her father and his wife once a year. After the applicant obtained an exit permit in 1984 for herself, her husband and her younger daughter, she left the GDR and moved to Bavaria. Thereafter the applicant visited her father on a regular basis until 2007. He died on 4 January 2009. 7.  On 14 January 2009 the applicant applied to the Memmingen District Court for the right to administer her father\u2019s estate, asserting the incapacity of her father\u2019s wife to protect the applicant\u2019s inheritance due to a grave illness, and notified the District Court of her inheritance claims. Furthermore, she asked to receive copies of all documents relating to the estate. She asserted that between 2002 and 2007 she had regularly visited her father at his retirement home and had talked to him on the telephone. Subsequently, her own health had prevented her from visiting. Telephone calls had been impossible because her father\u2019s health had meant he had no longer been able to use a telephone. The retirement home had been in possession of her address and telephone number, and had phoned her on several occasions. 8.  In a decision of 28 January 2009 the Memmingen District Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s application, as there were no indications that the applicant\u2019s father\u2019s wife could not protect the inheritance. In addition, being born before 1 July 1949 and thus not being a statutory heir, she had no right to receive copies of documents about the estate. 9.  On 6 February 2009 the applicant appealed to the Memmingen Regional Court, arguing in particular that she needed the power to administer the estate because her father\u2019s wife suffered from dementia and that she was a statutory heir because she was her father\u2019s natural daughter. 10.  In a decision of 23 February 2009 the Memmingen Regional Court upheld the District Court\u2019s decision refusing to give her the power to administer her father\u2019s estate, holding that the applicant was not a statutory heir and thus had no right to apply. The Regional Court referred to the first sentence of section 12(10)(2) of the Children Born outside Marriage (Legal Status) Act of 19 August 1969 (see paragraph 15 below) and to a decision of the Federal Constitutional Court of 8 December 1976, in which the provision had been found to be in conformity with the Basic Law (see paragraph 16 below). 11.  On 8 March 2009 the applicant appealed to the Munich Court of Appeal, arguing that the application of the first sentence of section 12(10)(2) of the Children Born outside Marriage (Legal Status) Act would discriminate against her and breach her inheritance rights and was therefore not in conformity with the Basic Law. The applicant pointed out that in her case there was no need to protect the legitimate expectations of the deceased or other heirs as she was her father\u2019s only daughter and her father had been separated from his wife for more than ten years when he had died. Furthermore, cultural and social changes within society had to be considered when interpreting the Basic Law. 12.  In a decision of 14 May 2009 the Munich Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal on the grounds that it was bound by the decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court in which the first sentence of section 12(10)(2) of the Children Born outside Marriage (Legal Status) Act had been found to be in conformity with the Basic Law. In the Court of Appeal\u2019s view, the provision did not contravene the Basic Law, despite German reunification, as the Federal Constitutional Court had held in a decision of 20 November 2003 (file no. 1 BvR 2257/03). 13.  On 17 July 2009 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court, claiming discrimination as a result of the application of the aforementioned provision. According to her there were no apparent reasons why children born outside marriage should be treated differently from those born within marriage. That was particularly true in her case because she was her father\u2019s only child. The applicant argued that the Munich Court of Appeal, when considering an appeal, had to respect Article 6 \u00a7 5 of the Basic Law, which provided that children born outside marriage must be provided by legislation with the same opportunities for physical and mental development and for their position in society as those enjoyed by children born within marriage. That provision prohibited a generalised application of the first sentence of section 12(10)(2) of the Children Born outside Marriage (Legal Status) Act. 14.  In a decision of 8 December 2009 the Federal Constitutional Court declined to consider the complaint, which it considered inadmissible for lack of sufficient substantiation (no. 1 BvR 2021/09). It observed, in particular, that the applicant had failed sufficiently to address the arguments of the Munich Court of Appeal\u2019s decision. As the applicant doubted the validity of the first sentence of section 12(10)(2) of the Children Born outside Marriage (Legal Status) Act, which had previously been declared valid by the Federal Constitutional Court, she had been obliged to give further reasons, which she had failed to do.", "references": ["6", "5", "1", "7", "0", "3", "2", "9", "No Label", "8", "4"], "gold": ["8", "4"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicants were or still are detained in Chios Prison, either in pre-trial detention or serving prison sentences. The first to fifth applicants and the tenth and thirteenth applicants were placed in cell no. 9, the sixth to ninth applicants and the eleventh and twelfth applicants were placed in cell no. 5, and the fourteenth applicant was placed in cell no. 3. 7.  The fifth applicant was transferred to Korydallos Prison on 10 September 2013, the seventh applicant was released on 29 October 2013 and the ninth applicant was released on 4 September 2013. 8.  The applicants submitted that Chios Prison was overcrowded, resulting in a situation where each inmate was allocated approximately 2 sq. m of personal space. The prison consisted of six cells which each had fifteen beds and five mattresses on the floor, and three cells which each had ten beds. As regards the cells in which the applicants were held, their measurements were as follows: cell no. 3 measured 10 sq. m. and accommodated six detainees, cell no. 5 measured 40 sq. m. and accommodated twenty detainees, and cell no. 9 measured 20 sq. m. and accommodated ten detainees. The sixth, eighth and ninth applicants slept on the floor, which was standard practice for other inmates as well. 9.  The applicants pointed out that the toilets in the cells were not partitioned off from the rest of the cells, and there was no hot water. Filthiness of the cells, in addition to overcrowding, exposed the inmates to contagious diseases and created various psychological problems, in respect of which no medical treatment was provided. Detainees lacked access to adequate dental care. 10.  The applicants stressed that inmates were not sufficiently separated according to their health conditions or according to whether they were in pre-trial detention or serving prison sentences, as was required by the Penal Code. 11.  The applicants also contended that they were confined to their cells for sixteen to seventeen hours per day, in the absence of any recreational or educational activities. 12.  Meals, which were insufficient and of poor quality, were served in the cells and consumed on the beds. 13.  On 29 August 2013 the applicants lodged a complaint with the Prison Board, arguing that the conditions of their detention were very poor, but did not receive any reply. 14.  The Government submitted that Chios Prison consisted of nine cells, each furnished with a table, stools, a fridge, cooking stoves, wardrobes and a television. Cells were sufficiently ventilated and heated and had adequate natural light. Additionally, they were regularly cleaned and disinfected. 15.  In respect of prison overcrowding, the Government argued that the prison had accommodated 142 inmates at the time the applicants had lodged their application with the Court, only slightly exceeding its capacity of 120 detainees. 16.  All detainees had access to adequate medical care provided by the prison doctor. In case of emergency, or when a serious incident occurred, detainees were transferred to Chios General Hospital or Korydallos Prison Hospital in Athens. Those suffering from contagious diseases were held separately or transferred to hospital. The Government provided information showing that some of the applicants had had consultations with doctors in respect of various conditions. 17.  There were fifty available places for detainees who wished to work. In addition, detainees had the opportunity to attend educational programmes or other recreational activities which were scheduled from time to time. Most of the applicants participated in some of the educational courses. 18.  As regards prisoners\u2019 meals, the Government submitted a menu from a week selected at random to demonstrate that meals were varied.", "references": ["4", "7", "6", "9", "0", "5", "3", "2", "8", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1947. At the time when the application was submitted, the applicant was serving a sentence of imprisonment in Oslo, Norway. 7.  In December 2004 a group of individuals transported a considerable quantity (possibly three tons) of hashish (which in the Netherlands is a banned substance) from one hiding-place to another. It appears that the possessors of the hashish later found some of it missing and came to the conclusion that it had been removed by one E. In late January 2005 E.\u2019s body was found dumped at a building site, with the hands tied behind the back, two ribs broken and holes in the knees and kneecaps consistent with the deliberate infliction of injury by means of an electric drill. 8.  The applicant was arrested on 11 April 2006 on suspicion of having been criminally involved in the above events and taken into pre-trial detention. Throughout the ensuing criminal proceedings he claimed to be innocent. 9.  The applicant was charged with causing E. grievous bodily harm resulting in his death, the abduction of E. resulting in his death, threatening grievous bodily harm against E., and importing, transporting and possessing three tons of hashish. His trial opened on 17 July 2006 before the Alkmaar Regional Court (rechtbank). 10.  The prosecution sought an eight-year prison sentence. 11.  After adjournments made necessary by the need for further investigative measures, the Regional Court gave judgment on 15 May 2007. It did not find it established that the abduction had resulted in E.\u2019s death and acquitted the applicant of that aggravating circumstance, but convicted the applicant of the remainder of the crimes charged, finding him to have committed them together with others. It sentenced the applicant to four years and six months\u2019 imprisonment. 12.  Both the applicant and the prosecution appealed. 13.  The appeal hearing opened on 31 October 2007 before the Amsterdam Court of Appeal (gerechtshof). Finding that the file was incomplete, the Court of Appeal adjourned the hearing sine die in view of its busy hearing schedule. Further adjournments were ordered, on the same ground, on 18 January 2008 and 4 April 2008. On 27 June 2008 an adjournment was ordered on the ground that no suitable hearing room was available. 14.  The Court of Appeal held a scheduling hearing (regiezitting) on 23 September 2008. Two more adjournments were ordered, one until 2 December 2008 for the purpose of securing the attendance of further witnesses and one until 24 February 2009 to allow the applicant\u2019s new counsel, who had replaced the lawyer who had conducted the applicant\u2019s defence at first instance, to acquaint himself with the case file. At the hearing of 24 February 2009 it was decided that the hearing on the merits of the case would be held on 18, 19 and 27 May 2009. 15.  On 26 March 2009 the applicant was released, having served two-thirds of the sentence handed to him by the Regional Court. 16.  The hearing was resumed on 18 May 2009. The applicant was in attendance. Since further witnesses were to be heard by the investigating judge at the request of the defence, a further adjournment was ordered until 27, 29 and 30 October 2009; the applicant and his counsel were cautioned to be present without further notice. 17.  On 4 October 2009 the applicant was arrested in Norway on suspicion of having imported \u201ca considerable quantity of narcotic substances\u201d. The applicant\u2019s counsel informed the Court of Appeal of this development by fax on 13 October 2009. 18.  The hearing was again resumed on 27 October 2009. The applicant\u2019s counsel stated that the applicant was in pre-trial detention in Norway. He asked for the applicant to be brought to the Netherlands a few days before the following hearing so as to consult with him. 19.  On 29 March 2010 the applicant received a summons at his detention address in Norway to appear at the hearing of the Amsterdam Court of Appeal to be held on 1 and 4 June. 20.  On 10 May 2010 the applicant\u2019s counsel sent an e-mail to the Advocate General (advocaat-generaal) to the Court of Appeal, with a copy to the president of the criminal division, restating his request for the applicant to be brought to the Netherlands in advance of the hearing of the Court of Appeal and announced his intention to oppose resumption of the hearing if this were not done. 21.  On 25 May 2010 the applicant\u2019s counsel informed the Court of Appeal by e-mail of his intention to seek an adjournment of the coming hearing. On the same day the president of the criminal division warned the applicant\u2019s counsel and the Advocate General by e-mail, without prejudging any decision that might be taken, of the possibility that the merits of the case would be addressed. 22.  The hearing was resumed on 1 June 2010. The official record of the hearing makes mention of the applicant\u2019s place of detention, namely Oslo Prison (Oslo Fengsel), Oslo, Norway. 23.  The applicant\u2019s counsel asked for the hearing to be adjourned until the applicant could be present in person. He suggested that this might be done pursuant to an extradition request; by way of transfer under the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, which possibility in his submission had not been adequately explored; and, following the outcome of the criminal proceedings in Norway, by allowing the applicant either to return of his own accord or to serve any sentence handed to him by the Norwegian courts in the Netherlands as the case might be. 24.  The Court of Appeal declined to adjourn its hearing until the applicant could be present. Its reasoning, reflected in the official record of its hearing, was as follows:\n\u201cIf a request is made to adjourn the hearing on the merits all relevant interests should be weighed, including the right of the accused to be present, the interest of not only the accused but also of society in a speedy determination of the charges and the interest of a proper organisation of the judicial system. In so doing, the court of Appeal will base itself on the following facts and circumstances:\n-  The present case began in 2005. The applicant was arrested on 11 April 2006 and sentenced to four years and six months\u2019 imprisonment by the Alkmaar Regional Court on 15 May 2007. The [applicant] took part in the proceedings. The [applicant] appealed against this judgment and the first appeal hearing took place on 31 October 2007.\n-  The [applicant] was released on 26 March 2009.\n-  It was not possible to hold the hearing on the merits on 18, 19 and 27 May 2009 as planned because the investigating judge had not finished hearing witnesses.\n-  On 13 October 2009 the applicant\u2019s counsel transmitted the information that the [applicant] had been arrested in Norway on 4 October 2009 on suspicion of having violated Article 192 \u00a7 3 of the Norwegian Criminal Code, to wit, unlawfully importing a large quantity of narcotic substances. The [applicant] was to remain in pre-trial detention until at least 4 November 2009. The hearing on the merits could therefore not be held on 27, 29 and 30 2009 October as planned and was moved to 1 and 4 June 2010.\n-  The [applicant] has therefore brought it on himself that he cannot now attend the appeal hearing independently (dat hij niet zelfstandig tegenwoordig kan zijn bij zijn berechting in hoger beroep).\n-  The [applicant] has indicated, following his arrest, that he wishes to attend the appeal hearing.\n-  The Advocate General has, on 15 October 2009, drafted a request for mutual assistance, in consultation with the Centre for International Legal Assistance North West and Central Netherlands (Internationaal Rechtshulp Centrum Noordwest en Midden Nederland) (...) requesting the Norwegian authorities to transfer the [applicant] to the Netherlands temporarily under Article 11 of the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters.\n-  The Norwegian public prosecutor replied on 16 October 2009 that the [applicant]\u2019s temporary transfer was not possible because Norway had entered a reservation relevant to Article 11 [of the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters]. The request for temporary transfer would have to be made via the Ministry of Justice.\n-  The Advocate General has, on 2 March 2010, prepared a draft request for mutual legal assistance setting out the request to the Norwegian authorities to transfer the [applicant] to the Netherlands under Article 11 [of the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters].\n-  On 18 March 2010 the head of the Department for International Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters (afdeling Internationale Rechtshulp in Strafzaken) of the Ministry of Justice informed the Advocate General that Article 11 [of the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters] provides only for the possibility to transfer temporarily as witnesses or for purposes of confrontation. Temporary transfer of an accused for trial requires extradition or surrender procedure (uitleverings- of overleveringsprocedure) to be followed, in which case there must be a valid Netherlands title for detention.\n-  The Advocate General prepared a draft extradition request on 27 April 2010.\n-  On 6 May 2010 the head of the Department for International Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters informed the Advocate General that it was not possible to request the [applicant]\u2019s extradition from Norway because there was no Netherlands title for his detention. This means that one of the documents referred to in Article 12 \u00a7 2 (a) is missing. The ultimate conclusion is that since neither extradition nor temporary transfer within the meaning of mutual assistance in criminal matters (kleine rechtshulp) is possible, there is no possibility to allow the [applicant] to attend the hearing in his criminal case on 1 and 4 June 2010.\n-  Counsel and [applicant] have had sufficient time to prepare the defence before the hearing on the merits [planned for] 18, 19 and 27 May 2009, which hearing was postponed until 27, 29 and 30 October 2009 only shortly before [it was due to begin]. Counsel has also had the opportunity to discuss the case with the [applicant] and prepare for the hearing before those new hearing dates. It does not make any difference that the [applicant] was arrested in Norway on 4 October 2009. Moreover, in March 2010 counsel visited the [applicant] in Norway to prepare today\u2019s hearing, it being worth noting in this connection that it is open to [counsel] in consultation with the [applicant] himself to make use of [this possibility] more frequently, the Norwegian authorities having imposed no restrictions in this respect.\n-  Counsel has been explicitly authorised (uitdrukkelijk gemachtigd) to defend the [applicant] at the hearing.\nThe Court of Appeal considers, in these circumstances, that in weighing the various interests against each other the general interest, including due process (het belang van een behoorlijke rechtspleging) and the interest of bringing the case to a close within a reasonable time must now prevail over the [applicant]\u2019s right to take part in the hearing in person. ...\u201d 25.  The hearing was continued on 4 June 2010. The applicant\u2019s counsel conducted the defence in the applicant\u2019s absence. 26.  The Court of Appeal gave judgment on 18 June 2010. It convicted the applicant of complicity in causing grievous bodily harm resulting in death, abduction and transporting and possessing an unspecified quantity of hashish. It sentenced him to eight years\u2019 imprisonment. 27.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law (cassatie) with the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad). He complained of a violation of his right to attend the hearing in person as a result of the Court of Appeal\u2019s refusal to order an adjournment until he could be present. His arguments were the following:\nFirstly, the starting point should be that an accused had the right to attend the hearing in his case in person; as long as he did not waive that right, he was in principle entitled to an adjournment if he was prevented from so doing. This starting point was not reflected in the Court of Appeal\u2019s reasoning.\nSecondly, it did not appear that the Court of Appeal had considered the seriousness of the charges. Considering the charges in issue, and the sentence imposed on appeal (which added years to the sentence imposed at first instance), the Court of Appeal\u2019s decision was misconceived.\nThirdly, the presence of counsel and the length of the proceedings, relied on by the Court of Appeal, were irrelevant. The length of proceedings in particular would be imputable to the suspect if an adjournment was requested by the defence.\nFourthly, the Court of Appeal had failed to respond to the suggestion made by the defence to await the outcome of the proceedings in Norway, after which the applicant could return of his own accord or the execution of any Norwegian sentence could be taken care of in the Netherlands, thus enabling the applicant\u2019s attendance.\nFifthly, the Court of Appeal had failed to explain why \u201cdue process and the interest of bringing the case to a close within a reasonable time\u201d were given priority over the applicant\u2019s attendance rights on 1 June 2010 given that those interests had never previously stood in the way of an adjournment of the case. 28.  The Advocate General (advocaat-generaal) to the Supreme Court submitted an advisory opinion (conclusie) in which he expressed the view that, in the light of Article 281 taken together with Article 415 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Wetboek van Strafvordering), the Court of Appeal had been called upon to decide whether the interest of the examination of the case at the hearing required the hearing to be adjourned. The advisory opinion continues (footnotes omitted):\n\u201c11.  [In the light of the principle stated, the Court of Appeal\u2019s findings] do not reflect an incorrect understanding of the law; nor, in view of the following, is it incomprehensible. The Court of Appeal has established as fact that [its own] Advocate General has made several unsuccessful attempts to have the suspect \u2013 who is detained in Norway \u2013 transferred to the Netherlands so that he can exercise his right to attend the hearing in person. This finding implies that the Court of Appeal has considered the question whether it was possible for the suspect to be placed at its disposal for the purposes of the appeal but has answered it in the negative. Moreover, it does not appear likely that the applicant will return to the Netherlands shortly after the end of the criminal proceedings in Norway and will be able to appear at a further hearing. Contrary to what is argued by the drafter of the ground of appeal, the Court of Appeal therefore sufficiently examined the possibilities of mutual legal assistance. The fact that the Court of Appeal did not react in so many words to counsel\u2019s suggestion that the outcome of the Norwegian criminal proceedings should be awaited does not change this. After all, in refusing to order an adjournment the Court of Appeal is not bound to answer every detail of the argument explicitly. [The sentence reflecting the decision that all parts of the request had been refused] was sufficient. That also implies the refusal to await the outcome of the Norwegian criminal proceedings, so that the suspect would be able to attend the hearing in the Netherlands by his own means or by way of transfer of the execution of the Norwegian sentence, if any.\nFurthermore, the suspect appeared at the first instance hearings alongside his counsel, in addition to several appeal hearings which he attended together with his counsel. It follows that the suspect had the opportunity to exercise his right to attend hearings and state his version of events to a court, notwithstanding the fact that the merits of the case were not dealt with at the appeal hearings referred to. The summonses for the appeal hearing on 1 and 4 June 2010 \u2013 at which hearing the suspect did not appear \u2013 were served in accordance with the law. Moreover, the defence could be conducted at this hearing on the applicant\u2019s behalf by the applicant\u2019s counsel, as in fact was the case.\nIn addition, the Court of Appeal adjourned its examination of the case at the appeal hearing of 27 October 2009 already, at the request of counsel, because of the suspect\u2019s detention in Norway. The examination of the case at the hearing in appeal had been adjourned nine times already, whereas the appeal proceedings lasted more than three years in total. The criminal acts with which the applicant was charged were committed in December 2004 [the drugs crimes] and January 2005 [the crimes against the person of E.] respectively, so that at the time of the appeal hearing of 1 June 2010 \u2013 at which hearing the request for an adjournment was made \u2013 five years and five months had already passed. Finally, in the cases of the co-suspects, which were dealt with simultaneously with [the present case] but not joined with it, one of them, S., did appear at that hearing. 12.  Contrary to the argument made by the drafter of the point of appeal, the Court of Appeal was under no obligation to consider the seriousness of the charges against the applicant in deciding on the request for an adjournment but it was at liberty to consider the presence of counsel authorised to conduct the defence and the length of the criminal proceedings. 13.  The limpidity of the Court of Appeal\u2019s reasoning is not impaired by the Court of Appeal\u2019s reliance, in refusing the request for an adjournment, on due process and the interest of bringing the case to a close within a reasonable time, even though these arguments supposedly did not stand in the way of adjournments of earlier appeal hearings. I note in this connection that the adjournments, from 23 September 2008 onwards, were connected, at least in part, with the need to ensure due process: the hearing of witnesses and the realisation of the suspect\u2019s right to attend the hearing in person.\u201d 29.  On 13 December 2011 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law on summary reasoning. 30.  It would appear that the applicant returned to the Netherlands at some time in mid-2013. 31.  The applicant served the remainder of the sentence given by the Amsterdam Court of Appeal. He was released on 26 August 2015. 32.  On 27 January 2011 the Oslo District Court convicted the applicant of drugs offences and sentenced the applicant to eleven years\u2019 imprisonment. 33.  On 1 September 2011 the Borgarting Court of Appeal reduced the prison sentence to five years and six months. It appears from the judgment that on 4 October 2009 the applicant had been caught red-handed importing 46 kilogrammes of cannabis. This judgment became final on 14 December 2011.", "references": ["8", "7", "0", "5", "2", "1", "9", "6", "4", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant company is a limited liability company with its seat in Bad Gleichenberg, producing building materials of concrete and using crushed stones (Schotter) for this purpose. 5.  On 29 November 2002 the applicant company requested the Steiermark Regional Governor (Landeshauptmann) to issue a licence under the Water Act (wasserrechtliche Genehmigung) for dredging (Nassbaggerung) on its plot. 6.  On 20 May 2003 the Steiermark Regional Governor decided to issue the licence for dredging and imposed certain conditions. 7.  On 31 July 2003 H.P., the owner of the Sicheldorfer mineral water spring appealed against this decision, claiming that the dredging had a negative impact on the spring. 8.  On 8 September 2004 the Ministry for Agriculture, Forestry, Environment and Water (Bundesministerium f\u00fcr Land- und Forstwirtschaft, Umwelt und Wasserwirtschaft) (\u201cthe Ministry\u201d) ordered the applicant company to submit a plan of the projected dredging area and of all the springs and wells concerned. 9.  On 21 September 2004 the applicant company submitted some plans but stated that it had no knowledge about the location of the spring and H.P. refused to provide the necessary information. 10.  On 13 October 2004 the applicant company submitted further plans to the authorities. 11.  On 23 February 2005 the Ministry served an expert opinion on the applicant company. According to this expert opinion the information submitted by the applicant company was not sufficient to prove that there was no negative impact of dredging on the springs. The applicant company was requested to comment hereon. 12.  On 19 April 2005 the Ministry quashed the decision of the Steiermark Regional Governor and remitted it back to the first instance authority on the grounds that the applicant company had failed to provide sufficient information in order to assess a possible negative impact on the spring. 13.  On 17 May 2005 the Steiermark Regional Governor ordered the applicant company to submit the missing documents. 14.  On 4 October 2005 the applicant company submitted a private expert opinion to the Regional Governor. 15.  On 21 November 2005 an oral hearing was held. 16.  On 13 February 2006 the Steiermark Regional Governor again issued the requested licence for dredging and imposed certain conditions. 17.  On 1 March 2006 H.P., the Bad Radkersburg municipality and the Bad Radkersburg spring company appealed against this decision to the Ministry. 18.  On 31 July 2006 the applicant company submitted written comments to the Ministry. 19.  On 25 September 2006 the applicant company complained to the Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgerichtshof) about the administration\u2019s failure to decide (S\u00e4umnisbeschwerde). 20.  On 27 September 2006 the Administrative Court ordered the Ministry to decide within three months. 21.  On 24 November 2006 the Ministry transmitted another expert\u2019s opinion to the parties and requested the applicant company to submit the missing documents. 22.  On 28 November 2006 the Ministry requested the Administrative Court to extend the deadline for the decision to nine months as the proceedings were not finalised. 23.  On 29 December 2006 the applicant company commented on the recently obtained expert opinion (see paragraph 21 above) claiming, inter alia, that the Ministry failed to determine which missing documents were to be submitted. 24.  On 26 February 2007 the Administrative Court prolonged the deadline for the Ministry until 30 April 2007. 25.  On 13 March 2007 the applicant company submitted another private expert opinion to the Ministry. 26.  On 17 April 2007 the Ministry rejected the requested dredging licence on the grounds that the applicant company had failed to submit all the requested documents. 27.  On 26 April 2007 the Administrative Court closed the proceedings on the applicant company\u2019s complaint about the administration\u2019s failure to decide (see paragraph 19 above) and ordered the reimbursement of the costs related to this complaint. 28.  On 29 May 2007 the applicant company lodged a complaint with the Administrative Court. 29.  On 1 June 2007 the Administrative Court asked the Ministry and the other parties to submit written observations within eight weeks. 30.  On 12 June 2007 H.P., the Bad Radkersburg municipality and the Bad Radkersburg spring company submitted their written observations. 31.  The Ministry submitted written observations which were served on the applicant company on 11 July 2007. 32.  On 19 July 2007 the applicant company put forward further submissions in reply to the Ministry\u2019s observations; H.P., the Bad Radkersburg municipality and the Bad Radkersburg spring company replied hereto on 2 August 2007. 33.  On 30 October 2008 the Administrative Court quashed the decision by the Ministry as it was not clarified which documents the applicant company had to submit. 34.  On 11 December 2008 the applicant company submitted two other private expert opinions to the Ministry. 35.  On 22 May 2009 the applicant company lodged another application against the administration\u2019s failure to decide with the Administrative Court. 36.  On 27 May 2009 the Administrative Court ordered the Ministry to decide within three months. 37.  On 5 August 2009 the Ministry submitted another expert opinion to the parties and asked the applicant company to submit certain precisely mentioned documents within four weeks. 38.  On 28 August 2009 the applicant company referred to the already submitted private expert opinions and claimed that the mentioned documents were not necessary. In addition, it requested to appoint another expert. Nonetheless, it submitted a supplementary expert opinion. 39.  On 28 September 2009 the Administrative Court extended to 15 months the deadline for the Ministry to decide. 40.  On 12 January 2010 the Ministry requested the Bad Radkersburg municipality and the Bad Radkersburg spring company (H. P.\u2019s appeal had meanwhile been considered to be withdrawn) to submit written observations on the documents recently transmitted by the applicant company. 41.  On 12 February 2010 the Bad Radkersburg municipality and the Bad Radkersburg spring company submitted their written observations, to which the applicant company replied on 19 February 2010. 42.  On 26 July 2010 the applicant company submitted another private expert opinion to the Ministry in compliance with the Ministry\u2019s request of 5 August 2009 (see paragraph 37 above). 43.  On 10 August 2010 the Ministry communicated a further expert opinion for the applicant company\u2019s information. 44.  On 20 October 2010 the Ministry dismissed the appeals and therefore permitted the requested dredging by the applicant company. This decision, served on the applicant company on 27 October 2010, became final. 45.  On 18 November 2010 the Administrative Court closed the proceedings on the applicant company\u2019s second complaint about the administration\u2019s failure to decide (see paragraph 35 above) and ordered the reimbursement of the costs related to this complaint.", "references": ["1", "8", "9", "0", "2", "5", "7", "6", "4", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1981 and lives in Pite\u015fti. 6.  On 4 September 2014 a gynaecologist prescribed the medicine Utrogestan to the applicant, to be taken twice a day for three months. 7.  According to the applicant\u2019s own statement before the Court, the medication was prescribed to help maintain her pregnancy and prevent a miscarriage. 8.  According to the medicine\u2019s patient information leaflet, it was recommended for the treatment of medical conditions causing an insufficient secretion of the hormone progesterone and could be used for several conditions, including inter alia, aiding a pregnancy. Its potential side effects included drowsiness and dizziness, usually as a result of an overdose. Stopping the treatment did not have any potential effects. 9.  On 29 October 2014 M.N., a prosecutor attached to the National Anticorruption Department (Direc\u021bia Na\u021bional\u0103 Anticorup\u021bie \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe DNA\u201d), summoned the applicant to be interviewed as a witness on 31 October 2014 in criminal proceedings opened by the authorities into alleged acts of corruption involving her father and others. Her father was the mayor of Pite\u0219ti and a member of a major political party which formed the Romanian Government at the time. 10.  According to the applicant\u2019s own statement before the Court, on the morning of 31 October 2014 she started feeling unwell and asked her chosen legal representative to inform M.N. that she might not be able to testify that day because of her health. Her lawyer called M.N. and informed him of the situation. The lawyer also reassured the prosecutor that he would accompany the applicant to the DNA\u2019s offices for the interview once her medical condition improved. Subsequently, the applicant\u2019s lawyer informed her that the prosecutor had refused to allow a lawyer to be present during her interview and he advised her to attend alone. 11.  On the same date a general practitioner issued a medical note and referred the applicant urgently to hospital. The note stated that she was suffering from an inflammation of her uterus. 12.  On the same date the gynaecology department of the Panait S\u00e2rbu Clinical Hospital in Bucharest took an ultrasound of the applicant\u2019s uterus. The ultrasound image produced by the applicant as evidence before the Court did not provide, contain or was accompanied by any explanation or medical report detailing her condition. 13.  According to the applicant\u2019s own statement before the Court, the examination at the Panait S\u00e2rbu Clinical Hospital confirmed that she was pregnant and was experiencing some complications as a result of stress and her medication\u2019s side effects. However, the scan could not confirm whether the foetus had stopped developing or not. She was advised to continue the prescribed treatment and rest. 14.  On the same date M.N. authorised two police officers to enforce a warrant to appear (mandat de aducere) issued in the applicant\u2019s name. It stated that she had unjustifiably ignored the summons of 29 October 2014 and that her presence was required at the DNA\u2019s offices in order to be interviewed as a witness. 15.  According to the applicant\u2019s own statement before the Court, on her return from the hospital two police officers presented her with the warrant to appear and took her to the DNA\u2019s offices even though she had informed them of her medical condition and had shown them her medical documents. During the interview she informed M.N. that she was feeling ill and presented him with the medical documents. Even though he was aware that she was pregnant, the prosecutor continued to interview her aggressively, using interview techniques aimed at intimidating her. Her interview was also recorded but in the absence of any procedural rules on the matter she was unable to ask for the recording. When she asked the prosecutor to mention in her statement that she was being interviewed while under treatment, in poor health and after a trip to the hospital, she was told that she would not be allowed to leave the premises for the rest of the evening. She became scared, gave in and fully complied with the investigating authorities\u2019 demands. 16.  On 31 October 2014, after the applicant\u2019s interview, prosecutor M.N. prepared a report which stated that according to the statement made by her, she had been late for the interview because she had been feeling unwell on account of health problems (av\u00e2nd probleme de s\u0103n\u0103tate). The report noted that the applicant had supported her statement by submitting a general practitioner\u2019s referral to hospital (see paragraph 11 above) and the results of the ultrasound taken by the Panait S\u00e2rbu Clinical Hospital (see paragraph 12 above). The applicant signed the report without objection. 17.  According to the applicant\u2019s own statement before the Court, she also gave the prosecuting authorities a prescription for her medication and the medication\u2019s patient information leaflet. 18.  On 19 January 2015 the applicant underwent a routine pregnancy check-up at a private clinic in Bucharest. According to the medical report prepared that day, she was thirteen weeks pregnant. 19.  At 4 a.m. on 6 November 2014 M.N. authorised the police to enforce a warrant to appear (mandat de aducere) issued in the applicant\u2019s name in order to interview her in the criminal proceedings opened by the authorities into alleged acts of corruption. 20.  At 11.30 a.m. two police officers went to the applicant\u2019s home and presented her with the warrant to appear. According to a report produced by the officers, the applicant did not object to the warrant and followed them to the DNA\u2019s offices. The applicant signed the report. 21.  According to the applicant\u2019s own statement before the Court, several police officers came to her home and took her to the DNA\u2019s offices. On her arrival, even though M.N. was aware of her pregnancy, he left her waiting for eight hours in the corridor. During that time she was forced to stand and had no access to food or water. She started feeling very unwell because of her treatment and its side effects. After eight hours a statement was taken from her in the presence of her chosen legal representatives. 22.  From 12.50 to 1.10 p.m. M.N. informed the applicant in the presence of her two chosen legal representatives that she was suspected of complicity in bribe taking and money laundering in criminal proceedings opened by the authorities into alleged acts of corruption. From 1.15 to 2.45 p.m. she was interviewed as a suspect in their presence. Her statement was recorded. 23.  At 6 p.m. M.N. charged (a pus \u020bn mi\u015fcare ac\u021biunea penal\u0103) the applicant with complicity in bribe taking and money laundering. Between 6.05 and 6.10 p.m. he informed her of the charges against her in the presence of her two chosen legal representatives. From 6.15 to 6.20 p.m. she was interviewed in their presence about the circumstances of the case as a person charged with an offence. Her statement was recorded. 24.  The applicant and her chosen legal representatives signed, without raising any written objections, all the documents produced by the DNA in respect of her case on 6 November 2014, including her statements. 25.  At 7.07 p.m. on 6 November 2014 M.N. decided to place the applicant in police custody for twenty-four hours and ordered that she be taken to the Bucharest Police Detention Centre (Centrul de Re\u021binere \u015fi Arestare Preventiv\u0103 din cadrul Direc\u021biei Generale de Poli\u021bie a Municipiului Bucure\u015fti). 26.  At 7.12 p.m. M.N. informed the applicant of her impending detention in the presence of one of her chosen legal representatives. 27.  According to the applicant\u2019s own statement before the Court, she arrived at the detention centre at around 7.30 p.m. with only a bottle of water and a small box of vitamins and minerals. The detention centre authorities took the vitamins from her immediately. 28.  On the same date the applicant signed a statement for the detention centre medical service. According to the statement, she informed them that she had been monitored for endometrial hyperplasia, that she agreed with the information recorded by the medical staff and that the information in respect of her health was complete and accurate. 29.  At 7.55 p.m. the medical service produced a report concerning the applicant\u2019s health. The report noted, inter alia, that according to the statement made by her, she had been suffering from endometrial hyperplasia. Furthermore, she did not have her own Utrogestan. In addition, she stated that she would bring her medical documents in case she was detained pending trial and that she was a non-smoker. 30.  According to the applicant\u2019s own statement before the Court, she informed the detention centre medical service of her pregnancy and treatment and asked them to give her the medication and vitamins that evening and the following morning as recommended. However, during her detention she was not provided with the treatment needed for her pregnancy and therefore she could have suffered a miscarriage. Furthermore, according to her, the detention centre authorities did not provide her with any food or water until the next morning. The food she received was unsavoury, and she was warned by her cellmates not to eat it. Moreover, she was detained in a cell measuring 5 square metres with three smokers, even though she had informed the authorities that she was a non-smoker and that smoke was harmful to someone in her condition. The cell had four bunk beds and was cold. She was forced to sleep in a bed that had a mattress but no bed linen or duvet. The cell had a sink and a squat toilet. The toilet was separated from the rest of the cell by a curtain and was covered with a plastic device to prevent rats from entering the cell. A shower was fitted above the toilet which was also used for flushing it. No warm water was available and the cold water from the sink was contaminated and could not be used for drinking. Furthermore, she was allowed only thirty minutes of outdoor exercise at the same time as her other three cellmates, in a yard measuring 6 or 7 square metres. It had walls three metres high and was covered by a metal grill. The other three cellmates smoked constantly in the yard, so it was filled with cigarette smoke because fresh air could not enter as a result of the very high walls. 31.  At around 7.07 p.m. on 7 November 2014 the Bucharest County Court dismissed the DNA\u2019s request to detain the applicant pending trial for thirty days and ordered her release, on condition that she did not leave the country. In examining her personal situation, the court noted, inter alia, that she was a former national television presenter and a film producer. 32.  On 25 February 2015 a gynaecologist prescribed the applicant Utrogestan, to be taken twice a day until the thirty-second week of pregnancy. 33.  On 17 December 2015 the DNA informed the Government, inter alia, that on 6 November 2014 similar procedural measures to those taken in respect of the applicant had been taken around the same time against eleven other suspects who were being investigated in the same set of criminal proceedings. Moreover, during the proceedings the applicant had been assisted by her chosen legal representatives and, like all the other suspects, she had been offered water or had been able to purchase food and water. Furthermore, water dispensers and disposable cups had been available in every corridor and office of the building. Everyone inside the building, including those under investigation, had access to its canteen. Lastly, all the defendants and their chosen legal representatives had the option of sitting down during the proceedings. 34.  On 28 January 2016 the detention centre coordination department informed the Government that the applicant had arrived at 8.20 p.m. on 6 November 2014. According to the rules in force at the time, detainees were served dinner from 5.30 to 6 p.m. There were no written rules setting out the procedure which needed to be followed for detainees arriving later than 6 p.m. and the applicant had not asked for a meal. In addition, detention centres did not have a clear procedure in respect of detainees statements on whether they were a smoker or non-smoker. As long as detainees were asked about that at the time of their incarceration and opted for smoker or non-smoker status, they would be detained as far as possible according to their preferences. 35.  According to the detention centre coordination department, none of the available documents proved that the applicant had stated that she was a non\u2011smoker at the time of her incarceration. Consequently, she had been assigned randomly to a cell for smokers. In addition, she had had access to running cold water which could have been used for drinking, and her cell had been heated at all times. 36.  The applicant submitted excerpts from several newspaper and online articles concerning her detention and the time she spent at the DNA\u2019s offices on 6 November 2014. According to three of these she was interviewed at the DNA\u2019s offices for eight or more hours.", "references": ["9", "7", "3", "6", "4", "8", "0", "2", "5", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1971. He is currently serving a sentence in a prison in Panama. 5.  Following an undercover operation set up by the police with the help of two undercover agents, the applicant and a Dutch national, V.D.P., were arrested on suspicion of drug trafficking. 6.  In November 2002, the prosecutor\u2019s office attached to the Timi\u015foara Court of Appeal committed the applicant and his co-accused for trial for drug trafficking and the case was registered with the Arad County Court. 7.  The applicant\u2019s counsel asked the court to hear evidence from the undercover agents. His request was refused on the ground that the anonymity of the undercover agents was protected. 8.  Following another request lodged by the applicant\u2019s counsel, on 5 March 2003 the court ordered the prosecutor to submit the authorisations it had issued for the undercover operation. 9.  The applicant\u2019s counsel claimed that his client had committed the drug offence only after being incited to do so by the undercover police agents. 10.  On 9 April 2003 the Arad County Court convicted the applicant of drug trafficking and sentenced him to three years\u2019 imprisonment. The County Court imposed a lenient sentence in the light of the applicant\u2019s good behavior after his arrest and the fact that he had pleaded guilty as charged. The court based his conviction on the report drafted by the undercover agents after the applicant had been caught red-handed, as well as a search report and the statements given by the applicant and his co-accused. 11.  The applicant appealed, complaining, inter alia, that the undercover agent had overstepped the legitimate limits of investigation by inciting him to sell drugs. 12.  By a decision delivered on 25 June 2003 the Timi\u015foara Court of Appeal increased his prison sentence to ten years\u2019 imprisonment. It held that the good behaviour of the applicant after he had committed the offence could not justify a lenient sentence. 13.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. In his grounds for appeal he did not complain about the unlawfulness of his conviction but only about the length of his sentence. He requested the appellate court to impose a milder sentence and accordingly, to overturn the decision of the Timisoara Court of Appeal and to uphold the judgment of the Arad County Court by which he had been convicted to only three years\u2019 imprisonment. 14.  By a final decision delivered on 27 November 2003, the Supreme Court of Justice dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law as unfounded. 15.  The applicant was detained in Jilava Prison between 25 July 2003 and 6 January 2004. 16.  The applicant alleged that he had been kept in poor hygienic conditions in overcrowded cells. The water provided had been of very poor quality, being of a yellow colour, smelling and containing worms. Sometimes, there had been no water \u2013 either for drinking or for the toilet. The food had also been of very poor quality. 17.  The Government contended that the records held by the prison authorities concerning the cells\u2019 size and their occupancy rate were no longer available as the archives for that period had been destroyed, pursuant to the domestic law. However, as regards the general detention conditions in Jilava Prison the Government submitted that every cell had been equipped with two squat toilets connected to the water network and separated from the rest of the room by a wall. It had been possible to let in fresh air by opening the window to each cell. The prisoners had been allowed to take one hot shower per week in the communal bathrooms located in each section of the prison (between nineteen and twenty-three showers had been available). The applicant had been allowed to walk outside his cell for thirty minutes each day.", "references": ["7", "8", "5", "4", "6", "9", "2", "3", "0", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1986 and lives in Bot\u00e2rl\u0103u. 6.  On 23 February 2007 X, a plain-clothes police officer from the Buz\u0103u County police organised crime unit, approached the applicant in a nightclub. According to a report drafted on 1 March 2007, the meeting had been planned in order to verify information received by the police that the applicant might have been dealing drugs. The report mentioned that X had discussed with the applicant, who claimed that he could get drugs and promised to call with more details. In a second report drafted on 14 April 2007 it was stated that the applicant had called X to ask whether he was interested in buying 2,000 ecstasy tablets at a cost of 10 euros (EUR) each. 7.  On 18 April 2007 a prosecutor from the Buz\u0103u County department for the investigation of organised crime (\u201cthe organised crime department\u201d) opened a criminal investigation against the applicant on suspicion of drug trafficking. A request to intercept his telephone conversations and make ambient voice recordings was authorised by a judge of the Buz\u0103u County Court. 8.  On the same date the prosecutor from the organised crime department authorised the use of X as undercover police agent in order to determine the facts of the case, identify the offenders and obtain evidence. The prosecutor justified the issuing of the authorisation on the basis that there was reason to believe that the applicant was about to commit a drug trafficking offence. 9.  In a report dated 17 May 2007 the chief of the Buz\u0103u County police organised crime unit stated that X had called the applicant several times in April and May in order to enquire when the transaction might take place. The report also mentioned that the applicant had replied on several occasions that he was not in possession of the drugs, which were to be brought into the country by friends of his who had not yet returned from abroad. 10.  In the early evening of 19 July 2007 the applicant called X and set up a meeting for later that evening. He and a friend, G.G., picked up X by car. X was accompanied by Y, a colleague in plain clothes. The four of them drove to a petrol station where a meeting had been arranged with C.A.O. to buy drugs. The applicant and Y went inside the petrol station while X remained outside and talked to C.A.O. As the deal got underway in the car park of the petrol station, the case prosecutor and ten police officers suddenly intervened and arrested the applicant, C.A.O. and G.G. In the car driven by C.A.O. the police found 742 ecstasy tablets. The offence report drafted on the spot by the police was signed by everyone, including the applicant, without any objection. The police operation was recorded on video. 11.  On 25 October 2007 the applicant was indicted with C.A.O. and G.G. for trafficking \u201chigh risk\u201d drugs. 12.  On 17 January 2008 the applicant and C.A.O. testified before the Buz\u0103u County Court. The applicant averred that he had acted as an intermediary for the meeting and subsequent deal between C.A.O. and X because the latter had asked him whether he could get drugs for him. Moreover, X had set the price for the drugs. C.A.O. stated that the drugs found on him had been for his own personal use and that he had had no intention of selling them. 13.  The applicant\u2019s lawyer argued before the court that the applicant had in fact been incited by X to act as an intermediary in the drug deal and requested that X be called to give evidence, along with two witnesses in the applicant\u2019s defence. The court allowed the request. 14.  On 14 February 2008 the court heard evidence from X, G.C. and one of the witnesses proposed by the applicant who appeared in court. X stated that the applicant had called him in order to arrange the drug deal without any incitement on his part. The applicant\u2019s lawyer had the opportunity to cross-examine X. He asked whether the reports of 1 March and 14 April 2007 had been signed by him and whether the criminal investigation had already been open when he had been authorised to investigate undercover. The two questions were disallowed by the court because they were considered an attempt to disclose X\u2019s identity. 15.  The Buz\u0103u County Court gave judgment on 22 February 2008. It convicted the applicant of drug trafficking and sentenced him to six years\u2019 imprisonment. The conviction was based on the reports of 1 March and 14 April 2007 and the offence report of 19 July 2007 (see paragraphs 6 and 10 above), as well as on transcripts of the applicant\u2019s telephone conversations with X, ambient recordings of discussions between X and C.A.O. and the in-court testimonies given by the applicant, the co\u2011defendants and X. The court considered that the applicant\u2019s allegations that he had been incited by X were clearly disproved by the above\u2011mentioned evidence taken as a whole. 16.  The applicant appealed against the judgment. He alleged that X had exceeded his authority and that Y should have also been called to testify in court. He also claimed that X had incited him to commit the offence under coercion and that the first-instance court had failed to respond appropriately to his arguments on that issue. 17.  On 26 May 2008 the Ploie\u015fti Court of Appeal rejected the appeal. In reply to the applicant\u2019s arguments, the court held that the authorisation and actions of the undercover police officer had been in accordance with the law. The statement of Y was irrelevant to the case since he had not directly witnessed the deal. The court considered that the applicant had not been incited by X since it was apparent from the evidence in the file that he had called the officer on several occasions and had planned the meeting of 19 July 2007 (see paragraph 10 above). 18.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law (recurs), reiterating his previous arguments. 19.  In a final judgment of 22 October 2008 the High Court of Cassation and Justice dismissed the appeal on points of law. Basing its findings on the reports of 1 March and 14 April 2007 (see paragraph 6 above), the court considered that there had been serious reason to suspect that the applicant would commit a criminal offence at the time of authorisation of the covert operation. It further noted that it was apparent from the documents in the file that X had acted lawfully. In addition, the information collected by X and the applicant\u2019s active participation in the crime in question were supported not only by the police reports, but also by transcripts of the telephone conversations that the applicant had with C.A.O. and X. The court stated that it was clearly apparent from those transcripts that the applicant had initiated calls to X on two occasions in order to act as an intermediary in the drug deal. It also noted on this point that the applicant and the other co-defendants had signed the offence report without any objection (see paragraph 10 above). The applicant\u2019s allegations concerning the unlawfulness of the covert operation and the police incitement were therefore considered to be ill-founded.", "references": ["6", "1", "9", "5", "4", "0", "8", "7", "2", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant company is a joint-stock company incorporated under Moldovan law. Ms Ro\u0219ca was born in 1984 and lives in Chi\u0219in\u0103u. 6.  On 23 February 2000 the Economic District Court ordered the applicant company to pay another company, E., 1,908,145 Moldovan lei (MDL) (equivalent to 152,190 euros (EUR)). The court issued a writ of enforcement. 7.  On 14 July 2005 E. sought to restart the time-limit for the enforcement of the judgment dated 23 February 2000, arguing that it had been unable to initiate enforcement proceedings within the three-year statutory period because the bailiff had lost the original writ of enforcement. 8.  On 2 May 2006 the Economic Court of Appeal, by a final judgment, dismissed E.\u2019s application as being ill-founded, noting that a duplicate of the writ had been issued in 2003. 9.  On 17 December 2008 the Economic Court of Appeal upheld an application by E. for a revision of the judgment, quashed the decision of 2 May 2006 and allowed the statutory time-limit to run anew. The court did not reply to the applicant company\u2019s contention that the application was time\u2011barred. 10.  After communication, E. initiated enforcement proceedings and the applicant company paid MDL 294,405.37 (equivalent to EUR 18,400). 11.  On 28 February 2007 the Ciocana District Court acknowledged the applicant\u2019s entitlement, as a young family, to a plot of land for construction purposes. The court ordered the Tohatin local administration to grant the applicant ownership of such a plot of land. As there was no appeal, the judgment became final on 20 March 2007. 12.  The applicant sought enforcement of the judgment of 28 February 2007, but to no avail. 13.  On 11 February 2009 the Tohatin local administration lodged an application for a revision of the judgment, arguing that the applicant had not qualified as a young family because her husband had died in 2006 and she had therefore lost her entitlement to any land. 14.  On 22 April 2009 the Ciocana District Court dismissed the application for revision, finding that the applicant had requested the plot of land in 2005. Her husband\u2019s death had not qualified as a new circumstance because the local administration had been aware of that matter at the time of the proceedings. The local administration appealed. 15.  On 24 June 2009, in the applicant\u2019s absence, the Chi\u0219in\u0103u Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, quashed the decision of 22 April 2009 and upheld the application for revision. It also quashed the Ciocana District Court\u2019s judgment of 28 February 2007 and delivered a new judgment on the merits that dismissed her claims as unsubstantiated. 16.  After communication, the applicant brought a civil action, claiming damages for a violation of her right to a fair hearing within a reasonable time, pursuant to Law no. 87 of 21 April 2011. She referred to the period of twenty-six months between 20 March 2007 and 24 June 2009, during which the judgment of 28 February 2007 had not been enforced. 17.  On 16 March 2012 the R\u00ee\u0219cani District Court found for the applicant, acknowledged a violation of her rights and awarded her MDL 450,000 (equivalent to EUR 27,250) in respect of pecuniary damage, MDL 66,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage and MDL 38,193 for legal costs. The court noted that the compensation for pecuniary damage represented the average market price of a plot of land of 0.09 ha. It said that it had used the reference size of 0.09 ha because the Tohatin local administration had granted plots of that size when executing similar judgments in respect of young families. The Ministry of Finance appealed. 18.  On 25 October 2012 the Chi\u0219in\u0103u Court of Appeal, by a final judgment, found the length of the proceedings to have been excessive, which it attributed to the acts of the authorities. It awarded the applicant MDL 30,000 (equivalent to EUR 1,895) in respect of non-pecuniary damage and MDL 5,000 (equivalent to EUR 316) for costs and expenses. The court dismissed the remainder of the claim, noting that the applicant had failed to substantiate alleged costs for renting alternative accommodation and finding that no compensation for the land should be awarded because the judgment acknowledging her entitlement to that land had been quashed.", "references": ["5", "8", "2", "6", "4", "0", "1", "7", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1995. According to the last information received by the Court on 6 October 2016, the applicant is detained in Lisbon. 6.  On 5 December 2013 criminal proceedings were initiated against the applicant by the public prosecutor of the Department of Investigation and Prosecution (Departamento de Investiga\u00e7\u00e3o e A\u00e7\u00e3o Penal) in Sintra in respect of allegations of him having committed the crimes of coercion (coa\u00e7\u00e3o), aggravated attacks upon the physical integrity of a person (ofensas \u00e0 integridade f\u00edsica qualificada), rape (viola\u00e7\u00e3o), and failing to assist a person in danger (omiss\u00e3o de aux\u00edlio). 7.  On 2 June 2014 the public prosecutor issued a European arrest warrant (\u201cEAW\u201d) in respect of the applicant in order to secure his presence before a judicial authority to be questioned (primeiro interrogat\u00f3rio judicial). 8.  On 28 August 2014 the applicant was arrested in the United Kingdom. Under the EAW issued by the Portuguese authorities, he was surrendered to the Portuguese authorities on 27 February 2015. 9.  On 27 February 2015, the applicant was given the status of defendant in the criminal proceedings against him (constitui\u00e7\u00e3o de arguido) and questioned by the investigating judge (primeiro interrogat\u00f3rio judicial). On the same day, the investigating judge remanded the applicant in custody. 10.  On 19 March 2015 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Lisbon Court of Appeal, challenging the lawfulness of the decision remanding him in custody, pursuant to Article 219 \u00a7 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 11.  On 2 April 2015 the investigating judge declared the appeal admissible and requested that the public prosecutor be asked to submit observations on the applicant\u2019s appeal. 12.  On 27 April 2015 the public prosecutor submitted observations on the applicant\u2019s appeal. 13.  On 29 April 2015 the investigating judge ordered that the applicant be notified of the public prosecutor\u2019s observations and that the file be sent to the Lisbon Court of Appeal. 14.  On 4 May 2015 the file was sent to the Lisbon Court of Appeal. On 11 May 2015 it was received and distributed. 15.  On 13 May 2015 the public prosecutor issued an opinion on the appeal, pursuant to Article 416 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The applicant was subsequently notified of the opinion and given ten days to reply, pursuant to Article 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 16.  On an unknown date, a judge rapporteur appointed to the case made a preliminary examination of the applicant\u2019s appeal and prepared a draft decision which was presented to two other judges. The judge rapporteur\u2019s analysis of the appeal was afterwards put on the agenda for discussion by the judge rapporteur and the two other judges. 17.  On 24 June 2015 the applicant lodged a habeas corpus application with the Supreme Court, claiming that the lack of analysis of his appeal in respect of the lawfulness of the decision placing him in pre-trial detention had violated Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention. He further argued that the time-limit of thirty days established under Article 219 \u00a7 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure had not been complied with. Therefore, his pre-trial detention had been unlawful. 18.  On 2 July 2015 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s habeas corpus application. Examining the effects of the thirty-day time-limit on pre-trial detention orders, it considered that the thirty-day time-limit on pre-trial detention orders simply constituted a guiding principle illustrating the urgency of such matters. It further noted that the lack of a speedy review of an order remanding a person in custody did not constitute a ground for a habeas corpus application under Article 222 of the Code and pointed out that Article 219 \u00a7 1 did not, in any case, stipulate the maximum length of any pre-trial detention. In this regard, the non-compliance with the thirty-day time-limit did not mean that the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention had been unlawful. 19.  On 2 July 2015 the Lisbon Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld the investigating judge\u2019s decision of 27 February 2015 to hold him in pre-trial detention.", "references": ["0", "3", "6", "4", "9", "1", "8", "7", "5", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1973 and lives in Orenburg. She is the widow of Mr Sergey Viktorovich Grabarchuk, who was arrested on 3 April 2003 on suspicion of robbery and sentenced on 24 November 2003 by the Orenburg Regional Court to eleven years\u2019 imprisonment. The applicant\u2019s husband died in 2010 while serving his prison sentence. 6.  After his arrest Mr Grabarchuk was taken to a remand prison in Orenburg, where doctors carried out a general health check and noted that he had HIV and hepatitis C. A month later HIV antibody testing confirmed the diagnosis. 7.  In May 2003 Mr Grabarchuk was seen by an infectious diseases doctor, who found no HIV symptoms except for enlarged lymph nodes. 8.  Until late April 2009 Mr Grabarchuk\u2019s health was stable. He had regular complete blood count tests, a basic metabolic panel, simple urine tests and a chest X-ray. 9.  On 30 April 2009 he complained of fever and a cough. Shortly thereafter Mr Grabarchuk was diagnosed with focal right-side tuberculosis and on 6 May 2009 transferred to a prison hospital for inpatient treatment. 10.  In the hospital Mr Grabarchuk received tuberculosis treatment. On 7 July 2009 he was seen by an infectious diseases doctor, who noted the progress of the HIV infection to the next stage because of a lack of antiretroviral therapy (\u201cART\u201d). The doctor recommended an immunological assessment. On 27 November 2009 Mr Grabarchuk was discharged from the hospital on account of a \u201cclinical recovery\u201d from tuberculosis. 11.  On 12 February 2010, on the basis of a routine complete blood count, doctors at the prison medical unit diagnosed Mr Grabarchuk with acute pyelonephritis, or inflammation of the kidney. 12.  Three days later an infectious diseases doctor repeated the recommendation for an immunological assessment. It was performed on 1 March 2010 and revealed that the patient\u2019s immune system had been seriously damaged by the HIV. Five days later he started receiving ART. 13.  According to the applicant, her husband suffered various side effects from the HIV treatment and tried unsuccessfully to have it changed. 14.  One week later the following entry was made in his medical file:\n\u201cWe, the undersigned, have made the present record to state that Mr S. Grabarchuk has refused ART.\u201d\n(The document was signed by the head of the medical unit, an infectious diseases doctor and a general practitioner). 15.  On 22 March 2010 a medical board recorded that the tuberculosis, which had been wrongly diagnosed by the doctors at the medical unit as pyelonephritis, had developed further. The board recommended treatment against the relapse. On the same day doctors at the medical unit made the following entry in the medical file:\n\u201cWe, the undersigned, have made the present record to state that Mr S. Grabarchuk has refused anti-tuberculosis treatment.\u201d\n(The signatures are illegible). 16.  The applicant submitted that after the medical unit doctors had erred in the diagnosis of pyelonephritis, her husband had lost faith in them and had therefore refused to follow their recommendations, including those pertaining to the antiretroviral therapy. 17.  A week later, after new chest X-rays, the doctors confirmed that Mr Grabarchuk had tuberculosis and not pyelonephritis. His transfer to a prison hospital was ordered. 18.  On 13 April 2010 Mr Grabarchuk was admitted to the regional prison hospital for tuberculosis in Orenburg, where he received the standard tuberculosis drug regimen, which, as shown by the medical record, did not lead to an improvement in his condition. 19.  On 16 and 30 April and 11 May 2010 Mr Grabarchuk was seen by an infectious diseases doctor, who noted that because of the lack of antiretroviral treatment the HIV had progressed to its advanced stage, Aids. The doctor prescribed a complete blood count and ordered him to continue the tuberculosis treatment. 20.  Mr Grabarchuk lost weight and the ability to walk. His overall condition became critical. Given the seriousness of his condition, the detention authorities applied for his early release on health grounds, but on 13 May 2010 their request was refused. 21.  Mr Grabarchuk complained to the head of the medical authorities about inadequate medical treatment, requesting, among other things, an in-depth examination. 22.  On 14 May 2010, owing to a drastic deterioration in his health, an ambulance was called. An emergency doctor recommended Mr Grabarchuk\u2019s transfer to a civilian hospital. The applicant was ready to cover transport expenses but a prison hospital medical board insisted on treating him in the prison hospital. 23.  Two days later Mr Grabarchuk died. An autopsy showed that he had died from HIV and tuberculosis which had led to pulmonary and cardiac failure. 24.  Shortly after the death of her husband the applicant complained to the Orenburg regional office of the Federal Service for the Execution of Sentences about the refusal on 14 May 2010 to transfer him to a civilian hospital. 25.  By a letter of 7 June 2010 the authorities informed the applicant that the prosecutor\u2019s office was carrying out a preliminary investigation into the circumstances of her husband\u2019s death. 26.  The applicant complained further, alleging that the head of the medical unit had shown deliberate indifference to Mr Grabarchuk\u2019s condition. 27.  On 9 September 2010 the prosecutor\u2019s office referred the case to the Investigative Committee of Orenburg Region. 28.  The Government did not submit the investigation file, stating that it had been destroyed in July 2014. 29.  Documents submitted by the applicant show that on 1 July and 27 October 2011 the investigating authorities obtained the autopsy report and questioned two doctors who had attended to Mr Grabarchuk in the prison hospital. The doctors stated that the patient had died of HIV and tuberculosis, despite their attempts to save his life. The investigator refused to open a criminal case. 30.  On 17 January 2011 the Novotroitsk Town Court, upon an application by the applicant, overruled the decision of 27 October 2011 on account of the failure of the investigating authorities to address the applicant\u2019s allegation of deliberate indifference to the patient\u2019s medical condition on the part of the head of the medical unit. A fresh investigation of the issue was ordered by the court. A month later the Orenburg Regional Court upheld that decision on appeal. 31.  According to the applicant, no further investigation followed.", "references": ["6", "1", "4", "3", "7", "8", "5", "2", "9", "No Label", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1971 and is currently serving a prison sentence in Vaslui Prison. 5.  In 2012 the applicant was convicted of human trafficking and sentenced to ten years\u2019 imprisonment. 6.  He was detained in several detention facilities. However, in the present application he only complained about the conditions of his detention in Ia\u015fi Prison and about the fact that he had not been assigned a personal care assistant in Rahova and Ia\u015fi Prisons between 2 April 2013 and 30 January 2014. 7.  The applicant was detained in Ia\u015fi Prison on several occasions, for a period of almost ten months: between 2 and 16 August 2013, 3 September 2013 and 11 March 2014, 14 March and 6 June 2014, as well as from 27 June and 4 July 2014. 8.  The applicant alleged that he had been kept in conditions of poor hygiene in overcrowded cells. He had shared a cell of twenty\u2011nine square metres with seventeen other detainees. Moreover, he submitted that he had shared his cell with smokers despite the fact that he was a non\u2011smoker. The food had also been of very poor quality. 9.  According to the information provided by the National Prison Administration and forwarded to the Court by the Government, the applicant was held in the following cells:\n- cells E 4.3, E 6.2. and E 6.7., all measuring 33.33 sq. m, containing twenty\u2011six beds (that is, 1.2 sq. m per bed), occupied by twenty to twenty\u2011six detainees;\n- cell E 7.5., measuring 17.48 sq. m, containing three beds (that is, 5.8 sq. m per bed), occupied by one to three detainees;\n- and cell E 8.10, measuring 17.48 sq. m, containing eight beds (that is, 2.1 sq. m per bed) and occupied by four to eight detainees. 10.  The Government did not provide any information concerning either the exact number of detainees who had occupied the cells or the time spent by the applicant in each of the above-mentioned cells. 11.  The detainees were provided with cleaning materials and personal hygiene products and they were responsible for cleaning the cells. Specialist contractors carried out work to eradicate rodents and insects whenever it was considered necessary. The detainees were entitled to two showers per week. 12.  The applicant received a special diet for his medical condition (see paragraph 13 below). 13.  On 29 October 2013 a medical commission issued a certificate attesting that the applicant had been classified as a person with a permanent, severe physical disability on account of his visual impairment. The medical commission granted the applicant the right to a personal care assistant. 14.  The applicant alleged that no special arrangements had been made for him as a person with severe visual impairment in Ia\u015fi and Rahova Prisons between 2 April 2013 and 30 January 2014. 15.  Moreover, he contended that he had not been assigned a personal care assistant and had been permanently subjected to humiliating and degrading remarks from his cellmates, the same people to whom he had to appeal for assistance. As he had had no personal assistant he had not been able to benefit from daily walks and had been dependent on the other inmates to be moved around the prison. 16.  He had only received assistance from inmates in the facility in exchange for cigarettes and money. The inmates had refused to help him unless they were paid. The administration had not taken any steps to rectify the situation. 17.  The applicant submitted copies of several requests he had lodged with the prison authorities on 21 May, 21 November and 23 December 2013 and on 20 February 2014 respectively, by which he had asked to be assigned a personal assistant. In each of his requests he had indicated the name of the co-detainee he had preferred to be assigned to him. All these requests were dismissed on the ground that the co-detainees indicated by the applicant could not assist him because they had been subject to disciplinary sanctions. 18.  The Government submitted that the administration of both prisons had made diligent efforts to comply with the standards imposed by the Court. Moreover, in 2013 the authorities in Ia\u015fi Prison had refurbished cell E 4.3 (see paragraph 9 above) to accommodate the needs of detainees with disabilities, including those of the applicant. 19.  The Government contended that the medical certificate on his disability had been issued only on 29 October 2013 (see paragraph 13 above) because the applicant had failed to submit the documents requested by the special commission for disabled persons. They further argued that even before the medical certificate had been issued, the prison authorities had on 9 August 2013 allowed a request lodged by the applicant on 7 August 2013 to be assigned a personal care assistant. They had assigned him an inmate, M.D., who had been sharing the applicant\u2019s cell. He had assisted the applicant until 16 August 2013, when the latter had been admitted to the medical unit of Dej Prison. In the medical unit the applicant had been assisted by a co-detainee with whom he had shared the room. The Government did not provide any information about the co-detainee in question. 20.  After the applicant had returned to Ia\u015fi Prison he had lodged a request to be assigned a personal care assistant. On 22 April 2014 the prison authorities had assigned him an inmate, whom the applicant had refused. 21.  The applicant lodged several complaints on the basis of Law no. 275/2006 on the execution of sentences with the post-sentencing judge. 22.  In 2013 the applicant lodged three complaints concerning an infringement by the administration of the Rahova Prison of his right to have a personal care assistant. He stated that he had not been assigned a person to assist him although he was suffering from a severe visual impairment. 23.  The complaints were joined and examined together by the post\u2011sentencing judge on 14 June 2013. The judge noted that the prison doctor\u2019s opinion was that the applicant was not entitled to a personal assistant. It further noted that on 9 May 2013 the prison authorities had appointed a commission of specialists, which had examined the applicant. The commission had found that owing to his visual impairment the applicant encountered difficulties in eating, maintaining his hygiene and in alerting prison staff or other co-detainees in case of need. It had therefore recommended a set of steps to be taken, which included closely monitoring the applicant. Subsequently, a detainee, C.F., sharing the applicant\u2019s cell, had been assigned to support him in his daily activities. The post-sentencing judge dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaints on the grounds that the steps taken by the prison authorities had been sufficient. 24.  In his application to the Court, the applicant contended that assigning him C.F. had been useless because the latter had refused to provide him with any help. The applicant produced a handwritten statement by C.F., dated 20 June 2013, in which the latter had stated that he had not helped the applicant because the prison authorities had refused to consider his activity as a personal care assistant as work that should be remunerated.", "references": ["7", "8", "4", "3", "6", "5", "9", "0", "2", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1986. Since February 2015 he has been kept in a detention centre for foreign nationals in the town of Makhachkala, Dagestan Republic, Russia. 6.  The applicant arrived in Russia in October 2011. He was in possession of a visa declaring the purpose of his visit as business. The applicant\u2019s visa was due to expire in October 2012. However, the visa allowed the applicant to stay in Russia for no longer than ninety days in the course of a single visit. As submitted by the Government, he was therefore expected to leave Russia in early 2012. 7.  The applicant did not leave and started to live together with Ms B., a Russian national. In November 2013 they had a child together. In April 2014 they married. 8.  In the meantime, on 15 and 19 February 2013 the applicant was found guilty of an offence under Article 18.10 of the Code of Administrative Offences (CAO), which provided that a foreigner could be punished for unlawful employment activities in Russia. 9.  By judgment of 26 February 2015 the Sovetskiy District Court of Makhachkala found the applicant guilty of an offence under Article 18.8 \u00a7 1.1 of the CAO (see paragraph 24 below), of remaining in Russia after the expiry of the visa. It sentenced him to a fine and a penalty of forcible administrative removal (\u043f\u0440\u0438\u043d\u0443\u0434\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e\u0435 \u0430\u0434\u043c\u0438\u043d\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0430\u0442\u0438\u0432\u043d\u043e\u0435 \u0432\u044b\u0434\u0432\u043e\u0440\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435) from Russia. The District Court held as follows:\n\u201cArticle 18.8 \u00a7 1.1 of the CAO provides for the following penalties: a fine of between 2,000 and 5,000 roubles with or without administrative removal from Russia ...\n The subsidiary penalty of administrative removal from Russian may be imposed with due regard to the information that confirms the actual need to impose such a penalty on the defendant, as well as the information that confirms the proportionality of this penalty as the only acceptable measure for achieving a balance between the public and private interests at stake ...\nThe defendant has no legal grounds for remaining in Russia. If a fine is imposed, the defendant will add himself to the group of illegal labour immigrants who do everything to avoid compliance with the Russian migration legislation. The penalty of administrative removal is also necessary for the sake of national security, to avoid the spread of various infectious diseases such as HIV, tuberculosis and leprosy, and to ensure the optimal balance of labour resources and in order to support, as a matter of priority, the employment of Russian nationals ...\u201d 10.  In the same judgment the District Court ordered that, while awaiting enforcement of the administrative removal, the applicant be placed in a special detention facility for foreigners in the town of Makhachkala. 11.  Lawyer D. lodged a statement of appeal on behalf of the applicant against the judgment of 26 February 2015. It appears that the applicant raised arguments relating to his family life in Russia; it is unclear whether he raised any argument relating to a risk to his life and physical integrity in the event of enforcement of the penalty of forcible removal. 12.  On 4 March 2015 the Supreme Court of the Dagestan Republic upheld the judgment. The appeal court held as follows:\n\u201cArticle 18.8 \u00a7 1.1 of the CAO provides for the following penalties: a fine of between 2,000 and 5,000 roubles with administrative removal from Russia ...\n[The applicant] has committed a violation of the regime applicable for the presence of foreigners in Russia, by way of omitting after 7 October 2012 to leave Russia ...\nThe court dismisses [the applicant\u2019s] argument relating to his family life in Russia ... The marriage with Ms B. was concluded on 28 April 2014, which was a long time after the commission of the offence by [the applicant] ... The administrative offence record did not contain any information relating to his family life in Russia. No such information was adduced during the proceedings before the first-instance court ...\n[The applicant\u2019s] prolonged violation of the migration legislation since October 2012 amounts to abuse of Russia\u2019s hospitality and thus should be treated as a breach of the receiving country\u2019s interests ...\u201d 13.  On an unspecified date the applicant received a copy of the appeal decision. 14.  The penalty of administrative removal was not enforced. According to the Government, the bailiff service instituted enforcement proceedings on 12 March 2015, but they were not pursued on account of an application lodged by the applicant for temporary asylum (see below). 15.  On 5 May 2015 the applicant applied for temporary asylum. He referred to the ongoing intensive military actions in Syria, in particular in his home town of Aleppo. He further argued that given his age, he would be drafted by the governmental forces for active military service, thereby putting his life and physical integrity in danger. 16.  It appears that the applicant engaged lawyer K. to assist him in those proceedings and had a meeting with him in the detention centre. On 2 June 2015 the applicant called the lawyer from the detention centre, complaining of beatings. On the same day, the lawyer was refused access to the applicant in the detention centre, apparently because he should have obtained authorisation for the visit from the regional migration authority. The lawyer wrote to the regional prosecutor\u2019s office complaining of a violation of the applicant\u2019s rights and physical integrity. 17.  On 4 June 2015 the lawyer made a further unsuccessful attempt to gain access to the applicant. 18.  On 6 August 2015 the local migration authority dismissed the applicant\u2019s application for temporary asylum. The applicant sought review of this refusal before the Federal Migration Service (\u201cthe FMS\u201d). On 24 September 2015 the FMS upheld its decision, stating as follows:\n\u201cIn February 2012 there were no large-scale military operations in Syria; there were only localised hostilities between governmental forces and opposition groups. Despite the above, the applicant failed to leave Russia ... At the time he did not apply for asylum and continued to stay in Russia unlawfully until the imposition of the penalty of administrative removal.\nThe following violations of the migration rules for foreigners should be pointed out:\nThe applicant arrived in Russia under a business visa, whereas his actual goal was employment. Thus, his declared aim did not correspond to the actual aim for arriving in Russia.\nThe applicant was unlawfully engaged in employment activities ...\nIn February 2013 he was twice prosecuted for administrative offences. However, even after this, he did not seek asylum, while neglecting the real possibility of his future deportation from Russia ...\nThe Ministry of Foreign Affairs points out that Syrian nationals who return to their homeland or who are deported or expelled there may arrive in Damascus and then proceed to other regions that are controlled by governmental forces.\u201d 19.  On 14 October 2015 the applicant, assisted by lawyer M., sought judicial review of the refusal of temporary asylum under the Code of Administrative Procedure (\u201cthe CAP\u201d) and asked the Leninskiy District Court of Makhachkala to put in place an interim measure by way of suspending enforcement of the judgment of 26 February 2015. On 16 October 2015 the court refused to deal with the case, concluding that it had to be lodged before a court with jurisdiction in the area of the applicant\u2019s current \u201cplace of residence\u201d; his stay in the detention centre did not qualify as a place of residence. 20.  Assisted by Ms Biryukova (who is his representative before this Court) the applicant resubmitted his application for judicial review to the Basmannyy District Court of Moscow. On 27 October 2015 the District Court left the matter without examination because the applicant had not indicated the date and place of his birth; had not specified whether he had a law degree, which was relevant because the case could only be lodged by a person in possession of a law degree; and had not provided evidence that his representative had a law degree. The applicant was required to remedy the above defects by 18 November 2015. 21.  By a judgment of 9 December 2015 the District Court upheld the refusals of temporary asylum. The court held that the applicant was at risk of violence which was no more intensive than for other people living in Syria:\n\u201cThe grounds for granting temporary asylum on account of humanitarian considerations include the following situations: a grave medical condition for which the foreigner will not receive the requisite medical care in the country of nationality, thus putting his or her life at risk; a real threat to his or her life or liberty on account of hunger, epidemics, emergency situations of environmental or industrial origin or on account of an internal or international conflict that encompasses the entire territory of the state of nationality; a real threat of being subjected to torture or another cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the country of nationality.\nUnder Article 62 of the Code of Administrative Procedure the parties to the case must prove the circumstances to which they refer as the basis for their claims or objections, unless otherwise provided for by the Code.\nAssessing the evidence submitted to it, the court concludes that [the applicant] has not adduced convincing arguments that he is at risk of being persecuted by the authorities or by groups of the population on account of his religion, race or membership of a social group ... Despite the difficult social and political situation in Syria, there are no grounds to consider that his life will be at a higher risk than that of other people living in this country ... According to information from the Federal Migration Authority, people returning to Syria may reach directly the city of Damascus, which is under the control of the government. ...\u201d 22.  The applicant received a copy of the judgment in February 2016 and lodged an appeal. He argued that the first-instance court had not paid proper attention to his argument relating to the risk to his life and physical integrity in the event of his removal to Syria; the migration authority had not refuted his argument while the court had shifted the burden of proof onto the applicant and had placed undue emphasis on the illegality of the applicant\u2019s presence in Russia. His appeal was dismissed by the Moscow City Court on 8 June 2016. The appeal court held as follows:\n\u201cThe first-instance court considered that the applicant did not fall within the scope of the notion of \u201crefugee\u201d under the Refugees Act ... In view of the applicant\u2019s failure to submit specific facts disclosing that in the event of his removal to Syria he would be exposed to a real threat to his security ... or that he was persecuted in this country, the appeal court agrees with the first-instance court ... The appeal court also notes that the applicant arrived in Russia in 2011 but only sought temporary asylum in 2015.\u201d", "references": ["8", "6", "9", "3", "5", "4", "7", "No Label", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["0", "1", "2"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Ufa, the Republic of Bashkortostan. 5.  In February 1996 the applicant was severely injured in a traffic accident. 6.  On 24 April 1996 he lodged a civil action against the owner of the car, the State Unitary Subsidiary Passenger Transport Company of Ufa No. 3 (\u0413\u043e\u0441\u0443\u0434\u0430\u0440\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0435 \u0443\u043d\u0438\u0442\u0430\u0440\u043d\u043e\u0435 \u0434\u043e\u0447\u0435\u0440\u043d\u0435\u0435 \u0443\u0444\u0438\u043c\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0435 \u043f\u0430\u0441\u0441\u0430\u0436\u0438\u0440\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0435 \u0430\u0432\u0442\u043e\u0442\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0441\u043f\u043e\u0440\u0442\u043d\u043e\u0435 \u043f\u0440\u0435\u0434\u043f\u0440\u0438\u044f\u0442\u0438\u0435 3 \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe transport company\u201d), seeking compensation for damage. 7.  On 29 November 2005 the Sovetskiy District Court of Ufa (hereinafter \u201cthe District Court\u201d) partly granted the applicant\u2019s claims. 8.  On 15 February 2006 the transport company was declared insolvent and it was put into liquidation. 9.  On 28 March 2006 the judgment of 29 November 2005 became final, as modified on appeal by the Supreme Court of the Republic of Bashkortostan. The final court award in the applicant\u2019s favour consisted of a sum in compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage sustained (equivalent to 30,462 euros (EUR)), to be paid once the judgment became final, and of a monthly allowance (equivalent of EUR 207), to be paid until the end of the applicant\u2019s life. 10.  On 17 June 2006 the Commercial Court of the Republic of Bashkortostan (hereinafter \u201cthe Commercial Court\u201d) granted the applicant\u2019s application for aggregation as a lump sum (\u00ab\u043a\u0430\u043f\u0438\u0442\u0430\u043b\u0438\u0437\u0430\u0446\u0438\u044f\u00bb) of the amounts of the monthly allowance awarded by the judgment of 29 November 2005, in accordance with section 135 \u00a7 1 of the Insolvency Act (see paragraph 20 below). Therefore the transport company\u2019s debt under this head amounted to EUR 69,029. 11.  Since the award remained unenforced, on 11 January 2009 the District Court granted a prior application by the applicant to have the amount of the monthly allowance index-linked, and raised it to EUR 909. The judgment became final on 22 January 2009. 12.  On 3 March 2009 the Commercial Court once again granted the applicant\u2019s application for payment as a lump sum of the amounts of the monthly allowance. The applicant was awarded EUR 203,673. The judgment became final on 23 April 2009. 13.  On 15 July 2009 the Commercial Court accepted the applicant\u2019s claim for transfer of the transport company\u2019s debt to the Russian Federation, as provided for in section  135 \u00a7 3 of the Insolvency Act (see paragraph 21 below). The court ordered that the judgment debts in the applicant\u2019s favour were to be paid by the Federal Tax Service of Russia. On 3 December 2009 the Commercial Court of the Uralskiy Circuit upheld that judgment and it became final. 14.  Between August and October 2010 the applicant received the equivalent of EUR 15,131, which corresponded to total of the monthly allowance that he had not received in 2005-2010. Furthermore, on 6 August 2010 the applicant started receiving a monthly allowance of EUR 948. 15.  The transport company provided public transport services on a commercial basis. It was a subsidiary of another company, Bashavtotrans State Unitary Company (\u0413\u0423\u041f \u00ab\u0411\u0430\u0448\u0430\u0432\u0442\u043e\u0442\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0441\u00bb \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe parent company\u201d). The legal provisions on subsidiary companies are summarised in paragraph 22 below. 16.  The transport company had the right of \u201ceconomic control\u201d over the assets allocated to it by the parent company. The parent company was a unitary company with the right of \u201ceconomic control\u201d over the assets allocated to it by the State Committee on construction, architecture and transport of the Republic of Bashkortostan. 17.  On 14 October 2004 the Government of the Republic of Bashkortostan issued Decree no. 918-P, by which all the transport company\u2019s assets were transferred to the parent company; the debts remained with the transport company. 18.  On 15 February 2006 the transport company was declared insolvent, and it was put into liquidation. The liquidation proceedings ended on 31 December 2013.", "references": ["0", "7", "6", "5", "1", "8", "4", "2", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1977. He has served sentences in several prisons. On 21 April 2015 he was released from T\u00e2rgu-Jiu Prison. 5.  The applicant alleged that while detained in cell no. 5 of T\u00e2rgu\u2011Jiu Prison for eight days, between 1 October and 9 October 2013, he had not had an individual bed and had therefore been forced to sleep on the cold floor on two blankets. As a consequence, the renal disease from which he suffered had been re-activated and he had experienced intense pain. 6.  On 3 October 2013 he had been examined by a prison doctor and had been prescribed medical treatment. However, he had been unable to submit any evidence in this connection as the prison authorities had rejected his requests for a copy of his medical records. He submitted instead an old medical certificate stating that on 23 September 2012 he had been hospitalised in the Nephrology Department of Slatina Hospital suffering from renal colic. 7.  The applicant lodged a complaint with the post\u2011sentencing judge asking for an individual bed. 8.  His complaint was examined on 15 October 2013. The applicant informed the judge that he had eventually been given a bed, but only after nine days. The post-sentencing judge took note that the applicant had obtained an individual bed; he did not draft an interlocutory judgment, but merely noted that the complaint had been withdrawn. 9.  The applicant lodged a complaint with the Gorj District Court seeking compensation in connection with the lack of an individual bed for eight days in cell no. 5 of T\u00e2rgu-Jiu Prison. 10.  On 12 November 2013 the T\u00e2rgu-Jiu District Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaint as inadmissible without examining its merits on account of the fact that the applicant had not submitted an interlocutory judgment by the post-sentencing judge in connection with his complaint.", "references": ["9", "4", "3", "0", "8", "6", "2", "7", "5", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "4.  The first applicant was born in 1980 and lives in Sharya, the Kostroma Region. 5.  The applicant was held in remand prison IZ-44/1 in Kostroma in the following cells:\nCell no.\nSurface, sq. m\nDates of stay\n29 6.  The parties disagreed on the design capacity of the cells and the actual number of inmates. 7.  The first applicant, relying on three hand-written statements from his co-detainees, submitted that Cell 49 had contained three two-tier bunk beds with metal sheets welded to beds on the upper and lower levels to create additional sleeping places. Cell 49 was used to accommodate between ten and twenty prisoners. Cell 43 contained two two-tier bunk beds and accommodated four prisoners. 8.  The Government submitted that the number of prisoners in the cells had not exceeded the occupancy limit. Cell 29 had three sleeping places, Cell 49 four places and Cell 43 two places. They submitted selected pages from the prison registration log. All of these pages, except one dated 24 July 2009, indicate that Cell 49 was designed for four persons and accommodated as many prisoners. The number \u201c4\u201d appears to be written over a different number that was erased. The entry of 24 July 2009 indicated that Cell 49 was designed for ten persons and accommodated eight prisoners. Similarly, the entries in respect of Cell 29 show traces of erasures and alterations. Its design capacity is listed as two or three places and the actual population is always three prisoners. 9.  The second applicant was born in 1958 and has been serving his term of imprisonment in Ivdel, the Sverdlovskiy Region. 10.  Between 14 July 2009 and 4 July 2010 the second applicant was held in remand prison IZ-59/1 in the Perm Region. According to him, the facility was overcrowded. In particular, Cell 90 measuring 40 sq. m accommodated up to sixteen inmates. 11.  According to the Government, the second applicant was held in cells 80, 90, 92, 98 and 103. The actual number of inmates detained in the cells did not exceed their designed capacity. Each inmate had more than 3 sq. m of personal space. Other conditions were satisfactory. The Government submitted selected pages from registration logs, some of which appears to contain erasures and alterations in the fields showing the number of inmates in Cell 90. On some pages the listed total number of inmates is ten less than the number produced by adding up the population of individual cells.", "references": ["6", "5", "8", "2", "3", "9", "7", "0", "4", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1977 and lives in Baku. 5.  The opposition planned to hold demonstrations on 17 November 2012 and 26 January 2013 in Baku. 6.  On 12 November 2012, the organisers gave notice to the relevant authority, the Baku City Executive Authority (\u201cthe BCEA\u201d), about the demonstration of 17 November 2012. It appears that no prior notice was given to the BCEA by the organisers of the demonstration of 26 January 2013. Information about that assembly was disseminated through Facebook or the press. 7.  The BCEA refused to authorise the holding of the demonstration of 17 November 2012, stating in general terms that that assembly was not in accordance with the Law on Freedom of Assembly. The BCEA further stated that the square where the organisers proposed to hold the assembly was a designated public leisure area and that the assembly itself was impractical. 8.  Nevertheless, the organisers decided to hold the demonstrations in the centre of Baku. 9.  According to the applicant, the demonstrations were intended to be peaceful and were conducted in a peaceful manner. The participants in the demonstration of 17 November 2012 were demanding democratic reforms in the country and protesting against impediments to freedom of assembly. The participants of the demonstration of 26 January 2013 were condemning the use of force by the police against participants of previous demonstrations. 10.  The applicant attended both demonstrations, but shortly after they had begun the police started to disperse them. In both cases the applicant was arrested during the dispersal operation and was taken to a police station, where he was questioned. According to the applicant, in the first case he was arrested by people in plain clothes. 11.  In both cases on the day of the applicant\u2019s arrest, an \u201cadministrative\u2011offence report\u201d (inzibati x\u0259ta haqq\u0131nda protokol) was issued in respect of him. In the first case the report stated that by deliberately failing to comply with a lawful order from the police, the applicant had committed an administrative offence under Article 310.1 of the Code of Administrative Offences (\u201cthe CAO\u201d). In the second case the applicant was charged with an administrative offence under Article 298.2 of the CAO (participation in a public assembly that had not been organised in accordance with the law). 12.  According to the applicant, he was never served with copies of the administrative-offence reports or with other documents from his case files. In neither case was he given access to a lawyer after the arrest or while in police custody. 13.  In both cases the applicant was brought before the Sabail District Court on the day of his arrest, 17 November 2012 and 26 January 2013 respectively. 14.  According to the applicant, the hearing before the court in both cases was very brief. Members of the public were not allowed to attend, even though the court had not taken a formal decision to close the hearing to the public. 15.  According to the applicant, in neither case was he given an opportunity to hire a lawyer of his own choice. 16.  The record of the court hearing in the first case shows that the applicant declared that he did not need legal assistance and would defend himself in person. 17.  At the court hearing in the second case a State-funded lawyer was appointed to assist the applicant. According to documents submitted by the Government, the applicant refused the assistance of that lawyer and decided to defend himself in person. 18.  At the hearing in the first case the court did not question any witnesses. In the second case the court questioned two police officers. The police officers testified that they had arrested the applicant because he had staged an unauthorised demonstration. 19.  In both cases the first-instance court found that the applicant had participated in an unauthorised demonstration. 20.  In the first case, by a decision of 17 November 2012 the first\u2011instance court convicted the applicant under Article 310.1 of the CAO and sentenced him to five days\u2019 \u201cadministrative\u201d detention.  In the second case, by a decision of 26 January 2013 the court convicted the applicant under Article 298.2 of the CAO and sentenced him to a fine of 500 manats (AZN). 21.  On unspecified dates the applicant lodged appeals before the Baku Court of Appeal, arguing that his convictions were in violation of his rights because the demonstrations in which he had participated had been peaceful. He also complained that his arrests had been unlawful and that the hearings before the respective first-instance courts had not been fair. 22.  In the first case the applicant was assisted before the Baku Court of Appeal by a lawyer of his own choice. In the second case he was not represented by a lawyer. 23.  In both cases, on 23 November 2012 and 5 February 2013 respectively, the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld the decision of the first-instance court.", "references": ["4", "9", "8", "0", "5", "6", "1", "No Label", "7", "2", "3"], "gold": ["7", "2", "3"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicants\u2019 dates of birth and places of residence are given in the appendix. At the material time some of them held positions in opposition political parties or groups. 5.  Demonstrations were planned to be held on 31 July 2010, 2 April 2011 and 17 April 2011 in Baku. Prior to those assemblies, on 23 July 2010, 18 March 2011 and 11 April 2011 respectively, the organisers, consisting of several members of the opposition, gave notice to the relevant authority, the Baku City Executive Authority (\u201cthe BCEA\u201d). 6.  The BCEA refused to authorise the holding of the demonstration of 31 July 2010 at the places indicated by the organisers and proposed three other locations on the outskirts of Baku, namely, a stadium in the Binagadi District, a square in the proximity of Zigh road in the Khatai District, and a yard of a driving school situated in the 20th residential area of the Sabail District. The BCEA noted that the squares in one of which the organisers proposed to hold the assembly were designated for public leisure and the other places proposed by the organisers were areas with heavy traffic. 7.  Similarly, the BCEA refused to authorise the holding of the demonstrations of 2 and 17 April 2011 at the places indicated by the organisers and in both cases proposed a different location on the outskirts of Baku, namely, the driving school yard mentioned above. The BCEA again noted that the places proposed by the organisers were areas with heavy traffic. 8.  Nevertheless, the organisers decided to hold the demonstrations in the centre of Baku. 9.  According to the applicants, the demonstrations were intended to be peaceful and were conducted in a peaceful manner. The participants were demanding free and fair elections and democratic reforms in the country. Participants in the demonstration of 17 April 2011 were also protesting against impediments to freedom of assembly. 10.  Each applicant attended one of the demonstrations (see appendix), but shortly after they had begun, the police started to disperse them. 11.  According to the official records, all the applicants were arrested during the dispersal operations and were taken to various police stations. 12.  According to the applicant in application no. 67351/11, he was arrested by people in plain clothes. 13.  The applicants were questioned at the respective police stations. 14.  On the day of the applicants\u2019 arrests, \u201cadministrative offence reports\u201d (inzibati x\u0259ta haqq\u0131nda protokol) were issued in respect of them. The reports stated that by deliberately failing to comply with lawful police orders, the applicants had committed an administrative offence under Article 310.1 of the Code of Administrative Offences (\u201cthe CAO\u201d). 15.  Some of the applicants refused to sign the respective administrative offence reports. 16.  According to most of the applicants, they were never served with copies of the administrative offence reports or with other documents in their case files (applications nos. 57737/11, 67351/11, 67977/11, 69411/11 and 69421/11). According to the applicant in application no. 57737/11, he obtained a copy of the administrative offence report several months after the administrative proceedings against him had ended. 17.  None of the applicants was given access to a lawyer after the arrest or while in police custody. 18.  Each applicant was brought before a first-instance court on the day of the arrest or the following day. 19.  According to most of the applicants, the hearing before the court in each case was very brief. In some of the cases members of the public were not allowed to attend, even though the court had not taken a formal decision to close the hearing to the public. 20.  According to all the applicants, they were not given an opportunity to hire lawyers of their own choice. State-funded lawyers were appointed to represent most of the applicants. 21.  The applicants in applications nos. 74609/10 and 57737/11 were not assisted by lawyers. The records of the respective court hearings show that those applicants refused the assistance of a State-funded lawyer and decided to defend themselves in person. 22.  The record of the hearing in the case of the applicant in application no. 69411/11 shows that in his oral submissions, the State-funded lawyer briefly asked the court to be merciful and adopt a lenient decision. In the cases of the applicants in applications nos. 67351/11 and 67977/11, the State-funded lawyers did not make any oral or written submissions. Similarly, none of the material submitted to the Court in application no. 69421/11 contains any record showing that the State-funded lawyer, Ms R.N., made any oral or written submissions before the first-instance court. 23.  The only witnesses questioned during the respective court hearings were the police officers who, according to the official records, had arrested the applicants. In the case of the applicant in application no. 67977/11, a police officer who had issued the administrative offence report was also questioned as a witness. All those police officers testified that the applicants had staged unauthorised demonstrations. 24.  In application no. 67351/11 the court did not question any witnesses. 25.  The respective first-instance courts found that the applicants had failed to stop participating in unauthorised demonstrations. The courts convicted the applicants under Article 310.1 of the CAO and sentenced them to periods of \u201cadministrative\u201d detention ranging from seven to fifteen days (see Appendix). 26.  On various dates the applicants lodged appeals before the Baku Court of Appeal, arguing that their convictions were in violation of their rights because the demonstrations in which they had participated or attempted to participate had been peaceful. The applicants also complained that their arrests had been unlawful and that the hearings before the respective first-instance courts had not been fair. They asked the Baku Court of Appeal to quash the first-instance courts\u2019 decisions in their respective cases. 27.  Most of the applicants were assisted before the Baku Court of Appeal by lawyers of their own choice. The applicant in application no. 57737/11 was not represented by a lawyer. 28.  On various dates the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the applicants\u2019 appeal and upheld the decisions of the respective first-instance courts (see appendix). 29.  According to the applicant in application no. 57737/11, on 28 February 2011, following his complaints about the authorities\u2019 failure to serve him with the relevant documents, the Sabail District Court sent him a copy of the administrative offence report issued in respect of him, the first\u2011instance court\u2019s decision of 31 July 2010 and the Baku Court of Appeal\u2019s decision of 20 August 2010. 30.  According to the applicant in application no. 69411/11, he received the decision of the Court of Appeal of 13 April 2011 on 15 October 2011, after having complained about the court\u2019s failure to serve him with that decision.", "references": ["8", "9", "1", "6", "0", "4", "5", "No Label", "7", "2", "3"], "gold": ["7", "2", "3"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1982 and lives in Baku. At the material time he was a member of an opposition party, Musavat. 5.  The applicant attempted to participate in a demonstration organised by the opposition on 20 October 2012. Prior to that assembly, on 15 October 2012, the organisers gave notice to the relevant authority, the Baku City Executive Authority (\u201cthe BCEA\u201d). The BCEA refused to authorise the holding of the demonstration at the place indicated by the organisers and proposed a different location on the outskirts of Baku. Nevertheless, the organisers decided to hold the demonstration as planned. 6.  According to the applicant, the demonstration was intended to be peaceful and was conducted in a peaceful manner. The participants were demanding democratic reforms in the country. 7.  The applicant had intended to attend the demonstration. He and a few others attempted to march from the headquarters of the Musavat party to the place where the assembly was being held. However, shortly after that attempt he was arrested and taken to a police station. According to the applicant, he was arrested by people in plain clothes. 8.  On 6 May 2014 the applicant also participated in another assembly, which took place near the Baku Court of Serious Crimes in support of members of an opposition group, Nida, who were being tried on that day. The courtroom was full, so some people were waiting outside the court for the outcome of the proceedings. When the court announced its judgment, those who had gathered outside began to protest against the judgment, which they considered unfair. The protest was brief, spontaneous and peaceful. As soon as the protesters started chanting slogans, police officers and people in plain clothes began to forcibly disperse the assembly. The applicant was arrested during the dispersal operation and taken to a police station, where he was kept overnight. 9.  In both cases on the day of the applicant\u2019s arrest, an \u201cadministrative\u2011offence report\u201d (inzibati x\u0259ta haqq\u0131nda protokol) was issued in respect of him. In the first case the report stated that by deliberately failing to comply with a lawful order of the police, the applicant had committed an administrative offence under Article 310.1 of the Code of Administrative Offences (\u201cthe CAO\u201d). In the second case the applicant was charged with an administrative offence under Article 298.2 (participation in a public assembly that had not been organised in accordance with the law) of the CAO. 10.  According to the applicant, he was never served with copies of the administrative-offence reports or with other documents in his case files. In both cases he was not given access to a lawyer after the arrest or while in police custody. 11.  In the second case, according to a document drawn up by a police officer and an order dated 6 May 2014, a State-funded lawyer (Mr S.A.) was instructed to assist the applicant. 12.  In the first case the applicant was brought before the Binagadi District Court on 20 October 2012, the day of his arrest. In the second case he was brought before the Nasimi District Court on 7 May 2014, the day following his arrest. 13.  According to the applicant, the hearing before the court in both cases was very brief. Members of the public, including human rights defenders and journalists, were not allowed to attend, even though the court had not taken a formal decision to close the hearing to the public. 14.  According to the applicant, in neither case was he given an opportunity to hire a lawyer of his own choice. 15.  In both cases State-funded lawyers were appointed to assist the applicant. In the second case it was the same lawyer, Mr S.A., who had been instructed to assist the applicant in accordance with the above-mentioned document of 6 May 2014 drawn up by a police officer. 16.  According to the records of the court hearings in both cases, in their oral submissions the State-funded lawyers briefly stated that the applicant was not guilty and asked the respective court to discontinue the case. 17.  In both cases the only witnesses questioned during the court hearing were police officers who, according to the official records, had arrested the applicant or prepared an administrative-offence report on him. They testified that the applicant had staged an unauthorised protest. 18.  In both cases the first-instance court found that the applicant had failed to stop participating in an unauthorised protest. 19.  By a decision of 20 October 2012 the first-instance court in the first case convicted the applicant under Article 310.1 of the CAO and sentenced him to ten days\u2019 \u201cadministrative\u201d detention.  By a decision of 7 May 2014 the court in the second case convicted the applicant under Article 298.2 of the CAO and sentenced him to fifteen days\u2019 administrative detention. 20.  On unspecified dates the applicant lodged appeals before the Baku Court of Appeal, arguing that his convictions were in violation of his rights because the assemblies in which he had participated or attempted to participate had been peaceful (in addition, in the second case the applicant argued that the assembly had been spontaneous). The applicant also complained that his arrests had been unlawful and that the hearings before the respective first-instance courts had not been fair. 21.  In both cases the applicant was assisted before the Baku Court of Appeal by a lawyer of his own choice. 22.  In both cases, on 29 October 2012 and 16 May 2014 respectively, the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld the decision of the first-instance court.", "references": ["0", "9", "1", "6", "4", "5", "8", "No Label", "7", "2", "3"], "gold": ["7", "2", "3"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Baku. At the material time she was deputy chairperson of one of the main opposition parties in the country, the Popular Front Party of Azerbaijan. 5.  On 17 April 2011 and 26 January 2013 the applicant participated in demonstrations organised by the opposition in Baku. 6.  On 11 April 2011, the organisers had given the relevant authority, the Baku City Executive Authority (\u201cthe BCEA\u201d), notice of the demonstration of 17 April 2011. It appears that no prior notice was given to the BCEA by the organisers of the demonstration of 26 January 2013. Information about that assembly was disseminated through Facebook or the press. 7.  The BCEA refused to authorise the demonstration of 17 April 2011 at the place indicated by the organisers and proposed a different location on the outskirts of Baku \u2013 the yard of a driving school situated in the 20th residential area of the Sabail District. The BCEA noted that the place proposed by the organisers was in an area with heavy traffic. 8.  Nevertheless, the organisers decided to hold the demonstrations in the centre of Baku. 9.  According to the applicant, the demonstrations were intended to be peaceful and were conducted in a peaceful manner. The participants of the demonstration of 17 April 2011 were demanding free and fair elections and democratic reforms in the country, and protesting about impediments to freedom of assembly. The participants of the demonstration of 26 January 2013 were condemning the use of force by the police against participants of previous demonstrations. 10.  The applicant attended both demonstrations, but shortly after they had begun the police started to disperse them. In both cases the applicant was arrested during the dispersal operation and taken to a police station. 11.  According to the applicant, during her arrest in the first case several police officers twisted her arms behind her back, held her head down and forced her to move in that position for 20-25 metres in the direction of a police car. As a result, the muscles in her neck, arms, back and other parts of her body hurt. At the police station she was kept handcuffed.\nIn a photograph, submitted to the Court by the applicant and allegedly taken at the time of her arrest, the applicant is shown with both arms twisted behind her back by two police officers and with her body bent as a result of that restraint. 12.  In both cases on the day of the applicant\u2019s arrest, an \u201cadministrative offence report\u201d (inzibati x\u0259ta haqq\u0131nda protokol) was issued in respect of her. In the first case the report stated that by deliberately failing to comply with a lawful order from the police, the applicant had committed an administrative offence under Article 310.1 of the Code of Administrative Offences (\u201cthe CAO\u201d). In the second case the applicant was charged with an administrative offence under Article 298.1 of the CAO (breach of the rules on the organisation and holding of assemblies, by an assembly organiser). 13.  According to the applicant, she was never served with copies of the administrative offence reports or with other documents from her case files. In neither case was she given access to a lawyer after the arrest or while in police custody. 14.  In the first case the applicant was brought before the Nasimi District Court on 18 April 2011, the day following her arrest. In the second case she was brought before the Sabail District Court on 26 January 2013, the day of her arrest. 15.  According to the applicant, the hearing before the court in both cases was very brief. In the second case members of the public were not allowed inside the courtroom, even though the court had not taken a formal decision to close the hearing to the public. 16.  According to the applicant, in neither case was she given an opportunity to hire a lawyer of her own choice. 17.  State-funded lawyers were appointed to assist the applicant. The records of the court hearings in both cases show that in their oral submissions the State-funded lawyers briefly stated that the applicant was not guilty and/or asked the respective court to discontinue the case. 18.  In both cases the courts questioned only the police officers who, according to the official records, had arrested the applicant or issued an administrative offence report in respect of her. The police officers testified that the applicant had attempted to stage an unauthorised demonstration, and, in the second case, had also incited others to participate in such an assembly. 19.  In the first case the first-instance court found that the applicant had participated or attempted to participate in an unauthorised demonstration. In the second case the court found that the applicant had incited people to participate in an unlawful assembly and, by doing so, had violated the rules on organising and holding assemblies. 20.  By a decision of 18 April 2011 the first-instance court in the first case convicted the applicant under Article 310.1 of the CAO and sentenced her to five days\u2019 \u201cadministrative\u201d detention. By a decision of 26 January 2013 the court in the second case convicted the applicant under Article 298.1 of the CAO and sentenced her to a fine of 2,000 manats (AZN). 21.  On unspecified dates the applicant lodged appeals before the Baku Court of Appeal, arguing that her convictions were in violation of her rights because the demonstrations in which she had participated had been peaceful. She also complained that her arrests had been unlawful and that the hearings before the respective first-instance courts had not been fair. 22.  In the first case the applicant also requested the Court of Appeal to order a forensic examination of the injuries she had allegedly sustained during her arrest. The court disregarded that request. The court also disregarded the applicant\u2019s requests to examine video recordings of the arrest made by some journalists; to question the police officers appearing in those video recordings; and to demand the medical record issued in respect of the applicant in the detention facility where she had served her administrative detention. 23.  In the first case the applicant was assisted before the Baku Court of Appeal by a lawyer of her own choice. In the second case she was not represented by a lawyer. 24.  In both cases, on 22 April 2011 and 6 February 2013 respectively, the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld the decision of the first-instance court. 25.  On an unspecified date the applicant lodged a complaint before the General Prosecutor\u2019s Office asking it to conduct an investigation into ill\u2011treatment allegedly committed by the police during her arrest. 26.  By a letter of 25 May 2011 the General Prosecutor\u2019s Office informed the applicant\u2019s lawyer that the complaint had been forwarded to the Baku City prosecutor\u2019s office for examination. The letter also instructed the Baku City prosecutor\u2019s office to inform the lawyer about the results of the examination. 27.  On an unspecified date, the applicant was summoned to the Nasimi District prosecutor\u2019s office and questioned in connection with her complaint of ill-treatment. 28.  According to the applicant, neither she nor her lawyer was informed about any actions taken by the authorities to investigate her complaint. It was only after making enquiries about the outcome of the investigation, in January 2012, that the applicant managed to obtain a copy of an investigator\u2019s decision of 16 June 2011 refusing to open a criminal case. 29.  The applicant did not lodge a complaint with a court against the decision of 16 June 2011.", "references": ["0", "4", "9", "5", "8", "1", "6", "No Label", "7", "2", "3"], "gold": ["7", "2", "3"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1973 and lives in Baku. At the material time he was a member of an opposition party \u2013 the Popular Front Party of Azerbaijan. 5.  The applicant participated or attempted to participate in demonstrations organised by the opposition on 17 November 2012 and 10 March 2013 in Baku. 6.  On 12 November 2012, the organisers gave notice to the relevant authority, the Baku City Executive Authority (\u201cthe BCEA\u201d), about the demonstration of 17 November 2012. It appears that no proper prior notice was given to the BCEA by the organisers of the demonstration of 10 March 2013. Information about that assembly was disseminated through Facebook or the press. 7.  The BCEA refused to authorise the holding of the demonstration of 17 November 2012, stating in general terms that that assembly would not be in accordance with the Law on Freedom of Assembly. The BCEA further stated that the square where the organisers proposed to hold the assembly was a designated public leisure area and that the assembly itself would be impractical. 8.  Nevertheless, the organisers decided to hold the demonstrations in the centre of Baku. 9.  According to the applicant, the demonstrations were intended to be peaceful and were conducted in a peaceful manner. The participants of the demonstration of 17 November 2012 were demanding democratic reforms in the country and protesting against impediments to freedom of assembly. The participants of the demonstration of 10 March 2013 were protesting about the deaths of numerous soldiers in the army. 10.  The applicant attended both demonstrations, but shortly after they had begun the police started to disperse them. In both cases the applicant was arrested during the dispersal operation and was taken to a police station, where he was questioned. According to the applicant, in the first case he was arrested by people in plain clothes. 11.  In both cases, on the day of the applicant\u2019s arrest, an \u201cadministrative-offence report\u201d (inzibati x\u0259ta haqq\u0131nda protokol) was issued in respect of him. In the first case the report stated that by deliberately failing to comply with a lawful order from the police, the applicant had committed an administrative offence under Article 310.1 of the Code of Administrative Offences (\u201cthe CAO\u201d). In the second case the applicant was charged with an administrative offence under Article 298.2 (participation in a public assembly that had not been organised in accordance with the law) of the CAO. 12.  In the first case the applicant refused to sign the administrative\u2011offence report. 13.  According to the applicant, he was never served with copies of the administrative-offence reports or with other documents in his case files. In neither case was he given access to a lawyer after the arrest or while in police custody. 14.  In the second case, according to a document drawn up by a police officer and a record dated 10 March 2013, a State-funded lawyer (Mr T.A.) was instructed to assist the applicant. 15.  In the first case the applicant was brought before the Sabail District Court on 17 November 2012, the day of his arrest. In the second case he was kept in police custody overnight and brought before the Sabail District Court on 11 March 2013, the day after his arrest. 16.  According to the applicant, the hearing before the court in both cases was very brief. Members of the public were not allowed to attend, even though the court had not taken a formal decision to close the hearing to the public. 17.  According to the applicant, in neither case was he given an opportunity to hire a lawyer of his own choice. 18.  At the court hearing in both cases a State-funded lawyer was appointed to assist the applicant. 19.  None of the material submitted to the Court contains any record showing that in the first case the State-funded lawyer, Mr Z.A., made any oral or written submissions before the first-instance court. According to the record of the court hearing in the second case, in his oral submissions the State-funded lawyer, Mr T.A., stated in general terms that the applicant was not guilty. 20.  At the hearing in the first case the court did not question any witnesses. The court in the second case questioned three police officers and a witness on the applicant\u2019s behalf, Mr M.M. The police officers testified that they had arrested the applicant because he had staged an unauthorised demonstration. Mr M.M. testified that he and the applicant had attempted to participate in the demonstration but had been arrested even before they had entered the area where the assembly had been held. 21.  By a decision of 17 November 2012 the first-instance court in the first case convicted the applicant under Article 310.1 of the CAO and sentenced him to seven days\u2019 \u201cadministrative\u201d detention. By a decision of 11 March 2013 the court in the second case convicted the applicant under Article 298.2 of the CAO and sentenced him to six days\u2019 \u201cadministrative\u201d detention. 22.  On unspecified dates the applicant lodged appeals before the Baku Court of Appeal, arguing that his convictions were in violation of his rights because the demonstrations in which he had participated or attempted to participate had been peaceful. The applicant also complained that his arrests had been unlawful and that the hearings before the respective first-instance courts had not been fair. 23.  In his appeals the applicant also complained that the respective first\u2011instance courts had failed to take into consideration the fact that he had a second-degree disability and, under the law, he should not have been sentenced to administrative detention. 24.  In the first case the applicant was assisted before the Baku Court of Appeal by a lawyer of his own choice. In the second case he was not represented by a lawyer. 25.  In the first case the Baku Court of Appeal found that the applicant had failed to stop participating in an unauthorised demonstration. In the second case the Court of Appeal found that the applicant had participated in a demonstration which had not been organised in accordance with the law. 26.  In both cases, on 26 November 2012 and 27 March 2013 respectively, the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld the decision of the first-instance court.", "references": ["8", "4", "9", "0", "5", "1", "6", "No Label", "7", "2", "3"], "gold": ["7", "2", "3"]}
+{"input": "5.  Between 1993 and 1999 the applicant, P., Lu., and La. served their prison sentences in Volnyansk Prison. After their release all four of them moved to Kyiv, where the applicant kept in touch with La., who gave him a key to his apartment. La. kept in touch with Lu. and P. 6.  On 22 August 2000 the applicant attacked Mr and Mrs I. in the hallway of their apartment block. He attempted to rob them, threatening them with a TT pistol and firing into the ceiling, but the victims resisted and the applicant ran away. On the same day the police arrived at the crime scene and found the bullet which the applicant had fired. In December 2000 the applicant travelled to Portugal; he returned to Ukraine in May 2001. 7.  At the beginning of June 2001 the police detained La. within the framework of an investigation into a number of crimes and seized a TT pistol from his apartment. A forensic examination established that the bullet found at the crime scene on 22 August 2000 had been fired from the same gun. La. told the police that the gun belonged to him, he had received it from Lu. and had kept it, unloaded, at his apartment. 8.  On 9 June 2001 P. told the police that La. had given him a TT pistol and said that the applicant had used it when he had tried to commit a robbery. P. also told the police that he and La. had committed a number of crimes using the same gun. 9.  On 15 June 2001 the police detained the applicant and brought him to a police station. According to the applicant, the police officers handcuffed him, laid him on the ground and kicked him, forcing him to say that La. had been his accomplice in the attack on Mr and Mrs I. The applicant did not provide any statements to the police on that date. 10.  In his application form the applicant stated, without developing further, that after his arrest he had been denied access to a lawyer. 11.  On 16 June 2001 the applicant was informed of his right to legal counsel and his right to remain silent, but he waived those rights in writing. Before the Court the applicant stated that the police had apprehended his girlfriend, Y., and had threatened to keep her in detention until he admitted that La. had helped him to prepare the attack on Mr and Mrs I. The case file contains no documentary proof that Y. was indeed apprehended by the police. 12.  On the same day the applicant told the police that in August 2000, when he had been living with Y. in her apartment, La. had suggested to him that he rob Mr and Mrs I. On 22 August 2000 La. had given him the TT pistol, had driven him to the apartment block where the couple lived, and had waited nearby while the applicant had tried to rob them. After the applicant had run away from the crime scene, La. had driven him home. About ten days later, La. had taken the gun away from the applicant. 13.  The police charged the applicant with having attacked Mr and Mrs I. 14.  During an identity parade and confrontation held on the same date Mr and Mrs I. said that it was the applicant who had attacked them. The applicant did not deny that he had done so. 15.  On 18 June 2001 the applicant was once again informed of his right to legal counsel and his right to remain silent; again he waived those rights in writing. On the same date he was questioned and repeated the statements he had made on 16 June 2001. 16.  On 19 June 2001 La. told the police that he had not been involved in the attack on Mr and Mrs I. 17.  On an unspecified date a court ordered the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention. He remained in pre-trial detention until his conviction. 18.  In July 2001 the applicant had a meeting with lawyer L. hired by his girlfriend. 19.  On 7 September 2001 the applicant once again waived in writing his right to legal counsel; also on the same date he was confronted with La. The investigator M. kept minutes of the confrontation, but later those minutes disappeared from the applicant\u2019s case file (see paragraph 25 below). Copies of the minutes were not made available to the Court. 20.  Also on 7 September 2001 the applicant was confronted with Lu. The latter denied that he had been involved in the attack, while the applicant stated that he had committed the attack alone, unassisted by other persons. Minutes of this confrontation were made available to the Court. 21.  On 10 September 2001 the applicant made a written statement in which he refused to participate in further confrontations with Lu. and La. According to investigator M.\u2019s testimony, subsequently relied upon by the trial court (see paragraph 37 below), the applicant motivated this statement by fear of reprisals from Lu. 22.  On 9 October 2001 the applicant asked the investigator M. for a lawyer, Mr L., to be assigned to defend him. Despite that request, on 9 October 2001 the applicant was questioned without a lawyer and made an oral statement saying that he had committed the attack with the help of Lu. and La. but those two persons had threatened him and for that reason during the confrontations with them he had said that he had committed the attack alone. The applicant noted that he planned to deny the involvement of Lu. and La. during the ensuing criminal proceedings. Investigator M. noted the applicant\u2019s oral statement in the minutes of the questioning and the applicant signed the minutes. 23.  During the pre-trial investigation Y. was questioned and stated that, from February to December 2000, she had lived together with the applicant in her apartment in Kyiv. 24.  On 26 November 2001 charges against the applicant were modified and he was charged with having attacked Mr and Mrs I. in conspiracy with Lu. and La. 25.  On 29 November 2001 the pre-trial investigation was completed. The applicant studied the material in the case file and found out that the minutes of his confrontation with La. (see paragraph 19 above) had disappeared from it. According to the authorities, the minutes, along with some other materials, disappeared during the period when the defendants were studying the case file. 26.  The case was submitted to the Kyiv Court of Appeal (\u201cCourt of Appeal\u201d) for trial. 27.  In July 2002 the applicant complained to the Court of Appeal that on 15 and 16 June 2001 the police had tortured him with the aim of extracting statements incriminating La. 28.  On 9 December 2002 the Court of Appeal held a preliminary hearing in the case in the presence of the applicant and his co-accused Lu., La., and P. On the same day the Court of Appeal remitted the case to the prosecutors for further investigation. 29.  On 24 April 2003 the Supreme Court partly modified the decision of 9 December 2002, but upheld it in the part stating that further investigation in the case must be carried out. 30.  On 19 June 2003 the Obolonskyy District Prosecutor\u2019s Office received the criminal case and started further investigation. 31.  On 4 August 2003 the applicant asked a prosecutor for a lawyer, Mr K., to be assigned to defend him. On the same date that request was granted. 32.  On 14 August 2003 the applicant was questioned in the presence of lawyer K. and stated that he had actually committed the attack alone and had not had any accomplices. He stated that initially he had said that La. had assisted him because the police had forced him to do so by using physical force. 33.  In 2004 the applicant asked the investigative authorities to carry out his confrontation with Lu. and La. In July 2004 an investigator rejected that request on the ground that it was useless to conduct such a confrontation after the applicant, Lu. and La. had been able to communicate during the preliminary court hearing (see paragraph 28 above). 34.  On an unspecified date the pre-trial investigation was completed and the case was submitted to the Court of Appeal for trial. 35.  When questioned in court, the applicant stated that in August 2000 he had been living in La.\u2019s apartment and had found a loaded TT pistol there. He had taken it without the knowledge or consent of La. and had attacked Mr and Mrs I. After the attack he had returned the gun to the apartment. During the pre-trial investigation the police officers had forced him, through physical and psychological pressure, to state that La. had helped him to prepare the attack. In particular, they had threatened to keep his girlfriend Y. in detention if he refused to give statements against La. 36.  La. and Lu. were questioned at a court hearing and stated that they had not been involved in the attack. 37.  Investigator M., who had conducted the preliminary investigation into the applicant\u2019s case, told the court that, initially, the applicant had stated that La. had helped him to prepare the attack. On 7 September 2001, during his confrontation with La., the applicant started denying La.\u2019s involvement and said that it had actually been Lu. who had helped him. After the confrontations with Lu. and La. the applicant had told M. that those two persons had threatened him and for that reason during the confrontations he had lied and said that he had committed the attack alone. In fact, he had committed it with the help of Lu. and La. 38.  On 3 December 2004 the Court of Appeal, referring, inter alia, to the submissions of the investigator M. (see paragraph 37 above) and P. (see paragraph 8 above), convicted the applicant and sentenced him to seven years\u2019 imprisonment and confiscation of all his property for having attacked Mr and Mrs I. with the help of Lu. and La. In particular, the court found that after the applicant had failed to repay his debt to Lu., Lu. and another individual brought the applicant to a forest, threatened him and suggested he repay the debt by robbing Mr and Mrs I.\nBy the same judgment the court convicted P., Lu. and La. of having committed a series of armed attacks and planned attacks using the TT pistol which the applicant had used to attack spouses I. P. was also convicted of murder of a person who promised to report him to the authorities and the attempted murder of police officers in order to evade arrest. The court referred to evidence that the applicant had hidden P. after the attack on the police officers.\nNoting that the applicant, La. and P. recanted their initial confessions in the course of the subsequent investigation and trial, the court stated that it found their initial confessions more trustworthy since they were more coherent with other evidence in the file than their subsequent, modified, accounts of the events. 39.  In reaching the conclusion that Lu. and La. had helped the applicant to prepare the attack the court referred to the fact that Lu., La., and the applicant knew each other because they had served their prison sentences together and maintained contacts after release. It also referred to the fact that the bullet found on the crime scene was shot from the TT pistol which belonged to La. and had been found in his apartment. The court noted that the fact that La. had assisted the applicant in the attack was confirmed by the statements that the applicant had given during the pre-trial investigation. In this context, the court specifically cited the applicant\u2019s initial statements of 16 and 18 June 2001. 40.  The court found that the applicant\u2019s submissions regarding the pressure exerted on him by the police were unsubstantiated. The applicant\u2019s statement that in August 2000 he had been living in La.\u2019s apartment and had found a loaded gun there was false because it was contradicted by the statements of Y. and La. In particular, Y. stated that from February to December 2000 the applicant had lived with her in her apartment, and La. stated that he had kept the TT pistol unloaded (see paragraphs 7 and 23 above). 41.  The applicant appealed to the Supreme Court. He argued that the police, by means of physical and psychological pressure, had forced him into stating that Lu. and La. had assisted him in the commission of the crime. In particular, the investigators had threatened to detain his girlfriend, Y., if he refused to give statements incriminating Lu. and La. In fact, those individuals had not been involved in the attack. The applicant also mentioned that on 9 October 2001 he had been questioned without a lawyer despite his request for a lawyer lodged on the same date. 42.  On 24 May 2005 the Supreme Court held a hearing in the presence of the applicant and orally pronounced its decision upholding the first-instance court judgment. It noted that the applicant\u2019s allegations of physical and psychological pressure were unsubstantiated. The court also noted that although the minutes of the applicant\u2019s confrontation with La. were not available, the case file contained sufficient evidence of the applicant\u2019s guilt. 43.  On 12 August 2005 the applicant was served with a copy of the Supreme Court\u2019s decision. 44.  On 31 October 2005 the applicant lodged his first letter with the Court. On 19 December 2005 he lodged his application form. 45.  On 29 March 2006 the Court asked the applicant to indicate on which date he first received legal assistance. The Court also asked the applicant to provide copies of any requests for legal assistance which he had lodged with the authorities. 46.  In his reply of 2 May 2006, the applicant indicated that the lawyer Mr L., had first visited him in July 2001 and his request for a lawyer of 9 October 2001 had not been granted. He also stated that before 9 October 2001 he had orally requested the authorities to assign him a lawyer, but he could not provide any proof that he had lodged such requests. 47.  On 14 May 2006 the applicant asked the Court of Appeal to give him a copy of his request for a lawyer of 9 October 2001. 48.  On 24 May 2006 the Court of Appeal refused the request, stating that the law did not empower it to provide him with such a copy. 49.  On 21 May 2007 the applicant was released on parole. The applicant did not inform the Court whether, after release, he had made any further attempts to obtain a copy of his request of 9 October 2001. 50.  In August 2001 the applicant was placed in SIZO no. 13 in Kyiv. In February 2003 he underwent a lung X-ray which revealed that he was suffering from tuberculosis (TB). According to the certificate issued by the State Penitentiary Service in 2011 and submitted to the Court by the Government, he was diagnosed with 5.1 TB (see paragraph 54 below). From February 2003 to May 2005 the applicant received a special diet in connection with his TB. The applicant stated that, during the same period, he had not been accorded medications to treat his TB. The Government stated (referring to a certificate issued by the State Penitentiary Service in 2011) that, from February 2003 to June 2005, the applicant had received anti-relapse medication. The Government were unable to specify the name of this medication because the applicant\u2019s medical file had been damaged by flooding in the SIZO in 2006-2007 and destroyed in 2008. In May 2005 the applicant started coughing up blood. An X-ray examination and an examination by a TB specialist revealed that the applicant\u2019s TB reactivated. In June 2005 the applicant was moved to the SIZO medical unit and started receiving antibiotics as a person suffering from category 1 TB. On 29 August 2005 the applicant was moved to Prison no. 17 for inmates suffering from TB, where he received treatment. On the date of the applicant\u2019s release he still suffered from TB. 51.  According to the applicant, he developed TB in the SIZO in 2003 because in that facility he was not able to \u201cbreathe fresh air\u201d and the food which he received was \u201cnot sufficiently rich in calories\u201d. He did not provide any further details concerning his detention conditions and did not submit any evidence in this respect. 52.  The Government provided certificates issued by the State Penitentiary Service stating that the cells in which the applicant had been held in the SIZO had been well ventilated and that the food provided to him had been adequate and in compliance with national legislation.", "references": ["2", "6", "3", "8", "5", "1", "9", "7", "4", "0", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1978 and lives in Kyiv. 5.  In 1995-2002 the applicant was convicted of and served a sentence for aggravated theft and burglary. 6.  On 27 December 2005 and 6 January 2006 the police found the applicant in possession of illegal drugs. 7.  On 20 January 2006 the police arrested the applicant on suspicion of drug manufacturing and possession. 8.  On the same day criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant and a certain Mr I. for armed robbery committed in a group. 9.  On 23 January 2006 the Kyiv Podilsky District Court (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) ordered the applicant\u2019s detention on remand until 20 March 2006 on the grounds that he had previous convictions and there was a risk that he would abscond, continue his criminal activities or obstruct the investigation. 10.  On 16 March 2006 the District Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 20 April 2006, stating that there was no reason to change it and there was a need to carry out investigative actions. 11.  On 27 June 2006 the District Court held a preliminary hearing in the case and upheld the preventive measure imposed on the applicant without giving any reasons or setting a time-limit for it. 12.  On 17 March and 14 July 2008, and 19 January and 23 April 2009 the District Court refused the applicant\u2019s requests for release. 13.  On 17 July 2009 the District Court convicted the applicant of drug possession and armed robbery committed in a group and sentenced him to nine years\u2019 imprisonment. 14.  On 27 July 2010 the Kyiv City Court of Appeal quashed that judgment and remitted the case to the District Court for fresh consideration. 15.  On the same day the applicant was released against his undertaking not to abscond. 16.  On 30 September 2013 the District Court sent the case against the applicant to the prosecutor for further investigation. 17.  On 25 April 2014 the charges concerning the armed robbery were separated into a second set of criminal proceedings. 18.  On 29 April 2014 the bill of indictment for robbery was approved and on 3 June 2014 the District Court committed the applicant for trial on that charge. 19.  As at the date of the last communication from the parties to the Court, 5 March 2015, proceedings against the applicant were still pending before the District Court.", "references": ["1", "9", "5", "4", "7", "6", "8", "0", "No Label", "2", "3"], "gold": ["2", "3"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1973 and lives in Baku. 5.  Demonstrations were planned to be held on 31 July 2010 and 10 March 2013 in Baku. 6.  On 23 July 2010 the organisers, consisting of several members of opposition parties, gave notice to the relevant authority, the Baku City Executive Authority (\u201cthe BCEA\u201d), of the demonstration of 31 July 2010. It appears that no prior notice was given to the BCEA by the organisers of the demonstration of 10 March 2013. Information about that demonstration was disseminated via Facebook or the press. 7.  The BCEA refused to authorise the demonstration of 31 July 2010 at the places indicated by the organisers and proposed three other locations on the outskirts of Baku \u2013 a stadium situated in the Binagadi District, a square near Zigh Road in the Khatai District, and the yard of a driving school situated in the 20th habitable area of the Sabail District. The BCEA noted that of the locations proposed by the organisers at which to hold the assembly, the squares were all designated public leisure areas and the other places were areas with heavy traffic. 8.  The organisers nevertheless decided to hold the demonstrations in the centre of Baku. 9.  According to the applicant, the demonstrations were intended to be peaceful and were conducted in a peaceful manner. The participants of the demonstration of 31 July 2010 were demanding free and fair elections and democratic reforms in the country. The participants of the demonstration of 10 March 2013 were protesting over the deaths of numerous soldiers in the army. 10.  The applicant attended both demonstrations, but shortly after they had begun the police started to disperse those who had gathered. In both cases the applicant was arrested during the dispersal operation and was taken to a police station, where he was questioned. 11.  In both cases on the day of the applicant\u2019s arrest, an administrative offence report (inzibati x\u0259ta haqq\u0131nda protokol) was issued on him. In the first case the report stated that by deliberately failing to comply with a lawful order of the police, the applicant had committed an administrative offence under Article 310.1 of the Code of Administrative Offences (\u201cthe CAO\u201d). In the second case he was charged with an administrative offence under Article 298.2 of the CAO (participation in a public assembly organised not in accordance with the law). 12.  According to the applicant, he was never served with copies of the administrative offence reports or with other material from his case files. In both cases he was not given access to a lawyer after the arrest or while he was in police custody. 13.  In the first case the applicant was brought before the Sabail District Court on 31 July 2010, the day of his arrest. In the second case he was held in police custody overnight and brought before the Sabail District Court on 11 March 2013, the day after his arrest. 14.  According to the applicant, the hearing before the court in both cases was very brief. In the second case members of the public were not allowed inside the courtroom, even though the court had not taken a formal decision to close the hearing to the public. 15.  According to the applicant, in both cases he was not given an opportunity to appoint a lawyer of his own choosing. 16.  At the court hearing in the first case the applicant was not represented by a lawyer. According to the material submitted to the Court by the parties, he refused legal assistance. 17.  It appears that at the court hearing in the second case a State-funded lawyer was invited to represent the applicant. None of the material submitted to the Court contain any records showing that the State-funded lawyer, Ms E.Z., made any oral or written submissions to the first-instance court. 18.  At the hearings in both cases the court did not question any witnesses. 19.  By a decision of 31 July 2010 the first-instance court convicted the applicant under Article 310.1 of the CAO and sentenced him to seven days\u2019 administrative detention. By a decision of 11 March 2013 the same court convicted the applicant under Article 298.2 of the CAO and sentenced him to seven days\u2019 administrative detention. 20.  On unspecified dates the applicant lodged appeals with the Baku Court of Appeal, arguing that his convictions were in violation of his rights because the demonstrations in which he had participated had been peaceful. The applicant also complained that his arrests had been unlawful and that the hearings before the first-instance court had not been fair. 21.  In the first case the applicant was not represented by a lawyer. In the second case the applicant prepared his appeal with the assistance of a lawyer of his own choosing, but that lawyer did not attend the hearing. 22.  On 16 August 2010 and 27 March 2013 respectively the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeals and upheld the decision of the first-instance court. 23.  According to the applicant, the decision of the Court of Appeal of 16 August 2010 was sent to him on 23 December 2010, after he complained that the court had failed to serve him with that decision.", "references": ["8", "5", "0", "4", "2", "6", "9", "1", "No Label", "7", "3"], "gold": ["7", "3"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant, a retired military officer, was born in 1947 and lives in the city of Simferopol, Ukraine. 5.  In December 2004 the applicant instituted proceedings before the Simferopol Garrison Military Court against a local military enlistment office seeking an order to recalculate his pension. 6.  On 20 May 2005 the court found against the applicant. On 11 August 2005, following his appeal, the Navy Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the first-instance court. 7.  On 30 August 2005 the applicant appealed on points of law. 8.  On 17 October 2005 the Higher Administrative Court of Ukraine allowed the applicant a time-limit until 1 November 2005 to rectify the procedural shortcomings of his appeal on points of law. The relevant part of the decision reads as follows:\n\u201cThe [present] appeal on points of law does not comply with the requirements laid down in Article 213 of the Code of Administrative Justice, as the applicant failed to pay the court fee and to provide a number of copies of the appeal on points of law corresponding to the number of persons involved in the proceedings ...\n[The court decides to] set for Gavrilov V.V. a deadline of 1 November 2005 for rectifying the shortcomings of the appeal on points of law submitted by him.\n[The court brings to] the attention of Gavrilov V.V. that if he fails to rectify the above shortcomings, in accordance with Article 108 of the Code of Administrative Justice, the appeal on points of law will be returned to the applicant and considered not submitted.\u201d 9.  The applicant dispatched his rectified appeal on points of law by registered post on 24 October 2005. It appears that the applicant resubmitted several copies of the appeal dated 30 August 2005 accompanied, in accordance with the instructions of the Higher Administrative Court of Ukraine, with proof of payment of the court fee. 10.  According to the acknowledgment of receipt form, the letter was received by the court registry on 27 October 2005. 11.  On 7 November 2005 the Higher Administrative Court of Ukraine adopted a decision which stated, inter alia, as follows:\n\u201cGavrilov V.V. failed to rectify the shortcomings indicated in the ruling [of 17 October 2005] within the time-limit granted by the court, the appeal on points of law should, therefore, be considered as not submitted and be returned to the applicant.\u201d 12.  On 10 November 2005 the Higher Administrative Court of Ukraine adopted another decision, the relevant part of which read as follows:\n\u201cWhen the Higher Administrative Court of Ukraine received the [applicant\u2019s] appeal on points of law, it was established that the above appeal on points of law had been lodged outside the statutory time-limit for lodging such an appeal as provided for by Article 212 of the Code of Administrative Justice ... In particular the challenged ruling of the Navy Court of Appeal was delivered on 11 August 2005, the appeal on points of law was dated 30 August 2005, and, according to the postmark, was dispatched to the Higher Administrative Court of Ukraine on 24 October 2005, the applicant failed to submit a request for an extension of the time-limit for lodging an appeal on points of law, his appeal on points of law should therefore be left without examination.\u201d", "references": ["4", "2", "9", "7", "8", "5", "1", "6", "0", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant, Mr Volodymyr Oleksandrovych Kryvenkyy, is a Ukrainian national who was born in 1934 and lives in Velyki Gadomtsi. 6.  On 25 March 1997 the applicant obtained a certificate (c\u0435\u0440\u0442\u0438\u0444\u0456\u043a\u0430\u0442 \u043d\u0430 \u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043e \u043d\u0430 \u0437\u0435\u043c\u0435\u043b\u044c\u043d\u0443 \u0447\u0430\u0441\u0442\u043a\u0443 (\u043f\u0430\u0439)) attesting his entitlement to a nominal 3.61-ha share of the land belonging to the V.G. collective farm. At the same time, according to him, he was allocated a specific plot measuring 3.61 ha, which, he had farmed and paid land tax on since that time. It appears that the allocated land consisted of at least two different parcels, one of them measuring 0.6021 ha. 7.  In September 1998 V.G. merged with Kh., a neighbouring collective farming company, which was designated as its successor. Following the merger, Kh. did not register itself as the new owner of the land formerly allocated to V.G. Subsequently the two farms separated again. 8.  On 18 March 1999 the Parliament of Ukraine ordered the expropriation of 150 ha of Kh.\u2019s land and its transfer to U.C.C. closed joint stock company for the exploitation of kaolin deposits. By the same decision, U.C.C. was obliged, in particular, to compensate the local council for the damage suffered by the agricultural producers in connection with the expropriation of the land. 9.  On 10 June 1999 the Berdychiv district land authority drew up a draft land-ownership certificate designating the boundaries of the plot to be allocated to U.C.C. This plot was de facto located on the land which had been registered as belonging to V.G.. The draft certificate mentioned, in particular, that U.C.C. had to obtain and register a relevant State land-use certificate. 10.  According to the applicant, until 2004 U.C.C. took no action to register its land-use rights and the plot designated for expropriation by Parliament\u2019s decision of 18 March 1999 remained in the hands of the members of the V.G. collective farm. The 0.6021-ha parcel of the land farmed by the applicant was affected by the Parliament\u2019s decision. 11.  Meanwhile, on 17 January 2003 the Berdychiv district administration approved a draft certificate determining the boundaries of the plots of land to be designated to individual farmers from the lands allocated to V.G. and ordered production of the respective individual land-ownership certificates. 12.  On the basis of this decision, on 4 June 2003 the applicant was issued with the land-ownership certificate for the aforementioned 0.6021-ha plot. No information concerning registration of ownership in respect of any other land parcels farmed by the applicant has been provided to the Court. 13.  On 7 July 2005 the Berdychiv district prosecutor addressed the Berdychiv district administration objecting to its decision of 17 January 2003. The prosecutor maintained, in particular, that 150 ha of land designated for exploitation of kaolin deposits had been allocated to individual farmers in breach of U.C.C.\u2019s rights. 14.  On 22 July 2005 the Berdychiv district administration accepted the prosecutor\u2019s objection and annulled its decision of 17 January 2003 in so far as it related to the 150 ha of land claimed by U.C.C. 15.  On 31 August 2005 U.C.C. lodged a civil action claiming the 0.6021-ha plot of land allocated to the applicant and seeking annulment of the land-ownership certificate issued to him on 4 June 2003. It noted, in particular, that the Berdychiv district administration had already annulled its own decision of 17 January 2003, which had served as the basis for the issuance of the land-ownership certificate to the applicant. The issuance had therefore been devoid of legal basis. 16.  On 17 August 2006 the Berdychiv Court allowed the aforementioned claim. It noted that the disputed plot had been allocated to the applicant mistakenly on the basis of the decision of 17 January 2003, without due regard to the fact that in 1999 this very plot had already been expropriated and transferred to U.C.C. 17.  Following this decision, U.C.C. blocked the road leading to the plot disputed by the U.C.C. and it became impossible for the applicant to access it or use it for farming. 18.  On 12 December 2006 the Zhytomyr Regional Court of Appeal upheld the above judgment. 19.  The applicant appealed in cassation before the Supreme Court of Ukraine. He noted, in particular, that he had obtained the disputed land lawfully and in good faith. He could therefore not be deprived of it unless fair compensation was paid. 20.  In February 2007 the applicant added to his cassation appeal, informing the Supreme Court of Ukraine that on 12 February 2007 the Regional Court had annulled the decision of 22 July 2005 and revalidated the decision of 17 January 2003, on the basis of which he had obtained his land-ownership certificate (see paragraph 23 below). 21.  On 4 April 2007 the Supreme Court of Ukraine rejected the applicant\u2019s request for leave to appeal in cassation. 22.  On an unspecified date several individuals, excluding the applicant, apparently the land owners whose land was also being claimed by U.C.C., instituted administrative proceedings against the Berdychiv district administration. They sought, in particular, to annul its decision of 22 July 2005 and to declare lawful the decision of 17 January 2003, on the basis of which their land-use certificates had been issued. 23.  On 12 February 2007 the Zhytomyr Regional Court of Appeal allowed their claim. It noted, in particular, that Parliament had ordered the expropriation of Kh.\u2019s land, while the land, whose boundaries had been in dispute, had belonged to V.G., which had been a separate legal entity on the date of the decision at issue. 24.  On 23 July 2008 the Higher Administrative Court of Ukraine quashed the above decision and remitted the case for retrial. 25.  After several rounds of proceedings, on 14 September 2011 the Berdychiv Court found that the decision of 22 July 2005 had been unlawful in so far as it had related to the plots of land of the individuals who had instituted the proceedings. On 6 December 2011 and 27 August 2013 the judgment of 14 September 2011 was upheld by the Zhytomyr Regional Administrative Court and the Supreme Court of Ukraine respectively.", "references": ["3", "8", "7", "1", "2", "5", "6", "4", "0", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
+{"input": "5.  In December 1996 the first applicant concluded a three-year military service contract with the Ministry of Defence. 6.  In March 1999 its housing commission allocated him a studio in a residence hall for students and employees of the National Defence Academy of Ukraine (\u201cthe Defence Academy\u201d), located on Z. Street in Kyiv, and the applicants moved into this accommodation. 7.  In December 1999 the first applicant concluded another three-year military service contract. 8.  On an unspecified date in 2001 the applicants\u2019 daughter was born. 9.  In December 2001 the first applicant rescinded his contract with the Ministry of Defence and resigned from military service, citing family circumstances. 10.  On 4 April 2002 he was employed as a salesman by G., a private company. 11.  On an unspecified date and for unknown reasons the first applicant registered himself as a temporary resident at an address on P. Street in Kyiv. However, according to the applicants\u2019 submissions, the family continued to live in and pay charges for the Z. Street studio, which they had renovated and modernised at their own expense. 12.  In October 2002 the Defence Academy and Office of the Prosecutor General instituted proceedings in the Shevchenkivskyy District Court in Kyiv, seeking to evict the applicants\u2019 family from the Z. Street accommodation. Relying on Article 132 paragraph 1 of the Housing Code (see paragraph 35 below), the plaintiffs argued that because the first applicant had resigned from military service, he and his family were obliged to vacate the accommodation, which had been provided to them on a temporary basis in connection with the first applicant\u2019s military service. 13.  During the trial, the applicants alleged that the first applicant had been \u201ccantoned\u201d or quartered in the disputed accommodation as a military serviceman, a fact which triggered a special duty on the part of the State to keep providing him with housing upon his resignation from the armed forces. Article 132 paragraph 1 of the Housing Code, which concerned accommodation for seasonal and temporary employees, did not apply in their case. They also noted that the first applicant had a dependent wife and young child, and that the family had no other accommodation in Kyiv. 14.  On 11 November 2003, after hearing oral submissions of all interested parties and having examined the written evidence presented, the court ruled for the plaintiffs. It found that the disputed accommodation had been provided to the applicants on a temporary basis, as a privilege in connection with the first applicant\u2019s military service. Since it had been his decision to terminate the contract early, there was no right to keep the accommodation or any duty of the State to provide other accommodation under the applicable law. Article 132 paragraph 1 of the Housing Code was therefore applicable and the applicants\u2019 family was legally obliged to vacate the Z. Street accommodation. 15.  On 9 December 2003 the first applicant lodged an appeal with the Kyiv City Court of Appeal (\u201cthe Court of Appeal\u201d). No copy has been provided to the Court. 16.  On 29 January 2004 the Court of Appeal upheld the judgment of 11 November 2003, following a hearing attended by representatives of the Defence Academy but not by the first applicant. The court held, in particular, that his service contract had contained no clauses obliging the Ministry to provide him with housing during his service. The fact that he had been provided with temporary accommodation at the Ministry\u2019s discretion did not mean that the State had a duty to accommodate him or his family after termination of the contract. 17.  According to the applicants, the Court of Appeal did not notify them of the date and time of the hearing of 29 January 2004. They further stated that on two occasions \u2013 in April 2004 and sometime in 2005 (the applicants could not recall the exact dates) \u2013 the first applicant had visited the Court to enquire about the status of the proceedings, but did not receive any meaningful response. 18.  According to the applicants, on 28 April 2004 they were evicted from the Z. Street accommodation. 19.  On 7 May 2004 the Official Gazette of Ukraine (\u041e\u0444\u0456\u0446\u0456\u0439\u043d\u0438\u0439 \u0432\u0456\u0441\u043d\u0438\u043a \u0423\u043a\u0440\u0430\u0457\u043d\u0438) published the new Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter \u201cthe 2004 Code\u201d), which was adopted on 18 March 2004 and entered into force on 1 September 2005. 20.  On 12 August and 26 September 2005 the first applicant lodged written complaints with the President of the Court of Appeal concerning the delay in examining his appeal. 21.  On 3 October 2005 the Deputy President of the Court of Appeal informed him that his case had already been decided and that the judgment of 11 November 2003 had been upheld. 22.  On 16 and 24 November 2005 the first applicant wrote to the Court of Appeal with a request to be provided with a copy of the decision taken on 29 January 2004. 23.  On 29 November 2005 the applicants received a copy of that decision. 24.  On 13 December 2005 the applicants lodged a request with the Supreme Court of Ukraine for leave to appeal in cassation out of time against the rulings of 11 November 2003 and 29 January 2004, on the grounds that they had not been notified of the latter ruling until 29 November 2005. They argued, in particular, that the Court of Appeal had failed, in breach of the requirements of the applicable law, to notify them of the date and time of the appeal hearing and the decision taken in their case. They had hence been deprived of their statutory right to attend the appeal hearing and to lodge a cassation appeal within the statutory time-limit. They also argued that the lower courts had erred in their assessment of the facts and application of the law in their case. In particular, since the first applicant had resigned from military service in connection with family circumstances, his situation fell within the ambit of paragraph 3, not paragraph 1 of Article 132 of the Housing Code. Accordingly, his family could only be evicted from the accommodation reserved for military personnel if they had been provided with other comparable accommodation. The applicants also relied on section 12 of the Social Protection of Military Servicemen Act (see paragraph 36 below) as the basis for their entitlement to permanent accommodation. 25.  On 20 December 2005 the Supreme Court rejected the applicants\u2019 request for leave to appeal out of time, noting that, in accordance with Article 325 \u00a7 2 of the new Code of Civil Procedure of 2004 such leave could only be granted within one year of pronouncement of the decision subject to appeal (see paragraph 34 below).", "references": ["8", "7", "2", "4", "5", "0", "9", "1", "6", "3", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1972 and lives in Kharkiv. 5.  According to the applicant, at 2 p.m. on 3 May 2005 he was arrested at his home, without any reason being given, and taken to the Ordzhonikidzevskyy district police station (\u041e\u0440\u0434\u0436\u043e\u043d\u0456\u043a\u0456\u0434\u0437\u0435\u0432\u0441\u044c\u043a\u0438\u0439 \u0440\u0430\u0439\u043e\u043d\u043d\u0438\u0439 \u0432\u0456\u0434\u0434\u0456\u043b \u0425\u0430\u0440\u043a\u0456\u0432\u0441\u044c\u043a\u043e\u0433\u043e \u043c\u0456\u0441\u044c\u043a\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0443\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043b\u0456\u043d\u043d\u044f \u041c\u0456\u043d\u0456\u0441\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0430 \u0432\u043d\u0443\u0442\u0440\u0456\u0448\u043d\u0456\u0445 \u0441\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432 \u0423\u043a\u0440\u0430\u0457\u043d\u0438 \u0432 \u0425\u0430\u0440\u043a\u0456\u0432\u0441\u044c\u043a\u0456\u0439 \u043e\u0431\u043b\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0456), where he was handcuffed to a radiator. At around 10 p.m. he was brought before an investigator. There he was put on the floor with his hands handcuffed behind his back and was beaten by five or six police officers in his stomach and his liver. The officers then put on a gas mask on him with the air passage blocked and cigarette smoke was blown into it. The officers demanded that he confess \u201cto crimes he had committed\u201d. This treatment continued for one hour and the applicant was then placed in a cell. The next morning, the applicant experienced severe abdominal pain and requested medical assistance (see paragraph 8 below). 6.  The Government denied all allegations of ill-treatment. However, they could not provide any factual information as to whether the applicant had been present at the police station on the date in question as the time-limit for keeping the relevant documents had expired and the admissions register of the police station had been destroyed. 7.  On 4 May 2005 criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant and two other persons for a robbery which had taken place on 12 April 2005. 8.  On the same date the applicant complained to the duty officer that he was experiencing acute abdominal pain. At 10 p.m. an ambulance was called and he was transferred to Kharkiv City Hospital no. 17 (\u201chospital no. 17\u201d). Upon admission, the applicant stated that he had fallen onto a concrete floor on 3 May 2005. His state of health had been classified as being of medium gravity. His initial medical examination revealed no visible bodily injuries. The applicant had an abdominal distention, felt moderate pain in the left part of his midabdomen and kidney region (\u201cpositive\u201d Pasternatsky symptom) and had \u201cnegative\u201d peritoneal signs. He was transferred to the surgical ward in order to verify if he had an abdominal trauma and retroperitoneal hematoma (\u0442\u0443\u043f\u0430 \u0442\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043c\u0430 \u0436\u0438\u0432\u043e\u0442\u0430 \u0442\u0430 \u043f\u043e\u0437\u0430\u0447\u0435\u0440\u0435\u0432\u043d\u0430 \u0433\u0435\u043c\u0430\u0442\u043e\u043c\u0430). The applicant underwent ultrasound and X\u2011ray examinations as well as urine and blood tests. No pathology had been revealed apart from intestinal pneumatosis which, according to the medical report, could have been an indirect indication of a possible retroperitoneal trauma. The relevant treatment was prescribed to the applicant. 9.  On 5 May 2005, according to the medical records, the applicant had no longer experienced pain and his health ameliorated. He was discharged from hospital in a satisfactory condition, after being given the relevant recommendations as to further medical treatment. The applicant alleged that the police forced the hospital officials to discharge him despite his poor state of health. 10.  On the same date the applicant, having waived his right to legal assistance, confessed to the crime in question and was arrested. The relevant parts of the arrest reports read as follows:\n\u201cInvestigator ... K., on 5.05.2005 at 18:00 in accordance with Article 115 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine detained, on suspicion of the commission of a crime: Dolganin Valeriy Nikolayevich ...\nBrought before the investigator ... or actually arrested: on 5.05.2005 ...\u201d 11.  He was taken for a forensic medical examination, which was conducted in the presence of a police officer. The relevant report suggests that no bodily injuries were noted by the forensic expert and no complaint was raised by the applicant. According to the applicant, the examination was only superficial and he was forced by the police to keep silent about his ill\u2011treatment. 12.  Later on the same day the applicant was questioned as a suspect and confirmed his earlier statements, having again waived his right to legal assistance. 13.  On 6 May 2005 the applicant was charged with robbery and questioned in the absence of a lawyer. He confirmed the statements he had given earlier. 14.  On the same date, the applicant complained about nausea, abdominal pain, bloating, fatigue and a dry throat and was transferred to Kharkiv City Hospital no. 2 (\u201chospital no. 2\u201d), where he underwent a full-scale medical examination. During the examination, the applicant again stated that on 3 May 2005 he had fallen onto a concrete floor. He was diagnosed with a twisted sigmoid colon and acute intestinal obstruction requiring surgery. On 7 May 2005 the surgery was performed and on 13 May 2005 the applicant was discharged from hospital in a satisfactory condition. 15.  On 13 June 2005, in the presence of witnesses, the applicant refused to participate in a reconstruction of the crime for health reasons, referring to testimony he had given earlier. 16.  On 13 April 2007 the Ordzhonikidzevskyy District Court sentenced the applicant to seven years\u2019 imprisonment on one count of robbery. The operative part of the judgment provided that the term of the applicant\u2019s imprisonment should be calculated from 3 May 2005, the day of his actual arrest. 17.  On 12 February 2009 the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal upheld this decision. 18.  On 9 June and 29 July 2009 the Supreme Court of Ukraine rejected the applicant\u2019s request for leave to lodge an appeal on points of law. 19.  From 16 May 2005 to 19 June 2009 the applicant was detained in the Kharkiv SIZO. On 19 June 2009 he was transferred to another pre-trial detention facility and, later on, to a prison. The applicant\u2019s complaint about inadequate medical treatment raised before the Court concerns the Kharkiv SIZO only. 20.  According to the applicant, the medical care provided to him during his detention in the Kharkiv SIZO was inadequate and resulted in a deterioration of his health. 21.  The Government\u2019s submitted that the applicant\u2019s intestinal problems had a long history and were of a chronic nature. The applicant\u2019s medical file suggests that in 2003, while serving a prison sentence for another conviction, the applicant was recognised as falling into the second category of disability because of his intestinal problems and the need for appropriate surgery was stressed by physicians. 22.  On 16 May 2005 upon his arrival at the Kharkiv SIZO the applicant underwent a medical examination and was prescribed post-surgical medical treatment. His name was put on the list for regular medical check-ups. 23.  On 3 June 2005 the SIZO generalist doctor advised that the previously prescribed treatment should be continued. 24.  On 6 June 2005 the applicant underwent an X-ray examination and was diagnosed with post-tuberculosis residual effect. The applicant was prescribed anti-relapse medical treatment, a special diet and regular medical check-ups. 25.  On 23 August 2005 the generalist doctor diagnosed the applicant as having peritoneal adhesions and prescribed him the relevant treatment. 26.  On 28 November 2005 the applicant\u2019s chest was X-rayed and found to be healthy. 27.  On 18 May 2006 the applicant was examined by a surgeon and diagnosed with a post-laparotomy condition. 28.  On 17 August 2006 a generalist confirmed that the applicant was suffering from peritoneal adhesions and prescribed him the relevant treatment. 29.  On 17 October 2006 the applicant complained to the medical unit about stomach problems. The relevant treatment was prescribed to him. 30.  On 8 December 2006, following further complaints about his health, the applicant was diagnosed with angioneurosis and prescribed the respective treatment. 31.  On 26 February 2007 the applicant was diagnosed with bronchitis. The appropriate treatment was prescribed and the applicant was further recommended to consult a tuberculotherapist, which he did on 28 February 2007. No signs of active tuberculosis were found. 32.  On 1 and 7 March 2007 follow-up examinations were conducted. The applicant\u2019s health was found to be improving. Thereafter and until his transfer to another detention facility on 19 June 2009, the applicant did not again consult the medical unit of the Kharkiv SIZO. 33.  On 23 June 2009 and 12 October 2010 because of his intestinal problems, the applicant was recognised as falling into the second category of disability for a one-year period and the third category of disability for the remaining imprisonment term, respectively. 34.  On 5 January 2012 the applicant was granted early release. 35.  On 20 February 2006 the applicant complained to a prosecutor about his ill-treatment by the police on 3 May 2005. He provided a detailed account of events and asked for the admissions register of the police station to be produced as evidence. 36.  On 2 March 2006 the Ordzhonikidzevskyy district prosecutor\u2019s office (\u201cthe district prosecutor\u2019s office\u201d) refused to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers for the lack of corpus delicti. In doing so, the prosecutor relied on the results of the forensic medical examination of 5 May 2005, the diagnosis made at hospitals nos. 2 and 17, and the fact that the investigator in charge of the applicant\u2019s criminal case denied all allegations of ill-treatment. 37.  On 8 August 2006 and 5 September 2006 the applicant\u2019s mother and the applicant, respectively, again complained to the district prosecutor\u2019s office about the applicant\u2019s ill-treatment by the police on 3 May 2005. In letters dated 18 September 2006 the prosecutor informed the applicant and his mother that a similar complaint from the applicant had already been examined and declared ill-founded on 2 March 2006. 38.  On 14 September 2006 the Kharkiv regional prosecutor\u2019s office (\u201cthe regional prosecutor\u2019s office\u201d) set aside the aforementioned decision of 2 March 2006 on the grounds that the inquiry had been incomplete and ordered an additional investigation. 39.  On 11 and 28 September 2006 and on 20 October 2006 the district prosecutor\u2019s office again refused to institute criminal proceedings, giving similar reasoning to that given in respect of its decision of 2 March 2006. 40.  On 28 April 2007 the regional prosecutor\u2019s office overruled the decision of 20 October 2006 on the grounds that the inquiry had been incomplete. The prosecutor expressly indicated the measures to be taken in the course of the additional inquiry. It was noted that the applicant and the police officers needed to be questioned in detail about the circumstances in which the alleged ill-treatment had taken place, including the exact place and time of the ill-treatment, the persons involved and their individual role in the alleged incident. Moreover, possible witnesses who could confirm or disprove the fact of the ill-treatment needed to be identified, and medical specialists who had examined the applicant had to be questioned and the relevant medical documents demanded and obtained. 41.  On 24 May 2007 the prosecutor again refused to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers. 42.  On 25 May 2007 the above decision was dismissed as premature by the regional prosecutor\u2019s office and the relevant instruction to conduct a further inquiry was given once again. 43.  On 1 June 2007 the prosecutor\u2019s office again refused to institute criminal proceedings in response to the applicant\u2019s complaint as there was no medical or other evidence to support the applicant\u2019s allegations. 44.  On an unspecified date the above decision was again overruled by a higher prosecutor and an additional investigation ordered. The parties did not inform the Court as to the outcome of that additional investigation. 45.  During the trial in his criminal case the applicant complained that his confession had been obtained from him by the police under duress. In the judgment of 13 April 2007, by which the applicant was convicted, his ill\u2011treatment complaint was dismissed as unsubstantiated mainly on the basis of the forensic medical report of 5 May 2005 and the results of the inquiries conducted by prosecutors in respect of the applicant\u2019s complaints. The court also observed that during the whole pre-trial investigation the applicant had acknowledged his guilt and had never complained about any ill-treatment, and that he had not retracted his statements until the trial (which the court considered that he did simply as part of his defence strategy). In the appeals against his conviction before the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, the applicant referred to a medical certificate issued by hospital no. 17 in which it was noted that he had sustained an abdominal injury. He stated, in particular, that this evidence of his ill-treatment had been completely disregarded by the trial court. In their judgments, the higher courts dismissed the applicant\u2019s allegation of ill\u2011treatment on the same grounds as the first-instance court.", "references": ["5", "0", "9", "3", "8", "6", "7", "4", "No Label", "1", "2"], "gold": ["1", "2"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1948 and lives in Kaunas. 6.  In 1991 the applicant asked the authorities to return to her some buildings and a plot of land owned by her father before nationalisation in 1940. In November 1995 the applicant wrote to the authorities to ask why the buildings and the land had been sold to other persons in 1992. The authorities replied in December 1995 that the applicant had given an incorrect address for the buildings when submitting her request for her property rights to be restored and the buildings in question had already been privatised. 7.  On 22 October 1996, upon their own initiative, the authorities suggested to the applicant that she submit a request to be paid monetary compensation for the buildings, if she did not have any objections to such a form of restitution. On 4 November 1996 the authorities indicated that the documents submitted by the applicant did not prove that her father had owned the buildings in question and asked her to provide additional documents or \u2013 if she did not have those documents in her possession \u2013 to ask the domestic courts to establish as a legal fact that her father had owned those buildings. 8.  On 27 April 1999 the applicant lodged a claim with the Kaunas District Court, asking it to establish as a legal fact that before the 1940 nationalisation her father had owned the buildings and a plot of land. On 18 August 1999 the Kaunas District Court stated that there was a dispute about the applicable law and left the applicant\u2019s claim unexamined. The court also suggested to the applicant that she submit her claim in accordance with the rules governing contentious proceedings (as opposed to the rules applicable to the procedure for the establishment of a legal fact). 9.  On 28 May 2003 the Kaunas District Court established as a legal fact that the applicant\u2019s father had owned the buildings before the 1940 nationalisation. 10.  On 4 July 2003 the applicant indicated that she wanted to receive compensation in the form of securities. The authorities asked the Centre of Registers (a State enterprise) to assess the value of the buildings, which was set on 14 July 2003 at 36,000 Lithuanian litai (LTL \u2013 approximately 10,426 euros (EUR)). On 18 September 2003 the authorities recommended that applicant\u2019s and her sister\u2019s property rights to their father\u2019s property be restored by paying them compensation in securities. 11.  On 9 October 2003 the authorities adopted a decision to restore the applicant\u2019s and her sister\u2019s property rights by paying them LTL 36,000 (approximately EUR 10,426) in total in securities. 12.  On 10 June 2004, the applicant lodged a claim with the Kaunas District Court, requesting the annulment of the valuation of the buildings made by the Centre of Registers on 14 July 2003 (see paragraph 10 above) and the appointment of independent experts to assess the market value of the buildings because she considered that the value set for the buildings was too low. The applicant\u2019s claim contained deficiencies, which she failed to eliminate within the time-limit set by the Kaunas District Court; accordingly, on 13 July 2004, the court decided to rule that the applicant\u2019s claim had not been lodged. 13.  The applicant lodged a separate complaint, where she claimed that the authorities assessed the value of the buildings incorrectly, and complaining that the assessment of the value of the buildings had been made before the decision to restore her property rights had been taken. On 23 August 2004 the Kaunas Regional Court held that the Kaunas District Court had made procedural mistakes and returned the case for fresh examination to the Kaunas District Court. 14.  The applicant lodged a modified claim with the Kaunas District Court, complaining that the assessment of the value of the buildings had been made three or four months before the decision to restore her property rights had been taken. On 2 February 2005 the Kaunas District Court held that although there were no provisions in the domestic law indicating how soon after the assessment of value the decision to restore property rights had to be taken, in the present case the time between the assessment and the decision had not been excessively long. The court therefore dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaint. 15.  The applicant appealed raising the same complaints as she did before the Kaunas District Court (see paragraph 14 above), and on 13 June 2005 the Kaunas Regional Court held that the assessment of value of the buildings had been based on several methods of calculation and in accordance with the provisions of the domestic law. It therefore dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. 16.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, and on 14 December 2005 the Supreme Court decided that the case had to be examined before the administrative rather than civil courts and referred the case for examination to the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court. 17.  On 23 March 2006, during the hearing before the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court, the applicant asked for the examination of the case to be postponed that she might have time to eliminate deficiencies in her claim. She also claimed that she was not aware of the fact that she had to submit a request to renew the time-limit for lodging a complaint separately, and asked the court to provide her with an opportunity to do that. Her requests were granted and the examination of the case was postponed until 9 May 2006. On 19 April 2006 the applicant lodged a modified claim in which, inter alia, she asked the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court to (i) annul the assessment of the value of the buildings made by the Centre of Registers, (ii) to annul that part of the order of the authorities for her property rights to be restored in which the value of the buildings was indicated and (iii) to renew the time-limit for lodging a complaint. On 9 May 2006, during the hearing at the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court, the applicant asked for the appointment of an expert to determine the market value of the buildings. On 6 June 2006 the court suspended the proceedings, appointed an expert and asked the expert (i) what the market value of the buildings had been on 14 July 2003 and (ii) what the market value of the buildings had been today, i. e. when the expert had been appointed. In April 2007 the expert stated that on 14 July 2003 the market value of the buildings had been LTL 56,850 (approximately EUR 16,465) and that the market value of the buildings at the time that the examination of the case had started had been LTL 164,900 (approximately EUR 47,758). Subsequently the court proceedings were resumed, and on 21 September 2007 the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court held that the new assessment of value of the buildings was more accurate and decided to annul the assessment of value of 14 July 2003 by the Centre of Registers and that part of the decision of 9 October 2003 to restore the applicant\u2019s property rights in which the value of the buildings was set at LTL 36,000 (approximately EUR 10,426) (see paragraphs 10 and 11 above). The applicant did not appeal and the decision became final on 5 October 2007. 18.  On an unspecified date, the applicant lodged a claim with the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court, asking, inter alia, for the authorities to be obliged to urgently re-issue the annulled part of the decision of 9 October 2003 (see paragraph 11 above). On 12 December 2007 the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court allowed the applicant\u2019s claim. 19.  On 18 May 2009 the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court examined and then rejected a claim by the applicant seeking for the Kaunas Municipality to be obliged to pay her LTL 82,450 (approximately EUR 23,879) for the buildings and to award her LTL 96,370 (approximately EUR 27,911) in damages. The court held that the assessment of value in itself did not give rise to any legal consequences for the applicant. The court concluded that the decision of the authorities of 9 October 2003 was still in force and that the question of the amount of the compensation was a matter for the public authorities and that it was not within the court\u2019s power to give instructions to them. 20.  The applicant appealed, but on 26 July 2010 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed her appeal. The court held that the applicant\u2019s request had been for the value of the buildings to be set at what their value had been at the moment when the expert valuation had been carried out in 2007 (see paragraph 17 above). The court also observed that the amendment of the decision of 9 October 2003 to restore the applicant\u2019s property rights had not yet been adopted and it was not clear how the applicant\u2019s rights were being breached. The court also held that the applicant had repeatedly raised the issue of the assessment of the value of the buildings, which had already been resolved. The court upheld the conclusion of the court of first instance that public authorities\u2019 functions did not fall within the jurisdiction of the domestic courts (see paragraph 19 above). 21.  The applicant requested that the proceedings be reopened. On 17 December 2010 the Supreme Administrative Court refused her request. 22.  In October 2007 the relevant authorities were informed that an additional assessment of the value of the buildings had to be made and then the Kaunas Municipality Administration asked the Centre of Registers to urgently assess their value. As no response was received, in February 2008 the Kaunas Municipality Administration again asked the Centre of Registers to assess the value of the buildings. The assessment was made on 17 March 2008 and the value of the buildings was set at LTL 57,000 (approximately EUR 16,508) in total, of which the applicant\u2019s part was LTL 28,500 (approximately EUR 8,254). This valuation was officially approved by the authorities on 5 June 2009, when they amended the annulled part of the decision of 9 October 2003 to restore the applicant\u2019s and her sister\u2019s property rights. 23.  On 16 August 2010 the applicant submitted a request to be compensated in securities of a State-owned enterprise. On 27 January 2011 the applicant was sent a document of acceptance in respect of 11,875 units of securities, the nominal value of each unit being LTL 1 (approximately EUR 0.29). The State Property Fund asked the applicant to sign the document of acceptance and indicated that the nominal value of one security was LTL 1 (approximately EUR 0.29) but that the real value was LTL 2.4 (approximately EUR 0.7). It meant that the real total value of the shares was LTL 28,500 (approximately EUR 8,254), which was the applicant\u2019s part of the compensation (see paragraph 22 above). The transfer of the securities was finalised on 1 February 2011. 24.  On 12 December 2012 the applicant asked the authorities to set the value of the buildings at the value that they had as of January 2011 and to pay her additional compensation. In February 2013 the authorities replied that there were no grounds for re-examining and deciding on questions regarding the restoration of property rights to the applicant because the procedure had already been finalised. 25.  The applicant lodged a claim with the domestic courts, asking, inter alia, that the decision of the authorities of 5 June 2009 by which the annulled part of the decision of 9 October 2003 had been amended (see paragraph 22 above) be quashed. She also requested the annulment of the assessment of value of the buildings at LTL 57,000 (approximately EUR 16,508) made by the Centre of Registers on 17 March 2008. The applicant\u2019s claim had several deficiencies and she was asked several times to eliminate them. However, the applicant failed to do so in an acceptable manner and on 25 October 2010 the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court declined to examine her claim. The court stated that the applicant had asked it to oblige the authorities to provide one of the original copies of the decision of 5 June 2009; however, it observed that the applicant already had an original copy. It was suggested by the court that the applicant contest the order of 5 June 2009, because it was that document which had legal consequences for her. This, according to the information in the Court\u2019s possession, she never did.", "references": ["4", "7", "3", "5", "8", "6", "0", "9", "2", "1", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicants are:\n1)  Ms Marzhan Kushtova, who was born in 1925,\n2)  Mr Magomet (in the documents submitted also spelt as Magomed and Magomed-Bashir) Kushtov, who was born in 1950,\n3)   Ms Minovsi (also spelt as Minuosi) Tsitskiyeva, who was born in 1954,\n4)  Ms Madina Kushtova, who was born in 1960,\n5)  Mr Musa Kushtov, who was born in 1961,\n6)  Ms Fatima Kushtova, who was born in 1966 and\n7)  Ms Khulimat Kushtova, who was born in 1968.\nThe applicants are Russian nationals who live in the Republic of Ingushetia, Russia. The first applicant is the mother of the other six applicants and of Mr Ibragim Kushtov, who was born in 1971. 6.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7.  At the material time, Mr Isa Kushtov, Mr Ibragim Kushtov\u2019s older brother, was wanted by the authorities on terrorism charges. Mr Isa Kushtov was killed in Ingushetia in July 2006, about six months after the events in question (see the Court\u2019s judgment in Kushtova and Others v. Russia, no. 21885/07, \u00a7\u00a7 7\u20119, 16 January 2014). 8.  On 25 January 2006 Mr Ibragim Kushtov was driving his VAZ-21074 car with registration number B309TX15 (in the documents submitted the number was also referred to as B309\u041aX15) near Magas airport in Ingushetia when he was stopped by policemen, forced into a Niva vehicle and taken away. His car was left behind. The circumstances of the incident were described by a witness, M., who submitted as follows:\n\u201cOn 25 January 2006 I witnessed the capture of a young man who was about 30 to 35 years old at around 5.30 p.m. ... I saw two traffic police officers stop ... a white VAZ-2107. When the driver got out of the car, one of the police officers hit him in the face twice and they started fighting. Suddenly two Niva cars (one white and one blue) drove up. Six military personnel jumped out of them. They were wearing camouflage uniforms and masks ... Some of them were not wearing masks. They looked Slavic and spoke Russian without an accent. I have seen only Federal Security Service members wear such uniforms. The people who got out of the blue Niva were wearing dark uniforms. The driver did not wear a uniform. He spoke like a local. All the men assaulted the [young man] and started beating him. Somehow, he managed to break free and started running down the road. I saw one of the servicemen shoot at him ... A bit later [the young man] stumbled and fell down. I cannot say whether he was wounded. [The other men] caught up with him and beat him again. They opened the back door of the white Niva and pushed him in. They then left ... I have no doubt that they were with the Federal Security Service. Only those people can move around freely and without hindrance.\u201d\nIt is unclear whether the witness\u2019s statement, which was submitted by the applicants to the Court and dated 3 April 2007, was also given to the authorities. 9.  According to the applicants, State agents abducted Mr Ibragim Kushtov in order to \u201clure Isa Kushtov out of hiding\u201d and that holding suspected terrorists\u2019 relatives in order to make suspects surrender had occurred several times in the region. They referred to the report of the Human Rights Watch NGO \u201cDisappearances in Chechnya as a Crime Against Humanity\u201d[1]. 10.  The Government did not dispute the applicants\u2019 version of events, but stressed that the perpetrators of Mr Ibragim Kushtov\u2019s abduction had been unidentified individuals and not State agents as alleged. 11.  In reply to a request from the Court to submit a copy of documents on the steps taken by the investigation into Mr Ibragim Kushtov\u2019s abduction, the Government furnished copies of criminal case file no. 066000005, running up to 434 pages. The information submitted may be summarised as follows. 12.  The applicants immediately complained about the abduction to various authorities, including the Sunzhenskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office (hereinafter \u201cthe prosecutor\u2019s office\u201d), the Ministry of the Interior (hereinafter \u201cthe police\u201d) and the Federal Security Service (\u0424\u0435\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u0430\u044f \u0421\u043b\u0443\u0436\u0431\u0430 \u0411\u0435\u0437\u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438 (\u0424\u0421\u0411)) (hereinafter \u201cthe FSS\u201d). 13.  On 26 January 2006 the police interviewed the second applicant, who stated that he had learnt of his brother\u2019s abduction from his relatives and that his brother\u2019s white VAZ-2107 car had been taken to the premises of the Sunzhenskiy district police department ( \u0421\u0443\u043d\u0436\u0435\u043d\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0439 \u0440\u0430\u0439\u043e\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u043e\u0442\u0434\u0435\u043b \u0432\u043d\u0443\u0442\u0440\u0435\u043d\u043d\u0438\u0445 \u0434\u0435\u043b (\u0420\u041e\u0412\u0414)) (hereinafter \u201cthe ROVD\u201d). 14.  On 28 January 2006 the prosecutor\u2019s office opened criminal case no. 066000005 in connection with the abduction. 15.  On 9 February 2006 the investigators received a request for information from the human rights NGO Memorial which stated that the first applicant had requested their assistance in the search for her son who had been abducted by law-enforcement officers. The investigators were requested to provide information about which State agency had arrested the first applicant\u2019s relative and on what charges. 16.  On 15 February 2006 the first applicant wrote to the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation asking him to provide security for her and the other applicants. She said in the letter: \u201cOur house has been raided on several occasions by law-enforcement officers in camouflage uniforms and masks, who swore and hit us with rifle butts ... our family has faced a great deal of threats from the law-enforcement agencies and the other State special services\u201d. The complaint was included in the criminal case file. No reply was given to it. 17.  On 29 March 2006 the investigators searched the applicant\u2019s house in the village of Troitskaya (also spelled Troitskoye). No evidence was collected. 18.  On 1 April 2006 the prosecutor\u2019s office refused to open a criminal case related to the first applicant\u2019s allegations of harassment by the law-enforcement agencies. 19.  On 10 April 2006 the Ingushetia FSS informed the investigators that they had not conducted any special operations in Troitskaya on 31 December 2005. 20.  On 13 April 2006 the investigators obtained information on the calls made to and from Mr Ibragim Kushtov\u2019s mobile telephone on the date of the abduction. 21.  On 10 May 2006 the first applicant requested that the investigators provide her with information on the progress of the investigation into her son\u2019s abduction. She was informed in reply that the whereabouts of her son had not been established but that search measures were being taken. 22.  On 17 May 2006 the Ingushetia FSS replied to a request for information from the investigators that the second applicant\u2019s allegations of the possible involvement of FSS agents in the abduction and detention of his brother were not true. 23.  On 28 May 2006 the investigation of the criminal case was suspended for failure to establish the identity of the perpetrators. On 29 May 2006 the applicants were informed of that decision. 24.  On various dates between February and May 2006 the investigators sent numerous information requests to various law-enforcement agencies and penal institutions concerning the possible arrest or detention of Mr Ibragim Kushtov. All of the replies were negative. 25.  On 28 June 2006 the investigation was resumed. 26.  On 26 July 2006 the investigators granted victim status to the second applicant in response to his request of 19 June 2006. 27.  On an unspecified date in June or July 2006 the first applicant again complained to the Prosecutor General, the head of the Federal Security Service and the Minister of the Interior, stating that her family was being threatened by law-enforcement agents, who had harassed her and her relatives and that her son Mr Ibragim Kushtov had been abducted in order to make him confess to crimes he had not committed. 28.  On 28 August 2006 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. 29.  On 28 December 2006 the first applicant requested that the investigators question the many people who had witnessed the abduction. In particular, she stressed that the perpetrators had stopped the traffic during the abduction and that therefore many drivers had stopped and witnessed the events. In addition, Mr Ibragim Kushtov\u2019s car had been stopped by policemen in traffic police uniforms and the incident had taken place about 200 metres from the traffic police station. She enclosed a hand-drawn map of the area in question and the police station\u2019s location. No reply was given to the request. 30.  On 27 November 2006, 29 April 2007 and on 21 December 2007 the investigators refused requests from the first and second applicants to have access to the investigation file. 31.  The investigation was suspended between 22 October 2006 and 25 December 2014, when it was resumed. It is still ongoing. 32.  On 26 January 2006 the investigators questioned Officer M.B. of the traffic police who stated that at about 5.30 p.m. on 25 January 2006 he and two of his colleagues, B.G. and A. Kh., had been on duty at the traffic police station near the airport. An officer of the ROVD, Yu.E., had arrived and told them that unidentified men in two Niva cars had abducted the driver of a white VAZ car about 500 metres from the station. The witness had immediately gone to the scene, where he had found a VAZ-21074 car with registration number B309TX15 and had taken it to the ROVD. The car had been searched there and a driver\u2019s licence in the name of Mr Ibragim Kushtov had been found in it. 33.  On 26 January 2006 the investigators questioned Officer B.G., whose statement was similar to that of M.B. 34.  On 26 January 2006 the investigators also questioned Officer Yu.E. of the ROVD who stated that he had been driving in the vicinity of the airport when he had seen a group of five or six people standing next to a white VAZ-2107 car. They had told him that unidentified men in Nivas, one blue and one white, had just abducted the driver of the white VAZ. 35.  On 30 January 2006 the investigators questioned the fifth applicant, who stated that he and his relatives had found two Chechen women who had witnessed his brother\u2019s abduction by men in two Niva cars. According to the applicant, both women worked at the service station next to where the crime had taken place. Furthermore, on 31 December 2005 a group of ROVD policemen and FSS officers had visited the Kushtov family, looking for Mr Isa Kushtov, who had been wanted by the authorities. The applicant had said during the search that no one in the family, including Mr Ibragim Kushtov, had known Mr Isa Kushtov\u2019s whereabouts since 2002. 36.  On 30 January 2006 the investigators again questioned the ROVD officer Yu. E. who stated that at about 5.30 p.m. on 25 January 2006 he had been off duty and driving home when, about 300 metres from the airport roundabout, he had seen a group of about ten armed men in camouflage uniforms of a black and sand colour in two four-door Nivas, one light and one dark one, with blackened windows. The men had stopped a white VAZ\u20112107 car with the registration number B309TX15, forced out its driver and detained him. The witness had wanted to pull over to find out what was going on, but one of the armed men had waved him on. The witness had then driven further, about 300 metres, and had seen officers from the ROVD at the airport roundabout. He had informed them about the abduction and then reported the incident to the head of the ROVD. According to the witness, the abductors had been armed with Kalashnikov machine guns, had prevented passing cars from pulling over at the scene and had carried out the abduction in the space of a few minutes. 37.  On 30 January 2006 the investigators questioned Ms R.I. who stated that she worked at the service station situated close to the road leading to the airport roundabout. On 25 January 2006 she and her colleague Ms S.S. had seen a crowd of men next to the service station. The witnesses had thought that the men were fighting and wanted to approach them. One of them waved them away. Then a young man had broken away from the crowd and gone about five metres, but the other men had dragged him back and forced him into the back of one of two Niva cars that had been there. Then the abductors had driven off in the direction of the airport. A number of cars had passed by during the incident, but none of them had pulled over. 38.  On 30 January 2006 the investigators also questioned Ms S.S. whose statement about the abduction was similar to that of Ms R.I. In addition, she stated that the abductors, a group of at least five people, had been in uniforms, armed with machine guns and that judging by the position of the VAZ-02107 car, it had been blocked in by the abductors\u2019 two Nivas. 39.  On 31 January 2006 the investigators granted victim status to the first applicant and questioned her. The applicant stated that she had four daughters and five sons, of which Mr Ibragim Kushtov was the youngest. On 25 January 2006, at about 4.50 p.m. Mr Ibragim Kushtov had spoken with someone on the telephone and had left the house. Later in the evening their family had learnt from the Troitskiy district police officer that Mr Ibragim Kushtov had been abducted by men in two Nivas, one white and one grey, and that his car had been left at the crime scene. She further stated that her other son, Mr Isa Kushtov, was wanted by the authorities and that their family had not kept in contact with him. 40.  On 1 and 6 February 2006 the investigators questioned the police officers M.B., B.G and A.Kh. They all stated that at about 5.30 p.m. on 25 January 2006 they and their colleague Kh.B. had been on duty at the police station at the airport roundabout when Officer Yu.E. had informed them that armed men in camouflage uniforms in two white and dark Niva cars had abducted a man from a white VAZ-2107 a few hundred metres from the station and had driven off, leaving the VAZ at the scene. Having reported the incident to their superiors, the witnesses had gone to the crime scene and had found documents in the VAZ-2107 in the name of Mr Ibragim Kushtov. 41.  On 4 February 2006 the investigators questioned the third applicant, who stated that she had learnt of the abduction from her relatives and that on 31 December 2005 local law-enforcement agents had arrived at her relatives\u2019 house looking for Mr Isa Kushtov. 42.  On 6 February 2006 the investigators questioned the ROVD Officer Ab.B. who stated that at about 8 a.m. on 31 December 2005 he and six or seven colleagues had been ordered to detain Mr Isa Kushtov. They had arrived at the first applicant\u2019s house in three cars whose make and model he could not recall. On the way they had been joined by two other vehicles with men in civilian clothing in them. At the applicants\u2019 house they had checked the identity documents of two men and a woman. After about ten minutes, the officers had left the house. He had learnt of Mr Ibragim Kushtov\u2019s abduction only on 6 February 2006. 43.  On 6 February 2006 the investigators questioned Ms M.A. and Ms R.K., both of whom stated that on 25 January 2006 they had been driving with an acquaintance in the latter\u2019s car when they had seen a group of armed men in dark-green camouflage uniforms in two Niva cars, who had been forcing a young man into one of their vehicles. After that, the abductors had driven off, leaving a white VAZ-2107 at the scene. In addition, Ms R.K. stated that she had noticed two traffic police officers sitting in a silver VAZ-21099 parked at the scene of the incident and that she had been surprised to see traffic police officers there as usually they patrolled another area in the vicinity of the airport. 44.  On 7 February 2006 the investigators questioned the head of the ROVD, Officer M. Ev., who stated that on 30 December 2005 his police station had received a request for assistance from the Sunzhen department of the FSS. On 31 December 2005 they and the FSS officers had gone to the village of Troitskaya. The group had comprised twenty officers in four or five vehicles. They had searched the applicants\u2019 house for Mr Isa Kushtov, but to no avail. 45.  On 7 February 2006 the investigators also questioned the second applicant who stated, amongst other things, that in his search for Mr Ibragim Kushtov he had been told by a lawyer, Ms N., that his brother had been detained on FSS premises under the command of Officer S.G. According to the lawyer, Mr Ibragim Kushtov would be released in exchange for his brother Isa. He had been summoned through the lawyer to the FSS for questioning on 7 February 2006, to Officer S. G. Earlier that day S.G. had told the applicant that the FSS was not involved in the abduction and that Mr Ibragim Kushtov might have been detained on the premises of the police\u2019s Department for the Fight Against Organised Crime in Khankala in Chechnya. The witness further stated that on 31 December 2005 a group of officers had visited his family\u2019s house. They had looked for Mr Isa Kushtov and taken photos of Mr Ibragim Kushtov\u2019s car, his identity documents and the house. 46.  On 9 February 2006 the investigators questioned the sixth applicant, who stated that she had learnt of her brother\u2019s abduction from Officer Yu. E., who had arrived at their house on 25 January 2006. Prior to that, on 31 December 2005, their house had been searched by law\u2011enforcement agents who had been looking for her brother Isa. 47.  On 7 February 2006 the investigators questioned the ROVD officer Kh.M. whose statement was similar to that of Officer M. Ev. (see paragraph 44 above). 48.  On 31 March 2006 the investigators again questioned the first applicant. She stated that on several occasions before and after the abduction of her son, groups of armed servicemen from law-enforcement agencies, in camouflage uniforms and balaclavas, had forced their way into her house and searched it, but had found nothing of interest. The servicemen, who had prohibited the family from moving around during the search, had scared her relatives and had on one occasion hit Mr Ibragim Kushtov with their rifle butts. Before the abduction the servicemen had taken photos of Mr Ibragim Kushtov, his documents and the car. 49.  On 19 April 2006 the investigators questioned the applicants\u2019 relative Mr I.K. who stated that he had tried calling Mr Ibragim Kushtov\u2019s mobile telephone at about 5.30 p.m. on 25 January 2006, but to no avail. 50.  On various dates in April and May 2006 the investigators questioned several people who had called or received calls from Mr Ibragim Kushtov\u2019s mobile telephone number on the date of the abduction. All of them either denied having spoken with him, stated that no conversation had taken place or that the telephone number used to call him had not been registered to them. 51.  On 30 June 2006 the investigators made a request to the head of the Ingushetia police to take steps to identify a man who on around 20 March 2006 had arrived at the applicants\u2019 house and told the fifth applicant that Mr Ibragim Kushtov was being detained in a remand prison under somebody else\u2019s name and that he could assist in his release in exchange for money. During his second visit the man had told the applicant that Mr Ibragim Kushtov had been transferred from the remand prison, in Khankala, to \u201cKadyrov\u2019s prison\u201d in Tsentaroy, Chechnya. The man had been a Chechen, in camouflage uniform and had been armed with a Makarov pistol. 52.  On 30 June 2006 the investigators again questioned the fifth applicant, who provided a detailed description of the man who had contacted him around 20 March 2006 concerning the whereabouts of his abducted brother. 53.  On 20 November 2006 the investigators questioned the FSS officer S.G., who stated that he was responsible for the search for Mr Isa Kushtov, who was wanted for a number of crimes. The witness stated that he had no information on the whereabouts of Mr Ibragim Kushtov and that the second applicant\u2019s statement in that regard was untrue (see paragraph 45 above). 54.  On 28 August 2006 the investigation of the criminal case was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators of the crime. The first applicant appealed against the suspension to the Sunzhenskiy District Court (the District Court). 55.  On 22 September 2006 the supervising prosecutor annulled the decision of 28 August 2006 and ordered that the investigation be resumed. On the same date, 22 September 2006, the District Court dismissed the first applicant\u2019s complaint without examination. 56.  On 22 October 2006 the investigation was suspended again for failure to identify the perpetrators. The applicants appealed against the suspension to the District Court. 57.  On 22 January 2007 the District Court upheld the suspension of the proceedings. The applicants appealed to the Supreme Court of Ingushetia (\u201cthe Supreme Court\u201d) stating, amongst other things, that the investigators had failed to take various basic steps, such as questioning the police officers who had been on duty at the checkpoints on the roads leading to and from the crime scene, or requesting information from the FSS and the police about agents who had been using Niva cars on the date of the abduction. 58.  On 20 February 2007 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicants\u2019 appeal as unsubstantiated and upheld the decision to suspend the proceedings.", "references": ["9", "4", "5", "6", "7", "8", "3", "No Label", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["0", "1", "2"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant is a non-governmental organisation that publishes Orlovskaya Iskra, a newspaper in the Orel Region. As of March 2003, the Orel branch of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and the Orel branch of the People\u2019s Patriotic Union of Russia, a nationwide movement, were listed as the applicant organisation\u2019s founders. This information was specified on the front page of the newspaper. 6.  Pursuant to the Articles of incorporation, the founders were in charge of setting up an editorial board and determining the editorial policy; in the case of disagreement on the editorial policy the matter was to be resolved by a meeting of the founders\u2019 representatives. 7.  During the election campaign for the State Duma, the lower chamber of Parliament, on 2 December 2007, the applicant organisation expressed to the Electoral Committee of the Orel Region (see paragraph 41 below) its intention to accept proposals for publication for a fee and, as required by law, published the fees applicable to the publications on behalf of political parties (30,000 roubles (RUB) per page). The applicant organisation specified that the above fee \u201cwas not applicable to the newspaper\u2019s founder\u201d. The applicant organisation signed a contract with the Communist Party for this purpose for publications on 7, 14, 21 and 28 November 2007. The contract mentioned a fee of RUB 30,000 per page; the total amount of the contract was RUB 300,000 for ten pages. Some of the publications in the applicant organisation\u2019s newspaper on these dates did mention the Party\u2019s sponsorship, others did not (see paragraph 8 below). 8.  Apart from the publications mentioned above, on 7 and 14 November 2007 the applicant organisation\u2019s newspaper also published, in the same weekly issues, two articles written by its staff correspondent, Ms O. Both articles were critical of Mr Stroyev, the then governor of the Orel Region and the former Chairman of the Federation Council (the upper chamber of the Russian Parliament). Governor Stroyev was a candidate at those elections: he was no. 1 on the regional list of United Russia (\u0415\u0434\u0438\u043d\u0430\u044f \u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u044f), a political party aligned with President Putin and dominant in the State Duma. The Communist Party was one of the main opposition parties at those elections. 9.  The first article was entitled \u2018Hatred, Stroyev style\u2019. It can be summarised as follows. It described Governor Stroyev as a person consumed by hatred towards people who oppose him. The journalist referred to the decision of the governor to wind up a publicly owned newspaper, Gorod Orel. According to journalist O., that decision was a direct consequence of a conflict between Mr Stroyev and the newspaper\u2019s former editor-in-chief who kept criticising Stroyev\u2019s policies. The speaker of the municipal council, who was politically weak owing to a corruption scandal involving municipal land, was unable to oppose the decision of the governor to close the newspaper. Most of the regional journalists under Stroyev became servile; those few who, like the editor-in-chief of Gorod Orel, remained independent and refused to flatter Mr Stroyev, were subjected to pressure and fell victim to Mr Stroyev\u2019s hatred. The article then turned to the story of two deputies of the regional legislature. They were elected as members of the Communist Party and were originally in opposition to Mr Stroyev, but later they both became members of United Russia. One of them was a businessman. The author suspected that the first deputy had changed political sides because of very serious pressure exerted by the Stroyev administration on local businessmen. The second deputy was a history professor. The article suggested that his decision to leave the Communist Party was also forced. The journalist ironically supposed that in fact Mr Stroyev did not want United Russia to win the elections, since he was doing everything to make the electorate angry with the ruling party. In 2006 the town population voted in large numbers for the Communist Party, which was in fact a vote of disapproval of Mr Stroyev\u2019s policies. However, the journalist supposed that Mr Stroyev\u2019s personal interests always prevailed over those of the United Russia party. The town mayor tried to protect himself by joining United Russia, but this was a weak defence against Mr Stroyev\u2019s hatred. The only people Mr Stroyev loved and defended were his own relatives and prot\u00e9g\u00e9s. The article cited the example of Mr Stroyev\u2019s nephew, a businessman suspected of abuse of public funds and fraud. His case was still pending; the article suggested that regional law-enforcement agencies being discouraged from pursuing the investigation actively. The article then turned to the dismissal of the head of the regional public Audit Chamber, who reported on abuses of funds allocated for road maintenance. The newly appointed head of the Audit Chamber, who was Mr Stroyev\u2019s man, came to the opposite conclusion, namely that the manipulation of the road funds had been perfectly in order. Nevertheless, the money had been spent; as a result, the federal authorities had had to allocate additional funds for road maintenance in the Orel Region. Mr Stroyev tried to get credit for that funding, but it was not United Russia\u2019s money that had been used, as they claimed, but taxpayers\u2019money. In the opinion of the author, by trying to present the whole situation as his personal achievement Mr Stroyev was making a fool of President Putin and of the population of the Orel Region.\nThe article had a long post-scriptum. It cited the European Court\u2019s findings in the case of Chemodurov v. Russia (no. 72683/01, judgment of 31 July 2007). That case concerned a defamation claim lodged by a governor of another Russian region against a journalist of a local newspaper. The case ended with a finding of a violation of Article 10 of the Convention by the Court. The author alluded to similarities between her criticism of Mr Stroyev\u2019s policies and the situation in the Chemodurov case. 10.  The second article was entitled \u2018Stroyev sues people: people sue Stroyev\u2019. It also concerned several topics. It opened with the statement that the electorate of Orel Region did not trust the authorities and at the 2006 and 2007 elections preferred to support the Communist Party. Next, it touched upon the story of Ms Ch., a former forest inspector who was dismissed from her job as a result of a reorganisation of the forestry authority. Forty-two other workers of the forest authority also lost their jobs. The article alleged that the reform of the forest authorities was initiated by Governor Stroyev in breach of federal legislation. It suggested that the reform was driven by the need to facilitate industrial tree-cutting. Ms Ch. sued the regional authorities, and at the relevant time the proceedings were pending. However, in the opinion of the journalist, there was little hope for impartiality on the part of the regional courts. The article then turned to the case of Ms G., who had made statements critical of the governor during a public rally and had been prosecuted for slander. The article then analysed recent public statements of the governor, who had criticised the policy lines of former President Yeltsin, whereas he himself during that period had been Chairman of the Federation Council, and therefore the second most important statesman in the country. According to the journalist, the proceedings in the case of Mr G. were adjourned, probably because Governor Stroyev wanted to avoid a scandal before the date of elections. The article closed with the suggestion that President Putin should not have associated himself such controversial figures as Governor Stroyev. 11.  On 17 November 2007 the Working Group on Informational Disputes of the regional Electoral Committee examined both articles. The Working Group concluded that the articles contained elements of electoral campaigning (\u0430\u0433\u0438\u0442\u0430\u0446\u0438\u044f). The Working Group concluded as follows:\nThe publications contained \u201cnegative, purposeful, systematically published information about a member of the High Political Council of the United Russia political party ... Mr E. Stroyev. The above-mentioned publications have created a negative attitude on the part of the voters towards ... United Russia. Although the text of the articles does not call for people to vote for or against United Russia, all the electorate understand that this is in fact counter-campaigning [against Mr Stroyev]\u201d. The publications \u201cdid not correspond to the current information policy of the organisations editing mass media\u201d, which (the policy) was \u201caimed at informing the voters about the development of the electoral campaign ... [and] about the political parties participating in it\u201d. Those articles, in the opinion of the Electoral Committee, fell \u201coutside the information space created by the political parties during the ongoing electoral campaign\u201d. The publication of those articles was not paid for from the official campaign fund of any party participating in the campaign, contrary to section 52 \u00a7 6 of the Electoral Rights Act of 2002. 12.  Consequently, in the opinion of the Electoral Committee, publication of those articles amounted to a breach of electoral law punishable by a fine in accordance with Article 5.5 of the Federal Code of Administrative Offences (CAO). 13.  The official of the Electoral Committee compiled an administrative offence record against the applicant organisation, referring to the legislative provisions defining \u201ccampaigning\u201d (see paragraph 40 below):\n\u201c[The applicant organisation] has committed an administrative offence: publications on 7 and 14 November 2007 containing elements of election campaigning as defined in sections 10 and 55 \u00a7 1(6) of the State Duma Deputies Elections Act\u201d ...\nLiability for this offence is prescribed under: Article 5.5 \u00a7 1 of the CAO.\u201d 14.  The case was then submitted to a justice of the peace. On 29 November 2007 the justice of the peace examined the case. At the hearing the editor-in-chief of the newspaper explained that both articles were informational in essence and were not a part of the election campaign. They reflected the author\u2019s opinion of Governor Stroyev. Consequently, there was no need for those articles to be paid for from any candidate\u2019s campaign fund. 15.  The judge held that, according to the State Duma Deputies Elections Act of 2005, taken in conjunction with the Electoral Rights Act, \u201celection campaigning\u201d meant publications where information about one of the candidates prevailed and was combined with negative comment about him or her. Having studied the impugned articles the judge agreed with the Electoral Committee that they primarily concerned candidate Stroyev, and secondly were negative. The judge concluded that those articles were in substance election \u201ccampaigning\u201d. Such material should either have been paid for from the campaign fund of one of the candidates or have been published free of charge; in any event, the newspaper had been required to indicate who had sponsored the publication. No such mention had been made in the articles. Consequently, the publication of both articles amounted to a breach of the electoral law. The applicant organisation was therefore found guilty of the administrative offence described in Article 5.5 \u00a7 1 of the Code of Administrative Offences of 2001 (hereinafter \u201cthe CAO\u201d). The justice of the peace ordered the applicant organisation to pay a fine of 35,000 roubles (RUB, equivalent to 1,000 euros (EUR) at the time). 16.  The applicant organisation appealed to the Zheleznodorozhny District Court of Orel. On 27 December 2007 it heard the applicant organisation\u2019s representatives and rejected the appeal. The relevant extract from the judgment reads as follows:\n\u201cHaving regard to the fact that the publication of the above articles took place during an election campaign period, the judge considers that the above-mentioned articles contained elements of election campaigning, and therefore could be described as campaign literature. This conclusion is supported by the words of the representatives of the newspaper ... who acknowledged that the articles contained criticism of Governor Stroyev ...\u201d 17.  The appeal decision entered into legal force on the same date. 18.  On unspecified dates the applicant organisation received a copy of this decision and lodged a supervisory-review application with the President of the Orel Regional Court. The scope of that application remains unclear. 19.  Without holding a hearing, on 29 January 2008 the acting president of the court issued a decision dismissing the application. The reasoning of the decision of the acting president was identical to that of the lower courts. On an unspecified date the applicant organisation received a copy of the acting president\u2019s decision. 20.  The applicant organisation then lodged a supervisory-review application with the President of the Supreme Court of Russia. The scope of this application remains unclear. On 19 June 2008 the Vice-President dismissed it. On an unspecified date the applicant organisation received a copy of this decision. 21.  On an unspecified date the applicant organisation introduced an individual application before the Constitutional Court of Russia, arguing that the impugned provisions of the Electoral Rights Act and the State Duma Deputies Election Act ran counter to freedom of the press. The Acts de facto regarded any critical material published during a pre-election period as \u201ccampaigning\u201d, and imposed additional requirements on such publications. 22.  By a letter of 23 October 2008 the Registry of the Constitutional Court informed the applicant organisation that its application was not allowed because, in substance, it was merely challenging the factual and legal findings made by the courts in the administrative offence case. 23.  On an unspecified date the applicant organisation resubmitted its application to the Constitutional Court. On 25 December 2008 a panel of judges of the Constitutional Court issued a decision (\u043e\u043f\u0440\u0435\u0434\u0435\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435) refusing examination of the application. It held as follows:\n\u201cIn its ruling of 30 October 2003 the Constitutional Court made the following statement of principle concerning a distinction between information for voters and pre-election campaigning. To protect the right to free elections, freedom of expression on the part of the mass media may be restricted, provided that the balance of constitutional values has been respected ...\n[The Electoral Rights Act] distinguishes between information for voters appearing in the mass media and pre-election campaigning by them. Both information and campaigning can influence voters to make certain choices, thus the obvious and only criterion to distinguish between them would be the existence of a particular aim, namely to incline voters to support or oppose a certain candidate ... Without such an aim in mind there would be no dividing line between information and campaigning, to the effect that all information would amount to campaigning. This would go against the constitutional guarantees of freedom of information and freedom of expression ...\nIt is incumbent on the courts and other authorities to establish that there is a campaigning aim in each case ... Thus, in view of the above statement of principle, the impugned legislative provisions cannot be considered to have violated the applicant organisation\u2019s rights or freedoms ... Establishment of the specific circumstances (whether or not the information provided by the applicant organisation concerned the electoral campaign rather than the reporting on the candidate\u2019s professional activity as a governor) are beyond of the Constitutional Court\u2019s competence ...\u201d", "references": ["3", "4", "7", "9", "1", "5", "2", "0", "8", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1981 and lived in Yoshkar-Ola before his conviction. 6.  On 29 August 2007 A.K., who had left home the previous day intending to sell his car, was reported missing. On the same day his car was found on the outskirts of Yoshkar-Ola. The investigative committee at the Yoshkar\u2011Ola town prosecutor\u2019s office opened criminal proceedings in respect of A.K.\u2019s alleged murder. The criminal investigation department of the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Mariy El carried out operational and search activities aimed at establishing A.K.\u2019s whereabouts and the circumstances of his disappearance. 7.  According to a record drawn up by investigator A., on 7 September 2007 A.K.\u2019s body was found and the place of its location examined. 8.  At 8.55 p.m. investigator G. drew up a record of the applicant\u2019s arrest as a suspect in the murder case, indicating that the applicant had been arrested at 8.55 p.m. that day. 9.  From 9.15 p.m. to 9.35 p.m. investigator A. examined the applicant as a suspect in the presence of V.K., a lawyer provided by the State at the applicant\u2019s request. The applicant refused to give statements, relying on Article 51 of the Constitution (privilege against self\u2011incrimination).\n(b)  Police officers\u2019 version 10.  According to operative police officers (\u043e\u043f\u0435\u0440\u0443\u043f\u043e\u043b\u043d\u043e\u043c\u043e\u0447\u0435\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0435), D.K., O. and S., they received information concerning the applicant\u2019s involvement in A.K.\u2019s murder. At about 5 or 6 p.m. on 7 September 2007 they came to the applicant\u2019s home and invited him to answer some questions; they took him with his consent to their office at the Yoshkar\u2011Ola Central police station; during his interview the applicant told them that he had murdered A.K. by strangling him in order to steal A.K.\u2019s car and that he could show them where A.K.\u2019s body had been hidden. 11.  At about 6 p.m. or 7 p.m. D.K., O. and S. took the applicant to a place on the outskirts of Yoshkar-Ola where he pointed out the location of A.K.\u2019s body. They called investigator A., who arrived with other members of the investigative team, carried out an examination of the place and seized the body.\n(c)  The applicant\u2019s version 12.  The applicant provided a different version of his arrest and the events which followed. According to him, at 3 p.m., when he and his girlfriend were buying something at a kiosk in the street, three men in plain clothes approached him, pushed him to the tarmac, handcuffed him and put him in an unmarked car without any explanation. A plastic bag was put over his head, making it difficult for him to breathe, and he was taken to a forest, where the three men subjected him to ill-treatment, demanding that he accept their conditions and do as he was told. He was punched (in particular on the forehead), kicked (after he had fallen to the ground), and administered electric shocks through wires attached to the thumbs. He agreed to cooperate and was taken to investigator G at the Yoshkar\u2011Ola Central police station. 13.  During the criminal proceedings against him the applicant asserted that he had never shown the whereabouts of A.K.\u2019s body to the investigating authorities; rather, it was his co-accused R.K. who had shown them the body (see paragraph 37 below).\n(d)  Injuries recorded at the temporary detention facility 14.  At 10.45 p.m. the applicant was placed in a temporary detention facility (\u201cthe IVS\u201d) at the Ministry of Interior of Mariy El. An officer on duty recorded the following injuries on him: a swelling and a haematoma on the left side of the forehead; haematomas on the right side of the chest, on the right shoulder and right shoulder blade; and abrasions on the back in the region of the waist. 15.  At 2.35 p.m. on 8 September 2007 the applicant was taken from the IVS to investigator G. to take part in two confrontations, which were carried out between 3.30 p.m. and 5.25 p.m. The applicant, who was represented by lawyer V.K., again refused to give statements. 16.  According to the IVS\u2019s records, the applicant was brought back to the IVS at 3.20 a.m.\n(b)  Investigator\u2019s version 17.  In a \u201cstatement of surrender and confession\u201d (\u044f\u0432\u043a\u0430 \u0441 \u043f\u043e\u0432\u0438\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0439) drawn up by investigator G. at 7 p.m. in the absence of a lawyer, the applicant confessed to participating in a conspiracy to murder A.K. and to stealing A.K.\u2019s car. The applicant stated that A.K. had been strangled by his partners in crime, R.K. and M.Ts. 18.  According to investigator G., that day the applicant remained in his office until he was taken back to the IVS.\n(c)  The applicant\u2019s version 19.  According to the applicant, investigator G. demanded that he confess to the crimes. The applicant refused, and after 9 p.m., G. telephoned someone and three men took the applicant out of the town by car. They beat him up, strangled him, threatened him with a revolver, tied him up with a car tow rope, threw him into a pit dug by one of them and threatened to bury him alive, demanding that he confess to the murder. After being taken back to the IVS, the applicant signed a statement of surrender and confession, as requested by the investigator. 20.  During the criminal proceedings against him the applicant stated that he had never signed the statement of surrender and confession, and that his signature on the record had been forged by the investigator. On 16 July 2008 a criminal complaint lodged by the applicant on 1 February 2008 against the investigator was dismissed after a handwriting expert was unable to determine whether his signature had been forged. 21.  At 8.20 a.m. on 9 September 2007 the applicant was taken to investigator G., charged with murder and robbery, and questioned as an accused in the presence of lawyer V.K. According to the record of his questioning, he stated that he had given the statement of surrender and confession the previous day voluntarily, without any pressure from police officers. He reiterated his self-incriminating statements. 22.  During the criminal proceedings against him the applicant claimed that he had never signed the record of his questioning as an accused, and that his signature on the record had been forged by an investigator. A handwriting expert, whose opinion was sought by an investigator, concluded that a handwritten note in which the applicant fully acknowledged his guilt of A.K.\u2019s murder had been written by the applicant, but that it was impossible to determine whether he had also signed that record. On 16 July 2008 the applicant\u2019s criminal complaint against the investigator (see paragraph 20 above) was dismissed.\n(b)  Detention on remand 23.  On the same day the Yoshkar-Ola Town Court, at a hearing held in the presence of the applicant and his lawyer, V.K., investigator G. and a prosecutor, ordered that the applicant be detained on remand.\n(c)  Injuries recorded at the pre-trial detention facility 24.  At 5.30 p.m. he was placed in pre\u2011trial detention facility IZ-12/1. Upon his admission he was examined by a medical assistant, who recorded the following injuries on him: an 8-cm-long bruise on the front side of the neck, a bruise 2 cm in diameter on the right side of the chest, and a 3\u2011cm\u2011long abrasion at the level of the first lumbar vertebra. 25.  On 17 October 2007 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Prosecutor\u2019s Office of the Republic of Mariy El, requesting that investigator G. and the police officers responsible for his ill-treatment (see paragraphs 12 and 19 above) be prosecuted. An inquiry into his allegations was carried out under Article 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (\u201cCCrP\u201d) by the investigative committee of the Mariy El prosecutor\u2019s office. 26.  The pit into which the applicant had allegedly been thrown on 8 September 2007 with the threat that he would be buried alive was located in a forest at a place pointed out by the applicant. Statements were taken from investigators and police officers. Investigator G. and operative police officers D.K., O. and S. denied having ill-treated the applicant. 27.  On 18 December 2007 an investigator ordered a forensic expert medical report concerning the applicant\u2019s injuries, as recorded in pre\u2011trial detention facility IZ-12/1 (see paragraph 24 above). In a report dated 19 December 2007 the forensic medical expert concluded that the injuries could have been caused by hard blunt objects. They had not resulted in a health disorder of sufficiently long a duration for it to be categorised as health damage. The information contained in the medical records made available to the expert did not make it possible to establish the time at which the injuries had been inflicted. 28.  Investigators refused five times (on 2 and 19 November and 13 December 2007, and 7 April and 29 June 2008) to open criminal proceedings in respect of the applicant\u2019s allegations for lack of the event of a crime (\u043e\u0442\u0441\u0443\u0442\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0438\u0435 \u0441\u043e\u0431\u044b\u0442\u0438\u044f \u043f\u0440\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0443\u043f\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f). Each time their decision was annulled as unlawful and unfounded by their superior at the Mariy El prosecutor\u2019s office and an additional inquiry ordered. The annulment of the investigators\u2019 refusals of 13 December 2007, 7 April 2008 and 29 June 2008 followed the Yoshkar\u2011Ola Town Court\u2019s findings of 3 March, 29 May and 31 July 2008 respectively that those refusals had been unlawful and lacking reasoning. 29.  The Town Court\u2019s decision of 31 July 2008 was initially set aside after an appeal by the prosecutor before the Mariy El Supreme Court on 22 September 2008 for the reasons that on 15 August 2008 the criminal case against the applicant had been transferred for trial to the Mariy El Supreme Court, that those proceedings were pending, and that it was open for the applicant to raise in the course of his trial complaints concerning his ill\u2011treatment. In supervisory review proceedings on 22 October 2010 the Presidium of the Mariy El Supreme Court quashed the decision of 22 September 2008. It found that the decision had been based on an erroneous interpretation of criminal procedural law and had failed to take into account Article 46 of the Russian Constitution, which guaranteed access to court in respect of complaints against decisions of State authorities. It noted that the Constitutional Court had explained that it was possible under Article 125 of the CCrP to appeal against decisions made by (as well as actions undertaken by or inaction on the part of) investigating authorities at the pre-trial stage of proceedings, regardless of whether issues addressed in those decisions were connected to circumstances concerning other pending or completed criminal proceedings. The Presidium referred to the Constitutional Court\u2019s decisions no. 369-O of 18 November 2004, 156\u2011O of 25 March 2004, 500-O of 20 December 2005, 576-O-P of 19 May 2009, 1107-O-O of 13 October 2009 and 79-O of 16 March 2006. The Mariy El Supreme Court stressed that in the course of a trial the task of a court was to examine the admissibility of evidence and other questions relevant to the merits of the case; such questions were factually and legally different from those examined in a review under Article 125 of the CCrP. On 22 November 2010, following supervisory review and appeal proceedings, the Town Court\u2019s decision of 31 July 2008 entered into force. 30.  The most recent decision of the investigative committee of the Mariy El prosecutor\u2019s office was taken on 9 March 2011. An investigator again refused to institute criminal proceedings against investigator G. and police officers D.K., O., S. and Z. for lack of the event of a crime under Article 24 \u00a7 1 (1) of the CCrP. Relying on the statements of the applicant\u2019s co\u2011accused, R.K., the investigator concluded that the injuries found on the applicant upon his admission to the IVS could have been inflicted by A.K. on 28 August 2007. R.K. stated that shortly before A.K.\u2019s murder the applicant and A.K. had had a fight in a car and that he had seen them delivering several blows to each other. R.K. was unable to say where A.K. had hit the applicant. As regards the bruise on the applicant\u2019s neck recorded upon his admission to the SIZO on 9 September 2007, the investigator noted that its cause had not been established and concluded that it could have been self-inflicted. 31.  On 7 October 2011 the Yoshkar-Ola Town Court dismissed an appeal by the applicant against the investigator\u2019s decision of 9 March 2011. It found that the investigator had carried out a comprehensive inquiry, having exhausted all possibilities for collecting evidence, and that his decision had been lawful and well-reasoned. 32.  On 5 December 2011 the Mariy El Supreme Court dismissed an appeal by the applicant against the Town Court\u2019s decision. It stated that in a review of an investigator\u2019s decision not to initiate criminal proceedings under Article 125 of the CCrP a court\u2019s task was to check whether the procedure for the examination of a complaint regarding the commission of a crime had been observed. The Mariy El Supreme Court noted that the Town Court had examined the material gathered during the course of the inquiry and established that the applicant\u2019s arguments had been examined by the investigator. It fully endorsed the Town Court\u2019s findings that the inquiry had been thorough and the investigator\u2019s decision of 9 March 2011 lawful and reasoned. 33.  On 12 December 2011 first deputy prosecutor of the Republic of Mariy El annulled the investigator\u2019s decision of 9 March 2011 as unlawful, lacking reasoning and proper assessment of evidence, and based on an inquiry which had not been thorough and had not exhausted all possibilities for collecting evidence. In particular, the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill\u2011treatment had not been refuted; the circumstances in which he had received the injuries had not been established; the existence of the pit at the place of the applicant\u2019s alleged ill-treatment had not been assessed; the allegations of electric shocks had not been verified; and the forensic medical expert had not been given all the necessary information (including the applicant\u2019s version of the cause of the injuries). Consequently, the forensic expert (see paragraph 27 above) had not made a full assessment, in particular of the injuries recorded upon the applicant\u2019s admission to the IVS. The prosecutor further noted that (i) the IVS records, which recorded at what times in the period from 7 until 9 September 2007 the applicant had been taken from the detention facility for the purpose of carrying out investigative actions and when he had been brought back, had not been assessed, and (ii) the documents indicating the grounds for the applicant\u2019s absence from the detention facility were missing. It was necessary, inter alia, to establish the applicant\u2019s location and a detailed chronology of the events in which had had participated in the period from 7 until 9 September 2007, taking into account the fact that he had actually been arrested at 3 p.m. on 7 September 2007, as established at the applicant\u2019s trial. The prosecutor ordered that the investigative committee of the Mariy El prosecutor\u2019s office carry out an additional inquiry. 34.  The applicant\u2019s case was heard by the Mariy El Supreme Court. On 20 August 2008 it ordered that a preliminary hearing be held in order to examine the applicant\u2019s request for the exclusion of some evidence as inadmissible. On 28 August 2008 the applicant withdrew his request. On 1 September 2008 the Mariy El Supreme Court \u2013 after hearing the applicant and his legal counsel, who confirmed the withdrawal of the request \u2013 ruled that the request should not therefore be examined. According to the trial records of 23 October 2008, in the course of the trial the applicant lodged a new request for the exclusion of some evidence as inadmissible, which he again withdrew. 35.  As regards the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment, the first\u2011instance court (\u201cthe trial court\u201d) examined witnesses and other evidence collected in the course of the inquiry carried out by the investigative committee of the Mariy El prosecutor\u2019s office. In particular, it heard investigators A. and G. and police officers O. and S., who denied having ill-treated the applicant. A., O. and S. stated that the applicant had pointed out the location of A.K.\u2019s body. The trial court found it impossible to establish the circumstances in which the applicant had received the injuries. It noted that it could examine allegations of unlawful investigative methods as long as the admissibility of evidence was at issue, and that this was not the case because no evidence whose admissibility would have been prejudiced by the discovery of the applicant\u2019s injuries had been examined by it. It stressed that the circumstances in which the applicant\u2019s injuries had been inflicted could be established by the relevant law enforcement authorities by means of an inquiry. 36.  In respect of an attack on A.K. in his car shortly before his murder, R.K. stated that he had seen the applicant punching A.K. to the head and body and A.K. trying to defend himself. In respect of the same episode another of the applicant\u2019s co-accused, M.Ts., who had also been in the car, stated that he had seen the applicant beating A.K. and A.K. covering himself from the blows. 37.  The applicant pleaded not guilty. When asked whether he had been taken to the place where A.K.\u2019s body had been found, he answered that he had been taken by car to an unknown place, where he had seen R.K. talking to police officers. R.K. had been covered in mud. The applicant had been told by a driver that R.K. had dug out A.K.\u2019s body with his bare hands. The applicant further stated that he had not written the statement of surrender and confession. 38.  In its judgment of 5 November 2008 the Mariy El Supreme Court established that the applicant had murdered A.K. by strangling and had stolen his car. It found the applicant guilty of murder and robbery and sentenced him to sixteen years\u2019 imprisonment. The finding of the applicant\u2019s guilt was based, inter alia, on statements made by R.K. and M.Ts. (his accomplices in the robbery and eyewitnesses to the murder). In deciding on the punishment for the robbery the Mariy El Supreme Court held that the applicant had played an active role in solving the crime by pointing out the location of A.K.\u2019s body, and that this constituted a mitigating circumstance. The applicant\u2019s co\u2011accused, R.K. and Ts., were convicted of aggravated robbery and sentenced to three and a half and three years\u2019 imprisonment respectively; in M.Ts.\u2019s case the sentence was suspended. 39.  The applicant lodged an appeal with the Russian Supreme Court against the judgment, complaining, inter alia, that the Mariy El Supreme Court should not have examined as evidence the witness statements made by A., O. and S. He further complained that his sentence in respect of the murder had been unfair because, in contrast with the decision on the punishment for the robbery, his disclosure of the whereabouts of A.K.\u2019s body had not been taken into account as a mitigating circumstance. 40.  On 5 February 2009 the Russian Supreme Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld the judgment of the Mariy El Supreme Court. It stated that in view of the disputed origin of the applicant\u2019s injuries the trial court had rightly not used evidence adduced at the time of the applicant\u2019s alleged ill-treatment. It agreed with the applicant that the record of his arrest had been drawn up more than three hours after his actual arrest at 3 p.m. on 7 September 2007, in breach of Article 92 \u00a7 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It further noted that the trial court had rectified that violation by including the time spent by the applicant in pre-trial detention in the sentence to be served.", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "6", "5", "7", "8", "9", "No Label", "1", "2"], "gold": ["1", "2"]}
+{"input": "10.  The applicant, Mr Angelo de Tommaso, is an Italian national who was born in 1963 and lives in Casamassima. 11.  On 22 May 2007 the Bari public prosecutor recommended that the Bari District Court place the applicant under special police supervision (sorveglianza speciale di pubblica sicurezza) for two years, on the basis of Act no. 1423/1956, and impose a compulsory residence order on him during that time. The public prosecutor submitted that the applicant\u2019s previous convictions for drug trafficking, absconding and unlawful possession of weapons showed that he associated with criminals and was a dangerous individual. He also noted that the applicant had been given a \u201cwarning\u201d by the police but had persisted in his criminal conduct. 12.  In submissions of 6 March 2008 the applicant challenged the prosecutor\u2019s recommendation. He argued that there had been a case of mistaken identity and that the alleged breaches of the terms of his special supervision concerned a person who shared his first name and surname but had been born in 1973. He further submitted that no criminal charges had been brought against him since a conviction dating back to 2002. Although he had been convicted of absconding in 2004, that was not a decisive factor for the imposition of the measure in question. He argued that there was no need to place him under special supervision. 13.  In a decision of 11 April 2008, served on 4 July 2008, the Bari District Court placed the applicant under special supervision for two years. It rejected his arguments, finding that the statutory requirements for the imposition of the measure were indeed satisfied, there being no doubt that he was dangerous. 14.  The District Court found that the applicant had \u201cactive\u201d criminal tendencies and that the evidence before it showed that he had derived most of his means of subsistence from criminal activity. 15.  The court observed, in particular:\n\u201cThe subject was issued with a \u2018verbal warning for public safety\u2019 on 18 September 2006, but this did nothing to improve his conduct; he continued to associate regularly with key figures in the local underworld (malavita locale) and carried on committing offences (see statement of charges pending: breach of supervision order on 25 April 2007; breach of supervision order on 29 April 2007).\u201d 16.  The District Court further held:\n\u201cThe findings of the investigation (see documents and certificates in the case file) show that Mr Angelo de Tommaso remains personally involved in various criminal activities, among which the greatest threat to public order and safety is posed by offences against property and weapon- and drug-related offences.\nThis negative picture is compounded by the contents of the recent report issued by the Gioia del Colle carabinieri on 26 January 2008, from which it appears that far from having receded, the subject\u2019s criminal tendencies are still thought to be active and operational. The evidence in the file indicates that he has no fixed and lawful occupation (having declared himself available for employment from February 2008) and that the serious offences under consideration are such as to warrant the conclusion that he has, up until now, derived a significant part of his means of subsistence from criminal activity, by repeatedly resorting to crime either alone or in association with habitual offenders (whether in his municipality of residence or elsewhere). To ensure more thorough monitoring, it is therefore necessary to order not only special police supervision for a period of two years (a measure deemed reasonable on account of the subject\u2019s character as clearly emerges from the acts attributed to him), but also compulsory residence for the same duration.\u201d 17.  The preventive measure imposed the following obligations on the applicant:\n\u2013  to report once a week to the police authority responsible for his supervision;\n\u2013  to start looking for work within a month;\n\u2013  to live in Casamassima and not to change his place of residence;\n\u2013  to lead an honest and law-abiding life and not give cause for suspicion;\n\u2013  not to associate with persons who had a criminal record and who were subject to preventive or security measures;\n\u2013  not to return home later than 10 p.m. or to leave home before 6 a.m., except in case of necessity and only after giving notice to the authorities in good time;\n\u2013  not to keep or carry weapons;\n\u2013  not to go to bars, nightclubs, amusement arcades or brothels and not to attend public meetings;\n\u2013  not to use mobile phones or radio communication devices; and\n\u2013  to have with him at all times the document setting out his obligations (carta precettiva), and to present it to the police authority on request. 18.  On 14 July 2008 the applicant appealed to the Bari Court of Appeal. 19.  On 31 July 2008 the Bari prefecture ordered the withdrawal of the applicant\u2019s driving licence. 20.  In a decision of 28 January 2009, served on the applicant on 4 February 2009, the Court of Appeal allowed his appeal and quashed the preventive measure ex tunc. 21.  The Court of Appeal observed, firstly, that for a preventive measure to be imposed it was necessary to establish that the individual posed a \u201ccurrent danger\u201d, which was not necessarily linked to the commission of a specific offence, but rather to the existence of a complex situation of a certain duration indicating that the individual had a particular lifestyle that prompted alarm for public safety. 22.  In the Court of Appeal\u2019s view, the requirement of a \u201ccurrent\u201d danger to society implied that the relevant decision should relate to the time of the assessment and should remain valid throughout its implementation; any previous circumstances could be taken into account only in relation to their impact on the \u201ccurrent\u201d element. 23.  The court found that at the time the measure had been imposed, the applicant\u2019s dangerousness could not have been inferred from any criminal activity. 24.  It then observed that in several final judgments delivered between September 1995 and August 1999 the applicant had been convicted of tobacco smuggling. He had subsequently changed his sphere of activity and until 18 July 2002 had been involved in drug trafficking and handling illegal weapons, offences for which he had been sentenced to four years\u2019 imprisonment in a judgment of 15 March 2003, which had become final on 10 March 2004; he had served his sentence from 18 July 2002 to 4 December 2005. 25.  The Court of Appeal accordingly noted that the applicant\u2019s most recent illegal activities relating to drugs dated back to more than five years before the preventive measure had been imposed. All that the court could hold against him was an offence of absconding, committed on 14 December 2004 (while he had been subject to a compulsory residence order). 26.  The court also pointed out that the breaches of the terms of special supervision committed on 25 and 29 April 2007 concerned a different person, who had the same first name and surname as the applicant but had been born in 1973. 27.  The Court of Appeal held that the District Court had omitted to assess the impact of the rehabilitation purpose of the sentence on the applicant\u2019s personality.\nIt observed in particular:\n\u201cWhile it is true that the application of special supervision is compatible with the status of detention, which relates solely to the time of the execution of the sentence, the assessment of dangerousness is inevitably even more significant in the case of an individual who has fully served his sentence and has committed no further offences after his release, as is the case for Mr de Tommaso.\nThe note of 26 January 2008 in which the carabinieri mentioned that Mr de Tommaso associated with convicted offenders (to whom he had been caught speaking) does not appear sufficient to establish his dangerousness, bearing in mind that Mr de Tommaso has not been the subject of any further judicial proceedings since the decision to impose the preventive measure.\nLastly, the Court of Appeal notes that the material produced by the defence before the District Court and at the hearing before this division indicates that, notwithstanding the typically casual nature of work as a farm labourer, the subject has, at least since his release from prison in 2005 up to the present day, consistently been in lawful employment providing him with a respectable source of income.\nIn conclusion, in March 2008 there were no specific facts from which to infer persistent dangerousness on the part of the subject, who, after serving his lengthy sentence of imprisonment, has not displayed any conduct justifying the assessment made in the judgment appealed against, which is therefore to be quashed.\u201d\nII.  THE GOVERNMENT\u2019S PARTIAL UNILATERAL DECLARATION 28.  On 7 April 2015 the Government submitted a letter containing a friendly-settlement proposal in respect of the part of the application concerning the complaint of a lack of a public hearing in the Bari District Court and Court of Appeal (Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention), as well as a unilateral declaration under Rule 62A of the Rules of Court in relation to that complaint. 29.  In their declaration the Government, referring to the Court\u2019s well\u2011established case-law (Bocellari and Rizza v. Italy, no. 399/02, 13 November 2007; Perre and Others v. Italy, no. 1905/05, 8 July 2008; and Bongiorno and Others v. Italy, no. 4514/07, 5 January 2010), acknowledged that there had been a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention on account of the lack of a public hearing, offered to pay a specified sum in respect of the costs relating to this part of the application and requested that this part of the application be struck out.", "references": ["9", "4", "7", "6", "2", "5", "8", "0", "1", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Poltava. 5.  On 16 September 2004 the applicant, who at that time was undergoing inpatient medical treatment in a psychiatric hospital, was arrested in connection with an offence of fraud. 6.  On 6 October 2006 the Kyivskiy District Court of Poltava found the applicant guilty of having committed fraud as part of a group, and sentenced him to five years\u2019 imprisonment. 7.  On 14 September 2007 and 20 January 2009 the Poltava Regional Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Ukraine respectively upheld that judgment. 8.  From 4 October 2004 to 2 October 2007 the applicant was detained in Poltava Pre-Trial Detention Centre no. 23 (\u201cthe SIZO\u201d).\n(a)  The applicant\u2019s account 9.  During his detention in the SIZO in Poltava, the applicant was held in various cells of the same type. Each cell measured 7 sq. m. and was occupied by three to four people. The window was covered by a metal shield and metal bars, preventing daylight and fresh air from reaching the cell. There was no ventilation in the cell, and most of the detainees were smokers. In the summer it was extremely hot, and this forced everyone to wear very little clothing, and during the winter it was very cold. The light in the cell was very poor, with only an electric bulb of 25-40W positioned above the front door. It was always switched on. A centrally operated radio loudspeaker was constantly on from 6 a.m. to 10 a.m., playing loud and unvaried music. Detainees had no access to television or newspapers. 10.  The cells had poor sanitary conditions and were infested with rats, mice, bedbugs, lice, spiders and cockroaches. They were very damp and the walls were covered with mould and stained with smoke. The toilet was not separated from the living area, had no flush, and emitted a foul smell that lingered in the air. Detainees were forced to eat their meals in close proximity to the toilet. No toiletries, apart from soap, were distributed to them. Bed linen was issued once and for the whole period of detention, which was three years in the applicant\u2019s case. His mattress was dirty and torn. The food was of poor quality, often made from products which had spoiled, and was unvaried. It smelled bad. No meat, fresh fruit or vegetables were provided. Detainees were allowed to take a shower once every seven to ten days, or even once a fortnight, and then only for ten to fifteen minutes. In order to get to the shower area or investigation rooms, or to be transferred to court, detainees had to pass through an underground tunnel which had poor lighting and was flooded with sewage. The shower was dirty and the water flow could not be adjusted. The floor was flooded with dirty water, as the drainage system did not work properly. The hairdresser at the SIZO used the same hair clippers on all of the detainees, without disinfecting them. Only one pair of scissors was available for cutting their nails, and these were also not disinfected. The applicant\u2019s cellmates were often suffering from tuberculosis, hepatitis, and scabies, or were HIV-positive. 11.  Outside walks were at the discretion of the SIZO authorities. Sometimes they took place every other day, and sometimes they took place once a week. 12.  On 9 June 2006 the applicant slit his wrists in protest against the conditions of detention. 13.  From 19 to 26 April 2007 the applicant was placed in a disciplinary cell. The cell had a concrete floor and was flooded with cold water in order to make him suffer more. As a result, he got a fever and had to spend a week at the SIZO\u2019s medical unit. No food or hot water was provided. 14.  On unspecified occasions in 2007 the applicant was taken to court for hearings or to examine his case file. On each occasion his journey took a whole day. He did not receive any food or water during the trips. He was transported in a prison van, which was originally designed to carry a maximum of ten passengers, but which actually contained fifteen to eighteen detainees whose hands were handcuffed behind their backs. Before being placed in the van, the detainees were held in a small, airless and smoky preliminary reception cell. Upon returning to the detention facility, the detainees had to wait for a long time in the van before being transferred to the preliminary reception cell, where they also had to wait to be escorted to their cells. It was very cold in the prison van in winter and hot in summer. During the court hearings the applicant was not taken to the toilet. He had to take an empty plastic bottle with him so that he could relieve himself during hearing breaks. 15.  To support his application, the applicant submitted, inter alia, photos showing the poor sanitary conditions of different cells he claimed to be cells in the SIZO. He also presented written statements from his cellmates.\n(b)  The Government\u2019s account 16.  The Government submitted that the conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention in the SIZO had been adequate, mainly referring to the statutory regulations on detention. They argued that the applicant had been held in seventeen cells of the same type during his detention in the SIZO, and it was unclear which of them he was referring to in his complaint to the Court. The Government provided no details as to the exact size of the cells, but stated that an inspection carried out at some point after the complaint had been communicated to the Government had determined that each cell in the SIZO allowed each detainee at least 2.5 sq. m of personal space, which was in compliance with the relevant domestic standards. A toilet was located in the corner of each cell, separated from the living area by fixed partitions. The windows were protected by metal bars, and allowed daylight and fresh air to reach the cells. All cells were equipped with artificial ventilation and lighting, as well as a radio. The food the applicant received met the standards set by domestic law, and he was provided with bedding in accordance with the relevant regulations. 17.  The Government further denied that there had been rats and insects in the cells, as three times a year thorough measures against rats were implemented and the entire SIZO facility was disinfected. The statutory regulations also provided that the SIZO detainees had weekly access to bathing facilities. The conditions of those facilities were appropriate. Toiletries were available at the SIZO shop, which the applicant was free to use. The applicant\u2019s right to a one-hour daily walk was never breached. 18.  The Government could not provide any information about the dates and conditions of the applicant\u2019s transport to and from the court hearings, because the time-limit for keeping the relevant documents had expired and the records had been destroyed. However, they provided a description of the general transport arrangements and advised that prison vans had been in use in 2004-2007. The vans were designed to accommodate twenty-one people in three compartments (two larger ones and one designed for single occupancy). The vans had no windows, but they were equipped with ventilation grills and had metal bars integrated in the lower and upper part of the vehicle door. The Government further submitted that, on average, it took up to ten minutes to transport detainees from the SIZO to the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Poltava (a distance of 7 km), and about twenty minutes to transport them to the Kyivskiy District Court of Poltava (a distance of 10 km). The latter court was not equipped with a room for defendants, and the detainees were therefore held in the courtroom. They were able to use public toilets. At the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Poltava the detainees were kept in the rooms for defendants, which were equipped with all the necessary sanitary facilities. 19.  From 2 October 2007 to 22 September 2009 the applicant was serving his sentence in Kremenchuk Correctional Colony no. 69 (\u201cthe prison\u201d).\n(a)  The applicant\u2019s account 20.  Upon his arrival, the applicant was put in the admission ward (\u043a\u0430\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0442\u0438\u043d) for fourteen days. The cell measured 13 sq. m and accommodated ten to twelve prisoners. Some of them were suffering from HIV and tuberculosis. There was no daylight in the cell, as the only small window was covered with metal bars, and a grid was attached to it from the outside. The artificial light in the cell was very poor, and there was only an electric bulb of 40W. It was always switched on. There was no natural or artificial ventilation in the cell. The toilet was not separated from the living area, had no flush, and emitted a foul smell that lingered in the air. The cell was infested with rats, mice and cockroaches. Outside walks did not take place on a daily basis, but at the discretion of the prison authorities, and lasted about twenty to thirty minutes. 21.  During his time in the prison, the applicant was placed in the admission ward four times, each time for fourteen days. 22.  The applicant was placed in disciplinary cells three times: from 17 to 22 January 2009, from 2 to 17 March 2009, and from 25 March to 26 June 2009, and on some occasions with people who were suffering from tuberculosis. The cells were dark, damp and cold. The toilet had no flush and emitted a smell. Outside walks lasted about twenty to thirty minutes and took place in very small yards on and under the prison roof, and were allowed to take place three times per week. Once per week the applicant had access to a shower. There was no hot water in the shower and the floor was flooded with dirty cold water. No visits or exchanges of correspondence were allowed. The applicant\u2019s plank bed was chained to the wall from 5 a.m. to 9 p.m., so he had to stand during this time, although this went against his medical prescription. There was no chair in the cell and his walking stick was taken away. 23.  The applicant spent the remainder of his sentence in the socio\u2011psychological unit of the prison (unit no. 5) in the following conditions. 24.  His cell measured 120 sq. m and accommodated seventy to eighty prisoners. Many of them were HIV-positive, suffering from tuberculosis, hepatitis and fungal diseases. The cell was dirty and infested with parasitic insects. The light in the cell was very poor, with eight electric bulbs of 40W, half of which did not work. The artificial ventilation in the cell did not work, and most of the prisoners were smokers. In summer it was extremely hot in the cell and during the winter it was very cold. The prisoners had to cook their food using an open flame, because of power cuts in the unit from 7.30 a.m. to 5 p.m. 25.  No disinfection products were available, and all cellmates shared water containers, scissors and a needle. Shower, toilets and dining rooms were also in an unhygienic state. The toilets had no flush and emitted a foul smell. The food was of poor quality and was often made from products which had spoiled. 26.  Prisoners could use the showers once a week. The bathroom was equipped with fifteen shower taps and it was not possible to adjust the water flow or temperature. 120-150 prisoners had only one hour to complete the whole process, including getting to the bathroom, which was 700 metres away from the cell. Thus, ten prisoners had to share one shower tap at the same time. The floor was flooded with dirty water, as the drainage system did not work properly. The hairdresser at the prison used the same hair clippers on all the prisoners, and these were not disinfected. 27.  To support his allegations, the applicant submitted photos which he claimed were of a disciplinary cell and the exercise yards of the prison. He also referred to interviews former prisoners had given to newspapers, in which they provided, inter alia, a similar description of their detention conditions, including the disciplinary cells. In order to support this part of his application, the applicant also made reference to a complaint to an MP by his former cellmate, who was HIV-positive, and to the newspaper articles mentioned above, which contained interviews with other prisoners. Lastly, he relied on a report by the Ombudsman regarding the general unsatisfactory detention conditions of prisons in Ukraine.\n(b)  The Government\u2019s account 28.  The Government referred to the statutory regulations governing detention in particular types of cells, and submitted the following. 29.  The quarantine cell at the prison measured 27 sq. m and could accommodate up to twelve prisoners. It had two windows, which were not covered with metal bars and could be opened at any time. Four artificial ventilation channels were also available. The artificial light in the cell was ensured with two electric bulbs of 100W and one of 40W. The cell was disinfected on a daily basis and measures against rats were implemented no less than twice a year. The duration of daily outside walks was not less than two hours. 30.  The isolation unit consisted of eight disciplinary cells, two of which were for prisoners suffering from tuberculosis. The concrete floor of all the isolation wards was covered with wooden planks. An appropriate temperature in the cells was ensured by radiators, and daily outside walks lasted not less than an hour. 31.  Each prisoner in unit no. 5 had about 2.2 sq. m of living space. The number of beds corresponded to the number of prisoners, and two prisoners shared one bedside table. HIV-positive prisoners, as well as those suffering from tuberculosis, were held separately from healthy prisoners. The unit had four windows, which could be opened to let in fresh air; artificial ventilation was also available. Artificial light in the cell was ensured with eight electric bulbs of 100W and two of 40W, and the temperature in the unit was never lower than 18\u02daC. Smoking was only allowed in smoking areas, and those who breached the rules faced administrative punishment. The Government denied the applicant\u2019s allegations that there had been power cuts and that the prisoners had had to use an open flame to prepare their food. In this respect, they argued that cooking in the unit had been prohibited by law. 32.  Prisoners were provided with soap and could buy other necessary toiletries, such as toilet paper, toothbrushes and toothpaste, at the prison shop, as the relevant regulations made no provision for these items to be provided by the State. Prisoners had access to bathing facilities once a week, and could use the services of a hairdresser. The hairdresser\u2019s tools were disinfected. The quality and quantity of the food corresponded to the domestic standards, and no cases of poisoning had been registered. 33.  In 1996 and 1998 the applicant sustained head injuries, and in 2004 he suffered spinal trauma. As a result, he experienced neurological dysfunction and his eyesight deteriorated. When arrested, the applicant was undergoing inpatient medical treatment for his health problems at a psychiatric hospital. 34.  On 5 October 2004, upon his arrival at the SIZO, the applicant underwent an initial medical examination by a general practitioner, a psychiatrist, a dentist, a dermatovenereologist, and a tuberculosis specialist. He also had an X-ray. No particular health problems were noted. 35.  According to the applicant, from January 2006 onwards he started experiencing severe pain in his back and legs, and he sought assistance from the medical unit at the SIZO. 36.  On 22 February 2006 the applicant was examined by a neurologist from Poltava Hospital no. 1. The applicant\u2019s mother arranged the appointment with the neurologist, as the SIZO did not have the relevant medical specialist. He was diagnosed with severe after-effects of closed head injuries (in 1996 and 1998), stomping gait syndrome, post-traumatic spinal osteochondrosis, and vertebrogenic left-side polyradiculitis, and was prescribed treatment (\u043d\u0435\u0439\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0456\u0442\u0430\u043d, \u0442\u0456\u043e\u0446\u0435\u0442\u0430\u043c). 37.  On 23 February 2006 the applicant had an X-ray of his spine and was diagnosed with post-traumatic osteochondrosis and spondylarthrosis deformans. 38.  On 10 March 2006, following an X-ray, the applicant was diagnosed with early arthrosis of the left knee. 39.  On unspecified dates in March 2006 the applicant underwent inpatient treatment at the SIZO medical unit on account of his neurological problems and vegetative-vascular dystonia, chronic gastroduodenitis, myopia, and arthrosis of the left knee. 40.  On 26 March 2006 the applicant was registered with a psychiatrist as a result of his going on hunger strike (from 26 March to 12 October 2006) and self-harming (9 June 2006), and he was regularly examined by the psychiatrist. 41.  On 13 April 2006 the applicant was examined by a general practitioner at the SIZO. 42.  On 15 April 2006 the applicant had an X-ray and was diagnosed as having ribs which were too close together. 43.  On 12 October 2006 the applicant was examined by the head of the neurological department of the hospital located at prison no. 100. He was diagnosed with osteochondrosis of the lumbar spine, right-sided lumbodynia, radicular pain syndrome, the after-effects of head injuries, asthenoneurotic syndrome, and toxic polyneuropathy. He was prescribed treatment (\u043f\u0435\u043d\u0442\u043e\u043a\u0441\u0438\u0444\u0456\u043b\u0456\u043d, \u043f\u0456\u0440\u043e\u043a\u0441\u0456\u043a\u0430\u043c, \u043d\u0435\u0439\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0456\u0442\u0430\u043d). 44.  On 27 October 2006 the applicant had an X-ray of his chest and was found to be healthy 45.  On 1 November 2006 the applicant was given a walking stick. 46.  Between 20 February and July 2007 the applicant was examined by a psychiatrist, a surgeon and a general practitioner. They confirmed the earlier diagnosis relating to the problems with his spine. 47.  On 26 July 2007 the applicant was examined by a tuberculosis specialist and was found to be healthy. 48.  On 6 September 2007 the applicant was examined by a neurologist from Poltava Hospital no. 1. His mother had arranged the appointment. The neurologist confirmed the diagnosis of 22 February 2006 and prescribed treatment (\u0434\u0456\u043a\u043b\u0430\u043a, \u043d\u0435\u0439\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0456\u0442\u0430\u043d). 49.  After his transfer to the prison on 2 October 2007, the applicant had a medical examination which confirmed the previous diagnosis. He was advised to undergo inpatient treatment at the neurological department of the hospital at prison no. 100. He stayed at the hospital from 6 to 27 November 2007 and from 12 to 26 February 2008. 50.  On 22 February 2008 the applicant was classified as having group III disability status (group III being the least severe category). He was expected to remain in this category for one year. 51.  On 27 February 2008 the applicant was diagnosed with chronic hepatitis C. 52.  On 11 March 2008 the applicant decided to have an HIV test. According to the results of this test dated 26 March 2008, the applicant had HIV antibodies. He was also diagnosed with persistent generalised lymphadenopathy and registered as an HIV-positive person. 53.  On 10 April 2008 the applicant had an X-ray of his chest and was found to be healthy. 54.  On 12 June 2008 the prison authorities informed the applicant about the results of the HIV test. According to the applicant, the authorities tried to conceal the situation, and he lodged a number of complaints in order to find out about the test results. 55.  In July and August 2008 the applicant complained to different authorities that, despite his requests, no further measures had been taken to specify his diagnosis and provide him with the relevant medical treatment. 56.  On 21 August 2008 the applicant was examined by an infectious disease specialist. He was diagnosed with clinical stage 2 HIV and persistent generalised lymphadenopathy. It was decided that he should be transferred to the hospital at Daryivska Correctional Colony no. 10 in the Kherson Region, which specialised in HIV treatment (\u201cthe HIV Treatment Facility\u201d), in order to decide whether he had to have antiretroviral therapy (ART). The applicant was further prescribed a CD4 cell count at Poltava City Aids Prevention and Control Centre (\u201cthe AIDS Centre\u201d) on 8 October 2008. The Court has not been informed of the results of that test, if any exist. 57.  From 14 October to 13 November 2008 the applicant had a medical examination at the HIV Treatment Facility. 58.  On 1 February 2009 the applicant was diagnosed with a chronic duodenal ulcer at an acute stage. 59.  On 27 February 2009 he was further diagnosed with HIV, chronic compensated hepatitis, a chronic duodenal ulcer in remission, chronic cholecystitis and pancreatitis in remission, and the after-effects of closed head injuries. 60.  On 25 March 2009 the applicant was rediagnosed with clinical stage 1 HIV. 61.  On 3 April 2009 the applicant was examined by a neurologist, who confirmed the earlier diagnosis. 62.  From 27 June 2009 until an unspecified date the applicant had medical treatment at the HIV Treatment Facility on account of his clinical stage 2 HIV, onychomycosis of the feet, vertebrogenic radiculopathy in unstable remission, toxic polyneuropathy, slight myoparesis of the feet, tardive after-effects of closed head injuries, chronic viral hepatitis B in remission and duodenal ulcer in remission. 63.  On 8 July 2009 the applicant was reclassified as having group III disability status for another year, on account of the diagnosis relating to his central nervous system. 64.  On 20 July 2009 the applicant was rediagnosed with clinical stage 2 HIV and onychomycosis of the feet. 65.  On 20 August 2009 the applicant was diagnosed with a duodenal ulcer in remission and chronic hepatitis in remission. 66.  On 22 September 2009, upon being released from the prison, the applicant was declared to be in a satisfactory state of health. He was advised to register with an infectious disease specialist based near his home. 67.  In September 2009 the applicant consulted a neuropathologist, a surgeon and an eye specialist. He was diagnosed with second-degree discirculatory encephalopathy, vestibular-atactic and cephalic syndromes, spinal osteochondrosis, radiculopathy with slight paresis of the right foot, stage 1-2 arthrosis of the knee, hyperopia, phacosclerosis, retinal angiopathy and amblyopia of both eyes. 68.  On 15 October 2009 the applicant was also diagnosed with chronic hepatitis B, a chronic duodenal ulcer in unstable remission, chronic bronchitis and cardiosclerosis. 69.  In November 2009 the applicant had a CD4 cell count, the result of which was 761 cells. On 14 December 2009, at the AIDS Centre, the applicant was diagnosed with clinical stage 2 HIV, recurrent infections of the lower respiratory airways, tuberculosis, chronic viral hepatitis C and a chronic inflammation of the gallbladder. Following this examination, the applicant received unspecified medical assistance at the AIDS Centre and was advised to go before a medical commission which could decide on his assignment to a disability group. 70.  On 13 January 2010 the applicant was classified as having group II disability status. On 31 January 2013 he was confirmed as having this status. 71.  Referring to, inter alia, the medical evidence he had submitted to the Court, the applicant alleged that his health had seriously deteriorated while he was in detention, in particular owing to the poor conditions of his detention, combined with the absence of medical care. 72.  The Government stated that the medical assistance provided to the applicant throughout his detention had been adequate. They provided no medical evidence in this regard, mainly referring to the fact that the SIZO registers for the relevant years on medical assistance provided to detainees by the SIZO medical specialists had been destroyed because the time-limit for keeping those documents had expired. 73.  At the same time, the Government provided some factual information regarding some of the applicant\u2019s medical examinations in both detention facilities. These submissions appear to be based on the information contained in a reply to the applicant\u2019s complaint regarding the lack of medical treatment in prison, which was given by a prosecutor in 2008. The Government asserted that the relevant medical documents had been studied by prosecutors during their inquiries into the applicant\u2019s complaints regarding the lack of medical assistance, and no proof had been found.", "references": ["6", "0", "9", "8", "4", "7", "2", "3", "5", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1984 and lives in Boscana. 6.  At the time of the events the applicant was a police officer. In December 2006 he and another police officer, V.G., arrested two suspects (A.C. and A.V.) on the street and took them to a police station. Since one of the suspects resisted arrest, the police officers used force to make him get into their car. At the police station one of the police officers allegedly kicked one of the suspects in the chest. Both police officers were charged with the offence of ill-treating the suspects. 7.  According to the statements made by the victims to prosecutors, only officer V.G. ill-treated A.C. at the police station by kicking him in the chest. Therefore, on 10 August 2007 the charges against the applicant were dropped. However, on 24 September 2007 that decision was annulled and the applicant was again charged with ill-treating one of the victims during the arrest. 8.  During the court proceedings, the two victims submitted that they had been approached by the two police officers on the street and had been asked to accompany them to the police station. As one of the victims (A.V.) had resisted, the officers had struggled with him and forced him into the car. According to the statements of several witnesses, the two victims were intoxicated. One of the witnesses stated that A.V., who was tall and well\u2011built, had refused to get into the car. The police officers had handcuffed him and had had to punch him in the stomach to make him bend over and enter the vehicle. It does not appear that A.V. suffered any injuries. A.V. submitted that the police officers had continued beating both of them, even after they had got into the police car. A.C. did not confirm that statement. According to the victims, the police officers had taken some personal items off them, including their wallets, immediately after the arrest. 9.  At the police station, the personal items were returned to the victims. According to A.C., he noticed after checking his wallet that his money was missing. He asked V.G. where the money was and, instead of receiving an answer, he received a kick in the chest. V.G. then kicked A.V. as well. A.C. later discovered that he had suffered a fractured rib from the kick. 10.  A.V. made two different and contradictory statements during the court proceedings. He at first submitted that both the applicant and V.G. had kicked him at the police station after he had asked where his wallet and documents were, but later submitted that only V.G. had hit him, using a machine gun for that purpose. Moreover, he submitted that he had not lodged a formal criminal complaint about the alleged ill-treatment and was only involved as a witness in the proceedings. He also stated that he did not have a clear memory of what had happened because of his acute state of intoxication. 11.  In a judgment of 21 May 2009 the Buiucani District Court found that the police officers had used force during the arrest but that the force had not been disproportionate in the circumstances. It acquitted both the applicant and V.G. in respect of that episode. As far as the ill-treatment at the police station was concerned, the court acquitted the applicant and found V.G. guilty of kicking A.C. in the chest. It based its conclusion on the statements of the victims, the accused and witnesses and on medical documents. The Prosecutor\u2019s Office appealed. 12.  On 18 January 2010 the Chi\u015fin\u0103u Court of Appeal upheld the appeal lodged by the Prosecutor\u2019s Office and reversed the judgment of the first\u2011instance court. The applicant was convicted as charged and given a three-year suspended prison sentence. In the process of examination of the appeal, the Court of Appeal did not question the suspects, victims or witnesses again, but only cited some of the statements they had made before the first-instance court. In particular, the Court of Appeal cited the part of A.V.\u2019s statement where he had accused both police officers of ill-treating him at the police station. The rest of his statement was not mentioned. The suspects and the victims were also asked to state whether or not they agreed with the appeal by the Prosecutor\u2019s Office against the judgment of the first\u2011instance court. 13.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. In his submissions to the Supreme Court of Justice the applicant\u2019s lawyer argued, inter alia, that the applicant\u2019s conviction had been contrary to Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention because the Court of Appeal had neither examined the case file nor heard him, the victims or witnesses in person. 14.  On 25 February 2011 the Supreme Court of Justice dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law, finding, inter alia, that in the circumstances of the case it had not been necessary for the Court of Appeal to examine the witnesses again because their statements had not been contested by the defendants. As to the objection that the Court of Appeal had not heard the defendants or the victims in person, the Supreme Court considered that asking them whether they agreed with the appeal had been sufficient to ensure the fairness of the proceedings. Moreover, the Supreme Court argued that the parties had not wished to submit new evidence. 15.  One of the members of the panel of judges of the Supreme Court wrote a dissenting opinion, expressing the view that a new examination of the victims and witnesses before the Court of Appeal had been imperative to ensure the fairness of the proceedings and concluding that the proceedings had not been fair within the meaning of Article 6 of the Convention. 16.  The applicant also lodged an extraordinary appeal with the Supreme Court of Justice, arguing that there had been a breach of Article 6 of the Convention. However, on 27 October 2011, the Supreme Court of Justice dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal.", "references": ["7", "5", "6", "1", "4", "9", "0", "8", "2", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1965 and lives in Traun. 5.  The applicant was employed as a civil servant of the Traun Municipality (Stadtgemeinde Traun). 6.  On 5 August 2002 the applicant declared to resign from his civil service employment as of 31 August 2002. However, on 29 August 2002 he revoked his declaration. 7.  On 12 September 2002 the mayor of Traun informed the applicant that the Traun City Council (Stadtrat) had not been able to accept his revocation and that his employment as a civil servant had therefore ended on 31 August 2002. 8.  On 26 September 2003 the applicant requested that his employment relationship be declared as still valid. On 11 December 2003 the City Council dismissed the request. 9.  On 30 December 2003 the applicant appealed. On 15 January 2004 he requested that suspensive effect be granted in respect of his appeal. On 18 May 2004 he requested that the City Council declare him entitled to (retroactive) payment of his salary as from 1 September 2002. 10.  On 18 June 2004 the Traun Municipal Council (Gemeinderat) dismissed the appeal, holding that the applicant was not entitled to his salary after 31 August 2002 and rejected his request for suspensive effect of 15 January 2004 as having been filed out of time. 11.  On 8 July 2004 the applicant filed an objection (Vorstellung) against the Municipal Council\u2019s decision of 18 June 2004. On 24 June 2005 the Upper Austria Regional Government (hereinafter, \u201cthe Regional Government\u201d) quashed the Municipal Council\u2019s decision in the part rejecting the applicant\u2019s request for suspensive effect of 15 June 2004 (see paragraph 9 above) and referred it back to the lower instance for a new decision. The remainder of the applicant\u2019s objection was dismissed. 12.  On 5 August 2005 the applicant complained to the Constitutional Court (Verfassungsgerichtshof) against the Regional Government\u2019s decision of 24 June 2005. On 25 September 2006 the Constitutional Court declined to examine the complaint and on 15 November 2006, at the applicant\u2019s request, transferred the complaint to the Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgerichtshof). 13.  On 15 November 2007 the Administrative Court lifted the Regional Government\u2019s decision of 24 June 2005 (see paragraph 11 above) on the ground that it had not heard the applicant in order to assess his credibility. 14.  On 4 March 2008 the Regional Government lifted the Municipal Council\u2019s decision of 18 June 2004 (see paragraph 10 above) and referred the case back to the lower instance for a new decision. 15.  On 3 December 2006 the applicant complained to the Administrative Court about the Municipal Council\u2019s failure to decide (S\u00e4umnisbeschwerde) on his request for suspensive effect of 15 January 2004 (see paragraph  9  above). On 31 January 2007 the Administrative Court rejected the complaint because the Municipal Council had not been competent to decide on this issue. 16.  On 25 June 2007 the applicant filed an application for transfer of jurisdiction (Devolutionsantrag) with the Municipal Council regarding his request of 15 January 2004, claiming that the City Council had failed to render a decision in due time. 17.  On 4 January 2008 the applicant complained to the Administrative Court about the Municipal Council\u2019s failure to decide on his request for suspensive effect. 18.  On 27 June 2008 the Municipal Council dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal against the City Council\u2019s decision of 11 December 2003 (see paragraph 8 above) and his request for suspensive effect of 15 January 2004 (see paragraph 9 above). Consequently, on 5 September 2008 the Administrative Court closed the proceedings regarding the applicant\u2019s complaint of 4 January 2008 about the Municipal Council\u2019s failure to decide (see paragraph 17 above) and awarded costs to the applicant. 19.  On 7 July 2008 the applicant filed an objection with the Regional Government against the Municipal Council\u2019s decision of 27 June 2008. 20.  On 4 February 2009 the applicant complained to the Administrative Court about the Regional Government\u2019s failure to decide on his objection. On 9 February 2009 the Regional Government dismissed the objection. Therefore, on 13 March 2009 the Administrative Court closed the proceedings regarding the Regional Government\u2019s failure to decide and awarded costs to the applicant. 21.  On 25 March 2009 the applicant complained to the Constitutional Court against the Regional Government\u2019s decision of 9 February 2009 (see paragraph 20 above). On 29 November 2010 the Constitutional Court declined to examine the complaint and on 27 January 2011, at the applicant\u2019s request, transferred the complaint to the Administrative Court. 22.  On 25 January 2012 the Administrative Court dismissed the complaint against the Regional Government\u2019s decision of 9 February 2009. The decision was served on the applicant\u2019s counsel on 9 February 2012.", "references": ["2", "7", "9", "5", "6", "1", "4", "8", "0", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in London. 5.  From 1997 to 1998, the applicant was the CEO of the Central Wechsel- und Creditbank AG (\u201cCWAG\u201d), a sub-company of the Hungarian national bank (\u201cUNB\u201d). 6.  On 22 December 2000 the Ministry of Finance (Bundesministerium f\u00fcr Finanzen) received anonymous information accusing the applicant of having received untaxed remuneration in the amount of 35,000,000 Austrian Schilling (approximately 2,550,000 euros (EUR))[1] via the Liechtenstein company Tudor AG. 7.  On 15 February 2001 the Investigation Department for Criminal Matters (hereinafter, the \u201cIDCM\u201d) was ordered to conduct investigations. 8.  On 21 September 2001 the IDCM submitted criminal information on suspicion of tax evasion with the Vienna Public Prosecutor\u2019s Office (Staatsanwaltschaft Wien). 9.  On 9 October 2001 the Vienna Regional Criminal Court (Landesgericht f\u00fcr Strafsachen Wien) opened preliminary investigation proceedings against the applicant on the request of the Public Prosecutor\u2019s Office. At the same time the Vienna Regional Criminal Court instructed the Vienna Tax Authority to investigate the case and to submit a final report concerning the amount of taxes evaded. It further issued an order for the applicant\u2019s house to be searched and pursuant to section 412 Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter, the \u201cCCP\u201d) the criminal proceedings were interrupted until the submission of the final report. 10.  On 28 November 2001 the applicant\u2019s house was searched and the applicant was informed about the investigations against him for the first time. 11.  On 22 April 2003 the Vienna Local Tax Authority informed the Vienna Regional Criminal Court that they had completed the investigations and had sent their findings to another Vienna Local Tax Authority which would assess the facts and prepare the final report. 12.  On 5 March 2004 the applicant lodged a request for the discontinuation of the criminal proceedings with the Vienna Regional Criminal Court. 13.  On 14 April 2004 the Vienna Regional Criminal Court rejected the applicant\u2019s request as it could not determine the case without having first obtained a final report from the Tax Authority. 14.  On 8 June 2004 the Tax Authority issued a decision, in which it assessed the applicant\u2019s income tax for the years 1997 and 1998 anew. 15.  On 5 July 2004 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Vienna Independent Financial Panel (Unabh\u00e4ngiger Finanzsenat, Au\u00dfenstelle Wien, hereinafter, the \u201cIFP\u201d). 16.  On 4 December 2007 the applicant\u2019s appeal lodged with the IFP was dismissed as unfounded. 17.  On 7 April 2009 the applicant lodged a further request for the discontinuation of the criminal proceedings against him. 18.  On 27 July 2009 the Vienna Regional Criminal Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s second request for the discontinuation of the criminal proceedings stating that the persecution of the applicant did not seem inadmissible. 19.  On 27 November 2009 that decision was confirmed by the Vienna Court of Appeal. The court noted however that the Tax Authority had still not submitted its final report even though it had concluded the investigations in 2003 and had already issued new tax assessment orders in 2004. It further noted that the measures set by the court and the public prosecutor to accelerate the proceedings were insufficient and amounted to a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention because the administrative proceedings had already ended on 4 December 2007 (when the applicant\u2019s appeal had been dismissed by the IFP). It therefore ordered the public prosecutor to obtain the final report without further delay and thereupon to close the investigative phase as soon as possible. 20.  On 23 June 2010 the Tax Authority submitted the final report, covering three pages. 21.  On 2 August 2010 the public prosecutor issued a bill of indictment against the applicant on the suspicion of tax evasion. 22.  On 15 December 2010 the applicant\u2019s appeal lodged with the Administrative Court was dismissed. 23.  On 21 December 2010 the applicant filed an official liability action against the Republic of Austria, claiming compensation for, inter alia the unreasonable length of the criminal proceedings and the caused loss of earnings. On 30 June 2011 the Vienna Regional Civil Court (Landesgericht f\u00fcr Zivilrechtssachen Wien), upon the applicant\u2019s request, suspended the official liability proceedings pending the outcome of the criminal proceedings. 24.  On 15 April 2011 the Vienna Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s objection to the bill of indictment. 25.  On 15 June 2011 the Vienna Regional Criminal Court held an oral hearing and convicted the applicant pursuant to section 33 \u00a7 1 of the Tax Offences Act for tax evasion and imposed on him a fine of EUR 150,000. 26.  On 8 March 2012 the Supreme Court quashed the judgment and referred the case back to the Vienna Regional Criminal Court. 27.  On 31 August 2012 the Vienna Regional Criminal Court held a hearing and acquitted the applicant of all charges. 28.  Following the termination of the criminal proceedings, the official liability proceedings were apparently continued and were still pending at the date of the last information available to the Court (22 July 2016).", "references": ["4", "8", "1", "7", "2", "9", "5", "0", "6", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1965 and lives in Remanzaccio. 7.  The applicant married A.T., a Moldovan national, and two children were born of the marriage: a daughter in 1992 and a son in 1998. 8.  The applicant alleged that after their marriage her husband had started beating her. However, in 2011 the applicant followed her husband to Italy in order to provide her children with the opportunity of a more serene future. 9.  The applicant submitted that her husband, who was an alcoholic, had already been physically abusing her for a long time when, on 2 June 2012, she requested the intervention of the police after she and her daughter had been assaulted by A.T. 10.  When the police arrived, A.T. had left the family home. He was found in the street in a state of intoxication, with scratches on the left side of his face. The police drew up a report of the incident. The report stated that the applicant had been beaten and bitten in the face and the left leg and that she had a number of bruises. The report also stated that the applicant\u2019s daughter had herself been hit after intervening to protect her mother and presented a neck injury caused by a fingernail and injuries to both arms. The applicant and her daughter were informed of their rights and expressed their intention to go to the hospital accident and emergency unit. 11.  The applicant alleged that she had not, however, been informed of the possibility of lodging a complaint or contacting a shelter for battered women. She also submitted that she went to the accident and emergency unit in order to have her injuries recorded, but that after waiting for three hours she had decided to return home. 12.  The Government, referring to the police report, submitted that there was no evidence that the applicant had gone to the accident and emergency unit. 13.  The applicant submitted that after the assault on 2 June 2012 she had taken refuge in the cellar of her flat and started sleeping there. 14.  She recounted the following events as follows. On 19 August 2012, after receiving a threatening telephone call from her husband, and fearing an attack by him, she decided to leave the house. When she returned home, she found that the cellar door had been broken. She tried telephoning a friend to ask if she could stay the night with her, but no one answered her call. She then decided to go back to the cellar. A.T. attacked her there with a knife and forced her to follow him in order to have sexual relations with his friends. Hoping that she would be able to seek help once outside, she resigned herself to following him. She asked a police patrol in the street for help. 15.  The police merely checked her and A.T.\u2019s identity papers, and despite the applicant\u2019s assertions that she had been threatened and beaten by her husband, they invited her to go home without offering her help and told A.T. to keep away from her. A.T. was fined for unauthorised possession of a lethal weapon. 16.  Shortly after she had returned home, the applicant called the emergency services and was taken to hospital. The doctors noted, among other things, that she suffered from cranial trauma, a head injury, multiple abrasions to her body and a bruise on her chest. It was deemed that her injuries would heal up within a week.\nb)  The Government\u2019s version 17.  The Government indicated that, according to the incident report drawn up by the police, they had arrived at Leopardi Street shortly after midnight. The applicant informed them that she had been hit in the face. A.T. had given the police officers a knife. The applicant told the police that she wanted to go to hospital to have her injuries recorded. She had gone there and A.T. had returned home. The knife had been seized and the applicant fined for unauthorised possession of a lethal weapon. 18.  At the hospital the applicant spoke to a social worker and said that she refused to return home to her husband. She was then given shelter by an association for the protection of female victims of violence, IOTUNOIVOI (\u201cthe association\u201d). 19.  The president of the women\u2019s shelter, accompanied by police officers, went to the cellar where the applicant had been living in order to fetch her clothes and personal effects. 20.  From 20 August onwards A.T. began harassing the applicant by telephoning her and sending her insulting messages. 21.  On 5 September 2012 the applicant lodged a complaint against her husband for bodily harm, ill-treatment and threats of violence, urging the authorities to take prompt action to protect her and her children and to prevent A.T. from approaching them. She stated that she had taken refuge in a women\u2019s shelter and that A.T. was harassing her by telephone. 22.  A.T. was placed under judicial investigation on charges of ill-treating family members, inflicting grievous bodily harm and making threats. The police sent the criminal complaint to the prosecution on 9 October 2012. 23.  On 15 October 2012 the prosecution, having regard to the applicant\u2019s requests for protection measures, ordered urgent investigative measures, in particular requesting the police to find potential witnesses, including the applicant\u2019s daughter. 24.  The applicant was given shelter by the association for three months. 25.  In a letter of 27 August 2012 the head of Udine social services informed the association that there were no resources available to take charge of the applicant or to find alternative accommodation for her. 26.  The Government gave a different interpretation of that letter, saying that, as the applicant had not first been referred to the Udine social services, which cared for victims of violence in the context of another project, called \u201cZero tolerance\u201d, the latter could not pay the association\u2019s expenses. In their submission, female victims of violence could contact social services requesting assistance, which the applicant had not done. 27.  On 4 December 2012 the applicant left the shelter to look for work. 28.  She said that she had first slept in the street before being accommodated by a friend, and had subsequently found a job as an assistant nurse for elderly people and was then able to rent a flat. According to the applicant, A.T. had continued exerting psychological pressure on her to withdraw her complaint. 29.  On 18 March 2013 the prosecution, finding that no investigative measure had been carried out, again asked the police to investigate the applicant\u2019s allegations rapidly. 30.  On 4 April 2013, seven months after she had lodged her complaint, the applicant was questioned for the first time by the police. She altered her statements, mitigating the seriousness of her original allegations. Regarding the episode of June 2012 she stated that A.T. had unsuccessfully attempted to hit her and her daughter. With regard to the incident that had occurred in August 2012, she said that A.T. had hit her but had not threatened her with a knife. A.T. had, however, pretended to turn the knife on himself.\nThe applicant also stated that at the time she had not spoken very good Italian and had not been able to express herself properly. She also stated that A.T. had not forced her to have sex with other people and that she had returned to live at the family home. She said that when she had been living at the shelter provided by the association, she had not spoken to her husband on the telephone because she had been told not to. She stated that, barring her husband\u2019s alcoholism, the situation at home was calm. She concluded by saying that her husband was a good father and a good husband and that there had been no further episodes of violence. 31.  The applicant submitted that she had altered her original statements because of the psychological pressure exerted on her by her husband. 32.  On 30 May 2013 the Udine public prosecutor\u2019s office, after noting, firstly, that the applicant, who had been interviewed in April, had mitigated her allegations against her husband saying that he had not threatened her with a knife and that she had been misunderstood by an employee from the shelter where she had taken refuge and, secondly, that no other violent episode had occurred, asked the investigating judge to close the complaint lodged against A.T. for ill-treatment of family members. Regarding the offence of grievous bodily harm, the prosecuting authorities indicated that they intended to continue the investigations. 33.  In a decision of 1 August 2013 the investigating judge discontinued the part of the complaint concerning the allegations of ill-treatment of family members and threats. He considered that the course of the events was unclear and that, with regard to the alleged ill-treatment, the offence had not been made out because, since the applicant had complained only about the incident of August 2012, the criterion of repeated episodes of violence was not satisfied. 34.  With regard to the complaint of threats aggravated by the use of a weapon, the investigating judge noted that the applicant\u2019s statements were contradictory and that in the report drawn up by the hospital there was no reference to knife injuries. 35.  With regard to the offence of causing bodily harm, the proceedings were continued before the magistrate. A.T. was committed for trial on 28 October 2013. The first hearing was held on 13 February 2014 and A.T. was ordered to pay a fine of 2,000 euros (EUR) on 1 October 2015. 36.  It can be seen from the case file that on 18 November 2013 A.T. received notice of his committal for trial before the magistrate\u2019s court on 19 May 2014 for inflicting bodily harm on the applicant in August 2012. 37.  In the night of 25 November 2013 the applicant sought the intervention of the police in connection with a dispute with her husband. 38.  The police made the following findings in their report: on their arrival they saw that the bedroom door had been broken down and that the floor was strewn with bottles of alcohol. The applicant had stated that her husband was under the influence of alcohol and that she had decided to call for help because she thought he needed a doctor. She told them that she had lodged a complaint against her husband in the past, but that she had subsequently changed her allegations. The applicant\u2019s son had stated that his father had not been violent towards him. Neither the applicant nor her son had shown any traces of violence. 39.  A.T. was taken to hospital in a state of intoxication. In the night he left the hospital and went to an amusement arcade. 40.  While he was walking along the street he was arrested by the police for an identity check at 2.25 a.m. 41.  The police report shows that A.T. was in a state of intoxication and had difficulty keeping his balance and that the police had let him go after stopping and fining him. 42.  At 5 a.m. A.T. entered the family flat armed with a 12 cm kitchen knife with the intention of assaulting the applicant. The applicant\u2019s son attempted to stop him and was stabbed three times. He died of his wounds. The applicant tried to escape but A.T. succeeded in catching up with her in the street, where he stabbed her several times in the chest. 43.  On 1 October 2015 A.T. was convicted by the magistrate\u2019s court of inflicting grievous bodily harm on the applicant, on account of the injuries he had inflicted on her during the incident in August 2012, and sentenced to a fine of EUR 2,000. 6.  Criminal proceedings instituted against A.T. for the murder of his son, the attempted murder of the applicant and ill-treatment of the applicant 44.  On an unspecified date in November 2013 the investigation into acts of ill-treatment was reopened. 45.  A.T. asked to be tried in accordance with the summary procedure (giudizio abbreviato). 46.  On 8 January 2015 A.T. was sentenced to life imprisonment by the Udine preliminary hearings judge for the murder of his son and the attempted murder of his wife and for the offences of ill-treatment of his wife and daughter and unauthorised possession of a prohibited weapon. He was also ordered to pay the applicant, who had applied to join the proceedings as a civil party, EUR 400,000 in damages. 47.  With regard to the ill-treatment, the preliminary hearings judge, after hearing witnesses and the applicant\u2019s daughter, considered that the applicant and her children had been living in a climate of violence. He found that A.T. had been habitually violent and held that, apart from the daily harassment suffered by the applicant, there had been four violent episodes. He added that A.T., at his trial, had confessed to experiencing feelings of hatred towards his wife. According to the preliminary hearings judge, the events of 25 November 2013 were the consequence of an attempt by the applicant to get away from A.T. 48.  On 22 May 2015 A.T. appealed against the judgment.\nIt can be seen from the file that in a judgment of 26 February 2016 the judgment was upheld by the Court of Appeal. However, neither of the parties annexed the judgment to their observations.", "references": ["6", "9", "7", "3", "4", "5", "2", "No Label", "8", "0", "1"], "gold": ["8", "0", "1"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1977 and lives in London. 5.  The applicant left Somalia with his family for the Netherlands in 1992 when he was fifteen years old. After claiming asylum, it would appear that the family were given a period of leave to remain in the Netherlands. During this period the applicant married and had a son, born in 1994. The applicant\u2019s family travelled to the United Kingdom in 1998. The applicant initially remained in the Netherlands but on 11 December 1999 he arrived in the United Kingdom, where he claimed asylum. In doing so, he provided the immigration authorities with a false name and a false immigration history in order to avoid being sent back to the Netherlands. Although the asylum application was unsuccessful the applicant was granted exceptional leave to remain until 2004. 6.  The applicant received ten criminal convictions over the period from 16 November 2001 to 4 August 2005. In December 2007 he was convicted of a public order offence and of failing to surrender. He was sentenced to four and a half months\u2019 imprisonment. 7.  On 29 January 2008 the applicant was served with notice that the Secretary of State intended to make a deportation order against him. The same letter refused an application for indefinite leave to remain in the United Kingdom. The applicant lodged an appeal against the decision to deport him on 1 February 2008. That appeal was dismissed on 30 June 2008 and his appeal rights were exhausted on 8 July 2008. 8.  On 8 February 2008, when the applicant had served half of his final custodial sentence and was eligible for release from prison, he was detained under paragraph 2(2) of Schedule 3 to the Immigration Act 1971 pending the making of a deportation order against him. The Secretary of State signed the deportation order on 29 October 2008 and he was thereafter detained under paragraph 2(2) of Schedule 3 to the Immigration Act 1971 pending his removal from the United Kingdom. 9.  On 2 June 2009 removal directions were set for 17 June 2009. However, they were cancelled on 16 June 2009 when the applicant made an application to this Court (application no. 26023/09), which granted an interim measure under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. 10.  The applicant\u2019s detention was reviewed monthly and the review forms set out the reasons for maintaining detention. The form from July 2009 includes the following statement in reference to the Rule 39 measure: \u201cWhilst this means that enforced removal is not possible, [the applicant] could reduce the length of time he spends in detention by withdrawing voluntarily\u201d. A similar point features in some, if not all, of the later forms. The form for February 2010 notes that \u201cRule 39 ECHR is a barrier to removal but I note that FRS [Facilitated Return Scheme] is an option that should be explored to the full to expedite his removal from the UK\u201d. Likewise, the form for July 2010 states that \u201c[t]he length of detention is a direct result of his appeals against deportation and, although it is now 29 months, he has the real option of return to Somalia with the Facilitated Returns Scheme. This option should be further explained to the subject\u201d. Furthermore, the form from December 2010 indicated that the applicant \u201ccould minimise his time in detention by withdrawing [the application to the ECHR] and taking up FRS which is offered each month\u201d and that he could \u201cend his detention by volunteering to return (with or without FRS) at any time\u201d. 11.  Applications for bail were refused on 9 November 2009, 21 April 2010 and 14 July 2010 as the Immigration Judges were not satisfied that the applicant would answer to any conditions set. On 9 November 2009 the Immigration Judge further noted that although the applicant had been in detention for a lengthy period, \u201cthe most recent period of detention is on account of delays with his own application to the European Court of Human Rights\u201d. 12.  The applicant made further representations against removal on 10 June 2010. Those representations were treated as an application for revocation of the deportation order, but on 17 November 2010 the Secretary of State refused to revoke the order. However, following an appeal by the applicant, the Secretary of State withdrew the refusal decision on 12 July 2011. 13.  On 19 November 2010 the applicant filed a claim for judicial review, contending that his ongoing detention was unlawful. Permission was granted on 17 June 2011 but a further application for bail was refused. On 13 July 2011, some two weeks after the Court ruled in Sufi and Elmi v. the United Kingdom (nos. 8319/07 and 11449/07, 28 June 2011), the applicant was granted bail. 14.  A hearing took place on 7 October 2011. Pursuant to the principles set down by the High Court in R. v. Durham Prison Governor ex parte Hardial Singh [1984] 1 WLR 704 (see section on domestic law below), the Secretary of State cannot lawfully detain a person pending removal for longer than a reasonable period and, if it becomes apparent that the deportation cannot be effected within a reasonable period, the detention will become unlawful even if the reasonable period has not yet expired. The applicant claimed that his detention was in breach of the principles (a) on or after 16 June 2009 when the Court granted an interim measure under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court; (b) on or immediately after 16 June 2010 when he applied to revoke the deportation order; or (c) at all points after the revocation refusal on 17 November 2010. 15.  In a judgment dated 14 November 2011 the Administrative Court dismissed the claim. It noted that in deciding whether or not there was a realistic prospect that deportation would take place within a reasonable time, the risk of absconding or re-offending were \u201cof paramount importance\u201d but neither risk could be regarded as a \u201ctrump card\u201d. Moreover, the fact that the period of detention occurred while the applicant was pursuing an appeal or comparable judicial process would also be a highly relevant factor, especially if there was a risk of absconding or reoffending. 16.  The court noted that the applicant in the present case had six convictions for absconding and the Immigration Judges had consistently concluded that he was a significant abscond risk. It agreed with the Immigration Judges and also concluded that the risk was plainly substantial on the evidence available. Equally, the court took into account the fact that the applicant had family in the country at the times he absconded and therefore, contrary to his assertions, their presence did not remove the risk of absconding. Likewise, the Secretary of State\u2019s detention reviews had characterised the risk of the applicant reoffending as \u201chigh\u201d. The court further noted that the applicant\u2019s offences became less serious and more intermittent as time went on. However, the fact remained that while he was free he was committing offences of such seriousness as to require him to be imprisoned, including robbery and public order offences. The court also considered whether alternatives to detention could be used such as electronic tagging, monitoring by telephone and regular reporting. However, given the applicant\u2019s history of absconding, it concluded that the alternatives would not have been sufficient and there was an absence of adequate assurances from the applicant. 17.  At the time the Administrative Court noted that the interim measure under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, was awaiting a lead judgment on returns to Mogadishu (Sufi and Elmi, cited above) and it was clear that there would be no resolution of the applicant\u2019s claim - and the interim measure would therefore not be lifted - before that judgment was handed down. However, the Administrative Court observed that at the time the interim measure was indicated, there was uncertainty about when that judgment could be expected. Moreover, while the applicants in Sufi and Elmi would have had a reasonable to good prospect of success, a positive outcome had not been inevitable. Consequently, the Administrative Court did not accept that there was not, at the time the interim measure was indicated, a realistic prospect of removing the applicant within a reasonable time. 18.  Furthermore, the court did not accept that by the time of the applicant\u2019s application for a revocation order, a reasonable period had already expired or that there was no realistic prospect of deportation within a reasonable time. In addition, it observed that the Secretary of State had been entitled to take two weeks to consider the applicant\u2019s personal situation in light of the judgment in Sufi and Elmi. It therefore did not consider his continued detention up to 13 July 2011 to be unlawful. 19.  The applicant was granted permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal. On appeal, he restated his arguments concerning the Hardial Singh principles which had been advanced in the court below. In addition, he submitted that the detention was vitiated by two public law errors that bore directly on the decision to detain: first, following the indication of the interim measure the Secretary of State had failed to take any reasonable steps to acquaint herself with when it might be lifted; and secondly, that the detention was maintained on the unlawful basis that the applicant could reduce the length of time in detention by withdrawing his application to the Court and returning voluntarily to Somalia. Finally, the applicant argued that his detention was in breach of Article 5 of the Convention. 20.  In its judgment of 20 October 2012, the Court of Appeal conducted an extensive review of the circumstances of the case, in particular the fact that the applicant\u2019s appeal against deportation as well as three separate bail applications had been rejected by immigration judges, as well as the broader context in relation to the on-going litigation concerning removals to Somalia both before the domestic courts and tribunals as well as before this Court (see \u00a7\u00a7 28 to 32). It took into consideration the fact that the Rule 39 measure applied in the applicant\u2019s case did not involve any specific assessment of risk towards him by this Court, since at the material time this Court had adopted a fact-insensitive approach towards Rule 39 measures in respect of removals to Somalia, and noted the consequence that from October 2008 this Court had adjourned 116 applications concerning removal to Somalia. It also took account of correspondence between the Government and the registry of this Court from which it was clear that from April 2009 the Court would be granting a fact-insensitive Rule 39 measure to any applicant with removal directions to Mogadishu as well as the separate correspondence between the Government and this Court concerning the progress of Sufi and Elmi, cited above and the linked domestic case law. 21.  With regard to the Hardial Singh ground, the Court of Appeal stated that there could be a realistic prospect of success without it being possible to specify or predict the date by which, or the period in which, removal can reasonably be expected to occur. It accepted that at the time of receipt of the Rule 39 measure in the applicant\u2019s case, although it was not possible to say when the proceedings before the Court would be concluded, there was nonetheless a reasonable prospect of their being concluded and of removal being effected within a reasonable time. Likewise, the Court of Appeal saw no reason to differ from the overall conclusion of the lower court on the lawfulness of the applicant\u2019s detention at the time of the application for revocation of the deportation order or after the judgment in Sufi and Elmi was handed down. Lord Justice Elias dissented on one point only: acknowledging that \u201cthere is no one right answer to the question what is a reasonable period\u201d, he believed that the period of two weeks which elapsed following the judgment in Sufi and Elmi before the applicant was released from detention was not reasonable in all the circumstances. 22.  With regard to the second ground of appeal, the court accepted that if the applicant were able to show that the decisions to maintain his detention were vitiated by public law he would succeed in establishing that the detention was unlawful and would have a claim of false imprisonment. However, the Court of Appeal found that although some of the passages in the review forms were not very happily expressed, they did not involve any legal error. Moreover, as the same conclusion was reached regardless of whether or not reference was made to the question of voluntary return, it appeared that the applicant\u2019s refusal of this offer played no material part in the assessment of whether detention should be maintained. 23.  Finally, the court found that Article 5 \u00a7 1(f) of the Convention added nothing of substance in the present case. In reaching this conclusion, it rejected the applicant\u2019s assertion that Mikolenko v. Estonia, no. 10664/05, 8 October 2009 was authority for the proposition that the lack of a realistic prospect of deportation within a defined period rendered detention under Article 5 \u00a7 1(f) unlawful. 24.  The Supreme Court refused the applicant leave to appeal on 26 March 2013.", "references": ["0", "7", "2", "8", "4", "5", "3", "9", "6", "1", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1954 and is currently residing in Kostyantynivka. Before his arrest the applicant was the managing director of a private company, A. 5.  A. concluded a contract with E., a Russian company, undertaking to export a certain amount of ferromanganese to Russia. 6.  During the period from March 2000 to April 2001 the applicant, in his capacity as the director of A., concluded contracts with four Ukrainian companies, F., T., M. and Sh. (\u201cthe seller companies\u201d) According to those contracts A. would buy the goods from the companies and pay them sums which included value added tax (VAT). 7.  On a number of occasions between March 2000 and April 2001 A. exported ferromanganese to Russia, delivered it to E. and received payment for it. Subsequently, A. claimed and, in April 2002, received from the Ukrainian authorities a refund of the VAT mentioned in the contracts with the seller companies. 8.  In 2002 criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant. According to the investigating authorities, the contracts which A. had concluded with the four seller companies were fictitious and had been concluded for the sole purpose of obtaining export VAT refunds. In fact those companies had not sold ferromanganese to A. Instead, the applicant and his co-defendants had bought the ferromanganese from private persons, without concluding any contracts with them and without paying VAT on those transactions. The applicant had then forged certificates of quality and fraudulently obtained certificates of origin for the goods. Using all the above documents, A. had exported the goods to Russia. He had then obtained or applied for VAT refunds based on the fictitious documents. 9.  The applicant stated that the contracts had not been fictitious and the certificates had not been forged. A. had legally bought ferromanganese from the private companies, exported it to Russia and received tax refunds. 10.  During the pre-trial investigation, the investigating authorities questioned managers of the four seller companies and the owner of a lorry which had been used for transporting the goods. They made certain statements the domestic courts subsequently found to be incriminating. In particular, managers of the four seller companies said that the contracts had been either forged or fictitious and that no actual shipments of the goods had taken place. Some of the managers repeated those statements in the course of confrontations with the applicant conducted in the course of the pre-trial investigation. Detailed information about the statements of the witnesses and confrontations can be found in the Table set out in paragraph 17 below. 11.  On an unspecified date the investigation was completed and the case was referred to the Kostyantynivka Court for trial. 12.  On at least five occasions between 28 November 2003 and 27 August 2004 the court ordered the Donetsk regional police to bring the witnesses listed in the Table below to court hearings, but the police failed to do so for various reasons. 13.  On 27 August 2004 the police informed the court, in response to its latest order to bring the witnesses to court, that S., K. and R. (see Elements 1-3 in the Table below) were away from Donetsk on holiday. 14.  At the court hearing held on the same day the prosecutor, in the light of the above-mentioned information from the police, asked the court to read out the pre-trial statements of the witnesses who had failed to appear, including all those listed in the Table below. The defence did not object and the statements were read out. The court then proceeded to examine the documents in the file. 15.  On 29 September 2004 the applicant\u2019s lawyer requested the court to summon S., K. and R. again (see Elements 1-3 in the Table below), because the examination of documents had revealed inconsistencies in their pre-trial statements and because the reasons for their failure to appear had not been established. The trial court refused the request on the grounds that the statements of those witnesses had already been read out at the trial. 16.  On 24 December 2004 the court found the applicant guilty of smuggling (export of ferromanganese based on forged documents), misappropriation accompanied by abuse of office (receipt of tax refunds on the basis of fictitious and forged documents), abuse of office, and forgery of documents. For the charge of misappropriation accompanied by abuse of office the applicant was sentenced under the Criminal Code of 2001 to seven years and six months\u2019 imprisonment with a ban on holding managerial positions for two years. He was also sentenced to various other more lenient punishments under the Criminal Code of 2001, but the court held that the most severe of the applicant\u2019s punishments absorbed the more lenient ones. The final sentence was thus seven years and six months of imprisonment with a ban on holding managerial positions for two years. 17.  In convicting the applicant the court relied, in particular, on the statements of a number of witnesses given during the pre-trial investigation, as shown in the below Table:\nTable. Witness evidence\nElement of the applicant company\u2019s operations to which witness evidence related\nWitnesses, their status and the tenor of their evidence\nCorroborating evidence, if any, in respect of the relevant element of the applicant\u2019s operations\nWas a confrontation conducted during the investigation? Did the applicant insist that the witness be called and examined (paragraphs 14 and 15 above)\nElement 1. Operations with company Sh. S., director: contract was forged\nNone since company Sh. had been wound up and its documentation destroyed \nConfrontation conducted.\nInsisted on examination\nElement 2. Operations with company T. K., director: contract was fictitious\nThe company which was supposed to supply the goods to company T. was deemed by the tax authorities to be fictitious\nConfrontation conducted.\nInsisted on examination\nElement 3. Operations with company \u041c. R., director: contract was fictitious\nThe modus operandi used with company M. was the same as that for other companies. No other corroboration since company M. had been wound up\nNo confrontation conducted.\nInsisted on examination\nElement 4. Operations with company F. N., deputy director: contract was fictitious\nThe company which was supposed to supply the goods to company F. was deemed by the tax authorities to be fictitious\nConfrontation conducted.\nDid not insist on examination P., director: confirmed N.\u2019s statement\nNo confrontation conducted.\nDid not insist on examination\nElement 5. Transportation of the goods\nZh., owner of a lorry \u2013 the lorry was lent to one of the applicant\u2019s co-defendants\nNot relevant \nNo confrontation conducted.\nDid not insist on examination 18.  The trial court also relied on certain inconsistencies between the official records of the applicant\u2019s company and the shadow accounting records discovered by the authorities. 19.  The applicant and his lawyer appealed. They stated, inter alia, that the trial court had relied on the evidence of witnesses who had not been examined at the trial and that he should have been tried for smuggling under the Criminal Code of 1960. 20.  On 4 March 2005 the Donetsk Regional Court of Appeal held that the applicant should be deemed to have been convicted for smuggling under the Criminal Code of 1960 instead of the Criminal Code of 2001. Otherwise, the Court of Appeal upheld the findings of the first-instance court and the applicant\u2019s sentence. 21.  According to the applicant, the appellate court did not give him a copy of the decision of 4 March 2005, despite his numerous requests. 22.  In March 2005 the applicant\u2019s lawyer appealed on points of law to the Supreme Court against the decisions of 24 December 2004 and 4 March 2005 and enclosed copies of those decisions with her appeal. In May, June and August 2005 the applicant lodged his own appeals with the Supreme Court, stating, inter alia, that the trial court had relied on evidence of witnesses who had not been examined at the trial. The applicant also stated that he should have been tried for misappropriation, abuse of office and forgery under the Criminal Code of 1960, rather than the Code of 2001, but did not provide any details. 23.  On 6 September 2005 the Supreme Court heard the case in the presence of the prosecutor but in the absence of the applicant and his lawyer, who were not informed of the date and time of the hearing. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals lodged by the applicant and his lawyer, stating that the lower courts\u2019 findings had been based on a substantial amount of evidence, in particular the statements of the directors of the seller companies made at the investigation stage. 24.  On 15 May 2009 the applicant was released from detention following a presidential pardon.", "references": ["2", "5", "8", "6", "7", "1", "9", "0", "4", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1967 and is currently serving his prison sentence. 6.  At about 10 a.m. on 1 June 2005 O., the president of the Ukrainian Dental Association, was shot at his office with a rifle which the applicant had brought. The applicant was present at O.\u2019s office at the time of the event. He asked for the police and an ambulance to be called and, once the police arrived, stated that an accident had happened. He explained that he and O. were interested in hunting and he had brought the shotgun to O. as a present. While he had been demonstrating the gun to O., the latter had wanted to see it closer and had pulled it towards himself; the gun had accidentally gone off. According to the applicant, once he had replied to the questions of the police, handcuffs were put on him; he was searched and samples were taken from him for forensic examination. His request for a lawyer was allegedly ignored. 7.  On the same date the applicant\u2019s arrest report was drawn up which stated that the applicant had been arrested for the murder of O. at 10 p.m. at the police station. He was subsequently questioned in the presence of K., his lawyer. He pleaded not guilty and repeated his statements made earlier. According to the applicant, his lawyer immediately indicated to the investigator that, under the Code of Criminal Procedure, the applicant had to be provided with the possibility to talk with him in private before the questioning, with a view to defining the legal defence strategy. Having heard that, the applicant insisted on such a meeting. The investigator, however, rejected that request on the ground that the applicant would be able to talk to his lawyer later. 8.  On 2 June 2005 a reconstruction of the crime was carried out in the presence of the applicant\u2019s lawyer. 9.  On 3 June 2005 the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention was ordered by a court. 10.  On 6 June 2005 L. was admitted to the proceedings as the applicant\u2019s second lawyer. 11.  On 9 June 2005 the applicant was charged with murder and questioned in the presence of his lawyers. He pleaded not guilty and repeated his previous statement that O. had been shot by accident. 12.  On 11 August 2005 the applicant was questioned in the presence of K. The applicant repeated his previous statements. 13.  On the same date the applicant and the lawyer K. became aware of the results of a number of forensic examinations in the case. They made no observations in this connection. 14.  On 17 November 2005 criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant for illegal production, possession and storage of firearms. On the same day the applicant was charged with the above offence and questioned in the presence of K. Those proceedings were subsequently joined to the murder case against the applicant. 15.  On 16 January 2006 the case was referred to the Kyiv City Court of Appeal (\u201cthe Court of Appeal\u201d) for trial. Throughout the trial the applicant denied the murder charge and consistently claimed that O. had been shot by accident. 16.  On 19 May 2006 the Court of Appeal, acting as a first-instance court, found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to fifteen years\u2019 imprisonment. The court found that on 27 May 2005 the coordinating council of the Ukrainian Dental Association had held its meeting in Kyiv and the applicant had run for the position of acting executive director of the Association. The victim, O., had proposed another candidate for the same position and that candidate had been elected. The applicant had therefore decided to take revenge and had come to the office of O. with a shotgun and fired twice at O.\u2019s head. The applicant had also been found guilty of modifying the shotgun in question prior to the incident. 17.  The Court of Appeal noted that although the applicant had never pleaded guilty and had claimed that the incident had been an accident, his guilt was proved by the testimonies of witnesses and the results of forensic examinations. In particular, O.\u2019s wife had testified that she had been in the neighbouring office when the incident had taken place and when she had entered her husband\u2019s office she had seen the applicant smiling with satisfaction. She had also maintained that her husband had not liked hunting and therefore would not have accepted a shotgun as a present. The negative attitude of O. to hunting had also been confirmed by his brother. O.\u2019s secretary and one of his colleagues had also confirmed that the applicant had been smiling when they had entered the office after the incident. 18.  Several witnesses had also confirmed that the applicant had shown dissatisfaction with the fact that he had not been elected to the position of the executive director of the Dental Association. 19.  The forensic expert, questioned in the court hearings, had confirmed the conclusions of the examination that the shots had been fired from some distance and not from close range, as the applicant had suggested, given that traces of metals and gunpowder, typically found following close-range shots, had not been found on the victim. The court also noted that the outcome of the ballistic examination as to the distance, trajectory and angle of the entry wounds had not matched the applicant\u2019s version of events. 20.  The applicant appealed. He submitted, inter alia, that his defence rights had been violated as he had not been given an opportunity to talk to his lawyer in private before his questioning at the police station on 1 June 2005, with no further details given. 21.  On 28 November 2006 the Supreme Court, in the presence of the applicant and his two lawyers, upheld the decision of the Court of Appeal, noting the aggregate of evidence against the applicant. 22.  From 5 July 2005 to 25 January 2007 the applicant was detained at Kyiv pre-trial detention centre no. 13 (\u201cthe SIZO\u201d). 23.  According to the applicant, the facility was often overcrowded with the number of detainees exceeding the number of beds. It was infested with insects, cockroaches and mice. The quality and quantity of food was unsatisfactory. There was only one pair of scissors and one hair clippers for the whole SIZO and they were not disinfected prior to or after use. As a result, the applicant contracted Hepatitis B. 24.  From 8 July until 8 November 2005 he was detained in cells nos. 18 and 116 in conditions which were detrimental to his health and incompatible with human dignity. In particular, those cells had no access to natural light as the windows were obscured by metal slats. The walls were permanently wet and covered with mould. The applicant had to share cell no. 116, which measured about 12 square metres, with three other detainees who were heavy smokers. The artificial lighting was not sufficiently powerful with the result that the cells were dim. Their clothes and linen were always wet and cold. 25.  On 7 September, 7 and 21 November 2006 the applicant requested that the investigator allow visits from his family but to no avail; the investigator attempted to extort money from him for granting permission to see the relatives. 26.  On 5 February and 4 July 2006 the applicant asked the Court of Appeal to allow him to correspond with his relatives but received no answer. He unsuccessfully complained of these matters to the prosecutor\u2019s office on a number of occasions. 27.  The applicant was not allowed to visit the SIZO church. His requests to the SIZO governor of 15 July and 1 August 2005 to meet with a priest also remained unanswered. On 6 and 7 September 2005 the applicant further complained to the SIZO administration that his religious literature and some items of a religious nature had been seized by the SIZO staff. On 23 September 2005 a \u201ctalk\u201d was held with the applicant by one of the prison staff on account of his complaints during which it was explained to him that nothing untoward had happened. On 1 October 2006 the applicant complained to the Prosecutor General about the violation of his right to practise his religion but received no reply. 28.  During his stay at the SIZO the applicant was held in twelve different cells (including cells nos. 18 and 116) and was moved fourteen times. 29.  The Government could not provide any information about the number of inmates in the cells at the relevant time or regarding the conditions of the floor, walls and linen because the compulsory period for keeping the relevant documents had expired and the records had been destroyed. 30.  They stated that the general detention conditions in the SIZO had been satisfactory and in compliance with the domestic standards: all the cells had had windows and had been equipped with sufficient artificial lighting; the applicant had been provided with adequate nutrition in accordance with the applicable standards. Scissors and other hairdressing implements had been disinfected after each use in accordance with the relevant regulations. That fact had been confirmed by the results of an investigation conducted by the Ministry of Health and the prosecutor\u2019s office following the applicant\u2019s complaints. 31.  The Government submitted, having provided the relevant documents, that the applicant had requested family visits before the relevant authorities only on 10 and 20 October and 29 December 2005 and on 11 January and 5 February 2006 and had asked for permission to send correspondence to his relatives on 10 and 27 October 2005 and 5 February and 8 August 2006. All his requests were rejected for security reasons. 32.  The applicant had been free to ask the investigator in his case or a court to allow him to meet with a priest but had failed to do so. He had also been entitled by law to possess religious literature and other items of a religious nature and never raised any complaint in this connection either before the SIZO governor or with the prosecutor responsible for observing compliance with the law in the detention facilities. 33.  No medical aid was provided to the applicant in respect of his heart and teeth problems. On 3 June 2006 the applicant asked the SIZO governor to conduct a medical examination as he believed he had contracted hepatitis B because of the failure of the SIZO staff to respect hygiene rules. This request was rejected; so was another request for a special diet in view of his possible hepatitis infection. On 2 November 2006 the applicant asked the Minister of Health to order a medical examination in view of his possible hepatitis infection, to no avail. No copies of the mentioned requests have been provided by the applicant. 34.  According to the Government, during his stay in the SIZO the applicant never went to the medical unit on account of his suffering from hepatitis B, heart pain or problems with his teeth and never lodged any complaints regarding a lack of medical assistance. His state of health did not necessitate a special diet. 35.  Following a liver-related complaint that the applicant was suffering from, he was diagnosed with bile-duct dyskinesia (\u0434\u0438\u0441\u043a\u0456\u043d\u0435\u0437\u0456\u044f \u0441\u0435\u0447\u043e\u0432\u0438\u0432\u0456\u0434\u043d\u0438\u0445 \u0448\u043b\u044f\u0445\u0456\u0432) and from 20 October to 15 November 2006 he underwent inpatient treatment in the SIZO medical unit. A number of laboratory tests were carried out on the applicant, including a specialised blood test for hepatitis indicators. The latter revealed hBs antigens, which meant that the applicant had hepatitis B antibodies in his blood but not that he had been definitely suffering from the active form of the disease. The applicant was prescribed the relevant treatment (Carsil, Livolin, Alochol, Gastronorm, Ursohol), which he received in full, and at the end of his treatment he was deemed to be in good health. 36.  On 1 July 2007 the applicant was transferred to prison no. 72 to serve his sentence. On 11 August 2007 he was diagnosed with hepatitis B. Thereafter he lodged a number of complaints with different State bodies alleging that he had contracted hepatitis in the SIZO owing to the failure to disinfect hairdressing implements, and demanding investigation of this matter. Following his allegations, investigations were conducted by the Health Ministry and the prosecutor\u2019s office, which found no evidence to support the applicant\u2019s allegations. The applicant was informed of the results of the investigation by a prosecutor\u2019s letter of 27 July 2009.", "references": ["7", "0", "3", "1", "8", "6", "2", "9", "No Label", "4", "5"], "gold": ["4", "5"]}
+{"input": "1.  The case originated in application against Ukraine lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (\u201cthe Convention\u201d) on the date indicated in the appended table. 4.  The applicants complained of the excessive length of civil proceedings and of the lack of any effective remedy in domestic law. 5.  The Court received friendly-settlement declarations under which the first applicant agreed to waive any further claims against Ukraine in respect of the facts giving rise to the part of the application concerning her complaints, subject to an undertaking by the Government to pay her the amount detailed in the appended table. The payment will constitute the final resolution of this part of the application.", "references": ["4", "5", "2", "9", "6", "0", "7", "8", "1", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1960 and until his conviction lived in the town of Slantsy in the Leningrad Region. 7.  In 1991 the applicant sustained a penetrating head injury, which involved the crushing of brain tissue. This trauma caused paralysis of the entire right side of his body, light speech impairment and post-traumatic epilepsy. To reduce the frequency of epileptic seizures the applicant was obliged to take Benzonal. 8.  The following year the applicant was examined by a social security medical assessment board (\u0431\u044e\u0440\u043e \u043c\u0435\u0434\u0438\u043a\u043e-\u0441\u043e\u0446\u0438\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u044d\u043a\u0441\u043f\u0435\u0440\u0442\u0438\u0437\u044b) and certified as having the highest-degree disability on the grounds that he had lost the ability to work, to walk without assistance or to look after himself. Those findings were confirmed by the board during routine re-examinations in 1994, 1996, 1998 and 2000, when the applicant was granted life-long disability status. 9.  In 2005 the applicant committed a homicide. On 16 April 2007 the Slantsy Town Court found him guilty of murder and sentenced him to seven years\u2019 imprisonment in a highly secure correctional colony. On 15 August 2007 the Leningrad Region Court upheld the sentence on appeal. 10.  On 16 April 2007 the applicant was taken to a police ward in the town of Slantsy. 11.  Two days later he was transferred to remand prison no. IZ-47/6 in St Petersburg. On admission to that facility the resident prison doctor conducted a general medical check-up of the applicant and noted his disability. The applicant was allowed to take Benzonal supplied by his wife in order to minimise his suffering from epileptic seizures. 12.  In the remand prison the applicant was detained in a normal cell block where he allegedly faced great difficulties in his daily routine owing to the lack of special arrangements, in particular when using the squat toilet and shared dormitory shower, which lacked handrails and non-slip flooring. 13.  On 26 September 2007, when the sentence became final, he was transferred to correctional colony no. 7 in the Leningrad Region, where he was also placed in a cell designed for healthy inmates and, allegedly, continued to experience the inconveniences arising from his disability. 14.  Having no licence to treat inmates with as strong a medication as Benzonal, the colony\u2019s medical authorities offered the applicant two substitute drugs with similar anticonvulsive effect, but the latter refused, alleging their low efficiency and possible side effects. 15.  On 3 March 2008, at his own request, the applicant was sent to Gaaza prison hospital in St Petersburg (\u201cthe prison hospital\u201d) for an in\u2011depth medical examination and treatment. In the hospital he was subjected to various medical tests which showed that his health was stable. On 1 April 2008 the applicant was discharged from the hospital. In the discharge summary the supervising doctor mentioned that the patient was able to look after himself and to walk without assistance. 16.  On 10 October 2008 the deputy head of the correctional colony ordered the applicant\u2019s transfer to a special unit for disabled prisoners. According to the Government\u2019s description, this unit had \u201cenhanced housing conditions\u201d and \u201cless strict security regime\u201d. It accommodated only disabled inmates, who were detained in a prison wing located close to the medical unit. 17.  The applicant submitted that even after his transfer to the special unit he had not been provided with nursing assistance. Being unable to dress himself or perform hygiene procedures without assistance, he had asked his inmates for help in exchanging valuable prison products such as tea, coffee, sweets and cigarettes. 18.  On 1 July 2009 the special medical board, at the request of the penal authorities, issued an advisory report confirming the gravity of the applicant\u2019s disability. 19.  On 4 August 2009 the applicant was examined by a medical board composed of the prison hospital management and a neurosurgeon. The doctors noted that the applicant\u2019s health had remained stable, that he was able to look after himself, and that nursing assistance was not required for him. However, due to the gravity of the applicant\u2019s brain condition it was decided to check whether his illness fell within the established list of illnesses warranting early release. 20.  Three days later a special medical board confirmed that the applicant\u2019s condition justified his early release. 21.  It appears that the applicant remained in the prison hospital until 8 September 2009. 22.  In the meantime the detention authorities applied for his early release on medical grounds. 23.  On 28 August 2009 the Smolninskiy District Court of St Petersburg dismissed their application, citing the gravity of the applicant\u2019s offence, the fact that he had developed paralysis and epilepsy prior to his arrest and that in detention his condition had remained stable. The decision was upheld on appeal by the St Petersburg City Court on 17 November 2009. 24.  Between 1 February and 18 March 2010, at his own request, the applicant was admitted to the prison hospital for treatment, and on 16 March 2010 he was re-examined by a medical board, which confirmed his right to early release on medical grounds. 25.  On 10 April 2010 the applicant was transferred to correctional colony no. 4 in the Leningrad Region. He was accommodated in a special unit for disabled prisoners. It appears that the conditions of his detention were similar to those in correctional colony no. 7. The applicant continued to receive Benzonal from his wife and refused to take any substitutes. 26.  On 10 June 2010 the Tosnenskiy Town Court dismissed the application for early release on medical grounds, referring to the gravity of the applicant\u2019s offence, the fact that his health status had already been taken into account by the court which sentenced him, and, lastly, to the fact that the applicant\u2019s medical condition had not worsened in detention.", "references": ["7", "6", "9", "2", "4", "8", "5", "3", "0", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1958 and lives in Nagykoz\u00e1r. 6.  The applicant had been working as a tax inspector. In 1996 he applied for early retirement on account of disability. As of 1 April 1996, he was declared to have lost 67% of his capacity to work and was granted a disability pension of 114,880 Hungarian forints (HUF) per month (approximately 370 euros (EUR) at the rate of January 2017). That disability assessment was maintained in 1999, 2003 and 2006. 7.  The relevant assessment methodology changed as of 1 January 2008. The applicant\u2019s case was reviewed under the new rules in 2009. Without any significant change in his state of health having occurred, he was then found to have lost 50% of his working capacity. As a consequence, his disability pension was terminated and, as of 1 July 2009, he was declared suitable for institutional rehabilitation and granted a monthly rehabilitation allowance in the amount of HUF 152,820 (approximately EUR 490), minus payroll deductions. Under the relevant statute, the benefit could only be granted for a limited period, namely until 31 October 2011 in the applicant\u2019s case. The law allowed for one extension of the time-limit, making the maximum deadline for the benefit 30 June 2012. However, under the law, the overall period allowable for rehabilitation could not exceed three years. 8.  The monthly amount payable evolved in the period preceding the deadline. On expiry, it was HUF 173,980 (approximately EUR 570) per month, minus HUF 17,398 in payroll deductions, resulting in a net sum of HUF 156,585 (approximately EUR 510). 9.  Meanwhile, on 29 December 2011 Act no. CXCI of 2011 on the Benefits Granted to Persons with Reduced Work Capacity was enacted. It came into effect on 1 January 2012 and introduced a new system of allowances. 10.  On 28 March 2012 the applicant applied for a disability allowance under the new law. On 8 May 2012 he was medically examined before an expert panel of the National Rehabilitation and Social Welfare Authority. The applicant\u2019s state of health was rated at 46% and he was classified as being suitable for rehabilitation within a time-frame of thirty-six months. The authority initially granted him HUF 41,850 (approximately EUR 140) per month in disability allowance, as of 1 July 2012. 11.  On appeal, the applicant\u2019s health score was maintained but the second-instance authority no longer recommended his rehabilitation. The monthly disability allowance corresponding to his situation was eventually set at HUF 55,800 (approximately EUR 180). 12.  The applicant sought a judicial review before the P\u00e9cs Administrative and Labour Court, but in vain. On 26 May 2014 the K\u00faria rejected his petition for review on the grounds that he had not relied on any particular breach of the law, as required by the Code of Civil Procedure. 13.  Following a further legislative amendment of 1 April 2014, the applicant became entitled to a disability allowance of HUF 159,100 (approximately EUR 520) per month retroactively as of 1 January 2014.", "references": ["2", "0", "7", "6", "1", "8", "4", "5", "3", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
+{"input": "5.  The first applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Bizeljsko. The second applicant was born in 1946 and lives in Arti\u010de. 6.  The applicants were charged in 2005 and 2006 respectively of committing theft by cutting down and taking trees from a forest belonging to another person and appropriating the wood. They were tried by a professional judge, A.K., sitting as a single judge. 7.  The first applicant stated in his defence in the proceedings against him that he had cut down trees which had been marked for cutting or had been attacked by bark beetle in his own forest. In the course of the proceedings against the first applicant Judge A.K. examined a number of witnesses during the main hearing, inspected the place of the alleged offence and examined a number of other documents, including a sketch and a copy of the land register map. None of the witnesses testified that they had seen the first applicant cutting down trees on the injured party\u2019s plot of land. However, they testified about a number of other circumstances in relation to the charges, for example similarities in the way the trees had been cut down on the first applicant\u2019s land and on that of the injured party, traces of the transport of trees, the fact that the first applicant had regularly sold wood and that he had also cut down unmarked trees on his own land. One of the witnesses also testified that he had seen the first applicant and another person, B.K., transporting trees over the injured party\u2019s land. Another witness, the injured party\u2019s husband, testified that B.K. had indirectly confirmed his involvement in cutting down the trees in question. B.K., however, stated that he believed that he had only cut down marked trees on the first applicant\u2019s land. The court also appointed an expert, who estimated that the value of the allegedly stolen wood amounted to 2,028 euros (EUR). 8.  The second applicant was charged with two counts of theft. In the course of the proceedings against him, Judge A.K. heard a number of witnesses at the main hearing and examined several documents, including copies of the relevant land register maps. In respect of the first charge, the second applicant maintained that he had mistakenly thought that he had been cutting down trees on his own land, whose borders had been shown to him by the former owners, F.H. and J.H., who also appeared as witnesses in the proceedings. The husband of the injured party, M.P., stated that they had found out about the stolen wood six months after the event and that neighbours had told them that the second applicant had been seen in the forest at the time, while another person, I.T., had been seen transporting the wood. He also testified that the second applicant had admitted to him that he had cut down the trees, thinking that they had belonged to his land but that they had failed to agree on how much the second applicant should pay M.P. in compensation. I.T. stated that he had helped the second applicant transport the wood and that he had been told by him that the land belonged to him, which I.T. had found suspicious. Another witness, S.P., stated that he had helped I.T. load the truck with the wood. As to the second charge, the second applicant argued that he had had an agreement with the injured party in that case, F.B., that he could cut down trees in exchange for wine. The judge questioned the injured party, who denied the existence of such an agreement. The court also appointed an expert, who estimated that the value of the beech and hornbeam trees cut down amounted to EUR 457 and that of the acacia trees at EUR 440. 9.  On 21 June 2007 Judge A.K. found the first applicant guilty of taking another\u2019s movable property with the intention of unlawfully appropriating it, and sentenced him to six months in prison, suspended for three years. The judge found that the applicant had cut down and taken eight oak trees in a forest without the knowledge of its owner and had appropriated wood worth EUR 2,028. She ordered him to either deliver to the injured party the same quantity of oak that had been taken from the forest or to pay compensation of EUR 2,028. She pronounced a guilty verdict and sentenced him (izrek, hereinafter referred to as \u201cthe verdict\u201d) orally. 10.  On 2 July 2007 Judge A.K., again giving an oral verdict, found the second applicant guilty of taking another\u2019s movable property with the intention of unlawfully appropriating it and sentenced him to seven months in prison, suspended for three years. She found that the second applicant had cut down and taken three beech trees and nine hornbeams worth at least EUR 457 and two hundred acacia trees worth at least EUR 440 from land belonging to other persons. Moreover, the second applicant was ordered to pay compensation of EUR 457 and EUR 440 respectively to the two injured parties. 11.  The Government submitted that Judge A.K., when pronouncing the verdict, had also given an oral summary of the main reasons (see paragraph 34 below), however, no indication of that can be found in the records of the hearing. 12.  After hearing the verdict both applicants gave notice of their intention to appeal, which gave rise to an obligation on the part of Judge A.K. to draw up written grounds for her verdicts (see paragraph 23 below). 13.  A.K. later retired on an unspecified date and the case files in both applicants\u2019 cases got lost. In 2010, the local court reconstituted the files. 14.  Based on the documents contained in the restored case file, Judge D.K.M. delivered written grounds for the verdict pronounced by Judge A.K. (see paragraph 9 above), which were served on the first applicant\u2019s counsel on 17 August 2010. In her reasoning, the judge relied on the records of the hearings, the transcript of the inspection of the location and other documents in the file. The judge did not believe the applicant\u2019s version of events and dismissed B.K.\u2019s statements as biased because he had been working for the first applicant. She also found his testimony to be in contradiction with some of the other witness statements. The court relied heavily on the finding that while B.K. had cut down the trees professionally on the applicant\u2019s land, witness testimony showed that certain trees had been cut down in an unprofessional manner on both the applicant\u2019s and the injured party\u2019s land, and that the first applicant and B.K. had been seen transporting trees over the injured party\u2019s land. 15.  The written grounds in the second applicant\u2019s case (see paragraph 10 above) were delivered by Judge M.B., who also based them on the documents contained in the restored case file. They were served on his counsel on 17 June 2010. As to the first charge, the judge found that the second applicant\u2019s defence had not been convincing. In particular, the judge considered the statements of two witnesses, F.H. and J.H., to be unpersuasive. On the other hand, the judge relied on the statements of the injured party and her husband, supported by other evidence, for example, the expert\u2019s opinion, the statements of the witnesses S.P. and I.T and the copy of the land register map showing that M.P.\u2019s land did not border on the second applicant\u2019s. As to the second charge, the court relied predominantly on the statement of the injured party, F.B., who denied that he had had an agreement with the second applicant. Other evidence, such as the expert\u2019s opinion and photographs, confirmed that F.B. was indeed the owner of the land and indicated the number of trees that had been cut down. 16.  Both applicants appealed against the judgments, raising similar arguments as those submitted to the Court (see paragraph 32 below). They further alleged that the judgments should have been set aside and remitted to the first-instance court for fresh consideration. Furthermore, both applicants also appealed against the factual findings on which their convictions had been based, including the assessment of the credibility of a number of witnesses. The second applicant also complained about the assessment of the existence of intent on his part to commit the second count of theft. 17.  On 26 August and 25 November 2010 respectively, the Ljubljana Higher Court dismissed the applicants\u2019 appeals, holding that the fact that the written grounds of the impugned judgments had been given a few years after they had been delivered orally had not rendered the judgments unlawful. The higher court emphasised that the impugned judgments had been based on facts established in adversarial proceedings and on evidence given at hearings which the applicants had been able to challenge by presenting their own versions of the events at issue. The first-instance judgments had been given orally by Judge A.K. who had presided over both applicants\u2019 hearings, had questioned the applicants and heard the witnesses. Moreover, the written grounds had disclosed on what evidence the judges providing them had relied and how they had assessed the reliability of the applicants\u2019 statements. In the higher court\u2019s opinion, the written grounds had been clear and reasonable. As regards the first applicant, the higher court reassessed the evidence, including the witness statements, and came to the same conclusion as the first-instance court. As to the second applicant, the higher court noted that the first-instance court had truthfully and accurately established all the relevant facts of the case, and that it had been proven that the second applicant had intended to commit the second offence. 18.  On 13 October 2010 and 20 January 2011 respectively, the applicants lodged applications for the protection of legality (zahteva za varstvo zakonitosti) with the Supreme Court, raising similar arguments as those submitted to the Court (see paragraph 32 below) and referring to the Constitutional Court\u2019s decision of 11 October 2006 (see paragraph 28 below). 19.  On 6 January and 1 September 2011 respectively, the Supreme Court dismissed the applicants\u2019 applications for the protection of legality, holding that only the operative part of the judgment, namely the verdict, could have interfered with the rights of the parties, while the purpose of written grounds was to enable a decision to be reviewed by higher instances. As a rule, the written grounds of a judgment were given by the judge who had conducted the trial and pronounced the verdict. However, in certain situations, such as when a judge was absent for a long time or died, the law had to be interpreted as permitting another judge to give the written grounds. In such cases, the judge who wrote the judgment based it on logical reasoning and the evidence in the file. The Supreme Court found that while the principle of immediacy required that a verdict should be given by the judge who had participated in the trial, the act of writing a judgment, was not, strictly speaking, part of the trial. Moreover, if the written grounds for a judgment were not convincing, a defendant had a better chance of succeeding with his or her appeal. Having regard to those considerations, the Supreme Court took the view that the applicants\u2019 rights of defence had not been violated. 20.  On 1 April and 2 December 2011 respectively, the applicants lodged constitutional complaints, reiterating the arguments they had made before the lower courts. 21.  On 3 April 2012 the Constitutional Court refused to admit the applicants\u2019 constitutional complaints, holding that their cases concerned neither a violation of human rights having serious consequences for them nor an important constitutional question.", "references": ["0", "6", "8", "5", "1", "9", "7", "4", "2", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicants in each case were affected by decisions of the Russian Federal Penal Authority (\u00ab\u0424\u0435\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u0430\u044f \u0441\u043b\u0443\u0436\u0431\u0430 \u0438\u0441\u043f\u043e\u043b\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u043d\u0430\u043a\u0430\u0437\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0439\u00bb, \u201cthe FSIN\u201d) on prisoners\u2019 allocation to post-conviction penal facilities. The applicants\u2019 individual circumstances are detailed below. 6.  The application was lodged on 13 June 2009 by Ms Elvira Vasilyevna Polyakova, who was born in 1976 and lives in Vladivostok, Primorskiy Region. She was represented before the Court by Ms L. Ovchinnikova, a lawyer practising in Vladivostok. 7.  The applicant is the live-in partner of Mr R. The couple originally set up home in Vladivostok in the Primorskiy Region. They have a son born in 2003. 8.  On 22 May 2008 Mr R. was convicted of drug-related crimes and sentenced to ten years\u2019 imprisonment in a strict-regime penal facility. After the conviction became final he was allocated to IK-33 in the Primorskiy Region, close to his family home. 9.  In September 2008 the head of the Primorskiy regional department of the FSIN decided to transfer Mr R. to the Krasnoyarsk Region, some 5,000 kilometres from Vladivostok. It appears that the basis for this decision was a telegram of 18 April 2008 from the deputy head of the FSIN of Russia that read as follows:\n\u201cThe Primorskiy regional department of the FSIN are allowed, until special notice, to send up to thirty convicts per month from remand prisons to the care of the Krasnoyarskiy regional department of the FSIN pursuant to Article 73 \u00a7 2 of the CES.\u201d 10.  On 30 September 2008 the Primorskiy regional department of the FSIN informed Ms Polyakova that her request for Mr R. to be allowed to remain in the facility in the Primorskiy Region had been refused, and advised the applicant as follows:\n\u201c... pursuant to Article 73 \u00a7 2 of the CES and the instruction by the FSIN of Russia, on 14 September 2008 Mr R. was sent to serve the remainder of his sentence in the care of the Krasnoyarskiy regional department of the FSIN. You will be notified of his arrival at a penal facility.\u201d 11.  The applicant challenged the FSIN\u2019s decision before a court, asking for her partner to be transferred back to the Primorskiy Region so that she and their son could afford to visit him. 12.  On 28 October 2008 the Sovetskiy District Court of Vladivostok examined the applicant\u2019s complaint under Article 258 of the Russian Code of Civil Procedure (\u201cCCP\u201d) and dismissed it. It found, referring to Article 73 \u00a7 2 of the Russian Code on the Execution of Sentences (\u201cCES\u201d), that strict-regime facilities in the Primorskiy Region were overcrowded and that transfers of a number of detainees to other facilities had been necessary for their own safety, as there could be conflicts among inmates fighting for a sleeping place. The District Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s argument related to her family life as unsubstantiated, stating that she could apply to the FSIN for permission to visit Mr R. in the Krasnoyarsk Region. 13.  On 30 December 2008 the FSIN of Russia dismissed the applicant\u2019s request for Mr R. to be transferred from the penal facility in the Krasnoyarsk Region to one in the Primorskiy Region, stating that under Article 81 of the CES prisoners should, as a rule, serve the entirety of their sentence in the same penal facility, and that there were no reasons for Mr R.\u2019s transfer. 14.  On 13 January 2009 the Primorskiy Regional Court summarily dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. 15.  The applicant and her son visited Mr R. in the penal facility in the Krasnoyarsk Region on three occasions. 16.  The application was lodged on 6 June 2011 by Ms Natalya Anatolyevna Kibalo, born in 1979, Miss Linda Aliyevna Kibalo, born in 2006, and Miss Iman Aliyevna Kibalo, born in 2009. The applicants live in the village of Dubovskaya in the Shelkovskiy District of the Chechen Republic. They were represented before the Court by lawyers of the Memorial Human Rights Centre. 17.  Ms Natalya Kibalo is the wife of Mr Kh. The couple are the parents of Linda and Iman Kibalo. 18.  On 29 May 2007 the Supreme Court of Dagestan found Mr Kh. guilty of kidnapping, illegal possession of arms, and attempted murder of a law-enforcement officer. Mr Kh. was sentenced to twenty years\u2019 imprisonment in a strict-regime penal facility. The judgment was upheld on appeal. 19.  On an unspecified date the FSIN decided to send Mr Kh. to serve his sentence outside the North Caucasus area. 20.  On 7 February 2008 Mr Kh. arrived at UV14/8, a strict-regime penal facility in the town of Blagoveshchensk in the Amur Region, some 8,000 kilometres from Dubovskaya village. 21.  Ms Natalya Kibalo asked the FSIN to transfer Mr Kh. to a penal facility located closer to their home village, arguing that she had been de facto deprived of the opportunity to visit her husband because it would take her about eight days to travel from her home village to Blagoveshchensk by train, and because the cost of the trip was prohibitive for her as an unemployed mother of two young children. 22.  On 25 May 2009 the head of a department of the FSIN dismissed the first applicant\u2019s request, referring to the lack of grounds for transfer listed in Article 81 of the CES. Ms Natalya Kibalo challenged the refusal before a court. 23.  On 21 August 2009 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow refused to examine Ms Natalya Kibalo\u2019s complaint on the merits, stating that she had no standing to bring a complaint on behalf of her husband. The Moscow City Court quashed that ruling on 14 January 2010 on appeal. 24.  On 17 June 2010 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow held a hearing in the absence of both parties. It examined Ms Natalya Kibalo\u2019s complaint under Articles 254-6 and 258 of the CCP and dismissed it. The District Court observed that Mr Kh. had been allocated to the penal facility in Blagoveshchensk under Article 73 \u00a7 4 of the CES, and that under Article 81 of the CES, as a rule, convicts should serve their sentence in the same facility throughout. It reasoned that Mr Kh. had breached prison rules on multiple occasions both in the remand prison and in UV14/8, and that he had been \u201cconvicted of terrorist offences in the Dagestan Republic, shows no remorse, and does not undertake to commit no unlawful actions in the future\u201d. The judgment read, in particular, as follows:\n\u201cThe claimant\u2019s argument that neither she nor her children could come to visit [Mr A. Kh.] because he is serving his sentence in the Amur Region cannot be taken into consideration, because the possibility of receiving visits is governed by the norms of the CES and is unrelated to the location of a penal facility.\u201d 25.  On 7 December 2010 the Moscow City Court upheld the judgment of 17 June 2010 on appeal. It reasoned that the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court had not erred in finding that there were no grounds listed in Article 81 of the CES that would warrant Mr Kh.\u2019s transfer to another penal facility, and that \u201cthe appeal statement contain[ed] no references to circumstances that would refute the [first-instance] court\u2019s findings and demonstrate that there were grounds for Mr Kh.\u2019s transfer from one facility to another within the meaning of Article 81 of the CES\u201d. 26.  Between 2008 and 2012 Ms Natalya Kibalo visited her husband in Blagoveshchensk on eight occasions. On six of those occasions, between 2008 and 2010, her travel expenses were sponsored. She visited her husband once in 2011 and once in 2012 but could not afford to travel at all in 2013 or 2014. Miss Linda Kibalo accompanied her mother on her trip to visit Mr Kh. once. Miss Iman Kibalo, born during Mr A. Kh.\u2019s detention, has never seen her father. 27.  The application was lodged on 13 July 2013 by Mr Ivan Dhzimsherovich Yeliashvili, who was born in 1979 and lives in Noginsk, the Moscow Region. He is currently serving his sentence in IK-8 in Labytnangi, the Yamalo-Nenetskiy Region. The applicant, who had been granted legal aid, was represented before the Court by Mr V. Shukhardin, a lawyer practising in Moscow. 28.  By a final judgment of 8 September 2009 the Moscow Regional Court convicted the applicant of robbery and sentenced him to eleven years\u2019 imprisonment in a strict-regime facility. 29.  On 15 September 2009 the FSIN decided to send the applicant to serve his sentence in IK-8 in the settlement of Labytnangi in the Yamalo\u2011Nenetskiy Region, located about 3,300 kilometres from Noginsk. 30.  The applicant asked the FSIN to transfer him to a facility closer to Noginsk, arguing that his father, brother, sister and nephew all lived in that town and that they would have no realistic opportunity to visit him in Labytnangi. On 21 November 2011 the FSIN dismissed his request, noting that the applicant had been allocated to the penal facility in Labytnangi under Article 73 \u00a7 2 of the CES because of the lack of strict-regime penal facilities in the Moscow Region, and that under Article 81 of the CES prisoners should serve their entire sentence in the same penal facility. 31.  The applicant challenged the FSIN\u2019s refusal before a court. On 11 April 2012 the FSIN submitted their objections to the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow, which read, in particular, as follows:\n\u201cThe claimant\u2019s arguments that he is unable to receive visits from his relatives cannot be taken into account, because the possibility of receiving visits from next of kin and relatives is governed by the norms of the Russian Code on the Execution of Sentences and is unrelated to the location of any penal facility.\u201d 32.  On 5 June 2012 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow examined the applicant\u2019s complaint under Articles 254-5 and 258 of the CCP, and dismissed it with reference to Articles 73 and 81 of the CES. The judgment read, in so far as relevant, as follows:\n\u201cThe claimant\u2019s arguments that it is difficult to receive visits from relatives owing to the remoteness of the [place of] the sentence is being served cannot be taken into account by the court, because the possibility of receiving visits is governed by the norms of the Russian CES and is unrelated to the location of any penal facility.\u201d 33.  On 14 January 2013 the Moscow City Court upheld the first-instance judgment. 34.  To date, the applicant\u2019s relatives have not been able to afford to visit him in Labytnangi. 35.  The application was lodged on 6 November 2014 by Mr Vladimir Aleksandrovich Palilov, who was born in 1968 and lives in the Yaroslavl Region. He is currently serving his sentence in IK-18 in the settlement of Kharp, the Yamalo-Nenetskiy Region. The applicant, who had been granted legal aid. was represented before the Court by Mr E. Markov, a lawyer practising in Strasbourg. 36.  On 11 August 2006 the Yaroslavl Regional Court convicted the applicant of murder and sentenced him to life imprisonment. The conviction was upheld on appeal and became final. 37.  On 19 February 2007 the applicant was sent to serve his sentence in a special-regime facility for those sentenced to life imprisonment in the village of Kharp in the Yamalo-Nenetskiy Region, 2,000 kilometres from the Yaroslavl Region. 38.  On 9 January 2013 the applicant asked the FSIN to transfer him to any detention facility located closer to his elderly mother\u2019s and sister\u2019s place of residence. 39.  On 14 February 2013 the FSIN dismissed the request, stating that the applicant had been sent to serve his sentence in a remote penal facility under Article 73 \u00a7 4 of the CES, and noting that under Article 81 of the CES a prisoner must serve their entire sentence in the same facility. The applicant challenged the decision before a court. In his statement of claims he requested to be present at court hearings. 40.  On 19 July 2013 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow held a hearing in the applicant\u2019s absence, which was referred to in the judgment as follows: \u201c[t]he applicant was notified of the date of the hearing. He has failed to appear at the court hearing owing to the fact that he is serving a sentence\u201d. The representative of the FSIN was also absent. The District Court examined the complaint pursuant to Articles 254-5 and 258 of the CCP and dismissed it, noting that there were \u201cno grounds listed in Article 81 \u00a7 2 of the CES that would preclude Mr Palilov from continuing to serve his sentence in the penal facility in the Yamalo-Nenetskiy Region\u201d. The applicant\u2019s argument related to the difficulties of maintaining his family ties was rejected as follows:\n\u201cThe claimant\u2019s arguments that he cannot receive visits from his relatives does not give grounds for allowing the claims, because the possibility of receiving visits from family members and relatives, receiving correspondence, or using the telephone, are all governed by the norms of the Code on Execution of Sentences and are unrelated to the location of any penal facility.\u201d 41.  The applicant appealed against the judgment and requested that an appeal hearing be held in his presence. 42.  On 4 June 2014 the Moscow City Court held a hearing in the applicant\u2019s absence, which was explained as follows: \u201cunder Article 167 of the Code of Civil Procedure the appellate collegium deems it possible to examine the case in the absence of the parties to the proceedings; they have been notified of the date and place of the court hearing\u201d. The appellate court upheld the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court\u2019s judgment. Referring to Article 73 \u00a7 4 of the CES, it stated that the rule on serving a sentence in a particular region close to a detainee\u2019s permanent residence was inapplicable to the applicant given the nature of the crime of which he had been convicted. The City Court also found that the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court had correctly interpreted Article 81 \u00a7 2 of the CES, reasoning as follows:\n\u201c... there were no medical recommendations that would contain contraindications for Mr Palilov\u2019s serving his sentence in the penal facility in the Yamalo-Nenetskiy Region. Other exceptional circumstances that the law connects with the FSIN\u2019s obligation to grant a claimant\u2019s request to be transferred to another penal facility were not referred to in the appeal statement and cannot be discerned from the circumstances of the case.\nThe argument that Mr Palilov is being deprived of the opportunity to maintain contact with his relatives because of the remoteness of the penal facility cannot serve, in the context of Article 73 \u00a7 4 of the CES, as grounds for declaring the actions of the penal authority\u2019s officials unlawful.\u201d 43. The applicant\u2019s mother and sister could not afford to visit him in Kharp. The mother died in 2013.", "references": ["9", "5", "7", "6", "2", "8", "0", "1", "No Label", "3", "4"], "gold": ["3", "4"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1968 and lives in Zhangala, Kazakhstan. 6.  In June 2000 the applicant moved from Kazakhstan to Russia, where he married Ms G.K., a Russian citizen, with whom he had two daughters who were born in 2000 and 2002. The applicant and his family lived in the settlement of Slantseviy Rudnik in the Saratov Region. The applicant regularly visited his relatives in Kazakhstan. 7.  The applicant lived in Russia under regularly extended temporary (three\u2011year) residence permits. On 20 August 2013 the Department of the Federal Migration Service of the Saratov Region issued decision no. 32469 granting the applicant yet another three-year residence permit, valid until 20 August 2016. 8.  On 12 April 2014 the applicant was returning from Kazakhstan to Russia through the \u201cOzinki\u201d border crossing in the Saratov Region when the border control department of the Russian Federal Security Service informed him that he had been denied re-entry to the Russian Federation. According to the notice handed to the applicant at the border crossing, he was subject to exclusion from Russia. He was banned from re-entering Russia until January 2030 on the basis of a report (\u043f\u0440\u0435\u0434\u0441\u0442\u0430\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435) dated 14 January 2014 from the Saratov Region department of the Federal Security Service (\u0424\u0435\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u0430\u044f \u0441\u043b\u0443\u0436\u0431\u0430 \u0431\u0435\u0437\u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438 (\u0424\u0421\u0411)) (hereinafter \u201cthe FSS\u201d), drafted pursuant to section 27 \u00a7 1 of the Entry Procedure Act, that is to say \u201cfor the purposes of ensuring the defensive capacity or security of the State, or protecting public order or health\u201d. No other explanation was given. 9.  On 13 May 2014 the applicant, through his representative, lodged an appeal against the exclusion order with the Frunzenskiy District Court of Saratov (hereinafter \u201cthe District Court\u201d). In his appeal the applicant requested that the exclusion order be overruled and the ban lifted as this measure had adversely affected his family life. The applicant stated, in particular, that since 2000 he had been married to a Russian national and had two children who were also Russian nationals. He added that he had no record of administrative violations or criminal offences and that he was unaware of the reasons for the exclusion order. 10.  The District Court forwarded the applicant\u2019s appeal to the Saratov Regional Court (hereinafter \u201cthe Regional Court\u201d) as under the domestic regulations regional courts were to examine cases involving State secrets. 11.  On 25 July 2014 the Regional Court examined the applicant\u2019s complaint. At the hearing, in reply to a question from the representative of the applicant concerning the actual basis for the applicant\u2019s exclusion and the sixteen-year re-entry ban, the FSS\u2019s representatives replied \u201c[T]he actual grounds for the ban cannot be disclosed in the interests of State security, which have priority in the Russian Federation over the rights of foreign citizens ... What exactly Mr Kamenov did cannot be disclosed as this information constitutes a State secret ...\u201d 12.  On the same date, 25 July 2014, the Regional Court upheld the applicant\u2019s exclusion until 2030. In its decision it did not cite any documents submitted by the FSS as serving as the basis for the ban, apart from noting that the measure had been imposed on the basis of the report of 14 January 2014 and the relevant internal instructions of the FSS. According to the court, the report of 14 January 2014 contained \u201csome operational activities data\u201d which had not been included in the case file (although it had been \u201creviewed\u201d by the court) as it constituted a State secret. The court neither specified the nature of that data nor provided any details regarding its origins or the circumstances of its collection. The court further noted that the appropriate procedure had been followed and stated that \u201cMr Kamenov\u2019s request that the State body [the FSS] that issued the [exclusion] decision be obliged to rescind it cannot be granted as the court [can only verify] the lawfulness of [the procedure of] the taking of such a decision. As regards any overruling of that decision, such competence lies with the executive body that took it\u201d. As to whether the exclusion order amounted to an interference with the applicant\u2019s family life, the court stated that the impugned decision \u201ccontained information on the basis of which the FSS concluded that the actions of Mr Kamenov had threatened the national security of the Russian Federation. Therefore, the public interest prevailed over the private interest of the applicant\u201d. 13.  The applicant\u2019s representative lodged an appeal against the above decision with the Administrative Cases Chamber of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation (hereinafter \u201cthe Supreme Court\u201d) stating, among other things, that in spite of the fact that he had submitted a signed undertaking of confidentiality to the Regional Court, he had not been given the chance to familiarise himself with the contents of the FSS report of 14 January 2014 and the other documents which had served as the basis for the exclusion and that the actual reasons for that measure remained unknown to the applicant. He stressed that the applicant had never committed criminal or administrative violations and that the exclusion and the re-entry ban had disrupted the applicant\u2019s family life. 14.  On 24 December 2014 the Supreme Court upheld the decision of 25 July 2014 stating that the Regional Court had duly examined the necessary legal basis for the exclusion and that its decision had been lawful and reasonable. The Supreme Court did not specify the evidence which had served as the basis for the FSS report of 14 January 2014, nor did it make any reference to its contents. As for the applicant\u2019s complaint concerning the interference order with his right to respect for family life caused by the sixteen-year exclusion, the Supreme Court left this unexamined. 15.  In reply to the Court\u2019s request for the information and documents that had served as the basis for the applicant\u2019s exclusion, the Government furnished copies of the courts\u2019 decisions in the applicant\u2019s case and a copy of the records of the hearing on 25 July 2014 by the Regional Court of the applicant\u2019s appeal. In addition, the Government submitted copies of the decisions of the Regional Court taken between 2011 and 2015 in respect of the following decisions taken by the domestic authorities: eight decisions granting appeals against expulsion orders imposed on account of criminal convictions and violations of immigration regulations, and three decisions granting appeals against exclusion orders and re-entry bans imposed on account of violations of immigration regulations. None of the documents furnished by the Government concerned an appeal against an exclusion order and/or a re-entry ban imposed on the grounds of national security.", "references": ["9", "5", "1", "8", "2", "7", "3", "6", "0", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "4.  The first applicant was born in Tanzania. She moved to Denmark in 2001 after marrying the second applicant. 5.  On 7 January 2004 the first applicant gave birth to a boy, L. Because of their marriage, by virtue of section 1, subsection 1, of the Children Act (B\u00f8rneloven), the second applicant was considered to be L.\u2019s father, and this was recorded by the civil registrar in connection with the child\u2019s birth. 6.  The applicants legally separated on 16 June 2005, but they continued to cohabit until June 2006. 7.  On 12 October 2006 the first applicant gave birth to a boy, S. 8.  Although he no longer lived with the first applicant, and had had no sexual contact with her since 2004, the second applicant nevertheless submitted to the State Administration for Greater Copenhagen (Statsforvaltningen Hovedstaden) (now the State Administration) a declaration, co\u2011signed by the first applicant, stating that together they would take care of and be responsible for S. The declaration was dated 21 December 2006 and received in mid-January 2007. Consequently, the second applicant was registered as S.\u2019s father under section 2, subsection 1, of the Children Act. 9.  Without the knowledge of the second applicant, during the period from 2003 to 2008, the first applicant had also had a relationship with a man called E. When that relationship ended in October 2008, the first applicant told the second applicant that E. was the biological father of S. and probably also of L. 10.  On 29 November 2008, the applicants requested that both paternity cases be reopened in order to establish formally E.\u2019s fatherhood of L. and S. The first applicant submitted, in English, that E. was the children\u2019s biological father and that he \u201chad warned me not to tell the truth about the fatherhood of the children\u201d. Their request was refused by the State Administration on 30 April 2009. 11.  The applicants brought the cases before the City Court (K\u00f8benhavns Byret) before which E. opposed their reopening. The children L. and S., represented by counsel, also objected to the reopening of the paternity cases, finding that the conditions set out in sections 22 and 24 of the Children Act had not been met. 12.  The first applicant explained that she had met the second applicant in Tanzania in 2001. They had married in December 2001 and she had moved to Denmark in 2002. In March 2003, she had met E. on a dating site and they had commenced a relationship and had sexual relations twice a week, on a few occasions without protection. She had become pregnant and informed E., but he had been in a dilemma because he was married at the time. In November 2003 she had been diagnosed as HIV-positive. When L. was born in January 2004 the second applicant was considered to be the father. They had separated in 2005 but had continued to live together until the beginning of 2006. After she and the second applicant had stopped having sexual relations, she had only had sexual relations with E. The latter had said that he would provide support for her and L, but he had never given her any money. He had said that everything would fall into place once he divorced. E. had seen L. several times and taken him swimming or to play in a park. She wanted L. to be introduced to E.\u2019s other children, but E. did not want that. Instead they had agreed that L. should have a sibling and they had planned their sexual activities according to her ovulation cycle in order for her to become pregnant. When S. was born in December 2006, the second applicant had wanted to help her and had therefore acknowledged fatherhood. E. had come to see her at the hospital after she had given birth to S. He knew that he was the biological father of both boys. He had also acknowledged that in several emails and text messages to her. Moreover, E.\u2019s mother had met the boys and had said that L. reminded her of E. when he was a child. E. had never contributed financially to the care of the children. In 2008 she had told E. that he would have to take care of the children soon and that she would report to the authorities that he was the biological father. He had replied that he did not want any responsibility for the children and ended their relationship. She wanted the boys to know their true identity while she was alive. L. was confused about the situation and had said \u201cmy father is uncle E., but my old father is [the second applicant]\u201d. 13.  The second applicant confirmed that he and the first applicant had not had a sexual relationship since L.\u2019s birth. He believed that L. was his son. He was aware that S. was not his son, but since the boys would grow up together he felt it important to treat them equally and he also wanted to help and support the first applicant. In the autumn of 2008 he had been told about E. At the beginning of 2009 he had overheard a telephone conversation between the first applicant and E., during which E. had talked about the boys as \u201cour children\u201d both in Danish and English. E. had stated that he did not want to take financial responsibility for the boys. The second applicant still saw the boys regularly and would continue to do so after the case had been settled. He felt that the biological father should take responsibility, including financial responsibility, and that the boys should know their identity. 14.  E. explained that he had two adult children from a previous marriage. He had met the first applicant in April or May 2003 but at the time they could not meet very often, because they were both married. The relationship was purely sexual, and he had no feelings for the first applicant. Their relationship had continued until 2008. They had met in the first applicant\u2019s home or in swinger clubs or in hotels. They had had sexual relations in swinger clubs from spring 2003 until 2007. He and another man had had sexual relations with her at the same time, but he could not recall when. The first applicant had given him the impression that she protected herself. He had chosen to use a condom. He might be L.\u2019s father, but they had not as such discussed the matter at the time. He had not wanted a child, whereas the first applicant had. She had told him that she would take care of the child herself. In December 2004, due to the applicants\u2019 separation, the first applicant had taken an apartment on her own and E. had visited her and L. there. L. called him \u201cuncle E\u201d. Their sexual relationship had continued in 2005 but the first applicant had told him that she had also met other men on a dating site. In 2006 they had had sexual relations regularly, including in a swinger club once or twice. They had made a plan for the first applicant to become pregnant again and thought that it would be good for L. to have a sibling. He could not remember whether they had had sexual relations in the fertile period between December 2005 and 26 February 2006 and they had not discussed whether he was the biological father. He had visited the first applicant in hospital in connection with the birth. He had found it natural that the second applicant should be father to the children since he was married to the first applicant. He had never behaved like a father to the children: he was still \u201cuncle E\u201d. It was true that he had gone swimming with L. once in October 2008 and that he had told his mother that he might be the children\u2019s father. The relationship between him and the first applicant had ended because she had not told him that she was HIV-positive. 15.  By decision of 11 February 2010, the City Court in Copenhagen decided to reopen the paternity cases. 16.  Regarding L., the City Court noted that both the second applicant and E. had had a sexual relationship with the first applicant during the fertile period and that the request for reopening the cases had been lodged more than three years after L.\u2019s birth. 17.  Regarding S., the City Court noted that E. and the first applicant had had sexual relations in the relevant fertile period. The Court did not find it established that the first applicant had had sexual relations with other men during that period. The request for a reopening had been lodged less than three years after S.\u2019s birth. 18.  The court took into account the disadvantage to which the children might be subject in case of a reopening, including the risk that paternity might not be established. It found it established that the first applicant had allowed both men to treat the children as theirs; that E. had taken on a paternal role; that E. had had frequent and regular contact with both children; that E. had taken L. swimming; that E. had taken the children with him on trips, to birthday parties and so on; and that E. was spoken of in familiar terms by the children. 19.  In respect of S. new information and circumstances in the case gave reason to believe that a mistake might have been made when registering paternity and that there might be a different outcome. Accordingly, that case was to be reopened. 20.  Moreover, having assessed overall the interests of the children and the union of the family, and the fact that the children would not be subjected to unnecessary inconvenience by a reopening, and since it was expected that paternity would be established, the court found that, exceptionally, both cases should be reopened. 21.  E. appealed against the decision to the High Court of Eastern Denmark (\u00d8stre Landsret), before which the applicants and E. were heard anew. E. added that he had moved to Sweden in August 2008 and thereafter had had no contact with the first applicant or the children. From 2004 to 2008 he had visited the first applicant for two to four hours, once or twice every month. He had become a sort of uncle for the children. He could not rule out that he was the father of the children but he would not voluntarily submit to a DNA test, since he would never be able take on the role of being their father. 22.  The first applicant added, amongst other things, that E. had given the children presents. They had both received a teddy bear when they were born. They had also received a book with 100 Danish kroner (DKK) (approximately 13 euros (EUR)). When L. had turned two years old, he had received a birthday card with the text: \u201cDear L., happy birthday, love daddy\u201d. The children were still in contact with the second applicant. 23.  The second applicant added that he would keep in contact with the children but that he had withdrawn after learning that he was not their father. He mainly took care of the children when the first applicant needed help due to her illness. 24.  By decision of 26 November 2010 the High Court refused to reopen the paternity cases. 25.  The majority (two judges) noted that it was not until the proceedings on paternity that the applicants had informed the authorities that they had not had sexual contact in the fertile period as regards S. Moreover, despite giving the children the impression that E. was their biological father, the second applicant had continued to treat the children as his own, at least until the end of 2008. In these circumstances, and since it was uncertain whether paternity would be established for the children if the paternity cases were to be reopened, they did not find a basis for reopening the case regarding S. under section 24 the Children Act. By the same line of reasoning, they did not find a basis for reopening the paternity case regarding L. under the stricter conditions set out in section 25 taken in conjunction with section 24 of the Children Act. 26.  The minority (one judge) agreed with the decision by the City Court, mainly with the same reasoning. In addition he pointed out that the second applicant had not been aware until autumn 2008 that the first applicant and E. had had a long relationship, and that he was probably not L.\u2019s father. Furthermore, the second applicant had withdrawn from the children after learning about E. and he saw them mainly in order to help the first applicant. Finally, the minority took into account that both children openly stated that it was E., and not the second applicant, who was their father. 27.  Subsequently, the second applicant took a DNA paternity test regarding both children which turned out negative with 0% compatibility, thus proving that he was not the father of L. or S. 28.  The applicants submitted this result to the Appeals Permission Board (Procesbevillingsn\u00e6vnet) and requested leave to appeal to the Supreme Court (H\u00f8jesteret), which was refused on 28 January 2011.", "references": ["3", "4", "9", "2", "7", "8", "5", "1", "6", "0", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  Details of the applicants are set out in the appendix. 6.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7.  On 3 December 2004 the third and fourth applicants filed a request with the Restitution and Compensation Commission (hereinafter \u201cthe Commission\u201d), seeking compensation for land expropriated from their legal predecessor in 1946. 8.  Between 17 July and 12 August 2005 the first and second applicants made statements waiving their rights in respect of the property belonging to the same legal predecessor in favour of the third and fourth applicants. 9.  On 28 August 2005 the Commission ruled in favour of the third and fourth applicants. 10.  On 14 October 2005 the Ministry of Finance quashed that decision upon an appeal filed on 19 September 2005 by the Supreme State Prosecutor (Vrhovni dr\u017eavni tu\u017eilac) in his capacity as legal representative of the respondent State. 11.  On 17 April 2006 the Commission issued a new decision, awarding compensation to all the applicants as they were all heirs of the legal predecessor. In so doing, it also examined the waiver statements of the first and second applicants made in 2005, but considered that, pursuant to section 40 of the Restitution of Expropriated Property Rights and Compensation Act, such waiver statements could only be validly made in non-contentious proceedings before a competent court (see paragraph 20 below). 12.  Between 12 June 2006 and 27 March 2014 the competent second\u2011instance administrative body (firstly the Ministry of Finance and later the Appeals Commission) and the Administrative Court, before which the case was first brought on an unspecified date in 2006, issued sixteen decisions in total (eight decisions each). The second-instance body ruled upon a series of appeals and gave decisions within 55 days, 65 days, 30 days, 53 days, 14 days, 78 days, 94 days, and 132 days. The Administrative Court gave rulings within 1 year 8 months and 17 days, 7 months and 22 days, 7 months and 27 days, 3 months and 23 days, 5 months, 5 months and 19 days, 4 months and 16 days, and 4 months and 23 days. 13.  On at least four occasions, when initiating an administrative dispute before the Administrative Court, the applicants explicitly referred to section 37 and/or section 58 of the Administrative Disputes Act (see paragraph 26 below) and urged the Administrative Court to decide on the merits of their request. The Administrative Court never ruled on the merits of the initial compensation request, but instead quashed or upheld the quashing of the first-instance decision of the Commission. Its last decision was issued on 27 March 2014, in substance remitting the case once again to the Commission. 14.  On 27 June 2014 the Supreme Court upheld the Administrative Court\u2019s decision. The Supreme Court\u2019s decision was served on the applicants on 8 July 2014. 15.  On 25 July 2014 the applicants each lodged a constitutional appeal against the decision of the Supreme Court, relying on, inter alia, Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention. The Government submitted that, on the same day, in addition to those constitutional appeals against the Supreme Court\u2019s decision, the applicants had also each lodged a second constitutional appeal against the decision of the Administrative Court of 27 March 2014. No copies of those second constitutional appeals were provided by either party. 16.  On 28 October 2014 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicants\u2019 constitutional appeals against the Supreme Court\u2019s decision as premature, given that the Commission was still considering their compensation request. 17.  On 28 December 2015 the Constitutional Court issued another decision dismissing the applicants\u2019 constitutional appeals. The decision stated that the applicants\u2019 constitutional appeals had been filed against the judgments of the Administrative Court and the Supreme Court. In its ruling, the Constitutional Court constantly referred to the \u201cimpugned judgments\u201d. There is no information in the case file as to when that decision was served on the applicants. 18.  On 31 March 2016, at a hearing before the Commission, the proceedings were adjourned at the applicants\u2019 request until this Court ruled on their applications.", "references": ["8", "6", "7", "9", "0", "1", "2", "4", "5", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "4.  At the time of the events giving rise to the present application, the applicants lived in Istanbul and their children attended different public elementary schools. 5.  On unspecified dates in December 2001 the applicants (save for Mr Y\u0131lmaz Yavuz) each sent petitions to the Ba\u011fc\u0131lar, Esenler and Kad\u0131k\u00f6y Education Directorates with a request for their children to be provided with education in Kurdish in their respective elementary schools. It appears that similar petitions were submitted by many other parents of Kurdish ethnic origin around the same time. 6.  According to the examples submitted by the applicants, the petitions were worded, with slight variations, as follows:\n\u201cI want my child who is studying at ... school to receive education in Kurdish, which is his [her] mother tongue, in addition to education in Turkish, at school...\u201d 7.  On receipt of the petitions the relevant education directorates informed the Istanbul Security Directorate, which brought the matter to the attention of the principal public prosecutor\u2019s office at the Istanbul State Security Court. 8.  On 28 December 2001 the public prosecutor asked the Anti-terrorism branch of the Istanbul Security Directorate to identify the names and addresses of the persons who had petitioned the Ba\u011fc\u0131lar and Esenler Education Directorates with a request for education in Kurdish. It appears that on an unspecified date the same instruction was given in relation to the petitions lodged with the Kad\u0131k\u00f6y Education Directorate. 9.  On 8 January 2002 the public prosecutor requested a warrant authorising a search of the homes of forty people, including the applicants, who had submitted petitions. The public prosecutor considered that the petitions in question had been made on the instructions of the PKK (Workers\u2019 Party of Kurdistan), an illegal armed organisation, and wished to collect relevant evidence from the petitioners\u2019 homes. The Istanbul State Security Court granted the public prosecutor\u2019s request that day. 10.  On 9 January 2002 the public prosecutor instructed the Anti\u2011terrorism branch of the Istanbul Security Directorate to conduct the searches with a view to finding evidence that could link the relevant persons to the PKK as aiders and abettors. It also instructed the Anti-terrorism branch to take the petitioners into police custody and question them in relation to the content and purpose of their petitions. The public prosecutor provided a list of questions to ask the petitioners, which mainly aimed to establish whether they had acted on the orders of the PKK. 11.  Early on the morning of 13 January 2002 police officers from the Anti-terrorism branch of the Istanbul Security Directorate carried out a simultaneous search of all the properties, including the applicants\u2019 houses. The search and seizure reports drafted by the police and signed by the applicants and other members of the household indicated that a search warrant had been issued by the Istanbul State Security Court on account of their petitions requesting education in Kurdish for their children. The reports also stated that the public prosecutor had ordered the petitioners\u2019 arrest for questioning. According to these search and seizure reports, no illegal material was found in the applicants\u2019 homes. 12. The applicants were arrested and taken into police custody following the searches on 13 January 2002. The search and seizure reports and custody records submitted by the Government indicate that the applicants were arrested and taken into police custody at the following times:\n \nName\nTime of arrest\nTime of placement in detention centre\nEsma D\u00f6ner 13.  On the same day the applicants were questioned by officers from the Anti-terrorism branch of the Istanbul Security Directorate. They were asked, in particular, whether they had submitted the petitions in accordance with the PKK\u2019s new \u201ccivil disobedience\u201d strategy adopted at its Sixth National Conference held between 5 and 22 August 2001. The applicants Meryem Peker and Y\u0131lmaz Yavuz claimed that they had not submitted any petitions requesting education in Kurdish to any State authorities. The remaining applicants mainly denied any affiliation with the PKK and stated that they had submitted the petitions in question so that their children could learn their parents\u2019 mother tongue. Some of the applicants also stated that the issue of submission of such petitions had also been discussed at the Ba\u011fc\u0131lar branch of HADEP (Halk\u0131n Demokrasi Partisi \u2013 the People\u2019s Democracy Party), a Turkish political party, which they attended from time to time. The applicants\u2019 signed statements suggest that interpretation services were provided to three of them (Ay\u015fe D\u00f6ner, Fatma Y\u0131lmaz and G\u00fcli Akyol) on request. A note drafted by the police also suggests that the applicants other than Meryem Peker, Halime G\u00fcnana, Asiya Karadeniz and Y\u0131lmaz Yavuz were illiterate. 14.  It appears that in the meantime, some of the applicants\u2019 families contacted the Istanbul Bar Association seeking legal aid for their relatives during their detention in police custody. A lawyer was accordingly appointed. On 13 January 2002 the lawyer applied to the public prosecutor\u2019s office at the Istanbul State Security Court for information in relation to twelve of the applicants (Esma D\u00f6ner, G\u00fclperi D\u00f6ner, Ay\u015fe D\u00f6ner, Han\u0131m G\u00fcl\u00fcn, \u015eahide G\u00fcm\u00fc\u015f, Hasibe Y\u0131lmaz, Fatma Y\u0131lmaz, Tenzile Akyol, G\u00fcli Akyol, Fatma Duru\u015fkan, Meryem Peker and Mehmet \u015eirin D\u00f6ner). In particular, he enquired about their legal status and the charges they were facing, and asked to meet them and to provide them with the necessary legal assistance. On the same day he applied to the Istanbul State Security Court to have the same twelve applicants released, arguing that they were being held in custody unlawfully. 15.  On the same day a judge at the Istanbul State Security Court decided that there was no need to decide on the lawyer\u2019s request as there was no record of the individuals in question being detained in relation to an investigation conducted by the public prosecutor\u2019s office. On 16 January 2002 the Istanbul State Security Court rejected a request by the lawyer to have the decision rendered by the judge set aside. 16.  In the meantime, on 14 January 2002 the public prosecutor informed the lawyer that the applicants in question were in custody on suspicion of being affiliated with an illegal organisation, and that there was no need to decide on the lawyer\u2019s request to have access to them as no authorisation for their detention in police custody had yet been issued by the public prosecutor\u2019s office. 17.  It appears that shortly after that decision, still on 14 January 2002, the public prosecutor authorised the applicants\u2019 detention in police custody for four days between 13 and 17 January 2002. The authorisation was granted in response to a request made by the Anti-terrorism branch of the Istanbul Security Directorate, who had claimed that the applicants\u2019 detention was needed for the completion of their files, in particular to verify whether the petitions had been submitted by the applicants themselves, whether they had any affiliation with the PKK and whether they were being searched for in connection with other offences (see paragraph 32 below for the legal basis for that authorisation). 18.  At 8.30 a.m. on 17 January 2002 the applicants were taken out of the detention centre and, following a routine medical check-up, were brought before the public prosecutor at the Istanbul State Security Court. They admitted before the public prosecutor that they had written the petitions, either themselves or with the help of their children, but stated that they had no other motive than wanting their children to learn their mother tongue. They denied any involvement with the PKK. Some of the applicants claimed that they had submitted petitions after hearing about it from other parents at school or on television. According to the information provided by the Government, seven of the applicants (Ay\u015fe D\u00f6ner, Hasibe Y\u0131lmaz, Fatma Y\u0131lmaz, Tenzile Akyol, G\u00fcli Akyol, Meliha Can and Kudret Da\u011f) were assisted by an interpreter during questioning by the public prosecutor. 19.  At an unspecified time on 17 January 2002 the applicants (except for Meryem Peker, Mehmet \u015eirin D\u00f6ner and Y\u0131lmaz Yavuz) were brought before a judge at the Istanbul State Security Court, who ordered their release after taking statements from them. The applicants concerned were actually released following the Istanbul State Security Court\u2019s order. Seven of the applicants (Ay\u015fe D\u00f6ner, \u015eahide G\u00fcm\u00fc\u015f, Hasibe Y\u0131lmaz, Fatma Y\u0131lmaz, G\u00fcli Akyol, Meliha Can and Kudret Da\u011f) were assisted by an interpreter before that court. It appears that Meryem Peker, Mehmet \u015eirin D\u00f6ner and Y\u0131lmaz Yavuz were also released that day, but the decision ordering their release was not submitted to the Court. 20.  On the same day the public prosecutor filed an objection concerning the decision to release the applicants, claiming that it was evident from the statements made by them following their arrest that they had submitted the petitions in an organised manner with the aim of assisting the PKK\u2019s \u201cpoliticisation\u201d process. The public prosecutor added that although the applicants appeared to have lawfully used their right to petition, in reality they were acting on the instructions of the PKK and were thus aiding and abetting that organisation. 21.  On 18 January 2002 the Istanbul State Security Court upheld the public prosecutor\u2019s objection in respect of the applicants Esma D\u00f6ner, Han\u0131m G\u00fcl\u00fcn, Hasibe Y\u0131lmaz, Meliha Can, \u015e\u00fckr\u00fcye Tem\u00fcro\u011flu, Halime G\u00fcnana and Z\u00fcbeyde Yavuz, and issued a warrant for their arrest. The court did not provide any reasons for its decision. 22.  On 22 January 2002 the lawyer asked the Istanbul State Security Court to set aside its decision of 18 January 2002 ordering the arrest of the relevant applicants. On 28 January 2002 the State Security Court dismissed that request, basing its decision on the nature of the offence, date of arrest, state of the evidence and contents of the case file. 23.  In the meantime, on 19 January 2002 Esma D\u00f6ner, Hasibe Y\u0131lmaz and Z\u00fcbeyde Yavuz were arrested on the basis of that warrant. The next day they were remanded in custody. It appears that the remaining four applicants named in the warrant could not be located. 24.  On 21 January 2002 the applicants Esma D\u00f6ner and Z\u00fcbeyde Yavuz filed objections concerning their detention on remand. 25.  On 22 January 2002 the Istanbul State Security Court dismissed Esma D\u00f6ner and Z\u00fcbeyde Yavuz\u2019s objections, basing its decision on the nature of the offence and the state of the evidence. 26.  On 6 February 2002 the public prosecutor at the Istanbul State Security Court decided not to prosecute the applicant Y\u0131lmaz Yavuz because of a lack of evidence against him. 27.  On the same day the public prosecutor issued an indictment against thirty-eight suspects, including the remaining applicants, accusing them of aiding and abetting an armed organisation under Article 169 of the Criminal Code and section 5 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713) in force at the material time. In the indictment the public prosecutor stated that following the arrest and conviction of their leader Abdullah \u00d6calan, the PKK had set out to pursue new policies. Accordingly, at the Sixth National Conference held between 5 and 22 August 2001, it had adopted the \u201cDemocratisation and Peace Project\u201d, a new strategy which had involved undertaking non-violent activities of \u201ccivil disobedience\u201d and aimed at leaving the State and its authorities in a difficult position in the international arena. The public prosecutor submitted that such organised acts of civil disobedience agreed on by the PKK had included petitioning the State authorities for education in Kurdish, dressing up in traditional Kurdish female costume, and applying to courts or population registration offices with requests for their Kurdish identities to appear on their national identity cards. When viewed against this background, the petitions in question \u2013 which had been submitted to certain authorities on predetermined dates and times \u2013 could not be considered to be individual acts. They had actually been part of an organised movement which had aimed to implement the decisions adopted by the PKK and thereby undermine the authority of the State. 28.  On 12 February 2002 the first-instance court ordered the release of the applicants Esma D\u00f6ner, Hasibe Y\u0131lmaz and Z\u00fcbeyde Yavuz pending the criminal proceedings. 29.  On 28 May 2003 the Istanbul State Security Court acquitted all the accused, including the applicants, because on the facts none of the elements of the crime of aiding and abetting an armed organisation had been present in their actions and there was no other evidence to support the allegations brought against them. The judgment became final on 5 June 2003.", "references": ["9", "0", "3", "1", "7", "8", "5", "4", "No Label", "6", "2"], "gold": ["6", "2"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 2001 and lives in St Petersburg. 6.  In August 2004 the applicant started attending public pre-school educational institution no. 42 (\u201cthe nursery school\u201d). His teachers were Ms K., Ms P. and an assistant teacher, Ms Ch. 7.  In the spring of 2005 the applicant\u2019s parents noticed a change in his behaviour. In particular, he became nervous and unwilling to go to nursery school. During the summer holidays of that year the applicant\u2019s physiological state significantly ameliorated and his mood returned to normal. However, as soon as he resumed nursery school in September 2005 he again became nervous and frightened of the dark and noises. He resisted going to school and refused to discuss school with his parents or sisters. 8.  On 7 November 2005, when picking him up from the nursery school, the applicant\u2019s mother noticed that his eyes were twitching and that he had a bruise on his left temple. The applicant complained that his neck and eyes were aching. The teacher, Ms P., told the applicant\u2019s mother that the children had been given eye drops containing an antibiotic. According to her, one of the children in the class had an eye infection and it was necessary to take preventive measures against its spreading among the children. 9.  On 8 November 2005 the applicant was examined by an ophthalmologist, who noted a bruise on his temple. She found no symptoms of any eye infection or disease. She recommended a consultation with a neurologist in order to verify whether the eye tics could have neurological causes. 10.  On the same day the applicant started to display mouth tics. 11.  On 14 November 2005 the applicant\u2019s mother lodged a complaint with the local department of the Federal Authority for Consumer Protection and the Supervision of Public Well-being. She complained that the teachers at nursery school no. 42 had administered eye treatment to her son without her consent and had used physical force against him. Her son had developed nervous tics as a result. 12.  On 15 November 2005 the applicant was examined by a neurologist and was diagnosed with hyperkinesia (a state of excessive restlessness which is manifested in a wide variety of disorders that affect the ability to control motor movement and which is mainly psychological in nature). 13.  On 16 November 2005 the applicant\u2019s mother complained to the local department of education about the incident of 7 November 2005 and asked that the applicant be transferred to another nursery school. 14.  By a letter of 23 November 2005 the local department of the Federal Authority for Consumer Protection and the Supervision of Public Well\u2011being informed the applicant\u2019s mother that the director of nursery school no. 42 had been disciplined for breaching sanitary standards. 15.  By a letter of 29 November 2005 the local department of education replied to the applicant\u2019s mother, stating that the facts described in her complaint had been confirmed in part and that the director of the nursery school, teachers Ms K. and Ms P. and medical nurse Ms Pt. had been disciplined. It had been decided to transfer the applicant to another public nursery school. 16.  When the applicant learnt that he would not have to return to nursery school no. 42, he was happy and told his parents that he had been mistreated by Ms K. and Ms P. In particular, he had been punished for a failure to sleep during the afternoon sleeping hours. Sometimes he had been made to lie on a folding bed in the toilets. The lights in the toilets had been switched off and the teachers had told him that he would be eaten by rats. The applicant had felt very frightened as he had once seen a rat in the toilets. On other occasions he had been forced to stand in the entrance hall, barefoot and wearing only his underpants, for the entire duration of the sleeping hours. He had been very cold. The applicant had also on occasions been hit on the back with a fist. On one occasion the teachers had taped his mouth shut with sellotape. After he had started to suffocate, he had tried to remove the sellotape. The teachers had then taped his hands behind his back. Some other children had also been subjected to similar punishments. They had been threatened that if they complained to their parents about the teachers they would be punished. 17.  The applicant also told his parents in detail about what had happened on 7 November 2005. He had been given eye drops twice. In the morning Ms K. had bent his head back with such force that his neck had ached. In the afternoon, she had sat on the applicant\u2019s legs and tried to force his eyes open with her hands. Frightened, the applicant had resisted. Ms K. had then slapped his face. 18.  On 23 November 2005 the applicant\u2019s father was questioned by the police in connection with a complaint lodged by Ms K. and Ms Pt. that he had assaulted them. The applicant\u2019s father stated to the police that his conflict with Ms K. and Ms Pt. had arisen because his four-year-old son had been mistreated by the staff of the nursery school. He denied assaulting them. The criminal proceedings against the applicant\u2019s father were discontinued after one of the nursery school staff members stated in writing that Ms Pt. had attempted to convince her and other staff members to falsely accuse the applicant\u2019s father of assaulting Ms K. and Ms Pt. 19.  On 21 December 2005 the local department of education informed the applicant\u2019s mother that the director of nursery school no. 42 had been dismissed. 20.  By a letter of 13 March 2006 the local department of education informed the applicant\u2019s father that an internal inquiry had established that teachers Ms K. and Ms P. had made some of the children sleep outside the sleeping quarters. That fact, although denied by Ms K. and Ms P., had been confirmed by assistant teacher Ms Ch. and by the grandmother of one of the children. Ms K. and Ms P. had been disciplined. 21.  By a letter of 17 July 2006 the Vice-Governor of St Petersburg informed the applicant\u2019s mother that medical nurse Ms Pt. had been disciplined. 22.  On 21 February 2006 the applicant\u2019s mother sued nursery school no. 42 for compensation for the damage sustained by the applicant to his health. 23.  On 30 June 2006 the Kirovskiy District Court of St Petersburg approved a friendly settlement agreement between the applicant\u2019s mother and nursery school no. 42. Under that agreement, the nursery school was to pay the applicant\u2019s mother 5,000 Russian roubles (RUB) (approximately 150 euros (EUR)) in compensation for medical expenses. 24.  On 29 September 2006 the applicant\u2019s mother complained to the Kirovskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office about her son\u2019s ill-treatment by the staff of nursery school no. 42. She described the incident of 7 November 2005, complained that during the sleeping hours her son had been occasionally locked in the toilets with the lights off, and submitted that as a result of such treatment he had developed nervous tics. She also submitted that she had not received an adequate response to her complaints to the local department of education and the local department of the Federal Authority for Consumer Protection and the Supervision of Public Well-being. 25.  By letter of 27 October 2006 the Kirovskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office informed the applicant\u2019s mother that an inquiry had been opened into her allegations of ill-treatment. It also noted that the local department of education had failed in its obligation under section 9 of the Minors Act to inform the district prosecutor\u2019s office of the applicant\u2019s ill-treatment (see paragraph 134 below). 26.  On 2 November 2006 the investigator questioned several of the parents of the children who had attended nursery school no. 42 with the applicant. Some of them stated that their children had never complained about being mistreated by teachers Ms P. or Ms K. Others stated that their children had told them about being locked in the entrance hall or in the toilets, where they had on occasion seen rats. They also confirmed that on 7 November 2005 eye drops had been given to the children without the parents\u2019 consent. 27.  Assistant teacher Ms Ch. stated to the investigator that on 7 November 2005 two children had shown symptoms of eye infection. Teacher Ms K. had consulted medical nurse Ms Pt., who had decided to give eye drops to all children in order to prevent the spread of the infection. The parents\u2019 consent had not been obtained. The drops had been given by the teacher herself rather than by the medical nurse. Ms K. had used physical force against those children who had resisted. Many of them had been frightened and had cried. Immediately after that the applicant\u2019s eyes had started twitching. Ms Ch. also stated that both Ms K. and Ms P. had many times made certain children, including the applicant, sleep on folding beds in the toilets or in the entrance hall. Ms K. and Ms P. had often shouted at the children and had punished them by sending them to the toilets. She had once seen a child tied with string to his chair. 28.  The investigator also questioned Ms K., who denied mistreating the applicant or other children. She stated that on 7 November 2005 the children had been given eye drops by the medical nurse. The children had submitted to the treatment without any resistance or stress. No physical force had been used against the applicant or other children. The applicant had already had nervous tics before 7 November 2005. 29.  On an unspecified date at the beginning of November 2006 the applicant was questioned by the investigator. The applicant\u2019s mother and a psychologist were present during the questioning. The applicant described the incident of 7 November 2005. He also stated that he and some other children had often been made to sleep on a folding bed in the entrance hall or in the toilets with the lights turned off or left standing in the entrance hall with few clothes on. They had been frightened and cold. 30.  On 8 November 2006 the Kirovskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office refused to open a criminal investigation against the teachers of nursery school no. 42, finding no evidence of a criminal offence. The applicant\u2019s parents were not given a copy of that decision. 31.  On 12 January 2007 the Kirovskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office cancelled its decision of 8 November 2006 and resumed the pre\u2011investigation inquiry. 32.  The investigator then questioned Ms P. and medical nurse Ms Pt., who gave the same testimony as Ms K. 33.  During the following year the Kirovskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office issued two more decisions (on 22 January and 6 July 2007 respectively) refusing to open a criminal investigation against the teachers of nursery school no. 42 on the ground that there was no evidence of a criminal offence having been committed. 34.  The applicant\u2019s mother challenged those decisions before the Kirovskiy District Court. However, before the District Court could examine her complaints against the decisions, the Kirovskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office annulled them (on 20 June and 24 December 2007 respectively) and resumed the pre-investigation inquiry. No investigative measures were performed during this one-year period. 35.  On 27 September 2007 the applicant\u2019s medical documents were examined by a child psychiatrist at the request of the applicant\u2019s mother. The psychiatrist found that before November 2005 the applicant had not suffered from any neurological or psychiatric disorders. He had, however, on occasions suffered allergic reactions. The psychiatrist further noted that in 2005 the applicant had been subjected to a prolonged, psychologically traumatic experience at the nursery school. Against the background of that prolonged, traumatic experience, the incident of 7 November 2005 involving the use of violence had served as a trigger for his present neurological disorder. An allergic reaction to the eye drops could have also contributed to the development of the disorder. The psychiatrist concluded that there had been a causal link between the traumatic experience suffered by the applicant in the nursery school from September 2005 to November 2005 and his persistent neurological disorder. 36.  On 24 December 2007 the Kirovskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office noted that the pre-investigation inquiry was incomplete and that it was necessary to question the children who had attended the nursery school with the applicant and their parents, to obtain an expert opinion on the contra\u2011indications and side-effects of the eye drops given to the children, and to question other teachers at the nursery school. 37.  On 17 January 2008 the case was transferred to the Kirovskiy district police department for further pre-investigation inquiry. 38.  In February 2008 the investigator questioned the parents of some of the children who had attended the nursery school with the applicant. They stated that they did not have any complaints against teachers Ms P. and Ms K. None of them gave the investigator permission to question their children. 39.  The investigator also questioned one of the teachers at nursery school no. 42. The teacher stated that she could not give any useful information. 40.  On 29 February 2008 the Kirovskiy district police department refused to open a criminal investigation against Ms P. and Ms K., having found no evidence of a criminal offence. The applicant\u2019s parents were informed about that decision on 4 May 2008 and received a copy of it on an unspecified later date. 41.  On 23 May 2008, after being criticised by the St Petersburg prosecutor\u2019s office for delays in the conduct of the pre-investigation inquiry and for its ineffectiveness, the Kirovskiy district police department cancelled the decision of 29 February 2008 and resumed the pre\u2011investigation inquiry. 42.  On 11 June 2008, in reply to a complaint by the applicant\u2019s mother, the St Petersburg prosecutor\u2019s office again criticised the Kirovskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office for delays in the conduct of the pre-investigation inquiry and for its ineffectiveness. 43.  On 26 June 2008 the Kirovskiy district police department informed the staff of nursery school no. 42 that criminal proceedings into the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment would not be opened because the prosecution had become time-barred. 44.  On 30 June 2008 the Kirovskiy district police department refused to open a criminal investigation into the allegations of ill-treatment, finding no evidence of a criminal offence. On 4 July 2008 the Kirovskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office quashed that decision and ordered a further inquiry. 45.  On 11 July 2008 the Kirovskiy district police department refused to open a criminal investigation against Ms K. It found that, although there was evidence that Ms K.\u2019s actions amounted to cruel treatment of minors, an offence under Article 156 of the Criminal Code, the criminal proceedings had become time-barred. 46.  On 29 July 2008 the St Petersburg prosecutor\u2019s office quashed the decision of 11 July 2008, finding that the inquiry had been incomplete. It noted that it was necessary to question the children who had attended the nursery school with the applicant and with their parents; to establish the seriousness of the damage sustained by the applicant to his health; to obtain and analyse the documents regulating the actions of the staff of public nursery schools; and to investigate Ms P.\u2019s actions. 47.  On 9 August 2008 the investigator questioned the father of a child who had attended the nursery school with the applicant. He stated that his son had never complained of being ill-treated by the nursery school teachers. 48.  On 11 August and then again on 11 September 2008 the Kirovskiy district police department refused to open a criminal investigation against Ms K. on the ground that there was no evidence of a criminal offence having been committed. Those decisions were cancelled on unspecified dates. 49.  In reply to new complaints lodged by the applicant\u2019s mother, on 21 November 2008 the St Petersburg prosecutor\u2019s office again criticised the Kirovskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office for the delays in the conduct of the pre-investigation inquiry and for its ineffectiveness. 50.  On 1 December 2008 the investigator questioned the mother of another child who had attended the nursery school with the applicant. She stated that her daughter had never been mistreated by the staff of the nursery school. 51.  On 19 January 2009 the Kirovskiy district police department opened a criminal investigation against Ms K. and Ms P. 52.  On 4 March 2009 the applicant was granted the procedural status of victim. The applicant\u2019s mother was recognised as his representative.\n(a)  Evidence collected during the investigation 53.  In the course of the criminal investigation, which lasted at least until December 2014, the police department collected the following evidence.\n(i)  Statements by the applicant 54.  On 4 March 2009 the applicant was questioned by the investigator in the presence of his counsel, his mother and a teacher. The applicant stated that Ms K. and Ms P. had often punished him and some other children. In particular, on many occasions they had made him sleep in the toilets and had threatened that he would be eaten by rats. Ms K. had once taped his mouth and hands with sellotape. She had also slapped him on the face when he had refused to open his eyes to receive eye drops. On another occasion Ms K. had splashed paint over his friend\u2019s face because she had not liked his drawings. The applicant also stated that Ms K. and Ms P. had forbidden him from telling his parents about those punishments. 55.  On 24 March 2009 the applicant was taken by the investigator to nursery school no. 42, where he repeated his previous statements. In particular, he showed the investigator the spot in the toilets where his folding bed had been placed and the place in the entrance hall where he and other children had been forced to stand wearing only their underwear and T\u2011shirts and keeping their arms up and apart during the entire duration of the sleeping hours. He further showed the investigator where and how he had been bound with sellotape and where and how he had been given eye drops. He also showed the investigator a closet in which he had been locked in the dark. Lastly, he told the investigator that if he did not sleep during the sleeping hours Ms K. and Ms P. would hold his head against the bed until it started to ache. The applicant\u2019s lawyer, the applicant\u2019s mother, a psychologist and a teacher were present during the questioning. 56.  On 9 June 2009 the applicant was questioned again. He repeated his previous statements. He also added that Ms K. had hit him on the back.\n(ii)  Statements by the suspects 57.  Ms P. was questioned by the investigator on 6 February and 21 May 2009, 23 August 2011 and 13 March 2014. She initially cited her right to remain silent and refused to testify. She then denied ill-treating the applicant or other children. She stated that the applicant had had nervous tics since September 2005. During the last round of questioning she asked that the criminal proceedings be discontinued as time-barred. 58.  Ms K. was questioned on 5 February and 22 June 2009 and 13 March 2014. She also initially refused to testify. She then denied ill\u2011treating the applicant or other children. She stated that the applicant had had nervous tics since the summer of 2005 and that assistant teacher Ms Ch. had given false testimony against her in revenge for critical remarks she had made in respect of Ms Ch.\u2019s unsatisfactory work. During the last round of questioning she again refused to testify and asked that the criminal proceedings be discontinued as time-barred.\n(iii)  Witness statements 59.  On 10 April 2009 medical nurse Ms Pt. was questioned. She stated that she had been the one who had administered eye drops to the children on 7 November 2005 because one of them had had an eye infection. When she had learned from the applicant\u2019s mother that the applicant had eye tics, she had talked to Ms K. and Ms P., who had affirmed that the applicant had had nervous tics before 7 November 2005. She had never seen Ms K. and Ms P. mistreating the children. However, when questioned on 24 October 2011 and 24 July 2012 Ms Pt. stated that she had lied during the previous rounds of questioning about having given the eye drops to the children on 7 November 2005. In fact the eye drops had been given by Ms K. without her (that is to say Ms Pt.\u2019s) permission. She had lied about that fact because she had had felt sorry for Ms K. and had not wanted her to be punished. 60.  On 19 June 2009 and 21 October 2010 assistant teacher Ms Ch. was questioned. She stated that on 7 November 2005 Ms K. had given eye drops to the children on the advice of the medical nurse. Ms K. had used physical force against those children who had resisted. Many of them had been frightened and had cried. Immediately after that the applicant\u2019s eyes had started twitching. Ms Ch. also stated that on many occasions she had seen Ms K. and Ms P. make the applicant and some other children sleep on folding beds in the toilets or in the entrance hall. Ms K. and Ms P. had often shouted at the children and had punished them by locking them up in the toilets. She had once seen a child tied with string to his chair. She added that she had never talked to the applicant\u2019s parents except at the nursery school. 61.  On 30 June 2009, 24 and 30 August 2011, and 12 and 13 March 2014 the investigator held confrontations between Ms Ch. and Ms P., between Ms Ch. and Ms K., and between Ms Pt. and Ms Ch. They all reiterated their previous statements. 62.  In April and May 2009, October and November 2011 and July 2012 the investigator questioned six teachers from nursery school no. 42. They stated that they had never seen Ms K. or Ms P. mistreating the children. Some of them also stated that the applicant had already had nervous tics before the incident of 7 November 2005. One of them stated that assistant teacher Ms Ch. had sometimes taken the applicant home in the evenings because she lived in the same block of flats as the applicant. Ms Ch. had often shouted at the children in the nursery school and the children had been afraid of her. 63.  On 21 September 2009 the investigator questioned the former director of nursery school no. 42. She stated that Ms K. and Ms P. had been competent and affectionate teachers who had been appreciated by the children and their parents. She had never received any complaints about them. 64.  On 12 December 2011 and 16 July 2012 the investigator questioned the then director of nursery school no. 42, who had taken up that position in December 2005. She gave positive references for Ms P. and Ms K. She stated that she had never seen them mistreating the children or received any complaints from the parents in respect of her. 65.  In April, May and September 2009, September and November 2011, and July 2012 the investigator questioned the parents of several children who had attended the nursery school with the applicant. Most of them stated that their children had never complained of having been mistreated by Ms K. or Ms P. One of them stated that her son had on occasions been punished by the teachers; in particular he had been made to sleep outside the sleeping quarters, in the changing room. Her son had also told her that he had seen a rat in the toilets. She had, moreover, seen some children carrying heavy folding beds from one place to another upon the instruction of the teachers. Lastly, she stated that her son had told her on 7 November 2005 that Ms K. had used force against the applicant (who had resisted and cried) when administering eye drops to him. Another parent stated that Ms K. had locked her son up in the toilets on two occasions and had once made him sleep outside the sleeping quarters, near the toilets. Another parent stated that her daughter had told her about the applicant and another boy being made to sleep separately from the others. She however did not know the details. 66.  Between 16 November and 2 December 2011 the investigator questioned four of the children who had attended the nursery school with the applicant. They all stated that Ms K. and Ms P. had been kind to them and had never mistreated them or other children. 67.  The applicant\u2019s mother was questioned on 10 March and 9 April 2009 and on 14 October 2010. She described the applicant\u2019s change in behaviour and mood after he had started to attend nursery school. She described the incident of 7 November 2005 and her son\u2019s subsequent development of nervous tics. She also related a conversation she had had with her son during which he had for the first time told her about being mistreated by Ms K. and Ms P. She also stated that her son continued to suffer from nervous tics and to undergo treatment for them. Lastly, she told the investigator that although Ms Ch.\u2019s sister was her neighbour she did not have any friendly relationship with her. 68.  On 24 November 2011 and 28 February 2014 the applicant\u2019s father was questioned. He made similar submissions as the applicant\u2019s mother. 69.  On 7 December 2011 and 28 February 2014 the investigator held confrontations between the applicant\u2019s mother and one of those teachers at the nursery school who had already been questioned in November 2011. They both reiterated their previous submissions. 70.  On 13 December 2011 and 12 March 2014 the investigator held confrontations between Ms Ch. and one of the teachers of the nursery school. Ms Ch. confirmed her previous submissions, while the teacher stated that Ms P. and Ms K. had never mistreated the children, that Ms Ch. had shouted at the children, that Ms. Ch. had sometimes babysat the applicant and that the applicant had had nervous tics before November 2005. 71.  On 17 March 2014 the investigator questioned the applicant\u2019s neighbour who lived on the same landing, who stated that the applicant\u2019s tics had started in November 2005. She also stated that the applicant\u2019s parents were on good terms with Ms Ch.\u2019s sister but that she had not noticed any kind of relationship between the applicant\u2019s parents and Ms Ch. herself. 72.  On 12 March 2014 the applicant\u2019s mother produced material from the civil case file and asked that it be included in the criminal case file. In particular, she asked for the inclusion of the written statement by one of the staff members of nursery school no. 42 (see paragraph 18 above) that medical nurse Ms Pt. had attempted to convince her and other staff members to give false testimony against the applicant\u2019s family. On 17 March 2014 the investigator refused the requests, finding that the documents from the civil case file were irrelevant to the criminal case.\n(iv)  Expert opinions 73.  On 10 April 2009 a panel of psychiatrists and psychologists examined the applicant and issued an expert opinion. They found that the applicant continued to suffer from nervous tics. Given that such tics could have had both organic and neurological causes, it was impossible to establish a causal link between the events of November 2005 and the applicant\u2019s current neurological disorder. Given the applicant\u2019s age at the material time and the time that had passed since the events in question, the applicant could not accurately recall those events. He was therefore psychologically incapable of testifying within the framework of the criminal proceedings. 74.  On 9 October 2009 a panel of medical experts examined the applicant\u2019s medical records and issued an expert opinion. They noted that his nervous tics could have had both organic and neurological causes. It was therefore impossible to establish a causal link between the events of September-November 2005 and the applicant\u2019s current neurologic disorder. 75.  On 14 January 2011 a panel of experts in psychiatry and psychology examined the applicant and analysed his medical records. When interviewed by the experts, the applicant stated that he wanted to forget about what had happened to him in the nursery school but he was constantly being reminded of those events because of the investigation. He affirmed that his tics were aggravated each time that he remembered, or had to discuss, the treatment to which he had been subjected in the nursery school. The experts confirmed that the aggravation of the tics was indeed related to the applicant\u2019s memories of the nursery school. The experts found that before November 2005 the applicant had not suffered from any psychiatric disorder. There had been a causal link between his nervous disorder and the prolonged, psychologically traumatic experience to which he had been subjected in the nursery school from September to November 2005. Many years later he still continued to suffer from nervous tics. He had therefore suffered damage of medium severity to his health. The experts further noted that the applicant did not suffer from any memory or intellectual disorder and that his intellectual development corresponded to his age; he was therefore capable of understanding and relating the relevant events accurately. However, his ability to remember the events had decreased with time. If in 2006 he had been still capable of remembering the events in question accurately, with the passage of time his memory of the events had become unrealistic and distorted. His statements \u2013 both in 2009 and at that current moment \u2013 could not therefore be relied upon in the criminal proceedings. Moreover, given that each discussion of the relevant events revived his memories of the traumatic experience and prevented him from moving on, his further participation in investigative measures was inadvisable. 76.  On 6 April and 2 November 2011 the investigator questioned a psychiatric expert chosen by the applicant\u2019s mother. The expert stated that she disagreed in part with the expert opinion of 14 January 2011. In her opinion, the applicant had suffered severe damage (rather than damage of medium severity) to his health. 77.  On 25 and 26 October and 23 December 2011 and 28 February 2014 the investigator questioned some of the experts who had participated in the expert examinations mentioned above. They confirmed the findings contained in the respective expert opinions.\n(v)  Other medical evidence 78.  On 11 March 2009 the psychologist treating the applicant stated to the investigator that the applicant had been suffering from a neurological disorder since November 2005. His health had improved as a result of the treatment. 79.  On 17 July 2009 the applicant\u2019s mother submitted to the investigator a copy of a medical certificate showing that the applicant did not have any anomalies in the brain. She argued that the certificate proved that the applicant\u2019s neurological disorder was psychological rather than organic in nature. 80.  On 11 November 2009 the investigator questioned a child psychiatrist who, after examining the applicant\u2019s medical records, stated that there was a causal link between the traumatic experience suffered by the applicant in the nursery school from September until November 2005 and his persistent neurological disorder. 81.  On 22 April 2010 a psychiatrist and a psychologist analysed the applicant\u2019s medical records at the applicant\u2019s mother\u2019s request. They found that in the absence of any anomalies in the applicant\u2019s brain, his neurological disorder could not be organic in nature. It was highly probable that they had been caused by psychological trauma. Given that the nervous tics had appeared for the first time in November 2005, there was a causal link between the ill-treatment in the nursery school to which the applicant had been subjected from September until November 2005 and his nervous tics. Finally, the experts noted that the applicant was of normal intellectual development and did not suffer from any memory or intellectual disorders. His statements to the investigator had been detailed and consistent. There were therefore no reasons to consider that the applicant could not remember the relevant events accurately and was psychologically incapable of testifying within the framework of the criminal proceedings.\n(b)  The course of the investigation 82.  The investigation was suspended from 2 until 16 September, from 23 until 30 September, from 9 until 12 October, from 15 October until 5 November and from 6 until 11 November 2009; from 15 September until 11 October, and from 22 October until 28 November 2010; from 15 December 2010 until 11 January 2011, from 15 January until 28 March, from 28 until 29 July, from 16 June until 4 August, and from 5 until 6 September 2011; and from 30 December 2011 until 9 July 2012. The decisions to suspend the investigation were taken by the investigator on the basis of medical certificates showing that Ms K. was on maternity leave and could not therefore participate in investigative measures. All those decisions were annulled by the investigators\u2019 superior as unlawful. 83.  On 17 July 2009 the Kirovskiy district police department discontinued the criminal proceedings against Ms K. and Ms. P., finding that their actions in the period from September to November 2005 amounted to battery or other violent acts causing physical pain and cruel treatment of minors, offences under Article 116 \u00a7 1 and 156 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code. The prosecution of those offences was time-barred. There was insufficient evidence of premeditated infliction of damage of medium severity to health, an offence under Article 112 of the Criminal Code. Moreover, according to the experts, the applicant could not remember the relevant events accurately and was psychologically incapable of testifying within the framework of the criminal proceedings. 84.  On 27 July 2009 the Kirovskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office quashed the decision of 17 July 2009, finding that the investigation was incomplete, and ordered further investigative measures. 85.  On 29 August 2009 the applicant\u2019s mother complained to the Kirovskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office that, despite her having lodged numerous requests, she had still not been given copies of the decisions of 17 and 27 July 2009. 86.  On 11 November 2009 the Kirovskiy district police department discontinued the criminal proceedings against Ms K. and Ms. P. for the same reasons as those set out in the decision of 17 July 2009. 87.  On 25 June 2010 the Kirovskiy District Court found that the decision of 11 November 2009 had been unlawful because the findings contained in that decision had been contradictory. It held, in particular, that in order to resolve those contradictions it was necessary to perform a new psychiatric examination of the applicant. 88.  On 19 July 2010 the Kirovskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office quashed the decision of 11 November 2009 and ordered further investigative measures. 89.  By a letter of 26 August 2010 the St Petersburg prosecutor\u2019s office criticised the Kirovskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office for the delays and the ineffectiveness of the investigation. On the same day the Kirovskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office gave instructions to the Kirovskiy district police department as regards further investigative measures to be performed. 90.  On 5 December 2011 Ms K. asked the investigator to discontinue the proceedings. She was suspected of inflicting damage to health of medium severity, an offence under Article 112 of the Criminal Code. The statutory limitation period for that offence was six years. The proceedings had therefore become time-barred. On the same day the prosecutor refused Ms K.\u2019s request, finding that the previous expert examinations had yielded contradictory results. It was therefore necessary for a new expert examination to be performed in order to establish the severity of the damage sustained to the health of the applicant. The investigation could not therefore be discontinued. 91.  On 15 December 2011 Ms P. also asked the investigator to discontinue investigations as time-barred. On the same day the prosecutor refused the request for the same reasons as those for which Ms K.\u2019s similar request had been refused. 92.  On 8 February 2012 the Kirovskiy District Court examined Ms K.\u2019s complaint against the decision of 5 December 2011 and dismissed it. It found that it was necessary for an additional expert examination to be performed in order to establish the severity of the damage sustained by the applicant to his health. If experts were to find that the applicant had sustained severe damage to his health, the limitation period would be ten years and the proceedings would not have become time-barred. 93.  On 13 July 2012 Ms K. again asked the investigator to discontinue the investigation because the proceedings had become time-barred. On the same day the investigator refused the request for the same reasons as those above. 94.  On 7 August 2012 the investigator found that after 16 June 2011 the investigation had been extended in breach of the procedure and time-limits provided by law. The investigative measures carried out between 16 June 2011 and 9 July 2012 had therefore been unlawful and all evidence collected during that period was inadmissible. 95.  On 10 August 2012 the Kirovskiy district police department discontinued the criminal proceedings against Ms K. and Ms P., finding that there was insufficient evidence of a criminal offence under Article 112 of the Criminal Code. It noted that only four witnesses had confirmed that ill\u2011treatment had occurred: the applicant, the applicant\u2019s mother, Ms Ch. and Ms Pt. (in her statements of 24 July 2012). The experts had found that, because of his young age at the material time, the applicant\u2019s description of the events was unreliable and his further participation in investigative measures was inadvisable. There were therefore doubts about the credibility of his statements. The applicant\u2019s mother\u2019s statements were equally unreliable because she had learned about the events from the applicant. Ms Pt.\u2019s statements of 24 July 2012 contradicted her previous statements and statements by other witnesses. They could not therefore be considered reliable either. The expert opinions establishing a causal link between the alleged ill-treatment and the applicant\u2019s neurological disorder could not serve as evidence of ill-treatment because it was not within the experts\u2019 remit to establish whether or not ill-treatment had occurred. The expert opinions had been made on the assumption that such ill-treatment had indeed taken place. Ms Ch.\u2019s statements therefore constituted the only evidence of such ill-treatment. The investigator considered that those statements were insufficient to prove that ill-treatment had indeed taken place. The investigator further noted that all evidence collected between 16 June 2011 and 9 July 2012 had been declared inadmissible. Given that that evidence did not contain any proof of ill-treatment, it was not necessary to collect it again. 96.  The applicant\u2019s parents learned about that decision on 24 August 2012 and received a copy of it on 27 August 2012. 97.  On 9 October 2012 the applicant\u2019s mother challenged the Kirovskiy district police department\u2019s decision of 10 August 2012 to discontinue the criminal proceedings before the Kirovskiy District Court against Ms K. and Ms P. On 23 October 2012 the applicant\u2019s mother also challenged that decision before the St Petersburg prosecutor\u2019s office. 98.  On 23 November 2012 the St Petersburg prosecutor\u2019s office found that the decision of 10 August 2012 had been lawful. 99.  On 2 August 2013 the Kirovskiy District Court rejected the complaint lodged by the applicant\u2019s mother on 9 October 2012. It found that the investigation had been thorough and effective. The breaches of procedure committed during the investigation \u2013 such as the failure to promptly notify the applicant\u2019s mother about certain procedural decisions taken by the investigator or the investigator\u2019s failure to comply with the prosecutor\u2019s instructions \u2013 were insufficiently serious as to warrant the quashing of the decision of 10 August 2012. 100.  On 24 December 2013 the St Petersburg City Court quashed the decision of 2 August 2013 on appeal and found that the decision of 10 August 2012 to discontinue the investigation had been unlawful. It found that the investigation had been ineffective. In particular, given that all evidence collected between 16 June 2011 and 9 July 2012 had been declared inadmissible, it was necessary to undertake anew the investigative measures carried out during that period and to carry out further investigative measures. The court also noted that although, according to the experts, the statements that the applicant had given after 2006 were unreliable, the statements that he had given before then could be taken into account in the assessment of evidence. The City Court also criticised the District Court for the delays in the examination of the complaint lodged by the applicant\u2019s mother on 9 October 2012 and the resulting excessive length of the judicial proceedings. 101.  On 5 March 2014 the applicant\u2019s mother applied to the investigator, asking that Ms P. and Ms K. be charged with the premeditated infliction of severe damage to health. The investigator refused her request, finding that there was no evidence of the premeditated infliction of severe damage to health. 102.  On 18 March 2014 the Kirovskiy district police department discontinued the criminal proceedings against Ms P. and Ms K., finding that their actions did not amount to a criminal offence under Article 112 of the Criminal Code. 103.  On 20 March 2014 the applicant\u2019s mother challenged that decision before the St Petersburg prosecutor\u2019s office, submitting that the investigation had been incomplete. On 18 April 2014 the St Petersburg prosecutor\u2019s office found that the decision of 18 March 2014 to discontinue the criminal proceedings had been lawful. 104.  On 23 May 2014 the Kirovskiy District Court held that the decision of 18 March 2014 had been unlawful, finding that the investigator\u2019s assessment of evidence had been selective and that he had disregarded some facts and evidence (such as a bruise on the applicant\u2019s face), some witness statements, and expert opinions. It also found that the investigation had been excessively long. 105.  On 9 June 2014 the Kirovskiy district police department annulled the decision of 18 March 2014 and resumed the investigation. After two written requests for a copy of that decision, the applicant eventually received it on 30 June 2014. 106.  On 19 July 2014 the Kirovskiy district police department discontinued the criminal proceedings against Ms P. and Ms K. The investigator found that although they had indeed given eye drops to the applicant, thereby causing damage of medium severity to his health, there was no evidence of intent to cause such damage. The infliction of damage to health had not therefore been intentional or premeditated. The police department further added that although the applicant had indeed had a bruise on his face, it was not possible to establish how he had received that bruise. The applicant\u2019s testimony was unreliable due to his young age and mental development at the time of his giving it, while the allegations of ill\u2011treatment made by the applicant\u2019s mother and by Ms Ch. had been countered by the statements of all other witnesses \u2013 namely the staff of the nursery school and the parents of other children \u2013 that Ms P. and Ms K. had never mistreated the applicant or other children. The investigator concluded that the evidence collected was contradictory and that it was not possible to resolve that contradiction. Any further investigative measures would be useless. Given that suspects should benefit from any doubt, it could not be found that Ms P.\u2019s and Ms K.\u2019s actions amounted to a criminal offence under Article 112 of the Criminal Code. 107.  On 29 August 2014 the St Petersburg prosecutor\u2019s office annulled the decision of 19 July 2014, finding that the investigation had been ineffective and incomplete. In particular, the criminal proceedings had been unlawfully discontinued even though it had been established that Ms P. and Ms K. had mistreated the applicant and had caused damage to his health. 108.  On 12 September 2014 the Kirovskiy district police department discontinued the criminal proceedings against Ms P. and Ms K. for the same reasons as those given in the decision of 19 July 2014. 109.  On 15 October 2014 the St Petersburg prosecutor\u2019s office annulled the decision of 12 September 2014, finding that the investigator had not complied with the prosecutor\u2019s decision of 29 August 2014. 110.  On 10 November 2014 the Kirovskiy district police department discontinued the criminal proceedings against Ms P. and Ms K., repeating verbatim the decision of 12 September 2014. 111.  On 4 December 2014 the Kirovskiy district police department again refused to open criminal proceedings against Ms P. and Ms K. under Article 156 of the Criminal Code (cruel treatment of minors), finding that the prosecution had become time-barred.\n(c)  The applicant\u2019s complaints about the ineffectiveness of the investigation 112.  The applicant\u2019s mother several times asked the investigator to declare the expert opinions of 10 April 2009 and 9 October 2009 inadmissible as evidence. She argued in particular that the panel of experts of 10 April 2009 had not included an expert in child psychiatry. The investigator refused the requests made by the applicant\u2019s mother, finding that the expert opinions of 10 April 2009 and 9 October 2009 had been obtained in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law and had contained clear findings. 113.  The applicant\u2019s mother lodged numerous complaints about the alleged ineffectiveness of the investigation with the Kirovskiy district police department, the Kirovskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office, the St Petersburg prosecutor\u2019s office, the Prosecutor General and the Kirovskiy and Krasnogvardeyskiy District Courts of St Petersburg. She complained that the investigation had been flawed by delays, in particular on account of the numerous unlawful suspensions of the investigation, and that she had often been denied access to the case file. She also complained that, although sufficient evidence of ill-treatment had been gathered, Ms P. and Ms K. had still not been charged with a criminal offence. She further argued that the applicant had sustained severe damage to his health (rather than damage of medium severity) as a result of the ill-treatment he had suffered. She also challenged the investigator\u2019s refusals to declare the expert opinions of 10 April 2009 and 9 October 2009 inadmissible as evidence. 114.  By letters of 16 and 18 November 2011 the St Petersburg prosecutor\u2019s office informed the applicant\u2019s mother that the investigator and the officials of the Kirovskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office responsible for supervising the case had been disciplined for the delays during the investigation and its ineffectiveness. 115.  On 2 December 2011 the Kirovskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office noted that the investigation had been conducted with serious delays and shortcomings. In particular, the investigator had not performed all requisite investigative measures, such as an additional medical examination of the applicant. 116.  On 12 January 2012 the Kirovskiy District Court found that it had no authority to assess whether the evidence was sufficient for charges to be brought. It was for the investigator to assess the collected evidence and to decide whether charges were to be brought. 117.  On 3 February 2012 the Kirovskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office found that the investigator\u2019s refusals (see paragraph 112 above) to declare the expert opinions of 10 April and 9 October 2009 inadmissible as evidence had been lawful. 118.  On 7 February 2012 the Kirovskiy District Court found that the rights of the applicant\u2019s mother had indeed been breached by the failure to provide her with copies of the numerous decisions to suspend the investigation. However, given that all of those decisions had been annulled, it was not necessary to examine the applicant\u2019s complaint relating to those decisions. Moreover, given that the decisions had been annulled by the investigator\u2019s superiors, the court concluded that those superiors had exercised effective supervision over the course of the investigation. On 18 April 2012 the St Petersburg City Court quashed that decision on appeal for procedural defects. 119.  On 13 August 2012 the Kirovskiy District Court found that the investigator had still not organised an additional expert examination of the applicant, even though he had been instructed to do so in August 2010 and again in August 2011. It also found that the applicant\u2019s mother had been unlawfully denied access to some documents in the case file. On 16 October 2012 the St Petersburg City Court quashed that decision on appeal for procedural defects. 120.  On 24 August 2012 the Krasnogvardeyskiy District Court of St Petersburg found that the complaints lodged by the applicant\u2019s mother about the delays and the ineffectiveness of the investigation were well\u2011founded. However, given that on 10 August 2012 the investigation had been discontinued for lack of evidence of a criminal offence, they had to be dismissed. On 15 November 2012 the St Petersburg City Court quashed that decision on appeal. It found that some of the complaints lodged by the applicant\u2019s mother had not been examined, that the decision had been based on certain documents that had not been examined during the hearing and that the court, even though it had found some of the complaints to be well\u2011founded, had nevertheless dismissed them. 121.  On 14 February 2013 the Kirovskiy District Court found that the investigator\u2019s decisions issued between 15 September 2010 and 6 October 2011 to suspend the investigation had been unlawful. The rights of the applicant\u2019s mother had, moreover, been breached by the investigator\u2019s failure to inform her about the suspensions of the investigation. Her complaint that the investigator had intentionally delayed the investigation with the aim of rendering the proceedings time-barred was, however, unsubstantiated. The investigation had been discontinued for lack of evidence of a criminal offence rather than on the ground that the proceedings had become time-barred. 122.  On 24 April 2013 the Kirovskiy District Court found that the applicant\u2019s mother had been unlawfully denied access to certain documents in the case file. It however rejected the remainder of her complaints relating to the alleged ineffectiveness of the investigation. In particular, the court established that the investigator had not complied with the prosecutor\u2019s instructions as to additional investigative measures to be performed. However, the prosecutor had later confirmed the investigator\u2019s decision to discontinue the investigation, thereby agreeing that it was no longer necessary to comply with his previous instructions and to undertake the investigative measures in question. The investigator\u2019s actions had therefore been lawful. On 6 August 2013 the St Petersburg City Court upheld that decision on appeal, finding it lawful, well-reasoned and justified. 123.  On 17 March 2014 the Kirovskiy district police department replied to the applicant\u2019s mother that all necessary investigative measures had been performed and that all relevant facts had been established. It was therefore not necessary to carry out any further investigative measures. On the same day the Kirovskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office also replied to the applicant\u2019s mother that the investigation had been thorough and complete and that there was no need for any further investigative measures. 124.  The applicant is regularly examined by a neurologist. After the initial diagnosis of hyperkinesia on 15 November 2005 (see paragraph 12 above), he was examined by a neurologist on 2 February, 24 April and 10 October 2006 and 26 January, 25 April, and 18 and 22 May 2007. He complained of nervous tics, sleeping difficulties, nervousness and fears. The neurologist noted that the symptoms had been caused by a prolonged, psychologically traumatic experience at the nursery school in 2005. The applicant was prescribed treatment. 125.  From September 2007 until June 2008 the applicant followed a course of treatment for nervous tics. 126.  On 22 October 2008 the applicant\u2019s medical documents were examined by a child psychiatrist, who found that the applicant continued to suffer from a neurological disorder of medium severity. 127.  From March until June 2009 the applicant underwent a new course of treatment for nervous tics. He underwent a further course of treatment between January and April 2010. 128.  Further medical certificates stated that in 2014 the applicant was still suffering from a neurological disorder and was following treatment for it.", "references": ["0", "6", "8", "3", "7", "5", "9", "2", "4", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in Chernigiv. 6.  On 25 January 2007 the Desnyanskiy District Court in Chernigiv (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) issued a warrant to search the applicant\u2019s flat for a mobile telephone, which had been reported stolen. The relevant part of the ruling read:\n\u201cActing investigator has applied to the court with a request to authorize search of the dwelling of [the applicant] ... with a view to locating a mobile telephone \u201cNokia\u20117270\u201d stolen from private entrepreneur [K.] ... [theft] having taken place on 2 December 2006 at night.\nDuring the hearing, the acting investigator and the prosecutor have supported their request ...\nHaving heard the acting investigator [and] the opinion of the prosecutor, and having examined the material of the criminal case, the court concludes that ... [it] has been provided with sufficient data indicating a possibility that the Nokia 7270 mobile telephone may be at the [applicant\u2019s] place of residence.\u201d 7.  On 30 January 2007 the police searched the applicant\u2019s flat in his presence and seized three mobile telephones, which, according to the applicant, belonged to him and his family members. As appears from a poorly legible copy of the list of the seized items prepared by the police, two of these telephones were apparently of Samsung and one \u2013 of Nokia make. According to the applicant, on an unspecified date the seized telephones were returned, and neither he nor any of his family members were ever indicted or involved in any other way in the criminal proceedings giving rise to the search warrant. 8.  On 3 March 2007 the applicant lodged an administrative complaint with the District Court, alleging that his home had been searched arbitrarily and seeking moral damages for breaching inviolability of his home. 9.  On 5 March 2007 the District Court refused to examine the above complaint, citing a lack of jurisdiction. It noted that all complaints regarding the unlawfulness of procedural actions by law-enforcement authorities taken in connection with a criminal investigation had to be lodged within the framework of relevant criminal proceedings based on Articles 234 and 236 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of Ukraine (\u201cthe CCP\u201d), then in force. 10.  The applicant appealed against that decision. He alleged that there was no meaningful opportunity for him to obtain redress on the basis of the CCP provisions, since a criminal court could only examine complaints concerning the actions of investigation authorities in the context of its examination of a criminal case. In the applicant\u2019s situation, such a remedy would not be effective, since he had no procedural status in the criminal proceedings at issue, and had never been informed of the progress of those proceedings. Moreover, it was not certain whether or when the case would reach trial stage. However, as the applicant considered himself to have been a victim of an arbitrary search, regardless of the outcome of the relevant criminal investigation, he also considered that he had standing to bring an administrative complaint under Articles 2 and 4 of the Code of Administrative Justice of Ukraine (\u201cthe CAJ\u201d). 11.  On 15 May 2007 the Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeal rejected the appeal by the applicant, having essentially endorsed the findings of the first-instance court. 12.  The applicant appealed in cassation. He reiterated the arguments raised in his ordinary appeal and additionally submitted that his claim against the police for non-pecuniary damages could not be examined and resolved within the framework of criminal proceedings against a third party. 13.  On 13 May 2009 the Higher Administrative Court of Ukraine rejected the applicant\u2019s cassation appeal.", "references": ["8", "2", "6", "5", "4", "1", "7", "0", "9", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1941 and lives in Staryy Oskol, Belgorod Region. 6.  On 6 May 2005 the applicant concluded a preliminary sale agreement with Mr N. regarding a plot of land with a small house under construction situated in the Belgorod Region. After the signature of this agreement, the applicant started using the plot of land, she finalised the construction of the house and beautified the plot of land. 7.  On 3 July 2006 Mr N. died. 8.  On 10 October 2008 the son of the deceased, Mr N. junior, sold the plot of land to another person, who registered her property right. 9.  Later, the applicant sought to register her property right over the plot of land and found that it already had another registered owner. She then sued Mr N. junior before courts. 10.  On 9 April 2009 the Starooskolskiy Town Court of the Belgorod Region declared the sale contract of 10 October 2008 null and void. Mr N. junior was declared the owner of the plot of land and of the house. 11.  On 17 June 2009 the Town Court granted the applicant\u2019s claims against Mr N. junior and awarded her 613,280 Russian roubles (RUB) for unjust enrichment and damages corresponding to different sums invested by the applicant in the plot of land and the house as well as the reimbursement of cost and expenses. 12.  On 4 August 2009 the Belgorod Regional Court partly modified this judgment. It decreased the amount of damages to RUB 246,569, notably quashing the part relating to unjust enrichment. 13.  On unspecified date the applicant lodged a supervisory review application. 14.  On 17 December 2009 the Presidium of the Belgorod Regional Court partly quashed the judgment of 4 August 2009 and sent the case for consideration anew before the second instance court. The Presidium considered that the Belgorod Regional Court misapplied the provisions of the Civil Code on unjust enrichment and miscalculated the amount of damages to which the applicant was entitled to. It concluded that these were significant violations of substantive or procedural law which influenced the outcome of the proceedings and must be corrected in order to restore and protect the applicant\u2019s right to a fair trial as guaranteed by Article 46 \u00a7 1 of the Constitution, Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. 15.  On 19 January 2010 the Belgorod Regional Court restored the judgment of 17 June 2009. 16.  On 11 May 2010 Mr N.\u2019s son lodged a supervisory review application. 17.  On 8 July 2010 the Presidium of the Belgorod Regional Court rejected the supervisory review application lodged by Mr N.\u2019s son, considering that the arguments it contained were limited to a different assessment of evidence. It however quashed the judgment of 19 January 2010 and restored the judgment of 4 August 2009 on its own motion, considering that:\n\u201cIn the interest of lawfulness and taking into account the principle of legal certainty recognised by the Russian Federation the Presidium considers it possible and necessary to go beyond the arguments developed in the supervisory review application.\nAs repeatedly indicated the European Court (Ryabykh v. Russia, no. 52854/99, \u00a7\u00a7 51\u201153, ECHR 2003\u2011IX, Khotuleva v. Russia, no. 27114/04, 30 July 2009) in order to preserve the aforementioned principle final judgments shall remain unchanged. The mere existence of two points of view on the same matter does not justify the reopening of the case.\nLegal certainty presupposes that it is not permissible to have a second examination of the once decided case in the absence of fundamental errors.\nTaking into account the aforementioned principle, the final decision in the present case should be the judgment of the Belgorod Regional Court of 4 August 2009 which granted certain damages to the claimant and rejected her claims for the rest, including as regards unjust enrichment.\nIn the course of the new examination by the cassation court the principles above have not been taken into account, this omission resulted in a violation of the principle of legal certainty provided by Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention and undermined the stability of a binding judicial act.\nThe claimant\u2019s argument that the judgment of 19 January 2010 was lawful is not deemed to be sufficient by the Presidium to disregard the aforementioned principles.\nThe fact that the Presidium of the Regional Court disagreed with the aforementioned judicial decision does not constitute in itself a ground for quashing of a final and binding judgment and for reopening of the proceedings.\nIn view of the above, the judgment of 19 January 2010 subject to the present application shall be quashed and the judgment of 4 August 2009 restored.\u201d 18.  On 3 November 2010 a single judge at the Supreme Court refused the applicant\u2019s supervisory review application.", "references": ["5", "2", "8", "4", "0", "7", "6", "1", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
+{"input": "5.  On 25 March 2004 the applicant company concluded a contract with Univerzal Banka AD (hereinafter \u201cthe bank\u201d), a private institution based in Belgrade. Under the terms of this contract, the applicant company acquired a debt belonging to the bank resulting from a final court judgment of 28 December 1999. That judgment was rendered against a socially-owned company called Mehanizacija (hereinafter \u201cthe debtor company\u201d) with its seat in Vladi\u010din Han. On 29 August 2000, upon the bank\u2019s application to that effect, the Leskovac Commercial Court ordered the enforcement of the said judgment and the debtor company subsequently paid a part of the judgment debt. 6.  On 14 April 2005, upon the applicant company\u2019s application to that effect, the Leskovac Commercial Court again ordered the full enforcement of the judgment in question. 7.  On 26 July 2005 the applicant company concluded a settlement with the debtor company, which was later annulled following an application by the debtor company by a decision of the Leskovac Commercial Court of 22 January 2009. That decision became final on 3 March 2010. 8.  On 24 December 2001 the Leskovac Commercial Court ordered the debtor company to pay the applicant company specified amounts. 9.  On 2 February 2005, upon the applicant company\u2019s application to that effect, the Leskovac Commercial Court ordered the enforcement of the said judgment. 10.  On 1 March 2010 the Leskovac Commercial Court opened insolvency proceedings in respect of the debtor company. As a result, all of the other ongoing enforcement proceedings against the debtor company were stayed. 11.  The applicant company duly reported its claims based on the above-mentioned judgments. 12.  On 15 October 2010 the Leskovac Commercial Court recognised a part of the applicant company\u2019s claims and instructed the applicant company to initiate civil proceedings in respect of the remainder. 13.  On 29 May 2012 the Leskovac Commercial Court ruled partly in favour of the applicant company and dismissed the remainder of its claims. That decision was upheld by the Commercial Appeals Court on 25 October 2013. The domestic courts found that the contract which the applicant company had concluded with the bank (see paragraph 5 above) entitled it only to the recovery of the amount paid for the transfer of the debt owed to the bank in question, not the judgment debt itself. 14.  The insolvency proceedings are still ongoing.", "references": ["0", "7", "6", "5", "4", "2", "8", "1", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1972, 1980, 1937 and 1925 respectively and live in Vilnius. 6.  On 5 November 1991 L.N. (who later died \u2013 the first and the second applicants became her heirs), the third and the fourth applicants asked the Lithuanian authorities to restore their property rights in natura to a house in Kaunas, nationalised in 1940s. 7.  In September 1993 L.N., the third and the fourth applicants were asked by the authorities to provide some additional documents necessary to proceed with the restoration of their property rights. L.N. submitted the necessary documents to the Kaunas City Municipality. 8.  In March 1995 L.N. and the fourth applicant agreed that the property rights to one room of the house would be restored to their brother \u2013 the third applicant. On 30 March 1995 the third applicant wrote a letter to the authorities, asking them to restore the property rights to 22.4 sq. m of the house and one room of 10.32 sq. m. He also asked to decide the question of the restoration of property rights to a remaining part of the house at a later stage. 9.  By a decision of 11 April 1995, the Kaunas City Council restored L.N.\u2019s, the third and the fourth applicants\u2019 property rights to a house in Kaunas in equal parts. The Kaunas City Council held that 22.42 sq. m of the house would be returned to L.N., the third and the fourth applicant in natura in equal parts and that a room of 10.32 sq. m would be returned in natura to the third applicant. The decision also indicated that the remaining part of the house would be returned in natura when the tenants of the house had been provided with other premises, or compensation would be paid if the premises were not returned. 10.  In July 1995 L.N. and the fourth applicant asked the authorities to pay them compensation for the part of the house that had not been returned in natura. 11.  In March 1996 L.N., the third and the fourth applicants wrote a letter to the authorities, stating that they refused the property that had already been returned to them in natura, and asked to be paid compensation for the entire house. 12.  In September 1996 the third applicant, who by an agreement approved by the notary in 1995, was representing L.N. and the fourth applicant, withdrew the application of March 1996 (see paragraph 11 above) and confirmed that 22.42 sq. m of the house and 10.32 sq. m had been returned to L.N., the third and the fourth applicant in natura. 13.  On 23 September 1996 L.N., the third and the fourth applicants asked the authorities to pay them compensation for the part of the house that had not been returned to them in natura and stated that they agreed to partial compensation until the full market-value compensation figure had been calculated. 14.  Following the request of L.N., the third and the fourth applicants (see paragraph 13 above), the Kaunas City Municipality assessed the value of the entire house and on 8 October 1996 set it at 239,190 Lithuanian litai (LTL \u2013 approximately 69,274 euros (EUR)) in total, the third applicant signed for himself and as L.N.\u2019s and the fourth applicant\u2019s representative, signalling their agreement to such compensation. On the same day, the Kaunas City Board amended the decision of 11 April 1995, establishing that the remaining part of the house would not be returned, compensation of LTL 79,730 (approximately EUR 23,091) would be paid to L.N., the third and the fourth applicants each, and that the remaining part of the compensation would be paid when the market value of the house had been calculated. Following this decision, L.N., the third and the fourth applicants were paid compensation on 17 October 1996 and 18 October 1996. 15.  On an unspecified date L.N., the third and the fourth applicants lodged a claim with the domestic courts in order to have the part of the decision of the authorities of 11 April 1995 by which the premises of 22.42 sq. m of the house had been returned to them in natura annulled. 16.  On 24 October 2000 the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court decided to annul the part of the decision of 11 April 1995 by which 22.42 sq. m of the house had been returned in natura and to oblige the Kaunas City Board to pay monetary compensation for this property. 17.  Accordingly, on 18 September 2001 the decision of the authorities of 11 April 1995 was amended and it was decided to pay monetary compensation for the 22.42 sq. m of the house. 18.  The value of the property was calculated on 14 April 2008. On 1 June 2009, in accordance with an application by L.N., the third and the fourth applicants to receive compensation for 22.42 sq. m of the house, LTL 30,000 (approximately EUR 8,689) in total were paid to them. 19. In November 2006 the Kaunas City Municipality Administration asked the Centre of Registers to assess the value of the house and to establish the difference between the value assessed and the compensation that had already been paid. In January 2008 the Centre of Registers assessed the market value of the house in 1996 at LTL 855,000 (approximately EUR 247,625) and established that the remaining compensation to be paid was LTL 615,809 (approximately EUR 178,350) in total. 20.  On 19 March 2008 the authorities amended the decision of 11 April 1995 and established that L.N., the third and the fourth applicants had to be paid compensation amounting to LTL 615,809 (approximately EUR 178,350) in total. 21.  On 26 March 2008 L.N., the third and the fourth applicants were asked to fill in a form in order to receive their compensation; they did so on 1, 20 and 4 April 2008 respectively. The compensation was adjusted in line with the inflation index and amounted to LTL 818,458 (approximately EUR 237,042) and was paid on 17 July 2008. Each person received LTL 272,819 (approximately EUR 79,014). 22.  On an unspecified date L.N. died, and the first, the second applicants, who became her heirs, the third and the fourth applicants lodged a claim with the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court, asking for the annulation of one part of the order of the authorities of 19 March 2008 (see paragraph 20 above), and to oblige the authorities to calculate the remaining compensation as well as the compensation that had already been paid in accordance with the market price of the house in 2008. They also asked to be awarded damages. 23.  On 9 March 2009 the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court decided to annul one part of the decision of the authorities of 19 March 2008 and to oblige the authorities to recalculate the compensation for the remaining part of the house in accordance with the market value in 2008. The court decided to reject the claim for damages as no unlawful acts by the authorities had taken place. 24.  The applicants appealed, and on 29 March 2010 the Supreme Administrative Court partly overturned the decision of the court of first instance. It referred to a similar case of the same court where it had held that the value of the property had had to be assessed in the light of values when the decision to restore property rights had been taken, and that the assessment of the value at a later stage might have created grounds for unjust enrichment. The Supreme Administrative Court also referred to the same case where it had held that although the authorities had not taken the necessary actions to calculate the remaining part of the compensation from 22 October 1996 until 28 April 2008, these had not been appropriate grounds for annulling the decision of the authorities to pay the remaining part of the compensation. The remaining part of the decision of the court of first instance was left unchanged.", "references": ["0", "5", "4", "1", "8", "2", "3", "6", "7", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1977 (in some of the documents submitted his year of birth was also stated as 1979). He used to live in Grozny, Chechnya, but is currently serving a life prison sentence at an unspecified location. 6.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7.  On 14 April 2001 the interim prosecutor of Grozny opened criminal case no. 11133 against the applicant. On 14 September 2001 the applicant was charged, in absentia, with aggravated murder. On 31 December 2001 he left Chechnya under a false identity and in January 2002 he arrived in Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan. 8.  On 13 January 2006 the applicant was arrested in Semipalatinsk. On 17 January 2006 the local authorities established his true identity and the Semipalatinsk town prosecutor\u2019s office extended the applicant\u2019s detention with a view to extraditing him. On an unspecified date in January or February 2006 the Russian authorities officially requested the applicant\u2019s extradition to Russia. On 23 February 2006 the applicant was taken to Astana airport and handed over to Russian law-enforcement officers. 9.  On 23 February 2006 the applicant was taken by Russian police officers from Astana to Moscow. Upon his arrival at Domodedovo airport in Moscow, he was filmed by a journalist of the RTR (Russian Public Television) company and a report about his extradition was televised on the same date in the nationwide news programme, Vesti. On the footage, the applicant showed no signs of ill-treatment. His relatives learned about his arrest and extradition from the news report. 10.  On the same date, 23 February 2006, the applicant was taken to remand prison IZ-77/4 in Moscow. Upon arrival he was examined by a doctor, who found no evidence of ill-treatment. 11.  On the same date, the applicant was handed over from prison IZ\u201177/4 to Chechen investigators and police officers for transfer to Grozny, Chechnya. 12.  According to the applicant, he was placed in a vehicle with two Chechen police officers, Mr Kh. Mag. and Mr L.-A. Mud., who repeatedly punched and kicked him on the way to the airport. 13.  At the airport the officers were joined by an investigator from Chechnya, Mr P. The applicant bore signs of ill-treatment: his face was swollen, he was covered in blood and he could not eat or drink.\n(b)  The applicant\u2019s ill-treatment on the journey from Vladikavkaz to Grozny 14.  Upon arrival at the airport in Vladikavkaz, Republic of North Ossetia\u2011Alania, the applicant was taken in a Gazel minibus to Grozny. 15.  According to the applicant, the commander of the Police Special Task Unit (\u041e\u0442\u0434\u0435\u043b \u043c\u0438\u043b\u0438\u0446\u0438\u0438 \u043e\u0441\u043e\u0431\u043e\u0433\u043e \u043d\u0430\u0437\u043d\u0430\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f (\u041e\u041c\u041e\u041d)) (\u201cthe OMON\u201d) police group ordered him to lie on the floor of the minibus, and the police officers kicked him and beat him with their rifle butts.\n(c)  The applicant\u2019s ill-treatment in the ORB-2 16.  Late in the evening of 23 February 2006 the applicant arrived at the police station known as Operational Search Bureau no. 2 (hereinafter \u201cthe ORB\u20112\u201d) in Grozny, where he was detained until 6 March 2006. 17.  According to the Government\u2019s submission to the Court, upon his arrival at the ORB-2 in the evening of 23 February 2006 the applicant underwent a medical examination, which established that he had haematomas around his right eye and an abrasion on his back. According to the Government, the applicant explained to the doctor that he had obtained those injuries in Kazakhstan. 18.  According to the applicant\u2019s submission to the Court, on the same evening, 23 February 2006, he was taken to a large room on the ground floor of the ORB-2 premises, where he was subjected to beatings by five police officers, namely the head of the ORB\u20112\u2019s operational search division; Mr Ib., the operational search officer; Mr As. Vak., the head of the department specialising in the investigation of aggravated robberies; and two other police officers from the station. 19.  The officers questioned the applicant about, among other things, the murder of a prosecutor perpetrated in 2001. They punched and kicked him, demanding that he confess to killing that prosecutor and give statements against certain persons whom he knew personally. The applicant refused. The officers then tortured the applicant with electric shocks and beat him about the head with plastic bottles filled with water. Every time he lost consciousness, the officers poured water on him and continued the interrogation and torture. 20.  According to the applicant, throughout the night of 23-24 February 2006 and during the day on 24 February 2006 he was tortured and pressured to admit his involvement in a number of serious crimes. The applicant refused to do so. 21.  On 25 February 2006 the applicant was told that his aunt, Ms Kh. Tas., had arrived with a food package for him. The officers detained her, questioned her about the applicant and threatened her. One of the officers then told the applicant that if he wanted nothing to happen to his aunt, he would have to sign confessions. The applicant signed the documents without familiarising himself with their contents. 22.  According to the applicant\u2019s submission, between 26 and 28 February 2006 he was regularly ill\u2011treated at night; he was bludgeoned, tortured with electric shocks, and a gas mask was put over his head to induce suffocation. He was forced to memorise statements concerning his forced confession to the commission of the crimes in question along with details of those crimes and of crimes in which he had allegedly participated. 23.  According to the applicant, on 6 March 2006 he was transferred to remand prison no. 20/1 (\u201cSIZO 20/1\u201d) in Grozny. Between March and December 2006 he was sometimes returned to the ORB-2 premises for questioning and was subjected to further beatings, electrocutions and other forms of ill-treatment. The officers threatened to kill him if he complained to anyone of the ill\u2011treatment. He again had to memorise the details regarding the crimes allegedly perpetrated by him; the police officers instructed him regarding places, methods and other details concerning the crimes he was accused of perpetrating. From the middle of March the police officers primarily used electric shocks to torture him in order to avoid leaving bruises and haematomas on his body. In the applicant\u2019s submission, the police officer who was most active in torturing him and pressurising him to confess was Mr As. Vak. from the ORB-2. 24.  On 30 April and 2 May, and again on 5 and 6 September 2006, the applicant was interviewed in SIZO 20/1 by an official from, apparently, the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture. The applicant described to that official the torture to which he had been subjected on the SIZO 20/1 premises. 25.  On the night of 24 to 25 May 2006, after the applicant\u2019s complaints of ill-treatment (see paragraphs 31-32 below), he was subjected to severe beatings: a plastic bag was put over his head and he was hit in the head with metal keys and kicked. The officers threatened to kill the applicant if he continued to complain of being ill-treated. 26.  On 1 June 2006 the applicant underwent a medical examination in SIZO 20/1, which established the following:\n\u201c... on his left upper shoulder there are circular purple bruises, both internal and external, measuring 2-3 cm. On his right hip there is a large circular purple haematoma measuring 6 cm and an abrasion measuring 3 cm ...\u201d 27.  On 20 October 2007 and again on 29 October 2007 the administrative authorities at remand prison IZ-77/4 in Moscow replied to a request for information by the applicant\u2019s representatives stating that at the time of his arrival at their remand prison on 23 February 2006 the applicant had not borne any traces of ill-treatment. 28.  In support of his allegations, the applicant furnished the Court with statements by witnesses who had also been detained in the ORB-2 at the material time. Those witnesses were: Mr Sh. El. (a statement dated 12 September 2009); Mr U. Cha. (an undated statement); Mr R. Le. (a statement dated 13 September 2007); and Mr M. Ga. (a statement dated 12 September 2007). The applicant also submitted two official statements by the administrative authorities of remand prison IZ-77/4 in Moscow, dated 20 and 29 October 2007 respectively.\n(d)  Investigation into the alleged ill-treatment\n(i)  The applicant\u2019s complaint to the supervising prosecutors 29.  On 1 March 2006 the applicant was examined by a medical expert at the Chechen Republic Bureau of Forensic Expert Evaluations. According to the applicant, out of fear for his life he had to tell the expert that he had sustained the haematomas as a result of several falls on 23 February 2006 while he had been in Kazakhstan. The expert\u2019s conclusions of 9 March 2006 were as follows:\n\u201c... [the applicant] stated that he had not been subjected to beatings. His facial trauma was a result of several falls that occurred during his arrest by the local police officers in Kazakhstan. He does not complain about the state of his health. Observations: under the right eye and on the right eyelid there is a crimson and green bruise, yellow along the eye, of about 3 cm by 1.5 cm. Other injuries or traces of trauma were not identified ...\nConclusions: the bruise on Mr A. Mukayev\u2019s right eye is the result of this part of his head [coming into contact] with a blunt object; possible date of occurrence \u2013 23 February 2006, in the circumstances described by him. The injury does not [fall under the category of] harm ...\u201d 30.  On 6 March 2006 the applicant was transferred to SIZO 20/1 in Grozny, where he was examined by a doctor who made the following notes in his medical record:\n\u201c... complaints of headaches; healing haematoma on the upper-right shoulder; fresh scar on the back of the knee measuring 2 cm; haemorrhage in the right eye; abrasion on the back of the head ... handcuff marks on both wrists ...\u201d 31.  On 11 May 2006 the applicant complained to the Chechnya prosecutor\u2019s office of having been ill-treated in Moscow and in the ORB\u20112, stating that the police officers had tortured him to make him confess to crimes he had not committed. 32.  On 15 May 2006 the applicant complained of the ill-treatment to the Prosecutor General\u2019s office. 33.  On 25 May 2006 an investigator from the Chechnya prosecutor\u2019s office refused to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers. The applicant was not provided with a copy of that decision. 34.  On 6 September the Chechnya deputy prosecutor overruled the decision of 25 May 2006 and returned the case to the investigators for further inquiries. The four police officers allegedly implicated in the ill\u2011treatment were questioned and gave statements to the effect that they had not ill-treated the applicant. On 15 September 2006, upon completion of the inquiry, the investigator, V.A., refused to open a criminal case against the officers. His report contained the following remarks:\n\u201c... according to the record of the initial medical examination carried out by the IVS [temporary detention centre] of the ORB-2, the examinations conducted on 7 March, 17 March, 29 March, 10 April, 24 May, 13 June and 11 July 2006 did not reveal any bodily injuries ...\nThus, no evidence was obtained as a result of the inquiry ... the allegations of A. Mukayev ... were not confirmed\u201d.\nThe applicant was not provided with a copy of this decision. 35.  On 10 October 2006 the decision of 15 September 2006 not to open a criminal case against the officers was overruled by the supervisory prosecutor and the complaint was returned to the investigators for further inquiries. On 20 October 2006 the investigator, Mr I.Kh. of the Chechnya prosecutor\u2019s office, questioned the officers who had brought the applicant from Moscow to Grozny and the investigator in charge of the criminal case against the applicant. Mr I.Kh. refused to investigate the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment, stating, inter alia:\n\u201c... according to the record of the initial medical examination carried out by the IVS of the ORB-2, the examinations conducted on 7 March, 17 March, 29 March, 10 April, 24 May, 13 June and 11 July 2006 did not reveal any bodily injuries ...\nAccording to the documents received from SIZO 20/1 dated 14 March 2006 and 5 June 2006 concerning bodily injuries allegedly sustained by A. Mukayev, the Leninskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office refused to institute criminal proceedings.\nFor instance, when questioned about his bodily injuries \u2013 such as the haematoma covering one-third of the right shoulder, a bruise under his right eye, scratches on the back of his head and handcuff marks on both wrists, all of which were found when he was transferred to SIZ0 20/1 on 1 June 2006 \u2013 A. Mukayev explained that these injuries had been sustained by him on the way to SIZO 20/1 and on the way back to the IVS. He stated that the guards had not used physical force against him ...\nWhen questioned about the origins of the injuries, including the haemorrhage of the upper-right arm and the haematoma on his left hip found on [the applicant] when he was brought to SIZO 20/1 on 1 June 2006, A. Mukayev explained that he had been taken for interrogation. By the exit [to the facility] he had been beaten on the buttocks and shoulder, but he did not know who had hit him. The escort guards had behaved normally towards him ...\u201d\nThe applicant was not provided with a copy of this decision. 36.  On 23 November 2007 the investigator\u2019s refusal of 20 October 2006 was overruled by the supervisory prosecutor and the case was forwarded to the Leninskiy District Investigative Committee for further inquiries. On 9 December 2007 the investigator of the Leninskiy District Investigative Committee refused to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers on the ground of lack of corpus delicti. The applicant was not provided with a copy of that decision. 37.  On 27 December 2007 the applicant\u2019s lawyers appealed to the supervisory prosecutor against the investigators\u2019 decisions in respect of the applicant\u2019s complaint of ill\u2011treatment and requested that the prosecutor recognise as unlawful the following:\n\u201c(a) the delays in the verification of A. Mukayev\u2019s complaints concerning the unlawful actions of the law-enforcement officers against him;\n(b) the investigator\u2019s refusal to question important witnesses who could have confirmed the use of violence against A. Mukayev;\n(c) the investigator\u2019s refusal to question A. Mukayev.\u201d 38.  On 17 January 2008 the investigator\u2019s refusal of 9 December 2007 to initiate a criminal investigation was overruled by the supervisory prosecutor, and the applicant\u2019s complaints of ill-treatment were sent back to the investigators for further inquiries. The applicant was informed of that decision on 24 January 2008.\n(ii)  The applicant\u2019s judicial appeals against the prosecutor\u2019s refusals to investigate allegations of ill-treatment 39.  On an unspecified date in June 2007 the applicant\u2019s lawyer complained to the Zavodskoy District Court of Grozny (\u201cthe Zavodskoy District Court\u201d), stating, among other things:\n\u201c... During the inquiry into the complaints of A. Mukayev, a forensic medical examination was conducted on 9 March 2006 ...\nHowever, this examination was incomplete, as on 6 March 2006 when A. Mukayev had been taken to SIZO 1 (remand prison no. 1) in Grozny, the following injuries had been noted [in the medical record]:\n- headaches;\n- a healing haematoma on the right shoulder;\n- a scar on the back of the knee measuring 2 cm;\n- a haemorrhage in the right eye;\n- an abrasion on the back of the head;\n- handcuff marks on both wrists.\nAll of the above objectively confirms that physical force was used against A. Mukayev ... In addition, [the policemen] used threats and intimidation to force A. Mukayev to state that he had not been subjected to beatings and that his facial trauma had been caused on 23 February 2006 during the arrest by law-enforcement officers in Kazakhstan.\nThe use of torture against A. Mukayev is confirmed by his allegedly voluntary confession to having committed serious crimes ...\nBefore his arrest, A. Mukayev was a healthy man. However, after his arrest he started to have health problems ... In spite of consistent allegations [of torture] in the complaint lodged by A. Mukayev, the investigator refused to open a criminal case ...\nOn the basis of the above, it is requested that the court:\nOrder the Chechnya prosecutor\u2019s office to furnish [the applicant with] the materials gathered by the inquiry which resulted in the refusal to institute criminal proceedings on the basis of the complaints of A. Mukayev, as he was neither provided with a copy of this decision nor familiarised with the contents of the file;\nRecognise as unlawful the failure of the prosecutor\u2019s office to investigate substantiated allegations of torture; and\nOrder the Chechnya prosecutor\u2019s office to conduct a thorough, objective and effective investigation into the applicant\u2019s torture, and to prosecute the culprits ...\u201d 40.  On 26 September 2007 the applicant\u2019s lawyer lodged an additional complaint with the Zavodskoy District Court. 41.  On 3 October 2007 the Zavodskoy District Court upheld the complaint in full and recognised as unlawful the refusal to institute criminal proceedings. The decision, which was not appealed against and became final, stated, among other things, the following:\n\u201cOn 1 March 2006 a forensic medical expert ... examined A. Mukayev. ... [A]ccording to his report, he found \u2018... under the right eye and on the right eyelid ... a crimson and green bruise, yellow along the eye, about 3 cm by 1.5 cm ...\u2019\nIt follows that, between his extradition to Russia on 23 February 2006 and 1 March 2006, A. Mukayev was subjected to physical violence.\nOn 6 March 2006, when he arrived at SIZO 20/1 in Grozny, Mukayev was examined by a doctor, who made the following notes in Mukayev\u2019s medical record: \u2018... complaints of headaches; healing haematoma in the upper right shoulder; fresh scar on the back of the knee measuring 2 cm; haemorrhage in the right eye; abrasion on the back of the head ... handcuff marks on both wrists ...\u2019\nConsequently, assuming that the examination conducted on 1 March 2006 was full and thorough, A. Mukayev was subjected to further physical violence between 1 and 6 March 2006. This is confirmed by the documents.\nOn 10 April 2006 the following note was made in Mukayev\u2019s medical record: \u2018[N]umbness of the right side [the next part of the sentence is illegible]. [B]eaten [according to A. Mukayev] in the head during the journey from Moscow ...\u2019\nOn 10 May 2006 in SIZO 20/1 the following note was made in Mukayev\u2019s medical record: \u2018[C]omplaints of numbness in the right side of his face; lacrimation of the right eye; sharp pains in the right side of the face, the ear and the gums.\u2019\nOn 1 June 2006 in SIZO 20/1, the following note was made in Mukayev\u2019s medical record: \u2018[O]n the upper left shoulder there are round purple bruises, both internal and external, measuring 2-3 cm. On the right hip \u2013 a large round purple haematoma measuring 6 cm and a straight, 3\u2011cm\u2011long abrasion ...\u2019\nIt follows that Mukayev was subjected to torture between 10 May and 1 June 2006. This is confirmed by the documents.\nThe inmates who were detained in the IVS of the ORB-2 at the same time as A. Mukayev also confirm the use of violence against him. ... [A]ll these [three] persons confirmed that they were prepared to give statements to the prosecutors if necessary. 42.  On an unspecified date between December 2007 and February 2008 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Zavodskoy District Court against the decision of 9 December 2007 by the investigator of the Leninskiy District Investigative Committee not to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers (see paragraph 38 above). 43.  On 19 March 2008 the Zavodskoy District Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal, stating that the impugned refusal to institute criminal proceedings of 9 December 2007 had just been overruled on the same date (that is to say 19 March 2008) by the head of the Leninskiy District Investigative Committee. 44.  On 29 March 2008 the investigator of the Leninskiy District Investigative Committee again ruled against instituting criminal proceedings against the police officers. The applicant again lodged an appeal against that decision with the Leninskiy District Court of Grozny (\u201cthe Leninskiy District Court\u201d). 45.  On 26 June 2008 the Leninskiy District Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal as unsubstantiated, stating that:\n\u201c... the facts of the alleged violations of the criminal procedure regulations [by the impugned police officers] were not confirmed by the numerous inquiries. A. Mukayev was found guilty as charged ...\u201d 46.  The applicant lodged an appeal against that decision with the Chechnya Supreme Court. On 6 August 2008 the latter upheld the decision of the Leninskiy District Court, stating that:\n\u201c... in [citing] the overruling of the decision in refusing to open a criminal investigation within the framework of a criminal case which has been resolved by a sentence, [the applicant\u2019s representative] is in fact proposing that the court examine and evaluate evidence that has already been examined and evaluated by the Chechnya Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. Those courts have already delivered decisions which are now binding; such a situation is not provided for by the current legislation ...\u201d 47.  The documents submitted to the Court show that the applicant had raised, consistently and in detail, complaints of ill-treatment during the proceedings before the Chechnya Supreme Court and in an appeal against his sentence that he lodged with the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation (see below). 48. According to the Government, between May 2006 and March 2008 the domestic authorities on six occasions carried out a preliminary inquiry into the applicant\u2019s ill-treatment complaint before each time refusing to open a criminal case. The inquiries carried out showed that the applicant\u2019s allegations \u201cwere not confirmed by objective data\u201d. 49.  According to the applicant, between 23 and 26 February 2006, while he was being questioned and tortured, he had had no access to a lawyer. The investigator had not explained to him his right to legal counsel, nor that anything he said during questioning might be used as evidence in the criminal proceedings against him. 50.  On 26 February 2006 the investigator appointed Mr G. Ber. as the applicant\u2019s lawyer. Rather than requesting a lawyer from the Bar Association, as prescribed by law, the investigator appointed Mr G. Ber. directly. The applicant agreed to that lawyer\u2019s services on 2 March 2006 only on the insistence of the investigator in charge of the criminal case against him, and only after he had already been questioned and charged with a number of crimes. 51.  On 28 February 2006 the applicant\u2019s relatives retained Mr B. El. as his lawyer, but the investigators did not allow him access to the applicant. Meanwhile, G. Ber. acted as the applicant\u2019s lawyer. According to the applicant, G. Ber. had been present during the applicant\u2019s questioning; the lawyer had known that the applicant was being subjected to ill-treatment, but had failed to raise the issue before the authorities. The lawyer had signed the procedural document post facto, as requested by the investigators. 52.  The applicant furnished the Court with a letter from the head of the Chechnya Bar Association of 14 December 2007, which read as follows:\n\u201c... the investigator [in charge of the criminal case against the applicant] did not request the Nisam Bar Association to assign lawyer G. Ber. as legal counsel for A. Mukayev.\n... under the law, a lawyer must obtain the approval of the head of the Bar Association for him to represent a client in criminal proceedings. However, Mr G. Ber. failed to do that; ... his retainer agreement to represent A. Mukayev was filled out by Mr G. Ber. unlawfully.\nOn the basis of the complaints received by the Bar Association against the lawyer G. Ber., including those from A. Mukayev, on 30 November 2007 G. Ber. was disbarred...\u201d 53.  The applicant\u2019s lawyer, Mr B.El., was allowed to meet with the applicant for the first time in the middle of March 2006. 54.  The applicant unsuccessfully raised a complaint regarding the flaws in the legal aid before the trial court and on appeal. His complaints were dismissed as unsubstantiated. 55.  During the trial the applicant was represented by his lawyer, Mr B.El. The applicant retracted his confession and claimed that he had made self\u2011incriminating statements under torture. He complained to the trial judge that during his arrest and detention at the ORB-2, he had been repeatedly tortured and threatened, and had finally been forced to confess. He pleaded not guilty in respect of the murders and admitted his guilt only in respect of the unlawful acquisition of a gun and of being in possession of false identity documents. 56.  On 22 May 2007 the Chechnya Supreme Court found the applicant guilty of, among other things, the murder of twelve people, and sentenced him to life imprisonment. Its ruling was based on the applicant\u2019s confession, statements made by witnesses and victims to the investigator and the court, and ballistic expert reports concluding that one of the victims had been shot with the gun found on the applicant. 57.  In respect of the applicant\u2019s allegations of torture, the trial court stated that there were\n\u201c... no grounds for distrusting the statement given by the operational search officer Mr As.Vak. or for casting doubt on the results of the inquiries conducted by the prosecutor\u2019s office [into the applicant\u2019s allegation]\u201d. 58.  On 30 October 2007 the sentence was upheld on appeal by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. In respect of the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment, the court stated that\n\u201c... the fact that unlawful methods of investigation were used against the applicant was not confirmed\u201d.", "references": ["9", "4", "7", "5", "8", "6", "2", "0", "No Label", "1", "3"], "gold": ["1", "3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicants are:\n1) Mr Oleg Petrovich Orlov, who was born in 1953,\n2) Mr Artem Dmitrievich Vysotskiy, who was born in 1974,\n3) Mr Stanislav Valeryevich Goryachikh, who was born in 1986, and\n4) Mr Karen Edvardovich Sakhinov, who was born in 1982.\nThe applicants live in Moscow. 6.  At the material time the first applicant was the Chairman of Memorial, a Russian non-governmental human rights organisation. The second applicant was a reporter for REN TV, a Russian television company. The third applicant was a camera operator and the fourth applicant an assistant camera operator with REN TV. 7.  Following the death of a six-year-old boy, Rakhim Amriev, in the course of a counter-terrorist operation in the Chemulga settlement in Ingushetia on 9 November 2007, a protest meeting against abuse of authority by the security forces was planned in Nazran, the capital of Ingushetia, for 24 November 2007. On 22 November 2007 REN TV dispatched a team consisting of the second, third and fourth applicants in order to cover the protest planned for 24 November 2007. The first applicant was on a business trip in Nazran at that time. All four applicants were staying in the Hotel Assa in Nazran (\u201cthe hotel\u201d). 8.  On 23 November 2007 at about 9 p.m. the first applicant returned to the hotel from Memorial\u2019s office in Nazran. Two and a half hours later (at about 11.30 p.m.), three men in balaclava masks and camouflage uniforms, armed with automatic weapons, burst into his room. The men neither introduced themselves nor produced any documents. They pointed their guns at the first applicant, ordered him to lie face down on the floor and asked him the reason for his trip to Ingushetia. The applicant explained that he worked for the NGO and had arrived in Nazran to monitor the human rights situation in Ingushetia. The men collected all of the applicant\u2019s belongings and put them into a bag. He attempted to protest but was kicked in the ribs by one of the intruders. They then pulled a black plastic bag over his head, took him out of the hotel and forced him into a minibus. 9.  On the same evening, the three other applicants returned to the hotel from Vladikavkaz, where they had been working on a news story. At about 11 p.m. they gathered in the second applicant\u2019s room. At about 11.30 p.m. five men in balaclavas and camouflage uniforms, armed with automatic weapons, burst into the room. Without any explanation, they forced the third and fourth applicants to the floor, kicked them, and put black plastic bags over their heads. These two applicants were then taken down to the lobby and put into the minibus with the first applicant. Despite the bag over his head, the third applicant was able to see other figures dressed in camouflage uniforms in the lobby. 10.  When the intruders broke into the second applicant\u2019s room, they struck him on the shoulder with a rifle butt so that he fell onto the floor. They then ordered him to look away. In reply to his question as to their identities, the men kicked him and hit him with their rifle butts. One of the intruders told him in unaccented Russian that they were from the Ministry of the Interior. They collected his personal belongings and his professional equipment and put it into bags. They then pulled a black plastic bag over his head and, continuing to beat him, took him out of the room and down to the minibus. 11.  At the time of their abduction, the applicants were wearing jeans or tracksuit trousers, shirts, T-shirts and slippers and were taken out as they were. The abductors did not allow them to put on shoes or warm clothing. 12.  In the minibus one of the abductors asked the second, third and fourth applicants who they were. They introduced themselves. The first applicant also started to explain who he was but was silenced with a number of blows. One of the abductors told the driver that the hotel had been \u201cmopped-up\u201d and ordered him to drive off. The applicants were ordered to be silent and to keep their heads bowed; the abductors threatened them with beatings and promised they would shoot them if they did not obey. All of the abductors spoke unaccented Russian. 13. The minibus drove for about an hour. Initially it went through the streets of Nazran. The windows were not obscured and through the bags on their heads the applicants could see the streetlights and the headlights of passing cars. According to the third applicant, the bag on his head was loose enough to enable him to see that their abductors did not put aside their weapons during the drive. He concluded they must be State agents. 14.  Some time later the minibus drove along a country road and stopped in a snow-covered field. The applicants were taken out of the minibus one by one and beaten up with kicks and blows from rifle butts. One of the abductors told the applicants that they would be shot and ordered his colleagues to fetch silencers from the bus. The applicants thought that they were going to be executed on the spot. One of the abductors checked the minibus, but could not find the silencers. The abductors ordered the applicants to remain on the ground until they had left, threatened to kill them if they returned to Ingushetia in future, and drove off. The applicants took the bags off their heads and saw a white Gazel minibus driving away. 15.  The applicants ran off in the opposite direction, fearing that their abductors would return to execute them. Walking in the snow, they suffered from the cold as they had neither overcoats nor proper shoes. After about an hour they reached the Nesterovskaya settlement, where they knocked on local residents\u2019 doors asking for help. After some time one of the residents let them in and called the police. The police arrived and took the applicants to the local police station, where they were provided with medical assistance. 16.  Early in the morning of 24 November 2007 the applicants were taken by the police to the Nazran District Department of the Interior (\u041e\u0442\u0434\u0435\u043b \u0432\u043d\u0443\u0442\u0440\u0435\u043d\u043d\u0438\u0445 \u0434\u0435\u043b \u041d\u0430\u0437\u0440\u0430\u043d\u043e\u0432\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0440\u0430\u0439\u043e\u043d\u0430 (\u0420\u041e\u0412\u0414)) (the Nazran ROVD) and made statements concerning their abduction and ill\u2011treatment. The second applicant asked a police officer whether he knew who was responsible for the incident. In reply the officer did not say anything but typed on his mobile phone three letters \u201cFSB\u201d (\u0424\u0421\u0411), (the Russian Federal Security Service (\u0424\u0435\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u0430\u044f \u0421\u043b\u0443\u0436\u0431\u0430 \u0411\u0435\u0437\u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438)).\n(a)  Main witness statements taken during the investigation 17.  On 24 November 2007 the Ingushetia Investigative Committee (\u201cthe investigative committee\u201d) opened an investigation into the incident under Articles 139, 144 and 161 of the Russian Criminal Code (violation of privacy, obstruction of the lawful professional activity of journalists, and robbery) and opened criminal case no. 07560126. In the decision it was stated that the crime in respect of the applicants had been committed by unidentified perpetrators who had used violence. 18.  On 24 November 2007 the investigators questioned the second applicant, who stated that at about 11 p.m. on 23 November 2007 he and the third and fourth applicants had been in the second applicant\u2019s room at the hotel when a group of five or six armed men in balaclava masks and camouflage uniforms had forced their way into the room. The men had been armed with automatic rifles. The applicants thought that they must be from a law-enforcement agency. The intruders had searched the room and collected the applicants\u2019 personal belongings and their professional equipment. They had then blindfolded the applicants, taken them down to the minibus and driven somewhere. They had stopped in a field and had subjected the applicants to severe beatings with rifle butts and kicks, as a result of which the second applicant had twice lost consciousness. Thereafter the abductors had driven off and the three applicants had spoken to the first applicant, who introduced himself as Mr Orlov. They had then made their way to the nearest village, where they had gone to the local police station, and from there they had been taken back to Nazran. 19.  On the same date, 24 November 2007, the investigators questioned the third and fourth applicants, whose statements were similar to that of the second applicant. In particular, both applicants also stated that the abductors, who had also beaten them unconscious, must have been from a law-enforcement agency. 20. On the same date, 24 November 2007, the investigators questioned the first applicant\u2019s colleague, Ms E.S., who stated that she had been called to come to the police station, where she had found the first applicant covered in bruises and hematomas, without an overcoat, and wearing slippers and dirty clothing. 21.  On 24 November 2007 the investigators questioned the hotel duty manager, Ms M.K., who stated that their hotel was usually guarded by police security officers, but they had been called off duty at about 9 p.m. on 23 November 2007 when a Deputy Minister of the Interior of Ingushetia had telephoned the hotel and ordered them to leave the premises. At least one other Deputy Minister of the Interior of Ingushetia had been staying at the hotel at the material time and his security officers had also been called off. The witness had asked the second Deputy Minister whether he had been aware that his security had been called off, and he had confirmed that he had been aware of it. At about 11.30 p.m. on 23 November 2007 a group of about fifteen armed men in balaclavas and camouflage uniforms had arrived at the hotel in a white Gazel minibus without registration plates. The men had told her that they had been conducting an identity check within the framework of counter-terrorist operation and ordered her to provide the registration log of the hotel\u2019s guests. Having checked the names, some of the men had gone upstairs whilst others had stayed in the lobby and held the staff at gunpoint. The intruders, who had communicated among themselves by gestures, had taken her and the other staff members\u2019 mobile telephones and removed the sim-cards and the batteries. About twenty minutes later the intruders who had gone upstairs had returned with four blindfolded men with sacks over their heads and had put the four men into the white minibus and driven off. The witness had not gone into the rooms raided by the intruders, but had been able to see from the corridor that everything inside the rooms had been turned upside-down. 22.  On 24 November 2007 the investigators twice questioned the hotel\u2019s managing director, Mr R.M., who stated that he had not been at the hotel during the events in question, but had been informed by his staff about the abduction of four of the hotel\u2019s guests. 23.  On 24 November 2007 the investigators questioned the first applicant, whose statement was similar to the account of the events submitted to the Court. In addition, he stated that at about 11.30 p.m. on 23 November 2007 someone had knocked at the door of his room and a female voice asked him to open. After that, the intruders had rushed in and subjected him to questioning about the purpose of his visit to Ingushetia. They had thrown him to the floor, collected his mobile telephone, documents and other belongings, blindfolded him with a black sack and taken him out to the minibus, where he had seen the other applicants. The abductors had then driven for about an hour, stopped and taken the four men out and assaulted them with kicks and rifle butts. The abductors had threatened to kill the first applicant; during the beating, the sack over his head had been displaced and he had seen the abductors and their vehicle. The abductors had left the applicants lying in the field in the cold, with no warm clothing, and had driven off having told them not to return to their region. 24.  On 24 November 2007 the investigators again questioned the second applicant, whose statement was similar to the one given previously and to the account before the Court. He additionally stated that he was sure that the abductors, who had acted as a well-organised professional group, must have been agents of a police special task unit. During their search of his room, one of the abductors had told him that they were from the police and that they would take him to the police station. The applicant also provided the investigators with a list of items stolen by the abductors, including his personal belongings, cash, passport, professional equipment, and credit cards and stated that the overall monetary value of his stolen items amounted to 46,500 Russian rubles (RUB) (about 1,300 euros (EUR)) and that of the stolen company\u2019s equipment to 580,000 RUB (about 16,200 EUR). 25.  On 24 November 2007 the investigators again questioned the third applicant, whose statement was similar to the account before the Court. He also stated that the abductors, who had acted as a well-organised professional group, had beaten him and the other applicants severely, and that he had lost consciousness at least once. He also provided the investigators with a list of items stolen by the abductors, including his personal belongings, cash, documents and professional equipment. 26.   On 24 November 2007 the investigators again questioned the fourth applicant, whose statement was similar to the account before the Court. He also stated that the abductors, who had acted as a well-organised professional group, had beaten him and the other applicants severely, and that when he had been taken out to the abductors\u2019 minibus, the first applicant had already been there. He also provided the investigators with a list of items stolen by the abductors, including his personal belongings, cash, documents and professional equipment. 27.  On 26 November 2007 the investigators questioned police sergeant I.S., who stated that on the evening of 23 November 2007 he and three other police officers, G.O., A.M. and Kh.T., were on their regular duty at the hotel, where they had been assigned to ensure the safety of the hotel guests in addition to the hotel\u2019s own security service. The police at the hotel worked in groups of four officers, in twenty-four hour shifts, starting at 9 a.m. each day. In addition to the police presence at the hotel, the administrator also had a special button to call the police in case of emergency. At about 9 p.m. on 23 November 2007 the administrator had told them that Deputy Minister of the Interior A.Kh. had telephoned. Officer G.O had spoken to the Deputy Minister, who had ordered the officers to leave the hotel and go to the building of the Ministry of the Interior. The witness and his colleagues had gone to the Ministry of the Interior, where Colonel Gu. had told them to remain, without giving any explanation. At 9 a.m. on the following morning, the four officers had been dismissed from their shift and gone home. According to the witness, he had learnt of the applicants\u2019 abduction from hotel staff two days after the event. Prior to 23 November 2007 their security team had never been called off duty from the hotel. 28.  On 26 November 2007 the investigators also questioned the hotel security guard, Mr S. Dz., who stated that on the evening of 23 November 2007 he had been on duty at the hotel with his colleague Mr Z. Ko. The hotel\u2019s security service worked in teams of two guards in twenty-four-hour shifts. A team of four police officers had also guarded the hotel. At least two deputy Ministers of the Interior of Ingushetia had been staying at the hotel. The hotel\u2019s lobby was equipped with CCTV cameras. At about 9.50 p.m. the police officers had left the hotel, which they had never done before. At about 11.30 p.m., as he was locking the back door, he had seen a group of five armed men in balaclavas and camouflage uniforms who had ordered him and his partner to stand up against the wall. The witness had thought that the men must have been a police special forces unit conducting a special operation. The men had searched them and taken them into the hotel lobby, where there were five more armed men in balaclavas and camouflage uniforms holding at gunpoint the duty manager, Ms M.K., and restaurant employees Ms O.A. and Mr T.Ga. The men had behaved like a special forces unit during a special operation; in unaccented Russian they had ordered everyone to lie down on the floor, be quiet and not to move. They had not beaten anyone. At about 12.30 a.m. they had left. The witness had not seen whether the intruders had taken anyone with them. He stressed that he had been certain that the intruders must have been law-enforcement agents. It was only on the following day that he had learnt that the intruders had abducted the applicants. 29.  On 26 November 2007 the investigators questioned the other security guard who had been on duty at the hotel on the evening of 23 November 2007, Mr Z. Ko. His statement was similar to that of his colleague Mr S. Dz. and he also provided a detailed description of the intruders\u2019 firearms and stated that they had acted under a chain of command. The intruders had guarded all the exits and entrances to the hotel, the stairs and the elevator. Then they had taken his and the others\u2019 mobile telephones, removed the batteries and sim-cards and thrown them onto the floor. While they had been held at gunpoint in the lobby, some of the women had started crying and panicking. One of the intruders, who had acted like the one in charge, had told them in unaccented Russian that they just needed to check something and would then leave. The witness emphasised that the intruders had acted as a well-organised group and that they must have been a highly-trained special police unit. The intruders had spent about half an hour at the hotel. After their departure, he had learnt that they had taken away the applicants. 30.  On 27 November 2007 the investigators questioned the managing director of the hotel\u2019s restaurant, Mr T.Ga., who stated that at about 11.10 p.m. on 23 November 2007 he had just gone down from the restaurant into the lobby with his colleagues Ms O.A. and Ms L.Dz. when three men armed with machine guns, wearing balaclavas and camouflage uniforms, had run up to them and ordered them by gesturing to lie down on the floor and not to move. About ten to fifteen more intruders had already been in the lobby; they had not spoken among themselves and had communicated by gesturing. Both of the hotel security guards were already lying on the floor. The intruders had taken his mobile telephone and removed its sim-card and battery. 31.  On 27 November 2007 the investigators questioned police officer G.O., who made a statement about the events similar to that given by his colleague, sergeant I.S. (see paragraph 27 above). In addition he stated that he and his colleagues had been providing security for the hotel\u2019s residents, including the Deputy Ministers of the Interior Selivanov and Seliverstov, who were in residence there at the time. At about 8 p.m. on 23 November 2007 a duty officer from the Ministry of the Interior had arrived at the hotel and told them that a Deputy Minister of the Interior had ordered the security team to leave the hotel and go to the Ministry of the Interior building. The witness had refused to do so, as there had been no orders from his superior officers to this effect. Then, about two hours later, the Deputy Minister of the Interior in charge of the borders, Mr A. Kh., had phoned the hotel and ordered the police security group to go to the Ministry of the Interior to secure its premises. The witness and his colleagues had spent the night there and it was not until the next morning that he had learnt about the applicants\u2019 abduction from the hotel. 32.  On the same date, 27 November 2007, the investigators also questioned the police officers Kh.T. and A.M., whose statements were similar to those of their colleagues I.S. and G.O (see paragraphs 27 and 31 above). 33.  On 27 November 2007 the investigators also questioned the hotel\u2019s cook and a waitress, Ms L.Dz. and Ms O.A., whose statements were similar to that of Mr S. Dz. (see paragraph 28 above). In addition, both women stated that they had seen the applicants being taken away by the intruders and that the applicants, who had had black sacks over their heads, had not been wearing outdoor shoes or warm clothing. In addition, Ms O.A. had seen the abductors\u2019 white Gazel minibus without official registration plates. 34.  On 27 November 2007 the investigators again questioned the hotel\u2019s administrator, Ms M.K., who reiterated her earlier statement (see paragraph 21 above) and added that the intruders had told her that they had come to conduct an identity check and were from the anti-terrorist unit of the police. They refused to let her see their service documents. Some of the intruders had stayed in the lobby while others had ordered her to go to the first applicant\u2019s room to ask him to open the door, which she had done. Later, she had seen the men take the applicant outside and had seen their white minibus. She also stated that she was now not sure whether the intruders had in fact been from a law-enforcement agency and that she did not remember whether anyone had called off the four police officers who had been on duty at the hotel on 23 November 2007. 35.  On various dates in November and December 2007 the investigators questioned two police officers from the Nesterovskaya police station and four officers from the Sunzhenskiy district police station whose statements concerning the circumstances of the applicants\u2019 arrival at the police station in the early hours of 24 November 2007 were similar to the applicants\u2019 account before the Court. 36.  On 9 December 2007 the investigators questioned Ingushetia Deputy Minister of the Interior A. Kh., who stated that he was in charge of the security of the administrative border of Ingushetia. To his knowledge, the hotel\u2019s police security service had consisted of officers from the Special Task Unit, in view of the fact that high-ranking law-enforcement officials were staying at the hotel, including two Deputy Ministers of the Interior, Mr Seliverstov and Mr Selivanov. He had called the police officers off duty from the hotel on the evening of 23 November 2007 as there had been a threat of attacks on the building of the Ministry of the Interior and the officers had therefore been needed elsewhere. He had not known that on that date the applicants had been staying at the hotel and learnt of their abduction and beating only the following morning when he read the police service incidents report. 37.  On 17 December 2007 the investigators questioned Deputy Minister of the Interior of Ingushetia Mr V. Selivanov, who stated that he had been resident in the hotel since mid-October 2007. On the evening of 23 November 2007 he had been in his room, had not heard anything and had not seen the police security guards that evening. He had been unaware of the reasons for the guards\u2019 recall from the hotel and learnt of the applicants\u2019 abduction and ill-treatment only the next day. 38.  On 18 January 2008 the investigators questioned First Deputy Minister of the Interior of Ingushetia Mr S. Seliverstov, whose statement was similar to that given by Mr V. Selivanov (see the paragraph above). 39.  On various dates in January and March 2008 the investigators questioned eleven police officers, who stated that on 23 November 2007 they had manned various checkpoints on the motorway between Ingushetia and Chechnya, on the roads between Nazran and the Ordzhenikidzevskaya settlement, and in the vicinity of the local airport. They did not recall the white Gazel minibus with abductors passing through their checkpoint due to the large number of similar vehicles going through daily, but said that any vehicle of that type passing through in the evening or at night should have been stopped and registered in the log. 40.  On 20 February 2008 the investigators questioned Mr Sh.A. and Mr A.Ge., both of whom stated that they had been present during the crime\u2011scene examination on 24 November 2007 at the hotel and that during the examination they had not seen any CCTV cameras on its premises. 41.  On 23 February 2008 the investigators questioned the hotel manager Ms L.T, who stated that she had not been at the hotel on 23 November 2007. 42.  On 24 February 2008 the investigators questioned Mr Akh.D., who stated that on the night of 23 November 2007 he had been at home in the Sunzhenskiy district of Nesterovskaya when at about 1 a.m. four men had knocked at his door. The men, who were not wearing warm clothing, had traces of beatings and were suffering from the cold; they had told him that they had been abducted from Nazran, beaten and left in the fields near the village. He had let the men in and then had gone to the Nesterovskaya police station to report the incident. 43.  On various dates in February 2008 the investigators also questioned several witnesses in Nesterovskaya whom the applicants had asked for help on the night of 24 November 2007 and who had refused to open the door. 44.  On various dates between December 2007 and April 2008 the investigators questioned more than forty employees of the school situated near the hotel. The persons questioned were primarily teachers or administrators. All of them gave similar statements to the effect that they worked at the school during the day, that they had therefore not witnessed the events late at night on 23 November 2007 and had learnt about them some time later. None of the school\u2019s security guards or night watchmen was questioned.\n(b)  Main steps taken by the investigation 45.  On 24 November 2007 the investigators granted each of the applicants victim status in the criminal case. In the decision they listed the items of their professional equipment and personal belongings taken by the perpetrators, including cash, credit cards, mobile phones, clothes, a laptop, tape recorder, service identity cards and a digital camera. 46.  On the same date, 24 November 2007, the investigators ordered a forensic expert examination of each of the applicants. On 29 November 2007 the medical forensic examiner issued report no. 735, which described the numerous bruises and hematomas received by the third applicant as being ones of a \u201clight degree of gravity\u201d. The same report described the injuries of the second applicant as unsuitable for forensic categorisation due to the absence of a chest X-ray and conclusions of other medical specialists. As for the injuries of the first and fourth applicants, they did not qualify for a degree of gravity, there being a \u201clack of lasting impact on his health\u201d. 47.  On 24 November 2007 the investigators examined the crime scene at the hotel, collected some fingerprints and ordered an expert forensic examination thereof. No other evidence was found. On 12 December 2007 the experts concluded that the fingerprints were not suitable for examination. 48.  On 25 November the applicants left for Moscow, where on 26 November 2007 the second applicant was admitted to hospital and received medical treatment in connection with his injuries, which included cerebral concussion. He was discharged from hospital on 4 December 2007. 49.  On 26 November 2007 the investigators seized and examined the registration log of the hotel guests. 50.  On 26 November 2007 the head of the Ingushetia investigative committee issued instructions for the investigators, ordering them to take these steps, amongst others:\n\u201c [...] 4) to identify and question the Deputy Minister of the Interior who, according to the statement of Ms M.K., telephoned the hotel at about 9 p.m. and recalled the police security officers; [...]\n9) to identify the police officers who had manned the checkpoints on motorway \u201cKavkaz\u201d on 23 November 2007 and question them about the passage of the Gazel minibus and examine the passing vehicles\u2019 registration logs; [...]\n15) to identify persons who had been staying at the hotel at the material time and question them about the events; [...]\n17) to establish whether there were CCTV cameras inside and outside the hotel and examine their contents; [...]\u201d 51.  On 27 November 2007 the investigators took fingerprints from six employees of the hotel for comparative forensic examination of the fingerprints collected at the crime scene. 52.  On 5 December 2007 the investigators examined the registration log of vehicles passing the Volga-20 checkpoint during November 2007. No passage of a Gazel minibus on 23 November 2007 was recorded. 53.  On 7 December 2007 the Nazran town police department replied to the investigators that there had been no CCTV cameras in the vicinity of the crime scene. 54.  On 8 December 2007 the Ingushetia Minister of the Interior, Colonel Medov, wrote to the investigators, stating that on 23 November 2007 his Deputies Mr Seliverstov and Mr Selivanov, as well as a number of other police officers from other regions of Russia had been staying at the hotel. They had all \u201cbeen resting in their rooms\u201d at the time of the abduction and had no pertinent information to offer the investigation. 55.  On 10 December 2007 the first applicant asked the investigators to change the legal classification of the crimes committed against him and the other applicants to that of \u201cexceeding official powers\u201d, a crime that is committed by State agents and punishable under Article 286 of the Russian Criminal Code. In particular, he stated that within the scope of their official powers, the perpetrators had been able to unlawfully break into the applicants\u2019 rooms, search them, take away their property, deprive them of liberty and subject them to ill-treatment. 56.  On 13 December 2007 the investigators rejected the request as unsubstantiated, referring to the lack of evidence of the involvement of State agents in the incident. 57.  On 4 February 2008 the investigators asked the hotel to inform them whether any CCTV cameras capable of recording had been in use on 23\u201124 November 2007. On 8 February 2008 the hotel replied that there had been \u201cno working CCTV cameras\u201d on their premises on the dates in question. 58.  On 22 February 2008 the investigators again examined the crime scene at the hotel. No evidence was collected. 59.  On 22 May 2008 the investigators requested the permission of the Nazran District Court to obtain a list of the mobile telephone calls made between 11 p.m. on 23 November and 12 a.m. on 24 November 2007 in the vicinity of the hotel. Permission was granted on 30 May 2008. 60.  On 26 May 2008 the preliminary investigation was suspended for failure to identity the perpetrators. 61.  On 27 May 2008 the head of the Ingushetia Investigative Committee overruled the decision to suspend proceedings as premature and unsubstantiated and ordered that the investigators take such additional steps as were possible even in the absence of identified perpetrators. 62.  On 29 May 2008 the first applicant complained to the head of the Nazran Branch of the Investigative Committee, alleging that the crime against him and the other applicants had been perpetrated by State agents but that the investigation was not taking any steps to examine this theory. He requested that the theory of State agents\u2019 involvement be examined. In particular, he pointed out the following facts:\n-  due to the security threats in the region at the material time, the hotel was usually guarded by several police officers. However, about two hours prior to the abduction, the police officers had been recalled by their superior and a vehicle had been despatched to pick them up and take them to another location. The police officers had therefore been removed from the hotel in order not to create obstacles for the applicants\u2019 abduction;\n-  two Deputy Ministers of the Interior were living permanently at the hotel. However, after examining the list of hotel residents, the abductors had gone straight to the applicants, showing no interest in the law\u2011enforcement officials. Had they been members of illegal armed groups, they would have targeted the officials and not the applicants;\n-  the perpetrators identified themselves to the hotel receptionists as members of an anti-terrorism unit. They behaved professionally, had a chain of command, were well-equipped and spoke unaccented Russian;\n-  the abduction took place on the eve of the planned protest meeting; the police should therefore have been on high alert. The minibus carrying the armed men and the applicants was driving for some time through the well-lit streets of Nazran and should have passed several checkpoints; however, it was not checked at any of them. Moreover, even though the vehicle\u2019s windows were not obscured, the perpetrators did not attempt to conceal their machine guns;\n-  the hotel employees told the first applicant and his two colleagues from Memorial, Mr Sh. and Ms S., that immediately after the abduction they had informed the hotel\u2019s managing director about the incident. He had arrived at the hotel about half an hour after the abduction and had called the police. The police had allegedly promised to take all necessary measures to find the applicants. However, they had not taken any steps in that direction and it was allegedly not until 4 a.m. that they had received information about the abduction, from colleagues at Nesterovskaya police station. The police\u2019s failure to react in a timely manner showed that the perpetrators had been State agents and that the abduction had been planned and executed as a special operation.\nThe applicant asked that his request be included in the investigation file, but received no reply. 63.  On 28 January 2009 the first applicant requested permission to have access to the investigation file. 64.  On 30 January 2009 the investigators granted the request in part, namely in respect of the records of investigative actions which had been carried out with the applicants\u2019 participation and the investigator\u2019s decisions to order forensic examinations and expert reports. Access to the rest of the file\u2019s contents was refused. 65.  On 7 April 2009 the first applicant appealed against the above refusal. On 24 April 2009 the Magas District Court in Ingushetia dismissed the complaint, stating that victims in criminal proceedings could familiarise themselves with the entire contents of the investigation file only after completion of the investigation. On 9 June 2009 the Ingushetia Supreme Court upheld that decision on appeal. 66.  On 28 April 2008 the first applicant asked the investigators to inform him of the progress in the criminal proceedings. On 3 June 2008 they replied that the investigation had been suspended on 26 May 2008. 67.  On 10 June 2008 the investigators familiarised the first applicant with the conclusions of the forensic medical examination. He pointed out that in addition to the bruises and hematomas received as the result of the beating by the abductors, he had been subjected for about an hour to extremely cold temperatures while wearing only the very light clothing in which he had been taken from the hotel. 68.  On 26 June 2008 the investigation was again suspended. 69.  On 28 January 2009 the first applicant\u2019s lawyer requested access to the entire contents of the investigation file. On 30 January 2009 he was allowed to familiarise himself only with documents concerning the investigative steps taken with his participation. 70.  On 11 April 2011 the Interim Deputy Head of the Ingushetia Investigative Committee overruled the decision to suspend the investigation as premature and unsubstantiated and ordered that it be resumed and the investigators take additional steps. 71.  On 16 March 2011 the investigators requested that the Interim Deputy Prosecutor of Ingushetia order the police to take steps to examine the theory of the involvement of State agents in the applicants\u2019 abduction and ill-treatment. 72.  On 3 April 2011 the investigators issued an official statement addressed to the Minister of the Interior criticising the failure of the police to take the steps necessary to identify the perpetrators of the applicants\u2019 abduction. The document stated:\n\u201c... from the very beginning of the investigation no operational search information of relevance and importance has been provided [to the investigators] regarding the identities of the possible culprits.\nSuch violations of the procedure committed by the operational officers of the police create obstacles for the full, thorough and objective investigation....the facts stated demonstrate the Ingushetia police\u2019s complete ignorance in respect of the requirements of criminal procedure, their lack of discipline and the absence of any control over their work by the senior officers.\nThere can be no change in this unhealthy situation as regards the operational units of the Ingushetia Ministry of the Interior [the police] when it comes to the execution of the investigators\u2019 lawful requests without your personal intervention. Your intervention could change the basis of the operational search officers\u2019 attitude to the execution of their tasks...\u201d 73.  On 30 May 2011 the Head of the Criminal Police Department of the Ministry of the Interior replied to the investigators, stating that as the result of their criticism they had conducted an internal inquiry and implemented various disciplinary measures against the officers responsible for their failure to take the necessary steps. 74.  On 4 May 2011 the hotel\u2019s administration replied to the investigators\u2019 request of 29 April 2011, stating that on 23 November 2007 there had been no CCTV cameras on their premises. 75.  On 11 May 2011 the investigation was suspended again. The proceedings are still pending. 76.  The Government did not contest the factual circumstances of the events as presented by the applicants. They added only that at the material time four Deputy Ministers of the Interior had been residing at the hotel. In addition to Mr Seliverstov and Mr Selivanov, Mr Seriy and Mr Magera were also staying there. 77.  In their submission before the Court on 1 February 2013 the Government stated that \u201cit has been positively confirmed that on 23 November 2007 [the applicants] were subjected to ill-treatment by unidentified perpetrators. There is no information showing that the crime was committed by representatives of the law-enforcement agencies or other State agents\u201d. 78.  In reply to the Court\u2019s request for a copy of the investigation file, the Government furnished its contents, amounting to 1182 pages. According to the applicants, the documents submitted did not contain copies of the transcripts of the questioning of the first applicant, in which he had stressed the involvement of State agents in the abduction and ill-treatment.", "references": ["0", "7", "8", "3", "4", "6", "5", "No Label", "1", "2", "9"], "gold": ["1", "2", "9"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1940 and lives in Tambov. 5.  On 8 August 2003 the Justice of the Peace of the 1st Court Circuit of the Leninskiy District of the Tambov Region ordered Municipal unitary enterprise of housing maintenance No. 1 (\u00ab\u0423\u041c\u041f\u0416\u0425 \u21161\u00bb, hereinafter \u201cdebtor company\u201d) to pay 348 euros (EUR) to Ms Lisova Aleksandra Semenovna. The judgment became final on 19 August 2003. 6.  On 11 September 2003 the Bailiffs\u2019 Service initiated enforcement proceedings. 7.  Following Ms Lisova\u2019s death, on 08 July 2005 the Justice of the Peace of the 1st Court Circuit of the Leninskiy District of the Tambov Region replaced the initial applicant, Mrs Lisova, by her successor, Mrs Karpesh, in the enforcement proceedings. 8.  The award was subsequently index-linked in the course of the enforcement proceedings by the decisions of 02 March 2006 (final on 14 March 2006), 09 April 2007 (final on 20 April 2007), 09 January 2008 (final on 22 January 2008), and 27 March 2008 (final on 08 April 2008). Each decision replaced and cancelled the previous one. 9.  The award has not been paid to the applicant to date. 10.  The company was incorporated as a municipal unitary enterprise set up by a decision of the local administration and provided housing maintenance services. The company had \u201cthe right of economic control\u201d (\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043e \u0445\u043e\u0437\u044f\u0439\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0432\u0435\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f) over the assets allocated to it by the administration in order to carry out their statutory activities. 11.  On 30 May 2008 the debtor company was declared insolvent and liquidation proceedings started. As a result, the company was liquidated on 27 May 2009.", "references": ["0", "8", "5", "2", "1", "7", "4", "6", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Vila Nova de Famalic\u00e3o. 5.  On 17 September 2003 he instituted inventory proceedings (processo de invent\u00e1rio) before the Vila Nova de Famalic\u00e3o Court in order to obtain the division of the property of his great-uncle, J.C., who died in 1944. 6.  On 26 November 2003 the administrator of the estate (cabe\u00e7a-de-casal) gave statements (declara\u00e7\u00f5es da cabe\u00e7a-de-casal) during the proceedings and on 27 January 2004 she identified at least fifty people as being J.C.\u2019s heirs. 7.  On 13 February and 13 June 2004 two additional groups of heirs sought to intervene in the proceedings as parties. The applicant was notified of these requests on 23 May 2005. 8.  On 21 April 2004 the administrator of the estate submitted a list of J.C.\u2019s assets (rela\u00e7\u00e3o de bens) to the case-file; the applicant was notified of this on 20 September 2004. 9.  On 20 June 2006 the court requested the administrator of the estate to make additional statements. Between that date and 3 September 2007 contact information with regard to some of the heirs was submitted by the administrator of the estate, the heirs who had sought to intervene in the proceedings were granted leave to do so (see paragraph 7 above), and land registry certificates were requested and added to the case-file. 10.  On 18 February 2008 the company J.M.C. (hereinafter \u201cJ.M.C.\u201d) lodged a request to be allowed to intervene in the proceedings. 11.  Following some difficulties in summoning the heirs (many of the letters sent had been returned undelivered to the court), on 20 May 2009 the court managed to summon all heirs. 12.  On 22 June 2009 the parties requested that a time-limit be set for the valuation of the property included in the inventory. 13.  On 24 June 2009 the administrator of the estate requested permission to step down from his post for health reasons. On 15 October 2009 the court granted her request and appointed a new administrator of the estate. 14.  On 24 March 2010 a meeting of the parties (confer\u00eancia de interessados) took place. The court admitted J.M.C. as a party to the proceedings and appointed an expert to value the immovable property left by J.C. The meeting was postponed pending the expert\u2019s report. 15.  On 7 June 2010, after requesting an extension of the initial thirty-day time-limit, the expert submitted his report. 16.  After J.M.C. criticised the expert\u2019s report, on 9 March 2011 the expert submitted a second report. 17.  On 21 March 2012 the expert was asked by the court to give information about the value of the properties, which he did on 9 May 2012. 18.  Between 7 January 2008 and 18 April 2013, a meeting of the parties was scheduled, re-scheduled or postponed twelve times, the last of them for an unknown date. 19.  Between 11 February 2008 and 18 April 2013 the court was informed four times of the deaths of parties to the proceedings. Procedural steps were taken to identify their heirs in order to continue the proceedings with those heirs as parties. 20.  As the letters summoning some of the newly identified heirs had been returned to the court, between 10 September 2013 and 17 December 2013 more steps were taken in order to try to summon them. 21.  On 6 February 2014 the administrator of the estate informed the court that she was unable to obtain information about the missing addresses of some of the heirs of a deceased party. 22.   The court stayed the proceedings three times (on 12 February and 13 November 2014, and on 10 September 2015), ordering that they should not continue until one or more of the parties took the initiative to submit information regarding the addresses of some of the heirs. 23.  According to the latest information received by the Court on 10 January 2016, on that date the proceedings were still pending at first instance.", "references": ["5", "8", "4", "1", "6", "7", "0", "2", "9", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1944 and lives in Kaliningrad. 6.  Until 1999 the applicant was married to Z. and was living with her in a state-owned flat which had been provided to Z.\u2019s parents. The applicant was registered as living in that flat. 7.  In 1999 the applicant and Z. divorced and the applicant moved in with his new partner, B. At that time he did not apply for deregistration from the flat which he had occupied with his former wife. Later Z. privatised that flat, and the applicant lost occupational right to it. 8.  B. occupied a room in a three-room communal flat under a social tenancy agreement. The other two rooms were occupied by her neighbours. The applicant and B. lived together in that room for the following ten years. They never married and the applicant was not registered as living in the room. 9.  In May 2009 B. died and her neighbours locked the applicant out of the flat. The local housing authority informed the applicant that he had to vacate the room, since he had no legal right to occupy it. 10.  On 28 September 2009 the applicant instituted court proceedings against the local administration, seeking recognition of his right to occupy the room as B.\u2019s family member. He submitted that he and B. had been living in the room as husband and wife since 1988, but that after her death her neighbours had locked him out of the room. He considered that despite the fact that he had not been married to B. and had not been registered as living in the room, he should be regarded as a member of her family who had acquired the right to occupy her room. In particular, he raised the following arguments:\n-  he had shared a common household with B.;\n-  he had paid for the maintenance of the room;\n-  he had assumed the cost of B.\u2019s burial;\n-  he had no other housing: he could not return to the flat of his former wife Z. since she had become the owner of that flat and lived there with her new family;\n-  on 8 September 2009 he had asked the authorities to deregister him from the flat of his former wife Z.;\n-  since his eviction, he had been obliged to live in the school in which he was working as a night watchman. 11.  The local administration submitted that the applicant had not been registered as living in B.\u2019s room, he was not a member of B.\u2019s family and, therefore, he had not acquired any right to occupy her room. 12.  B.\u2019s neighbours were invited to participate in the proceedings as third parties. They confirmed that between 1999 and 2009 the applicant had lived in the room with B. and had provided her with financial support. However, they considered that B.\u2019s room should be allocated to them and not to the applicant, since there were six of them living in two rooms and they needed to upgrade their living conditions. 13.  On 6 May 2010 the Leninskiy District Court (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) of Kaliningrad granted the applicant\u2019s claim with reference to Articles 69 and 70 of the Housing Code (see Relevant domestic law and practice below). The District Court established, in particular, that between 1999 and 2009 the applicant had cohabited with B. in the room in question, had shared a common household with her and had been removed from the register at his previous place of residence. The District Court considered that the above circumstances should be regarded as exceptional within the meaning of Article 69 of the Housing Code and that the applicant should therefore be regarded as a member of B.\u2019s family who had acquired the right to reside in the room previously occupied by her. 14.  The local administration did not appeal against the judgment of 6 May 2010. 15.  The third parties appealed against that judgment to the Kaliningrad Regional Court (\u201cthe Regional Court\u201d). They submitted that B. had on several occasions chased the applicant away. She had not applied to the authorities with a request to register him as living in her room, and had not asked that his name be added to the social tenancy agreement as a member of her family. The applicant had not paid any utility charges for the room and had been registered as living elsewhere until B.\u2019s death. 16.  On 22 September 2010 the Regional Court quashed the judgment of 6 May 2010 and dismissed the applicant\u2019s claims. The relevant part of the decision of 22 September 2010 reads as follows:\n\u201cWhen granting the claims of Mr Zakharov Ye. N. [the applicant], the court [the District Court] proceeded from the premise that there existed exceptional circumstances allowing it to recognise him as a member of Ms Brazhnikova\u2019s [B.\u2019s] family in accordance with Article 69 \u00a7 1 of the Housing Code.\nThe Civil Chamber [of the Kaliningrad Regional Court] cannot agree with such a decision.\nThe court [the District Court] established on the basis of the plaintiff\u2019s and witnesses\u2019 submissions that the plaintiff had lived together with Ms Brazhnikova L.P. [B.] since 1999 and had shared a common household with her.\nThe above circumstances are not in themselves exceptional, in particular given that no irrefutable evidence had been submitted to the court to prove that Ms Brazhnikova L. P. had let Mr Zakharov live in the flat as a family member rather than as a temporary resident. Throughout the period in which he lived together with Ms Brazhnikova L.P., the plaintiff had been registered as living in house no. 6, Pionerskaya street in the village of Aleksandrovka in the Zelenogradskiy district. He asked to be removed from the register on 8 September 2009 after the death of Ms Brazhnikova and just before applying to the court.\nTherefore, the circumstances of the case do not allow the court to recognise Mr Zakharov Ye. N. as a family member of the social tenant Ms Brazhnikova L.P. as well as acknowledging his right to occupy the flat in question. It follows that the court judgment should be quashed and a new decision should be taken dismissing those claims.\u201d 17.  On 3 March 2011 a judge of the Supreme Court of Russia (\u201cthe Supreme Court\u201d) refused to refer the applicant\u2019s application for supervisory review of the decision of 22 September 2010 to the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court for examination, finding no grounds for such review and relying on the principle of legal certainty.", "references": ["7", "6", "8", "0", "5", "1", "2", "3", "9", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "5.  On 26 June 2006 the Leskovac Commercial Court ordered AD Perper-Agrar, a socially-owned company based in Bo\u0161njace (hereinafter \u201cthe debtor\u201d) to pay the applicant specified amounts on account of damages. That judgment became final on 14 July 2006. 6.  On 31 October 2006, upon the applicant\u2019s request to that effect, the Leskovac Commercial Court ordered the enforcement of the said judgment and further ordered the debtor to pay the applicant the enforcement costs. 7.  On 27 May 2011 the Leskovac Commercial Court opened insolvency proceedings in respect of the debtor. 8.   The applicant duly submitted his claim. 9.  On 3 February 2012 the applicant\u2019s claim was formally recognised. 10.  The insolvency proceedings are still ongoing. 11.  On 22 April 2003, the debtor had been privatised and changed its name to AD Perper-Agrar. 12.  On 5 May 2005 the privatisation contract had been annulled and on 8 September 2006 the debtor\u2019s name was changed to Agrar Fruit. 13.  According to the Serbian Ministry of Economy, the debtor is still a company predominantly comprised of socially-owned capital (see http://www.priv.rs/Ministarstvo-privrede/90/AGRAR-FRUIT--u-stecaju.shtml/companyid=1238, accessed on 6 December 2016). 14.  In their additional observations of 19 April 2016 the Government informed the Court that the applicant had transferred its judgment claims to a third person on 28 October 2015. 15.  On 9 November 2016, as a response to the Government\u2019s additional observations, the applicant submitted that the contract regarding the transfer of the claims in question had been terminated by 11 December 2015.", "references": ["4", "7", "5", "0", "1", "8", "6", "2", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1968 and her two sons in 2001 (D.B.) and 2005 (P.B.), respectively. The applicant lives in I.; the children live with their father, I.B., in S. 6.  In 2002 the applicant married I.B. In the period between 2002 and March 2009 the family lived together in their home in S., a small town located on the central Dalmatian coast, north-west of the town of Split. 7.  On 24 March 2009 the applicant contacted the Split Social Welfare Centre (Centar za socijalnu skrb Split) and expressed fear for her life and the lives of the children. She claimed that her husband had been mentally and verbally abusing her and the children for years, and had lately become unbearable. 8.   The Split Social Welfare Centre immediately informed the police of the alleged abuse and of its intention to take child protection measures envisaged by the Family Act. On the same day the police interviewed the applicant, who stated that her husband was suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder and alcoholism. She reiterated that he had been abusing her and the children mentally and verbally but not physically. 9.  On 25 March 2009 the applicant and the children moved from S. and went to live with the applicant\u2019s parents in I., a municipality in central Croatia near Ivani\u0107-Grad. These two places are 426 kilometres apart.[1] 10.  In the period between 8 and 20 April 2009 the police interviewed I.B., the children\u2019s paediatrician, and employees of the younger son\u2019s kindergarten and the older son\u2019s school. I.B. denied any abuse and complained that the applicant\u2019s parents did not allow him any contact with the children. The paediatrician confirmed that I.B. had in 2002 and 2003 been treated for post-traumatic stress disorder but that she, like the other persons interviewed by the police, had not noticed any signs of abuse within the family. 11.  On 24 April 2009 the police authorities submitted a report on the alleged abuse in the applicants\u2019 family to the relevant State Attorney\u2019s Office, which eventually, on 22 February 2011, found that no criminal offence had been committed. 12.  On 1 July 2009 the applicant was admitted to a psychiatric hospital, where she stayed until 9 August 2009, when she was released. She was diagnosed as suffering from severe anxiety and depression caused by her current family situation. 13.  Since April 2009 several consecutive sets of proceedings have been conducted before judicial authorities concerning custody and contact arrangements regarding the applicant\u2019s children. Ivani\u0107-Grad or Split Social Welfare Centre participated in each of those proceedings as an independent intervener sui generis with a view to protecting the children\u2019s interests. The facts set out below give a detailed account of those proceedings, measures undertaken by the welfare authorities, and the surrounding circumstances. 14.  On 4 June 2009 I.B. instituted non-contentious proceedings (izvanparni\u010dni postupak) against the applicant in the Ivani\u0107-Grad Municipal Court (Op\u0107inski sud u Ivani\u0107-Gradu) in order to regulate his contact rights in respect of the children. 15.  On 30 July 2009 the Ivani\u0107-Grad Social Welfare Centre (Centar za socijalnu skrb Ivani\u0107-Grad), having interviewed the applicant and the children, submitted its report and recommendations. The report suggested that the children had expressed negative emotions towards their father and fear of corporal punishment by him. The relevant part of that report reads as follows:\n\u201cBy psychological evaluation of the [older son] it was established that the boy is very emotionally burdened by the family situation. [He] is anxious and upset at the mention of the father and the possible [re-establishment of] contact with him. He expresses fear of the father because he does not know how the father would behave. He stated that he likes it in I. because before he was afraid and had to listen to the parents fighting. He also states that he does not want to spend summer holidays with the father but that he is fine with telephone contact with him. The boy is very emotionally attached to the mother.\nThe psychologist\u2019s interview with the children of 28 July 2009 ... suggests that both children indicate that they do not want to go to their father, [and the older son] shows that he is mentally and emotionally very burdened by the family situation and his relationship with the father. The child is very anxious and upset when the issue of going to the father is mentioned, [as evidenced by his] emotional reaction. In particular, [the older son] started crying on several occasions [while] expressing negative emotions against the father, primarily a fear ... of corporal punishment. [He] says that he does not want to go to the father because he does not want the father to beat him as he used to, on the head and on the back, which [the younger son] confirms. He agrees to the father coming to I. to visit them on weekends and to have contact with him by telephone.\u201d\nIn view of the applicant\u2019s hospitalisation (see paragraph 12 above), the Centre recommended that the children be temporarily placed in the care of their maternal grandparents, that the father be granted contact rights, to be exercised every second weekend in I. and that the children be referred to the Polyclinic for the Protection of Children in Zagreb for treatment in order for them to overcome their emotional difficulties. 16.  By a decision of 31 July 2009 the Ivani\u0107-Grad Municipal Court:\n- decided to temporarily, until 1 December 2009, place the children in the care of their maternal grandparents;\n- awarded I.B. contact rights, to be exercised every Saturday between 9 a.m. and 7 p.m.;\n- ordered a combined psychological and psychiatric evaluation of the applicant and I.B. 17.  On 3 February 2010 the Velika Gorica County Court (\u017dupanijski sud u Velikoj Gorici) dismissed an appeal by I.B. and upheld that decision. 18.  In their combined expert opinion of 29 October 2009 the appointed forensic experts in psychology and psychiatry stated, inter alia, that both the applicant and I.B. had certain shortcomings, which, however, did not disqualify them as parents. The experts recommended that custody be awarded to the applicant because that would be less painful for the children. They explained that in the given circumstances separating the children from their mother and their having to adapt again to a new environment would be a traumatic experience for them. The experts also noted that the entire family, and especially the parents, needed professional assistance in overcoming their emotional difficulties 19.  By a decision of 27 November 2009 the Ivani\u0107-Grad Municipal Court:\n- temporarily deprived I.B. of custody of the children until 28 June 2010 or the adoption of a final decision in the concurrent divorce and custody proceedings (see paragraphs 22-53 below);\n- temporarily awarded custody to the applicant;\n- awarded I.B. contact rights, to be exercised in I. every Saturday between 9 a.m. and 7 p.m.; 20.  On 3 March 2010 the Velika Gorica County Court (\u017dupanijski sud u Velikoj Gorici) allowed an appeal by I.B., quashed that decision, and remitted the case. 21.  In the resumed proceedings, on 15 April 2010 I.B. informed the Ivani\u0107-Grad Municipal Court that he no longer wished to pursue the case, whereupon, by a decision of 16 April 2010, the Ivani\u0107-Grad Municipal Court discontinued the proceedings. 22.  Meanwhile, on 30 April 2009 the applicant brought a civil action against I.B. in the same court, seeking a divorce and custody of the children. In his response I.B. opposed a divorce and proposed that he be awarded custody of the children. 23.  By a decision of 27 May 2009 the Ivani\u0107-Grad Municipal Court ruled that it had no territorial jurisdiction in the matter and on 7 July 2009 it transferred the case to the Split Municipal Court (Op\u0107inski sud u Splitu). 24.  On 3 September 2009 the Split Municipal Court referred the applicant and her husband to the Split Social Welfare Centre for the mandatory mediation procedure before divorce. 25.  On 19 October 2009 the Split Social Welfare Centre submitted its report and recommendation, stating that reconciliation between the spouses was not possible because their relationship was deeply strained. As regards the issue of custody of their children, the Centre recommended a psychiatric evaluation of the parents in order to determine their parenting capacities. 26.  At the hearing held on 24 March 2010 the court decided to order a combined expert opinion from forensic experts in psychology and psychiatry. 27.  On 10 May 2010 the experts submitted their opinion, which was based on a psychiatric and psychological evaluation of the applicant and I.B. and a psychological evaluation of the children. The experts established that:\n- both parents were suitable for custody;\n- their parenting capacities had certain shortcomings, which was why they needed the assistance of welfare authorities in the form of supervision of the exercise of parental authority, counselling and, possibly, enrolment in a parenting school;\n- the children were more attached to the mother, who was at that time more available to meet their needs,\n- the children wished to remain living with their mother.\nThe experts recommended:\n- that weight be given to the children\u2019s wishes and custody be awarded to the mother,\n- that the father be granted extensive contact rights, to be exercised in I., initially every second Saturday, and later over one whole weekend per month, as well as every second public holiday, half of the winter holidays and the entire summer holidays (July and August),\n- that the child protection measure of supervision of the exercise of parental authority be imposed (nadzor nad izvr\u0161avanjem roditeljske skrbi). 28.  I.B. objected to those findings in the written submission that he submitted on 8 June 2010. The applicant did not object. 29.  At a hearing held on 18 June 2010 I.B., relying on the above-mentioned expert opinion (see paragraph 27 above), asked the court to order a provisional measure allowing him to spend the upcoming summer holidays with the children at his home in S. The representative of the Split Social Welfare Centre who attended the hearing endorsed this request. 30.  By a decision of the same day the court allowed the request and issued a provisional measure whereby it ordered that the children were to stay with their father in S. from 1 July 2010 until 30 August 2010. During that period the applicant was granted contact rights, to be exercised every second Saturday from 10 a.m. until 8 p.m. at I.B.\u2019s home, and every day by phone. 31.  On 28 June 2010 the applicant appealed against that decision. She had nothing against the children staying with their father during the summer but complained about the impracticability of the contact arrangements, in particular of having to exercise her contact rights during that period in I.B.\u2019s home, which for her was both objectionable for psychological reasons, given the animosity between her and her husband, and costly, as it entailed her having to travel to S. 32.  The applicant\u2019s appeal was only dismissed by the Split County Court (\u017dupanijski sud u Splitu) on 20 May 2011. The relevant part of that decision reads as follows:\n\u201cThe first-instance court adopted the provisional measure relying on [the relevant provisions of] the Enforcement Act and the Family Act after having established that the adoption of that measure was not contrary to the children\u2019s best interests. Since those interests were not called into question by the arguments raised by the appellant in her appeal, and given that in the proceedings leading to the adoption of the decision [on the provisional measure] there were no serious breaches of procedure ... the appellant\u2019s appeal had to be dismissed and the contested decision upheld.\u201d 33.  Meanwhile, in a report of 30 June 2010 the Ivani\u0107-Grad Social Welfare Centre (Centar za socijalnu skrb Ivani\u0107-Grad) informed the Split Municipal Court of the measures taken to prepare the children for their stay with their father during the summer holidays, as ordered under the measure of 18 June 2010 (see paragraph 30 above). It noted that the younger son wanted to go to S. and spend time with their father whereas the older one resisted that and preferred that their father come to I.. The Centre therefore recommended that implementing the provisional measure in respect of the younger child would be in his interests whereas implementing the measure by force against the older one would not be in that child\u2019s interests. 34.  It would appear that the older son eventually agreed to spend the summer holidays with his father in S. 35.  During the children\u2019s stay with their father in July and August 2010 the applicant did not come to visit them. She however maintained regular telephone contact with them, which became less frequent in August because the children grew reluctant to speak with her. 36.  On 10 August 2010 I.B. asked the Municipal Court to issue a provisional measure and to temporarily award him custody of the children until the final conclusion of the divorce and custody proceedings. 37.  In support of his request, on 27 August 2010 I.B. submitted an opinion of a clinical psychiatrist, Dr J.\u0160., who had interviewed the children, suggesting that the circumstances had changed in that the children now wanted to continue living with their father and firmly refused to go back to their mother in I. The opinion also stated that both parents had limited parenting capacities but were equally suitable to be awarded custody and that they had both been manipulating the children, who needed psychological assistance. 38.  On 30 August 2010 I.B. did not hand the children over to the applicant, but kept them in S. 39.  In their opinions of 1 and 10 September 2010 submitted to the Split Municipal Court the Split and Ivani\u0107-Grad Social Welfare Centres respectively suggested that the experts\u2019 recommendations made in the opinion of 10 May 2010 (see paragraph 27 above) be followed and the children returned to the applicant in I. In view of the children\u2019s recent resistance to returning to their mother\u2019s home, the Split Welfare Centre also proposed that a supplementary expert opinion be obtained from the same experts. 40.  On 13 September 2010 the Split Municipal Court made an enforcement order whereby it ordered I.B. to hand over the children to the applicant. Following an appeal by I.B., that order was quashed by the Split County Court on 20 May 2011. The County Court noted that, apart from the provisional measure of 18 June 2010 regulating custody and contact rights during the summer holidays of 2010, the Municipal Court had not issued any other decision temporarily regulating those issues for the duration of the divorce and custody proceedings. That meant that until the judgment on custody became final the parents were to exercise joint custody and could not enforce their respective custody rights against each other as they both had the right to have the children living with them. 41.  At the hearing held on 17 September 2010 the Municipal Court heard the two experts who had prepared the opinion of 10 May 2010 (see paragraph 27 above). They noted that the new circumstances (the children\u2019s resistance to returning to I.) were indeed important but stood by their opinion. They were also against the Split Welfare Centre\u2019s proposal to obtain a supplementary expert opinion, as another expert assessment would traumatise the children further, such an opinion would be incomplete, and it would be difficult to determine the boys\u2019 true wishes. If the court were nevertheless to decide to obtain such an opinion they suggested that the task be assigned to an expert institution in Zagreb. 42.  After the hearing the applicant tried to meet the children at their father\u2019s home in S. However, the children refused to meet her and were crying and hiding from her. 43.  On 28 September 2010 I.B. submitted to the court another opinion of the psychiatrist, Dr J.\u0160. (see paragraph 37 above), dated 23 September 2010, which stated that:\n- the children needed psychological assistance, to which the father agreed (he had started taking them to therapy);\n- the father had been advised to encourage the children to have contact with the mother;\n- the children were refusing contact not because they did not love their mother but because they were afraid she would take them to I.;\n- the supplementary expert opinion proposed by the Split Social Welfare Centre (see paragraph 39 above) should determine (a) in what way the parents had been manipulating the children, (b) what kind of impact returning to I. would have on the children\u2019s emotional health, and (c) the long-term consequences of either potential decision on custody. 44.  The applicant did not attend the hearing on 5 November 2010 at which the court decided to hear as witnesses at the next hearing scheduled for 1 February 2011 the older son\u2019s school teacher and school pedagogue, the younger son\u2019s kindergarten teacher, and the psychiatrist, Dr J.\u0160. 45.  On 24 January 2011 I.B. submitted to the court yet another opinion of Dr J.\u0160., dated 11 January 2011, which stated that the proceedings should end as soon as possible because they were traumatising for the children, who lived in a constant state of fear and uncertainty regarding their potential return to I. In her view, without addressing the causes of the children\u2019s refusal to return to their mother, returning them to I. would be impossible and contrary to their emotional well-being and their best interests. 46.  At the hearing held on 1 February 2011 the court heard evidence from Dr J.\u0160., who stated that:\n- the separation of the parents entailed a potential change of the children\u2019s residence, which was very traumatising for the children;\n- for the children it was more important where they would live than with which parent; they loved their mother but refused to live in I.;\n- the boys had sustained serious emotional harm and it was impossible to return them to I. without consequences;\n- the boys were refusing to have contact with the mother and were very likely inventing stories that they had been beaten by her and their maternal grandparents (see paragraph 15 above) only because they were afraid that she would take them back to I. (the older boy was saying that he would hide, run away or kill himself).\nShe recommended that the children continue to live with the father, have unhindered contact with the mother and undergo psychotherapy because they had suffered serious emotional harm. 47.  At the end of the hearing the court decided to obtain an opinion from a forensic expert in psychiatry, Dr N.S. from Split. During the hearing and later, in her submissions of 14 and 28 February 2011, the applicant objected to that decision because the court had:\n- appointed a single expert (in psychiatry), whereas a combined opinion from experts in psychology and psychiatry had been warranted;\n- appointed an expert from Split rather than experts from Zagreb, contrary to the recommendation of the earlier experts in the case (see paragraph 41 above), which had also been costly for her as it had entailed her having to travel to Split;\n- not ordered an expert evaluation of the children. 48.  On 9 March 2011 the expert, Dr N.S., submitted his opinion. The opinion was based on a psychiatric evaluation of I.B. but not of the applicant because she had refused to come to Split to undergo a psychiatric evaluation by the expert. The expert stated that:\n- he could not assess which parent was more fit to be awarded custody of the children because the applicant had refused to undergo a psychiatric evaluation; and\n- there were no signs indicating that I.B. was unfit to be awarded custody. 49.  Before the hearing held on 7 April 2011 the applicant tried to meet the older son in his school. However, after the boys\u2019 teacher had told him that his mother was looking for him, he left the school building. 50.  At the hearing held on 7 April 2011 the court heard the applicant and forensic expert Dr N.S., who confirmed that he had not interviewed the children, whereupon the court closed the main hearing and delivered a judgment. By that judgment the Split Municipal Court:\n- dissolved the marriage between the applicant and I.B.;\n- awarded custody of the children to I.B.; and\n- granted the applicant contact rights, to be exercised every second weekend in I., from Friday evening until Sunday afternoon so that the father could bring the children to her in I. and she could return them to him in S. 51.  Since the parties waived their right of appeal the judgment immediately became final. 52.  By a decision of 30 May 2011, the Split Social Welfare Centre ordered the child protection measure of supervision of the exercise of parental authority in the family (see section 110 of the Family Act, cited in paragraph 101 below). It prepared a programme of supervision and conferred regarding the supervision with a certain N.\u0110. (hereafter \u201cthe supervising officer\u201d), a psychologist and social worker. The decision stated that the measure was primarily aimed at establishing unhindered contacts between the children and the applicant. 53.  Bi-monthly reports prepared by the supervising officer (who has been visiting the children at their father\u2019s home twice a month) and various documents prepared by the Split Social Welfare Centre since 30 May 2011 suggest that only on a few occasions was the applicant able to see the children, not in I., but in S., and then only from a distance and for a very short time. In particular, those documents suggest that the applicant saw the children in that manner on 18 August 2011, 21 May and 1 December 2012, 2 May and 29 June 2013, and on 24 March 2014 (see paragraphs 56, 66, 71, 75, 78 and 82 below). Each time the children vehemently resisted the meeting, and were angry and behaved aggressively towards her. They also resisted telephone contact with their mother. The supervising officer also noted that even with her the children categorically refused to talk about their mother. 54.  On 30 June 2011 the applicant applied to the Split Municipal Court for enforcement of that court\u2019s judgment of 7 April 2011 (see paragraph 50 above), that is to say she sought enforcement of her contact rights to be exercised in I. 55.  At a hearing held on 18 August 2011 the enforcement court heard the parties. I.B. explained that he had several times tried to take the children to their mother to I. but had been faced with their very strong resistance. He stated that the older son had told him: \u201cYou can kick me in the head and put me in the boot [of your car] but I will escape during the trip\u201d and \u201cDad, if you keep pressuring us, don\u2019t be surprised if one day I do not return home\u201d. In I.B.\u2019s opinion the children had behaved in this way because they had been beaten by the applicant and their maternal grandparents while they had been living in I. (see paragraph 9 and 15 above). He also submitted that he had acted in accordance with the instructions of the supervising officer, who had advised him against forcing the children to go and visit the applicant against their will. 56.  After the hearing the applicant tried to meet the children at their father\u2019s home. The older son refused to see her and locked himself in his room. The younger son was playing outdoors, so the applicant managed to see him but the meeting was brief and superficial. 57.  Together with his submissions of 24 August 2011 I.B. enclosed an opinion of the psychiatrist Dr J.\u0160., dated 22 August 2011. The opinion suggested that the children had developed strong resistance towards the mother (to which both parents had subconsciously contributed) and that forcing them to go to I. would likely cause them psychological harm. On the other hand, the therapist stated that contact with the mother should be established as soon as possible, in the presence of an employee of the Split Social Welfare Centre and in the father\u2019s absence. 58.  At the hearing held on 11 October 2011, the enforcement court heard the supervising officer, who testified that the children were not ready to meet the applicant. They had resisted seeing her and were even refusing to talk about her. She also stated that, in her view, their behaviour was not the result of their father\u2019s influence. When asked whether visits to Dr J.\u0160. could prepare the children for meetings with their mother, she replied affirmatively but added that Dr J.\u0160. was a psychiatrist and that it would perhaps be better to take the children to a child psychologist. 59.  By a decision of 28 December 2011 the Split Municipal Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s application for enforcement. Relying on the supervising officer\u2019s testimony and the opinion of psychiatrist Dr J.\u0160. (see paragraphs 57-58 above), the court found that I.B. had not been obstructing the exercise of the applicant\u2019s contact rights, which remained unenforced exclusively because of the children\u2019s strong resistance. The applicant did not appeal against that decision. 60.  On 9 December 2011 the applicant instituted proceedings in the Split Municipal Court seeking a change in the contact arrangements. 61.  The court held hearings on 20 March, 21 May, 17 July and 6 August 2012. 62.  At the hearing held on 20 March 2012 the parties agreed that the contacts between the applicant and the children should in the future take place in S. on the premises of the Split Social Welfare Centre. At the same hearing the court ordered the Split Social Welfare Centre to conduct a thorough examination of both parents and the children. After the hearing the parties tried to organise contact between the applicant and the children in the manner agreed at the hearing but the children refused to come to the meeting.\n 63.  On 2 May 2012 I.B. informed the court that, at the suggestion of the supervising officer, he had on 27 April 2012 taken the children to the Split Polyclinic for Rehabilitation of Persons with Disabilities (Department of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry), where a psychologist had made an initial assessment and recommended that the children undergo psychotherapy. It would appear that soon afterwards I.B. started taking the children for regular treatment to Dr D.B., a psychiatrist from that polyclinic, with a view to overcoming their emotional and psychological difficulties and easing their resistance towards their mother. 64.  At the hearing held on 21 May 2012 the court heard the supervising officer. The relevant part of her statement reads:\n\u201cThe children refuse any cooperation and show resistance towards their mother, the strongest I have seen in my twenty-nine years of experience. At the mere mention of the mother, [the older son] starts to scream and shout and [the younger one] follows his brother\u2019s example. ... [I]n a situation like this, one needs to work with the children, as otherwise they will turn into mentally unstable persons ... Before, there was at least some telephone contact between the mother and the children; now the children do not want to speak to her.\n... [T]he mother has so far done everything she can, that is to say she has been calling, asking about the children. In my experience, there is nothing she can do in the present situation.\nIn order to overcome this situation I have been instructing the father and advised him to encourage the children to accept the mother, to speak positively of [her]. When talking to me he cooperates and takes on board all my advice, but I do not know which [part of it he accepts], and how he implements it. In the beginning, when I commenced supervision ... I could talk to the children, but they are now firm and resolute in their stance ... In order to achieve any progress in this situation the children must be under constant treatment, and I also think that the parents need expert assistance in overcoming their [issues]. I also have to say that that I asked [the father] at the beginning of the supervision to visit the Family Centre and seek help there. I do not know if he did it.\u201d 65.  At the same hearing the court decided to obtain an opinion and recommendation from the Split Social Welfare Centre. In so doing the court stated:\n\u201cThe Court would draw the attention of [the Social Welfare Centre\u2019s] expert ... team to the need for the children to undergo therapy and treatment, and the need for the parents to be advised as to how to resolve their relationship and to have clearly defined limits as to what to do and how in this situation ...\u201d 66.  After the hearing the applicant again tried to meet the children at their father\u2019s home. The children refused to leave the house and closed the shutters. An employee of the Split Social Welfare Centre who was accompanying the applicant went into the house to talk to the children alone. The older son cried, refused to see the applicant and stated that he wanted her to leave. The younger son also refused to see and talk to the applicant, even for a short while. Eventually, the children came to the doorway just to tell the applicant that they did not want to see her, and then locked themselves in the house. 67.  On 12 June 2012 the Split Social Welfare Centre submitted its report and recommendation. Bearing in mind the risks involved in meetings held without expert supervision and the necessity to gradually re-establish contact between the applicant and her children, the Centre recommended contact once a month in S. under the supervision of the supervising officer. Although the Centre was ready to organise meetings on its premises, it advised against it because the children had refused such an arrangement in the past. Instead, it proposed that the meetings take place elsewhere outside the father\u2019s home, for example in a park or a playroom. The relevant part of the report reads as follows:\n\u201cSince the beginning of the implementation of the supervision measure the children have not had regular contact with the mother. Both boys have been openly resisting meeting the mother ... by complaining, refusing, crying, and expressing anger and fear of the mother. This is confirmed by all reports of the supervising officer, psychiatrists\u2019 reports and the psychologist\u2019s report dated 27 April 2012.\nThe recommendations of the specialist, the expert ... team and the supervising officer are to provide the children with psychological support with a view to processing difficult emotions related to the situation in the family and their relationship with the parents. Even though in the context of the supervision measure the children are provided with counselling at which topics related to the parents and contact with the mother are discussed, this has not brought positive results in the sense of significant changes in the children[\u2018s behaviour]. It is therefore necessary to involve the children in psychotherapy. The father was therefore instructed to visit the Split Polyclinic for Rehabilitation of Persons with Disabilities, an expert team of the Department of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry. The father accepted this, and the treatment at the Polyclinic commenced in April 2012.\nTaking into account primarily the interests of the children, we are of the opinion that contact with the mother has to be regulated gradually, by following the children\u2019s emotional capacities, the course of the psychotherapy, [etc.] ...\n...\nIt is to be noted that any involvement of children in conflict between parents ... inevitably has harmful consequences for their development. Denial of free and regular contact between a parent and a child is the most common ... way of inflicting suffering on a child. To demand from a child that it choose between the parents constitutes violence against the existentially determined loyalty to both parents. Influencing the child [in such a way that he or she] has a bad opinion of the other parent will generally worsen that child\u2019s opinion of himself or herself. [Exercising force towards] children in any way necessarily has harmful consequences for their emotional development. Both parents have been informed of this [and] advised [accordingly] ... Through their appropriate behaviour and relationship parents have the power on their own to help their child to overcome the crisis and continue his or her development without harmful consequences. In circumstances where the parents do not have sufficient capacity [to do so] professional assistance should be sought for the children.\n...\nOnly with professional assistance and by establishing a minimal level of cooperation between the parents may one expect to establish unhindered contact between the mother and the children. In the current circumstances we are of the opinion that contact should be established gradually, by the mother visiting the children, at their place of residence, the last weekend in every month, on Saturdays from 3 a.m. to 7 p.m., and on Sundays from 11 a.m. to 3 p.m. It is suggested that contact take place in the presence of the supervising officer, N.\u0110. ... who undertakes to coordinate between the parents the place [of the meetings] and the manner of collecting and returning the children. In addition, it is necessary to follow the course of the children\u2019s psychiatric treatment and to respect the recommendations, instructions and opinions of the psychotherapist.\nOnce contact between the mother and the children is established, the times of their contact may be extended and could include holidays.\u201d 68.  In her opinion of 17 July 2012 the psychiatrist Dr D.B. (see paragraph 63 above) stated that during the first two therapy sessions she could not gain the children\u2019s trust, and that they perceived any contact with their mother as a threat to the current state of affairs and as bringing a change they could not accept. 69.  By a decision of 6 August 2012 the Split Municipal Court ordered that contact between the applicant and her children was to take place on the last weekend of every month, specifically on Saturday from 3 p.m. to 7 p.m. and on Sunday from 11 a.m. to 3 p.m., under the supervising officer\u2019s supervision. It refused the applicant\u2019s request to be allowed to spend two weeks in August 2012 with her sons. In so deciding, the Municipal Court relied on the opinion and recommendation of the Split Social Welfare Centre (see paragraph 67 above). 70.  In an opinion dated 10 September 2012 the psychiatrist, Dr D.B., stated that the older child was refusing to cooperate during therapy sessions and that he was crying and saying that he wanted to go home and felt that his rights were being violated. 71.  On 1 December 2012 the applicant again attempted to meet the children at their home. The children again refused to meet her and did not even approach her. The older son was crying, was verbally aggressive and told her that he did not want her and that she should go away. The younger son ran away from her and told her that he did not want to go to her. 72.  On 10 January 2013 the Split County Court dismissed an appeal by the applicant against the first-instance decision of 6 August 2012 (see paragraph 69 above). 73.  It would appear that in March 2013 I.B. stopped (regularly) taking the children for therapy to Dr D.B. (see paragraph 63 above). 74.  On 2 May 2013 the applicant met in person with Dr D.B., who suggested discontinuing the treatment because the children cried during the therapy sessions and she could not achieve anything. 75.  On the same day the applicant again tried to meet the children at their home. The children yet again refused to meet her. 76.  On 13 June 2013 the applicant instituted another set of proceedings before the Split Municipal Court, seeking a change in the contact arrangements. 77.  On 26 June 2013 the court invited the Ivani\u0107-Grad and Split Social Welfare Centres to make a psychological evaluation of the family and to submit a joint opinion and recommendation. The centres nevertheless submitted separate opinions on 26 July and 11 September 2013 respectively. The report of the Split Social Welfare stated that the children had refused to come to the Centre\u2019s premises for psychological evaluation, so the Centre\u2019s psychologist had visited their home. During the interview the children had avoided talking about the contact with their mother and had expressed their anger and discontent. Since, despite the supervision measure and psychiatric treatment, the children had continued to refuse to see their mother, the Centre recommended obtaining an opinion from an expert in psychiatry with a view to determining the causes of their behaviour. 78.  On 29 June 2013 the applicant went to visit the children, who again refused to see her. The older son was shouting and cursing at her, telling her to go home and that he did not need her. 79.  In her report of 19 September 2013 the psychiatrist Dr D.B., who was treating the children, informed the Split Social Welfare Centre that in her opinion continuing their psychiatric treatment would be counterproductive because the children had been resisting it, had not been cooperating and had engaged in strongly negative emotional outbursts during therapy sessions. It would appear that the treatment nevertheless continued upon the intervention of the supervising officer and the Split Social Welfare Centre. The therapy session of 14 January 2014 was attended by an employee of the Split Social Welfare Centre, who explained to Dr D.B. that the main goal of the therapy was to facilitate the children\u2019s contact with their mother. However, Dr D.B.\u2019s and the Split Social Welfare Centre\u2019s reports of 11 March 2014 suggested that no progress had been made, despite the continuation of the treatment. The report of the supervising officer dated February 2014 suggested that the children had been refusing psychotherapy or to participate in any other activity (such as going to the Social Welfare Centre) which entailed talking about their mother. 80.  Meanwhile, at a hearing held on 11 November 2013 the Split Municipal Court heard the parties and the representative of the Split Social Welfare Centre and decided to obtain a combined opinion from forensic experts in psychology and psychiatry with a view to determining the causes of the children\u2019s refusal to have contact with their mother. It appointed the same experts who had prepared the opinion of 10 May 2010 (see paragraph 27 above). 81.  In the period between 20 and 24 March 2014 the Split Social Welfare Centre unsuccessfully tried to organise a meeting between the applicant and the children at Dr D.B.\u2019s office. For that purpose the Centre\u2019s officials visited the children\u2019s home and explained to them that their mother did not want to take them away from their father but that she just wanted to see them. The children were nevertheless very upset and angry. On the same occasion the father was advised to encourage the children to have contact with the mother and to continue their therapy, either with Dr D.B. or with a different therapist. 82.  On 24 March 2014 the applicant intercepted her younger son on his way back from school. She asked him to stop and talk to her, at which point he ran away from her, upset and in tears. 83.  On 7 April 2014 the Split Social Welfare Centre filed a criminal complaint against I.B. with the Split Municipal State Attorney\u2019s Office (Op\u0107insko dr\u017eavno odvjetni\u0161tvo u Splitu) accusing him of \u2013 by not taking the children regularly to Dr D.B. for psychotherapy \u2013 committing the criminal offence of non-execution of a child protection measure, as defined in Article 173 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 106 below). 84.  On 3 June 2014, having consulted the documents in the case file, the court-appointed experts (see paragraph 80 above) in a joint letter asked the court to exempt them from the role of experts in the case. They criticised the way the judicial and welfare authorities and various experts had handled the situation in the applicant\u2019s family since they had delivered their previous expert opinion of 10 May 2010 (see paragraph 27 above). In particular, they:\n- stated that the children had been manipulated by their father and that their refusal to have any contact with their mother was completely irrational and resulted from the conflict of loyalties they had been drawn into;\n- criticised the opinions of Dr J.\u0160., who in their view had (a) failed to adequately explain the radical change in the children\u2019s behaviour after they had spent the summer holidays of 2010 with their father, (b) failed to recognise that change as an obvious symptom of the children\u2019s conflict of loyalties, and (c) recommended that the children\u2019s wish to continue to live with their father be respected (see paragraphs 45-46 above), thus ignoring their long-term interests;\n- pointed out that the judicial authorities had ignored the Split Social Welfare Centre\u2019s recommendation of 1 September 2010 that a supplementary expert opinion be obtained from them (as the experts who had on 10 May 2010 prepared the earlier opinion in the case \u2013 see paragraphs 27 and 39 above) and, instead of ordering a combined (psychiatric and psychological) evaluation of both parents and the children by a clinic in Zagreb, had only ordered a psychiatric evaluation of the parents by an expert from Split (see paragraphs 47-48 above).\nThe experts concluded:\n\u201c... Given that [we] had already made an expert evaluation of the family and in May 2010 submitted [our] opinion to the court, which was, to the detriment of the children, not accepted, we ask the court to accept our request for exemption.\n... [We] cannot disregard the fact that the children are being forced to choose for themselves whether they want to have contact with their mother or not \u2013 a developmentally inappropriate task [for them] \u2013 and that, even though the father verbally does not oppose the contact, non-verbally and by his behaviour he sends them the opposite message, thereby bringing them into a severe conflict of loyalties where they have a feeling that they are betraying their father if they show that they care about their mother. This has been causing harm to the healthy socio-emotional development of both children, which would be difficult to repair. Having regard to the foregoing, we suggest that a new, impartial expert assessment be ordered from the Polyclinic for the Protection of Children of the City of Zagreb, which [we] already proposed at the hearing held on 17 September 2010.\u201d 85.  On 20 November 2014 I.B. started undergoing counselling by a psychologist at the newly-opened Ka\u0161tela Family Counselling Centre. Furthermore, on 4 December 2014 he also started taking the children to counselling at the same institution. It would appear that from then on the children have been regularly attending family therapy there once a week, although I.B. stopped attending counselling at some point before May 2016. The Split Social Welfare Centre has been regularly asking the Ka\u0161tela Family Counselling Centre for information about the progress of the children\u2019s counselling. 86.  By a decision of 31 December 2014 the Split Municipal State Attorney\u2019s Office dismissed the criminal complaint against I.B. (see paragraph 83 above). The decision was based on the documents furnished by the Split Social Welfare Centre, an interview with I.B. conducted in the State Attorney\u2019s Office, and a separate interview with both children conducted before the investigation judge of the Split County Court with the assistance of a social pedagogue. The relevant part of that decision reads as follows:\n\u201cIt follows from [the established] facts ... that in the specific case there is no reasonable suspicion that I.B. committed the criminal offence defined in Article 173 paragraph 1 of the Criminal Code. ... It cannot be concluded that the father is exerting pressure on the children and [that he] urges them not to have contact with the mother. The documents enclosed suggest otherwise \u2013 namely, that he, [albeit] with certain difficulties ... takes the children for ... treatment with Dr D.B. and other doctors so that the children might adjust [their behaviour to accommodate] judicial decisions ... It also follows that the suspect is in constant contact with the [Split] Social Welfare Centre and that the supervising officer visits his home and checks the situation of the children, who, on the other hand, when pressured to see the mother, threaten to call the police, run away from home or do something else inappropriate.\u201d 87.  At a hearing held on 13 January 2015 the court accepted the experts\u2019 request to be excused and appointed new experts, a certain Dr Do.B. (a psychiatrist) and a certain Ms A.B. (a psychologist). 88.  The new experts submitted their opinion on 10 June 2015. In their view the children\u2019s estrangement from their mother was the result of their father\u2019s negative attitude toward her. The experts stated that a high level of the children\u2019s alienation from, and hostility towards, their mother was at present an obstacle to the immediate establishment of contact. The experts thus recommended referring the father for psychotherapy with a view to changing his attitudes toward the applicant, as well involving in that process the supervising officer, who should, in the course of supervising the exercise of the father\u2019s parental authority, also work with him towards that goal. They further recommended that, after a period of six months, the applicant be granted contact rights, to be exercised once a month for one hour on the premises of the Split Social Welfare Centre; thereafter, if the situation permitted, contact could be extended. 89.  At meetings held on 9 July and 7 August 2015 at the Split Social Welfare Centre its officials informed I.B. of the experts\u2019 opinion; subsequently he agreed to undergo the recommended psychotherapy. 90.  At a hearing held on 31 August 2015 the applicant, relying on the above expert opinion, requested that I.B. be deprived of custody. At the end of the hearing the court issued a decision whereby it:\n- referred I.B. to psychotherapy and instructed the supervising officer to work with him on changing his negative attitude toward the applicant;\n- decided that the applicant\u2019s request for I.B. to be deprived of custody would be examined within the present proceedings, together with her initial request for a change in contact arrangements;\n- ordered the Split Social Welfare Centre to appoint a special guardian (ad litem) for the children, pursuant to section 167(6) of the Family Act (see paragraph 101 below) and to submit a report and recommendations regarding the applicant\u2019s request for I.B. to be deprived of custody. 91.  By a decision of 18 September and 17 November 2015 the Split Social Welfare Centre appointed two of its employees to act as special guardians to the children. 92.  On 2 October 2015 the Split Social Welfare Centre submitted the report and recommendation requested by the court (see paragraph 90 above). The report suggested that depriving I.B. of custody would be contrary to the children\u2019s best interests. 93.   On 15 November 2015 I.B. started regularly attending therapy with a certain Dr S.D., a psychiatrist, pursuant to the court order (see paragraph 90 above). Between that date and 12 May 2016, when the therapy ended, he attended therapy twice a month and attended a total of twelve sessions. 94.  On 18 July 2016 that psychiatrist submitted a report on the course of I.B.\u2019s psychotherapy and its effects. The relevant part of her report reads as follows:\n\u201cAll memories of his former wife are painted negatively. Therefore, he simply cannot understand the experts\u2019 concern for the children\u2019s welfare [prompted by the fact that] they are not seeing their mother. [His opinion is reinforced by the fact that] he thinks that he saved them when he took them into his care.\n... At the conscious level we have achieved [a situation wherein] he will not resist contact between the mother and the sons, but only if [the sons] agree to that. He does not want to force them in any way to do that, nor does he want others to force them because, he says, after every conversation with the mother or every time she shows up, the children have psychological difficulties.\n[Even though] we have achieved the desired effect at the conscious level (that is to say he will not resist contact between the mother and the sons if the children agree to that), I could not influence the subconscious processes because of the structure of his personality. I am therefore of the opinion that there is no purpose in continuing with the psychotherapy.\u201d", "references": ["9", "5", "7", "8", "0", "1", "2", "3", "6", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1970 and lives in Bac\u0103u. 5.  On 20 September 2012 the applicant was placed in Bac\u0103u Prison in order to serve a five-year sentence for robbery. He remained there until 26 April 2013 when he was transferred to Vaslui Prison. In May 2015 the applicant was transferred to Foc\u015fani Prison from where he was conditionally released in 2016. 6.  The applicant described the detention conditions in Bac\u0103u and Vaslui prisons as inhuman because of overcrowding and extremely poor hygiene. He further mentioned the prison authorities\u2019 failure to provide the necessary cleaning products. He also complained of the presence of pests and of dampness in the cells and the poor quality of food, which sometimes even contained sand. 7.  In Bac\u0103u Prison the applicant was held for 7 months and 5 days in three different cells in section 1: one measuring 27.12 sq. m, which he shared with eleven prisoners; a second measuring 39.36 sq. m, which he shared with fifteen other prisoners; and a third measuring 39.27 sq. m, shared with seventeen other prisoners. All the cells had sanitary facilities with an area that was not provided. Taking into account the overall area of the cells without deducting the surface of the in-cell sanitary facility, the applicant had personal space ranging from 2.18 to 2.46 sq. m available. The cells were provided with natural light and ventilation through windows with measurements ranging from 118 x 147 cm to 237 x 75 cm. 8.  The hygiene conditions were adequate. Toiletries were provided within the limits of the prison budget. General disinfection of the cells was conducted once per trimester and also whenever necessary. 9.  The applicant received a menu in line with the regulations. The food prepared was always tested by the prison doctor and a representative of the prisoners and the results were marked in a register.\n(b)  Vaslui Prison 10.  In Vaslui Prison the applicant was assigned to a semi-open detention regime. He was held in cells measuring 14.75 sq. m, including a storage closet of 0.75 sq. m and sanitary facilities of 1.8 sq. m. For various periods of time the applicant shared the cells with three or five other prisoners. 11.  After deducting the surface of the in-cell sanitary facility and the storage closet from the overall surface of the cells, the applicant had personal space of 2.03 sq. m available for several non-consecutive periods totalling ten months. 12.  For the rest of the time spent in Vaslui Prison until 11 September 2014, the date of the correspondence from the National Administration of Prisons submitted by the Government, the applicant had personal space of 3.05 sq. m available for three non-consecutive periods of time totalling two months and twenty-four days. 13.  For several remaining short periods of time the applicant was transferred for various reasons to other locations. 14.  According to the government, the cells in which the applicant was accommodated were put in use on 1 May 2012 when new mattresses and bed clothes were distributed. The cells were provided with natural light and ventilation through windows measuring 116 x 115 cm. Artificial lighting was also provided as well as the necessary furniture. All the cells had separate sanitary facilities equipped with one toilet, one shower, one sink and a window of 35 x 55 cm. Hot water was provided for two hours twice per week while cold water was provided without interruption. 15.  The applicant was given a special diet for sick prisoners in line with the regulations. Here too the food prepared was always tested by the prison doctor and a representative of the prisoners and the results were marked in a register. 16.  According to the regulations in force at the relevant time a prisoner had the right to receive for free during a year a maximum of six tubes of toothpaste, twelve rolls of toilet paper, 10 kg of washing powder, three kilograms of poor quality soap and 3 litres of bleach. These items were provided within the limits of the prison budget. Between April 2013 and August 2014, washing powder, chlorine, soap and toilet paper were distributed to prisoners on a monthly basis. The Government submitted a copy of a printed form for the distribution of toothbrushes, toothpaste, shaving cream, razors, toilet paper and soap in Vaslui Prison, dated 1 August 2014. According to this form, on the said date the applicant received one razor, one roll of toilet paper and one bar of soap. 17.  On 28 August 2012, upon his placement in Bac\u0103u Prison, the applicant\u2019s medical chart mentioned that he was suffering from tuberculosis, and gastro duodenitis. 18.  Between 6 and 22 December 2012 the applicant was admitted to T\u00e2rgu Ocna Prison Hospital where he underwent follow-up examinations on a skin-graft operation carried out before his imprisonment. On this occasion he was diagnosed with chronic hepatitis B (HVB). He was released with the prescription of hepatoprotective and anti-inflammatory drugs and a special diet. 19.  Between 1 and 15 March 2013 the applicant was again admitted for a check-up to the same hospital. Arteriopathy obliterans of the lower limbs was added to his previous diagnosis. He was released with the same prescription. 20.  On 17 May 2013 the applicant was admitted to T\u00e2rgu Ocna Prison Hospital with acute appendicitis. On 30 May 2013 he was transferred to Moine\u015fti Emergency Hospital where he was operated on. The applicant was subsequently hospitalised four times for follow-up examinations. 21.  The applicant was examined by a dentist on three occasions throughout his detention. He was diagnosed with lateral, latero-frontal maxillary edentation and latero-terminal mandibulary edentation. On 28 August 2013 he was treated for an abscess and was prescribed antibiotics. 22.  The applicant requested in writing adequate dental treatment and prostheses. On 18 December 2013 in reply to the applicant\u2019s request the National Prisons Administration confirmed that he needed dental prostheses for which the price should be calculated by the prison dentist. The applicant\u2019s personal contribution was to amount to 40% of the calculated price in accordance with the rules for the application of Law no. 275/2006. In case he did not have the necessary financial means to cover his contribution, the applicant was instructed to lodge a request with the Vaslui Prison administration after obtaining an estimate of the extent of the dental work needed and its total costs. 23.  On 18 April 2013 the applicant lodged a complaint on the basis of Law no. 275/2006 on the serving of prison sentences with the post-sentencing judge in Bac\u0103u Prison claiming that his right to medication, medical treatment and a special diet had been breached by the prison administration. 24.  On 20 May 2013 the post-sentencing judge decided to reject the applicant\u2019s complaint as ill-founded. The judge reviewed the applicant\u2019s medical file and his doctors\u2019 prescriptions and, taking into account that the applicant had failed to mention any specific failures on the part of the prison administration, concluded that no breach of rights could be found in the case. 25.  The applicant contested the above decision before the Bac\u0103u County Court but during the hearing of 22 August 2013 he withdrew his complaint. 26.  On 18 December 2013 he complained to the Vaslui Prison administration that there had been no hot water for ten days and that the heating had also been cut recently. The prison administration replied on 20 December 2013 that there had been technical problems which had since been remedied.", "references": ["7", "0", "3", "5", "9", "4", "2", "8", "6", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1982 and lives in Kharkiv. 5.  According to the applicant, on 31 January 2009 she was arrested by a group of police officers in a caf\u00e9, K., and detained without record at a police station until 2 February 2009. She further alleged that during her detention, she was beaten and threatened by the police officers, notably A.A., who tried to obtain false confessions from her concerning her and other persons\u2019 involvement in drug dealing. According to the applicant, she did not seek any medical assistance upon her release because she intended to file an ill\u2011treatment complaint and expected to be instructed by the prosecutor\u2019s office on how to document the injuries properly. 6.  According to the Government, on 31 January 2009 the police officers seized some heroin from the applicant, which was the basis for the institution of criminal proceedings against her and her eventual committal for trial. However, the applicant was neither arrested, nor detained by the police at that time. 7.  On 10 February 2009 the applicant complained about the incident to the prosecutor\u2019s office. 8.  On 17 April 2009 this complaint was rejected as unsubstantiated. 9.  On 31 March 2010 Kyivskyy District Court in Kharkiv, which examined the criminal case against the applicant, ordered the prosecutor\u2019s office to inquire into her ill-treatment complaint lodged again during the trial. 10.  On 23 April 2010 the Kyivskyy District Prosecutor\u2019s Office in Kharkiv decided not to institute criminal proceedings in relation to the applicant\u2019s ill-treatment allegations. As appears from that document, the applicant had stated to the prosecutorial authority that she and V.J. (her partner) had been arrested on 29 January 2009 and that she had been ill\u2011treated by police officers and detained without record until 31 January 2009. V.J., questioned by the prosecutor\u2019s office in connection with the inquiry into the applicant\u2019s complaints, had likewise alleged that both of them had been arrested on 29 January 2009 and that the applicant had been subsequently detained until 31 January 2009. 11.  The applicant appealed against this decision to the General Prosecutor\u2019s Office, which forwarded the case-file materials back to the local prosecutor\u2019s office with a view for them to be joined to the criminal investigation of the applicant\u2019s complaint concerning the second ill\u2011treatment episode (see below). 12.  According to the applicant, on 18 June 2010 the Kyivskyy District Court in Kharkiv, to which the criminal case against her had been referred for examination, returned it for additional investigation. 13.  There is no further information concerning the final outcome or present status of the aforementioned case against the applicant. 14.  At 9.42 p.m. on 25 June 2009 the applicant sought medical aid at Kharkiv City Clinical Hospital no. 4. 15.  At 10 p.m. on the same date she was examined by a medical professional in that hospital and diagnosed as suffering from concussion and chest, stomach, and knee-joint contusions. She refused to be admitted as an inpatient for treatment, which was recommended to her, and left the hospital. 16.  On 26 June 2009 a new set of criminal proceedings was instituted against the applicant on suspicion of selling opium to three men on 24 June 2009 and of storing a jar of opium in her house (\u201cthe second set of criminal proceedings\u201d). 17.  On the same date the applicant complained to the Kharkiv Regional Department of the Interior that she had been ill-treated by the police. She submitted, in particular, that on 24 June 2009 four police officers had forced their way into her house without a court order, searching for drugs. Officer A.A. had hit the applicant on the head with the grip of his gun and had struck her several times in the face with his hand in the presence of the applicant\u2019s two-year-old son, her partner, brother, and two guests. The police officers had then taken the applicant to the police station, where she had been held from about 2 p.m. on 24 June until 5.30 p.m. on 25 June 2009 without a formal arrest record being drawn up. During that period, officer A.A. had demanded that she confess to dealing drugs under the protection of another police officer, Y.B. As the applicant had protested, he had threatened and punched her on various parts of her body. She had been released at about 5.30 p.m. on 25 June 2009 after confessing to drug-related offences and signing various documents at the demand of A.A. 18.  According to the applicant, during her visit to the Department of the Interior, she had felt so unwell that an ambulance had been called and she had been admitted as an urgent case to Hospital no. 4. 19.  According to the Government, it could be seen from the hospital records that no ambulance had been called for the applicant and she had arrived at the hospital on her own. They submitted hospital records, according to which the applicant had come to the hospital on her own from her home and was registered by the reception desk at 9.27 p.m. It can also be seen from those records that between 26 June and 20 July 2009 the applicant received inpatient treatment for a moderately serious case of concussion, accompanied by a traumatic subarachnoid haemorrhage, epileptic syndrome and several other neurological conditions. 20.  On 15 July 2009 a medical expert, having examined the applicant, reported that she had bruises on her right leg and left hip, which could be classified as minor injuries and which could have been sustained between seven and fifteen days prior to the assessment. He further concluded that he was not competent to decide on the cerebral trauma, in particular, as he had not been provided with a comprehensive medical record. 21.  On 27 July 2009 another medical expert, after examining the applicant and various medical records, concluded that the applicant\u2019s cerebral trauma could be classified as a moderately serious injury. He further reported that the trauma could have been sustained in the circumstances described by the applicant. 22.  In July 2009 the Kharkiv Regional Department of the Interior carried out an internal investigation into the applicant\u2019s ill-treatment complaints. 23.  On 10 August 2009 a report summarising the results of the investigation was transferred to the Kharkiv city prosecutor\u2019s office for review and follow-up. According to the findings contained in the report there were, in particular, irregularities in the visitors\u2019 log and other police records, making it difficult to determine the exact time of the applicant\u2019s presence in the police station on 24 and 25 June 2009. 24.  On an unspecified date the prosecutor\u2019s office began a preliminary investigation into the applicant\u2019s complaints, in the course of which a number of people were questioned as potential witnesses, including the police officers implicated by the applicant in her ill-treatment, the lay witnesses, who had signed the police report concerning seizure of opium from the applicant on 24 June 2009, the three men implicated in buying opium from the applicant, the applicant\u2019s partner, brother, guests, and the applicant herself. 25.  During the questionings, the four police officers implicated by the applicant in the forced entry to her house and ill-treating her, denied this accusation. They maintained that the applicant had willingly allowed them to inspect her house after they had caught her selling opium to three men at the entrance. In the presence of two lay witnesses, syringes full of opium had been seized from the men on the spot and a jar filled with opium had been seized from the applicant\u2019s garage following a search of her house. In connection with those seizures, the applicant had subsequently been taken in for questioning and had been at the police station on 24 and 25 June 2009, however, she had neither been arrested, nor held there overnight. The officers also submitted that it was known to them that the applicant sold drugs under the protection of police officer Y.B. 26.  Two men identified as the lay witnesses gave statements largely consistent with the police officers\u2019 submissions. 27.  The three men identified by the police officers as the drug buyers denied buying any opium from the applicant and submitted that they had visited her that day to borrow some money. Later on, they had been arbitrarily caught by the police and made to write false confessions, admitting that they had bought opium from the applicant, on pain of criminal sanctions. 28.  The applicant herself, V.J. (her partner), A.B. (her brother), and two persons identified by the applicant as the guests present during the purported forced entry, gave statements similar to the ones the applicant had provided to the Department of the Interior on 26 June 2009. The applicant also submitted that there had been no lay witnesses present during the forced entry and search and that the jar and syringes with opium had been brought by the police officers and planted on her. 29.  On 18 September 2009 the Kharkiv city prosecutor\u2019s office instituted criminal proceedings against \u201ca group of unidentified police officers\u201d suspected of abuse of authority accompanied by violence and the use of arms against the applicant on 24 June 2009. 30.  On 22 September 2009 the applicant joined those proceedings as an aggrieved party. 31.  On 1 March 2010, responding to a request from the applicant to be updated on the proceedings and to consult the case file, the Kharkiv city prosecutor\u2019s office informed her that the investigation was in progress and that she would be able to consult the file after it had been completed. 32.  On 9 March 2010 a further medical report on the applicant was obtained, which stated that it was not possible to determine the gravity of her cerebral trauma, in particular because of the unavailability of her previous complete medical history. It also concluded that it was unlikely that the applicant\u2019s injuries had been self-inflicted. 33.  On 8 December 2010 A.A. was indicted within the framework of the criminal proceedings concerning the applicant\u2019s alleged ill-treatment. The three other police officers implicated by the applicant in assisting him on 24 June 2009 were referenced in the bill of indictment by name. 34.  On 9 December 2010 the investigator S. discontinued the second set of criminal proceedings against the applicant for want of any evidence that she had stored opium in her house or had sold it to anyone on 24 June 2009. In his decision, the investigator referred to various procedural irregularities in the collection of evidence by the police officers and discrepancies in the statements of the various persons questioned as witnesses, which he deemed irreconcilable. He further decided to transfer the file of the case against the applicant to the Kharkiv prosecutor\u2019s office in order for it to be joined to the case concerning the applicant\u2019s alleged ill-treatment. 35.  On 21 January 2011 a further medical report was obtained. It stated that it was not possible to determine the severity of the applicant\u2019s cerebral injury because the medical history that had been provided to the expert writing the report had been incomplete, and because the applicant herself had not reported for an examination in person. It was also noted that, as regards the bruises which had been documented in July 2009, they could have been inflicted on the dates and in the manner reported by the applicant. 36.  On 11 August 2011 a further medical report, this time by a panel of three experts, was obtained, wherein the applicant\u2019s cerebral trauma was classified as a minor injury, which could possibly have been sustained on 24 June 2009 and was unlikely to have been self-inflicted. It was further reported that the data concerning the other injuries (bruises and contusions) were inconclusive, but that based on the available information it was not improbable that the injuries had been self-inflicted. 37.  On 29 August 2011 the Kharkiv prosecutor withdrew the bill of indictment against officer A.A., noting that the three men earlier identified as the drug buyers and one of the two people identified as the applicant\u2019s guests who had been present during the purported forced entry had retracted their testimony incriminating A.A. and his colleagues in the assault. 38.  On an unspecified date officer M.O., one of the four officers implicated by the applicant in the forced entry, appealed to the Kyivskyy District Court in Kharkiv, seeking the annulment of the decision to institute criminal proceedings. 39.  On 12 September 2011 the Kyivskyy District Court of Kharkiv allowed the appeal, referring the case for further preliminary inquiry. The court noted, in particular, that as the applicant\u2019s complaint had been lodged against four named police officers, it had been wrong to institute proceedings into alleged abuse of office by a group of \u201cunidentified officers\u201d. Furthermore, while officer M.O. had de facto been implicated in the bill of indictment against officer A.A. as his accomplice, he had been given witness status only, which had restricted his procedural rights, including the right to defence. 40.  On various dates in September 2011 formal confrontations were organised between the applicant, two of the three men identified by the police as the \u201cdrug buyers\u201d, and a woman identified by the applicant as one of her guests on 24 June 2009. During those confrontations, the applicant confirmed her previous testimony, while the other people maintained that because they had been regular clients of the applicant\u2019s for drugs in 2009, they had earlier given statements in her favour for fear of reprisals from her and officer Y.B., who had protected her. In fact, the two men confirmed that they had bought opium from the applicant on 24 June 2009, while the woman maintained that she had not visited the applicant on that date and had not witnessed any forced entry by the police. 41.  V.J. (the applicant\u2019s former partner) and A.B. (her brother), also questioned again in September 2011, confirmed their previous statements that they had witnessed a forced entry and assault on the applicant. Based on the case file, the second guest (the fourth person, who had earlier contended that he had witnessed the forced entry), was not questioned. 42.  On 26 November 2011 the Kharkiv prosecutor\u2019s office refused to reopen the criminal investigation into the applicant\u2019s ill-treatment complaints for want of any evidence that the police officers had committed a crime. They referred, in particular, to the retraction of several witness statements and to the re-classification of the applicant\u2019s injuries as minor in the latest medical report. They further pointed out that, according to the experts\u2019 findings, all of the applicant\u2019s external injuries could technically have been self-inflicted. Accordingly, she could have lied to the police about her ill\u2011treatment to avoid charges of drug dealing. 43.  It appears that the applicant was not informed of the above decision in due time, as in 2012 the applicant\u2019s lawyers unsuccessfully contacted the law-enforcement authorities to obtain information on whether there had been any progress in the proceedings.", "references": ["3", "4", "5", "7", "8", "6", "2", "9", "0", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1934 and lives in Strausberg. Before the reunification of Germany he lived in the former GDR, serving in the police force from 1952 to 1954. 6.  On 13 June 1958, the Frankfurt (Oder) District Court convicted the applicant of \u201ccriminal assault against the local bodies of the State\u201d (\u201cverbrecherischer Angriff gegen die \u00f6rtlichen Organe der Staatsmacht\u201d) after he had attacked a member of the GDR parliament of the ruling Socialist Unity Party. He was sentenced to one year and eight months\u2019 imprisonment and served 14 months in prison. 7.  On 8 February 1994 the Frankfurt (Oder) Regional Court annulled the 1958 judgment for its incompatibility with the principles of the rule of law and rehabilitated the applicant pursuant to Section 1 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Rehabilitation Act (Gesetz \u00fcber die Rehabilitierung und Entsch\u00e4digung von Opfern rechtsstaatswidriger Strafverfolgungsma\u00dfnahmen im Beitrittsgebiet \u2011 Strafrechtliches Rehabilitierungsgesetz) designed to rehabilitate and compensate prisoners of the GDR regime for deprivation of their liberty incompatible with the principles of the rule of law. 8.  On 25 April 1994 the applicant lodged an application for compensation under the Criminal Rehabilitation Act. The application form contained instructions that, according to Section 16 \u00a7 2 of the Act (see Relevant domestic law and practice, paragraphs 23 and 24 below), such compensation could not be granted to a person who had offended against the principles of humanity and the rule of law. The applicant declared on the questionnaire that he had never acted in disregard of these principles and never worked for the former GDR\u2019s Ministry of State Security (Ministerium f\u00fcr Staatssicherheit). On 13 February 1995 the President of the Frankfurt (Oder) Regional Court, acting as the competent authority, awarded him compensation of 8,250 German marks, equivalent to about 4,218 euros (EUR), pursuant to Section 17 in conjunction with Section 16 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3 of the Criminal Rehabilitation Act. 9.  On 7 August 2007, after an amendment of the Act, the applicant also applied for a special, income\u2011related pension which benefits former victims of imprisonment (monatliche besondere Zuwendung f\u00fcr Haftopfer). He again confirmed that he had never offended against the principles of humanity and the rule of law and never worked for the former GDR\u2019s Ministry of State Security. On 14 November 2007 he was granted a special monthly pension of EUR 250 pursuant to Section 17a of the Criminal Rehabilitation Act, with the reservation that information held by the Federal Commissioner for the Records of the State Security Service of the former GDR (\u201cthe Federal Commissioner\u201d) must not contradict the applicant\u2019s statements. A respective request for information was submitted on 19 November 2007. 10.  On 25 February 2008 the Federal Commissioner informed the President of the Regional Court that the applicant, between 22 September 1953 and 25 November 1954, had been a secret informant of the Ministry of State Security while he was a member of the police force. This information was based on a number of documents, including 32 handwritten reports allegedly drafted by the applicant and a declaration to commit to serve as a secret informant to the state security service. 11.  On 18 February 2009 the President of the Regional Court, relying on Section 48 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 2, third sentence, no. 2 of the Brandenburg Administrative Procedure Act (Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz f\u00fcr das Land Brandenburg), withdrew the decisions granting compensation and a special pension and at the same time ordered the applicant to reimburse the amounts already received pursuant to Section 49a of the same Act. The President considered that the decisions had been unlawful from the beginning as the prerequisites for either entitlement had never been met and that the applicant could not legitimately rely on these decisions being maintained, as he had obtained them by giving information that was substantially incorrect. Referring to Section 16 \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Rehabilitation Act, he observed that the applicant, contrary to the statements in his applications, had worked as a secret informant for the Ministry of State Security and had produced at least five reports for the Ministry in which he put at real risk the persons on whom he had informed. 12.  On 9 March 2009 the applicant applied for judicial review of that decision and asked to be heard in person. He claimed that the information contained in the documents of the Federal Commissioner was incomplete and not accurate. The fact that at the time of recruitment he was only 19 years old and had been severely traumatised when fleeing his home town in Silesia in 1945 and experiencing the bombing of Dresden on 13 February 1945, followed by several months of homelessness after the war had ended, also had to be taken into account. His father had returned, incapacitated for work, from Soviet captivity only in 1947 or 1948. While serving in the police forces he had not been aware of working for other government agencies. The written commitment to the state security service might have been dictated to him when he was under the influence of alcohol but he had no memory of it whatsoever. In any case, he ruled out that the wording was his own and that he had known that the reports were to be used by the state security service. 13.  On 16 February 2010 the Frankfurt (Oder) Regional Court, sitting as a chamber of three judges, dismissed the applicant\u2019s request for judicial review, finding that his work as a secret informant for the Ministry of State Security was of such nature, scope and duration that it was reprehensible enough to justify ruling out the applicant\u2019s eligibility for compensation payments pursuant to Section 16 \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Rehabilitation Act. Acknowledging that in a dictatorship which lasted for decades, minor involvement with the regime was frequent, it considered that the applicant\u2019s position as a secret informant of the state security service did not itself suffice to trigger the application of that provision. However, compensation provided under the Act was intended to benefit innocent victims only, but not those who had also participated in offences contrary to the principles of humanity and which were harmful to others or at least put them at risk. This could be assumed when a secret informant voluntarily reported on others and the reports could potentially cause persecution by the state security service. In that case compensation payments were ruled out, no matter how great the offender\u2019s own suffering had been. The courts were not to compare the extent of suffering involved. 14.  The Regional Court observed that the applicant had penned a handwritten commitment to serve the state security service after he had already reported twice on others. Thus the applicant\u2019s submission that he had believed that he was reporting to police officers and not to the state security service was, in the light of that declaration, not credible (\u201cnicht glaubhaft\u201d). Furthermore, the five reports mentioned in the decision of the President of the Regional Court, as well as two more reports were capable of putting in danger the persons informed on. The applicant mainly reported on their contacts with West Germany and West Berlin. An intention to leave the former GDR without permission, in particular, could have led to severe criminal persecution of the persons involved. The reports were not meaningless but contained valuable information for the state security service. The applicant\u2019s claim that some reports were unknown to him and factually incorrect and that he did not recognise the names of the superior officers was irrelevant to the Regional Court\u2019s decision. 15.  The Regional Court also pointed out that it was unnecessary to hear the applicant in person. His personality at the time and the circumstances of his recruitment would have been relevant only if there were indications that the applicant acted under insupportable pressure. However, there were no such indications and the applicant had made no claims in this regard. He had reported twice on others, even before being recruited by the state security service. Further, the court could not see a connection between the applicant\u2019s experiences relating to the impact of war and the post-war period on him and his psychological strain at the time of recruitment on the one hand and his willingness to cooperate with the state security service on the other hand. 16.  On 24 August 2010 the Brandenburg Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal, endorsing the Regional Court\u2019s reasons. 17.  On 28 October 2010 the Federal Constitutional Court declined to consider the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint without providing reasons (2 BvR 2329/10).", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "7", "5", "8", "6", "0", "9", "3", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Sofia. 5.  The applicant\u2019s father co-owned a plot of land and a house in Sofia. 6.  By a decision of the mayor of 15 July 1981 the property was expropriated with a view to constructing residential buildings. The decision, based on section 98 (1) of the Territorial and Urban Planning Act of 1973 (\u0417\u0430\u043a\u043e\u043d \u0437\u0430 \u0442\u0435\u0440\u0438\u0442\u043e\u0440\u0438\u0430\u043b\u043d\u043e\u0442\u043e \u0438 \u0441\u0435\u043b\u0438\u0449\u043d\u043e \u0443\u0441\u0442\u0440\u043e\u0439\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e), provided that the applicant\u2019s father and the applicant were to receive a three-room flat in compensation. 7.  By a supplementary decision of 25 March 1987, based on section 100 of the Territorial and Urban Planning Act, the mayor determined the exact location, size and other details in respect of the future flat offered in compensation. It was to have a surface of 109 square metres and was identified as flat no. 17 on the fifth floor of a residential building which was to be constructed by a State-owned enterprise. Lastly, it was decided that the flat would be given directly to the applicant. 8.  In 1989 the applicant paid to the authorities the part of the value of the future flat which had not been covered by the value of the expropriated property. In 1990 the Sofia municipality settled him temporarily in a flat which was property of the State-owned enterprise B. 9.  On an unspecified date the construction of the building where the flat was to be located was commenced. In 1996 the Sofia municipality concluded a contract with the company B., successor of the State-owned enterprise, delegating to it the construction works. The company was under an obligation to build, at its own expense, and deliver to the municipality, within twenty-four months, the flats earmarked for compensation of the expropriated owners; in exchange of that it was to become the owner of the remainder of the building. 10.  However, the construction was not completed within the deadline set. In 2005, in the context of the winding-up of the company B., the building, still unfinished, was sold to another company. The latter apparently resold the property to a third company, which in 2006 obtained a notary deed declaring it the owner of the building and the flats in it, including one half of flat no. 17 on the fifth floor; however, unlike what was indicated in the decision of 25 March 1987 (see paragraph 7 above), that flat was described as having a surface of 91, and not 109, square metres. The applicant submitted a certificate of occupancy of the building at issue, dated 5 October 2007, but claimed that it only concerned \u201ccertain construction activities\u201d and that the building was not in use. 11.  In the meantime, the applicant filed several requests with the municipal authorities in Sofia asking them to complete the compensation procedure and deliver the flat due to him. In a letter of 25 July 2000 the municipality informed him that the company B. had reassured the authorities that it was making effort to fulfill its obligations. In another letter of 13 August 2004 the municipality informed the applicant that it was the company that was responsible to deliver the flat to him. Lastly, in a letter of 8 November 2011 the Sofia municipality informed the applicant that he should have raised his claims in the winding-up procedure of the company B., or should contact the current owner of the building to claim the flat due to him. 12.  In 2007 the applicant was evicted from the flat where he had been temporarily settled, after it had been sold to a private party in the context of the winding-up of the company B. In the ensuing judicial proceedings whereby he challenged unsuccessfully the eviction it was established that at that time the applicant was not living in the flat, and that it was uninhabitable and in a very poor state of repair.", "references": ["5", "3", "6", "4", "8", "7", "0", "2", "1", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1976 and lives in Athens. 6.  The applicant is a businessman and chairman of a public limited company. 7.  On 23 September 2010 the public prosecutor at the Athens Court of Appeal ordered the Attica Police Department to carry out searches at fifteen residential and business premises in various locations in Athens and the Attica region, including the applicant\u2019s address, in the context of a preliminary police investigation being conducted in respect of S.G. and I.G. and other unnamed persons. The applicant was not referred to by name as being suspected of involvement in the offences in question. The prosecutor\u2019s warrant was worded as follows:\n\u201cOn the basis of decision no. 2940/29-7-2010 of the prosecutor at the Court of Cassation, we are conducting an investigation to verify whether criminal offences have been committed, in particular the setting up of a criminal organisation (Article 187 of the Criminal Code) by S.G. and I.G., and by other persons connected with them and acting in collaboration with them.\nIn view of the material gathered to date and in order to avoid the loss of decisive evidence, we hereby order searches, in application of Articles 253-259 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, at the residential and professional premises located in the following streets:\n28-30 rue Meletopoulou, Palaio Psychiko;\n...\nIn addition, should you consider it necessary, carry out body searches of the persons present in these homes and offices.\nIn any event, seize any object or document found therein which, in your opinion, has a link with the case under consideration, and draw up the relevant reports for submission to us as rapidly as possible ...\u201d 8.  On 24 September 2010 a police officer, accompanied by a deputy prosecutor, went to the applicant\u2019s home. Since the applicant was not at home the police officer and the prosecutor contacted a locksmith, who opened the entrance door. In the presence of a witness (a neighbour, a national of the Netherlands), they conducted a search and seized numerous items (two computers and hundreds of documents). The search lasted for twelve and a half hours. A 41-page list of items and documents was drawn up. 9.  In May 2012, on completion of the preliminary police investigation, the public prosecutor at the Athens Court of Appeal instituted proceedings against a number of individuals, including the applicant, for involvement in a criminal organisation. 10.  On 8 November 2012 the applicant applied to the Indictment Division at the Athens Court of Appeal to have the search declared null and void, the seizure order lifted and the seized items returned. 11.  On 13 February 2013 the indictment division dismissed his application. The main issue examined by it was whether a search and seizure operation could be carried out in the course of a preliminary police investigation. 12.  It noted that the preliminary police investigation (\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03c1\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03ae \u03b5\u03be\u03ad\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b7) and the subsequent pre-trial investigation (\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b1\u03bd\u03ac\u03ba\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03b7) pursued a common goal, that of establishing the truth. The only difference between them was that the second procedure concerned an \u201caccused\u201d, while the first procedure concerned a \u201csuspect\u201d, who, in the indictment division\u2019s finding, nonetheless enjoyed all the rights granted to an accused. It held that this difference was not such as to deprive the bodies responsible for investigating a case of an important tool for uncovering decisive items of evidence, otherwise there would be a serious risk of a finding that there was no case to answer without the authorities having been able to exhaust all the investigatory options available to them. Referring to a legal opinion by Professors D. Tsatsos, A. Papadima and K. Chrysogonos (published in the Poiniki Dikaiosyni magazine, no. 7/2003, pp. 813 et seq.), the indictment division held that the preliminary police investigation was judicial and not administrative in nature and that it was one stage in the criminal procedure. The indictment division further noted that the preliminary police investigation was conducted in accordance with the procedure for a pre-trial investigation, a specific reference being made to Articles 240 and 241 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP). In the indictment division\u2019s view, this meant that in deciding whether to bring a prosecution the public prosecutor\u2019s office had to use all the means at its disposal to gather evidence, in line with Article 178 of the CCP and the procedure applicable to the pre-trial investigation, with the exception of evidence that was incompatible with the nature of a preliminary police investigation (such as, for example, the memorandum of defence as a suspect and issuing an arrest warrant). 13.  The indictment division held that Article 256 of the CCP, providing for the right of the occupant of premises being searched to be present, did not impose an obligation on the person conducting the search to await the occupant or invite him or her to be present, and that, should the occupant be absent, the presence of a neighbour was sufficient. 14.  With regard to the authorities\u2019 refusal to return the seized objects, the indictment division noted that a considerable amount of evidence had been seized during the searches of the applicant\u2019s home and also at the residential premises of the other individuals concerned, and that this evidence provided sufficient proof of the existence of a criminal organisation involving persons who had committed serious offences, most of them crimes, in respect of which prosecutions had been brought. It pointed out that any subsequent proceedings would have been impossible if this evidence had not been gathered, and that, given that these items were particularly decisive and crucial for the investigation of the case, they ought to remain in the case file. 15.  On 12 March 2013 the applicant invited the public prosecutor at the Court of Cassation to lodge an appeal against the indictment division\u2019s decision. On 13 March 2013 the prosecutor dismissed that request. He held that the conditions for lodging an appeal on points of law had not been met, in that the indictment division had provided comprehensive reasoning for the contested decision and that, since no further investigative acts had been conducted, no decision by the indictment division at the court of appeal was necessary in order to approve them.\nII.", "references": ["8", "1", "5", "3", "9", "7", "2", "6", "0", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1965 and lives in Reykjavik. At the material time he was an editor of the web-based media site Pressan. 6.  On 2 November 2010 two adult sisters published an article and a letter on their website encouraging people to study the background of candidates in the forthcoming Constitutional Assembly elections. In particular, the sisters warned against A, a relative of theirs, who was standing for election. In the letter they alleged that A had sexually abused them when they were children. The sisters had previously sent the letter to their relatives, the police and the child protection services. For some unknown reason, the police had not instigated an investigation. 7.  On 7 November 2010, Pressan published an article about the sisters\u2019 allegations. The article was based on an interview with one of the sisters and on the letter posted on their website. A was also contacted and his response, in which he denied the allegations, as well as his statement that he would not make any further remarks on the matter, were reported in the article. Pictures of the sisters were published with the article. 8.  On 8 November 2010 Pressan published an article about comments made by A to a newspaper where he rejected all the allegations and threatened Pressan with a lawsuit for being the first to publish the allegations. Furthermore, the article contained comments from one of the sisters. Pictures of one of the sisters and of A were published with the article. 9.  On 27 January 2011 Pressan published an article about the sisters\u2019 having received a letter from A\u2019s lawyer offering to settle the matter, failing which A would bring defamation proceedings against them, and about the sisters welcoming the opportunity to prove their allegations in court. The article was based on an interview with the sisters and statements on their website. A\u2019s rejection of the allegations was also included in the article. Pictures of the sisters were published with the article. 10.  On 22 and 23 February and 30 May 2011, Pressan published further articles about the matter, based on the sisters\u2019 statements on their website and in other media interviews, on A\u2019 s comments in other media and on A\u2019s daughter\u2019s comments in a television interview. Pictures of the sisters were published with all the articles. 11.  Other media also published articles and interviews with the sisters. 12.  In the meantime, on 10 April 2011, A lodged defamation proceedings before the Reykjav\u00edk District Court against the applicant and requested that the following statements be declared null and void: 13.  According to Section 15, subsection 3, of the Printing Act (no. 57/1956, L\u00f6g um prentr\u00e9tt) the publisher or editor is liable for the publication if no author is identified. A argued that responsibility for the statements lay with the applicant as the editor of Pressan by virtue of Section 15 of the Printing Act, applied by analogy, since the author of the articles was not identified. 14.  During the proceedings before the District Court, B, a journalist, was identified as the author of the articles. He gave a statement before the District Court, but was not involved further in the proceedings. B stated that he had contacted A for comments before publishing all the articles, but he had been unsuccessful after publishing the first article. He also stated that he had tried to establish the sisters\u2019 credibility and the truthfulness of the allegations by interviewing the sisters, A\u2019s son, the police, one of the sisters\u2019 employers, another alleged victim and other people mentioned by the sisters in their writings, who could confirm that the allegations were not appearing for the first time because of A\u2019s candidacy, but had been known to the family and the police for years. B had also tried to contact the Child Protection Services, without success. 15.  Before the District Court, the sisters stated that they had been quoted correctly in Pressan and they had approved the publishing of their statements. Furthermore, they said that A had not initiated defamation proceedings against them. 16.  By judgment of 22 February 2012 the District Court found in favour of the applicant. 17.  As regards the issue of legality, the District Court came to the conclusion that Section 15 of the Printing Act did not apply to material published solely on the internet and that section 15, subsection 3, could not be applied by analogy in the case. However, the District Court stated that a supervisory obligation was placed on editors of web media, where articles were published without identifying the authors, and that the editor was obliged to ensure that material published on web-based media did not cause others harm or interfere with a person\u2019s private life. Therefore, the District Court rejected the applicant\u2019s claim that the case was wrongly directed against him. 18.  As regards the merits of the case, the judgment contained the following reasons:\n\u201cThe impugned statements were published on [Pressan] on 7 November 2010 after [A] had, along with about 500 people, declared his candidacy for the Constitutional Assembly. It was a gathering of 25 elected members, established by law by Parliament, which would prepare a proposal for a new constitution. There would be general elections, where the same rules about eligibility and the right to vote applied as in the Parliamentary election\u201d...\nWhen the statements in sections A-C are compared to the sisters\u2019 writings on their website on 2 November 2010, the court has to agree with [the applicant] that both the headline in section A and the statements in sections B and C are verbatim from their letter. [...] Furthermore, it cannot be overlooked that the sisters\u2019 allegations were not emerging for the first time because of [A\u2019s] candidacy; they had been proclaimed for at least a few years and were known to many, including the police. [The applicant] was therefore not publishing allegations that were being directed against [A] for the first time, but disseminating further allegations regarding offences that had emerged long before. [The applicant\u2019s] arguments about the public having the right to be informed about the candidates in public elections cannot be ignored. By introducing themselves publicly to gain voters\u2019 confidence and to persuade people to vote for them, [candidates] in a way become public persons and cannot expect all media coverage about them to be as positive as their own. Disputes, resolved and unresolved, regarding their earlier behaviour are matters to which one can expect attention to be drawn. By competing for voters\u2019 attention, candidates usually undertake to be heavily criticised and have to tolerate this up to a point, although that point should be determined on a case-by-case basis. [The applicant] did not present the sisters\u2019 allegations as his own, he just disseminated them further. Therefore, he will not be held accountable for the statements which are directly quoted from the sisters, which the latter have confirmed before the court to be theirs. The court does not agree with [A] that [the applicant] went beyond the limits of his freedom of expression under Article 73 of the Constitution. ...\nThe statements in sections D and E were published on 23 February 2011 when the elections for the Constitutional Assembly were over. [A\u2019s] daughter had discussed the sisters\u2019 writings about her father in a television interview and declared, inter alia, that he was not a public person and that allegations about child abuse did not belong in the media. The sisters reacted to this criticism on their website and then [Pressan] published their reactions. [...] No new discussions about [A\u2019s] case were initiated by the sisters this time, their writings were by way of reply. The statement in section D that appeared as a headline on [Pressan] quotes the sisters\u2019 replies but is partly rephrased. The statement in section E published in an article on [Pressan] is mostly directly quoted. However, this statement can be understood as a statement by the media itself. Even though the statement is not directly quoted, it is of a general nature and refers to child abusers in general. The sisters have also testified before the court that they consider that they have been correctly quoted. So the court concludes that [the applicant] did not go beyond the limit of the freedom of expression guaranteed in Article 73 of the Constitution, with the statements in sections D and E.\u201d 19.  On 1 August 2012 A appealed to the Supreme Court against the District Court\u2019s judgment. 20.  By a judgment of 21 February 2013 the Supreme Court partly overturned the District Court\u2019s judgment and found defamatory the statements in sections A, B, D and part of the statement in section C, consisting of insinuations that A was guilty of having abused children, and ordered the applicant to pay, under the Tort Act, 200,000 Icelandic Kr\u00f3nur (ISK) (approximately 1,600 euros (EUR)) for non-pecuniary damage, plus interest in compensation and ISK 800,000 (approximately 6,500 EUR) for A\u2019s legal costs before the District Court and Supreme Court. Under Article 241 of the Penal Code the statements were declared null and void. 21.  As regards the issue of legality, the Supreme Court noted that the author of the articles had been identified and that the applicant had confirmed that he had agreed to the publication of the articles. The Supreme Court also confirmed that Section 15 of the Printing Act did not apply to material solely published on the internet. Furthermore, the Supreme Court stated that Section 15, subsection 3, of the Printing Act could not be applied by analogy to the case. However, the applicant had a supervisory obligation which entailed that he should conduct his editorial duties in such a way that the published material would not harm anyone by being defamatory. The Supreme Court referred in this respect to a Supreme Court judgment of 24 November 2011. Therefore, the Supreme Court rejected the applicant\u2019s claim about the case being wrongly directed against him. 22.  As to the merits of the case, the judgment contained, inter alia, the following reasons:\n\u201cThe court can agree with [the applicant] that candidates for assignments in the public interest have to endure a certain amount of public discussion of their ability and skills and attributes and whether or not they can be trusted to bear this kind of responsibility. However, this cannot justify that [A], without any further or additional information, was accused of this criminal act in the media, [act] punishable by the Penal Code. Here it has been taken into account that [A] has not been found guilty of the conduct nor has he been under investigation because of it. It does not change anything that the journalist discussed the matter with [A] and others, who claimed they could testify about the incident, while working on the story and [A] rejected the allegations. In the light of the aforementioned, the limitation on the freedom of expression had to be justified in accordance with Article 73(2) of the Constitution.\u201d... 23.  The relevant provision of the Icelandic Constitution (Stj\u00f3rnarskr\u00e1 l\u00fd\u00f0veldisins \u00cdslands) reads as follows:\nArticle 73\n\u201cEveryone has the right to freedom of opinion and belief.\nEveryone shall be free to express his thoughts, but shall also be liable to answer for them in court. The law may never provide for censorship or other similar limitations to freedom of expression.\nFreedom of expression may only be restricted by law in the interests of public order or the security of the State, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights or reputation of others, if such restrictions are deemed necessary and in agreement with democratic traditions.\u201d 24.  The Penal Code No. 19/1940 (Almenn Hegningarl\u00f6g), Chapter XXV, entitled \u201cDefamation of character and violations of privacy\u201d, sets out the following relevant provisions:\nArticle 234\n\u201cAny person who harms the reputation of another person by an insult in words or in deed, and any person spreading such insults shall be subject to fines or to imprisonment for up to one year.\u201d\nArticle 235\n\u201cIf a person alleges against another person anything that might be harmful to his or her honour or spreads such allegations, he shall be subject to fines or to imprisonment for up to one year.\u201d\nArticle 236\n\u201cAnyone who, against his or her better knowledge, makes or disseminates a defamatory insinuation shall be liable to up to two years\u2019 imprisonment.\nWhere such an insinuation is published or disseminated publicly, even though the person publishing or disseminating it has no reason to believe it to be correct, the sentence shall be a fine or up to two years\u2019 imprisonment.\u201d\nArticle 241\n\u201cIn a defamation action, defamatory remarks may be declared null and void at the demand of the injured party.\nA person who is found guilty of a defamatory allegation may be ordered to pay to the injured person, on the latter\u2019s demand, a reasonable amount to cover the cost of the publication of a judgment, its main contents or reasoning, as circumstances may warrant in one or more public newspapers or publications.\u201d 25.  Section 26(1) of the Tort Liability Act No. 50/1993 (Ska\u00f0ab\u00f3tal\u00f6g) reads:\n\u201cA person who\na. deliberately or through gross negligence causes physical injury or\nb. is responsible for an unlawful injury against the freedom, peace, honour or person of another party may be ordered to pay non-pecuniary damages to the injured party.\u201d 26.  The Printing Act No. 57/1956 (L\u00f6g um prentr\u00e9tt), Chapter V, on the liability for the content of publications, contains the following relevant provisions.\nSection 13\n\u201cAny person who publishes, distributes, or is involved in the publishing or distribution of any publication other than a newspaper or periodical shall bear criminal liability and liability for damages pursuant to the general rules of law if the substance of the publication violates the law.\u201d\nSection 15\n\u201cAs regards liability for newspapers or magazines other than those listed in section 14, the following rules shall apply:\nThe author is subject to criminal liability and liability for damages if he or she is identified and either resident in Iceland when the publication is published or within Icelandic jurisdiction at the time proceedings are initiated.\nIf no such author is identified, the publisher or editor are liable, thereafter the party selling or distributing the publication, and finally the party responsible for its printing or typesetting.\u201d 27.  Section 51 of the Media Act No. 38/2011 (L\u00f6g um fj\u00f6lmi\u00f0la), which entered into force on 21 April 2011, reads:\nArticle 51\n\u201cLiability for textual content.\nIf textual content is in violation of the law, penalties and criminal and compensatory liability shall be as follows:\na. An individual shall be liable for the content he writes in his own name or with which he clearly identifies himself if he is domiciled in Iceland or is subject to Icelandic jurisdiction on other grounds. If textual content is correctly quoted as being that of a named individual, the person quoted shall be liable for his own statements if he gave consent for their being published or made available and he is either domiciled in Iceland or is subject to Icelandic jurisdiction on other grounds.\nb. The purchaser of commercial communications, whether an individual or a legal person, shall be liable for their content if he is domiciled in Iceland or is subject to Icelandic jurisdiction on other grounds.\nc. In instances other than those covered by items a and b above, the content manager in question and/or the person liable for the media service provider shall be liable for the content published.\nMedia service providers shall be liable for the payment of fines and compensation payments that their employees may be ordered to pay under this Article.\nMedia service providers shall be obliged to provide any persons who consider they are the victims of a violation as a result of the publication of text content with information indicating who is liable for the content.\u201d 28.  By judgment of 24 November 2011 (case No 100/2011), which concerned defamation proceedings against editors and a journalist of a newspaper and newspaper website, the Supreme Court of Iceland found that before the Media Act entered into force, there had been no applicable legal rule about the responsibility of an editor of web-based media which published material solely online. The court further stated that Section 15 of the Printing Act did not apply and could not be applied by analogy. Nevertheless, the court concluded that editors had a supervisory obligation which entailed that they should conduct their editorial duties in such way that the published material would not harm anyone by being defamatory.", "references": ["5", "4", "2", "7", "8", "3", "0", "9", "1", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1987 and is detained in Lublin. 7.  In 2005 the applicant was on two occasions convicted and sentenced to two terms of one year\u2019s imprisonment, which were suspended on probation. On 30 September 2008 the applicant was convicted and sentenced to two years\u2019 imprisonment, which were again suspended. On 24 September 2009 the applicant was again sentenced to two terms of imprisonment. The latter judgments became final and enforceable on 10 October 2009. All the above convictions concerned charges of burglary, theft and robbery. 8.  From 8 May 2009 the applicant was detained on remand on suspicion of having committed several armed robberies. 9.  In July 2009 he was indicted before the Lublin District Court. He was charged with several counts of armed robbery. 10.  On 24 February 2011 the Lublin District Court gave a judgment in the applicant\u2019s case (IX K 79/11). Following an appeal by the applicant, it appears that in 2011 the Lublin Regional Court examined the decision (Vka 370/11). On 11 October 2011 the applicant received two consecutive sentences of one year and ten months\u2019 imprisonment and of two years and eight months\u2019 imprisonment. 11.  On 24 February 2011 the Lublin Remand Centre Prison Commission classified the applicant as a \u201cdangerous detainee\u201d. The measures applied in the applicant\u2019s case comprised confinement in a special high-security prison wing and increased supervision of his movements within and outside the cell, which meant that he had to wear joined shackles whenever he was taken out of his cell. The measures involved his segregation from the prison community and restrictions on contact with his family. Also, every time he left or entered his cell he was routinely subjected to a \u201cfull strip-search\u201d \u2013 a thorough inspection of his body and clothes in which he was required to strip naked and make deep squats in order to enable an examination of his anus. In addition, his cell, including the sanitary facilities, was constantly monitored via a closed-circuit television system. 12.  It its decision of 24 February 2011 the commission relied on the fact that the applicant had assaulted a prison guard (Article 88a \u00a7 2 (2 b) of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences). The governor of the Lublin Remand Centre, in his application to impose the regime, stated that on 21 February 2011 the applicant had refused to undergo a strip-search, had been aggressive and had attempted to hit a prison officer in the face. 13.  The incident of 21 February 2011 was notified to a prosecutor who investigated whether an offence had been committed. It appears that the applicant was originally convicted of the offence but the judgment was quashed by the Lublin District Court. The outcome of this set of proceedings is not known. 14.  The applicant appealed against the decision of 24 February 2011, but on 27 April 2011 the Lublin Regional Court upheld it. The court held that the applicant posed a serious danger to the security of the Lublin Remand Centre. 15.  The Lublin Remand Centre in its subsequent applications to extend the measure against the applicant underlined that his behaviour had not improved and he had remained unpredictable. 16.  On 18 August 2011 the Commission reviewed and upheld its decision classifying the applicant as a \u201cdangerous detainee\u201d. 17.  The applicant appealed against that decision. On 26 October 2011 the Lublin Regional Court upheld the decision. 18.  On 15 November 2011 the governor of the Lublin Remand Centre applied to the Commission to lift the measure against the applicant. The governor noted that the applicant\u2019s behaviour had improved and he no longer posed a danger to the security of the remand centre. The applicant, as noted by the prison officers and a psychologist, was calm, disciplined, and following the internal regulations. 19.  On 16 November 2011 the Commission, having heard evidence from the applicant, lifted the measure. 20.  On 5 December 2011 the applicant was transferred to Opole Lubelskie Prison. 21.  On 3 January 2012 the governor of Opole Lubelskie Prison applied to the Prison Commission to impose the \u201cdangerous detainee\u201d regime on the applicant. He submitted that since the applicant\u2019s arrival at the prison he had been aggressive towards the prison officers and had been trying to gain prominence in the prison community by plotting to assault a senior officer of the service. The applicant had been aggressive and his behaviour was interfering with order in the prison. Overall, he posed a real danger to the prison officers and to the security of the prison. 22.  On 3 January 2012 the Prison Commission of Opole Lubelskie Prison decided to impose the \u201cdangerous detainee\u201d regime on the applicant. The decision stated as follows:\n\u201c[The applicant] has threatened to assault a senior prison officer or other officers in order to re-establish himself in the criminal prison community and secure for himself a position of high esteem within its structure. There exists a real risk to the security of the prison. During his stay in the Lublin Prison [the applicant] was excluded from the prison community and is eagerly trying to enter it again. Because of his high level of demoralisation, the nature of the offences committed by him, his tendency to want to gain control over others and his personal character, he remains determined to return to the criminal structure and poses a real risk to those surrounding him. The applicant shows an aggressive attitude, directed at the prison officers. Since the beginning of his stay in the prison he has been notorious for causing difficulties of an educational nature and relating to maintaining order; his behaviour is highly reprehensible. His negative attitude is a destructive influence on the atmosphere and order in the wing and in the prison. In view of the information collected, there is a real risk of him carrying out an active assault on a prison officer, as has happened in the past.\u201d\nThe applicant appealed but on 14 February 2012 the Lublin Regional Court upheld the decision. 23.  The governor of Rzeszow Prison (to which the applicant had in the meantime been transferred) subsequently requested the extension of the regime imposed on the applicant. In his first request of 3 April 2012 he noted that the applicant had been given a disciplinary punishment for insulting a prison officer and had been taking his daily walks individually. The applicant remained interested in joining the prison community and remained a serious risk to the security of the prison. On the same date the Prison Commission of Rzeszow Prison extended the regime, stating that the applicant \u201cshould consolidate his positive behaviour and carry out a deeper reassessment of his previous conduct\u201d.\nIn his second request of 28 June 2012 the governor of Rzeszow Prison pointed out that another disciplinary sanction had been imposed on the applicant for disobeying an order to leave his cell. The prison authorities acknowledged that the applicant had also received rewards for good behaviour and had started to take his daily walks with another inmate in order to see how he would function in a group. The governor considered that the applicant remained interested in belonging to the prison community and that his behaviour continued to pose a risk to the security of the prison. On 28 June 2012 the commission extended the regime, citing the same justification as in its previous decision of 3 April 2012.\nOn 27 September and 27 December 2012 the governor of Rzeszow Prison made further requests to extend the measure imposed on the applicant. The governor noted that the applicant had received some punishments and three rewards, but that it could still not be guaranteed that he would function correctly in the prison. He considered that the applicant continued to pose a serious danger to the security of the prison as he identified with the \u201cprison subculture\u201d, had behaved immorally and had not shown any remorse for the offences he had committed. On 27 September and 27 December 2012 the prison commission extended the application of the regime on the applicant. The decisions reiterated that the applicant \u201cshould consolidate his positive behaviour and carry out a deeper reassessment of his previous conduct\u201d. 24.  On 27 March 2013 the governor of Rzeszow Prison applied to the Prison Commission to lift the measure. The applicant\u2019s behaviour had improved, he complied with internal regulations and was no longer aggressive towards the prison officers. According to the authorities he no longer posed a threat to the security of the prison. The regime was lifted on 27 March 2013. 25.  Between 17 June 2009 and 9 December 2011 the applicant accumulated 372 Polish zlotys (PLN) in his release savings fund. In December 2012 he obtained further PLN 150 out of which half (PLN 75) was placed in his release savings fund. 26.  The applicant did not open a deposit or a savings account and it appears that he did not receive any payments afterwards.", "references": ["7", "3", "2", "4", "0", "8", "6", "9", "5", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Sarbice Pierwsze. 6.  On 1 January 1999 the applicant was a victim of a car accident in which he suffered several bodily injuries. He was treated in Hamburg until 27 February 1999. 7.  In the year 1999 the applicant was suspected of having committed several thefts of leased movable goods of considerable value, in particular cars, during the period he spent running a company. 8.  In June 1999 the applicant moved to New Zealand and the proceedings against him were stayed. 9.  On 29 March 2004 the Minister of Justice requested that the applicant be extradited to Poland. 10.  Following an extradition hearing in New Zealand, in 2010 the applicant was transported to Poland. 11.  On 9 March 2010 the applicant was arrested. 12.  On 13 March 2010 the Kielce District Court (S\u0105d Rejonowy) decided to detain him on remand for a period of three months, until 9 June 2010. The court referred to the reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the offences with which he was charged and in respect of which he would face, if found guilty, deprivation of liberty for a term exceeding eight years. It further noted that there was a reasonable fear that the applicant might obstruct the proceedings or go into hiding until the charges against him became time-barred. The court pointed out that the applicant had not remained at his place of residence, had refused to accept a summons from the prosecutor and, although he was aware that an investigation was being carried out in respect of him, he had moved to New Zealand in 1999 with a view to waiting until the charges that had been brought against him became time-barred; consequently, the proceedings against him had had to be stayed for ten years.\nAs regards the applicant\u2019s state of health the court found that \u201cthe problems cited by the applicant do not require any medical treatment\u201d. 13.  On 7 June 2010 the applicant\u2019s detention was extended until 7 September 2010. The court again referred to the reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the offences with which he was charged and on the severity of the penalty to which he would be liable if found guilty. It further noted that there was a reasonable fear that the applicant might obstruct the proceedings or go into hiding. In this respect the court referred to the fact that the applicant had moved to New Zealand on a previous occasion and had had to be located by means of an international search. 14.  The applicant appealed, referring, among other things, to his state of health. He submitted that he was suffering from serious neurological and orthopaedic problems which, if not treated properly, would pose a serious danger to his health. 15.  On 29 July 2010 the Cracow Court of Appeal (S\u0105d Apelacyjny) upheld the challenged decision, confirming the Regional Court\u2019s view that the detention had been justified by the severe penalty and the possibility that the applicant might obstruct the proceedings. As regards the applicant\u2019s state of health the court referred to two medical experts\u2019 opinions dated 15 April and 14 June 2010 respectively, according to which the applicant could be treated in the detention facilities and was able to participate in the trial. 16.  On 25 August 2010 the relevant bill of indictment was submitted to the Kielce Regional Court (S\u0105d Okr\u0119gowy). 17.  On 2 September 2010 the Kielce Regional Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention for a further five months, until 4 February 2011. The court justified its decision by citing the high probability that the applicant had committed the offences with which he had been charged. It also found that there was a risk that the applicant might go into hiding or obstruct the proceedings; it did not, however, give any grounds for its findings. Lastly, the court stated that there were \u201cno grounds for releasing the applicant from detention ... in particular, [there were none of the grounds listed] in Article 259 of the Code of Criminal Proceedings\u201d. 18.  On 19 October 2010 the first hearing took place. Further hearings were scheduled for 2 and 30 December 2010, 25 January, 17 February, 17 March, 5 and 28 April, 17 May, 16 June, 14 July, 4 August, 6, 27 and 29 September, 6 and 27 October, 10 and 24 November, and 8 December 2011. 19.  On 25 January 2011 the Kielce Regional Court again extended the applicant\u2019s detention for further five months. Apart from the grounds previously relied on, the court noted that the applicant had requested that several new witnesses be heard and considered that he might influence their testimony if released. The court considered that the applicant\u2019s declarations that he would appear before the court upon each and every summons did not correspond with his previous behaviour. It noted that on 19 October 2010 the applicant had resisted being taken to the court. According to the Government\u2019s submissions he had refused to be taken to the court without a wheelchair which had been provided by his wife. Lastly, the court determined, relying on the opinion of an expert neurologist and orthopaedist, that the applicant could be treated in detention. 20.  The applicant appealed. He referred, among other things, to his state of health, the fact that he had to use a wheelchair, that he was waiting for a spine operation and that he could not undergo physiotherapy under conditions of detention. 21.  On 22 February 2011 the Cracow Court of Appeal upheld the challenged decision relying, as previously, on the fact that in the past the applicant had gone into hiding. The court also found that the applicant had again obstructed the proceedings in that he had refused to be transported to the court hearing without a wheelchair. The Court of Appeal did not uphold the Regional Court\u2019s finding that the applicant might tamper with evidence; this, however, did not influence the court\u2019s overall assessment of the circumstances of the case. As regards the applicant\u2019s state of health, the court referred to a medical opinion issued on 28 October 2010 by an expert neurologist and orthopaedist according to which the applicant could participate in the court hearings and could be transported to court without a wheelchair. 22.  On 21 June 2011 the Kielce Regional Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 21 December 2011. The court noted that the results of the applicant\u2019s recent treatment in the \u0141\u00f3d\u017a Prison hospital ward had been satisfactory and that according to the experts in neurology and orthopaedics (see paragraph 21 above) he could be treated in prison facilities. The applicant appealed. 23.  On 13 July 2011 the Cracow Court of Appeal examined the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld the challenged decision. As regards the applicant\u2019s state of health, the court, relying on a physician expert opinion of May 2011, considered that there were no obstacles to his further detention and his treatment in the prison facilities. The court noted that if the applicant\u2019s further detention threatened his health he could be released at any time ex officio. 24.  Meanwhile, on 28 June 2011, the applicant underwent a medical examination ordered by the Kielce Regional Court. The applicant arrived for the examination in a wheelchair, from which he could not get up. The Government contested this submission. The doctor found that the applicant suffered from chronic pain of the thoracic and lumbar vertebral column on the basis of multilevel disc osteoarthritis and that he had suffered a spinal injury and left hip injury in 1999 and 2005 respectively. The doctor also ordered a further examination of the applicant, which took place on 16 August 2011. On 16 October 2011 a fresh opinion was delivered, the relevant part of which reads as follows:\n\u201cThere are obstacles to [an extension of the] stay of the applicant in the Kielce Detention Centre because he cannot receive neurological treatment there ... the results of the electromyography examination (EMG) show a gradually worsening] dysfunction of the peripheral nerves ... which qualifies the applicant for neurological surgery that can only be executed in a neurological ward. After the operation and rehabilitation treatment, depending on his neurological state, the patient will be able to continue his detention in the Kielce detention centre\u201d.\nThe doctor further stated that an objective assessment of the neurological state of the applicant was not possible due to his lack of cooperation. 25.  On 27 October 2011 the applicant\u2019s lawyer requested that the Kielce Regional Court lift the preventive measure applied to the applicant and to release him from detention. The lawyer referred to the applicant\u2019s state of health. He referred, among other things, to the fact that the Kielce Regional Court had to order breaks in hearings because the applicant had to rest \u201cin a horizontal position\u201d. He also requested that the court order a further examination of the applicant by a specialist in neurology. 26.  On 8 November 2011 the Kielce Regional Court refused the applicant\u2019s lawyer\u2019s requests. The court held that it had already ordered a medical opinion on 2 November 2011 and that that opinion would be delivered soon. The court furthermore found that the circumstances justifying the applicant\u2019s detention had not ceased to exist and that they had already been listed in the court\u2019s decision of 21 June 2011. The court did not find it necessary to repeat them. 27.  On 14 November 2011 a fresh opinion was delivered by a specialist in neurology. The doctor found that:\n\u201c1. The applicant\u2019s further stay in detention and refusal of medical (neurological) treatment may constitute a serious danger to his health or even life. 2. The post-operation rehabilitation should take place in a good rehabilitation ward  ... it may also take place in detention, however I do not know in which detention centre such a ward exists.\u201d 28.  On 14 November 2011 the applicant\u2019s lawyer lodged an appeal against the court\u2019s decision of 8 November 2011. He requested the court, in the event that the appeal was not granted, to change the preventive measure applied to the applicant and to impose bail on him of a \u201creasonable amount\u201d. 29.  On 22 November 2011 the Kielce Regional Court, sitting as a panel of three judges, upheld the challenged decision. The court held that the Kielce Regional Court, which made a decision in first instance in composition of single judge, had been aware of the applicant\u2019s state of health and that this matter had been taken into account each time his detention had been extended. Apparently, the court had not yet become aware of the medical expert opinion of 14 November 2011. 30.  On 8 December 2011 the Kielce Regional Court, acting ex officio, released the applicant and imposed another preventive measure on him, namely that of police supervision. The court found that the grounds originally relied on to impose and extend the applicant\u2019s detention, in particular the risk that he might go into hiding, still existed. However, given the applicant\u2019s state of health, his release was necessary. The court referred to a medical opinion which was completed and issued on 14 November 2011 (see above). It was determined that the only neurological ward in which the applicant could be treated in detention was at the Gdansk Remand Centre. The applicant, however, refused to agree to be operated on there. He undertook at the same time that if he were to be released, he would undergo such an operation once he was at liberty. He also indicated the address where he could be reached and where he would collect his correspondence. 31.  On 8 December 2011 the applicant was released from detention. 32.  According to the last information available to the Court, the criminal proceedings against him are still pending. 33.  Between 12 and 20 January 2016 he was hospitalised again in a hospital in Katowice. 34.  According to the applicant\u2019s submissions, at the time of his deportation to Poland from New Zealand the whole documentation pertaining to his case \u2013 including his medical file and information about medications that he was taking \u2013 had been handed over to the Polish authorities. 35.  As stated by the Government and not contested by the applicant, the applicant had undergone a preliminary examination on 11 March 2010 and at that time he had not informed the doctor of any illness. He stated that he felt well. He had informed the prison authorities of his previously incurred injuries only after he had been detained at the Kielce Remand Centre. As stated by the Government and not contested by the applicant, the applicant had an easy access to the shower. 36.  On 23 March 2010 the applicant was examined by the neurologist for the first time. He was advised to continue his pharmacological treatment (he had his own medications) and to use a hard mattress. 37.  On 26 April 2010 the applicant was examined by a physician. He complained of problems with walking and was therefore prescribed crutches. The applicant submitted that he had been prescribed crutches after he had collapsed on the floor in cell no. 114 at the Kielce Remand Centre. 38.  On 1 June 2010 the applicant underwent a further neurological examination. The relevant note made by the doctor read:\n\u201cHe claims that he does not have the proper mattress (prescribed on 23 March 2010). Declares [that he has] pain in his left leg ... during the examination [he did] not follow simple orders but afterwards stood up without any problems (sprawnie) on his own. He walks with the aid of crutches\u201d 39.  On 17 June 2010 the applicant collapsed while being questioned at the police station. He was then taken to hospital. 40.  On 28 June 2010 the physician considered it necessary to conduct a CAT scan of the applicant\u2019s spine. The examination took place on 30 June 2010. 41.  On 30 July 2010 the applicant consulted a neurosurgeon who, after seeing the results of the CAT scan, found no grounds for the applicant to undergo a spine operation. He advised pharmacological treatment and physiotherapy. 42.  On 25 August 2010 the applicant requested a wheelchair. According to the Government the director of the facility\u2019s health centre found no grounds for granting his request. 43.  According to the applicant\u2019s submissions on 31 August 2010 he again collapsed on the floor in the corridor of block X of the Kielce Remand Centre. Only then was he prescribed a wheelchair. However, since the chair which he received in the detention centre was, according to his submission, in such a state that its use constituted a danger for persons using it, the applicant requested his wife to provide him with another wheelchair; this she did, on 8 October 2010, with the approval of the prison authorities. The Government submitted that the approval was granted for \u201csocial reasons\u201d although there were no medical grounds for so doing. However, the applicant submitted copies of two medical certificates dated 31 August 2010, together with a note made by a psychiatrist, which read:\n\u201cThe patient collapsed in the corridor (lost consciousness?) ... Patient in generally good condition.\n- Wheelchair.\n- Neurological examination\u201d\nThe applicant submitted another note made by a neurologist, which read:\n\u201cToday [he] lost consciousness. He complains of pain in his left hip joint.\u201d 44.  The applicant submitted a copy of the record of the questioning of a certain S.L. for the purpose of civil proceedings for compensation which the applicant had instituted against the State Treasury. S.L., who had been placed in the same cell as the applicant between July and December 2010, testified, in so far as relevant, as follows:\n\u201cOur cell was on the [first] floor; one had to climb a long flight of stairs. The applicant used a wheelchair. I and J. (another cell inmate) would carry the applicant up these stairs. When J. was not there one of guards would come and help us out.\u201d 45.  On 19 October 2010 the applicant resisted being taken to the court hearing without a wheelchair. 46.  On the same day a doctor examined the applicant at the request of the Kielce Regional Court. The relevant parts of the medical certificate issued after the examination read as follows:\n\u201cToday he claims that his left leg is weak [and that] he has pain in his lumbar spine. ... While undressing, he easily lifts his legs without manifesting pain. When he stands up he drags his left leg and claims that he cannot stand on that leg because it is weak.\nIn the detention he occasionally (okresowo) uses a wheelchair; however, during none of the neurological or neurosurgeon consultations was it determined that the applicant needed to use a wheelchair.\nIn connection with the pain reported by the applicant and the results of his medical examinations, the specialist opinion of an expert neurosurgeon or neurologist is necessary in order to determine whether the applicant may be transported to court without a wheelchair. Aggravation possible.\u201d 47.  On 18 February 2011 the applicant complained about the pain in his spine and he was transported to \u0141\u00f3d\u017a prison no. 2, where he underwent treatment in the prison hospital. He remained there until 21 April 2011. 48.  During his stay in the prison hospital he remained in a cell which had been adapted for detainees using wheelchairs. According to the Government\u2019s submissions not contested by the applicant he had the assistance of professional \u201ccarriers\u201d when he wanted to go to the exercise yard (the Government did not explain what exactly should be understood under that notion, in particular whether the \u201ccarriers\u201d referred to above were the prison guards or other prison staff). He attended various forms of kinesiotherapy, including exercises to strengthen the muscles of his legs, and various other forms of treatment. He also consulted a dermatologist, orthopaedist, neurologist and ophthalmologist. 49.  After his release from the prison hospital the applicant was advised to continue performing the exercises he had been taught. From 21 April 2011 until his release on 8 December 2011 he was again detained in the Kielce Remand Centre. 50. As emerges from the decision of 10 January 2012 about the degree of the applicant\u2019s disability, he was moderately disabled and able to work in special conditions. He did not need constant assistance of another person.", "references": ["9", "8", "3", "0", "2", "4", "6", "5", "7", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Otwock. 6. The applicant was arrested on 11 July 2000. 7.  On 12 July 2000 the Jaros\u0142aw District Court (S\u0105d Rejonowy) remanded him in custody on suspicion that, together with two accomplices, he had attempted to extort money from J.G. and M.G. by depriving the alleged victims of their liberty and threatening to kill them. 8.  Subsequently, the applicant\u2019s detention on remand was extended by the Jaros\u0142aw District Court on 9 October and 29 December 2000 and 3 April, 25 June, 18 September and 29 October 2001. Interlocutory appeals brought by the applicant against those decisions were rejected.\nThe Jaros\u0142aw District Court justified its decisions to impose and, later, to extend the preventive measure with reference to the strong evidence against the applicant, the severe punishment which was likely to be imposed if he was convicted and the risk that he would abscond or go into hiding if released. In the domestic court\u2019s opinion, the latter risk was real in the light of the fact that in the past, the applicant had rarely lived at his permanent address. 9.  On 13 December 2001 the Jaros\u0142aw District Court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to five years\u2019 imprisonment. The period which he had already spent in detention, namely one year, five months and three days (from 11 July 2000 until 13 December 2001), was deducted from his sentence. 10.  On 23 April 2002 the Krosno Regional Court (S\u0105d Okr\u0119gowy) quashed that judgment and remitted the case to the first-instance court. 11.  The applicant\u2019s detention was continued by the Krosno Regional Court on 22 March 2002 and the Jaros\u0142aw District Court on 4 June and 8 October 2002 and 9 January, 3 April, 7 July and 9 October 2003.\nAt this stage of the proceedings the domestic courts referred to the original grounds for the applicant\u2019s detention. They also noted that the trial was pending and that delays had occurred for reasons not attributable to the court.\nInterlocutory appeals against those decisions were rejected, as were requests for release lodged by the applicant and his lawyer. 12.  On 7 November 2003 the Jaros\u0142aw District Court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to five years\u2019 imprisonment. The time which he had already spent in detention, namely three years, three months and twenty seven days (from 11 July 2000 to 7 November 2003), was deducted from his sentence. 13.  On 23 March 2004 the Krosno Regional Court upheld the first\u2011instance judgment in respect of the applicant. 14.  On 9 December 2004 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s cassation appeal. 15.  Throughout the entire proceedings the applicant was represented by two lawyers of his choice. 16.  The applicant did not lodge any complaint about the length of these proceedings under the Law of 17 June 2004 on complaints of a breach of the right to a trial within a reasonable time (Ustawa o skardze na naruszenie prawa strony do rozpoznania sprawy w post\u0119powaniu s\u0105dowym bez nieuzasadnionej zw\u0142oki \u2013 \u201cthe 2004 Act\u201d) 17.  On 10 November 2000 the Mi\u0144sk Mazowiecki District Court remanded the applicant in custody on the grounds that there was a reasonable suspicion that he had committed armed robbery and deprived the victims of their liberty. The court also considered that the measure was justified by the severity of the punishment which was likely to be imposed if he was convicted and the need to ensure the proper conduct of the proceedings. The applicant lodged an interlocutory appeal. On 29 November 2000 the Siedlce Regional Court upheld the detention order. 18.  The applicant lodged several applications for release. He claimed that his mother suffered from a \u201cback illness\u201d and required his personal care. All those applications were dismissed, both at first instance and on appeal. 19.  On 29 January 2001 the Siedlce Regional Prosecutor (Prokurator Rejonowy) lodged an indictment against the applicant and two co-accused, charging them with armed robbery and false imprisonment. At that stage the prosecutor ordered that nine witnesses be heard. 20.  Subsequently, the applicant\u2019s detention on remand was extended by the Mi\u0144sk Mazowiecki District Court on 6 February, 11 April, 12 July and 15 October 2001, and on 10 January 2002. Three of these decisions were upheld by the Siedlce Regional Court on 1 March, 29 August and 7 November 2001 respectively.\nThe domestic courts referred to the same grounds as previously, noting that prior to his arrest the applicant had not lived at his permanent address and that his whereabouts were unknown. It was also observed that the trial had still not begun because the applicant had challenged the judges who would be hearing his case. 21. On 14 June 2002 the Mi\u0144sk Mazowiecki District Court dismissed a request by the applicant for release. 22. Meanwhile, on 2 April 2002 the applicant\u2019s case was severed from that of his co\u2011accused, to be dealt with in a different trial.\nThe first hearing was scheduled for 18 June 2002 but was ultimately adjourned. The subsequent hearing was likewise adjourned. 23.  Subsequently, the Mi\u0144sk Mazowiecki District Court further extended the applicant\u2019s detention on 9 April and 12 July 2002. The earlier decision was upheld by the Siedlce Regional Court on 8 May 2002.\nThe courts reiterated the grounds previously given for the applicant\u2019s continued detention, also noting that there was a real risk that he would obstruct the proceedings if released in the light of the fact that many of his alleged accomplices were still at large. 24.  On 30 July and 29 August 2002 the trial court held the first two hearings in the case and on 27 August 2002 it ordered that the applicant undergo psychiatric observation. 25.  On 6 September 2002 the Mi\u0144sk Mazowiecki District Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention on remand. This decision was upheld by the Siedlce Regional Court on 2 October 2002. Both courts referred to the original grounds, also noting that the applicant\u2019s case had not yet reached the trial stage since proceedings against him before a different criminal court were pending at the time and there was a need to obtain an expert report which, in turn, required him to undergo psychiatric observation in a specialist institution. 26.  On 22 October 2002 the Siedlce Regional Court rejected an application by the applicant to have his detention on remand replaced with a different preventive measure. 27.  On the same date, as the period of the applicant\u2019s detention on remand was approaching two years, the trial court lodged an application with an appellate court under Article 263 \u00a7 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Kodeks post\u0119powania karnego \uf02d hereinafter, \u201cthe Code\u201d), seeking to extend the preventive measure for another five months. 28.  On 30 October 2002 the Lublin Court of Appeal (S\u0105d Apelacyjny) declared that it lacked jurisdiction and transferred the applicant\u2019s remand file to the Mi\u0144sk Mazowiecki District Court.\nThe appellate court referred to the uniform and well-established line of interpretation given to Article 263 of the Code by the Supreme Court. It reiterated that the statutory time-limit of two years for detention on remand was considered to run only in so far as a person had been effectively deprived of his or her liberty in the particular case in the framework of which the preventive measure had been applied (see paragraphs 73 and 74 below).\nThe appellate court concluded that since the applicant had been deprived of his liberty, either on remand or after conviction, from 12 July 2000 onwards in the first criminal case, the term of his \u201ceffective detention on remand\u201d in the second criminal case had not yet begun. 29.  On 5 November 2002 the Mi\u0144sk Mazowiecki District Court once more extended the applicant\u2019s detention. On 4 December 2002 the Siedlce Regional Court upheld that decision. Both courts held that the three original grounds for the applicant\u2019s detention and the need for him to undergo psychiatric observation were sufficient to extend the preventive measure in question even though the proceedings had not yet reached the trial stage. In addition, the second-instance court addressed the arguments which had been raised in an interlocutory appeal brought by the applicant against the District Court\u2019s decision. To that effect, the Regional Court reiterated the view of the Lublin Court of Appeal that the applicant\u2019s detention on remand was not effective because he had been first deprived of his liberty within the framework of the first criminal case. It also considered that only the most severe preventive measure and not bail, as the applicant had suggested, could ensure the proper conduct of the proceedings. 30.  On 17 December 2002 the Mi\u0144sk Mazowiecki District Court stayed the proceedings pending the enforcement of the court\u2019s decision of 27 August 2002 ordering the applicant to undergo psychiatric observation (see paragraph 24 above). On 5 February 2003 the Siedlce Regional Court dismissed an interlocutory appeal brought by him against this decision. It was observed that he could not at that stage be placed under psychiatric observation because his presence was necessary in the court before which his other criminal case was pending and because that court had not authorised the measure. 31.  In the meantime, on 28 January 2003 the Mi\u0144sk Mazowiecki District Court once again extended the applicant\u2019s detention on remand, referring to the risk that he might attempt to obstruct the proceedings if released. 32.  On 27 February 2003 the Siedlce Regional Court quashed that decision and ordered the applicant\u2019s release from custody. The court found that the grounds for his detention were no longer valid in the light of the fact that the proceedings had been stayed. 33.  The Government submitted that on 3 March 2003 the applicant had actually been released to his home. He on the other hand maintained that he had remained in custody as he had concurrently been in detention on remand in connection with his first criminal trial, pending at the time before the Jaros\u0142aw District Court (see paragraphs 6-13 above). 34.  On 12 November 2003 the Mi\u0144sk Mazowiecki District Court barred the applicant from leaving the territory of Poland. 35.   On 11 December 2003 the Jaros\u0142aw District Court ordered that the applicant undergo psychiatric observation in the psychiatric wing of the Warszawa-Mokot\u00f3w Remand Centre. 36.  On 30 December 2003 the Mi\u0144sk Mazowiecki District Court resumed the proceedings in the applicant\u2019s case in view of that decision and the fact that the psychiatric observation could be scheduled to start in March 2004. On the same date the court again remanded him in custody on the grounds that the evidence showed a significant probability that he had committed armed robbery. It also had regard to the severity of the punishment that could be expected and the need to ensure the proper conduct of the proceedings. 37.   On 28 January 2004 the Siedlce Regional Court dismissed an interlocutory appeal brought by the applicant against this decision. The appellate court acknowledged that the applicant had not to date attempted to obstruct the proper course of the proceedings. Nevertheless, the likelihood that a severe punishment would be imposed if he were convicted was considered to be sufficient reason for his continued detention. 38.  On 6 February 2004 the applicant applied to the Mi\u0144sk Mazowiecki District Court for the preventive measure to be changed. On 24 February 2004 the court dismissed his request. 39.  On 23 March 2004 the Mi\u0144sk Mazowiecki District Court further extended the applicant\u2019s detention on remand. The court gave the argument that strong evidence had been obtained against him, that it was likely that a severe sentence would be imposed in the case, and that, if released, he would attempt to persuade witnesses to give false evidence or would, by other unlawful means, try to obstruct the proceedings, especially in the light of the fact that the psychiatric observation was underway. 40. Appealing against the latter decision, the applicant\u2019s lawyer argued that his client had already been detained for almost four years and that the District Court did not have jurisdiction to decide on the preventive measure. Moreover, it was argued that since the applicant had never attempted to obstruct the proceedings, there was no risk that he would try to do so in the current stage of the case. 41.  On 28 April 2004 the Siedlce Regional Court dismissed that appeal. It was observed that the actual period of the applicant\u2019s detention on remand in the case in question had not reached two years because he had been concurrently deprived of his liberty in the framework of the first set of criminal proceedings. As to the grounds for extending his detention on remand, the appellate court held that, even though he had not attempted to obstruct the proper course of the proceedings, the likelihood that a severe punishment would be imposed if he were to be convicted was sufficient reason to uphold the preventive measure in question. 42.  On 24 June 2004 the Mi\u0144sk Mazowiecki District Court again decided to extend the applicant\u2019s detention on remand in view of the reasonable suspicion that he had committed armed robbery and the severity of the punishment that could be expected. This decision was upheld on 15 July 2004 by the Siedlce Regional Court. 43.   On 23 August 2004 the Mi\u0144sk Mazowiecki District Court rejected a request by the applicant for release, relying on the same grounds as in the decision described above. 44.   Subsequently, the applicant\u2019s detention on remand was extended by the Mi\u0144sk Mazowiecki District Court on 9 September and 22 December 2004 and 24 March and 23 June 2005. The decisions were upheld by the Siedlce Regional Court on 29 September 2004, on an unspecified date and on 13 April and 28 July 2005 respectively.\nAll the decisions in question were based on the grounds that there was strong evidence against the applicant, that a severe punishment would be imposed if he were convicted and, since the court proceedings were only at the initial stage, that if released, he would attempt to persuade witnesses to give false evidence or, by other unlawful means, obstruct the proper course of the proceedings. It was also stressed in the earlier decisions that the trial court had not yet started its examination of the applicant\u2019s case on the merits. 45.  On 1 September 2005 the Mi\u0144sk Mazowiecki District Court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to six years\u2019 imprisonment. The period he had already spent in detention on remand, namely one month and twenty-one days (from 11 July until 1 September 2005), was deducted from his sentence. The remainder of his incarceration was considered to have comprised the prison sentence which had been imposed by the Jaros\u0142aw District Court in the separate criminal case (see paragraph 12 above).\nIt appears that the first-instance court held fourteen and adjourned five hearings. It decided applications by the applicant challenging the judges, opposing the psychiatric observation and requesting a fresh examination of the case. 46.  On 10 February 2006 the Siedlce Regional Court quashed the judgment of 1 September 2005 (see paragraph 45 above) and remitted the case to the first-instance court, ordering it to gather additional evidence. 47.  On 7 March 2006 the Mi\u0144sk Mazowiecki District Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention. That decision was upheld on 29 March 2006. The domestic courts considered that the actual period of detention on remand in the framework of the second case had only started running on 11 July 2005, when he was no longer deprived of his liberty in connection with the first criminal case. The courts also referred to the two original grounds for the applicant\u2019s continued detention, namely a reasonable suspicion that he had committed armed robbery and the severity of the punishment that could be expected. In the courts\u2019 view, the latter element in turn created a presumption that the applicant would attempt to obstruct the proper conduct of the proceedings if released. 48.  On 29 March 2006 the Siedlce Regional Court fully adhered to the reasoning of the first-instance court and upheld the above-mentioned decision. 49.  On 11 April 2006 the case was transferred to the Siedlce Regional Court as the competent court because, in the meantime, the charges against the applicant had been modified. 50.  Pending trial the applicant\u2019s detention was extended by the Siedlce Regional Court on 31 May and 21 June 2006, on an unspecified date and on 13 November 2006 and 19 January 2007. The decisions were upheld by the Lublin Court of Appeal.\nThe domestic courts reiterated the original grounds for the applicant\u2019s detention on remand and stressed that the preventive measure in question had not lasted more than two years, regard being had to the fact that from 7 November 2003 to 11 July 2005 he had been serving a prison sentence imposed in the first set of criminal proceedings. 51.  The first hearing took place on 29 June 2006. 52.  On 6 July 2007 the Siedlce Regional Court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to six years\u2019 imprisonment. It appears that the court held seven hearings in the case. The period the applicant had already spent in detention on remand, namely one year, eleven months and twenty five days (from 11 July 2005 until 6 July 2007) was deducted from his sentence. 53.  On 9 April 2008 the Lublin Court of Appeal quashed that judgment, lifted the preventive measure and remitted the case to the lower courts. The following day the applicant was released from the remand centre. He has remained at liberty ever since. 54.  On 23 October 2009 the Siedlce Regional Court convicted the applicant on a number of charges and sentenced him to six years\u2019 imprisonment. It held fourteen hearings in the case. Two years and nine months of the applicant\u2019s detention on remand (from 11 July 2005 to 10 April 2008) were deducted from his sentence. It appears that he was not ordered to serve the remainder of his sentence. 55. On 12 February 2010 the applicant appealed. 56.  On an unspecified date before March 2011 the Lublin Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance judgment. 57.   The applicant did not wish to take his case to the Supreme Court, believing that a cassation appeal would not have any prospects of success. 58.  He did not lodge a complaint about the length of the second set of criminal proceedings under the 2004 Act. 59.  On 29 November 2006 the applicant made a constitutional complaint (skarga konstytucyjna) under Article 191, read in conjunction with Article 79 of the Constitution (see paragraph 86 below), asking for Article 263 \u00a7\u00a7 3 and 4 of the Code (see paragraph 73 below) to be declared unconstitutional (SK 39/07). He alleged that the provision infringed, inter alia, the right to personal inviolability and security under Article 41 \u00a7 1 of the Constitution (see paragraph 71 below). On 30 January 2007 the applicant finalised his complaint.\nThe applicant challenged two aspects of Article 263 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 60.  Firstly, he alleged that Article 263 \u00a7\u00a7 3 and 4 were unconstitutional in so far as, under the legal principle (zasada prawna) of the Supreme Court (see paragraph 74 below), they concerned only effective detention on remand, that is to say only the actual period of deprivation of liberty on the basis of a detention decision issued in a particular case because they denied a detainee sufficient protection of his liberty if he had earlier been convicted or otherwise deprived of his liberty on the basis of decisions issued in another set of proceedings. 61.  Secondly, the applicant challenged Article 263 \u00a7 3 in so far as it defined a maximum statutory period for the length of detention on remand only until the delivery of a first judgment by the trial court. Consequently, people such as him who remained in detention while their criminal proceedings were pending de novo after the quashing of the first judgment of the first-instance trial court, were not protected against unreasonably lengthy detention on remand. Article 263 \u00a7 3 of the Code was silent in that respect and because of that, the authorities could extend the preventive measure for an indefinite period following the quashing of the first judgment of a trial court. 62.  On 15 January 2008 the Ombudsman joined the proceedings, asking that Article 263 \u00a7 3 of the Code be declared unconstitutional in so far as it left a legal loophole which was filled in by an erroneously developed well\u2011established court practice not to include in the calculation of the statutory two-year period of detention on remand (prior to the first judgment of the first-instance court) periods of the detainee\u2019s concurrent deprivation of liberty on the basis of a criminal sentence. 63.  On 10 March 2009 the Constitutional Court discontinued the application under section 39 of the Constitutional Court Act of 1 August 1997, which provided for such a possibility in the event a ruling was considered to be redundant (zb\u0119dne). 64.  It was observed that, despite the obvious differences in scope, the essence of the first part of the applicant\u2019s complaint, concerning Article 263 \u00a7\u00a7 3 and 4 of the Code (see paragraph 60 above), had already been examined on the merits by the Constitutional Court in case no. SK 17/07. The provision had been declared unconstitutional in so far as it was interpreted to the effect that the statutory maximum period of two years allowed for a person\u2019s detention on remand prior to the first judgment of the first-instance court had not comprised the term of the prison sentence the detainee was serving in another case, concurrently to his detention on remand, thus allowing for an extension of the preventive measure beyond two years by a first-instance court on general grounds (see paragraphs 77\u201181 below). 65.  In connection with the second part of the complaint (see paragraph 61 above), the Constitutional Court held that the applicant did not have the standing to challenge Article 263 \u00a7 3 of the Code because this provision had not been applicable to his detention in the relevant period. The preventive measure in question had been extended during the proceedings which had been pending before the first-instance court de novo, after the original judgment had been quashed by the appellate court. In these circumstances, the legal basis for extending the applicant\u2019s detention was Article 263 \u00a7 7 of the Code (see paragraph 74 below). 66.  On 8 June 2001 the applicant informed the Przemy\u015bl prosecutor\u2019s office about an offence allegedly committed by staff of Przemy\u015bl Prison. He claimed that they had been selling alcohol, cigarettes and drugs to prisoners. On 29 November 2002 the Przemy\u015bl prosecutor\u2019s office discontinued the criminal investigation against the alleged culprits. This decision was upheld by the Przemy\u015bl District Court on 27 February 2003. 67.  When, on 26 November 2001, the applicant lodged his application with the Court he had been detained on remand in relation to the first and second sets of criminal proceedings against him. On 31 July and 30 November 2001 and on 10 and 14 March 2003 he sent letters to his defence lawyer, W.J. The envelopes bear the stamp \u201cJaros\u0142aw District Court\u201d and a handwritten note stating \u201ccensored on...\u201d (ocenzurowano dn.). 68.  On 18 July 2003 the Lubacz\u00f3w District Prosecutor discontinued criminal proceedings against several judges of the Jaros\u0142aw District Court who, in the applicant\u2019s view, had monitored his correspondence with his lawyer. The court held that none of the individuals concerned had opened and read the applicant\u2019s correspondence. This decision was upheld by the Lubacz\u00f3w District Court on 25 November 2003. The court found that the applicant\u2019s correspondence had not been read and the words \u201ccensored\u201d had been automatically stamped on the applicant\u2019s letters. 69.  On 4 December 2001, the Registry of the Court received its first letter from the applicant, dated 26 November 2001. The envelope bears the stamp \u201cJaros\u0142aw District Court\u201d and a handwritten note stating \u201cCensored on 30 November 2001\u201d (Cenzurowano dn. 30 XI 2000). 70.  On 8 August 2002 the Registry of the Court received another letter from the applicant, dated 22 July 2002. It was delivered in an envelope bearing the stamp \u201cJaros\u0142aw District Court\u201d and a handwritten note stating \u201cCensored on 26 July 2002\u201d (Cenzurowano dn. 26 VII 2002).", "references": ["6", "1", "9", "8", "3", "5", "0", "7", "No Label", "2", "4"], "gold": ["2", "4"]}
+{"input": "7.  The applicant was born in 1943 and lived in Sremska Mitrovica. He died on 20 October 2014. 8.  On 26 December 1993 the applicant was detained on remand by the \u201cPolice of the Republic of Serbian Krajina\u201d (Policija Republike Srpske Krajine) under suspicion of murder. His detention was subsequently extended by the \u201cinvestigative judge\u201d (istra\u017eni sudija) on 29 December 1993 and by the \u201cDistrict Court of Beli Manastir\u201d (Okru\u017eni sud u Belom Manastiru) on 25 January 1994, 15 February 1994, 8 April 1994 and 9 May 1994. 9.  On 9 May 1994 the \u201cDistrict Court of Beli Manastir\u201d sentenced the applicant to 8 years of imprisonment for murder. It found that the applicant, after a quarrel in which his neighbour accused him of war profiteering, intentionally shot the neighbour in the head with a rifle, leaving him dead on the spot. It further found that the entire event had taken place in front of several eyewitnesses. 10.  On 21 July 1994 this sentence was confirmed by the \u201cSupreme Court of the Republic of Serbian Krajina\u201d (Vrhovni sud Republike Srpske Krajine). The applicant was then sent to serve his prison sentence in \u201cBeli Manastir District Prison\u201d (Okru\u017eni zatvor u Belom Manastiru). 11.  All of the above institutions were at the relevant time under the control of the \u201cRepublic of Serbian Krajina\u201d (Republika Srpska Krajina), an internationally unrecognised self-proclaimed entity established on the territory of the Republic of Croatia during the wars in the former Yugoslavia. The entity ceased to exist after the adoption of the Basic Agreement on the Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium of 12 November 1995 (hereinafter Erdut Agreement) by which the Republic of Croatia assumed sovereignty over the entirety of its territory. The entity was never recognised as a state by the Respondent State. 12.  Shortly after the adoption of the Erdut Agreement, and upon the request of the \u201cBeli Manastir District Prison\u201d, the applicant was transferred on 20 June 1996 to Sremska Mitrovica prison (Kazneno-popravni zavod Sremska Mitrovica), which is on the territory of the Respondent State. The reason for the transfer was listed as \u201csecurity concerns\u201d. No proceedings for recognition and enforcement of a foreign prison sentence were conducted by the authorities of the Republic of Serbia. 13.  The applicant remained in Sremska Mitrovica prison until 5 February 1999, when he was released for annual leave until 15 February 1999. Due to the applicant\u2019s failure to return to the prison on the specified date, a warrant for his arrest was issued. 14.  On 7 July 2010, the applicant was arrested when he attempted to enter Serbia from Croatia. He was sent to Sremska Mitrovica prison to serve the remainder of his sentence. 15.  The applicant remained in prison until 15 November 2012 when he was pardoned by the President of the Republic of Serbia and released. 16.  On 4 February 2011 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal challenging the lawfulness of his imprisonment. 17.  On 10 May 2012 the Constitutional Court found that there was no violation of the applicant\u2019s right to liberty. It concluded that the legal ground for the applicant\u2019s detention was his conviction by the \u201cSupreme Court of Serbian Krajina\u201d of 21 July 1994. It further noted that the procedure governing the recognition of a foreign criminal sentence and its enforcement was not applicable in the applicant\u2019s case because Serbian Krajina was not a state. The court concluded that the applicant\u2019s transfer had been carried out for factual reasons \u2013 the deteriorating security situation in the war zone which could lead to the applicant\u2019s escape from prison or his death. The court further noted that the applicant had been convicted of murder by which the right to life was violated, and that states have positive obligations to protect this right. It finally held that the lack of procedure for recognition of a foreign judgment was proportionate to the obligation to enforce a prison sentence for murder especially given that the applicant had access to the Constitutional Court which had the power to review the legality of his detention and that he had access to other procedures available to any other prisoner in Serbia, including the procedure for applying for a pardon. 18.  On 7 March 2011 the applicant initiated civil proceedings for compensation for unlawful imprisonment. On 13 December 2012 the First Instance Court in Belgrade rejected the applicant\u2019s claim finding that he had been lawfully convicted of murder by the courts of the \u201cRepublic of Srpska Krajina\u201d and that his imprisonment cannot be considered as unlawful. On 16 April 2014 the Belgrade Appellate Court confirmed this judgment. On 6 June 2014 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law before the Supreme Court of Cassation. On 8 July 2015 the Supreme Court of Cassation rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law on procedural grounds, finding that the value of the dispute in question was below the applicable statutory threshold.", "references": ["3", "8", "9", "0", "7", "1", "4", "5", "6", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1990. 6.  The applicant is a man who is intellectually disabled. On 14 February 2001 he was taken, with his two brothers, into public care by the child welfare authorities and placed temporarily with a foster family with whom they had already been living since August 2000. The foster family lived in a village situated about 50 km from the applicant\u2019s home town, which is in the South of Finland. 7.  In June 2006 the foster family, the applicant and one of his brothers moved to a village in the North of Finland. The removal of the children was not authorised by the competent child welfare authority. In June 2007 the applicant finished his compulsory school education as a special needs student integrated into a normal school. Thereafter his foster parents planned to place him in a vocational school some 300 km away from their village, without authorisation by the competent child welfare authority. 8.  On 11 July 2007 the competent child welfare authority decided to remove the applicant from the foster family and to place him in a disabled children\u2019s home in his home town in southern Finland. The authority found that the foster care had not been satisfactory in the light of the fact that the foster parents had made important decisions without consulting the child welfare authorities, such as moving north and planning to place the applicant in a vocational school 300 km away from their home. The foster parents brought an appeal in court against that decision, but the decision was upheld by the Administrative Court (hallinto-oikeus, f\u00f6rvaltningsdomstolen) on 18 February 2008 and subsequently by the Supreme Administrative Court (korkein hallinto-oikeus, h\u00f6gsta f\u00f6rvaltningsdomstolen) on 10 December 2008. 9.  On 31 July 2007 the applicant was placed in a children\u2019s home in his home town in southern Finland. One of his brothers was placed in the same home in the autumn of 2007. 10.  On 23 July 2008 the applicant turned 18. On 13 August 2008 he began studying at a local vocational school. On 4 November 2008 a mentor (edunvalvoja, intressebevakare) was appointed for the applicant for matters other than those pertaining to his person. The applicant could thus freely make his own decisions in matters pertaining to his own person. 11.  On 30 December 2008 the social welfare authorities requested the District Court (k\u00e4r\u00e4j\u00e4oikeus, tingsr\u00e4tten) to appoint a mentor for the applicant also for matters pertaining to his person. The request was, inter alia, based on the fact that a conflict had emerged between the child welfare service and the applicant\u2019s former foster parents as to where the applicant should live. The appointment of an external mentor was therefore needed in order to assess the applicant\u2019s best interests and settle the matter accordingly. The applicant as well as his biological parents were heard before the court and none of them objected to the appointment of such a mentor. 12.  On 25 January 2009 the former foster parents took the applicant to the North of Finland, invoking his decision to move there to live with them. He considered them to be his real family. The next day, the social welfare authorities arrived with the police to fetch the applicant and to take him back, against his will, to his home town. He was placed in his home town in a special living unit for intellectually disabled adults. 13.  On 18 June 2009 the District Court, on the basis of the Guardianship Service Act, appointed a mentor for the applicant in matters concerning his property and economy, as well as matters pertaining to his person to the extent that the applicant was unable to understand their significance. The court found that, owing to his diminished mental faculties, the applicant was incapable of looking after his own interests and taking care of his personal affairs. The decision was based on medical records concerning the applicant\u2019s level of development and on submissions according to which the applicant was gullible and keen on small children\u2019s play. The appointed mentor was an official of the local public legal aid office entrusted with functions of this kind. 14.  On 7 February 2011, after having received a psychologist\u2019s report dated 26 November 2010 on the applicant, the appointed mentor decided, against the applicant\u2019s will, that it was in his best interests for him to live in his home town, where his family members also lived. He had better educational and work opportunities there than in the village in the North of Finland, where he only knew his elderly former foster parents. The applicant was given a possibility to go for holidays to his foster parents in the North of Finland. 15.  On 8 April 2011 the applicant asked the District Court to discharge the mentor appointed for him from her duties as far as matters pertaining to his place of residence and education were concerned. He requested that another person of his choosing be appointed as his mentor in those matters. 16.  On 22 June 2011 the District Court, having heard the applicant in person, as well as witnesses including the applicant\u2019s mentor, his former foster mother, his brother and two staff members from his housing service, refused his request. In its judgment, the court put on record the various testimonies. According to the record of the testimony of the applicant\u2019s mentor, she had discussed with the applicant his plan to move prior to her decision. The mentor was of the view that the applicant did not understand all the consequences of the plan, and did not realise that the good things in his present situation would not be relocated with him. In the light of all the circumstances, the mentor considered that the move would have been against the applicant\u2019s interests. 17.  As regards the facts, the court recalled the background of the previous decision, taken on 18 June 2009 (see paragraphs 11 and 13 above). The court further noted that, according to an expert evaluation dated 26 November 2010 and established by a psychologist, the applicant\u2019s decision-making skills were equal to those of a child aged between six and nine years. Consequently, the evaluation concluded that the applicant was not able to consider whether his plans about future were realistic and what consequences or implications they would have. The court noted that the applicant had told the court that he had no particular complaints about his current situation and that according to the witness statements he enjoyed his apartment and work in his home town. There was no evidence that the applicant\u2019s situation in his home town was not good. The court found that the applicant clearly did not understand what it would be like to live in a remote part of the country, especially as he had previously lived there for only one year, and what the implications of the move would be for his situation. Moreover, the court found it uncertain how clear or strong the applicant\u2019s will actually was, taking into account the evidence regarding his gullibility. It was likely that his opinion was influenced by that of the former foster parents. The applicant\u2019s development had improved in his home town and he had been able to live in a special unit for intellectually disabled adults, to go to work and to cycle independently around town. The applicant had in his home town a support network consisting of relatives, friends and staff of the social welfare authorities, a job, hobbies and educational possibilities. Due to the remote and isolated location of the former foster parents\u2019 home, the applicant would miss out on all these possibilities if he were to move there. The court further noted that according to the plan, the applicant would attend a vocational school far away from his new home, requiring daily long-distance trips each school day, more specifically a 15 km taxi ride to a bus station followed by a 70 km bus transport, and the reverse after school. The court was in doubt as to whether it was reasonable to expect that the applicant could cope with such demands on a daily basis. 18.  As matter of law, the District Court stated that as, on the evidence, the applicant was not able to understand the significance of the envisaged decision, the mentor was not required, or even permitted, to resolve the question of the applicant\u2019s place of residence in accordance with the applicant\u2019s own wishes. Under such circumstances the mentor was required to take the decision on the basis of an assessment of the applicant\u2019s best interests. 19.  Taking into account the evidence and the factual findings referred to above (see paragraph 17 above), the District Court concluded that it was in the applicant\u2019s best interests to remain in his home town. The mentor had not acted in breach of her powers and the District Court found no reason to replace the mentor by another person as regards matters concerning the applicant\u2019s place of residence and his education. 20.  On 15 July 2011 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Turku Court of Appeal (hovioikeus, hovr\u00e4tten). He pointed out that the Finnish Constitution guaranteed everyone the right to choose their place of residence. Moreover, a mentor had to enjoy the confidence of his or her client, which was not so in the present case. 21.  On 9 May 2012 the Turku Court of Appeal, after holding an oral hearing, rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld the District Court\u2019s decision by two votes to one. The Court of Appeal found no reason to deviate from the assessment of the evidence as conducted by the District Court and affirmed the conclusions reached by the latter. The dissenting judge found that the former foster mother had been the only adult with whom the applicant had had a long-standing and safe relationship in his life. The applicant had clearly understood the importance of this relationship in his life, he knew the former foster family and what life with them entailed, although he might not be able to understand all the implications of the envisaged move. When the applicant had been removed from the former foster family in 2007 and placed in a children\u2019s home in Southern Finland, no specific reasons had been given as to why this measure had been in the applicant\u2019s best interests. The decision taken subsequently by the mentor in February 2011 had merely confirmed the earlier decision. These decisions had created distrust between the applicant and his mentor. As both the present mentor and the proposed replacement were equally competent, the one who had the applicant\u2019s trust should be chosen. 22.  By a letter dated 6 July 2012 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Supreme Court (korkein oikeus, h\u00f6gsta domstolen), reiterating the grounds of appeal already submitted before the Appeal Court. 23.  On 8 February 2013 the Supreme Court refused the applicant leave to appeal. 24.  According to the information provided by the Government, in July 2013 the applicant learned that his foster father had died and he attended his funeral in Northern Finland. From 2010 to 1 January 2015 the applicant resided in his home town in a block of flats providing special care for persons with intellectual disability. Since 2 January 2015 he has been residing in sheltered accommodation, in a small two-room flat. He is employed by his home town, undertaking work five days a week in a shelter for intellectually disabled people. He is a talkative, efficient and well-liked employee and fits in very well in the working community. 25.  The applicant\u2019s former foster mother is in contact with the applicant via telephone but the frequency of their contact is not known. She moved to the eastern part of Finland before Christmas 2015 and invited the applicant to spend Christmas with her, but in the end he decided not to visit her. Instead, the applicant spent Christmas with his brother and other relatives. According to the Government, the applicant has not discussed the possibility of moving elsewhere for a long time. He is happy with his work and plays floorball twice a week as a hobby. The applicant states that he has stopped talking about his desire to move since there is no point in doing so, given the fact that the social welfare authorities do not want him to leave his home town. Although he now has a girlfriend in his home town, he maintains that his true and most sincere wish is still to live with or near to his former foster mother. There is nothing in his home town that keeps him there or makes him want to stay there.", "references": ["0", "6", "8", "3", "5", "7", "2", "9", "4", "1", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The first applicant was born in 1943 and lives in Cologne and the second applicant was born in 1940 and lives in Stuttgart. 6.  The first applicant is the natural son of a Mr H., who recognised paternity several months after his birth. The first applicant had a personal relationship with his father and worked in his business. The father died on 23 October 2007. 7.  On 6 November 2007 the first applicant applied for a certificate of inheritance attesting that he was entitled to 100% of the estate. 8.  On 7 November 2007 the Cologne District Court granted the certificate, upon which the first applicant took the estate into his possession and disposed of it. However, on 10 December 2007 the Cologne District Court withdrew the certificate, stating that the first applicant, being a child born outside marriage, was not Mr H.\u2019s statutory heir. The first applicant appealed against that decision, but on 25 August 2008 the Cologne Regional Court upheld it. 9.  On 23 July 2009 the first applicant again applied for a certificate of inheritance stating that he was entitled to 100% of Mr H.\u2019s estate, referring in particular to the European Court of Human Rights judgment in the case of Brauer v. Germany (no. 3545/04, 28 May 2009). 10.  In a decision of 3 November 2009 the Cologne District Court dismissed the first applicant\u2019s application, holding that the judgment in Brauer (cited above) was not applicable to his case. Instead, it granted certificates of partial inheritance to the first applicant\u2019s half-sister and to the grandchildren of the deceased\u2019s wife. 11.  On 16 November 2009 the first applicant appealed to the Cologne Regional Court, arguing that under Article 6 \u00a7 5 of the Basic Law, which states that children born outside marriage must be provided by legislation with the same opportunities as are enjoyed by children born within marriage, there were no reasons he should be treated differently from children born within marriage. He stated that if he was refused the certificate the German State would be liable for compensation claims. 12.  In a decision of 16 February 2010 the Cologne Regional Court upheld the District Court\u2019s decision, holding that the first applicant was not a statutory heir. The Regional Court referred to a decision by the Federal Constitutional Court of 8 December 1976, in which section 12(10)(2) of the Children Born outside Marriage (Legal Status) Act had been found to be in conformity with the Basic Law. The principles developed in Brauer (cited above) were not applicable to the present case. There was a need to protect the legitimate expectations of the deceased and other heirs. The Cologne Regional Court also considered that an interpretation of the relevant provision of the Children Born outside Marriage (Legal Status) Act in conformity with the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights was not possible as the domestic law was clear and therefore not open to any interpretation. 13.  On 18 March 2010 the first applicant appealed to the Cologne Court of Appeal, arguing that the application of the first sentence of section 12(10)(2) of the Children Born outside Marriage (Legal Status) Act would discriminate against him and breach his inheritance rights and therefore violate his right to equality before the law under Article 3 and his rights under Article 6 \u00a7 5 of the Basic Law. The first applicant stressed that the Regional Court\u2019s reasoning disregarded the Court\u2019s judgment in Brauer (cited above) and was therefore unlawful. The first applicant further noted that he had maintained a close relationship with his father until the latter\u2019s death and had even worked in his business. The first applicant\u2019s father had assumed that the first applicant would be his sole heir. 14.  In a decision of 11 October 2010 the Cologne Court of Appeal dismissed the first applicant\u2019s appeal on the grounds that it was bound by the decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court and that it had found that the first sentence of section 12(10)(2) of the Children Born outside Marriage (Legal Status) Act was in conformity with the Basic Law. The European Court of Human Rights judgment in Brauer (cited above) did not require a change of position because German courts were not bound by the decisions of that court. The Court of Appeal added that interpreting domestic law in the light of the Convention was restricted when domestic law was clear and therefore not open to interpretation. That was the case with the first sentence of section 12(10)(2) of the Children Born outside Marriage (Legal Status) Act. The Cologne Court of Appeal further noted that the first applicant\u2019s appeal had been an appeal on points of law only. The first applicant\u2019s argument, therefore, that he had had a close relationship with his father, which was a statement of fact, could not be taken into account when deciding on the appeal because it had been submitted for the first time before the Court of Appeal. 15.  The second applicant is the natural son of a Mr B. and was born in the former GDR, where he lived until his flight from the country in 1957. In 1949 Mr B. was ordered by the Hamburg-Blankensee District Court to pay maintenance for the applicant. He met his father on four occasions, but was asked by the latter not to get involved in the lives of his wife and daughter. The father died on 26 June 2006, naming his daughter as sole heir in his will. 16.  In 2009, after the European Court of Human Rights had issued its judgment in Brauer (cited above), the second applicant brought an action for a compulsory portion of the deceased\u2019s estate (Plichtteilsklage) with the Hamburg Regional Court. 17.  On 21 January 2010 the Hamburg Regional Court dismissed the second applicant\u2019s claim, holding that under the first sentence of section 12(10)(2) of the Children Born outside Marriage (Legal Status) Act the second applicant was not a statutory heir. That provision was in conformity with the Basic Law. The Regional Court referred to the Federal Constitutional Court\u2019s judgment of 8 December 1976. It noted that Brauer (cited above) was not applicable to the case at hand because there had been no regular contact between the second applicant and his father, the deceased had a natural daughter and the second applicant had not lived in the former GDR for most of his life. 18.  The second applicant appealed to the Hamburg Court of Appeal, arguing that the European Court of Human Rights judgment in Brauer (cited above) obliged the German courts to grant children born outside marriage the same inheritance rights as those born within marriage. The special circumstances of Brauer (cited above), which were referred to by the Regional Court, were not conditions that had to be present in order to apply the principles laid down in that judgment. 19.  In a decision of 15 June 2010 the Hamburg Court of Appeal upheld the Regional Court\u2019s decision, endorsing its reasoning. It referred to the Federal Constitutional Court\u2019s case-law, arguing that there was a need to protect the legitimate expectations of the deceased. 20.  The second applicant appealed to the Federal Court of Justice, which confirmed the Hamburg Court of Appeal\u2019s reasoning in a decision on 26 October 2011. The Federal Court of Justice argued that neither the old nor the amended first sentence of section 12(10)(2) of the Children Born outside Marriage (Legal Status) Act discriminated against children born outside marriage before 1 July 1949 because the difference in treatment was based on legitimate grounds. Regarding the amended first sentence of section 12(10)(2) of the Children Born outside Marriage (Legal Status) Act, expanding the retroactive scope of the reform beyond the one adopted was not necessary as the basic principles of legal certainty and legitimate expectations had to be respected. Those principles were also necessarily inherent in the Convention, meaning that even though the inheritance rights of children born outside marriage fell within the scope of the protection of Article 8 of the Convention, a State was dispensed from reopening legal acts or reviewing situations that pre-dated the delivery of a court judgment. The Federal Court of Justice also noted that the facts at issue did not fall within the ambit of Article 8 or that of Article 14 of the Convention. 21.  On 18 November 2010 the first applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court. He claimed discrimination and therefore a violation of Article 3 and Article 6 \u00a7 5 of the Basic Law by applying the first sentence of section 12(10)(2) of the Children Born outside Marriage (Legal Status) Act because there were no reasons why children born outside marriage should be treated differently from those born within marriage. The case-law of the Federal Constitutional Court, which considered that provision to be valid, disregarded the European Court of Human Rights judgment in Brauer (cited above) and was therefore unlawful. That led to a violation of Article 8 and Article 14 of the Convention. 22.  The second applicant also lodged a constitutional complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court. Relying on the judgment in Brauer (cited above), he complained that the application of the amended version of the first sentence of section 12(10)(2) of the Children Born outside Marriage (Legal Status) Act discriminated against him compared to children born within marriage. As a consequence he had been denied his inheritance rights. 23.  In a decision of 18 March 2013 the Federal Constitutional Court dismissed both applicants\u2019 constitutional complaints (file nos. 1 BvR 2436/11 and 3155/11). 24.  The Federal Constitutional Court noted that the judgment in Brauer (cited above) had led the German legislature to pass the Second Inheritance Rights Equalisation Act of 12 April 2011 (Zweites Gesetz zur erbrechtlichen Gleichstellung nichtehelicher Kinder). The first sentence of section 12(10)(2) of the Children Born outside Marriage (Legal Status) Act of 19 August 1969 had been changed retroactively, with the effect that the difference between children born outside marriage before and after 1 July 1949 had been set aside in cases of successions after 28 May 2009 (see paragraph 37 below). 25.  Even though the first applicant\u2019s claim of a close relationship with his father had only been made for the first time in his appeal to the Cologne Court of Appeal, the Federal Constitutional Court noted that that statement of fact was not relevant for the issue before it. It declared both applicants\u2019 constitutional complaints admissible. 26.  The Federal Constitutional Court confirmed the conformity of the amended first sentence of section 12(10)(2) of the Children Born outside Marriage (Legal Status) Act with the Basic Law. It reiterated that the cases at hand only needed to be examined under Article 6 \u00a7 5 of the Basic Law and not under Article 14, which contained the right to protection of property. The difference between children born outside marriage before and after 1 July 1949 had been abolished by the Second Inheritance Rights Equalisation Act of 12 April 2011. The general discrimination against children born before and after that date therefore no longer existed. The time-limit in the new provision was not linked to personal characteristics but to a coincidental external event (zuf\u00e4lliges, von au\u00dfen kommendes Ereignis). Any discriminatory treatment was therefore of a lesser degree. 27.  Making the reform retroactive was not necessary as the conformity of the relevant provision of the Children Born outside Marriage (Legal Status) Act had been repeatedly confirmed by the Federal Constitutional Court. The Brauer case (cited above) had not changed that position because the European Court of Human Rights had clarified in Marckx v. Belgium (13 June 1979, Series A no. 31) that the principle of legal certainty, which was necessarily inherent in the law of the Convention as in European Law, dispensed a State from reopening legal acts or reviewing situations that predated the delivery of a judgment by the European Court of Human Rights. 28.  The Federal Constitutional Court concluded that the domestic courts in the proceedings at issue had interpreted the relevant provision in accordance with the Basic Law. The European Court of Human Rights\u2019 judgment in Brauer (cited above) did not necessitate a different interpretation, particularly because the first applicant\u2019s submission about a close relationship with his father had been made belatedly while the second applicant had not claimed any relationship with his father at all.", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "2", "5", "7", "6", "0", "No Label", "8", "9"], "gold": ["8", "9"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1988 and lives in Zagreb. 6.  On 9 June 2013 Zagreb police (Policijska uprava Zagreba\u010dka, hereinafter \u201cthe police\u201d) received an emergency call informing them that two men were attacking a man and a woman of Roma origin. 7.  The police immediately went to the scene, where they found the applicant and her partner \u0160.\u0160., and another individual, I.M., with whom the applicant and her partner had had a verbal and physical conflict. They all had visible injuries. Soon afterwards, nearby, the police found and arrested another man, S.K., who had also been involved in the conflict. 8.  A preliminary report prepared by the police stated that the applicant and her partner had first had an argument with I.M. and S.K., during which S.K. had said \u201call Gypsies should be killed, we will exterminate you\u201d. S.K. and I.M. had then attacked the applicant\u2019s partner. The applicant and her partner had tried to escape but I.M. and S.K. had managed to catch them. S.K. had grabbed the applicant\u2019s T-shirt and thrown her to the ground and then kicked her in the head. I.M. and S.K. had then continued beating the applicant\u2019s partner, whose hands had been slashed with a knife by S.K.. 9.  The police report stated that the applicant had a contusion that was visible below her left eye. The emergency medical services also attended the scene. A doctor recorded the applicant\u2019s injuries as minor bodily injuries. On the same day the applicant was examined at a hospital, where her injuries were confirmed. She was told to rest and take painkillers. 10.  In connection with the incident, the police carried out an on-site inspection and a further assessment of the available material. The police also interviewed the applicant and her partner as well as the two assailants. 11.  In his police interview of 9 June 2013 the applicant\u2019s partner \u0160.\u0160. stated that he was of Roma origin. On the day of the incident he had been at a flea market with the applicant when some passers-by had pushed her. He had realised that it had been two young men and he had told the applicant to ignore them because they were drunk (\u201cwasted\u201d). One of them had heard him and had turned to \u0160.\u0160., saying \u201cFuck your Gypsy mother, who is wasted? Who are you to tell me that? You should all be exterminated, I fuck your Gypsy mother\u201d (Jebem ti mater cigansku, tko je urokan, \u0161ta ti meni ima\u0161 govoriti, sve vas treba istrijebiti mamu vam cigansku jebem). The other man had also turned towards \u0160.\u0160., saying \u201cFuck your mother, you should all be exterminated, I will kill you\u201d (Jebem vam majku, treba vas istrijebiti, ubit \u0107u te). \u0160.\u0160. stated that he had then panicked and had drawn a knife in order to scare them. However, that had created a further outburst of anger from the two men; one of them had taken out a knife and they had started chasing \u0160.\u0160. As \u0160.\u0160. was running away, the applicant had joined him and they had started running away together, looking for help. However, the attackers had managed to get hold of \u0160.\u0160. and had started beating him. At that point the applicant had tried to help and had also been hit. The two men had then continued beating \u0160.\u0160., saying that he was a Rom and should be killed. 12.  In her police interview of 9 June 2013 the applicant stated that she lived with \u0160.\u0160., with whom she had had two children. She confirmed \u0160.\u0160.\u2019s version of events, saying that she had been pushed by the two men. After \u0160.\u0160. had reacted by saying that the men should be left alone because they were drunk, one of the two men had said, \u201cWho is drunk? Fuck your Gypsy mother, you should all be exterminated, this will be a white Croatia again, you are garbage\u201d (Tko je pijan, jebem ti mater cigansku, vas treba istrijebiti, ovo \u0107e ponovno biti bijela Hrvatska, sme\u0107e jedno). The applicant stated that after this the two men had started attacking \u0160.\u0160. She had tried to approach them to help \u0160.\u0160. but another woman had prevented her from doing so. However, at one point she had joined \u0160.\u0160. and they had started running away. The two men had then caught them and one of them had grabbed her by the T-shirt and said, \u201cWhat are you going to do now you bitch? I will beat you now\u201d (\u0160to \u0107e\u0161 sad kujo jedna, sad \u0107u te prebiti). He had then kicked her in the head. The two men had continued beating \u0160.\u0160., while she had run away and looked for help. 13.  In their interviews of 9 June 2013 the two assailants explained that the conflict had broken out because \u0160.\u0160. had offended them by saying that they were drunk. They denied the conflict had had any racial overtones. 14.  On 10 June 2013 the police lodged a criminal complaint against S.K. and I.M. with the Zagreb Municipal State Attorney\u2019s Office (Op\u0107insko dr\u017eavno odvjetni\u0161tvo u Zagrebu) for suspected commission of a hate crime, perpetrated by attempting to inflict grievous bodily harm on \u0160.\u0160., and motivated by the latter\u2019s Roma origin. The applicant was mentioned in the criminal complaint as a witness. 15.  In the course of the investigation the Zagreb Municipal State Attorney\u2019s Office questioned the two suspects and on 17 June and 31 July 2013 it instructed the police to conduct an identification procedure and formal questioning of the applicant and \u0160.\u0160. as witnesses. 16.  When questioned as a witness, \u0160.\u0160. repeated the statement he had given during the first police interview. He explained how, after the two men had pushed the applicant, one of them had turned towards him and uttered the insults related to his Roma origin (see paragraph 11 above). \u0160.\u0160. also stated that the applicant had been attacked after she had tried to help him when the two men were beating him up. 17.  During her questioning as a witness, the applicant repeated the statement she had given during the first police interview (see paragraph 12 above). 18.  Upon completion of the investigation, on 30 October 2013 the Zagreb Municipal State Attorney\u2019s Office indicted S.K. and I.M. in the Zagreb Municipal Criminal Court (Op\u0107inski kazneni sud u Zagrebu) on charges of making serious threats against \u0160.\u0160. and inflicting bodily injury on him, associated with a hate-crime element. The indictment also made reference to the attack on the applicant, suggesting that she had been kicked in the head while trying to save \u0160.\u0160. from the beating. 19.  The indictment was confirmed and the case was sent for trial on 21 March 2014. 20.  Meanwhile, on 31 October 2013 the Zagreb Municipal State Attorney\u2019s Office informed \u0160.\u0160., as a victim in the proceedings, that an indictment had been lodged against S.K. and I.M. in connection with the attack on him. On 23 January 2014 the Zagreb Municipal State Attorney\u2019s Office informed \u0160.\u0160.\u2019s lawyer, L.K., of the institution of the proceedings in the Zagreb Municipal Criminal Court. 21.  At a hearing on 9 October 2014 the Zagreb Municipal Criminal Court questioned \u0160.\u0160. He repeated the statements given to the police. When asked whether the two assailants had said anything to the applicant related to \u0160.\u0160.\u2019s racial origin, \u0160.\u0160. stated that she had told him something but he could no longer remember the details. He thought that she had said that the two assailants had told her that she was also Roma if she was with a Roma man. On the basis of an agreement between the parties, including \u0160.\u0160.\u2019s representative, the applicant\u2019s statement to the police was admitted in evidence and she was not questioned further at the trial. 22.  By a judgment of 13 October 2014 the Zagreb Municipal Criminal Court found S.K. and I.M. guilty as charged and sentenced them to one year and six months\u2019 imprisonment. 23.  In the meantime, on 29 July 2013 the applicant and her partner, represented by the lawyer L.K., had lodged a criminal complaint with the Zagreb Municipal State Attorney\u2019s Office against two unidentified suspects in connection with the incident of 9 June 2013 (see paragraphs 6-13 above). It was alleged in the criminal complaint that one of the suspects had first pushed the applicant and had then told her that she was a \u201cbitch\u201d (kuja) who had a relationship with a Roma man and that she would be beaten. She had been grabbed by the T-shirt and thrown to the ground, banging her head. The assailants had then continued beating \u0160.\u0160., threatening to kill him and the applicant. The criminal complaint also alleged that the assailants had stolen two mobile telephones from \u0160.\u0160. at the same time. 24.  The applicant\u2019s representative tried to obtain the relevant information about the attackers from the police on the grounds that she needed the information in order to institute court proceedings. On 12 November 2013 the police informed the applicant\u2019s representative that they had lodged a criminal complaint with the Zagreb Municipal State Attorney\u2019s Office against two individuals in connection with a suspicion that they had committed the offence of attempted grievous bodily harm against the applicant and her partner, which, in the circumstances of the case, had been classified as a hate crime. The applicant\u2019s representative was also informed that she should contact the Zagreb Municipal State Attorney\u2019s Office for all further information. 25.  The applicant\u2019s representative then informed the Zagreb Municipal State Attorney\u2019s Office that the applicant and her partner would participate in the proceedings as victims and requested to be informed of all relevant procedural steps. On 17 February 2014 the applicant\u2019s representative, invoking the domestic authorities\u2019 obligations under the Convention, requested information from the police and the Zagreb Municipal State Attorney\u2019s Office about the criminal complaint lodged on behalf of the applicant. 26.  On 31 October 2014 the Zagreb Municipal State Attorney\u2019s Office rejected the applicant\u2019s criminal complaint. It examined the materials related to the investigation into the incident of 9 June 2013 and the criminal proceedings against S.K. and I.M. (see paragraphs 10-22 above). The relevant part of the decision reads:\n\u201cIn view of the above, it is established without any doubt that on the day in issue there was a physical conflict between S.K. and I.M. and \u0160.\u0160. whereby [S.K. and I.M.] caused bodily injury to and threatened \u0160.\u0160., and those offences were committed primarily because of hatred towards Roma.\nHowever, the statements of the witnesses \u0160.\u0160. and Maja \u0160korjanec show that [S.K. and I.M.] pushed her in the back, causing her to fall onto a [flea market] stall, not because she was the partner of \u0160.\u0160., who is of Roma origin, but because they were drunk and they accidentally pushed her towards the stalls.\nFurthermore, the medical documentation regarding Maja \u0160korjanec, as well as the records of the questioning of the witnesses \u0160.\u0160. and Maja \u0160korjanec and the statements of S.K. and I.M. given in their defence in the proceedings before the Zagreb Municipal Criminal Court, show that there is no doubt that S.K. kicked Maja \u0160korjanec in the left side of the face with the result that she sustained a minor bodily injury.\nGiven that there is no indication that S.K. and I.M. inflicted injuries on Maja \u0160korjanec because of hatred towards Roma, as she is not of Roma origin, the criminal offence under Article 117 \u00a7 2 in conjunction with Article 87(21) of the Criminal Code has not been established.\nIn particular, the injury which Maja \u0160korjanec sustained would, by its nature, suggest an injury within the meaning of Article 177 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code. ... As criminal proceedings for the offence under Article 177 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code are instituted on the basis of a private prosecution, the criminal complaint ... must be rejected ... on the grounds that the impugned criminal offence is not an offence that is prosecuted of the prosecutor\u2019s own motion.\nWith regard to the criminal offence under Article 139 \u00a7 2 in conjunction with Article 87(21) of the Criminal Code, it should be pointed out that it is obvious that S.K. and I.M. threatened \u0160.\u0160. and not Maja \u0160korjanec ... Moreover, ... it does not follow from the record of Maja \u0160korjanec\u2019s witness statement, which has been examined, that S.K. and I.M. threatened her, but rather \u0160.\u0160., and thus the criminal complaint ... should be rejected on the grounds that the impugned criminal offence is not an offence that is prosecuted of the prosecutor\u2019s own motion.\u201d 27.  The applicant was informed that she could take over the prosecution of S.K. and I.M. as a subsidiary prosecutor, as provided for under the relevant domestic law (see paragraph 30 below).", "references": ["9", "3", "7", "2", "5", "6", "4", "0", "No Label", "8", "1"], "gold": ["8", "1"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1945 and 1935 respectively and live in Moscow and Lyubertsy. 6.  The applicants, together with another person, were joint owners of a plot of land and the house built on it. 7.  The first applicant owned a one-sixth share of a house constructed between 1937 and 1949 (her share amounting to some 24 sq. m, of which some 12 sq. m was living space), and 208 sq. m of land. The property had been her registered address since 2001. It appears that her title originated in the inheritance she had received after her late mother\u2019s death in 1995. 8.  The second applicant owned a half share in the same house (amounting to some 78 sq. m) and 625 sq. m of the same plot of land. It appears that he had first had a right of use (as part of inheritance after another person) in respect of the land and had then acquired title to it in 1993; that he had inherited his share in the house after another person in 1975. 9.  The remainder of the house and plot of land were owned by the first applicant\u2019s brother. 10.  On 28 June 1999 the Ministry of Construction of the Moscow Region issued a decision to \u201cadopt\u201d the general plan of Lyubertsy town, \u201cto invite the Lyubertsy municipality to continue co-operating with the authors of the general plan when preparing future projects, bearing in mind that the plan is the main legal document in relation to town planning\u201d. In August 2005 the decision was amended to indicate that the Ministry \u201chad adopted the plan for further approval in accordance with the established procedure\u201d (see also paragraph 30 below). 11.  In November 2001 the Lyubertsy municipality (\u201cthe municipality\u201d) adopted a programme aimed at demolishing dilapidated housing. 12.  In April 2002 the local authorities adopted draft construction guidelines for the Oktyabrskiy Proezdy district where the applicants\u2019 house was situated. The draft guidelines were published in a local newspaper on 6 August 2002. It appears that they were eventually adopted in 2003. 13.  A committee composed of officials attached to various public authorities was asked to make a proposal regarding a plot of land for constructing blocks of flats. The committee considered that it would be appropriate to construct blocks of flats at Kirova Street. It does not transpire from the committee\u2019s deliberations that they considered any other plots of land. On 30 May 2002 the municipality issued a decision by which it agreed to the construction of several blocks of flats (including one on the applicants\u2019 land) and authorised a specialised State enterprise to start the compiling of the necessary technical documents. 14.  In September 2002 the regional administration, the Lyubertsy town administration and a State enterprise signed an investment contract for the construction of multi-storey blocks of flats in the area, including the applicants\u2019 land. Under the terms of the contract, the enterprise would arrange to buy the land from private owners and the municipality would acquire title to it. The investor would also take measures to resettle any inhabitants and provide them with compensation. The municipality and the investor would own 5% and 95% of the newly built housing space respectively. The estimated preliminary cost of the project amounted to 14,481,000 euros (EUR). 15.  As transpires from the available information, the block of flats to be built on the applicants\u2019 land comprised seventeen floors, 352 flats with the total space of 21,146 sq. m. Under the investment contract, the municipality was to receive title to some thirty flats for the overall space of 1,907 sq. m. 16.  The investor also agreed to make a contribution of funds corresponding to some 30% of the estimated costs for constructing a kindergarten for 114 children, an annex building for a school and some other amenities or facilities. 17.  In October 2002 a private company, ORS-Grupp, replaced the State enterprise as the project investor. 18.  In December 2002 the municipality issued an order aimed at implementing the demolition programme adopted in November 2001 and \u201cimproving the architectural appearance of the town and the resettlement of inhabitants from housing that no longer [met] sanitary requirements\u201d. The above investment project was one of the measures by which the municipality intended to achieve those aims. In total, the order concerned some eleven investment contracts in relation to over seventy dwellings, of which some thirty properties were privately owned and the remainder was owned by the municipality. 19.  The municipality assessed the situation as regards the private owners, including the applicants, and decided to proceed by way of expropriation for municipal needs under the Land Code (see paragraph 59 below). 20.  On 18 March 2003 the municipality ordered the expropriation of the applicants\u2019 house and land for municipal needs, namely the construction of a block of flats under the investment contract. 21.  According to the Government, on 24 April 2003 the second applicant received notice of the planned expropriation. 22.  On 19 May 2003 the municipality amended the expropriation order, indicating that pursuant to the investment contract the investor had to provide funds for paying compensation for the land being expropriated and provide inhabitants with comparable alternative housing. The investor was required to request expert valuations to determine the market value of the properties being expropriated (see paragraphs 23 and 27 below) and then buy those properties. 23.  It appears that on 21 May 2003 the investor obtained a valuation report regarding the applicants\u2019 house and land to determine their market value. The company used was Expert Centre, a private company licensed by the State to carry out valuation assessments (see paragraph 64 below). The Court was not provided with a copy of this valuation report. 24.  According to the Government, on 27 and 29 May 2003 the first applicant was served with notice of the planned expropriation. In January 2004 both applicants were informed that the amended expropriation order had been officially registered. 25.  According to the Government, on 3 July 2003 there was a meeting between Kirova Street residents and, apparently, a representative of the local authorities or the private company. The Government stated that the residents had been given access to a construction planning document for the area, documents concerning the choice of plots for such construction, the town plan and some other documents. 26.  As no comparable plots of land were available in the area, having regard to the valuation report of 21 May 2003 (see paragraph 23 above), the first applicant was offered several options of \u201ccompensation in kind\u201d, namely one or two-room flats in Lyubertsy or Moscow with market values of up to 150,000 United States dollars (USD), apparently with ownership title. She was also offered monetary compensation for the land and her part of the house of up to USD 50,000. However, she turned down these offers, considering them insufficient or the location of the alternative housing unsuitable. The second applicant appears to have turned down offers of plots of land in nearby areas ranging between USD 60,000 and 140,000 in value. The second applicant also turned down another offer: ownership title to two flats measuring at least 35 sq. m and 54 sq. m each together with USD 34,874. The second applicant stated that he was entitled to compensation amounting to USD 330,000. The investor then made a new offer of USD 200,000 as compensation for his part of the house and land. The second applicant did not accept it. 27.  On 5 May 2004 the investor requested another valuation report regarding the applicants\u2019 house and land from Expert Centre. On 14 May 2004 it issued a report indicating that the overall market value of the first and second applicant\u2019s shares of the house and land were USD 24,488 and USD 73,463 respectively. The Court was provided with part of that report, which reads:\n\u201c[Description] of the assessment object: a residential house (a single-storey building made of wood, [measuring] 110.8 [sq. m], of which 86 [sq. m is] living space) and annexes; a plot of land [measuring] 1,249 [sq. m] ...\n[Location] of the assessment object: ...\nThe assessment object is situated in the centre of the old town of Lyubertsy. On the one hand, there are old buildings (essentially residential houses dating back to the 1930s to 60s) and, on the other, [there are] new buildings consisting of modern blocks of flats. The town\u2019s major traffic arteries are in the immediate proximity of the assessment object. There is a car park on one side of the street and a residential area ont the other ... They have a well-developed infrastructure, good access to transport up to Vykhino metro station, central Lyubertsy and the above residential area ...\nDescription of the plot of land: ...Vykhino metro station is within a ten-minute ride by public transport ...\nDescription of the house: ... the main building was first constructed in 1937; the remaining buildings later, until the 1970s ... The house is habitable, although it requires some superficial repairs ...\u201d 28.  In November 2004 the district chief architect and the local land authority informed the municipal administration that the town\u2019s general plan of 1999 made no provision for the construction of individual housing. On 23 November 2004, in reply to an enquiry raised by the investor company, the municipality announced that it had no available plots of land that would be equivalent to the land to be expropriated from the applicants, namely those assigned for the construction of individual housing. 29.  In late 2004 the town administration brought proceedings in the Lyubertsy Town Court of the Moscow Region (\u201cthe Town Court\u201d) seeking judicial authorisation for the expropriation of the applicants\u2019 house and land. In December 2004 the first applicant lodged a separate claim against the municipality, arguing that the expropriation orders of 18 March and 19 May 2003 were ultra vires and otherwise unlawful and disproportionate. On 29 December 2004 the Town Court held a hearing. After hearing evidence from a representative of the municipality, it decided to join the cases. An appeal brought by the first applicant was not processed since the procedural order was not amenable to appeal. 30.  In the meantime, the Moscow Region Prosecutor\u2019s Office replied to a request for information from the second applicant, informing him that the regional ministry had acted ultra vires in taking a decision on the general plan in 1999 and that no copy of it existed (see paragraph 10 above). The applicants informed the court examining their case accordingly. 31.  The court held several hearings in the expropriation case. It appears that on 11 February 2005 the court ordered a new report from Expert Centre. The applicants did not oppose the choice of company and did not ask for any particular questions to be put to its experts. 32.  In February 2005 a group of three experts compiled a report indicating USD 23,300 and 5,200 as the market values of the first applicant\u2019s land and part of the house respectively, and USD 70,000 and 15,600 as the second applicant\u2019s (compare the earlier assessment in paragraph 27 above). The land and house were therefore valued at USD 112 and 216 per sq. m respectively. 33.  In reply to the second applicant\u2019s complaint, on 14 March 2005 the Prosecutor\u2019s Office provided the following reply (see also paragraphs 55 and 56 below):\n\u201cRegarding your complaint about unlawfulness relating to the adoption of Lyubertsy town plan:\nI inform you that Articles 18, 28, 35, 39, 58 and 60 of the old Town Planning Code provided for a procedure relating to consultation with the local population in relation to the documents relating to town planning. At the same time, the Code did not specify any particular manner for obtaining the population\u2019s view, and thus consultations could be done in any form. It has been established that Lyubertsy town plan was adopted on 28 June 1999 by the Ministry of Construction of the Moscow Region and not by a municipality, in breach of Article 35 of the Town Planning Code. Moreover, there is a breach of the same provision due to the fact that there is currently no Lyubetsy town plan. The municipality will be ordered to remedy the violation of the Code.\u201d 34.  On 7 April 2005 the municipality\u2019s mayor wrote to the Town Court asking to speed up the court proceedings, arguing that some of the flats were to be given to the people waiting for social housing and that the procrastination of the proceedings was also prejudicial to the people who had invested in the construction project. 35.  On 13 April 2005 the Town Court delivered a judgment, stating as follows.\n(a)  Referring to Articles 3, 11 and 63 of the Land Code (see paragraphs 57, 58 and 61 below), the court rejected the argument that the municipality had had no competence to issue the expropriation orders of 18 March and 19 May 2003.\n(b)  As to the allegations that the expropriation did not pursue any genuine public interest, that a decision had been taken on the general plan ultra vires, and that it did not actually exist, the court indicated that a general plan did exist (see paragraph 10 above) but, being a classified document, it could not be adduced as evidence (see, however, paragraph 54 below). In any event, it was deemed unnecessary since the court had examined the construction guidelines for the district (see paragraph 12 above) which contained information concerning planned construction works in the area where the applicants\u2019 house and land were situated. The court also received a statement from the town\u2019s chief architect, who confirmed that to be the case. It thus concluded that the construction project aimed at \u201cproviding the population with housing and social infrastructure\u201d. After examining the investment project, the court noted that the municipality would gain 5% of the new housing and the related infrastructure.\n(c)  The court considered that the applicants had failed to adduce evidence to substantiate their claims for better housing in Moscow and a higher amount of compensation for the land. It noted that the applicants had refused to have an expert assessment of the property carried out by an independent body.\n(d)  The court also noted that besides being unfounded, the first applicant\u2019s claim challenging the lawfulness of the 2003 administrative decisions had been submitted after the expiry of the three-month time-limit.\n(e)  The court held that the first applicant would receive compensation for the land and her part in the house equivalent to USD 28,500 and a social tenancy contact for a one-room flat in Lyubertsy measuring 31 sq. m. The second applicant would receive compensation for the land and his part in the house of USD 85,600 and a social tenancy contract for a four-room flat in Lyubertsy for his family measuring some 70 sq. m. Lastly, the court transferred ownership of the house and land to the municipality. 36.  The applicants appealed. They contended, inter alia, that the expert report relied on by the first-instance court had in fact been requested by the municipality and was thus biased and based on the material provided by them; no court-requested report had been prepared. The first applicant also argued that the expert report had failed to take into account the scarcity of land in Lyubertsy for individual housing; the commercially attractive location of the land, which bordered the city of Moscow; the proximity of a metro station under construction (or planned); and the intended use of the land being expropriated for commercial gain arising from the construction of blocks of flats. The applicant also contested the expert assessment regarding the value of the house to be demolished pursuant to the expropriation decision. The expert had not used the \u201cmethod of prospective use\u201d for determining the value of the house and land. The expert valuation was based on the premise that the land\u2019s use was for a summer cottage use rather than for the use relating to multi-storey blocks of flat; this premise was inappropriate, given that the property was already surrounded by similar blocks of flats. With reference to the above considerations, the applicant\u2019s own calculations amounted to USD 246,418 for her part of the land. 37.  On 4 July 2005 the Moscow Regional Court upheld the first-instance judgment. 38.  On 18 August 2005 the first applicant applied for supervisory review of the court decisions of 13 April and 4 July 2005, requesting that the enforcement proceedings be suspended. 39.  In the meantime, on 22 August 2005 the applicants were evicted and had their belongings removed from the house. According to the Government, the first applicant\u2019s belongings were then delivered to the social housing flat where they were then stored, under the supervision of a local public official, until December 2006 when she received the keys. 40.  A bank account was opened for the first applicant, and the expropriation compensation was credited into it on 26 August 2005. The bank issued a certificate allowing the accountholder to use the money. On 29 August 2005 the first applicant was informed of the above. 41.  On 31 August 2005 the Regional Court dismissed the first applicant\u2019s application for supervisory review. The reviewing judge held that the municipality had had competence to issue the expropriation decision, referring to the available general plan and all the other necessary documents. 42.  In November 2005 the first applicant lodged a further application for review before the President of the Regional Court. On 22 November 2005 the application was examined and rejected by another judge of the Regional Court. In March 2006 the first applicant again applied for review before the President of the Regional Court. In a letter of 10 April 2006 the President of the Regional Court dismissed her application, upholding the earlier refusals. 43.  The first applicant lodged an application for supervisory review with the Supreme Court of Russia. On 5 July 2006 it was dismissed. The applicant challenged that decision before the Deputy President of the Supreme Court. In a letter of 11 October 2006 he agreed with the lower courts\u2019 decisions. In April 2008, in reply to a new application, the Supreme Court informed the first applicant that she could lodge no further supervisory review applications in respect of the court decisions. 44.  According to the Government, until November 2006 the first applicant refused to accept the keys to the flat and the bank certificate relating to the account into which the expropriation compensation had been credited. 45.  On 1 December 2006 the applicant received the keys for the flat, the bank certificate and her belongings that had been in safekeeping. 46.  According to the second applicant, in July 2006 the municipality resold the properties it had acquired under the investment project to the investor. 47.  In 2005 the second applicant brought separate proceedings challenging the orders of 18 March and 19 May 2003. On 10 October 2005 the Moscow Regional Court took a final decision rejecting his claim, primarily because it was time-barred but also because the main arguments had already been dealt with in the final judgment of 13 April 2005 (see paragraph 35 above). 48.  On 26 August 2005 the first applicant brought separate proceedings in the Town Court (i) alleging that the bailiffs had acted unlawfully in the enforcement proceedings, and (ii) claiming compensation in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage. Her claim was turned down on several occasions because she had failed to comply with the required formalities. It appears that the relevant procedural orders were annulled because they reached the applicant after the respective time limits for complying with them had expired. Several hearings were scheduled in 2007. Sometime during that year the Town Court decided that the claims for compensation should be processed separately. 49.  In February 2007 the applicant resubmitted her claim for compensation. On 3 July 2007 the Town Court refused to deal with the case because she had failed to comply with its instructions to specify the amount of the claim, to submit calculations concerning the loss and to pay a court fee. 50.  On 5 September 2007 the Town Court granted the first claim in part, considering that the applicant had not been informed in good time of the order launching the enforcement proceedings in 2005. She had thus been deprived of the right to contest the documents relating to the enforcement.\n(b)  Pecuniary claims relating to delayed enforcement and loss of belongings 51.  The applicant sued the municipality, complaining of losses she had suffered because of inflation arising from the delay in enforcement of the judgment of 13 April 2005 in the part relating to the expropriation compensation. On 10 December 2008 the Town Court awarded her 89,712 Russian roubles (RUB) in pecuniary damages arising from the fact that the judgment had actually been enforced on 1 December 2006. On 26 February 2009 the Moscow Regional Court quashed that judgment on appeal and instead awarded the applicant RUB 3,161, considering that the judgment had been enforced on 26 August 2005 when the expropriation compensation had been credited into the bank account opened for her. 52.  In 2008 the applicant lodged a complaint with the bailiff service, requesting compensation for belongings that had either been lost or damaged during or following demolition of the house. On 22 May 2008 the District Bailiff Office replied that an inventory of her belongings had been compiled before the demolition. They had all been transferred to her social housing flat and entrusted to a public official for safekeeping; she had had three years to reclaim them. In February 2009 a new complaint by her was dismissed by the Federal Bailiff Office, which noted that the notices dated 11, 12, and 15 August 2005 of the impending demolition of the house had not been served on her personally as she had been away from her temporary address. Between August 2008 and January 2009 various courts in Moscow declined jurisdiction or turned down for procedural reasons a related civil claim by her against the Federal Ministry of Justice.", "references": ["8", "2", "7", "0", "4", "1", "5", "3", "6", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Tbilisi. 6.  On 15 May 1999 the applicant was appointed President of the Abasha District Court for a ten-year term. 7.  On 3 December 2004 the Supreme Council of Justice initiated disciplinary proceedings against the applicant under section 2(2)-(e) of the Act of 22 February 2000 on Disciplinary Proceedings against Judges of Ordinary Courts (hereinafter, \u201cthe Disciplinary Proceedings Act\u201d \u2013 see paragraphs 15-18 below). He was accused in particular of having retained a criminal case file for six months after withdrawing from the case on 29 October 2003. 8.  On 23 December 2004 a Panel of the Disciplinary Council of Judges (hereinafter, \u201cthe Panel\u201d), composed of Mr K.K. (the President of the Panel and rapporteur), Mr G.Ch, Mr D.S. and Mr Th.Th., considered the case at an oral hearing. According to the transcript of the hearing, the applicant admitted to the act of negligence he had been accused of. After examining the circumstances of the case, the Panel found the applicant guilty of the misconduct in question. It considered his conduct all the more serious because the defendants in the case had been in detention at the time and because he had had a duty, under Article 6 of the Convention, to act promptly and without fault. The Panel took into account the nature of the misconduct, which it classified as serious, and the existence of another disciplinary measure against the applicant in the past, and decided to remove him from office. 9.  On 29 December 2004 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Disciplinary Council of Judges (hereinafter, \u201cthe Disciplinary Council\u201d) on points of fact and law under section 60(1) of the Disciplinary Proceedings Act (see paragraph 17 below). He questioned the assessment of the circumstances of the case and the application of the legal provisions to the established facts in the decision of 23 December 2004. His appeal was examined at a plenary session of the Disciplinary Council composed of eight members, including the same four, Mr K.K., Mr G.Ch., Mr D.S. and Mr Th.Th, who had sat at the first hearing. As before, Mr K.K. acted as President and rapporteur in the examination of the applicant\u2019s appeal. 10.  By a decision of 27 January 2005, the Disciplinary Council unanimously upheld the Panel\u2019s decision of 23 December 2004 in its entirety. The appellate instance confirmed that the lower body had correctly established the facts and applied the relevant law to the factual findings. 11.  The applicant then lodged an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court under section 74 of the Disciplinary Proceedings Act, as amended on 25 February 2005 (see paragraph 18 below). He argued that he had not been given notice that he could appear before the Panel and that there had been a delay in the Disciplinary Council examining his appeal. He also stated that under Article 6 of the Convention the four members of the Panel who had taken the decision of 23 December 2004 had not had the right to sit subsequently in the Disciplinary Council appeal hearing. 12.  In a judgment of 11 July 2005, the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s cassation appeal as ill-founded. Based on the transcript, it found that he had in fact been present at the Panel hearing on 23 December 2004 and had been able to state his case without impediment, contrary to his allegation. At the hearing the applicant had admitted to the act of negligence with which he had been charged. The Supreme Court rejected the allegation of a delay in the examination of the case by the Disciplinary Council by noting that the latter had given its ruling within the statutory time-limit of one month. The Supreme Court also found that the presence of four members of the Panel as participants in the subsequent Disciplinary Council proceedings had not contravened the requirements of sections 22 and 24 of the Disciplinary Proceedings Act (see paragraph 17 below).", "references": ["2", "8", "0", "4", "7", "1", "9", "5", "6", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1968 and lives in Kalu\u0111erica. 6.  On 22 December 2006 the applicant was deprived of liberty on suspicion of participating in criminal association within the police operation \u201cCustoms mafia\u201d during which 43 persons were also arrested. The applicant was released on 15 June 2007. 7.  On 31 July 2009 the investigation against all the accused was transferred to the Prosecutor\u2019s Office for Organised Crime. 8.  On 28 June 2012 the investigation was closed. 9.  On 17 January 2013 the criminal proceedings against the applicant were suspended.", "references": ["7", "9", "5", "8", "6", "4", "1", "0", "2", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1986 and lives in Nizhniy Novgorod. 7.  At about 10.30 a.m. on 24 May 2004 two police officers from the Sovetskiy district police visited the applicant and invited him to answer some questions. With the permission of his mother, the applicant, a minor at the time, accompanied them to the Sovetskiy district police station in Nizhniy Novgorod. 8.  The applicant\u2019s interview took place in room no. 306. He was asked questions concerning the rape of a girl he knew, but stated that he had nothing to do with the crime. 9.  According to the applicant, some police officers tied him up and put him on the floor. About forty minutes later they untied him and requested that he confess to the rape. He refused. Four or five police officers punched and kicked him in the head and body, throttled him with a baton, put a plastic bag over his head and blocked off his access to air, sat and jumped on him having covered him with a blanket, grabbed him by the ears and forced him to do the splits. 10.  Fearing that the ill-treatment would continue, the applicant signed a self-incriminating statement at the request of the police officers. He was then taken to see S., an investigator at the prosecutor\u2019s office. After being questioned by S. he was released. He remained at the police station for approximately ten hours. No documents concerning his detention were issued. 11.  On 25 and 26 May 2004 the applicant underwent various medical examinations, including by a forensic medical expert. Additional opinions by forensic medical experts were given later. According to the applicant\u2019s medical records, he sustained the following injuries: a closed head injury, concussion, abrasions on and behind the ears and on the arms and knees, bruising on the right shoulder and ribcage and bruises on the buttocks. He was unable to attend school until 15 June 2004, having been issued a sick note on 26 May 2004 for concussion. 12.  The rape victim gave a statement saying that the applicant was not the person who had raped her. No criminal proceedings were brought against him. 13.  On 26 May 2004 the applicant\u2019s mother lodged a complaint with the Sovetskiy district police, alleging that the police officers had subjected her son to ill-treatment in order to make him confess to a crime which he had never committed, and requesting that they be prosecuted. On 28 May 2004 her complaint was transferred to the Sovetskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office. 14.  In accordance with Article 24 \u00a7 1 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (\u201cCCrP\u201d), six refusals to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers were issued on the grounds that the constituent elements of a crime were missing. They were each set aside because a comprehensive inquiry had not been carried out. On 20 February 2006 the Nizhniy Novgorod regional prosecutor\u2019s office instituted criminal proceedings under Article 286 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Criminal Code (abuse of authority with the use of violence). 15.  On 28 February 2006 the applicant was granted victim status. 16.  Police officers A. and G. gave statements saying that on 24 May 2004 they had invited the applicant to accompany them to the police station. He had remained in room no. 306 until evening and they had been present in the room, as had police officer F., who had taken statements from him. They denied any ill-treatment of the applicant. 17.  On 11 May 2006 the applicant failed to identify A. and G. during an identification parade. 18.  On 14 July 2006 he identified operative police officer F. from a photograph as one of the men who had ill-treated him. On the same day the investigation was suspended on the grounds that the perpetrator had not been identified. 19.  On 27 July 2006 the investigation was resumed and the applicant identified F. during an identification parade. During his examination as a suspect F. confirmed that on 24 May 2004 he had taken statements from the applicant in room no. 306, but denied using any violence. 20.  On 24 August 2006 a face-to-face confrontation was carried out between the applicant and F. The applicant stated that F. had taken part in his ill\u2011treatment and had taken the confession from him. He was unable to recall any specific acts of violence by him. 21.  On 25 August 2006 the criminal proceedings against F. were discontinued under Article 27 (1) \u00a7 1 of the CCrP on the grounds that he had not been involved in the crime. 22.  On 10 January 2007 an on-site examination of room no. 306 was carried out. 23.  On 26 January 2007 a confrontation was held between the applicant and police officers A. and G., who again both denied using any violence towards the applicant. The applicant stated that A. had taken part in his ill\u2011treatment, but he was unable to recall any specific acts of violence by him. He explained that he had not previously identified A. because he had poor eyesight. On the same day the investigating authority refused to bring criminal proceedings against A. on the grounds that the constituent elements of a crime were missing. The applicant stated that G. had not assaulted him, but had interviewed him and had been present during his ill-treatment. 24.  On 26 January 2007 photographs of several other police officers were shown to the applicant. He did not identify the culprits. 25.  On the same day the criminal proceedings were suspended on the grounds that the perpetrators had not been identified. The investigation was subsequently resumed and on 19 April 2007 was suspended again on the same grounds. 26.  In 2008 the applicant brought a civil claim against the Russian Ministry of Finance, seeking 500,000 Russian roubles (RUB) in damages in connection with his torture by the police. He stated that the circumstances of the case gave reason to believe that the amount claimed was lower than compensation to which he would be entitled under Article 41 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, however he considered it preferable to settle the case at the domestic court. 27.  On 17 November 2008 the Sovetskiy District Court of Nizhniy Novgorod (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) acknowledged a violation of the applicant\u2019s right not to be subjected to treatment proscribed under Article 3 of the Convention, allowed the applicant\u2019s civil claim in part and awarded him RUB 50,000 (about 1,450 euros (EUR)). 28.  It referred to Convention case\u2011law under Article 3 concerning the State\u2019s obligation to carry out an effective investigation, notably the case of Mikheyev v. Russia (no. 77617/01, 26 January 2006). It noted that the criminal proceedings had been initiated after six refusals to do so and that it had been acknowledged that the applicant had been the victim of a crime. 29.  The District Court gave credence to the applicant\u2019s mother\u2019s version of events, which it found to be consistent with other evidence in the case, in particular statements by her that the applicant had had no injuries when he had left home with the police officers and that his health had appeared to have been damaged when he had returned from the police station. Noting that the respondent authorities and the Sovetskiy district police, acting as a third party in the proceedings, had submitted no evidence capable of proving that the applicant could have received the injuries (see paragraph 11 above) in other circumstances, the District Court established that they had been sustained during his detention at the police station. 30.  The District Court noted that the applicant had been a minor at the time and that, according to his submissions at the hearing, various acts of violence, to which the police officers of the Sovetskiy district police had, in the exercise of their duties, subjected him (see paragraph 9 above), had caused him mental and physical suffering. According to the applicant, he had suffered severe pain as a result of the police officers\u2019 violent actions, which had included being punched, kicked, throttled with a baton, being unable to breath, being sat on and jumped on, being forced to do the splits and so on. He had been dizzy, nauseous and sick. Over the next few days he had been weak and dizzy and had felt heaviness in the back of his head. When the police officers had tried to throttle him he had feared for his life. There had been no one to ask for help. The fact that he had suffered harm at the hands of the police, who were supposed to be there to protect people, had been especially traumatic. He had been scared, subdued and depressed. His honour and dignity had been damaged. In his eyes, by forcing him to sign the confession the police officers had humiliated him. 31.  Having examined the evidence in its entirety, in particular the medical evidence of the applicant\u2019s injuries, the District Court found that the applicant\u2019s mental and physical suffering had been caused by the unlawful actions of the police officers of the Sovetskiy district police department, in particular by the inhuman and degrading treatment and by inflicting bodily harm. Therefore, his rights under Article 37 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights had been violated. 32.  Relying on the Russian Constitution, in particular the provisions concerning the right to compensation for damage sustained as a result of the unlawful actions of State organs (Article 53), the District Court held that the State was responsible for the applicant\u2019s ill-treatment regardless of the fact that the guilt of specific individuals had so far not been established. 33.  The parties appealed against the judgment. The applicant contested the amount of compensation, considering it to be disproportionate to the suffering he had endured. 34.  On 3 March 2009 the Nizhniy Novgorod Regional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld the judgment. However, it emphasised the fact that, being a minor at the time, to be held at the police station for approximately ten hours was a long time, and that the authorities had been unable to provide any legitimate reasons for his detention.", "references": ["9", "3", "5", "6", "7", "2", "4", "0", "8", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Kragujevac. 6.  On 13 July 2006 the applicant filed a civil suit together with 18 other persons with the Kragujevac Municipal Court against his former employer Telekom Srbija AD Beograd requesting the payment of funds from profit made in 2005. 7.  The applicant\u2019s previous representative did not attend first preliminary hearing fixed for 15 November 2006, since he had been deleted from the register of the attorneys\u2013at-law in May 2006. The applicant appointed the present representative on 25 January 2007. 8.  The preliminary hearing was held on 13 February 2007. 9.  On 27 August 2007 the proceedings were split to separate proceedings for each of the plaintiffs concerned. 10.  The preliminary hearing was held on 21 March 2008. 11.  Within the period from 21 October 2008 until 29 April 2011 seven out of eight hearings were postponed for various reasons, mainly because the representatives on the both sides provided new submissions and evidence and on the proposal of both sides due to the cost-efficiency of the proceedings. 12.  On 29 April 2011 the Kragujevac First Instance Court ruled against the applicant. 13.  On 20 February 2012 the Kragujevac Appeals Court upheld that judgment. 14.  On 27 June 2013 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal.", "references": ["2", "6", "7", "5", "4", "8", "1", "0", "9", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Kostrena. 6.  Between 1 October 2003 and 1 October 2007 the applicant was the director of a municipal utility company, KD Kostrena (hereinafter \u201cthe company\u201d), whose sole shareholder is the Municipality of Kostrena (Op\u0107ina Kostrena). The company primarily provides public utility services such as parking, waste disposal, funeral services, maintaining green spaces, cemeteries and so forth. 7.  In an article published in the daily Novi list of 19 September 2007, Mr M.U., who was the mayor of Kostrena Municipality and chairman of the company\u2019s General Meeting (skup\u0161tina) at the time, criticised the way the applicant performed her job. The relevant part of the article reads as follows:\n\u201c ... M.U. does not hide his dissatisfaction with the work of Mirela Maruni\u0107 as head of KD Kostrena.\n\u2018I cannot speak for the others, but after everything that has happened, I can say that Mirela Maruni\u0107 has betrayed the trust of the members of the General Meeting because she disclosed information which should only have been discussed at the General Meeting. Likewise, in the 2005 [annual] report she spoke in positive terms of building a sports hall, and I do not know what happened to make her change her mind.\u2019\nIn his words, dissatisfaction with the functioning of KD Kostrena goes beyond the current political crisis in Kostrena and the public statements of Mirela Maruni\u0107.\n\u2018The fact is that we had even earlier objected to Mirela Maruni\u0107\u2019s work because [the company] has been stagnating for some time now and functioning as a means of transferring municipal funds. Our municipal utility company does not carry out the type of business for which it was established. For example, \u017durkovo Bay was leased as a parking lot and a dry [dock] marina, and the same applies to the parking lot near Kostrenka. My question is, how does it benefit the concessionaires to have it and in addition pay rent for it? Had it stayed in our hands we would, apart from making a profit, also have had the chance to employ someone\u2019. M.U. does not hide his dissatisfaction.\nIn a lengthy list of criticisms of the current director of KD Kostrena, M.U. states that he does not like the fact that she has been referred to as a member of his [political] party. He claims that he was the one who had advised her when she was appointed to the position as head of Kostrena\u2019s municipal utility company not to make public statements as a member of [their political party] because someone could misinterpret [the nature of] her work and the way she came to get that position.\u201d 8.  In an article published in Novi list eight days later, on 27 September 2009, the applicant replied to the above criticisms. The relevant part of that article reads as follows:\n\u201cThe mayor of Kostrena, M.U., has publicly criticised the current director of KD Kostrena for having disclosed information which should only have been discussed at the General Meeting and for the company\u2019s poor performance, saying it does not engage in the type of business for which it was established.\n\u2018They betrayed my trust by not believing me. I first informed my [political] party but there was no reaction. In particular, at a meeting held before the September session of the General Meeting [of the company] last year, I warned them of all the irregularities, the financial losses and the ruining of KD Kostrena\u2019s business reputation. Then they asked me not to talk about it in the presence of D.G. [who was the only member of the company\u2019s General Meeting from the ruling political party at the State level],\u2019 says Mirela Maruni\u0107, repeating that there are written documents in respect of all the issues she had warned the General Meeting about.\nAs regards M.U.\u2019s remark that the company has been stagnating under her leadership, she says that Kostrena Municipality, which does not have a development strategy, has itself been stagnating ... The main precondition for that ... would be, in her opinion, the resolution of property issues which remain outstanding in the case of most of the parking lots administered by Kostrena\u2019s municipal utility company. Maruni\u0107 illustrates this by referring to the Viktor Lenac parking lot where the municipal utility company has been charging for parking on land which was not even owned by Kostrena Municipality.\n\u2018The legal department of Kostrena Municipality still requires [the company] to charge for parking even though [the company] Lenac refused to do so because of unresolved property issues. That case has now gone to court,\u2019 warns Maruni\u0107, \u2018and a similar situation exists with the parking lot in \u017durkovo and [the one] near Kostrenka, which have been leased out.\u2019\n\u2018Given that my work has been called into question I demand an audit of KD Kostrena, and the involvement of the Office for the Prevention of Corruption and Organised Crime and the State Attorney\u2019s Office. I sincerely hope that the State institutions will do their job in this case, as that will save Kostrena. Kostrena needs professionals, but they are being removed, the proof of which is the proposal to remove T.S. as a member of the General Meeting. I hope that a young and ambitious person will replace me and continue the work the municipal utility company has been doing so far.\u2019\u201d 9.  By a decision of the company\u2019s General Meeting of 11 October 2007 the applicant was summarily dismissed because of the statements she had made in the media, which were regarded as being damaging to the company\u2019s business reputation. The relevant part of that decision reads as follows:\n\u201cOn 27 September 2007 the Novi list daily published an article ... stating that the director of KD Kostrena, Mirela Maruni\u0107, had given a statement to [a] journalist of Novi list saying that KD Kostrena was acting unlawfully, that it was charging for parking where it was not allowed, that she demanded an audit of KD Kostrena, and the involvement of the Office for the Prevention of Corruption and Organised Crime and the State Attorney\u2019s Office with a view to looking into KD Kostrena\u2019s operations.\nThe director Mirela Maruni\u0107 was at the time of the publication of the article ... employed as [chief executive officer] of KD Kostrena, that is, the officer who heads the company and is responsible for the consequences of her own work. Making such allegations in a daily newspaper, if those allegations are true, testifies to unlawful conduct in her job precisely because it is her duty as the officer in charge [of the company] to monitor and make sure that the utility company operates in accordance with the law. If, on the other hand, those allegations are not true but were nevertheless made in the publication that has the largest circulation in the area [of the country] then those allegations gravely harm the [business] reputation of the company because they suggest that KD Kosterna operates unlawfully.\nThat kind of conduct, by an employee who was at the time of the publication of the statement in the daily newspaper the director of the utility company, which she headed, who makes such allegations in the media or engages in unlawful conduct, constitutes, in the opinion of the company\u2019s General Meeting, totally inappropriate behaviour which tarnishes the company\u2019s [business] reputation in the eyes of the public. ..\nSuch conduct ... depicting the utility company in a negative light [constitutes] a particularly serious breach of employment-related duties, and is a particularly important fact which, taking into account all the circumstances and the interests of both contracting parties, makes the continuation of the employment relationship impossible [under section 107 of the Labour Act].\u201d 10.  On 22 October 2007 the applicant launched an internal challenge to her dismissal by lodging a request for the protection of her rights (zahtjev za za\u0161titu prava), a remedy which is guaranteed for every employee by the Labour Act and which employees had to use before bringing a civil action against their employer. The applicant argued, inter alia, as follows:\n\u201cI contest entirely the argument that by making statements in the media I acted inappropriately and allegedly attacked the [business] reputation of the company ...\nThe utility company is a public company which belongs to the [local] community ... It was my duty, as a member of the [company\u2019s] Management, to contact the media and inform the public because it is a public company and not someone\u2019s private property. I particularly emphasise that I have always given accurate information to the public.\nIt is a well-known fact that the media show a great interest in Kostrena Municipality because of political turbulence among those heading the Municipality. However, my observations were always a defence against the media attacks directed against me by the chairman of the General Meeting.\n.. it is totally unclear what unlawful conduct I engaged in??? It is true that I warned about unlawful acts [by the company] but [I did so] directly to the General Meeting and the Supervisory Board. My statements were not directed against the utility company but made solely and exclusively with a view to removing any potential liability from myself. Therefore, the arguments in the dismissal decision are a twisted interpretation of the events.\u201d 11.  It appears that the applicant received no reply to her request. On 21 November 2007 she therefore brought a civil action for wrongful dismissal against the company in the Rijeka Municipal Court (Op\u0107inski sud u Rijeci). She challenged the decision to dismiss her and sought reinstatement. The relevant part of her statement of claim read as follows:\n\u201cThe defendant obviously did not properly read the [impugned] article because the plaintiff merely states some facts in it and, as an example, refers to a particular case of unresolved property issues, which is already the subject of judicial proceedings, and calls for an audit and the involvement of [the prosecuting authorities] with a view to protecting her integrity by expressly stating: \u2018Given that my work has been called into question I demand an audit of KD Kostrena, and the involvement of the Office for the Prevention of Corruption and Organised Crime and the State Attorney\u2019s Office.\u2019\u201d 12.  By a judgment of 12 June 2008 the Municipal Court ruled in favour of the applicant. The court accepted that her statements in the media had been damaging to the company\u2019s business reputation and as such had constituted a serious breach of employment-related duties within the meaning of section 107 of the Labour Act (see paragraph 23 below), making her summary dismissal justified. However, it ruled in the applicant\u2019s favour because it found that pursuant to her employment contract, her job as director of the company had ended on 1 October 2007, when the company had been required to transfer her to another job. That meant that she could not have been dismissed from her job as director, let alone dismissed with retroactive effect, as the decision to remove her had indicated. Furthermore, since the decision to dismiss her had specifically related only to her job as director, it could not be assumed that it had also entailed the termination of her entire employment relationship with the company, including the job to which she was supposed to have been transferred after 1 October 2007. The court thus found that the dismissal had been wrongful and that the applicant\u2019s employment relationship had not been terminated. It accordingly ordered that she be reinstated and assigned to another job within the company. 13.  By a judgment of 14 January 2009 the Rijeka County Court (\u017dupanijski sud u Rijeci) dismissed an appeal by the company and upheld the judgment of the first\u2011instance court. Its reasons, however, were different. 14.  It first noted that, contrary to the opinion of the first-instance court, the decision to dismiss the applicant had been aimed at terminating the applicant\u2019s entire employment relationship with the company, and not only her job as director, and had been capable of having that effect. However, the County Court also disagreed with the view of the Municipal Court that the applicant\u2019s behaviour, namely her statements in the media, had constituted a serious breach of employment-related duties such as to justify summary dismissal. In that respect the County Court held as follows:\n\u201c... the defendant company\u2019s [internal regulations] state that the business activities of the company are public [and] that the company informs the public by notifying the media of its organisation, the way and the conditions under which it operates, [and] the manner in which it provides services and runs its business.\nIt follows that neither the [internal regulations] nor the [applicant\u2019s employment] contract prohibit public statements or criticism of the defendant company\u2019s business activities, which are public.\nArticle 38 of the Croatian Constitution guarantees freedom of thought and [freedom of] expression, particularly emphasising freedom of speech and [the freedom] to speak publicly.\nAs established ... by the first-instance court, the plaintiff\u2019s public statements had been made in reaction to the statements of M.U. published a few days earlier in Novi list on 19 September 2007, where he had criticised the plaintiff\u2019s work and stated that she had betrayed the trust of the members of the General Meeting by disclosing information that should only have been discussed at the General Meeting, [had said] that the [company] was stagnating, that it did not operate the type of business for which it had been established [and so on] ...\n...\nTherefore, in this court\u2019s view, the plaintiff\u2019s actions should be interpreted as [the exercise of] her right to speak publicly and the right to freedom of thought, which are rights guaranteed by the Croatian Constitution.\nTherefore, in the view of this court, the plaintiff\u2019s conduct does not constitute a serious breach of employment-related duties as envisaged in section [107] of the Labour Act as grounds for summary dismissal.\nSpecifically, in the opinion of this court, the plaintiff\u2019s statements are to be seen as [a way of] informing the public of irregularities in the activities of the defendant company as a public institution; [the statements] were given in the public interest and in good faith and constitute a value judgment rather than a serious breach of employment-related duties. The first-instance court therefore correctly applied the substantive law when finding the dismissal wrongful.\u201d 15.  The company then lodged an appeal on points of law (revizija) against the judgment of the County Court. 16.  By a judgment of 6 October 2009 the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske) reversed the County Court judgment and dismissed the applicant\u2019s action. The relevant part of that judgment reads as follows:\n\u201cThe findings of the lower courts cannot be accepted. In this particular case, the aforementioned statements by the plaintiff clearly damaged the reputation of the defendant company, since an employer whose leadership structures tolerate and encourage criminal activities certainly cannot have a good reputation or be trusted in the business world. Therefore, the behaviour of the plaintiff, in stating on 27  September 2007 in the Novi list daily ... that the defendant company, which she heads, had acted illegally, namely by charging for parking when it was not allowed [to do so], asking that the [company] be audited, and also seeking the intervention of [the prosecuting authorities] with a view to verifying the activities of the defendant company, has significant repercussions on the employment relationship between the parties and gives the employer a justified reason for terminating the employment contract, within the meaning of section [107] of the Labour Act. Having regard to the given circumstances, it is precisely this which is a particularly important fact making the continuation of employment impossible ... In this particular case, the depiction by the employee of the employer\u2019s business activities in an extremely negative light in the media is a particularly important fact of the kind which gives the employer a justified reason to terminate the employment contract.\nThe plaintiff\u2019s reliance on her duty to speak publicly is unfounded. In this regard it is to be noted that the plaintiff could only have pursued her intention to prevent abuses and protect the property of the defendant company by turning to the relevant State authorities and lodging a complaint with them, which would have resulted in that information being available to the press and other media, and which could not have served as a reason for her dismissal.\u201d 17.  The applicant then lodged a constitutional complaint, alleging, inter alia, a violation of her freedom of expression. In so doing she explicitly relied on Article 38 of the Croatian Constitution and Article 10 of the Convention. 18.  On 17 February 2011 the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) dismissed the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint and served its decision on her representative on 14 March 2011. The relevant part of that decision reads as follows:\n\u201cThe Constitutional Court observes that the complainant justifies her conduct towards the employer (namely, her media statements), on account of which the employer summarily dismissed her, by arguing that she had merely been calling for the supervision of her actions in the company by the relevant authorities. That argument is incorrect [having regard to her statements in] the article published in Novi list of 27 September 2009 ...\nThe Constitutional Court notes that the right \u2018of a citizen\u2019 to publicly express his or her personal opinions cannot justify a breach of employment-related rights and obligations stemming from an employment contract and the relevant legislation.\u201d 19.  Meanwhile, on 21 June 2002 KD Kostrena had brought a civil action in the Rijeka Municipal Court against the water and sewage utility company (Komunalno dru\u0161tvo Vodovod i kanalizacija d.o.o.) of Rijeka seeking to be declared the owner of the Viktor Lenac parking lot in Kostrena. By a judgment of 3 March 2008 the court dismissed KD Kostrena\u2019s action. The final outcome of those proceedings is unknown. However, an extract from the land register concerning the two plots of land that were the subject of the proceedings suggests that the water and sewage company transferred ownership of the plots to shipbuilding company Viktor Lenac on 13 February 2014. 20.  On 12 February 2007 the water and sewage company brought a civil action against KD Kostrena in the same court seeking repayment of the parking fees the defendant company had collected from the Viktor Lenac parking lot. The plaintiff company claimed that KD Kostrena had been charging for parking on land owned by the plaintiff. The final outcome of those proceedings is unknown. 21.  In June 2013 the applicant won municipal elections and was elected mayor of Kostrena, replacing M.U. She still holds that position at the time of the Court\u2019s judgment.", "references": ["7", "1", "4", "9", "5", "3", "2", "0", "8", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Antalya. 6.  On 3 July 2004 the Samsun gendarmerie received a telephone call about a woman who had been heard crying for help in a white civilian car heading out of the city. On the basis of the information received, the gendarmerie located the car, which was being driven by the applicant, a police officer, in an isolated area outside the city. According to the incident report drawn up by the gendarmerie, the woman, identified as \u00c7.V., was crying when they approached the car and said that she had been kidnapped and beaten up by the applicant. There was blood around her mouth. Following preliminary evaluations at the place of the incident, both parties were taken to the gendarmerie station for their official statements. On the way to the station the applicant, who had been allowed to drive his own car, was caught trying to get rid of a knife, a hatchet and a mobile phone that he was hiding in the car. These articles were confiscated by the gendarmerie as evidence, along with a gun, duct tape, a rope, a bloodstained towel, handcuffs and a truncheon found in the applicant\u2019s car in a subsequent search. 7.  Upon arrival at the gendarmerie station, \u00c7.V. was at once brought before the Samsun Public Prosecutor, where she stated that she had been having an extra-marital affair with the applicant for a while, but wanted to break the relationship off because of his constant threats and pressure; that she had agreed to meet the applicant earlier that day to talk for one last time, but that after meeting in his car, the applicant had driven her out of the city without her consent, hit her in the stomach with a truncheon and beaten her, tied her hands with a rope, and threatened to assault her sexually. 8.  In his statement to the public prosecutor, the applicant admitted that he had started seeing \u00c7.V. two years before to help her through her divorce, including financially. However, over time \u00c7.V. had become very demanding and aggressive, and had threatened to expose their relationship and spread lies about him numerous times. He denied the allegation that he had kidnapped \u00c7.V. and claimed that it was she who had wanted to meet. He claimed that after they had met in the car she had demanded more money from him, started screaming and threatened to shoot herself, put on his police handcuffs and exhibited other \u201cmentally unstable behaviour\u201d, which had prompted him to hit her. She had then kissed him to calm him down and offered to have sexual intercourse, which he had rejected as she was menstruating. 9.  On 12 July 2004 the Forensic Medicine Institute issued its report in relation to \u00c7.V., which recorded a 0.5 cm cut on her tongue, a red ecchymosis of 3 cm x 2 cm on the right side of her neck, a red lesion on her upper right chest, and pain in her left thumb. The report concluded that the injuries sustained had rendered \u00c7.V. unfit for work for seven days. 10.  On the same day \u00c7.V. submitted a written statement to the Samsun Public Prosecutor, confessing that she had misrepresented the facts and had falsely accused the applicant in her prior statements because she had been upset with him; that she had not been kidnapped as previously alleged; and that the applicant had only hit her while they were quarrelling and had done her no other harm. 11.  Later the same day the public prosecutor summoned \u00c7.V. to seek an explanation in person. This time, \u00c7.V. claimed that she had submitted the written statement under duress and that her initial accusations had been truthful. 12.  On 16 September 2004 the Samsun Public Prosecutor filed a bill of indictment with the Samsun Assize Court against the applicant, charging him with attempted rape, false imprisonment and robbery. 13.  During the criminal proceedings before the Samsun Assize Court, \u00c7.V. maintained her allegations against the applicant, save for the attempted sexual assault. She claimed in this connection that although the applicant had said he would rape her, had taken off his pants and had told her to get undressed, he had never actually attempted to assault her sexually. The applicant, on the other hand, continued to deny the accusations against him. As evidence of the financial pressure he had received from \u00c7.V., the applicant submitted to the trial court copies of her phone bills, which she had given him for payment. 14.  The gendarmerie commander testified before the assize court that when they arrived at the scene of the incident \u00c7.V. was crying and looked frightened; she had handcuff marks on her hand and nail scratches on her neck. The applicant was sitting next to \u00c7.V. in his undershirt. He added here that it was a hot day. When he asked them what was going on, the applicant tried to brush over the matter lightly, while \u00c7.V. pointed to her bleeding mouth and signalled a gun with her hand. Upon his demand, the applicant retrieved the gun from the boot and handed it over to the commander. \u00c7.V. then told the commander that the applicant had kidnapped her and would have raped her if she were not menstruating or if the gendarmerie had not intervened. 15.  Based on the statements from the parties and witnesses, as well as other information in the case file, the Samsun Assize Court acquitted the applicant on 21 March 2006 of the charges of false imprisonment and robbery. As for the charge of attempted rape, the assize court held that the applicant had not attempted to rape \u00c7.V. However, his conduct underlying that charge had in fact constituted assault and battery, on which grounds the assize court ordered his conviction. The operative part of the judgment read:\n\u201cThe applicant is acquitted of the charge of false imprisonment as the elements of the crime were not fulfilled since \u00c7.V. had consented to meet the applicant and get into his car.\nThe applicant is acquitted of the charge of robbery since the elements of the crime could not be proven; and notwithstanding \u00c7.V.\u2019s allegations, there was no evidence in the case file that could reasonably and beyond any doubt prove that the applicant committed such an act.\nAs far as the charge of attempted rape is concerned, the court finds it established that the applicant was infuriated with \u00c7.V. on account of the latter\u2019s wish to break up with him and therefore assaulted \u00c7.V. In the light of the facts, the applicant is convicted of the offence of assault and battery and not on the charge of attempted rape, as was previously and wrongly characterised.\u201d 16.  Both the applicant and \u00c7.V. appealed against the judgment of the Samsun Assize Court. However, in her appeal \u00c7.V. did not contest the absence of a conviction on the charge of attempted rape. 17.  On 17 September 2012 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of the Assize Court on the ground that the five-year limit for the offence of assault and battery had expired, and ordered the discontinuation of the criminal proceedings against the applicant on that basis. It upheld the applicant\u2019s acquittal for the remaining charges. 18.  Parallel to the criminal proceedings pending before the Samsun Assize Court, the General Security Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior initiated disciplinary proceedings against the applicant in relation to the incidents of 3 July 2004. 19.  The Samsun Police Disciplinary Council, which was in charge of the disciplinary investigation, asked for the applicant\u2019s written defence, which he supplied on 29 November 2004, and concluded on 16 December 2004 that it had been established that the applicant had committed the offences of false imprisonment, attempted rape and threatening violence with a weapon, and transferred the case to the Supreme Disciplinary Council of the General Security Directorate (\u201cthe Supreme Disciplinary Council\u201d) for a decision on the applicant\u2019s dismissal from the police force in accordance with the provisions of section 8 \u00a7 6 of the Disciplinary Regulations of the Security Forces (\u201cthe Disciplinary Regulations\u201d). 20.  Basing itself largely on the evidence available in the criminal investigation file, on 15 February 2005 the Supreme Disciplinary Council found it established that the applicant had committed the offences of attempted rape, assault and threatening violence with a weapon, and ordered his dismissal from the police force as requested. 21.  The applicant submitted an objection to this decision to the Samsun Administrative Court. He argued, inter alia, that the complainant\u2019s allegations against him were contradictory and that the criminal proceedings on the same charges were still pending before the Samsun Assize Court. 22.  On 29 September 2005 the Samsun Administrative Court upheld the dismissal decision of the Disciplinary Council as lawful. The administrative court opined that \u00c7.V.\u2019s initial statements to the gendarmerie, along with her medical report and the articles confiscated from the applicant\u2019s car on the date of the incident, some of which he had attempted to hide from the gendarmerie, constituted sufficient evidence to hold that the applicant had committed the acts of attempted rape, false imprisonment and threatening with a weapon held against him, although there were no witnesses to corroborate \u00c7.V.\u2019s allegations. The relevant part of the judgment read:\n\u201cThe acts of ... rape, attempted rape and robbery listed in section 8 \u00a7 6 of the Disciplinary Regulations are types of conduct that carry the sanction of dismissal from the civil service ...\nThe applicant is prosecuted in relation to the events that took place on 3 July 2004 and he is accused of attempted rape, false imprisonment and threatening \u00c7.V. with a weapon. Based on the criminal case file and the disciplinary investigation report, it is understood that the applicant and \u00c7.V. had been involved in a sexual relationship for two years, which later became a subject of blackmail for both parties. The victim, \u00c7.V., alleged that the applicant had brought her to the crime scene against her will and forced her to have intercourse with him while handcuffing her hands, taping her mouth closed, and threatening her with a gun, a knife and a hatchet. Although the applicant has denied these allegations, the fact that the weapons and tools used in the assault were found and confiscated at the crime scene, and that the victim\u2019s injuries were corroborated by a medical report, and finally the fact that the applicant tried to conceal evidence, led the disciplinary authorities to rely on the victim\u2019s version of the events, despite the fact that there were no witnesses to corroborate the victim\u2019s allegations.\nIn the present dispute, it can be concluded that the applicant had a relationship with \u00c7.V. for two years. Notwithstanding the fact that the victim and the applicant gave different accounts of the events and that the specific allegations were not corroborated by witnesses, the court notes, on the basis of the preliminary investigation report of the Samsun Prosecutor\u2019s Office, that an anonymous caller notified the authorities that a cry for help came from a white \u015eahin type civilian type vehicle in the vicinity of Alanl\u0131 Village, and that the applicant and \u00c7.V. were later spotted by the gendarmerie close to that area, sitting in a similar car. The crime scene report indicated that a search was carried out in the applicant\u2019s car following \u00c7.V.\u2019s complaint and that a gun, a knife, a hatchet, handcuffs, a truncheon, duct tape, rope and a bloodstained blue towel were found.\nThe victim\u2019s injuries were also documented by a medical report ...\nIn this respect, the court takes the view that the applicant committed the acts he was accused of, basing its view on the consideration that the applicant was with \u00c7.V. in his car, that \u00c7.V. stated to the gendarme that she was being held against her will, and that during the search the gendarmerie found and confiscated a pistol, knife, hatchet, rope and a towel stained with blood, and that the applicant tried to conceal other weapons from the authorities.\nTherefore, the disciplinary offence of which the applicant was accused and the corresponding sanction he received cannot be deemed unlawful.\u201d 23.  The applicant appealed against the judgment of the Samsun Administrative Court, drawing the attention of the appeal court to the fact that he had in the meantime been acquitted of the criminal charges of false imprisonment, robbery and attempted rape by the Samsun Assize Court, and that his conviction for assault and battery would not in itself justify his expulsion from public service under the terms of the Disciplinary Regulations. 24.  By its decision of 10 April 2007 the Supreme Administrative Court rejected the applicant\u2019s arguments, holding that according to Section 131 of Law no. 657 on Public Service, an acquittal in respect of criminal charges did not preclude the imposition of disciplinary sanctions on the same facts. The relevant part of the judgment read:\n\u201cThe applicant asked the court to quash the decision to dismiss him from the police service and to overturn the decision of Samsun Administrative Court upholding his dismissal on the grounds that he had been acquitted of the criminal charges of false imprisonment, robbery, and attempted rape by the first-instance court, and that the charges of assault and battery on which he was convicted did not constitute conduct that attracted the penalty of dismissal from service. Be that as it may, since exoneration from criminal liability, or lack thereof, does not preclude the imposition of disciplinary sanctions by virtue of section 131 of Law no. 657 on Public Service, the present application must be rejected.\u201d 25.  This decision was served on the applicant on 12 July 2007. 26.  On unspecified dates, but after the introduction of his complaint to the Court, the applicant brought separate proceedings against the Ministry of Interior and the Governor of Samsun before the Samsun Administrative Court and requested the rectification of his civil servant record and the reopening of proceedings with respect to his dismissal from the police force. The applicant relied on the Court of Cassation\u2019s judgment of 17 September 2012, acquitting him of the charges of false imprisonment and robbery and discontinuing the proceedings in respect of battery and assault, and argued before the Samsun Administrative Court that his right to presumption of innocence had been violated in the course of the dismissal proceedings because he had been dismissed on the basis of allegations that he had committed offences in respect of which the criminal proceedings had not yet become final. The Samsun Administrative Court declared both applications inadmissible, on 11 December and 27 December 2012 respectively, holding that none of the reasons put forth by the applicant for the reopening of the proceedings fell within the exhaustive list of permissible grounds for this extraordinary remedy. 27.  On 6 March 2013 the applicant appealed against the decision of the Samsun Administrative Court of 27 December 2012 before the Supreme Administrative Court. 28.  On 10 February 2014, the Supreme Administrative Court rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal request, endorsing the reasons given in the judgment of the Samsun Administrative Court of 27 December 2012.", "references": ["1", "7", "8", "2", "5", "0", "9", "4", "6", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Waldegg, Austria. 6.  On 28 September 1994 the applicant initiated civil proceedings requesting the division of a certain estate. 7.  On 5 January 2009 the Ivanjica Municipal Court suspended the said proceedings until conclusion of another civil case. 8.  It would appear that the said civil proceedings are still pending. 9.  On 23 June 2011 the Constitutional Court found a breach of the applicant\u2019s right to a hearing within a reasonable time and ordered the speeding up of the impugned proceedings. The court, additionally, declared that the applicant was entitled to the non-pecuniary damages sought, in accordance with Article 90 of the Constitutional Court Act (see paragraph 13, Article 90, below). 10.   It seems that, the applicant contacted the Commission for Compensation on 11 December 2011 and requested the payment of the compensation awarded, but apparently received no response.", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "0", "7", "6", "8", "9", "5", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicants found themselves staying in the transit zone of Sheremetyevo Airport of Moscow. The details of each application are set out below. 6.  The applicant is an Iraqi national who was born in 1987. 7.  The applicant moved from Iraq to Turkey in 2013 seeking employment. He later moved to China to look for a job. 8.  On 24 July 2015 the applicant travelled by air from China to Turkey. The journey consisted of two legs: Shanghai to Moscow and Moscow to Ankara. The Turkish authorities denied him entry for reasons that the applicant did not specify in his application. The applicant was sent to Moscow on 27 July 2015. On arrival at Sheremetyevo Airport, he was not allowed to pass through passport control. 9.  From 27 July 2015 the applicant stayed in the transit zone of Sheremetyevo Airport. The applicant described the conditions of his stay in the transit zone as follows. He slept on a mattress on the floor in the boarding area of the airport, which was constantly lit, crowded and noisy. He sustained himself on emergency rations provided by the Russian office of UNHCR. There were no showers in the transit area. 10.  On 29 July 2015 the applicant applied for refugee status in Russia, arguing that in Iraq he would run the risk of persecution by militants belonging to the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS \u2013 also known as Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) because he had refused to join them, as well as by Iraqi government forces for the reason that he practiced the Sunni form of Islam. 11.  On 19 September 2015 the applicant received a visit from the Moscow regional department of the Federal Migration Service (\u201cthe Moscow Region FMS\u201d) and was interviewed in the transit zone. The Moscow Region FMS did not issue the applicant with a certificate to confirm that his refugee status application deserved to be examined on the merits (\u201cexamination certificate\u201d). 12.  On 10 November 2015 the Moscow Region FMS dismissed the applicant\u2019s refugee status application. The applicant appealed to the higher migration authority (the Federal Migration Service of Russia \u2013 \u201cthe Russian FMS\u201d), asking it to overrule the decision of 10 November 2015, to issue him with an examination certificate, and to allocate him to a centre for the temporary detention of aliens. 13.  On 29 December 2015 the Russian FMS dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal on the grounds that he had not received any direct threats targeted against him personally and that \u201cthe applicant [had not submitted] convincing evidence that he might become a victim of persecution by ISIS militants or Iraqi authorities on the grounds contained in the definition of the term \u2018refugee\u2019, including his religion\u201d. The issue of the applicant\u2019s stay in Sheremetyevo Airport was not addressed in the decision. 14.  The applicant\u2019s lawyer was served with the decision of 29 December 2015 on 23 January 2016. 15.  On 1 February 2016 the applicant lodged an appeal against the decisions of 10 November and 29 December 2015 with the Basmannyy District Court of Moscow. He specifically argued that the migration authorities had not complied with the procedural rules by failing to interview him speedily or to issue him with an examination certificate, and that he had spent more than six months in the transit zone of Sheremetyevo Airport in conditions contrary to the guarantees of Article 3 of the Convention, without access to shower and other amenities. 16.  On 17 March 2016, having been resettled by UNHCR, the applicant left for Denmark. 17.  On 12 May 2016 the Basmannyy District Court of Moscow upheld the Russian FMS\u2019s decision. On the same date the applicant\u2019s lawyer lodged a brief statement of appeal (\u00ab\u043a\u0440\u0430\u0442\u043a\u0430\u044f \u0430\u043f\u0435\u043b\u043b\u044f\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u043d\u0430\u044f \u0436\u0430\u043b\u043e\u0431\u0430\u00bb), pending receipt of a reasoned judgment in written form. By 5 July 2016 (the date on which the applicants submitted their written observations to the Court), no such reasoned judgment had been issued. 18.  The applicant was born in 1988. He holds a passport issued by the Palestinian Authority. 19.  Between April 2013 and August 2015 the applicant was in Irkutsk, Russia. It appears that initially he had held a valid entry visa but that he did not take steps to obtain permission to reside in Russia after its expiry. 20.  In August 2015 the applicant travelled from Russia to the Palestinian territories via Egypt. For unknown reasons he took a flight from Cairo back to Moscow on 23 August 2015. Because the applicant did not have a valid visa for Russia, he was denied entry to the country by the border guard service. 21.  From 23 August 2015 the applicant stayed in the transit zone of Sheremetyevo Airport. The applicant described the conditions of his stay in the transit zone as follows. He slept on a mattress on the floor in the boarding area of the airport, which was constantly lit, crowded and noisy. The applicant sustained himself on emergency rations provided by the Russian office of UNHCR. There were no showers in the transit area. 22.  Three weeks after his arrival at Sheremetyevo Airport, the applicant lodged an application for refugee status. In the course of the ensuing proceedings he mentioned that he had left Palestine because of the ongoing hostilities in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, as well as a lack of employment and the poor economic situation. 23.  On 1 December 2015 the Moscow Region FMS dismissed the applicant\u2019s refugee status application as ill-founded. The applicant\u2019s lawyer appealed to the Russian FMS, arguing that the applicant did not have any possibility to return to his home in the Gaza Strip, that the Moscow Region FMS had failed to assess his personal situation and the risk he would face if returned to Palestine, and that the Moscow Region FMS, in breach of the Refugees Act (FZ-4528-1 of 19 February 1993), had not issued him with an examination certificate. 24.  On 31 December 2015 the Russian FMS dismissed the appeal for the reason that the applicant had \u201cfailed to provide evidence confirming that he runs a higher risk of becoming a victim of the Palestine-Israel conflict than the rest of the population of the Palestinian National Autonomy\u201d. The applicant\u2019s lawyer was informed of that decision on 15 January 2016. 25.  On 1 February 2016 the applicant lodged an appeal against the migration authorities\u2019 decision with the Basmannyy District Court of Moscow. 26.  On 13 February 2016 the Egyptian authorities opened the Rafah crossing point to Gaza. The applicant agreed to take a flight to Egypt and left the transit zone of Sheremetyevo Airport. 27.  On 12 May 2016 the Basmannyy District Court of Moscow upheld the Russian FMS\u2019s decision. The applicant\u2019s lawyer lodged a brief statement of appeal on the same date, pending receipt of a reasoned judgment in written form. By 5 July 2016, no such reasoned judgment had been issued. 28.  The applicant is a Somalian national who was born in 1981. 29.  In 2005 the applicant moved from Somalia to Yemen, where he was granted refugee status. In 2015 he decided to leave Yemen. 30.  The applicant travelled by air to Havana, Cuba, a journey that consisted of three legs: Sana\u2019a to Istanbul, Istanbul to Moscow, and Moscow to Havana. On 13 March 2015 the applicant landed in Moscow for the first time; he then continued his journey to Havana. 31.  On 9 April 2015 the applicant was deported from Cuba to Russia. The Russian border guard service did not allow him to pass through passport control. 32.  From 9 April 2015 onwards, the applicant has been staying in the transit zone of Sheremetyevo Airport. The applicant described the conditions of his stay in the transit zone as follows. He slept on a mattress on the floor in the boarding area of the airport, which was constantly lit, crowded and noisy. He sustained himself on emergency rations provided by the Russian office of UNHCR. There were no showers in the transit area. 33.  On 10 April 2015 the applicant lodged an application for refugee status, arguing that he had fled Somalia in 2005 because he had received threats from members of a terrorist group. 34.  On 1 July 2015 the Moscow Region FMS interviewed the applicant. However, they did not issue him with an examination certificate. 35.  On 1 October 2015 the Moscow Region FMS dismissed the applicant\u2019s refugee status application. 36.  On 17 October 2015 the applicant\u2019s brother was killed in Mogadishu, Somalia. 37.  On 7 December 2015 the Russian FMS dismissed an appeal by the applicant against the decision of 1 October 2015. 38.  On 22 December 2015 the Moscow Region FMS refused to grant the applicant temporary asylum. On 10 February 2016 the Russian FMS upheld that decision. 39.  On 19 May 2016 the Basmannyy District Court of Moscow dismissed an appeal lodged by the applicant against the decisions by the Moscow Region FMS and the Russian FMS to dismiss his application for temporary asylum. It reasoned, in particular, that the applicant had not proved that the terrorists who had threatened him in 2005 represented any danger more than ten years later and that, should such threats persist, he \u201chas not been deprived of an opportunity to avail himself of the protection of his State of nationality [\u2013 that is to say] to apply to the law-enforcement agencies of the Republic of Somalia [for protection].\u201d On the same date the applicant\u2019s lawyer appealed. On 20 September 2016 the Moscow City Court dismissed the appeal. On 6 February 2017 it dismissed in the final instance the applicant\u2019s complaint about the refusals to grant him refugee status. 40.  Having received the final rejections of his applications from the Russian authorities, the applicant decided that he did not have any chance of obtaining asylum in Russia. On 9 March 2017 he left for Mogadishu, Somalia. 41.  The applicant, Hasan Yasien is a Syrian national who was born in 1975 in Aleppo. 42.  On 4 July 2014 the applicant arrived in Moscow from Beirut, Lebanon, holding a business visa valid until 25 August 2014. 43.  On 10 September 2014 he applied for temporary asylum to the Moscow City Department of the Federal Migration Service (\u201cthe Moscow City FMS\u201d), claiming to have fled Syria because of the ongoing civil war there. That application was refused on 8 December 2014. 44.  It appears that the applicant remained in Russia despite that refusal. 45.  On 18 August 2015 the applicant took a flight from Moscow to Antalya, Turkey. The Russian border guard service seized his passport and handed it over to the aircraft crew. The Turkish authorities denied the applicant entry to the country and sent him back to Moscow on 20 August 2015. Upon the applicant\u2019s arrival, the Russian authorities sent him back to Antalya. The Turkish authorities then returned the applicant to Moscow. 46.  On 8 September 2015 the applicant took a flight to Beirut, but the Lebanese authorities denied him entry to the country and sent him back to Moscow. The Russian border guard service did not allow him to pass through passport control. 47.  From 9 September 2015 the applicant stayed in the transit zone of Sheremetyevo Airport. He described the conditions of his stay in the transit zone as follows. The applicant slept on a mattress on the floor in the waiting area of the airport, which was constantly lit, crowded and noisy. He received basic food, clothing and sanitary wipes once a week from the Russian office of UNHCR. Given the absence of any refrigerator or kitchen, his rations were extremely limited. Throughout the whole period of his stay in the transit zone the applicant did not have access to a shower. 48.  The applicant applied to the Moscow Region FMS for temporary asylum. On 21 December 2015 the Moscow Region FMS dismissed the request. 49.  On 4 February 2016 the Russian FMS dismissed an appeal by the applicant against its refusal of 21 December 2015 to grant him temporary asylum. It noted, in particular, that there were regular flights from Moscow to Damascus, from where Syrian nationals could travel to other parts of the country, and that \u201cmany Syrians wish to leave the country not only because of a fear for their lives but, in large part, because of the worsening economic and humanitarian situation\u201d. 50.  On 7 April 2016 the applicant once again tried to lodge an application for refugee status through the border guard service. He received no response. 51.  On 11 April 2016 the applicant complained to the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow about the refusal of the Moscow Region FMS and Russian FMS to grant him temporary asylum and about his allegedly unlawful detention in appalling conditions in the transit zone of Sheremetyevo Airport. 52.  On 11 May 2016 the applicant was resettled by UNHCR and left for Sweden. 53.  On 21 July 2016 the applicant\u2019s lawyer submitted additional documents to the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow in support of the applicant\u2019s claims regarding the risks that he would face if returned to Syria. The outcome of the proceedings is unknown.", "references": ["7", "5", "8", "9", "0", "6", "4", "3", "No Label", "1", "2"], "gold": ["1", "2"]}
+{"input": "6.  Mr Grigoryan and Ms Sergeyeva were born in 1981 and 1975 respectively and live in Kyiv. The former is an ethnic Armenian, and at the time of the incident had had refugee status in Ukraine since 1997. It appears that at the relevant time they were unmarried life partners. 7.  At some time after 11 p.m. on 6 April 2010 the applicants and two of their acquaintances, Mr Y. K. and Ms Y. Yu., were travelling in a taxi driven by N. K. They were returning from a picnic in the course of which alcohol had been consumed. According to the taxi driver, the applicants\u2019 level of intoxication was \u201cabove average\u201d. 8.  According to the applicants, the police stopped the car and asked the Mr Grigoryan to get out. According to their acquaintances and the taxi driver, a police car drew up beside the taxi at traffic lights in Kurbasa Street in Kyiv and Mr Grigoryan opened his passenger-side window, leaned out, waved his hands and either started singing or said something to the officers in the police patrol car. The acquaintances could not hear what he said because loud music was playing in the taxi. According to the police, Mr Grigoryan, while leaning out of the car window, made obscene gestures and swore at them. The police asked him to get out of the car and show his identification, which he eventually did. According to the taxi driver, Mr Grigoryan initially refused to get out of the car and the officers tried to extricate him by force, but in his submissions before the Court he did not allege that any excessive force had been used on this occasion. Indeed, in his submissions it is suggested that he was fully cooperative, got out of the car voluntarily and identified himself. Ms Sergeyeva also got out of the car and joined the discussion, after which the applicants, without putting up any resistance, got into the police car and were taken to a police station. 9.  On arrival at the police station the patrol officers handed over the applicants to police Major A., the station\u2019s duty officer. 10.  According to the Government, immediately upon the applicants\u2019 arrival at the police station, Major A. drew up arrest and administrative offence reports in respect of both applicants. The reports state that they were drawn up at 11.50 p.m. on 6 April 2010. According to the reports, the applicants were arrested for and accused of \u201cpetty hooliganism\u201d (\u201c\u0434\u0440\u0456\u0431\u043d\u0435 \u0445\u0443\u043b\u0456\u0433\u0430\u043d\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e\u201d), namely swearing in the street in an intoxicated state and refusing to desist despite the police officers\u2019 warnings, by which conduct public order had been disturbed. On the pre-printed part of the report forms, the grounds for arresting them are cited as the need to stop the commission of the offence and to draw up a report (see relevant provisions of the Code of Administrative Offences in paragraph 34 (i) and (iii) below). According to the applicants, the reports were given to them to sign only the next morning immediately prior to their release. 11.  It is evident from subsequent findings made by the authorities (see paragraph 32 below) that, while the administrative reports were being drawn up, Mr Grigoryan continued yelling, swearing and attempting to hit the officers. To stop this, his arms were twisted behind his back and he was bound. The police report on the \u201ctying up\u201d procedure states that he remained tied up for ten minutes, from 11.55 p.m. to 12.05 a.m. According to him, at around 12.30 a.m. on 7 April 2010 three officers entered his cell. They shouted insults referring to his Armenian ethnic origin (\u201c\u0431\u0430\u043d\u043e\u0431\u0430\u043a\u201d, \u201c\u0447\u0435\u0440\u043d\u043e\u0436\u043e\u043f\u044b\u0439\u201d, \u201c\u0447\u0443\u0440\u043a\u0430\u201d), threw him on the ground, and tied his hands and right leg together behind his back. They also kicked and throttled him. According to the applicant, he was left lying bound on the floor until about 4.30 a.m. 12.  In the course of the subsequent investigation, Major A. explained that Mr Grigoryan was initially released after remaining bound for ten minutes but at around 1 a.m. he again started hitting the door of his cell with hands, feet and torso. The police then overcame his resistance and tied him up for another thirty minutes. 13.  According to Ms Sergeyeva, she was able to hear Mr Grigoryan being beaten from her cell and this caused her distress. She pulled a glass lampshade from the ceiling, damaging the wiring, and threw it against the cell\u2019s barred door, shattering it. Several officers then entered the cell, bound her and left her tied up for half an hour, according to the official report on the \u201ctying up\u201d procedure. She alleged that while tying her up, the officers also hit her, spat on her, called her an \u201cArmenian whore\u201d and threatened to rape her. 14.  Reports on the tying up of both applicants were drawn up by Major A. on pre-printed forms. The pre-printed forms state that the tying up procedure was used to stop unruly conduct (\u201c\u0431\u0443\u0439\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e\u201d) and prevent self\u2011harm by an intoxicated individual. 15.  According to the taxi driver, he accompanied the applicants to the police station and waited for them until about 2 a.m. At some point, apparently waiting outside the building, he heard the applicants\u2019 voices inside, shouting and asking somebody not to hit them. 16.  At 4.30 a.m. on 7 April 2010 the applicants were transferred to the central police station of the Svyatoshynskyy District (hereinafter \u201cthe district\u201d), arriving there at 5.20 a.m. There, a senior district police official ruled on their case, imposing fines equivalent to about EUR 4.70 on each of them. The fines were paid the same day. 17.  Between 10 a.m. and 11 a.m. the applicants signed the aforementioned administrative offence reports (see paragraph 10 above), without adding any objections, and were released. The release record relating to Mr Grigoryan includes a handwritten note reading \u201cI will not do this again\u201d (\u201c\u0431\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0448\u0435 \u043d\u0435 \u0431\u0443\u0434\u0443\u201d). According to the applicants, they signed without objection because the police threatened that if they did not cooperate, the fine would be replaced with fifteen days\u2019 administrative detention (see paragraph 33 below). 18.  Later the same day forensic medical expert N. examined the applicants at their request and drew up a report noting that they had numerous bruises on their faces and bodies, which could have been inflicted on 7 April 2010. In particular Mr Grigoryan had haematomas in the following areas: forehead, left cheekbone, right shoulder, jaw, right side of the neck, clavicle, left hypochondrium, stomach, right elbow, right shoulder-blade area, popliteal spaces (back of the knees), and ankles. The expert also observed bloating and bluish colour on his right hand and two parallel left-to-right abrasions on his forehead and chin. 19.  When questioned by the prosecutor\u2019s office in the course of the subsequent pre-investigation enquiries, the expert expressed the opinion that the above injuries suffered by Mr Grigoryan were the result of at least twenty impacts by blunt objects. The expert believed that they could not have been caused by falling over and that the injuries on Ms Sergeyeva\u2019s upper limbs could be explained through her having been tied up. 20.  On 8 April 2010 Ms Sergeyeva complained to the prosecutor\u2019s office about what she described as unlawful arrest and beatings by the police. She presented an account of events essentially consistent with the applicants\u2019 account set out in paragraphs 7 to 17 above. However, it appears that she did not cite any indications of ethnic prejudice on the part of the police. 21.  On 12 April 2010 Mr Grigoryan lodged a similar complaint. He stated in particular that on arrival at the police station he had immediately been put in a cell. Ms Sergeyeva had been shouting and demanding an explanation as to why they were being detained. He had started hitting the cell door, also wishing to receive an explanation. The police officers had entered, tied him up and continued hitting him for about thirty minutes while uttering insults referring to his ethnic origin (see paragraph 11 above). 22. From 13-15 April 2010 the district prosecutor interviewed the applicants, the arresting officers, Major A. and two other officers involved in the events at the police station. 23.  On 16 April 2010 the district prosecutor decided not to institute criminal proceedings against Major A. and two other officers involved in the events at the police station in view of the lack of a corpus delicti in their actions. The prosecutor\u2019s office relied essentially on the police officers\u2019 statements, according to which the applicants had been tied up in order to stop their disorderly behaviour at the police station and although the applicants had offered resistance, only the force necessary to control them and to bind them had been applied. 24.  On 21 April 2010 the Kyiv prosecutor\u2019s office overruled the decision not to institute proceedings on the grounds that not all possible enquiries had been made. In particular, it pointed out that other arrestees who might have been at the police station at the time should have been interviewed and the applicants should have been asked whether they had signed the administrative offence reports and about any comments they might have made on them. 25.  On 30 April 2010 the district prosecutor\u2019s office again refused to institute proceedings, adding that the applicants had been interviewed and had confirmed that they had drunk alcohol that night and had signed the administrative offence reports. There had been no other arrestees at the police station that night. 26.  On 26 May 2010 the applicants complained to the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office that the investigation was not progressing. They alleged that they had been victims of crimes falling within the provisions of Articles 161 (discrimination), 365 (exceeding power or authority) and 371 (knowingly illegal arrest or detention) of the Criminal Code. 27.  On 25 August 2010 the Kyiv prosecutor\u2019s office overruled the decision of 30 April 2010 on the grounds that the arresting officers had not been interviewed concerning the grounds for the arrest, the enquiry had not examined the allegation that ethnic prejudice had motivated the ill-treatment and, furthermore, no medical specialist had been interviewed to clarify the possible origins of the recorded injuries. 28.  On 9 September 2010 the district prosecutor again refused to institute criminal proceedings. He found that the grounds for arrest had been that Mr Grigoryan had made obscene gestures towards police officers and that the second applicant had sworn at them. Referring to the results of additional interviews with the arresting officers, the prosecutor found that allegations of racial discrimination or insults were unfounded. The prosecutor\u2019s office also repeated the statements of the applicants\u2019 acquaintances who were in the taxi with them at the time of arrest and who made statements in the course of the internal police inquiry (see paragraphs 7 above and 32 below). The prosecutor added that, although he had managed to interview Mr Grigoryan, Ms Sergeyeva could not be interviewed because she was apparently suffering from an acute episode of her chronic schizophrenia. Finally, the prosecutor\u2019s office quoted the results of an interview with the medical expert regarding the origins of the applicants\u2019 injuries (see paragraph 19 above). 29.  On 20 December 2010 the Kyiv prosecutor\u2019s office overruled the decision of 9 September 2010. 30.  On 30 December 2010, 8 April and 30 September 2011 the district prosecutor\u2019s office again refused to institute criminal proceedings, giving essentially the same reasons. On 17 March, 18 August and 12 December 2011 respectively the Kyiv Svyatoshynsky District Court declared those decisions premature. 31.  On 30 July 2012 the district prosecutor again refused to institute proceedings. 32.  On 23 April 2010 Ms Sergeyeva asked the chief of Kyiv police to investigate the legality of the police officers\u2019 actions. Her complaint contained no reference to alleged ethnic prejudice on the part of the police. On 25 May 2010 the personnel inspectorate of the city police department drew up a report on the internal inquiry \u2012 following which it was discontinued \u2012 concluding that there were contradictions between the applicants\u2019 and the officers\u2019 accounts. It forwarded the evidential material gathered in connection with the inquiry to the prosecutor\u2019s office to be taken into consideration in the context of the pre-investigation enquiries. It would appear that this report contains the only coherent official account of the events of the night of 6 to 7 April 2010.", "references": ["0", "9", "7", "5", "2", "6", "4", "3", "No Label", "8", "1"], "gold": ["8", "1"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1966 and lives in Ganja. 6.  The applicant had ownership rights to a shop at 32 Attarlar Street in Ganja. According to the certificate \u201con the sale of State property to legal entities or individuals\u201d issued on 30 October 2003 by the Ministry of Economic Development\u2019s Department of Management and Privatisation of State Property, the total area of the property was 78.3 sq. m and it had been purchased by the applicant from the State for 1,309,000 old Azerbaijani manats (AZM) (equivalent to 261.8 New Azerbaijani manats (AZN) or approximately 230 euros). 7.  According to the property\u2019s \u201ctechnical passport\u201d issued by the Ministry of Economic Development\u2019s Property Inventory Bureau on 5 September 2003, the shop had originally been constructed in 1972, was located on a plot of land of 84 sq. m, had a total surface area of 78.3 sq. m and was 3.5 m high. The shop had concrete foundations, the external and internal walls were made of metal and wood, while the roof was made of metal and covered with slate tiles. The property was classified as a non\u2011residential building used for wholesale or retail trade purposes. The document further stated that the plot of land on which the shop was located had been allocated on the basis of relevant documents. No other documents concerning the ownership of the land have been submitted by the parties. 8.  The applicant paid land tax for 2004 of AZM 19,400 for the plot underneath the shop. 9.  In 2004 the Ganja City Executive Authority (\u201cthe GCEA\u201d) decided to renovate and widen Attarlar and Nizami Streets in accordance with the city\u2019s planning scheme because the streets were not wide enough for the pedestrian and car traffic. 10.  According to the applicant, in November 2004 GCEA officials asked him verbally to vacate the shop in connection with the above decision. The applicant refused and brought a legal action asking the court to order the GCEA to stop its allegedly unlawful activities. 11.  According to the applicant, in December 2004 the GCEA destroyed the shop. According to the Government, the shop, being a transportable metal construction, was lifted away by crane and moved to an unspecified part of the city. 12.  On an unspecified date in December 2004 the applicant asked Aysel\u2011M, a private valuation firm, to assess the shop\u2019s market value. According to Aysel-M\u2019s expert report, dated 13 December 2004, the market value at the time was AZM 588,000,000, or 120,000 US dollars (USD) (there is no copy of the report in the case file). 13.  The applicant supplemented his court action against the GCEA with additional claims, asking for compensation of AZM 588,000,000 for the shop, AZM 99,000 for an unspecified \u201cState fee\u201d and AZM 490,000 for Aysel-M\u2019s fee for the report. 14.  In its submissions to the court, the GCEA as the respondent stated that a number of \u201cold shops and other retail facilities\u201d on Attarlar and Nizami Streets had been removed owing to the urgent need to widen the streets in order to accommodate the number of pedestrians and cars. The respondent argued that the applicant\u2019s shop had not been destroyed but, being a metal construction, had been removed by crane to another, unspecified location in the city. The applicant had been offered another plot of land in the city to continue operating his shop but he had refused. The applicant had not owned the original plot of land. The respondent argued that the compensation claimed by the applicant was excessive, taking into account the price he had paid the State for it in 2003. 15.  Following the respondent\u2019s submissions concerning the alleged excessiveness of the compensation claim, by an interim decision of 15 July 2005 the Khojavand District Court requested a new valuation by a State expert. 16.  On an unspecified date the State expert refused to issue an opinion, noting that the shop at 32 Attarlar Street no longer existed and that therefore it was technically impossible to examine it and assess its market value. Accordingly, the interim decision of 15 July 2005 remained unexecuted. 17.  On 6 October 2005 the Khojavand District Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s legal action without citing any provisions of the applicable domestic law. In its reasoning the court accepted the GCEA\u2019s explanation that the shop in question had been removed in accordance with town\u2011planning policy. Being a metal construction it had been possible to move it in one piece. It had not been destroyed but simply transported to another location. The court also accepted that the applicant had been offered a new plot of land by the GCEA but had refused it. It further decided to reject the applicant\u2019s compensation claim based on Aysel-M\u2019s report, without providing any reasons. However, the court ordered the GCEA to allocate the applicant a plot of land in Ganja equivalent in size to the shop in question. 18.  The applicant appealed, reiterating that his shop had been unlawfully destroyed and asking for compensation. 19.  On 23 January 2006 the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal, upholding the first-instance court\u2019s assessment. The appellate judgment contained no references to applicable domestic legal provisions. 20.  Following a further appeal by the applicant, on 14 July 2006 the Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeal\u2019s judgment. 21.  No information is available in the case file as to whether a new land plot was allocated to the applicant or as to its location or any other details.", "references": ["8", "1", "3", "6", "4", "0", "2", "7", "5", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
+{"input": "9.  The applicant was born in 1949 and lives in Makhachkala, Republic of Dagestan, Russia. 10.  On 25 April 2006 the applicant\u2019s son, Murad Nagmetov, participated in a public gathering in the village of Miskindzha, in the Dokuzparinskiy district of Dagestan. Several hundred people took part, alleging corruption by local public officials. At around 3 p.m. officers from the special mobile unit encircled the participants and fired several warning shots into the air. 11.  Thereafter the gathering was dispersed by the authorities with the use of firearms (see also Primov and Others v. Russia, no. 17391/06, \u00a7\u00a7 15\u201118, 12 June 2014). Murad Nagmetov was wounded by a tear-gas grenade and died from his wounds. Five other people were seriously wounded; a large number of people sustained injuries and were arrested. 12.  On the same day the prosecutor of the Republic of Dagestan initiated criminal proceedings on charges of murder and illegally handling firearms (Articles 105 and 222 of the Criminal Code) and assigned the case to an investigator. 13.  A forensic expert examined the deceased\u2019s body and extracted the objects that had killed him. 14.  On the same day, the investigator commissioned a ballistics report from the Forensic Expert Centre of the Dagestan Ministry of the Interior to determine the type of the grenade, the type of rifle used to fire it and whether the grenade had striae that could be used to identify that rifle. 15.  On 11 May 2006 the ballistics expert issued a report and concluded as follows:\n\u201c1. The forensic expert was given the following two objects for examination: a grenade with a special charge; and an obturator with a special charge (a 23 mm cartridge used with a carbine type KS-23 (KS-23M)). It has not been possible to determine the exact make of the tear-gas grenade. 2.  ... It would not be possible to use the obturator on the body of the grenade to identify the specific weapon used. It would however be possible to use the separate obturator to identify the weapon used, if the weapon were provided for examination.\u201d 16.  On 26 June 2006 the investigating authority commissioned another ballistics report to identify the rifle used to fire the grenade extracted from the body of the applicant\u2019s son. On 6 July 2006 the Forensic Expert Centre of the Dagestan Ministry of the Interior declined to carry out an examination, referring to the absence of \u201cfacilities or equipment for test-shooting 23 mm canisters with special gases\u201d. 17.  On an unspecified date, a number of carbines used by officers of the special mobile unit on 25 April 2006 were seized. 18.  In July and August 2006 the investigating authority commissioned ballistics reports from the Forensic Expert Centre of the Dagestan Ministry of the Interior and another local expert institution. However, the reports were not produced, apparently, on account of lack of sufficient technical facilities. 19.  On 6 September 2006 the Federal Office of Forensic Examination of the Federal Ministry of Justice was asked to prepare a ballistics report in order to determine which rifle had been fired at the victim. The investigating authority submitted the objects extracted from the victim\u2019s body, as well as thirteen carbines. 20.  On 19 October 2006 the authorities took the decision to open another criminal case concerning the charge of abuse of power by a public official causing death (Article 286 of the Criminal Code). It appears from the decision that it concerned persons other than the applicant\u2019s son. The decision read as follows:\n\u201cIt was established that police officers had had recourse to firearms ... Officers from the special mobile unit fired gunshots, using 23 mm cartridges, and teargas grenades, acting in violation of a directive dated 5 November 1996 and in excess of their powers... It is prohibited to fire these tear-gas canisters at a person. As a result, Mr N. and Mr A. sustained injuries.\u201d 21.  The above-mentioned cases were subsequently joined. 22.  On 8 November 2006 the Federal Office of Forensic Examination issued a report, the relevant parts of which read:\n\u201c ... As the relevant 23 mm cartridges had not been submitted for test shots, a request for 23 mm Volna cartridges was made to the relevant department of the Ministry of the Interior of the Russian Federation ... [Footnote: Volna cartridges are used for training purposes relating to the use of KS-23 and KS-23M carbines. These cartridges are similar to those normally used with these carbines. The only difference is that they do not contain the irritating chemical substance.] ...\nThe research part\n... 2.  ... I note that the tear-gas grenade has no striae left by the carbine used to fire it. This may be explained by the fact that the grenade could not have had contact with the interior of the carbine as it had been loaded into it with the aid of two obturators ... 5.  Test shots have been carried out in respect of the KS-23 and KS23M carbines that were submitted for the examination. The purpose of the test shots was to observe the striae left on the obturators of the grenades fired from these carbines, and to compare the striae with the striae left on the obturator of the grenade used against the victim. I have used 23 mm Volna cartridges for the test shots. These cartridges are similar to those that were submitted for the examination ... 6.  ... In view of the variance of the results of the test shots, it was impracticable to identify the relevant carbine on the basis of the striae left on the obturators ... in particular, on account of the elasticity and low thermo-resistance of the material used in the obturators ...\u201d 23.  On 15 November 2006 another ballistics report was requested from the Forensic Science Institute of the Federal Security Service (\u201cthe Institute\u201d). The Institute was likewise provided with thirteen carbines and the objects extracted from the victim\u2019s body. 24.  On 26 February 2007 the expert from the Institute issued a report stating that it was not practicable to determine which of the examined carbines had been used to shoot the cartridge. The forensic expert explained that she had been provided with Volna cartridges for the purpose of her research and for test shots, whereas the elements extracted from the victim\u2019s body were parts of a grenade. The forensic expert specified that Volna cartridges and tear-gas grenades had \u201cdifferent geometric parameters and are made of materials with different characteristics\u201d. 25.  On 26 February 2007 the investigating authority suspended the investigation. 26.  On 30 August 2007 the applicant\u2019s other son, Mr Rafik Nagmetov, brought court proceedings challenging the alleged inaction of the investigating authority. In a judgment of 8 October 2007 the Sovetskiy District Court of Makhachkala dismissed the complaint. The court held as follows:\n\u201cOver seventy people were interviewed in the course of the investigation. The necessary (medical, ballistics, criminological) examinations were carried out ... All carbines which had been used by the officers were seized ... All relevant officers were identified ... The logbooks concerning distribution of weapons and ammunition were examined ... On three occasions three different expert institutions were asked to submit ballistics reports. The requests were not complied with on account of the absence of the necessary equipment ... Attempts were made to identify the relevant rifle in other expert institutions ... Those were not equipped for this kind of forensic examination ... In consequence, the Federal Office of Forensic Examination was not able to identify the weapon ... Another request is pending before the Forensic Science Institute of the Federal Security Service ... Thus, the investigating authority has carried out all the investigative measures that were possible in the absence of an identified suspect.\u201d 27.  On 14 January 2008 the Supreme Court of the Republic of Dagestan upheld the judgment. 28.  The applicant\u2019s son, Mr Rafik Nagmetov, also sought judicial review of the suspension decision of 26 February 2007. On 25 July 2008 the District Court held that the suspension of the investigation was justified. However, on 8 September 2008 the appeal court quashed the judgment and ordered a re-examination of the complaint. In a judgment of 6 October 2008 the District Court granted the complaint, considering that by failing to submit appropriate comparative material to the forensic expert, the investigating authority failed to take \u201cexhaustive measures aimed at identifying the perpetrator\u201d. 29.  On an unspecified date, the applicant became aware that the evidence extracted from the body of his son had been lost. 30.  In November 2009 the applicant requested that the authorities commission an additional ballistics report and complained about the loss of the evidence. 31.  On 16 December 2009 the investigation was resumed. It appears that the investigating authority took some measures to clarify what had happened to the evidence. In particular, armourers from the special mobile unit were interviewed. The investigator also made an enquiry with the Institute referring to his difficulties in interpreting the report of 26 February 2007. It remains unclear what reply was received to this enquiry. 32.  According to the Government, the enquiry about the loss of evidence yielded no specific results, in particular on account of the death of the investigator in the case and the redeployment of the investigation unit. 33.  On 16 January 2010 the investigator again suspended the investigation. 34.  On 21 February 2011 the acting prosecutor of the Republic of Dagestan determined that this decision was unlawful and ordered a resumption of the investigation. The decision reads as follows:\n\u201cHaving examined the file, I conclude that the investigation did not exhaust the measures aimed at establishing the circumstances of the crime, at collecting the evidence and identifying the rifle used to cause the victim\u2019s death ... In particular, the request for a ballistics report to the Institute was submitted with Volna cartridges instead of the type of cartridges used for causing the victim\u2019s death. The different geometric parameters of these cartridges prevented the experts from identifying the carbine used against the victim ...\nFollowing the resumption of the investigation in December 2009 the investigator merely made an enquiry instead of actually submitting grenades for comparative research ...\nIt does not follow from the expert report of 26 February 2007 that it would have been impossible to identify the rifle, provided that cartridges of the relevant type were provided.\nThe evidence extracted from the victim\u2019s body was examined for the purposes of the above expert report. Thus, the current unavailability of this evidence is not an obstacle to seeking a new ballistics report from the same institution.\u201d 35.  Following the resumption of the investigation the investigator made enquiries with the Institute about the possibility of carrying out a ballistics examination in the absence of the evidence extracted from the victim\u2019s body. While it remains unclear what reply was received from the Institute, it does not appear that any new ballistics examination was carried out. 36.  On 17 April 2011 the investigating authority issued a decision suspending the investigation. This decision reads as follows:\n\u201cIt follows from the evidence in the case file that on 25 April 2006 inhabitants of nearby villages and other people blocked the road with stones and logs ... In reply to lawful orders from the police requiring them to disperse, unidentified people threw stones at the police, causing various physical injuries to eleven officers. The police officers used firearms to retaliate...\nOfficers of the special mobile unit fired shots with their pump-action shotguns towards the crowd, using 23 mm cartridges, and a tear-gas grenade. In so doing they violated a directive dated 5 November 1996 ... and acted in excess of their powers. As a result, [the applicant\u2019s son] and others sustained shotgun wounds ... causing [him] to die on the spot.\n...\nIt is impossible to commission another ballistics report in the absence of the cartridge. It has not been possible to identify the person who shot [the applicant\u2019s son].\u201d 37.  The applicant did not challenge this decision. 38.  On 11 July 2008 the applicant lodged an application before the Court. Relying on Article 2 of the Convention, the applicant argued that his son had died because of an unlawful and excessive use of lethal force. The investigations into his son\u2019s death were ineffective. In his application form the applicant sought \u201ccompensation for the related violations of the Convention\u201d albeit without specifying the type of damage and the amount. 39.  Following communication of the case, on 24 May 2012 Ms K. Kostromina, the applicant\u2019s representative, was invited to submit observations and claims for just satisfaction on behalf of the applicant. The relevant standard letter read as follows in this respect:\n\u201cThe President of the Section has instructed me to invite you to submit by 26 July 2012 ... any claims for just satisfaction. ...\nWith regard to just satisfaction claims, I would draw your attention to Rule 60 and would remind you that failure to submit within the time allowed quantified claims, together with the required supporting documents, entails the consequence that the Chamber will either make no award of just satisfaction or else reject the claim in part. This applies even if the applicants have indicated their wishes concerning just satisfaction at an earlier stage of the proceedings.\nThe criteria established by the Court\u2019s case-law when it rules on the question of just satisfaction (Article 41 of the Convention) are: (1) pecuniary damage, that is to say losses actually sustained as a direct consequence of the alleged violation; (2) non\u2011pecuniary damage, meaning compensation for suffering and distress occasioned by the violation; and (3) the costs and expenses incurred in order to prevent or obtain redress for the alleged violation of the Convention, both within the domestic legal system and through the Strasbourg proceedings. These costs must be itemised, and it must be established that they are reasonable and have been actually and necessarily incurred.\nYou must attach to your claims the necessary vouchers, such as bills of costs. The Government will then be invited to submit their comments on the matter.\nThese time-limits will not normally be extended.\u201d 40.  No such observations or claims were submitted by 26 July 2012. In a subsequent letter Ms Kostromina explained that, despite an informal agreement between them, her former legal office had not forwarded the mail to her new address (of which the Court had not been informed). On 11 October 2012 the President of the Section, on an exceptional basis, granted the lawyer leave to submit observations and claims, despite the expiry of the time-limit on 26 July 2012. The new time-limit was 22 November 2012. However, none were submitted by that date. The Government was informed that while no observations had been submitted within the time-limit, it transpired that the applicant wished to maintain his application before the Court and that the Court would therefore examine the case on the basis of the file as it stood at the time. 41.  The Rules of Court (adopted by the Plenary Court pursuant to Article 25 of the Convention) read in the relevant parts as follows at the relevant time:\n\u201cRule 36 \u2013 Representation of applicants\n... 2.  Following notification of the application to the respondent Contracting Party under Rule 54 \u00a7 2 (b), the applicant should be represented in accordance with paragraph 4 of this Rule, unless the President of the Chamber decides otherwise. ... 4.  (a) The representative acting on behalf of the applicant pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Rule shall be an advocate ..., or any other person approved by the President of the Chamber.\n(b)  In exceptional circumstances and at any stage of the procedure, the President of the Chamber may, where he or she considers that the circumstances or the conduct of the advocate or other person appointed under the preceding sub-paragraph so warrant, direct that the latter may no longer represent or assist the applicant and that the applicant should seek alternative representation. ...\nRule 60 \u2013 Claims for just satisfaction 1. An applicant who wishes to obtain an award of just satisfaction under Article 41 of the Convention in the event of the Court finding a violation of his or her Convention rights must make a specific claim to that effect. 2. The applicant must submit itemised particulars of all claims, together with any relevant supporting documents, within the time-limit fixed for the submission of the applicant\u2019s observations on the merits unless the President of the Chamber directs otherwise. 3. If the applicant fails to comply with the requirements set out in the preceding paragraphs the Chamber may reject the claims in whole or in part. 4. The applicant\u2019s claims shall be transmitted to the respondent Contracting Party for comment.\n...\nRule 75 \u2013 Ruling on just satisfaction 1.  Where the Chamber or the Committee finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, it shall give in the same judgment a ruling on the application of Article 41 of the Convention if a specific claim has been submitted in accordance with Rule 60 and the question is ready for decision; if the question is not ready for decision, the Chamber or the Committee shall reserve it in whole or in part and shall fix the further procedure ...\u201d 42.  The Practice Direction on Just Satisfaction Claims (issued by the President of the Court in accordance with Rule 32 of the Rules of Court on 28 March 2007) read in the relevant parts as follows at the relevant time:\n\u201c4. Claimants are warned that compliance with the formal and substantive requirements deriving from the Convention and the Rules of Court is a condition for the award of just satisfaction.\nII. Submitting claims for just satisfaction: formal requirements 5. Time-limits and other formal requirements for submitting claims for just satisfaction are laid down in Rule 60 of the Rules of Court ... Thus, the Court requires specific claims supported by appropriate documentary evidence, failing which it may make no award. The Court will also reject claims set out on the application form but not resubmitted at the appropriate stage of the proceedings and claims lodged out of time.\nIII. Submitting claims for just satisfaction: substantive requirements\n... 13.  The Court\u2019s award in respect of non-pecuniary damage is intended to provide financial compensation for non-material harm, for example mental or physical suffering. 14.  It is in the nature of non-pecuniary damage that it does not lend itself to precise calculation. If the existence of such damage is established, and if the Court considers that a monetary award is necessary, it will make an assessment on an equitable basis, having regard to the standards which emerge from its case-law. 15.  Applicants who wish to be compensated for non-pecuniary damage are invited to specify a sum which in their view would be equitable. Applicants who consider themselves victims of more than one violation may claim either a single lump sum covering all alleged violations or a separate sum in respect of each alleged violation.\n... 23.  The Court\u2019s awards, if any, will normally be in the form of a sum of money to be paid by the respondent Contracting Party to the victim or victims of the violations found. Only in extremely rare cases can the Court consider a consequential order aimed at putting an end or remedying the violation in question. The Court may, however, decide at its discretion to offer guidance for the execution of its judgment (Article 46 of the Convention).\u201d", "references": ["3", "5", "6", "2", "8", "7", "4", "9", "1", "No Label", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicants, Bangladeshi migrants living in Greece without a work permit, were recruited on different dates between October 2012 and February 2013 in Athens and other places, to work on the region\u2019s biggest strawberry farm, at Manolada, a village of two thousand inhabitants in the regional district of Elis, in the western part of the Peloponnese peninsula. In that area there are a number of production units, of various sizes, specialising in the intensive cultivation of strawberries. Exports account for 70% of the local production, which covers 90% of the Greek market. Most of the workers are irregular migrants from Pakistan and Bangladesh. Some are employed on the farms permanently and others only on a seasonal basis. 6.  The production unit in question was run by T.A. and N.V., the applicants\u2019 employers.\nThe applicants were among a total of 150 workers divided into three teams, each one headed by a Bangladeshi national who reported to T.A. 7.  The workers had been promised a wage of 22 euros (EUR) for seven hours\u2019 work and three euros for each hour of overtime, with three euros per day deducted for food. They worked in greenhouses every day from 7 a.m. to 7 p.m. picking strawberries under the supervision of armed guards employed by T.A. They lived in makeshift shacks made of cardboard, nylon and bamboo, without toilets or running water. According to them, their employers had warned them that they would only receive their wages if they continued to work for them. 8.  On three occasions \u2013 in late February 2013, mid-March 2013 and on 15 April 2013 \u2013 the workers went on strike demanding payment of their unpaid wages, but without success.\nOn 17 April 2013 the employers recruited other Bangladeshi migrants to work in the fields. Fearing that they would not be paid, between one hundred and one hundred and fifty workers from the 2012-2013 season who worked in the fields started moving towards the two employers, who were on the spot, in order to demand their wages. One of the armed guards then opened fire against the workers, seriously injuring thirty of them, including twenty-one of the applicants (listed under numbers 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 14, 15, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, 29, 33, 38, 39 and 42). The wounded were taken to hospital and were subsequently questioned by police. 9.  On 18 and 19 April 2013 the police arrested N.V. and T.A., together with the guard who had fired the shots and another armed overseer. During the preliminary investigation by the local police, a number of other Bangladeshis, including some who had worked with the suspects, were used as interpreters. 10.  On 19 April 2013 the Amaliada public prosecutor charged the four suspects with attempted murder and other offences, and also, in response to a request from the prosecutor at the Court of Cassation, with human trafficking under Article 323A of the Criminal Code. The charge of attempted murder was subsequently reclassified as grievous bodily harm. 11.  On 22 April 2013 the Amaliada public prosecutor acknowledged that thirty-five workers \u2013 including four team-leaders \u2013, who had all been injured during the incident, were victims of human trafficking, thus making them lawful residents under section 12 of Law no. 3064/2002 (on the repression of human trafficking, crimes against sexual freedom, child pornography, and more generally sexual exploitation). 12.  On 8 May 2013 one hundred and twenty other workers, including the twenty-one applicants who had not been injured (listed under numbers 1, 2, 3, 5, 10, 11, 12, 13, 16, 17, 18, 27, 30, 31, 32, 34, 35, 36, 37, 40 and 41), applied to the Amaliada public prosecutor for charges of human trafficking, attempted murder and assault, in respect of them also, to be brought against the four defendants. They stated that they had been employed on the farm run by T.A. and N.V. in conditions of human trafficking and forced labour and that they were part of the group which had come under fire. Relying on the Additional Protocol to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, known as the \u201cPalermo Protocol\u201d, of December 2000 (\u201cto Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons\u201d), they asked the public prosecutor to bring charges under Article 323A of the Criminal Code against their employers, accusing them of exploiting them in a work-related context. They further alleged that, on 17 April 2013, they had also been present at the scene of the incident and that they had gone there to demand their unpaid wages, with the result that they were also victims of the offences committed against the other thirty-five complainants. 13.  The police questioned each of the above-mentioned twenty-one applicants, who signed a record containing their statements, which had been given under oath and were accompanied by their photos, and they forwarded the statements to the public prosecutor. 14.  In decision 26/2014 of 4 August 2014, the Amaliada public prosecutor rejected the application of the one hundred and twenty workers. He emphasised that those workers had been sought in order to give testimony during the preliminary investigation and that only one hundred and two of them had been traced and interviewed (including the twenty-one applicants mentioned in paragraph 12 above). He noted that it transpired from their statements and other material in the file that their allegations did not correspond to the reality. He explained that if they had really been the victims of the offences complained of, they would have gone to the police immediately on 17 April 2013, like the thirty-five other workers had done, and would not have waited until 8 May 2013. In his view, the claim that the complainants had been afraid and had left their huts was not credible because they had been close to the scene of the incident and, when the police arrived, they could have returned to make their complaints known. He further noted that only four out of the hundred and two complainants interviewed had stated they had been injured and that, unlike the thirty-five workers mentioned above, none of those four workers had gone to hospital. Lastly, he observed that all the complainants had stated that they had made statements to the police after learning that they would receive residence permits as victims of human trafficking. 15.  On 28 January 2015 the public prosecutor at Patras Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals of the one hundred and twenty workers against decision no. 26/2014 on the grounds that the material in the case file did not substantiate their allegations and that they had sought to present themselves as victims of human trafficking in order to obtain residence permits (decision no. 3/2015). 16.  The accused were committed to stand trial in Patras Assize Court. Only N.V. was charged with committing the offence of human trafficking. The three other defendants, namely T.A. and the two armed overseers, were charged with aiding and abetting that offence. The hearings began on 6 June 2014 and ended on 30 July 2014. The thirty-five workers mentioned above joined the proceedings as civil parties and were represented by their lawyers V. Kerasiotis and M. Karabe\u00efdis, whose fees were paid by the Greek Council for Refugees and the Hellenic League for Human Rights. 17.  In his oral submissions the public prosecutor pointed out that the applicants who had been injured in the incident had been living and working in Greece without any permit, at the mercy of networks which exploited human beings and in conditions which enabled them to be characterised as victims of human trafficking. In his view both the material element and the mental element of this offence were made out in the present case. 18.  The public prosecutor further emphasised that exploitation in a labour context was part of the notion of exploitation provided for in European and other international law instruments as a means of committing the offence of human trafficking. He indicated that Article 4 of the Convention and Article 22 of the Greek Constitution prohibited forced or compulsory labour. He explained that the notion of exploitation through work included all acts which constituted a breach of employment law, such as the provisions concerning working hours, working conditions and workers\u2019 insurance. In his view, that form of exploitation also obtained through the performance of work for the benefit of the offender himself. 19.  Referring to the facts of the case, the public prosecutor explained that the employer, N.V., had not paid the workers for six months, that he had only paid them a very small sum for food, deducted from their wages, and had promised to pay the rest later. He observed as follows: that the defendants were unscrupulous and imposed themselves by making threats and carrying weapons; the workers laboured in extreme physical conditions, had to work long hours and were constantly humiliated; on 17 April 2013, N.V. had informed the workers that he would not pay them and would kill them, with the help of his co-accused, if they did not carry on working for him; as the workers had not given in to the threats, he had told them to leave and said that he would take on another team in their place and that he would burn down their huts if they refused to leave. He lastly noted that, when he recruited them, N.V. had promised the complainants makeshift shelters and a daily wage of EUR 22 \u2013 which in his view was the only solution for the victims to be sure of a means of subsistence \u2013 and that N.V. had thus succeeded, at that point, in obtaining their consent in order to be able to exploit them subsequently. 20.  The public prosecutor asserted that the incident of 17 April 2013 was illustrative of a situation of over-exploitation and barbaric treatment to which the major landowners in the region had subjected the migrant workers. He took the view that the incident had been a barbaric and armed aggression by Greek employers against the migrants, conjuring up images of a \u201csouthern slave-trade\u201d which had no place in Greece. 21.  At the hearing, one of the witnesses, an officer from the police station of Amaliada, stated that one or two days before the incident of 17 April 2013 some workers had gone to the police station to complain that their employers had refused to pay them their wages and that one of his colleagues had subsequently had a telephone conversation with N.V. on this subject. 22.  In a judgment of 30 July 2014, the Assize Court acquitted the four defendants on the charge of trafficking in human beings, on the ground that the material element of the offence was not made out in the present case. It convicted one of the armed guards and T.A. of grievous bodily harm and unlawful use of firearms, sentencing them to prison for terms of fourteen years and seven months and eight years and seven months, respectively. As regards the overseer who had been responsible for the shots, it took the view that he had not intended to kill those who were attacked in the incident and that he had been trying to make them move away so that the newly recruited workers would not be approached by them. As to N.V., it acquitted him on the ground that it had not been established that he was one of the workers\u2019 employers (and therefore that he was obliged to pay them their wages) or that he had been involved as an instigator of the armed attack against them. The Assize Court commuted their prison sentences to a financial penalty of 5 euros per day of detention. It also ordered the two convicted men to pay the sum of EUR 1,500 to the thirty-five workers who were recognised as victims (about EUR 43 per person). 23.  The Assize Court noted that the workers\u2019 conditions of employment had provided that they would receive: EUR 22 for seven hours of work and EUR 3 for each additional hour; food, of which the cost would be deducted from their wages; and materials for the construction of electrified huts next to their plantations, at their employers\u2019 expense, to satisfy their basic accommodation needs \u2013 while allowing them the option of living elsewhere in the region. It noted that these conditions had been brought to the knowledge of the workers by their fellow countrymen who were team-leaders. 24.  The Assize Court thus observed that the workers had been informed of their conditions of employment and that they had accepted them after finding them satisfactory. As to the amount of the wages, it found that this was the usual amount paid by the other producers in the region and the workers had not been obliged to accept it. In the court\u2019s view, the information provided to the workers by their team-leaders and their compatriots working for other employers about the reliable payment of wages constituted a major factor in the choice of T.A. as employer. The Assize Court further noted that, until the end of February 2013, the workers had not made any complaint about their employer, whether concerning his conduct or the payment of wages, and they had only started to complain at the end of February or the beginning of March 2013 about a delay in payment. 25.  Moreover, the Assize Court rejected the workers\u2019 allegations that they had not received any wages and had been subjected to a threatening and intimidating attitude, on the part of the defendants, throughout the duration of their work, on the following grounds: those allegations had been expressed for the first time at the hearing, and not at the stage of the preliminary enquiries or investigation; certain intimidating acts had led the complainants to leave their place of work; and the description of these acts was particularly imprecise and vague. The Assize Court also noted that it transpired from the testimony of the workers that, during their free time, they were able to move freely around the region, do their shopping in shops which operated by agreement with the defendants, play cricket and take part in an association set up by their compatriots. It added that it had not been shown that T.A. had, under false pretences and by means of promises, coerced the workers into agreeing to work for him by taking advantage of their situation of vulnerability, especially as it found that they were not in such a situation. 26.  The Assize Court took the view that it had also been shown that the relations between the workers and their employers had been governed by a binding employment relationship and its conditions were not intended to trap the workers or to lead to their domination by the employers. On that point, it explained that the conditions had not led the complainants to live in a state of exclusion from the outside world, without any possibility for them to abandon this relationship and look for another job. It further noted that the workers had been in a position to negotiate their conditions of employment at the time of their recruitment and that their unlawful presence in Greece had not been used by their employers as a means of coercion to force them to continue working. 27.  The Assize Court indicated that, for the notion of vulnerability to be constituted, the victim had to be in a state of impoverishment such that his refusal to submit to the offender would appear absurd; in other words the victim had to be in a state of absolute weakness preventing him from protecting himself. It added that the victim would be exploited, as a result of his vulnerability, if he unconditionally submitted himself to the offender and was cut off from the outside world, which in the court\u2019s view was not the case here since: (a) the relations between the workers and their employers had been governed by a binding employment relationship, and (b) its conditions were not intended to trap the workers or to lead to their domination by the employers, such that the workers might be cut off from the outside world and find it impossible to withdraw from the employment relationship and find another job. The Assize Court further observed that most of the workers had stated that they would have continued to work for their employers had they been paid their wages. 28.  Lastly, as to the workers\u2019 allegation that they had received death threats from the defendants \u2013 an allegation that it did not accept \u2013, the Assize Court took the view that, if that statement had been true the workers would have left their place of work without hesitation. The fact of fearing for their lives would have prevailed over any other consideration (such as: their unpaid wage demands; their need to earn a living, which allegedly could not have been satisfied in view of the objective inability to find another job; and all the other arguments that the workers had put forward to justify the fact that they had continued to work). 29.  On 30 July 2014 the convicted defendants appealed against the judgment of the Assize Court. The appeal, which is still pending before that same court, has suspensive effect. 30.  On 21 October 2014 the workers\u2019 lawyers lodged an application with the public prosecutor at the Court of Cassation asking him to appeal against the Assize Court judgment. In their application they submitted that the Assize Court had not adequately examined the charge of human trafficking. They took the view that, in order to determine whether that court had properly applied Article 323A of the Criminal Code, it was necessary to examine whether the accused had taken advantage of any vulnerability of the foreign nationals in order to exploit them. 31.  On 27 October 2014 the prosecutor refused to lodge an appeal. He gave reasons for his decision, indicating only that the statutory conditions for an appeal on points of law were not met. As a result of this decision, the part of the 30 July 2014 judgment concerning human trafficking became \u201cirrevocable\u201d (\u03b1\u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03ac\u03ba\u03bb\u03b7\u03c4\u03b7).", "references": ["7", "9", "2", "6", "8", "3", "5", "1", "0", "4", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1947 and lives in Yerevan. 6.  On an unspecified date the applicant brought a claim in the Arabkir and Kanaker-Zeytun District Court of Yerevan against K., a private individual, seeking payment of a certain amount of money. It appears that before the beginning of the court\u2019s examination of the case the applicant and K. concluded an agreement to settle the debt, which envisaged, inter alia, a time-frame for payment. 7.  On 3 May 2005 the District Court delivered a judgment upholding the settlement. It also stated that bailiffs would enforce the judgment if it was not complied with. No appeal was lodged and the judgment became final. 8.  As K. did not comply with the terms of the settlement, the District Court issued a writ of execution and on 13 June 2005 a bailiff instituted enforcement proceedings. According to the applicant, the bailiff found no funds or property belonging to K. during the enforcement procedure. 9.  By a letter of 7 June 2007 the bailiff informed the applicant that he had found out during the enforcement proceedings that K. had inherited a house but had not registered her ownership of it. The bailiff advised the applicant to institute proceedings against K. in order to have her ownership of the house recognised. 10.  It appears that later in 2007 the applicant brought a claim in the Arabkir and Kanaker-Zeytun District Court to have K.\u2019s ownership of the house recognised. 11.  On 24 October 2007 the District Court, relying on Article 1225 \u00a7 5 of the Civil Code, granted the applicant\u2019s claim and recognised K. as the owner of the house in question. There was no appeal and the judgment became final. 12.  On 19 November 2007 the bailiff, acting on a writ of execution issued by the District Court, instituted proceedings to enforce the judgment of 24 October 2007. 13.  On 22 November 2007 the bailiff requested that the State Committee of the Real Estate Registry recognise K.\u2019s ownership of the house, register it and issue a copy of the ownership certificate. 14.  In reply, the Real Estate Registry on 4 December 2007 informed the bailiff that in order to register K.\u2019s rights to the house it needed an application from K., the original of the District Court\u2019s judgment of 24 October 2007 and receipts for the State fee and other related payments. It also mentioned that K. was unlawfully occupying a plot of land whose status was unclear. 15.  On 8 February, 4 July and 4 August 2008 respectively, the bailiff made similar requests to the Real Estate Registry in which he stated, with reference to section 22 of the Law on the State Registration of Property Rights, that an application from K. was not required. He also stated that the issue of registration-related payments would be decided upon initiation of the registration process and that receipts would be submitted. 16.  In 2008 the applicant brought a claim in the Administrative Court against the Real Estate Registry and the bailiff, seeking to oblige them respectively to register K.\u2019s ownership of the house and to confiscate it from her. 17.  On 1 December 2008 the Administrative Court granted the applicant\u2019s claim by ordering the Real Estate Registry to register K.\u2019s rights to the house and the bailiff to confiscate it from her. In particular, the Administrative Court found that both the refusal of the Real Estate Registry to register K.\u2019s ownership rights and the non-enforcement by the bailiff of the judgment of 3 May 2005 owing to a lack of funds on the part of K. had been groundless as K.\u2019s ownership of the house had been recognised by the final court judgment of 24 October 2007. It appears that no appeal was lodged against the Administrative Court\u2019s judgment and it became final. 18.  According to the applicant, none of the three court judgments was enforced. 19.  On 18 February 2010 the applicant sought the payment of interest by K. via a claim in the District Court. On 1 March 2011 the District Court accepted his claim and ordered K. to pay him 17,727 US dollars (USD), to be converted into Armenian drams. The judgment became final on 1 April 2011. The applicant sought enforcement of the judgment on 2 April 2012 but was refused by the bailiff since he had failed to act within the time-limit of one year starting from the final judgment. That term had expired on 1 April 2012. Moreover, the applicant had also failed to submit a power of attorney to the bailiff. 20.  On 10 February 2012 K. submitted a receipt for the payment of the debt to the bailiff and he terminated the enforcement proceedings on 13 February 2012.", "references": ["2", "5", "0", "4", "6", "7", "8", "1", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicants were born in 1938, 1940 and 1961 respectively. The first two applicants live in Dolni Dabnik and the third applicant lives in Sofia. The first two applicants are the third applicant\u2019s parents. 5.  In 1990 the three applicants bought from the State a flat in Sofia measuring 144 square metres, which had become property of the State by virtue of the nationalisations carried out by the communist regime after 1945. 6.  In 1992 the heir of the pre-nationalisation owner of the flat brought an action against the applicants under section 7 of the Restitution Law, seeking to establish that their title was null and void. She also brought a rei vindicatio claim against them. 7.  The proceedings ended with a final judgment of the Supreme Court of Cassation on 22 June 2004. The domestic courts dealing with the proceedings allowed both actions against the applicants. In relation to the action under section 7 of the Restitution Law, the courts found the applicants\u2019 title null and void, since they had bought their flat in breach of the law: the area where the flat was located had been earmarked for the construction of buildings of more than three storeys, and the applicants\u2019 building was of two storeys; and the legislation at the time prohibited the sale of flats in such buildings. 8.  It appears that on an unspecified date after that the applicants applied for compensation bonds; however, the parties have not informed the Court of the outcome of the procedure. 9.  In 2005 the applicants brought a tort action against the Sofia municipality (which was the legal successor of the State with regard to residential property). On 20 January 2010 the Sofia City Court allowed their claim. That judgment was quashed on 4 November 2010 by the Sofia Court of Appeal, which dismissed the claim in its entirety. In a final judgment of 4 April 2012 the Supreme Court of Cassation, finding that the applicants were only entitled to receive the price they had paid for the flat in 1990, which had devalued enormously over the years, awarded them the equivalent of about 12 euros (EUR).", "references": ["3", "6", "8", "1", "7", "0", "4", "2", "5", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicants were placed in pre-trial detention at Thessaloniki General Police Headquarters on Monasteriou St in Thessaloniki. They were detained for periods ranging from one to eight months. 5.  The applicants mentioned below left the General Police Headquarters on the following dates: the first applicant on 16 August 2012, the sixth applicant on 20 August 2012, the thirteenth applicant on 14 August 2012 and the nineteenth applicant on 17 June 2012. It is not clear from the material in the Court\u2019s possession whether they were released or transferred to prisons. 6.  The eleventh applicant was detained at Thessaloniki General Police Headquarters from 7 May 2012 to 18 September 2012, except for the period between 5 July 2012 and 1 August 2012, when he was detained at the Thessaloniki Aliens Division. The fourteenth applicant was detained at Thessaloniki General Police Headquarters from 16 July 2012 to 3 September 2012, apart from 17 August 2012 to 27 August 2012, when he was held at Menemeni police station. The sixteenth applicant was detained at Thessaloniki General Police Headquarters from 18 April 2012 to 24 September 2012, except for the period between 27 April 2012 and 11 July 2012, when he was detained at the Thessaloniki Aliens Division. The seventeenth applicant was detained at Thessaloniki General Police Headquarters from 25 April 2012 to 14 August 2012, except for 11 June 2012 to 1 August 2012, when he was detained at the Thessaloniki Aliens Division. The eighteenth applicant was detained at Thessaloniki General Police Headquarters from 16 July 2012 to 25 December 2012, except for 16 August 2012 to 16 October 2012, when he was held at Menemeni police station. 7.  The applicants alleged that Thessaloniki General Police Headquarters had been entirely inappropriate for long periods of detention, as in their case. The cells had been insufficiently lit and ventilated, which, in addition to overcrowding, had led to their cells smelling badly. 8.  Detainees had been confined to their cells owing to the lack of an exercise yard. Recreational activities had not been offered and cells had not been equipped with televisions. Detainees had had to ask permission from the guards to use the restroom, which had been situated outside the cells and had been shared by seventy people. 9.  There had not been sufficient separation between detainees who were drug users or smokers and other detainees. Additionally, the cells had never been disinfected nor the mattresses cleaned. Detainees had not been allowed to bring their own sheets and towels, but had been obliged to use dirty ones provided by the prison authorities. 10.  As regards nutrition, meals had been of an insufficient quality and quantity and had never included meat. Detainees had not been provided with water but had had to buy it themselves. 11.  On 30 August 2012 the applicants and other detainees had lodged a complaint with the public prosecutor about the conditions of their detention at Thessaloniki Police Headquarters but had not received a reply. 12.  The eleventh, fourteenth, sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth applicants submitted in their written observations of 13 September 2013 that the conditions of their detention at the Thessaloniki Aliens Division and Menemeni police station had essentially been the same as those at the police headquarters, in particular as regards the lack of outdoor activities, the quality of the food and the filthiness of the premises. 13.  The Government submitted that Thessaloniki General Police Headquarters had had nineteen cells with a total capacity of seventy-three people. Fifteen cells with capacity for fifty-five inmates had accommodated male detainees, one cell for six people had accommodated females while three cells with capacity for twelve people had been set aside for minors. 14.  Most of the cells had windows, which had been partially covered by walls and rails but which had still admitted natural light and fresh air. The sanitary facilities had been no different from the ones used by the Police Headquarters staff and had been cleaned by a cleaning company every day, along with the rest of the premises. Sheets and blankets had been regularly sent to the Thessaloniki General Detention Facility (Diavata Prison) for cleaning. If detainees had suffered from a contagious disease, their sheets and blankets had been destroyed following their departure. 15.  Detainees were allowed access to newspapers, magazines and four payphones. Additionally, they were allowed visits from their lawyers at any time and from friends and family four times per week. 16.  Detainees were served food from the restaurant situated in the building, which was the same as that used by police officers. 17.  The Thessaloniki Aliens Division, where the eleventh, sixteenth and seventeenth applicants had been detained for several months, had ten cells measuring 58.85 square metres each, which included two toilets and showers. The eleventh, sixteenth and seventeenth applicants had been detained in cell no. 3 along with a number of other detainees whose number had varied from nine to fifteen. The cells had been sufficiently well-lit and ventilated and had been regularly cleaned. Meals had been provided by a catering company. Detainees had access to newspapers and televisions and were allowed visits from their family and friends three times per week. 18.  As regards Menemeni police station, where the fourteenth and eighteenth applicants had been detained for a certain period of time, the Government submitted that it was housed in a building constructed in 2008. The fourteenth and eighteenth applicants had been detained in a cell of 26 square metres accommodating five detainees. The cells had been sufficiently well-lit and ventilated and a cleaning company had maintained the cleanliness of the premises. Detainees had received 5.87 euros per day to order food from restaurants. 19.  The Government further contended that the applicants\u2019 allegations of a lack of separation between drug users and other detainees should be rejected as the applicants had not alleged that they themselves had been detained in the same cells as drug users.", "references": ["4", "8", "2", "0", "6", "9", "3", "5", "7", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1949 and lives in Antratsit, Ukraine. 5.  In 1996 the applicant was dismissed from the State Enterprise Coal Mine \u201cYur-Shor\u201d (\u00ab\u0413\u043e\u0441\u0443\u0434\u0430\u0440\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0435 \u043f\u0440\u0435\u0434\u043f\u0440\u0438\u044f\u0442\u0438\u0435 \u00ab\u0428\u0430\u0445\u0442\u0430 \u00ab\u042e\u0440\u2011\u0428\u043e\u0440\u00bb, \u201cthe coal mine\u201d). According to the Government, the mine was incorporated as a state unitary enterprise. In January 1999 the insolvency proceedings were opened in respect of the mine. 6.  On 28 October 1999 the Vorkuta Town Court of the Komi Republic (The Town Court) awarded the applicant the equivalent of 1,591 euros (EUR) in salary and allowances\u2019 arrears against the coal mine. It appears that the award became final ten days later. 7.  The applicant submits, without further details, that the bailiffs did not take measures to execute the judgment. 8.  On 27 December 1999 a prosecutor advised the applicant that as from 1 January 1999 the coal mine\u2019s own funds had discontinued and the salary arrears were to be paid from the federal budget. He informed the applicant that the judgment in his favour could not be enforced, since no funds had been allocated from the federal budget for these purposes. 9.  On 3 April 2001 the Town Court ordered the coal mine to pay the applicant EUR 51 for court expenses. 10.  On 24 April 2002 the Town Court allowed the applicant\u2019s claim for index-linking of the award of 28 October 1999 and held that the coal mine should pay him EUR 912 under this head. 11.  It appears that the awards of 28 October 1999, 3 April 2001 and 24 April 2002 in the applicant\u2019s favour have not been enforced to date. 12.  The applicant sued various domestic authorities for non-pecuniary damages and index-linking of unpaid salary. On 21 January 2004 the Town Court granted his action in part, having found, inter alia, that the coal mine could not claim lack of funds as an excuse for non-enforcement of the earlier judgments in the applicant\u2019s favour. The court further found that awards made on 28 October 1999, 3 April 2001 and 24 April 2002 in the amount of EUR 1,966 should be paid to the applicant by the Ministry of Energy, since the latter had been designated by the Government to finance the debts of the coal mine, in so far as the salary arrears and related social payments prior to the decision to wind up the company were concerned. The court specified that the awarded sums should be transferred by a local branch of the State Treasury to the coal mine, with view of their subsequent transfer to the applicant. The payment was to be made via a State-owned Enterprise \u201cSotsugol\u201d (\u00ab\u0413\u041f \u00ab\u0421\u043e\u0446\u0443\u0433\u043e\u043b\u044c\u00bb). The judgment became final on 23 September 2004, as upheld by the Supreme Court of the Komi Republic. 13.  On 21 January 2004 the Town Court by a separate decision obliged the coal mine to index-link the unpaid court awards and to pay the applicant EUR 527. The decision acquired legal force on 23 September 2004. 14.  On 7 December 2004 the Town Court ordered to index-link the awards of 21 January 2004 and held that the Ministry of Energy should pay the applicant EUR 155 and the coal mine EUR 41 respectively. The judgment entered into force on 20 December 2004. 15.  It appears that the judgments of 21 January 2004 and 7 December 2004 and the decision of 21 January 2004 have not been enforced to date. 16.  At some point the applicant claimed modification of the judgment of 21 January 2004, so that the respondent Ministry be replaced in the enforcement proceedings by the Ministry of Industry and Energy of the Russian Federation. On 30 November 2005 his application was rejected by the Town Court as having no grounds in the domestic law. It appears that the decision was not appealed against. 17.  On 28 December 2005 the Liquidation Commission of the Ministry of Energy informed the applicant that the Ministry had been liquidated and had no longer been in receipt of the funds from the federal budget and that the execution documents in respect of the Ministry\u2019s debts could no longer be accepted by the commission. 18.  The applicant further claimed that the respondent Ministry be replaced by \u201cSotsugol\u201d. On 8 June 2006 the Supreme Court of the Komi Republic in the final instance rejected his request.", "references": ["6", "7", "8", "1", "2", "0", "4", "5", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
+{"input": "6.  The application concerns the murder on 15 January 2005 of Elmas, Zerrin and Eyl\u00fcl G\u00fczelyurtlu, all Cypriot nationals of Turkish Cypriot origin. 7.  The applicants are the family of the deceased. The first, second and third applicants are the children of Elmas and Zerrin G\u00fczelyurtlu and the brother and sisters, respectively, of Eyl\u00fcl G\u00fczelyurtlu. The fourth and fifth applicants are Zerrin G\u00fczelyurtlu\u2019s sisters, and the sixth and seventh applicants are her parents. 8.  The first five applicants were born in 1978, 1976, 1980, 1962 and 1956 respectively. The sixth and seventh applicants were both born in 1933. The first, fifth, sixth and seventh applicants live in the \u201cTRNC\u201d. The second, third and fourth applicants live in the United Kingdom. 9.  Elmas G\u00fczelyurtlu was a businessman and used to live with his wife Zerrin and daughter Eyl\u00fcl in the \u201cTRNC\u201d. In 2000, following the collapse of the bank that Elmas G\u00fczelyurtlu owned, Elmas G\u00fczelyurtlu fled to and settled in Larnaca, in the Cypriot-Government-controlled areas. His wife and daughter joined him in 2001. In 2003 they moved to the Ayios Dometios district of Nicosia. 10.  On 15 January 2005 at about 8.00 a.m. on the Nicosia-Larnaca highway, near the Athiainou exit, a police officer spotted a black Lexus car parked on the hard shoulder. The engine was running, the left turn indicator light was flashing and the door of the front passenger seat was open. 11.  Zerrin and Eyl\u00fcl G\u00fczelyurtlu were found dead on the back seat of the car. Elmas G\u00fczelyurtlu was lying dead at a distance of 1.5 metres from the car in a nearby ditch. All three were in pyjamas and slippers. Zerrin G\u00fczelyurtlu had adhesive tape on her neck and two rolls of adhesive tape in her hands. Both Zerrin G\u00fczelyurtlu and her daughter Eyl\u00fcl G\u00fczelyurtlu had redness (\u03b5\u03c1\u03c5\u03b8\u03c1\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1) on the edges of their hands, which indicated that they had been tied with adhesive tape. They also had bruises on their shins which had been sustained in a struggle. 12.  The particulars of the investigation and the measures taken, as submitted by the Cypriot Government and as can be seen from the documents contained in the case file, may be summarised as follows. 13.  The police officer who discovered the bodies informed Nicosia police headquarters. A number of police officers (some of them high-ranking), arrived at about 8.35 a.m. at the crime scene, which had already been secured and sealed off. 14.  A detailed on-the-spot investigation was immediately conducted by the police and a forensic pathologist. Photographs were taken and a video recording was made. Two bullets, two cartridge cases and a kitchen knife were found inside the car. A third cartridge case was found outside the car. 15.  An investigation team consisting of eight officers was set up. 16.  The car was taken away for further inspection. 17.  At about 9.25 a.m. officers went to the victims\u2019 house in Ayios Dometios. The house was secured and sealed off. An investigation was carried out by the investigation team and a forensic pathologist. Photographs and fingerprints were taken and a video recording made at the scene. The investigation determined that the perpetrators of the murders had broken into the house through a window. A suction cup (\u03b2\u03b5\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03b6\u03b1) and pieces of adhesive tape were found outside the window. Adhesive tape was found in the victims\u2019 bedrooms, the living room and the car park. The security system had been switched off at 4.35 a.m. on that day and one of the cameras appeared to have been turned upwards at 4.29 a.m. 18.  Numerous exhibits were collected from the scene of the crime and the victims\u2019 home. These were sent for forensic examination. 19.  On the same day the victims\u2019 bodies were taken to the mortuary at Larnaca General Hospital for a post-mortem examination. Death certificates were issued. 20.  On 16 January 2005 post-mortem examinations were carried out by a forensic pathologist. It was determined that each of the three victims had died of severe craniocerebral injury caused by a shot from a firearm at close range and that their deaths had been the result of a criminal act. Photographs were taken and a video recording made of the post-mortem examinations. A diary of action (\u03b7\u03bc\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03b9\u03bf \u03b5\u03bd\u03ad\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1\u03c2) was kept by one of the police officers present during the post-mortem examinations, which recorded, inter alia, the actions and findings of the forensic pathologist. 21.  The investigation included the tracing and questioning of numerous witnesses, searching the records of vehicles that had gone through the crossing points between north and south, and examining the security system of the victims\u2019 house and computer hard discs for relevant material concerning the movements of persons and vehicles near the house at the material time. The source of the suction cup and the adhesive tape was determined to be a shop in Kyrenia (in northern Cyprus). 22.  From the evidence collected it appeared that on 15 January 2005, between 5.15 a.m. and 5.20 am, three shots had been heard from the area in which the car and the victims were found. 23.  According to the witness statements taken by the police, at the time the murders were committed a BMW car without number plates was seen parked behind the victims\u2019 car. Four persons were seen standing around the cars and one person was seen in the passenger\u2019s seat of the Lexus car. It was further ascertained that on 14 January 2005, at 11.00 p.m., a red BMW car with \u201cTRNC\u201d number plates had passed through the Pergamos crossing point located in the British Eastern Sovereign Base Area of Dhekelia but without passing through the Base Area\u2019s checkpoint. At 5.45 a.m. the next day the same car had returned to the \u201cTRNC\u201d through the same crossing point \u2013 again without being checked. The driver of the car, who resided in the \u201cTRNC\u201d, had been accompanied by another person. 24.  From the evidence gathered, it was determined that the victims had been kidnapped at 4.41 a.m. on 15 January 2005 and had been murdered between 5.15 and 5.20 a.m. 25.  According to the relevant police reports, five vehicles and more than eight people were involved in the murder; a fact which pointed to a well-planned and premeditated crime. 26.  A ballistics examination established that the bullets had been fired from the same handgun; two of the cartridge cases had been of Romanian manufacture and one of Turkish manufacture. 27.  The initial investigation resulted in the identification of five suspects: M.C. (\u201cthe first suspect\u201d), E.F. (\u201cthe second suspect\u201d), F.M. (\u201cthe third suspect\u201d), M.M. (\u201cthe fourth suspect\u201d) and H.O. (\u201cthe fifth suspect\u201d). It appears from the documents submitted to the Court that the first, second, third and fourth suspects were Cypriot nationals and \u201cTRNC\u201d citizens and that the fifth suspect was a Turkish national. 28.  DNA belonging to the first, second and fourth suspects was found on exhibits taken from the crime scene and the victims\u2019 house. DNA belonging to the first suspect was found on the steering wheel of Elmas G\u00fczelyurtlu\u2019s car. The police authorities already had DNA from these three suspects as they had taken genetic material from all of them in the past in connection with other offences (unlawful possession of a firearm and burglary). Moreover, the BMW car was found to be registered in the name of the fourth suspect and to have been driven by the first suspect. 29.  Arrest warrants had already been issued in respect of these three suspects with regard to other offences; the first suspect was wanted in relation to a drugs case and for obtaining a passport and identity card issued by the Republic of Cyprus under false pretences; the second suspect was wanted for the unlawful possession and transfer of a firearm, and the fourth suspect was wanted for the unlawful possession of a firearm. 30.  The other two suspects were linked to the murder through other evidence. DNA belonging to two unidentified persons was also found. 31.  On 20 January 2005 the Larnaca District Court issued arrest warrants in respect of all five suspects on the ground that there was a reasonable suspicion that they had committed the offences of premeditated murder, conspiracy to murder, abducting (\u03b1\u03c0\u03b1\u03b3\u03c9\u03b3\u03ae) a person in order to commit murder (sections 203, 204, 217 and 249 of the Criminal Code, Cap. 154), and the illegal transfer of a category B firearm (sections 4(1) and 51 of the Firearms and Other Arms Law (Law 113/(I)/2004, as amended). 32.  On 21 January 2005 the police authorities sent \u201cstop list\u201d messages to the immigration authorities (that is to say messages asking them to add the suspects to their \u201cstop list\u201d \u2013 a register of individuals whose entry into and exit from Cyprus is banned or subject to monitoring) and to notify the police should they attempt to leave the Republic. 33.  On 23 January 2005 the police submitted \u201cRed Notice\u201d requests to Interpol to search for and arrest the suspects with a view to their extradition. 34.  On 24 January 2005 an official request was made by the Director of the Diplomatic Office of the President of the Republic to the Special Representative and Chief of Mission (\u201cthe Special Representative\u201d) of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (\u201cUNFICYP\u201d) to facilitate the handing over to the appropriate authorities of the Republic of Cyprus of all the suspects and all evidential material relating to the crime and/or suspects in northern Cyprus (see paragraph 129 below). 35.  On 26 January 2005 Red Notices were published by Interpol in respect of the first four suspects and on 28 January 2005 in respect of the fifth suspect. These sought the provisional arrest of the suspects and stated that extradition would be requested from any country with which the Republic of Cyprus was linked by a bilateral extradition treaty, an extradition convention or any another convention or treaty containing provisions on extradition. 36.  As the police authorities were not able to trace the suspects in the areas controlled by the Republic, on 27 January 2005 they applied for the issuance of European arrest warrants. On the same day the Larnaca District Court issued European arrest warrants in respect of all five suspects. 37.  As the investigation continued, another three suspects were identified: A.F. (\u201cthe sixth suspect\u201d), S.Y. (\u201cthe seventh suspect\u201d) and Z.E. (\u201cthe eighth suspect\u201d). It appears from the documents submitted to the Court that the sixth and eighth suspects were Cypriot nationals and \u201cTRNC\u201d citizens and that the seventh suspect was a Turkish national. The sixth suspect had been wanted by the authorities since 2003 in respect of a case involving an assault causing serious bodily harm. The relevant case file had been classified as \u201cotherwise disposed of\u201d (\u0386\u03bb\u03bb\u03c9\u03c2 \u0394\u03b9\u03b1\u03c4\u03b5\u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u03c3\u03b1) in 2004. 38.  On 4 February 2005 the Larnaca District Court issued arrest warrants against all three suspects on the same grounds as those issued in respect of the other suspects (see paragraph 31 above). 39.  On 10 February 2005 the same court issued European arrest warrants against them. 40.  On 11 February 2005, at the request of the Cypriot authorities, Red Notices were published in respect of the latter three suspects. 41.  On 14 February 2005 a message was sent by Interpol Ankara to Interpol Athens in response to the Red Notice in respect of the fifth suspect. This message stated that the fifth suspect was in police custody and that the Turkish Ministry of Justice had been informed of the crime that he had allegedly committed. They also noted that under the Turkish Criminal Code, a Turkish national who had committed a crime in a foreign country which was punishable with at least three years\u2019 imprisonment under Turkish law could be punished under Turkish law. Furthermore, pursuant to domestic law, it was not possible to extradite a Turkish citizen from Turkey. Consequently, the Ministry of Justice wanted to know if it was possible for the investigation documents to be sent to them via Interpol channels. 42.  On 15 February 2005 the police authorities transmitted \u201cstop list\u201d messages to the immigration authorities (see paragraph 32 above). 43.  As can be seen from an email dated 7 March 2005 from the Director of the Diplomatic Office of the President of the Republic to the Chief European Union negotiator for Cyprus, the Cypriot authorities around this time forwarded to UNFICYP an interim report by the Laboratory of Forensic Genetics of the Cyprus Institute of Neurology and Genetics in order to facilitate its mediation of the handing over of the suspects in the instant case. The European Commission was asked for any assistance that it might be in a position to provide in bringing the perpetrators of the murders to justice. According to an internal note of a telephone conversation the Diplomatic Office was subsequently informed by UNFICYP that the above-mentioned report had been passed on to the \u201cTRNC\u201d authorities, who had found the evidence that it contained to be insufficient. The \u201cTRNC\u201d authorities requested video tapes but did not clarify whether the suspects would be handed over if such tapes were given to them. 44.  The Government submitted that as the investigation had progressed more evidence had been collected implicating the suspects. More than 180 statements had been taken from various persons, including the relatives of the victims, persons who knew or had connections with the victims, and persons involved in the investigation. The authorities had also carried out DNA tests on a number of other possible suspects but no link to the crime had been found. The applicants\u2019 representatives had also met and had been in telephone contact with the Attorney-General. 45.  On 12 July 2006 the eighth suspect was arrested by Cypriot police in Limassol (in the Government-controlled area). The next day he was remanded in custody for eight days by order of the Larnaca District Court on the ground that there was reasonable suspicion that he had committed offences under sections 203, 204, 217 and 249 of the Criminal Code (Cap. 154) and sections 4(1) and 51 of the Firearms and Other Arms Act (Law 113/(I)/2004, as amended). He was released, however, upon the expiry of the remand period as the authorities, after questioning him, did not have enough evidence to link him to the offences. According to the relevant police report, some of the allegations he had made could not be looked into as the Cypriot police could not conduct investigations in the \u201cTRNC\u201d. Furthermore, DNA tests did not link him to the crime. 46.  In a letter dated 26 July 2006 the Attorney-General assured the applicants\u2019 representatives that the Republic was \u201cdoing everything within its power \u2013 bearing in mind that it [did] not have effective control over the areas of the Republic occupied by Turkey (in which persons that might be involved [were at that time] and taking into account the relevant Convention case-law \u2013 to investigate the ... murder and bring the persons responsible to trial before the Courts of the Republic\u201d. He also informed them that he would keep them informed of the progress of the investigation and reply to the queries that they had submitted on behalf of the victims\u2019 family and that this could be achieved through meetings at his office between him, the applicants\u2019 representatives and the police. 47.  A report by the Larnaca police investigation department dated 1 July 2007 stated that the investigation had been extended to the British bases and the occupied areas of Kyrenia and Karavas. It also stated that the investigation was still ongoing as the authorities were waiting for replies from Interpol Ankara. The report also proposed that the officers in the investigation team be commended for their outstanding work on the case. 48.  As the authorities were not able to execute the arrest warrants in the \u201cTRNC\u201d or undertake other steps through UNFICYP, and given that the issuance of international arrest warrants had not resulted in the suspects\u2019 surrender by Turkey, the police officer in charge of the investigation suggested in a report dated 30 March 2008 that the case be \u201cotherwise disposed of\u201d (\u0386\u03bb\u03bb\u03c9\u03c2 \u0394\u03b9\u03b1\u03c4\u03b5\u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u03c3\u03b1) pending future developments. 49.  On 7 April 2008 the case file was sent, along with the above-mentioned proposal by the Larnaca police investigation department, to the Attorney-General. The latter agreed with the Larnaca police investigation department\u2019s proposal and on 24 April 2008 instructed the police to re-submit (\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1\u03c0\u03bf\u03b2\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u03b5\u03af) the investigation file if and when the arrest of all or any of the suspects was effected. 50.  On 19 May 2008 the case file were transferred to the coroner for the inquest proceedings (inquest nos. 9/05, 10/05 11/05) before the Larnaca District Court. The proceedings were scheduled by the court for 18 August 2009. According to the Cypriot Government, on that date the proceedings were adjourned until October 2009 due to the non-attendance of the first applicant. The first applicant was notified by the officer in charge of the investigation of the inquest proceedings and was requested to attend, as the testimony of a relative of the victims was necessary. No further information has been provided about these proceedings by the Cypriot Government. 51.  In a letter dated 25 June 2008 to the Chief of Police, the Attorney-General noted that, despite all efforts on the part of the authorities, the suspects had not been handed over to the Republic, that he had spoken to the President of the Republic and that he had had repeated meetings and telephone conversations with the applicants\u2019 counsel. The Attorney-General noted that the latter had informed him of the applicants\u2019 intention to lodge an application with the Court. The Attorney-General therefore considered that it was necessary \u2013 and counsel agreed \u2013 that international arrest warrants be issued in respect of the suspects and that Turkey \u2013 who had, pursuant to the Court\u2019s judgments, responsibility for whatever occurred in the occupied areas \u2013 be requested to enforce them. He requested that, if this had not been done already, international arrest warrants be issued as quickly as possible for the surrender of the suspects to the Republic of Cyprus. 52.  On 3 August 2008 the fourth suspect was murdered in the \u201cTRNC\u201d. Following confirmation of his death by UNFICYP and pursuant to instructions by the Attorney-General, the arrest warrant in respect of him was cancelled by the Larnaca District Court on 29 August 2008. 53.  On 6 August 2008 the Attorney-General gave instructions for the preparation of extradition requests to Turkey under the European Convention on Extradition of 13 December 1957, to which both States were parties (see paragraphs 164 and 165 below). 54.  On 23 September 2008, extradition requests in respect of the six remaining suspects (see paragraphs 45 and 52 above), together with certified translations of all documents into Turkish, were transmitted by the Cypriot Ministry of Justice and Public Order to the Cypriot Ministry of Foreign Affairs for communication through diplomatic channels to Turkey\u2019s Ministry of Justice. The requests were then sent to the Republic\u2019s embassy in Athens for communication to Turkey. 55.  By a letter dated 4 November 2008 the embassy of the Republic of Cyprus in Athens informed the Director General of the Cypriot Ministry of Foreign Affairs that on that date the extradition requests and a note verbale from the Cypriot Ministry of Justice and Public Order and had been delivered to the Turkish embassy in Athens in a sealed envelope. The usher of the embassy had given the envelope to the embassy security guard. No receipt of delivery had been given. 56.  By a letter dated 11 November 2008 the embassy of the Republic of Cyprus in Athens informed the Director General of the Cypriot Ministry of Foreign Affairs that on that date an employee of the Turkish embassy had left an envelope with the Cypriot embassy\u2019s security guard on which only the address of the Cypriot embassy had been written and which had contained the extradition requests and the note verbale from the Cypriot Ministry of Justice and Public Order, which had been given to the Turkish embassy on 4 November 2008. The person had not stated his identity, but had simply had left (\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03ac\u03c4\u03b7\u03c3\u03b5) the envelope and departed in haste. 57.  By a letter dated 24 November 2008 the Director General of the Cypriot Ministry of Justice informed the Attorney-General of the return of all the above-mentioned documents and stated that it was clear that Turkey was refusing to receive requests for the extradition of fugitives made by Cyprus under the European Convention of Extradition, due to Turkey\u2019s refusal to recognise the Republic of Cyprus as a State. 58.  In his reply dated 26 November 2008 the Attorney-General stated that the conduct of Turkey towards the Republic of Cyprus was not that expected of a State which had countersigned the European Convention on Extradition. It was not, however, for the Office of the Attorney-General to decide on the measures to be taken but it was an issue to be taken up on a political level, by the Cypriot Ministry of Foreign Affairs in particular. 59.  The Cypriot Government submitted that the domestic arrest warrants were still in force and would remain in force until executed pursuant to section 21 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Law. 60.  The particulars of the investigation and measures, according to the submission of the Turkish Government and as can be seen from the documents they provided, may be summarised as follows. 61.  On 17 January 2005 the victims\u2019 bodies were taken to the Dr. Burhan Nalbanto\u011flu State Hospital in Nicosia (\u201cLefko\u015fa\u201d) for post-mortem examinations. The \u201cTRNC\u201d police were provided with the death certificates, which had been issued by the Republic of Cyprus. 62.  Given that the cause of death required that a coroner\u2019s inquest be held, the \u201cTRNC\u201d police sought a court order for post-mortem examinations. 63.  Following a hearing before the \u201cTRNC\u201d Nicosia District Court, the \u201cTRNC\u201d Attorney-General\u2019s office requested the court to waive the requirement for post-mortem examinations, as post-mortem examinations had already been carried out in the Republic of Cyprus. Having heard evidence from two police officers and the hospital\u2019s forensic pathologist the court decided that post-mortem examinations were not required. 64.  On 18 January 2005 the first applicant gave a statement to the \u201cTRNC\u201d police. His views were requested concerning potential suspects. In his statement he alleged that there were five likely suspects: M.C, E.F., F.M., M.M. and H.O. (see paragraph 27 above). The \u201cTRNC\u201d authorities checked the entry and exit records of the suspects and established that the first suspect had crossed to the Republic of Cyprus side on the night of the murders and had returned to the \u201cTRNC\u201d side in the early morning hours. There was no record of the entry and exit of the other suspects on that day. 65.  On 18 January 2005 the first suspect was taken to Kyrenia (\u201cGirne\u201d) police headquarters (Polis Genel M\u00fcd\u00fcrl\u00fc\u01e7\u00fc) for questioning by the \u201cTRNC\u201d police. The BMW car he had used to cross the border was seized as evidence. The Kyrenia District Court issued a summons on the same day in respect of both the first and second suspects for the purpose of bringing them before the court on suspicion of theft, vehicle importation and forgery of documents (Hirsizlik Ara\u00e7 Ithali ve Evrak Sahteleme). The first suspect was kept in detention. 66.  The first suspect\u2019s BMW car was inspected, but no evidence was found. 67.  On the same day (that is to say 18 January 2005) the third and fourth suspects were also taken for questioning by police. An arrest warrant was issued in respect of the third and fourth suspects by the Morphou (\u201cG\u00fczelyurt\u201d) District Court on the same day on suspicion of forgery of documents \u2013 specifically, providing fake registered vehicle with falsified documents and statements (Sahte Belge D\u00fczenleme \u2013Yalan Belge ve Beyanlarla Sahte Kayitla Ara\u00e7 Temin Etme). 68.  On 19 January 2005 an arrest warrant was issued in respect of the first and second suspects by the Kyrenia District Court for two days (Mahkeme: Zanlilarin 2 g\u00fcn tutuklu kalmasina emir venir) on suspicion of theft, forgery of documents and \u201cproviding fake registry records, etc.\u201d (Hirsizlik, Sahte Belge D\u00fczenlemek, Sahte Kayut Temin Etmek v.s.). 69.  The second suspect was arrested the next day and was detained at Lapithos (\u201cLapta\u201d) police headquarters. 70.  The fifth suspect had already left for Turkey (on 18 January 2005) when the Red Notice was published by Interpol on 28 January 2005 (see paragraph 35 above). 71.  On 19 January 2005 the \u201cTRNC\u201d Nicosia District Court also remanded the third and fourth suspects in custody for two days on suspicion of theft and forgery of documents. 72.  The \u201cTRNC\u201d police searched the houses of the first four suspects, as well as that of another person, on the basis of search warrants issued by the Morphou District Court on 18 January 2005 (in respect of the third and fourth suspects) and by the Kyrenia District Court on 19 January 2005 (in respect of the first and second suspects). No evidence was found. 73.  Statements were taken from the four suspects while they were in detention. They all denied involvement in the murders. The \u201cTRNC\u201d police also took statements from a number of other persons, including public servants, mainly in relation to the BMW car that the first applicant had alleged had been used by the murderers. According to the evidence collected, the BMW car had been transferred to the first suspect on 17 May 2004. 74.  On 21 January 2005, following an application by the \u201cTRNC\u201d police, the \u201cTRNC\u201d Nicosia District Court remanded the first four suspects in custody for a further three days on suspicion of premeditated murder. 75.  On 22 January 2005 the \u201cTRNC\u201d Nicosia District Court issued a summons in respect of the fifth suspect for the purpose of bringing him before the court on suspicion of premeditated murder. \u201cTRNC\u201d Nicosia police headquarters informed all other district police offices that they were searching for this suspect and that a warrant had been issued. 76.  On different dates statements were taken from a number of persons, including the first applicant, with a view to obtaining information concerning the fifth suspect. 77.  On 23 January 2005 the fifth suspect was arrested as, in the meantime, he had returned to the \u201cTRNC\u201d (see paragraph 75 above). 78.  On 24 January 2005 the first four suspects were remanded in custody for another three days by the \u201cTRNC\u201d Nicosia District Court on suspicion of premeditated murder, murder, and possession of an illegal firearm and explosives (Taam\u00fcden Adam \u00d6ld\u00fcrme, Adam \u00d6ld\u00fcrme, Kanunsuz Ate\u015fli Silah ve Patlayici Madde Tasarrufu). An arrest warrant was also issued by that court in respect of the fifth suspect in order that he might be remanded in custody for three days. 79.  On 25 January 2005 \u201cTNRC\u201d Nicosia police headquarters were informed by the Turkish Ministry of Internal Affairs that a Red Notice had been published by Interpol in relation to the first four suspects. The above-mentioned Ministry requested confirmation of Elmas G\u00fczelyurtlu\u2019s death as the Turkish authorities had been looking for him in order to extradite him to the \u201cTRNC\u201d. They also enquired about the nationality status of the first four suspects, in particular, whether or not they had Turkish nationality. 80.  The Turkish Government submitted that on 23 and 28 January 2005 the Turkish Ministry of Internal Affairs received emails from Greek Cypriot Interpol stating that they were searching for the first, second, third and fifth suspects with a view to their arrest and that they should be arrested if they entered into Turkey. 81.  On 27 January 2005 the first, second, third, fourth and fifth suspects were remanded in custody for another five days by the \u201cTRNC\u201d Nicosia District Court on suspicion of premeditated murder. 82.  On the same day the \u201cTRNC\u201d Nicosia District Court issued a warrant in respect of the sixth and seventh suspects (see paragraph 37 above) for the purpose of bringing them before the court on suspicion of premeditated murder. Search warrants were also issued by the Kyrenia District Court in respect of the house of the fifth suspect and by the Nicosia District Court in respect of the houses of the sixth and seventh suspects. 83.  By a letter dated 27 January 2005 \u201cTRNC\u201d Nicosia police headquarters provided the Turkish Ministry of Internal Affairs with information about the suspects\u2019 identities. 84.  On 28 January 2005 the \u201cTRNC\u201d Nicosia District Court remanded the sixth, seventh and eighth suspects (see paragraph 37 above) in custody for three days on suspicion of premeditated murder. It also issued a search warrant for the house of the eighth suspect. 85.  On the same date the \u201cTRNC\u201d police also took a statement from the fifth suspect. 86.  On 31 January 2005 the sixth, seventh and eighth suspects\u2019 detention was extended by a further eight days by the \u201cTRNC\u201d Nicosia District Court on suspicion of premeditated murder. 87.  On the same day \u201cTRNC\u201d Nicosia police headquarters requested further information from the Turkish Ministry of Internal Affairs about the criminal record of the fifth suspect. They were provided with his criminal record, photograph and fingerprints on 7 February 2005. 88.  On 1 February 2005 the \u201cTRNC\u201d Nicosia District Court extended the first five suspects\u2019 detention for seven further days on suspicion of premeditated murder. 89.  On 2 February 2005 \u201cTRNC\u201d Nicosia police headquarters published a notice to all branches of police informing them that they were also looking for another person, M.K., who they also considered to be a suspect in the case. It transpired that this suspect had left for Turkey on 19 January 2005. 90.  On 7 February 2005 \u201cTRNC\u201d Nicosia police headquarters requested the Turkish Ministry of Internal Affairs police headquarters to carry out a criminal record check on M.K. and to inform them whether he was in Turkey or not. 91.  On 8 February 2005 the \u201cTRNC\u201d police took statements from the first, second, third, fifth, sixth and eighth suspects. An additional statement was taken on 11 February 2005 from the fifth suspect. They all denied involvement in the murders. 92.  On or around 11 February 2005 all the suspects were released due to a lack of evidence connecting them to the crime. 93.  The Turkish Government submitted that on 11 February 2005 another email was sent to the Turkish Ministry of Internal Affairs by Greek Cypriot Interpol informing them that they had information that the fifth suspect was going to travel to Mersin in Turkey the same day and requesting the Turkish authorities to take the necessary measures. 94.  The fifth suspect was arrested on the above date as he was entering Mersin. On 15 February 2005 he was taken to the office of the Mersin public prosecutor, where a preliminary file was opened in respect of the murders and he was questioned by the public prosecutor. The Turkish Government submitted that he was released in the absence of any evidence connecting him to the crime in question and in the absence of an extradition request. 95.  M.K. (see paragraph 89 above) was also traced and on 25 March 2005 he was questioned by police at Kyrenia police headquarters. He denied any involvement in the murders. 96.  On 15 April 2006 the authorities investigated a well in the village of Myrtou (\u201c\u00c7amlibel\u201d) in the Kyrenia district for evidence. Nothing, however, was found. 97.  Throughout the investigation the \u201cTRNC\u201d police questioned and took statements from numerous persons who knew or were somehow connected or related to the suspects. As can be seen from a document in the internal police files entitled \u201cTime/Work Sheet\u201d (\u0130\u015f Cetveli) and the copies of the statements provided, statements were taken from various witnesses, including the suspects. They also searched for evidence and took fingerprints. 98.  According to a note/direction in the \u201cTime/Work Sheet\u201d, on 30 January 2006 the \u201cTRNC\u201d Police Chief Inspector (Ba\u015fm\u00fcfetti\u015f - Tahkikat Memuru) wrote to the \u201cTRNC\u201d Nicosia Judicial Police Director \u2013 Assistant Police Director (\u201cPolis M\u00fcd\u00fcr\u00fc M\u00fcavini \u2013 Adli Polis M\u00fcd\u00fcr\u00fc\u201d) that upon the oral instructions of the \u201cTRNC\u201d Attorney-General (Ba\u015fsavc\u0131) a copy of the file in respect of the murder of Elmas, Zerrin and Eyl\u00fcl G\u00fczelyurtlu had been prepared and would be submitted for the opinion of the \u201cTRNC\u201d Attorney-General. A note bearing the same date from the \u201cTRNC\u201d Nicosia Judicial Police Director informed the \u201cTRNC\u201d Attorney-General\u2019s Office that the file regarding the case was ready and had been submitted to the \u201cTRNC\u201d Attorney-General. 99.  The Turkish Government submitted that, following a report by the \u201cTRNC\u201d Police Chief Inspector, the case had been classified as \u201cnon-resolved\u201d. They provided a copy of this report, which was not dated. According to this report, the last action undertaken as part of the investigation appears to have occurred on 22 March 2007, when the fifth suspect\u2019s car, which had been inspected by the \u201cTRNC\u201d police, had been handed over to the \u201cTRNC\u201d Nicosia Customs and Tax Office (Lefko\u015fa G\u00fcmr\u00fck ve R\u00fcsumat Dairesi). The inspection had not resulted in the collection of any evidence concerning the crime. In his report the \u201cTRNC\u201d Police Chief Inspector concluded that on the basis of the investigation that the police had conducted from the date of the murders until the time of his writing the report the police had not been able to resolve the case. He therefore suggested that the case be logged as \u201cnon-resolved for the time being\u201d. 100.  On 19 August 2009 the \u201cTRNC\u201d Attorney-General\u2019s office sent a copy of the case file to the \u201cTRNC\u201d Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They informed the latter that the case had been classified as \u201cnon-resolved for the time being\u201d on the instructions of the previous \u201cTRNC\u201d Attorney-General. 101.  The Turkish Government submitted that the case file was with the \u201cTRNC\u201d Attorney-General and remained open pending the submission of evidence by the Republic of Cyprus authorities. 102.  The Turkish Government submitted that after they received the investigation file from the Cypriot Government through the Court following communication of the case, the \u201cTRNC\u201d police questioned again the first and second suspects on 24 February 2010. The suspects denied their involvement in the killings. 103.  Subsequently, in other proceedings, on 31 August 2010 the Kyrenia Assize Court found the first and second suspects guilty of, inter alia, the murder of the first applicant\u2019s bodyguard and passed sentences amounting to thirty years\u2019 imprisonment each. An appeal by the first and second suspects was dismissed by the \u201cTRNC\u201d Supreme Court on 4 January 2012. They are both currently serving their sentences. 104.  The Turkish Government submitted that in the context of those proceedings, the first suspect had written on a piece of paper that the second suspect had killed three people. In addition, after being cautioned by the Kyrenia Assize Court that if he made a self-incriminating statement under oath it could be used against him, the second suspect stated: \u201cI saw this G\u00fczelyurtlu incident personally myself. This is what I want to say. There is also one thing, that is what he told me, ... I did not see it, it is what he explained to me. At this stage, I do not want to talk about the G\u00fczelyurtlu murder, your honour\u201d. In its judgment the Kyrenia Assize Court noted that it had to examine the voluntary statements made before it more carefully in the light of the fact that the first suspect had retracted the statements and submitted different statements. The first suspect refused to give any statement to the police. 105.  Following the above-mentioned development, the \u201cTRNC\u201d Attorney-General reviewed the investigation file. Taking into account the rules of evidence, he concluded that even if the first suspect had not retracted his statement, in the absence of other evidence, this statement would not have been sufficient for any charges against the suspects to be brought. 106.  In a summary of the first applicant\u2019s statements to his lawyers between 2006 and 2007, the first applicant stated, inter alia, the following: 107.  On the morning of 15 January 2005 the Cypriot police informed the first applicant of the death of his parents and sister. He went to Larnaca morgue to identify the victims. He signed a form authorising police officers to enter the family home in Ayios Dometios and conduct an investigation. The first applicant was present for part of the investigation and then went with the police to his father\u2019s office in Nicosia, where the police took documents as part of the investigation. 108.  The next day the first applicant went to Larnaca morgue and then Larnaca police station, where he spent nine hours giving a statement. In his statement he informed the police of the identities of the persons he suspected of committing the murders and the grounds for his suspicions. 109.  On 17 January 2005 the first applicant took the victims\u2019 bodies back to the \u201cTRNC\u201d, where a funeral was held. 110.  On 18 January 2005 the first applicant had meetings with the \u201cTRNC\u201d police. 111.  On 19 January 2005 the first, second and fourth applicants went to Nicosia police headquarters, where they were shown pictures and sketches of a number of people and asked whether they recognised them. Some of the photos had been taken at the funeral. The first applicant identified one of the suspects. The next day they returned to Nicosia police headquarters and were informed that the Cypriot police had DNA matches for at least three of the suspects and had found other DNA which they could not, however, match to any person in their records. The first applicant also gave them information concerning the investigation by the \u201cTRNC\u201d police. 112.  During the two weeks following the killings the first applicant met often with the Cypriot and the \u201cTRNC\u201d police and was informed by both sides of their respective investigations. He also updated each side on the other side\u2019s progress in an effort to prevent the suspects\u2019 release for lack of evidence and to convince the \u201cTRNC\u201d police to surrender them to the Cypriot Government for trial. 113.  The first applicant had meetings with a number of \u201cTRNC\u201d high-ranking officials. 114.  In March 2007 the Cypriot police informed the first applicant that the car and the material removed from the victims\u2019 home and office could be returned. They also informed the first applicant of the circumstances of the killings, that the investigation remained open and that the evidence had been shown to UNFICYP but that the \u201cTRNC\u201d authorities refused to cooperate. Although the Cypriot police showed the first applicant copies of the Red Notices and witness statements, they refused to give him copies. They also informed him that only a court could take possession of the case file (at the appropriate time). 115.  The applicants\u2019 representatives had meetings about the case with the Attorney-General of the Republic of Cyprus in January 2006 and July 2006. 116.  Furthermore, on 1 February 2006, at a meeting at Nicosia Police Headquarters, the applicants\u2019 lawyers were informed that one of the suspects had been briefly detained in Turkey. The Cypriot police had received this information from the office of Interpol in Athens. 117.  On 15 March 2006 the applicants, upon their request, were given a progress report by the Cypriot police on the case. The applicants submitted that they had requested all the evidentiary material but this was not provided with the report. 118.  On 15 July 2007 there was an attempt to kill the first applicant at his home in the \u201cTRNC\u201d. During that month the applicants were also informed by the Cypriot police that the arrest warrant in respect of one of the suspects had been cancelled. 119.  In May 2009 the first applicant\u2019s bodyguard was murdered. 120.  With regard to the inquest, the applicants submitted that the Larnaca District Court had adjourned the inquest on 19 August 2009 for administrative reasons and not because of the first applicant\u2019s absence. The court had resumed the inquest proceedings on 14 and again on 20 October 2009. Three of the applicants had attended with their counsel and a local lawyer. The inquest had confined itself to investigating whether the deaths had been the result of an unlawful killing. The judge had referred the matter to the Attorney-General as she was functus officio in so far as the criminal proceedings were concerned. 121.  The applicants, through their representatives, sent a number of letters to various Cypriot, Turkish and \u201cTRNC\u201d high-ranking officials about the case, including the President of the Republic of Cyprus, the Prime Minister of Turkey and the President of the \u201cTRNC\u201d. 122.  In a letter dated 30 November 2006 the applicants\u2019 counsel informed the Prime Minister of Turkey about the case and all the steps that had been taken until that date. They informed him, inter alia, that the Government of Cyprus had stated that they were prepared to hand over the relevant evidence to UNFICYP in order for the latter to decide whether there was a prima facie case against the suspects with the proviso that if UNFICYP concluded that there was indeed such a case, the \u201cTRNC\u201d would undertake to surrender the suspects. As UNFICYP was not prepared to take on this task (see paragraph 149 below) and the \u201cTRNC\u201d insisted on making a decision only after receiving the evidence, the applicants\u2019 counsel stated that \u201cI believe that I have now exhausted the possibilities for reaching the desired compromise through negotiation and mediation\u201d. 123.  Following the murders the Cypriot Government, the \u201cTRNC\u201d authorities and the applicants were in contact with UNFICYP officials concerning the case. A number of meetings were held. There was also an exchange of telephone calls and correspondence. The relevant information provided by the parties is set out below. 124.  According to this note, the Cypriot authorities made contact with UNFICYP\u2019s Special Representative to see whether UNFICYP could assist. They informed UNFICYP that they intended to carry out a complete investigation into the crime and that the police were working intensively to gather information and evidence. Some of this, however, would have to be collected from the occupied areas. UNFICYP\u2019s Special Representative said that UNFICYP was ready to provide help but suggested, acknowledging the difficulties, that it might be better for the two sides to be in direct contact with each other and to exchange information. The Cypriot authorities had informed him that this was not possible as the Cypriot police could not have direct contact with the \u201cTRNC\u201d police and that it was for this reason they had sought UNFICYP\u2019s intervention.\n(b)  Internal note by the Cypriot police dated 21 January 2005 125.  According to this note, a meeting was held on that day at UNFICYP headquarters in Nicosia on the initiative of UNFICYP\u2019s Senior Police Adviser and Commander (\u201cthe SPA\u201d) between the SPA and the assistant of the Cypriot Chief of Police. The UNFICYP\u2019s liaison officer was also present. The SPA stated that she had had, on the same day, a long meeting concerning the murders with the \u201cTRNC\u201d Chief of Police in the presence of other officers and the \u201cTRNC\u201d Attorney-General. She had informed the \u201cTRNC\u201d Chief of Police that the Cypriot police had in their possession genetic material linking three of the suspects with the crime (although she was not in a position at that time to tell them who these suspects were), as well as other evidence linking another two persons to the crime, and that one of the cartridges found at the scene had been made in Turkey. She had also informed him that five arrest warrants had been issued by a Cypriot court against the suspects, four of whom were detained in \u201cTRNC\u201d prisons. She had expressed her concerns that if the suspects were released they might leave the \u201cTRNC\u201d and their future arrest would not be possible. The \u201cTRNC\u201d Chief of Police had informed her that these suspects had been detained for minor offences (car theft) and that it was possible that their detention would not be extended by the judge. Although the \u201cTRNC\u201d authorities would try to get their detention extended, they had no evidence to charge them with murder. Although the suspects had already been questioned about the murders and had given some information, this was not enough. No voluntary statements had been made. The \u201cTRNC\u201d Chief of Police had also told her that he was aware that the Cypriot police did not have enough evidence and that only if the two police forces cooperated could more evidence be collected. He had also asked her if, and how, UNFICYP could help; she had informed him that UNFICYP could only intervene if one of the two sides made an official request for help. 126.  The \u201cTRNC\u201d Chief of Police had expressed his concerns in respect of the problems that had arisen and might also arise in the future and considered it advisable that the two police forces come to an agreement to enable cooperation in such cases. The \u201cTRNC\u201d Minister of Foreign Affairs was ready to discuss matters of policing and public safety with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Cyprus and other members of the Cypriot police in order to facilitate cooperation without any political ramifications (\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03ac\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2). 127.  UNFICYP\u2019s liaison officer had asked if there was a possibility that Turkey could be involved, so that the suspects could be extradited to Turkey and from there to the Republic of Cyprus. The \u201cTRNC\u201d Chief of Police had answered in the negative; it appeared that the \u201cTRNC\u201d authorities had already examined the matter but could not take such action as it was not provided for by their legislation. The \u201cTRNC\u201d Chief of Police had suggested that the Cypriot police hand over the evidence to the \u201cTRNC\u201d police so that the latter could arrest and try the suspects. If the Cypriot police informed their authorities officially about the evidence and exhibits in respect of the case and officially requested the extradition of the suspects, the \u201cTRNC\u201d authorities could cooperate and possibly extradite them. One of the suspects was in Turkey but appeared not to be connected to the murders. The \u201cTRNC\u201d authorities also had information in their possession linking other persons to the murders. 128.  According to the SPA the \u201cTRNC\u201d authorities were sincere and wished to cooperate. They had mentioned, inter alia, their concerns that there could be more crimes of this nature \u2013 that is to say criminals going through crossing points, committing crimes and then returning to the other side in order to avoid arrest and punishment. UNFICYP was ready to provide advice as to how the Cypriot Government should act and to sit in any negotiations in order to see how UNFICYP could intervene so as to help investigate (\u03b5\u03be\u03b9\u03c7\u03bd\u03b9\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5\u03b9) the murders. The SPA had asked the Cypriot authorities whether Interpol could intervene as she considered it unfair that, although the perpetrators of an atrocious crime had been identified, they remained free because of a political problem. The \u201cTRNC\u201d police had requested to be kept informed by the United Nations (UN) of developments in the case and she had promised that they would be.\n(c)  Letter dated 24 January 2005 from the Diplomatic Office of the President of the Republic to the SPA 129.  This letter reaffirmed the Cypriot Government\u2019s determination to bring the suspects to justice. The Cypriot authorities had collected sufficient evidence, issued arrest warrants for five suspects and requested UNFICYP to facilitate the handing over of the suspects and evidential material to the relevant authorities of the Republic of Cyprus. It stated that the Cypriot police had issued international arrest warrants in respect of four of the suspects, which had been forwarded to Interpol\u2019s General Secretariat and to all of Interpol\u2019s member States. The Cypriot police were in the process of issuing an international arrest warrant in respect of the fifth suspect.\n(d)  Internal note dated 25 January 2005 130.  This note stated that the \u201cTRNC\u201d Attorney-General did not intend to hand over to the police of the Republic of Cyprus the three suspects that were detained in the \u201cTRNC\u201d for the murders, relying on the 1960 Constitution. The \u201cTRNC\u201d Attorney-General had notified UNFICYP of this. An attached memo by UNFICYP stated as follows:\n\u201cI have seen the [Attorney-General]. Mr A.S. with regard to the inquiries [made in respect of] and the prosecution of the culprits in respect of the Elmas G\u00fczelyurtlu murder. He says that there is no legal and/or constitutional basis for handing over the accused to the Republican Authorities, for the following reasons:\nThe Constitution of Cyprus\nArticles: 133,153,158,159 (2), (3) and (4)\nAdmin. of Justice Law 14/60\nSection 4\nSection 5\nSection 20\nSection 23\nHe made representation to UN for the Turkish suspect kept by the Greek Police to be handed over to Turkish for prosecution, together with others\u201d.\n(e)  Police note dated 25 January 2005 131.  This note stated that the SPA had met with the police at Nicosia police headquarters after she had met the same day with the \u201cTRNC\u201d Chief of Police. The latter had suggested that a meeting be organised with the Cypriot police, in secret, in neutral territory chosen by UNFICYP, so that the issue would not become the object of political manipulation. The \u201cTRNC\u201d Attorney-General had consented to such a meeting. According to the \u201cTRNC\u201d Chief of Police, there were possibly more suspects and the first applicant had given inaccurate information to the Cypriot police, including the wrong photo of the alleged fifth suspect. As a first step, the \u201cTRNC\u201d Chief of Police had suggested the participation in the investigation of an equal number of officers of the same grade from both sides and the presentation of all exhibits collected which could help solve the crime, such as photographs and fingerprints of the suspects and samples of genetic material. He had also mentioned that in order to ensure the continued detention of the suspects, the \u201cTRNC\u201d authorities would like to have the results of the DNA tests linking the suspects to the case. As a second step, the \u201cTRNC\u201d Chief of Police had suggested that the \u201cTRNC\u201d police be given information concerning the ballistic evidence in order to enable the \u201cTRNC\u201d authorities to compare that evidence with information in their database. The SPA had noted that there would be no discussion in any meeting held as to which side would bring the suspects to justice, as the matter at this stage would be limited to the investigation of the case, without giving rise to any political implications. This matter could be discussed later on a political level. The Cypriot police had expressed their hesitations as to the usefulness and repercussions of such a meeting. They would inform her of the Chief of Police\u2019s decision on the matter.\n(f)  Letter dated 18 May 2006 from the Cypriot Chief of Police to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 132.  This letter stated that at meetings held with UNFICYP and the Deputy Senior Police Advisor (\u201cthe DSPA\u201d), the SPA had suggested that meetings between the Cypriot police, the police of the British Sovereign Bases and the \u201cTRNC\u201d police be held at a technical services level (\u03c4\u03b5\u03c7\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc \u03c5\u03c0\u03b7\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03b1\u03ba\u03cc \u03b5\u03c0\u03af\u03c0\u03b5\u03b4\u03bf) in the mixed village of Pyla, which is located in the UN buffer zone between the Cypriot police, the police of the British Sovereign Bases and the \u201cTRNC\u201d police. The Cypriot Chief of Police had rejected this as constituting a move towards recognising a \u201cpseudo-state\u201d which provided refuge to fugitives. It was true that UNFICYP\u2019s arguments for the meetings of the technical committees was valid in that there was a risk that the village of Pyla would become a safe haven for criminals. This could be dealt with, however, through more efficient cooperation between UNFICYP and the Cypriot authorities. The Cypriot Chief of Police sought to obtain the Cypriot Government\u2019s political position regarding this suggestion.\n(g)  Note by the Cypriot police to the Chief of Police dated 18 May 2006 133.  This note stated that as concerned a meeting held on 17 May 2006 between the SPA, the DSPA, and members of the Cypriot police and investigation team, the DSPA had raised his concerns as to an increased level of collaboration between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot criminals and their movements across the island. The DSPA had been informed generally about evidence that had been collected. He had also enquired whether:\n- the Cypriot police intended to give the evidence to UNFICYP for forwarding to the \u201cTRNC\u201d authorities to enable the suspects\u2019 prosecution;\n- the Cypriot police could make the necessary arrangements for the suspects to be taken to a UNFICYP building at the Ledra Palace Hotel in the buffer zone and be questioned through \u201cthe video recording interview method\u201d, and \u2013 if this was possible \u2013 whether such evidence would be admissible before a Cypriot court;\n- if one of the suspects were to come over to make a statement against the other suspects, the Cypriot authorities would arrest him and bring criminal proceedings against him. 134.  The Cypriot police had informed him that prosecution decisions were made by the Attorney-General. They had also informed him that they would cooperate with UNFICYP but not with the \u201cTRNC\u201d authorities or police. They had highlighted the fact that, despite the Red Notices, Turkey had refused to cooperate and had not surrendered the fifth suspect, who had gone to Turkey. They had arrested him but subsequently released him. 135.  The DSPA had stated that the \u201cTRNC\u201d \u2013 pursuant to its own laws \u2013could not surrender Turkish Cypriots. It had been stressed by the Police Chief Superintendant that the \u201cTRNC\u201d was not a state. 136.  The DSPA had also put forward the suggestion that the suspects could be surrendered to a third country such as Greece, and that steps to bring them to justice could be taken from there. The Police Chief Superintendant had informed him that this was not an option and that Turkey had an obligation to comply with international law. 137.  Finally, the DSPA had suggested that the matter could be discussed by the relevant technical committee (see paragraphs 154, 155 and 156 below) in order to avoid the issue taking on a political dimension, to find solutions for cooperation and to bring the perpetrators to justice. He had been informed that this was a sensitive matter and that the political aspects could not be ignored; if the \u201cpseudo-state\u201d authorities were interested in completing the investigation and bringing the perpetrators to justice, they should stop providing refuge to criminals.\n(h)  Internal note about a meeting on 20 June 2006 between UNFICYP and the Cypriot police 138.  The note stated that at this meeting, the DSPA had noted that he was trying to convince the \u201cTRNC\u201d authorities to surrender the suspects. The Cypriot police had informed him that they would not be providing any evidence to, or cooperating with, the authorities of the \u201cpseudo-state\u201d but that they were willing to cooperate with UNFICYP without this implying any recognition of any illegal entity. 139.  On 24 January 2005 a meeting was held between the private secretary of the \u201cTRNC\u201d Prime Minister, the SPA, the head of UNFICYP\u2019s civil affairs unit, and the envoy of the President of the Republic of Cyprus concerning the suspects held in detention. According to the minutes of the meeting, the \u201cTRNC\u201d authorities needed the results of the DNA tests that had been carried out by the Greek Cypriot authorities, which were reluctant to transmit them on the pretext that this would constitute the [de facto] recognition of the \u201cTRNC\u201d. The \u201cTRNC\u201d authorities suggested these could be transmitted through UNFICYP. A \u201cnon-paper\u201d dated 24 January 2005 was given to the envoy. This stated as follows:\n\u201cAccording to the Constitution of Cyprus (article 159), any case confined among Turkish Cypriots should be taken by the Turkish Cypriot courts.\nIn the case of murder of Elmas G\u00fczelyurtlu and his family, all the suspects are Turkish Cypriots hence the case should be heard by Turkish Cypriot courts by Turkish Cypriot judges.\nSince the act took place in Greek Cypriot side and all of the evidences collected successfully by the Greek Cypriot police, cooperation is needed for the justice to be done.\nThis is an urgent situation therefore we need to act together immediately. As a first step the report concerning the DNA analysis is needed to get the court order to have the suspects in custody during the lawsuit.\nThis is a humanitarian issue and totally out of political concerns. The political concerns should not be in the way to prevent the justice to take place.\u201d\n(b)  From the minutes of a meeting on 25 January 2005 140.  On 25 January 2005 the \u201cTRNC\u201d Chief of Police held a meeting with the SPA, who gave details about the circumstances of the murders. According to the minutes, Elmas G\u00fczelyurtlu had been known throughout Cyprus and had been suspected of many crimes; some had involved the suspects. The information in the hands of the Greek Cypriot police was sufficient for the purpose of issuing arrest warrants in respect of the suspects. Although the \u201cTRNC\u201d police had already issued such warrants, they did not have evidence to bring proceedings against the suspects; more information was necessary. The SPA had asked for suggestions.\n(c)  From the minutes of a meeting on 26 January 2005 141.  On 26 January 2005 a meeting was held between UNFICYP officials and \u201cTRNC\u201d functionaries, including the \u201cTRNC\u201d Deputy Prime Minister. According to the minutes, the question had been raised as to whether the Greek Cypriot authorities were willing to transmit the evidence. The \u201cTRNC\u201d Deputy Prime Minister had mentioned that if this was done the suspects\u2019 detention would be extended; then, if the \u201cTRNC\u201d courts considered the evidence to be credible, the suspects would be handed over to [the Republic of Cyprus] via UNFICYP.\n(d)  From the minutes of a meeting on 31 January 2005 142.  On 31 January 2005 another meeting was held between UNFICYP and \u201cTRNC\u201d officials. According to the minutes, the UNFICYP officials had submitted Interpol\u2019s Red Notices in respect of three of the suspects detained in the \u201cTRNC\u201d. They had mentioned that the Greek Cypriot authorities were reluctant to share the suspects\u2019 DNA test results and did not want to collaborate with the \u201cTRNC\u201d.\n(e)  From the minutes of a meeting on 7 February 2005 143.  At a meeting held on 7 February 2005 UNFICYP officials and the Prime Minister of the \u201cTRNC\u201d discussed the reluctance of the Greek Cypriot authorities to cooperate.\n(f)  From the minutes of a meeting on 18 February 2005 144.  On 18 February 2005 a meeting was held between the head of UNFICYP\u2019s civil affairs unit and the Undersecretary of the \u201cTRNC\u201d Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The former stated that the Greek Cypriot authorities\u2019 attitude concerning their cooperation with the \u201cTRNC\u201d was changing and that they were planning to send the evidence through UNFICYP. He also asked the Undersecretary whether the suspects could be re-arrested and given to the Greek Cypriot authorities through UNFICYP. The Undersecretary replied that under the 1960 agreements if the suspects were Turkish, then they should be tried in a Turkish court.\n(g)  From the minutes of a telephone conversation on 30 March 2005 145. On 30 March 2005 the head of UNFICYP\u2019s civil affairs unit had a telephone conversation with the \u201cTRNC\u201d Head of Consular Affairs. The former informed the latter that the courts of the British Sovereign Base areas did not have jurisdiction to try the suspects; however, the courts of the Republic of Cyprus could sit at the bases and the hearing could take place there. The Head of Consular Affairs stated that the \u201cTRNC\u201d authorities were not planning to take any steps until the evidence and records were given over to them because it was unacceptable to the \u201cTRNC\u201d authorities for the Greek Cypriot authorities to work alone on this matter.\n(h)  From the minutes of a meeting on 5 April 2005 146.  On 5 April 2005 UNFICYP officials had a general meeting with the \u201cTRNC\u201d Head of Consular affairs who mentioned that the DNA results given to them were not sufficient in order to proceed further with the case file. The \u201cTRNC\u201d authorities needed more concrete evidence such as police investigation records and security camera records. The head of UNFICYP\u2019s civil affairs unit promised to discuss this with the Greek Cypriot side. 147.  Between 2005 and 2006, an exchange of correspondence concerning the investigation of the murders took place between the applicants\u2019 representatives and UNFICYP officials. The text of the most relevant communications between UNFICYP and the applicants\u2019 representatives is set out below: 148.  In a communication to UNFICYP dated 19 December 2005, the applicant\u2019s lawyer, requested, inter alia, the disclosure of any possible information relating to the UNFICYP\u2019s efforts in the case, in particular, concerning the mistrust and lack of cooperation between the two sides. He wanted to ensure that all local remedies were properly exhausted and UNFICYP to help him to form a view in general terms about the attitude of both sides. If all legal means to bring about the prosecution of suspects of this heinous crime failed, he had instructions to bring an application before the Court against Turkey and Cyprus. 149.  In a letter to the applicants\u2019 representatives dated 23 February 2006 the SPA, stated, inter alia, the following:\n\u201c1. The Senior Police Advisor (SPA) of the UN police in Cyprus first became involved in the case on 16 January 2005 at the request of the Assistant Chief of Police of the Republic of Cyprus, ... who at that time briefed the Senior Police Adviser on the case. A request was made to the SPA to facilitate the exchange of information between the sides. 2. At no time was the SPA asked to operationally assist in the investigation of the murder or apprehend the suspects. If [she had been] asked this would not have been agreed to as this is not within UNFICYP\u2019s mandate.\n...(Illegible) 4. A copy of the preliminary investigation report prepared by the authorities in the south was provided to the Turkish Cypriot authorities, with the SPA\u2019s facilitation. UNFICYP limited itself to a mediation role and therefore neither verified the contents nor kept a copy of the report. 6. UNFICYP attempts to facilitate the exchange of information on criminal enquiries when asked to do so by one side or the other. ...\n(Illegible) 8. As you may be aware, UNFICYP is not part of the internal justice system of the Republic of Cyprus and does not have executive power. UNFICYP is not in any sense an element of the \u201cdomestic remedies\u201d available to victims of a crime in the [Republic of Cyprus]\u201d. 150.  In an e-mail sent by the DSPA to the applicants\u2019 representative, Ms Meleagrou on 25 October 2006, the following, inter alia, was stated:\n\u201cI note your request and assure you of the UN\u2019s utmost cooperation in dealing with any matter of a criminal nature, particularly ... in this most serious case. While UNFICYP has been exhausting its efforts to reach some conclusion to this case, it is unfortunate that there is a stalemate at this present time due to the two sides not agreeing on a way forward. I note your comments that:\nThe [Republic of Cyprus] will hand over to the UN in Cyprus all the evidence on the suspects so that the UN legal team can evaluate the evidence and see whether or not there is a prima facie case against them. The [Republic of Cyprus] will only do so if the \u201cTRNC\u201d authorities give an undertaking that they will hand the suspects over to the [Republic of Cyprus] to be tried if the UN is satisfied (possibly after discussion with the \u201cTRNC\u201d \u2013 the italicised parenthesis is not strictly speaking part of the proposal at this stage but might be what we will have to argue in order to facilitate matters) that there is such a prima facie case against the suspects: 1. The [Republic of Cyprus] will not hand over any evidence for the purposes of conducting a trial in the north. This is despite the fact that [an]other jurisdiction (United Kingdom) has in the past successfully caused a trial to be conducted in the north [in respect of] a serious crime committed in the UK. 2. The legal processes conducted in the north do not allow for the handing over of any [Turkish Cypriot] suspects to any authorities in the south or any other country in any other circumstances.\nTherefore UNFICYP stands ready to facilitate [in any way] it can in this case, I can see no resolution being [arrived at] until such time as one side or the other cedes their current position. Either the [Republic of Cyprus] is willing to hand over all the evidence to the north and offer full police and evidentiary cooperation so that a trial can be conducted in that \u201cjurisdiction\u201d, or the north is willing to hand over suspects [on the basis of] sufficient evidence to cause the [issuance] of an arrest warrant in the north, with a view to handling the suspects to UNFICYP for passing on the [Republic of Cyprus].\nAs always UNFICYP stands ready to cooperate in whatever manner it can.\u201d 151.  In an e-mail sent by UNFICYP to the applicants\u2019 representative Ms Meleagrou on 16 November 2006 the following was stated:\n\u201cAs stated in my previous email to you UNFICYP stands ready to facilitate negotiations between the two sides in respect of this matter and indeed continues in its efforts to find a solution. However, UNFICYP is not in a position to formally engage a suitably qualified expert to officially adjudicate on the evidence held by the Republic of Cyprus. It has already been stated that while the UNFICYP believes that there is enough evidence on face value for the two sides to reach a suitable position, it welcomes the delivery of any further or all evidence, copies or otherwise, from the Republic of Cyprus that can be used to further meaningful dialogue between the two sides. I again reiterate the following options that may in my view facilitate further useful negotiations:\nThe [Republic of Cyprus], without prejudice, [should] deliver to the UNFICYP all necessary evidence, allowing this to be used as UNFICYP sees fit, with a view to negotiating the alleged offenders\u2019 arrest and handover to UNFICYP for delivery to the authorities in the south for the purposes of a trial. However, without a clear guarantee that the north will arrest and hand over the alleged offenders there is little chance of this being successful.\nThe only other solution is for the [Republic of Cyprus] to hand over all the evidence to UNFICYP for delivery to the relevant persons in the north with a view to having a trial conducted in the north. This option has already been rejected by the [Republic of Cyprus].\u201d 152.  The relevant parts of the UN Secretary-General\u2019s reports on the UN operation in Cyprus are set out below: 153.  Report of 27 May 2005:\n\u201c23. Official contact between the sides is hampered by a high degree of mistrust. On 15 January 2005, three members of a Turkish Cypriot family living in the south were killed ... . Eight suspects were arrested in the north while all the evidence remained in the south. UNFICYP\u2019s efforts to assist the sides to bring the suspects to justice proved unsuccessful, and all suspects were released in the north. This case is an illustration of the growing number of crimes across the cease-fire line, such as smuggling, drug trafficking, illegal immigration and human trafficking. These problems are implicit in the expanding inter-communal contacts, which though positive, have also the potential for adverse consequences if the present lack of cooperation between the sides persists. 24. The continuing absence of official contacts between the sides has accentuated UNFICYP\u2019s role in promoting bicommunal contacts. Although people from either side can meet freely since the opening of the crossings in 2003, the impartiality of the Ledra Palace Hotel venue and the United Nations umbrella are considered indispensable for sensitive humanitarian and other meetings, including those of political parties from the north and the south. It is hoped that under the auspices of UNFICYP, contacts may be established between the sides, without prejudice to their political positions, on humanitarian and related issues generating a climate of trust and easing tensions. During the reporting period, UNFICYP provided facilities for 57 bicommunal events, including those implemented by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)/United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) ...\u201d. 154.  Report of 2 June 2008:\n\u201c4. On 21 March [2008], ... the two leaders met in the presence of my then Special Representative and agreed on a path towards a comprehensive settlement (see annex II). The agreement entailed the establishment of a number of working groups, to consider the core issues pertaining to an eventual settlement plan, and of technical committees, to seek immediate solutions to everyday problems arising from the division of the island. They also agreed to meet again in three months to review the work of the working groups and the technical committees and, using their results, to start full-fledged negotiations under United Nations auspices. In addition, the leaders agreed to meet as and when needed prior to the commencement of full-fledged negotiations. ... 5. On 26 March [2008], representatives of the leaders agreed to establish six working groups on governance and power-sharing, European Union matters, security and guarantees, territory, property and economic matters, as well as seven technical committees on crime and criminal matters, economic and commercial matters, cultural heritage, crisis management, humanitarian matters, health and the environment. ... On 22 April [2008], the groups and committees began to meet. They have been coming together on a regular basis since then, as foreseen by the leaders, and facilitated by the United Nations.\u201d 155.  Report of 15 May 2009:\n\u201c9. On 14 April [2009], the leaders agreed to the implementation of 4 of the 23 confidence-building measures identified by the technical committees, which were aimed at improving the daily life of Cypriots across the entire island. They concern the passage of ambulances through crossing points in cases of emergency, the establishment of a communications and liaison facility (operating round the clock) to share information on crime and criminal matters, an initiative funded by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) on awareness-raising measures for saving water and the establishment of an advisory board on shared cultural heritage. ...\u201d 156.  Report of 9 January 2015:\n\u201c10. (...) UNFICYP police facilitated meetings of the Technical Committee on Crime and Criminal Matters, and the Joint Communications Room continued to work actively, providing the police services of both sides with a forum for enhanced cooperation. The appointment for the first time of serving police officers as Greek Cypriot representatives to the Technical Committee signaled a significant step forward in cooperation. Over and above the exchange of information on criminal matters that have intercommunal elements, the Joint Communications Room focused on the investigation of crimes that took place within and across the buffer zone, the handover of persons of interest through the UNFICYP police and humanitarian cases.\u201d", "references": ["6", "4", "8", "7", "1", "5", "3", "2", "9", "No Label", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Split. 6.  He is the owner of a flat in Split with a surface area of 106.90 square metres. According to the applicant, that flat is the only real estate in his ownership and his only property of value. 7.  It would appear that in 1971 the housing authorities awarded a specially protected tenancy (stanarsko pravo) of the flat to a certain Ms N.R. and her family. 8.  On 5 November 1996 the Lease of Flats Act entered into force. It abolished the legal concept of the specially protected tenancy and provided that the holders of such tenancies in respect of, inter alia, privately owned flats were to become \u201cprotected lessees\u201d (za\u0161ti\u0107eni najmoprimci). Under the Act such lessees are subject to a number of protective measures, such as the duty of landlords to contract a lease of indefinite duration, payment of protected rent (za\u0161ti\u0107ena najamnina), the amount of which is set by the Government and significantly lower than the market rent; and better protection against termination of the lease. 9.  The applicant refused to conclude a lease contract with N.R. under the protected lease scheme. 10.  Therefore, on 16 October 1997 she brought a civil action against him in the Split Municipal Court (Op\u0107inski sud u Splitu) with a view to obtaining a judgment in lieu of such a contract. 11.  At the hearing held on 4 November 1998 the applicant argued that N.R. was not entitled to protected rent because she owned a house in the tourist village of Rogoznica, some 53 kilometres from Split. 12.  At the hearing held on 15 April 2002 the applicant submitted a counter-claim seeking to obtain a judgment ordering N.R. and her family to vacate the flat in question. He argued that he intended to move into the flat. 13.  By a judgment of 27 February 2008 the Municipal Court found in favour of N.R. and imposed on the applicant a lease contract stipulating protected rent in the amount of 163.56 Croatian kunas (HRK)[1] per month. 14.  On 21 October 2008 the Split County Court (\u017dupanijski sud u Splitu) dismissed an appeal by the applicant and upheld the first-instance judgment. 15.  The Municipal and the County Court established that N.R. was living in the flat with her son M.R., her daughter-in-law and her grandson whereas the applicant was living with his mother in a flat located in the same building. His mother also owned an adjacent building where he was running his medical practice in one of the flats. The court also found that N.R. and her son M.R. indeed owned a small summer home in Rogoznica surfacing 18 square metres only. 16.  Against this factual background the Municipal and the County Court held that the conditions provided in section 40(1) of the Lease of Flats Act, as interpreted by the Supreme Court (see Statileo v. Croatia, no. 12027/10, \u00a7\u00a7 48-49, 10 July 2014), had not been met and that the applicant was therefore not entitled to refuse to enter into a lease contract with N.R. under the protected lease scheme. In particular, even though the applicant intended to move into the flat and had no other accommodation, he was neither entitled to permanent social assistance or was over sixty years of age, nor was N.R.\u2019s summer home in Rogoznica located in the same municipality or township. 17.  Those courts also held that, apart from being protected from eviction, N.R. was also entitled to protected rent; the applicant thus having no right to charge her the market rent for living in his flat. That was so because they found that N.R.\u2019s summer home did not constitute a habitable house within the meaning of section 31(2) of the Lease of Flats Act (see Statileo, cited above, \u00a7 41). 18.  By a decision of 21 November 2012 the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) dismissed the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint against the judgments of the Municipal and the County Court, and served its decision on the applicant\u2019s representative on 7 December 2012.", "references": ["1", "7", "6", "2", "8", "3", "5", "0", "4", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1946, 1966 and 1973, respectively, and live in Sisak. 6.  On 17 October 1991 the body of Stevo Borojevi\u0107, the applicants\u2019 respective husband and father, was found on the right bank of the river Kupa in Sisak. An on-site inspection was carried out immediately as well as an autopsy the following day which showed that the victim had been stabbed to death. 7.  On 24 October 1991 the Sisak Police lodged a criminal complaint with the Sisak County State Attorney\u2019s Office. 8.  The police interviewed Ms Jasenka Borojevi\u0107, the victim\u2019s wife, on 5 December 1991. She told them that her husband had left her workplace at about 10.30 a.m. on 6 October 1991 to return home because a general emergency had been announced and their daughter, who was a minor, was there alone. However, after he left she had not seen him again. 9.  In 1996 the United Nations Security Council established the United Nations Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (the \u201cUNTAES\u201d). On 15 January 1998 the UNTAES mandate ceased and the transfer of power to the Croatian authorities began. 10.  On 27 February 2002 the police interviewed Jasenka Borojevi\u0107 and Edita Mihi\u0107, respectively the wife and daughter of the late Stevo Borojevi\u0107. They said that prior to Stevo Borojevi\u0107\u2019s disappearance on 6 October 1991, Croatian soldiers had carried out searches in their flat in July 1991 and on 3 October 1991. One of the soldiers, T.P., had been known to them. They had subsequently learned that an individual named G. had also been implicated. A certain M.T. had also told them that he had asked \u0110.B. about the killing of Stevo Borojevi\u0107 and that \u0110.B. had shown M.T. a list of persons to be followed and a list of persons to be liquidated, and that Stevo Borojevi\u0107 had been on neither of those lists. 11.  On 29 July 2005 the State Attorney\u2019s Office issued a document concerning enquiries into the killings of civilians between 1991 and 1995. The document was addressed to the County State Attorney\u2019s Offices, which were required to examine all the information collected to date on the killings of civilians during that period and to concentrate their activities on identifying the perpetrators and gathering the relevant evidence in order to initiate criminal proceedings. 12.  On 9 October 2008 the State Attorney\u2019s Office issued an instruction to the County State Attorney\u2019s Offices for implementation of the Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure, in which it indicated that an inspection of their work had indicated two main problems: possible partiality of the persons involved in the pending proceedings as regards the ethnicity of the victims or the perpetrators, and the problem of trials in absentia. The instruction advocated the impartial investigation of all war crimes, irrespective of the ethnicity of those involved, whether victims or perpetrators, and reiterated the duties of those working for the State Attorney in that respect. 13.  On 11 December 2008 an investigating judge at the Sisak County Court heard evidence from Jasenka Borojevi\u0107 and Edita Mihi\u0107, who repeated what they had said to the police. 14.  The police interviewed J.B., a relative of Stevo Borojevi\u0107, on 30 December 2008 but he had no knowledge of the latter\u2019s disappearance and killing. 15.  On 5 January 2009 the police interviewed V.P. and on 8 January 2009 they questioned T.P. 16.  On 27 January 2009 an investigating judge at the Sisak County Court heard evidence from T.P., a neighbour of the Borojevi\u0107 family. He said that one day in 1991 when Sisak was being shelled, he and other tenants from the building had been in the basement when three armed men dressed in military uniforms had entered. He had exited the basement with them and they had told him that someone had been shooting from the building. T.P. had shown them the flats where Serbs lived. The three men had entered the flat of the Borojevi\u0107 family while T.P. waited outside. They had not taken anyone from the flat. T.P. remembered that the men had been young. 17.  On the same day the judge heard evidence from V.P., who said that a certain T.\u0160., who had died in the meantime, had told him that he had learned that Stevo Borojevi\u0107 had been taken to \u017dabno by the men who controlled the roads. He had been tortured and then taken to Vurot. V.P. had the impression that T.\u0160. knew who had taken Stevo Borojevi\u0107 but he had not identified that person.  Later he had seen a vehicle belonging to Stevo Borojevi\u0107 on the Topolovac agricultural estate. However, when he had attempted to find out who was driving the vehicle, a man wearing a camouflage uniform and a balaclava and armed with a Kalashnikov had threatened to kill him. 18.  On 20 June 2011 the Sisak County Police lodged a criminal complaint against \u0110.B., V.M and D.B. on charges of war crimes against the civilian population. This included the killing of the applicants\u2019 relative. On the same day \u0110.B., Head of the Sisak Police Department in 1991 and 1992, V.M., police commander at the border territory of Sisak and Banovina in 1991 and 1992 and Deputy of Sisak Police Department, and D.B., a member of the \u201cWolves\u201d Unit of the Croatian Army, were arrested. 19.  On an unspecified date the investigation was opened. On 13 July 2011 \u0110.B. died. 20.  On 16 December 2011 the Osijek County State Attorney\u2019s Office lodged an indictment against V.M. and D.B. at the Osijek County Court, alleging that they had been in command of the unit whose unknown members had committed a number of crimes against the civilian population between July 1991 and June 1992, including the killing of the applicants\u2019 relative. They were charged with war crimes against the civilian population. 21.  On 9 December 2013 a first-instance judgment was delivered. V.M. was found guilty of war crimes against the civilian population in that, in his capacity as \u201cthe commander of police forces in the broader area of Sisak and Banovina\u201d and \u201cDeputy Head of the Sisak Police\u201d, he had allowed the killings of persons of Serbian origin and had failed to undertake adequate measures to prevent such killings. The relevant part of the judgment concerning the applicants\u2019 relative reads:\n\u201cin the morning of 6 October 1991 at a checkpoint in Odra Sisa\u010dka, some unknown members of the reserve police stopped a white vehicle, a Fiat 127, which was being driven by Stevo Borojevi\u0107, took the vehicle from him and kept it for themselves, and arrested Stevo Borojevi\u0107 and took him to an unknown location where they killed him, after which his body was found on 17 October 1991 on the right bank of the river Kupa at the location called \u201cRu\u0161etina\u201d in Sisak, with several open wounds and contusions on his head and a wound caused by stabs and cuts in his chest.\u201d 22.  On 10 June 2014 the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of V.M. and increased his sentence to ten years\u2019 imprisonment. 23.  On various dates the applicants brought separate civil actions against the State, seeking compensation in connection with the death of their close relative. The claims were dismissed on the grounds that they had been lodged after the statutory limitation period had expired. 24.  Following the criminal conviction of V.M., the applicants sought the reopening of these proceedings in the Petrinja Municipal Court. Their request is now pending.", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "9", "4", "5", "8", "6", "0", "7", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1946 and lives in St Petersburg. 7.  According to the applicant\u2019s medical history he has suffered from various mental conditions since 1979 and has been admitted to hospital and treated in various psychiatric facilities several times. The applicant\u2019s records contain information on alcohol abuse, suicide attempts, threats of violence against neighbours and medical professionals, and about a number of organic, psychiatric and personality disorders, including psychosis and paranoia. 8.  Between 1998 and 2007 the applicant was taken to hospital at least six times following suicide attempts, alcohol-induced paranoia, claims of unspecified murder threats, claims about explosives planted in various public places and threats to neighbours that he would blow up a petrol canister. 9.  According to a report issued on 29 March 2007 by the local ambulance service the applicant called for emergency assistance at his home twelve times in March 2007 (five times on 28 March 2007 alone). On each occasion there was no apparent reason for the call. The applicant behaved aggressively towards medical personnel, made sexual advances to female doctors and consumed alcohol in their presence. The service requested a police escort for further visits to his address. They stated that visits to the applicant meant there were delays in providing assistance to people who were in genuinely life-threatening situations and presented a danger to ambulance staff. 10.  According to a police report of 2 April 2007 the applicant contacted the police three times in two days alleging that nomadic tribes had attacked him, that he had found an unexploded Second World War shell, and that explosives had been placed at an industrial facility. The applicant\u2019s alerts were acted upon and found to be groundless. 11.  On 3 April 2007 the applicant was admitted without his consent to St Petersburg Psychiatric Hospital no. 3 (\u041f\u0441\u0438\u0445\u0438\u0430\u0442\u0440\u0438\u0447\u0435\u0441\u043a\u0430\u044f \u0431\u043e\u043b\u044c\u043d\u0438\u0446\u0430 \u2116 3 \u0433. \u0421\u0430\u043d\u043a\u0442-\u041f\u0435\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0431\u0443\u0440\u0433\u0430) (\u201cthe hospital\u201d). The grounds for his admission were repeated, groundless telephone calls to the police about the presence of explosives at an industrial facility, a series of calls to the emergency medical services with offers of sexual services to female doctors, as well as threats of violence against ambulance staff. The applicant refused to be treated or admitted to hospital voluntarily. 12.  On the same day a panel composed of the hospital\u2019s resident psychiatrists examined the applicant and his medical history and diagnosed him with an organic mental disorder coupled with a psychiatric and paranoid personality disorder. The panel also found that the applicant was a danger to himself and others and that there was a risk of significant damage to his health due to the likely deterioration or aggravation of his psychiatric condition in the absence of psychiatric assistance. The relevant parts of the panel\u2019s report read as follows:\n\u201cThe patient had a habit of intoxicating himself heavily with alcohol, and suffered from a cranial trauma. Psychiatric disorders since 1979. Clinical history [shows] behavioural problems including affective instability, querulous ideas about his own relevance and persecution amounting to delusions. [He] has been frequently treated in psychiatric facilities owing to aggressive and auto-aggressive habits in the context of acute morbid emotional experiences. Admissions to hospital were, as a rule, \u2018involuntary\u2019.\nIn the course of clinical development the organic defects have become predominant manifesting themselves through circumstantiality, a coarsening of emotions, and the exacerbation of his querulous tendencies. The current admission is due to inappropriate behaviour: informed the police that explosives had been planted somewhere, conflicts with [nomadic tribes], called for emergency medical services and when they arrived threatened the personnel, behaved improperly towards women.\nDuring examination \u2013 fully aware of his surroundings, answers questions in detail. \u2018Ingratiating\u2019. Believes that he is being persecuted by police because he is \u2018a person of the Stalinist era, and they do not want to work\u2019, shows an uncritical attitude towards [his] own behaviour, does not correct ideas of own relevance and persecution. Denies perceptual illusions.\nHaving regard to the lack of a critical attitude towards his improper behaviour, the presence of ideas about his own relevance and persecution, [it] can be concluded that he falls under section 29 (a) and (c) of the Law of the Russian Federation on Psychiatric Assistance and Guarantees of Citizens\u2019 Rights Related to Its Administration of 1992 (\u201cthe Psychiatric Assistance Act 1992\u201d).\u201d 13.  On 4 April 2007 the hospital applied for a court order for the involuntary placement of the applicant in a hospital under section 29 (a) and (c) of the Psychiatric Assistance Act 1992 as the applicant was a danger to himself and others and risked significant damage to his health from a likely deterioration or aggravation of his condition if there was no psychiatric treatment. 14.  On 9 April 2007 the Primorskiy District Court of St Petersburg (\u041f\u0440\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0440\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0439 \u0440\u0430\u0439\u043e\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u0441\u0443\u0434 \u0433. \u0421\u0430\u043d\u043a\u0442-\u041f\u0435\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0431\u0443\u0440\u0433\u0430) granted the application to admit the applicant to hospital without his consent. The hearing was attended by the applicant, a court-appointed lawyer, Mrs L., the psychiatrists, and the prosecutor. During the hearing the District Court examined the applicant\u2019s medical history and heard the testimony of the psychiatrists, who referred to severe alcohol abuse, erratic behaviour, frivolous calls to the police, and threatening conduct towards medical personnel. The trial record indicates that during the hearing the applicant claimed that informing the police about the alleged presence of explosives at a factory was his civic duty, complained about hospital regime and facilities and referred to his friendship with certain media personas in Russia.\nThe relevant parts of the court order authorising the applicant\u2019s treatment read as follows:\n\u201c... The recommendation for admission to hospital was issued ... due to the presence of a severe psychiatric disorder, which can cause significant damage to [his] health due to a deterioration or aggravation of the psychiatric condition in the absence of psychiatric help.\nMr V.K. did not consent to his admission to hospital since he refused treatment.\nOn 3 April 2007 he was examined by a panel of psychiatrists, who established that [he is] aware of his surroundings, answers questions in detail, believes that he is being persecuted by the police because he is \u2018a person of the Stalinist era, and they do not want to work\u2019, shows an uncritical attitude towards [his] behaviour, does not correct his ideas of his own relevance and persecution, denies perceptual illusions. On the basis of their observations the panel concluded that the treatment of Mr V.K. as an inpatient is necessary. The court has no grounds to doubt the conclusions of the panel\u2019s report. There is no evidence to the contrary.\nHaving considered the evidence in the case, having heard the opinion of the doctors, of the lawyer, Mrs L., who considered inpatient treatment to be reasonable, and the opinion of the prosecutor ... the court concludes that the application of the Hospital\u2019s chief physician is well-founded because Mr V.K. suffers from a severe disorder which indicates a risk of significant damage to [his] health due to a deterioration or aggravation of his psychiatric condition in the absence of psychiatric help.\u201d 15.  On 20 April 2007 the applicant was formally discharged from hospital after an improvement in his mental health. 16.  On 25 April 2007 the applicant, represented by Mr D. Bartenev, a lawyer practising in St Petersburg, lodged an appeal against the order of 9 April 2007, stating, inter alia, that the legal aid lawyer Mrs L. had failed perform her functions properly. On the same day the applicant left hospital. 17.  On 2 August 2007 the applicant\u2019s appeal was summarily dismissed in a short decision by the St Petersburg City Court (\u0421\u0430\u043d\u043a\u0442-\u041f\u0435\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0431\u0443\u0440\u0433\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0439 \u0433\u043e\u0440\u043e\u0434\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u0441\u0443\u0434). The relevant parts read as follows:\n\u201c ... In granting the application the [lower] court concluded that there were good reasons to place Mr V.K. in hospital against his will.\nThe court\u2019s conclusion relied on the evidence that had been submitted to it ... [It is] proven by the report of the panel of the Hospital\u2019s resident psychiatrists, which describes Mr V.K.\u2019s condition and confirms the existence of a severe psychiatric disorder indicating a risk of significant damage to [his] health due to a deterioration or aggravation of his psychiatric condition in the absence of psychiatric assistance.\nThe arguments in the statement of appeal that legal aid lawyer Mrs L. did not duly discharge her professional functions may not serve as a ground for annulment of the order, which is lawful on the merits ... \u201d 18.  Nothing in the materials available to the Court suggests that the applicant had ever been restricted in his legal capacity or appointed a legal guardian.", "references": ["3", "7", "6", "5", "1", "9", "4", "0", "8", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "7.  The applicant was born in 1978 and lives in Nairobi, Kenya. 8.  The applicant left Kenya on 29 March 2005. He entered Cyprus unlawfully through the \u201cTurkish Republic of Northern Cyprus\u201d (\u201cTRNC\u201d) on 4 April 2005. 9.  On 6 April 2005 the applicant was arrested at Larnaca Airport as he attempted to travel to London on a forged passport. 10.  On 12 April 2005 the applicant, after pleading guilty to using a forged document (sections 331, 332, 335 and 339 of the Criminal Code, Cap. 154; see Seagal v. Cyprus, no. 50756/13, \u00a7 100, 26 April 2016) was sentenced by the Larnaca District Court to nine months\u2019 imprisonment (criminal case no. 4728/05). He was detained in Wing 1B of Nicosia Central Prisons. 11.  The applicant appealed to the Supreme Court against his sentence (criminal appeal no. 132/05) but it was dismissed on 4 July 2005. 12.  In the meantime, on 21 April 2005, the applicant applied to the Asylum Service for asylum. 13.  On 10 November 2005, while the applicant was still serving his sentence, the Director of the Civil Registry and Migration Department issued detention and deportation orders against him, pursuant to section 14 of the Aliens and Immigration Law, on the grounds that he was a \u201cprohibited immigrant\u201d within the meaning of section 6(1)(d) of that law (see paragraphs 94-95 below). The enforcement of the deportation order was suspended pending the examination of his asylum application. 14.  On 14 November 2005 the applicant was released after serving his sentence. However, he was re-arrested the same day under the detention and deportation orders and placed in the immigration detention facilities in Block 10 of Nicosia Central Prisons. He was presented with the above orders but refused to sign them. 15.  On 31 January 2006 the Asylum Service rejected his application. 16.  On 22 February 2006 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Reviewing Authority for Refugees (\u201cReviewing Authority\u201d), which was dismissed on 6 April 2006. 17.  On 3 May 2006 the applicant brought a \u201crecourse\u201d (judicial review proceedings) before the Supreme Court (in its first-instance revisional jurisdiction) challenging the Reviewing Authority\u2019s decision (recourse no. 782/06). 18.  By a letter dated 11 June 2006 the applicant made a complaint to the Commissioner for Administration of the Republic of Cyprus (\u201cthe Ombudsman\u201d) concerning, inter alia, the deportation and detention orders. 19.  By letters dated 17 May 2006 and 29 August 2006 the applicant\u2019s lawyer complained to the Minister of the Interior of the unlawfulness of the applicant\u2019s continued detention following the expiry of his sentence and requested his release. He further noted that the authorities had threatened to deport the applicant even though his recourse was still pending before the Supreme Court. 20.  By a letter dated 5 December 2006 the Ombudsman informed the applicant that the authorities\u2019 decision to issue deportation orders had been justified as his asylum application had been rejected. 21.  It transpires from the documents in the case file that the applicant\u2019s deportation was not possible because he had no valid passport or other valid travel document and refused to cooperate with the authorities. When he eventually decided to cooperate, the authorities contacted the Kenyan Embassy in Italy. On 20 February 2007 it issued a travel document for the applicant in the name of David Kandiri Wanjiku. 22.  The previous orders were cancelled and on 22 February 2007 new ones were issued on the same grounds (see paragraph 13 above) under the name in the travel document. 23.  On 9 March 2007 the applicant was deported (see paragraphs 26-30 below) and added to the authorities\u2019 \u201cstop list\u201d (a register of individuals whose entry into and exit from Cyprus is banned or subject to monitoring). 24.  Following the applicant\u2019s deportation, on 9 May 2007 his lawyer withdrew the recourse from the Supreme Court (see paragraph 17 above). 25.  The applicant\u2019s Kenyan passport, issued on 15 October 2009, is in the name of David William Thuo. 26.  According to the applicant, in the early hours of 9 March 2007 prison guards and two immigration officers insulted him by saying \u201ccome here you stupid mavro (black)\u201d. They were holding a form with the applicant\u2019s photograph on it but the applicant could not read it. They asked him whether the photograph was of him and the applicant replied in the affirmative. The applicant asked to be allowed to call his lawyer but was told \u201cno telephone for you \u2013 you have no rights here\u201d. Then one of the immigration officers pushed him into a room, hitting him and pinching his testicles. It was very painful and he thought they were going to kill him. He could not breathe. He stated that the officers had had their hands on his neck. After a struggle the officers allowed the applicant to call his lawyer. The applicant\u2019s lawyer informed him that he was trying to contact the Minister of the Interior and the applicant told his lawyer that he had been beaten by the immigration officers. One of the officers also spoke to the lawyer but the applicant could not understand the conversation as it was in Greek. He was given very little time before leaving the detention facilities to take his belongings and had to leave some behind. 27.  The applicant was driven to Larnaca Airport with his hands handcuffed behind his back. He was placed in a room at the airport and the door was closed. The applicant asked to see the officer in charge and speak to his lawyer and began to shout after the officers refused to listen to him. Twenty minutes later three men in military uniform came into the room and, with the two immigration officers, they beat and verbally abused the applicant. They forced him into a chair and held him by the neck while an army officer held his mouth open and stuffed brown paper in it. They then placed adhesive tape with the Cyprus Airways logo on it over his mouth and neck. They wrapped bandages around his head and neck, almost entirely covering those parts. 28.  The applicant was escorted onto the aircraft, which was empty. He was seated at the back and was still in handcuffs. He was in pain. He remained in that state until the aircraft was near Milan. 29.  The applicant indicated to the officers that he wanted a pen and paper and they were given to him. He managed to write that he would not cause any problems and that he was in pain but they refused to listen to him. They warned him not to cause any more trouble. He stated that the captain and crew had witnessed everything. 30.  The applicant was very upset but remained calm during the flight and managed to have a meal. 31.  The applicant submitted that four of his top teeth had become loose owing to the ill-treatment and that he had later been informed by doctors that they needed to be replaced with artificial ones. 32.  Lastly, he noted that he could identify the three army officers who had ill-treated him. 33.  Following his deportation, on 27 December 2007, the applicant, while in Kenya, lodged a complaint with the Ombudsman concerning his deportation and the ill-treatment he had received during the deportation process at Nicosia Central Prisons, Larnaca Airport and on the aircraft to Milan. The applicant included a detailed chronology of the events with his letter of complaint, describing his alleged ill-treatment (see paragraphs 26-32 above). 34.  On 4 February 2008 the Ombudsman informed the applicant that she would investigate his complaints and inform him of the outcome. 35.  On 4 June 2009 the Ombudsman submitted her report to the Attorney General. She relied on comments by the Chief of Police as well as on a report dated 23 May 2008 by the Director of the Nicosia Police Aliens and Immigration Unit (see paragraph 37 below). She observed that the applicant had made his complaint following his deportation and so gathering evidence had not been easy and had had adverse consequences for the investigation. Given those factors and having examined the evidence that had been given to her, which did not substantiate the allegations of ill-treatment, she found that intervention on her part and the imputing of responsibility to the police for their handling of the applicant\u2019s situation could not be justified. 2.  The applicant\u2019s complaint to the Independent Authority for the Investigation of Allegations and Complaints against the Police (\u201cIAIACAP\u201d) and the initial refusal to investigate 36.  On 23 February 2008 the applicant lodged a complaint with the IAIACAP (see paragraphs 99-104 below). He complained that he had been deported even though asylum proceedings had still been pending before the Supreme Court and that he had been ill-treated during the deportation process.  The applicant attached a detailed chronology of the events to his letter of complaint (see paragraphs 26-32 above) and requested that the IAIACAP conduct an investigation. 37.  The president of the IAIACAP conducted a preliminary investigation by collecting material from the police, who denied ill-treating the applicant. The police provided him with a report dated 23 May 2008 by the Director of the Nicosia Police Aliens and Immigration Unit and open statements by the two immigration officers, acting sergeants T.C. and Po.P., who had accompanied the applicant throughout his deportation. According to the above report and statements, when the immigration officers went to take the applicant from his cell, they showed him his travel document, as was the usual practice. The applicant started shouting and asked to call his lawyer, which the officers allowed him to do before leaving the detention facilities. T.C. also spoke to the lawyer and asked him to persuade his client to be cooperative during the deportation process. The applicant calmed down, they handcuffed him and he got into the police car without any problem. They then went to Larnaca Airport. Po.P stated, in particular, that they had sat in the passengers\u2019 waiting area and the applicant had been offered coffee. He had been completely calm. At 9 a.m. the applicant and the two immigration officers had boarded the aircraft for Milan. As soon as they had entered the aircraft they had removed the handcuffs, as the use of handcuffs during flights was prohibited by International Air Transport Association (IATA) regulations. They had stayed in Milan for five hours and had then boarded a connecting flight to Nairobi. The officers denied the allegations of ill-treatment, maintaining that the deportation procedure had been carried out without the use of force and in compliance with the applicable rules. They also stated that the applicant had been a problematic, uncooperative person who had made threats to them throughout the process. T.C. stated that the officers had behaved impeccably and with patience, despite the fact that the applicant had been provocative throughout. 38.  On 9 July 2008 the president of the IAIACAP concluded that the seriousness of the applicant\u2019s allegations meant that his complaint ought to be investigated, irrespective of the police officers\u2019 statements that they had not ill-treated him. Nevertheless, in order to reach a decision he required information as to how the IAIACAP could secure medical evidence and a statement from the applicant. The matter was referred to the Attorney General for his opinion. 39.  \u0392y a letter dated 16 July 2008 the IAIACAP informed the applicant that it was willing to investigate the complaint, but there were certain difficulties, such as the fact that he was abroad. The IAIACAP had decided to ask the Attorney General\u2019s opinion on the matter. 40.  By a letter dated 28 July 2008 counsel for the Attorney General informed the IAIACAP that the applicant\u2019s complaint could not be investigated because the applicant had left Cyprus. The applicant was informed of that decision on 11 August 2008. 41.  By a letter of 17 June 2009 to the IAIACAP, the Attorney General, referring to the applicant\u2019s application to the Court, revisited the above decision and ordered the IAIACAP to conduct a formal investigation into the applicant\u2019s complaint. He noted that he had been informed of the position taken by counsel in the letter of 28 July 2008 (see paragraph 40 above) when he had looked into the case following communication of the applicant\u2019s application by the Court. In his opinion, where an arguable claim for ill-treatment had been made, the fact that the complainant had been deported, was not in Cyprus or that he was on the stop list did not constitute grounds for not conducting an investigation. He therefore did not agree with the opinion expressed by his counsel. 42.  The Attorney General requested that the relevant authorities take all the necessary steps to arrange the applicant\u2019s return to Cyprus for the purposes of the investigation. 43.  In their observations the Government submitted that the Attorney General had already informed the president of the IAIACAP in a letter dated 5 December 2007 on the taking of statements from witnesses, that when a person complaining to the IAIACAP was abroad, he or she should be asked to visit the IAIACAP in person and provide a statement and that the Government would pay the expenses for a complainant\u2019s return to Cyprus. 44.  On 13 July 2009 the applicant was informed of the decision to investigate and that he had been temporarily removed from the stop list for the purposes of the investigation. He was requested to inform the IAIACAP when he would be able to travel to Cyprus to provide a statement. 45.  On 14 July 2009 the IAIACAP launched an official investigation into the applicant\u2019s ill-treatment complaint. A member of the IAIACAP was appointed as investigator. 46.  In the course of the investigation the investigator collected documents and other physical evidence related to the applicant\u2019s case. It included the records kept by every police unit involved, including at Block 10 at Nicosia Central Prisons and at the airport; domestic court judgments and transcripts; samples of Cyprus Airways adhesive tape; and the aircraft cabin crew supervisor\u2019s report. No mention was made of the incident in the cabin crew report. The footage for that day from the airport\u2019s closed-circuit television (\u201cCCTV\u201d) cameras had already been destroyed. 47.  The investigator singled out five police officers as suspects: acting sergeants T.C. and Po.P. (see paragraph 37 above), the commanding officer of the \u0399mmediate Response Squad (\u039f\u03c5\u03bb\u03b1\u03bc\u03cc\u03c2 \u03a4\u03b1\u03c7\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2/\u0386\u03bc\u03b5\u03c3\u03b7\u03c2 \u0395\u03c0\u03ad\u03bc\u03b2\u03b1\u03c3\u03b7\u03c2) (\u201cIRS\u201d) Inspector N.S., and Constables Pa.P. and A.I. 48.  On 12 June 2010 the applicant arrived in Cyprus to take part in the investigation. He was examined by two specialist doctors at Nicosia General Hospital, a maxillofacial surgeon and a urologist. Each prepared a medical report. 49.  After taking X-rays, the maxillofacial surgeon concluded that as three years had passed since the alleged ill-treatment it was impossible to conclude with any certainty that any damage to the applicant\u2019s teeth that was diagnosed was due exclusively to ill-treatment, especially in view of the applicant\u2019s generally bad oral hygiene.  The urologist did not observe any health issues, defects or signs of ill-treatment which could be linked to the applicant\u2019s complaint. 50.  The reports were passed on to a forensics pathologist who concluded that there was no way to determine scientifically whether the applicant had been ill-treated, but found such a possibility minimal to negligible (\u03b5\u03bb\u03ac\u03c7\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7 \u03b5\u03ce\u03c2 \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u03b1\u03bc\u03b9\u03bd\u03ae). 51.  On 15 June 2010 the applicant was interviewed and gave his first written statement to the investigator. He made reference at the beginning of the statement to his conditions of detention and noted that during his detention in Block 10 he had kept a record of events. Until 8 March 2007 the behaviour of the police and immigration officers had been correct. The applicant continued by providing a detailed account of the events of 8 to 9 March 2007 and his alleged ill-treatment (see paragraphs 26-32 above). He stated that when the immigration officers had come to the detention facility to take him from his cell he had refused to leave and had resisted. He noted that the bandages and the paper that had been put in his mouth at Larnaca Airport had been removed when the aircraft had been approaching Milan. The applicant also complained that he had had pain when urinating and when erect but that it had gone away after three months of treatment. He stated that he had been examined by a doctor in Kenya and had been treated there. 52.  In support of his allegations the applicant provided the investigator with a certificate dated 9 June 2010 which had been issued by a doctor at Tigoni District Hospital, a public hospital in Kenya. It appears from the document that the applicant had written to the hospital on 21 December 2009 to request such a certificate. According to the certificate the applicant had visited the hospital on 10 March 2007 and had complained of neck and back pain, swelling of the face, dizziness, pain in the testicles and palpitations. It gave the applicant\u2019s blood pressure upon examination at 140/90 and his pulse at 115 bpm. It indicated that the applicant had \u201cfacial oedema/puffiness; bruises on wrist; testicles tendon, no obvious cut or fracture; thigh myalgia and bruises\u201d. The applicant was prescribed tablets. According to the certificate the applicant had returned to the hospital on 11 March 2007 because of \u201cpainful loose teeth and jaw\u201d. He was referred for a dental examination and told to rest for four days. The medical certificate is signed and was also stamped by the hospital\u2019s superintendent and certified by a notary on 10 June 2010. There is another signature dated 15 June 2010 but there is no indication whose it is. According to the applicant, he was advised to replace his front teeth but decided not to do so as with the passage of time they had gone back into place. 53.  On 16 June 2010 all serving members of the IRS who had been on duty on 9 March 2007 from 7 a.m. to 9 p.m. (the date and approximate time of the alleged ill-treatment) were ordered to attend an identity parade the following day. 54.  On 17 June 2010 the investigator visited Larnaca Airport where he took an open statement from N.S., who named the members of the IRS who had been on duty on the day of the alleged ill-treatment, including himself, Pa.P and A.I. He could not recall anything related to the applicant. He further stated that on the day of the alleged ill-treatment the members of his unit had worn blue uniforms. He said he did not object to the applicant, who was at the airport the same day, seeing him or members of the unit. 55.  Certain members of the IRS, including N.S., Pa.P. and A.I., did not attend the identity parade. N.S. and Pa.P were absent for personal reasons while A.I. had already retired. The applicant did not identify any of the police officers present in the identity parade. As some of the officers were absent the investigator showed the applicant pictures of IRS officers who had been on duty on 9 March 2007. The applicant identified N.S., Pa.P. and A.I. as the men in military uniform who had been responsible for his ill\u2011treatment that day with the assistance of the two members of the Police Aliens and Immigration Unit. 56.  Later the same day the applicant gave a second written statement to the investigator, providing further details of his alleged ill-treatment during the deportation process.  The applicant stated that at Larnaca Airport N.S. had introduced himself as the \u201cchief\u201d, put brown paper in his mouth, stuck adhesive tape on part of his face and had then wrapped almost his entire face in bandages. A.I. had assisted N.S. by holding the applicant by the neck. They had left some space so he could see and breathe. He also alleged that Pa.P. had held him by the shoulders and, with the assistance of one of the immigration officers, had immobilised him on the chair in which he had been sitting. He had kept trying to shout. Samples of the adhesive tape allegedly used during the incident were shown to the applicant. He identified the sample with the Cyprus Airways logo but noticed a difference in the colour of the letters. The applicant left Cyprus a few hours after giving his second statement. 57.  On 21 June 2010 the investigator was informed by an officer working at the warehouse and storeroom at Police Headquarters that the IRS had introduced blue uniforms on 31 May 2007. Before that, the IRS had worn military uniform. This was verified by another officer who kept the warehouse and storeroom records. 58.  On 25 and 28 June 2010 the investigator interviewed Po.P. and T.C and took statements from them. They handed the investigator the statements they had given in the course of the preliminary investigation in which they had denied the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment (see paragraph 37 above). They stated that no force had been used at Nicosia Central Prisons, that they had not insulted the applicant and that he had been allowed to speak to his lawyer. 59.  Po.P. stated that the applicant had reacted only verbally at Nicosia Central Prisons and that after calling his lawyer he had cooperated and shown no resistance. They had thus been able to handcuff him and take him to the police car. Po.P. stated that throughout the trip to and at the airport and during the flight, the applicant had threatened the officers but had not been violent. However, according to Po.P., during the wait at the airport, the applicant had started to become uneasy and had tried to hit his head on the wall to harm himself. With the assistance of colleagues from another unit, T.C. had wrapped bandages around the applicant\u2019s forehead to protect him, but they had not under any circumstances gagged him. The force used for that purpose had been minimal and Po.P could not recall whether the applicant had been injured. They had taken the applicant on board the airplane before the other passengers and had removed the bandages once on board in order to assure the captain, who had come to see them, that the applicant was not injured. From then on the trip had gone smoothly. When Po.P was asked why he had not mentioned this incident to his superiors earlier and had not made a note of it, for instance, in any of the police records, Po.P. stated that such things often happened during deportations, he had not considered it to be significant as no one had been injured and the whole deportation process had been carried out smoothly. He could not recall whether he had been informed of the applicant\u2019s specific allegations when he had given his open statement (see paragraph 37 above). 60.  T.C. stated that when the applicant had realised he was being deported he had only reacted verbally and had asked to speak to his lawyer. The officers had allowed him to do so. T.C. stated that he had heard the applicant tell his lawyer that the officers had taken him by the neck and had been suffocating him, but that was a lie. T.C. also spoke to the applicant\u2019s lawyer (see paragraph 37 above). The applicant had calmed down, they had handcuffed him and put him in the police car; T.C. stated that the applicant had tried to pull away when they had tried to put him in the car. At the airport in Larnaca, T.C. had left the applicant under Po.P.\u2019s supervision for about twenty minutes for check-in purposes. When he had returned the applicant had been frantic. Po.P had informed him that the applicant had been trying to hit his head on the wall. T.C. stated that he had also noticed that he had tried to hit himself against the chairs and walls in the room. He had been shouting and screaming and causing disruption in the departure hall. The officers had asked him to calm down but to no avail. For that reason, with the help of members of the IRS who had restrained the applicant, they had wrapped the applicant\u2019s head in bandages to protect him from possible self-harm. He could not remember whether they had also tied his feet because he had been kicking. T.C. stated that they had used the amount of force necessary to protect the applicant and immobilise or restrain him. When the aircraft had been ready to depart they had removed the bandages and handcuffs and the applicant had listened to music throughout the flight. When asked why he had not mentioned in his previous open statement that force had been used against the applicant (see paragraph 37 above), T.C. stated that it might have been an omission on his part but at that time he had not thought it essential. 61.  On 29 June 2010 the IAIACAP investigator arranged an interview with N.S., who refused to answer any questions or provide a statement. On the same day, the investigator interviewed Constable Pa.P. who stated that members of the IRS had been wearing military uniform on the day of the incident but he did not remember coming into contact with the applicant. He observed that IRS officers did not keep a record when they helped other units as it was the responsibility of the unit itself to do that. He could not remember whether he had made a note in his personal notebook. He stated that he would get back to the investigator when he had found it. 62.  On 1 July 2010 the investigator interviewed the applicant\u2019s lawyer. The lawyer stated that on 9 March 2007 he had spoken to the applicant by telephone while the applicant was still at Nicosia Central Prisons. The applicant had informed him that he was being deported. The applicant had not made any mention of ill-treatment. He had next spoken to the applicant a few days after his deportation. The applicant had informed him that he had been ill-treated and insulted by police officers from the beginning of the deportation process in prison to when he had boarded the aircraft. The applicant had not provided further details but had informed him that he had lodged an application with the Court. 63.  On 2 July 2010 the investigator started taking a statement from A.I. but A.I. left the interview following a telephone call and promised to return on 5 July 2010. However, A.I. informed the investigator on that date that he refused to answer any questions and referred the investigator to his lawyer. 64.  In the course of the investigation statements were taken from various individuals, mainly police officers, inter alia, from the units concerned and from those at the immigration detention facilities at Nicosia Central Prisons. 65.  On 22 July 2010 the investigator prepared a report on the investigation procedure and his findings. 66.  The report stated that the various police records (records of action and log or duty books) were deficient and had failed to keep track of ongoing events (such as the applicant\u2019s being moved from Block 10 to another area on the night of his deportation and the officers\u2019 actions during the deportation). 67.  The investigator stated that it was clear that the applicant, after failing in his asylum claim and lodging his recourse with the Supreme Court, had tried to delay and obstruct his deportation by reacting negatively and not cooperating. In the end he had applied to the Court for compensation. 68.  According to the investigator there was a possibility that the applicant had been exaggerating. The officers\u2019 omissions, however, allowed room for questioning the accountability and objectivity which ought to have characterised them as members of the police during the execution of their duties. Furthermore, he noted the discrepancies in the officers\u2019 statements with regard to the colour of their uniform. He observed that that had clearly aimed at hiding the truth (\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03ce\u03c2 \u03b3\u03b9\u03b1 \u03c3\u03ba\u03bf\u03c0\u03bf\u03cd\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c5\u03c3\u03ba\u03cc\u03c4\u03b9\u03c3\u03b7\u03c2). He also noted the fact that three of them had failed to attend the identity parade. The investigator considered that it was questionable whether the medical certificate provided by the applicant could be accepted as evidence in any procedure given that it did not mention the name of the doctor or doctors who had examined him. Relevant evidence from Kenya would therefore be required. 69.  The investigator found that the applicant had reacted negatively and resisted deportation, both at Nicosia Central Prisons and at the airport, either by trying to obstruct it or through resisting in an effort to gain time in order to prevent it. It was likely that he had caused a great deal of disturbance in Larnaca Airport\u2019s departure hall and it had seemed that that would extend to the aircraft. A certain amount of force had had to be used in those circumstances in order to overcome his resistance and calm him down. It was crucial to examine which of the two versions of events \u2013 that of the applicant or the officers \u2013 better described the level of force used against the applicant. He concluded with the following words:\n\u201cTheoretically, if the violence was as described by the complainant, it may be considered excessive, inhuman and degrading. In practice, however, it was imperative to use some analogous/proportionate (\u03b1\u03bd\u03ac\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b7) force to ensure the success of the deportation, to restore order and to ensure security during the flight, which probably, however, went beyond the permissible limits. It all depends, however, on the credibility of those involved.\u201d 70.  According to the investigator, on the basis of the evidence, the applicant had by his reactions and behaviour rendered the use of force necessary. However, as the applicant had described it, that force had been excessive (\u03c0\u03bf\u03c5 \u03cc\u03c0\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b7\u03bd \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03b3\u03c1\u03ac\u03c6\u03b5\u03b9 \u03bf \u03af\u03b4\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ae\u03c4\u03b1\u03bd \u03c5\u03c0\u03ad\u03c1\u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03c1\u03b7). In his opinion it was more suitable to take disciplinary action against the officers for improper conduct and neglecting their duty to record and report the events than to press criminal charges. If the officers had acted appropriately from the beginning it would have given more weight to their accounts and made them more convincing. 71.  On 27 July 2010 the investigator transmitted a summary of his report and findings to the president of the IAIACAP. 72.  The IAIACAP agreed with the investigator\u2019s finding that no criminal action was merited but disagreed with his suggestion that disciplinary action should be pursued against the officers involved. It stated that it believed the officers\u2019 testimony that only the requisite amount of force had been used to enable the applicant\u2019s deportation. After examining the background to the case, it further stated that it was clear that the applicant\u2019s actions had been self-serving and that through lying and using various stratagems he had tried to make sure he stayed in Cyprus or benefitted financially. To that end, he had proceeded to lodge an application with the Court. In addition, the IAIACAP supported its finding by noting that the cabin crew supervisor had stated that he had not noticed anything untoward during the flight, something he would have recorded in his flight report. The IAIACAP concluded as follows:\n\u201cIf [the applicant\u2019s] claim that he was gagged with bandages was true, the cabin crew would have perceived it as an unusual event and would have recorded it.\nAt the same time, omissions by the officers involved have been identified; they are not, however, of such a nature as to justify disciplinary action. Such omissions can be communicated to the Chief of Police for taking corrective steps\u201d. 73.  The IAIACAP\u2019s conclusion and the investigator\u2019s report with all the relevant material were submitted to the Attorney General for a decision. 74.  On 2 September 2010 the Attorney General decided that the police officers\u2019 actions and omissions did not merit criminal prosecution, noting also that it appeared that the applicant\u2019s actions had been self-serving. He agreed with the findings of the investigator and the IAIACAP that no criminal offence had been committed by the officers in question. In his opinion, the officers\u2019 omission in not recording or reporting the incident did not merit disciplinary action either, given that the applicant had been unruly (\u03b1\u03c4\u03af\u03b8\u03b1\u03c3\u03bf\u03c2) and uncooperative. He left that issue, however, to the discretion of the Chief of Police. 75.  On 10 September 2010 the applicant was informed of the Attorney General\u2019s decision. 76.  The Chief of Police decided not to take disciplinary action against the officers involved. Instead, on 7 October 2010, he issued instructions to the Immigration Police and the Airport Security Police that in future they had to ensure that all relevant information regarding similar incidents and actions taken by the police in such contexts was meticulously recorded. Furthermore, the police departments concerned held meetings and lectures on the matter. 77.  According to the applicant, he was detained in a police detention cell at Nicosia Central Prisons for a long time in conditions which had only been acceptable for a stay of a few days. He had been detained with another detainee in a cell measuring 5.5 sq. m and there had been no room for exercise. The conditions had also been unhygienic: strong smells had emanated from the toilet, the detainees had been made to clean their cells and the area nearby and rubbish had not been collected. He stated that the detention facilities had been overcrowded. 78.  The applicant submitted a hand-sketched floor plan of his cell in Block 10. The plan showed that it was 5.5 sq. m in area, measuring 2.75 m by 2 m with a window 75 cm wide. It had a bunk bed which measured 83.5 cm by 200 cm, two chairs and a small table. 79.  In May 2006 a fire broke out in Block 10. As a result the Block had been covered in ash and detainees had been exposed to the smell of smoke. However, despite those conditions the detainees, including the applicant, had still been detained in Block 10. They had even been kept there when the Block had been under renovation and had thus had to bear the smell of paint. In support of that statement, the applicant submitted extracts from newspaper articles describing the situation in Block 10. 80.  Relying on a letter issued by the Prison Director in June 2009 the Government made submissions about the conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention as follows. 81.  From 6 April 2005 until 14 November 2005, when serving his sentence, the applicant had been detained in Wing 1B of Nicosia Central Prisons. 82.  On 14 November 2005, following his release and re-arrest, the applicant had been moved to Block 10 (see paragraph 14 above). 83.  The applicant had been detained in a cell measuring 2.73 m by 2 m, equipped with a bunk-bed and any other equipment he had desired; it was likely that he had shared his cell with another detainee. A window measuring 87 cm by 68 cm had allowed for natural light and ventilation. 84.  Block 10 had had sufficient hygiene facilities such as washbasins, toilets and showers. Although a private cleaner had been hired, the detainees had been personally responsible for keeping their cells clean and had been provided with cleaning products. 85.  Air conditioning units provided heat in the winter and cold air in the summer. A communal area measuring 50 m by 3.5 m, which connected the cells, allowed detainees to move freely inside throughout the day so prisoners had had access to water coolers and entertainment rooms; the applicant had been allowed out of his cell from dawn to the evening, as referred to in the European Prison Regulations. After 11 a.m. all detainees were allowed to leave the common area to go to the laundry room where they could stay until the end of the laundry cycle, which could last up to ninety minutes. 86.  With reference to access to outdoor activities the Government submitted that all detainees were obliged to go out of the detention area straight after breakfast, from 7.30 a.m. until 9 a.m. Outdoor access was restricted from 9 a.m. to 11 a.m., during visiting hours. At the end of visiting time detainees could leave the detention area and visit the washrooms. Detainees were allowed out of their cells again from 4 p.m. to 8 p.m. when they also had access to the basketball court. 87.  Block 10 had been under renovation from October 2005 to October 2010 to improve conditions for detainees and ensure their compatibility with European standards. 88.  The Government submitted the file on the applicant which had been kept by prison officers during his detention and a medical certificate. They indicated that the applicant had had visits from his lawyer and other people and that he had received medical examinations on request. 89.  In his statement to the IAIACAP on 22 September 2009, the officer in charge of the archives at Nicosia Police Headquarters informed the investigator that on 28 April 1999, the Minister of Justice had declared Block 10 at Nicosia Central Prisons a police detention establishment. He further informed the investigator that for safety purposes Block 10 had been under renovation from October 2005 until October 2007. He provided the investigator with an undated document containing all the steps taken for the renovation of Block 10. With reference to the conditions of detention, the document recorded the following (emphasis in the original):\n\u201cCONDITIONS OF DETENTION BASED ON EUROPEAN STANDARDS:\nCell Size: In Block 10 there are 36 cells measuring 5.4 sq. m. It is noted that according to European standards, each cell should measure at least 7 sq. m for 1 person.\n- Lighting (metal shutters and natural light): Natural light is considered adequate.\n- Ventilation [and air conditioning]: There are air conditioning devices which are considered sufficient. There is no ventilation system and the area is ventilated by the windows inside the cells of the detention area. Ventilation is considered adequate.\n- Hygiene Areas: The toilets and bathrooms are built in a way they cannot be vandalised.\n- Access to drinking water: There is a water cooler in the common area which is considered sufficient.\n- Open area for exercise: There is an open area and it is considered sufficient\n- Chair and table in each cell: Tables and chairs have been placed inside the cells.\n- Rights of detainees: The rights of detainees are posted within the detention area. They have been translated into seven languages: English, Russian, Turkish, Arabic, Iranian, Chinese and French.\u201d 90.  It appears from extracts of the custody logs held in Block 10 in February 2007 contained in the IAIACAP\u2019s investigation file that detainees were allowed into the open area for walking and exercise for approximately one hour each day. It appears from the same record that overall in February a maximum of fifty-eight detainees were held in Block 10. On 15 February 2007 the police officers in Block 10 received instructions from the detention cell supervising officer that any detainee who refused to clean his cell or failed to contribute to the general cleaning of the detention facilities (\u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u03ae \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03c1\u03b1\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b7\u03c1\u03af\u03c9\u03bd) would be placed in isolation until he complied with the cleaning requirements. Food would be provided to the detainee in the isolation cell. 91.  In his statement to the IAIACAP investigator on 15 June 2010 (see paragraph 51 above) the applicant stated the following with regards to the conditions of his detention:\n\u201cThe treatment I had in Block 10 was good, I didn\u2019t have any problems with the policemen, but the conditions were not good. We used to be two in the same room and were locked. The cooling system was problematic, because some detainees from Iran burned the place during a protest they carried out. After the beginning of 2007 they started leaving us to go out of our rooms for one hour every day. ...\u201d. 92.  The applicant also complained about his conditions of detention in his letter to the Ombudsman dated 11 June 2006 (see paragraph 18 above). In her reply of 5 December 2006 the Ombudsman informed him that she would be conducting an investigation into the conditions of detention of foreigners in general in order to make suggestions for improving the situation.", "references": ["5", "6", "2", "7", "4", "3", "0", "8", "9", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "5.  At the material time the applicant union, founded in 1955 with its registered office in Istanbul, represented workers in the food-processing sector. 6.  In 2003 a number of employees at three factories in Turgutlu (Manisa), Torbal\u0131 (\u0130zmir) and Manyas belonging to the Tuka\u015f G\u0131da Sanayi ve Ticaret public limited company (\u201cthe Tuka\u015f company\u201d or \u201cTuka\u015f\u201d), the main shareholder of which was the holding company OYAK (Ordu Yard\u0131mla\u015fma Kurumu, a pension fund for the armed forces), joined the applicant union. 7.  On 20 February 2004, arguing that the number of its members at the three factories had attained the minimum level set in the Trade Union Act (Law no. 2821; ...), the applicant union applied to the Ministry of Labour and Social Security (\u201cthe Ministry\u201d) for certification of its representative status (yetki belgesi) so that it could enter into collective labour agreements with Tuka\u015f on behalf of its members. 8.  In a decision of 26 May 2004 the Ministry granted the application and confirmed the applicant union\u2019s representative status. On the basis of a report drawn up by labour inspectors on the nature of Tuka\u015f\u2019s activities and its labour force, the Ministry found that, in view of the number of employees belonging to the applicant union and the total number of staff at the three factories, which operated in the food-processing sector, the conditions laid down in the Trade Union Act (Law no. 2821) for engaging in collective bargaining were satisfied. It also stated that the staff at Tuka\u015f\u2019s head office belonged to the \u201cbusiness, computing, education and arts\u201d sector. 9.  On 31 May 2004 Tuka\u015f applied to the \u0130zmir 3rd Labour Court for judicial review of the Ministry\u2019s decision of 26 May 2004, submitting that the applicant union did not satisfy the requirements for engaging in collective bargaining. 10.  On 17 September 2004 the 3rd Labour Court appointed an expert to determine whether the applicant union\u2019s membership attained the minimum level laid down in the Trade Union Act (Law no. 2821). 11.  On 13 November 2004 the expert submitted his report to the court. In it he noted that, according to a first approach taking into account the total number of Tuka\u015f\u2019s employees at its head office and its three factories, the applicant union did not have enough members to represent employees in collective bargaining. He pointed out that production planning for the factories on the basis of market demand, laboratory controls and analyses of product hygiene, taste and quality, product marketing and human resources management were all carried out at the company\u2019s head office, that the activities of the three factories and the head office were \u201ccomplementary\u201d for the company and that they all came under the food-processing sector. Accordingly, a calculation of the company\u2019s total number of employees  had to include the staff at both the head office and the three factories, and as a result, the applicant union was not sufficiently representative to engage in collective bargaining with Tuka\u015f.\nIn his report the expert also noted that, according to a second approach excluding staff at the head office, the applicant union had a sufficient number of members at the three Tuka\u015f factories to qualify as representative. 12.  The applicant union challenged the expert report before the Labour Court. It argued that, pursuant to section 60(17) of the Trade Union Act (Law no. 2821), employees at the Tuka\u015f head office belonged to a different occupational sector, namely the \u201cbusiness, computing, education and arts\u201d sector, and consequently could not form part of its membership. That being so, it contended that the expert report should not have included staff at the head office in its calculations. 13.  The Ministry asked the Labour Court to reject the application by Tuka\u015f, arguing that its decision of 26 May 2004 authorising the applicant union to represent employees in collective bargaining with the company had been lawful. 14.  In a judgment of 2 December 2004 the \u0130zmir 3rd Labour Court found in favour of the company and withdrew the applicant union\u2019s representative status. It based its decision on the arguments set out in the first approach referred to in the expert report of 13 November 2004. It found that the activities carried out at the Tuka\u015f head office were complementary to the activities at the company\u2019s factories, and that they all came under the food-processing sector. Accordingly, it held that the applicant union\u2019s members accounted for only 152 of the 443 Tuka\u015f employees, a figure that was too low for the applicant union to qualify as representative in the light of the requirement for \u201cthe majority of a company\u2019s employees\u201d to be members. 15.  On 21 December 2004 the applicant union appealed on points of law and reiterated the observations it had made before the Labour Court. 16.  In a judgment of 22 March 2005 the Court of Cassation dismissed the applicant union\u2019s appeal and upheld the first-instance judgment. The judgment was finalised on 15 April 2005. 17.  Meanwhile, at the start of 2004 Tuka\u015f had invited employees who were members of the applicant union to cancel their membership on pain of dismissal. Some had complied but forty employees had refused. 18.  Shortly afterwards, Tuka\u015f had dismissed the forty employees in question on economic grounds (market fluctuations) or for professional shortcomings (underperformance). 19.  In March 2004 the employees dismissed by Tuka\u015f applied to the \u0130zmir labour courts, claiming wrongful dismissal and seeking their reinstatement in the company. 20.  In judgments delivered between July and December 2004, different \u0130zmir labour courts (nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5) found in favour of the dismissed employees, holding that they had been dismissed on the grounds of their membership of a trade union. They observed that Tuka\u015f had failed to persuade them that there had been any economic or performance-related reasons to justify the dismissals, which had therefore been wrongful. They ordered Tuka\u015f to reinstate the dismissed employees, or failing that, to pay each of them compensation for wrongful dismissal equivalent to one year\u2019s wages. 21.  In judgments delivered between December 2004 and June 2005 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgments of the \u0130zmir labour courts. 22.  Tuka\u015f did not reinstate any of the employees it had dismissed and paid them compensation as ordered by the labour courts. By 2005 the applicant union no longer had any members among the staff of Tuka\u015f.\n...", "references": ["1", "3", "9", "4", "0", "2", "8", "6", "5", "No Label", "7"], "gold": ["7"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1941 and lives in Belgrade. 6.  On 27 June 2001 the Obrenovac Municipal Court ordered a socially-owned company, Holding - Prva Iskra AD Bari\u010d (hereinafter \u201cthe debtor\u201d), to pay the applicant specified amounts on account of compensation for expropriated real estate plus the costs of the civil proceedings. 7.  On 18 March 2003, upon the applicant\u2019s request to that effect, the Obrenovac Municipal Court ordered the enforcement of the said judgment and further ordered the debtor to pay the applicant the enforcement costs. 8.  On 23 April 2003 the Privatisation Agency ordered the restructuring of the applicant\u2019s debtor. As a consequence, the ongoing enforcement proceedings against the debtor would appear to have been stayed. 9.  On 29 February 2016 the Belgrade Commercial Court opened insolvency proceedings in respect of the debtor. The applicant duly reported her claims based on the above-mentioned judgment to the insolvency administration. 10.  The insolvency proceedings are still ongoing and the said court judgment remains unenforced to the present day. 11.  According to publically available information the debtor is still, predominantly comprised of socially-owned capital (see http://pretraga2.apr.\u200cgov.rs/ObjedinjenePretrage/Search/Search, accessed on 7 February 2017). 12.  On 7 October 2011 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Constitutional Court. In terms of redress, relying on the Constitutional Court Act 2007, the applicant sought, inter alia, compensation for the pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage suffered due to the impugned non-enforcement. 13.  On 15 May 2012 the applicant noted the adoption of the amendments to the Constitutional Court Act, and specified her compensation claims accordingly. Specifically, on account of the pecuniary damage, the applicant requested the respective amounts awarded to her by the final judgment in question, whilst as regards the non\u2011pecuniary damage sustained she claimed 1,000,000 Serbian dinars (approximately 9,500 euros (EUR)). 14.  On 21 May 2014 the Constitutional Court found, in the operative part of its ruling (u izreci), that the applicant had indeed suffered a violation of her right to a fair trial within a reasonable time, as well as a violation of her property rights and awarded her EUR 1,000 in respect of the non-pecuniary damage in question. However, it rejected the compensation claim regarding the pecuniary damages sought by the applicant. The Constitutional Court, lastly, ordered the speeding up of the impugned enforcement proceedings. 15.  In its reasoning, the Constitutional Court stated in respect of the compensation issue that the applicant\u2019s pecuniary damage claim had been lodged out of time. In so doing, it merely referred to Article 85 \u00a7 3 of the Constitutional Court Act, as amended in 2011, requiring that such claims be brought simultaneously with the lodging of a constitutional appeal.", "references": ["6", "1", "8", "4", "5", "0", "7", "2", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1949 and is currently serving a prison sentence in Lepoglava. 6.  The applicant was a vice-president of the Croatian Privatisation Fund (Hrvatski fond za privatizaciju \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe Fund\u201d), a legal entity established by the State and tasked with carrying out the privatisation of publicly owned property. 7.  In August and October 2006 M.M., a businessman from Russia, approached the State Attorney\u2019s Office for the Suppression of Corruption and Organised Crime (Ured za suzbijanje korupcije i organiziranog kriminaliteta \u2013 hereinafter: \u201cthe State Attorney\u2019s Office\u201d) alleging that he had been trying to make various business investments in Croatia and that he had been introduced to a certain A.P., allegedly an official of the Fund, who had offered his assistance in pursuing the project in the State. In return, A.P. had asked M.M. to deposit 2,250,000 euros (EUR) in various bank accounts. 8.  In March 2007 an investigating judge of the Zagreb County Court (\u017dupanijski sud u Zagrebu) authorised the secret surveillance of a number of individuals, including A.P., in connection with suspicions of bribe-taking and abuse of power and authority. M.M. was granted informant status. 9.  In the course of further investigation using secret surveillance, several meetings were recorded in which M.M., assisted by a consultant, J.K., discussed with a lawyer, A.Pi., the measures that needed to be taken in order to carry out a business project in the Zadar region. On that occasion A.Pi. mentioned the applicant as her contact in the Fund. She also stated that everybody should make out well in this business undertaking. J.K. also explained that he knew the applicant from before and that very soon they would have a meeting concerning the investment at issue.\n 10.  On 3 April 2007 J.K. approached the State Attorney\u2019s Office claiming that he was the representative of M.M. and that he had already had a number of contacts with various officials concerning M.M.\u2019s investment in Croatia. In this connection, the day before he had also contacted the applicant, in his capacity as vice-president of the Fund, who had allegedly requested a provision of 5% of the total investment value, which was approximately between EUR 23,000,000 and 25,000,000, to help with the realisation of the project. The applicant had explained to J.K. that that amount would have to be distributed to the bank accounts of three (out of five) vice-presidents of the Fund who would take part in the decision-making process. J.K. consented to act as an informant under the further guidance of the prosecuting authorities. 11.  On 3 April 2007 the State Attorney\u2019s Office asked an investigating judge of the Zagreb County Court to authorise the use of special investigative measures in respect of the applicant, specifically the tapping of his telephone, covert surveillance of him, the use of J.K. as an informant, and conducting a simulated purchase operation. 12.  On the same day the application was allowed and the investigating judge ordered the use of special investigative measures in respect of the applicant. The relevant part of the order reads:\n\u201cThe application is accompanied by the submission of the Ministry of the Interior\u2019s Criminal Police Department, and the relevant official notes, statements and other material.\nThe application is well-founded since the case at issue concerns the offences under Article 181 \u00a7 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the investigation into these offences by other means would either not be possible or would be extremely difficult.\nTherefore, all the necessary requirements under Articles 180 and 181 of the Code of Criminal Procedure have been met and the order should be issued with a view to securing the information and evidence necessary for the criminal case.\u201d 13.  In the course of the investigation, the investigating judge issued several further orders to the same effect. Various meetings between the applicant and J.K. took place. At a meeting on 11 April 2007 J.K. gave to the applicant EUR 50,000 in connection with his investment project. 14.  On 16 June 2007, on the basis of an application by the State Attorney\u2019s Office, the investigating judge ordered the termination of the special investigative measures, indicating that their use had produced the results sought. 15.  On 16 June 2007 the applicant was arrested and detained in connection with a suspicion that he had taken bribes and abused his power and authority in several privatisation cases. 16.  On 18 June 2007 the State Attorney\u2019s Office forwarded to the investigating judge 288 CD recordings of the secret surveillance operation, and on 19 June 2007 it forwarded a further thirty-six CD and twenty DVD recordings. 17.  On 19 June 2007 the State Attorney\u2019s Office asked an investigating judge of the Zagreb County Court to open an investigation in respect of the applicant and seven other individuals in connection with a suspicion of bribe-taking and offering bribes related to several investment projects in Croatia, including the one in the Zadar region (see paragraphs 9 and 10 above). 18.  In its request for investigation the State Attorney\u2019s Office relied on the results of the special investigative measures suggesting that the applicant, in his capacity as vice-president of the Fund, had requested bribes in order to support M.M.\u2019s investment project in the Zadar region. In particular, it was alleged that he had requested bribes amounting to EUR 220,000 and 5% of the total investment, which amounted to EUR 1,700,000. The secret recordings showed that the sealing of this agreement had taken place first on 11 April 2007 when J.K., acting as M.M.\u2019s representative, had paid the applicant EUR 50,000, and then on 24 April 2007 when J.K. had deposited a further EUR 150,000 in a notary public\u2019s safe in the applicant\u2019s favour. The State Attorney\u2019s Office also alleged that the applicant had organised the bribery of the President of the Fund in respect of the investment in the Zadar region, and had agreed to further bribe-taking with J.K. concerning another investment project related to the privatisation of the hotels \u017d. and P. 19.  When questioned with regard to the charges against him, the applicant decided to remain silent and not to give evidence. On the basis of the available evidence, the investigating judge accepted the request of the State Attorney\u2019s Office and opened an investigation. 20.  Meanwhile, on 20 June 2007 the State Attorney\u2019s Office forwarded 191 CD recordings to the investigating judge. It also forwarded an additional ninety-eight CD recordings to the investigating judge containing secret surveillance of individuals in respect of whom an investigation had not been opened at that time. 21.  On 21 June 2007 the investigating judge in charge of the supervision of the special investigative measures forwarded to the investigating judge conducting the investigation 191 CD recordings and the relevant reports concerning the secret surveillance of the suspects and the informants M.M. and J.K. 22.  On 26 July 2007 the applicant asked to have access to and to have copies of the secret surveillance CD and DVD recordings. 23.  The investigating judge conducting the investigation commissioned a telecommunications expert report including transcripts of the relevant secret surveillance recordings. These were produced by M.\u0110., a telecommunications expert. By a letter of 30 November 2007 M.\u0110. returned ninety-eight secret surveillance CD recordings in the case at issue that did not contain the communications of the suspects in respect of whom the investigation had been opened. 24.  In the course of the investigation the investigating judge authorised numerous search and seizure operations and questioned a number of witnesses in connection with the offences for which the applicant and the other suspects had been charged. 25.  When questioned as a witness by the investigating judge, M.M. explained that J.K. had offered him the services of his company to help with a business investment in Croatia. In particular, J.K. had explained that he knew how to contact the competent State institutions and how these things could be done in a legal way. Soon afterwards they had sent a letter of intent to the Fund concerning M.M.\u2019s investment but they had not received a reply. J.K. had then contacted the applicant, who had been his colleague at university, and arranged a meeting with him at the Fund. M.M. also explained that it was J.K. who had been in contact again with the applicant concerning the investment in the Zadar region. 26.  The investigating judge also questioned J.K. but he was unable to give evidence owing to his medical condition and hospitalisation. 27.  On the basis of the results of the investigation, the investigating judge twice extended the scope of the investigation to other alleged instances of bribe-taking and abuse of power and authority by the applicant. 28.  Following the completion of the investigation, the investigating judge forwarded the case file to the State Attorney\u2019s Office for further assessment and a decision. 29.  On 12 February 2008 the State Attorney\u2019s Office indicted the applicant and nine other individuals and brought them before the Zagreb County Court on charges of bribe-taking, offering bribes and abuse of power and authority. The applicant was indicted in his capacity as a public official on two counts of bribe-taking and bribery of the President of the Fund related to M.M.\u2019s investment project in the Zadar region, two counts of bribe-taking related to the privatisation of the hotels \u017d. and P. and the company P.O., and one count of abuse of power and authority related to the privatisation of the company B. 30.  The indictment was based on voluminous evidence obtained during the investigation and the recordings of the applicant\u2019s telephone communications and secret surveillance of him obtained by the use of special investigative measures. In particular, the State Attorney\u2019s Office indicated the particular sequence of the relevant recordings which it intended to submit as evidence at the trial. The State Attorney\u2019s Office also asked that the case file concerning the special investigative measures be examined. 31.  On 6 March 2008 the applicant lodged an objection against the indictment, arguing that it was confusing and incomplete. He pointed out that his position in the Fund did not fall within the scope of the definition of \u201cpublic official\u201d under Article 89(3) of the Criminal Code. He further stressed that J.K., a central figure in the case, had not been questioned during the investigation. The applicant also contended that his defence rights had been breached since the defence had \u201cneither seen nor heard\u201d the audio and video recordings on which the indictment had been based. 32.  On 30 April 2008 a three-judge panel of the Zagreb County Court returned the indictment to the State Attorney\u2019s Office on the grounds that one count of the indictment, concerning the applicant\u2019s alleged participation in the bribery of the President of the Fund, had been confusing. It accordingly instructed the State Attorney\u2019s Office to submit an amended indictment consonant with that finding. The State Attorney\u2019s Office complied with the order and submitted an amended indictment on 9 May 2008, following which the Zagreb County Court confirmed it. 33.  On 15 October 2008 the president of the trial panel examined the case file of the special investigative operation. On the same day she commissioned a further expert report from the telecommunications expert M.\u0110. ordering him to produce transcripts of the relevant recordings relating to two meetings between the applicant and J.K. 34.  An order for further transcription of the recordings was made on 24 October 2008. This concerned the recordings of three meetings between the applicant, J.K. and several other individuals, and the sequences of the telephone conversations and text messages concerned. 35.  On 7 November 2008 M.\u0110. produced transcripts of the recordings indicated in the Zagreb County Court\u2019s order of 15 October 2008 (see paragraph 33 above). 36.  On 10 November 2008 the first hearing was held before the Zagreb County Court. At the hearing the trial bench forwarded the expert report of 7 November 2008 (see paragraph 35 above) to the defence. The applicant pleaded not guilty to the charges against him, contending that he had been entrapped by J.K., who was an agent provocateur. The defence lawyer of one of the co-accused contended that the defence had not been provided with the surveillance recordings and that those measures had been ordered contrary to the requirements of the relevant domestic law. The trial bench dismissed these arguments as unfounded and scheduled the examination of evidence. 37.  On 17 November 2008 M.\u0110. produced further transcripts of the secret surveillance recordings related to the Zagreb County Court\u2019s order of 24 October 2008 (see paragraph 34 above). 38.  At the hearings on 27 and 28 November 2008 the Zagreb County Court heard evidence from J.K., who explained that he had represented Russian investors in Croatia regarding their interest in the construction of luxury villas on the site of a former brick factory in the Zadar region. He had therefore contacted the Fund and the local authorities in Zadar in order to complete all the relevant administrative matters for the investment. J.K. stated that he had had several meetings with the applicant and that at one point the applicant had requested a bribe in order to ensure the realisation of the project. J.K. had reported that to the State Attorney\u2019s Office and then he had consented to act as an informant. He further explained that he had given EUR 50,000 in cash to the applicant and that, at the applicant\u2019s request, he had deposited a further EUR 150,000 in a notary public\u2019s safe. It had been also agreed that J.K. would pay EUR 1,500,000 on completion of the project. 39.  On 2 December 2008 the Zagreb County Court commissioned another expert report from M.\u0110. concerning several particular sequences of the secret surveillance recordings. 40.  On 9 December 2008 M.\u0110. produced further transcripts of the secret surveillance recordings related to the Zagreb County Court\u2019s order of 2 December 2008 (see paragraph 39 above). 41.  The expert report was served on the defence at a hearing on 10 December 2008. At the same hearing the trial bench heard evidence from M.M. He explained that the relevant contacts with the applicant had been arranged and directed by J.K., and that he had not personally participated in any illegal transactions in the applicant\u2019s favour. 42.  At the same hearing the defence counsel reiterated their application for access to the secret surveillance recordings (see paragraphs 31 and 36 above). They argued that according to the available information there were in total 515 CD and 160 DVD recordings which had never been provided to the defence. In these circumstances, the defence counsel contended that they had not had an effective opportunity to prepare for the case. They also asked for access to all the recordings since it was possible that some of them contained exonerating information, which the defence could then submit as evidence. 43.  The trial bench dismissed the application by the defence on the grounds that the recordings which were to be examined at the trial as evidence had been duly transcribed by an expert and that the relevant transcripts had been served on the defence. In the trial bench\u2019s view, this allowed the defence sufficient time and facilities to prepare for the case as they would be able to raise all objections concerning the recordings after their examination at the trial. Moreover, the trial bench stressed that the sole purpose of the recordings was to examine them during the trial and that Article 155 \u00a7 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, although providing for the possibility of access to and copying of the case file, did not envisage the copying of CD and DVD material. The trial bench also stressed that the defence could have examined the relevant material in the court-house in the same manner as they had generally examined the case files. 44.  On 10 December 2008 the defence counsel sent a joint statement to the Croatian Bar Association (Hrvatska odvjetni\u010dka komora) complaining that they had been unable to effectively carry out their tasks as defence lawyers since they had been denied access to the secret surveillance recordings. They also contended that the evidence had been hidden from the defence and that it had been impossible for them to identify whether certain recordings could exonerate their clients or whether there had been suggestions of unlawfulness in some of them. 45.  At a hearing on 11 December 2008 the trial bench found that there were in total 212 CD and twenty-seven DVD recordings which had been provided to the court with the indictment of the accused. There were also ninety-eight CD recordings from the same secret surveillance operation but which concerned different persons and not the accused. 46.  On 12 December 2008 another hearing was held before the Zagreb County Court at which the defence asked for an adjournment in order to examine the case file concerning the secret surveillance operation. The defence argued that they wanted to examine all the circumstances in which the secret surveillance had been ordered and conducted. The trial bench dismissed the request by the defence on the grounds that the case file concerning the secret surveillance order had been incorporated into the case file concerning the criminal proceedings at issue and could therefore have been consulted by the defence. The trial bench also reiterated its previous arguments concerning the reason for the dismissal of the application by the defence to obtain the copies of the CD and DVD material. 47.  On 12 December 2008 the defence counsel sent a letter to the Zagreb County Court asking for access to and the possibility to examine the secret surveillance recordings. They stressed that the CD and DVD material had never been made available to the defence and that there were no technical means available in the court-house which would allow for the examination of the recordings by the defence. They also pointed out that because of the technical impossibility of examining the recordings in the court-house, the practice of the Zagreb County Court in several other cases had been to make copies of the CD and DVD recordings and to send them to the defence. In these circumstances, the defence argued that the Convention rights of the accused to effectively prepare their defence had been breached. 48.  On 12 December 2008 the president of the trial panel commissioned another expert report from M.\u0110. concerning several further secret surveillance recordings. 49.  On 14 December 2008 defence counsel for one of the co-accused sent a letter to the President of the Zagreb County Court indicating that it had been impossible for the defence to obtain access to and to examine the secret surveillance recordings by any means whatsoever. 50.  Further hearings before the Zagreb County Court were held on 15 and between 17 and 19 December 2008 at which the secret surveillance recordings were played back. The applicant argued that the recordings were incomplete and confusing and that there were discrepancies between the transcripts and the recordings. He contended that it was impossible for his counsel to work thoroughly since they had not had access to the recordings. The lead prosecutor also indicated that there were certain discrepancies between the transcripts and the recordings, which she then tried to clarify at the hearing. The trial court ordered the State Attorney\u2019s Office to provide the relevant clarifications and it also commissioned a report from the expert M.\u0110. in order to provide explanations concerning his particular findings. 51.  Meanwhile, on 18 December 2008 M.\u0110. produced further transcripts of the secret surveillance recordings related to the Zagreb County Court\u2019s order of 12 December 2008 (see paragraph 48 above). 52.  On 22 December 2008 the president of the trial panel commissioned another expert report from M.\u0110. concerning several other secret surveillance recordings. The expert produced his additional report on 2 January 2009. 53.  At the hearings between 12 and 14 January 2009 additional secret surveillance recordings were examined. The applicant argued that he had been entrapped and that the recordings were unlawful evidence. 54.  Further hearings before the Zagreb County Court were held between 26 and 29 January; 11-13 and 16-17 February; 4-6 and 9-10 March 2009 at which the trial court heard witnesses and examined further secret surveillance recordings. 55.  On 9 March 2009 the applicant asked the Zagreb County Court to again question the informant J.K. and to take further evidence concerning his activities in the Fund. 57.  At a hearing on 16 March 2009 the State Attorney\u2019s Office asked that further secret surveillance recordings be admitted into evidence and examined. The applicant contended that the recordings had been unlawfully obtained as the use of secret surveillance measures had been ordered contrary to the requirements of the relevant domestic law. The trial bench accepted the request of the State Attorney\u2019s Office and commissioned an expert report from M.\u0110., instructing him to provide transcripts of the recordings. 58.  Further hearings were held on 17, 23-26 and 30 March 2009 at which the trial bench heard evidence from several witnesses. 59.  On 30 March 2009 M.\u0110. produced transcripts of the secret surveillance recordings related to the Zagreb County Court\u2019s order of 16 March 2009 (see paragraph 57 above). 60.  Further hearings were held on 15-17 and 20 April 2009 at which the trial bench heard further witnesses. The applicant contended that the initial contacts of J.K. and M.M. with the State Attorney\u2019s Office showed that they had been prepared to act as agents provocateurs and that he had been entrapped into engaging in illegal activities. He therefore asked that the evidence obtained by the use of informants be excluded as unlawfully obtained. The trial bench dismissed the applicant\u2019s arguments on the grounds that nothing suggested that he had been entrapped. 61.  At the hearings between 22-24 and 27-28 April 2009 the trial bench questioned the accused. The applicant stated that he had been incited to engage in illegal activities by J.K. but he refused to answer any further questions on the matter. 62.  On 29 April 2009 the State Attorney\u2019s Office submitted an amended indictment specifying the charges against the accused on the basis of the evidence adduced at the trial. At a hearing on 5 May 2009 the applicant pleaded not guilty to the amended indictment. He reiterated his arguments that he had been entrapped by J.K. and that he had not taken any actions which he had not been entitled to take as vice-president of the Fund. 63.  Further hearings were held between 8 and 12 May 2009 at which the trial bench heard the parties\u2019 closing arguments. 64.  On 15 May 2009 the Zagreb County Court delivered a judgment finding that the applicant, in his capacity as a public official as defined under Article 89(3) of the Criminal Code, had taken bribes (Article 347 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code), facilitated bribe-taking (Article 348 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code) and abused his power and authority (Article 337 \u00a7\u00a7 1, 3 and 4 of the Criminal Code) in connection with M.M.\u2019s investment project in the Zadar region, the privatisation of the hotels \u017d. and P. and the privatisation of the company B. The court sentenced him to eleven years\u2019 imprisonment. At the same time, it acquitted the applicant on charges of bribe-taking related to the privatisation of the company P.O. (see paragraph 29 above). 65.  The Zagreb County Court explained that all the relevant facts concerning the circumstances of the case had been duly established and that therefore there was no reason for the examination of further evidence requested by the applicant. 66.  As regards the application by the defence to obtain the secret surveillance recordings and a complaint of non-disclosure of certain recordings, the Zagreb County Court noted:\n \u201cWith regard to the recordings which [the State Attorney\u2019s Office] asked to be examined at the trial, an expert report was commissioned, that is to say, transcripts were prepared which were served on all the parties, the accused and their lawyers, who were thereby fully informed of the substance of the recordings submitted into evidence. In addition, this panel finds, that, with regard to the recordings which were to be examined at the trial, there was no obstacle to the defence lawyers examining [those recordings] in the court-house before the commencement of the trial.\nWith regard to the other conversations of the accused, these [recordings] were not submitted into evidence but the defence could have examined their substance by the examination of the written reports filed in the [special investigation case file] after the submission of the indictment.\nThis panel also considers that the recordings at issue were made solely for their examination at the trial and had they been provided to the parties, the court would not have had any legal basis at its disposal to prevent and prohibit the parties from reproducing [them] outside of the court[-house] before their examination at trial, and [the court would not have had any legal means] to prevent possible misuse of the recorded material.\nThis in particular concerns the recordings which were not submitted into evidence; that is to say [the recordings] which concern other individuals and not the accused. Since these recordings were not submitted into evidence, the application by the defence to obtain them is completely unfounded.\n Furthermore, this panel has found that ... 212 CD and twenty-seven DVD recordings were given [to the court] whereas the remaining ninety-eight CD recordings concern individuals who had been under secret surveillance ... but were not [subsequently indicted].\n...\nMoreover, as was noted above, the defence had knowledge of the substance of the material submitted into evidence and they had no right to examine material which does not concern these proceedings; that is to say [material which concerns] individuals who were not indicted in these criminal proceedings ...\nThis is because section 42(7) of the Office for the Suppression of Corruption and Organised Crime Act provides that if within six months following the termination of a secret surveillance operation criminal proceedings have not been instituted against the [individual under surveillance], all the material collected [during the operation] must be destroyed.\nIt is clear that, since criminal proceedings were not instituted against these individuals, the recordings at issue are still confidential and should have been destroyed; they could not be and were not evidence in these criminal proceedings ...\nIf these recordings were put at the disposal of the defence, that would amount to a breach of the above-cited provisions of law, particularly because [the recordings constitute] confidential material concerning individuals who are not under indictment.\nMoreover, Article 35 of the Constitution guarantees respect for the private life of every individual, and the court is obliged to act under the Constitution ..., so if it provided the defence with the recordings concerning other individuals ... that would amount to breach of the above-cited provision of the Constitution ...\u201d 67.  As to the applicant\u2019s plea of entrapment, the Zagreb County Court noted:\n\u201c... This panel finds that [the evidence obtained by the use of informants] is not unlawful evidence because it was obtained on the basis of an investigating judge\u2019s orders. The substance of the adduced evidence and the examined recordings do not show that there was incitement by the informant ... as was further demonstrated.\u201d 68.  With regard to the charges against the applicant and the evidence obtained by the use of informants, the Zagreb County Court extensively examined the secret surveillance recordings. It in particular analysed the recordings concerning a meeting on 3 April 2007 where the applicant had indicated to J.K. that a deposit should be made with regard to the investment and where he had also assured J.K. that the project would pass the procedure. During the conversation the applicant had explained to J.K. that it was usual to remunerate for lobbying and he had further stated the following:\n\u201cHowever, for [the investor], these [things], this information, this access and the [action] which will be taken while the project is [in the pipeline] \u2013 for this lobbying ... that is worth ... what I told you the last time. And he can do it, that is fifty thousand euros ... for them that is for a drink, for this company ... That is three or four [glasses of] wine compared to [our other possibilities]. So that\u2019s that and then, then we can make a deposit as you said. After that, if the decision goes through something ... is to be given to me, that is, for him... let\u2019s say one hundred thousand euros more or less when the whole thing goes through. Because on an investment of twenty-two million euros to give one hundred thousand ... for him that would not be even 2% ... I would be overly modest if that would be so, you understand [sic].\u201d 69.  The applicant challenged the first-instance judgment by lodging an appeal with the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske). He contended that he had been entrapped and unlawfully and unjustifiably placed under secret surveillance. He pointed out in particular that the secret surveillance orders had not been properly reasoned and had been issued under the Code of Criminal Procedure and not the Office for the Suppression of Corruption and Organised Crime Act (hereinafter \u201cthe OSCOC Act\u201d). He also complained that the relevant evidence had not been disclosed to the defence, and that the first-instance court had erred in the legal qualification of his position as falling under the term \u201cpublic official\u201d under Article 89 \u00a7 3 of the Criminal Code. 70.  On 17 February 2010 the Supreme Court quashed the first-instance judgment in respect of the charges of bribery of the President of the Fund related to M.M.\u2019s investment project in the Zadar region and ordered a retrial. At the same time, it upheld the applicant\u2019s conviction on charges of bribe-taking under Article 347 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code and abuse of power and authority under Article 337 \u00a7 4 of the Criminal Code. 71.  As to the applicant\u2019s complaint concerning the unlawfulness of the secret surveillance measures, the Supreme Court noted:\n\u201cThe first complaint to the effect that the results of the special investigative measures are unlawfully obtained evidence because the investigating judge\u2019s orders were made under the Code of Criminal Procedure and not the [OSCOC Act] is ill-founded.\nIt is true that the [OSCOC Act] is lex specialis, but the appellants failed to observe that section 41(1) of that Act provides that the investigating judge may order, \u2018save for the measures under Article 180 of the Code of Criminal Procedure\u2019, two additional measures which are not provided under the Code of Criminal Procedure, namely the use of simulated business services and simulated business contracts. The special investigative measures ... applied in the case at issue are not provided for under the [OSCOC Act] and therefore the [investigating judge\u2019s] orders could have been based only on the Code of Criminal Procedure. Had the investigating judge authorised any of the measures provided for in section 41(1) of the [OSCOC Act], he would have been obliged to rely on that Act.\n...\nThe further arguments that the results of the special investigative measures are unlawfully obtained evidence because the investigating judge, when making the orders, around thirty of them, failed to comply with the requirements set out in the case-law of the Constitutional Court [no. U-III-857/2008] to the effect that the orders must be sufficiently reasoned, are also ill-founded ...\n...\nThis court considers that mere flaws in the reasoning of the secret surveillance orders do not make the results of such measures unlawfully obtained evidence. This is because Article 9 \u00a7 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that unlawfully obtained evidence is evidence which has been obtained in breach of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and is expressly provided for by the [Code of Criminal Procedure].\nArticle 182 \u00a7 6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that evidence obtained by the use of secret surveillance, under Article 180 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, cannot be used as evidence in criminal proceedings only [in a case where] it is unlawful. That is to say, evidence which is obtained without a warrant issued by the investigating judge, or if the [police] acted contrary to Articles 180 and 182 \u00a7 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, but [this does not concern] the evidence obtained contrary to Article 182 \u00a7 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which provides that the order [authorising special investigative measures] should, inter alia, refer to the facts which warrant the application of such measures, specifically that there is a reasonable suspicion that an individual has committed a criminal offence and that the investigation could not have been carried out by other means or that [to do so] would have been extremely difficult.\nArticle 182 \u00a7 6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is compatible with the legal nature of [special investigation] orders. Such orders [made by the investigating judge] are transmitted to the State Attorney, who is authorised to request them, and they are executed by the police. There is no legal avenue [to challenge] such orders since the [State Attorney] has no legal interest in challenging them. The police were therefore, moreover, not allowed to challenge the orders. If the argument of the appellants that secret surveillance orders would be unlawful when they are not sufficiently reasoned were to be accepted, it would call into doubt the [use of] secret surveillance measures, particularly in situations where all other legal conditions had been met but the order was merely not sufficiently reasoned, which would be absolutely unacceptable.\u201d 72.  As to the applicant\u2019s plea of entrapment, the Supreme Court held:\n\u201cThe complaints ... that the informants J.K. and M.M. had incited the accused were raised by all the accused during the first-instance proceedings, and the [first-instance] court correctly found that [this claim] was not clear from the reviewed material. The same complaints are now raised by the accused, Matanovi\u0107, P. and Pa., and this court considers that their complaints are ill-founded.\nThe witnesses M.M. and J.K. testified that they had become informants after certain accused asked them for bribes [for carrying out the investment]. [M.]M. consented to act as an informant on 2 March and J.K. on 3 April 2007. After that the activity of gathering evidence commenced.\n...\nThe offence of bribe-taking, which is the subject matter of these proceedings, is committed [just] by making a request for a gift or benefit, and since the witnesses contacted the State Attorney after they had been asked to make a payment to the accused ... the plea of incitement cannot be accepted.\u201d 73.  With respect to the complaint about the non-disclosure of evidence, the Supreme Court noted:\n\u201cThe argument that the rights of the defence were violated by the non-disclosure of 515 CD and 177 DVD recordings, which were the result of the secret surveillance operation, cannot be accepted ...\n...\nIt is undisputed that at the hearing held on 11 December 2008 the trial court established the exact number of recordings and found that 212 CD and twenty-seven DVD recordings had been submitted with the indictment, while it was found that the [special investigation] case file contained a further ninety-eight CD recordings concerning the secret surveillance of other persons who are not accused in the proceedings at issue. It is also not disputed that the State Attorney asked that eighteen CD and twenty-three DVD recordings be examined as evidence, and that the telecommunications expert made transcripts of these recordings, which were then forwarded to the parties. It is further undisputed that the recordings were reviewed at a hearing, that the accused and their lawyers were present, and that they made their objections concerning the transcripts and not concerning the recordings. It is to be noted that the transcripts are not evidence on which a conviction can be based but are only of auxiliary technical assistance. The only evidence on which a conviction can be based is the recordings, in respect of which no objections were made.\nTherefore, the defence had access to all the evidence from the secret surveillance, and the trial court allowed them to comment on the evidence adduced and they exercised that right.\nThe trial court rightly held that, given that the defence had been informed of the substance of the evidence adduced, they had no right to have the other material which did not concern the accused in the proceedings at issue disclosed. The trial court also rightly pointed to the provision of section 42(7) of the OSCOC Act, which provides that the material obtained by the use of secret surveillance shall be destroyed if, within the six-month time-limit, criminal proceedings have not been instituted against the persons under surveillance ...\nWhether the State Attorney, when he was making his selection of the secret surveillance material [to be submitted to the court], excluded certain evidence in favour of the accused ... is of no relevance to the lawfulness of the proceedings at issue. Under the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure the State Attorney adduces only relevant evidence concerning the substance of the charges, and therefore he is in a position to make a selection of the evidence.\u201d 74.  As regards the applicant\u2019s complaint of the erroneous legal qualification of his position, the Supreme Court noted that the applicant\u2019s position in the Fund had not been one of a \u201cpublic official\u201d but rather of a \u201cresponsible person\u201d under Article 89 \u00a7\u00a7 6 and 7 of the Criminal Code. However, in the Supreme Court\u2019s view, this did not render the conviction unlawful. In this connection the Supreme Court explained:\n\u201c... [T]he omission at issue had no bearing on the legal qualification of the offence because the criminal offence under Articles 347 \u00a7 1 and 337 \u00a7 4 of the Criminal Code can be committed by public officials and responsible persons when they take the actions for which the court found ... Matanovi\u0107 guilty ...\u201d 75.  On 20 April 2010 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) reiterating his arguments of entrapment, the unlawfulness of the secret surveillance orders, the lack of access to evidence and the erroneous legal qualification of his conviction. He relied, inter alia, on Articles 29 \u00a7 1, 31, 35 and 36 of the Constitution and Articles 6 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3 (b) and 8 of the Convention. The applicant also complained that the statements of various public officials breached of his right to the presumption of innocence. 76.  On 30 June 2011 the Constitutional Court, relying on the Court\u2019s case-law in Pe\u0161a v. Croatia (no. 40523/08, 8 April 2010) found a violation of the applicant\u2019s right to the presumption of innocence but dismissed his other complaints, endorsing the findings and reasoning of the Supreme Court. 77.  Meanwhile, on 19 September 2011, following a retrial in respect of the charges of bribery of the President of the Fund related to M.M.\u2019s investment project in the Zadar region (see paragraph 70 above), the Zagreb County Court acquitted the applicant, and this judgment was confirmed by the Supreme Court on 18 January 2012. 78.  On 1 June 2012 the applicant, represented by I.F., a lawyer, lodged an application for the reopening of the proceedings before the Zagreb County Court. He relied, in particular, on a document allegedly issued by the Ministry of the Interior (Ministarstvo unutarnjih poslova Republike Hrvatske) on 3 March 1993 indicating that J.K. had worked as a police officer in the period between 1974 and 1993. Together with the document in question the applicant submitted a written statement by A.P., a lawyer, indicating that the document had been \u201caccidently\u201d left in her office by M.M. some time in May 2007. The applicant contended that this shed light on the actions of J.K., who had acted as an agent provocateur in his case. 79.  On 24 January 2014 the Zagreb County Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s application for the reopening of the proceedings on the grounds that, even if the document submitted by the applicant suggested that J.K. had worked as a police officer, there was no doubt that he had not been a police officer at the moment when he had acted as an informant in the applicant\u2019s case. The Zagreb County Court also considered that there were no new relevant facts warranting the reopening of the proceedings. 80.  The applicant appealed against the above decision to the Supreme Court on 13 February 2014; it appears that the proceedings are still pending.", "references": ["6", "1", "9", "0", "5", "7", "2", "8", "No Label", "3", "4"], "gold": ["3", "4"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1941 and lives in Birkerod, Denmark. 6.  On 11 April 1995 the applicant formed a limited company, N.R. Group Ltd. (\u201cthe company\u201d) together with a Turkish partner, N.K., to provide tourist services in Alanya, Turkey. 7.  On 19 March 1997 the applicant applied to the Alanya Civil Court of First Instance to cancel N.K.\u2019s management authority. On 2 October 1997 the court ordered the cancellation and on 18 May 1998 it appointed a trustee for the company. Meanwhile, it was discovered that the applicant\u2019s partner N.K. had fraudulently transferred the company\u2019s assets to a new company. 8.  On 8 July 1997, the applicant brought two civil cases against N.K. before the Alanya Civil Court of First Instance and sought compensation for his loss incurred due to the fraudulent acts of N.K. The court decided to join the compensation cases and to examine them together. 9.  On 7 June 2005 the Alanya Civil Court of First Instance accepted the applicant\u2019s compensation claim and granted him the equivalent of 203,000 deutschmarks (DEM) (103,792 euros (EUR) at the time) with statutory interest for his loss, to be paid in Euros, and DEM 10,000 (EUR 7,158 at the time) in compensation without interest of 40% (inkar tazminat\u0131), to be paid in Turkish Lira (TRY). The court further ruled that the legal costs and expenses of the proceedings were to be borne by N.K. 10.  On an unspecified day the applicant requested that the judgment be served on him in order to commence enforcement proceedings. The court rejected the request, stating that it was not possible to provide the judgment unless the charge required by section 28(1) (a) of Law no. 492 (Code of Charges) had been paid. 11.  The applicant was therefore unable to lodge enforcement proceedings in order to have the above-mentioned judgment executed.", "references": ["5", "2", "1", "4", "8", "0", "6", "7", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1953 and 1951 respectively and live in \u010ca\u010dak. 6.  On 21 March 2008 the \u010ca\u010dak Municipal Court ordered a socially-owned company, Fabrika Reznog Alata \u010ca\u010dak AD and its subsidiaries (hereinafter \u201cthe debtor\u201d) to pay the applicants specified amounts on account of salary arrears plus the costs of the civil proceedings. This judgment became final on 2 July 2008. 7.  On 4 August 2008, upon the applicants\u2019 request to that effect, the \u010ca\u010dak Municipal Court ordered the enforcement of the said judgment and further ordered the debtor to pay the enforcement costs. 8.  On 30 March 2010 the Privatisation Agency ordered the restructuring of the debtor. Subsequently, the enforcement proceedings against the debtor were stayed. 9.  On 8 April 2013, upon the applicants\u2019 request to that effect, the \u010ca\u010dak Municipal Court resumed the enforcement proceedings. 10.  On 29 July 2010 the applicants lodged an appeal with the Constitutional Court. In terms of redress, relying on the Constitutional Court Act 2007, the applicants sought, inter alia, compensation for the damage suffered due to the impugned non-enforcement. 11.  On 19 and 20 March 2013 the applicants noted the adoption of the amendments to the Constitutional Court Act, and specified their compensation claims accordingly. Specifically, on account of the pecuniary damage, the applicants requested the respective amounts awarded to them by the final judgment in question, whilst as regards the non\u2011pecuniary damage sustained they claimed 2,000 euros (EUR) each. 12.  On 18 September 2013 the Constitutional Court found a violation of the applicants\u2019 right to a hearing within a reasonable time and of their right to the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions. It further awarded the applicants EUR 1,000 and EUR 1,100 respectively as just satisfaction for non-pecuniary damage. However, it rejected their compensation claim regarding the pecuniary damage sought by the applicants. The Constitutional Court, lastly, ordered the speeding up of the impugned enforcement proceedings. 13.  In its reasoning, the Constitutional Court stated that the applicants\u2019 pecuniary damage claim had been lodged out of time. In so doing, it merely referred to Article 85 \u00a7 3 of the Constitutional Court Act, as amended in 2011, requiring that such claims be brought simultaneously with the lodging of a constitutional appeal. 14.  On 10 June 2016 the Government submitted that the National Bank of Serbia informed the \u010ca\u010dak First Instance Court, by its letter of 19 April 2016, that the final court judgment of 21 March 2008 had been partially enforced on 14 August 2008 and that the applicants had received the sum of 143.707,89 Serbian dinars (RSD). The remainder of the judgment remained unenforced. 15.  On 9 September 2016 the applicants\u2019 representative submitted that the first applicant and she were not aware of the partial enforcement of the above judgment. Moreover, she stated that they had never received a letter from the National Bank of Serbia related to enforcement issue. Lastly, the applicants\u2019 representative submitted that the National Bank of Serbia had informed her in its letter of 16 August 2016 that the amount of RSD 143.707,89 was paid only to the second applicant.", "references": ["6", "7", "0", "5", "4", "2", "8", "1", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant, Ms Ljiljana Milisavljevi\u0107, is a Serbian national who was born in 1966 and lives in Belgrade. 6.  The applicant was a journalist employed at Politika, a major Serbian daily newspaper. In September 2003 she was requested by the editorial board to write an article about Ms Nata\u0161a Kandi\u0107. 7.  Ms Nata\u0161a Kandi\u0107 is a Serbian human rights activist primarily known for her activities in investigating crimes committed during the armed conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, including those crimes committed by Serbian regular and irregular forces. She was also recognised as one of the most vocal advocates for full cooperation of the Yugoslav and later Serbian authorities with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (hereinafter \u201cthe ICTY\u201d). 8.  At the time relevant to this case, between 40% and 64% of the Serbian population considered the ICTY to be a major security threat to the Republic of Serbia.[1] Some 54% of the population was against cooperation with the ICTY, which would include arrests and transfers of Serbian suspects to this institution.[2] In 2003, the ICTY\u2019s assessment of Serbia\u2019s cooperation with that court was that it was \u201cneither full nor proactive\u201d.[3] The level of cooperation was further negatively influenced by the assassination of the Serbian Prime Minister Dr Zoran \u0110in\u0111i\u0107 in March 2003, a major political figure open to full cooperation with the ICTY.[4] Ms Kandi\u0107 herself came under attack by a significant portion of the Serbian political elite and general population. As a consequence, she was involved in several incidents. 9.  The applicant\u2019s article on Ms Kandi\u0107 appeared in Politika on 7 September 2003. The integral translation of the impugned article, titled \u201cThe Hague Investigator\u201d, reads as follows:\n\u201c\u2018Even my son blames me for protecting everybody but the Serbs\u2019, says the director of the Fund for Humanitarian Law.\nMs Nata\u0161a Kandi\u0107, founder and Executive Director of the Humanitarian Law Centre for Serbia, Montenegro, and Kosovo and Metohija, a non-governmental organisation aimed at promoting human rights for minorities, last week, again, defended herself \u2018from the Serbian patriotism surge\u2019.\nOn the occasion of the International Day of the Disappeared commemoration, at the gathering of the Association of Families of Missing and Kidnapped Persons in Kosovo and Metohija organised in the centre of Belgrade, following a short argument she slapped one of the participants. After this incident the Belgrade police submitted a request for the initiation of prosecution proceedings against her, and the Association of Families of the Missing lodged a lawsuit, demanding that she pay 30,000,000 Serbian dinars (RSD) for the insult to the families of those kidnapped and killed.\nRecently our media have also reported that this \u2018prominent advocate of human rights and democratic reform in Serbia\u2019 was awarded the annual Central European and Eurasian Law Initiative Award (CEELI) from the American Bar Association on 9 August during the ABA Annual Meeting luncheon in San Francisco. Former winners of this award were Petar Stoyanov from Bulgaria, Emil Constantinescu from Romania, Vaclav Havel from the Czech Republic, Stjepan Mesi\u0107 from Croatia ...\nIt was also reported that at the beginning of May the American magazine Time published a list of thirty-six individuals dubbed the European heroes, among which was Nata\u0161a Kandi\u0107, too.\nThe Serbian campaigner for the truth on war crimes, a lonely voice of reason in Serbia or the Soros[5] mercenary, the one who was named by all the banished FRY[6] spies, has won many awards, including the Human Rights Watch Award, but none of them were awarded to her in Serbia.\nNata\u0161a Kandi\u0107 provokes stormy reactions wherever she appears. While the West lauds and praises her, in Serbia she is spoken about with contempt and accused of anti-Serbian politics. Most of all they blame her for never pursuing the crimes against Serbs but exclusively dealing with those committed by Serbs against other ethnicities.\nAlthough she has been called a witch and a prostitute and is permanently under threat (this year she has also had to cancel her appearance at a local TV station owing to a bomb threat), she says: \u2018This is simply the part of this job. I don\u2019t think that they hate me, only my message\u2019.\nNevertheless, she once made a public complaint: \u2018Even my son has accused me of protecting everybody except the Serbs.\u2019 Although later, she adds, she heard him defending her concern for the weak.\nNata\u0161a Kandi\u0107 was born in 1946 in Topola, to her father Radoslav and mother Vera. In 1966 she went to study in Great Britain and upon her return she enrolled in the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Belgrade. She participated in the 1968 student demonstrations. In the 1970s she started working in the Belgrade municipality of Palilula.\nAfterwards she worked in the city trade union. During the mid-1990s she went to the Centre for Antiwar Action to work as a technical secretary, but before long she left it after a conflict with Ms Vesna Pe\u0161i\u0107[7]. With a group of like-minded people she founded the Humanitarian Law Centre at the beginning of 1993.\nA year later, on the invitation of Ms Jeri Laber, the Helsinki Watch Executive Director, she left for New York. Upon discussion with top people at the Hague Tribunal[8], the Humanitarian Law Centre took charge of its work in respect of the so\u2011called Serbian crimes against Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as violations and abuses of Muslim and Croatian minority rights in the FRY. That is how this organisation became the [ICTY] \u2018investigator\u2019. Starting from the second half of the 1990s the Centre became involved in the Kosovo and Metohija issues.\nDuring the NATO campaign[9] she frequently travelled the Belgrade-Kosovo and Metohija-Montenegro routes. Her email messages sent via the Internet to foreign friends and collaborators are the evidence of her time and work in Kosovo and Metohija.\nWith Lazar Stojanovi\u0107[10], the Plasti\u010dni Isus (\u2018Plastic Jesus\u2019) director, she has a son Stefan, who lives in New York and is involved in graphic animation.\u201d 10.  On 10 November 2003 Ms Kandi\u0107 started a private prosecution against the applicant. She claimed that the entire piece had been written with the intent of belittling her in the eyes of the public, to present her as a traitor to Serbian interests and as a \u201cpaid servant of foreign interests and a prostitute who sells herself for money\u201d. She further claimed that the points introduced in the article were maliciously misrepresented, and that the article contained untruths and blatant insults. She explicitly refused to lodge any civil compensation claim within these proceedings. 11.  The applicant, in her defence, stated that she was not expressing her own opinion of Ms Kandi\u0107, whom she did not intend to insult, and that she had written the entire article on the basis of the documentation of other magazines. She put the citations within quotation marks, but she omitted them when she was not literally citing but paraphrasing (\u201cono \u0161to nije stavila pod navodnike predstavljaju navode koji nisu citati, ve\u0107 ih je prepri\u010davala iz drugih listova\u201d). She provided details as to what phrases were taken from which articles and magazines, including from which article and magazine she had taken the phrase that Ms Kandi\u0107 had been called a witch and a prostitute. 12.  On 1 September 2005, after a remittal, the First Municipal Court (Prvi op\u0161tinski sud) in Belgrade found that the applicant had committed a criminal offence of insult when having stated for Ms Kandi\u0107 \u201calthough she has been called a witch and a prostitute\u201d and gave her a judicial warning. The court established that the impugned phrase had been indeed previously published in another article by another author in a different magazine. However, the applicant did not put it in quotation marks which meant that she agreed with it, thus expressing her opinion. The court concluded that there was therefore an intention to insult Ms Kandi\u0107. In view of no aggravating circumstances and a number of mitigating ones (the applicant had a clean record, was employed and of mature age (u zrelom dobu)), she was given a mere judicial warning (sudska opomena), on the grounds of Articles 41 and 59 of the General Criminal Code (see paragraph 18 below). No prison sentence or fines were imposed. 13.  On an unspecified date thereafter the applicant appealed. She reiterated that the impugned words were not her own opinion, but an opinion of another author. The fact that she wrote also on the negative attitudes towards the private prosecutor and her work could not and must not make her, the applicant, criminally liable. She also submitted that such an attitude towards the freedom of press could have long-reaching consequences. 14.  On 5 July 2006 the Belgrade District Court (Okru\u017eni sud) upheld the first-instance decision endorsing the reasons given therein. 15.  In separate proceedings, on 2 October 2006 the Belgrade First Municipal Court ordered the applicant to pay Ms Kandi\u0107 RSD 33,125 (around 386 euros (EUR)) in respect of costs and expenses. The applicant did not appeal against that decision. 16.  The applicant submitted in her observations that she had been later discharged from Politika and that \u201cher conviction [...] appear[ed] to have been the cause [thereof]\u201d.", "references": ["4", "3", "8", "9", "2", "1", "0", "5", "7", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant lives in \u010caglin. 6.  The applicant was a member of a hunting association, V., based in \u010caglin (hereafter \u201cthe association\u201d). 7.  On 17 June 2012 the association\u2019s executive board initiated internal proceedings against the applicant before its disciplinary commission. The executive board sought the applicant\u2019s suspension until the next session of the association\u2019s general meeting (skup\u0161tina) for reporting a member of the association to the police, falsely accusing him of the criminal offence of intimidation. The executive board argued that by doing so the applicant had committed a serious breach of his duties as a member, a disciplinary offence stipulated in the association\u2019s internal regulations. 8.  By a decision of 25 August 2012 the disciplinary commission dismissed the disciplinary action against the applicant. No appeals were lodged against that decision. 9.  The executive board nevertheless referred the matter to the general meeting for re-examination, convening an extraordinary session. 10.  On 2 September 2012 the general meeting adopted, by twenty votes to seven, a resolution expelling the applicant from the association. He was informed that he could appeal against that decision and that any appeal would be examined at the general meeting\u2019s (regular) annual session. 11.  The applicant appealed, but the general meeting\u2019s resolution was upheld by twenty-one votes to three following the adoption of another resolution at the annual session held on 20 February 2013. 12.  The general meeting did not give any reasons for expelling the applicant in either of its resolutions. 13.  On 11 January 2014 the applicant brought a civil action against the hunting association in the Po\u017eega County Court (\u017dupanijski sud u Po\u017eegi), whereby he asked the court to declare unlawful the general meeting\u2019s resolution of 20 February 2013 and to reinstate him as a member. He relied on section 26(1) of the Associations Act (see paragraph 22 below) and argued that the decision to expel him had been adopted in breach of the procedure provided for in the association\u2019s statute and its internal regulations on disciplinary proceedings. In particular, he submitted that, in the absence of appeals against the disciplinary commission\u2019s decision of 25 August 2012 (see paragraph 8 above), the general meeting could not have overridden that decision because under the association\u2019s statute that commission was the only body authorised to decide on the expulsion of a member. 14.  By a decision of 4 March 2014 the County Court declared the applicant\u2019s action inadmissible, on the grounds that the matter was outside the jurisdiction of the courts. The relevant part of that decision reads as follows:\n\u201cSection 26(1) of the Associations Act suggests that legal protection by way of civil action in the county court could be sought only if the General Meeting or the other relevant body of the association had failed to examine a member\u2019s report regarding irregularities in the implementation of the statute [of the association], or had failed to correct such irregularities.\nSuch a civil action would therefore be aimed at securing the implementation of the statute of the association, and thus would not provide for legal protection in the sense that a specific decision ... of the association could be declared unlawful.\nUnder section 50 of the defendant association\u2019s Statute [Statut] the disciplinary tribunal imposes disciplinary measures against members who have breached their duties stipulated in the statute. According to section 7(2) of the defendant association\u2019s Rules on Disciplinary Proceedings and Disciplinary Liability of Members, a request for review may be lodged with the General Meeting [to contest] the Disciplinary Tribunal\u2019s decision to expel [a member]. The time-limit for the General Meeting to adopt a resolution on the request is not stipulated. The General Meeting\u2019s resolution is final.\n... since the plaintiff in his action does not seek [legal] protection envisaged in section 26(1) of the Associations Act, but asks [the court] to declare unlawful the defendant\u2019s resolution to expel him, on which [issue] it is for the General Meeting to make a final decision ... this case does not fall within the jurisdiction of the courts ...\u201d 15.  The applicant then appealed against that decision to the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske). 16.  By a decision of 2 April 2014 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld the first-instance decision, reasoning as follows:\n\u201cThe first-instance court was correct in declaring the action inadmissible, because the case does not fall within the jurisdiction of the courts ...\nIn particular, pursuant to section 26(1) of the Associations Act ... the conduct of associations is supervised by their members, and if a member finds irregularities in the implementation of the statute he or she is entitled to report it to the relevant body of the association designated in the statute or to the General Meeting if there is no relevant body designated in the statute. Furthermore, if the written report is not examined at the General Meeting or by the relevant body of the association designated in the statute within thirty days of its submission, or if irregularities are not corrected, the member may bring a civil action in the county court within whose area of jurisdiction the registered office of the association is situated, with a view to protecting his or her rights as stipulated in the statute.\nThe said provision ... governs jurisdiction of the courts regarding the right of the members of an association to supervise its conduct. That right does not entail the power to contest the lawfulness of a decision adopted in disciplinary proceedings against the plaintiff as a member, as correctly explained in the impugned [first-instance] decision.\nIn this connection it should be taken into account that the case concerns membership of a ... voluntary organisation [where] members may under the internal rules regulate the protection of [their] membership rights. Therefore, the decision to expel a member does not fall within the jurisdiction of the courts under section 26(1) of the Associations Act.\nThe defendant association is not an entity vested with public authority, and the decisions it adopts are not administrative acts, which means that the plaintiff\u2019s action could not even be examined by the Administrative Court under the [relevant provisions] of the Administrative Disputes Act. That is also the opinion of the Constitutional Court, as expressed in the case U-III-140/2006.\nIt follows that the county court was correct in deciding that courts have no jurisdiction to decide on the plaintiff\u2019s action ...\u201d 17.  On 12 June 2014 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint against the Supreme Court\u2019s decision. He alleged violations of his right to a fair procedure guaranteed by Article 29 paragraph 1 of the Croatian Constitution (see paragraph 19 below), and also explicitly relied on Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention. 18.  By a decision of 18 December 2014 the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) declared the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint inadmissible and served its decision on his representative on 30 January 2015. It found that the case did not raise any constitutional issues.", "references": ["7", "6", "5", "2", "8", "4", "1", "0", "9", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant, who was born in 1989, was detained at the Tekirda\u011f prison when the application was lodged. 5.  On 9 July 2010 the applicant was taken into police custody on suspicion of membership of a terrorist organisation. 6.  On 13 July 2010 the investigating judge at the Istanbul Assize Court, after questioning the applicant, ordered his pre-trial detention having regard to the nature of the offence, the state of the evidence and the strong suspicion of the suspect\u2019s having committed the offence in issue. 7.  On 7 September 2010 the Istanbul public prosecutor filed an indictment with the Istanbul Assize Court, charging the applicant with membership of an illegal terrorist organisation. 8.  The trial commenced before the 9th Chamber of the Istanbul Assize Court and the first hearing was held on 15 February 2011. 9.  In the hearings held on 21 February 2012 and 3 May 2012, respectively, the applicant appeared before the court, and the judges ordered his continued detention. The applicant filed objections against these decisions. On 7 March 2012 and 8 June 2012 respectively, the 10th Chamber of Istanbul Assize Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s objections without holding an oral hearing and based on the public prosecutor\u2019s opinion which had not been communicated to the applicant or his representative. 10.  During the eleventh hearing held on 30 July 2013, the 9th Chamber of the Istanbul Assize Court ordered the applicant\u2019s continued detention on remand.", "references": ["0", "1", "6", "8", "7", "3", "4", "5", "9", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicants\u2019 dates of birth and places of residence are given in the Appendix. 6.  On 12 January, 26 January, 10 March and 29 December 2013 demonstrations were planned to be held in Baku. It appears that the organisers of the demonstrations gave no proper prior notice to the relevant authority, the Baku City Executive Authority (\u201cthe BCEA\u201d). Information about the demonstrations was disseminated through Facebook or the press. 7.  According to the applicants, the demonstrations were intended to be peaceful and were conducted in a peaceful manner. The demonstrations of 12 January and 10 March 2013 were aimed at protesting about the deaths of soldiers in the army. The demonstration of 26 January 2013 condemned the use of force by the police against the participants of previous demonstrations, while those taking part in the demonstration of 29 December 2013 were protesting against bureaucratic injustices which had allegedly caused a disabled war veteran to set himself on fire on 25 December 2013. 8.  Each applicant attended one of the demonstrations (see Appendix), but shortly after they had begun the police started to disperse those who had gathered. All the applicants were arrested during the dispersal operations and were taken to various police stations. 9.  The applicants were questioned at the police stations they were taken to. 10.  On the day of each applicant\u2019s arrest administrative offence reports (inzibati x\u0259ta haqq\u0131nda protokol) were issued, which stated that the applicants had committed an administrative offence under Article 298.2 of the Code of Administrative Offences (\u201cthe CAO\u201d) (participation in a public assembly that had not been organised in accordance with the law). 11.  Some of the applicants refused to sign the administrative offence reports (applications nos. 52270/13, 26424/14 and 26994/14). 12.  According to most of the applicants, they were never served with copies of the administrative offence reports or with other documents from their case files. They were not given access to a lawyer after their arrest or while they were in police custody. 13.  According to statements (\u0259riz\u0259) written by the applicants in applications nos. 20589/13 and 33164/13 at the police stations on the day of their arrest (12 January and 10 March 2013 respectively), they refused the services of a lawyer. 14.  The applicants in applications nos. 20589/13 and 26424/14 were released after being kept in police custody for a few hours, subject to an undertaking to reappear at the police station on various dates. 15.  Most of the applicants were taken to trial courts directly from the police stations, either on the day of their arrest or the following day. The applicants in applications nos. 20589/13 and 26424/14 were brought before first-instance courts on the day they returned to the police station. 16.  According to most of the applicants, the court hearing in each case was very brief. Members of the public were not allowed in the courtroom, even though the court had not taken a formal decision to close the hearing to the public. 17.  According to most of the applicants, they were not given an opportunity to appoint lawyers of their own choosing. State-funded lawyers were asked to assist some of them. The applicants in applications nos. 21219/13, 33164/13, 33593/13 and 26994/14 were not represented by a lawyer. According to documents from the case files, the applicants in applications nos. 21219/13, 33164/13 and 26994/14 refused the assistance of a State-funded lawyer and decided to defend themselves in person. 18.  According to the transcript of the hearing concerning the applicant in application no. 20589/13, the State-funded lawyer stated briefly in his oral submissions that the applicant was guilty and asked the court for lenience. Similarly, the State-funded lawyer for the applicant in application no. 26424/14 stated in general terms that the applicant was not guilty and asked the court to discontinue the case. In addition, none of the material submitted to the Court contains any record of showing that the State-funded lawyer, Mr V.M., made any oral or written submissions on behalf of the applicant in application no. 52270/13. 19.  The only witnesses questioned during the court hearings with respect to the applicants in applications nos. 20589/13 and 26424/14 were the police officers who, according to the official records, had arrested them. The police officers testified that the applicants had staged unauthorised demonstrations. No witnesses were questioned by the courts in the other applicants\u2019 cases. 20.  The first-instance courts found that the applicants had participated in unauthorised demonstrations. The applicants were convicted under Article 298.2 of the CAO and sentenced to a period of administrative detention, varying from thirteen to seventeen days, or to a fine of 400 or 500 Azerbaijani manats (AZN) (see Appendix). 21.  On various dates the applicants lodged appeals with the Baku Court of Appeal, arguing that their convictions had been in violation of their rights because the demonstrations in which they had participated or attempted to participate had been peaceful. The applicants also complained that their arrests had been unlawful and that the hearings before the first-instance courts had not been fair. They asked the Baku Court of Appeal to quash the first-instance courts\u2019 decisions in their cases. 22.  The applicants in applications nos. 21219/13, 52270/13 and 26424/14 were assisted before the Baku Court of Appeal by lawyers of their own choosing. The other applicants were not represented by a lawyer. 23.  On various dates the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the applicants\u2019 appeals and upheld the decisions of the first-instance courts (see Appendix). 24.  In its decision with regard to the applicant in application no. 33593/13 the Court of Appeal noted, inter alia, that he had voluntarily refused legal assistance at the pre-trial stage.", "references": ["6", "8", "2", "0", "5", "4", "9", "1", "No Label", "7", "3"], "gold": ["7", "3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The first and second applicants were born in 1981 and 2002 respectively, and live in Sofia. 6.  The first applicant married A.I. in 2001 and their son, the second applicant, was born in 2002. According to the first applicant, her husband started abusing her psychologically after the marriage, which grew worse after the child was born. 7.  The first applicant filed for divorce in 2004. She applied for interim measures in the same proceedings, seeking custody of the child while the proceedings were ongoing. The Sofia District Court granted her application for interim measures on 11 May 2005, giving her custody of the child. 8.  In the meantime, in January 2005, the second applicant visited his father for two days. A.I. then took the child back to the first applicant and insisted that they both return to live with him. When the first applicant refused, he put the child back in the car and drove away, saying that she could only see her son at his apartment. 9.  A.I. has kept the second applicant with him ever since. 10.  On 23 June 2006 the first-instance court granted the couple a divorce, finding that the husband was responsible for the marriage\u2019s failure. It granted custody of the child to the first applicant and limited A.I.\u2019s contact rights to two hours twice a month in the presence of the first applicant and another adult designated by her. The decision was upheld in ordinary appeal on 14 June 2007 and in cassation appeal on 1 October 2008. 11.  On 13 May 2005 the first applicant obtained a writ of enforcement on the basis of the decision on interim measures. She brought enforcement proceedings later the same month. 12.  The bailiff scheduled handovers of the child to the first applicant on the following dates: 14 June 2005, 15 July 2005, 25 August 2005, 30 September 2005, 21 October 2005, 18 November 2005, 22 November 2005, 26 January 2006, 5 March 2008, 14 July 2008, 5 August 2008 and 20 August 2008. A.I. did not come to any of those appointments or cooperate with the bailiff. 13.  On 19 September 2005 the bailiff fined A.I. about 25 euros (EUR) for failing to comply with a judicial decision. 14.  Subsequently, A.I. went to the bailiff\u2019s office and challenged her for having fined him. As a police officer, he threatened to fine her for wrongfully crossing the street as soon as she left her office. A.I. was dismissed from the police on 17 January 2007 as a result of that conduct. The order for his dismissal referred to his systematic obstruction of the enforcement of a final judicial decision and to conduct damaging to the image of the police. 15.  On 22 November 2006 the Sofia District Court ordered that the child be removed from A.I.\u2019s home and handed over to the first applicant on the basis of Article 71 \u00a7 1 of the Family Code of 1985. On 4 January 2007 the first applicant, accompanied by a lawyer and several police officers, went to the village where A.I. was living with the child and spoke to both A.I. and A.I.\u2019s father. A.I. categorically refused to hand the child over, thus failing to comply either with the court order of 22 November 2006 or the decision on interim measures of May 2005.\n(b)  Enforcement of the final custody judgment 16.  The first applicant obtained a writ of enforcement in October 2008 in respect of the final judgment on the divorce and on granting custody to her. 17.  On 11 December 2008, 5 March 2009, 2 September 2009 and 22 December 2009 the bailiff unsuccessfully attempted to hand the child over to the first applicant. On those occasions A.I. either failed to arrive for the appointments or did not take the child to them. When the bailiff and the first applicant visited his house on 11 December 2008, A.I. had left a note on his front door addressed to the first applicant and all accompanying individuals. The note stated that he was firmly opposed to handing the child over to her. 18.  The bailiff fined A.I. in July 2008 and in September 2009 for failure to cooperate in the enforcement proceedings. In 2009 the first applicant did not attend two of the scheduled meetings for handing over of the child, indicating in a letter to the bailiff that prior work commitments prevented her from attending one of those meetings. It would appear that those meetings had been scheduled by the bailiff without prior consultation with the applicant as to her availability. 19.  On 30 December 2009 the Pazardzhik District Court suspended the enforcement proceedings brought by the first applicant in relation to the final judgment of 1 October 2008. It acted in response to an application from A.I. for interim measures (\u043e\u0431\u0435\u0437\u043f\u0435\u0447\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b\u043d\u0438 \u043c\u0435\u0440\u043a\u0438) in the context of proceedings which he had brought to seek the limitation of the first applicant\u2019s parental rights and the granting of custody to him. 20.  The first applicant asked the Pazardzhik Regional Court to quash the suspension order. The court rejected her application in a final decision of 15 June 2010. 21.  Following a change of jurisdiction, the case was sent to the Sofia District Court. The proceedings for a change of custody were terminated by the Sofia City Court in a final decision of 19 June 2013 after A.I. withdrew his application. 22.  In the meantime, between April 2008 and July 2010, representatives of the social services, accompanied by the police, the mayor and the first applicant, repeatedly visited the house where A.I. lived with the second applicant. They met the child\u2019s teachers and his paternal grandparents. On 20 April 2010 the social services sent a report to the police in which they concluded that while A.I. was caring for the second applicant appropriately, the child needed to have contact with his mother to ensure his healthy development. 23.  The social services renewed their involvement in the case in 2012. After A.I. had expressed an intention to cooperate, the social services met him and the second applicant a number of times between September 2012 and April 2014. During the meetings the second applicant consistently expressed the wish to continue to live with his father. 24.  The first applicant brought criminal proceedings against A.I. for obstructing the enforcement of the 2005 and 2008 decisions on the exercise of parental rights. 25.  On 13 July 2009 the first-instance court found A.I. guilty of obstructing the implementation of final judicial decisions. The court observed that A.I. had demonstrated a belief that he was beyond the reach of the justice system and could act with impunity. The court also held that the particularly long period in which A.I. had kept the child, namely between his third and seventh birthday, was an aggravating circumstance. The court nevertheless absolved A.I. of criminal responsibility and, instead, imposed on him a fine of EUR 2,400 as an administrative punishment under Article 78a \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code. The decision was upheld on appeal by the Pazardzhik Regional Court on 8 October 2009 in a final judgment.\n(b)  Police assistance for the transfer of the second applicant 26.  On 17 December 2009 the Supreme Administrative Court quashed an earlier decision by the police to refuse to provide assistance for the transfer of the second applicant and ordered it to determine the best way to arrange it. The social services cooperated with the police towards organising such a transfer, which was due to take place on 14 January 2010. That procedure was not carried out because the child refused to go with the first applicant. 27.  The third applicant was born on 29 August 1972 and lives in Sofia. 28.  The third applicant gave birth to a child, P.P., in July 2005 while she was living with the child\u2019s father, Kh.P. The parents split up in March 2009 and the third applicant moved out with the child and his two elder siblings, who were not Kh.P.\u2019s children. 29.  On 1 July 2010, during judicial proceedings on custody, the Sofia District Court determined interim measures, giving custody to the third applicant. She started living with her child alone thereafter. 30.  An expert report of 19 December 2010 drawn up in the context of the proceedings concluded that the child was strongly attached to both parents and had expressed a wish to live with his mother while continuing to see his father. 31.  In a final decision of 29 October 2013 the Supreme Court of Cassation gave custody of the child to the third applicant. 32.  On 5 September 2011, after one of his scheduled meetings with the child, Kh.P. did not return the latter to the third applicant\u2019s home. Since that day the third applicant has only seen the child a few times and the meetings have always been in an institutional setting. 33.  On 13 September 2011 the third applicant visited Kh.P.\u2019s home in order to agree on the child\u2019s return, but Kh.P. prevented the child from leaving with her. Instead, according to the third applicant, he assaulted her in the presence of the child by hitting her on the head, pushing her against the lift, and knocking her to the ground. The third applicant submitted that thereafter she had repeatedly attempted to reach an agreement with the child\u2019s father on the child\u2019s return to live with her, as well as that she had contacted two private bailiffs over the following months but neither of them had taken any action because they considered that the case was too difficult. 34.  On 17 October 2012 the Sofia District Court issued a writ of enforcement to the third applicant on the basis of the court\u2019s decision on interim measures of July 2010. 35.  A first attempt by the bailiff to get the child handed over to the third applicant took place on 11 December 2012 but it failed as Kh.P. did not take the child to the meeting. The bailiff voiced his intention to seek police assistance to summon Kh.P. to the following meeting. 36.  The third applicant met the child on 11 January 2013 for the first time since he had been taken away by his other parent on 5 September 2011. The meeting took place in the presence of Kh.P. and a social worker. The child was reserved at the beginning but gradually warmed up to his mother, told her about his school and other activities, and allowed her to hug and kiss him. 37.  A second meeting between the third applicant and her child took place on 18 January 2013. The child arrived in a negative frame of mind and acted coldly towards the third applicant, refused to take the presents she had brought for him and asked to leave with his father. 38.  In two reports issued on 25 January 2013 and 1 February 2013 the social services found that, while the child had developed a solid emotional connection with the father, he had not lost his bond to his mother. The father had to show approval and encouragement for the relationship between the child and the mother for it to develop healthily. 39.  The bailiff attempted to have the third applicant meet with the child on five more occasions \u2013 28 January 2013, 19 April 2013, 26 April 2013, 31 May 2013 and 28 June 2013. Kh.P. did not attend the first four meetings nor send the child, despite having been summoned to some of them by the police. On 26 April and 31 May 2013 the bailiff fined him for his failure to take the child to the appointments scheduled on those two days. One of those fines was subsequently quashed in court. 40.  When Kh.P. took the child to meet with the third applicant on 28 June 2013, the child became visibly upset and tearful at the sight of her. He refused to hug her or otherwise engage with her. A psychologist present at the meeting concluded that it was impossible to hand the child over at that point in time as he was in a state of psychological stress and had a clearly negative attitude to his mother. As a result the bailiff postponed the handover of the child and urged both parents to actively cooperate so that the child could gradually accept his mother. The bailiff noted that the other parent played a key role in that process and that his constructive attitude was crucial for restoring the mother-child relationship. 41.  In June 2013 the social services recommended that the third applicant, Kh.P. and the child have six months of counselling. Kh.P. disapproved of psychologists working with his son, insisted that such sessions were a form of child exploitation and said that the mere mention of the child\u2019s mother gave his son headaches, which in turn impeded his ability to play football. Kh.P. did not allow the child to see his mother. He informed the psychologists that he and the child slept in the same bed at night and avoided their attempts to discuss the child\u2019s psychological development. Kh.P. instead emphasised his own financial resources and stability. 42.  A psychologist met the child once during the six-month counselling period. The child refused to speak about the third applicant and only referred to her as \u201cM\u201d. The psychologist concluded that the child\u2019s speech was full of inconsistent statements which showed that his attitude to her was being manipulated. The father was categorically opposed to contact between the child and the mother, which meant the child was afraid to express his need and wish to maintain a relationship with her. The child missed having contact with his mother, but could not express that openly for fear of his father\u2019s disapproval. The child suffered from parental alienation syndrome and there was a risk to his emotional and psychological development. On 28 August 2013 the social centre put an end to the counselling because of Kh.P.\u2019s lack of cooperation, in not taking the child to the appointments. 43.  A psychological assessment of the child and the situation with his parents was drawn up in September 2013. It concluded that the child was experiencing a chronic emotional crisis. His categorical rejection of the third applicant was at the origin of parental alienation syndrome. 44.  A new attempt to voluntarily hand the child over to the third applicant took place on 10 June 2014 but failed because the other parent did not take the child to the meeting. The bailiff postponed any further enforcement measures. The following day, 11 June 2014, the child, Kh.P. and the third applicant met at the social centre. Kh.P. stated that he would not allow any meetings in the future and the third applicant has not met her child since. 45.  An expert report drawn up on 17 June 2014 found that Kh.P. exhibited a tendency to verbal aggression, that he continuously demeaned the mother and criticised her personality and that this had turned the child into \u201ca child at risk\u201d. The obsessive and controlling love demonstrated by him towards the child risked making him rebel in the future; the permanent pitching of the child against the third applicant had led to psychosomatic disorders, as evidenced by the child\u2019s frequent headaches. 46.  On 11 July 2014 the third applicant asked the bailiff to schedule a new date for implementing the court\u2019s decision and to not suspend enforcement. She also asked the bailiff to direct the child to attend mandatory sessions with a psychologist and psychiatrist before his actual handing over to her, given that he needed specialist assistance to overcome his feelings of alienation towards her. 47.  On 22 July 2014 the third applicant asked the social services to provide her child with psychological counselling and support. On 8 August 2014 she complained to the Minister of Justice about the bailiff\u2019s inability to enforce the court decision granting custody to her. The Ministry replied on 21 April 2015 that the bailiff had done nothing wrong in the exercise of her functions. 48.  On 3 September 2014 she asked the bailiff to order weekly meetings between her and the child on the premises of the social services, emphasising that that was something to which Kh.P. had agreed but with which he had not complied. The third applicant also stressed that the child\u2019s health and well-being were the most important aspects of the process and asked the bailiff to coordinate all the actions related to the child\u2019s attendance at counselling sessions. On 5 September 2014 the third applicant sent documents to the bailiff issued by the social services directing the child to attend psychological counselling and support with a view to re\u2011establishing contact with his mother. On 7 November 2014 the social services reported to the bailiff that the support work which was to be carried out with the child had not started as the father had repeatedly failed to take the child to the social centre. 49.  On 22 October 2014 the third applicant again asked the social services to provide counselling for her child. The social services replied on 29 October 2014 that they had organised new sessions for the child and had apprised the other parent accordingly. They also informed the third applicant that the bailiff had ordered the child to report to the social centre every Thursday at 4 p.m. in order to meet with the third applicant. The first meeting was set for 30 October 2014 but did not take place as Kh.P. did not take the child to it. 50.  The third applicant subsequently received a letter from the State Agency for Child Protection, which directed her to seek counselling from the social services. The report drawn up in that connection indicated that the negative attitude displayed by the father towards the mother had been adopted by the child, who refused to meet his mother. It was necessary to work with the child for him to overcome his negative attitude to his mother. 51.  On 28 November 2014 the third applicant wrote to the bailiff, copying in the social services, and expressed her concern about the child\u2019s well-being. She asked for the judicial decision granting custody to her to be enforced, pointing out that the child\u2019s well-being was of paramount importance and had to be considered in any related actions. 52.  A report, dated 25 March 2015 and drawn up by the municipal social services, stated that specialists had met with the third applicant on ten occasions. She was found to be cooperative and willing to do whatever was necessary in order to facilitate contact with her child. The report concluded that it was not in the child\u2019s interests to continue to live with his father given that he manipulated him emotionally. The child did not dare to oppose the father as he was entirely dependent on him. The child\u2019s alienation from the mother was damaging for him as he needed her close involvement in his life. It was necessary to impose mandatory psychological counselling on the father in order for him to cooperate, otherwise the child had to be taken out of his home and either entrusted to the third applicant or placed in a \u201cneutral environment\u201d. The placing of the child into a foster home had to be only considered as a last resort, if the father continued to obstruct contact with the mother. 53.  The bailiff scheduled another meeting, for 23 April 2015, to hand the child over to the third applicant but Kh.P. again failed to appear. The bailiff postponed further enforcement to an unspecified date. The third applicant signed the report drawn up by the bailiff, expressing her discontent at the bailiff\u2019s inability to enforce the judicial decision. 54.  On 8 October 2012 the third applicant complained to the prosecutor under Article 182 \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Code about Kh.P.\u2019s active obstruction of the enforcement of the judicial decision granting custody to her. The prosecutor opened criminal proceedings and informed the third applicant of his decision on 19 April 2013. 55.  A full psychological expert report on the child was drawn up on 2 February 2014 in the context of those proceedings. The report\u2019s conclusion was that the child should not be forced to see his mother at that point in time. What was needed was systematic good-faith efforts by the father aimed at improving the child\u2019s attitude to his mother. Pressure from public institutions for the child to see his mother was likely to have a negative impact on him and so developing a relationship with his mother had to happen gradually. The report emphasised that if the child were to receive his father\u2019s support he would in all likelihood open up to his mother and develop a close relationship with her. 56.  Kh.P. was acquitted at the end of the proceedings in a final judgment of 7 July 2015 by the Sofia City Court. 57.  On 26 July 2013, the child, represented by Kh.P., brought court proceedings against the third applicant, alleging acts of domestic violence by her. The child alleged, through his father, that he had been put under constant psychological pressure by his mother, which had led to sleep disturbances and restlessness and a fear that she could appear at any time in the street and kidnap him. He claimed that he had developed a headache, felt sick and had even vomited during the latest attempt to reunite him with his mother on 28 June 2013. Experts questioned in the proceedings found that the child tended to identify himself with the father and his active denial of his mother was damaging for him. The experts concluded that it was imperative for the child\u2019s well-being to provide him with urgent psychological therapy. 58.  On 20 December 2013 the first-instance court rejected an application for a restraining order on the third applicant. In particular, the court found the complaint about psychological violence ill-founded as it had been based on the mother\u2019s repeated attempts to have the bailiff hand the child over to her in accordance with the court\u2019s decision. The court held that the third applicant had been right to seek effective enforcement of the decision granting custody to her, just as Kh.P. had been obliged to comply with that decision. The court concluded that the child\u2019s well-being was at risk as a result of the ongoing, open animosity between the parents and ruled that a copy of the judgment should be sent to the social services with a view to them taking appropriate measures. There is no information on file about whether that court\u2019s decision was appealed against. 59.  Kh.P. brought proceedings in 2014 to be given custody of the child. The Sofia District Court rejected his application on 29 July 2015. 60.  The fourth applicant was born on 14 March 1973 and lives in Stara Zagora region. 61.  On 13 February 2012 the fourth applicant\u2019s marriage to R.D. was dissolved by a court decision which also determined his contact rights with his child, who had been born in 2009. According to the decision, the fourth applicant was to see the child every first and third weekend of the month between 9 a.m. on Saturday and 6 p.m. on Sunday, and for one month during the summer holidays. Immediately after an argument between him and the child\u2019s mother on 15 June 2012, the mother started preventing him from having contact with his child. 62.  The fourth applicant brought forced enforcement proceedings in February 2013, seeking the effective implementation of his contact rights. According to him, the bailiff informed him that as the meetings with the child were scheduled to take place at the weekend, when the bailiff was off work, the fourth applicant would be better being accompanied to the meetings by witnesses. Those individuals were to testify about what they saw by signing a declaration every time he encountered difficulties in seeing the child. The fourth applicant attempted to see the child on numerous occasions but his former wife continued to place obstacles in his way. He submitted seven declarations about such incidents, all drawn up in the course of 2013. The bailiff fined the mother once, setting the sum at about EUR 50. 63.  The fourth applicant turned to the Child Protection Agency a number of times and the agency urged the mother to allow contact between the child and the fourth applicant, as set out in the court decision of 13 February 2012. 64.  Notwithstanding those efforts, the fourth applicant submitted that he was still unable to see the child owing to the obstacles created by the mother. 65.  In July 2013 the fourth applicant complained to the prosecutor. In August 2013 the prosecutor refused to open criminal proceedings, finding in particular that the child\u2019s mother had earlier been fined for impeding contact between the child and the fourth applicant, and that it would be unlawful to sanction her twice for the same offence. On appeal, the higher prosecutor returned the case for further examination. In September 2013 the district prosecutor opened criminal proceedings against the child\u2019s mother for obstructing the implementation of a judicial decision. The prosecutor terminated those proceedings on the basis of the fact that the child systematically refused to spend time alone with her father, but the first\u2011instance court later quashed that decision and returned the case for further consideration. 66.  On 21 November 2014 a different district prosecutor again terminated the proceedings, a decision that was upheld by courts at two levels of jurisdiction, on 17 December 2014 and 4 May 2015 respectively. The highest court involved, the Stara Zagora Regional Court, found more specifically that instead of pursuing a constructive dialogue with the child\u2019s mother with a view to seeing the child, the fourth applicant had resorted to forced enforcement proceedings, which had been unsuitable in the circumstances and had meant the child had been scared to go with him as he had always been accompanied by strangers. 2.  Additional facts submitted by the Government after communication\n(a)  Divorce and contact rights granted to the fourth applicant 67.  The fourth applicant applied for a divorce on 15 June 2011. The court granted it on 13 February 2012, granting custody to the mother, R.D., and giving contact rights to the applicant. R.D. did not participate in those proceedings; she was represented by a court-appointed lawyer as the fourth applicant had stated that he did not know where his wife could be contacted to be summoned. The fourth applicant continued to live with R.D. and the child at their family home until 15 June 2012. 68.  On the latter date an argument erupted between the fourth applicant and R.D., following which he left the family home. On 21 June 2012 R.D. instructed a lawyer to file for divorce on her behalf. The lawyer informed her that she was already divorced and had been so since 13 February 2012. Her former husband had also married another woman two weeks after that judgment had become final, in March 2012. 69.  On 15 July 2013 R.D. sought a change in the arrangements for contact between the fourth applicant and the child. She expressed serious concerns about the child\u2019s well-being and, in particular, voiced a fear that the father, having acted deceitfully in the past, might emigrate to Canada with his new wife, taking the child without R.D.\u2019s agreement or knowledge. She specified that the fourth applicant had proposed that she give up the child so that his new wife could adopt her. She also stated that he had not sought to have contact with the child since 15 June 2012 and had arrived at her dwelling on 20 April 2013 for the first time with several strangers; that had scared the child and she had refused to go with her father. 70.  The fourth applicant submitted during those proceedings that he had had a hernia operation in July 2012 and had been put on sick leave until 31 March 2013. As a result, he had been unwell and had not been in a position to collect the child, whom he had only seen at her kindergarten. He had been on bad terms with R.D. and that was the reason he had not called to enquire about the child\u2019s well-being. In September 2012 he had attempted to meet his daughter but R.D. had kept the child away from him and had refused to let them have any contact with each other. 71.  The social services submitted a report concluding that as the fourth applicant had not seen the child for many months in a row the relationship between the two of them had broken down. They recommended that contact between him and the child take place, at least temporarily, in the presence of the mother. 72.  On 10 January 2014 the first-instance court granted R.D.\u2019s application for limiting the father\u2019s contact rights with the child to visits without sleepovers. It concluded on the basis of a number of reports by social services that the relationship between the fourth applicant and the child had broken down. That decision was upheld on appeal on 30 April 2014.\n(b)  Enforcement of the fourth applicant\u2019s contact rights 73.  On 27 July 2012 the fourth applicant complained to social services that R.D. had been preventing him from seeing his daughter since 15 June 2012 and that the mother was not caring for the child appropriately. He stated that it was the latter\u2019s grandmother, who suffered from a psychiatric condition, who was the child\u2019s main care-giver. The social services carried out an inquiry and established in a report of 3 September 2012 that the child was not being brought up by her grand-mother but enjoyed the daily care and support of her mother. They also found that R.D. had not been preventing contact between the child and the applicant, but that the fourth applicant himself had not been seeking contact with his child. They had informed him that he had to meet his daughter regularly and that she needed the support and care of both of her parents. 74.  On 22 February 2013 the fourth applicant asked the bailiff to start enforcement proceedings on the basis of a writ of enforcement obtained on 29 June 2012. On 27 February 2013 the bailiff asked R.D. to hand the child over to the fourth applicant in line with his contact rights. R.D. replied on 28 February 2013 that the father had not sought any contact with the child since 15 June 2012, when he had left the family home, and had not telephoned to ask about the child\u2019s physical or emotional state. R.D. pointed out that she was aware of the arrangements for contact between him and the child, and had not opposed any meetings between them. 75.  The applicant complained to the bailiff on 1 and 16 March 2013 that R.D. had not taken the child to meet him in a caf\u00e9 located about 30 metres from R.D.\u2019s home. The bailiff replied that the fourth applicant was expected to collect the child from the house and not from caf\u00e9s or other locations of his own choosing. 76.  The bailiff scheduled a handover of the child to the fourth applicant for 12 August 2013 and R.D. took the child to that appointment. However, the bailiff did not enforce it as the child refused to go with her father. The bailiff scheduled a new appointment, 19 August 2013, for a handover for a contact meeting and R.D. took the child along to it. In the meantime, on 16 August 2013 the fourth applicant withdrew his request to use his right to spend a month with the child during the holidays. Despite that withdrawal, the bailiff fined R.D. on 19 August 2013 for not complying with the contact arrangements in favour of the fourth applicant. 77.  The bailiff further fined R.D. respectively on 28 May 2013, 11 July 2013 and 9 October 2013, referring to her continued failure to hand the child over to the father, beginning from 22 February 2013. R.D. brought judicial review proceedings in respect of the last fine, submitting that she had systematically prepared the child for her two-day stays with her father, but that the child had regularly refused to go with him after he had arrived at meetings in the company of strangers. On 6 November 2013 the Stara Zagora Regional Court quashed the fine of 9 October 2013. The court held that the bailiff should have attempted different means for enforcing the judgment before resorting to repeated fines. It set out his prerogatives under the law and emphasised that the bailiff was expected to be present when the child was handed over and to draw up reports on the particular circumstances, instead of relying on declarations signed by the parties or by individuals selected by them. 78.  Subsequently, the fourth applicant requested that further fines be imposed on R.D. for not being at home when he had gone to take the child. The bailiff refused on two occasions, finding that the dates in question had not been part of the applicant\u2019s visiting schedule. R.D. informed the bailiff that the fourth applicant had also arrived at her home in order to collect the child on days which had not been in the visiting schedule. 79.  The fourth applicant informed the bailiff on 28 October 2013 that he would not be in a position to meet his child for the foreseeable future owing to health problems. Thereafter, on 22 February 2014, without prior notice and on a day which was not part of the schedule for visits, he complained to the bailiff that R.D. and the child had not been at home when he had attempted to collect her. Subsequently, on 1 March 2014 and 25 April 2014 he failed to collect the child as scheduled. After being asked by the bailiff to state whether he wanted to resume contact with the child, the fourth applicant confirmed on 2 April 2014 that he did. 80.  The bailiff fined R.D. on 13 May 2014 because she had failed since 22 March 2013 to hand the child over to the fourth applicant. The Stara Zagora Regional Court quashed the fine on 20 June 2014 in a final decision, finding that R.D. had not impeded enforcement. R.D. informed the bailiff that the fourth applicant had failed to collect the child on 11 June 2014 as scheduled.\n(c)  Criminal proceedings brought by the fourth applicant 81.  In a final decision of 4 May 2015, the Stara Zagora Regional Court dismissed the complaint made by the fourth applicant in criminal proceedings he had brought against R.D. in July 2013. The court established that he had divorced R.D. without her knowledge in March 2012 and had continued living with her and the child until 15 June 2012. Immediately after learning later that month about the divorce and the contact regime, R.D. had sought to meet the fourth applicant in order to discuss and arrange his meetings with the child. He had not gone to a scheduled appointment at the end of June 2012 and had told R.D. over the telephone, something he had himself admitted to the prosecutor, that there was nothing to discuss with her. The court concluded that that demonstrated, on the one hand, R.D.\u2019s willingness and readiness to comply with the contact regime and, on the other hand, the fourth applicant\u2019s categorical refusal to have a dialogue with the child\u2019s mother. 82.  It was likewise established that after he had left the family home in June 2012 the applicant had not sought contact with the child for a number of months. He had also not called to ask about her well-being although that would have been fully compatible with his state of health at the time. That had led to the breakdown of his relationship with the child. Further, he had thereafter only sought contact with the child via forced enforcement proceedings in which he had gone to collect the child in the company of strangers. He had also at times sought meetings on days that had not been part of his visiting schedule while omitting to seek contact on days that had been set as part of the schedule.", "references": ["5", "1", "8", "3", "7", "2", "6", "0", "9", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1974 and 1994 respectively and live in Baku. At the material time the first applicant was a member of one of the main opposition parties in the country, the Popular Front Party of Azerbaijan, and the second applicant was a member of an opposition group, Nida. 6.  The applicants participated in an assembly on 6 May 2014. According to the applicants, they were among people who gathered near the Baku Assize Court to support members of Nida (an opposition group), who were being tried on that day. The courtroom was full, and therefore some people gathered outside the court to wait for the outcome of the proceedings. When the court announced its judgment, those who had gathered outside began to protest against the judgment, since they considered it unfair. The protest was brief, spontaneous and peaceful. Immediately after the protesters started chanting slogans, police officers and people in plain clothes began to forcibly disperse the demonstration. 7.  The applicants were arrested during the dispersal operation and were taken to a police station, where they were kept overnight. 8.  The applicants were questioned at the police station. 9.  On the day of the applicants\u2019 arrest, administrative-offence reports on them (inzibati x\u0259ta haqq\u0131nda protokol) were issued, which stated that they had committed an administrative offence under Article 298.2 of the Code of Administrative Offences (\u201cthe CAO\u201d): participation in a public assembly organised not in accordance with the law. 10.  According to the applicants, they were never served with copies of the administrative-offence reports or other documents from their case files. They were not given access to a lawyer either after their arrest or while they were in police custody. 11.  According to a police officer\u2019s decision and an order dated 6 May 2014, a State-funded lawyer (Mr O.A.) was invited to defend the first applicant. Similarly, according to a police officer\u2019s decision and an order dated 6 May 2014, a State-funded lawyer (Mr A.B.) was invited to defend the second applicant. 12.  The applicants were brought before the Nasimi District Court on the day following their arrest. 13.  According to the applicants, the hearing before the first-instance court was very brief in both cases. Members of the public were not allowed inside the courtroom, even though the court had not taken a formal decision to close the hearing to the public. 14.  According to the applicants, they were not given an opportunity to appoint lawyers of their own choosing. 15.  A State-funded lawyer was invited to defend the first applicant. It was the same lawyer, Mr O.A., who had been invited to defend her in accordance with the above-mentioned police officer\u2019s decision of 6 May 2014. 16.  The second applicant was not represented by a lawyer. According to the transcript of the hearing in his case, he refused the assistance of the State-funded lawyer and decided to defend himself in person. 17.  According to the transcript of the hearing concerning the first applicant, the State-funded lawyer did not make any oral or written submissions. 18.  The only witnesses questioned during the hearing concerning the first applicant were police officers who, according to official records, had arrested her or issued the administrative-offence report on her. They testified that the applicant had staged an unauthorised protest. With respect to the second applicant, the court did not question any witness. 19.  According to the transcript of the hearing concerning the first applicant, she stated that she had participated in the protest of 6 May 2014 and had rightfully used \u201cimproper language\u201d in the course of the protest. 20.  According to the transcript of the hearing concerning the second applicant, he stated that he had simply protested against an unfair judgment against the Nida members, and had not committed any unlawful action. 21.  In both cases the Nasimi District Court found that the applicants had participated in an unauthorised demonstration. The court convicted the applicants under Article 298.2 of the CAO, and sentenced them to a period of administrative detention of thirty and twenty days respectively. 22.  On unspecified dates the applicants lodged appeals with the Baku Court of Appeal, arguing that their convictions had been in violation of their rights, because the protest in which they had participated had been spontaneous and peaceful. The applicants also complained that their arrests had been unlawful, and that the hearings before the first-instance court had not been fair. They asked the Baku Court of Appeal to quash the first\u2011instance court\u2019s decisions in their respective cases. 23.  The first applicant was assisted by a lawyer of her own choosing before the Baku Court of Appeal. The second applicant was not represented by a lawyer. 24.  On 16 and 22 May 2014 respectively the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the applicants\u2019 appeals and upheld the decisions of the first\u2011instance court.", "references": ["5", "2", "6", "4", "1", "9", "8", "0", "No Label", "7", "3"], "gold": ["7", "3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1936 and lives in Skopje. He was a high-ranking official during the communist era. At the time of the events, he neither held a public office nor was a candidate for such an office. 6.  On the basis of a request by a third person and of its own motion, on 27 May 2013 the Fact Verification Commission (\u201cthe Commission\u201d) established in lustration proceedings that the applicant had collaborated with State security bodies. Relying on two files from the State Archives, it \u201cestablished indisputably that [the applicant] gave information ... to State security bodies about individuals ... namely ... he collaborated with the State security services in a conscious, secret, organised and continuous manner as a secret collaborator.\u201d Accordingly, it held that the applicant had fulfilled the condition for restricting his candidacy to or performance of public office. The Commission based its decision on the relevant provisions of the 2012 Lustration Act (see paragraphs 19, 23-26 below) and the Administrative Proceedings Act. 7.  Referring to a report registered as file no. 6825, the Commission established that in 1963, after he had visited his brother in Sweden, the applicant had given information about his brother, his brother\u2019s wife and other people to State security bodies. He also had provided information about other people after he had returned to the city of Gevgelija. The Commission established that the applicant had been engaged by the security services before leaving for Sweden and that they had intended to continue collaborating with the applicant. The file further noted that in 1964 the applicant had shared his impressions about his stay in Sweden with his father. 8.  On the basis of documents in another file, file no. 2599, the Commission established that the applicant, while editor-in-chief of a newspaper in 1962 and afterwards, had provided information to the security services about a colleague, the colleague\u2019s articles and his relations with other people. 9.  The Commission\u2019s decision was published on its website on 30 May 2013, in accordance with sections 29 and 31 of the Lustration Act (see paragraphs 25 and 26 below). It contained information about the applicant\u2019s place of birth, his personal identification number and the positions he had held. The decision was served on the applicant on 4 June 2013. 10.  On 11 June 2013 the applicant challenged the decision in the Administrative Court, arguing that the Commission\u2019s findings based on file no. 6825 had been wrong since the file had obviously been about another person with the same name and not him. He submitted several documents to show that the lustration decision had been a result of mistaken identity. The documents were his birth certificate, which showed a date of birth that was different from the one in file no. 6825; an inheritance decision, certified by a notary public, attesting that the applicant had a sister rather than a brother; his notarised military card, which showed that in 1963 he had been doing military service in Bosnia and Herzegovina; and a death certificate showing that his father had died in 1962. He argued that he had never visited Sweden and had lived since 1955 in Skopje. He also challenged the veracity and authenticity of the documents in file no. 2599 and denied that he had ever collaborated with or provided any information about any colleague to the State security services, let alone that any such collaboration had met the criteria specified in section 18 of the Lustration Act (see paragraph 24 below). In that connection, he submitted that none of the documents in the file had been signed by him. Lastly, he complained about the fact that the decision on the Commission\u2019s website had included his father\u2019s name, despite the fact that the Lustration Act made no provision for the release of such information. He argued that his reputation, dignity, personal information and integrity had been compromised. 11.  In a hearing held in private on 29 January 2014, the Administrative Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim. The court held that the Commission had correctly established the facts and applied the relevant law. The court stated:\n\u201c[the Commission] established that there were documents in the State Archives created by the State security bodies confirming that [the applicant] had collaborated with State security bodies in a conscious, secret, organised and continuous manner and that he had obtained favours when being promoted, as set out in sections 14 and 18 of [the Lustration Act] ... The Commission correctly established that [the files in question] contained information provided by [the applicant], which had been used to restrict and violate the human rights and freedoms of other people on political and ideological grounds ... \u201d 12.  As regards the applicant\u2019s complaints of mistaken identity, the court stated:\n\u201c... the Commission\u2019s decision clearly established collaboration with security bodies by [the applicant], by determining his personal identification number, place of birth and the office that he had held.\u201d 13.  As to his arguments that the Commission had erred in finding \u201cconscious, secret, organised and continuous collaboration\u201d with State security bodies, the court held:\n\u201c[the applicant] was entitled to obtain access to the documents attesting to his collaboration. In case of doubts about their veracity, he could have initiated proceedings before the competent court to prove their inaccuracy, before the impugned decision had been delivered.\nIn addition, the court considers that the above State security service documents on [the applicant\u2019s] secret collaboration were drawn up on the basis of the rules and regulations of those bodies.\u201d 14.  Lastly, the court stated:\n\u201cThe court made its decision at a hearing held in private because the Commission had correctly established the relevant facts [on the basis of written material] and [the applicant] had not submitted any evidence that led to different facts.\u201d 15.  On 7 March 2014 the applicant appealed to the Higher Administrative Court. He reiterated the complaints raised in his action in the Administrative Court and submitted that the latter court had not provided any reasoning regarding his complaint that the publication of the Commission\u2019s decision on its website had violated his right to respect for his private and family life, his reputation and dignity. It had also disregarded his evidence that file no.6825 had not concerned him, but a person with the same name, which had led to facts being wrongly established. He stated that the court had also relied on evidence adduced by the Commission without analysing it in adversarial proceedings in the presence of the applicant or any other relevant witness or expert. He complained that the lower authorities had not explained why they had considered that he had collaborated with the security bodies in an intentional, secret, organised and continuous manner, as set out in the Lustration Act. He further complained about the lack of an oral hearing before the Administrative Court and argued that there had been no statutory provision allowing him to request such a hearing. Lastly, he contested the Administrative Court\u2019s explanation about the possible legal avenues he could have used to challenge the veracity of the documents in file no. 2599. In that connection, he submitted that before 4 June 2015 he had not been aware of the existence of documents about his alleged secret collaboration with the security services. Furthermore, his arguments on that point should have been dealt with in the impugned proceedings. 16.  On 12 June 2014 the Higher Administrative Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld the lower court\u2019s decision. It found no grounds to depart from the facts as they had been established and the reasons given by the Commission and the Administrative Court. It stated:\n\u201cThe Fact Verification Commission only checks whether or not there was collaboration with the security services; there are no adversarial proceedings, the documents created and held by the [security services] are regarded as facts ...\u201d 17.  Section 13 of the 2008 Lustration Act provided that the name of the person concerned who had been identified by the Lustration Commission as a collaborator had to be published in the Official Gazette after final conclusion of the proceedings. The Act was replaced with the 2012 Lustration Act (see sub-heading B. below). 18.  Section 1 stated that the Lustration Act regulated the criterion for limiting the exercise of public office, the publication of information on cooperation with State security bodies and the powers of the Fact Verification (Lustration) Commission. 19.  Section 3 contained a list of persons subject to the Lustration Act. 20.  Section 4 provided that people found by the Lustration Commission to have been registered as a secret collaborator or secret informer between 2 August 1944 and the date of entry into force of the Act would be regarded as having met the criterion for limiting their candidacy for or the exercise of public office. Such collaboration was deemed as the operational gathering of information and data (hereinafter \u201cinformation\u201d) that was subject to processing, storage and use by the State security services, gathered and kept on certain persons, thereby resulting in violations or limitations of human rights and freedoms. 21.  Section 4(1) defined collaboration as conscious, secret, organised and continuous cooperation with the State security services, consented to in writing, as a secret collaborator or secret informant. It involved collecting information about an individual, violating their human rights on ideological or political grounds, in return for material benefit for the collaborator or informant, or favours during employment or in getting promotion. Under sub-section 3 of the provision, the Lustration Commission was to find that there had not been cooperation with the State security services if it could not establish that there had been conscious, secret, organised and continuous cooperation and activity. 22.  Section 5 established the Commission as an autonomous and independent authority financed from the State budget. It was composed of a president, a deputy president and nine other members, elected by Parliament by a qualified two-thirds majority for a five-year term (section 6(1)). 23.  Section 10 regulated the functioning of the Commission. The Commission was to deliberate in session in the presence of two-thirds of its members and decisions had to be taken by a majority of its members. 24.  Section 18(4) defined collaboration as conscious, secret, organised and continuous cooperation and activity with the State security services, established by a written agreement. The person was to have acted as a secret collaborator or secret informant, collecting information regarding an individual, in violation of their human rights, in return for material benefit or favours during employment or in getting promotion. 25.  Under section 29(1), any former holders of public office or of a position of public authority whom the Commission found, after conducting the verification procedure, to have collaborated within the meaning of the Act, were to be deprived of their right to exercise public office or hold positions of public authority during the validity of the law (ten years from the appointment of the Lustration Commission, section 42). Sub-section 2 stated that the Lustration Commission had to publish its decisions of a finding of collaboration with the State security services on its website. That had to be done immediately and in any case no later than three days after completion of the procedure. It also had to submit the decision to Parliament, the Government and the State Electoral Commission. 26.  Under section 31, a decision establishing collaboration with the State security services had to contain the full name and surname, personal identification number, date and place of birth, pseudonyms and documents used as evidence of collaboration. A person subjected to such checks would be informed by the Lustration Commission of the results of its investigation. The Commission\u2019s decision was to be published on its website. The documents used as evidence to confirm collaboration with the State security services were also to be published. The Commission\u2019s decisions were subject to a court appeal within eight days of the day of service, based on the principles of priority and urgency. 27.  The Act repealed the 2012 Lustration Act. All ongoing lustration proceedings were to be concluded. The Lustration Commission\u2019s mandate was also to be regarded as expired. It came into force on 1 September 2015. 28.  Section 1 of the Administrative Disputes Act states that for the purposes of judicial review a court decides in administrative-dispute proceedings on the lawfulness of decisions (\u201cadministrative acts\u201d) by administrative authorities, the Government and other State or public authorities (hereafter \u201cpublic entities\u201d) when, in the exercise of their public powers, they decide on the rights and obligations of individuals or legal entities in administrative matters. 29.  Section 4 provides that administrative disputes are decided by Administrative Court (at first instance) and by the Higher Administrative Court (on appeal). The Supreme Court can decide upon any extraordinary remedies specified by law. 30.  Under section 7-a, if the Administrative Disputes Act does not contain specific provisions on the administrative-dispute procedure, the provisions of the Civil Procedure Act apply mutatis mutandis. 31.  Section 9 provides that administrative-dispute proceedings cannot be instituted if another judicial remedy has been secured. 32.  Under section 10, administrative decisions may be contested for lack of jurisdiction, the misapplication of substantive law, incorrect findings of fact or for procedural flaws. 33.  Section 26 states that an Administrative Court must declare an application for judicial review inadmissible if, inter alia, the contested decision does not constitute an administrative act, or the law rules out the institution of an administrative dispute in that particular case. 34.  Section 30, as amended in 2010, no longer entitles a party to the proceedings to request that the Administrative Court hold an oral hearing. According to the amended text, the court, as a rule, decides at a hearing held in private. Section 30-a provides that the court holds a public oral hearing if the case is complex, to clarify matters or establish facts, or if it adduces evidence. 35.  Section 36 provides that an Administrative Court, as a rule, is to decide cases on the basis of the facts established in the administrative proceedings before the public entity whose decision is being contested, or on the basis of facts established by the court itself. The Administrative Court should quash the contested decision and remit the case if it finds that the facts have not been correctly established, or for procedural errors. When the evidence suggests that the actual facts are different from those established by the public entity in the administrative proceedings, the Administrative Court may itself establish the facts and decide the case. In such cases the facts are determined at a hearing in the presence of the parties. 36.  Section 39 provides for appeal against the judgment of an Administrative Court. 37.  Section 40 sets out situations where the Administrative Court, having found an action well-founded, does not have to remit the case but can decide it on the merits by a decision entirely replacing the public entity\u2019s contested decision. 38.  Article 33 \u00a7 1 (3) of the Criminal Code provides that a convicted person can be prohibited from exercising a profession, activity or duty. 39.  Under Article 38-b \u00a7 1, a court can prohibit a convicted person sentenced to imprisonment or given a suspended sentence from exercising a profession or activity if he or she acted in abuse of the rules of that profession or activity in committing the crime and could be expected to repeat that act of abuse in the commission of a new crime. 40.  On 24 March 2010 the Constitutional Court declared several provisions of the 2008 Lustration Act, which was replaced by the 2012 Lustration Act, to be invalid. Among other provisions, the court set aside section 13, which had provided for the publication of a collaborator\u2019s name in the Official Gazette after final conclusion of the lustration proceedings (see paragraph 17 above). The court found that such a measure was unnecessary and violated the moral integrity and reputation of the person concerned. It held that the publication of the collaborator\u2019s name in the Official Gazette was disproportionate to the aim of the 2008 Act, namely preventing collaborators with the secret service from holding public office in a democratic society. That aim, the court held, could be achieved by ascertaining the facts and informing the relevant State bodies.\nIII.  RELEVANT COUNCIL OF EUROPE DOCUMENTS\nParliamentary Assembly Resolution 1096 (1996) on measures to dismantle the heritage of former communist totalitarian systems 41.  The relevant Council of Europe documents are set out in Ivanovski case (see Ivanovski v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, no. 29908/11, \u00a7\u00a7 106-108, 21 January 2016). Further to the extracts cited in Ivanovski case, the Venice Commission amicus curiae of 17 December 2012 read as follows:\n\u201cD. The publication of the names of those persons who are deemed to be collaborators 74.  In the Commission\u2019s view, publication prior to the court\u2019s decision is problematic in respect of Article 8 ECHR. The adverse effects of such publication on the person\u2019s reputation may hardly be removed by a later rectification, and the affected person has no means to defend himself against such adverse effects. The latter may only appear to be a proportionate measure necessary in a democratic society when the collaboration is finally verified, not before. Publication should therefore only occur after the court\u2019s decision.\u201d", "references": ["1", "7", "5", "6", "8", "2", "0", "9", "No Label", "3", "4"], "gold": ["3", "4"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1937 and lives in Sofia. 5.  The applicant\u2019s husband owned part of a house and a yard in Sofia. 6.  By a decision of the mayor of 15 October 1981 the property was expropriated with a view to constructing a metro station. The decision, based on section 98(1) of the Territorial and Urban Planning Act of 1973, provided that the applicant\u2019s husband was to be compensated with a three\u2011room flat in a building which the municipality planned to construct. 7.  In 1989 the applicant and her husband were moved out of the expropriated property and settled in a two-room municipally-owned flat. The expropriated house was subsequently pulled down. 8.  By a supplementary decision of 1 September 1989, based on section 100 of the Territorial and Urban Planning Act, the mayor determined the exact location, size and other details in respect of the future flat offered in compensation, which was to measure 94 square metres. 9.  In 1993 the applicants\u2019 husband passed away, after which the applicant became the owner of the future flat allocated in compensation to him. 10.  In the years that followed the applicant requested on many occasions that the authorities complete the compensation procedure and deliver the flat due to her, but to no avail. The construction of the building in which the flat was to be located did not commence. 11.  In 2001 the applicant brought a tort action, claiming wrongful failure on the part of the Sofia municipality to build and provide her with the flat due to her during the period from January 1993 to September 2001. In a final judgment of 6 March 2008 the Supreme Court of Cassation, holding that the municipality was responsible for the failure to deliver the flat within a reasonable time-limit, awarded the applicant 10,000 Bulgarian levs (BGN) in non-pecuniary damage and BGN 44,320 for loss of profit. 12.  In 2009 the applicant brought a new tort action against the Sofia municipality covering the period after October 2001. The action was dismissed in a final judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of 22 March 2013, on the ground that the applicant had had a special remedy at her disposal, namely the possibility provided for in section 9(1) of the transitional provisions of the Territory Planning Act 2001 to claim monetary compensation for the expropriated property instead of compensation with a flat (see paragraph 16 below). 13.  In 2013 the Sofia municipality informed the applicant that the construction of the building where the flat due to her was to be located was to start in the near future. According to the latest information submitted by the parties in 2014, the municipality was looking for a company to carry out the construction works.", "references": ["1", "3", "7", "6", "5", "4", "8", "0", "2", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
+{"input": "6.  On the date of lodging of the applications, the applicants were regarded for civil-law purposes as belonging to the male sex. For that reason, the masculine form is used in referring to them; however, this cannot be construed as excluding them from the gender with which they identify. 7.  The first applicant was born in 1983 and lives in Paris. 8.  The first applicant stated that, although he had been entered in the register of births as being male, he had always behaved like a girl and his physical appearance had always been very feminine. As an adolescent and young adult he had struggled considerably with his gender identity, since the male identity assigned to him at birth did not match his female psychological and social identity. In 2006, after several doctors had diagnosed a gender identity disorder known as \u201cHarry Benjamin syndrome\u201d, he had begun a transitional phase, living in society as a woman and undertaking a course of hormone treatment under the supervision of an endocrinologist, Dr H., and a neuropsychiatrist, Dr Bo. 9.  The first applicant submitted three medical certificates issued by these doctors during the period in question. In the first two certificates, dated 12 April 2007, Dr Bo. stated that the first applicant had been under his supervision since 27 April 2005 \u201cfor a syndrome typical of gender identity disorder\u201d. He stated that \u201cthere [was] thus an observable difference between his current physique and the photograph on his identity card\u201d, and that \u201cthere [were] no medical or psychological contraindications for [an] operation ... on the Adam\u2019s apple\u201d. In the third certificate, dated 16 January 2008, Dr H. stated that he had been overseeing the applicant\u2019s hormone treatment for \u201ctypical primary gender identity disorder since 1 June 2006, together with Dr B.\u201d, and that \u201cfollowing endocrinology and metabolic tests, including karyotyping, [he was being] treated with anti-androgens and oestrogen\u201d. The doctor concluded that \u201cthe marked, plausible and genuine nature of his gender dysphoria, together with the \u2018real life test\u2019, [made him] eligible for reassignment surgery, of which [he had] a legitimate expectation\u201d. 10.  The first applicant also produced a medical certificate issued on 3 April 2008 by another psychiatrist, Dr Ba., which certified that he had \u201ctypical Harry Benjamin syndrome\u201d and that \u201cthere [were] currently no contraindications for the medical and/or surgical treatment entailed in the gender reassignment sought by the patient\u201d. 11.  The first applicant stressed that he had not originally intended to undergo mutilating gender reassignment surgery, but had resigned himself to it because the French courts\u2019 case-law made it a precondition for a change in civil status. 12.  The first applicant decided to undergo surgery in Thailand, performed by Dr S., whom he described as a \u201cworld-renowned specialist\u201d. The operation was carried out on 3 July 2008. Dr S. issued the following medical certificate:\n\u201c... following a period of diagnosis by psychosexual specialists and an appropriate period of living full-time with a female identity, the above-mentioned person was diagnosed with a gender identity disorder (F64.0) defined as DSM IV, ICD-10. She was accepted for the appropriate surgical treatment, namely gender reassignment surgery.\n... The surgery consisted of an orchidectomy, a vaginoplasty, a clitoroplasty and a labiaplasty, combined in a single operation. On completion of the operation the male sexual organs ... were replaced by organs that are female in appearance and function, with the exception of the reproductive organs. This involved removing the male reproductive organs, resulting in irremediable infertility.\nIn accordance with all established medical and legal definitions, the operation is irreversible and means that Mr [A.P.]\u2019s male sexual identity has been permanently changed to a female sexual identity.\u201d 13.  In a certificate signed on 10 September 2008 Dr H. confirmed that the first applicant \u201c[had] undergone irreversible male-to-female gender reassignment surgery\u201d, and stressed that \u201cthe request for a change in civil status [was] compelling and admissible [and was] an integral part of the treatment\u201d. 14.  The first applicant produced four further certificates. The first, dated 26 May 2009, was signed by Dr W., a surgeon. It stated that the first applicant had undergone \u201ca cosmetic laryngoplasty as part of male\u2011to\u2011female transitioning, after irreversible reassignment surgery was performed on the external genitalia\u201d. In the second certificate, dated 27 May 2009, a speech therapist stated that she had \u201cworked with [A.P.] for two years on feminisation of her voice\u201d, and that \u201cher voice and appearance [were] now wholly feminine and consistent with each other\u201d. The third certificate, signed on 23 July 2009 by Dr B., a psychiatrist, read as follows:\n \u201c... [A.P.] is under supervision for typical Harry Benjamin syndrome, for which a gender reassignment process has been under way for several years. She has had hormone treatment and the surgery required to make her appearance and behaviour female. It is therefore legitimate, in the interests of her social and professional integration, for her civil status to be brought into line with her appearance and her wishes. ...\u201d 15.  In the fourth certificate, dated 16 March 2010, Dr P., a doctor specialising in fundamental psychopathology and psychoanalysis and a psychotherapist, stated that he had started psychotherapy sessions with the first applicant and, in particular, had \u201cnoted ... the consistency between Ms [A.P.]\u2019s statements and her preferred gender identity\u201d. 16.  On 11 September 2008 the first applicant brought proceedings against State Counsel in the Paris tribunal de grande instance seeking a declaration that he was now female and that his first name was A. (a female forename). He submitted, in particular, the medical certificates of 12 April 2007 and 16 January and 10 September 2008, and the certificate issued by Dr S. On 16 October 2008 State Counsel requested a multi-disciplinary expert assessment, on the grounds that the applicant\u2019s surgery had been performed abroad.\n(a)  Interlocutory judgment of 17 February 2009 17.   On 17 February 2009, in an interlocutory judgment, the Paris tribunal de grande instance stressed as follows:\n \u201cWhere a diagnosis of gender identity disorder has been made following a thorough assessment and the person concerned has undergone irreversible physical changes for therapeutic purposes, it is appropriate to consider that, although the person\u2019s new gender status is imperfect in that the chromosomal make-up is unchanged, he or she is closer, in terms of physical appearance, mindset and social integration, to the preferred gender than to the gender assigned at birth.\u201d\n However, the court further found:\n\u201cIrrespective of the status of the authors of the medical certificates produced in support of the application, the need for a firm diagnosis means that a multi\u2011disciplinary expert assessment should be carried out in order to establish the applicant\u2019s current state from a physiological, biological and psychological perspective and to investigate the persistence of the alleged disorder in his past.\u201d\n The court appointed three experts \u2013 a psychiatrist, an endocrinologist and a gynaecologist \u2013 and requested them, after interviewing and examining the first applicant and consulting the medical certificates and operation reports submitted, to:\n\u201c(a)  describe the applicant\u2019s current physical state ... and the presence or absence of any external or internal genitalia of either sex; order, with the applicant\u2019s consent, any samples and laboratory tests capable of establishing the biological and genetic characteristics of the applicant\u2019s sex; state whether a mistake could have been made in the sex recorded on the birth certificate, or an organic or biological change could have occurred later; look for traces of possible surgery aimed at bringing about or completing a transformation of the genitalia or secondary sexual characteristics; state whether the patient has been treated with either medication or hormones; state whether the surgery or hormone treatment was carried out on account of pre-existing physical anomalies or because of the patient\u2019s psychological state, leaving aside his deliberate intentions;\n (b)  describe [the first applicant\u2019s] mental state and behaviour as regards his gender and, in so far as possible, indicate their origins and trace their development; report on any course of psychotherapy followed, specifying its duration and outcome; state whether the patient suffers from any mental disorder and, if so, specify the nature of that disorder;\n (c)  express a view on the possible existence of gender identity disorder, giving reasons for making or ruling out such a diagnosis; state whether, in the light of all the available individual medical data (physiological, biological and physical), the person concerned should be regarded as male or female.\u201d 18.  The court ruled that the costs of the expert assessment should be met by the first applicant, and ordered him to deposit a sum of 1,524 euros (EUR) for that purpose. 19.  The first applicant refused to submit to an expert assessment on the grounds that this type of assessment, as well as being very costly, also failed to respect the physical and mental integrity of the person concerned. In his view the documents he had submitted, which had been written by specialist doctors and noted the genuine nature of his change of gender, were more than sufficient and it was not necessary to make him undergo a further battery of traumatic tests. 20.  In an order of 13 March 2009 the Deputy President of the Paris Court of Appeal refused the first applicant leave to appeal against this interlocutory judgment.\n(b)  Judgment of 10 November 2009 21.  On 10 November 2009 the Paris tribunal de grande instance rejected the first applicant\u2019s request. It stressed that the certificates produced by the first applicant, however informative, did not answer the court\u2019s questions regarding the origin, nature, persistence and consequences of the disorder in question, and that the doctors who had been consulted could not, in the space of a few lines intended to allow the operation to go ahead, carry out the work of three experts instructed on the basis of a very wide-ranging and detailed mandate. The court noted in particular that the certificates did not mention the applicant\u2019s mental state and attitude with regard to his gender, or express a view as to the origin of the disorder and its development. Likewise, they did not specify whether the first applicant suffered from mental-health problems and whether he had followed a course of psychotherapy, nor did they provide any information on his current state, having been written prior to his gender reassignment. The court added that patients who underwent surgery in France submitted a comprehensive file covering all the disciplines concerned as a precondition of reassignment surgery, something which the doctor who had operated on the first applicant in Thailand had apparently not required. In order to have their costs covered by the social-security scheme, patients in France had to undergo a whole series of rigorous examinations. The court found that, in the light of the evidence in the file, the applicant should submit willingly to the expert assessment. In accordance with Article 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which authorised the courts to draw all the appropriate inferences from a party\u2019s refusal to cooperate with an investigative measure, the court found that, in the absence of a multi-disciplinary expert assessment, the first applicant\u2019s request had not been sufficiently substantiated. 22.  Following an appeal by the first applicant the Paris Court of Appeal, in a judgment of 23 September 2010, upheld the judgment of 10 November 2009 in so far as it had rejected the first applicant\u2019s request for the indication of gender on his birth certificate to be corrected. 23.  First of all, the Court of Appeal inferred from Article 8 of the Convention that \u201cwhere, following medical and surgical treatment undergone for therapeutic purposes\u201d, a person with a gender identity disorder no longer possessed all the characteristics of his or her original sex and had taken on a physical appearance closer to that of the opposite sex, which matched his or her social behaviour, the principle of respect for private life warranted amending the civil-status records to indicate the sex corresponding to the person\u2019s appearance. 24.  However, the Court of Appeal found that, in the light of the documents submitted by the first applicant, it was \u201cnot established that he no longer possesse[d] all the characteristics of the male sex\u201d. It stressed in that regard that, although the psychiatrists Bo. and Ba. had given a diagnosis of gender identity disorder in their certificates of 12 April 2007 and 3 April 2008, they had not noted the \u201cabsence of mental-health problems\u201d. The Court of Appeal further noted that the hormone treatment referred to in the certificates issued by Dr H. on 16 January and 10 September 2008 dated back a long time. It also found that the certificate drawn up by Dr S., the doctor who had operated on the first applicant in Thailand on 3 July 2008, was \u201cextremely brief\u201d and consisted merely in a list of items of medical information that did not make clear whether the gender reassignment surgery had been effective. Furthermore, the documentation produced by the first applicant concerning the clinic, which had been taken from the Internet, was not sufficient to establish either the scientific and surgical reputation of the surgeon who had performed the operation or whether the surgery had complied with standard medical practice. Nor was this demonstrated by Dr W.\u2019s certificate of 26 May 2009, \u201cowing to the lack of any detail\u201d. 25.  The Court of Appeal went on to observe that the first applicant had refused persistently on principle to submit to an expert assessment and had not cooperated in the assessment ordered by the lower court, \u201con the irrelevant pretext of protection of his private life, even though the aim [had been] to establish that a person presenting with a gender identity disorder no longer possessed all the characteristics of the sex assigned at birth\u201d. The court stressed that \u201cthe possible interference with private life [had been] proportionate to the requirement to establish the person\u2019s gender identity, which [was] a component of civil status that [was] subject to the public\u2011order principle of inalienability\u201d. 26.  The Court of Appeal found, however, that the fact that the first applicant was known by a female forename \u2013 as was clear from numerous statements from those close to him \u2013 allied to his conviction that he was female, the fact that he had had various medical treatments and operations, and the \u201creality of his social life\u201d, meant that he had a legitimate interest in changing his male forenames to female ones. The court therefore ordered that his forenames be corrected on his birth certificate. 27.  The first applicant appealed on points of law against the judgment of 23 September 2010. 28.  He argued, firstly, that the right to respect for private life meant that gender reassignment should be authorised for persons whose physical appearance was closer to that of the opposite gender, to which their social behaviour corresponded. He criticised the Court of Appeal\u2019s refusal of his request to have the indication of his gender amended because he had refused to cooperate in an expert assessment aimed at determining the origins of his gender identity disorder and its development, and at ascertaining that he no longer had all the characteristics of the male sex. In his view, in ruling in this way after noting that he was known by a female forename, that he was convinced that he belonged to the female sex, and that he had had various medical and surgical treatments and lived in society as a woman, the Court of Appeal had breached Article 8 of the Convention. The first applicant referred, in particular, to the position of the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe as set out in his issue paper of October 2009 entitled \u201cHuman rights and gender identity\u201d, and to Resolution 1728 (2010) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity (see paragraphs 73 and 75 below). 29.  Secondly, he argued that it had been fully established by the medical certificates he had submitted that he was transgender, that he had undergone surgery which made him a woman, and that his physical appearance and social behaviour were female. In ruling that these documents were insufficient to establish the existence of the conditions required for gender reassignment, and criticising him for not cooperating with the expert assessment, the Court of Appeal had therefore distorted the evidence. 30.  Thirdly, he alleged a violation of Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 8, taking the view that the Court of Appeal, in finding that he should have submitted to the expert assessment and in dismissing his appeal, had based its assessment on discriminatory grounds.\n(b)  The judgment 31.  On 7 June 2012 the Court of Cassation (First Civil Division, Bulletin 2012, I, no. 123) dismissed the appeal in the following terms:\n\u201c... In order to substantiate a request to have the gender markers on a birth certificate corrected, the person concerned must demonstrate, in view of the widely accepted position within the scientific community, that he or she actually suffers from the gender identity disorder in question and that the change in his or her appearance is irreversible. After examining the documents submitted, without distorting them, and having noted, firstly, that the certificate describing surgery performed in Thailand was very brief (being confined to a list of items of medical information and saying nothing about the effectiveness of the operation) and, secondly, that [the first applicant] refused in principle to undergo the expert assessment ordered by the first-instance court, the Court of Appeal was entitled to refuse the application for correction of the gender markers on the appellant\u2019s birth certificate ...\u201d 32.  The second applicant was born in 1958 and lives in Le Perreux\u2011Sur\u2011Marne. 33.  He submitted that, although he had been entered in the register of births as male, he had been aware from a very young age of belonging to the female gender. 34.  Owing to social pressure he had tried to hide his true nature and had married twice while living with the male identity entered on his birth certificate. However the marriages, from which he had children, had ended in divorce. 35.  He dressed as a woman and was perceived by others as a woman. Since 2004 he had been undergoing treatment with feminising hormones and had undergone genital reconstruction surgery. 36.  On 17 March 2009 the second applicant brought proceedings against State Counsel in the Cr\u00e9teil tribunal de grande instance seeking an order for his birth certificate to be corrected by replacing the word \u201cmale\u201d with \u201cfemale\u201d and replacing his male forenames with the name \u201c\u00c9milie\u201d. He referred in particular to a certificate issued in 2004 by Dr B., a psychiatrist and specialist in transgender issues, stating that the second applicant was a transgender person. 37.  The court gave judgment on 9 February 2010. It noted that the second applicant had merely filed a few invoices dated 2008 and issued in the name of \u201c\u00c9milie\u201d Gar\u00e7on, four statements made by witnesses in 2008 saying that they had known the second applicant for a number of years, knew that he was a \u201ctransgender\u201d person (or \u201ctranssexual\u201d, as one of them put it) and had seen him \u201cevolve as a woman without any apparent difficulty\u201d, and a certificate dated 23 April 2009 signed by the endocrinologist Dr T., according to which the second applicant had been receiving treatment for gender dysphoria since 2006 and taking feminising hormones since 2004, a treatment that was well tolerated and effective. Noting also that the second applicant had not submitted the certificate from Dr B., the court found that he had not \u201c[demonstrated] that he was actually transgender as claimed\u201d. As he had not demonstrated that he actually suffered from the alleged disorder, his request had to be refused, since a change to the indication of gender in civil-status documents \u201cwas possible only in order to make a proven de facto situation official\u201d. The court held that it had to refuse the request for a change of forename on the same grounds, as that request was merely secondary to the request for a change in civil status. 38.  On 27 January 2011, following an appeal by the second applicant, the Paris Court of Appeal upheld the judgment of 9 February 2010 giving the following reasons:\n\u201c... While the principle of the inalienability of civil status precludes the law from recognising a change wilfully sought by an individual, it does not imply that civil status cannot be changed.\nWhere a genuine gender identity disorder that is medically recognised and untreatable has been diagnosed following a rigorous assessment, and the transgender person has undergone irreversible physical changes for therapeutic purposes, it is appropriate to consider that, although the person\u2019s new gender status is imperfect in that the chromosomal make-up is unchanged, he or she is closer, in terms of physical appearance, mindset and social integration, to the preferred gender than to the gender assigned at birth. In these circumstances, and since under Article 57 of the Civil Code the birth certificate must mention the sex of the individual concerned, the principle of change should be accepted.\nIn the present case \u00c9mile Maurice Jean Marc Gar\u00e7on ... was entered in the civil\u2011status registers as male.\nIt is up to the appellant to give reasons, in particular on the basis of medical evidence, why he should be regarded as female as he requests.\nThe appellant claims to be a transgender person who has lived with a female gender identity for several years. He argues that the disparity between his preferred gender and the gender assigned to him at birth is sufficient to warrant a change in civil status without his first having to demonstrate that he has undergone gender reassignment surgery.\nRegarding the medical aspect he has simply submitted, as he did before the first\u2011instance court, a certificate issued by Dr [T.] dated 23 April 2009, written on the headed paper of Dr [D. S.-B.], in which that doctor \u2018certifies that the endocrinologist Dr [S.-B.] has been treating Mr \u00c9mile (\u00c9milie) Gar\u00e7on for gender dysphoria ... since 2006\u2019, and specifies that the appellant has been receiving treatment with feminising hormones since 2004 and that the treatment is well tolerated and effective.\nThis medical certificate stating that the appellant followed a course of feminising hormone treatment from 2004 to 2009 does not in itself demonstrate the existence of a permanent physical or physiological change and hence the irreversible nature of the gender reassignment process.\nAn expert assessment appears pointless since the appellant, who rejects the idea of having to undergo genital surgery, does not mention any plastic surgery performed in connection with the current course of hormone treatment, and has not produced any opinion by a psychiatrist capable of demonstrating the existence and persistence of the alleged disorder, although \u00c9mile Gar\u00e7on\u2019s birth certificate states that he has been married twice ... and divorced twice ...\u201d 39.  The second applicant appealed on points of law against the judgment of 27 January 2011. He argued in particular that, in refusing his requests on the pretext that he had not demonstrated either the existence of \u201cpermanent physical or physiological change and hence the irreversible nature of the gender reassignment process\u201d, or \u201cthe existence and persistence of the alleged disorder\u201d, the Court of Appeal had breached Article 8 of the Convention, since the right to respect for private life implied the right for individuals to define their sexual identity and to have their civil-status documents amended to reflect their preferred gender identity, without having to demonstrate the existence of a gender identity disorder or gender dysphoria, or to undergo a prior process of irreversible gender reassignment. Making the right to amendment of civil-status documents subject to proof of having undergone an irreversible process of gender reassignment amounted to requiring the holders of that right to be sterilised in order to exercise it, thereby interfering with their dignity and with due respect for their bodies and the intimacy of their private lives. The second applicant inferred from this that there had been a violation of Article 8 on account of the fact that the Court of Appeal had required him to furnish proof of having undergone that process. He added that it was discriminatory and contrary to Article 14 of the Convention to make this right subject to such proof and to proof of a gender identity disorder or gender dysphoria.\n(b)  Judgment of 13 February 2013 40.  On 13 February 2013 the Court of Cassation (First Civil Division) dismissed the appeal on points of law in the following terms:\n\u201c... In order to substantiate a request for correction of the gender markers on a birth certificate, the person concerned must demonstrate, in view of the widely accepted position within the scientific community, that he or she actually suffers from the gender identity disorder in question and that the change in his or her appearance is irreversible.\nFurthermore, after noting that [the second applicant] had merely produced a certificate issued by a doctor on 23 April 2009 on the headed paper of a different doctor, in which the former certified that the latter, an endocrinologist, was treating [the second applicant] for gender dysphoria, and which stated that the patient had been receiving treatment with feminising hormones since 2004, the Court of Appeal found that this medical certificate alone did not demonstrate the existence or persistence of a gender identity disorder, or the irreversible nature of the gender reassignment process. These are not discriminatory conditions nor do they infringe the principles set out in Articles 8 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights or Articles 16 and 16-1 of the Civil Code, as they are based on a fair balance between the requirements of legal certainty and the inalienability of civil status on the one hand, and the protection of private life and respect for the human body on the other ...\u201d 41.  The third applicant was born in 1952 and lives in Essey-les-Nancy. 42.  He submitted that, although he had been entered in the register of births as male, he had been aware from a very young age of belonging to the female gender. He had lived with a woman from 1975 to 1991 and they had had a child together in 1978. 43.  The third applicant said that he had hidden his true nature for a long time as he had been afraid of being bullied and later of losing custody of his daughter. Once his daughter was grown up he had adapted his appearance and social conduct to match his female gender identity. While most of the documents he used in everyday life reflected his gender identity, this was not the case of his civil-status documents, passport, driving licence, vehicle registration papers or entry in the national identity register. As a result, he was constantly obliged to refer to his transgender identity, to the detriment of his private life. 44.  On 13 June 2007 the third applicant brought proceedings against State Counsel in the Nancy tribunal de grande instance seeking an order for his birth certificate to be corrected by replacing the word \u201cmale\u201d with \u201cfemale\u201d and for his forenames to be replaced by the name \u201cSt\u00e9phanie\u201d.\n(a)  Judgment of 7 November 2008 45.  The Nancy tribunal de grande instance delivered an initial judgment on 7 November 2008. It pointed out that it was \u201cnow unanimously recognised by both domestic and European case-law that transgender persons [had] the right to respect for their private life\u201d and were therefore entitled to have their gender and forenames amended on their civil-status documents. However, the court stressed that a number of conditions had to be met, stating as follows:\n \u201c[T]he gender identity disorder [must] be established not only medically (usually by a multi-disciplinary team of doctors, surgeons, an endocrinologist, a psychologist and a psychiatrist), but also judicially, either by means of an expert assessment (although the court is not required to order one) or on the basis of medical certificates produced by the person concerned establishing with certainty that he or she has undergone medical treatment and surgery in order to achieve gender reassignment.\u201d\nThe court went on to find as follows:\n\u201cPersons wishing to have their gender changed in their civil-status documents must demonstrate that they have undergone medical and surgical treatment for therapeutic purposes and have had previous surgery to remove the external characteristics of their original sex.\nHence, only \u2018genuine\u2019 transgender persons can have the gender markers in their civil-status documents changed, that is to say, persons who have already undergone an irreversible gender reassignment process.\nIn other words, a court may order individuals\u2019 civil-status documents to be amended to reflect their preferred new gender only after they have genuinely altered their sexual anatomy to make it conform as closely as possible to their preferred gender.\nThese medical and surgical conditions are explained by the fact that a genuine gender identity disorder, which is characterised by \u2018a deeply held and unshakeable feeling of belonging to the opposite gender to one\u2019s genetically, anatomically and legally assigned gender, accompanied by an intense and consistent need to change one\u2019s gender and civil status\u2019, must be distinguished from other related but different concepts such as transvestism, which is based solely on reversible outward appearance and does not entail a change of anatomical sex.\nIn the present case, although S. Nicot is female in appearance and has provided documents and invoices issued to him by certain bodies in the name of Ms St\u00e9phanie Nicot, these factors do not enable the court to assess whether he has actually changed gender. At the hearing, when questioned by the President regarding any treatment he may have undergone, S. Nicot took a militant stance \u2013 as he is perfectly entitled to do \u2013 and invoked the confidential nature of his private life ...\u201d 46.  The court therefore stayed the proceedings concerning the third applicant\u2019s requests and ordered him to \u201cproduce in the proceedings any medical documents relating to the medical and surgical treatment undergone and capable of demonstrating that he [had] actually changed gender\u201d.\n(b)  Judgment of 13 March 2009 47.  The third applicant refused to produce any medical documents, taking the view that he had demonstrated sufficiently that he was physically and psychologically female and was integrated socially as a woman. He simply stated that his general practitioner had prescribed hormone treatment for him which meant that he had female secondary sexual characteristics such as breasts. State Counsel concluded that it was not possible to amend his civil status without proof of gender reassignment surgery. 48.  In a judgment of 13 March 2009 the Nancy tribunal de grande instance noted that the third applicant had not produced medical and surgical evidence of gender reassignment, and therefore rejected his request. The judgment reiterated the reasoning of the judgment of 7 November 2008. The court stated as follows:\n\u201c[A change of gender in civil-status documents may be granted only to] \u2018genuine\u2019 transgender persons, that is, to persons who have already undergone irreversible gender reassignment, and not to persons who merely claim to be \u2018transgender\u2019 on the grounds that they are regarded socially as belonging to the gender corresponding to their outward appearance, but who oppose any gender reassignment surgery or refuse to provide medical and surgical evidence of such reassignment having been carried out by means of medical treatment and surgery.\u201d\n The court went on to find as follows:\n\u201cGranting S. Nicot\u2019s request would effectively amount to the creation by the courts of a \u2018third gender\u2019, namely persons of female appearance who nevertheless continue to have a male external sexual anatomy but can marry a man. In the opposite case, a person who is male in appearance would continue to have female genitalia and could thus give birth to a child!!! As the case-law currently stands, such a situation is wholly prohibited.\u201d 49.  In a judgment of 3 January 2011 the Nancy Court of Appeal upheld the judgment of 13 March 2009. It stressed in particular that \u201cthe request for a change in civil status [did] not necessarily require proof of surgical change such as the removal or alteration of the genitalia, or plastic surgery\u201d, but implied that \u201cthe irreversible nature of the gender reassignment process be established in advance\u201d. The court went on to find that the third applicant \u201c[had] not provided such intrinsic proof, which [could] on no account derive from the fact that he [was] regarded by others as female\u201d. It added that respect for private life could not result in the third applicant being exempted from this \u201cobligation to provide proof, which [was] not designed to confuse transgenderism and transsexualism but which, besides the inalienability of civil status, [was] aimed at ensuring the consistency and reliability of civil-status records\u201d. That requirement, which was legitimate and in no way discriminatory, was not in breach of Article 14 of the Convention, and it was not the court\u2019s task to remedy the deficiencies in the evidence adduced by the third applicant. 50.  The third applicant lodged an appeal on points of law against the judgment of 3 January 2011. He argued that the right to respect for private life entailed the right to define one\u2019s gender identity and to have civil-status documents amended to reflect one\u2019s preferred gender, without a prior obligation to undergo an irreversible gender reassignment process and provide proof thereof. In finding that he should have furnished proof of this irreversible process, the Court of Appeal had therefore breached Article 8 of the Convention, especially since neither the principle of the inalienability of civil status nor the need for consistency and reliability of civil-status records made it necessary for individuals to undergo an irreversible process of gender reassignment, and provide proof thereof, in order to have their civil\u2011status documents amended. The third applicant added that it was discriminatory and contrary to Article 14 of the Convention to make individuals\u2019 right to have their civil-status documents amended to reflect their preferred gender conditional upon proof that they had undergone irreversible gender reassignment.\n(b)  Judgment of 13 February 2013 51.  The third applicant\u2019s appeal was examined at the same time as the second applicant\u2019s. 52.  On 13 February 2013 the Court of Cassation (First Civil Division) dismissed the appeal on the following grounds:\n\u201c... In order to substantiate a request for correction of the gender markers on a birth certificate, the person concerned must demonstrate, in view of the widely accepted position within the scientific community, that he or she actually suffers from the gender identity disorder in question and that the change in his or her appearance is irreversible.\nGiven that [the third applicant] has not furnished intrinsic evidence of the irreversible nature of the gender reassignment process in his case, which cannot derive from the sole fact that he is seen by others as female, the dismissal of his claims by the Court of Appeal did not infringe the principles laid down under Articles 8 and 14 of the Convention ..., but rather struck a fair balance between the requirements of legal certainty and the inalienability of civil status on the one hand, and the protection of private life on the other ...\u201d 53.  In November 2009 the High Authority for Health published a report entitled \u201cMedical treatment of gender identity disorders in France \u2013 situation and outlook\u201d. 54.  Among other things, the report advocated a \u201ccare pathway\u201d involving several stages. The first consisted in diagnosing and assessing the \u201cgender identity disorder\u201d; the aim was to \u201cavoid, as far as possible, unwarranted irreversible changes\u201d. The second stage consisted in \u201creal-life experience\u201d, the aim being to study the individual\u2019s capacity to live in the desired role. The person lived full-time in the desired gender role in his or her daily life and social and professional activities, and demonstrated his or her social integration in that role, chose a new forename and informed family members of the intended change. The third stage consisted in hormone substitution, whereby exogenous hormones were administered \u201cin order to eliminate the secondary sexual characteristics of the sex of origin and replace them as fully as possible with those of the opposite sex\u201d. The fourth stage consisted in reassignment surgery. The report specified in that regard that, although most transgender persons wished to have reassignment surgery, it was contraindicated for some patients on medical grounds, while others felt that this step was not necessary in their case and that, for instance, hormone substitution, \u201cperipheral\u201d surgery and speech therapy were sufficient to give them the appearance of belonging to the other gender and allowing them to be recognised as such by society. The report further observed that a reluctance to undergo surgery might also be due to the considerable technical difficulties and the secondary effects linked to the operations.", "references": ["8", "5", "9", "0", "1", "6", "3", "2", "7", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "7.  The applicants were born in 1964, 1935, 1963, 1965 and 1963 respectively. 8.  The status of Churches and religious societies is governed mainly by Articles 137 to 141 (known as the \u201cChurch Articles\u201d \u2013 Kirchenartikel) of the Weimar Constitution of 11 August 1919 (Weimarer Reichsverfassung), as incorporated into the Basic Law by Article 140 of that Law. A couple of Churches and religious societies, including the Catholic Church (about 23.7 million members) and the Protestant Church of Germany (about 22.2 million members), commonly known as the two \u201cbig Churches\u201d (Grosskirchen), have the status of public\u2011law entities. Other religious denominations have legal capacity under civil law. 9.  As regards their financing, churches and religious societies with the status of public-law entities are entitled to levy a church tax, which accounts for a significant portion of their total budget. The churches decide independently whether to levy a tax and what its rate should be. The rate of church tax has been over many years either 8% or 9% of the tax on an individual\u2019s income and, in most German L\u00e4nder, is collected by the State tax authorities on behalf of churches and religious societies, which in return pay 3% to 5% of their tax revenue to the State. 10.  The church tax is guaranteed by Article 140 of the Basic Law read in conjunction with Article 137 \u00a7 6 of the Weimar Constitution (see paragraph 49 below). Only members of a particular religious denomination authorised to levy the tax are obliged to pay it. Any church member who does not want to pay church tax can leave that church by declaration towards the authorities. 11.  If spouses are members of different churches entitled to levy taxes (konfessionsverschiedene Ehe) and if they have opted for a joint income tax assessment (gemeinsame steuerliche Veranlagung), both churches levy the tax on the spouses in the form of an additional levy on the income tax of both spouses. The amount of each spouse\u2019s church tax is calculated on the basis of half of the declared income tax. 12.  In marriages where only one spouse belongs to a church entitled to levy taxes (glaubensverschiedene Ehe), the church entitled to the tax levies it in accordance with that person\u2019s tax assessment. Churches calculate the tax on the basis of the income tax attributable to the spouse liable to pay tax rather than on the basis of that spouse\u2019s share of the total income. According to the Federal Constitutional Court\u2019s settled case-law, if the spouse belonging to a church has no income in terms of the regulations of the Income Tax Code, the church tax cannot be levied (see 56 paragraph below). In that case, in some German L\u00e4nder (inter alia, Baden\u2011W\u00fcrttemberg, Bavaria and Thuringia), the church entitled to levy taxes charges its members a special \u201cchurch fee\u201d (besonderes Kirchgeld). Although called a fee, the levy is, however, treated legally as a tax. The church fee amounts to about one-third of the relevant church tax. 13.  Churches only levy the special church fee if spouses decide on a joint income tax assessment. The special church fee is not levied if spouses make separate tax declarations (getrennte Veranlagung). It is important to note that in case of a joint income tax assessment the spouses benefit from a special calculation method for the income tax (the so-called \u201cincome\u2011splitting\u201d, \u201cSplitting-Verfahren\u201d) and furthermore from the progressive effect (Steuerprogression) of the German tax system, which generally leads to a lower tax burden. 14.  If spouses decide on a joint income tax assessment, they submit a tax declaration (Steuererkl\u00e4rung). In most of the German L\u00e4nder (except of the Land of Bavaria), in their tax calculation procedure (Steuererhebungverfahren) the tax authorities set the special church fee according to the calculation regulations of each church. The basis for calculating the special church fee is the church member\u2019s living expenses (Lebensf\u00fchrungsaufwand), which are calculated on the basis of the spouses\u2019 joint income. The special church fee is only levied on the spouse who is a church member. The remaining tax liability is applied to both spouses. 15.  If a tax authority\u2019s calculation on income tax leads to a tax reimbursement for the spouse not being a member of a church and who is liable to pay income tax, only that spouse will be credited with it. At the same time, the special church fee levied on one spouse can be offset against any tax reimbursement due to the other spouse. If the calculation of the income tax leads to a demand to pay more tax, offsetting cannot take place. 16.  Either spouse can file an objection (Einspruch) against that part of the tax bill which applies to them. If the special church fee has been offset against a tax reimbursement due to the spouse who is not a member of a church that spouse can apply for a settlement notice (Abrechnungsbescheid) in accordance with Article 218 of the Fiscal Code (Abgabenordnung, see paragraph 51 below) and thus have the possibility to be repaid the offset amount. 17.  The facts of the cases, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 18.  The first applicant lives in Heidelberg, in the Land of Baden\u2011W\u00fcrttemberg. He is married. His wife is member of the Protestant Church, which is authorised to levy church taxes. In 2005 the first applicant left his church and was no longer obliged to pay church taxes. 19.  For the tax assessment period of 2008 the spouses opted for a joint tax assessment. 20.  Their 2008 tax bill, dated 22 April 2010, included a special church fee for the first applicant\u2019s wife of 2,220 euros (EUR). As the spouses were jointly liable for income tax and the applicant\u2019s wife\u2019s income was below the minimum taxable amount, the wife\u2019s special church fee was calculated as a proportion of her living expenses, which in turn were calculated on the basis of the spouses\u2019 joint income (see paragraphs 12-14 above). 21.  The tax bill applied to both the first applicant and his wife. Page one showed the authority\u2019s tax calculation (Ergebnis des Steuererhebungsverfahrens) in a table, with one column for income tax (Einkommensteuer), one for solidarity tax (Solidarit\u00e4tszuschlag) and one headed \u201cProtestant Church tax, wife\u201d (Kirchensteuer evangelisch Ehefrau). The third column showed the amount of EUR 2,220. The table further showed that the first applicant had a tax reimbursement claim of EUR 3,423.00, which had been offset against the church fee of EUR 2,220 of his wife. It finished with a credit for the first applicant of EUR 1,203.00. 22.  Pages two to four of the tax bill contained a detailed assessment of the taxable annual income of the first applicant and his wife. The document then had explanations of the items. Line 40, out of 114 lines of explanations altogether, stated as follows:\n\u201cOnly the wife is liable for church tax.\u201d\nFollowing the explanations, the tax bill provided information on possible legal remedies. As regards the special church fee, it stated as follows:\n\u201cAn objection can be raised to the setting of the church tax and to the fixing of advance payment of church tax. ... An objection can be filed by the person on whom the church tax has been levied\u201d (\u201cGegen die Kirchensteuerfestsetzung und die Festsetzung der Kirchensteuervorauszahlung ist der Einspruch gegeben. ... Zur Einlegung des Einspruches ist derjenige befugt, gegen den sich die Kirchensteuerfestsetzung richtet.\u201d). 23.  The first applicant filed an objection against the tax bill. On 17 December 2010 the tax office dismissed the objection, referring to the Federal Constitutional Court\u2019s decision of 28 October 2010, fully endorsing its reasoning (see paragraph 32 below). 24.  The second applicant lives in Sulzbach-Rosenberg in the German Land of Bavaria. 25.  The second applicant is a member of the Protestant Church. In 2005 he had an annual income of EUR 10,144. His wife, who was not member of a church, had income of EUR 162,522. In 2005, the second applicant and his wife were jointly liable for annual income tax. 26.  On 7 February 2007 the competent tax office charged the second applicant a special church fee of EUR 1,500. The fee was calculated on the basis of his living expenses, which in turn were calculated on the basis of his and his wife\u2019s income (see paragraphs 12-14 above). 27.  The second applicant filed an objection to the decision. On 12 December 2007 the tax office dismissed the objection, relying on the Federal Constitutional Court\u2019s case-law that has been settled since 1965 (see paragraphs 56-58 below). 28.  The second applicant lodged an action with the Nuremberg Tax Court, asserting a violation of his basic rights. 29.  On 18 June 2009 the Tax Court dismissed the action. It argued that the special church fee had not violated the second applicant\u2019s right to equality or his right to freedom of religion or freedom of action and relied on the Federal Constitutional Court\u2019s settled case-law. It refused leave to appeal. 30.  On 29 January 2010 the Federal Tax Court dismissed an appeal by the second applicant against the decision refusing him leave to appeal and endorsed the Nuremberg Tax Court\u2019s reasoning. 31.  On 14 April 2010 the second applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court. He argued that he had no income and therefore could not pay the special church fee on his own because it had been calculated on the basis of both spouses\u2019 income. As a consequence, the freedom of religion of both spouses had been violated and spouses in their kind of marriage had been discriminated against when compared with other kinds of marriage. The second applicant argued that he could only remain a member of his religious community if his spouse was willing to pay his special church fee, otherwise he would have to sue her for maintenance. 32.  On 28 October 2010, the Federal Constitutional Court declined to consider the second applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint (file no. 2 BvR 816/10) after joining it, inter alia, with those of the third, fourth and fifth applicants. It considered that the constitutional complaint had not touched on any constitutional questions which needed to be decided as the relevant questions had been settled in a judgment delivered on 14 December 1965 (file no. 1 BvR 606/60, see paragraph 57 below). That judgment was still applicable and there was no doubt that the calculation of a person\u2019s living expenses on the basis of the spouses\u2019 income was in conformity with constitutional law. 33.  The third and fourth applicants are a married couple who live in Gera in the German Land of Thuringia. The third applicant is a member of the Protestant Church and had the higher income of the two. The fourth applicant is not a member of a church. In 2004 the third applicant\u2019s income amounted to EUR 53,511 while the fourth applicant\u2019s income was EUR 11,720. In 2005 the sums were EUR 55,033 and EUR 4,928 respectively, while in 2006 they were EUR 54,996 and EUR 12,640. 34.  On 29 August 2005, 5 February 2006 and 26 June 2008 the competent tax office levied church tax on the third applicant for the years 2004 to 2006. As the applicants had opted for a joint tax assessment, the third applicant\u2019s church tax was calculated with his income tax as a proportion of the income tax attributable to him, rather than in proportion to his share of the spouses\u2019 total income (see paragraph 12 above). 35.  On 23 June 2008 the competent tax office dismissed an objection by the third and fourth applicants against the church tax calculation. 36.  The two applicants lodged an action with the Gera Tax Court, asserting a violation of their basic rights. 37.  On 31 March 2009 the Tax Court dismissed the action, arguing that the calculation had not violated their right to equality or freedom of religion. The court stressed that the German tax authorities had a wide margin of appreciation regarding tax regulations. The fact therefore that the third applicant\u2019s church calculated its church tax on the base of a percentage of his income tax rather than on a percentage of income raised no doubts as to its legitimacy. The tax court refused leave to appeal. 38.  On 8 May 2009 the third and fourth applicants appealed against the decision refusing them leave to appeal, alleging, inter alia, a violation of their freedom of religion. They argued that in spite of the fourth applicant\u2019s decision not to be member of a religious community, the tax authorities had taken her income into account when calculating her husband\u2019s church tax. 39.  On 16 November 2009 the Federal Tax Court declared the applicants\u2019 appeal inadmissible for lack of sufficient reasoning. 40.  On 21 January 2010 the applicants lodged a constitutional complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court, alleging a violation of their right to equality and freedom of religion. 41.  On 28 October 2010, the Federal Constitutional Court declined to consider the third and fourth applicants\u2019 constitutional complaint after joining it, inter alia, with those of the second and fifth applicants (file no. 2 BvR 2715/09, see paragraph 32 above). 42.  The fifth applicant lives in Nuremberg, situated in the German Land of Bavaria. In 2004 and 2005 the fifth applicant, who had no income, was a member of the Protestant Church of the German Land of Bavaria. Her husband was not member of a church. The spouses opted for a joint income tax assessment for 2004 and 2005. 43.  The competent tax authority levied no church tax on the fifth applicant as she had no income, but on 2 February 2007 applied a special church fee of EUR 3,600 for 2005 and on 27 June 2007 it charged her EUR 1,860 for 2004. The amounts were calculated on the basis of the fifth applicant\u2019s living expenses, which were calculated on the basis of her and her husband\u2019s joint income. 44.  The fifth applicant raised an objection against those decisions and applied for a suspension of enforcement. On 23 October 2008 the tax office dismissed her objection, arguing that there had been no violation of the right to equality because there had been an objective and reasonable justification for the difference in treatment. 45.  The fifth applicant lodged an action with the Nuremberg Tax Court, again applying to have enforcement suspended and asserting a violation of her right to equality. 46.  On 15 June 2009 the Tax Court dismissed the request for suspension of enforcement, arguing that the special church fee did not violate the fifth applicant\u2019s right to equality in view of the Federal Constitutional Court\u2019s settled case-law. 47.  On 22 July 2009 the fifth applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court, alleging, inter alia, a violation of her right to freedom of religion. She argued that she could not remain in her religious community if her husband, who was not a church member, did not agree to pay her special church fee. 48.  On 28 October 2010, the Federal Constitutional Court declined to consider the fifth applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint after joining it, inter alia, with those of the second, third and fourth applicants (file no. 2 BvR 1689/09, see paragraph 32 above).", "references": ["1", "5", "2", "7", "8", "3", "0", "6", "4", "9", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1988 and lives in Baku. 6.  The opposition planned to hold demonstrations on 12 and 26 January 2013 in Baku. 7.  No prior notice was given to the relevant authority, the Baku City Executive Authority (\u201cthe BCEA\u201d), by the organisers of the demonstrations. Information about the demonstrations was disseminated through Facebook or the press. 8.  According to the applicant, the demonstrations were intended to be peaceful and were conducted in a peaceful manner. The participants in the demonstration of 12 January 2013 were drawing the public\u2019s attention to the deaths of soldiers in the army. The participants in the demonstration of 26 January 2013 were condemning the use of force by the police against those who had participated in previous demonstrations. 9.  The applicant attended both demonstrations, but shortly after they had begun the police started to disperse the assemblies. In both cases the applicant was arrested during the dispersal operation and was taken to a police station, where he was questioned. 10.  In both cases, on the day of applicant\u2019s arrest an \u201cadministrative-offence report\u201d (inzibati x\u0259ta haqq\u0131nda protokol) was issued in respect of him. The reports stated that the applicant had committed an administrative offence under Article 298.2 (participation in a public assembly that had not been organised in accordance with the law) of the Code of Administrative Offences (\u201cthe CAO\u201d). 11.  According to the applicant, he was never served with copies of the administrative-offence reports or with other documents in his case files. In neither case was he given access to a lawyer after his arrest or while in police custody. 12.  A statement (\u0259riz\u0259) written by the applicant on 12 January 2013 at the police station and submitted to the Court by the Government showed that in the first case, the applicant had declared that he would defend himself in person. 13.  A statement written by the applicant on 26 January 2013 at the police station and submitted to the Court by the Government showed that in the second case the applicant had declared that he did \u201cnot need a lawyer because of his financial [situation]\u201d. 14.  In the first case, after having been held for a few hours in police custody, the applicant was released, subject to an undertaking to reappear at the police station on 14 January 2013. 15.  In the first case, the applicant was brought before the Nasimi District Court on 14 January 2013, the day he reappeared at the police station. In the second case he was brought before the Nasimi District Court on 26 January 2013, the day of his arrest. 16.  According to the applicant, the hearing before the court in both cases was very brief. Members of the public were not allowed to attend, even though the court had not taken a formal decision to close the hearing to the public. 17.  According to the applicant, in both cases he was not given an opportunity to hire a lawyer of his own choice. 18.  A statement signed by the applicant on 14 January 2013 and submitted to the Court by the Government showed that in the first case, the applicant had declared that he did not need legal assistance and would defend himself in person. 19.  At the court hearing in the second case, a State-funded lawyer was appointed to assist the applicant. 20.  The record of the court hearing in the second case shows that in his oral submissions, the State-funded lawyer briefly stated that there had been elements of the administrative offence in the applicant\u2019s actions, and asked the court to adopt a fair decision. 21.  In both cases, the court questioned police officers who had participated in the dispersal operations and police officers who had prepared the administrative-offence reports against the applicant. The police officers testified that the applicant had staged an unauthorised demonstration. 22.  In both cases the first-instance court found that the applicant had participated in an unauthorised demonstration. 23.  In both cases, by decisions of 14 and 26 January 2013 respectively, the first-instance court convicted the applicant under Article 298.2 of the CAO. The court sentenced him to fines of 500 manats (AZN) and AZN 400 respectively. 24.  On unspecified dates the applicant lodged appeals before the Baku Court of Appeal, arguing that his convictions were in violation of his rights because the demonstrations in which he had participated had been peaceful. He also complained that his arrests had been unlawful and that the hearings before the respective first-instance courts had not been fair. 25.  In the first case, the applicant was not represented before the Baku Court of Appeal by a lawyer. At the appellate court hearing in the second case the applicant was represented by the same lawyer who had represented him before the first-instance court. 26.  In both cases, on 25 January and 6 February 2013 respectively, the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld the decision of the first-instance court.", "references": ["9", "4", "2", "8", "5", "0", "1", "6", "No Label", "7", "3"], "gold": ["7", "3"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1971 and lives in Mondsee. 5.  On 3 October 2000 the Vienna public prosecutor\u2019s office (Staatsanwaltschaft \u2013 hereinafter, \u201cthe prosecutor\u2019s office\u201d) requested the Vienna Regional Criminal Court (Landesgericht f\u00fcr Strafsachen \u2013 hereinafter, \u201cthe Regional Court\u201d) to institute criminal proceedings against the applicant. The prosecutor\u2019s office sought to obtain information about the outcome of criminal proceedings against the applicant in the United States, where he had been charged with aggravated fraud in his function as director of the M. investment fund and the M. capital management company. Among the injured parties there were also Austrian banks. The criminal proceedings against the applicant in Austria were suspended in accordance with Article 412 of the Code of Criminal Proceedings (hereinafter, the \u201cCCP\u201d) pending the outcome of the proceedings in the United States. 6.  On 27 November 2000 the applicant was convicted of bond fraud by the New York Southern District Court in the United States. However, he subsequently absconded and did not appear at the court hearing in which his sentence was to be determined. On 1 March 2002 the United States issued an arrest warrant against the applicant. 7.  On 29 May 2002 the Regional Court opened a judicial investigation (Voruntersuchung) against the applicant and issued an arrest warrant. 8.  On 6 July 2007 the applicant was arrested in Austria on the basis of the arrest warrant of 29 May 2002 (see paragraph 7 above) and subsequently placed in pre-trial detention. 9.  On 23 July, 17 August and 24 September 2007 the applicant filed complaints against the continuation of the pre-trial detention. While the first two complaints were withdrawn by the applicant, the third was dismissed by the Vienna Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht) on 5 November 2007. The applicant unsuccessfully requested his release also on 28 January, 8 May and 12 August 2008. The applicant\u2019s complaints against the continuation of his pre-trial detention lodged on 7 February, 27 May and on 27 August 2008 were dismissed by the Vienna Court of Appeal on 27 March, 24 June and 23 September 2008. 10.  On 25 October 2007 the applicant submitted a statement of facts to the authorities, presenting his view of the situation. 11.  On 16 November 2007, 21 April and 15 July 2008 the applicant applied to be granted access to his case-file. On an unspecified date the Regional Court dismissed his requests. 12.  On 27 December 2007 the case file was transferred to the prosecutor\u2019s office for further investigation. 13.  On 10, 29 and 30 January 2008 the applicant filed submissions with the Regional Court. Among other things, he declared that he was willing to give a statement concerning the accusations against him. On 26 March 2008 the Regional Court rejected his requests on formal grounds. 14.  On 14 April 2008 the applicant lodged a complaint relating to his fundamental rights (Grundrechtsbeschwerde) with the Supreme Court (Oberster Gerichtshof), which was dismissed on 19 June 2008. 15.  On 1 May 2008 the applicant lodged an objection because of alleged violations of his rights (Einspruch wegen Rechtsverletzung) and again applied to be granted access to his case-file. On 8 July 2008 the Regional Court dismissed the objection. 16.  On 21 July, 29 August and 1 September 2008 the applicant lodged further objections because of alleged violations of his rights. On 16 October 2008 the Regional Court dismissed all of them. The applicant appealed against this decision. 17.  On 30 December 2008 the Vienna Court of Appeal dismissed the objection of 1 September 2008, but granted the two objections of 21 July and 29 August 2008, holding that the refusal to grant the applicant access to his case file and to provide him with copies thereof constituted a violation of his rights. 18.  On 27 August 2008 the applicant filed another complaint against the continuation of his pre-trial detention. On 23 September 2008 the Vienna Court of Appeal dismissed this complaint. 19.  On 23 September 2008 the prosecutor\u2019s office informed the applicant about the intended appointment of expert S.J. 20.  On 29 September 2008 the applicant objected to this appointment, stating that S.J. would not have the necessary knowledge to deal with the case and could possibly be biased as she was cooperating with the companies involved in the alleged fraud. 21.  On 6 October 2008 the expert S.-J. was nonetheless appointed to provide an opinion relating to the applicant\u2019s businesses. 22.  On 9 October 2008 the applicant lodged another complaint relating to his fundamental rights with the Supreme Court. On 4 November 2008 his complaint was dismissed by the Supreme Court. 23.  On 21 October 2008 he unsuccessfully lodged another request to be released. On 6 April 2009 the applicant again requested his release from pre-trial detention. 24.  On 24 April 2009 the applicant was released from pre-trial detention. He alleged that he had not even once been questioned in relation to the accusations against him during the entire time he spent in pre-trial detention, even though he had tried to contribute to the clarification of the facts by submitting statements as well as requests for the taking of evidence. 25.  On 13 September 2009 the applicant lodged another objection because of an alleged violation of his rights, arguing that the expert S.-J. had close connections with potential victims and was therefore biased. On 19 January 2010 the Regional Court granted this objection. 26.  On 8 September 2010 the applicant filed an application for the discontinuation of the criminal proceedings against him. He argued that he had already been tried and sentenced in the United States for the same offences. Moreover, according to the laws in force at the time and place of the commission of the offences, the latter had become time-barred. On 7 October 2010 the Regional Court dismissed the application. On 14 March 2011 the Vienna Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal, holding that even though it was difficult to clarify the facts of the case after more than ten years, the applicant had significantly contributed to the length of the investigations by having absconded. 27.  On 7 April 2011 a new expert, W.-A., was appointed to provide an opinion. The applicant again objected to the expert and complained about the length of the pre-trial investigations. On 11 May 2011 the Regional Court granted the objection concerning the expert, but dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaint concerning the length of the proceedings, holding that it had been proportionate to the complexity of the case. Further, it held that the main reason for their length was that the applicant had filed a large number of objections and appeals. Hence, the duration of the proceedings was not in violation of Article 6 of the Convention. 28.  On 16 August 2011 the prosecutor\u2019s office informed the applicant that it intended to appoint a new expert, B. The applicant objected, alleging that B. had close relations with investors who could potentially have sustained damages because of his activities. On 25 October 2011 B. was nonetheless appointed by the prosecutor\u2019s office and given a deadline of nine months to provide the opinion. The applicant\u2019s objection was dismissed by the Regional Court on 5 December 2011. On 16 April 2012 the Vienna Court of Appeal rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal as being lodged out of time. 29.  On 14 August 2013 the applicant lodged an objection because of an alleged violation of his rights, repeating his arguments that the expert B. was not impartial. He further argued that B. had significantly exceeded the time-limit for providing his opinion. On 26 December 2013 the Regional Court granted the objection, holding that the prosecutor\u2019s office had not adequately reacted to the exceeding of the time-limit by the expert, who should have been discharged as a consequence. It therefore found that the applicant\u2019s right to have the proceedings conducted within a reasonable time was violated. 30.  On 4 March 2014 the expert B. was discharged and on 5 May 2014 another expert, M., was appointed. 31.  On 9 October 2016 the prosecutor\u2019s office submitted an indictment against the applicant on suspicion of embezzlement and aggravated fraud on a commercial basis. On an unspecified date, the applicant\u2019s appeal against the indictment was rejected by the Vienna Court of Appeal. Therefore, it has become legally binding. 32.  At the date of the latest information available to the Court (15 November 2016), the criminal proceedings against the applicant were still pending at first instance.", "references": ["8", "6", "4", "0", "7", "5", "1", "9", "2", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "6.  On an unspecified date in 1995 the applicants brought an action against the Bucharest Municipal Council and the Local Council of the Sixth District of Bucharest, seeking the recovery of property rights over 1,761 sq. m of land located at no. 37-39, Valea-Lung\u0103 Str., District No. 6, Bucharest. 7.  By a decision of 9 April 1998 the Bucharest County Court allowed the applicants\u2019 action on the merits. The decision was not appealed against by the parties and thus became final. 8.  On 27 January 1999 the office of the Mayor of Bucharest, relying inter alia on Article 322 \u00a7 5 of the Romanian Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter \u201cthe RCCP\u201d \u2013 see paragraph 13 below), brought extraordinary appeal proceedings against the applicants, seeking review (revizuire) of the final judgment of 9 April 1998, and submitting that a new document had appeared concerning the land claimed by the applicants. They referred to a report drafted on 29 December 1998 by the Management Agency for Markets of District No. 6 (Administra\u0163ia Pie\u0163elor sectorul 6 Bucure\u015fti), which stated that the land claimed by the applicants was occupied by a marketplace. 9.  By a decision of 24 September 1999 the Bucharest County Court allowed the action brought by the office of the Mayor of Bucharest on the ground that the document had not been in the file during the first set of proceedings and that it showed that the land claimed by the applicants was occupied by a marketplace. 10.  By a decision of 29 January 2002 the Bucharest Court of Appeal allowed an appeal by the applicants on the ground that the document invoked by the office of the Mayor of Bucharest was a document which did not comply with the requirements set out in Article 322 \u00a7 5 of the RCCP, since it had not existed at the time when the final decision of 9 April 1998 was delivered. Furthermore, the court found that the domestic authorities had failed during the first set of proceedings to raise the issue of the legal situation of the land before the court without an objective reason and could have recovered the investment made on the land claimed by the applicants by bringing separate proceedings against the applicants and seeking recovery of the money. 11.  By a final decision of 14 January 2003 the Supreme Court of Justice allowed the appeal (recurs) lodged by the office of the Mayor of Bucharest on the ground that although the document had not existed during the proceedings which had ended by the final judgment of 9 April 1998, it concerned a pre-existing situation. Furthermore, the court found that the provisions of Article 322 \u00a7 5 of the RCCP had to be interpreted as referring to documents used by one party to prove, in the light of new elements, facts which generally had not been known by the court which had delivered the judgment under review. In the light of the above, the court held that the concept of \u201cdocument\u201d had to be interpreted restrictively. Lastly, it considered irrelevant the fact that the document relied on by the party seeking review had been obtained by means of the undertaking of research into other documents which had existed at the time of the judgment of 9 April 1998 and which attested to the same facts, but had not been brought before the court delivering the judgment in question. 12.  On 12 February 2002 the applicants filed a request pursuant to Law no. 10/2001 on the rules governing immovable property wrongfully seized by the State between 6 March 1945 and 22 December 1989; they requested the restitutio in natura of the plot of land of 1,761 sqm. It appears from the file that in 2010, the request was still pending before the administrative authorities, in so far as further documentation needed to be submitted.", "references": ["6", "8", "1", "5", "9", "7", "0", "4", "2", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1959 and lived in Pama\u017eupiai, Pasvalys Region. 7.  In February 2007 the applicant started working as a welder for the company N. On 17 April 2007 he was working at a factory construction site in the city of Klaip\u0117da. Around 4.20 p.m., while the applicant and two other workers were standing on scaffolding approximately two metres above the ground, the scaffolding broke and all the workers fell to the ground (hereinafter \u201cthe accident\u201d). 8.  According to the applicant, he fell on his back and hit his head on a concrete surface, causing his helmet to break into pieces. One of his co\u2011workers and a metal tool fell on top of him. The applicant lost consciousness. He stated that while he was unconscious, he was moved away from the location of the accident on the orders of his employer and all traces of the accident were removed. At 4.53 p.m. an ambulance was called and the applicant was taken to hospital. It appears that the other workers sustained only minor injuries. 9.  The site of the accident was examined the same day by an inspector from the State Labour Inspectorate. He noted that at the time of the examination the scaffolding was intact and no workers were present at the construction site. The inspector spoke to the construction site manager, V.J.S., who stated that he had not seen the accident because he had been elsewhere on the site. The inspector also spoke to the person in charge of work safety in the company N. who informed him that, on the basis of the initial medical examination, the applicant had not sustained any serious injuries. Accordingly, the inspector decided that the State Labour Inspectorate would not investigate the circumstances of the accident. 10.  On 31 May 2007 another inspector from the State Labour Inspectorate looked into how the accident had happened and concluded that the applicant had fallen from the scaffolding because of his own recklessness. The applicant submitted a complaint against that conclusion and on 15 July 2007 the Inspectorate adopted a new conclusion, holding that the accident had been caused by \u201cthe inappropriate organisation of dangerous work\u201d (netinkamas pavojingo darbo organizavimas), in particular because the scaffolding had not complied with the applicable work safety requirements. 11.  On 10 September 2007 the applicant asked the Klaip\u0117da city prosecutor\u2019s office (hereinafter \u201cthe prosecutor\u201d) to open a pre-trial investigation into the accident. The investigation was opened on the same day and conducted by an investigator from Klaip\u0117da police (hereinafter \u201cthe investigator\u201d). 12.  On 9 October 2007 the investigator instructed a court medical expert to examine the applicant\u2019s medical file in order to determine the number, severity and causes of his injuries. The report on the results of that examination, delivered on 18 October 2007, showed that the applicant had sustained a large cut on his head, face and right ear, as well as multiple fractures of his facial bones, and a contusion on the chest. The injuries had been caused by blunt objects and flat surfaces, and could have occurred when falling from a height. The report noted that the injury on the head had bled, so there should have been traces of blood at the site of the accident. It concluded that the injuries to the applicant\u2019s head and face amounted to a minor health impairment (nesunkus sveikatos sutrikdymas) while the injury to his chest amounted to a negligible health impairment (ne\u017eymus sveikatos sutrikdymas). However, it also noted that the injury to the face would leave a big scar, possibly resulting in disfigurement and impairment of facial expression. 13.  On 13 November 2007 the applicant was interviewed as a witness in the investigation. He stated that just before the accident he and five other workers had been carrying a metal platform to attach to a reservoir tank. The applicant and two other workers had been holding the upper part of the platform while standing on the scaffolding and three others had been on the ground, holding the platform\u2019s bottom part. The weight of the platform was about 200 kg. Suddenly, the scaffolding had collapsed and all three workers had fallen to the ground. At that point the applicant had lost consciousness. When he had come to, he had realised that he was not lying near the scaffolding, where he must have fallen, but in a different place. He had not seen any debris from the scaffolding around him, or any other traces of the accident.\nOn the same day the applicant was granted the status of a victim in the investigation. 14.  On the same day the investigator instructed a court medical expert to examine the applicant\u2019s scars caused by the accident. The report on the results of that examination, delivered on 15 November 2007, found that the facial injury had left a large, rough scar, causing a minor disfigurement and impairment of facial expression. It also found that the scar and the resulting deformation could only be removed by plastic surgery, so the injury was considered as irreparable. As a result, the report concluded that the applicant\u2019s injury was legally classified as serious health impairment (sunkus sveikatos sutrikdymas). 15.  In November and December 2007 the investigator interviewed several of the applicant\u2019s co-workers and other people who had worked near the factory construction site. It appears that the co-workers stated that no platform had been carried on the day of the accident. None of those interviewed had seen how the applicant had fallen from the scaffolding. From January to June 2008 more witnesses were interviewed and the investigator requested various documents from the applicant\u2019s employer and from several State institutions which had assessed the applicant\u2019s health and ability to work after the accident. 16.  On 13 August 2008 the applicant was interviewed again. He stated that before the accident he had sometimes felt dizzy and had a feeling of numbness in his legs, but he had been declared fit to work after a medical examination. 17.  On 6 October 2008 the prosecutor discontinued the pre-trial investigation. He relied on the State Labour Inspectorate report that no damage to the scaffolding on the day of the accident had been observed (see paragraph 9 above), and noted that none of the witnesses had corroborated the applicant\u2019s description of how he had fallen. The prosecutor observed that the applicant may have fallen from the scaffolding owing to his own recklessness (d\u0117l savo paties neatsargumo), possibly because of the numbness in his legs. Accordingly, the prosecutor decided that the scaffolding had complied with safety requirements, and that there were no grounds to find that the applicant\u2019s employer had violated any laws. 18.  The applicant appealed against the prosecutor\u2019s decision. He also asked for the appointment of a different prosecutor to supervise the case and to carry out a forensic examination in order to determine the causes of the accident. On 27 October 2008 a senior prosecutor dismissed his appeal, noting that around fifty witnesses had been questioned, but nobody had corroborated the applicant\u2019s claims. However, on 5 December 2008 the Klaip\u0117da District Court overruled the prosecutor\u2019s decision and reopened the pre-trial investigation. The court noted that the prosecutor had not addressed the State Labour Inspectorate\u2019s conclusion of 15 July 2007 (see paragraph 10 above), and that other witnesses had only stated that they had not seen how the applicant had fallen from the scaffolding but had not disputed his account. The court also considered that the prosecutor\u2019s conclusion that the applicant had fallen because of his own recklessness or a medical condition had been \u201cspeculative and not based on any objective facts\u201d. However, the court rejected the applicant\u2019s request to appoint a different prosecutor as unfounded and did not examine his request to carry out a forensic examination, noting that the choice of investigative measures was the prerogative of investigators and prosecutors. 19.  In January and February 2009 the investigator examined the site of the accident and interviewed more witnesses. 20.  On 2 April 2009 the prosecutor instructed the investigator to carry out several additional investigative measures. Among other things, the investigator was requested to identify whether on the day of the accident or earlier the applicant and other workers had been ordered by their employer to attach the metal platform to the reservoir tank. 21.  In April and May 2009 the investigator carried out additional interviews with several witnesses and requested further information from the applicant\u2019s employer and from the medical institutions which had examined him. 22.  On 12 May 2009, in response to a prior complaint by the applicant, the deputy chief prosecutor of the Klaip\u0117da city prosecutor\u2019s office informed him that there were no grounds to find that the pre-trial investigation in his case had been unduly protracted. 23.  On 21 May 2009 the applicant\u2019s co-worker V.K. submitted a written statement to the State Labour Inspectorate that on the day of the accident he and other workers had been ordered by their supervisor V.J.S. to attach the metal platform to the reservoir tank. V.K. also submitted that the scaffolding had been made of very thin wood and could have broken at any time. He further alleged that immediately after the accident the director of the company N. had told other workers to repair the scaffolding. V.K. also asserted that he had previously given different testimony because of pressure from his employer. 24.  On 8 June 2009, in response to a complaint by the applicant about the length of the investigation, the chief prosecutor of the Klaip\u0117da city prosecutor\u2019s office noted that \u201cthe investigation had not always been of sufficient intensity\u201d (tyrimo intensyvumas ne visada buvo pakankamas) and that the prosecutor had been instructed to set a deadline for completing the investigation. The chief prosecutor also informed the applicant that it was still necessary to interview several witnesses living in various parts of the country and to carry out further investigative measures. 25.  On 17 June 2009 the State Labour Inspectorate adopted a new conclusion on the circumstances of the accident, holding that the scaffolding had not complied with applicable safety requirements and that the applicant had not been given appropriate instructions for working at height. Accordingly, the Inspectorate concluded that the applicant\u2019s employer had breached the legal requirements concerning safety at work. 26.  On 3 July 2009 the prosecutor discontinued the pre-trial investigation. He observed that the applicant and other workers had been using the scaffolding for several days before the accident and there had not been any accidents during that time, so there were no grounds to find that the scaffolding had been unsafe. The prosecutor also concluded that the workers had not been ordered by their employer to attach the metal platform to the reservoir tank because the construction manager, V.J.S., had not been at work on the day of the accident. Accordingly, the employer could not be held responsible for the workers\u2019 decision to carry the platform on the scaffolding. The prosecutor further observed that, in any event, the applicant had had the right to refuse to carry out tasks which were unsafe or for which he was unqualified, but he had not exercised that right. The prosecutor therefore concluded that the accident had been caused by the recklessness of the workers and not by the actions or omissions of the employer. 27.  The applicant appealed against the prosecutor\u2019s decision but on 24 July 2009 a senior prosecutor dismissed his appeal. However, on 13 October 2009 the Klaip\u0117da District Court overruled the prosecutor\u2019s decision and reopened the pre-trial investigation. The court observed that the absence of previous accidents on the scaffolding could not be interpreted as evidence that the scaffolding was safe. It also held that the applicant\u2019s right to refuse to carry out tasks in unsafe conditions did not excuse the employer from a duty to ensure that unsafe conditions did not exist at the workplace. The court further noted that attaching the platform to the reservoir tank had clearly been part of the construction work, so the employer had a duty to properly supervise the workers and to instruct them how to carry out that task safely \u2013 and by failing to do so, the applicant\u2019s employer had acted contrary to the law. 28.  The prosecutor appealed against that judgment, but on 28 October 2009 the Klaip\u0117da Regional Court dismissed the appeal. In its judgment the court noted that although more than two years had passed since the accident, the prosecutor had still not determined the precise way in which the accident had happened, and that without doing that it was not possible to determine who had been responsible for it. The court also considered it unlikely that the workers would have decided to attach the platform without receiving an order from their supervisor or at least informing him, so it was necessary to examine whether the construction manager V.J.S. had been present at the construction site at any time that day. Lastly, the court drew attention to the fact that \u201csome witnesses\u201d had admitted to giving false testimony under pressure from the employer and so it was necessary to investigate those claims further. 29.  In November and December 2009 the investigator arranged several formal confrontations between witnesses, interviewed additional witnesses, and requested further information from the applicant\u2019s employer and the hospital where the applicant had been examined. 30.  On 17 December 2009, following a complaint by the applicant, the deputy chief prosecutor of the Klaip\u0117da region prosecutor\u2019s office sent a note to the Klaip\u0117da city prosecutor\u2019s office, observing that the pre-trial investigation had been going on for more than two years, and requesting that it promptly carry out any necessary further investigative measures in order to make a well-founded final decision. 31.  On 7 January 2010, after an application by the prosecutor, the Klaip\u0117da District Court ordered a forensic examination of the precise way in which the accident had happened and its causes. The forensic expert examined the case file and delivered a report on 17 February 2010. The report noted that there was insufficient information in the case file concerning the technical characteristics of the metal platform and the scaffolding, so the way the accident had happened could be established only in part. On the basis of the available material, the report found that the weight of the platform had exceeded the weight limit of the scaffolding and had thus caused it to collapse. Accordingly, it concluded that the scaffolding had not been suitable for the work for which it was used, and that the workers had not been adequately informed about how to carry out their work safely. The report found that the employer had thereby breached the applicable work safety requirements. 32.  In March 2010 the investigator interviewed additional witnesses and arranged formal confrontations. 33.  On 19 May 2010 the prosecutor again discontinued the pre-trial investigation. He held that witness testimony and other evidence showed that the applicant\u2019s supervisor V.J.S. had not been present at the construction site on the day of the accident and that he had not ordered the workers to attach the platform. As a result, the prosecutor concluded that V.J.S. had not had any duty to ensure the safety of that operation. He further concluded that the accident had been caused by the workers\u2019 reckless decision to carry the platform, which had exceeded the weight limit of the scaffolding. The prosecutor noted that although the scaffolding had not fully complied with the applicable safety requirements, that had not been the main cause of the accident and thus the applicant\u2019s employer could be held liable only for an administrative offence of failure to comply with work safety requirements (see paragraph 58 below), but not for a criminal offence.\nThe prosecutor also observed that a separate pre-trial investigation should be opened in order to examine the claims of some witnesses that they had been pressured by their employer to give false testimony. However, from the material available to the Court it appears that no such investigation was opened. 34.  The applicant appealed against the prosecutor\u2019s decision, but on 7 June 2010 a senior prosecutor dismissed his appeal. However, on 9 August 2010 the Klaip\u0117da District Court overruled the prosecutor\u2019s decision and reopened the pre-trial investigation. The court underlined that attaching the platform to the reservoir tank had been an inherent part of the construction work carried out by the applicant and other workers, so it could not be considered that they had decided to do that of their own free will. It referred to the expert report of 17 February 2010, noting that that report had given grounds to believe that the applicant\u2019s employer had failed to ensure safe working conditions. The court further noted that V.J.S. had not been officially authorised to leave his workplace on the day of the accident, and thus he had failed to ensure the safety of the workers under his supervision. 35.  On 15 October 2010 V.J.S. was officially notified that he, being a person authorised by an employer to supervise construction work, was suspected of violating safety requirements at work, which had resulted in an accident, as set out in Article 176 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code. 36.  In October and November 2010 the investigator interviewed V.J.S. and several witnesses. 37.  On an unspecified date the applicant complained to the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office that the pre-trial investigation had been protracted, in particular because it had been discontinued and reopened several times. On 26 November 2010 the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office dismissed his complaint and stated that the repeated discontinuation of the investigation did not give grounds to find that any requirements of the Code of Criminal Procedure had been violated. 38.  In January and February 2011 the investigator carried out additional interviews with several witnesses and requested further information from the applicant\u2019s employer. 39.  On 14 February 2011 the applicant was informed that the pre-trial investigation had been completed. V.J.S. submitted a request to continue the investigation and carry out additional investigative measures but that request was dismissed. 40.  On 1 April 2011 the prosecutor issued an indictment against V.J.S. under Article 176 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code and on 5 April 2011 the case was transferred to the Klaip\u0117da District Court for examination on the merits. On 28 April 2011 the chairperson of that court noted that the case was complex and large-scale, and allowed an additional thirty days to prepare for its examination. 41.  The Klaip\u0117da District Court held the first hearing on 30 June 2011 and decided to adjourn the case until 27 September 2011 because several witnesses were not present. 42.  The next hearing was held on 27 September 2011 but several witnesses were absent again and the Klaip\u0117da District Court fined them for failing to appear. The court also decided to adjourn the case until 24 November 2011 in order to ensure the participation of all the necessary witnesses and, as requested by the applicant, to obtain the technical details about the metal platform. 43.  It appears that subsequently the case was adjourned again and a new hearing was scheduled for 14 December 2011. 44.  On 13 December 2011 V.J.S. submitted a medical certificate to the court indicating that he would be sick from 12 to 16 December 2011, and asked for a further adjournment. 45.  The Klaip\u0117da District Court held a hearing on 14 December 2011 but because of the absence of the accused it was decided to adjourn and to schedule a new hearing for 5 January 2012. 46.  At the hearing of 5 January 2012 V.J.S.\u2019s lawyer informed the Klaip\u0117da District Court that his client was still sick and had a medical certificate that was valid for another seven days. The court scheduled new hearings for 17, 19 and 24 January 2012. 47.  On 16 January 2012 the applicant submitted a civil claim against V.J.S., asking for non-pecuniary damages of 300,000 Lithuanian litai (LTL \u2013 approximately 86,886 euros (EUR)). 48.  On 17 January 2012 V.J.S.\u2019s lawyer asked the court to adjourn the case again because his client had been admitted to hospital. Later, V.J.S. submitted a medical certificate indicating that he would be sick from 16 to 23 January 2012, which also showed that he would undergo rehabilitation treatment from 23 January to 6 February 2012. 49.  The Klaip\u0117da District Court held a hearing on 24 January 2012 and decided to adjourn until 14 February 2012. Subsequently, owing to the continued illness of the accused, the case was adjourned until 17 February 2012, then again until 1 March 2012 and 16 March 2012. 50.  On 19 March 2012 the applicant asked the Klaip\u0117da District Court to continue its examination of the case in the absence of the accused, complaining that the latter was deliberately avoiding appearing before the court. The Klaip\u0117da District Court dismissed that application, informing the applicant that V.J.S. had submitted the required medical certificates to prove his illness and that domestic law did not allow for the examination of a criminal case in the absence of the accused. The court also noted that examination of the case had not been unduly protracted because the hearings had been scheduled with as little time between them as possible. 51.  Subsequently, owing to the accused\u2019s continued illness, the court further adjourned the case to 11 April 2012, 24 April 2012, and then to 8 May 2012. 52.  On 7 May 2012 the applicant asked the court to adjourn the hearing because he had to be admitted to hospital for surgery. 53.  The Klaip\u0117da District Court held a hearing on 8 May 2012 from which the applicant was absent. During the hearing the prosecutor asked the court to terminate the case against V.J.S. as time-barred. The court adopted a decision on 14 May 2012 and terminated the case. It noted that V.J.S. had been charged with a crime of negligence, and in such cases the statute of limitations, applicable at the time of the accident, was five years (see paragraph 59 below). The court also observed that the domestic law provisions on the statute of limitations, applicable at the time of the accident, were \u201cunconditional\u201d (bes\u0105lygi\u0161kos nuostatos) and did not provide for the possibility to suspend the limitation period. The domestic law was subsequently amended to allow such a decision (see paragraph 60 below), but the new legal framework could not be applied retroactively to the detriment of the accused.\nThe court did not examine the applicant\u2019s civil claim and noted that he had the right to institute separate civil proceedings for damages. 54.  On 4 June 2012 the applicant complained to the Klaip\u0117da Regional Court that the examination of the case before the district court had been so protracted that it had become time-barred, and asked the regional court to identify the reasons for that protraction. The court considered that complaint as an appeal by the applicant against the Klaip\u0117da District Court\u2019s judgment of 14 May 2012 but refused to admit it because the applicant had not signed it or properly outlined the reasons for the appeal. The applicant did not submit another appeal against the judgment of 14 May 2012. 55.  On an unspecified date V.J.S. appealed against the Klaip\u0117da District Court\u2019s judgment of 14 May 2012 and asked the court to examine the case on the merits and to acquit him, but on 13 June 2012 his appeal was dismissed. 56.  On 22 November 2012 the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office, in response to a complaint by the applicant, informed him that it had analysed the work of the prosecutors involved in the case and had not detected any \u201csubstantial violations\u201d (esminiai pa\u017eeidimai) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.", "references": ["4", "3", "9", "2", "6", "8", "7", "5", "0", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1978 and lives in Moscow. 6.  Prior to its privatisation, the flat at 103-29 Dmitrovskoye Shosse, Moscow, had been owned by the City of Moscow. N. and her son B. had resided there as tenants since 1968 under the social housing agreement with the City. N. died in 1993 and B. died in 1994. 7.  On 11 June 2002 the municipal authority supervising real-property transactions in Moscow (\u201cMoszhilservice\u201d) authorised an exchange of flats between N., whose name had not been removed from the tenant register, and K. 8.  On 21 June 2002 Moszhilservice issued all the documents necessary for K. to move into N.\u2019s flat. 9.  On 16 October 2002 the Moscow Housing Department transferred the title to the flat to K. under the privatisation scheme. On 11 November 2002 the Moscow City Committee for Registration of Real Estate Transactions (\u201cthe Registration Committee\u201d) registered K.\u2019s title to the flat. 10.  On 18 November 2002 K. sold the flat to the applicant. On 19 November 2002 the Registration Committee registered the applicant\u2019s title to the flat. The applicant moved into the flat with his family. 11.  On 14 August 2003 the police opened a criminal investigation into the fraudulent acquisition of the flat by K. and other persons. On 14 February 2004 the investigation was suspended as the whereabouts of the alleged perpetrators had not been established. 12.  On 4 August 2014 K. died. The criminal investigation against him was closed. 13.  According to the Government, the investigation was reopened in respect of the other suspects. The proceedings are still pending. 14.  On an unspecified date the prosecutor brought a civil claim on behalf of the Moscow Department of Housing Policy and the Housing Fund (\u201cthe Housing Department\u201d), seeking annulment of all the transactions on the flat, the applicant\u2019s eviction and the restitution of the flat to the City of Moscow. The applicant lodged a counter-claim for damages against the City of Moscow. He claimed that the fraudulent transactions in respect of the flat had resulted from the authorities\u2019 failure to duly verify the documents submitted by K. for exchange and privatisation of the flat. 15.  According to the applicant, his counter-claim for damages was dismissed by the court as premature. 16.  On 17 April 2006 the Timiryazevskiy District Court of Moscow granted the prosecutor\u2019s claims. The court established that N. had died in 1993 and B. had died in 1994; that after their death they had continued to be registered as tenants residing in the flat; that the flat allegedly exchanged by K. had never existed; that all the documents submitted by K. for the exchange of flats had been forged and that all the data indicated therein, including the name of the street and the names of the registrar and the notary, had been false. The court invalidated the exchange of flats between N. and K. It further considered that K. had defrauded the City of Moscow by submitting falsified documents for the exchange and privatisation of the flat, which should be construed as execution of the relevant transaction in the absence of intent to do so on the party of the City of Moscow. The court reinstated the City\u2019s title to the flat and ordered the applicant\u2019s eviction. 17.  On 24 October 2006 the Moscow City Court upheld the judgment on appeal. The court confirmed that the lower court had correctly applied legal provisions which allowed the lawful owner of the property to recover it from a bona fide purchaser. 18.  On an unspecified date the applicant reintroduced his claim against the City of Moscow for damages. 19.  On 12 May 2008 the Presnenskiy District Court dismissed the claim. The court discerned no causal link between the applicant\u2019s loss of title to the flat and the respondent\u2019s actions. 20.  On 18 September 2008 the Moscow City Court upheld the judgment on appeal. 21.  On 5 February 2007 the bailiff instituted enforcement proceedings in respect of the judgment of 17 April 2006. 22.  On 1 June 2007 the Timiryazevskiy District Court of Moscow suspended for six months the enforcement of the part of the judgment concerning the applicant\u2019s eviction. The applicant continued to reside in the flat. 23.  On 5 March 2012 the Registration Committee registered the City\u2019s title to the flat. 24.  It appears that the bailiffs service lost the writ of enforcement and on 30 March 2012 the Housing Department applied for a duplicate. 25.  On 29 May 2012 the District Court issued a duplicate of the writ of enforcement. 26.  On 22 June 2012 the City Court upheld the decision of 29 May 2012 on appeal. 27.  On 31 August 2012 the bailiff opened enforcement proceedings in respect of the judgment of 17 April 2006. 28.  On 4 December 2012 the Timiryazevskiy District Court of Moscow ordered the applicant to pay a fine of 500 Russian roubles for his failure to comply with the writ of enforcement in due time. 29.  On 28 December 2013 the applicant rented another flat for the period from January to March 2014. 30.  On 28 March 2014 the District Court suspended the eviction proceedings for one year and the applicant moved back into the flat. 31.  On 11 February 2014 the enforcement proceedings were discontinued as the Housing Department had withdrawn the writ of enforcement. 32.  According to the Government, on 12 February 2014 the Housing Department entered into a one-year social tenancy agreement with the applicant in respect of the flat, pending the resolution of his housing problem. On 25 August 2014 the Housing Department entered into a permanent social tenancy agreement with the applicant. 33.  On 10 October 2014 the Housing Department transferred ownership of the flat to the applicant under the privatisation scheme.", "references": ["7", "3", "4", "1", "2", "8", "5", "6", "0", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1969 and lives in Orenburg. 6.  In June and July 2006 the investigation division of the Leninskiy district police department of Orenburg instituted criminal proceedings into robberies committed by an organised group. 7.  On 30 August 2006 the applicant was arrested by the Department for Combating Organised Crime of Orenburg regional police (\u201cthe UBOP\u201d) on suspicion of having committed the robberies. 8.  On 31 August 2006 he was questioned as an accused in the presence of his lawyer and denied being involved in the crimes. 9.  On 1 September 2006 the Leninskiy District Court of Orenburg extended the term of the applicant\u2019s arrest, and on 4 September 2006 ordered that he be detained on remand and placed in pre-trial detention facility IZ-65/1 (\u201cthe SIZO\u201d). 10.  At an unspecified time on 18 September 2006 the applicant was taken from the SIZO to the UBOP building without his lawyer being present. There are no records of any investigative actions having been carried out that day with his participation. 11.  According to the applicant, once he arrived at the UBOP offices five or six police officers, including L. and G., beat him in order to force him to confess to the robberies and subjected him to ill-treatment as follows. They shackled his hands and legs and tied his arms with a belt. They pushed him to the ground and almost suffocated him by putting a plastic bag and a gas mask over his head that cut off his air. They later took him to the basement of the building, which was equipped as a gym. They hung him on the parallel bars and hit him on the kidneys and extremities with a baseball bat. The applicant fainted several times so they burned him with cigarettes to make him come around. 12.  At 9 p.m. the applicant was taken back to the SIZO. A routine examination by the medical assistant on duty, in the presence of a duty officer, revealed the following injuries: (i) a haematoma measuring 1 cm by 1 cm on the left frontal bone of the skull; (ii) hyperaemia (redness) measuring 1.5 by 3 cm on the right side of the forehead; (iii) a red and blue haematoma measuring 2 cm by 3 cm on the right shin; (iv) hyperaemia measuring 1 cm by 1 cm on both buttocks; and (v) hyperaemia measuring 2.5 by 4 cm on the right side of the lumbar region (medical report no. 249 of 18 September 2006, \u0430\u043a\u0442 \u043c\u0435\u0434\u0438\u0446\u0438\u043d\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0433\u043e \u043e\u0441\u0432\u0438\u0434\u0435\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u044f). 13.  According to the additional medical records on the applicant from the SIZO for the period from 19 to 23 September 2006, he complained of headache, nausea, dizziness, vomiting and pain on the left side of his body when breathing. He had twitching eyelids and hand tremors. He was diagnosed with neurocirculatory dystonia of a hypertensive type and received treatment. 14.  On 20 September 2006 the applicant went for questioning and his lawyer, Ms S., noticed that he had injuries on his forehead which he had not had before, that he looked unwell and had difficulty moving. The next day she asked for a forensic medical examination. 15.  On 23 September 2006, K., an investigator at the investigation division of the Orenburg regional police department in charge of the applicant\u2019s criminal case, ordered a forensic medical expert opinion on the applicant on the basis of medical records after considering the lawyer\u2019s request, the report on the examination of the applicant at the SIZO on 18 September 2006, and a report by Officer L. of the UBOP which stated that the applicant had caused the injuries to himself. K. wanted to know whether the applicant had any injuries and, if so, when and how they had been inflicted, whether they could have been inflicted as a result of a fall or as a result of harming himself, as described by Officer L., and whether the injuries were compatible with him being detained and participating in investigative actions in his case. 16.  According to L.\u2019s report, the applicant had been brought to the UBOP on 18 September 2006 as part of actions taken under the investigation, and had been taken to L.\u2019s office for an interview. The applicant had jumped up from his chair and \u201chit his forehead and face on the corner of the chair with some force while shouting that he had to be taken back to the SIZO; he became hysterical, fell on the wooden floor, which had a linoleum covering, and started rolling around on the floor, hitting himself against wooden chairs and tables\u201d. 17.  On 25 September 2006 the Promyshlennyy district prosecutor\u2019s office received a communication from the SIZO concerning the applicant\u2019s injuries. According to the applicant\u2019s statements to the prosecutor\u2019s office, the UBOP officers had subjected him to ill\u2011treatment on 18 September 2006 in order to force him to confess to the crimes. He remembered the name of one of them, L. On 27 September 2006 the applicant lodged a formal complaint with the district prosecutor\u2019s office, requesting the prosecution of the police officers. 18.  On 6 October 2006, following a pre-investigation inquiry, S., an investigator at the Promyshlennyy district prosecutor\u2019s office of Orenburg, found that the applicant\u2019s allegations had not been confirmed. Relying on Article 24 \u00a7 1 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, he refused to institute criminal proceedings on the grounds that no crime had been committed. The investigator relied on L.\u2019s denial of ill-treating the applicant. 19.  On the same day the Promyshlennyy district deputy prosecutor annulled the investigator\u2019s decision as unlawful and ordered an additional inquiry. 20.  On 25 October 2006 two forensic medical experts found after examining the applicant\u2019s medical records that he had haematomas on the left frontal bone and right shin, which had been caused either by hard, blunt objects, or as a result of hitting such objects, one to three days before his examination on 18 September 2006. They could have been caused by the applicant simply falling down or as a result of self-inflicted injuries, as described in L.\u2019s report. The hyperaemia on the forehead, buttocks and lumbar region was not considered as an injury and its gravity could not be assessed because it was an immediate and reversible reaction to some \u201cirritant effect\u201d, including \u201cmechanical impact\u201d. 21.  On 27 October 2006 S. again refused to open a criminal case, citing the same grounds. In addition to L.\u2019s evidence, the investigator relied on similar statements by Officer G., who had also been present at the time the applicant had allegedly injured himself, and on the forensic medical experts\u2019 report of 25 October 2006. 22.  The applicant appealed against the decision of 27 October 2006, arguing, inter alia, that the inquiry had not been thorough and that the State\u2019s responsibility had been engaged under Article 3 of the Convention because he had received injuries during his detention that had been confirmed by medical evidence. The applicant referred to the Court\u2019s case\u2011law, stating that the burden of proof in such a situation was on the State and that it had to provide evidence which could cast doubt on the applicant\u2019s allegations. The applicant argued that relying on the police officers\u2019 statements was clearly insufficient. 23.  On 19 September 2007 a judge at the Promyshlennyy District Court of Orenburg dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaint. The court held that the inquiry had been thorough and comprehensive, it had not found any facts to confirm the applicant\u2019s ill\u2011treatment, the medical experts\u2019 conclusions had been consistent with the police officers\u2019 statements and the refusal to institute criminal proceedings had been lawful and well-founded. On 25 October 2007 the Orenburg Regional Court dismissed an appeal by the applicant and fully endorsed the District Court\u2019s findings. 24.  On 6 March 2008 the Orenburg Regional Court convicted the applicant on several counts of robbery and sentenced him to twelve years and four months\u2019 imprisonment. It stated that the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment were unfounded, relying on the findings of the pre\u2011investigation inquiry and the statements by L. and the other police officers and investigators denying any wrongdoing on their part. 25.  On 24 November 2008 a deputy head of the investigation department of the Orenburg town prosecutor\u2019s office dismissed an appeal by the applicant against the investigator\u2019s decision of 27 October 2006, considering that the inquiry had been thorough and objective.", "references": ["8", "0", "9", "3", "2", "6", "7", "4", "5", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1939 and lives in Vienna. He is a former lawyer who was admitted to the bar in 1969. 5.  On 26 January 1999 the applicant renounced his right to practise as a lawyer because he had, as a result of his gambling addiction, committed criminal offences. On 28 June 1999 the applicant was convicted of aggravated fraud and embezzlement and sentenced to seven and a half years\u2019 imprisonment. 6.  On 4 November 1999 the applicant applied to the Committee of the Vienna Bar Association (Ausschuss der Rechtsanwaltskammer; hereinafter, \u201cthe Committee\u201d) for an invalidity pension. He argued that due to his gambling addiction \u2013 a recognised mental illness \u2013 he was no longer capable of practising as a lawyer. 7.  On 7 March 2001 the applicant requested the Committee to inform him why it had still not decided on his application, despite his repeated requests. On 22 June 2001 the applicant was interviewed by a medical expert, who submitted his report on 20 July 2001. 8.  On 5 February 2002 the competent division of the Committee (hereinafter, \u201cthe Committee\u2019s division\u201d) partly rejected as being lodged out of time and partly dismissed on the merits the applicant\u2019s application for an invalidity pension. 9.  On 8 March 2002 the applicant filed an objection (Vorstellung) against that decision.  On 30 April 2002 the Plenary of the Committee (hereinafter, \u201cthe Plenary\u201d) dismissed the objection. 10.  On 17 June 2002 the applicant complained to the Administrative Court about the Plenary\u2019s decision. On 20 October 2005 the Administrative Court quashed the Plenary\u2019s decision as unlawful. 11.  On 14 June 2007, under Article 132 of the Federal Constitution (Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz), the applicant complained to the Administrative Court about the Plenary\u2019s failure to decide (S\u00e4umnisbeschwerde). The applicant claimed that he had submitted a privately commissioned expert report on 30 March 2006 and requested a decision, but that the Plenary still had not taken any procedural steps. 12.  On 4 July 2007 the Administrative Court requested the Plenary, within three months, either to issue a decision or explain why it had not yet done so. On 13 October 2007 an expert appointed by the Plenary submitted a report. On 16 October 2007 the Administrative Court, at the Plenary\u2019s request, extended the time-limit for a decision until 20 January 2008. 13.  On 18 January 2008 the applicant requested the Administrative Court to decide on the merits, claiming that the Plenary still had not issued a decision. In addition, it had appointed another expert only at the end of the extended time-limit. Subsequently, the Administrative Court was informed by the head of the Bar Association that the expert opinion had arrived but that it required supplementation, and that a decision would be issued within one month. On 25 January 2008 the expert submitted his report and on 11 February 2008 he submitted a supplementary report. 14.  On 8 April 2008 the Committee\u2019s division dismissed the applicant\u2019s application for an invalidity pension. Consequently, on 26 June 2008 the Administrative Court closed the proceedings regarding the applicant\u2019s complaint of 14 June 2007 about the Plenary\u2019s failure to decide (see paragraph 11 above), and awarded costs to the applicant. 15.  On 21 April 2008 the applicant filed an objection against the Committee\u2019s division\u2019s decision of 8 April 2008. On 15 July 2008 the Plenary granted the objection and referred the case back to the Committee\u2019s division. 16.  On 20 October 2008 the applicant complained to the Administrative Court about the Plenary\u2019s decision.  On 17 December 2009 the Administrative Court quashed the Plenary\u2019s decision, holding that the Committee\u2019s division had not been competent to issue its decision of 8 April 2008 (see paragraph 14 above), as the case had been pending before the Plenary after the Administrative Court had quashed the latter\u2019s decision of 30 April 2002 (see paragraph 10 above). Therefore, the Plenary should have quashed the Committee\u2019s division\u2019s decision of 8 April 2008 and decided on the merits itself. 17.  On 15 July 2010, under Article 132 of the Federal Constitution, the applicant complained to the Administrative Court about the Plenary\u2019s failure to decide. Two days earlier, on 13 July 2010, in a decision received by the applicant on 20 July 2010, the Plenary quashed the Committee\u2019s division\u2019s decision of 8 April 2008 (see paragraph 14 above) and dismissed the applicant\u2019s objection against the Committee\u2019s division\u2019s decision of 5 February 2002 (see paragraph 9 above), confirming that the applicant was not entitled to an invalidity pension. Consequently, on 22 February 2012 the Administrative Court closed the proceedings regarding the applicant\u2019s complaint of 15 July 2010 about the Plenary\u2019s failure to decide, and awarded costs to the applicant. 18.  On 24 August 2010 the applicant complained to the Administrative Court about the Plenary\u2019s decision of 13 July 2010. On 22 February 2012 the Administrative Court dismissed the complaint as unfounded. 19.  That decision was served on the applicant on 5 March 2012.", "references": ["1", "6", "0", "9", "7", "8", "5", "4", "2", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1990 and lives in Budapest. 7.  On 22 March 2013 the police started investigating a case of armed home invasion in Budapest committed by three men wearing balaclavas. The crime was initially considered to constitute aggravated armed robbery committed by unknown perpetrators. 8.  Close to the crime scene, the police spotted and halted a car for checking. After a short chase, they apprehended the driver, K.I., but the other passenger fled. 9.  In the car and in K.I.\u2019s clothing, the police found and seized some of the valuables taken in the robbery as well as the applicant\u2019s identity card and mobile telephone. 10.  On the same day the police searched the applicant\u2019s house but did not find anything relating to the robbery. 11.  In his testimony K.I., a man with numerous past convictions, said that the person who had been with him in the car and run away was not the applicant. None of the police officers involved could positively identify the fugitive. 12.  On 25 March 2013 the police issued a warrant for the applicant\u2019s arrest. 13.  The applicant turned himself in on 3 April 2013, after learning of the arrest warrant. He was arrested on suspicion of armed robbery. 14.  A public defender appointed for him failed to attend his questioning held on the same day. The applicant denied any involvement in the robbery and contested the accusations. A related complaint by him was dismissed by the Budapest Chief Public Prosecutor\u2019s Office, who found that the reasonable suspicion against him was supported by the police report, the seized items and witness statements. 15.  On 6 April 2013 the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention was ordered on charges of armed robbery under Article 129 \u00a7 2 (a) to (d) of the Code of Criminal Procedure by the Pest Central District Court. Referring to police reports, an on-site examination, witness testimonies, decisions on seizure and examinations of various exhibits, the court agreed with the prosecution concerning the reasonable suspicion. It held that pre-trial detention was necessary because the applicant had fled from the police and then turned himself in, but only to avoid criminal liability. Indeed, there was a considerable risk of his absconding. Furthermore, there was evidence that he had tried to influence witnesses to procure an alibi, since the witnesses he had suggested had given false statements about his whereabouts during the robbery. Considering that there was another criminal investigation ongoing against the applicant on a charge of abduction of vehicle and the fact that he had no regular income or employment, there was also a risk of his reoffending. However, the authorities had not disclosed any evidence supporting the applicant\u2019s actual involvement in the robbery. 16.  The public defender failed to attend the hearing. 17.  On 15 April 2013 the Budapest High Court dismissed an appeal brought by the applicant, without hearing him in person. It reiterated the reasoning of the first-instance court. 18.  Subsequently, the prosecution applied to have the applicant\u2019s detention extended. The application was served on the applicant on 3 May 2013; and on the same day the court extended his detention until 6 August 2013. Consequently, he did not have any opportunity to make any comments on the application. The court maintained its previous reasons justifying the need for his detention and emphasised that the investigation regarding a third suspect was still ongoing, so that if released the applicant might jeopardise the procedure. The court took into account that an arrest warrant had had to be issued for the applicant, who was otherwise unemployed, had no apparent source of income and who was also the subject of another criminal investigation. The court held that there was a risk of his absconding (owing to the severity of the possible punishment), reoffending (owing to his unsettled personal circumstances) and interfering with the investigation (if he were to collude with the third suspect). The court added that there was indication that the applicant had tried to secure an alibi while on the run from the police. 19.  On 5 June 2013 the Budapest High Court dismissed an appeal brought by the applicant, agreeing with the first-instance decision. 20.  On 23 July 2013 a lawyer appointed by the applicant applied for his release, arguing that the authorities had not disclosed any evidence that might serve as the basis for the court\u2019s order. He challenged the existence of any reasonable suspicion, emphasising that the applicant had voluntarily gone to the police and submitting documents showing that the applicant\u2019s mother was willing to pay for his living expenses. 21.  On 30 July 2013 the prosecution applied to extend the applicant\u2019s detention. The application was served on the applicant\u2019s lawyer on 31 July 2013, the day before the court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 6 October 2013. The court simultaneously refused the application for release, without hearing the applicant in person. It considered that the reason for which he had surrendered to the police was only to escape punishment. The court considered that his mother\u2019s undertakings would not eliminate the risk of his absconding or reoffending. It reiterated that the extension was justified because the applicant had previously fled from the police and might influence witnesses, given his previous attempt to secure an alibi. It also referred to the impending severe punishment and the risk of his reoffending. 22.  On 15 August 2013 the Budapest High Court dismissed an appeal brought by the applicant, without hearing him in person. 23.  On 3 October 2013 the Buda Central District Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 6 January 2014 under Article 129 \u00a7 2 (b) to (d) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Referring to police reports, the on-site examination, witness testimony and various exhibits, the court found it established that, contrary to the applicant\u2019s argument, there was a reasonable suspicion that he had committed the crime. As regards the specific grounds of his pre-trial detention, the court no longer referred to the fact that he had fled, since he had then voluntarily appeared before the police. It did however repeat the other reasons. To show that there was a risk of his reoffending, the court noted that prior to the opening of the investigations, the applicant had only been employed for a short period of five months, that he had not been living with his parents but probably with some friends, that on 3 May 2013 he had already been sentenced for the offence of larceny, and that currently he was under investigation in yet another criminal case on a charge of abduction of vehicle. The court held that the applicant had not managed to demonstrate to its satisfaction that his personal circumstances were stable. As regards collusion, the court reiterated that the third suspect\u2019s identity had not been established and that some of the stolen goods were still missing. 24.  Both the applicant and his lawyer were present at the hearing. 25.  On 11 October 2013 the Budapest High Court upheld this decision. It also stated that less restrictive measures such as house detention or house arrest were not applicable in the applicant\u2019s case, since they would not eliminate the risk of his colluding, reoffending and absconding. 26.  On 3 January 2014 the Buda Central District Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 6 April 2014 under Article 129 \u00a7 2 (b) to (d) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. As regards the applicant\u2019s argument that he had not been provided with evidence of a reasonable suspicion against him, the court held that suspects could inspect documents if it was not contrary to the interests of the investigation. As regards the specific grounds of his pre-trial detention, the court repeated its previous reasons. It held that given the risk of his absconding, no less restrictive measure would suffice in his case. 27.  Both the applicant and his lawyer were present at the hearing. 28.  On 9 January 2014 the Budapest High Court upheld this decision. 29.  On 30 January 2014, relying on, inter alia, Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, the applicant applied for disclosure of the evidence serving as the basis for his pre-trial detention. The Budapest Chief Public Prosecutor\u2019s Office dismissed his application, pointing out that the investigation was still pending. 30.  On 26 March 2014 the applicant applied for release. In his application he complained that he had still not been provided with any evidence justifying his pre-trial detention. The expert opinions obtained by the authorities and forwarded to him did not contain anything supporting his involvement in the crime. He also attached documents proving that his mother, who was willing to pay for his living expenses, had a sufficient income. 31.  On 3 April 2014 the Budapest High Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s application for release and extended his detention until 6 June 2014. While referring to the Court\u2019s case-law, the court maintained that the detention was still necessary because of the risk of his reoffending (Article 129 \u00a7 2 (d) of the Code of Criminal Procedure). It considered that the applicant\u2019s absconding for two weeks and failed attempt to secure a false alibi, which both occurred at the beginning of the proceedings, could not be held against him when assessing the future risks if he was released. It also noted that the investigation was almost at an end and, in view of the nature of the investigatory steps yet to be carried out, it found it implausible that the applicant could interfere with its outcome. The High Court therefore held that neither the risk of the applicant\u2019s absconding nor his interfering with the investigation was real. However, noting the other pending case conducted against the applicant and his failed attempt to have secured a false alibi and, moreover, considering the \u201cprofessional\u201d nature of the crime and his unsettled personal circumstances, the court held that the most severe coercive measure should continue to be applied on account of the risk of his reoffending. 32.  On 18 April 2014 the Budapest Court of Appeal upheld the decision to extend his detention on the basis that there was a risk of his reoffending, absconding and jeopardising the investigation by influencing witnesses (Article 129 \u00a7 2 (b) to (d) of the Code of Criminal Procedure). The court held that the impending severe punishment in itself showed that there was a risk of his absconding. Furthermore, the fact that his attempt to influence witnesses dated back to a year before did not remove the risk of collusion, especially since the third alleged perpetrator was still at large and remained unidentified. 33.  On 29 May 2014 the applicant applied for release again, pointing out that there was no evidence that might support his involvement in the robbery. He argued that because the investigation had already been terminated, the risk of his jeopardising it was obsolete. He also argued that the impending severe punishment could not, in itself, justify his detention. He submitted a statement saying that a company intended to employ him after release. 34.  On 5 June 2014 the Budapest High Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 6 August 2014 under Article 129 \u00a7 2 (d) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (risk of reoffending), pointing out the \u201cprofessional\u201d manner in which the crime had been committed. It found that the other grounds of detention were not established in the case. 35.  The applicant and his lawyer were present at the hearing. The applicant\u2019s lawyer pointed out again that neither him, nor the applicant had access to the investigation file and thus could not have knowledge of the evidence substantiating the reasonable suspicion of him having committed a crime. He argued that access to such evidence was more relevant in the investigation phase than following the submission of the bill of indictment. 36.  The applicant appealed, emphasising that the \u201cprofessional\u201d manner had not even been mentioned in the public prosecutor\u2019s request to have his detention extended. 37.  On 19 June 2014 the Budapest Court of Appeal upheld the lower court\u2019s decision under Article 129 \u00a7 2 (b) to (d) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (risk of absconding, jeopardising the investigation and reoffending). 38.  On 8 July 2014 the Budapest Chief Public Prosecutor\u2019s Office preferred a bill of indictment, as the investigation had been terminated. 39.  On 21 July 2014 the Budapest High Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until the date of the first-instance court\u2019s judgment, under Article 129 \u00a7 2 (b) and (d) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (risk of absconding and reoffending). Without hearing from the applicant, the court pointed out that the severity of a potential punishment was not in itself sufficient to establish a risk of a person absconding; however, the applicant\u2019s personal circumstances, such as him being unreachable even to his family members, showed that such a risk existed. Furthermore, the professional manner in which the crime had been committed, in particular its organised nature and the number of people involved, supported the conclusion that there was a risk of his reoffending. Since the investigations had been closed, the court did not find a risk of collusion established. 40.  On 1 August 2014 the applicant appealed, arguing that none of the evidence made available to him supported the claim that he was the person who had escaped police arrest, and none of the involved police officers could identify him. He also argued that, in respect of the other criminal investigation against him, no actual prosecution had taken place, so those proceedings could not be taken into account when evaluating the risk of his reoffending. 41.  On 10 September 2014 the Budapest Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal, adding that a risk of collusion had also been established in his case. 42.  On 13 November 2014 a third suspect was apprehended. 43.  On 15 January 2015, six months after the indictment, the Budapest High Court reviewed the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention under Article 132 \u00a7 1 (a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and extended it until the delivery of the first-instance judgment. Giving the same reasons as previously, the court again stated that there was a reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the offences with which he had been charged, a risk that he might abscond and obstruct the proceedings (Article 129 \u00a7 2 (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure) and a risk that he would reoffend (Article 129 \u00a7 2 (d)). The court added that two additional suspects were likely to be indicted and, given the applicant\u2019s previous attempt to influence a witness, the risk of collusion (Article 129 \u00a7 2 (c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure) was also there. 44.  The public prosecutor\u2019s application was served on the applicant some days after the detention decision had already been taken. 45.  The first-instance decision was upheld by the Budapest Court of Appeal on 17 February 2015. 46.  On 20 April 2015 the third suspect and yet another person were also indicted by the Budapest Chief Public Prosecutor\u2019s Office. 47.  On 29 July 2015 the Budapest Appeal Court carried out the yearly review of the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention. Giving the same grounds as previously, the court extended the measure until the delivery of the first-instance judgment. 48.  Meanwhile, the case against the applicant and K.I. was brought to trial. The first hearing before the trial court took place on 19 September 2014. The Budapest High Court held further hearings on 13 November 2014, 15 January, 7 April, 19 June, 15 September, 7 October, 3 November, 1 and 21 December 2015, 9 February and 23 March 2016. Apparently from the indictment of 20 April 2015 onwards, the trial involved the other two suspects as well. 49.  On 23 March 2016 the Budapest High Court gave judgment, whose reasoning consisted of 63 pages. It concerned the applicant, K.I. and the two other suspects. The applicant was convicted of robbery and illegally entering a private property and sentenced to nine years\u2019 imprisonment. On the same day the High Court extended his custody until the closure of the second-instance proceedings. This decision was upheld by the Budapest Court of Appeal on 14 June 2016. 50.  The second-instance trial is still pending.", "references": ["6", "1", "4", "7", "9", "5", "3", "8", "0", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1978 and lives in Norway. 7.  Mr Elmar Huseynov, the applicant\u2019s husband, was a prominent independent journalist in Azerbaijan. At the time of the events he worked as the editor-in-chief of the weekly magazine Monitor, which was strongly critical of the Government as well as the opposition. He had also been the owner of the magazine since 1996 and wrote analytical and investigative articles for each edition under his own name. 8.  Various civil and criminal proceedings had been brought against Mr Huseynov since the beginning of his journalistic activity for the publication of critical articles about the President of Azerbaijan and members of his family, and about members of the parliament, Government and other State officials. In total, thirty-four proceedings were instituted against him by various public officials. Moreover, copies of the magazine had been confiscated on several occasions and the domestic authorities sometimes prevented its publication. 9.  According to the applicant, her husband regularly received threats because of his critical articles. In particular, in January 2004 a police officer had threatened him with death and told him to stop writing about the President and his family. 10.  At around 9 p.m. on 2 March 2005, Mr Huseynov was shot dead on the third floor of his apartment building as he returned home from work. 11.  Mr Huseynov\u2019s murder received wide local and international media coverage and was unanimously condemned by various politicians, international organisations, and local and international NGOs. 12.  On 2 March 2005 criminal proceedings were instituted under Articles 120.2.4 (murder) and 228.1 (illegal possession of weapons) of the Criminal Code by the Serious Crimes Department (\u201cthe SCD\u201d) of the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office. 13.  On the same day a record relating to the inspection of the scene of the crime and the examination of the body (hadis\u0259 yerin\u0259 v\u0259 meyit\u0259 bax\u0131\u015f ke\u00e7irilm\u0259si haqq\u0131nda protokol) was drawn up. It appears from the record that one bullet and seven cartridges were found at the crime scene and that two bullets were removed from the body. 14.  On 3 March 2005 the investigator in charge of the case ordered a post-mortem examination of the body, which was carried out on the same day. Report no. 27 dated 10 March 2005 showed that death had resulted from bleeding caused by gunshot wounds. The expert also found that death was likely to have occurred a few minutes after the injuries had been sustained. 15.  On 3 March 2005 a pistol with a silencer and a knitted hat were found near the crime scene. On the same day the investigator ordered forensic medical, ballistic and chemical trace examinations of the pistol and silencer, the bullets, the cartridges, the victim\u2019s hair and nails, and the clothes that he had been wearing on 2 March 2005. Report no. 2074/2108/2109, dated 7 March 2005, concluded that the pistol in question was a Baikal pistol that had been produced in 2003 in Russia and that it had been used in the murder. 16.  Still on 3 March 2005 the investigator asked a telecommunications company to provide details on any mobile telephones that had been used near the scene of the crime between 8.30 p.m. and 9 p.m. on 2 March 2005. 17.  On 4 March 2003 the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (\u201cthe MIA\u201d) and the Ministry of National Security (\u201cthe MNS\u201d) issued a joint statement officially informing the public of the institution of criminal proceedings in connection with the murder of the applicant\u2019s husband. 18.  On 5 March 2005 the crime scene was again inspected by the investigator. 19.  On the same day the investigator questioned the applicant as a witness in connection with her husband\u2019s murder. She stated that she had not seen the killer, but that from February 2005 a person, who had introduced himself as Vusal, had come to their flat on several occasions and asked for a meeting with her husband. He had always arrived when her husband had been absent and had asked various questions about his whereabouts and working hours. The applicant further stated that she could not say who had murdered her husband, but she was sure that he had been murdered because of his journalistic activity. 20.  On 7 March 2005 a photofit picture of the person who had introduced himself as Vusal was compiled on the basis of the applicant\u2019s statements. 21.  On 8 March 2005 the investigator arranged an identity parade in the presence of the applicant. However, she could not identify the man who had called himself Vusal among the people who took part in the identity parade. 22.  On 19 March 2005 the applicant was granted victim status. 23.  Further to various requests sent in March 2005 to the Russian authorities concerning the pistol found at the crime scene, the Russian authorities confirmed that the pistol in question had been produced in Russia as a gas pistol and had then been exported to Bulgaria on the basis of a contract with a Bulgarian company. It further appears from a letter, dated 23 March 2005 and signed by the Bulgarian Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs, that there was no record on the buyer of the pistol after its import to Bulgaria because Bulgarian legislation did not provide for such records for the buying and selling of gas pistols. 24.  In the meantime, the prosecuting authorities identified two mobile telephone numbers which had allegedly been used by the perpetrators of the murder. On 26 March 2005 T.B., an Azerbaijani national, was charged under Article 320.1 of the Criminal Code (use of false documents) as he had purchased the mobile telephone numbers in a mobile telephone shop in Baku by giving false information about his identity. During questioning, T.B. stated that on 27 February 2005 he had bought the numbers at the request of T.X. and T.A., who had asked him to obtain a telephone number registered in someone else\u2019s name. He further stated that he knew the men from Georgia where he was born and they had told him that they were in Baku on business. It appears from the documents in the case file that in July 2005 the Nizami District Court found T.B. guilty under Article 320.1 of the Criminal Code and sentenced him to two years\u2019 imprisonment. 25.  On 6 April 2005 the Prosecutor General reclassified the criminal case under Articles 277 (acts of terror) and 228.1 (illegal possession of weapons) of the Criminal Code and decided to hand the investigation over to the MNS. 26.  On 3 May 2005 the investigator in the case showed the applicant four photographs in order to try to identify the person who had introduced himself as Vusal. The applicant identified the individual in photograph no. 2 as that person. 27.  On the same day the investigator charged T.X., a Georgian national, under the aforementioned Articles 277 and 228.1 and issued a warrant for his arrest. It appears from the investigator\u2019s decision that T.X. was suspected of being involved in the murder and had been identified as the person calling himself Vusal. 28.  On 4 May 2005 the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office, the MIA and the MNS issued a joint statement that T.X. had been identified as the person involved in the murder. The statement also noted that T.X. had left the country immediately after the murder and that an arrest warrant had been issued. It also indicated that T.X. had been identified by the applicant as the person who had introduced himself as Vusal before the murder. Lastly, the statement pointed out that the investigation was being carried out in collaboration with the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the United States of America (\u201cthe FBI\u201d) and Turkey\u2019s Central Security Department. 29.  It appears from the case file that on 5 May 2005 the investigator questioned T.X.\u2019s sister and son, who resided in Azerbaijan. 30.  In the meantime, on 4 May 2005 the investigator ordered a new ballistic and chemical examination of the pistol and silencer found at the scene of the crime. The investigator noted that although the examination of 7 March 2005 had concluded that the pistol was a Baikal firearm produced in 2003 in Russia, the material collected during the investigation had revealed that the pistol had not been produced as a regular firearm but as a gas pistol that had subsequently been modified. On 27 May 2005 a panel composed of three experts issued report no. 4351/4352/4358 on the new ballistic and chemical examination of the pistol and the silencer. The experts reiterated the findings of the 7 March 2005 report (see paragraph 15 above), concluding that the pistol had been produced as a firearm and had not been modified. 31.  On 11 May 2005 the investigator questioned the applicant about a suspicious person that she had seen in their building in February 2005. 32.  On 20 May 2005 the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office, the MIA and the MNS issued a new statement, informing the public that T.A., a Georgian national, had been identified as another suspect. The statement said that a warrant for his arrest had been issued. 33.  It appears from a letter dated 27 May 2005, signed by the head of the Azerbaijani National Central Bureau of Interpol, that notices relating to T.X. and T.A. had gone out via Interpol. 34.  The case file shows that in March and May 2005 the investigating authorities submitted hair samples to the FBI for a trace evidence examination. They were taken from the hat found near the scene of the crime and from pillowcases found in the flat that T.X. and T.A. had rented in Baku. The results of the examination revealed that some fibres found on the hat and pillowcases had the same microscopic characteristics and optical properties, consistent with them having come from the same source. 35.  On 31 May 2005 the applicant wrote to the MNS asking for information concerning the progress of the investigation. In particular, she noted that although she had been recognised as a victim, the investigating authorities had failed to share any information on the investigation with her. 36.  It can be seen in a document dated 8 June 2005, signed by the investigator, that he informed the applicant by telephone about the investigation. In particular, he informed her that various investigative actions had been conducted, that T.X. and T.A. had been identified as the perpetrators of the murder, that an international warrant for their arrest had been issued and that some forensic examinations had been carried out by the FBI. 37.  On 2 June and 12 July 2005 the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office and the MNS issued joint statements on the forensic examinations carried out in the United States of America. They stated that the results of the examinations had confirmed that T.X. and T.A. were directly involved in the murder. 38.  In the meantime, on 16 and 30 May 2005 the Azerbaijani authorities asked the Georgian authorities to extradite T.X. and T.A. 39.  By a letter of 1 July 2005, signed by the Deputy Prosecutor General of the Republic of Georgia, the Georgian authorities refused to extradite T.X. and T.A. on the grounds that as they were Georgian nationals they could not be extradited to a foreign country. However, relying on the CIS Convention on Legal Assistance and Legal relations in Civil, Family and Criminal Matters of 22 January 1993 and the Treaty between Azerbaijan and Georgia on Legal Assistance and Legal relations in Civil, Family and Criminal Matters of 8 March 1996 (see paragraphs 66-70 below), the Deputy Prosecutor General stated in the same letter that the Georgian authorities undertook to institute criminal proceedings against its two nationals at the request of the Azerbaijani authorities in case of the transfer of the criminal case to the Georgian authorities. 40.  By two separate letters, dated 20 July 2005, the Prosecutor General of Azerbaijan again asked his Georgian counterpart for the arrest and extradition of T.X. and T.A. The Prosecutor General also asked the Georgian authorities to provide legal assistance to the Azerbaijani authorities by allowing two Azerbaijani investigators to conduct investigative actions on Georgian soil. 41.  In July and August 2005 the Georgian authorities conducted various investigative actions at the request of their Azerbaijani counterparts. In particular, on 26 July 2005 two flats in Tbilisi were searched and various people were questioned in connection with the criminal proceedings instituted in Azerbaijan. 42.  On 9 August 2005 the investigator showed various photographs to the applicant for identification. Although the applicant stated that she had seen two of the people on the photographs somewhere before, she could not remember more details about them. 43.  On 15 August and 6 September 2005 the investigator questioned the applicant about her neighbours and the clothes worn by the man who called himself Vusal. 44.  On 20 November 2005 the applicant again wrote to the MNS, asking for an effective investigation into the murder of her husband. She further asked the investigating authorities to provide her with information about the progress of the investigation. 45.  On 30 November and 20 December 2005 the investigator ordered further ballistic and trace evidence examinations, in particular asking the experts to compare the pistol found at the scene of the crime with another pistol found in a different murder case. The experts\u2019 reports, dated 15 December 2005 and 19 January 2006, concluded that the pistol found at the scene of the murder of the applicant\u2019s husband had not been used in the commission of the other murder. 46.  According to the applicant, she was threatened after her husband\u2019s murder because she said that the domestic authorities had been involved. On an unspecified date in 2006 the applicant left Azerbaijan for Norway, where she was granted asylum. 47.  On 4 May 2006 the investigator questioned a cousin of T.X. who resided in Azerbaijan. 48.  On 14 November 2006 the investigator again questioned the sister of T.X. who resided in Azerbaijan. 49.  On 30 November 2006 the investigator carried out a reconstruction of the murder. In particular, the investigator retraced the path the applicant\u2019s husband had taken from his workplace to where he had been murdered. 50.  In September and October 2005, in February, September and November 2006 and in July 2007 the Georgian authorities conducted various investigative actions at the request of their Azerbaijani counterparts. In particular, by a letter of 3 October 2006 the Office of the Prosecutor General of Georgia informed the Azerbaijani authorities that the Georgian prosecuting authorities had questioned T.A., who had used his right to remain silent. In that connection, it appears from the record of the questioning, which took place on 11 September 2006, that T.A. invoked his right to remain silent, stated that he did not consider himself guilty and that he had no confidence in the investigation conducted by the Azerbaijani authorities. The Georgian prosecuting authorities also informed their Azerbaijani counterparts by the same letter that they could not conduct any investigative actions in respect of T.X. as it had not been possible to establish his whereabouts. 51.  By a letter of 11 February 2008 the applicant\u2019s Azerbaijani lawyer asked the MNS to provide the applicant with information about the progress of the investigation. In particular, the lawyer pointed out that although three years had elapsed since the institution of criminal proceedings, the applicant had still not been informed about the progress of the investigation or the decisions that had been taken. He further asked the investigating authorities to allow the applicant to familiarise herself with the criminal case file and to provide her with copies of the relevant documents. 52.  By a letter of 12 March 2008, signed by the head of the investigation department of the MNS, the MNS informed the lawyer that the applicant had been informed orally about the progress of the investigation. It was further stated that in accordance with Articles 87 and 102 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 61 below) the applicant had the right to familiarise herself with the case file and obtain copies of documents only when the preliminary investigation was over. The letter also said that the Azerbaijani authorities had asked the Georgian authorities to extradite the murderers and were continuing to take the necessary steps to achieve that goal. Lastly, it was noted that members of the investigative group had been sent to Georgia several times and that the investigation was ongoing. 53.  On 13 May 2008 the investigator questioned T.B. (see paragraph 24 above) about the whereabouts of T.X. and T.A. It appears from the record of the questioning that T.B. stated that he had not seen them since his release from detention on 19 March 2007 and that he had no information about their whereabouts. 54.  By a letter dated 14 June 2008 the National Central Bureau of Interpol informed the head of the investigation department of the MNS that T.X. and T.A. were not registered as being in Russia. 55.  On 4 July 2008 the applicant\u2019s Norwegian lawyer and the Norwegian Helsinki Committee wrote to the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office and the MNS asking for the documents relating to the criminal investigation of the murder of the applicant\u2019s husband. 56.  By a letter of 18 July 2008 the MNS informed the applicant\u2019s Norwegian lawyer that as he was not a member of the Azerbaijani Bar Association and had failed to submit a notarised power of attorney, he could not obtain copies of the documents. Relying on Articles 87 and 102 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the letter also stated that a victim or his or her representative could only have access to a case file and the relevant documents following the termination of the preliminary investigation. The letter also informed the applicant\u2019s lawyer that the criminal investigation was still ongoing. 57.  On 30 January 2009 the applicant herself wrote to the MNS, reiterating her previous requests. In particular, she asked the investigating authorities to provide her with the documents relating to the investigation, to inform her of the progress of the investigation and of the date when the investigation would end. 58.  By a letter dated 17 March 2009 the MNS informed the applicant that her request for access to the case file had been examined. However, in accordance with Articles 87 and 102 of the Code of Criminal Procedure a victim or her representative could only have access to the case file and the relevant documents after the termination of the preliminary investigation. The letter, which was twelve pages long, contained a detailed summary of the investigative steps conducted from the institution of criminal proceedings until March 2009. It stated that the investigation had identified T.X. and T.A. as the perpetrators of the murder and that any information received relating to the possible involvement of various people in the crime had been examined. In that connection, the letter referred to allegations submitted to the investigating authority in August 2006 and August 2007 by people arrested in connection with other criminal cases, as well as information revealed by various journalists and NGO activists in November 2006 and March 2009 about the identity of T.X. and T.A. However, the investigation had not substantiated any of those allegations. The letter also stated that the preliminary investigation was still ongoing and had been extended until 2 September 2009. 59.  By a letter of 17 March 2009 the National Central Bureau of Interpol in Azerbaijan informed the head of the investigation department of the MNS that T.A. was living in Tbilisi in Georgia. However, his extradition had been refused by the Georgian authorities on the grounds that he was a Georgian national. The information was based on a letter dated 6 March 2009 from the Georgian National Central Bureau of Interpol to the Azerbaijani National Central Bureau of Interpol. 60.  At the time of the most recent communication with the parties on 3 February 2016, when the last observations were filed by the Government, the criminal proceedings were still ongoing.", "references": ["8", "3", "6", "1", "9", "4", "2", "5", "7", "No Label", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicants\u2019 years of birth and places of residence are listed in the Appendix. 5.  The circumstances of the case are similar to those in Gahramanli and Others v. Azerbaijan (no. 36503/11, \u00a7\u00a7 6-32, 8 October 2015). 6.  The applicants were independent or opposition candidates in the parliamentary elections of 7 November 2010 (see Appendix). All the applicants lost the elections in their respective constituencies. 7.  After election day, the applicants lodged complaints with the Central Electoral Commission (\u201cthe CEC\u201d) concerning a number of irregularities in their respective constituencies that had allegedly taken place during and/or before election day. Some of them also lodged identical complaints with the respective Constituency Electoral Commissions (\u201cthe ConEC\u201d). They complained about various types of irregularities, including, inter alia, interference by public officials, illegal campaigning, obstruction and intimidation of election observers, ballot-box stuffing, repeated voting by the same individuals, irregularities in applying election ink, incorrect vote\u2011counting procedures, inconsistencies in precinct election results records indicating a falsely inflated voter turnout, and so on. In support of their allegations, the applicants submitted various types of evidence documenting specific instances of the irregularities complained of, including statements made by election observers, video recordings and photographs. 8.  The applicants who lodged a complaint with the relevant ConEC did not receive any reply from those bodies (except in applications nos. 37554/11 and 39042/11). All of the applicants\u2019 complaints were examined by the CEC, which, on various dates (see Appendix), issued decisions rejecting the applicants\u2019 claims, providing reasoning similar to that in the CEC decision in Gahramanli and Others (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 21-26). 9.  The applicants lodged further complaints with the Baku Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, which, on various dates (see Appendix), dismissed the applicants\u2019 appeals providing reasoning similar to that in their respective decisions in Gahramanli and Others (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 27-32). 10.  In the meantime, before the Supreme Court delivered its final decision on each complaint, on 29 November 2010 the Constitutional Court had confirmed the countrywide election results, including the election results in the applicants\u2019 constituencies, as final (ibid., \u00a7 30).", "references": ["5", "2", "6", "8", "4", "3", "9", "7", "1", "0", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicants\u2019 years of birth and places of residence are listed in the Appendix. 5.  The circumstances of the case are similar to those in Gahramanli and Others v. Azerbaijan (no. 36503/11, \u00a7\u00a7 6-32, 8 October 2015). 6.  The applicants were independent self-nominated or opposition candidates in the parliamentary elections of 7 November 2010 (see Appendix). All the applicants lost the elections in their respective constituencies. 7.  After election day, the applicants lodged complaints with the Central Electoral Commission (\u201cthe CEC\u201d) concerning a number of irregularities in their respective constituencies that had allegedly taken place during and/or before election day. Some of them also lodged identical complaints with the respective Constituency Electoral Commissions (\u201cthe ConECs\u201d). They complained about various types of irregularities, including interference by public officials, illegal campaigning, obstruction and intimidation of election observers, ballot-box stuffing, repeated voting by the same individuals, irregularities in applying election ink, incorrect vote-counting procedures, inconsistencies in precinct election results records indicating a falsely inflated voter turnout, and so on. In support of their allegations, the applicants submitted various types of evidence documenting specific instances of the irregularities complained of, including statements made by election observers, video recordings and photographs. 8.  The applicants who lodged a complaint with the respective ConECs did not receive any reply from them (except in applications nos. 36821/11, 37656/11, 37740/11, 41066/11 and 42360/11). All of the applicants\u2019 complaints were examined by the CEC which, on various dates (see Appendix), issued decisions rejecting the applicants\u2019 claims, providing reasoning similar to that in the CEC decision in Gahramanli and Others (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 21-26). 9.  The applicants lodged further complaints with the Baku Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court which, on various dates (see Appendix), dismissed the applicants\u2019 appeals, providing reasoning similar to that in their respective decisions in Gahramanli and Others (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 27\u201132). 10.  In the meantime, however \u2012 and before the Supreme Court delivered its final decision concerning each complaint (except in application no. 42345/11) \u2012 on 29 November 2010 the Constitutional Court confirmed the countrywide election results, including the election results in the applicants\u2019 constituencies, as final (ibid., \u00a7 30). 11.  At the material time Mr Intigam Aliyev was representing not only the applicants in the present cases, but a total of twenty\u2011seven other applicants in cases concerning the 2010 parliamentary elections and a number of applicants in other cases before the Court. 12.  On 8 August 2014 criminal proceedings were instituted against Mr I. Aliyev, these being the subject of a separate application brought by him before the Court (application no. 68762/14). On 8 and 9 August 2014 the investigation authorities seized a large number of documents from Mr I. Aliyev\u2019s office, including all the case files relating to the proceedings pending before the Court which were in Mr Aliyev\u2019s possession, comprising over 100 applications in total. The files relating to the present applications were also seized in their entirety. The facts relating to the seizure and the relevant proceedings are described in more detail in Annagi Hajibeyli v. Azerbaijan (no. 2204/11, \u00a7\u00a7 21-28, 22 October 2015). 13.  On 25 October 2014 the investigation authorities returned a number of the case files concerning the applications lodged before the Court, including the files relating to the present applications, to Mr Aliyev\u2019s lawyer.", "references": ["2", "9", "5", "6", "7", "3", "8", "1", "0", "4", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in San Marino. He is a politician. 6.  The applicant was the subject of an investigation related to two sets of criminal proceedings (nos. 769/12 and 184/14) which were eventually joined, in connection with the crimes of, inter alia, conspiracy and various acts of money laundering. 7.  By a decision of 25 October 2012, relying on Articles 4 and 5 of Law no. 93 of 2008, the inquiring judge ordered that investigation file no. 769/12 be classified because that the existing representation of facts required further investigative steps, including urgent measures which could be prejudiced if the documents were not kept secret. 8.  By a decision of 23 June 2014 the Commissario della Legge, in his capacity as inquiring judge, described over twenty-five pages the circumstances resulting from the investigations and informed the applicant (along with other suspects) of the charges against him. The charges were, (i) conspiracy (in connection with crimes related to money laundering) under Article 287 of the Criminal Code; (ii) various instances of money laundering in participation with others (Articles 50, 73 and 199 bis of the Criminal Code) for the movement of money through the San Marino Foundation For the Promotion of the Economy and Finances; and (iii) various instances of money laundering in participation with others for the movement of money between B. (a Swiss company) and C. (a company based in San Marino). 9.  It appeared from the investigations that the applicant (and others) had illegally acquired large sums of money which they had transferred into certain named accounts, sometimes in cash or by cheque and sometimes through fictitious intermediary companies, in order to hide the money\u2019s criminal origins. The sums were then withdrawn and distributed to other entities, all traceable to the applicant. Furthermore, in order to hide the illicit origins of the money, other sums were transferred, hidden and replaced through other named companies, only to eventually be transferred to the applicant (and others) personally. The inquiring judge noted that those instances formed the basis of the second and third charge of money laundering. In particular, the factual circumstances, inter alia, suggested that there existed a criminal organisation made up of politicians, civil servants, entrepreneurs and bankers. The applicant appeared to have had a key role as a politician who had served in various posts and in the inquiring judge\u2019s view he was particularly well placed to accumulate money which he then concealed behind various companies located in San Marino and abroad. 10.  According to the inquiring judge the San Marino Foundation for the Promotion of the Economy and Finances (hereinafter \u201cthe Foundation\u201d), which could be traced back to the applicant and was run by a person the applicant trusted, had been created specifically to further the aims of the criminal organisation. More than eleven million euros had been deposited but no trace of it could be found in the accounts. Discretion in the exercise of decision-making by political powers, as well as bureaucracy, gave the opportunity to \u201cinvestors\u201d to pay millions of euros in bribes to the Foundation in order for it to allow, for example, construction in areas identified by local plans as zones where development was forbidden. The investors knew the money would eventually get to the applicant, who was in a position to influence the approval of such projects, which could only come about by bending the rules. The inquiring judge observed that further investigations were necessary to understand the reasons behind a transfer into the Foundation of three million euros by a certain A.S., one million of which reached the applicant in cash. 11.  The inquiring judge ordered that the applicant be arrested and detained on remand (misura cautelare personale) owing to a risk of his reoffending and tampering with evidence. The judge noted the substantial flow of money managed by the applicant, which was not compatible with his income. In view of the various evidentiary elements he concluded that it could be held with reasonable certainty that the financial transfers had been made in connection with the relations the applicant had with the co-accused, as a result of and during the time he had been a State representative. The evidence suggested that he had the ability to organise and benefit from adequate support to facilitate a further dispersion of funds, as a result of a mutual covering up with other associates, by means of the direct or indirect acquisition of the management of economic activities and of positions in public office in order to obtain unjust profit and advantage. The seriousness of the applicant\u2019s particular conduct indicated his specific role in the organised criminal group. In addition, the speed with which certain transfers of millions of euros had taken place demonstrated the network of mutual assistance from which the applicant and the criminal organisation benefited and continued to benefit within the institutional and economic system in San Marino. According to the inquiring judge, the danger presented by the applicant had not diminished simply because he had quit public office. Indeed, in 2013 the applicant had sold an apartment, which had already been subject to leasing and payment for which had been made (accreditati) from Foundation funds, which showed that his contacts with the relevant entities remained in place. Furthermore, the inquiring judge considered that the systematic concealment of funds through fictitious payment descriptions (causali fittizie), the use of frontmen (prestanome) and of shell companies (societa schermo) rendered the risk of tampering with evidence a real one. According to the inquiring judge, that risk persisted, given the evidence existing both in San Marino and abroad, because of the wide support network. That meant that less restrictive measures could not be considered as appropriate when trying to make sure that the applicant (and his co\u2011accused) did not commit further acts of money laundering. 12.  On the same day at 2.50 pm the applicant was taken to prison and placed in detention. 13.  The applicant was informed on 24 June 2014 that he would appear for questioning before the inquiring judge on 25 June 2014 at 4 pm and that he could meet his legal representatives on the latter date at 3 pm. 14.  On 24 June 2014, after requesting access to the relevant files, the applicant\u2019s legal representatives learnt that file no. 769/12 was partially classified and thus partially subject to non-disclosure. File no. 184/14 was entirely classified and could not be disclosed at all. The applicant noted that the index showed that the classified documents in file no. 769/12 which had been removed included (i) the initial notification by the Agency for Financial Information (hereinafter \u201cthe AIF\u201d); (ii) a note by the same agency and explanatory documents; and (iii) pages 7-54 of Annex A to the AIF\u2019s initial notification. 15.  Following a decision of the same day, the above-mentioned unclassified material in connection with file no. 769/12 was submitted to the applicant\u2019s representatives on the morning of the day of questioning. According to the applicant the information provided did not give sufficient grounds to substantiate the need for his detention. 16.  On 25 June 2014 during questioning before the inquiring judge (interrogatorio di garanzia) the applicant availed himself of his right to remain silent. He complained of not being able to examine the investigative material, the short length of time he had been able to consult with his lawyer and of the delay in appearing before the judge. 17.  On the same day the applicant, inter alia, challenged his detention and complained that the term provided by law (six months which can be extended by another three months) for maintaining the secrecy of the investigation had expired because investigation file no. 769/12 had been classified on 25 October 2012. He asked the court to release him or to, at least, order a less restrictive measure and to declassify the relevant documentation. 18.  On 26 June 2014 the inquiring judge rejected the applicant\u2019s requests. He considered that the fact that the applicant had not been allowed to consult some of the material related to the investigation before the end of the period of secrecy had not breached his rights. The expiry of the terms of Article 4 of Law no. 93/2008 (see relevant domestic law at paragraph 75 below) could also not result in the nullity of an order for detention on remand which had been duly justified and reasoned on the basis of the object of the proceedings pending against the applicant. Further, the relevant requirements and reasons justifying keeping him in detention remained, in particular the risk that the illegally acquired assets would be dispersed. 19.  As to the applicant\u2019s inability to access all the relevant material, the judge noted that the decision ordering his detention had contained all the relevant information justifying the lawfulness of and the need for such detention. The need for secrecy served the interests of justice and had to be balanced against the applicant\u2019s interests. However, the applicant had been informed of the reasons for his detention in a way which enabled him to challenge it through the available means. Furthermore, access to further material was possible through other procedures that were available. 20.  On 27 June 2014 the applicant reiterated his above-mentioned complaints and requests by means of an appeal (reclamo) under Article 56 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. He relied on various Articles of the Convention, and inter alia asked the court to take its decision solely on the basis of the documents which had been made available to him as the accused. 21.  By an interim decision of the Judge of Criminal Appeals (Giudice delle Appellazioni Penali) of 30 June 2014, notified to the applicant\u2019s representatives on 1 July 2014, the court upheld the applicant\u2019s complaints in part. 22.  It upheld the complaint about the non-disclosure of the documents, the content of which had served to justify his detention on remand given that the time-limit for classification of the file had expired. In connection with both files, in the text of its judgment the court considered that the applicant must be allowed access to such documents with the limited aim of allowing the applicant to be fully aware of the evidence already collected, especially that as a result of which the inquiring magistrate had ordered the applicant\u2019s arrest and detention. The operative part of the judgment did not refer to any limitations. The court set a five-day time-limit from that date for the submission of observations. 23.  As to the applicant\u2019s ancillary complaint of a lack of relevant requirements for his detention, namely a reasonable suspicion against him (insussistenza dei presupposti e delle condizioni richieste per l\u2019applicazione della misura), the court considered that the earlier decision had explained the relevant facts which had shown the applicant\u2019s involvement in the crimes at issue. It also noted that a criminal origin for the sums at issue could be presumed owing to the methods used for their transfer. The latter was sufficient fumus delicti to justify the detention order, which was to be kept in place. It dismissed the remainder of the applicant\u2019s complaints and upheld the findings of the first-instance court. 24.  Following the Judge of Criminal Appeal\u2019s decision, on 1 July 2014 the inquiring judge ordered the release to the applicant\u2019s legal representatives of certain specified documents and evidence collected in connection with files nos. 184/14 and 769/12. According to the applicant, on the same day, upon a request made by him to the court registry, he learnt that despite the appeal judge\u2019s order the relevant files had remained classified (file no. 184/14 had been partially declassified before the appeal judge\u2019s decision). According to the applicant none of the publicly available content in file no. 184/14 could in any way demonstrate the crime of conspiracy under Article 287, with which he had been charged. The Government submitted that it had been the legal representatives who had failed to find the relevant documents in the case file. 25.  On 6 July 2014 the applicant submitted observations by the time\u2011limit set by the Judge of Criminal Appeals in connection with the above claims. In particular, he reiterated his complaints under Articles 5 and 6 of the Convention in so far as he had not had full disclosure of the documents and evidence collected despite the court\u2019s order of 30 June 2014 (see paragraph 22 above) and argued that there was no reasonable basis to justify his detention on remand. 26.  By a decision of 18 July 2014, notified to the applicant\u2019s legal representatives on 22 July 2014, the Judge of Criminal Appeals upheld the order of 30 June 2014 and dismissed any further claims. He found that no new elements had emerged since the interim decision of 30 June 2014. It further noted that the order of 30 June 2014 had not ordered a total declassification but solely the disclosure of documents related to the continued detention, referring to the words with \u201cthe limited aim of\u201d \u201cancorche al limitato fine\u201d. It considered that such secrecy could be justified for the purpose of the proper administration of justice and the effectiveness of the investigation, and was subject to the inquiring judge\u2019s discretion which the court of appeal did not want to interfere with - without prejudice to a further appeal against such decision before the third instance judge. 27.  On 23 July 2014 the applicant appealed to the Third Instance Judge in Criminal Matters (Terza Istanza Penale) (hereinafter \u201cthe third-instance judge\u201d), focusing on the inability to access various documents and the lack of a justification for his detention based on a lack of the relevant requirements. He also complained of procedural irregularities. 28.  After a hearing, where oral and written submissions were made by the applicant and the Attorney General, the third-instance judge on 8 September 2014 dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaints. The judge also upheld the lawfulness of the orders of 23 and 30 June 2014 and the lawfulness of the inquiry and the detention order. The court noted that its competence at third instance concerning detention on remand extended to confirming the existence of reasonable suspicion and other factors making detention necessary. Thus, it was for the judge to examine the stage of the investigation, as well as the correctness of the facts established and the lawfulness of the procedural steps undertaken, and the persistence of the charges against the accused, falling short of making any findings on the criminal responsibility of the accused. 29.  As to the non-disclosure of some of the material, it noted that while under San Marino law an accused was granted the right to access and copy all the material in the investigation file and imposed on the judge a duty to inform the accused of the factual and legal circumstances surrounding the charges against him, the same procedural law also limited those rights for the sake of the proper administration of justice, while bearing in mind the procedural safeguards emanating from the right to a fair trial. Even the case\u2011law of the European Court of Human Rights provided for exceptions to the rule of disclosure. In the present case the secrecy imposed on certain of the documents, although not all of them had been necessary in view of a search for the truth and to avoid any risk of tampering with evidence. 30.  It further noted that the applicant had had access to a lawyer before his questioning and that the order of 23 June 2014 had been detailed and had clearly identified the elements justifying the detention. It could thus not be said that the applicant had not been aware of the reasons for his arrest, the charges, or the nature and content of the evidence adduced. Indeed, more information than that strictly required had been communicated to the applicant and the judicial communication at issue had been exemplary, both in respect of the quantity and the clarity of the information provided. 31.  In relation to the requirements justifying the applicant\u2019s detention, the third-instance judge examined the matter in connection with each of the charges and noted that the appeal court had adequately replied to the applicant\u2019s complaints. Referring extensively to the report of the inquiring judge, the third-instance judge found that it was necessary to keep the applicant in detention. 32.  In the third-instance judge\u2019s view, the factual evidence and relevant legal considerations indicated that the applicant could reasonably be considered as guilty of the charges against him. Furthermore, it was necessary to ensure the effectiveness of further investigations by avoiding any risk of tampering with evidence. 33.  In the meantime, on an unspecified date the applicant lodged an application for the release of hard copies or electronic versions of documents which had been saved on equipment seized from him, or the possibility to make copies of them. 34.  By a decision of 17 July 2014 the inquiring judge dismissed that application in part. The court noted that the investigation file had not yet included a detailed list of its contents. In any event such a request could only be accepted if it was specific enough to locate the documents referred to. It ordered that a list of the file\u2019s contents be made and that the applicant have access to documents he could specify in terms of their form, content, date and origin. 35.  On 15 July 2014 the applicant had also applied for access to information held by the court concerning P.W.S. (San Marino\u2019s ambassador to Montenegro) which he considered relevant to disprove the alleged fictitious nature of the operations linked to Company B. and thus that there had been money laundering in that connection. 36.  By a decision of 25 July 2014, the inquiring judge dismissed that application on the grounds that the reasons put forward by the applicant to access the documents were not deemed convincing by the court. According to the inquiring judge such a request could be accepted, at the relevant time, if it was made in connection with specific facts that were subject to debate, that had not yet been established, and which were pertinent to the ongoing investigation. 37.  According to the applicant a further request to examine witnesses remained unheeded. 38.  On 15 September 2014 the applicant asked the inquiring judge to revoke the detention order or impose a less strict measure. 39.  On 18 September 2014 the inquiring judge dismissed the application. He considered that the original detention order and its continuation were reasoned in fact and in law. The basis for such a detention order did not need to be any more detailed, particularly given the continued risk of tampering with evidence if the applicant was put on a less strict regime. Contrary to the applicant\u2019s assertions, the existence of this risk remained. The inquiring judge considered that the results of the investigation as well as the behaviour of the applicant, both during the interviews and while in detention, confirmed that view. He noted that the applicant\u2019s co-accused had tried to make contact with other people, namely, a private doctor, on the pretext of being ill, even though state doctors had not found any signs of illness. Furthermore, both of the accused had attempted to involve relatives in interfering with and altering documents. The inquiring judge referred to the applicant\u2019s ability to create ad hoc documents which looked real, with the intention of having them admitted as evidence. He also highlighted the applicant\u2019s participation in the manipulation of the truth and the artificial reconstruction of facts and the dissimulation of the real functions of the accused. According to the inquiring judge, such factors meant that the court could not exclude that there would be attempts to tamper with evidence. Indeed, such tampering would be a repeat of the acts with which the applicant had been charged, which included manipulating the truth and the artificial reconstruction of economic and commercial dealings to hide their real aims. 40.  The applicant appealed. He requested release from detention or at least the application of a less restrictive measure. He further asked the court to annul the decision appealed against, and if not, he asked the court to exhibit the evidence in connection with the facts and circumstances on which the decision of 18 September 2014 (to keep him in detention) had been based. 41.  By a decision of 13 October 2014, the Judge of Criminal Appeals upheld the applicant\u2019s appeal in part.\nIt ordered that the two investigations files be declassified in part, as to allow the applicant to have access to the files and evidence collected in the further investigations on which the inquiring judge had based his decision to dismiss the applicant\u2019s bail application in favour of keeping him on remand. The court ordered the disclosure of the material and set a five-day time-limit from that date for the submission of observations.\nIt further considered that the first-instance court had been correct in maintaining the detention order on the basis of the behaviour of the co\u2011accused. It was evident that the co-accused\u2019s mistrust of state doctors was a pretext to consult her private doctors, which had been part of a predetermined plan agreed on between the two co-accused. That had been shown through recordings of their conversation (intercepted by a third party) over walkie-talkies provided to them by a policeman (M.) to enable them to agree on the same line of defence and to tamper with evidence. Similarly, the first-instance court\u2019s finding on the attempt to involve third parties in tampering with evidence had been based on the fact that the applicant had transferred property into his daughter\u2019s name and the apparent complicity of M. (against whom proceedings had been instituted) who owed allegiance to the applicant in exchange for favours he had received. Such matters would be better explained once the documents had been declassified, as ordered above. The fact that the applicant had been able to plan the above-mentioned acts while in detention showed that his intention and possibility to tamper with evidence would be greater if he was released. 42.  In consequence, by a decision of the inquiring judge of 16 October filed in the relevant registry on 20 October 2014, further documents were released. 43.  After viewing them, the applicant considered that the copious documentation that had been made available to him (accounts of companies traceable to him and a series of bank transfers) only concerned the charges against him and not the alleged behaviour which had led the inquiring judge to decide to dismiss his application for bail. On 24 October 2014 the applicant therefore lodged a new appeal, arguing that despite the court\u2019s order he had again not had access to the relevant documentation to challenge his detention as the declassified information did not include any evidence to substantiate the alleged behaviour that had led to his application for release to be denied, namely the alleged falsification of documents, the alleged collusion with family members, the alleged simulation of his co\u2011accused\u2019s illness, and most importantly the alleged walkie\u2011talkie conversations. Moreover, despite the relevant time-limits having expired both files remained classified, and the applicant could not have knowledge of the further evidence collected and whether it supported suspicions against him, or the contrary. 44.  By a decision of 6 November 2014 the Judge of Criminal Appeals upheld the detention order, considering that evidence had already been presented to support the decision to keep the applicant in detention. Dismissing the applicant\u2019s arguments, the court found that it was therefore not necessary to repeat the earlier factual basis for the order or to give new reasons, as requested by the applicant, because the previous reasons were still valid, as also confirmed at various levels of jurisdiction. Furthermore, in so far as the applicant had claimed that the decision of 18 September 2014 had been based on elements (concerning his behaviour) that had not been found in the file, the court noted that a judge could ex officio take factors into consideration which had occurred after the issuance of the detention order. Indeed, in the present case, to make sure that there were no reasons to warrant a change in the applicant\u2019s pre-trial conditions, the judge had used information which, although having come to his knowledge by other means, was also found in the public domain (in the press and in publicly available judicial documents concerning the proceedings against M.). He further noted that the requirements of adversarial proceedings at the pre-trial stage, such as the non-disclosure and publication of documents, were different from those in a trial since pre-trial proceedings required a level of secrecy that enabled further investigations if necessary, including international assistance. While equality of arms had to be respected in connection with the debate concerning the measure imposed, the applicant could not obtain the declassification of documents by reiterating the same arguments. That was all the more so when the detention order had to a large extent been based on the fact that there was a risk of tampering with evidence. The applicant\u2019s request had to be seen in the light of the need to preserve the evidence as well as the proper administration of justice.  The necessity to maintain the classification of certain information was all the more important when that information concerned crimes for which charges had not yet been brought. It followed that the applicant\u2019s detention could not be revoked nor could further information be declassified. The court also noted that in 2009 Article 5 of law no. 93/2008 had been amended to include a suspension of the time-limit in the case of requests for letters rogatory. In the case at hand requests for judicial assistance had been made, thus in view of the applicable suspension the time-limits had not yet expired. 45.  On 4 March 2015 the applicant asked to be released on the basis that the testimony of a certain P. had been retracted in the proceedings against M. It had been P. who had previously stated that he had seen M. give the applicant a walkie-talkie to communicate with his co-accused. He argued that this meant that the evidence of the alleged misbehaviour on which the prolongation of his detention had been based no longer existed. 46.  On 6 March 2015 the inquiring judge dismissed the application. He held that there had been various grounds for the applicant\u2019s detention, not just the attempts to communicate with others inside and outside the prison. The matters that had been brought to light could not alter the grounds listed and explained in detail in previous decisions. 47.  On 16 March 2015 the applicant challenged that decision, arguing that if the decision to keep him in detention had been based on testimony given in proceedings against M., then such a decision had to be altered once that testimony had been withdrawn. 48.  By a decision of 20 March 2015 the Judge of Criminal Appeals dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. The court noted that the detention order of 23 June 2014 had stated that the reasons for considering detention necessary had been the fear of the applicant\u2019s reoffending and tampering with evidence, which had been justified by the role played by the applicant in the organisation and by the complex and effective network he could benefit from. The order of 18 September 2014, apart from relying on the evidence in the proceedings against M., had been based on other, more significant and relevant reasons. The impugned decision of 6 March 2015 had stated that the reasons to deny his application \u201calso\u201d included his attempts to communicate with others. The decision of 13 October 2014 had also stated that the measure had been justified by much more important reasons. Lastly, the decision of 6 November 2014 had also referred to other grounds for his detention. It followed that none of the decisions in question had been based solely on the supposed collaboration of M. Thus, the retraction of P.\u2019s testimony did not render nugatory the fear of the applicant\u2019s tampering with evidence, based on the fact that there had been various, more relevant considerations given in the previous decisions on the matter, and reiterated in a decision of 9 March 2015 (below). 49.  By a decision of 9 March 2015, by which time further charges of money laundering had been brought against the applicant, the inquiring judge prolonged the applicant\u2019s detention. He noted that the proceedings were based on the results of the investigation by the anti-fraud unit and on the analysis of financial operations by the applicant and other people involved in politics (directly or through the use of a plurality of individuals and legal persons). Added to those factors were other elements collected through investigations of suspicious financial operations, as well as witness testimony resulting from questioning and the large amount of documents that had been seized. The investigation as a whole concentrated on the overlap between political and economic activity and criminal activity. Referring to various evidentiary conclusions the court considered that in relation to the further charges of money laundering against the applicant, the evidentiary scenario was robust and exhaustive. It amply demonstrated that the applicant (with others) had participated in the transfer and concealment of funds generated from crimes committed in San Marino or elsewhere. 50.  The risk of reoffending could be presumed given the ease with which huge amounts of money had already been transferred, and the strong support network of which both co-accused could benefit. That meant that less severe measures would not prevent the applicant and his co-accused from re-establishing contact with other people who had facilitated the illegal acts. The fear of flight was all the more realistic given the weakening link between the applicant and San Marino following the incident in question. It was therefore feared that the applicant would seek refuge in jurisdictions with which San Marino had no extradition treaties. It had already been established that one of the foreign accomplices (P.W.S.) had made use of a diplomatic passport to avoid precautionary measures issued against him. 51.  Moreover, video surveillance images showed that the accused had received favourable treatment while in detention, with the director of the prison providing him with company, support and information, and even arranging meetings between the co-accused. That further went to show the status the accused continued to benefit from, which indicated the impossibility of envisaging more lenient measures. 52.  The seriousness of the elements on which the suspicion against the applicant was based (quadro indiziario), the facts and the means by which the crimes had taken place, as well as the dense network of personal relations, the involvement of family members, professionals, State representatives and government personnel who were still in service, led to the conclusion that there was a real risk that evidence, namely documentary evidence, would be tampered with and that pressure would be put on people who had knowledge of the events at issue. Moreover, the accused could still continue to hide the illicit origins of funds through the very complex and ingenious methods already applied. 53.  On 11 and 12 March 2015 the applicant had access to further documentation, concerning particularly letters rogatory, witness statements and interviews. 54.  The applicant appealed against the decision of the inquiring judge of 9 March 2015. 55.  By a decision of 23 April 2015 filed in the relevant registry on 29 April 2015 the Judge of Criminal Appeals upheld the first-instance decision. The judge noted that San Marino law did not impose a time-limit on the duration of pre-trial detention, and considered that the subsequent charges against the applicant had been brought as a result of further investigations. They had shown further money transfers between clearly identified people (including the applicant), as well as the origin of the funds and were connected to the facts behind the first set of accusations. In so far as the applicant had claimed that there had been no proof of conspiracy or of the illicit origin of the funds, and thus that there had been no substantiation of the charge of money laundering, the court held that the original decision of 23 June 2014 had highlighted the existence of a general agreement with permanent effects (constituting the pactum sceleris) between representatives of the State and the business world, as well as the details of its aims and functionalities. It further noted that final judgments confirming that a crime had generated certain funds were not needed to establish money laundering, but that it was enough to have a number of factual elements indicating the supposed crime which generated those funds. In other words the burden of proof to be satisfied was one where the illicit origin of the funds emerged from a logical and coherent interpretation of the evidence. The first-instance decision, based on the transfer of huge amounts of money, through the creation of ad hoc offshore companies and the dispersion of such sums in parcelled and undetectable amounts had therefore been reasonable. 56.  The appeal judge considered that house arrest would not be appropriate given the seriousness of the crimes at issue, the enormous sums laundered, as well as the conduct of the accused during the interrogation and detention period. He noted that the reasons for the applicant\u2019s detention on remand, namely his contacts with other accused persons and the networks he had access to which could facilitate further money laundering and the dispersal of funds, remained relevant. 57.  He dismissed a further application by the applicant for the declassification of the case files on the basis that the only things still classified related to the letters rogatory, which were still ongoing, and other material which was still subject to ongoing investigations. 58.  Following a further request by the applicant, by a decision of 4 May 2015 the inquiring judge released further documentation in light of the fact that the needs of the investigation had diminished. The secrecy regime was however maintained, in part, in connection with certain documents concerning both proceedings at issue as well as other documents and evidence yet to be collected following this decision. 59.  By a decree of 11 May 2015 the applicant was issued with an indictment. 60.  On 14 May 2015 the inquiring judge revoked the decision of 23 June 2014 to keep him in detention in relation to the charges in the indictment of 11 May 2015 as the investigation related to those charges had been concluded. However, he was kept in detention based on a decision of 9 March 2015 in relation to two recently added charges that were still under investigation. 61.  On 28 May 2015 the applicant lodged a challenge to the constitutional legitimacy of the decision of 23 April 2015 by the Judge of Criminal Appeals and the decision of the Commissario of 9 March 2015 in connection with his defence rights at the trial. 62.  By an interlocutory decision of 2 July 2015, the third-instance judge suspended the order for the applicant\u2019s detention on remand and ordered that he be put under house arrest until a decision on the merits of the constitutional challenge had been issued. In the judge\u2019s view such a decision was necessary in order to respect the rights of the defence, particularly the principle of equality of arms, which was to prevail during the trial. He ordered the inquiring judge to set bail and other relevant conditions, as well as the penalties in the event of a breach of such conditions. 63.  On 3 July 2015 the inquiring judge ordered the applicant to be put under house arrest under the following conditions: the applicant could not leave his house, have visits from or communicate with anyone (including by telephone) except for family members living in the house, descendants and ascendants (as well as their spouses or partners), siblings and legal counsel. Medical visits were allowed subject to notification. The applicant was ordered not to communicate with his co-accused (Mrs B.) and had to submit his travel documents to the authorities, in line with a travel ban which was being imposed concurrently. 64.  By a judgment of 15 October 2015 the third-instance judge confirmed the validity of the decisions of 23 April 2015 filed in the relevant registry on 29 April 2015 by the Judge of Criminal Appeals and the decision of the inquiring judge of 9 March 2015. It reiterated its previous findings as to the various and detailed evidence which had been presented and concluded that the same applied in respect of the last two charges against the applicant, which had been the basis for the impugned decision of 9 March 2015. It noted that there existed a huge amount of data, some of which was convincing evidence (dati probanti), some highly indicative (fortemente indizianti), and some merely illustrative yet useful, which together formed an adequate framework of relevant and sufficient evidence on which to base precautionary measures. It followed that the decision to place the applicant in pre-trial detention had at the time been appropriate in view of the material available. It also confirmed its interlocutory decree of 2 July 2015 that detention should cease and that the applicant be put under house arrest for the purposes of ensuring his defence rights in all the proceedings against him, without prejudice to any decision by the inquiring judge on an eventual release. 65.  By an order of 16 October 2015, the inquiring judge revoked the order for the applicant\u2019s house arrest and imposed a travel ban on him, considering that that measure would suffice. It further maintained the classified status of certain acts in the interests of the investigation and the ongoing international judicial assistance. 66.  The applicant was detained from 23 June 2014 in the San Marino prison known as the Carcere dei Cappucini. 67.  According to the applicant, from 8 August 2014 he was detained under a regime in which he was kept isolated for twenty-two hours a day. The applicant alleged that he had not had access to other parts of the prison which would have allowed him to have some form of activity and that he could only shower once a week. Furthermore, for certain periods he had had no access to sanitary facilities and had had to relieve himself in his cell in a container. 68.  The applicant stated that the conditions at the detention facility were inhumane and referred to the reports of the Committee for the Prevention of Torture (\u201cthe CPT\u201d) of 2005 on the matter. He noted in particular that the CPT had since 1992 reiterated the need to refurbish and upgrade the facility but that virtually no steps had been taken to that effect. 69.  On 30 June 2014 the applicant filed a complaint about his conditions of detention with the CPT.", "references": ["3", "5", "2", "9", "4", "6", "1", "7", "0", "8", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1940 and lives in Plung\u0117. 6.  The father of the applicant\u2019s husband owned 9.24 hectares of land in Tel\u0161iai region. This plot was nationalised in 1940. 7.  In 1991 the brother of the applicant\u2019s husband applied to the national authorities for the land to be returned to him and his brothers. In 1993 the three brothers signed an agreement and decided to divide their father\u2019s plot of land into three equal parts of 3.08 hectares and V.V., the applicant\u2019s husband, asked for the return of his plot of land in natura. 8.  In November 1999 V.V. participated in a meeting at the Plung\u0117 District Land Service of the Tel\u0161iai County Administration (hereinafter \u201cthe Plung\u0117 District Land Service\u201d), where he was informed that all of his father\u2019s land was already being used by others and could not be returned to him in natura. He was offered either monetary compensation, the restoration of his property rights in another cadastral area or a plot of land of equivalent value. V.V. did not agree to any of those offers. 9.  In January 2000 the the Plung\u0117 District Land Service asked V.V. to choose the form of restitution of his property rights. V.V. replied that he had already chosen the form of restitution in 1991, which was restitution in natura. 10.  In April 2002 a meeting was held at the Plung\u0117 District Land Service, where V.V. again refused to choose a different form of restitution. V.V. was also offered two plots of land of 2.5 and 0.5 hectares. He stated that he would have to think about the offer and would inform the authorities before 1 May 2002. 11.  During a meeting at the Plung\u0117 District Land Service in May 2002, V.V. said that he had not been offered any other forms of restitution in writing but acknowledged that the matter had been discussed orally. During a meeting in June 2002, V.V. reiterated his wish to receive the land in natura and when he was asked to choose another form of restitution, he said that he would think about it. 12.  In July 2003 the Plung\u0117 District Land Service informed V.V. that because it was impossible to restore his property rights in natura, he had to choose either a plot of land or forest of equivalent value, monetary compensation or compensation in Government bonds. V.V. was also informed that if a form of restitution was not chosen, the property rights would be restored in the form determined by the authorities. 13.  In November 2003 V.V. was invited to participate in a meeting at the the Plung\u0117 District Land Service, concerning the territorial plan of the area and the choice of the form of restitution. V.V. did not take part in the meeting. 14.  In May 2005 V.V. asked the authorities whether and when he would be paid damages for the failure to restore his property rights in natura or to provide him with a plot of land of equivalent value. He also suggested that the Lithuanian authorities find out what \u201ca plot of land of equivalent value\u201d meant because the plots offered to him had not been of equivalent value (\u201eir b\u016bt\u0173 gerai, kad \u017eem\u0117tvarkininkai i\u0161siai\u0161kint\u0173 \u017eod\u017eio \u201elygiavertis\u201c prasm\u0119 ir nesi\u016blyt\u0173 \u012fstatymo nuostat\u0173 neatitinkan\u010di\u0173 variant\u0173\u201c). In June 2005 the Plung\u0117 District Land Service asked V.V. to submit a written request to obtain a plot of land of equivalent value so that the authorities could prepare a document on the transfer of the land. V.V. replied that he had never been offered any plots of land of equivalent value and would only accept the restoration of his property rights in natura or a plot of land that was truly of equivalent value. V.V. also again refused the plots of land offered to him, stating that they were not of equivalent value. In July 2005 the authorities asked V.V. to choose a form of compensation for the land. He again replied that he had chosen that the land be returned to him in natura in 1991. In August 2005 V.V. reminded the authorities that he wanted the land to be returned in natura or to receive a plot of land of equivalent value. 15.  In October 2005 V.V.\u2019s representative participated in a meeting at the Plung\u0117 District Land Service, where she was asked to inform the authorities which land V.V. wanted in order to restore his property rights. Two plots of land were shown to the representative and the next day she replied that she refused to accept them. In November 2005 she was informed that because V.V. and she had refused to accept the plots of land, she had to inform the authorities before 1 December 2005 whether V.V. wanted monetary compensation or compensation in Government bonds as the form of restitution. She was also informed that if no response was received, the authorities would choose the form of restitution themselves. 16.  On 14 November 2005 V.V. died and the applicant became his heir. In April 2006 the Plung\u0117 District Land Service informed the applicant that she had to submit a written request to the authorities for the preparation of a document on the transfer of land and to actively choose a plot of land. The applicant replied that she would not submit any request if the land was not returned to her in natura or a plot of equivalent value was not provided. 17.  In October 2006 the applicant sent two letters to the Plung\u0117 District Land Service and stated that she would accept a plot of land of equivalent value if such a plot was given to her and a preliminary agreement was prepared on the transfer of such a plot. She also refused to agree to a document on the transfer of land and repeatedly asked to have her property rights restored in natura or to be provided with a plot of land of equal value. 18.  In November 2006 the Plung\u0117 District Land Service informed the applicant about the procedure for the assessment of the value of land and the calculation methods used, and asked the applicant to agree with the assessment. In December 2006 the Plung\u0117 District Land Service informed the applicant that in order to provide her with a plot of land, the authorities had to prepare a document on the transfer of land. The Plung\u0117 District Land Service also observed that there was no possibility to conclude the preliminary agreement requested by the applicant because it was not provided for in the domestic law. The Plung\u0117 District Land Service repeated that the document on a transfer of the land had already been prepared and the applicant had to sign it and indicate the area where she would like to receive a plot of land of equivalent value. In February 2007 the Plung\u0117 District Land Service informed the applicant about the procedure for restitution and reiterated that the applicant had to sign the document on the transfer of land. In May 2007 the applicant asked the authorities when the issue of the restoration of V.V.\u2019s property rights in natura or by providing her a plot of land of equivalent value would be dealt with. In June and July 2007 the Plung\u0117 District Land Service repeatedly informed the applicant that she had to sign the document. The Plung\u0117 District Land Service also informed the applicant that it was not possible to provide her with the plot of land first. In response, the applicant stated that she would sign the land transfer document after she had been shown a plot of equivalent value. 19.  In August 2007 during a meeting at the Plung\u0117 District Land Service it had been decided to include V.V.\u2019s request to restore his property rights into the preparation of an additional territorial plan of the area. In November 2007 the Plung\u0117 District Land Service established that because the applicant had refused to clearly indicate the form of restitution, she would be paid monetary compensation for the land. It gave the applicant ten working days to change the suggested form of restitution. 20.  The applicant repeatedly did not choose the form of restitution for the land by the time indicated by the authorities, which is by 7 May 2008, and on 13 May 2008 a decision was taken to restore V.V.\u2019s property rights by paying monetary compensation of 3,437 Lithuanian litai (LTL, approximately 995 euros (EUR)). The compensation was then adjusted (indeksuota) and the final sum to be paid was LTL 5,499 (approximately EUR 1,593). The national authorities indicated V.V. as the person to whom the compensation had to be paid. The applicant was sent the decision on 28 May 2008. In their observations, the Government provided a document to the Court, indicating that the compensation had been paid on 2 December 2008 and 31 December 2008. 21.  In June 2008 the applicant started court proceedings. She asked the court to annul the authorities\u2019 decision of 13 May 2008 to restore V.V.\u2019s property rights by paying him monetary compensation and to pay her LTL 3,000 (approximately EUR 869) in respect of pecuniary and non\u2011pecuniary damage. She stated that she wanted the land to be returned in natura or to be provided with a plot of land of equivalent value and she did not understand why the authorities kept asking her to make a new choice on the form of restitution each year. She further asked the authorities to explain why there had been no activity from 1993 to 1999 in the process of the restitution of her property rights. Finally, she complained that compensation calculated at LTL 3,437 (approximately EUR 995) was too low. 22.  On 29 September 2008 the \u0160iauliai Regional Administrative Court established that in 1991 V.V. had asked for his property rights to be restored by being given 3.08 hectares of land in natura and that that had been a proper expression of his will. As the land in question was already being used by other people, V.V. and later the applicant had been asked to choose another form of restitution. However, they had never expressly done so. Moreover, the court held that the applicant had never changed the original wish to have the land returned in natura because she had refused to agree to the document on the transfer of land, which would have allowed her to have a plot of equivalent value returned to her. As a consequence, and in accordance with the domestic law, the national authorities had chosen monetary compensation as the form of restitution, which had not breached any requirements of the domestic law. As for damages, the court held that the authorities had acted correctly and the necessary conditions to pay damages had not been satisfied. 23.  In October 2008 the applicant lodged an appeal. She complained that she had chosen the form of restitution because she wanted land of equal value to be returned to her in natura. She also stated that if her choice had been unclear to the authorities, they should have taken action to clarify it. She further complained that the monetary compensation was unjust and too low. 24.  On 21 September 2009 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. The court stated that V.V. had expressed a wish for his property rights to be restored to him in natura. The court also established that V.V. had been aware of the fact that there was no possibility of returning the land to him in natura because it was already being used by other people. V.V. had been asked several times by the national authorities to choose another form of restitution but he had insisted on restitution in natura. The court held that the national authorities had failed to inform V.V. about the time-limit for choosing the form of restitution, as the domestic law provided for such information to be sent before 1 March 2003 and the letter had only been sent to V.V. on 27 March 2003. The court however observed that that circumstance was not of major significance because V.V. had written on 1 March 2003 that he would never change his mind about the form of restitution. After V.V. had died, the applicant had been asked to choose the form of restitution but had persisted in asking to have the land returned to her in natura or to be provided with a plot of equivalent value. The court also held that the applicant had misinterpreted the provisions of the domestic law because she had required that she be provided with a plot of land of equivalent value and a preliminary agreement, and had stated that only then would she sign a document on the transfer of land. That had been contrary to the procedure established in the domestic law. The court also considered that although at some point the applicant had indicated that providing her with a plot of land of equivalent value was an alternative way to restore her property rights, she had tied that form to her own rules and requirements, which were not possible under the domestic law. The court further observed that the national authorities had decided to pay the applicant monetary compensation as the form of restitution. Lastly, the court held that the applicant\u2019s argument as to the amount of compensation was unsubstantiated because she had not provided specific arguments proving that the amount of compensation had been determined in breach of domestic requirements. 25.  On 12 September 2016 the applicant started court proceedings for debt and interest over the failure of the national authorities to pay her monetary compensation. 26.  In reply to the request by the authorities, on 29 September 2016 the notary dealing with the inheritance procedure for V.V.\u2019s property stated that after V.V.\u2019s death she had issued the applicant with certificates of the right to inheritance with regard to movable and immovable property. However, she had not issued the applicant with the document allowing the applicant to get the monetary compensation paid to V.V. because the applicant had not provided her with the decision of the national authorities of 13 May 2008 to restore V.V.\u2019s property rights. 27.  In their comments to the applicant\u2019s reply to the Government\u2019s observations, the Government acknowledged that the monetary compensation had never been transferred to the applicant \u201cdue to human error\u201d. The national authorities could not transfer the monetary compensation to the applicant because of the absence of the document proving that she was an heir of V.V. and the absence of the applicant\u2019s account number. The applicant submitted the relevant documents together with her account number and the compensation was transferred to her account on 14 November 2016.", "references": ["6", "2", "9", "4", "8", "1", "3", "7", "0", "5", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicants were detained in Korydallos Prison in Athens when they lodged their application with the Court. 5.  The first applicant was detained in Korydallos Prison on 7 March 2013, and was still in detention at the time his observations to the Court were submitted. His detention in Korydallos Prison was temporarily interrupted when he was transferred to Ioannina Prison from 3 July 2013 until 11 July 2013, and to Komotini Prison from 2 December 2013 to 17 December 2013. The second applicant was detained in Korydallos Prison on 22 March 2013 and the third applicant on 21 August 2013; they were still in detention when they submitted their observations to the Court. The fourth applicant was detained in Korydallos prison from 26 June 2013 to 1 May 2014, except for the periods from 17 July 2013 to 3 September 2013, from 27 November 2013 to 10 December 2013, and from 6 February 2014 to 17 February 2014, during which time he was detained in Chania Prison. The fifth applicant was detained in Korydallos Prison from 22 May 2013 to 19 June 2014, except for the period between 20 March 2013 and 28 March 2013. The sixth applicant was detained in Korydallos Prison from 30 January 2013 to 15 August 2014. 6.  The applicants alleged that the prison held 2,400 prisoners, while it had been designed to accommodate 700. The applicants were detained in wings A and D in various cells which all measured 9 sq. m, including the space for sanitary facilities, and accommodated three or four prisoners; the living space for each prisoner was therefore less than 3 sq. m. 7.  The toilet facilities were partially separated from the rest of the cell. In addition, there was insufficient heating and hot water. Inmates had to use a washbasin to wash themselves, as well as their dishes and clothes. Cells were dirty and overrun with cockroaches and other pests, and no attempt was made to exterminate them. Rubbish was not properly collected and food remains were left in the cells and corridors for days. Prisoners were not sufficiently separated according to their health conditions or whether or not they were drug users. There was no adequate medical care, in particular as regards psychological health. 8.  The inmates were confined to their cells for sixteen hours per day, as recreational or educational activities were not provided. They had to take their meals, which were poor in terms of quality and nutritional value, inside their cells. 9.  Moreover, the prison was understaffed and unable to secure the prisoners\u2019 safety. 10.  The Government asserted that the first to fifth applicants had been detained in various cells in wings A and D. All cells measured 9.60 sq. m. and accommodated three or, on rare occasions, four detainees. The first applicant had also been detained in two cells in wing E: one which measured 10.44 sq. m., and another which measured 42.78 sq. m. and accommodated ten to twenty-two detainees, although it had only accommodated twenty-two detainees for a short period of time. 11.  All cells had a window ensuring sufficient light. Every cell was furnished with a washbasin, a toilet, beds, a table, chairs and, usually, wooden shelves. Wings A, B, C and D had twelve communal showers each, and wing E had nine communal showers. Each wing could provide 2,000 litres of hot water every day. Detainees were provided with sheets and blankets, except for when they chose to use their own. 12.  The prison had a central heating system, and inmates were provided with fans during the summer. Cells were regularly disinfected and cleaned twice a day by cleaning crews consisting of detainees. All wings had rubbish bins. 13.  All detainees had access to the prison\u2019s infirmary, which was open twenty-four hours per day, and there were eighteen doctors with different areas of specialism and three nurses who offered appointments to the prisoners. When inmates\u2019 conditions could not be dealt with in the infirmary, they were transferred to Korydallos Prison Hospital, Korydallos Psychiatric Hospital or an external hospital. The Government submitted the applicants\u2019 medical records, to demonstrate that they had been treated on various occasions. Additionally, the prison\u2019s social services took care of detainees\u2019 needs, including those of the applicants, who had used those services on a number of occasions. 14.  As regards prisoners\u2019 meals, the Government submitted the menu for ten days selected at random to demonstrate that meals were varied. 15.  Prisoners were able to spend four to five hours in the prison yard every day, practising sport. They were allowed to have a television in the cells, and the prison had a lending library and a book club. In addition, detainees had the opportunity to take one of the available jobs or attend \u201csecond chance\u201d school. 16.  The Government did not submit observations concerning the sixth applicant (see below, paragraphs 24-26).", "references": ["5", "8", "2", "7", "4", "3", "9", "0", "6", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicants were all detained in the Transfers Department of Thessaloniki (\u03a4\u03bc\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1 \u039c\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b3\u03c9\u03b3\u03ce\u03bd); they were either in pre-trial detention or serving a prison sentence. Specifically, the first applicant was detained in the Transfers Department of Thessaloniki from 24 January 2013 until 29 April 2013; the second applicant was detained in the Transfers Department of Thessaloniki from 27 November 2012 until 1 March 2013; and the third applicant was detained in the Transfers Department of Thessaloniki from 29 January 2013 until 11 March 2013. 5.  The applicants alleged that the Transfers Department of Thessaloniki had been an entirely inappropriate place in which to spend long periods of detention, as they had done. The cells in which they had been held had measured 40 sq. m and had been designed to accommodate nine detainees. However, the number of detainees accommodated had varied from twelve to twenty-two. 6.  Cells had been insufficiently lit and ventilated, which, in addition to overcrowding and the filthiness of the premises, had affected inmates\u2019 health. The blankets that had been provided had never been washed. The applicants furthermore stressed that there had been insufficient heating and hot water and that they had never been provided with soap. 7.  Detainees had been confined to their cells and had not been allowed to spend time outside, which had affected their psychological health. Recreational activities had not been offered and cells had not been equipped with televisions or radio. 8.  The meals that had been provided to detainees had cost 5.87 euros (EUR) per day and had not sufficed to cover their daily dietary needs, either in terms of quantity or quality. 9.  On 22 February 2013 the applicants lodged a complaint with the public prosecutor, complaining of the conditions of their detention but received no reply. 10.  The Government firstly argued that the applicants had complained in a general way, without providing specific references concerning the actual conditions of their detention. 11.  As regards the premises in which the applicants had been detained, the Government submitted that the Transfers Department of Thessaloniki had been comprised of six cells on the ground floor which had measured 59 sq. m each and had been designed to accommodate ten male detainees. There had been another two cells which had accommodated female detainees. All cells had had in-cell sanitary facilities and had had sufficient light and received sufficient ventilation through large windows. 12.  Cells had accommodated five to fifteen detainees. Most of the detainees had been held in the facility for very short periods of time, as the Transfers Department had been used when transferring detainees from one facility to another or to the court room. As a result, when the number of detainees had exceeded the number that the cells had been designed to accommodate, that had only remained the case until transfers had been completed. In any event, the space available for each inmate had never been less than 4 sq. m. 13.  An external contractor had cleaned the facilities every day and had disinfected the detention areas once a week. Hot water and heating had been available throughout the premises and all sheets and blankets had been regularly cleaned and replaced in the event that they had become worn out. 14.  Food had been provided to detainees by a private catering company and had been of good quality and quantity; the Government submitted examples of the various meals offered, arguing that these had covered all dietary needs and preferences. 15.  The Government pointed out that the applicants had not referred to or adduced any evidence that they had not received any medical treatment that they had needed. On the contrary, according to the police station\u2019s records, the second applicant had been transferred to Papanikolaou Hospital on 29 December 2013 for a medical check-up.", "references": ["3", "6", "7", "9", "4", "2", "8", "0", "5", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicants were or are still detained in Ioannina Prison. 5.  Of the applicants, the fourth was released on 11 March 2013 and the eighth was transferred to Alikarnassos Prison on 6 December 2012. The fifteenth applicant was released on 1 March 2013 and the twenty-first on 14 March 2013. The twenty-ninth, forty-ninth, fifty-fourth and fifty-seventh applicants were released on 28 February 2013, the forty-third on 11 March 2013, and the fiftieth on 7 March 2013, while the fifty-sixth was transferred to Amfissa Prison on 14 December 2012. 6.  Additionally, the ninth, twenty-fifth, thirty-second and thirty-fifth applicants were released on 30 May 2013, the tenth and twenty-sixth applicants on 16 May 2013, the twelfth and forty-fourth applicants on 4 April 2013, the thirteenth on 28 May 2013, the sixteenth on 9 May 2013, the eighteenth on 14 June 2013, the nineteenth, twenty-second, twenty\u2011fourth, forty-first and forty-fifth applicants on 9 April 2013 and the twentieth on 23 May 2013. The thirty-fourth and fifty-third applicants were released on 31 May 2013, the thirty-ninth and forty-eighth on 26 April 2013, the fortieth and fifty-second on 30 April 2013, the forty-sixth on 10 April 2013 and the fifty-first on 11 April 2013. 7.  The applicants alleged that the prison had held 235 prisoners but had only been designed for 85. There were four big cells measuring approximately 45 sq. m each, which had accommodated 32 detainees. There were also four smaller cells: cell no. 5 measured 16 sq. m and had accommodated 20 detainees, cell no. 6 was 12 sq. m and had held 10 detainees, cell no. 7 had an area of 16 sq. m and had housed 20 detainees while cell no. 8, which used to be laundry room, measured 10 sq. m and had accommodated 9 detainees. A corridor of 34.5 sq. m had accommodated 40 detainees. 8.  The cells had had no tables or chairs. Inmates had been confined to their cells for seventeen hours a day as recreational or educational activities had not been provided. They had had to take their meals inside their cells. 9.  There was not enough separation between prisoners serving sentences and those in pre-trial detention. Additionally, healthy prisoners had been held together with sick prisoners, resulting in exposure to contagious diseases. Inmates had to wash and dry their clothes and underwear in the toilet facilities, which further spread contagious diseases. Medical care had been inadequate, particularly as regards psychological health. 10.  On 13 and 25 February 2013 the applicants and other prisoners lodged a complaint with the prison authorities about their conditions of detention, but received no reply. 11.  The Government asserted that Ioannina Prison had four cells measuring 50 sq. m with two toilets each, one cell of 36 sq. m, two which measured 15 sq. m, one of 37.63 sq. m and two solitary confinement cells, each 8 sq. m in area. The dining room was 78 sq. m while the corridors had an area of 300 sq. m. At the time of the applicants\u2019 application with the Court, the prison had held 210 to 230 detainees. 12.  Extensive repair works had been carried out in 2012 throughout the prison facilities and all areas had been repainted, stools had been placed in the cells, and a bookcase, television and table tennis table had been added to the dining-room, which served several purposes. Moreover, a fully equipped gym had been built for detainees. The detainees\u2019 daily schedule also included free time in the prison yard from 3 p.m. until half an hour before sunset. Numerous cultural events had been regularly organised for the inmates\u2019 entertainment. 13.  The cells had been regularly disinfected and cleaned on a daily basis. Ventilation and heating had been adequate in the cells and common areas. Appropriate standards of hygiene had been strictly observed and each new inmate was provided with clean clothing and blankets. All detainees had access to the prison infirmary and there were two general doctors, a dentist and three nurses. In emergencies, inmates were transferred to the Korydallos Prison Hospital or to an external hospital.", "references": ["5", "7", "0", "3", "6", "4", "9", "8", "2", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "7.  The applicants were born in 1970, 1966, 1976 and 1972 respectively. Mr Rezmive\u015f, Mr Mo\u015fmonea and Mr Gazsi are currently detained in Timi\u015foara, Pelendava and Baia Mare Prisons respectively. Mr Mavroian, who had been detained in Foc\u015fani Prison, was released on 13 January 2015. 8.  On 5 April 2011 the first applicant was admitted to Gherla Prison. He remained there until 12 March 2012, when he was transferred to Aiud Prison. On 13 April 2012 he was transferred to Oradea Prison, where he stayed until 20 December 2012, before being moved to Timi\u015foara Prison on 5 August 2013. 9.  The first applicant complained about the conditions of detention in Gherla, Aiud and Oradea Prisons. In particular, he complained of overcrowding (submitting that there was between 1.60 sq. m and 2.22 sq. m of living space per prisoner), the lack of natural light, the short duration of daily exercise and the lack of recreational activities. ... 10.  On 13 February 2008 the second applicant was placed in pre-trial detention in Craiova Prison. Following his conviction, he served his sentence there until 17 May 2012, when he was transferred to T\u00e2rgu-Jiu Prison. On 11 July 2012 he was transferred to Pelendava Prison. 16.  On 15 December 2009 the third applicant was admitted to Rahova Prison, where he stayed for several months before being transferred successively to Tulcea (2010), Ia\u0219i (2010-14) and Vaslui (2011-13) Prisons. 17.  The third applicant complained about the conditions of detention in Rahova Prison, referring in particular to overcrowding, lack of ventilation in cells, mould on the walls, poor-quality food and the presence of bedbugs. ... 23.  The fourth applicant was held in the Baia Mare police detention facility from 26 March to 25 May 2012 before being transferred to Gherla Prison. 24.  In his application form the fourth applicant complained of poor hygiene conditions, the lack of a toilet, running water, natural light and adequate ventilation, the presence of rats and the insufficient access to showers at the Baia Mare police detention facility. In relation to his detention in Gherla Prison, he complained of overcrowding, lack of ventilation in cells, insufficient and poor-quality food served in rusty containers, and the presence of only one bathroom between twenty-seven detainees, which had two toilets and no hot water and could not be cleaned more than once a month.\n...", "references": ["3", "2", "9", "7", "8", "0", "6", "4", "5", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1949 and lives in Donji Milanovac. 6.  He was employed by \u00d0erdap, a company in Kladovo (Ribarsko gazdinstvo \u201c\u00d0erdap\u201d \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe debtor company\u201d). 7.  On 28 December 1998 the applicant was reassigned to a lower post by his employer. He was subsequently dismissed on 20 January 2000. These two decisions, taken by the company\u2019s managing director, were upheld by its board of management. 8.  On 18 February 1999 the applicant filed a civil claim against the debtor company; on 26 April 2000 he filed a separate claim seeking reinstatement to a suitable position, as well as the outstanding salary payments and social benefits. 9.  On 19 June 2003 the Majdanpek Municipal Court (hereinafter \u201cthe Municipal Court\u201d) ruled in favour of the applicant and ordered the debtor company to reinstate the applicant to a post which corresponded to his professional qualifications and to pay him specified amounts on account of salary arrears and social insurance contributions, plus the costs of the civil proceedings. This judgment became final on 23 October 2003. 10.  On 16 February 2004, 9 March 2004, 18 and 19 October 2004, respectively upon the applicant\u2019s requests to that effect, the Municipal Court accepted the enforcement of the said judgment and further ordered the debtor to pay the applicant the enforcement costs. 11.  The Municipal Court provided the National Bank of Serbia (Narodna banka Srbije \u2013 \u201cthe Central Bank\u201d) with the above-mentioned enforcement orders on 14 April 2004, 20 July 2004 and 11 November 2004, respectively. 12.  It would appear that none of the above-mentioned enforcement orders have been enforced to date. 13.  On 8 April 2010 the Central Bank informed the Zaje\u010dar Commercial Court of the suspension of the debtor company\u2019s accounts for three years. 14.  On 13 April 2010 the Commercial Court opened preliminary insolvency proceedings against the debtor company. 15.  On 30 June 2010 the Commercial Court opened and closed the insolvency proceedings against the debtor company and that decision became final on 10 August 2010. 16.  The debtor company was ultimately struck from the relevant public register on 31 August 2010. 17.  The debtor company in the present case had been a socially owned company. In 1991 it was transformed into a limited company which remained mainly socially owned, and remained as such until it was struck off the register (see http://apr.gov.rs/, accessed on 1 December 2016).", "references": ["4", "5", "7", "0", "8", "6", "2", "1", "9", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in Kosovo. 6.  The applicant entered Austria for the first time on 14 January 1994 when he was 19 years old. 7.  In November 1994 the applicant was arrested for working illegally, and on 16 November 1994 the Dornbirn District Administrative Authority (Bezirkshauptmannschaft) issued a decision imposing a five-year residence ban (Aufenthaltsverbot) on him. 8.  On 5 January 1995 the applicant lodged an asylum claim, which on 27 January 1995 was dismissed by the Federal Asylum Office (Bundesasylamt) as unfounded. His appeal against that decision was dismissed, and he voluntarily returned to Kosovo in September 1997. 9.  On 1 July 1998 the applicant returned to Austria and lodged a fresh asylum claim on 8 July 1998, this time together with his wife and their daughter. The asylum claim was dismissed by the Federal Asylum Office on 12 August 1998, but the applicant and his family were granted subsidiary protection. They received a temporary residence permit, which was extended several times. 10.  The applicant\u2019s temporary residence permit, which was based on his right to subsidiary protection, expired in December 2009, as he had not applied for its renewal. 11.  On 2 March 2003 the Dornbirn District Court (Bezirksgericht \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe District Court\u201d) convicted the applicant of bodily harm and sentenced him to a fine of 350 euros (EUR), suspended in part on the basis of a probationary period. 12.  On 29 August 2003 the Feldkirch Regional Court (Landesgericht \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe Regional Court\u201d) convicted the applicant of bodily harm. He was sentenced to a fine of EUR 400, which was suspended on the basis of a probationary period. 13.  On 30 October 2003 the Regional Court convicted the applicant of aggravated burglary and sentenced him to twelve months\u2019 imprisonment, eight and a half months of which were suspended on the basis of a probationary period. He was in pre-trial detention and then prison from 28 July to 11 November 2003. 14.  On 26 July 2004 the Regional Court convicted the applicant of participating in a brawl, for which he was sentenced to a fine of EUR 720. 15.  On 17 January 2006 the District Court convicted the applicant of bodily harm and sentenced him to a fine of EUR 600. 16.  On 13 March 2007 the Regional Court convicted the applicant of several offences under the Drugs Act (Suchtmittelgesetz) and aggravated threat, and he was sentenced to ten months\u2019 imprisonment. The suspension of the eight and a half months\u2019 imprisonment in the sentence of 30 October 2003 (see paragraph 13 above) was revoked. The applicant was in prison from 23 May until 12 November 2007. A part of the prison sentence was postponed until 18 November 2009, when the applicant started serving the remainder of the sentence. 17.  On 21 January 2010, hence while he was in prison, the Regional Court convicted the applicant of an offence under the Drugs Act and sentenced him to a fine of 400 EUR. 18.  On 12 May 2010 the Bregenz District Court convicted the applicant, who was still in prison at that time, of attempted bodily harm, bodily injury caused by negligence, and endangering the physical integrity of others, and sentenced him to a fine. 19.  On 2 August 2012 the Regional Court convicted the applicant of aggravated threat and sentenced him to seven months\u2019 imprisonment. It was his ninth criminal conviction in Austria. 20.  On 13 September 2007, as a consequence of his criminal convictions, the Dornbirn District Administrative Authority issued the applicant with a ban prohibiting his return to Austria (R\u00fcckkehrverbot, see paragraph 33 below), which was valid for ten years. It however remained without effect as long as his subsidiary protection status was still valid (see paragraph 34 below). The Vorarlberg Security Police Authority (Sicherheitspolizeidirektion) confirmed the ban in a decision of 5 November 2007. The applicant did not appeal against that decision. 21.  On 29 March 2010 the Innsbruck Federal Asylum Office instituted proceedings to withdraw the applicant\u2019s subsidiary protection. On 7 April 2010 it conducted an interview with him, during which he stated the following concerning his living situation in Austria. He had four children, born in 1997, 1999, 2000 and 2006 respectively. His parents, his three siblings and their spouses and children all lived in the same city as him. His parents and his older brother were recognised refugees. He and his parents lived in the same house. He was working as a maintenance man and translator for Albanian and German, and his wife was also working. Both had a regular income. His father still owned some land and three shops in Kosovo, which were run by relatives at that time. The applicant stated that if he had to return to Kosovo he would not know what to do there or where to go. He had a \u201cbad feeling\u201d about returning, but did not fear any repression. The security situation was bad, and the views of society were primitive. His wife and children would not have to fear any problems upon returning to Kosovo, and would probably join him if he were expelled. He would, however, prefer to stay in Austria, where his children went to school. 22.  On 17 May 2010 the Federal Asylum Office withdrew the applicant\u2019s subsidiary protection status under section 9 (1) of the Asylum Act (Asylgesetz). It found that there was no longer a risk of a violation of the applicant\u2019s rights under Article 2 or 3 of the Convention if he was returned to Kosovo, and declared his expulsion admissible. Quoting international sources, it explained that the security situation in Kosovo had significantly improved in recent years and was now considered to be stable. There was no threat from the Kosovo Liberation Army (Ushtria \u00c7lirimtare e Kosov\u00ebs) anymore, which the applicant had initially alleged when applying for asylum. 23.  Turning to the applicant\u2019s rights under Article 8 of the Convention, the Federal Asylum Office acknowledged how established his private and family life was in Austria, where his family members were living. However, it referred to his numerous convictions for crimes against life and limb as well as property, and concluded that the public interest in his expulsion outweighed his personal interest in remaining in the country. The Federal Asylum Office specifically mentioned the two convictions for drug offences in 2007 and 2010, which it considered particularly serious. Further, it held that the applicant still had ties with Kosovo, because he had grown up there, spoke Albanian, and was physically capable of working in order to earn a living. According to the applicant\u2019s own statements, his father still owned some land and three shops in Kosovo, so it could be assumed that he could find work. Given that the applicant\u2019s wife had her own income, the Federal Asylum Office further assumed that she would be able to take care of the needs of the family, and that the applicant could send her financial maintenance from Kosovo. 24.  On 27 June 2011 the Asylum Court (Asylgerichtshof) confirmed the relevant parts of the Federal Asylum Office\u2019s decision. It held that, according to Article 19 \u00a7 3 in conjunction with Article 37 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch), the fines the applicant had received for his criminal convictions (1460 daily rates in total), amounted to almost twenty\u2011four months\u2019 imprisonment (see paragraphs 35-36 below). The actual prison sentences he had received amounted to twenty-two months in total, which was considerable. The Asylum Court concluded that, even though the applicant had strong private and family ties in Austria, the public interest in his expulsion in order to prevent crime outweighed his personal interest in continuing his family life in Austria. He had reoffended even after he had been issued with the ban prohibiting his return to Austria, a fact which did not speak in his favour. Also, he could reapply for a residence permit in 2017 when the ban expired. 25.  The applicant lodged a complaint against that decision with the Constitutional Court. Among other things, he stated that one of his daughters had in fact been born as a result of an extra-marital relationship with an Austrian citizen, and was living with her Austrian mother and not with him. The applicant claimed that it would be difficult to maintain contact with her if he were expelled to Kosovo. 26.  The Constitutional Court then asked the Asylum Court to submit a statement regarding this new fact. The Asylum Court replied on 13 September 2011 that the applicant had spoken of four children throughout the proceedings, but had never mentioned that one of them had in fact been born as a result of an extra-marital relationship and had never lived with him in the same household. He could continue to pay financial maintenance from Kosovo for his daughter. The Asylum Court expressed the view that the decision to declare the applicant\u2019s expulsion admissible was nonetheless proportionate to the aims pursued, as his family life with his illegitimate daughter was in any event much less established than that with his other family members. 27.  On 14 December 2011 the Constitutional Court refused to deal with the applicant\u2019s complaint. That decision was served on the applicant\u2019s counsel on 9 January 2012. 28.  The applicant was in pre-trial detention and prison from 1 June 2012 (in relation to the criminal conviction of 2 August 2012, see paragraph 19 above) until he was placed in detention pending his expulsion on 4 January 2013. 29.  On 5 January 2013 the applicant was expelled to Kosovo. His family decided to remain in Austria. 30.  The ban on the applicant\u2019s returning to Austria is in force until 16 November 2017.", "references": ["1", "5", "7", "4", "8", "6", "0", "3", "2", "9", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1980 and lives in Kresnice. 7.  The applicant and his family lived in a house in Litija which was sold in the impugned enforcement proceedings, described below. 8.  During the proceedings described below the applicant was the subject of enforcement claims brought by three different creditors, namely a public water-supply company JP Vodovod-kanalizacija J. (hereinafter \u201ccompany J.\u201d), private company Porsche Kredit in Leasing SLO (hereinafter \u201ccompany P.\u201d), and an individual, A.A. Each creditor was seeking to enforce its own claim against the applicant. Although company P. had initially requested that the enforcement be carried out by seizing the applicant\u2019s house, its claim was subsequently paid from the applicant\u2019s bank account. Having been unsuccessful in securing the payment of its claim by the sale of movable property, company J. subsequently requested that enforcement action be taken against the applicant\u2019s house. The house was ultimately sold at public auction for the purposes of enforcing company J.\u2019s claim. A.A. joined the proceedings with his claim after the house had been awarded to the successful bidder at the aforementioned public auction. As the applicant repaid the debt to company J. after the auction, the proceeds from the sale of the house were used to cover his debt to A.A. Taxes and the outstanding mortgage on the house were also paid from the proceeds. 9.  Company J. is based in Ljubljana and is the largest public water-supply company in Slovenia. On 18 December 2007 it sent the applicant a water bill in the amount of 124 euros (EUR), which was due to be paid on 5 January 2008. 10.  As the applicant had not settled the aforementioned water bill of 18 December 2007, company J. instituted enforcement proceedings against him on 28 May 2009. It sought enforcement of the principal amount of EUR 124 plus default interest. 11.  On 2 June 2009 the Ljubljana Local Court issued an enforcement decision \u2013 a writ of execution \u2013 against the applicant, ordering the seizure of his movable property as requested by company J. The decision contained a notice that an objection could be lodged by the debtor within a time-limit of eight days. The decision was served on the applicant on 24 June 2009. Since the applicant did not object to it, it became final on 3 July 2009. The case was subsequently transferred to the Litija Local Court for further consideration. 12.  On 7 January 2010 an enforcement officer went to the applicant\u2019s house with a view to seizing movable property. A report drawn up by the enforcement officer stated that nobody was at the property. The enforcement officer left a note, which included information concerning the attempted enforcement of the principal debt, interest and costs totalling EUR 376. He also wrote to the applicant inviting him to pay the debt voluntarily. 13.  On 2 March 2010 company P. instituted enforcement proceedings seeking payment of EUR 1,576 together with interest accrued as from 10 July 2009 until payment. It proposed several means of enforcement, including the sale of the applicant\u2019s house. The Ljubljana Local Court granted the request and the decision was served on the applicant on 9 March 2010. Since the applicant did not lodge an objection, the decision became final on 18 March 2010 and was transferred to the Litija Local Court for further consideration. 14.  On 21 April 2010, as part of the proceedings instituted by company P., the Litija Local Court ordered a valuation of the applicant\u2019s house. The order was served on the applicant through his father. Subsequently, on 2 June 2010, a property valuer submitted a report in which he set the market value of the house at EUR 140,000. He also stated that the applicant had assured him on the phone that the debt had already been repaid, but had then failed to submit confirmation of such repayment. The report was sent to the applicant for comment. As neither the applicant nor any other adult member of his household was found at the address, a note was left on 8 June 2010 directing the applicant to collect the report at the post office. However, he failed to do so, and on 24 June 2010 the report was left in his mailbox (see paragraphs 52 and 53 below). The applicant did not react to the report. 15.  In the meantime, on 29 April 2010, the enforcement officer inspected the interior of the applicant\u2019s house in the presence of the applicant\u2019s wife and concluded that it contained no objects which could be seized and sold to cover the debt concerned in the proceedings instituted by company J. The officer again left a note inviting the applicant to pay the debt, now amounting to EUR 516, voluntarily. In his report, he proposed that the creditor choose some other means of enforcement, because enforcement directed against movable property would not suffice for the payment of the enforcement costs, let alone the debt. It was also established that the applicant\u2019s car was leased and therefore could not be seized for enforcement purposes. 16.  On 15 June 2010 company J. applied to the Litija Local Court for an attachment order in respect of the applicant\u2019s immovable property, namely his house. 17.  On 17 June 2010 the Litija Local Court granted company J.\u2019s application and issued a decision allowing enforcement to be carried out by means of the sale of the applicant\u2019s house. The decision was served on the applicant via his wife on 21 June 2010. The applicant did not lodge an objection. Subsequently, the court joined company J.\u2019s application to the proceedings instituted by company P. 18.  On 1 July 2010, the Litija Local Court set the amount to be paid to the property valuer. This was then paid from the deposit made by company P. On the same day the court also issued a decision setting the market price of the applicant\u2019s house at EUR 140,000. After an unsuccessful attempt to serve both decisions on the applicant, they were left in the applicant\u2019s mailbox (see paragraphs 52 and 53 below). The applicant did not appeal against the decisions. 19.  On 31 August 2010 the Litija Local Court discontinued the enforcement proceedings pursued by company P. because the debt had been paid by means of the seizure of assets from the applicant\u2019s bank account. 20.  On 1 September 2010 the Litija Local Court ordered that a public auction of the applicant\u2019s house be held on 7 October 2010. Following an unsuccessful attempt on 3 September 2010 to serve the order and the summons on the applicant, they were left in his mailbox (see paragraphs 52 and 53 below) on 20 September 2010. 21.  On 2 September 2010 the Litija Local Court discontinued the enforcement action in respect of the applicant\u2019s movable property because company J. had not lodged a new application within three months of the failed attempt (see paragraph 15 above). The decision was served on the applicant on 6 September 2010. 22.  On 7 October 2010 a first public auction of the applicant\u2019s house was held. However, there were no interested buyers. The applicant did not appear. 23.  On 8 October 2010 the Litija Local Court ordered a second public auction to be held on 18 November 2010. Following an unsuccessful attempt to serve the order and the summons on the applicant on 14 October 2010, a note was left directing the applicant to collect them at the local post office. As he failed to do so, they were left in his mailbox (see paragraphs 52 and 53 below) on 2 November 2010. 24.  In the meantime, on 18 and 25 October 2010, company J. applied to the Litija Local Court for an extension of the enforcement order to other means of enforcement, namely the attachment of the applicant\u2019s bank account and his salary respectively. 25.  At the second public auction held on 18 November 2010 the house was sold to M.L. for EUR 70,000, namely 50% of its estimated market value. The applicant did not appear. 26.  On 19 November 2010 the Litija Local Court issued a written decision awarding the property to the bidder, M.L. (sklep o domiku). The award decision, together with a copy of the minutes of the second auction, was served on the applicant via his wife on 23 November 2010. 27.  On 22 November 2010 the Litija Local Court granted company J.\u2019s application and attached to the enforcement order the applicant\u2019s salary and bank account. The decision was served on the applicant on 24 November 2010. The decision mentioned that enforcement had previously been ordered against movable property, but contained no mention of the judicial sale of the house. It was noted that up to two thirds of the salary the applicant was receiving from his employer K. could be seized, provided that the applicant was left with the statutory minimum guaranteed income. The decision also contained a notice to the bank, which stated, among other things, that if no assets were currently available, the bank should proceed with the seizure once assets became available; if no assets became available within a year of the decision being served on the bank, the latter should inform the court to that effect. 28.  On 22 November 2010 another creditor, A.A., applied to the court for enforcement of a court judgment granting him compensation together with costs and interest, totalling EUR 5,112, with accrued interest. He requested that the enforcement be carried out by attachment of the applicant\u2019s house. 29.  On 24 November 2010 the applicant lodged an appeal against the award decision in which he informed the court that he had repaid the debt (see paragraph 26 above). He argued, inter alia, that he had been unable to go to the auction and that he had only learned from the impugned decision that the auction had been held. He further submitted that in the meantime he had repaid his debt. He had been having financial difficulties throughout that year since his father had died and his mother had lost her job. In this connection he submitted that he had needed to support her in addition to his wife, who had also been unemployed, and his two children. He stressed that in the event that the award decision were not revoked, his family would risk becoming homeless. Moreover, his employer, company K., had received the same day the enforcement order directed against his salary. 30.  Following the applicant\u2019s repayment of the debt on 24 November 2010, company J. on the same day applied to the court for discontinuation of the enforcement proceedings. 31.  On 25 November 2010 the Litija Local Court discontinued the enforcement proceedings instituted by company J. 32.  On 2 December 2010 the Ljubljana Local Court granted the application for attachment of the applicant\u2019s house in the enforcement proceedings instituted by A.A. (see paragraph 28 above). 33.  The applicant lodged an objection to the above decision (see paragraph 32 above), stating that the enforcement proceedings instituted by company J. had already been discontinued and that he wished to have A.A.\u2019s claim enforced by the seizure of his monetary assets and repaid in twelve monthly instalments. On 19 January 2011 the Litija Local Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s objection and refused to adjourn the enforcement proceedings in respect of the attachment of the applicant\u2019s house. It also refused to allow the enforcement by means of seizure of the applicant\u2019s monetary assets as proposed by the applicant because it had not been shown that such means would lead to the settlement of the debt within a year (see paragraph 49 below). That decision was served on the applicant on 21 January 2011. The applicant did not appeal against it. 34.  On 29 December 2010 the Ljubljana Higher Court dismissed an appeal lodged by the applicant against the award decision issued in favour of M.L. (see paragraphs 26 and 29 above), which thus became final. The court held that the applicant had been properly summoned to attend the public auction, which he had not disputed in his appeal, and that he had not given a reason why he had been unable to go to the auction. The court dismissed his allegations that he had been unable to repay the debt. It explained that the enforcement decision concerning the debt of EUR 124 had become final in July 2009, whereas he was relying on circumstances which had taken place in 2010. Moreover, the debt was of minor value. The court further pointed out that the applicant had been properly served with all the court documents in the proceedings but had not reacted to them, which had been entirely his choice. It also found that there was no reason to suggest that the applicant\u2019s family would end up on the street, although their standard of living might worsen as a result of the sale of their house. Lastly, the court referred to Constitutional Court decisions nos. Up-35/98 and Up-77/04 (see paragraph 55 below), stressing that the subsequent repayment of the debt could not lead to the revocation of an award decision that had already been pronounced, regardless of the amount of money to be paid. 35.  On 12 January 2011, following the full payment of the sale price by M.L., the Litija Local Court transferred the property sold at public auction to him and ordered that his name be entered as the owner in the Land Register. It further ordered the applicant to vacate the house within thirty days of receipt of the decision. 36.  On 21 January 2011 the applicant, now represented by a law firm, lodged an appeal against the decision concerning the transfer of title and applied for revocation of the finality of the award decision. He argued, inter alia, that following the discontinuation of the enforcement proceedings on 25 November 2010, the court should have, in accordance with section 76 of the Enforcement and Securing of Civil Claims Act (hereinafter \u201cthe Enforcement Act\u201d, see paragraph 48 below), annulled any enforcement actions already taken; hence it should also have revoked the award decision. He stressed that at the relevant time the buyer had not yet acquired ownership of the property and therefore the revocation of the award decision would not have affected rights already acquired by the buyer. The applicant maintained that the summons for the auction had not been served on him. 37.  On 25 May 2011 the Ljubljana Higher Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. It held that under section 192 of the Enforcement Act (see paragraph 50 below) there were only two conditions to be fulfilled in order to allow the transfer of property to a buyer \u2013 a final award decision and the payment of the purchase price. Therefore, the law had been correctly applied. The court also rejected the allegation that the summons had not been served on the applicant, referring to the findings in the decision of 29 December 2010 (see paragraph 34 above). It also rejected the applicant\u2019s assertion that the discontinuation of the enforcement proceedings should have resulted in the annulment of orders to carry out enforcement, including revocation of the award decision. The court further stated that the Constitutional Court, in its decisions nos. Up-35/98 and Up-77/04, had already expressed an opinion that the revocation of the award decision would have interfered with the rights of others (see paragraph 55 below). 38.  On 17 June 2011 the Litija Local Court held a hearing on the distribution of the proceeds of the house sale and decided to distribute them as follows: the amounts of EUR 146 and EUR 5,895 would go to the applicant\u2019s creditor, A.A., who had joined his claims to the enforcement proceedings after the house had already been sold; EUR 1,372 to the Tax Office for taxes due for the sale of the house; and EUR 58,888 to a bank on account of the outstanding mortgage on the house. The remainder of the proceeds from the sale in the amount of EUR 3,699 was transferred to the applicant. The decision was served on the applicant on 18 August 2011. 39.  At the request of M.L., on 11 July 2011 the Litija Local Court issued a writ of execution against the applicant, ordering the eviction of the applicant\u2019s family from the house. The applicant lodged an objection and a further appeal, which were both dismissed. He referred to his constitutional appeal (see the following paragraph) and essentially argued that the sale should be revoked in view of the fact that he had repaid the debt before the award decision had become final. In his submission, the transfer of the title to M.L. could not therefore be taken as a valid basis for his eviction. 40.  In the meantime, on 28 July 2011 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal against the decisions of 12 January and 25 May 2011 (see paragraphs 35 and 37 above). He argued that the decisions were unlawful and arbitrary and that the sale of his house resulting from a debt of EUR 124 amounted to a disproportionate interference with his property rights. In particular, he argued that the court had been under no obligation to attach immovable property to the enforcement order. He also submitted that an award decision could not become final if the enforcement proceedings had been discontinued, a point he had explicitly raised in his appeal (see paragraph 36 above). 41.  On 5 March 2012 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s constitutional appeal by referring to section 55b(2) of the Constitutional Court Act (see paragraph 54 below). 42.  On 16 March 2012 the applicant and his family were evicted from their house with the assistance of the police. They first moved in with their relatives and later acquired a new home.", "references": ["8", "0", "1", "6", "5", "7", "3", "4", "2", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
+{"input": "5.  At the material time the applicant company was the publisher of Kvartirnyy Ryad, a newspaper specialising in coverage of the housing market in the Moscow area (\u201cthe newspaper\u201d). 6.  On 20 May 2004 the newspaper published an article by G. entitled \u201cSo sorry for the bird. The blue one\u201d (\u00ab\u0410 \u043f\u0442\u0438\u0447\u043a\u0443 \u0436\u0430\u043b\u043a\u043e. \u0421\u0438\u043d\u044e\u044e\u00bb \u2013 \u201cthe article\u201d). The article described a conflict situation concerning a large commonhold association, Bluebird (\u0421\u0438\u043d\u044f\u044f \u043f\u0442\u0438\u0446\u0430), which included eight blocks of flats in the south-west of Moscow. G. suggested in the article that a number of residents of the Bluebird flats had been affected by the alleged misuse of common areas, in particular attics in the blocks of flats and that T., the head of the commonhold association, had been behind the misuse. G. emphasised that T. was also the deputy head of a district council in Moscow and that he had declined to comment on the article\u2019s contents prior to publication. The article asked T. and the local government questions pertaining to the misuse of the common areas. 7.  The relevant parts of the article read as follows:\n\u201cResidents of eight blocks of flats in Severnoe Butovo keep sending letters to the courts, the prosecutor\u2019s office, the city administration and even President Putin to complain about the head of the \u201cBluebird\u201d commonhold association, T., [w]ho has developed an indecently hasty business activity spitting in the face of the association\u2019s Charter and a number of regional and federal laws. ...\n... But T. has expressed his distrust in the commission elected by the general meeting and has appointed his own commission...as a result T. has managed to retain his position ...\n... the commission was not elected, but appointed, which guaranteed the appointment of T. for a third term ...\n... In sum, even though T. did not have the majority of the votes, he nonetheless managed to conclude the contract ...\n... let\u2019s ask one final question, which again pertains to T.: does a State official have the right to combine his official functions with a commercial business activity?\u201d 8.  On 28 May 2004 T. lodged a defamation claim against the applicant company and G. with the Presnenskiy District Court of Moscow (\u201cthe District Court\u201d). The plaintiff alleged that the statements contained in the article damaged his honour, dignity and business reputation. The court received the statement of claim on 15 June 2004. 9.  On 8 December 2004 the District Court examined and partially allowed the claim, referring to Article 152 of the Civil Code and Resolution no. 11 of the Plenary Supreme Court. It reasoned:\n\u201c... the impugned statement: \u201c... who [has] developed an indecently hasty business activity spitting in the face of the commonhold association\u2019s Charter and a number of regional and federal laws\u201d should be retracted [by the defendants] ... as during the judicial examination of the case the defendants failed to prove that T.\u2019s actions were unlawful.\nThe defendants, a third party and witnesses explained that an attic ... had been unlawfully rented out. The lease agreement had been unlawfully concluded by T. ...\nHowever, no evidence has been provided [by the defendants] to the court to prove that the plaintiff\u2019s actions were unlawful or illegal or in violation of federal and regional law or the commonhold association\u2019s Charter.\nMoreover, the issue of the lease of the attic ... was examined by the Zyuzinskiy District Court of Moscow. By the decision of the Zyuzinskiy District Court of Moscow of 19 May 2004 actions of the Bluebird commonhold association headed by T. were found to be in compliance with the law in force.\nAs to the statements: \u201c... the commission was not elected, but appointed, which guaranteed the appointment of T. for a third term ... In sum, even though T. did not have the majority of the votes, he nonetheless managed to conclude the contract ...\u201d ... They are not to be retracted as they are not damaging to the honour and dignity of the plaintiff.\n... as to the statement: \u201clet\u2019s ask one final question, which again pertains to T.: does a State official have the right to combine his official functions with a commercial business activity?\u201d It should not be retracted either as ... the author of the article [G.] is asking a rhetorical question ...\u201d 10.  The District Court ordered the applicant company \u201cto refute the statement [published] in the newspaper Kvartirnyy Ryad on 20 May 2004 ... that T. developed activities as the head of the \u201cBluebird\u201d commonhold association, violating the association\u2019s Charter as well as a whole range of laws of the capital area and federal law\u201d. It also awarded T. non-pecuniary damages: 10,000 Russian roubles (RUB \u2013 approximately 270 euros) to be paid by the applicant company and RUB 8,000 to be paid by G. 11.  The applicant company and G. appealed against the judgment to the Moscow City Court (\u201cthe City Court\u201d). 12.  On 4 May 2005 it upheld the judgment of 8 December 2004 in full, referring to Article 152 of the Civil Code and to Resolution no. 11 of the Plenary Supreme Court. It provided the following succinct reasoning:\n\u201cThe plaintiff has proven the fact that the contested statements were disseminated: he provided the court with an original issue of the newspaper of 20 May 2004 ...\n... the court [of first instance] rightly held that the defendants had failed to prove the veracity of the disseminated statement ... that [the plaintiff] had developed an indecently hasty business activity spitting in the face of the association\u2019s Charter and the law.\nAt the same time, the court [justifiably] referred to the judgment of the Zyuzinskiy District Court of Moscow ... which found the actions of the commonhold association ... headed by T. to be in compliance with the law in force.\u201d 13.  On 25 July 2005 the City Court rejected a request by the applicant company for supervisory review. 14.  On 13 October 2005 the enforcement proceedings were terminated by a bailiff as the judgment of 8 December 2004 had been enforced in full.", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "2", "5", "0", "8", "9", "7", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1938 and lives in Hamburg. 7.  On 19 March 1970 the applicant married A.S. From 1980 the couple lived in Hamburg and as of 1986 they resided in a rented apartment. In 1992 they moved to Riga but maintained their place of residence in Hamburg. In Riga the couple acquired an apartment, which was the applicant\u2019s registered address in Latvia at that time. In 1999 or 2000 the applicant moved back to Hamburg and stayed in the couple\u2019s previous place of residence. The couple maintained contact by telephone and post. On 15 December 2000 they both signed a paper which stated that \u201cwith view of regulating their separated life, [the applicant and A.S.] conclude the following agreement\u201d. There is no information on the content of that document. 8.  According to the documents submitted by the applicant, her residence permit in Latvia expired on 15 January 2002. The Government maintained that the correct date had been 14 May 2003. 9.  On 5 December 2003 A.S. brought divorce proceedings concerning his marriage to the applicant before the Riga City Zieme\u013cu District Court (R\u012bgas pils\u0113tas Zieme\u013cu rajona tiesa). In his application A.S. stated that the last time he had seen his spouse had been in 2000 and that their marriage was to all intents and purposes dissolved. He also submitted that prior to lodging this claim he had talked to the applicant over the telephone and had informed her of his intention to bring divorce proceedings. He had invited her to submit in writing any pecuniary claims she might have in relation to their common property; however, the applicant had refused to discuss this issue. A.S. also alleged that the applicant\u2019s last known place of residence had been their apartment in Riga and that, owing to their disagreements, he could not find out where the court summons should be sent to. Accordingly, A.S. suggested that the applicant should be summoned to the hearing by a notice in the Official Gazette. 10.  On 13 January 2004 the Riga City Zieme\u013cu District Court summoned the applicant to a divorce hearing by sending summons to her previous place of residence in Riga \u2013 the apartment in which she used to live with her husband A.S. Upon receiving the information from post authorities that the applicant did not live at the above address, on 27 January 2004 the applicant was summoned to the hearing scheduled for 1 March 2004 with a notice in the Official Gazette. Said hearing was postponed at A.S.\u2019s legal representative\u2019s request in order to present additional evidence. With a notice in the Official Gazette of 3 March 2004 the applicant was summoned to a divorce hearing scheduled for 6 April 2004. 11.  At the hearing of 6 April 2004 the Riga City Zieme\u013cu District Court established that the applicant had been summoned to the hearing in accordance with the requirements of the Civil Procedure Law. Therefore, it ruled that the adjudication of the case could take place in her absence. Owing to his poor health, A.S. was represented by a lawyer who stated, inter alia, that A.S.\u2019s and the applicant\u2019s children lived in Greece. After hearing testimony from two witnesses, who stated that they had not seen the applicant since 2000, the court granted the divorce. No appeal was brought against this judgment and it came into force on 27 April 2004. 12.  On 29 April 2004 A.S. married A.A. \u2013 one of the witnesses who had testified in the divorce proceedings. The following day A.S. passed away. 13.  According to the applicant, she learned about the judgment dissolving their marriage when she came to Riga for A.S.\u2019s funeral. The Government did not dispute this fact. 14.  Following a request by the applicant of 26 May 2004 the Justice Authority of the Free and Hanseatic City of Hamburg (Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg Justizbeh\u00f6rde) on 27 July 2004 delivered a declaratory decision (Feststellungsbescheid) stating that the requirements for legal recognition of the judgment of the Riga City Zieme\u013cu District Court had not been met, as the divorced spouse had not been afforded an opportunity to present her case in the divorce proceedings. On the basis of the information before it, the Justice Authority established that A.S. had been aware of the applicant\u2019s address in Hamburg. Notably, A.S. had maintained contact with this address in general correspondence and in correspondence concerning the pension he had been receiving from Germany and the Netherlands. 15.  Following a prior request by the applicant, on 8 November 2004, the President of the Supreme Court submitted an application for supervisory review (protests) to the Senate of the Supreme Court asking for the judgment of the Riga City Zieme\u013cu District Court to be set aside and for the case to be adjudicated anew. He argued that the first-instance court had overlooked some evidence concerning the applicant\u2019s domicile and had erred in its application of the procedural rules when summoning the applicant to the hearings. In accordance with section 59(2) of the Civil Procedure Law, A.S. could have placed a notice about the proceedings in a newspaper in Hamburg, where the applicant resided. Besides, as Hamburg had been the applicant\u2019s registered place of residence, she should have been summoned to the proceedings via the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The President of the Supreme Court emphasised that owing to these violations the Justice Authority of the Free and Hanseatic City of Hamburg had refused to recognise said judgment. Lastly, the application for supervisory review stated that the applicant\u2019s rights guaranteed under Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention had been violated. 16.  On 16 March 2005 the Senate of the Supreme Court, sitting in an extended composition, with a final judgment dismissed the supervisory review application and upheld the judgment of the Riga City Zieme\u013cu District Court. The Senate of the Supreme Court concluded that, since A.S.\u2019s claim had not contained a reference to the applicant\u2019s address and since the Riga City Zieme\u013cu District Court had therefore been unaware of her whereabouts, its actions had been compatible with the procedural requirements of the Civil Procedure Law. Section 59(2) of the Civil Procedure Law imposed no obligation on the court; it only gave the plaintiff a right to publish the court\u2019s summonses in other newspapers at his or her own expense. The Senate of the Supreme Court also stated that in the circumstances of the present case a reference to Article 6 of the Convention could not serve as grounds for setting aside the judgment of the first\u2011instance court. It reasoned:\n\u201cThe aim of the application for supervisory review \u2013 a fresh adjudication of the case permitting the defendant to exercise her procedural rights \u2013 can no longer be achieved because the plaintiff, [A.S.], passed away on 30 April 2004, a fact which excludes any further proceedings.\nBesides, one should bear in mind that following his divorce form Lydia Heide Friedel Schmidt [A.S.] concluded a new marriage, which, according to section 64(2) of the Civil Law, could not be declared null and void, irrespective of whether the judgment of 6 April 2004 of the Riga City Zieme\u013cu District Court would be quashed.\u201d 17.  The parties differ on whether A.S. had been aware of the applicant\u2019s place of residence and on whether the applicant had been aware of the divorce proceedings. In relation to the first issue the applicant maintained that she had been residing in the couple\u2019s previous place of residence in Hamburg and that the landline telephone there had been used for their telephone conversations. Furthermore, A.S.\u2019s retirement pension and health insurance had been transferred to their shared bank account, as well as to their place of residence in Hamburg. The Government, in turn, relied on the information A.S. had submitted to the Riga City Zieme\u013cu District Court and also emphasised that no other evidence had been at the court\u2019s disposal. 18.  With regard to the applicant\u2019s knowledge of the divorce proceedings the Government pointed to A.A.\u2019s submissions before the Senate of the Supreme Court. In particular, A.A. had alleged that the applicant had been informed of the divorce proceedings over the telephone. The applicant maintained that even though she had been aware of A.S.\u2019s desire to dissolve their marriage, she had only learned of the divorce proceedings following the death of A.S. 19.  On 3 November 2005 the applicant brought civil proceedings against A.A. claiming one half of the undivided share of the property that A.S. had acquired during their marriage. She argued that it had been the spouses\u2019 common property. On 30 November 2006 the Riga Regional Court granted her claim in full. A.A. appealed against this judgment. The Court has no further information about these proceedings.", "references": ["2", "4", "6", "8", "5", "9", "7", "1", "0", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The present case concerns the applicant\u2019s trial and conviction for attempted murder of M. G., a businessman and former parliamentarian. A co-defendant, Y. W., was tried and convicted for assisting an offender. 6.  The facts of the case may be summarised as follows. 7.  On 29 December 2001 a bomb placed under M.G.\u2019s car detonated when the latter started the engine in the morning. M.G. survived without major injuries. 8.  On the same date the District Prosecutor\u2019s Office started an investigation into the matter. When questioned by police officers, M.G. pointed to the applicant\u2019s ex-husband, A.G., with whom he had major disagreements over business-related issues, as the only possible offender. 9.  On the same day A.G. was summoned to the police station. Having acknowledged the existence of disagreements with M.G., he denied the offence and stated that he had been at home with his son, V.G., the night before the incident. 10.  On the same day V.G. was arrested on suspicion of attempted murder. The charges against him were eventually dropped several months later since his involvement in the offence had not been established. 11.  On 18 February 2002 A. At., A.G.\u2019s friend who also knew the applicant and the family, was interviewed. He stated, inter alia, that he was aware of A.G.\u2019s problems with M.G. and that the applicant had always been against A.G. doing business with M.G. since she considered the latter a \u201cscammer\u201d. 12.   On the same date A.A., A.G.\u2019s neighbour, was interviewed and described his family as a normal and ordinary one. She mentioned that about a year before, the applicant had complained about M.G. because he owed them some money. 13.  On 29 January 2002 L.G., the applicant\u2019s daughter, was interviewed and stated, inter alia, that she had learnt about her parents\u2019 divorce three or four years previously. The parents had maintained good relations and the family was in contact almost every day. She also stated that, most of the time, the applicant stayed in the apartment where the father lived. 14.  On 21 February 2002 A.B., the applicant\u2019s neighbour, was interviewed. He stated that he had known the members of the family, A.G., the applicant and their two children V.G. and L.G., since 2001, when they had settled in the building. 15.  On 16 September 2005 Y.W., a friend of the family, was arrested following the discovery of a large quantity of firearms and explosives in his house. Shortly after, Y.W. confessed to M.G.\u2019s attempted murder and stated that he had acted on the applicant\u2019s orders. 16.  On 23 September 2005 the applicant was arrested and charged with instigation of attempted murder and property damage. 17.  On an unspecified date the investigation was concluded and the criminal case was referred to the Avan and Nor-Nork District Court of Yerevan for trial. The bill of indictment included L.G. in the witness call list while it appears that A.At., A.A. and A.B. were not included in it. 18.  At the trial, Y.W. retracted his pre-trial statements, claiming that they had been obtained under duress. The applicant denied any involvement in M.G.\u2019s attempted murder, stating that she had divorced A.G. in 1999 and since then she had lived with their daughter L.G. in another apartment while A.G. lived with their son, V.G. She also stated that at some point she had been asked to sign some documents in relation to a contract between A.G. and M.G. since the contract concerned the sale of the house where she used to live, which she did. However, in general she had no connection with A.G. and tried not to maintain any contact with him. 19.  At the hearing of 22 June 2006 the applicant\u2019s lawyer asked for L.G. to be excluded from the witness call list, since the latter was the applicant\u2019s daughter. This request was granted when L.G. expressed her wish to use the testimonial privilege. 20.  On 12 October 2007 the District Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced her cumulatively to nine years\u2019 imprisonment. Y.W. was also convicted. The District Court found it established that the applicant had ordered M.G.\u2019s murder as the property-related disputes between the latter and A.G. had also affected her property rights. In this connection the District Court mainly relied on the trial statements of S.A., Y.W.\u2019s spouse, and L.C., his former colleague and the fact that the applicant was involved in court disputes with M.G., which showed that both she and A.G. had a strained relationship with the latter. 21.  On 29 October 2007 the applicant lodged an appeal against the judgment of the District Court. On 3 December 2007 she lodged a supplement to her appeal claiming, inter alia, that she had no reason to murder M.G. as she had been living separately from A.G. since their divorce in 1999 and had no interest in his business activities. 22.  In the course of the proceedings before the Criminal Court of Appeal Y.W. retracted his statements made before the District Court and submitted that in reality he had organised the explosion of M.G.\u2019s car upon the applicant\u2019s request. However, he had no intention of killing M.G., but was trying to frighten him. The applicant maintained her defence. 23.  On 18 June 2008 the Criminal Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld the judgment of 12 October 2007 as regards her conviction and sentence, while Y.W.\u2019s sentence was reduced. In its judgment the Court of Appeal, inter alia, established that although the applicant had divorced A.G., she had maintained a family-like relationship with him and expressed her annoyance at M.G.\u2019s actions in the presence of different people. In this respect, the judgment of the Court of Appeal referred to L.G.\u2019s pre-trial statement of 29 January 2002, A.At.\u2019s pre-trial statement of 18 February 2002, as well as the pre-trial statements of two neighbours, A.A. and A.B., made on 18 and 21 February 2002 respectively. 24.  On 21 November 2008 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law claiming, inter alia, that the Court of Appeal had based its conclusions on the pre-trial statements of L.G., A.A., A.B. and A.At., which had not been read out and examined either by the Avan and Nor-Nork District Court of Yerevan or the Court of Appeal. Furthermore, she had had no opportunity to question these witnesses. 25.  On 15 December 2008 the Court of Cassation declared the applicant\u2019s appeal inadmissible for lack of merit. 26.  On 14 April 2009 the applicant lodged an application with the Constitutional Court challenging the compatibility with the Constitution of certain provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereafter, the CCP) allowing the Court of Cassation not to indicate reasons when declaring inadmissible an appeal on points of law. 27.  On 28 July 2009 the Constitutional Court granted the application by finding such provisions of the CCP incompatible with the Constitution. 28.  On 11 August 2009 the applicant, based on the above decision of the Constitutional Court, requested the Court of Cassation to reopen the proceedings and to re-examine her appeal on points of law of 21 November 2008. 29.  By decision of 25 September 2009 the Court of Cassation reopened the proceedings, re-examined the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law and declared it inadmissible for lack of merit. In doing so, the Court of Cassation, inter alia, indicated that the Criminal Court of Appeal\u2019s conclusion concerning the applicant\u2019s guilt was correct as it was based, among other things, on the witness statements of L.G. and A.A.", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "7", "9", "6", "5", "8", "4", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born on 12 May 1988 and at the time of his most recent communication with the Court was detained in Toretsk (previously Dzerzhynsk). 6.  Early on the morning of 16 February 2005 Mrs D., a night security guard at a shop in Toretsk, was found dead and partially undressed at her place of work, with injuries on her head and genitals. It was established that a grinder tool had also gone missing. The prosecutor\u2019s office instituted criminal proceedings on the same day and over the following days proceeded to interview a number of witnesses. 7.  At about 10 a.m. on 20 February 2005 two police officers arrived at the applicant\u2019s home and asked him, at the time sixteen years of age, and his father to go to the police station with them. 8.  Once at the police station, the applicant was separated from his father and questioned as to whether he had any information about the grinder which had disappeared from the shop. According to the applicant, then the police had started urging him to plead guilty to the murder and theft. According to him, as he repeatedly denied those allegations, three officers allegedly beat him on various parts of his body and threatened him that he would be raped in prison. 9.  At an unspecified time the same day the applicant\u2019s father and grandfather, who lived in the same house as the applicant, made statements to the police about the presence of the grinder in their house. The father stated that the applicant had apparently brought the grinder home around the time of the murder and had originally told him that a stranger had been offering the grinder for sale. On learning that the police were searching for a grinder, the applicant had told him the story he had told the police (see paragraphs 8 above and 13 below). However, in the applicant\u2019s story as retold by the father, the grinder was found in a different street. On hearing this, the father had hidden the grinder. The grandfather\u2019s account of events was similar to the father\u2019s. On the same day the police also obtained a statement of Mr S., the applicant\u2019s friend, about the time they had spent together on the night of the murder and the circumstances under which they had parted. 10.  From 12.30 p.m. to 1.20 p.m. the police went to the place where the applicant\u2019s father had hidden the grinder. The father pointed to where the grinder was and the police seized it. 11.  At about 3 p.m. the applicant signed a document explaining his rights as a suspect, including the right to remain silent and to consult a lawyer before his first questioning. When signing the document, the applicant added that he did not object to L. representing him. The applicant alleged that he had mistakenly understood that L. had been asked to appear on his behalf by his parents. In fact, L. had been asked to represent the applicant by the investigator. 12.  Subsequently the Qualifications Commission of the Bar of Ukraine, at the time the highest authority in charge of the advocates\u2019 qualifications and discipline, examined the applicant\u2019s parents\u2019 complaint concerning the procedure used in the appointment of L. The Commission established that there was no evidence that L. had been appointed through a bar association, as required by law, in particular there was no order of the bar association or agreement with the client appointing L. It also established that there was no evidence that the investigator had issued a formal decision appointing L. as the applicant\u2019s lawyer, as he had been required to do by law. 13.  At 3.20 p.m. the applicant was questioned in the presence of L. He stated that on the night of the murder he had been walking home after a night out with friends. He had observed a stranger running down the street with a grinder and had started running after him. Once the man had dropped the grinder, the applicant had picked it up and run away. When he had brought the grinder home he had said to his father that someone had been offering to sell a grinder. When he had learned the next day that a night security guard had been killed and that grinders had been stolen, he had revealed the truth to his father, who had then hidden the grinder. 14.  At 3:55 p.m. the applicant was examined by a forensic medical expert, who concluded that he had several light injuries that had been inflicted two to seven days before the examination. 15.  At 4 p.m. the investigator K. drew up an arrest report, whereby the applicant was arrested on suspicion of D.\u2019s murder. According to the report, the applicant was being arrested on the grounds that \u201ceyewitnesses indicate the person who committed the crime\u201d. According to the Government, the applicant\u2019s parents were informed of the applicant\u2019s arrest at that time. According to the applicant, no such notification was made. 16.  At the same time most of the applicant\u2019s clothes were seized for a forensic examination. 17.  The applicant\u2019s father was taken to the family home to accompany the police during a search. 18.  At about 6.20 p.m. the police completed the search of the applicant\u2019s home, seizing some clothes. According to the applicant it was only then that the police officers who had conducted the search brought replacement clothes from the applicant\u2019s home to the police station. 19.  According to the applicant, he was left handcuffed at the police station, wearing just his underwear, for the entire period from the seizure of his clothes until the end of the search and return of the police officers who conducted it, feeling very cold and vulnerable. During that time police officers continued urging the applicant to confess to the murder and beat him with plastic water bottles. 20.  On the evening of 20 February 2005 the applicant was placed in a cell in the police\u2019s temporary detention facility with two adult detainees, K., born in 1975, and O., born in 1956, who were at the time registered as suffering from drug addiction. O. had also been suffering from tuberculosis and had had a prior conviction (see paragraphs 62 and 63 below). It is unclear whether the applicant knew of the above background of his co\u2011detainees at the time he had been held with them.\nAccording to the applicant, the two other detainees were secret police informants. They advised the applicant that as he was a minor and if he chose to cooperate the investigative authorities would prosecute him on less serious charges and he would not receive a real prison sentence. 21.  The applicant continued to be detained in the cell with O. and K. until a court detention order arrived on 23 February 2005 and he was transferred to the remand prison (see paragraph 26 below). 22.  According to the applicant, on the morning of 21 February 2005 two police officers took him out of his cell without registering it. They threatened to make sure he got a long prison sentence, to charge him with rape, which would lead to him being raped and harassed in prison by other inmates, and to create \u201cproblems\u201d for his family, unless he confessed. Unable to withstand such pressure, the applicant agreed to copy by hand a statement prepared for him by the police officers, acknowledging his guilt for murder in \u201cself-defence\u201d.\nAccording to the authorities, on the morning of 21 February 2005 the applicant asked to see the officer in charge of the police detention facility. 23.  The applicant then made a handwritten statement of surrender to Officer G., the head of the police detention facility. In his statement, the applicant noted that early on 16 February 2005, while in a state of alcoholic intoxication, he had decided to burgle the shop. Having suddenly run into the victim, who had tried to attack him with a grinder, he had defended himself and had hit her with a brick. When she had become unconscious, the applicant, scared of what had happened, had carried her to a couch and had undressed her to make it look as though there had been a rape. Then he had picked up the grinder and taken it home. 24.  Later on the same day the applicant repeated the above confessions in a formal questioning session in the presence of his lawyer, L. 25.  On the same day the applicant, unaccompanied by L., was taken to an identification parade, where Y., a shop assistant who had been working on a night shift at a kiosk close to the scene of the crime on the night of the murder, picked the applicant out of a four-person line-up as the person she had seen by her kiosk shortly before D. had been killed. In the course of one of the subsequent trials Y. stated that she had not identified the applicant with total certainty but had merely thought that there was a resemblance between him and the person she had seen that night. 26.  On 22 February 2005 the applicant was charged with murder without aggravating circumstances and theft. Accordingly, his procedural status changed from that of \u201csuspect\u201d to \u201caccused\u201d. Questioned on the same day in the presence of L. the applicant repeated his previous confession. 27.  On 23 February 2005 the Toretsk Court remanded the applicant in custody pending the completion of the investigation. That decision was not appealed against and became final. 28.  On the same day the applicant\u2019s cellmates, K. and O., were released. 29.  On 25 February 2005 the applicant was transferred from the police detention facility to the remand prison in Bakhmut (at the time Artemivsk). 30.  On 31 March 2005 the applicant was questioned in the presence of B., a lawyer engaged by his parents. He stated that he confirmed his prior statements about the murder. In the course of the subsequent investigation he was again questioned in the presence of the same lawyer and made detailed statements that repeated his confession. 31.  On 6 April 2005 a commission of psychologists and psychiatrists produced a report at the request of the investigator concerning the applicant\u2019s mental state at the time of the crime and at the time of his examination by the experts. The experts concluded, in particular, that the applicant, according to his own account, had committed the killing in self-defence, without premeditation and through an unexpected confluence of circumstances. As a result, he had suffered a serious shock and confusion. At the remand prison he had suffered from sleep troubles, fear, and confusion and had displayed inappropriate behaviour. When examined by a prison psychiatrist he had been diagnosed with an acute reaction to stress, put in the prison\u2019s medical wing and treated with sedatives, which had helped. 32.  In the course of the trial, conducted in the presence of his lawyer A.Kh. and his mother acting as a lay defender, the applicant confirmed the account of the attack on D. which he had given in the course of the pre-trial investigation. 33.  On 21 July 2005 the Toretsk Court convicted the applicant of murder without aggravating circumstances and theft and sentenced him to seven and a half years\u2019 imprisonment. 34.  On 5 August 2005 the applicant, represented by his parents and a new lawyer, Y.K., appealed against the judgment. Additional appeals were also lodged by them on later dates. In the appeals the applicant retracted his confessions as false. He and his representatives alleged that the confessions had been extracted from him under physical and psychological pressure from the police, namely that he had been subject to \u201cphysical pressure\u201d, \u201cthreats and beatings\u201d, \u201cmoral and physical influence\u201d, that his statement of surrender \u201cresulted from beatings\u201d (\u201c\u043f\u0440\u0438\u043c\u0435\u043d\u0435\u043d\u044b \u043c\u0435\u0440\u044b \u0441\u0438\u043b\u043e\u0432\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0434\u0430\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f\u201d, \u201c\u0443\u0433\u0440\u043e\u0437\u0430\u043c\u0438, \u0438\u0437\u0431\u0438\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u044f\u043c\u0438\u201d, \u201c\u043c\u043e\u0440\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u0438 \u0444\u0438\u0437\u0438\u0447\u0435\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0435 \u0432\u043e\u0437\u0434\u0435\u0439\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0438\u044f\u201d, \u201c\u0432\u044b\u0431\u0438\u0442\u0430 \u044f\u0432\u043a\u0430 \u0441 \u043f\u043e\u0432\u0438\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0439\u201d respectively). According to him, he had been told that unless he confessed to murder he would be falsely accused of rape making his life in prison extremely difficult. He stated that two cellmates at the police detention facility also urged him to confess. He also noted that he had kept to his initial confessions until his conviction because his cellmates and the police had told him that the police would make his life difficult in prison if he told anyone of the pressure on him. On the other hand, they had assured him that if he chose to cooperate with the police they would make sure the charges against him were not serious and that he would be released from custody right after his trial. Accordingly, he had said nothing to his lawyers about his ill-treatment. 35.  The prosecutor also appealed, in particular arguing that the sentence was excessively lenient. 36.  On 4 October 2005 the Donetsk Regional Court of Appeal (\u201cthe Regional Court\u201d) quashed the judgment of 21 July 2005 and returned the case for further investigation. The court noted that the judgment had been poorly reasoned. As far as the motives for the applicant\u2019s actions were concerned, it had also been based heavily on the applicant\u2019s confessions, without sufficient corroboration from other evidence. The description of the crime scene, for instance that the lock had been sawn off rather than broken off, had not matched the trial court\u2019s conclusion, based on the applicant\u2019s account, that the applicant had simply been exploring the shop out of curiosity. The victim had also had unexplained injuries on her genitals. 37.  On 19 December 2005 and on several subsequent occasions the investigators attempted to question the applicant within the framework of the further investigations. However, he refused to answer any questions and denied any involvement in the crimes he had been charged with. 38.  On 11 and 12 January 2006 the investigator reclassified the charges against the applicant from simple murder to aggravated murder for gain, and from theft to robbery. The applicant was also charged with theft of a friend\u2019s cell phone. 39.  On 17 February 2006 the Regional Court released the applicant from custody, finding that a further extension of his detention would be in breach of the applicable procedural time-limits. 40.  On 21 April 2006 the applicant\u2019s case was submitted for a retrial. 41.  On 10 May 2006 the Toretsk Court again remanded the applicant in custody. It held that while the applicant had no prior convictions and had positive character references, he had no employment and had been charged with grave offences. Accordingly, it held that detention was necessary to prevent the applicant from absconding or interfering with the investigation and to ensure his compliance with procedural decisions. No time-limit for his detention was fixed in that decision or in those made on 30 November 2006, 21 May 2007, 24 July and 30 December 2008, and 27 May 2009 (see below). 42.  On 30 November 2006 the Toretsk Court returned the case for further investigation and ruled that the applicant should remain in custody. The court based its decision on the gravity of the charges which, according to the court, made the applicant likely to abscond. 43.  On 21 March 2007 the applicant\u2019s case was submitted to the Regional Court for a retrial. 44.  On 21 May 2007 the Regional Court again sent the case back for further investigation and, without giving reasons, ruled that the applicant should remain in custody. 45.  On 25 January 2008 the Regional Court convicted the applicant of robbery and the murder of D. 46.  On 24 July 2008 the Supreme Court quashed the conviction, returning the case for further investigation. The Supreme Court also ruled that the applicant should remain in custody. It gave no reasons for the latter part of its decision. 47.  On 30 December 2008 the Regional Court returned the case, which in the meantime had been re-submitted to it, for further investigation. It also ruled that the applicant should remain in custody. By way of reasoning it stated that there were no grounds to order his release given that, in view of the gravity of the charges against him, it could not be ruled out that the applicant would attempt to abscond. On 9 April 2009 the Supreme Court quashed that decision. 48.  On 27 May 2009 the Regional Court committed the applicant for trial and ruled that he should remain in custody for the same reasons as given in the order of 10 May 2006 (see paragraph 41 above). 49.  In the course of the final retrial the applicant denied any involvement in the attack on D. and said that he had found the grinder, describing essentially the same circumstances as on 20 February 2005 (see paragraph 13 above). To explain the presence of his fingerprint in the shop where the victim had been killed he stated that he had bought cigarettes there on 15 February 2005. 50.  On 11 November 2009 the Regional Court convicted the applicant of robbery and aggravated murder and sentenced him to thirteen years\u2019 imprisonment. In particular, it made the following findings.\n(a)  It found established that the applicant had broken into the shop intending to burgle it, had discovered D. sleeping, had repeatedly hit her on the head with a brick and then, after she had become unconscious, had inserted the neck of a vodka bottle into her vagina.\n(b)  In finding the applicant guilty, the court referred to various pieces of evidence, including forensic examinations, witness statements and the applicant\u2019s confessions \u201cgiven by him when questioned as a suspect and as an accused\u201d (see paragraph 26 above), and the presence of the applicant\u2019s fingerprint at the crime scene. In particular, the trial court referred to the pre-trial identification of the applicant by witness Y. and to the testimony of V.B., who had seen the applicant near the shop around the time of the murder. The court considered the applicant\u2019s explanation for the presence of his fingerprint in the shop unconvincing since he had first mentioned the supposed visit to the shop on 15 February 2005 in the course of the retrial and had not previously mentioned that visit.\n(c)  The court rejected the applicant\u2019s argument that his confessions had been inadmissible because they had been obtained under duress. It noted in particular that there was no evidence that the applicant had suffered any physical injuries at the hands of the police. Moreover, the applicant had consistently repeated his confessions in the presence of his lawyers, mother, and psychiatric experts in the course of the first investigation and trial. His parents had voluntarily paid the victim\u2019s burial costs. Still, the applicant\u2019s confessions had only partially reflected the truth. In particular, according to the forensic and other evidence, D. had been raped with a vodka bottle, which was not in line with the applicant\u2019s initial statements that he had accidentally killed her after being surprised by her and had then run away almost immediately.\n(d)  The absence of the applicant\u2019s lawyer from the identification parade on 21 February 2005 had not breached the applicant\u2019s defence rights since he had not made any statements on that occasion and had simply been physically shown with other men in the line-up to the witness Y. through a one-way glass partition. It had been Y., and not the applicant, who had actively participated in that investigative measure, and therefore it had not had any impact on his chosen defence strategy. Moreover, contrary to the applicant\u2019s submissions, Y.\u2019s statements concerning the applicant\u2019s presence near the crime scene on the night of the murder had been consistent with the statements of other witnesses.\n(e)  On an application by the defence the court ruled certain expert evidence inadmissible.\n(f)  While the statement in the arrest report that \u201ceyewitnesses indicate the person who had committed the crime\u201d (see paragraph 15 above) had been technically incorrect in the applicant\u2019s case, the discovery of the grinder in the applicant\u2019s home had in fact constituted an independent legal basis for his arrest. Accordingly, the Regional Court refused to declare the applicant\u2019s arrest unlawful. 51.  In an appeal to the Supreme Court the applicant gave the account of alleged ill-treatment by the police set out above. He stressed, however, that he had managed to withstand most of the pressure from the police. What had made him finally agree to plead guilty to a murder he had not committed had been the threat that he would be charged with rape and that that would lead to him being raped in prison. That threat had had a particularly strong impact on him given that he had already been made to spend several hours in a state of undress and vulnerability. He had chosen the false confession as a lesser evil. He had then maintained his confession throughout the trial because he had been assured by the lawyer B., who had good relations with the investigator in charge of the case, that the trial court would reclassify the charges against him from murder to a lesser charge of a \u201ckilling committed while exceeding the limits of legitimate defence\u201d. He had hoped that such a reclassification would allow him to get probation instead of an actual prison sentence. It was not true that, as stated by the Regional Court, he had repeated his confession to psychiatrists. In fact the investigator had assured him that the psychiatric assessment was pre\u2011arranged to allow for reclassification and its results would be worded accordingly. The applicant had not talked to the experts and his mother assured him that she had arranged for the psychiatrists\u2019 report to be worded in such terms that it may justify reclassification of charges against him. 52.  On 3 June 2010 the Supreme Court upheld the above judgment and it became final. 53.  It would appear that the applicant first raised his allegations of ill\u2011treatment in his appeals against his first conviction (see paragraph 34 above). In those appeals his allegations were framed in rather general terms and were limited essentially to allegations of \u201cbeatings\u201d and \u201cpsychological pressure\u201d. He also stated, more specifically, that he had been told that, unless he confessed, charges of rape would be brought against him and this would make his life in prison extremely difficult.\nAfterwards the applicant\u2019s parents also lodged complaints about his alleged ill-treatment with the prosecutor\u2019s office. It appears that the applicant\u2019s mother lodged first such complaints on 23 December 2005 and 16 January 2006. The Court has not been provided with copies of those complaints. 54.  On 26 January 2006 the Toretsk prosecutor\u2019s office, in response to the applicant\u2019s mother\u2019s complaint of 16 January 2006, refused to institute criminal proceedings in relation to the applicant\u2019s complaints for lack of a corpus delicti in the police officers\u2019 actions, concluding that there was no evidence of any physical or psychological ill\u2011treatment. The prosecutors referred essentially to the lack of medical evidence of any injuries suffered by the applicant at the time of the alleged ill-treatment and the lack of any complaints from him before his first conviction. The prosecutors also stated that there had been no irregularities in the applicant\u2019s placement and holding in the police detention facility and that O. and K. with whom the applicant had been placed at that facility had had no prior convictions. 55.  In the course of examination of the case against the applicant, on 14 June 2006, the applicant complained to the trial court about the beatings, handcuffing, stripping and the threats of prison rape he had allegedly been subjected to by the police. On 15 June 2006 the trial court ordered the prosecutor\u2019s office to investigate the allegations. 56.  On 29 June 2006 the prosecutor\u2019s office again refused to institute criminal proceedings essentially on the same grounds. No mention was made of the applicant\u2019s placement with adults in the detention facility. 57.  On 26 September 2006 the applicant\u2019s mother complained to the regional prosecutor\u2019s office, reiterating her allegations that the applicant had been physically ill-treated by the police, left in a state of undress and handcuffed and threatened that he would be charged with rape and would, therefore, be raped in prison. She referred to her previous complaint of 23 December 2005 on the same subject and complained that she had received no satisfactory answer to it. 58.  On 16 October 2006 the regional prosecutor\u2019s office overruled the decisions of 26 January and 29 June 2006. 59.  On 3 November 2006 the Toretsk prosecutor\u2019s office again refused to institute criminal proceedings, essentially on the same grounds as in its previous decisions. The prosecutors stated, with no further explanation, that there were no irregularities in the course of the applicant\u2019s placement and holding in the police detention facility. On 25 June 2007 the regional prosecutor\u2019s office overruled that decision as premature. 60.  On 10 July 2007 the Toretsk prosecutor\u2019s office again refused to institute criminal proceedings essentially on the same grounds. No mention was made of the applicant\u2019s detention with adults. On 8 February 2008 the regional prosecutor\u2019s office upheld that decision. 61.  Subsequently, other decisions refusing to institute criminal proceedings were taken, the most recent one on 31 December 2008. The copies of those decisions have not been provided to the Court. 62.  On 6 January 2011 the Toretsk prosecutor\u2019s office wrote to the applicant\u2019s father in response to his complaint. It said that the records of local medical institutions showed that at the time the applicant had been placed in the cell with O. the latter had been registered as suffering from tuberculosis but, according to his file, he had not posed a danger of infection to others. He had been admitted to hospital in March 2005 to treat his tuberculosis. O. had had a conviction at some point in the past but his conviction had been considered sufficiently old to have been considered expunged by time the applicant had been detained with him. 63.  On 14 March 2011 the Toretsk prosecutor\u2019s office wrote to the applicant\u2019s father, again in response to his complaint, stating that the placing of adult arrestees in the same cell with the applicant, a minor, had been in breach of domestic law (section 8 of the Pre-Trial Detention Act) and had constituted a disciplinary infraction on the part of the police officers who had taken that decision. However, they could not be disciplined because the six-month limitation period for disciplinary measures had expired. The prosecutor\u2019s office also confirmed that the applicant\u2019s cellmates were at the time registered as drug users.", "references": ["5", "8", "3", "7", "4", "6", "0", "9", "No Label", "1", "2"], "gold": ["1", "2"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1952 and lives in Cologne. He works as a criminal defence lawyer. 7.  In 2009 the applicant defended a client in criminal proceedings. After the proceedings had concluded, and when the client had already been imprisoned, the client\u2019s fianc\u00e9e transferred the applicant\u2019s legal fees (1,500 euros (EUR)) from her private bank account to the applicant\u2019s professional account. The subject of the bank transfer read: \u201cProf Dr Sommer fees (client\u2019s last name)\u201d. 8.  In 2010 and 2011 the Bochum public prosecution office conducted investigations into several individuals suspected of having committed fraud on a commercial basis as members of a gang. One of the suspects was the aforementioned applicant\u2019s former client, who again retained the applicant as his defence lawyer. During these investigations, the bank accounts of several people, including the applicant\u2019s client and the client\u2019s fianc\u00e9e, were inspected. The inspection revealed that the client\u2019s fianc\u00e9e had received money (EUR 7,400) which was suspected to have stemmed from illegal activities, and had transferred EUR 1,500 for legal fees to the applicant\u2019s bank account. 9.  On the basis of the bank transfer of fees from the fianc\u00e9e to the applicant in relation to the first set of criminal proceedings, the Bochum public prosecution office also contacted the applicant\u2019s bank. On 1 March 2011 the public prosecutor asked for a list of all transactions concerning the applicant\u2019s bank account from 1 January 2009 until that day. He asked the bank not to reveal the request to the applicant. He based his request for information on Articles 161a, 51 and 70 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter \u201cthe CCP\u201d), in conjunction with Article 95 of that Code (see paragraphs 23\u201125 below). 10.  On 1 April 2011 the public prosecutor requested further information and asked the following questions:\n\u201c(a)  Which other bank accounts, investment accounts or safe deposit boxes at your bank belong to the person in question?\n(b)  What rights of disposal (Verf\u00fcgungsberechtigungen) does the person in question have?\n(c)  Who else has a right of disposal?\n(d)  Do other accounts exist of which the person in question is the beneficiary?\n(e)  If so, what are the current balances on these accounts?\n(f)  If bank accounts have been closed by the person in question, please submit information about the date of closure and the balance at the time of closure, and where the money was transferred after closure.\n(g)  Which addresses of the person in question are known to you?\n(h)  Are you aware of any money transfers to or other transactions with foreign countries? If so, please specify the bank, account and amount of each transfer or transaction.\n(i)  Please submit a list of all transactions for all existing or closed accounts from 1 January 2009 onwards.\n(j)  Are there any credit cards connected to any of the accounts?\u201d 11.  The bank complied with both requests for information and submitted the information to the public prosecution office. In both instances, the public prosecutor did not order the bank to submit the information, but pointed to the obligations of witnesses set out in the CCP and the possible consequences of non\u2011compliance (see paragraph 23 below). 12.  The information received was analysed by the police and the public prosecutor, and a list of fifty-three transactions deemed to be relevant was included in the investigation file as evidence. Therefore, everyone who had access to the case file, such as the lawyers of the co\u2011accused, also had access to the applicant\u2019s banking information, including the names of his clients who had transferred fees. 13.  On 31 January 2012, after several unsuccessful requests, the applicant, as the lawyer of the accused, was granted access to the investigation file. From the case file he learned, for the first time, of the investigative measures concerning his own bank account. 14.  On 24 April 2012 the applicant asked the Chief Public Prosecutor to hand over to him all data received from the bank and destroy all related data at the public prosecution office. In his request the applicant emphasised his role as a criminal defence lawyer, which was known to the acting public prosecutor, and the consequences for his clients, whose names were accessible through the banking information. He further argued that the investigative measures lacked a legal basis. 15.  On 2 May 2012 the Bochum Chief Public Prosecutor refused the applicant\u2019s request. He stated that there was a suspicion that the money transferred from the client\u2019s fianc\u00e9e stemmed from illegal activities. Consequently, it was legitimate for the public prosecutor to investigate whether further money transfers had taken place between the applicant and his client or the client\u2019s fianc\u00e9e. Therefore, since the investigative measures were legitimate, the information received had to be kept in the investigation file. The Chief Public Prosecutor further pointed out that there was no legal basis for returning the data or taking the documents out of the investigation file. The Chief Public Prosecutor cited Article 161 of the CCP (see paragraph 22 below) as a legal basis for the information requests, since the bank in question was a bank under public law and therefore considered to be an authority. 16.  Subsequently, the file was transferred to the Bochum Regional Court (\u201cthe Regional Court\u201d), because the criminal proceedings against the applicant\u2019s client had started. The applicant therefore asked the Regional Court to return the data. 17.  On 19 July 2012 the Regional Court refused the applicant\u2019s application. The court found that the investigation was lawful, that the bank had provided the information voluntarily, that the documents could therefore only be returned to the bank and not to the applicant, and that the prohibition of seizure under Article 97 of the CCP (see paragraph 28 below) was not applicable, since the information had not been in the applicant\u2019s possession. Nonetheless, in order to safeguard the client\u2011lawyer privilege, it also decided to separate the documents in question from the general court file and only grant access to them if reasons proving sufficient interest were provided. 18.  The applicant appealed against the decision. He challenged in particular the findings that the bank had acted voluntarily and that there had been sufficient suspicion for such an extensive analysis of his banking transactions. He further reiterated that, owing to his position as a lawyer, there were several safeguards in place concerning the seizure of documents (see paragraphs 26-29 below), and these should not have been circumvented because his and his clients\u2019 personal information was stored at and by the bank, and not at his office. 19.  On 13 September 2012 the Hamm Court of Appeal confirmed the decision of the Regional Court. It found that the decision was proportionate and that the safeguards were not applicable, in particular since the bank could not be considered a person assisting the applicant or a person involved in the professional activities of the applicant under Article 53a of the CCP (see paragraph 27 below). 20.  On 19 September 2013 the Federal Constitutional Court refused to admit the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint, without providing reasons (case no. 2 BvR 2268/12).", "references": ["7", "6", "5", "8", "1", "9", "2", "3", "0", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Shakhty, the Rostov Region. 6.  On 29 March 2005 the Rostov-na-Donu Military Court (\u201cthe military court\u201d) ordered, inter alia, the commander of the military unit no. 3654 (\u201cthe military unit\u201d) to provide the applicant certain monetary compensation and allowance for the periods specified in the operative part of the judgment. The judgment came into force on 15 April 2005. 7.  According to the applicant, having received the writ of execution, he forwarded it to the commander of the military unit who partly executed the judgment (see paragraph 9 below). 8.  According to the Government, on 6 May 2005 the applicant received two writs of execution in his case and sent them to the military unit. 9.  According to the parties, the judgment was enforced only in part. On 22 August 2005 approximately 68,000 Russian roubles were paid to the applicant in execution of the judgment. As the Government submitted in their observations, the allowance for the period from 1 March 2003 until the date of the applicant\u2019s reinstatement in military service as well as some additional payments due to the applicant under the judgment of 29 March 2005 had not been transferred to him. 10.  As submitted by the applicant, despite his subsequent requests, the original copy of the writ of execution in respect of the judgment of 29 March 2005 was never returned to him by the military unit. Therefore, on an unspecified date he requested the military court to issue a duplicate of the enforcement document. However, his application was rejected. 11.  In 2005, 2006 and 2008 the applicant applied for an additional decision to be made in his civil case against the military unit which resulted in the judgment of 29 March 2005. He considered that an additional decision specifying the amounts to be paid to him under the judgment of 29 March 2005 would resolve his difficulties in claiming the outstanding amounts. In his application of 26 May 2006 he also asked the court to index\u2011link the delayed payments and claimed non-pecuniary damage for the delayed enforcement of the judgment of 29 March 2005. The military court rejected all of the applicant\u2019s claims, explaining that he should have applied for an additional decision before the entry into force of the judgment of 29 March 2005. 12.  On 3 April 2008 the military court refused the applicant\u2019s request to clarify the judgment of 29 March 2005 by indicating the specific amounts to be paid. The court considered that the applicant\u2019s request amounted to a call to amend the judgment rather than to clarify it. It held that the text of the judgment was clear enough and the applicant\u2019s disagreement with the way it had been enforced was not a sufficient ground for clarifying the judgment. On 14 May 2008 this decision was upheld on appeal.", "references": ["2", "5", "0", "6", "1", "7", "4", "8", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
+{"input": "5.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows. 6.  The applicant association represents the interests of Vietnamese entrepreneurs who rent retail outlets in a shopping centre specialising in Asian goods in W\u00f3lka Kosowska, a village in the Lesznowola Commune, some 20 km south of Warsaw. The applicant association intended to organise a demonstration to protest against the business practices of company X, which ran the shopping centre, for example by raising rents by 300%. 7.  W\u00f3lka Kosowska is a village with some 700 inhabitants and more than 400 registered businesses. The majority of the businesses are located in warehouses along Nadrzeczna Street. 8.  On 12 May 2008 the applicant association, acting through its lawyer, informed the mayor of the Lesznowola commune (W\u00f3jt gminy) about its intention to organise a demonstration on 19 May 2008. It indicated that the event would start at 7 a.m. and end at 10 a.m., and would include speeches by representatives of the applicant association. Afterwards a petition would be handed over to the representatives of company X. The demonstration was to take place at Nadrzeczna Street in W\u00f3lka Kosowska. The organisers estimated the number of participants at 150 people. They also explained that the objective of the demonstration was to make a common statement on the hardships caused by company X to its tenants as a result of its allegedly unfair business practices. Attempts to negotiate with the company had failed, so it had been necessary to organise common action. The organisers assured the mayor that the demonstration would be peaceful.\nAt the mayor\u2019s request, on 12 May 2008 the lawyer representing the applicant association specified that the demonstration would take place at no. 16 Nadrzeczna Street, opposite two warehouses. 9.  On 14 May 2008 the mayor gave a decision in which she banned the demonstration on the grounds that it might entail a danger to life or limb, or a major danger to property (section 8(2) of the Assemblies Act). The reasons for the mayor\u2019s decision were as follows:\n\u201cNadrzeczna Street is the main road in W\u00f3lka Kosowska and provides access to Krakowska street for residents and many businesses located on [that street], their deliveries and employees. It should be underlined that there is increased traffic on that street, particularly during the morning (and in the evenings), which impacts on traffic on Krakowska street. Nadrzeczna Street is used by public transport minibuses and by the school bus. Therefore organising a demonstration on that street between 7 and 10 a.m. would block the entire length of the street and also limit or even make impossible any journey by car to Krakowska street and in the farther direction of Grojec. In the event of a traffic accident, the intervention of the police, the fire service or the ambulance service would be difficult, if not impossible. Similarly, access to a doctor by the residents of W\u00f3lka Kosowska during the demonstration might be totally impossible. The same applies for any intervention by the fire service or the police. This authority concludes that the holding of a demonstration on this street during heavy traffic might put people\u2019s health at risk.\u201d 10.  On 14 May 2008 the board of directors of company X sent a letter to the applicant association referring to the demonstration planned for 19 May 2008. In the letter the applicant association was reminded that any demonstration organised on its premises would be illegal. The board of directors further referred to leaflets distributed by the applicant association, also without their permission, calling for a demonstration and blockage of the premises. According to the company, the only aim of such actions was disruption and they could not influence its position on the contested measures. In conclusion, the applicant association was urged to stop organising illegal demonstrations on premises belonging to company X. If the association failed to comply, company X would take all necessary legal actions and inform the prosecuting bodies. On the following day the board of directors met with the mayor of Lesznowola. 11.  On 16 May 2008 the applicant association lodged an appeal against the decision of 14 May 2008 (see paragraph 9 above). It argued that the demonstration would be limited to a small part of the street and that there were alternative streets which would allow access to the shops and the centre of the village. Access to Krakowska Street was also possible by other streets. The planned demonstration would not block the entire street and would not make it impossible for cars and buses to pass. Moreover, it was excessive to conclude that the demonstration would prevent residents from seeking medical help and emergency services from gaining access to residents in an emergency. The applicant association emphasised that the Assemblies Act invoked by the mayor provided for the banning of a demonstration only in extreme circumstances; the authority had failed to show that they existed in the instant case. The mayor had accepted the arguments of the company X, which was afraid of the demonstration, and had thereby limited the association\u2019s constitutionally protected right to freedom of assembly. 12.  The demonstration planned for 19 May 2008 did not take place; on the same day the applicant association send a fax to the mayor\u2019s office informing that they would not go ahead with the demonstration. 13.  On 24 July 2008 the Governor overruled the impugned decision and discontinued the proceedings as devoid of purpose, given that the demonstration was to have taken place more than two months previously. The decision was delivered to the applicant association\u2019s lawyer on 25 August 2008. 14.  On 16 May 2008 the applicant association informed the mayor of the Lesznowola commune about its intention to organise a demonstration at the same place on 26 May 2008. The demonstration was to last for a shorter time than the one previously planned, from 7 a.m. to 8.30 a.m. The applicant association assured the mayor that all public and school buses would be able to pass, as well as all emergency services vehicles. 15.  On 21 May 2008 the mayor gave a decision in which she banned the demonstration, relying on the same legal grounds as those relied on previously, and putting forward similar arguments. The mayor emphasised the fact that Wolka Kosowska had about 700 inhabitants, some of whom used Nadrzeczna Street to get to work and school in the mornings. Moreover, there were about 400 registered businesses in the village, most of which were located in the zone affected by the planned demonstration. Access by those entrepreneurs and for deliveries would be impossible. Nadrzeczna Street was a single carriage way with no pavement. The planned demonstration would thus effectively block that road, impeding access to many businesses. In such circumstances, the emergency services would also be prevented from accessing the zone. 16.  On 23 May 2008 the applicant association appealed against the decision. They pointed out that most of the entrepreneurs working in the warehouses intended to participate in the demonstration. Moreover, the mayor had failed to notice that the duration of the planned demonstration had been halved in order to accommodate the arguments that the mayor had put forward in her first decision of 14 May 2008 (see paragraph 9 above). The applicant association further argued that if the same logic were applied, many big demonstrations in Warsaw would not have taken place, as the protesters often blocked access to government buildings. 17.  The demonstration planned for 26 May 2008 did not take place. 18.  The Mazowiecki Governor gave his decision on 24 July 2008, overruling the impugned decision of the mayor and discontinuing the case. Its reasoning was identical to the decision given on the same day, but concerning the demonstration planned for 19 May 2008 (see paragraph 13 above). 19.  The decision was delivered to the applicant association\u2019s lawyer on 25 August 2008. 20.  On 1 September 2008 the applicant association informed the mayor of Lesznowola about a demonstration planned for 2 October 2008. The time, venue and purpose of the demonstration were the same as in the two previous cases. On 8 September 2008 the mayor banned the demonstration for reasons identical to those given in her previous decisions on the applicant association\u2019s case (see paragraphs 9 and 15 above). She stated that disruption to traffic would make impossible any intervention by the police or other emergency services. The holding of the demonstration might therefore put people\u2019s health at risk. 21.  Following an appeal lodged by the applicant association, on 18 September 2008 the Mazowiecki Governor overruled the mayor\u2019s decision. He emphasised the importance of the constitutionally protected right of freedom of assembly, which also applied to non-political assemblies held in a public space. The governor stated that the banning of an assembly should be treated as an ultimate measure and that such a stringent limitation on the freedom of assembly was limited to situations where constitutionally protected rights were in direct and serious danger. Moreover, any assessment of that danger should be based on facts and not assumptions. Therefore, the mayor\u2019s conclusion that disruption to traffic would put people\u2019s health at risk had been erroneous. There was no basis for a decision to ban the demonstration.\nThe demonstration planned for 2 October 2008 took place. 22.  On 24 October 2008 the applicant association lodged a complaint with the Constitutional Court. It relied on Article 57 of the Constitution, which guarantees freedom of assembly. 23.  On 9 May 2009 the Constitutional Court refused to consider the complaint. The court held that for the constitutional complaint to be admissible, the applicant association should have lodged a complaint with the Regional Administrative Court against the governor\u2019s decisions of 24 July 2008 (see paragraphs 13 and 18 above). 24.  An appeal by the applicant association against the decision was finally dismissed as lodged out of time on 16 September 2010.", "references": ["9", "1", "8", "3", "0", "4", "6", "5", "2", "No Label", "7"], "gold": ["7"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1988 and lives in the village of Trudobelikovskiy, Krasnodar region. 6.  At around midnight on 15 August 2007 the applicant, who was 19 years old at the time, and B. were taken in a police patrol car to the police station of the Syktyvdinskiy district of the Komi Republic for an examination of allegations of assault made against them by two individuals, in particular of the sexual assault of a woman. The police intervened immediately after the alleged assaults. 7.  According to the applicant, at the police station investigator N. demanded that he confess to the crime, and threatened him with ill\u2011treatment and rape in a cell at the pre-trial detention facility. The applicant refused to sign self-incriminating statements and was allegedly subjected to ill-treatment which he described as follows. He was taken to a cell where two policemen held his hands while a third policeman kicked him in the stomach leaving a boot print on his T\u2011shirt; the two policemen then threw the applicant to the floor, face down. Thereafter, the policemen took the applicant to N.\u2019s office, where he signed a \u201cstatement of surrender and confession\u201d (\u044f\u0432\u043a\u0430 \u0441 \u043f\u043e\u0432\u0438\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0439). He was then taken to the toilet by a policeman who started insulting him. When the applicant responded, the policeman allegedly sprayed gas in his eyes and hit him several times with a rubber truncheon. The policeman then pushed the applicant into the cell so that the applicant hit his head against the wall and fell to the ground. 8.  According to the police record drawn up by operative police officer K., the applicant signed the \u201cstatement of surrender and confession\u201d at 2.35 a.m. on 16 August 2007. 9.  Investigator N. instituted criminal proceedings against him and B. and ordered a forensic medical examination of the applicant to establish, in view of the nature of the crime, whether the applicant had any pathology which would prevent him from performing sexual acts. 10.  The applicant was taken to a forensic medical expert who found that the applicant had the following physical injuries (examination report of 16 August 2007): (i) two abrasions on the left side of the forehead, measuring 2.5 cm by 0.7 cm and 0.7 cm by 0.5 cm; (ii) an abrasion on the bridge of the nose, measuring 4.5 cm by 1.5 cm; and (iii) a bruise around one eye, measuring 3 cm by 4 cm. The applicant explained to the expert that his injuries had been caused by the three police officers who had physically assaulted him at the police station in the night of 15 August 2007, in particular by hitting his face against the wall. The expert concluded that the bruise and abrasions on the applicant\u2019s face could have been sustained in the circumstances and at the time alleged by the applicant. 11.  After the medical examination the applicant was taken back to the police station, where investigator N. told him that he must come back at 3 p.m. that day for questioning as a suspect and released him. His arrest was not recorded. 12.  On the same day the applicant complained to the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Komi that he had been ill-treated at the police station. He also asked the traumatology unit of the hospital in Syktyvkar to record his injuries. According to the hospital medical records, the applicant had the following injuries: (i) an acentric fracture of the nose; (ii) a bruise on the forehead; and (iii) abrasions on the forehead. 13.  On 17 August 2007 the applicant was arrested, questioned as a suspect and detained on remand by a court. 14.  On 20 August 2007 the applicant\u2019s mother complained to the Syktyvdinskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office that the applicant had been ill\u2011treated at the police station. In her complaint she stated, inter alia, that at around noon on 16 August 2007 the applicant had returned home from the police station with bruises and abrasions on his body, and a print from a large boot on his T-shirt in the area of his stomach. The applicant had told her that he had been ill-treated at the police station. 15.  On 29 August 2007 the prosecutor issued a refusal to open a criminal case against the law\u2011enforcement officers, finding, in accordance with Article 24 \u00a7 1 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, that none of the elements of the crimes provided for in Articles 286 and 302 of the Criminal Code (on abuse of powers and forced confessions respectively) had been present in respect of the actions of investigator N. or police officers S.I., K.L., S.A., Sh., and K.N. The decision relied on the following statements. 16.  Investigator N. stated that he had interviewed the applicant after he had signed his \u201cstatement of surrender and confession\u201d. The applicant had not complained of any physical violence against him. After the applicant\u2019s forensic medical examination N. had talked to the applicant again and then released him. N. had not seen any injuries on the applicant, or a footprint on his T-shirt, during his interview or prior to his release from the police station. N. had heard about the applicant hitting his head against the wall later on from K.L. Investigator N. denied that the applicant had been put under any physical or psychological pressure. 17.  The police officers denied subjecting the applicant to any ill\u2011treatment. S.I. stated that he had learned from K.L. that the applicant had struck his head against the wall. K.L. stated that he had learned from duty officer S.A. about the applicant striking his head against the bars of a cell. S.A. and Sh. stated that they had seen the applicant bang his head repeatedly against the bars and then against the wall in a room of the duty officer. While banging his head against the wall the applicant was allegedly shouting that he would complain to the prosecutor\u2019s office that police officers had beaten him up. 18.  The applicant\u2019s mother challenged the refusal to open a criminal case against the police officers and investigator N. On 18 January 2008 the Syktyvdinskiy District Court dismissed her complaint. 19.  On 4 March 2008 the Supreme Court of the Komi Republic granted an appeal lodged by the applicant\u2019s mother and quashed the District Court\u2019s decision, noting that no assessment had been made of the contradiction between the medical expert\u2019s conclusions and the police officers\u2019 allegations of the applicant\u2019s self-harm. Nor had the court assessed the applicant\u2019s medical record concerning the nose fracture, the allegation of the applicant having been kicked and having a footprint from a boot on his T\u2011shirt, the presence of a video surveillance camera at the police station which should have recorded the incident, or statements by B. that he had heard the applicant screaming at the police station. The District Court had not taken into account circumstances which could have significantly influenced its conclusions and had not given reasons why, in so far as the conflicting evidence was concerned, it had given preference to some evidence whilst rejecting other. A fresh examination of the applicant\u2019s mother\u2019s appeal was ordered by a different composition of judges of the same court. 20.  On 21 March 2008 the Syktyvdinskiy District Court ruled that the refusal to open a criminal case of 29 August 2007 had been unjustified for reasons largely similar to those cited by the Supreme Court. The court ordered the investigation authorities to rectify those deficiencies. 21.  On 23 April 2008 the deputy prosecutor of the Komi Republic overruled the refusal of 29 August 2007 to open a criminal case. 22.  On 24 April 2008 the investigative committee of the prosecutor\u2019s office of the Komi Republic issued a new refusal to open a criminal case against the police officers and investigator N., finding, in accordance with Article 24 \u00a7 1 (2) of the CCrP, that none of the elements of the crimes provided for in Articles 130, 286 and 302 of the Criminal Code (on insulting behaviour, abuse of powers and forced confessions respectively) were present in their actions. It was noted that, according to information received from the Syktyvdinskiy district police department, the video surveillance recordings of the room of the duty officer and the cells for administrative offenders for the period from 15 to 16 August 2007 had not been preserved. Such records were normally kept for three days and then automatically deleted. It was concluded that the applicant had caused injuries to himself at the police station with the purpose of avoiding criminal liability for the crime which he had committed. 23.  On 24 April 2008 the applicant was found guilty by the Syktyvdinskiy District Court. 24.  The applicant\u2019s mother challenged the second refusal to open a criminal case against the police officers and investigator N. 25.  On 16 June 2008 the Syktyvdinskiy District Court dismissed her appeal. It examined the explanations given by the police officers and investigator N., and held that the allegations regarding the applicant\u2019s ill\u2011treatment had not been substantiated. The court also noted that the allegation regarding the applicant\u2019s forced confession had been examined during the applicant\u2019s criminal trial and had been dismissed as unfounded in the judgment of 24 April 2008. The court further noted that the trial court had examined and endorsed the refusal of 24 April 2008 to open a criminal case against the police officers. Finally, the court concluded that the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment had been designed to discredit the law\u2011enforcement authorities. On 18 July 2008 the Supreme Court of Komi upheld that decision on appeal. 26.  The judgment of 24 April 2008 in the applicant\u2019s criminal case was subsequently quashed and remitted to the first-instance court for fresh examination. On 13 November 2008 the Syktyvdinskiy District Court convicted the applicant of sexual assault, specifially holding the victim to enable B. to sexually assault her, and sentenced him to four years and three months\u2019 imprisonment. The applicant denied his guilt at trial, asserting that he had signed the \u201cstatement of surrender and confession\u201d under physical pressure from the police officers and psychological pressure from investigator N. The trial court rejected the applicant\u2019s arguments, relying on the refusal of 24 April 2008 to open a criminal case against the police officers and investigator N. The applicant\u2019s \u201cstatement of surrender and confession\u201d formed part of the evidence on which his conviction was based, and served as a mitigating circumstance. The applicant appealed against the judgment. 27.  On 16 January 2009 the Supreme Court of the Komi Republic upheld the judgment on appeal, stating that it was irrelevant to the criminal case against the applicant whether or not the refusal to open a criminal case into his allegations of ill-treatment had been unfounded.", "references": ["7", "9", "5", "6", "3", "0", "8", "2", "4", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Zagreb. 6.  In the period between 1987 and 1989 the applicant underwent several operations in the Zagreb Clinical Hospital Centre \u201cSestre Milosrdnice\u201d (Klini\u010dki bolni\u010dki centar Sestre Milosrdnice \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe hospital\u201d), a public health-care institution, for a middle-ear dysfunction. 7.  Following surgery in October 1989 the applicant\u2019s condition deteriorated, resulting in paralysis of the left side of her face. In this connection, she underwent further treatment until July 1997, when it was found that her condition was such that she would not recover. The applicant took early retirement on grounds of disability. 8.  On 29 January 1998 the applicant lodged a civil action against the hospital and the relevant insurance company with the Zagreb Municipal Civil Court (Op\u0107inski (gra\u0111anski sud) u Zagrebu), claiming damages for alleged medical malpractice. 9.  In September 1998 the applicant urged the Zagreb Municipal Civil Court to schedule a hearing in her case. 10.  The parties exchanged further submissions in February and March 1999. The applicant submitted an expert report drafted by V.F., according to which her medical condition had notably deteriorated in January 1997. 11.  The first hearing before the Zagreb Municipal Civil Court was held on 17 September 1999. Following questioning of the applicant, the hearing was adjourned until further notice. 12.  In October 1999 and May 2000 the applicant urged the Zagreb Municipal Civil Court to speed up the proceedings. 13.  On 27 September 2000 a hearing was held at which the Zagreb Municipal Civil Court decided to commission an expert report concerning the circumstances of the applicant\u2019s treatment. 14.  On 14 November 2000 experts R.T. and P.S. were commissioned to write the report. 15.  In December 2000 P.S. produced a report in which he stated that he had found no indications of medical malpractice in the applicant\u2019s treatment. 16.  R.T. asked to be excluded from the proceedings on the grounds that he was employed in the hospital and that therefore an issue as to his impartiality could arise. As a result of his withdrawal, on 16 January 2001 the Zagreb Municipal Civil Court commissioned a report from another expert, J.G. 17.  In her report of 5 February 2001, J.G. found that the applicant\u2019s condition was irreversible, but did not provide any conclusive findings as to the alleged medical negligence. 18.  On the basis of an objection by the applicant to J.G.\u2019s findings, on 8 March 2001 the Zagreb Municipal Civil Court invited the expert to supplement her report with findings concerning the applicant\u2019s allegations of medical malpractice. 19.  On 9 April 2001 J.G. submitted a supplement to her report, finding that there were no indications of medical negligence in the applicant\u2019s treatment. 20.  In April 2001 the applicant challenged J.G.\u2019s findings and asked the Zagreb Municipal Civil Court to question the experts at a hearing. 21.  On 8 November 2001 a hearing was held for the questioning of the experts, who reiterated their findings. The Zagreb Municipal Civil Court found that it was necessary to commission another expert report from the University of Zagreb Medical Faculty (Medicinski fakultet Sveu\u010dili\u0161ta u Zagrebu) concerning the question whether the applicant\u2019s condition was a result of medical negligence. 22.  An expert report was commissioned from the University of Zagreb Medical Faculty on 14 January 2002. 23.  The University of Zagreb Medical Faculty produced a report on 28 April 2005. It found that the applicant\u2019s facial paralysis was a result of complications during surgery and not medical malpractice. 24.  In response to the expert report of the University of Zagreb Medical Faculty, the applicant specified her claim, arguing that the report established a causal connection between the surgery and the deterioration of her health. She also considered that according to the principle of objective liability, the hospital was responsible. The applicant did not express any objections concerning the report. 25.  In September and December 2006 the applicant urged the Zagreb Municipal Civil Court to schedule a hearing. 26.  At a hearing held on 2 February 2007 the Zagreb Municipal Civil Court questioned the applicant and ordered that the experts from the University of Zagreb Medical Faculty, N.\u0160p. and J.\u0160k., be questioned at the next hearing. 27.  On 24 May 2007 the Zagreb Municipal Civil Court heard evidence from N.\u0160p. and J.\u0160k. They reiterated their findings, according to which the deterioration of the applicant\u2019s condition had been a result of complications during surgery. 28.  A further hearing was held on 16 May 2008 at which the Zagreb Municipal Civil Court decided that K.R., the doctor who had treated the applicant, would be questioned as a witness. 29.  A hearing on 17 October 2008 was adjourned because K.R., who at the time lived in Serbia, had not been properly summoned to appear as a witness. 30.  At a hearing on 4 December 2008 the Zagreb Municipal Civil Court questioned the applicant. It also found that K.R. had not been properly summoned. 31.  On 22 April 2009 a hearing was held at which the Zagreb Municipal Civil Court questioned K.R., who explained the circumstances of the applicant\u2019s operations and further treatment. 32.  On 7 May 2009 the Zagreb Municipal Civil Court commissioned another expert report from D.V. with regard to the question of a causal link between the applicant\u2019s condition and her disability pension. In a report of 8 July 2009 the expert found that there was a direct causal link between the applicant\u2019s condition and her retirement on grounds of disability. 33.  At a hearing on 20 January 2010 the applicant asked that experts from another European Union State be appointed as expert witnesses in her case. The Zagreb Municipal Civil Court dismissed that request and concluded the hearing. 34.  In a further submission of the same date the applicant challenged the impartiality of the expert witnesses from Croatia, arguing that it was clear from the negligible number of cases where medical malpractice had been established that they were biased in favour of the defendants. 35.  On 29 January 2010 the Zagreb Municipal Civil Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s civil action, holding that in the case at issue the principle of presumed fault (presumirane krivnje) should be applied. That meant that it was for the defendants to show that the hospital had acted in accordance with professional standards and that the damage was not the result of a lack of diligence on the part of the doctor who had performed the surgery. Relying on a detailed assessment of the expert reports obtained during the proceedings, the court found that on the facts of the case, the deterioration of the applicant\u2019s health had been a result of complications in the treatment and not of medical malpractice. It also pointed out that there was nothing putting into doubt the quality of the expert reports commissioned during the proceedings and that the applicant\u2019s request that another expert report be commissioned from abroad would unnecessarily further prolong the proceedings and generate further expense. 36.  On 17 March 2010 the applicant appealed against that judgment before the Zagreb County Court (\u017dupanijski sud u Zagrebu) alleging, inter alia, that the medical experts who had drafted the reports had a personal and professional conflict of interest in the proceedings, as they involved allegations of malpractice against their colleagues and the experts were financially dependent on the hospital system. 37.  On 14 September 2010 the Zagreb County Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal as unfounded on the grounds that there was no reason to doubt the quality and findings of the expert reports. 38.  On 11 November 2010 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske), reiterating her previous arguments concerning lack of impartiality on the part of the experts and the quality of the expert reports commissioned during the proceedings. 39.  On 31 August 2011 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law as unfounded, endorsing the reasoning of the lower courts. 40.  On 2 June 2012 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint before the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) complaining of lack of an effective procedure before the competent civil courts to deal with her allegations of medical negligence. She also reiterated her complaints as to the lack of impartiality of the medical experts, arguing that the relevant statistics showed that it had been impossible to establish her allegations of medical negligence on the basis of the expert reports commissioned from the domestic experts. 41.  On 26 September 2012 the Constitutional Court declared the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded. The decision of the Constitutional Court was served on the applicant on 12 October 2012. 42.  On 7 January 2008 the applicant complained to the Zagreb County Court about the excessive length of the proceedings before the Zagreb Municipal Civil Court. 43.  On 26 August 2008 the Zagreb County Court found a violation of the applicant\u2019s right to a trial within a reasonable time and awarded her 11,000 Croatian kunas (HRK \u2013 approximately 1,530 euros (EUR)) in compensation. It also ordered the Zagreb Municipal Civil Court to terminate the proceedings within a further period of eight months following the service of its decision. 44.  The decision of the Zagreb County Court was served on the Zagreb Municipal Civil Court on 22 October 2008.", "references": ["9", "4", "2", "7", "6", "5", "8", "1", "0", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1955. 6.  On 26 February 2014 the applicant began to serve a three-year prison sentence. He was placed in Zagreb Prison Hospital (\u201cZPH\u201d). 7.  On 28 February 2014 the applicant applied to a Zagreb County Court judge responsible for the execution of sentences and the head office of the Prisons Administration requesting the suspension of his prison sentence on account of his state of health. He claimed that from 5 to 12 February 2014 he had been hospitalised in Dubrava Hospital in Zagreb because he had suffered a stroke. He also had two brain arteriovenous malformations, one of which had been removed in February 2013 by means of gamma knife radiosurgery, and the three-year high-risk recovery period had not yet ended. He referred to his medical documents, which had established basal ganglia in the ventricular system with a risk of haemorrhage, increased by the stress of the prison conditions. He also claimed that in combination with the epileptic fits from which he suffered, his health issues could be life-threatening. 8.  A medical report drawn up by ZPH on 6 March 2014 confirmed the claims put forward by the applicant in his request and concluded:\n\u201c[The prisoner] presents a permanent high risk to himself and the institution in which he is placed. The expert opinion is that two or three years are needed for his brain condition to stabilise after the gamma knife surgery. We consider his request for a stay of his prison term medically justified.\u201d 9.  On 18 April 2014 a Zagreb County Court judge responsible for the execution of sentences dismissed the applicant\u2019s request. This decision was based entirely on an opinion given by Dr B., an expert in internal medicine and cardiology. Dr B. concluded that the applicant was not suffering from any acute illness and that during his time in ZPH his chronic illness had not worsened. Dr B. also stated that in the event of a sudden deterioration in the applicant\u2019s state of health, he could easily be transferred to an appropriate medical institution. Lastly, he asserted that the applicant\u2019s current medical problems could be appropriately treated at ZPH. 10.  On 25 April 2014 the applicant lodged an appeal, in which he argued that since incarceration his medical condition had been deteriorating constantly, that the ZPH doctors had themselves recommended that his prison sentence be suspended on medical grounds, and that Dr B. could not give a proper opinion on his health since he was not an expert in neurology. 11.  On 8 July 2014 a three-judge panel of Zagreb County Court quashed the first-instance decision and instructed the first-instance court to order an expert opinion from a neurologist. 12.  On 21 August 2014 the same Zagreb County Court judge responsible for the execution of sentences dismissed the applicant\u2019s request. The decision was based mainly on the opinion given by Dr M., an expert in neurology. She concluded that the applicant had not been suffering from any acute illness, that his chronic illness had improved, that he had been receiving good medical care at ZPH, and that it had appropriate staff to meet the needs of the applicant as regards the medical care his condition required. 13.  On 27 August and 4 September 2014 the applicant lodged appeals, in which he contested the qualifications of Dr M. and the validity of her opinion. He argued that she had not answered the question whether ZPH had adequate staff and could otherwise properly treat his medical condition. He further argued that the judge responsible for the execution of sentences had not addressed the contradictions between the findings the ZPH doctors had expressed in their opinion of 6 March 2014 and the reports of the medical experts commissioned by Zagreb County Court. He also asserted that his medical condition could only be properly treated in a specialist medical institution. 14.  Following a suggestion by ZPH that there was no need for the applicant\u2019s further hospitalisation, on 29 September 2014 the head office of the Prisons Administration ordered his transfer to Zagreb Prison. On 2 October 2014 he lodged an appeal, arguing that neither the staff nor equipment at ZPH was satisfactorily suited to carry out proper diagnostic examinations to accurately assess his medical condition. He asked for an urgent transfer to a suitable medical institution where a proper diagnostic examination could be carried out. The applicant\u2019s appeal was dismissed on 14 October 2014 by the Prisons Administration. 15.  On 31 October 2014 a three-judge panel of the Zagreb County Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal against the decision of 21 August 2014, endorsing its reasoning. 16.  On 19 November 2014, at his request, the applicant was taken to the Sisters of Mercy Hospital in Zagreb so that neurological tests could be carried out. During his transfer in a police van he suffered an epileptic fit and lost consciousness. This was discovered only on arrival at the front entrance of the hospital when officers opened the back door of the van and found him lying on the floor. He spent ten hours at the hospital and was then returned to Zagreb Prison. 17.  On an unspecified date the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint against the decisions concerning his request for the suspension of his prison sentence and the decision concerning his transfer to Zagreb Prison. In addition to the complaints put forward in his previous requests and appeals, the applicant also complained that during his eight months at ZPH he had not had proper access to sanitary facilities and had been obliged to ask the guards to let him out of the room each time he needed the toilet, a request which they sometimes had not answered in time. Since there had been no lift at ZPH, in order to have access to fresh air he had had to climb the stairs to his cell on the second floor, which had been a risk to his health. He further reiterated that ZPH had no neurology department or even a neurologist, so his condition could not have been properly treated there. Even though specialists from the two civil hospitals where he had been treated prior to his imprisonment had recommended that check-ups be carried out every month, he had not been given them. 18.  The applicant also complained about the conditions in Zagreb Prison. He claimed that he had been placed in a cell with seven other inmates, and that a lack of fresh air in the cell had worsened his condition. There had been a squat toilet in the cell, which had not been completely private and a foul smell had emanated from it. Inmates had had to eat in their cells. There had been no lift, which had prevented him from accessing fresh air. 19.  On 31 December 2014 the applicant lodged another application for the suspension of his prison sentence on health grounds, reiterating his previous arguments. He also complained that since 19 October 2014 he had not had any access to daylight and that any access to fresh air had been prevented by construction of a lift in ZPH. 20.  On 5, 9, 15 and 17 January 2015 the applicant was taken to Rebro Hospital in Zagreb. A report drawn up there on 15 January indicates that there was no need for any urgent measures. It was also established that the applicant had had a high concentration of tramadol (a painkiller) and its metabolites, benzodiazepine (a class of psychoactive drug) and olanzapine (an atypical antipsychotic drug). 21.  The applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint was declared inadmissible by the Constitutional Court on 27 January 2015 on the grounds that the contested judgment had not concerned the merits of his civil rights or obligations or a criminal charge against him, and as such was not amenable to constitutional review. 22.  On 18 March 2015 a Zagreb County Court judge responsible for the execution of sentences dismissed the applicant\u2019s request of 31 December 2014. The judge relied on previous expert opinions as well as on a further opinion of Dr S., an expert in neuropsychiatry who confirmed that the applicant had not been suffering from any acute illness, that his medical condition had not worsened, and that ZPH had the appropriate capacity for his treatment in all respects. The County Court further relied on ZPH reports dated 20 and 28 January 2015 stating that the applicant had not been following doctors\u2019 orders, had not been taking measures aimed at his treatment and had been deliberately putting his health at risk. There was no comment on the applicant\u2019s complaints concerning lack of access to daylight and fresh air. 23.  On 27 March 2015 the applicant lodged an appeal, reiterating his arguments concerning his health but made no mention of his previous complaints about lack of access to daylight and fresh air. This appeal was dismissed by a three-judge panel of the Zagreb County Court on 21 April 2015.", "references": ["9", "2", "3", "4", "0", "5", "7", "1", "6", "8", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1979 and is currently serving a prison sentence in Frolovo, Volgograd region. 6.  On 17 April 2009 Mr K. was found with very serious bodily injuries in the entrance to a block of flats. He died in hospital several days later. 7.  Between 7.15 a.m. and 8.55 a.m. on 18 April 2009 the scene of the incident was examined by investigator P. from the investigating unit of the Krasnoarmeyskiy district police department of Volgograd with the participation of attesting witnesses, police officers, and the applicant, who lived in the same block of flats. According to the record of the examination of the scene of the incident, the applicant stated that he had physically assaulted K. and described the circumstances of the crime committed by him against K. At around 9.30 a.m. the applicant was brought to the police station of the Krasnoarmeyskiy district of Volgograd (\u0423\u0412\u0414 \u043f\u043e \u041a\u0440\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0430\u0440\u043c\u0435\u0439\u0441\u043a\u043e\u043c\u0443 \u0440\u0430\u0439\u043e\u043d\u0443 \u0433. \u0412\u043e\u043b\u0433\u043e\u0433\u0440\u0430\u0434\u0430), where operative police officers interviewed him about the circumstances of the crime. 8.  According to the applicant, they demanded that he give statements concerning the circumstances of the crime committed by him and subjected him to ill-treatment which the applicant described as follows. Having handcuffed him, they punched and kicked him, hitting him with a rubber truncheon and giving him electric shocks using a device called a \u201cTP-50\u201d. The applicant gave the statements as demanded. 9.  At 6 p.m. investigator Ye. of the investigating unit of the Krasnoarmeyskiy district police department of Volgograd initiated criminal proceedings against the applicant and his brother. At 8 p.m. the investigator drew up a record of the applicant\u2019s arrest as a suspect and questioned him from 8.30 p.m. until 10 p.m. in the presence of D., a State-appointed lawyer invited by investigator Ye. The applicant repeated the statements incriminating himself and his brother and also stated that the previous evening he had been drunk and had fallen down a flight of stairs, and that he therefore had a headache and pain in the area of his ribs and kidneys. 10.  At 2.15 a.m. on 19 April 2009 the applicant was placed in a temporary detention facility (an \u201cIVS\u201d) at the Volgograd town police department. According to a document signed by a senior police transportation officer, the IVS duty officer and the applicant, the applicant had: (i) a haematoma on the left side of the body; (ii) a swelling on the left hip; and (iii) a swelling and redness on the right ear. 11.  On 20 April 2009 the Krasnoarmeyskiy District Court ordered his detention on remand. The applicant was taken to hospital no. 15. He complained of pain in his chest and in his left knee joint, and of generally feeling unwell. At the hospital he was diagnosed with contusion to the thoracic cage and left wrist, and his condition was assessed as not incompatible with being detained in a pre-trial detention facility. 12.  On 21 April 2009 the applicant was placed in pre-trial detention facility SIZO-4, where he was examined by the SIZO doctor who recorded multiple abrasions and haematomas on his trunk, and contusion to the thoracic cage and left wrist. The applicant was interviewed by the SIZO officer. He stated that he had received the injuries as a result of ill-treatment by police officers on 18 April 2009 whilst held at the Krasnoarmeyskiy district police department of Volgograd. 13.  The SIZO operative unit carried out an inquiry into the incident and concluded in a report of 22 April 2009 \u2012 approved by the acting head of the SIZO \u2012 that the applicant\u2019s injuries had been inflicted by police officers from the Krasnoarmeyskiy district police department at about 11 a.m. on 18 April 2009 during the applicant\u2019s interview. 14.  On 28 April 2009 the applicant was examined as an accused in the presence of lawyer D. The applicant stated that when examined as a suspect on 18 April 2009 he had given statements \u2013 concerning the origin of his injuries and also his brother\u2019s involvement in the crime \u2013 as demanded by the police officers who had ill-treated him, as he had still been in physical pain and was under the influence of threats from them, as well as threats from investigator Ye. that he would find himself at the hands of those police officers again should he not give \u201ccorrect\u201d statements. The applicant described the circumstances of his alleged ill-treatment and retracted the statements he had given earlier incriminating his brother. The criminal proceedings against his brother were eventually discontinued for lack of evidence. The applicant reiterated his self-incriminating statements. 15.  On 29 April 2009 the Krasnoarmeyskiy district investigation division of the investigative committee at the Volgograd regional prosecutor\u2019s office (\u201cthe Krasnoarmeyskiy district investigative committee\u201d) received a communication from the SIZO concerning the applicant\u2019s injuries. 16.  On 5 May 2009 a forensic medical examination of the applicant was carried out at the request of the investigator in charge of the criminal case against the applicant. The applicant stated to the medical expert that on 18 April 2009 he had been physically assaulted at the police station of the Krasnoarmejskiy district of Volgograd by police officers who had delivered many blows to his lumbar region, chest, shoulders, hips and ears, and had used a device called a \u201cTP-50\u201d to ill-treat him. He complained of pain in his chest. During the applicant\u2019s forensic medical examination, the expert detected only one linear abrasion, measuring 23 mm by 2 mm, located within a bruise of indeterminate form on the left side of the applicant\u2019s chest. The expert concluded that this injury had come about as a result of at least one (possibly tangential) impact by a hard, blunt object of limited surface area seven to nine days before the applicant\u2019s examination, and had not caused him any \u201cdamage to his health \u201d. 17.  On 6 May 2009 investigator N. in charge of the inquiry into the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment ordered an examination of the applicant\u2019s medical records by the forensic medical expert . The investigator inquired whether the injuries could have been received as a result of the applicant falling down from his own height and hitting himself against \u201cprotruberant objects in the vicinity\u201d. A forensic medical expert concluded in a report of 8 May 2009 that the applicant\u2019s multiple abrasions and haematomas could have come about as a result of blows from hard, blunt objects or collisions with such objects and surfaces \u2013 including the applicant falling from his own height and colliding with curved objects. The expert further concluded that it was hard to establish the time at which the applicant\u2019s injuries had been inflicted. 18.  Between 9 May 2009 and 16 June 2010 investigators from the Krasnoarmeyskiy district investigative committee issued eight refusals to initiate criminal proceedings into the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment, finding, in accordance with Article 24 \u00a7 1 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, that none of the elements of the offences provided for in Articles 285 and 286 of the Criminal Code (on abuse of powers) were present in respect of the police officers\u2019 actions. Those refusals were overruled by the head or deputy head of the Krasnoarmeyskiy district investigative committee as being unlawful, and the investigators were ordered to carry out additional inquiries. 19.  On 10 September 2009 the Krasnoarmeyskiy District Court of Volgograd convicted the applicant of manslaughter and sentenced him to nine years and six months\u2019 imprisonment. The applicant was ordered to pay 500,000 Russian roubles to the victim\u2019s mother by way of compensation for non\u2011pecuniary damage. The applicant was found to have invited the victim to his flat, to have inflicted many injuries on him, then moving the victim to the landing of the stairwell near the applicant\u2019s flat and leaving him there. The applicant pleaded guilty and his confession served as a mitigating factor. The court based its judgment on the applicant\u2019s consistent confession statements, the results of the search carried out in his flat in which the victim\u2019s passport and clothing had been found, and other evidence. The trial court found that the applicant\u2019s injuries had been unrelated to the actions of the victim of the crime and had been sustained after the crime had been committed. 20.  According to the most recent decision of an investigator of the Krasnoarmeyskiy district investigative committee of 11 September 2010, the police officers in question denied subjecting the applicant to ill\u2011treatment. Investigator P. stated that during the examination of the scene of the incident on 18 April 2009 the applicant had confessed that he had committed the crime. According to police officers B., D. and M. \u2012 as well as E., the head of the criminal investigating unit of the Krasnoarmeyskiy district police department \u2012 the applicant had been brought to the police station on suspicion of having inflicted very serious bodily injuries on K. At some point the applicant had been taken from a cell to E.\u2019s office. The police officers had inteviewed the applicant and established the circumstances of the crime against K. According to B., the applicant had complained of pain in his chest, explaining that he had fallen down a flight of stairs.  The applicant\u2019s mother stated that on 16 April 2009 she had seen the applicant without any sign of physical injury. 21.  In his decision of 11 September 2010 the investigator noted that, while being questioned as a suspect on 18 April 2009, the applicant had explained that he had fallen down a flight of stairs the day before as a result of being in an inebriated state. The investigator further noted that the applicant\u2019s forensic medical examination results indicated that the applicant\u2019s multiple abrasions and haematomas could have come about as a result of blows from hard, blunt objects or collisions with such objects or surfaces \u2013 including the applicant falling from his own height. The investigator concluded that none of the constituent elements of the alleged crimes had been present in the conduct of the police officers and refused to institute criminal proceedings under Article 24 \u00a7 1 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 22.  On 2 March 2010 the Volgograd Regional Court upheld the judgment in the applicant\u2019s criminal case on appeal.", "references": ["2", "9", "3", "5", "8", "7", "4", "0", "6", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1987 and lives in Vilnius. 6.  On 11 May 2009 the State criminal police bureau started a pre\u2011trial investigation into allegations that an armed criminal organisation was active in Vilnius Region. It was suspected that the said organisation possessed and distributed large amounts of narcotic and psychotropic substances, and that it was also engaged in other criminal activities, such as violent assaults, unlawful deprivation of liberty and extortion. 7.  In the context of that investigation, on 15 December 2009 the applicant was arrested near his parents\u2019 apartment in Vilnius. He was questioned and officially notified that he was suspected of participating in a criminal organisation armed with firearms (Article 249 \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Code) and possession of a large amount of narcotic and psychotropic substances with the intention to distribute them (Article 260 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 2 of the Criminal Code). 8.  On 16 December 2009 the Vilnius City First District Court authorised the applicant\u2019s detention on remand for three months. The court considered that the available evidence (testimonies of witnesses and other suspects and other data collected by the authorities) was sufficient to hold that the applicant may have committed the crimes of which he was suspected. It held that the applicant might try to abscond because he was suspected of serious and very serious crimes which could lead to life imprisonment, he was unemployed, not enrolled in an educational institution, not married and had no strong social ties. The court also found that the applicant might interfere with the criminal investigation or commit further crimes because the crimes of which he was suspected had been well-organised and not spontaneous. Lastly the court noted that the pre-trial investigation was ongoing (see paragraph 40 below) and the remaining investigative actions had to be carried out urgently, so the applicant\u2019s detention was necessary to ensure the unimpeded course of the investigation. 9.  The applicant appealed against that decision and asked the court to impose a different restrictive measure. He argued that the allegations against him were unfounded. He also submitted that there was no risk of him absconding because in another criminal case, in which he was accused, he had been prohibited from leaving his home for more than seven days in a row and he was complying with that restriction. The applicant further submitted that in the past he had always complied with similar restrictions of movement which had been imposed on him in other pre\u2011trial investigations. He stated that he had a permanent place of residence with his parents and that he had been taking care of his sick grandmother, so detaining him would negatively affect his family. The applicant also contended that he was young, that he used to work until the deterioration of the economic situation in Lithuania, and that he had no prior convictions, so there were no grounds to find that he might commit further crimes. Lastly the applicant submitted that all the witnesses in the investigation had already been questioned, so there was no possibility for him to interfere with the ongoing investigation. 10.  However, on 12 January 2010 the Vilnius Regional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. It firstly noted that when ordering detention on remand, a court was not establishing the applicant\u2019s guilt, and thus the standard of evidence required for detaining him was lower. The Vilnius Regional Court then found that the first-instance court had correctly assessed all the relevant circumstances, and upheld its findings in their entirety. 11.  On 16 March 2010 the Vilnius City First District Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention for a further three months. It relied on the same grounds as in its previous decision (see paragraph 8 above). In addition, the court noted that the case against the applicant was complex and of a large scale, and that the investigative actions were being carried out without undue delays (see paragraph 40 below). 12.  The applicant appealed against that decision, submitting essentially the same reasons as in his previous appeal (see paragraph 9 above). However, on 14 April 2010 the Vilnius Regional Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the lower court\u2019s findings that the applicant might flee, attempt to interfere with the investigation or commit further crimes, that the criminal case was complex, and that the pre-trial investigation was being carried out with due diligence (see paragraph 40 below). 13.  On 11 June 2010 the Vilnius Regional Court, acting as a court of first instance, extended the applicant\u2019s detention for a further three months. In addition to reiterating the findings of the previous court decisions (see paragraphs 8 and 11 above), it noted that the applicant had a prior conviction and that he was suspected of leading a criminal organisation, so there were grounds to believe that he might commit further crimes. The court also found that the pre-trial investigation concerned more than fifty suspects and that it was being carried out diligently and without undue delays (see paragraph 40 below). 14.  On 30 June 2010 the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. It reiterated that there had been sufficient evidence (such as testimonies of witnesses and other suspects, results of eyewitness identification, and other data collected by the authorities) to believe that the applicant might have committed the crimes of which he had been suspected. The Court of Appeal quashed the lower court\u2019s conclusion that the applicant might interfere with the investigation, holding that it was unsubstantiated. However, it accepted that the applicant might abscond because he was suspected of serious and very serious deliberate crimes which could lead to life imprisonment, and because he had no legal source of income or strong social ties. The Court of Appeal also held that the applicant might commit further crimes because he was suspected of having committed multiple crimes while participating in a criminal organisation which, allegedly, had been his main source of income.\nThe Court of Appeal observed that, in accordance with the domestic law, detention on remand could last longer than six months only when the case was especially complex or of a large scale. It found that those two conditions had been met in the applicant\u2019s case: the investigation concerned multiple criminal offences committed in a criminal organisation, there was a large number of suspects, and it was necessary to carry out numerous investigative actions, so the case could be considered especially complex and of a large scale. The Court of Appeal also noted that the pre\u2011trial investigation had been conducted with due diligence: after the last decision to extend the applicant\u2019s detention, the police had questioned additional witnesses and the applicant himself, conducted eyewitness identification, ordered forensic examinations of various objects, and carried out other investigative actions in respect of the other suspects (see paragraph 40 below).\nLastly the court held that the applicant\u2019s personal circumstances, such as his age, family situation, or restrictive measures imposed on him in other cases, could not be considered as \u201chaving a special priority\u201d (i\u0161imtinai prioritetiniai) which could \u201coutweigh the public interest\u201d and justify releasing him from detention. 15.  On 14 September 2010 the Vilnius Regional Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention for a further three months. It relied on essentially the same grounds (see paragraph 14 above), additionally finding that the applicant had connections to foreign countries which could facilitate his absconding. The court also held that the number and nature of the allegations against the applicant indicated that he was dangerous. Lastly it noted that over fifty suspects had been arrested in the case and that numerous investigative actions were still being carried out (see paragraph 40 below). As a result, the Vilnius Regional Court concluded that the applicant\u2019s continuing detention was necessary in order to ensure his participation in the criminal proceedings and the unhindered course of the investigation, as well as to prevent the commission of further crimes.\nIt appears that the applicant did not appeal against that decision. 16.  On 20 September 2010 the applicant was officially notified that he was suspected of leading a criminal organisation armed with firearms (Article 249 \u00a7 3 of the Criminal Code) and possession of a very large amount of narcotic and psychotropic substances with the intention to distribute them (Article 260 \u00a7 3 of the Criminal Code). 17.  On 3 December 2010 the prosecutor charged the applicant with the aforementioned crimes (see paragraph 16 above), and the case was referred to the Vilnius Regional Court for examination on the merits. 18.  On 13 December 2010 the Vilnius Regional Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention for a further three months, reiterating the findings of the previous decisions (see paragraphs 14 and 15 above). It also noted that the criminal organisation in question had been operating for a long time, it had been armed with firearms and had committed numerous well-organised crimes which had allegedly been a source of income for its members. Since the applicant was suspected of leading that organisation and participating in multiple crimes, and since he was unemployed, not enrolled in an educational institution and not married, the court considered that he was \u201cnot prone to following socially accepted rules of behaviour\u201d (nelink\u0119s laikytis visuomen\u0117je priimt\u0173 elgesio norm\u0173 ir taisykli\u0173). 19.  On 10 January 2011 the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal, relying on essentially the same grounds as before (see paragraphs 14, 15 and 18 above). It also underlined that after the case had been referred to the first-instance court for examination on the merits, the law had no longer established the maximum length of detention; however, it had to be compatible with the grounds and procedures provided for by law (see paragraphs 46-51 below). The Court of Appeal held that, in the light of the charges against the applicant, the protection of the public interest in his case outweighed his right to liberty. 20.  In separate criminal proceedings, on 25 February 2011 the Vilnius City Second District Court convicted the applicant of engaging in public violence when using firearms under Article 283 \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Code. He was given a suspended prison sentence of two years and one month. On 5 April 2012 the Vilnius Regional Court upheld the conviction. 21.  On 10 March 2011 the Vilnius Regional Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention for a further three months on essentially the same grounds as before (see paragraphs 14, 15 and 18 above). It appears that the applicant did not appeal against that decision. 22.  On 2 June 2011 the prosecutor, on the basis of the information collected during the pre-trial investigation, started a separate pre\u2011trial investigation against the applicant. The second investigation concerned allegations of production of a counterfeit electronic means of payment; fraudulently acquiring another person\u2019s property; unauthorised possession of firearms, ammunition or explosives; destruction of or damage to other person\u2019s property; murder for personal gain; unlawful deprivation of liberty using violence; and violation of public order (Articles 214 \u00a7 1, 182 \u00a7 1, 253 \u00a7 1, 187 \u00a7 1, 129 \u00a7 2 (9), 146 \u00a7 2 and 284 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code, respectively). On 29 July 2011 the prosecutor issued an indictment against the applicant in respect of those charges and the case was referred to the Vilnius Regional Court for examination on the merits. 23.  The Vilnius Regional Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention for a further three months on 13 June 2011 and 14 September 2011, relying on essentially the same grounds as before (see paragraphs 14, 15 and 18 above). 24.  On 14 October 2011 the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. It reiterated that there was sufficient evidence to believe that he had committed the crimes with which he had been charged, and upheld the lower court\u2019s findings that the applicant might flee. The Court of Appeal emphasised that the applicant had a prior conviction, that he was accused of participating in a criminal organisation and of having a leading role in the commission of multiple crimes, and that there was no information that he had ever had a legal source of income. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal considered that there were sufficient grounds to believe that the applicant might commit further crimes, so his continued detention was necessary. 25.  The Vilnius Regional Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention for a further three months on 12 December 2011 and 5 March 2012 on essentially the same grounds as before (see paragraphs 14, 15, 18 and 24 above). 26.  On 28 March 2012 the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld the lower court\u2019s findings that the applicant might flee or commit new crimes. It also noted that the criminal case was very complex and of a large scale: there were twenty-seven defendants, and the case file at that time consisted of seventy-six volumes. Thus, the Court of Appeal concluded that although the applicant had been detained for a very long time (two years and three months), the complexity and scope of the case made his detention essential for ensuring the unimpeded course of the criminal proceedings. 27.  From June to December 2012 the Vilnius Regional Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention every three months and the Court of Appeal dismissed his subsequent appeals, relying on essentially the same grounds as in previous court decisions (see paragraphs 14, 15, 18, 24 and 26 above). 28.  On 14 January 2013 the Court of Appeal, when dismissing an appeal by the applicant, emphasised that the case had been referred to the first\u2011instance court for examination on the merits and at that stage of the proceedings the maximum length of detention was not established either in domestic law or in the Convention or the Court\u2019s case-law. It reiterated that the case against the applicant was complex and of a large scope \u2013 the case file at that time consisted of seventy-nine volumes. The Court of Appeal also considered that there had not been any undue delays in the examination of the case before the first-instance court. It dismissed as unsubstantiated the applicant\u2019s argument that after a lengthy period of detention he no longer had any motivation to flee or commit further crimes. 29.  In unrelated criminal proceedings, on 6 February 2013 the \u0160iauliai Regional Court convicted the applicant of unlawful deprivation of liberty by using violence under Article 146 \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Code and sentenced him to seventy-five days of detention. 30.  The Vilnius Regional Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention for a further three months on 8 March 2013 and 13 June 2013, relying on essentially the same grounds as before (see paragraphs 14, 15, 18, 24 and 26 above) and additionally noting that the applicant was accused of serious crimes in another criminal case as well. On 3 July 2013 the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal, reiterating, inter alia, the scope and complexity of the criminal case and noting that the case file at that time consisted of eighty-one volume. 31.  On 11 September 2013 the Vilnius Regional Court refused to extend the applicant\u2019s detention. It noted that the applicant had been detained for more than three years, so the initial grounds \u2013 such as the possibility that he might flee or commit further crimes \u2013 could no longer justify his continued detention. The court also observed that all the witnesses and most of the co\u2011accused in the case had already been questioned, so it was no longer necessary to keep the applicant in detention. 32.  The Vilnius Regional Court released the applicant immediately and placed him under house arrest (see paragraph 52 below). The applicant\u2019s passport and driver\u2019s licence were taken and he was prohibited from leaving his home between 10 p.m. and 8 a.m., from visiting public places, except for medical institutions and shops, and from contacting the other defendants in the criminal case. According to the applicant, he complied with all those conditions and soon after his release he found a job as a security guard. 33.  On 24 September 2013 the Court of Appeal, following an appeal by the prosecution, quashed the lower court\u2019s decision to release the applicant from detention, finding that the latter had erred in concluding that the detention was no longer justified. The Court of Appeal held that there were sufficient grounds to believe that the applicant might flee because he was facing a very severe punishment and had no strong social ties. It also held that the applicant might commit further crimes because he had allegedly been the leader of a criminal organisation, had been suspected of committing crimes for personal gain, and had had several prior convictions, all of which contributed to a \u201cnegative description of his personality\u201d (neigiamai charakterizuoja kaltinamojo asmenyb\u0119). Although the court acknowledged that the applicant had been detained for a very long time (more than three years and six months), it reiterated that the public interest outweighed individual liberty, so the nature and seriousness of the charges against the applicant justified keeping him in detention. Lastly the Court of Appeal noted that the maximum length of detention during the examination of the case before the first-instance court was not established either in domestic law or in the Convention, so the necessity of extending detention had to be assessed on a case-by-case basis. In the applicant\u2019s case, the court considered that the scope of the case (twenty-seven defendants and, at that time, eighty-two volumes of case-file material) and the complexity of the investigation justified the applicant\u2019s continued detention. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal extended the detention for three months. 34.  On 17 October 2013 the Vilnius Regional Court found that the applicant had been detained on remand in another criminal case (see paragraph 38 below). It held that it was unnecessary to order detention in two separate cases and thus quashed the applicant\u2019s detention. However, on 5 November 2013 the Court of Appeal quashed that decision, finding that the grounds for detention established in its decision of 24 September 2013 (see paragraph 33 above) remained valid. 35.  On 20 December 2013 the Vilnius Regional Court again found that the applicant had been detained on remand in another criminal case and thus revoked his detention. However, on 7 January 2014 the Court of Appeal quashed that decision. It held that the applicant could be released only when the grounds for his detention had ceased to pertain, but the Vilnius Regional Court had not examined that. The Court of Appeal underlined that there was sufficient evidence (such as the testimonies of other defendants, eyewitness identification, surveillance data, expert reports, and other material in the case file) that the applicant might have committed the crimes with which he was charged. Then the court re-examined its previous findings concerning the need to keep the applicant in detention (see paragraph 33 above) and concluded that they were still valid. As a result, the Court of Appeal extended the applicant\u2019s detention for a further three months. 36.  On 28 March 2014 the Vilnius Regional Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention for a further three months. It relied on essentially the same grounds as the Court of Appeal in its previous decisions (see paragraphs 33 and 35 above), also noting that the applicant had connections abroad, which might facilitate his absconding. The Vilnius Regional Court also considered that the nature and seriousness of the charges against the applicant, as well as his personal character, indicated that he was especially dangerous to society and thus the commission of further crimes could not be prevented by less restrictive measures. 37.  On 15 April 2014 the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld the findings of the lower court. It reiterated that neither domestic law nor the Convention established the maximum duration of detention during the examination of a case before a first-instance court. The court considered that the circumstances of the applicant\u2019s case \u2013 such as the number, nature and seriousness of the charges against him, as well as the fact that proceeds of crime had allegedly been his main source of income \u2011 required prioritising the protection of the public interest over the applicant\u2019s individual liberty. Therefore, the Court of Appeal held that even the lengthy total period of the applicant\u2019s detention was in compliance with domestic law and the Convention. 38.  In separate criminal proceedings, on 22 May 2014 the Vilnius Regional Court convicted the applicant of unauthorised possession of firearms, ammunition or explosives, destruction of or damage to other persons\u2019 property, murder for personal gain, unlawful deprivation of liberty using violence, and violation of public order (Articles 253 \u00a7 1, 187 \u00a7 1, 129 \u00a7 2 (9), 146 \u00a7 2 and 284 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code, respectively). The applicant was sentenced to ten years and six months\u2019 imprisonment, after deducting the time spent in pre-trial detention from 1 October 2013 to 1 April 2014 which had been ordered in that case.\nThe applicant appealed against his conviction. According to the latest information submitted to the Court, at the time of the present judgment his appeal was still pending because the appellate court had decided to re\u2011examine the evidence in the light of new material. 39.  On 30 June 2014 the Vilnius Regional Court revoked the applicant\u2019s detention order on the grounds that on 22 May 2014 he had been convicted in another criminal case (see paragraph 38 above). 40.  From the applicant\u2019s arrest on 15 December 2009 (see paragraph 7 above) to the completion of the pre-trial investigation on 3 December 2010 (see paragraph 17 above), the authorities conducted five interviews with the applicant, searched his home twice, seized and examined his car, computer and other belongings, ordered two forensic examinations of various seized items, sent four requests for information to telecommunications providers, carried out secret-surveillance activities, conducted an eyewitness identification of the applicant, and interviewed around fifty witnesses and other suspects. 41.  From the transfer of the case to the Vilnius Regional Court for examination on the merits on 3 December 2010 (see paragraph 17 above) to the applicant\u2019s conviction in separate criminal proceedings on 22 May 2014 (see paragraph 38 above), a total of fifty-seven hearings were scheduled on a monthly or nearly monthly basis, and twenty-six of those hearings were adjourned:\n(a)  From 3 December 2010 to 31 March 2011 two hearings were scheduled but both were adjourned;\n(b)  From 1 April 2011 to 22 June 2011 six hearings were held;\n(c)  From 23 June 2011 to 7 December 2011 five hearings were scheduled but all were adjourned;\n(d)  From 8 December 2011 to 14 June 2012 twelve hearings were scheduled and nine of them were held;\n(e)  From 15 June 2012 to 3 October 2012 one hearing was scheduled but it was adjourned;\n(f)  From 4 October 2012 to 29 November 2012 five hearings were scheduled and four of them were held;\n(g)  From 30 November 2012 to 3 March 2013 two hearings were scheduled but both were adjourned;\n(h)  On 4 and 25 of March 2013 two hearings were scheduled and both were held;\n(i)  From 26 March 2013 to 6 October 2013 six hearings were scheduled but all were adjourned;\n(j)  From 7 October 2013 to 25 November 2013 six hearings were scheduled and five of them were held;\n(k)  From 26 November 2013 to 16 February 2014 four hearings were scheduled but all were adjourned;\n(l)  From 17 February 2014 to 22 May 2014 six hearings were scheduled and five of them were held. 42.  The main reasons for adjournment were the failure of the co\u2011accused or witnesses to appear, and in some of those instances the court ordered a search for them or imposed additional restrictive measures. During the thirty-one hearings which were held, the court heard over fifty testimonies of the co-accused and witnesses, read out the case material, played audio and video recordings, and examined applications lodged by the prosecutor and some of the co-accused. 43.  On 12 June 2015 the Vilnius Regional Court convicted the applicant of leading a criminal organisation armed with firearms and possession of a very large amount of narcotic and psychotropic substances with the intention to distribute them (Articles 249 \u00a7 3 and 260 \u00a7 3 of the Criminal Code, respectively). The applicant was sentenced to thirteen years\u2019 imprisonment, after deducting the time spent in pre-trial detention from 15 December 2009 to 11 September 2013 and from 24 September 2013 to 30 June 2014.\nThe applicant appealed against his conviction. According to the latest information submitted to the Court, at the time of the present judgment his appeal was still pending. 44.  On 23 September 2016 the Court of Appeal released the applicant on bail. The court observed that the applicant\u2019s conviction by the first-instance court (see paragraph 38 above) had not yet become final because the appellate proceedings were pending, and those proceedings would likely last a long time. The court also noted that the applicant had already been detained for more than six years, which amounted to nearly two thirds of his sentence (see paragraph 38 above). The Court of Appeal set bail at 5,000 euros (EUR), prohibited the applicant from leaving his home, visiting certain public places, contacting the other co-accused, and leaving Lithuania, and ordered him to report to a local police station twice a week.", "references": ["8", "4", "5", "1", "7", "9", "6", "0", "3", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1969 and lives in the town of Lyskovo, Nizhniy Novgorod Region. 6.  In 2004, after having been injected with a toxic drug, the applicant developed an arterial embolism and had to have his left leg amputated at thigh level. Four years later he was certified as having a second-degree disability. A special medical board decided that he would be provided with a prosthetic leg. On 2 February 2009 during a routine disability-related examination, he was also prescribed a cane. 7.  By 2010 the applicant had developed deep-vein thrombosis and post\u2011phlebitic syndrome of the right leg, a long-term complication of his main condition. 8.  On 26 November 2010 the police arrested the applicant on suspicion of drug trafficking. 9.  According to the applicant, the police took away his prosthetic leg and gave him crutches in order to increase his suffering and to force him to cooperate. The removal of the prosthesis was not noted in the police records. 10.  On the same day the Lyskovo District Court of the Nizhniy Novgorod Region remanded the applicant in custody. He remained in detention throughout the investigation and trial. 11.  On 10 December 2010 the applicant was transferred from a remand prison to a civilian hospital in Lyskovo on account of acute deep-vein thrombophlebitis. According to him, that condition had developed as a result of the removal of his prosthetic leg, which had caused him to place increased weight on his right leg. After successful surgery the applicant was discharged from the hospital on 30 December 2010. 12.  On 13 January 2011 the applicant was examined by an orthopaedic medical board, which established that he needed a prosthesis, crutches, a cane and some other orthopaedic devices. 13.  By the summer of 2011 a model of a prosthetic leg had been developed for the applicant, but he was unable to use it without the \u201cprosthesis-orthopaedic assistance\u201d needed to adjust it. 14.  In June 2011 the applicant applied for an examination by a special medical board with a view to determining whether his medical condition warranted early release. On 8 June 2011 the detention authorities wrote to him refusing to arrange the examination. 15.  On 23 June 2011 the Lyskovo District Court convicted the applicant of drug trafficking and sentenced him to imprisonment. Three months later the Nizhniy Novgorod Regional Court quashed the conviction and ordered a retrial. 16.  On 28 December 2011, while hearing the applicant\u2019s criminal case anew, the District Court asked officials whether \u201cprosthesis-orthopaedic assistance\u201d was accessible to him in detention. 17.  In a letter dated 13 January 2012 the Nizhniy Novgorod State orthopedic service, which performs individual adjustment of prostheses, informed the court that such assistance could not be provided in a remand prison given the lack of special equipment there. 18.  Ten days later an NGO, the Committee for Civil Rights, complained to the Lyskovo prosecutor of the poor quality of the applicant\u2019s medical treatment and the authorities\u2019 failure to give him a prosthetic leg. According to the applicant, no reply was received. 19.  On 28 April 2012 the District Court found the applicant guilty of drug trafficking and sentenced him to five years and six months\u2019 imprisonment. The sentence was upheld on appeal by the Regional Court and became final on 11 September 2012. 20.  Following his conviction the applicant again asked to be given a prosthetic leg. On 8 October 2012 he received a letter from the Federal Service for the Execution of Sentences in the Nizhniy Novgorod Region, informing him that on 2 February 2009 a medical board had only prescribed him a cane. The applicant was invited to apply for a special medical examination to determine whether he needed a transtibial prosthesis. According to the applicant, he promptly lodged an application as advised. 21.  In November 2012 the applicant was admitted to a prison hospital in Nizhniy Novgorod on account of an acute infectious inflammation of the leg and venal problems. 22.  On 3 December 2012, during his stay in the hospital, the following entry was made in the applicant\u2019s medical file:\n\u201cProsthetics refusal record\nWe, the undersigned, have made the present record to state that [the applicant] has refused prosthetics of the left limb.\u201d\n(The document was signed by the deputy head and two surgeons of the prison hospital.) 23.  Ten days later the applicant was discharged from the hospital. 24.  At some point the prison authorities requested the applicant\u2019s admission to the prison hospital in order to provide him with a prosthetic leg. On 20 May 2013 the applicant was taken to the hospital. Four days later he formally asked the head of the hospital for a prosthetic leg. The hospital discharge summary of 13 June 2013 states that the prosthesis was ordered and that the applicant would be informed about its production in due course. 25.  On 10 December 2013 the applicant was transported to the premises of the Nizhniy Novgorod State orthopedic service, where he was given the prosthetic leg and afforded the necessary prosthesis-orthopaedic assistance. 26.  The applicant was released from detention in November 2014.", "references": ["4", "8", "0", "9", "3", "5", "2", "7", "6", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Athens, Greece. 6.  Because of the difficult economic situation in Moldova, in 1997 the applicant left that State for Greece where she found employment; she was engaged by a family to take care of a disabled child. She used to visit Moldova on holiday every two to three years and she kept an apartment in Causeni. 7.  On 15 September 2008, after a visit to Moldova, the applicant was returning to Greece from Chisinau Airport when she was stopped by customs officers because she had on her twenty-nine pieces of non-identical jewellery such as rings, bracelets, necklaces and pendants. The applicant was wearing seven pieces of the jewellery and the rest were in a jewellery box in her handbag. Since the applicant had failed to declare the jewellery, she was taken to the airport police station. There she stated that she had not been attempting to smuggle the jewellery through customs and that she had honestly believed that no declaration was necessary for goods whose value was less than 5,000 euros (EUR). She also submitted that the jewellery in question had been brought to Moldova from Greece. She was informed that she only had the right to take five pieces of non-identical jewellery out of country, no matter their value. She also submitted that she had not been asked to declare anything by the customs officers. The police drew up a report according to which the applicant had in her possession twenty-nine pieces of jewellery made of precious metals and stones with a total value of 55,582 Moldovan lei (MDL \u2013 approximately EUR 3,284). All the jewellery, including the pieces allowed by law to be transported over the border, was seized by the police. 8.  The applicant missed her flight and spent two weeks in Moldova during which time she went to the police station on several occasions. There she made an official declaration and signed a formal undertaking to appear before the prosecuting authorities and courts when necessary. She informed the authorities about her intention to leave the country and obtained their permission. She also gave her Greek address and telephone number. 9.  On 1 October 2008 the applicant returned to Greece because she could no longer be absent from work. She had no difficulties in leaving the country through the same airport. 10.  On 7 October 2008 the Chi\u015fin\u0103u airport police formally initiated criminal proceedings against the applicant for attempted smuggling of jewellery. The offence was considered to be a minor one (infrac\u021biune u\u0219oar\u0103) with a maximum penalty of 6,000 Moldovan lei (approximately EUR 430) or 240 hours community service or imprisonment of two years. The applicant was not aware of the initiation of the criminal proceedings against her. 11.  Subsequently, the applicant was summoned to appear before the investigating authorities via her Moldovan address. Since she did not appear, the prosecutors contacted her adult son and a relative of hers and asked them about the applicant\u2019s whereabouts. Both of them stated that the applicant was in Greece and that they did not know when she intended to return to Moldova. It does not appear from the material in the case-file that the prosecutors asked the applicant\u2019s relatives for her contact information in Greece or to inform her that she had to appear before them. 12.  On 16 June 2009 the prosecutor\u2019s office applied to the Botanica District Court for a detention order in respect of the applicant. The reason relied upon by the prosecutors was that the applicant had absconded from prosecution when she left the country on 1 October 2008, in spite of her having given a written undertaking to appear when summoned. A public defender was appointed to represent the applicant. On 19 June 2009 the Botanica District Court ordered the applicant\u2019s detention for a period of fifteen days. The reason relied upon by the court was that the applicant had failed to appear before the investigating authorities when summoned. The publicly appointed lawyer did not challenge that decision. 13.  The applicant learned of the detention order against her in the summer of 2010 and employed a Moldovan lawyer to challenge it. On an unspecified date the applicant\u2019s representative lodged a habeas corpus application with the Botanica District Court in which it was argued, inter alia, that the applicant had not been aware of the criminal proceedings against her, that she had never been summoned to appear before the prosecutor\u2019s office and that she had not been informed that she could not leave the country. She asked the court to revoke the detention order and, in exchange, promised to appear before the court when necessary and to surrender her passport. 14.  On 18 September 2010 the Botanica District Court rejected the applicant\u2019s habeas corpus application relying, inter alia, on the fact that the applicant had formally undertaken to appear before the prosecuting authorities and courts and later failed to abide by the undertaking. The applicant\u2019s representative appealed, arguing, inter alia, that according to the law the undertaking had not been valid because no criminal proceedings had been formally instituted at that time. The appeal was dismissed by the Chi\u015fin\u0103u Court of Appeal on 30 September 2010. 15.  In July 2011, after the communication of the present case to the Government, the Moldovan authorities applied to Interpol for an international arrest warrant for the applicant. As a result, the applicant was arrested in Greece and held in detention pending extradition proceedings for a period of twenty-three days. In the documents ordering the applicant\u2019s arrest and detention, the Greek authorities made specific reference to the detention order issued by the Botanica District Court on 19 June 2009 (see paragraph 12 above). The extradition proceedings ended on 21 September 2011 when the Athens Court of Appeal rejected the Moldovan authorities\u2019 extradition request and ordered the applicant\u2019s release from detention. The Athens Court of Appeal found that according to Article 5 of the European Convention on Extradition, persons suspected of offences in connection with taxes, duties and customs could be extradited only if the Contracting Parties have so decided in respect of any such offence or category of offences. In the absence of any such agreement between Moldova and Greece, the extradition request could not be upheld. It appears that the applicant has not returned to Moldova ever since.", "references": ["3", "6", "1", "4", "8", "0", "9", "7", "5", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1973, 1985 and 1981 respectively. They live in Orsk in the Orenburg region, Krasnoturinsk in the Sverdlovsk region and Orenburg, respectively. 6.  In May 2006 D. complained to the Department for Combating Organised Crime (the \u201cUBOP\u201d) of the Orenburg regional police department that the applicant was allegedly planning his murder. Kh. and P. \u2012 whom the applicant had allegedly hired to murder D. \u2012 agreed to cooperate with the UBOP and, acting on the latter\u2019s instructions, organised a meeting with the applicant, told him that they had killed D., showed him photographs simulating D.\u2019s death \u2012 which they had prepared as part of the UBOP covert operation \u2012 and asked for payment. After paying them later the same day, the applicant and his father, who had accompanied him, were taken to the UBOP office where they arrived at about 2 a.m. on 17 May 2006. 7.  According to the applicant, he was interviewed at the request of the head of the UBOP, K., until 7.30 a.m. by several operative police officers, including M., G. and O., who demanded that he confess to having ordered D.\u2019s murder. They allegedly subjected him to ill-treatment which the applicant described as follows. They handcuffed him, punched him and subjected him to near\u2011suffocation by use of a plastic bag put over his head. He fainted several times. They forced his legs apart until he fell and then lifted him by his hands, which were shackled behind his back. They tied him up in a painful position with a belt so that his knees were pressed against his neck, and pulled up his shackled hands. They lifted the applicant up whilst thus tied, and dropped him down onto his coccyx. One of them stepped on his head. 8.  At 7.30 a.m. the applicant was placed in a cell in which he stayed until 3 p.m. He was then again interviewed and signed a document entitled \u201cexplanation\u201d (\u043e\u0431\u044a\u044f\u0441\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435) drawn up by the UBOP operative officer O., in which he gave statements which he later reiterated at his trial. 9.  No record of the applicant\u2019s arrest was drawn up. At 6 p.m. the UBOP officers took the applicant home, carried out a search, and then left. 10.  The next day the applicant was taken by his father to the Pirogov hospital in Orenburg. According to the hospital medical records, the applicant had many bruises on his body, in particular on the head, neck, abdomen and the lumbar region. 11.  On the same day the applicant complained about his ill-treatment to the Leninskiy district police department no. 1 of Orenburg, which ordered a forensic medical examination. 12.  On 18 May 2006 an expert examined the applicant, his medical records, and his allegations of ill-treatment by the UBOP officers the previous day (namely being handcuffed and tied, punched and beaten with a bat), and concluded that bruises and abrasions on the applicant\u2019s body and upper and lower extremities had been inflicted by hard blunt objects at the time, as alleged by him (forensic medical expert report of 19 May 2006). 13.  On 22 May 2006 the applicant was diagnosed with a fractured vertebra and hospitalised. His X-ray examination confirmed fractures of two vertebrae. 14.  On 10 July 2006 the Leninskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office of Orenburg brought criminal proceedings against the applicant in relation to the attempted murder of D. On 12 July 2006 the applicant was arrested. 15.  On 12 and 13 July 2006 the applicant was examined by a forensic medical expert who concluded that, in addition to the injuries noted in the previous report of 19 May 2006, the applicant had a fracture of the seventh thoracic vertebra which resulted in health impairment of medium gravity and had been caused in May 2006 by the impact of a hard blunt object or as a result of hitting such an object with great mechanical force. 16.  According to an additional forensic medical expert opinion of 31 July 2006 produced on the basis of medical records, the fracture of the vertebra could not have resulted from being punched, kicked and beaten with a bat, or as a result of handcuffing, having the legs tied together with a belt, or lifting the applicant up by his hands. It could have resulted from an impact by a traumatic force along the axes of the spine. 17.  On 31 July 2006 an investigator from the Promyshlenniy district prosecutor\u2019s office of Orenburg \u2012 who had carried out a pre-investigation inquiry into the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill\u2011treatment by the UBOP officers \u2012 refused to initiate criminal proceedings, relying on statements by the UBOP police officers, in particular G. and O., that on 17 May 2006 the applicant had been arrested on suspicion of having ordered a murder, and had been taken to the UBOP and interviewed, and that no violence had been used against him. The investigator also referred to statements by the applicant\u2019s father and other persons who had been in the UBOP building at the same time as the applicant and had not seen or heard that the applicant had been subjected to ill-treatment. On 26 July 2006 the applicant had been diagnosed as suffering from a mental disorder. The investigator concluded that the applicant could not be trusted, that he had probably received his injuries as a result of hitting himself accidentally against some objects, and that the true circumstances in which he had received the injuries could not be established. 18.  On 14 May 2008 the Promyshlenniy District Court granted an appeal lodged by the applicant against the investigator\u2019s decision. Subsequently, further refusals to open a criminal case followed on 24 July and 4 August 2008 and were annulled as unlawful by the prosecutor\u2019s office. 19.  On 14 October 2008 the Orenburg Regional Court convicted the applicant of the attempted murder of D., sentenced him to five years\u2019 imprisonment and ordered him to pay damages to D. It took into account the fact that the applicant had no criminal record and also had positive references. At the trial the applicant denied his guilt, stating that his sister had been killed in a traffic accident caused by D.\u2019s drunk driving, that D. had unlawfully avoided serving his sentence of imprisonment, that he \u2012 the applicant \u2012 had wished to compel D. to serve his prison sentence by using the services of Kh. and P. \u2013 who had suggested planting drugs on D., inter alia \u2013 and had paid them out of fear for his family\u2019s safety. The applicant\u2019s argument that the crime of which he was accused was the result of police entrapment was dismissed by the court. 20.  On 23 October 2008 an investigator from the investigative committee of the Orenburg regional prosecutor\u2019s office ordered, pursuant to Article 24 \u00a7 1 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, that no criminal case be opened into the applicant\u2019s allegations for lack of the elements of a crime under Articles 285 and 286 of the Criminal Code (on abuse of powers) in the acts of the police officers. The decision relied on the same reasoning as that set out in the initial decision of 31 July 2006, adding that the applicant had recovered from his psychiatric disorder and had been convicted. 21. On appeal by the applicant, the investigator\u2019s decision was found lawful by the Orenburg Promyshlenniy District Court in a decision of 15 January 2009, which was further upheld by the Orenburg Regional Court on 12 March 2009. The District Court held, in particular, that the fact that the applicant had been detained unlawfully for more than three hours at the UBOP premises was not in itself sufficient to prove that he had been ill\u2011treated by the police officers or that he had been deliberately subjected to unlawful detention. In reply to the applicant\u2019s criticism of the investigating authority\u2019s failure to carry out a thorough investigation and, in particular, to examine the room at the UBOP premises in which the applicant had been interviewed and allegedly ill\u2011treated, the District Court opined that there would be no sense in examining the UBOP office given the considerable length of time that had passed since the events in question. 22.   On 26 January 2009 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the applicant\u2019s conviction on appeal. 23.  On 21 May 2015 the acting head of the supervisory department of the Orenburg regional investigative committee annulled the decision of 23 October 2008 for being based on an incomplete inquiry and ordered an additional inquiry and the applicant\u2019s additional forensic medical examination. 24.  On 25 December 2010 between 8.43 a.m. and 11.50 a.m. the police searched the applicant\u2019s flat in Nizhniy Novgorod, pursuant to a decision of the Kanavinskiy District Court on 14 December 2010 concerning criminal proceedings against third persons, in order to find evidence of those persons\u2019 membership of extremist organisations. The police found explosives and bomb-making material. Once the search had been completed, they took the applicant to the Centre for Combating Extremism at the Nizhniy Novgorod regional police department. 25.  Between 4 p.m. and 5.08 p.m. the applicant was questioned as a witness in the criminal proceedings against third persons by investigator A. of the Kanavinskiy district investigative committee, who later stated that at the time of the questioning the applicant had had no injuries on the visible parts of his body. 26.  The investigator ordered that the case concerning the applicant\u2019s illegal possession of arms be transferred to an investigator at police department no. 1 of Nizhniy Novgorod. 27.  The applicant was then interviewed by the head of the Centre for Combating Extremism, T., his deputy K. and three operative police officers of the Centre A., S. and Sh. According to the applicant, they demanded that he confess to preparing a terrorist act and sign a \u201cstatement of surrender and confession\u201d (\u044f\u0432\u043a\u0430 \u0441 \u043f\u043e\u0432\u0438\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0439). They allegedly subjected him to ill\u2011treatment which the applicant described as follows. They beat him up, punching and kicking him. With his hands handcuffed behind his back they bound him with a two-metre-long orange rope, so that his crossed legs were pressed to his torso. They pulled on the rope and lifted the applicant off the floor, subjecting him to near-suffocation as the knots in the rope were pressing against the front of his neck, making it impossible to breath. They then loosened the rope, so that the applicant fell and hit his buttocks on the floor, causing him severe pain. The applicant lost consciousness. At some point two other police officers Ch. and K. joined the others. K. punched the applicant in the face, making his lip bleed. The applicant\u2019s ill\u2011treatment lasted until approximately 8 p.m. 28.  At about 9 p.m. the applicant was taken to police station no. 1 of the Nizhniy Novgorod town police department, formally arrested at 11.30 p.m. and questioned as a suspect. 29.  In his report of 25 December 2010 to the head of the Centre for Combating Extremism, T., police officer Sh. stated that physical force had been used in order to apprehend the applicant when he tried to escape. According to subsequent statements made by Sh. and A. to the investigative authority, Sh. had tripped the applicant up in order to prevent his escape and the applicant had fallen over, whereupon Sh. \u201chad used physical force to overcome the applicant\u2019s resistance\u201d and kept the applicant on the ground until the arrival of A. They had then handcuffed the applicant. As a result, the applicant had allegedly received abrasions to the head, face and neck. 30.  After the applicant\u2019s questioning as a suspect he was taken to a temporary detention facility (an \u201cIVS\u201d). The IVS officer on duty saw the applicant\u2019s injuries and refused to admit him without a prior medical examination. 31.  At 2.45 a.m. on 26 December 2010 the police officers took the applicant to town hospital no. 40 in the Avtozavodskoy district of Nizhniy Novgorod, where a doctor recorded contusions and bruises on his face and assessed his condition as not precluding detention. 32.  On the applicant\u2019s arrival at the IVS, the officer on duty examined the upper part of his body above the waist and recorded bruises and abrasions. The applicant stated that his injuries were the result of ill\u2011treatment to which he had been subjected by the police officers at the Centre for Combating Extremism from approximately 4 p.m. to 6 p.m. on 25 December 2010. The applicant stated, in particular, in relation to the injuries on the face, that he had an abrasion in the temple area on the right side, a bruise under the right eye, an abrasion on the chin on the right side, and a damaged lip on the left side. 33.  On 27 December 2010 the applicant was detained on remand by a court order and at 11.55 p.m. transferred from the IVS to pre-trial detention facility IZ-52/1 (the \u201cSIZO\u201d), where an on-duty officer and medical assistant recorded the following injuries on his body: a bruise on the right of the abdomen, a bruise in the left axillary region and multiple bruises on the face and neck. The applicant reiterated that he had been ill\u2011treated by the police. The incident was reported to the head of the SIZO. 34.  On 25 January 2011 the Kanavinskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office received a communication from the SIZO about the injuries found on the applicant on his admission and forwarded it to the Kanavinskiy district investigation division of the Nizhniy Novgorod regional investigative committee (\u0421\u043b\u0435\u0434\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u043e\u0442\u0434\u0435\u043b \u043f\u043e \u041a\u0430\u043d\u0430\u0432\u0438\u043d\u0441\u043a\u043e\u043c\u0443 \u0440\u0430\u0439\u043e\u043d\u0443 \u0433. \u041d.\u041d\u043e\u0432\u0433\u043e\u0440\u043e\u0434 \u0421\u0423 \u0421\u041a \u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0438 \u043f\u043e \u041d\u0438\u0436\u0435\u0433\u043e\u0440\u043e\u0434\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u043e\u0431\u043b\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0438). The applicant lodged a complaint with the investigative authorities about his alleged ill-treatment and on 4 February 2011 gave a statement. 35.  According to a forensic medical examination report of 24 February 2011 prepared on the basis of the applicant\u2019s SIZO medical records (and ordered on 11 February 2011 by an investigator who inquired, inter alia, whether the injuries could have been self-inflicted), the applicant\u2019s injuries could be classified as blunt trauma. Although the description of the injuries in the SIZO report made it impossible to determine reliably the date of their infliction, the expert suggested that the bruises on the right part of the abdomen and multiple bruises on the face and neck could have been inflicted within a period of three days prior to the applicant\u2019s examination at the SIZO on 27 December 2010 and the bruise in the left axillary region could have been inflicted more than three days before that examination. The expert noted that the injuries were located on parts of the body within the reach of the applicant\u2019s own hands. 36.  According to an additional forensic medical examination report of 2 September 2011, prepared on the basis of the applicant\u2019s medical documents, the applicant\u2019s injuries could have originated either as a result of being punched and kicked, or as a result of the use of force as alleged by police officers Sh. and A. 37.  According to a report of 23 March 2011, prepared on the basis of an internal inquiry and approved by the head of the internal security division of the Nizhniy Novgorod regional police department, Sh. stated that in order to overcome the applicant\u2019s resistance he had twisted the applicant\u2019s hand behind his back, and that the applicant had received the abrasions to the head and face as a result of falling over. The other four police officers who had interviewed the applicant had given similar statements. The report suggested that the question of the police officers\u2019 responsibility for the applicant\u2019s ill\u2011treatment could only be decided by the investigative committee pursuant to a pre-investigation inquiry. 38.  The Kanavinskiy district investigative committee issued six refusals to institute criminal proceedings concerning the applicant\u2019s alleged ill\u2011treatment (on 28 February, 8 April, 19 August, and 5 September 2011, 22 February and 1 July 2012). The first five decisions were revoked by the deputy head of the Kanavinskiy district investigative committee or the Kanavinskiy district deputy prosecutor for being based on an incomplete inquiry (decisions of 10 March, 20 July and 22 August 2011, 30 January and 22 June 2012). 39.  On 15 June 2011 the Avtozavodskoy District Court of Nizhniy Novgorod convicted the applicant of illegal storage of explosives under Article 222 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code. On 18 November 2011 the Nizhegorodskiy Regional Court upheld the judgment on appeal. 40.  In the decision refusing to open a criminal investigation into the allegations of the applicant\u2019s ill-treatment of 1 July 2012, pursuant to Article 24 \u00a7 1 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, for lack of the elements of a crime under Article 286 of the Criminal Code (on abuse of powers) in the actions of police officers Sh., A. and T., it was stated that the applicant had tried to escape during his transfer from the Centre for Combating Extremism to police station no. 1 on 25 December 2010 and could have received the injuries as a result of the lawful use of force by police officers Sh. and A. in their effort to stop him. That conclusion was based on statements by police officers based at the Centre, namely Sh., A., T., K., Ch., G., M. and S., who had conducted the applicant\u2019s interview (\u043e\u043f\u0440\u043e\u0441) with a view to establishing the circumstances of the case concerning the explosives found in his flat and his possible accomplices, in particular persons who had supplied him with the explosives. They denied the use of any violence against the applicant. The investigator confirmed that, in accordance with Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Operational-Search Activities Act, the police officers had the right to conduct the applicant\u2019s interview. 41.  The applicant appealed against the investigator\u2019s decision of 1 July 2012 to a court. He complained, in particular, that the investigator had not given him the opportunity to challenge the police officers\u2019 version. The applicant\u2019s appeal was rejected by a decision of 16 May 2013 of the Kanavinskiy District Court, which was satisfied that the decision was reasoned and lawful. That decision was upheld by the Nizhniy Novgorod Regional Court on 5 August 2013. 42.  On 25 May 2015 an acting prosecutor of the Nizhniy Novgorod region annulled the refusal of 1 July 2012 as unlawful and based on an incomplete inquiry and ordered an additional inquiry, finding that the applicant\u2019s statements contesting the police officers\u2019 version of events and alleging the use of violence by police officer K. had not been investigated. 43.  On 26 August 2011 a woman was attacked and robbed on the street. 44.  On 27 August 2011 nine police officers (Sh., R., P., G., S., M., Kh., Z. and A.S.) were ordered to arrest the applicant, who was suspected of having committed the robbery. At about 10 a.m. they apprehended the applicant on a street in Podmayachnyy village in the Orenburg Region. The applicant tried to flee because, according to him, he did not realise that those pursuing him \u2012 who were dressed in plain clothes \u2012 were police officers. Sh. and R. stopped him. According to the applicant, they tied his hands with a belt. The applicant was taken to the Orenburg town police department. 45.  The applicant described the events at the police station as follows. He was led through an entrance for staff only to an office on the first floor and handcuffed. The police officers, in particular O., demanded that he confess to having attacked the woman and stolen her gold chain and mobile phone. O. punched the applicant twice in the chest, then hit the applicant on his feet with a rubber truncheon for about forty minutes, while the other police officers, in particular A., pinned him down on the floor, holding onto his arms and legs. He was then asked to stand up on his feet but was unable to do so, fell over and was hit by the truncheon on the left side of his torso. His feet were stepped on and he was suffocated with a plastic bag. During the suffocation, which lasted three or four hours, he fainted several times. The applicant wrote a \u201cstatement of surrender and confession\u201d (\u044f\u0432\u043a\u0430 \u0441 \u043f\u043e\u0432\u0438\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0439), as requested. O. threatened him with further torture if he did not reiterate his confession to an investigator. 46.  The \u201cstatement of surrender and confession\u201d, in which the applicant confessed to having attacked the woman and stolen her gold chain, was recorded by the police. The applicant also signed a document entitled \u201cexplanation\u201d, drawn up by operative police officer D., with a detailed description of the circumstances of the crime. 47.  At 8.40 p.m. an investigator drew up a record of the applicant\u2019s arrest as a suspect. The applicant gave self\u2011incriminating statements when questioned as a suspect in the presence of a State-appointed lawyer, reiterating the confession statement he had given earlier to the police officers. 48.  At 12.25 a.m. on 28 August 2011 the applicant was placed in the temporary detention facility (the \u201cIVS\u201d) in Orenburg town police department, where the following injuries on his body were recorded: bruises on the chest, an abrasion on the face on the left cheek bone, many abrasions on the waist, abrasions on both wrists and scars on the left forearm. The applicant stated that those injuries had been inflicted during his arrest. 49.  On 29 August 2011 the applicant was taken to a traumatology centre, where he was diagnosed with contusion of the left side of his chest and both wrists. 50.  At 2.30 p.m. the applicant appeared before the Promyshlenniy District Court of Orenburg, which ordered his detention on remand. The court decision referred to the investigator\u2019s submissions that the applicant\u2019s involvement in the crime had been established on 26 August 2011 but he had been hiding from the law\u2011enforcement authorities until his arrest on 27 August 2011. 51.  On the same day he was placed in pre-trial detention facility IZ\u201156/3, where bruises on the left side of his chest, both wrists and both feet were recorded. 52.  On 30 August 2011 the applicant\u2019s lawyer A., who had been retained by his family, observed injuries on the applicant when visiting him in the detention facility. The applicant told her about his ill-treatment at the police station and the self\u2011incriminating statements he had given as a result. 53.  On 31 August 2011 when questioned as an accused in the presence of lawyer A., the applicant retracted his self\u2011incriminating statements, explaining that he had given them on 27 August 2011 as a result of his ill\u2011treatment by the police officers. 54.  According to the applicant\u2019s mother and brother, and his acquaintance Zh., the applicant had no injuries before his arrest. 55.  On 5 September 2011 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint concerning his alleged ill-treatment by the police. The Orenburg town investigative committee carried out a pre\u2011investigation inquiry. The operative police officers who had arrested the applicant on 27 August 2011 gave explanations. They stated that as soon as the applicant had seen them he had run away and they had lost sight of him. When running away the applicant had fallen over several times. The police officers had split into several groups in order to find and stop him. Police officers Sh. and R. had caught up with the applicant, knocked him to the ground and handcuffed his hands behind his back. R. suggested that any bruises or abrasions on the applicant\u2019s body could have been received as a result of his falling over when trying to run away from them. The police officers denied any deliberate use of force against the applicant either during his arrest or afterwards at the police station when they interviewed him. 56.  On 5 October 2011 an investigator refused to initiate criminal proceedings pursuant to Article 24 \u00a7 1 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure for lack of the elements of a crime under Articles 285 and 286 of the Criminal Code (on abuse of powers) in the acts of the police officers. Relying on the police officers\u2019 statements, the investigator found that the police officers had acted lawfully in using handcuffs and \u201cblocking\u201d the applicant, a suspect in criminal proceedings, who had tried to escape and resisted his arrest. On 10 October 2011 a deputy head of the Orenburg town investigative committee annulled the investigator\u2019s decision on the grounds that the inquiry had been incomplete, and ordered an additional inquiry. Subsequently fourteen more refusals to open a criminal investigation into the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill\u2011treatment were issued by investigators and annulled by their superiors within the investigative committee for being based on incomplete inquiries. 57.  On 28 December 2012 the Promyshlenniy District Court of Orenburg convicted the applicant of robbery and sentenced him to three years\u2019 imprisonment. The applicant pleaded guilty in relation to the assault against the victim but denied robbery, stating that he had given the self\u2011incriminating statements at the pre-trial stage of the proceedings as a result of the ill-treatment by the police. The court considered his allegations of ill-treatment unfounded, relying on the results of the inquiry and one of the refusals to open a criminal case of 21 December 2012 which had not at that moment been annulled. The court declared the applicant\u2019s self\u2011incriminating statements of 27 August 2011 admissible evidence. The applicant\u2019s \u201cstatement of surrender and confession\u201d served as a mitigating circumstance. The judgment became final. 58.  During one of the additional rounds of the pre-investigation inquiry into the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment two forensic medical expert reports were prepared, on 11 September and 18 October 2013, based on the applicant\u2019s medical documents. The experts concluded that the applicant\u2019s injuries \u2013 the bruises on his chest and both feet, numerous abrasions on his waist, the abrasion on the face, and numerous abrasions and bruises on both wrists \u2013 could have been inflicted as a result of impacts from a hard blunt object shortly before his injuries had been recorded at the IVS and possibly on 27 August 2011. 59.  On 7 May 2014 an additional forensic medical expert report was prepared at the investigator\u2019s request. The expert concluded that the applicant\u2019s injuries had originated from the impact of a blunt hard object with a limited contact surface (with a limited narrow elongated contact surface in the case of the injuries to his wrists). The nature, location and mechanism of the origin of the injuries were consistent with the applicant\u2019s version. All his injuries could have been received as a result of ill\u2011treatment by the police officers as described by him. As regards the police officers\u2019 version, the abrasions on the applicant\u2019s face and waist could have been received as a result of the applicant falling over when running away during his arrest. The abrasions on the wrists could have been received as a result of the use of handcuffs. There was nothing, however, in the police officers\u2019 statements to explain the bruises on the chest and feet. 60.  On 2 June 2014 investigator V. of the Orenburg north administrative circuit investigative committee initiated criminal proceedings into the applicant\u2019s allegations under Article 286 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Criminal Code (abuse of power with use of violence). He held that it was impossible to resolve the contradictions existing in the case-file material by means of a pre-investigation inquiry, and that it was therefore necessary to open a criminal case and examine the applicant\u2019s allegations by way of a criminal investigation, as there was sufficient data to indicate that a crime under Article 286 of the Criminal Code might have been committed. 61.  The next day the acting prosecutor of the Promyshlenniy district of Orenburg annulled the investigator\u2019s decision as unlawful and ill\u2011founded, disagreeing with the investigator that there was sufficient data to indicate that a crime could have been committed. The prosecutor stressed that it was possible to implement urgent measures aimed at establishing the circumstances of alleged ill\u2011treatment within the framework of a pre\u2011investigation inquiry, in particular by ordering forensic medical examinations. He noted that the pre-investigation inquiry had established that the applicant had received the injuries during his arrest as a suspect, and that in the final judgment in the applicant\u2019s criminal case the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment had been found unsubstantiated and that it was therefore impossible to question that finding. 62.  The applicant appealed against the prosecutor\u2019s decision. On 9 February 2015 the Promyshlenniy District Court found the prosecutor\u2019s decision lawful. It held that under Article 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the court did not have competence to assess whether the evidence or the presence of data indicating the elements of a crime constituted grounds for instituting criminal proceedings. That decision was upheld on 16 April 2015 by the Orenburg Regional Court. 63.  Following the prosecutor\u2019s decision, on 30 July 2014 investigator V. refused to open a criminal case. His decision was annulled on 18 August 2014 by a deputy head of the second procedural supervision department of the investigative committee of the Russian Federation for being based on an incomplete inquiry. Subsequently two more decisions refusing to open a criminal case \u2012 of 2 October 2014 and 26 March 2015 \u2012 were also annulled for the same reason, on 16 March and 21 May 2015, respectively, by an acting head of the procedural supervision department of the Orenburg regional investigative committee. 64.  In the investigator\u2019s decision of 26 March 2015, as in the previous decisions, it was found that the police officers had acted lawfully in using handcuffs and physical force, in particular for the purposes of \u201cblocking\u201d the applicant, who had actively resisted arrest. The applicant had received the injuries when trying to escape and resisting arrest. The injuries on his wrists had been caused by the lawful use of handcuffs. 65.  On 22 May 2015 the acting district prosecutor pointed to flagrant violations of the criminal procedural law, in particular the reasonable time requirement for examination of reports about crimes. He noted that, due to the lack of supervision and the acquiescence of the investigative committee management, the investigative committee had failed to conduct a thorough and objective inquiry for more than four years \u2012 thereby violating the applicant\u2019s rights \u2012 and that this constituted a serious disciplinary offence. 66.  According to a report by a psychologist who examined the applicant in September 2015 the applicant complained that, as a consequence of the police ill\u2011treatment, he suffered from frequent headaches, blood pressure abnormalities and sleep disturbances. He displayed signs that the ill\u2011treatment experienced by him and the lack of justice still affected him. He was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder and was recommended treatment and rehabilitation measures.", "references": ["3", "7", "5", "6", "9", "2", "8", "0", "4", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1978 and lives in Moscow. 5.  The flat at 137A-9-267 Samarkandskiy Boulevard, Moscow, had been owned by the City of Moscow. G. had resided there as a tenant under the social housing agreement with the City. On 21 February 2007 G. died. 6.  On an unspecified date G.\u2019s daughter Get. submitted to a local real estate registration body a forged copy of a court\u2019s decision recognising her as G.\u2019s heir and asked the latter to confirm her title to the flat at 137A-9-267 Samarkandskiy Boulevard, Moscow. On 19 March 2008, following the expert review of her application, she obtained the relevant certificate. 7.  On 17 April 2008 Get. sold the flat to N. On 28 May 2008, following the expert review of the transaction, N. was issued with a certificate confirming his title to the flat. 8.  On 28 July 2008 N. sold the flat to the applicant. On 28 August 2008, following the expert review of the transaction, the applicant obtained a certificate confirming his ownership in respect of the flat. He and his family moved into the flat and resided there. 9.  On 15 May 2009 the police opened a criminal investigation into the fraudulent acquisition of the flat by Get. The Government did not inform of the outcome of the proceedings. 10.  On an unspecified date the Department for Municipal Housing and Housing Policy of the City of Moscow (the \u201cHousing Department) brought a civil claim seeking (1) the annulment of the entry in the real estate register confirming the existence of Get.\u2019s title to the flat; (2) annulment of the flat purchase agreements between Get. and N. and N. and the applicant; (3) transfer of the ownership to the flat to the City of Moscow; and (4) the applicant\u2019s eviction. 11.  On 19 June 2009 the Kuzminskiy District Court of Moscow granted the Housing Department\u2019s claims. The court ruled that the case fell under one of the two exceptions to the protection of a bona fide purchaser\u2019s title, which required that precedence be given to the City of Moscow as a previous owner who had been deprived of the property against its will. The applicant\u2019s title to the flat was annulled and the ownership of the flat was transferred to the City of Moscow. The court also ordered the applicant\u2019s eviction. The applicant appealed. 12.  On 29 September 2009 the Moscow City Court upheld the judgment of 19 June 2009 on appeal. 13.  On 25 January and 12 May 2011 the applicant unsuccessfully lodged an application with the Housing Department asking for provision of housing. 14.  On 13 December 2011 the applicant was evicted from the flat. 15.  According to the Government, on 16 July 2012 the Housing Department assigned the flat as social housing to a family of four. On 25 April 2014 the ownership of the flat was transferred to them under the privatisation scheme. 16.  On 19 June 2009 the District Court granted the applicant\u2019s claims against N. and awarded him 990,000 Russian roubles (RUB) in damages. 17.  On 12 October 2011 the bailiff opened enforcement proceedings. 18.  On 15 March 2006 the bailiff discontinued enforcement proceedings as it was impossible to establish N.\u2019s whereabouts or to obtain information about his assets. 19.  According to the Government, the enforcement proceedings are still pending. The judgment in the applicant\u2019s favour has not been yet enforced.", "references": ["2", "6", "1", "8", "4", "0", "3", "5", "7", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicants live in Sisak. 6.  A report of 28 October 1991 drawn up by the Bosanski \u0160amac Police in Bosnia and Herzegovina indicated that the body of a man had been found on 27 October 1991 on the right bank of the river Sava. The body was identified as that of S.M., the applicants\u2019 respective husband and father, because an identity card bearing that name was found on it. The autopsy carried out on the same day indicated that he had been shot in the head. 7.  In 1996 the United Nations Security Council established the United Nations Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (the \u201cUNTAES\u201d). On 15 January 1998 the UNTAES mandate ceased and the transfer of power to the Croatian authorities began. 8.  On 9 December 2002 Z.M., the victim\u2019s wife, wrote to the Ministry of the Interior in Zagreb, alleging that on 23 September 1991 her husband had been taken away by men in black uniforms and then killed. Z.M., her two sons, R.M. and B.M., and two other residents of Novo Selo, I.D. and S.J., were direct eyewitnesses of the abduction of S.M. 9.  The Sisak police interviewed Z.M. on 19 December 2002. She told them that on 23 September 1991 four Croatian soldiers had driven in a white van to their house in Novo Selo, on the outskirts of the town of Sisak. Two men had remained in the van while two others had come into their courtyard. These two were \u0160. and B., both of whom were known to her son R.M., who had played pool with them and knew their names. They were from Rijeka and members of a Croatian Army unit stationed in Novo Selo, commanded by I.M. Her husband had come out of the house. The men had been armed and had placed her husband in the van and driven away. After about five weeks she had been informed by the police that her husband\u2019s body had been found in the river Sava near Bosanski \u0160amac. 10.  On 7 January 2003 the Sisak police lodged a criminal complaint against a person or persons unknown for the killing of S.M. A police inquiry ensued. This inquiry was part of a broader inquiry into the killing of a number of persons of Serbian ethnic origin in the broader Sisak area and which resulted in the indictment of several individuals (see 37-41 below). 11.  On 11 July 2003 the police interviewed D.M., the victim\u2019s other son, who confirmed his mother\u2019s statement. He said that his brother R.M. had told him that \u0160. had died after the war. 12.  Between 28 July and 25 September 2003 the police interviewed eighteen former Croatian soldiers. 13.  I.D. said that on 23 September 2001 he had been on guard duty in front of the ammunition depot, some forty metres from the house of the M. family, together with S.J. They had seen a white van which had stopped in front of the M. family\u2019s house. Three men dressed in camouflage uniforms and with balaclavas on their heads had got out of the van and taken S.M. away. Later on I.D. had heard that it was \u0160. and B. who had taken S.M. away. I.M. had been the commander of the Croatian Army unit stationed in Novo Selo whose members had taken the victim away in the van on 23 September 1991. 14.  S.J. confirmed that he had witnessed the taking of S.M. by two men, who had arrived in a white van with Rijeka licence plates, whilst the driver had stayed in the van. S.J. did not know the identity of those men since their faces had been masked. That same van had been there before and later had been parked in front of the fire station in Novo Selo. 15.  I.V.H. said that he had joined the second group of about twenty volunteers from Rijeka who had joined the Croatian Army and arrived in Sisak some time around 15 September 1991. Some of them had travelled by van. Immediately after their arrival in Novo Selo, the group had been divided into two subgroups. One comprised M.M., Lj.G., B.G., Z.H. and N.S. They had been stationed in the fire station, together with D.P., and had not gone to \u201cpositions\u201d. I.V.H. could not tell what that group had actually been doing in Novo Selo. After about ten days they had returned to Rijeka but most of them had later gone back to Novo Selo together with further volunteers. 16.  I.V. said that he had joined the volunteers from Rijeka and that on 16 September 1991 a group of them had gone to Novo Selo. D.P. had been in charge of the Rijeka unit and had slept in the fire station, staying there during the day as well, but I.V. did not know what D.P. had done whilst there. 17.  Z.M. said that he had joined the volunteers from Rijeka and that on 21 September 1991 a group of them had gone to Novo Selo. They had travelled to Novo Selo in two vans and another vehicle. They had stayed in Novo Selo for twenty to thirty days. 18.  M.V. said that he had gone to Novo Selo together with about ten other volunteers in a light blue Citroen van. The Rijeka unit had been under the command of D.P. and N.S., and the commander of the \u201cwhole group\u201d had been I.M. D.P., N.S., Z.H. and M.M. had been separated from the others and stationed in the fire station. The Citroen van had been parked in front of the fire station and driven by D.P. and the others who lodged there. 19.  D.S. said that he had gone with a group of volunteers from Rijeka to Novo Selo on 5 September 1991. They had travelled in a blue Citroen van which was a rented vehicle, and later on they had stayed with the Sisak Police. D.P. had been in charge of the Rijeka unit. D.P., N.S. and Z.H. had not gone to \u201cpositions\u201d. D.S. had heard about so called \u201cnight actions\u201d There had been rumours that some of those who were staying in the fire station had gone to one such action and had come back after two or three hours. N.S., D.P. and Z.H. had remained together and later on joined the Military Police. 20.  S.D. said that at the beginning of September 1991 he had gone with a group of volunteers which included Lj.G., N.S., D.P. and B.V. to Sisak in a white van. He could not tell which of the men from Rijeka had held the position of commander, but the most prominent men had been D.P. and N.S., otherwise known as \u0160. They had both been stationed in the fire station in Novo Selo, and had not gone on to \u201cpositions\u201d. S.D. could not tell what those two men had actually been doing in Novo Selo. 21.  M.M. stated that in 1991 he had joined a group of volunteers from Rijeka. Some time about the end of July 1991 they had gone to Novo Selo in a white van displaying Rijeka licence plates. The van had been driven by N.S. There had been seven of them in the van, including N.S., Z.H., B.V., D.P. and two more persons the names of whom M.M. could not remember. M.M. could not tell whether someone was formally in command, but D.P. had been in charge of the Rijeka unit. After about a month M.M. had gone back to Rijeka and returned with new volunteers, so that they had two vehicles, a white Volkswagen van and a blue Citroen van, both with Rijeka licence plates. The vans had been driven by Lj.G., B.V., N.S. and Z.H. 22.  Z.M. said that he had been in the second group of the Rijeka volunteers who had gone to Novo Selo in autumn 1991. The group had included M.V., S.L., D.S., N.S., I.S., B.V., M.M., D.P., I.V.H. and others. D.P. and N.S. had both had a bad reputation because they had \u201cbehaved like Rambo\u201d, had not gone to \u201cpositions\u201d and spent all their time in Novo Selo. 23.  B.A. said that at the beginning of September 1991 he had travelled to Sisak with a group of volunteers from Rijeka in a Citroen van, driven by N.S., together with D.P. \u2012 the informal commander of the group \u2012 B.V., M.M. and another six people. After two weeks they had returned to Rijeka for a short break and then gone back to Sisak. The headquarters of the group had been the fire station in Novo Selo. D.P. had once told him that during his stay in Sisak \u201csome ugly things had happened\u201d, but had not mentioned any details. B.A. had heard rumours that some people had been taken from their homes. 24.  S.L. said that he had joined a group of volunteers in Rijeka and had travelled to Sisak together with seven others on 19 September 1991 in a Citroen van to Novo Selo. The van had been driven by his neighbour N.S. The leader of the group had been D.P. B.V. and D.S. had also been present. 25.  I.S. said that his relative N.S., otherwise known as \u0160., had contacted him at the end of August 1991 and asked him to join a group of volunteers. He had travelled to Sisak as part of a group of nine volunteers comprising M.M., B.G., D.S., B.A., B.V., Z.H. and D.P. in a Citroen van rented from the Kompas car-rental agency. The Rijeka unit was under the command of D.P. After returning to Rijeka, he had not gone back to Sisak. 26.  Lj.G. said that at the beginning of September 1991 he had been contacted by N.S., otherwise known as \u0160., who had asked whether he would join the volunteers in Sisak. Soon after that, a group of twenty to twenty\u2011five men had travelled to Sisak in two rented Citroen vans. The leader of the group was D.P. Lj.G. had been stationed in the fire station, had been in charge of procuring weapons and had often travelled to Zagreb. He usually went in the van in which they had travelled to Sisak, while the other van stayed in Novo Selo. He had heard rumours about people being taken and liquidated and the bodies of the murdered being found, but in his view about eighty per cent of those stories had been fabricated. He knew that on one occasion a civilian aged between fifty-five and sixty had been brought to the fire station. One of the soldiers under the command of I.M. had telephoned and said that he would bring along a \u201cchetnik\u201d for N.S. to butcher. Lj.G. did not know what had happened to that person but he assumed that he had been handed over to the police. 27.  Z.H. said that he had been a member of military and police formations during the Homeland war and had been stationed in Banovina, amongst other places. His commander there had been D.P. He did not want to say anything else about the war, stating that he was suffering from post\u2011traumatic stress disorder. 28.  On 25 September 2003 the police interviewed N.S., who said that he had been stationed in the fire station in Novo Selo but did not know anything about the killing of S.M. He had always been \u201con positions\u201d whereas some others, such as M.M. and Lj.G. had organised the procurement of arms and equipment. He had not heard about the taking of any civilian but even if such things had happened, those civilians \u201chad deserved it.\u201d He maintained that even if something had happened at that time in that area, after so much time had passed \u201call that should not be opened up again or dug into\u201d. 29.  On the same date the police interviewed B.V., who said that he had been stationed in the fire station in Novo Selo. He had heard rumours about arrests and liquidations of civilians but could not confirm that any of the soldiers from the Rijeka unit had participated in it. He said that M.G. and \u0160. \u201chad not come to Novo Selo to participate in the defence [of Croatia] but had obviously been engaged in other activities\u201d. 30.  On 30 September 2003 the Sisak police drew up a report in which it was stated that D.P. had told the police that he was not going to give any statement about the \u201cSisak case\u201d because he had consulted his superiors who had told him not to say anything about it. The report also stated that others had said that D.P. was the informal commander of the Rijeka unit stationed in Novo Selo when S.M. was \u201ctaken and liquidated\u201d. The report also stated that photographs of persons known as \u0160. and B. had been taken. 31.  On 2 December 2003 the police interviewed R.M., the second applicant, who said that on 23 September 1991 he had been at home with his brother and father whereas his mother had been at the neighbour\u2019s. A white Volkswagen van with Rijeka licence plates had driven to their house and two men had come out of it dressed in camouflage uniforms whereas two other men had remained in the vehicle. R.M. had heard that the van had been driven by I.P. One of the men who had exited the van was big and tall about 1,90 centimetres. R.M. had heard the other man addressing him as B. The other\u2019s face had been uncovered and R.M. recognised him as \u0160. He had good relations with \u0160. and had often seen him in the fire station as well as B. and had sometimes played pool with them. They had taken R.M.\u2019s father with them and driven away. R.M. was shown eighteen photographs of the members of the Rijeka unit but he said that he did not know any of the persons on the photographs save for the person under number 1 for whom he said that he knew him but could not remember where from. The person under number 1 was N.S., also known as \u0160. R.M. told the police officers that he could recognise both B. and \u0160. if he saw them in person and in particular if he heard their voices. 32.  On 5 January 2005 the second applicant R.M. approached the Sisak police to enquire about the investigation into the killing of his father S.M. R.M. referred to his prior statement given to the police when R.M. had indicated \u0160. as one of the soldiers who had taken his father. R.M. also enquired whether \u0160 had been detained. R.M. knew who \u0160. was and said that he would be able to recognise him because he had a characteristic face. At that time R.M. had also been a Croatian soldier. He also said that his friend M.O., a member of the special police, had told him that he had seen his father in \u201cORA\u201d, a detention centre in Sisak, about three weeks after S.M. had been arrested. M.O. also said that it was not sure whether it was S.M. since he had been beaten. 33.  On 29 July 2005 the State Attorney\u2019s Office issued a document concerning enquiries into the killings of civilians between 1991 and 1995. The document was addressed to the County State Attorney\u2019s Offices, which were required to examine all of the information collected to date on the killings of civilians during that period and to concentrate their activities on identifying the perpetrators and gathering the relevant evidence in order to initiate criminal proceedings. 34.  On 9 October 2008 the State Attorney\u2019s Office issued an instruction for implementation of the Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure to the County State Attorney\u2019s Offices, in which it stated that an inspection of their work had indicated two main problems: possible partiality of the persons involved in the pending proceedings as regards the ethnicity of the victims or the perpetrators; and the problem of trials in absentia. The instructions advocated impartial investigations of all war crimes, irrespective of the ethnicity of those involved, whether victims or perpetrators, and stressed the duties of those working for the State Attorney in that respect. 35.  The police again interviewed the victim\u2019s wife and sons on 22 December 2008; they all repeated their prior statements. R.M. also said that the soldiers who had taken his father had had masked faces but that they had been addressing each other with the names \u0160. and B. 36.  The inquiry continued and in January 2009 S.J. was again interviewed. He repeated his prior statement (see paragraph 14 above). 37.  On 20 June 2011 the Sisak County Police lodged a criminal complaint against \u0110.B., V.M. and D.B. on charges of war crimes against the civilian population. This included the killing of the applicant\u2019s husband. On the same day \u0110.B., Head of the Sisak Police Department in 1991 and 1992, V.M., police commander at the border territory of Sisak and Banovina in 1991 and 1992 and Deputy of Sisak Police Department, and D.B., a member of the \u201cWolves\u201d Unit of the Croatian Army, were arrested. 38.  On an unspecified date the investigation was opened. On 13 July 2011 \u0110.B. died. 39.  On 16 December 2011 the Osijek County State Attorney\u2019s Office lodged an indictment against V.M. and D.B. at the Osijek County Court, alleging that they had been in command of the unit whose unknown members had committed a number of crimes against the civilian population between July 1991 and June 1992, including the killing of the applicant\u2019s husband. They were charged with war crimes against the civilian population. 40.  On 9 December 2013 a first-instance judgment was delivered. V.M. was found guilty of war crimes against the civilian population in that he, in his capacity as \u201cthe commander of police forces in the broader area of Sisak and Banovina\u201d and \u201cDeputy Head of the Sisak Police\u201d, had allowed the killings of persons of Serbian origin and had failed to undertake adequate measures to prevent such killings. The relevant part of the judgment concerning the applicant\u2019s close relative reads:\n\u201con 23 September 1991 at about 7.30 p.m. four members of the Sisak Reserve Police, wearing camouflage uniforms and grey uniforms and armed with automatic guns, arrived in a white Volkswagen van bearing Rijeka licence plates at the house at Janko Rup\u010di\u0107 8 in Novo Selo, which had been damaged the previous day by unidentified persons before using explosives. They searched the premises, arrested its owner S.M., took him in the van to an unknown destination and shot him dead; his body was found on 27 October 1991 on the right bank of the river Sava in Bosanski \u0160amac with gunshot wounds to the head.\u201d 41.  On 10 June 2014 the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of V.M. and increased his sentence to ten years\u2019 imprisonment. 42.  On 27 February 2006 the applicants brought a civil action against the State in the Sisak Municipal Court, seeking compensation in connection with the death of their close relative. The claim was dismissed on 3 May 2007 and was upheld on appeal by the Sisak County Court and the Supreme Court on 4 December 2009 and 27 April 2011 respectively. The national courts found that the claim had been submitted after the statutory limitation period had expired. 43.  A subsequent constitutional complaint lodged by the applicants was dismissed on 8 December 2011. 44.  Following the conviction of V.M., the applicants sought the re-opening of civil proceedings on 1 August 2014. On 6 February 2015 the Sisak Municipal Court accepted that request.", "references": ["3", "5", "8", "2", "7", "4", "6", "1", "9", "No Label", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1945 and lives in Pechora, the Komi Republic. 5.  The applicant sued the Municipal Unitary Enterprise for Housing and Communal Services (MUP Pechorazhilkomhoz or MUP PZHKH \u2013 \u041c\u0423\u041f \u041f\u0435\u0447\u043e\u0440\u0430\u0436\u0438\u043b\u043a\u043e\u043c\u0445\u043e\u0437 \u2013 hereafter \u201cthe company\u201d) of Pechora, the Komi Republic, for salary arrears. 6.  On 31 May 2007 the Justice of the Peace of the Privokzalnyy Court Circuit of Pechora awarded the applicant the equivalent of 18,358 euros (EUR) of the salary owed to him for the period from 1 January 2005 to 31 December 2006. The judgment became final ten days later. 7.  On 12 January 2009 the Pechora Town Court granted another claim which the applicant had lodged against the company, awarding him EUR 592. The judgment became final ten days later. 8.  Neither judgment has been enforced. 9.  The company was incorporated as a municipal unitary enterprise. It was set up by a decision of the local administration to provide heating supply and housing maintenance services in the local area. The company had \u201cthe right of economic control\u201d (\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043e \u0445\u043e\u0437\u044f\u0439\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0432\u0435\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f) over the assets allocated to it by the administration in order to carry out its statutory activities. 10.  In 2006 the owner (the local administration) withdrew several of the company\u2019s assets and transferred them either to the local treasury or to other legal entities. 11.  On 17 January 2007 the respondent company was declared insolvent and liquidation proceedings started. 12.  The company sued the owner in subsidiary liability proceedings. On 13 May 2009 the Commercial Court of the Komi Republic dismissed that action, having found that the owner had acted without intending to cause the company\u2019s insolvency when transferring the assets. 13.  On 16 June 2009 the company was liquidated. 14.  The applicant brought subsidiary liability proceedings against the owner before the Pechora Town Court, arguing, inter alia, that the company\u2019s insolvency had been premeditated. On 21 June 2012 the court dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim against the owner as unfounded. On 3 September 2012 the Supreme Court of the Komi Republic upheld that decision.", "references": ["6", "7", "1", "5", "8", "0", "4", "2", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant is a Swedish national born in 1950. He lives in Jordbro. 7.  The applicant suffered for many years from, inter alia, pain in his back and legs and numbness in his right arm. He alternated between full and part-time sick leave from 1996 to 2001. In 1999 he received a partial early retirement pension and in 2002 a full disability pension. 8.  In 2003 he applied for life annuity and alleged that his physical problems had been caused by his former employment as a driver (1973 to 1974), as a dairy worker (1974 to 1984) and as a food science technician (1984 to 1991). The Social Insurance Office (F\u00f6rs\u00e4kringskassan) appointed an in-house specialist in orthopaedic surgery who, in a written statement, concluded that there was not a high degree of probability (h\u00f6g grad av sannolikhet) that any harmful element in the applicant\u2019s former employment had caused his problems. 9.  On 17 May 2005, after having held an oral hearing, the Social Insurance Office rejected the application. Referring to, inter alia, the specialist statement by the insurance doctor, it was held that the applicant had not been subject to any harmful influences which, with a high degree of probability, could have caused or aggravated his problems. 10.  The applicant appealed to the County Administrative Court (f\u00f6rvaltningsr\u00e4tten) of Stockholm. On 19 April 2007 the court, after having held an oral hearing, upheld the Social Insurance Office\u2019s decision in full. The court found that, although it was scientifically known that employees in the food industry had a statistically high risk of injury, the circumstances in the applicant\u2019s case had to be taken into account. The applicant\u2019s back problems had appeared after barely two years in the industry and he suffered from degenerative changes to his back. Against that background, the medical investigation and other material did not adequately support the conclusion that the applicant, in his work, had been subject to any harmful influences which, with a high degree of probability, could have caused or aggravated his problems. 11.  Upon further appeal to the Administrative Court of Appeal (kammarr\u00e4tten) of Stockholm, the applicant submitted, inter alia, a medical statement (epikris) issued in February 2008 by the Centre of Public Health, Occupational and Environmental Medicine (Centrum for folkh\u00e4lsa, arbets\u2011 och milj\u00f6medicin). According to the medical statement, there were reasons to believe that the applicant\u2019s work had caused his problems. 12.  In a written statement to the appellate court, the Social Insurance Office questioned the conclusions in the medical statement as they were based on information about exposure which was to a high degree uncertain. Furthermore, there were medical records from 1997 in which the applicant was held to be fully able-bodied and in which it was noted that no somatic evidence had been found in support of the applicant\u2019s symptoms. 13.  On 17 March 2008, the Administrative Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal. The applicant requested an oral hearing in the case but, on 5 September 2008, the court rejected the request. It referred to the nature of the case and to the fact that an oral hearing had been held before the County Administrative Court. The applicant was given the opportunity to submit further observations. 14.  In a judgment of 27 October 2008, the Administrative Court of Appeal upheld the lower court\u2019s judgment in full. It first gave an account of the parties\u2019 submissions and the evidence relied upon, including the medical statement of February 2008, and then stated the following reasons:\n\u201cThe medical and other evidence in the case does not demonstrate that the applicant has been exposed to any such harmful influences in his work which could, with a high degree of probability, have caused his problems. His back-related and other problems can thus \u2013 as has been found also by the County Administrative Court and the Social Insurance Office \u2013 not be defined as a work-related injury. [The applicant] is therefore not entitled to life annuity according to the [Work Injury Insurance Act]. The appeal must consequently be rejected.\u201d 15.  The applicant appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court (H\u00f6gsta f\u00f6rvaltningsdomstolen). He complained of the lack of reasoning in the Administrative Court of Appeal\u2019s judgment and argued that that court\u2019s refusal to hold an oral hearing had infringed his right to a fair trial within the meaning of Article 6 of the Convention. 16.  On 4 August 2009, the Supreme Administrative Court refused leave to appeal. 17.  On 3 February 2010 the applicant lodged an application with the Court, complaining that his right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the Convention had been infringed because the Administrative Court of Appeal had refused to hold an oral hearing and its judgment had not been sufficiently reasoned. 18.  This application was declared inadmissible by the Court on 21 May 2013 for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. The Court found that the applicant had failed to lodge a claim with the Chancellor of Justice (Justitiekanslern) or the ordinary courts to seek compensation for the alleged breaches of the Convention (Ruminski v. Sweden (dec.), no. 10404/10, 21 May 2013). 19.  Consequently, on 30 December 2013, the applicant lodged a claim for compensation for the alleged breaches of the Convention with the Chancellor of Justice. He argued that the Administrative Court of Appeal\u2019s lack of reasoning, as well as its refusal to hold an oral hearing, had infringed his right to a fair trial within the meaning of Article 6 of the Convention. He requested 50,000 Swedish kronor (SEK) for non-pecuniary damage. 20.  The Chancellor of Justice communicated the case to the Administrative Court of Appeal which submitted that its handling of the case had been in accordance with domestic law as well as the Convention. In response, the applicant maintained, and developed the grounds for, his claim. 21.  On 15 January 2015 the Chancellor of Justice rejected the applicant\u2019s claim. As concerns the lack of an oral hearing, the Chancellor of Justice noted that the Social Insurance Office and the County Administrative Court had held an oral hearing and consequently, in accordance with the Court\u2019s case-law, a less strict standard applied to the requirement to hold a hearing before the appellate court. Thus, in view of the character of the case and the fact that the applicant had been given the opportunity to finalise his submissions in writing and the court had had access to substantial written evidence, the Chancellor of Justice concluded that there had been no breach of the Convention in this respect. 22.  As concerns the Administrative Court of Appeal\u2019s alleged lack of reasoning, the Chancellor of Justice referred extensively to the Court\u2019s case law on this matter and then made the following evaluation. The Administrative Court of Appeal had, in its judgment, accounted for the applicant\u2019s arguments and the new evidence he had submitted before it. It had further accounted for the considerations and conclusions drawn from the evidence submitted by the parties, namely, that the investigation in the case did not demonstrate that the applicant had been exposed to any such harmful influences in his work which, with a high degree of probability, could have caused his problems. Thus, the Chancellor of Justice found that the Administrative Court of Appeal had taken a stance on the central and decisive question in the case, that is, whether the applicant had been exposed to harmful influences in his work. While the Chancellor noted that it would have been preferable, for pedagogical reasons, for the court to have given clearer grounds for why the applicant\u2019s evidence had not been sufficient, she concluded that the reasoning was not so deficient that the applicant\u2019s right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the Convention had been infringed.", "references": ["8", "6", "3", "4", "0", "1", "2", "7", "9", "5", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1937 and lives in Sumgayit. 6.  The applicant\u2019s son, Mahir Mustafayev (M.M.), was born in 1967 and at the time of the events was serving a life sentence in Gobustan Prison. 7.  The applicant\u2019s son, who suffered from epilepsy, was held with one other inmate (S.R.) in cell no. 94, designated for two inmates. 8.  Since June 2006 M.M. had sent numerous complaints to various domestic authorities, including the Ministry of Justice, the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office and the Ombudsman of the Republic of Azerbaijan. He complained, in particular, of his conditions of detention, of violations of inmates\u2019 rights in Gobustan Prison and of ill-treatment by prison guards because of his complaints to various domestic authorities, alleging that his life was in danger. 9.  On 2 December 2006 S.R. left cell no. 94 for a long-term visit to his mother and M.M. remained the sole occupant of the cell. 10.  Early in the morning of 3 December 2006 a fire broke out in the cell. According to the applicant, the fire began at approximately 6 a.m. and prison guards did not immediately intervene to extinguish it despite warnings from other inmates. It took an hour for them to open the cell door after the outbreak of the fire. 11.  According to the Government, the fire broke out at approximately 6.50 a.m. The prison guards took immediate action and opened the cell door at around 7 a.m. They took the applicant\u2019s son out of the cell and gave him first aid. M.M. was sent to hospital by car at 11.45 a.m., arrived at 2.45 p.m. and died at 3.30 p.m. 12.  The applicant was informed by telegram at 3.21 p.m. on 6 December 2006 of the death of his son. 13.  It appears from M.M.\u2019s death certificate, dated 13 March 2007, that the cause of death was first and second degree burns over the whole body and smoke inhalation (b\u00fct\u00fcn b\u0259d\u0259nin texniki yan\u0131\u011f\u0131, I-II d\u0259r\u0259c\u0259li yan\u0131q, intoksikasiya). 14.  On 4 December 2006 the Garadagh District Prosecutor\u2019s Office launched a criminal inquiry into M.M.\u2019s death. 15.  On 7 December 2006 the investigator in charge of the case refused to institute criminal proceedings. The investigator found that M.M. had suffered from epilepsy and that the fire had begun after his cigarette had fallen onto the bed during a seizure. The investigator relied on a statement written by M.M. after the incident, which stated that the fire had broken out because he had had an epileptic seizure while smoking. The investigator found that the prison guards had acted immediately in order to extinguish the fire. The investigator also referred to a statement from S.R. that he had seen M.M. after the incident, at approximately 10 a.m. on 3 December 2006, and that M.M. had told him that he had had a seizure and that he had not known how the incident had happened. The investigator\u2019s decision also referred to post-mortem forensic report no. 147 dated 5 December 2006, which confirmed the existence of extensive burns on M.M.\u2019s body. The forensic report also established that the time of the injuries corresponded to 3 December 2006 and that they were the kind of injuries which caused serious harm and could be life-threatening. 16.  Despite the Court\u2019s explicit request to the Government to submit copies of all the documents relating to the criminal investigation concerning M.M.\u2019s death, the Government failed to provide the Court with a copy of M.M. and S.R.\u2019s written statements of 3 December 2006 and forensic report no. 147 of 5 December 2006, submitting that the case file had been destroyed. 17.  The applicant was provided with a copy of the investigator\u2019s decision of 7 December 2006 only one month later. He immediately lodged a complaint against that decision with a superior prosecutor. 18.  On 16 February 2007 the Baku City Prosecutor overturned the investigator\u2019s decision and remitted the case to the Garadagh District Prosecutor\u2019s Office for a new examination. The prosecutor held that the investigator had not duly examined the scene of the incident. He also asked the investigator, inter alia, to order forensic fire, chemical and handwriting examinations, to check if M.M.\u2019s cell had been equipped with an adequate fire detection system, to question other inmates, prison guards, and the medical staff who had given first aid to M.M. and to establish why M.M. had not been taken to hospital immediately after the incident. The prosecutor also asked the investigator to order a new forensic examination in order to establish, inter alia, whether M.M. had been able to speak and move freely immediately after the incident given the nature of his injuries. 19.  On 26 April 2007 the investigator again refused to institute criminal proceedings, concluding that there had been no crime involved in M.M.\u2019s death. He relied mainly on the statements submitted by the prison guards, who said the fire had broken out at approximately 7 a.m. because of M.M.\u2019s epileptic seizure and that they had intervened immediately after the incident. The investigator also noted that handwriting report no. 2692 dated 6 April 2007 had indicated that the statement written on 3 December 2006 had been signed by M.M. However, he also noted in the decision that forensic expert report no. 32 dated 25 April 2007 had stated that M.M. had not been able to move, speak or write immediately after the incident as he had been in a state of shock as a result of his burns. The decision also recorded that chemical analysis report no. 2375 of 19 March 2007 had concluded that there had been no trace of oil products in samples taken from the cell walls or of carbonised particles. The investigator also pointed out that it was not possible to carry out a forensic fire examination because the scene of the incident had not been preserved and repairs had been carried out in the cell in question. As regards the statements by some inmates that the fire had broken out at approximately 6 a.m., that it had taken an hour for the prison guards to open the door of the cell and that M.M. had died as a result of their negligence, the investigator noted that the cells of the inmates in question were situated far from M.M.\u2019s cell and that therefore their statements could not be considered as reliable. The investigator also questioned Gobustan Prison\u2019s paramedic (feld\u015fer) (N.B.) who had given first aid to M.M. after the fire. N.B. stated that he had been informed by telephone at home about the incident at around 7 a.m. on 3 December 2006. He had taken a taxi to the prison and had arrived fifteen minutes later. He had given first aid to M.M. but his condition had worsened at around 8 a.m. and he had requested his transfer to a hospital. N.B. stated that he had accompanied M.M. in the car that had transported him to the hospital but they had not arrived until 2.45 p.m. because they had waited for an hour and fifteen minutes for the car to be repaired after it had broken down. In that connection, the investigator referred to letter no. 17/1/15-954 of 27 February 2007 from the Prisons Service of the Ministry of Justice, confirming that the car transporting M.M. to the hospital had arrived at 2.45 p.m. and that the delay in his transfer had been due to the fact that the car had broken down on its way to the hospital. The letter also contained information about M.M.\u2019s medical history, pointing out that he had previously been admitted five times to that medical establishment, had been diagnosed four times with epilepsy and had received the appropriate treatment. 20.  Despite the Court\u2019s explicit request to the Government to submit copies of all the documents relating to the criminal investigation concerning M.M.\u2019s death, the Government failed to provide the Court with a copy of chemical analysis report no. 2375 dated 19 March 2007, handwriting report no. 2692 dated 6 April 2007, forensic expert report no. 32 dated 25 April 2007, letter no. 17/1/15-954 of 27 February 2007 from the Prisons Service of the Ministry of Justice and the statements made by the prison guards, medical staff and inmates detained in Gobustan Prison, submitting that the case file had been destroyed. 21.  The applicant lodged a complaint against the investigator\u2019s decision with the Garadagh District Court, complaining that he had failed to carry out an effective investigation. 22.  On 4 July 2007 the Garadagh District Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaint. 23.  On an unspecified date the applicant lodged an appeal against that decision. He complained, in particular, of the inconsistency between the conclusions of the handwriting report dated 6 April 2007 and the forensic expert opinion dated 25 April 2007. He also argued that the investigator and the first-instance court had failed to examine photographs of M.M. taken immediately after the incident on 3 December 2006. He submitted that the photographs showed that M.M.\u2019s body had signs of ill-treatment. 24.  On 27 July 2007 the Baku Court of Appeal granted the appeal and remitted the case to the prosecuting authorities for fresh examination. The appellate court held that the prosecuting authorities had failed to examine the photographs of M.M. for signs of ill-treatment on his body or to establish why the scene of the incident had not been preserved. 25.  On 15 October 2007 a prosecutor at the Garadagh District Prosecutor\u2019s Office again refused to institute criminal proceedings on the grounds of a lack of a criminal element in the death. In particular, the prosecutor held that there was no evidence that M.M. had been ill-treated, as alleged by the applicant. He relied in that connection on the conclusions of forensic report no. 147, which had only confirmed the existence of numerous burns on M.M.\u2019s body. 26.  On an unspecified date the applicant appealed against that decision. 27.  On 6 December 2007 the Garadagh District Court overruled the prosecutor\u2019s decision and remitted the case to the prosecuting authorities for a new examination. The court pointed out the inconsistencies as to when the fire had begun. It further held that the investigation had failed to clarify why M.M. had been taken to hospital almost eight hours after the fire had broken out. The court held that the fact that the car transporting M.M. had broken down could not explain such a long delay. The court also found that the investigation had failed to examine whether M.M.\u2019s conditions of detention had been appropriate for a person suffering from epilepsy. 28.  On 7 January 2008 the investigator in charge of the case again refused to institute criminal proceedings. The wording of the decision was identical to that of 26 April 2007, except the last few paragraphs, which concerned the conditions of detention of inmates suffering from epilepsy. In that connection, relying on statements made by the head of the prison regime department of Gobustan Prison and N.B., the investigator found that domestic law did not provide for any special conditions of detention for inmates suffering from epilepsy or any restriction on the authorised items they could possess in prison. 29.  On 14 March 2008 the Garadagh District Court overruled the investigator\u2019s decision of 7 January 2008 and remitted the case to the prosecuting authorities. The court held that the investigator had failed to examine the reason for the delay in M.M.\u2019s transfer to hospital. It also pointed out the inconsistencies in the inmates\u2019 statements concerning the circumstances of the incident. The court further found that it had not been established whether M.M.\u2019s conditions of detention had been compatible with his illness and that an inquiry should have been carried out as regards the necessary security and medical measures for a person like M.M., whose condition was likely to give rise to sudden seizures. 30.  On 7 May 2008 a prosecutor at the Garadagh District Prosecutor\u2019s Office again refused to institute criminal proceedings, using wording that was almost identical to the decisions of 26 April 2007 and 7 January 2008. The prosecutor found that it had been M.M.\u2019s fault that the fire had broken out and that he had died as a result of his burns. He further held that the prison guards had taken immediate action and there had been no negligence on their part. The prosecutor noted that there was no special rule for the detention of inmates suffering from epilepsy. He also confirmed that there had been a delay in taking M.M. to hospital because the car had broken down. He further found that it had not been possible to carry out a forensic fire examination as the scene of the incident had not been preserved. Lastly, the prosecutor referred to a statement made by a forensic expert, A.M., that there had been no causal link between M.M.\u2019s death and his delayed transfer to hospital. 31.  Despite the Court\u2019s explicit request to the Government to submit copies of all the documents relating to the criminal investigation concerning M.M.\u2019s death, the Government failed to provide the Court with a copy of A.M.\u2019s statement, submitting that the case file had been destroyed. 32.  The applicant was provided with a copy of that decision only on 26 December 2008, following intervention by the Ombudsman. 33.  On an unspecified date the applicant lodged a complaint against the prosecutor\u2019s decision of 7 May 2008, arguing that the prosecuting authorities had failed to investigate the questions raised by the previous court decisions. In particular, there had been no plausible explanation for M.M. not being taken immediately to hospital after the incident. He also disputed the official version, according to which M.M. had been able to write a statement immediately after the incident and that he had caused the fire himself. 34.  On 12 February 2009 the Garadagh District Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaint. The judge held that all the facts of the case had been examined by the prosecuting authorities and that M.M. had died as a result of an accidental fire. 35.  On 6 March 2009 the applicant appealed against that decision, arguing that there had not been an effective investigation into his son\u2019s death in prison. He argued that the wording of the prosecutor\u2019s decision of 7 May 2008 had been almost identical to the prosecuting authorities\u2019 previous decisions and that it had not dealt with any of the questions raised by the previous court decisions. 36.  On 22 May 2009 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal, finding that there was no reason to overrule the first-instance court\u2019s decision of 12 February 2009.", "references": ["6", "2", "1", "3", "4", "8", "5", "9", "7", "No Label", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "6.  The first applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Mosfellsb\u00e6r, the second applicant was born in 1980 and lives in Reykjav\u00edk and the third applicant was born in 1980 and lives in Seltjarnarnes. At the material time the first and second applicants were on the editorial board of the newspaper DV and the third applicant was a journalist for DV. 7.  On 30 September 2010, an Icelandic private limited company, (hereafter \u201cthe company\u201d), was declared bankrupt. The company was established in 1960 and is one of the leading industrial companies in Iceland in the production of plastic packaging material. 8.  In October 2010 the liquidator of the bankruptcy estate hired an accountancy firm to investigate the company\u2019s accounts. 9.  On 31 January 2011 the accountancy firm finalised a report indicating a suspicion of criminal misconduct by the board members. The chairman of the board, A, who was also one of the owners of the company, was an assistant professor at the University of Iceland at the time. 10.  The liquidator reported the suspected criminal misconduct to the police. A holding company and a bank also reported the company and A to the police. 11.  On 14 March 2011 DV published a picture of A on its front page under the headline \u201cBlack report on [the company]: Police investigate Assistant Professor\u201d. An article on the matter was printed on pages 2 and 3. The third applicant was identified as its author. The headline of the article read \u201cAssistant professor entangled in police investigation\u201d and another picture of A appeared beside the headline. The article was based on information from the accountancy firm\u2019s report. It is not known how the applicants knew about the report and its contents. The article discussed inter alia A, who was a board member and one of three owners of the company and the former supervisor of the MBA programme and assistant professor of business studies at the University of Iceland. The article described the company\u00b4s situation with reference to the accountancy firm\u00b4s report. It stated that the report had concluded the company had paid for the A\u00b4s expenditures, which were unlikely to be connected to the company\u00b4s operations. The report had also indicated that A and one of his co-owners had known about the grave financial situation of the company long before it had been declared bankrupt in 2010. The report had concluded that the company\u00b4s assets had been partly expended when it was clear that it was insolvent. These assets had in fact been transferred to another company, owned by the A\u00b4s co-owner.When the company was declared bankrupt on 30 September 2010 the company owed approximately 1,100,000,000 ISK (approx. 7,150,000 euros at the time) to a large bank in Iceland. The amount had increased significantly after the financial crisis in 2008. 12.  On 16 March 2011 A\u2019s lawyer received an email from a police prosecutor confirming that the liquidator\u2019s complaint had been received and was being \u201cexamined\u201d and that two other complaints received by the police were also under consideration. He stated that no formal decision had been taken to instigate a police investigation. A\u2019s lawyer sent this email to the first applicant and requested correction of the impugned statements. The first applicant refused his request. 13.  On 28 April 2011 A lodged defamation proceedings against the applicants and DV before the Reykjav\u00edk District Court and requested that the statements published by DV, \u201cPolice investigate Assistant Professor\u201d and \u201cAssistant Professor entangled in police investigation\u201d, be declared null and void and that the applicants be ordered to pay compensation, including expenses for publishing the final judgment. 14.  The applicants and A were heard and the email of 16 March 2011 from the police prosecutor to A\u2019s lawyer was submitted as evidence. 15.  By a judgment of 5 March 2012 the District Court found that both disputed statements had been defamatory and ordered the applicants to pay 200,000 Icelandic Kr\u00f3nur (ISK) (approximately 1,600 euros (EUR)) to A in compensation for non-pecuniary damage, plus interest, ISK 200,000 for the cost of publishing the judgment and ISK 500,000 (approximately 4,200 EUR) for A\u2019s legal costs before the District Court. The statements were declared null and void. 16.  The judgment contained the following reasons:\n\u201c... According to Article 73(1) of the Constitution everybody has the right to freedom of opinion and belief. However, Article 73(3) of the Constitution allows certain restrictions on the freedom of expression. It states that freedom of expression may only be restricted by law in the interests of public order or the security of the State, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights or reputation of others, if such restrictions are deemed necessary and in agreement with democratic traditions. In Chapter XXV of the Penal Code, freedom of expression is restricted in the interest of the rights and reputation of others. When deciding the limits of freedom of expression, the possibility of a public debate has to be guaranteed.\n[The applicants] claim that the statements are true and refer to the principle that they cannot be held liable for true statements. It is undisputed that, before the newspaper coverage, [the police] had been informed by the liquidator of a reasonable suspicion of criminal acts by the company\u2019s board members, of which A was one. It is also clear that the information given by the liquidator was based on [the accountancy firm\u2019s] report of 31 January 2011. An email of 16 March 2011 from [the prosecutor] to [A\u2019s] lawyer stated that the liquidator\u2019s report was being \u201cexamined\u201d [\u201ctil sko\u00f0unar\u201d]. Furthermore, it was stated that two other entities [had reported, inter alia, A] to the police and that those reports \u201cwere also being considered\u201d [liti\u00f0 til framangreindra k\u00e6ra]. However, it is stated that no formal decision has been taken about a police investigation nor possible criminal acts defined.\n[The applicants] base their defence on the fact that nothing in their statements, which [A] wants declared null and void, indicates that a formal decision had been taken to start [a police] investigation and that the wording of the statements should not be interpreted more widely than its general meaning indicates. Here it has to be taken into account that in general the media are required to base coverage on thorough research of the facts. Taking this into account, and having regard to [the absence of a formal decision by the police to investigate] [the company] and its board members, including [A], the court cannot accept [the applicant\u2019s] arguments. No police investigation had been instigated against [A], thus the statements \u201cPolice investigate Assistant Professor\u201d and \u201cAssistant professor entangled in police investigation\u201d were factually wrong, but both statements did in fact have the same meaning. It was not unreasonably difficult to verify whether such an investigation had in fact been opened. The wording of the statements was of such a nature as to make the reader believe that [A] was a suspect in a police investigation because of his criminal and punishable acts. This damaged [A\u2019s] reputation. Therefore, the court has to agree with [A] that [the applicants] violated Article 235 of the Penal Code No 19/1940 (Almenn Hegningarl\u00f6g) by publishing the aforementioned statements. In the light of the aforesaid, and with reference to Article 241(1) of the Penal Code, [A\u2019s] request to declare the statements null and void is granted. However, there is no reason to impose punishment; therefore [A\u2019s] request that [the applicants] be punished is rejected ...\u201d 17.  On 8 May 2012 the applicants appealed to the Supreme Court against the District Court\u2019s judgment. 18.  By judgment of 6 December 2012 the Supreme Court confirmed the District Court\u2019s judgment and ordered the applicants to pay, in addition, ISK 500,000 for A\u2019s legal costs before the Supreme Court. 19.  As to the reasoning, the Supreme Court stated:\n\u201c... The aforementioned email from [the police prosecutor] can only be understood as meaning that no investigation had been instigated on account of the three reports [to the police] which are referred to in the email. There is nothing to indicate that such an investigation was initiated later and it will not be held against [A] that he did not provide confirmation of that during the proceedings as requested by [the applicants].\nWith these comments, [and] with reference to the District Court\u2019s reasoning, the Supreme Court confirms the District Court\u2019s decision on declaring the statements null and void and confirms the publication of the judgment in the next issue of DV and the next online edition of DV after the delivery of this judgment. The annulled statements were wrong and defamatory for [A]. When examining the coverage and the publication of pictures of [the company] and its representatives in the printed issue of DV and in the online edition of [DV], [A\u2019s] reputation was attacked, at a time when there were no grounds for it ...\u201d 20.  By letter of 31 May 2013 the Special Prosecutor notified another company representative that \u201cthe investigation\u201d into the complaints against him and A had been closed and the case had been dismissed.", "references": ["9", "1", "3", "7", "4", "2", "0", "8", "5", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
+{"input": "5.  After the regaining of independence, in 1991 property reform legislation came into force in Latvia and provided that former owners or their heirs could reclaim property nationalised in 1940. 6.  The second applicant and two other individuals were the heirs of A.S. In 1999 they asked the Riga Regional Court to recognise their title to 30 ha of forest in Jurmala (hereinafter \u201cthe contested property\u201d) which had allegedly belonged to A.S. and was nationalised in 1940. They also asked the court to recognise their right to receive a plot of land of the same value in Jurmala, as it had not been possible to establish the precise boundaries of the inherited land. 7.  On 7 May 1999 the Riga Regional Court ruled in favour of the claimants. It recognised that there was no question over whether the claimants were the heirs of the late A.S., as that had been established by a court order in 1995. Referring to documents received from the State Archive and the State Land Authority (Valsts Zemes dienests), it also established that A.S. had purchased 30 ha of forest in Jurmala. Referring to section 12 of the Law on Land Reform in the Cities of the Republic of Latvia (Par zemes reformu Latvijas Republikas pils\u0113t\u0101s), which provided that any requests after 1 June 1994 for the restoration of property rights should be decided by a court, the Riga Regional Court recognised that the second applicant owned a two-third share of the forest in Jurmala and that the other two claimants owned a sixth each. As there was no evidence of what the precise boundaries of the forest were, the court recognised the claimants\u2019 right to receive a plot of land of the same value elsewhere. 8.  Jurmala City Council was a defendant in the above proceedings and a representative of Jurmala City Land Commission contested the claim, arguing that in 1940 the contested property had belonged to several individuals as undivided property, and the archive documents did not show what part of that property each claimant could be entitled to. 9.  The judgment was not appealed against and became final on 8 June 1999. In April 2000, at the claimants\u2019 request, the Riga Regional Court adopted an additional decision specifying that the contested property had historically been part of the Bulduri estate forest. 10.  After adoption of the above judgment, the Jurmala City Land Commission informed the claimants, the Jurmala City Council and the State Land Authority several times of problems in enforcement of the judgment. The Jurmala City Land Commission maintained that the archive material, which had been obtained after the above judgment had been adopted, did not give information as to the location of the contested property. On those grounds, in October 2000 the State Land Authority asked the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office to lodge an application for supervisory review (protests) asking for the judgment of 7 May 1999 to be quashed. 11.  In November 2000 the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office dismissed the request, arguing that reassessment of evidence could not serve as grounds for triggering supervisory review proceedings. 12.  On several occasions the second applicant complained to the Jurmala City Council and the Jurmala City Land Commission about delays in the enforcement of the judgment. 13.  In order to comply with the judgment, on 6 December 2002 the Jurmala City Land Commission adopted decisions allocating four plots of land to the claimants. 14.  On 27 December 2002 the title to the four plots of land was entered in the land register, and on 8 and 9 January 2003 the second applicant and the other two claimants sold their respective plots to the fifth applicant, the limited liability company Bulduru Mui\u017ea, the owner and director of which at the material time was the second applicant.\nBetween January 2002 and October 2003 the first applicant was the president of the fifth applicant, and between October 2003 and August 2007 the first applicant was its chairman of the board. 15.  On 24 October 2003 the President of the Civil Division of the Senate of the Supreme Court lodged an application for supervisory review with regard to the judgment adopted on 7 May 1999 by the Riga Regional Court, arguing that there was a lack of evidence to corroborate that A.S. had owned the property before 1940. As information received from the State Archive had suggested, the contested property had consisted of undivided shares and therefore it could not be concluded that A.S. had been the sole purchaser of 30 ha of a forest. 16.  A copy of that application was sent to the second applicant and the other two parties to the initial proceedings, inviting them to submit comments within thirty days of receipt. 17.  At a hearing on 17 December 2003 attended by the representative of the claimants in the initial proceedings, the Senate of the Supreme Court quashed the judgment and remitted the case to the Riga Regional Court for fresh consideration. The Senate recognised that there was nothing in the case file to suggest that A.S. had owned the contested property. 18.  In January and March 2004 the Bureau for the Prevention and Combating of Corruption (\u201cthe KNAB\u201d) asked the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office to initiate proceedings to reclaim the contested property from the applicants. 19.  The fifth applicant entered into various transactions with the contested property. 20.  On 15 and 16 December 2003 part of the property was for a total amount of 7,000 Latvian lati (LVL) (about 10,000 euros (EUR)) sold to A.V. who on 26 and 29 March 2004 sold it for the same amount to the third applicant, the limited liability company Balt Invest Group, the co\u2011owner and representative of which at the material time and until February 2007 was A.V. himself.\nOn 23 April and 7 May 2004 the third applicant was registered as the owner of the property in the land register. 21.  On 12 and 19 February 2004 the fifth applicant sold two other parts of the contested property to the sixth and fourth applicants respectively for about EUR 45,000 per each transaction. The purchase contract of 19 February 2004 provided, inter alia, that the seller, namely the fifth applicant, guaranteed that the property was not subject to any dispute, and that seller would be liable for any third party claims made in respect of the transaction. 22.  On 27 February 2004 the fifth applicant sold another part of the property to K.K, who on 18 June 2004 sold it to the first applicant for about LVL 29,000 (about EUR 41,500). The purchase contract of 18 June 2004 provided, inter alia, that the seller guaranteed that the property was not anyhow encumbered. 23.  On 27 April 2004 and on 16 September 2004 (with regard to the first and the third applicants) the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office, acting on behalf of the Ministry of Finance, lodged a claim against the Jurmala City Council, the applicants, A.V. and the two other claimants in the initial proceedings. The Prosecutor General\u2019s Office relied on the Senate\u2019s judgment (see paragraph 17 above) and the request received from the KNAB (see paragraph 18 above). The claim stated that the second applicant and the two other claimants in the initial proceedings had no legal right of ownership over the contested property. The Riga Regional Court was asked to quash the decisions of Jurmala City Land Commission allocating the four plots of land (see paragraph 13 above). The Prosecutor General\u2019s Office also asked for the relevant Land Registry records to be deleted and the rights of the State to the contested property to be recognised. 24.  The claim was based on the section of the Civil Law regulating property claims, such as sections 1041, 1044 and 1063 (see paragraph 37 below). 25.  On 30 May 2004 the Riga Regional Court decided to join the claim lodged by the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office and the claim about the restoration of property rights (see paragraph 17 above). 26.  On 9 September 2005 the Riga Regional Court dismissed the claim lodged by the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office and upheld the decision recognising the second applicant and the two other claimants as owners of the contested property. 27.  Both the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office and the Jurmala City Council appealed against that decision. 28.  On 22 June 2006 the Civil Division of the Supreme Court partly upheld the appeal lodged by the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office. The court revoked the decisions of the Jurmala City Land Commission allocating the second applicant and the two other claimants the four plots of land, and ordered that the corresponding entries be deleted from the relevant Land Registry records. It established that the lower court had failed to address the fact that until 1937 the contested plots of land had been jointly owned by the former owner A.S. and seventy-six other individuals. Moreover, the joint ownership of the land had ceased after the passing of a decree in 1937, and after that date A.S. had not registered his title to the property with the Land Registry.\nThe appellate court also dismissed part of the claim of the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office in which it claimed that the State (represented by the Ministry of Finance) had ownership rights over the property in question. The plots of land were returned to Jurmala Municipality in order for it to finalise the land reform. 29.  In relation to the applicants\u2019 argument that they had all acted in good faith when acquiring their part of the contested property, the court at the outset noted that such criteria as the date of conclusion of a contested transaction and the nature of the infringed property rights have to be considered when assessing the protection of bona fide acquirers. The court also observed that after the second applicant had sold the contested property to the fifth applicant, the owner of which was the second applicant himself, all the transactions involving the contested property (see paragraphs 19-22 above) had been concluded after the Senate of the Supreme Court had revoked the final judgment in the initial proceedings. It also noted that K.K. had sold his respective parts of the property to the first applicant despite the fact that the civil proceedings initiated by the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office had been pending. On those grounds and on the basis of section 1055 of the Civil Law (see paragraph 38 below), the applicants were not recognised as having acted in good faith. 30.  The first, second, fourth and fifth applicants lodged an appeal on points of law. Following an application dated 14 August 2006, the third applicant joined the cassation appeal lodged by the first applicant. The sixth applicant did not lodge an appeal on points of law. 31.  The five appellants complained, inter alia, that the State did not have sufficient interest in the property to justify the fact that the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office had lodged a property claim on behalf of the State. 32.  By a final decision of 17 January 2007, the Senate of the Supreme Court upheld in essence the appellate court\u2019s judgment. With respect to the property claim brought by the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office, the Senate noted that even if the State\u2019s property rights had not been infringed, that did not prevent the court from finding that the second applicant and the two other claimants in the first set of proceedings had had no rights to the contested property. The Senate also upheld the appellate court\u2019s conclusions about the applicants acting in bad faith. 33.  After the above judgment took effect and at Jurmala Municipality\u2019s request the applicants\u2019 entries were deleted from the relevant Land Registry records. 34.  On 16 October 2012 the third applicant was declared insolvent and the Riga District Court appointed E.K. as its insolvency administrator who replaced the former board members of the third applicant. On 19 February 2013 the insolvency proceedings were terminated and on 14 May 2013 the third applicant was deleted from the company register. 35.  On 12 April 2013 A.V., who until June 2012 had been a board member of the third applicant, on its behalf designated a legal representative in the proceedings before the Court (see paragraph 2 above).", "references": ["0", "6", "4", "7", "8", "3", "9", "1", "2", "5", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant company, Chap Ltd, is a private Armenian company that was set up in 1999 and has its registered office in Gyumri. 6.  In 2005 the applicant company established a regional television channel, Gala TV, with the intention of broadcasting in the local region. 7.  On 23 February 2005 the applicant company was granted a licence by the National Television and Radio Commission (\u201cthe NTRC\u201d) permitting it to broadcast in Gyumri, the second largest town in Armenia, and the surrounding area. The licence was granted for a period of seven years. Gala TV was one of four television stations operating in Gyumri and, according to the applicant company, it was widely recognised as one of the few independent voices in television broadcasting in Armenia. 8.  From 29 October to 12 November 2007 the State Revenue Service (\u201cthe SRS\u201d) conducted an inspection of the applicant company\u2019s accounts. As a result, on 12 November 2007 it issued a report stating that the applicant company had a high tax liability for the years 2005 to 2007 and ordered it to pay 25,665,100 Armenian drams (AMD) (approximately 51,000 euros (EUR)), including surcharges and fines. The report stated that the indicated amounts were payable to the State budget within a period of ten days. 9.  The SRS established in its report that the applicant company had underreported its tax liability by hiding income earned from advertising. The report also stated that the applicant company had failed to include the prices for its services in its invoices or keep records, as required by the Television and Radio Broadcasting Act. Furthermore, it was alleged that the applicant company had manufactured and sold fireworks without a government licence. 10.  The SRS\u2019s report was based, inter alia, on:\na)  documents requested from and subsequently submitted by Gr.A., the head of the NTRC;\nb)  statements by the heads of companies and individual businessmen that they had placed advertisements on Gala TV but had not received any documents acknowledging payment to the applicant company for such services. 11.  The applicant company objected to the allegations of tax evasion as fabricated and politically motivated as home-made advertisements that had a social function, which Gala TV had broadcast for free, had been taken into account by the authorities in calculating the tax arrears. 12.  On an unspecified date the SRS instituted criminal proceedings against the applicant company\u2019s chief executive, K.H., for tax evasion. The investigating authorities discontinued the proceedings after the required amount had been paid. 13.  Having received no payment from the applicant company as regards the amounts stated in its report of 12 November 2007, on 26 November 2007 the SRS brought a claim with the Commercial Court to oblige the applicant company to pay AMD 25,212,800 (approximately EUR 50,000) in tax debt and to freeze its bank accounts and other assets in the amount of the alleged tax shortfall. 14.  On 27 November 2007 the Commercial Court admitted the case to its proceedings and at the same time dismissed the application to freeze the applicant company\u2019s bank accounts. 15.  On 3 December 2007 the Commercial Court approved a freezing order on the applicant company\u2019s assets as security for the claim. 16.  On 17 December 2007 the applicant company brought a counterclaim against the SRS, challenging the results of the tax inspection. It argued, inter alia, that the relevant statements obtained from the heads of companies and individual businessmen, as well as the information obtained from Gr.A., could not be used as evidence to support the findings of the SRS in its report. 17.  On 24 December 2007 the applicant company\u2019s case was transferred to the Administrative Court, which had been set up as part of a reform of the court system that year. 18.  On 29 January 2008 the Administrative Court admitted the case. 19.  On 12 March 2008 the applicant company\u2019s lawyer lodged an application to obtain and examine the tax records of the companies that had advertised on Gala TV and had been inspected by the SRS. He claimed that those tax records contained tax reports and other documents which could rebut the evidence submitted by the SRS. This application was rejected. 20.  On the same day the applicant company\u2019s lawyer also asked the Administrative Court to summon, inter alia, the heads of the relevant companies and the businessmen, namely A.J., S.A., S.M., H.P., G.S., G.A. and H.M. to whose statements the SRS had referred in its report. 21.  By another application submitted on the same date the lawyer asked the Administrative Court to summon Gr.A. to testify about the information and documents he had provided to the SRS and confirm the veracity of those documents. 22.  The applicant company\u2019s applications were rejected by the Administrative Court, which considered the witness evidence in question as irrelevant. 23.  On 19 March 2008 the Administrative Court granted the SRS\u2019s claim against the applicant company in part. It annulled the SRS\u2019s report in respect of a charge of AMD 96,000 (approximately EUR 190) imposed on the applicant company for the alleged illegal production and sale of fireworks. The Administrative Court decided to levy a total charge of AMD 25,116,700 (approximately EUR 50,000) on the company, including AMD 14,291,300 (approximately EUR 28,400) for Value Added Tax (VAT), comprising arrears, a 60% fine and surcharges for late payment; AMD 8,338,300 (approximately EUR 16,600) for profit tax, comprising arrears, a 60% fine and surcharges for late payment; and AMD 2,487,100 (approximately EUR 5,000) for the tax authority\u2019s development fund. The Administrative Court referred to the relevant provisions of the Law on Value Added Tax and the Law on Taxes when imposing the surcharges and fines. In establishing the applicant company\u2019s VAT and profit tax liability, it relied, inter alia, on the documents provided by Gr. A. and the statements of A.J., S.A., S.M., H.P., G.S., G.A. and H.M. which had been referred to in the SRS\u2019s report. The amount of court fees to be paid by the applicant company was calculated at AMD 502,334 (approximately EUR 1,000). 24.  On 18 June 2008 the applicant company lodged an appeal on points of law with the Administrative Court. 25.  On 4 August 2008 the Court of Cassation returned the applicant company\u2019s appeal on the grounds that it had failed to pay the correct amount of State fee and set a deadline for resubmission. 26.  After paying the required State fee, the applicant company resubmitted its appeal on 3 September 2008. 27.  On 18 September 2008 the Court of Cassation declared the applicant company\u2019s appeal on points of law inadmissible for lack of merit.", "references": ["7", "1", "6", "8", "0", "2", "4", "9", "5", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1983 and lives in Cocieri. 6.  The background to the case, including the Transdniestrian armed conflict of 1991-1992 and the subsequent events, is set out in Ila\u015fcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia ([GC], no. 48787/99, \u00a7\u00a7 28-185, ECHR 2004\u2011VII) and Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia ([GC], 43370/04 and 2 others, \u00a7\u00a7 8-42, ECHR 2012 (extracts)). 7.  On 22 August 2010 the applicant, who is an entrepreneur, was transporting merchandise to an agricultural market in the town of Dubasari in the self-proclaimed \u201cMoldovan Republic of Transdniestria\u201d (the \u201cMRT\u201d). He was stopped by two persons presenting themselves as customs officers of the \u201cMRT\u201d who seized his van and the merchandise contained therein on account of his having allegedly failed to register the vehicle. On 7 October 2010 the \u201cMRT\u201d customs authority issued a decision obliging the applicant to pay a fine of some 1,320 euros (EUR) in return for being able to recover his van and merchandise. The applicant paid the fine. 8.  In the meantime the applicant complained to the authorities of the Republic of Moldova about the seizure of his van and merchandise. On 9 September 2010 the Dubasari prosecutor\u2019s office initiated a criminal investigation into the facts of the case and several suspects were declared wanted. However, the investigation was suspended in 2014. 9.  On 21 July 1992 the Presidents of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Moldova signed an agreement in Moscow to put an end to the military conflict in the Transdniestrian region of Moldova. Under the agreement, a security zone was created between the conflicting parties and a Joint Control Commission (hereinafter \u201cthe JCC\u201d) was set up to monitor the implementation of the agreement in the security zone. The JCC is composed of representatives of Russia, the Republic of Moldova, and the \u201cMRT\u201d. Any decisions made by the JCC must have the consent of all the parties (for more details, see Ila\u015fcu and Others (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 87-91). 10.  Reports by inter-governmental and non-governmental organisations, the relevant domestic law and practice of the Republic of Moldova, and other pertinent documents were summarised in Mozer v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia ([GC], no. 11138/10, \u00a7\u00a7 61-77, ECHR 2016).", "references": ["1", "0", "5", "2", "4", "3", "7", "6", "8", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Portoro\u017e. 6.  The applicant and R.H. are neighbours; they live in a two apartment house with a shared courtyard. They have been in conflict for several years and have both instituted several sets of legal proceedings against each other. 7.  On 13 February 2004 R.H. lodged a criminal complaint against the applicant. He alleged that earlier on that same day the applicant had threatened him by yelling \u201cI have bought a gun, so it will all be over soon\u201d. R.H. alleged that this incident happened in front of their house. He stated that first his cleaning lady had been obstructed by the applicant when entering the courtyard through a small door, and half an hour later he had been able to open neither the small door, nor the large electric sliding doors, which he had assumed had been the applicant\u2019s fault. At that point he allegedly engaged in arguing with the applicant who allegedly replied with the aforementioned threats. R.H. also stated that the applicant had had a gun licence. 8.  On 1 March 2004 the Koper police held an interview with the applicant. 9.  On 2 April 2004 the police sent a report to the Koper district prosecutor, stating that they had not found any reasonable suspicion that the alleged criminal offence had been committed by the applicant. 10.  On 29 October 2004 the Koper district prosecutor lodged charges against the applicant for the offence of threatening the security of another person. 11.  On 2 April 2007 the Piran Local Court held a hearing. The applicant denied the charges, claimed that R.H. had lied and that multiple sets of proceedings had been brought against him following an attempt on his life in 1999. He requested that the video surveillance footage of the day of the incident be inspected. He handed in to the court the minutes from a hearing of 9 February 2004 in some other proceedings which noted that the applicant had changed the lock of the small door leading to the courtyard and that he had handed the new keys to R.H. at that hearing. In reply to the questions put by the applicant\u2019s counsel, R.H. submitted that there had been between twelve and sixteen cameras surveying inside and the outside area of the house and that the recordings had been stored for about fifteen days. He said that the applicant had been standing somewhere between his entrance and the courtyard of the house during the incident but had refused to sketch where the incident had taken place. R.H. further replied that he had not checked the video footage following the incident, but that in any event the cameras would have not covered the whole incident and that the server of the video surveillance system had broken down on many occasions; he later added that in any case the server had been changed by the maintenance company. The applicant insisted that an inspection of the site be carried out and that evidence concerning video surveillance, including information such as the change of server, could and should be verified. The judge found it unnecessary to obtain the evidence in question and the following day acquitted the applicant finding that it had not been proved that the applicant had directed the threats against R.H. 12.  On 21 November 2007 the Koper Higher Court upheld the appeal lodged by the district attorney\u2019s office and remitted the case to the first-instance court. It found that the charges contained all the elements of the offence and that it was not necessary to include the circumstances showing that the injured party had actually felt endangered. 13.  At the Piran Local Court\u2019s hearing of 10 April 2009 the applicant gave testimony. He denied that the alleged incident had taken place, submitting, inter alia, that he and R.H. were in dispute over the division of the house in which they lived, and that the prosecution authorities were not functioning as they should. He also said that neither the inspection of the site of the alleged offence nor an examination of video surveillance footage had been done although they would have proved that he had not committed the alleged offence. Furthermore, the applicant denied that he had prevented the cleaning lady from entering the courtyard and that she must have had the wrong key. The applicant requested that the prosecution obtain a statement from D.\u010c. who could testify to the fact that R.H. had regularly influenced witnesses so that they had given false testimonies. The applicant requested that D.\u010c. be examined at the hearing as well, and explained that this evidence would have undermined the credibility of R.H., whose testimony was the only prosecution evidence in the case. 14.  The Court also examined R.H. who stated that the cleaning lady had on the day of the incident told him that the applicant had not allowed her to enter the courtyard. According to R.H., he had then taken the rubbish out himself at which point he had met the applicant. R.H. had suspected that the applicant had disconnected the outdoor sliding door and for that reason argued with him at which point the applicant had threatened him. R.H. was asked by the prosecutor whether he had told anyone about the offence to which R.H. replied that he had told K.C., but maybe also the cleaning lady and the gardener (P.P.). As regards K.C. he could not remember where he had told him and how. R.H. also stated that he did not know if anyone had witnessed the incident and that he had not stored the video surveillance footage but that this would have in any event not have shown the incident as it had happened out of the cameras\u2019 field of vision. R.H. also stated that D.\u010c. was not to be believed as he was a drug addict and a criminal. 15.  The Court allowed the evidence by witness K.C. and P.P. and D.\u010c.\u2019s written statement of 30 November 2008. The latter, which was read out at the hearing of 3 July 2009 (see paragraph 16 below), read, as far as relevant, as follows:\n\u201cThe undersigned, ... declare that ...[R.H]. ... had been using his influence to obtain false testimony against Marino Poropat in many cases.\n \n... [R. H.] offered me 10,000 euros [EUR] to find a person in Croatia who would be prepared to kill Marino Poropat.\n...\u201d 16.  At the hearing of 3 July 2009, P.P. did not attend. However, K.C. attended and was examined as a witness. He said that he did not know why he had been summoned to testify but, further to the question by the applicant\u2019s counsel, confirmed that he had spent ten minutes with R.H. in a bar before attending that hearing. He denied that he had been instructed to testify against the applicant. In his testimony he also said that R.H. had called him after the incident of 13 February 2004 and told him that the applicant had said that he had bought a gun and would end this. The applicant stated that K.C. was not to be believed as he had been previously reported to police because of alleged false testimony. He requested that D.\u010c. be examined as a witness with regard to K.C.\u2019s and R.H.\u2019s credibility as he could testify to the fact that there had been \u201cmore such false statements\u201d. D.\u010c.\u2019s statement had been read out at the hearing, however the court refused to hear evidence from him, finding that the facts had been sufficiently established. It also found it unnecessary to hear evidence from P.P. At the hearing, the applicant\u2019s representative pointed out that the applicant and R.H. had been opposing parties in a number of civil and criminal proceedings. He also drew attention to the fact that the police had not found any evidence to prosecute the applicant and submitted that that the charges had been based on two statements of unreliable witnesses, namely the injured party and K.C. 17.  On 3 July 2009 the Piran Local Court found the applicant guilty and sentenced him to three months\u2019 imprisonment, suspended. It noted that the applicant had contested the credibility of R.H. and K.C., to whom the court referred as R.H.\u2019s work colleague (sodelavec), because the former had been in several legal disputes with him and because the latter had been reported to the police for false testimony on several occasions. However, the court concluded that this had not undermined their credibility and that it was proved on the basis of the evidence given by R.H. and K.C. that the applicant had threatened the former by referring to the fact that he had bought a gun and that the threat had caused fear in R.H. The court also found the applicant\u2019s argument that the whole incident had been made up unpersuasive. It explained that it had not questioned P.P. and D.\u010c. as the facts had been sufficiently established and further stated the following reasons for the dismissal of the applicant\u2019s application to have the evidence examined:\n\u201c...the court did not hear evidence from D.\u010c. because nothing can be deduced from his written statement that would refer to the incident which is the subject of [the present] proceedings. Also the inspection of the site and a reconstruction of the events were not performed, since the manner how the incident occurred and moreover the content of the words said can already be established from the other evidence produced.\u201d 18.  On 9 September 2009 the applicant lodged an appeal relying on, inter alia, Article 6 \u00a7 3 (d) of the Convention. He complained about the court\u2019s refusal to hear D.\u010c., stressing that the court should have taken into account the numerous proceedings to which the applicant and R.H. had been party and that it should therefore have shown more prudence when giving credence to the statements of K.C., who had been testifying for the benefit of R.H. in almost all of these proceedings. He further alleged that the court should have doubted the credibility of K.C. on account of the fact that R.H. had mentioned his conversation with K.C. only six years after the incident, that is to say after the applicant had initially been acquitted in the first set of proceedings. He also noted that, despite the fact that the whole grounds of the house had been under video surveillance, R.H. had not provided video footage to prove that he and the applicant had actually met on the relevant day, which the applicant had denied. 19.  On 6 January 2010 the applicant became aware of the opening of a criminal judicial investigation against K.C. in respect of the offence of aiding the attack on him in 1999. It would appear that no charges were eventually brought in this connection and the applicant instituted civil proceeding against the State, claiming compensation for non-pecuniary damage due to the infringement of his personal rights caused by the ineffective criminal investigation. On 29 May 2014 the Constitutional Court decided that the attack had not been duly investigated and that this had amounted to an infringement of the procedural aspects of the applicant\u2019s rights to personal dignity and safety (Article 34 of the Constitution) and the inviolability of his physical and mental integrity (Article 35 of the Constitution). 20.  In the meantime, on 3 February 2010, the Koper Higher Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. It observed that the rights of the defence had not been violated by the refusal to hear evidence from D.\u010c. or to obtain other evidence and that the first-instance court had given sufficient reasons in this respect. 21.  On 15 February 2010 the applicant lodged an application for the protection of legality with the Supreme Court. He repeated the arguments advanced before the lower courts, in particular that D.\u010c. could have testified to the hostile relationship between the applicant and R.H. and about the latter\u2019s influence on witnesses and should have therefore been given an opportunity to testify. He further referred to the fact that in the meantime criminal proceedings had been opened against K.C. in respect of the 1999 attack against him (see paragraph 19 above). He argued that this confirmed his allegations that K.C. could not be considered a reliable witness. 22.  On 12 April 2010 in a separate set of civil proceedings to which R.H. and the applicant were party, D.\u010c. testified that he had been a long term friend of R.H. He further stated that he had witnessed R.H. influencing witnesses in order to obtain statements against the applicant. He also stated that R.H. had threatened and insulted the applicant almost every time he had met him and the latter had always avoided a confrontation with R.H. 23.  On 17 June 2010 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim for the protection of legality. As regards D.\u010c., it noted that this witness could presumably testify to the hostile relationship between the applicant and R.H. and about the latter\u2019s influencing of witness but not about the actual incident which was the subject of the present proceedings. As to the applicant\u2019s reference to an investigation against K.C. (see paragraph 21 above), the Supreme Court found that this argument was of a factual nature and could not therefore be successfully pursued in an appeal on points of law. 24.  On 30 August 2010 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint. He reiterated his arguments concerning non-admission of evidence and in addition referred to the testimony given by D.\u010c. on 12 April 2010 (see paragraph 22 above). 25.  On 25 October 2011 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint, referring to section 55.b of the Constitutional Court Act (see paragraph 33 below). 26.  On 30 August 2010 the applicant applied to have the above criminal proceedings against him reopened on the basis of the evidence adduced at the hearing of 12 February 2010 (see paragraph 22 above) and requested that D.\u010c. be examined as a witness. In particular D.\u010c. had stated that he had been R.H.\u2019s friend and the applicant therefore argued that it would have been unusual for R.H. not to tell D.\u010c. about the incident with the applicant. He moreover referred to D.\u010c.\u2019s statement that the applicant had always avoided R.H. and argued that his testimony would have confirmed his defence. 27.  Further to the instruction by the judge who had been allocated the reopening application, another judge examined D.\u010c. on 28 June 2011 in the presence of the applicant. D.\u010c. testified that he had been a friend of R.H. in 2004 and had been in daily contact with him but did not remember if R.H. had told him if he had been threatened by the applicant. He further stated, among other things, that he did not remember the events of 13 February 2004 but that there had been many incidents in which the applicant and R.H. had met in front of the house and R.H. had threatened and insulted the applicant. He had witnessed many of their quarrels there but had never seen the applicant threatening or insulting R.H. When confronted with R.H. the applicant had always withdrawn. D.\u010c. further stated that he had seen R.H. influencing witnesses but would not be able to tell in which cases as there had been more than twenty sets of proceedings involving R.H. and most of them had been directed against the applicant. He further affirmed that he had himself been asked to falsely testify and said that that matter was pending before the courts. Lastly, D.\u010c. testified that R.H. had had two guns when he had moved into the house. 28.  On 16 August 2011 the Piran Local Court rejected the applicant\u2019s application for reopening finding that D.\u010c. had not directly observed the incident leading to the applicant\u2019s conviction but could only testify to R.H.\u2019s influencing of witnesses and the nature of the relationship between the applicant and R.H. The court found that these facts had already been known to the trial court, which had refused to hear D.\u010c. as a witness. The court also had regard to the fact that the Koper Higher Court as well as the Supreme Court had examined the applicant\u2019s request to hear D.\u010c. 29.  The applicant\u2019s appeal against the above decision was dismissed on 14 December 2011 by the Higher Court. The latter noted, first, that D.\u010c.\u2019s testimony had not brought to light any new facts directly relating to the criminal offence for which the applicant had been convicted and, second, that the applicant had already attempted to prove R.H.\u2019s had influenced witnesses and that his request to that effect had been rejected by the courts during the criminal proceedings, including by the Supreme Court, which meant that this could not be considered as new evidence. 30.  The applicant lodged an application for the protection of legality. On 26 April 2012 the Supreme Court dismissed the application, endorsing the conclusion of the lower courts that D.\u010c.\u2019s testimony was \u201can irrelevant piece of evidence as [D.\u010c.] could not tell [the court] anything concrete about the criminal offence of threatening security considered [by the court] because he had not directly witnessed it.\u201d The Supreme Court further found that the Higher Court had rightly pointed out that D.\u010c.\u2019s testimony could also not have been considered as new evidence.", "references": ["4", "0", "5", "1", "6", "7", "9", "2", "8", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1971 and 1974 respectively and live in Sesvete. 6.  On 12 December 1996 at about 8.30 p.m. one D.M., a member of the Croatian army, exploded a grenade in a pizza parlour in Zagreb, as a result of which D.M. and one other person died and the second applicant was gravely injured. The first applicant, who worked in a nearby flower shop, came to the scene and found the second applicant lying on the floor, covered in blood. 7.  An on-site inspection of the crime scene was carried out on the same evening by the military police and it was videotaped. The report drawn up by them indicates that D.M. was dressed in civilian clothes. During the enquiry the military police took statements from witnesses and on 3 July 1997 sent a report on the incident to the Zagreb County State Attorney\u2019s Office. The relevant part of the report reads:\n\u201cOn 12 December 1996 at about 8.30 p.m. at the N. pizza parlour ... soldier D.M. was consuming alcoholic beverages at the bar in the company of D.Ma., N.F. (an employee of the judicial police) and \u017d.B. when all at once [D.M.] took an M-75 hand grenade out of his pocket and pulled out the safety clip and placed the grenade into the hand of waitress T.B., ... who put it on the counter saying \u2018What would I need this for?\u2019, whereupon D.[M.], seeing that the grenade had been activated, took it in his right hand and turned sideways from the counter, after which an explosion occurred. [D.M.] was killed on the spot, while D.Ma. and N.F. ... sustained grievous bodily injuries and \u017d.B. ... minor bodily injuries. ... The injured were transferred to Dubrava Hospital and D.Ma. died during transport.\u201d\nNo further investigation ensued. 8.  On 1 July 1998 the applicants brought a civil action against the State in the Zagreb Municipal Court. The second applicant sought damages in connection with the life-threatening injuries he had sustained in the incident of 12 December 1996, while the first applicant sought damages on account of the stress and fear she had suffered because of the event in question. The applicants argued that D.M. had been on duty at the time when he had exploded the grenade, that he had been dressed in his military uniform and that his mother had obtained a survivor\u2019s pension after his death under a decision which stated that he had died on duty (specifically, \u201cat work\u201d). 9.  During the proceedings it was established that the second applicant had sustained numerous injuries to his head, face, chest, belly and lower extremities and that he was suffering from permanent consequences, such as frequent headaches, pain throughout his body, impaired hearing, double vision, fatigue and incapacity for work. 10.  Their claim was allowed on 21 June 2002. That judgment was quashed by the Zagreb County Court on 25 April 2005. The first-instance court again allowed the claim on 17 September 2010. However, on 5 April 2011 the Zagreb County Court, after an appeal lodged by the defendant, overturned the judgment and dismissed the applicants\u2019 claim. The relevant part of that judgment reads:\n\u201cThe first-instance court established the following:\n- D.M. was a member of the Croatian army \u2013 a military serviceman;\n- D.M. used an M-75 grenade, which served a military purpose and was registered for [use by] the members of the Croatian army;\n- the decision of 12 October 1998 ... issued by the Croatian Pension Fund stated that the mother of D.M., who had been a Croatian Homeland War veteran, obtained the right to a survivor\u2019s pension because [D.M.] had been [serving in the] military when he had caused the damage, and the reasoning of that decision stated that he had died because of an injury sustained at work;\n- D.M. had not been on duty.\nOn the basis of the thus-established facts the first-instance court concluded that the defendant was liable because the said decision of the Croatian Pension Fund stated that the death of [D.M.], as an active military serviceman, had occurred while [he had been] carrying out his official duties ...\nThe first-instance court also concluded that there had been a failure on the part of the defendant [to carry out a weapons] check under section 14 of the Instruction on the Allocation, Distribution, Carrying and Use of Official Short Weapons. Had the correct check (for which the military police were responsible under section 14 of the above-mentioned Instruction) [been exercised in respect of] the carrying of weapons \u2013 namely the grenade [held by D.M.] without a proper licence or an identity document, \u2013 and the grenade been taken [from D.M.], the damage most likely would not have occurred.\nHowever, this court considers that these facts, as established [by the first-instance court], do not serve as a sufficient basis for concluding that the requirements for the defendant to be held liable for the concrete damage have been met.\nFirst of all, D.M.\u2019s parents\u2019 right to obtain a survivor\u2019s pension on the basis of a decision of the Croatian Pension Fund is not decisive for the defendant\u2019s liability for damage since the right to a survivor\u2019s pension was obtained on the basis of D.M.\u2019s status as a Croatian Homeland War veteran \u2013 that is to say an insured military person. The fact that the reasoning of that decision ... states that the \u2018insured party\u2019s death occurred because of an injury sustained at work\u2019 is not relevant for an assessment of the defendant\u2019s liability in these civil proceedings.\nAn assessment of the facts shows that D.M. was not on duty on the critical evening; that the M-75 grenade was not given to him by his military unit ([according to] a letter from the I Croatian Guard Corps of 12 November 1998); that the record of the on-site inspection carried out on the day of [D.M.\u2019s] death does not show that D.M. was wearing a uniform; and that nothing proved that the grenade in question was the property of the defendant (that D.M. had unlawfully obtained the grenade from the defendant), regardless of the fact that such a grenade serves a military purpose and is registered for [use by] members of the Croatian army; [therefore,] this court finds that the conclusion of the first-instance court regarding ... the liability of the defendant is not correct.\nLastly, this court considers ... in respect of the failure of the defendant to carry out a check on the carrying of weapons and to seize [weapons] where there is no licence [to carry them], as the basis of the defendant\u2019s liability, that there is no proof ... that the military police had a duty to carry out a check in the pizza parlour in question on the critical evening or that the competent authorities knew that D.M. possessed a grenade and failed to seize it from him. Therefore, this court finds that the requirements for the defendant\u2019s liability are not met ...\u201d 11.  The applicants\u2019 subsequent constitutional complaint of 7 July 2011 was dismissed on 17 June 2014. This decision was served on the applicants on 3 July 2014.", "references": ["8", "4", "9", "7", "6", "2", "1", "5", "3", "No Label", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "10.  The applicant was born in 1975 and is detained in Sofia Prison. 11.   On 2 July 1999 two armed individuals burst into a bureau de change in Burgas. Shots were fired and two staff members were killed. The criminals fled with a sum of money. On the same day the Burgas investigation department instigated criminal proceedings against a person or persons unknown for armed robbery and homicide. 12.  The bodies responsible for the criminal investigation implemented a number of investigative measures: inspection of the premises, autopsies on the victims and questioning of witnesses. The investigators quickly made a connection with the applicant and a certain A.S. 13.  By decision of 9 July 1999 a police officer ordered the applicant\u2019s detention for twenty-four hours, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Ministry of the Interior Act. The order mentioned the detainee\u2019s right to assistance from a lawyer as from the time of his arrest. It also stated that a copy of the order should be presented to the arrestee. The copy of the relevant order in the case file is not signed by the applicant, who was on the run and being sought by the police at that time. 14.  On 3 October 1999 the applicant was arrested in Sofia. None of the case papers indicate whether he received a copy of the 9 July 1999 order after his arrest. He remained in detention in Sofia that day and the next. 15.  On 4 October 1999 an investigator from Burgas, on the basis of Article 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, ordered the applicant\u2019s detention for twenty-four hours from 8 p.m. 16.  On 5 October 1999 the applicant was transferred to Burgas. His detention was extended by a prosecutor that same day. 17.  The document containing the two decisions of 4 and 5 October 1999 does not mention the applicant\u2019s right to the assistance of a lawyer and does not bear his signature. 18.  The applicant affirmed that he had submitted four requests, on 3, 4, 5 and 6 October 1999, for contact with a lawyer, Mr V. Mihailov, and that the authorities had not acceded to those requests. 19.  He stated that he had been questioned by the officers in charge of the investigation over the period from 3 to 6 October. While being questioned he had explained that he had taken part in the hold-up at the bureau de change but denied having committed the two murders. 20.  The criminal case file contains no written trace of any such questioning. On the other hand, it includes a handwritten statement by A.S., the applicant\u2019s presumed accomplice, dated 3 October 1999, in which A.S. explained that the applicant had instigated the hold-up, that he himself had agreed to cooperate with the applicant and that the latter had used a gun during the incident. 21.  On 6 October 1999 the investigator in charge of the investigation appointed an official lawyer for the applicant. At noon, assisted by his officially appointed lawyer, the applicant was formally charged with the double murder and the hold-up in the bureau de change in Burgas. When questioned immediately after being charged, he made the following statements:\n\u201cI have read the charge sheet in the presence of my officially appointed lawyer, D. Todorov.\nI have been informed of my rights and obligations as a charged person and of my right to refuse to give evidence.\nI shall make no submissions concerning the charges until my parents, who have been informed, have had time to engage a lawyer.\u201d 22.  On 7 October 1999 A.S. was questioned by the investigator in the presence of a lawyer. A.S. related the circumstances surrounding the preparation, execution and aftermath of the hold-up, and explained how he had helped the applicant at all those stages. He affirmed that it had been the applicant who had killed both victims. 23.  On 8 October 1999 the applicant engaged a lawyer practising in Burgas, Mr Kanev. During his questioning in the presence of that lawyer on 12 October 1999 he remained silent and stated that he would give evidence at a later date. 24.  On 21 October 1999 the applicant confessed in the presence of his lawyer, Mr Kanev. He admitted that he had prepared and committed the hold-up at the bureau de change and claimed that the two victims had been killed by A.S. 25.  On 22 December 1999 the applicant engaged a second lawyer, this time practising in Sofia, Ms Zheleva. 26.  Subsequently, the officers responsible for the investigation gathered several different types of evidence, that is to say witness statements and medical, scientific, physical and documentary evidence. 27.  On 4 January 2000 the applicant and A.S., assisted by Counsel, took cognisance of the case papers. They retracted their confessions, and their lawyers requested that their clients be questioned once again. 28.  On 16 February 2000 the Burgas regional prosecutor returned the file to the investigator for further inquiries. He asked him, in particular, to conduct several investigative measures and to formally charge both suspects afresh. 29.  On 7 March 2000 the applicant was charged with an additional offence, namely the unlawful purchase of the firearm which had been used during the robbery of 2 July 1999. On the same day the two suspects were questioned in the presence of their lawyers. In his statement the applicant related a version of events to the effect that the robbery and murders in question had been committed by a certain V., an Iranian national, aided and abetted by an unknown second person. 30.  On 17 May 2000 the regional prosecutor\u2019s office drew up the indictment and committed the applicant and his presumed accomplice for trial before the Burgas Regional Court. 31.  The Regional Court considered the criminal case between 25 July 2000 and 14 June 2001. During the proceedings the applicant, who was assisted by a lawyer, submitted that he and his presumed accomplice had indeed been in Burgas on 1 July 1999 and that they had indeed intended to commit a robbery in the bureau de change, but that they had changed their minds and returned to Sofia the same day. 32.  On 14 June 2001 the Burgas Regional Court delivered its judgment. The applicant was found guilty of armed robbery in the Burgas bureau de change, committed jointly with A.S. and resulting in the murder of two persons. He was also found guilty of the unlawful purchase of a pistol and ammunition for it. The Regional Court imposed the heaviest sentence available under the Bulgarian Criminal Code, namely a whole-life sentence. In accordance with section 127b (1) of the Execution of Punishments Act, the Regional Court ordered the applicant\u2019s placement under the \u201cspecial\u201d prison regime. 33.  Drawing on the evidence gathered during the preliminary investigation and at the trial, the Regional Court established the facts as follows: the applicant\u2019s former partner, D.K., had started work as a cashier in the bureau de change in question in 1997 when she was still living with him. While working there she had met the first victim, a certain N.B., who was a close relative of the owner and an employee in the same establishment. In June 1999 D.K. had left the applicant and moved in with N.B. in Burgas. The applicant had then decided to kill N.B. and to steal the cash kept in the bureau de change. He had acquired a \u201cMakarov\u201d pistol, a silencer and ammunition. The applicant had persuaded a friend, A.S., to take part in the robbery. On the afternoon of 1 July 1999 the applicant and A.S. had arrived in Burgas by coach. They had then gone to the building in which the bureau de change was located, and had gone up to the top floor to spend the night there. The next morning, just before 9 a.m., they had gone down to the floor on which the bureau de change was located and noted that N.B. was in the premises alone. A.S., who had been carrying the pistol, had burst into the premises and fired one point-blank shot at the victim\u2019s left temple. The victim had died instantly. The two accomplices had then placed the money found in the bureau de change in a bag which they had brought with them. Meanwhile the armed security guard of the bureau de change, a certain P.I., had rushed into the premises where the first victim had been killed. A.S. had fired two shots at him, hitting him in the face. The security guard had been killed instantly. A.S. and the applicant had left the building. They had then concealed the murder weapon under a rubbish bin, thrown away the clothes they had been wearing and hidden the stolen money. Some time later the two men had ordered a certain E.E. to fetch the money for them, which he had done. 34.  The applicant appealed against that judgment. He complained that insufficient reasons had been given for the conviction, that his guilt had not been established, that the first-instance court had reached an erroneous decision, that there had been several breaches of procedural and substantive rules under domestic law and that the Regional Court had shown bias. 35.  The applicant\u2019s lawyer requested the withdrawal of all the judges of the Burgas Court of Appeal. He argued that the media coverage of the criminal case had created a climate of intolerance and hostility towards his client. The defence called for an additional witness to be summoned, the re\u2011examination of one of the witnesses already heard by the trial court, and several additional expert opinions. On 4 December 2001 the reporting judge responsible for the criminal case rejected the requests for further evidence\u2011gathering as irrelevant. He dismissed the challenge to the judges of the Court of Appeal for lack of any evidence of bias. 36.  The Court of Appeal considered the criminal case between February and July 2002. It examined a new witness and received additional conclusions from psychiatric experts on the mental state of the two accused. 37.  On 6 August 2002 the Court of Appeal upheld the judgment of the first-instance court, giving its full backing to the latter\u2019s factual and legal findings. The evidence gathered during the preliminary investigation, presented before the first-instance court and produced for the first time before the Court of Appeal had demonstrated that the two accused had planned and carried out the robbery in the bureau de change and that the two victims had been killed by A.S. Yet the applicant had been the instigator of those crimes and had provided the weapon used by his accomplice. The Court of Appeal drew on the statements of the many witnesses questioned during the assessment of the case, on the results of the ballistic, technical and accountants\u2019 reports and the medical and psychiatric opinions, and also on the physical and documentary evidence gathered. 38.  The Court of Appeal observed that the accused\u2019s initial statements during the preliminary investigation had differed considerably from their submissions to the first-instance court. The initial statements had corroborated the finding concerning their participation in committing the criminal offences in issue, whereas the subsequent ones set out a version of events to the effect that an Iranian national had committed those offences. The Court of Appeal gave credence to the accused\u2019s initial statements, which had been made to an investigator in their lawyers\u2019 presence after they had been formally charged. The two individuals thus charged had been advised that their statements could be used in court with a view to establishing the facts, and their prior medical examination had revealed no sign of physical violence, which contradicted the defence lawyer\u2019s allegation that the applicant\u2019s initial confession had been extracted from him. 39.  The Court of Appeal turned its attention to the applicant\u2019s version of events to the effect that the two murders and the robbery had been committed by a certain V., an Iranian national, and that the applicant himself had been at his place of work in Sofia at the material time. Checks carried out in the Ministry of the Interior database had shown that no Iranian national of that name was present in Bulgaria. It was true that the applicant had been at his place of work in Sofia on 2 July 1999. However, he had been working as a night watchman and the robbery and murders had been committed early in the morning, which had given him enough time to cover the distance between Burgas and Sofia and to arrive at work the same evening. The Court of Appeal deemed unconvincing the statement by the only witness who had corroborated the applicant\u2019s version of events. 40.  The Court of Appeal noted that the judgment of the first-instance court displayed none of the procedural defects mentioned by the defence. The factual and legal findings of the Regional Court had not been exclusively based on the accused\u2019s confessions but on the whole body of consistent evidence gathered during the criminal proceedings. The applicant had participated actively in the proceedings and his lawyers had submitted several requests linked to the progress of the trial and the gathering of evidence. The Regional Court had responded to all those requests and had provided full reasons for its procedural decisions. There had, moreover, been no sign of bias on the part of the judges who had examined the case, and the proceedings had been conducted in such a way as to safeguard the parties\u2019 interests. 41.  The Court of Appeal excluded a statement by one witness from the evidence for non-compliance with the procedural rules, but did not consider that statement decisive in terms of the factual and legal conclusions in the case. It held that even though the Regional Court had been dilatory in issuing the grounds for its judgment, the defence had nonetheless been able to submit additional observations on appeal after having secured a copy of those grounds. 42.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, reiterating his submissions to the Court of Appeal. In that appeal, which ran to forty pages, his lawyer raised seventy-four objections concerning the gathering and the interpretation of various pieces of evidence, as well as the factual and legal findings of the lower-level courts. In paragraph 33 of his submissions the lawyer contested the admissibility of a record of a reconstruction of the events of 7 October 1999, arguing that on that day his client had not been assisted by a lawyer of his choosing. At the time his client had been assisted by an officially appointed lawyer who had not been nominated by the local bar association, as required by the applicable legislation. The applicant\u2019s lawyer added that his client had undeniably been deprived of a defence lawyer on 4 October 1999, when he had been taken into custody; he regarded this as an infringement of the provisions of section 70(4) of the Ministry of the Interior Act and of the Constitution. That was the only sentence relating to the circumstances of the applicant\u2019s detention in police custody. 43.  By a judgment of 17 December 2003 the Supreme Court of Cassation dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law. It found that none of the circumstances mentioned by the defence demonstrated the existence of bias on the part of the judges who had considered the criminal case. The applicant had had an opportunity to defend himself effectively during the criminal proceedings: he had given evidence and challenged the evidence against him. Some of his requests for further evidence-gathering had been accepted by the lower-level courts, and proper reasons had been given for their rejection of other requests by the defence for evidence to be taken. 44.  Furthermore, in endorsing the Court of Appeal\u2019s other arguments, the Supreme Court of Cassation considered that the facts had been well established, that the substantive and procedural rules had been appropriately applied and that the accused\u2019s rights had been fully respected. 45.  The applicant was held in Burgas Investigation Detention Facility from 5 October 1999 to 27 January 2000, and again from the beginning of March to 14 April 2000. He was incarcerated in Burgas Prison from 27 January 2000 to the beginning of March 2000, and again from 14 April 2000 to 25 February 2004. On the latter date he was transferred to Sofia Prison, where he is still being held. 46.  The applicant submitted that he had been held in a cell without windows, a toilet or running water. The premises had had poor ventilation and lighting. He had not been allowed to exercise in the open air. Access to sanitary facilities had been restricted and the time allowed for washing had been insufficient. The applicant emphasised that the conditions of hygiene in the detention facility had been deplorable. He had subsequently been moved to another cell with two other detainees. The three detainees had had to take turns sleeping because the cell only had one bench. 47.  According to a rapport by the Director General of Prisons submitted by the Government, at the time the only furniture in the cells in Burgas Investigation Detention Facility had been a bench. The cells had had no windows and the only daylight had entered through holes in metal plates affixed to the doors. The facility in question had only had one shared washroom and lacked any open-air facilities for detainees. The report also mentioned that between 2002 and 2009 the facility had been completely renovated and redeveloped to bring the conditions of detention into line with the detainees\u2019 human dignity. 48.  The applicant alleged that his cell in Burgas Prison had had a surface area of 6 sq. m. It had contained a bed and a metal rack. There had been neither running water nor a toilet in his cell. He had used a plastic bucket for his bodily functions. Like all the prisoners he was allowed out of his cell for thirty minutes three times a day, in order to empty the bucket and fill his water bottle. The applicant submitted, in support of those allegations, a statement by his co-accused A.S., who had been detained with him under the same conditions in Burgas Prison. The applicant added that he had been forced to wear a convict\u2019s uniform even though he should have been allowed to wear his own clothes, under the prison rules. 49.  The applicant explained that at the beginning of his term in Burgas Prison he had been deprived of open-air exercise. According to A.S.\u2019s statement (see paragraph 48 above), prisoners were allowed one-hour\u2019s open-air exercise every other day. The applicant was not involved in any organised activities in Burgas Prison. He had submitted several requests to the prison authorities to allow him to join in the various vocational training and occupational programmes and had applied for a transfer to Sofia Prison in order to be closer to his family, but no action had ever been taken on his requests. 50.  According to a report by the governor of Burgas Prison submitted by the Government, the applicant had problems adapting to the prison regulations; his attitude to the wardens and the prison authorities had been refractory and disrespectful. However, the applicant had enjoyed all the rights afforded to persons deprived of their liberty. He had board and lodging in accordance with normal prison standards. He had open-air exercise every day and free access to the prison library. He had consulted a psychologist on several occasions and had had a number of meetings with the prison\u2019s activity coordinator. 51.  Following his transfer to Sofia Prison the applicant was subject to the \u201cspecial\u201d prison regime, involving virtually total isolation from the rest of the prison population. 52.  The applicant submitted that over the period from February 2004 to summer 2006 he had been confined to a cell measuring 4 m by 2 m, which he had shared with another prisoner. The two beds had taken up most of the floor area, leaving the two prisoners with a free area of only 2 sq. m. There had been no running water in the cell and the prisoners had used a bucket as a toilet. 53.  The applicant stated that he had spent most of the day sitting on his bed for lack of free space in the cell. He had eaten his meals in the cell and had been allowed to walk in the prison yard for one hour every day. His access to the prison library had been limited to the few minutes it took to choose and borrow a book, after which he had been immediately taken back to his cell. He had been allowed to attend the prison chapel twice a year, at Easter and Christmas, although not during worship so that he would not meet other prisoners. 54.  Up until 2005 the high-security wing of the prison had been overcrowded and ill prisoners had not been held separately from other prisoners, which had fostered the transmission of infectious diseases. The physical conditions had improved somewhat after the renovation work in the high-security wing in 2005 and 2006. In December 2008 the applicant\u2019s prison regime had relaxed. However, like all prisoners in his category, he had still been kept separate from the rest of the prison population and his cell had been kept locked during the day. In 2004 and 2005 he had occasionally worked in his cell folding envelopes. Since 2010 he had been allowed into an activities room, where he could talk to other life prisoners and read books. 55.  According to a report by the governor of Sofia Prison dated 11 October 2011, the high-security wing of Sofia Prison had been completely renovated in 2005 and 2006. On the date of the report in question the applicant had been held in an individual cell measuring 7.7 sq. m., with a bed, a table, a rack, a shower and a private toilet. His cell had been heated and had running water and proper lighting. 56.  Apart from the restrictions imposed by his prison regime, the applicant had access to all the activities provided to other prisoners: he could work, visit the library and the prison chapel, receive visits from his relatives, and write and receive letters. He was also eligible for relaxation of his prison regime under section 198 of the Prisons Act, subject to a favourable opinion from the relevant special panel, and could ultimately be accommodated with the rest of the prison population. 57.  Furthermore, in 2010 the applicant applied to have a number of the provisions of the implementing regulations of the Prisons Act declared void as regards the conditions for the execution of his life sentence. His application was dismissed with final effect by a judgment of 14 September 2011 delivered by the Supreme Administrative Court, which found that the impugned provisions of the implementing regulations were not contrary to the Prisons Act and that the adoption of the regulations had not involved any irregularities justifying their being declared void.", "references": ["0", "4", "7", "2", "8", "5", "6", "9", "3", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant is a taxi driver. 6.  On the night of 25 July 2009 traffic police stopped the applicant\u2019s car. Following the applicant\u2019s failure to produce his driving licence and suspecting that it had been withdrawn, police officers took him to the duty unit of the Ezhvinskiy District police station, where he was kept in a cell for administrative detainees until the following morning. A record of the applicant\u2019s administrative arrest was drawn up. 7.  On 26 July 2009 the Justice of the Peace of the Vezhdinskiy Court Circuit of the Ezhvinskiy District found the applicant guilty of driving a vehicle after the withdrawal of his driving licence (an administrative offence under Article 12.7 \u00a7 2 of the Russian Code of Administrative Offences) and sentenced him to fifteen days of administrative detention. 8.  On 31 July 2009 the applicant made a written request to the head of the detention unit seeking a family visit. The next day the request was returned to the applicant bearing a handwritten note by the acting head of the detention unit, Mr S., which stated that family visits were not \u201cprovided for [by law]\u201d. 9.  On 14 August 2009 the applicant\u2019s representative lodged a complaint with the Syktyvkar Town Court, alleging that the applicant\u2019s right to family life guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention had been unlawfully restricted. 10.  The police officials filed a written objection, arguing that the Internal Rules governing Detention Facilities for Administrative Detainees did not provide administrative detainees with the right to have a family visit. 11.  On 15 September 2009 the Syktyvkar City Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaint, having accepted the police authorities\u2019 argument that administrative detainees were not entitled to a family visit under the domestic law in force and that the applicant had been subjected to those limitations of his rights as a negative consequence of the administrative detention. 12.  The applicant\u2019s representative appealed. Relying on the Court\u2019s judgments in the cases of Messina v. Italy (no. 2) (no. 25498/94, \u00a7 61, ECHR 2000\u2011X) and Vlasov v. Russia (no. 78146/01, \u00a7 123, 12 June 2008), he argued that the authorities\u2019 assistance in maintaining contact with close family was an essential part of a detainee\u2019s right to respect for family life. Limitations imposed on the number of family visits constituted an interference with the applicant\u2019s rights under Article 8 of the Convention. Restrictions of that kind could only be applied \u201cin accordance with the law\u201d, should pursue one or more legitimate aims and, in addition, should be justified as being \u201cnecessary in a democratic society\u201d. The representative submitted that there was no norm in Russian law imposing restrictions on family visits for administrative detainees. 13.  On 22 October 2009 the Supreme Court of the Komi Republic upheld the City Court\u2019s decision, having reasoned as follows:\n\u201cThere is no prohibition on family visits for administrative detainees.\n...\n[At the same time] a refusal to authorise a family visit has a basis in Russian law; however, it should be warranted by circumstances and conditions providing the competent authorities with the right to apply the disputed restriction. Providing law\u2011enforcement bodies with unlimited powers in issues pertaining to fundamental rights could run contrary to the superior role of the law and could result in arbitrary interference with human rights.\nIn the case under examination, there are no grounds for concluding that the actions of the acting head [of the detention unit of the police station where the applicant had been detained] were unlawful because, having applied for a family visit, [the applicant] had not indicated whom he had wanted to see and what the relationship was between him and that person. If those important details are not provided, the authorisation of a family visit cannot be considered lawful.\u201d", "references": ["3", "5", "2", "9", "8", "7", "0", "6", "1", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Bela Crkva. 6.  He was employed by \u201cBetonjerka\u201d- DP, a socially-owned company based in Bela Crkva (hereinafter \u201cthe debtor\u201d). 7.  On 20 May 2003 the Bela Crkva Municipal Court ordered the debtor to pay the applicant specified amounts on account of salary arrears and social insurance contributions, plus the costs of the civil proceedings. On the same day this judgment became final. 8.  On 14 October 2003 upon the applicant\u2019s request to that effect, the Bela Crkva Municipal Court ordered the enforcement of the said judgment and further ordered the debtor to pay the applicant the enforcement costs. 9.  The Government in its observations maintained that the said judgment had been fully enforced by the domestic decisions of 2 December 2004, 4 November 2005 and 19 May 2006 respectively. The applicant did not contest this submission. 10.  On 10 February 2009 the Bela Crkva Municipal Court ordered the debtor to pay the applicant other specified amounts on account of salary arrears and social insurance contributions. In addition the domestic court ordered each party to pay its own costs of the civil proceedings. This judgment became final on 18 February 2009. 11.  On 30 April 2009 upon the applicant\u2019s request to that effect, the Bela Crkva Municipal Court ordered the enforcement of the said judgment and further ordered the debtor to pay the applicant the enforcement costs. 12.  The said decision remains unenforced to the present date. 13.  On 12 May 2009 the Pan\u010devo Commercial Court opened insolvency proceedings in respect of the debtor. 14.  On 22 September 2009, upon a submission to that effect, the Pan\u010devo Commercial Court recognized the applicant\u2019s respective claims. 15.  On 27 August 2012 the Pan\u010devo Commercial Court terminated the insolvency proceedings against the debtor, having decided to continue with the insolvency action against the debtor\u2019s estate. 16.   The insolvency proceedings are still pending. 17.  On 8 August 2013 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal complaining firstly about the fairness of the insolvency proceedings. Further, he requested the Constitutional Court to adopt a decision obliging the respondent State to pay from its own funds his unpaid salaries. In particular, the applicant had referred only to the judgment which had been adopted in his favour on 10 February 2009. In so doing, the applicant also relied on the Court\u2019s case-law related to the non-enforcement of domestic court decision rendered against socially-owned companies in Serbia. 18.  On 31 March 2015 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal finding that it is not vested with the power of the insolvency court to enable the payments of the claims recognized in the insolvency proceedings.", "references": ["6", "8", "4", "7", "1", "2", "0", "5", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in Vienna. He worked as a civil servant for the Ministry of Economics and Labour (Bundesministerium f\u00fcr Wirtschaft und Arbeit). 5.  On 23 August 2004 the Disciplinary Prosecutor (Disziplinaranwalt) of the Ministry of Economics and Labour reported to the Disciplinary Council (Disziplinarkommission) of the Ministry of Economics and Labour that it suspected the applicant of having committed disciplinary offences. The report indicated that the applicant had been working on a project for the implementation of an electronic administration system for foreign trade since 2001. The Disciplinary Prosecutor accused the applicant of not having conducted an award procedure (Vergabeverfahren). Furthermore, the applicant had allegedly placed orders without consulting the Ministry and asking for permission beforehand. He had thereby caused damage amounting to around 200,000 euros (EUR). Furthermore, he had disobeyed orders from the Ministry and subsequently tampered with the files. He had therefore breached his official duties (Verletzung der Dienstpflicht). 6.  In his submissions of 7 September 2004, the applicant contested these accusations. 7.  On 1 October 2004 the Disciplinary Council of the Ministry of Economics and Labour decided not to institute disciplinary proceedings against the applicant as it considered that prosecution of the reported offences had become time-barred. 8.  On 30 December 2004 the Appeals Commission at the Federal Chancellery (Berufungskommission beim Bundeskanzleramt) allowed the appeal of the Disciplinary Prosecutor and quashed the decision by the Disciplinary Council. It held that the authority had only learned about the applicant\u2019s offences on 1 July 2004 and therefore prosecution had not become time-barred. 9.  On 25 January 2005 the Disciplinary Council decided to institute disciplinary proceedings against the applicant. 10.  On 7 April 2005 the Appeals Commission dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal against this decision. 11.  On 11 October 2005, the Vienna Public Prosecutor informed the applicant that criminal investigations against him on the grounds of suspected embezzlement had been discontinued. 12.  On 15 March 2006 the Constitutional Court (Verfassungsgerichtshof) dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaint against the Appeals Commission\u2019s decision of 7 April 2005 (see paragraph 10 above). 13.  Meanwhile, on 20 December 2005, the Disciplinary Council had decided to summon the applicant to an oral hearing and specified the offences of which he was accused, namely the breach of official duties. 14.  On 28 February 2006 the Appeals Commission dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal against this decision. 15.  On 6 December 2006 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaint against the decision of the Appeals Commission of 28 February 2006. 16.  Meanwhile, on 1, 24 and 27 March 2006 the applicant had lodged three requests for the re-opening of the disciplinary proceedings on issues which had already been decided by the authorities at previous stages. He had further requested that the proceedings before the Disciplinary Council be stayed and that no oral hearings be held as long as the proceedings concerning his complaints before the Constitutional Court were pending (see paragraphs 12 and 15 above). 17.  On 7 April 2006 the Ministry of Economics and Labour ex officio placed the applicant in retirement as from 1 May 2006. It held that the applicant was suffering from a personality disorder, was not able to exercise his official duties and was therefore unfit for service. 18.  In spite of the applicant\u2019s request to stay the disciplinary proceedings (see paragraph 16 above), the Disciplinary Council held oral hearings on 27, 28 and 31 March, 5 April, 2, 3, 22, 23 and 24 May and 28 June 2006. 19.  On 28 June 2006 the Disciplinary Council convicted the applicant of breach of official duties and imposed the disciplinary penalty of loss of all his rights and entitlements from his public employment. The applicant appealed. 20.  On 20 July 2006 the Appeals Commission rejected the applicant\u2019s request for re-opening of 24 March 2006 (see paragraph 16 above). 21.  On 5 September 2006 the Disciplinary Council rejected the applicant\u2019s requests for re-opening of 1 and 27 March 2006 (see paragraph 16 above). On the same day, the applicant lodged an application for transfer of jurisdiction to the superior authority (Devolutionsantrag) with the Appeals Commission. 22.  On 14 December 2006 the Appeals Commission quashed the Disciplinary Council\u2019s decision of 28 June 2006 (see paragraph 19 above) and remitted the case to the Disciplinary Council on the grounds that the Disciplinary Council had not sufficiently assessed the evidence before it. It found several procedural errors and ordered the Disciplinary Council to appoint a psychiatric expert to establish whether the applicant could be held accountable for his actions. 23.  On 9 January 2007 the Appeals Commission rejected the application for transfer of jurisdiction to the superior authority and on 15 March 2007 it dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal against the Disciplinary Council\u2019s decision of 5 September 2006 (see paragraph 21 above). 24.  Between 21 September 2007 and 16 June 2008 the Disciplinary Council held several hearings, in the course of which it appointed a psychiatric expert to submit a report on whether the applicant could be held responsible for his actions. Since, despite several previous summonses, the applicant failed to appear before the expert, on 4 April 2008 the Disciplinary Council requested the expert to deliver his opinion on the basis of the medical certificates and expertises obtained so far in parallel proceedings. 25.  Meanwhile, on 23 October 2007, the Administrative Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal against the decision of the Ministry of Economics and Labour of 7 April 2006, and the applicant\u2019s compulsory retirement became final (see paragraph 17 above). 26.  On 20 June 2008 the Disciplinary Council again convicted the applicant of breach of official duties and imposed as punishment the loss of all his rights. 27.  On 2 December 2008 the Appeals Commission quashed the decision again and remitted the case to the Disciplinary Council on similar grounds to those set out in its decision of 14 December 2006 (see paragraph 22 above). 28.  Thereupon the Disciplinary Council held oral hearings on 27 April, 5 and 18 May, 3, 4 and 10 June and 1 July 2009. 29.  On 1 July 2009 the Disciplinary Council decided that the applicant was not guilty of having committed a breach of his official duties. In its reasoning the Disciplinary Council noted that there were doubts as to whether the applicant could be held responsible for his actions at the relevant time. The Disciplinary Prosecutor appealed against this decision. 30.  By decision of 28 October 2009, the Appeals Commission upheld in essence the reasoning of the Disciplinary Council and dismissed the Disciplinary Prosecutor\u2019s appeal. Subsequently, the Disciplinary Prosecutor filed a complaint with the Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgerichtshof). 31.  On 2 July 2010, after the Disciplinary Prosecutor had withdrawn her complaint, the Administrative Court discontinued the proceedings and ordered the Disciplinary Prosecutor to reimburse the applicant\u2019s expenses in the amount of EUR 1,106.40. This decision was served on the applicant\u2019s counsel on 3 August 2010. 32.  By judgment of the Vienna Court of Appeal of 25 May 2011 concerning the official liability proceedings instituted by the applicant, he was awarded EUR 4,608, corresponding to the costs of his appeals against the Disciplinary Council\u2019s decisions of 28 June 2006 and 20 June 2008 (see paragraphs 19 and 26 above), which were both quashed by the Appeals Commission due to procedural errors and lack of reasoning (see paragraphs 22 and 27 above).", "references": ["8", "6", "5", "9", "2", "7", "4", "1", "0", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicants are Russian nationals. They were owners of flats in Moscow. The State authorities reclaimed the flats, and the applicants\u2019 title to the real property in question was annulled. 5.  The flat at 21-110 Belovezhskaya Ulitsa, Moscow, was owned by K. On 5 January 2005 K. died intestate with no surviving kin. 6.  On 18 May 2005 M. bought the flat from a person acting on K.\u2019s behalf by virtue of a power of attorney. 7.  On 28 October 2005 M. sold the flat to O. 8.  On 7 April 2006 O. sold the flat to V. 9.  On 19 April 2006 V. sold the flat to the applicant and his minor daughter. 10.  On an unspecified date the police opened an investigation into the fraudulent sale of the flat after K.\u2019s death. On 30 January 2008 the police informed the Moscow Department of Housing Policy and Housing Fund (the Housing Department) about the investigation. 11.  On an unspecified date the Housing Department brought an action against the applicant seeking the transfer of the title to the flat to the City of Moscow and the applicant\u2019s eviction. 12.  On 18 December 2012 the Kuntsevskiy District Court of Moscow granted the Housing Department\u2019s claims in full. The court established that K. had died intestate with no surviving kin and that the flat should have been considered bona vacantia. It considered all the transactions with the flat to be void and ordered the transfer of the title to the flat to the City of Moscow and the applicant\u2019s eviction. 13.  On 14 March 2013 the City Court upheld the judgment of 18 December 2012 on appeal. 14.  On 16 May 2013 the City Court refused to allow the applicants\u2019 cassation appeal. 15.  On 14 August 2013 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation refused to allow the applicants\u2019 second cassation appeal. 16.  On 24 December 2013 the City of Moscow had its title to the flat registered. 17.  According to the Government, on 2 December 2014 the Housing Department entered into a social housing agreement with the applicant and his daughter who continued to reside in the flat. 18.  The flat at 10-1-339, Orekhoviy Bulvar, Moscow, was owned by S. On 29 July 2009 S. died intestate with no surviving kin. 19.  On 16 April 2010 an unidentified person sold the flat to B. 20.  On 10 June 2010 B. sold the flat to K., the applicant\u2019s father. 21.  On 15 April 2011 the Nagatinskiy District Court of Moscow approved a friendly settlement agreement between the applicant and her father recognising the applicant\u2019s title to the flat. 22.  On 21 October 2011 the police opened an investigation into the fraudulent sale of the flat after S.\u2019s death. On 29 February 2012 the police informed the Housing Department about the investigation. 23.  On an unspecified date the Housing Department brought a civil action against the applicant seeking the transfer of the title to the flat to the City of Moscow and the applicant\u2019s eviction. 24.  On 19 June 2013 the District Court granted the Housing Department\u2019s claims in full. The court established that S. had died intestate with no surviving kin and that the flat should have been considered bona vacantia. The court ruled that the case fell under one of the two exceptions to the protection of a bona fide purchaser\u2019s title, which required that precedence be given to the previous owner who had been deprived of the property against his or her will. The applicant\u2019s title to the flat was annulled and the title was transferred to the City of Moscow. 25.  On 14 November 2013 the City Court upheld the judgment of 19 June 2013 on appeal. 26.  On 25 March 2014 the City Court refused to allow the applicant\u2019s cassation appeal. 27.  According to the applicant, the judgment in the City\u2019s favour has not been enforced and the applicant continues to reside in the flat. 28.  The flat at 33-31, Stremyanniy Pereulok, Moscow, had been owned by N., who died intestate with no surviving kin on 14 April 2006. 29.  On an unspecified date P. and other unidentified persons forged N.\u2019s will, naming P. as N.\u2019s heir. 30.  On 19 October 2006 P. applied to a notary seeking to be recognised as N.\u2019s heir. On 30 November 2006 the notary issued a certificate confirming that P. had inherited N.\u2019s flat. 31.  On 6 December 2006 the Moscow City Registration Board (the \u201cRegistration Board\u201d) registered the certificate confirming P.\u2019s title to the flat and issued the relevant deed. 32.  On 30 January 2007 P. sold the flat to the first applicant. 33.  On 6 February 2007 the Registration Board registered the flat purchase and issued the respective deed to the first applicant. The applicants moved into the flat and resided there. 34.  On an unspecified date the authorities opened a criminal investigation concerning the forgery of the will issued on behalf of N. 35.  On 26 April 2012 the Perovskiy District Court of Moscow found P. guilty of several counts of fraud and sentenced him to five and a half years\u2019 imprisonment. In particular, the court established that P., acting in concert with other persons whose identity was not known, had fraudulently acquired N.\u2019s flat and sold it to the first applicant on the basis of a forged will. The court also found that the flat was bona vacantia which therefore vested in the State and, by having fraudulently acquired title to it and then sold it to the first applicant, P. had caused damage to the State. 36.  On 25 June 2012 the Moscow City Court upheld the judgment of 26 April 2012 on appeal. 37.  On 25 March 2013 the Housing Department brought a civil action against the applicants seeking, inter alia, (1) revocation of the first applicant\u2019s title to the flat; (2) the applicants\u2019 eviction; and (3) restitution of the flat to the City of Moscow. 38.  On 26 May 2014 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow granted the Housing Department\u2019s claims. It established that the flat was bona vacantia and ordered its restitution to the City of Moscow. It also revoked the first applicant\u2019s title to the flat and ordered the applicants\u2019 eviction. 39.  On 26 December 2014 the City Court upheld the judgment of 26 May 2014 on appeal. 40.  On 17 March 2015 the Moscow City Court refused to allow the applicants\u2019 cassation appeal. 41.  On 17 April 2015 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation refused to allow the applicants\u2019 cassation appeal. 42.  It appears that the judgment in the City\u2019s favour has not been enforced to date. The applicants continue to reside in the flat.", "references": ["6", "7", "0", "5", "4", "2", "1", "3", "8", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1966 and lives in Vladimir. 5.  In 2008 the applicant was indicted with fraud. On 21 March 2008 the Frunzenskiy District Court of Vladimir (\u201cthe district court\u201d) ordered temporary suspension of the applicant from the post of the chief accountant of municipal hospital no. 4. At the same time, the district court awarded the applicant an allowance for the period of the suspension in the amount of five statutory monthly wages. The decision came into force on 1 April 2008. 6.  On 11 August 2009 the district court cancelled the suspension of the applicant from the office as no longer necessary. The decision came into force on 24 August 2009. 7.  On 12 July 2010 the Presidium of the Vladimir Regional Court (\u201cthe regional court\u201d) quashed the decision of the district court of 21 March 2008 in the part concerning the monthly allowance. The Presidium of the regional court found that while ordering the suspension and the allowance for the period of such suspension, the district court had failed to specify from which funds the allowance was payable, thus the decision of the district court in that part had remained unenforced. The case was remitted for a new examination. 8.  On 3 August 2010 the district court awarded the applicant monthly allowance for the period of her suspension from the office in the amount of 266,812.92 Russian roubles. The allowance was to be paid from the federal budget. That decision was upheld on appeal on 22 September 2010. 9.  On 31 January 2011 the amount mentioned above was transferred to the applicant.", "references": ["1", "2", "8", "7", "4", "6", "5", "0", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1980 and lives in Istanbul. 5.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 6.  On 22 December 2009 the Ankara Magistrates\u2019 Court decided to restrict access to the investigation file in accordance with Article 153 \u00a7 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (the \u201cCCP\u201d), Law no. 5271 7.  On 9 February 2010 the applicant was arrested and taken into custody on suspicion of forming a criminal organisation and fraudulent use of credit cards. 8.  On 11 February 2010 the applicant\u2019s statement was taken by the police in the presence of his lawyer and he was questioned at length about his telephone conversations that had been intercepted. The police read out the transcripts of the intercepted conversations, and the applicant did not deny that he had had these conversations but claimed that they did not prove that he was guilty. 9.  On 12 February 2010 the investigating judge questioned the applicant in the presence of his lawyer. The applicant denied that he was involved in a criminal organisation and submitted that the intercepted calls did not prove that he was guilty. The investigating judge ordered the applicant\u2019s detention on remand taking into account the strong suspicion that he had committed the alleged offence, the risk of absconding and tampering with evidence as well as the risk of coercing some of the witnesses and victims. 10.  On various dates the applicant requested his release pending trial. These requests were dismissed by the courts, having regard to the nature of the offence with which the applicant was charged, the existence of a strong suspicion that the applicant had committed the offence in question, the state of the evidence, the risk of absconding and tampering with evidence as well as the time spent in detention. The applicant objected to these decisions. By decisions of 22 April 2010 and 20 October 2010 the appeal courts, without holding a hearing, rejected the applicant\u2019s objections based on the information contained in the case file. 11.  Upon his application, on 19 January 2011, the 26th Chamber of Ankara Criminal Court ordered the applicant\u2019s release having regard to the time he spent in detention.", "references": ["7", "3", "6", "8", "9", "4", "0", "1", "5", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1948 and lives in Bucharest. 6.  As an officer in a sub\u2011unit of the special anti-terrorist unit within the special forces for State security (hereinafter \u201cthe Securitate\u201d), the applicant participated in the events which commenced in Bucharest on 21 December 1989 and led to the fall of the Ceausescu dictatorship on 22 December 1989. 7.  The applicant was arrested by army forces and held in detention from 22 December until 23 December 1989. He was then held by the unit\u2019s commander from 25 December 1989 until 2 February 1990. During this period of time, he was subjected to ill-treatment and, as a result, he suffered depression and he was placed on the officers reserve list on the grounds of poor health (see paragraphs 8 - 13 below). 8.  On 29 April 1990 the applicant filed a criminal complaint with the military prosecutor, alleging that he had been ill-treated and illegally detained in the Securitate building and requesting the punishment of various officials, including the unit\u2019s commander, G.A. The military prosecutor questioned the defendants and a large number of witnesses during the criminal investigation and gathered medical evidence. 9.  On 2 December 1993 the military prosecutor found that the unit\u2019s commander G.A. had been responsible for the applicant\u2019s deprivation of liberty and his injuries; however, criminal proceedings could not be initiated because the commander had died. 10.  On 16 December 1993 the applicant asked the military prosecutor to extend the investigation to other officials he alleged were involved, including doctor P.I. and various Securitate officers. 11.  On 2 March 1995 the military prosecutor decided not to initiate criminal proceedings against the doctor P.I. on the ground that the constituent elements of the alleged offence were not present. Following the applicant\u2019s appeal, this decision was set aside by a decision of 25 September 1996 and the investigation continued. 12.  On 21 October 1997 the military prosecutor found doctor P.I. liable to pay an administrative fine; however, the type of offence he committed had been pardoned by a decree of July 1997. The military prosecutor discontinued the investigation in respect of the dead defendant, G.A. The criminal case related to the other defendants, the Securitate officers, was severed into separate proceedings. 13.  On 20 February 1998 and 16 February 1999 the military prosecutor decided not to initiate criminal proceedings against some of the defendants as the applicant\u2019s complaint had become partly statute-barred. The investigation into crimes allegedly committed by three of the defendants was severed and jurisdiction was relinquished to the prosecuting authorities at the High Court of Cassation and Justice in order to be joined to the main criminal investigation into the events of December 1989. 14.  On 27 June 2005 and 23 August 2007 the applicant was heard as a witness and as a civil party in the main criminal investigation. 15.  The most important procedural steps taken in the main criminal investigation are summarised in Association \u201c21 December 1989\u201d and Others v. Romania (nos. 33810/07 and 18817/08, \u00a7\u00a7 12-41, 24 May 2011), and Alecu and Others v. Romania (nos. 56838/08 and 80 others, \u00a7\u00a7 10-13, 27 January 2015). Subsequent developments are as follows. 16.  Following the entry into force of the new Code of Criminal Procedure in February 2014, jurisdiction over the case was relinquished in favour of the military prosecutor\u2019s office. 17.  On 14 October 2015 the prosecutor\u2019s office closed the main investigation, finding that the complaints were partly statute-barred and partly ill-founded. The parties have not submitted any information on whether there was an appeal against that decision.", "references": ["0", "3", "5", "6", "2", "7", "4", "8", "9", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1978 and lives in Calaraseuca. 6.  On 27 July 2005 the applicant was stopped by the traffic police for speeding. 7.  By an order of 5 September 2005 the traffic police fined the applicant 60 Moldovan lei (MDL) (the equivalent of some 4 euros (EUR) at the time). The applicant did not challenge the police order. 8.  As the applicant failed to pay the fine, on an unspecified date a bailiff applied to the Ocnita District Court to have the fine converted into thirty days\u2019 administrative detention, under Article 26 \u00a7 5 of the Code of Administrative Offences (see paragraph 14 below). According to the bailiff, the applicant had been ordered to pay the fine by 28 February 2006; however, he had failed to do so and had thus acted in bad faith. 9.  On 26 May 2006, at a hearing conducted without the presence of the parties, the Ocnita District Court accepted the bailiff\u2019s request and ordered the applicant\u2019s administrative detention for a period of thirty days. The document constituting the court\u2019s decision was a pre-printed template which the judge had completed by hand with the specific details of the case, such as the names of the judge, the applicant and the bailiff, the relevant dates, the amount of the fine, the applicant\u2019s address and the number of days of detention to be served by the applicant. It did not contain any indication that the applicant had been summoned to appear at the hearing. 10.  At 8 a.m. on 12 June 2006 the applicant was arrested at home and placed in detention. At about 5 p.m. the same day he suffered a heart attack and was taken by ambulance to a hospital. He recovered shortly thereafter and was soon discharged from hospital. 11.  On 16 June 2006 the applicant lodged an appeal against the Ocnita District Court\u2019s decision of 26 May 2006, arguing, inter alia, that he had not been summoned to appear at the hearing of 26 May 2006, that he had had no knowledge of the decision of 26 May 2006 prior to his arrest, and that he had not been given a chance to contest the court\u2019s decision before being placed in detention. The applicant also argued that the traffic police\u2019s order of 5 September 2005 imposing a fine on him for speeding had been abusive because the police had no evidence to prove that it had been his car which had been caught speeding and not other cars on the road. 12.  On 30 August 2006 the Balti Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal, finding that the applicant had not challenged the traffic police\u2019s order of 5 September 2005 within the statutory time-limit. The Court of Appeal did not respond to the applicant\u2019s argument about the failure to summon him to the hearing of 26 May 2006. 13.  It does not appear from the materials of the case that the applicant served the rest of the detention term.", "references": ["3", "5", "7", "1", "9", "6", "0", "4", "8", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant, Mr G\u00f6khan Ayd\u0131n, is a Turkish national who was born in 1983. He was detained in Tekirda\u011f F-type prison at the time of the introduction of the application with the Court. 5.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 6.  On 11 November 2002 the applicant was taken into custody by police officers from the Anti-Terrorist Branch of the Istanbul police headquarters on suspicion of membership of TKP/ML-TIKKO, an illegal organisation. 7.  On 14 November 2002 the Istanbul State Security Court ordered the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention. 8.  On 26 December 2002 the public prosecutor at the Istanbul State Security Court filed a bill of indictment charging the applicant and ten other persons with attempting to undermine the constitutional order, an offence prescribed by Article 146 \u00a7 1 of the former Criminal Code. 9.  Following the promulgation of Law no. 5190 of 16 June 2004, the case against the applicant was transferred to 10th Chamber of the Istanbul Assize Court. 10.  During the proceedings, the first-instance courts examined the applicant\u2019s continued detention at the end of every hearing, either on their own motion or upon the applicant\u2019s request. 11.  On 25 December 2007, at the end of the hearing and in the presence of the applicant, the 10th Chamber of the Istanbul Assize Court ordered the applicant\u2019s continued detention. The applicant objected to this decision. On 27 December 2007 the 11th Chamber of Istanbul Assize Court dismissed his objection without holding an oral hearing and relying on the public prosecutor\u2019s opinion which had not been communicated to the applicant or his representative. 12.  On 24 March 2009 the applicant was convicted as charged and sentenced to life imprisonment. This decision was upheld by the Court of Cassation and became final on 20 January 2011.", "references": ["8", "7", "4", "1", "5", "6", "0", "3", "9", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1978 and lives in \u015eanl\u0131urfa. 6.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7.  On 22 July 2008 the applicant was dismissed from her post of officer in the army due to non-compliance with disciplinary rules and immoral behavior. 8.  On 14 August 2008 the applicant brought an action before the Supreme Military Administrative Court and requested the annulment of her dismissal. 9.  On 16 June 2009 the Supreme Military Administrative Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s case taking into account \u201csecret documents\u201d submitted by the Ministry of Defence. These documents were not disclosed to the applicant. 10.  On 29 September 2009 the applicant\u2019s request for rectification was rejected by the same court.", "references": ["8", "9", "1", "4", "2", "5", "6", "7", "0", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1958 and lives in Riga. 6.  In May 2004 an official representing the Ministry of Health informed the State police authorities in writing that a private person \u2013 the applicant \u2013 was selling unlicensed pharmaceutical products via the internet. The products were advertised as medicines for the treatment of HIV, hepatitis C and cancer.\nThe official mentioned that the Department for the Combat of Organised Crime (Organiz\u0113t\u0101s noziedz\u012bbas apkaro\u0161anas p\u0101rvalde) had established the applicant\u2019s address, but that it had declined to launch an investigation on the grounds that a sample of the product sold by the applicant did not contain narcotic or other dangerous substances. Other departments of the State police had similarly refused to investigate the case. 7.  An undercover investigation was carried out and on 11 June 2004 police officers responsible for investigating economic crime made a test purchase. They contacted the applicant via the email address indicated on the website that was advertising the pharmaceuticals products, and met him at a pizzeria near his home. After having bought a pack of ten bottles of one of the products for 50 Latvian lati (LVL) (about 70 euros (EUR)), the police officers informed the applicant about the test purchase which had been carried out.\nA record of the operation (p\u0101rbaudes akts), dated 11 June 2004 and signed by four police officers and the applicant, stated, inter alia:\n\u201cgiven that company Baltijas elektronikas izstr\u0101des has been registered at [the applicant\u2019s] address, and that the applicant himself lives at that address, [the applicant] voluntarily agreed that the apartment be subjected to an inspection (apskate) and to show the tools used to fabricate the medicaments.\u201d 8.  Immediately after the test purchase, the same police officers carried out an inspection at the applicant\u2019s apartment. Later, four police officers from the organised crime department, an expert and officers from the police press centre arrived. 9.  During the inspection, the applicant explained that he was director of the company \u201cBaltijas elektronikas izstr\u0101des\u201d and that the company was not connected with the production of medicines. He had been producing alleged medicines at home since the beginning of 2004, when several pharmaceutical companies in Latvia had refused to cooperate with him in the production of medical products for the treatment of HIV and hepatitis C. He alleged that he had sold about fifty packs of the alleged medicines. He admitted to being aware that the sale of medicines required a licence, but claimed that he did not have the means to obtain such a patent. 10.  As a result of the inspection, which lasted five hours, a computer, a computer hard drive and items used in the production of the medicines (chemical substances, spare bottles and labels) were seized from the applicant\u2019s apartment. The inspection was video-recorded and photographs were taken; the seized items were packed and sealed. The inspection record of 11 June 2014 listed everything which the police officers had observed during the inspection at the applicant\u2019s three-room apartment, including the composition of the apartment, and detailed content of shelves and boxes, and of the fridge. 11.  The above inspection record was written on a standard form with a pre-typed text according to which the inspection had been carried out under Articles 179-183 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 12.  A subsequent forensic examination concluded that there were no signs of narcotic or psychotropic substances in the seized items. The expert report concluded that the computer contained a massive volume of information, including on the production and distribution of the alleged medicines, as well as email correspondence, including communication with potential clients. 13.  As a result, the police authorities instituted two sets of administrative offence proceedings under the Code of Administrative Offences on unlicensed business operations (see paragraphs 27-35 below) and on the sale of unlicensed pharmaceutical products (see paragraph 36 below). The first set of proceedings was remitted for examination by the State Revenue Service (Valsts ie\u0146\u0113mumu dienests \u2013 \u201cthe VID\u201d), whereas the latter was remitted to the State Pharmacy Inspectorate (Valsts farm\u0101cijas inspekcija). 14.  In June and July 2004 the applicant submitted various complaints to the State police authorities concerning the events of 11 June 2004. An internal inquiry by the Internal Security Office of the State Police (Valsts policijas Iek\u0161\u0113j\u0101s dro\u0161\u012bbas birojs) was completed on 26 July 2004. It concluded that there had been no violations of law in the conduct of the police officers who had carried out the test purchase and the subsequent inspection of the applicant\u2019s apartment. 15.  In addition, the Internal Security Office of the State Police refused to initiate criminal proceedings following a complaint lodged by the applicant about the theft by the police officers of weights from his apartment on 11 June 2004 (decision adopted on 25 November 2004), the alleged unauthorised conduct of investigative activities and false testimonies given by one of the police officers present during the inspection (decision adopted on 30 December 2009). 16.  Contrary to what was indicated in the decisions adopted by the Internal Security Office of the State Police, the applicant did not appeal against those decisions to a higher official within the State police hierarchy. Instead, he submitted a new complaint to the Office of the Prosecutor General. The complaint was dismissed by a final decision of 29 December 2009 (see paragraph 25 below). 17.  On 30 May 2005, following the internal inquiry, the Pre-trial Investigation Department of the State Police (Valsts policijas Galven\u0101s Krimin\u0101lpolicijas p\u0101rvaldes Pirmstiesas izmekl\u0113\u0161anas p\u0101rvade) dismissed the allegations that the police officers had carried out a search of the applicant\u2019s apartment on 11 June 2004. They concluded that the police officers had verified the facts about the alleged sale of pharmaceutical products. After the test purchase and with the permission of the applicant, they had inspected the legal address of the company \u201cBaltijas elektronikas izstr\u0101des\u201d and had taken items in accordance with section 12(1)(23) of the Law on the Police, which authorised the examination of premises of legal entities (see Relevant domestic law section).\nThe decision further stated that on arriving at the address of the company registered at the applicant\u2019s apartment, the police officers had had no intention of drawing up an administrative offence record. The latter had been drawn up only after the examination of all the evidence seized during the inspection. According to the decision, the police officers had not carried out a search because all the seized items were easily visible and accessible. Therefore the Code of Criminal Procedure could not have been violated.\nThe decision also stated that the applicant himself had not taken back the computer. The applicant did not appeal against the decision. 18.  On various occasions the applicant complained to various branches of the Office of the Prosecutor, alleging that the \u201csearch\u201d of his apartment on 11 June 2004 had been unlawful. He also requested that the seized items be returned to him. 19.  According to information submitted by the Office of the Prosecutor General, between December 2004 and March 2012 the applicant complained to the Office of the Prosecutor General on sixty-two occasions in relation to the events of 11 June 2004, out of which the Office examined forty eight complaints. It appears that most of the complaints were related to various aspects of the administrative offence or criminal proceedings (see paragraphs 29-30 below). 20.  On 17 November 2004 a prosecutor in charge of investigating financial end economic crimes replied to the applicant that the inspection of the applicant\u2019s apartment, which was also the registered address of company \u201cBaltijas elektronikas izstr\u0101des\u201d, had been carried out \u201cin accordance with the law\u201d, and that the items from the apartment had been seized, recorded and filmed in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The prosecutor\u2019s reply was amenable to appeal to a higher prosecutor. 21.  On 13 January 2005 the applicant complained to the Office of the Prosecutor General that, inter alia, items from his apartment had been seized \u201cwithout judicial authorisation\u201d. 22.  On 5 April 2005 the applicant was offered to receive back a computer hard drive seized in 2004. The computer was added to the materials of the criminal case. 23.  On 27 April 2005 a supervising prosecutor ordered an internal inquiry into the conduct of the police officers at the applicant\u2019s apartment and the seizure of items there on 11 June 2004. The prosecutor noted that the police had had no legal grounds on which to carry out an inspection of the applicant\u2019s apartment, in that the Code of Administrative Offences did not provide for such a measure. The prosecutor also noted that the police officers had breached various procedural rules, notably Articles 168-178, 179 and 180 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 24.  On 25 August 2009 a prosecutor from the Office of the Prosecutor General dismissed the applicant\u2019s request to institute criminal proceedings in respect of the conduct of the police officers. The decision stated that the police officers had carried out the investigative measure \u2013 an inspection of the applicant\u2019s apartment \u2013 on the basis of Articles 179 and 183 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Having concluded that there were no grounds to institute criminal proceedings, the police officers drew up an administrative offence record. The Prosecutor General\u2019s Office recognised that the police officers should have remitted the administrative offence files to the court for adjudication, rather than to the VID. However, that omission had later been rectified by a supervising prosecutor (see paragraph 29 below). The decision stated that in any event, the statutory deadline for instituting disciplinary proceedings against the police officers had expired. 25.  By a final decision of 29 December 2009 a supervising prosecutor from the Office of the Prosecutor General upheld the decision not to initiate criminal proceedings with regard to the conduct of the police officers on 11 June 2004. The decision stated that the police officers had conducted an inspection and seizure at the applicant\u2019s apartment pursuant to sections 10(1)(6), 12(1)(4) and 12(1)(24) of the Law on the Police. 26.  Meanwhile, in August 2009 and again in August 2010 the applicant claimed compensation for non-pecuniary damage from the Office of the Prosecutor General on the basis of the alleged unlawful activities of police officers on 11 June 2004. On 15 September 2009 the claim was dismissed and the applicant was informed that it was open to him to institute civil damages proceedings. On 29 October 2010 the same prosecutor dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim for damages with respect to the seized items. The applicant appears to have appealed against that decision to the administrative courts. The Court has no further information on the outcome of the proceedings. 27.  On 20 September 2004 the VID held the applicant liable for committing the administrative offence of unlicensed business activities \u2013 manufacturing of pharmaceutical products. He was fined LVL 200 (about EUR 300) and the items he had used in manufacturing the pharmaceutical products were confiscated. On 11 August 2004 the items were destroyed. 28.  The applicant appealed against the decision to the administrative courts and to the Office of the Prosecutor. 29.  On 7 October 2004 the Office of the Prosecutor of Financial and Economic Offences established that the impugned actions of the applicant had amounted to a criminal offence under section 207 of the Criminal Law, and therefore instituted criminal proceedings. On the basis of the prosecutor\u2019s instruction, on 11 October 2004 the VID revoked their decision to hold the applicant liable for an administrative offence. 30.  Following the pre-trial investigation in the criminal case, in which the applicant was questioned as a witness, on 26 June 2006 the criminal proceedings were terminated owing to lack of evidence that a criminal offence had been committed, and the materials, including the items seized from the applicant\u2019s apartment, were remitted to the VID for the initiation of administrative offence proceedings. 31.  Subsequently, on 21 July 2006 the VID adopted in substance an identical decision to that adopted after the first attempt to institute administrative offence proceedings (see paragraph 27 above). 32.  The applicant appealed against the decision to the VID and later to the administrative courts, seeking revocation of the allegedly unlawful decision. Among other things, the applicant complained that an unlawful search and seizure had been carried out at his home on 11 June 2004. He claimed compensation for non-pecuniary damage in the amount of LVL 5,000 (about EUR 7,140), and later increased the claim to more than a million lati. 33.  On 11 December 2008 the District Administrative Court dismissed the appeal. It noted that, within the powers vested in the State police under section 18(2) of the Law on the Police, in June 2004 police officers had inspected the applicant\u2019s apartment in the course of criminal proceedings. Therefore the activities carried out prior to the institution of the administrative offence proceedings fell outside the administrative courts\u2019 competence. The court nevertheless analysed the information concerning the alleged unlawful conduct of the police officers and concluded that there were no grounds to question the legality of the police officers\u2019 conduct. 34.  The applicant submitted a further appeal in which he argued, inter alia, that the evidence had been obtained unlawfully and therefore it could not be admitted in the administrative offence proceedings. 35.  On 15 April 2010, by a final decision, the Regional Administrative Court upheld the VID\u2019s decision. At the same time it varied the lower court\u2019s finding that the police officers had carried out the contested measure as part of criminal proceedings. The appellate court relied on the outcome of the police internal inquiry into the lawfulness of the police officers entering the applicant\u2019s apartment and seizing evidence. The court noted that the police officers had acted pursuant to section 12(1)(23) of the Law on the Police (see paragraph 40 below), which vested police officers with powers to inspect company premises, and section 10(1)(6) and (7), which provided that police officers had a duty to prevent and terminate administrative offences (see paragraph 37 below). As a consequence, the appellate court did not find that any of the evidence had been obtained unlawfully.\nOn the merits, the Regional Administrative Court established that the applicant had carried out an unlicensed business activity, i.e. the manufacturing of pharmaceutical products, with an aim of receiving income. The court came to this conclusion by analysing the applicant\u2019s activities, such as him setting up a web site, communication with potential clients via emails and setting a price. Accordingly, it was concluded that the applicant was rightly fined. It was also noted that the fine was the lowest possible for an individual person. 36.  On 15 September 2004 the State Pharmacy Inspectorate fined the applicant under Article 46\u00b9, second paragraph, of the Administrative Offences Code in the amount of LVL 500 (about EUR 700) for selling unauthorised pharmaceutical products (see paragraph 51 below). The decision was upheld at three levels of the administrative jurisdiction and came into force in June 2009.", "references": ["5", "0", "7", "3", "6", "2", "1", "8", "9", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "9.  The first applicant, Mr J\u00f3n \u00c1sgeir J\u00f3hannesson, was born in 1968 and lives in London. The second applicant, Mr Tryggvi J\u00f3nsson, was born in 1955 and lives in Reykjav\u00edk. At the time of lodging its application, the third applicant, Fj\u00e1rfestingaf\u00e9lagi\u00f0 Gaumur, was a private limited liability company registered in Iceland. 10.  On 17 November 2003 the Directorate of Tax Investigations (Skattranns\u00f3knarstj\u00f3ri r\u00edkisins) initiated an audit of the applicants\u2019 tax returns and bookkeeping. The investigation concerning the first applicant was concluded with a report issued on 27 October 2004. On the basis of the report the Directorate of Internal Revenue (R\u00edkisskattstj\u00f3ri), ruling on 30 December 2004, found that the first applicant had failed to declare a significant payment that he had received in August 1998. Therefore, it revised upwards the amount declared as capital income in his tax return for 1999 and, consequently, re-assessed his taxes and imposed a 25% tax surcharge. Ruling on 30 December 2005, it also found, among other things, that he had failed to declare significant payments received from 1999 to 2002, car allowances for the years 2000 to 2002, further allowances (payment of life insurance) and profits from the sale of shares in the Baugur Group company. It re-assessed his taxes for the years 1999 to 2002 and imposed a 25% surcharge. 11.  The investigation concerning the second applicant was concluded with a report of 24 November 2005. On the basis of that report the Directorate of Internal Revenue, ruling on 29 December 2005, found, in particular, that he had failed to declare significant payments received from 1999 to 2002. It also found that the Baugur Group company had paid his life insurance in the years 1999 to 2002 and that he had failed to declare these amounts as taxable allowances. It re\u2011assessed his taxes for the mentioned years and imposed a 25% surcharge. 12.  The investigation concerning the third applicant was concluded with a report of 29 July 2004. On the basis of that report the Directorate of Internal Revenue, ruling on 30 December 2004, re\u2011assessed the third applicant\u2019s taxes for the years 1998 to 2002. In particular, it found that the third applicant had failed to account for and declare allowances (such as cars and housing) enjoyed by the first applicant and other employees, and failed to withhold public levies on these allowances and pay them to the state treasury. It further considered that profits and losses from the sale of shares in the Baugur Group company had not been declared correctly and that expenditure from 2000 to 2002 had been overdeclared. Consequently, it re-assessed the third applicant\u2019s taxes for the years 1998 to 2002, imposing a 25% surcharge and a further 10% surcharge because of its failure to withhold levies at source and pay them to the state treasury. 13.  Following the applicants\u2019 appeal, the Internal Revenue Board (Yfirskattanefnd), in its decisions of 29 August 2007 (in respect of the second applicant) and 26 September 2007 (in respect of the first and third applicants), upheld the imposition of tax surcharges for the most part. 14.  The applicants did not seek judicial review of these decisions, which thus acquired legal force six months later, in February and March 2008, respectively, when the time-limit for appeals had expired. 15.  On 12 November 2004 the Director of Tax Investigations reported the matter to the National Police Commissioner (R\u00edkisl\u00f6greglustj\u00f3ri) and its unit for investigation and prosecution of economic and environmental crimes, and forwarded its reports concerning the applicants and the documents collected during the investigation were forwarded to the police. In August 2006 the applicants and other witnesses were interviewed by the police for the first time. According to the respondent Government, the applicants were, at the same time, informed of their status as suspects in the criminal investigation. On 18 December 2008 the National Police Commissioner indicted the applicants for aggravated tax offences. The first applicant was indicted, among other things, for having underdeclared his income in his tax returns in 1999 to 2003. This included the failure to declare significant payments received in 1998 to 2002, car allowances for the years 2000 to 2002, further allowances (life insurance payments) and profits from the sale of shares in the Baugur Group company. The second applicant was indicted for having underdeclared his income in his tax returns in 1999 to 2003 by failing to declare significant payments he had received from 1998 to 2002 and the Baugur Group\u2019s payment of his life insurance. The third applicant and its representative, KJ, were indicted for having failed, from 1999 to 2002, to declare salaries and car allowances enjoyed by the first applicant and other employees, for not having withheld public levies on these allowances and pay them to the state treasury, for having neglected to declare correctly the profits and losses from the sale of shares in Baugur Group and for having overdeclared expenditure and losses. 16.  In a ruling of 1 June 2010 the Reykjavik District Court (H\u00e9ra\u00f0sd\u00f3mur Reykjav\u00edkur) found that the offences for which the applicants were personally indicted were based on the same facts as the above-mentioned decisions of the tax authorities. It further found that the proceedings concerning the tax surcharges had involved a determination of a \u201ccriminal charge\u201d within the meaning of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention. Relying mainly on that provision and the Court\u2019s judgment in Sergey Zolotukhin v. Russia ([GC], no. 14939/03, ECHR 2009), the District Court therefore dismissed those parts of the indictment on the ground that they referred to offences for which the applicants had already been tried and punished by the decisions of the Directorate of Internal Revenue of 30 December 2004 and 29 December 2005, as upheld by the Internal Revenue Board in its decisions of 29 August and 26 September 2007. 17.  The Acting National Commissioner of Police lodged an appeal with the Supreme Court (H\u00e6stir\u00e9ttur \u00cdslands) which, by a judgment of 22 September 2010, overturned the District Court\u2019s ruling and ordered it to examine the merits of the case. It referred to section 2 of the Act on the European Convention on Human Rights (L\u00f6g um mannr\u00e9ttindas\u00e1ttm\u00e1la Evr\u00f3pu, no. 62/1994), in which the legislature had reiterated the validity of the principle of dualism of national law and international law in respect of the decisions of the institutions established under the Convention. It stated that the courts should look to the judgments of the European Court when interpreting the Convention, but that the principle of dualism required that the necessary amendments to national law to honour the State\u2019s obligations under the Convention would have to be made by the legislature. Domestic law provided for the current system where tax offences could be dealt with in two separate sets of proceedings, one deciding on surcharges and the other on criminal punishment, even in circumstances where the proceedings were based on the same or substantially the same facts. According to the Supreme Court, the case-law of the European Court had not been clear on this issue and, consequently, there was uncertainty as to the scope and content of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7. In the light of this, the Supreme Court found that the domestic courts could not decide that the current system of tax surcharges and subsequent criminal proceedings was in violation of the Convention. 18.  By a judgment of 9 December 2011 the District Court found that the first and second applicants had acted with gross negligence, which was sufficient for criminal liability under the relevant provisions of the tax law, and all three applicants were convicted in respect of some of the charges against them. However, the District Court, referring to the excessive length of the proceedings and to the fact that the tax authorities had imposed a 25% tax surcharge on the applicants, decided to suspend the determination of penalty for one year. 19.  The first and second applicants, as well as KJ and the public prosecutor, lodged an appeal against the District Court\u2019s judgment. No appeal was lodged on behalf of the third applicant. 20.  On 7 February 2013 the Supreme Court upheld the first and second applicants\u2019 convictions for the most part. Moreover, the Supreme Court convicted the first applicant on two further charges for which he had been acquitted by the District Court. It revoked earlier suspended sentences (three months\u2019 imprisonment in respect of the first applicant and twelve months\u2019 imprisonment in respect of the second applicant, both suspended for two years by a Supreme Court judgment of 5 June 2008) and included them in their sentencing in the present case. The first applicant was sentenced to twelve months\u2019 imprisonment, suspended for two years, and the payment of a fine of 62,000,000 Icelandic kr\u00f3nur (ISK; corresponding to approximately 360,000 euros (EUR) at the exchange rate applicable in February 2013). The second applicant was sentenced to eighteen months\u2019 imprisonment, suspended for two years, and the payment of a fine of ISK 32,000,000 (approximately EUR 186,000). In determining the applicants\u2019 prison sentences, the Supreme Court took into consideration the excessive length of the proceedings, noting that the delay had not been the applicants\u2019 fault, and therefore decided that the sentences should be suspended. In fixing the fine that the applicants were ordered to pay, the court had regard to the tax surcharges imposed, without describing any calculation made in this respect, and the excessive length of the proceedings.", "references": ["2", "6", "3", "4", "9", "0", "1", "7", "8", "5", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Yerevan. 5.  The applicant is a former employee of a State Revenue Committee (hereinafter \u201cthe Committee\u201d). By an order of the Head of the Committee of 27 February 2009 the applicant was dismissed from his job. 6.  On 20 March 2009 the applicant brought an action against the Committee, requesting reinstatement in his job and payment for forced absence up to the day of his reinstatement. 7.  On 11 August 2009 the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan found in the applicant\u2019s favour. In particular, it decided to declare the order of 27 February 2009 void. Moreover, it ordered the applicant\u2019s reinstatement in his previous position and awarded him compensation for lost earnings. 8.  On 2 September 2009 the Committee appealed against the District Court\u2019s judgment. By a decision of 7 October 2009 the Civil Court of Appeal rejected the appeal and upheld the District Court\u2019s judgment. 9.  On 2 November 2009 the Committee lodged an appeal on points of law against the decision of 7 October 2009 with the Court of Cassation. 10.  On 9 December 2009 the Court of Cassation decided to declare the appeal inadmissible for lack of merit, so the judgment of 11 August 2009 became final. 11.  On 27 January 2010 the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan issued a writ of execution in respect of its judgment of 11 August 2009. 12.  On 5 February 2010 the bailiff instituted enforcement proceedings. On the same date he decided to oblige the Committee to comply with the requirements of the writ within two weeks. 13.  By a letter dated 11 February 2010 the bailiff requested that the Committee comply with the requirements of the writ. 14.  On 23 March 2010 the bailiff received a response from the Committee, stating that it was impossible to reinstate the applicant in his job, since the structure of the Committee had been modified and the applicant\u2019s former position did not exist anymore. 15.  On 20 April 2010 the applicant was paid 937,114 Armenian drams (AMD) for his forced absence, calculated from 27 February 2009 until 9 December 2009, the date on which the judgment in his favour became final. 16.  The applicant sent several letters to the Committee and to different officials, complaining that no measures had been taken to enforce the final judgment of 11 August 2009 and requesting that the Committee be compelled to comply with that judgment. 17.  On 18 July 2011 the bailiff decided to terminate the enforcement proceedings on the grounds that it was impossible to enforce the judgment of 11 August 2009. In particular, the applicant could not be reinstated because his previous position was no longer vacant. 18.  On 25 July 2011 the applicant contested the bailiff\u2019s decision before the Administrative Court. 19.  On 5 December 2011 the Administrative Court found in favour of the applicant and cancelled the bailiff\u2019s decision of 18 July 2011. 20.  On 20 January 2012 the supervising bailiff decided to set aside the bailiff\u2019s decision of 18 July 2011 and reopen the enforcement proceedings. 21.  By a letter dated 5 March 2012 the bailiff again requested that the Committee reinstate the applicant in his previous position and award him compensation for lost earnings until the date of his reinstatement. The Committee replied that the applicant\u2019s former position had ceased to exist as a result of the Governmental decree of 15 December 2011. 22.  On 26 April 2012 the bailiff again decided to terminate the enforcement proceedings on the grounds that it was impossible to enforce the judgment of 11 August 2009, since the structural unit of the Committee where the applicant had been working had ceased to exist. 23.  On 7 May 2012 the applicant contested that decision before the Administrative Court. He alleged, in particular, that the judgment of 11 August 2009 had not been enforced: firstly, he had not been awarded the full sum for his forced absence, and secondly, he had not been reinstated in his previous position. 24.  By a judgment of 16 October 2012 the Administrative Court decided to grant the applicant\u2019s claim in respect of the payments for his forced absence, stating that the period should be calculated up to 15 December 2011, the day on which that particular unit of the Committee had ceased to exist. As to the applicant\u2019s second claim, the Administrative Court stated that the bailiff\u2019s decision in this respect was lawful, since the applicant\u2019s reinstatement had been impossible. 25.  On 9 November 2012 the applicant lodged an appeal against the judgment of the Administrative Court. 26.  On 21 February 2013 the Administrative Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim and upheld the Administrative Court\u2019s decision of 16 October 2012. 27.  On 11 March 2013 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law against the decision of 21 February 2013 with the Court of Cassation. 28.  On 27 March 2013 the Court of Cassation decided to declare the appeal inadmissible for lack of merit. 29.  On 19 April 2013 the bailiff decided to reopen the enforcement proceedings. 30.  On 4 November 2013 the applicant was invited to the Committee and the Committee made him a verbal offer of a similar position in another tax inspectorate unit, but this offer was later turned down by the applicant. 31.  Three days later, via telephone, the applicant was again invited to the Committee, but he failed to appear. 32.  On 8 November 2013 the Head of the Human Resources Department of the Committee sent a letter to the applicant, offering to reinstate him in a position similar to his previous one, that is, the position of a tax inspector in Current Control Division no. 2 of the Shengavit Tax Inspectorate. The letter also stated that the compensation for the applicant\u2019s forced absence up to that date amounted to AMD 4,017,860. 33.  On the same day the applicant refused to accept the Committee\u2019s offer. He claimed that the compensation for his forced absence should amount to AMD 9,975,970. In response, the Committee informed the applicant that it would consider the above-mentioned sum if the applicant submitted substantiating calculations. 34.  On 9 June 2015 the amount of AMD 4,017,860 was transferred by the Committee to the bailiff\u2019s account. On 18 June 2015 the enforcement proceedings were terminated by the bailiff as this amount had been further transferred to the applicant\u2019s bank account. 35.  On 22 July 2015 the applicant appealed to the Administrative Court, requesting that the bailiff\u2019s decision be quashed. 36.  On 22 May 2016 the Administrative Court allowed the applicant\u2019s appeal and quashed the bailiff\u2019s decision of 18 June 2015. That judgment became final on 26 May 2016.", "references": ["0", "7", "4", "2", "1", "8", "6", "5", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Petro\u015fani. 6.  She married N.C. in 1979 and they had four children, born in 1980, 1988, 1992 and 1999. According to the applicant, N.C. was violent towards her and their children on numerous occasions throughout their marriage. In 2007, assaults against the applicant intensified during their divorce proceedings. The divorce was finalised on 6 December 2008. 7.  On 24 June and 3 September 2007 the applicant was physically assaulted and threatened by her husband. 8.  According to a forensic medical certificate issued on 28 June 2007, the applicant had numerous bruises on her face, arms, back and thorax, which required five to six days of medical care. A second forensic medical certificate, issued on 6 September 2007, stated that the applicant had an excoriation (scratches) on her ear lobe and several bruises on her arm and thighs. It was possible the injuries had been caused on 3 September. They required two to three days of medical care. 9.  On 8 September 2007 the applicant was again physically assaulted by her husband. After the arrival of the police, she was taken to hospital by ambulance. She was diagnosed with an open facial trauma and a contusion of the nasal pyramid. According to a forensic medical certificate issued on 13 September 2007, the injuries might have been caused by impact with or on a hard object and required nine to ten days of medical care. 10.  In their duty reports for the above dates, the police officers called by the applicant noted that she had been injured in a domestic dispute and that they had informed her that she could lodge formal complaints against N.C. In the report drafted on 24 June 2007, the police officer on duty also mentioned that when he had arrived at the scene of the incident he had found that N.C. had locked the applicant out of their joint residence. 11.  On 3 August and 2 October 2007 the applicant lodged complaints with the prosecutor\u2019s office attached to the Petro\u015fani District Court, alleging that she had been physically assaulted by her husband in their home, in the presence of their children, on 24 June, and 3 and 8 September 2007. She attached copies of the medical certificates drawn up after the incidents. 12.  On 28 August 2007 the applicant also sent a letter to the Hunedoara County police chief, in which she alleged that she had been the victim of repeated acts of violence by her husband, who often assaulted her in the presence of their children. She mentioned that on several occasions he had locked her out of their home and asked for help from the police in solving these problems. 13.  On 11 September 2007 the applicant gave a detailed statement describing the three assaults to the policeman in charge with the investigation. She stated that on 24 June 2007 her husband had come home around noon and had started punching her in the face and head and threatened to kill her. She had managed to flee, but when she had returned an hour later her husband had refused to let her back into the apartment. She also mentioned that he had told the children not to speak about it. 14.  In statements dated 12 September 2007, the applicant\u2019s mother and brother told the police that throughout 2007 the applicant had very often come to their house, complaining that N.C. had beaten her, threatened to kill her or that he had locked her out of their apartment. 15.  On 15 November 2007 the applicant\u2019s and N.C.\u2019s adult daughters, C.B.A. and C.C.A., told the police that the applicant used to drink and that she became aggressive when she got drunk. They also stated that their father had not hit their mother. C.C.A. mentioned that although she earned her own living, her father had always given her money. Her mother, on the other, had constantly been short of money and had debts to banks. 16.  On 19 November 2007 N.C. was questioned by the police. He stated that he had argued with the applicant over their divorce, but had not laid a hand on her. He added that the applicant had not been cleaning the house properly and had a drinking problem. He also stated that \u201cI did not hit her so hard as to cause her injury\u201d and that \u201cshe may have fallen in the bathroom\u201d. He alleged that the medical certificates submitted by the applicant had been forged. 17.  On 13 and 19 December 2007 the applicant wrote to the head prosecutor of the prosecutor\u2019s office attached to the Petro\u015fani District Court, complaining that N.C., who had moved out of their apartment and had taken two of the children with him, had threatened to kill her when they had accidentally met on the street a week before. She stated that she feared for her life and asked for the proceedings to be speeded up and for protection from N.C. 18.  On the same date, the prosecutor\u2019s office attached to the Petro\u015fani District Court decided not to press criminal charges against N.C. and imposed an administrative fine of 200 Romanian lei (RON) (approximately 50 euros (EUR)) on him. The prosecutor held that the applicant had provoked the disputes after drinking alcohol and referred to N.C.\u2019s statements and those of the applicant\u2019s two adult daughters. As regards the alleged threats, it was considered that the applicant had failed to prove her accusations. 19.  The prosecutor concluded that, although N.C. had committed the crime of bodily harm, his actions had not created any danger to society, because he had been provoked by the victim, had no previous criminal record and was a retired person (pensionar). 20.  The applicant\u2019s complaint against that decision was rejected as ill\u2011founded on 25 March 2008 by the superior prosecutor. 21.  On 21 April 2008 the applicant lodged a complaint against the prosecutors\u2019 decisions of 19 December 2007 and 25 March 2008 with the Petro\u015fani District Court, asking that N.C. be charged with bodily harm, be convicted and ordered to pay non-pecuniary damages for the suffering she had endured. She alleged that the administrative fine, which N.C. had refused to pay, had not had a deterrent effect on him as he had continued to assault her after the prosecutor\u2019s decision of 19 December 2007. She also asked the court to impose criminal sanctions on him and requested permission to submit a recording of a conversation with N.C. in order to prove that she had been assaulted and threatened by him in September 2007. In the last paragraph of her submission, the applicant stated that she feared for her life and asked the court to \u201cpunish [N.C.] as provided for by law ... to forbid him from entering the apartment ... and to forbid him from coming near [her] ...\u201d. 22.  At the second hearing before the Petrosani District Court, the applicant applied to be given a court-appointed lawyer because she did not have the financial means to hire one. The court dismissed the application, holding that the subject matter of the case did not require representation by a lawyer. 23.  By an interlocutory judgment of 23 June 2008, the Petrosani District Court decided to partially quash the prosecutor\u2019s decision of 19 December 2007 in respect of the crime of bodily harm and the penalty imposed for it and to examine that part of the case on the merits. The prosecutor\u2019s findings in respect of the threats were upheld. The recording was not admitted as evidence because the court considered that it had no relevance to the case. 24.  The applicant and N.C. gave statements before the court. N.C. explained that on 8 September 2007 the applicant had been drunk and had threatened him with a knife. In order to defend himself, he had pushed her but he denied having ever hit the applicant. 25.  On 10 February 2009 the court heard a statement from the applicant\u2019s daughter, C.B.A., who testified as follows:\n\u201cMy father used to hit my mother [the applicant] and us, the children, many times. He used to do it when he had not come home at night and my mother asked him where he had been. Then he would get angry and hit her. The main reason he got angry was lack of money ... Even after July 2007, when I moved out of my parents\u2019 apartment, my mother continued to be hit by my father; I saw some of these incidents personally. Before 2007, my mother used to drink alcohol, but it was within normal limits, and in 2007 she stopped drinking.\nI retract the statement I gave during the criminal proceedings because I gave it after threats from my father.\u201d 26.  On 17 February 2009 the Petro\u015fani District Court decided to acquit N.C. of the crime of bodily harm. The court considered that C.B.A.\u2019s statement could not be taken into consideration, without mentioning any reasons for that decision. The court concluded as follows:\n\u201cThe injured party [the applicant] has not proved her allegations that on 24.06.2007, 3.09.2007 and 8.09.2007 ... she was physically assaulted by the defendant. The court considers, also in view of the evidence collected during the criminal investigation, that such assaults by the defendant took place principally because of the injured party\u2019s alcohol consumption and because she was not taking adequate care of her four children. The defendant\u2019s acts are not so dangerous to society as to be considered crimes and he shall therefore be acquitted of the three counts of bodily harm and shall pay an administrative fine of RON 500.\u201d 27.  The court further dismissed the applicant\u2019s claims for damages as ill-founded, without giving reasons. No mention was made in the judgment of the applicant\u2019s request for protective measures made in her complaint of 21 April 2008 (see paragraph 21 above). 28.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law (recurs) against that judgment. She alleged, among other arguments, that N.C. was a violent person who continued to assault her, even after being punished with an administrative fine by the prosecutor on 19 December 2007. 29.  On 12 May 2009 the Hunedoara County Court dismissed as ill\u2011founded the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law and upheld the decision of 17 February 2009. The court held that the acts of violence committed by N.C. had been provoked by the applicant and had therefore not reached the level of severity required for them to fall within the scope of the crime of bodily harm. For the same reason, an award for damages was not justified. 30.  Between 19 February and 21 April 2008 the applicant made five complaints to the Petro\u015fani police concerning new incidents of assault or threats by N.C. to which she attached medical reports. 31.  In the meantime, on 27 March 2008, the applicant asked the Hunedoara County police to apply the measures provided by law in order to stop the constant assaults she was being subjected to by N.C. She stressed that she felt that her life was in danger. A similar request was sent by the applicant to the police on 11 April 2008. 32.  On 29 September 2008 the prosecutor\u2019s office attached to the Petro\u015fani District Court decided not to press charges against N.C. for the five incidents described by the applicant. He was however punished with an administrative fine of RON 100 (approximately EUR 25). 33.  The applicant\u2019s letter of 27 March 2008, requesting the police to take the necessary measures in order to stop the constant assaults against her, was not taken into consideration. The prosecutor found that it could not be considered a formal complaint because, unlike the other complaints, it did not refer to a specific assault. 34.  The applicant did not lodge any further complaints against the above-mentioned decision.", "references": ["5", "0", "2", "6", "4", "7", "3", "9", "No Label", "8", "1"], "gold": ["8", "1"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1965 and lives in Samobor. 6.  On 20 April 2009 she sustained an injury in a car accident while returning home from work. On 8 May 2009 her injury was recognised as a work-related injury by the Croatian Health Insurance Fund for Health Protection at Work (Hrvatski zavod za zdravstveno osiguranje za\u0161tite zdravlja na radu). On the basis of her work-related injury the applicant was granted sick leave between 21 April 2009 and 3 July 2009. 7.  On 26 October 2011 the applicant visited the Emergency Medicine Centre of the University Hospital Centre Zagreb (Centar za hitnu medicinu Klini\u010dkog bolni\u010dkog centra Zagreb) owing to the pain in her neck and back. There it was established that she was suffering from a severely sore spine with a deformity. 8.  The following day she visited her chosen general practitioner, who found that the applicant was unable to work and granted her sick leave starting from 27 October 2011 on the basis of an illness. 9.  On 3 November 2011 the applicant lodged a complaint against her general practitioner\u2019s assessment of the reason for her sick leave. She argued that she should be granted sick leave entitlement on the basis of the work-related injury that she had sustained on 20 April 2009. She submitted medical documentation in support of her argument. 10.  Following the lodging of the complaint, the applicant\u2019s general practitioner referred the applicant for an expert medical evaluation, enclosing her medical documentation with the request for expert evaluation. 11. On 6 December 2011 an authorised doctor of the Zagreb Office of the Croatian Health Insurance Fund (Hrvatski zavod za zdravstveno osiguranje, Podru\u010dni ured Zagreb \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe Zagreb Office\u201d), specialised in physical medicine and rehabilitation, examined the applicant\u2019s medical documentation and reported finding no direct causal link between the work-related injury sustained by the applicant in 2009 and the sick leave she had begun on 27 October 2011. 12. The Zagreb Office forwarded the report to the applicant and informed her of her right to seek the delivery of a written decision on the matter of her sick leave entitlement. The applicant availed herself of that right and asked for a written decision. 13.  By a decision of 23 January 2012 the Zagreb Office, relying on the report of 6 December 2011, refused the applicant\u2019s request that the sick leave from 27 October 2011 be granted on the basis of her work-related injury. It also dismissed her claim for compensation for lost salary during the period of sick leave. 14.  The applicant challenged this decision before the Central Office of the Fund (Hrvatski zavod za zdravstveno osiguranje, Direkcija \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe Central Office\u201d), submitting further medical documentation and requesting that her sick leave be granted on the basis of her work-related injury. 15.  Following the appeal by the applicant, the Central Office asked an in-house medical commission to conduct an expert examination regarding the matter. On 16 March 2012 the medical commission, consisting of three doctors of medicine, examined the applicant\u2019s overall medical documentation and reported that her sick leave from 27 October 2011 could not be granted on the basis of the work-related injury that she had sustained in 2009. 16.  On 5 April 2012 the Central Office, relying on the findings of the medical commission, dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld the decision of the Zagreb Office. 17.  The applicant then brought an administrative action in the Zagreb Administrative Court (Upravni sud u Zagrebu). She contested the findings of the Fund\u2019s expert medical bodies, relied on her medical documentation and alleged that it indicated a causal link between the work-related injury she had sustained in 2009 and her sick leave. She requested that she be heard and that an expert medical report on the matter be obtained. 18.  On 27 June 2012 the Central Office submitted a response to the applicant\u2019s administrative action. This response was forwarded to the applicant. 19.  On 27 August 2012 the Zagreb Administrative Court held a public hearing, to which the applicant was duly summoned. She did not attend the hearing, but was represented by a lawyer. Her lawyer reiterated the arguments adduced and evidence proposed in the administrative action. The representative of the Central Office contested this. The Zagreb Administrative Court then dismissed the proposal to hear the applicant and to obtain a further expert medical report on the matter and closed the hearing. 20.  On 31 August 2012 the Zagreb Administrative Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s action as unfounded. It stressed, in particular, that two expert medical bodies of the Fund, as well as the applicant\u2019s chosen general practitioner, had established without a doubt that the applicant\u2019s sick leave beginning on 27 October 2011 was not linked to the work-related injury she had sustained in 2009. It also stressed that the applicant, by the submissions in her administrative action, did not manage to put into doubt the findings of the expert medical bodies and that thus there was no need to hear her or to obtain a further expert medical report on the matter. 21.  The applicant lodged a constitutional complaint, alleging that the proceedings had been unfair in that she had been excluded from the procedure of commissioning and obtaining the administrative authorities\u2019 expert reports, whereas the Zagreb Administrative Court had refused to hear her and to obtain an independent expert medical report on the matter. 22.  On 6 February 2013 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint as manifestly ill-founded. This decision was served on the applicant\u2019s representative on 22 February 2013.", "references": ["9", "6", "5", "8", "7", "0", "4", "2", "3", "1", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1961 and lives in Beveren. 7.  On 10 May 2006 the Hasselt public prosecutor, pursuant to Article 28bis \u00a7 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (\u201cCIC\u201d), gave prior written agreement for the instigation of a proactive investigation against the applicant and several other suspects, on suspicion of drug trafficking, involvement in an international criminal organisation and money laundering. The proactive investigation included using the special investigative method of infiltration. On 1 August 2006 the public prosecutor also authorised the use of the special investigative method of observation. 8.  Pursuant to Articles 47septies \u00a7 1 and 47nonies \u00a7 1 CIC, a separate confidential case file was established (see paragraphs 47-49 below). 9.  The proactive investigation continued until 17 September 2008. On that date a report was drawn up by the police officer in charge summarising all the evidence gathered, summarising all the evidence gather in the framework of the proactive investigation. That report was followed by two more reports on 18 September 2008, one on the infiltration and the other on the observation operation, describing the evidence specifically gathered by means of those two special investigative measures. The three reports were added to the criminal file, which was subsequently to be made accessible to the defendants. 10.  By two decisions issued on 18 September 2008 the public prosecutor confirmed that authorisations had been given for both the observation and the infiltration operations. 11.  On 18 September 2008 the public prosecutor requested the investigating judge of the Hasselt Court of First Instance to instigate a judicial investigation. A \u201ctraditional\u201d reactive investigation ensued, conducted by the investigating judge. In addition to the observation and infiltration operations, recourse was had to phone-tapping and international mutual legal assistance. 12.  A report drawn up on 25 September 2008 by the police officer in charge mentioned information on the existence of a criminal organisation which had served as the grounds for using observation and infiltration at the proactive search stage, as well as the confirmations obtained in the framework of the said special investigative measures. 13.  On 20 October 2008 the Federal Prosecutor\u2019s Office took over the case from the Hasselt public prosecutor. The investigation remained under the oversight and authority of the Hasselt investigating judge. 14.  The observation and infiltration operations ended on 14 June 2009. On that date several suspects, including the applicant, were arrested and placed in pre-trial detention. 15.  By written submissions of the Federal Prosecutor of 29 December 2009, the Indictments Division of the Antwerp Court of Appeal was instructed to verify, pursuant to Article 235ter CIC, the conformity of the confidential file with the evidence contained in the criminal case file and to ensure that there were no irregularities (see paragraphs 50-54 below). During the proceedings, the parties requested that the court also verify the lawfulness of the procedure followed under Article 235bis CIC (see paragraph 55 below). 16.  At a hearing on 2 March 2010 the Indictments Division heard the Federal Prosecutor separately, in the absence of the parties. On that occasion, the confidential case file was made available to the Division. Subsequently, several defendants, including the applicant, were invited to present their case, assisted by their lawyers. 17.  By interim judgment of 20 May 2010, the Indictments Division stated that, as regards the scrutiny of the special investigative measures, it had to verify the information in the confidential file concerning not only the reactive investigation but also the proactive one. It further held that some evidence concerning the special investigative measures had yet to be added to the criminal file. It ordered the reopening of proceedings so that the Federal Prosecutor\u2019s Office could complete the files. 18.  Following that judgment, the aforementioned decisions of 18 September 2008 and the report established on 25 September 2008 (see paragraphs 10 and 12 above) were added to the criminal file pursuant to Articles 47septies and 47novies CIC. 19.  By judgment of 24 June 2010, the Indictments Division declared the criminal file complete, stating that no nullity, irregularity or violation of legal or Convention provisions had been found (see Article 235bis CIC), and that no irregularities had been committed in implementing the special investigative methods (see Article 235ter CIC). 20.  As regards in particular the use of those methods during the proactive investigation, the division stated the following:\n\u201cThe proactive investigation, including the special investigative methods of observation and infiltration, fulfilled the conditions of Articles 28bis, 47sexies and 47octies of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The strong prima facie evidence of the offences charged and the reasonable suspicion as defined in Article 28bis of the Code of Criminal Procedure were present, transpiring [from the reports of 25, 17 and 18 September 2008].\nThose reports of 17 and 18 September 2008 also confirm that the \u2018maximum\u2019 limit of the proactive investigation was complied with. It was thus found, on the one hand, that the overview of the case had been sufficiently established, and on the other, that sufficiently serious indications had been obtained to instigate a reactive investigation. Those serious indications had been reflected in the summary written conclusions in response from the public prosecutor\u2019s office. In that context, the discovery on 15 August 2008 of a debit indicator left by V.W. had been decisive.\nThe reports in question demonstrate that the special investigative methods used during the proactive investigation met the conditions of proportionality and subsidiarity.\u201d\n... 22.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law against the judgment of 24 June 2010. That appeal was dismissed by judgment of the Court of Cassation on 21 September 2010. Relying on Article 6 of the Convention, the applicant complained that the criminal file contained neither the report on the basis of which the public prosecutor had instigated a proactive investigation on 10 May 2006 nor the documents relating to that proactive investigation. Those pleas were dismissed on the grounds that they required a factual assessment which the Court of Cassation was unable to conduct. 23.  By order of the Hasselt Court of First Instance sitting in private session on 29 September 2010, seventeen defendants, including the applicant, were committed to stand trial. 24.  On 16 March 2011 the applicant was sentenced to ten years\u2019 imprisonment and fined 137,500 euros by the Hasselt Court of First Instance for drug trafficking, involvement in an international criminal organisation and money laundering. It transpires from the almost 160-page judgment that the establishment of the facts stemmed partly from evidence gather by means of the special investigative methods.\n... 27.  As regards the applicant\u2019s request for a face-to-face meeting with the undercover agents, the court ruled as follows:\n\u201cHaving regard to the procedure followed, to the proceedings relating to the special investigative methods implemented in the Indictments Division from the judicial investigation to the hearing stage, to the evidence before us, to the fact that two undercover agents drew up a report and that their results were compared, to the fact that the defendants were able to call witnesses and therefore, in particular at the request of the [applicant] and the second defendant, witnesses were heard in connection with the [applicant\u2019s] statements on the undercover agents, and to the fact that the court and the defendants were able to compare the reports on the evidence gathered by the undercover agents with such objective facts as the items discovered during the searches (e.g. the card), the conversation between the undercover agent Billy and the [applicant], SMS messages (e.g. between the [applicant] and Billy) and telephone conversations (e.g. the conversation with the third defendant), the court considers it unnecessary for the establishment of the truth, the exercise of the rights of the defence and the safeguard on a fair trial for the undercover agents to be heard.\n...\nFurthermore, regard must be had to the aspect of the undercover agents\u2019 safety and security and the importance of anonymity, inter alia from the angle of their possible involvement in other cases. In the present case this aspect is especially important given that the infiltration continued over several years and that friendly links had grown up between the agents and several defendants and their partners. During the preliminary investigation photographs of the undercover agents were apparently published on the Internet to alert others to their undercover status. In view of the friendships formed and the content of certain telephone conversations (including those between the [applicant] and the third defendant) ... the risk of reprisals is very real.\n...\nLastly, it should be noted that it is unclear what specific questions they wish to put to the undercover agents. The [applicant] and the second defendant only wish to put questions to the undercover agent Billy concerning the recovery of the debit indicator allegedly thrown away by the [applicant]. However, since the undercover agent\u2019s submission on this point is set out in the report included in the criminal file it is unnecessary to hear the undercover agent on this question. The Indictments Division, which is an independent tribunal, held that the reports corresponded to the confidential file. The defendants have an opportunity at the hearing to put forward their pleas concerning the recovery of the debit indicator and to contradict the undercover agent\u2019s version.\u201d 28.  The court replied to the applicant\u2019s plea that he had been unable to verify whether an undercover agent had been engaged in incitement to crime in the present case as follows:\n\u201cIn the present case the undercover agent only acted in the framework of the offence mentioned in point C of the indictment. [That offence] covered the period from January to June 2009, whereas the judicial investigation had begun on 18 September 2008. On the basis, inter alia, of the regular reports on the undercover work which were submitted during the judicial investigation and the text messages and telephone calls tapped, the agreements and transactions relating to those facts, as well as the prior operations, [were] scrutinised. This information shows that there was no incitement to crime. That is, moreover, confirmed by the fact that other offences of possession, sale, import and export of drugs or psychotropic substances were established in which the undercover agents had played no part.\u201d 30.  On appeal, and following adversarial proceedings, the same court delivered a judgment on 13 October 2011 confirming the first-instance judgment decision in the same terms as before. As he had done before the Court of First Instance, the applicant had requested that the Court of Appeal allow a face-to-face meeting with the undercover agents in order to assess the reliability of their statements. The Court of Appeal dismissed the request with reference to the reasoning of the impugned judgment. It added that it only ascribed relative evidentiary value to the statements of the undercover agents, and that the truth and proof of guilt had also been established on the basis of other evidence. Furthermore, since the applicant had refused to appear at first instance and on appeal, the request for a face-to-face meeting seemed rather academic. 31.  Relying, inter alia, on Article 6 of the Convention the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with the Court of Cassation against that judgment. As before the Court of Appeal, he alleged that there had been a breach of the right to a fair trial, the rights of the defence and the principle of adversarial proceedings, complaining more specifically of the use by the trial courts of evidence gathered against him even though that evidence transpired from the confidential case file, which had been brought to the attention of the defence neither during the judicial investigation nor during the investigation into the merits of the case. Finally, he criticised the Court of Appeal for dismissing his request for a face-to-face meeting with the undercover agents. 32.  By judgment of 20 March 2012 the Court of Cassation dismissed the appeal on points of law. It dismissed the argument concerning access to the confidential file as follows:\n\u201cThe fact that, inter alia during the investigation into the merits of the case, the defendant was not allowed to consult the confidential file does not in itself amount to a violation of Article 6 of the [Convention]. Clearly, for the defendant it constitutes a restriction of his defence rights, but that was justified by the need to protect the technical resources used and police investigatory techniques, and to guarantee the safety and anonymity of the persons implementing those techniques.\nThat restriction of the right to adversarial proceedings is exceptional throughout the proceedings and is counterbalanced by the fact that the lawfulness of the investigative methods implemented is overseen by an independent and impartial tribunal, in this case the Indictments Division, which has discretionary power to ascertain that the content of the criminal file, including the implementation report and the [reports] on the proactive investigation, correspond to the evidence in the confidential file.\nBefore the trial court, the defendant can also draw on the criminal file to put forward any legal arguments he may wish against the investigative methods used.\nGiven that the content of the confidential file cannot be used in evidence, there has been no violation of the defendant\u2019s defence rights.\nThe ground of appeal accordingly has no basis in law.\u201d 33.  As regards the face-to-face meeting with the undercover agents, the Court of Cassation primarily adduced the following:\n\u201cArticle 6 \u00a7 3 (d) of the [Convention] secures the defendant\u2019s right to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf; that provision does not prevent the judge from using his unfettered discretion to assess the necessity and relevance of hearing a witness who has been requested and to reject such request, unless that rejection violated the parties\u2019 right to present evidence.\nThe ground of appeal accordingly has no basis in law.\u201d 34.  For the remainder, the Court of Cassation held that the appellate courts had legally justified their decisions and that in adopting the reasons for the impugned judgment, particularly those concerning the alleged incitement, those courts had replied to the applicant\u2019s specific plea relating to that matter.\n...", "references": ["3", "4", "7", "0", "5", "9", "1", "2", "8", "6", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Bratislava. He is and at the relevant time was a Supreme Court judge. 7.  The Judicial Council of the Slovak Republic is the supreme governing body of the judiciary in Slovakia. It has eighteen members, including its President (section 3(1) of the Judicial Council Act (Law no. 185/2002 Coll., as amended)). Under Article 141a of the Constitution (Law no. 460/1992 Coll.), as applicable at the relevant time, the President of the Supreme Court automatically held the office of the President of the Judicial Council. Of the remaining seventeen members, eight were elected by judges and three were appointed by each the National Council of Slovakia, the President of Slovakia, and the Government of Slovakia. 8.  On 8 September 2009, sitting it the above mentioned composition, the Judicial Council decided under section 22(1) and (2) of the Judges and Assessor Judges Act (Law no. 385/2000 Coll., as amended \u2013 \u201cthe Act\u201d) to suspend (do\u010dasn\u00e9 pozastavenie v\u00fdkonu funkcie sudcu) the applicant in the exercise of his function with immediate effect. This decision followed another decision of the Judicial Council taken on the same day under section 120(2)(c) of the Act to file disciplinary charges against the applicant. 9.  The accusation was that the applicant had committed what was classified as a \u201cserious disciplinary offence\u201d by failing to comply with his duties, such as abstaining from behaviour which might cast doubt on the respectability of his judicial office, abiding by the principles of judicial ethics and enhancing the good reputation of the judiciary.\nIn particular, reference was made to the fact that the applicant (i) had filed a criminal complaint accusing the President of the Supreme Court of abuse of authority, and (ii) had publicly stated that the distribution of cases at the Supreme Court had been modified with a view to allowing its President to influence the outcome of proceedings.\nIn terms of a sanction, the Judicial Council proposed that the applicant\u2019s post as a judge be revoked. 10.  Under section 22(7) of the Act, the decision to suspend him entailed a 50% reduction in the applicant\u2019s salary for the duration of the disciplinary proceedings. The same provision prevented him from spending time at the workplace, with the exception of time which was necessary for asserting his rights in relation to the administration of human resources. Under section 22(5) of the Act, the suspension could last at most two years. The withheld part of the applicant\u2019s salary might or might not be restored to him, depending on the outcome of the disciplinary proceedings (section 22(8) and (9) of the Act). 11.  The applicant sought protection of his rights in relation to the decision to suspend him as a judge by way of what he termed an appeal (rozklad) to the Judicial Council of 29 October 2009, an administrative-law action of the same day, and a constitutional complaint of 2 November 2009. 12.  On 25 November 2009 the Constitutional Court declared the complaint inadmissible. It noted that the applicant\u2019s applications before the Judicial Council and administrative tribunals were still pending and considered that, under the principle of subsidiarity, his constitutional complaint was accordingly premature. 13.  As to the applicant\u2019s submission to the Judicial Council, its president responded to it in a letter of 27 January 2010 informing the applicant that the law did not allow for decisions of the Council to be challenged by means of appeals to the Council and that its decisions were reviewable by administrative tribunals. 14.  On 13 May 2010 the Bratislava Regional Court discontinued the proceedings on the applicant\u2019s administrative-law action and on 23 February 2011 the Supreme Court upheld that decision following an appeal lodged by the applicant.\nThe courts found that the decision to suspend the applicant had been of a preliminary nature, that it had not amounted to a determination of his rights with final effect, and that as such it had no bearing on his fundamental rights and freedoms. In such circumstances, the decision was excluded from judicial review under Article 248 (a) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Law no. 99/1963 Coll., as applicable at the relevant time). 15.  On 17 June 2011 the applicant lodged a fresh complaint with the Constitutional Court, alleging a breach of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention on account of the ordinary courts\u2019 decisions, as detailed above. 16.  On 7 December 2011 the Constitutional Court declared the applicant\u2019s complaint of 17 June 2011 inadmissible as being manifestly ill\u2011founded. It held that the Supreme Court had given sound reasons for its decision, and its decision was not arbitrary or otherwise contrary to the applicant\u2019s right to a fair hearing. 17.  According to a communication from the Judicial Council dated 6 August 2016, submitted and relied on by the Government, the applicant had addressed various submissions to the Council, but had never requested it to lift his temporary suspension, pursuant to section 22(5) of the Act (as applicable at the relevant time \u2013 see paragraph 24 below). 18.  The disciplinary charges against the applicant fell to be determined by the Supreme Court, sitting as a disciplinary tribunal. 19.  In accordance with a legislative amendment which took effect on 1 May 2011, the Minister of Justice became a party to pending disciplinary proceedings against judges which had been initiated by the Judicial Council. 20.  On 9 May 2011 the Minister of Justice withdrew the application to discipline the applicant. 21.  On that ground the Supreme Court discontinued the disciplinary proceedings against the applicant on 13 May 2011. The applicant challenged that decision by way of an appeal, only to withdraw it on 11 August 2011. The decision thus became final on 27 September 2011. 22.  The part of the applicant\u2019s salary that was retained from him during the time of his suspension (see paragraph 10 above) was restored to him in July 2012.", "references": ["8", "1", "6", "4", "2", "5", "9", "0", "7", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "8.  The first applicant, Mr K\u0119stutis Matio\u0161aitis, was born on 3 February 1961 and is serving a life sentence at Luki\u0161k\u0117s Prison (Luki\u0161ki\u0173 tardymo izoliatorius \u2013 kal\u0117jimas) in Vilnius. 9.  By a Supreme Court judgment of 2 June 1993, K. Matio\u0161aitis was sentenced to the death penalty for aggravated murder of another prisoner, committed in prison and in a particularly cruel manner. By the same judgment the applicant was also convicted of violence against other prisoners. Under Article 24 of the old Criminal Code, in force at the time, if the death penalty was imposed, the court could change it to life imprisonment (see \u201cRelevant domestic law\u201d, paragraph 61 below). The Supreme Court thus changed the applicant\u2019s sentence from the death penalty to life imprisonment.\nThe applicant started serving his life sentence nearly twenty four years ago, in June 1993. 10.  In May 2003 a new Criminal Code came into force. Article 3 of the new Code provided for retroactive application of the law commuting a penalty or mitigating the legal circumstances of a convict in other ways (see paragraph 63 below). The applicant asked the court to reclassify his crimes and to commute the sentence imposed on him. In a final decision the Court of Appeal found that there were no grounds for commuting the life sentence imposed. 11.  In 2011, whilst serving his life sentence in Luki\u0161k\u0117s Prison, K. Matio\u0161aitis obtained a bachelor\u2019s degree in social pedagogy from the Vilnius Pedagogical University. 12.  In his annual assessment for 2009, the applicant\u2019s character was assessed as satisfactory (patenkinamai) by Luki\u0161k\u0117s Prison administration. They came to the same conclusion in further assessments in 2012 for the purpose of a pardon plea, and in 2014 at the request of the Prisons Department. As from 2007 the applicant had been working in prison, but on 31 March 2009 he refused to work, explaining in writing that he would not work with prisoners belonging to a lower caste. The applicant took part in social rehabilitation programmes aimed at social reintegration of convicted persons, reform of life prisoners and computer literacy, and responded positively. He participated actively in both individual and collective discussions, but remained suspicious and appeared unable to think objectively. The applicant had social contact with his family by means of letters, telephone calls and visits. According to the prison administration, he had fully admitted his guilt but had not made serious resolutions. By 2012 the applicant had committed three disciplinary violations. In particular, in 2010 a knife, sharpened pieces of tin, needles and other prohibited objects were found in his cell. He was then placed in a punishment cell for fifteen days. He was commended for good behaviour ten times. As of 2013 the applicant has taken part in a social skills programme organised by the Prisoners\u2019 Care Society (Kalini\u0173 globos draugija) \u2013 he was part of a \u201cknitting group\u201d. He has also studied English in courses provided in prison. 13.  In 2012 the applicant submitted a pardon[1] plea to the President of the Republic. His plea was rejected by the Pardon Commission at its meeting on 29 January 2013. 14.  In May 2012 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court. As it transpires from the summary of his complaint by that court, K. Matio\u0161aitis argued that Article 158 of the Code for the Execution of Sentences, which prohibits life prisoners\u2019 release on parole (see paragraph 69 below), was unconstitutional. By a ruling of 29 May 2012 the administrative court refused to examine the applicant\u2019s complaint, underlining that the acts adopted by the President of the Republic or the Seimas could not be challenged in the administrative courts (see paragraph 108 below). 15.  In August 2014 the applicant submitted a request to Luki\u0161k\u0117s Prison administration, stating that he would like to obtain vocational training (mokytis profesin\u0117je mokykloje). The prison administration replied that the conditions in Luki\u0161k\u0117s Prison were not appropriate for teaching a profession (see also paragraph 106 below). 16.  The second applicant, Mr Juozas Maksimavi\u010dius, was born on 13 December 1963 and is serving a life sentence in Luki\u0161k\u0117s Prison. By a judgment of 20 December 1993 the Supreme Court found the applicant guilty of aggravated murder for mercenary reasons, illegal possession of firearms and other crimes. The Supreme Court sentenced him to death. 17.  By a decree of 13 April 1995 the President of the Republic granted a pardon to the second applicant and changed his death sentence to life imprisonment. The applicant has served twenty two years of his prison sentence. 18.  Following the adoption of the new Criminal Code, the applicant asked the courts to reclassify his crimes and to commute his penalty. In a final decision the Court of Appeal held that there were no grounds for commuting the life sentence imposed, because the crime which the applicant had committed was particularly grave. 19.  The applicant\u2019s annual character assessment for 2011 by Luki\u0161k\u0117s Prison administration stated that he had partly admitted his guilt, but avoided talking about his crime. He worked at a manufacturing facility, took part in the social rehabilitation and recreation (laisvalaikio u\u017eimtumo) programmes, and devoted much time to computer work. The applicant had incurred no disciplinary penalties and had no civil claims outstanding against him. He had been commended (skatintas) for good behaviour thirteen times. His behaviour while in prison had been positive. In the character assessment report for 2012 drafted by the prison administration for the purpose of a pardon, it was further noted that the applicant had fully admitted his guilt and that no civil claims were outstanding against him. He was also a keen participant in individual and theme discussions. 20.  In 2012 the applicant asked the President of the Republic for a pardon. His plea was rejected by the Pardon Commission at its meeting on 12 October 2012. The applicant\u2019s further pardon plea was rejected 17 October 2014. 21.  The third applicant, Mr Stanislovas Katkus, was born on 26 October 1956 and is currently serving a life sentence in Luki\u0161k\u0117s Prison. On 17 August 2001 the Klaip\u0117da Regional Court found him guilty of aggravated murder and illegal possession of firearms. He was sentenced to life imprisonment and all his property was confiscated. 22.  According to the Government, the conviction was upheld by the higher courts. The applicant started serving his life sentence more than sixteen years ago, in October 2000. 23.  Following the adoption of the new Criminal Code, the applicant asked the courts to reclassify his crimes and to commute his sentence. In a final decision of 5 December 2003, the Court of Appeal took into account the fact that, as noted in the court decision convicting the applicant, he had committed the crimes in cold blood (\u0161altakrauji\u0161kai), those crimes had had particularly grave consequences for society, and the applicant had two prior convictions. Accordingly, there were no grounds for commuting the life sentence. 24.  According to the applicant\u2019s annual character assessment by Luki\u0161k\u0117s Prison administration for 2011, he had partly admitted his guilt but avoided talking about his crimes. The applicant had been an active participant in individual and theme discussions and had shown an interest in his future. He had also participated in social rehabilitation and recreation programmes, and had reacted to the former programme positively. His behaviour was satisfactory. In 2011 the applicant had been found slightly inebriated and had been placed in a punishment cell for fifteen days for that disciplinary violation. 25.  The applicant admitted that he had not yet applied for presidential pardon. 26.  The fourth applicant, Mr Vladas Beleckas, was born on 6 February 1954 and is currently serving a life sentence in Pravieni\u0161k\u0117s Correctional Institution. On 11 September 2000 the Vilnius Regional Court found him guilty of theft, robbery, destruction of property of historical and cultural value, and aggravated murder. By another judgment, the applicant was also convicted of absconding from justice. For all the crimes committed a final combined sentence of life imprisonment together with confiscation of all his property was imposed. The applicant has been serving his sentence for eighteen years, since March 1999. 27.  Following the adoption of the new Criminal Code, the applicant asked the courts to reclassify his crimes and to commute his sentence. However, on 4 February 2004 the Court of Appeal refused to change the sentence of life imprisonment. 28.  Between September 2010 and December 2013 the courts refused a number of requests (teikimas) by Luki\u0161k\u0117s Prison administration to transfer the applicant to a correctional home[2]. The applicant participated in at least two of those court hearings, and testified about his reformed personality. On other occasions he was represented by different lawyers. 29.  In his written pleadings for transfer, the applicant stated that in Luki\u0161k\u0117s Prison he had attended computer literacy courses, taken part in sports and in a group for psychological rehabilitation, and had been part of a Bible reading group. He had also communicated with the prison psychologist. The courts evaluated those factors positively. That being so, on the basis of the applicant\u2019s character reports which Luki\u0161k\u0117s Prison administration had drawn up for the purpose of possible transfer, the courts observed that in 2003 and 2008 he had received disciplinary punishments and had been placed for ten and fifteen days in a punishment cell, having been found in possession of a mobile phone, which was forbidden under the prison regulations. Although from 2003 until 2008 the applicant had received positive assessments and his behaviour was not conflictual, it was only in 2009, one month before he had asked the prison administration to intervene on his behalf so that he could be transferred to a correctional home, that he had fully admitted his guilt for the crimes committed. Even in his character report for 2008 the applicant was described as having no remorse about the crimes he had committed and had not made any serious resolutions. That led the courts to doubt the sincerity of his repentance. Moreover, as was apparent from his file, he had also committed a number of other small violations of the prison rules for which he had received a warning from Luki\u0161k\u0117s Prison authorities without any disciplinary sanctions. It was also relevant that until March 2011 the applicant had remained on a list of persons likely to attempt to escape (linkusi\u0173 pab\u0117gti asmen\u0173 \u012fskaita). Lastly, it was also pertinent that throughout his imprisonment the prison administration had assessed the applicant\u2019s behaviour only as \u201csatisfactory\u201d (patenkinamai); he had not been assessed positively (teigiamai) until 2011. The courts thus held that it was not yet possible to conclude that the applicant had really changed and that therefore it was safe to make the conditions of serving his sentence less strict by transferring him to a correctional home. Only after further observation of the applicant\u2019s behaviour would it be possible to reliably state that his personality changes were long term. 30.  The applicant\u2019s character assessment by Luki\u0161k\u0117s Prison administration, drawn up for the purpose of his pardon plea on 30 April 2012, stated that he had taken part in a number of social rehabilitation programmes, as well as individual and theme discussions. As of August 2011 he had been working in the prison laundry and had shown a strong motivation to work. He also maintained good social contacts with his family. The report nevertheless stated that the applicant had misbehaved in 2003 and 2008, when prohibited objects had been found in his cell.\nThe applicant\u2019s plea for presidential pardon was rejected by the Pardon Commission at its meeting on 29 January 2013. 31.  On 21 December 2015 the Vilnius City District Court rejected the applicant\u2019s request for transfer to a correctional home. The court noted that the applicant had good social contacts because he received visits often. In May 2015 he had been commended for having actively participated in social rehabilitation programmes, which showed that his behaviour was improving. However, the district court also noted the earlier breaches of prison rules committed by the applicant (see paragraph 29 above), which showed that it was still too early to transfer him to Pravieni\u0161k\u0117s. 32.  By a ruling of 26 January 2016 the Vilnius Regional Court quashed that decision and granted the transfer request. On the basis of the applicant\u2019s character assessments by Luki\u0161k\u0117s Prison administration, the court held that the applicant\u2019s behaviour had clearly improved as of April 2011, which was also proved by his active participation in the social rehabilitation programmes. 33.  The fifth applicant, Mr Rolandas Lenkaitis, was born on 31 December 1973 and is currently serving a life sentence in Pravieni\u0161k\u0117s Correctional Institution. 34.  On 11 October 2001 the Panev\u0117\u017eys Regional Court found the applicant guilty of aggravated murder and other crimes. For all the crimes committed, a final combined sentence of life imprisonment was imposed together with the confiscation of all his property and a fine. The applicant has been serving his sentence for sixteen years, since March 2001. 35.  Following the adoption of the new Criminal Code, the applicant applied to the courts with a request to reclassify his crimes and to commute his sentence. In October 2003, the first-instance court reclassified the crimes in accordance with the new legislation, which provided for certain mitigation. Following the reclassification, the confiscation of the applicant\u2019s property and the fine were lifted. However, with regard to the crime of murder, the court found no reason to change the life imprisonment sentence. In a final decision in that regard, the Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the lower court, holding that the maintenance of the life sentence for aggravated murder was substantiated and corresponded to the basic principles for imposition of a penalty taking into account the established circumstances, the gravity of the offence and the personality of the perpetrator. 36.  According to the applicant\u2019s character assessment carried out by the prison administration, while serving his sentence in Luki\u0161k\u0117s Prison between 2001 and 2005 he had committed four disciplinary violations, including use of physical violence against another inmate and possession of prohibited objects. Between 2010 and 2013 the applicant had been commended four times. The assessment of March 2014 stated that the applicant had not paid compensation to the victims of the crimes he had committed (turi priteist\u0105 civilin\u012f ie\u0161kin\u012f, kurio nedengia) and had only partly acknowledged his guilt. 37.  The applicant applied for a presidential pardon in 2013. His plea was rejected on 17 December 2013. 38.  In January 2014 the Vilnius Regional Court approved the applicant\u2019s transfer to Pravieni\u0161k\u0117s Correctional Institution (Pravieni\u0161ki\u0173 pataisos namai \u2013 atviroji kolonija) to continue serving his life sentence. It was important for that court that the applicant had already spent more than twelve years in Luki\u0161k\u0117s Prison, where reports about his behaviour had been positive. He had confessed to his crimes, was respectful towards the prison administration, worked as a painter in the prison, and had responded well to social rehabilitation measures. Accordingly, there were grounds for approving the applicant\u2019s transfer to a correctional home (see paragraph 104 below). 39.  The sixth applicant, Mr Aidas Kazlauskas, was born on 21 September 1968 and is currently serving a life sentence in Luki\u0161k\u0117s Prison. On 14 April 1995 the \u0160iauliai Regional Court found him guilty of aggravated murder and theft. He was sentenced to the death penalty. On 7 August 1995 the Court of Appeal changed the sentence to life imprisonment, on the basis of Article 24 of the old Criminal Code. The applicant has been serving his sentence for more than twenty-two years, since December 1994. 40.  Following the adoption of the new Criminal Code, the applicant asked the court to reclassify his crimes and to commute his sentence. In a final decision of 30 September 2003 the Court of Appeal held that there were no grounds for commuting the life sentence. 41.  In January 2005, following a proposal by Luki\u0161k\u0117s Prison administration, the court decided to transfer the applicant to Pravieni\u0161k\u0117s Correctional Institution to serve the remainder of his life imprisonment sentence. The court held that as the applicant had received positive character assessments the transfer could be allowed. However, in April 2005 the applicant attempted to kill another life prisoner by stabbing him with a knife. The other prisoner survived only because he ran away and called for help. The applicant was then convicted of attempted murder and sentenced to twelve years\u2019 imprisonment. The sentence was combined with the previous one and a final sentence of life imprisonment, to be served in [Luki\u0161k\u0117s] prison (bausm\u0119 paskiriant atlikti kal\u0117jime), was imposed. In his written appeal the applicant asked to be transferred back to Luki\u0161k\u0117s Prison and never to be returned to freedom, because he was afraid of liberty. On 19 January 2007 the Court of Appeal upheld the conviction. 42.  The applicant\u2019s yearly character assessment for 2012 showed that he had taken part in social rehabilitation and recreation (u\u017eimtumo) programmes for convicts. He had received no disciplinary punishments, but had been commended twice. The applicant worked in Luki\u0161k\u0117s Prison. He had partly acknowledged his guilt but had shown no remorse at all for his crimes (nejau\u010dia jokio s\u0105\u017ein\u0117s grau\u017eimo d\u0117l padaryto nusikaltimo). 43.  According to his lawyer, the applicant has never asked to be pardoned by the President of the Republic. 44.  In 2015 the applicant asked the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court to refer to the Constitutional Court the question whether Article 158 of the Code for the Execution of Sentences, which prohibits life prisoners\u2019 release on parole, was in compliance with Article 29 of the Constitution, which prohibits discrimination, and with Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights, as well as Article 1 of its Protocol No 12. 45.  By a ruling of 14 May 2015 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court refused to accept the request for examination. The administrative court noted that under Article 4 \u00a7 2 of the Law on Administrative Proceedings it could ask the Constitutional Court for interpretation of a legal norm if it considered, in a particular case, that that norm could be unconstitutional (see paragraph 108 below). Referral of a question to the Constitutional Court was within the discretionary powers of the administrative court, and the parties\u2019 wish to have the question referred to the Constitutional Court did not bind the administrative court. In the applicant\u2019s case, his request was of a general nature, therefore such a request could not be examined. 46.  The seventh applicant, Mr Piotr Gervin, was born on 20 November 1984 and is currently serving a life sentence in Luki\u0161k\u0117s Prison. On 17 March 2010 the Klaip\u0117da Regional Court found the applicant guilty of aggravated murder and robbery. He started serving his life sentence seven years ago, in March 2010. 47.  In the applicant\u2019s annual character assessment for 2011, the Luki\u0161k\u0117s Prison administration stated that he had taken part in social rehabilitation programmes and had reacted to them satisfactorily. He had not committed any breaches of discipline. He worked in the Luki\u0161k\u0117s Prison and had been commended once. He had admitted his guilt. He had taken part in individual and collective discussions, but without showing much interest. 48.  The applicant is not yet entitled to apply for a presidential pardon (see paragraph 76 below). 49.  The eighth applicant, Mr Edmundas Svotas, was born on 1 January 1983. He is serving a life sentence at Luki\u0161k\u0117s Prison. On 13 April 2010 the Panev\u0117\u017eys Regional Court found the applicant guilty of a number of crimes, including two aggravated murders, six robberies and illegal possession of a firearm. For all the crimes committed a final combined sentence of life imprisonment was imposed. The term of the sentence started nine years ago, in February 2008. 50.  The applicant\u2019s yearly character assessment for 2011 conducted by Luki\u0161k\u0117s Prison administration disclosed that he had taken part in social rehabilitation and recreation programmes and had reacted to them satisfactorily. He was tactful, maintained constant contact with his family, had received no disciplinary penalties and had admitted his guilt. 51.  The applicant is not yet entitled to apply for a presidential pardon (see paragraph 76 below). 52.  The relatives of some of the applicants in this case (K. Matio\u0161aitis, R. Lenkaitis, A. Kazlauskas, S. Katkus and J. Maksimavi\u010dius) or of other life prisoners have addressed the State authorities asking for legislative amendments establishing the possibility of parole for life prisoners in Lithuanian law. Their pleas and the authorities\u2019 replies may be summarised as follows. 53.  By a petition of 19 November 2007, J.B., another person sentenced to life imprisonment, filed a petition with the Seimas (the Lithuanian Parliament). He pointed out that life prisoners were a separate category of convict. After having served ten years in prison, they could ask for a milder detention regime \u2013 to be transferred to a correctional home. Nonetheless, the punishment of deprivation of liberty remained for life and they had no right to early release. He also maintained that because the punishment \u2013 deprivation of liberty \u2013 remained the same, many persons sentenced to life imprisonment did not ask to be transferred to a correctional home. 54.  J.B. also noted that life prisoners were serving sentences for crimes of varying gravity \u2013 some had been convicted for one murder, others for multiple murders. He argued that if the possibility of early release were established in Lithuanian law, it would be a motivating factor for prisoners to learn social rehabilitation skills, and thus to reform. 55.  On 1 April 2008 the Seimas granted the petition. A working group was created to consider legislative changes concerning the possibility for life prisoners to be released on parole. 56.  In January 2009, the Ministry of Justice informed life prisoners\u2019 relatives that it was preparing legislative amendments and consulting other institutions and legal scientists. 57.  A month later, the Committee on Legal Affairs (Teis\u0117s ir teis\u0117tvarkos komitetas) of the Seimas wrote to the petitioners stating that while Lithuanian penal legislation was in conformity with the European Convention on Human Rights, the Committee did not disregard the possibility that because society had developed, penal legislation could also evolve. 58.  By a letter of 5 July 2013, the Ministry of Justice informed the third applicant, S. Katkus, that on 22 December 2011 the Seimas had amended the Code for the Execution of Sentences, including its provisions on conditional release. Nonetheless, the stipulation that life prisoners would not be released on parole remained intact. A working group had been created within the Ministry to discuss the issue further. The Ministry also observed that once persons sentenced to life imprisonment had served at least ten years of their sentence, they could ask the President of the Republic for a pardon. The President had once already changed life imprisonment to fixed\u2011term imprisonment. Moreover, the Seimas could declare an amnesty. Lastly, a person could be released from prison if he or she fell terminally ill. The Ministry reiterated that Lithuania was not obliged under European Union law or any international treaties to regulate the issue in one way or another, because penal policy was the State\u2019s own prerogative. 59.  By a letter of 18 July 2013, the Committee on Legal Affairs of the Seimas informed the third applicant, S. Katkus, that the question of release on parole for life prisoners whose behaviour indicated that they were no longer dangerous to others was very complex and had wide social, legal and moral repercussions. Nonetheless, the issue was being discussed at the Ministry of Justice, so that the optimal suggestions for legal reform could be presented. The Committee was confident that the penal system, as established in the new Criminal Code, was in line with international standards. 60.  In May 2015 the fourth applicant, V. Beleckas, raised the exclusion of life prisoners\u2019 release on parole with the Ministry of Justice. On 26 May 2015 the Vice-Minister of Justice replied that it was desirable to see firstly whether a life prisoner had reformed, and then to transfer him to a correctional home where the regime was milder. Release on parole was possible only when a life prisoner proved that he or she did not pose a danger to others. Given that the present case was pending before the European Court of Human Rights, it would be useful to consider any new grounds for life prisoners\u2019 release only after the Court delivered its judgment. The Vice-Minister lastly mentioned amnesty, pardon and release because of incurable illness as the existing ways of mitigating life sentence.", "references": ["6", "7", "9", "8", "3", "2", "4", "0", "5", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1965 and lives in Szajol. 6.  On 6 October 1990 he married Ms N.R. The couple had one daughter, R.\u00d3, born on 23 March 1994. 7.  On 24 March 2006 the couple divorced and agreed on custody of the child and other parental rights. Their agreement, which was approved by the Szolnok District Court, placed the daughter with her mother and granted the applicant contact every other weekend, during the school holidays, Easter Sunday, Whit Monday, the first holiday following Christmas Eve and three weeks during the summer holidays. The applicant was also to pay child allowance, amounting to 20% of his salary, but at least 20,000 Hungarian forints (HUF \uf02d approximately 66 euros (EUR)) per month. 8.  Ms N.R. moved out of the former family home and took up residence in Budapest. 9.  The applicant could exercise contact on 25 and 26 June and 24 July 2006. However, his daughter was reluctant to stay with him during the summer holidays and preferred to spend her holidays with her grandparents. 10.  The applicant\u2019s further attempts to exercise contact failed, seemingly because in the mother\u2019s view it was up to the child to decide whether she wanted to see her father. The applicant applied to the Szolnok County Guardianship Authority to have the contact agreement enforced. In a decision of 11 September 2006 it ordered Ms N.R. to comply with the agreement, warning her that failure to do so could result in her being fined and ordered to reimburse the applicant\u2019s travel costs. Given the strained relationship between the parents, a notary initiated child protection proceedings (v\u00e9delembe v\u00e9tel) on 27 December 2006. Subsequently, on a number of occasions Ms N.R. was fined for not complying with the agreement. It appears from the case file that the applicant could exercise contact between 10 July 2007 and 10 November 2008. 11.  In 2007 Ms N.R. brought an action seeking to change the applicant\u2019s contact rights and an increase in the amount of child allowance. In a counterclaim the applicant requested that the child be placed in his custody. 12.  The applicant also filed a criminal complaint against Ms N.R. alleging child endangerment. The parties\u2019 attempt to stabilise the relationship between the applicant and his daughter during the suspension of the custody proceedings were unsuccessful and the Szolnok District Court ordered that any meetings between them take place at a child protection centre. 13.  In a judgment of 10 June 2008 the Szolnok District Court reduced the applicant\u2019s contact with his daughter to every first and third Saturday of the month from 9 a.m. to 6 p.m. It held that the previously agreed form of contact was unlikely to be implemented and would only lead to further proceedings before the guardianship authority, which would be to the detriment of the child. The court based its judgment on an expert opinion finding that the child should have had an adaptation period to re-establish her relationship with her father. The court dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim concerning custody, stating that the child\u2019s wishes had to be taken into account, given that she was now fourteen years of age. 14.  On 19 November 2008 the J\u00e1sz-Nagykun-Szolnok County Regional Court upheld the first-instance judgment in essence but amended the applicant\u2019s contact rights to every other Saturday between 9 a.m. and 4 p.m. until 31 May 2009, and all weekend-long visits every other weekend as of 1 June 2009. 15.  In 2009 the applicant failed to turn up at numerous scheduled meetings for months, for which he was fined HUF 10,000 (approximately EUR 35). 16.  In 2010 the applicant\u2019s contact rights and the amount of child allowance were subject to further litigation. On 29 January 2010 the Szolnok District Court dismissed an action brought by him seeking to decrease the amount of child allowance, and a review of the way contact should be exercised. The court established that since the court decision of 19 November 2008, no contact had taken place between the applicant and his daughter and, despite a request by the applicant, the guardianship authority had taken no steps to implement the judgment on the grounds that he had made no efforts to resolve the conflict with his daughter. In particular, he had paid no heed to her request to travel by public transport instead of in his car.\nThe court also found that in the absence of any significant change in circumstances, there was no reason to amend the arrangements for contact. 17.  In a final judgment of 15 April 2010 the J\u00e1sz-Nagykun-Szolnok County Regional Court reviewed the applicant\u2019s parental rights, granting him contact every other weekend on the condition that the daughter, who was by now already 16 years old, be allowed to visit him by herself. The court dismissed the applicant\u2019s request for a decrease in the child allowance. The applicant lodged a petition for review with the Supreme Court. It was dismissed on 8 February 2011. 18.  It appears from the case file that meetings between the applicant and his daughter only took place sporadically in 2010 and did not happen at all in 2011, despite the applicant lodging numerous enforcement requests with the guardianship authority. 19.  In 2011 the applicant requested that the J\u00e1sz-Nagykun-Szolnok Guardianship Authority and all subordinate guardianship authorities be excluded from any further proceedings for bias. On 12 December 2011 the Budapest Regional Guardianship Authority appointed the Budapest XV District Guardianship Authority to deal with any further proceedings concerning the enforcement of the applicant\u2019s contact rights, noting that at that point there were eight enforcement requests pending, the oldest dating back to January 2010. 20.  The applicant lodged a number of requests seeking to end his obligation to pay child allowance, which were finally accepted by the Budapest IV and XV District Court on 10 October 2012 and on appeal by the Budapest High Court on 3 September 2013. Nonetheless, an additional request by him for the reimbursement of the child allowance he had already paid was dismissed at both levels of jurisdiction.", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "3", "6", "7", "5", "8", "9", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1948 and lives in Re\u0161etari. 6.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7.  In 1978 the applicant was employed by the Z.B. company of Zagreb. He worked as a driver in the company\u2019s Nova Gradi\u0161ka branch. After organisational changes within the company he was given notice of dismissal on 14 February 2000. Pursuant to the notice his employment was terminated on 20 November 2000. 8.  On 27 November 2000 the applicant applied to the Croatian Employment Bureau\u2019s Regional Office in Slavonski Brod (Hrvatski zavod za zapo\u0161ljavanje, Podru\u010dna slu\u017eba Slavonski Brod, hereinafter \u201cthe Slavonski Brod Bureau\u201d), for unemployment benefit. 9.  On 6 December 2000 he was granted unemployment benefit of 900 Croatian kunas (HRK) per month[1] for the period between 21 November 2000 and 10 July 2013, provided that no grounds for terminating payment or the applicant\u2019s entitlement to payment arose before the end of the period. The applicant then received unemployment benefit on a regular basis until 31 March 2008. 10.  On 29 March 2000 the applicant brought a civil action in the Nova Gradi\u0161ka Municipal Court (Op\u0107inski sud u Novoj Gradi\u0161ki) challenging his dismissal and seeking reinstatement and compensation for lost salary. 11.  On 11 January 2001 the applicant\u2019s employer brought a counterclaim and asked the court to set 20 November 2000 as the day of the termination of his employment (sudski raskid ugovora o radu). On 5 October 2005 it also sought reimbursement of the severance pay the applicant had received. 12.  On 23 January 2007 the Nova Gradi\u0161ka Municipal Court ruled that the applicant\u2019s dismissal from work had been unlawful and that his employment had never been terminated. It ordered the applicant\u2019s reinstatement and awarded him compensation for lost salary. At the same time it ordered the applicant to reimburse the severance pay he had received, and dismissed the remainder of the employer\u2019s counterclaim. 13.  On 15 February 2008 the Slavonski Brod County Court (\u017dupanijski sud u Slavonskom Brodu) reversed the first-instance judgment in the part ordering the applicant\u2019s reinstatement and decided that his employment had been terminated on 23 January 2007. It also awarded the applicant damages. The judgment was served on the applicant on 5 March 2008. 14.  On 30 April 2008 the applicant applied to the Slavonski Brod Bureau for unemployment benefit for the period after 23 January 2007. 15.  On 2 June 2008 the Slavonski Brod Bureau rejected the applicant\u2019s claim, finding that it had been lodged outside the time-limit from the termination of his employment on 23 January 2007, as provided by section 31 of the Job Placement and Unemployment Insurance Act (hereinafter \u201cthe Job Placement Act\u201d). 16.  The applicant appealed to the Central Service of the Croatian Employment Bureau (Hrvatski zavod za zapo\u0161ljavanje, Sredi\u0161nja slu\u017eba, hereinafter \u201cthe Central Bureau\u201d). In particular, he contended that the time-limit for lodging the unemployment benefit claim should not have been calculated from 23 January 2007, given that the termination of his employment had only been established by the Slavonski Brod County Court judgment of 15 February 2008. 17.  On 15 October 2008 the Central Bureau, acting as a second-instance administrative authority, dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal as unfounded and upheld the decision of the Slavonski Brod Bureau. It also noted that the applicant himself had informed the Slavonski Brod Bureau of the outcome of the labour dispute, and had communicated with one of its officials on 27 March 2008 and 2 April 2008. He had also been informed of the consequences of the Slavonski Brod County Court judgment setting 23 January 2007 as the day of the termination of his employment. 18.  In an administrative claim the applicant argued that he had only learned about the day of the termination of his employment after receiving the Slavonski Brod County Court\u2019s judgment in March 2008, and that the time-limit for lodging the unemployment benefit claim should have been calculated from that date. 19.  On 20 January 2011 the Administrative Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s administrative claim and upheld the administrative authorities\u2019 decisions. 20.  A subsequent constitutional complaint by the applicant was dismissed by the Constitutional Court on 4 April 2012. The decision was served on the applicant\u2019s representative on 9 May 2012. 21.  On 21 November 2008 the Slavonski Brod Bureau found that the applicant had not been due unemployment benefit from 21 November 2000 to 31 March 2008. Given that the applicant had already reimbursed part of the unduly received sum, it ordered him to reimburse the rest within 15 days of receipt of the decision at issue. 22.  On 16 July 2013 the Central Bureau upheld the decision of the Slavonski Brod Bureau, save in the part concerning the start of the deadline for the applicant having to pay back the money. In particular, it ordered him to reimburse the funds within 15 days of the receipt of his compensation for lost salary. 23.  On 12 September 2014 the Osijek Administrative Court dismissed an administrative claim by the applicant and upheld the administrative authorities\u2019 decisions. It found that according to the civil courts\u2019 rulings in the labour dispute the applicant had not been entitled to unemployment benefit for the period up to 23 January 2007. It further found that his unemployment benefit claim for the period after that day had already been dismissed in another set of proceedings. 24. A constitutional complaint by the applicant was dismissed by the Constitutional Court on 17 July 2015. 25.  In June 2008 the applicant applied to the Croatian Pension Fund (Hrvatski zavod za mirovinsko osiguranje, hereinafter \u201cthe Fund\u201d), to obtain an early retirement pension. 26.  On 18 August 2008 the Fund granted him an early retirement pension of HRK 1,890.53 per month[2] from 11 July 2008. The applicant has been receiving that pension since.", "references": ["5", "6", "3", "1", "2", "8", "7", "4", "0", "9", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1982 and lives in Tiraspol. 6.  The background to the case, including the Transdniestrian armed conflict of 1991-1992 and the subsequent events, is set out in Ila\u015fcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia ([GC], no. 48787/99, \u00a7\u00a7 28-185, ECHR 2004\u2011VII) and Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia ([GC], nos. 43370/04 and 2 others, \u00a7\u00a7 8-42, ECHR 2012 (extracts)). 7.  On 21 January 2005 the applicant was arrested by the authorities of the break-away \u201cMoldavian Republic of Transdniestria\u201d (the \u201cMRT\u201d) on charges of robbery. He was detained in custody until 8 July 2005 when he was released on bail. During detention he was allegedly detained in very poor conditions with persons with HIV and subjected to ill-treatment. He claims that a doctor infected him with HIV after using the same syringe on all the inmates. 8.  During the criminal proceedings, two and a half years after the robbery, the victim of the robbery was asked to identify the applicant from a picture. The applicant claims that no procedural guarantees were in place and suggests that the investigator indicated to the victim which picture to choose. Moreover, the applicant\u2019s alibi regarding his being away from the \u201cMRT\u201d on the date when the offence was committed had been dismissed without any investigation. According to the applicant, at the time of the alleged offence, he was in Moscow. He obtained a letter from his employer to confirm that on the particular day of the offence the applicant had been at work. However, the investigators seized the original of that letter during a search of his parents\u2019 home and it later disappeared. The courts refused to accept a copy of the letter as evidence and/or to check the information contained in it. 9.  On 29 August 2006 the Tiraspol District Court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to seven years\u2019 imprisonment. 10.  The applicant was placed in detention in Tiraspol colony no. 2 where the conditions allegedly were very poor. In particular, his cell was overcrowded, he did not have daily walks, the material conditions were very poor, there were shortages of electricity sometimes for several days, and he shared space with detainees suffering from contagious diseases. The food was inedible and therefore detainees had to rely on the food supplied to them by their relatives. According to the applicant, he requested on numerous occasions that he be seen by a doctor in relation to his HIV diagnosis. However, the prison authorities ignored his requests. There was no dentist in the prison, and the inmates had to remove each other\u2019s teeth in emergencies. The applicant had his molar teeth removed in this way. 11.  On 26 September 2006 the Supreme Court of the \u201cMRT\u201d dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. 12.  On an unspecified date after his final conviction, the applicant\u2019s mother engaged a lawyer with a view to lodging an application to the Court. She later went to visit the applicant to obtain his signature on the application form. However, the prison guards refused to allow her to do so on the grounds that the application was not in Russian and that it had to be authorised first by the prison authorities. It appears that she eventually succeeded in having the application form signed by the applicant. 13.  On 24 April 2012 the applicant was released from detention. 14.  It appears from the material in the case file and from the parties\u2019 submissions that the applicant never informed the authorities of Moldova about his detention in the \u201cMRT\u201d or about the criminal proceedings against him.", "references": ["4", "7", "6", "5", "9", "0", "8", "No Label", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["1", "2", "3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Yaroslavl. 6.  On 19 February 2009 the applicant, former head of the department of pharmacology at the Yaroslavl State Medical Academy, was arrested on suspicion of bribe-taking. 7.  On 20 February 2009 the Leninskiy District Court of Yaroslavl (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) remanded the applicant in custody. The court held as follows:\n\u201cOn the basis of [the submitted documents] it appears that [the applicant] is the head of the department of pharmacology at the [Yaroslavl State Medical Academy], so a person with organisational/executive functions; the witnesses in the case are students at the above [Academy], who had been taking or were to take pharmacology exams.\nWhen questioned as a suspect [the applicant] refused to testify, citing Article 51 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation.\nDuring the crime-scene inspection on 19 February 2009, 500-rouble and 1,000\u2011rouble banknotes were discovered in various parts of the [applicant\u2019s office], the origin of which [the applicant] explained as personal savings.\nOne of the [witnesses] in the case made a statement expressing concern as to the possible exertion of pressure on him by [the applicant], as well as to the possible emergence of difficulties for him in further studies.\nThe above confirms the conclusions of the investigator that, if not detained, the suspect might exert pressure on witnesses, destroy evidence or otherwise obstruct the course of justice. ...\u201d 8.  On 26 February 2009 the applicant was charged with eight counts of bribe-taking under Article 290 \u00a7 2 of the Russian Criminal Code. 9.  On 3 March 2009 the Yaroslavl Regional Court (\u201cthe Regional Court\u201d) upheld the decision of 20 February 2009 on appeal. 10.  On 11 March 2009 the applicant was dismissed from the post of head of the department of pharmacology at the Yaroslavl State Medical Academy. 11.  On 16 April and 17 June 2009 the District Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 19 June and 31 July 2009 respectively. On both occasions the court held that the grounds relied on by the court when applying the custodial measure still persisted, and that the applicant was charged with eight counts of a serious crime, committed between December 2007 and February 2009 and punishable by three to seven years\u2019 imprisonment. He was further suspected of having committed another fifteen similar offences, in respect of which he had refused to testify. He had confessed only in part and had refused to testify as either a suspect or an accused. Although the applicant had been dismissed from his post, he remained on good terms with his colleagues from the pharmacology department, including its acting head. He could therefore have access to information and documents which might be of interest to him. All of the above, as well as the position which the applicant had taken in the proceedings, gave the court grounds to believe that, if released, he might exert pressure on witnesses (the students at the Medical Academy), destroy evidence or otherwise interfere with the proceedings. In particular, according to the investigator\u2019s submissions made before the court, two more witnesses in the case had explained that they had had problems passing their pharmacology exams and that they believed it to be a means of making them change their position in the case in respect of the applicant. Lastly, the court held that, in view of the above circumstances, the custodial measure could not be replaced by a more lenient preventive measure. 12.  On 28 April and 3 July 2009 the Regional Court upheld the above decisions on appeal. 13.  On 30 July 2009 the District Court further extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 19 September 2009. The court held that some of the grounds on which it had relied when extending the applicant\u2019s detention were no longer valid. However, it noted the gravity of the charges against the applicant, the fact that he was suspected of having committed a further fifteen similar offences and that three more criminal cases had been opened against him in that connection in February-March 2009, and the fact that on 29 July 2009 seventeen other criminal cases had been opened against him on suspicion of twenty-nine criminal offences. The court further relied on the applicant\u2019s refusal to give evidence as either a suspect or an accused and the potential for him to influence the witnesses (the Academy\u2019s students), destroy evidence and otherwise obstruct the course of justice. The court found unconvincing the applicant\u2019s argument to the effect that the students had already taken their pharmacology exams and were on summer holidays, since this did not exclude the risk of the applicant\u2019s meeting them outside the Academy. The court therefore found that it would not be appropriate to apply a more lenient preventive measure. 14.  On 14 August 2009 the Regional Court upheld the above decision on appeal. 15.  On 16 September 2009 the charges against the applicant were finalised to include twenty-six counts of bribe-taking and forgery of official documents under Articles 290 \u00a7 2 and 292 \u00a7 1 of the Russian Criminal Code. 16.  On 17 September 2009 the applicant was released against an undertaking not to leave the city of Yaroslavl. 17.  On 18 February 2010 the District Court convicted the applicant of twenty-six counts of bribe-taking under Article 290 \u00a7 2 of the Russian Criminal Code and imposed a conditional sentence of four years and six months\u2019 imprisonment. 18.  On 5 March 2009 the applicant asked the investigator to allow his wife to visit him in the remand prison. 19.  On 23 March 2009 the investigator refused the request, because the applicant\u2019s case was being investigated and a visit by his wife might obstruct the establishment of the truth. The applicant found out about that decision on 8 May 2009 after lodging a complaint with the investigating department of the Yaroslavl regional prosecutor\u2019s office. 20.  On 13 May, 10 June and 24 June 2009 the applicant applied for permission for his wife and daughter to visit him. 21.  On 18 May, 15 June and 29 June 2009 respectively, the investigator again refused the applicant\u2019s requests, relying on the ongoing investigation and the risk of the family visits obstructing the establishment of the truth. 22.  Meanwhile, on 1 June 2009 the District Court found unlawful the decision of 23 March 2009 refusing the applicant\u2019s request to see his wife and obliged the investigator to reconsider the applicant\u2019s request for a family visit. 23.  On 2 July 2009 the District Court found the decision of 15 June 2009 unlawful and obliged the investigator to grant the applicant\u2019s request. 24.  On 24 July 2009 the investigator decided to allow the applicant\u2019s wife to visit the applicant in the remand prison, but limited the visit to fifteen minutes. The decision further stipulated that the visit had to take place in the presence of the investigator. 25.  The applicant challenged the ruling that the visit was limited to fifteen minutes and had to take place in the presence of the investigator. 26.  On 11 August 2009 the Leninskiy District Court found the decision of 24 July 2009, in so far as it limited the duration of the visit and imposed the presence of the investigator, unlawful. The court further obliged the investigator to grant the applicant permission to see his wife in accordance with the domestic law. 27.  On 27 August 2009 the investigator decided to allow the applicant to see his wife. The decision did not impose a restriction on the duration of the visit. However, according to the applicant, it was never communicated to him or his wife. As a result, he did not see his family until 17 September 2009 when the custodial measure was lifted. 28.  In view of the repeated violations of the applicant\u2019s rights, the Yaroslavl regional prosecutor\u2019s office sent the head of the investigating department an information letter on the inadmissibility of the practice of limiting the constitutional rights of defendants and on the need to examine the issue of imposing disciplinary sanctions on the investigator in charge of the applicant\u2019s case.", "references": ["2", "7", "5", "1", "3", "0", "9", "6", "8", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1976 and, until his death in 2006, lived in Vinnytsya. 6.  The background to the case, including the Transdniestrian armed conflict of 1991-1992 and the subsequent events, is set out in Ila\u015fcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia ([GC], no. 48787/99, \u00a7\u00a7 28-185, ECHR 2004\u2011VII) and Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia ([GC], nos. 43370/04 and 2 others, \u00a7\u00a7 8-42, ECHR 2012 (extracts)). 7.  In 2001 the applicant was arrested in the self-proclaimed \u201cMoldavian Republic of Transdniestria\u201d (the \u201cMRT\u201d) on charges of murder. On 28 June 2002 he was convicted in a final judgment by the \u201cMRT\u201d Supreme Court and sentenced to ten years\u2019 imprisonment. 8.  According to the applicant, during his pre-trial detention he was subjected to ill-treatment to make him confess to committing the murder. 9.  After his conviction the applicant\u2019s mother made many requests to various Ukrainian official bodies to obtain the transfer of her son to a Ukrainian prison. The case file before the Court contains approximately forty replies received by her from various Ukrainian authorities. However, her efforts were not successful. In particular, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine informed the applicant that it had contacted its counterpart in Moldova, which had informed it that Moldova could not secure the applicant\u2019s transfer to a Ukrainian prison because it did not have control over the territory of the \u201cMRT\u201d. The Ukrainian authorities also contacted the \u201cMRT\u201d authorities, but to no avail. In a letter to the applicant\u2019s mother, the \u201cMRT\u201d authorities stated that they would only transfer the applicant to a Ukrainian prison after the conclusion of a treaty between Ukraine and the \u201cMRT\u201d which would make the transfer of prisoners possible. Since Ukraine refused to sign such a treaty with it, the transfer was not possible. The applicant\u2019s mother went so far as to initiate court proceedings against the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, denouncing its lack of action, but she was not successful. 10.  On several occasions the applicant\u2019s representative also contacted the Moldovan authorities, enquiring about the status of the Transdniestrian region and, on at least two occasions, asking them for assistance with the question of the applicant\u2019s transfer to a Ukrainian prison. It does not appear from the material submitted by the applicant and his mother that he complained to the Moldovan authorities about alleged breaches of his Convention rights by the \u201cMRT\u201d authorities. In a letter of 25 April 2003 the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office of Moldova informed the applicant\u2019s representative that it had contacted the prosecuting authorities of the \u201cMRT\u201d and requested the necessary documents to have the applicant transferred to a Ukrainian prison. It is not clear from the case file whether the \u201cMRT\u201d authorities reacted to that letter. In another letter sent to the applicant\u2019s representative by the office of the President of the Republic of Moldova, the lawyer was informed that the Moldovan authorities were unable to bring about the applicant\u2019s transfer to a Ukrainian prison while the Transdniestrian conflict remained unsettled. 11.  The applicant\u2019s mother also wrote to the OSCE mission in Moldova, which informed her that her letter had been forwarded to the Ukrainian Embassy in Chisinau. 12.  In around March 2006 the applicant broke his leg and was admitted to hospital. It appears from his mother\u2019s statements that she was able to spend time with him during his stay in hospital. 13.  On 24 May 2006 the applicant was found hanged in the gym of the prison in which he was being detained. It does not appear that the applicant\u2019s mother requested or obtained a medical forensic report concerning the circumstances of his death. However, it appears from her statements that the applicant did not have any signs of violence on his body.", "references": ["1", "6", "5", "9", "7", "8", "0", "3", "4", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicants, Mr Ernest Vardanean and Ms Irina Vardanean, are Moldovan nationals who were born in 1980 and live in Chisinau. 6.  The background to the case, including the Transdniestrian armed conflict of 1991-1992 and the subsequent events, is set out in Ila\u015fcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia ([GC], no. 48787/99, \u00a7\u00a7 28-185, ECHR 2004\u2011VII) and Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia ([GC], nos. 43370/04, 8252/05 and 18454/06, \u00a7\u00a7 8-42, ECHR 2012). 7.  The applicants are husband and wife and are journalists. At the time of the events they were living in the self-proclaimed \u201cMoldovan Republic of Transdniestria\u201d (the \u201cMRT\u201d). The first applicant was employed by a Russian news agency and by a Moldovan newspaper. 8.  On 7 April 2010 the first applicant was arrested by agents of the secret service of the \u201cMRT\u201d on charges of treason and/or espionage undertaken for the Republic of Moldova. A search was carried out in the applicants\u2019 apartment and many of their belongings \u2013 such as pictures, computers and a bank card \u2013 were seized. 9.  On 16 December 2010, a tribunal from the \u201cMRT\u201d convicted the first applicant and sentenced him to fifteen years\u2019 imprisonment. Following international pressure, on 5 May 2011 the president of the \u201cMRT\u201d pardoned him. After that date, the applicant and his family moved to Chisinau. 10.  During his detention the first applicant met on several occasions with representatives of the \u201cMRT\u201d secret services, including the chief of the secret services, and was led to believe that his family might suffer if he refused to cooperate with them. He was asked to record a video of himself admitting having worked for the Moldovan secret services. That video was aired on Transdniestrian television. On another occasion he was asked to write a letter to the foreign ambassadors to Moldova \u201cdisclosing\u201d the fact that the Moldovan secret services were spying on the foreign embassies based in Chisinau. He subsequently was given to understand by representatives of the \u201cMRT\u201d secret services that the letter had served the purpose of creating tensions between Chisinau and western countries and that the whole matter, including his arrest, was being coordinated from Moscow. 11.  The second applicant could only visit the first applicant on a limited number of occasions during his detention and lawyers representing the first applicant in the proceedings before the Court were denied access to him on the grounds that they were not members of the \u201cTransdniestrian Bar Association\u201d. 12.  In the meantime, the Moldovan authorities made numerous attempts to secure the first applicant\u2019s release. In particular, the problem of his detention in the \u201cMRT\u201d was raised by the Moldovan authorities with the European Union and the United States authorities in April 2010 in Brussels. The Moldovan delegation distributed a circular letter during the April 2010 session of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and raised the first applicant\u2019s situation during meetings of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in January and February 2011. The first applicant\u2019s situation was also raised by the Moldovan authorities in their discussions with the OSCE representatives in Chisinau, and a criminal investigation was initiated by the Moldovan Prosecutor\u2019s Office in respect of the applicant\u2019s detention in the \u201cMRT\u201d. However, the criminal investigation was later discontinued. 13.  The Moldovan Government also awarded financial assistance to the first applicant\u2019s family during the period of the first applicant\u2019s detention in the \u201cMRT\u201d and transferred to them ownership of a flat in Chisinau worth 53,000 euros (EUR) after the first applicant\u2019s release from detention.", "references": ["7", "5", "0", "6", "8", "1", "9", "No Label", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["2", "3", "4"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1960 and is detained in Vadul lui Voda. 6.  On 22 February 2002 at 7 a.m. the applicant was arrested and placed in detention. She was released at 4.40 p.m. on the same day after a court had found that her detention had been abusive and had ordered her release. 7.  In the meantime, during her detention, the applicant was subjected to ill-treatment by the police. In particular, she was punched and strangled. After release, the applicant went to a hospital, where she was diagnosed with concussion and multiple bruises on her head and neck. She lodged a criminal complaint in relation to the above-mentioned facts; however, it was not successful. 8.  On an unspecified date, the applicant initiated civil proceedings against the State, claiming compensation for unlawful detention and ill\u2011treatment. 9.  By a final judgment of 9 August 2012, the Supreme Court of Justice found a breach of the applicant\u2019s rights, as guaranteed by Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention, on account of her unlawful detention and ill-treatment on 22 February 2002. The Supreme Court also found a breach of the applicant\u2019s rights, as guaranteed by Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention, on account of the length and ineffectiveness of the criminal investigation conducted into the applicant\u2019s complaints of abusive actions on the part of the police. The Supreme Court awarded her 3,200 euros (EUR) in compensation.", "references": ["3", "4", "5", "7", "0", "8", "6", "9", "No Label", "1", "2"], "gold": ["1", "2"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1966 and lives in Khachmaz. 6.  The applicant\u2019s son, Zakir Babayev (Z.B.), was born in 1991; on 3 July 2009 he was drafted into the army to perform his compulsory military service. From October 2009 he served as a sniper in Gadabay region in military unit no. 171. 7.  On the morning of 14 November 2009 Z.B. was on guard duty with one other soldier (Q.S.) at a military post called \u201cA\u201d in Gadabay region. At around 11 a.m. he left his post and went into the nearby forest, where two peasants were cutting wood. Z.B. called the applicant using the telephone of one of the peasants and asked his father to provide him with some belongings. He also asked the applicant to send him a mobile telephone top\u2011up card worth ten Azerbaijani manats (AZN). During the telephone conversation he was in a good mood and did not complain about any problems. Z.B. also asked the applicant to tell his mother to leave her mobile telephone turned on as he would call her later. Following that conversation, the applicant bought mobile telephone top-up cards and sent their passwords to his son by a telephone message. 8.  According to the material in the case file, following the telephone conversation with the applicant, Z.B. returned to his guard duty post. At around noon Q.S. left the post in order to change the guard and Z.B. remained alone. A few minutes later the soldiers heard a gunshot and went to the post, where they discovered Z.B.\u2019s body. 9.  On 14 November 2009 criminal proceedings were instituted under Article 125 (incitement to suicide) of the Criminal Code by the Gazakh Military Prosecutor. 10.  On the same day a record of an inspection of the scene of the crime was drawn up and signed by the commander of military unit no. 171, Major A.F. It was also signed by two attesting witnesses, E.Q. and N.D., who were soldiers in the same military unit. The record states that the inspection began at 4.30 p.m. and ended at 6 p.m. According to the record, Z.B. had been wearing a shoe and four socks on his left foot; however, the shoe and the sock of his right foot had been taken off. His right shoe had been found next to his body. According to the record, one cartridge, a pen and a note written on a cigarette pack were found at the crime scene. Various photographs of Z.B.\u2019s body, the cartridge, the pen and the note were taken. The note read as follows:\n\u201cI, Z.B., commit suicide and nobody is responsible for that. I commit suicide because I don\u2019t want to be a burden to anyone. Mum and Dad, forgive me. Goodbye to everyone; goodbye to life. Signature. Z.B.\u201d 11.  On the same day a record of the examination was drawn up by the investigator in charge of the case, who examined Z.B.\u2019s body at the headquarters of military unit no. 171 in Gadabay region. According to the record, the examination began at 9 p.m. and ended at 10 p.m. Various photographs of Z.B.\u2019s body were taken. 12.  On 15 November 2009 a record of the examination of the body was drawn up in the presence of a forensic expert in the city of Ganja. 13.  On the same date a post-mortem examination of Z.B.\u2019s body was carried out. Report no. 02 dated 15 November 2009 showed that death had resulted from one gunshot wound to the left part of the rib cage. The expert found that the seam of the left pocket of Z.B.\u2019s uniform had become unstitched. The expert did not find any other injury on Z.B.\u2019s body or uniform. 14.  On 17 November 2009 the investigator questioned nine soldiers of the military unit in which Z.B. had served. The soldiers stated that Z.B. had never been ill-treated during his military service. One of the soldiers, Q.S., further stated that when they had been on guard duty on 14 November 2009, Z.B. had been in a bad mood and had told him about his family problems. In particular, according to Q.S., the applicant\u2019s son told him that he had talked to his mother-in-law, who had said that his parents had gone to Russia and would not be visiting him. However, another soldier (N.D.) stated that on 14 November 2009 Z.B. had been in a good mood and had told him that he had talked to his mother-in-law by telephone. 15.  On 17 November 2009 the investigator also took signature and writing samples from the soldiers of the military unit in order to identify the author of the written note found at the crime scene. 16.  On 19 November 2009 the investigator requested the Khachmaz District Department of Education to provide the investigation with the signature and samples of the applicant\u2019s son\u2019s writing. 17.  On 24 November 2009 the investigator also sent an operational request (\u0259m\u0259liyyat tap\u015f\u0131r\u0131\u011f\u0131) to the head of the military counterintelligence department of military unit no. 171, asking him to investigate whether Z.B. had been subjected to unlawful actions during his military service. In a letter dated 30 November 2009 and marked \u201csecret\u201d, the head of the military counterintelligence department of military unit no. 171, a lieutenant-colonel (Y.S.), replied to the investigator\u2019s request of 24 November 2009. He noted that according to the information obtained after having taken operational measures (\u0259m\u0259liyyat t\u0259dbirl\u0259ri), on 14 November 2009, before going to the guard post, Z.B. had had a dispute with a sergeant (S.H.) and a soldier (Q.S.), who had beaten him. Around five minutes after this incident, a gunshot had been heard and Q.S., S.H. and another soldier (K.M.) had gone to the post, where they had discovered Z.B.\u2019s body. It was also indicated in the letter that the soldiers had removed Z.B.\u2019s body after the incident in order to help him, but upon realising that he was dead they had laid the body back in its original place. 18.  On 24 November 2009 the investigator sent another operational request to the head of the Khachmaz District Police Office, asking him to investigate whether Z.B. had had any family problems, whether Z.B. had been engaged to anyone, or whether any of his close relatives had been suffering from any psychological illnesses. By a letter of 7 December 2009, the head of the Khachmaz District Police Office informed the investigator that Z.B. had had no family problems, that he had not been engaged to anyone and that his relatives had not been suffering from any psychological illnesses. 19.  By a decision of 25 November 2009, the investigator recognised the applicant as a legal heir of the victim (z\u0259r\u0259r\u00e7\u0259kmi\u015f \u015f\u0259xsin h\u00fcquqi varisi). On the same day the applicant was questioned by the investigator. He stated that at around 11 a.m. on 14 November 2009 he had talked to his son by telephone. Z.B. had been in a good mood and had not complained about anything. Z.B. had asked the applicant to tell his mother to leave her mobile telephone turned on as he would call her later. The applicant further stated that at the request of his son he had bought mobile top-up cards and sent their passwords to him by a telephone message. The applicant also stated that his son had not had a fianc\u00e9e or a mother-in-law and that he had not had any family problems. 20.  On 4 December 2009 the investigator ordered forensic medical, ballistic, chemical and trace examinations. Report no. 16771/72/73 dated 29 December 2009 showed that Z.B. had used his service weapon \u2013 an SVD-type D6197 sniper rifle \u2013 to commit suicide. The report further found that the seam of the left pocket of Z.B.\u2019s uniform had become unstitched and that this could have resulted either from contact with a blunt object or the use of physical force. 21.  On 7 December 2009 the investigator ordered a handwriting examination of the written note found at the crime scene. Report no. 16713 dated 28 December 2009 concluded that a comparison of the samples submitted to the examination showed that the note had similarities with Z.B.\u2019s writing and signature. Report no. 709 dated 27 January 2010 concluded that the coloured elements used in the writing of the note in question and of the pen found at the scene of the crime had the same chemical characteristics. 22.  According to a document entitled \u201cInstruction\u201d (G\u00f6st\u0259ri\u015f) dated 14 December 2009 the Deputy Military Prosecutor of the Republic of Azerbaijan gave various instructions to the prosecuting authorities in connection with the criminal proceedings relating to Z.B.\u2019s death. In particular, he asked the prosecuting authorities to inspect the scene of the crime. The relevant part of the document reads as follows:\n\u201cIt appears from the case material that the Gazakh Military Prosecutor\u2019s Office received the information that Z.B. died ... and the agents of the prosecuting authorities went to the scene of the crime, but it was not possible for them to inspect the scene of the crime, given the foggy weather conditions in the mountainous area. The military commander who carried out the preliminary inspection of the scene of the crime presented the collected material evidence to the Gazakh Military Prosecutor\u2019s Office. In order to reconstruct the conditions in which the incident took place, the scene of the crime should again be inspected ...\u201d 23.  On 11 January 2010 the investigator visited the \u201cA\u201d military post and inspected the scene of the crime. According to the record of the inspection (dated 11 January 2010), it began at 2.30 p.m. and ended at 3.40 p.m. The investigator took various photographs of the area where the military post was situated. 24.  On the same day the investigator questioned four soldiers, including S.H. and Q.S. They denied having beaten Z.B. on 14 November 2009 and submitted that Z.B. had never been subjected to ill-treatment. As regards the investigator\u2019s question regarding the fact that the seam of the left pocket of Z.B.\u2019s uniform had been unstitched, they stated that they had not noticed it. 25.  On 12 January 2010 the investigator questioned the two peasants who had seen Z.B. on 14 November 2009. They stated that on 14 November 2009, as they had been cutting wood in the forest, Z.B. and Q.S. had approached them. Z.B. had used their mobile telephone to call his father; Z.B. and Q.S. had then left the area. They also stated that Z.B. had been in a good mood before and after the telephone conversation. 26.  On 18 January 2010 the investigator carried out a reconstruction of the events in order to establish whether Z.B. had been technically able to commit suicide with his service weapon. The investigator concluded that it would have been possible if he had pressed the trigger of the weapon with the toe of his right foot when standing up or lying down. 27.  On 21 January 2010 the applicant was again questioned by the investigator. 28.  On the same day the investigator ordered a post-mortem psychiatric and psychological examination (m\u0259hk\u0259m\u0259-psixiatrik v\u0259 psixoloji ekspertizas\u0131) of Z.B. Report no. 19 of that examination, dated 1 February 2010, concluded on the basis of the statements available in the case file that Z.B. had not been suffering from any mental disorder, but that he had probably been in a state of depression before his death. However, it was not possible to determine the reason for that depression. 29.  On 3 February 2010 the investigator questioned five soldiers of the military unit in which Z.B. had served. 30.  On 9 February 2010 the investigator decided to terminate the criminal proceedings, finding that there had been no criminal element in Z.B.\u2019s death. The investigator concluded that Z.B. had committed suicide because he had probably been in a state of depression. The investigator further held that it had not been established that Z.B. had been ill-treated by other soldiers. The investigator also decided to destroy the material evidence found at the crime scene, including the written note found next to Z.B.\u2019s body. 31.  On 27 February 2010 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Gazakh Military Court against the investigator\u2019s decision of 9 February 2010, complaining of the ineffectiveness of the criminal investigation. He disputed the investigator\u2019s conclusions relating to the suicide of his son, pointing out that Z.B. had not suffered from any mental disorder. He submitted in that connection that the statements of the soldiers had been contradictory and had been fabricated, as his son had never had a fianc\u00e9e or a mother-in-law. The applicant alleged that his son had been either killed or had been driven to suicide by S.H. and Q.S. In that connection, he relied on the content of the letter of 30 November 2009 from the military counterintelligence department of the military unit. He also submitted that the fact that the seam of the left pocket of Z.B.\u2019s uniform had become unstitched proved that his son had been beaten before his death. The applicant further pointed out that the note found at the crime scene had been written using certain words that his son had never used. In particular, he noted that even though Z.B. had never called his parents \u201cana\u201d (mum) and \u201cata\u201d (dad), but rather \u201cmama\u201d and \u201cpapa\u201d, he had addressed them as \u201cana\u201d and \u201cata\u201d in that note. The applicant also complained that his son had been harassed by S.H., who had regularly forced Z.B. to ask the applicant to send mobile telephone top-up cards for S.H. In that connection, he asked for an examination of the list of calls made to and from his mobile telephone during the entire period during which his son had been undertaking military service. 32.  On 18 March 2010 the Gazakh Military Court overruled the investigator\u2019s decision and remitted the case to the prosecuting authorities for fresh examination. The court ordered the investigating authority to examine the applicant\u2019s particular complaints. It further found that the investigator had not had the right to decide to destroy the material evidence found at the scene of the crime. 33.  As can be seen from the documents submitted by the Government, following the Gazakh Military Court\u2019s decision of 18 March 2010, on 19 March 2010 the investigator decided to continue the investigation. 34.  On 23 March 2010 the investigator questioned the expert who had conducted forensic medical, ballistic, chemical and trace examinations (see paragraph 20 above). The expert stated that the seam of the left pocket of Z.B.\u2019s uniform could have come unstitched because it had come into contact with his service weapon after his suicide. 35.  On 25 March 2010 the investigator also questioned two soldiers, who stated that they did not remember whether Z.B. had called his parents \u201cana\u201d (mum) and \u201cata\u201d (dad) or \u201cmama\u201d and \u201cpapa\u201d. 36.  On 29 March 2010 the same investigator again decided to terminate the criminal proceedings. That decision was identical in its wording to the investigator\u2019s previous decision of 9 February 2010, except for the part concerning the preservation of the written note found at the scene of the crime and two newly added paragraphs. In those paragraphs, the investigator noted that the two soldiers questioned during the investigation had not remembered whether Z.B. had called his parents \u201cana\u201d (mum) and \u201cata\u201d (dad) or \u201cmama\u201d and \u201cpapa\u201d. Moreover, relying on the questioning of the expert on 23 March 2010, the investigator concluded that the seam of the left pocket of Z.B.\u2019s uniform had been unstitched because it had come into contact with his service weapon after his suicide and not as a result of any ill-treatment. 37.  On 10 April 2010 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Military Prosecutor of the Republic of Azerbaijan against that decision. He complained of the ineffectiveness of the criminal investigation, pointing out that, taking into consideration that there had been a national holiday in the country from 20 to 28 March 2010, it had been impossible to carry out a new investigation between 19 and 29 March 2010. The applicant also argued that the investigator should have questioned Z.B.\u2019s parents and relatives \u2013 not the two soldiers in question \u2013 in order to establish whether Z.B. had called his parents \u201cana\u201d (mum) and \u201cata\u201d (dad) or \u201cmama\u201d and \u201cpapa\u201d. He further disputed the investigator\u2019s interpretation of the expert\u2019s conclusion (see paragraphs 20 and 34 above), alleging that the investigator had substituted his own opinion for the expert\u2019s conclusion. Lastly, he complained that his lawyer had not had access to the case file. 38.  As can be seen from the documents in the case file, on 21 April 2010 the Military Prosecutor of the Republic of Azerbaijan overruled the investigator\u2019s decision of 29 March 2010 and remitted the case for fresh examination. Despite the Court\u2019s explicit request to the Government that they submit copies of all the documents relating to the criminal proceedings concerning Z.B.\u2019s death, the Government failed to provide the Court with a copy of the decision of 21 April 2010 of the Military Prosecutor of the Republic of Azerbaijan. 39.  The criminal case was allocated to another investigator at the Gazakh Military Prosecutor\u2019s Office. 40.  In May and June 2010 the new investigator questioned Z.B.\u2019s parents, two schoolmates, and five soldiers (including Q.S.) who had served in the same military unit. During the questioning, despite stating that Z.B. had never complained before his death about being ill-treated, the applicant reiterated his previous complaints. It further appears that, even though on 5 June 2010 the investigator questioned the five soldiers separately, the wording of their statements was identical. They each stated that Z.B. had never been ill-treated during his military service. 41.  On 18 June 2010 the investigator in charge of the case decided to terminate the criminal proceedings. The investigator found that the allegation of Z.B.\u2019s ill-treatment by Q.S. and S.H. had not been proved during the investigation and that Z.B. had committed suicide because he had probably been in a state of depression. 42.  On 13 July 2010 the applicant lodged a complaint against that decision, reiterating his previous arguments. He also noted that the investigator\u2019s decision of 18 June 2010 was almost identical in its wording to the previous decisions of the prosecuting authorities. He further complained that the new investigator had failed to question S.H. again or to address the contradictions in the statements of the soldiers. In that connection, he pointed out that, although Z.B. had had no fianc\u00e9e or mother-in-law \u2013 which had been confirmed in a letter dated 7 December 2009 from the Khachmaz District Police Office \u2013 the soldiers had referred in their statements to an alleged telephone conversation with a mother-in-law. The applicant lastly complained about the investigator\u2019s failure to attach any importance to the letter dated 30 November 2009 from the head of the military counterintelligence department of military unit no. 171. 43.  On 23 July 2010 the Military Prosecutor of the Republic of Azerbaijan again quashed the investigator\u2019s decision and remitted the case to the prosecuting authorities for fresh examination. The Government failed to provide the Court with a copy of the decision of 23 July 2010 of the Military Prosecutor of the Republic of Azerbaijan. 44.  On 27 July 2010 the investigator again questioned Z.B.\u2019s parents, who reiterated their previous complaints. They also stated that Q.S. and S.H. had regularly harassed their son into obtaining mobile telephone top-up cards. 45.  In August 2010 the investigator also questioned various soldiers, who denied any ill-treatment or harassment of Z.B. during his military service. 46.  According to the documents submitted by the Government, on 27 August 2010 the investigator again sent an operational request to the head of the military counterintelligence department of military unit no. 171. The investigator noted that, although in the letter dated 30 November 2009 it was stated that Z.B. had been beaten by S.H. and Q.S. on the day of the incident, that allegation had not been proved during the investigation. The investigator further asked the head of the military counterintelligence department to investigate whether S.H. and Q.S. had tried to extort money from Z.B. during his military service. 47.  By a letter dated 10 September 2010, the head of the military counterintelligence department of military unit no. 171, Y.S., replied to the investigator\u2019s request of 27 August 2010. Y.S. noted that, although he had previously indicated in his letter of 30 November 2009 that Z.B. had been beaten by S.H. and Q.S., that information had not been subsequently confirmed. He further informed the investigator that the military counterintelligence department had not received any information relating to the extortion of money. 48.  On 20 September 2010 the investigator at the Gazakh Military Prosecutor\u2019s Office again decided to terminate the criminal proceedings, finding that there had been no criminal element in Z.B.\u2019s death. In that connection, the investigator found that Z.B. had committed suicide because he had probably been in a state of depression. Relying on the letter dated 10 September 2010 from the intelligence department of military unit no. 171, he also concluded that the allegation that Z.B. had been ill-treated by S.H. and Q.S. had not been confirmed during the investigation. 49.  On 9 October 2010 the applicant lodged a complaint against that decision with the Military Prosecutor of the Republic of Azerbaijan. He reiterated his previous complaints, pointing out that the investigator had tried to cover those who had ill-treated his son and driven him to suicide. 50.  On 15 October 2010 the Deputy Military Prosecutor of the Republic of Azerbaijan dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaint, finding that the criminal investigation had been effective. 51.  On 1 November 2010 the applicant lodged a complaint against that decision with the Baku Military Court, arguing that the investigator had failed to carry out an effective investigation. In particular, he alleged that the appearance of a new letter from the military counterintelligence department of military unit no. 171 (see paragraph 47 above), which clearly contradicted the previous letter from the same organ, had shown that the domestic authorities had tried to cover S.H. and Q.S., who had beaten his son. He also complained of the investigator\u2019s failure to address the contradictions in the statements of the soldiers relating to the alleged existence of a fianc\u00e9e and a mother-in-law and the alleged family problems of Z.B. 52.  On 13 November 2010 the Baku Military Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaint. The court found, without providing any explanation, that the applicant\u2019s complaints were groundless. 53.  On 1 December 2010 the applicant appealed against that decision, reiterating his previous complaints. 54.  On 29 December 2010 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld the Baku Military Court\u2019s decision of 13 November 2010.", "references": ["5", "7", "3", "9", "6", "4", "2", "8", "1", "No Label", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicants were born in 1978, 1980 and 2007 respectively. 5.  The first applicant came to Bulgaria in 1997. In 2001 he was granted long-term resident status, and in 2003 \u2013 permanent resident status. In 2005 he married the second applicant, and in 2007 the third applicant, their son, was born. 6.  On 29 May 2008 the head of the National Security Service issued an order withdrawing the first applicant\u2019s residence permit, ordering his expulsion and imposing a ten-year ban on his re\u2011entering Bulgaria on the ground that his presence in the country represented a \u201cserious threat to national security\u201d. Factual grounds justifying the order were not indicated; it was merely noted that it was based on \u201cproposal no. B848\u201d. 7.  That proposal, drawn up by the National Security Service on 27 May 2008 and initially classified, was declassified in 2016 and has been submitted by the Government. It stated that the first applicant was a member of a \u201cRussian criminal group\u201d implicated in money laundering, extortion, smuggling, illegal arms deals and the financing of \u201cterrorist groups\u201d on the territory of the Russian Federation. It said further that the first applicant had lowered Bulgaria\u2019s international reputation, by \u201cimplicating the country in the financing of terrorist organisations, transnational criminality, corruption and drug trafficking\u201d. No evidence was provided to substantiate those claims. 8.  On 12 June 2008 the first applicant applied for judicial review of the order of 29 May 2008. He denied the allegations against him and stated that his family resided in Bulgaria and that the measures against him breached his Convention rights. In addition, he presented a certificate that he had no criminal convictions in Bulgaria. 9.  In a final judgment of 8 January 2009 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the application for judicial review and held that the 29 May 2008 order was lawful. After summarising the allegations made in proposal no. B848, it held merely that they were sufficient to justify a conclusion that the first applicant represented a threat to national security. Furthermore, it dismissed his arguments relating to his family life, considering that\n\u201cany restriction of the rights under the Convention is justified [when based] on national security considerations, in cases where foreign citizens\u2019 behaviour threatens the national security and the public order of the State where they reside.\u201d 10.  The first applicant was expelled on 24 April 2009. It is unclear whether the second and third applicants remained in Bulgaria after that. In 2012 the first and second applicants had another child.", "references": ["0", "9", "2", "6", "7", "3", "5", "1", "8", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1941 and lives in the small village of Yamna, which forms part of Yaremche, a resort town located in the Carpathian Mountains in the Ivano-Frankivsk Region of Ukraine. 6.  On 16 July 1996 the Executive Committee of Yaremche Town Council (\u201cthe Executive Committee\u201d) allotted a plot of land next to the applicant\u2019s house to St John\u2019s Church to build a new cemetery (\u201cthe new cemetery\u201d). 7.  As is evident from the photographs submitted by the applicant, as of the date when they were taken (which is not specified) her land was adjacent to the cemetery. The house where she and her family lived was located some ten metres from the cemetery boundary. The applicant\u2019s yard was separated from the cemetery by a wire mesh fence. The nearest row of graves was about a metre from the fence (some eleven metres from the house) and was clearly visible from the applicant\u2019s yard. The part of the cemetery captured on the pictures contained over fifty graves, some freshly decorated with wreaths. 8.  According to the applicant\u2019s statements, at the time, when she lodged the present application, her family was routinely disturbed in its daily life by the sight of funeral processions and the sound of people mourning by the graves. In hot weather unpleasant smells sometimes emanated from the cemetery. In addition, the well from which the applicant\u2019s family drew water for drinking and other household needs was situated some twenty-five metres from the cemetery and they were worried it could become contaminated with the by-products of human decomposition. 9.  The applicant contacted various authorities on numerous occasions, complaining that the distance between her house and the new cemetery was less than the 300 metres required by law as a sanitary \u201chealth protection\u201d zone. 10.  On 14 September 2000 Yaremche\u2019s Sanitary Officer banned burials in the new cemetery as its location was in breach of applicable sanitary standards. 11.  On 30 August 2001 the Executive Committee took a further decision proscribing burials in the new cemetery. 12.  On an unspecified date in 2001 the applicant received authorisation from the municipality to bury her son in the old cemetery in Yamna (\u201cthe old cemetery\u201d) in exchange for a promise not to contest the location of the new cemetery. 13.  On 25 June 2002 the Executive Committee overturned its previous decision of 30 August 2001 (see paragraph 13 above) in response to complaints from St John\u2019s congregation members and village residents that no other suitable burial ground was available. 14.  On an unspecified date in 2002 the applicant instituted court proceedings seeking the revocation of the Executive Committee\u2019s decision of 25 June 2002 and the prohibition of burials. She noted, in particular, that the distance between her house and the cemetery was less than twenty-five metres. That was in breach of applicable sanitary rules, which were justified by the fact that toxins from decomposing corpses could seep into the ground water and contaminate an area around the cemetery as large as 300 metres. Locating the cemetery so close to the applicant\u2019s home had put her life and health at risk. The applicant also claimed non-pecuniary damages for her sufferings. 15.  On 16 January 2003 the Yaremche Court found the decision of 25 June 2002 unlawful as the applicant\u2019s house had been located within the sanitary health protection zone, which had been illegal. It ordered the Executive Committee to proscribe the burials. The judgment was not appealed against and became final. 16.  On 3 March 2003 the Yaremche Bailiffs\u2019 Service initiated enforcement proceedings, however, no steps preventing the burials were taken. 17.  On 23 June 2003 the acting chief sanitary officer of the Ivano\u2011Frankivsk Region sent a letter to the mayor of Yaremche, demanding that he take urgent measures to bring the new cemetery in Yamna into conformity with the applicable law. He noted, in particular, that the 300\u2011metre sanitary health protection zone had been established to prevent water and soil pollution and the spread of infectious diseases. Allowing burials ten metres from the applicant\u2019s house was not in conformity with sanitary rules. 18.  On 24 July 2003 the Yaremche Court found that the Bailiffs\u2019 Service had failed to act to enforce the judgment of 16 January 2003, but dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim for non-pecuniary damages arising from the bailiffs\u2019 inaction. 19.  On 26 August 2003 the enforcement proceedings concerning the judgment of 16 January 2003 were terminated on the grounds that enforcement was impossible because the Executive Committee members refused to vote to proscribe the burials. 20.  In the meantime, on 14 August 2003 the applicant instituted further proceedings against the Yaremche Council, seeking to compel it to stop burials and to pay her non-pecuniary damages for her suffering. 21.  On 18 March 2004 the Yaremche Court found for the applicant in part. It noted that the Yaremche Council had failed to take all the necessary steps to prevent unlawful burials on the disputed land and ordered it to take the requisite measures. At the same time, the applicant\u2019s claim for damages was rejected. The decision became final and enforcement proceedings were instituted. 22.  At many of its meetings the Executive Committee discussed draft decisions banning burials, however, they were never approved by a vote as no suitable alternative location for the cemetery could be found. 23.  On several occasions the Bailiffs\u2019 Service imposed fines on the Yaremche Council for failure to comply with the judgments. 24.  On 28 February 2005 the enforcement proceedings were terminated because of the impossibility of enforcement as members of the Council refused to vote against the burials. 25.  On 26 July 2005 the Yaremche Council informed the applicant that it had been unable to relocate the cemetery in view of the unavailability of other suitable land. It was further noted that they were continuing to look for alternatives and, in particular, were negotiating to acquire a plot from the Yamna forestry authority. 26.  On 9 August 2005 the applicant requested that the mayor of Yaremche consider resettling her family and proposed that the Town Council acquire another house for her. She suggested a specific house that was for sale at the material time, which, according to her, was comparable to her present house. 27.  On 15 September 2005 the Executive Committee informed the applicant that the municipal authorities were ready to consider the applicant\u2019s resettlement as an option. However, the town had no funds in its budget to buy the proposed house at that time. 28.  On 9 August 2006 the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Bailiffs\u2019 Service refused to re-institute the enforcement proceedings in view of the impossibility of enforcement. 29.  According to the Government, the municipality has not authorised any burials in the new cemetery since 2011 owing to the applicant\u2019s continued protests and the old cemetery has been used instead.", "references": ["2", "0", "6", "5", "7", "8", "4", "1", "9", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1976 and is detained in Lublin. 6.  On 10 October 2008 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of the attempted murder of his brother, K.D. 7.  On 25 March 2009 a bill of indictment against the applicant was lodged with the Lublin Regional Court. 8.  On 12 December 2011 the Lublin Regional Court convicted the applicant and sentenced him to 10 years\u2019 imprisonment. 9.  The applicant appealed. 10.  On 21 August 2012 the Lublin Court of Appeal upheld the conviction. 11.  On 7 December 2012 the applicant\u2019s lawyer lodged a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court. 12.  On 10 June 2013 the Supreme Court dismissed the cassation appeal as manifestly ill-founded. 13.  Following his arrest, on 11 October 2008 the applicant was remanded in custody in the Lublin Remand Centre. 14.  On 22 August 2009 the prison authorities discovered 132 pills of psychoactive drugs hidden in the applicant\u2019s clothes. 15.  On 26 August 2009 the applicant encouraged other prisoners to start a hunger strike. On the same day, the Penitentiary Commission, viewing the applicant as someone who posed a severe danger to the safety of the facility, classified him as a \u201cdangerous detainee\u201d. The applicant then went on a hunger strike which lasted until 7 September 2009. He was punished by being placed in solitary confinement for fourteen days. 16.  In November 2009 the applicant refused to continue to take part in his rehabilitation programme and was therefore excluded from it. 17.  On 18 February 2010 the special regime for dangerous detainees was lifted in respect of the applicant. 18.  Between 17 November 2009 and 31 March 2010 the applicant was detained in the Rzesz\u00f3w Remand Centre. On the latter date he was transported back to Lublin. 19.   The applicant\u2019s behaviour during 2011 varied: he was sometimes rewarded for good behaviour and sometimes faced disciplinary measures. Such measures were imposed in particular for illegal contact with other inmates, for commencing hunger strikes and for being active in the prison subculture. 20.  On 6 December 2011 prison officers found that the applicant had 80 Polish zlotys in cash from an unknown source. The money was seized and transferred to the applicant\u2019s bank account. 21.  On 30 January 2012 the applicant attempted to go for a walk in the prison yard without permission from the supervising officer and was reprimanded on 1 February. 22.  On 4 February 2012 the applicant was visited by members of his family and tried to pass them an illegal message on a piece of paper. After the visit he was ordered to undergo a strip search. 23.  On 6 February 2012 the applicant complained about the strip search to the Lublin Remand Centre. 24.  On 17 April 2012 the director of the Lublin Remand Centre examined his complaint and found that the search had been performed in accordance with the law and that the applicant had not been debased or humiliated. The director also found that on 4 February 2012 the applicant had given a visiting member of his family a piece of paper with some notes on it. The director found that that \u201cconstituted a violation of discipline and order\u201d. 25.  On 29 April 2012 the applicant complained about another strip search, which had taken place on 28 April 2012. His complaint was examined on 29 June 2012 by the director of the Lublin Remand Centre, who found that the search had been carried out in accordance with the law. 26.  On 5 June 2012 the applicant underwent a strip search which was accompanied by a search of his cell. The inspection of the cell was part of an action plan introduced at the Lublin Remand Centre in 2012 to increase security. The plan included the inspection of all the cells. 27.  In his observations before this Court, the applicant\u2019s lawyer submitted that the applicant had been ordered to undergo a strip search on 5 June 2012, even though he had had severe back pain and had barely been able to walk. He had also had difficulties getting undressed. 28.  The applicant complained to the director of the remand centre. He submitted that after the search of his cell his personal belonging had been thrown on the floor, mixed in with other inmates\u2019 possessions and that the cell had \u201clooked like after a hurricane\u201d. In the complaint he neither mentioned any irregularities as regards the strip search nor complained about back problems. 29.  On 9 August 2012 the remand centre director dismissed the complaint. He found that the search had been performed in accordance with the law and had respected the applicant\u2019s rights and personal dignity. The relevant part of the director\u2019s decision read as follows:\n\u201cThe strip search and cell inspection were conducted in accordance with Article 116 \u00a7\u00a7 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences. The guards did not use offensive language and did not debase you. Nobody hit you. The objects which were inspected were not thrown around. Nothing was damaged during the search.\u201d 30.  In 2012 the applicant was seen by a neurologist seventeen times and on two occasions by a neurosurgeon. On 16 October 2012 an operation, apparently for back pain, was scheduled for the applicant for 17 September 2013. The doctors did not advise against body checks of the applicant. 31.  On 25 August 2012 the applicant had a visit from his sister and brother-in-law and was afterwards ordered to undergo another strip search. He again complained to the director of the Lublin Remand Centre, submitting that the strip search had not been justified and had lacked legal grounds. 32.  On 30 October 2012 the director of the Lublin Remand Centre dismissed the complaint as ill-founded.\nThe relevant part of the decision read:\n\u201cThe strip search you were subjected to was carried out in accordance with the relevant provisions and with respect for your personal dignity.\u201d 33.  On 3 November 2012 the applicant received a visit from members of his family and was allowed to have direct contact with them. Afterwards, he was again ordered to undergo a strip search. The applicant stated that he had intense pain in his spine on that day and could barely stand and had therefore refused to undergo the search. The chief duty officer was then called. He arrived with three other guards and subjected the applicant to a strip search. He was ordered to strip naked, bend at the knees, show his penis and open his mouth. However, as he was deemed to have performed the guards\u2019 orders \u201cin a dilatory manner\u201d he was punished on 6 November 2012 with a two-month ban on having direct contact with his family during visits, only being able to see them from behind a glass screen. 34.  On 3 November 2012 the applicant complained to the Central Board of the Prison Service about the way the strip search of 3 November 2012 had been conducted. He submitted, among other things, that he had had severe back pain after the family visit, had barely been able to move and had therefore refused to undress. The prison officers had apparently ignored his complaints and had \u201cforced him to undergo the strip search\u201d. He also submitted in the complaint that he had been unable to get dressed after the strip search because of the severe pain in his back and that he had been left standing in only his underpants for about fifty minutes. One of the officers had then opened the window to let in freezing air to make him get dressed quickly. 35.  On 7 November 2012 the applicant also complained about the imposition of the disciplinary penalty on him after the strip search of 3 November 2012. 36.  On 20 November 2012 the director of Lublin Remand Centre informed the applicant that his complaint of 3 November needed further investigation, which would last until 7 December 2012. The applicant did not provide any further information about the outcome of those proceedings. 37.  The complaint of 7 November 2012 was dismissed on 20 November 2012. The decision, issued by the deputy director of the Lublin Remand Centre, said that the \u201capplicant refused to undergo a strip search and only agreed to comply when the chief duty officer was called\u201d. The decision does not refer to the applicant\u2019s submissions that the alleged reason for his refusal to undergo the strip search had been severe back pain. It also made no reference to his allegations that he had been left for about fifty minutes in a state of being unable to get dressed and that he had been forced to put his clothes on by someone letting freezing air into the room. The applicant then lodged a further complaint with the Lublin Regional Court, which, on 17 December 2012 upheld the decision given by the deputy director of the Lublin Remand Centre. The court found that the decision had been issued in accordance with the relevant provisions of the law and that it had no competence to examine whether the decision had been well-founded or not. 38.  On 12 September 2013 the Lublin Regional Court, in view of the applicant\u2019s state of health and his neurological and orthopaedic problems, granted him leave to undergo the operation outside prison. The applicant was scheduled to return to prison on 12 January 2014.", "references": ["0", "6", "2", "7", "8", "9", "3", "1", "5", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1942 and lives in Tomasz\u00f3w Mazowiecki. 6.  On 29 September 2010 at a village meeting in Jadwig\u00f3w, fifteen residents voted in favour of holding the previous local mayor (so\u0142tys) Z.M. to account for his management of public funds. They appointed the applicant to be in charge of further action in that regard. 7.  On 7 October 2010 the applicant sent a document to the mayor of the Tomasz\u00f3w Mazowiecki District (Starosta Powiatowy - \u201cthe district mayor\u201d) entitled \u201cPetition\u201d (Wniosek - \u201cthe document\u201d), which was signed by the applicant and three other residents of Jadwig\u00f3w who confirmed their agreement with the petition. 8.  The text read as follows:\n\u201cOn 27 September in the village of Jadwig\u00f3w a legally valid village meeting took place, during which residents of the village decided by a large majority to appoint me to be in charge of investigating the concerns detailed below. It took me over one week to figure out a solution to this problem. I came to the realisation that the best way to approach [it] would be to file a request with the Mayor of the District in order to clarify the issue, even though I had already informed the current local mayor and Mayor of the Tomasz\u00f3w Mazowiecki Commune (w\u00f3jt) of the allegations.\nThe facts and circumstances are as follows.\nThe local mayor of Jadwig\u00f3w, Z.M., whose term in office was concluded on the election of the current local mayor, Ms J. G., received grants for the benefit of the village from the Commune and accepted payments from the lease of the village shop.\nDuring his term in office, he never asked the residents or the local council for what purpose the money should be used. He managed the funds arbitrarily and, I think, used them for building works, namely the renovation of the community hall (\u015bwietlica \u2013 dom ludowy).\nHowever, he never shared the accounts with the residents of the village; in particular how much money there was and what it was spent on.\nThere are many rumours going around the village, which out of respect for your office I will not be repeating. I will only add one more thing, namely that the community hall was not accessible to the residents and their children for [ten] years.\nI consider, therefore, that the petition and the request are both valid.\n[signatures of three residents]\nI, other signatories of this request for a petition and all the residents believe that, thanks to the Mayor of the District, they will receive a full and plausible explanation of the facts described above.\u201d 9.  The document was sent to the district mayor before local elections which took place on 21 November 2010 (wybory samorz\u0105dowe). Both the applicant and Z.M. were candidates in those elections but neither of them became a local councillor. 10.  On an unspecified date the Tomasz\u00f3w Mazowiecki Commune Council Audit Committee analysed the document. It decided, as summarised by the domestic court, \u201cthat there were no grounds to allege that somebody had mismanaged the funds.\u201d 11.  On 14 December 2010 Z.M. lodged a civil action with the Piotrk\u00f3w Trybunalski Regional Court (\u201cthe Regional Court\u201d) against the applicant for infringement of his personal rights. He requested that the court order the applicant to publish an apology in the local weekly newspaper and pay 4,000 Polish zlotys (PLN) to the Voluntary Fire Brigade (Ochotnicza Stra\u017c Po\u017carna \u2013 \u201cthe VFB\u201d). 12.  On 31 May 2011 the Regional Court decided that the applicant had violated Z.M.\u2019s personal rights and ordered that he send a statement by post to the district mayor, the Tomasz\u00f3w Mazowiecki Commune Office (Urz\u0105d Gminy w Tomaszowie Mazowieckim) and Z.M. stating:\n\u201cI, Jarsos\u0142aw Ko\u015b\u0107, apologise to [Z.M.] for violating his reputation by forwarding to the Mayor of Tomasz\u00f3w District a document on [7 October] 2010 entitled \u201cPetition\u201d, which contained false allegations that the local mayor, Z.M., arbitrarily managed funds for the benefit of the village; that he took, as local mayor, the payments under the lease of the village shop; and a statement that the community hall had not been available to the residents for the past [ten] years.\u201d 13.  In the course of the proceedings the court examined a statement made at the village meeting on 10 February 2011 at which six residents of Jadwig\u00f3w confirmed that they had all been instigators of the enquiry in October 2010 which had resulted in the applicant\u2019s document to the district mayor. The residents explained that their intention had been to clarify the questions raised, given Z.M.\u2019s involvement in matters such as the community hall refurbishment and running of the VFB. 14.  The court considered that the applicant\u2019s letter from 7 October 2010 contained false information, which supported the finding of a violation of Z.M\u2019s personal rights. This included statements claiming that Z.M., acting in his capacity as local mayor, had taken rent from the lease of the village shop. The domestic court established that even if Z.M. had taken any payments, he had done so as chairman of the VFB. The court also found that the village shop was located in the building owned by the VFB, which also hosted the community hall, and that the rent under the lease was paid to the VFB through an intermediary, its treasurer. Z.M., as chairman of the VFB, merely set the amount of rent to be paid each year. The court also found that during Z.M.\u2019s time in office, the community hall had been open for public use; in that respect it dismissed the testimony of some witnesses stating the opposite. At the time, there were also building works being carried out in the same building. It was established that nobody, and this included Z.M., had received any money in cash for the work. It was also established that the village had not received any funds directly from the commune. The commune had paid the costs of the renovations of the VFB\u2019s building. 15.  The court considered that since the applicant had failed to prove the veracity of his accusations and, given their adverse effect, this amounted to a violation of Z.M.\u2019s personal rights. 16.  On 12 July 2011 the applicant lodged an appeal with the \u0141\u00f3d\u017a Court of Appeal, alleging that the court had not considered that the relevant text had been communicated in the public interest. 17.  On 4 November 2011 the \u0141\u00f3d\u017a Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal, emphasising that the publishing of false information would result in a violation of a person\u2019s personal rights. It rejected the applicant\u2019s claim that the petition was merely an expression of doubt concerning the lawfulness of Z.M.\u2019s actions when he was local mayor. The court considered that the timing of the applicant\u2019s actions proved that they had not served the public interest and had been motivated by his desire to win the elections. He had raised his concerns almost three years after the end of Z.M.\u2019s mandate during the electoral campaign which Z.M. had lost. The applicant received a copy of the judgment on 15 December 2011. 18.  On 1 March 2012 the Regional Court issued a writ of enforcement in respect of its final judgment of 31 May 2011. The applicant instituted proceedings to have the enforcement order quashed on the grounds that he had a case pending before the European Court of Human Rights. On 21 September 2012 the Piotrk\u00f3w Trybunalski Regional Court dismissed his claim. On 18 October 2012 the applicant lodged an appeal against the latter judgment. On 7 November 2013 it was dismissed by the Piotrk\u00f3w Trybunalski Court of Appeal. 19.  On 21 January 2011 the applicant was elected mayor of Jadwig\u00f3w.", "references": ["5", "2", "7", "4", "1", "3", "9", "0", "8", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Rostov-on-Don, Russian Federation. She is the sister of Seyran Ayvazyan, who was born in 1961 and was killed by police officers on 6 March 2006. He had been suffering from a mental disorder (paranoid-type schizophrenia) and at the material time had been living alone in the village of Odzun, in the Lori Region of Armenia. 6.  The circumstances of Seryan Ayvazyan\u2019s fatal shooting, as established by the decision issued by the investigator on 3 October 2006 following the end of the investigation (see paragraph 30 below), are as follows. 7.  On 6 March 2006 at around 11 a.m. Seyran Ayvazyan went to a local shop, where he took out a knife and, for no reason, stabbed H.Ch., a shop assistant, in the arm, and E.P., a customer entering the shop, in the cheek. He then went home. 8.  Some time later, after a telephone call made from the Odzun Medical Centre to the police station of the nearby town of Tumanyan, four police officers, A.A., V.B., A.E. and M.V., arrived at Seyran Ayvazyan\u2019s house. As they approached, Seyran Ayvazyan was in the garden and, having seen the police officers, ran towards the house. The police officers started chasing him. As Seyran Ayvazyan entered the house and was about to shut the door, police officer V.B. reached him and started to push the door open. At that moment Seyran Ayvazyan stabbed V.B. in the arm and cheek with the knife, through the half-open door, and managed to shut the door. V.B. was taken by car to hospital, while A.A. and A.E., who remained at the house, called Tumanyan police station and reported the incident. Then they tried to persuade Seyran Ayvazyan to come out, but the latter refused to do so, threatening to kill anybody who tried to approach the house and sharpening his knives in full view. They contacted one of Seyran Ayvazyan\u2019s sisters, who lived in the same village, but she refused to come. Having received the call from A.A. and A.E, nine more police officers, including A.S., N.N., G.M., R.M., H.Gev., and H.Gri, led by Major A.B., the chief of Tumanyan police station, arrived at the house and surrounded it. The mayor of Odzun, an ambulance and the fire brigade were also called. Another attempt was made to have Seyran Ayvazyan\u2019s relatives, who lived in the same village, come to the scene in order to persuade him to surrender, but they refused to come. Then for about five hours the police officers tried to persuade Seyran Ayvazyan to surrender, but he continued to display the same threatening behaviour as earlier. In the meantime, the police officers contacted the head of Vanadzor Psychiatric Hospital, who told them that it would only be possible to tranquillise Seyran Ayvazyan only in hospital. 9.  At around 5 p.m. it was decided to neutralise and apprehend Seyran Ayvazyan by spraying him with water from the hose of a fire engine. After the fire hose had been turned on, six police officers, A.S., N.N., G.M., R.M., H.Gev. and A.A., upon an order from the chief of Tumanyan police station, pushed open the door and entered the house. H.Gev., who was the first to enter, held a small wooden table in front of him as a shield against a knife attack. After the police officers entered, they saw that the way from the corridor into the room had been barricaded with furniture. The police officers decided on the spot to leave the house and the entire group went out. Having seen that the police officers were leaving, Seyran Ayvazyan moved towards them with a knife in each hand, reached H.Gev. by the door to the porch, and stabbed him in the head with one of the knives. H.Gev. immediately fell as a result of the stabbing. As he was lying on the ground, Seyran Ayvazyan tried to stab him again, but at that moment another police officer, H.Gri., who was guarding the entrance, fired a warning shot in the air from his automatic rifle and, seeing that Seyran Ayvazyan was still trying to stab H.Gev., shot at Seyran Ayvazyan\u2019s legs. At the same time, and independently of those actions, police officers A.S., A.A. and R.M., seeing that H.Gev. had fallen as a result of the assault and that Seyran Ayvazyan was trying to stab him again, started to shoot with their pistols at Seyran Ayvazyan\u2019s legs. A.S. fired eight shots, while A.A. and R.M. fired three shots each. As a result of the shooting, Seyran Ayvazyan was wounded, fell and died. 10.  During the subsequent on-site inspection, two knives were found in the porch, as well as a hand grenade and one more knife in the corridor. 11.  During an inspection of Seyran Ayvazyan\u2019s clothes, two more knives and a medical lancet were discovered. 12.  As a result of being assaulted by Seyran Ayvazyan, civilians H.Ch. and E.P. and police officers V.B. and H.Gev. received injuries that were of minor or medium severity, but not life-threatening. 13.  The applicant contested these facts and alleged that in reality Seyran Ayvazyan had not posed a threat to police officer H.Gev.\u2019s life and that the police officers had simply executed him in retaliation for his having injured one of their colleagues. 14.  On the date of the incident the Lori regional prosecutor\u2019s office decided to institute criminal case no. 55200706 for attempted murder under Article 104, in conjunction with Article 34 of the Criminal Code (CC), on account of Seyran Ayvazyan\u2019s actions, namely his armed assaults on civilians and police officers. 15.  On the same date an inspection of the crime scene was conducted and a report produced, which included sketch maps. The house had two rooms, one behind the other, divided by a wall, with a passageway on the right. All along the front of the house there was a porch, which measured 3 by 1.8 metres. There were windows onto the porch on the left, and the main entrance was on the right, in front of the above\u2011mentioned passageway. The house also had windows on the right side. The sketch map also noted the positions of Seyran Ayvazyan and police officer H.Gev. at the time of the incident. Seyran Ayvazyan appears to have been on the porch just outside the main entrance and police officer H.Gev. appears to have been next to him. Police officers H.Gri. and R.M. were also on the porch to the left of the main entrance, while police officers A.S. and A.A. were outside the porch in front of the main entrance. 16.  On 7 March 2006 an autopsy was conducted. According to the results, Seyran Ayvazyan had received wounds from ten bullets, nine of which had hit him in his calves and thighs and his left forearm and one of which had hit him in the chest. Six bullets had been shot at Seyran Ayvazyan from behind. The direct cause of Seyran Ayvazyan\u2019s death had been severe internal bleeding resulting from a bullet wound to the chest, which had damaged the lower part of the heart and a lung. Death had occurred shortly after Seyran Ayvazyan being wounded. 17.  On 11 April 2006 An.A., one of Seyran Ayvazyan\u2019s four sisters, was granted victim status in the instituted criminal proceedings. This decision indicated that, as a result of a crime, physical damage, namely death, had been inflicted on Seyran Ayvazyan. 18.  On 18 April 2006 a ballistic examination of cartridge cases and bullets retrieved after the incident was conducted. It was established that they had come from police ammunition. The weapons that had been used were three Makarov pistols and one Kalashnikov automatic rifle. 19.  On 16 June 2006 a forensic examination concluded that the five knives and the medical lancet did not fall into the category of \u201cbladed weapons\u201d. All of the knives but one were homemade. 20.  On 22 June 2006 a forensic examination report was released. According to the report, Seyran Ayvazyan\u2019s clothes had been damaged by at least twelve bullets shot at close range. 21.  On 10 August 2006 a medical expert produced his opinion regarding Seyran Ayvazyan\u2019s mental health, according to which, Seyran Ayvazyan had suffered from a mental disorder \u2013 paranoid schizophrenia, and had received treatment for his condition in various mental health institutions since 1993. 22.  The investigator took statements from five of the seven police officers involved in the arrest operation and the fatal shooting (A.S., H.Gev., H.Gri., N.N., A.A., G.M. and R.M.). Three of the four police officers who had fired shots, A.S., H.Gri. and A.A., were questioned on 6, 14 and 16 March 2006 respectively, while H.Gev. (who had been injured in the incident) and N.N. were questioned on 7 and 15 March 2006 respectively. The police officers were asked to provide an account of the incident. 23.  Police officer A.S.\u2019s account was as follows. Seyran Ayvazyan was in the second (rear) room when the six police officers entered the house. The door was barricaded with an armchair and a wardrobe. As they were entering, he proposed that Seyran Ayvazyan come out of the room but he held the knife as if he wanted to throw it and kept threatening to stab him. Realising that it was not possible to remove him from the room and that he could harm someone, A.S. told the other five police officers that they should all go outside and find another way to neutralise Seyran Ayvazyan. They left the house; the last one to leave was H.Gev., who was holding a table to protect himself in case a knife was thrown. A.S. went down from the porch and was already in the yard when those of his colleagues who had gathered there shouted \u201cHe has come out and attacked.\u201d H.Gev. was holding a table, defending himself against Seyran Ayvazyan. A.S. ran towards them and saw Seyran Ayvazyan stab H.Gev. in the head, so he shot at Seyran Ayvazyan\u2019s legs. Seyran Ayvazyan fell down and, while lying on the ground, he threw the same knife at H.Gev. Then he took out another knife and threw it at the police officers. A.S. fired again in his direction. Seyran Ayvazyan then took out a third knife, rolled over, while shouting, and tried to throw the knife in A.S.\u2019s direction. A.S. fired again and Seyran Ayvazyan dropped the knife. The police officers approached and handcuffed him. 24.  Police officer H.Gev.\u2019s account was as follows. After the six police officers had entered the house, Seyran Ayvazyan threatened them and told them to leave. They left \u2013 that is to say he noticed that the others had already gone out. Realising that he was alone, he tried to leave the house while holding the table. He had not yet reached the door when suddenly Seyran Ayvazyan screamed and ran towards him with a knife in his hand. Seeing this, he tried to move faster towards the door. Seyran Ayvazyan reached him and stabbed him with the knife in the head. This happened in the doorway. Seyran Ayvazyan managed to stab him because he (that is to say Seyran Ayvazyan) was taller, although he (that is to say H.Gev) had managed to a certain extent to push Seyran Ayvazyan back with the table. He fell down on the porch. As he was lying on his side, facing the door and bleeding, he saw Seyran Ayvazyan trying to stab him a second time with the same knife, again in the head. Seyran Ayvazyan was still standing at a distance of one metre away while he (that is to say H.Gev) continued to use the table to defend himself. After Seyran Ayvazyan had tried to stab him for a second time, he heard a number of shots, but could not remember how many. He saw that the shots had hit Seyran Ayvazyan in the legs. Seyran Ayvazyan fell down, with his legs lying next to his own. Seyran Ayvazyan then took out another knife. Seyran Ayvazyan must have thrown the first knife either in his direction or in the direction of those who were behind him, but he could not tell how far away the knife had been thrown. Seyran Ayvazyan subsequently wanted to get up and stab him again, but then he heard other shots. Seyran Ayvazyan was screaming loudly, but while the shots were being fired the others dragged him away from Seyran Ayvazyan and transported him to the hospital. 25.  Police officer H.Gri.\u2019s account was as follows. Seyran Ayvazyan hid behind the wardrobe with a knife in his hand and made death threats when the six police officers tried to approach. At that time he was standing with his rifle next to the porch windows. Then he heard Seyran Ayvazyan screaming and saw the others come out of the house and Seyran Ayvazyan, with a knife in his hand, run towards and reach H.Gev. (who had been the last to leave) and stab him in the head. H.Gev. squatted and started bleeding. With the same knife Seyran Ayvazyan tried to stab H.Gev., who was at that time lying on the ground, one more time. He fired a warning shot in the air but seeing that Seyran Ayvazyan was trying to stab H.Gev. again he fired at Seyran Ayvazyan\u2019s left leg, with the aim of neutralising him. Seyran Ayvazyan did not fall after his shot but stumbled back with a knife in his hand. One of the police officers at that moment managed to drag H.Gev. away from Seyran Ayvazyan, who then threw a knife at them and took out another knife to throw again. Seyran Ayvazyan was still standing. He heard a number of other shots but could not tell who had fired them, how many there had been and at which parts of Seyran Ayvazyan\u2019s body the shots had been fired. He did not fire any other shots apart from the above-mentioned two. Then the other police officers managed to approach and disarm Seyran Ayvazyan, who was already on the ground. 26.  Police officer N.N.\u2019s account was as follows. Police officer H.Gev. was the first to enter the house, holding a table as a shield, since Seyran Ayvazyan was holding a knife by its blade and was threatening to throw it. He and the others following H.Gev. entered the first room. Seyran Ayvazyan retreated into the second room and barricaded the door with an armchair, which prevented them from entering the second room. Seyran Ayvazyan refused to give up and would not allow them to advance, threatening them with a knife. They were forced to leave the house. While they were still on the porch, he N.N. heard the others saying \u201cHe\u2019s coming\u201d. He turned around and saw that Seyran Ayvazyan, having left the house, in the doorway stabbed H.Gev. in the head with a knife. H.Gev. immediately started bleeding. He had tried to defend himself with a table, but Seyran Ayvazyan had managed to stretch his hand over it and stab H.Gev., who had fallen down. As far as N.N. could recall, Seyran Ayvazyan then fell; after falling he threw the knife at them. Then Seyran Ayvazyan took out another knife and wanted to stab H.Gev. again. At that moment N.N. heard shots but did not see who was firing. Then they managed to handcuff Seyran Ayvazyan. 27.  Police officer A.A.\u2019s account was as follows. Once the fire engine had started working, they broke down the door and entered the house. H.Gev. was the first to enter \u2013 or rather they all entered together, with a small table in front of them for protection. At that moment the fire engine was spraying water at Seyran Ayvazyan, who had barricaded himself in with a wardrobe and moved the wardrobe to protect himself from the water. Seyran Ayvazyan had also placed an armchair between the two rooms, so that they could not enter the second room. They tried to persuade him to throw down the knife, but he continued to threaten them. As Seyran Ayvazyan was not coming out and was refusing to calm down, A.A. received an order to leave the house in order that an alternative plan could be devised. As the six police officers were leaving, Seyran Ayvazyan unexpectedly ran towards them, screaming loudly. A.A. could not see whether Seyran Ayvazyan had a knife since he (that is to say A.A.) was facing the main entrance. He heard somebody outside say \u201cCareful, he\u2019s about to strike\u201d. He then jumped out of the house and over the porch into the yard. Before rolling away, he heard two shots and saw H.Gev. lying in the porch on his back, facing the main entrance. Seyran Ayvazyan was squatting with a knife in his hand and was trying to stab H.Gev., who had already been injured. Thinking that the shots fired earlier had not touched Seyran Ayvazyan and that, if he did not shoot, Seyran Ayvazyan would strike again and kill H.Gev., he took out his weapon, took aim at Seyran Ayvazyan\u2019s legs and fired three shots at them. While shooting, he heard other shots and saw Seyran Ayvazyan fall next to H.Gev. He then saw two knives in Seyran Ayvazyan\u2019s hands. 28.  The investigator posed between two to four questions to each of the police officers. A.S. was asked (a) whether it would have been possible to neutralise Seyran Ayvazyan without the use of firearms (answer: negative) and (b) how many firearms had been used for that purpose (three). H.Gev. was asked how much time had elapsed between their entering the house and the stabbing (three to four minutes). H.Gri. was asked who had been beside him at the time of the shooting (police officer A.S.) and how many knives Seyran Ayvazyan had had (at least three). N.N. and A.A. were asked whether they had received an order to shoot before they had entered the house (both: negative). A.A. was also asked (a) who had been beside him at the time of the shooting (he could not remember) and (b) to provide further details of the shooting incident. H.Gev., H.Gri., N.N. and A.A. were also asked whether they had noticed a grenade in Seyran Ayvazyan\u2019s hands or whether he had made threats with a grenade (all four: negative).\n(b)  Other police officers present at the scene 29.  Between 20 March and 30 July 2006 the investigator took statements from six other police officers who had been present at the scene. Police officers H.Grig. and L.K., who had witnessed the shooting incident, were asked to provide accounts. Police officer D.K. submitted, inter alia, that neighbours and other villagers had been present and had watched the entire incident; this was confirmed by H.Grig. Police officer S.A. submitted, inter alia, that there had been between ten and twenty police officers at the scene. All the above-mentioned police officers submitted that the fire brigade and an ambulance had been called to the scene. L.K. further submitted that he had seen another police officer, A.T., filming the incident but was not sure whether he had been filming during the shooting. A.T., when asked about the video, submitted that no material was available since he had been mistakenly filming without a tape in the camera, which he had discovered only later. 30.  On 3 October 2006 an investigator of the Lori regional prosecutor\u2019s office, decided to discontinue criminal case no. 55200706 in the light of the death of Seyran Ayvazyan. By the same decision the investigator refused to institute criminal proceedings against police officers A.S., A.A., R.M. and H.Gri. The wording of the decision first outlined the facts, as established by the investigation (see paragraphs 7-12 above), and concluded that the police officers had employed their service weapons in the light of the exigencies of the situation for the purpose of repelling a life-threatening attack on police officer H.Gev. Thus, their actions had been lawful, as they had been undertaken in compliance with the requirements of sections 32 \u00a7 2 and 33 of the Police Act. 31.  On an unspecified date the applicant, together with An.A. and her two other sisters, lodged a complaint with the Lori regional prosecutor seeking to quash the part of the decision of 3 October 2006 relating to the refusal to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers. 32.  On 16 November 2006 the Lori regional prosecutor informed them by letter that there were no legal grounds for quashing the decision of 3 October 2006 since it had been taken on the basis of an accurate legal assessment of the circumstances of the case. 33.  The applicant and her three sisters then lodged a similar complaint with the General Prosecutor\u2019s Office of Armenia. 34.  On 19 January 2007 the General Prosecutor\u2019s Office informed them that there were no grounds for quashing the decision of 3 October 2006 since, following a thorough and objective investigation, the actions of the police officers had been determined to have been lawful. 35.  On 27 June 2007 An.A. lodged a complaint in her capacity as a victim with the Lori Regional Court against the decision of 3 October 2006, seeking to have invalidated the part of the decision concerning the refusal to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers for killing her brother. In particular, she complained that, despite the fact that her brother had been deliberately killed by the police officers, no separate criminal proceedings had been instituted and no criminal investigation had been conducted into the fact of his killing. She also complained that the police officers had opened fire on Seyran Ayvazyan in a situation where there had been no threat to life or limb for any of them. As to the finding of a grenade in Seyran Ayvazyan\u2019s house, An.A stated that this could not serve as justification for the police officers\u2019 actions, since it had been discovered only after the fatal incident had taken place, and her brother had never threatened the policemen that he would use it. 36.  On 29 June 2007 the Lori Regional Court admitted the complaint for examination as having been lodged in compliance with Articles 185 and 263 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (\u201cthe CCP\u201d). 37.  On 12 September 2007 the Lori Regional Court, relying on the facts, as established by the investigation, examined the complaint and decided to dismiss it, finding that the use of firearms by the police officers had been justified as they had opened fire to prevent, and protect themselves from, Seyran Ayvazyan\u2019s unlawful violent actions. It concluded that the police officers had acted in necessary defence, as provided for by Article 42 of the CC, and also in compliance with sections 32 \u00a7 2 and 33 of the Police Act. The Regional Court moreover held that there was no need to institute separate criminal proceedings concerning Seyran Ayvazyan\u2019s killing, since the investigation into that incident had been carried out within the framework of criminal proceedings instituted in relation to Seyran Ayvazyan\u2019s unlawful actions. Separately, the Regional Court found that the complaint against the refusal to institute criminal proceedings had been lodged outside the one-month time-limit prescribed by Article 290 of the CCP. 38.  On 27 September 2007 An.A. lodged an appeal against the decision of the Regional Court raising the same arguments as those contained in her original court complaint. She also alleged that she had lodged her complaint in compliance with the procedural rules since neither of the applicable Articles of the CCP, namely Articles 185 and 263 (as in force at the material time), had provided any time-limit for lodging a complaint. 39.  On 23 October 2007 the Criminal Court of Appeal examined the merits of the appeal and dismissed it, upholding the findings of the Regional Court concerning the lawfulness of the police officers\u2019 actions. It then also examined the question of the compliance of An.A.\u2019s court complaint with the procedural rules and found that it had not been lodged in compliance with Article 290 of the CCP. 40.  On 1 February 2008 An.A. lodged an appeal on points of law against the decision of the Court of Appeal, raising the same arguments regarding both the admissibility and the merits of her court complaint. 41.  On 4 March 2008 the Court of Cassation declared the appeal admissible. 42.  On 23 May 2008 the Court of Cassation examined the appeal. Turning to the question of compliance with domestic time-limits, it found that the appeal procedure pursued by An.A. was indeed governed by Article 263 \u00a7 2, which at the material time had not prescribed any time-limits for contesting the prosecutor\u2019s refusal before the courts. However, the one\u2011month time-limit prescribed by Article 290 was applicable to her case. The appeal had only been lodged on 27 June 2007 \u2013 namely outside that one-month time\u2011limit. Thus, both the Regional Court and the Court of Appeal had exceeded their temporal jurisdiction by examining the merits of An.A.\u2019s complaint. This in itself was sufficient grounds for rejecting the appeal; however, the Court of Cassation found it necessary \u2013 taking into account the fact that (a) both courts had examined the merits of the case and had reached findings on the merits, and (b) it was called upon to ensure uniform application of the law \u2013 to express a number of legal positions on the matter, which could provide guidance to lower courts in similar cases. 43.  The Court of Cassation first examined the question of whether any criminal proceedings had been instituted and any investigation carried out into the killing of Seyran Ayvazyan. Referring to Articles 27 \u00a7 1, 175 and 182 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 2 of the CCP, the Court of Cassation concluded that it was impossible to answer that question unequivocally. In particular, a number of factors suggested that criminal case no. 55200706 had been instituted on account of the acts committed by Seyran Ayvazyan rather than his killing. Firstly, the proceedings had been instituted only under Article 104 \u00a7 2 (1), in conjunction with Article 34 of the CC (namely in respect of attempted murder of two or more persons) and therefore could not legally be characterised as applying to his killing. Secondly, the wording of the decision to discontinue the proceedings also contained a refusal to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers implicated in his shooting, which confirmed that no criminal proceedings had been instituted on account of that incident. 44.  On the other hand, a number of factors suggested that the proceedings instituted had also been based on the fact that he had been killed, and an investigation had been carried out in that connection. Thus, the descriptive part of the wording of the decision to institute proceedings had mentioned the fact that Seyran Ayvazyan had been taken to hospital and had died. Furthermore, Seyran Ayvazyan\u2019s sister, An.A., had been granted victim status in the criminal case by decision of the investigator, moreover, that decision had stated that Seyran Ayvazyan had been deprived of his life \u201cas a result of a crime\u201d. Lastly, certain investigative measures taken in the course of the criminal proceedings had been aimed at obtaining evidence concerning the circumstances of Seyran Ayvazyan\u2019s death, including the inspections of the crime scene, of Seyran Ayvazyan\u2019s body and of his clothes, the autopsy, the forensic examination of his clothes and the interviews with the police officers who had shot at Seyran Ayvazyan or witnessed the shootings. This suggested that some investigation into his death had nevertheless been carried out. Having reached this conclusion, the Court of Cassation decided in any event to examine the question of whether the investigation had been adequate. 45.  The Court of Cassation firstly noted that there had been no eyewitnesses to the shooting, other than the police officers. However, not all the police officers who had witnessed the shooting had been questioned. In particular, two of the six officers who had been present at the time of the shooting, namely G.M. and R.M, had not been questioned. Thus, the investigating authority had failed to secure all the evidence relating to the incident. As regards those officers who had been questioned, H.Gri. had been questioned eight days, N.N. nine days and A.A. ten days after the incident. No measures had been taken in the meantime to isolate them from each other. While there was no evidence to suggest that the police officers had colluded with each other, the fact that no steps had been taken to minimise such risk constituted a significant shortcoming in the investigation. Furthermore, no adequate assessment had been made of the direction of the bullets fired at Seyran Ayvazyan. In particular, no reasonable explanation had been determined by the investigation for the fact that six bullets had been fired at Seyran Ayvazyan from behind. 46.  On the basis of those findings, the Court of Cassation concluded that the investigation into the killing of Seyran Ayvazyan had not been adequate. Nevertheless, the Court of Cassation decided to dismiss the appeal on points of law on the ground that neither the Lori Regional Court nor the Criminal Court of Appeal had had temporal competence to examine the complaint against the decision of 3 October 2006. 47.  On an unspecified date Seyran Ayvazyan\u2019s sister, An.A., died.", "references": ["3", "4", "5", "1", "9", "7", "6", "2", "8", "No Label", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "5.  The first applicant was born in 1959. From 2004 until 16 January 2012 he was Minister (Landesrat) of the Regional Government of Carinthia (K\u00e4rntner Landesregierung). He was also head of the Austrian Peoples\u2019 Party in Carinthia (\u00d6sterreichische Volkspartei K\u00e4rnten \u2013 \u00d6VP K\u00e4rnten), which was coalition partner of the Alliance for the Future of Austria (B\u00fcndnis Zukunft \u04e6sterreich, BZ\u04e6) under the leadership of J.H. 6.  The second applicant was born in 1970 and lives in Klagenfurt\u2011W\u00f6lfnitz. He studied law and worked as a lawyer before becoming an employee of the Landes-und Hypothekenbank (\u201cH. Bank\u201d) in 1999. In 2004 he became a board member of that bank. In 2007 he became a member of the board of K\u00e4rntner Landes- und Hypothekenbank-Holding (hereinafter referred to as \u201cLandesholding\u201d). 7.  The third applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Maria W\u00f6rth. He studied law and worked as a lawyer before becoming an employee of the law department of the H. Bank in 1999. In 2001 he was appointed head of that department. In 2005 he became a member of the board of the Landesholding. 8.  The Landesholding is a corporate body governed by public law (Anstalt \u00f6ffentlichen Rechts). It was set up to manage the estate of the Land of Carinthia considering its interests (unter Ber\u00fccksichtung der Interessen des Landes). The Land of Carinthia is liable as a guarantor in the event of Landesholding\u2019s insolvency. 9.  The Landesholding is governed by a board of management (Vorstand), consisting of two people, which represents it. The board is supervised by a supervisory body (Aufsichtsrat), which appoints the board\u2019s members and participates in special commercial transactions specified by the law. The supervisory body itself is appointed by the Regional Government of Carinthia and is composed of representatives of the political parties to the regional parliament (Landtag). 10.  It is the task of one member of the regional government \u2013 the commissioner (Aufsichtskommiss\u00e4r), a position defined by the relevant law \u2013 to monitor the supervisory board. He or she has the power to appeal against decisions of the supervisory board if they run counter to the interests of the Land. 11.  On 1 January 1991 the H. Bank was disjoined from Landesholding and became a public limited company (Aktiengesellschaft). The majority of its shares were held by Landesholding until 2006. Following an increase in capital stock at the end of 2006, Landesholding still owned 44.91% of the shares. 12.  From 1999 to 2008 Regional Governor and Head of the Regional Government of Carinthia was J.H. 13.  In 2007, as Governor of Carinthia, J.H. was the commissioner. The first applicant was chairperson of the supervisory board of the Landesholding. 14.  After careers as managers in H. Bank, the second applicant and the third applicant were appointed as members of the board of management of Landesholding. 15.  In 2007 B. Bank showed an interest in taking over H. Bank by buying a certain number of its shares. The ensuing negotiations involved J.H. and the first applicant as the political leaders of the Regional Government of Carinthia, the head of the management board of H. Bank, the head of another shareholder, as well as an investors group. The main negotiations were carried out by investment banks and law firms. J.H. and the first applicant appointed D.B., an accountant and financial consultant (Wirtschaftspr\u00fcfer und Steuerberater) based in Villach, Austria, to take part in and supervise the negotiations. 16.  The board of management of Landesholding itself was not informed and did not participate in the negotiation process. Not only did it not appoint D.B. but it was not informed about his mandate. It was informed about the negotiation process just a short time before the signing of the contract. D.B.\u2019s mandate was not communicated to it. 17.  The Landesholding management board had to sign the contract for the transfer of the shares and the supervisory board had to authorise the transaction in advance. On 21 May 2007 the supervisory board was informed by the first applicant on behalf of the management board, and the deal was confirmed by four votes to three. The contract was signed on 22 May 2007. 18.  On 9 October 2007 all the legal arrangements necessary for finalising the transaction were completed. B. Bank bought around 25% of the shares previously held by Landesholding for 809,544,534 euros (EUR). 19.  In a plenary debate of the Carinthian Regional Parliament on 9 August 2007, J.H. stated that the costs of the consultation service connected to the share deal would not exceed EUR 250,000. 20.  In February 2008 the first applicant and J.H. informed the second applicant that they had entrusted D.B. with supervising the negotiations on behalf of Landesholding and that he was entitled to a fee of 1.5% of the total sales profit (EUR 12,143,168). They said that Landesholding should pay that fee. The second applicant informed the third applicant, and on 12 February 2008 they both presented D.B.\u2019s claim for fees as reasonable to the supervisory board of Landesholding. The lawfulness of the claim was a matter of discussion at the supervisory board meeting. No final conclusion was reached in that regard. 21.  After the meeting of the supervisory board, the media reported on D.B.\u2019s claim and expressed doubts as to his contribution to the negotiation process and the amount of the fee. Following the media coverage and the discussion at the supervisory board\u2019s meeting, the Landesholding management board (the second applicant and the third applicant) commissioned lawyers and legal experts and asked them to confirm the appropriateness and reasonability of the claim for fees. 22.  Three external legal experts examined the case put before them. They assessed the risk of civil claims being raised and the potential consequences under criminal law, under the explicit assumption that the bill for D.B.\u2019s services was reasonable. The core question \u2013 whether D.B.\u2019s claim for fees was reasonable \u2013 was to be answered by another three external experts. One of those experts, however, informed the second applicant, the third applicant and their lawyers that he would not conclude that the claim for fees was reasonable. According to a note of 7 March 2008 written by a lawyer appointed by the second and the third applicant, they tried to persuade the privately commissioned expert in a telephone conversation to make several changes to his report and to declare that the fees were reasonable. The expert refused to do so. In the end, he agreed to delete one paragraph which had stated that the services provided by D.B. were not equivalent to those of an investment bank. 23.  As the media controversy did not cease and the expert had not confirmed the reasonableness of the fee, D.B. agreed in talks with J.H. and the first applicant to reduce his claim for fees by half. The expert was then asked to amend his report and in March 2008 he concluded that a fee of EUR 6,000,000 could be considered reasonable considering the fees generally charged by investment banks. 24.  Based on this expert\u2019s report, the supervisory board discussed the payment of the fee at its meetings held on 25 April and 29 May 2008 and finally agreed to the payment by four votes to three. 25.  On 4 June 2008 the third applicant ordered the payment of EUR  4,500,000 to D.B. On 17 December 2009 the second applicant and the third applicant ordered the payment of the remaining amount to D.B. 26.  The share deal was the subject of intense debate within the Carinthian Regional Parliament and the Bavarian Regional Parliament, as B.  Bank\u2019s head office was in Munich. That led to parliamentary enquiries (Untersuchungsausschuss) in both parliaments. 27.   The Carinthian branch of the Social Democratic Party of Austria (SP\u04e6 K\u00e4rnten) and R.H., a Member of the Carinthian Regional Parliament, lodged separate criminal complaints (Strafanzeige) against J.H., the first applicant and D.B. In March 2008 the public prosecutor opened preliminary proceedings against J.H., the first applicant and D.B. for breach of trust and fraud. 28.  On 21 June 2008 the second applicant and the third applicant submitted four expert reports indicating that the fees claimed by D.B. for his services in the negotiation process had been appropriate and reasonable. 29.  J.H., the first applicant and D.B. gave statements to the public prosecutor and refuted the accusations. 30.  On 2 September 2008 the second applicant and the third applicant gave statements and submitted a contract of 28 April 2008 concluded between J.H., the first applicant, Landesholding and D.B. in which D.B. had reduced his claim for fees from EUR 12,143,168 to EUR 6 million. 31.  On 19 January 2009 the Klagenfurt public prosecutor closed the preliminary proceedings. The investigations against J.H. were closed because he had died on 11 October 2008. The preliminary proceedings against the first applicant and D.B. for breach of trust were closed because a new contract had been concluded fixing a lower fee and the expert reports submitted by the accused had indicated that the claim for fees was appropriate and reasonable. The proceedings against the first applicant for perjury (Falsche Beweisaussage) committed at a hearing of the parliamentary enquiry carried out by the Carinthian Regional Parliament were closed because it could not be proved that he had intended to commit that crime. 32.  On 13 February 2009 R.H. filed a request for the reopening of the preliminary proceedings. 33.  On 17 September 2009 the Graz Court of Appeal rejected the request for the reopening of the preliminary proceedings. 34.  On 1 March 2010, eleven people lodged criminal complaints with the Procurator General\u2019s Office (Generalprokuratur). They accused all of the Klagenfurt public prosecutors of abuse of authority. They asked for the reopening of the preliminary proceedings and the transfer of the case to another public prosecutor\u2019s office. The Procurator General\u2019s Office transferred the file to the Public Prosecutor\u2019s Office for Crimes of Corruption (Korruptionsstaatsanwaltschaft) (\u201cthe KStA\u201d). The KStA conducted an investigation, closed the preliminary proceedings against the public prosecutors and transferred the file to the Klagenfurt public prosecutor\u2019s office, proposing the reopening of the preliminary proceedings. 35.  On 19 January 2011 the public prosecutor reopened the proceedings against the first applicant and D.B. On 9 February 2011 the investigations were extended to the second applicant and the third applicant for breach of trust. 36.  On 6 April 2011 the public prosecutor appointed F.S. as an expert in the preliminary proceedings and instructed him to submit a report dealing with the following questions:\n\u201c- whether the services of D.B. as described in a letter of April 2007 and the progress report of 20 February 2008 were comparable to the services normally offered by an investment bank in similar circumstances\n- what fee was appropriate and reasonable for the services D.B. had provided.\u201d 37.  The accused were informed about the appointment of the expert and told that they could object to his appointment within three days. The applicants did not object. At an unspecified date the case file was transferred to F.S. 38.  On 28 June 2011 F.S. delivered his expert report. The report stated that the services provided by D.B. were not comparable to the services of an investment bank and that a fee of EUR 200,000 would be appropriate and reasonable for the services provided by D.B. 39.  The report was served on the applicants. 40.  On 19 September 2011, the second applicant submitted reports by two court-approved experts which he had commissioned on a private basis. The private expert reports stated that fees of 1.5% of the sum of the transaction were reasonable for the services provided by an investment bank when negotiating a share deal in a similar situation. The services provided by D.B. could in part be seen as those of an investment bank. The second expert certified that D.B. had carried out 43% of the activities normally carried out by an investment bank. Those expert reports were transmitted to F.S. for further consideration. 41.  On 28 September 2011 F.S. commented on the private expert reports submitted by the second applicant. He said that he had examined carefully the findings of the two experts and that the methods used to assess which activities D.B. had been involved in within the negotiations were not plausible. F.S.\u2019s comment was served on the accused. 42.  On 5 October 2011 the third applicant submitted another expert report by a court-approved expert which he had commissioned on a private basis to counter the findings of F.S. The expert report stated that F.S. had overstepped his competence by weighting the evidence. He had also not fulfilled the formal requirements of an expert report. The calculation of EUR 240,000 as a reasonable fee was criticised as wrong. 43.  On 6 October 2011 that expert report was sent to F.S. for further consideration and, if necessary, amendment of his report. 44.  On 14 October 2011 F.S. commented on the expert report commissioned by third applicant and concluded that there was no need to alter his findings. His comment was submitted to the accused. 45.  On 16 December 2011 Landesholding submitted another expert report which its supervisory board had commissioned from a private limited company. The report examined the liability of the board members under civil law and concluded that the second applicant and the third applicant could not be held liable for their actions under civil law. 46.  On 19 December 2011 the second applicant commented on that expert report. 47.  On 21 March 2012 the public prosecutor filed a bill of indictment, charging the second applicant and the third applicant for breach of trust under Article 153 of the Criminal Code and the first applicant and D.B. for aiding and abetting in breach of trust. Based on the expert\u2019s report prepared by F.S., the public prosecutor claimed that the applicants and D.B. knew that only a fee of a maximum of EUR 240,000 was reasonable for D.B.\u2019s assistance in the negotiation process, but had nevertheless instructed Landesholding to pay a fee of EUR 6 million. Therefore they had caused damage amounting to EUR 5,760,000. 48.  The Klagenfurt Regional Court sent out summonses and appointed F.S. as official expert to the trial. 49.  All the applicants and D.B. submitted statements disputing the contentions of the public prosecutor but none of them appealed against the bill of indictment. The second applicant submitted eleven reports by private experts commissioned by the accused in the preliminary proceedings and requested that two of those experts be summoned as official experts to the trial. 50.  On 4 July 2012 the trial started. 51.  After several hearings D.B. conceded on 11 July 2012 that the findings of the official expert, F.S., were correct inasmuch as his services to the negotiation process had not corresponded to a fee of EUR 6 million but only to a fee of EUR 300,000. He further stated that, in his view, the second applicant and the third applicant had known at the relevant time that his fee was inappropriate and unreasonable. Also, his bill had been established together with the second applicant in February 2007 when the latter had stated that he needed documentation to present to the supervisory board of Landesholding. 52.  The applicants disputed D.B.\u2019s confession and argued that the fee paid to him had been reasonable. 53.  On 18 July 2012 the third applicant asked the court not to include the expert report of F.S. in the case file. He argued that F.S. had to be treated as a witness for the prosecution and not as an impartial expert assisting the court. Moreover, F.S. was a professional lawyer and university professor in Germany and not registered in Austria as an expert for book-keeping, cost accounting or financial auditing in the list of court appointed experts and therefore lacked the necessary expert knowledge for assessing whether the remuneration of D.B. had been appropriate. Lastly he submitted that F.S. had been biased because in the course of the preliminary investigations he had answered questions of assessment of evidence and questions of law. Should the court not appoint another official expert for the trial, the third applicant requested that the privately commissioned expert reports presented to the court be included in the file. He also requested that the experts who had drawn up those reports be summoned for questioning as official experts in the trial. The other applicants joined those requests. 54.  The Regional Court dismissed all the requests. As regards the challenge for bias of F.S. and the request not to hear him as expert or to read out his report, it found that from the case file and the evidence collected hitherto it did not appear that there were reasons for considering him as being biased. Since F.S. had been summoned to the hearing by the trial court, he had at the same time been appointed as expert by that court. As regards the argument that he had answered questions of assessment of evidence and questions of law in the preliminary proceedings, the court found that, even assuming that this had been the case, such statements had to be disregarded by the court. As regards the private experts commissioned by the applicants as court appointed experts the Regional Court pointed out that only after having examined and discussed the report by the court appointed expert, the necessity of appointing other experts could be decided. 55.  The public prosecutor extended the charge, claiming that the damage caused by the accused amounted to EUR 6 million. 56.  On 25 July 2012, D.B. confessed that in 2007, after his bill had been paid by Landesholding, the first applicant had asked him to share the money with him and J.H. D.B. had handed over part of the payment to the first applicant. Other leading members of the Alliance for the Future of Austria party had asked for money as well. 57.  At the same hearing, the first applicant conceded that after the deal with B. Bank had been concluded, he and J.H. had decided that part of D.B.\u2019s fee should be used to finance the Austrian Peoples\u2019 Party in Carinthia and the Alliance for the Future of Austria party. He further confessed that he had received a portion of the fee from D.B. 58.  The second applicant and the third applicant maintained their initial statements and claimed that they had acted in good faith without knowing that D.B.\u2019s fees were not reasonable. 59.  On 9 August 2012 F.S. was heard by the court. He gave a brief summary of his written expert report and answered the questions raised by the court and the parties to the trial. While F.S. was being questioned, an expert commissioned by the defence sat next to the applicants\u2019 lawyers and advised them but was not allowed to question F.S. on his own. There is no indication that F.S. took part in any other hearing or put questions to witnesses or the accused. 60.  After the questioning of F.S., the applicants and their co-accused reiterated their request to appoint another official expert. In their view, the answers given by F.S. had shown that his expert report was deficient. They further argued that the appointment of another expert was necessary because F.S. had to be considered as a witness for the prosecution and not as an impartial expert assisting the court. 61.  The court dismissed those requests. 62.  On 1 October 2012 the Klagenfurt Regional Court reached a verdict. It convicted the accused as charged and sentenced the first applicant to five and a half years, the second applicant to three years, the third applicant to two years and D.B. to three years of imprisonment. In addition, they were ordered to repay EUR 4,765,193 plus interest to Landesholding for compensation. The Regional Court found that the services provided by D.B. in the negotiation process only corresponded to fees in the amount of EUR  300,000 and that the second applicant and the third applicant had been aware of that fact but had breached their obligation of diligence by authorising the payment of EUR 6 million to D.B. As the first applicant had asked them to authorise the payment, he was guilty of abetting them. 63.  The applicants lodged pleas of nullity and appeals against the sentence. D.B. also lodged an appeal against the sentence. The public prosecutor appealed against the sentences imposed on the second applicant, the third applicant. and D.B. 64.  In their pleas of nullity the applicants, relying on Article 281 sub\u2011paragraph 4 of the Code of Criminal Proceedings (Strafprozessordnung, hereinafter referred to as CCP), stated that the Regional Court should have appointed another official expert. The proceedings had made it clear that F.S.\u2019s expert report had been deficient. F.S. had been appointed by the public prosecutor and had delivered the basis for a bill of indictment, which showed that he was biased. F.S. had to be considered as a witness for the prosecution and not as an impartial expert assisting the court. Moreover, under Article 126 \u00a7 4 of the CCP a challenge for bias against an official expert could not be made on the grounds that he had previously been appointed as official expert in the preliminary investigations. They argued that this provision was not in line with the right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the Convention, as they did not have a real chance to counter F.S.\u2019s expert report. This was aggravated by the fact that the expert reports commissioned by the applicants and their co-accused and submitted to the trial court had not been admitted to the file and the experts had not been summoned as requested. They therefore asked the Supreme Court to request a review of the constitutionality of Article 126 \u00a7 4 of the CCP by the Constitutional Court. 65.  On 11 March 2014 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicants\u2019 pleas of nullity and the appeals of the second applicant and of the public prosecutor, but partly granted the appeals of the first applicant, the third applicant and D.B. The sentence imposed on the third applicant was added to a sentence previously imposed on him on of 2 February 2013 (Zusatzstrafe), and the sentences imposed on the first applicant and D.B. were reduced to four and a half years and two and a half years of imprisonment respectively. 66.  With regard to the alleged violation of Article 6 of the Convention, the Supreme Court found that Article 126 \u00a7 4 of the CCP should in general ensure that two different official experts were not appointed in the preliminary proceedings and the trial, as this would result in delays in the proceedings. Article 126 \u00a7 4 of the CCP did not exclude a challenge for bias, except when it was merely argued with the fact that the expert had been appointed previously in the preliminary proceedings. The requests to appoint another expert had been dismissed by the court not on the grounds of Article 126 \u00a7 4 of the CCP but for other reasons. In fact, it had dismissed the requests because the applicants had not given valid reasons for their bias challenge. It had not been shown that the expert had a close relationship with the public prosecutor that would cast doubts on his objectivity. 67.  Moreover, the neutrality of the expert was ensured as he or she was obliged by law to act in an objective manner. His or her findings had to be based on facts established using scientific methods and principles. Criminal law (perjury) as well as the provisions on challenge for bias would ensure that his or her findings and conclusions were in accordance with the law. The expert was not part of the public prosecutor\u2019s office, and the results of the proceedings had no effect on his or her payment. In the event of a dispute between the public prosecutor and the accused about the amount of the expert\u2019s fees, it was up to the court to fix the amount and to pay the expert. 68.  The Supreme Court also reasoned that in preliminary proceedings as well as in a trial, an accused could address written questions to the official expert and question him or her in court and, in so doing, the accused could be assisted by a privately appointed expert. The Supreme Court noted that the applicants had made use of this opportunity. In that way, the accused had an opportunity to show that the official expert\u2019s report contained errors or shortcomings. If those errors or shortcomings could not be corrected by the official expert, the court had to dismiss him or her and appoint another expert to draw up a report. Furthermore, the findings and conclusions of the official expert could be challenged even before the trial stage by lodging an objection (Einspruch) against the bill of indictment, but this had not been done in the case at hand (see paragraph 50 above). 69.  The Supreme Court rejected as inadmissible the first applicant\u2019s complaint that contacts between the public prosecutor and F.S. had influenced the latter and rendered him biased vis-\u00e0-vis the accused as this complaint had not been submitted following the proper proceedings. It added, however that such a complaint was in any event ill-founded, since the initial contact between the public prosecutor and F.S. merely had the purpose of clarifying under which conditions F.S. would accept the task of drawing up an expert report and subsequent contacts consisted in supplementing the case file which had been transmitted to F.S. for drawing up the report. Thus, it could not be seen how this kind of contact could give rise to doubts as to the neutrality of the expert. 70.  The Supreme Court held further that the applicants in the present case had not used their opportunity to question the competence of F.S. or to object to his appointment in the preliminary proceedings. Moreover, the Regional Court had based its findings and decision primarily not on the expert report, but on D.B.\u2019s confession. Citing the Court\u2019s case-law (Brandstetter v. Austria, 28 August 1991, Series A no. 211; B\u00f6nisch v.  Austria, 6 May 1985, Series A no. 92; and C.B. v. Austria, no. 30465/06, 4 April 2013), the Supreme Court found that the applicants had had sufficient opportunities to question F.S. during the hearing of 9 August 2012. Consequently, the Supreme Court had no doubt that the right to equality of arms in the trial had been maintained. 71.  The written decision of the Supreme Court was served on the applicants on 27 March 2014.", "references": ["6", "2", "8", "5", "1", "3", "4", "0", "7", "9", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1932, 1929, 1965 and 1956 respectively and live in Sofia. 6.  On 15 January 1968 the second applicant, together with the antecedents of the other applicants, bought from the then existing local agricultural co-operative a plot of land situated on the outskirts of Sofia measuring 953 square metres. Until 2002 the applicants or their antecedents enjoyed undisturbed possession of that land. 7.  On 10 May 2002 a group of persons, the heirs of Mr T.S., Mr G.S. and Ms K.S., brought against the applicants a rei vindicatio action, stating that the plot of land was theirs. They stated that the plot, once the property of their antecedents, had been collectivised in the years after 1945, but had been returned to them within the context of the process of the restitution of agricultural land by a decision of the relevant body, the local land commission, dated 27 December 1999. They claimed that under section 10(13) of the Agricultural Land Act (see paragraph 13 below), the fact that the second applicant and the remaining applicants\u2019 antecedents had purchased the land in 1968 could not be held against them. 8.  Initially, the Sofia District Court (its judgement is undated) dismissed the action against the applicants. After an appeal by the heirs of Mr T.S., Mr G.S. and Ms K.S., on 5 November 2009 the Sofia City Court overturned that ruling, allowed the rei vindicatio claim and ordered the applicants to surrender possession of the plot. It found in particular that the land commission\u2019s decision of 27 December 1999 was sufficient to render the claimants the owners of the disputed land. It pointed out that of the two rival claims to the same plot the law \u2013 namely section 10(13) of the Agricultural Land Act \u2013 gave priority to the one based on restitution, and thus had the effect of rendering devoid of any legal force the contract under which the second applicant and the remaining applicants\u2019 predecessors had bought the plot. 9.  In a final decision of 18 June 2010 the Supreme Court of Cassation declined to entertain a cassation appeal by the applicants. 10.  On an unspecified date soon after that the applicants surrendered possession of the plot.", "references": ["0", "3", "5", "8", "4", "2", "1", "7", "6", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1990 and lives in Turkey. 6.  The applicant\u2019s parents, who are of Turkish origin, were living in Austria when the applicant was born. They divorced in 1992 and his father was awarded sole custody. In the same year, his grandparents, who had been looking after him while his father had been working, moved to Turkey and took the applicant and his sister with them. The applicant\u2019s mother also returned to Turkey, but founded a new family and did not keep in touch with him. The applicant lived in Turkey from 1992 until 1998, attending school there for three years. In 1998, when he was eight years old, he and his sister moved back to Austria to live with their father again. For that purpose, the applicant was granted a residence permit by the Austrian authorities. 7.  On 30 December 2004, at the age of 14, the applicant, together with four of his friends, assaulted a man. He jumped on the victim from behind, while his friends beat and kicked the man, causing him serious injuries. They also stole money and cigarettes from their victim. On 20 January 2005 the applicant attempted to shoplift. On 29 August 2005 he drove a moped without the owner\u2019s consent. 8.  On 8 November 2005 the applicant and his friends stole an item from a man. Between 15 and 30 January 2006 the applicant and a group of his friends partly attempted and partly succeeded in stealing the handbags of nine elderly women through threats or the use of force. The applicant was 15 years old at that time. He had ripped the handbags from some of the victims; grabbed one of the women from behind, holding her mouth and dragging her to the ground; hit another one on the head and pushed his knee into her back so that she would fall down; and had also beaten some of them. Two of the women were seriously injured as a result. 9.  On 13 March 2006 the Vienna Regional Criminal Court (Straflandesgericht \u2013 hereinafter, \u201cthe Criminal Court\u201d) convicted the applicant of aggravated robbery, attempted theft and unauthorised use of a motor vehicle (see paragraph 7 above). He was sentenced to one year\u2019s imprisonment, which was suspended for a probationary period of three years. The Criminal Court considered as mitigating factors that the applicant had no previous criminal record, that he had confessed to his crimes and that he had shown willingness to afford redress to the victim. Aggravating factors were that he had committed several offences, specifically a crime and two misdemeanours. In its reasoning of the judgment, the Criminal Court noted that the applicant had been notorious for excessive acts of violence and had had to change schools several times already. It observed that the applicant had virtually no age-appropriate capacity of reflection, and attested that he had an enormous tendency to act aggressively, which he used as his strategy for problem-solving. 10.  On 31 May 2006 the Criminal Court convicted the applicant of aggravated robbery as a member of a criminal organisation and theft (see paragraph 8 above). He was sentenced to two and a half years\u2019 imprisonment. The probationary period of his previous criminal conviction of 13 March 2006 was prolonged to five years in total. The Criminal Court considered the applicant\u2019s confession to be a mitigating factor, but the repeated commission of offences as an aggravating factor. It argued in its reasoning that the applicant had taken a leading role in the robberies. The applicant and his friends had deliberately targeted elderly women because they had expected they would not resist. Moreover, the Criminal Court found that the applicant had been one of the main perpetrators, which is why there was no leeway to pronounce a more lenient sentence than two and a half years\u2019 imprisonment. 11.  On 7 August 2006 the Vienna Federal Police Authority (Bundespolizei\u00addirektion) imposed a ten-year exclusion order (Aufenthaltsverbot) on the applicant pursuant to section 60(1) and (2)(1), section 63(1) and (2), and section 66 of the Aliens Police Act (Fremdenpolizeigesetz). It found that even though most of his family lived in Austria, the applicant\u2019s expulsion was justified because of the severity of his offences in order to protect public order and security. 12.  The applicant appealed. He argued that he had committed the criminal offences as a juvenile delinquent who had had the wrong friends. The authorities had not properly taken into account his interests, given that his father, paternal grandparents, siblings, half-brothers and half-sisters all lived in Austria. Because of his young age he would not be able to live in Turkey by himself. 13.  On 16 March 2007 the Vienna Security Authority (Sicherheitsdirektion) partly granted his appeal and limited the exclusion order to eight years. 14.  On 30 April 2007 the applicant was released from prison because of his good conduct after having served half of his sentence. 15.  On 11 December 2007 the Administrative Court set aside the Vienna Security Authority\u2019s decision of 16 March 2007 for lack of jurisdiction and held that the Independent Administrative Panel (Unabh\u00e4ngiger Verwaltungssenat \u2013 hereinafter, \u201cthe IAP\u201d) was the competent authority to examine the appeal. 16.  On 21 July 2008, following an oral hearing, the Vienna IAP partly granted and partly dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. It confirmed the legality of the exclusion order, but limited it to five years. It considered that the robberies in particular had been serious offences which demonstrated the applicant\u2019s severe disrespect for the well-being and property of others. The victims had been mostly elderly, fragile women, who had been physically weaker than him and his friends. Two of the women had been severely injured. The applicant had been one of the main perpetrators. His tendency towards violence and aggression was remarkable and appeared to have even increased between the first and the second conviction. The IAP further took into consideration that the applicant had only been 14 and 15 years old at the time of the offences, and therefore had still been in the process of reaching maturity. This was however put into perspective by the fact that he had not offended only once, but multiple times, and in a particularly brutal manner. 17.  The IAP proceeded to examine whether it could be assumed that the applicant still posed a threat to public order and safety. His probation officer (Bew\u00e4hrungshelfer) testified that the applicant had developed a sense of justice after his conviction and that cooperation with him had worked well. The applicant had worked as an apprentice during his time in prison. After his release, he had participated in several training programmes and was looking for a job. The IAP noted furthermore that the applicant had not reoffended in over a year since his release from prison. It came to the conclusion, however, that the relatively short time since his release was not enough to prove that he was not a danger to society anymore. 18.  The IAP then assessed whether the exclusion order violated the applicant\u2019s rights under Article 8 of the Convention. It held at the outset that an expulsion of \u201csecond-generation migrants\u201d such as the applicant was subject to stricter criteria than an expulsion of other foreigners. Referring to the Court\u2019s judgments in the cases Boultif v. Switzerland (no. 54273/00, ECHR 2001\u2011IX), \u00dcner v. the Netherlands ([GC] no. 46410/99, ECHR 2006\u2011XII) and Maslov v. Austria ([GC] no. 1638/03, ECHR 2008), it found that \u2013 in contrast to Maslov \u2013 the applicant had repeatedly committed serious crimes of a violent nature. Because of his family and his social integration in Austria, the exclusion order constituted an interference with his rights under Article 8 of the Convention. However, he had almost reached the age of majority at the time the exclusion order had been issued. Economic integration could not be observed as he was unemployed at the time. He spoke Turkish and had last visited Turkey in 2001. His mother still lived in Turkey; he had no contact with her at the time but could get in touch with her. The serious nature of the offences and the resulting public interest in his expulsion therefore outweighed the applicant\u2019s interest in remaining in the country. However, because of his young age, the IAP concluded that a five-year exclusion order would be sufficient. 19.  On 30 September and 16 December 2008 respectively, the Constitutional Court and the Administrative Court declined to hear prior appeals by the applicant against the IAP\u2019s decision. 20.  On 8 September and 17 November 2009 and on 4 January 2010 the applicant was informed of the possibility to leave the country voluntarily. As he did not leave, he was expelled to Turkey on 10 February 2010. He was nineteen years old at that time. 21.   The five-year exclusion order against the applicant, which had been pronounced in the IAP\u2019s decision of 21 July 2008, expired in July 2013.", "references": ["8", "1", "9", "5", "0", "3", "4", "7", "6", "2", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1977 and 1979 respectively and live in Tbilisi and Tskaltubo. 6.  On 20 January 2004 criminal proceedings were brought against unidentified people following an armed attack on K.G., a member of the Georgian Parliament (\u201cthe member of parliament\u201d). 7.  On 4 February 2004 the victim was questioned for the first time by an investigator. A photofit image of the attacker was created with the help of the victim\u2019s description, but the member of parliament also added that he did not know who the attacker was. 8.  On 25 February 2004 the investigator drew up a report on the handing in to the police of a PSM pistol, equipped with a silencer, by a woman and her child. Notably, according to the report, the child had found the weapon while playing with his mother in the back yard of their house, close to where the member of parliament had been attacked. The report on the handing in of the gun was also signed by two taxi drivers and an interpreter. 9.  On 13 May 2004, at around 10 a.m., the first applicant, who had two convictions for robbery and drugs offences, was arrested in the street in connection with the above-mentioned criminal case on suspicion of attempted murder. He was searched in the presence of two witnesses at the time of his arrest, which revealed that he was in possession of a Browning pistol. 10.  The applicant was taken under arrest to Tbilisi police headquarters and put in an office to be questioned by a police officer, D.Ch. He confessed during the interview to conspiring with the second applicant to murder the member of parliament. In particular, as noted in the police report of 13 May 2004, the first applicant stated that he had been contacted by the second applicant in the autumn of 2003 and offered 10,000 United States dollars (USD) to kill a man whose identity was not specified at the time. The second applicant had therefore driven him to the building where the victim lived, without explaining the reasons for the murder. He had furnished him with a PSM pistol, which had been loaded and fitted with a silencer. From that date onwards the first applicant had regularly gone to the building, however, he had not tried to kill the victim on those occasions. The second applicant had telephoned him and insisted that he carry out the plan. On 19 January 2004, the first applicant had successfully entered a garage at the same time as the victim, had fired shots at him until he had run out of ammunition and then fled. Later that evening, the second applicant had called him to express his discontent because the victim, although seriously injured, had survived. A few days later, the first applicant had learnt from the television that the man he had tried to kill was a member of parliament. 11.  According to the record of the questioning of 13 May 2004, the first applicant had been feeling remorse and had wanted to give himself up to the police for some time. He told the investigator that his confession was sincere, that he regretted committing the crime and was relieved to have been arrested. The first applicant had no lawyer present during the questioning and did not sign the record of it. As subsequently explained by P.B., an investigator in charge of the applicant\u2019s case from the Tbilisi City public prosecutor\u2019s office (\u201cthe investigator\u201d), the reason the applicant did not sign the record was that he had lost consciousness several times during the interview and had had to be brought round with cold water. 12.  At 5.15 p.m. that day, 13 May 2004, the investigator formally charged the first applicant with attempted murder, based on his confession, and, without informing the latter of his right to call in a lawyer of his own choice, assigned a public defence lawyer to him; according to the case materials, that public lawyer was dismissed by the applicant on 4 June 2004 (see paragraph 23 below), and, in general, the latter replaced his defence lawyers several times as the criminal proceedings unfolded. The first applicant was taken to the scene of the crime for a reconstruction of the events, and asked to repeat his confession there, which he did in the presence of the public defence lawyer and two independent witnesses. The applicant repeated his confession word for word, again implicating the second applicant and adding that he hoped that his sincere confession would be taken into account as a mitigating circumstance. The statements given during the reconstruction were recorded in writing, with the written record bearing the signatures of both the first applicant and the lawyer appointed for him. 13.  Later the same day, the first applicant was brought face-to-face with the victim in a formal confrontation. He was lined up with three other people in front of the member of parliament, who, after some hesitation, identified him as the attacker. After the identification parade, the member of parliament asked to speak privately with the first applicant and was allowed to do so. No one else was present during their talk. 14.  The investigator then showed the first applicant the PSM pistol and silencer which had been handed in to the police by the two independent witnesses on 25 February 2004 (see paragraph 8 above). The applicant stated that he recognised the gun as the one he had used to attack the victim. The identification procedure was recorded in writing and was signed by the first applicant\u2019s public defence lawyer. 15.  On 13 May 2004 the second applicant was also arrested and charged with attempted murder. A public defence lawyer was assigned to him. The charges stated that he had wanted to kill the member of parliament, who was a distant relative. As the founder of a bank which had employed the second applicant\u2019s brother, the member of parliament had demanded that the applicant and his brother repay USD 700,000, which had been found missing by an internal audit (see also paragraph 62 below). 16.  On 14 May 2004, the first applicant met the second applicant in a formal confrontation and accused him in accordance with his previous confession. According to a written report on the formal confrontation, the second applicant was assisted by the public defence lawyer. 17.  On 15 May 2004 the first applicant was charged in connection with the discovery of the Browning pistol on his person when he was arrested with an additional offence of illegally carrying a weapon. 18.  On 16 May 2004 the Vake-Saburtalo District Court ordered at a public hearing that the two applicants be held in pre-trial detention for three months, until 13 August 2004. After reviewing the criminal case material and hearing the parties\u2019 oral submissions, the court confirmed the existence of a reasonable suspicion that the offences in question had been committed. A further main justification for the imposition of pre-trial detention was the assumption that the accused might abscond, in view of the severity of the possible sentence. 19.  According to statements subsequently given to the investigative authorities by the first applicant\u2019s wife, she attended the hearing on 16 May 2004 and noticed that her husband\u2019s nails had been bitten down and were blackened and that he had bandages on his wrists which he attempted to hide under his pullover. 20.  On the same day, 16 May 2004, the first and second applicants were transferred from Tbilisi police headquarters, where they had been held since their arrest, to, respectively, Prison no. 7 and Prison no. 1 in Tbilisi. They remained in those prisons for the whole of their pre-trial detention, until their conviction at first instance (see paragraph 73 below). 21.  Upon his admission to Prison no. 7 on 16 May 2004, the first applicant was examined by the prison doctor, who noted in a report that there were no marks of violence on his body. 22.  On 27 May 2004 the Tbilisi Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal by the applicants and upheld the reasons given in the detention order of 16 May 2004. 23.  On 4 June 2004, immediately after, a private lawyer, had been hired for the first applicant by his family (\u201cthe private lawyer\u201d), the first applicant submitted a complaint to the investigator, alleging that he had given his confession of 13 May 2004 as a result of torture, and that those statements had not been true. The first applicant asked to be questioned again. He alleged that he had been subjected to electrical shocks and severe beatings on 13 May 2004 and requested that a comprehensive medical examination be conducted for the purposes of establishing the exact nature of the injuries he had received. 24.  On 24 June 2004 the investigator ordered an expert medical report on the applicant\u2019s physical condition, which was only produced three months later (see paragraph 35 below). 25.  On 15 June 2004 the first applicant made a submission to the Tbilisi City public prosecutor in charge of his case (\u201cthe city prosecutor\u201d), asserting his innocence. He specified that his first lawyer, appointed by the State, had been assigned to him by the investigator without his consent (see paragraph 12 above), that he had done nothing to defend him, and that he had not even been offered the possibility of appointing another lawyer, one of his own choice, at that time. The first applicant alleged that before being questioned on 13 May 2004 he had been beaten with a square iron padlock, which had caused him to have seizures, and a doctor had had to be called. 26.  On 17 June 2004 the first applicant submitted a complaint to the city prosecutor about threats he had received in Prison no. 7. Notably, he had been threatened by unidentified people that his family would suffer if he did not stand by his confession. 27.  On 22 June 2004 the first applicant submitted an alibi to the investigator, citing the names of six people he had been with on 19 January 2004, when the member of parliament had been injured. He requested that those people be questioned as witnesses. 28.  On 28 June 2004 the investigator rejected the first applicant\u2019s request of 22 June 2004 on the grounds that his guilt had been established by his own, very detailed, confession, which he had repeated in the presence of a lawyer during the reconstruction of events at the crime scene. The investigator noted that, in addition, when confronted with the second applicant, the first applicant had accused him of being the instigator of the crime. Furthermore, the first applicant had been identified by the victim. There was therefore no reason to check his alibi. 29.  On 14 July 2004 the first applicant\u2019s lawyer submitted written statements to the investigator from the six witnesses concerned (see paragraph 27 above), supporting the alibi and stating that on 19 January 2004 the first applicant had been at a church wedding ceremony and subsequent reception until 2 a.m. The lawyer repeated his request for those people to be questioned. For his part, the second applicant stated his interest in having the first applicant\u2019s alibi verified. On 24 July 2004 the investigator again rejected the request, using the same grounds as on 28 June 2004. 30.  On 13 July 2004 the second applicant informed the Chief Public Prosecutor\u2019s Office (\u201cthe CPPO\u201d) that the member of parliament had clandestinely visited the first applicant in prison at 9 p.m. on 25 June 2004 to demand that he stand by his confession. In exchange, he had offered him money. The member of parliament\u2019s visit to the prison had not been officially registered, but could be confirmed by prison staff. The second applicant also complained of the fact that the expert medical report on the first applicant had still not been produced and that the people who were capable of confirming his alibi had not been questioned. 31.  Between July and August 2004 the second applicant lodged several more complaints with the city prosecutor about the investigator\u2019s repeated refusals to check the first applicant\u2019s alibi. The complaints were rejected on 3 and 7 August, the city prosecutor considering that there was no need to take the first applicant\u2019s alibi into account, given that he had freely confessed to the crime, and that there was no evidence in the record of his interview of 13 May 2004 that he had alleged that he had been subjected to ill-treatment. 32.  On 2 August 2004 the first applicant submitted a written request to the investigator to replace his private lawyer who had been hired by his family and had been in charge of his defence since 4 June 2004 (see paragraph 23 above), with a new lawyer, Sh.Dz. The applicant added that he wished to be \u201cquestioned again with a view to a confession\u201d and \u201carranging a plea bargain\u201d with the prosecution in the presence of this new public defence lawyer. 33.  On 5 August 2004 the investigator and the newly appointed lawyer Sh.Dz. went to the prison hospital to attend the questioning of the first applicant, as he had requested on 2 August 2004. The applicant, however, refused to be questioned, without providing any explanation. 34.  On 11 August 2004 the Tbilisi Regional Court granted an application by the prosecutor to extend the applicants\u2019 pre-trial detention to 13 November 2004. 35.  On 13 September 2004 an expert from the Ministry of Health commissioned by the investigator on 24 June 2004 (see paragraph 24 above) issued a report on the applicant\u2019s physical condition. It appeared that the expert had not examined the applicant in person but had asked the investigator to provide him with X-rays of his head and body. Two X-rays had been sent by the investigator to the expert as late as 8 September 2004. Notably, an X-ray of his head, taken only from one side, and an X-ray of his thorax showed that at that time he bore no signs of lesions on those parts of the body. 36.  On 27 September 2004 the second applicant\u2019s mother lodged a criminal complaint with the CPPO, alleging that the member of parliament had visited the first applicant in prison in July 2004 and had offered him 30,000 Georgian lari (GEL) (approximately 13,000 euros (EUR)) to stand by his confession. The investigator had then put pressure on the first applicant\u2019s wife to convince her husband to accept the offer. She further alleged that after the member of parliament\u2019s visit, criminal bosses had been allowed to enter the applicant\u2019s cell on 2 August 2004 in order to pressure him to testify as the member of parliament wished. 37.  On the same day, 27 September 2004, the first applicant\u2019s wife lodged the same complaint as the second applicant\u2019s mother with the CPPO. She added that in exchange for the money offered by the member of parliament, her husband had been expected to dismiss the private lawyer hired by his family, stand by his confession and ask for a plea bargain with the prosecution. The member of parliament had given her an advance payment of USD 1,500 to convince her husband. However, when on 5 August 2004 the first applicant had refused to make a statement confirming his confession in the presence of the investigator and the newly appointed public lawyer Sh.Dz. (see paragraph 33 above), the investigator had left the hospital and K.K., a \u201cmafia boss\u201d whose criminal case had been investigated by the same investigator, had been allowed into the first applicant\u2019s cell. K.K. had threatened the applicant with death if he refused to cooperate with the investigator, giving him two days to think about it. The first applicant\u2019s wife added that she had received threats since 19 August 2004 that her child would be killed if she dared to speak about the above-mentioned events with the authorities. 38.  The allegations of the second applicant\u2019s mother were subsequently confirmed by a journalistic investigation into the events in question (see paragraphs 83-85 below). 39.  On 1 October 2004 the city prosecutor replied to the first applicant\u2019s wife and the second applicant\u2019s mother that their complaints of 27 September 2004 were manifestly ill-founded for the same reasons given in the replies to the first applicant\u2019s repeated requests to have his alibi checked. 40.  At the beginning of October 2004 the first applicant dismissed Sh.Dz. and reappointed his private lawyer (see paragraph 23 above). 41.  On 8 October 2004 the first applicant\u2019s lawyer wrote to the Tbilisi city prosecutor requesting, among other things, that secret recordings of various meetings between the first applicant\u2019s wife and the member of parliament\u2019s lawyer (see the details of the journalistic inquiry at paragraphs 83\u201185 below) be obtained from the investigation into the ill\u2011treatment case (see paragraphs 46\u201153 below) and added to the applicants\u2019 criminal case file. That request was rejected on 12 October 2004. 42.  On 21 October 2004 the first applicant\u2019s lawyer informed the investigator that his client wished to be questioned again. The investigator questioned the first applicant the same day and he repeated all the factual details concerning his allegations of ill-treatment on 13 May 2004, gave the names of the police officers involved and detailed the threats made against him. He complained of having been coerced into accepting Sh.Dz. as his lawyer and that his sole purpose had been to sign witness statements for the investigator. 43.  On 5 November 2004 the prosecutor applied for an extension of two months to the applicants\u2019 pre-trial detention, until 13 January 2005. By a decision of 10 November 2004, a judge at the Supreme Court, after reviewing the application in the presence of the prosecution and the applicants\u2019 lawyers, granted the extension. As grounds for that decision he noted that the applicants had been accused of particularly serious crimes and that the \u201ccircumstances of the case\u201d gave reason to believe that if they were released the accused would attempt to impede the establishment of the facts and evade justice. In his view, a request by the applicants to be released on bail had to be rejected for the same reasons. No reference to any specific, factual circumstances of the case was given in the decision of 10 November 2004. 44.  On 30 December 2004 the investigation was completed, a bill of indictment was approved by the prosecutor and the case was sent for trial to the Tbilisi Regional Court. 45.  On 7 June 2005 the Tbilisi Regional Court held a pre-trial conference hearing in the case, ruling to commit the applicants for trial as defendants. The decision was rendered in a standard, template form with pre-printed reasoning. The judge simply added in the blank spaces a brief statement of the facts, the names of the accused, the definition of the impugned offence and the measure of pre-trial restraint. As regards the confirmation of the latter, the printed standard phrase read as follows:\n\u201cThe measure of pre-trial restraint \u2013 detention \u2013 has been chosen correctly.\u201d 46.  On 7 September 2004 the first applicant lodged a criminal complaint with the Chief Public Prosecutor\u2019s Office, alleging that he had been subjected to ill-treatment on 13 May 2004 and requesting an investigation. He specified that at around 10 a.m. he had been taken to police headquarters in Tbilisi and placed in a room on the twelfth floor. He had been given electric shocks and beaten. The surname of the officer who had held a weapon to his head and forced him to sign a pre-prepared confession was D. K. Two other officers, K. Ch. and D. En., had also participated. Other police officers had also been involved, and while the applicant did not recall their names, he stated that he would be able to identify them if confronted with them. He had also been beaten on the neck with a square padlock. He had passed out while being given the electric shocks and the police officers had poured water on his head to bring him around. When he had regained consciousness, a doctor had been there who had said that he needed an injection of a sedative, but the doctor\u2019s recommendation had been ignored. The first applicant had then been told by the police officers that his flat had already been visited, drugs had been planted there, and that his wife could easily be arrested. Upon his transfer to Tbilisi\u2019s Prison no. 7 on the night of 16 to17 May 2004, the prison doctor had asked him, in the presence of the police officers, if he had been beaten, but he had denied it for fear that the ill-treatment would resume. 47.  On 9 September 2004 the CPPO referred the complaint of 7 September 2004 to the Tbilisi city prosecutor and the investigator in person, asking them to take action and to inform the Chief Prosecutor of their response. On 5 October 2004 the investigator replied to the first applicant directly, informing him that his criminal complaint about ill\u2011treatment had been rejected as unsubstantiated as the applicant had not supported it with evidence. 48.  On 8 October 2004 the first applicant\u2019s wife complained to the Inspectorate General of the CPPO and the Inspectorate General of the Ministry of the Interior that her husband had been ill-treated by police officers and that there had been a lack of response by the investigator and the Tbilisi city prosecutor to her various previous complaints. She asked for the investigator to be removed from the case and for those who had carried out the ill-treatment to be identified and punished. In support of her request, she attached a copy of a report dated 29 September 2004 on an examination of the applicant conducted at her request, and with the prison authority\u2019s permission, by private medical experts. That report showed that three medical specialists \u2013 a psychiatrist, a neurologist and a trauma specialist \u2013 had examined the first applicant in prison, using the medical equipment available in the prison hospital, in the course of several visits. They first noted that the first applicant had repeated the statements he had made in his complaint of 7 September 2004. The medical experts also observed that the applicant suffered from epileptic fits, and that, according to the applicant himself, the first fit had occurred on 22 July 2004. Their view, on the basis of ultrasound and computed tomography (CT) scans, was that the applicant suffered from epileptic fits which had been caused by a traumatic head injury. The CT scan also showed a scarred lesion in the area of the joint at the nape of the neck, and signs of intracranial hypertension syndrome. A poorly healed fracture of the zygomatic bone and the left of the upper jaw was also detected. In the experts\u2019 opinion, the physical and psychological problems that had been revealed could well have been caused, in principle, by the type of ill-treatment complained of by the first applicant. 49.  On 12 October 2004 the Inspectorate of the CPPO asked the investigations department of the Tbilisi city prosecutor\u2019s office to set up a meeting with the first applicant for 13 October 2004 with a view to checking the wife\u2019s allegations. The Inspectorate General of the Ministry of the Interior, for its part, replied to the first applicant\u2019s wife that the criminal complaint made by the applicant had already been examined and dismissed as unsubstantiated. 50.  When questioned by an investigator of the Inspectorate General of the CPPO on 13 October 2004, the first applicant stood by his allegations that he had been tortured by the police officers on 13 May 2004. 51.  Following a request by the Inspectorate General of the CPPO, on 19 October 2004 State experts drew up another medical report on the first applicant. The experts noted a wound at the nape of the neck, which was at an advanced stage of scarring and had been caused by a hard, blunt object; various cuts on the stomach, some of which measured 18 by 0.1 cm and 16 by 0.1 cm; and several cuts on his left forearm. The scar on the head was old and it could not be said exactly when the injury had been sustained. However, it could have been caused between April and July 2004. 52.  Between late October and early November 2004, the Inspectorate General of the CPPO questioned a number of potential witnesses to the first applicant\u2019s alleged ill-treatment: P.B., the investigator in the applicant\u2019s case; M.S., a Ministry of the Interior camera operator who had recorded the applicant\u2019s confirmation of his initial confession at the crime scene; the public defence lawyer who had been assigned to the applicant after his arrest and first interview; G.B., the judge who had ordered the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention on 16 May 2004; two relatives of the first applicant who had attended the above-mentioned hearing; and the doctor from Prison no. 7 who had carried out a visual examination of the applicant at the time of his admission to prison. None of those people said they had seen marks of ill-treatment on the first applicant. In addition, all three police officers accused by the first applicant of ill-treatment denied those accusations when questioned by the Inspectorate General of the CPPO. 53.  On 15 November 2004 another medical expert examined the first applicant at the request of the Inspectorate General of the CPPO. As well as confirming the findings of the previous expert report (see paragraph 51 above), he added that the zygomatic bone surrounding the left eye was deformed. 54.  On 17 November 2004 the Inspectorate General of the CPPO, on the basis of the statements given by the various witnesses as well as the medical reports of 19 October and 15 November 2004, decided not to institute proceedings in relation to the first applicant\u2019s alleged ill-treatment. 55.  The Krtsanisi-Mtatsminda District Court quashed that decision on 23 December 2004. The court found that the investigation carried out by the prosecution authority had not been comprehensive enough, and ordered the Inspectorate General to undertake further investigative actions aimed at re\u2011examining the well\u2011foundedness of the serious allegations made by the first applicant. On 8 February 2005 that decision was upheld at final instance by the Supreme Court, and on 24 February 2005 criminal proceedings were initiated in the case under Article 126 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code (torture). 56.  After the reopening of the investigation the prosecutorial authority questioned the same people who had already been questioned in October\u2011November 2004. The applicant was also examined again in April 2005. A report issued on 27 April 2005 suggested that the deformation of the zygomatic bone surrounding the applicant\u2019s left eye could not be said with certainty to have been caused by a traumatic injury from a dense or blunt object in 2004. 57.  According to the case file as it stands, including the parties\u2019 most recent factual addendums, the relevant authorities never took a definitive decision in relation to the investigation of the applicant\u2019s torture case under Article 126 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code. 58.  On 14 September 2006 a trial started at the Tbilisi Regional Court. 59.  The first applicant, who was represented by the private lawyer, pleaded innocent, making particular reference to the ill-treatment he had been subjected to in order to obtain a confession. He complained that despite repeated requests the contents of the criminal file opened by the Inspectorate General of the CPPO with respect to his alleged torture had not been added to the file in the criminal case against him and the other applicant (see paragraph 41 above). He insisted that the outcome of the criminal investigation into his ill-treatment would be of decisive importance for the assessment of the well-foundedness of the criminal charges against him and the second applicant. The first applicant also underlined the fact that he had an alibi. 60.  The second applicant also pleaded innocent. His lawyer applied to have the record of the member of parliament\u2019s identifying the first applicant on 13 May 2004 declared inadmissible as tainted by irregularities. In that connection, he maintained that on 4 February 2004 the victim had said he was unable to identify his attacker while the photofit image created with his help had not resembled the first applicant. Later, however, he had stated that he was able to identify his attacker, and did so on 13 May 2004 on the basis of the first applicant\u2019s \u201cgeneral appearance\u201d. In addition, the first applicant had been lined up in front of the victim with three other people who had looked totally different from him (see also paragraphs 64 and 65 below). The second applicant\u2019s lawyer also applied to have the record of the formal confrontation between the first and second applicants, dated 14 May 2003, declared inadmissible as tainted by irregularities. Notably, the report contained the name of a public defence lawyer who had supposedly assisted the second applicant at the time. However, in actual fact the second applicant had been alone during the confrontation. Indeed, according to a letter from the Ministry of the Interior, between 13 and 17 May 2004 the public defence lawyer officially assigned to the second applicant on 14 May 2004 had not possessed a badge allowing him to enter the main police station in Tbilisi. Both applications were rejected by the trial court on the same day as ill-founded. 61.  When questioned by the trial court, the woman and son who had allegedly handed in the weapon used to commit the crime to the police on 25 February 2004, according to the official version of events contained in the case file (see paragraph 8 above), stated that they had never handed in such a gun to the police. On the contrary, it had been the police who had suddenly come to her house, and had searched for and found the PSM pistol in the yard. She added that the gun that the police had found had not been equipped with a silencer. 62.  Among other statements concerning a possible motive for the attack allegedly perpetrated by the applicants, the member of parliament told the court that as one of the founders of the bank and one of its largest shareholders, he had recommended the second applicant\u2019s brother for the post of manager of the bank\u2019s Batumi branch (see also paragraph 15 above). However, the two brothers had abused his trust. They had taken certain items of gold belonging to clients and a large sum of money and had disappeared in October 2003. Three days later, as a result of efforts made by the family, the brothers\u2019 uncle had returned the objects and the money to the bank. Some months earlier, an internal audit of the branch in question had uncovered considerable losses there. The second applicant and his brother had put pressure on the members of the audit committee to not inform headquarters in Tbilisi. Following internal discussions in which the member of parliament had been involved in person, it had been agreed that the two brothers would by 25 January 2004 at the latest repay the USD 750,000 they had embezzled by various means. The member of parliament also told the trial court that he had easily identified the first applicant on 13 May 2004. He confirmed that he had approached the applicant after the identification parade, with the investigator\u2019s consent, and had asked him why he had tried to kill him. During their private talk the first applicant had allegedly replied that he had not wanted to kill him but had been acting on the second applicant\u2019s orders (see paragraph 13 above). 63.  When questioned by the trial court, the two witnesses to the reconstruction of the crime on 13 May 2004 stated that they had been stopped by police officers in the vicinity of the main police station. The officers had asked them to go with them to assist in an investigative procedure and added that they would be arrested if they refused. At the station, the witnesses had seen the first applicant who, despite it being a warm day in May, had been wearing a woollen hat. He had also had a deep bruise around one of his eyes. The investigator had asked the first applicant one or two questions but he had remained silent for much of the time. When asked by the investigator about the place in question being the scene of the crime, he had simply nodded. The reconstruction had lasted between ten and fifteen minutes, at the end of which the two witnesses had signed a record of the procedure, without reading its contents. No pressure had been put on the first applicant in their presence. 64.  One of the men who took part in the identification parade where the first applicant had been identified by the victim on 13 May 2004 told the court that he had been approached at random in the street by the police to take part in the line-up. He stated that, with the exception of the first applicant, all three members of the identification parade, including himself, had been clean-shaven. Another clearly distinguishing feature had been that of the four men in the line-up, only the first applicant had been bald. The applicant had looked exhausted and had had a deep bruise around one eye. There had therefore been a considerable difference in appearance between the first applicant and the others. 65.  Another participant in the identification parade, who had also been approached in the street to take part, gave the same version of events, including regarding the bruise. He added that the first applicant had been the only one not wearing a belt and without shoelaces. When the victim had identified him as the one who had shot at him, the first applicant had exclaimed that it was not him. 66.  When questioned by the trial court, the two taxi drivers who had signed the report of 25 February 2004 on the handing in of the PSM pistol by the woman and her son stated that they had been taken to the main police headquarters under coercion, on pain of having their driving licences confiscated by the police, in order to take part as witnesses in an investigative procedure. They were told by an officer that a woman and a child were going to bring in a weapon, and they would have to confirm that fact by signing a record. They had waited in vain for an hour and a half for the woman and child to arrive. The two policemen had then taken a weapon equipped with a silencer out of a drawer in a table, explaining to the taxi drivers that it was the weapon in question. The police officers had drawn up a report saying that a woman and child with non-Georgian names had brought the weapon to the station. The two taxi drivers had signed the fabricated document in order to get their driving licences back and leave the premises as soon as possible. 67.  The interpreter whose signature was appended to the bottom of the same record of 25 February 2004 stated before the trial court that she had not acted as an interpreter in the investigative procedure in question for a woman and child who did not speak Georgian. She alleged that her signature had been forged. 68.  Four people who had attended the wedding party of 19 January 2004 also attended the hearing and confirmed the applicant\u2019s alibi by stating that they had seen him at the party, that he had stayed until late in the evening, and definitely until after 9 p.m. 69.  A member of an independent human rights organisation told the trial court that at the time of the events she had had official permission from the State to visit prisoners who had allegedly been subjected to abuse. Following a series of complaints by the family, she had visited the first applicant two weeks after his arrest. She had seen that he had a head wound, cuts on his face and had been in a generally poor condition. The first applicant had also complained to her of a fracture of the bone surrounding his eye. He had subsequently spent time in the prison hospital but had requested to be transferred back to prison because various people, including the member of parliament\u2019s lawyer, had been able to visit him in the hospital and disturb him. The first applicant had given the human rights activist the name of a police officer, a certain K., saying he had been one of the men who had tortured him on 13 May 2004 at Tbilisi main police station. She had immediately informed the Ministry of the Interior and the Chief Prosecutor\u2019s Office of the applicant\u2019s allegations, but neither of them had reacted. 70.  The first applicant\u2019s wife told the court that she had visited her husband in prison on 2 June 2004. She had been able to see through the glass between them that he was wearing a woollen hat, under which a plaster was visible. He had had dark circles under his eyes and his nails were blackened. She also confirmed the facts relating to her meetings with the parliamentarian\u2019s lawyer. 71.  On application by the defence, the secret recordings of the two meetings between the first applicant\u2019s wife and the victim\u2019s lawyer were played to the trial court (see details of the journalistic investigation at paragraphs 83\u201185 below). 72.  On 21 February 2007 the Tbilisi Regional Court ruled that the following pieces of evidence were inadmissible owing to significant procedural shortcomings in the way they had been obtained:\n(i)  the first applicant\u2019s confession at his first interview on 13 May 2004 (see paragraphs 10 and 11 above);\n(ii)  the record of 25 February 2004 of the woman and her son handing in the PSM pistol at the police station (see paragraph 8 above);\n(iii)  the record of 13 May 2004 of the first applicant identifying the PSM pistol (see paragraph 14 above). 73.  On 26 February 2007 the Tbilisi Regional Court gave judgment. It first held that it was undeniable that the first applicant had had various injuries on his body, as confirmed by the various expert reports. However, the time, place or circumstances of sustaining the injuries had not been established. 74.  The first applicant was found guilty of attempted murder with aggravating circumstances, on account of his attack on the member of parliament on 19 January 2004, and illegal possession of a weapon, owing to the Browning pistol that had been found on him when he had been arrested. His guilt related to the Browning had been proved, according to the court, by the record of the body search after his arrest and the record of the seizure of the weapon thus discovered. 75.  The court found that the charge of attempted murder had been proved by the following items of direct evidence, which it considered to have been obtained without any major irregularities:\n(i)  the written record of the first applicant\u2019s confession given during the reconstruction at the scene of the crime on 13 May 2004 (see paragraph 12 above);\n(ii)  the record of his identification by the member of parliament on the same day (see paragraph 13 above);\n(iii)  the member of parliament\u2019s statements concerning the private talk he had had with the first applicant on 13 May 2004 (see paragraph 13 above). 76.  The second applicant was also found guilty of attempted murder with aggravating circumstances and of the illicit possession of a weapon on account of his role in planning to kill the member of parliament by hiring the first applicant and providing him with a firearm. He was additionally found guilty of embezzlement on account of his complicity with his brother in misappropriating the bank\u2019s assets (see paragraphs 15 and 62 above). In the trial court\u2019s opinion, the same evidence as used against the first applicant had proven the charge of attempted murder against the second applicant (see the preceding paragraph):\n(i)  the written record of the first applicant\u2019s confession during the reconstruction at the scene of the crime on 13 May 2004; and\n(ii)  the member of parliament\u2019s statements concerning the private talk he had had with the first applicant on 13 May 2004. 77.  As to the defence\u2019s arguments concerning the lawfulness of the various records mentioned above, the trial court conceded that there had been a series of irregularities in the course of the investigative procedures in question, but they had not been such as to render the evidence inadmissible. 78.  Both applicants appealed. 79.  With respect to the conviction for attempted murder, the first applicant reiterated his complaints about the absence of a lawyer of his own choice at the first interviews, his ill-treatment and forced confession. According to him, numerous witnesses questioned by the judges had raised a reasonable doubt that he had been able to participate properly in the confirmation of his confession during the reconstruction of the events at the scene of the crime on 13 May 2004. Nevertheless, the record of that procedure had been considered a key piece of evidence in establishing his guilt. The second piece of evidence used to establish his being guilty of attempted murder \u2013 the record of his identification by the victim \u2013 had also been tainted by irregularities. In fact, contrary to the requirements of Article 347 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the other men who had lined up with him had all looked healthy, had had full heads of hair, had been clean\u2011shaven and had been wearing belts and shoes that had been laced up. He, on the other hand, was partially bald, had been injured and looked tired, had not been able to shave for several days and had had no belt or laces. The first applicant also referred to the secret recordings of the meetings between his wife and the member of parliament\u2019s lawyer (see paragraphs 83\u201185 below). Those recordings had been played to the trial court judges, but they had chosen not to mention them in their judgment or take them into consideration in any way. 80.  The second applicant\u2019s appeal had similar arguments as regards the conviction for attempted murder. He specifically complained that while the trial court judges had confirmed his guilt by reference to the record of the confirmation of the first applicant\u2019s confession during the reconstruction at the scene of the crime on 13 May 2004, that specific item of evidence had clearly been tainted by the ill-treatment the first applicant had suffered at the hands of the police. 81.  On 17 July 2007 the Criminal Affairs Chamber of the Supreme Court dismissed the applicants\u2019 appeals. As far as the alleged ill\u2011treatment was concerned, the criminal chamber affirmed that it was not in dispute that the first applicant had had marks of violence on his person. Nevertheless, the circumstances under which the injuries had been sustained and who had caused them were not known. The court held that the guilty verdict against both applicants had to be upheld in its entirety. The first and second applicants were convicted, respectively, to twenty-one and sixteen years\u2019 imprisonment. 82.  The cassette contains a recording of the investigative journalism programme 60 minutes. The recording in question is about the applicants\u2019 case and is entitled \u201cContract murder, or rigged investigation?\u201d 83.  Amongst other details, the programme aired secret video-recordings of two meetings between the first applicant\u2019s wife and the member of parliament\u2019s lawyer. 84.  At the first meeting, which took place a few days before 2 August 2004, the lawyer offered an advance payment to the first applicant\u2019s wife to ensure that her husband replaced the lawyer he had chosen with Sh.Dz., who was trusted by the member of parliament. It was with the help of that new lawyer that the applicant was expected by the member of parliament to stand by his initial confession. The first applicant\u2019s wife replied that her husband\u2019s lawyer could do the job just as well, but the member of parliament\u2019s lawyer stated that that lawyer could not be trusted in such dealings. 85.  The secret recording of the second meeting showed how Sh.Dz., by then appointed as the first applicant\u2019s lawyer on the advice of the member of parliament\u2019s lawyer, handed over USD 1,500 to the first applicant\u2019s wife on behalf of the member of parliament (see also paragraph 37 above).", "references": ["4", "9", "6", "7", "8", "5", "0", "No Label", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["1", "2", "3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1970, 1973, 1999, 2001 and 2007 respectively. The Court has not been informed of their current place of residence. 6.  The first and second applicants, a married couple, arrived in Bulgaria in 1997. Their three children, the remaining applicants, were born in that country. All members of the family were granted permanent resident permits. In 2005 the first applicant bought a flat in Sofia, where the family lived. 7.  On 29 May 2008 the head of the National Security Service issued an order withdrawing the first applicant\u2019s residence permit, ordering his expulsion and imposing a ten-year ban on his re\u2011entering Bulgaria, on the ground that his presence in the country represented a \u201cserious threat to national security\u201d. Factual grounds justifying the order were not indicated; it was merely noted that it was based on \u201cproposal no. B849\u201d. 8.  That proposal, drawn up by the National Security Service on 27 May 2008 and initially classified, was declassified on 22 February 2016 and has been submitted by the Government. It stated that, according to intelligence data, the first applicant was the leader of an international terrorist group, working towards the aiding and financing of Chechen extremist and separatist organisations. It also stated that he was being searched on the territory of the Russian Federation and that his actions lowered the prestige and the interests of the Bulgarian State. The document claimed, in addition, that the first applicant had been implicated in extortion, drug trafficking, smuggling, money laundering and other criminal activities. No evidence was provided to substantiate those claims, even though the document referred to some specific facts. It was stated, for example, that in 2006 the applicant and another person had attempted to smuggle into Bulgaria a \u201chighly toxic substance\u201d, and that, also in 2006, he had threatened the seller of an expensive property in Varna forcing him to choose as a buyer a person close to the applicant. 9.  On 12 June 2008 the first applicant applied for judicial review of the expulsion order. He disputed the allegation that he represented \u201ca serious threat to national security\u201d. He pointed out that his family was living in Bulgaria and that his children had been born in the country, and claimed that the proposed separation of his family was \u201cunjustified\u201d. 10.  During the ensuing proceedings the applicant and his representative were shown proposal no. B849 and they presented evidence seeking to disprove some of the allegations it contained. In particular, the first applicant presented certificates issued by the Bulgarian and the Russian authorities stating that he had no convictions in the two countries and explained that in February 2008 he had travelled to Russia, where, as he claimed, he would have been arrested had he indeed been searched by the authorities of that country. In addition, in his written submissions the first applicant\u2019s representative pointed out that the allegations made in the proposal were not substantiated by any evidence, and that they could not justify a conclusion that the applicant represented a threat to national security. In his oral pleadings he pointed out once again that the first applicant had \u201ccreated his family\u201d in Bulgaria. 11.  In a final judgment of 20 December 2008 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the application for judicial review. After summarizing the claims made in proposal no. B849, it held briefly that it was bound by them. Thus, in its view\n\u201cit should be concluded that the presence and the activity of the [first applicant] amount to a serious threat to national security and to the international prestige of the Republic of Bulgaria.\u201d 12.  In a decision of 29 May 2008 the head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs\u2019 Migration Directorate ordered the first applicant\u2019s detention pending expulsion. That decision was quashed in a judgment of the Sofia Administrative Court of 17 July 2008. In another decision dated 28 August 2008 the head of the National Security Service ordered once again the applicant\u2019s detention. That decision was quashed as well, in a judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of 27 November 2009. The first applicant effectively remained in detention from 10 September 2008 to the date of his expulsion, 3 September 2009. 13.  The other applicants remained for several more years in Bulgaria, but left in November 2015.", "references": ["6", "5", "9", "7", "1", "8", "3", "0", "2", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "5.  The first applicant, Franz-Olivier Giesbert, is the publication director of the magazine Le Point. The second applicant, Herv\u00e9 Gattegno, is a journalist with Le Point. The third applicant is the company operating Le Point. 6.  The proceedings against the applicants which form the subject matter of the three applications are related to the events commonly referred to as the \u201cBettencourt affair\u201d. 7.  Mrs Liliane Bettencourt, principal shareholder of the group L\u2019Or\u00e9al, is one of the richest individuals in France. From the late 1990s she made numerous gifts to her friend B., a writer and photographer, totalling several hundred million euros in value. 8.  In December 2007 Mrs Bettencourt\u2019s daughter, Ms Bettencourt\u2011Meyers, filed a criminal complaint against B., for the offence of undue influence (abus de faiblesse), with the public prosecutor at the Nanterre tribunal de grande instance. A preliminary investigation was opened. In that context numerous interviews were conducted, in particular with individuals close to Mrs Bettencourt, and searches were carried out. In September 2008 B. was taken into police custody. 9.  Without waiting for the outcome of the investigation, Ms Bettencourt-Meyers brought a private prosecution against B. in the Nanterre Criminal Court, on the same charge of undue influence. She sought and obtained the inclusion in the case file of material and reports from the preliminary investigation. 10.  In September 2009 the public prosecutor\u2019s office decided to discontinue the proceedings based on Ms Bettencourt-Meyers\u2019 original complaint. 11.  The case initiated by the private prosecution was first set down for hearing on 3 September 2009, then on 11 December 2009. On that date it was decided to seek a medical assessment of Mrs Bettencourt and the hearing was deferred again to 15 April 2010 (for the subsequent criminal proceedings, see paragraphs 52 and 53 below). 12.  Mrs Bettencourt publicly announced that she was refusing to undergo the assessment ordered by the court. She also filed submissions by way of voluntary intervention, including in the alternative an application to join the proceedings as a civil party in the event that the prosecution was regarded as valid by the court. She argued that the aim of her civil-party application was to persuade the court that her mental faculties were not diminished and that she had made her gifts to B. with all due lucidity. 13.  The developments in the case were widely reported in the press. The offending articles in Le Point were thus published in that context. 14.  On 10 December 2009 the third applicant published, with the second applicant\u2019s byline, a four-page spread under the heading \u201cInvestigation into a very dear friend\u201d and with the sub-heading: \u201cTreasure. Did he take advantage of Liliane Bettencourt? [B.] denies it but the finger of suspicion points to him\u201d. 15.  The article referred to various aspects of the case and in particular the very significant gifts made by \u201cthe heir of L\u2019Or\u00e9al\u201d, for a total of one billion euros, to B. The journalist wrote, quoting the testimony of Liliane Bettencourt\u2019s former accountant: \u201cShe too describes the psychological domination imposed on an elderly lady who is more fragile than she may like\u201d. He also inserted a passage from the \u201cprosecution document\u201d which summed up the situation as follows:\n\u201cTaking advantage of his influence and Liliane Bettencourt\u2019s weakness, [B.] persuaded her, at a time when her health was declining, to give him sums of money and assets going beyond tokens of friendship.\u201d 16.  The article was full of comments between inverted commas, presented as extracts from statements made to the investigators working under the public prosecutor. It pointed out that the latter had discontinued the investigation in question. Among the quotations were explanations given by B. when he was in police custody in September 2008, and it was claimed by the journalist that those explanations were often contradicted by the facts:\n\u201cHe swears that Liliane Bettencourt has acted towards him \u2018like a patron\u2019. Their first meeting goes back to the 70s but their friendship dates from a portrait he made of her in 1987 ... \u2018I was then sufficiently well off that I did not need financial assistance from Mrs Bettencourt\u2019, he retorted to the investigators. \u2018I already owned five apartments on rue Servandoni [Paris 6th], a large collection of paintings and had co-ownership of the Brouzet estate [a large estate in the Gard], together with copyright dues and a commission on the sale by Dior of the perfume Poison\u2019. After verification, this inventory seems to be somewhat overstated: in actual fact it was through a series of cheques from the billionaire and the cancellation of astronomical debts to real estate companies owned by him that B. has managed to build up his assets to the point of acquiring seven apartments in the well-to-do neighbourhood of Saint Sulpice. Today the whole complex forms a quaint townhouse with swimming pool, CCTV cameras and secret passages between the bookshelves.\nContradicted by the numbers and dates, the photographer was forced to explain, more humbly, that Mrs Bettencourt wanted him \u2018to expand\u2019 in order to \u2018install all his works and perhaps set up a museum\u2019. But curiously his benefactor did not even mention such a project during her own hearing on 13 May 2008. B\u2019s explanation: \u2018She is a modest woman; she will not say the things that are in the depth of her heart\u2019.\nThe police investigation also demonstrates the lavishness of his property in the Gard ... \u2018Mrs Bettencourt did not contribute to its financing\u2019 he claimed. However, the billionaire\u2019s accountant testified that \u2018numerous cheques\u2019 had been signed by her, made out to contractors doing work on the estate, \u2018for at least 150,000 euros, and as much as a cheque of 10 million euros in December 2006\u2019.\nSeveral employees testified that around the same time the old lady\u2019s health had deteriorated ... Herein lies the gravamen of the whole case: was the L\u2019Or\u00e9al heiress really aware of the extent of her generosity? ... 17.  Those two statements are extracts from the testimony of the \u201cformer director of L\u2019Or\u00e9al once responsible for the management of Liliane Bettencourt\u2019s assets\u201d and her former accountant. The first spoke of a \u201chold\u201d over Mrs Bettencourt. He had asked to be relieved of his duties because, he testified, \u201cI ran the risk of being complicit in the misdeeds of Mr [B] by my tacit consent\u201d. The second witness referred to \u201cpressure\u201d on the part of the photographer and testified that he was always \u201casking for money\u201d. In late 2006 her attention was drawn to the proposed assignment of a life insurance policy (for an amount in excess of 260 million euros). \u201cI tried to reason with Mrs Bettencourt but she was no longer her old self\u201d, recalled the accountant. \u201cI then bumped into B. in the house and said to him \u2018you\u2019ve seen the state she is in, you know she is very ill\u2019. He replied \u2018never mind, as long as she is not under deputyship she can still sign\u2019\u201d. 18.  The article also contained comments made by Mrs Bettencourt on 13 May 2008, in a box headed: \u201cExclusive: what Liliane Bettencourt told the police\u201d. The journalist, after quoting extracts from the statement showing that Mrs Bettencourt did not recall the agreements she had signed with B., wrote that \u201cthese memory lapses are clearly at odds with the picture that B. would be painting of her to the same investigators\u201d. 19.  In another box the journalist reported on the application for \u201cjudicial protection\u201d filed by Mrs Bettencourt\u2019s daughter and quoted an extract from the \u201creport of neurologist P.A.\u201d, who had been \u201casked by the public prosecutor to examine the billionaire\u2019s medical records\u201d, revealing \u201ca state of vulnerability related to a probable degenerative neurological condition which impaired her individual faculties\u201d. 20.  The article stated that from this episode and many others, the financial brigade investigators, in a report of 1 December 2008, had concluded that there was \u201ca series of sufficiently strong presumptions that the offence of undue influence [had] been committed by B.\u201d; and that the photographer, for his part, had denounced an \u201codious attack\u201d on a \u201cworld-famous artist\u201d. It ended thus: \u201cthe court will rule whether the fortune passed to him by Liliane Bettencourt was a windfall or a swindle \u2013 either way, it\u2019s a masterstroke\u201d. 21.  On 4 February 2010 the third applicant published, with the second applicant\u2019s byline, an article indicated on the full front cover of the magazine under the headline \u201cBettencourt affair: how to gain one billion (without any effort)\u201d. The subheadings announcing the article read: \u201cthe unbelievable story of a society photographer who made a fortune by \u2018seducing\u2019 Liliane Bettencourt, the richest woman in France\u201d and \u201cthe accusations of Madam\u2019s employees\u201d. A photo-montage showing Mrs Bettencourt \u201cwith her friend B.\u201d also appeared on the cover. 22.  The subject of the article, which extended to eight pages, was indicated as follows: \u201cBettencourt affair. Has the richest woman in France been conned by the photographer [B.]? Some of her former employees have said as much to the police. Le Point reveals their testimony and the secrets of this incredible high-society melodrama\u201d. The article began as follows:\n\u201cIs it about money or sentiment? A quarrel over an inheritance or a question of principle? A settling of family scores or the most perfect scam? All of these things put together, perhaps and much more, because the millions slip away by their hundreds in an atmosphere redolent of an Agatha Christie novel and a setting worthy of Scott Fitzgerald ... Even the trial \u2013 the inevitable epilogue \u2013 will resemble a high-society event: on 15 and 16 April, the court of Nanterre will look into the incredible generosity, for almost a decade, of the richest woman in France towards the person she has made her favourite, the photographer [B.].\u201d 23.  The article continued as follows:\n\u201cSince the billionaire\u2019s daughter has taken her case to the courts, accusing her mother\u2019s prot\u00e9g\u00e9 of the offence of \u2018undue influence\u2019, ripples of disgust have been felt along the majestic avenues of Neuilly and beyond \u2013 the high society of Paris in finance, industry and politics \u2013 concerned that it may one day be regretted that no one had seen anything, or at least said anything.\nFor the investigation has revealed the existence of lavish gifts, apparently totalling around 1 billion euros. Could such riches pass unnoticed? There\u2019s a disturbing detail: the largest sums were assigned to B. in the spring of 2003 and in the summer of 2006, at a time when Liliane Bettencourt\u2019s health was declining sharply ...\nGuru. Much testimony has come to light since then \u2013 Le Point is exclusively publishing several extracts (see the following pages). Housemaids, nurses, secretaries, the chauffeur, accountants, all describe \u2018the hold\u2019 that [B.] had over the L\u2019Oreal heiress (aged 87), his own individual way of soliciting her generosity, the equivocal aspects of his behaviour. Before the court, the succession of these indignant employees will be reminiscent of the spectacle in the von B\u00fclow affair \u2013 the trial of the libertine and cynical American aristocrat who was accused, in the early 80s on Rhode Island, of poisoning his wife so that he could take over her fortune. But even that scenario would not be the worst for [B.]: convicted at first instance, von B\u00fclow was nevertheless acquitted on appeal ...\nFor the time being, the photographer confronts the suspicions with sardonic contempt. \u2018To make a work of one\u2019s life, that\u2019s what matters\u2019, he proclaimed in Le Monde, describing the charges against him as \u2018pathetic rumours\u2019. His benefactor? \u2018An intelligent woman who knows how to choose men, to take risks\u2019, he told the police, sweeping a little too quickly under the carpet the doubts about her state of health. To be sure, the heiress affirmed a year ago, in Le Journal du dimanche, that she was attached to [B.] and that she had no time for gossip. ...\nShe has since shut herself away, leaving her lawyers to speak in her place, refusing any medical assessment and cutting short her appearances at receptions or ceremonies. This silence has only served to reinforce the impression of a woman under influence.\u201d 24.  In the middle of the article, under the heading \u201cExclusive: the women who accuse\u201d, there were long extracts (over three pages) from statements of employees who worked at Mrs Bettencourt\u2019s house (accountant, secretary, chambermaid, nurse) that had been given during the preliminary investigation. The following statements were highlighted in particular:\n\u201cIt was as if [B.] had woven his web around Mrs Bettencourt.\u201d\n\u201cHe answered me: \u2018As long as she is not under deputyship she can sign.\u2019\u201d\n\u201c[B.] takes advantage of Madame\u2019s weakness to benefit from her generosity.\u201d 25.  After referring to remarks by B. and by Mrs Bettencourt in the press, the article added: \u201ca number of statements paint a less idyllic picture: under oath, employees and servants mentioned pressing requests for money going as far as harassment, harsh language, and various schemes bordering on the sordid. ...\u201d 26.  Under an intermediate heading \u201cStrategy\u201d the article then mentioned and partially quoted documents that had been discovered by the financial investigators at B.\u2019s home in Paris. 27.  The article ended with a small insert indicating that B. had refused to respond to Le Point, preferring to \u201creserve his answers for the judges\u201d. 28.  On 11 February 2010, following the publication of 4 February 2010, Mrs Bettencourt brought urgent proceedings against the applicants in the Paris tribunal de grande instance claiming a manifestly unlawful nuisance under Articles 808 and 809 of the Code of Civil Procedure ... She asked the urgent-applications judge to find that the reproduction of procedural documents from the file of the preliminary investigation initiated by the Nanterre public prosecutor breached section 38(1) of the Law of 29 July 1881 on freedom of the press (\u201csection 38\u201d, ...), which prohibited the publication of documents from a criminal case file before they had been read out in open court, and Article 9 of the Civil Code, guaranteeing the right to respect for private life ... She requested that a court-ordered notice be published in Le Point, on pain of a coercive fine, and that the applicants be ordered to pay her, by way of an advance, compensation for her non-pecuniary damage, on account of her portrayal as an individual with diminished intellectual faculties who had been duped. 29.  The applicants disputed Mrs Bettencourt\u2019s standing to bring the proceedings, as prosecution in respect of the section 38 offence could only be initiated by the public prosecutor under section 47 of the same law ... On the merits, they claimed that it was contradictory, on the one hand, to require journalists to establish the veracity of the information that they published and, on the other, to penalise them for substantiating their investigation. 30.  In a decision of 2 March 2010, the Vice-President of the Paris tribunal de grande instance found that Mrs Bettencourt had standing in so far as she was arguing that the publication of the impugned documents had, on the basis of that provision, caused her personal damage. The judge indicated that while section 47 of the 1881 law reserved the prosecution of the section 38 offence for the public prosecutor, an individual who claimed to have sustained pecuniary or non-pecuniary damage as a result of a publication was entitled to act as a civil party in the proceedings or to bring a case before the urgent-applications judge under Article 809 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in order to seek the requisite protective or remedial measures to put an end to the unlawful nuisance resulting from such publication, or to request a sum by way of an advance. The judge explained: \u201cIt suffices for the publication of the documents prior to their reading in open court to have caused the person actual and direct damage, regardless whether or not the person is a party to the proceedings in which the documents are to be presented\u201d. He ordered the applicants jointly to pay an advance of 3,000 euros (EUR) and the same sum in procedural expenses under Article 700 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 31.  As to the application of section 38 of the 1881 Act, the judge took the view that the statements by employees of Mrs Bettencourt (paragraph 24 above) constituted \u201cprocedural documents\u201d which were part of the preliminary investigation and that, even though it had been discontinued, those documents had been joined to the criminal proceedings now pending, after their transmission had been sought and obtained by Ms Bettencourt\u2011Meyers in support of her own private prosecution. He added that those statements all helped the case for the prosecution, as indicated on the magazine\u2019s cover, \u201cthe accusations of Madame\u2019s employees\u201d, and observed as follows:\n\u201c... the publication of long passages emanating from insiders helps to give the reported facts an appearance of authenticity and objectivity (that the article does not seek to nuance but, on the contrary, to reinforce); the reader is thus led to regard those facts as proven, because they are presented through the prism of a journalist\u2019s analysis, which is bound to contain a degree of subjectivity or opinion. For those reasons, the alleged breach of section 38 cannot be combined with the breaches under Article 9-1 of the Civil Code (presumption of innocence) or Article 9 of the Civil Code (private life) or section 29 of the Law of 29 July 1881 [defamation proceedings, ...], nor can it result in redress on the basis of those separate legal provisions.\u201d\nThe judge concluded that the publication was capable of infringing the rights of Mrs Bettencourt as it portrayed her, at a time when the Nanterre Criminal Court had not yet begun to examine the criminal cases, as a woman who was manipulated and weak, a description that she categorically denied. 32.  The judge further found that the applicants were not justified in relying on the provisions of Article 10 of the Convention and the necessities of information. In this connection he indicated that section 38 sought mainly to preserve the independence and orderly conduct of the judicial process, in addition to protecting the rights of the persons concerned, particularly by guaranteeing the presumption of innocence. He emphasised the limited and temporary nature of the restriction on freedom of expression, as the legislation did not prevent analysis of, or comments on, procedural material, or the publication of information gleaned from the proceedings themselves, but only prohibited the reproduction of documents which were intended for public disclosure in the context of a judicial process surrounded by safeguards. These safeguards include respect for defence rights and the principle of adversarial proceedings, \u201cwhich could not be ensured by a prior, isolated and partial media report\u201d. The judge went on to explain as follows:\n\u201c... the impugned restriction cannot be compared to the case of disclosure of professional secrets or of secrets from the preliminary or judicial investigation, on account of the possession by a journalist of documents covered by secrecy and used in publications imparting information to the general public, in so far as the journalist, who is not bound [by those secrets], is required to possess such documents in order to justify the veracity of the facts reported or the seriousness of his investigation, but also to use them in compliance with the applicable legislation.\u201d 33.  All of the claims submitted by Mrs Bettencourt alleging a breach of her privacy were dismissed on the ground that such a breach had not been sufficiently established, having regard to the general public\u2019s right to be informed, and interest in being informed, of current affairs or events in the general interest:\n\u201c... the claimant has not relied on any specific breaches of her private life which would go beyond the information that it is permitted to mention in connection with the criminal case before the court of Nanterre, as Le Point did not, in particular, provide details about any health problems she may have.\u201d 34.  The applicants appealed. They argued in particular that the procedural documents in question, which had been included in the case file solely on the initiative of the claimant, and not on that of the public prosecutor, could not be regarded as carrying the degree of authority which justified, by derogation to the principle of freedom of expression, the prohibition imposed by section 38. They further emphasised that neither Mrs Bettencourt\u2019s right to a fair hearing, nor any undermining of the authority or impartiality of the courts, was at stake. 35.  In a judgment of 19 March 2010, the Paris Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the court below, in the main, and raised the amount of the advance to EUR 10,000, in addition to charging EUR 5,000 for the costs of the appeal proceedings. It confirmed that the witness statements \u201cclearly\u201d constituted \u201cprocedural documents\u201d, even though the preliminary investigation had been discontinued, since they had been transmitted by the public prosecutor at the request of the civil party and thus formed an integral part of the criminal proceedings. In the court\u2019s view, \u201cthe fact that they were transmitted at the request of the civil party and not on the initiative of the public prosecutor bore little relevance in this connection\u201d. It concluded that the publication of long passages from those statements constituted a violation of section 38 and thus an unlawful nuisance within the meaning of Article 809 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It added as follows:\n\u201c... the requirement for the journalist to verify his sources and to compare the various material available to him on a given subject in the context of a serious investigation, before imparting information to the public, does not mean reproducing verbatim the documents used for his investigation, where, as in the present case, such publication is prohibited under press legislation of which he cannot be unaware.\u201d\nThe court concluded that the applicants\u2019 submission that section 38 should be declared incompatible with Article 10 of the Convention was unfounded. It took the view that Mrs Bettencourt was entitled to claim non-pecuniary damage as she had been portrayed as:\n\u201ca woman in a weak mental state, being easy to manipulate and under the influence of [B.], which the reader is all the more likely to regard as the truth as [the observations] are presented as emanating from individuals who have played a particular role, making them privileged observers of her private life.\u201d\nLastly, the Court of Appeal confirmed that there had been no breach of Mrs Bettencourt\u2019s privacy in the following terms:\n\u201c... the mere mention of Mrs Bettencourt\u2019s mental health in the body of the article, without any details falling within her private sphere, and in the testimony reproduced, which was mainly about the conduct and manoeuvres attributed to [B.], does not suffice to establish any particular breach of the respondent\u2019s privacy that would go beyond the limits of legitimate information that the public is entitled to expect about a case which, already being widely covered by the media, is before the courts ....\u201d 36.  The applicants appealed on points of law. In their grounds of appeal they argued, under Article 10 of the Convention, that they had a duty to inform the public about a case pending before the courts which had been revived after a private prosecution, following its discontinuance by the public prosecutor, and which had given rise to wide media coverage especially on account of the personality and wealth of Mrs Bettencourt; that the judgment of the Court of Appeal had found against them solely for publishing the statement extracts and not on account of their content; that there had been no impairment of the interests protected by section 38(1) because Mrs Bettencourt was not the defendant in the proceedings; that there was a manifest contradiction in the Court of Appeal\u2019s position, as it had declared Mrs Bettencourt\u2019s action admissible on the basis of the damage sustained, while taking the view that she had not been portrayed as a weak and manipulated woman in terms of her right to respect for her private life. 37.  In a judgment of 28 April 2011 the Court of Cassation dismissed the applicants\u2019 appeal and ordered them to pay Mrs Bettencourt the sum of EUR 4,000 in costs. It gave the following reasons for its decision:\n\u201c... the judgment observes that long extracts were published from the statements taken during the preliminary investigation ..., in which [Mrs Bettencourt] was portrayed as a manipulated and weak woman; proceeding with a correct application of Article 10 of the Convention ..., the Court of Appeal was able, without contradicting itself, to conclude from that publication, since the documents drawn up by the police during an investigation are procedural documents within the meaning of section 38 of the Law of 29 July 1881, that [Mrs Bettencourt] was justified in claiming, solely on the basis of that publication, that she had sustained personal damage ...\u201d 38.  On 11 February 2010 B. brought urgent proceedings against the applicants in the Paris tribunal de grande instance following the publication of 4 February 2010, arguing that it had caused him a manifestly unlawful nuisance, infringing both his copyright to the photographs illustrating the article and his defence rights, including his right to be presumed innocent. 39.  In a decision of 2 March 2010, the Vice-President of the Paris tribunal de grande instance, in addition to endorsing the reasoning already set out in paragraphs 31 and 32 above, took the view that the impugned publication could have the alleged effects, infringing B.\u2019s right to a fair hearing and his right to the presumption of innocence. B.\u2019s claim concerning the infringement allegedly caused by the reproduction of photographs was rejected as falling outside the remit of the urgent proceedings judge. The judge ordered the publication of a notice inside the magazine together with an indication of it on the cover (to take up one half of the page in bold type, under the heading \u201cJudgment against Le Point in proceedings brought by [B.]\u201d) and on the weekly magazine\u2019s website. The applicants were also ordered jointly to pay B. an advance of EUR 3,000 on compensation for his non-pecuniary damage, together with an equivalent sum by way of procedural expenses. 40.  The applicants appealed. 41.  In a judgment of 19 March 2010 the Paris Court of Appeal upheld the decision appealed against, mainly in the same terms as those set out in paragraph 35 above. It reiterated that the witness statements, \u201cwithout engaging in any extensive interpretation of [section 38]\u201d, could be characterised as procedural documents, even though the investigation had been discontinued: \u201cthe fact that they were transmitted at the request of the private prosecutor and not on the initiative of the public prosecutor is of little relevance in this connection because they support the prosecution case\u201d. It went on to find that \u201cconsequently, the mere publication of substantial extracts from those statements, before they had been referred to or read out in open court, [had] indeed constituted a violation of section 38 of the Law of 29 July 1881 and therefore an unlawful nuisance\u201d. The Court of Appeal further found as follows:\n\u201c... the four statements thus presented to the public portray [B.] as a devious and unscrupulous individual, using seduction, manoeuvres and psychological pressure to persuade Liliane Bettencourt to grant him substantial and frequent gifts, at a time when she was weak and when her husband\u2019s state of health had declined;\n... the reader is all the more likely to consider these statements to be true, supporting as they do the accusation against [B.] before the Nanterre Criminal Court, as they are presented as emanating from individuals who, as a result of the services they rendered to her (nurse, chambermaid, secretary), played a particular role through which they became privileged observers of her private life;\n... the reader is thus led to believe in the accusation, even before the court hearing the case has been able to reach its decision, in conditions that breach the respondent\u2019s right to be presumed innocent and his defence rights ...\u201d 42.  The applicants lodged an appeal on points of law. 43.  In a judgment of 7 July 2011 the Court of Cassation dismissed their appeal in the same terms as those of its judgment of 28 April 2011 (see paragraph 37 above). 44.  On 9 March 2010, B. brought proceedings against the applicants on the merits before the Paris tribunal de grande instance seeking redress for the damage sustained on account of the publication of the articles of 10 December 2009 and 4 February 2010, in breach of section 38(1) of the 1881 Act. 45.  In a judgment of 21 June 2010, that court dismissed all of B.\u2019s claims. On the admissibility of his suit, it observed that the applicants were correct to assert that an individual who claimed to be the victim of the offence provided for under section 38 of the 1881 Act was not authorised to bring a private prosecution on that basis. It pointed out that, by contrast, the provisions of that Act did not preclude the injured party from bringing proceedings in the civil courts, as only one section of that Act (section 46) prohibited the bringing of civil proceedings separately from a public prosecution, namely in cases of defamation against public authorities, State institutions and civil servants. After observing that section 38 usefully contributed to preserving the orderly functioning and impartiality of the justice system and to guarantee due process, since the full and verbatim publication of documents from a criminal file before the trial could hinder the conduct of pending investigations or influence individuals who might subsequently be called upon to testify, or even lay magistrates who might have to adjudicate upon the case, the court gave the following reasons for its decision:\n\u201c... The prohibition that it establishes must not, however, restrict the ability of journalists to report on criminal cases, even those which have not yet been publicly examined by a court, and specifically those which, raising issues of general interest, involving significant interests, or concerning people with high-level responsibilities, especially in political, economic or artistic fields, particularly deserve to be brought to public attention.\nThe application of this legislation cannot, in particular, have the effect of precluding journalists from imparting to their readers, in such a case, all or part of the documentary resources from which they derived their information, in order to establish its credibility, or which substantiate their commentary and analysis, in order to submit them for open discussion. This is the case here: extracts ... from reports which have been drawn up by the police acting on the instructions of the public prosecutor and which have been appended, after the discontinuance of the proceedings for which they were produced, to the file of further proceedings brought directly by a civil party in a criminal court \u2013 those extracts, therefore, were included by [the second applicant] in two successive articles which were each the result of a journalistic investigation and sought to present readers with information, analysis and comments on a criminal case that would soon be adjudicated upon by a court, that involved considerable financial interests and concerned one of the richest individuals in France and a photographer and writer who has, as he himself boasts, \u2018undeniable success and notoriety\u2019.\nIn the first of the impugned texts, short quotations from procedural documents, which are reproduced in quotation marks in the body of the article and are therefore fully integrated into the journalist\u2019s writing, mention certain facts and offer an analysis thereof. In the second text, the three pages of extracts from procedural documents are included in a broader editorial presentation, consisting essentially of a four-page spread and a large photograph of the person concerned, from which they are indissociable; the journalist expressly refers to those extracts in his article, analysing them and basing his conclusions on them.\nIf one were to accept, in those circumstances, that these two bodies of text should be examined by this court only on the basis of the strict-liability offence under section 38 of the Freedom of the Press Act, that would lead, as the respondents rightly argue, to preventing them from initiating the debate that is warranted by the journalist\u2019s work, within which the impugned extracts are merely one element; and they would be deprived, in the present case, of the defences made available by law to persons who are prosecuted for defamation or for a breach of the right to be presumed innocent, in other words precluding them from proving the veracity of the allegations or, at least, the journalist\u2019s good faith, and from submitting argument to the effect that the impugned texts do not contain any final conclusions expressing a biased view that the person in question is definitely guilty.\nIt should be noted in this connection that the claimant directs his main criticism, in his writ of summons, against the comments and analyses that the journalist has been led to write, under his own name, by the procedural documents cited .... and that he mainly reproduces in that writ only those comments and not the quotations that he is supposed to be challenging. It should be observed in particular that the claimant complains that the statements from which extracts were quoted \u2013 or in reality the journalist\u2019s analysis thereof \u2013 breached his right to be presumed innocent and were presented as \u2018damning\u2019 and \u2018particularly incriminating\u2019.\nIt can be concluded that B. himself admits that, absent his chosen basis of action, he had other options at his disposal: a private prosecution or civil proceedings for defamation, or a civil action for a breach of his right to be presumed innocent; both of those courses of action would have entailed fair proceedings, ensuring respect for the equality of arms, and he was not therefore deprived of his right to have access to a court in order to secure respect for his rights.\nIn those circumstances, the upholding in the present case of the claims that he has submitted under 38 would constitute a restriction of freedom of expression devoid of any necessity in a democratic society.\u201d 46.  In a judgment of 22 February 2012, the Paris Court of Appeal overturned that judgment. It found that the impugned publications infringed B.\u2019s right to a fair trial with respect for his defence rights, including the right to be presumed innocent, and breached section 38 of the 1881 Act. It ordered the applicants jointly to pay B. the sum of EUR 1 for each publication by way of compensation and EUR 6,000 in expenses under Article 700 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It also ordered the publication, on pain of a coercive fine, of a notice containing the operative provisions of the judgment in Le Point and on the magazine\u2019s website. 47.  The Court of Appeal explained that the assessment of the offending publication \u201cclearly\u201d went beyond \u201cthe framework of that of so-called \u2018procedural\u2019 offences\u201d and that it would have to be carried out with regard to Article 10 of the Convention and to the question whether the interference with the applicants\u2019 freedom of expression was necessary to protect the reputation or rights of others and to maintain the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. 48.  As regards the article of 10 December 2009, the court noted that it had been published the day before B.\u2019s appearance in the criminal court and that it clearly suggested that he was guilty, as he was portrayed as an individual against whom there was \u201ca series of sufficiently strong presumptions [that he had committed] the offence of undue influence\u201d. It took the view that the court below had wrongly regarded the aim of informing the public as prevailing over the means used, namely illegal methods whereby extracts had been selected from statements collected in an investigation in order to show that B. had committed the offence of undue influence, whereas there had been no judicial decision to that effect. It could be understood by the reader that B. was not telling the truth about Mrs Bettencourt\u2019s mental health and that his guilt was \u201cdoubly suggested\u201d in the introduction (citing an extract from the prosecution document, which fell under section 38) and in the conclusion. It added as follows:\n\u201c... The reasoning given by the court below is tantamount to legitimising the practice, which is legally prohibited, of publishing extracts from an investigation file before they are read out in open court, first, on account of the interest of the subject, and secondly, while noting B.\u2019s claim that his right to be presumed innocent was breached.\nThe court cannot agree with the reasoning of the court below ...\nThe article of 10 December 2009, in so far as it portrays [B.] as having committed the offence of undue influence vis-\u00e0-vis Mrs Bettencourt in the above-mentioned context, clearly breaches his right to a fair trial including to the presumption of innocence.\nThat breach, according to the article, is exclusively based on the publication of extracts from statements which legally speaking are not addressed to journalists when they are not parties to the proceedings.\nThe court would reiterate that, for a reader who has an average knowledge of the courts, documents from judicial investigations take on particular credibility and an undeniable evidential value.\nThe court reaches the conclusion that the date of publication, the choices of quotation, and the portrayal of [B.] as guilty according to the documents from the judicial investigation, even though it had been discontinued, had the consequence of influencing his exercise, which was legally and conventionally guaranteed, of his defence rights, which meant that before being heard by a court he should not have been portrayed as guilty of the offence of undue influence against Mrs Bettencourt. [B.] thus finds himself required to give explanations on evidence against him which has not yet been debated in a court of law and which has been taken from an investigation, then still secret, conducted under the supervision of a judge ...\nIt is not befitting to consider, as did the court below, that [B.] had other courses of action available to him. Being entitled to bring his case to the civil court under section 38, it cannot be suggested to the claimant that he should have opted for other types of proceedings on the erroneous ground that his action contravenes Article 10 of the Convention ...\u201d 49.  As regards the article of 4 February 2010, the Court of Appeal took the view that the editorial choices \u2013 front cover of the magazine, presentation of whole swathes of statements, highlighting of the exclusive publication of the witness statements \u2013 constituted a communication of some importance directly aimed at B. who had not been able to explain before a court his position \u201con the accusations of the staff\u201d. It added that the publication portrayed B. \u201cas being accused by third parties in conclusive terms\u201d and that the article was \u201ca repeated incrimination of [B.] two months before a hearing at which the \u2018epilogue\u2019 of the case was supposed to take place\u201d. 50.  The applicants appealed on points of law. In their grounds of appeal, they argued in particular that the ban on publishing procedural documents was a matter of defence of the general interest falling within the sole jurisdiction of the public prosecutor, and that a private person could not seek redress for damage on that basis. They added that their argument was supported by the fact that B. could have, under Article 9-1 of the Civil Code, used another legal remedy to ensure the protection of his interests and that the interference with freedom of expression and of information had therefore not been justified or proportionate. 51.  In a judgment of 29 May 2013 giving the following reasons, the Court of Cassation dismissed the applicants\u2019 appeal:\n\u201cHaving found, first, that the article of 10 December 2009 was based on an analysis of extracts from various statements taken by the criminal investigation police, in order to portray [B] as having taken advantage of Mrs Bettencourt\u2019s weakness, the day before his appearance before a criminal court, which was to rule on the relevance and merits of the accusations made against him by her daughter, and, secondly, that the article of 4 February 2010, based on a partial reproduction of statements taken by the criminal investigation police, seeking to portray [B.] as being accused by third parties in conclusive terms in order to lead the reader to believe that the case against him was made out, two months before a hearing which would constitute, according to the article, \u2018the epilogue of the case\u2019, the Court of Appeal ... reached the conclusion that the publication had infringed [B.]\u2019s right to a fair trial with due respect for his right to be presumed innocent and his defence rights; ...\u201d 52.  After June 2010 there were many developments in the case, with its various political and financial repercussions, and they were widely reported in the media. On 17 November 2010 the Court of Cassation ordered the transfer of all the aspects of the Bettencourt case to the Bordeaux tribunal de grande instance. Mrs Bettencourt\u2019s daughter withdrew her claims but the criminal proceedings were later resumed, and on 14 December 2011 B. was placed under judicial investigation for the offence of undue influence. 53.  In a judgment of 28 May 2015, B. was found guilty of that offence and sentenced to three years\u2019 imprisonment, of which six months were suspended, a fine of EUR 350,000 and the payment of EUR 158 million in damages awarded to Mrs Bettencourt. In a judgment of 24 August 2016, the Bordeaux Court of Appeal upheld the judgment in respect of the prosecution case and varied the sentence, giving B. a four-year suspended prison sentence, fining him EUR 375,000 and ordering the confiscation of part of his property. The Court of Appeal also took the view that it did not need to make an award of damages on account of settlements that had been agreed between the parties.\n... 59.  The Court refers to Recommendation Rec(2003)13 of the Council of Europe\u2019s Committee of Ministers to the member States on the provision of information through the media in relation to criminal proceedings, adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 10 July 2003 (see B\u00e9dat v. Switzerland [GC], no. 56925/08, \u00a7 21, ECHR 2016).", "references": ["4", "6", "1", "9", "5", "2", "8", "0", "7", "3", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1966 and lives in Kiev. 6.  The applicant came to Bulgaria in 1995. In 1996 he started a relationship with Ms M., also a Ukrainian national. In 1997 the two of them had a son. In 2003 the applicant was granted permanent resident status. 7.  On 6 November 2006 the head of the Ministry of the Interior\u2019s National Security Service issued an order withdrawing the applicant\u2019s residence permit, ordering his expulsion and imposing a ten-year ban on his re-entering Bulgaria, on the ground that his presence in the country represented a \u201cserious threat to national security\u201d. Factual grounds justifying the order were not indicated; it was merely noted that it was based on \u201cproposal no. B4923\u201d. 8.  That proposal, drawn up by National Security Service and also dated 6 November 2006, was submitted to the Court. It stated that the applicant had allegedly been involved in acts of extortion, smuggling, arms deals and money laundering, that he operated with large amounts of illegally obtained money, that he had established contacts with Bulgarian officials, including police officers, who had been providing him with illegal services, and that he had been in contact with presumed terrorists. While enumerating the applicant\u2019s presumed illegal activities, the proposal referred to specific dates and names, but to no evidence to support the allegations. Lastly, it was stated that the applicant had left Bulgaria on 29 October 2006. 9.  Unaware of the ministerial order of 6 November 2006, on 15 November 2006 the applicant attempted to re-enter the Bulgarian territory but was stopped at the border and not permitted entry. Since then he has been living in Kiev, while Ms M. and his son remained in Bulgaria. 10.  Through his lawyer, the applicant submitted an appeal to the Bulgarian Minister of the Interior against the order of 6 November 2006. The appeal was dismissed on 22 December 2006, the Minister pointing out, in particular, that he considered irrelevant the applicant\u2019s argument that he had settled in Bulgaria with his family. 11.  After that the applicant applied for judicial review of the order of 6 November 2006. In particular, he pointed out in his application that his family resided in Bulgaria and that their separation had been unjustified. 12.  In the course of the judicial proceedings the applicant\u2019s lawyer was shown proposal no. B4923. 13.  In a decision of 30 October 2007 the Supreme Administrative Court held that it was competent to examine the application, with reference to the Court\u2019s judgment in the case of Al\u2011Nashif v. Bulgaria (no. 50963/99, 20 June 2002) and Article 13 of the Convention, even though, at the time the impugned order had been issued, judicial review had not been available under the legislation then applicable (see paragraph 16 below). 14.  The judicial proceedings ended on 19 March 2009 with a final judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court, which upheld the order of 6 November 2006. After enumerating the applicant\u2019s alleged unlawful activities described in proposal no. B4923, it stated merely that the impugned order did not breach the law. Furthermore, it dismissed the applicant\u2019s arguments relating to his family and private life, stating:\n\u201cany restriction of the rights under the Convention is justified [when based] on national security considerations, in cases where foreign citizens\u2019 behaviour threatens the national security and the public order of the State where they reside.\u201d", "references": ["1", "9", "8", "0", "5", "3", "7", "2", "6", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1979 and is currently in detention in Zhytomyr, Ukraine. 6.  In October 2001 Ms K. was found murdered in her flat. In December 2001 Ms S., a minor, was kidnapped and murdered. 7.  On 10 December 2001 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of kidnapping S. in order to extort money from her parents and of S.\u2019s murder. On 17 December 2001 the applicant was provided with a lawyer in connection with those charges. 8.  On 25 December 2001 Mr K., the deceased Ms K.\u2019s son, was questioned as a witness and confessed to the murder of his mother. The next day he retracted his confession. 9.  On 15 February 2002, purportedly at his own request, the applicant, was questioned as a witness about the circumstances of K.\u2019s death. During the questioning, which took place without a lawyer, the applicant confessed to K.\u2019s murder. The applicant said that he had read an advertisement in a local newspaper that K. wanted to buy a flat in Zhytomyr. He had decided to rob her, on the assumption that she had savings at home for the purchase of a flat. The victim had allowed him to enter her flat. During their conversation, the victim had told the applicant that she had a conflict with a neighbour about a sausage business the neighbour was running from the building. She also had tense relations with her daughter-in-law. When the applicant had threatened her and demanded money she had told him that she had none because she had placed the advertisement at the request of a friend who lived in another town and wanted to buy a flat in Zhytomyr. To conceal his attempted robbery the applicant had then murdered the victim. 10.  The transcript of the applicant\u2019s questioning recorded that he was told about his duty to state everything he knew about the case, that he could face criminal liability for refusal to testify and for giving false statements and about the constitutional provision guaranteeing the privilege against self-incrimination. 11.  On 16 February 2002 the applicant, still acting as a witness, participated without a lawyer in an on-site reconstruction of the attack on K. On 18 and 22 February 2002 he was again questioned, without a lawyer, about the attack. 12.  On 22 February 2002 the investigator in the case requested an opinion from psychiatrists on a number of questions, namely:\n(i)  whether the applicant was suffering from a psychiatric condition;\n(ii)  whether the applicant was sane at the time of the commission of the acts he was accused of and at the time of the assessment;\n(iii)  if the experts established that the applicant had been suffering from a psychiatric condition or a temporary disruption of his mental capacities at the time of commission of the act, whether he had been conscious of the meaning of his actions and whether he could control them; and\n(iv)  whether the applicant was in need of compulsory psychiatric treatment. 13.  On 25 February 2002 the investigating prosecutor instituted criminal proceedings against the applicant for the murder of K. and joined them with the criminal case concerning the kidnapping and murder of S. It appears from the applicant\u2019s submissions that on the same day he was given the procedural status of an accused and was allowed for the first time to consult a lawyer in connection with the charges related to the attack on K. Article 142 of the Code of Criminal Procedure required that procedural rights had to be explained to a person who acquired the status of an accused, including the right to remain silent and to have a lawyer. 14.  On 5 March 2002 a panel of psychiatric experts examined the applicant and produced a report on his mental state, concluding that he had been sane at the time of the alleged crimes and was sane at the time of the assessment. According to the report, in the course of the interview with the experts the applicant gave a description of K.\u2019s murder that was identical to the one he had given to the investigator (\u201c\u043e\u0431\u0441\u0442\u043e\u044f\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0430 \u0435\u0433\u043e \u043f\u043e\u0434\u0433\u043e\u0442\u043e\u0432\u043a\u0438 \u0438 \u0443\u0431\u0438\u0439\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0430... \u0438\u0437\u043b\u0430\u0433\u0430\u0435\u0442 \u0442\u0430\u043a, \u043a\u0430\u043a \u0438\u0437\u043b\u0430\u0433\u0430\u043b \u0432 \u0445\u043e\u0434\u0435 \u0441\u043b\u0435\u0434\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0438\u044f\u201d). The experts added that in doing so the applicant had been speaking as if reciting a text memorised by heart and had remained silent when interrupted and asked for details or clarifications. The experts concluded that the applicant was sane. 15.  The applicant stood trial at the Zhytomyr Regional Court of Appeal, which was competent to act as a trial court (\u201cthe trial court\u201d) because the applicant was accused of aggravated murder, a crime carrying a potential life sentence. In the course of the trial the applicant stated that he was innocent of both murders but pleaded guilty to kidnapping S. He stated that on the day of K.\u2019s murder he had met an old childhood acquaintance, M., in the street. M. had told him that he had killed K. To check M.\u2019s story the applicant had gone to K.\u2019s flat and had seen her dead body there. He had had nothing to do with the robbery and murder. 16.  On 11 July 2002 the trial court convicted the applicant of kidnapping, extortion and the murder of S. He was also convicted of the robbery and murder of K. The court sentenced him to life imprisonment. In convicting the applicant of K.\u2019s robbery and murder the trial court relied in particular on:\n(i)  the applicant\u2019s initial confessions;\n(ii)  the crime scene report, which showed that the layout of the victim\u2019s flat, the placement of furniture and the position of her body matched the applicant\u2019s confessions;\n(iii)  medical evidence that the victim\u2019s clothing and injuries matched the applicant\u2019s confessions;\n(iv)  the statement of Ms O.K., the victim\u2019s friend, who said she had asked the victim to place an advertisement for the purchase of a flat on her behalf;\n(v)  the testimony of Ms V.S., the victim\u2019s neighbour, who stated at the trial that she had run a sausage business from the victim\u2019s block of flats and that she had had a conflict with the victim over that matter;\n(vi)  the testimony of the victim\u2019s son and daughter-in-law that relations between the victim and the daughter-in-law had been tense;\n(vii)  evidence from an expert to the effect that it could not be ruled out that the victim\u2019s injuries had been caused by a knife found at the applicant\u2019s home. 17.  On 10 October 2002 the Supreme Court, sitting as a court of cassation, upheld the applicant\u2019s conviction. 18.  On 2 April 2003 the applicant lodged an application with the Court (no. 16404/03), alleging that his conviction for the murder of K. had been based on incriminating evidence that had been obtained in violation of his right to remain silent and the privilege against self-incrimination and that he had been hindered in the effective exercise of his right to defence when questioned at the pre-trial stage of the proceedings. 19.  On 19 February 2009 the Court declared the application partly admissible and found a violation of Article 6 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3 of the Convention. The Court found in particular that:\n\u201c58.  The Court reiterates that in particular where a deprivation of liberty is at stake, the interests of justice in principle call for legal representation (see Benham v. the United Kingdom, no. 19380/92, \u00a7 61, 10 June 1996). Furthermore, the Court notes that Ukrainian legislation provides for obligatory legal representation of persons who could expect life imprisonment if convicted. This was the applicant\u2019s situation, in that he was already charged with a murder and being accused of the second murder made a sentence of life imprisonment a possibility... The Court considers that the legal representation of the applicant during the period in question was required in the interests of justice. 59.  Furthermore, ... the circumstances of the case suggest that his statements were obtained in defiance of his will. Although the applicant failed to substantiate any physical coercion by the investigators, the fact that another person within the same proceedings also confessed to the murder of Mrs K. and retracted his statement, alleging coercion by the same investigator, could raise reasonable doubts as to the practices of the investigator in the present case. In addition, the applicant, having been warned about criminal liability for refusal to testify and at the same time having been informed of his right not to testify against himself, could have been confused, as he alleged, about his liability for refusal to testify, especially in the absence of legal advice during that interview. It should be further noted that although the applicant had retracted his statements during the court hearings the domestic authorities based his conviction for the murder of Mrs K. to a decisive extent, if not solely, on these self\u2011incriminating statements. The statements did not in fact contain any information which was not already known to the investigators (in contrast to the case of the kidnapping and murder of S., in which the applicant showed the police where the corpse had been hidden) and had been received in unclear circumstances and in clear violation of the applicant\u2019s right to defence.\u201d (Shabelnik, cited above) 20.  The Shabelnik judgment (cited above) became final on 19 May 2009. 21.  The applicant\u2019s lawyer (Mr Bushchenko), lodged an application with the Supreme Court for a review of the applicant\u2019s criminal case in view of the first Shabelnik judgment (cited above). He asked the Supreme Court to quash the trial court\u2019s judgment and its own 2002 decision upholding the original conviction. He asked that he and the applicant be present during the examination of the request. 22.  The prosecutor\u2019s office also applied to the Supreme Court for a review. They asked the court to amend the trial court\u2019s judgment and the Supreme Court\u2019s 2002 decision by striking out references to the records of the questioning of the applicant as a witness about K.\u2019s murder and the result of the on-site reconstruction of that murder. 23.  On 30 April 2010 the Supreme Court, sitting in a formation composed of all the judges of the criminal and military chambers of the court, allowed the above applications in part, quashed its own 2002 decision and remitted the case for fresh examination in cassation proceedings by a panel of three judges of the Supreme Court. 24.  Hearings before the Supreme Court panel were scheduled and rescheduled several times and the applicant was informed of this accordingly. The case was finally scheduled for hearing on 9 September 2010 and the applicant and Mr Bushchenko were informed of this by letter on 30 July 2010. Neither the applicant nor Mr Bushchenko requested that the applicant be escorted from his prison to the hearing before the Supreme Court panel. 25.  On 9 September 2010 the Supreme Court examined the case in the absence of the applicant but in the presence of his lawyer and a prosecutor. The lawyer made submissions to the court and a written summary of his remarks was submitted to the Supreme Court. 26.  According to the summary, after reiterating that the applicant\u2019s confessions and the reconstruction reports should be ruled inadmissible, the lawyer presented his analysis of the remaining evidence in the file. He dealt with the question of the evidence of the applicant\u2019s involvement in the attack on K., seeking to show that it was either inadmissible or unreliable. In particular, he made the following arguments:\n(i)  the psychiatric report, in so far as it provided a record of the applicant\u2019s alleged statements about K.\u2019s murder, was unspecific and constituted a judgment by the experts about the applicant\u2019s statements which the experts had been unqualified to make, as opposed to an accurate record of those statements. In any case, it was improper to use that report since the psychiatrists had never been examined by the defence. Moreover, the applicant\u2019s supposed statements to the experts were inadmissible because they were marred by the same problems as the confessions that had been obtained in breach of his Convention rights;\n(ii)  as to the other evidence, in particular the crime scene examination report and the witness evidence, it only had evidentiary value as corroboration for the applicant\u2019s statements, but as those statements had to be ruled inadmissible to give effect to the first Shabelnik judgment (cited above), the other witness evidence could also not be used to support a finding of the applicant\u2019s guilt;\n(iii)  certain circumstances, such as the fact that no traces of the applicant\u2019s presence had been found in K.\u2019s flat, pointed to the applicant being innocent of the murder. 27.  On the same day the Supreme Court delivered its decision. It excluded the applicant\u2019s original confessions from the body of evidence. However, it found that the rest of the evidence in the case file was sufficient to support the trial court\u2019s finding that the applicant had murdered K. while trying to cover up an attempted robbery. 28.  In particular, the Supreme Court approved of the trial court\u2019s reliance on: (i) evidence from the expert that it could not be ruled out that the victim\u2019s injuries had been caused by the knife found at the applicant\u2019s home, and (ii) the statements of the witnesses O.K., V.S. and \u201cothers\u201d concerning the applicant\u2019s supposed motive for the murder (see paragraph 16 above). 29.  In support of its findings the Supreme Court also referred to material and circumstances on which the trial court had not explicitly relied: (i) the fact that \u201cin the course of psychiatric assessment [the applicant], told the experts about [K.\u2019s murder] under the circumstances established by the [trial] court\u201d; (ii) the applicant\u2019s admission in court that he had visited the victim\u2019s flat; and (iii) the testimony of Ms G., the victim\u2019s neighbour, that she had seen the applicant in the victim\u2019s block of flats.\nThe Supreme Court concluded that, other than the breaches which led to the exclusion of the applicant\u2019s original confessions, there had been no other breaches of the rules of criminal procedure which would put in doubt the correctness of the conclusions of the trial court (the Court of Appeal) concerning his guilt or legal qualification of his actions. The investigation authorities and the trial court examined all the circumstances of the case which could be relevant to correctly decide the case. The trial court\u2019s conclusions were based on admissible and sufficient evidence.", "references": ["8", "7", "2", "0", "5", "9", "1", "4", "6", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicants were born on 18 September 1971 and 24 December 1994 respectively and live in Moscow. 6.  A two-roomed flat at 29-1-26 Ozernaya Ulitsa, Moscow, was owned by the city. G. and her son resided there as tenants under the social housing agreement with the city. 7.  On 16 November 2002 G. died. On 17 September 2003 the municipal authorities de-registered her tenancy. 8.  On 3 October 2003 G.\u2019s son died. On an unspecified date the municipal authorities de-registered his tenancy. 9.  On an unspecified date A. submitted a forged copy of a court judgment to the Department of the Municipal Housing and Housing Policy (the \u201cHousing Department\u201d) recognising her right to reside in the flat and on 9 February 2005 the Housing Department entered into a social housing lease agreement with A. and her family. 10.  On 25 February 2005 the Housing Department transferred the title to the flat to A., her husband and her daughter under the privatisation scheme. 11.  On 15 December 2005 A. and her husband sold the flat to the applicant. On 29 December 2005 the city registration body issued a certificate confirming the first applicant\u2019s title to the flat. The applicants moved into the flat and resided there. 12.  On an unspecified date the Housing Department obtained information that the court judgment submitted by A. might have been forged and on 15 December 2005 the housing authorities asked the prosecutor\u2019s office to conduct a relevant inquiry. 13.  On 20 March 2008 the Nikulinskiy District Court of Moscow invalidated the social housing lease agreement of 9 February 2005 and the privatisation agreement of 25 February 2005. 14.  On an unspecified date the Housing Department brought an action against the applicants seeking the transfer of the flat to the city and the applicants\u2019 eviction. 15.  On 9 October 2009 the District Court granted the Housing Department\u2019s claims in full. The court ruled that the case fell under one of the two exceptions to the protection of a bona fide purchaser\u2019s title, which required that precedence be given to the previous owner who had been deprived of the property against his or her will. The first applicant\u2019s title to the flat was annulled and the title was transferred to the City of Moscow. The court also ordered the applicants\u2019 eviction. The applicants appealed. 16.  On 25 February 2010 the City Court upheld the judgment of 9 October 2009 on appeal. 17.  On an unspecified date the bailiff instituted enforcement proceedings. 18.  On 12 March 2012 the District Court granted the applicant\u2019s additional time to comply with the judgment of 9 October 2009. The applicants were required to vacate the flat by 1 August 2012. On 14 May 2012 the City Court upheld the said decision on appeal. 19.  The applicants continued to reside in the flat. On 14 August 2013 the Housing Department entered into a housing agreement with them in respect of the flat for a term of five years.", "references": ["7", "5", "0", "1", "2", "8", "4", "6", "3", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1962. He is serving a prison sentence in the Orenburg region. 6.  The applicant was head of the security service of the Yukos oil company. 7.  On 14 April 2005 the applicant, who had been found guilty of several counts of attempted murder and murder on 24 March 2005, was charged with the murder of Kr. and Fd. and the attempted murder of R., I. and Fl. On 4 July 2005 the applicant was charged with the murder of P. and the attempted murder of Kk. The charge sheet stated, in particular, that the applicant had entered into a criminal conspiracy with N. and other unidentified managers of the Menatep bank to murder Kr., R. and P. with whom the Yukos oil company had been in conflict for various reasons. The applicant had asked G. to find and hire hitmen to commit those murders. G. had hired Sh., Ts., Re., Go. and O. who had killed Kr. and P. and had committed several unsuccessful attempts to kill R. Fd., I., Fl. and Kk. had been collateral victims of their actions. 8.  According to the applicant, the investigation was completed on 5 July 2005. 9.  On 5 July 2005 a Deputy Prosecutor General K., gave an interview to two major Russian channels, the NTV and the First Channel. The interview was broadcasted in their news programmes of the same date. K. said, in particular:\n\u201cN., a member of the Committee of Directors of the Yukos oil company and the first deputy president of that oil company, [the applicant], the head of the 4th division of the internal and financial security service of that oil company, and other still unidentified persons among the employees of that oil company founded a criminal gang for committing criminal offences in their personal and other interests. In 1998 [the applicant], upon instructions from N. and other employees of the Yukos oil company ..., organised the murder of the head of the Nefteyugansk Town Council P[.] ... For that purposes [the applicant] involved G., Go., Sh., Re. and Ts. ...\u201d\n\u201c[The applicant], upon instructions from N. and other unidentified persons from among the managers of the Menatep bank, organised the murder of the director of the Fenix company Kr[.] who had acted contrary to their interests ...\u201d. 10.  The applicant lodged a complaint with the Tverskoy District Court of Moscow. He complained that the prosecutor\u2019s statements had encouraged the public to believe him guilty and prejudged the assessment of the facts by the competent court. They therefore had breached his presumption of innocence. The applicant also stated that he had wished to ask for a trial by jury but had had to renounce his wish for fear that the jurors might be influenced by the prosecutor\u2019s statements to the press. 11.  On 10 July 2007 the District Court rejected the applicant\u2019s complaint, finding that the applicant had been charged with many counts of murder and attempted murder. In his statements to the press K. had related the facts as established by the investigation and confirmed by the materials in the criminal case file. He had acted lawfully and had not breached the applicant\u2019s rights. 12.  On 16 October 2007 the Moscow City Court upheld the judgment of 10 July 2007 on appeal. 13.  On 11 September 2005 the TVC Channel broadcasted an interview with B., a lead investigator of the Prosecutor General\u2019s office in charge of the applicant\u2019s case. B. said, in particular:\n\u201cB.: At present we have already completed the investigation into several more episodes of the criminal activities of the Yukos oil company. [The applicant], the former head of the internal financial security service, has been charged with six [counts of murder]... The crimes were organised by, among others, N. ... In fact, N. organised and financed all these crimes.\nThe presenter: Does it mean that P. was killed by the same gang that had committed other murders? B.: This gang was founded by [the applicant] on the instructions from N.. Yes, this was proved. It was financed by N.\u201d 14.  The applicant lodged a complaint with the Basmannyy District Court of Moscow. He complained that B.\u2019s statements had breached his presumption of innocence. 15.  On 11 January 2006 the District Court rejected the applicant\u2019s complaint. It found that B. had orally expressed his personal opinion about the applicant\u2019s guilt in his interview to the press. His statements were not contained in an official document issued in the framework of the criminal proceedings. There was no reason to believe that B.\u2019s opinion had breached the applicant\u2019s constitutional rights or had undermined the fairness of his forthcoming trial. 16.  On 6 March 2006 the City Court upheld the judgment on appeal. 17.  On 20 March 2006 the City Court held a preliminary hearing of the applicant\u2019s case. 18.  On 17 August 2006 the City Court convicted the applicant and his co-defendants Sh., Ts., Re. and O. of the murder of Kr., P. and Fd. and the attempted murder of R., I. and Fl. It acquitted the applicant of the attempted murder of Kk. The applicant was sentenced to twenty-one years\u2019 imprisonment. 19.  On 21 February 2007 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the conviction in respect of the applicant\u2019s co-defendants. It quashed the applicant\u2019s conviction and remitted the case for a retrial before another judge of the City Court. 20.  The second trial started on 17 April 2007. During the hearing the court examined a handwritten note containing R.\u2019s address in Vienna. That note had been found among the personal belongings of the late G. who, according to witness statements, had been an intermediary between the applicant, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, Ts. and Re. who had committed the two attempts on R.\u2019s life. 21.  The Court also examined the expert reports of 24 December 2003 and 7 October 2004, ordered by the investigator. In the report of 24 December 2003 the experts found that it could not be excluded that the note had been written by the applicant. It was however not possible to make any firm conclusions about the author of the note for the lack of comparative material. In the report of 7 October 2004 the experts found, after having examined additional samples of the applicant\u2019s handwriting, that the note in question had been written by him. When questioned in court, the experts confirmed their findings. 22.  The applicant submitted to the court a \u201cspecialist\u201d opinion of 4 July 2004 by V. According to V., the samples of the applicant\u2019s handwriting submitted for comparative analysis were insufficient to make any firm conclusions as to whether he was the author of the note. V. confirmed her findings when questioned in court. 23.  Referring to the \u201cspecialist\u201d opinion of 4 July 2004, the applicant asked for a new handwriting expert opinion and submitted a list of questions to be put to the experts. The court refused the request, finding that the case file already contained two expert opinions and a \u201cspecialist\u201d opinion and that there was no need for an additional expert examination of the note. The court refused to admit the \u201cspecialist\u201d opinion as evidence noting that it contained only \u201ca value judgment\u201d in respect of the experts\u2019 findings. 24.  On 6 August 2007 the City Court found the applicant guilty of the murder of Kr., P. and Fd. and the attempted murder of R., I. and Fl. and sentenced him to life imprisonment. 25.  As regards the attempted murder of R., the court relied, inter alia, on the expert opinion of 7 October 2004, finding that the applicant had been the author of the handwritten note containing R.\u2019s address. It declared the specialist opinion of 4 July 2004 inadmissible as evidence because V. had not been appointed as a forensic expert and did not therefore have any procedural status. 26.  On 31 January 2008 the Supreme Court upheld the applicant\u2019s conviction on appeal.", "references": ["7", "2", "5", "0", "4", "8", "6", "9", "1", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1956 in the Tambov Region. Before his arrest he lived in St Petersburg. 7.  The applicant was arrested on 23 August 2007. He remained in detention throughout the investigation and trial. 8.  On 9 November 2009 the Kuybyshevskiy District Court of St Petersburg found him guilty of aggravated fraud and money laundering committed within an organised criminal group and sentenced him to fourteen years\u2019 imprisonment. That judgment was upheld on appeal by the St Petersburg City Court on 30 March 2010. 9.  On 6 March 2012, in another set of criminal proceedings, the Kuybyshevskiy District Court, found the applicant guilty of two counts of aggravated extortion committed within an organised criminal group and imposed a cumulative prison sentence of fifteen years. The judgment became final on 12 July 2012 when endorsed by the City Court. 10.  In 1994 the applicant lost his right arm. He suffered heart attacks in 2000 and 2007 and a kidney affected by cancer was removed in 2003. At the time of his arrest the applicant\u2019s diagnoses listed: ischemic disease, exertional angina of the second functional group, atherosclerotic and post infarction cardiosclerosis, third-stage hypertension with a high risk of vascular complications; cardiac failure of the second functional group; chronic post-traumatic pericarditis with effusion; remote cancer metastases requiring permanent supervision; kidney stones; concretion of the right kidney; chronic pyelonephritis; chronic kidney failure of the first degree; adenocarcinoma of the prostate gland; chronic prostatitis; chronic cystitis, and constantly recurrent multidrug-resistant infection of the urinary tract. To keep his medical condition under control, the applicant followed a daily complex drug regimen comprising up to ten medicaments and underwent an in-depth medical examination every two months in a hospital where he received necessary treatment in respect of his oncological illnesses. 11.  On 24 August 2007 upon his admission to remand prison no. IZ\u201177/1 in Moscow the applicant informed the prison medical authorities of his condition, submitting the full list of his diagnoses. 12.  In September 2007 he started complaining about a number of symptoms such as a heart pain, fatigue, difficulty in breathing, and frequent urination. He received basic treatment which alleviated a part of his health problems, but the urinary condition worsened. In November 2007 he complained of a pain in the low abdomen and inability to urinate. On 20 November 2007 a surgeon recommended urinary catheterisation, that is to say the insertion of a tube into the patient\u2019s bladder via the urethra. That procedure was performed approximately 250 times during the first year of detention. In the meantime the urinary condition became more acute. 13.  On 4 December 2008 the applicant was examined by a urologist for the first time whilst in detention. The doctor recommended treatment with antibiotics, regular urological supervision and to avoid catheterisation in so far as possible. 14.  Throughout 2009 the applicant\u2019s urinary condition persisted. He urinated up to thirty-seven times per day and his nocturnal sleep was interrupted every hour or two. He had to continue resorting to urinary cauterisation. On several occasions he had a consultation with a urologist. 15.  On 12 October 2009, at the request of the applicant\u2019s lawyer, three medical experts prepared a report assessing the capability of the custodial authorities to properly treat the applicant. Having examined the medical file on the applicant compiled in the civilian hospital, submissions by the custodial authorities and the applicant\u2019s own comments, the experts concluded that he required systematic treatment with amendments to the chemotherapy regimen and periodic admissions to a specialised cardiology hospital for instrumental examinations and necessary amendments to drug regimen. Given the absence of proper medical supervision, the experts also warned of a possible deterioration of the applicant\u2019s urinary and oncological problems and a risk of those illnesses advancing to a stage requiring surgery, or to a stage with no prospects of the applicant being cured or even his life being saved. The experts observed that the medical unit of the detention facility where the applicant was kept was not equipped for treating patients in such a medical condition. 16.  On 28 December 2009, 19 March, 15 June, 26 July, 25 August and 30 November 2010 the applicant was examined in the Moscow Scientific Institute of Urology (hereinafter \u201cthe Urology Institute\u201d), having been diagnosed with neurogenic bladder dysfunction. The treatment provided slightly improved his condition. 17.  On 21 December 2010 the doctors from the Urology Institute performed a surgery on the applicant. A suprapubic catheter was inserted into his bladder through a cut in the abdomen. The applicant was discharged from the hospital to a remand prison under the supervision of the resident doctor. 18.  Three days later the applicant complained of continuous bleeding from the abdominal incision. The next day, having lost more than one litre of blood, he was sent back to the Institute, where his condition was brought under control. 19.  In April 2011, in the remand prison, the applicant developed an acute inflammation of the urethra, which was successfully treated in the Institute. 20.  From 2012 to 2014 the applicant\u2019s urinary condition remained stable. He continued using the suprapubic catheter to remove the urine. 21.  In the meantime, in December 2009 the applicant brought a court claim against the detention authorities, seeking that the lack of appropriate medical treatment be declared unlawful. 22.  On 28 June 2010 the Preobrazhenskiy District Court of Moscow dismissed his claim. The court found as follows:\n\u201cFrom the [applicant\u2019s] medical file submitted by the [remand prison] it is apparent that ... [the authorities] provided him with medical aid, subjected him to medical testing, and prescribed treatment. In particular, on 4 December 2008, 25 September and 15 November 2009 he was seen by a urologist... On 28 December 2009 he was examined in the [Urology Institute]. It is not apparent from the medical file that the authorities refused to provide [the applicant] with the medical assistance or that he was deprived of the requisite medication\u201d. 23.  On 24 March 2011 the Moscow City Court upheld that decision on appeal.", "references": ["0", "2", "5", "6", "8", "7", "4", "9", "3", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Istanbul. 6.  The applicant\u2019s husband, Ali Sinim, entered into an agreement with a truck owner, Mr A.S., for the transportation of some personal goods and furniture from Istanbul to Antalya on 5 August 2006. According to the applicant\u2019s allegations, her husband was informed that the truck in question had been booked by a transport company for the same day and that it would also be carrying some raw materials belonging to another client. 7.  On the date in question the applicant\u2019s husband loaded his goods into the truck and got into it as a passenger. However, before reaching its destination the truck collided with another vehicle and caught fire. The truck\u2019s driver and substitute driver died at the scene of the accident as a result of the fire. The applicant\u2019s husband died a few days later at the hospital where he had been receiving treatment for his burns. 8.  It was discovered after the accident that the \u201craw materials\u201d being transported in the truck with the applicant\u2019s husband\u2019s goods were in fact an inflammable liquid, which had caught fire upon impact. According to the police scene-of-incident report, the containers that had contained the spilt inflammable liquid bore the words \u201c\u015eenocak chafing fuel[1]\u201d. 9.  An autopsy report issued on 31 January 2007 by the Forensic Medicine Institute stated that the applicant\u2019s husband had died as a result of the burns he had sustained at the time of the accident rather than from trauma caused by the impact of the crash. 10.  According to the initial report prepared by the traffic police at the scene, the driver of the truck, whose identity could not be established at the time, bore the main responsibility for the accident as he had hit the other vehicle, driven by S.S.H., from behind. 11.  On 5 August 2006 officers from Sultanbeyli police station took statements from the applicant, S.S.H. and the owner of the truck, A.S., who was also the son of one of the truck drivers, M.S. A.S. confirmed in his statement that he was the owner of the truck, which his father M.S. had loaded with goods to be transported to Antalya. He stated that a third person, namely A.\u00c7., had also been in the truck to help his father during the journey. He was not asked any questions about the nature of the goods transported. 12.  On 4 September 2006 the applicant filed a criminal complaint with the Sultanbeyli public prosecutor\u2019s office against A.S., S.S.H, and the transport company to which the truck had been leased, if any, for causing her husband\u2019s death by illegally carrying dangerous inflammable goods. The applicant stressed in her complaint that the incident in question had not been a simple traffic accident caused by negligence, and that her husband had lost his life because of the inflammable goods that had been loaded unlawfully in the truck without his knowledge and consent. The applicant argued that if her husband had been properly informed of the nature of the truck\u2019s cargo, he would never have agreed to travel in it. The applicant therefore requested the identification of all the individuals or companies who may have been responsible for her husband\u2019s death, including the transporter, the seller and the buyer of the inflammable goods. She also requested to be informed of developments in the investigation as she intended to join the proceedings as a civil party (m\u00fcdahil). 13.  On 9 November 2006 A.S. submitted a petition to the Sultanbeyli public prosecutor\u2019s office for an investigation into the liability for the accident of both the transport company which had leased his truck and of the seller and buyer of the inflammable cargo, whom he accused of concealing the dangerous nature of the goods in question. As evidence, he submitted the invoice and delivery note (sevk irsaliyesi) prepared on 4 August 2006 by the transport company Salihli Nakliyat Otom. Ltd. \u015eti. (\u201cSalihli Ltd. \u015eti.\u201d) for the recipient, \u015eenocak D\u0131\u015f Ticaret ve Turizm Sanayi Ltd. \u015eti. (\u201c\u015eenocak Ltd. \u015eti.\u201d), where the shipment was described as \u201craw materials\u201d without any further details. A.S. stated that if it had been made clear that the goods involved were inflammable then they would have been transported in accordance with the conditions set out in the law, which might have prevented the fatal accident. 14.  On 28 November 2006 the applicant filed an additional complaint against the producer of the inflammable liquid, which she had identified as \u015eenocak Ltd. \u015eti. based on the information provided in the scene-of-incident report (see paragraph 8 above). The applicant claimed that the liquid in question contained ethanol and methanol, which had both been classified as \u201chazardous goods subject to control\u201d in the Regulation on Dangerous Goods and the Regulation on the Transport by Land of Dangerous Goods, and which accordingly had to be packed, labelled, stored and transported in compliance with the strict requirements set down in those regulations. Moreover, under the Regulation on the Transport by Land of Dangerous Goods, it was prohibited to carry passengers, apart from a substitute driver and a guard, in vehicles transporting dangerous goods. Having regard to the various responsibilities imposed by the relevant legislation on the producer, seller, transporter and buyer of such goods, the applicant requested that the public prosecutor (i) check if \u015eenocak Ltd. \u015eti. was the producer and whether it also engaged in the distribution of such material; (ii) establish whether the truck in question had been leased by a transport company or by \u015eenocak Ltd. \u015eti. itself and whether it had a licence to carry such dangerous goods; and (iii) identify the buyer of the goods. She also repeated her request to be informed of developments in the investigation. 15.  On 6 May 2007, at the request of the Sultanbeyli prosecutor, a traffic engineer submitted an expert report, where it was found that the deceased truck driver M.S. had been responsible for the accident by failing to comply with the law applying to vehicles carrying inflammable goods on keeping a distance of fifty metres. The expert found that S.S.H., the driver of the other vehicle, had not been at fault. 16.  Relying mainly on the expert report, on 7 May 2007 the Sultanbeyli public prosecutor found that the only person responsible for the accident within the meaning of Article 85 of the Turkish Criminal Code (causing death by negligence \u2013 see paragraph 46 below) was M.S. However, since M.S. had also lost his life in the accident, the public prosecutor decided against prosecution. A.S. was listed as the sole complainant in the decision, which was not notified to the applicant. 17.  After finding out about the decision on her own initiative, on 29 June 2007 the applicant objected to the public prosecutor\u2019s decision not to prosecute, arguing mainly that the issues she had raised in her petitions of 4 September and 28 November 2006 had not been taken into account by the public prosecutor. She reiterated that her husband had not been informed that the truck was carrying inflammable liquids, and also argued that the prosecutor had failed to identify the companies involved in the shipment of such dangerous goods, including the seller, buyer and transport company, and had not established the relations of the truck owner, A.S., to those companies. She argued that it was of the utmost importance to collect that information in order to establish the facts and to identify those responsible for the accident, apart from the driver of the truck. She added that despite the numerous complaints she had lodged with the public prosecutor\u2019s office and her requests to be informed of developments in the investigation, she had not been named as a complainant in the public prosecutor\u2019s decision and the decision had not been notified to her. 18.  It appears that A.S., as the other complainant, did not lodge an objection against the public prosecutor\u2019s decision. 19.  On 4 September 2007 the Kad\u0131k\u00f6y Assize Court rejected the objection against the decision of the Sultanbeyli public prosecutor not to prosecute M.S. and S.S.H. It held, nevertheless, that complaints lodged by A.S. against Salihli Ltd. \u015eti. and \u015eenocak Ltd. \u015eti. had remained unanswered and instructed the Sultanbeyli public prosecutor to investigate their liability for the accident. A.S. was once again listed as the sole complainant in the decision, which was not notified to the applicant. 20.  On 6 December 2007 the applicant submitted a petition to the Sultanbeyli public prosecutor\u2019s office, asking it to investigate the matters raised in her previous petitions. The applicant also stressed that despite her numerous requests, she had, once again, not been recognised as a complainant in the Kad\u0131k\u00f6y Assize Court\u2019s decision. 21.  It appears that on 22 January 2008 an agent of the transport company Salihli Ltd. \u015eti., a certain B.T., was questioned about the accident for the first time by the police. B.T. stated that \u015eenocak Ltd. \u015eti. had requested a truck from them to transport some goods. The company had, however, put \u015eenocak Ltd. \u015eti. in touch with A.S., who provided transportation services with his truck upon request, and they had had no further involvement with the shipment in question. 22.  In a further petition submitted by the applicant to the Sultanbeyli public prosecutor\u2019s office on 23 May 2008, she expressed her concern that the investigation after the Kad\u0131k\u00f6y Assize Court\u2019s decision had appeared to focus solely on the liability of the transport company Salihli Ltd. \u015eti., whereas both \u015eenocak Ltd. \u015eti., as the producer and/or the shipper of the goods, and A.S., as the owner of the truck, also bore responsibility for the accident on account of their failure to comply with the relevant legislation on the transport of dangerous goods. 23.  On an unspecified date the Sultanbeyli public prosecutor asked the traffic branch of the Forensic Medicine Institute to prepare a report to determine the respective liability of Salihli Ltd. \u015eti. and \u015eenocak Ltd. \u015eti., or any others, for the accident in question. In its response dated 10 July 2008 the Forensic Medicine Institute stated that there was no information in the case file on \u015eenocak Ltd. \u015eti. and that, in the absence of such information, it could not report on the requested matters. 24.  On 15 October 2008 S.\u015e., the owner of \u015eenocak Ltd. \u015eti., was questioned about the accident for the first time by the police. S.\u015e. stated that he had requested a truck from Salihli Ltd. \u015eti. to send goods to his company\u2019s Antalya branch. A truck owned by A.S. had been provided to him by Salihli Ltd. \u015eti. and he had loaded it with the goods in question. He confirmed that the truck had been involved in an accident shortly after loading and that it and his goods had been destroyed in a fire. 25.  Following the receipt of the above information, on 19 February 2009 the Forensic Medicine Institute submitted its report on the accident. It found that there was no information in the file that the truck in question had been loaded with inflammable goods by \u015eenocak Ltd. \u015eti. There was, furthermore, no information on the identity of the recipient of the shipment. Although containers bearing the name \u201c\u015eenocak\u201d had been found in the truck after the accident, there was no other evidence in the file to enable the Institute to determine who had loaded the truck. In those circumstances, it had not been possible to establish the liability of \u015eenocak Ltd. \u015eti., Salihli Ltd. \u015eti., or anyone else for the accident. 26.  On 8 May 2009 the applicant submitted objections to the Forensic Medicine Institute\u2019s report. She contested the finding that there had been no evidence to suggest the involvement of \u015eenocak Ltd. \u015eti. with the shipment in question. She argued that the owner of \u015eenocak Ltd. \u015eti. had made it clear in his police statement that the truck had been loaded with his company\u2019s goods, which had consisted of chafing fuel. Moreover, in response to the compensation request she had made to the Sultanbeyli Civil Court of First Instance (see below paragraph 30 for further details), the owner of \u015eenocak Ltd. \u015eti. had stated, inter alia, that he had also suffered a loss as a result of the accident as he had lost all of his merchandise. A representative of Salihli Ltd. \u015eti. had similarly told the Sultanbeyli Civil Court of First Instance that the truck involved in the accident had been sent to \u015eenocak Ltd. \u015eti. for loading, accompanied by a delivery note prepared by them on 4 August 2006. In the applicant\u2019s opinion, those statements provided sufficient proof that the inflammable goods loaded in the truck had belonged to \u015eenocak Ltd. \u015eti. On the basis of that information, and having regard to the legal requirements in the relevant legislation on the packaging, labelling, storing and transportation of inflammable goods, none of which had been observed in the instant case, it was clear that both \u015eenocak Ltd. \u015eti. and Salihli \u015eti., as well as the owner and driver of the truck, had been responsible for the accident. 27.  On 25 May 2009 the Sultanbeyli prosecutor decided not to prosecute representatives of Salihli Ltd. \u015eti. and \u015eenocak Ltd. \u015eti. on the basis of the Forensic Medicine Institute\u2019s report of 10 July 2008. In the decision, the public prosecutor did not respond to any of the applicant\u2019s allegations. 28.  On 17 June 2009 the applicant objected to that decision. Reiterating mainly the arguments she had raised in her objection to the Forensic Medicine Institute\u2019s report, she submitted that the public prosecutor had failed to establish the facts of the case and had disregarded essential evidence in the investigation file which pointed to the representatives of Salihli Ltd. \u015eti. and \u015eenocak Ltd. \u015eti, A.S. and the deceased driver of the truck as being criminally liable for the accident. 29.  On 23 July 2009 the Kad\u0131k\u00f6y Assize Court rejected the applicant\u2019s objection, without responding to any of her arguments. 30.  On 16 July 2007 the applicant brought an action for compensation before the Sultanbeyli Civil Court of First Instance against \u015eenocak Ltd. \u015eti., Salihli Ltd. \u015eti, the owner of the truck, A.S., the heirs of both dead truck drivers, and an insurance company. Reiterating the legal requirements for the packaging, labelling, storage and transportation of dangerous goods that she had referred to during the criminal proceedings, the applicant argued that the defendants had caused her husband\u2019s death by their failure to comply with the relevant legislation. 31.  On unspecified dates, representatives of Salihli Ltd. \u015eti. and \u015eenocak Ltd. \u015eti. responded to the applicant\u2019s allegations, as noted in paragraph 26 above. 32.  At the request of the Sultanbeyli Civil Court of First Instance, on 19 March 2012 three experts from the traffic branch of the Forensic Medicine Institute submitted a report (\u201cthe first report\u201d) on the defendants\u2019 liability for the accident in question, where they made the following findings:\n-  \u015eenocak Ltd. \u015eti., which was the producer of the inflammable goods in question, had requested Salihli Ltd. \u015eti.\u2019s services for the transportation of merchandise from its headquarters in Istanbul to its Antalya office;\n-  Salihli Ltd. \u015eti. had subcontracted A.S. for the business;\n-  in the consignment note it had prepared, \u015eenocak Ltd. \u015eti. had described the consignment as sixteen tonnes of raw material, without indicating that it consisted of inflammable goods;\n-  the fire that had broken out upon impact with S.S.H.\u2019s vehicle and that had claimed the applicant\u2019s husband\u2019s life had been caused by the inflammable goods loaded in the truck;\n-  \u015eenocak Ltd. \u015eti. was liable for the accident because it had failed to comply with the consignor\u2019s obligations set out in the relevant legislation;\n-  Salihli Ltd. \u015eti. and A.S. were liable on account of their failure to pay heed to the type of raw material they had accepted, which had resulted in the transportation of dangerous goods in a truck which had not fulfilled the relevant criteria for such transportation;\n-  A.S. was also liable for having unlawfully loaded other goods in the truck and accepting a passenger (the applicant\u2019s husband);\n-  the driver of the truck was liable owing to his failure to drive with care.\nIn the light of those considerations, the Forensic Medicine Institute found that \u015eenocak Ltd. \u015eti. bore 40% of the liability for the accident, Salihli Ltd. \u015eti. and A.S. bore 20% each, while the remaining liability lay with the driver. 33.  On 18 October 2012 Salihli Ltd. \u015eti. objected to the Forensic Medicine Institute\u2019s report. 34.  Following that objection, seven experts from the traffic branch of the Forensic Medicine Institute, including the three experts who had prepared the previous report, issued another report on 18 September 2013 (\u201cthe second report\u201d). They found that while Salihli Ltd. \u015eti., \u015eenocak Ltd. \u015eti. and A.S. may all have disregarded their legal obligations on the transport of dangerous goods, the accident had been caused by the driver\u2019s carelessness rather than the other defendants\u2019 failure to comply with those obligations. They could not therefore be held accountable for the accident in any way. 35.  On 19 November 2013 the applicant objected to the Forensic Medicine Institute\u2019s report, which in her opinion conflicted with its previous report of 19 March 2012. The applicant reiterated that her husband had not died as a result of a simple traffic accident, but had burned to death because of the inflammable goods carried unlawfully in the truck, for which all the defendants bore responsibility. The applicant requested that the Sultanbeyli Civil Court of First Instance obtain a third report from independent experts to resolve the contradictions between the two reports prepared by the Forensic Medicine Institute. 36.  At a hearing held on 29 April 2014, the civil court of first instance appointed a group of experts, consisting of a mechanical engineer and two professors of mechanical engineering and chemistry from Istanbul Technical University. The court asked them to comment on the contradictions between the two Forensic Medicine Institute reports and to state which report they agreed with. 37.  In their report dated 13 November 2014 (\u201cthe third report\u201d), the experts established at the outset that the action brought by the applicant concerned the death of her husband as a result of the burns he had sustained because of the fire caused by the accident. The examination in the instant case therefore had to focus not on the technical cause of the accident per se, which was what the second report had done, but on the reasons and the responsibility for the fire that had claimed her husband\u2019s life. The experts stated in that connection that the fire had been caused by chafing fuel, which was a \u201chighly inflammable liquid\u201d, according to the Regulation on the Transport by Land of Dangerous Goods and which therefore had to be transported in accordance with the relevant legislation concerning the transportation of such dangerous substances. The truck in which the chafing fuel had been loaded in the instant case had, however, not been suitable for the transportation of dangerous goods: it had not been equipped with an electrical system to prevent short circuits and fire; it had had no warning signs; and the driver had not been trained in the transportation of such goods. \u015eenocak Ltd. \u015eti., as the producer of the chafing fuel, bore the principal liability (40%) for the fire on account of its failure to ensure the safe transportation of its merchandise in accordance with the relevant legal requirements. Salihli Ltd. \u015eti., which had procured the truck in question, and A.S., the owner and operator of the truck, were each 20% liable for agreeing to transport such dangerous goods in a vehicle unfit for the job. A.S. was further liable because he had accepted additional cargo in the truck. The remaining responsibility lay with the deceased driver, who had not kept a safe distance from the vehicle in front. On the basis of those findings, the experts stated that they agreed with the first report\u2019s conclusions. 38.  At a hearing held on 7 October 2015 the civil court of first instance decided to appoint an expert to calculate the applicant\u2019s pecuniary damage, on the basis of the findings of the third report of 13 November 2014. 39.  In a report dated 19 November 2015 the expert calculated the applicant\u2019s pecuniary damage as 229,613 Turkish liras (TRY) (approximately 75,145 euros (EUR) at the material time). 40.  According to the latest information in the case file, the compensation proceedings are still ongoing in the court of first instance.", "references": ["3", "5", "1", "2", "6", "7", "8", "9", "4", "No Label", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1966 and lived, prior to his conviction, in the Tver Region. 5.  On 21 November 2000 a country house which belonged to a district prosecutor was set on fire. 6.  On 8 February 2002 F. confessed that the applicant had conspired with him to set fire to the prosecutor\u2019s summer house. On the same date the applicant was arrested. He was released on 11 February 2002 on an undertaking not to leave his place of residence. 7.  On 10 December 2003 I. and A. stabbed F. to death. 8.  On an unspecified date the applicant was arrested on suspicion of having organised F.\u2019s murder. He remained in custody pending investigation and trial. 9.  On 6 February 2004 the Kashin Town Court found the applicant guilty of arson. On 25 May 2004 the applicant\u2019s conviction became final. 10.  On 23 June 2004 a local newspaper, Veche Tveri, published an article under the headline \u2018Vengeance\u2019. According to the article, the applicant had stood for local elections. However, he had been disqualified by a court at the request of the district prosecutor. The applicant had plotted revenge. He had paid F. to set fire to the prosecutor\u2019s country house. The house had completely burned down. When questioned by the investigator, F. had confessed to arson and had testified against the applicant. Shortly thereafter F. had been found stabbed to death. The article then quoted from the official information note issued by the regional prosecutor\u2019s office:\n\u201cThe investigation has established\u2019, states the information note, \u2018that in 2003 [the applicant] and F[.] had an argument ... [;] [the applicant] started to fear that he could no longer control F[.] and that the latter would not only interfere with his plan to protract the trial but would give truthful testimony incriminating him in the arson of [the prosecutor\u2019s] country house ... . [The applicant] organised F.\u2019s murder to silence him.\nThe murder was carried out by two residents of the town of Kalyazin, who were charged with F.\u2019s murder.\u201d 11.  According to the applicant, several more articles reporting on the arson and murder cases were published in the local press at around the same time. On 15 July 2004 a TV programme \u201cPolice unit on duty\u201d (\u0414\u0435\u0436\u0443\u0440\u043d\u0430\u044f \u0447\u0430\u0441\u0442\u044c) broadcast daily on the federal RTR channel, covered the applicant\u2019s case. 12.  The jury trial started on 16 August 2004. At the beginning of the trial the presiding judge asked the jurors whether they had read about the case in newspapers or heard about it from other sources. All the jurors answered in the negative. They also stated that they had not yet formed any opinion about the defendants\u2019 guilt or innocence. 13.  At the hearing of 24 August 2004 the court examined the prosecution witness Sh. At the request of the prosecutor, the written statements he had made during the investigation were read out to the jury. Sh. then explained that his statements to the investigator had been more detailed and precise, as at the time of the investigation he had remembered the events better. The applicant was then allowed to put questions to Sh. The relevant excerpt from the record reads as follows:\n\u201c[The applicant asks]: \u2018How many times were you questioned? Were your statements to the investigator voluntary?\u2019\nThe presiding judge rules [the applicant\u2019s] question out of order and warns him that he should not [raise issues] of admissibility of evidence in the presence of the jury as it may be considered an attempt to influence the jury.\n[The applicant asks]: \u2018What state were you in when giving those statements?\u2019\nThe presiding judge rules [the applicant\u2019s] question out of order and warns him that if he continues to put questions concerning admissibility of evidence he may be excluded from the hearing room.\n[The applicant says]: \u2018The witness was drunk, the police officers had given him alcohol, he was made [temporarily] insane.\u201d\nThe presiding judge interrupts [the applicant] and directs the jury to disregard [his] remarkds about the circumstances in which Sh. was questioned, as this issue is not within the competence of the jury.\n[The applicant continues]: \u2018All the evidence has been forged and the case does not hold water.\u2019\nTaking into account [the applicant\u2019s] repeated attempts to influence the jurors, the presiding judge decides to exclude him from the courtroom.\nThe presiding judge directs the jurors that they should disregard [the applicant\u2019s statements] ... and should proceed from the understanding that all evidence presented to them ... was collected in accordance with the procedure established by law and was not [declared inadmissible].\u201d 14.  The trial court continued the hearing in the applicant\u2019s absence. Further hearings were held on 25 and 26 August 2004. The applicant was not brought to the courtroom. All hearings were attended by his counsel. During those hearings several witnesses and the applicant\u2019s co-defendants testified. One of the co-defendants pleaded not guilty, while the other confessed to the murder and stated that he had committed it on the applicant\u2019s instructions and had received remuneration from him. 15.  The applicant was brought to the courtroom at the end of the hearing of 26 August 2004 and was allowed to make a closing statement. The applicant pleaded not guilty. The jury delivered a guilty verdict. They found it established that applicant had hired I. and A. to murder F. 16.  The presiding judge indicated in the verdict that (1) the applicant\u2019s actions, as established by the jury, should be characterised as incitement to murder, and (2) the jury had not established that the applicant had been the organiser of the murder or had directed its execution. 17.  On 2 September 2004 the Tver Regional Court found the applicant guilty of incitement to murder and sentenced him to seventeen years\u2019 imprisonment. 18.  The applicant appealed. In particular, he complained that his presumption of innocence had been violated by publications in the press, that he had been removed from the courtroom and that the presiding judge had recharacterised his offence after the jury had delivered the verdict. He also complained that the evidence had been assessed inaccurately and that he had been found guilty of the crime he had not committed. 19.  On 9 February 2005 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the judgment on appeal. The court noted, in particular, as follows:\n\u201c... as regards the [applicant\u2019s] removal from the courtroom, [the appeal court] finds that the presiding judge\u2019s decision was in full compliance with [the applicable rules of criminal procedure].\n[The applicant] repeatedly breached the order in the courtroom and attempted to influence the jurors. The presiding judge repeatedly reprimanded [the applicant], warned him and explained to him the consequences of [his] conduct. However, [the applicant] chose to ignore [the warnings]. Accordingly the decision to remove [the applicant] from the courtroom was justified.\nIn those circumstances, the counsel\u2019s argument that [the applicant\u2019s] right to participate directly in the examination of the evidence and to defend himself in person was violated is unfounded. [The applicant] waived his rights.\n...\n[The applicant\u2019s] argument that the publications in the media ... negatively influenced the jurors should be rejected as unfounded.\nBefore the commencement of the trial all jurors replied in the negative to the question whether they had heard about the case from the media ... .\nThe defendants\u2019 actions established in the verdict received the correct legal characterisation.\nIt was permissible to change the legal characterisation of [the applicant\u2019s] actions from organisation of murder to incitement to murder, as the new legal characterisation was based on the same evidence as established in the verdict. [The applicant\u2019s] defence rights were not violated.\u201d", "references": ["8", "0", "1", "9", "7", "6", "4", "2", "5", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Cheboksary. He is a former head of the civil law department in the Cheboksary State University. 6.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7.  On 28 February 2004 baby V. was born. One month later her mother, H., sued the applicant to establish his paternity and to receive alimony. A genetic study confirmed the applicant\u2019s paternity in respect of V.; however, a medical study concluded that the pregnancy \u201ccould not have occurred naturally\u201d. 8.  On 7 December 2004 the Moskovskiy District Court in Cheboksary held a hearing with the participation of the applicant and Ms H. and rejected her claim. On 31 January 2005 the Supreme Court of the Chuvashiya Republic quashed the District Court\u2019s judgment and remitted the matter for a new examination. 9.  On 17 October 2005 the District Court gave judgment in favour of H. It was quashed on appeal by the Supreme Court on 14 December 2005 in particular on the ground that the parties had not been informed of the date and place of the hearing in which genetics experts had been cross-examined. 10.  In March 2007 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of large-scale bribery. He was detained in remand prison IZ-21/1 in Cheboksary. 11.  On 15 March 2007 the District Court sent a letter of request (\u0441\u0443\u0434\u0435\u0431\u043d\u043e\u0435 \u043f\u043e\u0440\u0443\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435) to the director of the remand prison, asking him to clarify the applicant\u2019s position on the merits of the dispute and to ascertain whether he agreed to having the matter examined in his absence or wished to appoint a representative. On 20 March the director interviewed the applicant who declared his wish to take part in the proceedings and to defend himself in person. The applicant also claimed that he possessed new evidence he wished to submit to the court. On 26 March the District Court refused the applicant leave to be present at the hearings on the ground that the Code of Civil Procedure made no provision for bringing detainees to courts. 12.  On 4 April 2007 the District Court held the hearing in the presence of Ms H., as well as Mr K. and Ms U. who represented the applicant. The judgment of the same date was given in Ms H.\u2019s favour. It mentioned that the applicant was held in a remand prison, that he did not recognise the paternity and that he had \u201cpreviously given similar testimony before the court\u201d. 13.  On 16 May 2007 the Supreme Court rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal. It held that the applicant\u2019s absence from the hearing did not entail a violation of his rights because he had been represented and had previously given testimony to the court. 14.  On 9 June 2007 the applicant was released on bail. 15.  On 27 March 2008 the Moskovskiy District Court decided that he had breached the terms of the bail by exercising pressure on witnesses, issued a detention order and put the applicant\u2019s name on the list of fugitives from justice. The applicant was not present at the hearing and could not be immediately re-arrested. 16.  At about 11 p.m. on 8 April 2008 three police officers showed up at the entrance of the applicant\u2019s residence. They had been allegedly tipped off that the applicant was there. As it happened, the applicant received in-patient treatment at the infections centre but his daughter was inside. 17.  She did not open the door to the police immediately and told them that her father was in a hospital. According to her, the police began banging at the door and threatened her to break in. She was thus compelled to open the door. The police entered the flat, inspected all the rooms, opened closets and boxes, lifted the sofa and bed, and then left. 18.  On the following day the applicant was arrested and placed in custody. 19.  On 24 April 2008 the Supreme Court found that the detention order of 27 March 2008 was not justified. In its view, the District Court had wrongly attached decisive weight to the statements by witnesses who had not mentioned any actual threats emanating from the applicant. The Supreme Court quashed the detention order and released the applicant. 20.  The applicant complained to a prosecutor about the unlawful actions of the police on 8 April 2008. On 16 May 2009 the prosecutor refused to institute criminal proceedings, finding that no criminal offence had been committed. 21.  The applicant then sued the Ministry of Finance for compensation in respect of an unauthorised search of his home carried out by the police. The District Court heard a number of witnesses. The applicant\u2019s daughter insisted that the police officers\u2019 presence in the flat had lasted as long as two and a half hours. The officer K. testified that he had entered the flat with the consent of the applicant\u2019s daughter and that he had stayed inside no longer than two or three minutes. He had not searched the flat or opened closets. S., a relative who was present at the scene, stated that the police had entered the flat with the daughter\u2019s consent, that they had \u201cmoved beds, looked under the carpets, displaced closets and paintings, gone into the basement\u201d. 22.  By judgment of 29 October 2009, the Leninskiy District Court rejected the applicant\u2019s claim. Citing section 11 of the Police Act and section 8 of the Operational-Search Activities Act, the District Court held that the officers had acted lawfully, on the basis of the detention order of 27 March 2008, and that they had the right to enter the applicant\u2019s flat because they had information that he might have been at home. Since the Russian law only established the right to compensation in case of unlawful actions, the applicant\u2019s claim was dismissed. 23.  On 9 December 2009 the Supreme Court upheld the District Court\u2019s judgment on appeal. 24.  On 17 April 2009 the Moskovskiy District Court found the applicant guilty of forcing students to pay bribes into the account of his law firm in exchange of passing grades and gave him a custodial sentence. On 2 July 2009 the Supreme Court upheld the conviction on appeal. 25.  The applicant sued the Ministry of Finance for compensation in connection of his unlawful detention from 9 to 24 April 2008. 26.  By judgment of 27 November 2009, the Leninskiy District Court rejected his claim, noting that the applicant had been ultimately convicted in the criminal proceedings and given a custodial sentence and that the Supreme Court had quashed the detention order as being \u201cunjustified\u201d rather than \u201cunlawful\u201d. In the latter case, no compensation was payable. 27.  On 11 January 2010 the Supreme Court rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal.", "references": ["7", "8", "5", "6", "1", "2", "9", "0", "No Label", "3", "4"], "gold": ["3", "4"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1965. On 27 March 2009 the Leningrad Regional Court convicted him of murder and sentenced him to thirteen years and six months\u2019 imprisonment. Since January 2010 he has been serving the sentence in correctional colony no. IK-4, in Fornosovo, Leningrad Region. 7.  According to the applicant, his eyesight began deteriorating in 2008. In September 2010 he complained about this to a resident colony doctor. 8.  Eight months later the applicant was examined by an ophthalmologist, who visited the detention facility. The doctor diagnosed an \u201calmost mature\u201d cataract of the right eye and a focal cataract of the left eye. An in-depth medical examination in a hospital was recommended. 9.  On 1 July 2011 the applicant was sent to a prison hospital for an examination by an ophthalmologist. The ophthalmologist confirmed the presence of cataracts on both eyes. He established that the patient had lost his vision in his right eye and prescribed cataract surgery. It was noted that owing to the lack of intraocular lenses in stock and the overcrowding of the facility, the surgery would have to be performed later, in a \u201cplanned manner\u201d. 10.  The applicant was sent back to the detention facility, the ophthalmologist having recommended that the applicant undergo another eye examination between January and March 2012. 11.  On 7 April 2012 the applicant complained about the quality of medical assistance he had received to the Federal Service for the Execution of Sentences in St Petersburg. His complaint was then referred to the medical unit of his detention facility, which dismissed it in a letter dated 25 April 2012, stating that the patient had been provided with medical assistance in full. 12.  In May 2012 the applicant was seen by the head of the medical unit and put on a waiting list for admission to the ophthalmological department of the prison hospital for a medical examination and eye surgery. 13.  On 24 October 2013 the applicant was seen by an ophthalmologist. The doctor endorsed the advice that the applicant had received on 1 July 2011 and confirmed that he needed cataract surgery. 14.  On 14 January and 22 June 2014 the applicant underwent repeated eye examinations, which revealed that the cataract on his left eye was growing. The need for surgery was again noted. The surgery was performed in the prison hospital on 1 October 2014.", "references": ["6", "7", "9", "4", "0", "3", "2", "5", "8", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1974, 1975 and 2003 respectively and live in Ankara. 6.  In 2004 Duru Kurt\u2019s parents took her to the Ankara SSK hospital because they thought that she was displaying symptoms of heart problems. The child was examined and then transferred to the Sami Ulus paediatric hospital, where she was treated for two years, after which the doctors decided that she should undergo heart surgery. 7.  Before the operation, which took place on 19 July 2006, the patient\u2019s father signed a form setting out the potential risks facing his daughter in undergoing the surgical operation, consenting to the operation (\u201cthe consent form\u201d). 8.  During the post-operative check-ups a leak was detected on the periphery of the membrane covering the incision. 9. On 8 February 2007, by decision of the hospital medical board, the patient underwent a second operation carried out by a different medical team. Prior to the operation, the patient\u2019s father signed a consent form identical to the first one. That form did not mention any risk of a serious neurological problem, but specified that the list of possible sequelae was not exhaustive. 10.  After that second operation, the patient suffered an oedema, a brain haemorrhage, liver failure and muscle spasticity while in intensive care. 11.  On 6 July 2007 the applicants lodged a complaint against the doctors who had carried out the operations. 12.  On 11 July 2007 the medical board of the D\u0131\u015fkap\u0131 paediatric hospital in Ankara diagnosed the child with a severe irremediable psychomotor disability (caused by hypoxic ischemic encephalopathy), estimating her disability rate at 92%. 13.  On 16 July 2007, pursuant to standard procedure, the prosecutor\u2019s office applied to the Governor of Ankara for authorisation to prosecute. 14.  The report drawn up following the internal investigation commissioned by the Governor\u2019s Office stated that the patient was suffering from a very serious congenital heart disease, that treating that disease would entail a high-risk surgical operation and that in 52% of cases a leak was noted around the membrane, necessitating a second operation. It concluded that the medical team had not been guilty of negligence during the first operation. 15.  According to the aforementioned report, the second operation, which had been carried out to rectify the leak, had also been very risky. The report pointed out that the patient\u2019s neurological complications had been a common occurrence during open-heart surgery and that they occurred when artificial pumps were installed to maintain blood circulation or where the patient was placed in hypothermia. It added that the patient continued to suffer from sequelae despite the treatment administered after the second operation. In conclusion, the investigator recommended not authorising a criminal prosecution. This preliminary investigation report explained that the relevant persons had been questioned by the instigator. It is not known in what capacity the author of the report, who is a doctor, was involved or to which hospital he is attached. 16.  On 6 September 2007, as recommended by the preliminary investigation report, the Governor\u2019s Office refused to authorise prosecution. 17.  The applicants\u2019 challenge to that administrative decision was dismissed by the Regional Administrative Court on 18 December 2007 on the grounds that the preliminary investigation report and the appendices thereto were not such as to enable the prosecutor\u2019s office to instigate a judicial investigation. 18.  Consequently, on 28 September 2008 the prosecutor\u2019s office issued a discontinuance decision. 19.  Concurrently with the criminal proceedings, the applicants lodged a complaint with the Ankara Medical Association. 20.  The expert appointed by the latter submitted his report on 14 July 2008. This one-page document stated that the patient had displayed a congenital anomalous left coronary artery from the pulmonary artery (ALCAPA), that open-heart surgery had been carried out in order to irrigate the left coronary artery from the aorta, that six months later a leak had been detected on the membrane which had been applied to the incision during that first operation, that a second operation had been carried out which had resolved that problem, but that the patient had suffered a stroke. The expert pointed out that the patient\u2019s anomaly had been extremely serious, that it was liable to be fatal, and that the probability of complications occurring during or after such an operation had been high. The expert took the view that the second operation, geared to treating a foreseeable complication stemming from the first operation, had in fact been even riskier. He considered that open-heart surgery presented risks not only to the organ being operated on but also to other organs. The expert concluded his report as follows:\n\u201cThe stroke [suffered by] the patient Duru Kurt was one of the possible complications occurring during open-heart surgery.\nNo negligence or fault has been noted on the part of the medical teams which carried out the first and second operations. The teams showed great efficiency and a high degree of medical expertise. The complication [which occurred in the present case] was an eventuality which can be observed in cases of anomalies [such as that suffered by the patient] and as a result of open-heart surgery.\u201d 21.  On 23 May 2008 the applicants brought an action for damages against the doctors before the Ankara Civil Court of General Jurisdiction (\u201cCCGJ\u201d) alleging that they had not practised their profession properly and had caused the very severe sequelae with which their daughter Duru Kurt was afflicted. In support of their claim they submitted a private expert report dated 13 May 2008 on the amount of the damages. 22.  On 26 March 2009 the CCGJ appointed a board of experts comprising two professors and a lecturer in cardiovascular surgery from Ankara University. 23.  The board of experts submitted its report on 31 July 2009. 24.  According to that report the patient had originally been diagnosed with dilated cardiomyopathy (an illness which significantly diminishes the \u201cpumping\u201d capacity of the heart) at Ankara University Hospital, and following more detailed examinations at the Sami Ulus Hospital, ALCAPA, also known as Bland-White-Garland syndrome, had been diagnosed. 25.  The experts explained that the patient had undergone a Takeuchi operation to create an intrapulmonary tunnel and that a leak had been noted on the periphery of the membrane during the check-ups conducted six months later. They stated that that leak had led to a second surgical operation, that the patient had been placed on respiratory support owing to the emergence of a tonic-clonic contraction after the operation and that the neurological sequelae had appeared during that period of intensive care. 26.  After those initial findings, the experts stated in their report that the heart disease from which the patient suffered and for which she had undergone surgery was rare, accounting for 0.5% of all congenital heart diseases. Without treatment the mortality rate was between 80% and 90%, and those affected seldom reached adulthood. The board of experts considered that the only treatment for that disease was surgery, and that the most appropriate type of surgery was the Takeuchi operation. The board added that the latter had a mortality rate of up to 23%, that in 50% of all cases a leak could occur around the membrane following such heart surgery and that, taking all types of complications together, the rate of re-operation was up to 30%. 27.  The experts added that in 10% to 29% of cases congenital cardiovascular diseases were accompanied by neurological disorders, and that a multi-country study had shown that the rate of neurological damage in the immediate post-operative period stood at 20%. 28.  In their conclusions, the experts pointed out that ALCAPA was a very serious heart disorder and that the patient\u2019s parents had signed a consent form before their child\u2019s operation. They considered that the fact of the patient\u2019s dilated cardiomyopathy had further exacerbated the already serious risks posed by the operation. According to the report, the leak which had been observed around the membrane after the first operation had been a complication which occurred in 50 % of cases, and the operation carried out to resolve that issue had been even riskier than the first one. The experts also pointed out that the neurological damage suffered by the patient had been a complication which was often encountered in cases of patients suffering from a congenital heart defect who underwent post-operative intensive care. 29.  The report, which quoted twenty or so bibliographical sources, ended with the following words:\n\u201cIn short, this patient\u2019s situation could be seen as one large complication. There can be no question of the doctors having committed a medical or surgical error.\u201d 30.  The applicants contested the report, deeming it inadequate. They considered that the document, which cited scientific studies, was more like a magazine article than an expert report. It contained no concrete and objective facts about the case in hand and would not help in determining the dispute. The applicants did not deny that there had been a risk, but considered that neither that risk nor the signing of a consent form released the doctors from their duty to practise their profession properly. They submitted, however, that the report, which lacked any explanations or reasoning on that point, had not mentioned any checks carried out with regard to the risk factors. Consequently, they asked the court to commission a second expert assessment, either from a different medical board or from a specialist section of the Istanbul Institute of Forensic Sciences. 31.  By judgment of 3 November 2009 the CCGJ rejected the applicants request for a second expert assessment.\nWith regard to the expert report of 31 July 2009 and the facts set out in the prosecution investigation file, the court held that the doctors had not been responsible for the sequelae affecting the child after her high-risk operations, to which her parents had given their consent. 32.  The parents lodged an appeal on points of law against that judgment, reiterating their previous criticism of the expert report, which they considered inadequate. They also emphasised that the report had been based on the medical file and that their daughter had not been examined by the experts. Furthermore, under established case-law, the experts should have begun by explaining the acts and procedures required by medical lege artis and comparing them with the acts which the doctors in question had actually carried out in order to determine whether and how far the said rules had been observed. Furthermore, they submitted that it was not the courts\u2019 usual practice in this type of case to confine themselves to a single expert report. In that connection, the rejection of their request for a second expert report had amounted to a blatant injustice. They alleged, moreover, that one of the doctors who should have been present during the operation had stayed away from the theatre after having been alerted by telephone that the patient\u2019s heart had stopped during the operation, pointing out that the expert report had neither analysed nor even mentioned that fact. 33.  Their appeal was dismissed by judgment of 20 April 2010. 34.  On 7 October 2010 the Court of Cassation also dismissed the applicants\u2019 application for rectification.", "references": ["0", "1", "5", "6", "9", "7", "3", "8", "2", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1985 and lives in Perm. 5.  On 22 April 2008 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of drug dealing and was placed in pre-trial detention on the ground that he was suspected of committing a serious offence, was a foreign national, had no permanent place of residence in Perm, no job, no income, he could abscond and commit crimes. 6.  On 18 June 2008 the Permskiy District Court of the Perm Region extended his pre-trial detention on the same grounds. 7.  On 5 August 2008 the Permskiy District Court issued the first conviction which was quashed by the Perm Regional Court on 14 October 2008. The court held that the applicant should remain in detention without indicating any reasons. 8.  By decisions of 1 November 2008 and 18 March 2009, as upheld on appeal, the Permskiy District Court extended the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention reiterating its earlier reasoning and stating that he could interfere with the investigation and put pressure on witnesses. 9.  On 20 May 2010 the District Court issued a new conviction. On 14 December 2010 the Perm Regional Court quashed this conviction. The applicant remained in detention. 10.  On 26 May 2011 the Perm Regional Court convicted the applicant of drug dealing and smuggling and sentenced him to 10 years\u2019 imprisonment. On 25 October 2011 the Supreme Court of Russia commuted the sentence to 8 years\u2019 imprisonment.", "references": ["5", "8", "1", "4", "3", "6", "0", "7", "9", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1954 and died on 27 May 2014. On 24 October 2014 his wife, Mrs Schwab, was established as his heir. 6.  As of 1987 the applicant had intermittently received emergency relief benefits (Notstandshilfe) under the Unemployment Insurance Act (Arbeitslosenversicherungsgesetz). 7.  On 4 February 2008 the Vienna Prandaugasse Labour Market Service (Arbeitsmarktservice) retroactively revoked these benefits in so far as they related to the period from 22 August 2002 to 31 July 2007, and ordered the applicant to refund the payments concerned, holding that he had not been entitled to them as he had been living in a joint household with his wife during that period. 8.  The applicant appealed, claiming that his wife had moved to her parents\u2019 house in September 2000, and that they had been running separate households ever since. 9.  On 8 August 2008 the Vienna Regional Labour Market Service (Arbeitsmarktservice Landesgesch\u00e4ftsstelle; hereinafter, \u201cthe Labour Market Service\u201d) dismissed the appeal. It held that its preliminary investigations had not shown that the applicant and his wife had terminated their joint household during the period in question. 10.  The applicant made a request to the Constitutional Court (Verfassungsgerichtshof) for legal aid to lodge a complaint against this decision. On 6 November 2008 the Constitutional Court dismissed the request for lack of prospects of success. 11.  On 6 November 2008 the applicant complained to the Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgerichtshof) about the Labour Market Service\u2019s decision of 8 August 2008 (see paragraph 9 above), explicitly requesting an oral hearing before the Administrative Court. He contested, inter alia, that he had been living in a joint household with his wife during the period in question. 12.  By decision of 25 May 2011 the Administrative Court, without holding an oral hearing, dismissed the complaint as unfounded. It held that the Labour Market Service had, in view of the evidence established during its preliminary investigations, reasonably assumed that the applicant had been living in a joint household with his wife. The applicant\u2019s request for an oral hearing was not addressed. 13.  The Administrative Court\u2019s decision was served on the applicant\u2019s counsel on 17 June 2011.", "references": ["2", "7", "8", "5", "9", "0", "6", "1", "4", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1961 and lives in Blumau. 6.  The applicant and his former partner, S.O., have two children, born out of wedlock in 2002 and 2004 respectively. S.O. always had sole custody of the children as the parents never agreed to have joint custody. The applicant and S.O. never cohabited on a permanent basis. The children lived with their mother during the week. At weekends, the whole family usually stayed at the applicant\u2019s house. 7.  In April 2008 S.O. and the applicant separated and the children remained with their mother. 8.  On 27 June 2008 the applicant lodged an application with the Vienna Inner City District Court (Bezirksgericht Innere Stadt; hereinafter, \u201cthe District Court\u201d) to transfer sole custody to him, or to grant him joint custody together with S.O. Furthermore he applied for an interim measure concerning his visiting rights, as he had not seen his children since 20 April 2008. 9.  On 8 October 2008 the parents agreed that the applicant would be able to see his children every second Monday from 2.30 pm or 3 pm until 6 pm and every second Saturday from 10 am until 6 pm. 10.  On the same day the applicant applied for an extension of his visiting rights to the whole weekend. 11.  After five visits from the applicant in October and November 2008, S.O. unilaterally stopped further visits, claiming that these had a negative influence on the children. Between November 2008 and Easter 2009, on his own initiative, the applicant secretly went to see his children at their school and kindergarten a few times. 12.  The Vienna Juvenile Court Assistance Office (Jugendgerichtshilfe) submitted its statement on 10 March 2009 and recommended maintaining sole custody for the mother and visiting rights for the applicant according to the agreement the parents had concluded on 8 October 2008. 13.  On 6 April 2009 the District Court decided to grant the applicant visiting rights on every second Saturday from 8 am until 7 pm. It dismissed the applicant\u2019s application for sole custody. 14.  In its reasoning the court held that the children were well cared for by their mother. According to Article 176 of the Civil Code (Allgemeines B\u00fcrgerliches Gesetzbuch) as in force at the relevant time, a transfer of custody was only possible if the children\u2019s best interest was at risk. In the present case the court found no such risk and the applicant actually had not claimed such a risk. The court further held that the visiting rights were decided in accordance with the parents\u2019 mutual agreement. 15.  The applicant appealed on 14 April 2009 and argued in essence that he was discriminated against, compared to the mother. Also, he complained that the court had not decided on the question of whether the parents could be awarded joint custody. 16.  According to the applicant\u2019s submissions, his visiting rights were resumed on 24 April 2009 in the amount determined by the District Court (see paragraph 13 above). 17.  On 28 July 2009 the Vienna Regional Court (Landesgericht) dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal as unfounded. It confirmed the reasoning of the District Court and held that there was no indication of a risk to the children\u2019s best interest if the mother maintained sole custody. It further held that there was no provision in law ordering a preference for granting one of the parents sole custody. The court also found that the parents had not mutually agreed on joint custody, therefore no further issues arose in this connection. 18.  The applicant lodged an extraordinary appeal with the Supreme Court (Oberster Gerichtshof) on 10 November 2009, again claiming that he was discriminated against compared to the mother and that the decision of the lower instances violated his rights under Article 8 of the Convention. 19.  On 1 September 2010 the Supreme Court rejected the applicant\u2019s extraordinary appeal for lack of an important issue of law. 20.  After the amendment of the Civil Code (see paragraph 22 below), the applicant on 5 February 2013 again applied for joint custody, or sole custody in the alternative. Shortly after, S.O. moved with the children to the south of Austria, about 400 kilometers from Vienna. The applicant\u2019s requests for sole or shared custody were finally dismissed by the Supreme Court on 7 May 2014.", "references": ["0", "7", "9", "1", "3", "6", "5", "2", "No Label", "8", "4"], "gold": ["8", "4"]}
+{"input": "4.  The relevant details of the application are set out in the appended table. 5.  The applicant complained of the inadequate conditions of his detention. He also raised other complaints under the provisions of the Convention. 6.  The Government submitted a declaration with a view to resolving the issues raised by the applicant. 7.  In particular, the Government acknowledged that the conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention in facility no. IZ-42/2 in Novokuznetsk had not complied with the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention. They offered to pay the applicant the sum of 4,480 euros and invited the Court to strike the application out of the list of cases in accordance with Article 37 \u00a7 1 (c) of the Convention. The amount would be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable on the date of payment, and would be payable within three months from the date of notification of the Court\u2019s judgement. In the event of failure to pay this amount within the abovementioned three-month period, the Government undertook to pay simple interest on them, from the expiry of that period until settlement, at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points. The declaration did not mention the applicant\u2019s complaint concerning the inadequate conditions of detention in correctional colonies, no. IK-13 in Nizhniy Tagil and no. IK-2 in Yekaterinburg. 8.  The applicant informed the Court that he agreed to the terms of the declaration.", "references": ["7", "5", "0", "4", "3", "9", "8", "2", "6", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "7.  The applicant was born in 1946 in Kazakhstan. He had Kazakh nationality until 1997, when he was granted Russian nationality and renounced his Kazakh nationality. In 2001 he moved to Moscow, where he has been living ever since. 8.  On 12 April 2002 the applicant was accused of abuse of office while he had been deputy head of the government of the Pavlodar Region of Kazakhstan. Eleven days later the Interior Department of the Pavlodar Region of Kazakhstan placed the applicant on the international list of wanted persons. On the same day a deputy prosecutor of the Pavlodarskiy Region ordered his arrest. 9.  On 23 September 2010 the applicant was arrested in Moscow. The next day the inter-district prosecutor\u2019s office of the Presnenskiy District of Moscow (\u201cthe Prosecutor\u2019s Office\u201d) \u2013 relying on Article 61 of the Minsk Convention, Article 16 of the European Convention on Extradition and Articles 97-101, and 108 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of Russia (\u201cthe CCrP\u201d) \u2013 applied to the Presnenskiy District Court of Moscow (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) for the authorisation of his detention pending extradition. 10.  On 25 September 2010 the District Court granted the application, having found that the applicant was a national of Kazakhstan and that his Russian nationality had been annulled in 2006 by a court. The District Court took into account the fact that the applicant had been charged with a serious criminal offence in Kazakhstan and that he was a fugitive from justice. It considered that there were no reasons to release him on bail, and that he was health was sufficiently good for him to be held in custody. The court cited Articles 97, 99, 100, 108 and 466 of the CCrP as the legal basis for the applicant\u2019s detention. After an appeal by the applicant, the Moscow City Court (\u201cthe City Court\u201d) upheld the decision on 29 October 2010. 11.  According to the applicant, it was only at the hearing on 25 September 2010 that he learned about the annulment of his Russian nationality. Shortly afterwards he lodged an appeal with the Altay Regional Court, challenging the court decision annulling his Russian nationality and the administrative decision on which that court decision had been based. On 15 December 2010 the Altay Regional Court dismissed his appeal against the court decision annulling his Russian nationality. 12.  In the meantime, on 19 November 2010 the District Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 23 March 2011. It repeated the reasons put forward in the original detention order and noted that the Russian authorities had received a request on 25 October 2010 for the applicant\u2019s extradition. It furthermore considered that the applicant\u2019s state of health did not prevent his further detention, regard being had to the constant medical supervision and the appropriate quality of care ensured by the custodial authorities. The court refused to release him on bail, stating that if the applicant were released, it might not be possible to detain him again in the future. 13.  After an appeal by the applicant, on 22 December 2010 the City Court examined the detention order. It noted that the delivery of a decision on the extradition request by the General Prosecutor\u2019s Office was the only procedural step that had to be taken and that it could not thus justify such a lengthy detention of the applicant. The court then reduced the term of his detention by a month, to 23 February 2011. 14.  In February 2011 the applicant asked the Kazakh investigative authorities to authorise his release from detention in return for a written undertaking not to leave the place of his residence. The request was granted on 18 February 2011. 15.  On 18 February 2011, the District Court, unaware of the decision of the Kazakh investigators, extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 23 March 2011. The applicant appealed. 16.  On 3 March 2011 the District Court noted the fact that the Kazakh authorities had ordered that the applicant be released from detention; accordingly it ordered his release from detention. 17.  On 14 March 2011 the City Court discontinued the appeal proceedings against the detention order of 18 February 2011. 18.  At the time of his arrest the applicant was suffering from advanced hypertension, which posed a high risk of cardiovascular complications, advanced atherosclerosis of the carotid arteries, ischaemic heart disease, and other illnesses. 19.  On 24 September 2010, the day following his arrest, the applicant suffered a hypertensive crisis and was taken to a civilian hospital in Moscow. Four days later, when his condition became stable, he was discharged from the hospital. 20.  The detention authorities sent him to the medical unit in prison no. IZ-77/1 in Moscow. The next day he was transferred to remand prison no. IZ-77/4 in Moscow. 21.  On admission to the detention facility he was examined by a resident prison doctor, who recorded his chronic ailments but noted the absence of any acute complaints. No prescriptions were issued. 22.  Several weeks later, on 15 November 2010, an ambulance was called after the applicant began to suffer from acute heart pain. Ambulance doctors performed an electrocardiogram examination, recommended that he undergo outpatient treatment, and prescribed medication. 23.  The next day the applicant\u2019s lawyer interviewed an anaesthetist who had treated the applicant several years previously and since then had been in contact with him and his family (apparently on an informal basis). According to the lawyer, the hypertensive crisis and the heart pain were signs of a serious deterioration in the applicant\u2019s health. His medical condition called for an in-depth medical examination, and possibly cardiovascular surgery. 24.  On 10 December 2010 the Court decided to indicate to the Government, under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, that the applicant should be provided with immediate access to an independent medical practitioner for an examination of his current state of health and, if considered necessary, should be admitted to an appropriate civilian or prison hospital. 25.  Four days later the applicant was taken to the medical unit in prison no. IZ-77/1. In the hospital he was subjected to a number of tests and examinations, including an electrocardiography examination, an ultrasound heart examination, ultrasound imaging of blood vessels in the applicant\u2019s neck and legs, X-ray examinations of the chest, hip and bowels, a gastroscopy, and a colonoscopy. He was also seen by several medical specialists, including a general practitioner, a traumatologist, an ophthalmologist and an urologist. The diagnosis of cardiovascular, advanced hypertension and atherosclerosis (see paragraph 18 above) was confirmed. In addition, the applicant was diagnosed as suffering from prostate adenoma, inflammation of the urinary bladder, and an early-stage cataract on one eye. Several drugs were prescribed. In addition, the authorities allowed the applicant to receive certain medication from his relatives. 26.  On 20 January 2011 the applicant was examined by a medical board. Having approved the treatment administered by the detention authorities, the board noted that the applicant should be seen by a vascular surgeon, neurologist, urologist and a cardiologist. 27.  On 11 February 2011 the applicant was admitted to a civilian hospital in Moscow. A special medical board, comprising a surgeon, neurologist, urologist, cardiologist and an ophthalmologist, examined the applicant and his medical file. They found that his chronic illnesses were not in acute phases and that the treatment afforded to him in detention fully corresponded to his condition. Accordingly, there was no need for his hospitalisation. Regard being had to the applicant\u2019s continuous cardiovascular problems, it was recommended that appointments be made for a coronary catheterisation procedure and a consultation with a heart surgeon. 28.  On 14 February 2011 the applicant\u2019s lawyer, citing the seriousness of the applicant\u2019s medical condition, asked that the applicant be medically examined by a general practitioner. She also asked the custodial authorities for a copy of the applicant\u2019s medical file. Both requests were refused. 29.  On 15, 17 and 25 February 2011 the applicant was seen by the doctor responsible for the applicant\u2019s treatment, who gave him drugs. No deterioration in his condition was recorded. The applicant was released on 3 March 2011. 30.  On 6 April 2011 the interim measure was lifted by the Court. 31.  Several weeks later the applicant underwent successful vascular surgery in a civilian hospital. 32.  In April 2011 the applicant lodged a claim with the District Court against the detention authorities, seeking that the following be declared unlawful: their refusal to submit him to medical examinations (including those ordered by the Court) (see paragraphs 24 and 28 above); and the refusal of 14 February 2011 to allow him to receive medical attention and to grant his lawyer access to the applicant\u2019s medical file. 33.  On 4 October 2011 the District Court declared that the authorities had unlawfully restricted the lawyer\u2019s access to the medical file and dismissed the remainder of the claim. It in particular found that by admitting the applicant to the prison hospital in Moscow the authorities had complied with the interim measure indicated by the Court. The applicant had been provided with the required medical assistance in detention. It appears that the decision was not appealed against and became final.", "references": ["9", "6", "3", "4", "0", "8", "7", "5", "1", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicants were owners of flats in Moscow and Yekaterinburg. The municipal authorities reclaimed the flats, and the applicants\u2019 title to the real property in question was annulled. 5.  Ye. resided in the flat at 7-1-50 Ulitsa Burakova, Moscow, under a social housing agreement. On 12 December 2003 Ye. died. 6.  On 22 December 2003 an unidentified person using the documents in the name of A. (hereinafter referred to as \u201cA.\u201d) had the flat registered as her place of residence and moved into the flat. As it was later established by the police, A. submitted to the registration authorities a written consent for her registration in the flat allegedly signed by Ye. on 11 December 2003. 7.  On 28 August 2007 the Housing Department transferred the ownership of the flat to A. under the privatisation scheme. A.\u2019s title to the flat was verified and registered by state authorities. 8.  On 10 October 2007 A. sold the flat to the applicant. The transaction and the applicant\u2019s title to the flat were verified and registered by state authorities. 9.  According to the Government, the applicant did not move into the flat. She rented it to a third party. 10.  On 15 February 2010 the police opened a criminal investigation into the fraudulent acquisition of the flat by A. The Government did not inform of its outcome. 11.  On 16 May 2012 the Housing Department brought a civil claim seeking invalidation of all the transactions with the flat, transfer of the title to the flat to the City of Moscow, and the applicant\u2019s eviction. 12.  On 19 December 2012 the Izmailovskiy District Court of Moscow granted the Housing Department\u2019s claims in full. The court considered the housing and privatisation agreements to the benefit of A. to be null and void and reinstated the City\u2019s title to the flat. The court also dismissed the applicant\u2019s argument that she had bought a flat in good faith noting that the purchase price she had paid for the flat had been below the market value. Nor had she demostrated due care or diligence when buying the flat. She \u201chad not shown any interest in the flat or persons who had it registered as their place of residence\u201d. Lastly, the court ordered the applicant\u2019s eviction. The applicant appealed. 13.  On 30 May 2013 the City Court upheld the judgment of 19 December 2012 on appeal. 14.  On 11 October 2013 the City Court rejected the applicant\u2019s cassation appeal. 15.  The flat at 10-94 Ulitsa Shchorsa, Yekaterinburg, was owned by the City of Yekaterinburg. T. resided there as a tenant under the social housing agreement with the city from 1966 until her death on 16 April 2009. On 5 May 2009 the municipal authorities were informed of her death and annulled her registration in the flat. 16.  On 7 May 2009 the city administration asked the police to carry out an inquiry as regards the persons residing in the flat. The police sealed off the flat. The Government did not inform of the outcome of the inquiry. 17.  On an unspecified date Tikh. applied to the state registration authorities for the registration of the sale of the flat by T. to her. According to the documents submitted with the application, on 5 June 1992 the title to the flat was transferred from the City of Yekaterinburg to T. under the privatisation scheme and on 16 January 1997 T. sold the flat to Tikh. The sale was verified and registered by the state authorities and the title to the flat was transferred to Tikh. on 5 February 2010. 18.  On 11 August 2010 Tikh. sold the flat to the applicant. The transaction was verified and registered by state authorities. 19.  On 26 November 2012 the city administration brought an action seeking the invalidation of all the transactions with the flat. 20.  On 19 December 2013 the Leninskiy District Court of Yekaterinburg invalidated the privatisation agreement and transferred the title to the City of Yekaterinburg. The court established that T. had not applied for the privatisation of the flat. Nor had she sold it to Tikh. 21.  On 19 March 2014 the Sverdlovsk Regional Court upheld the judgment of 19 December 2013 on appeal.", "references": ["1", "8", "3", "7", "4", "2", "5", "6", "0", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1978 and lives in Bal\u0131kesir. 6.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7.  On 26 May 2010 the applicant was dismissed from his post as an officer in the army due to non-compliance with disciplinary rules. 8.  On 22 June 2010 the applicant brought an action before the Supreme Military Administrative Court and requested the annulment of his dismissal. On 9 November 2010 the chief public prosecutor submitted his observations to the Supreme Military Administrative Court. These observations were notified to the applicant and he replied to it in his petition of 14 December 2010. 9.  On 8 February 2011 the Supreme Military Administrative Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s case taking into account the \u201csecret documents\u201d submitted by the Ministry of Defence. These documents were not disclosed to the applicant. 10.  On 26 April 2011 the applicant\u2019s request for rectification was rejected by the same court.", "references": ["5", "2", "0", "9", "6", "1", "8", "7", "4", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1965 and lives in Ankara. 6.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7.  On 13 April 2010 the applicant was dismissed from his post as an officer in the army due to non-compliance with disciplinary rules. 8.  On 16 May 2010 the applicant brought an action before the Supreme Military Administrative Court and requested the annulment of his dismissal. On 21 October 2010 the chief public prosecutor submitted his observations to the Supreme Military Administrative Court. These observations were notified to the applicant and he replied to it in his petition of 24 January 2011. 9.  On 15 February 2011 the Supreme Military Administrative Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s action having regard to the \u201csecret documents\u201d submitted by the Ministry of Defence. These documents were not disclosed to the applicant. 10.  On 3 May 2011 the applicant\u2019s request for rectification of the above judgment was rejected by the same court.", "references": ["4", "5", "7", "1", "9", "2", "0", "6", "8", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1975 and lives in Taurag\u0117. 6.  On 23 July 2006 officers of the State Border Guard Service were patrolling the border between Lithuania and Russia in the Jurbarkas Region, by the river Nemunas. At around 2 a.m. the officers noticed several cars approaching the river and heard the sound of a boat in the water. The officers approached one of the cars and found cartons of cigarettes inside, which they suspected had been smuggled from Russia. The three individuals who had been in the car, K.B., E.L. and M.G., were arrested. During the arrests K.B. received a gunshot wound and the officers took him to a hospital in Jurbarkas (hereinafter \u201cthe hospital\u201d). 7.  At around 3.30 a.m. E.L.\u2019s mobile telephone began to ring and a border officer answered it. The caller stated that he would \u201cfind and shoot\u201d the officer who had injured K.B. A subsequent forensic examination identified the caller\u2019s voice as probably (tik\u0117tinai) that of the applicant. 8.  At around 4 a.m. the applicant arrived at the hospital and approached the border officers guarding K.B. The applicant used various swearwords towards the officers, demanded that they release K.B. and said that he would beat them up or kill them. It appears that no physical altercation occurred between the applicant and the officers and that the applicant subsequently left the hospital. 9.  On the same day the State Border Guard Service opened a pre-trial investigation against the applicant and several other individuals. The applicant was suspected, among other things, of threatening to murder or seriously injure law enforcement officers and obstructing and verbally abusing them in the exercise of their official duties, under Articles 145 \u00a7 1 and 231 \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Code (see paragraphs 21-22 below). 10.  On 5 December 2006 the Jurbarkas district prosecutor (hereinafter \u201cthe prosecutor\u201d) discontinued the pre-trial investigation against the applicant for lack of evidence. As to the words and statements used by the applicant in his interaction with the border officers (see paragraphs 7 and 8 above), the prosecutor noted that the applicant could have committed the administrative offence of minor hooliganism under Article 174 of the Code of Administrative Offences (see paragraph 26 below). The prosecutor\u2019s decision was forwarded to the State Border Guard Service, instructing them to decide whether administrative proceedings against the applicant should be instituted. However, three days later a senior prosecutor annulled that decision and reopened the pre-trial investigation. 11.  On an unspecified date administrative proceedings were instituted against the applicant; the information available to the Court does not indicate which authority was in charge of them. On 18 December 2006 the Jurbarkas District Court held that the applicant had committed the administrative offence of minor hooliganism when he had used swearwords in the presence of border officers in the hospital (see paragraph 8 above). He was given a warning. The decision was not appealed against and became final after the expiry of the ten-day time-limit for appeal. 12.  On 6 August 2008 the prosecutor charged the applicant with threatening to murder or seriously injure law enforcement officers, and insulting them in the exercise of their official duties, under Articles 145 \u00a7 1 and 290 of the Criminal Code (see paragraphs 21 and 24 below). The indictment alleged that the applicant had committed the offences in the hospital on 23 July 2006 (see paragraph 8 above). The case was transferred to the Jurbarkas District Court for examination on the merits but in June 2009, at the prosecutor\u2019s request, the case was returned for additional investigation. 13.  On 23 October 2009 the prosecutor discontinued the pre-trial investigation, stating that the applicant\u2019s actions had not amounted to the criminal offence of threatening to murder or seriously injure the officers because there had not been any objective circumstances indicating that he could have carried out those threats. The prosecutor also held that the applicant could not be prosecuted for insulting the officers because he had already been given an administrative penalty for the same conduct (see paragraph 11 above) \u2013 continuing the criminal proceedings against him would be in breach of the ne bis in idem principle. 14.  On 11 June 2010 the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office annulled the prosecutor\u2019s decision and reopened the investigation, noting that the administrative penalty given to the applicant \u201cdid not automatically preclude\u201d the criminal proceedings against him. 15.  The applicant appealed against that decision to a senior prosecutor at the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office but on 30 June 2010 his appeal was dismissed. The senior prosecutor held that, in line with the case-law of the domestic courts, an administrative penalty did not preclude the institution of subsequent criminal proceedings concerning the same conduct; however, in order to comply with the ne bis in idem principle, if a person was found guilty in the criminal proceedings, the previous administrative penalty had to be annulled or, if that was impossible, it had to be taken into account during sentencing. Accordingly, the prosecutor considered that the administrative penalty given to the applicant did not preclude the continuation of the criminal proceedings against him. 16.  On 2 November 2010 the Jurbarkas District Court upheld the applicant\u2019s appeal and overruled the prosecutor\u2019s decision of 30 June 2010. It held that criminal proceedings against the applicant could be continued only after the administrative penalty had been annulled, but since that had not been done, any further proceedings concerning the same conduct would be in breach of the ne bis in idem principle. However, on 8 December 2010 the Kaunas Regional Court quashed the lower court\u2019s decision, reiterating the reasoning of the prosecutor\u2019s decision of 30 June 2010 (see paragraph 15 above). That decision was not subject to any further appeal. 17.  In June 2011 the case was transferred to the Jurbarkas District Court for examination on the merits. The amended indictment alleged that the applicant had committed the offences set out in Articles 145 \u00a7 1 and 290 of the Criminal Code because of the words and statements which he had used when speaking to the border officers on the telephone (see paragraph 7 above) and in the hospital on 23 July 2006 (see paragraph 8 above). 18.  On 6 September 2011 the Jurbarkas District Court terminated the criminal proceedings against the applicant as time-barred. That decision was not appealed against and became final.", "references": ["1", "8", "5", "9", "7", "4", "3", "2", "0", "6", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Gar\u00f0ab\u00e6r. At the material time, the applicant was a journalist and a freelance writer for the web-based media site Pressan. 6.  The Federation of Icelandic Fishing Vessel Owners (hereafter \u201cthe LIU\u201d) represented fishing vessel owners in Iceland and safeguarded their common economic, financial, legal, technical and social interests. 7.  The applicant claimed that a private website, B, was publishing anonymous blogs, constantly lobbying for the LIU and discrediting persons who spoke against it. 8.  On 21 July 2010 a newspaper, DV, published an article regarding rumours that the LIU was providing financial support to website B. It was alleged that this support amounted to 1,500,000 Icelandic Kr\u00f3nur (ISK) each month. In the article, no mention was made of the LIU\u2019s chief executive office (hereafter \u201cA\u201d). 9.  On the same day the applicant published an article on Pressan under the headline \u201cLIU pays 20 million for offensive material\u201d and referred to the article in DV. A sent a short statement to Pressan submitting that the LIU had not supported website B. The statement was published on Pressan on 23 July 2010. 10.  On 24 July 2010 the applicant published an article on Pressan where he responded to A\u2019s statement. The article stated that A had to do better than just denying that direct payments had been made to website B and that the LIU, directed by A, was accountable for the offensive material published anonymously on website B. Furthermore, the applicant called into question whether or not the respectable representatives of the LIU\u2019s member companies had agreed to the organisation\u2019s funds being paid through intermediaries to gossips such as the owners of website B. 11.  On 26 July 2011 the applicant published a third article on the matter on Pressan. The article stated that the LIU supposedly supported website B with ISK 20 million annually through companies owned by [Mr Y], who was also the owner of website B. Furthermore, the article stated that the applicant knew that not all LIU board members were aware of the organisation\u2019s support for the offensive material on website B since the payments were well-disguised in the organisation\u2019s financial records. 12.  Moreover, it stated that the applicant had been told that it was possible that none of the LIU\u2019s board members knew about the organisation\u2019s millions being used to support anonymous slander on website B and that A alone had decided to use the funds in this way. The applicant added that he had not received confirmation of the last statement. A picture of A appeared beside the text of the article. 13.  On 28 December 2011 A lodged defamation proceedings against the applicant before the Reykjaness District Court and requested that the following statements be declared null and void:\n\u201cA. The LIU, directed by [A], is left accountable for the offensive material that is published anonymously on the gossip [website B] 14.  By judgment of 29 November 2012 the District Court found that only one of the statements, namely that under item D above, had been defamatory and ordered the applicant to pay A ISK 300,000 (approximately 2,500 euros (EUR)) in non\u2011pecuniary damages under the Tort Liability Act, plus interest, and ISK 450,000 (approximately 3,750 EUR) for A\u2019s costs before the District Court. It declared the statement null and void. 15.  The judgment contained the following reasons:\n\u201c... [A] is the chief executive officer of the Federation of Icelandic Fishing Vessel Owners or LIU, as the Federation is called in everyday speech, and he has held the job for almost 12 years. Part of his job is, inter alia, to participate in public debate on maritime affairs and to express the views and policies of the LIU.\n...\nIn recent years there has been extensive debate on the advantages and flaws of the current fisheries management system. There are different views on this system in society, and it is of great concern, as the fishing industry is one of the fundamental and most important industries of this country. [A] has, because of his occupation, appeared publicly on behalf of the LIU and advocated the organisation\u2019s views. The defendant, who writes on a regular basis about various social matters, has discussed the fisheries management system though his writings and criticised certain aspects of it.\n...\nAccording to Article 73(1) of the Constitution no. 33/1944 everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and belief. Article 73(2) of the Constitution states that everyone shall be free to express his thoughts, but shall also be liable to answer for them in court. The law may never provide for censorship or other similar limitations to freedom of expression. Article 73(3) of the Constitution states that freedom of expression may only be restricted by law in the interests of public order or the security of the State, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights or reputation of others, if such restrictions are deemed necessary and in agreement with democratic traditions. Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms contains an equivalent provision, cf. Act no 62/1994 on the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.\nTherefore, the present case concerns balancing the fundamental provisions on freedom of expression and the right to respect for private life.\n...\nIn the court\u2019s view the following statement applies directly to [A]: \u201cI know that some of the LIU board members are not aware of the financial support for the offensive writings on [website B], because the payments are well-disguised in the organisation\u2019s financial statements. I have been told that it is possible that no members of the LIU board know that the organisation\u2019s millions are being used to support anonymous slander on [website B] - that the CEO alone decided to use the organisation\u2019s funds this way\u201d. [The applicant] does not maintain that this does not apply directly to [A], his plea for acquittal is based on the fact that the statement does not imply that [A] has committed a criminal offence; furthermore he claims that this is not something he maintains, since he pointed out [in the article] that he was not able to confirm that statement.\nThe evaluation of whether or not the statement includes an accusation of a criminal act or is defamatory will not be based on how [the applicant] understands it but on how readers are expected to perceive and interpret it. The claim that the payments to [website B] have been disguised in the organisation\u2019s financial statements seems to imply that [A], who is responsible for the LIU\u2019s financial accounts as the CEO of the organisation, condones accounting deception to hide the alleged support to [website B]. [The applicant] cannot prove the statement so it is considered not to be proved.\nThe court considers that the second part of the statement, \u201cI have been told that it is possible that no LIU board members know that the organisation\u2019s millions are being used to support anonymous slander on [website B] - that the CEO alone decided to use the organisation\u2019s funds in this way\u201d, can be understood as an insinuation of fraud by abuse of position [umbo\u00f0ssvik] and negligence at work as it implies that [A] allocated LIU funds against the board\u2019s will and without authorisation. [The applicant] has not shown that the statement is true, for this he carries the burden of proof.\nThe aforementioned statement is considered to be defamatory for [A] and likely to damage his reputation and honour. In accordance with the aforementioned, and with reference to Article 241(1) of the Penal Code no. 19/1940, the statement is declared null and void.\u201d 16.  The applicant sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, which was refused on 25 February 2013.", "references": ["8", "2", "7", "3", "1", "9", "5", "6", "0", "4", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1992 and lives in Istanbul. 5.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 6.  On 15 February 2009 the applicant was arrested by police officers from the Istanbul Police Headquarters on suspicion of being involved in the activities of a terrorist organisation. 7.  On 18 February 2009 the applicant\u2019s statement was taken by the public prosecutor. The same day the investigating judge at the Istanbul Assize Court ordered that the applicant be detained on remand taking into account the strong suspicion that the applicant had committed the offence he was charged with and risk of tampering with evidence. 8.  On 27 March 2009 the Istanbul public prosecutor filed an indictment with the Istanbul Assize Court. He charged the applicant with membership of an armed terrorist organisation, making the propaganda of an armed terrorist organisation, contravening the Meetings and Demonstration Marches Act (Law no. 2911), and causing damage to public property. 9.  On 5 May 2009 at the end of the preparatory hearing, the Istanbul Assize Court decided that the applicant\u2019s detention should be continued taking into account the nature of the offence, the state of evidence and the fact that his statements had not yet been taken. 10.  On 2 October 2009 the applicant\u2019s trial resumed. At the first hearing, in the presence of the applicant, the court ordered that the applicant\u2019s detention on remand be continued on the same grounds. 11.  At hearings held on 16 February 2010 and 8 June 2010, respectively, the applicant\u2019s requests to be released from detention on remand were rejected by the trial court. The applicant filed objections against these decisions. On 15 March 2010 and 7 July 2010, the Istanbul Assize Court dismissed the objections. The court decided on the basis of the case file, without holding a public hearing. In delivering its decisions, the court also took into consideration the written opinion of the public prosecutors, which had not been communicated to the applicant or his representative. 12.  On 23 November 2010 the Istanbul Assize Court released the applicant from detention on remand taking into account the period he had remained in detention. 13.  On 17 October 2010 the case was transferred to the Juvenile Court. 14.  According to the information in the case file, the case is still pending before the Istanbul Anadolu Juvenile Court.", "references": ["4", "3", "5", "1", "0", "9", "7", "8", "6", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "6.  On 9 August 2004 the applicant lodged a civil claim concerning a property issue against eleven other persons with the Court of First Instance (Osnovni sud) in Herceg Novi. 7.  On 15 March 2011 the Court of First Instance in Herceg Novi ruled partly in favour of the applicant. 8.  On 18 March 2011 the applicant lodged an appeal with the High Court (Vi\u0161i sud) in Podgorica. 9.  On 8 November 2013 the High Court in Podgorica quashed the judgement and remitted the case back to the Court of First Instance. 10.  On 6 July 2015 the Court of First Instance in Herceg Novi ruled against the applicant. On 3 August 2015 the applicant lodged an appeal against this judgment. The proceedings are still pending at the second instance.", "references": ["5", "7", "9", "4", "2", "6", "0", "1", "8", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1988 and lives in Istanbul. 5.  On 19 September 2007 the applicant left Uzbekistan for fear of being subjected to ill-treatment while under criminal investigation. The applicant submitted that the investigation had been initiated on account of his political activities. 6.  On 13 December 2007 the Uzbek prosecuting authorities issued an international warrant for the applicant\u2019s arrest. 7.  On an unspecified date the applicant arrived in Turkey. 8.  On 9 September 2009 the applicant was arrested in Turkey. According to the arrest and search reports, he was arrested and searched because \u201che was wanted by Interpol\u201d. 9.  On 10 September 2009 the Bak\u0131rk\u00f6y Magistrates\u2019 Court ordered that the applicant be kept in provisional detention for forty-five days. The court based its decision on the Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Civil, Commercial and Criminal Matters between the Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Uzbekistan. 10.  On 17 September 2009 the applicant appealed against his detention but on 20 October 2009 the magistrates\u2019 court dismissed his objection. 11.  On the same day the applicant applied to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (\u201cthe UNHCR\u201d) and the Ministry of the Interior for recognition as a refugee. 12.  On 15 October 2009 the Turkish authorities received a formal extradition request from the Uzbek authorities. 13.  In a judgment dated 23 October 2009 the Bak\u0131rk\u00f6y Assize Court ordered the applicant\u2019s extradition and that he be kept in detention, on the basis of Article 18 \u00a7 7 of the Criminal Code. 14.  On 16 April 2010 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of 23 October 2009 on procedural grounds. It noted, in particular, that the first-instance court had failed to attach a photograph of the applicant to his case file for identification purposes, to keep a record of the last hearing in the case file, to inform him of his legal rights, in breach of Law no. 5271, and to obtain final defence submissions from the applicant before ruling. The Court of Cassation also noted that the assize court had failed to enquire whether the applicant had been convicted in Uzbekistan or whether there was a case pending against him before ruling on the merits. Lastly, the Court of Cassation noted that the first-instance court had ordered the applicant\u2019s extradition, whereas it should merely have declared the extradition request admissible, given that extradition could only be ordered by the Cabinet of Ministers. 15.   The Court of Cassation\u2019s decision was received by the first-instance court on 12 May 2010. 16.  On 3 June 2010 the Bak\u0131rk\u00f6y Assize Court asked the opinion of the Bak\u0131rk\u00f6y public prosecutor as to whether the applicant could continue to be detained under Articles 100 and 101 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The public prosecutor replied on the same day that the applicant could be kept in detention under Article 100. 17.  On 7 June 2010 the Bak\u0131rk\u00f6y Assize Court re-started its examination. It annulled its previous detention order, given on the basis of Article 18 \u00a7 7 of the Criminal Code, and ordered the applicant\u2019s detention under Articles 100 and 101 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It took account the nature of the offences, the state of the evidence, the content of the case file, the existence of a strong suspicion that he had committed the offences in question and the risk that he might abscond. 18.  On 1 July 2010 the Bak\u0131rk\u00f6y Assize Court decided to find out whether the applicant had been convicted or whether there was a case pending against him in Uzbekistan. To that end, the president of the court sent a letter to the Uzbek authorities via the Ministry of Justice. 19.  On 4 November 2010 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent the documents that had been requested, which had been obtained through the Turkish Embassy in Tashkent, to the Ministry of Justice. On 10 November 2010 the Ministry of Justice sent them to the Bak\u0131rk\u00f6y public prosecutor\u2019s office. 20.  On 14 December 2010 the Bak\u0131rk\u00f6y public prosecutor submitted the documents to the Bak\u0131rk\u00f6y Assize Court. They showed that there was neither a criminal conviction nor a case pending against the applicant in Uzbekistan. 21.  Between 1 July and 27 December 2010 the assize court adjourned the proceedings six times as it awaited information from the Uzbek authorities. 22.  On 27 December 2010, at the eighth hearing, the trial court asked the applicant to submit observations in response to the documents received from the Uzbek authorities and adjourned the hearing. 23.  In the meantime, on 23 December 2010 the UNHCR had sent a letter to the Ministry of the Interior. It advised the authorities to grant the applicant subsidiary protection status and to refrain from extraditing or deporting him to Uzbekistan pending proceedings before the UNHCR. The UNHCR also informed the authorities in its letter that it had rejected the applicant\u2019s application for refugee status since he did not qualify for that status but that he should nevertheless not be removed to Uzbekistan in the light of the non-refoulement principle and the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention. On an unspecified date the applicant appealed against the UNHCR\u2019s decision not to grant him refugee status. 24.  On 7 January 2011 the Bak\u0131rk\u00f6y Assize Court decided to ask the Ministry of the Interior to submit a certified copy of the UNHCR\u2019s letter to it and adjourned the hearing. 25.  The Ministry of the Interior submitted the document requested at a hearing on 4 February 2011. The court also decided to await the outcome of the applicant\u2019s appeal against the UNHCR\u2019s decision not to grant him refugee status. 26.  The proceedings were adjourned between 4 February and 30 March 2011 as the assize court waited for a response from the UNHCR but on the latter of those dates it decided to annul its previous decision on the grounds that the UNHCR\u2019s examination of the applicant\u2019s appeal could take a long time. 27.  At the thirteenth hearing in the case, held on 27 April 2011, the Bak\u0131rk\u00f6y Assize Court asked the applicant to make his defence submissions. On 23 May 2011 the court once again adjourned the proceedings as one of the applicant\u2019s lawyers failed to attend the hearing and the other lawyers had not submitted their defence submission. 28.  On 1 June 2011 the Ministry of the Interior granted the applicant subsidiary protection status and a temporary permit to reside in Sakarya. 29.  By a letter dated 2 June 2011, the Ministry of the Interior provided information about the applicant\u2019s new status to the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Istanbul and Sakarya governors\u2019 offices and the police\u2019s Interpol\u2011Europol department attached to the General Police Headquarters. The Ministry of the Interior asked the Ministry of Justice to take the necessary measures to prevent possible extradition of the applicant to Uzbekistan because he had been granted a permit to reside in Sakarya. On 15 June 2011 the Ministry of the Interior\u2019s letter was submitted to the Bak\u0131rk\u00f6y Assize Court by the Bak\u0131rk\u00f6y public prosecutor\u2019s office. 30.  On 20 June 2011 the Bak\u0131rk\u00f6y Assize Court once again admitted the request for the applicant\u2019s extradition. In its judgment the court noted that there was an ongoing investigation into the applicant in Uzbekistan and that the offence with which he had been charged had nothing to do with military or political matters. The court noted that the applicant was under investigation for establishing a criminal organisation and causing bodily harm. 31.  On the same day the court ordered that the applicant be kept in detention under Article 18 \u00a7 7 of the Criminal Code. 32.  On 20 July 2011 the applicant applied to the Bak\u0131rk\u00f6y Assize Court for release. He noted, in particular, that he could not be extradited because he had been granted subsidiary protection status. He asked the court to consider measures other than detention such as a prohibition on leaving the country, release on bail or an obligation to report to a police station. His application was rejected. 33.  On 2 August 2011 the applicant appealed against the judgment of 20 June 2011. He once again stressed that he had been granted subsidiary protection status and that therefore he could not be extradited. 34.  On 6 December 2011 the public prosecutor at the Court of Cassation asked the high court to quash the judgment of 20 June 2011. He argued that the first-instance court had ruled without having made an examination of the case in the light of Article 3 of the Convention and the relevant provisions of other human rights treaties. 35.  On 8 March 2012 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of 20 June 2011. 36.  On 4 May 2012 the Ministry of Justice sent a letter to the Bak\u0131rk\u00f6y public prosecutor\u2019s office, stating that the applicant could no longer be extradited as a result of his subsidiary protection status and that therefore his detention should be reviewed by the court. 37.  On 9 May 2012, at the request of the Bak\u0131rk\u00f6y public prosecutor, the Bak\u0131rk\u00f6y Assize Court ordered the applicant\u2019s release from prison on the grounds that he had been granted subsidiary protection status. He was then placed in a foreigners\u2019 removal centre, where he was detained for one day. 38.  On 10 May 2012 the applicant was released from the removal centre on the basis of his residence permit. 39.  On 10 September 2012 the applicant acquired Turkish nationality. 40.  Between 7 June 2010 and 23 May 2011 the Bak\u0131rk\u00f6y Assize Court ordered the applicant to be kept in detention owing to the nature of the offences in question, the state of the evidence and the fact that he was not a permanent resident of Turkey. The applicant asked to be released several times. He also appealed against the orders for his continued detention. In particular, in petitions and oral submissions to the trial court starting from June 2011 the applicant argued that he had been granted subsidiary protection status, that he could not be extradited and that therefore he should be released.", "references": ["5", "1", "8", "6", "9", "3", "4", "7", "0", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1945 and lives in Taganrog. 5.  In 1978 the applicant and her sister inherited a house. 6.  In 2001 the applicant had a civil dispute with her sister regarding division of the house. On 17 January 2001 the Taganrog Town Court determined that the sisters had equal shares in respect of the inherited property. 7.  On 29 May 2002 the Taganrog Town Court factually determined the equal shares of the house, as well as the way of its sharing. On 31 July 2002 the Rostov Regional Court upheld this judgment. 8.  On an unspecified date the applicant\u2019s sister lodged a separate claim, requesting the court to acknowledge her property right to the corridor and the kitchen in the house, referring to the fact that she had invested in their reconstruction in 1989 and built some attachments to the house. 9.  On 17 October 2003 the Taganrog Town Court held that the attachments to the house belonged to the applicant\u2019s sister because she had built them after the inheritance. The court increased the share of the applicant\u2019s sister in the property up to 64/100 and reduced the applicant\u2019s part to 36/100. On 26 November 2003 the Rostov Regional Court upheld this judgment. 10.  On 22 October 2004 the Taganrog Town Court on request of the applicant\u2019s sister held that the judgment of 17 October 2003 established \u201cnew circumstances\u201d, i.e. that the attachments in the house had been built by the applicant\u2019s sister. Thus the court quashed the judgment of 29 May 2002 and re-opened the case on account of the \u201cnewly-discovered circumstances which were not and could not have been known at the moment of delivering the judgment of 29 May 2002\u201d. 11.  The proceedings resumed, but on 8 February 2005 the applicant withdrew her claim and the proceedings were terminated. 12.  In March 2005 the applicant\u2019s sister again filed an action seeking to divide their property in kind. 13.  On 10 October 2006 the Taganrog Town Court granted her claims. The house was divided in two parts and the parties were ordered to pay dividing costs. The court rendered the judgment in the absence of the applicant and her representative on the ground that she failed to appear without any reasons despite her having been duly summoned to the hearing. The court noted that the applicant had attended several hearings and had already presented her arguments on the merits. It also mentioned that the applicant had begun to avoid the court hearings in order to delay the trial. The applicant appealed, claiming, inter alia, that the trial court had rendered the judgment in her absence though she had been ill. 14.  On 6 December 2006 the Rostov Regional Court upheld the judgment on appeal. As to the applicant\u2019s absence, the court found that the applicant had been properly notified about the hearing in question but had failed to inform the trial court that she had been ill and never requested to suspend the proceedings.", "references": ["7", "0", "4", "6", "1", "2", "5", "8", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Belgrade, Serbia. 6.  The relevant facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7.  On 18 September 1995 the applicant and her family members instituted proceedings before the Court of First Instance (Osnovni sud) in Herceg Novi, seeking division of their joint property. 8.  On 5 May 1997 the Court of First Instance in Herceg Novi discontinued these proceedings and instructed the parties to initiate a separate civil case given a number of contentious issues. 9.  On 8 September 1997 the applicant\u2019s cousins brought a claim against the applicant and her parents before the Court of First Instance in Herceg Novi. On 30 December 1997, the cousins lodged an additional claim concerning the same matter. Both claims were subsequently joined and examined in the same civil proceedings. 10.  On 1 October 2002 the Court of First Instance in Herceg Novi ruled against the applicant and her parents. 11.  On 25 June 2004 the High Court (Vi\u0161i sud) in Podgorica upheld this judgment on appeal. The judgment, thereby, became final. It was served on the applicant on 15 July 2004. 12.  On 17 August 2004 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law (revizija) with the Supreme Court of Montenegro. 13.  This appeal was misplaced until 20 January 2006, when the applicant\u2019s lawyers intervened and urged the authorities to find it. On 12 January 2007 the applicant amended her appeal on points of law. 14.  On 14 February 2008 the Supreme Court of Montenegro rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law as unfounded. This decision was served on the applicant on 6 March 2008.", "references": ["5", "1", "4", "7", "0", "2", "6", "8", "9", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1947 and lives in Fryazino, the Moscow Region. 6.  She is retired and receives a monthly pension, which at the material time amounted to 2,440 Russian roubles (RUB). 7.  The applicant is also the founder and editor-in-chief of Fryazinets (\u201cthe newspaper\u201d), an independent weekly newspaper published in Fryazino with a circulation of 2,000-5,000 copies. 8.  On 14 April 2005 the Shchelkovo town prosecutor\u2019s office opened a criminal investigation in case no. 81992 against a woman called S.P. under Article 201 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code (\u201cabuse of powers by a person performing managerial functions in a commercial or other organisation\u201d). The date is apparent from the decision to resume that criminal investigation, which was taken on 3 July 2006 (see paragraph 17 below). The initial investigation was opened on the grounds that S.P., as a person performing managerial functions at a non\u2011commercial organisation, had allegedly abused her position by fraudulently receiving 5,243 Russian roubles (RUB) in petty cash from Strela ZhSK[1]. 9.  On an unspecified date in April 2005 the applicant published a statement by the Shchelkovo town deputy prosecutor in the newspaper. The statement included the following text:\n\u201c... On 14 April 2005 the Shchelkovo town prosecutor\u2019s office opened a criminal case against S.P. under Article 201 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code ...\u201d 10.  After publication of the statement the newspaper\u2019s editorial department received a number of telephone calls from residents of Fryazino who informed the applicant that S.P., an employee at Fryazino town administration, had been rude to them when they had tried to make an appointment with the mayor through the administration\u2019s Public Reception Office. 11.  In issue no. 16 (228) of 27 April-3 May 2005 of the newspaper the applicant published an article entitled \u201cReporting the details\u201d, which included, among other statements, the following:\n\u201c... Our last issue contained information about the opening of a criminal case against S.P. by the Shchelkovo town prosecutor\u2019s office. Who is she and what has she done? S.P. is an employee of the town administration and [as such] is a municipal civil servant working in the mayor\u2019s Public Reception Office. It is forbidden for municipal civil servants to have a second job. However, S.P. combines her activities in the Public Reception Office \u2013 where, judging by the telephone calls to the editorial department, she does not always behave appropriately towards visitors: [she] raises her voice and is rude, for which she has been reprimanded by the head of the Public Reception Office, K., \u2013 with jobs as accountant at Strela-3 ZhSK ... and head of Strela ZhSK, and so forth. As head of Strela ZhSK, S.P. allowed financial irregularities to take place and [as a result of those] the [residential building] association\u2019s members brought civil proceedings against her.\u201d 12.  In August 2005 S.P. brought defamation proceedings against the applicant and the newspaper\u2019s editorial department before the Shchelkovo Town Court (\u201cthe Town Court\u201d), seeking a retraction of the information contained in the article and non\u2011pecuniary damages. 13.  On 14 September 2005 the Town Court, without the applicant being present, held a hearing. In particular, it questioned several witnesses: the head of Strela-3 ZhSK, a member of the governing board of Strela ZhSK, an employee of the Public Reception Office and three people who had visited it. It also examined several items of evidence, such as Strela ZhSK\u2019s payroll records, a certificate confirming that S.P. had received a salary from it, and a document from the auditors of Strela ZhSK confirming that some of its funds had been spent in an irregular way. The Town Court did not consider whether the impugned information had consisted of statements of fact or value judgments. It found in the plaintiff\u2019s favour, ordering the newspaper to publish a retraction of the statements that S.P. had not always behaved appropriately towards visitors, had raised her voice and had been rude, that she had combined her functions as a municipal civil servant with jobs at Strela ZhSK and Strela-3 ZhSK, that she had allowed financial irregularities to take place as head of Strela ZhSK and that members of the association had brought civil proceedings against her. The Town Court ordered the applicant to pay S.P. RUB 10,000 in non\u2011pecuniary damages. The judgment read, in particular, as follows:\n\u201c... The publication contains statements (\u0441\u0432\u0435\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f) [which are] a negative assessment of S.P.\u2019s personality and her business abilities in connection with breaches of law, improper and unethical behaviour in discharging her official functions, and a lack of conscientiousness in performing her duties as head of ZhSK, which tarnish her honour, dignity and business reputation and are not true.\n... The term \u2018combining of employment\u2019 in the Labour Code ... is defined as a worker performing other regularly paid work under a contract of employment. No proof has been presented to the court that S.P. has concluded a contract of employment with Strela ZhSK and Strela-3 ZhSK. S.P. has submitted that she performed the functions of bookkeeper and head of those entities as a volunteer and had no contract of employment or payment. ... [A] witness, Ya., a member of Strela ZhSK\u2019s board, has explained that there was no contract between Strela ZhSK and S.P. The court rejects the part of his statement which said that S.P. received a salary from Strela ZhSK because the original of the document presented by the witness as a payroll document bore no statement to confirm that it was a payroll document. ... On the same grounds, the court finds that the certificate issued by [Strela] ZhSK to confirm that a salary was paid is unreliable [as evidence]. ...\n... Given that it has not been proved during the court hearing that S.P. concluded contracts of employment with the [Strela ZhSK and Strela-3 ZhSK] associations and received remuneration for her work, the court finds that S.P. ... has not combined her activity as a municipal civil servant with any other employment.\nAccordingly, the statements ... concerning a breach of the prohibition [for a municipal civil servant] on having a second job, that S.P. had other employment as an accountant at Strela-3 ZhSK, as head of Strela ZhSK and so forth, are untrue. ...\n... the allegations of improper behaviour on the part of S.P. towards visitors to the Public Reception Office, such as raising her voice and being rude, have not been proven in the course of the court hearing. ...\nThe law does not define the term \u201cfinancial irregularities\u201d. ...\nThe Popular Encyclopaedia of Economics ... defines ... finances as the creation, movement, allocation and reallocation of financial resources. Bookkeeping is a documentary record of all commercial and financial operations, expenses and income.\nTherefore, financial irregularities in respect of [residential building associations] should be recognised as ... expenditure which is against the interests of a ZhSK. ...\nThe court rejects the argument that breaches of the rules of bookkeeping amount to financial irregularities.\n... the court comes to the conclusion that the financial irregularities for which S.P. was allegedly responsible during the time she performed the duties of head of Strela ZhSK ... have not been proven [by the applicant] ...\nIn determining non-pecuniary damages ..., the court takes into account that ... the published material was based on unverified information and that S.P., being a municipal civil servant ... is particularly deeply affected by articles alleging violations of the law by her, a lack of conscientiousness and unethical behaviour ...\u201d 14.  The applicant appealed against the decision to the Moscow Regional Court (\u201cthe Regional Court\u201d). She stated, in particular, that the amount of damages was excessive as the Town Court had failed to take into account the small size of her retirement pension and had failed properly to examine the evidence she had submitted to prove the impugned statements. 15.  On 22 March 2006 the Regional Court upheld the Town Court\u2019s judgment in full, leaving the applicant\u2019s arguments without examination. 16.  On 17 May 2006 the criminal investigation against S.P. was suspended. 17.  On 3 July 2006 the Shchelkovo town prosecutor resumed the investigation against S.P. in case no. 81992. 18.  In issue no. 1 (213) of 12-18 January 2005 of the newspaper, the applicant published an article entitled \u201cThe town\u2019s black hole and attempted murder\u201d. The article was an interview with N., a local businessman standing for mayor of Fryazino. The text of the article included the following statement by N. concerning L.K., the then head of the Fryazino Technical Inventory Bureau (the BTI)[2] and also the wife of U., the incumbent mayor:\n\u201c... as transpires from a complaint by residents to the Shchelkovo town prosecutor\u2019s office, U.\u2019s wife, a certain L.K., in abuse of her position as head of the Fryazino BTI ..., committed forgery by stealing ... the land-use plan for the building at 23 Polevaya Street and replacing it with [another] land-use plan ...\u201d 19.  On an unspecified date in 2006 L.K. brought defamation proceedings against the applicant and N., arguing that the article had damaged her honour and dignity and tarnished her business reputation. 20.  On 11 May 2006 the Town Court found against the applicant andN., ordered that the newspaper publish a retraction and awarded L.K. RUB 15,000 and RUB 30,000 in non-pecuniary damages from the applicant and N. respectively. The Town Court did not examine whether the interview had concerned matters of public interest or the professional activities of a public figure, nor did it provide any reasons for holding the applicant liable for publishing it. N. and the applicant argued that the impugned statement had in fact been a value judgment which had not been susceptible of proof, which the Town Court dismissed as follows:\n\u201cThe argument by N. and his representative that the impugned statement was a value judgment is refuted by the case material. ... N.\u2019s statement ... has a precise statement of fact that L.K. had committed a crime by stealing and replacing the land-use plan ...\nHaving analysed the complaint by members of the public to the Shchelkovo town prosecutor regarding L.K., the court concludes that the defendant presented a statement of fact, not a value judgment, in the newspaper article. It can be concluded from the complaint by the public that she had, possibly, forged the land-use plan for the building and plot of land. Accordingly, it concerns an inquiry into [events] reported in the complaint. However, the defendant has distorted the contents of the complaint in the interview ... and its contents are represented as a statement of fact that L.K. committed forgery ... As can easily be verified by examining the text of ... the complaint, it does not include such a statement. ...\nA statement of fact that a crime has been committed should be examined in the way established by the Code of Criminal Procedure, therefore N.\u2019s statement cannot be considered by the court as a value judgment or opinion and [its veracity] should be proven by presenting criminal-procedure documents to the court confirming that L.K.\u2019s actions constituted a crime. In breach of Article 152 of the Civil Code, the defendant has not presented the court with such documents. ...\nThe defendant Ms Cheltsova has not presented the court with any evidence to prove that ... the statement was true or with proof that the truthfulness of the statement was checked [prior to publication]. ... L.K. has argued before the court that she ... is a civil servant who discharges her duties in good faith and that publication in the media ... of the statement that she had committed a ... crime caused her distress, on the basis of which the court concludes that L.K.\u2019s claims for non-pecuniary damages should be granted.\u201d 21.  The applicant and N. both appealed. The applicant argued, among other things, that the amount of the award had been excessive considering that her monthly pension was only RUB 2,600. 22.  On 20 July 2006 the Regional Court upheld the Town Court\u2019s judgment on appeal. In a very succinct judgment, it dismissed the defendants\u2019 arguments as follows:\n\u201cGiven that the [first-instance] court has correctly determined the legally relevant circumstances and properly assessed the evidence, its judgment is lawful and well\u2011founded.\nThe arguments [contained in] the statements of appeal are aimed at a reassessment of the evidence and do not contain circumstances that would refute the findings of the [first-instance] court and require additional examination.\u201d 23.   N. stood for office as mayor of Fryazino in elections scheduled for 4 September 2005. He paid from his election fund to have an appeal addressed to President Putin published in the newspaper, which was signed \u201cN., a candidate for the office of mayor\u201d. The newspaper published the appeal in issue 32 (244) of 17-23 August 2005 under the headline \u201cApproaching the elections. Introducing the candidates for the office of mayor of Fryazino\u201d, mentioning specifically that the article had been paid for from N.\u2019s election campaign funds. 24.  The article criticised a local entrepreneur, G.A., one of N.\u2019s opponents in the campaign, and suggested that the authorities should investigate his business activities. The article read, in so far as relevant, as follows:\n\u201c... One of the covert heads of the limited liability company Roads of the XXI Century, who is also the head of the Prince Casino, a certain G.A., who is in direct contact with the mayor of Fryazino, U., and connected to him by a dubious financial relationship linked to the construction of housing and commercial car parks in Fryazino, arranged for a criminal case opened against U. to be terminated. Meanwhile, in conversation with me, G.A. was open about the fact that he had personally paid \u2018werewolves in epaulettes\u2019 [corrupt policemen] one million U.S. dollars!!!\nIn reply to my question as to where he had got such a huge [amount of] money, G.A. said he was a \u2018person of immense authority\u2019 in Fryazino and the Shchelkovo district, who had judges, prosecutors and tax officers \u2018in his pay\u2019...\nIn addition, G.A. informed me that in the near future he would be working in the Fryazino town administration as chairman of the Council of Deputies \u2013 [that he would be] controlling and distributing the funds belonging to ... Fryazino to \u2018his own companies\u2019, and, first and foremost, to Roads of the XXI Century. ...\n... that very G.A. who paid one million U.S. dollars!!! to \u2018werewolves in epaulettes\u2019 to terminate the criminal case [instituted] against U. under three provisions of the Criminal Code in respect of ten [criminal] episodes and who intends in the near future to control and distribute cash belonging to ... Fryazino to companies loyal to him! ...\nIt turned out that, in violation of ... the law on the main guarantees of election rights ..., the campaign material was not paid for from G.A.\u2019s campaign funds, but [from the assets of] the very same company, Roads of the XXI Century!!! ...\n... despite being near to the town administration building, G.A. pounced on me, punched me in the chest, and threatened to kill me and my family and shoot my guards. He also said he regretted the fact that he had not been able to organise that crime properly in December 2004 during an attempt on my life.\n On top of that, G.A. told me that he would shoot all businessmen who were out of favour with him and his construction business partner, K. (of Roads of the XXI Century), and [the mayor] U. G.A.\u2019s promise to shoot businessmen was proved true that day. On the evening of 13 August 2005 Ch., who had had a long-standing dispute with Roads of the XXI Century, G.A. and U., was shot in the head and killed ...\u201d 25.  On 22 August 2005 the territorial electoral commission brought a claim in the Town Court against N., alleging that the newspaper article had not complied with election campaign rules and had been an abuse of press freedom. 26.  On 27 August 2005 the Town Court found for N. and stated that the impugned publication had been paid campaign material and as such had complied with the relevant regulations. 27.  Both N. and G.A. lost the mayoral election. 28.  On an unspecified date in 2006 G.A. brought defamation proceedings against the applicant and N. in connection with the publication of N.\u2019s open appeal to President Putin. 29.  On 16 May 2006 the Town Court found against the applicant and N. It did not examine whether the impugned information had consisted of statements of fact or value judgments, nor did it provide reasons for holding the applicant liable for publishing the impugned article. The Town Court ordered the newspaper to retract the statements and awarded G.A. non\u2011pecuniary damages, of which RUB 10,000 in particular were to be recovered from the applicant. 30.  The applicant appealed arguing, in particular, that the amount of damages was excessive and disproportionate in view of her small pension and that the Town Court had failed to properly examine the evidence she had submitted to prove the impugned information. 31.  On 2 August 2006 the Regional Court upheld the first-instance judgment on appeal. It found, in particular, as follows:\n\u201cThe [first-instance] court found that N.\u2019s statements in the published material could and should have been checked as to their truthfulness, that ... [they] are not truthful, tarnish G.A.\u2019s honour, dignity and business reputation, which has caused him emotional suffering.\nThe court also correctly found that the defendants\u2019 ... argument that the publication ... had been permissible in the course of an election campaign ... was ill-founded. ... The court lawfully found that there were no grounds to relieve N. and Ms Cheltsova of liability for the dissemination of untruthful statements tarnishing [the reputation of] G.A. and that the defendants had not proven the truthfulness of the statements they had disseminated, which the appellate court agrees with. The fact of dissemination of harmful statements was established by the court, which took into account the newspaper\u2019s circulation of 3,000 copies in the course of the election campaign.\u201d", "references": ["9", "4", "1", "7", "5", "3", "2", "8", "0", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
+{"input": "6.  The first applicant is a sister of Mr B., who died of AIDS in the Botkin Hospital in St Petersburg on 6 May 2008. 7.  The second applicant is the mother of Mr P., who died of the same disease in the same hospital on 19 June 2009. 8.  The applicants live in Moscow. 9.  On 13 October 2004 Mr B. was arrested on suspicion of robbery. The next day the Frunzenskiy District Court of St Petersburg authorised his detention pending investigation. He was then taken to remand prison no. IZ\u201147/6 in the Leningrad Region. Twelve days later he was diagnosed with HIV. 10.  In November 2004 Mr B. was transferred to remand prison no. IZ\u201147/1 in St Petersburg. On admission he informed the prison doctor about his HIV status. A relevant entry was made in his medical file, but no treatment was prescribed. 11.  On 1 December 2005 the Frunzenskiy District Court of St Petersburg convicted Mr B. and sentenced him to seven years\u2019 imprisonment. In August 2006 he was sent to serve the sentence in correctional colony no. IK-5 in the Leningrad Region. 12.  Having complained of abdominal pain, on 4 March 2007 Mr B. was admitted to the prison hospital, where he was later diagnosed with tuberculosis of the peripheral lymph nodes. It was decided that he should stay in the hospital for tuberculosis treatment. 13.  On 16 March 2007 Mr B. was seen by an infectious diseases doctor, who ordered a CD4 count to be conducted. The test, performed five days later, showed that the level of CD4 cells was 163 cells/mm3, which corresponded to an advanced stage of the disease. 14.  On 31 May and 16 June 2007 the infectious diseases doctor visited Mr B. According to the medical records, the latter asked for antiretroviral therapy. In response, the doctor \u201cgave him a talk\u201d. No HIV treatment was prescribed. 15.  On 20 June 2007 Mr B. was discharged from the prison hospital. Until April 2008 he was transferred from one prison medical facility to another for anti-tuberculosis treatment. Although the treatment was successful, the patient\u2019s overall medical condition continued to deteriorate. Medical specialists interpreted that as a sign of progressing HIV. 16.  On 2 April 2008 Mr B. was admitted to prison hospital no. RB-2 in the Republic of Karelia. At that time he was unable to walk, was feverish and extremely emaciated. Eight days later he was transferred to an infectious diseases unit. His doctor alleged that his grave medical condition resulted from a lack of highly active antiretroviral therapy (HAART). Mr B. was prescribed antibacterial and disintoxication therapy. 17.  On 22 April 2008 the medical authorities applied for Mr B.\u2019s early release on medical grounds. Three days later the Medvezhyegorsk Town Court of the Republic of Karelia granted the request. On the same day Mr B. was released from detention. 18.  On 26 April 2008 Mr B. was admitted to Botkin Hospital in St Petersburg. He did not regain consciousness and died there on 6 May 2008. 19.  On 26 July 2006 Mr P. was convicted of theft and sentenced to a term of imprisonment. He was taken into police custody and two days later sent to remand prison no. IZ-47/6 in the Leningrad Region. 20.  During the admission procedure he told the resident doctor that in 2000 he had been diagnosed with HIV, which by 2006 had progressed to AIDS. Before his arrest he had been receiving antiretroviral therapy. He was also suffering from hepatitis B, C, and D and a skin disease. 21.  Having undergone a routine medical examination, on 31 July 2006 Mr P. was diagnosed with infiltrative tuberculosis of the right lung. A standard drug regimen was prescribed and administered to him in the prison medical unit. A chest X-ray examination carried out on 20 November 2006 showed a decrease in the area of the lung affected by the tuberculosis. 22.  Mr P. was convicted of robbery in another set of criminal proceedings and on 12 December 2006 he was sentenced to three years\u2019 imprisonment. He was sent to prison medical facility no. 4 in the Republic of Karelia. 23.  Mr P.\u2019s medical condition worsened. The result of a sputum culture test performed on 26 February 2007 was smear-positive. By April 2007 Mr P.\u2019s tuberculosis had developed resistance to six of the drugs he had been taking. Following a decision of the prison medical board on 16 June 2007, his drug regimen was adjusted. 24.  On 26 June 2007 Mr P. was admitted to prison hospital no. RB-2 in the Republic of Karelia, where the tuberculosis treatment continued as prescribed. It appears that the change in medication improved the patient\u2019s lung condition. However, doctors noted a further development of opportunistic infections. A viral load test was performed, the results of which, as alleged by the second applicant, were not given to Mr P. 25.  On 13 July 2007 Mr P. returned to the prison medical facility. Chest X-ray examinations carried out on 24 July and 26 September 2007 showed that the condition of Mr P.\u2019s lungs had improved. The results of a smear test proved negative. On 16 October 2008 Mr P. was sent back to a regular prison ward. His treatment continued. 26.  On 27 October 2008 at the request of Mr P., the Segezha Town Court of the Republic of Karelia ordered his release on parole. Having been released on 31 October 2008, Mr P. was taken to Botkin Hospital. He died in the hospital on 19 June 2009 from \u201can illness caused by the HIV infection\u201d. 27.  On 26 May and 4 June 2010 a Russian non-governmental organisation, Agora, complained to the Russian Prosecutor General\u2019s Office of the lack of HIV treatment for detainees, including Mr B. and Mr P. The complaint was referred to the prosecutor\u2019s office in the Republic of Karelia. 28.  In a letter to the Russian Prosecutor General\u2019s Office dated 6 July 2010 the prosecutor\u2019s office in the Republic of Karelia observed that in 2007 and 2008 prison authorities in Karelia had experienced difficulties with providing medical assistance to HIV-infected convicts in view of the fact that a large number of infected inmates had been sent to the Republic from other regions. The prosecutor\u2019s office said that the supply of drugs had been limited and the number of medical professionals had been insufficient, and acknowledged that the medical care of Mr B. and Mr P. had fallen short of the domestic standards. In particular, they had not received HAART. The prosecutor\u2019s office had sent the evidence it had gathered to the investigative committee in the Republic of Karelia to determine whether a criminal case should be opened. 29.  On 5 August 2010 the investigative authorities refused to open a criminal case into the deaths of Mr B. and Mr P. Citing the difficulties encountered by the prison authorities of the Karelia Republic in 2006-08, including the large number of HIV-positive inmates, a lack of specialists trained to treat inmates suffering from that infection, the absence of an immunological laboratory and the lack of medication, the investigators concluded that the prison authorities had taken all possible measures to provide medical assistance to HIV-infected inmates. No causal link between the absence of HIV therapy and the deaths of Mr B. and Mr P. was established. The investigative authorities stressed that Mr B. had managed to live in detention without the antiretroviral therapy for almost three years and that Mr P. had died more than seven months after his release. The conduct of the prison and medical authorities, in the investigators\u2019 opinion, did not reveal any signs of a criminal offence. 30.  The above decision was not challenged. 31.  In 2011 the applicants lodged a claim for non-pecuniary damages against the Russian Ministry of Finance, arguing that their relatives\u2019 death from HIV had been caused by the authorities\u2019 failure to provide appropriate medical care. 32.  On 28 October 2011 the Tverskoy District Court of Moscow examined the claim. It found that the burden of proof was on the applicants, who had to prove the unlawfulness of the prison officials\u2019 conduct, the alleged damage, and the causal links between the officials\u2019 conduct and that damage. Having noted the absence of a decision establishing a breach of the law by the prison authorities, and having referred to the decision not to open a criminal case into the deaths of the applicant\u2019s relatives, the court dismissed the claim as unsubstantiated. 33.  On 22 February 2012 the Moscow City Court upheld the judgment on appeal, fully endorsing the District Court\u2019s reasoning.", "references": ["9", "2", "6", "7", "5", "8", "1", "3", "4", "No Label", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1987 and lived in Voronezh prior to her arrest. 5.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 6.  On 14 July 2007 the applicant, together with B., travelled to Moscow by car. At about 3.40 a.m. the police stopped the car; two men from the narcotics unit approached the car and asked the passengers to step out and produce their identity documents and luggage for inspection. An officer opened the sports bag which, according to the applicant, her friend had asked her to take to another friend in Moscow, and found a black plastic bag. The applicant stated that she was not aware of its contents. The officers then put the black bag into the trunk of the police car and took the applicant and B. to the premises of the narcotics unit. 7.  The applicant and B. were interviewed in separate rooms. In the morning the applicant was taken to another office, in which one female officer, a forensics expert and two individuals who were introduced as \u201cattesting witnesses\u201d (\u043f\u043e\u043d\u044f\u0442\u044b\u0435) were present. The applicant was told to open the black bag and to show its contents. Four plastic bags containing yellow and green herb and cash money were found inside. At 8.15 a.m. the police drafted a report on the seizure of objects and substances. The expert later determined that the herb was marijuana having a total weight of almost three kilograms. 8.  At 6 p.m. a senior investigator of the narcotics unit instituted criminal proceedings against the applicant and B. on suspicion of attempted large\u2011scale sale of drugs. 9.  At 8.15 p.m. the investigator compiled the record of the applicant\u2019s arrest. The time of arrest was given as 7.50 p.m. on 14 July 2007. 10.  On 15 July 2007 the applicant was formally charged and the investigator applied to a court for a detention order. 11.  The detention hearing before the Zyuzinskiy District Court in Moscow began at 7.15 p.m. on 16 July 2007. Counsel for the applicant submitted that, in view of the actual time of the applicant\u2019s detention, the maximum statutory period of forty-eight hours had already expired. However, the court did not heed that argument and ordered that the applicant be remanded in custody because the gravity of charges against her. 12.  On 19 July 2007 counsel for the applicant filed an appeal. On 25 July 2007 copies of the appeal were forwarded to the applicant and to the prosecutor for comments. The appeal hearing was initially scheduled for 22 August 2007 but subsequently adjourned for one week because one of the applicant\u2019s representatives did not show up. 13.  On 27 August 2007 the City Court rejected the appeal against the detention order in a summary fashion, noting that \u201cthe pre-trial investigation authorities did not commit any substantial breaches of the rules of criminal procedure\u201d. 14.  The case against the applicant was referred for trial to the Babushkinskiy District Court in Moscow. 15.  The defence claimed that the attesting witnesses who had been present during the opening of the bag were in fact employees of the narcotics unit rather than independent observers as required by law. Both of those witnesses \u2013 Ms P. and Ms A. \u2013 did not appear before the trial court. Instead, a court bailiff submitted reports about his unsuccessful attempts to ensure their attendance. The reports contained the same text to the effect that the witnesses could not be reached on the phone, that no one opened the door at their residence and that neighbours had told the bailiff that they had not seen them for a long time. 16.  Counsel for the applicant requested the court to obtain the visitors journal from the reception of the narcotics unit. Since the unit was located within a security perimeter, all civilian visitors were to be recorded in the journal. The trial court refused the motion, without giving any reasons. It further held that there existed \u201cexceptional circumstances\u201d for the absence of the witnesses Ms P. and Ms A. and allowed their pre-trial statements to be read out, overriding the objections from the defence. 17.  The trial court also authorised the reading-out of the pre-trial statement of Mr F., the driver of the car, of which the applicant and B. had been passengers. The bailiff submitted similarly worded reports to the effect that Mr F. was unavailable on the telephone or at his residence. 18.  By judgment of 8 April 2008, the District Court found the applicant and B. guilty as charged and sentenced each of them to eight years\u2019 imprisonment in a high-security correctional colony. It held in particular that the applicant\u2019s claim that she did not know she was carrying marijuana in her friend\u2019s bag was refuted by the seizure report of 14 July 2007 and the statements by the witnesses Ms P. and Ms A. 19.  On 28 July 2008 the Moscow City Court examined and rejected her appeal against the conviction.", "references": ["5", "8", "9", "7", "0", "4", "1", "6", "No Label", "2", "3"], "gold": ["2", "3"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1976. 5.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 6.  In 1994, the applicant was convicted of theft and given a two-year custodial sentence conditional on one year\u2019s probation. However, the court applied a general amnesty act and the applicant\u2019s conviction, including the probation period, was spent with immediate effect. 7.  Less than one year later, on 29 May 1995, a different court convicted the applicant of aggravated robbery and sentenced him to six years\u2019 imprisonment. Considering that the applicant had breached the terms of his probation by committing a new offence, the court ordered the suspended sentence to be activated and increased the total length of the sentence by one year. 8.  On 11 December 2001 the Presidium of the Omsk Regional Court acknowledged that the 1995 judgment had been unlawful in the part relating to the increase of the final sentence in connection with the prior conviction that had already been spent. The length of the sentence was varied to six years\u2019 imprisonment, calculated from 2 January 1995 which was the date of the applicant\u2019s arrest. Given that the applicant had already spent more than six years in detention, the Presidium ordered his immediate release. 9.  The applicant unsuccessfully tried several avenues for claiming compensation for his unlawful detention during eleven months and fourteen days. 10.  He sought first to exercise the \u201cright to rehabilitation\u201d under the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 13 below). On 5 August 2003 the Oktyabrskiy District Court in Omsk rejected his application, pointing out that the \u201cright to rehabilitation\u201d only accrued to those who have been acquitted or exonerated which was not the applicant\u2019s case. The applicant did not appeal against that decision. 11.  The applicant also tried to initiate criminal proceedings against Judge B. who had given the judgment of 29 May 1995. His criminal-law complaint was rejected on the ground that the limitation period had expired. 12.  Finally, the applicant filed a civil claim for compensation under the tort provisions of the Civil Code (see paragraph 14 below). On 20 December 2005 the Tsentralniy District Court in Omsk rejected his claim, finding that paragraph 1 of Article 1070 did not apply because the applicant had been found guilty rather than acquitted and that the special condition of applicability of paragraph 2 \u2013 the criminal conviction of the judge \u2013 was not fulfilled. On 14 June 2006 the Omsk Regional Court rejected an appeal against that decision.", "references": ["4", "1", "7", "8", "0", "3", "9", "5", "6", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in \u0160iauliai. 6.  On 17 February 2007, at around 12.30 a.m., the applicant and his friends, J.J., A.D. and D.R., arrived at a petrol station near the town of Skuodas. While they were waiting in line at the petrol station\u2019s shop, another group of men, who were not known to them, arrived at the shop and attempted to skip the queue, leading to an argument between the two groups. After they had all left the shop, some of the men started beating J.J. in the petrol station\u2019s parking lot. When the applicant tried to help his friend, the men punched the applicant in the face and head several times, causing him to fall to the ground, where they kicked him in the head. According to the applicant, the assault lasted a couple of minutes and he was hit about ten times. 7.  On the day of the incident the Skuodas police (hereinafter \u201cthe police\u201d) opened a pre-trial investigation, interviewed the applicant and granted him victim status. On unspecified dates J.J., A.D. and D.R. were also granted victim status. 8.  On 19 February 2007 the applicant was examined by a court medical expert. The expert found contusions on the applicant\u2019s face and head, and determined that they could have been caused by at least four blows with a hard, blunt object. The expert concluded that the injuries corresponded to negligible health impairment (ne\u017eymus sveikatos sutrikdymas) and that they could have occurred at the time and in the circumstances described by the applicant (see paragraph 6 above). 9.  On 13 March 2007 the police identified two suspects, E.G. and R.B., and notified them that they were suspected of disturbing the public order, contrary to Article 284 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 25 below). On 13 June 2007 a third suspect, S.G., was identified and notified of the same suspicion. 10.  On 20 March 2007 the applicant joined the proceedings as a civil party. He claimed 10,000 Lithuanian litai (LTL \u2013 approximately 2,896 euros (EUR)) in pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages jointly from all the suspects. 11.  On 7 June 2007 a court medical expert again examined the applicant and his medical file. The expert found that a few days after the incident the applicant\u2019s doctor had detected a fracture in the applicant\u2019s nose, without any displacement of the bone (nosies kaulo l\u016b\u017eiai be dislokacijos), and that the applicant had been granted sick leave from work for four days. The expert concluded that the injury corresponded to negligible health impairment. 12.  On 28 December 2007 E.G., R.B. and S.G. were notified that they were also suspected of causing negligible health impairment or physical pain to other persons by violent acts, contrary to Article 140 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 25 below). 13.  In the course of the pre-trial investigation, the police interviewed twelve witnesses, examined the victims\u2019 clothes and other items, obtained a video recording of the incident from the petrol station, and carried out various other investigative measures. On 16 July 2007 the suspects and the victims were informed that the pre-trial investigation had been completed. 14.  On 10 January 2008 the Skuodas District Prosecutor (hereinafter \u201cthe prosecutor\u201d) issued an indictment against E.G., R.B. and S.G., charging them with the crimes set out in Articles 140 \u00a7 1 and 284 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code. 15.  On 12 August 2008 at the applicant\u2019s request the Skuodas District Court ordered an additional medical examination of his injuries in order to determine whether there had been any further deterioration of his health. On 18 December 2008 the applicant was examined by a court medical expert. The expert found that although a few months previously the applicant had been diagnosed with inflammation of the auditory nerves, that condition was not related to the injuries sustained during the incident of 17 February 2007. 16.  On 17 December 2009 the Skuodas District Court convicted E.G., R.B. and S.G. of the crimes set out in Articles 140 \u00a7 1 and 284 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code. The court considered that the charges had been proven by victim and witness testimony, the confessions of the accused, and the video recording from the petrol station\u2019s camera. E.G., R.B. and S.G. were given suspended prison sentences ranging from twelve to eighteen months. The applicant\u2019s civil claim was granted in part and he was awarded LTL 6,000 (approximately EUR 1,738) in non-pecuniary damages. 17.  The convicted persons and the victims, including the applicant, appealed against the district court\u2019s judgment. On 25 February 2010 the Klaip\u0117da Regional Court quashed the judgment because of grave breaches (esminiai pa\u017eeidimai) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraphs 28\u201129 below). The Klaip\u0117da Regional Court held that the district court had not based its judgment on circumstances examined at the hearing but solely on the description of the charges in the indictment. It also held that the district court had not assessed all the testimony and other evidence in detail and had not explained why some evidence had been considered reliable and some not. The Klaip\u0117da Regional Court concluded that such breaches had affected the district court\u2019s impartiality. As a result, the case was remitted to the Skuodas District Court for re-examination. 18.  On an unspecified date the prosecutor amended the indictment and charged E.G., R.B. and S.G. only with disturbing public order, contrary to Article 284 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code. 19.  On 5 May 2011 a different panel of the Skuodas District Court, after re-examining the case, convicted E.G., R.B. and S.G. of the charges against them and gave them suspended prison sentences ranging from twelve to eighteen months. The applicant\u2019s civil claim was granted in part \u2013 he was awarded LTL 124.45 (approximately EUR 36) in pecuniary damages consisting of travel expenses to attend court hearings, LTL 5,000 (approximately EUR 1,448) in non-pecuniary damages and LTL 5,000 in legal costs. The court also held that the applicant had the right to claim further pecuniary damages from the convicted persons in separate civil proceedings. 20.  The convicted persons and one of the victims, J.J., appealed against the district court\u2019s judgment. On 5 August 2011 the Klaip\u0117da Regional Court quashed the judgment because of grave breaches of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraphs 27 and 29 below). It found that the district court had not made any findings in respect of one of the victims, D.R., and had thereby breached D.R.\u2019s rights and those of the accused. The Klaip\u0117da Regional Court also held that the district court had not examined whether two of the accused, R.B. and S.G., had disturbed public order, as submitted in the amended indictment. Rather, the district court had examined whether R.B. and S.G. had assaulted the victims, thereby de facto changing the charges against them and violating their right to defend themselves. The Klaip\u0117da Regional Court concluded that such breaches had affected the district court\u2019s objective impartiality, and the case was again remitted to the Skuodas District Court for re-examination. 21.  On 26 March 2012 a different panel of the Skuodas District Court held that the five-year statute of limitations (see paragraph 26 below) had expired and discontinued the case as time-barred, leaving the victims\u2019 civil claims unexamined. The victims, including the applicant, appealed against that decision, arguing that the court had erred by applying the statute of limitations because the legal classification of the charges had been incorrect. However, on 28 June 2012 the Klaip\u0117da Regional Court dismissed their appeal, finding that the legal classification of charges was the prerogative of the prosecutor and that the Code of Criminal Procedure did not provide for any possibility to continue criminal proceedings after the expiry of the statute of limitations. 22.  After the discontinuation of the criminal proceedings, the applicant submitted a civil claim against E.G., R.B. and S.G. He claimed LTL 12,170 (approximately EUR 3,525) in pecuniary damages, consisting of the salary which he had allegedly lost while attending court hearings in the criminal proceedings, travel expenses to attend those hearings, and legal costs sustained in the criminal proceedings. He also claimed LTL 300,000 (approximately EUR 86,886) in non-pecuniary damages. 23.  On 20 February 2013 the Skuodas District Court granted the applicant\u2019s civil claim in part. It examined the evidence which had been collected in the criminal proceedings and on that basis concluded that E.G., R.B. and S.G. had caused damage to the applicant by their deliberate actions. However, the court considered that the applicant had not proven the pecuniary damage claimed and awarded him LTL 124.45 (approximately EUR 36) under that head on the basis of petrol receipts he had submitted. The court further observed that the applicant\u2019s nose had been broken and that he must have suffered a certain amount of inconvenience owing to the need to attend numerous court hearings; however, the injury had not caused him any long-term physical or psychological damage. On those grounds, the court awarded the applicant LTL 7,000 (approximately EUR 2,027) in non\u2011pecuniary damages. 24.  The applicant appealed against that judgment, and on 4 July 2013 the Klaip\u0117da Regional Court partly upheld his appeal. It found that the district court had erred in refusing to award the applicant pecuniary damages related to the legal costs which he had incurred in the criminal proceedings, and granted him LTL 5,000 (approximately EUR 1,448) under that head, thereby increasing the total amount of pecuniary damages to LTL 5,124.45 (approximately EUR 1,484). The amount of non-pecuniary damages was left unchanged.", "references": ["8", "3", "4", "5", "7", "2", "6", "9", "0", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "4.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 5.  On 25 March 1996 the applicant brought a compensation claim for damages suffered as a consequence of an expropriation of his property against the Municipality of Bar and one of the local primary schools before the Court of First Instance (Osnovni sud) in Bar. 6.  On 11 April 1996 the applicant\u2019s representative informed the Court of First Instance that he had initiated a separate set of proceedings to determine the value of the above-mentioned damages. The Court of First Instance suspended the above mentioned civil proceedings pending the final resolution of this matter. 7.  No document was submitted by the parties as to whether or not the compensation proceedings have ended in the meantime. Accordingly, it would appear that the said two sets of proceedings are still pending before the Court of First Instance. 8.  On 2 February 2004 the applicant instituted proceedings before the Court of First Instance in Bar, against his neighbour, seeking a demarcation between their two plots of land. 9.  On 25 March 2004 the applicant amended his proposal to this effect. 10.  On 14 September 2004 the applicant and the respondent reached a friendly settlement which was approved by the Court of First Instance on the same day.", "references": ["2", "0", "6", "4", "1", "9", "5", "8", "7", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1966, 1967, 1988 and 2003 respectively and live in Blagoevgrad. The first and second applicants are cohabiting partners and the fourth applicant is their daughter. The third applicant is the second applicant\u2019s son. At the relevant time all the applicants were living together. 6.  The first applicant suffers from muscular dystrophy, which has gradually progressed since the age of twelve. Currently (and at the time of the relevant events), he is only able to move his head and hands. He needs assistance for most daily activities, which is usually provided by the second applicant or his care assistant. According to the applicants, the care assistant, who was specially trained and had taken care of the first applicant for many years, was the only person with whom the latter felt secure when he needed to go out of his home, in particular to go to his office, as this involved the assistant carrying him and installing him in a car. The assistant also drove the applicant\u2019s car. At the time the first applicant owned a pawnshop and managed several companies. One of his activities was giving short-term loans at high interest rates. 7.  In 2010 the prosecution authorities opened criminal proceedings against the first applicant for usury. Prior to that, in 2006 and 2009 he had been convicted for an abuse in the exercise of a disputed right and for threatening another person. 8.  On 7 April 2011, at about 11 a.m., the first applicant, while travelling in his car which was being driven by his care assistant, was stopped by police officers and ordered to follow them to the police station. Upon arrival, his care assistant was arrested. While the parties have not specified the grounds for this arrest, it is very likely that it was on the basis of the Ministry of the Interior Act, which allowed, inter alia, the detention for up to twenty-four hours of a person suspected of having committed an offence, and that it was related to the investigation against the first applicant. 9.  The car remained in the carpark and the first applicant remained in it. Unable to move, he stayed in that position for several hours, guarded by two police officers. At about 3 p.m. his care assistant was brought out under guard to move him to another car, because the first one was going to be impounded as physical evidence. On two or three occasions during the day the second applicant was allowed to come to help him with his physical needs. 10.  During the time the first applicant spent in front of the police station, police officers searched his home, his office and his pawnshop, as well as his parents\u2019 flat and house. They also searched the applicant\u2019s cars. The operation against him had been planned in advance. 11.  At about 6 p.m., while still in the car and in the presence of his lawyer who had arrived in the meantime, the first applicant had charges of usury brought against him by an investigator. For that purpose the police officers installed the necessary equipment in the carpark, including a computer and a printer. The applicant was invited to make a declaration in relation to the charges; he stated that he was not guilty. 12.  The first applicant remained in the car in front of the police station until about 7.30 p.m. After that he was brought in front of the building of the Blagoevgrad Regional Court, which was to hold a hearing to examine an application by the prosecution to place him under house arrest. In the court carpark police officers attempted to take the applicant out of the car and place him in a wheelchair, despite the second applicant\u2019s protests. They gave up, after becoming aware that they could hurt him. After that his care assistant, still in detention, was again brought out under guard. The first applicant was thus able to get out of the car at about 9.30 p.m. He attended the court hearing, which ended at 11.30 p.m. The care assistant remained with him until the end of the hearing. The prosecution\u2019s application to have the first applicant placed under house arrest was allowed. 13.  The applicant\u2019s care assistant was released on 8 April 2011 and has not been questioned any further or prosecuted. 14.  The Blagoevgrad Regional Court\u2019s decision to place the first applicant under house arrest was upheld on appeal by the Sofia Court of Appeal on 14 April 2011. Before taking its decision, that court heard evidence from, among others, A.Z., who stated that she was the first applicant\u2019s sister and a neurologist and gave evidence concerning the applicant\u2019s state of health. 15.  On 22 January 2016 the first applicant had charges brought against him once again, in a detailed bill of indictment listing more than a hundred occasions where he had given loans to individuals at high interest rates. According to reports published in the Bulgarian media, in November 2016 he was indicted and is standing trial at present. 16.  The observance of the first applicant\u2019s house arrest was supervised by the police. 17.  Between 8 and 14 April 2011 there were no checks on whether he was complying with the measure. 18.  On 15 April 2011 the first applicant was seen by patrolling police officers in the city centre. When asked to provide an explanation, he stated that he had gone out to buy something. The police checked on him at his home in the evening of the same day. 19.  Between 16 April and 27 May 2011 police officers visited the applicants\u2019 home to check on the first applicant on twenty-nine occasions, once a day and almost every day. On eight days there were no checks at all, and on another four days officers did not go to the applicants\u2019 flat, but observed for some time the building\u2019s entrance. On 29 April 2011 the applicant was met by officers in front of the building as he arrived in his car. 20.  On 28 May 2011 officers checked on the first applicant on three occasions, and on two occasions on 30 May. On 31 May they visited the flat on three occasions, but on one of them were not allowed in. 21.  On 1 and 2 June 2011 the second applicant did not allow the police into the flat. On 3 June they visited the flat five times; on one of the visits nobody answered the doorbell. 22.  Between 4 and 20 June 2011 officers visited the applicants\u2019 flat usually three or four times a day. One of the visits on 16 June was provoked by the fact that the applicant, having received authorisation to visit a physiotherapist, had not shown up for his appointment. 23.  During some of the visits the fourth applicant, then eight years old, was present as well. Usually she was taken by her mother to another room. The third applicant, then twenty-three years old, was working full time during this period. 24.  On 21 June 2011 the first applicant was released from house arrest, by a decision of the Sofia Court of Appeal, which noted in particular his grave state of health and the fact that much of the evidence in the investigation against him had already been collected.", "references": ["2", "9", "6", "8", "0", "3", "7", "4", "5", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Los Angeles. 5.  The applicant was born in Armenia and grew up in a house in Yerevan which had been built by his grandfather in the 1940s. After the grandfather\u2019s death the applicant\u2019s uncle lived with his family on the first floor of the house, while the applicant\u2019s family lived on the second floor. The entrance to the house is common to the occupants of the first and second floors, and there is a common plot of land adjacent to it. 6.  In the 1970s the applicant\u2019s uncle sold the first floor of the house to M.G. 7.  The applicant later moved to the United States with his father, who died there in 1993, leaving all his property to the applicant. 8.  In 1997 the applicant submitted his father\u2019s will to a notary in Armenia. The notary then issued a certificate of inheritance and the State Real Estate Registry registered his title in respect of the second floor of the house. 9.  In 2003 M.G. sold the first floor of the house to E.T., who registered her title in respect of the first floor. She also obtained the right of common ownership in respect of the adjacent land. 10.  It appears that E.T. and her family carried out construction works in the house and on the plot of land adjacent to it, modifying both the house and the surrounding area. They have built and are running a restaurant there. 11.  On an unspecified date the applicant lodged a civil claim against E.T., M.G. and the State Real Estate Registry, seeking to annul E.T.\u2019s title in respect of the first floor and the adjacent land, and to oblige her to demolish the buildings constructed without the permission of the authorities and to restore the stone wall that she had destroyed. E.T. in her turn lodged a counterclaim against the applicant, seeking to annul the will and the subsequent registration of his title as regards the plot of land adjacent to the house. 12.  By a judgment of 1 July 2003 the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan (\u0535\u0580\u0587\u0561\u0576 \u0584\u0561\u0572\u0561\u0584\u056b \u053f\u0565\u0576\u057f\u0580\u0578\u0576 \u0587 \u0546\u0578\u0580\u0584-\u0544\u0561\u0580\u0561\u0577 \u0570\u0561\u0574\u0561\u0575\u0576\u0584\u0576\u0565\u0580\u056b \u0561\u057c\u0561\u057b\u056b\u0576 \u0561\u057f\u0575\u0561\u0576\u056b \u0564\u0561\u057f\u0561\u0580\u0561\u0576 \u2013 \u201cthe District Court\u201d) partially allowed the applicant\u2019s claim and dismissed E.T.\u2019s counterclaim. 13.  On 22 August 2003 the Civil Court of Appeal (\u0540\u0540 \u0584\u0561\u0572\u0561\u0584\u0561\u0581\u056b\u0561\u056f\u0561\u0576 \u0563\u0578\u0580\u056e\u0565\u0580\u0578\u057e \u057e\u0565\u0580\u0561\u0584\u0576\u0576\u056b\u0579 \u0564\u0561\u057f\u0561\u0580\u0561\u0576) re-examined the case on the merits. It granted the applicant\u2019s claims in their entirety and rejected E.T.\u2019s counterclaim. 14.  E.T. subsequently lodged an appeal on points of law against the judgment of the Civil Court of Appeal. 15.  On 24 October 2003 the Civil and Economic Chamber of the Court of Cassation (\u0540\u0540 \u057e\u0573\u057c\u0561\u0562\u0565\u056f \u0564\u0561\u057f\u0561\u0580\u0561\u0576\u056b \u0584\u0561\u0572\u0561\u0584\u0561\u0581\u056b\u0561\u056f\u0561\u0576 \u0587 \u057f\u0576\u057f\u0565\u057d\u0561\u056f\u0561\u0576 \u0563\u0578\u0580\u056e\u0565\u0580\u056b \u057a\u0561\u056c\u0561\u057f) dismissed E.T.\u2019s appeal on points of law and upheld the judgment of the Court of Appeal. The judgment of 22 August 2003 thereby became final and binding and a writ of execution was issued in this respect. 16.  On 4 December 2003 enforcement proceedings were instituted by the Department for the Enforcement of Judicial Acts (\u0534\u0561\u057f\u0561\u056f\u0561\u0576 \u0561\u056f\u057f\u0565\u0580\u056b \u0570\u0561\u0580\u056f\u0561\u0564\u056b\u0580 \u056f\u0561\u057f\u0561\u0580\u0574\u0561\u0576 \u056e\u0561\u057c\u0561\u0575\u0578\u0582\u0569\u0575\u0578\u0582\u0576 \u2013 \u201cthe DEJA\u201d). 17.  Thereafter the head of the Kentron division of the State Real Estate Registry (\u0531\u0576\u0577\u0561\u0580\u056a \u0563\u0578\u0582\u0575\u0584\u056b \u056f\u0561\u0564\u0561\u057d\u057f\u0580\u056b \u057a\u0565\u057f\u0561\u056f\u0561\u0576 \u056f\u0578\u0574\u056b\u057f\u0565\u056b \u053f\u0565\u0576\u057f\u0580\u0578\u0576 \u057f\u0561\u0580\u0561\u056e\u0584\u0561\u0575\u056b\u0576 \u057d\u057f\u0578\u0580\u0561\u0562\u0561\u056a\u0561\u0576\u0578\u0582\u0574) requested the Civil Court of Appeal to clarify the judgment of 22 August 2003. 18.  On 22 October 2004 the Civil Court of Appeal issued a clarification of the above-mentioned judgment. It stated, in particular, that the title to the plot of land adjacent to the house was to be registered in the applicant\u2019s name. This decision became final and was also submitted for enforcement. 19.  On 11 April 2006 the applicant lodged a civil claim against the Kentron division of the State Real Estate Registry, the DEJA and E.T., seeking to oblige the Kentron division of the Real Estate Registry to comply with the requirements of the judgment of the Court of Appeal of 22 August 2003 and the decision of 22 October 2004 concerning its clarification, to evict E.T. and other persons who were unlawfully occupying his property, and to terminate the activities of the restaurant situated therein. 20.  By the judgment of 28 August 2006 the District Court allowed the applicant\u2019s claim in its entirety. It stated, in particular, that the applicant\u2019s title was to be registered in respect of the plot of land adjacent to the house and the constructions situated therein, that E.T. and the other persons occupying the applicant\u2019s property were to be evicted, and that these persons should terminate the activities of the restaurant. 21.  After an appeal lodged by E.T. on 22 December 2006 the Civil Court of Appeal re-examined the case and allowed the applicant\u2019s claim. In doing so, it stated that the judgment of 22 August 2003 and the decision of 22 October 2004 had not yet been enforced since the applicant\u2019s title had not been registered and the constructions had not been demolished. The Court of Appeal went on to state that the non-enforcement of the above-mentioned judicial acts was in violation of Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in that the applicant\u2019s right to peaceful enjoyment of his possessions was being violated by the illegal occupation of his property by E.T. without the applicant\u2019s permission. This judgment became final and binding on the day of its delivery and on 26 January 2007 enforcement proceedings were instituted in its respect. 22.  Since 2003 a number of decisions have been made by the bailiffs in respect of obliging E.T. to comply with the requirements of the judgment in the applicant\u2019s favour within certain time-limits. However, each time E.T. has failed to comply with these decisions, for which failure the bailiffs have each time imposed a fine. It appears that she has also failed to pay the fines. 23.  In 2005 enforcement activities were postponed on the grounds that various measures applied in respect of E.T. had been ineffective in view of the fact that the DEJA needed to suspend the proceedings in order to conclude a contract with a construction company, given the absence of technical equipment necessary for conducting the compulsory construction works. It appears that at some point the proceedings were resumed. 24.  By a letter of 25 December 2008 the Minister of Justice informed the applicant\u2019s lawyer that the Kentron division of the State Real Estate Registry had justified the non-registration of the applicant\u2019s title in respect of his property by pointing to the fact that the constructions situated therein had not been demolished because the DEJA did not have the appropriate technical equipment and workforce at its disposal. 25.  It appears that until 2010 other measures were initiated by the DEJA, such as obliging the Kentron division of the State Real Estate Registry to perform the registration of the applicant\u2019s title, in accordance with the judgments in his favour, and setting new time-limits for E.T. to comply with her obligations. However, it appears that these measures did not lead to the full enforcement of the judicial acts in question. 26.  On an unspecified date the applicant applied to the General Prosecutor\u2019s Office (\u0540\u0540 \u0563\u056c\u056d\u0561\u057e\u0578\u0580 \u0564\u0561\u057f\u0561\u056d\u0561\u0566\u0578\u0582\u0569\u0575\u0578\u0582\u0576), seeking to have criminal proceedings instituted against those responsible for not enforcing the judicial acts in question. His request was refused. 27.  Following a complaint lodged by the applicant, on 3 July 2007 the District Court annulled the decision of the General Prosecutor\u2019s Office to refuse to institute criminal proceedings, on the grounds that the investigator had not taken proper action to verify whether the bailiffs had carried out their duties properly with a view to securing the enforcement of the above-mentioned judicial acts in favour of the applicant. As a result, criminal proceedings were instituted against the bailiffs and officials of the Kentron division of the State Real Estate Registry. 28.  On 26 December 2007 the investigator terminated the proceedings on the grounds that the judicial acts in question had not \u2013 for objectively justifiable reasons \u2013 been enforced. 29.  On 25 February 2008 the District Court annulled the investigator\u2019s decision of 26 December 2007, stating, inter alia, that the investigator had failed to determine why for more than four years E.T. and other persons had not been evicted, the constructions on the applicant\u2019s property had not been demolished, and the activities of the restaurant had not been terminated \u2013 even after E.T. had been fined for not complying with the requirements of the judicial acts in question. 30.  The prosecutor appealed against the above-mentioned decision of the District Court. 31.  On 28 April 2008 the Criminal Court of Appeal (\u0540\u0540 \u057e\u0565\u0580\u0561\u0584\u0576\u0576\u056b\u0579 \u0584\u0580\u0565\u0561\u056f\u0561\u0576 \u0564\u0561\u057f\u0561\u0580\u0561\u0576) upheld the decision of 25 February 2008. As a result, the criminal proceedings were resumed on 14 May 2008. 32.  Thereafter, the criminal proceedings were again terminated three times, namely on 14 June 2008, 17 July 2009 and 23 April 2010. The first two termination decisions were successfully challenged by the applicant at two levels of jurisdiction, following which the criminal proceedings were re-opened on the orders of those courts. As for the final decision by which the proceedings were once again terminated, the applicant lodged a complaint with the General Prosecutor\u2019s Office, but his complaint was rejected for failure to comply with the time-limits for lodging an application for supervisory review. According to the applicant, he did not pursue this last complaint any further. 33.  According to the latest information received from the applicant, the enforcement proceedings were closed on 5 September 2016 because the enforcement of the judgments was impossible. The judgments of the Civil Court of Appeal of 22 August 2003 and 22 December 2006, as well as the decision of 22 October 2004, therefore remain unenforced today.", "references": ["7", "2", "1", "4", "0", "6", "8", "5", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant company is the publisher of an Irish daily newspaper, the Herald. At the time of the events giving rise to this case, the title of the newspaper was the Evening Herald. 7.  Between 30 November and 17 December 2004, the Evening Herald, published a series of articles about the awarding of Government contracts to a public relations consultant, Ms L. The articles pointed out that she was a supporter of, and well acquainted with, a prominent political figure, Mr C., both of them coming from the same city. She had been hired as a consultant by the Office of Public Works beginning in November 2001, when Mr C. was the minister with responsibility for this department of Government. When he was appointed in mid-2002 to the more senior political post of Minister for the Environment, Heritage and Local Government, Ms L. was then hired as a consultant by that Government Department, and was still working for it at the time the articles appeared. 8.  The Evening Herald called into question the manner in which the tendering procedure had been conducted, the qualifications of Ms L. for the work involved, the high level of remuneration she received, as well as the amount of work that was in fact done by Ms L. It referred to eight trips abroad on which Ms L. had been part of the ministerial entourage, in particular a trip to New York to attend a United Nations conference. The newspaper stated several times that the relevant United Nations department could find no trace of Mr C. having taken part in the conference, even though his Department maintained that he had attended it. A later article stated that the United Nations did in fact have a record of the Minister\u2019s attendance. 9.  The story was developed in eleven articles published over a period of two weeks in nine editions of the newspaper. It became headline news and formed the subject-matter of an editorial decrying apparent favouritism in the award of Government contracts and calling for an inquiry. 10.  The articles referred to rumours of an intimate relationship between Mr C., who was at that time separated from his wife, and Ms L., who was married with two teenage children. There were also references to Ms L.\u2019s attractive appearance and her lifestyle. Various photographs were included, including one that showed the two standing side by side in evening wear as if a couple. This image was obtained by altering the original photo, which contained four people. One of the front page articles was accompanied by a large photomontage containing the same image of Ms L. in evening wear, but modified to suggest that the skirt had a slit that reached almost to her hip. The montage showed her standing very close to the Minister, whose image had been taken from another photo, with the New York skyline behind them. The headline read \u201cThe Minister, [Ms L.] and the Mystery Meeting\u201d. 11.  The Supreme Court found that the articles complained of amounted to a serious and sustained attack on Ms. L.\u2019s business and personal integrity and were part of a sustained campaign building up over a period of just two weeks. She had been accused of engaging in an adulterous relationship for the sake of obtaining lucrative contracts and at the end of that period, she had gone from a person who would not have been known to the general public at all to someone who was notorious (see further paragraphs 23\u201133 below). 12.  The issue of the contracts awarded to Ms L. was taken up by other parts of the Irish media, and led to questions in the Irish parliament (D\u00e1il \u00c9ireann). A report issued in 2005 at the request of the then Prime Minister (Taoiseach) found that while there had been certain shortcomings in the way that the contracts had been awarded and in the monitoring and recording of the work done, there had not been any specific infringement of the relevant norms, guidelines or practices. 13.  Ms L. sued the applicant company for defamation. The case was heard before a jury in the High Court over seven days in June 2009. The two issues put to the jury were whether the articles, as a whole, including the accompanying photographs, meant that Ms L. had an extra-marital affair with Mr C., and whether the last article in the series meant that Ms L. had travelled to New York at Government expense in the company of Mr C. for a United Nations conference, but that she had not in fact attended it. 14.  In accordance with Irish law (see paragraphs 38-42 below for further details), the jury was directed that if it found in favour of Ms L. on either issue, or both, it should assess damages. 15.  In his charge to the jury, the trial judge explained that in an action for defamation, damages serve three functions: to afford consolation for the distress caused by the defamatory statement; to repair the harm to reputation, including business reputation; and to vindicate the person\u2019s reputation. He stated that the jurors could take account of Ms L.\u2019s standing in society and in the business community, the nature of the libel (the insinuations that she had betrayed husband and family and that she had misused public funds), the mode and extent of publication (carried repeatedly in a widely-read daily newspaper), the absence of an apology, and the fact that the applicant company pleaded the defences of justification and fair comment throughout the trial. If the jury were to make an award, it must be appropriate and fair to both parties. The rules governing the trial judge\u2019s directions to the jury are known as the Barrett rules, laid down by the Supreme Court in 1986 (see paragraph 39 below). 16.  The trial judge did not give any specific guideline to the jury regarding the appropriate level of compensation, stressed the limited nature of the guidelines he could provide and indicated, in broad terms, that, when assessing damages the jury must bear in mind reality, the current times, the cost of living and the value of money. He added a cautionary note:\n\u201cOn one famous occasion I told a jury that the plaintiff, if he won, hadn\u2019t won the [national lottery] and they immediately awarded a million euro. Now, that wasn\u2019t what I meant when I was saying that to them.\u201d\nHe explained that the law did not permit him to suggest a figure or a range of figures to the jury:\n\u201cThe amount of damages, ladies and gentlemen, is a matter for you, should you choose to award them. I can\u2019t suggest a figure to you, I am not permitted to suggest a figure to you. I can\u2019t give you a range of figures, I am not permitted to give you a range of figures. I can give you what help I can, and I will, in coming to an appropriate figure for damages. But, ultimately, the figure is yours.\u201d 17.  He warned the jurors not to be \u201covercome by feelings of generosity and give [Ms L.] a ridiculously large amount of money\u201d. Any award must be of an appropriate amount. He continued his charge to the jury as follows:\n\u201c... [T]hat appropriate figure must also take into consideration the Defendant. You must also be fair to the Defendant too ...[Y]ou must consider the Defendant as well because your decision must be a fair decision and must be fair to both parties. ... You must come to a figure that is an appropriate figure and that is, I fully realise, ... not an easy thing to do. I would like to be able to tell you what other figures have been given in the recent past in similar cases, but I can\u2019t do that and I mustn\u2019t do that. If any of you think you remember newspaper headlines over the past twelve months or so of damages awarded in cases, every case is different. Put those out of your mind completely ... It is this case and what is appropriate in this case that is important and you have to reach that decision yourself and without as much help as I would like to be able to give you, but I am not permitted to give you.\u201d 18.  After the jury had retired, the plaintiff\u2019s counsel requested the trial judge to retract the reference to the lottery, as he feared it would be understood by the jury as a warning to keep any award significantly lower than one million euros. He contended that no figure should have been suggested. Counsel for the applicant company disagreed, taking the view that the jury would have clearly understood the trial judge\u2019s remark was not to make any suggestion about the appropriate level of damages in the instant case. The trial judge declined to revisit this aspect of his charge to the jury as it could cause confusion in jurors\u2019 minds, who might think that in withdrawing the reference the trial judge might have been suggesting less or more than that figure. He observed to counsel:\n\u201cI do find myself in difficulties because of the Supreme Court\u2019s ruling [in the De Rossa case] in that I can\u2019t even indicate to a jury upper and lower in the most general terms, which I would like to be able to do because I think it would save a lot of trouble and I can\u2019t do it because of the decision of the Supreme Court.\u201d\nHe concluded the exchange with counsel on this matter as follows:\n\u201cI did think that I had traversed the question of damages and, each successive case I do, I get more long-winded about it because I started with very short charges and I used to be very surprised, one way or another, at the amounts juries brought in.\u201d 19.  On the first issue the jury found that the newspaper had alleged an extra-marital affair between the plaintiff and Mr C. On the second issue, it found that the meaning of the article was not defamatory. 20.  The jury assessed damages at EUR 1,872,000 and the trial judge gave judgment in this amount. He granted a stay on payment pending appeal, with the proviso that the applicant company make an interim payment of EUR 750,000 to Ms L., with an additional EUR 100,000 in legal costs. These payments were made, the Supreme Court having refused on 27 July 2009 to set aside the High Court\u2019s order on interim payment. 21.  The applicant company accepted the jury\u2019s decision that it had defamed Ms L. The Evening Herald published an apology to her in its edition of 19 January 2010. It appealed the amount of damages, arguing that no reasonable jury could have made such an award, that it was disproportionate to the damage caused and amounted to an unlawful interference with the applicant company\u2019s rights under the Constitution and the Convention. In its subsequent submissions to this Court on just satisfaction, it considered that a much lower sum \u2013 EUR 175,000 \u2013 would have been sufficient compensation in the circumstances. 22.  In the event that the Supreme Court set aside the award of damages on appeal, Ms L. sought to have the matter remitted to the High Court for a fresh assessment by a new jury. In its notice of appeal, the applicant company also sought an order directing a retrial on the issue of damages. It appears from the case file that, in its subsequent submissions before the Supreme Court, in the event that the latter set aside the High Court award, it argued that the Supreme Court should itself decide the amount of compensation. 23.  The Supreme Court gave its ruling on 19 December 2014. All three judges found that the award to Ms L. was excessive and must be set aside. The majority decided to substitute its own assessment of damages (EUR 1.25 million), while the other judge took the view that the case should be re-tried before a different jury. As this would not happen, he indicated that he would have assessed damages at EUR 1 million. 24.  The judgment of the majority was given by Dunne J., with whom Murray J. concurred. She noted that the case did not come within the current law on defamation (the Defamation Act 2009, see paragraphs 51-53 below), but had to be decided in accordance with the previous law. Under that regime, the trial judge was limited in the directions that could be given to a jury regarding the appropriate level of damages. It had not been suggested that the trial judge had committed any error in his charge to the jury on the question of damages. Rather, the complaint was that the award was so disproportionately high that it should be set aside. She referred to the relevant Supreme Court case-law, which held that it was the duty of the trial judge to direct the jury that damages must be confined to an amount that will fairly and reasonably compensate the plaintiff for injured feelings and loss of standing. Furthermore, as a fundamental principle of the law of compensatory damages, the award must be reasonable and fair and bear a due correspondence with the injury suffered; a disproportionately high award would be set aside. She rejected the applicant\u2019s argument that larger libel awards should be subjected to more searching scrutiny on appeal than had been customary in the past. Nor did she accept that the relevant legal test should be whether a reasonable jury would have thought such an award necessary to compensate the plaintiff and to re-establish her reputation. She stated:\n\u201cIf such were the test to be applied, it would remove from the jury award the \u201cvery unusual and emphatic sanctity\u201d referred to [in previous case-law].\nConsequently, while awards made by jury must, on appeal, be subject to scrutiny by the appellate court, that court is only entitled to set aside an award if it is satisfied that in all the circumstances, the award is so disproportionate to the injury suffered and wrong done that no reasonable jury would have made such an award.\u201d 25.  She further recalled the need for the law to reflect a due balancing of the constitutional right to freedom of expression against the constitutional protection of every citizen\u2019s good name, which, as stated in case-law, brought the concept of proportionality into constitutional jurisprudence. Referring to this Court\u2019s judgment in Independent News and Media and Independent Newspapers Ireland Limited v. Ireland (no. 55120/00, ECHR 2005\u2011V (extracts)), she observed that it did not alter or reconfigure Irish law in respect of awards of damages in defamation. She stated:\n\u201c[T]he position in Irish law is that an appellate court will be slow to interfere with the verdict of a jury on the assessment of damages but nevertheless awards by juries are subject to scrutiny and if an award is so disproportionate in the circumstances of the case having regard to the respective rights of freedom of expression on the one hand and on the other hand the requirement under the Constitution to protect the good name of every citizen that no reasonable jury would have made such an award then the award will be set aside on appeal.\u201d 26.  She reviewed the terms used by the trial judge in his charge to the jury. He had told them they could consider the plaintiff\u2019s position in the business community. They could also consider the nature of the libel, which contained the suggestion that she was immoral, had been unfaithful to her husband and had betrayed her family. The mode and extent of publication were relevant, as were the absence of an apology and the company\u2019s decision to stand over the articles to the end. 27.  Dunne J. then considered the applicant company\u2019s argument that the amount of damages awarded against it should be compared to awards that had been set aside as excessive in previous defamation cases. She agreed that the comparison might provide some assistance in assessing the gravity of the libel. But she also underlined the need for caution, given the wide variety of factual circumstances of such cases and also the passage of time since previous appellate decisions. As for comparison with personal injury awards, she recalled the different function of damages in the two types of case. In defamation, the function of damages was both to compensate the injury to reputation and to vindicate the person\u2019s good name, a consideration which was not relevant in personal injuries cases. 28.  The judge then set out the relevant factors for considering the proportionality of the damages awarded to Ms L. The first was the gravity of the libel. The more closely the libel touched the plaintiff\u2019s personal integrity, professional reputation, honour, courage, loyalty and the core attributes of their personality \u2013 as was the case here \u2013 the more serious it was likely to be. She described the libel as a serious and sustained attack on the business and personal integrity of Ms L. It could be fairly compared with a previous case involving the defamatory allegation against a prominent businessman of bribing a Government minister in order to obtain a licence to operate a radio station (the O\u2019Brien case, summarised in Independent News and Media judgment at \u00a7\u00a7 54-63). It could not, however, be regarded as being in the category of the gravest and most serious libels to come before the courts, as was the libel in the De Rossa case (the case that led to the Independent News and Media case, it having been alleged that Mr De Rossa personally supported anti-Semitism and violent communist oppression). But the libel of Ms L. was nonetheless a very serious one. The allegation of adultery must have been a course of real hurt and distress to her. 29.  The next factor was the extent of publication. Ms L. had cited eleven articles concerning her. There had been some more articles focussing on the role of the Minister. It was a sustained campaign over a number of days. The newspaper had a daily circulation throughout the State of 90,000 copies; its readership would be higher still. Ms L. had gone from being unknown to the public to being notorious. The publication had therefore been particularly widespread and extensive. 30.  The third factor was the conduct of the defendant. It had run a defence of justification that the jury had rejected. It had not offered any apology to Ms L. before the verdict, which was a point the jury could have taken into account. The articles had been accompanied by photographs that had been cropped and manipulated to lend force to the implication that Ms L. got her contracts by virtue of the fact that she was having an affair with the Minister. That too could have been taken into consideration by the jury. 31.  The fourth factor was the impact of the defamation on Ms L. The articles had attacked her moral character and her professional reputation. They had implied that she was unfaithful to her husband and had played a part in the break-up of Mr C.\u2019s marriage. They had conveyed the impression that she was prepared to engage in an adulterous relationship in order to advance her professional standing and career. Her ability to do the work she was hired for had been called into question. A new business initiative she was involved in ended when the partner had withdrawn following the publication of the articles, and her consultancy work for the Government had come to an end. Ms L. had given evidence of her own personal hurt and distress at the articles, and described the impact on her husband and sons, one of whom had had to change school in his final year while he was preparing to sit important public examinations. Ms L. had received personal abuse in her hometown. Overall, the articles had had a profound effect on her in every aspect of her family and professional life, which was a consideration that was also relevant to the jury\u2019s award. 32.  She then assessed the sum awarded in damages:\n\u201cThe award of damages in this case in the sum of \u20ac1,872,000 is a very large award by any standard. ... Overall, I am satisfied that the defamation in this case was a very serious defamation. Undoubtedly, if one was to place the defamation in this case on a scale of seriousness, it would certainly be towards the higher end of the scale. A somewhat unusual feature of this case was the sustained campaign in the Evening Herald in respect of Ms. L. The consequences of it affected her in her day to day life, personally and in her business life. Her newly launched business was destroyed before it could become established. I have no doubt that from her point of view it was a very serious matter. Nevertheless, I do not think it could be classed as one of the most serious libels to come before the Courts ... [T]he award made to Ms. L in this case was one of the highest ever awards made in a case of this kind in this country. Even accepting that this case is one that comes towards the higher end of the scale, I am satisfied that the award made by the jury in this case was excessive and must be set aside.\u201d 33.  She continued:\n\u201cI am conscious of the firm instructions of Ms. L to her legal representatives that in the event that this Court came to the conclusion that the amount of the award was excessive that the Court should in those circumstances remit the matter to the High Court for assessment by a jury again. Whilst I understand those to be her instructions I am satisfied that in the context of this case it would be desirable for all parties to bring an end to the litigation between the parties and in those circumstances it seems to me that the approach to be taken by the Court should be to set aside the verdict of the jury on damages and to substitute a sum in the figure of \u20ac1,250,000 for damages.\u201d 34.  The other, partly-dissenting judgment was given by McKechnie J. He stated that the issue was whether the award was reasonable and fair and bore a due correspondence with the injury suffered, which was essentially a matter of proportionality. He rejected the suggestion that the jury should be informed of awards made in personal injury actions. The nature and purpose of the two types of damages were inherently different. As for comparison with previous defamation awards, he opposed this for practical reasons. Even with the greatest of care, he did not see how cross referencing to a previous award could aid in determining the compensation to be paid to a particular plaintiff in respect of a particular publication for a particular injury. At most, he could accept that some benefit could be obtained if the comparison was applied within the same or similar class of defamatory remarks. 35.  He observed that since the jury represented the community, and defamation was rooted in community values, jury awards in defamation cases enjoyed an eminence and distinction significantly higher than other types of award, including jury awards in non-defamation cases. This point was supported by numerous dicta of the Supreme Court. He said:\n\u201c... Appeal judges, when conducting such a review, are not the jury and cannot assume the jury\u2019s role. Intervention will be justified only where the award obviously falls outside permitted parameters which, in determining, the court must have due regard, inter alia, to the uniqueness of the jury\u2019s representative function in this particular judicial process. ... Therefore, an award will not be disturbed easily or second guessed purely to fine tune it.\u201d 36.  He analysed the libel in detail and also concluded that the award was not proportionate, failing to reflect the necessary objective relationship between wrongdoing and harm. Although he considered that the issue of damages should be submitted for consideration by a fresh jury, in the light of the majority\u2019s decision to set aside the jury verdict and substitute its own award, he offered his own view on the appropriate level of damages, placing it at one million euros. 37.  The applicant company duly paid an additional EUR 500,000 in compensation to Ms L. On 26 February 2015, the Supreme Court ordered that the applicant company should bear the legal costs incurred by Ms L. in the appellate proceedings. According to the applicant company, this came to EUR 240,448.16.", "references": ["5", "7", "2", "0", "9", "8", "3", "4", "1", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1963 and is detained in Riga. 6.  The applicant was charged with several counts of organising, inciting and aiding various crimes against persons and property. Two of his eleven co-accused, A.D. and V.P., had given evidence against him when questioned by the police between January and May 2001; when giving that evidence they stated that the applicant had incited them to engage in certain criminal activities. They also gave evidence as regards the alleged involvement of their co-accused, P.B., in some of those criminal activities. According to the records of the police questioning, on all but one occasion A.D. and V.P. were questioned by L.Z., a police officer, and they did not ask for a lawyer. Subsequently, when questioned by a prosecutor on 17 October 2001, A.D. stated that police officers had coerced him into incriminating his co-accused, including the applicant; V.P. told the prosecutor that he would testify in court. 7.  The trial commenced before the Kurzeme Regional Court (Kurzemes apgabaltiesa) on 16 April 2003 and lasted until 16 July 2003. During that period at least ten court hearings were held in the presence of the applicant and his defence council.\nAt the trial, A.D. and V.P. testified that they had never before met the applicant, and that P.B., who had died in the meantime, had been the instigator of some of the crimes. The court read out the pre-trial statements of A.D. and V.P. When invited to explain the discrepancies between those initial pre-trial statements and their subsequent evidence, they claimed that they had been forced to sign the initial pre-trial statements. A.D. submitted that the statements had been illegible and that he had not been given the opportunity to engage a lawyer. V.P. stated that police officer L.Z. had been writing a record of his questioning while another police officer had questioned him. On 3 May 2003 V.P. lodged with the first-instance court a written request for the court to take into account his submission that the police had coerced him into incriminating the applicant. 8.  On 5 May 2003 L.Z. appeared before the first-instance court. She testified that she had taken statements from the accused. She stated that it was possible that another police officer, R.S., had participated in their questioning. On the same day, R.S. appeared before the first-instance court. He testified that while he had questioned A.D. and V.P., L.Z. had been keeping a record of their respective questioning. L.Z. and R.S. denied the allegations of physical or psychological coercion. The applicant\u2019s lawyer, A.V., was given an opportunity to put questions to them. 9.  On 7 May 2003 A.D. submitted a written request to the first-instance court for it to disregard his pre-trial statements as he had been ill-treated and tortured during the pre-trial investigation in order to force him to incriminate his co-accused, including the applicant. Specifically, he had been constantly beaten and ridiculed: electric currents had been applied to his body through his handcuffs, and narcotic substances had been forcibly injected into his veins. Nobody had offered to assign him a lawyer. He had not complained about these incidents at the time because he had been afraid of retribution. However, after the completion of the pre-trial investigation he had complained to the prosecutor, who had ignored his complaint. 10.  In his closing statement, the prosecutor denied the allegations of A.D. and V. P., emphasising that they had not lodged any complaints prior to the first-instance proceedings. During their initial questioning A.D. and V.P. had given evidence in respect of facts which at that stage had not been known to the police. The credibility of their allegations of coercion was further diminished by the fact that following the death of P.B. they had stated that he had been the instigator of some of the criminal activities in question. 11.  On 14 July 2003 the Kurzeme Regional Court delivered judgment. The court cited the initial pre-trial statements of A.D. and V.P. incriminating the applicant. It did not regard as credible their submissions that police officers had pressured them into giving those statements. The police officers had also questioned another co-accused, I.T., who, unlike A.D. and V.P., had not incriminated the applicant. Furthermore, had the police officers pressurised them into giving their statements, they would have contained more details as regards the applicant\u2019s involvement. A.D. and V.P had signed the statements. The court did not find that their right to legal assistance had been restricted. No complaints as regards the alleged ill-treatment had been submitted or noted down in procedural documents by A.D. or V.P., or their lawyers. A.D. and V.P. had made the allegations of coercion in an attempt to explain why they had subsequently given evidence in favour of their other co-accused, including the applicant, and against their late co-accused, P.B. 12.  The Kurzeme Regional Court found the applicant guilty and sentenced him to six years\u2019 imprisonment. It also ordered his detention. As the applicant was not present at the delivery of judgment, he could not be arrested in the courtroom. He was subsequently declared wanted by the police and arrested more than six years later \u2013 on 23 November 2009. 13.  On 23 July 2003 the applicant\u2019s lawyer, A.V., lodged an appeal against the first-instance judgment. He argued that the police officers had pressurised A.D. and V.P. into incriminating the applicant. 14.  On 17 March 2004 the appeal hearing was held before the Criminal Cases Chamber of the Supreme Court (Augst\u0101k\u0101s tiesas Krimin\u0101llietu tiesu pal\u0101ta). The applicant did not attend the hearing. A.V. submitted that he did not know his whereabouts. The court adjourned the hearing. At the following hearing, held on 25 October 2004, the applicant was represented by a different lawyer, V.K., who had been retained by the applicant\u2019s wife. 15.  On 25 October 2004 the Criminal Cases Chamber of the Supreme Court, referring to Article 442(7) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Krimin\u0101lprocesa kodekss), declined to examine the appeal lodged by A.V. It noted that the applicant, even though he had been summoned, had failed to appear at the two appeal hearings without a valid reason. Similarly, he had failed to attend the closing hearing before the first-instance court. He had been declared wanted and was at large. Given that the applicant had retained V.K. to represent him, he had been aware of the proceedings and had intentionally failed to attend, thereby showing disrespect towards the court. In the applicant\u2019s absence the court was unable to ascertain whether he wished to maintain the appeal lodged by his lawyer. Lastly, proceedings in the case \u2013 which required the examination of voluminous material \u2013 could not be delayed simply because of the applicant\u2019s unjustified absence. 16.  On 5 November 2004 V.K. appealed against the aforementioned decision to the Criminal Cases Division of the Senate of the Supreme Court (Augst\u0101k\u0101s tiesas Sen\u0101ta Krimin\u0101llietu departaments). He argued that he had not been retained by the applicant but by his wife, on the applicant\u2019s instructions (uzdevum\u0101). The applicant had not received any summons and his family had no information about his whereabouts or the reasons for his absence. V.K. relied on Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention and complained of an infringement of the applicant\u2019s defence rights. 17.  On 30 September 2005 the Senate of the Supreme Court by a final decision refused to examine the appeal lodged by A.V. It noted that the applicant had repeatedly failed to attend the appeal hearings and that \u201cin the criminal case at hand only the accused could maintain the appeals lodged by their lawyers\u201d. This decision was sent to the applicant\u2019s address and to V.K. on 7 October 2005. 18.  On 27 October 2004 the Criminal Cases Chamber of the Supreme Court delivered judgment with respect to the appeals lodged by the applicant\u2019s co-accused. It found that the first-instance court had correctly assessed the allegations of A.D. and V.P. as regards coercion. It also found that they had made those allegations in an attempt to explain why they had subsequently given evidence in favour of their co-accused, including the applicant. 19.  On 30 September 2005 the aforementioned judgment was upheld by the Senate of the Supreme Court.", "references": ["8", "0", "1", "6", "2", "9", "5", "7", "4", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in Riga. 6.  On 5 November 2004 criminal proceedings were instituted in connection with large-scale smuggling of oil products and on 27 September 2005 the applicant was declared a suspect. On the latter date he appointed O.S. as his defence counsel. 7.  On 8 June 2006 charges were brought against the applicant and on 22 March 2007 he was issued with a full copy of his criminal case file. It consisted of more than 100 volumes and included \u2013 in volumes nos. 33 (64 pages) and 58 (194 pages) \u2013 transcripts of the applicant\u2019s telephone conversations with several individuals and also with O.S. (see paragraph 10 below). 8.  On 27 March 2007 the case material was sent for adjudication to the first\u2011instance court. On 9 June 2008 the first-instance court convicted the applicant of large-scale smuggling of oil products, aggravated forgery and money laundering in an organised group and sentenced him to imprisonment of five years and one month. The parties disagree as to whether or not the transcripts of the applicant\u2019s telephone conversations with O.S. were used as evidence against him. 9.  On 23 September 2013 the appellate court quashed the first-instance court\u2019s ruling and acquitted the applicant on all counts. In a final decision of 23 April 2014 the Supreme Court refused to institute proceedings on points of law. 10.  Over a period of time, the Constitution Protection Bureau (Satversmes aizsardz\u012bbas birojs), which is one of the Latvian intelligence services, intercepted the applicant\u2019s telephone conversations with several individuals, including O.S. Telephone conversations with the latter were recorded on 8 April, 22 and 27 May, 7 October 2005. Four pages of transcripts of those recordings were subsequently included in the evidence in the criminal case material against the applicant (see paragraph 7 above). 11.  The parties disagree as to when the applicant learned about those recordings. They also disagree as to whether O.S. was the applicant\u2019s lawyer at the time of those recordings. According to the applicant, O.S. was his lawyer with effect from 8 February 2005. According to the Government, O.S. was the applicant\u2019s acquaintance; he had become his lawyer only with effect from 27 September 2005, when the applicant appointed him as his defence counsel. 12.  According to a document (uzzi\u0146a) prepared by the Supreme Court on 27 June 2012 and addressed to the Government, on 26 November 2004 an operational measure \u2013 the interception of the applicant\u2019s telephone conversations \u2013 had been authorised until 26 January 2005. The document was based on \u201cthe Supreme Court\u2019s register of special proceedings (lietved\u012bba) relating to classified State secrets for the year 2004, Volume 11, entry no 2\u20114249s of 26 November 2004\u201d. That document also contained further similar entries relating to subsequent authorisations on 25 January, 31 March, 1 June, 22 July, 20 September and 16 November 2005. 13.  On 27 June 2006 a prosecutor examined the applicant\u2019s inquiry concerning the recording of his telephone conversations, referring to section 35(1) of the Law on Operational Activities (Operat\u012bv\u0101s darb\u012bbas likums). She informed him that a Supreme Court judge had authorised the measure in accordance with section 7(3) and 7(4) and section 17 of the Law on Operational Activities. She explained the legal regulation pertaining to the use of such recordings in criminal proceedings. She also referred to Article 8 of the Convention and the permissible limitations contained therein. 14.  On 13 October 2006 the same prosecutor examined a further complaint from the applicant concerning the lawfulness of the recordings. She stated that the interception had been carried out by the Constitutional Protection Bureau from December 2004 to January 2006. It had been done in accordance with domestic law on suspicion of large-scale tax evasion. Transcripts of the telephone conversations that had been of relevance for the criminal proceedings had been sent to the relevant authority (procesa virz\u012bt\u0101js) and would be assessed in the context of those criminal proceedings. 15.  On 13 November 2006 the same prosecutor refused the applicant\u2019s request to have sight of the decisions authorising the interception of his telephone conversations as they constituted classified information. 16.  On 21 December 2007 the applicant lodged another complaint with the prosecutor\u2019s office concerning the fact that his telephone conversations with his lawyer had been intercepted and that the recordings of those conversations had been played back at a court hearing. The applicant argued that the investigating prosecutor, I.K., had been aware that these were conversations between him and his lawyer and that he had therefore violated domestic law. The applicant asked that the lawfulness of the prosecutor\u2019s actions be examined and that it be decided whether he was suitable for his position. The applicant also called for criminal proceedings to be instituted against I.K. 17.  On 3 January 2008 a different prosecutor decided to refuse the institution of criminal proceedings against I.K. 18.  On 15 January 2008 the applicant appealed against the refusal to institute criminal proceedings and also complained that the reply of 3 January 2008 had not provided an answer to his request for evaluation of the lawfulness of I.K.\u2019s actions and his suitability for the position of prosecutor. He relied on the relevant provisions of domestic law and Article 8 of the Convention. 19.  On 21 January 2008 a higher-ranking prosecutor dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaint. She argued that the applicant had not authorised O.S. to represent him in those criminal proceedings until 27 September 2005 and that the intercepted conversations prior to that date had therefore taken place between the applicant and O.S. as a citizen, not as a practising lawyer. As to the conversation of 7 October 2005, she pointed out that it was not the telephone conversations of O.S. that had been intercepted but those of the applicant, which had been duly authorised by a Supreme Court judge. A reference was made to the fact that the applicant\u2019s complaint concerning the playing back of his telephone conversations at a court hearing had been examined by the first-instance court. Lastly, in rejecting the applicant\u2019s complaint under Article 8 of the Convention, she referred to that Article and the permissible limitations contained therein. That decision included a note that it was final.", "references": ["8", "0", "1", "7", "3", "5", "6", "9", "2", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Warsaw. 6.  On 11 February 2004 the applicant was charged with domestic violence. 7.  On 27 February 2004 a bill of indictment in respect of the applicant was lodged with the Warsaw District Court. Subsequently, on an unknown date the case was returned to the prosecution authorities in order to amend the charges. 8.  On 20 August 2004 the Warsaw District Court ordered the applicant to undergo a psychiatric assessment in a psychiatric hospital. The applicant did not lodge an interlocutory appeal against this decision. 9.  On 11 April 2005 the applicant was brought by the police to the Warsaw Psychiatric Hospital in order to undergo the psychiatric assessment. However, he refused to stay and left the waiting room. On the same day he was ordered to come to the hospital on 18 April 2005, on pain of detention on remand. On 18 April 2005 the applicant came to the hospital. However, he refused to stay for the assessment, explaining that he had many urgent matters to attend to. 10.  On 7 June 2005 the Warsaw District Court ordered the applicant\u2019s detention on remand in accordance with Articles 249 \u00a7 1 and 258 \u00a7 1 (1) and (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (\u201cthe CCP\u201d) (see paragraphs 25 and 26 below). The court held that in view of the applicant\u2019s parents\u2019 and his sister\u2019s  testimonies there was a reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the offences with which he was charged. In addition, there was a reasonable risk that the applicant would obstruct the proceedings or that he would go into hiding. The court noted that the applicant\u2019s mother had admitted that he had stayed irregularly at his home address: he had been coming home late in the evening and leaving early in the morning. Furthermore, the applicant had failed to comply with the order of 20 August 2004 to undergo a six\u2011week psychiatric assessment (see paragraph 8 above). The court noted the applicant\u2019s parents\u2019 submissions that his mental condition was bad, he was not able to function independently and he was in need of urgent medical assistance. The court also attached importance to the fact that the applicant had previously behaved in a similar manner. He had been admitted to a psychiatric hospital on 23 October 2001, however the next day he had left the hospital on his own initiative. Consequently, in the court\u2019s view the applicant\u2019s submissions that he would comply with the order to undergo a psychiatric assessment were not convincing. 11.  An appeal lodged by the applicant was dismissed by the Warsaw Regional Court on 20 September 2005. The court mainly referred to the fact that the applicant had still to undergo a psychiatric assessment. It also noted the fact that the applicant stayed irregularly at his home address, therefore once released he might go into hiding. 12.  The applicant\u2019s detention was subsequently prolonged on the following dates: 28 September 2005 (until 4 January 2006), 27 December 2005 (until 4 February 2006) and 1 February 2006 (until 4 March 2006). The court relied on the grounds previously given. The applicant unsuccessfully appealed against all those decisions. 13.  On 18 October 2005 the Warsaw District Court ordered that the applicant undergo a psychiatric assessment at the hospital wing of the Warsaw Detention Center. The applicant underwent this assessment between 21 November 2005 and 1 February 2006. 14.  On 3 February 2006 the amended bill of indictment was lodged with the Warsaw District Court. The applicant was charged with domestic violence and possession of 1.15 grams of marijuana. 15.  On 16 February 2006 the Warsaw District Court again extended the applicant\u2019s detention (until 4 May 2006). The court stressed that there was a reasonable risk that the applicant would obstruct the proceedings and that he would go into hiding. This risk was particularly valid in view of the difficulties which the applicant had caused in the past by his repeated refusal to undergo a psychiatric assessment. 16.  During a hearing held on 23 March 2006 the applicant\u2019s father and sister refused to testify. The applicant was released from detention on the same day. Subsequently, on 5 April 2006, the applicant\u2019s mother also refused to testify. 17.  The Warsaw District Court held further hearings on 27 April, 7 July and 16 October 2006 and on 24 January and 12 March 2007. 18.  On 12 March 2007 the Warsaw District Court gave judgment, acquitting the applicant on charges of domestic violence and convicting him of possession of a small amount of marijuana. The court sentenced the applicant to five months\u2019 imprisonment stayed for three years. 19.  Following an appeal by the applicant, the judgment was quashed (in its part concerning possession of drugs) by the Warsaw Regional Court on 9 August 2007. The proceedings were subsequently discontinued by the Warsaw District Court on 6 November 2007. The court found that the prohibited act committed by the applicant had not constituted an offence because of its insignificant social consequences (znikoma szkodliwo\u015b\u0107 spo\u0142eczna czynu). 20.  On 5 November 2008 the applicant instituted proceedings for compensation for unjustified detention under Article 552 of the CCP (see paragraph 27 below) before the Warsaw Regional Court. He stated that while the main reason for his detention on remand had been a six-week psychiatric assessment, he had been kept in detention for nearly one year. Moreover, the assessment had begun only five months after his arrest. He also stressed that there had been no risk that he would have attempted to obstruct the proceedings. 21.  His claim was dismissed by the Warsaw Regional Court on 18 March 2010. The court referred at the outset to the Supreme Court\u2019s Resolution of 15 September 1999 (see paragraph 28 below). It further noted that in the present case there had been no breach of procedural provisions of the CCP since the detention on remand had been applied mainly in view of the applicant\u2019s repeated refusal to comply with the courts\u2019 orders. Consequently, the applicant\u2019s detention on remand had been undoubtedly justified, even though eventually he had been acquitted. 22.  On 16 July 2010 the Warsaw Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. The court repeated the reasons given by the Regional Court. It stressed that the applicant had clearly obstructed the proceedings by refusing to undergo a psychiatric assessment. Furthermore, there had been a risk that he could have gone into hiding. Lastly, the court noted that as soon as the applicant\u2019s parents and sister had refused to testify, the applicant had been released. 23.  On 31 May 2011 the applicant\u2019s cassation appeal was dismissed as manifestly ill-founded by the Supreme Court.", "references": ["5", "1", "2", "6", "7", "0", "3", "8", "9", "4", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "6.  On 9 March 1966 the Municipality of Ohrid appropriated from several individuals the right of use of nationalised building land (\u043e\u0434\u0437\u0435\u043c\u0430\u045a\u0435 \u043e\u0434 \u043f\u043e\u043d\u0430\u0442\u0430\u043c\u043e\u0448\u043d\u043e \u043a\u043e\u0440\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0435\u045a\u0435 \u043d\u0430 \u0433\u0440\u0430\u0434\u0435\u0436\u043d\u043e \u043d\u0430\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u0430\u043b\u0438\u0437\u0438\u0440\u0430\u043d\u043e \u0437\u0435\u043c\u0458\u0438\u0448\u0442\u0435) located in an area E. The land in question included a plot owned by the applicant\u2019s legal predecessor, measuring 764 sq. m. 7.  By a final decision of 1 November 2001, the applicant was declared heir of the right to claim restitution of the land. On 10 October 2002 he requested its restitution. 8.  On 1 September 2003 the Ohrid Restitution Commission, operating within the Ministry of Finance (\u041c\u0438\u043d\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e \u0437\u0430 \u0444\u0438\u043d\u0430\u043d\u0441\u0438\u0438 \u043d\u0430 \u0420\u0435\u043f\u0443\u0431\u043b\u0438\u043a\u0430 \u041c\u0430\u043a\u0435\u0434\u043e\u043d\u0438\u0458\u0430 - \u041a\u043e\u043c\u0438\u0441\u0438\u0458\u0430 \u0437\u0430 \u0414\u0435\u043d\u0430\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u0430\u043b\u0438\u0437\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0458\u0430 \u0441\u043e \u0441\u0435\u0434\u0438\u0448\u0442\u0435 \u0432\u043e \u041e\u0445\u0440\u0438\u0434 \u2013 \u201cthe Restitution Commission\u201d), accepted the applicant\u2019s request and ordered the restitution of the land (\u201cthe restitution decision\u201d). On the basis of documentary evidence of 30 May 2002 obtained from the Ministry of Transport and Communications (\u041c\u0438\u043d\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e \u0437\u0430 \u0422\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0441\u043f\u043e\u0440\u0442 \u0438 \u0412\u0440\u0441\u043a\u0438), the Restitution Commission found that no structures of public interest, but rather \u201cbeach service facilities and a leisure centre\u201d (\u0441\u0435\u0440\u0432\u0438\u0441 \u043e\u0431\u0458\u0435\u043a\u0442\u0438 \u0437\u0430 \u043f\u043b\u0430\u0436\u0430 \u0438 \u0446\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0430\u0440 \u0437\u0430 \u0437\u0430\u0431\u0430\u0432\u0430), were planned to be constructed on the plot in question. An expert had carried out an on-site inspection and had established that the land in question had been undeveloped building land and was part of the Ohrid lakeshore strip (\u043a\u0440\u0430\u0458\u0431\u0440\u0435\u0436\u0435\u043d \u043f\u043e\u0458\u0430\u0441 \u043d\u0430 \u041e\u0445\u0440\u0438\u0434\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0442\u043e \u0435\u0437\u0435\u0440\u043e). On 4 and 9 June 2003 the State Archives and the Ohrid Court of First Instance informed the Restitution Commission that they had no information as to whether any compensation had been paid to the applicant\u2019s predecessor for the appropriated land. By a letter of 26 August 2003 the Municipality of Ohrid confirmed that neither the applicant nor his predecessor had sought compensation for the appropriated land. 9.  A copy of the decision was served on the Solicitor General (\u0408\u0430\u0432\u0435\u043d \u041f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043e\u0431\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b) but it appears that no appeal was lodged against the decision. Accordingly, it became final on 29 October 2003. 10.  On 9 April 2004 the land was restored to the applicant\u2019s possession (\u043f\u0440\u0435\u0434\u0430\u0432\u0430\u045a\u0435 \u0432\u043e \u0432\u043b\u0430\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435). The minutes drawn by the Restitution Commission stated that, although properly summoned, the Solicitor General did not attend the Commission\u2019s meeting. 11.  On an unspecified date, A., an association that ran a campsite near the plot in question (\u201cthe association\u201d), submitted documentation to the Solicitor General that the plot in question was developed building land and was in use by the campsite. It submitted minutes of a meeting between the association and municipal representatives of 26 April 1978 which showed that the plot in question had been transferred to the association\u2019s possession. As stipulated in the minutes, the plot in question had been given to the association for its use even earlier, on 9 March 1966. The association also submitted a decision from 1981 in which the Municipality was ordered to pay compensation to the applicant\u2019s predecessor for the plot. 12.  On an unspecified date in 2004 the Solicitor General requested that the Appeal Commission of the Government, acting as a second-instance body (\u041a\u043e\u043c\u0438\u0441\u0438\u0458\u0430 \u043d\u0430 \u0412\u043b\u0430\u0434\u0430 \u043d\u0430 \u0420\u0435\u043f\u0443\u0431\u043b\u0438\u043a\u0430 \u041c\u0430\u043a\u0435\u0434\u043e\u043d\u0438\u0458\u0430 \u0437\u0430 \u0440\u0435\u0448\u0430\u0432\u0430\u045a\u0435 \u0432\u043e \u0443\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043d\u0430 \u043f\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0430\u043f\u043a\u0430 \u0432\u043e \u0432\u0442\u043e\u0440 \u0441\u0442\u0435\u043f\u0435\u043d \u043e\u0434 \u043e\u0431\u043b\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0430 \u043d\u0430 \u0434\u0435\u043d\u0430\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u0430\u043b\u0438\u0437\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0458\u0430\u0442\u0430 \u2013 the Appeal Commission), either annul (\u043f\u043e\u043d\u0438\u0448\u0442\u0438), declare null and void (\u043e\u0433\u043b\u0430\u0441\u0438 \u0437\u0430 \u043d\u0438\u0448\u0442\u043e\u0432\u043d\u043e) or quash through a supervisory-review procedure (\u0443\u043a\u0438\u043d\u0435 \u043f\u043e \u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043e \u043d\u0430 \u043d\u0430\u0434\u0437\u043e\u0440) the restitution decision of 1 September 2003. The Solicitor General argued that the association had submitted documentary evidence that contradicted the facts established by the Restitution Commission in that the land had been in use by the association and that compensation had been paid to the applicant\u2019s predecessor. That evidence had not previously been submitted to the Restitution Commission. 13.  In his reply of 24 September 2004, the applicant submitted that the Solicitor General could not rely on errors of fact as grounds for supervisory review of the final restitution order. He further denied that any compensation had been paid to his predecessor or him. 14.  On 16 March 2005 the Ministry of Finance carried out an on-site inspection and drew up a report according to which the land \u201cwas vacant space between Lake Ohrid and the Ohrid-St Naum road\u201d and \u201cit was not used for the servicing of any surrounding structures\u201d (\u043d\u0435 \u0435 \u0432\u043e \u0444\u0443\u043d\u043a\u0446\u0438\u0458\u0430 \u043d\u0430 \u043e\u043a\u043e\u043b\u043d\u0438 \u043e\u0431\u0458\u0435\u043a\u0442\u0438). It determined that the land was intended for the construction of \u201cbeach service facilities and a leisure centre\u201d, which could not be considered as being of public interest. Accordingly, possession of it could be restored (\u043c\u043e\u0436\u0435 \u0434\u0430 \u0431\u0438\u0434\u0435 \u043f\u0440\u0435\u0434\u043c\u0435\u0442 \u043d\u0430 \u0440\u0435\u0430\u043b\u043d\u043e \u0432\u0440\u0430\u045c\u0430\u045a\u0435). 15.  On 11 June 2007 the Appeal Commission accepted the Solicitor General\u2019s request and declared the restitution order null and void finding that, pursuant to section 267(1)(3) of the Administrative Procedure Act (see paragraph 48 below), it could not be enforced. Relying on section 8 of the Restitution Act, the Appeal Commission stated that:\n\u201cFrom all admitted evidence in the proceedings it can be established that the undeveloped building land was appropriated from the [applicant\u2019s] predecessor, that compensation was paid to the latter, and that the land in question is developed building land with playing fields and other leisure and recreational facilities, which are an integral part of camp E.\nThe [Appeal Commission] established that in the present case the final restitution order was based on a wrong application of the law, which was preceded by erroneous and incomplete establishment of the facts.\u201d 16.  On 14 August 2007 the applicant lodged an administrative action, arguing that the Restitution Commission, in its decision of 1 September 2003, had established the facts correctly. In this connection he referred to the Ministry of Finance\u2019s report of 16 March 2005 (see paragraph 14 above) and another on-site report of 13 July 2007 drawn up for the purpose of an \u201caction for disturbance of possession\u201d in which it had been confirmed that the land had been vacant \u2013 a fact that had been established by Bitola Court of Appeal in an earlier civil dispute between him and the association (see paragraph 33 below). 17.  On 4 September 2009 the Administrative Court (\u0423\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u0435\u043d \u0421\u0443\u0434) \u2013 which had meanwhile become competent to decide on administrative actions \u2013 dismissed the applicant\u2019s action and held that the annulment order of the Appeal Commission had been lawful. It referred to section 267 of the General Administrative Proceedings Act, sections 8(1) and 10 of the Restitution Act, sections 1 and 2 of the Protection of Lakes Ohrid, Prespa and Dojran Act, as well as sections 2, 69(4) and 70 of the Waters Act (see paragraphs 39, 40, and 42-44 below) and relied on the fact that the land in question was part of the shoreline. The relevant part of the judgment reads as follows:\n\u201cIn the court\u2019s opinion, in deciding the present case, the [Appeal Commission] acted correctly when it declared null and void the final restitution order, in accordance with section 267(1)(3) of the Administrative Proceedings Act, under which a decision whose enforcement is not possible shall be declared null and void. In relation to this, the court emphasises that this provision does not concern only the factual, but also the legal impossibility of enforcement ...\n... In view of the above-cited statutory provisions, it is undisputed that Lake Ohrid and its shore are ... of general interest (\u0434\u043e\u0431\u0440\u043e \u043e\u0434 \u043e\u043f\u0448\u0442 \u0438\u043d\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0435\u0441), which is relevant, in the court\u2019s view, for the restitution proceedings, within the meaning of the Restitution Act. ...\u201d 18.  On 25 February 2010 the Supreme Court (\u0412\u0440\u0445\u043e\u0432\u0435\u043d \u0441\u0443\u0434 \u043d\u0430 \u0420\u0435\u043f\u0443\u0431\u043b\u0438\u043a\u0430 \u041c\u0430\u043a\u0435\u0434\u043e\u043d\u0438\u0458\u0430) declared inadmissible an appeal against the Administrative Court\u2019s judgment lodged by the applicant. The Supreme Court held that the impugned judgment had predated 25 September 2009, the day when it had become competent to decide administrative actions in the second instance. 19.  On 31 May 2010 the Administrative Court rejected the applicant\u2019s request for reopening of the proceedings on the basis of newly discovered facts. That decision was confirmed on appeal by the Supreme Court in a decision of 23 June 2010. 20.  On 19 July 2010 the applicant applied to the public prosecutor (\u0408\u0430\u0432\u0435\u043d \u041e\u0431\u0432\u0438\u043d\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b \u043d\u0430 \u0420\u0435\u043f\u0443\u0431\u043b\u0438\u043a\u0430 \u041c\u0430\u043a\u0435\u0434\u043e\u043d\u0438\u0458\u0430) seeking that protection of legality proceedings (\u0411\u0430\u0440\u0430\u045a\u0435 \u0437\u0430 \u0437\u0430\u0448\u0442\u0438\u0442\u0430 \u043d\u0430 \u0437\u0430\u043a\u043e\u043d\u0438\u0442\u043e\u0441\u0442) be instituted regarding the judgment of the Administrative Court of 4 September 2009, as well as regarding the rejection of his request for the reopening of the proceedings. It appears that the public prosecutor accepted the applicant\u2019s application and lodged an application for the protection of legality with the Supreme Court, which the latter rejected as inadmissible on the grounds that the remedy in question was no longer available due to change in legislation. 21.  Following the final decision to declare the restitution decision null and void, on 13 April 2011 the Restitution Commission dismissed the applicant\u2019s request. 22.  On 16 June 2011, the applicant lodged an administrative action with the Administrative Court, challenging that decision. 23.  On 1 February 2012, the Administrative Court quashed the decision. It found that the facts of the case relating to whether the plot was developed building land or not, as well as the issue of whether the applicant had received compensation, had not been sufficiently well-established. 24.  On 25 May 2012 the Restitution Commission, after having made a fresh on-site inspection, upheld the applicant\u2019s restitution request. 25.  On 7 June 2012 the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the State, challenged the latter decision with an administrative action, arguing that the Restitution Commission had failed to obtain information as to whether the land was of public interest owing to its situation on the Ohrid lakeshore. 26.  On 10 July 2013 the Administrative Court dismissed the Solicitor General\u2019s action and upheld the decision of the Restitution Commission. 27.  On 25 July 2013 the Solicitor General lodged an appeal against the latter judgment with the Higher Administrative Court (\u0412\u0438\u0448 \u0423\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u0435\u043d \u0421\u0443\u0434). The reasons stated in the appeal were, inter alia, that the Administrative Court had not given appropriate reasons as to whether the land had been of public interest. 28.  The applicant died on 23 August 2013. 29.  On 26 June 2014 the Higher Administrative Court quashed the judgment and remitted the proceedings. Relying on sections 6, 131 and 132 of the Waters Act, it found that the land in question was part of the Ohrid lakeshore strip and therefore was of public interest. 30.  On 30 July 2014 D.S., the applicant\u2019s daughter, asked the Restitution Commission to stay the proceedings. She submitted evidence that inheritance proceedings regarding the legacy of the applicant had been opened. The inheritance proceedings were later stayed due to civil proceedings in which she challenged the alleged existence of a will made by the applicant in favour of G.T., her brother. 31.  On 22 September 2014 the Restitution Commission decided to stay the proceedings pending the outcome of the civil and the inheritance proceedings. 32.  It appears that the civil and the inheritance proceedings are still pending. 33.  In a separate set of proceedings concerning the same plot of land on 17 September 2009 the Bitola Court of Appeal overturned the lower court\u2019s decision and finally upheld the applicant\u2019s action for protection from disturbance of possession (\u0441\u043c\u0435\u045c\u0430\u0432\u0430\u045a\u0435 \u043d\u0430 \u0432\u043b\u0430\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435) against the association which ran the camp regarding the same plot of land. It ordered the association to refrain from further disturbances. 34.  According to a document from the Land Registry dated 3 September 2010, the historical records of the plot of land show that the association was granted use of the plot as of 9 March 1966. The State had at the time remained the owner of the plot, which continued to be the case until the day the document was issued. 35.  On 30 August and 4 November 2010, and 30 March and 10 August 2011 the applicant made additional submissions to the Court, including evidence, which were added to the case file. This evidence refers to other neighbouring plots of land which, according to the applicant, had been returned to the possession of their respective owners. According to him, it had never been argued by the State that these neighbouring plots had been of public interest. In support he submitted several decisions from several different sets of restitution proceedings. It cannot be ascertained whether any of those proceedings ended finally in the respective plaintiffs\u2019 favour.", "references": ["8", "9", "6", "5", "4", "7", "2", "0", "3", "1", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  In 1995 Dr Marija Arsovska, a psychiatrist whose name at the time was Marija Karanfilova (\u201cthe psychiatrist\u201d), established a private practice called Dr Marija Karanfilova\u2019s Independent Psychiatric Practice (\u0421\u0430\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u043e\u0458\u043d\u0430 \u0441\u043f\u0435\u0446\u0438\u0458\u0430\u043b\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0438\u0447\u043a\u0430 \u043e\u0440\u0434\u0438\u043d\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0458\u0430 \u043f\u043e \u043d\u0435\u0432\u0440\u043e\u043f\u0441\u0438\u0445\u0438\u0458\u0430\u0442\u0440\u0438\u0458\u0430 \u201e\u0414-\u0440 \u041c\u0430\u0440\u0438\u0458\u0430 \u041a\u0430\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0444\u0438\u043b\u043e\u0432\u0430\u201e \u2013 \u201cthe Practice\u201d) where she treated people using Carl Jung\u2019s analytical psychotherapy methods. The Practice was assigned an individual tax number beginning with the numbers 503. 6.  In 2004 the Practice signed a contract with the State Health Insurance Fund (\u201cthe Fund\u201d) on the funding of treatment provided by the Practice to health insurance beneficiaries. 7.  On 15 February 2006 the Ministry of Health\u2019s State Sanitation and Health Inspectorate (\u201cthe Inspectorate\u201d) conducted an on-site inspection (\u0438\u043d\u0441\u043f\u0435\u043a\u0446\u0438\u0441\u043a\u0438 \u043d\u0430\u0434\u0437\u043e\u0440). It ordered the Practice to re-register as a private health institution in order to comply with amendments to the Health Protection Act of 2004 (\u0417\u0430\u043a\u043e\u043d \u0437\u0430 \u0438\u0437\u043c\u0435\u043d\u0443\u0432\u0430\u045a\u0435 \u0438 \u0434\u043e\u043f\u043e\u043b\u043d\u0443\u0432\u0430\u045a\u0435 \u043d\u0430 \u0417\u0430\u043a\u043e\u043d\u043e\u0442 \u0437\u0430 \u0437\u0434\u0440\u0430\u0432\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435\u043d\u0430 \u0437\u0430\u0448\u0442\u0438\u0442\u0430, Official Gazette no. 10/04). 8.  In compliance with the Inspectorate\u2019s orders, the psychiatrist applied to the Ministry of Health to have the Practice re-registered and to change its name, as required by the new statutory provisions. 9.  On 28 February 2006 the Ministry of Health issued a decision on the registration of the Private health institution Dr Marija Karanfilova\u2019s Specialist Psychiatric Practice (\u041f\u0440\u0438\u0432\u0430\u0442\u043d\u0430 \u0437\u0434\u0440\u0430\u0432\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435\u043d\u0430 \u0443\u0441\u0442\u0430\u043d\u043e\u0432\u0430 \u2013 \u0441\u043f\u0435\u0446\u0438\u0458\u0430\u043b\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0438\u0447\u043a\u0430 \u043e\u0440\u0434\u0438\u043d\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0458\u0430 \u043f\u043e \u043d\u0435\u0432\u0440\u043e\u043f\u0441\u0438\u0445\u0438\u0458\u0430\u0442\u0440\u0438\u0458\u0430 \u201e\u0414-\u0440 \u041c\u0430\u0440\u0438\u0458\u0430 \u041a\u0430\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0444\u0438\u043b\u043e\u0432\u0430\u201e \u2013 \u201cthe new Practice\u201d) at the same address as the previous Practice. It stated that the 1995 registration decision relating to the original Practice would no longer be in force (\u045c\u0435 \u043f\u0440\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0430\u043d\u0435 \u0434\u0430 \u0432\u0430\u0436\u0438) after the new decision had been entered into the relevant register. The decision was delivered to several institutions, including the Fund. 10.  The Inspectorate conducted a fresh on-site inspection on 6 March 2006. It concluded that the Practice had fully complied with its decision of 15 February 2006, including the instructions for re-registration. 11.  On 17 April 2006 the Central Registry recorded the registration of the new Practice as of 29 March 2006. It was given a new individual tax number, beginning with the numbers 403. 12.  On 6 June 2006 the new Practice notified the Fund about the changes in its registration, including the change of its name. 13.  On 29 November 2006 the Fund notified the new Practice that it did not intend to sign a new contract after the expiry of the previous one. 14.  On 2 August 2007, on the basis of a request by the new Practice, the Central Registry allowed the new Practice to change from being a private health institution to one that was a limited liability company established by a single person (\u0414\u041e\u041e\u0415\u041b) and entered that transformation in its records. The applicant company was known officially as the Centre for the Development of Analytical Psychology Ltd. (\u0426\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0430\u0440 \u0437\u0430 \u0440\u0430\u0437\u0432\u043e\u0458 \u043d\u0430 \u0430\u043d\u0430\u043b\u0438\u0442\u0438\u0447\u043a\u0430 \u043f\u0441\u0438\u0445\u043e\u043b\u043e\u0433\u0438\u0458\u0430 \u2013 \u0414\u041e\u041e\u0415\u041b). It kept the same tax number as the new Practice. The link between the new Practice and the applicant company was not disputed in the impugned proceedings (see below). 15.  On 25 January 2006 the Practice initiated compensation proceedings against the Fund in the Skopje Court of First Instance (\u041e\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0432\u0435\u043d \u0441\u0443\u0434 \u0421\u043a\u043e\u043f\u0458\u0435) for non-adherence to the terms of the contract. Both the new Practice and the applicant company continued the proceedings as the claimant. 16.  On 10 June 2008 the first-instance court granted the claim in part. 17.  On 26 August 2008 the Fund lodged an appeal against the first\u2011instance judgment, objecting to the applicant company\u2019s standing in the proceedings for the first time. It argued that the claimant was a different legal entity than the one which had signed the contract with the Fund in 2004, as evident in the two entities\u2019 different individual tax numbers. 18.  The applicant company submitted in reply that the re-registration of the Practice had been carried out in compliance with the Inspectorate\u2019s orders and that the Fund had been aware of the changes. It also argued that the Fund had implicitly recognised the legal continuity of the two entities as it had accepted reports submitted by the new Practice under the contract of 2004 and had given notice of the termination of the contract to the new Practice. 19.  The Skopje Court of Appeal (\u0410\u043f\u0435\u043b\u0430\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u0435\u043d \u0441\u0443\u0434 \u0421\u043a\u043e\u043f\u0458\u0435) on 28 January 2009 granted the Fund\u2019s appeal and remitted the case for fresh consideration. 20.  On 10 April 2009 the Skopje Court of First Instance dismissed the applicant company\u2019s claim, finding that it had no standing in the proceedings (\u043d\u0435\u043c\u0430 \u0430\u043a\u0442\u0438\u0432\u043d\u0430 \u043b\u0435\u0433\u0438\u0442\u0438\u043c\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0458\u0430 \u0432\u043e \u0441\u043f\u043e\u0440\u043e\u0442). It established that the contract had been signed by the Fund and Dr Marija Karanfilova\u2019s Independent Psychiatric Practice and that the applicant company could not be considered as the Practice\u2019s legal successor as they had different individual tax numbers. 21.  The applicant company appealed, complaining that the first-instance court had disregarded the evidence that had shown the existence of a legal relationship between the parties and had based its assessment solely on the different tax numbers. In particular, the first-instance court had disregarded the fact that the new Practice had continued to perform its contractual obligations until the contract had been terminated by the notice of 29 November 2006 (see paragraph 13 above). The applicant company maintained that those circumstances indicated that the Fund had implicitly recognised the legal continuity of the original and the new Practice. The applicant company alleged that the formalistic approach of the first-instance court had meant its claim had remained undecided on the merits. 22.  On 2 December 2009 the Skopje Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant company\u2019s appeal and upheld the first-instance judgment. 23.  On 7 July 2006 the new Practice lodged a civil claim against the Fund for the payment of an undetermined sum for failing to adhere to the terms of the contract of 2004. After the new Practice turned itself into the applicant company (see paragraph 14 above) the latter continued the proceedings as the claimant. 24.  At a hearing held on 27 June 2008 the Fund raised an objection that the applicant company lacked standing in the proceedings. 25.  On 16 February 2009 the Skopje Court of First Instance dismissed the applicant company\u2019s claim, finding that it had no standing in the proceedings. The first-instance court relied in its reasoning on the difference in the tax numbers between the original Practice that had been party to the contract with the Fund in 2004 and the applicant company. 26.  On 11 December 2009 the Skopje Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal by the applicant company and upheld the first-instance judgment. It stressed that a tax number was a unique attribute of a particular entity and would remain unchanged, regardless of any structural or other changes to the entity.", "references": ["5", "1", "0", "8", "7", "6", "9", "4", "2", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicants were born in 1974, 1984, and 1977 respectively. The first and the third applicants live in Moscow, and the second applicant lives in Gryazy, Lipetsk Region. 7.  The applicants are gay rights activists. They were each found guilty of the administrative offence of \u201cpublic activities aimed at the promotion of homosexuality among minors\u201d (\u043f\u0443\u0431\u043b\u0438\u0447\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u0434\u0435\u0439\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0438\u044f, \u043d\u0430\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u043d\u0430 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u043f\u0430\u0433\u0430\u043d\u0434\u0443 \u0433\u043e\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0435\u043a\u0441\u0443\u0430\u043b\u0438\u0437\u043c\u0430 \u0441\u0440\u0435\u0434\u0438 \u043d\u0435\u0441\u043e\u0432\u0435\u0440\u0448\u0435\u043d\u043d\u043e\u043b\u0435\u0442\u043d\u0438\u0445). 8.  On 3 April 2006 the Ryazan Regional Duma adopted the Law on Protection of the Morality of Children in the Ryazan Oblast, which prohibited public activities aimed at the promotion of homosexuality among minors. 9.  On 4 December 2008 the Ryazan Regional Duma adopted the Law on Administrative Offences, which introduced administrative liability for public activities aimed at the promotion of homosexuality among minors. 10.  On 30 March 2009 the first applicant held a static demonstration (\u201cpicket\u201d, \u043f\u0438\u043a\u0435\u0442\u0438\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435) in front of a secondary school in Ryazan, holding two banners which stated \u201cHomosexuality is normal\u201d and \u201cI am proud of my homosexuality\u201d. He was charged with an administrative offence for doing so. 11.  On 6 April 2009 the Justice of the Peace of Circuit no. 18 of the Oktyabrskiy District of Ryazan found the first applicant guilty of a breach of section 3.10 of the Ryazan Law on Administrative Offences. He was ordered to pay a fine of 1,500 Russian roubles (RUB, equivalent to about 34 euros (EUR)). On 14 May 2009 the Oktyabrskiy District Court dismissed the first applicant\u2019s appeal. 12.  On 30 September 2011 the Arkhangelsk Regional Assembly of Deputies passed amendments to the Law on Separate Measures for the Protection of the Morality and Health of Children in the Arkhangelsk Oblast. The amended law prohibited public activities aimed at the promotion of homosexuality among minors. 13.  On 21 November 2011 the Arkhangelsk Regional Assembly of Deputies passed amendments to the Regional Law on Administrative Offences. The amendments introduced administrative liability for public activities aimed at the promotion of homosexuality among minors. 14.  On 11 January 2012 the second and the third applicants held a static demonstration in front of the children\u2019s library in Arkhangelsk. The second applicant was holding a banner stating \u201cRussia has the world\u2019s highest rate of teenage suicide. This number includes a large proportion of homosexuals. They take this step because of the lack of information about their nature. Deputies are child-killers. Homosexuality is good!\u201d The third applicant was holding a banner stating \u201cChildren have the right to know. Great people are also sometimes gay; gay people also become great. Homosexuality is natural and normal\u201d; it went on to list the names of famous people who had contributed to Russia\u2019s cultural heritage and were believed to be gay. Both applicants were arrested and escorted to the police station, where administrative offence reports were drawn up. 15.  On 3 February 2012 the Justice of the Peace of Circuit no. 6 of the Oktyabrskiy District of Arkhangelsk found the second and the third applicants guilty of a breach of section 2.13 \u00a7 1 of the Arkhangelsk Law on Administrative Offences. The second applicant was ordered to pay a fine of RUB 1,800 (about EUR 45), and the third applicant was fined RUB 2,000 (about EUR 50). On 22 March 2012 the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Arkhangelsk dismissed both applicants\u2019 appeals. 16.  On 7 March 2012 the St Petersburg Legislative Assembly passed amendments to the Law on Administrative Offences in St Petersburg. The amendments introduced administrative liability for public activities aimed at the promotion of homosexuality, bisexuality and/or transgenderism among minors; the same law introduced administrative liability for promotion of paedophilia. 17.  On 12 April 2012 the third applicant held a demonstration in front of the St Petersburg City Administration, holding up a banner with a popular quote from a famous Soviet-era actress Faina Ranevskaya: \u201cHomosexuality is not a perversion. Field hockey and ice ballet are.\u201d He was arrested by the police and escorted to the police station, where an administrative offence report was drawn up. 18.  On 5 May 2012 the Justice of the Peace of Circuit no. 208 of St Petersburg found the third applicant guilty of a breach of section 7.1 of the Law on Administrative Offences in St Petersburg. He had to pay a fine of RUB 5,000 (about EUR 130). On 6 June 2012 the Smolninskiy District Court of St Petersburg dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. 19.  On an unspecified date the first and the third applicants brought proceedings before the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation. They challenged the compatibility of section 4 of the Law on Protection of the Morality and Health of Children in the Ryazan Oblast with the provisions of the Constitution, in particular with the principle of equal treatment and the freedom of expression enshrined in Articles 19 and 29 of the Constitution, and also the provisions of Article 55 \u00a7 3, setting out the conditions under which the constitutionally guaranteed rights and freedoms may be restricted. 20.  On 19 January 2010 the Constitutional Court declared the complaint inadmissible, for the following reasons:\n\u201cSection 14 \u00a7 1 of the Federal Law clearly sets out the responsibility of the State bodies of the Russian Federation to take measures for the protection of children from information, propaganda and activism which is harmful to their health and moral and spiritual development.\n...\nThe laws of the Ryazan Oblast \u201cOn protection of the morality of children in the Ryazan Oblast\u201d and \u201cOn administrative offences\u201d do not strengthen any measures which prohibit homosexuality or provide for its official censure; they do not contain signs of discrimination, and there is no indication in their intent of superfluous actions by the State bodies. It follows that the provisions being challenged by the appellants cannot be regarded as disproportionately restrictive of freedom of speech.\u201d 21.  On unspecified date the third applicant brought proceedings before the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation. He challenged the compatibility of section 7 of the Law on Administrative Offences in St Petersburg with the Constitution. 22.  On 24 October 2013 the Constitutional Court declared the complaint inadmissible, for the following reasons:\n\u201c... It follows that the given prohibition, determined by the fact that such promotion is capable of harming minors by virtue of the age-specific features of their intellectual and psychological development, cannot be considered as permitting a limitation on the rights and freedoms of citizens exclusively on the basis of sexual orientation.\n...\nHowever, this does not rule out a need to define \u2013 on the basis of a balancing exercise with regard to the competing constitutional values \u2013 the limits of the given individuals\u2019 effective practice of their rights and freedoms, in order not to infringe the rights and freedoms of others.\n...\nGiven that it is bound up with the investigation into the factual circumstances of the case, the assessment of whether the appellant\u2019s actions with regard to the targeted and unchecked dissemination of generally accessible information were capable of causing harm to the health and moral and spiritual development of minors, including creating a distorted impression of the social equivalence of traditional and non-traditional marital relations, does not come within the competence of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation; nor does verification of the lawfulness and validity of the judicial decisions issued in the appellant\u2019s case.\u201d 23.  On 29 June 2013 the Code of Administrative Offences of the Russian Federation was amended, introducing in Article 6.21 administrative liability for the promotion of non-traditional sexual relations among minors. 24.  On an unspecified date the third applicant and two other persons brought proceedings before the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation. They challenged the compatibility of Article 6.21 of the Code of Administrative Offences with the provisions of the Constitution. 25.  On 23 September 2014 the Constitutional Court examined the complaint on the merits and dismissed it, for the following reasons:\n\u201c... Citizens\u2019 enjoyment of the right to disseminate information concerning the question of an individual\u2019s sexual self-determination ought not to infringe the rights and freedoms of others; in regulating of this right by means of legislation, it is necessary to ensure that a balance is struck between the values protected by the Constitution. Consequently, bearing in mind the sensitive nature of such questions, since they belong to the sphere of individual autonomy, and without encroaching on its very essence, the State is entitled to introduce, on the basis of the above-mentioned requirements of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, specific restrictions on activities linked with the dissemination of such information if it becomes aggressive [and] importuning in nature and is capable of causing harm to the rights and legal interests of others, primarily minors, and is offensive in form.\n \n... In so far as one of the roles of the family is [to provide for] the birth and upbringing of children, an understanding of marriage as the union of a man and a woman underlies the legislative approach to resolving demographic and social issues in the area of family relations in the Russian Federation...\n \nRegulation of freedom of speech and the freedom to disseminate information does not presuppose the creation of conditions which would facilitate the formation of other interpretations of the family as an institution, and the associated social and legal institutions, which would differ from the generally accepted interpretations nor society\u2019s approval of them as being equivalent in value...\n \nThese aims also determine the need to protect the child from the influence of information that is capable of causing harm to his or her health or development, particularly information that is combined with an aggressive imposition of specific models of sexual conduct, giving rise to distorted representations of the socially accepted models of family relations corresponding to the moral values that are generally accepted in Russian society, as these are expressed in the Constitution and legislation.\n...\nIn order to ensure the child\u2019s healthy development, States are required, in particular, to protect the child from all forms of sexual exploitation and sexual perversion.\n...\nThe aim pursued by the federal legislature in establishing the given norm was to protect children from the impact of information that could lead them into non-traditional sexual relations, a predilection for which would prevent them from building family relationships as these are traditionally understood in Russia and expressed in the Constitution of the Russian Federation. The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation acknowledges that the possible impact on the child\u2019s future life of the information in question, even when delivered in a persistent manner, has not been proven beyond doubt. Nonetheless, in assessing the necessity of introducing one or another restriction, the federal legislature is entitled to use criteria that are based on the presumption that there exists a threat to the child\u2019s interests, especially as the restrictions introduced by it concern only the tendency of the information in question to target persons of a given age group, and cannot therefore be regarded as excluding the possibility of exercising one\u2019s constitutional right to freedom of information in this area. ...\nThe prohibition on public activities in relation to minors is intended to prevent their attention being increasingly focused on issues concerning sexual relations, which are capable, in unfavourable circumstances, of deforming significantly the child\u2019s understanding of such constitutional values as the family, motherhood, fatherhood and childhood, and adversely affecting not only his or her psychological state and development, but also his or her social adaptation. The fact that this ban does not extend to situations concerning the promotion of immoral conduct in the context of traditional sexual relationships, which may also require State regulation, including through [the existence of] administrative offences, is not grounds for finding that the given norm is incompatible with the Constitution of the Russian Federation from the perspective of infringing the principles of equality as applied to the protection of Constitutional values, which ensure the uninterrupted replacement of generations ...\nThe imposition on minors of a set of social values which differ from those that are generally accepted in Russian society, and which are not shared by and indeed frequently perceived as unacceptable by parents \u2013 who bear primary responsibility for their children\u2019s development and upbringing and are required to provide for their health and their physical, psychological, spiritual and moral development \u2013 ... may result in the child\u2019s social estrangement and prevent his or her development within the family, especially if one considers that equality of rights as set out in the Constitution, which also presupposes equality of rights irrespective of sexual orientation, does not yet guarantee that persons with a different sexual orientation are actually regarded in equal terms by public opinion; this situation may entail objective difficulties when trying to avoid negative attitudes from individual members of society towards those persons on a day-to-day level. This is also true for instances where the very information that is banned from dissemination to minors may be intended, from the disseminator\u2019s perspective, to overcome such negative attitudes towards persons with a different sexual orientation...\nThe prohibition on the promotion of non-traditional sexual relationships does not in itself exclude the information in question from being presented in a neutral (educational, artistic, historical) context. Such transmission of information, if it is devoid of indications of promotion, that is, if it is not aimed at creating preferences linked to the choice of non-traditional forms of sexual identity and ensures an individualised approach, taking into account the specific features of the psychological and physiological development of children in a given age group and the nature of the specific issue being clarified, may be conducted with the help of experts such as teachers, doctors or psychologists.\n... does not signify a negative appraisal by the State of non-traditional sexual relationships as such, and is not intended to belittle the honour and dignity of citizens who are involved in such relationships...\n... cannot be regarded as containing official censure for non-traditional sexual relationships, in particular homosexuality, far less their prohibition...\n... the person [disseminating information] must understand that what appears to him or her as the straightforward provision of information may, in a specific situation, resemble activism (promotion), if it is shown that the aim was to disseminate (or especially to impose) information with the above-mentioned content. At the same time, only intentional commission by a person of the corresponding public activities, directly targeted at promoting non-traditional sexual relations among minors, or intentional commission of these actions by a person who was fully aware that there could be minors among those receiving the information, is punishable...\u201d", "references": ["7", "9", "5", "1", "4", "0", "3", "2", "No Label", "6", "8"], "gold": ["6", "8"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant is an Eritrean national and was born in 1990. He grew up in Eritrea and currently lives in Switzerland. 7.  The applicant entered Switzerland illegally on 23 June 2014 and applied for asylum the next day. He was heard in person three times by the Swiss authorities responsible for asylum and migration (until 31 December 2014 the Bundesamt f\u00fcr Migration, renamed with effect from 1 January 2015 as the Staatssekretariat f\u00fcr Migration, SEM \u2013 hereafter \u201cthe State Secretariat for Migration\u201d). During all three hearings an interpreter was present and the record was translated for the applicant prior to his signing it. 8.  The first hearing was a summary interview at the Centre for Reception and Procedure (Empfangs- und Verfahrenszentrum) in Kreuzlingen on 1 July 2014. The applicant stated that he had not been allowed to continue at school beyond the eighth grade because he had failed the national admission exams for secondary school, and had been summoned for military service, which he had tried to avoid. Once he had reported for duty, he had tried to escape but had been caught. He stated that he had been beaten and subsequently imprisoned in Wi\u2019a in conditions of very poor hygiene. He was unable to recall the exact dates of his imprisonment, but stated that he had been imprisoned from June 2012 to September 2013. He had managed to escape from prison one night when the guards were asleep. After staying in Eritrea for one more week, he had left the country on foot on 3 October 2013, crossing the border at Mereb. He had been picked up by Ethiopian soldiers the next day. 9.  In order to support his account, the applicant submitted copies of his student card and a card showing that he was a church deacon, as well as the original of a card used for food distribution in Italy. He stated that he had been issued with an identity card in Eritrea in 2010, but had had to hand it in in Ethiopia. The applicant further stated that he was married and had a son born in October 2012. 10.  The second, more detailed, hearing took place at the office of the State Secretariat for Migration in Berne on 11 March 2015. A member of a non-governmental organisation was present as a neutral witness, in order to guarantee the fairness of the hearing. He had the opportunity to add comments at the end of the record of the hearing in the event that he had witnessed any irregularities, but did not note down any such observations. 11.  The applicant again gave an account of the alleged events in Eritrea leading up to his escape. This time he stated that he had been imprisoned in Wi\u2019a from March to October 2013 following his attempt to escape from the military. When confronted with the discrepancy in comparison with his previous account in that regard, he stated that he might have made a mistake in the first interview. When asked about the conditions of his detention, the applicant claimed that it had been very dirty and very hot, and that he had been locked up all the time. Other than beatings suffered due to his attempt to escape, there had been no particular incidents. He did not recall any rules other than fixed meal times and being brought outside in the mornings and evenings to relieve himself. 12.  When asked about his military training, the applicant claimed that he had only been there for a very brief period of time prior to his attempted escape. He had not learned how to use weapons. He could neither provide a name of his superior nor his unit nor his military number. 13.  When questioned about his departure from Eritrea, the applicant described leaving A. (a village) on foot at around 6 p.m., together with a person living in the neighbourhood who knew the area. They had walked towards Mereb, but had lost their way as it was night-time. They had been very afraid and also hungry and thirsty. There were lots of thorn bushes in their way and they had heard the howling of hyenas. They had not been sure whether they had reached Ethiopian territory until soldiers who spoke Amharic had apprehended them at around 3 a.m. When informed by the interviewer that his account in relation to his departure might not be considered credible, which would result in the conclusion that he had left the country legally, the applicant said that he could not give more details about the departure because he did not know the area well and had been following the person with whom he had fled. 14.  The applicant claimed that he had always been in good health. 15.  In order to support his account, the applicant submitted the originals of his marriage certificate of 2010 and his son\u2019s baptism certificate of 2012, as well as an attestation that he was a church deacon. He claimed that these documents had been sent to him from Eritrea. 16.  The applicant was heard for a third time by the State Secretariat for Migration on 29 January 2016. Again, a member of a non-governmental organisation was present as a neutral witness, who did not note down any observations relating to irregularities. 17.  The interviewer explicitly advised the applicant that the interview was taking place to give him another opportunity to describe his departure from Eritrea, and that the account he had so far provided in this regard would probably be dismissed as not credible, which would result in the conclusion that he had left the country legally. 18.  The applicant responded that he had spent two days at his parents\u2019 home in A. after escaping from prison. His family had contacted a people smuggler from the Mereb area. He and the smuggler had left A. on foot at around 6 p.m. When confronted with his previous account that he had left with a person from the neighbourhood, the applicant clarified that the person he had travelled with (the smuggler) came from a neighbouring village. During the night the smuggler had told him that he had taken many people across the border, but that he and the applicant had already been walking for too long a time, which meant that they must have lost their way. They had become disorientated and had only realised that they had crossed the border when they had been apprehended by Ethiopian soldiers at around 4 a.m. who had spoken to them in Amharic. 19.  On 8 March 2016 the State Secretariat for Migration rejected the applicant\u2019s asylum request and ordered his departure from Switzerland. It found that his account was not credible, and concluded that, having failed to prove or credibly demonstrate his refugee status pursuant to section 7 of the Asylum Act, the applicant was not a refugee as defined in section 3 of the Asylum Act. 20.  The State Secretariat for Migration pointed out that the applicant had stated in the first hearing that he had been detained for a period of one year and three months, from June 2012 to September 2013, whereas in the second hearing he had said that he had been detained for seven months, from March to October 2013. It added that the applicant had also contradicted himself a number of times in the second hearing in relation to the commencement of his military training and the end of his schooling. Furthermore, his account as regards his time in prison and his escape from prison lacked substance, and he could not provide details as to what he had learned during his military training. 21.  The State Secretariat for Migration also found that the applicant\u2019s submissions regarding his illegal exit from Eritrea were not credible. Despite being asked several times to provide a detailed account of his departure or specific events in that connection, the applicant\u2019s statement in that regard was superficial and limited to phrases. The State Secretariat for Migration argued that, particularly in relation to the hours during which the applicant and the smuggler had lost their way, it could legitimately be expected that the applicant would provide a substantiated account, which he had failed to do. Nor had he provided a consistent account in that regard. Moreover, he had made contradictory statements as to how long he had stayed at home between escaping from prison and leaving the country. 22.  On 14 April 2016 the applicant lodged an appeal against that decision before the Federal Administrative Court. He submitted that the authorities had initially refrained from drafting him because of his role as a deacon \u2013 the fact that he was a deacon not having been contested by the asylum authority. He referred to a report of the European Asylum Support Office (EASO), which stated that the relevant authorities had, at times, deferred the draft of clerics, until a change in practice in 2010 had led to a stricter approach (see paragraph 49 below). The applicant submitted that he had had to undergo his military training in Wi\u2019a, a place to which, according to a report by the US Department of State (see paragraph 51), students with poor grades were typically assigned. Shortly after reporting for duty, he had attempted to escape. He had been caught and, as a result, detained in March 2013. He had managed to escape from detention in September 2013 after seven months. Fearing that he would be detained once again or forced to perform military service, he had decided in early October 2013 to leave the country illegally. His family had organised a smuggler. They had fled during the night and, while attempting to cross the border at Mereb, had lost their way. They had been apprehended by Ethiopian soldiers early in the morning of 4 October 2013 and taken to Endabaguna. One week later, they had been transferred to the Hitsas refugee camp. 23.  With regard to the alleged discrepancies relating to his schooling, the applicant submitted that he had difficulties with dates concerning the duration of his schooling and his age when he had started and left school, but emphasised that he had consistently stated that he had left school after eighth grade, having failed the exams to move on to secondary school, and referred to a report by EASO regarding the national examination at the end of eighth grade (see paragraph 49 below). Also, during the hearing he had corrected himself in relation to the commencement of his military training. Furthermore, it was comprehensible that he could not give a detailed account about things which he had learned during that training, given that he had attempted to escape almost immediately after reporting for duty. 24.  The applicant claimed that the discrepancies between his statements in the first and the second hearings concerning the duration of his detention were due to his poor level of education. He emphasised that his statements as regards the time of the end of his detention, September 2013, were consistent. In relation to the conditions of detention, he argued that the account he had given to the asylum authorities very much reflected his personal experiences: he had stated that the prison had been dirty, that it had been very hot, that detainees had had lice, that there had been fixed meal times, and that he had been taken outside in the mornings and evenings to relieve himself. In light of this monotonous pattern, the mistake, if any, had been on the part of the interviewer, who had asked for a description of specific events. In that regard, the applicant argued that his account that he had been beaten with a wooden stick and kicked while lying on the ground in front of everyone as punishment related to a specific personal event. He emphasised that the interviewer had not questioned him about his scars, which he alleged were the result of that incident, or about specific events surrounding his escape from prison, pointing out that the latter issue had been raised by the representative of the non-governmental organisation who had been present as a neutral witness at the second hearing. As to the time between his escape from prison and his departure from Eritrea, the applicant argued that his first statement that he had left Eritrea one week after escaping from prison, and his second statement that he had spent two days at his parents\u2019 home in A. during that time, were not contradictory. 25.  With regard to the circumstances of his departure from Eritrea, he emphasised that his account had been consistent as regards the time when he and the smuggler had left the village and when they had been apprehended by Ethiopian soldiers. It was only logical that he could not make detailed statements about the area, as he had no knowledge of that area and had fled during the night. His most prominent memory related to the fears he had experienced when they lost their way. He could also recall the exact words in Amharic used by the Ethiopian soldiers when they had been apprehended. His account, which revolved around feelings of thirst, hunger and fear, and which mentioned the many thorn bushes in their way and the howling of hyenas, corresponded to his young age and poor level of education. Moreover, the State Secretariat for Migration had wrongfully concluded that there was a contradiction in his statements concerning the smuggler\u2019s reaction when they had lost their way. 26.  Lastly, the applicant submitted that he did not belong to any of the groups of people who could possibly obtain a visa to exit Eritrea. Referring to a letter from UNHCR \u2013 the original of which he presented \u2013 stating that he was registered in the Hitsas refugee camp in Ethiopia on 8 November 2013, and to the fact that crossing the border to enter Ethiopia by land was always unlawful (see paragraph 49 below), he argued that he had proved his illegal exit from Eritrea. 27.  In conclusion, the applicant argued that he was a refugee as defined in section 3 of the Asylum Act, on account of his fear of ill-treatment for having deserted from military service. In the alternative, he claimed to qualify for temporary admission because of \u201csubjective post-flight grounds\u201d (as set out in section 54 of the Asylum Act), notably his illegal exit from Eritrea and his asylum application in Switzerland. Further, in the alternative, he alleged that his removal to Eritrea was neither permitted in the light of Article 3 of the Convention nor reasonable, entitling him to temporary admission to Switzerland. 28.  On 9 May 2016 the Federal Administrative Court rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal, finding that he had failed to credibly demonstrate his asylum claim. It noted that it was not apparent why the applicant\u2019s age \u2013 he was 24 years old at the time of his interviews \u2013 or level of education should lead to different conclusions as to the credibility of his account, and considered that his two statements concerning the end of his schooling, either in 2005/2006 or 2007/2008, could not be reconciled with each other or with his student identity card, which indicated that he was a student in 2010. The court also considered that the applicant\u2019s statements regarding the time and content of his military training lacked substance. It commented that, even if the applicant had left the military shortly after reporting for duty, he could be expected to provide a detailed and specific account of it, given that he merely had to talk about something which he had experienced in person. Viewing the duration and dates of the applicant\u2019s detention as key elements of his asylum claim, the court noted that a discrepancy of eight months as regards the duration, and the different dates given in the first two hearings as regards the end of the detention, constituted fundamental contradictions which could not be resolved by his references to conditions of poor hygiene and being let outside twice a day to relieve himself. 29.  Referring to its judgment in an earlier case concerning Eritrea, the court reiterated that the only way to exit Eritrea legally was with a valid passport and an additional exit visa, and that the practice concerning the issuance of an exit visa was very restrictive. They were issued to a few people who were considered loyal, in exchange for payment of significant sums. As a rule, children aged 11 or more, men under the age of 54, and women under the age of 47, were not granted exit visas. People attempting to leave the country without authorisation risked their life, as the border guards were under orders to prevent attempts to flee by way of targeted shots (a \u201cshoot to kill\u201d policy), in addition to imposing punishment as set out by law. The Eritrean Government viewed illegal exits as an indication of political opposition, and tried to get both the reduction in defence readiness and the mass exodus under control through draconian measures. 30.  The Federal Administrative Court noted that finding that the applicant had concealed the true circumstances of his departure was not in itself sufficient to conclude that he had left the country legally. However, the burden of proof did not shift to the authorities, and the applicant was required to provide a substantiated and consistent account concerning the reasons for and circumstances of his departure. Considering that his account given at first-instance level was not credible, which also raised doubts about his overall credibility, and that he had not provided comprehensible explanations in his submissions on appeal, the court found that the applicant had failed to credibly demonstrate that he had left Eritrea illegally. 31.  The Federal Administrative Court added that the applicant could not rely on the letter from UNHCR stating that he was registered in the Hitsas refugee camp in November 2013, since the conditions in Ethiopian refugee camps were chaotic and, in the case of people of Eritrean origin, there was no comprehensive assessment of whether they faced persecution at the time they were registered in those camps. This was supported by the wording of the registration, which read that it constituted a recognition prima facie that the applicant was a refugee within the mandate of UNHCR. 32.  Furthermore, the court found that the applicant\u2019s removal was possible, permitted and reasonable within the meaning of section 83(1)-(4) of the Aliens Act. In particular, the applicant was a young man in good health who had a support network in his hometown, notably his wife and their son, who lived in the same house as his parents. 33.  On 19 May 2016 the State Secretariat for Migration set a deadline for the applicant\u2019s voluntary departure, which passed on 17 July 2016.", "references": ["3", "8", "0", "6", "4", "5", "7", "9", "1", "2", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1978 and lives in Berezniki, Perm region, together with her son, born in 2001. She is a single mother. 6.  At the material time the applicant was teaching physical education in a secondary school in Berenzniki. 7.  In November 2007 the applicant learnt that a photograph of her son had been published on the cover page of a booklet prepared by the Centre for Psychological, Medical and Social Support of the Usolskiy District, Perm region (\u201cthe Centre\u201d), entitled \u201cChildren need a family\u201d. 8.  The booklet consisted of six pages, including the cover page. The boy\u2019s photograph occupied the major part of the cover page and showed his face. Above the photograph there was a slogan \u201cChildren need a family\u201d. At the bottom of the cover page, just under the photograph were the words: \u201cCentre for Psychological, Medical and Social Support, town of Usoliye\u201d. The second page contained two more photographs of other children, with citations from the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Russian Family Code. The third page was headed \u201cForms of replacing family care\u201d and presented the various arrangements: adoptive family, tutorial family, foster home and others. The remaining pages informed the readers about the creation in the district of the Municipal Centre for Psychological, Medical and Social Support, the role of which was to protect orphans and assist families in adopting them. They explained what kind of support and advice families could seek in the Centre and how they could help orphans. On the last page the following was written:\n\u201cIf you wish to save a child from loneliness and give him a hearth and home, come to us!\u201d 9.  The applicant alleged that she had not been informed about the booklet, let alone asked for authorisation for a photograph of her son to be published. 10.  In November 2007 the applicant asked the local department of the interior and the prosecutor\u2019s office to carry out an investigation into the unauthorised publication of her son\u2019s photograph on the booklet. 11.  In December 2007 the department of the interior replied that there were no grounds to institute criminal proceedings. 12.  On 9 January 2008 the district prosecutor informed the applicant that the booklet had been prepared and published by a publishing company, A., at the request of the Centre. In total, 200 copies of the booklet had been published. The photograph of the child had been placed on the booklet by Mr P., who had been engaged by that company to prepare the layout of the booklet and who had found the photograph of the applicant\u2019s son on the Internet. It was impossible to establish from which website the photograph of the child had been taken. The prosecutor advised the applicant to bring court proceedings to protect her rights. 13.  The applicant did not lodge any judicial appeal against those replies. 14.  In March 2008 the applicant instituted civil proceedings against the Centre before the Usolskiy District Court, Perm Region (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) on her own behalf and on behalf of her minor son. 15.  In her statement of claim the applicant complained that her and her son\u2019s honour, dignity and reputation had been damaged by the unlawful publication of her son\u2019s photograph in a booklet calling for adoption. In particular, the photograph had been published without her authorisation and knowledge. The booklet had been distributed in various organisations in the town of Usoliye and in the Usolskiy District, Perm region (libraries, hospitals, police departments) and had provoked a negative attitude towards her and her son on the part of her colleagues, neighbours and those close to her. People thought that she had abandoned her son. The boy had become a victim of mockery in the kindergarten. The publication of the photograph had also affected her honour and dignity and her reputation as a schoolteacher. She requested that the court, with reference to Articles 151 and 152 of the Russian Civil Code (see Relevant domestic law and practice below), award her non-pecuniary damages and order the publishing company to apologise for the publication of the photograph. 16.  On 23 April 2008 the District Court held, with the applicant\u2019s consent, that the Centre was not a proper respondent in the case and that the claim should have been made against the publishing company and Mr P. The Centre was invited to take part in the proceedings as a third party. 17.  The publishing company contested the applicant\u2019s claims. It submitted that the material which had been presented to the court showed that a certain Mr Sh. had taken the photograph of the applicant\u2019s son with the knowledge of the applicant. Mr Sh. had not informed the applicant of his intentions or the ways in which the photograph might be further used. Nor had he received any written authorisation from the applicant for its use. Mr P., who had been engaged by the company for the preparation of the layout of the booklet, had found the photograph on the Internet and placed it on the cover page of the booklet. 18.  The publishing company considered that it had not been obliged to verify whether prior consent had been received for publication of the photograph in the booklet for two reasons. First, it was not responsible for the actions of Mr P., who had been working for the company on a contractual basis. Secondly, under Article 152.1 of the Civil Code (see Relevant domestic law below), consent to the use of a photograph was not required when the image was being used in the interests of the State, or in social or other public interests. By ordering the booklet, the Centre had been pursuing social and public interests and calling for mercy to be shown to orphans. The company concluded that the damage had been caused to the applicant by Mr Sh. and, therefore, the company should be exempted from liability for damage. 19.  Mr P. submitted to the court that in 2004 he had gone travelling together with his friend Sh., who was a photographer. Sh. had openly taken photographs of other tourists, including a photograph of the applicant\u2019s son. After their return, Sh. had sent him electronic copies of those photographs and since that time they had been saved in his computer. In 2007 he (Mr P.) had been temporarily working for the publishing company and had been asked to prepare the layout of the booklet. The text and some photographs had been provided by the Centre. He searched in his computer for more photographs to be placed in the booklet and saw the picture of the applicant\u2019s son, which seemed to fit the booklet well. He therefore placed it on the cover page. He did not know who the boy on the photograph was. 20.  The representative of the Centre, acting as a third party, submitted that the use of the photograph of the applicant\u2019s son had not been agreed with the Centre. He also submitted that the booklet did not call for adoption; it was intended to provide information about the Centre. He replied to a question put by the court that after publication of the booklet, a number of people had called the Centre and asked whether it was possible to adopt the child whose photograph was on the cover page of the booklet. 21.  It appears from the record of the court hearings that the applicant\u2019s representative, G., submitted to the court that it had been established that the photograph of the applicant\u2019s son had been used on the booklet without his parent\u2019s consent, contrary to the requirements of Article 152.1 of the Civil Code. That provision was concordant with the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights (\u201cthe Convention\u201d) protecting private and family life. The publication of the photograph in the booklet constituted unlawful interference with the applicant\u2019s private life and therefore the publishing company was under an obligation to pay compensation for non\u2011pecuniary damage sustained by the applicant. 22. The publishing company contested the application of Article 152.1 of the Civil Code in the case and considered that the applicant\u2019s consent to the publication of her son\u2019s photograph had not been required. 23.  On 20 June 2008 the District Court examined and dismissed the applicant\u2019s claims. The judgment consisted of a summary of the submissions of the parties and the third party, a summary of the relevant domestic law, a summary of the witnesses\u2019 submissions and other evidence examined by the court, and several paragraphs of conclusions. In particular, the District Court held as follows:\n\u201c... The court has established that the honour, dignity and professional reputation of the plaintiff were not affected by the publication of the booklet with the photograph of the plaintiff\u2019s son. Thus, all witnesses submitted that they did not have any hostile feelings towards Mrs Bogomolova, the attitude [towards Mrs Bogomolova] of all those questioned [in the court hearing] remained the same: friendly, amicable; they were not aware of any instances of insults, reproaches in respect of the plaintiff. In the subjective view of the witnesses, the booklet in itself had a positive scope. The plaintiff\u2019s professional reputation was not affected by the publication of the booklet in any way, since the plaintiff had provided the court with positive references from her workplace, where her pedagogical competences were highly appreciated.\nThe content of the booklet had a positive scope aimed at providing information, did not contain any defamatory details; the photograph on the booklet did not have any defects, and the text in the booklet did not contain any defamatory details either. None of the information in the booklet indicated that defamatory information had been disseminated; it did not diminish the honour, dignity and reputation of Mrs Bogomolova or of her minor son.\nTherefore, the evidence submitted [to the court] has demonstrated [that the booklet had] a strictly value character, and did not contain any defamatory details, diminishing the plaintiff\u2019s and her son\u2019s honour, dignity and reputation in the public\u2019s opinion and the opinion of certain individuals.\nTo make negative assumptions in respect of the booklet with the photograph of the plaintiff\u2019s son on the front page amounts to an individual value judgment, which has not been included in the content and meaning of that information booklet. The court takes into account that on several occasions in 2004 the plaintiff authorised Mr Sh., a photographer familiar to her, to take photographs of her son. Sh. then forwarded the photographs to painter Mr P., who [in his turn] then placed [one of] the photograph[s] in the booklet. Mrs Bogomolova did not place any restrictions or conditions on the use of those photographs, did not seek to find out what had happened to those photographs. In addition, it follows from witness statements that after publication of the booklet, the plaintiff showed it to persons around her and at her workplace and annotated it in an emotionally skewed way, and thus disseminated false information about herself and her son with reference to the photograph [on the booklet].\n...\nTaking into account that it has not been established in the court hearing that there was any information discrediting the honour, dignity and reputation of the plaintiff and her minor son, her claims of compensation for non-pecuniary damage should be dismissed. The court also considers that the plaintiff\u2019s claims concerning the imposition of an obligation on the defendant to provide public apologies in the SMI [mass media] ... should be dismissed ...\u201d 24.  On 25 June 2008 the applicant resigned from her job. 25.  In an appeal against the judgment of 20 June 2008 the applicant submitted, in particular, that in taking its decision the District Court had not applied the provisions of Article 152.1 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation concerning the protection of one\u2019s image or the provisions of Article 8 of the Convention. She argued that in the absence of parental consent to the use of her son\u2019s photograph, her claim should have been granted in accordance with the above provisions. She expanded on her position with the following arguments. 26.  The booklet had been distributed in several towns in the Perm region, including Usoliye, where her parents lived, and Berezniki, where she and her son lived. She had worked for a long time in those towns and a lot of people knew her and her family. After seeing her son\u2019s photograph on the booklet, people who knew her, including the parents of her pupils, thought that she could no longer take care of her son because she had been deprived of her parental rights. She had had to explain to her neighbours, friends and colleagues that her family was doing well and that her son was living with her. Since the publication of the booklet, children in the kindergarten had started calling her son \u201clittle vagrant\u201d and \u201cpoor orphan\u201d. She had been obliged to quit her job because of comments made by the parents of her pupils. The booklet provoked a feeling of pity towards children abandoned by their parents and at the same time it aroused feelings of indignation towards their parents. 27.  On 19 August 2008 the Regional Court upheld the decision of 20 June 2008, finding it lawful and duly reasoned. Regarding the applicant\u2019s argument about the District Court\u2019s failure to examine her claims under Article 152.1 of the Civil Code, the Regional Court held that the court had taken a decision on the claims as they had been submitted by the applicant, in accordance with Article 196 \u00a7 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure (see Relevant domestic law and practice below). The applicant\u2019s claims were based on the infringement by the defendants of her right to honour, dignity and reputation. She had not raised any claims on the grounds contained in Article 152.1 of the Civil Code. 28.  By a judgment of 20 January 2009 the Justice of Peace of the Bereznikovskiy Circuit granted the Centre\u2019s claim for recovery from the applicant of the legal costs it had incurred when it had taken part in the libel proceedings as a third party, in the amount of 5,200 Russian roubles.", "references": ["5", "7", "9", "1", "0", "8", "6", "2", "3", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in Zimbabwe and lives in London. 6.  The applicant arrived in the United Kingdom in May 2001 and was granted six months\u2019 leave to enter as a visitor. In or around 2003 he began suffering from a mental illness which led to his hearing voices in his head and at least two suicide attempts. 7.  In 2004 and 2005 the applicant was convicted of a number of driving offences, including driving otherwise than in accordance with a licence, using a vehicle while uninsured and driving whilst disqualified. He was also convicted of resisting or obstructing a police officer and failing to surrender to custody. No custodial sentence was passed. 8.  On 18 April 2005 the applicant made an application for asylum. However, the application was refused on 22 June 2005 on non-compliance grounds as the applicant had failed to attend his substantive asylum interview. Notice of this decision was served on the applicant on 27 June 2005. On the same day, he was served with notice of liability to removal as an overstayer. 9.  The applicant did not appeal against this decision. When he subsequently failed to comply with his reporting conditions he was treated as an absconder. 10.  On 13 August 2007 he was convicted of possessing Class A drugs with intent to supply and sentenced to three years\u2019 imprisonment. He did not appeal against conviction or sentence. 11.  While serving his sentence the applicant was prescribed a variety of anti\u2011psychotic drugs. This was the first time he had received any treatment for his mental illness as he had previously declined to engage with psychiatrists and other health care professionals. 12.  The applicant made a second asylum application on 27 March 2008. In doing so, he described two violent incidents he had experienced in Zimbabwe: first, he claimed that in 2000 he had been attacked by Zanu-PF supporters with knives, sticks and sandbags while protesting about gay rights; and secondly, he claimed that later that same year he had been arrested for demonstrating and beaten on his back and the soles of his feet while detained at a police station. 13.  On 30 October 2008 the applicant was interviewed in relation to his second asylum claim. 14.  On 14 November 2008 the applicant was served with a notice of liability to automatic deportation. As a consequence, when he completed his sentence on 28 November 2008 he remained in detention under the Secretary of State for the Home Department\u2019s immigration powers. 15.  On 20 February 2009 the applicant was admitted to hospital for a psychiatric assessment and was sectioned for six days after his mental health deteriorated significantly. 16.  On 26 May 2009, a further asylum interview took place following which the applicant submitted further evidence in support of his claim. 17.  On 22 October 2009, an interview took place with the applicant for the purposes of obtaining a travel document. The applicant refused to provide bio-data for the purposes of the travel document asking to contact his solicitor first. 18.  On 3 November 2009 the applicant\u2019s representatives asked the Government to allow them more time to submit medical evidence supporting the applicant\u2019s second asylum claim. The Government did not indicate whether they responded to this request. 19.  On 3 December 2009 the applicant applied for bail which was refused on 9 December because the tribunal judged he posed an unacceptable risk of absconding. 20.  On 16 February 2010 the Secretary of State enquired of the applicant\u2019s representatives about their intentions concerning the medical report. The applicant\u2019s representatives indicated they had requested an appointment and asserted that it would be unreasonable for the Secretary of State to make a decision without awaiting the outcome. On 10 June 2010 the Secretary of State telephoned the applicant\u2019s representatives again to ask what their intentions were regarding the medical report. The representatives indicated they would reply in writing. 21.  On 22 June 2010 the applicant was interviewed again to obtain further bio-data to issue a travel document but he would not provide further details. 22.  On 28 June 2010 the applicant\u2019s representatives wrote to the Secretary of State. The letter stated that his detention was unlawful and that he should be released. The representatives sent a second letter to the Secretary of State on 8 July 2010, in which they again requested that the applicant be released due to his medical conditions and pursuant to the Secretary of State\u2019s policy on not detaining mentally ill persons. 23.  The Secretary of State replied to these letters on 12 July 2010 in the following terms:\n\u201c1.  The Secretary of State, having considered the particulars of your client\u2019s case, is satisfied that the presumption in favour of release is outweighed by the seriousness of the offence, risk of harm to the public, and risk of absconding and that your client\u2019s detention is justified and lawful. 2.  It has been decided that your client should be detained because:\n- Your client is likely to abscond if given temporary admission or release.\n- Your client does not have close enough ties (e.g. family or friends) to make it likely that he will stay in one place.\n- Your client has previously failed to comply with conditions of his stay, temporary admission or release.\n- Your client has previously absconded.\n- Your client has used or attempted to use deception in a way that leads us to consider he may continue to deceive.\n- Your client has not produced satisfactory evidence of his identity, nationality, or lawful basis to be in the United Kingdom.\n- Your client has previously failed or refused to leave the United Kingdom when required to do so.\n- It is conducive to the public good for your client to be detained.\u201d 24.  On 26 July 2010 the Secretary of State set a time limit of 31 August 2010 for the provision of further information in support of the applicant\u2019s asylum claim. 25.  On 28 August 2010 the applicant was examined by Dr S. and her expert report, dated 3 October 2010, was sent to the Secretary of State on 22 November 2010. 26.  Dr. S noted that the applicant had a number of scars which accorded with his description of the first assault by supporters of Zanu-PF. She also noted that he had a clear history of a psychotic illness which was characterised by many first-rank symptoms of schizophrenia. He was being treated but still experienced some symptoms, including auditory hallucinations and ideas of reference. In addition, he had symptoms of post\u2011traumatic stress disorder, including poor sleep, nightmares, intrusive daytime thoughts, and physical symptoms of fear, hopelessness and isolation. 27.  On 3 November 2010 the detention centre where the applicant was detained raised concerns about his mental health. He was assessed by the Health Care Manager as unsuitable for detention under the Mental Health Act on 8 November 2010 and on 12 November 2010 as not requiring compulsory mental health treatment. 28.  On 16 November 2010 the applicant applied to the tribunal for bail but withdrew his application on 19 November. 29.  On 22 November 2010, the medical report was provided to the Secretary of State. 30.  On 14 January 2011 the applicant submitted his application for permission to apply for judicial review, in which he challenged his continuing detention on the grounds that it was contrary to the Secretary of State\u2019s published policy on the detention of persons suffering from serious mental illness (\u201cthe mental health concession\u201d); that it was contrary to the Secretary of State\u2019s published policy on the detention of persons who had been victims of torture (\u201cthe torture concession\u201d); and that it was contrary to the principles set down in R v. Durham Prison Governor ex parte Hardial Singh [1984] 1 WLR 704 (\u201cthe Hardial Singh principles\u201d). The applicant also claimed damages for unlawful detention. 31.  On 18 January 2011, the applicant\u2019s representatives sent a new medical report and informed the Secretary of State that they were no longer relying on the medical report provided on 22 November 2010. 32.  On 8 February 2011 the Secretary of State refused the applicant\u2019s second asylum claim and made a deportation order pursuant to section 32(5) of the United Kingdom Borders Act 2007. The applicant\u2019s appeal was dismissed on 7 April 2011. On 4 May he was refused permission to appeal against that decision. 33.  On 3 June 2011 the applicant was refused permission to apply for judicial review on the papers by Mr Justice Calvert-Smith. In refusing permission, he observed that the mental health concession only applied where the detainee was suffering from a serious mental illness which could not be satisfactorily managed within detention. As a consequence, he concluded that the applicant\u2019s condition fell short of the severity required. 34.  With regard to the torture concession, the judge noted that the alleged torture which had happened some eleven years previously and which was said to be the cause or part cause of the mental illness the claimant was suffering from could have no bearing on the reasonableness or otherwise of the current detention. Finally, he found that the Hardial Singh principles were not infringed because:\n\u201ca.  the 1st principle is not engaged.\nb.  The 2nd and 3rd principles are not infringed. The dangers of absconscion and reoffending are and have always been real in view of the claimant\u2019s behaviour between July 2005 and his arrest in respect of the drugs matter. The recent decision of October 2010 means that the detention is not open-ended.\nc.  the 4th principle is not infringed. There has been no lack of expedition by the defendant since the expiry of the claimant\u2019s sentence in late 2008.\u201d 35.  The applicant was released from detention on 15 September 2011 after being granted bail by the Upper Tribunal. 36.  On 28 October 2011 the applicant was again refused permission to apply for judicial review by Mr Justice Ouseley at a renewed oral hearing in which he heard from representatives for both parties. In the renewed application, the applicant had contended that his detention became unlawful on 28 June 2010, when the pre-action letter was sent to the Secretary of State. However, Mr Justice Ouseley rejected that claim and found that the applicant had no arguable case. In particular, he noted that there was no evidence to suggest that his mental illness could not be satisfactorily managed in detention; that there was no independent evidence that he had been tortured because his scarring was only consistent with an assault by Zanu-PF supporters which did not amount to torture, and there was no scarring consistent with his allegations of ill-treatment at the police station; and finally, that there was nothing to indicate the applicant\u2019s prospects of removal at the relevant time were nil or that efforts did not take place to effect his removal. 37.  On 22 February 2012 the Court of Appeal, Civil Division refused the applicant permission to appeal the decision of 31 October 2011, finding that the High Court had been correct on every point. There was no independent evidence of torture and the fact that the mental health concession had been clarified on 26 August 2010 to refer to satisfactory management in detention did not mean that the position was otherwise before that date. 38.  In the meantime, the applicant had challenged the decision to refuse his asylum claim and sought to appeal to the Court of Appeal. On 28 April 2012 the Secretary of State agreed that the decision of 8 February 2011 refusing the applicant\u2019s asylum claim was flawed and that the case should be remitted to the Upper Tribunal. 39.  On 20 November 2012 the Upper Tribunal allowed the applicant\u2019s asylum appeal on human rights grounds. On 30 January 2013 the deportation order was revoked and the applicant was subsequently granted discretionary leave until 25 September 2013. He applied for further discretionary leave on 26 September 2013. According to the observations submitted, a decision on that application remains outstanding.", "references": ["9", "5", "1", "8", "4", "0", "6", "3", "7", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "6.  On 11 December 2002 the applicant instituted proceedings for restitution of a hotel in Skopje which had been confiscated from his predecessor in 1948. On 7 June 2004 a commission responsible for such matters within the Ministry of Finance dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim. On 27 July 2004 he appealed. On 16 November 2004 a second-instance commission set up within the Government dismissed his appeal. Subsequently, the case went back and forth several times between the administrative bodies and courts at two levels of jurisdiction. The proceedings are currently pending before the Higher Administrative Court, awaiting a decision on an appeal by the applicant of 26 January 2016 against a judgment of the Administrative Court. 7.  On 3 July 2014 the applicant applied to the Supreme Court for a ruling that the length of the restitution proceedings had been excessive, to award him compensation and set a three-month time-limit for the court dealing with his case to decide on his restitution claim. 8.  By letters dispatched between 8 July 2014 (received on 3 September 2014) and 20 January 2015, the Supreme Court requested the case file from the Administrative Court. The case file, which was with the administrative bodies, was forwarded to the Supreme Court on 13 February 2015. 9.  On 28 April 2015 the first-instance panel of the Supreme Court found that the relevant period to be taken into consideration had started to run on 16 November 2004 (see paragraph 6 above). It further established that the case had not been complex and that there had been no delays attributable to the applicant. It concluded that there had been a violation of the applicant\u2019s right to a hearing within a reasonable time and awarded him the equivalent of 810 euros (EUR) in compensation. 10.  By a letter of 3 June 2015 (received on 10 August 2015), the Supreme Court asked the Ministry of Justice to provide assistance in delivering its decision because the applicant lived in Serbia. Between 25 August and 21 December 2015, the Ministry of Justice of the respondent State asked, on three occasions, that the relevant Ministry in Serbia serve the Supreme Court\u2019s decision on the applicant. By a letter of 28 December 2015 (received on 10 March 2016), the Ministry of Justice of Serbia informed the relevant Ministry of the respondent State about the date of service of the Supreme Court\u2019s decision to the applicant. 11.  In an appeal against the Supreme Court\u2019s decision of 28 April 2015, the applicant complained that it had taken too long for that court to decide on his application. He referred to section 36(4) of the Courts Act, which required the Supreme Court to decide on a length of proceedings remedy within six months (see paragraph 14 below). He also complained that the amount of compensation awarded to him had been too low. 12.  On 21 March 2016 the second-instance panel of the Supreme Court ruled partly in favour of the applicant. It endorsed the findings of the first-instance panel regarding the complexity of the case and that no delays were attributable to the applicant, found that the proceedings had lasted for ten years, five months and twelve days and set compensation at the equivalent of EUR 1,050.", "references": ["4", "8", "7", "2", "5", "1", "6", "9", "0", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Oss\u00e8s. 6.  On 17 January 2008 he attended a rally organised by a Basque agricultural trade union and by the GFAM (a mutual-benefit land alliance), the \u201cLurra\u201d, on the occasion of a meeting of the Technical Committee of the Land Use and Rural Settlement Corporation (SAFER) in the Pyr\u00e9n\u00e9es-Atlantiques D\u00e9partement. That meeting had been aimed at producing an opinion on the use of the land comprising a farm which Mr F.L. had been operating for several years. The rally was held in a political and trade-union situation where tensions had been heightened by the fact that the majority agricultural union in the D\u00e9partement was backing candidates other than Mr F.L. At the end of the meeting scuffles broke out between the demonstrators and the gendarmerie. 7.  The applicant was placed in police custody and brought before the Bayonne Criminal Court under \u201cimmediate summary trial\u201d procedure, and charged with intentional violence not entailing total unfitness for work, against gendarmes whose identity has not been established, and against a person exercising public authority, using or threatening to use a weapon, in this instance an umbrella. 8.  By judgment of 13 March 2008, the applicant was sentenced to two months\u2019 imprisonment, suspended, for having struck gendarmes with an umbrella, which incident had not entailed unfitness for work on the latter\u2019s part. In its judgment, the court noted that the applicant had refused to answer questions during the investigation or to admit to any wrongdoing, and had denied that he had been carrying an umbrella. The judges noted that witnesses had nevertheless stated that he had attempted to cross the barrier by clambering over demonstrators and trying to hit the gendarmes with his umbrella. The applicant pointed out that he had refrained from appealing in order to calm the situation and in the framework of a friendly settlement of the dispute that had been the cause of the rally. 9.  On 24 December 2008, following a request from the Bayonne Public Prosecutor\u2019s Office, the applicant was ordered by the police to give a DNA sample, on the basis of Articles 706-55 and 706-56 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CPP). He was brought before the Criminal Court on 19 May 2009 for refusing to give the sample. 10.  By judgment of 27 October 2009, the Bayonne Regional Court imposed on the applicant a fine of five hundred euros. 11.  On 3 February 2011 the Pau Court of Appeal upheld that judgment. As regards the legal aspect of the offence, it stated, in particular, that unlike the applicants in the case of S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom ([GC], nos. 30562/04 and 30566/04, ECHR 2008), the applicant had been convicted, rather than suspected, of an offence, which precluded him from arguing that the impugned judgment had entailed a disproportionate interference with his private life. Relying, in particular, on the 16 September 2010 decision of the Constitutional Council (see paragraph 16 below), it held that \u201cthe provisions of national law applied [to the applicant] were such as to reconcile respect for private life and the protection of public order in a manner that was neither manifestly unbalanced nor in breach of the requirements of Article 8 of the Convention\u201d. In connection with the substantive aspect of the offence, the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s plea that a sample had already been taken from his headgear during his police custody and that he was entitled to refuse further sampling, given that there had been no DNA profiling the first time. 12.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. His first plea was that the sample geared to identifying his DNA and storing the corresponding data amounted to a disproportionate interference with his private life, having regard to the duration of the data storage and his personal situation (an easily identifiable person who was socially well-established, with a job, a family and a fixed abode). In his second plea, he argued that the Court of Appeal had provided no reasons for its decision in connection with the substantive aspect of the offence. 13.  By judgment of 28 September 2011, the Court of Cassation dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law as follows:\n\u201c... the Court of Appeal responded adequately and cogently to the main points of the pleadings submitted to it, and characterised all the substantive and purposive aspects of the offence of refusing to undergo a biological test, of which it found the defendant guilty, in full compliance with the provisions of Article 8 of the Convention.\u201d", "references": ["2", "5", "3", "7", "8", "0", "6", "9", "1", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "5.  The facts, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 6.  All four applicants were dismissed by their respective employers and subsequently brought separate civil claims against them, seeking reinstatement and/or pecuniary damages. They all obtained final court decisions in their favour, which remain unenforced to the present day. The debtor companies were registered as fully or predominantly socially/State-owned companies in the relevant public registers before and throughout the relevant insolvency/enforcement proceedings. 7.  On 26 May 2004 the applicant was dismissed by his employer, DP Udarnik, a transport and transshipment company based in Belgrade (currently registered as Socially-owned company Udarnik (in liquidation)). On 9 June 2004 the applicant brought a civil action challenging that decision. He withdrew the request he had made for his outstanding salary on 20 December 2006. On the same date, the Third Belgrade Municipal Court:\n(a)  declared the employer\u2019s decision null and void;\n(b)  ordered the applicant\u2019s reinstatement within eight days, and\n(c)  awarded the applicant RSD 49,500 on account of costs. 8.  The Belgrade District Court upheld the judgment on 10 July 2008. It became enforceable on 26 December 2008. 9.  In the meantime, the debtor company appears to have been subject to insolvency proceedings before the Commercial Court between 19 March and 14 May 2007. On the latter date the insolvency proceedings were stayed (obustavljen) and the debtor continued its business activities. 10.  On 21 January 2009 the applicant filed a request for enforcement of the judgment of 20 December 2006 and the payment of the outstanding salaries till his reinstatement, submitting amendments on 6 March 2009. It would appear that the court sent the request to the debtor for comment on 2 April 2009, but it has not been served on the debtor. Throughout 2009 the applicant complained at least five times to the enforcement court about its failure to issue an enforcement order. In his complaint of 31 August 2009, the applicant submitted that the debtor was an active company and, in that respect, provided a copy of the decision on staying of insolvency proceedings of May 2007, certified by the Commercial Court. 11.  On 13 October 2009 the enforcement court rejected the applicant\u2019s request, incorrectly stating that the debtor was subject to pending insolvency proceedings (see paragraph 9 above). The applicant unsuccessfully appealed and wrote to the enforcement court again on numerous occasions. 12.  In the meantime, between July 2009 and November 2011, attempts at liquidation of the debtor failed, as there were not enough assets to settle all the creditors\u2019 claims. Another set of insolvency proceedings in respect of the debtor was opened on 19 December 2011, which appears to be still pending. The applicant registered his claim for costs within the insolvency proceedings. After a division of property, he received 2.89% of his claim for costs. 13.  Between 1990 and 2007 the applicant was employed by Ra\u0161ka Holding AD \u2013 Pamu\u010dna predionica DOO, a company based in Novi Pazar. She was placed by her employer on compulsory paid leave until such time as normal production could be resumed and the company\u2019s business performance had improved sufficiently. Whilst on leave, in accordance with the relevant domestic legislation, the applicant was entitled to a significantly reduced monthly income and payment of her pension, disability and other social security contributions. 14.  In February 2007 many employees on compulsory leave were made redundant and took part in the Government\u2019s \u201csocial programme\u201d. After enquiring about her entitlements, on 14 March 2007 the applicant was served with a decision dated 18 March 1991 concerning her dismissal. 15.  On 9 July 2007 the Novi Pazar Municipal Court declared the dismissal null and void and ordered her employer to:\n(i)  reinstate her within eight days to a post which corresponded to her professional qualifications;\n(ii)  pay her the minimum salary arrears for the period 8 November 1990 to 16 March 2007, together with statutory interest;\n(iii)  pay her pension and disability insurance contributions for the period 1 January 1994 to 16 March 2007; and\n(iv)  pay RSD 11,700 for her legal costs. 16. The judgment became final on 5 September 2007 and the Municipal Court ordered its enforcement on 3 December 2007. In the meantime, on 22 October 2007 the applicant was made redundant. 17.  Following a claim by the applicant, on 6 May 2008 the Municipal Court ordered her employer to pay her pension and disability insurance contributions for the period 16 March to 22 October 2007 and RSD 13,000 for her legal costs, while rejecting her claim for her outstanding salary for the same period. The judgment became final on 22 January 2009. The enforcement courts rejected a request by the applicant for enforcement. On 24 February 2011 the Supreme Court issued an instruction stating that enforcement proceedings should be initiated, and an enforcement order was adopted on 7 July 2011. The applicant was also awarded RSD 7,420 for the enforcement costs. After a re-trial, on 18 October 2013 the Municipal Court ordered the applicant\u2019s employer to also pay her outstanding salary for 16 March to 22 October 2007 (the period during which she was on paid leave) and RSD 13,000 for her legal costs. These proceedings are pending at domestic level. 18.  On 5 January 2004 the Privatisation Agency ordered the restructuring of the debtor. Ra\u0161ka Holding Kompanija and its subsidiary companies, including the debtor, have been in the process of being restructured since 26 May 2006. On 11 September 2013 the Kraljevo Commercial Court opened preliminary insolvency proceedings in respect of the debtor. On 18 October 2013 the restructuring of the debtor was terminated. It would appear that insolvency proceedings in respect of the debtor were opened on 25 October 2013, and that the applicant\u2019s claim was allowed by the Kraljevo Commercial Court on 26 January 2015 but has not yet been paid. The insolvency proceedings are still ongoing. 19.  On 25 June 2010 the First Belgrade Municipal Court accepted the settlement of a dispute between the applicant and his employer, Livnica Ralja AD, a company based in Ralja. The terms were as follows:\n(a)  the dismissal of the applicant in 2002 was to be declared null and void and the employer was to reinstate the applicant within eight days into a post which corresponded to his professional qualifications.\n(b)  the employer was to pay the applicant RSD 1,544,783 and RSD 484,810.65 on account of his outstanding salary arrears and corresponding social contributions for the period 11 March 2002 to 31 May 2010, as well as the required court stamp duties. 20.  The court\u2019s decision became final and enforceable on the same date. 21.  The Second Belgrade Municipal Court \u2013 Sopot Unit (hereinafter \u201cthe enforcement court\u201d) issued an enforcement order on 29 June 2010. The applicant asked the court to expedite the enforcement proceedings on several occasions. On 28 March and 2 June 2011 the bailiff found no available movable assets to enforce the settlement. On 23 May 2011 the court issued an enforcement order in respect of the debtor\u2019s immovable assets. 22.  On 9 February 2011 the Belgrade Commercial Court opened preliminary insolvency proceedings, inviting the claimants to pay the deposit for the opening of the insolvency proceedings and register their claims. The call for the claimants was displayed on the court\u2019s notice board between 9 February and 9 April 2011. On 18 April 2011 the court opened and terminated the insolvency proceedings in respect of the debtor. The court ordered the debtor\u2019s liquidation as the latter had gone bankrupt, seemingly without having any legal successor, and none of the claimants had deposited costs of the proceedings or registered claims. The decision became final on 23 June 2011 and was published. It said that any property of the debtor had become State assets. 23.  On 28 June 2011 that decision was registered (zabele\u017eba) in the relevant public registers concerning the status of all companies and the debtor was struck off the relevant public registers. The date of its publication in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia is not available on these registers. 24.  On 18 October 2011 the enforcement court suspended (obustavio) the enforcement proceedings as no available assets had been found. 25.  On 25 November 2011 the enforcement court terminated (prekinuo) the enforcement because of the debtor\u2019s liquidation. 26.  On 9 December 2004 the Leskovac Municipal Court ruled in favour of the applicant and ordered his employer, DP Galpres from Leskovac, to reinstate him, to pay him his outstanding salary arrears, to pay his corresponding pension and disability insurance contributions (doprinosi za penzijsko i invalidsko osiguranje) and his legal costs. 27.  The part of the judgment in respect of reinstatement and contributions became final on 16 February 2005 and enforceable on 19 March 2005, while the Leskovac District Court quashed the remaining part concerning his salary arrears. 28.  On 13 November 2006 the Leskovac Municipality Court awarded the salary arrears for the period of 2003 to 2006, together with relating contributions and costs. 29.  The enforcement courts ordered enforcement of the above judgments on 20 May 2005 and 24 April 2007 respectively.\n(b)  Proceedings before the Court 30.  On 18 April 2015 the Court decided to give notice of the application to the Government. 31.  On 7 August 2015 the Serbian Government sent their observations on the admissibility and merits. By a letter of 14 August 2015 the Government\u2019s observations were forwarded to the applicant, who was invited to submit any written comments together with any claims for just satisfaction by 25 September 2015. 32.  In the absence of any response, on 15 March 2016 the Registry tried to make enquiries with the applicant about whether he was still interested in pursuing the case, but to no avail. By a registered letter dated 17 March 2016, he was notified that the periods allowed for appointment of a lawyer and for submission of his observations and claim for just satisfaction had both expired and that the Court had extended the deadline for submissions until 28 April 2016. The Court also sent copies of the previous letters of 17 April and 14 August 2015 and enclosures. The applicant\u2019s attention was again drawn to Article 37 \u00a7 1 (a) of the Convention, which provides that the Court may strike a case out of its list of cases where the circumstances lead to the conclusion that the applicant does not intend to pursue the application. The return receipt indicated that the applicant received the letter on 23 March 2016. However, no response has been received.", "references": ["5", "6", "7", "2", "8", "4", "1", "0", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
+{"input": "10.  On an unknown date in May 2003 the applicants wrote a letter to the highest authorities of the BD, namely the International Supervisor for BD, the President of the Assembly of BD and the Governor of BD, while the procedure for the appointment of a director of the BD\u2019s multi-ethnic public radio station was still pending. In the letter, they voiced their concerns regarding the procedure for the appointment of a director of the BD\u2019s multi-ethnic public radio station. They criticised the authorities for having disregarded the principle of proportional representation of ethnic communities in the public service of BD set out in the Statute of BD[3]. In this connection they stated:\n\u201c...We acknowledge and appreciate your support and the effort you put into creating a multi-ethnic radio ... Unfortunately, it appears that there was a major oversight at the very beginning of this important venture. The panel for the selection of the director [of the radio] was created in contravention of the Statute of Br\u010dko District. It is composed of three Serb[4] members, one Croat[5] and one Bosniac. Thus, yet again, the (BD) Statute, which requires proportional representation of the three constituent peoples in public institutions, was disregarded. Parliament established several cases of non-compliance with this principle regarding employment of staff in the public sector, including the BD radio, to the disadvantage of Bosniacs and Croats, and requested that the Governor correct this imbalance. Unfortunately, nothing has been done to correct this. That this is true is confirmed by the unofficial information that Ms M.S. was proposed for the position of the radio\u2019s director by the Serb members of the (selection) panel, who are in the majority, although the former director was Bosniac. This proposal is unacceptable, all the more so because it concerns a person who lacks the professional and moral qualities for such a position.\u201d 11.  The letter continued as follows:\n\u201cAccording to our information (na\u0161im informacijama), the lady in question\n(1)  stated in an interview published in \u2018NIN\u2019[6], commenting on the destruction of mosques in Br\u010dko, that Muslims were not a people (Muslimani nisu narod), that they did not possess culture and that, accordingly, destroying mosques could not be seen as destruction of cultural monuments,\n(2)  as an employee of the BD radio demonstratively tore to pieces on the radio\u2019s premises (demonstrativno kidala) the calendar showing the schedule of religious services during the month of Ramadan,\n(3)  on the radio\u2019s premises covered the coat of arms of Bosnia and Herzegovina with the coat of arms of the Republika Srpska,\n(4)  as an editor of the cultural programme on the BD radio banned the broadcasting of sevdalinka[7] arguing that that type of song had no cultural or musical value.\nWe firmly believe that the above-described acts absolutely disqualify Ms M.S. as a candidate for the position of director of the multi-ethnic Radio and Television of Br\u010dko District and that a Bosniac should be appointed to that [radio\u2019s director] position, which would be in compliance with the Statute of [BD] and the need to rectify the ethnic imbalance regarding employment in the public sector.\nWe hope that you will react appropriately to our letter ...\nIn the absence of any action on your part, we will be forced to address the public (obratiti se javnosti) and [to contact] international and other competent representatives.\u201d 12.  Soon afterwards, still in May 2003, the letter was published in three different daily newspapers. 13.  On 29 May 2003 M.S. brought civil defamation proceedings claiming that in the above letter the applicants had made defamatory statements which had damaged her reputation and discredited her as a person and a professional journalist. 14.  At the trial the first-instance court admitted a considerable volume of evidence, including oral statements from seven witnesses (apparently all employees of the BD public radio) regarding the veracity of the four allegations contained in the applicants\u2019 letter; it also admitted oral statements from the plaintiff and from O.H. and S.C., the members and statutory representatives of two of the applicants. 15.  As described in the judgment of 29 September 2004 (see paragraph 18 below), M.S. stated that she had learned of the letter shortly after it had been sent by the applicants, but that she did not know who had given it to the media. She confirmed that she had removed from the wall in the premises of the radio station the calendar showing the schedule of religious services during the month of Ramadan, but explained that the wall had been used only for work-related announcements. She denied that she had torn up the calendar. As to the coat of arms of Bosnia and Herzegovina, she stated that an invitation card with the coat of arms of Republika Srpska[8] had been placed in a corner of the coat of arms of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but that the latter had not been covered. Lastly, she denied that she had banned the broadcasting of sevdalinka. She argued that all those matters had been taken out of context, that her career as a journalist had been thwarted and that she had been concerned about her professional future. 16.  O.H. confirmed that he had participated in the preparation of the letter and stated that he had found out about the information contained therein from employees of the radio station who had asked him for help. There had been no intention to publish the letter. For that reason, it had been sent to the authorities personally. He did not know how the letter had reached the media. 17.  S.C. stated that most of the information had been brought to his attention by O.H. The letter had been sent to the authorities personally. Their intention had not been to publish the letter in the media. That was why they had indicated in the letter that it concerned allegations and not established facts. Their aim had been to draw the attention of the authorities to errors of M.S., who had been a serious candidate for the post of director of the BD radio. 18.  By a judgment dated 29 September 2004, the BD Court of First Instance dismissed M.S.\u2019s action and ordered her to publish the judgment at her expense and to reimburse the trial costs of the applicants. It found that the applicants could not be held responsible because there had been no evidence that they had published the letter in the media. The relevant part of the judgment reads as follows:\n\u201cIt is clear that the defendants\u2019 letter was addressed personally (upu\u0107eno na ruke) to the Governor, to the President of the Assembly and to the Supervisor for Br\u010dko District ... and it was not sent to the media ... The court established that the aim of the letter was to bring the attention of the authorities to (these) issues and to enable them to draw certain conclusions on verification of that information, and not to publish unverified information.\nHaving examined the articles published in the media, the court concludes that none of them was published by [the applicants].\u201d 19.  On appeal by M.S., the BD Court of Appeal quashed that judgment on 16 May 2005 and decided to hold a new hearing. 20.  At the hearing before the Court of Appeal M.S. reiterated that the four statements specified above (see paragraph 11 above) had contained untrue and defamatory allegations whose aim had been to portray her as a nationalist and accordingly disqualify her for the post for which she had applied. Not only had she not been appointed to the post, but the letter had had other long-term negative consequences for her. 21.  The applicants argued that they had lacked capacity to be sued because they had not sent the letter to the media and, accordingly, had not expressed or disseminated in public any defamatory statements in respect of the appellant. The letter had been sent to the authorities. By a judgment of 11 July 2007 the BD Court of Appeal dismissed that argument and stated that\n\u201c... a person\u2019s reputation can be damaged if someone expresses or disseminates to other people untrue facts or allegations about the past, knowledge, skills or anything else (and he or she knew or ought to have known that those facts or allegations were untrue). For these reasons, the court dismisses the respondents\u2019 arguments that one can be held responsible for defamation only if there was a public announcement or dissemination or publication of (such) statements in the media.\u201d 22.  The applicants further argued that M.S. had been a public servant and that by having taken part in the competition for the position of radio director she had become a public figure. Relying on section 6(5) of the Defamation Act (see paragraph 41 below), the court held as follows:\n\u201c... even if the aggrieved party is a public servant or a candidate for a post in a public body and he or she is generally perceived as having an important influence on public issues of political interest ... (a defendant) is to be held liable for defamation if he knew that a statement was false or negligently disregarded its inaccuracy.\u201d 23.  Referring to the first part of the letter (see paragraph 10 above), the BD Court of Appeal did not go beyond noting that it contained value judgments for which no responsibility could be attributed to the applicants under the Defamation Act. It further quoted the four statements contained in the letter (see paragraph 11 above) and held that these \u201cconcerned statements of fact which the defendants were required to prove.\u201d In this connection it re-examined O.H., S.C. and the witnesses who had already given oral evidence before the first-instance court (see paragraph 14 above). 24.  The Court of Appeal also noted that R.S. and O.S., both employees of the BD public radio, had visited one of the applicants in order to discuss M.S.\u2019s behaviour in the workplace. On that occasion R.S. had told O.H. that during the month of Ramadan M.S. had detached from the wall in the radio\u2019s premises the calendar showing the schedule of religious services. The court noted that the wall had been used for work-related announcements. It also indicated that, at the relevant time, another text, which had not been work-related, had been posted on the wall. O.S. (sound manager in the radio) had told O.H. that on one occasion M.S. had asked him to explain why sevdalinka had been broadcasted during the time reserved in the programme for another type of music. He confirmed that she had removed the Ramadan religious calendar from the wall. 25.  At a meeting held shortly afterwards, O.H. shared the information received from R.S. and O.S. with the other respondents. On that occasion one of the respondents had referred to a newspaper article and the alleged statement of M.S. regarding Muslims and the destruction of mosques. An allegation had been also made that M.S. had covered the coat of arms of Bosnia and Herzegovina with the coat of arms of Republika Srpska. S.C. had confirmed having heard people speaking about that in the city. 26.  After analysing the statements of the witnesses and the respondents, the court found that the facts reported in the letter regarding the calendar of religious services during the month of Ramadan and the broadcasting of sevdalinka were untrue, since \u201cthe letter obviously did not contain what (R.S. and O.S.) had said about the appellant and her behaviour regarding the religious calendar and the broadcasting of sevdalinka\u201d. Noting that the allegation that M.S. was the author of the statement published in the newspaper was untrue, the court stated:\n\u201c... on the basis of S.C.\u2019s statement [the court establishes] that at the meeting that preceded the preparation of the letter a distinguished member of a [respondent] had informed those attending the meeting that the appellant had given a statement to the newspaper, whose contents were identical to the contents of the letter. On subsequent verification [S.C.] established that such a text had been published, but that the appellant had not been the author ...\u201d 27.  The court further stated that:\n\u201cThe respondents also did not prove the truthfulness of the allegation that in her office the appellant had covered the coat of arms of Bosnia and Herzegovina with the coat of arms of Republika Srpska. On the basis of evidence given by the witnesses examined at the trial (B.S., D.N. and K.P.), [the court] established that the appellant had put an invitation card, which bore the coat of arms of Republika Srpska, in the corner of the coat of arms of Bosnia and Herzegovina ...\u201d 28.  In conclusion, the court stated:\n\u201cBy the letter sent to the Office of High Representative BD - International Supervisor of the BD, the President of the BD\u2019s Assembly and the Governor of the BD, the respondents damaged the plaintiff\u2019s reputation and honour in the place in which she lives and works. They did so by expressing and disseminating to the above persons facts about the appellant\u2019s behaviour, actions and statements which they knew or ought to have known were false ...\u201d 29.  The Court of Appeal ordered the applicants to inform the International Supervisor for BD, the President of the Assembly of BD and the Governor of BD within 15 days that they retracted the letter, failing which they would have to pay jointly the equivalent of EUR 1,280 in non-pecuniary damages to M.S. They were further ordered to give the judgment to the BD radio and television and to two newspapers for publication at the applicants\u2019 own expense. As regards the calculation of the amount of non-pecuniary damages, the court stated:\n\u201cWhen assessing the amount of damages, namely, just satisfaction to be awarded to the appellant, [the court] took into consideration that the impugned facts had been mentioned in the article published in the media ...\u201d 30.  On 15 November 2007 M.S. filed a request with the BD Court of First Instance for enforcement of the above judgment. On 5 December 2007 the Court of First Instance issued a writ of execution. 31.  On 12 December 2007 the applicants paid the equivalent of EUR 1,445 (inclusive of interest and enforcement costs) in enforcement of the judgment of 11 July 2007. On 27 March 2009 the Court of First Instance closed the enforcement proceedings. 32.  On 15 October 2007 the applicants applied to the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina seeking protection of their rights under Article 10 of the Convention. 33.  On 13 May 2010 the Constitutional Court held that the interference with the applicants\u2019 right to freedom of expression had been \u201cnecessary in a democratic society\u201d and concluded that there had been no violation of Article II/3.h) of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina or Article 10 of the Convention. The relevant part of the decision reads as follows:\n\u201c34.  At the outset the Constitutional Court notes that the appellants did not deny that their liability for defamation was based on the Defamation Act 2003 and that, therefore, the interference with the right [to freedom of expression] protected by Article 10 of the European Convention was prescribed by law ... 35.  The impugned judgment was delivered in civil defamation proceedings initiated by the respondent against the appellants ... accordingly, the interference pursued the legitimate aim of the protection of the \u201creputation or rights of others\u201d. 36.  What remains to be determined is whether the interference complained of was \u2018necessary in a democratic society\u2019... 37.  With regard to the existence of a \u2018pressing social need\u2019, the Constitutional Court observes that the impugned (court) decisions concern the letter which the appellants sent to the authorities of the BD and the Supervisor for BD casting the plaintiff (M.S.) in a negative light. The Court of Appeal considered it to be defamation because (the case) concerned statements whose veracity could be verified ... The Constitutional Court notes that the Court of Appeal qualified the impugned statements in the letter as statements of fact and not as value judgments. The Constitutional Court also considers that they are to be regarded statements of fact which should be proved. The appellants failed to do so, as they did not make reasonable efforts to verify the truthfulness of [those] statements of fact before [reporting], but merely made [those statements]. 38.  The Constitutional Court considers that the Court of Appeal established without doubt that the impugned factual statements about M.S. were false and that the appellants were liable for defamation. From the submissions of the two witnesses, from whom the appellants received the information presented in the letter (concerning the part of the letter in which it was stated that M.S. \u2018made a point of removing from the wall (and tore to pieces) the calendar with the schedule of religious services during the month of Ramadan and as the editor of the entertainment programme banned the broadcasting of sevdalinka arguing that that type of song had no cultural or musical value\u2019), the Court of Appeal established that there was an evident inconsistency between what had been said to the appellants and what they had reported in the letter. Furthermore, the statement in the impugned letter that M.S. had given an interview concerning the destruction of mosques was refuted by another witness, who submitted that subsequent verification had revealed that M.S. had not been the author of the said interview. Finally, the appellants failed to prove the veracity of the allegations that M.S. had covered the coat of arms of Bosnia and Herzegovina with the coat of arms of the Republika Srpska. In view of the above, in the present case the public interest that permits reporting on alleged irregularities in the conduct of public officials cannot be based on manifestly untrue factual allegations which impugn their reputation [and] which cannot be regarded as criticism that they ought to tolerate in view of their function. Accordingly, the court considers that the Court of Appeal correctly concluded that there was \u2018a pressing social need\u2019 in the present case [for the interference with the appellants\u2019 right to freedom of expression]. 39.  Furthermore, the Constitutional Court notes that the Court of Appeal awarded non-pecuniary damages to M.S. because her reputation was affected by the untrue statements made in the impugned letter ... The Constitutional Court has already stated in its previous case-law that a person\u2019s reputation forms part of his or her personal identity and psychological integrity ...\n... 43.  The appellants ... failed to verify the impugned statements beforehand as was their duty. The Court of Appeal established that the appellants had damaged M.S.\u2019s reputation by making untrue allegations which caused her mental distress ...When deciding on the claim in respect of non-pecuniary damage and its amount, the Court of Appeal took into account the purpose of those damages and the rule that it should not favour aspirations that were incompatible with its nature and social purpose. 44.  [T]he Constitutional Court considers that the measure imposed on the appellants in the present case was proportionate to the aim pursued ...The court further considers that the Court of Appeal did not go beyond its discretionary power in deciding on the claim in respect of non-pecuniary damage ... [T]he Constitutional Court finds that the reasons the Court of Appeal gave were \u2018relevant\u2019 and \u2018sufficient\u2019 within the meaning of Article 10 of the European Convention. 45.  In view of the above, the Constitutional Court considers that the interference with the appellants\u2019 right to freedom of expression was \u2018necessary in a democratic society\u2019 and that, therefore, there has been no violation of Article II/3.h) of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina or Article 10 of the European Convention.\u201d 35.  According to the minutes of a meeting of the Management Board of the BD\u2019s radio station dated 9 May 2003, there were two candidates for the post of the radio\u2019s director, one of whom was M.S. The Management Board decided to extend the mandate of the acting director of the radio given that \u201cdue to political pressure and repeated voting\u201d no decision could be made in respect of either of the candidates.\nII.  1995 GENERAL FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT FOR PEACE IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA (\u201cTHE DAYTON AGREEMENT\u201d) 36.  The Dayton Agreement, initialled at the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base near Dayton (the United States of America) on 21 November 1995 and signed in Paris (France) on 14 December 1995, was the culmination of some forty-four months of intermittent negotiations under the auspices of the International Conference on the former Yugoslavia and the Contact Group. It entered into force on the latter date and contains twelve annexes. 37.  Annex 2 of the Agreement concerns the Agreement on Inter-Entity Boundary Line and Related Issues. The relevant part of this Annex reads as follows:\n \u201cThe Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska (the \u2018Parties\u2019) have agreed as follows:\n...\nArticle V: Arbitration for the Br\u010dko Area 1.  The Parties agree to binding arbitration of the disputed portion of the Inter-Entity Boundary Line in the Br\u010dko area indicated on the map attached at the Appendix. 2.  No later than six months after the entry into force of this Agreement, the Federation shall appoint one arbitrator, and the Republika Srpska shall appoint one arbitrator. A third arbitrator shall be selected by agreement of the Parties\u2019 appointees within thirty days thereafter. If they do not agree, the third arbitrator shall be appointed by the President of the International Court of Justice. The third arbitrator shall serve as presiding officer of the arbitral tribunal. 3.  Unless otherwise agreed by the Parties, the proceedings shall be conducted in accordance with the UNCITRAL rules. The arbitrators shall apply relevant legal and equitable principles. 5.  The arbitrators shall issue their decision no later than one year from the entry into force of this Agreement. The decision shall be final and binding, and the Parties shall implement it without delay.\u201d", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "6", "9", "0", "5", "8", "7", "2", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Constan\u0163a. At the time of the relevant events, she was an investigative journalist working in Constan\u0163a. 6.  During the night of 12 to 13 August 2006 a group of approximately fifty to eighty armed persons were involved in a violent incident that took place in Mamaia, a seaside resort on the outskirts of Constan\u0163a. Several locations in Mamaia \u2013 including Hotel F., belonging to a company in which R.M., mayor of Constan\u0163a since 2000, was a shareholder \u2013 were attacked and severely damaged. 7.  Following that incident, R.M. accepted to participate in a television show hosted by A.G. and broadcast on \u201cR.\u201d, a national television channel. During the show, the applicant intervened and made some remarks which R.M. considered as defamatory. Consequently, he instituted civil proceedings against the applicant (see paragraphs 9-22 below). 8.  The relevant excerpts from the television show are set out below:\n\u201c[A.G., the host of the show, acting as a moderator, asks [the applicant], a journalist in Constan\u0163a]: What types of clans are we talking about, are they gangs, are they clans, who are these people we are talking about?\n[The applicant]: These are clans, it is well known, the city of Constan\u0163a is divided between the supporters of R.M. and his enemies. More precisely, it is the V. clan, in other words the clan of the V. brothers, who are at war with the supporters of R.M. This war has been going on for several years and it is well known that at the beginning, the V. brothers and R.M. were good friends. The hostility occurred, if my memory is not mistaken, on the occasion of the construction of Hotel O., when one of the V. brothers was excluded from the business, in spite of the initial plan. This doesn\u2019t mean that M. [R.M.] or V. is personally involved in this war. This war continued between the people that represent the two, and the enmity has continued to this day. ... But the crux of the problem is not the conflict between R.M. and the V. brothers. It seems that nowadays they have different claims, at a different level, within different hierarchies ...\n[A.G.]: The image you describe is that of a city torn between the underworld clans, in which the offenders retaliate against the mayor. The latter is a business partner of the President of the Regional Council and during the night anything can happen because the police have made a pact ... and do not want to sanction anyone.\n[The applicant]: Lately, the police have been doing their job, as I said before. Except that they do not succeed in finalising it ... Two years ago, when there was a big fight in the city centre, before the eyes of everybody, when the G. clans were opposed to the P. clan \u2013 and here we are talking about the same clan masters \u2013 the police did not intervene promptly because, they said it clearly, these were R.M.\u2019s men and they were afraid, because M. [R.M.] was and still is the mayor. The only victims were the heads of the city police, who were sacked; the aggressors were allowed to go free.\n[A.G.]: I have the impression that we are talking about an ungoverned city, in which the delinquents walk freely and the mayor fights different clans. Is this an erroneous conclusion?\n[R.M.]: I have the impression that [the applicant] needs to be hospitalised \u2013 in a psychiatric hospital (la balamuc). How dare she? What is this story, this nonsense? The supporters of R.M. fight I do not know who \u2013 V.? I do not even know him, I have never seen him in my life and I have never spoken to him .... I have listened for fifteen minutes to her [the applicant\u2019s] lucubrations, in which she tries to create about Constan\u0163a the image of a demonic city, in which the mayor runs everything, is a smuggler, has clans with Kalashnikovs and bodyguards ...\n[A.G.]: Would I be entitled to believe that this conflict was generated by one of your actions, or by one of your past activities, or your past partnerships; maybe you had relations with them and in this context they came to vandalise your hotel?\n[R.M.]: Mr. A.G., [the applicant] is a journalist, she should have submitted a document from the Chamber of Commerce to prove that I have a business partnership with whomever she mentioned. She had not submitted anything because it is all false. I personally asked the police to intervene and arrest the perpetrators. ... I do not know the people who were fighting. It does not interest me what they do in their free time, why they fight. All I said was that it is unacceptable to see forty people armed with axes. Let them identify and arrest the guilty. Everything else is just a fantasy of [the applicant], worthy of a psychiatric hospital ...\n[A.G.]: ... this is what the mayor says, that everything is false ...\n[The applicant]: What I have said, I said as an observer of the daily events; these things have been observed, discussed, noted for years. I have presented a general picture of the situation.\n[R.M.]: And they must be proved ... Just like other journalists, you have learned to drag others in the mud, with no evidence to support what you state.\n[The applicant]: If I understand correctly, he does not know the V. brothers, he knows them well, but that is not the point, the point is that their men ...(interrupted)\n[R.M.]: But I do not know them! Prove the contrary if you please; I have never spoken to any of them, I do not know them. Stop lying ...\n[The applicant]: ... the reality is that they present themselves as being M. [R.M.]\u2019s men, or V.\u2019s men. This does not mean that M. [R.M.] or V. order these conflicts. You know what happens in the world of ordinary people: I am strong because I represent R.M., who is mayor. Or I am stronger because I have the backing of the V. brothers ... Mr R.M., I did not say that you ordered this assault. But this is indeed what has been going on for several years in the city of Constan\u0163a.\n[A.G.]: Actually, we are dealing with a band of delinquents; it doesn\u2019t matter who they are associated with or who is behind them and supports them, these people were on the street, made noises and I, as a simple citizen, am dissatisfied with not seeing them arrested. This is the only thing I can say, apart from the political connotations and connotations of the clans. I now turn to Mr. M.P, a sociologist, a specialist in violent incidents. This type of incident, what do you think? ...\n[M.P.]: ... I would ask Mr. R.M. if he is still live ... it is necessary to know that mayors elsewhere in the world, such as Giuliani or Chirac, have had what are called urban policies of prevention and that they were directly involved. I am talking about a sociological perspective, an area that in which I specialise. I am not interested in your relationship with the institutions that accuse you today in one way or another. Do you have an urban prevention policy project? For if this were the case, such events would not happen again. ...\n[R.M.]: Do you know that according to Romanian legislation, the police are not under the authority of the mayor? ... I have asked the police to intervene and to arrest those who are guilty ...\n[A.G.]: Thank you ... The story we have followed is a violent one. Hooligans go during the night, armed with axes and knives, something very common lately, and vandalise a hotel. The police, ineffective, react very late, disinterestedly, unconvincing ... At the same time, the name of Mayor R.M. and his business partners appears again directly linked to a strange business. And all these strange things, which I quote \u2018need proof\u2019, accumulate and accumulate, one after the other, and create in the end the perception of a mayor who raises certain questions, of a forgotten city and, in general, of inefficiency at all levels. In this story, in my opinion, the two managers are also guilty, the police are also guilty and we are also guilty, because we tolerate endlessly the incompetent authorities. I thank you.\u201d 9.  On 24 October 2006 R.M. lodged a civil complaint against the applicant. He alleged that, in her capacity as a journalist, she had made defamatory statements during a television show hosted by A.G. in relation to a violent incident that had occurred during the night of 12-13 August 2006 (see paragraph 6 above). R.M. requested that the applicant write a public letter of apology, that she publish at her own expense the final judgment allowing his claims in two newspapers, one with a nationwide circulation and the other a local circulation, and that she pay him 200,000 Romanian lei (RON) in non-pecuniary damages. 10.  R.M. complained that the applicant had attempted to persuade people that Constan\u0163a city was divided between two gangs, \u201cM.\u2019s men and those who were against M.\u201d, and that he himself had at one point been familiar with certain persons from the underworld (\u201cpersoane interlope\u201d), namely with the V. clan, who had allegedly been at the origin of the violent incident in August 2006. He considered that the applicant\u2019s imagination had proved to be \u201cdiabolical and of an infinite malice\u201d, as her remarks had gone beyond what was permitted not only by freedom of speech, but also by professional deontology. He claimed that the applicant had failed to first check her information before using it, and then to prove her statements. R.M. further claimed that the defamatory statements the applicant had made against him in prime time on national television had seriously damaged his image as a public person and a locally elected official. 11.  The applicant submitted that her statements during the television show had reflected her opinion in an honest and ethical manner. Like any other opinion, hers was inevitably subjective, the important issue being that it had been expressed with honesty and in good faith, based on information concerning R.M.\u2019s conflicts with the V. brothers that had been presented more than once in the local press.\nThe applicant further argued that the non-pecuniary damage claimed by R.M. was unjustified, in so far as there was no evidence to prove that her statements had had any impact among R.M.\u2019s supporters in connection with his public image. 12.  On 11 October 2007 the Constan\u0163a District Court dismissed R.M.\u2019s claims. The court started with an overview of the ECHR\u2019s case-law on freedom of expression, referring specifically to the essential role played by journalists in a democratic society and to the fact that the essential criteria in assessing their statements is whether they are made in good faith. The court held that in the case before it, the applicant\u2019s statements could not be interpreted as a personal attack on the claimant and in any event, they were not of such a severe nature as to harm R.M.\u2019s honour, reputation or dignity. The court further noted that in answering the questions of A.G., the host of the show, the applicant had provided an objective explanation for her opinion; in support of her opinion, she had submitted before the court excerpts of articles from the local press, as well as from a publication issued by several investigative journalists on the topic of public integrity, a project implemented by Transparency International Romania, in which the name of the mayor, R.M., was connected to several ongoing criminal investigations.\nThe court concluded that the applicant\u2019s intervention had not been made in bad faith; her opinions concerned a matter of general interest and did not have an illicit nature; at the same time, her opinions were not found to have harmed the reputation of the claimant. 13.  R.M. appealed against that judgment. He essentially argued that the applicant\u2019s defamatory statements had not only consisted of her personal opinions, but also reports on specific facts which had not been previously verified, nor ever proved to be true. He further argued that by associating his name and image with that of criminal groups or clans, the applicant had seriously harmed his reputation. 14.  On 29 May 2008 the Constan\u0163a County Court allowed the appeal and awarded R.M.\u2019s claims in part, holding the applicant liable for the payment of 50,000 RON in non-pecuniary damages, and 7,197 RON in respect of legal costs. It also ordered her to publish the judgment at her own expense in one national newspaper and in another local newspaper and to present R.M. with written public apologies within fifteen days of the date of the final judgment. 15.  The County Court considered that the conclusion of the television show, as drawn by A.G., was based essentially on the applicant\u2019s statements, namely that the city was \u201ctorn between the underworld clans, in which the offenders retaliate against the mayor\u201d (see paragraph 8 above), and that the same conclusion would have been drawn by anyone else who had watched the show. From that perspective, it was evident that the applicant\u2019s statements had damaged the reputation of the claimant. 16.  The court also held that the applicant\u2019s intention had not been to present facts, but to deliberately discredit R.M. by claiming in bad faith that he was involved in illegal activities. Such allegations, made without prior verification and lacking factual support, were of a serious nature and had severely damaged the claimant\u2019s image.\nFurthermore, in trying to support her allegations with extracts of articles from the press reporting on the activities of R.M., the applicant had only proved that what she had presented in the television show was information, and not her personal opinions. 17.  The applicant appealed against that judgment, reiterating her arguments that the impugned statements were in fact her opinions as an investigative journalist, and that they had been expressed in an honest and ethical manner. She pointed out that the County Court had not analysed whether R.M. had participated in the television show in his capacity as a public person or as a private one, so as to attract specific consequences in the balancing-of-rights exercise carried out by the court. She pointed out that the sanction imposed by the court was excessive and lacked appropriate reasoning and any justifying criteria. 18.  On 24 November 2008 the Constan\u0163a Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld the lower court\u2019s judgment. 19.  The appellate court firstly noted that R.M. had participated in the television show in his capacity as a shareholder of Hotel F., as well as in his capacity as a local politician. 20.  While drawing a clear distinction between opinions and information, the court held that that the applicant had not put forward any argument or explanation to support her allegation that what she had expressed in the show were her opinions, and not factual elements:\n\u201cBy setting herself up as a connoisseur of what was going on in the local area, she had presented to the public, in the form of undeniable truth, some information that was not true\u201d. 21.  The court further referred to the responsibilities of journalists, namely to present information and ideas to the public, while respecting certain limits in relation to the rights and reputation of others. The applicant, as a journalist, \u201chad breached the rules of journalistic ethics by manifesting aggression and intention to blame, with no evidence and without maintaining a balance between the statement made and the unconfirmed allegations\u201d. 22.  The court considered the amount of damages to be paid by the applicant to be fully justified, in view of the fact that the defamatory statements had been broadcast in prime time on a national television channel, and that the amount had been reduced by the appeal court to one quarter of the full amount claimed by R.M. The court held:\n\u201cIf she had complied with the first obligation, namely \u2018to apologise\u2019, the court would have examined the proportionality of the amount in relation to her intentions, as she does not contest the allegations, but by means of victimisation, she gives them strength, albeit without any evidence or documents having been submitted to the present day\u201d. 23.  It appears that in February 2009 the applicant fully complied with the terms of the final judgment.", "references": ["0", "8", "1", "3", "9", "4", "7", "2", "5", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
+{"input": "8.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 9.  On 27 November 1987 a claim was lodged with Ko\u0161ice-okolie District Court against some of the applicants or their predecessors. With this claim, the plaintiffs were seeking a judicial ruling declaring them to be the owners of an area of grassland. The other applicants entered the proceedings as defendants on different dates and on the basis of different legal entitlements as outlined in the annexed table. 10.  Between 1988 and 2009 the first-instance court held a number of hearings, ordered expert opinions, dealt with other relevant evidence, and heard witnesses. It also took some time to determine the parties who were actually to be sued in the proceedings in view of multiple deaths among the original defendants and various transactions made in respect of the property in question. 11.  On 27 April 2010 the Constitutional Court delivered a judgment, finding that the applicants\u2019 (or their predecessors\u2019) right to a hearing within a reasonable time had been violated by the District Court. It ordered the District Court to proceed without undue delay and to reimburse the complainants\u2019 legal costs. It also awarded just satisfaction in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage in the amount of EUR 300 to the applicants listed under points 1 to 17 and EUR 500 to those listed under points 18 to 28 and to the deceased predecessor of the applicants listed under points 29 to 32 of the Appendix. The Constitutional Court noted inter alia that the District Court had failed to proceed with the matter between 1995 and 2009. It also observed some of the applicants\u2019 lack of interest in those proceedings. That judgment became final on 19 July 2010. 12.  On 22 November 2011 the District Court delivered a judgment on the merits of the case, which was not served on the parties to the proceedings until seven months after its delivery. 13.  On 19 March 2013 the Constitutional Court rejected a fresh constitutional complaint that had been lodged by the applicants (except those listed under points 30 to 32). It found no further undue delays in the proceedings before the District Court after the constitutional judgment of 27 April 2010. It noted the delay of seven months which the District Court had taken to serve its judgment on the parties. However, it did not consider it unconstitutional. 14.  On 15 May 2013 the District Court transferred the case file to Ko\u0161ice Regional Court following an appeal lodged by the applicants listed under points 9 and 18 and some other defendants in the proceedings. 15.  On 12 March 2014 the Regional Court had to identify and deal with successors of some of the deceased parties to the proceedings. It partly upheld the District Court\u2019s judgment and partly dismissed the claim concerning some of the contested property. It also rejected the remainder of the appeal. The judgment became final on 10 July 2014. 16.  On 8 August 2014 the applicants listed under points 4 and 30 to 32, together with several other defendants in the proceedings, lodged an appeal on points of law. On 21 January 2015 the proceedings in respect of that appeal were discontinued without examination of its merits due to the appellants\u2019 failure to pay the court fees. That decision became final on 13 February 2015.", "references": ["6", "1", "4", "2", "8", "5", "9", "0", "7", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  In disputes between the applicants and the domestic pension authorities, the first\u2011instance courts ruled in their favour, ordering increases of their pensions based on the rise in the average wages in the country since their retirement. 6.  The defendant authorities appealed to the Dnipropetrovsk Administrative Court of Appeal (\u201cthe Court of Appeal\u201d). 7.  Under domestic law (see paragraph 18 below), when an appeal arrived at the Court of Appeal, a judge rapporteur of that court, if he or she believed that it complied with the necessary formal requirements, had to issue a ruling opening appeal proceedings (\u201cthe ruling\u201d) and send it to the applicants together with a copy of the appeal. 8.  The Government and the applicants disagree as to whether those documents were actually sent to the applicants (see paragraphs 11 to 13 below). 9.  On various dates set out in the Appendix, the Court of Appeal quashed the judgments in the applicants\u2019 favour, dismissing their claims for pension increases holding that the domestic law did not require the pensions to be increased in case of rise in the average wages in the country following retirement. In the fifth applicant\u2019s case the Court of Appeal held a hearing in his presence (see paragraph 14 below). In the other applicants\u2019 cases the court sat in camera without summoning the parties. 10.  In the second to sixth applicants\u2019 cases the Court of Appeal\u2019s decisions became effective immediately since no further appeal lay against them (see the related legislative provisions in paragraph 16 below). The first applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with the Higher Administrative Court. On 26 October 2012 it upheld the Court of Appeal\u2019s decision, without commenting on the complaint she had presented that she had not been informed of the appeal proceedings. 11.  According to the applicants, the domestic courts did not send them either (i) a copy of the defendants\u2019 appeals or (ii) a copy of the rulings opening appeal proceedings in their cases. They therefore had no knowledge of the appeal proceedings prior to the Court of Appeal\u2019s decisions in their cases. They learned of those decisions later, notably after their pensions had been reduced based on the Court of Appeal\u2019s decisions. 12.  According to the Government, the applicants were duly informed of the appeal proceedings. 13.  It can be seen from the material before the Court that:\n(i)  the first to third and sixth applicants\u2019 domestic case files contain copies of either the rulings opening appeal proceedings in their cases or notification letters from the court clerks addressed to them informing them of the upcoming examination of their cases in camera and referring to the fact that a judge\u2019s ruling and a copy of the appeal were enclosed with the letter;\n(ii)  the notification letters addressed to the first and second applicants contain a note to the effect that they were intended to be sent by registered mail with acknowledgement of receipt;\n(iii)  the third applicant\u2019s case file also contains a copy of a letter from the first-instance court informing her that her case file with an appeal had been sent to the Court of Appeal;\n(iv)  the fourth applicant\u2019s case file does not contain a ruling or notification letter;\n(v)  none of the case files contain any postal documents or registers of sent correspondence showing that the documents in (i) to (iii) above had been sent or delivered to the applicants. 14.  On 23 June 2012 the Court of Appeal sent the fifth applicant a summons to attend a hearing on 1 November 2012. The delivery slip is in his domestic case file. At the hearing, which he attended, the court examined the pension authority\u2019s appeal in its absence and quashed the first-instance court\u2019s judgment.", "references": ["5", "4", "1", "6", "8", "9", "0", "7", "2", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Sinj. 6.  On 29 December 2005 M.R. brought a civil action against the applicant before the Sinj Municipal Court (Op\u0107inski sud u Sinju), seeking that a will be declared null and void. M.R. was represented by lawyers, V.Lj. and \u017d.V. 7.  On 8 December 2006 the Sinj Municipal Court adopted a judgment in the applicant\u2019s favour. 8.  The plaintiff lodged an appeal with the Split County Court (\u017dupanijski sud u Splitu). The Civil Division of that Court has over forty judges. On 27 August 2009 a panel of three judges presided over by Judge D.P., sitting in a closed meeting, reversed the first-instance judgment and upheld the appeal. It held that the first-instance court had correctly established the facts but had wrongly applied the relevant law. 9.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske) alleging, inter alia, that she had not had a fair hearing before an independent and impartial tribunal because Judge D.P. was the father of a trainee lawyer working at the law office of V.Lj. and \u017d.V., who had both represented the plaintiff in the proceedings. 10.  On 14 September 2011 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law as unfounded and upheld the second-instance judgment. It held in particular:\n\u201cThe case file shows that N.P., Judge D.P.\u2019s son, did not participate in any manner in the proceedings at issue. This court therefore considers that there are no circumstances which put the impartiality of Judge D.P. in such doubt as to exclude his participation in the adoption of the appeal judgment.\u201d 11.  In a constitutional complaint of 29 June 2012 the applicant argued that even though N.P. had not participated at the hearings held in the proceedings at issue, there were no indications that he had not been otherwise involved in the case. He had been in a relationship of subordination (employer-employee) to the opposing party\u2019s legal representative and the law office concerned had employed only a very small number of people. The applicant noted that the first-instance judgment in her favour had also later been reversed on appeal. The constitutional complaint was declared inadmissible on 3 October 2012 by the Constitutional Court.", "references": ["9", "0", "2", "6", "4", "8", "7", "1", "5", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1942 and lives in Vilnius. 6.  On 27 September 1996 the applicant was admitted to the Bar. She signed an oath \u201cto be faithful to the Republic of Lithuania, to observe its Constitution and laws, to honestly perform her duties as an advocate (a lawyer who has been admitted to the Bar (advokatas)), to observe moral norms, citizen\u2019s rights and freedoms, and to protect professional secrets\u201d. A couple of months later the applicant registered a law office in her name, and started practising law. 7.  At the applicant\u2019s request her name was taken of the list of practising advocates on 19 December 2003. As noted by the civil courts afterwards, the applicant had acknowledged that her request had been made owing to the fact that a criminal case had been pending against her (see paragraph 8 below). 8.  On 13 August 2004 the applicant was found guilty of forgery of documents (Article 300 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code) and fraud (Article 182 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code). The court established that while pursuing her professional practice, the applicant had on more than thirty occasions falsely claimed in writing that she had provided legal services within the framework of the State-paid legal-aid scheme. In addition, the court found that the applicant had forged the signatures of pre-trial-investigation officers on the above documents, submitted them to court officials to receive payment and thereby obtained payment. The crimes she had committed fell into the category of minor intentional crimes (nesunkus ty\u010dinis nusikaltimas), because the maximum possible sanction for them was up to three years of deprivation of liberty (Article 11 \u00a7 3 of the Criminal Code). In the applicant\u2019s case, as a sanction, she was ordered to pay a fine, which she did on 24 August 2004. Her conviction expired three years after she had paid the fine, that is to say on 24 August 2007. 9.  On 12 September 2007 the applicant asked the Bar Association to readmit her to the Bar. 10.  On 20 September 2007 the Bar Association refused the applicant\u2019s request, inter alia, on the grounds that the applicant did not have high moral character (nepriekai\u0161tinga reputacija). Given that only three years and twenty-four days had passed since the applicant\u2019s conviction, and taking into account the nature of the applicant\u2019s criminaloffence \u2013 misappropriation of property for non-existent legal services \u2013 as well as the specifics of the professional practice of an advocate, it was reasonable to conclude that the applicant had not regained high moral character within such a short time frame, to meet the requirements set out in Articles 7 \u00a7 4 and 8 \u00a7 4 of the Law on the Bar (see paragraph 21 below). 11.  The applicant challenged this decision before the Vilnius Regional Court. On 25 April 2008 the court heard the applicant\u2019s case. Six witnesses were questioned in court as to the applicant\u2019s reputation; most of them testified to having known the applicant before 1996, when she had been working at the Ministry of Justice. The court partly annulled the Bar Association\u2019s decision and ordered the latter to reconsider the applicant\u2019s request to be readmitted to the Bar. The court noted that the applicant had been convicted of a minor intentional crime. On the day when the applicant had submitted the request to be readmitted to the Bar, her conviction had expired. Consequently, and relying on Article 8 (1) of the Law on the Bar (see paragraph 21 below), the Vilnius Regional Court found that the Bar Association had erred in finding that the applicant had not met the high-moral-character criterion. 12.  The Bar Association appealed. It pointed out that the applicant was not of high moral character as she failed to meet the criteria listed in Article 8 (4) of the Law on the Bar. Refusal to readmit the applicant to the Bar had been based on an evaluation of the nature of actions for which she had been convicted. 13.  In her defence, the applicant submitted to the appellate court a character reference from a managing director of a private company, where the applicant had worked as marketing director. The reference stated that the applicant performed her duties well; and that she was responsible and had a sense of initiative. As shown from the summary of her arguments by the Court of Appeal, the applicant did not plead that reputation related restrictions on her practising law as an advocate had been more severe than those applied to other law-related professions. 14.  On 7 October 2008 the Court of Appeal allowed the Bar Association\u2019s appeal and quashed the first-instance court\u2019s decision. As to the question of high moral character, the Court of Appeal underlined that higher standards were applicable to advocates, as only persons of untainted reputation could participate in the justice system without discrediting it. Therefore, when evaluating an advocate\u2019s conduct it was not sufficient to have regard only to whether the person obeyed the law. It was also pertinent to see a person\u2019s behaviour in the context of the legal norms that regulate the ethics of the advocates\u2019 profession. In this connection the Lithuanian Code of Professional Ethics for Advocates underlined that an advocate should observe legal and moral duties (point 1.2.), should not discredit advocate\u2019s name, the oath he or she swore or the ideal of justice (point 1.3.). An advocate also had duties set out in the Constitution, the Law on the Bar and the Lithuanian Code of Professional Ethics for Advocates (point 2.2) (see paragraph 23 below). 15.  The Court of Appeal concurred with the first-instance court\u2019s finding that the term of the applicant\u2019s conviction had expired and that therefore she could not be reproached under Article 8 (1) of the Law on the Bar. Nonetheless, taking into account the fact that she had committed the criminal offence in the course of her professional practice and that her professional practice had been aimed at committing crimes, of which there were more than thirty counts, it was reasonable to conclude that the applicant\u2019s behaviour did not meet the criteria set out in Article 8 (4) of the Law on the Bar. That the conviction had expired did not mean ipso facto that the applicant had regained an irreproachable reputation within the meaning of Article 8 (4) of that Law. For the appellate court, insufficient time had passed from the date when the applicant had committed the crime to when she had asked the Bar Association to readmit her to the Bar. 16.  The appellate court also noted that a person could submit a request to be admitted to the Bar and to prove that he or she had regained high moral character. However, it was then for the court to establish, of its own motion, whether sufficient time had passed for a person\u2019s rehabilitation to be objectively validated. A person who claimed to have regained high moral character should bring clear and persuasive evidence that he or she had been following the ethical and disciplinary rules. It was then for the court to examine what the nature of the infringements of law was, what personal situation had led to the infringements being committed, and whether those factors still applied. In the present case, despite four years having passed since the date the crime had been committed, there was still no sufficient basis to conclude that the applicant was of high moral character within the meaning of Article 8 (4) of the Law on the Bar. 17.  The Court of Appeal lastly dismissed certain arguments by the applicant that the lower court had erred when interpreting some other legal norms unrelated to the matter of the applicant\u2019s reputation. 18.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. She raised a number of arguments about the Bar qualification exam and professional reputation, without maintaining that the criminal conviction had placed her in a worse situation than representatives of other law-related professions. 19.  By a ruling of 23 February 2009 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law, and left the Court of Appeal decision unchanged. On the question of reputation, the Supreme Court noted its practice to the effect that no breach of law (joks nusi\u017eengimas) was too serious to unconditionally preclude an individual from ever asking to be reinstated to the Bar (the Supreme Court referred to its earlier ruling in case no. 3K-7-168/2001 of 9 January 2001, see paragraph 30 below). 20.  The Supreme Court then held that the expiry of a conviction for a minor intentional crime, as it was indicated in Article 8 (1) of the Law on the Bar, was only one of the criteria when considering the question of a person\u2019s reputation. Moreover, Article 8 (4) of that Law read that a person should meet the criteria of ethics applicable to advocates. Under point 1 of the Code of Professional Ethics for Advocates, advocates were involved in the implementation of justice. The professional practice of an advocate required him or her to carry out his or her duties and obligations towards clients, the courts, the advocate\u2019s profession and society. Moreover, an advocate should never discredit the name of the profession, the oath he or she swore and the ideal of justice. On the facts of the applicant\u2019s case, the Court of Appeal therefore had been correct in finding that the applicant had not proven that she had regained high moral character, in particular given the nature of the criminal acts she had committed.", "references": ["5", "6", "3", "4", "7", "0", "9", "8", "2", "1", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1968 and is serving a prison sentence in Astrakhan. 5.  In July 2004 the applicant was charged with murder of V. Counsel Sh. was appointed to represent him during investigation and trial. 6.  On 10 December 2004 the Astrakhan Regional Court held a preliminary trial hearing. The applicant opted for a jury trial. In support of his request, Sh. stated as follows:\n\u201c[The applicant] has committed a particularly serious offence which might entail a lengthy custodial sentence. ... I support the [applicant\u2019s] request.\u201d 7.  On 18 February 2005 the court completed the examination of evidence. Both prosecution and defence made their closing arguments. In his statement, Sh. called the applicant \u201ca robber and a drunkard\u201d. The presiding judge instructed the jury to disregard the counsel\u2019s statement as referring to the applicant\u2019s character. 8.  On 18 February 2005 the jury delivered a guilty verdict. 9.  On 21 February 2005 the applicant asked the court to replace counsel Sh. alleging that the defence carried out by him had not been effective. The court dismissed the applicant\u2019s request. 10.  On the same date the Regional Court found the applicant guilty of murder and sentenced him to fifteen years\u2019 imprisonment. 11.  On 1 March 2005 the applicant asked the Regional Court to appoint legal counsel to represent him before the appeal court. On 8 March 2005 the court refused to appoint a lawyer referring to the relevant legal provisions that did not provide for a right to have a state-appointed lawyer before the appeal court. 12.  On 21 July 2005 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the judgment of 21 February 2005 on appeal. According to the official documents, the applicant was not provided with legal assistance. 13.  On 6 June 2007 the Presidium of the Supreme Court quashed the appeal judgment of 21 July 2005 by way of supervisory review. The court noted that the applicant had not been provided with legal assistance in the appeal proceedings and remitted the matter for fresh consideration to the appeal court. The applicant did not attend the hearing. He was represented by counsel O. 14.  On an unspecified date the applicant was transferred to Moscow. Counsel R. was appointed to represent him. From 1 to 3 August 2007 R. studied the case-file. On 7 and 14 August 2004 he met with the applicant at the remand prison. 15.  On an unspecified date the applicant submitted a revised statement of appeal. 16.  On 16 August 2007 the Supreme Court held a new appeal hearing. According to the applicant, he participated in the hearing by means of a video link. R. was present in the courtroom. He did not submit a statement of appeal and made oral submissions to the court. Having examined the applicant\u2019s appeal, the court upheld, in substance, his conviction. The court also dismissed as unsubstantiated the applicant\u2019s complaint about the alleged ineffectiveness of the legal assistance provided by counsel Sh. In this connection, the court noted that the applicant had consented to be represented by Sh. both during the investigation and trial. The court also concluded, on the basis of the trial record, that Sh. had taken an active part in the trial. In his closing argument, Sh. had supported the applicant\u2019s non-guilty plea and argued that the applicant had not been proved guilty. Lastly, the court took into account that, prior to the jury verdict, the applicant had not complained about the quality of the defence provided by Sh. 17.  On 18 August 2008 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s supervisory review complaint against the judgment of 16 August 2007.", "references": ["6", "8", "2", "1", "0", "5", "9", "7", "4", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1972 and lives in Pakruojis. 6.  In 1996 the applicant graduated from the Lithuanian Police Academy with a degree in law. He worked as an investigator at \u0160iauliai city police headquarters. 7.  On 3 October 2000 the \u0160iauliai Regional Court established that from 1995 to 1996, when he had been working as an investigator, the applicant had several times solicited and sometimes succeeded in getting bribes for discontinuing criminal proceedings. The victims of the applicant\u2019s crimes, who were suspects in criminal proceedings or their relatives, had been threatened and sometimes harassed sexually by the applicant. He would tell them that \u201cthe case would end badly (blogai baigsis)\u201d if they did not meet his demands. The \u0160iauliai Regional Court found that such actions amounted to the intentional crimes of abuse of office (Article 285 of the Criminal Code) and bribery (Article 282 of the Criminal Code). The court also noted that the applicant had not acknowledged his guilt, but had instead tried to justify his criminal acts and avoid taking responsibility for them in any way possible. The trial court sentenced him to eight years\u2019 deprivation of liberty in a correctional labour colony under a strict regime, ordered the confiscation of all his property, and prohibited him from working in law enforcement or the justice system for five years. 8.  The applicant\u2019s conviction was upheld by the Court of Appeal on 29 June 2001 and by the Supreme Court on 18 December 2001. 9.  In 2003, upon entry into force of the new Criminal Code, the \u0160iauliai Regional Court requalified the applicant\u2019s sentence to four years and seven months\u2019 deprivation of liberty. The applicant was released from prison on 8 September 2003 after serving his sentence. 10.  By a ruling of 17 June 2005 the \u0160iauliai Regional Court expunged the applicant\u2019s conviction from his criminal record. The court noted that the applicant had served his sentence. He had been convicted of crimes of medium severity. The court also took account of the fact that the applicant had not committed any violations of administrative law, had been bringing up a child alone, had been described in positive terms by people at his place of residence and at his workplace, had drawn the right conclusions from the crimes he had committed, and had promised not to commit any crimes in the future. The ruling was not appealed against and became enforceable. 11.  According to the applicant\u2019s curriculum vitae, which he later submitted to the Bar Association, from May 2004 he worked as in-house lawyer and loan administrator in various private companies. 12.  On 12 January 2007 the applicant wrote to the Lithuanian Bar Association, which regulates advocates (lawyers admitted to the Bar, advokatas), requesting to be admitted as a trainee advocate. He asked that an advocate V.S.B. be appointed as his supervisor in his work practice. The applicant also confirmed in writing that \u201cnone of the grounds listed in the Law on the Bar prevented him from being put on the list of trainee advocates\u201d. The applicant also submitted a written application (advokato \u012fskaitos lapas) where he listed his former places of employment, stating that from 22 July 1991 until 15 March 1999 he had worked in the police and from 19 March 2004 in the private sector. There was no explanation about the period between 1999 and 2004. 13.  The Bar Association placed the applicant\u2019s name on the list of trainee advocates on 25 January 2007 and advocate V.S.B. was appointed as his supervisor. 14.  On 13 June 2007 the Bar Association received a letter from a private person, L.G., informing it that the applicant had withheld information from the Bar Association that he had been previously convicted. 15.  On 20 June 2007 the Bar Association held that by failing to inform it of the conviction, the applicant had withheld information relevant to assessing his reputation, and that therefore he had shown that his attitude towards the standing of the Lithuanian Bar and towards becoming a trainee advocate was not honest and respectful. The Bar Association considered that the applicant had breached points 1.3, 12.1 and 13.2 of the Lithuanian Code of Professional Ethics for Advocates (see paragraph 37 below \u2013 hereinafter, \u201cthe Code of Ethics\u201d), and disciplinary proceedings against him were therefore justified. The Bar Association also considered that the applicant\u2019s supervisor, V.S.B., had likewise breached the Code of Ethics but that he would not face disciplinary proceedings owing to his long and positive professional record. 16.  On 10 July 2007 the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Association held that the applicant had committed a disciplinary violation by withholding information about his conviction by \u0160iauliai Regional Court on 3 October 2000 (see paragraph 7 above). The committee emphasised the fact that the applicant had not mentioned the conviction or his \u201clong prison sentence\u201d in his application to be admitted as a trainee advocate, his curriculum vitae or in the other documents submitted in support. Information about the conviction had been relevant for assessing his reputation. By withholding such information the applicant had acted dishonestly and disrespectfully, and had not protected the prestige of the Lithuanian Bar. The applicant had thus breached points 1.3, 12.1 and 13.2 of the Code of Ethics, which set out the necessary requirements for candidates to become trainee advocates (see paragraph 37 below). The case therefore had to be decided by the Court of Honour of Advocates (hereinafter \u2013 \u201cthe Court of Honour\u201d). 17.  In a letter of 4 September 2007 to the Bar Association the chief prosecutor of \u0160iauliai Region wrote that the applicant lived in the city of \u0160iauliai and that in the course of his work as a trainee advocate he had interaction with the same investigators, prosecutors and judges with whom he had worked before committing his crimes and with those who had later investigated his crimes or examined his case in court. Even though the applicant had served his sentence, communication with those investigators, prosecutors and judges caused some strains at work in \u0160iauliai. The chief prosecutor stated that it would be better if the applicant could be prevented from practising law in the city or region of \u0160iauliai, even though the Law on the Bar did not provide for the possibility to restrict an advocate\u2019s activity within or outside a certain area. 18.  By a letter of 4 September 2007 the Court of Honour informed the applicant about the forthcoming hearing in his case, and invited him to participate in person or have an advocate represent his interests in those disciplinary proceedings. The applicant was present at the hearing, and explained that he had not hidden his conviction. The only reason he had not informed the Bar Association about it was because in his view there had been no requirement to do so. He also asked for the removal of the president of the Court of Honour, J.K., stating that the manner in which the latter had put certain questions to him showed he was biased. The request was refused as unfounded. 19.  The Court of Honour, composed of the presiding advocate, J.K., and two other advocates, A.P. and G.P., met on 25 September and 25 October 2007. They postponed the hearing to a later date on each occasion. 20.  On 23 November 2007 the Court of Honour rejected a request by the applicant to remove J.K. as unsubstantiated, while A.P. was replaced by another advocate, J.M. 21.  The Court of Honour also held on the same day that the applicant had breached the Code of Ethics and imposed the disciplinary measure of ordering his removal from the list of trainee advocates, on the basis of Articles 13 \u00a7 1 and 54 \u00a7 2 of the Law on the Bar (see paragraph 34 below). In setting out its reasons the Court of Honour had regard to the crimes committed by the applicant and noted that during the criminal court proceedings he had expressed no remorse (see paragraph 7 above). For the Court of Honour, even though the law did not directly require that a person disclose a prior conviction when submitting a request to become a trainee advocate, such an obligation stemmed from Article 8 (4) of the Law of the Bar, which required candidates to be of high moral character (nepriekai\u0161tinga reputacija). Similarly, point 13.2 of the Code of Ethics set out that an advocate had to act honestly and ethically, even if certain acts or behaviour that did not meet the requirements of the Law on the Bar or the Code of Ethics were not described specifically in that Code (see paragraph 37 below). The Court of Honour considered that the crimes which the applicant had committed whilst working in law enforcement had been cynical and had shown great disrespect towards society. Moreover, he had committed those crimes while working in the legal field. In the light of such considerations, the Court of Honour was convinced that the applicant, who had a university degree and had previously had a law-related job, had deliberately withheld information about his prior conviction, because he had been aware that, if information not only about his crimes but also about the manner in which he had committed them had come to light, then the Bar Association would have rejected his application to become a trainee advocate. Lastly, the Court of Honour noted that the profession of advocate was defined not only by legal acts, but also by certain ethical rules, historic practices and society\u2019s legitimate expectations as to the assistance an advocate was to provide as part of his or her role. An advocate should therefore always adhere to the moral and legal standards and obligations, protect the professional honour and dignity of advocates and do nothing that would discredit the good name of the profession, the advocate\u2019s oath, or the notion of justice. 22.  The applicant challenged the above decision before the Vilnius Regional Court. He argued, inter alia, that there had been procedural beaches and that the Court of Honour had not been impartial. He also maintained that the concept of high moral character applied to advocates was too strict when compared with the requirements for bailiffs or civil servants. 23.  On 24 October 2008 the Vilnius Regional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal as unfounded. It dealt with the applicant\u2019s allegations about procedural violations by the Court of Honour by noting that that court had merely postponed the case on 25 September and 25 October 2007, without examining it on the merits (see paragraph 19 above). The applicant\u2019s suggestion that the Court of Honour had issued a ruling on either of those dates that the applicant had not committed a disciplinary violation was therefore unfounded. Furthermore, J.K., the advocate who had been the president of the Court of Honour, had been questioned as a witness by the Vilnius Regional Court and had testified that he had not been biased against the applicant; he had only had an opinion about the particular actions performed by the applicant. Moreover, the applicant\u2019s allegation about a lack of impartiality on the part of J.K. had also been dismissed as unfounded by the Court of Honour. Lastly, the change in the composition of that court when the case had been decided on 23 November 2007, removing A.P., a member said by the applicant to have been favourable to him (see paragraph 20 above), had not been a decisive factor because the court had been unanimous in its finding against the applicant. The Vilnius Regional Court thus dismissed the applicant\u2019s request to summon for questioning advocate A.P., who, according to the applicant, had participated in the hearing when his case had gone before the Court of Honour. On the basis of the written evidence, the first-instance court established that A.P. had not taken part in the disciplinary proceedings against the applicant. 24.  As to the question of the applicant\u2019s reputation, the Vilnius Regional Court had particular regard to the crimes of which he had been convicted (see paragraph 7 above). While observing that the conviction had expired, the court noted that the crimes had been committed when the applicant had been working in law enforcement. The manner in which those crimes had been committed and their scale did not allow for the assertion that the applicant had automatically regained the status of being of high moral character immediately after the conviction had been expunged. Were it otherwise, society\u2019s expectations as to the morals and ethics of representatives of the advocate\u2019s profession would not be met. Only people of high moral character could be trusted to work in the process of the implementation of justice. In other words, the applicant\u2019s actions had to be looked at to see not only if they had been in accordance with applicable laws, but also whether they had adhered to the requirements of professional ethics. That stemmed, inter alia, from Article 8 (4) and other provisions of the Law on the Bar, which provided that an advocate was liable to disciplinary sanctions, including disbarment, for breaches of professional ethics (see paragraph 34 below), and was something that had also been confirmed by the Supreme Court (see paragraph 43 below). 25.  The Vilnius Regional Court concurred with the Court of Honour that the applicant had had a moral obligation to disclose important information such as a prior conviction to the Bar Association when submitting an application to become a trainee advocate, even though that requirement had not been explicitly stated on the application form (see paragraph 12 above, advokato \u012fskaitos lapas). The fact that, according to the applicant, his supervising advocate, several other advocates in \u0160iauliai and some members of the Bar Association Council had known about his prior conviction, did not absolve him from the obligation to provide information that was as comprehensive as possible when applying to the Bar, so that it would be possible to assess his reputation objectively and comprehensively. The Court of Honour had also been correct in holding that the applicant had consciously withheld that information because he had understood that the nature of his criminal acts would not have permitted him to be considered as a person of high moral character. In any case, if the applicant had had any doubts about whether the information about his prior conviction was relevant, he could have asked the Bar Association. Consequently, it had been legitimate for the Court of Honour to impose a disciplinary measure on the applicant by removing him from the list of trainee advocates. 26.  The applicant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the rules of the Code of Ethics had not applied to him at the time when he had requested to become a trainee advocate, given that they applied only to people who were already advocates and trainee advocates. According to the applicant, the president of the Court of Honour had clearly acknowledged to the Vilnius Regional Court that anyone who had disclosed a prior conviction had been admitted to the Bar and that the applicant would also have been admitted if he had done the same. The applicant also relied on Article 5 \u00a7 1 (2) of the Law on Bailiffs and Article 9 \u00a7 3 (1) of the Law on Civil Service (see paragraphs 41 and 42 below), implying that the definition of high moral character had been interpreted too broadly by the Court of Honour.\nThe Bar Association asked that the applicant\u2019s appeal be dismissed. 27.  By a ruling of 7 April 2009 the Court of Appeal upheld the Vilnius Regional Court\u2019s arguments and dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. It found that no violations had been committed under Article 6 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3 of the Convention as regards the fairness of the disciplinary proceedings. The rules regulating disciplinary proceedings did not prohibit postponing examination of a case. Moreover, the applicant had not challenged J.M.\u2019s participation in the disciplinary proceedings. It would also have been irrelevant to summon A.P. as she had not sat in the Court of Honour when it had decided on the applicant\u2019s case on 23 November 2007. 28.  As to the merits of the complaint, the Vilnius Regional Court had been correct in its interpretation of the Law on the Bar and of established court practice in looking at the applicant\u2019s crimes, their manner and scale not only in the light of the Law on the Bar, but also taking into account the rules for advocates\u2019 professional ethics. There had been no arguments in the applicant\u2019s appeal to refute the first-instance court\u2019s view of his crimes and behaviour in the light of those ethical requirements. Contrary to the applicant\u2019s submission, the first-instance court had relied on Article 8 (4) of the Law on the Bar and on the Code of Ethics, not on Article 8 (1) of the Law on the Bar. The applicant\u2019s argument that the first-instance court had applied Article 8 (1) of the amended Law on the Bar (see paragraph 35 below) retroactively was therefore unfounded. 29.  Lastly, the Court of Appeal rejected the applicant\u2019s argument that he had had no obligation to inform the Bar Association about his prior conviction. The Court of Honour had been correct in finding that such an obligation stemmed from the Law on the Bar and the Code of Ethics, which also applied to the applicant. The Court of Honour\u2019s conclusion had been supported by point 12.1 of the Code of Ethics, which set out that the relationship between an advocate and the Bar was based on mutual respect and good-will assistance, and by point 13.2, which stated that an advocate must also adhere to the traditions and customs which corresponded to the common principles of ethics and decency (see paragraph 37 below). As a result, the Court of Honour had had grounds to impose a disciplinary penalty on the applicant and to strike his name off the list of trainee advocates on the basis of Articles 7 \u00a7 1 (4), 8 (4), 13 \u00a7 1 (1) and 35 of the Law on the Bar. 30.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. He submitted, inter alia, that the prohibition on him practising law was in breach of his rights under Articles 8 and 14 of the Convention. He also argued that an expired conviction should not be an obstacle for him to become an advocate. He mentioned that the stricter requirements on reputation under the amendments to Article 8 (1) of the Law on the Bar of 15 April 2008 (see paragraph 35 below), should not have been applied to him retroactively. For the applicant, it was also wrong to apply the Code of Ethics to actions he had committed before becoming a trainee advocate. Lastly, he was also dissatisfied by how his case had been handled by the Court of Honour, relying on Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention. He argued that all such considerations meant his case merited review by the Supreme Court because the uniform interpretation of the law was at stake. 31.  On 13 May 2009 the Supreme Court rejected the appeal. It restated its settled case-law (see paragraphs 43 to 47 below) that advocates and trainee advocates were part of the justice system, and were therefore not only bound by laws, but also had to protect the spirit of the law and the ideals of justice and lawfulness. Ignorance of requirements of laws discredited the advocate\u2019s profession and undermined its prestige. An advocate or trainee advocate who had breached imperative legal norms could not excuse that failing by alleging that he or she did not know the law or that the law was not sufficiently precise, because that person was bound to know the law and ethical requirements as part of his or her job. The activity of advocate was not only regulated by standards applicable to the general public, but also by special requirements set out in the laws regulating the advocate\u2019s profession and by professional ethics. The requirements for the applicant\u2019s behaviour, which were set out in the rules for professional ethics, were objectively necessary: only a person whose professional behaviour was beyond reproach could be entrusted to take part in the process of the implementation of justice. The notion of the implementation of justice would be discredited if any and every person was allowed to take part in that process, irrespective of his or her behaviour. The applicant\u2019s case therefore did not give grounds for cassation appeal because it followed established case-law and was not relevant for developing it. 32.  On 25 June 2009 the applicant attempted to submit another appeal on points of law. He drew the Supreme Court\u2019s attention to the \u0160iauliai Regional Court\u2019s ruling of 17 June 2005 to expunge his conviction (see paragraph 10 above). 33.  On 10 July 2009 the Supreme Court found the appeal to be essentially identical to the earlier one and refused to admit it for examination.", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "3", "7", "8", "6", "9", "4", "5", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "8.  Since 1994 the first applicant company, Satakunnan Markkinap\u00f6rssi Oy collected data from the Finnish tax authorities for the purpose of publishing information about natural persons\u2019 taxable income and assets in the Verop\u00f6rssi newspaper. Several other publishing and media companies also publish such data which, pursuant to Finnish law, are accessible to the public (see paragraph 39 below for an explanation of the Finnish access to information regime). 9.  In 2002 Verop\u00f6rssi appeared 17 times, with each issue concentrating on a certain geographical area of the country. The data published comprised the surnames and forenames of approximately 1.2 million natural persons whose annual taxable income exceeded certain thresholds, mainly from 60,000 to 80,000 Finnish marks (approximately 10,000 to 13,500 euros (EUR)), as well as the amount, to the nearest EUR 100, of their earned and unearned income and taxable net assets. When published in the newspaper, the data were set out in the form of an alphabetical list and organised according to municipality and income bracket. 10.  The first applicant company worked in cooperation with the second applicant company, Satamedia Oy, and both were owned by the same shareholders. In 2003 the first applicant company started to transfer personal data published in Verop\u00f6rssi, in the form of CD-ROM discs, to the second applicant company which, together with a mobile telephone operator, started a text-messaging service (SMS service). By sending a person\u2019s name to a service number, taxation information could be obtained concerning that person, on the requesting person\u2019s mobile telephone, if information was available in the database or register created by the second applicant company. This database was created using personal data already published in the newspaper and transferred in the form of CD-ROM discs to the second applicant company. From 2006 the second applicant company also published Verop\u00f6rssi. 11.  It transpires from the case file that in 1997 the Minister of Justice requested that the police instigate a criminal investigation into the publishing activities of the applicant companies. No information is contained in the file as to the outcome of this request or of any subsequent investigation. 12.  In September 2000 and November 2001, the applicant companies ordered taxation data from the Finnish National Board of Taxation (verohallitus, skattestyrelsen). Following the first order, the Board requested an opinion from the Data Protection Ombudsman, on the basis of which the Board invited the applicant companies to provide further information regarding their request and indicating that the data could not be disclosed if Verop\u00f6rssi continued to be published in its usual form. The applicant companies subsequently cancelled their data request and paid people to collect taxation data manually at the local tax offices. 13.  On an unspecified date, probably in 2003, the Data Protection Ombudsman (tietosuojavaltuutettu, dataombudsmannen) contacted the applicant companies and advised them that, although accessing and publishing taxation data were not prohibited as such, they had to cease publishing such data in the manner and to the extent that had been the case in 2002, when they had published data concerning the 2001 tax year. The applicant companies refused to abide by this request, which they considered violated their right to freedom of expression. 14.  By a letter of 10 April 2003 the Data Protection Ombudsman asked the Data Protection Board (tietosuojalautakunta, datasekretessn\u00e4mnden) to prohibit the applicant companies from processing the taxation data in the manner and to the extent that had been the case in 2002 and from passing those data to the SMS service. He claimed that under the Personal Data Act the companies had no right to collect, store or pass on personal data and that the derogation provided by that Act concerning journalism did not, in his view, apply to the present case. The collecting of taxation information and the passing of such information to third parties were not for journalistic purposes and therefore were not covered by the derogation in the Personal Data Act, but rather constituted the processing of personal data in which the applicant companies had no right to engage. 15.  On 7 January 2004 the Data Protection Board dismissed the Data Protection Ombudsman\u2019s request. It found that the derogation laid down in the Personal Data Act concerning journalism applied to the present case. As regards the SMS service, the data used in the service had already been published in Verop\u00f6rssi and therefore the Act did not apply to it. 16.  By letter dated 12 February 2004 the Data Protection Ombudsman appealed to the Helsinki Administrative Court (hallinto-oikeus, f\u00f6rvaltningsdomstolen) reiterating his request that the applicant companies be prohibited from processing taxation data in the manner and to the extent that had been the case in 2002 and from passing such data to the SMS service. 17.  On 29 September 2005 the Administrative Court rejected the appeal. It found that the derogation laid down in the Personal Data Act concerning journalism, which had its origins in Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data was adopted (OJ 1995 L 281, p. 31, hereafter \u201cthe Data Protection Directive\u201d), should not be interpreted too strictly, as an overly strict interpretation would favour protection of privacy over freedom of expression. That court considered that Verop\u00f6rssi had a journalistic purpose and that it was also in the public interest to publish such data. It emphasised, in particular, that the published data were already accessible to the general public. The journalism derogation thus applied in the circumstances of the present case. As regards the SMS service, the Administrative Court agreed with the Data Protection Board that, as the information had already been published in the newspaper, the Act did not apply to it. 18.  By letter dated 26 October 2005 the Data Protection Ombudsman lodged an appeal with the Supreme Administrative Court (korkein hallinto-oikeus, h\u00f6gsta f\u00f6rvaltningsdomstolen), reiterating the grounds of appeal already presented before the Helsinki Administrative Court. 19.  On 8 February 2007 the Supreme Administrative Court decided to request a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice of the European Communities (which became the Court of Justice of the European Union on 1 December 2009, hereafter the \u201cCJEU\u201d) on the interpretation of Directive 95/46/EC. 20.  On 16 December 2008 the Grand Chamber of the CJEU handed down its judgment (see Case C-73/07 Tietosuojavaltuutettu v. Satakunnan Markkinap\u00f6rssi Oy and Satamedia Oy, EU:C:2008:727). It found, first of all, that the activities in question constituted \u201cprocessing of personal data\u201d within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 95/46. According to the CJEU, activities involving the processing of personal data such as those relating to personal data files which contained solely, and in unaltered form, material that had already been published in the media, also fell within the scope of the Directive (see paragraphs 37 and 49 of the judgment). The object of the derogation in Article 9 of the Directive for the processing of personal data carried out solely for journalistic purposes was to reconcile the protection of privacy with freedom of expression. In order to take account of the importance of the latter in every democratic society, it was necessary to interpret notions relating to that freedom, such as journalism, broadly. However, in order to achieve a balance between those two fundamental rights, the protection of the fundamental right to privacy required that the derogations and limitations in relation to the protection of data had to apply only in so far as were strictly necessary (see paragraphs 54 and 56 of the judgment). Journalistic activities were not limited to media undertakings and could be undertaken for profit-making purposes (see paragraph 61). Furthermore, when interpreting the journalistic purposes derogation, account must be taken of the evolution and proliferation of methods of communication and the dissemination of information. Activities such as those involved in the domestic proceedings, relating to data from documents which were in the public domain under domestic legislation, could be classified as \u201cjournalistic activities\u201d if their sole object was the disclosure to the public of information, opinions or ideas, irrespective of the medium which was used to transmit them. Whether or not that was the case, was for the national court to determine (see paragraphs 60-62 of the judgment). 21.  On 23 September 2009 the Supreme Administrative Court, applying the ruling of the CJEU and with reference to the case-law on Article 10 of the Convention, quashed the impugned decisions of the Data Protection Board and the Helsinki Administrative Court and referred the case back to the Data Protection Board for a fresh examination with a view to issuing an order pursuant to section 44(1) of the Personal Data Act. The Supreme Administrative Court requested the Board to prohibit the processing of taxation data by the applicant companies in the manner and to the extent carried out in 2002. 22.  In its legal assessment, the Supreme Administrative Court gave the following reasoning:\n\u201cScope of the matter\nThe present case does not concern the question of the extent to which taxation data and official documents concerning taxation are public under the Act on the Public Disclosure and Confidentiality of Tax Information.\nNor does it concern the right to publish taxation data as such but only the processing of personal data. Therefore, there is no issue of possible prior interference with the content of the publications, but rather an assessment of whether the legal conditions set for personal data processing and protection of privacy are fulfilled.\nThe reconciliation of protection of privacy with freedom of expression is part of the legal assessment of personal data processing in the matter.\n...\nReconciliation of the protection of privacy and freedom of expression\nInterpretation of the exception concerning journalistic purposes in the Data Protection Directive. The Court of Justice of the European Communities emphasised that the purpose of the Data Protection Directive is to ensure that when processing their personal data, the Member States guarantee individuals\u2019 fundamental rights and freedoms, and in particular their right to privacy, while allowing the free movement of such information. The Court further emphasised that these fundamental rights must be reconciled to a certain extent with the fundamental right to freedom of expression, and that this task belongs to the Member States.\n...\nIt therefore appears from the aforementioned ruling of the Court of Justice of the European Communities that the concept of journalism must, as such, be interpreted broadly within the meaning of Article 9 of the Directive, that, on the other hand, the protection of privacy can be derogated from only in so far as it is strictly necessary, and that this task of reconciliation of the two fundamental rights is the task of the Member States. Ensuring proper balance between the rights and interests at stake, including the fundamental rights guaranteed in the Communities\u2019 legal order, is the task of the domestic authorities and courts (see also case C-101/01 Lindqvist).\nInterpretation of the exception in the Personal Data Act concerning journalistic purposes. ... It transpires from the preparatory work on the Personal Data Act (HE 96/1998 vp) that the purpose of the adoption of the Personal Data Act was to maintain the existing situation in respect of journalistic files kept by the media, provided it remained within the limits imposed by the Data Protection Directive. Therefore, in order to conclude that processing of personal data is conducted for journalistic purposes within the meaning of the Personal Data Act, inter alia, that data must be used solely for journalistic activities and the data must not be made available to persons other than those involved in those journalistic activities.\nWhen interpreting section 2(5) of the Personal Data Act, particular regard must be had to the fact that it concerns the reconciliation of two fundamental rights, namely the freedom of expression and the protection of privacy.\n...\nThe case-law of the European Court of Human Rights has also adopted a position on reconciling freedom of expression with the protection of privacy. The Court has held, inter alia in its von Hannover judgment of 24 June 2004, that the press plays an essential role in a democratic society. Although it must not overstep certain bounds, in particular in respect of the reputation and rights of others, its duty is nevertheless to impart, in a manner consistent with its obligations and responsibilities, information and ideas on all matters of public interest.\nOn the other hand, the Court also held in the above-mentioned judgment that increased vigilance as regards the protection of private life was necessary in order to contend with the new communications technologies which make it possible to store and reproduce personal data.\nAccording to the Court, when balancing the protection of private life against freedom of expression, the decisive criterion had to be the contribution made by publishing the data to a debate of public interest. If a publication is only meant to satisfy the curiosity of a certain audience, freedom of expression must be interpreted more narrowly.\nIn the present case, it must be assessed to what extent the impugned processing of personal data as carried out in the course of the companies\u2019 activities falls within the scope of the exception concerning journalistic purposes that is provided for in section 2(5) of the Personal Data Act. The starting point is whether the aim of their activities was to disclose information, opinions or ideas to the public. In this assessment, account must be taken of whether or to what extent those activities can be seen as contributing to a debate in a democratic society rather than solely satisfying the curiosity of certain individuals.\nProcessing of personal taxation data in the background file of Satakunnan Markkinap\u00f6rssi Oy and in the Verop\u00f6rssi newspaper\nSatakunnan Markkinap\u00f6rssi Oy collected for the Verop\u00f6rssi newspaper taxation data from different tax offices in which individuals\u2019 names appear together with information on their taxable income.\nAs mentioned above, the case concerns the processing of personal data to which the general requirements in Chapter 2 of the Personal Data Act are applicable, unless the Act allows for an exception from the application of these provisions. It must first of all be assessed whether the processing of personal data in the company\u2019s background file before the publication of such data in the Verop\u00f6rssi newspaper falls within the scope of the exception concerning journalistic purposes.\nFrom the preparatory work on the amendment of the Personal Data File Act (HE 311/1993 vp), which was the Act in force before the Personal Data Act, it transpires in particular that the press considers that the right to freely disclose information also requires journalists to be able, in advance, to freely collect and store information. Restricting the processing of personal data at this stage, that is to say before publication, could in practice mean that a prior decision is taken on what can be published. Such an outcome would be incompatible with the fundamental right guaranteeing freedom of expression.\nThe issue at stake in the present case concerns publicly accessible personal data received from the tax authorities. The collection and processing of such data in the company\u2019s internal files for the purpose of the company\u2019s publishing activities can, on the basis of above-mentioned grounds, be regarded as processing of personal data for journalistic purposes. The processing of large quantities of such data from the various municipal taxation records may well be necessary as background information for the purpose of the editing of a publication concerning taxation and from the point of view of free communication and open debate. At this stage of activities the protection of the privacy of the persons concerned can also be sufficiently secured, provided that the data collected and stored in the file are protected against unlawful processing as required by section 32 of the Personal Data Act.\nSatakunnan Markkinap\u00f6rssi Oy has published the personal data collected from the tax offices as wide-ranging municipality-based catalogues in the Verop\u00f6rssi newspaper. As already stated above, in this regard too it is a question of processing personal data within the meaning of section 3(2) of the Personal Data Act. As part of the case file, the Supreme Administrative Court had at its disposal Verop\u00f6rssi newspaper no. 14/2004, published by Satakunnan Markkinap\u00f6rssi Oy and covering the Helsinki metropolitan area.\nIn this respect it must be decided whether a derogation is possible from the requirements relating to the processing of personal data on the basis of section 2(5) of the Act, that is to say whether the impugned processing of personal data by publishing those data in the Verop\u00f6rssi newspaper came within the scope of the exception provided for journalistic purposes.\n...\nIt transpires from the preparatory work on the Personal Data Act (HE 96/1998 vp) that the processing of data in the background file referred to in the Personal Data File Act must relate solely to journalistic activities and that the processed data must not be made available to any persons not engaged in journalistic activities. The purpose of section 2(5) of the Personal Data Act was to maintain the existing situation in respect of journalistic files kept by the media, within the limits allowed by the Data Protection Directive. Therefore, the purpose of the Personal Data Act in this respect can be seen as guaranteeing the possibility for free journalistic work prior to the publication of information.\nThe term \u201cprocessing of personal data for journalistic purposes\u201d cannot be regarded as covering the large\u2013scale publication of the journalistic background file, almost verbatim, as catalogues, albeit split into different parts and sorted by municipality.\nSince the disclosure of registered data on such a scale is equivalent to the disclosure of the entire background file kept for journalistic purposes by the company, such disclosure does not represent solely an expression of information, opinions or ideas. As stated above, with a view to reconciling the requirements of freedom of expression with the protection of privacy, the collection of data before publication has been made permissible under section 2(5) of the Personal Data Act without any requirement of compliance with general conditions set out in section 8 of the Act. By contrast, the processing of personal data collected in the company\u2019s background file by publishing it and by rendering it available to the general public to the extent that has been done in the present case, and beyond the scope of the minimum requirements set out in section 2(5) of the Act, cannot be regarded as compatible with the purpose of the Personal Data Act.\nOpen public-interest debate, the monitoring of the exercise of power in society and the freedom to criticise, which are necessary in a democratic society, do not require the disclosure of the personal data of specific individuals in the manner and to the extent described above. When regard is also had to the foregoing comments on the narrow interpretation of section 2(4) of the Personal Data Act and the fact that a strict literal interpretation of that provision would result in a situation incompatible with the purpose of the Act as regards protection of personal data, the processing of personal data with a view to publishing them in the Verop\u00f6rssi newspaper, and as far as the contents of this publication itself are concerned, was not conducted for journalistic purposes within the meaning of the Personal Data Act.\n...\nHaving regard to sections 2(5) and 32 of the Personal Data Act and Article 9 of the Data Protection Directive, as interpreted by the Court of Justice of the European Communities in its preliminary ruling, the collection of personal data prior to its publication in the Verop\u00f6rssi newspaper and its processing in the background file of Satakunnan Markkinap\u00f6rssi Oy cannot as such be regarded as contrary to the regulations concerning the protection of personal data, provided that, inter alia, the data have been protected properly. However, with reference to all the clarifications on how and to what extent the personal data in the background file were further processed in the Verop\u00f6rssi newspaper, Satakunnan Markkinap\u00f6rssi Oy did in fact process personal data concerning natural persons in violation of the Personal Data Act.\nHandover of data in a CD-ROM\nSatakunnan Markkinap\u00f6rssi Oy handed over a CD-ROM containing the published data to Satamedia Oy so that the latter could start up an SMS service using that data. As mentioned above, that action amounts to the processing of personal data within the meaning of section 3(2) of the Personal Data Act.\nHaving regard to the preliminary ruling of the Court of Justice of the European Communities and its effect on the interpretation of section 2(4) of the Personal Data Act, as well as all that has been said above about the processing of personal data in the Verop\u00f6rssi newspaper, the handover to Satamedia Oy of personal data collected in the background file of Satakunnan Markkinap\u00f6rssi Oy, even though they were published in the Verop\u00f6rssi newspaper, cannot be regarded as processing of personal data for journalistic purposes within the meaning of Personal Data Act. Nor can the processing of personal data in such a manner be regarded as having been effected for journalistic purposes within the meaning of Article 9 of the Data Protection Directive. Therefore, in that regard too, Satakunnan Markkinap\u00f6rssi Oy processed personal data in violation of the Personal Data Act.\nProcessing of personal data for the realisation of a SMS service by Satamedia Oy\nAs stated above in the \u201cFacts\u201d section, Satamedia Oy handed over the above-mentioned personal data to a third company in order to start up a SMS service, which company operated the SMS service on behalf of Satamedia Oy.\nIt was pointed out above that Satakunnan Markkinap\u00f6rssi Oy had no right under the Personal Data Act to process the personal data at issue by handing it over to Satamedia Oy. Consequently, Satamedia Oy also had no right under the Personal Data Act to process personal data received in this manner.\nIn addition, it follows from the preliminary ruling of the Court of Justice of the European Communities that the exception provided for in the Data Protection Directive, which concerns the processing of personal data for journalistic purposes, requires the disclosure of data to the public. According to section 2(1) of the Act on the Exercise of Freedom of Expression in Mass Media, the term \u201cthe public\u201d in that Act refers to a group of freely determined message recipients. Satamedia Oy\u2019s SMS service involves the company processing personal data relating to the taxation of a specific individual on the basis of a request by another individual. It therefore does not concern disclosure of data to the general public, as explained above, but replying to a request by an individual concerning the personal data of another individual.\nOpen public-interest debate, the monitoring of the exercise of power in society and the freedom to criticise, which are necessary in a democratic society, do not require the possibility of processing the personal data of specific individuals as has been done in this case. Freedom of expression does not require any derogation from the protection of privacy in such a situation.\nThe Court of Justice of the European Communities further stated in its preliminary ruling that the technical means used for the transfer of information is not relevant when assessing whether there is any question of activities undertaken solely for journalistic purposes. As regards the SMS service operated by Satamedia Oy, it is irrelevant that the data were transferred via mobile phones and text messages. Therefore, this is not a case of treating this mode of transmission of data differently from other modes of transmission. The assessment would be the same if the company processed, on the basis of a request by an individual, the personal data of another individual by using some other mode of transmission.\u201d 23.  Pursuant to the above-mentioned judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court, on 26 November 2009 the Data Protection Board prohibited the first applicant company from processing taxation data in the manner and to the extent that had been the case in 2002 and from forwarding that information to an SMS service. It found that the collection of personal data prior to its publication in Verop\u00f6rssi and its processing in the background file of the first applicant company could not as such be regarded as contrary to the data protection rules, provided, inter alia, that the data had been protected properly. However, considering the manner and the extent to which the personal data in the background file had been published in Verop\u00f6rssi, the first applicant company had processed personal data concerning natural persons in violation of the Personal Data Act. The second applicant company was prohibited from collecting, storing or forwarding to an SMS service any data received from the first applicant company\u2019s database and published in Verop\u00f6rssi. 24.  By letter dated 15 December 2009, after the Data Protection Board had made its decision, the Data Protection Ombudsman asked the applicant companies to indicate what action they were envisaging in response to the Board\u2019s decision. In their reply, the applicant companies asked for the Data Protection Ombudsman\u2019s views on the conditions under which they could continue to publish public taxation data at least to a certain extent. In his reply the Data Protection Ombudsman stated, with reference to the decision of the Data Protection Board of 26 November 2009, that \u201cwhen data on taxable income were collected in a database and published in large catalogues almost as it stood, the Personal Data Act was applicable...\u201d. He reminded them of his duty to report any breach of the Personal Data Act to the police. 25.  By letter dated 9 February 2010 the applicant companies appealed against the decision of the Data Protection Board to the Helsinki Administrative Court, which transferred the case to the Turku Administrative Court. They complained that the decision violated the Constitutional prohibition of censorship as well as their right to freedom of expression. According to the applicants, under domestic law, it was not possible to prevent publication of information on the basis of the amount of information to be published or of the means used for its publication. Nor was it possible to rely on the \u201cpublic interest\u201d as a criterion for preventing publication where preventive restriction of freedom of expression was concerned. Accepting that would mean that the authorities would be able to prevent publication if they thought that the publication did not promote discussion of a topic of public interest. 26.  On 28 October 2010 the Turku Administrative Court rejected the applicant companies\u2019 appeal. It found that the Supreme Administrative Court had stated in its decision of 2009 that the case concerned neither the public accessibility of taxation data nor the right to publish such information per se. As the court was now examining only the 2009 decision rendered by the Data Protection Board, it could not examine the issues which the Supreme Administrative Court had excluded from the scope of its 2009 decision. As the Board\u2019s decision corresponded to the content of the latter decision, there was no reason to change it. 27.  By letter dated 29 November 2010 the applicant companies further appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court. 28.  On 18 June 2012 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the judgment of the Turku Administrative Court, reiterating that the case concerned neither the right to publish taxation information as such, nor preventive censorship. 29.  According to the information submitted by the applicants, the SMS service was shut down after the 2009 decision of the Supreme Administrative Court was served on the applicant companies. The newspaper continued publishing taxation data in autumn 2009 when its content was only one fifth of the previous content. Since then the newspaper has not appeared. The Government, on the other hand, submitted that, according to the applicant companies\u2019 website, Verop\u00f6rssi was still being published on a regional basis in 2010 and 2011. Moreover, an Internet service continued to operate allowing anyone to request a natural person\u2019s tax data concerning the year 2014 by filling in a form on the website in question. The requested tax information would then be delivered to the customer by phone call, text message or e-mail. 30.  The editor-in-chief of Verop\u00f6rssi lodged an application with the Court in 2010, complaining that the impugned decision of the Supreme Administrative Court violated his right to freedom of expression. On 19 November 2013 the application was declared inadmissible as being incompatible ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention (see Anttila v. Finland (dec.), no. 16248/10, 19 November 2013). 31.  The first applicant company was declared bankrupt on 15 March 2016. The bankruptcy administration did not oppose the continuation of the present proceedings before the Court (see paragraph 94 below).", "references": ["8", "2", "1", "5", "0", "4", "9", "6", "7", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in Martin. 6.  On 20 October 2011 the applicant lodged a claim with the Martin District Court (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) (file no. 10 C 60/2012), seeking payment of his wages plus interest in connection with the termination of his employment. 7.  On 17 February 2012 the District Court issued a payment order in summary proceedings. As the defendant challenged the order, the matter fell to be determined by the court in ordinary proceedings. 8.  It took the District Court more than eight months to deal with an application by the applicant to change the particulars of claim. 9.  In October 2014 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Constitutional Court under Article 127 of the Constitution, contesting the length of the proceedings before the District Court. 10.  On 28 April 2015 the Constitutional Court rejected his complaint (file no. III. \u00daS 172/20150), on the grounds that, prior to lodging his constitutional complaint, the applicant had failed to exhaust ordinary remedies, in particular lodging a complaint with the President of the District Court under the Courts Act (Law no. 757/2004 Coll.).\nThe Constitutional Court referred to the Court\u2019s previous case-law in I\u0161tv\u00e1n and I\u0161tv\u00e1nov\u00e1 v. Slovakia (no. 30189/07, 12 June 2012), and tried to distinguish that case from the applicant\u2019s case. It observed that the case of I\u0161tv\u00e1n and I\u0161tv\u00e1nov\u00e1 concerned proceedings lasting more than six years, which was substantially longer than the duration of the proceedings in the applicant\u2019s case (three years). The Constitutional Court further stated that only in cases where the length of proceedings was prima facie excessive at the time of lodging a constitutional complaint was it not necessary to lodge a complaint with the president of a court, and therefore the applicant should have lodged a complaint with the President of the District Court. 11.  In the meantime, the District Court had appointed an expert in economics, accountancy and tax, and had ordered the applicant to pay fees in advance for the expert evidence. That order was challenged by the applicant before the \u017dilina Regional Court, but to no avail. The appointed expert then prepared her opinion between June and September 2015. 12.  Subsequently, the District Court scheduled a hearing for 16 March 2016. On that date the District Court delivered a judgment by which it granted the applicant\u2019s claim in part and dismissed the remainder of the claim. A written judgment was delivered to the applicant two months later. However, in their submissions to the Court the parties failed to specify the exact date when the judgment was served on the applicant, and they did not provide appropriate evidence to confirm this. They also did not inform the Court about any possible further development in the proceedings.", "references": ["8", "4", "7", "0", "6", "1", "9", "5", "2", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1968 and is currently detained in Vratsa Prison. 7.  In 2012 the applicant was detained in Varna Prison, serving a combined sentence of eighteen years\u2019 imprisonment for aggravated murder, lewd acts, aggravated theft and car theft. 8.  He suffers from many chronic medical conditions and a personality disorder which manifested itself in, inter alia, several attempts at self-harm and some suicide threats. 9.  In 2007 the applicant was treated on the psychiatric ward of Lovech Prison Hospital. 10.  Following his placement in an isolation cell in April 2008, he again threatened to harm himself and for eight days was kept almost constantly immobile by having his hands and feet handcuffed to a bed (see Dimcho Dimov v. Bulgaria, no. 57123/08, 16 December 2014, where the Court found violations of the substantive and procedural limbs of Article 3 of the Convention in that regard). 11.  In early 2012 the applicant was part of a prisoner group that included Mr K.I. The latter was serving a combined sentence of six and a half years for aggravated racketeering and numerous instances of threats of murder and aggravated hooliganism. According to a later psychological report, Mr K.I. had previously been admitted many times to the psychiatric ward of Lovech Prison Hospital and he suffered from a mixed personality disorder with elements of dissocial behaviour, paranoia and emotional instability. 12.  On the morning of 15 February 2012 the applicant went to the wing for prisoners who were being transferred to fetch a mattress he had allegedly lent to another inmate. When he entered the cell, Mr K.I., with whom he had had a conflict since January that year, began arguing with him, telling him that he had no right to come in and remove items. A guard intervened and took the applicant out of the wing, leaving him in the prison barbershop. According to statements made by the applicant later, Mr K.I. followed him, grabbed him by the collar through the bars separating the barbershop from the corridor, and hit him on the head and nose. In a report drawn up several days later, the social worker in charge of the applicant\u2019s group said that there was no evidence of such an incident as no other inmate had confirmed the applicant\u2019s allegations, and the applicant had not requested a medical examination. 13.  Alerted by the guard, the social worker came and talked with the applicant, repeating that he could not go back into that wing. According to her report about the incident, her words upset him and he began arguing with her in a loud voice. That in turn irritated Mr K.I., who began to shout at the applicant. The social worker took Mr K.I. and two other inmates to a cell, where she reminded them of their duties and warned them that any violence would be in breach of prison rules and entail disciplinary measures. They agreed that they had overreacted and undertook to make efforts to put relations in the group right. After that, the social worker had a talk with the applicant, who was in a highly emotional state. She told him of Mr K.I.\u2019s undertaking to calm the conflict. The applicant began shouting and insulting Mr K.I., who heard him and shouted back. To calm things down, the social worker had the applicant isolated in a cell. 14.  The next day, the social worker received complaints from five other inmates from the group. They protested against the applicant\u2019s return to the group, saying that he had systematically bullied and assaulted them. The applicant also filed a complaint, saying that he could no longer remain in the same group as Mr K.I. 15.  As a result, on 21 February 2012 the social worker recommended that the prison governor move the applicant to another group. She was of the view that his remaining in his old group would worsen relations within it because he would take on inmates who had not taken his side in the conflict with Mr K.I., which would also be bad for his emotional well-being and security. In the meantime, the applicant was provisionally held in a cell on another floor. 16.  Six days after the first incident, on 21 February 2012, a guard took the applicant back to his old corridor so that he could fetch his belongings from his locker. According to the guard\u2019s report, filed the same day, the applicant swore at and threatened Mr K.I. when passing him by. The latter, upset, punched the applicant on the jaw. The social worker carried out an enquiry over the following days at the request of the prison governor and obtained statements from eight other inmates, confirming the events. She proposed that Mr K.I. be given a disciplinary warning and that the applicant be kept in his new group to avoid further altercations between the two. As a result of the blow he had received the applicant suffered a fractured jaw, but this was not detected immediately (see paragraphs 18, 25 and 28 below). Three weeks after the incident, on 13 March 2012, the prison governor issued Mr K.I. with a disciplinary warning. 17.  The applicant expressed no wish to be given a medical examination after the incident which allegedly took place on 15 February 2012. 18.  After the incident on 21 February 2012 he was brought to Varna Prison\u2019s medical centre, where he was seen by the feldsher as the prison\u2019s only doctor was on long-term sick leave at the time (see paragraph 40 below). The applicant told the feldsher that he had been punched next to his right ear and had pain in the ear and the lower jaw. The feldsher noted some redness in his ear, but reported nothing more serious. She also noted that the applicant had no signs of other traumatic injuries to his body. She wrote a note to the prison administration, detailing her findings. According to a statement which he made in the course of the ensuing criminal proceedings against Mr K.I. (see paragraph 35 below), the applicant asked the feldsher to send him for an X-ray, but she refused. 19.  On 22 February 2012 the applicant went to the medical centre again and was given vitamins, an anti-inflammatory drug, a muscle relaxant and antibiotics. 20.  He visited the centre once more on 24 February 2012 and was given a painkiller. 21.  According to a statement by the applicant in the criminal proceedings against Mr K.I. (see paragraph 35 below), he repeatedly asked to be sent to an external medical specialist for an examination. 22.  His next visit to the centre was on 7 March 2012, when he complained of a loss of hearing in his right ear. The feldsher decided to refer him to an external specialist. The consultation took place seven weeks later, on 26 April 2012 (see paragraph 25 below). The Government said the delay was because the applicant\u2019s symptoms had not suggested that he had a medical condition that required urgent attention and because it took time to organise a medical examination outside the prison. 23.  The applicant went to the prison\u2019s medical centre again on 13 March 2012 and threatened to go on a hunger strike. According to a statement which he made in the course of the criminal proceedings against Mr K.I. (see paragraph 35 below), he made that threat to pressure the prison authorities to send him for a medical examination by an outside specialist. 24.  His next visit to the centre was on 23 April 2012, when he obtained a painkiller but apparently did not complain further about his health. 25.  On 26 April 2012 the applicant was seen by an external otolaryngologist, who noted that he was experiencing pain in his right temporomandibular joint and ears and had poor hearing. He also noted that the applicant had some redness on his eardrums. He prescribed painkillers and antibiotics, and suggested that the applicant be seen by a maxillofacial surgeon. The prison paid for the consultation. 26.  On 27 April and 7 and 10 May 2012 the applicant again visited the prison\u2019s medical centre and obtained antibiotics and analgesics. On 12 May 2012 he was taken out of prison for a consultation with a psychiatrist. 27.  On 14 May 2012 the prison\u2019s feldsher told the applicant that she would ask the prison administration to pay for a consultation with a maxillofacial surgeon. The Government explained that that had been necessary because such consultations were not covered by Bulgaria\u2019s health insurance scheme and the prison had to make a special payment for such a consultation. 28.  On 19 May 2012 the applicant was examined by a maxillofacial surgeon and given a panoramic X-ray. The surgeon noted that the applicant had a fracture of the right condyloid process that had not healed properly and post-traumatic arthritis of the right temporomandibular joint. He recommended that the applicant have physiotherapy for that joint. The consultation and the X-ray were paid for by the prison administration. 29.  On 21 May 2012 the prison feldsher offered to send the applicant to Sofia Prison Hospital for physiotherapy. He refused. 30.  On 15 June 2012 the applicant agreed to be sent to Sofia Prison Hospital, and was admitted on 18 July 2012. He was examined and given an X-ray of the skull. It was noted that he had a fracture of the jaw that had already healed and could no longer be operated on, and a deviated nasal septum. He was treated with antipsychotic, anticonvulsant and mood\u2011stabilising drugs, and had physiotherapy for his temporomandibular joints. He was in the hospital until 1 August 2012, when he returned to Varna Prison. 31.  Between June and October 2012 the applicant visited the prison medical centre on several occasions. He was generally given pain medication and further on request external medical consultations were discussed. 32.  The second consultation with an otolaryngologist took place on 27 December 2012. She noted that the applicant complained of poor hearing and pain in the right ear. She found that he had normal eardrums but poor teeth, which caused luxation of the temporomandibular joint, and also had a dysfunction of that joint. She prescribed painkillers. 33.  In a medical report drawn up on 11 February 2013, the Varna Prison doctor noted that the applicant had no money to pay for surgery on his jawbone and that the national health insurance scheme did not cover it. In November 2013 the applicant had surgery for the deviated nasal septum in a hospital in Varna. 34.  On an unknown date in 2012 the applicant complained to the Varna district prosecutor\u2019s office about the incidents on 15 and 21 February 2012. In June 2012 the prosecutor\u2019s office refused to open criminal proceedings. It found that no prison staff had committed any offences during the incidents. On appeal by the applicant, the Varna regional prosecutor\u2019s office upheld that decision in August 2012. The applicant appealed further and, on 10 October 2012, the Varna appellate prosecutor\u2019s office quashed the refusal to open criminal proceedings against Mr K.I., but upheld the refusal to open proceedings against prison staff. It noted that the internal inquiry had established that the incident involving the two inmates had been promptly dealt with and that there had been no culpable omissions by prison staff. It referred the case back with instructions to the lower prosecutor\u2019s offices to check whether Mr K.I.\u2019s actions had amounted to causing moderate bodily harm. 35.  Following a criminal investigation and delays in the resulting trial due to Mr K.I.\u2019s mental health, in February 2015 the Varna District Court found Mr K.I. guilty of causing moderate bodily harm to the applicant by breaking his jaw. It sentenced him to six years\u2019 imprisonment and ordered him to pay the applicant 2,000 Bulgarian levs (BGN) in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage. The court noted that the fracture had impaired the applicant\u2019s chewing and speech functions for at least four months and had caused him considerable pain and suffering (see \u043f\u0440\u0438\u0441. \u2116 68 \u043e\u0442 12.02.2015 \u0433. \u043f\u043e \u043d. \u043e. \u0445. \u0434. \u2116 3419/2013 \u0433., \u0420\u0421-\u0412\u0430\u0440\u043d\u0430). 36.  In March 2016, following an appeal by Mr K.I., the Varna Regional Court fully upheld the lower court\u2019s judgment (see \u0440\u0435\u0448. \u2116 61 \u043e\u0442 07.03.2016 \u0433. \u043f\u043e \u0432. \u043d. \u043e. \u0445. \u0434. \u2116 301/2015 \u0433., \u041e\u0421-\u0412\u0430\u0440\u043d\u0430). 37.  In September 2014 the applicant brought a claim for damages against the Chief Directorate for the Execution of Punishments at the Ministry of Justice. He alleged that over the previous two months the authorities at Varna Prison had failed to provide him with adequate medical care for pain in the right ear, his fractured jaw and numbness in his left arm. 38.  The Varna Administrative Court heard the case on 1 December 2014 and 2 February 2015, when the applicant unexpectedly withdrew his claim and the court discontinued the proceedings.\nII.  RELEVANT REPORTS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMITTEE FOR THE PREVENTION OF TORTURE AND INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT 39.  A delegation of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (\u201cthe CPT\u201d) visited Bulgaria between 18 and 29 October 2010. The visit included a visit to Varna Prison. In its ensuing report (CPT/Inf (2012) 9), the CPT noted the following (footnotes omitted):\n\u201c88.  At both Plovdiv and Varna Prisons, inter-prisoner violence was rife. It transpired from the examination of documentation on disciplinary punishments that there was at least one violent altercation between prisoners every week, leading to placements in a disciplinary cell and occasionally to a medical intervention or hospitalisation. ...\nAt Varna Prison in particular, the low staffing level, coupled with severe overcrowding, could easily compromise the safety of staff and prisoners alike. ... 89.  ... The Committee considers that an effective strategy to tackle inter-prisoner intimidation/violence should seek to ensure that prison staff are placed in a position to exercise their authority in an appropriate manner. In particular, staff should be encouraged more closely to supervise the activities of prisoners and enter in direct contact with them with a view to developing dynamic security. This implies making available sufficient numbers of staff and providing them with appropriate initial and advanced training. When incidents of inter-prisoner intimidation/violence do occur, staff must be both resolved and properly trained to intervene. ...\nIn addition to implementing an individualised risk and needs assessment, the prison system may also need to develop the capacity to ensure that potentially incompatible categories of prisoners are not accommodated together. ... 121.  Despite the goodwill and commitment of health-care staff at the prisons visited, the provision of health care to prisoners remained problematic, due to the serious shortage of staff and resources. The delegation heard a number of complaints from prisoners at both Plovdiv and Varna Prisons concerning delayed or difficult access to a doctor, inadequate quality of care (in particular dental care), problematic access to outside specialists and delays in transfer to outside hospitals. ...\nAt Varna Prison, the health-care staff team comprised a psychiatrist and a feldsher. The impossibility to replace the head doctor who was on prolonged sick leave placed an overwhelming burden on the psychiatrist and the feldsher. As a stop-gap solution, the doctor from the nearly hostel \u2018Razdelna\u2019 periodically visited the prison (i.e. four to five times a month). ...\u201d 40.  A delegation of the CPT visited Bulgaria again between 4 and 10 May 2012. The visit again included a visit to Varna Prison. In its ensuing report (CPT/Inf (2012) 32), the CPT noted the following (footnotes omitted):\n\u201c19.  The delegation received many allegations of inter-prisoner violence at both Burgas and Varna Prisons (including verbal and physical intimidation), and even witnessed itself such episodes. This was hardly surprising considering the combination of severe overcrowding and extremely low staffing levels at both establishments.\nDespite long-standing recommendations on this issue, the findings from the 2012 visit suggest that very little progress has been made to tackle inter-prisoner violence. The Committee must stress again that the duty of care which is owed by the prison authorities to prisoners in their charge includes the responsibility to protect them from other prisoners who might wish to cause them harm. In particular, prison staff must be alert to signs of trouble and be both resolved and properly trained to intervene. Such a capacity to intervene will of course depend, inter alia, on an adequate staff/prisoner ratio and on providing all staff members with appropriate initial and advanced training. In addition, the prison system as a whole may need to develop the capacity to ensure that potentially incompatible categories of prisoners are not accommodated together. ... 40.  The provision of health-care was very problematic at both prisons due to an extreme shortage of staff and resources. The delegation was submerged by complaints about difficulties in having access to prison medical staff, inadequate quality of care (including dental care), problematic access to outside specialists/hospitals (in particular for insurance reasons) and delays in transfer to outside hospitals.\nAt Varna Prison, the health-care staff consisted of a general practitioner \u2013 who had just returned to his duties after a lengthy period of sick leave \u2013 and a feldsher, both working full-time. The doctor from the nearby prison hostel \u2018Razdelna\u2019 had been ensuring medical cover when the feldsher was absent. The psychiatrist\u2019s post had been vacant since January 2011. A part-time dentist was present for two hours, five days a week. No qualified nurse was present at the establishment. To sum up, since January 2011, the establishment\u2019s needs in terms of health-care had been covered essentially by a single feldsher. The delegation was impressed by her professionalism and commitment, which was also recognised by inmates; nevertheless, the fact that no arrangement was found to compensate the absence of the GP for at least 18 months is unacceptable. ... 41.  The above-mentioned staffing situation rendered virtually impossible the provision of health care worthy of the name in the establishments visited. Further, there was an over-reliance on feldshers, causing them to practise beyond the limits of their competence. ... 43.  No specific screening for injuries was performed upon arrival or after a violent episode in prison, and very limited medical information could be found at Varna Prison ... in this respect. Further, it appeared that reporting of injuries depended on the prisoner concerned making a specific request, usually to the social worker, on a special form (a copy of the form was not kept in the medical file). There appeared to be no systematic reporting of traumatic injuries to the Main Directorate for the Execution of Sanctions.\nIn the light of the above, the CPT reiterates its recommendation that steps be taken to ensure that prison health-care services perform a thorough screening of newly-arrived prisoners for injuries. In this context, the report completed by the doctor should contain, in addition to a detailed description of injuries observed, any allegations made by the prisoner concerned and the doctor\u2019s conclusions as to the consistency between those allegations and the objective medical findings. ...\nThe same approach should be followed whenever a prisoner is medically examined following a violent episode in prison.\u201d", "references": ["8", "7", "2", "9", "3", "4", "5", "0", "6", "1", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicants\u2019 dates of birth and places of residence are given in the Appendix. 7.  On 12 January, 26 January and 10 March 2013 demonstrations were planned to be held in Baku. It appears that the organisers of the demonstrations gave no proper prior notice to the relevant authority, the Baku City Executive Authority (\u201cthe BCEA\u201d). Information about the demonstrations was disseminated through Facebook or the press. 8.  According to the applicants, the demonstrations were intended to be peaceful and were conducted in a peaceful manner. The demonstrations of 12 January and 10 March 2013 were aimed at protesting about the deaths of soldiers in the army, while the demonstration of 26 January 2013 condemned the use of force by the police against the participants of previous demonstrations. 9.  Each applicant attended one of the demonstrations (see Appendix), but shortly after they had begun the police started to disperse those who had gathered. All three applicants were arrested during the dispersal operations and were taken to police stations.\nAccording to the second applicant, during the demonstration she was giving an interview to the media and the moment of her arrest was recorded. 10.  The applicants were questioned at the police stations they had been taken to. 11.  On the day of each applicant\u2019s arrest administrative-offence reports (inzibati x\u0259ta haqq\u0131nda protokol) were issued, which stated that the applicants had committed an administrative offence under Article 298.2 of the Code of Administrative Offences (\u201cthe CAO\u201d) (participation in a public assembly that was not organised in accordance with the law). 12.  According to the first and second applicants, they were never served with copies of the administrative-offence reports or with other documents from their case files. 13.  According to the first and third applicants, they were not given access to a lawyer after their arrest or while they were in police custody. 14.  According to a statement (\u0259riz\u0259) written by the second applicant at the police station on the day of her arrest, she refused the services of a lawyer. 15.  The first applicant was released after being kept in police custody for a few hours, subject to an undertaking to reappear at the police station two days later. 16.  The third applicant was taken to a trial court directly from the police station on the day following his arrest. The first applicant was brought before a first-instance court on the date he returned to the police station. The second applicant was brought before a court on the day of her arrest; however, the hearing was postponed for two days to allow her to hire a lawyer of her own choosing. 17.  A State-funded lawyer was appointed to assist the first applicant. The second and third applicants were not represented by a lawyer. According to documents from the case file of the second applicant, on the day the hearing recommenced, the lawyer she had hired failed to appear and she decided to defend herself in person. 18.  None of the material submitted to the Court contains any records showing that the State-funded lawyer, Mr V.M., made any oral or written submissions on behalf of the first applicant. 19.  The only witnesses questioned during the court hearing with respect to the second applicant were the police officers who, according to the official records, had arrested her or had drawn up the administrative-offence report. The police officers testified that the applicant had staged an unauthorised demonstration. No witnesses were questioned by the courts in the first and third applicants\u2019 cases. 20.  The first-instance courts found that the applicants had participated in unauthorised demonstrations. The applicants were convicted under Article 298.2 of the CAO and sentenced to fines of 450, 500 and 600 Azerbaijani manats (AZN) respectively (see Appendix). 21.  On various dates the applicants lodged appeals with the Baku Court of Appeal, arguing that their convictions had been in violation of their rights because the demonstrations in which they had participated had been spontaneous and peaceful. The applicants also complained that their arrests had been unlawful and that the hearings before the first-instance courts had not been fair. They asked the Baku Court of Appeal to quash the first-instance courts\u2019 decisions in their cases. 22.  The applicants were not represented before the Baku Court of Appeal by a lawyer. 23.  The appellate court refused to grant the applicants\u2019 requests to hear evidence from particular witnesses in their favour, without giving any reasons for the refusal. In the case of the second applicant the court in a similar way additionally refused to examine video recordings made by the media during her arrest. 24.  On various dates the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the applicants\u2019 appeals and upheld the decisions of the first-instance courts (see Appendix). 25.  On 8 August 2014 Mr I. Aliyev, who represented all three applicants before the Court, was arrested on charges of large-scale tax evasion, abuse of power and illegal entrepreneurship. On the same day he was detained pending trial. The circumstances relating to Mr Aliyev\u2019s arrest and detention are the subject of a separate application brought by him before the Court (application no. 68762/14). 26.  On 8 and 9 August 2014 the prosecuting authorities conducted a search of Mr Aliyev\u2019s home and office. During the search the domestic authorities seized a large number of documents, including all the case files relating to the pending applications before the Court, which were in Mr Aliyev\u2019s possession as a representative. The files relating to the present cases, which, it appears, included copies of all the documents and correspondence between the Court and the parties, were also seized in their entirety. No adequate inventory of the seized document files relating to the Court proceedings was made in the search and seizure records of 8 and 9 August 2014. 27.  On an unspecified date Mr Aliyev lodged a complaint with the Nasimi District Court, claiming that the search had been unlawful. He further complained about the seizure of the documents and files relating to the pending court proceedings before the Court and the domestic courts. 28.  On 12 September 2014 the Nasimi District Court dismissed Mr Aliyev\u2019s claim. It held that the searches had been conducted in accordance with the relevant law. As to the seizure of the documents relating to the cases pending before the Court and the domestic courts, it found that they could not be returned to the applicants at that stage of the proceedings. Following an appeal, on 23 September 2014 the Baku Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance court\u2019s decision of 12 September 2014. 29.  On 25 October 2014 the investigating authorities returned a number of the case files concerning the applications lodged with the Court, including the files relating to the present cases, to Mr Aliyev\u2019s lawyer. The investigator\u2019s relevant decision specified that \u201csince it [had] been established that among the documents seized on 8 and 9 August 2014 there [had been] files concerning applications by a number of individuals and organisations lodged with the European Court of Human Rights, which ha[d] no relation to the substance of the criminal proceedings [against Mr Intigam Aliyev], [those files] ha[d] been delivered to [Mr Aliyev\u2019s lawyer,] Mr Javad Javadov\u201d.", "references": ["2", "1", "5", "0", "4", "8", "9", "6", "No Label", "7", "3"], "gold": ["7", "3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The first applicant was born in 1983 and lives in Ludbreg. The second applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Slunj. 6.  During 1991 and 1992 Serbian paramilitary forces gained control of about a third of the territory of Croatia and proclaimed the \u201cSerbian Autonomous Region of Krajina\u201d (Srpska autonomna oblast Krajina, hereinafter \u201cKrajina\u201d). At the beginning of August 1995 the Croatian authorities announced their intention to take military action with the aim of regaining control over Krajina. The operation was codenamed \u201cStorm\u201d (Oluja) and took place from 4 to 7 August 1995. Before the military action, the vast majority of the population of Krajina fled Croatia. Most of them went to Bosnia and Herzegovina, and also to Serbia. Some returned to Croatia after the war. The number of people who fled is estimated at between 100,000 and 150,000. 7.  On 5 November 1997 Croatia ratified the Convention. 8.  On 8 August 1995 the applicants\u2019 close relatives, G.O. and M.V., were killed in a house in Veljun, a town on the territory of Krajina. The police were alerted to the killings on the same day. On 11 August 1995 the bodies were buried in a cemetery in Slunj. 9.  On 25 January 2002 the police interviewed M.M., who said that on 8 August 1995 he had been wounded by the Croatian army in Veljun. That day he had seen G.O. and M.V. alive but did not know what had happened to them after that because he had been taken to a hospital by a member of the Croatian army. 10.  On 20 February 2002 the police interviewed D.V. and J.V. D.V. said that on 6 August 1995 she had moved to a house in Veljun, together with the first applicant, G.O. and M.V. On 7 August 1995 the Croatian army had entered Veljun. When G.O. and M.V. had been killed she had not been in the house and had not seen who had killed them. J.V. said that he had lived in Veljun during the war. On 7 August 1995 the Croatian army had entered Veljun. On 9 August 1995 he had heard that G.O. and M.V. had been killed the day before but had not seen who had done it. 11.  On 25 February 2002 the police interviewed the second applicant. He said that at the material time he had been serving as a Croatian policeman in Karlovac. He had learned about the killing of his wife G.O. and her mother M.V. on 8 August 1995 when his son, who had lived with his mother and grandmother, had been brought to him. The son said that on the morning of 8 August 1995 some members of the Croatian army had come to their house and asked for the keys of a Golf vehicle parked in the courtyard but that his grandmother had shouted at them. The second applicant assumed that that had angered the soldiers who had then killed his wife and her mother. 12.  On 30 March 2006 the Karlovac State Attorney\u2019s Office asked the Slunj police whether the Veljun area had been occupied on 7 August 1995; whether the perpetrator of the killing of G.O. had been identified; and whether G.O. had been a member of the paramilitary forces of Krajina or of the Croatian army. On 6 July 2006 the Karlovac police department replied that Veljun had not been occupied on 7 August 1995 because Serbian paramilitary forces had left the area the previous day as the Croatian forces had advanced from the direction of Slunj. However, owing to the disorganised nature of the withdrawal of the Serbian paramilitary forces, there had still been some armed members of the \u201cSerbian army\u201d in the area. On 7 August 1995 the Croatian forces had started to enter the area and therefore it could be said that from a military point of view that area had been in a war zone. There had been no information about the people who had killed G.O. and she had not been registered as a member of any army. 13.  On 25 October 2006 the police interviewed the first applicant, who said that he had lived with his mother and grandmother in Slunj and that his father had been a Croatian policeman. When the war had escalated in 1991 his mother had stayed in Slunj, in occupied territory, since her mother was a disabled person who could not move at all. Some time at the beginning of Operation Storm his uncle had taken them all to a relative\u2019s house in Veljun. On 5 or 6 August 1995 the Croatian army had entered Veljun. They had instructed them to put a white flag on their house to indicate that there were civilians living there and his mother had done so. The following day he had spent some time with Croatian soldiers, about 1,500 metres from the house where he had been staying with his family. Around noon he had heard some gunshots from the direction of the house but had not paid much attention to them. About half an hour later he had returned home and had found his mother and grandmother shot dead in the house. He had informed some of the Croatian soldiers about it. After that they had taken him to his father in Slunj. He could not remember whether there had been any dispute between his mother and grandmother and Croatian soldiers about the Golf parked in their courtyard, which had belonged to his uncle. 14.  On 17 January 2007 the police interviewed I.B., a policeman who had carried out an inspection of the crime scene. He described how he had found the bodies of G.O. and M.V. On the same day another police officer, Z.G., made a note stating that on 8 January 2007 he had inspected the premises of the elementary school in Veljun, where he had found the following inscriptions on the walls: \u201cTigers, I.V. 4 August 1995, K.T., 40th regiment GSOSRH\u201d and \u201cTigers TNT No 31 \u2013 Moles\u201d. 15.  On 1 February 2007 the Karlovac police lodged a criminal complaint with the Karlovac County State Attorney\u2019s Office against unknown perpetrators in connection with the killing of G.O. and M.V. 16.  On 1 August 2007 the police interviewed Mi.V. who said that she had not been in Veljun during Operation Storm and had no direct knowledge about the killing of G.O. and M.V. 17.  On 22 October 2012 a Deputy State Attorney of the Karlovac State Attorney\u2019s Office interviewed the applicants, who repeated their previous statements. The first applicant added that in his opinion the Croatian soldiers who had killed his mother and grandmother had not been those who had been the first to enter Veljun because that group had treated civilians correctly. 18.  On 9 November 2012 the Karlovac police asked the Ministry of Defence about the Croatian army units which had been in Veljun between 7 and 12 August 1995, the identity of their commanders and all their members. That request was repeated on 11 December 2012. 19.  On 9 January 2013 the first applicant asked the President\u2019s Office, the State Attorney, the Karlovac County State Attorney, the Ministry of Justice and the State Attorney\u2019s Department of War Crimes to identify the perpetrators of the killing of his mother and grandmother. 20.  On 21 February 2013 the Karlovac police drew up a note on the investigation. It stated that documents about the Croatian army units present in Veljun in the material period (those documents have not been submitted to the Court by the Government) showed that on 7 August 1995 at 10.30 a.m. Veljun had been liberated by members of the 143rd Domobran Regiment of Ogulin (143. domobranska pukovnija Ogulin), under the command of Captain (satnik) N.N. On 7 August 1995 at about noon the armoured battalion of the \u201cTigers\u201d First Guards Brigade (oklopna bojna 1. gardijske brigade \u201cTigrovi\u201d) under the command of Captain Lj.U., as well as the Second Infantry Battalion of the First Guards Brigade (2. pje\u0161a\u010dka bojna 1. gardijske brigade) under the command of Major A.K., had arrived.\nOn 8 August 1995 the following Croatian army units had been in Veljun: the Second Infantry Battalion of the 143rd Domobran Regiment from Ogulin under the command of Captain M.K. and the IS-2 (izvidni\u010dka skupina IS-2) patrol group comprised of the soldiers M.I., M.B., T.N. and Z.\u010c., under the command of Lance Corporal (razvodnik) P.K. 21.  Between 27 February and 28 March 2013 the police interviewed several Croatian soldiers who belonged to the units of the Croatian army that had been in Veljun on 7 and 8 August 1995. N.N., the commander of the Second Battalion of the 143rd Domobran Regiment, said that they had entered Veljun on the morning of 8 August 1995. At the same time the First Guards Brigade under the command of I.K. had been coming to Veljun from the direction of Slunj. He had no knowledge of the killing of two women in Veljun. As regards the officers of the Second Battalion, Z.K. had been in command of the First Company (prva satnija), M.B. of the Second Company (druga satnija) and I.Z. (who had died later on) of the Third Company (tre\u0107a satnija). The brigade also had a mortar unit (mitnica minobaca\u010da) under the command of N.V., a communications squad (desetina za veze) led by D.L., a medical platoon (sanitrani vod) headed by S.P. and an anti-tank platoon (protuoklopni vod) under the command of D.S. B.S., the second-in-command of the First Battalion of the 143rd Domobran Regiment, confirmed that M.K. had been the commander. The regiment had been composed of three companies. The First and Second Companies had been under the command of I.F. and I.P. respectively, but he could not remember the commander of the Third Company. He said that owing to the passage of time he could not remember the places they had been during Operation Storm. He had no knowledge about the killing of civilians in Veljun.\nOfficer J.C. of the Slunj police said that he had heard about the killing of his colleague\u2019s wife and her mother, but had no relevant information. M.K., the commander of the First Battalion of the 143rd Domobran Regiment of Ogulin, said that that formation had comprised three battalions. His First Battalion and the Second Battalion, which had been under the command of N.N, had had about 970 soldiers. The Third Battalion had been under the command of T.L. He then described the units of the First Battalion and named the commanders he could remember. He had no knowledge about the killing of civilians in Veljun. A.B., the commander of a platoon of the 134th Domobran Regiment, said that he and his men had spent about an hour in Veljun during Operation Storm but could not say on which day exactly. None of the soldiers in his platoon had searched for civilians in houses and he had no knowledge about the killing of G.O. and M.V. S.P., the commander of the medical squad of the Second Battalion of the 143rd Domobran Regiment, said that his battalion had entered Veljun at about noon on 7 August 1995 and had stayed there for two days. There had been no military action and he had not given any medical assistance to anyone in Veljun. He knew nothing about the killing of two women there.\nOfficer I.\u0160. of the Slunj police said that during Operation Storm a Croatian soldier had approached him and told him that a child in Veljun needed transport. I.\u0160. had gone with his colleague M.V. to Veljun where they had found two dead bodies and a child in a house. They had taken the child to Slunj police station to join his father, Pave Obajdin. M.V. confirmed that statement. S.V. said that he had been a policeman in Slunj during Operation Storm and had been the one who had found the bodies of G.O. and M.V. 22.  Between 14 October 2014 and 21 October 2015 the police conducted further interviews with Croatian soldiers A.\u017d., Z.P., B.S., B.G., V.J. and P.K., who all said they had no knowledge about the killing of G.O. and M.V. In the same period the police also interviewed the victims\u2019 relatives G.V., D.M. and S.V., who had all heard about the killing of G.O. and M.V. but had no relevant information about possible perpetrators.", "references": ["2", "8", "4", "3", "7", "6", "0", "9", "5", "1", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant company, Service Benz Com S.R.L., is a Commerciale company founded in 1993 under Romanian law and based in Aduna\u0163ii Cop\u0103ceni. 7.  On 11 May 2010 the applicant company, whose main activity is the retail distribution of fuel in specialised outlets, entered into a contract with company \u201cN.\u201d SARL for the carriage of \u201cautomobile lubricants and other goods\u201d. The contract stipulated that it was incumbent on the company N. to \u201ccomplete the transport documents with the requisite, correct and accurate information\u201d. 8.  On the same day, two fuel tankers belonging to the company S.C. Service Benz Com S.R.L. were loaded in Bulgaria, in the presence of a tax office representative. After the tankers had been loaded the representative sealed them. 9.  Before the two fuel tankers could reach their destination, they were stopped for inspection by representatives of the Romanian fraud squad. After laboratory analyses, the Romanian authorities found that the liquid transported did not have the same specifications as those indicated in the transport documents. 10.  By official report of offence of 7 June 2010, the fraud squad representatives decided to:\n\u2013 impose on the company \u201cN\u201d, the owner of the goods carried, a fine of RON 100,000 (approximately EUR 23,000) for non-compliance with the regulations on goods subject to excise duty pursuant to Article 220 \u00a7 1 (k) of the Code of Tax Procedure (\u201cCPF\u201d); and\n\u2013 confiscate the goods (the liquid carried) and the two fuel tankers belonging to the applicant company, pursuant to Article 220 \u00a7 2 (a) and (b) CPF. 11.  The applicant company challenged the part of that official report relating to the confiscation of its two fuel tankers. Before the Slobozia Court of First Instance it argued that:\n\u2013 it had only carried its customer\u2019s goods and accordingly held no responsibility for their compliance\u2009with the law;\n\u2013 Article 220 \u00a7 1 (k) CPF had not been applicable to it since, according to the transport documents in its possession, it had not been transporting goods subject to excise duty. 12.  By judgment of 15 November 2010 the Slobozia Court of First Instance allowed the applicant company\u2019s challenge and annulled the part of the official report relating to the confiscation of the fuel tankers. The trial court held as follows:\n\u2013 the transport company\u2019s responsibility could not be incurred because it had not been in a position to verify the legal conformity of the goods and a tax office representative had sealed the two fuel tankers after loading; and\n\u2013 in the instant case the confiscation had therefore been unacceptable and unlawful. 13.  The tax authorities appealed against that judgment. 14.  On 28 February 2011 the Ialomi\u0163a County Court allowed the tax authorities\u2019 appeal: it quashed the judgment and, ruling on the merits, dismissed the applicant company\u2019s challenge as being ill-founded. The court reasoned as follows:\n\u2013 the administrative offence laid down in Article 220 \u00a7 2 (b) CPF authorised the ancillary penalty of confiscation, without specifying whether the property to be confiscated belonged to the administrative offender or to a third party;\n\u2013 furthermore, Articles 24 and 25 of Government Ordinance No. 2/2001 of 12 July 2001 governing administrative offences provided for the eventuality of the confiscated property belonging to someone other than the administrative offender.\nThe court gave the following reasons for its judgment:\n\u201c... the owner of the confiscated property, the company Service Benz Com SARL, is not an administrative offender, such that there is no need to [discuss] any fault on its part; the confiscation is conducted exclusively in pursuance of the law as an ancillary penalty; it can only be annulled in the event of breach of the relevant legal provisions.\nThe ground of appeal based on negligence on the part of the transporter, who was directly responsible for the safety and lawfulness of the goods transported, is also well-founded.\u201d", "references": ["9", "8", "7", "5", "6", "3", "4", "0", "2", "1", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1976 and lives in Pozna\u0144. 6.  On an unspecified date A.R., a member of the political party Self\u2011Defence of the Republic of Poland (\u201cSamoobrona\u201d) sent Gazeta Wyborcza, a daily newspaper, an electronic mail containing information about an alleged \u201csex scandal\u201d in the party. 7.  The following day the applicant, who is a journalist, contacted A.R. on the telephone. After their conversation he informed her that he had recorded the call and that he intended to use the transcript for an article. 8.  On 6 December 2006 the applicant published an interview with A.R. in the Gazeta Wyborcza. The interview, entitled \u201cPayment for sex, the choice is yours\u201d (\u201cP\u0142aca ze seks, wyb\u00f3r nale\u017cy do pani\u201d) concerned the \u201csex scandal\u201d story which had broken in Poland earlier in 2006. Public figures, including Samoobrona activists, had offered and accepted sexual favours in the course of exercising public functions. A.R. told the newspaper that she had begun working with the party through her contacts with A.K. Initially, she had been unpaid and when she had demanded payment, one of the activists, K.Z., had told her:\n\u201cI will pay if you go to bed with me\u201d\nShe also said that in July 2004 during a party organised by A.K. a prominent Samoobrona activist, B.S., had offered to find a post for her in a parliamentary deputy\u2019s office \u2013 specifically R.C.\u2019s \u2013 in return for sexual favours. According to A.R., B.S. was so forward that she had to ask K.S. for help. K.S. then called a taxi to take B.S. home 9.  Then the applicant asked A.R.:\n\u201cDid you get the job?\u201d 10.  On the same page, to the right of the article, the newspaper quoted three prominent Samoobrona activists referred to in the interview, namely K.Z., B.S. and K.S. They all, denied that there had been any sexual propositions made to A.R. 11.  Also on the same page the newspaper published a short interview with A.K. who confirmed that she knew A.R. but had never recommended her for any work. When asked about the \u201csex scandal\u201d A.K. said:\n\u201cWhat are you saying? I have never heard of it. This cannot be true.\u201d 12.  On 30 November 2007 M.C., a Member of the European Parliament, lodged a private bill of indictment against the applicant. He demanded that the applicant be charged with defamation. According to the indictment the defamation consisted of the publication of the interview with A.R. in which she said that B.S. could arrange a job for her in M.C.\u2019s office in return for sexual favours. According to M.C. this suggested to readers that he had been involved in the \u201csex scandal\u201d. He also claimed that he had been defamed in the published interview at the point where A.R. had accused him of nepotism by saying that he had employed his own daughter. 13.  On 16 March 2010 the Warsaw District Court ruled the indictment partially accurate: it then discontinued the proceedings for a probationary term of one year and ordered the applicant to pay 1,000 Polish zlotys (PLN \u2013 232 euros (EUR)) to charity and to pay the costs of the proceedings. 14.  The District Court found the applicant guilty of the defamation of M.C. with respect to his publication of the statements made by A.R. concerning nepotism (see paragraph 23 below). According to the court the applicant neglected his professional obligations because he did not verify that the job had been offered to M.C.\u2019s daughter. At the trial it became clear that this information could not be accurate because M.C. did not have a daughter. It did not accept the applicant\u2019s argument that he had acted with due diligence because before publication he had sent the text of the interview to A.R. who had accepted its contents and returned it to the applicant without making any objection or comment (autoryzacja). 15.  The District Court did not hold that the applicant was guilty of defamation when he had suggested that M.C. had been involved in the \u201csex scandal\u201d. It found that in this respect the applicant had fulfilled his professional obligations because he had published the statement of B.S., who had denied propositioning A.R. For the above reasons, in the District Court\u2019s view, the average reader should not have had the impression that M.C. was involved in the \u201csex scandal\u201d. 16.  The applicant and M.C.\u2019s lawyer appealed against the first\u2011instance judgment. 17.  On 18 June 2010 the Warsaw Regional Court upheld the challenged judgment, repeating in essence the same reasoning as the District Court. Regarding the applicant\u2019s arguments concerning his right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the Convention, it noted that \u201cin the light of the journalist\u2019s right to publish critical comments (prawo do krytyki dziennikarskiej), an individual\u2019s right to legal protection of good name and reputation should also be taken into account\u201d. 18.  On 3 February 2011 the applicant\u2019s lawyer requested the Ombudsman to lodge a cassation appeal on the applicant\u2019s behalf. 19.  On 6 May 2011 the Ombudsman informed the applicant that she had found no grounds to lodge a cassation appeal.", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "3", "2", "5", "7", "9", "8", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicants were born in 1981, 1982, 1986, 1974 and 1971 respectively. Mr \u017danas Aleksandravi\u010dius, Mr Andrej Gailiun and Mr Artem Novikov are currently detained in Pravieni\u0161k\u0117s Correctional Facility. Mr Gra\u017evydas D\u016bda lives in Kupi\u0161kis and Mr Darius Antonovas is detained in Alytus Correctional Facility. 5.  The first applicant was detained in Luki\u0161k\u0117s Remand Prison from 23 June 2011 to 30 September 2011. The documents submitted to the Court show that he was held in various different remand prison cells where most of the time he had between 1.8 and 2.46 square metres of living space, except for the following periods:\n-  from the evening of 24 June 2011 to the morning of 27 June 2011 he had 3.69 square metres of personal space;\n-  on the evening of 23 June 2011, the morning of 24 June 2011 and the morning of 31 August 2011 he had between 7.38 and 7.8 square metres of personal space. 6.  In 2012 the applicant instituted proceedings for damages. He argued that the conditions in which he had been held in Luki\u0161k\u0117s Remand Prison had been degrading: the cells had been overcrowded and the conditions unsanitary. 7.  On 19 April 2012 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court established that the applicant had been held in overcrowded cells for three months and three days, given that for that duration he had been held in cells where he had had less than 3.6 square metres of personal space. Nonetheless, the court dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaint about unsanitary conditions in the prison as not actually proven. It noted that the applicant\u2019s complaints had been expressed in abstract terms and that he had not provided accurate information about the conditions in question. The court awarded him 1,000 Lithuanian litai (LTL, approximately 290 euros (EUR)) in compensation for non-pecuniary damage on account of overcrowding. 8.  The applicant appealed but on 4 December 2012 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the first-instance decision. 9.  From 22 October 2008 to 10 November 2010 the second applicant was detained in Luki\u0161k\u0117s Remand Prison, except for the following periods when he was moved to \u0160ven\u010dionys police station:\n-  from 3 December 2008 to 10 December 2008;\n-  from 23 September 2009 to 29 September 2009;\n-  from 23 December 2009 to 29 December 2009;\n-  from 3 February 2010 to 16 February 2010.\nThe documents submitted to the Court show that he was held in several different remand prison cells where he had between 1.2 and 2.68 square metres of personal space, except for the following days:\n-  the whole of 29 October 2008, the morning of 31 October 2008, the morning of 3 March 2009, the morning of 15 June 2009, the evening of 20 July 2009, the whole of 21 July 2009, the morning of 22 July 2009, the evening of 21 September 2009, the morning of 22 September 2009, the morning of 31 December 2009, the evening of 9 March 2010, the morning of 10 March 2010, the morning of 7 April 2010, the morning of 26 April 2010, the morning of 14 June 2010, the evening of 28 June 2010, the morning of 29 June 2010, the evening of 3 November 2010 and the morning of 4 November 2010. During those periods he had between 3.74 and 3.97 square metres of personal space;\n-  the morning of 23 November 2008, when he had 7.94 square metres of personal space. 10.  In 2012 the applicant instituted proceedings for damages. He argued that the conditions in which he had been held in Luki\u0161k\u0117s Remand Prison had been degrading: the cells had been overcrowded, had had rats and insects and mould on the walls. They had also been damp and his health had deteriorated. 11.  On 7 September 2012 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court established that the applicant could only request compensation for the period from 3 April 2009 onwards because the applicant had missed the three-year time-limit to lodge a complaint for the preceding period. The court further held that the relevant period was 559 days, and that the applicant had been held in conditions that satisfied the personal space requirement for only 2.5 days. Nonetheless, the applicant\u2019s complaint about unsanitary conditions was dismissed as unsubstantiated as he had not complained about them to the prison authorities. The court awarded him LTL 1,000 (approximately EUR 290) in compensation for non-pecuniary damage on account of overcrowding. 12.  The applicant and Luki\u0161k\u0117s Remand Prison appealed. On 25 February 2013 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the first\u2011instance decision. 13.  From 20 July 2009 to 16 June 2010 the third applicant was detained in Luki\u0161k\u0117s Remand Prison, except for 9 June 2010 to 11 June 2010. He complained about his conditions of detention from 20 July 2009 to 16 June 2010.\nThe documents before the Court show that he was held in several different remand prison cells where he had:\n-  between 1.8 and 2.65 square metres of personal space from 23 July 2009 to the morning of 24 July 2009; from the evening of 27 July 2009 to 25 August 2009; from the evening of 1 September 2009 to 22 September 2009; from the evening of 23 September 2009 to 27 September 2009; from the evening of 28 September 2009 to 4 November 2009; from the evening of 6 November 2009 to 22 December 2009; from the evening of 23 December 2009 to 16 February 2010; on the evening of 17 February 2010 and on 18 February 2010; from the evening of 19 February 2010 to 22 February 2010; from the evening of 23 February 2010 to 2 March 2010; on the evening of 3 March 2010; from the evening of 4 March 2010 to 19 April 2010; from 21 April 2010 to 12 May 2010; from the evening of 13 May 2010 to 23 May 2010; from the evening of 11 June 2010 to the morning of 12 June 2010; on the morning of 14 June 2010;\n-  between 3.7 and 3.97 square metres of personal space from the evening of 24 July 2009 to the morning of 27 July 2009; from 26 August 2009 to the morning of 1 September 2009; on the morning of 23 September 2009; on the morning of 28 September 2009; on the morning of 5 November 2009; on the morning of 23 December 2009; on the morning of 17 February 2010; on the morning of 19 February 2010; on the morning of 23 February 2010; on the morning of 3 March 2010; on the morning of 4 March 2010; on 20 April 2010; on the morning of 7 May 2010; on the morning of 13 May 2010; on the evening of 12 June 2010;\n-  between 3.13 and 4.3 square metres of personal space from 24 May 2010 to the morning of 9 June 2010;\n-  between 7.24 and 7.31 square metres of personal space from 13 June 2010 to the morning of 16 June 2010. 14.  In 2012 the applicant instituted proceedings for damages. He argued that the conditions in which he had been held in Luki\u0161k\u0117s Remand Prison had been degrading: the cells had been overcrowded, his health had deteriorated and he had become bald. 15.  On 23 October 2012 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court held that until 10 April 2010 the statutory norm for personal space per prisoner per cell had been five square metres and that since 14 May 2010 it had been 3.6 square metres. The court also held that the applicant had been held for only ten days in conditions that had satisfied the statutory personal space requirement and awarded him LTL 800 (approximately EUR 232) in compensation for non-pecuniary damage on account of overcrowding. The applicant\u2019s complaints about his health and baldness were dismissed as unsubstantiated as the applicant had not provided any evidence that he had ever complained to doctors or the prison authorities about those issues. 16.  The applicant argued in an appeal that the compensation amount was too low and stated that he had asked the prison administration to take him to a doctor. Luki\u0161k\u0117s Remand Prison argued that the applicant\u2019s complaint was unfounded because the courts imposed sentences on people, it could not refuse to accept prisoners and thus it had no control over their number. On 5 July 2013 the Supreme Administrative Court held that the applicant had not had enough cell space for 319.5 days and increased his compensation to LTL 5,000 (approximately EUR 1,450). The court reiterated that the applicant\u2019s complaints about his health were unsubstantiated and that the applicant himself had not been able to prove that his health had deteriorated or that he had complained to a doctor. 17.  The fourth applicant was detained in Luki\u0161k\u0117s Remand Prison from 25 February 2011 to 27 August 2012, except for the following periods when he was in a prison hospital:\n-  from 17 May 2011 to 1 June 2011;\n-  from 8 September 2011 to 19 September 2011;\n-  from 21 November 2011 to 24 November 2011;\n-  from 15 January 2012 to 15 February 2012;\n-  from 18 June 2012 until 26 June 2012;\n-  from 5 July 2012 to 19 July 2012;\n-  from 8 August 2012 to 13 August 2012.\nThe documents before the Court show that he was held in several different cells in the remand prison where he had:\n-  between 1.2 and 2.7 square metres of personal space from the evening of 25 February 2011 to the morning of 28 February 2011; from the morning of 3 March 2011 to 15 March 2011; from the evening of 16 March 2011 to 7 April 2011; from 13 May 2011 to the morning of 16 May 2011; on the evening of 1 June 2011; on 27 July 2011; on the evening of 28 July 2011; from 26 August 2011 to 29 August 2011; from 20 September 2011 to the morning of 21 September 2011; on the evening of 24 November 2011; from the evening of 30 November 2011 to 7 December 2011; from the evening of 8 December 2011 to 10 January 2012; from the evening of 11 January 2012 to 21 February 2012; from the evening of 22 February 2012 to the morning of 7 March 2012; from the evening of 8 March 2012 to 14 March 2012; from the evening of 15 March 2012 to 28 March 2012; from the evening of 29 March 2012 to 1 April 2012; from the evening of 2 April 2012 to 3 April 2012; from the evening of 4 April 2012 to 5 June 2012; from the evening of 6 June 2012 to 26 June 2012; on the evening of 26 June 2012; on the evening of 27 June 2012; from the evening of 28 June 2012 to 1 July 2012; from 19 July 2012 to 22 July 2012; from the evening of 23 July 2012 to 7 August 2012; from the evening of 16 August 2012 to the morning of 21 August 2012; from the evening of 23 August 2012 to the morning of 27 August 2012;\n-  between 3.27 and 4 square metres of personal space from the evening of 28 February 2011 to 2 March 2011; on the morning of 16 March 2011; from 8 April 2011 to 20 April 2011, from the evening of 21 April 2011 to the morning of 12 May 2011; on the evening of 16 May 2011; on the evening of 2 June 2011; on the evening of 3 June 2011; from 4 June 2011 to 16 June 2011; on the evening of 17 June 2011; from 18 June 2011 to 20 June 2011; on the evening of 21 June 2011; on the evening of 22 June 2011; from 23 June 2011 to the morning of 21 July 2011; from the evening of 21 July 2011 to 26 July 2011; on the morning of 28 July 2011; from the evening of 30 August 2011 to 7 September 2011; from the evening of 27 September 2011 to 9 October 2011; from the evening of 10 October 2011 to 12 October 2011; on the evening of 13 October 2011; from the evening of 14 October 2011 to 1 November 2011; from the evening of 5 November 2011 to 17 November 2011; from the evening of 18 November 2011 to 20 November 2011; from 29 November 2011 to the morning of 30 November 2011; on the morning of 11 January 2012; from the evening of 7 March 2012 to the morning of 8 March 2012; on the morning of 15 March 2012; on the morning of 29 March 2012; on the morning of 2 April 2012; on the morning of 4 April 2012; on the morning of 6 June 2012; on the morning of 27 June 2012; on the morning of 28 June 2012; from 2 July 2012 to 4 July 2012; on the morning of 23 July 2012; from the evening of 14 August 2012 to the morning of 16 August 2012; from the evening of 21 August 2012 to the morning of 23 August 2012;\n-  between 6 and 10.6 square metres of personal space on the morning of 8 April 2011; on the morning of 21 April 2011; on the evening of 12 May 2011; on the morning of 2 June 2011; on the morning of 3 June 2011; on the morning of 17 June 2011; on the morning of 21 June 2011; on the morning of 22 June 2011; from 29 July 2011 to 25 August 2011; on the morning of 30 August 2011; on the evening of 19 September 2011; from the evening of 21 September 2011 to the morning of 27 September 2011; on the morning of 10 October 2011; on the morning of 13 October 2011; on the morning of 14 October 2011; from 2 November 2011 to the morning of 5 November 2011; on the morning of 18 November 2011; from 25 November 2011 to 28 November 2011; on 22 February 2012; from the evening of 13 August 2012 to the morning of 14 August 2012; on the evening of 27 August 2012. 18.  On an unspecified date the applicant instituted proceedings for damages. He argued that the conditions in which he had been held in Luki\u0161k\u0117s Remand Prison had been degrading: the cells had been overcrowded; he had been held together with prisoners who smoked; the toilets had not been separated from the rest of the cell; and his health had deteriorated. 19.  On 2 January 2012 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court held that the applicant\u2019s personal space had not corresponded to the statutory norms and awarded him LTL 1,000 (approximately EUR 290) in compensation for non-pecuniary damage on account of overcrowding. As regards his other complaints, the court held that there was no evidence that his health had deteriorated because of overcrowding and stated that his health condition, according to medical data, was hereditary. The domestic courts also held that the toilets had had a partition of at least 1.5 metres and dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaints in this respect as unsubstantiated. 20.  The applicant and Luki\u0161k\u0117s Remand Prison appealed; however, the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the decision of the court of first instance on 28 May 2012. 21.  In the application form, the fifth applicant complained about his conditions of detention in Luki\u0161k\u0117s Remand Prison from 29 November 2007 until 9 March 2010. However, in his reply to the Government\u2019s observations, he claimed that the period to be considered was from 10 June 2009 to 27 September 2011. The applicant was not in prison between 2 July 2009 and the morning of 13 July 2009 as he was in a prison hospital while from 12 January 2010 to the morning of 26 January 2010 he was held in Taurag\u0117 police station.\nIt can be seen from the documents before the Court that he was held in several different remand prison cells where he had:\n-  between 1.2 and 2.8 square metres of personal space from 17 June 2009 to 1 July 2009; from the evening of 13 July 2009 to 3 November 2009; from the evening of 4 November 2009 to the morning of 2 December 2009; from 3 December 2009 to the morning of 7 January 2010; from the evening of 26 January 2010 to 5 February 2010; from 8 February 2010 to 10 February 2010; from the evening of 27 February 2010 to 28 February 2010; from the evening of 1 March 2010 to the morning of 2 March 2010;\n-  between 3 and 3.97 square metres of personal space on the morning of 4 November 2009; from the evening of 7 January 2010 to 11 January 2011; from 6 February 2010 to 7 February 2010; from the evening of 11 February 2010 to the morning of 27 February 2010; on the morning of 1 March 2010; from the evening of 2 March 2010 to 8 March 2010;\n-  7.45 square metres of personal space on the evening of 2 December 2009;\n-  5.3 square metres of personal space on the morning of 11 February 2010. 22.  On 11 June 2012 the applicant instituted proceedings for damages for the period from 29 November 2007 until 9 March 2010 when he was in Luki\u0161k\u0117s Remand Prison. The applicant later further specified the period for which he was complaining as being from 29 November 2007 to 27 September 2011. He argued that the conditions in which he had been held in the remand prison had been degrading: the cells had been overcrowded; there had been rats and insects; and his sight had deteriorated owing to insufficient lighting. The court applied the three-year period of limitation and found that the relevant period to be considered was from 10 June 2009 to 10 June 2012. The court held that the applicant had been held in overcrowded cells for two years, although the period was non\u2011consecutive, and awarded him LTL 300 (approximately EUR 87) in compensation for non-pecuniary damage. The court held that the applicant had failed to substantiate his other complaints with evidence. 23.  In an appeal, the applicant also stated that the cells had been damp and the beds uncomfortable. Luki\u0161k\u0117s Remand Prison and the Prisons Department argued that the applicant had failed to substantiate his complaints. On 20 May 2013 the Supreme Administrative Court, without examining the additional complaints, held that the applicant had been held in overcrowded cells for a non-consecutive period of ten months and nine days. It increased the award for non-pecuniary damage to LTL 3,000 (approximately EUR 870).", "references": ["0", "7", "5", "3", "8", "2", "4", "9", "6", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1973 and lives in Novosibirsk. 6.  On 10 April 2007 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of robbery as part of an organised group and of abuse of position. 7.  On 11 April 2007 the Zheleznodorozhnyy District Court of Novosibirsk remanded him in custody. He remained in detention pending the completion of the investigation and trial. Referring to the seriousness of the charges, the courts extended his detention on the grounds that he might threaten witnesses, abscond, interfere with the investigation, reoffend or destroy evidence. 8.  On 13 April 2009 the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Novosibirsk found the applicant guilty and sentenced him to nine years\u2019 imprisonment. 9.  On 18 January 2010 the Novosibirsk Regional Court quashed the judgment on appeal and remitted the case for fresh examination. The court decided to place the applicant in pre-trial detention. His detention was subsequently extended on the same grounds as described above. 10.  On 14 April 2011 the District Court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to nine years\u2019 imprisonment. On 5 September 2011 the Novosibirsk Regional Court upheld the judgment on appeal. 11.  On 16 January 2015 the Government submitted a unilateral declaration. They acknowledged that the applicant had been detained \u201cwithout well-founded justification on the basis of decisions rendered by the courts\u201d, which did not \u201ccomply with the requirements of Article 5 \u00a7 3 of the Convention\u201d. They stated their readiness to pay 1,500 euros (EUR) to the applicant as compensation for his pre-trial detention from 18 January 2010 to 14 April 2011 and asked the Court to strike the case out of its list of cases. 12.  On 10 March 2015 the applicant rejected the Government\u2019s offer. He expressed the view that the amount of money offered by the Government was insufficient.", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "0", "9", "6", "8", "7", "5", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1970 and lives in Hafnarfj\u00f6r\u00f0ur. At the material time, the applicant was working as a journalist for the newsroom of the Icelandic National Broadcasting Service (hereinafter \u201cthe RUV\u201d). 7.  The RUV is an independent public service broadcaster, comprising television, radio and online services. The RUV broadcasts news programmes on television every evening at 7 p.m. that last for about 40 minutes. During the news programmes, a series of news items is first introduced by a news anchor in a studio, and then each news item is presented by different news reporters, whether current events, live or pre\u2011recorded interviews or editorial content. 8.  On 24 May, 28 May and 6 December 2010 the RUV broadcast news items, prepared and presented by the applicant, on its news programme at 7 p.m. The subject of all three news items was a loan transaction of 3,000,000,000 Icelandic Kr\u00f3nur (ISK; approximately EUR 19,736,842 at the exchange rate applicable in December 2010) between an Icelandic company, Y, and a shelf company in Panama, that had been written off in its entirety. The news items were introduced by a news anchor and then a film clip was played, showing pictures related to the subject of the news item while the applicant narrated. 9.  On the evening news on 24 May 2010 the news anchor introduced the news items, stating that the authorities were investigating whether the ISK 3,000,000,000 had made its way back to Iceland and that there was a suspicion that B, the owner of company Y, had returned the money to his business partners. In the film clip, the applicant stated that the Icelandic authorities believed that they had found the money trail and they thought that the money had made its way back to Iceland, not necessarily into B\u2019s pockets but into those of his business partners. The applicant then speculated on who the business partners might be and pictures were shown, inter alia, of A, a prominent businessman in Iceland. Lastly, the applicant stated that the question of where the money had ended up would be answered after the authorities\u2019 investigation. 10.  On the evening news on 28 May 2010, the news anchor introduced the news items by stating that the authorities were investigating whether B, A and C, an investor in Iceland, had jointly planned a business deal where ISK 3,000,000,000 seemed to vanish in Panama. Furthermore, the anchor stated that documents, from the year 2007 and onwards, supported this suspicion and that the documents indicated that the money had found its way back into the pockets of the same group. In the film clip the applicant stated that the authorities believed that they had found the money trail, as had been previously reported, and that they were in possession of documents indicating that A, B and C had planned the Panama deal in advance, in order to send the money to Panama and then back into their own pockets again, via a circuitous route. Pictures of A, B and C were shown on the screen with the text \u201cunder investigation\u201d written below each picture. 11.  On the evening news on 6 December 2010 the news anchor introduced the news item. In the film clip, the applicant stated that in the spring of 2007 company Y had loaned ISK 3,000,000,000 to the company in Panama. The funds had been transferred to Panama on 24 April 2007 and six days later, on 30 April 2007, a loan agreement had been prepared. On the same day, the loan had been written off in its entirety from the accounts of company Y. Furthermore, the applicant stated that B had issued a declaration claiming that there was nothing suspicious about the loan. Lastly, the applicant stated: \u201cThe Icelandic authorities have also searched for the funds, as we have previously reported, and they believe that they have found the money trail, as they have documents indicating that [B], [A] and [C] organised the Panama deal in advance. That is, they sent the money to Panama, and later the money found its way back, through several detours, into the pockets of the threesome\u201d. Pictures of A, B and C were shown above a world map, a pile of money was shown being divided up into three parts in Panama and each part was then visually transferred to the pictures of the men. 12.  On the same day, a corresponding article was published on RUV\u2019s website. After the news broadcast, A issued a press release. The online news article was updated to include the press release. 13.  On 12 January 2011 A lodged defamation proceedings against the applicant before the Reykjaness District Court and requested that the words \u201c[A]\u201d and \u201cthreesome\u201d in the above-mentioned statement of the news item broadcast on 6 December 2010 be declared null and void. 14.  Before the domestic courts, the applicant maintained that he had based the news item on information from sources, both verbal and written, that he deemed highly trustworthy. Furthermore, the applicant maintained that when he had prepared the news item he had attempted to contact A by telephone, in vain. 15.  During the proceedings before the District Court the applicant submitted a letter dated 5 September 2011 from the Special Prosecutor confirming that the loan transaction, which was the subject of the news items, had been reported to the police and was under investigation. The Special Prosecutor also stated that this had been confirmed in the media in July 2011. It does not transpire from the letter from the Special Prosecutor whether A was under investigation as a suspect or charged. The applicant did not, during the proceedings before the District Court submit any other documents or evidence to in support of the information concerning A presented in the news items. 16.  By judgment of 3 November 2011 the District Court found for the applicant. In its reasoning it referred to the right to freedom of expression and the protection of private life as guaranteed by the Icelandic Constitution. 17.  The judgment contained the following reasoning:\n\u201c...The banking collapse of 2008 caused great changes to the business environment and society in general. A wave of bankruptcies hit companies and individuals, the value of the krona plummeted and changes were made to the ruling government, to name a few. The media have covered these events since the crisis began and the individuals involved have also been the subject of news coverage, including [A]. In determining whether the content of the news item is a part of the social debate and therefore of public interest, it should be kept in mind that [A] himself, as well as the companies he has represented, has been in the media and public debate for many years. [A] has also been very prominent in business, both here and abroad, and in both a negative and positive light. [Company Z], led by [A], was a large shareholder in [F] ..., and held an active share in G...Bank. News about [A] has therefore more often than not been about his role in the banking collapse, and after the collapse of the Icelandic banks in the autumn of 2008 the media was full of news on the banking collapse and crisis, the reasons behind them and related matters. The media have been called upon to disseminate all material that could be of public interest, especially if the content might shed light on elements pertaining to parties who have played key roles in the Icelandic economy. In the light of the circumstances that developed after the banking collapse, [A] will have to withstand personal discussion of his actions and participation in business. Loan facilities and transfers of funds occurring in the lead\u2011up to the bank failure are important news stories that are relevant to the general public. Restricting that discussion through sanctions should only be done after great consideration.\n[The applicant] has stated that the news item is based on sources, both verbal and written, that he finds trustworthy. [The applicant] cannot be asked to prove these statements, as the journalist\u2019s right to protect his sources and their identity has been upheld in judicial rulings. [The applicant] has also sufficiently demonstrated that he tried to contact [A] before he delivered the news item and he has therefore not violated the National Broadcasting Service\u2019s procedures in that respect.\nThe Court does not agree with [A] that he is accused of actions punishable by law in the news item. The news item must be assessed as a whole and not on the basis of individual statements in the piece. As previously noted, the Court must consider the circumstances under which the statements are made, that they are necessary for a social debate on the causes and repercussions of the bank failure and also that some discrepancies can occur when dealing with complicated loan facilities and business deals. When the statements on [A] are assessed in this light, they are not found to violate the provisions of Articles 234 or 235 of the Penal Code no. 19/1940. ...\u201d 18.  On 30 January 2012 A appealed against the District Court\u2019s judgment to the Supreme Court. 19.  By a judgment of 15 November 2012 the Supreme Court overturned the District Court judgment and ordered the applicant to pay ISK 300,000 (approximately 2,600 euros (EUR)) to A in compensation for non-pecuniary damage, plus interest and ISK 1,000,000 (approximately 8,800 EUR) for A\u2019s legal costs before the domestic courts. The two words were declared null and void. 20.  The judgment contained the following reasoning:\n\u201c... In assessing where the line should be drawn between freedom of expression, as protected by Article 73 of the Constitution, and the right to privacy, as protected by Article 71 of the Constitution, it is important to determine whether the content published can be considered a part of the social debate and therefore of public interest, see the Supreme Court judgments of 1 June 2006 in case no. 541/2005, 1 March 2007 in case no. 278/2006, 10 November 2011 in case no. 65/2011 and 24 November 2011 in case no. 100/2011. The media play an important role in disseminating information and opinions on social issues. The public has a right to information on such issues and there must be particularly strong reasons for determining that limitations on media freedom are warranted in a democratic society. The collapse that occurred in the Icelandic economy following the failure of the three Icelandic commercial banks in the autumn of 2008 has had a significant and broad effect on all activity in the country and the general public\u2019s quality of life. Public debate and media coverage have been very focused on identifying the preceding events and reasons for the collapse, and reporting on the financial business of individuals has often been personal.\nWhen the content of the news item debated in this case is assessed as a whole, and the disputed remarks are evaluated in context with other statements in the news report and in consideration of the visual presentation, the comments clearly implied that [A] had committed an act which was punishable in accordance with the Penal Code no. 19/1940.\n[The applicant] has not presented any documents supporting the legitimacy of the statements, for which he has to bear the burden, as it was incumbent on him rather than [A] to secure such evidence. [The applicant] has also not demonstrated that he sought information from [A] on the content while preparing the news report. He therefore failed in his duty, as outlined in Article 2 of the National Broadcast Service\u2019s Rules on News and Related Programming dated 1 May 2008, to seek \u201c... information from both or all parties and attempt to show their points of view as equally as possible\u201d. The Supreme Court therefore finds that [the applicant] could not have been acting in good faith as pertains to the accuracy of the remarks in the news piece. Therefore [A\u2019s] demand for the quoted statements to be declared null and void is granted, pursuant to Article 241, cf. Article 235 of the Penal Code.\u201d", "references": ["1", "3", "6", "2", "0", "8", "4", "9", "7", "5", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant company has its registered office in Valongo, Portugal. 5.  On 18 July 2005 the applicant company brought enforcement proceedings against M.C. before the Valongo Court, seeking payment of an alleged debt of 32,992.99 euros (EUR) plus EUR 18,413.35 in interest it considered to be due up to that date, amounting to a total sum of EUR 51,406. It also sought the payment of the interest accrued until the date of repayment of the debt in full. 6.  On 12 October 2005 a judicial enforcement officer (agente de execu\u00e7\u00e3o) was appointed to the case by the Valongo Court. He accepted this appointment on 13 October 2005. 7.  M.C. was summoned on 20 November 2005 and on 14 December 2005 she lodged an application for proceedings for opposition to enforcement (oposi\u00e7\u00e3o \u00e0 execu\u00e7\u00e3o). These proceedings were joined to the enforcement proceedings on 15 December 2005. 8.  Between 15 December 2005 and 3 March 2016 information was exchanged between the Valongo Court and the judicial enforcement officer about the date on which M.C. had been summoned and the documents in that connection. 9.  On 30 May 2006 the applicant company gave its reply to the opposition to enforcement proceedings. 10.  Between 6 February 2007 and 15 August 2008 several procedural steps took place in the enforcement proceedings regarding the possible freezing of M.C.\u2019s bank accounts. 11.  In the meantime, on 22 February 2008, in the proceedings for opposition to enforcement the court had given a preparatory decision setting out the facts that had already been established and those that remained outstanding (despacho saneador). 12.  On 29 November 2010 the applicant company\u2019s lawyer withdrew from the case. 13.  On 6 December 2010 the court requested that the judicial enforcement officer provide a report on the procedural steps taken (see paragraph 10 above). 14.  On 14 January 2011 the court could not contact the applicant company at the address it had provided to the court. 15.  On 16 December 2011 a hearing in the proceedings for opposition to enforcement was scheduled for 30 May 2012. For reasons related to the health of M.C.\u2019s lawyer, the hearing was postponed to 27 November 2012. On an unknown date the hearing was postponed to 6 March 2013, the date on which it took place. 16.  For unknown reasons, on 23 December 2011 the Chamber of Judicial Officers (C\u00e2mara dos Solicitadores) informed the Valongo Court that a new judicial enforcement officer was to be appointed. 17.  On 3 January 2012 a new judicial enforcement officer was appointed to the enforcement proceedings. 18.  On an unknown date before the 16 January 2012 another lawyer started representing the applicant company. 19.  Between 25 September and 11 December 2012 discussions took place between the new judicial enforcement officer, the court and the previous judicial enforcement officer regarding the transmission of the necessary case documents from the previous judicial enforcement officer to the new one. 20.  Between 9 April and 1 October 2013 correspondence took place between the new judicial enforcement officer and the court regarding the applicant company\u2019s representation by a lawyer (whether it was represented in the case and by whom). 21.  On 29 April 2013 the Valongo Court adopted a decision against the applicant company in the proceedings for opposition to enforcement. 22.  On an unknown date before or during February 2014 the applicant company appealed against that decision to the Oporto Court of Appeal. 23.  The Oporto Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance decision by a judgment adopted on 20 May 2014. 24.  On an unknown date the applicant company appealed against that judgment to the Supreme Court of Justice. On 11 September 2014 that appeal was rejected by the Oporto Court of Appeal because the applicant company had not submitted any grounds of appeal. Following that decision, the enforcement proceedings were terminated.", "references": ["7", "9", "5", "1", "8", "4", "2", "0", "6", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The facts of the cases, as submitted by the applicants, may be summarised as follows. 6.  On various dates between 2004 and 2008 the applicants were criminally prosecuted for and convicted of various offences under the Russian legislation then in force. All of the applicants appealed, but their cases were examined by the appeal courts in the absence of their respective counsel. The appeal courts upheld their convictions. 7.  In the case of Mr Chernenko (application no. 51264/07) the first\u2011instance court ordered him to pay the legal fees incurred in respect of his representation in the criminal proceedings against him. On 6 November 2012 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation quashed the order of the first-instance court and waived the legal fees that Mr Chernenko had been ordered to reimburse. 8.  Following the communication of the applications, the prosecutor lodged requests for supervisory review of the criminal cases of Ms Ichetovkina and Mr Dubrovskiy (applications nos. 12584/05 and 45690/05). 9.  Following the communication of the other four applications (nos. 45075/05, 11343/06, 51264/07 and 59378/08), the prosecutor lodged a request for supervisory review of the judgment of the appeal courts. The domestic courts examined his request and expressly acknowledged that these four applicants\u2019 right to legal assistance in the appeal proceedings in respect of their cases had been breached. The applicants\u2019 cases were remitted for re-examination by the same appeal courts. The Court requested additional observations from the Government in respect of these four cases regarding the conformity of the second set of appeal proceedings with the requirements of Article 6 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention. When the applicants\u2019 cases were heard and re-examined by the appeal courts, they were represented by lawyers, and they participated in the respective proceedings via video link. 10.  The details of the applicants\u2019 cases are set out in the appendix.", "references": ["1", "5", "4", "0", "8", "9", "6", "2", "7", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  During 1991 and 1992 Serbian paramilitary forces gained control of about one third of the territory of Croatia and proclaimed the so-called \u201cSerbian Autonomous region of Krajina\u201d (Srpska autonomna oblast Krajina, hereinafter the \u201cKrajina\u201d). Part of the Zdjelar family \u2013 father Milan, mother An\u0111elija, daughter Dragica (the third applicant) and sons Janko (the first applicant), Slavko (the eighth applicant) and \u010cedo (the ninth applicant) \u2013 lived in Crni Potok, a village situated in the Krajina. At the beginning of August 1995 the Croatian authorities announced a campaign of military operation with the aim of regaining control over the Krajina. The operation was codenamed Storm and lasted from 4 to 7 August 1995. Before that action, the vast majority of the population of the Krajina had fled Croatia, initially for Bosnia and Herzegovina, but later many of them went to live in Serbia. Some returned to Croatia after the war. The number of people who fled is estimated at between 100,000 and 150,000. 6.  On 11 October 2001, one S.K. submitted to the State Attorney\u2019s Office (Dr\u017eavno odvjetni\u0161tvo Republike Hrvatske, hereinafter the \u201cSAO\u201d) a list of persons killed during and after Operation Storm. Milan Zdjelar, the applicants\u2019 father, was on the list and next to his name was a note that he had been shot in the head and a leg on 8 August 1995 by members of the Croatian Army\u2019s \u201cTigers\u201d brigade. On 16 October the SAO forwarded that list to the Ministry of the Interior. 7.  On 25 October 2001 the Gvozd police photographed the site of Milan Zdjelar\u2019s grave. 8.  On 29 October 2001 the Gvozd police interviewed Dragica Zdjelar, the third applicant, who said that her father had been killed on 8 August 1995 in Crni Potok. 9.  On an unspecified date in 2002 the body of Milan Zdjelar was exhumed and a post mortem was carried out in the Zagreb \u0160alata Hospital on 20 September 2002. The cause of death was not established and the only injury noted was a broken collar bone. 10.  On 23 March 2004 the Gvozd police again interviewed Dragica Zdjelar. She said that of her family members, only she and her father had remained in Crni Potok after the beginning of Operation Storm. On 8 August 1995 at about 12.50 p.m. she had been sitting with her father Milan in front of their house, situated on a hill in Crni Potok, about a hundred metres away from the unpaved main road. A military transport vehicle had appeared on that road, coming from the direction of the village of Gojkovac. When it drew level with their house the vehicle had stopped and three soldiers, dressed in camouflage uniforms, had got out and started to walk towards her and her father. Her father had then said that he did not wish to wait for the soldiers but would run into the woods. When he started to run, she had followed him and then heard three gunshots. She had hidden in the grass and had seen her father shot twice, in the chest and the leg. He had died soon afterwards. The soldiers had returned to the vehicle and continued in the direction of Topusko. The soldiers who had killed her father had been from the \u201cTigers\u201d brigade. She had hidden in the woods for two days while her father lay dead in the grass. When she returned from the woods she had reported the matter to the Croatian Army and had been given food by some soldiers, who had also buried her father. 11.  On 24 March 2004 the Gvozd police interviewed An\u0111elija Zdjelar, who had no relevant information to give them about the circumstances in which her husband had been killed. 12.  On 9 April 2004 the Sisa\u010dko-moslava\u010dka Police Department (Policijska uprava sisa\u010dko-moslava\u010dka) sent a report to the Sisak County State Attorney (\u017dupanijski dr\u017eavni odvjetnik Sisak) stating that Dragica Zdjelar had alleged that on 8 August 1995 her father Milan Zdjelar had been killed by Croatian soldiers, members of the \u201cTigers\u201d brigade. 13.  On 29 July 2005 the State Attorney\u2019s Office issued a document concerning enquiries into the killings of civilians between 1991 and 1995. The document was addressed to the County State Attorney\u2019s Offices, which were instructed to examine all the information collected to date on the killings of civilians during that period and to concentrate their activities on identifying the perpetrators and gathering the relevant evidence in order to instigate criminal proceedings. 14.  On 26 September 2005 the applicants and their mother lodged a criminal complaint with the SAO in connection with the killing of Milan Zdjelar, classifying the offence as a war crime against a civilian and alleging that the victim had been of Serbian ethnic origin, unarmed and never involved in any military activity during the war in Croatia. 15.  On 29 September 2005 the SAO referred the case to the Sisak County State Attorney\u2019s Office, requesting an investigation into the killing of Milan Zdjelar. 16.  Between October 2005 and February 2007 the State Attorney\u2019s Office asked the police about the progress of the investigation on several occasions. Each time the police replied that there had been no progress. 17.  On an unspecified date the police asked the Military Police Administration (Uprava Vojne Policije, hereinafter the \u201cMOP\u201d) for information about the killing of Milan Zdjelar. On 7 February 2007 the MOP answered that they had no relevant information. This was forwarded to the Sisak State Attorney\u2019s Office on 13 February 2007. 18.  On several occasions between September 2007 and July 2008 the State Attorney\u2019s Office asked the police about the progress of the investigation. Each time the police replied that there had been no progress. 19.  On 9 October 2008 the State Attorney\u2019s Office issued an instruction for implementation of the Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure to the County State Attorney\u2019s Offices, in which they indicated that an inspection of the work of these Offices had highlighted two main problems: the possible partiality of persons involved in the pending proceedings as a result of the ethnicity of the victims or the perpetrators; and the problem of trials in absentia. The instruction advocated the impartial investigation of all war crimes, irrespective of the ethnicity of those involved, whether victims or perpetrators, and stressed the duties of those working for the State Attorney in that respect. 20.  On 30 December 2008 the Sisak State Attorney\u2019s Office asked the Investigation Department of the Sisak County Court to hear evidence from Dragica Zdjelar. This request was complied with on 25 March 2009, when an investigating judge of that court heard evidence from her. Dragica Zdjelar repeated her earlier statement. 21.  On 11 May 2009 the police interviewed F.O. and F.K., both of whom were neighbours of the Zdjelar family in Crni Potok. F.K. confirmed that it had been soldiers from the Croatian Army who had come to the village when Milan Zdjelar had been killed. They had no other relevant information about possible perpetrators. 22.  On 12 May 2009 the police informed the Sisak State Attorney\u2019s Office that they had asked the Ministry of Defence for information regarding the members of brigade 153 of the Croatian Army who had arrived in Crni Potok after Operation Storm and the killing of Milan Zdjelar. On 20 July 2009 the Ministry of Defence informed the police that Milan Zdjelar had been buried by members of brigade 153 of the Croatian Army which had been under the command of a person named M., and provided a list of all members of that brigade with that name. One of them, M.\u0160., had already died. 23.  Between 26 January and 3 February 2010 the police interviewed five former Croatian soldiers, A.A., B.J., N.S., G.G. and M.T., all members of the First Brigade of the Croatian army, also called the \u201cTigers\u201d.  None of them had any knowledge about the killing of M.Z. or any other civilians during Operation Storm. 24.  On 15 February 2010, in answer to an inquiry from the SAO, the Sisak State Attorney\u2019s Office drew up a short report on the case. There had been no significant progress. 25.  On 9 and 16 March 2010 the police interviewed M.J., M.L. and M.M., members of smaller army units belonging to brigade 153 of the Croatian Army. M.J., a former member of the engineering unit, said that his unit had comprised between three and five soldiers and that he had never witnessed the killing of any civilians by any of them. M.L., a former commander of logistics in the artillery unit, stated that his unit had never encountered any civilians at any time during Operation Storm, with the exception of a few in Topusko, to whom they had given food and drink. Most of the villages they had passed through had had no name signs. He had no information to give them about the killing of Milan Zdjelar. M.M. had been a soldier in the unit under the command of I.P., and the smaller unit to which he had belonged had been under the command of K. M.M. had no information to give them about the killing of Milan Zdjelar and denied any involvement of his unit in the killing of civilians during Operation Storm. 26.  On several occasions between May and December 2011 the State Attorney\u2019s Office asked the police about the progress of the investigation. Each time the police replied that there had been no progress. 27.  In a separate development, on 8 October 2012, \u017d.L., who had been a member of the \u201cTigers\u201d brigade for about a month in 1994, after which he had been transferred to the Third Battalion, lodged a criminal complaint with the SAO against P.M. \u2013 the Minister for war veterans \u2013 and others for alleged abuse of authority. In that complaint \u017d.L. mentioned the killing of a civilian or civilians in Crni Potok, a few days after Operation Storm. He alleged that the crime had been \u201ctolerated by the command of the Third Battalion (bojna) of the First Brigade of the Croatian Army (\u201cgbr.\u201d which stands for \u201cgardijska brigada\u201d) whose commander had been M.A. On 2 November 2012 the SAO forwarded that information to the State Attorney\u2019s Office in Sisak, which forwarded it to the police on 14 November 2012. 28.  On 22 November 2012 the police interviewed \u017d.L. He said that during Operation Storm, the battalion had been in the village of Krznari\u0107 and had then gone on to Crni Potok. A person in charge of logistics, named M., had brought in a civilian, saying that he was a \u201c\u010detnik\u201d (derogatory term for a Serbian nationalist or a member of Serbian paramilitary forces). \u017d.L. described the man in question in detail. Soon the vice-commander P.Z. and the commander of the Third Company (satnija) J.M. had arrived and had taken the man away somewhere. P.Z. and J.M. had returned after about twenty minutes, and when questioned about the whereabouts of the man they had taken away, P.Z. had answered that he had \u201cdrifted in the river\u201d. After some time they had heard firing on a hilltop above them. \u017d.L. and another soldier, M.T., had started walking towards the top of that hill and had come to a house where an old woman was standing wailing. There had been no one in the house, but in a field about twenty metres away they had found an elderly man lying on his belly with gunshot wounds to his back and head. A gun had been lying next to him. The man from logistics had said that he had shot him in the head to \u201cshorten his pain\u201d. \u017d.L. had expressed his disapproval of the behaviour of the Croatian soldiers to his commander \u017d.M. Later on he had learned that the old woman they had encountered in front of her house had also been killed. 29.  On 13 December 2012 the police again interviewed Dragica Zdjelar. She repeated her earlier statement, in essence, and also gave a description of the two soldiers who had killed her father. 30.  During 2013 several short reports on the actions allegedly taken were compiled by the police and the Sisak County State Attorney\u2019s Office. 31.  On 10 July 2013 the SAO sent to the Sisak County State Attorney\u2019s Office a submission by \u017d.L. in which he alleged that he had witnessed the killing of civilians in Crni Potok, which had been both encouraged and perpetrated by the officers in command of the Third Battalion (bojna) of the First Brigade of the Croatian Army. 32.  On 16 October 2013 the Zagreb County State Attorney\u2019s Office sent summonses to Dragica Zdjelar, F.O. and \u017d.L. for 19 and 20 November 2013. 33.  On 11 November 2013 \u017d.L. informed the Sisak County State Attorney\u2019s Office that, owing to his health problems, he would not be able to come to Sisak on his own. He asked that transport to Sisak be organised for him or that he be heard in Karlovac, where he lived. In a further letter written on the same day he stated that some police officers had interviewed him on 22 November 2012 and had concluded that \u201cthe information he provided did not lead to the conclusion that a criminal offence had been committed\u201d. He further referred to a letter from the Zagreb State Attorney\u2019s Office of 28 May 2013 stating that \u201cthe allegations from his objections and criminal complaints were unfounded\u201d. 34.  On 19 November 2013 Zagreb County State Attorney\u2019s Office heard evidence from Dragica Zdjelar and on 26 February 2014 from F.O. They both repeated their earlier statements. 35.  It appears that on 1 December 2014 the Sisak State Attorney\u2019s Office emailed a summons to \u017d.L. requiring him to give a statement regarding the killings in Crni Potok in 1995. On 6 December 2014 \u017d.L. sent a note back to the State Attorney\u2019s Office referring to the summons and stating that he refused to give any statements because of his health problems, the passage of time, and the fact that he had not actually witnessed any crimes and that his prior allegations in that respect had been unfounded. He also alleged that he had been denied his rights in connection with his medical treatment. On 31 December 2014 the State Attorney\u2019s Office forwarded \u017d.L.\u2019s note to the Sisak County State Attorney\u2019s Office. 36.  On 5 June 2015 the investigation in respect of a number of victims killed on the broader territory of the Sisak County by unknown perpetrators during Operation Storm was assigned to the Osijek County State Attorney\u2019s Office (hereinafter the \u201cOCSAO\u201d). 37.  On 13 July 2016 the OCSAO, relying on \u017d.L.\u2019s statement to the police, asked the Ministry of Defence to provide information about the whereabouts of the people \u017d.L. had named, in particular P.J., J.M., a person nicknamed M. and the person who had been in charge of logistics in the \u201cTigers\u201d brigade. 38.  On 23 November 2016 the OCSAO requested that the police in Sisak carry out interviews with one F.K., who possibly had information about the men who had killed Milan Zdjelar; to interview B.J., A.A., N.S., G.G. and M.T., members of the \u201cTigers\u201d brigade who had been in Crni Potok during Operation Storm, about their whereabouts during the operation; to locate three commanders of the Croatian Army unit whose members had allegedly buried Milan Zdjelar on 10 August 1995 and whose first names all began with M, namely M.J., M.L. and M.M.; and to again interview D.Z., M.V., N.M., D.V, J.V. and M.B., all inhabitants of Crni Potok. 39.  On 20 December 2016 the police informed the OCSAO that F.K., N.M., M.B. and J.V. had died. There were also several people in Crni Potok called M.V. and D.V. 40.  On 29 December 2016 the police interviewed G.G. and N.S., former members of the \u201cTigers\u201d brigade. G.G. said it was possible that the brigade had passed through Crni Potok during Operation Storm but that they had not seen any civilians. He also said that B.J., N.S. and M.T. had been part of a patrol group (izvi\u0111a\u010dka desetina). N.S. said that the \u201cTigers\u201d brigade had not killed or arrested any civilians or soldiers during Operation Storm. 41.  On 11 January 2017 the Ministry of Defence informed the police about the whereabouts of M.J., M.L. and M.M. 42.  On 16 January 2017 the police interviewed A.A., who had been a member of a \u201cTigers\u201d brigade patrol group. He said his group had not been in Crni Potok during Operation Storm and he did not know whether the \u201cTigers\u201d brigade had been there either. 43.  On 24 April 2004 the applicants and their mother brought a civil action against the State in the Gvozd Municipal Court, seeking compensation in connection with the death of their father. They based their claim on the 2003 Liability Act. 44.  The claim was dismissed on 14 July 2005. This judgment was upheld on appeal by the Sisak County Court on 18 June 2009 and by the Supreme Court on 5 October 2011. The national courts found that the claim for compensation had been submitted after the expiry of the statutory limitation period prescribed by the law governing damages awards in civil proceedings. 45.  A subsequent constitutional complaint lodged by the applicants was dismissed on 5 June 2012.", "references": ["9", "2", "8", "6", "7", "4", "0", "3", "5", "1", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1972 and currently lives in Ukraine. Prior to the events at issue, notably during an unspecified period before 1998, the applicant used to serve in the police. He provided no further details in that regard. 6.  On 11 June 2004 the police were informed that the applicant and one of his suspected accomplices, who at the time were on a wanted list for having committed multiple robberies, were on a train travelling to Moldova. The police were also informed that they could be in possession of a gun. At about 11 p.m. on that day a group of four police officers boarded the train and arrested the applicant and his accomplice, using, as noted in the relevant official documents, \u201chand-to-hand combat techniques\u201d and handcuffs to subdue them. According to the Government, during the arrest the applicant tried to escape. Subsequently, the applicant was taken to Kotovsk police station. 7.  On 12 June 2004 the police drew up a report on the applicant\u2019s arrest in which it was noted that he had been arrested for \u201chaving resisted lawful demands of the police\u201d, which was an administrative offence, on 12 June 2004 in Kotovsk. The police report on the offence, joined to the above arrest report of 12 June 2004, specified that the applicant \u201chad behaved aggressively, had refused to present his identity documents, had tried to run away [and] had grabbed the police officers\u2019 clothes\u201d. According to the parties, the information concerning the time and place of the arrest contained in the reports was false. 8.  Later that day the Kotovsk Town Court found the applicant guilty of the abovementioned administrative offence and ordered his administrative detention for twelve days. The applicant remained in police custody. 9.  On 17 August 2004 the regional police department examined the circumstances of the applicant\u2019s arrest and issued a report, finding that the police officers concerned had lawfully used \u201chand-to-hand combat techniques\u201d and handcuffs against the applicant. No further details were given in that connection. In the report, it was also noted that the applicant had had bruises on his body after the arrest.\nII.  Alleged ill-treatment of the applicant 10.  According to the applicant, while in police custody during the night of 11 to 12 June 2004, he was ill-treated by several police officers with the aim of extracting his confession to the crimes of which he was suspected (see paragraph 6 above). In particular, police officers allegedly beat him up, administered electric shocks to him, suffocated him using a gas mask, inserted needles under his nails, hung him over a metal bar, and attempted to sexually abuse him. Unable to withstand the ill-treatment, the applicant made self-incriminating statements and also statements incriminating several other persons, who later became his co-defendants in the proceedings. The applicant stated that had he not done so, the police officers would have killed him as they had killed a certain M., whom the police had suspected of being the applicant\u2019s accomplice, during his questioning in the same police station on 18 March 2004. As was later found by the trial court, M. had died in the course of a robbery he had committed together with the applicant (see paragraph 54 below). 11.  Allegedly, the police officers also forced the applicant to sign a written statement that he had no complaints about them and that he had received his injuries elsewhere. 12.  On 12 June 2004 the applicant complained to a prosecutor\u2019s office that he had been tortured by the police. On the same day, on the prosecutor\u2019s office\u2019s instructions, the applicant was examined by a medical expert who noted multiple bruises on the applicant\u2019s body and face, which the expert classified as minor. During his medical examination the applicant stated that he had been beaten up by the police officers at the police station during the night of 11 to 12 June 2004. The expert noted that the applicant could have been punched and kicked in the head and body during that time. 13.  According to the applicant, the police officers continued torturing him for the next three days. The applicant stated that two people had witnessed him being ill-treated by the police. He did not give their details. 14.  On 29 June 2004 the applicant handed the investigators a written statement informing them of his wish to withdraw his complaints of ill\u2011treatment. Notably, he stated that he had no grievances against the police and that he had been injured due to his own fault in a different location. He did not provide any details of how he had been injured. 15.  On 30 June 2004 an investigator from the Kotovsk police station, having questioned the applicant in the presence of his lawyer (see paragraph 38 below), decided not to launch a criminal investigation in respect of the applicant\u2019s injuries, noting, mainly, that the applicant had withdrawn his complaints. 16.  Subsequently, the applicant lodged new complaints of alleged ill\u2011treatment by the police on 11-12 June 2004 with a prosecutor\u2019s office. 17.  In particular, in August 2004 the applicant complained to the prosecutor overseeing the investigation that he had been beaten up by the police. On 30 August 2004 the prosecutor met with the applicant and allegedly tried to force him to confess to having committed other crimes. As the applicant refused, the prosecutor allegedly beat him up. As a result, the applicant decided to stop making complaints to that prosecutor. 18.  The applicant\u2019s complaints of ill-treatment by the police on 11\u201112 June 2004 made to other prosecutors were re-examined on several occasions. In particular, the prosecutors\u2019 decisions refusing to prosecute the police officers issued on 6 July and 31 August 2004, 25 January, 28 July and 25 November 2005 were annulled by senior prosecutors for failure to investigate the matter in full. 19.  By a decision of 11 February 2006, the prosecutor\u2019s office again rejected the complaints as unsubstantiated, finding that it had not been demonstrated that the police officers had committed a crime and that there was no evidence that the police had forced the applicant to give self\u2011incriminating statements after his arrest. Statements of a number of police officers were relied upon in that regard. It was also noted that at some point in time the applicant and his lawyer had made statements that the applicant had not been ill-treated by the police after his arrest, and that he had refused to give details as to how he had received the injuries noted in the medical examination of 12 June 2004 (see paragraphs 14 and 15 above). The prosecutor\u2019s office further found no issue in the way the police had arrested the applicant, relying on the report of 17 August 2004 (see paragraph 9 above). 20.  The applicant did not challenge that decision in a separate appeal to a higher prosecutor or the courts, though he raised the complaints of ill\u2011treatment by the police raised during his trial (see paragraph 49 below). 21.  According to the applicant, during further stages of the criminal proceedings against him, he was subjected to beatings by the police on several occasions. 22.  The applicant also stated that during his trial he had been subjected to various forms of ill-treatment by the guards, who had been escorting him to court hearings. In particular, the guards had twisted his hands and tried to break his vertebral column; they had not provided him with food during the lunch breaks; and they had threatened the applicant with physical punishment. They had also placed him temporarily in cells together with inmates whom the applicant claims he had arrested when he had worked for the police (see paragraph 5 above). The guards had informed the inmates that they would go unpunished had they killed or raped the applicant. Allegedly, the prosecutors to whom the applicant had brought his complaints of ill-treatment did not examine those complaints on the merits. 23.  After his trial, in particular between February 2009 and November 2012, the applicant was detained in \u201cordinary\u201d prisons, where he was allegedly subjected to abuse and threats by inmates on account of his previous service in the police. Eventually he was transferred to a specialised prison in Mena in which inmates with law-enforcement backgrounds were detained. 24.  On 15 February 2016 the applicant was released from prison.\nIII.  Allegedly inadequate medical assistance to the applicant while in detention 25.  The applicant stated that during his detention he had suffered from different health issues, including a gastric ulcer, kidney disease and an eye issue, for which he had not been provided adequate medical assistance. Consequently, his health condition had deteriorated. The applicant had lodged multiple complaints concerning his allegedly inadequate medical assistance with a prosecutor\u2019s office. 26.  In 2006 the prosecutor\u2019s office instructed the head of the Prisons Service in Odessa to ensure that the applicant received adequate medical assistance while he was detained in Odesa Pre-Trial Detention Centre (\u201cthe SIZO\u201d). Allegedly, the SIZO administration did not comply with that instruction and he was not given the assistance he needed. Thus, he continued to lodge complaints with the prosecutor\u2019s office. The prosecutor\u2019s office eventually rejected the complaints as unsubstantiated, having studied the applicant\u2019s medical file and noted that he had been medically examined and provided with adequate medical assistance during his detention in the SIZO. The applicant\u2019s further complaints of inadequate medical assistance while in prison were also rejected as unsubstantiated. 27.  The Government submitted detailed information regarding the medical assistance which the applicant had received in detention. It demonstrates that throughout the period of his detention in the SIZO and in different prisons he had been examined by various doctors, including those from civilian medical institutions, and had been provided with treatment for the different medical issues he had had at the time.\nIV.  The applicant\u2019s detention prior to his conviction on 30 March 2007 28.  After his arrest on 11 June 2004, the applicant was detained on the basis of the decision of the Town Court of 12 June 2004 sentencing him to twelve days\u2019 administrative detention (see paragraph 8 above). 29.  On 24 June 2004 the applicant was informed that he was being arrested in connection with his criminal prosecution. The next day the Town Court ordered his further detention for two months on the grounds that the applicant was accused of serious crimes and that he might evade investigation or commit a new crime. No further details were given in that regard. 30.  The applicant did not appeal against the decision of the Town Court of 25 June 2004. Nor did he appeal against the decision of the same court of 10 August 2004 extending the maximum period of his detention to 21 October 2004. 31.  Between 21 October and 24 December 2004 the applicant was detained solely on the basis of his case having been referred to the trial court. 32.  Subsequently, the applicant was detained partly on the basis of the decision of the Town Court of 24 December 2004 and the decisions of the Odesa Regional Court of Appeal (\u201cthe Appeal Court\u201d) of 3 June 2005 and 10 January 2006 returning the case for additional investigation, and partly on the basis of the decisions of the Appeal Court of 4 March, 29 July and 2 November 2005 and 10 March 2006 repeatedly extending the maximum period of his pre-trial detention. Those decisions were based mainly on the grounds that further investigative measures had to be performed, that the applicant was accused of serious crimes, and that he might evade investigation and trial and obstruct the establishment of the truth in the case. Those decisions contained no further details in that connection. No appeal against those decisions could be lodged. The applicant alleged that they were taken in violation of procedural norms, in particular without him or his lawyer taking part in the hearings on the matter. 33.  Some of the periods of the applicant\u2019s detention between 4 March 2005 and 18 April 2006 \u2013 notably, from 10 May to 3 June and from 4 to 16 December 2005 \u2013 were not covered by any decision at all, the applicant having been detained on the grounds that the case was pending commencement of the trial. 34.  According to the applicant, his detention between 10 and 15 May 2005 was also not covered by any decision at all. 35.  On 13 June 2004 the applicant was questioned as a witness concerning several cases of robbery. The applicant made self-incriminating statements, giving details of the crimes which he and several other persons had committed. 36.  On 15 June 2004 the applicant was questioned on suspicion of murder, as one of his accomplices had given statements implicating him in that crime, which he had allegedly committed in the course of a robbery. The accomplice had been with the applicant when the murder had been committed, but had not seen how it had happened. In the course of the applicant\u2019s questioning on that date he confessed to having committed the murder and gave details in that regard. On the same date the applicant was officially charged with that crime. The applicant stated that he had been questioned without a lawyer being present. The Government did not address this submission. No documents regarding the applicant\u2019s questioning of 15 June 2004 were provided. Reference to that questioning was made in the judgment of 30 March 2007 (see paragraph 53 below). Notably, when assessing evidence concerning the murder charges, the Appeal Court held that:\n\u201c... [T]he questioning of Sadkov V.A. was conducted with the participation of a lawyer [while Mr Sadkov had the procedural status of] a suspect on 15 June 2004 ([pages] 64-65, [volume] 12 [of the case file]) and an accused ([pages] 69-70, [volume] 12 [of the case file]) ... during which Sadkov explained that he had stabbed [the victim] repeatedly with a knife ... [and that] subsequently, he threw that knife into a lake. [His] statements contained information about the way the victim had been stabbed ... which was later confirmed by a forensic expert ... and which was not present in the statements of [his accomplice] ... [O]n 15 June 2004, immediately after that information was received, the police officers searched the lake which [Mr Sadkov and his accomplice] had indicated and found a knife, which, according to the experts\u2019 report, could have been used to inflict the injuries of the victim ...\u201d 37.  Subsequently, the applicant took part in a number of investigative procedures, notably crime reconstructions and witness confrontations. According to the applicant and the information contained in the judgment of 30 March 2007 (see paragraph 53 below), he was not represented by a lawyer during those procedures. 38.  According to the parties\u2019 submissions, on 24 June 2004 a lawyer was appointed by the investigator to represent the applicant in the proceedings. No copy of the relevant decision was provided. The applicant was questioned in the lawyer\u2019s presence where he confirmed his previous statements to the police. 39.  During questioning at later stages of the investigation and at the trial, the applicant, with his lawyer present, repeatedly changed his version of the events pertaining to the charges against him. For instance, while initially he testified that it had been only him who had committed the murder, during subsequent questioning he stated that one of his co-defendants had also taken part in the murder. Ultimately, the applicant denied his responsibility for the murder and the majority of the counts of robbery. In particular, he stated that the crimes had been committed by his co\u2011defendants, who had informed him of the relevant details, and that his confession during the initial questioning in June 2004 had been extracted as a result of ill\u2011treatment by the police. 40.  On 22 October 2004 the investigation was completed and the applicant was given the case file to study. 41.  On 24 December 2004 the Town Court returned the case for additional investigation for failure to complete the required investigative steps in full. It also instructed the investigator to look into one of the applicant\u2019s co-defendants\u2019 complaints of ill-treatment by the police. 42.  Subsequently, the case was returned to the prosecutor\u2019s office for additional investigation two more times, on 3 June and 16 December 2005, mainly for failure to complete the required investigative steps in full. 43.  In the meantime, on 28 April 2005 the applicant asked the investigators to terminate the criminal proceedings against him and to release him from detention, stating that the charges against him were based on his self-incriminating statements obtained as a result of ill-treatment in June 2004. 44.  On 29 April 2005 the request was refused as unsubstantiated. 45.  On 30 November 2005 the investigators rejected a similar request made by the applicant\u2019s lawyer on 29 November 2005, in which he also alleged that the applicant\u2019s complaints of ill-treatment by the police had not been duly examined. 46.  During the pre-trial investigation the applicant was given access to the entire case file and studied it together with his lawyer on several occasions, notably in April and September 2005 and February 2006. He was also given access to the case file during the trial. 47.  According to the reports of the police, while the applicant was studying the case file on 29 September 2005 he tried to destroy several documents, in particular those concerning his statements made on 29 June 2004 (see paragraph 14 above). The applicant did not make any comments in that regard. 48.  In April 2006 the case was referred to the Appeal Court for trial. 49.  During the trial the applicant denied being guilty of the crimes he was charged with. The applicant\u2019s principle argument was that the charges were based on his and his co-defendants\u2019 testimony obtained as a result of ill-treatment by the police, and on false evidence. 50.  On 30 March 2007 the Appeal Court found the applicant and five others guilty of a number of crimes, including murder, illegal possession of firearms and on multiple counts of robbery, sentenced the applicant to fifteen years\u2019 imprisonment and ordered the confiscation of all his property. 51.  The court based its judgment regarding most of the charges mainly on the testimony of the applicant\u2019s co-defendants obtained in the course of the investigation and during the trial. The court also relied on the testimony of a number of witnesses and victims of the crimes and on the conclusions of several forensic, ballistic and other expert examinations. 52.  The court noted that the applicant\u2019s and his co-defendants\u2019 arrest and administrative detention at the initial stage of the investigation (in the applicant\u2019s case between 11 and 24 June 2004) had been contrary to Articles 106 and 115 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (setting-out rules on pre\u2011trial detention), as they had actually been arrested on suspicion of having committed crimes. The court also noted that during that period they had been questioned as witnesses concerning the relevant events and had taken part in other investigative procedures, notably crime reconstructions and witness confrontations. According to the court, that situation had entailed a violation of their right to mount a defence. The court decided not to accept as evidence all the verbatim records of the investigative actions in which the applicant and his co-defendants had taken part as witnesses during the relevant periods (see paragraph 35 above). 53.  As regards the charge of murder, the court relied principally on the statements of one of the applicant\u2019s accomplices and the applicant\u2019s self\u2011incriminating statements made at the pre-trial stage, in particular during his interview on 15 June 2004 and during subsequent questioning, having noted that the applicant had been assisted by a lawyer when he had made those statements (see paragraphs 36 and 38 above). The court found that the statements were reliable and noted that during the trial the applicant had made conflicting submissions concerning the relevant events, which could not be accepted. 54.  Relying on the prosecutor\u2019s office\u2019s decision of 11 February 2006 (see paragraph 19 above), the court found that the applicant\u2019s complaints of ill-treatment by the police had been unsubstantiated. The court also found that, contrary to the applicant\u2019s submissions, one of his accomplices, M., had died of blood loss after he had been injured by the applicant\u2019s other accomplice in the course of one of the robberies they had committed. 55.  The applicant and the prosecution challenged the judgment of 30 March 2007 on appeal. While the prosecution disagreed with the first-instance court\u2019s legal qualification of some of the crimes, the applicant argued that he had not been guilty, that he had made self-incriminating statements as a result of ill-treatment by the police and that his co\u2011defendants had made untruthful statements concerning his involvement in the crimes. 56.  On 4 December 2007 the Supreme Court heard the case and delivered its decision in the applicant\u2019s presence. It upheld the judgment of 30 March 2007 in so far as it concerned the majority of the convictions, including murder. The Supreme Court found that the applicant\u2019s guilt had been duly established. In its decision, it referred to the statements of the applicant\u2019s co-defendants, witnesses and victims, and also to different forensic evidence. 57.  By the same decision, the Supreme Court ordered a retrial of several of the convictions of robbery, holding that the first-instance court had erred in the legal qualification of the crimes. In particular, it ordered the examination of whether those crimes could be considered as having been committed by an \u201corganised group\u201d. 58.  The applicant stated that a copy of the decision of the Supreme Court of 4 December 2007 had been given to him, after a substantial delay, on 19 June 2008. 59.  During the retrial the applicant argued that he was not guilty and that he had been ill-treated by the police on 11-12 June 2004. 60.  On 11 August 2008 the Appeal Court convicted the applicant and his co-defendants on the remaining counts of robbery. It did not change the applicant\u2019s sentence. The conviction was based mainly on the testimony of the applicant\u2019s co-defendants obtained in the course of the investigation and trial. To a certain extent, the court also relied on the testimony of several witnesses and victims and the results of various expert examinations. 61.  Relying on the prosecutor\u2019s office\u2019s decision of 11 February 2006, the court found that the applicant\u2019s complaints of ill-treatment by the police were unsubstantiated. 62.  The applicant appealed in cassation. 63.  On 16 December 2008 the Supreme Court upheld the judgment of 11 August 2008, noting, inter alia, that there had been no evidence that the applicant\u2019s co-defendants had perjured themselves. It also noted that the applicant had acknowledged his guilt and had given details of the relevant events on several occasions during the investigation. The Supreme Court did not specify the period of the investigation to which it referred. 64.  The Supreme Court generally noted that the applicant\u2019s complaints of a violation of his right to mount a defence did not have any basis in the case file. It further found no violation of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1960 (\u201cthe CCrP\u201d) in that the applicant had taken part in the investigative actions during his administrative detention. The applicant\u2019s complaints of ill-treatment were considered to be unsubstantiated. 65.  On 13 February 2009 the Appeal Court sent the applicant a copy of the decision of the Supreme Court of 16 December 2008, noting that after that date the applicant would not be entitled to study the case file.\nVI.  The application to the Court 66.  In June and July 2005 the applicant made submissions to the Court, complaining principally of ill-treatment by the police and of the unlawfulness of his arrest and detention. 67.  By a letter of 22 August 2005, the Court invited the applicant to provide copies of documents pertinent to his complaints. 68.  In his letter of 29 September 2005, the applicant stated that his requests for copies of the necessary documents had been refused by the domestic authorities. In particular, in September 2005 the prosecutor\u2019s office informed the applicant that the CCrP did not provide for the issuing of copies of documents from criminal case files and that once the investigation had been completed the applicant and his lawyer would be given a possibility to study the case file and to make copies of documents by hand. 69.  By a letter of 5 December 2005, the Court invited the Government to provide factual information concerning the applicant\u2019s complaints regarding his inability to obtain copies of the documents needed for his application. 70.  In January 2006 the applicant and the Government submitted copies of a number of documents relating to the applicant\u2019s complaints of ill\u2011treatment and unlawful detention. 71.  In their reply to the Court\u2019s letter of 5 December 2005, the Government also stated that pursuant to the CCrP the applicant had the right to study the case file and to make copies of documents after the completion of the investigation against him. 72.  Subsequently, the applicant allegedly also had difficulties obtaining copies of other documents from the case file. He stated that his requests to the prosecutor\u2019s office and the courts for such copies had been to no avail. According to the documents provided by the parties, it was noted that the applicant had been given access to his case file during the criminal proceedings against him and that the courts had not been required to issue him copies of documents other than judgments in his criminal case. 73.  The applicant alleged that the administration of a prison in which he had been detained in August 2009 had destroyed a letter which he had asked them to send to the Court on 3 August 2009. 74.  The prosecutor\u2019s office examined the alleged destruction of the letter and found that it had been duly dispatched. 75.  The Court did not receive a letter from the applicant dated 3 August 2009.", "references": ["9", "6", "7", "5", "4", "3", "8", "0", "No Label", "1", "2"], "gold": ["1", "2"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1956 and is currently detained in the centre for persons in preventive detention on the premises of Schwalmstadt Prison. 5.  On 6 October 1987 the Landshut Regional Court convicted the applicant, inter alia, of two counts of rape combined with one count of sexual assault, of attempted rape and of aggravated robbery. It sentenced the applicant, who had acted with full criminal responsibility, to thirteen years\u2019 imprisonment. Furthermore, after a first preventive detention order made in that judgment had been quashed by the Federal Court of Justice, the Regional Court, on 25 July 1988, again ordered the applicant\u2019s preventive detention under Article 66 \u00a7\u00a7 2 and 1 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 24 below). 6.  The Regional Court found that between June and August 1986 the applicant, having absconded during a leave from prison where he served a term of imprisonment for rape, had again raped a twenty-two-year-old woman and a sixteen-year-old girl on a farm track, had attempted to rape another randomly chosen woman and had stolen two cars by use of threats or force. It had endorsed the findings of medical expert W. who had diagnosed the applicant with a mental abnormality with schizoid and psychopathic elements which was not pathological and thus did not affect the applicant\u2019s criminal responsibility, and with a propensity to commit serious sexual and property offences. 7.  On 10 April 2002 the applicant, having fully served his terms of imprisonment, was placed for the first time in preventive detention. 8.  On 13 December 2011 the Marburg Regional Court ordered the applicant\u2019s preventive detention to continue also after 9 April 2012, when the applicant would have served ten years in that form of detention. 9.  The Regional Court considered that the requirements for an extension of that detention beyond ten years, laid down in Article 67d \u00a7 3 of the Criminal Code and modified by the Federal Constitutional Court\u2019s judgment of 4 May 2011 (see paragraph 24 below), were met. 10.  Having heard the applicant, his counsel, the prosecution, psychiatric expert J. and a representative of Schwalmstadt Prison, the Regional Court considered that there was still a high risk that the applicant, owing to specific circumstances relating to his person and his conduct, would commit the most serious crimes of violence and sexual offences if released. The Regional Court referred to the applicant\u2019s previous convictions of numerous counts of rape of randomly chosen victims who had suffered most serious mental damage and of robbery by potentially mortal stabs in the chest in this respect. It further noted that the applicant had not completed any of the therapies offered to him to reflect on his offences. 11.  Furthermore, the Regional Court found that the applicant suffered from a mental disorder for the purposes of section 1 \u00a7 1 of the Therapy Detention Act (see paragraph 24 below). It noted that expert J., in his report dated 15 September 2011, having regard to the relevant tool for the classification of diseases, the ICD-10[1], had diagnosed the applicant with a dissocial and schizoid personality disorder, which was to be classified as a mental disorder under the said Act. It further had regard to the report dated 27 December 2004, submitted in previous proceedings by psychiatric expert B., who had already diagnosed the applicant with a dissocial personality disorder with schizoid and psychopathic elements. 12.  On 13 March 2012 the Frankfurt am Main Court of Appeal, endorsing the reasons given by the Regional Court, dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. 13.  On 13 June 2013 the Federal Constitutional Court refused to grant the applicant legal aid and declined to consider the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint (file no. 2 BvR 963/13). 14.  On 23 January 2013 the Marburg Regional Court, having heard the applicant in person, his counsel, the prosecution and a representative of Schwalmstadt Prison and having regard to the report of psychiatric expert J. dated 15 September 2011, again ordered the extension of the applicant\u2019s preventive detention. 15.  The Regional Court endorsed the reasons given by the Frankfurt am Main Court of Appeal and by itself in the previous set of proceedings. It further took note, in particular, of the fact that the applicant had proved reliable during several leaves from prison under escort and had taken up work in prison. However, he still had not completed a necessary therapy aimed at preventing him from reoffending. 16.  On 14 March 2013 the Frankfurt am Main Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. It referred to the conclusions in its decision dated 13 March 2012 and found that the factual findings and legal assessment made in that decision were still valid. In particular, the applicant kept refusing a necessary therapy. 17.  On 13 June 2013 the Federal Constitutional Court refused to grant the applicant legal aid and declined to consider the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint (file no. 2 BvR 1055/13). 18.  At the outset of the execution of the preventive detention order, the applicant was detained in a separate department for persons in preventive detention in Schwalmstadt Prison. From January 2013 onwards he has been detained in a separate building for persons in preventive detention on the premises of Weiterstadt Prison. In the latter building, detainees now disposed of two rooms, each measuring some 11 square metres, and could use the outdoor area during the day. Since spring 2013, the number of staff in the psychology service responsible for persons in preventive detention has been increased and specific therapies, notably a sex offender treatment programme, have been made available. On 20 December 2014 the applicant was transferred to the new centre for persons in preventive detention on the premises of Schwalmstadt Prison. 19.  In the Government\u2019s submission, which was not contested by the applicant, both in Schwalmstadt Prison and in Weiterstadt Prison, measures were taken in the interim period between September 2011 and the entry into force of the new legislation on preventive detention on 1 June 2013 (in particular the Act on establishment, at federal level, of a difference between the provisions on preventive detention and those on prison sentences, see paragraph 24 below) by which the conditions of detention for persons in preventive detention and the offers of therapy were gradually improved. The Government submitted that these measures served to comply with the constitutional requirement of differentiating between preventive detention and imprisonment. 20.  The applicant refused any specific therapy addressing his offences throughout his preventive detention. In the period at issue, he participated in a weekly discussion group for persons in preventive detention. In May 2013 the applicant was repeatedly invited to participate in the sex offender treatment programme then available in Weiterstadt, which he refused. He worked in detention and was regularly granted leave from prison under escort. 21.  On 26 April 2012 the Marburg Regional Court dismissed the prosecution\u2019s request to transfer the applicant to a psychiatric hospital for the further execution of his preventive detention under Article 67a \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 24 below). 22.  On 18 November 2013 the Marburg Regional Court again extended the applicant\u2019s preventive detention.", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "4", "8", "6", "5", "9", "7", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Sisak. 6.  The applicant was married to N.T. and they had two sons, Z.T. and B.T. In 1985 the applicant and N.T. divorced. 7.  On 25 August 1991 a number of members of the \u201cWolves\u201d (Vukovi) unit of the Sisak police entered the house of the applicant\u2019s son Z.T., They abducted Z.T., the applicant\u2019s second son B.T. and her former husband N.T. On 26 August 1991 the body of N.T. was found in the River Sava and the autopsy showed that he had been shot and killed. Z.T. and B.T. disappeared. On 2 September 1991 the Sisak police lodged a criminal complaint with the Sisak County State Attorney\u2019s Office in connection with the killing of N.T. Police enquiries were started by the Sisak police, under the command of \u0189.B. and his deputy V.M. (see paragraph 31 below). 8.  On 9 September 1991 the applicant contacted the Ministry of the Interior and informed them that her former husband and two sons had disappeared. 9.  The commander of the Wolves unit was J.G., who died in a road accident in 1992. 10.  On 14 June 1993 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint with the State Attorney\u2019s Office 11.  On an unspecified date broader police enquiries were opened into the killing of individuals of Serb ethnicity in the Sisak area during the war. The enquiries into the killing of N.T. and disappearance of the applicant\u2019s sons were part of these overall enquiries. 12.  Before 5 November 1997, when Croatia ratified the Convention, the police interviewed the applicant as well as potential witnesses D.F.T., M.T., \u017d.B., D.M. and J.J. None of them had any concrete knowledge about the potential perpetrators. 13.  On 15 October 2002 an investigating judge of the Sisak County Court heard evidence from Z.G., a former Croatian soldier who firstly denied knowing anything about the fate of the applicant\u2019s sons and former husband but later on, through tears and saying that he was scared, said that he had seen all three of them in ORA, a military base near Sisak. Z.T. and B.T. had been visibly beaten. 14.  In October and November 2002, January and February 2003 the police interviewed a number of former Croatian soldiers as witnesses, some of whom (Z.K., M.D., S.\u0160., S.K., \u017d.R., M.B., I.A., M.P., A.D., S.G., D.M.S.K.I.\u0160., I.K., M.G., M.R., D.V. as well as two anonymous individuals) had given statements about the arrest of individuals during the war in the Sisak area and their detention in ORA. None of them had any knowledge about the fate of the applicant\u2019s former husband and sons. 15.  On 4 November 2002 the police interviewed D.M., a friend of the applicant\u2019s sons, who had witnessed their and their father\u2019s arrest by four people dressed in camouflage uniforms and had heard that they had been taken to ORA. 16.  On 9 January 2003 an investigating judge of the Sisak County Court heard evidence from the applicant. She said that she had not witnessed the arrest of her former husband and sons but had heard from D.F.T., wife of her son Z.T., about it. D.M. had also witnessed the arrest of her former husband and sons. Also, M.F. had told her that he had seen her sons in ORA and his girlfriend had also told her that her sons had been beaten in ORA. Another person, C., had also told her that he had seen her son B.T. in ORA. 17.  A report drawn up by the Sisak police in 2004 for the Sisak County State Attorney\u2019s Office on disappeared individuals lists the applicant\u2019s sons as missing. 18.  On 29 July 2005 the State Attorney\u2019s Office issued a document concerning enquiries into the killings of civilians between 1991 and 1995. The document was addressed to the County State Attorney\u2019s Office, which were required to examine all the information collected to date on the killings of civilians during that period and to concentrate their activities on identifying the perpetrators and gathering the relevant evidence in order to initiate criminal proceedings. 19.  On 21 November 2005 the applicant\u2019s sons were declared dead by the Sisak Municipal Court as of 25 August 1991. 20.  On 5 October 2006 the Sisak County State Attorney\u2019s Office classified the killing of N.T. and the disappearance of the applicant\u2019s sons as war crimes against the civilian population. 21.  On 13 December 2006 the applicant again lodged a criminal complaint. She alleged that her sons had been arrested by the members of the Croatian army and taken to ORA, under the command of B.B. 22.  On 25 January 2007 an investigating judge of the Sisak County Court heard evidence from witnesses D.M. and D.F.T. D.M. repeated his previous statements (see paragraph 15 above). D.F.T., the wife of the late Z.T., had witnessed the arrest of the victims but had no information on possible direct perpetrators. 23.  On 9 October 2008 the State Attorney\u2019s Office issued an instruction to the County State Attorney\u2019s Offices concerning implementation of the Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure, in which it indicated that an inspection of their work had indicated two main problems: possible partiality on the part of the individuals involved in the pending proceedings as regards the ethnicity of the victims or the perpetrators; and the problem of trials in absentia. The instruction advocated the impartial investigation of all war crimes, irrespective of the ethnicity of those involved, whether victims or perpetrators, and reiterated the duty of those working for the State Attorney in that connection. 24.  On 14 October 2008 the Sisak police compiled an analysis of the criminal complaints concerning the crimes committed in 1991 and 1992 in the broader Sisak area and adopted a plan for further actions to be taken, including in the Trivkanovi\u0107 case. 25.  On 17 December 2008 the police again interviewed the applicant. She said that she had heard that Z.R. was one of the people who had taken her former husband and sons and that her daughter-in-law D.F.T. also knew one of the individuals implicated but was afraid to talk about it. 26.  On the same day the Sisak County State Attorney\u2019s Office compiled a report on the cases concerning war crimes, including the killing of the applicant\u2019s sons. 27.  On 18 December 2008 the police interviewed D.F.T. and M.F. D.F.T. said that she did not know any of the individuals who had arrested the victims. M.F. said that he had no knowledge of the events at issue. 28.  On 26 January 2009 the Sisak police sent a report on the interviews to the Sisak County State Attorney\u2019s Office. 29.  In January and March 2009 the police interviewed D.K., M.R., I.V., J.J., and K.J., none of whom had any relevant knowledge of the critical events. The police also again interviewed D.M. and Z.G., who both repeated their respective prior statements. 30.  On 25 March and 18 August 2009 the Sisak police sent a report to the Sisak County State Attorney\u2019s Office. 31.  The enquiries into the killing of the applicant\u2019s former husband and sons were a part of broader police enquiries which concerned officials of the Sisak police as suspects and altogether thirty-four victims (see paragraph 61 below). As a result of these enquiries an investigation was opened in the Sisak County Court (see below, paragraphs 32 and 33). 32.  On 20 June 2011 the Sisak county police lodged a criminal complaint against \u0110.B., V.M and D.B. on charges of war crimes against the civilian population. This included the killing of the applicant\u2019s sons and former husband. On the same day \u0110.B., head of the Sisak police in 1991 and 1992, V.M., police commander at the border territory of Sisak and Banovina in 1991 and 1992 and deputy head of the Sisak police, and D.B., a member of the Wolves, a reserve unit of the Sisak police, were arrested. 33.  On an unspecified date an investigation was opened. On 13 July 2011 \u0110.B. died. 34.  During the trial D.F., D.M., D.F.T., S.R., Z.G., P.M. and S.L. as well as the applicant all testified as witnesses that they had either seen or heard that the applicant\u2019s former husband and two sons had been abducted from their home by the members of the Wolves unit and taken to ORA. 35.  On 16 December 2011 the Osijek County State Attorney\u2019s Office lodged an indictment against V.M. and D.B. with the Osijek County Court, alleging that they had been in command of the unit whose unnamed members had committed a number of crimes against the civilian population between July 1991 and June 1992, including the killing of the applicant\u2019s relatives. They were charged with war crimes against the civilian population. 36.  On 9 December 2013 a first-instance judgment was delivered. V.M. was found guilty of war crimes against the civilian population in that, in his capacity as \u201ccommander of police forces in the broader area of Sisak and Banovina\u201d and \u201cdeputy head of the Sisak police\u201d, he had allowed the killings of individuals of Serb ethnicity and had failed to take adequate measures to prevent such killings. The relevant part of the judgment concerning the applicant\u2019s sons and former husband reads:\n\u201cOn the afternoon of 25 August 1991 a number of members of the \u2018Wolves\u2019 unit of the Sisak police forcibly abducted N.T. and his sons Z. and B.T. from their family home at 38 Slavonska Street in Sisak and took them in a white van to the improvised prison at \u2018ORA\u2019, where they were beaten during an unlawful interrogation after which N.T. was taken to an unknown place on the same day and shot and killed and his body was found on 26 August 1991 at the left bank of the River Sava at a place called Gu\u0161\u0107e, whereas the fate of Z. and B.T. after they had been taken to \u2018ORA\u2019 remains unknown.\u201d 37.  On 10 June 2014 the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of V.M. and increased his sentence to ten years\u2019 imprisonment.", "references": ["2", "7", "3", "5", "9", "8", "0", "1", "4", "6", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1945 and lives in Jonava. 6.  In 1994 the applicant bought an apartment in Jonava. In 1998 he lost his regular job and was no longer able to pay for utilities. 7.  In 2000 the utility provider instituted civil proceedings against the applicant concerning his debt of 2,861 Lithuanian litai (LTL \u2013 approximately 828.60 euros (EUR)). The domestic courts allowed the claim. In 2003 the judgment was transferred to a bailiff for enforcement. The bailiff decided to direct enforcement against the applicant\u2019s apartment. On 6 October 2004 he organised a public auction at which the apartment was sold to a third party for LTL 3,390 (approximately EUR 982). On 18 November 2004 a district court confirmed the transfer of the apartment to the third party. 8.  Since that date, the applicant has not had a permanent home. He submitted that he had been living in temporary accommodation, at times in unsuitable conditions, and often in exchange for manual work. 9.  Between 2006 and 2008 the apartment was resold and gifted to different individuals on several occasions. 10.  In November 2007 the applicant instituted civil proceedings before the Jonava District Court, arguing that the sale of his apartment at the public auction had been unlawful. The applicant submitted that, in accordance with the domestic law, taking a person\u2019s home in order to enforce a court judgment was only permitted when the debt in question was larger than LTL 3,000 (see paragraph 22 below), which had not been the case here (see paragraph 7 above). The applicant also submitted that he had owned 0.05 hectares of land near Jonava, so the enforcement should have begun in respect of that property and not his only home (vienintel\u0117 gyvenamoji vieta). In view of the alleged unlawfulness of the sale, the applicant claimed damages jointly from the bailiff and the bailiff\u2019s professional liability insurer. According to the applicant, restitution in integrum was not possible because there was no indication that the third party who had bought the apartment at the public auction had acted in bad faith. Therefore, he claimed LTL 51,000 (approximately EUR 14,770) in damages, an amount corresponding to the market price of the apartment at the time of the submission of the claim. 11.  The defendants (the bailiff and his professional liability insurer) contested the applicant\u2019s claim. They submitted that the value of the applicant\u2019s land had been insufficient to cover his debt, so the enforcement had had to be directed against the apartment. They also argued that the applicant\u2019s debt (LTL 2,861) and the enforcement expenses (LTL 540), taken together, had exceeded LTL 3,000, and thus the sale of his apartment had been in accordance with the domestic law. The defendants further argued that the applicant had acted in bad faith \u2013 he had not appealed against the execution writ or the results of the public auction, and he had submitted his claim at the very end of the time-limit because he had been waiting for the market price of the apartment to increase. Therefore, they argued that the applicant could not claim damages corresponding to the market price of the apartment at the time of the submission of the claim, but only the price for which the apartment had been sold at the public auction \u2013 LTL 3,390 (see paragraph 7 above). 12.  On 17 June 2009 the Jonava District Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim. It acknowledged that his debt had been below the required threshold of LTL 3,000 and that the bailiff had erred by calculating the debt together with the enforcement expenses. However, the court considered that this breach had not been such as to warrant the annulment of the sale. Accordingly, it dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim for damages. The court also noted that the applicant had submitted his claim three years after the sale and on the last day permitted by the time-limit, when the market price of housing was several times higher than in 2004. Therefore, his claim for damages corresponding to the market price of the apartment at the time of the submission of the claim could be regarded as an attempt at unjust enrichment (vertintinas kaip siekimas nepagr\u012fstai praturt\u0117ti). 13.  The applicant appealed against the Jonava District Court\u2019s judgment. He and the defendants presented essentially the same arguments as in their pleadings before the first-instance court (see paragraphs 10-11 above). 14.  On 1 October 2009 the Kaunas Regional Court quashed the first\u2011instance judgment and allowed the applicant\u2019s claim in its entirety. The court held that the bailiff had acted in violation of domestic law, firstly by failing to direct the enforcement against the applicant\u2019s land, but also by selling his apartment at a public auction even though his debt had been less than LTL 3,000. The court considered that the bailiff had failed to respect the balance between the interests of the debtor (the applicant) and the creditor. It held that, because of the material breaches of the relevant law, the sale of the applicant\u2019s apartment had to be declared unlawful. 15.  Accordingly, the Kaunas Regional Court decided to award the applicant damages from the bailiff\u2019s professional liability insurer. It stated that it \u201cessentially agreed with the amount claimed by the applicant\u201d (i\u0161 esm\u0117s sutinka su ie\u0161kovo nurodyta suma) and awarded him LTL 51,000 (approximately EUR 14,770), after subtracting the amount of his debt (see paragraph 7 above). 16.  The bailiff\u2019s professional liability insurer appealed against the Kaunas Regional Court\u2019s judgment. It submitted, inter alia, that the amount of damages awarded to the applicant had no basis, and the court should have either ordered restitution in integrum or awarded the applicant the amount for which his apartment had been sold at the auction (see paragraph 7 above), but not its market price in 2007, which had increased significantly since 2004. 17.  The applicant contested the appeal, arguing that there was no legal obligation for him to ask for restitution rather than for damages, and that the amount of damages was a question of fact which the Supreme Court could not examine. 18.  On 8 February 2010 the Supreme Court amended the judgment of the Kaunas Regional Court in part. It upheld the conclusion that the sale of the applicant\u2019s apartment had been unlawful for the reasons established by the lower court (see paragraph 14 above). The Supreme Court then reiterated its own case-law that, where the sale of property at a public auction is unlawful because of a bailiff\u2019s actions, restitution in integrum should not be applied; accordingly, it considered that the most appropriate way of protecting the applicant\u2019s rights was by awarding him damages. However, the court considered that, in line with \u201cthe nature of the obligation and the principles of equity, reasonableness and good faith\u201d (pagal prievol\u0117s esm\u0119, atsi\u017evelgiant \u012f teisingumo, protingumo ir s\u0105\u017einingumo kriterijus), the amount of damages in the applicant\u2019s case had to be assessed at the moment of the unlawful act, that is, the sale of the apartment. According to the State Enterprise Centre of Registers, the market price of the applicant\u2019s apartment at the time of its sale had been LTL 12,100 (approximately EUR 3,504). Therefore, the Supreme Court awarded the applicant that amount, after subtracting his debt (see paragraph 7 above) and the bailiff\u2019s enforcement expenses (see paragraph 11 above).", "references": ["0", "4", "7", "8", "5", "1", "3", "6", "2", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1986 and lives in Sumy. 6.  The applicant had relations with V., a female student born in 1989. On 24 March 2008 V. gave birth to their daughter. On 29 August 2008 the applicant and V. registered their marriage. 7.  From the time of the birth of the child the couple and their daughter lived in the applicant\u2019s flat in Sumy. The applicant\u2019s parents lived in the same flat and assisted the parents in bringing up the child. 8.  In 2009 the applicant and V. were absent from home for six months, as they were working abroad. During their absence the applicant\u2019s parents took care of the child. 9.  In October 2010 the child was admitted to a child-minding centre in Sumy. 10.  Between 2010 and 2011 V. worked abroad for six months. During that time the child was taken care of by the applicant and his parents. While working abroad, V. transferred funds to the applicant to support the family. 11.  Relations between the applicant and V. grew worse and on 20 September 2011, after a quarrel with the applicant, V. took the child and moved from the flat without the agreement or knowledge of the applicant. The applicant was not informed of the place to where V. and the child moved to live. 12.  On 28 September 2011 the applicant asked the police to establish the whereabouts of the child. He and his parents also conducted their own enquiries. 13.  As was further established in the course of the domestic proceedings, V. moved to the village of Bezdryk, near Sumy, where she apparently cohabited with her uncle, F. (born in 1967). The applicant\u2019s child was admitted to the child-minding centre located in the same village. 14.  On 1 December 2011 the applicant found the child at the Bezdryk child-minding centre. According to the applicant, the child\u2019s body bore bruises. He took the child back to his flat in Sumy and the following day submitted her for medical examination. 15.  On 2 December 2011 a forensic medical expert examined the child and reported a red spot on the chin, measuring 1.5 cm by 0.8 , which \u2013 in the expert\u2019s opinion \u2013 was \u201ca sign of an earlier abrasion\u201d. The expert also documented two abrasions on the nose, measuring 0.4 cm by 0.3 cm and 0.3 cm by 0.2 cm; a bruise on the back, measuring 2 cm by 1 cm; two bruises on the right shin, measuring 1.8 cm by 1 cm and 1.5 cm by 1 cm; and a red, itchy spot in the abdominal area. The expert stated that the injuries could have been caused by blunt objects three or four days before the examination. 16.  The applicant asked the police to carry out a criminal investigation in connection with the injuries sustained by his daughter, who had allegedly explained that the injuries had been inflicted by V. 17.  After her return to Sumy, the child continued to live with the applicant and his parents. V. was given access to the child only in the presence of the applicant or other persons that he trusted. 18.  On 9 December 2011 the Zarichnyy district police of Sumy refused to open a criminal investigation in respect of the alleged abduction of the child, stating that the facts of the case did not indicate that the crime of child abduction had been committed. It was noted that the couple had not divorced and it had yet to be determined by the court with whom the child should reside. 19.   On 13 December 2011 the Trostyanetskyy district police of the Sumy Region refused to open a criminal investigation in connection with the child\u2019s injuries, as determined on 1 December 2011, for lack of corpus delicti. According to the police decision, the seriousness of the injuries had not been established; however, if the injuries had been minor, the applicant was free to institute a private prosecution against the person concerned. 20.  On 28 March and 9 April 2012 the applicant\u2019s mother requested the law-enforcement authorities to institute criminal proceedings against V. and F. under Article 156 \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Code. She considered that the child could have been a victim of sexual abuse in the period during which the latter had been living together with V. and F. in the village of Bezdryk. The applicant\u2019s mother submitted that the child had told her personal stories which suggested that V. and F. might have engaged in sexual activities in view of the child and that F. had shown his genitals to the child. 21.  On 9 April 2012, in the course of a pre-investigation inquiry, the applicant\u2019s daughter was interviewed in the presence of the applicant\u2019s mother. The child explained that during her stay with the mother in the village of Bezdryk she had regularly observed V. and F. naked, embracing and kissing each other and engaging in some \u201cbackwards and forwards movements\u201d which she had not been able to understand; F. had taught the child how to kiss in an adult fashion, uncovered his genitals in front of her and asked her to touch his genitals. 22.  On 14 April, 16 May and 31 October 2012 the Sumy district police, having conducted the pre-investigation inquiries, refused to open criminal proceedings for lack of corpus delicti. Those decisions were quashed as unsubstantiated by the supervising prosecutors, who ordered further measures, such as establishing the whereabouts of F. (who had not been interviewed), identifying and interviewing possible witnesses, inspecting the premises and the yard where the alleged crime could have been committed, and undertaking medical and psychological examinations of the child. 23.  On 8 November 2012 the Sumy district police once again refused to open criminal proceedings against V. and F. on the grounds that there had been no corpus delicti. In their decision the police referred to the interviews with the applicant\u2019s child, V., and other people. V. denied the allegations. F. could not be interviewed as he had moved abroad. In sum, the Sumy district police concluded that the available material had been insufficient to suggest that any crime had been committed. 24.  On 8 May 2013 the applicant, relying on the new Code of Criminal Procedure of 2012, requested that an investigation be opened against V. and F. in respect of the alleged child sexual abuse. On the same day the Sumy district police opened a criminal investigation under Article 156 \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Code. The applicant was admitted to the proceedings as the representative of his daughter. 25.  The investigator ordered that measures be undertaken to establish the whereabouts of F. During the investigation V. denied the allegations and submitted that she had been a victim of domestic violence, that she had been threatened and beaten by the applicant, and that this had prompted her to run away with the child on 20 September 2011; she also submitted that she had moved to the village of Bezdryk, where her grandfather lived, and that she had had no sexual relations with F., her uncle. When questioned, the applicant and his mother insisted on the truth of their previous statements. They underwent polygraph examinations which suggested that they had told the truth in their submissions. 26.  On 3 October 2013 the applicant\u2019s daughter was questioned in the presence of a psychologist and her grandmother (the applicant\u2019s mother). The applicant\u2019s daughter submitted in particular that F. had taken her hand and placed it on his genitals; that F. had taught her to kiss in an adult fashion; and that F. and V. had engaged in certain activities which she had not been able to understand and which she had earlier described to the applicant and the grandmother. 27.  On 21 November 2013 a panel of experts carried out a forensic psychiatric examination of the applicant\u2019s daughter. In the course of the examination, the child stated that F. had been touching her genitals and she, in compliance with his commands, had had to touch F.\u2019s genitals. F. taught her to kiss in an adult fashion. The child stated that she had seen V. and F. naked and kissing each other; she then described the movements that she had observed V. and F. engaging in while in bed. 28.  The experts found that the child had not been suffering from any mental illness at the time of the events or at the time of the examination; that she had not shown any tendency to fantasise; and that she was able to remember the circumstances of the events at issue and to give truthful statements in that regard. However, she could not understand the meaning of the actions that she had observed or in which she had participated. The experts concluded that the child could take part in the investigative measures. 29.  On 9 April 2014 the deputy head of the investigation division of the Sumy regional police department ordered the investigator in charge of the case to immediately speed up the investigation, which, in his opinion, was being conducted too slowly. He requested the investigator to undertake a number of investigative measures. 30.  On 28 April and 29 September 2014 the Sumy district police closed the criminal proceedings for lack of corpus delicti in the actions of V. and F. Having assessed the available material, the investigator found that there had been insufficient evidence submitted to enable the bringing of charges of sexual abuse. In the last decision the investigator also referred to the statements by F. who was questioned on 20 September 2014 and who denied all the allegations, arguing that they were totally false. 31.  These two decisions were reversed as unsubstantiated by the supervising prosecutors, who ordered further investigation. 32.  On 27 December 2014 the Sumy district police decided once again to close the criminal proceedings. In examining the statements of the applicant\u2019s daughter, the investigator considered that these statements could not convincingly prove the alleged events since the child had made those statements belatedly; furthermore, the child had only been three years old at the time of the events in question. The investigator furthermore noted that these statements did not suggest anything in respect of mens rea, in particular whether there was any sexual intent in V.\u2019s and F.\u2019s alleged actions in relation to the child, or whether they had been aware of the fact that the child had been observing them during the alleged instances of sexual intercourse. 33.  The investigator then referred to the statements of the applicant and his mother, as well as of the mothers of two girls with whom the child had used to play. The latter two women stated in particular that the applicant\u2019s daughter had told them stories which had suggested that she had been subjected to sexual abuse while she had been living with V. and F. The investigator noted that those individuals had not directly observed the alleged instances of sexual abuse and that they had simply repeated statements made by the child. The investigator then stated that V. and F. denied the allegations of child sexual abuse. Other people, such as the child\u2019s teacher at the child-minding centre and village inhabitants, had not provided any more precise information. Overall, the investigator concluded that the available material had been insufficient for him to conclude that V. and F. had committed the alleged crime. 34.  On 6 March 2015 the Sumy district prosecutor\u2019s office reversed the decision of 27 December 2014 as unsubstantiated. The supervising prosecutor found that the previous instructions given by the prosecutor\u2019s office had not been followed and that it was necessary to take further investigative measures. 35.  As of 20 January 2016, the investigation was ongoing. 36.  On 20 June 2012 the Zarichnyy District Court of Sumy dissolved the marriage between the applicant and V. and ruled that the child should live with V. The court ordered the applicant to hand over the child to V. and to pay her a monthly amount for the support of their daughter. 37.  In determining the place of the child\u2019s residence, the court first established that until 20 September 2011 the child had lived with both parents and her paternal grandparents in the applicant\u2019s flat and that all of them had participated in the upbringing of the child; the paternal grandparents had taken care of the child when both parents had been abroad for six months in 2009; when V. had been abroad for six months over 2010 and 2011 she had transferred money earned by her to the applicant to cover the needs of the family. On 25 October 2010 the child had been admitted to the child-minding centre in Sumy; the child had been accompanied to and from the centre by the applicant. 38.  The court also established that on 20 September 2011 V. had taken the child and moved from the flat because of conflict between her and the applicant. On 25 October 2011 the child had been admitted to the child\u2011minding centre in the village of Bezdryk. The child had been accompanied to and from the centre by her mother. On 1 December 2011 the child had been taken from the centre by her father. Since that time the child had been living again in the applicant\u2019s flat in Sumy. 39.  In comparing the applicant\u2019s flat and the flat where V. was then living, the court found that both flats were located in Sumy and offered appropriate conditions for the residence of the child. In that regard the court referred to the report of the local guardianship office, which stated that both parents provided adequate residential conditions for the child. As to the income of the parents, the father was employed and received a salary; the mother was a student but worked unofficially and had been abroad to earn money. Both parents had positive reference letters and the child had an equal attitude towards both of them. 40.  The court dismissed as unsubstantiated the applicant\u2019s allegation that the mother was negligent with the child and that she might have exercised physical violence against the child: in contrast to the results of the medical examination of 2 December 2011 documenting the injuries on the child\u2019s body (see paragraph 15 above), the staff of the Bezdryk child-minding centre had signed a certificate stating that on 1 December 2011 the child had had no injuries; furthermore, the police had refused to institute criminal investigation in respect of the child\u2019s injuries (see paragraph 19 above). The court concluded that there was no link between V.\u2019s attitude towards the child and the latter\u2019s injuries. 41.  Relying on the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of the Child of 1959 the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and Article 161 of the Family Code, the court found that the facts did not disclose any exceptional circumstances which could justify the separation of the child from her mother. Consequently, it determined that the child should reside with her mother. 42.  The applicant appealed against that decision, arguing that the first\u2011instance court had breached substantive and procedural provisions of domestic legislation and international law. He submitted that in determining the place of the child\u2019s residence the court should have been guided by the principle of the best interests of the child. The applicant insisted that on 20 September 2011 V. had secretly moved with the child from the flat and destroyed the stability of the child\u2019s everyday life. The court had failed to properly examine the allegations that V. had behaved violently towards the child and the possibility that the child had been the target of sexual abuse during the period when she had lived apart from her father with her mother. The applicant emphasised that on 1 December 2011 he had lawfully taken the child back to his flat since the child had previously been permanently living in his flat and he had never given any consent for V. to change the child\u2019s place of residence. In his opinion, the court had paid no attention to the fact that the child had been attached to the paternal grandparents and that her separation from them would be detrimental to her interests. Furthermore, the respective financial capacity of the applicant and V., as well as the residential conditions, had not been properly assessed. Important pieces of evidence had not been included in the case file and part of the evidence had been assessed wrongly \u2013 namely, the certificate issued by the Bezdryk child-minding centre regarding the child\u2019s good state of health was a fabricated document that had been discredited by the forensic medical expert report of 2 December 2011. 43.   On 9 August 2012 the Sumy Regional Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld the decision of the first-instance court. The Court of Appeal found that the allegations of child abduction, sexual abuse and physical violence had been groundless. As to the child\u2019s attachment to the paternal grandparents, the Court of Appeal considered that the parents played a more important role in the upbringing of the child. Overall, the findings of the first-instance court had been lawful and reasonable. 44.  On 14 September 2012 the Higher Specialised Court for Civil and Criminal Matters dismissed a cassation appeal lodged by the applicant as unfounded.", "references": ["7", "8", "5", "0", "3", "9", "2", "1", "6", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1978 and lives in Osijek. 6.  On 27 April 2011 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of trafficking illegal substances. On the same day an investigating judge of the Osijek County Court (\u017dupanijski sud u Osijeku) heard his evidence and ordered his pre-trial detention under Article 102 \u00a7 1 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (risk of reoffending). The decision also stated that the detention could not exceed forty-eight hours. 7.  On 28 April 2011 another investigating judge of the Osijek County Court summoned the applicant, who said that he would be remaining silent because he wanted to be represented by a lawyer, D.O. The judge issued a decision on opening an investigation against him and two other suspects, G.D. and I.D., on charges of trafficking illegal substances. He also ordered his detention for one month, referring to Article 104 \u00a7 1 and Article 102 \u00a7 1 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The applicant\u2019s detention was ordered because G.D. had said that he had been buying illegal drugs from him. Furthermore, he was unemployed and another set of criminal proceedings on similar charges was pending against him. Following an appeal lodged by the applicant, on 3 May 2011 the decision on his detention was upheld by a three-judge panel of the Osijek County Court. 8.  On 24 May 2011 the investigating judge ordered the applicant\u2019s immediate release because G.D. had retracted his previous statement that he had been buying illegal drugs from him. Furthermore, the applicant had submitted documents showing that he had his own candle-making business. The applicant was released that same day. However, following an appeal lodged by the Osijek County State Attorney\u2019s Office (\u017dupanijsko dr\u017eavno odvjetni\u0161tvo u Osijeku), on 26 May 2011 a three-judge panel of the Osijek County Court quashed that investigating judge\u2019s decision and ordered him to re-examine the case. 9.  On 31 May 2011 the investigating judge confirmed his previous decision. On 1 June 2011 the Osijek County State Attorney\u2019s Office lodged an appeal, which was not communicated to the applicant or his counsel. It was argued that the risk of the applicant reoffending continued to exist for several reasons. Firstly, G.D. had given a detailed statement describing how he and I.D. had been buying illegal drugs from the applicant, and the evidence showed that the applicant had had frequent telephone contact with G.D. and I.D. Furthermore, G.D.\u2019s retraction of his previous statement had been unconvincing. Secondly, the applicant had already been convicted of a similar offence, and another set of criminal proceedings concerning charges of trafficking illegal substances were pending against him. Thirdly, the evidence indicated that the applicant had been suspected of selling illegal substances over a longer period of time. Fourthly, he was unemployed and had no lawful means of subsistence. 10.  On 10 June 2011 a three-judge panel of the Osijek County Court, composed of Judges D.K., A.B. and M.J., held a closed session in the parties\u2019 absence. They reversed the investigating judge\u2019s decision and ordered the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention under Article 102 \u00a7 1 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The decision did not set any time-limit for the detention. 11.  On 14 June 2011 the applicant was again placed in pre-trial detention. 12.  On 17 June he lodged an appeal with the Supreme Court against the decision of 10 June 2011. Judge M.R., acting as a single judge of the Osijek County Court, declared it inadmissible on 27 June 2011 on the grounds that it was not amenable to further appeal. This decision was upheld on 1 July 2011 by a three-judge panel of the same court, composed of Judges R.\u0160., A.R. and N.S. 13.  On 6 July 2011 the Osijek County State Attorney\u2019s Office indicted the applicant in the Osijek County Court on charges of trafficking illegal substances. 14.  On 8 July 2011 a three-judge panel of the court extended the applicant\u2019s detention under Article 102 \u00a7 1 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. An appeal lodged by him against that decision was dismissed by the Supreme Court on 20 July 2011. 15.  On 12 July 2011 the applicant lodged two constitutional complaints, about the decisions of 10 June and 1 July 2011 respectively (see paragraphs 10 and 12 above). 16.  On 15 July 2011 the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) declared the constitutional complaint about the decision of 10 June 2011 inadmissible, on the grounds that on 8 July 2011 a new decision extending the applicant\u2019s detention had been adopted. It also declared his constitutional complaint about the decision of 1 July 2011 inadmissible, endorsing the lower courts\u2019 reasoning (see paragraph 12 above). 17.  On 18 October 2012 the Osijek County Court dismissed the indictment against the applicant because the prosecutor had withdrawn the charges against him. On 14 June 2012 the Supreme Court ordered his release. 18.  On 15 April 2013 the applicant submitted a request for settlement with the Ministry of Justice in connection with his wrongful detention. A settlement was not reached. 19.  On 1 August 2013 the applicant brought a claim in the Osijek Municipal Court against the State under Article 480 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, seeking non-pecuniary and pecuniary damages for his detention, which he claimed had been unfounded (neosnovan). 20.  On 18 February 2014 the court allowed the applicant\u2019s claim and awarded him 137,550 Croatian kunas (HRK \u2013 about 18,560 euros) in non-pecuniary damages. It held that his detention had been unfounded because a judgment dismissing the charges (presuda kojom se optu\u017eba odbija) had been adopted after the State Attorney\u2019s Office had dropped the charges against him. The proceedings are still pending as regards the claim for pecuniary damages. The relevant part of the judgment reads:\n\u201cThe claimant\u2019s claim is well founded in its entirety.\nThe documents in the case file show that the claimant was finally acquitted of the charge [sic] that he had committed the criminal offence against the values protected by international law \u2013 abuse of illegal drugs, described and punishable under Article 173 \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Code in conjunction with section 41 of the Criminal Code Amendments Act (Official Gazette no. 71/06) by the Osijek County Court\u2019s final judgment no. K-43/2012-86 of 18 October 2012.\nFurther documents show that the claimant was actually detained in connection with the criminal proceedings against him for 393 days.\nThe Osijek County Court\u2019s decision no. Kv-138/2011-3 of 26 May 2011 (pages 16 and 17 of the case file) shows that the claimant had already been finally convicted by the Donji Miholjac Municipal Court of the criminal offence of abuse of illegal drugs under Article 173 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code, that is to say for an offence of the same type but in its basic form.\nAgainst the above background, this court considers that the claimant is to be awarded the amount of HRK 350 for each day he spent in detention, which in total amounts to HRK 137,550 since the claimant was detained without basis for 393 days.\nWhen assessing the adequate amount of [just] satisfaction, the Court has taken into account all the circumstances of this case: that the claimant was indicted for the criminal offence of abuse of illegal drugs, described and punishable under Article 173(2) of the Criminal Code in conjunction with section 41 of the Criminal Code Amendments Act; was deprived of his personal liberty for 393 days; [and] that the proceedings ended by the Osijek County Court\u2019s judgment no. K-43/2012-86 of 18 October 2012 because the County State Attorney\u2019s Office had withdrawn the charges.\nIt is true that the claimant was previously convicted of the above-mentioned criminal offence. However, in the opinion of this court the sole fact that the claimant was previously convicted has no effect on the defendant\u2019s obligation to compensate him for his unfounded deprivation of liberty, or his detention. Therefore, since the defendant has not proved that the claimant caused his arrest by some unlawful act such as absconding or concealing evidence, this court considers that there was no contribution on his part to the ordering of his detention.\u201d", "references": ["1", "3", "6", "9", "0", "8", "7", "5", "4", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "10.  The applicant was born in 1961 and lives in Matosinhos. 11.  Following an altercation with other persons, the applicant was prosecuted by the public prosecutor at the Matosinhos District Court for threatening conduct. An expert report was produced during the investigation, stating that the applicant had limited intellectual and cognitive capacities but that she should be held criminally responsible for her acts. 12.  In a judgment of 23 March 2007 the Matosinhos District Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s defence of diminished criminal responsibility and sentenced her to 320 day-fines, amounting to a total of 640 euros (EUR), for threatening and insulting conduct, as well as ordering her to pay damages to the victims. 13.  On 13 April 2007 the applicant appealed to the Oporto Court of Appeal (\u201cthe Court of Appeal\u201d) against the judgment. She repeated that she had been unaware of the unlawfulness of her acts and sought an acknowledgment of her lack of criminal responsibility owing to the psychiatric disorders from which she claimed to suffer. Consequently, she asked for a fresh assessment of the facts and the opportunity to state her case at a hearing. 14.  On 12 December 2007 the Court of Appeal held a hearing attended by the public prosecutor and counsel for the applicant. However, no examination of the applicant herself took place. 15.  In a final judgment of 19 December 2007 the Court of Appeal upheld the applicant\u2019s conviction for threatening and insulting conduct, but reduced the sentence to 265 day-fines, amounting to a total of EUR 530. It held that there was no need for a fresh assessment of the facts because the applicant had not succeeded in challenging the validity of the assessment conducted by the court of first instance. 16.  The applicant paid the fine in several instalments. 17.  During the hearing before the Court it was pointed out that in January 2016, five years after the fine had been paid in full, the entry concerning the applicant\u2019s conviction had been deleted from her criminal record. 18.  On 15 April 2008 the applicant lodged an application with the Court complaining that she had not been heard in person by the Court of Appeal, and that this violated Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention. 19.  In a judgment of 5 July 2011 the Court declared admissible the complaint under Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention and found a violation of that provision, holding as follows:\n\u201c... 33.  The Court notes that in the present case the Court of Appeal was invited to determine several questions relating to the facts of the case and to the person of the applicant. As before the court of first instance, the applicant raised, in particular, the question whether her criminal responsibility should have been deemed diminished, which might have had a major impact on the determination of the sentence. 34.  The Court takes the view that that question could not have been settled by the Court of Appeal without a direct assessment of the applicant\u2019s personal testimony, particularly since the judgment of the Matosinhos District Court had departed slightly from the conclusions of the psychiatric report without setting out the reasons for such a departure, as required under domestic law ... The Court of Appeal\u2019s re-examination of that question should therefore have comprised a full rehearing of the applicant ... 35.  Those factors are sufficient for the Court to conclude that in the instant case a public hearing should have been held before the appellate court. There has therefore been a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention.\u201d 20.  As regards the claims in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage under Article 41 of the Convention, the Court stated the following:\n\u201c41.  The Court firstly considers that when, as in the instant case, an individual has been convicted after proceedings that have entailed breaches of the requirements of Article 6 of the Convention, a retrial or the reopening of the case, if requested, represents in principle an appropriate way of redressing the violation. In that regard, it notes that Article 449 of the Portuguese Code of Criminal Procedure permits the reopening of proceedings at domestic level where the Court has found a violation of a person\u2019s fundamental rights and freedoms. However, the specific remedial measures, if any, required of a respondent State in order to discharge its obligations under the Convention must depend on the particular circumstances of the individual case and be determined in the light of the terms of the Court\u2019s judgment in that case (see \u00d6calan v. Turkey [GC], no. 46221/99, \u00a7 210, ECHR 2005-IV, and Panasenko v. Portugal, no. 10418/03, \u00a7 78, 22 July 2008). In the present case, the only point at issue is the fact that the applicant was not given a hearing by the Court of Appeal. 42.  Secondly, the Court notes that in the present case the only applicable basis for an award of just satisfaction lies in the fact that the applicant was not afforded the safeguards of Article 6. In that regard, it does not discern any causal link between the violation found and the pecuniary damage alleged, and rejects this claim. The Court cannot speculate as to what the outcome of the proceedings before the Court of Appeal would have been if it had examined the applicant at a public hearing (see Igual Coll v. Spain, no. 37496/04, \u00a7 51, 10 March 2009). On the other hand, it considers it appropriate to award the applicant EUR 2,400 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.\u201d 21.  On 5 July 2012 the Portuguese Government submitted an action plan to the Committee of Ministers concerning the execution of the Court\u2019s judgment of 5 July 2011. They confirmed that the amount awarded to the applicant had been paid to her on 14 December 2011. As regards the general measures, the Government pointed out that the Prime Minister\u2019s Office had proposed amending the Code of Criminal Procedure to allow hearings to be held in any court of appeal determining the issue of guilt or the sentence in respect of an accused person. 22.  At the hearing before the Court it was pointed out that the aforementioned proposal had not been approved and had therefore not in fact been included in the final version of the revised Code of Criminal Procedure. 23.  At the time of adoption of the present judgment no plans to reform the Code of Criminal Procedure were on the domestic authorities\u2019 agenda. The procedure for supervising the execution of the judgment of 5 July 2011 was still pending before the Committee of Ministers. 24.  Concurrently, on 18 October 2011, relying on Article 449 \u00a7 1 (g) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the applicant lodged an application for review with the Supreme Court. She submitted that the Court of Appeal\u2019s judgment of 19 December 2007 was incompatible with the Court\u2019s judgment of 5 July 2011. 25.  The prosecution submitted that the application should be allowed on the grounds that serious doubts could legitimately be raised about the conviction, particularly as regards the sentencing. 26.  In a judgment of 21 March 2012 the Supreme Court refused to grant a review. It held that there was no cause for a review because the judgment delivered by the Court of Appeal was not incompatible with the Court\u2019s judgment. It considered that the lack of a hearing for the applicant in the Court of Appeal had constituted a procedural irregularity that was not amenable to review, and held as follows:\n\u201c... under domestic law, an application for review can be submitted solely in respect of judgments (in particular, convictions), and not in respect of orders concerning the conduct of proceedings, it being understood that ... \u2018judgment\u2019 denotes any judicial decision on a case or on a procedural application (see Article 156 \u00a7 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure).\nIn the light of domestic law, however, a review of the judgment in the present case cannot be allowed on the basis invoked by the applicant, because the conviction is not incompatible with the European Court\u2019s judgment (Article 449 \u00a7 1 (g) of the Code of Criminal Procedure). On the other hand, the procedure followed by the Court of Appeal in holding the hearing at the close of which the appeal was determined was incompatible with what the European Court has deemed vital in order to guarantee the rights of the defence.\nUnder domestic law, where the accused is legally required to appear in court, his or her absence entails an irremediable nullity (Article 119 (c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure).\nHowever, even where a nullity is irremediable, it cannot give rise to an extraordinary application for review of the judgment ...\nFurthermore, as noted by the European Court, it is impossible to speculate about the decision which the Court of Appeal might have taken if the convicted person had been examined at the hearing which led to the decision on her appeal, and, in particular, about whether or not the sentence would have been the same.\nThe European Court thus precluded from the outset any possibility that its decision might raise serious doubts about the conviction, regardless of the sentence actually imposed.\nIn short, the conviction is not incompatible with the European Court\u2019s binding decision, and no serious doubts arise as to its validity.\nFor that reason, being aware that it is not always possible to secure a retrial or the reopening of proceedings under the applicable domestic law, as in the present case, the European Court decided to require the Portuguese State to compensate the applicant in respect of non-pecuniary damage, and thus to afford redress not for the unfairness of the conviction, which has not been established, but for a serious defect in the conduct of the proceedings which infringed the applicant\u2019s defence rights ...\nFor the above reasons, the applicant\u2019s argument in support of her application to be granted a review is not substantiated.\nConsequently, the judges of the Criminal Division of the Supreme Court decide not to grant a review.\u201d", "references": ["1", "4", "7", "2", "9", "8", "6", "5", "3", "0", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1974. 7.  In February 2011, after holding a firearms licence and a hunting permit for about ten years, the applicant asked the S. Police Department (hereinafter: \u201cthe police\u201d) to renew his firearms licence for hunting purposes. He did not live in Croatia but went hunting when he spent holidays there. 8.  When submitting his request the applicant relied on a certificate of the Ministry of Health (Ministartsvo zdravstva Republike Hrvatske) attesting that he was healthy and thus capable of carrying firearms. 9.  Following the applicant\u2019s request the police carried out a background check. A report of 22 February 2011, available in the file, contains a finding of the police that the applicant had often been under the influence of alcohol when visiting Croatia. 10.  On 18 August 2011 the applicant was summoned by the police to give a statement concerning the intention of a weapons commission not to renew his firearms licence. The applicant denied any alcohol abuse and stated that he had been a hunter for several years and that, if necessary, he could undergo any test concerning his health and the alleged drinking problem. 11.  In a further written statement dated 19 August 2011 the applicant contended that hunting was his hobby and that his membership of a hunting association was related to his social status. He denied any allegations of alcohol abuse and argued that there were no justified reasons for a refusal to renew his firearms licence. 12.  On 23 August 2011 the applicant made the same objections through a lawyer. He stressed that his request for renewal of the firearms licence could not be refused merely because somebody had allegedly said that he was a drinker. 13.  On the same day the police dismissed the applicant\u2019s request for renewal of his firearms licence and ordered him to hand over his weapons on the grounds that a police inquiry had shown that he had a problem of alcohol abuse. 14.  The applicant challenged this decision before the Ministry of the Interior (Ministarstvo unutarnjih poslova Republike Hrvatske, hereinafter \u201cthe Ministry\u201d), arguing that he had been falsely accused by some neighbours and that there was no evidence of any drinking problem. He also stressed that hunting allowed him to see his friends, and that those who had made the allegations against him did not really know him. 15.  On 11 October 2011 the Ministry ordered the police to produce a new assessment of the background check on the applicant, on the grounds that the report of 22 February 2011 (see paragraph 9 above) had not been substantiated with the relevant evidence. 16.  On 9 November 2011 the police produced a new report on the background check on the applicant. The report, which was available in the file, provided further details on the applicant\u2019s alleged alcohol abuse, which had been confirmed by his neighbours in Croatia. The report explained that all the relevant details concerning the sources of this information were classified as confidential information. 17.  On 12 December 2011 the Ministry dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaints, on the grounds that the documents from the case file suggested that he had a problem of alcohol abuse. 18.  On 6 February 2012 the applicant lodged an administrative action in the Administrative Court challenging the Ministry\u2019s decision. He contended that the refusal to renew his firearms licence had been based on mere insinuations, and that there had been no relevant evidence to support the findings of the police. In particular, he contended that he had never been registered as a person with a problem of alcohol abuse and he had never been convicted of an offence related to the abuse of alcohol. In his view, the police based its conclusion only on the basis of gossips of his neighbours in Croatia. 19.  On 14 April 2012 the applicant asked the police to disclose the relevant reports containing the allegations against him, in particular the identity of those who had seen him under the influence of alcohol and the date and place when that had happened. On 1 March 2012 he received a reply that the information which he requested could not be disclosed since it was confidential (see paragraph 16 above), as provided under the relevant domestic law (see paragraphs 31-32 below). 20.  On 26 April 2012 the Administrative Court held a hearing at which it heard the parties\u2019 arguments. The applicant\u2019s representative stressed that the police had failed to produce any credible evidence justifying the refusal to renew the applicant\u2019s firearms licence. He also considered that it was not clear on which grounds the police had dismissed the applicant\u2019s request. The Ministry\u2019s representative explained that further details of the applicant\u2019s background check, in particular the names of individuals from whom the relevant information had been obtained, were confidential as provided under the Confidentiality of Information Act. 21.  As the parties did not have any further proposals for the examination of evidence, the Administrative Court concluded the proceedings and scheduled a hearing for the delivery of the judgment for 4 May 2012. 22.  On 27 April 2012 the Administrative Court found that the judgment could not be delivered, as a further assessment of the relevant circumstances of the case was needed. It scheduled a hearing for 17 May 2012, and ordered the Ministry to provide the confidential case file containing the details of the information on the applicant\u2019s background check. It explained that the file at issue would be inspected by the judges and would not become part of the Administrative Court\u2019s case file. 23.  At a hearing on 17 May 2012 the Administrative Court examined the confidential file of the police without the presence of the parties. Afterwards, in the resumed hearing in the parties\u2019 presence, the applicant\u2019s representative reiterated his arguments that the applicant did not have a drinking problem. He did not seek examination of further evidence. 24.  On 23 May 2012 the Administrative Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s administrative action and upheld the decisions of the administrative bodies refusing to renew the applicant\u2019s firearms licence. It explained that it was satisfied from the examination of the confidential reports that the reasons for the police\u2019s refusal to renew the applicant\u2019s firearms licence were well founded. It also held that the medical certificate attesting that the applicant was healthy and capable of carrying firearms did not call these findings into question, as that was only one element in the assessment of an individual\u2019s suitability to be granted a firearms licence. The relevant part of the Administrative Court\u2019s decision reads:\n\u201cBy examining the classified file of the defendant the court ... established that the police officer\u2019s conduct, while searching for and collecting information from citizens, ... was in accordance with the By-law on the conduct of the police in the procedure for issuing a licence for the procurement of weapons to a natural person ... and, based on data and information collected from interviewed citizens, found that the plaintiff is prone to common and excessive alcohol abuse, which indicates a possibility of weapons abuse.\n...\nConsequently, the plaintiff\u2019s claim that the defendant wrongly applied the substantive law, is unfounded, while the plaintiff\u2019s objection that the medical certificate is sufficient evidence showing that the defendant wrongly determined the facts of the case was not accepted by this court because the medical fitness for possessing and carrying weapons which is established through a certificate of medical fitness is only a special requirement for the weapons acquisition permit to natural persons within the meaning of section 10 paragraph 3(1) of the Weapons Act, while the defendant acting in accordance with the [above-cited] By-law ... established that the plaintiff does not meet the requirement of section Article 10(5) of the Weapons Act, as one of the general requirements which natural persons need to meet in order to be issued a firearms licence.\u201d 25.  The applicant challenged this decision before the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske), complaining that he had been denied access to the evidence containing allegations against him and that therefore he had been left without any opportunity to challenge those allegations. He also argued that his right to respect for his private life had been breached by the unjustified refusal to extend his firearms licence, which prevented him from hunting. In this connection he explained that he had been a hunter for over ten years, and that hunting was his way of maintaining contact with his friends. 26.  In support of his constitutional complaint the applicant submitted a list of signatures of his neighbours attesting that he did not have a problem of alcohol abuse. He also submitted a medical certificate indicating that he had no problem of alcohol abuse. 27.  On 6 February 2014 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint as unfounded. It explained that it was primarily the function of the relevant authorities to examine the facts and apply the relevant law and that it was not its function to deal with alleged errors of law or fact, in so far as they had not infringed human rights and freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution. The Constitutional Court held that since the applicant had had access to the police reports on his background check, which contained details for dismissing his request (see Bak\u0131rc\u0131 the reports referred to in paragraphs 9 and 16 above), the fact that further details on which those report had been based, including personal details about individuals who had provided information to the police, had not been disclosed to him did not infringe any of his rights. 28.  The decision of the Constitutional Court was served on the applicant\u2019s representative on 18 February 2014.", "references": ["0", "9", "6", "1", "2", "8", "7", "5", "4", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1977 and lives in Dison. 7.  The applicant stated that she was a Muslim and had decided, on her own initiative, to wear the niqab \u2013 a veil covering the face except for the eyes \u2013 in accordance with her religious beliefs. She said that she had taken the decision to wear the full-face veil when she was sixteen years old. She explained that her choice had been accepted by her family and friends and by her husband. She also stated that she had always agreed to remove her veil for identification purposes as required by the authorities, such as when issuing her identity card. 8.  On 18 February 2008 the Vesdre district administrative authorities proposed an amendment to the district regulations regarding the wearing of the burqa in public thoroughfares and in public places ... . 9.  The president of the police district invited the Verviers public prosecutor to express an opinion on that proposal. On 18 March 2008 the public prosecutor replied that he did not have any observations to make. 10.  The municipal councils of the three municipalities belonging to the police district \u2013 the municipal council of Pepinster on 23 June 2008, Dison on 26 June 2008 and Verviers on 30 June 2008 \u2013 enacted the following provisions of the consolidated by-laws of the Vesdre police district, which differed, moreover, from the original proposal.\n\u201cArticle 113. Save where authorised by the mayor (Bourgmestre) of the municipality, wearing a mask or using any strategem whatsoever for the purposes of concealing personal identity shall be forbidden at all times, at any public meeting and in all public places and in public thoroughfares.\n...\nArticle 113bis. The wearing of clothing concealing the face shall be forbidden at all times and in all public places.\nHowever, a helmet, balaclava or other headgear may be worn where authorised by the legislation on the safety of workers or other legislation.\n... 11.  On 29 August 2008 the applicant lodged an application with the Conseil d\u2019\u00c9tat for annulment of Article 113bis. She argued that the provision in question expressly targeted the Islamic veil, which she wore, and that the resulting ban constituted an interference with her rights guaranteed by Articles 8, 9 and 10 of the Convention and discrimination in breach of Article 14 of the Convention. She contended that the interference did not pursue a legitimate aim as the principle of secularism was not a constitutional principle and there could therefore be no blanket ban on wearing the veil. In any event, even supposing that the aim could be regarded as legitimate, the applicant maintained that the means were disproportionate in the absence of public disorder or threat of public disorder and thus of a pressing social need. In their memorial in reply of 18 April 2011, the three municipalities submitted that the impugned provision sought to guarantee public safety and not to regulate or restrict the exercise of any form of worship. 12.  The auditeur at the Conseil d\u2019\u00c9tat delivered a detailed 26-page report in which he concluded that in his opinion the applicant\u2019s above-mentioned submission was well founded because public safety could not serve as a basis for a ban on wearing the full-face veil in all places generally open to the public, as no specific public disorder was associated with it as such. 13.  In judgment no. 213.849 of 15 June 2011, the Conseil d\u2019\u00c9tat, refusing to follow the opinion of the auditeur, dismissed the application for annulment of the provision ... . 14.  That judgment was served on the applicant on 23 June 2011.", "references": ["6", "7", "9", "1", "4", "0", "2", "8", "5", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1981. 6.  On 3 May 2007 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint with the police alleging that in the past two years she had been a victim of multiple acts of domestic violence by her husband, B.B. 7.  A preliminary police investigation showed that there was a suspicion that the applicant had been the victim of psychological and physical violence by B.B. during the period at issue. On the basis of those findings, the police forwarded the applicant\u2019s criminal complaint to the relevant State Attorney\u2019s Office. The police also forwarded the applicant\u2019s medical records showing that in April 2007 she had sustained a contusion on her back after being pushed from a chair by B.B. 8.  On 3 July 2007 the P. Municipal State Attorney\u2019s Office (Op\u0107insko dr\u017eavno odvjetni\u0161tvo u P.) asked an investigating judge of the S. County Court (\u017dupanijski sud u S.) to open an investigation into the matter. 9.  In the course of the investigation, the investigating judge heard the applicant and B.B. The latter denied the allegations of domestic violence. The judge also heard another witness, V.K., who confirmed that the applicant had often complained of emotional and physical harassment by her husband and had twice sustained injuries as a result of the alleged harassment. 10.  On the basis of the results of the investigation, on 29 January 2008 the State Attorney\u2019s Office indicted B.B. in the P. Municipal Court (Op\u0107inski sud u P.) on charges of domestic violence punishable under Article 215a of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 20 below). The relevant part of the indictment reads:\n\u201cIn the period between 1 January 2004 and 26 April 2007 in P., ... [B.B.] attacked his wife \u017d.B. several times, telling her to \u2018go back to her scumbags in the dump from which she had come\u2019 and that she was worthless. He raised his hand [threatening] to hit her, punched her in the face and body, and ordered her to go to the corner of the room. In December 2004 he grabbed her head and banged it against the bathroom wall and on 27 April 2007 he pushed her from a chair, as a result of which she fell to the ground. In this manner he reduced \u017d.B. to a position of helplessness and debasement ...\u201d 11.  During the proceedings, the trial court heard the applicant, B.B., and several witnesses. On 21 April 2009 it found B.B. guilty as charged and sentenced him to seven months\u2019 imprisonment, suspended for two years. 12.  On 2 March 2010, following an appeal lodged by B.B., the S. County Court quashed the first-instance judgment and remitted the case to the Municipal Court on the grounds that all the relevant facts of the case had not been established. 13.  In the resumed proceedings, the Municipal Court again heard the applicant, B.B. and a number of witnesses. It also examined further documents from other relevant State bodies concerning conflicts within the applicant\u2019s family. 14.  On 2 December 2010 the Municipal Court found B.B. guilty as charged and sentenced him to seven months\u2019 imprisonment, suspended for two years. 15.  B.B. challenged that judgment before the S. County Court. On 14 October 2011 the S. County Court quashed the judgment and remitted the case for further examination on the grounds that some relevant facts still needed to be established. 16.  In the resumed proceedings, on 16 January 2013 the Municipal Court discontinued the proceedings on the grounds that the 2011 Criminal Code (see paragraph 21-22 below) had abolished the criminal offence of domestic violence under Article 215a of the 1997 Criminal Code, and that further proceedings against B.B. were therefore barred. 17.  The State Attorney\u2019s Office did not challenge that decision but the applicant lodged an appeal with the S. County Court. 18.  On 28 February 2013 the S. County Court declared the applicant\u2019s appeal inadmissible on the grounds that she did not have legal standing to challenge the decision on the discontinuation of the criminal proceedings.", "references": ["7", "0", "8", "6", "1", "9", "5", "2", "3", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "5.  The first and second applicants were born in 1981 and 1971 respectively and live in Jurbarkas. They are wife and husband. 6.  On 15 May 2009 the first applicant, who was nine months pregnant and already past her due date, was admitted to the obstetrics and gynaecology ward of Jurbarkas Hospital. 7.  On the morning of 20 May 2009 she was given medication in order to induce labour, but the medication was subsequently discontinued and she was given sedatives. In the late afternoon her waters broke. The doctors noticed that the heartbeat of the foetus was weak and decided to perform a Caesarean section. Following the surgery, the first applicant gave birth to a daughter. The newborn baby was in a serious condition, so she was taken to a hospital in Kaunas for intensive care. 8.  On 22 May 2009 the baby died. The applicants decided not to have an autopsy performed on her body \u2013 according to them, they were informed by doctors that an autopsy was not necessary. The Government contested this and submitted that the applicants had been informed that an autopsy had been necessary but refused it nonetheless. 9.  Following the baby\u2019s death, Jurbarkas Hospital conducted an internal inquiry into the medical services provided to the first applicant. The inquiry report, issued on 16 June 2009, found that some erroneous entries had been made in the first applicant\u2019s medical file, the assessment of her and the baby\u2019s condition had probably been inadequate, and certain actions to resuscitate the baby had been taken too late. 10.  At the applicants\u2019 request, the Ministry of Healthcare also conducted an inquiry into the medical services provided to them at Jurbarkas Hospital. A provisional report, issued on 22 June 2009, found that the first applicant\u2019s labour had not been induced in compliance with the relevant rules, the condition of the foetus had not been properly monitored, there had been shortcomings in the resuscitation of the baby, and one of the doctors (R.B.) had not been properly qualified to provide obstetric services. The report issued a series of recommendations to the hospital, and also suggested that the State Inspectorate for Medical Inquiries conduct a more in-depth inspection of the medical services at Jurbarkas Hospital. 11.  The State Inspectorate for Medical Inquiries issued its report on 26 August 2009, in which it identified several shortcomings in the work of doctors who had provided care to the first applicant, and concluded that the medical services had been inadequate. 12.  Subsequently, doctor R.B. was dismissed from Jurbarkas Hospital, and the hospital stopped providing obstetric services, citing a lack of qualified medical personnel. V.K., a gynaecologist, and three other doctors were officially reprimanded for having provided inadequate medical services to the first applicant and V.K. was later dismissed at her own request. 13.  On 22 June 2009 the applicants asked the Jurbarkas district prosecutor (hereinafter \u201cthe prosecutor\u201d) to open a pre-trial investigation into the medical negligence at Jurbarkas Hospital which had led to their newborn daughter\u2019s death. The pre-trial investigation was opened on the same day and carried out by the Jurbarkas police. In July and August 2009 the applicants were interviewed and granted victim status in the investigation. 14.  On 7 August 2009 a court-appointed doctor delivered a specialist opinion (specialisto i\u0161vada) that the applicants\u2019 daughter\u2019s death had resulted from asphyxia during birth and meconium aspiration syndrome. 15.  In August and September 2009 the police interviewed the doctors who had provided medical services to the first applicant, and obtained various documents from Jurbarkas Hospital. 16.  In September 2009 the applicants asked the prosecutor to exhume their daughter\u2019s body so that an autopsy could be performed and the cause of her death could be more precisely determined. However, the prosecutor denied their request, relying on an opinion from medical experts that performing an autopsy more than three months after the baby\u2019s death would not give any results because of the significant post-mortem changes to the body during that time. 17.  In October 2009 the police asked four court-appointed doctors for a specialist opinion on the causes of the baby\u2019s death and the actions of the doctors at Jurbarkas Hospital. The applicants also submitted questions and their questions were forwarded to the specialists. The opinion, delivered on 5 May 2010, stated that no causal link between the doctors\u2019 actions and the death could be established, and that it was not possible to determine whether the death could have been avoided because an autopsy of the body had not been performed. Subsequently, the applicants asked the police to order another opinion from specialists, and they submitted additional questions. On 10 February 2011 three other court-appointed doctors provided answers to the applicants\u2019 questions. Their overall conclusions were the same as those of the previous specialists. 18.  On 4 March 2011 the prosecutor discontinued the pre\u2011trial investigation on the grounds that no causal link between the actions of the doctors at Jurbarkas Hospital and the baby\u2019s death had been established. On 24 March 2011 a senior prosecutor upheld that decision, but on 2 May 2011 the Jurbarkas District Court upheld a complaint submitted by the applicants and reopened the pre-trial investigation. The court found that the two specialist opinions (see paragraph 17 above) had not answered some of the questions submitted because certain medical data had not been made available. It also found that the investigation had not established why an autopsy had not been performed (see paragraph 8 above). Therefore, the court ordered the prosecutor to ask additional questions of some of the witnesses and order a comprehensive forensic examination. 19.  On 2 June 2011 the prosecutor asked the court to order a forensic examination of the causes of the baby\u2019s death and the causal link between the doctors\u2019 actions and the death. The applicants submitted a list of additional questions to be forwarded to the forensic expert. On 27 June 2011 the Jurbarkas District Court ordered the examination, but that order included only the prosecutor\u2019s questions and did not provide any reasons as to why the applicants\u2019 questions had not been included. The applicants appealed against it, but on 14 October 2011 the Kaunas Regional Court dismissed their appeal on the grounds that deciding which questions to forward to the expert was the lower court\u2019s prerogative. 20.  On 25 October 2011 the applicants again submitted their questions to the prosecutor and asked for an additional forensic examination. On 5 December 2011 the Jurbarkas District Court ordered an additional forensic examination, and that order included the applicants\u2019 questions. However, the court\u2019s order was only forwarded to the forensic expert on 5 February 2013. 21.  On 29 January 2013 a court-appointed forensic expert delivered the answers to the prosecutor\u2019s questions (see paragraph 19 above). The expert found that the cause of the baby\u2019s death had been determined correctly, the medical services provided to the first applicant had been adequate, and there was no causal link between the doctors\u2019 actions and the death. 22.  On 13 February 2013 the applicants submitted a complaint to the Prosecutor General, stating that the pre-trial investigation was being conducted inefficiently and with undue delays. They complained, in particular, that the court\u2019s decision of 5 December 2011 to order an additional forensic examination (see paragraph 20 above) had not been forwarded to the expert until 5 February 2013, one year and two months after it had been issued. The Prosecutor General\u2019s Office conducted an official inquiry, which on 18 June 2013 concluded that Jurbarkas prosecutors had committed disciplinary violations, and that the pre-trial investigation had not been properly conducted and supervised. The inquiry found that the Jurbarkas district prosecutor\u2019s office had been reorganised in 2012, which was the likely reason for the above-mentioned shortcomings. No individuals were penalised. 23.  On 25 June 2013 a court-appointed forensic expert delivered the answers to the applicants\u2019 questions (see paragraph 20 above). Among other things, the expert found that some of the doctors\u2019 actions had not been in line with the relevant requirements, but there was no direct causal link between their actions and the applicants\u2019 daughter\u2019s death. 24.  On 5 July 2013 the prosecutor discontinued the investigation on the grounds that no causal link between the actions of the doctors at Jurbarkas Hospital and the applicants\u2019 daughter\u2019s death had been established (see paragraphs 17, 21 and 23 above). The applicants appealed against that decision, and on 4 November 2013 a senior prosecutor reopened the pre\u2011trial investigation and assigned it to a different police department. The senior prosecutor considered that, following the decision to discontinue the investigation, new relevant circumstances had emerged, although he did not specify what those circumstances were. 25.  On 28 February 2014 V.K., the gynaecologist, was served with a notice that, under Article 229 of the Criminal Code, she was suspected of having failed to perform her official duties (see paragraph 37 below). On 8 April 2014 the case was referred to the Jurbarkas District Court for examination on the merits. 26.  On 28 April 2014 the Jurbarkas District Court held an oral hearing. V.K. was not present and her lawyer informed the court that she had been admitted to hospital, although no medical certificate was submitted. The court adjourned the case until 12 May 2014. 27.  On 12 May 2014 V.K. was again not present, and the court received a medical certificate confirming her hospitalisation until 14 May 2014. The court decided to adjourn the case and proposed three alternative dates: 13 May, 16 May and 19 May 2014. V.K.\u2019s lawyer stated that V.K. would not be well enough by 13 May, and that on the later dates he would be unable to represent her. The court adjourned the case until 25 June 2014. 28.  On 23 June 2014 the applicants applied to the court to reclassify the charges against V.K. as negligent homicide in violation of special conduct security rules under Article 132 \u00a7 3 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 38 below). The court adjourned the case until 14 July 2014 in order to give the accused enough time to acquaint herself with the case file. 29.  On 14 July 2014 the Jurbarkas District Court terminated the case on the basis that it was time-barred. It held that V.K. had been charged with a crime of negligence, and the five-year statutory limitation period had ended on 21 May 2014 (see paragraphs 8 above and 39 below). The court also dismissed the application to reclassify the charges and noted that, in any event, reclassification would not alter the statutory limitation period. 30.  The applicants appealed against that judgment. They submitted that, in line with the Criminal Code, the statutory limitation period must have been suspended while the examination of the case had been adjourned owing to V.K.\u2019s illness (see paragraph 40 below). 31.  On 6 November 2014 the Kaunas Regional Court dismissed the applicants\u2019 appeal and upheld the judgment of the first-instance court. It firstly held that the legal provision cited by the applicants had been adopted after the alleged offence had been committed, and that at the time the alleged offence had been committed domestic law had not provided for suspension of the statutory limitation period during the adjournment of a case (see paragraphs 39-40 below). The court further held that, in any event, the examination of the case had been adjourned for an important reason \u2011 V.K.\u2019s hospitalisation \u2013 so there were no grounds for suspending the statutory limitation period. 32.  On 24 February 2015 the Supreme Court refused to examine a cassation appeal lodged by the applicants, on the grounds that it did not raise any important legal questions. 33.  The Government in their observations informed the Court that on 15 September 2011 the applicants instituted civil proceedings against Jurbarkas Hospital, claiming compensation in respect of pecuniary and non\u2011pecuniary damage caused by inadequate medical services provided to the first applicant and their newborn daughter. They revised their claim in December 2011 and August 2013. The applicants claimed a total of 600,000 Lithuanian litai (LTL \u2013 approximately 173,770 euros (EUR)) in respect of non-pecuniary damage and a total of LTL 16,295 (approximately EUR 4,720) in respect of pecuniary damage, consisting of funeral expenses and the second applicant\u2019s lost earnings during his time off work after their daughter\u2019s death. 34.  On 26 November 2014 the Kaunas Regional Court granted the applicants\u2019 claim in part. Relying on the available inquiry reports, as well as the specialist opinions and results of the forensic examinations delivered in the criminal proceedings (see paragraphs 9, 10, 11, 17, 21 and 23 above), the court held that the doctors at Jurbarkas Hospital had breached their duty of care and that their actions \u201chad contributed\u201d (tur\u0117jo \u012ftakos) to the death of the applicants\u2019 daughter, so there were grounds for the hospital incurring civil liability. However, the court considered that the doctors\u2019 actions had not been premeditated or grossly negligent, so the applicants\u2019 claim in respect of non-pecuniary damage was granted in part, and they were awarded a total of LTL 80,000 (approximately EUR 23,170) under that head. They were also awarded a total of LTL 6,716 (approximately EUR 1,945) in respect of pecuniary damage, on the basis of the documents in the court\u2019s possession. 35.  The applicants and the hospital appealed against that judgment, but on 17 September 2015 the Court of Appeal upheld the lower court\u2019s findings. The hospital transferred the awarded amount to the applicants\u2019 bank accounts in November and December 2015.", "references": ["0", "3", "9", "5", "7", "2", "6", "8", "1", "4", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicants\u2019 dates of birth and places of residence are given in the Appendix. 5.  At the material time the first applicant was a chairman of the Sumgait city branch of an opposition party Musavat and the fourth applicant was a deputy chairman of the Goychay district branch of that party. The third applicant was a member of another opposition party, the Popular Front Party of Azerbaijan. The second applicant was a member of the Coordination Council of an opposition group \u0130ctimai Palata.\nAccording to the applicants, they participated in a number of peaceful demonstrations organised by the opposition. 6.  The number of opposition demonstrations increased in 2011. That tendency continued into the following years. Demonstrations were held, inter alia, on 2 April and 17 April 2011 and 20 October 2012. 7.  The second applicant attended the demonstration of 2 April 2011. The first and third applicants attended the demonstration of 17 April 2011. According to the first applicant, he also intended to participate in the demonstration of 20 October 2012. 8.  Prior to those demonstrations, on 18 March 2011, 11 April 2011 and 15 October 2012 respectively the organisers had given notice to the relevant authority, the Baku City Executive Authority (\u201cthe BCEA\u201d). 9.  The BCEA refused to authorise those demonstrations at the places indicated by the organisers and proposed a different location on the outskirts of Baku \u2013 the grounds of a driving school situated in the 20th residential area of the Sabail District. 10.  The organisers nevertheless decided to hold the demonstrations as planned. According to the applicants, the demonstrations were intended to be peaceful and were conducted in a peaceful manner. The participants were demanding democratic reforms in the country and free and fair elections, and protesting against impediments on freedom of assembly. 11.  The fourth applicant was one of the organisers of a rally planned by several opposition parties. The rally was to be held on 18 October 2011 in Goychay. The fourth applicant also intended to participate in that assembly. 12.  According to the fourth applicant, prior to the rally of 18 October 2011, on 9 October 2011, he and the other organisers gave notice to the relevant authority, the Goychay District Executive Authority (\u201cthe GDEA\u201d). The information about the rally was sent to the GDEA by post and the fourth applicant\u2019s home address was indicated (for reference) as the address of the sender. 13.  According to the fourth applicant, the rally was intended to be peaceful. Its purpose was to mark the twentieth anniversary of the Independence Day and to honour the memory of those buried in the Cemetery of Martyrs in the town of Goychay. 14.  It appears that eventually the rally did not take place. 15.  As mentioned above, the demonstration of 2 April 2011 was attended by the second applicant; the demonstration of 17 April 2011 was attended by the first and third applicants. However, the police began to disperse those demonstrations as soon as the protesters began to gather. 16.  The circumstances related to the dispersal of the demonstrations of 2 April and 17 April 2011, the first, second and third applicants\u2019 arrests and custody, and subsequent administrative proceedings against them are similar to those in Gafgaz Mammadov v. Azerbaijan (no. 60259/11, 15 October 2015) (see also Appendix). 17.  The circumstances of the fourth and first applicants\u2019 arrests on 15 October 2011 and 20 October 2012 respectively, their custody and subsequent administrative proceedings against them are similar to those in Huseynli and Others v. Azerbaijan (nos. 67360/11 and 2 others, 11 February 2016) (see also Appendix). 18.  According to the first and third applicants, after being arrested during the dispersal of the demonstration of 17 April 2011 and brought to a police station, they were subjected to ill-treatment by the deputy chief of the Nasimi District Police Office, police officer S.N. 19.  In a photograph, submitted to the Court by the first applicant and allegedly taken after his police custody, he is shown with a bruise on his forehead. In the other photograph, allegedly taken before his police custody, the first applicant is shown without any bruising on his forehead. 20.  The third applicant submitted to the Court a medical report of 18 April 2011 confirming that he had a broken rib. According to the third applicant, that medical report was issued when he was taken to a hospital after his trial, before he was placed in a detention facility to serve his sentence. He also submitted a photograph in which he is shown with bruises on his body. 21.  The applicants raised their ill-treatment complaints during the administrative proceedings following their arrest on 17 April 2011. Namely, in their appeals against the first-instance court\u2019s decisions the applicants complained that they had been ill-treated during their police custody, and requested the Baku Court of Appeal to order a forensic examination of their injuries, to question particular witnesses and to obtain the review of the medical records drawn up at their check-in to a detention facility where they had served their sentence. 22.  On 21 April and 4 May 2011 respectively the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the applicants\u2019 appeals and upheld the decisions of the first\u2011instance court (see Appendix).\nThe appellate court disregarded the applicants\u2019 ill-treatment complaints and their requests related to those complaints. 23.  On an unspecified date the applicants lodged a complaint before the General Prosecutor\u2019s Office asking it to conduct an investigation into the alleged ill-treatment. 24.  On unspecified dates, the applicants were summoned to the Nasimi District prosecutor\u2019s office and questioned in connection with their complaint of ill-treatment. 25.  On 23 May and 2 July 2011 investigator M.H. adopted decisions refusing to open criminal proceedings into allegations of ill-treatment in respect of the third and first applicants respectively. 26.  According to the applicants, for a certain period of time neither they nor their lawyer were informed about any actions taken by the authorities to investigate their ill-treatment complaints. Only in January 2012, after making enquiries about the outcome of the investigation, did they manage to obtain copies of the investigator\u2019s above-mentioned decisions. 27.  The applicants did not lodge a complaint with a supervising court against those decisions.", "references": ["6", "1", "8", "4", "5", "0", "9", "No Label", "7", "2", "3"], "gold": ["7", "2", "3"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicants\u2019 dates of birth and places of residence are given in the Appendix. 5.  The applicants were opposition-oriented activists. At the material time the first applicant was a member of one of the opposition parties, the Popular Front Party of Azerbaijan. He participated in a number of peaceful demonstrations organised by the opposition and on several occasions was arrested and convicted for that. 6.  On 12 October 2013 an opposition group \u0130ctimai Palata held a demonstration, authorised by the relevant authority, the Baku City Executive Authority (\u201cthe BCEA\u201d).\nThe demonstration was held in the Mahsul stadium, a place proposed by the BCEA. It was intended to be peaceful and was conducted in a peaceful manner. The participants were protesting against alleged irregularities and fraud during the presidential elections of 9 October 2013. 7.  All three applicants participated in that demonstration. 8.  After the end of the demonstration of 12 October 2013 the applicants were arrested at the entrance to a nearby metro station, Inshaatchilar. 9.  The circumstances of the applicants\u2019 arrests, their custody and subsequent administrative proceedings against them are similar to those in Huseynli and Others v. Azerbaijan (nos. 67360/11 and 2 others, 11 February 2016) and Huseynov and Others v. Azerbaijan ([Committee] nos. 34262/14 and 5 others, 24 November 2016) (see also Appendix).", "references": ["8", "5", "0", "6", "1", "4", "9", "No Label", "7", "2", "3"], "gold": ["7", "2", "3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1966 and lives in Sofia. 6.  In 1993 the applicant, acting as a sole trader, concluded a contract with a municipally-owned company under which she undertook to set up a shop in the city shopping centre. This contract was extended numerous times. 7.  On 1 July 1996 the applicant asked the Kardzhali Municipal Council (\u201cthe municipal council\u201d) to sell to her the first floor of the shopping centre under the preferential privatisation procedure for tenants of State- and municipally-owned property as provided for in section 35 (1) of the Transformation and Privatisation of State and Municipally-Owned Enterprises Act (\u0417\u0430\u043a\u043e\u043d \u0437\u0430 \u043f\u0440\u0435\u043e\u0431\u0440\u0430\u0437\u0443\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0435 \u0438 \u043f\u0440\u0438\u0432\u0430\u0442\u0438\u0437\u0430\u0446\u0438\u044f \u043d\u0430 \u0434\u044a\u0440\u0436\u0430\u0432\u043d\u0438 \u0438 \u043e\u0431\u0449\u0438\u043d\u0441\u043a\u0438 \u043f\u0440\u0435\u0434\u043f\u0440\u0438\u044f\u0442\u0438\u044f) (\u201cthe Privatisation Act\u201d). In February 1997 the applicant was informed that the municipal council had refused her request on 29 January 1997. 8.  The applicant brought judicial review proceedings challenging the refusal to sell the property to her. On 20 February 2004 the Kardzhali Regional Court quashed the council\u2019s refusal and instructed it to open a privatisation procedure under which it would offer the applicant the option to buy the first floor of the shopping centre under preferential conditions, in accordance with the Privatisation Act. The court ordered several expert reports and determined on the basis of them that the first floor in question constituted a separate property unit, in both technical and legal terms, which could be the subject of a transaction. That finding was upheld by the Supreme Administrative Court in a final decision of 18 February 2005. 9.  In the meantime, on 8 May 2001 the mayor of Kardzhali sent a notice to the applicant announcing the termination of the contract concluded in 1993 (see paragraph 6 above). On 4 June 2001 the mayor ordered the applicant\u2019s eviction from the shop. Following an appeal by the applicant, the Burgas District Court suspended the enforcement of the order. This ruling was confirmed by the Burgas Regional Court. 10.  On 24 September 2001 the mayor issued another order for the applicant\u2019s eviction. Before it entered into force, representatives of the municipal council broke into the shop and took possession of it. The applicant complained to the district prosecutor of Kardzhali (\u201cthe district prosecutor\u201d) about the mayor\u2019s allegedly arbitrary action. On 9 November 2001 the district prosecutor refused to intervene or to open criminal proceedings. Subsequently the regional and appellate prosecutors upheld that refusal. 11.  On 11 April 2005 the applicant requested the municipal council to open a privatisation procedure so that she could buy the first floor of the shopping centre, in accordance with the final decision of the Supreme Administrative Court of 18 February 2005 (see paragraph 8 above). The municipal council did not reply to her request, so the applicant complained to the district prosecutor about that failure to respond and asked him to open criminal proceedings. On 3 July 2006 the district prosecutor refused to open criminal proceedings, observing in particular that, given that the decision had been taken by a collective body, no individual criminal responsibility could be attached to any of its members. 12.  On 20 April 2006 the municipal council decided to open a privatisation procedure in favour of the applicant in respect of part of the first floor of the shopping centre. In the same decision the council also prohibited any and all transactions aimed at disposing of the property. 13.  On 16 June 2006 the mayor ordered that two expert reports be drawn up, in accordance with the relevant procedure: one in respect of the legal status of the property and another one in respect of its value. During the proceedings the relevant authorities considered that the shopping centre had not been divided into separate property units and that such a division would have to be carried out before some of those could be sold to the applicant. 14.  On 24 July 2008 the municipal council authorised the mayor to open a privatisation procedure in favour of the applicant in respect of part of the shopping centre\u2019s first floor. On 20 August 2008 the applicant brought judicial review proceedings in respect of the tacit refusal of the municipality to offer to her the whole first floor of the shopping centre and not just a part of it. While those proceedings were pending, on 29 September 2008 the municipal council and the applicant, acting as a sole trader, signed a contract under which the applicant purchased the part of the first floor of the shopping centre offered by the council. The applicant\u2019s challenge to the municipality\u2019s tacit refusal was dismissed as inadmissible by the Kardzhali Administrative Court on 7 October 2009. The court found that the municipality\u2019s failure to sell to her the entirety of the property, as decided in the final judgment of 18 February 2005 in the applicant\u2019s favour (see paragraph 8 above), did not constitute a new refusal to initiate a privatisation procedure; rather, it represented a failure on the part of the authorities in question to comply with the said final judgment ordering the start of that privatisation procedure. This ruling was upheld by the Supreme Administrative Court on 22 January 2010. 15.  In the meantime, the applicant lodged a claim for damages against the municipal council under the State and Municipalities Responsibility for Damage Act 1988 (\u201cthe SMRDA\u201d). She sought damages in respect of the municipal council\u2019s failure to open a privatisation procedure by means of offering to sell to her the whole first floor of the shopping centre. Her claim concerned the period between the date of the final judgment of 18 February 2005 and the date of her lodging the claim for damages \u2013 18 December 2007. 16.  The Sofia Administrative Court rejected her claim on 10 November 2008. The court found in particular that the applicant had not proved her claim in respect of the pecuniary damages she had sought, given that there had been no certainty that, had the municipality made an offer, she would have actually paid the price for the property and thus completed the deal. As regards her claim for non-pecuniary damages, the court found that the applicant\u2019s great emotional suffering was established during the trial. However, the suffering was more intense during the several months immediately following the municipal council\u2019s initial refusal to sell the premises to the applicant. The court further noted during a hearing on 21 April 2008 that the applicant had interrupted her activities as a sole trader at the time, having moved to another city with her family. Given that it had not been demonstrated that the applicant had felt resentment and tension specifically as a result of the failure to enforce the judgment in her favour, no award for non-pecuniary damage was due to her. 17.  The applicant appealed before the Supreme Administrative Court which upheld the lower court\u2019s findings in a final decision of 31 May 2010. 18.  The applicant continued to pursue the purchase, under the preferential privatisation procedure, of the remaining part of the shopping centre\u2019s first floor. That part was identified as consisting of two separate units, which she claimed were due to her on the basis of the final judgment of 18 February 2005. In response to a request made by the applicant on 21 June 2013 to be offered to buy the remaining part of the shopping centre\u2019s first floor, the municipal council decided in December 2013, on the advice of the municipal council\u2019s counsel, as well as on the basis of various expert reports, to offer her the option to buy the remaining part of the shopping centre\u2019s first floor. 19.  On 18 August 2014 the municipal council sold to the applicant the outstanding part of the first floor of the shopping centre. 20.  On 12 September 2014, the applicant leased one of her recently acquired property units to a third party, a company. The terms of the lease were for the period of twenty years and for the price of 50,000 euros (EUR).", "references": ["2", "7", "1", "8", "4", "6", "0", "5", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1970 and lives in Riga. 5.  In 2000 a criminal investigation was conducted into suspected irregularities in customs procedures with respect to the transit of vehicles. As a result of these unlawful activities, it had been possible for third persons to legalise foreign goods (the vehicles) in Latvia using falsified documents. 6.  Seven customs officials, including the applicant, were charged with exceeding their official powers or failing to fulfil their duties. Each of the officials had allegedly acted unlawfully at different stages of the customs procedures. The applicant was charged with negligence which had caused substantial harm to the State and public interest. This charge was brought in connection with the processing of documentation for a used semi-trailer. 7.  Several witnesses were questioned during the pre-trial stage, including witness E.A., a Latvian national residing in Latvia, who had purchased one of the vehicles. 8.  On 16 December 2005 the Riga Regional Court, acting as the court of first instance, found the applicant guilty and imposed on him a fine to the amount of five minimum monthly salaries. 9.  With respect to the applicant, the court established that on 31 March 1999 at a customs control point he had acted contrary to the applicable regulations in the processing of documentation for the importation of the used semi-trailer. 10.  In particular, the applicant had accepted a transit declaration from a person who had not been a declarant\u2019s authorised representative. He had not verified whether the person submitting a power of attorney had been the person to whom it had been issued. The applicant had not verified whether the used semi-trailer had been in the customs zone. Further, he had not issued an administrative violation record on the non-compliance with the forty-eight hour time-limit for the delivery to the customs office of the used semi-trailer. Furthermore, the documentation processed had been incomplete. 11.  The regional court relied on a report drawn up by the State revenue service, dated 24 March 2000. The report stated that the applicant had not complied with a number of applicable regulations. 12.  Further, the court referred to the pre-trial statement of witness E.A. who was summoned to a court hearing but could not attend due to his hospitalisation. The court took note of a medical certificate to that effect. 13.  E.A. had testified that he had purchased the semi-trailer at the beginning of 1999. He had come to the customs control point together with the vendor\u2019s representative. The vendor\u2019s representative had turned first to a customs representative and then to a customs officer who processed the documentation. The semi-trailer had not been at the customs warehouse and it could not have been inspected by the customs officer. According to the documentation, the customs clearance of the vehicle was carried out by the applicant.\nAfter the statements were read out, the applicant\u2019s defence asked the court to explain on what grounds a certified copy of the statements of E.A. was included in the case-file and where was its original. The request was upheld and the prosecutor provided a reply. 14.  The court relied on a set of documentary evidence attesting to the fact that the documentation for the semi-trailer in question had been processed by the applicant and that the semi-trailer had not entered the customs territory. 15.  The applicant appealed against the first instance court judgment. 16.  At the appellate hearing on 8 January 2007, E.A. could not be summoned to the hearing because he was abroad at the time. The applicant requested that E.A. be summoned to the appeal proceedings. 17.  The appellate court decided that this request be granted and E.A. was summoned to the hearings of September 2007 and February 2008. On both occasions E.A. asked the appellate court in writing to excuse his absence from the hearing on the grounds of hospitalisation (in September 2007) and his being abroad and having a technical problem with a car which had prevented him from coming to the hearing (in February 2008). He further asked the court to read out his pre-trial statements. 18.  On 11 February 2008 the appeal proceedings were resumed. 19.  During the court hearing, the applicant\u2019s defence and the court questioned a defence witness \u2013 a customs expert on the customs procedure and its application. 20.  E.A. did not appear at the court hearings on 11 and 12 February 2008. The prosecutor submitted that, by way of such conduct, E.A. avoided appearing in court and that this gave grounds for his testimony to be read out. 21.  The applicant\u2019s defence counsel disagreed that E.A.\u2019s testimony could be read out. At the same time, the defence counsel submitted that he\n\u201c[did] not need witness [E.A.] anymore ... the evidence [previously] given by the expert [was sufficient]. We do not uphold the request anymore. I consider that his statements should not be read out... I consider that there are no justifiable grounds for [E.A.] not appearing in court\u201d. 22.  The appellate court ruled that E.A.\u2019s testimony be read out in accordance with section 501 of the Criminal Procedure Law. 23.  After the testimony was read out, the applicant\u2019s defence explicitly stated that they did not have any requests and that the court adjudication could be terminated. 24.  On 15 February 2008 the appeal court upheld the applicant\u2019s conviction. It considered that the applicant had inadequately verified the power of attorney (see paragraph 10 above). 25.  The appellate court referred to the evidence of witness E.A., i.e., that the semi-trailer had not been at the customs warehouse and the customs officer could not have inspected it. It also relied on the logbook indicating that the semi-trailer had not entered the customs territory. The court also relied on the applicant\u2019s statements in which he considered that the verification on the merits had been carried out by the customs broker and therefore those tasks fell outside his duties. The appeal court dismissed the applicant\u2019s contention that he had inspected the semi-trailer. 26.  Furthermore, the appeal court held that the applicant had inadequately verified the payment documents. It reasoned that the payment orders in question had given the appearance that a transfer of funds had been made to the State. However, a bank report indicated that these orders had neither been registered nor confirmed by the bank. 27.  The appeal court found that the applicant had formally performed his official duties. However, it deemed that the applicant\u2019s contention \u2013 that a customs broker and not a customs officer had been responsible for the truthfulness of the information \u2013 indicated that, in fact, the applicant had not verified anything. 28.  In his appeal on points of law the applicant argued that the appellate court had not ensured the attendance of E.A. He insisted that the evidence attested to the fact that he had verified the power of attorney and had compared the bank accounts indicated in the payment orders. No electronic database had existed at the time and the only way to check the payment documents had been to compare the bank accounts listed. 29.  On 1 July 2008 the Senate of the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law. 30.  It reasoned that the appellate court had verified the testimonies of witnesses in accordance with section 501 of the Criminal Procedure Law. Also, the appeal court had made efforts to establish E.A.\u2019s whereabouts and to bring him to court. Therefore, the appeal court had done everything possible in order to call E.A. to court. 31.  This decision was final.", "references": ["7", "5", "0", "6", "1", "9", "3", "2", "8", "4", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1983 and lives in Portoheli. 6.  On 12 September 2007 the applicant was convicted of forming a criminal organisation, of \u2013 together with others \u2212 kidnapping an adult, of robbery committed together with others, and of the theft and illegal possession of a gun, and was sentenced to twenty-two years\u2019 imprisonment by the Nafplio three-member Court of Appeal for felonies (\u03a4\u03c1\u03b9\u03bc\u03b5\u03bb\u03ad\u03c2 \u0395\u03c6\u03b5\u03c4\u03b5\u03af\u03bf \u039a\u03b1\u03ba\u03bf\u03c5\u03c1\u03b3\u03b7\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd) acting as a first-instance court (decision no. 317/2007). The applicant, who had been in pre-trial detention since 7 April 2006, was represented by a lawyer in the proceedings. 7.  Following the delivery of the judgment, the applicant expressed his wish to lodge an appeal against the decision of the first-instance court and was escorted, handcuffed, by policemen to the registry of the court in order to do so. In the registry there were pre-printed forms for lodging an appeal, which included the following wording:\n\u201cIn Nafplio, in the Nafplio Court of Appeal today on ... day... and time ... came to me, the Registrar of Nafplio Court of Appeal .... (name), the ... (name) of ... (father\u2019s name) and of ... (mother\u2019s name) who was born on ... in ..., whose profession is ... and resides in ..., street ... no. ... and has the no. ... identity card issued on ... by.... And REQUESTED that this report be drafted declaring that: (he) APPEALS before the Nafplio five-member Appeal Court against decision no. .... of the Nafplio three\u2011member Court of Appeal by which he was convicted of ... to a total sentence of ... requesting that the decision under appeal be set aside and that he be acquitted from the charge for the reasons he will cite before the Appeal Court.\u201d 8.  Under the above paragraph there was an empty space and then followed the phrases:\n\u201cHe appoints as his representative the lawyer practising in Nafplio ...(name).\nThis report was read and confirmed and is signed by the person lodging the appeal and the registrar\u201d. 9.  The registrar completed the pre-printed form with the applicant\u2019s personal data, the number of the decision against which he wished to lodge the appeal, the sentence that was imposed to him and the name of the applicant\u2019s representative. He then signed the report and the applicant was momentarily released from handcuffs in order to sign it as well. 10.  On 7 May 2009 the applicant\u2019s appeal was heard by the Nafplio five\u2011member Court of Appeal (\u201cthe Appeal Court\u201d). The Appeal Court by a majority dismissed the legal remedy as inadmissible on the grounds that no reasons had been included in the report, as required by law (decision no. 113/2009). The President of the Appeal Court did not agree with the majority of the panel, expressing the view that from the phrase \u201c...for the reasons he will cite before the appeal court\u201d, one could easily infer that the applicant was complaining about erroneous assessment of the evidence by the court of first instance. 11.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law against the decision of the Appeal Court, arguing that his appeal should not have been dismissed as inadmissible. The applicant submitted that it was standard practice in all Appeal Courts for the defendants to be given a pre-printed form which included the phrase: \u201cbecause the court of first instance did not assess correctly the facts of the case and declared the defendant guilty of an act he did not commit and for the reasons he will cite before the Appeal Court\u201d. In the instant case, the Nafplio Court of Appeal had printed a form in which the first part of the phrase was omitted and the applicant was not to blame for this omission. He was only given the form to sign and was handcuffed at the time, making it even more difficult for him to read the report thoroughly. 12.  The Court of Cassation dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law as unfounded on the grounds that the content of the appeal was the applicant\u2019s responsibility, as distinct from the formalities which were the responsibility of the registrar (decision no. 848/2010). The decision was finalised on 28 April 2010. 13.  The applicant served his sentence in Patras prison until 23 July 2015 when he was given a conditional release.", "references": ["6", "8", "2", "9", "0", "1", "5", "4", "7", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1966 and lives in Pazardzhik. 6.  On 10 January 2007 the police searched the applicant\u2019s home, where they found five one hundred dollar (USD) bills, which turned out subsequently to be counterfeit. 7.  In May 2007 the applicant was charged by an investigator with having acquired those bills and with their possession, offences under Article 244 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 2 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 16 below). However, the second charge was subsequently dropped and in July 2007 a prosecutor indicted the applicant for acquiring the notes \u201cin the period between 2002 and 10 January 2007\u201d, in the knowledge that they were counterfeit. It was noted in the description of the facts in the bill of indictment that in 2002 the applicant had sold a flat and that with part of the money had bought several one hundred dollar bills from a person on the street. 8.  The applicant was brought to court. He testified to Pazardzhik Regional Court (hereinafter \u201cthe Regional Court\u201d), which examined the case at first instance, that it had been his brother who had given him money in 2002 after selling a flat. The applicant had bought dollars with that money, USD 1,000, of which he had been keeping USD 500 \u201cfor hard times\u201d. He stated that he did not know that the notes were counterfeit. 9.  The applicant\u2019s brother testified as well. He confirmed that in 2002 he had sold his flat and had given the applicant money to buy dollars. He added that in the following years he and the applicant had regularly exchanged the Bulgarian levs they had had for dollars. He admitted that he was uncertain whether the counterfeit notes found in the applicant\u2019s home by the police had been the ones the applicant had acquired in 2002. 10.  In a judgment of 25 January 2008 the Regional Court convicted the applicant. However, the conviction was for having acquired counterfeit notes \u201cin the period between 26 March 2005 and 10 January 2007\u201d, as it had been only on the former date that the act of acquiring such notes had been criminalised (see paragraph 16 below). The Regional Court acquitted the applicant for having acquired the notes between 2002 and 26 March 2005. 11.  When summarising the facts of the case as it had established them, the Regional Court repeated what the applicant had said, namely that in 2002 his brother had given him money to buy dollars. It also referred to the applicant\u2019s brother\u2019s explanation that after 2002 the two men had regularly exchanged their Bulgarian levs for dollars. It did not comment any further on the question of when the applicant had acquired the counterfeit notes. Finding in addition that he had been aware at the time of obtaining those notes that they had been counterfeit (the key evidence in that regard had been a statement by the applicant made in a telephone conversation with another person on 9 January 2007), the Regional Court found him guilty of that charge. In addition, it found him guilty of another offence and gave him a suspended sentence of two years\u2019 imprisonment. 12.  The applicant lodged an appeal, arguing that there was no evidence substantiating the conclusion that, when he had bought the five hundred dollar bills in 2002, he had been aware that they were counterfeit. 13.  In a judgment of 24 April 2008 the Plovdiv Court of Appeal (hereinafter \u201cthe Court of Appeal\u201d) upheld the Regional Court\u2019s judgment, endorsing its reasoning. Once again, when summarising the facts, it restated what the applicant had said, namely that in 2002 his brother had given him money to buy dollars, which he had done, and had kept USD 500 hidden in his house. It did not comment any further on the question as to when the applicant had acquired the counterfeit notes found on him. 14.  In an appeal on points of law lodged with the Supreme Court of Cassation, the applicant stated in particular the following:\n\u201cThe two lower instances established unconditionally that [the applicant] had bought the five counterfeit dollar bank notes in the spring of 2002 with money given to him by his brother. ...\nAt the time that did not amount to a criminal offence, which is why [the applicant] was acquitted of having acquired the notes in the period before 26 March 2005.\nBut where is the proof that those notes in particular were acquired after that date? There can only be guesses ... and a conviction cannot be based on guesses.\u201d 15.  In a final judgment of 24 November 2008 the Supreme Court of Cassation upheld the Court of Appeal\u2019s judgment, failing to comment on the applicant\u2019s argument that it had not been shown that he had acquired the counterfeit bank notes after 26 March 2005.", "references": ["9", "8", "1", "4", "6", "0", "7", "5", "2", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "7.  The applicants, all Georgian nationals, were born in 1946, 1947 and 1957 respectively. At the material time they lived in different flats in a residential block (\u201cthe building\u201d) constructed in 1952 and situated at 4 Uznadze Street in Tbilisi. 8.  The building is located in the city centre, in close proximity (approximately 4 metres) to the \u201cTboelectrocentrali\u201d thermal power plant (\u201cthe plant\u201d). The plant was constructed in 1911 and reconstructed at a later date. It started operations in 1939. For several decades it burned coal to generate power, before replacing it with natural gas. The plant provided the adjacent residential areas with electricity and heat. 9.  Several accidents have been reported throughout the plant\u2019s history. An accident on 10 April 1996 rendered it inoperative for more than thirty days. An expert report concerning the incident disclosed that the main reason behind the accident was the fact that no major repairs had been carried out there since 1986. 10.  On 2 November 1999 Presidential Decree No. 613 was issued, stating that the plant was to be privatised and sold directly to a private company. The privatisation agreement between the Government and the company was concluded on 6 April 2000. 11.  On 2 February 2001 the plant partially ceased generating power owing to financial problems. However, it continued to use some of the generators. 12.  According to the applicants, while operational the plant\u2019s dangerous activities were not subject to the relevant regulations, as a result of which, in addition to some other alleged nuisances, it emitted various toxic substances into the atmosphere negatively affecting their well-being. 13.  On unspecified dates the applicants and other residents of the building lodged complaints with the municipal authorities, alleging that nuisances were emanating from the plant such as air, noise and electromagnetic pollution and water leakage. By official letters dated 22 March 2000, 19 October 2000 and 16 January 2001 the Tbilisi City Hall (\u201cthe City Hall\u201d) acknowledged that the residents of the building had been affected by the nuisances they had complained of. It advised the central Government that relocation of the plant would not be in the public interest in view of the acute energy crisis in the country and suggested that the residents of the affected area be offered electricity and heat free of charge as a form of compensation. 14.  In the letter dated 22 March 2000 the City Hall asked the plant to implement certain environmental protection measures, including the installation of chimney filters to reduce the air pollution emanating from the plant. The request was left unaddressed. 15.  On 1 October 2001, in an official response to a query by the applicants, the City Hall confirmed that the plant\u2019s activities fell within the \u201cfirst category\u201d within the meaning of the Environmental Permits Act (see paragraphs 43-44 below) and that the Ministry of the Environment and Natural Resources (\u201cthe Ministry of the Environment\u201d) was responsible for issuing the relevant permit.\n(b)  Action for damages and the friendly settlement 16.  On an unspecified date in the summer of 2000 the applicants and other residents of the building brought an action for damages against the plant concerning the environmental nuisances emanating from the plant. A friendly settlement was reached between the parties on 12 December 2000, according to which the claimants would renounce their claims in exchange for a commitment by the plant\u2019s management to provide them with hot water, electricity and heat free of charge. Owing to technical difficulties and a lack of cooperation between the relevant authorities, the friendly settlement was left unenforced. 17.  On 25 October 2001 the applicants and three other residents of the building (\u201cthe claimants\u201d) brought a fresh action against the plant and other respondents including the Tbilisi electricity distribution company, AES TELASI JSC (\u201cAES\u201d), the City Hall and the Ministry of the Environment. They claimed compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage for the harm caused to their health and well-being by the air, noise and electromagnetic pollution and water leakage emanating from the plant. They relied on privately commissioned independent expert opinions in support of their complaints.\n(ii)  Expert examinations commissioned by the court 18.  On 7 March and 23 September 2002 the Tbilisi Regional Court granted a request by the claimants and ordered the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Labour, Health and Social Affairs and the Ministry of the Environment to arrange a number of expert examinations. The latter were intended to measure the environmental pollution caused by the plant, clarify how the associated harmful effects had affected the claimants\u2019 health and might have endangered human life, and identify appropriate remedies.\n(\u03b1)  Air pollution 19.  An expert examination dated 28 October 2002 and carried out by the Expertise and Special Research Centre at the Ministry of Justice concluded as follows:\n\u201cAs the \u201cTboelectrocentrali\u201d plant does not have a [buffer] zone and is immediately adjacent to a residential building, the plant\u2019s chimneys must be equipped with appropriate filters and other equipment to protect the population from the hazardous gases.\u201d 20.  On 17 January 2003 the Institute of Environmental Protection (\u201cthe IEP\u201d) at the Ministry of Environment issued an expert opinion on the air pollution and noise levels in the residential area concerned. It noted that while the plant\u2019s equipment responsible for the emission of toxic substances stood idle, it was impossible to determine the real pollution situation with which the residents had had to cope for years and noted that \u201cthe results were considerably minimised compared to the possible real picture.\u201d 21.  The expert opinion disclosed that the plant\u2019s technical compliance document was defective as it did not reveal all the chemical substances known to be emitted into the atmosphere in the course of natural gas burning. That document also incorrectly indicated the height of the chimneys as 30.8 metres instead of the actual 27 metres, which could lead to the pollution data being misleadingly decreased. 22.  With regard to the air pollution and the possible impact upon the residents of the building, the expert opinion concluded as follows:\n\u201cConsidering the fact that the plant does not have a [buffer] zone and is immediately adjacent to a residential building ..., taking into account the direction of the wind, a whole bouquet of emissions is reaching into the homes ... negatively affecting the population living in the adjacent area.\u201d 23.  The opinion specified that even where individual hazardous substances were considered to be within the acceptable margin, it was necessary to consider the combined impact of various substances upon the health of the population as the combined toxicity might go beyond the acceptable limits. It continued to note in this connection that the concentrated toxicity of the gases emitted by the plant was twice the norm and the residents of the building concerned had to live in conditions where the concentration of toxic substances surpassed the acceptable limits twenty-four hours a day. The IEP proposed that the competent municipal authorities either ban those industrial activities or ensure the plant\u2019s relocation outside the town, where at least a buffer zone could be established. 24.  On 4 March 2003 the Institute of Scientific Research in Health and Hygiene at the Ministry of Labour, Health and Social Affairs responded to a query by the applicants and listed the diseases that might potentially be caused by excessive concentrations in the air of substances such as SO2, CO, NO2, smoke and black dust. These were mucocutaneous disorders, conjunctivitis, bronchitis, bronchopulmonary and other pulmonary diseases, allergies, different types of cardiovascular disease and anoxemia (low oxygen levels in the blood), which could lead to other serious disorders.\n(\u03b2)  Noise levels 25.  On 17 January 2003 the IEP issued an expert opinion concerning the noise levels in the building. Without specifying the noise levels in the individual flats of the applicants, the opinion concluded in generic terms that \u201cthe residential building ... situated at 4 Uznadze Street [was] affected by noise in excess of the permissible limits.\u201d 26.  On 6 February 2004 the IEP expert carried out an additional investigation aimed at determining the noise levels in the individual flats of the claimants. It concluded that the permissible levels of noise were exceeded only with respect to two claimants and not in the applicants\u2019 apartments.\n(\u03b3)  Electromagnetic pollution 27.  An expert opinion issued by the IEP on 7 November 2002 stated that the intensity of the electromagnetic waves did not exceed the permissible levels. 28.  The expert opinion produced by the Ministry of Labour, Health and Social Affairs on 17 January 2003 disclosed that, in some instances, the intensity of the electromagnetic fields in the vicinity of the building exceeded the permissible levels. It concluded however that it was impossible to establish the exact source of the electromagnetic pollution.\n(\u03b4)  The applicants\u2019 health 29.  On 13 May 2003 the court ordered the Forensic Medical Examination Centre at the Ministry of Labour, Health and Social Affairs to examine the health of four of the claimants. The third applicant and another claimant were not included, without any reasons being given for their exclusion. Its experts were asked to give an opinion on whether the claimants were suffering from any diseases which might have been caused by the pollution emanating from the plant. 30.  The Forensic Medical Examination Centre carried out the court\u2011commissioned examination between 7 August and 17 September 2003. A panel of experts concluded that the four claimants \u201c[had] been affected by a combined impact of protracted exposure to harmful factors such as SO2, NO, CO2 as well as black dust, noise and electromagnetic pollution negatively impacting their health.\u201d The first and second applicants were found to be suffering from largely similar health conditions such as neurasthenia and asthenic syndrome. The panel considered it \u201cpossible that the asthenic syndrome and neurasthenia ... [had been] caused by the prolonged and combined effect of being exposed to harmful factors.\u201d It added that \u201ctaking into account the circumstances of the case, the worsening of the health conditions of the persons examined [had not been] excluded.\u201d\n(iii)  Regional Court\u2019s findings 31.  On 12 March 2004 the Tbilisi Regional Court dismissed the claims of the applicants and another claimant, but partially allowed the claims of two other claimants (\u201cthe successful claimants\u201d) with respect to the noise pollution emitted by the plant\u2019s generators. Relying on the expert examination of the IEP concerning the noise levels, the court found that only the two successful claimants\u2019 flats were affected by noise in excess of the permissible limits. It awarded them 5,000 Georgian laris (GEL \u2013 equivalent to 1,981 euros (EUR))[1] each, holding the plant, the City Hall, and the Ministry of the Environment jointly liable:\n\u201c... Both the City Hall and the Ministry failed to fulfil the obligations imposed on them by law. That is to say, despite the claimants\u2019 numerous requests and complaints, [the authorities concerned] failed to take specific measures to ensure an environment safe enough for the claimants\u2019 health.\u201d 32.  Furthermore, acknowledging that the plant was responsible for the infiltration of water into the foundations of the building, the court ordered it to halt the leakage and make the necessary repairs to the ruptured walls. 33.  As regards the air pollution complained of, the court found that the material before it did not prove a causal link between the emissions and the claimants\u2019 health problems described in the Forensic Medical Examination Centre\u2019s expert report. It further suggested that the third applicant and another claimant had refused to undergo the medical examination. 34.  While the court accepted the experts\u2019 conclusions that the plant had breached certain environmental standards by not having filters and other purification equipment in place to decrease the emission of toxic substances, it refused to order the plant to install such equipment on the grounds that the sole remedy requested by the claimants had been compensation for the damage caused by the pollution.\n(b)  In the Supreme Court 35.  On 4 May 2004 the claimants appealed to the Supreme Court. Relying on the Court\u2019s judgment in the case of L\u00f3pez Ostra v. Spain (9 December 1994, Series A no. 303\u2011C) and the findings of the court\u2011commissioned expert examinations at the domestic level, they reiterated their complaints about the lack of a buffer zone and the inherent risk of pollution, the absence of purification equipment over the plant\u2019s chimneys and its impact upon their health and well-being, and the defectiveness of the plant\u2019s technical compliance document. They further disagreed with the lower court\u2019s findings with respect to the alleged noise pollution emanating from the plant. 36.  On 21 April 2005 the Supreme Court delivered a final judgment in the case. It upheld the appeals of the two already successful claimants and ordered the plant\u2019s operators, the City Hall and the Ministry of the Environment to pay them, jointly, GEL 7,000 (EUR 2,938)[2] each for the deterioration of their health caused by the noise pollution that persisted after the partial termination of the plant\u2019s activities on 2 February 2001 and affected them individually (see paragraphs 11 and 26 above). In addition, it ordered the plant to pay GEL 50 (EUR 21) monthly to one claimant and GEL 100 (EUR 42) to the other. It further upheld the lower court\u2019s finding concerning the plant\u2019s responsibility for the infiltration of water into the foundations of the building. 37.  The Supreme Court rejected the complaint concerning the electromagnetic pollution as unsubstantiated. 38.  As regards the submissions concerning the air pollution, the Supreme Court dismissed them as unsubstantiated. It reasoned that the claimants\u2019 reference to violations of environmental standards, regardless of their validity, could not have served as a basis for awarding damages for air pollution considering that they had not requested that the plant\u2019s permit be revoked, that filters be installed over the chimneys, that other environmental protection measures be implemented, or that the hazardous activities be banned or relocated. 39.  The court further noted that the Court\u2019s findings in the case of L\u00f3pez Ostra v. Spain could not serve as grounds for requesting damages. It highlighted the fact that the plant in the instant case had been operational since 1939 while the flats had been built at a later date in 1952. It consequently concluded that the applicants had accepted the associated dangers when choosing to settle near the plant and were effectively barred from claiming any damages in that respect within the meaning of the Compensation for Damage Inflicted by Dangerous Substances Act (see paragraph 47 below). It thus concluded that the appellants had been under a duty to tolerate nuisances such as noise, smells, steam and gases caused by the ordinary industrial activities of the neighbouring plant, whose essential purpose had been to supply the nearby buildings with heating and hot water. The court interpreted the applicants\u2019 unenforced friendly settlement in an earlier set of proceedings (see paragraph 16 above) as their acceptance of the ecological discomfort. 40.  The Supreme Court further reasoned that at the time of the proceedings the plant had suspended most of its operations and had no longer been emitting any substances into the air. Consequently, the appellants were no longer being affected by the pollution. Moreover, they had failed, in the court\u2019s opinion, to show what specific pecuniary damage, if any, had been sustained as a result of the air pollution in the previous years. It was further noted that the appellants had not specified the costs which they had incurred or would inevitably incur in the future for medical treatment for their health problems.", "references": ["7", "2", "0", "5", "3", "1", "8", "9", "6", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1967 and lives in Kalinkovichi. 5.  On 29 March 2008 the applicant was stopped by a Russian customs officer at the border crossing into Belarus. After having checked the applicant\u2019s documents, the officer informed the applicant that, having failed to declare his Opel car when entering Russia, he had infringed the Russian customs regulations. The officer instituted administrative proceedings against the applicant and impounded his car. 6.  On 11 June 2008 Colonel B., Head of the Novozybkov Customs Post of the Bryansk Customs Office, examined the applicant\u2019s case. He found the applicant liable for having failed to declare the car and ordered him to pay a fine in the amount of 35,509.50 Russian roubles (RUB). He further ruled that the applicant\u2019s car, which had been impounded by customs, should be returned to the applicant. The applicant appealed. 7.  On an unspecified date the Novozybkov Town Court of the Bryansk Region fixed the hearing for 8 August 2008. 8.  On 8 August 2008 the Town Court examined the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld the decision of 11 June 2008. The court heard the case in the applicant\u2019s absence. In the operative part of the judgment, the court advised the applicant of his right to appeal against the judgment adopted by the Town Court. 9.  According to the applicant, the letter from the Town Court notifying him of the date and time of the court hearing reached him on 9 August 2008. 10.  On 26 September 2008 the applicant received a copy of the Town Court\u2019s judgment of 8 August 2008 by post. 11.  On an unspecified date the applicant lodged an appeal with the Bryansk Regional Court. On 13 November 2008 the Regional Court sent a letter to the applicant informing him that his appeal was dismissed. 12.  The subsequent request by the applicant for supervisory review was dismissed by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation on 26 January 2009. 13.  On 20 August 2009 the Acting Head of the Novozybkov Customs Post of the Bryansk Customs Office discontinued the enforcement proceedings in respect of the decision of 11 June 2008. He noted that the applicant was a foreign national and had no assets or known place of residence in the Russian Federation and that it was impossible to enforce the decision of 11 June 2008 on account of the expiry of the relevant time-limit. 14.  On 24 August 2009 the Bryansk Customs certified that (1) the decision concerning the applicant\u2019s administrative liability had come into force on 15 July 2009; and (2) the applicant had failed to reclaim his car within a month of that date. 15.  On an unspecified date the regional agency in charge of the federal property applied to the Town Court seeking to reclaim the applicant\u2019s car as bona vacantia. 16.  On 12 November 2009 the Town Court granted the agency\u2019s claims in full. It took into account that, as claimed by the agency, the applicant had been repeatedly summoned to the regional customs office to pick up his car. According to the documents submitted by the Government, the court decided to hear the case in the applicant\u2019s absence given that he had been duly notified of the hearing and chose not to attend. The applicant did not appeal. 17.  On 2 June 2010 the judgment of 12 November 2009 was enforced. 18.  On 19 March 2012 the leaders of the Strategy-31 movement notified the Mayor of Moscow of their intention to organise a rally (from 6 to 8 p.m.) at Triumfalnaya Square in the centre of Moscow and a march (from 8 to 8.30 p.m.) from Triumfalnaya Square down Tverskaya Street to Manezh Square on 31 March 2012 (Saturday). Approximately 1,500 people were expected to attend. The events were organised to promote the right to peaceful assembly as set forth in Article 31 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation and the freedom of Parliamentary elections in Russia. 19.  On 20 March 2012 the Government of Moscow refused to agree on the venues for the rally and the march. According to the authorities, there was archeological and construction work going on in Triumfalnaya Square and the march, according to the indicated route, would \u201cdisrupt the normal functioning of the city\u2019s infrastructure and traffic [and] infringe the rights and interests of people who would not take part [in the rally and the march]\u201d. The authorities further suggested two alternative venues for the planned events, also located in the centre of Moscow. 20.  On 29 March 2012 the leaders of the Strategy-31 movement informed the Mayor of Moscow that the rally would take place at the venue indicated in their notification of 19 March 2012. 21.  On 31 March 2012 the rally was held as planned by its organisers at Triumfalnaya Square. The applicant took part. At 6.30 p.m. he was arrested and brought to the police station. According to the arrest record, the applicant had taken part in an unauthorised gathering and chanted slogans such as \u201cDown with Putin\u201d, \u201cLet us stop the dictatorship\u201d and \u201cFascism shall not pass\u201d. 22.  On 17 April 2012 the Justice of the Peace of Precinct no. 367 of the Tverskoy District of Moscow found that the rally held on 31 March 2012 had been organised in contravention of the existing procedure and that the applicant had taken part in it without having verified whether it had been legitimate. The court found the applicant administratively liable for violation of the established procedure for organising a public assembly and fined him RUB 500. The applicant appealed. 23.  On 21 May 2012 the Tverskoy District Court of Moscow upheld the decision of 17 April 2012 on appeal.", "references": ["6", "3", "9", "2", "5", "0", "1", "4", "8", "No Label", "7"], "gold": ["7"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicants are all Russian nationals living in different regions of Russia. Their personal details are set out in the appendix below. 7.  On various dates the applicants obtained binding judicial decisions ordering the State authorities to provide them with housing or perform other obligations in kind. 8.  According to the latest information available to the Court, judgments became final as specified in the table below and either were enforced with a delay or have remained unenforced. The relevant details in respect of the judgments are listed in the appendix. 9.  The applicants on several occasions applied to different Russian authorities seeking to accelerate the enforcement of the judicial awards in their favour. 10.  The applicant in case no. 73303/11 challenged lawfulness of his dismissal from military service alleging, in particular, that the judicial award in his favour of 28 May 2007 had not been complied with. By the final judgment of 12 May 2011 the Moscow Garrison Military Court rejected his action and established, inter alia, that the judgment of 28 May 2007 had been enforced in full on 25 March 2010.", "references": ["8", "0", "6", "1", "5", "4", "7", "2", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Sesto Fiorentino, Italy. 7.  In 1997 in New York the applicant married M.G., who held joint American and Russian nationality. On 3 October 1997 M.G. gave birth to their son. 8.  In 1998 the family moved to Italy, where three more children were born: a son on 7 February 2000, a daughter on 22 July 2002 and a son on 26 February 2006. All four children hold joint American and Russian nationality. 9.  In September 2007 the applicant and M.G. separated. 10.  On 18 June 2009 the applicant applied for a divorce. 11.  While the divorce proceedings were ongoing, on 27 August 2011 M.G. took the children and left Italy for Russia. 12.  Since the removal of the children the applicant has travelled to Russia on over fifty occasions, trying to bring them back to Italy and maintain contact with them, however, M. G. has prevented him from doing so. 13.  The case file material indicates that the applicant saw the children on several occasions at their school between 15 October and 26 October 2012 when he taught English there on a voluntary basis. 14.  He also saw the children in the short period which followed Dzerzhinskiy District Court\u2019s decisions to grant his application for a temporary contact arrangement pending a decision in the proceedings in Russia to determine the children\u2019s place of residence (see paragraphs 47-48 below). 15.  On 27 November 2012 the applicant went to the children\u2019s school to meet his younger son. The boy did not want to see him, he was pushing the applicant away and yelling. After failed attempts to calm the boy down, the applicant picked him up against his will, held him in both hands and carried him to an office allocated by the school administration for the applicant\u2019s meetings with the children. The boy started screaming, crying and fighting the applicant off. In the meantime, the applicant\u2019s daughter had telephoned M.G., who came to the school shortly afterwards and took the children home. 16.  M.G. sought the institution of criminal proceedings against the applicant for having allegedly inflicted bodily harm on the children in the course of the above incident. On several occasions the Juvenile Division of the St Petersburg Central District Office of the Ministry of Internal Affairs refused to institute criminal proceedings against the applicant, owing to the absence of the constituent elements of a crime in his actions. The most recent decision was on 10 June 2013. The regional prosecutor\u2019s office found the above decision lawful. 17.  Following the incident of 27 November 2012, on 4 December 2012 the temporary contact arrangement for the applicant and his children was cancelled (see paragraph 49 below). 18.  While exercising his contact rights in accordance with a judgment of 13 May 2014 (see paragraph 57 below), on 24 August 2014 the applicant took his second-born son and left Russia for Italy. He never returned the child to the mother and has not seen his other children since. 19.  Since 2014 the applicant\u2019s eldest son has been living in Israel. The applicant\u2019s daughter and youngest son continue to live with their mother in Russia. 1.  Interim decisions concerning the children\u2019s placement in care and residence arrangements pending the conclusion of the divorce proceedings 20.  On 19 December 2009 the Florence District Court held that, while the divorce proceedings were ongoing, the four children should be placed in the care of social services, the children should reside with their mother, and the applicant should pay her child maintenance. The court further determined a schedule for the applicant\u2019s contact sessions with the children. 21.  On 6 December 2010 the Florence District Court varied the arrangements relating to residence and who had care of the children. Relying on an expert report by a psychologist and psychoanalyst, Dr C., and noting M.G.\u2019s continued lack of income, it ordered that, while the divorce proceedings were ongoing, the applicant should have sole care of the four children and the children should reside with him. It further ordered that the three younger children were to spend weekends with their mother in the following manner: from Friday after school to Sunday afternoon, and every other weekend from Friday after school to Sunday evening. The eldest son, who had been diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder, was to go to a day centre for children with special needs after school, and he was free to choose which parent he wanted to stay with at night. The court also ordered that during the approaching Christmas holidays the children were to spend a week with their father and the following week with their mother. 22.  On 7 December 2010 the Florence District Court entrusted Dr C. with carrying out a monitoring exercise in relation to compliance with the above court order. This exercise, carried out in the period between January and May 2011, showed that compliance with the court order of 6 December 2010 was rather good. After certain difficulties initially, the three younger children adapted quite well to their new schedule and accepted their new rhythm of life, which was more regular and settled. Dr C.\u2019s report further mentioned that the children continued to experience psychological discomfort, partly owing to the difficult family situation (acute tensions and conflict between the parents), partly owing to their age (two children were approaching adolescence), and partly owing to M.G.\u2019s actions (her continuing to \u201cuse\u201d the children as \u201cinstruments\u201d in her dispute with the applicant). Despite the remaining difficulties in the relationship between the children and their parents, the arrangement of the children\u2019s life at that stage was assessed by the expert as being the best possible from a psychological and material point of view. The main problems which came to light during the monitoring exercise were: the situation of the applicant\u2019s eldest son, who was not receiving therapy for his condition; the behaviour of M.G., who was unpredictable and eccentric and motivated by a paranoid delusion that she was a victim of plotting and persecution by the court and state institutions in general, and who gave the impression that she was suffering mentally; and M.G.\u2019s relationship with the children, in particular, her attempts to involve the children in judicial proceedings and seek \u201callies\u201d in them against the father, who she represented as cruel, dangerous and violent, all of which was harming the psychological well-being of the children. In the expert\u2019s opinion, in order to prevent further psychological trauma being inflicted on the children by the mother\u2019s behaviour, it was necessary not only to put a distance between her and the children, but also to have recourse to psychotherapy and improve the quality of the children\u2019s psychological environment at their father\u2019s home. 23.  On 29 June 2011 the Florence District Court found that M.G. had not respected the previous court orders. In particular, it found that the eldest son had been living with her during the previous months. As he had refused to see his father, she had been the only parent who had had effective access to him. However, she had refused to bring him to the monitoring meetings with social services or ensure his attendance at the day centre for children with special needs, as ordered by the court. Moreover, she had sent the child to Venice in April without his father\u2019s permission and without notifying social services. Given that M.G. had not respected the arrangements fixed by the court, it was necessary to modify them. Accordingly, the court confirmed the previous arrangements in respect of the younger children in relation to who had care of them, their place of residence and contact. It further confirmed that the applicant should have sole care of the eldest son, and that the eldest son should reside with him. The eldest son was no longer given the choice as to whether he wished to stay with his father or mother at night. The court further confirmed the order for the eldest son\u2019s attendance at a day centre for children with special needs, and noted that if M.G. continued to not comply with that order, the matter would be reported to the Minors Court for the adoption of measures limiting parental authority. It also held that the children were not allowed to leave Italy without the consent of both parents. Lastly, it fixed the manner in which the children should spend the approaching summer holidays. In particular, it ordered that from 25 August to 1 September 2011 the four children were to stay with M.G. 24.  On 27 August 2011 M.G. and the children left Italy for Russia. 25.  On 18 September 2012 the Florence District Court pronounced the divorce of the applicant and M.G. with reference to section 170(1) of the New York Domestic Relations Law, which provides that an action for divorce may be maintained by a husband or wife to procure a judgment divorcing the parties and dissolving the marriage on the grounds of cruel and inhuman treatment of the plaintiff by the defendant such that the conduct of the defendant so endangers the physical or mental well-being of the plaintiff as renders it unsafe or improper for the plaintiff to cohabit with the defendant. The Florence District Court further ordered that the applicant should pay child maintenance to M.G. As regards who should have care of the children and where they should live, the court noted that M.G. had taken the children to Russia in breach of a court order, and for over a year had thereby deprived the father of any possibility of seeing the children. M.G.\u2019s having sole care of the children, as requested by her, was therefore excluded as an option. The court ordered that the applicant and M.G. should have joint care of the children and that the children should reside with their father. After the children\u2019s return to Italy, M.G.\u2019s contact rights would be fixed by social services so as to prevent the children being wrested once again from the environment in which they lived. Lastly, the court ordered that the applicant should bear all financial expenses in respect of the children, except medical expenses not covered by medical insurance, which should be divided between the parents. The judgment was \u201ctemporarily enforceable\u201d (provvisoriamente esecutivo) pending a decision in appeal proceedings. 26.  M.G. appealed against the judgment of 18 September 2012. 27.  On 25 March 2014 the Florence Court of Appeal quashed the judgment of 18 September 2012 and dismissed the applicant\u2019s petition for divorce under section 170 (1) of the New York Domestic Relations Law as not meeting the required conditions. The court further noted that it could not take measures in relation to the personal relationship between the applicant and M.G. or other issues concerning the children. 28.  On 6 July 2015 the Florence Criminal Court convicted M.G. in absentia of abducting the children. She was given a three-year prison sentence with suspension of her parental authority. 29.  On 19 November 2015 the Florence Minors Court dismissed an action by the applicant to strip M.G. of her parental authority in respect of the children. 30.  The applicant applied to the St Petersburg City Court (\u201cthe City Court\u201d) for recognition and enforcement of the Florence District Court\u2019s decision of 6 December 2010. He relied on both the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction and the 1979 Bilateral Convention on Legal Assistance in Civil Matters between Italy and the Soviet Union (\u201cthe Bilateral Convention\u201d). 31.  On 19 January 2012 the City Court rejected the applicant\u2019s application. It found that the decision of 6 December 2010 was an interim decision pending a final decision in divorce proceedings. It could be modified by the judge who had made it at any time, as indeed it had been modified on 29 June 2011, and could not be appealed against. That decision was therefore not a decision rendered in civil matters within the meaning of Article 409 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and accordingly was not enforceable in Russia. The court further held that enforcement of the decision of 6 December 2010 should be refused by reference to Article 412 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Article 13 of the Bilateral Convention. It found that the decision of 6 December 2010 was manifestly incompatible with Russian public order because it ordered that the father should have sole care of the children. Russian law did not provide for one parent to have sole care unless the other parent had been formally stripped of his or her parental authority. Given that M.G. had not been stripped of her parental authority, the decision to award sole care to the applicant was incompatible with Russian law. 32.  The decision of 19 January 2012 mentioned that an appeal against it could be lodged with the Appellate Panel of the City Court within fifteen days. However, the applicant never availed himself of that remedy. 33.  On 13 November 2012 the applicant applied to the City Court for enforcement of the Florence District Court\u2019s judgment of 18 September 2012. He relied on the Bilateral Convention. 34.  On 25 January 2013 the City Court rejected the applicant\u2019s application. Referring to Article 412 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Article 13 of the Bilateral Convention, the City Court found that the judgment of 18 September 2012 was incompatible with the basic principles of Russian law and public order. The judgment read as follows:\n\u201cEstablished case-law shows that public order in the Russian Federation is the basis of State and social organisation of the Russian Federation, [and] the violation of public order is the incompatibility with existing legal norms, social order and fundamental principles of law. Foreign court judgments violating the fundamental rights of a defendant, preventing him or her from defending his or her rights, as well as foreign court judgments whose enforcement may be in conflict with the national law of the State where they have to be enforced, are considered incompatible with public order. Reference to public order is possible when the application of a foreign law may lead to a result incompatible with Russian legal thinking.\nIn the present case, the enforcement of a foreign court decision may be in conflict with Russian national law.\nIn accordance with Article 163 of the Family Code of the Russian Federation, if parents and children do not have a joint place of residence their rights and obligations shall be determined in accordance with the law of the State where the children have citizenship. At a plaintiff\u2019s request, child maintenance obligations and other relationships between parents and children may be determined in accordance with the law of the State where the children permanently reside.\nBy the time the Florence District Court delivered its decision of 18 September 2012 the children had been permanently residing in Russia for over a year (since 27 August 2011), they are Russian nationals and have no Italian nationality. These circumstances are not disputed by the parties.\n[The proceedings concerning residence arrangements, child maintenance and parental authority in respect of the children are ongoing before the Dzerzhinskiy District Court of St Petersburg.]\nUnder these circumstances, examination of the dispute by the Florence court is incompatible with Russian law.\nBesides, the relationship between parents and children is an ongoing process, objectively it can and does change over time. As was noted above, by the time the Florence court delivered its judgment the children had been living in Russia for a long time. During this time their relationship with their parents and their perception of the possibility of living with their father could have changed, which should have been taken into consideration by the [Italian] court. However, the judgment [of 18 September 2012] indicates that the [Italian court] did not take these circumstances into consideration, thereby violating the children\u2019s fundamental rights under Article 12 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child ...\nThe court also takes into account that the enforcement of the Florence court judgment might be incompatible with Russian law.\nIn particular, enforcement of the foreign court decision in the present case would involve the return of the children to Italy, [a country] of which they are not nationals, with them being handed over to [the applicant], who also does not hold Italian nationality ...\nAt the same time, under Article 61 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation a national of the Russian Federation may not be expelled from the territory of the Russian Federation.\nThe applicant\u2019s argument to the effect that he did not intend to bring the children back to Italy immediately and that he first wished to restore his relationship with them cannot serve as grounds for granting [his] application [for recognition and enforcement of the judgment of 18 September 2012]. The court proceeds on the understanding that enforcement of the Florence court judgment would be impossible without the children\u2019s return to Italy ...\u201d 35.  On 7 February 2013 the applicant lodged a private complaint. Referring to Article 15 of the Constitution and Article 6 of the Family Code, he submitted that international treaties took precedence over national law. Under Article 24 of the Bilateral Convention the Italian courts had jurisdiction over the case, because at the time when the proceedings had been instituted he, M.G. and the children had all been permanently residing in Italy. The fact that M.G. had then abducted the children and taken them to Russia had no bearing on the jurisdiction of the Italian courts to proceed with the case. Further, referring to decisions by the Supreme Court (see paragraphs 74-75 below), the applicant argued that the City Court had not indicated what basic principles of the economic, social and legal organisation of Russian society had been infringed by the judgment of 18 September 2012. Moreover, the Russian courts had no competence in relation to verifying whether that judgment was lawful and justified. The applicant also submitted that the Florence District Court had taken into account the children\u2019s wishes, and proof of this had been produced before the City Court. The applicant further argued that the prohibition on deporting Russian nationals was irrelevant to the present case, because the children were not to be deported or extradited from Russia. They were to be handed over to their legal guardian and would enjoy freedom of movement, including the freedom to leave Russia. Lastly, the applicant complained under Article 8 of the Convention that the refusal to enforce the judgment of 18 September 2012 violated his right to respect for his family life. 36.  On 12 March 2013 the Appellate Panel of the City Court held an appeal hearing. The parties had not been notified about the date of the appeal hearing and were therefore absent. On the same day the court upheld the decision of 25 January 2013, finding that it was lawful, well reasoned and justified. It found, in particular, that the judgment of 18 September 2012 by the Florence District Court was incompatible with Russian public order because it was in conflict with Russian family law provisions and unacceptable in relation to Russian legal thinking. 37.  The applicant lodged a cassation appeal with the Presidium of the City Court, repeating the argument set out in his appeal submissions. 38.  On 8 May 2013 a judge of the City Court refused to refer the case for consideration by the Presidium of that court, finding no significant violations of substantive or procedural law which could influence the outcome of the proceedings. The first-instance and appeal courts had correctly applied domestic law. 39.  On 30 September 2013 a judge of the Supreme Court of Russia refused to refer the case for consideration by the Civil Chamber of that Court. 40.  On 9 December 2013 the Deputy President of the Supreme Court of Russia informed the applicant that there were no grounds to disagree with the decision of 30 September 2013, refusing to refer the case for consideration by the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court. 41.  On 10 January 2012 M.G. lodged an application with the Dzerzhinskiy District Court of St Petersburg. Claiming domestic violence and a lack of care and financial support, and referring to the children\u2019s wish to live with her, she asked for an order stripping the applicant of his parental authority in respect of the children and determining that the children should reside with her. She also asked for child maintenance. 42.  The applicant lodged a counterclaim, asking for an order that the children should reside with him. He submitted that M.G. had unlawfully abducted the children despite the decisions by the Florence District Court that they should reside with him. Their residence with M.G. was detrimental to their psychological health. In particular, by falsely accusing him of domestic violence, M.G. had caused the children to fear their father. Moreover, she had prevented him and his relatives from seeing the children or supporting them financially. She had not taken proper care of the eldest son, who suffered from a mental disorder and needed specialist care. 43.  On 12 April 2012 the Dzerzhinskiy District Court of St Petersburg declared M.G.\u2019s claims inadmissible. It noted that proceedings concerning the children\u2019s residence arrangements and child maintenance were ongoing before the Florence District Court. Given that the proceedings in Italy had been initiated before the present proceedings, it was the Italian courts which had jurisdiction over the case, in accordance with Article 25 of the Bilateral Convention. Accordingly, the Russian courts had no competence to examine the case between the same parties, which was based on the same facts and had the same purpose. As regards the claim to strip the applicant of his parental authority, that claim was not part of the proceedings before the Italian courts. However, given that the applicant was a national of the United States of America and permanently living in Italy, the Russian courts had no competence to examine the claims against him. M.G. should therefore submit her claims to the court with territorial jurisdiction over the applicant\u2019s place of residence. 44.  On 6 June 2012 the City Court quashed the decision of 12 April 2012 and remitted the case for fresh consideration before the Dzerzhinskiy District Court. It found that the present proceedings were not identical to the proceedings ongoing in Italy. In particular, the claim to strip the applicant of his parental authority had only been made in the present proceedings. M.G. was entitled to lodge her claim with a court with territorial jurisdiction over her place of residence. Given that she lived in the Dzerzhinskiy District of St Petersburg, the Dzerzhinskiy District Court had competence to examine the case. 45.  On 11 September 2012, having questioned the applicant\u2019s three older children aged 15, 13 and 10, who had all expressed their wish to live with their mother and refused to have any contact with their father, the Dzerzhinskiy District Court decided that, pending the resolution of the proceedings, the children should reside with their mother. 46.  On the same date the applicant asked the court to determine a temporary contact arrangement for him and the children. 47.  Following the applicant\u2019s application, on 30 October 2012 the Dzerzhinskiy District Court decided that, pending the resolution of the proceedings, the applicant should be able to have contact with the children at the schools they attended, in the presence of and with the active involvement of a psychologist, for one hour a week with each child: on Wednesdays after classes from 3 p.m. to 4 p.m. with the elder son; on Fridays after classes from 3 p.m. to 4 p.m. with the second son; on Mondays after classes from 2 p.m. to 3 p.m. with the daughter; and on Tuesdays after classes from 1 p.m. to 2 p.m. with the younger son. 48.  Following an application by the applicant, on 21 November 2012 the Dzerzhinskiy District Court modified the interim contact arrangement between him and the children. In particular, in addition to the previously established contact hours, the applicant was allowed to: take his second son for a walk on Saturdays from noon to 1 p.m.; pick up his daughter from extracurricular activities on Sundays at 1 p.m., have lunch with her afterwards and return her to the mother by 2.30 p.m.; and take his younger son to theatres, museums and for other extracurricular activities for children every other Saturday, for a maximum of four hours starting from 10 a.m. The applicant was also allowed to accompany the three older children to and from school if the children agreed. 49.  However, on 4 December 2012 the Dzerzhinskiy District Court cancelled the above interim contact arrangement on the grounds that it was not in the best interests of the children. In taking that decision, the district court relied on a letter from the Children\u2019s Psychiatry Centre for Recovery Treatment of 29 November 2012 to the effect that, in circumstances where there was bitter parental conflict, meetings between children and the parent from whom they were living apart were psychologically highly traumatic for the children. The court also took into consideration the fact that the school principal firmly objected to having the meetings between the applicant and the children take place on the school premises. Reference was made to the incident of 27 November 2012 (see paragraphs 15-16 above). 50.  On 23 July 2013 the Dzerzhinskiy District Court rejected both M.G.\u2019s and the applicant\u2019s claims in full. It found no evidence of domestic violence in respect of M.G. or the children. It further found it established that, despite the applicant\u2019s wish to take care of the children and support them financially, he was being prevented from doing so by M.G. There were therefore no reasons to strip him of his parental authority in respect of the children. As regards residence arrangements, the court noted that the Florence District Court had already examined similar claims and had ordered by its judgment of 18 September 2012 that the children were to live with the applicant. That judgment was final and enforceable and the procedure for its enforcement in Russia was established by the Bilateral Convention and Article 409 of the Code of Civil Procedure. All the arguments raised by the parties in the present proceedings had already been examined by the Florence District Court. The parties had not produced any new evidence which could warrant changing the residence arrangements determined by the Florence District Court. Moreover, the court had been hampered in its examination of the issue by M.G.\u2019s refusal to have the children examined by court-appointed experts. In the absence of a psychological expert report it was impossible to ascertain effectively the children\u2019s attachment to each of the parents, the parents\u2019 moral character and other relevant qualities, and the relationships between the children and each of the parents. Lastly, the court rejected M.G.\u2019s claim for child maintenance. The parties appealed. 51.  On 19 November 2013 the City Court considered it necessary, among other things, to question the three older children who had reached the age of 10 about their attitude towards each of the parents and the prospect of their living with them, and to obtain the opinion of the youngest child with the involvement of a psychologist. The hearing of 19 November 2013 was adjourned until 10 December 2013. 52.  On 6 December 2013 an inspection of the children\u2019s living conditions with their mother was carried out, and there was also a discussion with the applicant\u2019s youngest child. 53.  On 10 December 2013 the City Court ordered that an expert examination should be carried out so as to determine which parent the children would be most comfortable living with from an emotional perspective, with regard to the individual psychological features of the children and the parents, the relationships between them and the existing circumstances. The examination was also to determine whether it would be possible for the children to live apart from each other with one of the parents, taking into account their psychological attachment to each other. The proceedings were adjourned pending the results of the expert examination. 54.  On 14 January 2014 the City Court ordered that the forensic psychological examination should be carried out by the St Petersburg State Institution for the Social Assistance of Families and Children \u201cThe Regional Family Centre\u201d. 55.  On 19 March 2014 the report of the forensic psychological examination was drawn up. It was based on an examination of the applicant and an analysis of the case file material, since M.G. had refused to take part in the examination and had not let the children be examined either. The experts\u2019 conclusion was that the applicant was polite, communicative, sincere, easy-going, in control of his emotions, sentimental, sensitive to emotional nuances, and that he wanted friendly harmonious relationships. He had broad interests. Rudeness, hostility and a dominating attitude were not part of his character. He could easily adapt to different environments. The experts did not have sufficient material to fully assess the individual psychological features of M.G. and the children. However, on the basis of an analysis of M.G.\u2019s behaviour and the reports by the Italian specialists, and taking into account the ongoing conflict and the children\u2019s being in a psychotraumatic situation for a very long time, the experts recommended that M.G. underwent a comprehensive psychological and psychiatric expert examination. The experts further noted that, owing to the mother\u2019s behaviour, the children had a negative image of their father, which created a substantial risk for their normal mental development. In such a situation, determining the children\u2019s place of residence in accordance with their wishes could contradict their true interests. 56.  On 20 March 2014 the proceedings were resumed. The City Court considered it necessary that the applicant\u2019s two older sons, aged 16 and 14, join the proceedings as third parties. 57.  On 13 May 2014 the City Court quashed the decision of 23 July 2013. It took note of the fact that on 25 March 2014 the judgment of the Florence District Court of 18 September 2012 had been quashed on appeal. The City Court granted M.G.\u2019s claims in part by ordering that the children were to live with her and that the applicant was to pay her child maintenance, and granted the applicant\u2019s claims in part by determining his contact rights in respect of the children. In particular, the applicant was allowed to spend time with the children on the second and last weekend of the month from 10 a.m. on a Saturday to 8 p.m. on a Sunday, for at least four hours on the dates of the children\u2019s birthdays, during half of the public and school holidays, and for at least thirty calendar days during the summer holidays. During public holidays and school holidays the applicant was allowed to travel with the children both in Russia and abroad. The remaining claims by the applicant and M.G. were dismissed. In taking that decision the City Court took into consideration that: the children had been living with their mother for a long time, and they had been cared for and raised by her during this time; while living in St Petersburg they had acquired a circle of friends and teachers; the material in the case file proved M.G.\u2019s conscientious attitude towards her parental obligations; and the children, questioned by both the court and the childcare authority, had expressed their wish to live with their mother. 58.  Between June and October 2011 a number of internet news sites published M.G.\u2019s account of her relationship with the applicant, their divorce and their dispute over the children. In particular, the news sites reproduced M.G.\u2019s accusations against the applicant, describing his alleged acts of violence against her and the children. 59.  The applicant sued the news sites and M.G. for defamation. 60.  On 13 August 2012 the Petrogradskiy District Court of St Petersburg allowed the applicant\u2019s claims against one of the news sites. On 20 August 2012 the Dzerzhinskiy District Court of St Petersburg allowed his claims against M.G. On 30 May 2013 the Golovinskiy District Court of Moscow allowed his claims against another news site. All the district courts found that M.G. and the news sites had not proved the truth of their allegations against the applicant. They noted that the Italian authorities had conducted an inquiry into M.G.\u2019s allegations against the applicant and had found no evidence of domestic violence. The St Petersburg police had also conducted an inquiry which had not revealed any evidence of violent acts by the applicant against M.G. or the children. No such evidence had been produced in the present proceedings either. 61.  The 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (\u201cthe Hague Convention\u201d) entered into force in respect of Italy on 1 May 1995 and in respect of Russia on 1 October 2011. On 1 July 2016 the Convention entered into force between Italy and Russia. For the relevant provisions of the Hague Convention see X v. Latvia [GC], no. 27853/09, \u00a7 34, ECHR 2013. 62.  The relevant provisions of the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child, which has been ratified both by Russia and Italy, reads:\nArticle 3\n\u201c1.  In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.\u201d\nArticle 12\n\u201c1.  States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own views the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the views of the child being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child. 2.  For this purpose, the child shall in particular be provided the opportunity to be heard in any judicial and administrative proceedings affecting the child, either directly, or through a representative or an appropriate body, in a manner consistent with the procedural rules of national law.\u201d 3.  Convention of 25 January 1979 between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Italian Republic on Legal Assistance in Civil Matters 63.  The 1979 Bilateral Convention on Legal Assistance in Civil Matters between Italy and the Soviet Union (still in force) provides that each Contracting Party recognises final judicial decisions in civil and family matters rendered in the territory of the other Contracting Party by a court considered to have jurisdiction within the meaning of this Convention. Each Contracting Party also recognises decisions rendered by the competent authorities of the other Contracting Party concerning paternity, adoption and who has care of a child (Article 19). 64.  Judicial decisions rendered by the courts of one Contracting Party and recognised by the other Contracting Party are enforceable in the territory of that latter Party if they are enforceable in the territory of the Contracting Party from which they originate (Article 22). 65.  The procedure for the recognition and enforcement of judicial decisions is governed by the law of the Contracting Party addressed, so far as this Convention does not provide otherwise (Article 23). 66.  Courts of the Contracting Party from which a decision originates shall be considered to have jurisdiction for the purposes of this Convention if the defendant had his habitual residence in that Contracting Party at the time when proceedings were instituted, or, where the object of an action was the determination of financial maintenance payments, the plaintiff had his habitual residence in the Contracting Party from which the decision originates at the time when the proceedings were instituted (Article 24 \u00a7 1). 67.  Recognition of a judicial decision may nevertheless be refused in any of the following circumstances: (1) if the defendant did not participate in the proceedings because he had not been duly notified of the institution of the proceedings and the date of the hearing; (2) if there is a final decision by the courts of the Contracting Party addressed in the proceedings between the same parties which is based on the same facts and has the same purpose; (3) if proceedings between the same parties, based on the same facts and having the same purpose, are ongoing before the courts of the Contracting Party addressed, provided that those proceedings were the first to be instituted; or (4) if, in accordance with international treaties ratified by both Contracting Parties, the courts of the Contracting Party addressed have exclusive jurisdiction over the case (Article 25 \u00a7 1). Recognition of a judicial decision may also be refused if enforcement of that decision may be detrimental to the sovereignty or national security of the Contracting Party addressed, or if it is manifestly incompatible with the basic principles of law of the Contracting Party addressed (Article 13). 68.  For the relevant provisions of domestic law from 1 January 2012 onwards, see Abramyan and Others v. Russia ((dec.), nos. 38951/13 and 59611/13, \u00a7\u00a7 29-45, 12 May 2015). 69.  The Constitution provides that the commonly recognised principles and norms of international law and the international treaties of the Russian Federation shall be a component part of its legal system. If an international treaty of the Russian Federation sets out rules other than those stipulated by the domestic law, the rules of the international treaty shall apply (Article 15 \u00a7 4). A similar provision is contained in Article 6 of the Family Code. 70.  The Code of Civil Procedure provides that the judgments of foreign courts must be recognised and enforced in the Russian Federation if this is stipulated in the international treaty to which the Russian Federation is a party. Proceedings for recognition and enforcement of a judgment of a foreign court must be instituted within three years of the day of its becoming enforceable (Article 409). 71.  With regard to a person against whom a judgment has been issued, it is the court located where that person has a permanent or temporary residence in the Russian Federation which has territorial jurisdiction to examine an application for the compulsory execution of a foreign court judgment. If that person has no permanent or temporary place of residence in the Russian Federation, or if the location of his place of temporary residence is unknown, it is the court where his property is located which has jurisdiction (Article 410). 72.  The application for recognition and enforcement of a foreign court judgment must be considered in open court, and the person against whom the judgment was issued must be notified of the time and place of the examination of the application. That person\u2019s failure to appear, in the absence of valid reasons, does not preclude the court from examining the application. The court may grant the application for enforcement of a foreign court judgment or refuse it, after having heard the defendant and examined the evidence. In the event of there being doubts during the examination of the application, the court may seek explanation from the person who lodged the application, and may also question the defendant on the merits of the application and, if necessary, seek explanation from the foreign court which delivered the judgment in question (Article 411 \u00a7\u00a7 3, 4 and 6). 73.  Enforcement of a foreign court judgment may be refused in any of the following circumstances: (1) if the judgment is not final or enforceable in accordance with the domestic law of the State in which it was issued; (2) if the defendant was deprived of an opportunity to participate in the proceedings because he was not duly notified of the time and place of the hearing; (3) if Russian courts have exclusive jurisdiction over the case; (4) if there is a final judgment by Russian courts in the proceedings between the same parties, based on the same facts and having the same purpose, or if the proceedings between the same parties, based on the same facts and having the same purpose, are ongoing before Russian courts, provided that the proceedings before the Russian courts were the first to be instituted; (5) if enforcement of the judgment may be detrimental to Russian sovereignty or national security, or if it is manifestly incompatible with Russian public order; (6) the time-limit for applying for enforcement has expired and has not been extended by a Russian court at the plaintiff\u2019s request (Article 412). 74.  In its decision no. 91-\u041308-6 of 19 August 2008 the Supreme Court held that \u201cpublic order\u201d within the meaning of Article 412 of the Code of Civil Procedure could not be equated to national law. The notion of \u201cpublic order\u201d meant basic principles of the economic, social and legal organisation of Russian society set out by the Constitution and federal laws. 75.  In its decision no. 59-\u041309-14 of 25 August 2009 the Supreme Court held that, when examining an application for enforcement of a foreign judicial decision, Russian courts had no competence in relation to verifying whether that decision was lawful and justified. 76.  The Code of Civil Procedure provides that a first-instance court decision concerning the recognition and enforcement of a foreign court judgment may be appealed against before an appeal court by lodging a private complaint (\u0447\u0430\u0441\u0442\u043d\u0430\u044f \u0436\u0430\u043b\u043e\u0431\u0430) within fifteen days of the decision of the first-instance court being taken (Article 331 \u00a7 1 and Article 332). 77.  A private complaint against the first-instance court decision concerning the recognition and enforcement of a foreign court judgment is examined by the appeal court without the participants being notified of the proceedings (Article 333 \u00a7 2, as in force at the material time). 78.  By its ruling of 30 November 2012, 29-P the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation interpreted Article 333 \u00a7 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as in force at the material time, as implying that: (a) the participants in the proceedings should be informed about the lodging of a private complaint against the decision of a first-instance court, and they should be provided with an opportunity to acquaint themselves with the contents of the private complaint and \u2013 if the private complaint is examined in the absence of an oral hearing \u2013 to submit to the appeal court in writing their position as regards the private complaint; (b)  the participants in the proceedings should be informed about the time and place of the examination by the appeal court in an oral hearing of a private complaint against the decision of a first-instance court where the appeal court, taking into account the nature and complexity of the procedural issue under examination and the arguments set out in the private complaint, arrives at the conclusion that it is necessary for the proper administration of justice to provide the participants in the proceedings with an opportunity to make oral submissions as to their position before the appeal court. 79.  As of 28 December 2013 Article 333 \u00a7 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure explicitly provides that the examination of a private complaint against a first-instance court decision concerning the recognition and enforcement of a foreign court judgment is carried out with the participants in the proceedings being notified about the time and place of the appeal hearing.", "references": ["7", "9", "6", "2", "5", "1", "3", "0", "8", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1975 and lived in Novosibirsk before his arrest. 7.  On 12 November 2010 the Kalininskiy District Court of Novosibirsk convicted the applicant of aggravated theft and armed robbery and sentenced him to nine years\u2019 imprisonment. The applicant was represented by a lawyer in these proceedings. 8.  On 24 January 2011 an appeal brought by the applicant himself was examined by the Novosibirsk Regional Court in the absence of counsel. The appeal court upheld the applicant\u2019s conviction. 9.  The applicant has been serving his sentence in IK-8 in Novosibirsk since 10 February 2011. 10.  As regards the conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention in the IK-8 facility, the Government submitted information which can be summarised as follows:\n \nPeriod of detention\n \nUnit no.\n \n \nDormitory surface area in square metres\n \n \nNumber of sleeping places\n \nNumber of inmates assigned to the dormitory\n \nNumber of washbasins and lavatories\n \n10-15 February 2011\n \nQuarantine section 50.2\n24\n6-24\n2 and 2\n \n15 February \u2013 30 May 2011\n \n17\n219\n109\n100-108\n8 and 10\n \n30 May 2011 \u2013 February 2013\n7 11.  The Government also submitted that all the units where the applicant had been detained had had a sufficient number of sleeping places for all the detainees, they had been ventilated through openings in the windows and had had access to cold water in accordance with up to date sanitary standards. The units were equipped with ten to fifteen kettles to boil water and tanks containing potable water. All the lavatories had individual cabins with doors that were one and a half metres high, opening to the outside. They submitted photographs of the washbasins and lavatories. 12.  The applicant acknowledged that he had an individual sleeping place. However, he underlined that the conditions he had to live in were cramped. He further submitted that the units had no access to natural light or had poor artificial lighting, that the ventilation did not work and that the air was damp. The food he was provided was not in accordance with the special diet prescribed for him. Furthermore, inmates with tuberculosis lived in the same dormitory. There were only three lavatories (in units 17 and 7), they had no doors and the applicant had no privacy when using them. They were clogged up most of the time owing to the number of people using them. Prisoners were only allowed one shower a week. The applicant had no access to potable water and only one washbasin out of four had worked. There were only two kettles for boiling water and the electricity was switched off during the day and therefore it was not possible to have boiled water. The applicant further submitted that the buildings where his units were located were in a hazardous condition and that the roof and walls were liable to fall in at any time owing to a lack of repairs. Lastly, the applicant adduced written statements from his four co-detainees who confirmed his account of the conditions of detention in IK-8 in Novosibirsk.", "references": ["7", "6", "3", "9", "5", "8", "0", "2", "4", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1949 and lives in Vyshneve, the Kyiv region. 6.  The applicant\u2019s son (born in 1972), V.K., had a long history of chronic alcoholism and opium addiction. He also suffered from a number of chronic diseases (see paragraph 51 below). 7.  On 13 August 2001 an officer of the Fastiv railway station police, K.M., apprehended him on suspicion of a drugs-related offence. 8.  In February 2002 V.K. complained to the prosecution authorities that for more than a year he had been suffering from psychological pressure and physical ill-treatment by the Fastiv railway station police officers. It is not clear whether there was any follow-up to that complaint. The fact that V.K. had raised it was established by the domestic courts during the subsequent criminal proceedings against K.M. The trial court dealing with that case stated in its judgment that it had inspected the documents regarding the above-mentioned events on 27 February 2007 (see paragraph 78 below). 9.  From 17 June to 1 July 2003 the applicant\u2019s son was treated for opium addiction in the Kyiv regional hospital. There is no information in the case file whether that treatment was successful and in what condition V.K. was discharged from the hospital. 10.  On 13 August 2003 V.K. left home and never returned. 11.  On 18 August 2003 the applicant reported his disappearance to the Vyshneve town police. 12.  On the same date an unidentified unconscious man was found in Vasylkiv, the Kyiv region. He was taken by ambulance to the local hospital with a preliminary diagnosis of \u201cpoisoning by unknown substance\u201d, which was not, however, confirmed by laboratory tests. 13.  On 19 August 2003 the man regained consciousness and identified himself as V.K. As subsequently stated by many witnesses, he had no visible injuries at that time. The only available information about V.K.\u2019s treatment is that his condition improved considerably. 14.  On 21 August 2003 an official of the Vasylkiv town police informed his counterparts in Vyshneve that the applicant\u2019s son had been found and that he was in hospital. There was no follow-up to the message and it was not passed on to the applicant. 15.  On 22 August 2003 V.K. left hospital without authorisation. 16.  Shortly after midnight on 25 August 2003 he was found injured and unconscious at Fastiv railway station (further details are provided in paragraph 20 below). 17.  After V.K.\u2019s subsequent death (see paragraph 36 below), the domestic authorities tried to establish what had happened to him between the two above-mentioned events. It took them five years to establish some of the facts (see paragraph 74 below). 18.  In that regard, several people who had been detained in the police unit at Fastiv railway station on the evening of 22 August 2003 stated that they had witnessed the following events. At about 8 p.m. two police officers had brought in an apparently drunk man (subsequently recognised as V.K.) and placed him in a cell. As V.K. had protested loudly against his detention, one of the officers, who already was at the police station when V.K. had arrived (subsequently recognised as K.M. \u2013 see paragraphs 7 and 8 above), had entered his cell and hit him in the face with a rubber truncheon. V.K. had fallen down and his nose had started bleeding. K.M. had then kicked him twice, on the head and torso. The two officers who had apprehended V.K. joined K.M. From that moment the other inmates chose not to watch the beating but heard it going on. At about 6 a.m. on 23 August 2003, after the other detainees had been taken out for various procedural acts, V.K. had remained in the police unit, lying motionless on the floor. By noon that day he was no longer seen there. 19.  The time and circumstances of V.K.\u2019s departure from the police unit and his arrival at the railway station have never been established. None of the police unit\u2019s documents contained any information about his detention. The two officers who apprehended him and subsequently participated in his ill-treatment have never been identified. 20.  About thirty minutes after midnight on 25 August 2003, supposedly after a telephone call from a passer-by whose identity remained unknown, K.M. called an ambulance for an unidentified, unconscious man (later identified as V.K.) found at the railway station. The incident was not mentioned in the police unit\u2019s log. When the ambulance arrived, K.M., who was waiting for it, made no mention of knowing V.K. or of having any information about him. 21.  The applicant\u2019s son was taken to the State-run Fastiv Central Town Hospital (\u201cthe Fastiv Hospital\u201d; see paragraphs 25-36 below). 22.  The case file contains fragmentary and contradictory information as to whether the police showed any interest in V.K. thereafter. As stated in a letter from the chief doctor to the applicant of 25 January 2005, the nurse on duty had immediately informed the Fastiv town police by telephone about the arrival of a man with injuries. Subsequently, on 13 August 2005 there was a confrontation between that nurse and the police officer who had been on duty that day, with the police officer denying any such telephone call. It is not clear in what context the above confrontation was conducted. Furthermore, two nurses stated during questioning in February 2010 (also in an unclear context) that at about 7 a.m. on 25 August 2003 two police officers had arrived at the hospital to see \u201cthe newly arrived patient with injuries\u201d. Given the considerable lapse of time, the nurses were unable to recognise the officers or give any further details. However, none of the four patients with whom V.K. had shared his ward remembered seeing the police. 23.  On 28 August 2003 the applicant, who remained unaware of the whereabouts of her son, once again asked the police to look for him. 24.  On the same day the police officer K.O., who was in charge of the search at Vyshneve police, issued a report on questioning Vasylkiv Hospital staff, which said V.K. had been discharged on 22 August 2003 in good health. As subsequently established (see paragraph 61 below), K.O. did not in fact talk to the hospital\u2019s staff and forged the report. Relying on that document, he issued a decision refusing to open a criminal case concerning V.K.\u2019s disappearance, which was approved by his superior, A.V. (see paragraph 62 below). 25.  At about 2.35 a.m. on 25 August 2003 the applicant\u2019s son was taken by ambulance to Fastiv Hospital, where he was registered as an unidentified person. He was dirty and his wounds were covered with scabs. 26.  He was examined by the admissions doctor, a traumatology doctor and the anaesthesiologist on duty. They diagnosed him as having a closed craniocerebral injury and cerebral contusion and contused wounds to the head. As subsequently stated by numerous doctors in the context of the criminal proceedings against their colleague P.V. (see paragraphs 63-73 below), an X-ray examination of V.K.\u2019s skull was carried out and did not reveal any fractures. However, there were no X-rays in his medical file and none of the hospital\u2019s staff could explain their disappearance. 27.  At about 9 a.m. on 25 August 2003 V.K. recovered consciousness, but hardly responded to any attempts of contact. He did not remember who he was. For most of the time his mental state was blurred and he mumbled incomprehensibly. 28.  On the same day he was examined by a neuropathologist, who carried out a lumber puncture. It indicated elevated intracranial pressure. The doctor prescribed some drugs for V.K. via intravenous drip, but it appears that he received only glucose, which was administered on 29 August 2003 (see paragraph 34 below). 29.  It is not clear what medicine was administered to V.K. during his stay in Fastiv Hospital. It appears that he was prescribed anti-edema drugs and two different types of antibiotic. As stated by numerous patients, including those sharing the ward with V.K., all medications were at their own expense. Furthermore, none of the nurses questioned in the course of the criminal proceedings against P. (see paragraphs 63-73 below) was able to say what medication the hospital had had at its disposal to administer to patients free of charge. 30.  On 26 August 2003 the traumatology doctor P.V. was appointed to oversee V.K.\u2019s treatment and examined him. On that day and the next the applicant\u2019s son was also examined by the head of the traumatology department and a neuropathologist. 31.  On 28 August 2003, following a serious deterioration in V.K.\u2019s condition, a panel of six of the hospital\u2019s doctors examined him and it was decided to consult a neurosurgeon. 32.  A neurosurgeon from Kyiv Regional Clinical Hospital examined V.K. that evening and stated that he needed a computerised brain tomography scan for a proper diagnosis. As there was no such machine at Fastiv Hospital he needed to be transferred to the regional hospital. 33.  However, for unknown reasons that recommendation was not followed. P.V. stated in the course of his trial (see paragraphs 63-73 below) that, firstly, he had considered V.K. to be too ill to be moved and, secondly, that it had been impossible to overcome all the administrative formalities needed to obtain the required vehicle, for which he blamed his superiors. 34.  On 29 August 2003 V.K. was given an intravenous infusion of glucose and his condition improved slightly. That was the only intravenous infusion carried out. 35.  On 2 September 2003 V.K. slipped into a coma. Although the change in his condition was brought to their attention, the medical staff did not react. V.K. was not examined by his doctor or any other specialist. He was kept in the same ward in the traumatology department and no resuscitation measures were undertaken. 36.  He died at 6.20 p.m. on 3 September 2003. 37.  On 4 September 2003 a forensic medical expert, G.S., conducted an autopsy of V.K. (documented as an unidentified person) and issued a preliminary death certificate. He stated that V.K. had died of toxic hypoxic encephalopathy (a brain dysfunction caused by oxygen deprivation resulting from toxic exposure) complicated by swelling of the brain on a background of proliferative leptomeningitis (inflammation of the tissues surrounding the brain), pericarditis (inflammation of the sac surrounding the heart), and chronic hepatitis. The expert also reported some minor injuries but stated that they had had nothing to do with his death. He did not mention the numerous tattoos on V.K.\u2019s body (see also paragraph 48 below). 38.  On 5 September 2003 the chief doctor at Fastiv Hospital wrote a letter to the Fastiv town police informing them that an unidentified man with head injuries had been brought to the hospital on 25 August 2003 and that he had died on 3 September 2003. The hospital\u2019s administration therefore requested that the police identify that person. 39.  On 9 September 2003 the applicant found out about her son\u2019s death from unspecified sources and immediately went to the Fastiv police. However, V.K. had already been buried in Fastiv as an unidentified person earlier that day. The applicant identified him from photographs of his body. According to her, \u201che was all dirty, shaggy, wizened, and his hair was covered with dried blood\u201d. 40.  On 12 September 2003, at the applicant\u2019s wish, the body was reburied in Vyshneve. She had the coffin opened so she could see her son. According to her, his body bore signs of torture. She submitted, in particular, that there were numerous injuries, including handcuff marks on his wrists and traces of electrical burns between the fingers. The applicant also alleged that one of her son\u2019s tattoos appeared to have been \u201cburnt off\u201d. It appears that she complained to the prosecution authorities about the above matters. 41.  On 10 October 2003 G.S. issued a post-mortem examination report reiterating his earlier findings (see paragraph 37 above). 42.  On the same date the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office (\u201cthe PGO\u201d) opened a criminal case in respect of the suspected murder of V.K., however, no suspects were identified. That case was subsequently joined to and eventually severed from numerous other related criminal proceedings (see the sections below). 43.  On 29 October 2003 G.S. issued a forensic examination report with similar conclusions as before. He also stated that V.K.\u2019s medical condition had been caused by lengthy alcohol and drug intoxication. As regards his injuries, they were insignificant and might have resulted from his falling on a hard surface. 44.  On 30 October 2003 the applicant took her son\u2019s clothes and shoes from Fastiv Hospital and handed them over to the prosecution (the exact name of the authority is not legible in the copy of the document concerned). The clothes were covered with stains which looked like blood and the shoes had no laces. Given that removing the shoelaces of detainees was a well-known police practice, the applicant suspected that her son had been detained and asked the authorities to investigate that possibility. 45.  Forensic immunological examinations of the clothes and shoes, which were carried out on 5 December 2003 and 1 July 2005, established, respectively, that the stains were blood and that it could have been V.K.\u2019s. 46.  The investigation was entrusted to various prosecution and law\u2011enforcement authorities at different times: the town prosecutor\u2019s offices in Fastiv, Vasylkiv and Bila Tserkva, the Kyiv Regional Prosecutor\u2019s Office and the PGO. It was discontinued and resumed on many occasions. Overall, from 2003 to 2016 the investigator in charge of the case was changed at least twenty times. 47.  On 15 October 2004 V.K.\u2019s body was exhumed on the PGO\u2019s order. 48.  On 15 November 2004 a forensic medical expert (S.A.) completed a report after examining the body. He documented the following injuries: a fracture of the nose, three wounds on the right side of the head, an unspecified number of haematomas in the soft tissues under the scalp and on the face, and three haematomas under the pericranium. All the injuries had been inflicted by blunt objects, possibly by hands and/or feet, without further specification being possible. The report also noted large tattoos on the arms and shoulders. 49.  According to the applicant, the forensic examination also found that the left kidney, the suprarenal glands and the pancreatic gland were missing from her son\u2019s body. The expert report stated in that regard:\n\u201cIn the place where the left kidney should be is a greyish-brown mass resembling a kidney in texture. [...] It has not been possible to identify secretions from the suprarenal glands or the pancreatic gland.\u201d 50.  The mass resembling a kidney was taken for a forensic histological analysis, which did not discover anything of note. S.A. was asked during G.S.\u2019s subsequent trial whether any organs were missing from the body and he replied in the negative. 51.  Between 2004 and 2009 numerous forensic medical examinations were carried out on the basis of the material in the case file (at least six). They found that although, as established by the forensic histological examinations, V.K. had been suffering from various diseases (namely chronic leptomeningitis, chronic encephalopathy, granular myocardial dystrophy, interstitial hepatitis with the first signs of cirrhosis, granular kidney degeneration, diffuse proliferative nephritis and chronic bronchitis), none of them, either taken separately or together, could have caused his death. It was eventually established that the direct cause of death had been swelling of the brain and meninx, which had blocked the circulation of blood in the brain. Only a computerised brain tomography could have diagnosed that condition while V.K. was still alive, but that had not been done. The experts held that the fatal brain injuries could have resulted from him being beaten. It was stated in that connection that he had sustained at least eight blows to the head from blunt objects (possibly a rubber truncheon, fists and/or feet). At the same time, it was impossible to establish precisely the nature and scope of all the injuries to V.K.\u2019s head given the omissions and deficiencies of the post-mortem examination. Details of additional forensic medical examinations, carried out in 2010 and 2012, are provided in paragraphs 65-66 and 81 below. 52.  On 21 December 2008 the investigator in charge of the case inspected V.K.\u2019s cell at Fastiv railway station police unit and took several samples from the walls and floor (see paragraph 75 below for the context of that investigative measure). A number of forensic immunological examinations were carried out in 2008, 2009 and 2010. They found that the samples contained traces of blood, which could have come from the applicant\u2019s son. 53.  On 6 December 2012 an investigator at Bila Tserkva City Prosecutor\u2019s Office (it is not known when and in what circumstances the investigation had been handed over to that authority) made an entry in the Unified Register of Pre-Trial Investigations regarding an investigation into abuse of office by two unidentified police officers on account of V.K.\u2019s ill\u2011treatment on 22 August 2003. Such an entry was a new procedure for initiating a pre-trial investigation under the new Code of Criminal Procedure, which had come into effect on 19 November 2012. The case was transferred to the Kyiv Regional Prosecutor\u2019s Office on 10 September 2013. 54.  There is no information in the case file about further developments in the investigation. According to the Government\u2019s observations, it was still ongoing as of September 2016. 55.  On 7 April 2005 the PGO opened a criminal case against the forensic medical expert G.S. on suspicion of negligence. Further charges were subsequently brought against him (see below). 56.  On 5 May 2010 the Kyyevo-Svyatoshynskyy District Court (\u201cthe Kyyevo-Svyatoshynskyy Court\u201d) found G.S. guilty of abuse of office and forgery in office leading to grave consequences and of delivering a knowingly false expert conclusion. More specifically, the trial court held that the expert had knowingly given false data on the cause of V.K.\u2019s death, had failed both to collect all the requisite tissue samples and to carry out a number of essential analyses. However, it acquitted G.S. of concealing a serious crime. He was also exempted from punishment for forgery and a false expert conclusion as those charges had become time-barred. He was sentenced on the charge of abuse of office to three years and six months\u2019 imprisonment and a three-year ban on holding expert positions. The Kyyevo-Svyatoshynskyy Court allowed a civil claim by the applicant in part. It awarded her 1,851 Ukrainian hryvnyas (UAH; at the time equivalent to 175 euros (EUR)) in respect of pecuniary damage and UAH 10,000 (about EUR 950) in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be paid by G.S. In addition, the applicant was awarded UAH 50,000 (about EUR 4,700) in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be paid by the Kyiv Regional Bureau of Forensic Medical Examinations. 57.  On 18 August 2010 the Kyiv Regional Court of Appeal (\u201cthe Regional Court of Appeal\u201d) allowed an appeal by G.S., quashed the first\u2011instance court\u2019s judgment in the part which convicted him of making a knowingly false expert conclusion and discontinued proceedings on that charge, because there were no constituent elements of an offence in his actions. The appellate court also reclassified the remaining charges. Instead of abuse of office and forgery in office leading to grave consequences, he was found guilty of professional negligence with grave consequences and was sentenced to three years\u2019 imprisonment and a ban on holding expert positions for three years. As that new charge had become time-barred, the Regional Court of Appeal absolved him from the penalty. The judgment upheld the applicant\u2019s civil claim. 58.  On 18 October 2010 the Supreme Court rejected a prosecution request for leave to appeal on points of law. 59.  On 28 October 2010 G.S. paid the amount due to the applicant. 60.  According to the applicant, she has never received any money from the Kyiv Regional Bureau of Forensic Medical Examinations. 61.  Following numerous complaints by the applicant about the inadequacy of Vyshneve police\u2019s search for her son in August 2003, on 16 April 2007 the PGO opened a criminal case against officer K.O., who had been in charge of the search. Courts at two levels of jurisdiction (the Kyyevo-Svyatoshynskyy Court on 9 July 2012 and the Regional Court of Appeal on 9 April 2014) found him guilty of abuse of office with grave consequences and of forgery in office (see paragraph 24 above). They sentenced him to five years\u2019 imprisonment and a prohibition on holding positions related to the performance of public duties for two years. He was, however, exempted from serving the sentence given the expiry of the statutory limitation period. The decision became final as there were no appeals on points of law. 62.  The applicant also unsuccessfully sought the prosecution of A.V., K.O.\u2019s supervisor. 63.  On unspecified dates the prosecution authorities refused to institute criminal proceedings in respect of V.K.\u2019s death against the chief doctor, the head of the traumatology department, the anaesthesiologist and the neuropathologist at Fastiv Hospital. The case file does not contain any further information or documents in that regard. Nor is there any information as to whether there were any disciplinary proceedings. 64.  On 24 October 2007 the PGO opened a criminal case against P.V., the traumatology doctor at the hospital, on suspicion of failure to provide V.K. with the requisite medical care, which had led to the latter\u2019s death. 65.  On 14 September 2010 the investigator ordered a forensic examination of the case file by a panel of experts with a view to assessing the care provided to V.K. at Fastiv Hospital. The panel had to answer thirty specific questions, including the following:\n(a) Were there any legal standards for the treatment of craniocerebral injuries and, if so, had they been complied with in V.K.\u2019s case?\n(b) Was the neurosurgeon\u2019s recommendation to undertake a computerised brain tomography binding on P.V.?\n(c) How had the failure to carry out the computerised brain tomography influenced the quality of the medical care provided to V.K. and his health condition?\n(d) Would a timely computerised brain tomography have helped to detect the pathological developments that caused V.K.\u2019s death? If so, would a timely medical response have made it possible to prevent them?\n(e) Had it been feasible to transport V.K. to the better equipped Kyiv Regional Hospital given the state of his health?\n(f) Were there any legal standards for such transportation?\n(g) Were any resuscitation measures carried out once V.K. had gone into a coma?\n(h) Did his coma result from low blood sugar?\n(i) Was V.K. so ill when he had arrived at Fastiv Hospital that he had been bound to die, regardless of any medical care? 66.  The experts issued their report on 28 January 2011. It stated that there had been no legal standards for treating craniocerebral injuries until 13 June 2008. However, according to general practice, treatment was to consist of sedatives and pain relief; treatment of symptoms; an initial surgical debridement of wounds; anti-inflammatories, and, if required, hormonal, dehydrating, anti-edemic, antioxidant and nootropic treatment. The experts noted that the drugs prescribed for the applicant\u2019s son (see paragraph 29 above) appeared to correspond to that practice. The report also observed that there were no regulations that had obliged P.V. to comply with the neurosurgeon\u2019s recommendation. A timely computerised brain tomography would have helped to clarify the nature and scope of V.K.\u2019s craniocerebral injuries, which, in turn, would have led to the right treatment. Accordingly, the failure to carry out that diagnostic measure had impaired the quality of the medical care given to V.K. and had contributed to aggravating his condition. Transporting him had been necessary and possible using a special intensive care vehicle, which the hospital had had at its disposal. In the absence of any relevant legal standards, questions concerning the transportation of patients were at the discretion of the doctor treating the patient and the hospital\u2019s administration. The panel of experts further noted that V.K.\u2019s medical file made no mention of resuscitation measures. As regards the cause of V.K.\u2019s coma, there appeared to be no conclusive evidence that it had been due to low blood sugar. At the same time, the experts noted that given V.K.\u2019s inability to eat and drink on his own it was probable his sugar level had dropped. Furthermore, they observed that although his condition had warranted regular infusions of glucose under the supervision of an endocrinologist, there had been only one such intravenous infusion, on 29 August 2003. Lastly, the report stated that there was no indication of an inevitable fatal outcome for V.K., regardless of any medical assistance. 67.  In March 2011 the investigation was completed and the case was sent for trial. 68.  On 19 September 2013 the Vasylkiv Town Court remitted the case for additional investigation. However, on 6 February 2014 the Kyiv City Court of Appeal quashed that ruling. 69.  On 29 July 2014 the Kyyevo-Svyatoshynskyy Court (to which the case had been transferred at the applicant\u2019s request) found P.V. guilty of a failure to provide the applicant\u2019s son with the requisite medical care, which had led to grave consequences. The court held, in particular, that P.V., without any good reason, had failed to make sure V.K. was transferred to the regional hospital for a computer brain tomography, which had seriously undermined the effectiveness of his treatment. Furthermore, it was concluded that P.V. had failed to take even the minimum measures in response to V.K.\u2019s coma on 2 and 3 September 2003. The court sentenced him to three years\u2019 imprisonment, but released him from serving the sentence as the limitation period for that type of offence had expired. Furthermore, the court allowed a civil clam by the applicant in part and awarded her UAH 100,000 (at the time equivalent to about EUR 6,100) in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be paid jointly by P.V., the Fastiv District State Administration and Fastiv Hospital. 70.  On 5 November 2014 the Regional Court of Appeal upheld that judgment. The only amendment it ordered was to make Fastiv Hospital solely responsible for paying the applicant. 71.  As there was no appeal on points of law the judgment became final. 72.  The Government submitted an information note from the unified register of enforcement proceedings along with their observations. It stated that the bailiffs service had on 23 January 2015 terminated enforcement of the above judgment at the applicant\u2019s request. 73.  Without commenting on that document, the applicant submitted that as of 1 August 2016 she had not received any payment from Fastiv Hospital. 74.  On 19 November 2008 the investigator questioned several persons, who had been detained at the Fastiv railway station police unit on the evening of 22 August 2003. They submitted that they had witnessed the ill\u2011treatment of another inmate (see paragraph 18 above). 75.  On 8 December 2008 a former detainee, S.P., recognised K.M. as one of the police officers who had beaten V.K. On various dates thereafter several other former detainees made similar statements. 76.  On 26 December 2008 the PGO detained K.M. 77.  Subsequently, several criminal cases were opened against him on suspicion of abuse of office by a law-enforcement official with grave consequences, the exceeding of authority associated with ill-treatment of the victim, also with grave consequences, and infliction of grievous bodily harm leading to the death of the victim. K.M. consistently denied being present at the police unit on the evening on 22 August 2003, let alone having beaten V.K. 78.  On 7 September 2011 the Bila Tserkva City Court found K.M. guilty of abuse of office by a law-enforcement official with grave consequences, and exceeding his authority associated with ill-treatment of the victim, also with grave consequences. The court acquitted him in respect of the charge of inflicting grievous bodily harm leading to the victim\u2019s death. It sentenced him to six years\u2019 imprisonment and a prohibition on holding positions related to public duties for three years. It also ordered the confiscation of his property. The court noted that the applicant had lodged a civil claim, however, it left it without examination on the grounds that there were a number of related criminal proceedings still ongoing and that she could later bring a civil claim under the civil procedure. 79.  On 7 December 2011 the Regional Court of Appeal quashed K.M.\u2019s acquittal and remitted that part of the case for additional investigation. It upheld the rest of the judgment. 80.  On 7 March 2012 S.P. took part in a reconstruction of the events of 22 August 2003 (see paragraph 75 above). 81.  On 12 March 2012 the investigator ordered a forensic medical examination to verify S.P.\u2019s account. Furthermore, the expert was to establish the cause of V.K.\u2019s death and the existence of any cause and effect between the death and his being beaten by K.M. The report was issued on 21 March 2012 and stated that the injuries sustained by V.K., as documented by the earlier forensic examination reports, could have been inflicted in the manner and in the circumstances described by S.P. As regards the cause of death, the panel referred to its earlier findings and stated that V.K. could have died of the brain and meninx injuries (see paragraph 51 above). Lastly, they concluded that the injuries could have resulted from K.M.\u2019s assault on V.K., as described by S.P. 82.  On 30 October 2012 the Higher Specialised Court for Civil and Criminal Matters upheld the lower courts\u2019 decisions of 7 September and 7 December 2011 (see paragraphs 78 and 79 above). 83.  K.M. was released on parole on 2 November 2012. 84.  However, on 15 November 2012 he was remanded in custody as a preventive measure pending his trial on the remaining charge (see paragraph 79 above). 85.  On 12 August 2013 the Kyyevo-Svyatoshynskyy Court found K.M. guilty of inflicting grievous bodily harm on V.K., which had led to the victim\u2019s death, and sentenced him to ten years\u2019 imprisonment. The court saw no aggravating or mitigating circumstances in the case. At the same time, the case file material referred to in the judgment included the testimony of two witnesses who stated that K.M. was prone to violence. One of them, Vo., a retired teacher, stated that he had been arbitrarily detained in December 2003 and that K.M. had punched him in the face and used a pepper spray on him when he had complained. Being scared, Vo. had written a statement that he had no complaints against the police. Another witness, M., submitted that she had been in a caf\u00e9 in October 2005 when K.M., clearly drunk, had passed by her and pushed her. She was pregnant and had told him his behaviour was unacceptable. K.M. had reacted by punching her in the face. Later, in the presence of the police, he had hit her again and she had fallen to the ground. Both K.M. and his superior had subsequently apologised to her and asked her not to lodge a complaint so she had not. 86.  On 27 November 2013 the Regional Court of Appeal quashed the first-instance court\u2019s judgment and discontinued the proceedings in that part as time-barred. The appellate court noted that the statutory ten-year limitation period had not been interrupted as K.M. had not absconded or committed other criminal offences. K.M. was released in the courtroom. 87.  The applicant appealed on points of law. She submitted, in particular, that K.M. had for many years concealed the truth about both knowing V.K. and ill-treating him. Accordingly, the applicant contended that he had been seeking to evade justice. 88.  On 21 August 2014 the Higher Specialised Court for Civil and Criminal Matters upheld the appellate court\u2019s ruling. 89.  On 9 August 2012 the Baryshivka Town Prosecutor\u2019s Office (in the Kyiv region) opened a criminal case against G.V., who had not stopped his colleague K.M. from beating the applicant\u2019s son. 90.  During the pre-trial investigation and the trial G.V. consistently denied that either V.K. or K.M. had been present at the police unit on 22 August 2003. 91.  On 14 October 2013 the Kyyevo-Svyatoshynskyy Court found G.V. guilty of negligence with grave consequences and of concealing a criminal offence. It sentenced him to five years\u2019 imprisonment and a prohibition on holding any office related to the performance of public duties for three years. G.V. was absolved from the penalty as the charges had become time\u2011barred. A civil claim by the applicant was allowed in part. The court ordered G.V. to pay her UAH 80,000 (equal to about EUR 7,100 at the time) in compensation for non-pecuniary damage. 92.  On 10 December 2013 the Regional Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance court\u2019s judgment, increasing the compensation to UAH 100,000 (about EUR 8,800). 93.  There was no appeal on points of law against those decisions. 94.  The applicant states that as of 1 August 2016 she has received no payment.", "references": ["9", "8", "7", "2", "1", "3", "5", "6", "4", "No Label", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicants were all employed at a State-owned limited liability company. Their employment was terminated as of 3 July 2012. 5.  The first applicant, I.B. was born in 1957 and lives in Budapest. A certain part of his severance payment was subject to the 98% special tax in the amount of 3,557,737 Hungarian forints (HUF) (approximately 11,900 euros (EUR)). 6.  The second applicant, L.C. was born in 1963 and lives in Budapest. Part of his severance payment was subject to the 98% special tax in the amount of HUF 3,675,702 (approximately EUR 12,200). The second applicant withdrew his application on 25 February 2016. 7.  The third applicant, A.D. was born in 1968 and lives in Budapest. Part of his severance payment was subject to the 98% special tax in the amount of HUF 2,824,844 (approximately EUR 9,400). 8.  The fourth applicant, E.F. was born in 1959 and lives in Monor. Part of his severance payment was subject to the 98% special tax in the amount of HUF 2,650,902 (approximately EUR 8,800). 9.  The fifth applicant, E.J. was born in 1954 and lives in Solym\u00e1r. Part of his severance payment was subject to the 98% special tax in the amount of HUF 5,696,384 (approximately EUR 19,000). Due to subsequent amendments of the relevant legislation, the tax rates applicable to the fifth applicant\u2019s severance payment changed retroactively. Accordingly, the National Tax Authority found that part of the applicant\u2019s severance payment had been subject to a flat-rate public charge of 20% in the amount of HUF 746,808 and another part of his severance payment had been subject to a flat-rate public charge of 75%, amounting to HUF 1,558,949. Therefore, the applicant was reimbursed HUF 3,390,627 by the National Tax Authority. The overall tax burden imposed on the applicant\u2019s severance payment was 30.7 %. 10.  The sixth applicant, J.K. was born in 1956 and lives in Budapest. Part of his severance payment was subject to the 98% special tax in the amount of HUF 2,099,845 (approximately EUR 7,000). 11.  The seventh applicant, Z.J.K. was born in 1955 and lives in Budapest. Part of his severance payment was subject to the 98% special tax in the amount of HUF 3,119,393 (approximately EUR 10,400). 12.  The eighth applicant, G.N. was born in 1960 and lives in Budapest. Part of his severance payment was subject to the 98% special tax in the amount of HUF 2,886,807 (approximately EUR 9,600). The eighth applicant withdrew his application on 14 January 2015. 13.  The ninth applicant, I.S. was born in 1957 and lives in Szolnok. Part of his severance payment was subject to the 98% special tax in the amount of HUF 3,972,297 (approximately EUR 13,200). 14.  The tenth applicant, S.S was born in 1965 and lives in Monor. Part of his severance payment was subject to the 98% special tax in the amount of HUF 2,376,658 (approximately EUR 7,900). 15.  The eleventh applicant, F.V. was born in 1955 and lives in Budapest. Part of his severance payment was subject to the 98% special tax in the amount of HUF 3,345,040 (EUR 11,100).", "references": ["8", "1", "0", "4", "2", "6", "3", "5", "7", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1961 and lives in Surgut, Khanty\u2011Mansiyskiy Region, Russia. 5.  The applicant was the leader of a trade union in a private company. His co-workers expressed a wish to hold a public assembly on Constitution Day on 12 December 2009 and the applicant, in his capacity as trade union leader, decided to help them. According to him, such help was \u201can indirect expression of his own opinion\u201d. The applicant distributed banners and explained that it would be more practicable to stage solo demonstrations. To avoid prosecution for holding a public assembly without notifying the authorities in advance, the applicant suggested that his co-workers position themselves at some distance from each other, for instance on different streets. At the time, there was no federal or regional statutory requirement concerning the minimum distance between simultaneous solo demonstrations (see \u201cRelevant domestic law\u201d). 6.  The applicant was then arrested and taken to the police station, where he was held for three hours. 7.  On 18 December 2009 a justice of the peace found him guilty under Article 20.2 \u00a7 1 of the Code of Administrative Offences (\u201cthe CAO\u201d) and fined him 1,500 Russian roubles (RUB) (35 euros at the time). The court considered that the applicant and his co-workers had met in one place; the applicant had given instructions to the others and had distributed banners; he had taken them to the place of the demonstration. In the court\u2019s view, the above circumstances disclosed the presence of a group event in the form of a static demonstration (a \u201cpicket\u201d), and confirmed the applicant\u2019s role as its organiser. Thus, it was incumbent on the applicant to lodge a prior notification about this event to the competent authority as required by section 7 of the Public Events Act (\u201cthe PEA\u201d). 8.  The applicant appealed noting that the PEA defined a \u201cpicket\u201d as a form of public expression of opinion where one or more citizens with placards, banners and other means of visual expression stationed themselves near the target object of the \u201cpicket\u201d. However, there had been a separate \u201ctarget object\u201d for each solo demonstrator; the demonstrators had been positioned at a considerable distance from each other (for instance, thirty metres for two of them); thus, he could not be lawfully considered as an organiser of a group event. 9.  On 22 January 2010 the Surgut Town Court upheld the judgment.", "references": ["6", "5", "9", "1", "2", "3", "4", "0", "8", "No Label", "7"], "gold": ["7"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1965 and lives in Budapest. 6.  At 4.07 p.m. on 7 October 2009 the applicant notified the police that he planned to organise a demonstration from 2 to 7 p.m. on 10 October 2009 in front of the Venyige Street prison in Budapest, to protest against the \u201cpolitical persecution of national radicalism\u201d. Venyige Street is a broad cul-de-sac with a service lane. 7.  A police officer from the police station that had received the notification repeatedly attempted to contact the applicant by phone, in line with the relevant decree issued by the Minister of the Interior on police tasks related to securing public order at major events, in order to arrange for a meeting. Despite making several attempts and leaving messages, however, he could not reach him. 8.  On 9 October 2009 the head of the Budapest Police Department banned the demonstration on the grounds that traffic could not be diverted to alternative routes (section 8(1) of the Assembly Act). In the decision, he referred to Article 21 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 11 of the Convention and Decision no. 55/2001.AB of the Constitutional Court. 9.  The applicant sought a judicial review of the decision within the statutory three-day time-limit. 10.  On 15 October 2009 the Budapest Regional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s case. It noted that in assessing whether or not traffic could be diverted to other routes, the authority had reckoned on the participation of some 200 demonstrators, as per the applicant\u2019s notification, and that it had established that lawful parking and traffic circulation in the neighbourhood would become impossible should the event take place. The court agreed with the police\u2019s decision in that although the right to assembly was a constitutional fundamental right, it was not absolute and must not give rise to a violation of the fundamental rights of others, and could therefore be restricted. The court was satisfied that the decision had been lawful as the police had adequately established the facts, complied with the procedural rules and applied clear assessment criteria, and the assessment of the evidence had been logical.", "references": ["1", "5", "9", "8", "0", "2", "4", "3", "6", "No Label", "7"], "gold": ["7"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicants were born in 1981 and 2006 respectively and live in Moscow. The first applicant is the second applicant\u2019s father. 5.  Prior to its privatisation, the flat at 4-1-25, 12-ya Novokuzminskaya Ulitsa, Moscow, had been owned by the City of Moscow. Spouses V.F. and G.F resided there under the social housing agreement with the City. 6.  On an unspecified date V.F. applied for the privatisation of the flat. His wife chose not to participate in the transaction. On 22 August 2002 V.F. and the Housing Department signed a privatisation agreement. 7.  On 14 May 2004 V.F. sold the flat to L.M., the first applicant\u2019s mother. According to the text of the sale contract, L.M. paid RUB 300,000 to V.F. for the flat. According to the applicants, in reality, L.M. had paid RUB 2,500,000. 8.  On 28 September 2006 L.M. died. The first applicant inherited the flat after her death. His family, including the second applicant, moved in and resided there. According to the official documents, V.F. did not move out and also continued to reside in the flat. According to the applicants, V.F. moved to the suburbs, but they let him keep the flat registered as his place of residence so that he could continue to receive social benefits in Moscow. 9.  On 10 July 2007 the first applicant transferred the title to half of the flat to his sister by way of gift. 10.  On 22 April 2011 V.F. lodged a complaint with law enforcement authorities. He alleged that he had not sold the flat to his relative L.M. and that he had not received any money from her. He had continued to live in the flat and had let the first applicant move into the flat temporarily in view of the problems the latter had been having with his wife. In May 2010 V.F. and the first applicant had had a fight and V.F. had asked the first applicant to move out. The first applicant had refused claiming to be the owner of the flat. He had kicked V.F. out of the flat. After that V.F. had been able to have access to the flat only with the support of the police or the neighbours. 11.  On 5 July 2011 the prosecutor, acting in the interests of V.F., brought a civil action seeking the annulment of the first applicant\u2019s title to the flat and eviction of his family. 12.  On 15 November 2012 the Kuzminskiy District Court of Moscow granted the claims in full. The court established that, at the time of the privatisation and sale of flat, V.F. had not been able to understand his actions or control them. It relied on the forensic experts\u2019 findings that \u201cV.F. suffered from organic personality syndrome and vascular dementia which had developed long before he had applied for privatisation of the flat on 22 August 2002 and sale of the flat on 14 May 2004. [His condition] had prevented him from understanding his actions or controlling them.\u201d The court invalidated all the transactions with the flat and transferred it to the ownership of the City of Moscow. Lastly, the court ordered the applicants\u2019 eviction. 13.  On 29 April 2013 the District Court issued a supplementary judgment refusing to apply the statute of limitations to the prosecutor\u2019s claims in V.F.\u2019s interest. 14.  On 12 November 2013 the Moscow City Court upheld the judgments of 15 November 2012 and 29 April 2013 on appeal. 15.  On 13 March 2014 the City Court rejected the applicants\u2019 cassation appeal. 16.  On 27 November 2013 the District Court issued a writ of enforcement in respect of the judgment of 15 November 2012 indicating V.F. as the beneficiary. 17.  On 3 December 2013 the bailiff instituted enforcement proceedings. 18.  On 30 January 2014 the applicants were evicted. According to the eviction report prepared by the bailiff, V.F. received the keys to the flat and could reside there. 19.  On 16 April 2014 the Housing Department signed a social housing agreement with V.F. and on 20 November 2014 the title to the flat was transferred to V.F. under the privatisation scheme.", "references": ["3", "6", "9", "8", "7", "5", "0", "2", "1", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Podgorica. 6.  On 14 April 2003 a certain \u017d. L. (hereinafter \u201cthe first debtor\u201d) and S. S. (hereinafter \u201cthe second debtor\u201d) were each sentenced to two years\u2019 imprisonment for attempted murder of the applicant in January 2003. 7.  On an unspecified date, the applicant lodged a claim for damages with the Court of First Instance (Osnovni sud) in Nik\u0161i\u0107. 8.  On 23 June 2008 the aforementioned court ruled in favour of the applicant and ordered the debtors to pay him, jointly, 45,000 euros (EUR) plus statutory interest on account of the non-pecuniary damage suffered. 9.  On 27 July 2009 the applicant lodged with the Court of First Instance in Podgorica a request for enforcement of the judgment dated 23 June 2008. Following an order, the applicant amended his request for enforcement on 25 February 2010. The enforcement order itself was then adopted on 31 March 2010. 10.   On 24 April 2010 the debtors objected to the enforcement order, but their objections were rejected. 11.  On 21 June 2010, 5 July 2010 and 7 July 2010 the enforcement court ordered the debtors to disclose their immovable property. It appeared that no immovable assets had been registered in the debtors\u2019 names. 12.  On 19 July 2010 the enforcement court requested information from the Ministry of Interior as to whether the debtors owned any motor vehicles. The record showed that the first debtor had had two motor vehicles. However, on 16 February 2011, when a bailiff came to make an inventory, the vehicles had already been sold to a third person. 13.  On 7 September 2011 the enforcement court ordered an inventory of the debtors\u2019 movable assets. 14.  On 11 and 12 April 2012 new inventories of the debtor\u2019s moveable assets were carried out. Between April 2012 and January 2013 the enforcement court dealt with the objections to the inventories raised by the debtors and third parties. 15.  On 9 January 2013 a decision to auction the debtors\u2019 specified movable assets was issued, and the applicant was ordered to deposit EUR 200 for the auction costs. The sale was scheduled for March 2013. However, on 27 February 2013 the second debtor informed the enforcement court that he had donated his movables to a charity. On 12 April 2013 a new inventory of his moveable assets was carried out. 16.  On 15 April 2013 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint against the bailiff. 17.  On an unspecified date in April the second debtor offered to pay the applicant EUR 15,000, but the applicant rejected this offer. The second debtor subsequently made a new offer in the amount of EUR 25,000, but this offer was also rejected by the applicant. 18.  On 6 August 2013 the applicant informed the enforcement court that the second debtor had paid him EUR 31,000 and that he considered the enforcement proceedings in respect of this debtor as final. 19.  On 18 October 2013 the enforcement proceedings in respect of the second debtor were formally terminated. 20.  As regards the first debtor, the enforcement proceedings continued. 21.  In September 2013 the first debtor\u2019s specified movable assets were estimated at EUR 1,285.99 and the enforcement court invited the applicant to take possession of them on 16 September 2013. The applicant failed to do so. He was again invited to take possession of the assets in November 2013 and, once more, in July 2015. However, the applicant again declined to do so on both occasions. 22.  On 20 October 2015 the first debtor\u2019s father informed the enforcement court that he would pay his son\u2019s debt. 23.  In December 2015 the applicant was once again invited to take possession of the movable assets belonging to the first debtor. This time, the applicant explicitly rejected the court\u2019s offer stating that he did not need those \u201cworthless\u201d assets and that they could have instead been given to a charity. 24.  On an unspecified date in December 2015 the applicant notified the enforcement court that he had entered into an agreement with the first debtor and that the first debtor would honor the judgement debt in instalments. However, it appears from the applicant\u2019s later submissions to this Court that the first debtor had in fact not paid him anything since he did not have any \u201cvaluable assets\u201d. 25.  Between March 2011 and March 2012 the applicant availed himself of two domestic remedies concerning the length of proceedings, in particular two requests for review of the duration of the proceedings, in order to have them expedited (kontrolni zahtjev) and three actions for fair redress, aimed at obtaining compensation for the excessive duration of the proceedings (tu\u017eba za pravi\u010dno zadovoljenje). The Court of First Instance rejected the applicant\u2019s requests for review on 30 June 2011 and 15 February 2012, respectively. The applicant unsuccessfully appealed to the High Court, which upheld the First Instance Court\u2019s decisions. The High Court in Podgorica also ruled against the applicant\u2019s actions for fair redress on 11 May 2011, 24 November 2011 and 10 May 2012, respectively.", "references": ["8", "5", "9", "0", "6", "7", "2", "1", "4", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant, who was born in 1963, is a member of the Turkish Parliament and lives in Ankara. At the time of the events giving rise to the present application he was the president of the Diyarbak\u0131r Bar Association. 6.  On 2 June 2005 the daily newspaper H\u00fcrriyet reported statements by a senior intelligence officer, who claimed that the National Intelligence Agency of Turkey (\u201cM\u0130T\u201d) had been intercepting the telephone conversations and email correspondence of a number of people on the basis of approximately ninety court decisions over the previous ten years. The intelligence officer stated that the surveillance had been continuous until March 2005, when the M\u0130T had stopped it in order to wait for the entry into force of the new Criminal Code. However, when a bomb attack had occurred in March in Ku\u015fadas\u0131, killing a police superintendent, the M\u0130T had gone to the Sixth Division of the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court (\u201cthe Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court\u201d) to seek permission for the interception of communications. 7.  In a decision dated 6 May 2005, relying on Article 22 of the Constitution and sections 2, 4, 11 and 16 of Law no. 4422, the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court had granted the M\u0130T permission to monitor and examine all electronic communications in order to identify and arrest terrorist suspects with international connections as well as to collect evidence and to prevent crime by having early intelligence of it. The M\u0130T had obtained permission to intercept all domestic or international telephone calls and communications provided between 8 April and 30 May 2005 by national telecommunications company T\u00fcrk Telekom, private mobile network operators and Internet providers and to obtain information contained in SMS, MMS, GPRS and fax communications, as well as caller IDs, correspondents\u2019 IP addresses and all other communication-related information. 8.  On 6 June 2005, after reading the article, the applicant filed a criminal complaint with the Diyarbak\u0131r Principal Public Prosecutor\u2019s Office against the judge, S.T., who had delivered the Assize Court decision in question, the public prosecutor, the M\u0130T agents who had sought permission to monitor and examine communications, and the M\u0130T agents who had implemented the decision. Relying on a number of newspaper and online articles, the applicant alleged that S.T. had decided that the records of all domestic and international electronic communications between 8 April and 30 May 2005 should be given to the M\u0130T by the telecommunications companies. The judge had made that decision in complete disregard of the legislation then in force and without carrying out any research or requiring proof. The impugned decision had been of a very general nature since it had not included the names of any suspects or indicated the date, location or address of people whose communications would be intercepted. As a consequence, any person, including himself, who had used a landline or mobile telephone to communicate between the above-mentioned dates, had been a victim of the impugned decision. The applicant maintained that the decision had violated his rights protected by Article 8 of the Convention and had also contravened Articles 20 and 23 of the Constitution, which protected private life and the freedom of communication respectively, since the accused had obtained records of his communications and restricted his freedom of communication without any justification. Lastly, the applicant contended that the implementation of the decision, which had been in contravention of section 2 of Law no. 4422, required the punishment of those responsible. 9.  On 20 June 2005 the Diyarbak\u0131r Principal Public Prosecutor decided to disjoin the case concerning the M\u0130T officials and to register it separately because the prosecution of M\u0130T officials required the Prime Minister\u2019s permission. 10.  On 30 September 2005 the Diyarbak\u0131r Principal Public Prosecutor decided not to prosecute the M\u0130T officials who had implemented the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court\u2019s decision. He decided that the M\u0130T officials had merely implemented the court\u2019s decision when intercepting and examining communications and that the implementation of court decisions was required by law and did not constitute a crime. In any event, there was no evidence that the telecommunications companies had given any records to the M\u0130T officials or that they had monitored communications over the Internet. The Public Prosecutor also referred to a decision by the Ankara Principal Public Prosecutor not to prosecute over the same issue (decision no. 2005/35575, 17 June 2005) in relation to a number of other complaints brought against the Diyarbak\u0131r Assize Court\u2019s decision. 11.  On 25 October 2005 the applicant filed an objection with the Siverek Assize Court against the above decision, alleging that the Diyarbak\u0131r Public Prosecutor had failed to carry out an investigation into his complaints concerning an alleged violation of his rights guaranteed by Articles 8 and 13 of the Convention. 12.  On 30 November 2005 the Siverek Assize Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s objection, holding that the Principal Public Prosecutor\u2019s decision against prosecution had complied with the legislation since the M\u0130T officials had implemented a court decision and had not committed any offence. 13.  On 6 April 2006 the Ministry of Justice decided not to take an action against the public prosecutor and the judge as it found that their acts fell within judicial discretion. The Ministry considered that although the impugned interception decision had been in breach of the national and international legal norms, the aim was to locate the terrorists before they acted and to take the necessary security measures against them. For the Ministry, the decision did not display \u2018ill-will\u2019 towards any individual or institution and the complainants had failed to demonstrate that they had been affected by the impugned decision in any way. On an unspecified date the applicant filed an objection against this decision. On 31 October 2007 the Third Division of Ankara Administrative Court dismissed the objection.", "references": ["9", "7", "1", "3", "6", "2", "0", "5", "8", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in Budapest. 6.  The applicant was placed in retirement on grounds of disability and received a disability pension as of 1 November 2006, the amount of which was 91,363 Hungarian forints (HUF) (approximately 305 euros (EUR)) per month. The entitlement was based on a final decision of the Supreme Court. At the material time the medical board rated her state of health at 46 per cent. 7.  The methodology for disability assessment changed as of 1 January 2008. 8.  Act no. CXCI of 2011 on the Benefits Granted to Persons with Reduced Work Capacity was enacted on 29 December 2011 and entered into force as of 1 January 2012. It introduced a new system of allowances and beneficiaries of the old scheme were invited to re-apply under the new rules. 9.  The applicant lodged a fresh application for disability allowance under the new law.\nPending approval of her new application, she continued to receive a monthly disability allowance in the amount of HUF 89,925 (approximately EUR 300) on the strength of the fact that on the day the new law entered into force, she had been in receipt of a disability benefit. 10.  On 29 June 2012 the National Rehabilitation and Social Authority assessed the applicant\u2019s state of health at 59 per cent. She was categorised as a person suitable for rehabilitation on the basis of that assessment. However, owing to the applicant\u2019s other circumstances, her rehabilitation was not recommended. 11.  In application of the relevant rules, the applicant\u2019s rehabilitation allowance was established at 45 per cent of the minimum wage, that is, in the amount of HUF 41,850 (approximately EUR 140), by a decision of the Budapest Governmental Office (Directorate of Pension Insurance) given on 19 September 2012 and effective as of 1 December 2012. 12.  The applicant appealed. 13.  A medical assessment carried out in the course of the second-instance administrative proceedings resulted in the finding that the applicant\u2019s state of health was at 58 per cent. It was reaffirmed that her rehabilitation was not recommended. Since the minor difference in the scores did not alter the calculation of the allowance, the National Rehabilitation and Social Authority upheld the first-instance decision on 17 January 2013. 14.  The applicant sought a judicial review. 15.  On 23 February 2016 the Budapest Administrative and Labour Court dismissed her action. Having obtained fresh medical assessments and the opinion of the national forensic body, the court was satisfied that the applicant\u2019s state of health was at 54 per cent (her locomotor, digestive and endocrinological conditions were calculated cumulatively as per the method prescribed in Annex 1 to Decree no. 7/2012 (II. 14.) NEFMI).\nAgain, the minor difference in the scores had no bearing on the calculation of the allowance. The court upheld the administrative decisions. 16.  On 12 September 2016 the K\u00faria dismissed the applicant\u2019s petition for review. It observed in particular that the lower courts had found that the applicant\u2019s state of health (for the purposes of the application of rules of disability benefits) had improved and that the applicant had challenged that finding. It pointed out that such an improvement did not necessarily correspond to actual healing from a condition, but could also result from a change in, or stricter application of, the relevant rules of medical assessment. 17.  The applicant submitted that, as of August 2015, she no longer received any benefits. The legal or factual circumstances underlying this state of affairs are not known.", "references": ["6", "0", "3", "7", "1", "4", "8", "5", "2", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant, who was born in 1992, was detained at the Gaziantep Prison at the time when the application was lodged. 6.  On 26 December 2011 the Mersin Magistrates\u2019 Court decided to restrict access to the file regarding an ongoing investigation against a terrorist organisation. 7.  On 29 December 2011 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of being a member of a terrorist organisation and making its propaganda. 8.  On the same day the applicant\u2019s police statement was taken at the Anti-Terror Branch of the Mersin Security Directorate, in the presence of his lawyer. He was mainly questioned about several records of telephone conversations as well as allegations about the burning of vehicles and throwing Molotov cocktails. He was questioned at length about the telephone conversations that had been intercepted. The police read out the transcripts of the telephone conversations and asked the applicant to comment on them. He was further asked questions about the incriminating statements of one of his co-accused. The applicant used his right to remain silent. 9.  On 30 December 2011 the Mersin Magistrates\u2019 Court ordered the applicant\u2019s detention on remand. 10.  On 16 March 2012 the applicant\u2019s representative lodged an objection against the decision on the applicant\u2019s detention, and requested his release. She also asked the court to lift the restriction of access to the investigation file. On 19 March 2012 the Mersin Magistrates\u2019 Court dismissed the objection, without holding a hearing. The applicant\u2019s representative filed a further objection against that decision. 11.  On 26 March 2012 the Mersin Assize Court dismissed the objection on the basis of the case file, without holding a hearing. 12.  On 20 April 2012 the Mersin Magistrates\u2019 Court ex officio examined the applicant\u2019s detention on remand on the basis of the case-file and decided to extend it. 13.  On 10 September 2012 the Adana public prosecutor filed a bill of indictment against the applicant, accusing him mainly of being a member of a terrorist organisation, making propaganda in its favour, illegal possession of explosives, causing damage to property and having participated in an illegal armed demonstration. 14.  On 1 October 2012 the Adana Assize Court accepted the indictment. On the same date the restriction on the investigation file was lifted. 15.  According to the latest information in the case file, the proceedings against the applicant are still pending before assize court.", "references": ["1", "7", "5", "8", "6", "9", "4", "0", "3", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1964 and is detained in Krems. 7.  On 9 February 1983 the applicant shot his cousin, P.D., three times in the chest and stomach. His victim died. The applicant then decapitated P.D. and disposed of his head. 8.  On 15 February 1983 the applicant shot dead two women, namely his former girlfriend, U.E., as well as her mother, S.E., using the same gun as he had used for the previous murder. 9.  The applicant was arrested on 26 February 1983 and remanded in custody. 10.  On 14 March 1984 the Vienna Regional Criminal Court (Straflandesgericht \u2013 hereinafter, \u201cthe Criminal Court\u201d), sitting as an assize court (Geschworenengericht), convicted the applicant of triple murder and disturbing the peace of the dead (St\u00f6rung der Totenruhe). He was found to be criminally responsible for his acts and was sentenced to twenty years\u2019 imprisonment. In addition to the sentence, the Criminal Court ordered his detention in an institution for mentally ill offenders in accordance with Article 21 \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch; see paragraph 31 below). A psychiatric expert, Dr Q., had found in his expert opinion that the applicant presented a distinctive picture of secondary personality defence mechanisms, in the sense of suppression of fear, emotion and sexuality. His potential for aggression was increased and he was emotionally unstable and could easily become aggressive. Moreover, there were clear signs of an identity disorder. 11.  The above judgment was upheld by the Supreme Court (Oberster Gerichtshof) on 27 September 1984. 12.  The applicant has been detained in institutions for mentally ill offenders since 27 September 1984. He served his prison sentence until 26 February 2003 (as the time he had spent in pre-trial detention \u2013 see paragraph 9 above \u2013 was counted towards his prison sentence). Thereafter, he remained in preventive detention, subject to yearly review proceedings in accordance with Article 25 \u00a7 3 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 32 below). He was first detained in the units for mentally ill offenders of the Vienna-Mittersteig Prison and Graz-Karlau Prison (Justizanstalt), and since 2008 has been detained in the respective unit of Stein Prison in Krems. 13.  On an unknown date in 2008, the applicant applied for release from the institution for mentally ill offenders. He argued that he had completed individual therapy with Professor G. in the Vienna-Mittersteig Prison as well as specialised therapy preparing him for his release with an external therapist. Two psychiatric experts had attested that the danger emanating from him had abated or was significantly reduced. Even though different entities had suggested that he be granted privileges (Vollzugslockerung) under section 126 of the Execution of Sentences Act (Strafvollzugsgesetz \u2013 see paragraph 41 below), he had not yet been granted any. The applicant claimed that his lawyer had offered him a job and a small apartment if he were released. 14.  On 25 February 2009 the Krems a.d. Donau Regional Court (Landesgericht \u2013 hereinafter, \u201cthe Regional Court\u201d) ordered the continuation of the applicant\u2019s detention in the institution for mentally ill offenders. It referred to an expert opinion of 25 January 2009 by Dr L., who had stated that the applicant\u2019s condition had stabilised and that the danger emanating from him had considerably abated in respect of the closed and protected living environment of the prison. However, the same could not be said with certainty for a life outside prison. The director of the prison did not recommend releasing the applicant either, as the special therapy he needed in order to be prepared for release was only available in the Vienna\u2011Mittersteig Prison. The applicant waived his right to appeal against that decision. 15.  On 20 September 2009 the applicant again applied for release, reiterating that Dr L. in his expert opinion of 25 January 2009 had attested that a process of mental stabilisation had taken place and that it was highly likely that the danger emanating from him was significantly reduced. The applicant claimed that he had successfully completed psychotherapy, which he considered as sufficient preparation for life outside of prison. He emphasised that he was willing to be treated, but that currently he was not receiving any therapy. Moreover, he reminded the court that his lawyer would be able to supply a flat and a job for him if he were released. He complained that the prison authorities had refused his requests to be granted privileges, and as a consequence the domestic courts had dismissed his previous applications for release as he had not been prepared for it. 16.  On 15 March 2010 the Regional Court, having held an oral hearing, ordered the continuation of the applicant\u2019s detention. It confirmed that Dr L., in his additional expert opinion of 24 February 2010, had referred to the fact that the applicant\u2019s condition had stabilised. Even though the applicant had developed an aversion to psychotherapy, he did not refuse to talk to psychiatrists. He was actively seeking a dialogue with them. However, Dr L. also found that no protection and support would be provided for the applicant after his release. Without such support, conditional release would be too risky from a psychiatric point of view. The stress caused by the overwhelming feeling of unpreparedness for release could lead to near-psychotic or micropsychotic disorders, the danger of which was unpredictable. 17.  The Regional Court also referred to the expert opinion of Dr H. of 31 October 2006 and the forensic expert opinion by the Vienna-Mittersteig Prison of January 2007, as well as the most recent expert opinion by Dr B. (the resident psychologist of Stein Prison, where the applicant was held at that time) of 3 March 2010. The latter had come to the conclusion that the applicant still suffered from a pronounced combined personality disorder with paranoid, schizoid, emotionally unstable and narcissistic elements. Dr B. responded to the generally positive tenor of Dr L.\u2019s opinion and found that the stabilisation process was rather a reaction to the \u201cenemy\u201d institution, namely the prison, in which the applicant was being held, and was not to be considered real or rendering the applicant capable of surviving the challenges of daily life outside prison. Moreover, at that time, Dr B. did not recommend further therapy for the applicant, who was not prepared for any self-reflection and was not ready to process the experiences and challenges of normal social interaction, and thus was still likely to present a danger to others. The director of Stein Prison also recommended the continuation of the applicant\u2019s detention, adding that his institution was not equipped to deal with the preparation of his release, which it considered to be a complex and risk-prone task. Only the Vienna-Mittersteig Prison was capable of preparing the applicant for his release. The applicant in any event refused to undergo any more therapy. 18.  The Regional Court found that owing to the applicant\u2019s negative approach to therapy, it was impossible to prepare him for release, even though his counsel had confirmed the offer of a flat and a job, and the applicant appeared to be stable. In line with the argumentation of the expert opinions of Dr B. and Dr L., the court held that in the light of the gravity of the underlying criminal offences, there was a danger that an unprepared release would overwhelm the applicant and could have unpredictable consequences. Therefore, the application for conditional release had to be dismissed. 19.  On 26 July 2010, the Vienna Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht \u2013 hereinafter, \u201cthe Court of Appeal\u201d) dismissed an appeal lodged by the applicant. It referred to the expert opinions obtained in 1983, 2000, 2002, 2006, 2009 and 2010, and confirmed the decision of the first-instance court. It also reiterated that Stein Prison\u2019s psychology service had recommended a transfer to the Vienna-Mittersteig Prison, where the necessary therapy was available. 20.  The applicant lodged an application for release with the Regional Court on 20 August 2010 and submitted additional observations on 16 November and 3 December 2010. In essence, he repeated the arguments he had made in the previous review proceedings (see paragraphs 13 and 15 above). He also requested that a new expert opinion be obtained from Dr L. 21.  On 7 December 2010 the Regional Court, ordered the continuation of the applicant\u2019s detention in an institution for mentally ill offenders, referring to the most recent expert opinion by Dr B. of 3 March 2010 (see paragraph 17 above). It found that there had been no changes in his circumstances and therefore declined the request for a new expert opinion. Recently obtained information from Stein Prison\u2019s psychology service stated that the applicant still refused to undergo further therapy at their institution and requested preparation for his release. It reiterated that the necessary preparation was not available in Stein Prison, but only in the Vienna-Mittersteig Prison. However, the latter had not yet responded to a request for the applicant\u2019s transfer. The Regional Court further referred to the reasoning in previous review decisions to avoid repetition, in particular the one by the Court of Appeal of 26 July 2010 (see paragraph 19 above). It stressed that the applicant still refused to deal with his offences in a therapeutic setting, which in turn was a prerequisite for being granted privileges. In the light of the gravity of the underlying offence, the statements obtained from the various prison services as well as the recent expert opinions, the Regional Court concluded that the applicant still presented a danger to society. 22.  On 25 January 2011 the Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal lodged by the applicant as unfounded, as it was evident that there had not been a change in his negative attitude towards further therapy. 23.  On 8 September 2011 the applicant applied for conditional release from the institution. 24.  On 23 January 2012 the Regional Court held an oral hearing and subsequently ordered an expert opinion in the framework of the yearly judicial review proceedings. On 1 February 2012 the applicant submitted his observations on the review. He stated that the expert opinion of Dr B. (see paragraph 17 above) had been wrong and the court should therefore rather rely on Dr L.\u2019s expert opinion (see paragraphs 13-16 above). As the applicant refused to be examined by any expert, the court held another hearing on 23 April 2012. On that occasion, the presiding judge reproached the applicant with the fact that he could not expect to be granted privileges if he did not collaborate with the experts and the authorities. The applicant replied that previously one of the experts had found that privileges were a prerequisite for his release, and that another expert had even come to the conclusion that he could already be released. He explained that he had refused to be examined by a psychiatrist because he was not suffering from a mental illness. The applicant repeated that his lawyer had offered him a small apartment and work in his law firm. He was not willing to live in an assisted-living facility or to follow psychotherapy after his eventual release, but would agree to work with a probation officer. 25.  On 23 April 2012, the Regional Court ordered the continuation of the applicant\u2019s detention. Based on the information on file, the latest expert opinion of Dr B. of 3 March 2010 and the information from the director of the prison, it concluded that the danger emanating from the applicant still persisted and therefore his application for release had to be dismissed. 26.  That decision was upheld by the Court of Appeal on 30 July 2012. The court summarised the genesis of the case so far and the applicant\u2019s complaints, and reiterated the lower court\u2019s findings. As to its own conclusion, it almost exclusively referred to its previous decisions in the applicant\u2019s case of 26 July 2010 and 25 January 2011, holding that there had been no significant changes in the applicant\u2019s situation, in particular that he still refused any further therapy. 27.  On 26 March 2013 the applicant applied for release from the institution for mentally ill offenders. 28.  On 20 June 2013 the Regional Court again ordered the continuation of the applicant\u2019s detention, essentially reiterating the reasoning it had given in its decision of 23 April 2012 (see paragraph 25 above). It appears that the Regional Court did not hold an oral hearing prior to that decision. It referred to the \u201ccurrent\u201d expert opinion of Dr B. of 2010 (see paragraph 17 above) and statements by the prison administration and the social service of the prison (Ma\u00dfnahmenteam) that the applicant should not be released, as he refused to undergo therapy and still posed a threat. The Regional Court reiterated that the applicant could only be prepared for his release at the Vienna-Mittersteig Prison, but found that it would be unreasonable to order his transfer because of his negative attitude towards therapy. 29.  On 19 July 2013 the Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal lodged by the applicant as unfounded. It held that the Regional Court had had no choice but to take into consideration the expert opinion of 2010, as in the course of the 2011/12 review proceedings the applicant had refused to be examined by an expert. The Court of Appeal again referred to the reasoning it had given in its three previous decisions relating to the applicant. 30.  At the time of the above decision, the applicant was almost forty\u2011nine years old and had spent some twenty-nine years of his life in different institutions for mentally ill offenders.", "references": ["3", "6", "0", "8", "4", "9", "1", "7", "5", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1972 and lives in Yerevan. 5.  The applicant is a former deputy head of Vardashen prison in Armenia. According to the applicant, his father is an opposition activist. 6.  On 4 September 2007 the Yerevan prosecutor\u2019s office decided to institute criminal proceedings on the basis of an application made by R.K., an inmate of the above-mentioned prison, who stated that on 23 August 2007 he had been beaten with rubber truncheons by the applicant and two other prison officers, A.G. and L.H. The decision also mentioned that a forensic medical examination of R.K., conducted after he had lodged the application, had revealed bodily injuries of a minor degree. 7.  On 11 September 2007 the Yerevan prosecutor\u2019s office decided to impose a preventive measure in respect of the applicant: an undertaking not to leave his place of residence. In substantiating the imposition of a non-custodial preventive measure, the decision stated that the applicant had a permanent residence, was not obstructing the examination of the case and that, if he remained at large, he would not abscond or obstruct the investigation. 8.  On 18 September 2007 the preventive measure in respect of the applicant was lifted. 9.  It appears that, during the investigation of the case, the head of Vardashen prison gave a statement confirming that R.K. had sustained bodily injuries, while the head of the prison medical unit stated that he had provided medical treatment to R.K. and made a corresponding entry in the medical register. 10.  On 7 February 2008 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of abuse of power accompanied with violence. 11.  On 10 February 2008 the applicant was charged with abuse of power accompanied with violence, as provided for by Article 309 \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Code of Armenia. 12.  On the same day the investigator, M., applied to the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan seeking to detain the applicant on remand. In substantiating this preventive measure, the investigator indicated that, if the applicant remained at large, he could abscond and obstruct the conduct of an objective and thorough examination by influencing witnesses. He referred to the nature and the gravity of the imputed offence, the punishment for which was imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. 13.  On the same day the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan granted the application on the grounds that the imputed offence was a grave one and that if the applicant remained at large, he could abscond, obstruct the examination of the case and influence the witnesses. It thus authorised the applicant\u2019s detention for two months, starting from the date of his arrest. 14.  On 14 February 2008 the applicant lodged an appeal against the decision of the District Court. In particular, he sought to be released on bail, taking into account his good character, the fact that he had no previous convictions and had a child who was a minor. 15.  On 28 February 2008 the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that it was not competent to decide on the question of replacing detention with bail, since that question had not been raised before the District Court. 16.  On 28 March 2008 investigator M. applied again to the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan, seeking an extension of the applicant\u2019s detention. In substantiating the application, the investigator referred to the nature and gravity of the imputed offence and said that there were sufficient grounds to assume that, if released, the applicant could abscond or obstruct the examination of the case. 17.  On 4 April 2008 the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan granted the application and extended the applicant\u2019s detention to 7 July 2008. In doing so, the District Court indicated the same reasons as those given in the application. 18.  On 9 April 2008 the applicant lodged an appeal against the decision of the District Court, seeking to be released on bail. 19.  On 17 April 2008 the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. 20.  According to the applicant, on 26 May 2008 the same charge as the one against him was also brought against A.G. and L.H. and, as a preventive measure, they made an undertaking not to leave their places of residence. 21.  On 30 May 2008 the investigation was officially concluded and the case was sent to the Criminal Court of Yerevan. 22.  On 12 June 2008 the Criminal Court of Yerevan decided to set the case down for trial. The decision stated that there was no necessity to change the preventive measure imposed on the applicant. 23.  At a hearing held on 24 November 2008 the applicant applied to the Criminal Court of Yerevan seeking to change the preventive measure. He argued that there were no grounds to assume that he would abscond, obstruct the examination of the case during the court proceedings or fail to appear when summoned by the trial court. In this regard, he referred to the fact that he had not absconded or in any way tried to obstruct the course of justice in the period preceding his arrest and detention, despite the fact that the investigation had already been ongoing for several months before his arrest. The applicant further argued that he was of good character, and had a family with a child who was a minor and a permanent residence. 24.  On the same date the examining judge decided to dismiss the application, finding that there was sufficient evidence in the case file which did not rule out the applicant\u2019s involvement in the commission of a grave crime. 25.  On 12 January 2009 the Criminal Court of Yerevan found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to two years\u2019 imprisonment.", "references": ["8", "7", "3", "9", "1", "0", "5", "4", "6", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1976 and lives in Metsamor. 5.  On 23 July 2011 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of threatening to use violence against the investigator in charge of the criminal case against his ex-wife. 6.  On 25 July 2011 the applicant was charged with the same crime. 7.  On the same date the investigator filed a motion with the Armavir Regional Court seeking to have the applicant detained for a period of two months. 8.  On the same date the Regional Court examined and granted the investigator\u2019s application, ordering the applicant\u2019s detention for a period of two months, namely until 23 September 2011. It found that the motion was substantiated, since the applicant partially admitted his guilt and the case materials provided sufficient grounds for believing that he might abscond and obstruct the investigation, having regard to the nature and degree of dangerousness of the offence in question. 9.  On an unspecified date the applicant lodged an appeal seeking to cancel the detention order and claiming that the investigating authority had not obtained any materials or evidence to substantiate the reasons for which it had sought to detain him and that they failed to take into account the applicant\u2019s personality. 10.  On 11 August 2011 the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the applicant\u2019s detention was based on a reasonable suspicion, and found the grounds invoked by the Regional Court in justification of detention to be sufficient. It also noted that less severe measures were insufficient to safeguard the applicant\u2019s proper conduct. 11.  On 19 August 2011 the applicant lodged a cassation appeal against the decision of 11 August 2011 of the Court of Appeal. 12.  On 9 September 2011 the investigation into the applicant\u2019s case was concluded and the case was transferred to the Regional Court for trial. 13.  On 13 September 2011 the applicant\u2019s criminal case was set down for trial. By the same decision the trial court decided that the applicant\u2019s detention on remand was \u201cto remain unchanged\u201d. 14.  On 17 September 2011 the Cassation Court returned the applicant\u2019s cassation appeal as it was unsubstantiated and did not met the formal requirements imposed by law. 15.  On an unspecified date the applicant filed a motion with the Regional Court seeking to be released. He argued, inter alia, that there were not sufficient reasons to keep him in detention. 16.  On 13 December 2011 the Regional Court examined and dismissed this motion. The Regional Court found that the applicant\u2019s detention was ordered by its decision of 13 September 2011. It also noted that the existing materials of the case were sufficient to conclude that the applicant\u2019s detention was justified. 17.  On 19 December 2011 the applicant lodged an appeal against this decision. 18.  On 28 December 2011 the Criminal Court of Appeal left the appeal unexamined. The Criminal Court of Appeal found that there was no possibility under domestic law to appeal against the decision of the District Court \u201cto leave the applicant\u2019s detention unchanged\u201d. 19.  The applicant lodged an appeal against this decision. 20.  On 20 March 2012 the Court of Cassation declared the applicant\u2019s appeal inadmissible for lack of merit. 21.  On 11 May 2012 the applicant filed a new motion with the Regional Court seeking to be released. He argued, inter alia, that the collection of evidence against him had been finalised and that there were not sufficient reasons to keep him under detention. 22.  On 4 June 2012 the Regional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s motion having regard to the dangerousness and nature of the alleged offence and the fact that the applicant might abscond and obstruct the investigation. 23.  On 14 June 2012 the applicant lodged an appeal against this decision. 24.  On 19 June 2012 the Criminal Court of Appeal left the applicant\u2019s appeal unexamined on the same grounds as indicated in its decision of 28 December 2011. 25.  The applicant lodged an appeal against this decision. 26.  On 17 August 2012 the Court of Cassation declared the applicant\u2019s appeal inadmissible for lack of merit. 27.  On 6 August 2012 the Regional Court found the applicant guilty as charged, imposing a sentence of one and a half years\u2019 imprisonment.", "references": ["1", "4", "6", "5", "8", "3", "9", "0", "7", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicants\u2019 dates of birth and places of residence are given in the Appendix. 6.  At the material time the first applicant was a member of the youth committee of an opposition party, the Popular Front Party of Azerbaijan (Az\u0259rbaycan Xalq C\u0259bh\u0259si Partiyas\u0131 \u2013 \u201cthe PFPA\u201d), and the second applicant was a chairman of a youth organisation called Azad Genclik. 7.  Both applicants participated in a number of unauthorised peaceful demonstrations organised by the opposition. In the course of many of those demonstrations, they were arrested and convicted. In particular, the first applicant was arrested during the demonstrations on 15 May, 19 June and 31 July 2010. 8.  The number of opposition demonstrations increased in 2011. That tendency continued into the following years. Demonstrations were held, inter alia, on 11 March 2011 and 20 October and 17 November 2012. 9.  The second applicant attended the demonstrations of 11 March 2011 and 20 October 2012. The first applicant attended the demonstrations of 20 October and 17 November 2012. 10.  According to the first applicant, he also intended to participate in the demonstration of 11 March 2011. Moreover, he was actively promoting public participation in that assembly on online social networks. 11.  It appears that the organisers of the demonstration of 11 March 2011 gave no proper prior notice to the relevant authority, the Baku City Executive Authority (\u201cthe BCEA\u201d). Information about the assembly was disseminated through Facebook or the press. 12.  Prior to the demonstrations of 20 October and 17 November 2012, on 15 October and 12 November 2012 respectively the organisers had given notice to the BCEA. 13.  The BCEA refused to authorise the demonstration of 20 October 2012 at the site indicated by the organisers and proposed another location on the outskirts of Baku \uf02d the grounds of a driving school situated in the 20th habitable area of the Sabail District. 14.  The BCEA also refused to authorise the demonstration of 17 November 2012. It noted in general terms that that assembly would not be in accordance with the Law on Freedom of Assembly. The BCEA further noted that the square where the organisers proposed to hold the assembly was a designated public leisure area and that the assembly itself would be impractical. 15.  The organisers nevertheless decided to hold the demonstrations as planned. According to the applicants, the demonstrations were intended to be peaceful and were conducted in a peaceful manner. The participants were demanding democratic reforms in the country and free and fair elections, and protesting against impediments on freedom of assembly. 16.  On 4 March 2011 the first applicant was arrested and brought to police station no. 22 of the Nasimi district police office. 17.  According to the official records, he was arrested because at around 11.20 a.m., in front of the National Bank in Baku, he had disobeyed a lawful order of the police to stop speaking loudly on a mobile phone and to stop using foul language. He also swore at the police officers and tried to run away when being arrested. 18.  The applicant contested the official version of his arrest. He stated that he had been arrested in an Internet caf\u00e9 by three persons in plain clothes who had failed to present themselves or give reasons for the arrest. They had taken his belongings from the Internet caf\u00e9, including his mobile phone. He had been pushed into an unmarked car. There one of the persons who had arrested him had presented himself as a police officer and shown a police badge. The other two had presented themselves as agents of the Ministry of National Security, without showing any supporting document. He had been told that the arrest had been in connection with the demonstration of 11 March and another protest planned to be held on 12 March 2011. 19.  At the police station an administrative-offence report (inzibati x\u0259ta haqq\u0131nda protokol) was issued in respect of the applicant, setting out the charges against him. The report stated that the applicant had committed an administrative offence under Article 310.1 of the Code of Administrative Offences (\u201cthe CAO\u201d) (failure to comply with a lawful order of a police officer). 20.  According to the applicant, he was never served with a copy of the administrative-offence report or with other documents from his case file. He was also not given access to a lawyer after his arrest or while he was in police custody. 21.  On the day of his arrest the applicant was brought before the Nasimi District Court, which on the same day adopted a decision on the merits. 22.  According to the applicant, he was not given an opportunity to appoint a lawyer of his own choosing. A State-funded lawyer (Mr O.A.) was appointed to assist him. 23.  According to the transcript of the first-instance court\u2019s hearing, Mr O.A. did not make any oral or written submissions. 24.  In his statement before the court the applicant contested the police officers\u2019 version of events and argued that he had been arrested unlawfully. The court disregarded that statement as non-reliable. 25.  Only the police officers who, according to the official records, had arrested the applicant and the police officer who issued the administrative\u2011offence report in respect of him were questioned as witnesses. In their statements those police officers reiterated the official version of the reasons for the applicant\u2019s arrest (see paragraph 17 above). 26.  The court found that the applicant had committed the administrative offence attributed to him (see paragraph 17 above). It convicted the applicant under Article 310.1 of the CAO and sentenced him to ten days\u2019 administrative detention. 27.  According to the applicant, until 6 March 2011 his whereabouts were unknown to his family and friends. 28.  Only on 7 March 2011 was a lawyer hired by his family able to meet the applicant and to learn the details of his arrest, detention and the court proceedings against him. 29.  On an unspecified date the applicant lodged an appeal with the Baku Court of Appeal, presenting his version of the events surrounding his arrest, and arguing that he had been arrested in connection with the demonstration scheduled for 11 March 2011. The applicant also complained that the hearing before the first-instance court had not been fair. 30.  In addition, he applied to the appellate court to have examined his mobile-phone call records in respect of the date and time of the alleged administrative offence. 31.  The applicant was represented before the Baku Court of Appeal by a lawyer of his own choosing. 32.  On 19 March 2011 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld the decision of the first-instance court, stating that the conclusions reached by that court had been correct. 33.  The appellate court did not address the applicant\u2019s above-mentioned request to have his mobile-phone call records examined. 34.  As mentioned above, the demonstration of 11 March 2011 was attended by the second applicant, the demonstration of 20 October 2012 by both applicants, and the demonstration of 17 November 2012 by the first applicant. 35.  All three demonstrations were dispersed as soon as the protesters began to gather. Both applicants were arrested during the dispersal operations and after each arrest were taken to police station no. 9 of the Sabail district police office. 36.  According to the applicants, during the dispersal of the demonstrations of 20 October and 17 November 2012 they were arrested by individuals in plain clothes. 37.  On the day of each of the applicants\u2019 respective arrests, administrative-offence reports were issued in respect of them. In each case the applicants were charged with an administrative offence under Article 310.1 of the CAO. Following their arrest on 20 October 2012 the applicants were additionally charged under Article 298 (violation of rules on holding public assemblies) of the CAO. 38.  According to the applicants, they were never served with a copy of the administrative-offence reports or with other documents from their case files. They were also not given access to a lawyer after their arrests or while they were in police custody. 39.  The applicants were brought before the Sabail District Court on the day of each arrest (specifically, the first applicant on 20 October and 17 November 2012, and the second applicant on 11 March 2011 and 20 October 2012). 40.  According to the applicants, the respective hearings before the first\u2011instance court were very brief. Members of the public were not allowed inside the courtroom, even though the court had not taken a formal decision to close the hearings to the public. 41.  According to the applicants, they were not given an opportunity to appoint lawyers of their own choosing. 42.  A State-funded lawyer was appointed to defend the applicants at each hearing. 43.  According to the transcript of the hearing of 11 March 2011, in his oral submissions the State-funded lawyer for the second applicant (Mr V.M.) briefly asked the court to consider the young age of the applicant and his sincere regret for having committed the administrative offence. 44.  None of the material submitted to the Court contains any record showing that at the hearings of 20 October and 17 November 2012 respectively the State-funded lawyer for the second applicant (Mr K.B.) or the State-funded lawyer for the first applicant (Mr Z.A.) made any oral or written submissions on behalf of the applicants. 45.  According to a statement (\u201c\u0259riz\u0259\u201d) signed by the first applicant, he refused the assistance of the State-funded lawyer at the hearing of 20 October 2012 and decided to defend himself in person. 46.  The only witnesses questioned during the hearing of 11 March 2011 concerning the second applicant were police officers who, according to official records, had arrested him. They testified that together with some other people the applicant had attempted to hold an unlawful demonstration and continued to protest despite the order to disperse. During the hearings of 20 October 2012 and 17 November 2012 the court did not question any witnesses. 47.  In each case the Sabail District Court found that the applicants had failed to stop participating in an unauthorised demonstration. The court convicted the applicants under Article 310.1 of the CAO. In the proceedings related to his participation in the demonstration of 20 October 2012 the second applicant was also convicted under Article 298 of the CAO. The applicants were sentenced to various periods of administrative detention (see Appendix). 48.  On unspecified dates the applicants lodged appeals with the Baku Court of Appeal, arguing that their convictions had been in violation of their rights, because the protest in which they had participated had been peaceful. The applicants also complained that their arrests had been unlawful, and that the hearings before the first-instance court had not been fair. They asked the Baku Court of Appeal to quash the first-instance court\u2019s decisions in their respective cases. 49.  The first applicant was assisted by a lawyer of his own choosing in each case before the Baku Court of Appeal. The second applicant was assisted by a lawyer of his own choosing during the appellate-court proceedings related to his participation in the demonstration of 20 October 2012, but he was not represented by a lawyer during the appellate-court proceedings related to his participation in the demonstration of 11 March 2011. 50.  On various dates the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the applicants\u2019 appeals and upheld the decisions of the first-instance court (see Appendix).", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "9", "6", "5", "8", "No Label", "7", "2", "3"], "gold": ["7", "2", "3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Pula. 6.  In 1985 the applicant was employed by the T. company of Pula. On 22 August 1992 he sustained a work-related injury. He continued working for the T. company in another post. 7.  On 6 February 2004 the applicant was made redundant following organisational changes within the company. The following day he concluded an agreement with the T. company shortening the notice period for the termination of his employment. 8.  On 19 February 2004 the applicant was given his redundancy notice and his employment was terminated on 23 February 2004. 9.  On 9 April 2004 the applicant was granted a disability pension with effect from 24 February 2004 on the grounds of his inability to work. 10.  On 28 June 2004 the applicant instituted civil proceedings against the T. company in the Pula Municipal Court (Op\u0107inski sud u Puli). He alleged that he would have received more income if he had not sustained the work-related injury in 1992. He claimed damages relating to the difference between his disability pension and the salary he had received until the termination of his employment. 11.  On 20 February 2008 the Pula Municipal Court dismissed his claim as unfounded. 12.  The applicant appealed against the first-instance judgment, challenging all the factual and legal aspects of the case. 13.  On 12 September 2011 the Pula County Court (\u017dupanijski sud u Puli), relying on section 373a of the Civil Procedure Act, dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal as unfounded. It agreed with the outcome of the case but held that the first-instance court had failed to take into account all the facts from the proceedings that had supported the dismissal of the claim. The relevant part of the judgment reads as follows:\n\u201c... this appellate court finds that although the first-instance court failed to take into account all the facts emerging from the first-instance proceedings which meant [the plaintiff\u2019s] claim had to be dismissed, the decision on dismissing the claim as unfounded is in any event correct, therefore the first-instance judgment is upheld by application of section 373a of the Civil Procedure Act.\n...\nThis appellate court therefore holds that the plaintiff\u2019s claim was certainly to be dismissed, but for the reasons set out in this appellate decision; that is, that the reasons the first-instance court stated in the reasoning of its decision would not suffice for the claim to be dismissed.\nTherefore the first-instance decision is upheld on the basis of section 373a of the Civil Procedure Act ...\u201d 14.  On 5 December 2011 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske), challenging the lower courts\u2019 judgments. He stated that the appellate court had relied expressly on section 373a of the Civil Procedure Act, and that therefore he was lodging his appeal on points of law on the basis of section 382(1)(3) of that Act. 15.  On 14 May 2013 the Supreme Court declared the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law inadmissible on the grounds that the appellate court in fact had not applied section 373a of the Civil Procedure Act, and that therefore his appeal on points of law could not be allowed. The relevant part of the decision reads as follows:\n\u201cThe first-instance court and the appellate court found that the plaintiff had not been dismissed because of his inability to work caused by the work-related injury, but that his employment had been terminated by dismissal due to redundancy and that therefore there was no causal link between his dismissal and the granting of the disability pension, so his claim for damages ... was dismissed as unfounded.\nTherefore, in this court\u2019s assessment, the requirements for the application of section 373a of the Civil Procedure Act were not met, given that the appellate court did not establish, in the manner prescribed by section 373a of the Civil Procedure Act, a different set of facts to the one established by the first-instance court, but based its decision on the same facts.\u201d 16.  The applicant subsequently complained to the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) about the Supreme Court\u2019s decision on his appeal on points of law. He made no allegations of any violation of his rights in respect of the proceedings before the first-instance court or the appellate court. 17.  On 16 October 2013 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint as manifestly ill-founded. The decision was served on the applicant\u2019s representative on 25 October 2013.", "references": ["4", "9", "3", "6", "0", "5", "8", "1", "2", "7", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicants\u2019 dates of birth and places of residence are given in the Appendix. 5.  At the material time the second applicant was a member of an opposition group Nida. The third applicant was a member of an opposition group \u0130ctimai Palata; he was also one of the organisers of several demonstrations held in Baku. 6.  The first and the second applicants participated in a demonstration organised by the opposition on 20 October 2012. Prior to that assembly, on 15 October 2012, the organisers gave notice to the relevant authority, the Baku City Executive Authority (\u201cthe BCEA\u201d). The BCEA refused to authorise the holding of the demonstration at the place indicated by the organisers and proposed a different location on the outskirts of Baku \u2013 the grounds of a driving school situated in the 20th residential area of the Sabail District. Nevertheless, the organisers decided to hold the demonstration as planned. 7.  The second applicant also participated in demonstrations held on 12 January and 26 January 2013. The third applicant participated in a demonstration held on 30 April 2013. The organisers of those demonstrations gave no proper prior notice to the BCEA. Information about the demonstrations was disseminated on the internet or in the press. 8.  According to the applicants, the demonstrations were intended to be peaceful and were conducted in a peaceful manner. The participants of the demonstration of 20 October 2012 were demanding democratic reforms in the country and free and fair elections, and protesting against impediments on freedom of assembly. The demonstration of 12 January was aimed at protesting about the deaths of soldiers in the army, while the demonstration of 26 January 2013 condemned the use of force by the police against the participants of previous demonstrations. The participants of the demonstration of 30 April 2013 were commemorating the victims of a terrorist attack which had been committed in 2009 at the Azerbaijan State Oil Academy. 9.  The police began to disperse the demonstrations of 20 October 2012, 12 January, 26 January and 30 April 2013 as soon as the protesters began to gather. 10.  The circumstances related to the dispersal of the demonstration of 20 October 2012, the first and second applicants\u2019 arrests and custody, and subsequent administrative proceedings against them are similar to those in Gafgaz Mammadov v. Azerbaijan (no. 60259/11, 15 October 2015) (see also Appendix). 11.  The circumstances related to the dispersal of the demonstrations of 12 January, 26 January and 30 April 2013, the second and third applicants\u2019 arrests and custody, and the subsequent administrative proceedings against them are similar to those in Bayramov v. Azerbaijan ([Committee] nos. 19150/13 and 52022/13, 6 April 2017) (see also Appendix).", "references": ["1", "6", "5", "0", "8", "4", "9", "No Label", "7", "2", "3"], "gold": ["7", "2", "3"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1966 and lived before his arrest in the Arkhangelsk Region. He is currently detained in the town of Severodvinsk. 5.  On an unspecified date the applicant, while being on the wanted list after having breached his undertaking not to leave the place of his residence, was arrested on the charges of violent acts against a public official (Article 318 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation). On 18 May 2010 the Severodvinsk Town Court of the Arkhangelsk Region authorised his detention. 6.  On 2 September 2010 the applicant asked the Town Court to apply a non-custodial restraint measure to him. The applicant and his lawyer attended the hearing and made oral submissions. The Town Court dismissed the motion for release, having referred, in particular, to the applicant\u2019s criminal record, which included two convictions for having mounted threats of violence against a judge, an offence under Article 296 of the Criminal Code, and for contempt of court, punishable under Article 297 of the Criminal Code. The applicant appealed. 7.  In the meantime, on 20 September 2010 the applicant was convicted as charged. 8.  On 12 October 2010 the Arkhangelsk Regional Court upheld the decision of the Town Court of 2 September 2010. With reference to its discretional powers under Article 379 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation the appeal court rejected the applicant\u2019s leave to appear, and held the hearing in his absence.", "references": ["4", "3", "8", "7", "0", "1", "9", "5", "6", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "5.  The three applicants were born in 1980, 1981 and 1983 respectively and are in detention in Moscow. 6.  The facts of the cases, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7.  The applicant was arrested on 8 March 2015 on suspicion of murder. 8.  On 8 March 2015 a court ordered his pre-trial detention, which was further extended on several occasions, in particular on 24 August and 25 November 2015. The applicant appealed against the extension orders on 26 August and 26 November 2015 respectively. The appeals were dismissed on 16 December 2015 and on 8 February 2016. 9.  The applicant has been detained in remand prison no. 77/6 in Moscow since 17 March 2015, except for twenty-one days in May 2015 when he was detained in remand prison no. 77/1 in Moscow (hereinafter \u201cIZ-77/6\u201d and \u201cIZ-77/1\u201d). In IZ-77/6 the applicant has around 3 square metres (sq.m) of personal space, the cell is extremely hot in the summer and extremely damp in the winter, it lacks natural light and fresh air, while access to potable water and hot water is restricted. The applicant has not been provided with bedding and can have no more than one ten-minute shower a week. Daily physical exercise in the fresh air is limited to one hour. The applicant has not described the conditions of his detention in IZ-77/1. 10.  On 25 November 2015 the applicant was transported between IZ\u201177/6 and the Basmanny District Court of Moscow in a prison van. Personal space in the van was limited and there was not enough fresh air; the applicant had no access to a toilet and no food or drinking water was provided. Upon his arrival to the court building and before returning to the remand prison he was detained for about 15 hours in a convoy cell where he disposed of around 0.5 sq. m of personal space and had no access to natural light, fresh air, the toilet or drinking water. 11.  The applicants were arrested on 7 March 2015 on suspicion of murder. 12.  On 8 March 2015 a court ordered their pre-trial detention, which was further extended on several occasions, in particular on 19 February, 1 March and 12 May 2016. Appeals filed by the applicants were dismissed on 8 April, 21 April and 28 June 2016 respectively. 13.  On 12 May 2015 the applicants were transported from remand prison No. 77/2 in Moscow (\u201cIZ-77/2\u201d) to the Moscow City Court and back in a prison van. The conditions of the applicants\u2019 transfer to and from the court building were identical to those described by the applicant in case no. 18496/16. 14.  By a letter of 26 October 2016 the Government asked the Court to strike application no. 18496/16 out of its list and enclosed the text of a unilateral declaration with a view to resolving the issues it raised. 15.  On 13 December 2016 the applicant\u2019s lawyer disclosed the terms of the Government\u2019s declaration to the media stating that the Russian Government and the Court had \u201centered into an agreement under which Russia [would] pay a compensation\u201d of six thousand euro to the applicant, that \u201cRussia ha[d] acknowledged\u201d the violations and that the applicant was \u201cthinking over the offer but [would] most likely accept it\u201d. The lawyer\u2019s statements were published, in particular, on the websites of the Vedomosti and Kommersant newspapers and on the website of the Ria Novosti news agency. 16.  On 14 December 2016 the applicant accepted the Government\u2019s declaration. 17.  By letters of 12 December 2016 the applicants in applications nos. 61249/16 and 61253/16 were informed of the Court\u2019s decision to communicate their applications to the Government. The information note in the Russian language attached to the letters included, inter alia, information on the strictly confidential nature of all friendly-settlement negotiations. The Court also provided the parties with declarations prepared by the Registry, aimed at securing a friendly settlement of the cases. 18.  On 30 January 2017 the applicants\u2019 lawyer informed several media outlets that the Court \u201chad found for the applicants and awarded 6,500 euros to each [applicant]\u201d. That information was published, in particular, on the websites of the Kommersant, Vedomosti and Izvestiya newspapers.", "references": ["9", "5", "0", "7", "3", "6", "4", "8", "No Label", "1", "2"], "gold": ["1", "2"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1970 and lives in Houten. 7.  The applicant was employed by the AIVD as an audio editor and interpreter. In this capacity he had access to classified information (gerubriceerde informatie), which he was under a duty not to divulge to persons not authorised to have knowledge of it. 8.  The suspicion arose that the applicant had forwarded copies of classified documents to persons outside the service, including in some cases persons who were under covert investigation by the AIVD in connection with possible terrorist activity. 9.  On 30 September 2004 the applicant was arrested. He was charged with divulging State secret information to persons not authorised to take cognisance of it and taken into detention on remand (voorlopige hechtenis). 10.   The AIVD advised the applicant in writing that he was still under an obligation of secrecy. Consequently it would be constitutive of a further criminal offence if he were to discuss matters covered by his duty of secrecy with anyone including his counsel. 11.  The applicant\u2019s counsel were also warned that they might be prosecuted should they divulge any State secret information to third parties. 12.  The trial opened before the Rotterdam Regional Court (rechtbank) on 10 January 2005. It was adjourned several times. 13.  The applicant\u2019s counsel protested against the restrictions affecting communication between themselves and the applicant, which in their submission undermined the effectiveness of the defence. They also asked for certain documents to be added to complete the file: these included the internal AIVD report that was the basis of the prosecution, which was absent from the file altogether, and the documents which had supposedly been leaked, which had been added to the case file in redacted form with parts blacked out. They further repeated a request, made earlier in writing, for the applicant to be released unconditionally from his duty of secrecy in order to conduct his defence (vrijwaring). 14.  The public prosecutor (officier van justitie) announced that some but not all of the documents requested by the defence would be added to the file but refused to release the applicant from his duty of secrecy unconditionally. 15.  On 24 January 2005 the Regional Court gave a decision remitting the case to the investigating judge, to whom it would fall to carry out investigations in such a way as to mitigate, and compensate as far as possible, the handicaps under which the defence laboured. 16.  On 4 March 2005 the head of the AIVD informed the applicant in writing that communication of matters covered by his duty of secrecy was permitted, subject to the following conditions:\nThe letter continues:\n\u201cIn order to preclude any misapprehension I stress that this release from the duty of secrecy does not apply to the suspect\u2019s counsel. In the event that counsel wish to make use of information obtained from the suspect with a view to the defence of M, this must be done in consultation with the investigating judge. The investigating judge will then determine whether the (answers to the) questions are of any relevance to the criminal proceedings (strafvorderlijk van belang). If this is the case, the AIVD will then indicate to what extent State secrets are at stake in this context.\u201d 17.  On 1 April 2005 the Head of the AIVD wrote to the investigating judge in the following terms:\n\u201c... I consider it of great importance that the suspect (verdachte) should be able to defend himself adequately against the matters of which he is suspected. This entails that he will have to consult his counsel for that purpose. To that end I have granted the suspect conditional release from his duty of secrecy. These conditions are necessary and serve the interest of national security. There exists a certain tension within these frameworks, i.e. a (more far-reaching) release (as requested) of the duty of secrecy and the interests of national security. After all, the AIVD can only carry out its statutory duty within a certain measure of secrecy. Three criteria are of importance in this respect, namely that the AIVD should be able to maintain the secrecy of its current levels of intelligence, its sources and its working methods. These are critical thresholds that can be seen as the practical implementation of the so-called \u2018jeopardise\u2019 criterion in the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights.\n...\n... Two additional conditions apply: 1.  the release from his duty of secrecy granted [the applicant] shall apply solely to communication between the suspect, his lawyers B\u00f6hler and Pestman, Public Prosecutor Z. and the court, and 2.  shall take place within the confines of the offices of the Investigating Judge or in the presence of the trial court in a closed hearing.\n...\nThe parties to the proceedings are to submit their questions and other requests to you [i.e. the investigating judge]. You then check whether the questions and requests are of any procedural significance (strafvorderlijk belang) in these proceedings, as you have indicated to me with regard to the three subjects mentioned by counsel. In the affirmative, you offer me the opportunity to consider whether the text of the questions in itself can harm national security.\nIn the (probably most likely) event that the questions in themselves cannot harm national security, the answer can be provided in the accustomed way, i.e. by means of an official AIVD report ...\nIn addition, and if the parties to the proceedings consider it necessary, more specific answers can be given by means of, for example, the hearing of witnesses. Perhaps unnecessarily I would observe that section 86(2) of the 2002 Intelligence and Security Services Act (Wet op de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten) applies.\nIn the event that the line of questioning (vraagstelling) in itself is capable of endangering national security, it is my responsibility, pursuant to section 15 of the 2002 Intelligence and Security Services Act, to ensure the secrecy of the information that should remain so and accordingly the classification of that information. I therefore propose that you do not place this information, after I have classified it, in the case file and to request the Regional Court to deal with those questions at a closed hearing. I am of the opinion that the above procedural proposal serves the interests of all parties to the proceedings, taking into account the interests involved in national security.\n...\nThe second condition, which is that the suspect should not be allowed to disclose the identities of AIVD members or human sources, appears clear enough to me. All information that, whether or not in combination with other information, may lead to the identities of AIVD members or human sources becoming known, falls within the scope of the second condition for release [from the duty of secrecy].\n...\nAs regards the third and fourth conditions, I am of the view that these too are sufficiently clear: [the applicant] is released from his duty of secrecy vis-\u00e0-vis his counsel Dr B. B\u00f6hler and Mr M. Pestman in so far as consultation between the suspect and his counsel [Dr] B\u00f6hler and Mr Pestman relates to the crimes with which he is charged. In the event that counsel wish to discuss documents with the suspect which they may wish to add to the case file, the third and fourth conditions should be interpreted to mean that the documents must be relevant and directly necessary for the defence in this case and may possibly be added to the case file. [These requirements of] relevance and direct necessity also apply to the preparation of requests and defences.\nAs to the latter condition: if and when such a procedure becomes a real possibility I will consider, if asked, whether release from the duty of secrecy, conditional or not, is possible.\n...\nFourthly, you have asked me to react to the witnesses requested by counsel. I presume that you mean the AIVD members. I am of the opinion that this is above all a matter of criminal procedure, the public prosecutor indicating in her letter that the questions counsel would like to ask relate primarily to the working methods of the AIVD, the spreading of the leaked information and the internal investigation into this. I can agree with the position taken by the public prosecutor that these questions can most probably be answered by me or my deputy during a witness hearing. Whether and to what extent national security permits the questions to be answered will have to be seen for each question. This will require me first to have the questions intended to be asked at my disposal, so that the Ministers of Justice and of Internal Affairs and Kingdom Relations can decide together and in due time on the application of section 86(2) of the 2002 Intelligence and Security Services Act.\nAs to the possible questioning of AIVD members as witnesses, I would ask you to make it possible, in pursuance of Article 187c of the Code of Criminal Procedure, for special access to be granted to an additional AIVD member. This person can consider the interests of national security for each specific question during the interrogation. This will also permit the defence to put \u2018sub-questions\u2019, questions arising from the questions previously submitted in writing. The hearing of witnesses will thus, in my opinion, considerably speed up the pace of the proceedings \u2013 at least as far as the hearing of witnesses is concerned \u2013 since the (additional) AIVD member present will in many cases be able to decide almost immediately whether the said sub-questions can be answered. This acceleration of the proceedings, in my opinion, benefits all parties to the proceedings. I am prepared to advise the Ministers of Justice and of Internal Affairs and Kingdom Relations, on the basis of section 86(2) of the 2002 Intelligence and Security Services Act, to consider this in any exemption decision.\n...\u201d 18.  On 15 April 2005 the Regional Court gave a decision in which, following the public prosecutor, it refused to make the exemption unconditional. It expressed the view that it would serve no useful purpose to allow the applicant to disclose the identities of AIVD staff members and informants to his counsel. The interests of the applicant were sufficiently protected inasmuch as the exemption covered information strictly necessary for his defence. The Regional Court ordered the investigating judge to hear thirteen witnesses referred to by name and seven witnesses referred to by a code name or number. It refused to order the hearing of fifteen other witnesses referred to by a number and one named witness immediately, leaving that decision to be taken by the investigating judge after a particular witness, an AIVD staff member called B., had been heard. As to the partially blacked-out documents, the Regional Court noted that it too was thereby prevented from considering whether they held secret information within the meaning of Articles 98 and 98a of the Criminal Code (Wetboek van Strafrecht, see below); even so, the prosecution interest in maintaining secrecy prevailed. 19.  The named witness B. was heard on 23 May 2005 and 6 June 2005. It appears that he refused to answer certain questions because of his duty of secrecy. 20.  It appears that on 9 June 2005 the investigating judge decided to refuse to hear the sixteen witnesses requested by the defence for lack of available time (agendatechnische redenen). 21.  On 17 June 2005 the investigating judge decided that the unnamed witnesses permitted to be questioned would be heard at a secret location, under heavy disguise and with the use of voice distorting equipment. A representative of the AIVD and legal counsel of the State would attend in addition to the prosecution and the defence. 22.  The defence lodged an objection against the investigating judge\u2019s decision of 17 June 2005 with the Regional Court, stating also that they would not cooperate in any witness hearing held at a secret location. They also asked for the named witnesses already heard to be relieved of their duty of secrecy and to be heard anew. 23.  The Regional Court held a hearing in camera on 5 July 2005. The defence outlined its provisional strategy, which was to aim for an acquittal by identifying potential sources of the leaks other than the applicant and by demonstrating that the documents leaked did not contain State secrets properly so-called. They also wished to establish the applicant\u2019s attitude to his work for the AIVD. This strategy required the applicant\u2019s former direct colleagues to be questioned and uncensored copies of the documents in question to be made available to the defence and the court. 24.  On 8 July 2005 the Regional Court gave an order for two further named witnesses to be heard but dismissed the defence\u2019s objection for the remainder. 25.  On 14 July 2005 the defence challenged two judges of the trial chamber who had also taken part in the decision of 8 July 2005, arguing on various grounds that positions taken in the latter decision prejudged the outcome of the trial. 26.  The following day, 15 July 2005, the challenge was dismissed and the trial hearing was resumed. The defence asked for documents to be added to the file, including all those found in the applicant\u2019s desk. The Regional Court remitted the case to the investigating judge for the hearing of the witnesses authorised to be heard, in so far as they had not already been heard, and requested the prosecutor to add documents to the file including a description \u2013 to be prepared by the AIVD \u2013 of the documents found in the applicant\u2019s desk. 27.  Witnesses were heard on various dates. In so far as they were unnamed AIVD staff members, they were identified by a number; they were heavily disguised and they were placed in a box that left only their upper body visible; and their voices were distorted. The applicant states that it was impossible to discern their body language and facial expressions. He further states that an AIVD official was present, who could \u2013 and did \u2013 prevent named and unnamed witnesses from answering a proportion of the questions put by the defence, and that this was permitted by the investigating judge. 28.  The trial hearing was resumed on 30 August 2005. Finding no indication that the AIVD information had been leaked by someone else, the Regional Court yet again refused to hear the named witness and the fifteen unnamed witnesses. As to AIVD staff members who refused to disclose certain information based on their duty of secrecy, it stated that the final decision whether to allow this lay with the trial court itself but found that it could not set precise limits as the prosecution wanted. 29.  The trial hearing was resumed on 6 and 7 October 2005. The applicant made no statement. 30.  On 30 November 2005 the trial hearing resumed. The prosecution and the defence made their closing statements. 31.  The Regional Court gave judgment on 14 December 2005. It convicted the applicant and sentenced him to four years and six months\u2019 imprisonment. 32.  The applicant lodged an appeal with the Court of Appeal (gerechtshof) of The Hague. 33.  The appeal hearing opened on 28 September 2006. Among other things, the applicant\u2019s counsel objected to the refusal, in the proceedings at first instance, to allow the defence an unconditional exemption that would allow the applicant and his counsel to communicate unimpeded; to the hearing of unnamed witnesses under heavy disguise, in a closed box that partially hid them from view and with the use of voice distortion, even though they were the applicant\u2019s former direct colleagues; to the withholding of evidence by the witnesses, based on their duty of secrecy as AIVD staff members; and to the withholding of documentary evidence requested by the defence. The prosecuting Advocate General (advocaat\u2011generaal) conveyed an offer by the AIVD to allow an independent expert to see uncensored AIVD documents and report on their content; the expert proposed had previously been a member of a committee appointed to investigate the internal functioning of the AIVD itself. The defence protested that this expert lacked independence precisely for that reason. 34.  The Court of Appeal delivered an interlocutory judgment on 12 October 2006. Its reasoning included the following:\n\u201cThe duty of secrecy arising from the 2002 Intelligence and Security Services Act Serviced Act is subject only to the exceptions set out in that Act. The implication is that only the possibility offered by section 86(1) of that Act offers a solution for the applicant\u2019s present predicament.\nThe interests of State security, which the 2002 Intelligence and Security Services Act and Article 98 and following of the Criminal Code seek to protect, stand in the way of a complete release from the duty of secrecy as the defence would wish and a complete exemption from prosecution for disclosing State secrets to be granted by the Public Prosecution Service. It is obvious that the said duty of secrecy constitutes a restriction of \u2013 normally entirely \u2013 free and confidential consultation between the suspect and his counsel and that \u2013 if it remained in force in its entirety \u2013 it would prevent a fair trial. In the present case, the suspect has been granted conditional release from that duty by the AIVD, based on the latter section of the 2002 Intelligence and Security Service Act, as have his two counsel. The conditions accompanying that release, all of which concern interests of State security in relation to interests of the defence in the present criminal proceedings, appear to the Court of Appeal neither unreasonable within the framework of the interests of State security nor unworkable within the framework of the interests of the defence.\n...\nFinally, it is the case that if the suspect and the defence, if they consider that the space left to them by the said release is not sufficient to conduct a defence meeting the requirements of the Convention and they consider, in their assessment, that he/they have to transgress his/their duty of secrecy further than the conditions governing the release allow, they can plead justification (rechtvaardigingsgrond), namely the interest of a proper defence within the meaning of Article 6 of the Convention. The Advocate General gave the assurance at the hearing of 28 September 2006 that no prosecution would be brought if a violation of the duty of secrecy by the suspect \u2013 and as the Court of Appeal presumes, his counsel as well \u2013 was justified by invoking Article 6 of the Convention.\u201d\nand\n\u201cThe Court of Appeal assumes that the defence request [for access to the internal AIVD investigation materials] comprises all investigations undertaken by the AIVD after it had become known that a third party, i.e. S., possessed [a copy of a classified AIVD document]. It does not appear from the file that these internal investigations were set out in any report. The case file contains criminal complaints (aangiftes) based on those investigations.\nIt must be noted in the first place that the defence request does not concern documents in the possession of the Public Prosecution Service within the meaning of Article 30 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; none of the participants in the proceedings is aware of the content of the internal investigations, save for what has been stated by witnesses in this respect, and what is set out in the said criminal complaints. There is therefore no violation of the principle of \u2018equality of arms\u2019[1].\nQuite apart from the question whether the AIVD, given its duty and responsibility ..., would be willing to submit its report or any written documents concerning its internal investigation to the public prosecution service to be added to the file, the question needs to be considered whether these documents, which do not emanate from any investigatory body, can in reason be relevant to the defence.\nThe defence has not, in the present case, suggested, let alone shown, that the materials compiled by the AIVD within the framework of its internal investigation have been obtained unlawfully or are unreliable, but only that the documents and information provided by that service have been accepted uncritically (voor zoete koek aangenomen) first by the National Police Internal Investigations Department (Rijksrecherche) and then by the Public Prosecution Service and cannot be checked.\nThe Court of Appeal takes the provisional view \u2013 without wishing to prejudge its final decision [on the question whether the trial was fair] \u2013 that the said materials can be assessed based on the statements of the witnesses questioned, albeit, as far as AIVD members are concerned, subject to some restrictions owing to their duty of secrecy.\u201d\nIt noted the \u201cparticular tension between fundamentally opposed interests\u201d, namely the applicant\u2019s interest as a defendant in a criminal trial and the State interest in maintaining the secrecy of AIVD information, but rejected the protests put forward on the applicant\u2019s behalf. The judgment took note of a promise made by the Advocate General not to prosecute for a violation of the duty of secrecy if that violation was justified by reliance on Article 6 of the Convention (gerechtvaardigd is door een beroep op artikel 6 EVRM). It asked the prosecution to submit certain official reports but not the uncensored AIVD documents requested by the defence. 35.  The appeal hearing was resumed on 12 February 2007. The applicant announced that he might, in his own defence, have to reveal State secret information. This prompted the Court of Appeal to exclude the public from the interrogation of the applicant, despite the latter\u2019s protests. 36.  In the course of questioning by his counsel the applicant mentioned the names of particular AIVD staff members; these are not recorded in the official record of the hearing. The Advocate General protested against the mentioning of these names in so far as they were not already to be found in the case file, which in his view was not justified by Article 6 of the Convention, and announced his intention to prosecute if the applicant should \u201ctransgress those limits\u201d (mocht hij die grenzen overschrijden). The applicant\u2019s counsel replied that the defence needed these names in order to decide whether to call the persons concerned as defence witnesses and pointed out that the public had been excluded. After the president decided that the Advocate General should be entitled to state a view on the acceptability of questions put to the applicant by his counsel, the applicant stated that he would for the remainder of the hearing comply with his duty of secrecy. Thereupon the hearing was reopened to the public. 37.  On 14 February 2007 the applicant\u2019s counsel Mr Pestman sent the Advocate General a letter by fax, to which was appended a list of questions he and Ms B\u00f6hler would have wished to ask the applicant in support of the case for the defence. These questions concerned AIVD working methods and procedures and AIVD members. One question asked the applicant to identify individual AIVD members on a handwritten anonymised organigram by name. Other questions asked the applicant to state the names of AIVD members other than himself who would have had access to the documents found to have been leaked. 38.  The hearing continued on 15 February 2007. The Advocate General announced his intention to prosecute the applicant should he answer questions naming AIVD sources, providing an insight into AIVD working methods or relating to the blacked-out parts of the redacted documents. Responding to protests by the defence, the Court of Appeal referred to its interlocutory judgment of 12 October 2006 (see paragraph 34 above), in which it had stated that if the applicant considered a breach of his duty of secrecy in the interest of his defence he would, if prosecuted, be able to pray the right under Article 6 of the Convention to defend himself in justification. The decision to prosecute, however, belonged to the Public Prosecution Service alone to the exclusion of the courts. 39.  The Court of Appeal gave judgment on 1 March 2007. It quashed the judgment of the Regional Court on the technical ground that the Regional Court\u2019s judgment could not be simply endorsed, convicted the applicant and sentenced him to four years\u2019 imprisonment. 40.  The evidence relied on was the following:\nPhotocopies of the address book with the post-it note and the redacted AIVD documents were attached to the judgment. 41.  The Court of Appeal\u2019s reasoning included the following:\n\u201cIn considering whether the positions adopted by the service [i.e. the AIVD] and/or its members as regards the necessary secrecy and in answering the question to what extent restrictions on (among other things) the right to question witnesses can be justified, other issues than that of defining State secrets in a strict sense also play a part. That is apparent from the chapeau paragraph of section 85(1) of the 2002 Intelligence and Security Services Act, which imposes on AIVD officials a duty of secrecy \u2018without prejudice to Articles 98-98c of the Criminal Code\u2019. That obligation extends to \u2018all information the confidential character of which he knows or ought reasonably to suspect\u2019. Only a ministerial decision as referred to in section 86(2) of that Act can relieve the official of this duty of secrecy if he wishes to act as a witness. The legislature has thus placed the choice in the \u2018conflict ... between the interests of State security, which may imperatively require certain sources or information to be kept secret, and the interest of establishing the material truth in, among other things, ... criminal procedure\u2019 [reference to the statutory drafting history of an earlier Act, repealed by the 2002 Intelligence and Security Services Act, omitted] in the hands of the said Ministers.\n...\nThe above leads the Court of Appeal to conclude as follows. In addition to State secrets within the meaning of Article 98 of the Criminal Code there are other matters that (in the view of the AIVD) fall under the duty of secrecy of section 85 of the 2002 Intelligence and Security Services Act. The Court of Appeal deduces, on the basis of what is laid down in section 86 of that Act, that that obligation (in principle) prevails over the duties of a witness in a criminal trial. The Court of Appeal\u2019s examination of the question whether an AIVD staff member has rightly invoked his duty [of secrecy] is necessarily detached/marginal. Things are different where it concerns the question whether the right of the defence to question witnesses is materially impaired, it being relevant, in the opinion of the Court of Appeal, whether the statement of that particular witness is used in evidence.\u201d\nand\n\u201cThe interests of State security, which the 2002 Intelligence and Security Services Act and Articles 98 and following of the Criminal Code are intended to protect, stand in the way of granting a complete exemption from the duty of secrecy as desired by the defence.\nIt is obvious that the said duty of secrecy constitutes, to some extent, a restriction on \u2013 normally entirely \u2013 unimpeded free and confidential discussion between the suspect and his counsel and that \u2013 had it been in force unmitigated \u2013 it would prevent a fair trial.\nAs the Court of Appeal held in its interlocutory judgment of 12 October 2006, the duty of secrecy is subject only to the exceptions set out in the 2002 Intelligence and Security Services Act.\nThis means that the situation in which the suspect finds himself in the present criminal case leaves only the avenue left by section 86(1) of the said Act.\u201d\nand\n\u201cThe Advocate General has given the undertaking, at the Court of Appeal\u2019s hearing of 2 September 2006, that [the applicant] shall not be prosecuted if a violation of the duty of secrecy by [the applicant] is justified by reliance on Article 6 of the Convention, with due regard to the demands of proportionality and subsidiarity inherent pertaining to a legal defence (strafuitsluitingsgrond).\nThe conditions attached to the exemption aforementioned, all of which concern the interest of State security in relation to the interests of the defence in the present criminal proceedings, do not appear unreasonable to the Court of Appeal within the framework of the interests of State security and in the Court of Appeal\u2019s opinion have done no relevant harm to the interests of the defence.\u201d\nand\n\u201cThe Court of Appeal can only answer the question whether the information in issue is to be considered \u2018State secret\u2019 or as information relating to State security by referring to the texts, as contained in the file, of [the documents concerned], to the extent that these documents have been added to the file in censored form as appendices to the AIVD\u2019s official record of 15 March 2005, [an uncensored e-mail relevant to one of the charges] and the explanations to these documents given by the AIVD, especially as contained in the said official record of the head of the AIVD of 10 February 2005 and the official record of the acting head of the AIVD of 28 December 2006, which latter report has been verified by the National Public Prosecutor for Counter-terrorism (Landelijke Officier van Justitie Terrorismebestrijding) as appears from the latter\u2019s official report of 29 December 2006.\nThe Court of Appeal considers itself sufficiently able to determine the nature and character of this information on the basis of these documents, considered in context. For that purpose it is not necessary, in the opinion of the Court of Appeal, to possess or have access to entirely uncensored versions of the information. In this connection, the Court of Appeal has sought, in giving its interlocutory judgment aimed at obtaining a further official report about the type and nature of the State security interest of the information contained in the censored texts portions, to gain optimum understanding of the nature and character of the information. Although the AIVD, in submitting its official record of 28 December 2006 (verified by the National Public Prosecutor for Counter-terrorism), has not entirely kept to the letter of the Court of Appeal\u2019s order, the Court of Appeal has, based on the texts before it, considered in context with the AIVD\u2019s explanations in its official records of 10 February 2005 and 28 December 2006, sufficiently gained the understanding referred to.\u201d 42.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law (cassatie) with the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad). 43.  The Supreme Court gave judgment on 7 July 2009 (ECLI:NL:HR:BG7232). It held that the length of the proceedings before it had been excessive and the applicant was entitled to compensation in the form of a reduction of sentence. It therefore quashed the judgment of the Court of Appeal for technical reasons in order to revise the sentence which it reduced by two months to three years and ten months. It held, however, that the appeal was unfounded. Its reasoning included the following:\n\u201c5.5.  There is no statutory provision for an exception to the duty of secrecy laid down in section 85 of the 2002 Intelligence and Security Services Act in the event that the official concerned is a suspect. Even then the official is bound by his duty of secrecy and he will not be permitted to divulge information in violation of that duty.\nIf, however, the trial judge takes the view, whether or not it be in response to a request or a legal argument (verweer) put forward by the defence, that the interest of the defence requires that information falling under the duty of secrecy is disclosed by the suspect, the court will have to weigh the conflicting interests in the case. The guiding principle (richtsnoer) in so doing is whether, if this information cannot be disclosed after all, there can still be a fair trial within the meaning of Article 6 of the Convention.\nIf the trial court reaches the finding that it is necessary, from the point of view of that Convention guarantee, to take cognisance of that secret information and the handicap for the defence [resulting from not being able to disclose it][2] is not sufficiently compensated by the procedure followed, it will have to determine \u2013 for example, by hearing the appropriate AIVD official or officials on this point \u2013 whether the duty of secrecy is to be maintained intact in relation to that information. If that is the case, the conclusion will have to be that there cannot be any fair trial and the prosecution will have to be declared inadmissible (zal de officier van justitie niet-ontvankelijk moeten worden verklaard in de vervolging). 5.6.  In so far as the Court of Appeal has been inspired by a procedural framework other than outlined above, it has misinterpreted the law (heeft het blijk gegeven van een onjuiste rechtsopvatting). However, that need not lead to the quashing of the judgment [of the Court of Appeal] for the following reasons. ...\u201d\nThe Supreme Court went on to find that the compensatory measures had been sufficient in the circumstances: the possibility had been offered to hear AIVD officials as witnesses without disclosing their identities, and the Court of Appeal had been sufficiently informed by the information contained in the case file \u2013 the uncensored parts of documents, the official explanatory documents submitted by the AIVD, and the checking of the AIVD position by the National Public Prosecutor for Counter-terrorism \u2013 to make a proper assessment as to whether the documents in issue were properly classified State secret.", "references": ["1", "8", "4", "0", "7", "9", "6", "5", "2", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1945 and lives in Bobadela. 6.  In December 1993 the applicant became a patient of the gynaecology department of the Alfredo da Costa Maternity Hospital (since renamed the Central Lisbon Hospital \u2013 Centro Hospitalar de Lisboa Central, hereinafter \u201cthe CHLC\u201d). 7.  On 9 December 1993 the applicant was diagnosed with bartholinitis, a gynaecological disease, on the left side of her vagina (bartholinite \u00e0 esquerda). She started treatment, which included drainages (drenagens). After each drainage the Bartholin gland would swell, causing the applicant considerable pain. She would thus require a second drainage and painkillers. 8.  She was offered surgery for the condition during a consultation at the beginning of 1995. 9.  On 21 May 1995 the applicant was admitted to the CHLC for a surgical procedure to remove the left Bartholin gland. On 22 May 1995 the applicant had both glands, on the left and right sides of the vagina, removed. 10.  On an unknown date after being discharged, the applicant began to experience intense pain and a loss of sensation in the vagina. She also suffered from urinary incontinence, had difficulty sitting and walking, and could not have sexual relations. 11.  On an unknown date the applicant was informed after being examined at a private clinic that the left pudendal nerve (nervo pudenda do lado esquerdo) had been injured during the operation. 12.  On 26 April 2000 the applicant brought a civil action in the Lisbon Administrative Court (Tribunal Administrativo do C\u00edrculo de Lisboa) against the CHLC under the State Liability Act (a\u00e7\u00e3o de responsabilidade civil extracontratual por facto il\u00edcito), seeking damages of 70,579,779 escudos (PTE), equivalent to 325,050,020 euros (EUR), of which PTE 50,000,000 (EUR 249,399) was in respect of non-pecuniary damage owing to the physical disability caused by the operation. 13.  On 4 October 2013 the Lisbon Administrative Court ruled partly in favour of the applicant. It established, inter alia, the following facts:\n(i)  that the applicant had suffered since 1995 from a physical deficiency which had given her an overall permanent degree of disability of 73% and that the disability had resulted from the left pudendal nerve being cut;\n(ii)  after being discharged from hospital, the applicant had complained of pain associated with insensitivity in the part of the body which had been operated on and which had become swollen;\n(iii)  the left pudendal nerve had been injured during the operation, which had caused the pain from which the applicant was suffering, the loss of sensitivity and the swelling in the vaginal area;\n(iv)  the applicant had suffered from a decrease in vaginal sensitivity due to the partial lesion to the left pudendal nerve. 14.  On the merits, the Lisbon Administrative Court found that the surgeon had acted recklessly by not fulfilling his objective duty of care, in breach of leges artis, and established that there was a causal link between his conduct and the injury to the applicant\u2019s left pudendal nerve. The Lisbon Administrative Court also established that it was that injury which caused her, among other problems, the pain and loss of sensation in the vagina and urinary incontinence. As a consequence, she had difficulty walking, sitting and having sexual relations, which, all together, made her feel diminished as a woman. Consequently, the applicant was also depressed, had suicidal thoughts and avoided contact with members of her family and friends. For those reasons the Lisbon Administrative Court considered that the applicant should be awarded EUR 80,000 in compensation for non-pecuniary damage. In respect of pecuniary damage, the Lisbon Administrative Court awarded her EUR 92,000, of which EUR 16,000 was for the services of a maid the applicant had had to hire to help her with household tasks. 15.  On an unknown date the CHLC appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court (Supremo Tribunal Administrativo) against the judgment of the Lisbon Administrative Court. The applicant lodged a counter-appeal (recurso subordinado), arguing that she should have received EUR 249,399 in compensation and that the CHLC\u2019s appeal should be declared inadmissible. An opinion from the Attorney General\u2019s Office attached to the Supreme Administrative Court (Procuradora Geral Adjunta junto do Supremo Tribunal Administrativo) stated that the CHLC\u2019s appeal should be dismissed because it had been established that there had been a violation of leges artis. As a consequence, the various requirements of the obligation to pay compensation had been verified and the first-instance court had decided on compensation in an equitable and proper way. 16.  On 9 October 2014 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the first-instance judgment on the merits but reduced, inter alia, the amount that had been awarded for the services of the maid from EUR 16,000 to EUR 6,000 and the compensation for non-pecuniary damage from EUR 80,000 to EUR 50,000. The relevant part of the judgment on those points reads as follows:\n\u201c... with respect to damages related to the charges for the maid ... [the plaintiff] could not show the amount paid under that head. Also ... we consider that the award of EUR 16,000 under that head is manifestly excessive.\nIndeed, (1) it has not been established that the plaintiff had lost her capacity to take care of domestic tasks, (2) professional activity outside the home is one thing while domestic work is another, and (3) considering the age of her children, she [the plaintiff] probably only needed to take care of her husband; this leads us to the conclusion that she did not need to hire a full-time maid ...\nLastly, as regards non-pecuniary damage, it is important to set an amount which compensates the plaintiff for her pain and loss of sensation and swelling in the vaginal area, and for the difficulty sitting and walking, which causes her distress and prevents her from going about her everyday life, forcing her to use sanitary towels on a daily basis to conceal urinary and faecal incontinence and which has limited her sexual activity, making her feel diminished as a woman. In addition, there is no medical solution to her condition. All this has caused her severe depression, expressing itself in anxiety and somatic symptoms manifested in the difficulty she has sleeping, deep disgust and frustration with the situation in which she finds herself, which has turned her into a very unhappy person and which inhibits her from establishing relationships with others and has caused her to stop visiting family and friends, from going to the beach and theatre and which has given her suicidal thoughts.\nIt should be noted, however, that the plaintiff has been suffering from the gynaecological condition for a long time (at least since 1993) and that she had already undergone various kinds of treatment without any acceptable result and that it was that lack of results and the impossibility of curing the condition otherwise that was the motivation for surgery. She had already had unbearable pain and symptoms of depression before [surgery]. This means that the plaintiff\u2019s complaints are not new and that the surgical procedure only aggravated an already difficult situation, a fact which cannot be ignored when setting the amount of compensation.\nAdditionally, it should not be forgotten that at the time of the operation the plaintiff was already 50 years old and had two children, that is, an age when sex is not as important as in younger years, its significance diminishing with age.\nThus, having regard to all those aspects, we believe that the compensation awarded at first instance exceeded what could be considered reasonable and, as such, the plaintiff should be awarded EUR 50,000 in compensation [in respect of non-pecuniary damage].\u201d 17.  On 29 October 2014 the Attorney General\u2019s Office attached to the Supreme Administrative Court applied to the Supreme Administrative Court to have the judgment of 9 October 2014 declared null and void (nulidade do ac\u00f3rd\u00e3o) in the part concerning the amount awarded for non-pecuniary damage. It argued that the reasoning in the judgment and the decision on the amount of compensation were contradictory. It further submitted that the compensation award should not have taken account of the applicant\u2019s symptoms before the medical intervention, as if only a worsening of those symptoms had been at stake. The relevant parts of the application read as follows:\n\u201c...\nIII \u2013 In the instant case, we are dealing with surgical intervention which aimed exclusively at extracting the Bartholin glands.\n...\nDuring that surgical procedure the left pudendal nerve was partly damaged.\nThe pudendal nerve ... is a different organ from the one which was the object of the surgical intervention.\nFollowing the extraction of the glands the plaintiff suffered damage which was considered as being established and which specifically arose from the lesion in question.\nIV- In view of the factual basis of the judgment and having regard to the fact that \u2018in the absence of unlikely and unexpected occurrences doctors would have cured the plaintiff\u2019s illness and she could have returned to her normal life\u2019, the decision setting the amount of compensation for non-pecuniary damage should not have taken account of the plaintiff\u2019s pain and symptoms of depression prior to the surgical intervention as if they had worsened.\nThat is because, according to the judgment, they would have disappeared once the Bartholin glands had been removed and the plaintiff\u2019s condition cured by surgery.\nV \u2013 The reasoning in the judgment leads logically to a different decision.\nThat would be to set compensation for non-pecuniary damage on the basis of the fact that the plaintiff would have been cured if the pudendal nerve had not been injured.\u201d 18.  On 4 November 2014 the applicant applied to the Supreme Administrative Court to join the Attorney General\u2019s appeal of 29 October 2014, arguing that the judgment of 9 October 2014 should be declared null and void in the part concerning the amount of non-pecuniary damage she had been awarded. 19.  On 29 January 2015 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the appeals by the Attorney General\u2019s Office and the applicant and upheld its judgment of 9 October 2014. It considered that the causal link between the injury to the pudendal nerve and the alleged damage had been established. However, that injury had not been the only cause of damage to the applicant. In the opinion of the judges of the Supreme Administrative Court, the applicant\u2019s health problems prior to the operation, and her gynaecological and psychological symptoms in particular, could not be ignored and had been aggravated by the procedure.", "references": ["1", "6", "0", "9", "2", "7", "3", "5", "No Label", "8", "4"], "gold": ["8", "4"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1979 and is currently detained in the Tren\u010d\u00edn hospital for charged and convicted persons. 7.   The applicant was arrested on 1 January 2012 and charges were brought against him the following day for the criminal offence of endangering public safety. The charge was based on the suspicion that he had made home-made explosive devices; that he had sent some of them, together with written threats, to veterinarians and the head office of a supermarket chain; and that he had planted one of the devices next to a fast food outlet and had allowed it to explode with a view to promoting animal rights. 8.  On 4 January 2012 the Ko\u0161ice I District Court remanded the applicant in custody pending trial to prevent him from continuing his criminal activity. The District Court took into account, inter alia, the nature of the criminal charge and the fact that the applicant had been having long-term psychiatric treatment. An interlocutory appeal by the applicant was unsuccessful. 9.  Courts at two levels of jurisdiction reviewed and confirmed the lawfulness of the applicant\u2019s detention on five occasions as follows. 10.  Between 28 March 2012 and 21 May 2012 courts at two levels dismissed applications by the applicant for release. They relied on a risk of reoffending and took into account new charges that had been brought against him as well as the testimony of various witnesses and victims. In that connection, they referred to evidence that the applicant had been planning his attacks for a long time and in a systematic way. On 3 May 2012 the domestic courts added new grounds for his detention, namely a risk that he might abscond. That was based on a statement by a witness who had allegedly said that the applicant had declared that he would try to flee if he was arrested. The evidence in the case, in particular the applicant\u2019s computer, suggested that he had \u201centertained the idea of counterfeiting an ID\u201d. 11.  On 11 June 2012 the District Court prolonged the applicant\u2019s detention by five months (until 1 January 2013) on the grounds that the investigation was not finished, that further charges had been brought against him since May 2012, and that the criminal charges had been reclassified as a crime of terrorism and the acquisition and possession of firearms. The domestic courts concluded that his criminal case was complex owing to the extent and nature of his criminal activity and repeated the grounds for his detention, namely the possibility of his reoffending and absconding. The court also ordered a report by an expert on extremism and terrorism. That decision was upheld on appeal. 12.  At the pre-trial stage the applicant was committed to the hospital for charged and convicted persons in Tren\u010d\u00edn on two occasions, namely between January and February 2012 and March and June 2012 because, inter alia, he had demonstrated signs of anxiety, made threats of suicide and needed to have his mental state examined. 13.  On 1 October 2012 the applicant was indicted to stand trial on the above charges before the District Court. 14.  Between 3 October and 27 December 2012 the applicant applied two more times for release to courts at two levels of jurisdiction. Given the serious accusations made against him in the meantime (on 1 October 2012) for crimes including terrorism, the courts upheld both grounds for his continued detention. In addition, they referred to a witness statement that the applicant had written a will where he had expressed the alleged intention to commit a terrorist suicide attack. Furthermore, the courts rejected bail and guarantees of supervision offered by the applicant\u2019s parents since they had been unable to prevent the crimes while the applicant had lived in their house. 15.  The District Court held seven hearings in the criminal case against the applicant. It examined oral and documentary evidence, including evidence from several experts. It delivered its judgment on 19 June 2013, finding the applicant guilty of the charges and sentencing him to twenty-five years in prison. However, on 30 October 2013 the Regional Court quashed the judgment following an appeal by the applicant and remitted the case to the District Court for re-examination. 16.  The Regional Court observed that in the course of the appellate proceedings, on 24 October 2013, the applicant had submitted a report by two certified experts concluding that he had long been suffering from a mental schizotypal disorder preventing him from understanding the illegal nature of his behaviour and from controlling it (\u201cthe second expert report\u201d). Those conclusions were contrary to those in a report by two other experts at the pre-trial stage of the proceedings (\u201cthe first expert report\u201d), which had concluded that the applicant was not suffering from a mental illness but merely a personality disorder. Resolving that contradiction was imperative in order to establish whether or not the applicant was criminally responsible. The Regional Court therefore instructed the District Court to obtain a third opinion from an expert institute. In addition, it ordered the lower court to resolve an issue concerning the legal classification of the applicant\u2019s impugned actions. 17.  In the meantime, on 4 September 2013, while the criminal proceedings were pending on appeal, the Regional Court decided to keep the applicant in detention on the same grounds as before (see paragraph 14 above). 18.  The subsequent course of the trial is described in paragraphs 27 et seq. below. 19. After the verdict was quashed on appeal and remitted to the District Court for re-examination, the applicant, assisted by his lawyer, applied for release on 23 December 2013. He referred to his mental disorder as established in the second expert report of 24 October 2013. He added that he had been seeing a psychiatrist since the age of 14 and needed medicine on a daily basis to prevent suicidal thoughts. He could not live without that medicine, even in detention, as he required treatment and sessions with a psychiatrist. He submitted that there was no risk of him absconding if at large as he had only had a basic education, had no financial means, no job, had never travelled alone outside his home town, and was completely dependent on his parents, emotionally, financially and for everyday care. Moreover, there was no risk he would continue his criminal activity if he was under medication and being properly treated, or, alternatively, if he was committed to a psychiatric institution, as he feared for the future after the charges had been brought against him. 20.  The applicant\u2019s parents supported his application for release and offered to stand as guarantors of his pledge that he would live in accordance with the law. They also supported his request that his detention be replaced by supervision by a parole officer. 21.  On 10 January 2014 the District Court heard the applicant, his lawyer, and the Public Prosecution Service as regards his request for release. According to the transcript of the hearing, the applicant and his counsel reiterated and further developed their arguments made in the application and submitted that his mental condition meant that his absconding was not realistic. 22.  The Government\u2019s observations show that on the same date the District Court sent a letter to the director of the detention centre in Ko\u0161ice where the applicant was being held, asking for information about the applicant\u2019s state of health. It enquired whether the applicant was being provided with the drugs he had been prescribed and whether the detention centre was able to provide the applicant with his treatment. The director of the detention centre replied on the same day in the affirmative. 23.  On 13 January 2014 the District Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s application to be released and his supplementary requests, a decision that was upheld by the Regional Court on 29 January 2014 after an interlocutory appeal by the applicant. 24.  The courts concluded that there was still a strong suspicion against the applicant, which added to the reasons for keeping him detained. They observed that he had created explosives and contemplated where to plant them over a long time and in a systematic way. He had lived with his parents and a search of the home they shared had shown that they had clearly not been aware of his illegal activities and had been unable to prevent them. The applicant faced a particularly severe potential penalty, had declared openly that he would try and flee in case of arrest and a search of his computer had suggested that he had contemplated counterfeiting an ID.\nRegarding the nature, scope and seriousness of the alleged offences and the applicant\u2019s character, the courts concluded that the conditions for a restriction of liberty still existed. In addition, they observed that the relevant authorities had proceeded with the case expeditiously and with due diligence.\nMoreover, the courts found that the requirements for alternative measures, such as a parental guarantee, a pledge by the applicant or replacing his detention with supervision had not been met.\nThere was no separate consideration of the applicant\u2019s mental condition as such. The correspondence between the district court and the director of the detention centre was not mentioned in the courts\u2019 decisions. 25.  The applicant subsequently turned to the Constitutional Court with a complaint under Article 127 of the Constitution, alleging a violation of his rights, inter alia, under Article 5 \u00a7\u00a7 1 (c), 3 and 4 of the Convention, or their constitutional equivalents.\nAs to the substance, he raised arguments that were similar to those in his application to be released. He added that the courts had failed to take into account the specific nature of his situation, consisting of his mental disorder; that the length of his detention had been excessive and based on irrelevant and insufficient reasons; and that the only matter open to debate was whether he was legally insane, which impacted on his criminal liability. 26.  On 2 April 2014 the Constitutional Court dismissed the complaint as manifestly ill-founded. It endorsed the reasons given by the ordinary courts and concluded that they had been relevant and sufficient to keep the applicant detained. It gave no answer to his argument concerning the specific nature of his situation. 27.  Following remittal of the case by the Regional Court, the District Court asked the expert institute on 9 December 2013 to produce a report on the applicant\u2019s mental condition. On 20 March 2014 it also ordered that the applicant be admitted to the psychiatric department of the Tren\u010d\u00edn hospital for charged and convicted persons in order to have his mental health examined. The report was filed on 1 July 2014, and the District Court heard the case between January and July 2014. 28.  On 10 July 2014 the District Court again found the applicant guilty. The Regional Court dismissed an appeal by the applicant on 10 October 2014. He was sentenced to twenty-five years\u2019 imprisonment, thirty-six months\u2019 protective supervision and payment of damages. No ordinary appeal being available, the judgment became final and binding. 29.  Nevertheless, the applicant appealed on points of law and the Supreme Court quashed the District and Regional Court judgments owing to breaches of the law to the applicant\u2019s disadvantage. The matter was remitted to the District Court for fresh examination. The Supreme Court provided an extensive interpretation of the criminal offence of terrorism and concluded that the lower courts\u2019 legal interpretation of the case had been wrong as the applicant\u2019s motive had not included elements of the crime of terrorism. 30. Subsequently, the case returned to the District Court and the applicant remained detained pending trial as of 14 April 2016. 31.  Taking into account the Supreme Court\u2019s judgment and its legal interpretation of the crime in question, the District Court once again found the applicant guilty of, inter alia, the criminal offence of endangering public safety, the illegal acquisition, possession and trafficking of firearms, the making of serious threats, extortion, and attempted bodily harm and sentenced him to twenty-three years and six months in prison on 29 September 2016. It also ordered protective supervision lasting thirty-six months. The applicant appealed and those proceedings are still pending. 32.  On 29 November 2016 the applicant was transferred from the Ko\u0161ice detention centre to the hospital in Tren\u010d\u00edn after he reportedly collapsed.", "references": ["0", "7", "9", "5", "4", "8", "1", "6", "3", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Staryy Oskol. 5.  The applicant took part in the cleaning up operation at the Chernobyl nuclear disaster site. 6.  On 5 July 2002 the Staryy Oskol Town Court of the Belgorod Region granted the applicant\u2019s action against the Belgorod Regional Administration and awarded him and his family, comprising two members, a flat in the town of Staryy Oskol and 3,000 Russian roubles (approximately 100 euros) in compensation for non-pecuniary damage. The representative of the Regional Administration did not attend the hearing: in writing he had requested the Town Court to adjudicate the case in his absence. 7.  The judgment was not appealed against and became final on 15 July 2002. 8.  On 19 August 2002 the Staryy Oskol Town Court issued a writ of execution and enforcement proceedings were instituted. 9.  On 9 October 2002 the Belgorod Regional Administration lodged a statement of appeal against the judgment of 5 July 2002. The Administration also asked the Town Court to restore the ten-day time-limit for lodging the appeal. The Administration claimed that it had received a copy of the judgment of 5 July 2002 by fax on 8 October 2002. The Administration asked to stop the enforcement proceedings. 10.  The applicant insisted that there had been no reason to restore the time-limit. He noted that a copy of the judgment had been forwarded to the Regional Administration at the end of July 2002. 11.  On 14 October 2002 the Staryy Oskol Town Court restored the time-limit for lodging the appeal, accepted the Administration\u2019s statement of appeal and stopped the enforcement proceedings. 12.  On 19 November 2002 the Belgorod Regional Court examined the Administration\u2019s appeal, quashed the judgment of 5 July 2002 and remitted the case for a fresh examination to the Town Court. 13.  On 20 January 2003 the Staryy Oskol Town Court, in the new examination of the case, accepted the applicant\u2019s action in part. The relevant part of the judgment read as follows:\n\u201cOrder that the Belgorod Regional Administration should provide ... Mr Babynin G.A. and his family with housing premises, which satisfy sanitary and technical requirements, in their turn according to the housing waiting list of families having persons with disabilities and individuals who had taken part in the cleaning operation at the site of the Chernobyl nuclear plant.\nDismiss [the claim] for compensation for non-pecuniary damage.\u201d 14.  The judgment was not appealed against and became final on 31 January 2003. 15.  On 13 February 2003 a writ of execution was issued and enforcement proceedings were instituted. 16.  According to the applicant, from 5 to 12 March 2004 a group of five people, including the applicant, began a hunger strike to protest against the poor level of welfare protection provided for the Chernobyl victims. 17.  On 16 April 2004 the mayor of Staryy Oskol decided to provide the applicant with a flat measuring 55,05 m\u00b2. 18.  On 21 April 2004 the applicant received from the mayor an occupancy voucher in respect of the flat assigned to him. He found the flat satisfactory.", "references": ["8", "7", "0", "5", "4", "6", "1", "2", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1976 and lives in Barnaul. He has been disabled since childhood and has lacked legal capacity since 1999. The application was brought on his behalf by his mother. 6.  At about 5 p.m. on 28 August 2007 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of robbery and taken to Industrialniy district police station, Barnaul (\u0418\u043d\u0434\u0443\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0438\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u0420\u041e\u0412\u0414 \u0433. \u0411\u0430\u0440\u043d\u0430\u0443\u043b\u0430, \u201cthe Industrialniy ROVD\u201d) by Officers K., S. and Ch., who allegedly beat him when they arrived at the police station. 7.  A report on the applicant\u2019s arrest was drawn up at 9 p.m., following which the applicant\u2019s mother was informed about his arrest. She arrived at the police station shortly afterwards. The applicant complained, in the presence of his mother and a lawyer, that he felt unwell and that he had been beaten by the police officers who had arrested him. 8.  An ambulance was called to the police station at 10.29 p.m. on 28 August. The applicant was diagnosed as having facial and chest contusions. He told the ambulance medics that he had been physically assaulted by the police. 9.  Another ambulance was called for the applicant at 12.24 a.m. on 29 August 2007, to the temporary detention facility. He was diagnosed as having a contusion on the soft tissues of the face and an X-ray examination was recommended. The applicant told the medics that he had injured himself while drunk two days previously after falling down and hitting his head on the ground. 10.  The applicant was taken to hospital the same day for the X-ray examination and was diagnosed as having a closed fracture of his nose bones with displacement of bone fragments and a chest contusion. He gave the same explanation for the injuries as he had given previously that day to the ambulance medics at the temporary detention facility. 11.  Upon admission to the temporary detention facility, staff seized, among other items, a pledge ticket for a silver chain and cross which were in pawn until 5 September 2007 (worth 4,840 Russian roubles (RUB) and RUB 990 respectively). 12.  On 30 August 2007 the Industrialniy District Court of Barnaul (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) ordered the applicant to be kept under arrest for an additional forty-eight hours, until 2.30 p.m. on 1 September 2007. 13.  On 1 September 2007 the applicant was released. 14.  On the same day the District Court granted an application from the investigator to place the applicant in a psychiatric hospital for a psychiatric forensic examination. 15.  On 4 September 2007 the applicant was admitted to a psychiatric hospital, where he stayed until 4 October 2007. 16.  On 4 October 2007 the report on the forensic psychiatric examination of the applicant was concluded. It established that at the time of the events in question the applicant could understand and take responsibility for his actions. 17.  On 11 October 2007 the pawn shop ticket was returned to the applicant. 18.  On 9 November 2007 the applicant underwent planned surgery for a fracture of the nose (rhinoplasty). 19.  On 17 March 2008 the criminal proceedings against the applicant were discontinued owing to a lack of evidence of his involvement in the crime in question. 20.  On 29 August 2007 the applicant\u2019s mother complained to the prosecutor\u2019s office that the applicant had been beaten by the police. 21.  On 19 September 2007 a forensic medical expert held that the closed fracture of the applicant\u2019s nose had been caused by a blow from a hard, blunt object with a limited area of impact and that it had resulted in moderately severe health damage. The report went on to say that the injury had occurred shortly before the applicant had sought medical assistance and that it could have been caused on 28 August 2007. The possibility of the injury being caused by a fall or that the applicant had inflicted it on himself was excluded. The diagnosis of a chest contusion was found to be unsubstantiated by the information in the medical documents. 22.  On 4 October, 25 November and 24 December 2007, and 1 February and 15 March 2008 the prosecutor\u2019s office refused to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers who had allegedly ill-treated the applicant for lack of the constituent elements of a crime in their actions. The applicant\u2019s statements were found to be contradictory and not consistent with the injuries sustained. The applicant\u2019s mother had not witnessed the alleged beatings and, because the applicant was mentally disabled and had been inebriated when arrested, his statements were assessed in critical fashion. There was also evidence that the applicant had possibly had injuries prior to his arrest. The initial refusal to institute criminal proceedings referred to the following evidence:\n-  the statements of the applicant\u2019s mother, who submitted that the applicant had had no injuries when he had left home on 28 August 2007 and that she had found him at the police station later that day with a swollen face, bruises on his back and with his clothes covered in blood;\n-  a statement by the applicant\u2019s mother that on 26 August 2007 she had witnessed a quarrel between her son and a certain Kar., that she had called the police and that the police had helped her take the applicant home;\n-  statements by a witness, B., who had seen the applicant on 28 August 2007, shortly before his arrest, drunk, but without any visible injuries; B. later saw police officers escorting the applicant to a police car, with the applicant showing no resistance. B. did not see the police officers using physical force against the applicant;\n-  the applicant\u2019s statements on the circumstances of his arrest. He submitted, in particular, that the beatings had taken place at the back entrance to the police station and in an out-of-the-way office inside the police station; the police officers had hit him with truncheons on his back, bottom and legs (at least four to five blows), and had then punched him on the head and nose (no less than seven to ten blows). The applicant had started bleeding and the officers had threatened him, warning him not to tell anyone about the beatings;\n-  information on the applicant\u2019s health and his disability, as well as his previous criminal and administrative offence records;\n-  documents on the applicant\u2019s arrest;\n-  documents on the ambulance doctors\u2019 examination of the applicant on 28 August 2007 in connection with complaints of a bleeding nose and chest pain;\n-  the forensic medical report of 19 September 2007 (see paragraph 21 above);\n-  statements by Officers S. and K. on the circumstances of the applicant\u2019s arrest. In particular, they submitted that when the applicant had seen them he had started to run in the opposite direction. He had stumbled and fallen forward onto the pavement. When they had lifted him up they had noticed that he had old abrasions on the left side of his face and a bleeding nose, probably from falling on the pavement. His breath had also smelt of alcohol. The applicant had then been escorted to the police car and taken to the police station. He had not resisted arrest and no physical force had been applied to him;\n-  statements by Officer Ch., who had been waiting for S. and K. in the police car. He submitted that he had seen S. and K. escorting the applicant to the car and that the applicant had been visibly drunk. He had had abrasions and dried blood on his face and his clothes had been dirty. No physical force had been used against him;\n-  statements by police officers on duty at the police station on 28 August 2007 about the absence of any conflict situations there on that day or any complaints of ill-treatment from the applicant;\n-   statements by Ts., A., D., detained at the police station at the same time as the applicant. They submitted that they had not witnessed any clashes between the applicant and the police and had not seen the police use physical force against him;\n-  statements by the investigator, N., who had questioned the applicant on 28 August 2007 and to whom he had explained that his injuries (a scratch on the face and a swollen nose) had been sustained while he was drunk, either by falling down or in some other way, the applicant had not remembered exactly. The investigator had later called the applicant\u2019s mother. After she had arrived, the applicant had started complaining that he felt unwell and that he had been beaten by the police, after which an ambulance had been called for him;\n-  statements by the investigator D., who said that she had questioned the applicant on 31 August 2007 at the temporary detention facility. He had stated that he had been drinking in the courtyard of his house on 26 August 2007 and had picked a fight with a certain Kar., with whom he had drunk before;\n-  information from the temporary detention facility on the applicant\u2019s injuries at the time of his admission (a closed fracture of the nasal bones and an abrasion on the left cheek) and a handwritten note from the applicant to the effect that he had received the injuries after falling down while in an inebriated state and that he had no complaints about the law-enforcement bodies;\n-  statements by a certain R., who submitted that on 26 August 2007 the applicant and her husband Kar. had been drinking together and had had a quarrel.\nThe subsequent decisions also took into account the following evidence:\n-  statements by Kar., who submitted that he had been drinking alcohol with the applicant on 25 August 2007, that they had been so drunk they could not walk in a straight line and had had to hold to one another, and that on their way home they had fallen down several times. On 26 August 2007 Kar. and the applicant had again spent all day drinking together, but had had no arguments. He could not remember whether the applicant had had any injuries on 25 and 26 August 2007;\n-  an additional forensic medical report of 18 December 2007 which showed that the injury could have been caused on 26 August 2007 but that it could not have been caused by the applicant\u2019s falling down;\n-  statements by the doctors who examined the applicant on 28 and 29 August 2007 and performed the X-ray examination and by the expert who conducted the initial forensic medical examination. 23.  The supervising authority set aside all those decisions, except for the most recent one, as unfounded and ordered additional pre-investigation inquiries. 24.  In the meantime, on 13 December 2007 the chief of inquiries at the investigations department of the Industrialniy ROVD instituted criminal proceedings against unidentified persons under Article 112 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code for the intentional infliction of moderately severe damage to the applicant\u2019s health at an unidentified place and time, but no later than midnight of 19 September 2007.\n(a)  Forensic medical examinations conducted in the course of the investigation 25.  On 14 February 2008, 11 March 2009, 20 October 2010 and 5 May 2012 forensic medical examinations of the applicant\u2019s medical file were conducted. The conclusions of the examinations showed that the closed fracture of the nose and swelling of the soft tissues in the nasal area could have been caused between 26 August and 28 August 2007. It was not possible to completely exclude the possibility that the above injury had originated as the result of the impact of a slightly protruding object. The injured area was also accessible to the applicant himself. The report of 20 October 2010 excluded the possibility that the applicant had been injured by falling on the pavement while running away from Officers S. and K. given the absence of other injuries on prominent parts of his face (nose, cheekbones or forehead) or on other parts of his body (the stomach or his extremities).\n(b)  Repeated suspension and resumption of the investigation between 12 January 2008 and 10 May 2012 26.  On 12 January 2008 the chief of inquiries at the investigations department of the Industrialniy ROVD decided to suspend the investigation. 27.  However, on 29 January 2008 the acting prosecutor of the Industrialniy District of Barnaul set that decision aside. He noted that the case file contained information that police officers at the Industrialniy ROVD had allegedly inflicted the applicant\u2019s injuries and transferred the criminal case from the investigations department of the Industrialniy ROVD to the Barnaul investigations department of the investigation committee of the Altay Regional Prosecutor\u2019s Office. 28.  On 11 February 2008 the chief of inquiries at the investigations department of the investigation committee of the Altay Regional Prosecutor\u2019s Office resumed the case. 29.  On 13 February 2008 a witness, I., (the victim in the proceedings against the applicant on suspicion of robbery) submitted that when the alleged robbery had taken place, at about 3 p.m. on 28 August 2007, she had noticed that the applicant had an old abrasion on his face. She did not exclude the possibility that she could have scratched the applicant in the course of the struggle, but she had not hit him and had not seen any injuries on his face later that day when she had seen him at the police station. 30.  On 16 February 2008 Officer Ch. was questioned as a witness. 31.  On 11 April 2008 the proceedings were suspended for the second time. The decision mentioned that the operational-search activities conducted to identify the perpetrator of the assault had not led to any positive results. It provided no further details on the exact measures taken by the investigator. 32.  On 16 April 2008 the deputy head of the investigations department set that decision aside and held that it was necessary to give the applicant victim status in the proceedings and question him. He also wanted to give the applicant\u2019s mother the status of the applicant\u2019s legal representative and question her, to carry out a comprehensive psychological and psychiatric examination of the applicant, to question a number of witnesses on the circumstances of the alleged ill-treatment (among them Officer S.), and to join references from work on Officers K., S. and Ch. to the case file. 33.  On 17 April 2008 the applicant was given the status of a victim in the proceedings and was questioned as such. The applicant\u2019s mother joined the proceedings as his legal representative and was questioned. 34.  On 19 May 2008 the proceedings were suspended for the third time, with reference to the fact that the operational-search activities to identify the perpetrator had not led to any positive result. However, on 21 May 2008 the deputy head of the investigations department set that decision aside and held that it was necessary to question the witnesses to establish all the relevant circumstances of the alleged ill-treatment. 35.  Between May and August 2008 the head of the Industrialniy ROVD and the officers present there at the time of the applicant\u2019s arrest were questioned as witnesses. 36.  Meanwhile, on 26 June 2008 a fourth decision on suspending the proceedings was taken. However, on 2 July 2008 the deputy head of the investigations department set the decision aside and listed in detail the investigative measures that were needed. They included questioning the police officers S., K. and Ch. about the circumstances of the applicant\u2019s arrest, a forensic psychiatric examination of the applicant and, depending on the results of that examination, deciding on the possibility of carrying out identification parades involving the applicant and S., K. and Ch. 37.  On 7 August 2008 Officer K. was questioned as a witness. 38.  The proceedings were suspended for the fifth time on 14 September 2008, but were again resumed on 29 September 2008. The acting head of the investigations department considered it necessary, inter alia, to put further questions to certain witnesses. He also wanted to carry out a comprehensive psychological and psychiatric forensic examination of the applicant and, depending on the results of that examination, to decide on the possibility of carrying out identification parades involving the applicant and S., K. and Ch. In addition, he wanted to request documents on the applicant\u2019s hospital treatment after 4 September 2007 and join them to the case file and to carry out an additional forensic medical examination. 39.  On 23 October 2008 another witness, D., (an acquaintance of the applicant\u2019s mother) stated that he had seen the applicant\u2019s arrest on 28 August 2007. The applicant had been escorted by two people \u2013 one wearing a police uniform and the other in plain clothes. The applicant had not shown any resistance, had had no visible injuries and had not been subjected to physical force. 40.  On 28 October 2008 the applicant had an additional forensic psychiatric examination, which established that at the time of the alleged beatings he could not correctly perceive the factual aspect of events or understand the meaning and nature of actions taken in his respect. 41.  On 30 October and 8 November 2008 two witnesses, Z. and M., stated respectively that they had seen the applicant on 28 August 2007, shortly before his arrest, that he had been dressed tidily and had had no injuries on his body or blood stains on his clothes. They had later seen him being escorted by two police officers to a police car, the applicant had acted calmly, his clothes had been tidy and no physical force had been applied to him. A similar statement was made by the witness B. 42.  On 14 November 2008 the investigator decided to suspend the proceedings for the sixth time. He relied on the results of the applicant\u2019s forensic psychiatric examination of 28 October 2008 and therefore the impossibility for the investigation to rely on his statements, as well as the absence of eyewitnesses of the circumstances in which the applicant had received his injuries. However, on 30 December 2008 the District Court found that decision unlawful and unsubstantiated. 43.  On 12 February 2009 the proceedings were resumed, only to be suspended for the seventh time on 12 March 2009 for the same reasons as given in the decision of 14 November 2008. However, on 7 April 2009 the District Court found the decision of 12 March 2009 unlawful and unsubstantiated, and on 14 May 2009 the proceedings were again resumed. 44.  On 15 June 2009 the proceedings were yet again suspended. The decision said that the applicant\u2019s statement about his alleged ill-treatment by the police officers S., K. and Ch. could not be admitted as evidence in view of the results of the forensic psychiatric examination of 28 October 2008. The applicant\u2019s mother\u2019s statements had derived from those of the applicant himself. There was no direct evidence proving that the applicant had sustained his injuries at the hands of S., K. and Ch. The fact that those officers had arrested the applicant and taken him to the Industrialniy ROVD had not proved that they had been involved in the alleged ill-treatment. Exhaustive measures had been taken to establish the time the applicant had sustained his injuries. The witnesses B., D. and Z., who had seen the applicant\u2019s arrest, had stated that they had not seen the police officers use any physical force against him. 45.  On 12 January 2010 the proceedings were resumed and subsequently suspended for the ninth time on 15 February 2010. The investigation established that on 28 August 2007 the applicant had been taken to the Industrialniy ROVD by Officers S., K. and Ch. The applicant had complained that those officers had beaten him after his arrest. According to the forensic medical examination of 14 February 2008, the applicant had had a closed fracture of bones in the nose and swelling of the soft tissues in the nasal area, which had been caused by the impact of a hard, blunt object and could have occurred between 26 August and 28 August 2007. The investigation had not confirmed any fact of ill-treatment of the applicant by S., K. and Ch. That was in accordance with the statements by the police officers, who had denied inflicting any injuries on the applicant, the witnesses who had seen the applicant\u2019s arrest, the records of identification parades and other evidence. There had been no other evidence attesting directly to the fact that a crime had been committed by the police officers. In addition, the decision reiterated that the applicant\u2019s statements could not be relied on in view of the results of the forensic psychiatric examination of 28 October 2008 and could not be a basis for bringing charges against the police officers. The mother\u2019s statements had derived from those of the applicant and therefore could not be relied on either. 46.  On 27 April 2010 the District Court found the decision of 15 February 2010 unlawful and unsubstantiated and on 1 June 2010 the proceedings were again resumed. 47.  On 8 June 2010 P., an expert in psychiatry \u2013 a doctor of medical sciences and a professor \u2013 was questioned as a witness. He submitted that the conclusions of the psychiatric expert examination of 28 October 2008 on the applicant\u2019s mental state at the time of the events in question were more consistent and reliable than those of the applicant\u2019s previous psychiatric expert examination on 4 October 2007. 48.  On 11 June 2010 the proceedings were suspended for the tenth time. The decision referred to the applicant\u2019s arrest on 28 August 2007, his statement as to the alleged ill-treatment by the police officers S., K. and Ch., the results of the forensic medical examination of 14 February 2008 with a description of his injuries and the time they were inflicted, and the police officers\u2019 denial of the alleged ill-treatment. 49.  Proceedings were resumed on 12 July 2010. Formal confrontations were carried out between the witnesses B. and Z., Officer K. and Z., Officer Ch. and Z., the applicant and the investigator N., the applicant\u2019s mother and N., the applicant and the police officer who had taken him from the Industrialniy ROVD to the temporary detention facility and had allegedly threatened him on their way there by warning him not to tell anyone about the beatings, and the applicant and Officer K. 50.  On 19 July 2010 the proceedings were suspended for the eleventh time. The decision noted that it had been impossible to reconcile the statements of the police officers and the witnesses as to whether the applicant had had any injuries on his face at the time of his arrest. However, on 31 August 2010 the District Court found that decision unlawful and unjustified and the proceedings resumed again on 19 October 2010. 51.  On 21 August 2010 another police officer, S., was questioned as a witness (the case file contains no earlier record, if any, of the questioning of S. as a witness). 52.  The proceedings were again suspended on 26 October 2010, 14 January, 10 February and 17 February 2011, and resumed respectively on 12 January, 8 February, 15 February and 7 April 2012. In addition to the previously collected evidence, the decisions on suspension relied on:\n-  statements by the investigator N.;\n-  statements by Ts., D. and Yer., detained at the police station at the same time as the applicant;\n-  a radiology laboratory assistant K. and the radiologist R.;\n-  an expert, Kl., on the nature of the applicant\u2019s injuries;\n-  statements by Kar.;\n-  a statement by the witness, S., who submitted that she had seen a fight between the applicant and the witness I., but that she had not seen any injuries on the applicant\u2019s body at that time;\n-  Kr., who submitted that she had seen no injuries on the applicant on 26 August 2007 and that when she had seen him on 1 September 2007 he had had a swollen nose. He had had no other visible injuries;\n-  a statement by the officer on duty at the temporary detention facility, P., who called an ambulance for the applicant on 29 August 2007;\n-  the ambulance medics who examined the applicant on 28 August and 29 August 2007, but who could not remember any circumstances of value to the investigation given the length of time since the events in question;\n-  the neurosurgeon R., who examined the applicant on 29 August 2007 at the hospital and submitted that he could have received his injuries several days prior to the examination;\n-  the lawyer M., present at the applicant\u2019s questioning at the police station on 28 August 2007. Owing to the passage of time, he could not remember whether the applicant had any visible injuries or if he had told him anything about the circumstances of the alleged beatings. 53.  On 10 May 2012 the proceedings were suspended for the sixteenth and last time. Taking into account the evidence that had been collected, the investigating authority came to the conclusion that the applicant had received his injuries no later than 10.37 p.m. on 28 August 2007 (the time of his examination by ambulance medics at the Industrialniy ROVD). However, it was impossible to make an objective and reliable conclusion as to the exact time and circumstances of the injuries. The results of the applicant\u2019s psychiatric expert examination precluded the investigating authority from relying on the applicant\u2019s submissions as evidence and there was no other evidence proving beyond doubt that his injuries had been inflicted in the circumstances he had described. In addition, the experts had arrived at the conclusion that the injury could have been caused anytime between 26 August and 28 August 2007. 54.  According to the applicant, while the investigator was questioning him as a suspect on 28 August 2007, a trainee police officer, I., had taken the keys to his flat and had gone there and searched his room. A gold bracelet had allegedly gone missing after the search. 55.  According to the applicant, Officers A. and B. had allegedly threatened him on the same day, warning him not to reveal that he had been beaten at the police station and to say instead that he had injured himself several days before in a fight. 56.  From 2008 the applicant\u2019s mother sought to have criminal proceedings instituted against I. and Officers A. and B. for abuse of position. 57.  The investigator refused several times to institute criminal proceedings. 58.  The most recent refusal to institute criminal proceedings against I. is dated 15 October 2009. On 10 December 2009 the Altay Regional Court found at final instance that the aforementioned decision was lawful and justified. It had been established that the applicant\u2019s mother had let I. into the flat, answered his questions, and had then let him into the applicant\u2019s room and helped him search it. It had also been established that the disappearance of a gold bracelet had been alleged long after the events complained of. For those reasons, there could not reasonably have been an expectation that the incident would be investigated. 59.  The most recent refusal to institute criminal proceedings against A. and B. is dated 31 May 2010. The inquiry found no evidence to support the applicant\u2019s allegations. There is no information in the case file as to whether the applicant challenged the lawfulness of that decision in court. 60.  The applicant\u2019s mother brought civil proceedings against the Ministry of Finance on behalf of herself and the applicant, seeking compensation for non-pecuniary damage caused by the unlawful prosecution of the applicant and the resulting medical treatment. She also sought compensation for pecuniary damage, representing the cost of the silver chain and cross which could not be recovered from the pawnshop and other costs and expenses. 61.  On 10 March 2010 the District Court granted the claim in part and ordered the Ministry of Finance to pay the applicant RUB 15,000 for the non-pecuniary damage caused by his unlawful prosecution. It refused the claim for recovery of the cost of the silver chain and cross, holding that the mother, as the applicant\u2019s legal representative, could have recovered them from the pawnshop herself. 62.  On 21 April 2010 the Altay Regional Court upheld the above judgment on appeal, increasing the amount awarded in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage to RUB 40,000. The court further held that the applicant\u2019s mother had failed to submit any evidence that she had asked the investigator to return the pawnshop pledge ticket and that such a request had been refused.", "references": ["8", "4", "7", "6", "0", "3", "2", "9", "5", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Pyatigorsk. 6.  The applicant took part in the cleaning-up operation at the Chernobyl nuclear disaster site. He was subsequently registered disabled by Ukrainian authorities, becoming entitled to various social benefits. 7.  In September 1999 the applicant settled in Russia. The welfare authorities rejected re-establishing the applicant\u2019s disability status. The applicant challenged the rejection before the courts. 8.  On 30 August 2005 the Pyatigorsk Town Court granted the applicant\u2019s claim and ordered the Administration of Labour and Social Security of the Population of Pyatigorsk to issue a certificate of benefits. 9.  On 20 September 2009 the judgment became final. 10.  On 18 October 2005 the applicant was issued with the certificate of benefits. 11.  On 1 November 2006 the Presidium of Stavropol Regional Court allowed the defendant authority\u2019s application for supervisory review and quashed the judgment of 30 August 2005, considering that the lower courts misapplied the material law. The case was remitted for fresh consideration. 12.  On 13 December 2006 the the Pyatigorsk Town Court discontinued the proceedings since the parties failed to appear.", "references": ["9", "1", "6", "5", "8", "0", "4", "2", "7", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1966 and lives in St Petersburg. 7.  On 5 April 2010 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of having planned and carried out a murder and of having injured two persons. Four days later he was charged with murder and attempted murder committed within an organised criminal group. The Leninskiy District Court of St Petersburg (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) authorised his pre-trial detention for two months. 8.  On 3 June 2010 the District Court examined an application by the investigating authorities to extend the applicant\u2019s detention. They relied on the seriousness of the charges, the applicant\u2019s de facto residence not being at his registered address, and the potential risk of intimidation of witnesses or victims, and the risk of obstruction of justice and reoffending. The defence argued that the applicant had no criminal record, that he lived at a known address, had a family with two minor children, and that he suffered from severe diabetes. Having been fully satisfied with the prosecution\u2019s arguments, the District Court extended the detention until 15 August 2010. 9.  On 1 July 2010 the St Petersburg City Court (\u201cthe City Court\u201d) upheld the decision on appeal. 10.  On 12 August 2010 the District Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 30 August 2010 citing the seriousness of the charges and the fact that the investigation had not yet been completed. The court found that if released the applicant could influence his co-accused or the victims. With reference to the medical report of 15 July 2010 (see paragraph 41 below) the court noted that the state of health of the accused was compatible with further detention on remand. The decision contained the following phrase:\n\u201cThe investigation has proved [the applicant\u2019s] guilt in that crime\u201d 11.  The defence did not appeal against the extension order. 12.  On 27 August 2010 the District Court ruled that the applicant should remain in detention until 30 November 2010. The court endorsed the reasoning of the decision of 12 August 2010 and noted that there were still certain investigative actions to be taken. In particular, the authorities had to obtain an expert report, to investigate the applicant\u2019s alleged involvement in five more criminal incidents and to finish examining evidence. 13.  On 23 September 2010 the City Court upheld the order on appeal. 14.  On 29 November 2010 the District Court examined another application for extension of the applicant\u2019s detention. The same judge as at the hearing of 12 August 2010 presided. Relying on the wording of the court order of that date (see paragraph 10 above) the defence challenged the judge, alleging that he was biased. 15.  The District Court dismissed that application, having found that the hearing on 12 August 2010 and the ensuing decision had not concerned the determination of the applicant\u2019s guilt and that there was no evidence of the judge\u2019s partiality. 16.  The court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 28 February 2011, repeating its earlier reasoning. It also concluded that his state of health was \u201cclose to satisfactory\u201d and that he could be transferred to a prison hospital should his health worsen. 17.  On 30 November 2010 the applicant appealed against both the extension order and the court\u2019s decision regarding the impartiality of the judge. On 15 December 2010 he amended his appeal. 18.  The next day the applicant\u2019s lawyer was informed that the appeal hearing had been listed for 23 December 2010. Citing his busy schedule, the lawyer asked the court to adjourn the hearing. The court allowed the request and set the hearing for 20 January 2011. 19.  On 20 January 2011 the City Court discovered that a copy of the decision of 29 November 2010 dismissing the application for a change in the composition of the District Court had not been served on the defence, which therefore had had no opportunity to challenge it. The case was remitted to the District Court. 20.  A week later the District Court provided the defence with a copy of the impugned decision. 21.  On 17 and 24 February 2011 the City Court postponed hearings owing to the applicant\u2019s inability to participate for health reasons. 22.  At the hearing on 3 March 2011 the applicant informed the City Court of his wish to change lawyer. The hearing was adjourned again. 23.  On 10 March 2011 the City Court upheld the extension order and rejected the applicant\u2019s challenge to the District Court\u2019s judge as unfounded. 24.  On 24 February 2011 the District Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 5 April 2011, and dismissed a prior application for early release on medical grounds. The court decided that he was receiving adequate medical care and that the circumstances of the case did not call for his release. 25.  On 28 February 2011 the applicant appealed against the extension order with reference to his frail health and the lack of adequate medical care. His appeal reached the court on 10 March 2011. 26.  The City Court upheld the extension order on 31 March 2011. 27.  On 5 April 2011 the City Court held another detention hearing. The applicant and his lawyer were absent. According to a medical certificate, the applicant was unable to appear owing to ongoing inpatient treatment. A written statement from the investigator said that the applicant\u2019s counsel had been informed of the hearing by telephone on 1 April 2010. Noting the counsel\u2019s absence, the City Court appointed a new lawyer for the defence. The appointed lawyer objected to the extension of the applicant\u2019s detention, referring to the latter\u2019s family situation, permanent residence at a known address and his poor health. 28.  The City Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 30 May 2011. In addition to the usual reference to the seriousness of the charges, it noted the complexity of the case and the need for the investigating authorities to look into recently obtained evidence suggesting that two more people had been involved in the criminal offences. The court made a detailed list of the investigative steps taken since the most recent detention order, and declared reasonable the length of the investigation. The court also found that the applicant could not be released on medical grounds given the absence of a medical report assessing the compatibility of the applicant\u2019s health with prolonged detention. 29.  On 7 April 2011 the defence appealed against the extension. On 21 April and 5 May 2011 a supplement to the appeal was submitted by the applicant\u2019s lawyer, who, referring to the call records on her mobile telephone, argued that the investigator had not informed her of the hearing on 5 April 2011. 30.  On 25 May 2011 the Supreme Court held the appeal hearing in the absence of the applicant \u2013 who was still receiving inpatient treatment \u2013 and his counsel, who asked the court to examine the issue in his absence. The applicant was represented by court-appointed counsel, who supported the arguments put forward in the statement of appeal statement. 31.  The Supreme Court upheld the extension order. As it was satisfied with the investigator\u2019s statements about the telephone conversation with the applicant\u2019s lawyer, the court dismissed the argument that the lawyer had not been notified of the hearing on 5 April 2011. 32.  On 30 May 2011 the St Petersburg City Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention for three months. The court reiterated that he had been charged with multiple counts of very serious crimes and that the case was very complex. It also cited the applicant\u2019s liability to abscond. As regards his state of health, the court found that in the absence of an expert report release was not warranted. 33.  The applicant appealed. On 1 and 8 June 2011 his lawyer submitted supplements to the statement of appeal. 34.  The appellate hearing was initially scheduled for 27 June 2011, but then adjourned until 13 July 2011 owing to the applicant\u2019s ongoing medical treatment. On the latter date the Supreme Court upheld the detention order. 35.  A number of additional orders followed, extending the detention until 30 November 2011. The extensions were authorised in view of the seriousness of the charges and the necessity for the applicant to study the case file. The applicant was found fit to stay in detention because the requisite treatment was available in prison. Other measures of restraint could not, in the court\u2019s opinion, secure his appearance before the investigating authorities or his law abidance. 36.  On 30 November 2011 the District Court refused to extend the applicant\u2019s detention. It found that he was living in St Petersburg at a known address, and that he was employed, and had two minor children. There was no evidence confirming the risk of witness intimidation or reoffending. The court also took into account the applicant\u2019s poor health and his unequivocal intent to cooperate with the prosecution. It appears that on the same day the applicant was released. The City Court upheld that decision on 22 December 2011. 37.  There is no information about further developments in the criminal proceedings. 38.  Since 1989 the applicant had been suffering from insulin-dependent type-one diabetes. In 2008 he was certified as having a second-degree disability. 39.  After the arrest in April 2010 he was taken to the medical unit of remand prison no. IZ-47/1 in St Petersburg. During the first months of detention his treatment was overseen by a prison endocrinologist. 40.  On 15 June 2010, at the request of the applicant\u2019s wife, a panel of experts examined his medical condition. They confirmed the diagnosis of type-one-diabetes and frequent instances of ketoacidosis complicated by concomitant diseases. The experts observed that his condition was aggravated by chronic pancreatitis and called for his constant supervision by an endocrinologist and a gastroenterologist of a specialised medical institution licensed to provide those types of medical assistance. The applicant needed a specific diet and insulin injections. A specialist was needed to monitor and correct the applicant\u2019s insulin level. A failure to comply with those recommendations could threaten the applicant\u2019s life. The experts further concluded that the remand prison medical unit was unable to provide adequate medical assistance. 41.  At the investigator\u2019s request, on 15 July 2010 a medical panel issued a report concluding that the applicant was fit to stay in the remand prison if he received specific medical care comprising: monitoring of blood sugar levels throughout the day; administration of the requisite medicines and adherence to a specific diet; insulin injections; and \u201cactive supervision by an endocrinologist\u201d in order to ensure the correct insulin therapy. The experts noted that \u201cinappropriate\u201d insulin intake could lead to severe complications. 42.  In August 2010 the prison endocrinologist was discharged from the medical unit. A resident general practitioner started supervising the applicant\u2019s treatment. According to the applicant, no checks of his insulin level were carried out in the medical unit. Medical documents show that he developed face and feet oedemas. On that account he was sent to Gaaza Prison Hospital in St Petersburg on 13 October 2010. 43.  License no. FS 78-01-001560 of 23 April 2009 indicates that Gaaza Prison Hospital was not authorised to provide endocrinological medical services. It did not employ an endocrinologist. 44.  On 26 October 2010 the applicant was seen by a civilian endocrinologist. The applicant\u2019s wife paid for the visit. The doctor noted that the patient was suffering from severe diabetes complicated by several concomitant conditions and that he needed \u201cdynamic supervision by an endocrinologist\u201d. 45.  Three days later the applicant was transferred from Gaaza Prison Hospital back to the medical unit in the remand prison. 46.  On 23 November 2010 and 21 February 2011 a medical board carried out an additional expert examination and repeated its earlier conclusion made in the report on 15 July 2010. 47.  According to the applicant, the medical unit staff changed his insulin regimen because the prescribed medication was not available. No consolations with an endocrinologist preceded that decision. As a result his blood sugar level increased significantly. 48.  In April and May 2011 he underwent short courses of inpatient treatment in Gaaza Prison Hospital. 49.  On 15 June 2011 he was taken by ambulance to Mariyinskaya City Hospital in St Petersburg and was admitted to the emergency department in view of his serious medical condition. He was diagnosed with type-one severe diabetes; diabetic ketoacidosis; non-proliferative diabetic retinopathy; cataracts in both eyes; diabetic angiopathy of both feet; encephalopathy of mixed origin; diabetic sensory polyneuropathy; and diabetic nephropathy. A special medical board stated that those illnesses were not on the list of medical conditions precluding detention; accordingly, the applicant was not eligible for release on medical grounds. The board also called for \u201cdynamic supervision\u201d of the applicant\u2019s treatment by an endocrinologist. 50.  Between June and November 2011 the applicant was moved several times between the medical unit in the remand prison and Gaaza Prison Hospital. According to the Government, he was seen once, on 28 June 2011, by a civilian endocrinologist. 51.  On 5 April 2012 at the request of the applicant\u2019s lawyer three medical experts prepared a report on the quality of his treatment in detention. It addressed the following questions:\n\u201c1.  What does the necessity of dynamic medical supervision by an endocrinologist\u2019 suggest? 4. How did the absence of \u2018dynamic medical supervision by an endocrinologist\u2019 between 5 April 2010 and 30 November 2011 affect [the applicant\u2019s] health? ...\u201d\nThe doctors came to the following conclusions:\n\u201c1.  Dynamic medical supervision by an endocrinologist involves regular medical tests and contact with a doctor ... In a case of stable diabetes with no changes in the insulin level, a medical examination by an endocrinologist must be performed once a month ... [However,] if important changes are being introduced into a patient\u2019s insulin regimen, he or she must have a daily consultation by an endocrinologist ... until the target glucose level is achieved and there is no risk of hypoglycaemia...\nIrregular examinations of [the applicant] did not constitute \u2018dynamic supervision\u2019, as their frequency was clearly insufficient for the assessment of the patient\u2019s well\u2011being in its dynamic ... or for the adjustment of his treatment. 2.  ... The seriousness of [the applicant\u2019s] diabetes ... shows that inpatient treatment in a specialised medical facility was required.\n... 4.  ... The lack of \u2018dynamic medical supervision by an endocrinologist\u2019 between 5 April 2010 and 30 November 2011 resulted in the deterioration of [the applicant\u2019s] health. Developed vascular disease (vascular angiopathy of the lower extremities) and encephalopathy, an irreversible brain damage ... were signs of his worsening health.\nIn the absence of dynamic medical supervision, improper adjustment of the medical treatment led to an increased risk of ketoacidosic/hypoglycemic comas...\u201d", "references": ["3", "0", "5", "8", "9", "6", "4", "7", "No Label", "1", "2"], "gold": ["1", "2"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicants are husband and wife. The first applicant was born in 1959 and the second applicant was born in 1981. Both live in Dorset, the United Kingdom. 6.  On 10 April 2007 Mr and Mrs G. initiated civil proceedings against the applicants before the Mon\u00e7\u00e3o Court (domestic proceedings no. 165/07.0TBMNC), with a view to obtaining recognition of their ownership of a property and a declaration that the applicants had no right of way (servid\u00e3o de passagem) over that property. 7.  On 14 May 2007 the applicants were summonsed. On the same day the court was informed of the death of Mr G. and the proceedings were consequently suspended. 8.  On an unknown date Mr G.\u2019s eight heirs were admitted as parties to the proceedings (habilita\u00e7\u00e3o de herdeiros). The proceedings restarted on 19 June 2007. 9.  On an unknown date in September 2007 the applicants lodged their submissions in reply (contesta\u00e7\u00e3o) and a counterclaim (pedido reconvencional). 10.  After having realised that the applicants had not communicated their submissions in reply to the claimants, on 26 October 2007 the court ordered the applicants to do so. 11.  Later, the court realised that the claimants had not complied with the legal requirement to register the proceedings with the Land Registry Office (Conservat\u00f3ria do Registo Predial). On 18 December 2007 the proceedings were suspended until an unknown date on which the claimants complied with that requirement. 12.  On 24 April 2008 the court realised that the applicants had also not complied with the legal requirement to register the counterclaim with the Land Registry Office. The court ordered them to do so within forty days. The applicants requested that the deadline be extended by thirty days. 13.  On an unknown date the applicants lodged an application for evidence to be immediately obtained from a witness who was residing in the United Kingdom. Considering that the applicants had not supplemented the application by complying with the necessary legal requirements for such a procedural act, the court dismissed the application on 26 January 2009. 14.  On 8 May 2009 the court gave a preliminary decision (despacho saneador) setting out the facts that had already been established and those that had yet to be decided. 15.  On an unknown day of January 2010 a videoconference to obtain witness evidence took place. 16.  On an unknown date a hearing was scheduled for an unknown day in April 2010. 17.  On the scheduled day the hearing was adjourned due to the absence of the claimants. 18.  On 29 September 2010 a hearing was held. Twelve other hearings took place, the last of which was on 12 December 2011. 19.  On 3 March 2012 the Mon\u00e7\u00e3o Court ruled against the applicants. On an unknown date the applicants appealed against that decision to the Guimar\u00e3es Court of Appeal. 20.  On 20 November 2012 the Guimar\u00e3es Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and upheld the first-instance decision. On 5 December 2012 the applicants appealed against that judgment to the Supreme Court of Justice. 21.  On 24 April 2013 the Supreme Court of Justice dismissed the appeal and upheld the previous judgment. The applicants\u2019 lawyer was notified of the Supreme Court of Justice judgment on 7 May 2013.", "references": ["8", "7", "6", "5", "4", "2", "1", "0", "9", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1961. 5.  On 10 October 2003 a deputy prosecutor in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, added the applicant\u2019s name to the list of fugitives from justice and issued an arrest warrant on suspicion of human trafficking with the purpose of sexual exploitation. 6.  On 26 February 2009 the applicant was arrested in Russia. 7.  On 28 February 2009 the Pechorskiy District Court in the Pskov Region ordered the applicant\u2019s detention pending extradition, referring to Articles 108 and 466 of the Code of Criminal Procedure but without setting a time-limit. 8.  On 16 March 2009 the Russian Prosecutor General\u2019s office received a request for the applicant\u2019s extradition from his counterpart in Uzbekistan. 9.  On 15 May 2009 the deputy Russian Prosecutor General ordered the applicant\u2019s extradition to Uzbekistan. 10.  The applicant challenged the extradition order before the Pskov Regional Court. On 26 June 2009 the Regional Court found that the extradition order was lawful. On 17 August 2009 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the decision on appeal. 11.  On 17 October 2009 the applicant was extradited to Uzbekistan.", "references": ["4", "0", "8", "1", "3", "9", "7", "6", "5", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1973 and 1996 respectively and live in Blagoveshchensk, Amurskaya Region. They are mother and daughter. 6.  At the material time the applicants lived in Blagoveshchensk. 7.  In the beginning of 2002 they moved to Moscow and decided to purchase a flat there. A certain B. proposed to help them in finding a flat. 8.  On 16 October 2002 the Housing Department of the City of Moscow signed a social tenancy agreement with a certain K. in respect of a two-room flat at 32-70-69, Prospekt Vernadskogo, Moscow. 9.  In October 2002 the first applicant bought a flat in Kaluga Region with the intention of exchanging it for a flat in Moscow. 10.  On 23 October 2002 K. applied to Moszhilservice (the Moscow State commercial agency) for authorisation to exchange his flat in Moscow, occupied under a social tenancy agreement, for the flat in Kaluga Region belonging to the first applicant. 11.  On 29 October 2002 the Committee for Exchange of Housing authorised the exchange of flats between K. and the first applicant. 12.  On 6 November 2002 the first applicant received an exchange voucher authorising her to move into the flat in Moscow. Later in November 2002 the applicants were registered as living in that flat. The applicants paid a sum of money to B. 13.  In 2004 criminal proceedings were instituted against B. on suspicion of fraud. The first applicant had been informed of those proceedings. However, she had not submitted any civil claims against B. 14.  On 12 December 2005 the Nikulinskiy District Court, Moscow, (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) found B. guilty of fraud. The court established that B. had falsified a court judgment authorising the assignment of the flat at 32\u201170-69, Prospekt Vernadskogo, Moscow to K. under the social tenancy agreement and then fraudulently arranged for the exchange of flats between K. and the first applicant against the payment by the latter of 1,177,773.40 Russian roubles (RUB). As a result of B.\u2019s criminal actions, the property rights of the City of Moscow to the flat in question had been unlawfully transferred to the first applicant. 15.  On 6 March 2006 the Moscow City Court (\u201cthe City Court\u201d) amended the judgment of 12 December 2005. In particular, the City Court held that as a result of B.\u2019s actions the first applicant had been registered as occupying the flat in question and had acquired the right to become its owner by way of privatisation. However, the first applicant had not had sufficient time to acquire property rights to the flat by way of privatisation and the flat had not been taken from the ownership of the City of Moscow. Therefore, B.\u2019s actions had to be reclassified as attempted fraud. 16.  In October 2008 the Housing Department of the City of Moscow brought court proceedings against the first applicant and K. The Housing department claimed, with reference to the judgment of 12 December 2005, that all transactions involving the flat at 32-70-69, Prospekt Vernadskogo, Moscow had been unlawful and therefore had to be declared null and void, and the applicants had to be evicted from that flat. 17.  In April 2009 the first applicant brought a counterclaim against the Housing Department on her own behalf and also on behalf of the second applicant, who was a minor at that time. She submitted that she could not have known that K. had secured the social tenancy agreement on the basis of forged documents; the exchange of flats between her and K. had been verified and approved by all competent State authorities, and therefore she had to be considered as a bona fide user of the flat. The first applicant also claimed that the court action of the City of Moscow had been time-barred. 18.  On 6 October 2009 the District Court invalidated the social tenancy agreement concluded with K., the exchange of the flats between K. and the first applicant and the exchange voucher of 6 November 2002, and ordered the applicants\u2019 eviction. The District Court held as follows:\n\u201c...Taking into account that [K.] had not acquired the right to use the dwelling in question, he therefore could not exchange it, and [the first applicant] could not receive the exchange voucher and move into the dwelling in question. The court declares the transactions null and void in accordance with Article 168 of the [Civil Code] since they are incompatible with the requirements of Articles 50, 51, 53, 54, 67-74 of the Housing Code.\nThe court, pursuant to Article 167 of the Civil Code returns the parties to their previous positions. Taking into account that flat no. 3-1-a in the village of Novoslobodsk, Duminichskiy district, Kaluga Region, cannot be returned to [the applicant] since it has been subject to several transactions and its value amounts to RUB 732,000, the court orders [K.] to pay RUB 732,000 in favour of Shvidkaya Natalya Yevgenyevna [the first applicant] ...\u201d 19.  The first applicant appealed. In her appeal she submitted that the City of Moscow had not lost its property rights to the flat and, having regard to her status as a bona fide user, the District Court had found no grounds for granting the eviction claims. The first applicant also submitted that she had been living in the flat for seven years together with her minor daughter, had been paying charges for it and had carried out maintenance therein. Lastly, she pointed out that the District Court had not invited the custody agency to give its opinion as regards the eviction of her minor daughter from the flat. 20.  On 6 May 2010 the City Court upheld the judgment of 6 October 2009 on appeal. 21.  In 2014 the applicants returned to Blagoveshchensk. 22.  On 9 February 2015 the applicants applied to the Nikulinskiy District Court of Moscow, requesting that a duplicate of the writ of execution in respect of the judgment of 6 October 2009 be issued. 23.  On 21 April 2015 the applicants received the writ of execution. 24.  On 26 June 2015 the bailiff\u2019s office instituted enforcement proceedings in order to recover from K. the amounts awarded in the judgment of 6 October 2009 in favour of the first applicant.", "references": ["3", "2", "6", "7", "5", "0", "8", "9", "1", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in Nizhyn in the Chernihiv Region. 6.  On 1 May 2010 the applicant was arrested and remanded in custody pending the outcome of the investigation and trial. 7.  On 30 April 2013 the Alchevsk Court of the Luhansk Region convicted the applicant and his four co-defendants of armed robbery committed in an organised group, banditry and illegal possession of firearms in connection with a series of armed attacks committed in the Perevalsk District of the Luhansk Region. The court sentenced the applicant to eight years and nine months\u2019 imprisonment, to be counted from 1 May 2010 (the date on which he had been arrested), and to confiscation of his property. It ordered that the applicant remain in detention pending appeal. 8.  On 14 May 2013 the applicant\u2019s sister, acting in the capacity of his lay defender, appealed against the judgment to the Luhansk Regional Court of Appeal (\u201cthe Court of Appeal\u201d). Other parties lodged appeals as well. 9.  From the beginning of April 2014, armed groups started to seize official buildings in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions and announced the creation of self-proclaimed entities known as the \u201cDonetsk People\u2019s Republic\u201d and the \u201cLuhansk People\u2019s Republic\u201d (\u201cDPR\u201d and \u201cLPR\u201d). 10.  In response, on 14 April 2014 the Ukrainian Government, who consider those armed groups to be terrorist organisations, authorised the use of force against them in the legal form of an \u201canti-terrorist operation\u201d. 11.  As a result of extensive military action, between May and August 2015 the Ukrainian Government forces recaptured some territory in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, but certain parts of the regions have remained outside of the Government\u2019s control since that time. The parts of the Luhansk Region not under the Government\u2019s control include the Perevalsk District, where the offences for which the applicant was convicted were committed, Alchevsk, where the applicant was tried and convicted, and Luhansk, where the Court of Appeal was located. 12.  A ceasefire was agreed upon within the framework of the Tripartite Contact Group composed of representatives of Ukraine, Russia and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (hereinafter, \u201cthe OSCE\u201d). An obligation to uphold the ceasefire and to withdraw heavy weaponry from the contact line was enshrined in the Minsk Agreements and the Package of Measures for their Implementation of September 2014 and February 2015 respectively. However, numerous violations of the ceasefire have continued to occur ever since. 13.  At the time the events of spring and summer 2014 were unfolding, the applicant was detained in Starobilsk remand prison, located in the part of the Luhansk Region that has remained under the control of the Ukrainian Government. He remained in that prison until his release (see paragraph 30 below). 14.  On 6 June 2014 the Court of Appeal, which was still sitting in Luhansk, failed to hear the applicant\u2019s case because the applicant could not attend the hearing on account of the armed conflict. A hearing by video conference was scheduled for 8 August 2014, but it did not take place because as from 1 August 2014 the electricity and water supply and telephone communications were cut off at the Court of Appeal\u2019s building in Luhansk. At some point around that time, the judges of the court moved to the Government-controlled territory. The case files, however, remained at the court\u2019s building in Luhansk. 15.  On 2 September 2014 the President of the High Civil and Criminal Court, acting under the Law of 12 August 2014 (see paragraph 44 below), reassigned jurisdiction over cases which would normally have fallen within the jurisdiction of the Alchevsk Court to the Lysychansk Court of the Luhansk Region (\u201cthe Lysychansk Court\u201d), located in the Government\u2011controlled area. 16.  On 12 November 2014 the President of Ukraine issued a decree defining Sieverodonetsk in the Luhansk Region, also located in the Government-controlled area, as the seat of the Court of Appeal instead of Luhansk. 17.  On 25 February 2015 the applicant complained to the Court of Appeal about the delay in the examination of his appeal. 18.  On 3 March 2015 the applicant lodged a similar complaint with the office of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Human Rights. 19.  On 27 March 2015 the Court of Appeal informed the applicant that his criminal case file was in Luhansk, which was not under the Government\u2019s control, and that this prevented the court from examining his case. In order to resolve the problem, amendments would have to be made to the relevant legislation. 20.  On 30 March 2015 the Parliamentary Commissioner\u2019s office responded that there was no way to obtain case files from the territory that was not under the Government\u2019s control, but that the Commissioner was working with the courts, the prosecutor\u2019s office and other authorities to find a way to resolve the problem. 21.  In response to another complaint from the applicant, on 19 May 2015 the Court of Appeal informed him that it was unable to apprise him of the state of proceedings in his case because his criminal case file was in the court archives in Luhansk, to which there was no access. 22.  On 21 May 2015 the Parliament of Ukraine (Verkhovna Rada) adopted a declaration which read, insofar as relevant, as follows:\n\u201cI. Derogation from Obligations\n... 2. In view of the armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine involving both the regular Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and illegal armed groups guided, controlled and financed by the Russian Federation, since April 2014 an anti-terrorist operation has been conducted by the units of the Security Service of Ukraine, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine and the Armed Forces of Ukraine in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions (oblasts) of Ukraine. The anti-terrorist operation is part of Ukraine\u2019s inalienable right to individual self-defense against aggression under Article 51 of the UN Charter. The Russian Federation, which has occupied and is exercising control over certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, is fully responsible for respect for and protection of human rights in these territories under international humanitarian law and international human rights law. 3. The Russian Federation\u2019s ongoing armed aggression against Ukraine, together with war crimes and crimes against humanity committed both by the regular Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and by illegal armed groups guided, controlled and financed by the Russian Federation, constitutes \u2018a public emergency threatening the life of the nation\u2019 in the sense of ... Article 15 \u00a7 1 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 4. In order to safeguard the vital interests of society and the State in response to the armed aggression of the Russian Federation, the Parliament of Ukraine, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and other authorities have to adopt decisions which constitute a derogation from certain obligations on the part of Ukraine under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.\n... 7. On 12 August 2014, the Parliament of Ukraine adopted the Law on Administration of Justice and Criminal Proceedings in connection with the Anti\u2011terrorist Operation. The Law changed, for the duration of the anti-terrorist operation, the territorial jurisdiction over cases amenable to the courts located in the anti-terrorist operation area and, concerning the situations where it is impossible to conduct a pre-trial investigation in that area, investigative jurisdiction over criminal offences perpetrated there. The application of this law makes it necessary for Ukraine to derogate from certain of its obligations under Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Article 6 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. However, the courts and pre-trial investigation bodies are not currently functioning in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions because of the armed aggression of the Russian Federation and the actions of terrorist groups backed by the Russian Federation. That is why Ukraine has had to change the territorial jurisdiction of the courts and investigative jurisdiction in respect of criminal offences in conditions where the life of the nation is threatened.\n...\u201d 23.  On 5 June 2015 the Permanent Representation of Ukraine to the Council of Europe transmitted to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe a note verbale containing the text of the above declaration and its translation. 24.  On 15 June 2015 the applicant applied to the Lysychansk Court for restoration of the lost case file (\u0432\u0456\u0434\u043d\u043e\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u043d\u044f \u043c\u0430\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0456\u0430\u043b\u0456\u0432 \u0432\u0442\u0440\u0430\u0447\u0435\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0430\u0434\u0436\u0435\u043d\u043d\u044f). 25.  On 22 June 2015 the Lysychansk Court held a hearing in the presence of a prosecutor but in the applicant\u2019s absence. The prosecutor stated that the case file in question was not in the area of the Luhansk Region controlled by the Ukrainian Government and that it was therefore not possible to furnish the court with any of the material therein. The court found that there was insufficient material available to restore the file. It discontinued the examination of the application, reminding the parties that if sufficient material was provided, the question of restoration could be re\u2011examined. 26.  On 22 October 2015 the Court of Appeal again informed the applicant that examination of his case required amendments to the legislation. In this context, it referred to draft law no. 2930 (see paragraph 47 below). 27.  On five occasions between May 2015 and February 2016 the applicant applied for release, arguing that his detention was unlawful because his conviction was not final and \u201cwould never become final\u201d. 28.  The Starobilsk Court of the Luhansk Region rejected the applicant\u2019s applications for release, finding that, contrary to his submissions, there were sufficient legal grounds for continuing to detain him, since he had been convicted and his case was pending before the Court of Appeal. The most recent of those decisions was taken on 25 February 2016. No appeal lay against them. 29.  On 30 December 2016 the applicant applied to the Court of Appeal for release under the Law of 26 November 2015 (see paragraph 46 below). 30.  On 18 March 2016 the Lysychansk Court released the applicant. It considered that, as he had been held in pre\u2011trial detention since 1 May 2010, under the Law of 26 November 2015 he could be deemed to have already served his sentence. 31.  The regional prosecutor\u2019s office appealed, arguing that the applicant\u2019s conviction had not become final because his domestic case file had remained inaccessible in a non-Government-controlled area and appeals against his conviction were still pending before the Court of Appeal. According to the prosecutor\u2019s office, only convicted persons whose convictions had become final could benefit from the application of the new legislation. By contrast, those whose convictions were not final could be released only once the period for which they had been detained had exceeded half of the maximum sentence for the offence of which they stood accused. Since the applicant was accused of offences, in particular banditry and aggravated robbery, the maximum punishment for which was fifteen years\u2019 imprisonment (see paragraph 41 below), and he had served much less than half of that term, he could not be released. 32.  On 24 May 2016 the Court of Appeal upheld the Lysychansk Court\u2019s ruling of 18 March 2016 (see paragraph 30 above). 33.  Following communication of the case to the respondent Government, on 11 August 2016 the regional prosecutor\u2019s office informed the office of the Government Agent that, apart from the applicant, there were seven other individuals still held in the region\u2019s remand prisons against whom criminal proceedings were still pending but whose case files were in the non-Government-controlled areas. The prosecutor\u2019s office stated that it had requested the assistance of the police in gathering the documentation necessary to restore the relevant files. That work had allowed the prosecutor\u2019s office to gather sufficient material to ask the courts to consider the case against one of those individuals. The work was ongoing concerning two other defendants. Assistance had also been requested from the International Committee of the Red Cross, which operated in both the Government-controlled and the non-Government-controlled areas, in facilitating the transfer of files from the Court of Appeal\u2019s building in Luhansk. 34.  At the date of last information made available to the Court (19 January 2017), the applicant\u2019s appeal against his conviction remained pending before the Court of Appeal.", "references": ["9", "8", "7", "4", "3", "5", "0", "6", "1", "2", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Perm. 6.  On 21 October 2006 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of extortion, kidnapping and fraud. Two days later the Leninskiy District Court of Perm authorised his detention. 7.  On 21 December 2006 the District Court held a hearing on extension of the applicant\u2019s detention. The applicant asked to postpone the hearings for five days because his counsel was sick and could not attend. The District Court dismissed the request, assigned lawyer N. to represent the applicant, proceeded with the hearing and extended the applicant\u2019s detention. The applicant\u2019s objection to the participation of N. on account of their different defence strategies and N.\u2019s limited knowledge of the case-file was also dismissed. 8.  The applicant and his counsel appealed, complaining, in particular, about a breach of the applicant\u2019s right to defend himself through legal assistance of his own choosing. On 18 January 2007 the Perm Regional Court upheld the detention order of 21 December 2006, having also noted that the legal aid lawyer N. had been appointed because the detention matter \u201chad to be examined immediately\u201d. 9.  On 19 January 2007 the District Court once again extended the applicant\u2019s detention. On 8 February 2007 the Regional Court held the appeal hearing without informing the applicant in advance about the hearing date. The applicant\u2019s counsel attended the appeal hearing and made oral submissions. The Regional Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the detention order of 19 January 2007. 10.  The applicant\u2019s detention was further extended on several occasions. In particular, on 16 March 2007 the measure of restraint was prolonged until 4 April 2007. 11.  On 21 March 2007 the applicant was committed to stand trial before the Regional Court. Five days later, on 26 March 2007, the trial court scheduled a preliminary hearing for 3 April 2007 and ruled that, in the meantime, the measure of restraint in respect of the applicant should remain unchanged until the preliminary hearing. The decision was delivered in a written procedure (without the parties being present). 12.  The applicant appealed, complaining, among other matters, that that decision in the part relating to his detention was unlawful and that it had been delivered in his and his lawyer\u2019s absence. On 14 May 2007 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the decision, having found, in particular, that the trial judge\u2019s decision was no more than a restatement of the detention order of 16 March 2007 extending the applicant\u2019s detention until 4 April 2007 (see paragraph 10 above). 13.  At the preliminary hearing on 3 April 2007 the trial court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 21 September 2007. 14.  On 1 June 2007 the applicant was convicted. On 22 September 2008 the Supreme Court upheld his conviction on appeal.", "references": ["9", "2", "8", "4", "0", "5", "6", "3", "7", "1", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  On 22 December 1998 the first applicant lodged a compensation claim with the Sarajevo Municipal Court, seeking damages against the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (\u201cthe Federation\u201d) for goods seized during the 1992-95 war. 6.  On 10 May 2007 the Sarajevo Municipal Court ordered the Federation to pay the first applicant 521,556.20 convertible marks (BAM \u2013 approximately 266,370 euros (EUR)) in respect of pecuniary damage, together with default interest at the statutory rate from April 1992, and legal costs, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Civil Obligations Act of 1978. 7.  On 23 January 2009 the Sarajevo Cantonal Court allowed the Federation\u2019s appeal in part and amended the judgment of 10 May 2007 in respect of the part concerning default interest. It ordered that the interest should be calculated from February 1996. The rest of the first-instance judgment was upheld and it became final on the same day. 8.  On an unspecified date the Federation lodged an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (\u201cthe Supreme Court\u201d) against the judgment of 23 January 2009. On 10 June 2010 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. It held, in particular, that the Sarajevo Cantonal Court had correctly applied the Civil Obligations Act of 1978 as regards default interest. 9.  On 4 March 2009 the Sarajevo Municipal Court issued an enforcement order. The enforcement was to be carried out at the debtor\u2019s expense. 10.  On 28 May 2009 the Sarajevo Municipal Court dismissed the debtor\u2019s objection and upheld the enforcement order of 4 March 2009. 11.  On 16 March 2010 the debtor\u2019s bank informed the enforcement court that the applicant had received BAM 24,244.78 in respect of legal costs. 13.  On 28 January 2013 the Sarajevo Municipal Court requested information from the bank about the status of the enforcement. 14.  On 14 February 2013 the bank informed the Sarajevo Municipal Court that it did not consider that the enforcement order of 4 March 2009 had been fully implemented (because the interest due had not been paid). 15.  On 17 August 2010 the first applicant lodged an appeal with the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (\u201cthe Constitutional Court\u201d), complaining about the non-enforcement of the final judgment of 10 May 2007. 16.  On 7 November and 13 December 2012 the first applicant informed the Constitutional Court that the principal debt had been paid on 9 December 2011 but that the default interest remained unsettled. 17.  Invited to submit their comments on the first applicant\u2019s appeal, the Federal Ministry of Finance argued that the War Damage Act of 2001 had declared that war damage constituted a part of public debt to which default interest did not apply. Thus, there was no legal basis for the payment of default interest to the first applicant. 18.  On 12 June 2013 the Constitutional Court held that there had been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention on account of the excessive length of the enforcement proceedings. It ordered the Municipal Court to conclude the enforcement proceedings without delay. However, the Constitutional Court did not examine the issue of the amount of default interest.\nIn so far as relevant to the case before the Court, its reasoning was as follows:\n\u201c39.  ... from the material in the case file it is evident that the impugned enforcement proceedings were not (i) completed or (ii) terminated by means of a final procedural decision rejecting the appellant\u2019s request for the enforcement. Moreover, they were not suspended for any of the reasons prescribed by the Enforcement Procedure Act of 2003 ... Under the Enforcement Procedure Act of 2003, the enforcement court\u2019s duty does not end once an enforcement order has been issued and delivered to the competent authority for enforcement. 40.  Therefore, the failure of the Municipal Court to ... terminate the enforcement proceedings in one of the ways prescribed by [the Enforcement Procedure Act of 2003] ... without any justification based on the relevant law has led to an unlawful interference with the appellant\u2019s right to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions under Article II/3.k) of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention.\u201d 19.  Neither the judgment of 10 May 2007 (the amount due in respect of default interest) nor the Constitutional Court\u2019s decision of 12 June 2013 has been fully enforced until the present day according to the last available information. 21.  On 5 June 2001 the second applicant lodged a compensation claim with the Ora\u0161je Municipal Court, seeking damages against the Federation in respect for property owned by him that had been destroyed during the 1992-95 war. 22.  On 28 May 2007 the Ora\u0161je Municipal Court ordered the Federation to pay the second applicant BAM 70,000 (approximately EUR 35,260) in respect of pecuniary damage, together with default interest at the statutory rate from April 2003 and legal costs, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Civil Obligations Act of 1978. 24.  On 14 November 2007 the second applicant lodged a request for the enforcement of the judgment of 28 May 2007 with the Ora\u0161je Municipal Court. 25.  On 14 December 2007 the Ora\u0161je Municipal Court issued an enforcement order. The enforcement was to be carried out at the debtor\u2019s expense. 26.  On 13 February 2008 the court dismissed the debtor\u2019s objection and upheld the enforcement order of 14 December 2007. 27.  On 26 October 2009 the second applicant was issued government bonds in lieu of cash in respect of the principal debt, in accordance with the Domestic Debt Act of 2004 (see paragraph 42 below). 29.  On 10 December 2010 the bank informed the Ora\u0161je Municipal Court that it could not make any payments from the debtor\u2019s account without the approval of the Federal Ministry of Finance. 30.  On 4 November 2011 the Federal Ministry of Finance informed the second applicant that, in accordance with the amendments to the Domestic Debt Act of 2004 (see paragraph 42 below), he would receive payment in cash for the nominal value of those of his government bonds with which he had not traded on the stock exchange market, reduced by the amount paid in respect of the interest earned on bonds. 31.  On 5 December 2011 the second applicant received BAM 66,499.98 in respect of the principal debt. The second applicant acknowledged that that payment had fully settled the principal debt. 32.  On 17 May 2012 the Ora\u0161je Municipal Court partially suspended the enforcement proceedings in view of the payments made in 2010 and 2011. 33.  On 12 June 2012 the Ministry of Finance informed the Ora\u0161je Municipal Court that the judgment of 28 May 2007 had been fully enforced as regards the principal debt and legal costs, and that there was no legal basis for the payment of default interest. 34.  On 5 April 2013 the Ora\u0161je Municipal Court instructed the second applicant to bring a civil action for damages against the bank under the ordinary rules of tort law for failure to comply with the execution order of 14 December 2007 and to fully enforce the judgment of 28 May 2007. 35.  On 2 April 2014 the Ora\u0161je Municipal Court amended the execution order of 14 December 2007 in respect of the means of enforcement in that it ordered that the enforcement be executed with funds in accounts held by the debtor in two different banks. 36.  On 3 January 2009 the second applicant lodged an appeal with the Constitutional Court, complaining about the non-enforcement of the final judgment of 28 May 2007. 37.  On 8 June 2011 the Constitutional Court held that there had been a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention in the case of the second applicant and in three other cases on account of the excessive delay in the enforcement in respect of each case. It also held that the enforcement schedule under the Domestic Debt Act of 2004, which at the time stipulated that final judgments should be enforced by the payment of war damages in governments bonds in lieu of cash, had placed a disproportionate burden on the appellants. In its reasoning the Constitutional Court referred to its earlier decisions concerning the same matter. It ordered the Federation to enforce the final judgments in question without further delay. 38.  On 16 January 2013 the Constitutional Court concluded that its decision of 8 June 2011 had been enforced. 39.  The judgment of 28 May 2007 (the amount due in respect of default interest), however, has not been hitherto fully enforced.", "references": ["6", "5", "7", "2", "8", "1", "0", "4", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicants either owned businesses at Voronezh municipal market and rented the market pitches for their businesses, or worked as vendors for these businesses. 6.  It appears that in August 2007 the title to the plot of land on which the market was located was transferred from the town to a municipal enterprise and then to a private company, which intended to demolish the market and build a shopping centre. It appears that in 2008 and 2009 court proceedings were ongoing between the prosecutor\u2019s office and the municipal enterprise in relation to the land in question. 7.  Disagreeing with this course of action, which would adversely affect their businesses and employment, the applicants and some other people (several dozen in total) decided to remain on the market premises permanently, doing \u201cnight shifts\u201d. 8.  According to the applicants, on an unspecified date and in a specified manner, the entrepreneurs notified the town administration of their intention to \u201cconstantly do night shifts at the market until the matters relating to the legality of the land\u2019s transfer and the demolition of the market [were] settled\u201d. They started their \u201cnight shifts\u201d on an unspecified date. 9.  On 6 August 2009 the police told the entrepreneurs who had gathered at the market to leave the premises. Some refused to comply in the absence of any court order, and argued that, under their rent contracts, they had a right to remain at the market. 10.  On 7 August 2009 some of the applicants (Mr Annenkov, Mr Khripunov, Mr Khavantsev, Mr Finskiy, Ms Suprunova, Ms Zakharova and Ms Guseva) were arrested (see also paragraphs 41-51 below). 11.  These applicants were accused of an offence under Article 19.3 of the Federal Code of Administrative Offences (\u201cthe CAO\u201d), which punished disobeying or resisting the lawful order of a public official (see paragraph 61 below). The applicants, who were assisted by counsel before the trial court, pleaded not guilty and denied that they had disobeyed or resisted any specific lawful orders from the police, or that they had otherwise breached the public order or endangered public safety. 12.  By a judgment of 7 August 2009 a justice of peace convicted Mr Finskiy of the offence and sentenced him to five days\u2019 administrative detention. The court held as follows:\n\u201c[The defendant] violated the procedure for organising and managing a gathering (\u0441\u043e\u0431\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435); he disobeyed a lawful order issued by police officers in relation to their duties to ensure public order and safety, he also obstructed their exercise of the above duties ...\n[The defendant\u2019s] guilt is confirmed by the following documents: the record of the administrative offence, a complaint and written statements issued by the market director, written reports by police officers, and statements from witnesses ...\u201d 13.  On the same day Mr Khripunov was sentenced to five days\u2019 detention. The court held as follows:\n\u201c[The defendant] violated the procedure for organising and managing a gathering; he disobeyed a lawful order issued by police officers in relation to their duties to ensure public order and safety, he also obstructed their exercise of the above duties ... N., a witness, made the following statement before this court, \u2018on 7 August 2009 a group of entrepreneurs were doing night shifts to prevent the demolition of the market building. Suddenly, police officers arrived and started to grab people and take them to the police station. [The defendant] was also grabbed by the police; he did not show any resistance during this procedure ...\u2019\nThe court adopts a critical stance in relation to the testimony of this witness, who is the [defendant\u2019s] acquaintance and colleague, because this testimony is refuted by the bulk of the other evidence, namely the officers\u2019 written reports made in their official capacity ...\u201d 14.  A judgment, apparently in similar terms, was issued in respect of Mr Khavantsev, who was sentenced to ten days\u2019 detention. 15.  As required under the CAO, the applicants started to serve their sentences of administrative detention immediately following the trial judgments in their cases. 16.  At the same time, the applicants appealed to the Sovetskiy District Court of Voronezh (hereafter \u201cthe District Court\u201d). Mr Khripunov argued that the trial court had not made a proper assessment of the testimonies of eyewitnesses. He and Mr Finskiy argued, inter alia, that they had taken part in a \u201cgathering\u201d, and the Public Events Act did not require that prior notice be given to the competent public authority for this type of public event (see paragraph 66 below). Moreover, in breach of the Act, no written requirement to cease any unlawful conduct had been issued to them or the other entrepreneurs, and the penalty of administrative detention had been disproportionate. 17.  Mr Finskiy argued before the appeal court that he had been present on the market premises in the early morning of 7 August 2009, because he had been performing a \u201cduty\u201d. Having heard some noise, he had gone out of the building and had seen other entrepreneurs being arrested; he had started to film the events on his camera but had then been ordered to delete the video and had been arrested. 18.  The appeal court examined a written statement from M., the new executive director of the market. He had arrived at the marketplace, but could not get into the office building because a number of entrepreneurs were blocking the entrance by holding hands or linking their arms. Following a request by him for assistance, the police had ordered the entrepreneurs to stop their activity. The entrepreneurs, including Mr Finskiy, had not complied with that order. 19.  The appeal court also examined written statements from B., Ma. and L., who provided testimony in the following terms. While passing through the marketplace on the morning of 7 August 2009, they had seen a group of some fifty people. These people had been shouting slogans and calling for people in the town and regional administrations to be dismissed, as well as calling for the violation of public order. The police had told them to stop, but they had not complied with that order. Thereafter, the police had repeated the warning to the most active participant. After he had failed to comply, he had been taken to a police car, while grabbing the officers\u2019 uniforms and trying to run away. 20.  Officers S., Y. and F. submitted written reports in the following terms. On 6 August 2009, noting the blocking of the entrance to the office building, they had ordered the people present to disperse. The same thing had happened on 7 August 2009. Approaching one of the most active participants, Mr Finskiy, they had ordered him to stop. After he had refused, they had taken him to the police station. 21.  The appeal court heard Ms D., who stated that Mr Finskiy had been trying to film the ongoing events when the police had taken him away; he had not shown any resistance. 22.  On 13 August 2009 the District Court upheld the judgment in respect of Mr Finskiy, stating as follows:\n\u201cThe court has no reason to doubt the testimonies of police officers and L., B. and Ma., because they were not previously acquainted with the defendant or other entrepreneurs, and have no reason to give false testimony against him ... The court dismisses the argument that L., B. and Ma. could not be eyewitnesses since the market was surrounded by a wall. Their testimonies indicate that they effectively passed through the marketplace ... The court dismisses the argument that the police acted unlawfully in relation to the entrepreneurs\u2019 presence at a gathering requiring no prior authorisation. As the material in the file and testimonies indicate, the police acted lawfully with the aim of ensuring public order and public safety, because the entrepreneurs were blocking access to the market for employees and had not reacted to lawful orders from the police to stop these actions ... The court adopts a critical attitude in respect of the testimony of D., who tried to help her colleague avoid responsibility for the offence, because this testimony is refuted by the other evidence ...\u201d 23.  By a decision of 13 August 2009, in respect of Mr Khripunov, the District Court held:\n\u201cP., a witness, stated before the appeal court \u2018on 7 August 2009 ... people in plain clothes and the police arrived at the market and, following orders from the chief officer of the Sovetskiy police station, started to arrest entrepreneurs without explaining the reasons for such arrests. [The defendant] was also arrested, while showing no resistance or disobedience to any specific orders ...\u2019\nThe fact that [the defendant] committed the offence is confirmed by:\n\u2013 the record of the administrative offence stating \u2018after his violation of the procedure for organising and managing public events, while being arrested, he disobeyed the lawful order of a police officer, grabbed his uniform and tried to escape ...\u2019;\n\u2013 written statements from [three passers-by] who, while passing through the market area, saw some fifty people chanting slogans and calling for the dismissal of the mayor and the governor and for violations of the public order. Despite the police\u2019s order to stop what they were doing, the entrepreneurs refused; thereafter the police approached [the defendant], who appeared particularly active, and again ordered him to stop what he was doing, but he did not respond to this order. While being placed in the police car, he resisted, and threated the officers with violence and prosecution;\n\u2013  [the officers\u2019 written statements in similar terms]: ... Having approached one of the most active men (subsequently identified as the defendant), they warned him against committing offences, but he did not react and refused [to stop]; Finskiy [sic] was thus arrested and taken to the police station.\nThe court dismisses the defence\u2019s argument that [the defendant] lawfully participated in a gathering requiring no prior authorisation, because the police\u2019s actions were lawful and aimed to secure public order and public safety, since the entrepreneurs were blocking the market employees\u2019 access to the building ... The court adopts a critical attitude in respect of the testimony of P., who is the defendant\u2019s colleague and wants to help him, because this testimony is refuted by the bulk of the other evidence.\u201d 24.  An appeal decision in similar terms was issued in respect of Mr Khavantsev. 25.  Thereafter, learning in late September 2009 that the court decisions in respect of certain other participants in the same events had been quashed on appeal in September 2009 (see paragraph 27 below), on 8 October 2009 Mr Finskiy, Mr Khavantsev and Mr Khripunov lodged applications under Article 30.12 of the CAO for review of the final judgments in respect of them. On 20 November 2009 the Deputy President of the Voronezh Regional Court upheld the lower courts\u2019 decisions. In respect of each defendant, the reviewing judge stated as follows:\n\u201cI dismiss the defence\u2019s argument that the lower courts\u2019 judges omitted to specify the type of public event in which the defendant had participated, the relevant regulations on such public events, and the specific details concerning the police\u2019s orders to the defendant. It was established by the justice of the peace that the impugned event was a \u2018gathering\u2019 ...\u201d 26.  By judgments of 7 August 2009 the female defendants in the proceedings and Mr Annenkov were fined. 27.  On 2, 8 and 10 September 2009 the District Court set aside the judgments in respect of the female defendants and Mr Annenkov.\nAs regards Mr Annenkov, the appeal court held as follows:\n\u201cNeither the record of the administrative offence nor the judgment contains references to specific circumstances or actions relating to the corpus delicti of the imputed offence (disobeying the lawful order of a police officer). In particular, neither of the two documents specifies what order was given to the defendant which was then not complied with. Moreover, the judgment does not indicate that the defendant did disobey a lawful order issued by a police officer.\u201d\nIn respect of Ms Guseva, the appeal court held as follows:\n\u201cIt is indicated in the record of the administrative offence that the defendant violated the procedure relating to the organisation and management of demonstrations, meetings and gatherings, and that during her arrest she disobeyed the lawful order of a police officer in relation to his work to ensure public order. The record does not specify what type of public event was being held, which above-mentioned procedure was violated, or what orders relating to maintaining public order during a public event were not complied with by the defendant.\u201d\nIn respect of Ms Suprunova, the appeal court held as follows:\n\u201cThe record of the administrative offence indicates that on 7 August 2009 the defendant violated the procedure relating to the organisation and management of demonstrations, meetings and gatherings, [and that] during her arrest she resisted the lawful order of a police officer and grabbed his uniform and tried to escape ... The record does not indicate what type of public event was being held, which applicable procedure the defendant allegedly violated, what orders relating to maintaining public order during such an event were issued to the defendant by the police, or which of those orders was not complied with.\u201d\nIn respect of Ms Zakharova, the appeal court held as follows:\n\u201cNeither the record of the administrative offence nor the first-instance judgment refers to specific facts and actions forming part of the offence imputed to the defendant, namely disobeying the lawful order of a police officer ... or the specific order given to her which she failed to comply with. Moreover, it does not follow that what the defendant disobeyed was a lawful order given by a police officer. The record does not specify what the defendant\u2019s violation of the procedure concerning the organisation and management of demonstrations, meetings and gatherings was, or what type of event was being held.\u201d 28.  The appeal court ordered the return of the case files to the relevant justice of the peace. Thereafter, the justice of the peace returned the files to the police station, apparently for the documents to be amended or the administrative-offence records to be redrafted. The files were not resubmitted for a retrial. 29.  At 5.30 a.m. on 10 August 2009 the police arrested some twenty people at the market, including certain applicants such as Mr Buzov, Ms Garkavets, Ms Zuravleva, Ms Khavantseva and Ms Suprunova. 30.  On 10 August 2009 a justice of the peace examined a case against Mr Buzov. The court heard Ms Khr., who stated that a group of people had impeded security guards as they tried to re-establish access to the market building. The police had then arrived and had taken some people to the police station. 31.  It appears that during the hearing the applicant, who was assisted by counsel, first sought to have some other witnesses and police officers examined in open court. However, according to the Government, he then withdrew his application. 32.  By a judgment of 10 August 2009 Mr Buzov was convicted of an offence under Article 19.3 of the CAO and was sentenced to ten days\u2019 administrative detention. The justice of the peace found as follows:\n\u201c[The defendant] disobeyed the police officers and did not comply with lawful orders to stop violating public order ...\nThe defendant\u2019s guilt is confirmed by: the administrative-offence record, the police officers\u2019 reports and the written testimonies of witnesses ...\u201d 33.  According to the Government, Mr Buzov did not serve his sentence, as he was taken to the cardiology unit of a local hospital on the evening of 10 August 2009. 34.  Mr Buzov appealed to the District Court, which held a hearing on 13 August 2009. It heard his lawyer and Ms Yef., who stated that she had seen the applicant making a video recording while he was surrounded by security guards who had torn his clothes. Colleagues had managed to \u201cget him of the security guards\u2019 grasp\u201d, then the police had arrived and had started to push certain entrepreneurs aside. One of the security guards \u201chad given an order to arrest [Mr Buzov]\u201d. Mr Buzov had not disobeyed any orders and had not resisted arrest (see also paragraph 50 below). 35.  By a decision of 13 August 2009 the appeal court upheld the judgment of 10 August 2009 in respect of the applicant. 36.  Learning in late September 2009 that the court decisions in respect of certain other participants in the events on 10 August 2009 (and 7 August 2009) had been quashed on appeal (see paragraphs 27-28 above and paragraphs 38-39 below), the applicant and his counsel, Ms Gnezdilova, thought that they had a reasonable prospect of success in seeking a further review of the court decisions of 10 and 13 August 2009. In early October 2009 they lodged an application for review of those court decisions. They argued, inter alia, that: the lower courts had not specified what specific order the applicant had disobeyed or whether such an order was lawful under Russian law; the courts had not heard any officers or eyewitnesses who had witnessed the impugned reprehensible conduct on the part of the applicant; and the courts had not specified any particular actions on his part which constituted a breach of public order. 37.  On 20 November 2009 the Deputy President of the Voronezh Regional Court upheld the lower courts\u2019 decisions. The judge held as follows:\n\u201c[The applicant] was part of the group of people who impeded market officials as they tried to gain access to their office building. The guards from a private security company intervened and a fight ensued between them and some participants. These participants did not respond to orders from police officers. The officers required [the applicant], who was one of the most active participants, to cease his unlawful conduct, but he did not respond to this order. Thereafter, he was taken to the police station.\u201d 38.  On 10 August 2009 a justice of the peace sentenced several female defendants to a fine. However, on 8 September 2009 the District Court heard appeals from them and set aside the judgments against them. 39.  In respect of Ms Zhuravleva, it held as follows:\n\u201cArticle 28.2 of the CAO requires that a record of an administrative offence must describe, among other things, the factual elements relating to the offence and the circumstances in which it was committed. The record concerning the defendant specifies that ... she disobeyed the police officers, did not respond to their lawful requests to stop unlawfully violating the public order, and grabbed the officers\u2019 uniforms while being escorted to the police vehicle, trying to push them away and run away.\nThe record of the administrative offence does not specify which requests relating to public order were addressed to the defendant and were not complied with, or which actions of the applicant such requests related to. The deficiencies of the record make it impossible to establish the defendant\u2019s liability for an administrative offence, and the record must be returned to the [police].\u201d\nIn respect of Ms Khavantseva and Ms Garkavets, the appeal court held as follows:\n\u201cNeither the record of the administrative offence nor the justice of the peace\u2019s judgment specifies how the defendant violated public order, or which specific order was given by the police in this connection but not complied with by her.\u201d 40.  It appears that the files were then returned to the police for the documents to be amended. The files were not resubmitted to the relevant justice of the peace for a retrial. 41.  On 10 August 2009 Mr Annenkov\u2019s wife (Ms Shatalova, also an applicant in the present case) lodged a criminal complaint with the Sovetskiy Investigations Unit. 42.  Ms Shatalova alleged that Officer Ku., a senior officer at the Sovetskiy police station, had subjected her elderly husband to ill-treatment on 7 August 2009. She sought the institution of criminal proceedings against this officer. She stated as follows: at her request, her husband had arrived at the market in the early morning of 7 August 2009, where she had been doing \u201cnight shifts\u201d with others, in order to bring her some warm clothes; Officer Ku. had struck a blow to his chest, causing the man to fall to the ground and sustain a head injury as he hit his head against the corner of a table. 43.  Mr Annenkov was examined on 7 August 2009 by a neurosurgeon, a traumatology specialist and a therapist, who concluded that he had a contused wound on his head measuring 6 cm by 0.3 cm by 0.5 cm, some swelling on his upper right arm, and some other injuries (this part of the certificate is not legible). In her submissions before the Court the applicant\u2019s lawyer alleged that Mr Annenkov had sustained a rib fracture. She maintained this assertion following communication of the case to the Government; the latter did not comment on this matter. 44.  Unspecified officials carried out an inquiry between 10 and 18 August 2009, looking into whether any police officers had committed the offence of abuse of power (defined at the time as \u201cactions manifestly outside the scope of official duties, causing a significant violation of one\u2019s rights or legitimate interests\u201d), an offence under Article 286 of the Criminal Code. 45.  Three other applicants (Ms Guseva, Ms Suprunova and Ms Zakharova) also sought medical assistance on 8 August 2009. Ms Suprunova was diagnosed with concussion and soft-tissue bruises on her head and right arm. Ms Zakharova was diagnosed with soft-tissue bruises on her head and right shoulder. Ms Guseva was examined by a forensic expert, who concluded that she had bruises on the front upper part of her right arm (measuring 2.5 cm by 2 cm, and 2.4 cm by 1.9 cm) and a smaller one on the inner part of her right arm, abrasions on her right and left hip measuring 9 cm by 8.5 cm and 8 cm by 7.5 cm respectively, and abrasions on her right and left ankle joints measuring 6 cm by 3 cm and 2 cm by 1.3 cm respectively. 46.  It appears that on an unspecified date Ms Suprunova, Ms Zakharova and Ms Guseva were heard in the context of the pre-investigation inquiry regarding Mr Annenkov. 47.  Ms Zakharova stated that she had arrived at the market early on the morning of 7 August 2009 and had seen a police officer dragging Ms Guseva. She had protested to Officer Ku., who had then pushed her. She had fallen to the ground, hitting her shoulder and the back of her head against wooden objects on the ground. 48.  Ms Suprunova stated that Officer Ku. had ordered \u201cTake this one\u201d and had started to pull her hair and hands, but other entrepreneurs had tried to shield her. 49.  Ms Guseva stated that she had tried to shield Ms Suprunova from Officer Ku., who was pulling her hair. Officer Ku. and Officer Kh. had pushed Ms Guseva against a wall, causing her to fall to the ground and lose consciousness. She had then been dragged along the ground by her hands, and had been kicked in the back by one of the officers as she was placed in the police car. 50.  Ms Yef., the applicants\u2019 colleague, made a written statement that in the early morning of 7 August 2009 some thirty people had been at the market. Upon being alerted to the arrival of the police, she had gone out and seen some sixteen police officers, including Officer Ku., a senior officer, who was giving orders and indicating that the officers should \u201cTake this one\u201d or something similar. She had seen an officer twisting Ms Suprunova\u2019s arms and Ms Guseva being dragged along the ground. Then she had seen Mr Annenkov ask Officer Ku. \u201cWhat are you doing?\u201d, and Officer Ku. had suddenly hit him in the chest, causing Mr Annenkov to fall to the ground and hit against the top of a table. Mr Annenkov had fainted. Officer Ku. had then kicked him on the leg and ordered \u201cTake this one\u201d. 51.  Officer Ku. made the following written statement during the inquiry:\n\u201cOn 6 August 2009 the police station received information that in the early morning of 7 August a group of three hundred people might take violent action in order to take possession of the market. At 5.45 a.m. some thirty officers under my supervision arrived at the market to prevent disorder and unlawful actions. We saw some twenty people outside the building who were holding a meeting, chanting slogans and shouting about the regional prosecutor and the governor. The entrepreneurs had previously been issued with warnings against unlawful actions on their part. Suddenly, some five women started to shout and call for help, grabbing our uniforms. We arrested some thirteen people, including the most active perpetrators; all of them resisted during the arrest ... We did use physical force against some people, namely sambo fighting techniques such as twisting hands behind backs. None of the officers, including myself, inflicted any blows ...\u201d 52.  On 19 August 2009 an investigator issued a decision refusing to institute criminal proceedings, referring to the statements of several officers, including Officer Ku., and the testimonies of Mr Annenkov, Ms Shatalova, Ms Zakharova and Ms Suprunova. 53.  It appears that the refusal of 19 August 2009 was then overruled for unspecified reasons and the inquiry was resumed. Written statements were obtained from some other participants in the gathering. Officer Kh. was also heard and he confirmed Officer Ku.\u2019s earlier statement. 54.  On 7 September 2009 the investigator issued a new refusal to institute criminal proceedings against Officer Ku., Officer Kh. or other officers. Having summarised the above testimonies, he concluded as follows:\n\u201cNo sufficient and objective data could be gathered during the inquiry to show that any police officers had committed any criminal offence ... The grievances presented in the complaints are refuted by the testimonies from the officers ... Injuries could have been sustained during the arrest procedure owing to the resistance displayed to the police officers (such resistance later being confirmed by the prosecution for the administrative offences). Furthermore, in view of the important and irremediable inconsistencies in various testimonies, there is no possibility of drawing a truthful conclusion regarding the commission of a criminal offence by Ku., Kh. or others ...\u201d 55.  For unspecified reasons, a new refusal to prosecute was issued on 1 October 2009. It was then overruled on 7 October 2009 by the deputy director of the District Investigations Department. He indicated that it was necessary to: assess the available court decisions regarding administrative offences concerning the events on 7 August 2009; identify and interview people who had been kept with the arrested people at the police station; identify and interview all police officers who had been present at the station and had compiled administrative-offence files against the arrested entrepreneurs; and identify and interview all the officers who had been on duty on that date and had been present at the market. 56.  Four applicants (Mr Annenkov, Ms Suprunova, Ms Guseva and Ms Zakharova) sought judicial review in respect of the refusal dated 1 October 2009. They learnt at a hearing on 19 October 2009 that the refusal had already been overruled. The case was therefore discontinued. 57.  A new refusal was issued on 9 November 2009. 58.  On 22 December 2009 the Regional Investigations Department set aside the refusal of 9 November 2009 because it contained an insufficient assessment of the factual circumstances, no plausible explanation for the applicants\u2019 injuries, and no assessment of the legality of the police\u2019s actions. 59.  Being unaware of the above decision, one of the applicants sought judicial review of the refusal to prosecute dated 9 November 2009. On 9 November 2010 the District Court discontinued the proceedings because the supervising authority had overruled the impugned refusal decision. 60.  According to the Government, a new refusal to prosecute was issued on 19 June 2012. It was overruled on 5 October 2012 by the district prosecutor\u2019s office. Thereafter, a criminal case was opened under Article 286 of the Criminal Code. Apparently, Mr Annenkov and Ms Suprunova at least were interviewed again by an investigator. Mr Annenkov also had a formal confrontation procedure with an unspecified witness who had allegedly seen the applicant stumble and fall to the ground by himself on 7 August 2009.", "references": ["2", "5", "8", "6", "3", "4", "9", "0", "No Label", "7", "1"], "gold": ["7", "1"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Z\u00e1kop\u010die. 5.  On 28 February 2011 the applicant was sued by his son in proceedings on child maintenance before the \u010cadca District Court (file no. 10 C 38/2011). 6.  During those proceedings he made an incomplete submission on 21 April 2011, which he supplemented the month after alleging that he had been waiting for a response from the Centre for Legal Aid in respect of his request for a legal aid lawyer. He also lodged two complaints with the president of the District Court about the excessive length of proceedings, namely on 9 February 2012 and 29 February 2012, which were unsuccessful. Having been dissatisfied with their outcome, he turned to the appellate court for review of his complaints to no avail. 7.  The District Court, on the other hand, took the following steps. It asked several public authorities, such as for example Social Security Authority and the Job Centre, to provide it with information relevant to the case. Between May 2012 and April 2014, it was dealing with an appointment of a guardian to the applicant, who at the material time was undergoing an ambulatory psychiatric treatment. Such an appointment was eventually revoked in September 2014 on the grounds that the Centre for Legal Aid had appointed a lawyer for the applicant in June 2014. The District Court also joined the present case file to another set of proceedings for several months. In January 2014, the District Court judge responsible for hearing the applicant\u2019s case changed. The District Court further scheduled several hearings, which were either adjourned or cancelled. 8.  On 13 May 2015 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant\u2019s complaint about a violation of his right to a hearing within a reasonable time in the proceedings held before the District Court as manifestly ill-founded. It concluded that the District Court proceeded with the matter actively and properly, apart from a few minor exceptions, such as the joining of a case file to another set of proceedings, changing of the judge and a procedural error made during one of the hearings. In particular, the Constitutional Court took into account the fact that the applicant had complained of excessive delays with the president of the District Court and challenged them further on appeal on each occasion. 9.  Subsequently, the District Court took several steps as follows. It asked for further information from inter alia the applicant\u2019s employer. It also scheduled a hearing for 12 August 2015, which was adjourned to 31 August 2015. It then postponed the latter hearing to an unspecified date, since it had to deal with a procedural request from the plaintiff, which was also challenged on appeal. In the absence of any further information from the parties, it appears that the proceedings are still pending and no judgment on the merits has been delivered by the District Court.", "references": ["1", "4", "7", "9", "0", "2", "8", "5", "6", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1965 in the Altay Region. He lives in Novosibirsk. 6.  At the relevant time the applicant was serving a prison sentence for aggravated robbery in correctional colony no. 21 in the Novosibirsk Region. 7.  On 20 January 2007 he complained to a prison doctor that he had started experiencing severe pain in the lower back after an accidental fall. The doctor diagnosed lumbar osteochondrosis and prescribed the standard treatment. 8.  The treatment proved to be ineffective. Thirty days later he was admitted to the correctional colony\u2019s medical unit for a month-long course of inpatient treatment. According to the applicant, the unit did not employ the necessary medical specialists and did not have the equipment needed to treat his condition. 9.  Since there were no positive developments in the applicant\u2019s health and the pain persisted, on 13 March 2007 he was taken to the regional prison hospital in Novosibirsk. He was seen by a neurologist, who diagnosed myelopathy, a neurological problem related to the spinal cord, accompanied with a mild dysfunction of the legs. The treatment regimen was amended, but his condition did not change. He was discharged from the hospital on 2 April 2007. 10.  On two occasions, between 20 April and 23 June 2007 and between 17 September and 2 November 2007, the applicant was treated in the correctional colony\u2019s medical unit. 11.  On 28 November 2007 the applicant was certified as having a third\u2011degree disability. 12.  On 18 February, 25 August and 1 November 2008 the detention authorities applied to move him to Gaaza Prison Hospital in St Petersburg for \u201cneurosurgical treatment\u201d, but apparently received no reply. 13.  In the meantime, the applicant was sent back and forth between the medical unit and the prison hospital, mainly receiving medication for his symptoms. He developed paresis, a neurological condition of muscle weakness, in three of his limbs, and started using crutches. 14.  On 1 December 2008 a special medical board confirmed the applicant\u2019s disability and ordered a magnetic resonance imaging examination (\u201cMRI\u201d), however, the detention facility had no funds to pay for it. After collecting enough money, the applicant had an MRI on 10 December 2009. It revealed an abnormal narrowing of the spinal canal. The applicant was prescribed conservative treatment. 15.  The treatment he received did not stop the illness\u2019s progression and on 2 April 2010 he was certified as having a second-degree disability. 16.  In July 2010 the detention authorities applied for his admission to the spinal surgical unit of the Gaaza hospital. On 27 September 2010 their request was dismissed owing to the absence of a fresh MRI. 17.  On 6 December 2010 the applicant complained to the prosecutor of Novosibirsk Region about the failure of the medical authorities to duly apply for his transfer to the prison hospital. By a letter of 28 December 2010 the prosecutor supported the applicant\u2019s allegations, noting that a prison official had already been disciplined for the failure to submit the applicant\u2019s complete medical file to Gaaza Prison Hospital. The prosecutor ordered the detention authorities to apply for the applicant\u2019s admission to the prison hospital. 18.  On 24 February 2011 the applicant was seen by the chief traumatology specialist of Novosibirsk Region, who prescribed spine surgery, an operation which was accessible through the quota system (for the applicable quota regulation see paragraph 28 below). On 1 March 2011 the hospital\u2019s medical board asked the regional authorities to allocate a surgery quota to the applicant. 19.  On 9 September 2011 the detention authorities paid for an MRI for the applicant in a civilian hospital. On the basis of that examination, a civilian doctor confirmed three days later that spine surgery was required. 20.  In the meantime, the applicant brought a tort action with the Toguchinskiy District Court of Novosibirsk Region, complaining about the authorities\u2019 failure to provide him with effective medical assistance, in particular, the required spine surgery. 21.  On 23 November 2011 the District Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim, finding that he had been provided with the required medical assistance. As regards the subject of the claim, the alleged failure to perform spine surgery, the court noted that the authorities had already asked for a surgery quota to be allocated to the applicant. 22.  On 29 March 2012 the Novosibirsk Regional Court upheld the judgment on appeal and it became final. 23.  On 5 July 2012 the Novosibirsk Regional Court refused to reopen the case by way of a cassation appeal, affirming the lower courts\u2019 decisions. 24.  On 7 November 2012 a special medical board at the Novosibirsk Research Institute of Traumatology and Orthopaedics, the regional medical authority in charge of quota distribution, refused to allocate one to the applicant. Conservative treatment was recommended. 25.  In 2012 and 2013 the applicant went to the prison hospital for several courses of inpatient treatment. No positive effect on his spine condition was recorded. 26.  The applicant was released on parole on 19 July 2013.", "references": ["5", "6", "2", "9", "3", "8", "4", "7", "0", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1983 and lives in Kyiv. 6.  On 7 May 2015 the applicant stood trial before the Kyiv Obolonsky District Court, charged with unlawful purchase and possession of large quantities of narcotic drugs, an offence under Article 309 \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Code. A prosecutor was present. The applicant was unrepresented. 7.  It appears from the trial court judgment that when questioned in the course of the trial, the applicant stated that he had been feeling unwell so had been taking Tramadol to relieve the pain. He admitted that on 22 January 2015 he had bought ten blisters of Tramadol, a narcotic-like pain reliever, from a stranger in the street for the equivalent of about EUR 53 and had been arrested shortly afterwards. He expressed remorse and asked for leniency in sentencing. In view of those admissions the trial court, relying on Article 349 \u00a7 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (\u201cCCP\u201d) (see paragraph 13 below), ruled it unnecessary to examine the evidence related to the \u201ccircumstances\u201d, which were \u201cnot contested by any party\u201d. On the same day the trial court convicted the applicant of illegal purchase and possession of drugs, an offence under Article 309 \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Code, and sentenced him to two years and six months\u2019 imprisonment. 8.  The applicant appealed, arguing that his admissions before the trial court had related only to the facts and not to the legal classification of the offence, which he maintained was erroneous. He argued that mere possession of Tramadol was not unlawful as such, except where it was in breach of the applicable regulations. For this reason, his acts should have been classified not under Article 309 of the Criminal Code as drug possession but rather under Article 320 of the Criminal Code, namely breach of the rules related to the purchase and circulation of drugs and analogous products. 9.  On 1 July 2015 the Kyiv City Court of Appeal, sitting as a single\u2011judge formation, denied the applicant leave to appeal. The court stated that the applicant had admitted the circumstances of the offence and the trial court had then proceeded under Article 349 \u00a7 3 of the CCP. However, in his appeal the applicant was contesting his conviction under Article 309 of the Criminal Code and the legal classification of his actions. The court held that, because of the applicant\u2019s admission and the procedure used at the trial under Article 394 \u00a7 2 of the CCP (see paragraph 14 below), the decision was not amenable to appeal on the grounds invoked by the applicant. 10.  On 3 August 2015 the Higher Specialised Civil and Criminal Court dismissed an appeal on points of law lodged by the applicant, holding that the Court of Appeal\u2019s decision had complied with the rules of criminal procedure.", "references": ["8", "0", "2", "4", "5", "7", "1", "6", "3", "9", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1949 and lives in Torres Novas. 5.  On 16 February 2004 eviction proceedings were instituted against the applicant\u2019s husband, A.S., before the Court of Torres Novas (domestic proceedings no. 154/04.7TBTNV). 6.  On 31 March 2004 A.S. lodged his submissions in reply (contesta\u00e7\u00e3o) and on 6 May 2004 the claimant lodged new submissions (r\u00e9plica). 7.  On 22 September 2006 A.S. died. 8.  On 7 November 2006 the court suspended the proceedings and on 9 November 2007 it declared the proceedings\u2019 interruption as the claimant had not taken the initiative of continuing the proceedings against the defendant\u2019s heirs. 9.  On 18 December 2007 the claimant applied for leave to continue the proceedings against the defendant\u2019s heirs (incidente de habilita\u00e7\u00e3o de herdeiros). 10.  After having faced some difficulties in summoning the heirs, the court managed to summon all of them and on 13 June 2009 the defendant\u2019s heirs, including the applicant, were admitted as parties to the proceedings. 11.  On 26 June 2009 the court was informed of the claimant\u2019s death. 12.  On an unknown date one of the claimant\u2019s heirs, A.O., applied for leave to continue the proceedings with her and the other claimant\u2019s heir as parties. 13.  On 22 June 2012 the court admitted the claimant\u2019s heirs as parties to the proceedings. 14.  On 22 January 2010 the court was informed of the death of one of the defendant\u2019s heirs. 15.  On an unknown date A.O. applied for leave to continue the proceedings against the heirs of the deceased party. On 4 May 2010 she provided information on those heirs and in July she provided their birth certificates. On 12 July 2011 A.O. provided the heirs\u2019 addresses, following which they were summoned. 16.  On 30 April 2012 those heirs were admitted as parties to the proceedings. 17.  On 14 December 2012 the court gave a preparatory decision setting out the facts that had already been established and those that remained outstanding (despacho saneador). 18.  On 14 January 2013 the claimant\u2019s heirs requested an inspection to the house, which took place on 3 April 2013. 19.  On 29 May 2013 the hearing that had been scheduled for that day was postponed as the parties\u2019 lawyers were not present. 20.  Subsequently, hearings were held on 18 September, 29 October and 17 December 2013. 21.  On 14 January 2014 the court adopted a decision with regard to the factual basis (resposta \u00e0 mat\u00e9ria de facto) and on 13 March 2014 it delivered its decision in which it ordered the applicant to vacate the house and to pay rent arrears. 22.  On an unknown date the applicant appealed against that decision. The appeal was declared inadmissible for an unknown reason. 23.  As the applicant had not complied with the 13 March 2014 decision (see paragraph 21 above), on 19 January 2015 the claimant instituted enforcement proceedings against her before the Santar\u00e9m Court. 24.  According to the latest information received by the Court on 23 November 2015, on that date the enforcement proceedings were still pending at first instance.", "references": ["0", "6", "1", "2", "8", "4", "9", "5", "7", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "4.  On 18 January 2007 the Moscow City authorities, the Ministry of the Defence of the Russian Federation and a private construction company signed an investment contract for the construction of a number of residential buildings in Moscow. Pursuant to the contract, a title to 3,823 flats was to be transferred to the Ministry of the Defence. The rest of the flats were to remain the city\u2019s property. 5.  In 2008 the city authorities commissioned, as part of the said investment contract, several residential buildings. It appears that a number of flats in those buildings were transferred to the Ministry of the Defence. 6.  In 2009 the city authorities had their title to a number of flats, including those in residential buildings nos. 8 and 26-1 at Ulitsa Marshala Savitskogo, Moscow, registered by the state authorities. 7.  In 2010 the Ministry of the Defence assigned five of those flats to private individuals and entered into social housing agreements with them. Subsequently those people successfully applied to the Zyuzinskiy District Court of Moscow seeking recognition of their title to the flats by way of privatisation. Once the court\u2019s judgments became final, they had their ownership in respect of the flats registered in the state register and then sold the flats to other persons, including the applicants. The relevant transactions and transfer of the title to the property were duly registered by the authorities. The applicants moved into the flats and resided there. 8.  According to the Government, in 2012 and 2013 the police opened criminal investigation in respect of the fraudulent transactions with the flats. The Government did not inform of its outcome. 9.  On an unspecified date city authorities asked the District Court to re\u2011open the cases concerning the flats privatised by the tenants who sold them to the applicants in 2011. The authorities claimed that the flats owned by the applicants were the city\u2019s property. The District Court granted the request, quashed the earlier judgments allowing the privatisation of the flats and re-examined the cases. The court established, inter alia, that the Ministry of the Defence had never owned the flats and, accordingly, had not had a right to assign them to private individuals. It granted the city\u2019s claims in full invalidating the decisions of the Ministry of the Defence in respect of the flats and ordering the applicants\u2019 eviction. The court also found that the applicants had acquired the flats in good faith. However, it ruled that the cases fell under one of the two exceptions to the protection of a bona fide purchaser\u2019s title, which required that precedence be given to the City of Moscow given that the flats had left the City\u2019s possession against the latter\u2019s will. 10.  The applicants\u2019 appeals were to no avail. The Moscow City Court and the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation rejected them as unsubstantiated. 11.  According to the Government, the judgments ordering the applicants\u2019 eviction were not enforced. The applicants continue to reside in the flats. 12.  The details pertaining to each case are summed up in Appendix II below.", "references": ["3", "2", "8", "0", "1", "4", "7", "5", "6", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
+{"input": "5.  Ms Fatma Nuray Uncuo\u011flu (\u201cthe first applicant\u201d) was born in 1945 and lives in Istanbul. Ms Nurcihan Uncuo\u011flu (\u201cthe second applicant\u201d) was born in 1940 and also lives in Istanbul. 6.  The applicants each owned a share in respective plots of land in the area of Firuzk\u00f6y, in the district of Avc\u0131lar, Istanbul. 7.  On 24 December 1987, a new zoning plan was put into force in the area of Firuzk\u00f6y, which encompassed the applicants\u2019 plots of land. Under the new plan, the plots of land were designated as \u201cuniversity area\u201d. Subsequently, in 1988, 1989, 1990 and 1991, annotations (\u015ferhler) were made in the land registry records indicating that the applicants\u2019 land would be expropriated by Istanbul University (hereinafter \u201cthe University\u201d). 8. On 26 March 1998 the applicants both asked the University to either expropriate the disputed land or to remove the annotations from the land registry records. The University informed the applicants, on 27 April 1998 and 28 April 1998 respectively, that the expropriation proceedings would commence when the necessary funding was provided. 9.  On 20 July 2001 the applicants initiated respective proceedings before the K\u00fc\u00e7\u00fck\u00e7ekmece Civil Court of First Instance, claiming compensation for de facto expropriation. 10.  On 12 December 2003, relying on expert reports which had indicated that the applicants\u2019 land had been fenced off by the University, the K\u00fc\u00e7\u00fck\u00e7ekmece Civil Court of First Instance awarded the first applicant 97,125,000,000 Turkish liras (TRL) and the second applicant 37,837,500,000 TRL by way of compensation for de facto expropriation. In its respective judgments, the first-instance court held in particular that the land at issue had been under the effective control of the University and that access to the land was restricted due to the fences that had been built around the land. 11.  On 22 June 2004 the Fifth Civil Division of the Court of Cassation quashed the judgments of the K\u00fc\u00e7\u00fck\u00e7ekmece Civil Court of First Instance, holding that the land in question had not been controlled or used effectively by the University. 12.  On 24 September 2004 both applicants requested the rectification of the respective decisions dated 22 June 2004. In their petitions, they drew the attention of the Fifth Civil Division of the Court of Cassation to its previous decisions, dated 28 September 1999 and 31 March 2003, in which it had held that neighbouring plots of land in the same area had been de facto expropriated by the University because the latter had built fences around the land and because of the annotations made in the land registry records. 13.  On 12 April 2005 the Fifth Civil Division of the Court of Cassation rejected the applicants\u2019 requests for rectification of the decisions of 22 June 2004. However, it did not express any reason as to why it had reached a different conclusion from its previous decisions dated 28 September 1999 and 31 March 2003. 14.  On 6 October 2005 the K\u00fc\u00e7\u00fck\u00e7ekmece Civil Court of First Instance complied with the decisions of the Court of Cassation and dismissed the cases. 15.  On 28 November 2005 both applicants filed an appeal, reiterating their argument concerning the contradictory decisions (see paragraph 12 above) delivered by the Fifth Civil Division of the Court of Cassation. 16.  On 27 March 2006 and 4 April 2006 respectively, the Fifth Civil Division of the Court of Cassation dismissed the appeals. In its decisions, it gave no reply to the applicants\u2019 arguments regarding the fact that it had given contradictory judgments in respect of similar cases. 17.  The applicants\u2019 requests for the rectification of the decisions were furthermore rejected and the judgments became final on 28 September 2006 and 3 October 2006 respectively. 18.  On an unknown date the University paid compensation to the second applicant for her plot of land.", "references": ["7", "2", "8", "5", "1", "4", "0", "6", "9", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "10.  The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Bucharest. 11.  From 1 August 2004 to 6 August 2007 he was employed in the Bucharest office of S., a Romanian private company (\u201cthe employer\u201d), as a sales engineer. At his employer\u2019s request, for the purpose of responding to customers\u2019 enquiries, he created an instant messaging account using Yahoo Messenger, an online chat service offering real-time text transmission over the internet. He already had another personal Yahoo Messenger account. 12.  The employer\u2019s internal regulations prohibited the use of company resources by employees in the following terms:\nArticle 50\n\u201cAny disturbance of order and discipline on company premises shall be strictly forbidden, in particular:\n...\n\u2013 ... personal use of computers, photocopiers, telephones or telex or fax machines.\u201d 13.  The regulations did not contain any reference to the possibility for the employer to monitor employees\u2019 communications. 14.  It appears from documents submitted by the Government that the applicant had been informed of the employer\u2019s internal regulations and had signed a copy of them on 20 December 2006 after acquainting himself with their contents. 15.  On 3 July 2007 the Bucharest office received and circulated among all its employees an information notice that had been drawn up and sent by the Cluj head office on 26 June 2007. The employer asked employees to acquaint themselves with the notice and to sign a copy of it. The relevant parts of the notice read as follows:\n\u201c1.  ... Time spent in the company must be quality time for everyone! Come to work to deal with company and professional matters, and not your own personal problems! Don\u2019t spend your time using the internet, the phone or the fax machine for matters unconnected to work or your duties. This is what [elementary education], common sense and the law dictate! The employer has a duty to supervise and monitor employees\u2019 work and to take punitive measures against anyone at fault!\nYour misconduct will be carefully monitored and punished! 2.  Because of repeated [disciplinary] offences vis-\u00e0-vis her superior, [as well as] her private use of the internet, the telephone and the photocopier, her negligence and her failure to perform her duties, Ms B.A. was dismissed on disciplinary grounds! Take a lesson from her bad example! Don\u2019t make the same mistakes! 3.  Have a careful read of the collective labour agreement, the company\u2019s internal regulations, your job description and the employment contract you have signed! These are the basis of our collaboration! Between employer and employee! ...\u201d 16.  It also appears from the documents submitted by the Government, including the employer\u2019s attendance register, that the applicant acquainted himself with the notice and signed it between 3 and 13 July 2007. 17.  In addition, it transpires that from 5 to 13 July 2007 the employer recorded the applicant\u2019s Yahoo Messenger communications in real time. 18.  On 13 July 2007 at 4.30 p.m. the applicant was summoned by his employer to give an explanation. In the relevant notice he was informed that his Yahoo Messenger communications had been monitored and that there was evidence that he had used the internet for personal purposes, in breach of the internal regulations. Charts were attached indicating that his internet activity was greater than that of his colleagues. At that stage, he was not informed whether the monitoring of his communications had also concerned their content. The notice was worded as follows:\n\u201cPlease explain why you are using company resources (internet connection, Messenger) for personal purposes during working hours, as shown by the attached charts.\u201d 19.  On the same day, the applicant informed the employer in writing that he had used Yahoo Messenger for work-related purposes only. 20.  At 5.20 p.m. the employer again summoned him to give an explanation in a notice worded as follows:\n\u201cPlease explain why the entire correspondence you exchanged between 5 to 12 July 2007 using the S. Bucharest [internet] site ID had a private purpose, as shown by the attached forty-five pages.\u201d 21.  The forty-five pages mentioned in the notice consisted of a transcript of the messages which the applicant had exchanged with his brother and his fianc\u00e9e during the period when he had been monitored; the messages related to personal matters and some were of an intimate nature. The transcript also included five messages that the applicant had exchanged with his fianc\u00e9e using his personal Yahoo Messenger account; these messages did not contain any intimate information. 22.  Also on 13 July, the applicant informed the employer in writing that in his view it had committed a criminal offence, namely breaching the secrecy of correspondence. 23.  On 1 August 2007 the employer terminated the applicant\u2019s contract of employment. 24.  The applicant challenged his dismissal in an application to the Bucharest County Court (\u201cthe County Court\u201d). He asked the court, firstly, to set aside the dismissal; secondly, to order his employer to pay him the amounts he was owed in respect of wages and any other entitlements and to reinstate him in his post; and thirdly, to order the employer to pay him 100,000 Romanian lei (approximately 30,000 euros) in damages for the harm resulting from the manner of his dismissal, and to reimburse his costs and expenses. 25.  As to the merits, relying on Copland v. the United Kingdom (no. 62617/00, \u00a7\u00a7 43-44, ECHR 2007\u2011I), he argued that an employee\u2019s telephone and email communications from the workplace were covered by the notions of \u201cprivate life\u201d and \u201ccorrespondence\u201d and were therefore protected by Article 8 of the Convention. He also submitted that the decision to dismiss him was unlawful and that by monitoring his communications and accessing their contents his employer had infringed criminal law. 26.  With regard specifically to the harm he claimed to have suffered, the applicant noted the manner of his dismissal and alleged that he had been subjected to harassment by his employer through the monitoring of his communications and the disclosure of their contents \u201cto colleagues who were involved in one way or another in the dismissal procedure\u201d. 27.  The applicant submitted evidence including a full copy of the transcript of his Yahoo Messenger communications and a copy of the information notice (see paragraph 15 above). 28.  In a judgment of 7 December 2007 the County Court rejected the applicant\u2019s application and confirmed that his dismissal had been lawful. The relevant parts of the judgment read as follows:\n\u201cThe procedure for conducting a disciplinary investigation is expressly regulated by the provisions of Article 267 of the Labour Code.\nIn the instant case it has been shown, through the written documents included in the file, that the employer conducted the disciplinary investigation in respect of the applicant by twice summoning him in writing to explain himself [and] specifying the subject, date, time and place of the interview, and that the applicant had the opportunity to submit arguments in his defence regarding his alleged acts, as is clear from the two explanatory notices included in the file (see copies on sheets 89 and 91).\nThe court takes the view that the monitoring of the internet conversations in which the employee took part using the Yahoo Messenger software on the company\u2019s computer during working hours \u2013 regardless of whether or not the employer\u2019s actions were illegal in terms of criminal law \u2013 cannot undermine the validity of the disciplinary proceedings in the instant case.\nThe fact that the provisions containing the requirement to interview the suspect (\u00eenvinuitul) in a case of alleged misconduct and to examine the arguments submitted in that person\u2019s defence prior to the decision on a sanction are couched in imperative terms highlights the legislature\u2019s intention to make respect for the rights of the defence a prerequisite for the validity of the decision on the sanction.\nIn the present case, since the employee maintained during the disciplinary investigation that he had not used Yahoo Messenger for personal purposes but in order to advise customers on the products being sold by his employer, the court takes the view that an inspection of the content of the [applicant\u2019s] conversations was the only way in which the employer could ascertain the validity of his arguments.\nThe employer\u2019s right to monitor (monitoriza) employees in the workplace, [particularly] as regards their use of company computers, forms part of the broader right, governed by the provisions of Article 40 (d) of the Labour Code, to supervise how employees perform their professional tasks.\nGiven that it has been shown that the employees\u2019 attention had been drawn to the fact that, shortly before the applicant\u2019s disciplinary sanction, another employee had been dismissed for using the internet, the telephone and the photocopier for personal purposes, and that the employees had been warned that their activities were being monitored (see notice no. 2316 of 3 July 2007, which the applicant had signed [after] acquainting himself with it \u2013 see copy on sheet 64), the employer cannot be accused of showing a lack of transparency and of failing to give its employees a clear warning that it was monitoring their computer use.\nInternet access in the workplace is above all a tool made available to employees by the employer for professional use, and the employer indisputably has the power, by virtue of its right to supervise its employees\u2019 activities, to monitor personal internet use.\nSuch checks by the employer are made necessary by, for example, the risk that through their internet use, employees might damage the company\u2019s IT systems, carry out illegal activities in cyberspace for which the company could incur liability, or disclose the company\u2019s trade secrets.\nThe court considers that the acts committed by the applicant constitute a disciplinary offence within the meaning of Article 263 \u00a7 2 of the Labour Code since they amount to a culpable breach of the provisions of Article 50 of S.\u2019s internal regulations ..., which prohibit the use of computers for personal purposes.\nThe aforementioned acts are deemed by the internal regulations to constitute serious misconduct, the penalty for which, in accordance with Article 73 of the same internal regulations, [is] termination of the contract of employment on disciplinary grounds.\nHaving regard to the factual and legal arguments set out above, the court considers that the decision complained of is well-founded and lawful, and dismisses the application as unfounded.\u201d 29.  The applicant appealed to the Bucharest Court of Appeal (\u201cthe Court of Appeal\u201d). He repeated the arguments he had submitted before the first-instance court and contended in addition that that court had not struck a fair balance between the interests at stake, unjustly prioritising the employer\u2019s interest in enjoying discretion to control its employees\u2019 time and resources. He further argued that neither the internal regulations nor the information notice had contained any indication that the employer could monitor employees\u2019 communications. 30.  The Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal in a judgment of 17 June 2008, the relevant parts of which read:\n\u201cThe first-instance court has rightly concluded that the internet is a tool made available to employees by the employer for professional use, and that the employer is entitled to set rules for the use of this tool, by laying down prohibitions and provisions which employees must observe when using the internet in the workplace; it is clear that personal use may be refused, and the employees in the present case were duly informed of this in a notice issued on 26 June 2007 in accordance with the provisions of the internal regulations, in which they were instructed to observe working hours, to be present at the workplace [during those hours and] to make effective use of working time.\nIn conclusion, an employer who has made an investment is entitled, in exercising the rights enshrined in Article 40 \u00a7 1 of the Labour Code, to monitor internet use in the workplace, and an employee who breaches the employer\u2019s rules on personal internet use is committing a disciplinary offence that may give rise to a sanction, including the most serious one.\nThere is undoubtedly a conflict between the employer\u2019s right to engage in monitoring and the employees\u2019 right to protection of their privacy. This conflict has been settled at European Union level through the adoption of Directive no. 95/46/EC, which has laid down a number of principles governing the monitoring of internet and email use in the workplace, including the following in particular.\n- Principle of necessity: monitoring must be necessary to achieve a certain aim.\n- Principle of purpose specification: data must be collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes.\n- Principle of transparency: the employer must provide employees with full information about monitoring operations.\n- Principle of legitimacy: data-processing operations may only take place for a legitimate purpose.\n- Principle of proportionality: personal data being monitored must be relevant and adequate in relation to the specified purpose.\n- Principle of security: the employer is required to take all possible security measures to ensure that the data collected are not accessible to third parties.\nIn view of the fact that the employer has the right and the duty to ensure the smooth running of the company and, to that end, [is entitled] to supervise how its employees perform their professional tasks, and the fact [that it] enjoys disciplinary powers which it may legitimately use and which [authorised it in the present case] to monitor and transcribe the communications on Yahoo Messenger which the employee denied having exchanged for personal purposes, after he and his colleagues had been warned that company resources should not be used for such purposes, it cannot be maintained that this legitimate aim could have been achieved by any other means than by breaching the secrecy of his correspondence, or that a fair balance was not struck between the need to protect [the employee\u2019s] privacy and the employer\u2019s right to supervise the operation of its business.\n...\nAccordingly, having regard to the considerations set out above, the court finds that the decision of the first-instance court is lawful and well-founded and that the appeal is unfounded; it must therefore be dismissed, in accordance with the provisions of Article 312 \u00a7 1 of the C[ode of] Civ[il] Pr[ocedure].\u201d 31.  In the meantime, on 18 September 2007 the applicant had lodged a criminal complaint against the statutory representatives of S., alleging a breach of the secrecy of correspondence. On 9 May 2012 the Directorate for Investigating Organised Crime and Terrorism (DIICOT) of the prosecutor\u2019s office attached to the Supreme Court of Cassation and Justice ruled that there was no case to answer, on the grounds that the company was the owner of the computer system and the internet connection and could therefore monitor its employees\u2019 internet activity and use the information stored on the server, and in view of the prohibition on personal use of the IT systems, as a result of which the monitoring had been foreseeable. The applicant did not avail himself of the opportunity provided for by the applicable procedural rules to challenge the prosecuting authorities\u2019 decision in the domestic courts.", "references": ["3", "2", "8", "0", "5", "6", "9", "7", "1", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant is a privately owned company which was established in 1989 and registered in Belgrade. 6.  On 9 September 2003 the applicant and Beranka AD, a socially\u2011owned company, concluded a guarantee agreement. To secure the payment of obligations under this agreement, the applicant and Beranka AD concluded Annex No. 1 on the fiduciary transfer of the latter\u2019s property to the applicant (Anex br. 1 Ugovora o fiducijarnom prenosu prava svojine). In this Annex, the property offered as collateral was: (a) property no. 6 \u2013 storehouse (magacin); (b) property no. 29 \u2013 power plant (energana); (c) property no. 30 \u2013 boiler-room (kotlovnica); (d) property no. 9 \u2013 laboratory (laboratorija); and (e) property PM2 \u2013 paper machines (papir ma\u0161ine). 7.  On 31 October 2003 the fiduciary transfer of Beranka AD\u2019s property to the applicant was registered by the Real Estate Office in Berane (Direkcija za nekretnine, Podru\u010dna jedinica Berane). 8.  On 8 April 2004 the Commercial Court in Bijelo Polje (Privredni sud u Bijelom Polju) opened insolvency proceedings in respect of Beranka AD. 9.  On 5 June 2004 the applicant reported its claim in these proceedings. 10.  On 17 September 2004 the Commercial Court refused to recognise this claim. 11.  Following the decision of 17 September 2004, on 11 October 2004 the insolvency administrator for Beranka AD (ste\u010dajni upravnik) lodged a request with the Real Estate Office in Berane seeking that the registration of the fiduciary transfer of property to the applicant be erased. On the same day the Real Estate Office Registry accepted this request. 12.  On 5 November 2004 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Real Estate Department in Berane (Uprava za nekretnine Podru\u010dna jedinica Berane). On 26 November 2004 the Real Estate Department amended the said decision. 13.  On 13 April 2005 the Real Estate Department in Podgorica (Uprava za nekrentine u Podgorici) quashed both decisions on appeal and remitted the case for reconsideration. 14.  On 1 June 2005 the Real Estate Department in Berane re-registered the fiduciary transfer on properties nos. 6 and 9, as well as on PM2, but refused to re-register the fiduciary transfer on properties nos. 29 and 30. 15.  On 22 November 2005 the Real Estate Department in Podgorica upheld this decision. 16.  The applicant appealed to the Administrative Court. On 6 February 2007 the Administrative Court quashed the decision of the Real Estate Department in Podgorica and remitted case to the Real Estate Department in Berane. It would appear that the case is still pending before that body. 17.  On 11 April 2007 the Administrative Court issued an enforcement decision ordering the registration of the applicant\u2019s fiduciary rights in respect of all properties. 18.  Following the Commercial Court\u2019s decision of 17 September 2004 (see paragraph 10 above), the applicant lodged an objection. The hearings concerning the objection were held on 11 August 2004, 31 May 2005 and 17 April 2006. On 24 August 2006 the Commercial Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s objection. 19.  On 17 January 2007 the Real Estate Department in Berane again erased the fiduciary transfer of Beranka AD\u2019s property from the public register. On 24 February 2007 the applicant lodged an appeal against this decision. 20.  On 3 September 2007 the Ministry of Finance upheld the decision of the Real Estate Department to erase the applicant\u2019s fiduciary rights. 21.  On 8 July 2008, upon an appeal by the applicant, the Administrative Court quashed the decision of the Ministry and remitted the case to the Real Estate Department in Berane for reconsideration. 22.  On 2 October 2008 the Real Estate Department in Berane ordered the removal of the applicant\u2019s rights on Beranka AD\u2019s property from the public register. 23.  On 9 April 2009 the Ministry of Finance quashed the decision of 2 October 2008 and remitted case to the first instance. 24.  On 8 April 2010 the Real Estate Department in Berane stayed the proceedings, because it needed some documents which were in the file of a case pending before the Commercial Court. This decision was quashed by decision of the Ministry of Finance and the matter was remitted to the first instance. 25.  On 26 October 2011 the Real Estate Department adopted a decision allowing the deletion of the applicant\u2019s rights from the public register. The same authority confirmed that decision on 2 November 2011. 26.  On 16 November 2011 the applicant filed an objection with the Ministry of Finance. 27.  On 9 July 2012 the applicant also lodged an appeal with the Administrative Court. On 30 November 2012 the Administrative Court rendered a decision in the applicant\u2019s favour and ordered the Ministry of Finance to reconsider on the applicant\u2019s prior objection. 28.  On 14 June 2013 the Ministry of Finance remitted the case to the first instance. The proceedings are still pending before the Real Estate Department in Berane.", "references": ["4", "8", "0", "6", "9", "1", "5", "7", "2", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1961 and 1960 respectively and live in Charleroi and Antwerp. 6. The applicants are the parents of Michael Tekin, who was born in 1978. 7.  The latter was detained in the psychiatric wing of Jamioulx Prison on two occasions, from 1 February 2007 to 11 July 2007 and from 17 May 2008 to 7 July 2008, that is to say for a total period of about seven months. On both occasions he benefited from discharges on probation. 8.  On 19 January 2009 Charleroi Criminal Court, sitting in private session, once again ordered the detention of the applicants\u2019 son under the 9 April 1930 Social Protection in respect of Mental Defectives, Habitual Offenders and Specific Sexual Offenders Act as amended by act of 1 July 1964 (\u201cthe Social Protection Act\u201d). During his detention in the psychiatric wing of Jamioulx Prison he was the subject of several disciplinary measures owing to his aggressive attitude to staff and other detainees. 9.  On 3 July 2009 the Jamioulx Prison\u2019s Social Protection Commission (\u201cthe CDS\u201d) ordered his discharge on probation and made him subject to medico-social supervision by attaching a number de conditions to his provisional discharge. 10.  By order of 7 August 2009, owing to his non-compliance with his conditions of discharge, the Public Prosecutor with the Charleroi Court of First Instance decided to return the applicants\u2019 son to the psychiatric wing of Jamioulx Prison. Michael Tekin was arrested on that same date and detained for insulting and threatening two police officers. 11.  On his arrival at the police station later the same day, he was examined by a general practitioner before being transferred in the evening to Jamioulx Prison, where he was examined by Dr S., who prescribed a sedative and a sleeping tablet. 12.  The applicants\u2019 son was then placed in an individual cell in an ordinary section of Jamioulx Prison. 13.  The course of events as set out below was established following the judicial investigation and proceedings and is undisputed by the parties. 14.  At around 9.30 a.m. on 8 August 2009 Michael Tekin was presented before the Deputy Director of Jamioulx Prison for his interview as a new arrival. After the interview, the Deputy Director decided to implement special security measures for a week. Those measures were adopted owing to Michael Tekin\u2019s nervous, agitated state and because he considered his detention to be arbitrary and was demanding his release. The following special security measures were ordered: placement in an individual cell, individual access to the prison yard, receiving visits in a booth rather than in the collective visiting area, use of plastic knives and forks, opening of the cell only by heads of section accompanied by two prison officers, accompaniment by a member of staff during the detainee\u2019s movements and implementation of special surveillance involving checks on the cell by a prison officer every fifteen minutes to ensure that nothing abnormal was happening. 15.  Prison officer R., who had accompanied Michael Tekin since his return to prison, was instructed to inform him of those special security measures in his capacity as head of section acting as a prison assistant. He was accompanied by two other officers, L. and D. 16.  On their arrival in the cell at about 11.30 a.m., Michael Tekin was just finishing his lunch. R. read out the special security measures ordered by the Director. According to R. \u2013 as confirmed by L. and D. \u2013 Michael Tekin provoked him by deliberately sneezing (or \u201cspitting\u201d, according to the Government) on him. When R. told the detainee to stop his provocative behaviour, otherwise he would be moved to an isolation cell, Michael Tekin moved up to him and placed his head so close to R.\u2019s that all three officers thought that they was about to be attacked. 17.  In view of Michael Tekin\u2019s reaction and his previous history, R. decided to place him in an isolation cell. He seized Michael Tekin by the scruff of his neck and D. grabbed his shoulder in order to whisk him out of the cell. 18.  R. explained that owing to the exiguity of the cell, he was unable to maintain his grip on the back of the detainee\u2019s neck and he decided to resort to a different stranglehold technique, which involved an \u201carmlock\u201d around the detainee\u2019s neck, while forcing him down to the ground. When Michael Tekin was face-down on the floor, he was still immobilised in an armlock by R., who was also leaning his full weight on the upper part of his back. Michael Tekin had allegedly then complained that he could not get any air and was suffocating. L. blocked the detainee\u2019s right arm; his left arm was already blocked under L\u2019s body. Finally, D. squatted on top of the detainee. 19.  Reinforcements were called in, and several more officers arrived on the spot. A total of about ten officers were now present. Some of them helped with keeping Michael Tekin under control while others remained passive. Michael Tekin was handcuffed and shackles were placed on his ankles. 20.  He was then lifted to his feet to be transported by two officers, including D., to the isolation cell. The officers\u2019 witness statements diverge on Michael Tekin\u2019s ability to talk and breathe on his way to the cell. However, they all agree that they had to drag him along, supporting him under the shoulders and then carrying him, and that his head was hanging down. The officers noted that he had urinated on himself. They had to carry him down twenty or so steps to reach the isolation cell. 21.  On arrival at the door to the isolation cell, the officers placed Michael Tekin face down on the floor owing to the narrowness of the door, and dragged him inside. Once they were inside the isolation cell they turned him over, only to note that his face was cyanotic. 22.  At about 11.50 a.m. the prison nurse received a telephone call to inform her that Michael Tekin was unconscious. She alerted the duty doctor and prepared the medical equipment. 23.  When the nurse and the duty doctor arrived at the inner security gate of the prison, an officer, who had been a witness to the events, informed them that the \u201cservice 100\u201d (the medical emergency service) and the SMUR (emergency ambulance service) had been called at about 11.54 a.m. A transcription of the call is included in the case file. 24.  Pending the arrival of those services, the duty doctor and the prison nurse began a cardiac massage at 12 noon, having noted that Michael Tekin was not breathing and had no pulse. 25.  The \u201cservice 100\u201d paramedics arrived at 12.15 p.m. However, they noted that the SMUR had not been contacted, and decided to request its emergency intervention. A \u201cservice 100\u201d nurse subsequently stated that they had been called for a straightforward assault and had therefore not been informed of the gravity of the situation. 26.  The SMUR arrived at 12.35 p.m. and Michael Tekin was immediately intubated and put on a drip. However, the doctor could only note that in the absence of electrical activity it was pointless to continue the attempts at resuscitation. 27.  Michael Tekin\u2019s death was recorded at 12.50 p.m. 28.  An inquiry was immediately instigated ex officio. The forensic pathologist instructed by the Public Prosecutor travelled to the scene of the events at 2.20 p.m. on the same day and noted very extensive cyanosis of the face and the neck region, and the presence of food products in the region of the nostrils and mouth. 29.  All the main witnesses were heard on the same day or in the ensuing days. 30.  At his first hearing on 8 August 2009, R. stated the following, as regards the prison officers\u2019 intervention:\n\u201cMichael Tekin arrived in prison yesterday in a state of high nervous tension. In fact the police officers accompanying him described him as very dangerous.\nOn arrival Michael Tekin was very worked up against the police. We took over and he calmed down.\nWe knew Michael Tekin from his previous detention, and so, for security reasons we placed him in an individual cell in the 9th section, cell no. 9229. According to my information he didn\u2019t cause any trouble during the night.\nThis morning Michael Tekin went to see Director [H.] for the \u2018incomer\u2019s report\u2019, as for every new arrival.\nI was present during this interview in the office used for that purpose.\nMichael Tekin started shouted about the police officers, calling them disabled and claiming it was their fault he was there.\nThe Director explained that he had to visit the CDS (the Social Protection Commission). Michael Tekin replied that he did not have to wait around and that he was going to fetch his keys in the cloakroom and leave. When we told him that was impossible, he threatened us with the words \u2018you\u2019ll get what\u2019s coming to you\u2019.\nKnowing that Michael Tekin had a capricious and unforeseeable character and had already attacked officers in the past, the Director imposed special measures on him such as an individual cell, opening the cell door by several officers, using plastic knives and forks, etc.\nHe was taken back to his cell by a number of officers, without incident.\nWhere special measures are ordered, they must be entered in writing and signed by the detainee.\nAt about 11.45 a.m. I went to his cell accompanied by [L., D. and C.]. Michael Tekin was eating when we went in.\nWhen I explained the measures to him, Michael Tekin got up and pretended to sneeze, spitting some of his dinner (vol-au-vent) in my face. I stepped back. Michael Tekin moved towards me and started sneezing again.\nI immediately told him to calm down and to spit somewhere else. He moved towards me again. I told him that if he did not calm down he would be moved to the isolation cell. He came right up to me, with his head against mine, and said \u2018I\u2019d like to see you doing that\u2019. I then grabbed him by the neck in order to force him to the ground and take him to the isolation cell. I should point out that I got him in an armlock before pushing him off balance.\nMy colleagues were holding him by the arms and legs. We called for reinforcements. While I was holding him I spoke to him and he answered \u2018I\u2019m choking\u2019. I relaxed my hold and told him that if he could talk he was not choking.\nMichael Tekin was gesticulating with his arms and legs. I would specify that I fell to the ground with Michael Tekin and he was on his side. In the end I was no longer holding him around the neck but exerting pressure on his head.\nThe reinforcements arrived and we managed to handcuff him. We lifted him to his feet in order to take him to the isolation cell. The reinforcements took charge of Michael Tekin, and I started following them up near the rotunda after I\u2019d got my breath back. Michael Tekin was no longer protesting, relaxing to the extent that the officers had to carry him. Arriving at the cell I realised that Michael Tekin was not pretending, as his face was turning blue. We called the infirmary and also the SMUR. Dr [L.] was at the prison, and Tekin was given first aid, including artificial respiration, for at least 15 minutes. He was also defibrillated. I stayed beside the doctor the whole time. The ambulance arrived and I stayed in the cell to help them. When the SMUR arrived I left the cell and waited in the corridor. From what I heard it was already too late. They hadn\u2019t managed to resuscitate him.\u201d 31.  Later on the same day R. was questioned again, and he added the following statement:\n\u201cI would point out that during my explanation of the reasons for the [special security] measures I noticed the expression in Michael Tekin\u2019s eyes changing and becoming more threatening, such that I was already on my guard when he got up.\nWhen he was there with his forehead pressed against mine, I moved aside and got him in an armlock, that is I placed my right arm around his neck and fell to the ground with him. You ask me if I exerted pressure on his neck, and I would reply that I did not press on the front of his throat. Once we were on the floor on the corridor side of the cell door I reduced the pressure. When he started to struggle again I exerted a small amount of pressure and slackened it immediately. In any case he was talking to me, as I mentioned in my first statement.\n...\nWe have not been trained in restraining detainees in critical situations. Following the events at Lantin we were given \u2018conflict management training\u2019, learning how to manage a conflict by talking, and especially how to prevent things getting out of hand. My answer to your question is that in the event of an attack by a detainee we just have to do our best to restrain him.\u201d 32.  Officer D. made the following statement:\n\u201cWe pinned Michael Tekin to the ground. ... I didn\u2019t hear Michael Tekin speaking, but I think he was trying to talk but nothing came out. ... On the way to the isolation cell I didn\u2019t hear him talking or complaining. ... I think he was still alive because several times I felt resistance in his arm.\u201d 33.  Dr B. carried out the autopsy the next day, on 9 August 2009. The autopsy report of 14 August 2009 concluded that the manoeuvres on his neck had caused injuries deep enough to fracture the right upper horn of the thyroid cartilage and that those injuries had been prolonged, because symptoms of asphyxiation had been observed. The report added that the loss of urine reported by the investigators pointed to the moment when the loss of consciousness became so deep as to inhibit the sphincter reflex mechanism. Such an inhibition could be observed, for instance, during the unconscious phases occurring in epileptic episodes. As regards the \u201carmlock\u201d restraint technique, the autopsy report stated:\n\u201cDuring the compression exerted by a forearm (acting as a lever, with the person standing behind the victim), the lethal mechanism is virtually identical to traditional manual strangulation.\nSuch particularly severe compression causes a bilateral vascular obstruction and a flattening of the upper respiratory channels against the cervical vertebrae.\u201d 34.  An investigation was instigated on 10 August 2009 against persons unknown on charges of grievous bodily harm having led to unintentional death. The applicants applied to join the proceedings as civil parties. 35.  The reconstruction of the events led Dr B., who had carried out the autopsy, to the conclusion that the cervical manoeuvres had been caused by the armlock applied by R., while the weight applied by L. on Michael Tekin\u2019s thorax had had a negative effect on the latter\u2019s respiratory mechanism and been conducive to asphyxia, his respiration being further hindered by the manner in which he had been transported to the isolation cell. 36.  By judgment of 20 March 2012 the Indictments Division of the Mons Court of Appeal committed the three accused, that is to say R., L. and D., for trial before the Charleroi Criminal Court on charges of grievous bodily harm having led to unintentional death. 37.  At the 24 October 2012 hearing before the Charleroi Criminal Court, Dr B. submitted that it was not impossible that the detainee\u2019s fall to the ground had produced the force leading to the fracture of the right upper horn of the thyroid cartilage and that it had been quite possible that the armlock had on its own been sufficient to bring about the fatal outcome. He was, however, unable to affirm that if the strangulation had ceased after the thyroid cartilage had been broken Michael Tekin would have been able to breathe again normally and survive, since the outcome would have depended on the injuries sustained previously. Furthermore, Dr B. took the view that the compression of the thorax and the fact that Tekin had been carried to the isolation cell were not, in themselves, sufficient to have caused his death. Finally, he confirmed that the version of events provided by R. during the reconstruction had been compatible with the medical findings. 38.  On 28 November 2012 the Charleroi Criminal Court acquitted R. The court held that R.\u2019s intervention had indisputably been a matter of self-defence, which ruled out any responsibility on his part. Having regard to Michael Tekin\u2019s personality and his nervous, agitated state, R. could reasonably have feared an imminent serious attack against L. and himself. The accused\u2019s reaction had therefore been absolutely necessary. The court accordingly considered that R. had react proportionately to the attack by applying a hold which he had learnt during training in the management of that kind of incident, and in respect of which nothing in the case file suggested that it had been wrongly executed. Subsequently, the continuation of the armlock had been equally justified and proportional in view of the fact that Michael Tekin had continued to struggle. According to the court, there was no objective evidence to suggest that the accused\u2019s actions had been dangerous, or that R. had used force not strictly necessary for the execution of the restraint technique. There was no indication that R. had known, or should have known, about the risk of fracture of the thyroid cartilage since that risk was not mentioned in the training programmes included in the case file; nor could he have been aware that in maintaining the hold he had been exacerbating the decrease in the oxygenation of Michael Tekin\u2019s blood, particularly since R. had not known what his colleagues were doing. Moreover, the court considered that R. must not have been alarmed by the detainee\u2019s reactions since he had continued to struggle and R. had regularly relaxed his grip to let him breathe. There was no evidence that the accused had noticed any change in the detainee\u2019s voice resulting from the fracture of the thyroid cartilage, nor, in any event, that they could have connected that putative change with any risk to Michael Tekin\u2019s physical integrity. 39.  The applicants, as civil parties, appealed against the judgment as regards its civil-law provisions. The prosecution did not follow suit. The appeal has been pending before the Mons Court of Appeal since December 2012. The Government submitted that the applicants had not requested notification of the hearing such as to facilitate adjudication of the civil-law interests. 40.  On 28 July 2014 the applicants lodged a criminal complaint, together with an application to join the proceedings as civil parties, against the three acquitted prison officers and three of their colleagues for failure to assist a person in danger.\nOn 9 May 2016 the Charleroi Court of First Instance, sitting in private session, declared inadmissible the application to join the proceedings as civil parties to the extent that it concerned the three prison officers acquitted by judgment of the Criminal Court on 28 November 2012 on the grounds that the facts were identical to those of the first set of criminal proceedings, and gave a discontinuance decision in respect of the other three accused on the grounds that the investigation had not uncovered sufficient evidence against them. 41.  On 1 August 2014 the applicants further filed an action for damages before the Brussels Court of First Instance seeking a finding that the Belgian State had been responsible for Michael Tekin\u2019s death and for the suffering which he had sustained owing to his placement in an ordinary cell instead of in the psychiatric wing of the Jamioulx Prison.\nBy judgment of 19 February 2016 the Brussels Court of First Instance declared the claim inadmissible as being time-barred. 42.  Furthermore, the Government submitted that the applicants had complained about the same facts in Turkey, Michael Tekin\u2019s country of origin, and that that complaint had given rise to letters rogatory addressed to the Belgian Public Prosecutor\u2019s Office by the Turkish public prosecutor of the town of Sivas. On 6 May 2015 the Belgian authorities had allegedly sent a scanned copy of the criminal case file to the Turkish judicial authorities.\nThe applicants, however, denied ever having brought proceedings in Turkey.\n...", "references": ["3", "9", "5", "6", "8", "2", "4", "7", "1", "No Label", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "4.  On 25 April 2008 the applicant arrived in Turkey legally on a visa valid for one month. 5.  On 24 April 2010 the applicant, who had been living in Turkey since April 2008, was taken into police custody while he was at Istanbul Atat\u00fcrk Airport. He made a statement to the airport police on the same day. According to the document containing his statement, the applicant was informed that he was suspected of lacking a valid identity document and of illegal entry into Turkey. He was kept in detention at the airport police station for the following three days. 6.  On 27 April 2010 the applicant was sent to Istanbul Kumkap\u0131 Removal Centre. According to the applicant\u2019s account, the centre was severely overcrowded at the time of his detention, which resulted in hygiene problems. The building was infested with insects and the quality and quantity of the food was also fairly poor. Moreover, there was no provision for outdoor exercise. 7.  On 2 June 2010 the applicant applied for release to the Istanbul Magistrates\u2019 Court. The court decided on the same day that it did not have jurisdiction as the applicant had not been detained within the scope of a criminal investigation. The court therefore ruled that any request had to be brought before the administrative courts. 8.  On an unspecified date the applicant made an asylum claim to the Ministry of the Interior and lodged an application for refugee status with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). 9.  On 25 June 2010 the applicant was granted a temporary residence permit in the province of Bilecik as an asylum-seeker and was released from Kumkap\u0131 Removal Centre on the same day. 10.  According to information provided by his representative on 4 January 2017, a deportation order was issued in respect of the applicant on an unspecified date in 2016. He has been detained at \u0130zmir I\u015f\u0131kkent Removal Centre since 20 September 2016 with a view to his expulsion. The domestic proceedings brought by the applicant against the deportation order and the applicant\u2019s application to the UNHCR for refugee status are still ongoing.", "references": ["4", "6", "5", "7", "3", "8", "0", "9", "No Label", "1", "2"], "gold": ["1", "2"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1972 and is currently serving a life sentence in Antalya. 6.  On an unspecified date the applicant went to the Mersin Security Directorate headquarters to complete certain procedures regarding the sale of his car and found out that a warrant for his arrest had been issued by the Antalya Security Directorate. 7.  Subsequently, at approximately 1 p.m. on 16 February 2004 the applicant went to the Antalya Security Directorate. It appears that at some point he confessed to his involvement in the shooting of a certain K.G. and as a result, at 4 p.m. the same day he took part in a photo identification procedure. According to a report drawn up by the police and signed by the applicant, the applicant turned himself in and confessed to his involvement in the shooting of K.G., which had taken place in 1992, and identified S.K., M.N.A. and A.Y. as his accomplices. There was no record indicating that the applicant had been advised of his rights, including his right to legal assistance and his right to remain silent, under the Code of Criminal Procedure in force at the material time. 8.  At around 5.30 p.m. the same day, the applicant participated in a reconstruction of the events (yer g\u00f6sterme). According to the record drafted by police officers and signed by the applicant, the latter described in detail what steps he had taken before the shooting, how he had shot K.G. in 1992 in Antalya, and how he had left the crime scene. There was no record indicating that the applicant had been advised of his rights, including his right to legal assistance and to remain silent, under the Code of Criminal Procedure in force at the material time. 9.  The police started questioning the applicant at around 6.30 p.m. the same day. According to the applicant, he was shown an arrest warrant, dated 19 November 1992, in which the offence was indicated as \u201cbreaching Law no. 6136 (the Firearms Act)\u201d and the deadline stipulated in the statute of limitations was \u201c2 September 1997\u201d. In this connection, the police officers told him that the offence for which he was being sought was illegal possession of firearms and explosives contrary to Law no. 6136. They said that any statement given by him was merely a \u201cformality\u201d, since the time-limit for prosecution of that offence had already expired in 1997. The applicant therefore agreed to give a statement. His statements were transcribed on a pre-printed form. According to this form, he had been reminded of his rights to remain silent and to be represented by a lawyer. It appears that the applicant had refused legal assistance, since the first page of the record includes a pre-printed phrase stating \u201cNo lawyer is requested\u201d with the applicant\u2019s signature underneath. He was thus questioned in the absence of a lawyer. 10.  The applicant was accordingly questioned at the Anti-Terrorism Department of the Antalya Security Directorate about his involvement in the PKK (the Workers\u2019 Party of Kurdistan, an illegal organisation) and the wounding of a certain K.G. in 1992. In his nine-page statement, the applicant admitted to his involvement in the PKK and explained in detail that he had shot K.G. upon the instructions of the illegal organisation. 11.  On 17 February 2004 the applicant was questioned again by the Antalya public prosecutor and the investigating judge. According to the statement drawn up during the questioning by the public prosecutor, the applicant had been advised of his rights again. However, the statement he gave was similar to his police statement. 12.  Before the investigating judge, the applicant was advised of his rights again. He stated that he did not want the assistance of a lawyer and repeated the content of his police statement. The investigating judge first ordered the applicant\u2019s release; however, following an objection by the prosecutor, he ordered that the applicant be placed in detention pending trial. 13.  On 10 March 2004 the public prosecutor at the Izmir State Security Court filed an indictment with that court and accused the applicant of carrying out activities for the purposes of bringing about the secession of part of the national territory, an offence under Article 125 of the Criminal Code. In his indictment, the public prosecutor also indicated that the applicant had turned himself in. 14.  During the hearings before the Izmir State Security Court the applicant was represented by a lawyer. At a hearing held on 4 May 2004, the applicant gave evidence in the presence of his lawyer and retracted the statements he had made previously. He maintained, in particular, that he had been tricked by the police into giving incriminating statements by being shown a paper in which the time-limit for prosecution of the offence he was accused of committing had expired. He denied his involvement in the shooting and rejected the accusations against him. The applicant further submitted that he did not know the co-accused, A.Y., S.K. or M.N.A. 15.  During the same hearing, the trial court deemed it necessary to hear from people who had been tried for the same incident in a previous case, no. 1996/9, namely M.N.A., S.K. and B.\u00c7., with a view to verifying the defence submissions of the applicant and his co-accused, A.Y. In this connection, the trial court ordered that the necessary steps be taken to find out in which prisons M.N.A., S.K. and B.\u00c7. had been held and ordered an enquiry as to their addresses in the event that they had been released from prison. The trial court further ordered that a confrontation take place once the witnesses had been located. It ordered that photographs be taken of the applicant and A.Y., one from the side and the other from the front, and sent with the reports concerning the case, in the event that M.N.A., S.K. and B.\u00c7. were located outside its jurisdiction. If they resided in the centre of \u0130zmir, they should be heard in person. 16.  The trial court also ordered that the address of the victim, K.G., be ascertained with a view to bringing him before the court, so that evidence could be taken from him in person. 17.  At a hearing held on 29 June 2004, the trial court heard evidence from S.K. as a witness. S.K. said that he neither knew nor had ever seen the applicant and A.Y. He did not have direct knowledge of K.G.\u2019s shooting and had given his previous statement as a result of information he had obtained from M.N.A. and B.\u00c7. The trial court reiterated its orders concerning M.N.A., B.\u00c7. and K.G. 18.  At a hearing held on 26 August 2004, A.Y.\u2019s lawyer submitted a medical report issued by the Elaz\u0131\u011f Psychiatric Hospital, dated 3 September 2002, which stated that M.N.A. suffered from depression. The lawyer accordingly asked the trial court not to call M.N.A. as a witness. The trial court did not respond to that request. 19.  Under Law no. 5190 of 16 June 2004, published in the Official Gazette on 30 June 2004, State Security Courts were abolished. The case against the applicant was therefore transferred to the Izmir Assize Court. 20.  On 19 August 2004 M.N.A. was questioned by the Siirt Assize Court, pursuant to a letter rogatory from the trial court. According to the transcript of the hearing at the Siirt Assize Court, M.N.A. was serving a sentence in the Siirt E-type Prison at that time. He explained that in 1992, together with the applicant and a certain A.Y., he had received instructions from the PKK and S.K. to shoot K.G. Accordingly, while he had secured the area, the applicant and A.Y. had gone to shoot K.G. He had heard gunshots but had not seen K.G. being shot. He further identified the applicant and A.Y. from the photographs. The Siirt Assize Court then asked M.N.A. to clarify the inconsistency between the statements he had given to the police and the public prosecutor in 1995 and those he had just given to the court. M.N.A. insisted that he was now telling them the correct version of the events. The court reminded him that in his statement of 29 November 1995 before the public prosecutor he had said that he had not known the accused, and asked him to clarify that point. M.N.A then explained that it was because he had been questioned as an accused on 29 November 1995. He repeated that he was now telling them the correct version of the events. 21.  On 17 December 2004, at the seventh hearing, M.N.A.\u2019s statement was read out. The applicant objected to the statement, referring to the inconsistency of M.N.A.\u2019s statements since 1995. A.Y.\u2019s lawyer also referred to the medical report in respect of M.N.A. and requested that his statement be considered as unreliable. The trial court did not provide a response to that request. It reiterated its orders concerning B.\u00c7. and K.G. 22.  On 17 February 2005 the eighth hearing was held, and the trial court again reiterated its orders concerning B.\u00c7. and K.G. 23.  At the ninth hearing on 28 April 2005 the trial court once again reiterated its orders concerning B.\u00c7. and K.G. 24.  At the tenth hearing on 12 July 2005 the victim, K.G. appeared before the trial court and gave evidence as a witness. K.G. submitted that he had not seen the applicant or A.Y. at the crime scene and that they had not been involved in his shooting. He gave a detailed description of the people who had shot him. 25.  On 4 October 2005 the Izmir Assize Court found the applicant guilty as charged and convicted him on the basis of the case file as a whole, including the record of the reconstruction of the events and the report of the photo identification. 26.  The court accordingly sentenced the applicant to life imprisonment, under Article 125 of the former Criminal Code, for carrying out activities with the aim of bringing about the secession of part of the national territory. 27.  On 14 February 2006 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment and remitted the case to the first-instance court in order to determine whether the terms of the new Criminal Code, which had entered into force on 1 June 2005 (no. 5237), were more favourable for the applicant. The case was thus re-examined by the Izmir Assize Court in view of the recent legislative changes. 28.  On 13 June 2006 the applicant\u2019s lawyer requested that the trial court bring M.N.A before the court in order to cross-examine him directly and arrange a physical confrontation between him and the applicant. The Izmir Assize Court rejected the request on the grounds that it had already examined and rejected the same request. 29.  On the same date the Izmir Assize Court, relying on the same pieces of evidence, once again found the applicant guilty as charged under Article 125 of the Criminal Code and sentenced him to life imprisonment. 30.  The applicant lodged an appeal on 3 July 2003, in which his lawyer submitted, inter alia, that M.N.A.\u2019s statements should not have been taken into consideration given the medical report on his mental state. He further submitted that the applicant had been deceived by the police and asked the Court of Cassation to declare his statements inadmissible and in contravention of Article 6 of the Convention. 31.  On 19 December 2006 the Court of Cassation rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal.", "references": ["4", "7", "9", "1", "6", "5", "2", "8", "0", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1980 and lives in Diyarbak\u0131r. 7.  On 17 January 2003 the applicant was arrested and taken into police custody on suspicion of membership of an illegal organisation. 8.  On 18 January 2003 his statements were taken by the police in the absence of a lawyer. The applicant confessed to being a member of an illegal organisation. He gave a detailed account of its structure and his acts within the illegal organisation. On the same day the applicant was heard by a public prosecutor and an investigating judge respectively. In these statements to the public prosecutor and the investigating judge, he denied his police statements and argued that they had been taken under duress. Following his questioning, the investigating judge ordered that the applicant be held on remand. 9.  On 28 January 2003 a public prosecutor at the Istanbul State Security Court filed an indictment with that court, charging the applicant under Article 146 of the former Criminal Code. 10.  State Security Courts were later abolished by Law no. 5190 of 16 June 2004, and the case was transferred to the Istanbul Assize Court. 11.  On 10 June 2008 the Istanbul Assize Court found that, inter alia, on the basis of the applicant\u2019s statements to the police, the public prosecutor and the investigating judge, the applicant had committed the offence under Article 314 of the Criminal Code and sentenced him to two years and one month\u2019s imprisonment. 12.  On 27 May 2009 the applicant\u2019s lawyer appealed against the judgment, arguing that the applicant had been convicted on the basis of statements taken under duress. 13.  On 3 March 2010 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of the first-instance court.", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "7", "5", "9", "6", "2", "8", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1949 and lives in Podgorica. 6.  The applicant was an employee of an export trading company with its seat in Ljubljana, Slovenia. Following the breakup of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, on 15 October 1991 the applicant\u2019s employer closed its office in Podgorica. In line with the domestic law at the relevant time, the applicant was entitled to compensation in the amount of 24 monthly salaries. 7.  On 5 October 1991 the applicant founded a trading company with its seat in his former employer\u2019s offices. On 25 March 1992 he submitted a request asking for a certificate which would make it possible for his new company to continue providing its services (rje\u0161enje o ispunjenosti uslova za obavljanje djelatnosti) with the Secretariat of Commerce and Development in Podgorica. On 3 October 1997 the applicant received this certificate from the Ministry of Commerce of the Republic of Montenegro. 8.  On 29 December 1998 the applicant lodged a civil claim with the Court of First Instance in Podgorica seeking compensation for the pecuniary loss suffered while he was awaiting the certificate. 9.  On 10 March 1999 the Court of First Instance ruled that it lacked competence to deal with the case and rejected the claim. This decision was quashed by the High Court on 17 September 1999 and was remitted to the Court of First Instance. 10.  On 30 April 2004 the Court of First Instance ruled partly in favour of the applicant. The High Court in Podgorica overturned this decision on 24 January 2008 and rejected the applicant\u2019s claim. 11.  On unspecified date in 2008 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court. The latter quashed the judgement of the High Court on 7 May 2008 and remitted the case. 12.  On 11 June 2009 the High Court again rejected the applicant\u2019s claim. 13.  On 4 March 2010 the Supreme Court upheld this decision. The Supreme Court\u2019s judgment was served on the applicant on 1 April 2010. 14.  On 23 April 2002 the applicant lodged a claim seeking payment of the 24 monthly salaries (see paragraph 6 above) against the Municipality of Podgorica and the Republic of Montenegro. 15.  On 5 February 2004 the Court of First Instance in Podgorica rejected the applicant\u2019s claim. The applicant appealed. 16.  On 9 November 2004 the High Court in Podgorica quashed this decision and remitted the case to the Court of First Instance for reconsideration. 17.  On 16 May 2006 the Court of First Instance again rejected the applicant\u2019s claim. 18.  On 27 May 2008 the High Court quashed the above judgment partly. It remitted the case for reconsideration in so far as the quashed part is concerned. 19.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law in respect of the part of the judgment of 16 May 2006 upheld by the High Court. The Supreme Court rejected this appeal on 3 March 2009. 20.  On 16 January 2010 the Court of First Instance rejected the applicant\u2019s claim in respect of the remitted part of the judgment of 16 May 2006. This decision was upheld by the High Court on 4 June 2010. 21.  On 18 January 2011 the Supreme Court rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law. This judgment was served on the applicant on 7 February 2011. 22.  On an unspecified day in 2011, the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal. 23.  On 19 April 2013 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal. This decision was served on the applicant on 28 May 2013.", "references": ["0", "9", "6", "4", "7", "2", "5", "8", "1", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1975 and is detained in Kahramanmara\u015f. 6.  On 19 November 2003 the applicant was taken into police custody on suspicion of membership of an illegal organisation, namely the PKK/KADEK (Workers\u2019 Party of Kurdistan/Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress). It appears that at some point the applicant confessed to committing an armed attack on a prison vehicle in Adana and, as a result, on 21 November 2003 at 3 p.m. was required to participate in a reconstruction of the events (yer g\u00f6sterme). According to the record drafted by police officers and signed by the applicant, the latter described in detail what steps he had taken before the attack on a prison vehicle in Adana and indicated how he had opened fire on that vehicle. 7.  On the same day, he was taken to the D\u00f6rtyol police station for questioning. The questioning took place between 8.10 p.m. and 11.50 p.m. the same day and 10 a.m. and 3.45 p.m. the following day. The applicant\u2019s statements to the police were transcribed on pre-printed forms, the relevant part of which was filled in to indicate, inter alia, that the applicant was suspected of membership of an illegal organisation and of carrying out armed activities on behalf of that organisation. On the first page of the forms there was a pre-printed message stating, inter alia, that the person being questioned had the right to remain silent and the right to choose a lawyer. It appears from the form that the applicant had refused legal assistance since the first page of the record includes a pre-printed phrase stating \u201cNo lawyer sought\u201d with the applicant\u2019s signature underneath. He was thus questioned in the absence of a lawyer. 8.  In his statement, the applicant admitted that he was a member of the PKK/KADEK and that he was active in the organisation. In particular, he gave detailed information about, inter alia, an armed attack on a prison vehicle in Adana. He also stated that his code name was \u201cH\u00fcseyin\u201d. 9.  On 23 November 2003 he was brought before the D\u00f6rtyol public prosecutor, where he partly confirmed and partly denied the content of his statements to the police made in the absence of a lawyer. Prior to this he had been told his rights, including the right to benefit from the assistance of a lawyer. He further stated that he was a member of the PKK/KADEK and had been involved in some of its activities in northern Iraq but had not taken part in any political or armed activities in Turkey. 10.  On the same day, an investigating judge of the Adana State Security Court took statements from the applicant. Prior to the interview, the applicant was informed of his rights under Article 135 of the former Code of Criminal Procedure. He did not ask for a lawyer. During the interview, the applicant stated that his statements made to the police and the public prosecutor had been correct. He maintained, in particular, that his statements made to the police in respect of the armed attack in Adana had been entirely correct. The court ordered the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention. 11.  During the applicant\u2019s period in custody, specifically from 19 to 23 November 2003, he was examined six times by doctors. The medical examinations conducted before and at the end of his custody period revealed no signs of ill-treatment on his body. 12.  Prior to the applicant\u2019s arrest, on 27 October 2003, a certain H.K., who was a co-accused, had claimed during questioning that he had organised the armed attack, acting with someone whose code name was \u201cH\u00fcseyin\u201d. Later, at the first court hearing, he retracted his statements to the police, alleging that they had been extracted under duress. 13.  On 23 December 2003 the Adana public prosecutor lodged an indictment, charging the applicant with the offence of breaking up the unity of the State and seeking to remove part of the national territory from the State\u2019s control, under Article 125 of the former Criminal Code. 14.  On 16 March 2004, at the first hearing in the case, the applicant retracted his statements made to the police, the public prosecutor and the investigating judge, alleging that they had been obtained through coercion and death threats by the police. He admitted that he was a member of the PKK/KADEK while denying involvement in the armed attack in Adana. When asked about the reports of the reconstruction of events, the applicant submitted that he had not accepted the evidence against him. 15.  State Security Courts were abolished on 16 June 2004 pursuant to Law no. 5190. The case was therefore transferred to the Adana Assize Court. 16.  On 10 February 2005 the applicant\u2019s lawyer applied to the court to have a certain F.Y. summoned as a witness and to hold a confrontation with the applicant, as F.Y. had stated in his witness statements dated 16 October 2003 that he had seen the perpetrators of the attack. He also asked the court to enquire of the banks as to whether there had been any money transferred between the applicant\u2019s father and H.K. The court dismissed the application concerning the attendance of a witness, on the grounds that the witness would not remember the incidents given the long time which had elapsed and that he would not tell the truth owing to the nature of the incident. It further dismissed the other request concerning the transfer of money, considering it not to be essential for the purposes of the case. 17.  On 11 December 2005 the applicant sent a letter to the trial court in which he explained the threats and coercion he had been subjected to in detail and asked the court not to take his co-accused\u2019s statements into consideration. 18.  On 22 December 2005 the Adana Assize Court convicted the applicant as charged. 19.  On 28 December 2005 the applicant\u2019s lawyer appealed against that judgment and alleged, inter alia, that the applicant\u2019s statements had been taken without notifying him of his rights and as a result of coercion and death threats by the police. The applicant\u2019s lawyer gave detailed accounts of such treatment and asked the Court of Cassation not to rely on these statements which had been obtained by impairing the applicant\u2019s will. 20.  On 12 October 2006 the Court of Cassation quashed the conviction for procedural shortcomings. 21.  At a hearing on 22 June 2007, the applicant\u2019s lawyer once again maintained that the applicant\u2019s confessions had taken by coercion and that the applicant had been forced by the police to sign his statements. He asked the trial court not to rely on those statements. At the same hearing, the first-instance court again convicted the applicant under Article 125 of the Criminal Code then in force, and sentenced him to life imprisonment. It relied, inter alia, on the consistent confessions of the applicant and H.K. made during questioning, which were later repeated before the public prosecutor and the investigating judge, and the record of the reconstruction of events. It also took into account the weapons, bullets and explosives seized by the judicial authorities and the organisational documents as well as the incident report, hotel records, an autopsy and expert reports, photographs, witness statements and investigation reports. The trial court\u2019s reasoned judgment did not contain any pronouncements as regards the admissibility of the applicant\u2019s pre-trial statements. 22.  On the same day, the applicant\u2019s lawyer appealed against that judgment and alleged, inter alia, that the applicant\u2019s statements had been taken without notifying him of his rights and as a result of coercion and death threats by the police. The applicant\u2019s lawyer gave detailed accounts of such treatment and asked the Court of Cassation not to rely on these statements which had been obtained by impairing the applicant\u2019s will. 23.  On 12 February 2009 the Court of Cassation upheld the conviction. 24.  On 18 February 2009 the judgment was pronounced in the absence of the applicant and his lawyer.", "references": ["7", "6", "8", "9", "1", "2", "0", "5", "4", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1952. At the time of lodging his application, he was detained in Berlin Tegel Prison. He now lives in Berlin. 6.  On 1 October 1998 the Berlin Regional Court convicted the applicant of dangerous assault. It sentenced him to six years and six months\u2019 imprisonment and ordered his preventive detention under Article 66 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 36 below). The court found that the applicant had stalked his former girlfriend, terrorised her and her family with telephone calls, sudden appearances and threats against their life and limb, had finally waylaid his former girlfriend in front of her workplace and had stabbed her twice in the neck with a pair of scissors with the intention of killing her. He had stopped short of stabbing his victim to death. Endorsing the findings psychiatric expert A. had set out in his report, the court was of the view that the applicant had acted with diminished criminal responsibility as he had been in a state of affective excitement and suffered from a neurasthenic syndrome at the time of the offence. The court found that the applicant, who had previously been convicted in 1975, 1977, 1981, 1983 and 1988 of comparable offences including dangerous and sexual assault and rape, committed mostly against former girlfriends at the end of their relationship with him, had a propensity to commit serious violent offences and was dangerous to the public. 7.  The applicant served his full term of imprisonment, which ended on 27 February 2005, essentially in Berlin Tegel Prison. 8.  The applicant was not released at the end of his prison sentence but remained in factual preventive detention without a formal decision of the competent courts for the execution of the preventive detention order under Article 67c of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 36 below), because the proceedings were delayed. 9.  On 15 June 2007 the Berlin Court of Appeal decided that the applicant\u2019s further preventive detention without a court decision ordering its execution was unlawful, and ordered its interruption. The applicant was released on that day. 10.  On 9 July 2007 the Berlin Regional Court ordered the execution of the applicant\u2019s preventive detention in accordance with Article 67c \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code as it was not reasonable to expect that the applicant would commit no further unlawful acts if released. It took note, in this context, of the view expressed by psychotherapy expert B., who had considered that the applicant\u2019s impulsive and offensive behaviour in the hearings in June 2007 had confirmed the finding in his report dated 15 September 2005 that the applicant was still dangerous to the public. 11.  The applicant appealed against the decision. He remained at liberty while the appeal was pending. 12.  While he was at liberty, he found a flat and a job and voluntarily started psychotherapy treatment with a female psychologist, So. He regularly attended weekly therapy sessions with So. and did not commit any criminal offences while at liberty. 13.  On 27 May 2008 the Berlin Court of Appeal upheld the Berlin Regional Court\u2019s decision. Just like the Regional Court, it based its decision on a medical expert opinion drawn up previously by psychotherapy expert B. and psychologist S. Expert B. had examined the applicant on four occasions between February and September 2005. S. had performed psychological tests with the applicant in March 2005. Both experts had issued their common written medical report on 15 September 2005 and had supplemented it with a further medical statement answering the questions of counsel representing the applicant on 20 April 2006. The original report was moreover based on the examination of the applicant\u2019s prison files and a large number of investigation files, as well as on an interview with one of his fellow prison inmates. 14.  In their written report, the experts came to the conclusion that the applicant suffered from a narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder. They were of the view that there was a very high risk that the applicant would reoffend because of his personality structure and could be expected to commit serious criminal offences mainly directed against potential female victims\u2019 physical and sexual integrity. The applicant had continually committed new offences while on probation, so that his probation had been revoked on five occasions. He had mostly committed crimes against the physical and sexual integrity of women and usually at the end of his relationships, when he had been unable to accept that his girlfriend had left him. Therapeutic treatment had not been successful so far. 15.  The court endorsed the findings of the psychiatric experts. It ruled that although the applicant had not committed any offences during his year at liberty, and although he had voluntarily and regularly undergone psychological treatment during that year, there was no reason to believe that he would abstain from reoffending. In the past the applicant had already abstained from committing further offences for longer periods. Situations similar to those in which the applicant had previously committed offences, especially against the physical and sexual integrity of his female partners, at the end of relationships, were likely to arise and to escalate again just as in the past. 16.  On 30 May 2008 the applicant returned voluntarily to Berlin Tegel Prison for the continuation of his preventive detention. 17.  On 2 September 2008 the Federal Constitutional Court declined to consider the constitutional complaint lodged by the applicant against the Regional Court\u2019s and the Court of Appeal\u2019s decision on the execution of the preventive detention order (file no. 2 BvR 1612/08). 18.  On 20 December 2012 an application (no. 12132/09) lodged with this Court in this context was declared inadmissible by a Single Judge in a procedure pursuant to Article 27 of the Convention. 19.  On 12 October 2009 the Berlin Regional Court decided in its first periodic review proceedings, in accordance with Articles 67d \u00a7 2 and 67e \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 2 of the Criminal Code in their then relevant version (see paragraph 36 below), that the applicant\u2019s preventive detention was to continue. It found that it was not reasonable to expect the applicant to commit no further unlawful acts on his release. 20.  The court heard the prison authorities which, in their written statement of 6 March 2009, submitted that the applicant was not willing to work on his problems and refused any therapeutic treatment in the detention centre. The court also heard the applicant on 25 September 2009. It further based its decision to extend the applicant\u2019s preventive detention on the opinion of psychotherapy expert B. and psychologist S. of 15 September 2005, supplemented on 20 April 2006 (see paragraph 13 above). It had regard to the fact that the applicant had been convicted fifteen times since 1971, including ten convictions for violent crimes. 21.  The Regional Court further dismissed the applicant\u2019s request for a new psychiatric expert opinion. It found that Article 454 \u00a7 2, read in conjunction with Article 463 \u00a7 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 37 below), only required a new psychiatric expert report as a basis for a periodic review decision if the court was considering releasing a detainee from preventive detention on probation, in order to ensure that he was no longer a danger to the public. The court held that, in accordance with the case-law of the Federal Constitutional Court (see decision of 3 February 2003, file no. 2 BvR 1512/02) and of the Constitutional Court of Berlin (see decision of 4 March 2009, file no. VerfGH 104/07) it was otherwise within the discretion of the court assessing the need to extend the preventive detention order to decide whether a new expert opinion was necessary. As a rule, an expert opinion would be necessary if the detainee suffered from psychiatric anomalies that demanded a psychiatric expert\u2019s assessment in order to be able to predict the danger he represented for the public. Otherwise, a new psychiatric expert report was generally not necessary unless special new circumstances demanded a new examination of the detainee. 22.  The court found that, in accordance with the legal standards described, there was no necessity to seek a new expert opinion. It referred to the arguments given in the Court of Appeal\u2019s decision of 27 May 2008, adding that there had been no significant changes since then. The applicant had refused to undergo therapeutic treatment within the detention centre since he had been returned to preventive detention. His age of 57 years did not warrant a different conclusion as regards the danger he represented in the circumstances of his case. The written expert opinion of B. and S. of 15 September 2005, supplemented on 20 April 2006 and explained by B. at two hearings, lasting a total of six hours, before the Regional Court in June 2007, was therefore still recent enough. 23.  The court was, however, of the view that the applicant should be allowed to continue his therapy with the external psychologist So., which he had not been authorised to pursue since his renewed preventive detention. The prison authorities should allow him to continue and organise escorted short-term leave for therapy sessions with his psychologist outside the detention centre. 24.  On 24 March 2010 the Berlin Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. The court considered that releasing the applicant on probation on the condition that he underwent therapeutic treatment outside the detention centre would be irresponsible. There were no convincing and verifiable indications that the applicant had tackled his offences or the flaws in his character that had led to them. The year he had spent at liberty during the interruption of his preventive detention did not prove otherwise, although he had not reoffended during that period of time. The applicant had already abstained from committing offences for longer periods of time in the past, but had nevertheless repeatedly committed serious offences against the physical integrity of his female partners when they had ended their relationship with him. Having regard also to the personality disorders leading to his dangerousness, the period of one year at liberty was therefore too short to prove that the applicant was no longer dangerous. In this regard, the court referred to the reasoning in its decision of 27 May 2008 and the expert opinion of B. and S. on which that decision was based (see paragraphs 13-15 above). 25.  The court further recognised that the applicant had voluntarily undergone psychological treatment once per week with the psychologist So. while at liberty. However, it considered that there was no proof of the success of this treatment. Instead, the impulsive and offensive way in which the applicant treated other people, notably those working in the detention centre, showed that his attitude and his character had not changed and that he was still unwilling to cooperate. 26.  Moreover the court found that, although the prison authorities had, without giving proper reasons, refused to grant the applicant escorted short\u2011term leave from prison, especially short-term leave for the purpose of meeting his external therapist So., such deficiencies in the execution of the preventive detention did not justify the applicant\u2019s release. The court recognised that prison leave was necessary in order to enable the applicant, in the long run, to prove his capacity to live at liberty again without committing further offences. However, the court was of the view that, even if the applicant had been granted the necessary leave since his readmission into preventive detention, the period passed since then would have been too short to prove that he was no longer dangerous. Therefore, the continuation of the applicant\u2019s detention was not yet excessive. 27.  The Court of Appeal was moreover of the view that the Regional Court\u2019s decision not to commission a new medical expert opinion was lawful and did not breach its duty to establish the relevant facts. As explained above, a new psychiatric expert would not be confronted with a significantly different situation to the one B. and S. had found when they prepared their expert report. The applicant\u2019s refusal to cooperate and to accept further psychological treatment within the detention centre showed that the therapy with So. had not significantly changed his character and behaviour. 28.  On 16 June 2010 the Federal Constitutional Court declined to consider the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint against the decisions of the Berlin Regional Court and the Berlin Court of Appeal, in which the applicant had alleged breaches of his constitutional rights to liberty and to a fair trial (file no. 2 BvR 903/10). 1.  The proceedings concerning the applicant\u2019s request to be granted escorted short-term leave for external psychological treatment 29.  On 24 March 2010, upon the applicant\u2019s appeal, the Berlin Court of Appeal, in a separate decision, quashed the prison authorities\u2019 and the Regional Court\u2019s decision refusing the applicant short-term leave to continue his psychotherapy treatment with So. as from October 2008. The court ordered the prison authorities to grant the applicant escorted short\u2011term leave at least every second week in order to undergo further psychotherapy treatment with the external psychologist, So. 30.  The applicant was enabled to attend psychotherapy sessions with So. until his relationship of trust with the psychologist came to an end in September/October 2010. On 9 December 2010 the Berlin prison authorities thereupon suspended the applicant\u2019s prison leave, finding that the applicant had repeatedly threatened So. On 29 April 2011 the Berlin Court of Appeal upheld that decision. It found that there was a risk that the applicant would use the prison leave to commit further offences, seeing that his dispute with So. resembled the situation arising in the applicant\u2019s past relationships with women prior to his committing serious offences against them. 31.  The applicant\u2019s subsequent requests to be granted access to treatment with the external psychiatric expert Dr P. in a Berlin clinic were turned down by the prison authorities, confirmed by the Regional Court. The Berlin Court of Appeal quashed these decisions on 3 November 2011 and 4 May 2012 and ordered the prison authorities to reconsider the applicant\u2019s requests in view of the court\u2019s findings. In its decision of 4 May 2012 the Court of Appeal found that, as it had explained in its decision of 24 March 2010, the applicant could not be obliged to undergo therapy in prison. The applicant resumed external psychotherapy in September 2012. 32.  On 22 May 2012 the Berlin Regional Court issued its decision in the fresh periodic review proceedings. It held that the execution of the preventive detention was to be suspended on probation as from 20 November 2013, ordered the applicant\u2019s probationary supervision for five years and ruled, inter alia, that the applicant was to avoid any contact with his former external psychologist So. and her family, as he had started to stalk her and threaten her with e-mails and telephone calls. 33.  The court, endorsing the findings in a new external psychiatric expert opinion issued by P., held that although the probability that the applicant would reoffend at liberty was still high, it would be possible to release the applicant on probation after a preliminary period of about one year if the pre-operational phase was mastered by the applicant without further problems. As the prison authorities had ignored and boycotted the court\u2019s orders to grant the applicant access to external psychological treatment for years in a way the court had never seen before and which it found to be unconstitutional, the applicant\u2019s interest in being at liberty now outweighed the public interest. 34.  On 12 October 2012 the Court of Appeal upheld that decision on appeal. It found that the applicant\u2019s immediate release was not to be ordered owing to the danger he represented. Referring to a report drawn up by expert D. in 2010, it stressed in that context that the fact that the applicant had not reoffended while at liberty in 2007/2008 was not conclusive of his not representing a danger. The applicant had previously committed offences in the context of relationships with women. However, he had not had such a relationship during the time he was at liberty. Furthermore, he did not have a right to choose freely his therapist. 35.  The applicant was released on parole on 20 November 2013.", "references": ["8", "2", "4", "6", "3", "1", "5", "0", "9", "7", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant, born in 1987, is the mother of two children, who are half-brothers. Her older son, born in 2008, was taken into permanent public care by the authorities in 2010 and placed with the applicant\u2019s mother and stepfather. Her younger son, X, was born in February 2012. The applicant has been diagnosed as having a hyperkinetic disorder and has had a history with psychiatric treatment. 6.  On 15 June 2012, after receiving notifications from the authorities and a private individual regarding the applicant\u2019s inability to take care of X, the municipal child welfare authorities decided to place him in emergency foster care. On 29 June 2012, that decision was upheld by the County Social Welfare Board (fylkesnemnda for barnevern og sosiale saker). 7.  The emergency placement was followed up by the child welfare authorities with a petition of 6 July 2012 to the Board for a public care order. The authorities requested that X be placed in a foster home and that the applicant be granted supervised access rights. Concerning the question of where he should be placed, the authorities essentially stated that the applicant\u2019s mother and stepfather had previously been approved as foster parents for the applicant\u2019s older son (see paragraph 5 above). However, the ability to cooperate was necessary for those wanting to be foster parents and there had been some conflict between the applicant\u2019s mother and the authorities. Moreover, the applicant\u2019s mother and stepfather were considered to be relatively old (having been born in 1962 and 1955, respectively) to serve as foster parents to a small child, and the applicant\u2019s mother had recently been ill. Furthermore, the applicant\u2019s mother had not made visiting the applicant\u2019s younger son her priority. In these circumstances, it would not be in X\u2019s best interest to be placed with his maternal grandmother and her husband \u2013 the applicant\u2019s mother and stepfather. 8.  The applicant objected to the request for an order of public care in respect of her younger son X and maintained that, if such an order be granted, he should be placed with her mother and stepfather. In her view, the child welfare authorities had not properly evaluated that possibility. Her mother\u2019s alleged inability to cooperate had in fact merely been a question of disagreement. The applicant\u2019s mother and stepfather had been aware of the applicant\u2019s difficulties and had helped her. They had also been approved as foster parents to the older son, who had developed well and had positive references from his kindergarten. Their age was not in itself of importance, given that other circumstances were in favour of their acting as his foster parents. To place X with them would be more stable and less stigmatising than an external placement. 9.  On 26 October 2012, after hearing the parties and ten witnesses, the County Social Welfare Board granted the request for an order of public care. It decided that X should remain in the home in which he had already been placed as an emergency measure. 10.  In its reasoning regarding the issue of the choice of foster home, the Board firstly noted that it was accepted that the applicant\u2019s mother and stepfather had been generally approved as foster parents in connection with the care order in respect of the older son in 2010, but that this issue had to be assessed in view of the current situation, taking into account the best interest of the younger son X. On the specific question as to whether it would be in his best interest to be placed with them, the Board stated the following:\n\u201cThe Board sees that there are many positive sides to a placement within the family network, which justifies that such a placement be considered. The Board considers that the grandmother and her husband in many respects are well suited as foster parents for [X]. [According to] the grandmother, they have been asked whether they [are willing to] adopt [the older son]. Placing [X] with his maternal grandmother and her husband would mean that [the two sons] would grow up together.\nAs the Board has previously mentioned, [X] may be inherently vulnerable. This is reinforced by the fact that the Board finds that it cannot be ruled out that the boy may have attention-related difficulties. Reference is made to the emergency foster mother\u2019s description of the boy\u2019s restlessness. In addition to the mother\u2019s diagnosis and her considerable difficulties, it has emerged that her brother has also been diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and has considerable difficulties. This means that there is a risk of the boy having the same type of difficulties.\nThe Child Welfare Service has referred to problems concerning cooperation between the maternal grandmother and agencies such as the Child Welfare Service and health workers. The Child Welfare Service in [the municipality] has also reported difficulties regarding cooperation. On the basis of the statements of the Child Welfare Service and the [younger son\u2019s] health visitor, the Board finds that there have been challenges as regards their cooperation with the grandmother. However, the Board finds no grounds for concluding that these problems have been as serious as they might have initially seemed, and the grandmother\u2019s explanations are to a certain extent plausible. The Board nonetheless finds reason to conclude that there have been some difficulties regarding cooperation.\nThe grandmother has seen that [the applicant] has not been capable of caring for [the older son], and she has also been concerned about [the applicant]\u2019s ability to look after [X]. In her statement to the Board, she still seemed to be uncertain about [the applicant]\u2019s ability to care for the boy. She nevertheless largely left [the applicant] and the child to themselves shortly after the birth while they were staying with her. The Board further remarks that the grandmother had not arranged with the Child Welfare Service in [the municipality] that [the applicant] and [X] were to move in with her and [the applicant\u2019s older son]. [The applicant] moved out of her mother\u2019s house, together with [X] after a short period, even though the grandmother realises that [the applicant] faces challenges as regards running a home. The Board has noted that the grandmother has not attended the contact sessions and thus not seen [X] since he was placed in care.\nThe grandmother and her husband are relatively old to be foster parents to such young children. [The applicant]\u2019s mother was born in 1962 and her husband in 1955. The Board considers it likely that [X]\u2019s placement in care will be long-term. Although age alone is not decisive in relation to the choice of foster home, it is a factor in the assessment. The maternal grandmother and her husband already have a foster child who is four years old, and it will require a lot of energy on their part to have another foster child ... who is also younger than the one they [already] have. Taking care of [X] could also affect the situation of [the older son], who they already have care of and must look after.\nThe Board has found that its doubts about placing [X] with his grandmother and her husband are so serious that the disadvantages outweigh the advantages. The reason is the uncertainty relating to the boy\u2019s vulnerability and the strain that another foster child would entail, regardless of whether or not this child has special needs, the grandmother\u2019s and her husband\u2019s age and certain difficulties regarding cooperation.\u201d 11.  On the basis of the above, the Board arrived at the conclusion that X should not be placed with his grandmother and her husband. On 27 January 2013 X was transferred from the emergency home to a foster home. 12.  The applicant appealed to the local City Court (tingrett), which held an oral hearing from 4 until 6 June 2013. In accordance with section 36-4 of the Dispute Act (see paragraph 22 below), the court\u2019s bench comprised one professional judge, one psychologist and one lay person. It heard fourteen witnesses in addition to the parties. The applicant was present, was represented by counsel, and gave testimony. 13.  In its judgment of 22 July 2013, the City Court upheld the County Social Welfare Board\u2019s decision in full. 14.  With respect to the applicant\u2019s caring skills and X\u2019s care needs, the City Court reiterated the findings of the County Social Welfare Board and the court-appointed expert. It concluded that there were beyond doubt serious deficiencies in the applicant\u2019s daily care of and personal contact with X, and that it was necessary to place him in public care. 15.   Turning next to the question of whether he could be placed with the applicant\u2019s mother and stepfather, the City Court observed that they had been approved as foster parents when the applicant\u2019s older son had been placed with them in 2010. It further noted that there were advantages to a child moving to a foster home comprising family members. X would in that case be placed within the family network. It had moreover been documented that the applicant\u2019s mother and stepfather might well be suitable foster parents for him. Furthermore, it would be an advantage that the two sons would be allowed to grow up together. 16.  The City Court nonetheless found that, in this case, there were no grounds for deciding that the applicant\u2019s younger son should be placed in foster care with his maternal grandmother and her husband. In addition to referring to the Board\u2019s assessment (see paragraph 10 above), the court quoted excerpts from the court-appointed expert, T.B., a specialist in psychology. 17.  The expert did not recommend the placement of X with the applicant\u2019s mother and stepfather. In the report she stated, inter alia:\n\u201cSeveral factors have emerged that may have a bearing on the assessment of whether [X]\u2019s grandparents can be his foster parents:\nFirstly, the grandparents\u2019 age has been taken into account in the assessment. The undersigned does not see this as a decisive factor.\nFurthermore, it has been emphasised that [X]\u2019s step-grandfather has himself mentioned that he is getting older, and that this may be perceived as an expression of doubt on his part. This has not had a decisive bearing on the undersigned\u2019s assessment, either. The child\u2019s step-grandfather comes across as an honest, responsible and reflective man who would be an excellent foster father for [X], even though he expresses some doubts himself.\nIn addition, it has also been suggested that the Child Welfare Service has had difficulties in cooperating with the foster mother in respect of [the applicant\u2019s older son]. To the undersigned, these so-called \u2018cooperation difficulties\u2019 seem to be nothing more than disagreements/challenges that the parties are capable of handling and working out. That is how the challenges are described by both the representative of the Child Welfare Service in [the municipality] and the grandmother herself. It must also be added that [the applicant]\u2019s mother and stepfather cooperated with the undersigned in an impeccable manner during the investigation. They have had many difficult challenges over the years, and it would almost be strange if there had been no \u2018friction\u2019 during all this time. This has therefore not had any bearing on the undersigned\u2019s assessment of the question of [X]\u2019s foster home placement.\nWhat has been important to the undersigned\u2019s assessment of this question, however, is, first of all, that [the applicant] has very different emotional ties to her two sons ..., in the sense that she seems to have renounced her role as mother of the [older son], while she must still be expected to make an effort to have as much contact as possible with [X]. This will necessarily be a problem for both boys if they are to live in the same foster home.\nFurthermore, there is good reason to believe that, if [X] is placed in foster care with [the applicant]\u2019s parents, this situation will ... represent an opportunity for the contact between mother and child to constantly increase in scope, and thus be a hindrance to [X] in his development of a good attachment to his foster home. For the undersigned, this concern is based, not least, on the fact that [X]\u2019s grandmother has clearly expressed to the undersigned that she primarily wants to be a mother to [the applicant].\nHowever, the argument in favour of letting [X]\u2019s grandmother and step-grandfather be his foster parents is of course the fact that [he] will then get to grow up together with his (half) brother. The undersigned is nonetheless of the view that this cannot carry more weight than the concerns mentioned above.\nThis means that placing [X] in foster care with his grandparents is not recommended.\u201d 18.  Expert T.B. had upheld these assessments in her report during the main hearing, but also stated that there were \u201cdilemmas\u201d if the applicant\u2019s mother and stepfather were to be chosen as foster parents. The City Court shared the expert\u2019s concerns. Moreover, it pointed out that the two children had different needs and challenges. Although the older brother, according to the information received, was happy in his foster home with the applicant\u2019s mother and stepfather, X, despite his young age, had experienced two broken relationships \u2013 firstly with his biological mother and then with his emergency foster mother. He had now formed an attachment with his new foster mother after he had moved into his latest foster home in January 2013. There would be a risk of \u201ccontact injury\u201d (kontaktskade) \u2013 that is to say a serious impairment to his ability to form attachments \u2013 if he were to experience another broken relationship. From the foster mother\u2019s testimony it was clear that he was developing well in the foster home and that he was happy and thriving. The City Court moreover emphasised the challenges associated with having two small boys of pre-school age living with people of the age of the applicant\u2019s mother and stepfather. In addition, there was the issue of the applicant\u2019s very different respective emotional relationships with the two boys, which also entailed special challenges, particularly if X were to be placed in foster care in the same home as that of his older brother. Overall, the City Court agreed with the County Social Welfare Board and the court-appointed expert that the applicant\u2019s mother and stepfather should not be the foster parents of the applicant\u2019s younger son. 19.  The applicant lodged an appeal against the City Court\u2019s judgment in so far as it concerned the choice of foster home. The High Court (lagmannsrett) refused leave to appeal on 15 October 2013, and on 3 December 2013 the Supreme Court\u2019s Appeals Leave Committee (H\u00f8yesteretts ankeutvalg) rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal against the High Court\u2019s decision.", "references": ["4", "6", "8", "9", "5", "3", "1", "0", "2", "7", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1945 and lives in Sofia. 6.  The applicant is a former prosecutor. For several years, until 2005 or 2006, he served as district prosecutor for Sofia, heading what has been described as the largest prosecution office in Bulgaria. While in that post, he got into a conflict with several of his subordinates, including B.K. and G.C. 7.  After the applicant left his post, a commission was appointed with the task of looking into the prosecution office\u2019s work under his management. B.K. and G.C. were among the commission\u2019s members. The revision carried out by the commission led subsequently to the opening of criminal proceedings against the applicant, as it was alleged that he had exerted pressure on one of his subordinates in relation to the outcome of a case. 8.  On 12 October 2006 the national daily Trud published an interview with the applicant, where he stated:\n\u201cAll my life I have fought against crime. What is more, I have tried to defeat the mafia present in the prosecution services. I admit that I have failed. And now I am bearing the consequences of that. The commission which carried out the inquiry [at the district prosecutor\u2019s office] includes exactly those prosecutors, [B.K., G.C. and a third person], who staged a revolt at the time against the working methods I introduced. The aim of those methods was to eliminate any grounds for corrupt arrangements related to the cases. That did not suit those three prosecutors and the notorious [prosecutor N.N.].\u201d 9.  Warned by the journalist interviewing him that his words were strong, the applicant nevertheless continued:\n\u201cI am saying things which will not surprise my colleagues. It is a public secret that one of the prosecutors I mentioned is known among barristers and \u201cclients\u201d of the prosecution not so much with his own name, but with another one.\u201d\nThe applicant then explained that the prosecutor at issue was known as \u201cProsecutor Rushvetchiyski\u201d (\u043f\u0440\u043e\u043a\u0443\u0440\u043e\u0440\u0430 \u0420\u0443\u0448\u0432\u0435\u0442\u0447\u0438\u0439\u0441\u043a\u0438), meaning someone who takes bribes, derived from the colloquial word for bribe, rushvet (\u0440\u0443\u0448\u0432\u0435\u0442). 10.  Asked by the journalist whether the Chief Public Prosecutor knew that, the applicant continued:\n\u201cIf he does not know, he may ask me. I am knowledgeable about corruption patterns. And because I respect his efforts to defeat these patterns, I will give him a well-meant advice: he should check the properties owned by the people accusing me of having committed an offence while doing my work.\u201d 11.  Questioned about a finding by the commission that a \u201cbad psychological atmosphere\u201d existed at the Sofia district public prosecutor\u2019s office while it was headed by him, the applicant stated further:\n\u201cThe inspection might be right, if by \u2018bad psychological atmosphere\u2019 they mean my intolerance towards those prosecutors ..., who performed their duties in a sloppy manner, or attended meetings with the lawyers of criminals to decide on the outcome of cases. There were such prosecutors at the [Sofia district prosecutor\u2019s office]. They became an organised group when the prosecutor [N.N.] came to work with us. ... The animosity between me and [N.N.\u2019s] circle, comprising the unhealthiest elements in the prosecution service, is well known. As are known from media publications [N.N.\u2019s] palaces, the companies owned by his wife in association with criminals. ... It is ironic that exactly those prosecutors which we at the [district prosecutor\u2019s office] called \u201c[N.N.\u2019s] guardsmen\u201d are in the group which is to check my work. Me being checked by Prosecutor Rushvetchiyski! Shame! And have the case files of the checkers also been checked?\u201d 12.  Asked then about the working methods he had introduced, the applicant stated:\n\u201cInstead of commenting on whether the working methods introduced by me have been effective, I will give you simple statistics. I took over [the district prosecutor\u2019s office] in 1996. During the previous year the prosecutors in it had drawn up 782 acts of indictment. 39% of those were remitted by the courts, and the acquittals were 12%. This means that the failures were 51%. The persons convicted were 768.\nNow pay attention to the statistics for 2004, after I introduced my working methods. Acts of indictment drawn up: 4,164. Only 8% of the cases remitted by the courts. Acquittals: 6%. Persons convicted: 3,594. I am not being smug about the obvious progress of the prosecution. On the contrary, I thought we could have improved even further. ...\u201d\nConcerning the working methods at issue, the applicants said further:\n\u201cThe aim was to make the police officer and the prosecutor work side by side, exactly as European experts are recommending. And to reduce the possibilities for corruption deals made in private ... But I do not want to talk any further. My frustration is enormous. You understand why.\u201d 13.  In response to a question by the journalist as to why he had not discussed the matter with the Chief Prosecutor, the applicant said:\n\u201cI don\u2019t know if there is any point. In fact, what [he] is doing now in [his office] is what I tried to do at the time at the [Sofia district prosecutor\u2019s office] \u2013 to sweep all the trash out of the house. I managed, to a certain extent, but at the end of the day many pieces of trash came to the surface. They are crushing me now. I hope sincerely that the same fate will not befall [the Chief Prosecutor].\u201d 14.  On 16 October 2006 Trud published B.K. and G.C.\u2019s response to the applicant\u2019s allegations. That article has not been submitted by the parties. 15.  On an unspecified date in 2007, B.K. and G.C. initiated a private prosecution of the applicant, alleging that he had insulted them and had committed the offence under Articles 146 and 148 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 24 below). They found the following statements particularly offensive: \u201cI have tried to defeat the mafia present in the prosecution services\u201d; \u201cthe unhealthiest elements in the prosecution service\u201d; \u201cmany pieces of trash came to the surface ...crushing me now\u201d; as well as his allegedly calling one of them \u201cProsecutor Rushvetchiyski\u201d. They claimed that the offence was aggravated because the insult had been made through the media and concerned them in their capacity as \u201cpublic officials\u201d. 16.  In the context of the criminal proceedings, B.K. and G.C. also brought civil claims for damages against the applicant, each of them seeking 10,000 Bulgarian levs (BGN) in compensation. 17.  The first-instance court, the Plovdiv District Court, heard a number of witnesses, who described the conflict between the applicant and B.K. and G.C. It also heard the applicant, who stated that when making the above statements he had not referred to either of the two complainants and pointed out that in the interview he had mentioned the names of two other prosecutors, in particular N.N. 18.  In a judgment of 5 December 2007, the Plovdiv District Court acquitted the applicant and dismissed the civil claims against him. It considered that it had not been established that the expressions complained of had indeed referred to B.K. and G.C. It found further that the complainants had seen the statements as being aimed at them, and had felt their reputation and dignity as being harmed, \u201cowing to their strained relations\u201d with the applicant. 19.  B.K. and G.C. lodged an appeal. In a final judgment of 22 May 2008 the Plovdiv Regional Court reversed the lower court\u2019s ruling and convicted the applicant, finding that he was guilty of insult in an aggravated form. It set aside his criminal liability but imposed an administrative penalty on him \u2013 a fine of BGN 1,000 (the equivalent of 510 euros (EUR)). Furthermore, it ordered him to pay each of the complainants BGN 5,000 (the equivalent of EUR 2,551) in damages, plus interest, and BGN 412 (the equivalent of EUR 210) for the costs and expenses incurred by the complainants. 20.  The Regional Court reasoned as follows:\n\u201cIt is a fact that the accused uttered the expressions indicated in the private criminal prosecution \u2013 \u201cmafia in the prosecution services\u201d, \u201cRushvetchiyski\u201d, \u201cthe unhealthiest elements in the prosecution service\u201d and \u201cmany pieces of trash came to the surface ...crushing me now\u201d. It is also a fact that the expressions were uttered in an interview, which was published and disseminated through the mass media \u2013 the Trud newspaper ..., in its issue of 12 October 2006. It is a fact that the complainants ... were named in their capacity as public officials \u2013 being prosecutors at the Sofia district public prosecutor\u2019s office \u2013 and in relation to their official duties.\u201d ...\n\u201cIt has been established that the complainants were aware of those statements, on the basis of the testimony [of the witnesses], as well as on the basis of the article in Trud published on 16 October 2006, and presented in the case, which contained ... their response to the interview of 12 October 2006 ....\u201d\n\u201cIt can be seen from the testimony [of the witnesses] that after reading the interview given by the accused ...the complainants felt that their honour and dignity had been harmed, which caused a feeling of humiliation ...\u201d\n\u201cThe accused\u2019s explanations show that he was aware that the incriminatory expressions were offensive and humiliating to those to whom they were addressed [and] the manner in which he disseminated them [shows] that he aimed to make them public and that they reach the complainants ...\u201d\n\u201cThe accused\u2019s claim in his defence, endorsed by the district court, that the incriminatory expressions were not directed specifically at the complainants ..., cannot be accepted by the appeal court.\nThe fact that [the statements] may have been directed against two other [prosecutors whose names were mentioned in the interview], and that those people may have decided not to prosecute the accused for harming their honour and dignity, does not alter the fact that the accused\u2019s criminal liability in respect of the two complainants must be engaged.\u201d 21.  The applicant paid in the amounts indicated in paragraph 19 above on 7 August 2008. The total amount paid, including interest and the fees charged by the enforcement official, was BGN 14,826 (the equivalent of about EUR 7,565). 22.  On 5 January 2009 Trud published an interview with B.K. and G.C., where they discussed the applicant\u2019s conviction.", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "1", "8", "0", "9", "5", "7", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in Aachen. 7.  On 20 April 2010 the premises in which the applicant ran a caf\u00e9 were searched, based on a search warrant of 2 March 2010 issued by the Aachen District Court. The applicant was found in a back room of the caf\u00e9, weighing and packaging some 400 grams of cocaine, with a sum of 2,325 euros (EUR) in the pockets of his trousers. He was arrested. 8.  The following day, the Aachen District Court issued a warrant for the arrest of the applicant on the ground that he was strongly suspected (dringend verd\u00e4chtig) of commercial trafficking of a substantial amount of drugs and that there was a risk of his absconding. It considered that the applicant could face a considerable prison sentence for the offences in question, that he did not have strong ties to Germany, that he was unemployed and living on social security, and that he could easily abscond to Turkey. 9.  At a detention review hearing on 5 May 2010, the applicant\u2019s counsel applied for the applicant\u2019s release on bail, stating that the applicant\u2019s family were able and willing to furnish the amount of bail to be determined by the court. The following day, the applicant\u2019s counsel withdrew the application after the court indicated that bail would not be granted. 10.  On 6 July 2010 the Public Prosecutor\u2019s Office lodged a bill of indictment against the applicant, charging him with three counts of commercial trafficking of a substantial amount of drugs. 11.  On 6 August 2010 the Aachen District Court decided to open the trial against the applicant. 12.  On 29 September 2010 the District Court convicted the applicant on one of three counts of commercial trafficking in a substantial amount of drugs and acquitted him on the other two counts. It sentenced him to two years and six months\u2019 imprisonment and ordered the continuation of his detention. 13.  On 30 September 2010 both the applicant and the Public Prosecutor lodged appeals against the District Court\u2019s judgment. 14.  That same day, the applicant lodged an appeal against the decision ordering his continued detention and asked for the detention order to be set aside or its execution to be stayed. He argued that there was no incentive for him to abscond. The strength of his ties to Germany rendered his absconding to Turkey unlikely. He had lived in Germany for twenty years, had been married for the past thirteen years, and had two children, aged eight and one. His parents and his brother also lived in Germany. His only tie to Turkey, by contrast, was his parents\u2019 holiday home. 15.  On 1 October 2010 the Aachen District Court decided not to grant the applicant\u2019s appeal against the continued detention order and to refer the matter to the Aachen Regional Court. It considered that it was possible that the applicant would be sentenced to a significant prison sentence on appeal. There was, hence, an incentive for him to abscond which was not counterbalanced by his existing social ties to Germany. In that regard, it noted that the applicant and his entire family had lived on social security since 2001, that his command of the German language was insufficient and that he had no prospects of employment. Considering that his wife was also a Turkish national, that his children were of a young age and that his parents owned a holiday home in Turkey, there was a risk that the applicant would abscond to Turkey with his family. This risk could not be adequately remedied by reporting requirements or payment of security. 16.  On 7 October 2010 the Aachen Regional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. It limited the basis of the detention order to the count on which he had been convicted and annulled it for the two counts on which he had been acquitted by the District Court. Yet, referring to the reasoning of the District Court and underlining that the applicant had no legal employment whereas he had family ties to Turkey, it considered that there continued to be a risk of the applicant\u2019s absconding. 17.  On 26 October 2010 the applicant lodged a further appeal against that decision. After essentially reiterating his earlier submission as to why there was no risk of his absconding, he stated that such risk could, in any event, be remedied by imposing a less severe measure. In that regard, he proposed that his family furnish security of EUR 10,000. 18.  After the Regional Court decided not to grant the applicant\u2019s further appeal and to refer the matter to the Cologne Court of Appeal, that court informed the applicant\u2019s counsel, in a letter dated 22 November 2010, that it was considering staying the execution of the detention order. It asked the applicant to clarify the offer made and requested that the necessary means be given to him by his family in a manner that allowed him to dispose freely of those means and to furnish the security himself. The lawful origin of those means had to be credibly demonstrated. 19.  The following day, the applicant\u2019s counsel informed the Court of Appeal that the applicant\u2019s family was able and willing to furnish security of EUR 10,000 to the court and to demonstrate credibly the lawful origin of those means. The family was, however, unwilling to put the money at the applicant\u2019s disposal as they were unwilling to run the risk of having the repayment claim attached for payment against future claims the authorities might have against the applicant. He added that, if the applicant had to assume that the security would be forfeited in any event, that is to say, even if he did not abscond, because the repayment claim would be attached for payment against other claims, the security could not effectively remedy a risk of his absconding. 20. On 3 December 2010 the Cologne Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s further appeal. It endorsed the assessments of the District Court and the Regional Court as to the risk of the applicant\u2019s absconding and noted that the sentence the applicant risked incurring was not limited to two years and six months\u2019 imprisonment, for the Public Prosecutor had appealed against the District Court\u2019s judgment, seeking the applicant\u2019s conviction on the two counts on which he had been acquitted. It stated that it would nonetheless consider staying the execution of the detention order if security were furnished. As long as the applicant\u2019s family was not willing to put the necessary means at his own disposal it was, however, not ready to do so, arguing that this unwillingness indicated that his family lacked confidence in him and concluding that the family ties appeared not to be strong enough to prevent him from risking forfeiture of the security by absconding. The Court of Appeal furthermore found that there was a risk that the applicant would commit more drug-related offences if he were released from detention and also based the detention order, by way of subsidiarity, on a risk of reoffending. The decision was served on the applicant on 9 December 2010. 21.  On 3 January 2011 the District Court\u2019s judgment of 29 September 2010 became final, following the Regional Court\u2019s decision to discontinue the proceedings in relation to one of the charges and the withdrawal of appeals by both the applicant and the Public Prosecutor. 22.  That same day, the Aachen District Court stayed the execution of the detention order against the applicant on a number of conditions, including that either he or another person furnish security of EUR 5,000. Upon the furnishing of that amount by another person that same day, the applicant was released from detention. 23.  On 14 April 2011 the Federal Constitutional Court declined to accept the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint against the Court of Appeal\u2019s decision not to stay the execution of the detention order against him, lodged on 10 January 2011, for adjudication, without providing reasons (file no. 2 BvR 155/11).", "references": ["0", "5", "3", "9", "4", "6", "1", "2", "8", "7", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Graz. He was the managing director and 80% shareholder of Ritz Baugesellschaft m.b.H. 5.  On 12 October 1998 the Graz Civil Regional Court (Landesgericht f\u00fcr Zivilrechtssachen) opened insolvency proceedings (Konkursverfahren) in respect of Ritz Baugesellschaft m.b.H. (hereinafter: \u201cthe company\u201d). These proceedings were discontinued on 14 June 2013 for lack of funds to cover the cost (Beschluss auf Aufhebung des Konkurses mangels Kostendeckung). 6.  On 15 April 2002 the applicant initiated official liability proceedings in the name of the company (case no. 20 Cg 79/02y) with the Klagenfurt Regional Court (hereinafter \u201cthe Regional Court\u201d) against the Republic of Austria, represented by the Financial Procurator\u2019s Office (Finanzprokuratur). On 5 June 2002 he filed a further claim in his own name (case no. 29 Cg 110/02y). In both claims the applicant sued the Republic of Austria for pecuniary compensation for allegedly unlawful acts and shortcomings of the Regional Court in the course of the insolvency proceedings, which had resulted in pecuniary losses. In addition to that, the applicant and the company requested a declaratory judgment (Feststellungsurteil) concerning the future liability of the Republic of Austria for any further damages arising from the insolvency proceedings. 7.  On 13 November 2002 the Regional Court rejected the applicant\u2019s claim filed in the name of the company, holding that the applicant had no locus standi because he could not dispose of the company\u2019s assets as long as the insolvency proceedings were still pending. 8.  On 28 January 2003 the Graz Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht) granted the applicant\u2019s appeal and referred the case back to the Regional Court. On 25 March 2003 the Supreme Court rejected the extraordinary appeal lodged by the Financial Procurator\u2019s Office. 9.  On 17 September 2003 the Regional Court held a new hearing regarding the company\u2019s claim, in which the parties agreed to suspend the proceedings, pending the outcome of other proceedings, apparently including the claim lodged in the applicant\u2019s name. 10.  On 20 January 2004 the applicant asked for the proceedings lodged in the company\u2019s name to be resumed and submitted a list of witnesses to be questioned by the Regional Court. On 7 April 2004 the Regional Court held a further hearing during which a building expert and a bookkeeping expert as sub-expert were appointed, the sub-expert to be consulted for any further advice. After that, the hearing was adjourned. The proceedings filed in the applicant\u2019s name remained suspended, awaiting the outcome of the resumed proceedings. 11.  On 2 March and 19 July 2005 the applicant filed requests to accelerate the proceedings (Fristsetzungsantrag) under Section 91 of the Court Act (Gerichtsorganisationsgesetz). In the latter request the applicant asked the Court of Appeal to set a time-limit for the delivery of the expert reports by the end of July 2005 and for the Regional Court to hold a hearing for the purpose of questioning further witnesses and discussing the expert reports by 12 October 2005. 12.  On 11 August 2005 the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s request under Section 91, finding that the Regional Court had not been dilatory; it also stated that the requested time-limits were unrealistic and that the applicant\u2019s request itself had caused further delays. 13.  On 15 March and 19 May 2006 the experts submitted their reports. 14.  On 29 June 2006 the Regional Court held another hearing to discuss the expert reports; eventually the court decided to submit the file to the public prosecutor to examine whether criminal investigations should be instituted against unknown offenders ex-officio and the proceedings stayed until such proceedings were terminated. 15.  On 21 February 2007 the applicant requested that the proceedings be resumed after the Graz Public Prosecutor\u2019s Office (Staatsanwaltschaft Graz) had discontinued the criminal investigations. 16.  On 28 June 2007 the Regional Court held another hearing and on 12 July 2007 gave its judgment: it partly dismissed and partly granted the claim. 17.  On 14 April 2008 the Court of Appeal quashed parts of the judgment upon both parties\u2019 appeals and, to this extent, remitted the case back to the Regional Court. On 16 December 2008 the Supreme Court rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal. 18.  On 31 May 2010 the Regional Court partly dismissed and partly rejected the applicant\u2019s extended claim as inadmissible after holding hearings on 7 July and on 18 November 2009. 19.  On 15 February 2011 the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal and on 28 April 2011 the Supreme Court rejected the applicant\u2019s extraordinary appeal on points of law.", "references": ["7", "6", "5", "1", "8", "9", "2", "4", "0", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1939 and lives in Vienna. 5.  On 28 July 1965 the applicant married T.G. They have two children, born in 1968 and 1977. In 1987 the applicant learned that T.G. had a relationship with another woman and in October 1990 T.G. left their common home. On 29 February 1996 the applicant sued for a divorce. On 28 November 1996 the couple was divorced due to the sole fault of T.G. by the Hietzing District Court (Bezirksgericht). This judgment became final. 6.  On 19 September 2005 the Hietzing District Court, after having held several hearings, divided the matrimonial property. This decision became final on 11 July 2006. 7.  On 2 August 1991 the applicant lodged a claim for spousal maintenance with the D\u00f6bling District Court (hereinafter \u201cthe District Court\u201d) and requested an interim order (einstweilige Verf\u00fcgung) for provisional maintenance pending the conclusion of the main proceedings. T.G. objected. 8.  On 15 February 1992 the District Court issued an interim order requiring T.G. to pay the applicant provisional maintenance. T.G. appealed. On 23 February 1992 the District Court appointed an expert to assess T.G.\u2019s income. 9.  On 16 June 1992 the Vienna Regional Civil Court (Landesgericht f\u00fcr Zivilrechtssachen; hereinafter \u201cthe Regional Court\u201d) confirmed the interim order, which became binding and enforceable. As T.G. did not comply with the interim order, the applicant instituted enforcement proceedings with the District Court. The enforcement was granted on 23 July 1992. 10.  On 9 November 1992 and on 18 January 1993 hearings were held. On 1 October 1993 the expert submitted his report to the court. On 13 June and 15 September 1994, 23 October 1995, 5 and 26 February 1996 further hearings took place. 11.  On 26 March 1997 the District Court issued a judgment partly granting and partly dismissing the maintenance claim. Both parties appealed. 12.  On 1 October 1997 the Regional Court quashed the District Court\u2019s judgment. 13.  The District Court held further hearings on 23 February and 27 April 1998. On the latter date it appointed a second expert to supplement the first expert\u2019s report. The second expert submitted his report on 11 March 1999. 14.  On 29 December 1998 T.G. requested that the enforcement proceedings be stopped, which was granted by the District Court. On 29 April 1999 the Regional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. 15.  On 7 May 1999 the applicant requested a fresh interim order for provisional maintenance and an interim order to prohibit the pay-out of money from T.G.\u2019s pension fund and the redundancy money (Abfertigung) he had received after retiring in April 1999. T.G. objected to this request. 16.  On 9 June 1999 the District Court ordered T.G. to pay the applicant 20,000 Austrian Schillings per month. It also barred T.G. and his former employers from drawing out money from T.G.\u2019s pension fund. T.G.\u2019s objection was dismissed on 19 December 1999. On 26 January 2000 the Regional Court dismissed T.G.\u2019s appeal. 17.  On 28 January 2000 T.G. requested a reduction of his provisional maintenance payment because of his retirement. On 25 May 2000 the District Court rejected this request. The Regional Court quashed the decision upon T.G.\u2019s appeal. On 19 October 2000 the District Court held a hearing. 18.  In the main maintenance proceedings the District Court held further hearings in May 1999, September 2001 and January 2002 and heard further witnesses. On 13 February 2002 the District Court asked the expert to supplement his report concerning T.G.\u2019s income for the years 1999, 2000 and 2001. The expert submitted his report on 1 April 2003. 19.  On 10 July 2003 private insolvency proceedings against T.G. were opened by the Salzburg Regional Court (see paragraph 33 below) and the liquidator requested the lifting of the interim order of 9 June 1999 concerning the maintenance payments (see paragraph 16 above). Thereupon, the maintenance proceedings were suspended. The applicant requested the acknowledgement of her claim of 632,253.65 euros (EUR) for maintenance payments in the insolvency proceedings. The liquidator refused to acknowledge that claim. 20.  On 14 October 2003 the District Court lifted the ban on the pay-out of money from T.G.\u2019s pension fund and his redundancy money, but dismissed the liquidator\u2019s request to lift the order of provisional maintenance payments. The liquidator appealed against this decision. 21.  On 23 November 2003 the applicant requested the continuation of the main maintenance proceedings. 22.  On 10 March 2004 the Regional Court rejected the liquidator\u2019s appeal. On 28 July 2004 the Supreme Court (Oberster Gerichtshof) partly granted the liquidator\u2019s extraordinary appeal on points of law. 23.  On 16 September 2004 T.G. requested a reduction of the provisional maintenance payments because of the private insolvency proceedings pending against him. The applicant opposed this request. On 21 June 2005 the District Court dismissed T.G.\u2019s request, and on 13 September 2005 the Regional Court confirmed the decision. 24.  On 20 September 2005 the applicant filed a request for the acceleration of the main maintenance proceedings (Fristsetzungsantrag) under Section 91 of the Court Act (Gerichtsorganisationsgesetz). On 7 November 2005 the Regional Court partly granted the request and ordered the District Court to hold a hearing within four weeks. 25.  On 9 January 2006 the District Court held a hearing. The applicant did not appear because she was in hospital. Her representative informed the court that she would be fit for questioning as of March 2006. On 24 April 2006 a hearing was held and the proceedings subsequently adjourned in order to obtain the statement of witnesses by means of letters of request from the Z\u00fcrich District Court. On 11 September 2006 the applicant asked to address further letters of request to the Z\u00fcrich District Court regarding more witnesses. 26.  On 21 March 2007 the applicant filed a second request for the acceleration of the proceedings. 27.  On 15 September 2007 the Z\u00fcrich District Court submitted a large number of documents containing T.G.\u2019s bank data. The questioning of three further witnesses took place on 2 February 2009. 28.  On 11 May 2009 the applicant asked the District Court to suspend the proceedings concerning maintenance payments as from the date when the insolvency proceedings were opened (see paragraph 19 above). On 17 August 2009 the District Court held another hearing and granted this request. 29.  On 30 March 2010 the District Court partly dismissed and partly refused the applicant\u2019s claim regarding maintenance until the opening of the insolvency proceedings on 10 July 2003 by partial judgment (Teilurteil). The applicant appealed. 30.  On 11 January 2011 the Regional Court confirmed this judgment. On 29 June 2011 the Supreme Court rejected the applicant\u2019s extraordinary appeal on points of law (au\u00dferordentlicher Revisionsrekurs), thus the partial judgment entered into force. 31.  On 27 October 2011 the applicant requested the continuation of the maintenance payments proceedings concerning the period starting from 10 July 2003 (see paragraph 28 above). 32.  On 23 June and 5 September 2014, further hearings in the main maintenance proceedings took place before the District Court. After several hearings were postponed, another one took place on 27 November 2015. As no information to the contrary has been given by the parties, the proceedings are apparently still pending. 33.  On 20 May 2003 T.G. applied for the opening of private insolvency proceedings (Schuldenregulierungsverfahren), which were opened by the Salzburg Regional Court (file no. 8 S 44/03y) on 10 July 2003 (see above paragraph 19). 34.  The private insolvency proceedings of T.G. are still pending. 35.  On 28 December 2011 the applicant filed a fresh maintenance claim with the Salzburg District Court (Bezirksgericht) against the liquidator as he had refused to acknowledge the applicant\u2019s claim in the insolvency proceedings. 36.  On 16 February 2012 the Salzburg District Court rejected the application after having held a hearing on 2 February 2012 because of res iudicata. On 25 April 2012 the Salzburg Regional Court quashed the District Court\u2019s decision. 37.  Several hearings were held between 10 September 2013 and 16 September 2014. On 24 August 2015 the Salzburg District Court partly granted the applicant\u2019s appeal. However, the applicant appealed, therefore these proceedings are apparently still pending.", "references": ["7", "5", "1", "0", "9", "2", "8", "4", "6", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant, Mr Piotr Budnik, is a Polish national who was born in 1980 and lives in Leszno.\nThe circumstances of the case 6.  The facts of the case were not in dispute and may be summarised as follows. 7.  The applicant was detained in \u0141owicz Prison from 27 January 2007 to 19 April 2009 (2 years, 2 months and 22 days). 8.  The applicant submitted that throughout his detention in \u0141owicz Prison he had been held in overcrowded cells in which the space per person had been below the Polish statutory minimum standard of 3 sq. m. 9.  The domestic courts established, without giving any further details, that the applicant had been detained in overcrowded cells during various unspecified periods from 27 January 2007 to 19 April 2009. The overcrowding led to many quarrels between the prisoners as the tables did not have enough space for everybody. 10.  The applicant was placed in a solitary confinement cell for fourteen days as part of a disciplinary measure, where the toilet was not separated from the living space. 11.  In reply, The Government submitted that the applicant had been held in solitary confinement owing to a need to monitor his behaviour. The number of stools and beds in all cells matched the number of inmates. All the cells were equipped with ventilation and heating systems. The applicant was entitled to one hot shower per week and one hour of outdoor exercise per day. 12.  On 12 May 2009 the applicant, represented by a legal aid lawyer, brought a civil action over an infringement of his personal rights on account of the inadequate living conditions in \u0141owicz Prison from 27 January 2007 to 19 April 2009. The applicant argued that he had been detained in overcrowded cells with space that was below the statutory minimum. He claimed 100,000 Polish zlotys (PLN) (approximately 25,000 euros (EUR)) in compensation. 13.  On 20 July 2012 the \u0141\u00f3d\u017a Regional Court (S\u0105d Okregowy) granted the applicant PLN 3,000 (EUR 750) in compensation and dismissed the remainder of his claim. The domestic court found that the applicant had been detained in overcrowded cells from 27 January 2007 to 19 April 2009. Moreover, he had been detained in a solitary confinement cell as a disciplinary punishment for fourteen days. 14.  On 1 March 2013 the \u0141\u00f3d\u017a Court of Appeal (S\u0105d Apelacyjny) amended the above judgment, increased the compensation to PLN 7,000 (approximately EUR 1,750) and dismissed the remainder of the action.", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "5", "7", "3", "6", "9", "8", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1967 and lives in D\u00fcren. 6.  On 27 August 2010 the Krefeld District Court issued a warrant for his arrest as there was a strong suspicion that he had been trafficking drugs. Earlier that day he had been stopped with 15.8 grams of heroin, which he had allegedly intended to sell. On two previous occasions he had been stopped at the German border with 11 and 12.5 grams of heroin on him. The arrest warrant was based on the risk of him absconding as he could expect a considerable sentence for the offences in question, had no social ties, being unemployed and a drug addict, and had an unstable character. That same day he was detained on remand. 7.  Between 30 August 2010 and 11 November 2010 the lawfulness of the applicant\u2019s detention on remand was examined eight times by the District Court or Regional Court. 8.  In a judgment of 6 December 2010 the District Court convicted the applicant of three counts of large-scale drug trafficking \u2013 two counts of smuggling drugs into Germany and trafficking (dealt with as a single offence instead of two separate offences) and a third count of trafficking only and sentenced him to two years and six months\u2019 imprisonment. On the same day, in a separate decision, the District Court ordered the continuation of the applicant\u2019s detention. 9.  On 8 December 2010 the applicant lodged an appeal against that decision. In substance he mainly referred to his previous submissions. On 13 December 2010 he lodged an appeal against the judgment. 10.  The District Court did not allow the appeal of 8 December 2010 relating to the applicant\u2019s detention and referred it to the Regional Court, which dismissed it on 15 December 2010, finding that there continued to be a risk of the applicant absconding. 11.  On 5 January 2011 the applicant lodged a further appeal against that decision. In substance, again, he referred to his previous submissions. He explicitly asked that the observations of the Chief Public Prosecutor\u2019s Office be sent to him so as to be able to comment on them. 12.  On 28 January 2011 the D\u00fcsseldorf Chief Public Prosecutor\u2019s Office (Generalstaatsanwaltschaft \u2013 \u201cthe prosecution authorities\u201d) submitted written observations to the Court of Appeal, requesting the dismissal of the applicant\u2019s appeal of 5 January 2011. 13.  The applicant\u2019s counsel received the observations from the prosecution authorities on 3 February 2011 and submitted a reply to the Court of Appeal on 10 February 2011. 14.  Following a telephone enquiry to the Court of Appeal, the applicant\u2019s counsel learned on 10 February 2011 that on 3 February 2011 it had already decided the applicant\u2019s appeal of 5 January 2011 and dismissed it. The applicant had therefore not been able to reply to the observations of the prosecution authorities of 28 January 2011 prior to the court taking its decision. 15.  That same day the applicant\u2019s counsel requested a subsequent hearing (Nachholung des rechtlichen Geh\u00f6rs) under Article 33a of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 16.  On 14 February 2011 the Court of Appeal\u2019s decision of 3 February 2011 was served on the applicant. 17.  On an unspecified date the prosecution authorities submitted written observations in relation to the applicant\u2019s request for a subsequent hearing. 18.  On 25 February 2011 the Court of Appeal dismissed the request for a subsequent hearing as inadmissible, finding that the applicant\u2019s right to be heard had not been violated, that the prosecution authorities\u2019 observations of 28 January 2011 had not contained any facts unknown to him and there had therefore been no need to serve them on him. In so far as his submission of 10 February 2011 was to be classified as an objection (Gegenvorstellung), the court rejected it because its decision of 3 February 2011 had not been based on incorrect factual or procedural considerations. Prior to the decision of 25 February 2011, the observations of the prosecution authorities relating to the request for a subsequent hearing had not been served on the applicant, who had thus had no opportunity to reply to them. The Court of Appeal nevertheless quoted and endorsed those observations in its decision. 19.  On 7 April 2011 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court. He alleged, in particular, that his right to be heard, as guaranteed by Article 103 \u00a7 1 of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz), had been violated, because the Court of Appeal had taken its decisions of 3 and 25 February 2011 without giving him the opportunity to reply to the observations of the prosecution authorities. 20.  On 28 July 2011 the Federal Constitutional Court declined to accept the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint without providing reasons (2 BvR 805/11). Its decision was served on him on 10 August 2011.", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "8", "6", "9", "5", "0", "7", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Novigrad. 6.  By a contract concluded in 1971 between a company, G.P. (hereinafter \u201cthe claimant\u201d), and the Novigrad Municipality certain plots of land were given to the former for its permanent use with a view to the construction of residential buildings thereon. These plots of land were registered in the land register as being publicly owned. In accordance with the contract, the claimant built residential buildings and sold all of them. 7.  During and after the construction of the residential buildings, the claimant instituted several sets of land register correction proceedings with regard to the land at issue in order to harmonise the record in the land register with the new situation. In one of the land register correction proceedings the Novigrad Municipality objected to the claimant\u2019s application for a correction and therefore on 2 October 2000 the Land Registry Department of the Buje Municipal Court instructed the parties to initiate civil proceedings. 8.  On 6 October 2000 the claimant brought a civil action before the Buje Municipal Court (Op\u0107inski sud u Bujama) against the Novigrad Municipality (hereinafter \u201cthe defendant\u201d), seeking that the data concerning the size of certain plots of land be corrected in the land register of that court. Specifically, it complained that during the delineation \u2013 that is to say the process of subdividing the larger parcels into smaller ones \u2013 one part of the plots of land at issue had been registered as a public good (javno dobro). In its civil action the claimant indicated the value of the claim as 5,000 Croatian kunas (HRK). 9.  Meanwhile, on 27 December 1999, the applicant and the claimant had concluded a purchase agreement in respect of the plots of land that surrounded the residential buildings the claimant had built and that were the subject of the proceedings instituted on 6 October 2000. 10.  On 23 October 2000 the applicant asked to join the claimant in the proceedings as an intervener since she had bought some of the plots of land at issue. 11.  At the hearing held on 14 June 2001 the Buje Municipal Court established that the claimant had raised the value of the claim to HRK 105,000 in its submissions of 4 June 2001. The defendant did not object to that valuation. After that, the defendant gave its reply to the claim on the record. Furthermore, the first-instance court adopted a decision allowing the applicant to join the claimant in the proceedings as an intervener because it held that she had a legal interest. 12.  On 25 February 2005 the Buje Municipal Court allowed the claim. 13.  Upon an appeal by the defendant lodged on 5 February 2007 the Pula County Court (\u017dupanijski sud u Puli) quashed the first-instance judgment and remitted the case for a fresh examination. 14.  On 26 May 2009 the first-instance court dismissed the claim as ill-founded. In its reasoning it stated, inter alia, that at the moment of the delineation of the disputed parcels the claimant had not had any right to the property at issue and therefore by its correction the claimant would have become an owner of the property which he had never been given for permanent use. Further to this, the court had assessed the costs of the proceedings according to the value of the claim set at HRK 105,000 at the hearing on 14 June 2001. It ordered the claimant to bear these costs. At the bottom of the last page of that judgment was a note stating that the case had been conducted and the judgment had been drafted by J.G., the court administrator (sudski savjetnik). 15.  The applicant lodged an appeal complaining, inter alia, that her case had been heard and decided by a court administrator who had not been authorised to conduct the impugned proceedings under the relevant procedural rules. She proposed that evidence be heard from J.G., as well as the parties to the proceedings and their legal counsel. The applicant further complained of the assessment of the amount of the litigation costs. She was of the opinion that the value of the claim was the one indicated in the civil action, namely HRK 5,000, which should have been taken into account by the first-instance court when calculating the costs. 16.  On 18 October 2010 the Pula County Court upheld the first-instance judgment. It held, inter alia, that the value of the claim was the one established at the hearing on 14 June 2001, namely HRK 105,000, because the claimant had increased the value before the defendant had begun litigation on the merits. Furthermore, the second-instance court in its reasoning had stated that the case file had shown that the proceedings had been conducted by a trial judge in the presence of a court administrator. 17.  The applicant then lodged simultaneously an appeal on points of law and a constitutional complaint. She complained, among other things, that her case had neither been heard nor decided by a tribunal established by law because the proceedings had been conducted and the judgment drafted and pronounced by a court administrator. She stated that the judge had not been present at the hearings and that the judge had signed the records of the hearings afterwards. 18.  On 14 October 2011 the Supreme Court declared the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law inadmissible ratione valoris, considering that the value of the claim did not reach the statutory threshold of HRK 100,000. It held, contrary to the lower courts\u2019 findings, that the value of the claim was the one indicated in the civil action because the claimant would have been allowed to alter that value only if it had also amended its claim at the same time. 19.  On 2 December 2011 the applicant informed the Constitutional Court that her appeal on points of law had been declared inadmissible and that she wished to add the Supreme Court\u2019s decision to her constitutional complaint. She argued that the Supreme Court had applied the relevant procedural provisions concerning the value of the claim in an arbitrary manner. 20.  On 29 March 2012 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint as manifestly ill-founded.", "references": ["6", "8", "1", "9", "7", "5", "4", "0", "2", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1971 and was at the material time serving a prison sentence in Rustavi Prison no. 2. 7.  On 9 August 2005 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of having robbed an individual of his vehicle, his mobile phone, and a sum of money while armed. He was placed under investigation that day and questioned twice. He protested his innocence, providing an alibi, and said that he had cancer and was undergoing treatment at an oncology clinic. The applicant was identified by the victims. Maintaining his innocence, he refused to sign the record of the identification procedure. 8.  During questioning on 10 August 2005, the applicant repeated his alibi and complained about his state of health. On the same day he was charged with theft and armed robbery (Articles 178 and 179 of the Criminal Code respectively). 9.  On 11 August 2005 the Mtskheta District Court granted an application by the prosecutor to place the applicant in pre-trial detention for three months. On 22 August 2005 the decision was upheld by the Tbilisi District Court, despite the applicant\u2019s submission that he was ill and would not attempt to evade justice. The applicant was placed in Tbilisi Prison no. 5. 10.  On 18 October 2006 the applicant was found guilty of the charges and sentenced to ten years\u2019 imprisonment by the court of first instance. 11.  The applicant appealed to the Tbilisi Court of Appeal. After examining the witness statements in the light of the other evidence, the Court of Appeal found that the applicant\u2019s alibi lacked credibility. By a judgment of 24 July 2007, it amended the judgment of 18 October 2006 in the part concerning the classification of the offences, but upheld the applicant\u2019s conviction and prison sentence. 12.  The Supreme Court of Georgia dismissed an appeal on points of law by the applicant on an unidentified date. 13.  In 1998 the applicant had an operation to remove a malignant tumour from his right testicle. He subsequently had chemotherapy on a sporadic basis. As the illness then returned, he had another operation in 2003. According to a medical certificate dated 4 March 2005, the applicant also suffered from chronic hepatitis C (HCV). 14.  Shortly after being placed in detention, on 20 August 2005, the applicant was transferred to the prison hospital. After confirming the diagnosis of chronic HCV and that he had been recently treated for cancer of the right testicle, doctors recommended he have a consultation with an oncologist and a special medical examination. On 24 August 2005 the head of the surgical unit wrote to the prison hospital\u2019s acting head doctor, informing her that the applicant needed to be examined by a urological oncologist at the National Centre for Oncology (\u201cthe NCO\u201d). He noted that the applicant was ready to bear all the costs himself. In September 2005 doctors again recommended he be seen by an oncologist specialising in urology. The case file shows that the applicant was not transferred to the NCO or examined by an oncologist. He stayed at the prison hospital until 4 February 2006 and, according to his medical records, he was provided with treatment for his symptoms, which consisted of pain medication. 15.  After several prison transfers and given that his health was still unsatisfactory, the applicant returned to the prison hospital on 25 February 2006. On 7 March 2006 an oncologist concluded after examining the applicant that the cancer had returned and that he also had pain in his left testicle. He had lost weight and the chronic HCV had worsened. 16.  On 15 August 2006, at the request of the applicant\u2019s defence, a group of independent experts submitted a report on his health. They diagnosed him with cancer of the right testicle at stage 1 B in clinical group II. The experts considered that given the degree of the tumour\u2019s malignancy the applicant\u2019s state of health could be considered as potentially serious. The rest of the tumour would have to be removed and the applicant given an intensive course of chemotherapy in conditions of stability. He would have to undergo check-ups every three months for five to seven years. 17.  On 2 September 2006 the applicant was sent back to Tbilisi Prison no. 5. The authorities refused a request for his return to the prison hospital sent by his lawyer to the director of the prisons department of the Ministry of Justice, the prison governor and other authorities. 18.  On 17 November 2006 the applicant was sent to the NCO for a course of chemotherapy. On 5 December 2006, before being discharged, the oncologist recommended that the applicant return after three weeks for a check-up and more chemotherapy. At the same time, in view of the further progress of the disease, he recommended that the applicant be placed under permanent medical supervision in the prison hospital. 19.  The applicant was put in the prison hospital from 5 to 16 December 2016, receiving treatment for his symptoms. On 16 December 2006 he was moved from the prison hospital to Rustavi Prison no. 6. Contrary to the oncologist\u2019s recommendations, the prison administration did not send the applicant back to the NCO after three weeks. 20.  On 5 April 2007 the applicant\u2019s lawyer lodged a complaint with the Tbilisi Court of Appeal, drawing the judge\u2019s attention to his client\u2019s poor health, caused by a lack of adequate treatment which, in his view, could lead to his death. He complained in particular about the fact that the applicant had not been able to attend intensive chemotherapy sessions, despite doctors\u2019 recommendations. The lawyer asked the Court of Appeal to order an expert report to reassess his client\u2019s state of health, determine whether the prison hospital was able to provide him with the necessary treatment and whether the conditions of his detention could have a negative impact on his health. It also had to establish whether the applicant\u2019s life would be put at risk if the authorities failed to place him in a specialist clinic. 21.  On 10 April 2007, the Court of Appeal, having received an objection from the prosecutor, rejected the lawyer\u2019s request and decided to summon the oncologist who had signed the recommendation of 5 December 2006. 22.  On 21 April 2007 the applicant was placed in the prison hospital. On 24 April 2007 his doctor concluded that the applicant required a transfer to the NCO for more chemotherapy. The doctor subsequently reiterated his recommendation, however, it was in vain as no transfer followed. By mid\u2011May the applicant\u2019s condition had deteriorated. According to his medical records, he suffered constant pain and regularly received strong painkillers. The doctor in charge noted on a regular basis in the medical record that the applicant needed to be transferred to the NCO urgently. 23.  In the meantime, in the context of the criminal proceedings conducted against the applicant, the Court of Appeal ordered that he be examined at the NCO. 24.  On 19 June 2007, the applicant was admitted to the NCO, where he stayed until 13 July 2007 in order to undergo a course of chemotherapy. At the same time a report concerning his medical condition was issued, which confirmed the diagnosis of cancer of the right testicle at stage 1 B in clinical group II. The experts held that the results of the chemotherapy meant that the applicant\u2019s state of ill health could not be described as serious. Nevertheless, given the malignancy of the tumour the cancer could return. Consequently, several chemotherapy sessions were necessary to consolidate the success of the previous treatment. In addition, the applicant needed check-ups in a specialist clinic every three months. 25.  He was then returned to the prison hospital on 13 July 2007, with a recommendation for another course of chemotherapy after three weeks. In August 2007 the doctor in charge of his case repeatedly noted in his medical records that he required chemotherapy. The medical file shows that only treatment for his symptoms was available at that time. 26.  On 23 August 2007 the applicant returned to the NCO for chemotherapy. On 7 September 2007 he was transferred back to the prison hospital with a recommendation for regular quarterly medical tests. On 22 September 2007 he was sent to Rustavi Prison no. 2 and given a recommendation for an examination after three months. No record of his medical care at Rustavi Prison no. 2 and the subsequent four months, if any, has been submitted to the Court. 27.  On 31 January 2008 the applicant was transferred to the prison hospital, where he had various medical tests and had a consultation with an oncologist and a chemotherapy specialist. The latter concluded that there was no need for continued chemotherapy and noted that the applicant was due to return to the prison hospital for another check-up within two months. As for the applicant\u2019s HCV, a liver function test had helped establish that the amount of bilirubin was within the norm and that no antiviral treatment was required at that stage. On 21 February 2008 the applicant complained about being discharged from the prison hospital and of a lack of adequate medical care, particularly for his HCV. He stated that the chemotherapy had had an adverse effect on his liver and that he required urgent care in that regard. Notwithstanding his complaint, on 23 February 2008 he was transferred to Rustavi Prison no. 2. 28.  The applicant submitted that he had borne the costs of his stays in hospital and treatment with the support of his family. According to the invoices in the case file, 800 Georgian laris (approximately 333 euros (EUR)) were spent on his treatment at the NCO. The applicant also submitted a certificate which stated that in the framework of a state-funded programme to combat cancer he had benefitted from a 30% reduction in the cost of treatment and a 70% reduction in the cost of diagnostic tests. Without those reductions, the family would not have been able to pay for his treatment. 29.  On 28 March 2008 the Court, acting under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, indicated to the Government that the applicant should be placed in the prison hospital, where he could be provided with adequate medical treatment for his cancer and chronic HCV. The Government were also directed to ensure that the applicant was provided with all the relevant medical tests before commencing antiviral treatment and that his treatment be determined in consultation with an oncologist. 30.  The applicant was transferred to the prison hospital the next day. On 8 April 2008, he was taken to a specialist civilian medical institution, where he underwent a tomography scan, which revealed a cyst-like lump. Doctors recommended a cancer marker blood test and an examination by an oncologist. Upon his return to the prison hospital, on 12-13 April 2008, the applicant had a consultation with a chemotherapy specialist, who concluded that he required several liver tests in view of his HCV diagnosis and further chemotherapy. The applicant was immediately offered chemotherapy at the prison hospital under the surveillance of an oncologist and a chemotherapy expert. However, he rejected that offer and on 16 April 2008 requested a transfer to a specialist medical establishment. In that connection, the applicant argued that the conditions at the prison hospital were not appropriate for chemotherapy and that the relevant specialists were not present on a permanent basis to monitor his condition. 31.  On 1 May 2008 a medical panel at the prison hospital, including an oncologist, chemotherapy doctor and a liver specialist, concluded that treating both of the applicant\u2019s diseases simultaneously was not advisable. They concluded that chemotherapy was the priority and that the antiviral treatment should be postponed. On 5 May 2008 the applicant was again offered chemotherapy at the prison hospital, but he refused and requested a transfer to the NCO. In reply to his request, by a letter of 8 May 2008, the head of social services at the prisons department asked the applicant to substantiate his request and explain the reasons for his dissatisfaction with the prison hospital. The applicant noted in a letter of 23 May 2008 that the prison hospital, inter alia, did not employ a chemotherapy specialist who was present on a daily basis and that he would therefore be left without full\u2011time medical supervision there. 32.  According to the medical file, the applicant on 27 May 2008 again had a consultation with a chemotherapy doctor. Whilst confirming the need for chemotherapy, the doctor also noted that the applicant required various liver tests before antiviral treatment could commence. 33.  In a letter of 4 June 2008 the head of social services stated that the prison hospital was adequately equipped to provide the applicant with chemotherapy under the supervision of relevant specialists. He noted that several other inmates had had such treatment at the prison hospital and there was therefore no need to transfer the applicant to a specialist civilian hospital. 34.  The Government informed the Court in a letter of 4 June 2008 about the applicant\u2019s refusal to have chemotherapy in the prison hospital. Treating it as obstructive behaviour and referring to the associated health risks, the Government asked the Court to provide them with any further indications at its earliest convenience. 35.  On 7 and 8 July 2008 the applicant asked the Court, under Rule 39, to indicate to the Government to transfer him to the NCO for chemotherapy. He reiterated his argument concerning the inadequacy of the equipment at the prison hospital for providing the requisite treatment for his cancer. In support, he noted that two of the six prisoners who had had chemotherapy at the prison hospital had passed away. 36.  On 10 July 2008 the Court, acting under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, requested that the Government transfer the applicant to the NCO for more chemotherapy. On 14 July 2008 the applicant was transferred to the NCO, where he had a tomography scan, which showed that there had been no progression of his retroperitoneal lymphadenopathy in the abdominal cavity and that tumour markers were within normal limits. At the same time the scan revealed changes in his left lung and doctors recommended that he have a further examination. Following additional medical tests the applicant was diagnosed with tuberculosis (\u201cTB\u201d) in the left lung. On 20 August 2008 he had a resection of the upper part of the left lung. On discharge from the NCO in early September, it was noted that his condition was stable but that he required specialist treatment in a tuberculosis unit. The need for quarterly oncological check-ups was also noted. 37.  On 3 October 2008 the applicant had a consultation with a liver specialist, who noted a low level of pathological activity in the applicant\u2019s HCV and prescribed treatment with various hepatoprotectors. At the same time he was offered anti-TB treatment within the DOTS programme (Directly Observed Treatment, Short\u2011course \u2013 the treatment strategy for the detection and cure of TB recommended by the World Health Organisation), which he refused. On 31 October 2008 and then on 12 January 2009 the applicant also had HCV tests. The results showed no replication of the hepatitis and accordingly no need for antiviral treatment. The applicant was prescribed continued treatment with various hepatoprotectors. 38.  Over the following months the applicant was kept mainly in the prison hospital, except for short periods in December 2008, and January, March and July 2009, when he was transferred to the NCO and other civilian hospitals for check-ups. The medical records show that over that time the applicant was kept under constant medical supervision, having regular laboratory tests and examinations (blood and urine tests, ultrasound examinations, several tomography scans, determination of cancer markers, and bacteriological sputum tests), and having repeated consultations with medical specialists, including an oncologist, urologist, and an infection specialist. The medical file also shows that between 27 March and 28 April 2009 the applicant underwent a comprehensive forensic examination at the National Forensics Bureau. As a result his diagnosis was defined as follows: cancer of the right testicle at the first stage in clinical group III in a post\u2011chemotherapy and post-resection period. The applicant\u2019s condition was described as satisfactory, with the experts noting no hepatological pathology, inactive tuberculosis bacteria and no progression of the cancer. 39.  On 7 October 2009 the Government updated the Court on the treatment provided to the applicant for his various diseases. When submitting the applicant\u2019s complete medical file for 2009, the Government maintained that the applicant\u2019s diseases were not showing any signs of progression. They submitted that they had taken all the necessary measures for the protection of the applicant\u2019s health in prison and asked the Court to lift the interim measure indicated on 28 March 2008. 40.  By a letter of 16 June 2010, the applicant objected to being discharged from the prison hospital. He stated that the medical evidence submitted by the Government did not support the assertion that he did not require further medical treatment. He also noted that he had never been provided with any treatment for his chronic HCV and that his health would again deteriorate if he was transferred to Rustavi Prison no. 2. 41.  In the light of the information provided by the parties, the Court on 8 February 2012 decided to lift the interim measures previously indicated on 28 March and 10 July 2008 under Rule 39. 42.  The applicant was detained in Tbilisi Prison no. 5 between 11 August 2005 and 17 November 2006, including several transfers to the prison hospital. According to the applicant, the conditions of his detention in Tbilisi Prison no. 5 were appalling. He was kept in an overcrowded cell, where he had to take turns to sleep, getting a maximum two-three hours of sleep a day. The sanitary and hygiene conditions in the cell were bad and he was not allowed to have daily outdoor exercise. 43.  The applicant mainly spent the following two years in Rustavi Prison no. 6 and the prison hospital. According to the applicant, the food provided in those establishments was so poor that his family had to regularly supply him with food at their own expense. Furthermore, he was deprived of basic items of hygiene, such as toilet paper, soap and bed linen.", "references": ["5", "0", "4", "9", "2", "3", "7", "6", "8", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicants were born in 1984, 2002, 2005, 1935, 1948, 1973, 1983, 1973, 1969 and 1976 respectively and live in Tunceli. The first applicant is the wife, the second and third applicants are the children, the fourth and fifth applicants are the parents and the sixth to ninth applicants are siblings of Mr B\u00fclent Karata\u015f, who was killed on 27 September 2007. The tenth applicant was injured in the same incident. 6.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties and as they appear from the documents submitted by them, may be summarised as follows. 7.  On 27 September 2007 at 12.35 p.m. first lieutenant \u0130.Y., who was the commander of the gendarmerie station in Yeniba\u015f village in south-east Turkey, was informed by radio that an armed clash had taken place at a location approximately six kilometres away from his station. The clash had been between members of \u201cthe terrorist organisation\u201d and military units from the 51st Motorised Infantry Brigade, which is based in the nearby town of Hozat. The first lieutenant informed the Hozat public prosecutor and the Hozat gendarmerie command about the incident before setting off, on foot, to the scene of the incident together with a number of gendarmes under his command. While they were on their way the first lieutenant was informed by radio that \u201cthere were [a number of] injured persons\u201d at the scene of the incident. They then encountered a villager on his tractor and asked him to take them to the scene of the incident. On their arrival at the scene at 3 p.m. they were asked to assist two injured persons, whom they loaded onto the trailer of the tractor and took to a place from which a helicopter picked them up and took them to the military hospital in Elaz\u0131\u011f. 8.  The first lieutenant and his gendarmes, who were informed that the Hozat public prosecutor and crime-scene investigators from the Hozat gendarmerie would be coming to the scene of the incident, took the necessary security measures in the area. However, since it was getting dark and as a result of security concerns, the prosecutor did not visit the area that day and instead instructed the gendarmes to secure any objects found in the area. A search was then conducted during which the gendarmes found, amongst other things, a horse and its saddle, a motorbike and sidecar, a chainsaw, a grey jumper, a black T-shirt, a brown cardigan, a red hat, an old and torn sports shoe, a video camera and a rucksack. These were put on the trailer and taken to the Yeniba\u015f gendarmerie station at 7.30 p.m. the same day. The gendarmes returned to the scene of the incident at 12.50 a.m. on 28 September 2007 and awaited the Hozat public prosecutor and the crime\u2011scene investigators, who arrived in a helicopter at 8.45 a.m. 9.  The Hozat public prosecutor prepared his report on his visit to the area on 28 September 2007. The gendarmes who were guarding the area showed the prosecutor the exact place where the soldiers from the 51st Motorised Infantry Brigade had taken cover the previous day and told the prosecutor what they had been told by the soldiers. According to the information given to the prosecutor, \u201ctwo terrorists\u201d had been walking along a nearby country lane and had been warned by the soldiers to stop. However, the terrorists had failed to obey the soldiers\u2019 orders and had started running down the hill towards a river bed. The soldiers had fired warning shots in the air and immediately afterwards the soldiers had been fired at from the river bed. The soldiers had then returned fire. 10.  The prosecutor went to the exact spot \u2012 in a country lane \u2012 where the soldiers had been the previous day when they opened fire, where he found six spent bullet cases discharged from G-3-type automatic rifles and six spent bullet cases discharged from BKC-type automatic rifles. While walking down the hill which the \u201ctwo terrorists\u201d had run down the previous day towards the river bed, the prosecutor noticed that it was very steep and densely covered with trees; from a distance of 35 metres it was impossible to see the top of the hill where the soldiers had been standing the previous day. As the prosecutor walked down the hill, he noted bullet holes in the trees and 35 metres further on noted blood stains on the ground and ordered samples to be taken. After following the trail of blood stains for 172 metres he arrived at the place where the tenth applicant had been found by the soldiers the previous day. The prosecutor continued walking for a further 143 metres and arrived at the spot where the applicants\u2019 relative B\u00fclent Karata\u015f had been found. There were more extensive blood stains in the two places where the men had been found. 11.  After crossing the river bed and walking for 35 metres the prosecutor found eight spent bullet cases discharged from Kalashnikov-type automatic rifles. The distance between the place where the bullet cases were found and the country lane where the soldiers had been standing was 120 metres. After another 54 metres the prosecutor noted two large pits in the ground in which there were supplies of food in plastic bags, batteries and power cables, which the prosecutor instructed the soldiers to destroy. On his way back up the hill the prosecutor noted more holes in the trees caused by bullets fired from the direction of the river bed. The findings described above were photographed and videoed during the course of the prosecutor\u2019s visit. 12.  In the meantime, on the evening of 27 September 2007 a post mortem examination was carried out in Elaz\u0131\u011f on the body of the applicants\u2019 relative B\u00fclent Karata\u015f. He was formally identified by a relative who also told the authorities that he had gone to that place to collect wood. 13.  The doctors who conducted the examination noted that B\u00fclent Karata\u015f\u2019s body had been stripped of its clothes except for his underpants. In a plastic bag placed next to the body the doctors found a single sports shoe and a pair of blood-stained jeans which had been cut off when they had been removed from the body. There was nothing in the pockets of the jeans. A prosecutor from Elaz\u0131\u011f was present during the examination and placed the jeans and the shoe in a bag as evidence. The prosecutor also instructed a police chief to secure the clothing of the tenth applicant, who at that time was being treated in the intensive care unit. 14.   Examining B\u00fclent Karata\u015f\u2019s injuries, the doctors noted that there was a bullet entry hole on the upper left arm and a corresponding exit hole on the other side of the arm. Another bullet had entered his body on the upper lateral of the left femur and exited the body. A third bullet had entered the body on the left scapula, travelled through an area near the vertebrae and exited the body. An abrasion measuring 6.5 x 1.5 centimetres on the anterior superior iliac spine had been caused by a fourth and final bullet. The doctors observed that all the bullets had entered the body through clothed areas but noted that there was no clothing such as a vest or a shirt in the bag which could be examined with a view to establishing the distance from which he had been shot. In their report the doctors also noted a number of \u201cfresh and superficial\u201d abrasions and a broken rib. The doctors established the cause of death as hypovolemic shock caused as a result of the laceration of the left great saphenous vein. 15.  According to a second medical report pertaining to the examination of the tenth applicant, he had been shot in the upper left chest by a bullet which had exited his body from behind the left arm. 16.  On 2 October 2007 the Hozat public prosecutor took a statement from the tractor driver who had assisted the gendarmes on 27 September 2007 (see paragraph 7 above). He told the prosecutor that he and the gendarmes had driven to a location \u201cwhich was a dangerous area and was therefore avoided by the locals\u201d. At that place the gendarmes had loaded onto his trailer \u201can injured person\u201d whom he had then taken to another location, where he had been transferred to a helicopter. 17.  On 2 and 3 October 2007 the prosecutor questioned six military personnel from the 51st Motorised Infantry Brigade who had taken part in the operation. One of the six military personnel was first lieutenant A.S.\u00c7., who had been in charge of the five other soldiers questioned by the prosecutor the same day. 18.  First lieutenant A.S.\u00c7. told the prosecutor that on the day of the incident he and his soldiers had gone to the area for reconnaissance duties. The area in question was a place where members of the terrorist organisation had been carrying out intensive activities. The reason for their presence in that place on that day had been to look for members of the terrorist organisation who, according to the intelligence in their possession, had been transporting food supplies and other equipment to their hiding places before the onset of winter. At 3 a.m. they had seen an abandoned motorbike and sidecar and had taken cover in order to observe it. At midday they had heard a horse and a number of people but had been unable to see them. Two persons had then approached the motorbike and the soldiers had asked them to stop. However, they had failed to obey the warning and had started running down the hill. The soldiers had fired in the air and repeated their warnings and at that moment fire which sounded as though it was from a Kalashnikov-type rifle had been opened in the direction of the soldiers from the river bed. The soldiers had then returned fire in the direction of the river bed. 19.  After a short while the first lieutenant had asked his soldiers to stop firing and they had walked towards the river bed where they had found an injured person whom they later identified as the tenth applicant R\u0131za \u00c7i\u00e7ek. They had left behind some of the soldiers to guard the tenth applicant and to provide him with first aid and continued their search. After searching for one and a half to two hours they had found the second person, who was later identified as the first applicants\u2019 relative B\u00fclent Karata\u015f. He was also injured and was hiding under a rock approximately 100-150 metres away from the tenth applicant. They had provided first aid to B\u00fclent Karata\u015f as well, requested that a helicopter be sent to the area and then transported the tenth applicant on a makeshift stretcher and B\u00fclent Karata\u015f on the trailer of the tractor to an area approximately one and a half to two kilometres away, from where the two men had been picked up by helicopter. They had then returned to the scene of the incident and conducted a search during which they had found two pits in the ground containing food supplies. At dawn the following day they had continued their search and found eight to ten spent cartridges discharged from Kalashnikov rifles. They had then secured the area and subsequently the prosecutor and the crime scene investigators had arrived at 8.30 a.m. 20.  The other five military personnel gave similar statements to the prosecutor. 21.  On 9 October 2007 the Hozat public prosecutor took a statement from M.\u00c7., a military officer who worked at the Yeniba\u015f gendarmerie station (see paragraph 7 above). M.\u00c7. told the prosecutor how he, together with thirty-nine other soldiers and their commander, first lieutenant \u0130.Y., had gone to the area where the two persons had been injured. He added that when they were taking the motorbike back to their station on the trailer (see paragraph 8 above) they had encountered four persons on the road who asked them to stop. The tractor driver had told him that one of the four was the brother of B\u00fclent Karata\u015f. M.\u00c7. had told the driver not to stop because he considered that it was not safe to do so. He added that he knew that B\u00fclent Karata\u015f\u2019s brother was a farmer in the area and did not think that he and the three others had been waiting on the road specifically for them; in his opinion the brother had asked them to stop because he had recognised B\u00fclent Karata\u015f\u2019s motorbike on the trailer. 22.  On 10 October 2007 the prosecutor questioned B.A., a villager who had been working in the fields on the day of the incident together with his fellow villager, the driver of the tractor. B.A. confirmed that a number of gendarmes had arrived in the field and asked his friend to assist them with his tractor. After his friend and the gendarmes had left he, his wife and another villager had stayed behind. At around 4 p.m. the same day, while they were waiting for the tractor to return, B\u00fclent Karata\u015f\u2019s brother had arrived on his motorbike and asked them whether they had seen his brother B\u00fclent or the tenth applicant who, he said, had not returned to their homes the previous evening. When they had told him that they had not seen the two men, he had left on his motorbike in the direction of his village. 23.  On 15 October 2007 the Hozat public prosecutor took a formal decision to secure as evidence the objects found by the gendarmes during their search at the scene of the incident. The prosecutor\u2019s decision was endorsed by the Hozat Magistrates\u2019 Court the same day. 24.  On 6 November 2007 the tenth applicant was questioned by the Tunceli prosecutor as a \u201csuspect\u201d. He told the prosecutor that he used to live in Istanbul but after losing his job he had moved back to his home town of Hozat. His deceased cousin B\u00fclent Karata\u015f, who had been a bee-keeper, had told him that he had seen a bee colony in a field and asked him to accompany him there to collect it. On the morning of 27 September 2007 they had left on the motorbike and the horse and had put a chainsaw in the sidecar of the motorbike. After their arrival they had left the road, collected the bee colony from a tree and taken it on horseback to the motorbike at around 11 a.m. At that moment a group of eight or nine soldiers had appeared and asked them what they were doing. They had shown the soldiers their identity cards and told them that they were in the area looking for bees. The soldiers had told them to leave, as they were in a \u201cterrorist area\u201d. B\u00fclent had told the soldiers that they would finish their job and then leave. The soldiers had then left and gone into the forest but approximately twenty minutes later they had returned and asked to see their identity cards again, before asking them to take off their jumpers. He and B\u00fclent had then walked away approximately ten metres and taken their jumpers off. On the orders of the soldiers they had then lain on the ground. The officer in charge of the soldiers had walked towards them and told them to get up and run away. Immediately after he had stood up and started running he had heard a rifle being cocked. Two rounds of shots had then been fired in his direction, followed by a few more rounds of fire. B\u00fclent had at that time been running in another direction. The tenth applicant added that he had rolled down the hill which was next to the road. He had been shot in his chest and arm. Within minutes the soldiers had encircled him and he had started begging the soldiers not to kill him. One of the soldiers had then radioed his commander and said that he did not want to kill him. The commander had then replied, over the radio, \u201cgive him first aid and take him to hospital\u201d. He had then been taken to the hospital in Elaz\u0131\u011f. 25.  The tenth applicant added that although he had not seen it personally, he had heard on the soldiers\u2019 radio that B\u00fclent had been shot in the foot. B\u00fclent had not been taken to hospital with him and it was only after he was put in prison that he found out that B\u00fclent had died. He maintained that their reason for going to the area was to collect bee colonies. As he was a nature-lover, he had taken his camera with him. He denied that they had gone to the area to help terrorists; he had never had anything to do with terrorism. 26.  On 9 November 2007 the tenth applicant was brought before the Hozat Magistrates\u2019 Court, which ordered his detention on remand in prison pending institution of criminal proceedings against him for terrorism-related offences. It is apparent from this order that a decision was taken two days after the incident to classify the file relating to the investigation into the actions of the soldiers as confidential in order to prevent the applicants from having access to it. 27.  During the hearing the tenth applicant told the Hozat Magistrates\u2019 Court that he stood by what he had already told the prosecutor. His lawyer told the court that no weapons had been found in the area and that it was not possible to link the spent bullet cases found in the area to his client; it was possible that those spent bullets had been left there from another incident. The lawyer also stated that according to the doctors who conducted the post mortem (see paragraph 14 above), forensic examinations of the men\u2019s clothing would be needed in order to establish the distance from which his client and B\u00fclent Karata\u015f had been shot; however, as noted by the prosecutor, the clothing was missing. 28.  On 4 December 2007 the eight bullet cases found in the area (see paragraph 11 above) were subjected to ballistic examination and it was established that they had been discharged from the same rifle. 29.  The single sports shoe and the pair of blood-stained jeans found in the bag during B\u00fclent Karata\u015f\u2019s post mortem examination, as well as a pair of shoes and a track-suit bottom which apparently belonged to the tenth applicant, were analysed at the Forensic Medicine institute on 31 January 2008. It was established that the blood samples taken from near the river bed by the prosecutor on 28 September 2007 (see paragraph 10 above) belonged to the tenth applicant, B\u00fclent Karata\u015f and a third person. 30.  On 31 March 2008 the Malatya public prosecutor filed an indictment with the Malatya Assize Court, charging the tenth applicant with the offence of aiding and abetting a terrorist organisation. The prosecutor alleged that the tenth applicant and the applicants\u2019 deceased relative B\u00fclent Karata\u015f had been supplying food and other materials to a terrorist organisation on 27 September 2007 when they had come across a group of soldiers with whom they had had an armed clash. In the indictment the prosecutor also alleged that statements taken from two of the applicants, namely G\u00fcler Karata\u015f and B\u0131ra Karata\u015f, as well as statements taken from two other persons, namely \u00d6zg\u00fcr Bozkaya (the son of the applicant\u2019s\u2019 deceased relative B\u00fclent Karata\u015f) and Zeynep \u00c7i\u00e7ek (the tenth applicant\u2019s mother), indicated that the tenth applicant had committed the offence in question. The prosecutor also listed in his indictment as evidence the food supplies and the other materials found in the two pits (see paragraph 11 above). 31.  The Malatya Assize Court declined to institute criminal proceedings against the tenth applicant and returned the indictment to the Malatya public prosecutor on 11 April 2008. The Assize Court noted that the statements taken from G\u00fcler Karata\u015f, B\u0131ra Karata\u015f, \u00d6zg\u00fcr Bozkaya and Zeynep \u00c7i\u00e7ek were in fact statements of complaint against the soldiers and therefore not statements in support of the prosecutor\u2019s allegations. The Assize Court also held that the prosecutor, who alleged that the tenth applicant had been supplying food and other materials to a terrorist organisation, had not specified in his indictment what kind of food and materials they were. 32.  On 15 April 2008 the Malatya public prosecutor objected to the Assize Court\u2019s decision not to entertain the indictment. The prosecutor argued, in particular, that he had mentioned the statements taken from the four persons because in accordance with the applicable legislation he was duty-bound to include in his file not only evidence against a suspect but also any evidence which was favourable to the suspect. The prosecutor also stated that a list of the items which the tenth applicant had been supplying to the terrorist organisation had been included in the indictment. 33.   The Malatya Assize Court rejected the prosecutor\u2019s objection that same day. It referred to the report drawn up by the Hozat public prosecutor on 28 September 2007 in which it was stated that the food supplies and other materials referred to in the Malatya public prosecutor\u2019s indictment had indeed been found in the two pits, but noted that there was no evidence in the prosecutor\u2019s indictment showing that the tenth applicant had had anything to do with those items. On 7 May 2008 the Malatya Assize Court ordered the tenth applicant\u2019s release from the prison. 34.  On 15 May 2008 the Hozat public prosecutor took statements from four of the six military personnel who had already been questioned between 2 and 3 October 2007 (see paragraph 17 above). The remaining two military personnel were also questioned, on 26 May and 10 June 2008. In the statements the six personnel were referred to as \u201csuspects\u201d. 35.  First lieutenant A.S.\u00c7. repeated his earlier statement (see paragraphs 18-19 above) and denied the allegation that he and his men had stopped the tenth applicant and the applicants\u2019 deceased relative B\u00fclent Karata\u015f, checked their identity documents, asked them to take their jumpers off and then shot them. He added that the fact that they had then requisitioned a helicopter in order to have the two injured men taken to hospital proved that the allegations against them were baseless. Four of the remaining five military personnel made similar statements. The fifth person stated that he remembered that he had made a statement to the Hozat public prosecutor soon after the incident but added that he could not now remember the events in question. 36.  On 23 June 2008 the Hozat public prosecutor ruled that he did not have jurisdiction to carry out the investigation and forwarded the investigation file to the Elaz\u0131\u011f military prosecutor\u2019s office. The prosecutor concluded that the incident had taken place while the soldiers had been carrying out their duties as military personnel and that jurisdiction to conduct the investigation therefore lay with the military prosecutor. In the Hozat public prosecutor\u2019s decision the six military personnel were referred to as \u201csuspects\u201d of the offences of \u201cattempted murder\u201d and \u201cmurder\u201d. The first applicant G\u00fcler Karata\u015f, the fourth applicant B\u0131ra Karata\u015f and the tenth applicant\u2019s mother Ms Zeynep \u00c7i\u00e7ek were referred to as the \u201ccomplainants\u201d. It appears from this decision that the tenth applicant had also made an official complaint to the Hozat public prosecutor about the injury caused to him. 37.  On 4 July 2008 the applicants R\u0131za \u00c7i\u00e7ek, G\u00fcler Karata\u015f, B\u0131ra Karata\u015f and the tenth applicant\u2019s mother filed an objection against the prosecutor\u2019s decision. In their objection they repeated their allegation that the soldiers had unlawfully opened fire with the intention of killing B\u00fclent Karata\u015f and the tenth applicant, and complained that the Hozat public prosecutor had not conducted a serious investigation into their allegations. In this connection they pointed out, in particular, that the prosecutor\u2019s examination of the scene of the incident (see paragraphs 9-11 above) had not been conducted in an impartial manner because the prosecutor had been accompanied by a number of soldiers and that the family\u2019s requests to visit and examine the place with the attendance of all the parties had been unreasonably rejected. They also stated that the food supplies and other materials allegedly found at the scene of the incident had been destroyed on the orders of the prosecutor, and yet the prosecutor had gone on to rely on those items as evidence against the two men. They argued that a prosecutor\u2019s duty was to preserve evidence, not destroy it. They also noted that the tenth applicant had been questioned only as a \u201csuspect\u201d (see paragraph 24 above) and never as a \u201ccomplainant\u201d. Similarly, although they had asked for the tenth applicant to be given the opportunity to identify the suspected soldiers in person, that request had not been granted. 38.  The applicants also criticised the decision to classify the investigation file as confidential, arguing that it had had a negative effect on their rights and had also prevented the public from exercising its right to obtain information. They argued that the offence committed did not fall within the jurisdiction of the military prosecutor. The offence committed by the soldiers was murder and the jurisdiction to investigate it lay with the Hozat public prosecutor. They argued that if the file were to be forwarded to the office of the military prosecutor, the investigation would be closed altogether. 39.  On 18 August 2008 the Hozat public prosecutor forwarded to the military prosecutor\u2019s office in Elaz\u0131\u011f a statement taken from a certain M.D., who had been a member of an outlawed organisation but had given himself up on 17 July 2008. The Hozat public prosecutor considered that the information M.D. had provided to the authorities in his statement referred to the incidents which form the subject matter of the present application. The relevant parts of M.D.\u2019s statement are as follows:\n\u201cI do not remember the exact date but I remember that when I first arrived in the Tunceli area, a member of the PKK with the code name \u201cSava\u015f\u201d met with a number of persons in an area not far from the Yeniba\u015f gendarmerie station. Those people were providing [Sava\u015f] with food but at that moment an armed clash ensued between them and soldiers who had been conducting security operations in the area. I heard that Sava\u015f managed to run away. I have also heard that the persons in question were working both for the State and for the PKK and that one of them was a militiaman.\u201d 40.  On 26 December 2008 the Elaz\u0131\u011f military prosecutor decided to close the investigation and not to bring criminal proceedings against the soldiers for the killing of the applicants\u2019 relative B\u00fclent Karata\u015f or for the injury caused to the tenth applicant. 41.  It was noted in the decision that the tenth applicant had been found injured approximately 150-200 metres away from the place where the soldiers had been standing and that the applicants\u2019 deceased relative B\u00fclent Karata\u015f had been found approximately 100-150 metres away from the tenth applicant. Both injured men had been put into the helicopter at 3.25 p.m. and the helicopter had arrived at the hospital at 4 p.m.; B\u00fclent Karata\u015f had died on the way to the hospital. On their arrival at the hospital the tenth applicant had been wearing a track-suit bottom and B\u00fclent Karata\u015f a pair of jeans. Neither man had had any clothing covering the upper part of his body. 42.  The military prosecutor\u2019s decision recorded that another statement had apparently been taken from the tenth applicant in his capacity as a \u201csuspect\u201d, by the prosecutor on 9 November 2007 before he was brought before the Hozat Magistrates\u2019 Court (see paragraphs 26-27 above) in which he had apparently told the prosecutor that he and B\u00fclent Karata\u015f had gone to the area on the evening of 26 September 2007 and not on the morning of 27 September 2007. He had also stated that when the soldiers opened fire, he and B\u00fclent Karata\u015f had been on the road and the soldiers had been below the road down by the river bed. After he had been shot he had rolled down the hill approximately 4\u20115 metres and was only prevented from rolling down further by the trees and bushes. 43.  Two separate complaints, apparently handed in to the prosecutor by the applicants\u2019 legal representative on 10 October and 18 December 2007, were also summarised in the military prosecutor\u2019s decision. In the petitions the legal representative stated that, after checking their identity cards, the soldiers had allowed the tenth applicant and B\u00fclent Karata\u015f to go down to the river bed to collect their belongings and come back up again. After they had come back their identity cards had been checked once again and they had been ordered to take their clothes off. At that moment B\u00fclent Karata\u015f had been taken to a different location by the soldiers and the tenth applicant had been ordered to kneel down. When he refused to do so the soldiers had hit him with the butts of their rifles and he had therefore rolled down the hill. While doing so, the officer in charge of the soldiers had opened fire at him. The officer had then provided first aid to him and arranged for him to be taken to hospital by helicopter. The legal representative also stated that no weapons allegedly belonging to the tenth applicant or B\u00fclent Karata\u015f had been found, that the former had been shot at close range, and that clothing which would have shown the distance from which he had been shot was missing. 44.  It also appears from the military prosecutor\u2019s decision that sergeant H.A., who is one of the six military personnel who were questioned on 2 October 2007 (see paragraph 17 above) and again on 15 May 2008 (see paragraph 34 above), was questioned for a third time in the course of the military prosecutor\u2019s investigation. The sergeant had apparently told the military prosecutor that the day in question had been hot and the tenth applicant and B\u00fclent Karata\u015f had only had [sleeveless] vests on. The sergeant did not know what happened to the vests but thought that they might have been cut off the bodies to be used as tourniquets to stop their bleeding, or might have fallen off the stretchers while the two men were being transported to the helicopter, or might have been left behind in the trailer of the tractor or in the helicopter. 45.  It also appears that a forensic pathologist was asked by the military prosecutor to examine the post mortem report of 27 September 2007 (see paragraph 12 above) in order to assist the military prosecutor in his investigation. The forensic pathologist observed that the tenth applicant had been shot by a single bullet and he was of the opinion that, since he had not been wearing a top and there were no burn marks around the bullet entry hole, he had been shot from a distance. The bullet had entered on a downward trajectory. 46.  The forensic pathologist noted that B\u00fclent Karata\u015f had been shot with four bullets, two of which had entered the back of his body; it was not possible to establish the trajectory of the remaining two bullets. Given that there were no burn marks around the bullet entry holes, it appeared that he had also been shot from a distance. 47.  In his decision the military prosecutor noted that, although neither the tenth applicant nor B\u00fclent Karata\u015f had any previous convictions, there had been a number of criminal investigations against them for terrorism\u2011related offences. Moreover, a number of members of outlawed organisations had provided information to the authorities according to which B\u00fclent Karata\u015f had been implicated in aiding and abetting outlawed organisations. In the light of that information, together with the information provided by M.D., the former member of the outlawed organisation (see paragraph 39 above), the military prosecutor had \u201cstrong suspicions\u201d that both the tenth applicant and B\u00fclent Karata\u015f had had dealings with terrorist organisations. 48.  The military prosecutor argued that the tenth applicant\u2019s version of the events \u2212 namely that after he had been shot he had rolled downhill for four or five metres \u2212 was contradicted by the fact that stains of his blood had been found some 315 metres away from the place where he claimed to have been shot. His allegation that the soldiers had been positioned lower than him when they opened fire was also contradicted by the medical reports. 49.  In the light of the foregoing the military prosecutor was of the opinion that the version of the events put forward by the military personnel represented the truth. The two men, although unarmed at the time, had been in the area to assist the terrorists by supplying them with the food found in the two pits. Furthermore, the bullet entry points on the bodies of the two men showed that the soldiers had not opened fire on them with the intention of killing them and B\u00fclent Karata\u015f had died as a result of the blood-loss sustained whilst hiding. In the opinion of the prosecutor, the soldiers had opened fire in self-defence when they had come under fire. 50.  The tenth applicant, the applicants G\u00fcler Karata\u015f and B\u0131ra Karata\u015f, and the tenth applicant\u2019s mother lodged an objection against the military prosecutor\u2019s decision. In their objection they repeated the allegation that the two men had been shot intentionally by the soldiers. They also criticised the fact that the investigation had been conducted by a military prosecutor rather than a civilian prosecutor, and argued that the former had failed to conduct a thorough investigation. In that connection they contended, in particular, that the military prosecutor had never sought to question the tenth applicant, who was both a victim and a witness to the events in question. They also complained that the military prosecutor had failed to conduct a visit to the scene with them in attendance, had not given the tenth applicant the opportunity to identify the soldiers in person, and their effective participation in the investigation had not been ensured as a result of the previous investigating prosecutor\u2019s decision to have the file classified as confidential (see paragraph 26 above). They also repeated their argument that a prosecutor\u2019s duty was to preserve the evidence and not to destroy it; and yet the investigating prosecutor had ordered the destruction of the food supplies found in the pit (see paragraph 11 above), only to rely on them later as evidence against the tenth applicant. 51.  They were also critical of the military prosecutor\u2019s reliance on the contradictions contained in the tenth applicant\u2019s statements when closing the investigation. In that connection they argued that the tenth applicant had survived a life-threatening injury and had been detained in prison immediately after his discharge from the hospital, facing very serious criminal charges. It was therefore normal that some of his statements might appear contradictory. The fact that both men had been shot from the front also discredited the soldiers\u2019 allegation that they had been shot whilst running away. 52.  In their objection the four above-mentioned persons pointed out that a criminal court had refused to entertain the prosecutor\u2019s allegations that the tenth applicant had been aiding and abetting an outlawed organisation (see paragraphs 30-33 above). In his decision, however, the military prosecutor still insisted that the tenth applicant had been in the area to deliver food supplies to terrorists. Furthermore, the allegations made by the former member of the terrorist organisation could not be accepted as representing the truth because what he had told the authorities was only hearsay and vague, and he had not actually witnessed anything in person. Moreover, the spent bullet cases found in the area had nothing to do with the two men in question. 53.  In their objection the four persons concerned also referred to Article 2 of the Convention and alleged that the use of lethal force against B\u00fclent Karata\u015f and the tenth applicant had been in breach of that provision. In particular, the soldiers had not opened fire on the two men in order to achieve one of the aims set out in Article 2 \u00a7 2 of the Convention because they had been unarmed and had not been running away. The soldiers could have tried to apprehend them without opening fire. All the evidence in the file showed that the two men had been shot in an execution-style killing. 54.  The objection was rejected by the Malatya Military Court on 23 March 2009. In the opinion of the military court, the decision to classify the investigation file as confidential two days after the incident was a justifiable action and in accordance with the applicable procedure because there had been ongoing military operations against terrorist organisations in the area at the time and allowing access to the investigation file could have facilitated the terrorists\u2019 escape and led to destruction of the evidence. 55.  The military court stated in its decision that a jumper and a cardigan belonging to the tenth applicant and B\u00fclent Karata\u015f had been placed in the sidecar of the motorbike and at the time of the events they had been wearing only their vests, which despite all efforts had never been found. Furthermore, it had not been possible to conduct a forensic examination of the jeans worn by B\u00fclent Karata\u015f on that day. The allegation made by the complainants, namely that all the evidence in the file indicated that the two men had been shot at close range, could therefore not be accepted. 56.  The military court did not accept the complainants\u2019 allegation that, despite the criminal court\u2019s decision not to bring criminal proceedings against the tenth applicant (see paragraph 33 above) the military prosecutor had used the finding of food supplies as grounds for concluding that the two men had been aiding and abetting a terrorist organisation. It accepted the argument that the eight spent bullet cases had nothing to do with the two men but in any event those spent bullet cases had not been relied on by the military prosecutor when closing the investigation. The military prosecutor had not been concerned with the question of whether or not the two men had committed any offences; he had been investigating whether the use of force by the soldiers against them had been justified. The military court concluded that the soldiers had remained within the remit of their powers in resorting to the use of force because they had been following two men who had been trying to escape and had come under fire while doing so, even though there was no clear evidence that that fire originated from the two men.", "references": ["5", "1", "4", "9", "6", "8", "7", "3", "2", "No Label", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Tallinn. 7.  In 2006 the applicant\u2019s son O., who was born in 1983, was diagnosed with malignant melanoma. He was operated on in 2006, and underwent regular check-ups. In April 2009 a metastasis was removed from his brain, and he received radiation therapy. 8.  In September 2009 O.\u2019s state of health deteriorated. He was vomiting and felt weak and dizzy. 9.  On 19 September 2009 the applicant called an ambulance and O. was taken to the North Estonia Medical Centre (\u201cthe NEMC\u201d) (P\u00f5hja-Eesti Regionaalhaigla) for examination. A computerised tomography (CT) scan was performed on him. According to the applicant, O. was told that the scan had not revealed any problems with his health. He was prescribed an anti-vomiting drug and discharged from the hospital the same evening. 10.  On 24 September 2009 the applicant again called an ambulance for O., who had been complaining of feeling generally unwell, of a numbness of one side of his face, a rash around his nose and dizziness. O. was admitted to the NEMC. A CT scan and magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) of O.\u2019s brain were performed the same day and the following day, respectively. An additional CT scan of O.\u2019s neck, lungs, abdomen and pelvic area was performed on 29 September 2009. The MRI scan and the CT scan of 29 September 2009, taken together, indicated a leptomeningeal pathological process involving the cranial nerves, a probable meningeal metastatic process and probable multiple metastases in the liver and other organs of the abdominal cavity. He was given hormonal and infusion therapy, but his health deteriorated rapidly. He developed breathing and walking problems and a speech impediment, and his eyesight worsened. On 28 September 2009 a hospital medical council decided to proceed with palliative care. It found that because of the spread of the tumour, oncological treatment would not be effective. The applicant pointed out that the medical council\u2019s decision had not been signed by O. 11.  For one week starting from 5 October 2009, O. was physically restrained to a bed with magnetically locking restraints on both arms, apparently in order to prevent him from hurting himself, given his disturbed state of mind. 12.  On 6 October 2009 O. was transferred to an intensive care unit because he was suffering from progressive respiratory failure and a disturbed state of mind. He was also diagnosed with pneumonia and, in the light of that finding, was given additional antibacterial treatment. According to the medical record (nurse\u2019s notes), on 6 October 2009 O. was intubated because he was having breathing difficulties. On the same day the medical council found that a surgical cure would not be possible and decided to continue with palliative treatment supporting the vital functions. The applicant again pointed out that the medical council\u2019s decision was not signed by O. 13.  On 9 October 2009 a tracheotomy was performed on O. 14.  On 12 October 2009 O. stopped breathing and mechanical ventilation was applied. On 13 October 2009 characteristics corresponding to brain death were ascertained. According to information in a report drawn up by the Estonian Forensic Science Institute based on an analysis of O.\u2019s medical records, an electroencephalogram performed the same day revealed serious diffuse brain damage and only minimal electrical activity. O.\u2019s active treatment and feeding were discontinued, but the infusion therapy was continued. The applicant disagreed with this finding and rather considered that O. had fallen into a coma following an overdose of medicine. She maintained that O.\u2019s pulse had reacted to her speech the following day, 14 October 2009, which had indicated that O. had not been brain-dead. According to the applicant, the protocol for verifying brain death was never fully and properly carried out. The administration of food and medicines was not resumed, despite the applicant\u2019s requests. The applicant alleged that during the night of 14 October 2009, O.\u2019s blanket had been removed and he had been left with only a sheet near an open window, which had caused his body temperature to drop to 35 degrees Celsius. 15.  On 15 October 2009 O.\u2019s heart stopped and the mechanical ventilation was terminated. 16.  On 15 October 2009 the applicant called the police on the general emergency number, complained about O.\u2019s treatment and asked that an expert examination be commissioned. Her phone call was registered as an information notice (infoteade) and not as the reporting of a crime. The applicant was advised to contact the Expert Committee on the Quality of Health Care Services (Tervishoiuteenuse kvaliteedi ekspertkomisjon; hereinafter \u201cthe Expert Committee\u201d). 17.  On 16 October 2009 an autopsy was performed at the NEMC. The medical death certificate (arstlik surmateatis) indicated cerebral oedema as the immediate cause of death, and melanoma with multiple metastases as the medical condition that had brought about the immediate cause of death. According to the autopsy report (lahangu protokoll), O. died of malignant melanoma with multiple metastases in the brain, which also caused cerebral haemorrhage and oedema as complications. 18.  On 2 November 2009 the applicant complained to the Health Board (Terviseamet) of O.\u2019s inhuman treatment and about the circumstances of his death. 19.  On 8 March 2010 the Health Board informed the applicant that the case had been transmitted to the Expert Committee. The Expert Committee examined O.\u2019s medical records, obtained written explanations from several members of the medical staff who had treated O., and ordered two expert opinions, one to be prepared by one of its members and the other by another doctor, both professors emeriti. The Expert Committee also heard the applicant. In its decision given on 25 March 2010, it found no medical malpractice in O.\u2019s treatment. According to the report of the Expert Committee\u2019s meeting of 25 March 2010 at which the applicant was also present, the Expert Committee gave oral answers to the applicant\u2019s questions regarding the possible radiation of O. during his previous treatment; the decision not to offer chemotherapy to O.; and the alleged late detection of pneumonia. In addition, the Expert Committee\u2019s decision contained written answers to the applicant, stating that O. had not suffered from a stroke; that the deterioration in his health had not been caused by the administration of specific medication or the withdrawal thereof, but rather by the metastatic developments in his brain; and that based on the medical records, O. had not been starved, nor had his mechanical ventilation been stopped before his death. The applicant was also notified of the possibility to request an alternative medical expert opinion and was informed that tissue samples gathered while the patient was alive as well as after his death, would be maintained for thirty years at the NEMC pathology centre and were available on demand. The applicant considered that the Expert Committee had not been impartial, that it had lacked a quorum at its meeting of 25 March 2010 and that the decision it had adopted contained false statements. An action lodged by the applicant to have the Expert Committee\u2019s report declared unlawful and claiming damages for it was dismissed by a final judgment of the Supreme Court on 2 December 2015. 20.  In the meantime, on 22 March 2010 the applicant lodged an offence report with a prosecutor\u2019s office. Criminal proceedings under Article 123 of the Penal Code (placing or leaving another person in a situation which is life-threatening or likely to cause serious damage to the person\u2019s health) were initiated on 1 April 2010. 21.  In the course of the criminal investigation, several individuals (doctors, nurses, the applicant, and O.\u2019s friends who had visited him in the hospital) were interviewed. Requests for documentary evidence (the Expert Committee\u2019s opinion, O.\u2019s medical file as well as the autopsy report) were submitted and documents were received; a forensic medical examination was ordered from the Estonian Forensic Science Institute. The prosecutor posed ten questions to the forensic medical experts addressing, inter alia, O.\u2019s diagnoses; the adequacy of the treatment with respect to his state of health (including the tracheotomy); the restraining of O. to the bed; the administration of medicine on 12 October 2009 and whether this could have caused O.\u2019s breathing to stop; the decision to cease the administration of medicine and food on 13 October 2009; the assertion that O. was brain-dead; and the decision to stop mechanical ventilation. 22.  According to the forensic medical report dated 30 August 2012, O. had received treatment appropriate for his condition. The forensic medical experts also concluded that the medicine administered to O. had been appropriate and had not caused his breathing to stop. They considered that the restraining of O. to the bed could have been justified in the instant case. As the characteristics corresponding to brain death had been ascertained, the discontinuation of feeding and the continuation of infusion therapy had been medically justified. The experts also concluded that the mechanical ventilation had been turned off only after his heart had stopped and thus could not have been the cause of his death. The forensic medical assessment found that O.\u2019s death had been caused by malignant melanoma with multiple metastases, with further complications of cerebral haemorrhage and oedema. 23.  On 25 October 2012 the criminal proceedings were terminated as the commission of an offence had not been proven based on the evidence gathered. An appeal lodged by the applicant with the Office of the Prosecutor General was dismissed on 10 December 2012. On 28 January 2013 the Tallinn Court of Appeal dismissed a further appeal lodged by the applicant. 24.  Following the termination of the criminal proceedings, the Office of the Prosecutor General dismissed complaints lodged by the applicant regarding the refusal to initiate additional criminal proceedings against the chief inspector of the Health Board\u2019s supervisory department, against the experts of the Estonian Forensic Science Institute who had drawn up the forensic medical report during the original criminal proceedings (this refusal was later upheld by the Court of Appeal), against two prosecutors and the judge of the Court of Appeal. The Office of the Prosecutor General also dismissed an application lodged by the applicant to reopen the original criminal proceedings.", "references": ["7", "5", "2", "1", "8", "6", "4", "9", "3", "0", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1949 and lives in Torre del Greco. 6.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, can be summarised as follows. 7.  In January 1990, a few years after she had applied to the Interior Ministry for a disability pension, Ms T.G., the applicant\u2019s mother, was granted an entitlement to the monthly payment of the pension together with a special allowance on account of her partial blindness. 8.  On 21 October 1994 Ms T.G. filed an application with Torre Annunziata District Court (pretore), sitting as an employment tribunal, to obtain acknowledgment of a re-evaluation of her pension and interest on the arrears. 9.  On 27 March 1998, after the hearing had been adjourned three times, the District Court dismissed the application as out of time. On 24 September 1998 Ms T.G. died. 10.  On 10 March 1999, the applicant, lodged an appeal against that decision, on her own behalf and in her capacity as heir, in Naples District Court. 11.  On 10 December 2002 that court acknowledged the applicant\u2019s right to the recalculated sum and interest for a total of EUR 12,240.26. The decision became final on 25 January 2004. 12.  As the decision was not enforced by the relevant authorities, on 14 June 2004 the applicant served a payment order (atto di precetto) on the National Social Security Agency (Istituto Nazionale della Previdenza Sociale \u2013 INPS) for EUR 30,364.38, representing the sum claimed, with interest and taking account of the re-evaluation. 13.  On 25 January 2005 she obtained a garnishee order (pignoramento presso terzi) from the Naples enforcement judge in respect of her whole claim. 14.  On 25 May 2005 the applicant lodged an appeal with the \u201cPinto\u201d Division of the Rome Court of Appeal, complaining about the excessive length of the proceedings. With regard to the admissibility of her appeal, she argued that, under section 4 of Law no. 89/2001 (the \u201cPinto Act\u201d), the \u201cfinal domestic decision\u201d to be taken into account was that of the enforcement judge of 25 January 2005. In consequence, she argued, the six-month deadline for lodging the claim for just satisfaction ought to run from that date. 15.  On 18 May 2006 the Court of Appeal declared the appeal inadmissible as out of time, taking the view that the final domestic decision to be taken into consideration was that delivered by the Naples District Court in the proceedings on the merits, a decision which had become final on 25 January 2004. 16.  The Court of Cassation upheld that decision on 25 September 2008 and dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law.", "references": ["9", "2", "8", "5", "4", "1", "6", "0", "7", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1987 and was serving a prison sentence in Nubarashen penal facility (see paragraph 27 below) at the time when he lodged his application with the Court. 6.  On an unspecified date the applicant was drafted to the Armenian army. At the material time he was performing his military service in the Syunik Region of Armenia. 7.  On 29 April 2006 the dead body of a fellow serviceman, A.H., was found in the forest next to the applicant\u2019s military unit. He was hanging from a tree with his arms tied behind his back with wire. On the same day the military prosecutor\u2019s office of Zangezur garrison instituted criminal proceedings in respect of the death. Shortly afterwards the investigation of the case was taken over by the Military Prosecutor\u2019s Office and assigned to investigator A.K. 8.  According to the materials of the case, on 2 May 2006 the applicant was questioned in the town of Kapan in connection with the criminal case. It appears that on the same day he and another serviceman, R.H., were subjected to disciplinary punishment in the form of ten days\u2019 detention for beating up A.H. the previous month. It further appears that the following day the applicant and R.H. were taken to the Military Police Department of the Ministry of Defence in Yerevan (\u201cthe Military Police Department\u201d), where they were held until 12 May 2006. 9.  During their detention at the Military Police Department, the applicant and R.H. were questioned as witnesses in the criminal case. It appears that during questioning on 7 May 2006, R.H. confessed that he and the applicant had murdered A.H. 10.  On an unspecified date the head of the disciplinary isolation facility of the Military Police Department addressed the following letter to investigator A.K.:\n\u201cPursuant to your oral enquiry, we inform you that ... [the applicant] was admitted to the detention facility of the Military Police Department on 3 May 2006 and stayed there until 12 May 2006 after which he was transferred to military unit no. 20440 of the Ministry of Defence ... Upon his admission, during his stay and upon his discharge he had no bodily injuries, and no complaints with regard to his state of health had been received.\u201d 11.  On 17 May 2006 investigator A.K. drew up a record of the applicant\u2019s arrest, which stated that the applicant had been arrested on that day in the Military Police Department on suspicion of beating up and murdering A.H. On the same day he asked the Public Defender\u2019s Office to grant the applicant a defence lawyer, who was assigned the next day. 12.  On 20 May 2006 the applicant was charged with aggravated breach of military discipline rules and aggravated murder, under Article 359 \u00a7 2 and Article 104 \u00a7 2 (10) of the Criminal Code. In particular, the investigator found that in March 2006 the applicant, together with R.H., had subjected A.H. to beatings and, on 28 April 2006, had murdered him by hanging him from a tree. 13.  On the same day the applicant was taken to the Arabkir and Kanaker-Zeytun District Court of Yerevan. At the request of investigator A.K., the court ordered his remand in custody. 14.  The applicant contested the facts as reflected in the materials of the case file, and alleged that in reality he was taken to the Kapan Military Police Department on 1 May 2006 and was held there until 3 May 2006. Thereafter, he was taken to the disciplinary isolation facility of the Military Police Department, where he was held until 20 May 2006. Throughout the whole period he was subjected to severe beatings and torture by military police officers and investigators, who hit him in the soft parts of the body, as well as the \u201cinvisible\u201d parts, including the soles of the feet, forcing him to confess to the murder. No legal representative was allocated to him at that time. R.H. and another serviceman who had been taken to the Military Police Department in connection with the death of A.H. were beaten too. R.H. was unable to withstand the beatings and made confession statements. 15.  On 21 June 2006, while in the Nubarashen detention facility, the applicant lodged a complaint with, inter alia, the General Prosecutor\u2019s Office, stating as follows:\n\u201c... On 1 May this year military police officers came to the military outpost and took me [and two other soldiers] to the [military police] department. They took statements from us there and started to beat us. At night [R.H.] and I were kept in the reception area, sitting on the floor with our hands handcuffed to the walls. I was there until 3 May, during which time I witnessed only beatings and cries from different rooms where the soldiers were being beaten. On 3 [May], we, 11 soldiers, were brought to the Military Police Department and I was taken to the room of [a senior officer, A.M.] where they started continuously to beat me, now with more brutal methods. They took off my shoes and with a thin branch started to beat the soles of my feet. They were forcing me to give false incriminatory statements. Late at night they would take me to the disciplinary isolation cell. [Several other co-servicemen] were also kept there, while the rest stayed in a common room. About 10 days later, when I was being questioned as a witness, the investigator took off my shoes. I should mention that I was kept in the isolation cell unlawfully, upon an order from the superior. I was held for 10 days for violation of the internal disciplinary code. Every day they would take me to a room and try, by beatings and threats, to force me to give evidence in the way they wanted. At 1 a.m. on 17 or 18 May the investigator came and told me that my girlfriend was in the next room and that if I refused to testify in the way he wanted, bad things would happen to her. They further threatened me that bad things would also happen to my 17-year-old sister. The head of the [operational intelligence] department [M.Gh.] and his deputy [A.Mar.] would also beat me. When I was not able to eat because my teeth were aching from many punches and slaps, they threatened me and used indecent swearwords. One night, as I was being taken back to the isolation cell [the isolation facility officers] noticed the traces of beatings on my body and warned [the military police officers] not to bring me again to the cell in such condition. [The deputy head A.Mar.] started to beat me and curse at me, asking why I had not told [the isolation cell officers] that I had bumped into a door. I could hear the cries and sobbing of other soldiers coming from the rooms. As one police officer was beating me, the other filmed the beatings on his mobile phone and showed the film, in my presence, to his other colleagues and then they would start to humiliate me. They drove me to such a state that I told them I wanted to die. They immediately put a blank sheet of paper in front of me, gave me a pen and said that if I wrote down that I wished to commit suicide they would assist me in doing so. They were proposing that I give false testimony against [R.H.] in the same words as [R.H.] had testified against me ... After my confrontation with [R.H.] ... he started begging me to forgive him and said that he had been unable to withstand the beatings, pain and fear and that he had given false testimony against me as otherwise bad things would have happened to his family. I was kept in [the military police headquarters] and isolation cell not for 10 days but for 18 days. On 20 May we were taken to the [Arabkir and Kanaker-Zeytun District] court, which ordered our detention. During the court hearing I stated that I had had no involvement in the death of [A.H.] and that I did not plead guilty. On 15 June the investigator, together with my defence lawyer, visited me at the [Nubarashen detention facility] and produced a forensic expert opinion according to which the grains of sand discovered on the soles of my military shoes corresponded to those taken from the site of the crime. I told them that I did not agree with the results of the expert opinion and the investigator threatened to tell the defence lawyer to go out [of the cell] for ten minutes and to [beat me] ... .\nI am asking and requesting again that the investigative authorities conduct an impartial and thorough investigation by observing the ... requirements of the criminal process, to find the real murderers and to release me and other innocent persons involved in the investigation from this inhuman nightmare.\u201d 16.  On 21 September investigator A.K., to whom the applicant\u2019s complaint had been forwarded, questioned M.Gh., A.Mar. and A.M., all of whom denied having ill-treated the applicant. 17.  On 23 September 2006 the investigator decided not to institute criminal proceedings. His decision stated as follows:\n\u201c[Investigator A.K.] of the Military Prosecutor\u2019s Office... having examined the materials of criminal case ... assigned to me ...\nDuring the investigation of the criminal case [concerning the death of A.H.] the accused [applicant] lodged a complaint with ... the General Prosecutor of Armenia, which [was] received by the Military Prosecutor\u2019s Office. In [that complaint] the accused stated that he and ... another accused, [R.H.], had been beaten during their stay in the Military Police Department by the head of the operational intelligence department [M.Gh.] and his deputy [A.Mar.], and that violence was used against him also in the room of [a senior officer, A.M].\nThe head of the operational intelligence department [M.Gh.] gave statements according to which no violence had been used against [the applicant] and said that, if such a thing had happened, the military police officer who had applied such violence would have been made to answer for his actions.\nSimilar statements were made by the deputy head of the operational intelligence department [A.Mar.] and a senior officer [A.M.].\nAccording to the [letter of the head of the disciplinary isolation facility of the Military Police Department, M.T.], there were no traces of bodily injuries on [the applicant] and [R.H.] during their admission and stay in the isolation cell and the latter had not lodged any complaints about their health.\nTherefore, the fact is that during the period in which ... [the applicant] and [R.H.] stayed in the Military Police Department, no violence against them by the officers of the above Department has been substantiated during the investigation of the criminal case [concerning the death of A.H. Hence], there is no evidence of a crime.\nBased on the above ... I decide not to institute criminal proceedings ... due to the absence of evidence of a crime.\u201d 18.  According to the applicant, that decision was not served on him and he learned about it only after the closure of the investigation, when consulting the criminal case file. 19.  On an unspecified date the investigation was closed. 20.  On 1 November 2006 investigator A.K. provided the materials of the case file to the applicant and his lawyer. 21.  On 14 November 2006 the criminal case was referred to the Syunik Regional Court for trial. It appears that during the trial the applicant and R.H. alleged that they had been ill-treated during the investigation. 22.  It further appears that on 16 May 2007 the Syunik Regional Court, following the applicant\u2019s and R.H.\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment, ordered a forensic medical examination. It apparently decided to stay the proceedings and asked the Military Prosecutor\u2019s Office to address the allegations of ill\u2011treatment. 23.  According to the report of the applicant\u2019s medical examination drawn up on 15 June 2007, no traces of injury were discovered on his body. The medical examination report then stated that because the examination had been conducted belatedly (a year after the alleged ill-treatment) and there were no medical documents, it was impossible to say whether the applicant had suffered any bodily injuries, since such injuries might have existed but then healed, leaving no trace. 24.  The medical examination of R.H. revealed an old nasal fracture, but according to the medical examination report, it was impossible to establish the date on which it had been sustained. No other bodily injuries were found. It appears that the investigator then questioned several persons, including R.H.\u2019s former co-servicemen, who stated that during their military service they had noticed that R.H.\u2019s nose was deformed and that he had told them that he had injured his nose before his conscription. 25.  On 20 June 2007 the military prosecutor\u2019s office of the Goris garrison refused to institute criminal proceedings concerning R.H.\u2019s allegation of ill-treatment, for lack of evidence of a crime. 26.  On 2 August 2007 the military prosecutor\u2019s office sent a letter to the Syunik Regional Court informing it that the applicant\u2019s and R.H.\u2019s allegations of beatings had not been confirmed. The letter referred to the decisions of 23 September 2006 and 20 June 2007, as well as to the results of the two forensic medical examinations. 27.  On 29 August 2007 the Syunik Regional Court found the applicant guilty of non-aggravated murder in connection with A.H.\u2019s death, under Article 104 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code, and of breaching military discipline rules, under Article 359 \u00a7 2 (2) of the Criminal Code, in connection with A.H.\u2019s beating. It imposed an aggregate sentence of nine and a half years\u2019 imprisonment. R.H. was also found guilty and sentenced to a prison term. The Regional Court found that R.H.\u2019s testimony could be considered as admissible evidence because his allegations of forced confessions had not been substantiated. 28.  On 7 September 2007 the applicant lodged an appeal against the judgment of the Syunik Regional Court, stating that he did not agree with the judgment. He asked the court to quash the judgment and to acquit him since he was innocent. 29.  It appears that all the other parties to the criminal proceedings also lodged appeals against the judgment of the Syunik Regional Court. 30.  On 3 December 2007 the Criminal Court of Appeal dismissed all the appeals and upheld the judgment of 29 August 2007. 31.  On an unspecified date the Military Prosecutor\u2019s Office lodged an appeal on points of law against the judgment of the Court of Appeal, seeking to have the part relating to the evaluation of the offences quashed and a harsher penalty imposed. 32.  On 25 July 2008 the Court of Cassation granted the appeal. It quashed the part of the Court of Appeal\u2019s judgment concerning the evaluation of the offences and remitted the case for a fresh examination. 33.  On 12 November 2008 the Criminal Court of Appeal examined the case anew and changed the applicant\u2019s offence in connection with A.H.\u2019s death to aggravated murder under Article 104 \u00a7 2 (10) of the Criminal Code, increasing his sentence to fifteen years\u2019 imprisonment. 34.  On an unspecified date the applicant\u2019s defence lawyer lodged an appeal on points of law against the judgment of the Court of Appeal of 12 November 2008. He claimed, inter alia, that the applicant had been beaten and tortured by military police officers and that when he and R.H. had been taken into custody and questioned as witnesses, R.H. had been forced to make confession statements. 35.  On 25 February 2009 the Court of Cassation declared the appeal on points of law inadmissible. It held that it was precluded from examining the arguments contained in the applicant\u2019s appeal since he had not mentioned them in his appeal of 7 September 2007 and the Criminal Court of Appeal had therefore not examined them. The Court of Cassation, however, referred to the complaint concerning the applicant\u2019s alleged ill-treatment by mentioning investigator A.K.\u2019s decision of 23 September 2006 not to institute criminal proceedings against the military police officers. It further noted that no criminal proceedings had been instituted on account of R.H.\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment. 36.  On 26 March 2009 the applicant lodged his own appeal on points of law against the judgment of 12 November 2008, in which he raised arguments similar to those indicated in his defence lawyer\u2019s appeal. 37.  On 30 April 2009 the Court of Cassation declared the applicant\u2019s appeal inadmissible for lack of merit. 38.  On an unspecified date thereafter the applicant lodged an application with the Constitutional Court, claiming that the Court of Cassation\u2019s refusal in its decision of 25 February 2009 to examine all the arguments indicated in his appeal on points of law was incompatible with the provisions of the Constitution. 39.  On 22 December 2009 the Constitutional Court held that if the Court of Appeal quashed a judgment of the first-instance court and adopted a new legal act, an appeal on points of law should be available to the parties to the proceedings in question. 40.  Following the ruling of the Constitutional Court, on 20 January 2010 the applicant lodged a new appeal on points of law against the judgment of 12 November 2008, claiming, inter alia, that neither the investigative authorities nor the courts had taken into account the fact that he and R.H. had been beaten and tortured by the military police. 41.  On 26 March 2010 the Court of Cassation dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. The relevant parts of its decision read as follows:\n\u201cIn the present case the Court of Cassation will firstly address the following questions put before it: whether the arguments ... that [the applicant] was subjected to ill-treatment by police officers are substantiated, whether [R.H.\u2019s] confession had been extorted as a result of beating and whether the charges had been based on evidence obtained by beating and torture.\n... as it appears from the decision of 23 September 2006 ..., no criminal proceedings were instituted ... on account of the ill-treatment of [the applicant] and [R.H.] by ... military police officers for lack of evidence of a crime.\n... Consequently, the arguments of the appellant with regard to [the applicant\u2019s] ill-treatment by police officers are unsubstantiated ...\u201d", "references": ["6", "9", "5", "2", "8", "0", "7", "3", "4", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "4.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 5.  The applicant and his mother entered the United Kingdom on 13 July 1989 and were granted six months\u2019 leave to enter as visitors. Following the expiry of their leave they remained in the United Kingdom as overstayers. 6.  The applicant\u2019s father entered the United Kingdom in 1991. 7.  The applicant\u2019s siblings were born in the United Kingdom on 20 November 1993 and 11 January 1995. 8.  On 5 June 1995 the applicant\u2019s mother claimed asylum on undisclosed grounds. The applicant and his two siblings were named dependents on that claim. The Secretary of State for the Home Department refused the asylum claim on 15 April 1998. Following a reconsideration of the case in August 1999, the Secretary of State again refused the asylum claim but granted the family four years\u2019 exceptional leave to remain in the United Kingdom. 9.  In March and November 1999 the applicant, who was then twelve years old, received police cautions for offences of assault occasioning actual bodily harm and robbery. 10.  On 7 February 2003 he was convicted of robbery and assault occasioning grievous bodily harm. 11.  On 21 August 2003 the applicant, his mother and his siblings were granted indefinite leave to remain in the United Kingdom. His mother and siblings have since become British citizens. 12.  On 16 December 2003 the applicant was convicted of disorderly behaviour or using threatening/abusive/insulting words likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress. He was fined GBP 50.00. 13.  On 3 March 2004 he was convicted of burglary, theft and impersonating a police officer. He was sentenced to a community punishment order of two hundred hours. 14.  On 26 November 2004 the applicant was convicted of robbery and was sentenced to three years\u2019 detention in a Young Offenders\u2019 Institution. 15.  In or around this time the Secretary of State considered instigating deportation proceedings against the applicant. On 30 June 2006 he decided not to pursue such proceedings owing to the length of his residence in the United Kingdom. However, he warned him that should he come to the adverse attention of the authorities through criminal offending in the future, he could be liable to deportation. 16.  In 2006 the applicant\u2019s father was granted indefinite leave to remain in the United Kingdom. 17.  On 11 July 2008 the applicant pleaded guilty to the supply of Class A drugs. On 20 March 2009 he was sentenced to seven years\u2019 imprisonment. The sentencing judge addressed him in the following terms:\n\u201cthis case has been a copy-book example of how people in your position are able to continue to operate outside the law by the use of interchangeable street names, preying upon the most vulnerable addicts and by the indiscriminate use of fear and violence to ensure that no-one informs the police of your criminal activities ... Your evidence to the jury was that you were the main man for drugs in Swindon ... Your nickname of \u2018Bruiser\u2019 ensured that when the \u2018workers\u2019 as you called those who sold drugs on your behalf, \u2018messed up\u2019 it was your policy, to use your own words, of \u2018roughing them up a little bit\u2019. You told the jury, with some satisfaction, that this policy was successful ... I regard you as close to the source of supply and wholesaling to retailers in Swindon on a persistent and regular basis.\u201d 18.  The applicant\u2019s appeal against conviction and sentence was dismissed on 19 June 2009. However, on 9 February 2010 the Court of Appeal substituted the applicant\u2019s sentence of seven years\u2019 imprisonment with one of seven years\u2019 detention in a Young Offenders\u2019 Institution. While in detention he received sixteen adjudications, which included the use of threats and abusive behaviour, disobeying lawful orders, fighting with other inmates, and attempting to commit/incite another inmate to commit assault on staff. 19.  He was released on licence on 3 March 2011. 20.  Pursuant to section 32(5) of the United Kingdom Borders Act 2007 (\u201cthe 2007 Act\u201d), the Secretary of State was required to make a deportation order in respect of foreign criminals sentenced, inter alia, to a period of imprisonment of at least twelve months, unless one of the exceptions in section 33 \u2013 namely that removal would breach their rights under either the Refugee Convention or the European Convention on Human Rights \u2013 applied (see paragraphs 52 and 53 below). 21.  On 6 April 2010 the Secretary of State notified the applicant of his liability to automatic deportation and asked him to submit reasons why he should not be deported. His representatives responded to that letter; however, on 2 March 2011 he was served with both a deportation order dated 23 February 2011, and a decision that section 32(5) of the 2007 Act applied (that is, he was liable to automatic deportation and removal would not breach his rights under either the Refugee Convention or the European Convention on Human Rights). 22.  In a section of the decision headed \u201cConsideration under ECHR\u201d, the Secretary of State had regard to her obligations under Article 8 of the Convention. Although she accepted that the applicant had family ties in the United Kingdom with his mother, father, brother and sister, in the absence of further elements of dependency she found that these ties did not constitute family life. She did accept that he enjoyed private life in the United Kingdom but did not consider that his removal would be disproportionate to the legitimate interest of preventing disorder and crime. In particular, she noted that he had an elderly grandmother in Nigeria and as an adult he could be expected to readjust to life there. Furthermore, as English was one of the official languages of Nigeria, he would not face a language barrier on return. Finally, she had regard to the seriousness of his criminal record, the sixteen adjudications he had received while in detention, and the fact that he had been warned about the risk of reoffending in 2006. She therefore concluded that his deportation would not be in breach of Article 8 of the Convention. 23.  The applicant appealed against this decision. In support of his appeal, he submitted a report by Dr B., a consultant forensic psychiatrist. The report indicated that he suffered from dyslexia; that he had developed Adolescent Conduct Disorder which could manifest itself in antisocial behaviour but was not inevitably associated with continued offending in adult life; and that although he presented a medium risk of reoffending, there existed a number of positive factors which would decrease the likelihood of continued criminal involvement, including his family\u2019s abstention from criminal activity, his sustained and supportive parental relationships, his wish to improve himself, and the absence of substance misuse. 24.  On 8 June 2011 the First-tier Tribunal (IAC) allowed the applicant\u2019s appeal on Article 8 grounds, having found that his deportation would be neither proportionate nor necessary in a democratic society. It found that the applicant did enjoy family life with his parents and younger siblings, his unfortunate history having resulted in a particular dependency on them, since he required their support to \u201chelp him to change from being a criminal offender to an employed adult and useful member of society\u201d. In addition, it found that he had also established a private life in the United Kingdom; that he had no experience of living in Nigeria, save for a short period as a baby and a two week holiday in 2004; that he had no close relatives in, and no ties to, Nigeria; that he had indicated his remorse and given assurances that he would not offend again; and that his working and studying whilst in detention supported those assurances. 25.  The Secretary of State was granted permission to appeal on 24 June 2011. 26.  On 31 October 2011 the Upper Tribunal (IAC) found there to have been a material error of law in the decision of the First-tier Tribunal. The decision was set aside in its entirety and the case submitted for a full rehearing before the Upper Tribunal. 27.  On 24 April 2012 the Upper Tribunal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal against the deportation order. 28.  The Tribunal considered the principles established by this Court in Boultif v. Switzerland, no. 54273/00, ECHR 2001\u2011IX, \u00dcner v. the Netherlands [GC], no. 46410/99, ECHR 2006\u2011XII and Maslov v. Austria [GC], no. 1638/03, ECHR 2008. In its view, the single most compelling factor in the applicant\u2019s favour was the length of his residence in the United Kingdom. It also had regard to his family ties. Although it did not accept that there was any additional element of dependency which would enable it to find the existence of family life for the purposes of Article 8 of the Convention, it nevertheless accepted that the applicant\u2019s parents and siblings were an important part of his private life. 29.  Balanced against his long residence and established private life, the Tribunal considered the applicant\u2019s criminal record. It noted that he had a long history of offending, beginning at the age of twelve; that he had received fair warning from the Secretary of State in 2006 that any further offending would not be tolerated; that notwithstanding that warning and the subsequent assurances given to the Secretary of State that he was turning his life around, he was already engaged in drug dealing; that his criminal behaviour had not only continued but had also escalated; that whilst serving his most recent sentence, he had received sixteen adjudications, the majority of them for violence and disobedience; that his problems with dyslexia could not be used as an excuse to justify his poor behaviour and repeat offending; and that whilst the majority of his offending had occurred when he was a child, his most recent and most serious had occurred after he had attained his majority. 30.  With regard to the issue of future offending and risk to the public, the Tribunal found it difficult to accept his assurances that he had had a genuine change of heart and no longer posed a risk to the public. He had made similar assurances when faced with deportation in 2006, and since his criminal associates were in prison the fact that he did not see them was not a weighty factor indicating a lifestyle change. Furthermore, there was no evidence that either of his parents would be able to exert any positive influence over him, as they had been unable to do so in the past. Although he was in employment on a probationary period, there was no evidence of a contingency plan should he not progress into more secure employment. 31.  Therefore, whilst accepting that the applicant\u2019s removal would be difficult, the Tribunal concluded that he was of an age where he could be expected to \u201cstand on his own two feet and make a life for himself\u201d. His family could visit him in Nigeria and there was evidence to suggest that he had a number of relatives living there. The Tribunal further noted that he had no girlfriend or children in the United Kingdom, he was in good health, and he would not face any language difficulties as there was a universal use of English in Nigeria. Consequently, the Tribunal concluded that in spite of his long residence and family circumstances, serious reasons (as required by this Court in Maslov, cited above, \u00a7 75) existed to justify the applicant\u2019s expulsion, and that the public interest in effecting deportation outweighed his Article 8 rights. 32.  On 21 June 2012 the Upper Tribunal refused to grant the applicant permission to appeal. The Court of Appeal similarly refused permission to appeal on 12 September 2012, and again on 30 October 2012 following an oral hearing. It found that although the case had required a difficult and delicate balancing exercise, the Upper Tribunal had provided a thorough and careful determination, and the conclusion reached was one which had been open to it. 33.  On 9 July 2012 the Secretary of State amended the Immigration Rules (see paragraphs 54-57 below). In so far as relevant, the new Rules (which have since been further amended) provided that the deportation of foreign criminals would be conducive to the public good if they were sentenced to four or more years\u2019 imprisonment. In such cases, the public interest would only be outweighed in \u201cexceptional circumstances\u201d. 34.  On 9 November 2012 and 14 November 2012 the applicant submitted further representations to the Secretary of State based on his fourteen-month relationship with a British national, who had no connection to Nigeria, and the birth of their son on 1 October 2012. The Secretary of State treated those representations as an application to revoke the deportation order and refused it on 3 January 2013. She also certified the applicant\u2019s claim, which meant that he was not afforded an automatic in\u2011country right of appeal. 35.  On 14 January 2013 the applicant sought permission to apply for judicial review of the Secretary of State\u2019s decision to certify his claim. Along with his application, he provided medical evidence that his son required an operation in March 2013 to correct an umbilical hernia, and that he had been diagnosed with respiratory syncytial virus and bronchiolitis. 36.  On 19 February 2013 the Secretary of State agreed to withdraw the certification decision and to issue a new decision taking account of the applicant\u2019s further representations of November 2012 and those lodged with the judicial review application in January 2013. 37.  The Secretary of State considered the applicant\u2019s further representations in light of the amended Immigration Rules. In a decision dated 11 April 2013, she refused to revoke the deportation order since there were no \u201cexceptional factors\u201d which outweighed the public interest. In particular, she noted that the applicant had entered into a relationship in the full knowledge of the intention to deport him; that both the applicant and his partner should have been fully aware of the implications of conceiving a child in those circumstances; that no valid reason had been given to explain the applicant\u2019s failure to make submissions regarding his relationship at either the Upper Tribunal hearing in April 2012 or the Court of Appeal hearing on 30 October 2012; that if the applicant\u2019s partner wished to continue the family unit in Nigeria, suitable medication would be available in that country to treat their son\u2019s bronchiolitis condition; that there was no evidence of any exceptional, compelling or compassionate factors; and that deportation remained a proportionate response to the applicant\u2019s serious criminal offending. 38.  The applicant appealed. He submitted a number of documents in support of his case, including a further psychiatric report by Dr B. dated 17 July 2013. The report indicated that he had continued to make progress in adopting a \u201cpro-social lifestyle\u201d, that he had addressed his tendency to violence, that he no longer had any criminal associates, that he had demonstrated a commitment to his partner and their son, that he had secured employment, and that the risk of re-offending and of harm to the public was very low. 39.  The First-tier Tribunal, having heard oral evidence from the applicant, his partner, mother, father, brother and sister, and having considered the evidence before it, dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal on 16 September 2013. 40.  Using a two-stage approach, the Tribunal first considered the applicant\u2019s case under the Immigration Rules. It noted that the applicant\u2019s most recent conviction was for a serious offence which had attracted a sentence of seven years\u2019 detention; that following the amendment of the Immigration Rules, \u201cexceptional circumstances\u201d would be required to prevent deportation; and that those \u201cexceptional circumstances\u201d were inextricably bound up with the applicant\u2019s Article 8 rights. 41.  In this regard, the Tribunal recalled that the applicant\u2019s family and personal circumstances had been examined with the most careful and thorough consideration by the Upper Tribunal in 2012. It had considered them in the context of the exceptionality requirements set out in Maslov (the requirement of \u201cvery serious reasons\u201d to justify the expulsion of a settled migrant: see Maslov, cited above, \u00a7 75) and concluded that his deportation was justified. The Tribunal noted, however, that the applicant\u2019s personal circumstances had since changed. It therefore gave careful consideration to his two-and-a-half-year relationship with his partner and the birth of their child. Nevertheless, it concluded that neither the relationship nor the birth of the child amounted to an \u201cexceptional circumstance\u201d within the context of the Immigration Rules. Although it accepted that there would be an inevitable interference with the family life said to exist between the applicant, his partner and their child, it found there to be nothing \u201cexceptional\u201d about this. Consequently, the Tribunal did not consider that his family and personal circumstances amounted to the \u201cexceptionality\u201d required by the Immigration Rules. 42.  The Tribunal moved on to consider Article 8 as a separate issue, having regard to the findings of the Upper Tribunal in 2012. It agreed with the Upper Tribunal that language would not be an obstacle for the applicant since English was widely spoken in Nigeria. It further noted that while the evidence as to the existence of family in Nigeria was somewhat confusing, it was perhaps not of fundamental importance for an adult quite capable of standing on his own two feet; that the applicant would continue to receive support from his parents following his removal to Nigeria; and that his parents could visit him there as often as they wished. 43.  In respect of the applicant\u2019s relationship with his partner and their child, it observed that he had failed to disclose his immigration status to his partner until after she had fallen pregnant; that he and his partner had never lived together; that his partner and child had the full support of her family in the United Kingdom, with whom they lived, and that support would continue following the applicant\u2019s deportation; and that his child could visit him in Nigeria and maintain such a relationship as deemed appropriate. Therefore, having carefully considered the issue of proportionality, including \u201csection 55 [of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 \u2013 see paragraph 60 below] and the best interests of the Appellant\u2019s child\u201d, the Tribunal concluded that the Secretary of State had a legitimate interest in maintaining appropriate immigration control and social order within the United Kingdom, and that the interests in effecting the applicant\u2019s deportation were not outweighed by his Article 8 rights. 44.  The applicant sought permission to appeal on the ground that the Tribunal had erred in concluding that his circumstances were not \u201cexceptional\u201d for the purposes of the Immigration Rules. The First-tier Tribunal refused permission to appeal on 4 October 2013. The applicant made a further application for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal, raising the same grounds as before the First-tier Tribunal. In addition, he also submitted that the application raised an important point of principle: namely, whether the decision of the Tribunal was contrary to the principle of double jeopardy, or constituted discriminatory punishment, since a British national could not be excluded from the United Kingdom. On 23 October 2013 the Upper Tribunal refused the application for permission to appeal. Both Tribunals found that the applicant\u2019s grounds sought, in essence, to reargue the merits of the appeal and that no error of law had been disclosed. 45.  The applicant then sought permission to apply for judicial review of the Upper Tribunal\u2019s refusal of the application for permission to appeal. Following the Supreme Court judgment in R (on the application of Cart) v. The Upper Tribunal; R (on the application of MR (Pakistan)) v. The Upper Tribunal (Immigration & Asylum Chamber) and Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] UKSC 28, the Administrative Court could only review decisions of the Upper Tribunal if the \u201csecond appeal\u201d test was satisfied; that is, if the appeal raised an important point of principle, or there was another compelling reason to allow it to succeed. In the present case the applicant once again submitted that the \u201cdouble jeopardy\u201d argument raised an important point of principle. However, on 6 December 2013 the Administrative Court refused the application for permission to apply for judicial review. In refusing permission the judge expressly stated that while it was \u201capparent that different views might reasonably be taken about whether the Claimant should be permitted to remain in the UK in the light of his family ties and length of residence\u201d, that was \u201cnot the test for the grant of permission\u201d. 46.  Following the refusal of the application for permission to apply for judicial review, the applicant had no right to renew the application at an oral hearing in the Administrative Court. However, it would have been possible for him to apply to the Court of Appeal for permission to appeal against the Administrative Court\u2019s decision. 47.  Removal directions scheduled for 20 January 2015 were cancelled owing to the absence of a valid travel document. 48.  On 18 March 2015 the applicant advised the Court that his relationship with his partner had broken down and that he had court-ordered direct contact with his son on alternate Saturdays. 49.  On 4 August 2015 the Secretary of State advised the applicant that an application to the Nigerian authorities for a travel document, required to effect his deportation from the United Kingdom, was pending.", "references": ["8", "6", "7", "2", "1", "4", "5", "9", "0", "3", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicants are the next-of-kin of several Roma who died or disappeared in the circumstances described below. 7.  On the night of 15 August 1999 around seventy Roma boarded the boat \u201cMiss Pat\u201d on the Montenegrin coast with the intention of reaching Italy. A few hours later the boat sank owing to the large number of passengers. 8.  By 30 August 1999 one of the passengers had been found alive on the Montenegrin shore, and thirty-five bodies had been found in the sea, thirteen of which were identified by their relatives. The forensic specialists who had performed autopsies on the bodies by 30 August 1999 stated that the cause of death could not be established with certainty on the basis of autopsies alone. In their opinion, however, the cause of death was drowning. 9.  On 1 September 1999 the Court of First Instance (Osnovni sud) in Bar initiated a formal judicial investigation (rje\u0161enje o sprovo\u0111enju istrage) against seven individuals on suspicion of illegally crossing the State border in connection with reckless endangerment. 10.  By 21 October 1999 the investigating judge had (a) questioned two suspects who were available to the authorities at the time, as well as thirty other individuals in relation to the incident, including the eleventh applicant; (b) requested that some other witnesses be questioned by the relevant authorities in Serbia; and (c) asked for the autopsy reports, an expert opinion on the capacity of the boat and a report on the weather conditions on the night of the incident. The eleventh applicant was questioned on 10 September 1999. She stated that she had been living with her brother and sister-in-law and their children in Kosovo, but that her brother and sister-in-law had decided to go to Montenegro. They had not called her from Podgorica or mentioned that they had intended to go to Italy. She also stated that she had not recognised them amongst the bodies found, but had recognised her brother\u2019s arm in one of the photographs shown to her during questioning. Being illiterate, she had \u201csigned\u201d the minutes of the hearing by giving a fingerprint. 11.  On 21 October 1999 the State prosecutor in Bar lodged an indictment with the Court of First Instance in Bar against the seven suspects. 12.  On 29 October 1999 the court decided that it lacked territorial competence to deal with the case and transferred it to the Court of First Instance in Kotor. On 6 December 1999 the High Court (Vi\u0161i sud) in Podgorica declared that the court in Bar was territorially competent to process the case and the case was returned. 13.  By the end of 2002 the court in Bar had decided that two defendants still at large would be tried in their absence and appointed representatives for them. The remaining five defendants appeared before the court. 14.  Between 25 December 2002 and 24 September 2003 ten trial hearings (glavni pretres) were scheduled, five of which took place. Four were adjourned because some of the defence lawyers, defendants, witnesses and an interpreter did not attend court; there is no information in the case file about one of the hearings. During the hearings that did take place, the court questioned four defendants and eleven witnesses. 15.  On 24 September 2003 the court decided to recommence the trial hearing due to the passage of time. By 14 April 2004 ten hearings had been scheduled, six of which took place. Four were adjourned because one of the defence lawyers and some of the witnesses did not attend court. During the hearings that did take place, the court read out the indictment again, questioned four defendants and sixteen witnesses, including the eleventh applicant, and read out the earlier statements made by the witnesses; the fifth defendant chose to remain silent. The eleventh applicant was heard on 8 October 2003. She stated that she had come to Podgorica with her brother and his family and had had no idea that her brother and his wife had intended to go to Italy. When asked to explain the differences between that and her previous statement of 10 September 1999, she stated that she was certain that they had all been together since they had all been living together in one tent. She also confirmed that she was illiterate. 16.  On 14 April 2004 the Supreme State Prosecutor (Vrhovni dr\u017eavni tu\u017eilac) in Podgorica instructed the State prosecutor in Bar to specify the indictment in terms of the facts and legal classification of the criminal offences, after which the court in Bar would declare that it lacked competence to deal with the case and would transfer it to the High Court in Podgorica (hereinafter \u201cthe High Court\u201d), as the competent court to deal with it. Accordingly, the indictment was amended and the case file transferred to the High State Prosecutor (Vi\u0161i dr\u017eavni tu\u017eilac) and the High Court. 17.  On 26 May 2004 the High State Prosecutor requested that an investigation be opened (zahtjev za sprovo\u0111enje istrage) against the same seven people and another individual, Z, on suspicion of committing reckless endangerment. 18.  By 20 October 2004 the High Court had questioned four of the defendants, while the fifth had chosen to remain silent. It also ordered that the remaining three defendants be brought before the court. 19.  On 11 November 2004 an investigating judge of the High Court decided to initiate a formal judicial investigation against the eight individuals, a decision which was upheld by the High Court on 25 November 2004. 20.  On 25 February 2006 the High State Prosecutor urged the investigating judge to finish the investigation. 21.  On 28 March 2006 an expert witness issued an opinion on the capacity of the boat. 22.  On 31 October 2006 the High State Prosecutor charged eight defendants with reckless endangerment under Article 338 \u00a7 2 in connection with Article 327 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3 of the Criminal Code (see paragraphs 43-44 below). 23.  Between 24 and 28 November 2006 the indictment was served on four of the defendants. 24.  On 15 January 2007 the president of the chamber informed the president of the High Court that a trial hearing could not be scheduled yet as the indictment had not yet been served on all the defendants. 25.  By 15 February 2008 the High Court had issued a national arrest warrant (potjernica) against one of the defendants, and had attempted to serve one on the other three, one of whom was in detention in Podgorica at the time. The other two were based in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina respectively. 26.  On 3 April 2008 the High Court rejected the indictment against Z (the defendant based in Serbia), a decision which was upheld by the Court of Appeal on 26 May 2008. 27.  By 28 September 2009 the High Court had decided that the two defendants at large, one of whom was based in Bosnia and Herzegovina, would be tried in their absence. 28.  At the first trial hearing on 28 September 2009 one of the defendants, X, stated that he was illiterate and did not understand the indictment. At the request of his lawyer the hearing was adjourned until further notice, so that the indictment could be translated into Romani. By 31 October 2009 the translation of the indictment into Romani had become available. 29.  In the course of 2010 seven hearings were scheduled. One was held on 8 October 2010, during which the indictment was read out and four defendants were heard, the fifth having chosen to remain silent. Six hearings scheduled for 5 February, 29 April, 4 June, 2 July, 17 November and 17 December 2010 were adjourned because some of the defendants, defence lawyers, the interpreter for Romani and a witness did not attend court. 30.  On 25 January 2011 another judge of the High Court took over the case. In the course of 2011 eight hearings were scheduled, seven of which were adjourned: (a) three because there was no permanent court interpreter for Romani; (b) two because the defence lawyers and witnesses did not attend court; (c) one because one defendant and several defence lawyers did not attend court and an interpreter had not yet been appointed; and (d) one because of changes to the Criminal Procedure Code, which made the relevant court panel incomplete. One hearing was held on 21 November 2011, during which four defendants were heard and their earlier defence statements made in 1999, 2003, 2004 and 2010 read out. The fifth defendant chose to remain silent. 31.  In the course of 2012 seven hearings were scheduled, two of which were adjourned because one defendant, a defence lawyer, some of the witnesses, including the seventh applicant, and/or the interpreter did not attend court. Five hearings were held, two of which by 24 September 2012, when several witnesses were heard. On 24 September 2012 the trial hearing was recommenced due to \u201cthe passage of more than three months\u201d. During that hearing and the subsequent two hearings four defendants and several witnesses were heard again, and a number of written documents were read out, including the indictment, the defendants\u2019 earlier statements and witness statements from 1999, 2003 and 2012, reports by the Kotor and Budva police directorates (odjeljenja bezbjednosti), as well as information provided by the Radio and Television of Montenegro and the Bar Public Information Centre. The fifth defendant remained silent. 32.  In the course of 2013 nine hearings were scheduled, five of which were adjourned because one of the defendants, two lawyers, an expert witness, a judge, and/or the interpreter did not attend. The lawyers were fined 500 euros (EUR) for their unjustified absence. By 18 December 2013 three hearings had been held, during which one expert witness was heard, and a number of other pieces of documentary evidence were read out, such as an earlier statement of another expert witness, earlier statements of other witnesses from 1999, 2003 and 2004, including the statements of the eleventh applicant, autopsy reports and reports from the Port of Bar of 1995 and 1998 relating to the boat. On 18 December 2013 the trial hearing was recommenced due to the passage of time. Four defendants and one of the expert witnesses were heard and their earlier statements read out. 33.  In the course of 2014 five hearings were scheduled, two of which were adjourned because the interpreter and one of the expert witnesses did not attend court and because one defendant was justifiably absent. By 4 June 2014 one hearing had been held, at which earlier statements of witnesses, including the eleventh applicant\u2019s statements, official reports, autopsy reports and experts witness statements were read out. On 4 June 2014 the trial hearing was recommenced due to the passage of time. At that and the subsequent hearing held in 2014 the court read out the indictment, the defendants\u2019 earlier statements and some witness statements, including the eleventh applicant\u2019s, as well as other written evidence. One of the witnesses was also heard. 34.  On 24 July 2014 the High Court acquitted all the accused for lack of evidence. On 10 November 2014 the High State Prosecutor appealed against that judgment. There is no information in the case file as to the outcome of the appeal. 35.  On an unspecified date prior to 7 December 2009 the Roma Centre complained to the Ombudsman, asking for the criminal proceedings to be expedited and the responsible persons punished, as well as for a DNA analysis of the bodies which had been buried. 36.  On 7 December 2009 the Ombudsman issued a report in this regard noting, in substance, that the investigation had lasted for more than seven years and that ten years after the impugned event the criminal proceedings had not yet been terminated, which was unjustified. He recommended that the High Court undertake all necessary steps to terminate the proceedings as soon as possible. 37.  On 21 December 2010 the Ombudsman enquired what had been done in the meantime. The judge in charge informed him of the hearings scheduled between October and December 2010. 38.  On 19 August 1999 the only surviving passenger was found guilty of boarding the boat on 16 August 1999 with the intention of illegally crossing the border to Italy and was fined by the Misdemeanour Court (Sud za prekr\u0161aje) in Kotor. 39.  In the course of 2002 a number of family members of those who had disappeared, two of them applicants in the present case, urged that the proceedings at issue be expedited. Some of them claimed that their next-of-kins were alive but had been trafficked. It appears that some others also hoped that their family members might still be alive. 40.  On 15 June 2011 the president of the High Court requested the Ministry of Justice to appoint a permanent court interpreter for Romani as soon as possible, stressing that one of the reasons for the criminal proceedings in question having \u201clasted too long\u201d had been the absence of an adequate interpreter for Romani. 41.  It would appear that on several occasions the Roma Centre requested the High Court to expedite the proceedings, and that on 16 August 2010 it issued a statement that the investigation had not been effective. 42.  The eleventh applicant\u2019s initial representative submitted an authority form signed by her. He also specified that her two sons, two daughters-in-law and five grandchildren had died or disappeared in the impugned event.", "references": ["3", "9", "7", "1", "4", "6", "2", "5", "8", "No Label", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "9.  The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Prague. 10.  On the basis of a contract signed on 2 November 2004 and governed by the provisions of the Labour Code, the applicant became an employee of the Ministry of Defence. 11.  On 27 December 2004, the Ministry\u2019s authorised representative requested the National Security Authority (N\u00e1rodn\u00ed bezpe\u010dnostn\u00ed \u00fa\u0159ad \u2013 \u201cthe Authority\u201d) to issue the applicant with security clearance (osv\u011bd\u010den\u00ed) giving him access to State classified information in the \u201csecret\u201d category (tajn\u00e9) in accordance with the duties to be carried out by him. 12.  On 1 January 2005 the applicant took up his duties as director of the Department of administration of the Ministry\u2019s property (Sekce spr\u00e1vy majetku Ministerstva obrany). 13.  On 19 July 2005 the Authority issued the applicant with security clearance, valid until 18 July 2010, confirming that he had access to State classified information in the \u201csecret\u201d category. 14.  During the year 2006 the applicant was appointed deputy to the first Vice-Minister of Defence (z\u00e1stupce Prvn\u00edho n\u00e1m\u011bstka ministra obrany), while continuing to carry out his duties as director of the Department of administration of the Ministry\u2019s property. 15.  On 7 October 2005 the Authority received confidential information from the intelligence service, classified \u201crestricted\u201d (vyhrazen\u00e9) and dated 5 October 2005. It started an investigation in order to verify the information received. In the course of that investigation the intelligence service provided the Authority with other information, dated 21 March 2006, classified \u201crestricted\u201d and annexed to the security file (bezpe\u010dnostn\u00ed spis) under number 77. On the basis of that information the Authority revoked the security clearance on 5 September 2006. There were two unrelated reasons for that decision: firstly, the applicant had failed to indicate, as he should have done when applying for security clearance, that he held directorships in a number of companies and accounts in foreign banks; and secondly, the applicant was considered to pose a national security risk, within the meaning of section 14(3)(d) of Law no. 412/2005. With regard to that risk, the decision did not however indicate which confidential information it was based on, as this was classified \u201crestricted\u201d and could not therefore legally be disclosed to the applicant. The decision indicated that the facts established in respect of his conduct, as documented in the information received by the Authority on 7 October 2005, cast doubt on his suitability for security clearance and his ability not to be influenced and to keep sensitive information secret, and thus indicated that he was no longer trustworthy. 16.  On an administrative appeal (rozklad) by the applicant, the director of the Authority, after obtaining an opinion from the appeals board, confirmed on 18 December 2006 the Authority\u2019s decision of 5 September 2006, but on partly different grounds. He dismissed as unfounded the complaint that the applicant had failed to disclose certain information prior to being issued with security clearance. However, he agreed with the Authority\u2019s conclusions regarding the existence of a security risk, which had transpired from the investigation carried out by the Authority and from the classified documents. 17.  In the meantime, on 4 October 2006, the applicant had asked to be discharged, for health reasons, from his duties as deputy to the first Vice-Minister of Defence, and from those of director of the Department of administration of the Ministry\u2019s property. He was removed from office on the same day under Article 65 \u00a7 2 of the Labour Code (see paragraph 26 below). On 20 October 2006 he signed an agreement, under Article 43 of the Labour Code, terminating his contract by mutual consent with effect from 31 January 2007. 18.  On 19 January 2007 the applicant lodged an application with the Prague Municipal Court (m\u011bstsk\u00fd soud) for judicial review of the decision revoking his security clearance. He and his lawyer were permitted to consult the file, but the parts classified as confidential were excluded. However, the documents containing information about the existence of a risk, including the confidential documents, had been sent by the Authority to the court, which had access to them. At the public hearing the applicant was given the opportunity to make his submissions and to state what he thought were the reasons for revoking his security clearance. He stated that he believed the information in question had been provided by a military intelligence service which had sought to take revenge on him for his refusal to accept a proposal to co-operate in a manner exceeding his statutory obligations. 19.  In a judgment of 1 September 2009 the court dismissed the application for judicial review. It observed that in a procedure revoking security clearance the relevant authority could only disclose reasons for revoking clearance that were based on non-classified documents and that as regards grounds based on classified documents it had to confine itself to referring to the relevant documents and their level of confidentiality. It found that the approach taken by the Authority, which had not disclosed to the applicant the contents of the information on the basis of which the security clearance had been revoked, had not been illegal as disclosure of such information was prohibited by law. It added that the applicant\u2019s rights had been sufficiently respected because the court had power to obtain knowledge of the classified information and assess whether it justified the decision taken by the Authority. 20.  In a judgment of 15 July 2010 the Supreme Administrative Court (Nejvy\u0161\u0161\u00ed spr\u00e1vn\u00ed soud) dismissed an appeal on points of law (kasa\u010dn\u00ed st\u00ed\u017enost) lodged by the applicant as unfounded. It considered that the classified documents in question had shown beyond any doubt that the applicant did not satisfy the statutory conditions to be entrusted with secret information. It observed that the risk in his regard concerned his conduct, which affected his credibility and his ability to keep information secret. The Supreme Administrative Court added that disclosure of the classified information could have entailed the disclosure of the intelligence service\u2019s working methods, the revelation of its information sources or the risk of influencing possible witnesses. It explained that there was a statutory prohibition on indicating where exactly the security risk lay and on specifying the considerations underlying the conclusion that such a risk existed, the reasons and considerations underlying the Authority\u2019s decision being based exclusively on classified information. Accordingly, the reasons for the decision had to be limited to a reference to the documents on which it was based and the level of confidentiality of the information used. It went on to observe that, owing to the special nature of proceedings where classified information was concerned, not all the applicant\u2019s procedural rights could be guaranteed but that the non-disclosure of the exact reasons underlying the decision to revoke security clearance was counterbalanced by the guarantee that the administrative courts had unlimited access to the classified documents. The Supreme Administrative Court pointed out that the report on the result of the investigations carried out by the intelligence service, included in the file under no. 77, contained specific, comprehensive and detailed information concerning the conduct and lifestyle of the applicant on the basis of which the court was satisfied in the present case as to its relevance for determining whether the applicant posed a national security risk. It observed, further, that the information did not in any way concern the applicant\u2019s refusal to co-operate with the military intelligence service. 21.  On 25 October 2010 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Constitutional Court (\u00dastavn\u00ed soud), complaining of the unfairness of the proceedings. In a judgment of 18 November 2010 the court dismissed his complaint as manifestly ill-founded. Referring to its earlier case-law on the subject, it observed that given the special nature and the importance of decisions adopted in respect of classified information where national security interests were manifest, it was not always possible to apply all the guarantees relating to fairness of proceedings. It considered that in the present case the courts\u2019 conduct had been duly justified and the reasoning in their decisions comprehensible and in conformity with the Constitution; that they had not departed from procedural standards and constitutional rules to an inordinate degree; and that the Constitutional Court was not therefore required to intervene in their decision-making procedure. 22.  On 16 March 2011 the prosecution service lodged a bill of indictment against the applicant and 51 other persons on charges of influencing the award of public contracts at the Ministry of Defence from 2005 to 2007. The applicant was indicted for participation in organised crime (\u00fa\u010dast na zlo\u010dinn\u00e9m spol\u010den\u00ed); aiding and abetting abuse of public power (pomoc k trestn\u00e9mu \u010dinu zneu\u017e\u00edv\u00e1n\u00ed pravomoci ve\u0159ejn\u00e9ho \u010dinitele); complicity in illegally influencing public tendering and public procurement procedures (pomoc k trestn\u00e9mu \u010dinu pletich p\u0159i ve\u0159ejn\u00e9 sout\u011b\u017ei a ve\u0159ejn\u00e9 dra\u017eb\u011b); and aiding and abetting breaches of binding rules governing economic relations (pomoc k trestn\u00e9mu \u010dinu poru\u0161ov\u00e1n\u00ed z\u00e1vazn\u00fdch pravidel hospod\u00e1\u0159sk\u00e9ho styku).\nIn a judgment of 25 March 2014 the \u010cesk\u00e9 Bud\u011bjovice Regional Court (krajsk\u00fd soud) found the applicant guilty and sentenced him, inter alia, to three years\u2019 imprisonment. In a judgment of 27 May 2016 the Prague High Court (Vrchn\u00ed soud) upheld the first-instance judgment convicting the applicant, but suspended execution of his prison sentence for a two-year probationary period. That judgment became final.", "references": ["8", "1", "7", "9", "0", "4", "5", "2", "6", "3", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The first applicant company, Axel Springer SE, is a publishing house operated in the legal form of a Societas Europea registered in Berlin. The second applicant company, RTL Television GmbH, is a broadcasting company set up as a private limited company registered in Cologne. 6.  On 14 June 2010 the defendant, S., then aged 28, was arrested. The public prosecutor\u2019s office charged him with killing his parents, dismembering their bodies, burning some of the parts, flushing others down the toilet and disposing of the rest by putting them in barrels. S. confessed to the police. Several German newspapers reported on the case. Some published pictures of S., which mostly showed him at a much younger age. 7.  The public prosecutor\u2019s office obtained a psychiatric expert opinion in October 2010. The expert concluded that S. was suffering from a schizoid personality disorder at the time when he had committed the offence. 8.  The trial against S. began on 11 January 2011 at the Potsdam Regional Court. Photographers working for the applicant companies attended the hearings to take still photographs and make video\u2011recordings of the defendant. 9.  Prior to the start of the hearing, the presiding judge informed the photojournalists orally that the defendant\u2019s face would have to be made unidentifiable \u201cin the usual manner\u201d before any images of him were published. 10.  According to the applicant companies, the presiding judge had indicated at the beginning of the hearing on 11 January 2011 that anyone who failed to comply with this order no longer needed to show himself at the Regional Court of Potsdam and apply for permission to take photos of future proceedings. The applicant companies submitted a copy of an email of a journalist who attended the hearing confirming the alleged statement of the presiding judge. 11.  The Government contested the applicant companies\u2019 assertions that the presiding judge had threatened not only to bar journalists from taking photographs during the proceedings against the defendant, but also from future proceedings before the Potsdam Regional Court. The Government submitted that according to the presiding judge no such statement had been made. 12.  S. repeated his confession on the first day of the hearing. 13.  By a letter of 12 January 2011 the second applicant company asked the President of the Regional Court to change the presiding judge\u2019s oral order. It pointed out, inter alia, that several unpixelated pictures of S. had been published in different newspapers before. By a letter of the same date the president replied that he had forwarded the letter to the presiding judge for lack of competence. 14.  On 17 January 2011 the presiding judge supplemented his order and provided his reasons in writing. The only media representatives who were permitted to take photographs and make video-recordings of S. were those who had previously registered with the court and given an assurance that prior to the publication or forwarding of the material, the face of S. would be disguised by a technical process, for example by pixelisation, so that it would only be possible to use the images in such a form. Journalists were barred from further reporting on the case if they failed to comply with the order. 15.  The presiding judge stated in his reasons that he had to balance the public interest in being informed and the personality rights of S. He acknowledged that the crime at issue was very different from \u201cusual crimes\u201d and that permitting only pictures that disguised S. impaired the public\u2019s ability to be informed. However, he held that the order was justified in view of the need to protect the personality rights of S. He reasoned that it was unlikely that the case had caused a sensation throughout Germany. No nationwide television channel besides the second applicant had shown any interest in reporting on it. He stressed the importance of the presumption of innocence, finding that reporting on S. in a way which identified him could have a \u201cpillory effect\u201d. Consequently, according to the presiding judge the personality rights of S., who had never been in the public eye or sought to contact the media and who had expressly requested that his identity be concealed, outweighed the public interest in being informed. Furthermore, the order had already proved to be necessary as there had been individual violations of the judge\u2019s instructions following the first day of the hearing. 16.  On 18 January 2011 the presiding judge sent the supplemented written order to a number of journalists, including some who worked for the applicant companies. 17.  On 31 January 2011 the applicant companies filed an objection (Gegenvorstellung), requesting the suspension of the judicial order banning the publication of images enabling identification \u201cduring the proceedings against (...) S.\u201d (\u201df\u00fcr die Dauer des Prozesses gegen (...) S.\u201d). The applicant companies stressed the fact that S. had confessed to the crime on the first day of the hearing. 18.  On 4 February 2011 the presiding judge upheld the order. He held that the implications of the confession and its credibility could only be assessed at the end of the hearing. 19.  Further hearings took place on 20 and 27 January 2011 and on 8 February 2011. On 10 February 2011 the Regional Court delivered its verdict, sentencing the defendant to prison on two counts of murder. 20.   On 1 February 2012 the Federal Constitutional Court declined to consider a constitutional complaint by the applicant companies, without providing reasons (no. 1 BvR 381/11).", "references": ["1", "8", "7", "3", "2", "4", "5", "9", "6", "0", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1992 and lives in Tbilisi. 6.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7.  On 9 November 2006 a classmate of the applicant, Mr T.T. (hereinafter \u201cT.T.\u201d), was stabbed several times in a secondary school playground. The applicant, aged fourteen at the material time, was present at the scene. There were no eyewitnesses to the incident. 8.  According to the applicant\u2019s version of the events, on the above date and at the material time, she met with T.T. in the school playground. They were discussing T.T.\u2019s need for a certain sum of money when four young men \u2013 strangers to the applicant \u2013 appeared and two of them immediately attacked T.T. One of the two attackers held T.T. down on the ground and both men stabbed him several times with two different knives. The applicant claimed that T.T. had owed them money. One witness (\u201cthe witness\u201d) stated that at the material time she had seen two young men fitting the description given by the applicant climb into the school playground swearing and leave after a while. 9.  According to the official version of the events based on T.T.\u2019s statements, the applicant and T.T. met in the school playground following the former\u2019s promise to lend T.T. a certain sum of money. In the course of the conversation, T.T. kneeled with his back to the applicant. At that moment, the applicant hit him on the head. T.T. fell to the ground and the applicant stabbed him with a knife from behind. While T.T. remained conscious, the applicant held him down with one hand and continued stabbing him with the other. T.T. was facing the ground during the entire incident and could not see whether the applicant was using a knife. T.T. managed to escape from the applicant and ran approximately forty metres before falling unconscious on the school\u2019s basketball court, where he was eventually found. Later he was transported to a hospital where, after emergency surgery, his life was saved. 10.  On 14 November 2006 the applicant was arrested in view of T.T.\u2019s statement given to the investigating authorities. She was subsequently remanded in custody on charges of attempted aggravated murder. 11.  On 9 January 2007 a forensic expert report of the Ministry of the Interior (\u201cthe first MI report\u201d) confirmed that multiple wounds had been inflicted upon the victim with \u201ca sharp object, possibly a knife\u201d. A forensic chemical examination report no. 443/sq produced by the Ministry of the Interior (\u201cthe second MI report\u201d) found particles of grey cotton fibre on the applicant\u2019s jacket that by their colour, structure, and type were similar to the grey cotton fibre contained in the textile of the victim\u2019s jacket. 12.  On an unspecified date an initial forensic medical expert report no. 6135 by the National Forensic Bureau (\u201cthe first NFB report\u201d) concluded that T.T.\u2019s wounds had been inflicted with a sharp object and that taken together, they had been life-threatening. The expert attached particular importance to two wounds to the chest which had perforated T.T.\u2019s lungs. Between 16 and 20 February 2007 the same forensic expert carried out an additional examination and issued report no. 998/31 (\u201cthe second NFB report\u201d) at the applicant\u2019s request. The second report specified that six wounds had perforated T.T.\u2019s lungs and re-confirmed that \u201call the wounds had been inflicted with some sharp object/objects and, taken together, were life-threatening.\u201d Concerning the question of whether the injuries were inflicted on the victim with one or several weapons, the NFB expert stated:\n\u201cIn order to answer that question it is necessary to convene a panel of forensic\u2011medical experts, and additionally to have the clothes as well as the object/objects possibly used to inflict the injuries presented, if available.\u201d 13.  The expert testified during the proceedings before the first-instance court that the discrepancy between the first and the second NFB reports concerning the number of wounds inflicted on the victim had been caused by the poor quality of the photocopied material relied on during the first NFB expert examination. The expert confirmed that the second NFB report was therefore more accurate and six, rather than two, wounds had perforated T.T.\u2019s lungs. The exact figure depicting the total number of wounds was not explicitly specified either by the experts or by the domestic courts. 14.  On 12 June 2007 the Tbilisi City Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced her to ten years\u2019 imprisonment, of which the last five years were suspended on probation. Dismissing altogether the applicant\u2019s version of the events and relying on T.T.\u2019s statements, the first and second NFB reports, the first and the second MI reports and other evidence in the case, the court found that the applicant had stabbed T.T. \u201cwith a knife.\u201d The knife was never recovered. Amongst certain other items of evidence, the City Court also referred, in its judgment, to statements of several witnesses, schoolmates of the applicant, according to which the latter was known for having been carrying a knife with her at school on a regular basis. 15.  The applicant appealed, reiterating that the victim had been stabbed by two young men with two knives and that she could not possibly have inflicted the wounds alone. She argued that the witness statement supporting her version of the events had been rejected arbitrarily. During the trial at the Tbilisi Court of Appeal, in accordance with Article 364 \u00a7 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 40 below), the defence adduced in evidence two alternative forensic reports, both issued on 2 November 2007, and argued that their results supported the applicant\u2019s version of the events, including the use of two knives, and conclusively excluded the applicant\u2019s guilt. 16.  The first report, of a comprehensive alternative forensic expert examination, was prepared by a panel of experts at a private forensic science centre. The descriptive part of the report no. 42/k, which reflected results of an examination carried out between 25 October and 2 November 2007 (\u201cthe first alternative forensic report\u201d), was based on the following material: the judgment of the first-instance court, T.T.\u2019s statements, the applicant\u2019s statements, the first MI report and T.T.\u2019s medical file. 17.  The applicant\u2019s lawyer presented the panel of experts with the following questions:\n\u201c1. Based on the [existing evidence and the victim\u2019s statements] ... was the victim capable of showing resistance to G. Kuparadze or otherwise defending himself ...? 2. Considering the existing material, what type of pain and responsive reactions (self-defence, etc.) would the [victim] have had at the time the first injury was inflicted on him? 3. In view of the [victim\u2019s] statements and considering the mechanism used to inflict the injuries described in the [forensic reports], how plausible is it that G. Kuparadze inflicted them on the [victim] by holding his shoulder with one hand while the latter was initially kneeling and then crawling on the ground face-down? 4. In view of the convicted G. Kuparadze\u2019s statement, how possible is it that the [victim\u2019s] injuries described in the [forensic reports], given the mechanism used to inflict them, were inflicted by two different persons if one of them had been holding [the victim]?\u201d 18.  The part of the report entitled \u201ccircumstances of the case\u201d contained excerpts from the applicant\u2019s criminal case file with the following concluding paragraph:\n\u201cGiven that the [first-instance] court accepted the [victim\u2019s] statements and dismissed the statements given by the convicted G. Kuparadze and [the witness], that the statements given by the [victim] and the convicted G. Kuparadze essentially contradict each other, that there is no eyewitness in the case except for [the witness], as well as the fact that the weapon of the crime is missing, the lawyer commissioned the alternative expert examination to determine the truth regarding the case and in order to receive answers to his questions.\u201d\nThis was followed by a more detailed account and an assessment of the matter. 19.  After examining all the material at hand, the experts came to the following conclusions in response to the questions posed by the applicant:\n\u201c1. ... Before losing consciousness, T.T. was able to carry out various active measures (self-defence, punching, running, etc.). 2. ... [considering the nature of the injuries] T.T. would have experienced a sharp, strong pain at the moment of their infliction which would have triggered adequate self-defensive or other movements. 3. Considering the statement given by T.T. ... the location of the wounds ... and the anatomical-physiological differences between the sexes ... it is hard to imagine how G. Kuparadze could have inflicted the wounds on T.T. in the conditions described by the latter. 4. Considering the nature and location of T.T.\u2019s wounds, it is entirely possible that they were inflicted in the conditions described by G. Kuparadze (by two individuals, one holding T.T. and both stabbing him with knives).\u201d 20.  The applicant\u2019s lawyer commissioned a second forensic expert report from the Research Centre for Independent Forensic Examinations of the Georgian Technical University concerning the instrument of the crime and other technical aspects of the incident. The report no. 2-e-116, which reflected results of an examination carried out between 19 October 2007 and 2 November 2007 (\u201cthe second alternative forensic report\u201d), was based on the following material: the statements of T.T., the statements of the applicant, the first MI report, the second NFB report, T.T.\u2019s medical file and the first-instance court judgment. 21.  The lawyer presented the panel of experts with the following questions:\n\u201c1. In view of the [forensic] expert reports presented, were the injuries to [the victim\u2019s] body and [through his] clothes inflicted with one or several objects (knives)? 2. How possible is it that G. Kuparadze inflicted the wounds as described in T.T.\u2019s statement, by holding his shoulder with one hand while he was initially kneeling and then crawling on the ground face-down, in view of the mechanism used to inflict the wounds [described in the forensic and forensic medical reports]? 3. How possible is it that the ... wounds were inflicted by two different individuals and accordingly with two different knives, in accordance with the statement given by G. Kuparadze?\u201d 22.  Having provided a reconstruction of the incident by means of sketches and having analysed the case materials, the experts reached the following conclusions:\n\u201c1. The wounds were inflicted on T.T.\u2019s body and [through his] clothes not with one but with two sharp objects, possibly knives, of different sizes, 2 and 4 centimetres wide [respectively]. 2. G. Kuparadze could not have inflicted the wounds as described in T.T.\u2019s statement, by holding his shoulder with one hand while he was initially kneeling and then crawling on the ground face-down, in view of the mechanism used to inflict the wounds [described in the forensic and forensic medical reports] and bearing in mind the limited access to the areas of impact. 3. ... it is possible ... that the ... wounds were inflicted by two different individuals (and accordingly with two different knives), as described in G. Kuparadze\u2019s statement.\u201d 23.  On 7 December 2007 the Tbilisi Court of Appeal upheld the conviction. Concerning the applicant\u2019s argument that the witness statement confirmed her version of the events, the court reasoned that although the witness had stated that she had seen two men climb in and out of the school playground, she had also said that that was a common sight at that school. Accordingly, the court found it impossible to establish that those persons had been implicated in T.T.\u2019s stabbing. 24.  The Court of Appeal dismissed the two alternative forensic reports commissioned by the defence. Regarding the first alternative forensic report, the court stated the following:\n\u201cThe court cannot accept the findings of the [first alternative forensic report] given that it is drafted in violation of a number of procedural norms. In particular, information as to which specific materials were presented [to the experts] and relied on when reaching the conclusions is missing; the research part of the forensic report contains a legal assessment of the [first-instance court] judgment and of a number of pieces of evidence, whereas under Article 96 of the Code of Criminal Procedure an expert examination is not to be carried out to determine legal matters. Furthermore, the concluding part of the expert examination [report] is presumptive, speculative and based on probability which, in the first place, is beyond the expert\u2019s competence as provided for in Articles 365 [and] 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, [and] no evidentiary value may be attributed to speculative findings, in accordance with Article 371 (6) [of the Code].\u201d 25.  As regards the second alternative forensic report, the court noted the following:\n\u201cThe court cannot accept the findings of the [second alternative forensic report] as they are also speculative. Furthermore, the report relies on the conclusions of the medical and forensic expert examinations [medical documentation, the MI report and the second NFB report] which themselves do not categorically determine the nature of the object used to inflict the injuries on the victim, and even more so the number [of such injuries]. Without referring to a concrete scientific study, the [report] analyses and rejects the victim\u2019s statement and relies on the statement of the accused.\u201d 26.  The appellate court also reasoned that the applicant\u2019s argument that two unidentified men had beaten the victim while stabbing him was not confirmed in view of the absence of any physical signs of beating in the relevant forensic medical report. In the subsequent part of the judgment the Court of Appeal referred to the first and the second MI reports and the second NFB report, among other evidence, while upholding the judgment of the first-instance court. 27.  On 12 September 2008 the Supreme Court of Georgia dismissed an appeal on points of law lodged by the applicant as inadmissible. Without responding to the applicant\u2019s arguments that the lower courts\u2019 dismissal of the alternative forensic reports had been erroneous and arbitrary, and that the main argument of the defence had been left without an appropriate answer, the court reproduced the relevant provision of the Criminal Procedure Code, holding that \u201cthe case [was] not important for the development of the law and coherent judicial practice, the [contested] decision [did] not differ from the Supreme Court\u2019s existing practice in such matters, and the appellate court [had] not committed any major procedural flaws during its examination which could have significantly affected its outcome.\u201d 28.  On 16 November 2006 the applicant, aged fourteen at the time, was remanded in custody and placed in a cell together with adult female inmates in Tbilisi Prison no. 5 for Women and Juveniles (\u201cprison no. 5\u201d). According to the case file, the applicant did not complain about the material conditions of her detention in that cell. 29.  On 10 January 2007 the Minister of Justice issued an order for the creation of a separate section for juvenile female offenders within prison no. 5, and instructed the relevant authority to separate the inmates accordingly. 30.  On 24 January 2007 the applicant was moved to the newly created juvenile section of prison no. 5. She was alone in a cell for five months and subsequently shared the cell with two other juveniles. The applicant complained about the material conditions of detention in that cell during the proceedings concerning the deferral of her sentence (see paragraphs 32\u201134 below). 31.  On 21 February 2009 the Public Defender of Georgia visited the applicant in prison. In letters dated 6 March and 24 April 2009 addressed to the Minister of Corrections and Legal Assistance, the Public Defender expressed his concerns about the conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention in prison no. 5. According to him, the cell in which the applicant was detained with two other juveniles measured approximately 12-15 square metres, the water tap was out of order, causing humidity in the cell, and the ventilation did not function properly, which led to an unpleasant odour. According to a press release issued by the Public Defender\u2019s Office on 20 March 2009, the tap in the applicant\u2019s cell was fixed shortly afterwards. 32.  On 11 March 2009 the applicant instituted proceedings requesting the deferral of her sentence pending the construction of a separate detention facility for juvenile female offenders. She argued that, in the absence of a separate facility, her detention in the adult prison, even if in a separate section for juveniles, as such amounted to a breach of Article 3 of the Convention. She further complained that the cell where she was serving her sentence was too small, the water tap was out of order causing humidity, the ventilation did not function properly, and that she was deprived of the opportunity to have daily walks, contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. 33.  On 16 June 2009 the Tbilisi City Court rejected the deferral request as manifestly ill-founded. It reasoned that domestic legislation did not provide for deferral of a sentence pending the construction of a separate detention facility for juveniles and that the complaints concerning the alleged violation of the applicant\u2019s rights under Article 3 of the Convention had not been substantiated. The applicant appealed. 34.  On 23 September 2009 the Tbilisi Court of Appeal rejected the appeal as manifestly ill-founded in a final decision. It reasoned that such a deferral was not guaranteed by the domestic legislation. As regards the applicant\u2019s allegation that her rights under Article 3 of the Convention had been violated, the court found the complaint unsubstantiated and contrary to the material available before it. It based its finding on the applicant\u2019s own admission before the court that she had been afforded the possibility of unlimited daily walks but sometimes chose not to use her exercise time, as she preferred not to share the space with other inmates, that she was free to take showers even if taking turns with other juvenile inmates, and that she was able to see the psychologist present in the prison without any problems. 35.  According to the applicant, she completed her secondary education while in detention, and was admitted to a university after passing the requisite admission exam. 36.  On 11 November 2011 the applicant was released on probation.", "references": ["2", "3", "8", "4", "0", "7", "9", "1", "5", "6", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1967 and lives in Rochefort, France. 7.  The applicant was in a relationship with C.B., a French and Austrian national. Their sons (twins), also of French and Austrian nationality, were born on 3 March 2006. The family had been living together in Rochefort and the applicant and C.B. had joint custody of the children under French law. 8.  On 10 December 2008 the applicant and C.B. had a dispute, which resulted in C.B. leaving their home with the two children. She claimed that she would return two days later. 9.  On 13 December 2008, instead of coming back home, C.B. went with the children to stay with her parents in Golfe-Juan in the south of France. She informed the police of this fact. 10.  On 17 December 2008 C.B. notified the police in Fr\u00e9jus that she intended to move to Vienna, where she had already taken her main residence. 11.  On 18 December 2008, however, she notified the police in Rochefort that she was living with her parents and that her lawyer would inform the applicant of her whereabouts. Nonetheless, the same day C.B., her mother and the children left France and travelled to Vienna. 12.  On 7 January 2009 the family judge at the Rochefort tribunal de grande instance, after an oral hearing on 31 December 2008, issued an interim injunction at the applicant\u2019s request, ruling that he and C.B. had joint custody, but that the children\u2019s main residence was with their father. The court also proceeded to determine C.B.\u2019s contact rights. It noted that C.B., being absent from the oral hearing, had been duly summoned to attend. 13.  On 16 March 2010 the Rochefort investigating judge issued an arrest warrant against C.B. and on 11 June 2010 the Rochefort tribunal de grande instance issued a European Arrest Warrant (EAW) against her for unlawful removal of the children from France. 14.  On 5 July 2011 the Poitiers Court of Appeal upheld the interim injunction issued by the Rochefort tribunal de grande instance on 7 January 2009 on the above-mentioned points (see paragraph 12 above). 15.  On 26 January 2012 the competent public prosecutor decided not to institute a preliminary investigation against the applicant, who had been accused of sexual assault by C.B. in a complaint lodged with the French authorities on 15 December 2011. 16.  On 25 April 2013 the La Rochelle tribunal correctionnel convicted C.B. of child abduction and sentenced her to one year\u2019s imprisonment. In addition, she was ordered to pay the applicant 25,000 euros (EUR) in damages. C.B. subsequently lodged an appeal against that decision, but withdrew it on 29 May 2013. 17.  On 6 June 2013 the Court of Cassation dismissed an appeal on points of law by C.B. against the Poitiers Court of Appeal\u2019s decision of 5 July 2011. 18.  On 23 December 2008 the Vienna District Court (\u201cthe District Court) granted a request by C.B. for an interim injunction against the applicant, ordering him to refrain from contacting her for a period of three months. The court based its decision on statements given by C.B. according to which the applicant had threatened to kill her and had tried to abduct one of the children. 19.  On the same day the mayor of Vienna granted a request by C.B. for a ban on disclosing information (Auskunftssperre) under the relevant provision of the Residence Registration Act (Meldegesetz). 20.  On 27 February 2009 the applicant lodged a complaint against C.B. with the Austrian criminal authorities for suspected child abduction. 21.  On 17 March 2009 the District Court dismissed a request by C.B. for an extension of the interim injunction granted against the applicant on 23 December 2008. 22.  On 7 April 2009 C.B. filed a new request with the District Court for an interim injunction against the applicant, this time claiming that they were all at risk of physical harm and the children at risk of sexual abuse. The request was dismissed on 22 April 2009. 23.  On 22 May 2009 the Vienna public prosecutor\u2019s office (Staatsanwaltschaft) informed the applicant that the criminal investigation it had initiated against him for the aggravated sexual abuse of minors had been discontinued. 24.  On 25 May 2011 the public prosecutor\u2019s office informed the applicant that the criminal investigation against C.B. in Austria for child abduction had been discontinued. 25.  On 25 February 2009 the applicant lodged a request with the District Court for the children\u2019s return, pursuant to the Hague Convention of 25  October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (\u201cthe Hague Convention\u201d). 26.  On 6 April 2009 the District Court, after hearing the applicant and C.B. in person, ordered C.B. to return the children to the applicant. It found that C.B.\u2019s allegations of sexual abuse of the children directed against the applicant could not be proven by her or her mother\u2019s statements, or reports obtained from the Child Protection Centre (Kinderschutzzentrum). It argued that she had raised that suspicion rather late in the proceedings, and that the Child Protection Centre\u2019s reports mainly relied on her and her mother\u2019s allegations. Furthermore, the Child Protection Centre\u2019s first report, dated 4  March 2009, did not contain any information about alleged sexual abuse, while the reasoning in the second report, dated 14 March 2009, why certain observations of the children\u2019s behaviour would allude to sexual abuse by their father, was considered to be unsubstantiated. The District Court further held that the children\u2019s removal had been wrongful within the meaning of Article 3 of the Hague Convention and that C.B. had failed to establish that their return would expose them to a grave risk of physical or psychological harm or otherwise place them in an intolerable situation pursuant to Article 13 (b) of the Hague Convention. 27.  C.B. appealed against that decision. 28.  On 25 June 2009 the Vienna Regional Court (\u201cthe Regional Court\u201d) partly allowed C.B.\u2019s appeal and amended the decision in so far as it ordered the children\u2019s immediate return to France (and not to the applicant). Under point 3 of the decision, it further declared that the decision would only become effective if the French authorities demonstrated that they would take adequate measures to protect the children\u2019s best interests in France after their return, in particular with regard to the suspicion of sexual abuse and in accordance with Article 11 (4) of the Brussels IIa Regulation. It held that neither tactical reasons for the mother\u2019s allegations of sexual abuse nor interference with the children\u2019s best interests after their return to their father\u2019s place could be excluded. 29.  On 13 October 2009 the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal by C.B. against the Regional Court\u2019s decision. However, it partly allowed an appeal by the applicant and removed point 3 from the impugned decision. Since it had not been established that he actually posed a threat to the children or that there were any other obstacles to their return, there was no reason to make the return order dependent on the safeguards which could be furnished by the French authorities under Article 11 (4) of the Brussels IIa Regulation (\u201csafe harbour orders\u201d). 30.  On 18 November 2009 the applicant filed a request with the District Court for enforcement of the return order. 31.  On 21 November 2009 a court bailiff (huissier de justice) in Nice confirmed that C.B. and the children had presented themselves to her. In submissions to the District Court of 24 November 2009, C.B. claimed to have fulfilled the conditions set out in the decisions of the Regional Court and the Supreme Court by returning the children to France (and not to the applicant). 32.  On 2 December 2009 the applicant informed the District Court of his suspicion that C.B. had meanwhile left France again and travelled back to Austria. 33.  On 6 December 2009 the District Court ordered a bailiff (Gerichtsvollzieher) to remove the children from C.B. and hand them over to the Youth Welfare Office. 34.  On 7 December 2009 the competent judge, the bailiff and a representative of the Youth Welfare Office looked for C.B. and the children at her and her mother\u2019s addresses in Vienna. However, the enforcement attempt was unsuccessful as neither C.B. nor the children were present at the addresses known to the authorities\u2019 representatives. However, they did see C.B.\u2019s mother and a friend of hers, who stated that C.B. was currently hiding in France with her children but would have to come back to Vienna for work. Afterwards the applicant, who had been waiting nearby, was informed of the authorities\u2019 unsuccessful attempt to trace C.B. and their children that day. The incidents were reported in a letter to the president of the District Court, including a statement that the court currently regarded the \u201cissue\u201d as \u201cterminated\u201d. 35.  C.B. subsequently appealed against the District Court\u2019s enforcement order of 6 December 2009, and on 24 December 2009 she filed a request for the court to refrain from enforcing the return order (Antrag auf Abstandnahme von der Fortsetzung des R\u00fcckf\u00fchrungsverfahrens). 36.  On 22 February 2010 the applicant requested that the District Court disclose C.B.\u2019s address, which had been kept secret from him. 37.  On 2 April 2010 the District Court granted the applicant\u2019s request, holding that the ban on disclosure was no longer justified. 38.  On the same day the District Court dismissed C.B.\u2019s request for non\u2011enforcement of the return order. 39.  On 13 April 2010 the Regional Court rejected C.B.\u2019s appeal against the District Court\u2019s enforcement order of 6 December 2009. It held that she was no longer adversely affected by the impugned decision as the enforcement date had already passed before she had filed the appeal. However, as an obiter dictum it pointed out that, according to recent reports from the Child Protection Centre, the children\u2019s accounts of alleged ill\u2011 treatment by their father had become more precise in the meantime, which constituted a substantial change in the circumstances on which the return order had been based. Contrary to the outcome of the main proceedings under the Brussels IIa Regulation and the Hague Convention, the Regional Court therefore considered the obligation under Article 11 (4) of the Brussels IIa Regulation to be applicable in that the District Court would have to ask the French authorities to use safeguards to ensure that the return of the children was in their best interests, such as not to return them to the applicant in person while the suspicion of abuse against him remained. 40.  On 16 April 2010 the applicant filed a new request for enforcement of the return order, stating that in another set of proceedings before a court in Rochefort C.B.\u2019s representative had informed the court that her current address was her mother\u2019s in Vienna, where for the purposes of enforcement of the return order C.B. and the children had been searched for by the competent authorities on 7 December 2009 (see paragraph 34 above). 41.  On 26 April 2010 C.B. filed a new request for the District Court to refrain from enforcing the return order, which was dismissed on 26 July 2010. She also submitted a psychiatric opinion, dated 29 March 2010 and commissioned by the Vienna Youth Welfare Office. The expert stated that the children seemed to be traumatised and suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder, possibly due to assaults by their father which could not be specified any further; thus, even assuming that C.B. had also attempted to alienate her children from the applicant, their return to their father would in any event trigger fear and panic reactions contrary to their best interests. 42.  On 21 September 2010 the Regional Court dismissed appeals by C.B. against the decisions of 2 April 2010 and 26 July 2010 concerning her requests for non-enforcement of the return order. It further rejected an appeal by her against the District Court\u2019s decision of 2 April 2010, ordering the disclosure of her address to the applicant. However, it held again that it would be the District Court\u2019s task to obtain safeguards from the French authorities to avoid the children being exposed to a grave risk of physical or psychological harm. 43.  On 20 October 2010 the Supreme Court rejected an extraordinary appeal on points of law by C.B. against the Regional Court\u2019s decision of 13 April 2010. It upheld the Regional Court\u2019s reasoning in so far as C.B. was no longer adversely affected by the impugned decision (see paragraph 39 above), but held that it was for the court of first instance to examine whether the circumstances had changed in the meantime in such a way that the enforcement of the return order would now entail a grave risk for the children. 44.  On 23 November 2010 the Supreme Court rejected an extraordinary appeal on points of law by C.B. against the Regional Court\u2019s decision of 21 September 2010. It noted that the District Court had already contacted the French Central Authority by letter in accordance with Article 11 (4) of the Brussels IIa Regulation, and that the enforcement of a return order under the Hague Convention could only be stopped if it was established that there were no adequate safeguards to protect the children\u2019s best interests upon their return to France. It therefore called upon the District Court to examine the adequacy of the safeguards offered by the French authorities. 45.  On 14 January 2011 the District Court held an oral hearing to examine how best to approach the question whether the children would face a grave risk of harm upon their return to France. The competent judge also requested that C.B. inform her of all the proceedings then pending in France. 46.  On 26 January 2011 the judge appointed an expert psychologist, S., and ordered her to submit a report on whether the children\u2019s return to France (either to their father or to a child protection institution) could harm their psychological development. The judge pointed out, inter alia, that due to the arrest warrants (see paragraph 13 above) C.B. was likely to be arrested as soon as she returned the children to France herself, and that the expert\u2019s observation of the father\u2019s and the children\u2019s interactions with each other would be of significant importance with a view to the accusations of ill-treatment directed against him. All the parties were ordered to cooperate with the expert. 47.  On 4 February 2011 C.B.\u2019s counsel submitted to the court the requested information concerning the pending proceedings in France (custody proceedings, criminal proceedings against C.B. for child abduction, and criminal proceedings against the applicant for sexual abuse) (see paragraphs 12 \u2013 17 above). 48.  On 15 March 2011 C.B. informed the court that the children would not be able to attend the scheduled examination by the appointed expert due to illness; she also submitted a medical certificate describing the children\u2019s illness. 49.  On 21 March 2011 C.B. challenged the judge and S. for bias. The president of the District Court dismissed the challenge for bias against the judge on 25 May 2011. C.B. subsequently appealed against that decision and submitted new challenges for bias against the competent judge of the District Court again as well as the panel of judges of the Regional Court which had given the decision of 21 September 2010 (see paragraph 42 above). The District Court, the Regional Court and the Vienna Court of Appeal each subsequently ruled on these challenges for bias and on C.B.\u2019s respective appeals. Her allegations were dismissed with final effect on 7 December 2011 by the Regional Court, which, inter alia, considered C.B.\u2019s allegations to be unfounded and that she had lodged several challenges for bias for tactical reasons. 50.  On 7 March 2012 the District Court dismissed C.B.\u2019s challenge against the expert S. 51.  On 8 March 2012 the District Court removed S. from the case and appointed another expert psychologist, R. who, unlike S., was a specialist in traumatology. It referred to the Court\u2019s judgment in the case of \u0160neersone  and Kampanella v. Italy (no. 14737/09, 12 July 2011), in which the Court found a violation of Article 8 because the domestic courts in that case had not adequately taken into consideration the risk of psychological trauma that would inevitably stem from a sudden and irreversible cutting of the close ties between mother and child. 52.  On 5 April 2012 R. submitted her expert opinion to the District Court; two further psychological opinions were privately commissioned by C.B. and submitted by her counsel to the court at the same stage of the proceedings. 53.  On 13 August 2012 the District Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s request of 16 April 2010 for enforcement of the return order (see paragraph 40 above). Referring to the three expert opinions mentioned above (see paragraph 52 above), in particular the one obtained from R., it held that the children had been severely traumatised by all the events which had occurred in their family since 2008, that they were suffering from severe post-traumatic stress disorder, and that a separation from their mother and their return to France would very likely trigger an existential crisis and gravely harm their emotional and cognitive development. The court did not deny that the mother\u2019s adverse influence on the children regarding their father had also contributed to their negative attitude towards him. However, it also stated that the allegations of sexual abuse against him could neither be proven nor excluded. Regarding the statement on the applicant\u2019s mental health in the psychiatric opinion forwarded by the French Central Authority (see paragraph 72 below), the District Court considered that the report had not been drawn up in accordance with the Austrian standards for examining a person\u2019s educational skills as it had only been based on the applicant\u2019s interview with the expert and no psychological tests had been carried out. In contrast, the three expert opinions (see paragraph 52 above) were not only based on C.B.\u2019s allegations, but also on psychological tests of the children and their mother. However, in her examination of the case R. did not hold a meeting between the children and the applicant as such an interaction would have very likely resulted in the children being further traumatised. 54.  In its reasoning, the District Court further reiterated that a court could only refuse to return a child for the reasons set out under Article  13 (b) of the Hague Convention if it was not established that adequate measures to protect the child\u2019s best interests after his or her return would be taken. In August 2010 it had therefore requested that the French authorities provide the appropriate safeguards. According to the French Central Authority\u2019s answers by letters of 23 May and 8 July 2011, all conditions would be met to ensure that the children were returned without any risk; they also stated that the children would not be immediately entrusted to the applicant upon their return. The District Court concluded therefore that the children would temporarily be put into foster care, which was contrary to their best interests. It also pointed out that on 26 March 2012 it had held a hearing to discuss possible scenarios concerning the children\u2019s return to France and to consider alternative ways of re\u2011establishing contact between the applicant and the children. Since the applicant had failed to attend the hearing without providing any excuse, the court assumed that the purpose of the proceedings seemed to be more for him to argue out his conflict with C.B. than for the children\u2019s return to France. It further held that a balancing of the competing interests of those involved had to be carried out in such a case, and that the children\u2019s interests were of paramount importance. Referring to the case of Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland ([GC], no.  41615/07, ECHR 2010), the court stated that the possibility of the children being further traumatised, the serious difficulties that they would be likely to encounter under new living conditions in France and the lack of adequate safeguards were reasons why the return order could not be enforced. Instead, psychologically assisted contact between the applicant and the children should be slowly re-established in Austria. 55.  The applicant appealed against the decision and challenged the judge for bias. 56.  On 1 October 2012 the District Court dismissed the challenge for bias. The decision was upheld by the Regional Court on 20 February 2013. 57.  On 7 May 2013 the Regional Court dismissed an appeal by the applicant against the District Court\u2019s decision of 13 August 2012 (see  paragraph 53 and 54 above), upholding its reasoning and adding that, due to the arrest warrant against C.B., the children would likely be put into foster care without their mother. 58.  On 28 August 2013 the Supreme Court quashed the District Court\u2019s decision of 13 August 2012 and the Regional Court\u2019s decision of 7 May 2013 and remitted the case. It observed that under the Hague Convention the court dealing with an application for return should act expeditiously when deciding it and, subsequently, when providing for the enforcement of an already issued return order. It would be contrary to that obligation if the court delayed or possibly impeded the return of a child by not ruling or by belatedly deciding the parties\u2019 requests. In that context, it noted that in the present case, after the District Court had delivered its decision on 13 August 2012, eleven months had already elapsed before the case eventually came before it. The delay in the return proceedings caused by the abducting parent\u2019s behaviour was not a fact which by itself exempted the authorities from their obligation to swiftly and adequately implement their duties under international law. 59.  However, the Supreme Court conceded that, given that the children had meanwhile adapted well to living in Austria and their mental health had become stable, their well-being would be gravely put at risk if the return order was enforced without any safeguards. Nonetheless, it noted that this development was mainly due to the fact that almost four years had elapsed since the return order had become final in October 2009. Therefore, the return order was still enforceable as long as it was not established that no adequate measures would be taken to protect the children\u2019s best interests upon their return to France. The Supreme Court therefore ordered the District Court to clarify whether the arrest warrant issued against C.B. in France could be lifted, to assess whether C.B.\u2019s mother in place of C.B. would be willing to accompany the children to France and care for them in a child protection institution, and to obtain the French authorities\u2019 assurance that the children could live in a child protection institution as close to the applicant as possible. It further held that it was for the applicant to apply to the competent authorities in France for temporary care for his children in a child protection institution, and that it was not for the Austrian courts to establish contact between him and the children under Article 11 (4) of the Brussels IIa Regulation since the establishment of contact for the purposes of the enforcement of a return order fell within the competence of the authorities of the State from which the children had been abducted. 60.  On 15 November 2013 the District Court asked the French authorities for information as requested by the Supreme Court in its decision of 28 August 2013. 61.  On 31 October 2014, after another oral hearing on 29 August 2014 and a telephone conversation with the public prosecutor at the Poitiers Court of Appeal on 3 September 2014, the District Court again dismissed the applicant\u2019s request of 16 April 2010 for enforcement of the return order (see paragraph 40 above). It held that C.B.\u2019s mother was unwilling to stay temporarily with the children in France after their return and that, in any event, C.B. had to start serving her prison sentence once she entered France. It further noted that the French authorities had formulated different ways of avoiding the children\u2019s separation from their mother, but could not give any guarantees in advance; instead, they had pointed out that C.B. first had to return the children to France before any concrete measures could be taken. The District Court therefore concluded that the French authorities had failed to devise an exact plan which, in particular, would avoid the children being immediately separated from their mother. Given that the children would probably be placed in a child protection institution in a (for them) foreign country and without any familiar caregivers around, there would be a severe risk of harm for them within the meaning of Article 13 (b) of the Hague Convention if they were returned to France. 62.  On 11 February 2015 the Regional Court dismissed an appeal by the applicant against the District Court\u2019s decision of 31 October 2014. It conceded that C.B.\u2019s behaviour concerning the removal of the children from France in itself, but also with regard to her delaying tactics in the present proceedings, was unacceptable. However, it was now for the Austrian courts only to decide whether the requirements of Article 11 (4) of the Brussels IIa Regulation were fulfilled, namely whether the children could be returned to France without being separated from their mother. In this regard, it held that the District Court had correctly concluded that the requirements of Article 11 (4) were not fulfilled, since the French authorities had not provided sufficient guarantees to ensure that the children would not suffer severe harm upon their return. It had not been established that the children could stay with C.B. while she was serving her prison sentence, and since their grandmother was unwilling to accompany them to France, they would be left without any caregivers familiar to them. 63.  Regarding the applicant\u2019s allegations that the District Court had failed to contact the relevant French authorities and to ask the right questions, the Regional Court held that the French authorities had merely referred to general alternatives without offering any precise answers to the Austrian courts\u2019 concerns. The court considered that the District Court had already made sufficient attempts to obtain concrete guarantees from the French authorities as it was mainly their responsibility to take adequate measures. In particular, the French authorities should have given an undertaking that the decision of 7 January 2009 provisionally determining the children\u2019s main residence with their father would be revoked and that, despite the prison sentence, C.B. would be granted safe conduct in order to be able to participate in the custody proceedings in France. The Regional Court also considered that the applicant\u2019s conduct was not in the children\u2019s best interests either, since the enforcement of the decision of 7 January 2009 and C.B.\u2019s criminal conviction appeared to be more important to him than their well-being, and he did not even realise the seriousness of the burden to which he would expose his children if they were forced to return to him after not having seen him for more than six years. In sum, the Regional Court concluded that because of a lack of adequate \u201csafe harbour orders\u201d the children\u2019s return to France entailed a grave risk for them; furthermore, since they had meanwhile adapted well to living in Vienna, their uprooting would very likely also lead to a severe endangerment of their well-being. 64.  On 30 March 2015 the applicant filed an extraordinary appeal on points of law. 65.  On 27 April 2015 the Supreme Court rejected the extraordinary appeal on points of law. It confirmed that the children\u2019s separation from their mother in the event of their return to France could still not be excluded because of C.B.\u2019s prison sentence, and that such separation would very likely severely traumatise and psychologically harm them within the meaning of Article 13 (b) of the Hague Convention. It reiterated that the return of the children could not be refused if it was established that the French authorities had made adequate arrangements to protect the children\u2019s best interests upon their return. However, if there remained doubts in this respect, the return would have to be refused. Since the measures as set out by the French authorities had to be considered insufficient to secure the protection of the children upon their return, the non-enforcement of the return order was justified. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court pointed out that the decision was primarily based on what seemed best for the children\u2019s well-being and did not necessarily lead to the conclusion that C.B.\u2019s conduct had been lawful. Lastly, it observed that the applicant still had the possibility of applying to the Austrian courts for contact rights. 66.  The decision was served on the applicant on 19 May 2015. 67.  In a letter of 6 February 2017 the District Court stated that, to date, the applicant had not applied to the Austrian courts for contact rights. 68.  The French Central Authority (bureau de l\u2019entraide civile et commerciale international) at the Ministry of Justice (hereinafter \u201cthe FCA\u201d) and its Austrian counterpart at the Federal Ministry of Justice (hereinafter \u201cthe ACA\u201d) remained in contact throughout all of the above\u2011mentioned proceedings. In their letters, the officials in charge of the case regularly discussed how to protect the children\u2019s best interests upon their return to the applicant. The FCA sent several requests to its counterpart for information on the progress of the case, in particular on the measures taken by the Austrian authorities to locate C.B. and the children and the reasons why the return order had not been enforced. The ACA informed its French counterpart of the respective state of the proceedings, referred to the parties\u2019 requests and appeals as obstacles to the continuation of the enforcement of the return order and considered the actual address of C.B. and the children to be unknown. Regarding the ACA\u2019s requests for safeguards to secure the protection of the children, the FCA pointed out at the beginning of the enforcement proceedings that there were no obstacles impeding the children\u2019s return to their father as the competent French judge had already determined that their main residence was at his home; thus, the French Youth Welfare Office would not be notified of the children\u2019s return to France. However, on 27 November 2009 the FCA confirmed in a letter to the ACA that if the children returned to France, a social worker would meet them at the airport in Paris and take them to their father. 69.  In May and August 2010 the competent judge at the District Court twice requested that the FCA help her establish contact with the judge competent in childcare matters (juge des enfants \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe children\u2019s judge\u201d) in France because she had doubts as to whether the immediate return of the children to their father would expose them to grave harm and therefore preferred temporary social care for them. 70.  On 4 February 2011 the FCA informed its Austrian counterpart that it had been suggested to the public prosecutor in charge of childcare matters that the case be brought before the children\u2019s judge in accordance with Article 11 (4) of the Brussels IIa Regulation, and that the public prosecutor had indicated a wish to do so. 71.  On 7 February 2011 the children\u2019s judge at the La Rochelle tribunal de grande instance appointed an expert psychiatrist and ordered him to deliver a report on whether the applicant was suffering from any form of mental illness; on the same day he ordered the STEMOI (Service territorial \u00e9ducatif de milieu ouvert et d\u2019insertion, a youth welfare service) in La Rochelle to examine the living conditions at the applicant\u2019s home and his educational and emotional skills. 72.  On 6 April 2011 the FCA submitted the psychiatric opinion obtained by the children\u2019s judge, which stated that the applicant did not suffer from any form of mental illness, could meet a child\u2019s needs and was very much devoted to his children. 73.  On 23 May 2011 the FCA submitted the STEMOI\u2019s pre-report which confirmed that the living conditions provided by the applicant were appropriate to accommodate his children; however, the STEMOI would only be able to assess the applicant\u2019s educational and emotional skills once the children were returned to him. 74.  In a letter of 8 July 2011 the FCA confirmed, in reply to the Austrian authorities\u2019 concerns about an immediate return of the children to the applicant and their proposal of temporary social care, that the children would not be entrusted to their father right after their return, and that the children\u2019s judge would monitor their best interests and, if need be, take measures of educational support. 75.  On 12 August 2011 the FCA submitted a judgment given by the children\u2019s judge of the La Rochelle tribunal de grande instance on 27 July 2011, which stated that no measures of educational support for the applicant had to be taken at that time. According to the evidence taken so far (see paragraphs 72 and 73 above), the applicant was able to provide appropriate living conditions for his children and did not suffer from any form of mental illness or sexually deviant behaviour. His educational and emotional skills could only be assessed upon the children\u2019s effective return to France, and by the time of their return concrete measures could again be taken into consideration. 76.  Following the Supreme Court\u2019s decision of 28 August 2013 (see paragraph 58 above), on 23 December 2013 the FCA informed its Austrian counterpart that it had forwarded the District Court\u2019s request of 15 November 2013 (see paragraph 60 above) to the public prosecutor at the Poitiers Court of Appeal, suggesting that the case again be brought before the children\u2019s judge at the La Rochelle tribunal de grande instance. 77.  In a letter of 14 March 2014 the FCA submitted a report which the public prosecutor at the Poitiers Court of Appeal had made on 14 February 2014, in reply to the District Court\u2019s request of 15 November 2013 (see paragraph 60 above). According to the report, C.B., due to the arrest warrant against her, was registered in the French register of persons being searched for by the criminal authorities (fichier des personnes recherch\u00e9es \u2013 \u201cFPR\u201d); thus, she could immediately be arrested once she entered France. However, in the event of her return to France together with her children, the public prosecutor would be prepared to withdraw her from the FPR on the grounds that the children\u2019s return would make it possible for the applicant to see his children, so that the objective of the arrest warrant would then also be achieved. Hence, C.B. would not risk immediate arrest if she entered France. The public prosecutor however noted that in any event C.B. would have to start serving her prison sentence, and that suspending it from the outset would not be possible. She could however apply to serve the sentence under electronic surveillance immediately after being imprisoned if she proved that she had a residence in France. After serving half of the sentence she could then apply for conditional release, which could even be granted earlier if she proved that her children were living with her. As to the civil\u2011law issues of the District Court\u2019s request of 15 November 2013, the public prosecutor referred to the children\u2019s judge\u2019s decision of 27 July 2011 (see paragraph 75 above). 78.  In their letter of 14 March 2014, the FCA complemented the public prosecutor\u2019s report by explaining that the children\u2019s judge could order that the children be placed either with their mother, another member of the family or a trusted third party, or eventually in an institution, possibly in the vicinity of the applicant\u2019s home. Such an order would overrule the decision of the Rochefort tribunal de grande instance family judge of 7 January 2009, which had determined that the children\u2019s main residence was with their father. As for C.B.\u2019s prison sentence, it was recommended that she or her counsel contact the competent public prosecutor in advance and already prepare the necessary applications, since it could not be excluded that she would be questioned by the judge in charge of the review of her punishment as early as on the first day of her detention. 79.  On 15 April 2014 the FCA submitted confirmation by the children\u2019s judge dated 8 April 2014 that as soon as the effective return of the children was fixed by the Austrian authorities he would be prepared to order temporary foster care for them and educational support for the father to re\u2011establish the ties between them. 80.  On 1 July 2014 the FCA submitted another report from the public prosecutor at the Poitiers Court of Appeal which, in reply to another questionnaire of the District Court, repeated the conditions under which C.B. could apply for conditional release. It further stated that the children would not be allowed to stay at the detention centre while C.B. was serving her sentence. During that time they would be cared for by their father or by the Youth Welfare Office. Instead of temporary foster care, the children\u2019s judge could order educational support in an \u201copen setting\u201d consisting of a team of social workers assisting the father with his children. If the exact return date was not communicated by the Austrian authorities in advance and an interim measure had to be adopted quickly due to C.B.\u2019s detention, the public prosecutor would have to order temporary foster care for the children and would have eight days to bring the case before the children\u2019s judge, who would then have to take the necessary steps.", "references": ["6", "5", "9", "2", "3", "0", "1", "8", "7", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicants were born in 1975 and 1976 respectively and live in Grozny. They are husband and wife. 5.  M. was the owner of a three-roomed flat at at 35-122, Ulitsa Starosunzhenskaya, Grozny, Chechen Republic. 6.  On 26 March 1996 M.\u2019s husband sold the flat to A. The transaction and A.\u2019s title to the flat were duly registered by the state authorities. 7.  On an unspecified date M. and her family moved from Grozny to the Krasnodar Region abandoning the flat. On 21 April 1998 they applied for the compensation for the loss of the flat resulting from the military conflict in Chechnya. On 22 December 2000 M. received the compensation. 8.  On 14 November 2008 the police refused to institute criminal proceedings against M.\u2019s husband on the charges of fraud in respect of the flat as time-barred. 9.  On 24 March 2010 A. sold the flat to the second applicant. The transaction and the second applicant\u2019s title to the flat were duly registered by the state authorities. The applicants moved into the flat and resided there. 10.  On an unspecified date the Housing Department of Grozny lodged a civil action against A. and the first applicant seeking the invalidation of the purchase of the flat by A. and claiming the title to the flat. 11.  On 7 December 2010 the District Court applied the statute of limitations to the claims lodged by the Housing Department and rejected them. 12.  On 1 February 2011 the Supreme Court of the Chechen Republic upheld the judgment of 7 December 2010 on appeal. 13.  On 18 June 2010 the Leninskiy District Court of Grozniy granted the second applicant\u2019s claim and removed the flat from the data base listing the flats in respect of which the former owners received compensation from the State. 14.  On 30 April 2013 the District Court re-opened the case in view of newly discovered circumstances concerning a third party\u2019s right to the reside in the flat. 15.  On an unspecified date Mur. lodged a civil action seeking the applicants\u2019 eviction. She claimed that in 1999 the municipal authorities had assigned the flat to her under the social housing agreement. 16.  On 28 June 2011 the District Court rejected Mur.\u2019s claims. It also invalidated the assignment of the flat to Mur. under the social housing agreement. 17.  According to the Government, on 15 November the Supreme Court of the Chechen Republic quashed the judgment of 28 June 2011 on appeal and remitted the matter for fresh consideration. 18.  On 26 May 2014 the District Court considered the claims lodged by the second applicant and Mur. The court dismissed Mur.\u2019s claims in full. It found that Mur. had failed to present any original document confirming the assignment of the flat to her under the social housing agreement. The court also invalidated the flat purchase agreements between (1) M.\u2019s husband and A. and (2) the second applicant and A., recognised that the flat was the property of the Town of Grozniy and ordered the applicants\u2019 eviction. 19.  On 11 November 2014 the Supreme Court of the Chechen Republic upheld the judgment of 26 May 2014 on appeal. 20.  According to the Government, the applicants were not evicted and continue to reside in the flat.", "references": ["5", "1", "7", "4", "0", "8", "2", "6", "3", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Ufa. 5.  On 26 December 2006 a new block of flats was commissioned by the Ufa Town Administration. 6.  On 30 September 2010 the Ordzhonikidzevskiy District Court of Ufa recognised T.\u2019s title to the flat at 66/2-54, Ulitsa Kommunarov, Ufa. 7.  On 28 October 2010 T. sold the flat to M. The transaction and M.\u2019s title to the flat were registered by the state registration authorities. 8.  On 13 January 2011 M. sold the flat to the applicant. The transaction and the applicant\u2019s title to the flat were registered by the state registration authorities. 9.  On an unspecified date the Housing Foundation of the Republic of Bashkortostan brought a civil claim seeking, inter alia, the invalidation of the applicant\u2019s title to the flat and eviction. 10.  On 23 July 2013 the District Court granted the claims in full. The court established that the judgment of 30 September 2010 had been forged and that T. had died in 2008 and could not have been a party to the relevant proceedings. The court refused to recognise that the applicant had purchased the flat in good faith for her failure to check the authenticity of the judgment of 30 September 2010. It further took into account that M. had sold the flat to the applicant for 180,000 Russian roubles (RUB) while she had bought it for RUB 190,000. 11.  On 17 November 2013 the Supreme Court of the Republic of Bashkortostan upheld the judgment of 23 July 2013 on appeal. 12.  On 4 April 2014 the Supreme Court rejected the applicant\u2019s cassation appeal. 13.  On 9 July 2014 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation rejected the applicant\u2019s second cassation appeal. 14.  According to the Government, the eviction order was not enforced and the applicant continues to reside in the flat.", "references": ["6", "0", "4", "2", "5", "3", "7", "1", "8", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1949 and lives in Beloljin, Republic of Serbia. 5.  In 1997 the Maribor unit of the Surveying and Mapping Authority (hereinafter the \u201cMaribor unit\u201d) issued several decisions concerning the delimitation of real estate belonging to the applicant and to company D., and ordering changes in respect of the use of land. The applicant appealed against some of those decisions. 6.  On 28 September 2000 the Ministry for the Environment and Spatial Planning (hereinafter the \u201cMinistry\u201d) granted the applicant\u2019s appeal in part and annulled a decision issued on 12 February 1997 while it dismissed the appeal concerning two decisions issued on 31 January 1997. 7.  On 23 November 2000 the applicant challenged the aforementioned decision of the Ministry in the part dismissing his appeal by instituting proceedings before the Administrative Court. 8.  On 6 November 2003 the Administrative Court granted the applicant\u2019s appeal, annulled the challenged part of the decision of 28 September 2000 (see paragraph 6 above) and referred the case back to the Ministry who, in turn, referred it to the Maribor unit. The applicant appealed. 9.  On 24 May 2006 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the Administrative Court\u2019s judgment. This decision was served on the applicant on 4 July 2006. The applicant lodged a constitutional complaint. 10.  On 19 December 2007 the Constitutional Court dismissed the constitutional complaint. The decision was served on the applicant on 10 January 2008. 11.  On 10 July 2015, referring to section 25 of the 2006 Act, which regulates the domestic settlement proceedings in cases where an application to an international court had been lodged before the 2006 Act entered into force (see paragraph 14 below), the State Attorney\u2019s Office sent the applicant a settlement offer. In the offer they emphasised that the proceedings before the Constitutional Court could not have given rise to a violation of the \u201creasonable time\u201d requirement. In respect of redress they offered to provide the applicant with a written statement in which they would acknowledge that his right to a trial within a reasonable time had been violated in the proceedings before the Administrative Court and the Supreme Court. The offer was served on the applicant on 24 July 2015. 12.  The applicant did not accept the offer.", "references": ["4", "6", "0", "1", "5", "9", "2", "7", "8", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicants were born in 1976 and 1978 respectively and are detained in Vilnius Correctional Facility and Kybartai Correctional Facility. 5.  The first applicant was detained in \u0160iauliai Remand Prison from 11 January 2011 to 3 November 2011. The documents submitted to the Court show that he was held in four different remand prison cells: nos. 9, 104, 29 and 37. 6.  In 2012 the applicant instituted proceedings for damages. He argued that the conditions in which he had been held in \u0160iauliai Remand Prison had been degrading: cell no. 9 had not been renovated, had had almost no natural light and the artificial light provided in the evening had been very poor; the ventilation had been insufficient and the cell was cold; cell no. 104, although renovated, lacked sufficient ventilation and was cold, and there was almost no natural light; cell no. 29 had insufficient light and ventilation; cell no. 37 was dirty, the electrical system was damaged and thus dangerous, the sanitary facilities were not separated from the cell, the cell lacked light, ventilation and the temperature was too low. The applicant also submitted a document from the \u0160iauliai Health Care Centre from 19 April 2012, which noted violations of hygiene norms in the remand prison\u2019s cells. 7.  On 21 December 2012 the \u0160iauliai Regional Administrative Court held that the applicant\u2019s right to adequate conditions of detention had been breached but dismissed his claim for compensation. The court held that the applicant had not complained about his conditions of detention while in prison and had only lodged his complaint a year after leaving it. Moreover, it was up to the applicant to prove that he had sustained damage. The court held that there was no information to show that the remand prison had purposely interfered with his right to dignity or treated him inhumanely, that he had not suffered a great enough negative impact from the hygiene violations, and that there were no grounds to award him compensation. 8.  The applicant appealed but on 17 July 2013 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the first-instance decision. The court observed that the document from the \u0160iauliai Health Care Centre (see paragraph 6 above) had been issued five months after the applicant had left the remand prison and it was not able to determine the negative impact of the unsanitary conditions on the applicant on the basis of such evidence alone. 9.  The second applicant was detained in \u0160iauliai Remand Prison from 15 December 2009 to 8 February 2012. The documents submitted to the Court show that he was held in several different cells: nos. 101, 95, 54, 14 and 49. 10.  On 27 December 2011 the applicant instituted proceedings for damages and on 9 January 2012 he submitted a detailed complaint. He argued that the conditions in which he had been held in \u0160iauliai Remand Prison had been degrading: the cells were damp and dirty, there was insufficient light and ventilation, and the walls had not been painted. As a result, his health had deteriorated: his sight had worsened and he had pain in his joints and his back. 11.  On 28 December 2012 the \u0160iauliai Regional Administrative Court held that the applicant\u2019s right to adequate conditions of detention had been breached but dismissed his claim for compensation. The court found that the \u0160iauliai Health Care Centre had examined cell no. 101 on 7 January 2011, while the applicant had been detained there from 5 January 2011 to 3 February 2011 and from 14 February 2011 to 28 April 2011. The cell had been dirty, the toilet doors broken, and there was mould on the walls and ceiling. The health centre also examined cell no. 101 on 27 April 2011 and established that there was no longer any mould and the temperature was satisfactory, but the lighting was still insufficient. The court thus held that the applicant had proven that the conditions in cell no. 101 had been unsanitary. However, the court noted that the applicant had not proven the existence of unsanitary conditions in the other cells. The court further noted that the inmates were responsible for keeping the cells clean, but that the remand prison had not proven that it had provided the applicant with cleaning materials for at least six months. As regards the applicant\u2019s health, the court observed that he had been prescribed several drugs for spinal osteochondrosis, but that there was no relation between his illness and the unsanitary conditions in cell no. 101. The court also noted that during the hearing the applicant had claimed that all the cells had been overcrowded but he had failed to mention this in his written complaint. The court thus held that the case concerned sanitary conditions and not overcrowding. 12.  The applicant appealed and on 11 June 2013 the Supreme Administrative Court found that the court of first instance had acted unreasonably in dismissing his compensation claim, and awarded him with 300 Lithuanian litai (LTL, approximately 87 euros (EUR)) for non-pecuniary damage.", "references": ["5", "9", "2", "6", "8", "0", "4", "3", "7", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1992 and lives in Baku. 6.  A demonstration was planned to be held on 12 March 2011 in Baku. Prior to the assembly, on 7 March 2011, the organisers, members of the opposition, gave notice to the relevant authority, the Baku City Executive Authority (\u201cthe BCEA\u201d). 7.  The BCEA refused to authorise the demonstration at the place indicated by the organisers and proposed a different location on the outskirts of Baku \u2013 the grounds of a driving school situated in the 20th habitable area of the Sabail District. 8.  The organisers nevertheless decided to hold the demonstration in the centre of Baku. According to the applicant, the demonstration was intended to be peaceful and was conducted in a peaceful manner. The participants were protesting against, inter alia, corruption and demanding the resignation of the President of the State. 9.  The applicant attended the demonstration, but shortly after it had begun the police started to disperse those who had gathered. The applicant was arrested during the dispersal operation and was taken to three different police stations consecutively. 10.  According to the applicant, he was arrested at around 2 p.m. His arrest and custody in the police stations were video recorded on a mobile phone by one of the protesters, Mr A.H. 11.  On the day of the applicant\u2019s arrest, an administrative-offence report (inzibati x\u0259ta haqq\u0131nda protokol) was drawn up in respect of him by police officer E.G. The report stated that at around 2.55 p.m., at Fountains Square in Baku, the applicant had attempted to hold an unlawful demonstration and had disobeyed a lawful order of a police officer. He had been charged with administrative offences under Article 298 (violation of the rules on holding public assemblies) and Article 310.1 (failure to comply with a lawful order of a police officer) of the Code of Administrative Offences (\u201cthe CAO\u201d). 12.  On the same day two police officers, M.A. and H.A., prepared a report (raport) for a superior, stating that at around 4 p.m. during the demonstration they had arrested ten individuals. The report contained a list of the arrested protesters. According to the applicant, his name \u2013 the eleventh on the list \u2013 was added to the report later in different handwriting. 13.  According to the official records, the administrative-offence report in the applicant\u2019s respect was prepared on the basis of the abovementioned report drawn up by police officers M.A. and H.A. 14.  According to the applicant, he has never been served with a copy of the administrative-offence report or with other documents from his case file. He was also not given access to a lawyer after the arrest or while he was in police custody. 15.  On the day of his arrest the applicant was brought before a first\u2011instance court, the Sabail District Court. 16.  A State-funded lawyer was appointed to assist the applicant. None of the material submitted to the Court contains any record showing that the State-funded lawyer, Mr E.N., made any oral or written submissions on behalf of the applicant. 17.  No witnesses were questioned during the court hearing. 18.  By a decision of 12 March 2011, the court convicted the applicant under Article 310.1 of the CAO and sentenced him to eight days\u2019 administrative detention. 19.  On an unspecified date the applicant lodged an appeal with the Baku Court of Appeal, arguing that his arrest and conviction were in violation of his right to freedom of assembly and that the hearing before the first\u2011instance court had not been fair. He argued that he had participated in the demonstration because he had had a constitutional right to do so, but that he had not disobeyed any order of a police officer. 20.  The applicant also asked the appellate court to summon and examine witnesses on his behalf (namely, Mr A.H., Mr A.M. and Mr R.M.) who, according to the applicant, had witnessed his arrest and time in custody, and to examine the video recordings made by Mr A.H., which, according to the applicant, showed his arrest and custody in the police stations. He further asked the court to order a handwriting examination of the report prepared by police officers M.A. and H.A., in order to establish whether his name had been added to it by one of those two police officers. The applicant alleged that his name had been added to the mentioned report as the eleventh person in the list later and in different handwriting. 21.  The applicant was represented before the Baku Court of Appeal by a lawyer of his own choosing. 22.  On 18 March 2011 the Baku Court of Appeal partially granted the applicant\u2019s appeal and remitted the case to the first-instance court for re\u2011examination. The Court of Appeal found that the first-instance court had failed to examine the report prepared by police officers M.A. and H.A. The court also held that the case-file contained only a photocopy and not the original of that report and, therefore, it had not been possible to order its expert examination. The court did not address the applicant\u2019s above\u2011mentioned requests to summon and examine the witnesses on his behalf and to examine the video recordings. 23.  On 12 April 2011 the Sabail District Court re-examined the case. 24.  According to the applicant, he was not given an opportunity to appoint a lawyer of his own choosing. 25.  A State-funded lawyer was appointed to assist him. 26.  The only witnesses questioned during the court hearing were police officers M.A. and E.G. The former testified that the applicant had been detained for having participated in an unlawful assembly, making noise and disobeying the lawful orders of the police. The latter testified that he had prepared the administrative-offence report. 27.  By a decision of 12 April 2011, the court convicted the applicant under Article 310.1 of the CAO and sentenced him to seven days\u2019 administrative detention. 28.  On an unspecified date the applicant appealed. He argued before the Baku Court of Appeal that his arrest and conviction had been in violation of his right to freedom of assembly. He also complained that his arrest had been unlawful, and that the rehearing before the first-instance court had not been fair. 29.  The applicant again requested that witnesses on his behalf (namely, Mr A.H., Mr A.M., Mr R.M. and Mr R.B.) be summoned and heard. In addition, he challenged the reliability of the official records related to his arrest and police custody. He pointed out in particular the discrepancy between the time of arrest indicated in the administrative-offence report and the report prepared by police officers M.A. and H.A. The applicant repeated his allegation that his name had been added as the eleventh person on the list in the mentioned report later. The applicant asked the appellate court to hear at least three individuals listed along with him in the report prepared by police officers M.A. and H.A. He further asked the court to examine certain photographs and the video recordings made during his arrest and time in police custody. 30.  The applicant was not represented before the Baku Court of Appeal by a lawyer. 31.  On 28 April 2011 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld the first-instance court\u2019s decision. 32.  The appellate court did not address the applicant\u2019s above-mentioned requests to summon and hear the witnesses and to examine the photographs and video recordings. 33.  On 8 August 2014 Mr I. Aliyev, who represented the applicant before the Court, was arrested on charges of large-scale tax evasion, abuse of power and illegal entrepreneurship. On the same day he was detained pending trial. The circumstances relating to Mr Aliyev\u2019s arrest and detention are the subject of a separate application brought by him before the Court (application no. 68762/14). 34.  On 8 and 9 August 2014 the prosecuting authorities conducted a search of Mr Aliyev\u2019s home and office. During the search the domestic authorities seized a large number of documents, including all the case files relating to the pending applications before the Court, which were in Mr Aliyev\u2019s possession as a representative. The file relating to the present case, which, it appears, included copies of all the documents and correspondence between the Court and the parties, was also seized in its entirety. No adequate inventory of the seized files relating to the Court proceedings was made in the search and seizure records of 8 and 9 August 2014. 35.  On an unspecified date Mr Aliyev lodged a complaint with the Nasimi District Court, claiming that the search had been unlawful. He further complained about the seizure of the documents and files relating to the pending court proceedings before the Court and the domestic courts. 36.  On 12 September 2014 the Nasimi District Court dismissed Mr Aliyev\u2019s claim. It held that the searches had been conducted in accordance with the relevant law. As to the seizure of the documents relating to the cases pending before the Court and the domestic courts, it found that they could not be returned to the applicants at that stage of the proceedings. Following an appeal, on 23 September 2014 the Baku Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance court\u2019s decision of 12 September 2014. 37.  On 25 October 2014 the investigating authorities returned a number of the case files concerning the applications lodged with the Court, including the file relating to the present case, to Mr Aliyev\u2019s lawyer. The investigator\u2019s relevant decision specified that \u201csince it has been established that among documents seized on 8 and 9 August 2014 there were files concerning applications by a number of individuals and organisations lodged with the European Court of Human Rights, which have no relation to the substance of the criminal proceedings [against Mr Intigam Aliyev], [those files] have been delivered to [Mr Aliyev\u2019s lawyer] Mr Javad Javadov\u201d.", "references": ["9", "8", "0", "1", "5", "4", "6", "No Label", "7", "2", "3"], "gold": ["7", "2", "3"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1986 and lives in Ufa. 5.  On 26 December 2006 a new block of flats was commissioned by the Town of Ufa at 66/2, Ulitsa Kommunarov, Ufa. 6.  According to the documents submitted by U. to state registration authorities, on 19 July 2010 the Ordzhonikidzevskiy District Court of Ufa recognised his title to the flat at 66/2-39, Ulitsa Kommunarov, Ufa. The state registration authorities registered U.\u2019s title. 7.  On 30 October 2010 U. sold the flat to M. On 22 November 2010 the state registration authorities registered the said transaction and M.\u2019s title to the flat. 8.  On 12 February 2011 Z., acting on M.\u2019s behalf by virtue of the power of attorney, and the applicant signed a contract according to which A. sold the flat to the applicant. Z. and the applicant submitted the documents for the registration of the transaction and the transfer of the title to the flat to the applicant. 9.  According to the applicant, she paid the amount due under the contract to Z. and moved into the flat while her application for the registration of the transfer of the title to the flat to her was still pending. 10.  On an unspecified date a third party brought a civil action challenging U.\u2019s sale of the flat to M. and the latter\u2019s title to the flat. 11.  On 28 February 2011 the Ordzhonikidzevskiy District Court of Ufa issued an injunction in respect of the transactions with the flat. 12.  On 3 March 2011 the state registration authorities informed the applicant that her application for the registration of the transfer of the title to the flat could not be granted pending the outcome of the civil proceedings concerning the title to the flat. 13.  On 24 December 2012 the Supreme Court of the Republic of Bashkortostan dismissed the third party\u2019s claims in respect of the flat in full. 14.  On an unspecified date the Housing Foundation of the Republic of Bashkortostan brought a civil claim seeking, inter alia, the invalidation of M.\u2019s title to the flat and the applicant\u2019s eviction. 15.  On 23 August 2013 the District Court granted the claims in full. It invalidated the purchase of the flat by M. and ordered the applicant\u2019s eviction. The court considered that the applicant had not acquired the title to the flat and had no legal basis for moving into the flat and residing there. 16.  On 7 November 2013 the Supreme Court of Republic of Bashkortostan upheld the judgment of 23 August 2013 on appeal. 17.  On 12 May 2014 the Supreme Court rejected the applicant\u2019s cassation appeal. 18.  On 28 August 2014 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation rejected the applicant\u2019s second cassation appeal. 19.  On an unspecified date the applicant asked the District Court to stay the eviction proceedings. She submitted that the flat had been her only place of residence and that, in view of her financial situation, she was unable to buy or rent another flat. On 24 March 2014 the District Court stayed the eviction proceedings for three months. 20.  On 24 February 2015 the applicant was evicted.", "references": ["5", "7", "2", "1", "6", "8", "0", "9", "3", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Tolyatti. The applicant is the widow of Mr Vitaliy Sergeyevich Postnov. 7.  On 5 December 2000 the Leninskiy District Court of Ulyanovsk (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) ordered the Administration of the Ulyanovsk Region to pay Mr Postnov 228,000 Russian roubles (RUB) in reimbursement of costs for purchase of housing. The amount was to be paid from the federal budget funds allocated for housing of the military servicemen. The District Court further awarded Mr Postnov RUB 810, the cost of the expert examination. 8.  On 15 December 2000 the decision of the District Court came into force. 9.  In January 2001 Mr Postnov obtained two writs of execution and forwarded them to the bailiffs\u2019 service in Ulyanovsk. 10.  On 26 April 2002 Mr Postnov passed away. 11.  On 16 June 2003 the applicant joined the enforcement proceedings in her late husband\u2019s stead, pursuant to a domestic court\u2019s decision. 12.  In 2003 the applicant and the bailiff in charge of the enforcement proceedings applied for changing the method of execution of the judgment of 5 December 2000. They argued that as the Administration of the Ulyanovsk Region had no authority to administer the federal budget funds, the judgment could not be enforced as prescribed in its operative part. 13.  On 25 November 2003 the District Court refused the application for changing the method of execution. 14.  On 22 December 2004 the writ of execution in respect of RUB 228,000 was returned to the applicant from the bailiffs\u2019 service without enforcement. 15.  On 30 January 2005 the judgment of the District Court in the part concerning RUB 810 was enforced. 16.  On 13 November 2003, 13 July 2004, and 20 May 2005 the District Court index-linked the amount due to the applicant under the judgment of 5 December 2000, and awarded her RUB 169,846.46, RUB 17,401.28, and RUB 36,517.69 respectively. These amounts were to be paid from the federal budget funds allocated for housing of the military servicemen. The decisions came into force. 17.  In June 2005 the applicant obtained the writs of execution in respect of the three above decisions, and a new writ of execution in respect of the judgment of 5 December 2000 due to the change of the creditor in the enforcement proceedings (see paragraphs 10 and 11 above). 18.  On 31 May 2006 the applicant submitted all the writs of execution to the bailiffs\u2019 service. 19.  On 2 June 2006 the bailiffs initiated the execution proceedings. On 6 June 2006 the proceedings were terminated. The writs of execution were returned to the applicant as the compulsory enforcement of the judicial decisions in question was impossible. 20.  In 2005-2006 the applicant submitted the enforcement documents to the Ministry of Finance of Russia and the Federal Treasury Department for the Ulyanovsk Region. Each time the writs of execution were returned to the applicant without enforcement.", "references": ["8", "5", "6", "2", "7", "4", "1", "0", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Had\u017ei\u0107i. 6.  On 22 November 2011 the applicant was arrested and detained on suspicion of having committed war crimes against the civilian population and against prisoners of war during the 1992-95 war. 7.  On 23 November 2011 the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (\u201cthe State Court\u201d) reviewed and extended his detention based on the risk of his obstructing the course of justice by exerting pressure on witnesses and co-accused or by destroying evidence. On 1 December 2011 that decision was upheld by the Appeals Chamber of the State Court. 8.  On 21 December 2011 the State Court further extended the applicant\u2019s detention on the same grounds as before. On 5 January 2012 that decision was upheld by the Appeals Chamber of the State Court. 9.  On 29 December 2011 the State Prosecutor issued an indictment against the applicant and seven other co-suspects, which was confirmed by the State Court on 10 January 2012. 10.  Thereafter, the applicant\u2019s detention was regularly examined and extended every two months by the State Court. In addition to those automatic reviews, the applicant repeatedly challenged his detention before the Appeals Chamber of the State Court. 11.  On 23 February 2012 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal, relying on Article II \u00a7 3.(d) of the Constitution (see paragraph 16 below) and Article 5 of the Convention. He alleged, in particular, that his detention had been arbitrary and excessive, and that it had not been based on relevant and sufficient reasons. 12.  On 13 July 2012 the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (\u201cthe Constitutional Court\u201d), in a formation of eight judges, rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal since it could not reach a majority on any of the proposals. The court\u2019s reasoning included all the views expressed at the session on the issues raised in the case. Pursuant to Article VI \u00a7 4 of the Constitution (see paragraph 16 below) that decision was final. 13.  On 1 November 2012 the State Court held that the grounds for the applicant\u2019s continued detention had ceased to apply and released the applicant. By the same decision, the court imposed preventive measures on the applicant which included the following: a prohibition on leaving his place of residence without the prior approval of the State Court save for the purpose of appearing before that court; the duty to report once a week to the Had\u017ei\u0107i police; a prohibition on associating with other co-accused and on associating or having contact with the witnesses. Furthermore, the applicant\u2019s passport was seized. 14.  The preventive measures were reviewed and extended every two months. On 16 December 2015 they were revoked. 15.  At the date of the latest information available to the Court (22 July 2016), the criminal proceedings against the applicant were still ongoing.", "references": ["1", "4", "7", "3", "8", "6", "9", "5", "0", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1970 and lives in Murmansk. 5.  On 24 September 2004 the applicant was arrested on charges of robbery. Two days later the Polyarniy Town Court of the Murmansk Region imposed on the applicant an undertaking not to leave the place of his residence. 6.  On 21 February 2005 the Town Court, presided by Judge D., convicted the applicant of robbery and forgery, sentenced him to seven years and four months of imprisonment and ordered his detention pending the appeal proceedings. 7.  On 3 May 2005 the Murmansk Regional Court, under the presidency of judge K., quashed the judgment on appeal and remitted the case to the Town Court for a fresh examination, ordering that the applicant should remain in custody. 8.  On 3 June 2005 the Town Court, in its turn, further extended the applicant\u2019s detention and remitted the case to the Murmansk Prosecutor\u2019s Office for the elimination of certain procedural deficiencies preventing the examination of the case on the merits. 9.  The applicant\u2019s detention was once again extended by the Town Court, presided by judge D., on 16 August 2005. The applicant challenged the presiding judge on the ground that he had convicted him on 21 February 2005. Judge D. refused to step down. The applicant also raised that point in his statement of appeal against the detention order. On 6 September 2005 the Regional Court, presided by Judge K., found no grounds for Judge D. to step down. The Regional Court reasoned that by virtue of Articles 61 and 63 of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure Judge D., who had already presided over the applicant\u2019s trial once, could not take part in the new trial proceedings, however, he was not prevented from deciding on detention matters. 10.  On 18 November 2005 the Town Court further extended the applicant\u2019s detention. The parties disagreed as to whether the applicant had been served with a copy of that detention order. While the applicant argued that he had never received it, the Government stated that the detention order had been served on him on 5 December 2005. They supported their claim with a copy of the Town Court\u2019s letter of 29 November 2005 by which the detention order had been forwarded to the applicant and a copy of the detention order from his personal file kept in a remand prison, bearing the applicant\u2019s signature and the date of receipt. 11.  On several occasions the trial court adjourned hearings in the applicant\u2019s case. In particular, on 30 November 2005 the hearing was re-scheduled for 15 December 2005 because the applicant and his co-defendant asked to summon several defence witnesses. The hearing on 15 December 2005 was also adjourned owing to the applicant\u2019s and his co-defendants\u2019 counsel failure to appear. In the same decision the court, of its own motion, extended the applicant\u2019s detention. 12.  The applicant appealed, complaining, in particular, that the detention order of 15 December 2005 was delivered in his counsel\u2019s absence. On 17 January 2006 the Regional Court, presided by Judge K., dismissed the appeal, having noted that the counsel had failed to appear without providing any explanation for his absence. The appeal hearing was attended by a prosecutor and the applicant\u2019s counsel, but not by the applicant himself, despite his request to that effect. 13.  On 10 April 2006 the Town Court convicted the applicant of extortion and sentenced him to three years\u2019 imprisonment and a fine of 3,000 Russian roubles (RUB). The Regional Court upheld the conviction on 5 September 2006, but reduced the sentence.", "references": ["4", "9", "5", "1", "6", "7", "3", "8", "0", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "5.  The first applicant was born in 1971 and lives in Leverkusen, Germany. She is the daughter of the second and third applicants who were born in 1943 and 1942 respectively and lived in Tambov, Russia. The second applicant Ms Galina Zabelina died in 2013. 6.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7.  On 25 April 2007 Mr P.Z., the brother of the first applicant and the son of the second and third applicants, was charged with large-scale fraud; his name was placed on the list of fugitives from justice. He was accused of embezzling the assets of the companies under his management. The wronged companies filed a claim for compensation in respect of pecuniary damage. 8.  On 12 May 2007 a senior operational officer from the Federal Security Service sent a letter to the investigator in charge of P.Z.\u2019s case to inform him that \u201caccording to the available information, the real estate property owned by [the first applicant] (four flats) and by [the second applicant] (one flat) had been purchased at the expense of their close relative P.Z.\u201d 9.  On 22 May 2007 the investigator asked the Basmannyy District Court in Moscow to authorise attachment of the applicants\u2019 property, including three flats owned by the first applicant, a flat owned by the second applicant, and a car owned by the third applicant. He referred to undisclosed sources allegedly confirming that all that property had been purchased by P.Z. 10.  On 24 May 2007 the District Court issued the requested writs of attachment. It observed that, \u201caccording to the information from the investigation\u201d, P.Z. had used the stolen money to purchase the property which he had registered in the name of his family members. It considered therefore necessary to attach the property which the District Court described as being owned by P.Z. The District Court explained that the application for writs was to be granted because \u201cit [had been] lodged in the framework of a criminal case by the competent official and with the prosecutor\u2019s approval, it [was] well-reasoned and [complied] with the requirements of the Code of Criminal Procedure\u201d. 11.  The applicants filed an appeal. They produced evidence showing that they had paid for the impugned property out of their pocket and that the link to P.Z. was the investigator\u2019s conjecture without basis in fact. They were not defendants in any criminal proceedings or respondents in any civil claim and there were no legal grounds for attaching their property. 12.  On 13 August 2007 the Moscow City Court rejected their appeals, stating that the District Court had \u201ccarefully reviewed the materials enclosed with the investigator\u2019s request and reached the justified conclusion that there were sufficient grounds for seizing\u201d the listed property. 13.  The attachment of the applicants\u2019 property has remained in place to date.", "references": ["7", "6", "5", "8", "1", "4", "2", "3", "0", "No Label", "9"], "gold": ["9"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant company, an editorial and publishing house registered in Moscow, edits and publishes a national newspaper with a circulation of 500,000, the Novaya Gazeta (\u201cthe newspaper\u201d). The second applicant was born in 1977 and lives in Moscow. 6.  At 11.30 a.m. on 12 August 2000 K-141 Kursk, a nuclear cruise missile submarine of the Russian Navy (\u201cthe Kursk\u201d), while in the Barents Sea on a naval training exercise, sank as a result of explosions on board. Most of the crew died within minutes of the explosions. However, twenty\u2011three crew members (of the 118 aboard) survived the explosions and gathered in a stern compartment. They wrote a note to report the events. All of these twenty-three men died on board the Kursk before the arrival of a rescue team. 7.  The Chief Military Prosecutor\u2019s Office launched an official investigation into the accident under Article 263 \u00a7 3 of the Russian Criminal Code (a provision on \u201ca breach of safety procedures while using a means of transportation which causes the death of two or more persons by negligence\u201d) in case no. 29/00/0016-00 (\u201cthe investigation\u201d). 8.  On 22 July 2002 the Chief Military Prosecutor\u2019s Office terminated the investigation for lack of evidence of a crime. 9.  On 30 December 2002 B.K., counsel for the relatives of the deceased members of the Kursk crew, challenged the decision to terminate the investigation before the Chief Military Prosecutor. On 4 January 2003 his complaint was dismissed. B.K. challenged both decisions in court. 10.  On 21 April 2004 the Military Court of the Moscow Garrison confirmed the decision of 22 July 2002. On 29 June 2004 the Appeal Tribunal of the Military Court of the Moscow Garrison upheld the judgment on appeal. 11.  Between 2000 and 2005 the applicant company published in the newspaper a number of articles written by the second applicant covering the Kursk catastrophe and the investigation into it. 12.  In late 2004 B.K. lodged an application before the Court on behalf of R.K., the father of D.K., lieutenant-captain of the Kursk, alleging a violation of D.K.\u2019s right to life. 13.  On 24 January 2005, in issue no. 5 of 24\u201126 January 2005, the newspaper published an article written by the second applicant entitled \u201cThe Kursk case is now before the European Court\u201d (\u201c\u2018\u0414\u0435\u043b\u043e \u2018\u041a\u0443\u0440\u0441\u043a\u0430\u2019 - \u0432 \u0415\u0432\u0440\u043e\u043f\u0435\u0439\u0441\u043a\u043e\u043c \u0441\u0443\u0434\u0435\u201d \u2013 \u201cthe first article\u201d). 14.  The first article reported that R.K. had lodged an application before the Court alleging a violation of Article 2 of the Convention. It described D.K. as the person who had written the note stating that twenty-three men had survived the explosions and had been waiting for rescue in the stern compartment. The note had been discovered in October 2000. According to the first article, the note refuted the official version that all crew members had died as a result of the explosions. The first article stated that after the Kursk had sunk a series of knocks making an SOS signal in Morse code had been audible from the stern part of the submarine. Russian officials, including the then Prosecutor General, V.U., had refused to consider those knocks a plea for rescue, and had established that the noise had originated outside the stern part of the submarine. R.K. had unsuccessfully tried to prove in courts that the omission to consider the knocks an SOS signal amounted to an abuse of public office (\u201c\u0434\u043e\u043b\u0436\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u043d\u043e\u0435 \u043f\u0440\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0443\u043f\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435\u201d). His complaints had been rejected by the Moscow Garrison Military Court and the Moscow Circuit Military Court. In particular, the first article read as follows:\n\u201cR.K., the father of D.K., and his counsel B.K. have repeatedly tried to prove in Russian courts that this [failure to characterise the noise as an SOS signal] is absurd and [constitutes] an abuse of public office, the purpose of which is to help the Navy officers escape criminal responsibility.\nThe abuse of public office, according to the claimants, was perpetrated not only by investigators of the Chief Military Prosecutor\u2019s Office, but also by experts, V.K. and S.K. The reports by those two military officials (V.K. is the chief forensic expert of the Ministry of Defence, S.K. is the chief navigating officer of the Russian Navy) were relied upon by the investigators, headed by A.E. and V.U., who terminated the criminal case in relation to the Kursk catastrophe and delivered a decision refusing to prosecute eleven officers of the Northern Fleet.\u201d 15.  On 27 January 2005, in issue no. 6 of 27-30 January 2005, the newspaper published another article by the second applicant entitled \u201cThe prosecutor\u2019s office is worried about the prospect of the Kursk case being examined by the European Court. All reasonable offers welcome?\u201d (\u201c\u041f\u0435\u0440\u0441\u043f\u0435\u043a\u0442\u0438\u0432\u044b \u0415\u0432\u0440\u043e\u043f\u0435\u0439\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0441\u0443\u0434\u0430 \u043f\u043e \u2018\u0434\u0435\u043b\u0443 \u201c\u041a\u0443\u0440\u0441\u043a\u0430\u201d\u2018 \u0432\u0437\u0432\u043e\u043b\u043d\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043b\u0438 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u043a\u0443\u0440\u0430\u0442\u0443\u0440\u0443. \u0422\u043e\u0440\u0433 \u0443\u043c\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0435\u043d?\u201d \u2013 \u201cthe second article\u201d). The second article described State officials\u2019 reaction to R.K.\u2019s lodging the application. It reported that the Leningrad Military Circuit prosecutor had tried to persuade R.K. that his counsel had lodged the application exclusively for the purposes of self-promotion. B.K. had reportedly stated that his client had been willing to cooperate with the prosecutors, and had implied that R.K. had received an offer to have the official investigation reopened in exchange for the withdrawal of his application to the Court. In particular, the second article read as follows:\n\u201cB.K., counsel who represents the forty-seven families of the deceased crew members, has also confirmed that the application before the European Court was the last resort. There was no other prospect of success for the Kursk case in Russia, owing to the position adopted by V.U., the Prosecutor General, and A.S., the Chief Military Prosecutor. Apparently, those two officials took a decision to help the officers in command of the Northern Fleet escape criminal responsibility and to terminate the investigation. (B.K. has written about this in his book \u2018It has sunk ... The truth about the Kursk hidden by Prosecutor General U.\u2019).\u201d 16.  After the publication of the two articles, V.K., the chief forensic expert of the Russian Ministry of Defence, A.E., the head of an investigative group within the Chief Military Prosecutor\u2019s Office in charge of the Kursk investigation, A.S., the Chief Military Prosecutor of Russia, and the Chief Military Prosecutor\u2019s Office of Russia as a legal entity lodged civil actions for defamation against the applicants with the Basmannyy District Court of Moscow (\u201cthe District Court\u201d). Each claimant sought compensation for non-pecuniary damage and the retraction of certain statements appearing in the articles. 17.  V.K. sought the retraction of the following statement:\n\u201c... this is ... an abuse of public office, the purpose of which is to help the Navy officers escape criminal responsibility. The abuse of public office ... was perpetrated not only by investigators of the Chief Military Prosecutor\u2019s Office, but also by experts ...\u201d 18.  A.E. insisted that his reputation as the head of the investigative group in charge of the Kursk case had been tarnished by the following text:\n\u201c... this is ... an abuse of public office, the purpose of which is to help the Navy officers escape criminal responsibility. The abuse of public office ... was perpetrated not only by investigators of the Chief Military Prosecutor\u2019s Office, but also by experts ...\u201d 19.  The Chief Military Prosecutor\u2019s Office and its head, A.S., sought to have the following parts of the articles retracted:\n\u201c... this is ... an abuse of public office, the purpose of which is to help the Navy officers escape criminal responsibility. The abuse of public office ... was perpetrated not only by investigators of the Chief Military Prosecutor\u2019s Office, but also by experts ...\u201d\n\u201cThere was no other prospect of success for the Kursk case in Russia, owing to the position adopted by V.U., the Prosecutor General, and A.S., the Chief Military Prosecutor. Apparently, those two officials took a decision to help the officers in command of the Northern Fleet escape criminal responsibility and to terminate the investigation.\u201d 20.  On 3 March and 7 July 2005 the District Court joined the proceedings instituted by V.K., A.E., A.S. and the Chief Military Prosecutor\u2019s Office. 21.  On 11 April 2005 an expert linguist of the Russian Language Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences, at the applicant company\u2019s request, delivered an expert report on the impugned articles. The expert concluded that it was possible to perceive the texts as the reported opinions of R.K. and B.K., and not those of the journalist. 22.  On 7 December 2005 the District Court decided the case. It found that it had been established that the newspaper had indeed disseminated information concerning the claimants. It further found that the information in question was damaging to the claimants\u2019 reputation for the following reasons. The allegations that investigators and experts had tried to help the Navy officers escape criminal responsibility had suggested that these officials had lacked the requisite impartiality when performing their duties. The District Court found the expression \u201cto help escape criminal responsibility\u201d defamatory, as it contained an allegation of criminal conduct. The applicants had failed to provide evidence that the claimants had committed a crime. The District Court dismissed as unsubstantiated the applicants\u2019 reference to the fact that the second article had merely reproduced B.K.\u2019s position as reflected in his book. Furthermore, the District Court reasoned that the applicants had been under an obligation to verify the truthfulness of the information before publishing it. It dismissed the applicants\u2019 assertion that the impugned statements amounted to value judgments. The District Court found in the claimants\u2019 favour, ordered the retraction of the statements concerning the claimants\u2019 involvement in an abuse of public office, and awarded each claimant 50,000 and 7,000 Russian roubles (RUB \u2013 approximately 1,470 and 205 euros (EUR)), to be paid by the applicant company and the second applicant respectively. To reimburse court fees, the applicant company was ordered to pay RUB 85 and the second applicant was ordered to pay RUB 15 to each claimant. 23.  In so far as relevant, the District Court\u2019s judgment read as follows:\n\u201c... assessing the impugned statements, the court considers that they contain affirmations that V.K., A.E., A.S. and investigators of the Chief Military Prosecutor\u2019s Office broke the Russian law which was in force and committed an abuse of public office, and that such statements tarnish the honour, dignity and business reputation of V.K., A.E., [and] A.S., as well as the business reputation of the Chief Military Prosecutor\u2019s Office as an agency performing, in the name of the Russian Federation, State functions of supervision with regard to respect for the Constitution of Russia and laws in force within the Russian territory.\n...\nThe defendants have failed to produce any evidence to prove the veracity of the disseminated statements that the claimants abused public office and adopted unlawful decisions.\nLooking into the defendant\u2019s claim that the impugned articles reflect the opinion of ... B.K., ... expressed in his complaint before the European Court and his book \u201cIt has sunk. The truth about the Kursk hidden by Prosecutor General U.\u201d, the court finds as follows.\n... page 170 of the book by B.K. ... contains the following text: \u201cI think that the final decision not to find commanders of the Northern Navy criminally liable was taken by ..., A.S. and ...\u201d\nIn view of the above, comparing the impugned statements of the article ... and the text of the book, the court considers that the meaning of the phrase \u201cto take a decision not to find [somebody] criminally liable\u201d is not equivalent to the phrase \u201cto take a decision to help [somebody] escape criminal responsibility\u201d.\nThe complaint ... lodged by B.K. before the European Court ... does not contain statements alleging that the claimants committed an abuse of public office.\nFurthermore, the defendants\u2019 arguments that ... the editorial department and the author of the articles are not the authors of [B.K.\u2019s] statements cannot serve as grounds to absolve a mass media outlet and a journalist of responsibility, in view of the following.\nUnder section 49 of ... the Mass Media Act, a journalist must verify the truthfulness of the information he communicates, and section 57 of the Act sets out an exhaustive list of grounds for absolving an editorial department, an editor-in-chief, or a journalist of responsibility for disseminating untruthful statements that tarnish the honour and dignity of individuals and organisations ...\nThe court cannot accept as grounds to dismiss the [defamation] action the defendants\u2019 arguments that the impugned statements are opinions, value judgments that could not be retracted under Article 152 of the Civil Code, for the following reasons.\nUnder Article 17 of the Constitution, freedom of thought and expression, as well as the right to protect one\u2019s honour and good name, are recognised and guaranteed ... At the same time, the realisation of the rights and freedoms of an individual and citizen should not breach the rights and freedoms of other citizens.\nIn view of the Constitution\u2019s provisions, freedom of thought and expression guaranteed by the Constitution should not serve as an instrument to violate the honour and dignity of others.\nTherefore, expression by a journalist of his opinion on any topic, or the publication of an opinion by another person does not give grounds to absolve [the journalist] of responsibility where damage has been unlawfully inflicted on the values protected by the Constitution and the Civil Code of Russia, [such as] honour, dignity and the business reputation of an individual.\u201d 24.  The applicants appealed, arguing in particular that the information contained in the impugned articles amounted to value judgments, and that the articles had reflected the opinions of R.K. and B.K., opinions expressed in the former\u2019s application to the Court and the latter\u2019s book. 25.  On 16 March 2006 the Moscow City Court (\u201cthe City Court\u201d) dismissed the appeal and upheld the District Court\u2019s judgment in full. In particular, it reasoned \u201cthe defendants have not submitted evidence of the veracity of the disseminated statements, [while] the claimants have provided evidence proving that they did not commit the actions mentioned in the disseminated statements.\u201d 26.  The applicants also unsuccessfully applied for supervisory review. 27.  On 7 December 2005 the District Court issued two writs of execution against the applicant company in V.K\u2019s favour. The first writ contained an order to publish a retraction, and the second one ordered the applicant company to pay V.K. RUB 50,085. 28.  On 3 May 2006 the bailiffs\u2019 service received the writs and commenced enforcement proceedings. 29.  The newspaper published the retraction regarding V.K. in its issue of 22-25 June 2006. 30.  On 26 June 2006 the applicant company transferred RUB 50,085 to the bailiffs\u2019 bank account to be paid to V.K. 31.  On 27 June 2006 the bailiffs\u2019 service terminated the enforcement proceedings against the applicant company in respect of the retraction. 32.  On 28 June 2007 the second applicant transferred RUB 7,490 to the bailiffs\u2019 bank account to be paid to V.K. 33.  On 12 February 2008 the bailiffs\u2019 service initiated enforcement proceedings against the applicants on the basis of writs of execution in A.E.\u2019s favour. They ordered the applicant company and the second applicant to pay RUB 50,085 and RUB 7,015 respectively. 34.  On the same date the applicant company transferred to the bailiffs\u2019 bank account RUB 50,085 on its own behalf and RUB 7,015 on behalf of the second applicant, to be paid to A.E.", "references": ["2", "9", "8", "7", "1", "5", "4", "3", "0", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1966 and lives in Nizhniy Novgorod. 6.  At the material time he was the executive director of the Russian\u2011Chechen Friendship Society (\u041e\u0431\u0449\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e \u0440\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0439\u0441\u043a\u043e-\u0447\u0435\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u0434\u0440\u0443\u0436\u0431\u044b), a non-governmental organisation which monitored human rights violations in the Chechen Republic and other parts of the North Caucasus. He was also the chief editor of a monthly newspaper, Pravo-Zashchita (Protection of Rights), with a circulation of 5,000. The newspaper was published and distributed mainly in the Nizhniy Novgorod Region. At the end of each issue there was a standard disclaimer stating that the views of the editorial team might not concur with those expressed in the articles published. 7.  In early 2004 the applicant obtained two articles from the website Chechenpress. The first, which had the headline \u201cAddress by Akhmed Zakayev, Vice Prime Minister of the Government of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, to the People of Russia\u201d(\u00ab\u041e\u0431\u0440\u0430\u0449\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0432\u0438\u0446\u0435-\u043f\u0440\u0435\u043c\u044c\u0435\u0440\u0430 \u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0430 \u0427\u0435\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u0420\u0435\u0441\u043f\u0443\u0431\u043b\u0438\u043a\u0438 \u0418\u0447\u043a\u0435\u0440\u0438\u044f \u0410\u0445\u043c\u0435\u0434\u0430 \u0417\u0430\u043a\u0430\u0435\u0432\u0430 \u043a \u0440\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0439\u0441\u043a\u043e\u043c\u0443 \u043d\u0430\u0440\u043e\u0434\u0443\u00bb \u2013 \u201cthe first article\u201d), was published by him in issue no. 1 (58) of Pravo-Zashchita for March 2004. It read as follows:\n\u201cA year ago a peace process that had just begun was interrupted by the tragic events in the Dubrovka [theatre]. There may be long arguments as to who was responsible for that tragedy, but there is no dispute as to who benefited from it.\nToday, on behalf of Aslan Maskhadov, President of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, I am again addressing myself to the people of Russia. It is still not too late for us to resolve all the questions at issue. But for this, the people of Russia should get rid of those for whom peace represents the loss of power or perhaps even a trial. As long as they remain in the Kremlin, blood will continue to flow in Chechnya and in Russia.\nI am extending to the people of Russia the hand of peace over the head of their president. No one needs the war except for him: neither right nor left, neither poor nor rich. Vladimir Putin left the Chechens no choice, but you have a choice and you may still choose peace by voting against Putin in March 2004. Both for you and for us this is a real opportunity.\u201d 8.  The article was accompanied by the editorial team\u2019s comments (\u043e\u0442 \u0440\u0435\u0434\u0430\u043a\u0446\u0438\u0438), which read as follows:\n\u201cFor reasons beyond the editorial team\u2019s control, we are publishing this document belatedly. This address was made on the eve of the presidential elections in Russia. Unfortunately, the people of Russia did not avail themselves of their historic opportunity, having again elected as their president a man who has made political capital out of a bloody war against his own people and who is leading the country towards the blind alley of a police state. Nevertheless, we are convinced that this document, which represents the legitimate Chechen authorities\u2019 statement to the outside world, has not lost its topicality in the meantime\u201d. 9.  The second article, which had the headline \u201cAddress by Maskhadov, President of the Chechen Republic Ichkeria, to the European Parliament\u201d (\u00ab\u041e\u0431\u0440\u0430\u0449\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u041f\u0440\u0435\u0437\u0438\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0430 \u0427\u0435\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u0420\u0435\u0441\u043f\u0443\u0431\u043b\u0438\u043a\u0438 \u0418\u0447\u043a\u0435\u0440\u0438\u044f \u041c\u0430\u0441\u0445\u0430\u0434\u043e\u0432\u0430 \u043a \u0415\u0432\u0440\u043e\u043f\u0430\u0440\u043b\u0430\u043c\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0443\u00bb \u2013 \u201cthe second article\u201d), was published by the applicant in issue no. 2 (59) of Pravo-Zashchita for April and May 2004 and read as follows:\n\u201cOn 26 February 2004 the Parliament of the European Union adopted a declaration in which Stalin\u2019s deportation of the Chechen people on 23 February 1944 was officially recognised as an act of genocide. The European Parliament also recommended that the European Council study the plan of the Government of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (the CRI) on peaceful resolution of the present military conflict [between Russia[1] and Chechnya], which I had approved.\nThe total deportation to Central Asia and Kazakhstan in 1944 is one of the most tragic pages in the entire centuries-old history of the Chechens, since during this act of violence the national republic was completely liquidated and its territory separated among the adjacent regions. During the 13 years which the Chechen people spent in exile, about 70% of the population died.\nIt must be mentioned that the 1944 deportation was the ninth large-scale act of genocide by the military and political authorities of Imperial Russia during the period of the 400-year-long armed confrontation between the Chechens and Russians.\nThe very first deportation of the Chechens was carried out by Russia as early as in 1792, after the destruction of the State headed by the first Imam of the Caucasus, Sheikh Mansur. And after the destruction of the State headed by Imam Shamil, when the Russian-Caucasian war was officially declared to be over in 1859, a considerable proportion of Chechens ended up on the territory of the Ottoman Empire.\nThe last tsarist deportation was the expulsion of many Chechen families to cold and faraway Siberia in 1913. And the first mass deportations of the Chechens during the Soviet regime began in the years of collectivisation and cultural revolution, in other words during Stalin\u2019s regime.\nWhat is the aim of this historical overview? The Government of the CRI regards this political resolution by the European Parliament as an undoubtedly serious historic act on the way to achieving the long-awaited peace on blood-stained Chechen soil. More than a quarter of a million innocent civilians have already died in the CRI during the latest continuing Russian-Chechen war, the entire infrastructure of the republic has been completely devastated, many towns, villages, schools, hospitals and cultural facilities have been destroyed, and there is still no light at the end of the tunnel.\nYet the international community is watching the deliberate and systematic murder of the entire nation with complete serenity and has not the slightest desire to react in any way to this criminal madness by the bloody Kremlin regime. This in turn engenders thousands and thousands of new fighters in the republic, who replenish the ranks of the Chechen Resistance with fresh forces each day, and who believe that they have a moral right to use the enemy\u2019s own methods against the enemy, [an approach] which we unequivocally condemn.\nEven on this mournful date \u2013 the 60th anniversary of the deportation \u2013 many Chechens marked the occasion in extremely harsh conditions of unmotivated mass murders, extrajudicial executions, groundless detentions, severe \u2018clear-up\u2019 operations, tortures, kidnappings, disappearances and \u2018residential\u2019 checks by Russia\u2019s invaders and their accomplices, who have been committing excesses in the territory of the CRI for the past five years.\nAs the legitimately elected President of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, I express, on behalf of the recalcitrant Chechen people fighting for their freedom, sincere gratitude to all the members of the European Parliament who took this fundamental decision to recognise the deportation of 1944 as an act of genocide...\nToday, just as 60 years ago, the new global Russia\u2019s terror has become our national tragedy. Its inexorable millstones are grinding the gene pool of the unique and original Chechen people, one of the indigenous nations of the ancient Caucasus, and this in the end may lead to [the Chechens\u2019] total physical disappearance from the face of the earth.\nYour decision in defence of the Chechen people, living in a situation of ongoing genocide, is an additional moral incentive in the fight for survival. We are always open to constructive dialogue with the international community, and we invite independent experts from the United Nations and the European Union to monitor the situation with their own eyes, so that the groundless and defamatory attacks on the Chechens by Russia\u2019s propagandists, who insolently continue to pester the PACE, OSCE and other authoritative organisations, can no longer distort the real picture in the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria.\nThere is no doubt that the Kremlin is today the centre of international terrorism, and [the Kremlin] selected Chechnya and the Chechens as targets for testing terrorist methods which are being developed by the [Federal Security Service]. It would be naive to believe that the present regime in Russia would be too shy to use its terrorist experience in the international arena to solve its political and other problems. An example of this is the treacherous and cowardly terrorist attack by Russia\u2019s special services in the State of Qatar, which prematurely took the life of my predecessor, Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, and was carried out with the use of diplomatic channels.\nOwing to the wide publicity given to the latest events concerning the Khanbiyev family, you have become witnesses to one of the numerous terrorist methods used by the State party of Russia, notably taking hostages from the civilian population. In the majority of cases, hostages disappear without trace, and their bodies, showing traces of torture, are later discovered in secret graves that can be found all across the territory of Chechnya.\nThe genocide of the Chechen people, which continues in the 21st century, is a direct and impertinent challenge to all of progressive mankind, let alone civilised and democratic Europe, which considers human rights as its main value and priority, thus making the human factor of paramount importance and the most valuable achievement of civilisation.\nWe would therefore like to believe that the Chechen people have a right to hope that you will soon recognise the war which the Putin regime imposed on Chechnya as genocide \u2013 a war which, in its scale, refinement, vandalism and inhumanity, overshadows the genocide of 1944.\nI sincerely believe in the triumph of reason and justice on earth, and in the final victory of the Chechen people. The bright day is near when the sacred Chechen soil will be completely cleansed of the countless hordes of Russia\u2019s invaders and their accomplices among local nation-traitors. The Chechen Resistance will inevitably accomplish it! Whatever the costs! No one in the world should have any doubt about this!\u201d 10.  On 28 November 2004 an officer from the prosecutor\u2019s office of the Nizhniy Novgorod Region (\u043f\u0440\u043e\u043a\u0443\u0440\u0430\u0442\u0443\u0440\u0430 \u041d\u0438\u0436\u0435\u0433\u043e\u0440\u043e\u0434\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u043e\u0431\u043b\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0438 \u2013 \u201cthe regional prosecutor\u2019s office\u201d) reported that he had established that the articles written by unidentified authors contained public appeals to extremist activity \u2013 most notably to overthrow the State regime and forcibly change fundamental aspects of Russia\u2019s constitutional system. 11.  The applicant was interviewed in connection with his publication of the articles. He stated that he supported the assessment given by Akhmed Zakayev in his article of the role of Mr V. V. Putin, the President of Russia, in the history of Russia over the last several years. He also stated that he strongly supported his appeal to stop the war and to resolve the military conflict in the Chechen Republic in a peaceful political way, having made a commentary to that effect after the article. As regards the second article, the applicant explained that he had considered the material to be of great public importance for the people of Russia so had published it. He added that he had intended to convey to the readers the position of the leaders of one of the parties to the military conflict in the Chechen Republic as he had considered that, in the light of the continuing tragedy in the Northern Caucasus and terrorist threat, citizens should be entitled to have an idea of that position first hand rather than having the situation presented to them by Russia\u2019s mass media, which only reflected the point of view of the authorities of Russia. 12.  On 11 January 2005 the regional prosecutor\u2019s office instituted criminal proceedings under Article 280 \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Code (public appeals to extremist activity through the mass media). The applicant was questioned on several occasions as a witness. 13.  In reports dated 18 February 2005 Ms T., a linguistic expert, stated that the articles in question contained no appeals to extremist activity but rather were aimed at inciting racial, ethnic and social discord (\u0440\u043e\u0437\u043d\u044c), associated with violence (see paragraphs 20-27 below). Following that conclusion, the authorities decided to conduct a further investigation under Article 282 \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Code (incitement to hatred (\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0430\u0432\u0438\u0441\u0442\u044c) or enmity (\u0432\u0440\u0430\u0436\u0434\u0430) and the humiliation of human dignity). 14.  In a witness interview on 25 April 2005 the applicant stated, inter alia, that he had published the two articles as he had considered the material to be of great public significance and had intended to apprise readers in the Nizhniy Novgorod Region of them. He had not pursued any other aim. He also stated that he had taken the decision to publish the articles, without being asked by anyone. In his opinion, the articles were decent and reflected their authors\u2019 point of view. He disagreed with the conclusions of the expert reports of 18 February 2005 that the articles contained statements aimed at inciting enmity between the Russians and the Chechens, or statements humiliating the human dignity of the Russians on the grounds of their ethnic origin. He also affirmed his principal position regarding that issue, namely that the actions of the Government of Russia and its armed forces during the conflict in the Chechen Republic should be regarded as a war crime and a crime against mankind. The applicant further stated that he had considered that the publication of the articles promoted friendship and peace between the people of Russia and the Chechen people. Lastly, he denied that he had obtained any payment for publishing the articles. During subsequent interviews the applicant consistently maintained his position. 15.  By a decision of 5 May 2005 the investigator in charge suspended the proceedings as those responsible remained unidentified. The decision referred to the statements the applicant had made during witness interviews to the effect that he had obtained the impugned documents from a website and published them with a view to apprising readers in the Nizhniy Novgorod Region of them. The decision further stated that no evidence capable of refuting the applicant\u2019s arguments had been obtained during the investigation. It went on to say that there was evidence of a crime under Article 282 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code in the actions of those who had published the documents online; however, since they remained unidentified the investigation had to be suspended. 16.  The decision of 5 May 2005 was quashed by a deputy prosecutor of the regional prosecutor\u2019s office and the proceedings were resumed on 9 July 2005. 17.  On 2 September 2005 the applicant was formally charged under Article 282 \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Code and banned from leaving his place of residence. On the same date the investigator in charge refused a request by him for another linguistic expert examination of the articles, stating that the conclusions in the reports of 18 February 2005 were well-reasoned and consistent. 18.  By a decision of 26 September 2005 the investigator in charge refused a request by the applicant for a comprehensive expert examination of the articles involving linguistic experts and historians including the history, culture and traditions of the Chechen people. The grounds for the refusal were similar to those stated in the decision of 2 September 2005. 19.  On 29 September 2005 an indictment was served on the applicant and the case file was sent for trial. 20.  In the context of the criminal proceedings against the applicant, the investigating authorities ordered a linguistic expert examination of the articles published by him. An expert was requested to answer whether they contained any appeals to extremist activity and, in particular, whether there were any appeals to activity aimed at advocating the exceptionality, supremacy or inferiority of citizens on the grounds of their racial, ethnic or social origin. The expert was also requested to reply whether the articles contained statements aimed at inciting hatred or enmity or humiliating the dignity of an individual or a group of individuals on the grounds of their race, ethnic origin, language, origin, attitude towards religion, or membership of a certain social group. 21.  On 18 February 2005 Ms T. drew up two expert reports. In a report on the linguistic expert examination of the first article, she pointed out that the text contained statements in the affirmative to the effect that \u201cthe tragedy in the Dubrovka [theatre] and the war in Chechnya [were] beneficial for Vladimir Putin\u201d, that \u201cthe cessation of war and a peace agreement with the leaders of the [Chechen Republic of Ichkeria meant] the loss of power for V. Putin\u201d, and that \u201cuntil V. Putin [guided] the State, blood [would] continue to flow in Chechnya and Russia\u201d. The report then referred to the following statement:\n\u201cIt is still not too late for us to resolve all the questions at issue. But for this, the people of Russia should get rid of those for whom peace represents the loss of power or perhaps even a trial. As long as they remain in the Kremlin, blood will continue to flow in Chechnya and in Russia.\u201d\nAccording to the report, that statement, analysed in the context of the whole article, contained a demand by the author to the people of Russia not to vote for Vladimir Putin in March 2004. It went on to note that the author was also promising that, otherwise, killings and terrorist acts would be carried out in Chechnya and in Russia (\u201cblood will continue to flow...\u201d), verbally threatening the people of Russia. On the basis of that analysis, Ms T. concluded that the above-mentioned statement was aimed at inciting racial, ethnic or social discord, associated with violence. The report provided no further details in respect of that conclusion. It also stated that the article contained no appeals to extremist activity or any statements aimed at advocating the exceptionality and supremacy of the Chechens on the grounds of their ethnic origin. 22.  The other report of 18 February 2005 concerned a linguistic expert examination of the second article and stated that the following statements were aimed at inciting racial, ethnic and social hostility, associated with violence:\n\u201c...the 1944 deportation was the ninth large-scale act of genocide by the military and political authorities of Imperial Russia...\u201d\n\u201cThe very first deportation of the Chechens was carried out by Russia as early as in 1792...\u201d\n\u201cMore than a quarter of a million innocent civilians have already died in the [Chechen Republic of Ichkeria] (the CRI) during the latest continuing Russian-Chechen war...\u201d\n\u201c...the international community ... has not the slightest desire to react in any way to this criminal madness by the bloody Kremlin regime...\u201d\n\u201c...the 60th anniversary of the deportation ... many Chechens marked ... in extremely harsh conditions of unmotivated mass murders, extrajudicial executions, groundless detentions, severe \u2018clear-up\u2019 operations, tortures, kidnappings, disappearances and \u2018residential\u2019 checks by Russia\u2019s invaders and their accomplices, who have been committing excesses in the territory of the CRI for the past five years...\u201d\n\u201cToday, just as 60 years ago, the new global Russia\u2019s terror has become our national tragedy. Its inexorable millstones are grinding the gene pool of the unique and original Chechen people...\u201d\n\u201c...we invite independent experts from the United Nations and the European Union to monitor the situation with their own eyes, so that the groundless and defamatory attacks on the Chechens by Russia\u2019s propagandists... can no longer distort the real picture in the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria...\u201d\n\u201cThere is no doubt that the Kremlin is today the centre of international terrorism, and [the Kremlin] selected Chechnya and the Chechens as targets for testing terrorist methods which are being developed by the [Federal Security Service]...\u201d\n\u201cIt would be naive to believe that the present regime in Russia would be too shy to use its terrorist experience in the international arena to solve its political and other problems...\u201d\n\u201cAn example of this is the treacherous and cowardly terrorist attack by Russia\u2019s special services in the State of Qatar, which prematurely took the life of ... Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev...\u201d\n\u201c...you have become witnesses to one of the numerous terrorist methods used by the State party of Russia, notably taking hostages from the civilian population...\u201d\n\u201cWe would therefore like to believe that the Chechen people have a right to hope that you will soon recognise the war which the Putin regime imposed on Chechnya as genocide...\u201d\n\u201cThe bright day is near when the sacred Chechen soil will be completely cleansed of the countless hordes of Russia\u2019s invaders and their accomplices...\u201d 23.  The report stated that in all those statements the author of the article was directly pointing out that it was Russia and its invaders, military and political authorities, special services and State party who were carrying out \u201cgenocide\u201d, \u201cunmotivated mass murders, extrajudicial executions, groundless detentions, severe \u2018clear-up\u2019 operations, tortures, kidnappings, disappearances and \u2018residential\u2019 checks\u201d, and that it was they who were \u201ccommitting excesses\u201d. It also indicated that \u201cthe expression \u2018State party [of Russia]\u2019 should be understood to mean a designation of a group of people, organisation or State set in contrast in some aspect to another group of people, organisation or State (in the present case, to Chechnya)\u201d. 24.  The report also pointed out that the last three sentences of the articles were exclamatory and expressed the author\u2019s contemptuous and angry attitude. According to the report, the three sentences were \u201can undisputable and unequivocal statement to the effect that the Chechen Resistance [would] inevitably liberate their soil of Russia\u2019s servicemen\u201d. The report went on to state that the expression \u201cWhatever the costs!\u201d referred to the means and methods (\u201cto use the enemy\u2019s own methods against the enemy\u201d, \u201cterrorist methods\u201d), and that it was of little importance whether those methods were condemned by the author or not, as the author\u2019s \u201cprotective reservation\u201d \u201cto use the enemy\u2019s own methods against the enemy, [an approach] which we unequivocally condemn\u201d did not change the true meaning of the aforementioned expression. 25.  T. also considered it necessary to note that the article contained a number of statements with contemptuous, angry stylistic connotations expressing a distinctly negative assessment of the actions of Russia\u2019s servicemen and governance of the military and political authorities of Russia, such as \u201cthis criminal madness by the [bloody] Kremlin regime\u201d, \u201cRussia\u2019s invaders and their accomplices, who have been committing excesses in the territory of the CRI for the past five years\u201d, \u201cthe Kremlin is today the centre of international terrorism\u201d and \u201cthe Putin regime\u201d. 26.  The report went on to note that the article in question also contained statements aimed at advocating the exceptionality and supremacy of the Chechens on the grounds of their ethnic origin, namely:\n\u201c...the new global Russia\u2019s terror has become our national tragedy. Its inexorable millstones are grinding the gene pool of the unique and original Chechen people, one of the indigenous nations of the ancient Caucasus...\u201d\n\u201cThe bright day is near when the sacred Chechen soil will be completely cleansed of the countless hordes of Russia\u2019s invaders...\u201d 27.  Lastly, the report concluded that the article contained no appeals to extremist activity. 28.  At a hearing, the applicant denied the charges. He confirmed that he had decided to publish the articles in question in the newspaper Pravo-Zashchita himself and supported the views expressed in them. He further argued that it had been his responsibility as a journalist to inform his readers of the position of the other party to the Chechen conflict and of possible means to its peaceful resolution. According to the applicant, he had acted in the name of peace and friendship between various nations in Russia. He confirmed that he supported the ideas expressed in the articles. 29.  The applicant\u2019s defence submitted a report by a linguistic expert, Ms V., which they had obtained at their own request at the investigation stage. It stated that the two articles in question could not be regarded as inciting racial or national hatred and discord. Before the trial court, the applicant argued that Ms T.\u2019s conclusions in the reports of 18 February 2005 were hypothetical and that she had not taken into account scientific recommendations for investigating the type of criminal offence with which he had been charged. The applicant also insisted that Ms T. had exceeded her competence as she had given a legal qualification to his actions. He also pointed to discrepancies between the reports by Ms T. submitted by the prosecution and the report by Ms V. submitted by the defence. 30.  A number of witnesses examined at the trial gave positive references about the applicant, stating that he was a man of good character and spoke out in favour of a peaceful resolution of the conflict in the Chechen Republic. 31.  Both experts were also cross-examined during the trial. The applicant submitted an audio recording of Ms T.\u2019s cross-examination, which he had made at the trial. It appears from the recording that, in reply to the applicant\u2019s questions, Ms T. refused to give definitions of the notions of \u201crace\u201d, \u201cethnic origin\u201d and \u201csocial group\u201d, stating that it fell outside of her field of expertise. 32. In a judgment of 3 February 2006 the Sovetskiy District Court of Nizhniy Novgorod (\u201cthe District Court\u201d), sitting in a single-judge formation composed of Judge B., established that, in breach of sections 51 and 59 of the Mass Media Act, the applicant, \u201cacting intentionally and using his official position as chief editor, [had] decided to publish two articles which contained statements aimed at inciting enmity and humiliating the dignity of a group of persons on the grounds of race, ethnic origin and membership of a certain social group\u201d. The court then quoted the expressions referred to in the expert reports of 18 February 2005 (see paragraphs 21-22 above) and observed that 5,000 copies of each of the two issues in which the articles had been published had been distributed in Nizhniy Novgorod, Moscow, Voronezh, Kazan and the Republic of Ingushetia. 33.  The District Court found that the applicant\u2019s guilt had been proven \u201cby witness statements and the case material, [in particular] by the conclusions of the forensic expert examinations, according to which the texts [of the impugned articles contained] no appeals to extremist activity, but [contained] statements aimed at inciting racial, ethnic or social discord, associated with violence\u201d. On the basis of the evidence adduced to it, the District Court found it necessary to classify the applicant\u2019s actions as those punishable under Article 282 \u00a7 2 (b) of the Criminal Code, namely those aimed at inciting enmity and humiliating the dignity of a group of persons on the grounds of race, ethnic origin, membership of a social group, committed through the mass media by a person using his official position. 34.  The trial court then found that, \u201cacting with direct intent, being aware of the nature of his actions and wishing to carry them out, [the applicant], on his own, [had taken] a decision to publish two articles which had, as their basis, statements aimed at inciting enmity and humiliating the dignity of persons on the grounds of race, ethnic origin and membership of a social group\u201d. It observed that \u201cduring the trial [the applicant had] repeatedly expressed his support for the points of view reflected in the published articles\u201d and had \u201cpointed out that he [had been] carrying out his duty as a journalist by so doing\u201d. In the court\u2019s opinion, however, the arguments advanced by the applicant in his defence were \u201cuntenable from a legal point of view and should be regarded as [his] attempt to defend himself to avoid punishment for the committed offence of medium gravity\u201d. The witness statements in the applicant\u2019s favour were held \u201cto concern only the applicant\u2019s personality\u201d and to be \u201cirrelevant for the present criminal case\u201d. 35.  The District Court further pointed out that it had based its guilty verdict \u201con the lawful and well-founded expert reports [of 18 February 2005], in which [Ms T. had] thoroughly analysed the texts of both articles in their entirety and made a conclusion as to the presence in [them] of statements aimed at inciting racial, ethnic and social discord\u201d. The court considered that it had no reason to doubt or question the conclusions of the expert reports given, in particular, \u201cMs T.\u2019s competence, professional skills and [past] experience.\u201d 36.  The District Court further rejected the report by Ms V. as defective, saying that it was superficial and formalistic and that the expert examination in question had been carried out without due regard to an analysis of the texts. The court also noted in this connection that the applicant had paid for the report and that Ms V. had not been informed of the relevant provisions of procedural legislation which criminalised the drawing up of knowingly false expert reports. 37.  The trial court found it necessary to exclude from the charges against the applicant reference to \u201cthe statements aimed at advocating the exceptionality and supremacy of the Chechens on the grounds of their ethnicity\u201d \u201cin the absence of such wording in the provisions of Article 282 of the Russian Criminal Code\u201d. 38.  As regards the punishment to be imposed on the applicant, the court had regard to the nature and social dangerousness of the offence with which he had been charged and the fact that he had no criminal record, had positive references and had two dependent children. It also stated that there was no evidence at that time that \u201c[his] illegal actions had entailed any serious consequences\u201d. The court therefore considered it appropriate to give the applicant a two-year suspended sentence and four years\u2019 probation. 39.  On 9 February 2006 the applicant applied to the District Court to have the trial record amended. He complained that Ms T.\u2019s testimony, which was of crucial importance to his case, had been distorted in the record and that, in particular, it attributed certain statements to her which she had not made at the trial. He pointed out, more specifically, that during the trial Ms T. had refused, in reply to his questions, to give definitions to the notions of \u201crace\u201d, \u201cethnic origin\u201d and \u201csocial group\u201d, stating that it was outside of her competence as a linguist and rather fell within the competence of a sociologist or historian. However, according to the official trial record, Ms T. had defined the aforementioned notions. The applicant also asked the court to include in the case file a copy and transcript of the audio recording of the first-instance hearings, made by the defence, indicating the discrepancies between the actual statements made by Ms T. and those reflected in the trial record. 40.  By a decision of 13 February 2006 Judge B. of the District Court rejected the applicant\u2019s application. He noted that the trial record had been made in compliance with procedural law and fully reflected the actual testimony given by all witnesses. The judge further stated that neither the applicant nor his lawyer had notified the District Court of the audio recording of Ms T.\u2019s cross-examination at the trial or requested that the court include it in the case file, and that there were no legal grounds at that time for entertaining the applicant\u2019s application. 41.  On 9, 10 and 13 February 2006 respectively the applicant\u2019s two lawyers and the applicant lodged appeals against his conviction. 42.  On 17 February 2006 the applicant filed supplementary appeal pleadings, reiterating his complaints concerning the shortcomings in the trial record with respect to Ms T.\u2019s testimony and requesting that the appellate court examine the audio recording made during the trial of Ms T.\u2019s statements and establish the discrepancy between them and those reflected in the trial record. 43.  By a letter of 21 February 2006, Judge B. returned the applicant\u2019s supplementary pleadings, stating that, in substance, they reflected his remarks in respect of the trial record, which had already been examined and rejected on 13 February 2006. 44.  On 1 March 2006 the applicant resubmitted his supplementary pleadings of 17 February 2006 to the Nizhniy Novgorod Regional Court (\u201cthe Regional Court\u201d) and complained about Judge B.\u2019s refusal to accept them. In a letter of 13 April 2006 the Regional Court informed the applicant that it had accepted his pleadings of 17 February 2006 for examination and had examined them during an appeal hearing on 11 April 2006, and therefore the breach of his right of appeal against the judgment of 3 February 2006 had been remedied. The letter also stated that Judge B.\u2019s actions when he had unlawfully returned the applicant\u2019s supplementary pleadings of 17 February 2006 would be discussed by the Regional Court, but that at the same time there were insufficient grounds for instituting disciplinary proceedings against him. 45.  In its decision of 11 April 2006 the Regional Court found the judgment of 3 February 2006 reasoned and well-founded and upheld it on appeal. It reiterated the reasoning of the trial court, stating that the applicant\u2019s guilt for the offence with which he had been charged had been proven by the body of evidence examined during the trial \u2013 his own statements in which he had admitted having published the impugned articles and the expert reports of 18 February 2005. The Regional Court endorsed the trial court\u2019s argument that there was no reason to question the conclusions of those reports. It also stated that the trial court had addressed Ms V.\u2019s report, which had been favourable to the applicant, having assessed it critically. 46.  In February and March 2006 the applicant unsuccessfully attempted to have disciplinary and criminal proceedings instituted against Judge B. for alleged falsifying the trial record, exceeding his powers and obstructing justice.", "references": ["7", "5", "2", "1", "4", "8", "9", "3", "0", "No Label", "6"], "gold": ["6"]}
+{"input": "7.  The applicant was born in 1980 and lived in St Petersburg until her arrest. 8.  On 6 February 2013 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of drug trafficking. She remained in detention throughout the ensuing investigation and trial. 9.  On 28 March 2013 the Krasnogvardeiyskiy District Court of St Petersburg found her guilty and sentenced her to one year in prison. Regard being had to her previous convictions for similar offences, the applicant was ordered to spend four years and one month in a correctional colony. 10.  At the time of her arrest the applicant suffered from HIV and chronic hepatitis C. 11.  She underwent a routine medical examination by a general practitioner on admission to her remand prison. Several days later, on 18 February 2013, she was examined by a gynaecologist, who diagnosed cervical erosion and carried out basic tests. 12.  In late April 2013 the applicant was sent to correctional colony no. 2 in St Petersburg. 13.  She had the necessary treatment for HIV and other illnesses in the correctional colony. She was examined by various doctors, including a gynaecologist. She consulted the latter on 6 and 22 May 2013 on account of a vaginal infection. 14.  On 9 June 2015 the applicant complained of intense pain in the lower abdomen, which she had been experiencing for four months. A gynaecologist tested her for sexually transmitted diseases and prescribed treatment with hormones and painkillers. 15.  Six days later the doctor examined her again and suggested that she might have developed cervical cancer and needed to go to hospital for an in\u2011depth examination. 16.  On 17 June 2015 the applicant, referring to \u201cpersonal circumstances\u201d, asked for the admission to hospital to be suspended. The doctor talked to her, insisting that she urgently needed to be admitted to hospital, but she refused. 17.  A cervical smear test was carried out next day. It revealed cell pathology which resembled cervical cancer, requiring a histological examination to confirm the diagnosis. 18.  On 21 July 2015 the applicant was admitted to Gaaza Prison Hospital in St Petersburg (\u201cthe prison hospital\u201d). It appears that it was not licensed to provide healthcare services, although certain services for cancer patients were provided by St Petersburg City Cancer Hospital under a special agreement (see paragraph 42 below). 19.  The applicant had a histological examination two days later, which confirmed cervical cancer. Local chemotherapy was prescribed. 20.  On 22 September 2015 the custodial authorities asked a gynaecological cancer specialist to examine the applicant. The doctor noted that her cancer had progressed to such an advanced stage that it could not be cured by surgery. Radiotherapy was prescribed. 21.  The applicant suffered from \u201cunbearable pain\u201d which ordinary painkillers could not alleviate. On 30 October 2015 the prison hospital\u2019s medical board therefore authorised the use of narcotic pain relief. 22.  In November 2015 the head of the prison hospital applied for the applicant\u2019s early release on medical grounds. 23.  At a hearing on 25 November 2015 before the Smolninskiy District Court of St Petersburg, the applicant\u2019s doctor supported the application, stating that she was very ill, was in constant, severe pain, and that the prison hospital had no drugs to treat her. The drugs accessible in detention were unable to relieve the pain. He argued that if released the applicant would benefit from the wider range of painkillers available in civilian hospitals. 24.  A representative of the detention authorities left the issue to the court\u2019s discretion, only making positive comments about the applicant\u2019s work while in detention and about her character. 25.  The prosecutor in the case objected to the applicant\u2019s release, stating that the detention facility could provide her with the requisite treatment. 26.  The court dismissed the application, finding that the treatment she would receive in the prison hospital was similar to what she would get in a civilian one. 27.  On 1 March 2016 the St Petersburg City Court quashed the decision of 25 November 2015 on appeal and remitted the case for fresh examination. No hearings were held. 28.  By a letter delivered to the Court on 2 March 2016 the applicant asked to apply interim measures under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. She complained of a lack of medical care in detention, including an absence of effective painkillers. On the same day the Court indicated to the Government, under Rule 39, that the applicant should immediately be given access to the entire range of medication available for cancer patients in accordance with Russian laws, including appropriate pain relief drugs. It noted that if such drugs were not available in prison medical institutions, the applicant should be transferred to a civilian hospital. 29.  Following the Court\u2019s decision on interim measures the authorities continued treating the applicant in the prison hospital, which mostly consisted of treating her symptoms. 30.  The applicant\u2019s condition deteriorated rapidly. She complained of constant pain and asked to consult a psychiatrist. She was afraid that she would have no chance to say farewell to her mother, who was dying of cervical cancer in a hospital. On 16 March 2016 the prison psychiatrist prescribed her sedatives. 31.  On 25 March 2016 the applicant was examined by a cancer specialist. He recorded that \u201cadditional prescriptions\u201d were necessary to address the applicant\u2019s severe and increasing pain. It does not appear that any changes in the pain relief therapy were made. 32.  The applicant died on 9 April 2016.", "references": ["0", "5", "4", "6", "9", "3", "8", "7", "2", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "9.  The first applicant was born in 1986 and the second applicant in 1985. 10.  The first applicant left his village in Mali on account of the 2012 armed conflict. He arrived in Morocco in March 2013. He spent approximately nine months in the makeshift camp for migrants on Gurugu Mountain, near the Spanish border crossing into Melilla, a Spanish enclave on the North African coast. He spoke of several raids on the camp by the Moroccan law-enforcement authorities. 11.  The second applicant arrived in Morocco in late 2012. He also stayed in the camp on Gurugu Mountain. 12.  On 13 August 2014 the applicants left the Gurugu Mountain camp and attempted to enter Spain as part of a group of sub-Saharan migrants, via the Melilla border crossing. The crossing comprises three successive fences: two six-metre-high outer fences and a three-metre-high inner fence. A system of infrared CCTV cameras and movement sensors is in place. The applicants and other migrants scaled the first fence in the morning. They claimed that stones had been thrown at them by the Moroccan authorities. The first applicant managed to climb to the top of the third fence, and remained there until the afternoon without medical or legal assistance. The second applicant stated that he had been hit by a stone while climbing the first fence and had fallen, but had subsequently succeeded in climbing over the first two fences. During this time the applicants allegedly witnessed violence against some of the sub-Saharan migrants by the Spanish Guardia Civil and Moroccan law-enforcement officials. At around 3 p.m. and 2 p.m. respectively the first and second applicants climbed down from the third fence, assisted by Spanish law-enforcement officials. As soon as they reached the ground they were apprehended by members of the Guardia Civil, who handcuffed them and sent them back to Morocco. At no point were the applicants\u2019 identities checked. They had no opportunity to explain their personal circumstances or to be assisted by lawyers, interpreters or medical personnel. 13.  The applicants were then transferred to Nador police station, where they requested medical assistance. Their request was refused. They were subsequently taken, together with other individuals who had been returned in similar circumstances, to Fez, some 300 km from Nador, where they were left to fend for themselves. The applicants stated that between 75 and 80 migrants from sub-Saharan Africa had also been returned to Morocco on 13 August 2014. 14.  Journalists and other witnesses were at the scene of the assault on the fences and the expulsions of 13 August 2014. They provided video footage which the applicants submitted to the Court. Some non-governmental organisations subsequently lodged a complaint with the Melilla investigating judge no. 3, seeking the opening of an investigation. 15.  On 9 December and 23 October 2014 respectively, the first and second applicants succeeded in entering Spanish territory by the Melilla border crossing. Two sets of proceedings were commenced concerning them and orders were subsequently issued for their expulsion. N.D. was returned to Mali on 31 March 2015 under an expulsion order issued on 26 January 2015, after his asylum application of 17 March 2015 had been rejected by the administrative authorities on 26 March 2015. He is currently in the Bankoumana area (Koulikoro region, south-west of Bamako).\nAn order for N.T.\u2019s expulsion was issued on 7 November 2014 and was upheld on 23 February 2015 after the dismissal of his administrative appeal (de alzada). His current situation is unknown.\nBoth applicants were represented by lawyers during these proceedings.", "references": ["9", "6", "8", "0", "4", "3", "7", "5", "2", "1", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Bor. 6.  The applicant was employed by the bank called Borska banka AD, (\u201cthe debtor\u201d). It would appear that at the relevant time the debtor was predominantly comprised of socially-owned capital. 7.  On 13 February 2004 the Zaje\u010dar Commercial Court opened insolvency proceedings in respect of the debtor. 8.  On 8 February 2005, upon a submission to that effect, the Zaje\u010dar Commercial Court recognised the applicant\u2019s claims concerning salary arrears. 9. On an unspecified date the applicant was paid 8,533 Serbian dinars (RSD) on account of the debt in question. The remainder of the debt has not been paid until the present day. 10.  The insolvency proceedings are still pending. 11.  On 14 December 2006 the applicant applied to the Zaje\u010dar Commercial Court for enforcement of the court\u2019s decision of 8 February 2005, by which the applicant\u2019s claims were recognised. The Zaje\u010dar Commercial Court, however, declined its jurisdiction ratione materiae and transferred the case file to the Bor Municipal Court. 12.  On 7 May 2007 the Bor Municipal Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s enforcement request. In its reasoning, the Court stated that the Commercial Court\u2019s decision of 8 February 2005 was not suitable for execution. 13.  On 23 November 2007 the Zaje\u010dar District Court upheld the first instance court\u2019s decision, stating that the debtor had been subject to the pending insolvency proceedings. 14.  On 18 March 2008 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal against the Zaje\u010dar District Court\u2019s decision. 15.  On 4 November 2010 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant\u2019s constitutional appeal. It found that the applicant had failed to properly seize the Constitutional Court, having lodged her appeal against \u201cthe wrong\u201d decision.", "references": ["7", "2", "5", "6", "8", "0", "1", "4", "No Label", "3", "9"], "gold": ["3", "9"]}
+{"input": "6.  The applicant was born in 1973 and lives in Bucharest. He is a lawyer. 7.  In a judgment of 25 May 2011, the Bucharest Court of First Instance sentenced him to seven years\u2019 imprisonment for embezzlement and forgery. On 1 December 2011 he was imprisoned in the police station\u2019s detention facility in Bucharest (Centrul de re\u0163inere \u015fi arestare preventiv\u0103 nr. 2 \u2013 sec\u0163ia 4 Poli\u0163ie), where he started serving his sentence. The judgment of the Court of First Instance was upheld by a final judgment of the Bucharest Court of Appeal of 25 November 2011, which was finalised on 25 May 2012. 8.  The applicant lodged two applications for a stay of execution of sentence under Article 453 \u00a7 1 b) and c) of the former Code of Criminal Procedure (\u201cthe CCP\u201d) (see paragraph 22 below). He submitted that he was married and had a child who was only a few months old, born on 19 May 2011, whom he wanted to look after, and that his family were experiencing financial and social difficulties on account of his detention. 9.  In a judgment of 27 March 2012, the Bucharest Court of First Instance dismissed his first application on the grounds that a stay of execution of sentence provided for by Article 453 \u00a7 1 b) of the CCP for convicted mothers up to their child\u2019s first birthday had to be interpreted strictly and that the applicant could not seek application of that provision by analogy. It also found that the financial and family difficulties referred to by the applicant did not fall within the category of special circumstances required by Article 453 \u00a7 1 c) of the CCP to allow a deferral of sentence, especially as they had existed prior to his placement in detention. 10.  On appeal by the applicant, the Bucharest County Court upheld the judgment of the Court of First Instance in a judgment of 7 May 2012. 11.  In a judgment of 13 June 2012, the Bucharest Court of First Instance dismissed the second application lodged by the applicant under Article 453 \u00a7 1 c) of the CCP on the grounds that the statutory conditions were not satisfied. In particular, the court found that enforcement of the sentence did not endanger the applicant\u2019s personal or family situation. In a judgment of 17 July 2012, the Bucharest County Court dismissed an appeal by the applicant against that judgment. 12.  The applicant was detained in a number of different prisons, including the Bucharest police detention facility (from 1 to 13 December 2011), Bucharest\u2011Rahova Prison (from 13 to 19 December 2011, 21 December 2011 to 9 January 2012 and 17 January 2012 to 30 January 2013), M\u0103rgineni Prison (from 9 to 17 January 2012) and Giurgiu Prison (from 30 January to 25 February 2013 and from 11 March to 26 September 2013). 13.  With regard to the Bucharest police detention facility, the applicant stated that he had been detained there with three other detainees, in cell no. 1, which he said measured 1.80 x 2 sq. m. He said that the cell had only one window, measuring 30 x 40 sq. cm, which had two rows of bars across it and therefore did not let natural light in. He added that the toilets were dirty and separated from the rest of the cell only by a curtain. Lastly, he stated that running water was available only two hours per day. 14.  With regard to Bucharest\u2011Rahova Prison, the applicant said that he had been detained in cell no. 209 with eight other detainees. He said that the cell measured 3.20 x 5.80 sq. m and had only one window, measuring 1 x 1.20 sq. m, with bars and a grille and thus no natural light. He added that the cell had been damp and had an unpleasant smell. 15.  With regard to M\u0103rgineni Prison, he stated that he had been detained there with twenty-four other detainees in a 2 x 6. sq. m. cell and that there had been no running water. 16.  Regarding Giurgiu Prison, he said that he had been detained in an overcrowded cell. He alleged, among other things, that hot water had only rarely been available and that the mattress and bed linen had been dirty. He also complained of the presence of cockroaches, rats and bed bugs. 17.  The Government stated that in the Bucharest police detention facility the applicant had been held in a 10.68 sq. m cell containing four bunk beds, a television, natural light and toilets measuring 2.5 sq. m. 18.  At Bucharest-Rahova Prison the applicant had been successively detained in seven cells, varying from 19.30 sq. m to 19.58 sq. m in size and containing ten bunk beds. They added that the cells were equipped with toilets, a kitchenette and ventilation and had natural light. 19.  At M\u0103rgineni Prison the applicant\u2019s cell had measured 28.35 sq. m and contained twenty-one beds. They specified that it was equipped with toilets, a kitchenette, ventilation and natural light. 20. At Giurgiu Prison the applicant had been detained successively in four cells, varying from 20.35 sq. m to 20.96 sq. m in size and containing space for six detainees. They contained individual beds, a table allowing the inmates to eat their meals together, three bedside tables, a small bench, a television socket and a shoe cupboard. They added that the cells all had toilets measuring 4.03 sq. m, but did not specify whether these were included in the cell area. They stated, lastly, that the cells and the laundry provided to inmates were in good condition.\n...", "references": ["2", "5", "0", "4", "8", "7", "6", "3", "9", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 2001 and lives in Bucharest. His parents, C.I. and D.D., separated in April 2004 and divorced in September 2004, mainly because of D.D.\u2019s abusive behaviour towards his wife and their son. The applicant remained with his mother. On 27 February 2004 C.I. called the hotline of the Bucharest Child Protection Authority (Direc\u0163ia General\u0103 de Asisten\u0163\u0103 Social\u0103 \u015fi Protec\u0163ia Copilului) to report the domestic abuse she and the applicant had been suffering at the hands of D.D. Since then, the case has been monitored by the Authority. On 7 October 2008 the Child Protection Authority certified that since 2004 it had included the applicant in a psychological counselling programme.\nThe Child protection Authority issued the following statement concerning the monitoring of the applicant\u2019s case (on 29 August 2005 for the purpose of court proceedings):\n\u201cMrs [C.I.] kept contact with our institution, the case being monitored by the Legal Counselling Service (legal counselling concerning eviction from home ...) as well as by the Service concerning emergency relocation and the Centre for Psychological Counselling for Parents.\u201d 6.  On 5 March, 16 April, 7 May and 30 June 2004 C.I. lodged complaints with the Bucharest Police about the alleged violence inflicted by her husband on the applicant. No action was taken on these complaints. On 1 July 2004 C.I. lodged a new complaint with the police concerning the alleged abuse. The police heard evidence from witnesses on behalf of the applicant and obtained information about the applicant\u2019s situation from the centre where he and his mother had been relocated. Based on the evidence gathered, the police sent the file to the prosecutor\u2019s office attached to the Bucharest District Court (\u201cthe prosecutor\u201d). 7.  On 1 November 2005 the prosecutor instituted a criminal investigation against D.D. It heard evidence from C.I., D.D. and six witnesses and examined the expert reports concerning the applicant\u2019s and D.D.\u2019s psychological evaluations. It concluded that the applicant had suffered trauma during his early childhood because of his father who had done everything he could to torment him and to make him suffer. 8.  On 27 December 2007 the prosecutor indicted D.D. for abusive behaviour towards his son. 9.  The Bucharest District Court heard evidence from a psychologist who had observed the applicant during therapy, from C.I. and other witnesses, as well as from D.D., the last mentioned denying having hurt his son. C.I. did not request damages on behalf of the applicant. In a decision of 9 June 2008 the court acquitted D.D. on the grounds that his occasionally inappropriate behaviour towards the applicant had not been severe enough to constitute a crime. This decision was upheld by the County Court on 19 February 2009, but on 19 June 2009 the Bucharest Court of Appeal quashed this latter decision and remitted the case to the County Court, as it considered that the lower courts should have heard evidence from the applicant and relied on the psychological reports. 10.  On 14 December 2009 the County Court held a private hearing and interviewed the applicant. He told the judges how D.D. used to hit him, lock him in a small room without lights, throw water on him while he was sleeping and call him names. He stated that D.D. had often fought with his mother and that sometimes he had thrown the applicant\u2019s maternal grandmother and aunt \u2013 who were bringing food to the child \u2013 out of their apartment. The applicant told the court that he did not want to live with D.D. or even meet him on the street. He was persuaded that D.D. would want to hurt him. He stated that he wished that D.D. would be punished for what he had done to him. 11.  In a decision rendered on 22 December 2009 the County Court convicted D.D. of ill-treatment inflicted on a minor and sentenced him to a suspended penalty of four years\u2019 imprisonment. It considered that the evidence in the prosecution file, in particular the psychological reports and the testimony given by a psychologist, confirmed that the child had suffered trauma as a consequence of his father\u2019s abusive behaviour.\nThe court also noted that C.I. had not requested damages on behalf of the applicant (see paragraph 9 above). Based on Article 17 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (\u201cthe CCP\u201d, see paragraph 24 below), the court, on its own initiative, awarded the applicant 20,000 Romanian lei (RON) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 12.  Upon an appeal on points of law lodged by D.D., on 7 April 2010 the Bucharest Court of Appeal remitted the case to the County Court and ordered that court to obtain an expert examination of the applicant by the Forensic Medicine Institute. 13.  On 26 April 2012 the County Court rendered a new decision. Based on the evidence before it, notably the expert evaluations, psychologist\u2019s testimony, witness statements, as well as the parents\u2019 and the applicant\u2019s statements, the County Court considered it established that D.D. had physically and verbally abused his child from 2002 to 2004. It stated:\n\u201cThe County Court notes that the acts perpetrated by [D.D.] cannot be considered as isolated and random acts of physical punishment which parents can administer to their minor children, but became more severe and caused childhood attachment troubles.\u201d 14.  D.D. was convicted of ill-treatment inflicted on a minor. He was given a suspended sentence of one year\u2019s imprisonment; in addition, his right to be elected and his parental rights were suspended during the sentence and for two additional years. 15.  When sentencing D.D., the court took into account the undue length of the criminal proceedings and that there had been significant periods of inactivity by the authorities involved, in particular by the investigators and the Forensic Medicine Institute. 16.  No award of damages was made. The court did not give any explanation in its judgment as to why it decided not to award compensation to the applicant. 17.  All parties appealed on points of law. Relying on Article 17 of the CCP (see paragraph 24 below), the applicant and the prosecutor complained notably about the fact that the County Court had not awarded damages. 18.  The Bucharest Court of Appeal examined the parties\u2019 submissions in the light of the evidence before it. It reaffirmed that D.D. had physically and verbally abused his child; his sentence was recalculated based on the same criteria, including the reduction as a remedy for the length of the trial. The court accordingly increased the sentence to three years\u2019 imprisonment and suspended it. The additional penalty of restricting D.D.\u2019s right to be elected and his parental rights was maintained. 19.  The court further considered that in so far as both the prosecutor and the applicant had limited their initial appeals to solely the criminal aspects of the District Court\u2019s decision of 9 June 2008, the County Court had been right in not awarding damages on its own initiative. The relevant part of the decision reads as follows:\n\u201cIn so far as the prosecutor\u2019s office and the injured party argued that the [County Court] should have examined the award of damages on its own initiative because the injured party was a minor, it is to be observed from the content of the decision under review that both the prosecutor\u2019s office and the injured party had expressly limited their appeals to the criminal aspects of the case.\nIn this situation, the [County Court] was right in limiting its examination strictly to the issues brought before it.\u201d 20.  The Court of Appeal rendered its final decision on 1 November 2012 and rectified the text of the operative part on 22 November 2012.", "references": ["8", "5", "6", "7", "9", "0", "4", "2", "No Label", "1", "3"], "gold": ["1", "3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1978 and lives in Minneapolis, Minnesota, USA. 6.  On 24 July 2009 the applicant and S. (a Ukrainian national) were married in Minneapolis. 7.  On 28 August 2009 their son, M., was born there. The family lived in Minneapolis. A US passport was issued in M.\u2019s name. 8.  On 10 May 2010 S. obtained permanent resident status in the USA. 9.  In June 2011 the family arrived in Ukraine for a holiday and to visit S.\u2019s relatives. 10.  On 13 July 2011 the applicant returned alone to the USA. The child stayed with S. in Ukraine. 11.  In May 2012 S.\u2019s US permanent resident card expired. 12.  In June 2012 the applicant instituted proceedings before the Minnesota 4th Judicial District Family Court (\u201cthe Minnesota District Court\u201d), seeking dissolution of the marriage and sole custody of M. In the course of the proceedings S. agreed to the dissolution of marriage. She argued, however, that the Minnesota District Court did not have jurisdiction with regard to the issue of M.\u2019s custody pursuant to the Minnesota Statutes \u00a7518D.201 because the child had been in Ukraine for a period of more than six consecutive months. 13.  In July 2012 the applicant spent a holiday in Ukraine with S. and M. 14.  On 14 August 2012 the applicant asked the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine to order the return of M. from Ukraine to the USA in accordance with the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (\u201cthe Hague Convention\u201d \u2013 see paragraph 37 below). 15.  On 24 September 2012 the Minnesota District Court dissolved the marriage between the applicant and S. The court reserved the issue of M.\u2019s custody, finding that it did not have jurisdiction over that issue pursuant to Minnesota Statutes \u00a7518D.201. 16.  On 19 March 2013 the Chernihiv Regional Department of the State Migration Service of Ukraine issued a certificate declaring M.\u2019s citizenship of Ukraine pursuant to section 7 \u00a7 1 of the Citizenship Act 2001. 17.  On 10 April 2013 the Chernihiv Regional Chief Department of Justice, acting in the applicant\u2019s interests, lodged a claim with the Desnyansky District Court of Chernihiv (\u201cthe Desnyansky District Court\u201d), asserting that M. had been wrongfully retained in Ukraine and must be returned to the USA in accordance with the Hague Convention. 18.  The applicant submitted that he had expected S. and M. to return from Ukraine to the USA on 16 August 2011; however, S. changed her plans and decided to stay on with M. in Ukraine after that date. During the hearings the applicant stated that he was prepared to cover travel expenses for both the child and the mother if the latter were to be ordered to accompany the child to the USA. 19.  S. objected and submitted that it was the applicant who had asked her to stay in Ukraine with the child beyond 16 August 2011. In that regard S. stated that on 9 August 2011 the applicant had sent her four parcels from Minneapolis containing all her and M.\u2019s personal belongings, including toys and clothes. The applicant also sent her M.\u2019s vaccination certificate for his admission to a child-care centre in Ukraine. In July 2012, despite the divorce action initiated by the applicant in the USA, S. agreed to spend a holiday with him and their son in Ukraine, trying to restore good relations. She further submitted that the applicant had arrived in Ukraine in 2013 and stayed for a considerable period of time but had not attempted to meet up with the child. S. therefore alleged that there was no factual child abduction or unlawful retention which would necessitate a return order under the Hague Convention. 20.  On 19 June 2013 the Desnyansky District Court found that M. had arrived in Ukraine with both parents\u2019 agreement, but that later the mother had retained the child in Ukraine without the father\u2019s consent. The court found that such retention was wrongful within the meaning of the Hague Convention and that the child should be returned to the country of his habitual residence, the USA. No exceptions under the Hague Convention applied. Given the applicant\u2019s verbal assurances, the court considered that there were no objective obstacles to the mother\u2019s accompanying the child to the USA and resolving the custody dispute before the courts of that country. In the operative part of the decision, the court ordered that M. should be returned to the USA \u2012 to the father\u2019s home address in Minneapolis \u2012 specifying that the child should be accompanied on the journey by both parents. 21.  On 2 July 2013 the Desnyansky District Court issued an additional decision stating that if the child were not returned voluntarily, S. would be ordered to transfer the child to the applicant at his home address in Minneapolis. 22.  S. appealed against those decisions, maintaining that there was no abduction or unlawful retention of the child and that, in any event, there were grounds to apply the exception provided by Article 13 (b) of the Hague Convention (see paragraph 37 below) as regarded the risk of psychological harm to the child and his being placed in an intolerable situation. 23.  On 13 August 2013 the Municipal Centre of Social Services for Family, Children and Youth of Chernihiv issued a certificate stating their psychiatrist\u2019s opinion that M. was \u201cwell settled in Ukraine and, having regard to the strong bond between the child and the mother and the need to avoid causing the child psychological trauma, it would be inappropriate to remove the child to the other place of residence\u201d. 24.  On 14 August 2013 the Chernihiv Regional Court of Appeal (\u201cthe Court of Appeal\u201d) quashed the decisions of 19 June and 2 July 2013 (see paragraphs 20 and 21 above) and dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim as unsubstantiated. The court considered there was a grave risk that M.\u2019s return to the USA would expose him to psychological harm or would otherwise place him in an intolerable situation, as provided in Article 13 (b) of the Hague Convention. In that regard the Court of Appeal stated that M. was completely settled in his new environment, as he had been living in Ukraine since June 2011. M. had always lived with the mother and there were close ties between them. There was no realistic possibility for the mother to accompany M. to the USA and stay near him in that country. In addition, the Court of Appeal noted that the applicant had not provided any information regarding his actual place of residence in the USA, his current living conditions, or his level of income. 25.  On 20 November 2013 the Higher Specialised Court of Ukraine for Civil and Criminal Matters (\u201cthe Cassation Court\u201d) quashed the decision of 14 August 2013 (see paragraph 24 above) and upheld the Desnyansky District Court\u2019s decisions of 19 June and 2 July 2013 (see paragraphs 20 and 21 above), noting that they were well substantiated and had been adopted in compliance with the requirements of the Hague Convention. It found the submissions concerning the risk of exposing M. to psychological harm unconvincing. 26.  On 26 November 2013 the Desnyanskyy District Court issued a writ of execution in respect of its decisions of 19 June and 2 July 2013. On the same date S.\u2019s lawyer contacted the USA Embassy in Kyiv and enquired about applying for a USA visa in the specific circumstances. 27.  On 27 November 2013 the Desnyanskyy District Department of State Bailiffs Service instituted enforcement proceedings, resulting in the imposition of fines on S. for failure to comply with the return order. 28.  In February 2014 S. submitted a request to the Supreme Court for review of the case on the grounds that the Hague Convention had been applied divergently in the cassation proceedings, resulting in inconsistent judicial practice. On 28 April 2014 the Cassation Court declared the request admissible and referred the case to the Supreme Court. 29.  On 18 June 2014 the Supreme Court considered S.\u2019s request for review of the Cassation Court\u2019s decision of 20 November 2013 (see paragraph 25 above) on the grounds of divergent application of the law by the cassation courts. Having examined the domestic judicial practice, the Supreme Court found that Articles 3, 12 and 13 of the Hague Convention (see paragraph 37 below) had been applied divergently. It set out the principles which had to be followed when interpreting and applying those provisions. As regards the present case, the Supreme Court found that the domestic courts had failed to apply the provisions properly. In particular, there had been no clear stance on the question of whether or not the removal or retention of the child had been wrongful, and \u2012 if that were the case \u2012 at what moment it started to be wrongful, nor as to whether or not the father had consented to or subsequently acquiesced as regards the child\u2019s retention, nor whether facts existed demonstrating that the child was settled in his current environment. The Supreme Court quashed the decision of 20 November 2013 and remitted the case to the Cassation Court for fresh consideration. 30.  On 30 July 2014 the Cassation Court quashed the Court of Appeal\u2019s decision of 14 August 2013 (see paragraph 24 above), on the grounds that the Court of Appeal had breached procedural rules and had failed to establish all the relevant facts. The case was remitted to the Court of Appeal. 31.  On 5 September 2014 the Court of Appeal found that there was no dispute regarding removal of the child because the father had only complained about the wrongful retention of the child in Ukraine. The Court of Appeal then considered the applicant\u2019s updated submissions, in which he no longer argued that the retention of the child had been wrongful as from 16 August 2011 but rather as from 20 June 2012, which was the date when he had first expressed his disagreement with the child\u2019s retention in Ukraine. It was also established that in August 2011 the applicant had sent parcels to Ukraine containing the child\u2019s belongings. 32.  As regards the period commencing on 20 June 2012, the Court of Appeal considered that the applicant had continued to consent to the child\u2019s retention in Ukraine as there was no express objection on that point before the request was made under the Hague Convention. The Court of Appeal found that on 20 June 2012 the applicant\u2019s divorce claim was delivered to S.\u2019s representative. In that claim the applicant also sought to establish sole custody of the child; however, that claim did not mean that the applicant disagreed with the child\u2019s ongoing stay in Ukraine. Moreover, in July 2012, the applicant had spent a holiday with S. and M. in Ukraine and in August 2012, after his return to the USA, he had sent M.\u2019s vaccination certificate in order to facilitate M.\u2019s admission to a child-care centre in Ukraine. The Court of Appeal concluded that in these circumstances the applicant enjoyed custody rights in relation to M. and that he had failed to demonstrate that those rights had been violated. For those reasons the child\u2019s retention in that period could not be considered wrongful within the meaning of the Hague Convention. 33.  The Court of Appeal next stated that, even assuming that there had been a wrongful retention of the child, the return request could be rejected under the provisions of Articles 12, 13 and 20 of the Hague Convention (see paragraph 37 below). The Court of Appeal examined the evidence relating to the child\u2019s place of residence in Ukraine, and the social and medical care provided to him in Ukraine, and found that M. was assured of all the conditions necessary for his proper development. Based on the evidence presented and having regard to the overall period during which the child had lived in Ukraine, the Court of Appeal found that M. was entirely settled in his current environment. It also considered that M.\u2019s return to the USA without his mother \u2013 who no longer had legal basis for entering and living in the USA \u2013 would not be in the best interests of the child. The Court of Appeal therefore quashed the Desnyansky District Court\u2019s decisions of 19 June and 2 July 2013 (see paragraphs 20 and 21 above) and dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim as unsubstantiated. 34.  On 4 December 2014 the Cassation Court dismissed appeals on points of law brought by the applicant and the Ministry of Justice and upheld the decision of 5 September 2014 (see paragraphs 31\u201333 above).", "references": ["5", "6", "3", "1", "8", "2", "7", "9", "0", "No Label", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "5.  The first applicant was born in 1944 and lives in Oliveira de Azem\u00e9is. The second applicant was born in 1970 and lives in Vila Real. 6.  The first applicant was born out of wedlock. His mother always considered T.S. to be his father and from an early age he has been in touch with T.S.\u2019s family, who have always treated him as a relative. 7.  On 26 March 2012 the first applicant instituted an action for recognition of paternity before the Vale de Cambra Court. T.S. objected and argued that the applicant\u2019s claim was time-barred under Article 1817 \u00a7 1 of the Civil Code. Mr Silva responded that this provision was unconstitutional because it violated Articles 18 \u00a7\u00a7 2 and 3 and 26 \u00a7 1 of the Constitution. 8.  On 26 June 2012 the judge gave directions (despacho saneador) setting out those matters that had already been established and those that remained outstanding. In addition, the judge dismissed T.S.\u2019s objection that the applicant\u2019s claim was time-barred, holding that the time-limit set by Article 1817 \u00a7 1 was unconstitutional insofar as the limitation thus imposed on the possibility of investigating an individual\u2019s paternity at all times constituted an unjustified and disproportionate restriction of the right of a son to know who his father was. It also found that the exercise of a person\u2019s right to know his parentage could not be subject to temporal barriers and could only be restricted in cases where such exercise of the right would constitute an abuse. The fact that the plaintiff had only instituted the proceedings more than fifty years later could not, in itself, be considered to constitute an abuse. 9.  On an unknown date T.S. challenged the judge\u2019s decision of 26 June 2012 \u2012 in the part in which it considered Article 1817 \u00a7 1 to be incompatible with constitutional provisions \u2012 before the Porto Court of Appeal. On an unknown date the applicant submitted his observations in reply (contra\u2011alega\u00e7\u00f5es), arguing that the decision should be upheld and the proceedings should not be deemed time-barred. 10.  Meanwhile, on an unknown date, at the request of the first applicant, the Vale de Cambra Court ordered DNA tests which established that T.S. was the applicant\u2019s father. In the light of that result the Vale de Cambra Court asked the parties about the usefulness of continuing the proceedings. T.S. did not acknowledge paternity and requested the Vale de Cambra Court to continue the proceedings. 11.  On 9 April 2013 the Porto Court of Appeal dismissed T.S.\u2019s challenge. It held that Article 1817 \u00a7 1 was unconstitutional and that the right to seek judicial recognition of paternity should not be subject to a time-limit. 12.  T.S. appealed to the Supreme Court of Justice. 13.  On 14 January 2014 the Supreme Court dismissed T.S.\u2019s appeal and upheld the decision of the Porto Court of Appeal in its entirety. 14.  On an unknown date T.S. appealed to the Constitutional Court, to which he submitted the question of the constitutionality of Article 1817 \u00a7 1 of the Civil Code, pursuant to Article 70 \u00a7 1 (a) of the Law of the Constitutional Court. 15.  On 10 March 2014 the Constitutional Court held, with reference to its previous ruling no. 401/2011, that Article 1817 \u00a7 1 complied with the relevant provisions of the Constitution. 16.  The first applicant appealed to the Conference of the Constitutional Court (Confer\u00eancia do Tribunal Constitucional), claiming that Article 1817 \u00a7 1 was unconstitutional. On 7 May 2014 the Conference of the Constitutional Court upheld the previous decision of the Constitutional Court and dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim. 17.  As a result of the Constitutional Court\u2019s decisions, the Supreme Court of Justice dismissed the applicant\u2019s action on 9 July 2014. 18.  The second applicant was born out of wedlock. His mother always considered A.M. to be his father. 19.  On 31 March 2014 he brought paternity proceedings before the Vila Real Court and contended that he had always known that A.M. was his father. A.M. objected, arguing that the claim was time-barred. 20.  On 15 June 2013 the Vila Real Court dismissed the second applicant\u2019s action, holding that it was time-barred for being lodged outside the ten-year time-limit established under Article 1817 \u00a7 1 of the Civil Code. In addition, it noted that the second applicant had not argued that there were any factors justifying the addition of a further three years pursuant to Article 1817 \u00a7\u00a7 2 and 3 of the Civil Code. 21.  On 5 September 2013 the second applicant appealed to the Porto Court of Appeal, challenging the judgment of the Vila Real Court. He argued that the time-limit established under Article 1817 \u00a7 1 of the Civil Code for the institution of paternity proceedings was not compatible with the Constitution and that the right to one\u2019s identity should prevail over the rights of the alleged parent. 22.  On 10 December 2013 the Porto Court of Appeal upheld the first\u2011instance judgment, finding that Article 1817 \u00a7 1 of the Civil Code was not incompatible with constitutional provisions, pursuant to Ruling no. 401/2011 of the Constitutional Court. One of the judges dissented, expressing the view that the protection afforded by the Constitution to the fundamental right to personal identity required that the possibility of investigating one\u2019s biological identity should not be subject to a time\u2011limit. 23.  On 28 January 2014 the second applicant challenged the decision of the Porto Court of Appeal before the Supreme Court of Justice and asked it to rule that the referred time-limit was unconstitutional. 24.  By a judgment of 27 May 2014 the Supreme Court of Justice quashed the judgment of the Porto Court of Appeal and held that the ten\u2011year time-limit established under Article 1817 \u00a7 1 of the Civil Code was unconstitutional. 25.  On an unknown date A.M. lodged a constitutional appeal before the Constitutional Court, which by a summary decision of 25 September 2014 ruled that, with reference to its previous ruling no. 401/2011, the provision was constitutional and ordered that the judgment of the Supreme Court be modified accordingly. 26.  The second applicant appealed to the Conference of the Constitutional Court. On 28 October 2014 the Conference upheld the previous decision. 27.  Following the Constitutional Court decisions, the Supreme Court of Justice dismissed the second applicant\u2019s action on 13 January 2015.", "references": ["3", "2", "5", "6", "9", "0", "4", "8", "7", "1", "No Label"], "gold": ["No Label"]}
+{"input": "4.  In a dispute between the applicant and the domestic pension authorities, on 18 February 2011 the Kryviy Rih Dovgyntsivskyy District Court ruled in his favour, ordering an increase of his pension based on the rise in the average wages in the country since his retirement. The court sat in camera. 5.  On 3 November 2011 the first-instance court amended the judgment at the applicant\u2019s request, indicating that it was enforceable immediately. In doing so, the court referred to the provision of the Code of Administrative Justice governing abridged procedure (see paragraph 11 below). 6.  The defendant pension authority appealed to the Dnipropetrovsk Administrative Court of Appeal (\u201cthe Court of Appeal\u201d). 7.  On 23 November 2011 the first-instance court informed the applicant that an appeal had been lodged in his case. On 29 February 2012 he wrote to the Court of Appeal, requesting to be informed about the date of the hearing of his case. According to him, he received no response and no further information about the proceedings until 22 February 2013 when he received the Court of Appeal\u2019s final decision, dated 26 June 2012, quashing the first-instance court\u2019s judgment. 8.  It can be seen from the material before the Court that the applicant\u2019s domestic case file contains copies of the ruling of the Court of Appeal\u2019s judge (date illegible) opening appeal proceedings in his case and a notification letter dated February 2012 from the court clerk informing him of the upcoming examination of his case in camera on 26 June 2012 and stating that the judge\u2019s ruling and a copy of the appeal were enclosed with the letter. The Government alleged that the above documents had been sent to the applicant, while the applicant alleged that they had not. The file does not contain any postal documents or registers of sent correspondence showing that the above documents had been sent or delivered to the applicant. 9.  On 26 June 2012 the Court of Appeal, in a final decision not amenable to appeal, quashed the first-instance court\u2019s judgment, dismissing the applicant\u2019s claim for a pension increase and holding that the domestic law did not require the pensions to be increased in case of rise in the average wages in the country following retirement. The court sat in camera.", "references": ["9", "0", "6", "8", "1", "7", "2", "5", "4", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicants lived in a dormitory in Lipetsk, Russia. The dormitory was mainly inhabited by the students and the staff of the Lipetsk Metallurgy College (\u201cthe College\u201d). 6.  In 2000 the joint-stock company \u201cNLMK\u201d (\u201cthe Company\u201d) registered its title over that dormitory as a result of privatisation. 7.  The applicants brought a case against the Company seeking to obtain a title to the rooms they lived in. They argued in particular that the privatisation of the dormitory had taken place in violation of the legislation and that the Company could not be declared as a sole owner of the property. The Lipetsk Metallurgy College was also involved into the case as a third party. 8.  On 19 April 2010 the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Lipetsk found for the applicants and granted their claims. The District Court found that the dormitory was transferred to the Company in breach of domestic law. 9.  On 2 June 2010 the appeal court upheld the judgment and it became final. 10.  In August 2010 the applicants registered their title to the dormitory rooms and subsequently sold them to third parties. 11.  On 12 April 2011 the Company lodged a request with the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Lipetsk seeking to reopen the proceedings on the grounds of newly discovered circumstances. It relied on the order of the College\u2019s director and a lease agreement concluded in 2008 between the Company and the College in respect of the dormitory. The Company further argued that it had not been aware of those documents since they were possessed by the College. 12.  On 12 May 2011 the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Lipetsk quashed the judgment of 19 April 2010. The court found in particular that the documents presented by the Company might have had significant impact on the outcome of the case and thus they constituted \u201cnewly discovered circumstances\u201d. 13.  On 31 August 2011 as a result of the fresh consideration of the case the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Lipetsk rejected the applicants\u2019 claims and ordered reversal of execution of the judgment of 19 April 2010. This judgment was upheld on 26 October 2011 by the Lipetsk Regional Court.", "references": ["2", "7", "9", "0", "5", "4", "6", "8", "1", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1992 and lived, prior to his arrest, in Voronezh. 5.  On 9 October 2011 the applicant had an altercation with S., a security guard at his place of work. The applicant stabbed S. thirty-four times and then fled the scene. When Z. tried to stop him, the applicant stabbed him too. Both S. and Z. died. 6.  On 10 October 2011 the police located the applicant. They took the applicant for questioning to the police station approximately at 1-2 p.m. 7.  According to the applicant, the police officers beat him and subjected him to electrocution. They kept him handcuffed during the night and did not provide him with food or water. 8.  In the evening of 10 October 2011 the applicant was taken to hospital where a neurosurgeon examined him. According to the doctor\u2019s statement given at a later date, the applicant did not have any injuries on his body. 9.  On 11 October 2011 at 5:05 p.m. the applicant underwent a forensic medical examination. The expert noted the following injuries on the applicant\u2019s body: a bruise on the right shoulder joint, a bruise and an abrasion on the right shoulder, abrasions on the right calf. In the expert\u2019s opinion, the applicant might have sustained the injuries as a result of an impact of solid blunt objects, including blows administered by arms and legs, not a long time before the forensic examination. The expert also noted a dot sized wound probably caused by a piercing object shortly before the forensic examination. The applicant submitted to the expert that he had no memory as to what had happened to him after he had been arrested by the police. 10.  On 18 November 2011 the investigator in charge of the applicant\u2019s case reported the applicant\u2019s injuries to the regional investigative committee. He considered that the applicant could have been subjected to ill-treatment while held in police custody on 10 October 2011. 11.  Following an inquiry into the circumstances of the applicant\u2019s arrest, on 28 November 2011 the investigator refused to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers as regards the alleged unlawful deprivation of liberty of the applicant and ill-treatment in police custody on 10 October 2011. He based his conclusions on the findings as follows:\n\u201cOn 11 October 2011 from 7:45 to 8:30 a.m. ... investigator F. questioned [the applicant] as a witness [in the murder case]. Without stating any reasons, [the applicant] refused to sign the questioning record.\nAccording to Krav. and Ch., on 11 October 2011 they attested by their signature the [applicant\u2019s] refusal to sign the questioning record. They did not see any injuries on [the applicant]. He did not complain about the police officers either.\nOn 11 October 2011 at 10:10 a.m., in the presence of the [applicant\u2019s] lawyer B., [the applicant] was [officially] detained on suspicion of [murder] and from 10:40 a.m. to 11:10 a.m., he was questioned. He refused to say anything.\nOn 11 October 2011 [the applicant] underwent a medical forensic examination. ...\nAccording to [the applicant], he did not remember where he had sustained the injuries documented by the expert. He did not complain about the police officers. They did not injure him.\nLawyer B. ... refused to comment ...\nAccording to former investigator F., ... on 10 October 2010 [the police] established the [applicant\u2019s] whereabouts and he was taken to the police station for questioning. In the evening he saw [the applicant] at the police station. The latter demonstrated strange behaviour; he hit his head against the wall, rolled around on the floor, fell down trying to hurt himself. He asked the police officers to take [the applicant] to hospital ... for examination. ...\nAccording to police officer Krut., ... in the morning on 11 October 2011 he took [the applicant] to the [investigator\u2019s office] ... . During questioning, [the applicant] repeatedly fell down hitting the floor with different parts of his body and refused to talk. ... . All the [applicant\u2019s] injuries were self-inflicted. ... They did not use any physical force or put psychological pressure on [the applicant]. Nor did the latter allege such treatment.\nAccording to police officer Bid., ... on 10 October 2011 they located [the applicant] ... and invited him for a talk to the police station. [The applicant] behaved in a strange way in the police car and at the police station. He claimed that he had no memory of the circumstances of the crime. He fell off the chair down on the floor and hit himself against pieces of furniture in the office. ... They did not use any physical force or put psychological pressure on [the applicant]. [The applicant] could have inflicted all the injuries himself when he hit his head against the wall, fell down off the chair and rolled around on the floor.\nPolice officers Kom., Mesh. and Sim. made similar statements. According to them, [the applicant] behaved in a strange way and tried to cause himself injuries. They did not use any physical force or put psychological pressure on [the applicant]. Furthermore, Kom. explained that on 10 October 2011 [the applicant] had stayed at the police station of his own will.\nPolice officers Moch. and Pov. made similar statements. They submitted that on 10 October 2011 at about 1-2 p.m. they had established the [applicant\u2019s] whereabouts and invited him for a talk. At the police station [the applicant] had behaved in a strange way. He talked to himself, hit his head and back against the wall, fell down and rolled around on the floor. They did not use any physical force or put psychological pressure on [the applicant]. Nor did the latter allege such treatment.\nAccording to the medical documentation obtained from municipal hospital no. 10, on 10 October 2011 a neurosurgeon examined [the applicant]. He did not detect any injuries or diseases.\nAccording to the statement made by neurosurgeon Mor., on 10 October 2011 he examined [the applicant] who was taken to hospital by police officers. [The applicant] did not have any injuries. Nor did he detect any disease. [The applicant] did not complain about his health or police officers. ...\n...\nAccording to the statement of the emergency response doctor Yer., in the evening on 10 October 2011 an emergency response team arrived to municipal hospital no. 10. He examined [the applicant]. ... According to the police officer present, [the applicant] behaved in a strange way and they had to take him to hospital. [The applicant] said that he had no memory of the crime. He did not complain about the police officers.\n...\nAccording to report no. 4925.11 dated 24 November 2011, regard being had to the placement and nature of the bodily injuries documented during the forensic examination [the applicant] underwent, it is possible that [applicant] sustained the injuries when he hit himself against the solid protruding objects in the circumstances described by [the police officers] ... . [The injuries] were self-inflicted by [the applicant].\nThe inquiry further established that from about 1-2 p.m. on 10 October 2011 to 7:45 a.m. on 11 October 2011 ... [the applicant] stayed at the police station voluntarily. When questioned, [the applicant] did not deny that he had not been kept at the police station against his will. Accordingly, there is no evidence of his abduction or unlawful deprivation of liberty.\u201d 12.  On 23 July and 30 August 2012 the Leninskiy District Court of Voronezh and the Voronezh Regional Court respectively upheld the decision of 28 November 2011. 13.  On 11 October 2011 the applicant was charged with two counts of murder. It appears that he remained in custody pending investigation and trial. 14.  On 28 June 2012 the Voronezh Regional Court found that the applicant had committed the murders and in a state of insanity and ordered his confinement in a psychiatric institution. 15.  On 6 September 2012 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the judgment of 28 June 2012 on appeal.", "references": ["0", "8", "6", "5", "9", "4", "7", "3", "No Label", "1", "2"], "gold": ["1", "2"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1965 and lives in Budapest. 6.  On 14 April 2010 the applicant notified the police that he planned to organise a demonstration from 2 to 7 p.m. on 17 April 2010 in front of the Venyige Street prison in Budapest, in order to draw attention to the \u201csituation of political prisoners\u201d. Venyige Street is a broad cul-de-sac with a service lane. 7.  On 16 April 2010 the head of the Budapest Police Department banned the demonstration on the grounds that traffic could not be diverted to alternative routes (section 8(1) of the Assembly Act). In the decision, he referred to Article 21 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 11 of the Convention and Decision no. 55/2001.AB of the Constitutional Court. 8.  On 19 April 2010, within the statutory time-limit, the applicant sought a judicial review of the decision. 9.  On 22 April 2010 the Budapest Regional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s case. It noted that in assessing whether or not traffic could be diverted to other routes, the authority had reckoned on the participation of some 200 demonstrators, as per the applicant\u2019s notification, and that \u2013 after having obtained the opinion of a traffic expert \u2013 it had established that lawful parking and traffic circulation in the neighbourhood would become impossible should the event take place. The court agreed with the police\u2019s decision in that although the right to assembly was a constitutional fundamental right, it was not absolute and must not give rise to a violation of the fundamental rights of others, and could therefore be restricted. The court was satisfied that the decision had been lawful as the police had adequately established the facts, complied with the procedural rules and applied clear assessment criteria, and the assessment of the evidence had been logical.", "references": ["1", "2", "8", "4", "9", "0", "3", "5", "6", "No Label", "7"], "gold": ["7"]}
+{"input": "4.  The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Donji Kraljevec. 5.  On 15 October 2001 the applicant brought a civil action against a private person in the \u010cakovec Municipal Court (Op\u0107inski sud u \u010cakovcu) seeking that a contract for lifelong maintenance (ugovor o do\u017eivotnom uzdr\u017eavanju) be declared null and void, that certain entries in the land register be altered, and that certain property be included in his deceased father\u2019s estate. At the first hearing of the trial, the applicant indicated the value of the claim at 101,000 Croatian kunas (HRK). 6.  On 4 February 2005 the \u010cakovec Municipal Court declared the applicant\u2019s action inadmissible. The applicant lodged an appeal against the first-instance decision. On 12 May 2005 the \u010cakovec County Court (\u017dupanijski sud u \u010cakovcu) dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld the first-instance decision. 7.  The applicant then lodged an appeal on points of law (revizija) with the Supreme Court. On 19 April 2006 the Supreme Court accepted the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law, examined it on the merits and quashed the decisions of the lower courts and ordered a fresh consideration of the case. 8.  On 17 February 2009, in the fresh proceedings, the first-instance court gave judgment in the applicant\u2019s favour. 9.  The defendant, T.B., lodged an appeal and on 10 June 2010 the \u010cakovec County Court reversed the first-instance judgment. 10.  The applicant then lodged an appeal on points of law. On 21 September 2011 the Supreme Court declared the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law inadmissible ratione valoris because it fell below the threshold of 100,000 Croatian kunas, given that the applicant\u2019s civil action had included three separate claims lodged on different factual and legal bases \u2013 therefore, the amount of the claim had to be divided into three. The Supreme Court did not provide any reasoning as to why it had accepted as admissible the applicant\u2019s previous appeal on points of law and decided on the merits. 11.  A constitutional complaint subsequently lodged by the applicant was declared inadmissible by the Constitutional Court on 12 January 2012.", "references": ["6", "7", "9", "0", "2", "8", "4", "1", "5", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant company was a Ukrainian joint-stock company registered in Kyiv. At the relevant time it operated a commercial air carrier business (see East West Alliance Limited v. Ukraine, no. 19336/04, \u00a7 7, 23 January 2014). 6.  On 12 March 2003 the applicant company brought a claim for damages, in particular loss of profit, against the State Aviation Safety Department. The claim was based on a delay on the defendant\u2019s part in issuing a safety certificate, which the Department had been required to issue in 2001 by a court judgment. 7.  On 16 August 2005 the Kyiv City Commercial Court allowed the claim in part. 8.  On 18 October 2005 the Kyiv Commercial Court of Appeal quashed the first-instance court\u2019s judgment and rejected the claim, mainly on the grounds that the applicant company had failed to prove the loss of profit it had claimed. It considered the estimates of the loss profit speculative. 9.  On 21 February 2006 the Higher Commercial Court reversed the ruling of the Court of Appeal and upheld the judgment of the first instance court. The Higher Court held that because the defendant\u2019s inaction prevented the applicant company from operating its business as from 2001, the first instance court was correct in accepting the information about the applicant company\u2019s gross income for 1999 and 2000. 10.  On 6 June 2006 the Supreme Court quashed the ruling of the Higher Commercial Court and upheld the ruling of the Court of Appeal. The Supreme Court considered that no causal connection has been proven between the defendant\u2019s culpable inaction and the alleged loss of profit. It held, in particular, that the applicant company had failed to prove that it had realised a profit, rather than gross income, prior to 2001, or that its income for the preceding years came from operations which required a safety certificate. 11.  Following communication of the case and unsuccessful friendly settlement negotiations, on 2 September 2014 the Government informed the Court of their intention to resolve the issue raised by the application. They produced a unilateral declaration, in which they acknowledged a breach of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention and offered to pay the applicant company a sum to cover any pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage together with any costs and expenses. The Government requested that the Court strike out the application in accordance with Article 37 \u00a7 1 of the Convention. 12.  On 7 November 2014 the applicant company objected to the striking out of its application, wishing to have its merits determined with a view to obtaining appropriate redress. It argued, in particular, that under domestic law the unilateral declaration, unlike a Court\u2019s judgment finding a violation, would not provide grounds for reexamination of its case by the Supreme Court. The Government\u2019s unilateral declaration would therefore not lead to actual restoration of the applicant company\u2019s rights. 13.  The Government were invited to comment and on 10 July 2015 informed the Court of the relevant domestic legislation (see paragraphs 15 and 16 below). They submitted a letter from the Supreme Court informing the Government Agent there was no relevant domestic case\u2011law on the matter. 14.  On 3 November 2015 the applicant company\u2019s only shareholder, East/West, informed the Court that on 2 October 2014 the Kyiv City Commercial Court had declared the applicant company bankrupt and opened liquidation procedure and on 8 October 2015 had declared it liquidated. Accordingly, East/West requested that any just satisfaction award due to the applicant company be paid to East/West. Asked to comment, the Government responded on 18 January 2016 that they \u201cdo not object against the applicant\u2019s request as to the payment to its sole shareholder the awarded compensation and, thus, leave this question on the Court\u2019s discretion\u201d.", "references": ["7", "8", "2", "4", "6", "0", "9", "5", "1", "No Label", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1985 and lives in Warsaw. 6.  On 14 May 2010 the applicant was arrested in Kyiv by officers of the Security Service of Ukraine (\u201cthe SBU\u201d) on suspicion of unlawfully importing equipment for the covert surveillance of telephone networks and using it to intercept private telephone conversations (see paragraph 24 below), an offence committed in collaboration with M., a Russian national. 7.  An SBU investigator lodged a request with the Shevchenkivskyy District Court of Kyiv (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) seeking that the applicant be remanded in custody pending the investigation. He submitted that the applicant\u2019s detention was necessary in order to prevent him from absconding and interfering with the investigation, given that the applicant was a foreign national, did not have a permanent place of residence in Ukraine and was suspected of a serious offence. 8.  On 17 May 2010 the District Court held a hearing in the presence of the prosecutor and his lawyer, remanded the applicant in custody, and ordered that he be placed in an SBU detention facility. It held that the arguments submitted by the investigator were sufficiently strong to allow the conclusion that the applicant should be detained. 9.  On 27 May 2010 the Court of Appeal held a hearing to examine the applicant lawyer\u2019s appeal against the order of 17 May 2010 in the presence of a prosecutor and the applicant\u2019s lawyer and upheld the order. 10.  On 13 July 2010 the District Court held a hearing in the presence of the prosecutor, the applicant and his lawyer and extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 14 September 2010. It noted that there were no reasons to release the applicant and that the investigative authority needed time to complete the investigation. 11.  On 26 July and 6 August 2010 the Court of Appeal held hearings to examine, respectively, the applicant lawyer\u2019s and the applicant\u2019s own appeals against the District Court\u2019s decision of 13 July 2010. Only a prosecutor was present at the former hearing, whereas the latter hearing was attended by the prosecutor, the applicant and his lawyer. The Court of Appeal rejected both appeals and upheld the District Court\u2019s decision on both occasions. 12.  On 9 September 2010 the Court of Appeal held a hearing in the presence of the prosecutor and the applicant\u2019s lawyer, granted the investigative authority\u2019s request, and extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 14 November 2010. The court noted that the charges against the applicant were serious, that there were no reasons to release him and that the investigative authority needed more time to complete the investigation. 13.  On 1 November 2010 the investigator charged the applicant with several additional offences in connection with the same events: breaching the privacy of telephone communications and unlawful transfer of equipment subject to export control, committed in a group (see paragraph 24 below). 14.  On 12 November 2010 the Court of Appeal extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 14 December 2010. 15.  On 14 December 2010 the applicant\u2019s case was sent to the District Court for trial. 16.  On 27 April 2011 the District Court committed the applicant for trial, rejected the applicant\u2019s request for release and ordered his continuing detention pending trial. The court stated that the applicant was charged with a serious offence, was a foreign national and had no permanent place of residence in Ukraine. No time-limit was set for his detention. 17.  On 25 August 2011 the District Court rejected the applicant\u2019s requests for release. It gave reasons similar to those given in its decision of 27 April 2011 and added that there was no reason to set an end-date for the applicant\u2019s detention since his detention was needed to complete the trial. 18.  On 14 October, 24 November 2011, and 11 January 2012 the District Court rejected the applicant\u2019s further requests for release. It gave reasons similar to those given in its decision of 27 April 2011. 19.  On 19 March 2012 the District Court convicted the applicant as charged, sentencing him to four years\u2019 imprisonment. 20.  On 7 December 2012 the Court of Appeal quashed the conviction and remitted the case for additional investigation. It ordered the applicant\u2019s continuing detention without giving reasons. 21.  On 15 January 2013 the District Court set bail for the applicant. 22.  On 16 January 2013 the applicant was released on bail. 23.  On 17 May 2013 the District Court approved the applicant\u2019s plea bargain, convicted him, and sentenced him to two years and eight months\u2019 imprisonment, which was to be considered fully served in view of the time the applicant had spent in pre-trial detention.", "references": ["6", "8", "9", "3", "4", "7", "0", "5", "1", "No Label", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "5.  The applicant was born in 1993 and is detained in J\u0113kabpils. On 9 February 2011 he reached the age of majority. 6.  The applicant (who was a minor at the time of the criminal trial) and his co-accused, V.P., P.V. and F.\u010c., were charged with the aggravated murder of a fifteen-year-old girl, and the intentional destruction of property. The case was heard in May 2010 by the Riga Regional Court (R\u012bgas apgabaltiesa). The applicant pleaded \u201cpartially guilty\u201d (vainu atz\u012bst da\u013c\u0113ji). He was held in detention on remand in Riga Central Prison (R\u012bgas centr\u0101lcietums) and was transported to the Riga Regional Court for the hearings. 7.  The applicant submits that on the trial days, that is to say on 20, 21, 24 and 25 May 2010, in the holding area in the basement of the Riga Regional Court, he was insulted and physically assaulted by the detainee escort officers to make him confess to the crimes. He was made to perform different exercises, such as a \u201cwall-sit\u201d exercise, push-ups and a \u201cduck walk\u201d (walking slowly in a squatting position). While the applicant was performing the exercises he received blows to the back with a rubber truncheon. The applicant submits further that the escort officers assaulted him before and after the hearings and during the breaks. They beat him on different parts of the body. During the beatings they expressed their opinion regarding the criminal proceedings and manifested a negative and belittling attitude towards him. They also threatened to kill or mutilate the applicant if he did not plead guilty. Having been psychologically broken and without having consulted his lawyer, during the hearing of 25 May 2010 the applicant admitted his guilt and refused to testify. 8.  On 26 May 2010 the applicant\u2019s mother visited him in Riga Central Prison. On the following day the applicant\u2019s mother, acting as his representative, lodged a complaint with the prosecution service. She stated that the escort officers had kicked her son on his body, arms, legs and head, and that he had shown her many bruises. She requested the prosecution service to institute criminal proceedings in respect of these events. On 31 May 2010 the prosecution service forwarded the complaint to the Riga regional division of the State Police. On 2 June 2010 the applicant\u2019s mother lodged a similar complaint with the Internal Security Office of the State Police (Valsts policijas Iek\u0161\u0113j\u0101s dro\u0161\u012bbas birojs \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe Internal Security Office\u201d) (see paragraph 17 below). 9.  On 26 May 2010 employees of the Ombudsman\u2019s Office visited the applicant in Riga Central Prison. On the following day the Ombudsman wrote a letter to the Internal Security Office stating that the applicant had alleged that the escort officers had assaulted him. He had borne traces of the alleged violence \u2013 a haematoma on his side and abrasions on his arm and legs. The Ombudsman requested the Internal Security Office to examine the actions of the escort officers. He informed the Riga Regional Court about this letter. 10.  On 27 May 2010 the applicant\u2019s lawyer visited him in Riga Central Prison. Following the meeting, the applicant\u2019s lawyer lodged a complaint with the prosecution service. He stated that between 20 and 25 May 2010 the applicant had been beaten by the detainee escort officers in order to make him confess to the crime. The applicant had shown him his injuries. As a result of this coercion at the hearing on 25 May 2010 the applicant had admitted his guilt, contrary to his defence position. The applicant\u2019s lawyer requested the prosecution service to institute criminal proceedings in respect of these events. On 2 June 2010 the prosecution service sent the complaint to the Riga regional division of the State Police. 11.  At a hearing on 28 May 2010 the applicant stated that on all four trial days he had been assaulted, as a result of which he had admitted his guilt. He maintained his earlier plea of \u201cpartially guilty\u201d. Moreover, the applicant\u2019s co-accused also stated that they had been assaulted. The applicant\u2019s lawyer stated that the applicant had a black eye and that he had been hit on his head. He argued that the applicant was unable to testify. The judge adjourned the hearing in order to request information from Riga Central Prison on the applicant\u2019s and his co-accused\u2019s state of health. 12.  On 28 May 2010 Riga Central Prison faxed to the Riga Regional Court a copy of a medical certificate issued after the applicant had been medically examined on 26 May 2010. The handwritten medical certificate, dated 26 May 2010, provided to the Court by the Government stated that the applicant had the following injuries: wounds on his lower legs and on the right hand \u201cin the typical area\u201d; a haematoma on the left forearm; and a haematoma on the right side. The applicant had stated that he had been beaten with a truncheon while being escorted on 20, 21 and 24 May. The Government also provided a typewritten report, dated 14 June 2010, from Riga Central Prison. According to the report, the applicant\u2019s state of health on 26 May 2010 had been satisfactory; he had had several injuries covered by scabs on his lower legs; injuries covered by scabs on the \u201ctypical area\u201d of the right hand caused by the use of handcuffs; a haematoma four centimetres in diameter on his left forearm; and a haematoma six centimetres in diameter in the \u201cphase of absorption\u201d on the right side in the area of the kidney. 13.  At a hearing on 29 May 2010 the applicant stated that he was unable to testify because he had a headache. His lawyer argued that the applicant\u2019s medical examination had been superficial. The prosecution was of the view that the applicant was seeking to delay the proceedings. The judge decided to proceed with the trial. The same day the Riga Regional Court found the applicant and his co-accused guilty and sentenced him to ten years\u2019 imprisonment. The applicant and his mother lodged appeals indicating inter alia that the applicant had been assaulted by the escort officers. The case was forwarded to the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court (Augst\u0101k\u0101s tiesas Krimin\u0101llietu tiesu pal\u0101ta). 14.  At a hearing on 30 January 2013 the prosecution informed the appellate court that the criminal investigation in relation to the applicant\u2019s \u201cbodily injuries\u201d had been terminated, that that decision had taken effect and that no appeal had been lodged against that decision. The relevant material was included in the case file. At a hearing on 9 December 2013 the applicant admitted his guilt in full and asked the court to review his conviction only in so far as it concerned his sentence. 15.  On 11 December 2013 the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court upheld the applicant\u2019s conviction, but reduced his sentence to nine and a half years\u2019 imprisonment. In setting the sentence the court took into account that the proceedings before it had included a period of inactivity of more than one year and thus had lasted for unreasonably long time. 16.  On 29 October 2014 the Supreme Court with a final decision dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law. 17.  As submitted by the Government, on 7 June 2010 the Internal Security Office instituted an internal inquiry. It requested the applicant\u2019s medical records from Riga Central Prison. On 18 June 2010 the Internal Security Office, referring to the complaint lodged by the applicant\u2019s mother (see paragraph 8 above), sent a copy of the file to the Riga regional division of the State Police for it to decide on the lawfulness of the actions of its employees. The Internal Security Office stated that the file did not indicate that the escort officers had committed a criminal offence. 18.  On 28 June 2010 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Internal Security Office regarding his alleged ill-treatment, stating that he would be able to identify the alleged perpetrators. The Internal Security Office sent the complaint to the Riga regional division of the State Police. 19.  On 3 August 2010 the Riga regional division of the State Police, terminated the internal inquiry. It noted that according to the medical documentation concerning the applicant provided by Riga Central Prison the applicant\u2019s state of health on 26 May 2010 had been satisfactory. He had had several wounds on his lower legs covered by scabs; wounds on the right hand covered by scabs, caused by the use of handcuffs; a haematoma four centimetres in diameter on his left forearm; and a haematoma six centimetres in diameter \u201cin the phase of absorption\u201d on the right side. The Riga regional division of the State Police noted the injuries found on V.P. At the same time, there had been no visible injuries found on P.V. or F.\u010c. According to explanations (paskaidrojumi) obtained from sixteen officers, neither the applicant nor his co-accused had been assaulted. The Riga regional division of the State Police concluded that the information gathered did not indicate that the officers had committed a disciplinary offence. It returned the file to the Internal Security Office. 20.  On 11 August 2010 the Internal Security Office refused to institute criminal proceedings in view of the fact that the constituent elements of the offence of \u201cexceeding official authority\u201d under section 317(2) of the Criminal Law (Krimin\u0101llikums) were lacking in the officers\u2019 actions. The applicant\u2019s mother appealed against this decision. 21.  On 26 August 2010 the prosecution service found that the Internal Security Office had based the impugned decision on an inquiry conducted by another institution of the State Police and medical documentation provided by Riga Central Prison. It was necessary to question the applicant and his co-accused regarding the circumstances of their transportation and to find out whether any of the employees of Riga Central Prison had seen injuries on them prior to and after their transportation and whether any of the employees had received any complaints from them in this regard. It was also necessary to find out whether between 20 and 25 May 2010 or earlier the applicant or his co-accused had been involved in any kind of conflict in the prison as a result of which they could have sustained the injuries. The prosecution service referred the case back to the Internal Security Office. 22.  In reply to a request from the Internal Security Office, on 22 October 2010 Riga Central Prison provided information that prison employees who had between 20 and 25 May 2010 searched (p\u0101rmekl\u0113t) the applicant and his co-accused each time prior to and after their being transported had not seen any injuries on them. The applicant and his co-accused had not made any complaints. There were no records showing that between 1 and 26 May 2010 they had been involved in any conflicts in the prison. On 5 November 2010 the Internal Security Office obtained explanations from the applicant and his co-accused, who maintained that the escort officers had assaulted them. As regards the daily physical security checks that they had undergone in the prison, they stated that prison employees had not asked them to undress. Therefore their injuries had remained undetected. 23.  On 10 November 2010 the Internal Security Office again refused to institute criminal proceedings, stating that the information gathered during the additional inquiry did not indicate that the officers had committed any offence under section 317(2) of the Criminal Law. The applicant\u2019s mother appealed against this decision. 24.  On 17 December 2010 the prosecution service quashed the decision as it had been based on an incomplete inquiry. It instructed the Internal Security Office to question the persons with whom the applicant and his co\u2011accused had shared cells between 20 and 25 May 2010 and to obtain information regarding breaks during the trial days on which the applicant and his co-accused had allegedly been assaulted. It was also necessary to question further the escort officers. 25.  On 29 November 2011 the Internal Security Office obtained information from Riga Central Prison regarding the applicant\u2019s and his co\u2011accused\u2019s cellmates. In December 2011 and January 2012 it took explanations from them. According to the applicant\u2019s cellmate, A.D., the applicant had told him that the escort officers had assaulted him and his co\u2011accused. He had shown him marks left by the beatings. It was difficult for A.D. to recall details as a long time had passed. Between 19 and 30 January 2012 the Internal Security Office questioned the escort officers, who stated that they had not assaulted the applicant or his co-accused. 26.  On 31 January 2012, for the third time, the Internal Security Office refused to institute criminal proceedings, stating that the information gathered during the additional inquiry did not indicate that the officers had committed any offence under section 317(2) of the Criminal Law. The applicant\u2019s mother appealed against this decision. 27.  On 22 February 2012 the prosecution service quashed the decision. It considered that the Internal Security Office had not clarified the contradictions between the statements of the applicant and his co-accused on the one hand, and the statements of the escort officers on the other hand, and the circumstances in which the applicant and V.P. had obtained the injuries established on 26 May 2010. In view of the information gathered during the internal inquiry it was possible that above-mentioned offence under section 317(2) of the Criminal Law had been committed. Accordingly, the prosecution service instituted criminal proceedings and returned the file to the Internal Security Office for further investigation. On 23 February 2012 the prosecution service informed the applicant\u2019s mother that the criminal proceedings had been instituted. 28.  Between 29 February and 21 March 2012 the Internal Security Office questioned as witnesses fifteen escort officers, who gave largely the same statements. They had not beaten the applicant or his co-accused. They explained that officers wore belts which they never removed because handcuffs, truncheon, gun, pepper spray and gun belt were attached to them. They could not give more detailed statements as a long time had passed since the events. One escort officer, M.S., who was questioned as a witness on 11 April 2012, stated that he had seen bruises on the applicant and his co-accused during their personal search in the court building. M.S. had thought that they had been beaten in the prison. The escort officers had not assaulted them. 29.  On 20 March 2012 an inspector of the Internal Security Office questioned one of the applicant\u2019s co-accused, V.P., as a witness. 30.  V.P. stated that on the first trial day the escort officers had made him perform push-ups and a \u201cduck walk\u201d, during which two escort officers had hit him on his back, abdomen, legs and chest with their legs, fists, a belt and truncheons. The escort officers had also beaten the applicant, who had been next to him. The officers had placed V.P. in a holding cell, and after some time they had escorted him to the court room. 31.  P.V. and F.\u010c., the applicant\u2019s co-accused, stated that on the second trial day the escort officers had made them perform push-ups and a \u201cduck walk\u201d. While they had been performing the exercises the escort officers had beaten them. P.V. had been hit during a break by two escort officers with a black belt on his back ten to twelve times. F.\u010c. had been hit by one escort officer on his back and legs approximately ten times. He had also been hit on his buttocks with a belt twenty to thirty times. 32.  P.V. had heard the applicant screaming. On the way back to the prison the applicant had told P.V. that he had been beaten; later, in the prison, he had shown him two bruises on his chest. After the occurrence of the alleged beating had been raised during the trial P.V. had been examined by a prison doctor. He had had no injuries. 33.  V.P., P.V. and F.\u010c. stated that they would not be able to identify the officers who had beaten them. They could not recall the events in detail. They did not wish to be declared victims in the proceedings. 34.  On 3 April 2012 the applicant was questioned as a witness. He stated that on the trial days in the basement of the court building the escort officers had made him perform different exercises, such as a wall-sit exercise, push\u2011ups and a \u201cduck walk\u201d. While he had been performing the exercises, the escort officers had beaten him. He further stated that the escort officers had beaten him on different parts of the body. They had also hit him with a belt. On 7 June 2012 the inspector presented photographs of the escort officers to the applicant for the purposes of identification. He could not identify the officers who had allegedly assaulted him. 35.  As submitted by the Government, on 2 May 2012 the Riga Regional Court confirmed that the court building premises were equipped with a video surveillance system. However, they stated that video recordings were stored for two to three months and then erased. 36.  On 3 May 2012 the Internal Security Office requested an expert medical report.\nIn respect of V.P., P.V. and F.\u010c. the report concluded that their medical documentation contained no records of injuries sustained over the time period in question. In respect of the applicant the report stated that the description of the injuries contained in the medical documentation, in the record of the applicant\u2019s questioning by the police, and in the hearings transcripts was incomplete. Therefore, it was not possible to determine the exact time at which the injuries had been sustained, how extensive they had been, and the degree of trauma or force that had been employed to inflict them. However, it could not be excluded that the injuries had appeared between 20 and 25 May 2010 in the circumstances indicated in the record of the applicant\u2019s questioning. While it was indicated in the record of the applicant\u2019s questioning and in the hearings transcripts that injuries had also been inflicted to the applicant\u2019s face, abdomen, buttocks, lower part of the back, back, and left side of the thorax, such injuries had not been identified in the medical examination of 26 May 2010. 37.  On 18 May 2012 the Internal Security Office questioned P.V.\u2019s former cellmate, V.A., who stated that he had seen red patches on P.V.\u2019s back. P.V. had told him that the escort officers had beaten him in the basement of the court building; they had also beaten the applicant. According to V.A. this had happened prior to 5 May 2010. V.A. had heard that the applicant had also been beaten in the prison. 38.  On 20 July 2012 the Internal Security Office terminated the criminal proceedings on the grounds that the elements of the offence had not been made out. There was no irrefutable evidence that the escort officers had inflicted the injuries as alleged. According to the expert report, the injuries had not been recorded in the medical documentation precisely. The persons involved in the criminal proceedings had given contradictory accounts of the circumstances in which the injuries had been inflicted. 39.  On 6 August 2012 the applicant\u2019s mother lodged an appeal with the prosecution service against the decision to terminate the criminal proceedings, the applicant having on 21 October 2011 granted her power of attorney (univers\u0101lpilnvara) to take any action concerning his property. This included the right to represent the applicant before the police, the courts and other institutions in relation to all rights vested in him as a victim. Prior to the authorisation she had represented the applicant on the grounds of his being a minor. In the wording of the appeal the applicant\u2019s mother indicated that she was acting on behalf of the applicant. 40.  She complained of deficiencies in the criminal investigation which had precluded obtaining important information. Namely, the presentation of photographs to the applicant for the purpose of identifying the alleged perpetrators had been organised in a manner intended to impede justice \u2011 while he had been shown the small black-and-white frontal photographs he had been surrounded by seven escort officers in an effort to intimidate him. She asked that the investigating authorities organise an identity parade for the applicant and his co-accused and question the applicant\u2019s co-accused regarding the events in question. 41.  On 6 September 2012 a prosecutor dismissed her appeal, noting that during the presentation of photographs the applicant had been assisted by his lawyer. They had not made any remarks or requests as regards this procedure. The investigating authorities had established that no force had been used against the applicant and his co-accused and that no threats had been made. From the moment at which the trial had started the Ombudsman had paid particular attention to the applicant and his co-accused. All of the escort officers had been questioned as witnesses. They had had no interest in the outcome of the trial. Therefore, there had been no reason to doubt their account of the events. The applicant\u2019s co-accused had also been questioned and their evidence assessed. There was no need to take any further investigative steps as the constituent elements of the offence under section 317(2) of the Criminal Law were lacking in the officers\u2019 actions. The prosecutor indicated that her decision was amenable to appeal before a higher prosecutor. 42.  On 22 September 2012 the applicant\u2019s mother appealed against the aforementioned decision before a higher prosecutor. She indicated that she was acting on behalf of the applicant. In addition to the issues raised previously she complained that a long time had passed before criminal proceedings had been instituted. She considered that it had been a deliberate delay to hide any traces of assault. Furthermore, during the internal inquiry the Internal Security Office had \u201cinterviewed\u201d the applicant and the co\u2011accused, who had been minors at the relevant time, in the absence of a lawyer or a representative. After those \u201cinterviews\u201d the co-accused had all refused to testify. 43.  On 24 October 2012 a higher prosecutor dismissed the applicant\u2019s mother\u2019s appeal. He upheld the findings of the lower prosecutor \u2013 the decision to terminate the criminal proceedings had been lawful as the constituent elements of the offence had been missing. At the same time, he noted that the applicant had not been declared a victim in the criminal proceedings and hence could not be represented by another person. Furthermore, at the time when the criminal proceedings had been instituted he had reached the age of majority. The higher prosecutor indicated that the applicant\u2019s mother did not have the right to complain about the decision to terminate the criminal proceedings and that it had been wrong for the lower prosecutor to examine her complaint on the merits. That being said, the higher prosecutor also examined her complaint on the merits for the reason of legal certainty as the lower prosecutor had done so. He concluded by indicating that the applicant\u2019s mother could not lodge further complaints about the decision to terminate the criminal proceedings. 44.  On 9 November 2012 the applicant lodged an appeal with the prosecution service against the aforementioned decision. He stated that his mother had been authorised to lodge complaints in his name under the power of attorney that he had granted her on 21 October 2011. He further noted that the assessment of the flaws in the proceedings had been superficial and had not properly addressed the points raised by his mother. He emphasised that no explanation had been given for the injuries that he had sustained while in custody or for the delay in the institution of the investigation and the superficial manner in which it had been conducted. He argued that it might have been that the State, acting through its agents, had been willing to cover-up his assault. 45.  On 12 December 2012 a chief prosecutor responded that the applicant\u2019s procedural status was that of a witness and that, unlike victims, witnesses had no right to authorise other persons to exercise their procedural rights on their behalf. Furthermore, the applicant himself did not have a right to challenge the response that had been given to his mother, as he was not the addressee of this letter sent to her. Lastly, because he had not been the one who had lodged the initial appeals, the applicant had missed the time-limit for lodging an appeal against the decision of 20 July 2012 terminating the criminal proceedings. Accordingly, the applicant\u2019s appeal was not examined. The applicant was informed of the fact that in accordance with domestic law this decision was not amenable to appeal. 46.  On 28 July 2011 the applicant complained to the Ombudsman, who then instituted an inquiry and requested information from Riga Central Prison, the State Centre for Forensic Medical Examination (Valsts tiesu medic\u012bnas ekspert\u012bzes centrs) and the Internal Security Office. 47.  On 16 May 2012 the Ombudsman delivered a report in which he observed that, as the criminal investigation was still ongoing, it would be premature to assess the proceedings as a whole. However, with regard to the internal inquiry, the Ombudsman expressed concerns regarding the institutional independence of the Internal Security Office when analysing offences allegedly committed by the police officers. 48.  Furthermore, the internal inquiry had lasted one year and seven months \u2013 beyond a reasonable time-limit. The inquiry had not been carried out with the requisite diligence, as exemplified by the repeated quashing of decisions not to institute criminal proceedings. The Ombudsman expressed concerns that flaws in the internal inquiry might render it impossible to establish whether the applicant\u2019s injuries had been inflicted by the police officers. Thus, the internal inquiry undertaken by the State Police could not be regarded as constituting an effective remedy within the meaning of Article 13 of the Convention. Nonetheless, the Ombudsman considered that it would be premature to pronounce on a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.", "references": ["2", "4", "6", "8", "5", "7", "0", "3", "9", "No Label", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}